&' 
 
BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME 
 FROM THE 
 
 SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 
 m^ntu ^* Sage 
 
 X891 
 
 ..Aixz^^. _..I^- ^Z^f/?-^- 
 
Cornell University Library 
 arV1084 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus, and *he struggle of P 
 
 3 1924 031 170 313 
 olin,anx 
 
 ill 
 
gg \4 Cornell University 
 
 flStSlf I.J T -1 
 
 f Library 
 
 The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924031170313 
 
Iberoes of tbe IRations. 
 
 PER VOLUME, CLOTH, $1.50. HALF MOROCCO, $1.75. 
 
 I. — Nelson, and the Naval Supremacy of England. 
 
 By W. Clark Russell, author of " The Wreck of 
 
 the Grosvenor," etc. 
 II. — Gustavus Adolphus, and the Struggle of Protest- 
 antism for Existence. By C. R. L. Fletcher, 
 
 M.A., late Fellow of AH Souls College, Oxford. 
 III.— Pericles, and the Golden Age of Athens. By 
 
 Evelyn Abbott, M.A., Fellow of Balliol College, 
 
 Oxford. 
 IV. — Theodoric the Goth, the Barbarian Champion of 
 
 Civilization. By Thomas Hodgkin, author of 
 
 "Italy and Her Invaders," etc. 
 v. — Sir Philip Sidney : Type of English Chivalry. 
 
 By H. R. Fox Bourne. 
 VI. — Julius Caesar, and the Organization of the Roman 
 
 Empire. By Warde Fowler, M.A., Fellow of 
 
 Lincoln College, Oxford. 
 
 (For titles of volumes next to appear and for further details 
 »f this Series see prospectus at end of volume.) 
 
 P. PUTNAM'S SONS, Publishers, 
 
 NEW YORK AND LONDON 
 
Ibetoes of tbe IRattong 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 Evclign BbtJOtt, fln.B. 
 
 7HLLOW OF BALLIOL. COLLEGE, OXFORD 
 
 fACTA DUCia VIVENT, OPEROBAQUE 
 
 GLORIA RERUM. OVID, IH LIVIAM, 2Bi. 
 
 THE HERO'S DEEDS AND HARD-WON 
 FAME SHALL LIVE. 
 
 GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS 
 
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS II 
 
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS 
 
 AND 
 
 THE STRUGGLE OF PROTESTANTISM 
 FOR EXISTENCE 
 
 C. R. L. gLETCHER, M.A. 
 
 LATE FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE, OXFORD 
 
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
 
 ,',„„T^ LONDON 
 
 NEW YORK BEDFOED STKEKT, STKAND 
 
 ,7 WEST TWENTV-THIED STREET 24 BEDFORD S 
 
 Efet SniAtiboihtt f less 
 
 r M. 
 
A. 
 
 771^7 
 
 COPYRIGHT 1890 BY 
 
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
 
 Entered at Stationers' Hall, London 
 BY G, P. Putnam's Sons 
 
 tCbe fenfcftetbocfier ^tese, "new ^vft 
 
 Electrotyped, Printed, and Bound by 
 G. P. Putnam's Sons 
 
^HE following account of the life 
 of King Gustavus Adolphus, the 
 national hero of Sweden, de- 
 mands little preface. It makes 
 no pretensions to be based upon 
 iginal research, and I cannot claim 
 have read even all the modern 
 authorities on the subject. My knowl- 
 edge of the Swedish language is by no 
 means independent of the assistance of 
 a dictionary, nor can I hope to have escaped that 
 tendency to partiality for which the natural fascina- 
 tion of such a subject is the only excuse. The work 
 was undertaken, and the material partly gathered, 
 before I was aware that it was to have the honour of 
 forming one of a series of biographies. The diffi- 
 culty of accommodating its proportions to that 
 object has not been inconsiderable. I am on the one 
 hand debarred from giving the references which in 
 many places I should have desired to give, and on 
 the other hand obliged to include accounts of 
 many things of which I had made no special study. 
 The military history of the Thirty Years' War is in 
 itself a case in point. No satisfactory monograph 
 on the subject exists, and I have often been obliged 
 
vi Preface, 
 
 to confess myself at fault in grasping the exact 
 meaning of military terms, and the exact effect of 
 manoeuvres, in an art of which even in its modern 
 shape I know nothing. Every one in the seven- 
 teenth century was a bit of a soldier, and the books 
 which were written at the time presuppose in their 
 readers a considerable knowledge of the practice of 
 arms. In the library of the immortal Captain Miles 
 Standish, the Swedish Intelligencer stood side by 
 side with the Bible. But the times have so far 
 changed, that I am able to plead that I am proba- 
 bly not much more ignorant of the art of war than 
 the majority of my readers are likely to be. 
 
 The contemporary literature of the Thirty Years' 
 War was very voluminous and is still very undi- 
 gested. Every variety of dates, figures, and num- 
 bers, every variety of judgment upon the principal 
 characters engaged, makes a little task like mine 
 extremely bewildering. No great history of the 
 period as a whole has as yet been written. Pro- 
 fessor Anton Gindely's larger work treats, so far as. 
 it has at present gone, only of the very early years 
 of the struggle. He has indeed published a 
 smaller school-book on the whole subject, which 
 has been translated into English, but this is avow- 
 edly only tentative, and he confesses that he has 
 not explored the archives of Stockholm. But in 
 those archives, if anywhere, it is probable that the 
 true Gustavus Adolphus is to be found. 
 
 On the other hand, almost every separate char- 
 acter and every separate incident in the war has 
 had one, if not many historians. For instance, I 
 
Preface. vH 
 
 have come across, in one place and another, 
 seventeen different accounts of the Battle of Lut- 
 zen. The subject of the present biography has 
 been particularly fortunate, or unfortunate, in this 
 respect, Gustavus Adolphus has been attacked and 
 defended any time these two hundred and fifty- 
 eight years. His character has undergone, in the 
 so-called impartial verdict of history, even more 
 transformation than that of Oliver Cromwell : he has 
 been deified as a hero ; with no less warmth he has 
 been denounced as a hypocrite. To the school of 
 Gfrorer, to Forster and the biographers of Wallen- 
 stein, he came into Germany as a robber. What 
 claim have I to say that the later German his- 
 torians, such as Droysen, are justified in their 
 vindication of his character, even though Ranke has 
 lent his great name to the view that the life-work 
 of the King was essentially the defence of the 
 German Protestants and the restraint of the ambi- 
 tion of the House of Hapsburg, as the only real 
 'safeguard for the national independence of Sweden ? 
 The only answer I can make to this question is 
 that, in the present state of historical knowledge, a 
 man who has no pretensions to be a student of 
 archives can but study the result of the researches 
 made by others and form his conclusions accord- 
 ingly. I am quite aware that this is not a per- 
 fectly safe guide, for I believe that one can prove 
 almost anything from a judicious use of original 
 documents, and that in a subject which possesses 
 such a completely European interest as the Thirty 
 Years' War, documents may at any moment turn up 
 
viii Preface. 
 
 which may falsify all the conclusions of previous 
 writers. Every Court in Europe probably possesses 
 some archives which have reference to it, and the 
 field of research has been by no means exploited. 
 
 I must therefore at once avow tljat my main 
 guides have been G. Droysen's " Gustav Adolf " 
 (Leipzig, 1869), and Geijer's " Sveriges Historia," 
 the classic work upon the subject, which has been 
 translated into German. Geijer is especially valua- 
 ble, because so large a portion of his history of the 
 German campaigns is made up of letters from Gus- 
 tavus himself, taken from the Swedish archives, 
 which, in many-places, he quotes in extenso. He, as 
 it were, lets the King tell his own tale. A large 
 proportion of these letters were written to John 
 Casimir, the Regent of Sweden, who had married 
 the King's sister Catherine, and who became the 
 father of King Charles X., and ancestor^f the later 
 Vasa Kings. Next in importance comes a volume 
 of letters of the King to his Marshal, General Knip- 
 hausen, written during the campaign of 1630-1-2, 
 and published at Groningen, in Holland, by H. O. 
 Feith, in i860. Of this same description is a little 
 volume of the King's miscellaneous letters and 
 writings (including the correspondence of Gustavus 
 with his first sweetheart, Ebba Brahe), published at 
 Stockholm, in 1861, under the title of " Konung 
 Gustav Adolfs Skrifter." 
 
 I have found little difficulty in the use of the 
 above-mentioned books, but it is quite another mat- 
 ter with the mass of contemporary pamphlets, 
 broadsheets, pictures, caricatures, and letters, to 
 
Preface. ix 
 
 which the King's extraordinary success in Germany- 
 gave rise. Some part of the ground is cleared by 
 the fact that Professor Droysen has proved con- 
 clusively that the three most important contemporary 
 accounts, the " Arma Suecica" of Arlanibaeus (Frank- 
 fort, 1631), the "Inventarium Sueciae " of Godo- 
 fredus (Frankfort, 1632), and the "Theatrum 
 Europaeum " of Ab'elinus, which did not appear in 
 its final shape until 1679, were substantially the 
 work of the same hand, namely, of Abelinus himself. 
 The latter was evidently intended to be the life- 
 work of the author ; it is a wonderful monument of 
 research and industry, and is enriched with numer- 
 ous plates, two of which adorn the present volume. 
 Next in order, of the same class, comes the " Swedish 
 Intelligencer," printed for a London bookseller in 
 successive instalments from the year 1632 to 1637. 
 It professes to be, and one sees no reason to doubt 
 the fact, compiled from a series of letters written by 
 several persons from the actual theatre of the 
 conflict — that is to say, it may be called entirely 
 first-hand evidence, although probably not derived 
 from any persons who would be likely to be in the 
 interior secrets of the diplomatic and military move- 
 ments. It is enriched with numerous plates. Of the 
 value of the work of Colonel Robert Monro, an 
 officer who served in the Scotch Brigade of Gus- 
 tavus's army, I have spoken in the text. In England 
 also was brought out " Swedish Discipline, Religious, 
 Civil, and Military," a very interesting tract (1632), 
 of ninety pages, which includes the famous articles 
 of war and a pay-list of the Swedish army. 
 
X Preface. 
 
 As first-hand evidence, too, may be reckoned the 
 work of Gualdo Priorato, a Venetian gentleman who 
 had served under Maurice of Nassau, then under 
 Gustavus, Wallenstein, Horn, and Bernard, respec- 
 tively. He may at least be considered as having 
 seen both sides of the struggle, but with the accu- 
 racy for which his nation was famous, he gives no 
 account of anything which he did not actually see, 
 and the disappointing thing about his book is that 
 he seems to have seen very little. As a foreigner 
 and a soldier of fortune, he was not perhaps ad- 
 mitted to much of the secrets of either side. This 
 is the book, however, in which Frederick the Great 
 probably read up his Thirty Years' War campaigns, 
 for it was translated into French by one Franche- 
 ville, and published at Berlin in 1772, the new 
 edition being enriched with movable plans of the 
 principal battles, "compiled on the spot by an 
 engineer officer in the Prussian service." 
 
 Every campaign, however, and every event in 
 each campaign, has, as I have said, a special litera- 
 ture of its own. Much of this is known to me only 
 by name, though the names of many of the tracts 
 are extremely expressive, as, for instance, the 
 " Hansische Wecker," " Nun geht's mit Gott ins 
 Bayern," etc. I have, however, endeavoured to 
 read all of those, on which I could lay hands either 
 in the British Museum or the Bodleian Library, 
 which have reference to the two great battle-fields 
 of Breitenfeld and Liitzen, although without arriving 
 at any very clear notions of the disposition of this 
 second battle. 
 
Preface. xi 
 
 Of modern works besides those already re- 
 ferred to, I have derived considerable help, with 
 regard to the thorny subject of military history, 
 from a little Belgian book edited by MM. Merzbach 
 and Falk, and entitled "Campagnes de Gustave 
 Adolphe " (Brussels, 1887), one of a series of sketches 
 of European warfare now in progress. The old 
 German General von Billow's " Gustav Adolf's 
 Feldzug in Deutschland," 1808, is written rather 
 from the point of view of a military theorist than of 
 an historian. For the negotiations between the 
 King and Wallenstein, and those between the King 
 and the Protestant princes in the winter of 163 1-2, 
 the thirty-fifth volume of the " Preussische Staats- 
 archiv," contributes valuable material which I have 
 done my best to use carefully. Harte's " Life of 
 Gustavus Adolphus " (London, 1759) is a ponderous 
 and painstaking work of the Robertsonian school, 
 and contains a valuable diary or diurnal of the 
 King's campaigns. The works of the Rev. B. 
 Chapman (London, 1856) and Consul Stevens (Lon- 
 do;i, 1885) are spirited and picturesque biographies, 
 especially the former, though it has the disadvantage 
 of having appeared prior to Droysen's researches. 
 I cannot, however, claim to have made much use 
 of the three last-mentioned works. To the very 
 voluminous modern Swedish life of Gustavus, 
 by Abraham Cronholm, I have made frequent 
 reference, but only upon doubtful points. I cannot 
 claim to have read it through. Herr Weibull's, the 
 latest Swedish life (Stockholm, 1884), I have 
 studied carefully, and have derived much valuable 
 
xii Preface. 
 
 side information therefrom, as well as the right, by 
 the extreme courtesy of its editor, Herr Bukowski, 
 to make use of some of the illustrations to that work. 
 
 I have unfortunately not had the opportunity of 
 travelling over all the ground, even of the German 
 campaign, with this special object in view, and the 
 Prussian and Polish " terrain " is completely un- 
 known to me. I have, however, seen at one time 
 or another most of the places described in the 
 German and some of those in the Swedish part 
 of the book ; and about two years ago I was able 
 to make some special study of the Pomeranian 
 campaign on the spot. 
 
 With regard to the spelling of the proper names, 
 I am aware that I shall be severely taken to task for 
 " arbitrariness," but it is a choice between arbitrari- 
 ness and pedantry, and I prefer to be found guilty 
 on the former charge. There are historians who 
 write Lorraine Lothringen, and who would shiver 
 at the very name of Charlemagne ; there is every- 
 thing to be said for their view, but do they always 
 write Roma and Firenze ? There is another school, 
 which professes to adopt universally the French 
 spelling wherever there is no English equivalent, 
 but which is in practice equally illogical. I am not 
 likely to find favour with either of these, for the 
 only rule, by which I have thought myself at lib- 
 erty to be bound, is the rule of common practice 
 among educated Englishmen. Thus I maintain 
 that Alsace has become an English word to exjress 
 the country lying between the Vosges and the 
 Rhine ; Cologne, to express the city of " four and 
 
Preface. xiii 
 
 seventy stenches " ; and that to use these terms 
 does not in the least stamp a man as an upholder of 
 any anti-nationalist theories with regard to the Rhine 
 frontier. But I cannot give up Mainz and Trier 
 for Mayence and Treves. While refusing to call 
 my hero Gustav Adolf, Gothenburg Goteborg, 
 Munich Miinchen, or Vienna Wien, I hold myself 
 quite free to speak of Regensburg, Speyer, and 
 Kalmar. 
 
 The dates of the days of the month in this book 
 are given in the old style, but it has been thought 
 convenient to give the years according to the new 
 style. Ten days must, therefore, it is almost needless 
 to say, be added to each date to bring it into accord 
 with modern chronology. 
 
 My thanks for assistance in my little work are 
 due first to my father, who most carefully corrected 
 the whole, and pointed out numerous faults of 
 English ; to Mr. Evelyn Abbott, of Balliol College, 
 for many valuable hints ; and to my most kind 
 friend, Mr. Alexander Titz, of Stockholm, for his 
 assistance with the illustrations, and for his unceas- 
 ing attentions during my stay in Sweden. Lastly, 
 to the Rev. Arthur Johnson, of All Souls, and Mr. 
 Richard Lodge, of Brasenose College, to whose 
 advice, though not directly in connection with this 
 book, I owe whatever interest in History I may 
 possess. 
 
 Oxford, January, 1890. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 p^ I. INTRODUCTORY 1 
 
 I II. — THE BEGINNINGS OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS . 1 6 
 
 VJII. — OPENING YEARS OF THE REIGN OF GUSTAVUS, 38 
 IV. — THE BEGINNING OF THE THIRTY YEARS* 
 
 WAR 51 
 
 V. — FOREIGN HELP TO GERMANY . . . 70 
 
 VI. — GUST AVUS'S PREPARATIONS . ... 86 
 
 VII. THE ARMY OF GUSTAVUS IIO I 
 
 VIII. THE CAMPAIGN IN POMERANIA AND MECK- 
 LENBURG 131 
 
 IX. — WHICH WAY ? 145 
 
 X.— THE CRITICAL TIME 169 
 
 XI. BREITENFELD . . . . . .179 
 
 XII. — FORWARDS 197 
 
 XIII. DIPLOMACY 221 
 
 XIV. BAVARIA 238 
 
 XV. — NUREMBERG 256 
 
 XVI. LiJTZEN 269 
 
 EPILOGUE 289 
 
 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VII. THE ARTICLES 
 
 OF WAR 299 I 
 
 INDEX 3°^ 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 GUSTAVus ADOLPHUS 11 Frontispiece 
 
 PEDIGREE OF THE HOUSE OF VASA IN THE i6tH 
 
 AND 17TH CENTURIES xix 
 
 SEAL OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS II I 
 
 VAXHOLM 16 
 
 HELSINGBORG 18 
 
 JOHN SKYTTE 22 
 
 THE BASIN OF THE BALTIC IN THE 17TH CENTURY . 28 
 
 RIKSTALER — 1615 37 
 
 REVAL 38 
 
 ELFSBORG 42 
 
 MEDAL (riGa) OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS . . . 50 
 MEDAL OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS's CORONATION — 
 
 1617 50 
 
 EMPEROR FERDINAND II 52 
 
 GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS ENTERS ELBING 1 626 . . 64 
 
 CHRISTIAN IV. OF DENMARK 70 
 
 STRALSUND 84 
 
 JOHN CASIMIR 86 
 
 JEAN ARMAND DU PLESSIS, CARDINAL AND DUKE 
 
 OF RICHEtlEU 92 
 
 JOHN GEORGE 1 104 
 
 GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS II. (fULL FIGURE IN AR- 
 
 mor) IIO 
 
 xvii 
 
XVlll 
 
 Illustrations. 
 
 GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS II. — 1 63 2 
 
 MAGDEBURG AT THE TIME OF THE SIEGE BY TILLY 
 
 TILLY 
 
 GUSTAVUS'S CAMP AT WERBEN 
 
 MINNESPINNING 
 
 SWEDISH ORDER OF BATTLE . 
 
 AXEL OXENSTIERN, CHANCELLOR OF SWEDEN 
 
 MAXIMILIAN OF BAVARIA 
 
 THE SWEDISH POSITION AT NUREMBURG . 
 
 ALBERT VON WALLENSTEIN, DUKE OF FRIEDLAND 
 AND MECKLENBURG 
 
 GRAVE OF GUSTAVUS IN RIDDARHOLM CHURCH 
 
 MINNESPINNING, WITH DEATH OF GUSTAVUS ADOL- 
 PHUS 
 
 ROUTE MAP OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS 
 
 PACK 
 I3O 
 
 166 
 
 178 
 187 
 
 222 
 238 
 260 
 
 262 
 288 
 
 298 
 316 
 
SEAL OF GUSTAVUS ADOL.PHUS II, 
 
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 HE period of the Reformation had pro- 
 duced two great changes in the history 
 of Europe. It had revolutionised re- 
 ligion and it had revolutionised commerce. Both 
 changes were the result of a previous revolution 
 in thought. It was not so much that men had not 
 dared to think in the Middle Ages — many of them 
 had, like Abelard and Wiclif, dared to attack the 
 prevalent system — but it was rather that men, as a 
 whole, had not taken the trouble to think, and few 
 indeed were the incentives to such trouble. With 
 the invention of printing it had, however, become 
 a great deal easier to think. Thought was, so to 
 speak, forced upon people, who at first would gladly 
 have avoided the trouble of it, but who soon found 
 
Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
 it a pleasure, an excitement, a moral necessity, and 
 then, as Ulrich von Hiitten said : " Men began 
 to awake and live." 
 
 The result of their awakening was that they 
 began to desire to provide better for their bodies 
 and better for their souls. It is rather characteristic 
 of the end of the Middle Ages that they should have 
 thought first of their bodies. It was all very well for 
 Erasmus to say : " First I shall buy Greek books, 
 and then clothes " ; but, in the first place, the ma- 
 jority of men were not as Erasmus ; and, in the 
 second place, Erasmus did not mean what he said. 
 But before any serious attack had been made upon 
 the dominant form of Christianity, serious attacks 
 had been made upon the dominant system of trade 
 and commerce. That there was an open-sea route 
 to the Indies had long been an idea of the Portu- 
 guese navigators, who crept stealthily along the 
 coast of Africa year after year, in search of the Cape 
 of Good Hope. Columbus undertook his western 
 voyage with the same idea, and called the naked 
 Hispaniolans, upon whom he lighted, Indians. But 
 what he went to seek he found not. The prize fell to 
 the Portuguese, although it was not until many wars 
 had been fought with the natives on the coasts of 
 Malabar that they began to reap the fruit of their ad- 
 ventures. About the year 1 503, merchants from Lis- 
 bon began to appear in the markets at Antwerp and 
 Bruges, offering for sale cargoes of sea-borne spices 
 at about one tenth of the price at which the same 
 commodity, land-borne by the old Venetian trade 
 route from the East, had previously been offered. 
 
Introductory. 
 
 And why, it may be said, should a fall in spices 
 affect the history of the world in general, and of 
 Sweden in particular ? Because spice was a prime 
 necessary of life in the days when there were no 
 green vegetables. And because the spice trade 
 had become oceanic, all commerce became oceanic 
 too. And the nations that lived upon the ocean 
 would be the inheritors of the riches of the world. 
 The old trade routes would be and were destroyed. 
 The mighty organisation, which had brought the 
 East and the West and the North, however feebly 
 and expensively, together, whose pivot had been 
 the Flemish towns, and whose two wings had 
 stretched up the Mediterranean to Venice and Al- 
 exandria, and up the Baltic to Dantzic and Novgo- 
 rod ; — that was to fall. And not merely to fall, but 
 to tumble down in sudden collapse. Venice, and 
 Bruges the Venice of the North, — on hantoient 
 toutes les nations dtrangires, — soon retained but 
 shadows of their former importance. The haughty 
 spirit of the former, and her wars against the Turks, 
 enabled her to disguise the fact for three centuries. 
 But these centuries were a lingering agony. 
 
 And the Northern wing of this great European 
 machine, the Hanseatic League, decayed as rapidly. 
 It is with this wing that we are more immediately 
 concerned. The great German cities ranged along 
 the Baltic coast, or in the Northern Interior of Ger- 
 many, had elaborated a system of territorial as well 
 as commercial dominion over the Baltic, which had 
 absolutely precluded for a time the normal develop- 
 ment of the Scandinavian kingdoms. Their business 
 
Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
 had been that of the carriers of northern Europe ; 
 the Scandinavian kingdoms lay directly across their 
 path. The temporary union of those three king- 
 doms, under Queen Margaret of Denmark, at the 
 end of the fourteenth century, had been the first 
 blow to the Baltic supremacy of the Hansa. The 
 rupture of this union by Gustavus Vasa seemed for 
 a moment to put the game in their hands again. 
 But it was too late. The date of that rupture was 
 the third decade of the sixteenth century, and the 
 change had already begun. The Hansa was out of 
 the race before Sweden entered it. Yet the Baltic 
 commerce was worth having, and the new Swedish 
 dynasty was well aware of the fact. That "Domini- 
 um Maris Baltici," about which we read so much in 
 all contemporary records, was a prize worth strug- 
 gling for ; it meant the dominion over the coasts of 
 the Baltic as well as its commerce. Now the first 
 point we have to bear in mind is, that the period of 
 Sweden's greatness is precisely the period in which 
 this question of the "Dominium Maris Baltici" is 
 the question of Northern politics. I shall hope to 
 shew that if this was not the mainspring of the life- 
 work of Gustavus Adolphus, it was eclipsed, and 
 eclipsed pro hac vice only, by his duty to the Prot- 
 estant faith. 
 
 The Protestant faith ; that was the other conquest 
 of the age. That was the conquest which England 
 and Sweden in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen- 
 turies were called upon to defend against a wave 
 of reaction. We may make what fine distinctions, 
 theological and other, that we will ; we may ac- 
 
Introductory. 
 
 cuse and with justice, Protestant persecutors of 
 being very nearly as bad as Catholic, and with far 
 less excuse than they ; but to go back to what Mac- 
 chiavelli called the " effectual truth of things," the 
 fact remains that the spirit which animated Philip 
 II. and Alva, Ferdinand II. and Maximilian of 
 Bavaria, was but little different from the spirit 
 which animated the persecutors of our own Puritan 
 forefathers; whereas the spirit of the Pilgrim Fa- 
 thers was essentially one with the spirit of Gustavus 
 and of Cromwell. And on that side was Freedom ; 
 not as fully known as now ; the Goddess had hardly 
 
 yet 
 
 " Stepped down through town and field 
 To mingle with the human race," 
 
 but had only partly 
 
 " To men revealed 
 The brightness of her face." 
 
 Yet she was the same in essentials as she is to-day. 
 
 It would be interesting to speculate whether there 
 is or is not anything in the fact that Spain and 
 Portugal, the two nations who were first in the race 
 of the new commerce and discovery, were by that 
 fact in any way blinded to the contemporary revo- 
 lution in Thought. They rejected the Reformation 
 from the beginning, but they had perhaps their 
 hands too full to allow them to consider it. The 
 Northern nations, on the other hand, less occu- 
 pied at first with the commercial question, seem to 
 have owed their subsequent commercial success to 
 the spirit which the Reformation awoke in them. 
 
Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
 Now it is remarkable that Sweden and England, 
 who were to be the two champions of Protestantism, 
 had both accepted that form of faith more as a 
 matter of political necessity or convenience than 
 anything else. Gustavus Vasa, the founder of his 
 dynasty, was not a very religious man. He had de- 
 termined to make Sweden a Lutheran country for 
 two main reasons : first, because he wanted the 
 lands of the Church, both in order to enrich the 
 crown and also to attach the nobles to his cause ; 
 secondly, because, as he said, the " priests were all 
 unionists in Sweden " — that is, they all wished to 
 maintain the union of the three Scandinavian king- 
 doms which he had broken, and they were, there- 
 fore, irreconcilably hostile to his dynasty. 
 
 Three other great services were rendered to Swe- 
 den by Gustavus I. : (i) at the Diet of Westeras, in 
 1544, the hereditary character of the monarchy was 
 definitely declared. This was a great victory over 
 the nobles, who in nearly all the Northern and East- 
 ern Kingdoms of Europe — and in Sweden itself at 
 a later time — succeeded in erecting an oligarchy, 
 which oppressed the peasants and crippled the ac- 
 tivity of the State. (2) Again, by his consistent 
 favouring of the middle classes, and his conclusion 
 of commercial treaties with Russia, France, and the 
 Netherlands, he became the founder of Swedish 
 commerce, and dealt a serious blow at the Baltic 
 supremacy of the Hanseatic League. (3) And 
 lastly, he appears as the founder of that policy of 
 territorial aggression (toward the South and East), 
 which, however we may judge of its morality in this 
 
Introductory. 
 
 age of peace, was certainly looked upon then as the 
 prime duty of all Kings, and which in the case of 
 Sweden was the direct path toward the great part 
 which she was destined to play in the seventeenth 
 century. 
 
 His first enemy was Russia, a recently consoli- 
 dated State, already bordering on the half-Polish 
 province of Livonia and the Swedish province of 
 Finland ; already extending her flanks to the Cau- 
 casus and the Don on the south and to the White 
 Sea on the north.* The English Captain Chancel- 
 lor, attempting the N. E. passage in 1553, was 
 astonished to find himself on Russian ground at 
 Arkhangel ; a somewhat close commercial connec- 
 tion between England and Russia followed upon his 
 adventure, and soon afterwards Elizabeth founded 
 her " Muscovy Company." Thus Russia had her 
 interest in oceanic commerce, and it looked at one 
 time as if she might become successor to the Hansa 
 in the Baltic. But the wars of Ivan the Terrible 
 (1534-84) for Finland and Livonia were unsuccess- 
 
 * When I say that Russia was " extending " herself, it must alwayi 
 be borne in mind that, in pursuing this policy, she was only reassert- 
 ing her claim to the territories over which her half mythical hero St. 
 Vladimir had ruled in the Middle Ages. Poland had partitioned and 
 Sweden afterwards began partitioning Russia with infinitely less re- 
 gard to nationality than Russia herself shewed in the eighteenth 
 century under the Great Peter and the Great Catherine. Catherine 
 in 1772 was but rescuing Russians from a tyranny of five hundred 
 years ; Peter in 1721 but reclaimed provinces from Sweden which, 
 according to the strict theory of nationality, ought never to have be- 
 longed to her, and which never had, in fact, submitted kindly to her 
 rule. But few theories in practical politics have proved more provoca- 
 tive of present war and future illusion than the theory of nationalities. 
 
8 Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
 ful, and the chief interest which they possess for us 
 is that in 1561, the year after the death of Gustavus 
 I., his son Eric acquired for Sweden the province of 
 Esthonia, which appears to have previously fluctu- 
 ated between dependence on Denmark and on 
 Russia. This was the first of the so-called " Baltic 
 provinces " of Sweden ; herewith began the exclu- 
 sion of Russia from the " Dominium Maris Baltici." 
 But this possession brought Eric face to face with 
 Poland, a country which was disputing with Russia 
 the possession of Livonia. 
 
 Poland, under the last of the great Jaghellon line, 
 was already displaying the fatal tendency to anarchy 
 which at last devoured her. It must always be 
 remembered that the huge, unwieldy carcase, which 
 bears the name of Poland on any sixteenth-century 
 map, was in reality a conglomeration of conquered 
 provinces of at least as many different nationalities 
 as the Austrian Empire of our own day. 
 
 Poland turned for help to the King of Denmark, 
 in whom Eric, with keen insight, recognised the 
 most dangerous foe for Sweden. In 1 563 Eric con- 
 cluded peace with Russia, and the nations of the 
 North began to assume their natural relation to each 
 other. The Baltic question rapidly became an Eu- 
 ropean one. English sympathies were with Sweden 
 and Russia ; Spain and the Emperor as naturally 
 took the other side, and suggested to the King of 
 Denmark, Frederick II. (1559-1588), that he should 
 ask for the hand of Mary Stuart ; to counteract which 
 King Eric indulged in an elaborate flirtation with 
 Elizabeth. The powers of North Germany took 
 
Introductory. 
 
 sides in the war (1565), but the war itself produced 
 but little result. The able Eric displayed symptoms 
 of insanity and was extremely unpopular with the 
 Swedish nobles, and Denmark was as yet too power- 
 ful an enemy for Sweden to overthrow. In 1567 
 Eric was deposed by a revolution, the fruit of which 
 was reaped by his brother John. 
 
 When the great Gustavus I. was dying, and could 
 no longer speak, he made a sign that he wished to 
 write, and wrote half a sentence of warning to his 
 people : " Rather die a hundred times than aban- 
 don the Gospel. . . ." Then his hand failed, and he 
 dropped back dead. He was not, I have said, a par- 
 ticularly religious man, but he marked out the true 
 path for Sweden. Now in 1567 a certain reaction 
 set in : many of the nobles, who had felt the yoke of 
 Gustavus heavy and of Eric heavier, seemed ready to 
 drift back to Catholicism, and John's reign (1567- 
 1 590) was one of reaction in many ways. John never 
 openly went over to Catholicism, but he cast off all 
 the Lutheranism that he dared to cast off. He 
 made peace with Denmark and war with Russia ; 
 thereby he allowed the former country to develop 
 her trade and foreign relations enormously and rap- 
 idly, and made the task of his successors doubly 
 hard. Above all, he originated, by his marriage 
 with Catherine Jaghellon, the disastrous connexion 
 with Poland. That unhappy country, "the fatal 
 byword for all years to come " of genuine anarchy, 
 had just closed its period of prosperity. The last of 
 the Jaghellon Kings died in 1572, and the elected 
 King, Stephen Bathori, died in 1586. Ivan the Ter- 
 
lo Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
 rible sought the crown of Poland. Perhaps it would 
 not have been a bad thing for the Poles if he had 
 obtained it ; on the ground of nationality his claim 
 was overwhelmingly better than that of his rivals; 
 but it would have brought Russian barbarism two 
 centuries nearer to Europe. John of Sweden, on the 
 other hand, saw an opening for the House of Vasa. 
 His son Sigismund was, by dint of bribes and in- 
 trigue, elected King of Poland. But he had to 
 become a Catholic. Poland was the one conquest of 
 the Latin Church in the East, and the one honoura- 
 ble thing in the subsequent history of Poland is the 
 way she adhered to her Catholicism. But the union 
 of Sweden with Poland, which would necessarily 
 follow, if Sigismund succeeded his father on the 
 Swedish throne, would be almost certainly a Cath- 
 olic union, and would mean a complete change in 
 the Northern balance of power, which had been 
 already so far settled that a hard fight would prob- 
 ably be made by those interests which were threat- 
 ened. 
 
 And the first of these interests was Swedish 
 Protestantism. Sweden was still a free country, in 
 the sense of being governed in a parliamentary way 
 with the consent of the four estates, Nobles, Clergy, 
 Citizens, and Peasants. Whatever the Riddarhus 
 might think upon the subject, the three non-noble 
 estates were red-hot Protestants and would have no 
 Catholic king. Even the nobles were only induced to 
 consent to Sigismund becoming King of Poland with- 
 out forfeiting his right to succeed in Sweden, by the 
 grant of extravagant privileges, practically so great, 
 
Introductory. 1 1 
 
 had they been observed, as to emasculate the Vasa 
 monarchy. Luckily the people had a deliverer at 
 hand. Charles, Duke of Sudermania, the young- 
 est of the sons of Gustavus I., lived wholly in the 
 best traditions of his father's policy. He might be 
 relied upon to head an insurrection, if necessary. 
 
 Even before John's death in 1590 murmurs begaCn 
 to be heard that he had been an usurper — was his 
 son necessarily the heir ? These murmurs increased, 
 when in 1593, after waiting three years, Sigismund 
 came home to claim his kingdom, with a present of 
 twenty thousand crowns from the Pope in his pocket, 
 " to defray the cost of the restoration of Catholicism 
 in Sweden." Duke Charles had already prepared 
 his plans when the King arrived ; there seems little 
 doubt that he was playing a game, and for the 
 crown. We are not concerned with his motives, it 
 is sufficient to know that they corresponded with 
 the interests of his country. In 1593, just before 
 Sigismund had landed, Charles had been chosen 
 Regent and President of the Council of State, which 
 had sworn "to obey him in everything which he 
 should think fit to do for the maintenance of the 
 Confession of Augsburg." These were ominous 
 words for King Sigismund, who, however, being a 
 thorough believer in the doctrine of the Jesuits, by 
 whom he was guided, that all means are lawful for 
 a good end, agreed in 1594 to accept the "decrees 
 of Upsala," i. e., the decision of the Council in the 
 previous year, which confirmed Lutheranism as the 
 one religion of Sweden. Thereupon he was crowned. 
 It was afterward remembered that in that part of 
 
1 2 Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
 the coronation ceremony where the King had to 
 hold his right hand aloft for some minutes, he let it 
 fall, either through impatience or weariness, and 
 that Duke Charles had to remind him to keep it 
 upright. Sigismund's coronation-oath included a 
 promise to " preserve the Swedish Church," which 
 promise on his return to Stockholm he immediately 
 broke. He made a Catholic noble governor of that 
 city ; he began to found Catholic churches and 
 schools ; worse than this, he began to rule Sweden 
 through Polish ministers, and to treat it as a con- 
 quered province or a dependency of Poland. 
 
 We must remember what a period it was, that 
 last decade of the sixteenth century, and we must 
 put ourselves in the position, as far as possible, of 
 the men of that day. The great fact in European 
 politics that presented itself to all eyes was the suc- 
 cess of the Catholic reaction. It is not always easy 
 for a man standing upon the seashore to perceive 
 the exact moment when the tide begins to ebb. 
 Some few great waves may even dash up beyond 
 high-water mark when the flow has already ceased 
 for many minutes. In this case the tide had turned, 
 but men had hardly perceived it. It was but a few 
 years since Philip II., master of the New World, of 
 Spain, of Naples, of Milan, of Franche Comt6, had 
 swallowed Portugal and annexed her colonies ; had 
 apparently crushed the insurgent Netherlands ; and 
 had seemed on the point of crushing the heretic 
 Elizabeth and the heretic Henry of Navarre. Now, 
 it was true, the Armada had come and failed ; Parma, 
 the greatest of Philip's captains, was dead (1592); 
 
Introductory. 1 3 
 
 the age of the great aggressive Popes was over. 
 Yet all this had made as yet but faint impression ; 
 Henry IV. could hardly yet be called King of 
 France, and if Spain had received one or two serious 
 checks, she was still far and away the mightiest 
 power in the world. By the close alliance of the 
 two branches of the House of Hapsburg, she as- 
 pired to the dominion in Europe, and King Sigis- 
 mund seemed a tool ready made to her hands, to 
 assure to her the neutrality, if not the obedience, of 
 the North; — a share in, if not the dominion over, 
 the commerce of the Baltic. Sigismund's two mar- 
 riages with Austrian archduchesses had further 
 cemented the union, and Denmark seems at this 
 time, and for long after, to have been always ready 
 to play into the hands of Spain. 
 
 At the risk of repetition it seems worth while to 
 remind the reader of the essential connexion of all the 
 great European questions in the sixteenth and first 
 half of the seventeenth century. After that period 
 it is possible to trace a Northern, a Western, and a 
 Southern set of policies, which by no means hang 
 upon the same, or even upon similar, considerations. 
 But the period before us is one, in which if you 
 touch one nerve of the European body-poUtic, the 
 shock will vibrate and revibrate throughout the 
 whole frame. 
 
 And one branch of the great European struggle 
 now centred in the contest between Sigismund Vasa 
 and his people. But, though unperceived, the tide 
 had turned, and that contest could have but one 
 end. Its details have little interest for us. When 
 
14 Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
 Sigismund went back to Poland at the end of the 
 year 1594, he could not prevent Charles being 
 chosen to administer the kingdom in his absence, 
 and Diet after Diet subsequently confirmed the 
 power of the Regent. The peasants of Dalecarlia, 
 the great province of the centre, which had first 
 come forward to the support of Gustavus I. in 1520, 
 sent up a petition to the effect that there ought to 
 be only one king in Sweden, and that Sigismund 
 had forfeited the crown. Charles himself had been 
 unwilling to lead a revolution, until it became ap- 
 parent that Sigismund was massing troops and 
 raising money in Poland for an attack upon his 
 native land. In 1 597 the civil war may be said to have 
 begun ; in the following year Sigismund landed 
 (with only five thousand Polish troops) and was 
 utterly defeated near Linkoping (on September 25, 
 1598). On the next day a treaty was concluded by 
 which Sigismund was acknowledged as King, but 
 promised to send away his foreign troops and 
 maintain Protestantism. It was obviously a mere 
 effort to gain time, and in the following year on 
 failing to keep the condition, which he never had 
 the remotest intention of keeping, he was formally 
 deposed (July, 1599). 
 
 The contest, however, was by no means over, and 
 it led to that perpetual hostility between Sweden 
 and Poland which played such an important part in 
 the history of Northern Europe in the seventeenth 
 century. On the whole, Spain, Austria, and. Den- 
 mark ranged themselves on the side of Poland, 
 while England under James I., who was the brother- 
 
Introductory. 15 
 
 in-law of King Christian IV. of Denmark (i 588-1648), 
 hesitated between the two parties. The failure of 
 the elder branch of the Vasas to assert their rights 
 was very considerably due to the unwillingness of 
 the Poles to fight for a foreign crown to be placed 
 on the head of their King. On the other hand, 
 Sigismund and his descendants became more and 
 more thoroughly Polish, more and more imbued 
 with the spirit of the Catholic reaction, and there- 
 fore any chance they might have had of return to 
 the crown of Sweden rapidly vanished. In 1604 
 Charles was solemnly crowned King ; that was the 
 second birthday of the Vasa monarchy ; the crown 
 was entailed upon his eldest son, Gustavus Adol- 
 phus, and his descendants, being Protestants, and 
 the descendants of Sigismund were forever ex- 
 cluded. "Every prince who should deviate from 
 the Confession of Augsburg should ipso facto lose 
 the crown. Anyone who should attempt to effect 
 any change of religion should be declared an enemy 
 and a traitor. Sweden should never be united with 
 another kingdom under one crown ; the King must 
 live in Sweden." 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE BEGINNINGS OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. 
 
 N the year in which Sigismund was iirst 
 conditionally recognised as King of Sweden, 
 1594, on the 9th of December, Gustavus 
 Adolphus was born in the Palace in Stockholm. 
 Duke Charles, as he still was, had by his first 
 wife (a daughter of the Elector Palatine) only one 
 daughter who survived infancy ; she was called 
 Catherine, and became in after years her half- 
 brother's most trusted friend and adviser. By 
 his second wife, Christina* of Sleswick Holstein, 
 he had two sons and one daughter. The eldest was 
 our hero ; the second, Charles Philip, became at one 
 time a claimant for the crown of the Czar, but died 
 childless in 1622. The daughter, Mary Elizabeth, 
 married her cousin John, the only one of Sigis- 
 mund's brothers who took the Swedish side in the 
 succession wars, and who honourably refused 
 himself to trouble the existing entail of the crown. 
 
 * She was the granddaughter of I^uther's friend Philip the Magnani' 
 mous of Hesse, and thus Gustavus's hereditary Vasa-Protestantism may 
 be said to have been reinforced from the maternal side. 
 16 
 
2 
 
 J 
 
 
 K 
 X 
 <! 
 > 
 
1594-1618] Gustavus Adolphus. 1 7 
 
 When the grandfather of the new-born Crown 
 Prince had seized the throne, Sweden was a barbar- 
 ous country. Gustavus I. used to complain that his 
 people understood civilisation so little, that they 
 invariably robbed the merchants who came to trade 
 with them. Their culture was perhaps about on a 
 level with that of Poland and Russia. With the 
 lapse of eighty years all this was changed. Sweden 
 was a civilised country, if not to the extent of the 
 England of Elizabeth or the France of the days before 
 the League wars, yet so far that it might at least 
 compare favourably with the neighbouring German 
 and Scandinavian states. We know what an im- 
 petus to literature and especially to theological 
 study was given by the Lutheran Reformation in 
 Germany ; Lutheranism was essentially in its early 
 days a scholarly faith, and when engrafted upon the 
 rugged Swedish stock it did produce very rich, if 
 not very enduring, fruit. That there is something 
 in " national character " is a doctrine which will 
 probably survive the destructive efforts of modern 
 historians. And the character of the Swedish peo- 
 ple seems to have been actually new-created by the 
 Reformation. The same was the case in Scotland, 
 but one difference is readily perceptible : Scotland 
 became Calvinist and learnt only the sterner lessons 
 of Protestantism ; Sweden took in all that was brill- 
 iant, attractive, and progressive from her Lutheran- 
 ism, while her fresh Northern blood prevented her 
 from relapsing, as the German Lutherans so easily 
 did, into an indolent fatalism. By the end of the 
 sixteenth century the Swedish nobles were by far 
 the most cultivated aristocracy of the North. 
 
1 8 Gustavus Adolphus. [1594-1618 
 
 The traveller of to-day who approaches Stock- 
 holm by the Malar Lake, and sees the houses spread- 
 ing out upon the numerous islands and up the heights 
 of the Sodermalm, is looking upon a very different 
 city from that in which Gustavus was born. Yet, 
 as in the case of London, the integral kernel of 
 Stockholm is still called " the city " (Staden), and 
 with the adjacent island of the Riddarholm pre- 
 sents an aspect not altogether modern, though, 
 in consequence of the only recently abandoned 
 Scandinavian habit of building all houses, even 
 in the cities, of wood alone, few ancient buildings 
 remain, and the palace itself is an eighteenth-cen- 
 tury erection. The palace of " Birger Jarl," a huge 
 mediseval pile, went the way of all Swedish build- 
 ings in the conflagration of 1697, but it stood upon 
 the same site as the present " Slots." Before the 
 birth of our hero, the Norrmalm, which is now 
 the fashionable quarter of the city, had been at 
 least partially invaded by buildings, although these 
 were not incorporated in the city until 1635. The 
 true old capital of Sweden had been, in fact, not 
 Stockholm at all, but Upsala, which long continued 
 to be the crowning-place of the kings, as well as the 
 seat of the Metropolitan, but which the Vasas by 
 this time had pretty well abandoned as a place of 
 permanent residence. 
 
 The other chief towns of importance in the coun- 
 try at the time of Gustavus's birth were Westeras, 
 Orebro, and Kalmar. Gothenburg was only founded 
 during his boyhood ; Malmo, Lund, and Helsing- 
 borg were still Danish possessions. Any one who 
 
1594M618] Gustavus Adolpkus. 19 
 
 wishes to know what the conditions of life in the 
 country were, could hardly do better than study 
 Whitelocke's journal of his embassy to Queen 
 Christina in the year 1654. Whitelocke was, it is 
 true, only a passing visitor, but he performed the 
 journey across Sweden from Gothenburg to Stock- 
 holm in the rigours of a northern winter, and he 
 records his experiences with great intelligence and 
 some humour. Great allowance must be made in 
 reading his account for the corruption of morals 
 and manners, which had been produced by the later 
 years of the long war, and the great influx of previ- 
 ously unknown luxuries upon a poor and hardy 
 people. It is, however, probable that this corrup- 
 tion had not largely affected the peasant class, into 
 whose habits Whitelocke diligently enquired, and 
 with whom he came during his journey into fre- 
 quent contact, and, therefore, it is quite permissible 
 to regard him as a valuable first-hand authority for 
 any one who wishes for a peep into the life of 
 Sweden at the period of our story. The one prac- 
 tice which struck our traveller with uniform disgust 
 was, that he was very frequently asked to dine off 
 the flesh of animals which had died a natural death, 
 a practice which he attributes not so much to the 
 poverty as to the thriftiness of the " primaeval 
 peasantry," who had won so many victories for the 
 cause of Protestantism. 
 
 Of the manner of life of the Court and aristocracy 
 Whitelocke's book has less to say, and what he says 
 concerns us very little, as there can be no doubt that 
 a complete revolution had been effected in these in 
 
20 GustaVllS AdolphtlS. [1594-1618 
 
 consequence of the spoils of Germany, which the 
 Swedish commanders brought home between 1632 
 and 1648. But we may perhaps picture the Brahes 
 and De la Gardies, and all the best of the Swedish 
 aristocracy, old and new, at the end of the sixteenth 
 century, as, if we put aside the diiferent conditions 
 of climate, leading a life in time of peace not es- 
 sentially different from the Pembrokes and the 
 Arundels, the courtiers of Kings James and Charles, 
 of whom Clarendon has left us such a vivid picture. 
 They were undoubtedly rich from the spoils of the 
 Church, and they were undoubtedly cultivated and 
 lettered men. 
 
 But nothing is more remarkable than the way in 
 which the Royal Family of Vasa towered above 
 their people and their contemporaries in this last 
 respect. Gustavus I., though previously a compara- 
 tively uneducated man, developed when on the 
 throne a passion for literature, art, and music, which 
 amazed his somewhat jealous Court. Theology — to 
 many non-religious minds (such as our own Eliza- 
 beth's) the engrossing study of the age — was his 
 greatest delight. Eric based his claim to the ad- 
 miration of posterity no less upon his foreign 
 policy than upon his proficiency as a painter, a 
 musician, a mathematician, an astronomer, an ora- 
 tor, and a writer on military tactics. Poor man, he 
 had much need of these arts to console him in later 
 life, for he spent seventeen years in prison between 
 his deposition and his murder. In him also first 
 appeared that taint of madness which sometimes 
 accompanies great genius, and which has reappeared 
 
1594-1618] Gustavus Adolphus. 2 1 
 
 from time to time in the Vasa race down to their 
 latest descendants. John, the fratricide and would- 
 be apostate, was a man of almost greater ability 
 than Eric, and Sigismund was hardly behind them. 
 Charles was the least naturally able and the worst 
 educated of Gustavus's sons ; but his second wife, 
 the mother of Gustavus Adolphus, was a great 
 patroness of literature, and he himself was a con- 
 siderable composer of hymns, prayers, and cate- 
 chisms. The great point about him, however, was, 
 that he was a more practical man than any of his 
 brothers. War and the Gospel were undoubtedly 
 the true business of a King of Sweden, and Charles 
 understood both thoroughly. He endeavoured 
 steadily throughout his reign to bring the whole 
 resources of Sweden into a condition to contribute 
 liberally to the defence of the kingdom, and to 
 organise that defence upon the most practical 
 method. Thus, without being a great or original 
 genius, he prepared the way for his son. 
 
 And to him that son owed the priceless boon of 
 an excellent education. The boy was a Vasa from 
 head to foot, and the father knew it. " Ille faciet," 
 said the dying King looking at him lovingly, when 
 his counsellors stood round, pulling long faces about 
 "the state of the nation, should any unforeseen 
 accident to your Majesty deprive us," etc., etc. 
 And the next day when they told him of the loss of 
 some fortress or other at the hands of the Danes, 
 he replied calmly : " The concerns of this world 
 trouble me no more ; I leave all in better hands than 
 mine." They were not Court ladies, to whom the 
 
22 GustaVUS AdolphuS. [1594-1618 
 
 early years of the Lion of the North were entrusted. 
 Charles deliberately took the advice of his Estates 
 as to the choice of a tutor, and the person selected 
 was John Skytte. Skytte drew up a plan of educa- 
 tion, "such as a prince should have." He was a 
 Swede who had passed ten years in travel to most 
 places in Europe which were worth seeing. A Ger- 
 man, Von Morner, also a travelled man, was to assist 
 Skytte, and the Count de la Gardie, a Swedish noble 
 of French origin, took care of the military side of 
 the Prince's education. The seed fell on good 
 ground ; Gustavus, when he arrived at man's estate, 
 knew a good deal of seven languages, and could 
 converse fluently in four besides his own. His let- 
 ters, like those of many of his contemporaries, are 
 the strangest mixture of Latin, German, French, 
 and Swedish ; they read as if the languages were all 
 in his head and he used the shortest and readiest 
 word in each case to explain his thoughts, quite in- 
 different to which tongue it belonged. It must be 
 remembered that Latin was the universal language of 
 diplomacy of the day, and that German, owing, no 
 doubt, to the wide-spread influence of the Hanseatic 
 merchants, was the Lingua Franca of the Baltic na- 
 tions. But Gustavus's knowledge of Greek was a rarer 
 accomplishment, and enabled him to read Xenophon 
 in the original, and to pronounce him the greatest 
 ancient writer on the military art. Even when in 
 camp he always carried in his pocket a copy of 
 Grotius's treatise " De Jure Belli et Pacis."* 
 
 * This passion for history bore fruit in the fragment of a " History 
 of the House of Vasa," which he left behind him. There is a copy 
 
""'mm 
 
 JOHN SKYTTE. 
 
1594-1618] Gustavus Adolphus. 23 
 
 The stories which gathered round the infancy of 
 Gustavus are of the usual slight merit, and demand 
 but little recognition here. Of course his horoscope 
 was cast for him, and of course a glorious career 
 and a violent death were easily discoverable therein. 
 It was not unsafe to predict either of these things of 
 a Vasa and a Protestant King in that age. Nay, the 
 old books are full of the " marvellous discovery," by 
 Tycho Brahe * ten years before our Hero's birth, of 
 a new star in the constellation of Cassiopeia, which 
 clearly could have no other meaning than that " a 
 Protestant prince should arise in the North, who 
 should procure great advantages to those of the 
 Protestant faith." (Is it not written that Louis 
 XIII. was born under the sign of Libra, and was 
 therefore called " Louis the Just " ?) How natural, 
 too, that in the name Gustavus — a good honest 
 family name — which was given to him, men should 
 discover the anagram of Augustus ; a play upon 
 words, of which his admirers knew how to make 
 good use, when he afterwards restored the Reformed 
 faith in the city of Augsburg (Augusta). 
 
 Of the usual child stories, however, I am inclined 
 to like two, which were narrated of our infant Hero. 
 One is that, when he was five years old, his father 
 took him down to Kalmar to see a fleet which was 
 preparing to pay a visit of observation to the 
 
 of this fragment in the British Museum, printed at Stockholm in 
 1759. The memorable opening sentence may perhaps be worth 
 extracting : " God grant me so to live, that I may ever live with 
 Christ, and on earth may never blush for my own deeds." 
 
 *See a very rare tract, entitled "The New Star of the North 
 Shining on the Victorious King of Sweden." London, 1638. 
 
24 Gusiavus Adolphus. I1694-1618 
 
 Hanseatic city of Liibeck, which had threatened to 
 behave unpleasantly to Sweden. " Which of the 
 ships does your Highness like best ? " said an officer 
 of distinction to the boy. " That one."—" Why ? "— 
 " Because she has more guns on board than the 
 others." Guns were to be the essentials of his trade. 
 The other story is equally characteristic: "You 
 must not go into that wood, my dear," said his 
 nurse to him one day, when they were walking in 
 the country near Linkoping; "there are huge ser- 
 pents in that wood." " Give me a big stick then," 
 said the boy ; " I '11 soon kill them." 
 
 From his earliest years the young Prince was 
 systematically " accustomed to affairs." His father 
 lost no opportunity of bringing him forward in the 
 Council, and, at the audiences given to foreign 
 ambassadors, sometimes made the child of ten years 
 old reply on behalf of the Crown of Sweden. The 
 period was a deeply interesting one at the Court of 
 Stockholm, for as the Spaniards began to slacken in 
 their efforts against Holland after the death of 
 Philip n. (1598), a large number of adventurers — 
 Germans, English, French, and above all Scotch 
 officers — came to Sweden to put their swords and 
 their somewhat cosmopolitan Protestantism at the 
 service of a King who was engaged in a struggle 
 with Catholic Poland, which might easily develop 
 into a struggle with Catholic Europe. One great 
 reason that King Charles had for thus calling atten- 
 tion to his brilliant son was the uncertainty of the 
 succession. In spite of the settlement of 1604, a 
 revolution in favour of the elder line might easily 
 
1694-1618] Gustavus Adolphus. 25 
 
 follow upon his death, for Gustavus's cousin John 
 was five years older than he, and was " much seen of 
 all men." It was in no jealous or narrow spirit that 
 the old monarch resolved to extend to John as 
 much of his favour as possible. By bringing up the 
 boys together, and treating his nephew almost as 
 a son, he seemed to be leaving to his people the 
 choice between them. Yet he lost no opportunity 
 of secretly directing that choice, and before his 
 death could have had no doubt where it would fall. 
 
 " Before all things, fear God," writes Charles to 
 Gustavus, "honour thy father and mother, be ten- 
 der to thy sisters, love those who have served me 
 faithfully, reward them according to their deserts, 
 be gracious to thy subjects, punish the evil, trust all 
 men fairly, but only entirely when thou hast learnt 
 to know them. Be no respecter of persons before 
 the law; invade no man's just privileges, provided 
 they clash not with the law ; diminish not thy regal 
 possessions in favour of any man, except thou art 
 sure that he will recognise the benefit and do thee 
 good service in return." This last sentence was a 
 wise bit of instruction in a country where the crown 
 subsisted entirely upon domains, and where the 
 nobles, provided they served in the field, were free 
 from the burdens of taxation. 
 
 The father needed to give no instruction in regard 
 to his son's duty as a soldier, for Gustavus stole 
 hours from his books and his sleep to listen to the 
 tales of the great Prince Maurice, and his heroic 
 deeds against the Spaniards, told by the immigrant 
 ofificers who had made a campaign or two in the 
 
26 GustaVUS Adolphus. [I594-1618 
 
 Low Countries. So early was his passion for soldier- 
 ing developed, that he was profoundly hurt at being 
 forbidden to serve in the Russian campaign of 1610, 
 when he was between sixteen and seventeen, and 
 proportionally elated when, in April, 161 1, Christian 
 of Denmark having declared war on Sweden, he was 
 solemnly knighted, and sent to collect troops in 
 West Gothland for the relief of Kalmar, then the 
 most important Swedish port, which Christian had 
 besieged, and which he shortly afterwards took. 
 His first successes were the destruction of the towns 
 of Christianopel in the province of Schonen, and the 
 reconquest of the isle of Oland in the same year. 
 Here, as elsewhere, Gustavus began to prove true 
 the saying of a contemporary historian concerning 
 the Swedish troops : " They don't defend their men 
 with walls, but their walls with men." The sword 
 in the boy's hand woke in him the Viking spirit of his 
 race ; a spirit which, it must always be remembered, 
 is not merely one of sheer fighting, but of adventure 
 as well»; not merely one of conquest, but also of 
 colonisation, but which on more than one occasion 
 in the history of the Vasa family [e.g., in Eric) de- 
 generated into mere "Berserkir" passion. Even 
 the sober Charles once challenged his " dear adver- 
 sary of Denmark" to decide the war by a single 
 combat ; and his son's one great fault as a general 
 — and it was a serious one — was that, in the moment 
 of victory, and sometimes, as in the last fatal field 
 of Liitzen, too soon for life if not for victory, he 
 would throw prudence to the winds, and charge like 
 any Crusader. But, on the other hand, his swift 
 
1594-1618] Gustavus Adolphus. 27 
 
 and dashing courage was precisely what was wanted 
 in an age of Spanish captains, slow movements, and 
 heavy battalions ; and when off the battlefield, his 
 . higher qualities — his ready habit of command over a 
 a temper naturally fiery, his knowledge of the occa- 
 sional necessity of silence and reserve, above all his 
 deep and unaffected piety — almost invariably got 
 the better of his Viking blood. 
 
 Here, with his maiden sword in his hand, we must 
 leave the young Hero for a few moments, in order 
 to recapitulate briefly the events of his father's 
 reign, and to consider the state of Europe at the 
 date of his own accession to the crown. We have 
 got to clear the stage for the main actors, and the 
 main act in the drama ; we have to dispose of Den- 
 mark, Russia, and Poland, before we can send a 
 soldier to Pomerania. The main questions in this 
 period have their roots some distance back and do 
 not appear at first sight directly connected with the 
 Thirty Years' War. Shall the Baltic be a Danish 
 lake ? Shall Sweden have the keys of the province of 
 Livonia, which again is the key of Poland ? Lastly, 
 the long-standing dynastic quarrel between the Polish 
 and Swedish branches of the House of Vasa has to 
 be cleared out of the way. If these questions seem 
 to the reader to be unimportant, I must beg leave to 
 put him in mind of one of the sayings of Gustavus 
 himself : "All wars in Europe hang together." 
 
 How European these Baltic questions were be- 
 coming, we may learn at a glance from the number 
 of Powers which interested themselves more or less 
 directly in these early wars of Sweden. 
 
28 GustaVUS Adolphus. [1594-1618 
 
 In the first place, there is Denmark. She was 
 perhaps then at the height of her power ; she had 
 recently founded on either side of the Sound the 
 two strong fortresses of Kronborg (or Elsinore) 
 and Helsingborg, thus giving herself command of 
 the only practicable passage from the Baltic to 
 the North Sea, which Sweden could possibly have 
 disputed. And Sweden could not at present dis- 
 pute it, for the very good reason that her three 
 Southern provinces (those provinces that have been 
 called, from the shape of the Scandinavian penin- 
 sula, the " bear's paws)" — Halland, Schonen, and 
 Blekingen — were then, and until some time after 
 Gustavus's death, in the hands of the Danes. It 
 was just this part of his country which Gustavus I. 
 had been unable to liberate. Sweden, therefore, if 
 she wished for any share in extra-Baltic commerce, 
 was compelled to seek it from the only point at 
 which she touched the open sea. This was at the 
 mouth of the river Gota, where, in addition to the 
 already existing strong fortress of Elfsborg, Charles 
 IX. was now founding Gothenburg, in modern times 
 the most important commercial city in Sweden. 
 The central point of the strife between Sweden and 
 Denmark at this time will therefore be found to be 
 round these two fortresses, over against which the 
 Danes had recently rebuilt and strengthened the 
 fortifications of Bohus. But we must not wholly 
 divert our eyes from the Sound, where the tolls 
 levied, and often arbitrarily raised, by the Danes 
 were a second great cause of strife ; and Denmark 
 had recently put forward the monstrous demand, 
 
1594-1618] Gustavus Adolphus. 29 
 
 that no commerce should pass round the North 
 Cape to Arkhangel, under pretence that this would 
 be an evasion of the tolls of the Sound. One other 
 burning grievance was the claim of the Danes to 
 free commercial access to the Swedish possessions 
 in Esthonia and (as soon as Sweden got hold of 
 the province) in Livonia. During the seven years 
 of Charles IX. 's rule Denmark had kept herself 
 fairly quiet, but when King Christian perceived 
 that his rival was growing feeble, and that there 
 might possibly be on his death a dispute for the 
 Swedish succession, a succession to which he, too, 
 might lay claim (for Denmark had never given up 
 the idea of reuniting the three Scandinavian crowns), 
 he declared war at the beginning of 161 1, and took 
 with little trouble Kalmar and Elfsborg. A war 
 with Denmark meant more to Sweden than a war 
 with any other country, for their frontiers con- 
 verged everywhere ; and along the long Norwegian 
 boundary there was seldom any real peace at all. 
 In estimating the position of the Danish monarch 
 vis-h-vis with the Swedish, it must not be forgotten 
 that the former was by no means so completely 
 master of his own kingdom as the latter. Charles 
 IX. was harassed by a rival claimant to the crown, 
 but the Swedish nobility were almost to a man 
 loyal to the decision of the Estates ; whereas Chris- 
 tian had constant troubles with the Danish nobility. 
 He himself always affected — and perhaps it was not 
 altogether affectation — the manners and feelings of 
 a bourgeois, and endeavoured to rely upon the bour- 
 geoisie for support against the aristocracy ; but the 
 
30 Gustavus Adolphus. 11594-1618 
 
 course of Danish history during the previous hun- 
 dred years had by no means resulted in the estab- 
 lishment of a popular monarchy, in the sense in 
 which the Vasa monarchy could claim that title ; 
 and over and over again Christian was compelled to 
 desist from some enterprise which he had begun, 
 owing to murmurs and even threats of deposition 
 which became audible among his nobles. It was 
 only in 1660 that the Kings of Denmark, finding 
 themselves called by the popular voice to undertake 
 the defence of their country against Charles X. of 
 Sweden, were able to overthrow for a time the 
 dominion of the aristocracy. 
 
 Closely involved with the Danish troubles, the 
 burden of which Gustavus thus inherited, came the 
 relation of Sweden to the Dutch Republic. Holland 
 was, perhaps more than any other Power, stepping 
 into the position in Baltic commerce formerly occu- 
 pied by the Hanseatic League. By the middle of 
 the seventeenth century it is said that she drew a 
 third of her revenue from this source, and even at 
 the end of the sixteenth her understanding with 
 England enabled her to make sufficiently good 
 terms with Denmark as to the right of entering the 
 Sound. All the offers of Charles failed to draw 
 her away into a league with Sweden against the 
 Danish claim to control that passage. With all her 
 greatness, Holland often displayed an intense and 
 narrow commercial selfishness, which rendered her 
 oblivious of the interests of European freedom. So 
 long as she, for the time being, could get in upon 
 good terms, she cared not that she was contributing 
 
1594-1618] Gustavus Adolphus. 31 
 
 to aggrandise the jealous guardian of the mouth of 
 the Baltic ; and when her twelve years' truce with 
 Spain was concluded in 1609, she made rapid com- 
 mercial strides towards the north-east of Europe. 
 Charles was not powerful enough to refuse her that 
 which he determined to refuse to the Danes, namely, 
 free access to the Swedish ports in Esthonia ; he was, 
 moreover, always hoping for an alliance against 
 Christian, or at least an armed mediation on the 
 part of Holland between himself and that monarch. 
 But Holland's cue was strict neutrality ; that 
 Sweden, Denmark, and Poland should just about 
 balance each other, and be so occupied with snarl- 
 ing at each other's bones that she would stand in 
 the end a fair chance of clearing the plates of all 
 three, is no unfair representation of Holland's view 
 of the Baltic question. 
 
 I have already pointed out the beginnings of 
 Swedish aggression against Russia, another of the 
 Powers deeply interested in the points in dispute. 
 A fresh opportunity was offered for interference 
 there, when the direct line of Rurik came to an end 
 in 1598 with the death of Czar Feodor. The vola- 
 tile Sigismund of Poland at once seized upon the 
 idea of getting himself chosen Czar, and thus indem- 
 nifying himself for his loss of Sweden. But his Ca- 
 tholicism stood hopelessly in the way. Sixteen years 
 of anarchy and disputed succession followed in 
 Russia. It is needless for us to specify the Borises, 
 and Demetriuses, and Wassilis, who laid claim to, 
 and occasionally occupied, the throne of Moscow. 
 The only points for us to notice are that Charles 
 
32 GustaVUS AdolphuS. [1594-1618 
 
 and Sigismund steadily supported rival candidates, 
 and finally, more or less leaving the combatants to 
 fight the original matter out, settled down into a 
 hearty struggle for the possession of Livonia, once 
 a debatable land between Russia and Poland ; 
 while Sweden, being geographically in a better posi- 
 tion to carry out the design, overran the Russian 
 provinces of Ingria and Carelia at the end of the 
 Gulf of Finland, and even, in 1611, penetrated as 
 far as Novgorod. It was not until Gustavus had 
 been some time upon the throne that there arose 
 in Russia a really national Czar, in the person of 
 Michael, ancestor of the present reigning House of 
 Romanoff. In the course of these quarrels the 
 Swedish General de la Gardie at one time proposed 
 to put on the Russian throne Charles Philip, the 
 youngest brother of Gustavus ; but the latter, just 
 after his accession to the Swedish crown, wisely 
 decided against permitting the aggressive policy. 
 The kings of Sweden have been much blamed by 
 modern writers for this wanton attack upon the 
 territories of their neighbour, the Czar ; but, apart 
 from the fact that most of the attacking was done 
 while there was no proper Czar at all, and largely to 
 prevent the King of Poland from becoming Czar, I 
 must be allowed to protest, however mildly, against 
 the application of principles which have by no 
 means gained universal acceptance in the nine- 
 teenth century to the events of the first two dec- 
 ades of the seventeenth. In saying this, I am not 
 following that great master of human motives, Mac- 
 chiavelli, but merely putting the question upon the 
 
1594-1618] Gustavus Adolphus. 33 
 
 ground of the interests of Sweden. The Florentine 
 would have looked at the matter thus : " If Charles 
 was strong enough to conquer Russia, he ought to 
 have done it ; not being so, the next best thing he 
 could do was to take what he could get of it ; before 
 all things he ought not to have allowed Sigismund 
 to get a footing there, and he did not." Ought not — 
 that is to say, in the interests of his own country, 
 which were the only things that a seventeenth-cen- 
 tury king ever regarded — perhaps the only things 
 that any king in any century ought to regard. 
 
 For Livonia the struggle between Poland and 
 Sweden was long ; and this brings us directly to the 
 subject of the mutual relations of these two coun- 
 tries during this period. Ever since Sigismund had 
 retired from Sweden in 1599, ^^ ^^"^ found it more 
 and more impossible to interest his new country in 
 his dynastic quarrel. He had therefore been re- 
 duced to the resource of keeping up relations with 
 such disaffected people as he could hear of in 
 Sweden itself, in Finland and in Esthonia. On his 
 own brother John, he attempted to work, but in 
 vain ; but there were some few Catholic nobles in 
 Sweden who were not unwilling to pocket a little 
 Polish gold occasionally, though they made practi- 
 cally no return for it. Meanwhile the only theatres 
 on which Sigismund and Charles could meet were 
 Livonia, and the Russian succession wars. That in 
 the former Charles was nearly always successful 
 (which was by no means the case where native Rus- 
 sian troops had to be encountered), proves that 
 Poland had already entered upon her rapid career 
 
34 Gustavus Adolphus. [1594-1618 
 
 of decline ; and, a little before the death of the 
 Swedish King, Sigismund was obliged to conclude 
 an armistice which partially left the former in tem- 
 porary possession of the coveted province. 
 
 One other prince who has as yet played no part at 
 all in these questions, but who is destined to give us 
 a great deal of trouble, and to play a very prominent 
 if not a very dignified part later on, is the Elector 
 of Brandenburg. The House of HohenzoUern had 
 as yet done little to shew that it was one day to rule 
 over Germany. Its main possession, Brandenburg, 
 was cut off from the sea by Pomerania. Its chief 
 outlying possession, Prussia, was a Polish fief and 
 surrounded on all sides with Polish territory. The 
 " wings of the Prussian Eagle," Silesia and West 
 Prussia (the latter, now a Polish province, pure and 
 simple, had been torn from the Teutdnic knights in 
 the fifteenth century) awaited Frederic, the re- 
 deemer or the robber. Not a foot had yet been 
 planted upon the Rhine, of which Prussia was one 
 day to be the guardian. Only two great rivers 
 passed through its territory, the Oder and the Vis- 
 tula, and the mouths of both were in the hands of 
 other Powers. 
 
 Shut out from commerce, sheltered behind the 
 broad back of the Elector of Saxony from the 
 aggressive Catholic reaction of the south, Branden- 
 burg remained utterly indifferent to, or oblivious of, 
 that flowing tide. Even when partially awakened 
 to what was going on, the two contemporary Elec- 
 tors showed an extraordinary apathy, and even 
 cowardice, for which one searches in vain in the 
 previous or subsequent history of their family. 
 
16d4-l6i8] Gustavus Adolphus. 35 
 
 Carlyle has well characterised one of them, with whom 
 we shall make a somewhat nearer acquaintance later 
 on, as " Que faire," because the story goes that he 
 once said when asked why he did not resist Gus- 
 tavus, " Que faire ? ils ont des canons." Yet this 
 sleepy Elector and his father are all-important to 
 our story. Sigismund knew that fact well, and 
 during the Russian disputes, and still more during 
 the armistice, did his utmost to conciliate his pon- 
 derous vassal. Though Dantzig was a free city and 
 Konigsberg practically independent of Prussia, there 
 were several points (notably Pillau) on the coast of 
 that duchy from which the Elector could easily hold 
 out a hand to a possibly invading Swede. Once tht 
 Swede was in Prussia, he had a "'sedes belli," to use 
 the language of the day, of the most favourable 
 nature, for an attack upon Poland itself. What if 
 the Elector should try and shake off Polish suze- 
 rainty ? Who could be a more favourable ally for 
 this purpose than the King of Sweden ? And even 
 more than this. Were not Brandenburg and Saxony 
 almost equally entitled to claim the leadership of 
 North German Protestantism? If the general con- 
 flagration should come — nay, when it should come, 
 for we may be sure that Sigismund foresaw what 
 every thinking man in Europe foresaw — was not an 
 alliance between Brandenburg and Sweden, in the 
 interests of Protestantism, the most natural thing in 
 the world? Therefore, since, if my readers will 
 allow me again to quote Macchiavelli, " men must 
 either be caressed or destroyed," and since Sigis- 
 mund was not powerful enough to destroy the 
 Elector, he determined to caress him. And he did 
 
36 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
 11594-1618 
 
 it so effectually that it was just Brandenburg that 
 proved an almost greater obstacle to Gustavus's 
 later plans, than all the soldiers which Catholicism 
 could put in the field. 
 
 I have thus briefly sketched out the relation to 
 each other of the various Powers who were inter- 
 ested in the Baltic question. It will perhaps be of 
 assistance to the reader if I am allowed to recapitu- 
 late their objects in a tabular form. 
 
 (i) Holland : her object was — freedom from tolls in 
 the Sound, free commerce over the 
 whole Baltic, to maintain the statu quo 
 among other Powers. 
 To maintain her Swedish provinces 
 and her mastery of the Sound ; to op- 
 pose Sweden in every possible way, if 
 necessary by an alliance with Poland. 
 To recover the Crown of Sweden, to 
 conciliate Brandenburg and all other 
 possible allies of Sweden, to recover 
 Livonia. 
 
 To get back her Baltic provinces if 
 possible. 
 
 To keep Prussia and to be allowed to 
 go to sleep. 
 
 To win territory on the eastern shores 
 of the Baltic, to be friendly with Den- 
 mark if possible, to keep Elf sborg and 
 Gothenburg (and thus her communica- 
 tion with the North Sea,) not at present 
 to attempt the recovery of her south- 
 ern provinces ; to resist all attempts of 
 Poland, whether on Sweden itself, or on 
 her eastern possessions. 
 
 (2) Denmark : 
 
 (3) Poland 
 
 (4) 
 
 (s) 
 
 Russia 
 
 Branden- 
 burg : 
 (6) Sweden : 
 
1594-1618J 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
 37 
 
 I have put this last object in italics because it was 
 just this which led on to the later implication of 
 Sweden in the struggle of Protestantism for exist- 
 ence. Let my readers never lose sight of the fact 
 that at the back of Sigismund were all the wishes, 
 and might be all the armies, of Catholic Europe, and 
 perhaps they will pardon me for dwelling so long on 
 the introductory part of my subject. 
 
 RIKSTALER.— 1618. 
 
OPENING YEARS OF THE REIGN OF 
 GUSTAVUS. 
 
 HARLES IX. died at Nykoping, in the 
 arms of his eldest son, on the 30th 
 of October, 1611. We have seen to 
 what difficuhies that son was left heir. 
 Few Kings have indeed ever inherited a 
 kingdom in a more critical condition. But the lad of 
 seventeen was not unequal to the task. We have an 
 interesting glimpse of his personal appearance about 
 this time, from an account left by some Dutch 
 Ambassadors, who visited Sweden shortly after his 
 accession : " His Majesty," they write, " stood before 
 his throne to receive us with head uncovered, dressed 
 in satin trimmed with black fur, and with a black 
 silk cloak on his shoulder (for he was in mourning 
 for his uncle, the late Duke of Holstein). There was 
 a canopy over his head ; on his right hand the regalia 
 of Sweden on a marble table with silver feet ; he is 
 slender of figure, well set up, with rather a pale com- 
 plexion, a long-shaped face, fair hair, and a pointed 
 beard, which here and there runs into a tawny colour; 
 38 
 
REVAL. 
 
<6ii'25] Opening Years. 39 
 
 and, according to all reports, he is a man of high 
 courage, though not revengeful ; keen of intellect, 
 watchful, active ; an excellent speaker, and courteous 
 in his intercourse with all men ; from a youth of 
 such promise great things are to be expected." 
 
 And another contemporary says : " He seems 
 more occupied in ruling his kingdom than with the 
 ordinary pleasures of youth." 
 
 Little time indeed was left him, from the moment 
 of his accession, for the cultivation of the ordinary 
 pleasures of youth ; yet he had one considerable 
 love affair before his marriage. There was a beau- 
 tiful Court lady, called Ebba Brahe, sprung from 
 one of the proudest families in Sweden, with whom 
 he deliberately intended to share his throne. At 
 Skokloster, in Sweden, is preserved a fragment of 
 their correspondence, including some passionate 
 love-letters from the young King. While engaged 
 in the campaign against Russia in 1616, he sends her 
 in a letter an actual flower, " which the Germans call 
 Forget-me-not." He wrote sonnets to her while 
 away, and when at home played duets with her on 
 the flute. For some time his mother, who was a 
 lady of very decided character, watched the progress 
 of their passion with great anxiety. Then she finally 
 exacted from her son a promise that he would see 
 the lady no more for three years. Those were years 
 of war and of tribulation for Sweden, too severe and 
 too absorbing to allow the King's constancy to stand 
 the trial, and, at the end of the period, the Queen 
 Dowager triumphantly married the dangerous maid- 
 en to James de la Gardie. Nor is the young King 
 
40 Gustavus Adolphus. [t6ii-25 
 
 absolutely clear from less creditable connexions, for 
 he had, by a Dutch lady, a natural son, Gustaf Gus- 
 tafson, born in 1616 ; the boy won his spurs on the 
 field where his father met his death. It should be 
 mentioned that this instance is the sole record 
 against Gustavus in an age of almost universally 
 lax morality on such matters. Few indeed are the 
 trustworthy details respecting his personality that 
 remain to us ; and, were they more, I should be less 
 inclined to dwell upon them than upon his services 
 to his country and to the Protestant cause. Here 
 and there a touch comes out in his correspondence 
 or intercourse with his Chancellor, Axel Oxenstiern 
 (which for the most part consists of diplomatic and 
 military counsel given and received by both parties 
 with the most outspoken freedom) ; as when the 
 King says to his Chancellor : " You are so cold in 
 your proceedings that you act perpetually as a drag 
 on my activity " ; to which the latter replies : " If I 
 did not perpetually throw cold water on you, you 
 would catch fire and blaze up once for all." And 
 the same Chancellor makes use of the words " Im- 
 petus ingenii," in reference to the hastiness with 
 which, as the German war developed, the King 
 changed his plans, ever ready to meet or even to 
 provoke a new combination of foes. Most of the 
 correspondence between the King and his Chancel- 
 lor was published by Grimoard, at Paris, in 1790. 
 The King's impatience, which sometimes caused the 
 more prudent Oxenstiern a pang, is marked by a 
 story told of the days of his early manhood to the 
 effect that, having a sharp touch of fever, he sweated 
 
'611-25] Opening Years. 41 
 
 it off by a terrific fencing bout witli Count Peter 
 Brahe. 
 
 It is time that we should consider by what means 
 he succeeded in solving the problem of foreign 
 policy, to which reference has been made in the 
 previous chapter. 
 
 For two months after the death of Charles IX. 
 Sweden was without a King, for Gustavus was but 
 seventeen years old, and the age of legal majority 
 for Kings had been previously fixed at twenty-four. 
 The father had so far deferred to precedent that he 
 appointed a Council of Regency, though there is 
 little doubt that he foresaw that the Diet would at 
 once declare his son to be of full age. This in fact 
 happened at the Diet of Nykoping, and on the 17th 
 of December, 161 1, the Queen and the rest of the 
 Council of Regency laid down their power, and Gus- 
 tavus took his father's title, " Elected King and 
 Hereditary Prince of the Swedes, Goths, and Van- 
 dals." The foremost adviser of this young sover- 
 eign. Axel Oxenstiern, the Chancellor, was only 
 twenty-eight years of age ; and these two now sat 
 down to play in earnest the great game of war 
 against all the powers of Northern Europe. The 
 stake was the very national existence of Sweden. ' 
 
 And first for the Danish war. The hero who 
 ended in triumphing over Catholic Europe in arms, 
 had first to seek the keys of his own kingdom from 
 the King of Denmark. We left Christian in posses- 
 sion of the two most important fortresses of Sweden, 
 Kalmar and Elfsborg. One year of terrible fron- 
 tier war, in which Gustavus nearly lost his life by 
 
42 Gustavus Adolphus. 11611-25 
 
 falling, horse and all, through the ice on the lake of 
 Widsjo, in one of those winter battles on that "fifth 
 element " which has added such dramatic horrors to 
 Northern warfare, left Denmark still in possession 
 of these fortresses. But Gustavus succeeded in in- 
 spiring in the peasants on the frontier, and above all 
 in Dalecarlia, a personal affection and an energy 
 which made any permanent occupation of Sweden 
 by the Danes a moral impossibility. And on the 
 side of Denmark there were influences tending to 
 peace. The nobles dreaded any great personal 
 ascendency of their King, such as was likely to 
 be the result of a too successful war, and Christian 
 himself was not the man to pursue any plan very 
 consistently. In this state of things the mediation 
 by Christian's brother-in-law, James I., of Great 
 Britain, was accepted by both sides. The Peace of 
 Knarod, 19th January, 161 3, began, as all treaties in 
 all ages have begun, with an article which meant 
 nothing; Denmark was to continue to carry the 
 three crowns on her arms, " without thereby raising 
 any claims on Sweden." More important was the 
 giving back of Kalmar to Sweden, and the retention 
 of Elfsborg by Denmark in pawn for six years, or 
 until a million dollars * were paid for its redemption. 
 If not redeemed within the six years, it was to re- 
 main to Denmark. It is a proof that Gustavus and 
 Oxenstiern were as good rulers at home as they 
 were statesmen abroad, that the payment was made 
 within tivo years, not of course without heavy taxa- 
 tion, which for this great object was, on the whole, 
 
 * A Swedish Rikstaler equals about 3^^. td. English money. 
 
'^"■251 Opening Years. 43 
 
 cheerfully borne. It was not a glorious peace nor a 
 glorious beginning to a new reign, but it was a use- 
 ful and necessary peace, and Gustavus, though he 
 was incessantly thwarted and provoked by him 
 throughout his life, never had to draw sword against 
 Christian again. 
 
 Secondly, his attention was engaged by the Rus- 
 sian war. Gustavus refused, as we have already 
 seen, to place his younger brother on the throne of 
 the Czar, as De la Gardie, the Swedish commander 
 in Russia, was anxious to do ; but the sixteen-year- 
 old Michael Romanoff, who now appeared first as 
 the puppet, then the leader, of the National party in 
 Russia, had hardly fewer difficulties to contend with 
 than Gustavus himself. In 1614, the King of Swe- 
 den appeared at Narva at the head of his troops, 
 and stormed Augdoff, and in the following year 
 Pleskoff. The Swedes were almost everywhere vic- 
 torious, but the campaigns were frequently inter- 
 rupted by negotiation, in which England and 
 Holland carried on a diplomatic strife at Moscow; 
 the former, on account of her commercial relations, 
 leaning to Russia, the latter (who had got promises 
 from Charles IX. of free entry to Livonia and the 
 Baltic provinces), for similar reasons, to Sweden. 
 Between their diplomacy and the terror of the 
 Swedish armies, was hammered out the Peace of 
 Stolbova, 27th February, 1617, by which Russia 
 ceded to Sweden the provinces of Ingria and 
 Carelia, henceforward to be the barrier between 
 herself and the sea. These provinces included the 
 fortresses of Kexholm, Noteborg, Ivangorod, Jama, 
 
44 Gustavus Adolphus. [1611-25 
 
 and Koporie, and were, as the King of Sweden 
 wrote to his mother, the keys at the same time 
 of Finland and of Livonia ; " and if at any time 
 Russia should get them back and learn her strength, 
 she would be able not only to attack Finland on 
 both sides, but also to set such a fleet on the Baltic 
 as would endanger our Fatherland." Geijer, who 
 quotes the letter in extenso, adds that the King 
 writes as if he had foreseen the plans of Peter the 
 Great. A later famous warrior King of Sweden,* 
 who possessed some of Gustavus's great qualities, 
 but who was destined to undo all, and more than 
 all, his work, might well have taken warning from 
 the views here expressed. " Now," said Gustavus 
 to the Estates of Sweden, on his triumphant return 
 from the Russian war, " this enemy cannot launch a 
 boat on the Baltic without our permission. The 
 great lakes of Ladoga and Peipus, thirty miles of 
 morasses and several great fortresses, are enough to 
 keep him off from us. I hope, in God's Name, he 
 will find this brook a tough one to jump over." 
 The ground whereon St. Petersburg now stands 
 thus passed to the crown of Sweden, and the 
 foundation of the foreign greatness of the latter 
 Power may be said to have been laid. It was after 
 this Russian war that Gustavus's name began to be 
 celebrated in Europe. Skytte writes to Oxenstiern 
 from London at the end of 1617, that, in the course 
 of his recent journey to Denmark, Liibeck, Holland, 
 and England, he has heard loud praises of his master 
 everywhere. 
 
 * Charles XII. — not, of course, a descendant of Gustavus. See table. 
 
1611-25] Opening Years. 45 
 
 But it was in the Polish war above all that the 
 young King really founded his European reputa- 
 tion. The campaigns of the 1620 decade were to 
 him, to some extent, what the Egyptian campaign 
 was to the first Napoleon, for it was in these that he 
 trained and attached to himself that brilliant array 
 of generals who afterwards carried out his ideas. 
 Besides old James de la Gardie (whom the King 
 persisted in calling " his master "), Gustavus Horn, 
 John Banfer, Torstenson, and Wrangel were all with 
 him in Poland. It is to this period, too, that his 
 more important innovations in the art of war really 
 belong, though it will be convenient for our purpose 
 to postpone consideration of these for the present. 
 Lastly, it was in the Polish war that he first actually 
 crossed swords with Imperialist troops. This is just 
 the reason why it is impossible to make any sharp 
 division between the Polish question and the Ger- 
 man question. 1 am obliged to let them run into 
 one another, both from a diplomatic and a military 
 point of view. But I promise to pause as soon as 
 we stand with Gustavus at Peenemunde on his first 
 entrenched camp on German soil, on the 26th of 
 June, 1630. 
 
 We are yet far from that glorious division in his 
 career. At the end of the Russian war Sweden 
 was in a very bad state. She was beginning to feel — 
 what a poor country always will feel, however well 
 governed it may be — the strain of a war of which the 
 advantages, though certain, were future, and she 
 was not yet so well organised for offensive warfare 
 on a grand scale as she was ten years later. Yet to 
 
46 Gustavus Adolphus. [161V25 
 
 prolong the armistice, with a still unbeaten Poland, 
 would be more dangerous than war ; internal quiet 
 could never be assured as long as Sigismund was an 
 BjCtual and active pretender to the Swedish crown. 
 He must be made tacitly, if not expressly, to re- 
 nounce these claims, or must be shewn that it was very 
 much more impossible for these claims to succeed 
 than he at present imagined. And worse than Sigis- 
 mund, I must be allowed to repeat again, was that 
 which was behind Sigismund. We are within a year 
 of the actual outbreak of the Thirty Years' War. The 
 sky over Europe was black with the coming clouds, 
 and the clouds were bursting with electricity. Sigis- 
 mund was energetically seeking aid from the Courts 
 of Vienna and Madrid. Madrid and Vienna, which 
 perhaps looked forward to a " walk over the course," 
 were hardly yet alive to the importance of assisting 
 Sigismund with all their forces ; but the former sent 
 him a little gold to pay his troops, and the latter a 
 great many Jesuits to strengthen his purpose. Spain 
 seemed ready to prolong her truce with Holland, if 
 only she could make such an alliance with Denmark 
 as would give her the mastery of the Sound, and 
 Denmark was not unwilHng to lend an ear to the 
 tempter. 
 
 Against this combination, should it ever come 
 about, Gustavus had nothing to speak of in the way 
 of allies ; he was completely unprepared, when in 
 1 617, immediately after the conclusion of his peace 
 with Russia, he heard that Sigismund was hurling 
 troops on that portion of Livonia which Sweden 
 held. Poland, however, was incapable of a sus- 
 
1615-25] Opening Years. ^y 
 
 tained effort, and though the campaign of 1617 and 
 161 8 were not on the whole productive of any 
 success to Sweden, they assured Gustavus that 
 Esthonia and the newly acquired provinces could 
 at least defend themselves ; and at the end of 161 8 
 he concluded a two years' armistice, afterwards pro- 
 longed to July, 1621. Meanwhile his diplomacy was 
 not inactive. Holland saw no very good reason 
 why her truce with Spain should not expire at the 
 appointed time, and, though Prince Maurice was no 
 great friend to Sweden, his opponent, Barneveldt, 
 was ; and Barneveldt at this time led the richest 
 and most powerful corporate body that represented 
 Dutch public opinion, and rendered excellent ser- 
 vice in inducing the Elector of Brandenburg to 
 consent to the marriage of Gustavus with his daugh- 
 ter, as the preliminary basis for an alliance with 
 Sweden. But parties at the Hague were too nearly 
 balanced to allow of more, and in 1619 came the 
 revolution, which led to the death of Barneveldt, 
 and which left a deep stain on the character of 
 Maurice of Nassau. It is very interesting to see 
 that it was in these Dutch-Swedish negotiations 
 that the idea was first mooted (by Holland) of hav- 
 ing a canal dug from the Oder to the Elbe, and 
 thus evading the tolls of the Sound. Denmark an- 
 swered with the foundation (1617) of the fortress of 
 Gliickstadt at the mouth of the Elbe, opposite Ham- 
 burg, a fortress which would have endangered the 
 free trafific on such a canal. The canal project was 
 afterwards carried out by the " Great Elector " of 
 Brandenburg. 
 
48 Gustavus Adolphus. [i6ii-25 
 
 John Sigismund, the ruling Elector, did not at all 
 like the idea of the Swedish marriage when it was 
 first proposed to him. But Gustavus, who, we already 
 know, had a taste for adventures, visited the Court 
 of Berlin in disguise, to have a look at the lady; 
 that there was little but political love in question 
 was to be seen from the fact that in 1618 the 
 young King actually proposed that Maria Eleanora 
 should marry Prince Charles of England, and he 
 himself take her sister instead. In 1620 he car- 
 ried out another secret visit under the name of Cap- 
 tain Gars (G. A. Rex Suecise), and being apparently 
 more satisfied with the charms of his bride than it 
 is easy to be with her portrait, and having obtained 
 to some extent her mother's consent (her father 
 was just dead from a paralytic stroke), he sent Oxen- 
 stiern in August, 1620, to fetch her home to Stock- 
 holm. It is, however, worthy of note that on this 
 second visit he made a detour to the Palatinate and 
 the Rhine. Who knows what thoughts may have 
 been in his heart ? The Elector Palatine could 
 not be present to welcome Captain Gars, for he had 
 just established himself on another man's throne at 
 Prague. 
 
 The marriage thus accomplished gave Gustavus a 
 new link with German Protestantism. The young 
 Elector, George William of Brandenburg, had been 
 tolerably passive in this matter, as in most other 
 matters of his eventful life. Sigismund, his over- 
 lord, had indeed threatened to refuse him investiture 
 with the Duchy of Prussia (which, it must always be 
 remembered was a Polish fief), if he consented to 
 
1611-25] Opening Years. 49 
 
 the marriage ; but he probably knew that Sigismund 
 was not Hkely to carry out the threat. And, anyhow, 
 George William's new brother-in-law was sure to 
 keep Sigismund's hands pretty well tied for years to 
 come. 
 
 This was just what Gustavus was resolved to do. 
 The campaign of 1621 against Poland was to be a 
 marked one in the history of Sweden. The famous 
 new articles of war, of which more hereafter, were 
 recited to the Swedish army, which was assembled 
 at Elfsnabben in July, twenty-four thousand strong, 
 ready to be transported on one hundred and fifty- 
 eight vessels to the mouth of the Dwina, in Livonia. 
 The war opened with the siege of Riga. 
 
 At all periods in her history Poland was capable 
 of making sudden efforts, which surprised her 
 enemies; and the little garrison of Riga, although 
 Livonia was, as a whole, by no means well affected 
 to Sigismund, made a gallant stand. But isolated 
 stands are of little effect, when a government is 
 going down hill as fast as that of Poland now was, 
 and when there is no national unity to take the 
 place of a government. Sigismund had his hands 
 full on the south as well ; he was involved in a war 
 with the Turks, who had beaten him at J assy in the 
 previous year. The Imperial help, which had been 
 promised, was not sent, and the King of Poland left 
 Riga to its fate. The town surrendered on the i6th 
 of September, and Gustavus pressed on through 
 Kurland, took Mittau, and retired for the winter to 
 Sweden. During the campaign his only brother 
 Charles Philip, who was a youth of great promise. 
 
50 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
 [1611-25 
 
 had died. Gustavus was deeply grieved ; but the 
 shrewd Chancellor Oxenstiern rejoiced over a loss 
 which, together with that of Duke John and his 
 wife, a little while before, rendered back to the 
 crown two great appanages, and left its wearer free 
 from all those dangers of pretenders within the 
 family which had been so disastrously exemplified 
 in the recent history of Sweden. In June, 1622, 
 Sigismund was glad to conclude a new armistice on 
 the basis of uti possidetis, which left Sweden in full 
 possession of Livonia, and of several isolated places 
 in Kurland. This armistice was prolonged until 
 June I, 1625, although it was all but broken by both 
 parties on more than one occasion. It was, however, 
 of inestimable advantage to Gustavus, as it enabled 
 him to turn his eyes westward, whither we mvst 
 now also look. 
 
 MEDAL OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS' 
 CORONATION.— 1617. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 ? — ' - i i ■ 
 
 ■^•^ 
 
 
 
 .V5 
 
 M 
 
 a, 
 
 
 
 a 
 <! 
 
 m 
 
 h 
 
 M 
 
 
 
 
 
 < 
 
 
 1— c 
 
 E 
 <i 
 
 Q 
 W 
 
THE BEGINNING OF THE THIRTY 
 YEARS' WAR. 
 
 HE Thirty Years' War may be viewed 
 from two aspects — an European and 
 a German one. In respect of the 
 first, it was the last of the great religious wars, 
 closing the epoch of Reformation and Counter- 
 Reformation, proving to the Catholic Powers of 
 Europe that their ideal unity was no longer attain- 
 able, and teaching mankind, by the rudest possible 
 process, the hard lesson of toleration. In respect of 
 the second, it had a somewhat similar effect. Ger- 
 many was an Europe in miniature ; her nominal 
 unity under the Hapsburgs was a parallel to the 
 Catholic ideal unity of Europe under the Pope and 
 the Emperor. This unity was blasted forever by 
 the muskets of the opposing armies. But worse 
 than this ; when the war began Germany was a rich 
 country, as the countries of Europe then went. She 
 was really full of cities, which, though their main 
 threads of commerce were fast snapping, might yet 
 fairly be called very flourishing. When the war ended 
 she was a desert ; 
 
52 Gustavus Adolphus. [I6I8-27 
 
 "Her graves with corpses swelling 
 And mouldering heroes' bones, — 
 Heroes of fame excelling 
 Whatever earth- has known." 
 
 It is, however, from neither of these aspects that 
 we have mainly to consider this disastrous war. We 
 have to look at it from a third point of view — the 
 Swedish. In this aspect Germany merely becomes 
 the stage on which our Hero is to fret his brief 
 hour, and to do the deeds for the good cause of 
 Protestantism which have entitled him to the gar- 
 land of immortality. 
 
 I do not propose to go into the direct causes of 
 the great struggle ; they are well known, and I 
 should feel that it was out of place for me to wan- 
 der off into such a very well beaten track. The 
 indirect causes simply resolve themselves into two : 
 (i) the determination of Catholicism to make one 
 grand effort to re-fetter a half-liberated Europe ; (2) 
 the determination of an able and energetic man to 
 make the Imperial rule a reality in Germany. The 
 two are inextricably mixed up ; yet it was the 
 second design which ultimately ruined the first. 
 The Catholic princes of Germany, and especially the 
 ablest of them all, Maximilian of Bavaria, were 
 heart and soul in favour of the first. Yet Maxi- 
 milian of Bavaria was the man who again and again 
 threw himself into neutrality, or the arms of France, 
 rather than submit to the second. But without 
 Maximilian, who was the leader of two thirds of 
 German Catholicism, the Emperor Ferdinand was 
 powerless. The German princes were not bad men, 
 
EMPEROR FERDINAND II. 
 
1618-27] The Thirty Years War. 53 
 
 but they lived wholly in the ideas of the past, and 
 were unable to see that Germany, if it were to be 
 consolidated, must submit to the natural result of 
 consolidation. To the Catholics the choice was 
 given between an united nation, under a prince of 
 their own creed, and religious defeat, coupled with 
 the maintenance of the old anarchy. They loved 
 anarchy so well that they embraced the latter 
 alternative. 
 
 The Protestant princes were hardly less foolish. 
 Even more than the Catholics they lived in the 
 ideas of the past, and they were, moreover, torn by 
 the religious dispute between Calvinists and Luther- 
 ans into two hostile factions incapable of recog- 
 nising their common interest or of uniting against 
 their common enemy. They had to be driven to 
 fight in their own cause, one might almost say, at 
 the point of the pike ; even then they frequently 
 stood aside, and in the end practically allowed 
 Frenchmen and Swedes to do the business for them. 
 Not unnaturally these allies soon came to think 
 more of their own business. The French, and small 
 blame to them, did so from the very first. Happily, 
 however, we have not got to consider the last six- 
 teen pages of that awful record, — the most awful, 
 in some respects, that disfigure the book of history. 
 When Gustavus died, the two great designs of the 
 House of Hapsburg had already been overthrown, 
 and it was his arm that had done it ; but yet the 
 war was only half over. 
 
 From a Swedish point of view we may say that 
 the Thirty Years' War began when Spain turned 
 
54 Gustavus Adolphus. [1618-27 
 
 her thoughts from Poland to Austria. Spain gradu- 
 ally came to see that Sigismund's game was practi- 
 cally played out, whereas Ferdinand was a man of 
 great promise from the Spanish point of view. 
 Ferdinand might rule on the Baltic — even on both 
 sides, if things turned out well. Sigismund might 
 be rehabilitated afterwards. The universal monarchy 
 of the Austro-Spanish House, so long a dream, should 
 now become a reality. So things were, when the 
 Bohemian succession question suddenly gave the 
 Powers the word to prepare for action. The Bo- 
 hemian revolution (1618) was undoubtedly the result 
 of bad government and violated charters. The Bo- 
 hemian crown had undoubtedly been once elective. 
 But that was one hundred and fifty years ago. It 
 was just the sort of question upon which the kind of 
 creature termed a " publicist " (a tame one was kept 
 by most of the German Princes in order to rake up 
 old succession claims on their neighbours' territory), 
 would expend many years in writing many folios, 
 without coming much nearer a solution. But the 
 time for folios was past. Bohemia troubled herself 
 little about the rights and wrongs of her cause. She 
 boldly turned to the natural head of German Protes- 
 tantism, and offered him the crown. The Elector 
 Palatine was undoubtedly the natural head of Ger- 
 man Protestantism. His geographical position as 
 guardian of the Rhine, the richness of his territory, 
 the constant help which his father had sent to the 
 Netherlands, the friendship of that father for Eliza- 
 beth of England, the former marriage of his aunt to 
 Charles IX. of Sweden, all pointed him out as the 
 
1618-27J The Thirty Years War. 55 
 
 leader of the cause. Above all, in 1610 the Elector 
 Frederick, himself then seventeen years old, had 
 married Elizabeth Stuart. He thus appeared to 
 possess every possible qualification and advantage 
 for the task. But he lacked one qualification. He 
 was a fool. 
 
 It is not half enough remembered how earnest all 
 Frederick's friends were against his accepting the 
 Bohemian crown : the College of Electors, his own 
 Estates, his mother, and his wife * all said no. It is 
 pretty well known that his father-in-law. King James 
 of England, could not bring himself to say either 
 yes or no. James's attitude was not an, unintelligent 
 one, but it was not one suited to the times. What 
 he practically said was this : " I don't approve of 
 one prince seizing another prince's crown ; Heaven 
 forbid. But I am aware that the balance of Europe 
 needs redressing against the Catholics. You say the 
 Bohemian Constitution is elective ; it seems to me 
 
 more than doubtful, but if it is so " And there 
 
 he stopped. Frederick looked on his reserve as the 
 silence which gave consent, and on the 31st of 
 October, 1619, entered Prague. He did not ask 
 Gustavus's advice until after the event. Gustavus, 
 it is true, was not the man to desert a relation when 
 in trouble, and he sent an embassy to Prague in the 
 brief winter of Frederick's reign to see how the land 
 lay. He even acknowledged the obligation to help, 
 but made anything that he could do depend abso- 
 lutely on the unity of Holland and England in the 
 same cause. That Poland was just going to break 
 
 * At least so says Droysen. 
 
56 Gustavus Adolphus. [1618-27 
 
 the armistice he knew, but he thought it possible 
 that his principle, that "all wars on Europe hang 
 together," might be exemplified here, and that in 
 fighting Poland he might really be striking a blow 
 for Frederick. But the combination of Holland 
 and England remained an idea, and Gustavus sat 
 still. Then on the 8th of November, 1620, came 
 the battle of Prague, and Frederick and his bright 
 Elizabeth became wanderers on the face of Europe. 
 For the war blazed out in a moment on all sides, 
 the Valteline and the Palatinate being the two 
 points of greatest interest for Spain. It was Spain's 
 war to begin with, even more than Ferdinand's ; 
 nay, it was possible that Ferdinand's patriotism 
 might at any moment take fire at seeing a foreign 
 power in possession of Imperial territory, even 
 though that power were his dear cousin Philip of 
 Spain. Philip, however, did not much care, and 
 had got fast hold of the western portion of the 
 Lower Palatinate by the end of 1622. 
 
 From whence could help to Frederick come ? 
 Only from one of the three Northern Powers, Eng- 
 land, Denmark, or Sweden. What the help of the 
 two former was worth the event showed ; one day 
 they were all for stirring up a league of German 
 Protestant princes (such a league did, in fact, already 
 exist, called, perhaps in irony, the " Union," but 
 was at this very moment hastening to its dissolu- 
 tion) ; the next, they advised Frederick to cast 
 himself at the Emperor's feet and beg for mercy. 
 Droysen quotes a remark of a Swedish diplomatist, 
 which not unaptly illustrates the view which his 
 
1618-27] The Thirty Years' War. 57 
 
 master probably took of James, though I have little 
 doubt that it was a grossly unfair view : " God have 
 pity on him," writes this man ; " he must be either 
 a papist or a beast." England, however, differed 
 from Denmark in this, that she had no object of her 
 own to pursue, whereas Christian was perpetually 
 hankering after German bishoprics — especially the 
 Archbishopric of Bremen, which would give him 
 command of the mouth of the Weser. And these 
 objects he hoped to gain now in alliance with, now 
 in opposition to, the Emperor. He was always 
 "temptable," so to speak, from his somewhat easy 
 Protestantism by such a bait as this ; and still more 
 by anyone who could work upon his jealousy of 
 Sweden. How this jealousy must have increased, 
 when he saw the rapid substitution of Swedish for 
 Russian and Polish influence in the Eastern Baltic ! 
 Rightly indeed Gustavus stood aside from all 
 schemes, which depended upon allies in whose 
 policy revolutions of this kind might at any moment 
 occur. 
 
 We must not allow ourselves to be diverted from 
 Gustavus in order to follow the fortunes of poor 
 Frederick. It is sufficient to remember that, until 
 1625, no foreign help worth having reached him, or 
 any of the German Protestant leaders, who took up 
 arms on his behalf. England, France, Sweden, and 
 Denmark intrigued and planned to interfere, but in 
 vain — the jealousy of France thwarted England, the 
 stupid blunders of Buckingham thwarted France. 
 England alternately cringed to and bearded Spain, 
 who smiled grimly as she tightened her grasp on the 
 
58 Gustavus Adolphus. [1 618-27 
 
 Lower Palatinate. The Upper Palatinate with the 
 Electoral title was handed over, at first secretly by 
 Ferdinand (1621), then openly with the consent of 
 a majority of the Electoral College (1623), to Maxi- 
 milian, of Bavaria, who had defensible though anti- 
 quated claims to it. In the year 1624 Mansfeld, an 
 adventurer with a strong dash of the hero in him, 
 was skipping to and fro between France, England, 
 and Holland, laying schemes before the rulers of 
 these countries for raising on behalf of Frederick a 
 large army to be paid by them. But the aims of all 
 three countries were different ; it was not to restore 
 Frederick that France would take up arms ; it was 
 not to a Mansfeld that Richelieu, who now began 
 to take the lead in French foreign affairs, would 
 give three hundred and sixty thousand francs a 
 month, if any other method of attacking Austria 
 could be found. Richelieu might do a little if Eng- 
 land would help too ; and Mansfeld, who was en- 
 thusiastically received in London as a Protestant 
 hero, got an impressed army of twelve thousand 
 men and plenty of promises from James. James 
 was also being solicited in this last year of his life 
 by his brother-in-law of Denmark, for the same 
 purpose. He promised to both, and left Charles to 
 fulfil to neither. The natural result was, that the 
 Catholic arms were everywhere victorious in Ger- 
 many. 
 
 The only figure that stands out clearly upon this 
 lurid canvas is the King of Sweden. His position 
 was this : he was most anxious to strike a blow for 
 the Protestant cause ; he was anxious to do so in 
 
1618-27] The Thirty Years War. 59 
 
 alliance with Denmark ; he was even willing that 
 Denmark should anticipate him in doing so, if there 
 were any probability of success. But he could not 
 do so, any more than Christian could, alone. Swe- 
 den was too poor to attack the Emperor and Spain 
 without large foreign subsidies. She might at any 
 moment be again involved in the weary war with 
 Poland ; she might need all her resources to defend 
 her own coasts, if the victorious Catholic Powers 
 got much further. And Gustavus had watched the 
 early course of the war enough to see that adven- 
 turers like Mansfeld and Christian of Anhalt were 
 ruining their own cause. He had good reason to 
 distrust Denmark, though he shewed himself eager 
 to bury his distrust. He and Richelieu, probably 
 alone of the rulers of Europe, foresaw the serious- 
 ness of the issue at stake. They alone knew that 
 the road to the restoration of the balance of power 
 in Europe was to attack Austria and Spain them- 
 selves wherever they were strong ; that the whole 
 thing meant nothing less than a life and death 
 struggle with the House of Hapsburg. Compared to 
 this all minor questions, such as the restoration of 
 Frederick, were of very small importance. 
 
 England is not to be blamed for not entering into 
 such far-reaching plans as these. They were plans 
 that could only be brought to a satisfactory conclu- 
 sion by an alliance of all the Protestant princes of 
 Germany and of Europe, with France at the head — 
 France " Catholic at home, Protestant abroad," — 
 and lavishly fed by French or English gold. Even 
 then Gustavus's first task would lie rather in the 
 
6o Gustavus Adolphus. [1618-27 
 
 direction of Poland. At this time, whenever — and 
 it is very often — he writes of any direct attack 
 upon the Empire, it is nearly always to be an attack 
 through Silesia upon the hereditary countries of Aus- 
 tria. Such an attack must necessarily pass over the 
 prostrate body of Poland. One other plan of attack 
 he indeed did propose, and it is an interesting one, 
 for it unveiled all the subsequent Swedish plans. 
 Oxenstiern, who, we must remember, always acted 
 as the drag upon his impetuous master, and refused 
 to look upon the Thirty Years' War from anything 
 but a purely Swedish point of view, said after 
 Gustavus's death : " The first thing that impelled 
 his late Majesty of blessed memory to the German 
 expedition, was his desire of erecting a Bastion for 
 Sweden to the south of the Baltic." The King 
 himself, in his last farewell to the Swedish Estates 
 in 1630, said : " This is a war for the defence of 
 our Fatherland. Either we must go and find the 
 Emperor at Stralsund, or he will come and find 
 us at Kalmar." He said almost as much in the pro- 
 posals which he made in 1624 to England. He 
 would enter the war for the defence of the Protes- 
 tant cause only on stringent conditions ; and these 
 were : (i) That he must be assured of having a 
 port to the south of the Baltic, or on the North Sea, 
 as a basis of operations (Stettin and Wismar were 
 both mentioned) ; (2) that he should have a much 
 larger subsidy, either from England or France, than 
 that with which Christian of Denmark (who was, at 
 the same time, negotiating with England) would be 
 content ; (3) that an English fleet should enter the 
 
1618-27] The Thirty Years War. 6i 
 
 Sound and keep Denmark absolutely quiet ; (4) 
 that he, Gustavus, was to have the absolute com- 
 mand of all forces to be raised by himself or his 
 allies. Ready for either this or the Silesian plan, 
 he quietly matured his resources throughout the 
 years 1624 and 1625, and practically indicated that, 
 if neither were accepted, he should go and deal his 
 final blow at Poland by himself. 
 
 His ambassadors met those of Christian in Lon- 
 don, and, after much negotiation, the terms offered 
 by Christian prevailed with the Court of England. 
 Christian was to support an army of twenty-eight 
 thousand foot and seven thousand horse for the 
 defence of the Lower Saxon Circle (that portion of 
 Germany lying immediately south of Denmark and 
 including Christian's own Duchy of Holstein) ; Eng- 
 land was to pay thirty thousand pounds a month, 
 Holland fifty thousand florins. This treaty was 
 concluded on December 9, 1625, and Christian im- 
 mediately prepared to translate it into action. What 
 finally determined Christian to engage was probably 
 the invasion of the Lower Saxon Circle, a year be- 
 fore, by Tilly, the general of the Catholic League. 
 With a heavy heart, Gustavus, after repeated offers 
 of assistance to Christian upon reasonable condi- 
 tions, turned to the eastward, as soon as he saw 
 that neither England nor Denmark would write to 
 him. Long before the actual terms of Christian's 
 treaty were settled he was overrunning Kurland. 
 
 Sweden, altogether left out by the Protestant 
 allies, and then abused for deserting the cause, had 
 at least one field open to her in which she would 
 
62 Gustavus Adolphus. t16l8-27 
 
 not need their co-operation. The campaign of 1625 
 resulted in the' complete capture of all the strong 
 places in Kurland and the few that remained un- 
 taken in Livonia ; and an advance was even made 
 into Lithuania. Right into the winter fighting was 
 pushed on ; Gustavus's troops were better clad than 
 the Poles ; he took care to provide them with fur- 
 lined boots, made waterproof by oil, and two pairs 
 of thick stockings each. He defeated Sapieha and 
 Gosieowski, the Polish generals, in a pitched battle 
 at Wallhof, on the 6th of January, 1626; then leav- 
 ing De la Gardie to command in Livonia, he returned 
 to Sweden, to prepare to renew the attack in the 
 summer from another quarter. The Vistula instead 
 of the Dwina was to be his theatre of operation — no 
 doubt with the idea that by this means he would 
 be nearer to Germany in case of opportunity. He 
 could not give up j|^e idea that his duty and fortune 
 would sooner or later call him to Germany, in spite 
 of the slights that he had recently received. If the 
 operations on the Vistula were very successful he 
 might advance to Silesia, and hold out a hand on 
 the left to Bethlen Gabor,* the Protestant Prince of 
 Transylvania, who lived in a chronic state of war 
 with Ferdinand in Hungary, and who was besides 
 one of his (Gustavus's) great admirers ; and a hand 
 on the right to Christian of Denmark, or to Mans- 
 feld, as the case might be. Anyhow he would be 
 able to act against Sigismund from his new basis in 
 the best possible way. To shut Poland altogether 
 
 * Bethlen had married in 1624 a Brandenburg princess, sister of 
 Gustavus's own wife. 
 
1618-27] The Thirty Years War. 63 
 
 off from the sea, as he had. already shut off Russia, 
 would be the greatest service he could render to 
 Sweden. For this end he determined, if possible, 
 to make Dantzic his sedes belli, as he called it. 
 But Dantzic was not easy to take. It was by far 
 the richest city in Eastern Europe, not even except- 
 ing Novgorod ; it had been one of the most impor- 
 tant trading stations of the Hansa, and it had main- 
 tained the status of a free city, with a very nominal 
 allegiance to the crown of Poland. It was just the 
 failure to take Dantzic which caused the partial 
 failure of the four campaigns of 1626-27-28-29. 
 From a military point of view Gustavus learnt from 
 this failure a very valuable lesson, namely, that it is 
 next to impossible to take a town which can be pro- 
 visioned from the sea, unless you have a fleet strong 
 enough to enforce an absolute blockade. This ex- 
 perience he turned to good account when he aided 
 the heroic defence of Stralsund. A still more strik- 
 ing proof of the truth was seen in the English civil 
 war, in the hopeless failure of the Royalist com- 
 manders to take Plymouth and Hull, and even such 
 a wretched mud-walled village as Lyme-Regis. 
 
 In the campaign of 1626 Gustavus had political as 
 well as military difficulties to contend with. He 
 was about to land in the Duchy of Prussia, the ter- 
 ritory of his own brother-in-law, George William of 
 Brandenburg. He must have one port handed over 
 to him, as a sedes belli, or else take one by force ; 
 and he was most unwilling to proceed to the latter 
 extremity. On the iSth of June he set sail with a 
 large force and one hundred and fifty ships, and 
 
64 Gustavus Adolphus. [1618-27 
 
 landed close to Pillau, a strong cliff fortification on 
 the Prussian coast. He came, he said, as the friend 
 of his brother-in-law, and only asked for a peaceful 
 march through his duchy, and the temporary pos- 
 session of the fortress of Pillau, in order to cover his 
 re-embarkation. One feels a good deal of pity for 
 the Elector of Brandenburg in this unfortunate di- 
 lemma between his overlord and his brother-in-law. 
 He acted after his kind, and asked for three weeks 
 to consider whether he would give up Pillau. Weeks 
 were precious, and Gustavus refused ; then helped 
 himself to Pillau, which was instantly evacuated by 
 the small Prussian garrison. Having thus secured 
 his basis, he advanced into the country. To George 
 William he sent continual messages beseeching him 
 to take up arms against Sigismund. Very possibly he 
 had no right to take Pillau ; he was ready to admit 
 it ; but there are cases where necessity must over- 
 ride legal right ; he was engaged in war with the King 
 of Poland, and Pillau was a convenient port in which 
 to secure his fleet — the only one he could at the 
 moment find. " If I had meant any hostility to 
 you, I should not have left such a strong place as 
 Konigsberg untaken in my rear." Finally : " I 
 know that you would like to remain neutral, but 
 neutrality will break your neck. You must hold 
 either with me or with Poland. I am your fellow- 
 Protestant — your brother-in-law ; I will fight for you 
 and defend your city. I have good engineers with 
 me, am no fool at the trade myself, and make no 
 doubt but to defend it against the King of Poland 
 or the Devil himself. My troops are poor Swedish 
 
01 
 
 CD 
 
 7 
 
 d 
 
 3 
 J 
 w 
 
 (/) 
 
 tt 
 w 
 
 h 
 
 W 
 w 
 
 D 
 
 a. 
 
 J 
 
 
 Q 
 < 
 M 
 
 > 
 << 
 h 
 m 
 D 
 
 
1618-271 The Thirty Years' War. 65 
 
 peasant fellows, it 's true, squalid and ill-dressed ; 
 but they can smite hard, and shall soon have finer 
 clothes." 
 
 The town of Konigsberg he frightened into neu- 
 trality by telling it that, if it did not swear to be 
 neutral, he would first take Elbing and the other 
 neighbouring fortresses, and then Konigsberg itself. 
 Konigsberg swore, but not until Gustavus had taken 
 Elbing and Marienburg, and begun the blockade of 
 Dantzic. The poor Elector found himself worse 
 and worse off, and he was already in the toils of Im- 
 perial diplomacy. Count Dohna, Ferdinand's ambas- 
 sador, was at that very moment listening to George 
 William's groans over his brother-in-law's wickedness, 
 although that brother-in-law had scrupulously avoided 
 taking any of his fortresses except Pillau, and was in 
 fact already out of Ducal Prussia in the territories of 
 Sigismund. A glance at the map will show (in 
 reading this campaign one is apt to forget it) that 
 there were two Prussias; and that one of them 
 (West Prussia) belonged to Poland entirely (and was 
 only redeemed in 1772). It was this Polish province 
 which was to be the seat of war, and, with the ex- 
 ception of Dantzic, the King of Sweden practically 
 overran all the northern half of it in the first cam- 
 paign. Braunsberg, Frauenburg, Dirschau all fell 
 into his hands. The last place was of the greater 
 importance because it commanded the Vistula a little 
 above Dantzic. Here a bridge was built, and the 
 trade of that city with the interior at once cut off. 
 
 The great rapidity of this conquest of Prussia may 
 be partly accounted for by the fact that the inhabitants 
 5 
 
66 Gustavus Adolphus. [1618-27 
 
 were nearly all Lutherans, and looked upon Sweden 
 as their deliverer from the persecution of Sigismund. 
 Gustavus systematically confiscated the goods of the 
 Jesuits and Catholic priests, and shewed himself far 
 less tolerant here, than he was to do later in Ger- 
 many. At the same time, everyone who put him- 
 self under the protection of the Swedish crown was 
 declared inviolable. Forced contributions were levied 
 with perfect order on the rest of the country. All 
 was made into a daily common stock for the army, 
 and anyone caught plundering on his own account 
 was hanged on the spot. Sigismund meantime was 
 collecting his Army at Graudenz, anxious to relieve 
 Dantzic. The numerous garrisons, which Gustavus 
 had been obliged to leave in the captured towns, had 
 weakened his force ; and Sigismund had got a corps 
 of five thousand Austrian troops to assist him. It 
 was the first time that the Imperialists actually crossed 
 swords with the Swedes ; these men, however, were 
 not sent directly by the Emperor, but merely bought 
 by Sigismund from a Gottorp Prince, who happened 
 to have been in command of them. The only thing 
 they did was to sit down before the small fortress of 
 Mewe. It is to be noticed that it was before all 
 things Wallenstein's advice to send as many troops 
 as possible to help Sigismund against Sweden. That 
 baleful star was now beginning to be in the ascend- 
 ant, not indeed at the Council Board at Vienna, nor 
 in the Imperial Diet, but among those private coun- 
 sellors, Eggenberg, Lammermann, and Harrach, 
 upon whom Ferdinand principally relied. Wallen- 
 stein dreaded, that which Holland desired, that Gus- 
 
1618-27] The Thirty Years War. 67 
 
 tavus would finish with Poland even more rapidly 
 than he did, and would then be free to ally himself 
 with Christian before the consummation of the lat- 
 ter's ruin (which ruin, it must be remembered, was 
 even now in progress). " A worse foe than ever was 
 the Turk," Wallenstein calls Gustavus in a letter to 
 Colalto in March, 1627. Gustavus went to winter in 
 Sweden, whence he returned to Pillau in the follow- 
 ing May (1627) with six thousand fresh troops, and 
 began to push on actively the siege of Dantzic. 
 
 He found a new enemy. George William had at 
 length been goaded on to take the field against his 
 brother-in-law. It must therefore have been a sore 
 blow for him, when Gustavus suddenly came upon 
 his little army, entirely surrounded it, and incorpo- 
 rated three thousand men with his own forces. After 
 that the Elector, not unnaturally, relapsed into the 
 neutral state again. Sigismund threatened diversions 
 against De la Gardie in Livonia, and Gustavus was 
 obliged to detach Horn to the assistance of the 
 latter. The siege of Dantzic nevertheless did not 
 languish, and the King was twice badly wounded in 
 the progress of it. In a letter to his brother-in-law, 
 John Casimir, who was left Regent of Sweden,, he 
 says : " We went to the isle of Hoefft " (opposite the 
 city). " The enemy was just over against us on the 
 Dantzic side, and began to play upon us with his 
 cannon. J. Banfer and Count Thurn were to lead 
 the first attack, and I was to second them with the 
 pikemen. We were all divided into our respective 
 boats, and all would have gone well if my fellows 
 had obeyed orders ; but only one boat (Axel Du- 
 
68 Gustavus Adolphus. [1618-27 
 
 vall's) reached the opposite bank. The others mostly 
 got stuck on a sand-bank, and one division of boats 
 rowed in a wrong direction. So I jumped into a lit- 
 tle boat to set the matter right. And because it is apt 
 to get rather hot on such occasions, I was actually hit 
 in the belly by a shot. But I have God to thank that 
 it has not endangered my life or health, and I hope 
 in a few days to be able to direct the work again." 
 This was on May 25 th ; the letter was written the 
 same night, and contained also news of the arrival of 
 a Dutch Embassy at Elbing, " no doubt to treat of 
 peace between ourselves, Poland, and Dantzic." As 
 soon as his wound was healed the King turned to 
 attack the camp of the Polish general, Koniecpolski ; 
 and on the 8th of August was hit again in the shoul- 
 der, and his troops repulsed. His letters to John 
 Casimir, on which Geijer has founded this part of his 
 most admirable history, contain long accounts of 
 military operations, personal dangers, complaints that 
 the Swedish Government sends him so little money 
 and provisions, oddly mixed up with expressions of 
 affection towards his correspondent, and diplomatic 
 gossip. The campaign of the year 1627 closed with 
 a sharp action between the blockading fleet of the 
 Swedes (six of the line), and ten Dantzic ships under 
 a Danish admiral (i8th November). After a long 
 conflict the blockade was broken ; one of the Swed- 
 ish captains blew his ship into the air rather than 
 strike, and Sternskjold, the Swedish Admiral, was 
 about to do the same, when a round shot silenced 
 the order he was giving. Dantzic was still untaken, 
 when Gustavus sailed for Sweden to prepare for 
 fresh efforts. 
 
1618-27] The Thirty Years' War. 69 
 
 Dantzic was not likely to be taken. Apart from 
 the military reason given above, which was undoubt- 
 edly the main one, we must remember that the city 
 was one of the last which was animated by the old 
 municipal and communal spirit. It cared very little 
 whether it owed a nominal allegiance to the crown 
 of Sweden or to Poland, but did not intend to change 
 its allegiance at the order of either. Like another 
 great trading city, Venice, it was profoundly indifferent 
 to religion. And lastly its rulers had an idea that 
 Sweden was becoming rather too great for the main- 
 tenance of the Baltic balance. So Dantzic remained 
 firm, not without much secret encouragement from 
 Holland, -vi^hither the citizens had sent an embassy in 
 the previous February, to beseech the mediation of 
 the States-General in their favor. The double atti- 
 tude, which Holland was obliged to take up, is no- 
 where better illustrated than in this matter. Holland 
 was, we know, extremely eager for the intervention 
 of Denmark, if not of Sweden also, in the German 
 war. She was, in fact, the real author of the treaty 
 between England, Denmark, and herself, to which we 
 have already referred — the treaty of December 9, 
 1625. But, on the other hand, she had the strongest 
 objection to allowing the present balance of the Baltic 
 powers to be disturbed, and, that Gustavus should 
 take Dantzic, or even that he should cut off the rest 
 of Poland from the sea-coast, was by no means 
 pleasant to her. The ultimate solution of . the ques- 
 tion for her was found later, when Sweden, coming 
 into possession of the harbour dues at the mouth of 
 the Vistula, was obliged to agree to share them with 
 the Dutch. 
 
least down to 
 entering upon 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 FOREIGN HELP TO GERMANY. 
 
 ND meanwhile what of Germany? 
 Gustavus, we know, is detained, at 
 1627, by the siege of Dantzic, from 
 his grand plans, but Christian of 
 Denmark has gone to help the Protestants. Every 
 step that Christian took, every turn of the wheel of 
 fortune in the German war, was watched by the King 
 of Sweden, and reacted upon his attitude towards 
 Poland. 
 
 The alliance of England, Holland, and Denmark 
 was not by any means the universal combination of 
 all Protestant Powers which Gustavus had hoped to 
 see ; but still it was something, and it produced at 
 last a closer rapprochement of the Catholic Powers, 
 Bavaria, Austria, and Spain. Ferdinand most dis- 
 tinctly promised the King of Spain a port on the 
 Baltic, if he would send a fleet against Christian ; 
 and also promised that he would exclude Dutch 
 commerce from the German Empire. France was 
 profoundly jealous of any such step on the part of 
 Spain ; we all know what attention Richelieu bestowed 
 
 70 
 
1625-8] Foreign Help to Germany. 71 
 
 on the creation of the French Navy, and it is prob- 
 able that he would have come eagerly forward on the 
 side of the allies, if the foolish action of England had 
 not made him pause. England has often been nar- 
 row-minded in foreign politics, even when best inten- 
 tioned, but never more so than when in the case be- 
 fore us she allowed her present jealousy of the infant 
 French fleet, and her Protestant zeal for the revolted 
 Huguenots, to get the better of her judgment, 
 
 In 1625, it is true, she had lent her ships to Riche- 
 lieu for the purpose of subduing the Rochellese ; but 
 the very same year saw a complete reversal of this 
 policy (which had not unnaturally provoked great 
 indignation in England), and on January 20, 1626, 
 it was resolved in the English Council to send an 
 expedition for the relief of La Rochelle. This atti- 
 tude of England, combined with domestic causes, 
 compelled Richelieu to patch up an indifferent 
 peace with the rebels at Montpellier (February, 1626), 
 and to stand aside from any plans of interference in 
 Germany, which would depend upon the co-operation 
 of Charles I. 
 
 With regard to the actual course of the war in Ger- 
 many, England had now Mansfeld and Christian of 
 Denmark both in her nominal pay. King James had 
 died in the very beginning of the new year of 1625 
 according to the old style (March 27th), but even be- 
 fore his death the EngHsh Court had contrived to 
 furnish the " Protestant hero " as Mansfeld was com- 
 monly called in London, with the means of enlisting 
 a considerable force. As for the maintenance of that 
 force, when it was enlisted, the shrewd old King 
 
72 Gustavus Adolphus. 11625-8 
 
 might have an inkling as to what was intended, but 
 after all that was not his affair. He would pay in 
 regular instalments a proportion ; France would pay 
 a proportion ; and — well it was perhaps only fair that 
 Germany should contribute also, although not ex- 
 actly in the same regular manner. James's incapable 
 son shut his eyes to the fact that, by not paying 
 Mansfeld even the proportion which was due from 
 England with anything like honest regularity* (al- 
 though it seems not impossible that the English 
 Parliament, if humoured in other respects, would 
 have been willing to guarantee a fixed payment) he 
 was sanctioning on the part of a man nominally in 
 his service a system of plunder which went far to 
 stamp the Thirty Years' War with its peculiarly hor- 
 rible character. In January, 1625, Mansfeld sailed, 
 not to France as had been at first arranged, but to 
 Flushing, where his troops, harassed by contradictory 
 orders from England and from France, melted away^ 
 without effecting anything. Of the twelve thousand 
 English who went, very soon only three thousand 
 were in a state to bear arms at all. Moreover, from 
 lack of money Mansfeld soon began to prove the 
 truth of the saying, that armies like serpents move 
 upon their bellies. England then almost preferred 
 Mansfeld to Christian, not merely because he cost 
 less money, as subsisting largely upon plunder, but 
 also, because she had an idea that he would set him- 
 self more directly to relieve the Palatinate. But the 
 
 * As a matter of fact only j^75,ooo ever reached Mansfeld, and the 
 greatest difficulty was experienced in getting security for even so 
 much. 
 
■625-81 Foreign Help to Germany. 73 
 
 injunctions given to him not to succour the town of 
 Breda which was being besieged by the Spanish 
 general, Spinola, was a great poHtical blunder, for it 
 alienated Holland from the cause of the Allies, which 
 she thus realised was indeed a narrower one than her 
 own. Christian's campaign of 1626, which need not 
 detain us, began on the Weser, and was in fact wholly- 
 one for the annexation of the Weser bishoprics to 
 the crown of Denmark. If anyone at all tried to re- 
 cover the Palatinate, it was still Mansfeld. And 
 Mansfeld had wider ideas in his head. Early in 
 1626 he attempted to carry out Gustavus's idea of a 
 Silesian march upon Vienna, or at least to join hands 
 with Bethlen Gabor. On his way through North 
 Germany he was met by the newly raised army of 
 Wallenstein (who after all was only a greater Mans- 
 feld), and utterly defeated at the Bridge of Dessau, 
 (April, 1626). It was in the spring of the same year, 
 in which Mansfeld appeared in Germany as the nom- 
 inal hireling of England, that Wallenstein received 
 his first Imperial commission to raise troops ; and in 
 the early summer he was made generalissimo of the 
 Imperial forces. It is a common mistake to imagine 
 that the original arrangement between him and Fer- 
 dinand was, that he would find and pay the troops 
 to be raised himself. In practice it came, owing to 
 the emptiness of the Imperial exchequer, to some- 
 thing not unlike this, but regular pay was at first 
 stipulated for. Wallenstein's unrivalled powers as a 
 recruiting agent were displayed first in the territories 
 of the princes of the League, and especially in the 
 valley of the Main, and this was one of the great 
 
74 Gusiavus Adolphus. [1625-8 
 
 reasons of the complaints against him, which soon 
 began to be heard from the CathoHc princes them- 
 selves. 
 
 That soldiers of fortune like Mansfeld and Wal- 
 lenstein had the power of raising fresh armies almost 
 immediately after defeat, speaks volumes for the mis- 
 erable condition of Germany. The former now suc- 
 ceeded in doing so, and even in drawing Wallenstein 
 after him into Silesia, while he, Wallenstein, was 
 burning to be on the northern march against Chris- 
 tian. This glory he was compelled, by the Emper- 
 or's express order to follow Mansfeld, to leave to his 
 rival Tilly. Four months after the Dessau fight Tilly 
 utterly defeated the King of Denmark at the battle 
 of Lutter (August 27, 1626). These events pro- 
 duced a profound impression in Northern Europe. 
 Spain, it was said, will now be sure to get her Baltic 
 port. What if the Emperor should give her Lubeck ? 
 Lubeck, the head of the Hanseatic League, the dar- 
 ling city of the great Hohenstaufen Emperor Fred- 
 erick II., the pioneer of northern commerce ; would 
 Lubeck defend her walls with men or even her men 
 with walls ? Lubeck would at least hold a Diet of 
 the Hanseatic League, and turn for help and advice, 
 where alone she could now hope for it, to the King 
 of Sweden. 
 
 She was not the only Power that had looked north- 
 eastwards after Mansfeld's defeat. Christian eagerly 
 sent to Gustavus for assistance. But Gustavus had 
 just begun his campaign in Prussia, and could not — 
 dared not — advance, with Dantzic in his rear, to lean 
 upon such a bruised reed as Christian. Nor could 
 
1625-8] Foreign Help to Germany. 75 
 
 he, at a moment's notice, shift his base of operations 
 to the Weser or to the Oder. Heart-breaking as it 
 was to look on, he must wait. Now it must be 
 observed that, instead of changing this view of Gus- 
 tavus, the battle of Lutter only confirmed it ; before 
 that Christian must have indirectly supported him, 
 whatever forward step he had taken ; after that he 
 knew that Christian would soon make a separate 
 peace for Denmark, and leave any allies he might at 
 the moment possess in the lurch. 
 
 In 1627 all was, in fact, over with Christian ; and 
 it waSjOnly owing to Tilly's incredible slowness that 
 it was not all over in 1626. But Christian gathered 
 some sort of a new army after Lutter, and continued 
 to make on his retreat towards Jutland a feeble re- 
 sistance to Tilly. When, in August, Wallenstein 
 joined Tilly, the retreat became a flight. With swift 
 instinct, Wallenstein saw the chances of the game 
 unfold themselves before him. In October he stood 
 already on the edge of the Baltic Sea. With a fleet 
 at his command Europe would be at his feet — his 
 and his Emperor's ; for in that dark heart, which has 
 been such an enigma to historians, there were always 
 personal and national thoughts bound up together. 
 The best we can say of Wallenstein is, that he saw 
 the rottenness of the Holy Roman Empire ; that, as a 
 soldier, he believed in strong government, and would 
 have liked to have seen Germany a strong and united 
 military monarchy: under the House of Hapsburg if 
 you will, but at all hazards strong and united. Now 
 the time seemed to be come. Denmark should be 
 followed into her islands, Ferdinand crowned King of 
 
76 Gustavus Adolphus. [1625-8 
 
 Denmark, or not, as events shaped themselves ; and 
 then Kalmar stormed, and the King of Sweden driven 
 back to his snows. About the Catholic part of the 
 business Wallenstein did not care two straws. For- 
 tunately for Europe, Ferdinand cared more for the 
 Catholic than the monarchical idea. 
 
 If there were any doubts as to the actual plans of 
 the Hapsburgs at this time, they were cleared away 
 by the publication of a Jesuit pamphlet in Prague, in 
 the spring of 1628. It professed to be the copy of a 
 letter from Father Lammermann, Ferdinand's con- 
 fessor, to another Jesuit. It laid down that th^ time 
 for absolutism was come ; that the first thing to be 
 done was to destroy the freedom of the Hanseatic 
 cities of the north ; the free cities of the interior 
 would soon follow ; all should be made by fraud or 
 force to receive Imperial garrisons. It would not be 
 difficult ; and a beginning of the work should be 
 made with the leaders — Hamburg, Lubeck, and 
 Bremen. Once their league is dissolved — and the 
 grant of sudden, extravagant, and easily revocable 
 privileges to one of them would dissolve it, — they can 
 be mastered in detail. Then, to prevent their relief 
 from Denmark, Christian should be lulled into 
 security — " mountains of gold " must be promised 
 him to induce him to stand aside a little while from 
 Imperial affairs. Gustavus would be more difficult, 
 but by dexterous diplomacy he might be kept quiet, 
 until Poland was sufficiently strengthened to resist 
 him effectually. Then the Sound should be seized, 
 and Holland cut off from her Baltic trade, and, what 
 is more important, from her Baltic granaries. 
 
1625-8] Foreign Help to Germany. TJ 
 
 So to this it was come in the year 1628 — the most 
 critical year in the fate of Protestantism since Luther 
 had stood up to the Emperor Charles at Worms. 
 
 Deliverance came, not only from the north, but 
 also from the south, from the Catholic Electors them- 
 selves. When Wallenstein and Tilly were pressing 
 on into Jutland, and Christian had fled, as he soon 
 did, to his island fortresses, Wallenstein had cast his 
 eyes upon the Duchy of Mecklenburg, where reigned 
 two Protestant dukes. He did not intend they 
 should reign there long, and his rearward troops 
 were actually quartered within their territory. Meck- 
 lenburg was of supreme importance to him, if he was 
 to create his Baltic fleet, for it possessed some of the 
 best harbours on the coast, especially Rostock and 
 Wismar. Wanton aggression is an inadequate ex- 
 pression to describe Wallenstein's designs against 
 Mecklenburg. The dukes had, it is true, appeared 
 as the allies of Christian in common with the Lower 
 Saxon Circle, but immediately after Lutter they had 
 withdrawn their contingent from his army, and de- 
 manded that he should leave the territory of the 
 Circle. Military necessity may have justified the 
 occupation of their country by the Imperial troops, 
 but nothing short of a solemn ban by the Diet could 
 deprive them of their fiefs. It may therefore be 
 regarded as the first revolutionary step taken towards 
 absolutism, whether wholly with, or partly against, 
 Ferdinand's good pleasure maybe very fairly doubted. 
 Anyhow, the Emperor promised Wallenstein the in- 
 vestiture qf the two Mecklenburg duchies for him- 
 self. This was why that general was so anxious to 
 
yS Gustavus Adolphus. [1625-8 
 
 complete the conquest of Denmark, and to put his 
 master — or his puppet — on its throne. The south- 
 ern portion of the Danish peninsula would be an in- 
 valuable bulwark for his new duchy. But it was 
 exactly to projects of this kind that the whole con- 
 servative opinion of Germany, whether Catholic or 
 Protestant, was most pertinaciously hostile. Even 
 before the end of 1627 the Catholic Electors had 
 begun to cry out for peace with Denmark. Chris- 
 tian, as Duke of Holstein, was a Prince of the Em- 
 pire ; Wallenstein was an upstart, an object, half of 
 dread, half of repulsion, to such men as Maximilian 
 of Bavaria. Gradually Wallenstein, whether in fear 
 of the growth of public opinion, or, as is more likely, 
 in fear of Gustavus, came round to the same view, 
 that peace with Christian was necessary. Early in 
 1628, therefore, he ceased to pursue Christian, and 
 allowed those negotiations to begin, which termi- 
 nated with the peace of Liibeck in May, 1629. He at 
 once set to work on his new task to make himself 
 Admiral of the Baltic, in fact as well as in name (the 
 title dates from April, 1628). All Mecklenburg was 
 soon overrun, and his troops spread over Pomerania 
 also. " There are 28 ports in Pomerania," he writes. 
 " We must fortify them all, and thus at least keep 
 Sweden from attacking them." Stralsund, Wismar, 
 Rostock, and the Isle of Riigen were the most im- 
 portant in his eyes. His first mention of Stral- 
 sund occurs in a letter to his lieutenant, Arnim, as 
 far back as November, 1627. It was not a Hanseatic 
 town, nor a free Imperial city, but simply a strong 
 port belonging to the Duke of Pomerania, Boguslav 
 
1625-8] Foreign Help to Germany. 79 
 
 the XlVth, the only prince of Pure Wendish blood 
 left on the Baltic, a childless old man of very weak 
 mind. " I am told," this letter says, " that they of 
 Stralsund have begun to fortify their town. That I 
 intend to stop." 
 
 Meanwhile Gustavus was preparing for his third 
 (1628) expedition to the Polish coast. All eyes were 
 on him. Holland was up in real alarm at the pros- 
 pect of losing her Baltic trade. She kept sending 
 messages imploring him to make peace with Poland, 
 and defend the Western Baltic. The Elector of 
 Brandenburg was equally anxious for peace, for the 
 simple reason that his territory was the basis of 
 operations of war for Gustavus. The negotiations 
 did actually begin in February, 1628. The Swedish 
 and Polish diplomats could not meet personally, for 
 each party refused to give to his rival the title of 
 King of Sweden. It does not seem an unreasonable 
 refusal on Gustavus's part. But the negotiations 
 went on by means of Dutch, English, and French go- 
 betweens right through the year. One reason which 
 induced Sigismund not to be in too great a hurry 
 was that Ferdinand promised him ten thousand men 
 from Wallenstein's army to arrive in the summer. 
 Gustavus landed at Pillau in May, almost on the day 
 on which Wallenstein began in earnest the siege of 
 Stralsund. His fleet defeated and sank a Dantzic 
 squadron off the coast, and thus avenged, from the 
 previous year, the honour of the Swedish flag. Then 
 the King, leaving Dantzic again blocked up, advanced 
 towards Warsaw to meet Koniecpolski in the field. 
 But the Polish general avoided a general engagement, 
 
8o Gustavus Adolphus. [1625-8 
 
 and confined himself to making (with complete suc- 
 cess) what the French call " la petite guerre." The 
 campaign of 1628 was therefore, as far as Poland was 
 concerned, practically a fruitless one for Sweden. 
 
 Not so in Germany. I may be perhaps excused 
 for abstracting at some length from a very important 
 letter written by Gustavus to Christian on October 
 21, 1627. It is especially valuable, not only from the 
 light which it throws upon the views of the situation 
 as entertained by our Hero, but because it gives an 
 evidently unprejudiced account of the means and 
 ends of the Imperial diplomacy. The King of Swe- 
 den writes : " I have now little difficulty in discern- 
 ing that the projects of the House of Hapsburg are 
 directed against the Baltic ; and that, partly by force 
 and partly by cajolery, the United Netherlands, 
 my own power, and finally yours are to be ousted 
 therefrom. On the one side I understand that they 
 intend to offer you the title^ of Admiral of the Ro- 
 man Empire, as a bait and as indemnification for 
 your expenses in the late war, provided that you 
 will cede control of the Sound. Perhaps, however, 
 you are not aware that in the same breath they have 
 offered to help me to a safe and durable peace with 
 Poland, which shall include the retention of Livonia 
 and of Prussia by the crown of Sweden, nay even 
 the Kingdom of Denmark for myself as an Imperial 
 fief, if I will ally myself with the Emperor against 
 you. Obviously such offers are illusory, and only 
 meant to hinder an alliance between you and me. 
 I know well how united and diligent they are ; well 
 how disunited and slothful all those, who ought to 
 
1625-8] Foreign Help to Germany. 8 1 
 
 be for us, have as yet proved themselves. At pres- 
 ent not one of them dares to defend the other : each 
 will look on quietly at the ruin of all " (this must of 
 course be taken as a reference to the falling away of 
 the Lower Saxon Circle after the defeat of Lutter). 
 " I am now putting everything aside, which can pos- 
 sibly hinder a swift termination of this wretched Po- 
 lish business of mine. I will take care that Poland 
 shall be in no condition to send help to the princes 
 of the League. I am not ignorant of the deplorable 
 condition in which you stand at this moment ; but I 
 wish you had been able to call upon me for help 
 earlier " {i. e. in 1625, when you refused my conditions 
 in London). " Now we must positively during the 
 winter concoct measures for our mutual defence, and 
 for the defence of the Baltic." 
 
 A few days after this letter Gustavus told Oxen- 
 stiern openly, that he saw that intervention in Ger- 
 many could no longer be avoided, " for the danger 
 is daily drawing nearer to our own doors." 
 
 Denmark received this offer with joy, and during 
 the late autumn the negotiations for a treaty between 
 the two countries went busily forward. The chief 
 difficulty lay, as usual, in the not unnatural narrow- 
 ness of Christian's present wishes. The King of 
 Sweden wanted a league offensive and defensive 
 against all the Catholic Powers of Europe. The 
 King of Denmark wanted an ally to come forward 
 and win backior him his Duchy of Holstein. The 
 treaty however, which, to use a peculiarly expressive 
 Carlylism, was "got signed " in April, 1628, was of 
 sufficient breadth, if not to satisfy all Gustavus's as- 
 
Missing Page 
 
Missing Page 
 
84 Gustavus Adolphus. [1625-8 
 
 But Stralsund always looked to Gustavus. In 1625 
 he had expressly promised to this particular town 
 that he would come to its help if it were attacked. 
 His keen eye had picked out on the map the im- 
 mense importance of the position. The time of need 
 was come. Gustavus instantly wrote to Christian 
 to ask him to co-operate for its relief. Poor Chris- 
 tian was not in much of a condition to co-operate in 
 anything, but he promised to victual Stralsund from 
 the sea, and he did so. Gustavus then sent a small 
 contingent of six hundred men and a few ships. He 
 concluded, moreover, a treaty, offensive and defen- 
 sive, with the town of Stralsund for twenty years to 
 come ; " the rights of the Emperor, Empire, and Duke 
 Boguslav being reserved," whatever that might 
 mean. Stralsund promised to receive and assist a 
 Swedish army if it should land in Pomerania. The 
 die was cast. Gustavus had directly allied himself 
 with a German town against the Emperor of Ger- 
 many. It was still possible for him to retreat from 
 this position. It was no longer possible for him to 
 retreat from it with honour. 
 
 The siege went on ; Wallenstein came in person. 
 His attempts at storm failed. He tried negotiations. 
 He offered to hold the town at the command of the 
 Emperor, the Duke and the Elector of Brandenburg, 
 who was the Duke's heir-presumptive, and not to en- 
 force Catholicism. Stralsund refused to listen. Storm 
 succeeded negotiation, and bombardment succeeded 
 storm. In vain. Hot debates in the Council-cham- 
 ber (where there was of course a party for yielding) 
 were held to the music of red-hot shot. On the 9th 
 
M 
 
 < 
 
 H 
 
 w .2 
 
 
 c) ■0 
 
 
 ^ « ^ 
 
 
 
 ^ <f " 
 
 
 d J, ^ 
 
 m 5 - 
 
 
 SS-o 
 
 S 
 
 "J '^ 
 
 ^ '^ •'' d 
 
 <; Cfi .J 01 
 W 
 
 <; ^ 
 
 n t. j: 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 ■0 . 
 
 'o 
 
 H 2 
 
 ^^ 
 I 
 
 S Q 
 
 S 3 
 
 (1) 
 
 
 
 J J /3 
 
 
 J) 
 
1625-8] Foreign Help to Germany. 85 
 
 of July a few Danish troops arrived ; on the 12th the 
 Danish fleet were sighted beyond Riigen ; on the 
 1 8th Count Brahe and Col. Alexander Leslie* ar- 
 rived with two thousand picked Swedish troops. On 
 the 24th Wallenstein, who was already gone, sent 
 orders to Arnim to raise the siege. We have had 
 enough occasion to be angry with Christian of Den- 
 mark in the present work ; it is pleasant to be able 
 to say a good word for one who is still his country's 
 national hero. He shares with Gustavus and the 
 Stralsunders the honour of the deliverance of Stral- 
 sund. 
 
 * Colonel (afterwards Sir Alexander) Leslie is a person of consider- 
 able interest to Englishmen, still more to Scotchmen. Mr. Gardiner 
 in his ' ' History of the Great Civil War " speaks of him as being the 
 bastard son of a Fifeshire laird, but he was, in fact, on his father's side 
 directly descended from the great House of Balquhain, and had be- 
 sides the blood of Calders, Ramsays, and Stewarts in his veins. By 
 the law of Scotland he became legitimate when his father, George 
 Leslie of Balgonie, married his mother, although the step was not 
 taken until the son had become famous. He was the first Captain 
 employed by Gustavus in the German war, as we have now seen, 
 but he had previously served in that war in Sir Horace Vere's expedi- 
 tion for the recovery of the Palatinate. He continued in the Swedish 
 service, which he had entered a few months before the affair of Stral- 
 sund, until 1638, when he was invited home to take command of the 
 army of the Scotch Covenanters, probably by the influence of his kins- 
 man the Earl of Rot.hes. The part he played in the English and 
 Scotch civil wars is sufficiently well known to need no mention here. 
 He was created Earl of Leven in 1641, and, living to a good old age, 
 did not neglect with regard to the acquisition and retention of broad 
 lands to follow out his old family motto " Grip Fast.'' 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 GUSTAVUS'S PREPARATIONS. 
 
 VERYONE knew what the failure be- 
 fore Stralsund meant. " Now is the 
 time," cried the author of a spirited 
 pamphlet, addressed to the Hansa, " for the good 
 towns to arm, to drive the enemy back over the Elbe. 
 There is one at hand, who will help ; who has already 
 helped. God has raised up for us, a hero, a Gideon, 
 the like of whom lives not among men, nor in his- 
 tory." 
 
 Boguslav might send and beseech Gustavus to re- 
 call his troops ; Gustavus answered by sending a 
 garrison of five thousand more. Wallenstein might 
 take Rostock (as he did in October), and bully the 
 whole Hansa with words, but the plan of a Hapsburg 
 dominion over the Baltic was gone forever. The 
 battle had been fought out in the Council chambe;r 
 of Lilbeck, as well as before the walls of Stralsund. 
 Gustavus had used all his efforts to induce the Hansa 
 to conclude there and then an offensive and defensive 
 alliance with the Swedish crown ; he had failed in 
 this, but he had induced them to order a general levy 
 for the defence of their walls. 
 
 86 
 
JOHK CASIMIR. 
 
1628-301 Gustavuss Preparations. 87 
 
 The Swedish diplomats saw the bastion already 
 growing before their eyes. " The Treaty of Stralsund 
 with our King," writes Salvius, on the ist of Sep- 
 tember, to Oxenstiern, " mentions a nominal relation 
 of client and patron ; I think it is not far from a real 
 subjection." But if the bastion was won it must be 
 defended, and how to best defend it was just the 
 question. We find two opinions put forward in 
 Sweden on the subject of the best method of inter- 
 ference in the German war. The first is that of 
 Oxenstiern, that the war should be carried on offen- 
 sively in Prussia, Poland, and possibly Silesia, and 
 only .defensively in Pomerania. The second is that 
 of Gustavus, to confine the Eastern operations to an 
 army of observation and occupation only, and to 
 hurl the whole power of the Swedish monarchy upon 
 Northern Germany. No one was ever more open to 
 advice than Gustavus : he discussed both plans with 
 Oxenstiern and other of his principal advisers, for 
 the space of over a year, and finally he referred, as 
 we shall see, the whole question to the Swedish 
 Council, requesting every man to speak his mi^id 
 freely on the subject, and to vote for one or the 
 other plan according to his opinion. His impetu- 
 osity, of which the Chancellor complains so much, 
 was in subjection on this matter. He knew the seri- 
 ousness of a war whose end no man could foresee ; 
 he would not engage in it lightly or without full 
 deliberation and preparations. 
 
 We are within sight of the end of the dreary 
 Polish war. " The King of Poland may give himself 
 any title he pleases in the negotiations," said Gus- 
 
88 Gustaviis Adolphus. [1628-30 
 
 tavus, " except that of Sweden." He was anxious 
 to keep these negotiations open, until he could see 
 how the German war went. In May, 1629, arrived 
 Arnim with ten thousand Imperial troops to the aid 
 of Sigismund ; and in June Gustavus was unable to 
 prevent the junction of this force with that of Koni- 
 ecpolski. But, fortunately, Arnim brought no pay 
 with him for his soldiers, and Sigismund could not 
 afford to supply this necessary. On June 17th, a battle 
 was fought against this united army, in which Gus- 
 tavus was nearly taken prisoner and the Swedes 
 compelled to retreat ; the royal hat was taken pris- 
 oner and sent to Vienna as a trophy. Those who are 
 curious in such matters may be glad to learn that it 
 was a grey hat with a red feather in it. But it was 
 impossible for the King to have his heart very much 
 longer in this Polish war. As his nephew, Charles X. 
 — almost as great a warrior as himself, — afterwards 
 experienced, Poland is a country which is easy to 
 conquer, but what is to be done with it when con- 
 quered? History has proved that partitioning is 
 the only secure method of dealing with it. " Just as 
 I had decided to cross to Sweden," writes Gustavus 
 to John Casimir, on August l, 1629, "there has 
 come in the Baron de Charnac6, ambassador of the 
 King of France, to offer his mediation for a treaty 
 between us and the enemy." The truce was concluded 
 on September 25th, at Stuhmsdorf. It was to be for six 
 years to come. Its terms were of advantage to Sweden, 
 (i) She retained the whole of Livonia. (2) In ducal 
 Prussia she retained Memel and Pillau (poor Elector 
 of Brandenburg !). In Polish Prussia, Braunsberg, 
 
1628-30] Gustavuss Preparations. 89 
 
 and Elbing, the latter a place of great commercial 
 importance. (3) She restored the rest of Poland and 
 Kurland to Sigismund. (4) With Dantzic, which 
 was declared neutral, a separate treaty was drawn 
 up, by which the city engaged to pay to the crown 
 of Sweden two thirds of the customs levied at its 
 harbour, — an important clause, as it both gave 
 Sweden a permanent interest in improving the com- 
 merce of the Baltic, and also formed a slight set-off 
 for the stream of gold which the tolls of Elsinore 
 poured into the capacious pockets of King Christian. 
 It was probably this treaty which decided Gustavus 
 against Oxenstiern's plan of making Prussia again 
 the main theatre of war. We shall see, however, that 
 the possession of these Prussian and Polish ports was 
 of great assistance during the German campaigns, for 
 a reserve of troops was constantly kept there ; and 
 they were at first the position from which Oxenstiern 
 himself watched, not without many misgivings, his 
 master's victorious career. Some historians have re- 
 jected the idea that it was French mediation that 
 really produced this treaty ; and indeed it does seem 
 probable that a truce would in any case have been 
 concluded before the end of the year. Poland was 
 exhausted and disaffected, and Gustavus, whose in- 
 terest in Western affairs increased daily, would prob- 
 ably have accepted worse terms. Richelieu in his 
 own memoirs, written long after the event, gives 
 himself the credit of the affair, and it is impossible 
 to avoid seeing what an immense interest France 
 possessed in launching against her Austrian enemy 
 such a weapon as the Swedish King. It is worthy 
 
QO Gustavus Adolphus. [1628-30 
 
 of notice too that Charnac^, who was one of Riche- 
 lieu's most trusted diplomatists, had recently been 
 in Bavaria, where he had foreshadowed the latter 
 work of Father Joseph, and encouraged the growing 
 split between the two parties in the Catholic camp ; 
 still more recently at Liibeck, where his presence 
 contributed to disquiet the Austrian negotiations, 
 although he was unable to hinder Christian from 
 concluding a separate peace, or even to prevent the 
 exclusion of the Swedish ambassador from the nego- 
 tiations. Possibly it was Charnac6's representations 
 that made Richelieu realise what sort of man he had 
 got to deal with in Gustavus. 
 
 We have to turn for a moment to the affairs of 
 Denmark, in order to see how fresh causes continu- 
 ally inclined Gustavus in the direction in which his 
 heart was set. The conferences at Liibeck, in the 
 latter part of 1628 and the early part of 1629, were 
 practically ruled by Wallenstein ; Gustavus had sent 
 an embassy thither, relying on his recent treaty with 
 Christian, to urge that no peace should be made, 
 which did not include the absolute restoration of 
 North Germany to the status quo before the war, in 
 the case especially of the two Dukes of Mecklen- 
 burg. But Wallenstein refused to admit the Swedish 
 ambassador to the sittings, and Ferdinand supported 
 Wallenstein. Richelieu's messenger, as we have seen, 
 was as active at Lubeck as at Stuhmsdorf. His 
 whole energy was bent to effect the alienation of the 
 Catholic League, as represented by the ecclesiastical 
 electors of the Rhine, Maximilian of Bavaria, and 
 Tilly, from Wallenstein and the purely Austrian 
 
1628-30] Gustavuss Preparations. 91 
 
 party. The Cardinal urged Christian to conclude a 
 separate peace with the League princes, whom he 
 knew to be furious with Wallenstein, and to stand in 
 profound dread of Ferdinand's ultimate aims. Hol- 
 land urged the same thing. The King of Sweden 
 had an interview with Christian in the winter, and 
 advised him to continue the war against the Em- 
 peror, or at least to make no peace that was not 
 common to both of them. Gustavus describes the 
 circumstance in an amusing letter to Oxenstiern. 
 " I was the host, the King my guest ; we did n't 
 have much to eat, but drank lots of bad wine — frozen 
 too, it was. ... I proposed four points " (prac- 
 tically an offensive alliance against the Emperor, un- 
 less they could together come to an understanding 
 with him at Liibeck). "He told me he had already 
 sent his ultimatum to the Emperor, and could not go 
 back on it. As for an alliance ' he must ask his 
 Estates, which would take time.' When he said 
 that, I thanked God that I could command my tem- 
 per, and let him go on his way." 
 
 So the Peace of Liibeck was concluded on the 2d 
 of May, 1629, without the King of Sweden being 
 allowed to say a word in questions which were of 
 such vital importance to him. By the terms of it 
 Christian received back all his lands, and promised 
 to stand aloof from German affairs altogether, ex- 
 cept so far as Le regarded his own interests as Duke 
 of Holstein. They were indeed terms extravagantly 
 favourable to. Christian, considering the circum- 
 stances — not even a war indemnity was exacted ; 
 and they justified Richelieu in writing that " this 
 
92 Gustavus Adolphus. [1628-30 
 
 wretched Prince had betrayed all his allies, and 
 wriggled out of the war untouched." The King of 
 Sweden, he adds, was '' the new rising sun." There 
 is little doubt that it was the dread of the as yet 
 level beams of that sun that induced Wallenstein to 
 detach Christian at all costs from the Swedish alli- 
 ance. It is curious to trace in Wallenstein's letters 
 the change of tone with which he speaks of Gustavus 
 — at first it is in utter contempt of a " King of snow 
 and ice " who would melt in Europe ; soon it is 
 curiosity ; later still it is lively anxiety. Geijer says 
 that Wallenstein consulted the stars on the question 
 of his luck against Gustavus ; but I have been unable 
 to find what answer " the lying spirit whom he 
 served " gave him. 
 
 Before we enter upon the immediate preparations 
 of the King for the German expedition, let us clear- 
 ly understand the significance of the fact that, with- 
 in three months after the failure of Wallenstein at 
 Stralsund, Richelieu had taken La Rochelle. The 
 last Protestant stronghold in France was down, and 
 the great Cardinal was free to turn his arms in fa- 
 vour of a wider and more enlightened Protestantism 
 than that of the Soubises and Rohans, who looked 
 upon their religion largely as a potent weapon to be 
 used against the centralising policy of the Bourbon 
 Kings. Thus even before the third period of the 
 Thirty Years' War — the Swedish period — ^has opened, 
 the fourth, the French period, is already in sight. 
 Gustavus has interfered ; there is no longer any rea- 
 son why Richelieu should not interfere. We must 
 be completely on our guard, however, against allow- 
 
JEAN ARMAND DU PLESSIS, 
 Cardinal and Duke of Richelieu. 
 
1628-30] Gustavus's Preparations. 93 
 
 ing equal weight to the two interferences. Richelieu 
 was entirely political ; his aim was the greatness and 
 strength of France. It happened to coincide with 
 the religious determination of Gustavus to succour 
 the Protestants of Germany, and defend the Protes- 
 tants of Sweden ; but it was a mere coincidence. No 
 two men ever had less in common, except the fiery 
 courage which enabled them to cut through difficul- 
 ties. Richelieu deliberately allowed Gustavus to 
 begin the campaign absolutely unaided, and later on 
 thwarted him over and over again, when he dreaded 
 that he would be too victorious, or victorious over 
 the wrong people. Gustavus was for the Cardinal, 
 in fact, merely a knight on the chessboard of Eu- 
 rope ; it is true he estimated his value above that of 
 many pawns, and would in no wise allow him to be 
 taken. France had in 1626 been obliged, by inter- 
 nal trouble, to make peace with Spain ; now that her 
 hands were free, she concluded with her rebellious 
 subjects the Peace of Alais (which secured perfect 
 toleration, but no political advantages, to the Hu- 
 guenots), and began with Spain a little border war 
 in the north of Italy on the matter of the disputed 
 succession to the Duchy of Mantua. At the same 
 time (April, 1629) the Peace of Susa between France 
 and England put an end to a war which ought never 
 to have been begun. And now, too, the essential di- 
 vergence of the aims of the Catholic Electors of Ger- 
 many from that of the Catholic Emperor became 
 more obvious. Ferdinand, truly recognising the 
 struggle as a European one, sent help to the anti- 
 French party in the Mantuan war, not unaided by 
 
94 Gustavus Adolphus. [1628-30 
 
 Spanish gold. The Electors, anxious only for the 
 supremacy of their own party in Germany, and equal- 
 ly with their Protestant neighbours careless of the 
 European fortune of their creed, never ceased to 
 clamour for the withdrawal of the Imperial troops 
 from Italy. "Let the Emperor observe strict neu- 
 trality in this quarrel, and also in the quarrel between 
 Spain and Holland. Let him attend strictly to Ger- 
 man business, and we shall soon see an end of the 
 usurpations of the Protestant princes on the territory 
 of the Church." It was in a spirit like this that they 
 soon appeared at the Diet of Regensburg of 1629, 
 prepared to go even further, and to dictate to the 
 Emperor as to the management of the German war. 
 Their main complaints were, as we shall see, directed 
 against Wallenstein, but as early as 1627 I find them 
 grumbling that Tilly had been obliged to take up 
 his quarters in Catholic territory because the Impe- 
 rialists were occupying nearly all the Protestant 
 countries (Saxony hitherto excepted). 
 
 Gustavus returned from Poland immediately after 
 the Peace of Stuhmsdorf, seriously prepared for the 
 German war. Was he right or wrong ? Were his 
 aims personal — for glory ; or, national — for Sweden ; 
 or religious — for the faith ? I can give no direct an- 
 swer to such a question, nor can any one. All hu- 
 man motives are mixed, and, if there is one lesson 
 that history teaches, it is that no principle works in 
 exclusion. But we must beware of judging Gus- 
 tavus in the light of the later history of Sweden. 
 That his countrymen did imbibe a taste for foreign 
 conquest and foreign gold is undoubted, and it 
 
1628-30] Gustavuss Preparations. 95 
 
 brought about the ruin of a noble country. But if his 
 motives were as pure, as I believe them in the main 
 to have been ; if they were resistance to the tyranny 
 of Austria, defence of his father-land, and the rescue 
 of Germany, we must pause before we lay at his 
 door the later foreign ambition of his countrymen. 
 
 Another question irresistibly presents itself. What 
 were his ultimate intentions ? Did he — seeing, as he 
 must have clearly seen, the corrupt condition of the 
 German Empire, the absolute necessity of its recon- 
 struction, dream of reconstructing it under a Protes- 
 tant head ? And was that head to be himself or 
 someone else? I think the best answer to that 
 question is found in the simple fact that his ideas 
 developed as he went on. In December, 1628, he 
 wrote to Oxenstiern : " Here is a plan, from which 
 you can gather at least the feasibility of my ideas. 
 You say we have n't money to pay troops for more 
 than four months ; granted ; but once let us plant 
 our foothold sure " (he means on German soil), " and 
 God and the hour will teach us how to strengthen 
 ourselves further." It is the strong dash of knight- 
 errantry combined with lofty aims that separates 
 Gustavus Adolphus from his contemporaries. There 
 were knights-errant in plenty (like Christian of Bruns- 
 wick) in the field, but in Gustavus alone met the 
 knight-errant, the statesman, and the king. That he 
 wanted Pomerania as a bastion for the crown of 
 Sweden is nothing whatever to the point. He could 
 not go to war for nothing. His wide and new rela- 
 tions on the Baltic made it imperatively necessary 
 that future kings of Sweden should be princes of the 
 
96 Gustavus Adolphus. [1628-30 
 
 Empire ; and the German Protestant princes had 
 only too recently proved how utterly incapable they 
 were of defending themselves or their faith. Sweden 
 in Pomerania would be z. point d'apputlor Protestant 
 Germany, and would be in a condition to make her 
 voice heard in the Diet, in case of future attempts at 
 oppression. We shall have to revert to these ques- 
 tions again for a moment when we have laid our 
 Hero to rest in the Riddarholm Church at Stock- 
 holm. 
 
 In his own country Gustavus probably stood alone 
 in his lofty aims. We have already seen how anxious 
 Oxenstiern was to induce his master to continue to 
 make Poland his main object. When he found that 
 that was in vain, he was almost equally anxious to 
 induce him not to risk his life in person. The Swed- 
 ish Estates in 1629 (in the absence of the King it is 
 true) urged that the war, if carried on at all, should 
 be carried on as far as possible from the frontiers of 
 Sweden, and should support itself. In October of the 
 same year came Gustavus's personal address to the Es- 
 tates, and his conference with his Council at Upsala, of 
 which I have already spoken. It is interesting to see 
 how completely he succeeded in inspiring both As- 
 semblies with his own spirit. When Skytte, his old 
 tutor, represented that he was hazarding the Vasa 
 monarchy (his daughter Christina was only three 
 years old), he nobly replied — it was in an age that 
 produced royal houses like the Stuarts and Bourbons 
 — " All monarchies have passed from one race to an- 
 other ; a monarchy consists not in persons, but in 
 the law." He laid, before his Estates, as before his 
 
1628-30] Gustavuss Preparations. 97 
 
 Council, naturally very little stress on the oppressed 
 Protestants in Germany, but confined himself to the 
 dangers threatening Sweden. " Denmark is used up. 
 The Papists are on the Baltic, they have Rostock, 
 Wismar, Stettin, Wolgast, Greifswald, and nearly all 
 the other ports in their hands ; Riigen is theirs, and 
 from Riigen they continue to threaten Stralsund ; 
 their whole aim is to destroy Swedish commerce, and 
 soon to plant a foot on the southern shores of our 
 •Father-land. Sweden is in danger from the power of 
 Hapsburg ; that is all, but it is enough ; that power 
 must be met, swiftly and strongly. The times are 
 bad ; the danger is great. It is no time to ask 
 whether the cost will not be far beyond what we can 
 bear. The fight will be for parents, for wife and 
 child, for house and home, for Father-land and Faith." 
 It was no wonder that he carried his point. The 
 Estates to whom this speech was addressed voted at 
 once heavy and regular taxation for three years. 
 They voted a general levy of troops for the two fol- 
 lowing years. The nobles renounced their privileges 
 of freeing their tenants from taxation and service. 
 They themselves by the law of Sweden were only 
 free, provided they served in person in the field. 
 The mercantile companies renounced their govern- 
 ment subsidies, and handed them over to provide for 
 the fleet. When the Council came to vote -their 
 opinions for or against the war, though many had 
 spoken against it, all voted for the King ; and the 
 King then addressed to theni a speech, from which 
 I may perhaps be pardoned for quoting at some 
 length. " I did not call you together because I had 
 
gS Gusiavus Adolphus. [1628-30 
 
 any doubt in my mind, but in order that you might 
 enjoy the freedom of opposing me if you wished. 
 That freedom you can no longer enjoy ; you have 
 spoken. My view is this : that, for our safety, 
 honour, and final peace, I see nothing but a bold at- 
 tack on the enemy. I hope that it will be for the 
 advantage of Sweden, but I also hope that, if the day 
 go hard with us, no blame will be laid upon me, for 
 I have no other end in view but that advantage. I 
 do not underrate the difficulties — such as the want 
 of means, the doubtful issue of battle ; in which it is 
 no idle glory that I am seeking — the King of Den- 
 mark is a sufficient warning to me against that — be- 
 sides the judgment of posterity generally leaves a 
 man very little glory. And I am satiated with 
 glory, and want no more. Your duty is clear ; to 
 exhort all my subjects to continue in their present de- 
 voted attitude. I hereby advise you so to bear your- 
 selves, and all over whom you have influence, that 
 either you or your children may live to see a good 
 end of this matter ; which may the Most High grant. 
 For myself I foresee that I have no more rest to ex- 
 pect, but the rest of eternity." 
 
 It is not difficult to see, in considering the willing- 
 ness of Sweden to undertake the war, the immense 
 effect of the possession of Stralsund. There at least 
 was a harbour where the Swedish fleet could ride, a 
 fortification, behind which the Swedish army could 
 retreat. In fact, when Stralsund took a Swedish 
 garrison the war was already begun, and begun well 
 for Sweden. 
 
 The next matter to receive attention was that of 
 

 ^ 
 
 ^V^ 
 
 
 
 \ 
 
 l:-*^- 
 
 !»^^ 
 
 
 \ 
 
 \ 
 
 iJk' 
 
 - <1 
 
 .^- 
 
 CHRISTIAN IV. OF DENMARK. 
 
1628-30] Gustavuss Preparations. gg 
 
 alliances. Nearly a year before, Gustavus had decided 
 on sending an ultimatum to the Emperor, but had 
 angrily recalled his ambassador, when Wallenstein 
 had refused to admit his representative to the Liibeck 
 conferences. An Imperial ambassador arrived at 
 Stockholm at the end of 1629, but his instructions 
 did not give Gustavus the title of King. Gustavus 
 returned his letters unopened. He was quite open 
 about his intentions in his dealings with Ferdinand. 
 He publicly gave out that he demanded, as a pre- 
 liminary condition of any negotiation for peace, the 
 full restoration of North Germany to the status 
 quo before the war. The Imperial ambassador, not 
 unnaturally, said : " What more could the King of 
 Sweden demand, if he stood a victor in the heart of 
 the Empire ? " Ferdinand said : " We have got a 
 new little enemy, have we ? " 
 
 The ally whom Gustavus would most dearly have 
 wished, Denmark, was evidently hopelessly out of 
 the question. The treaty of the spring of 1628 had 
 been practically rendered valueless by the exclusion 
 of Gustavus's ambassadors from the conferences of 
 Lubeck. If Christian receded from the coveted 
 position of neutrality, which he had gained almost 
 against hope at the peace, it would probably be to 
 throw his weight on the side of the Emperor, — pos- 
 sibly to attack Sweden in the absence of its King. 
 Next in importance came the Protestant princes of 
 Germany. Their attitude towards Sweden, however, 
 I propose to discuss a little further on, in order to 
 obtain therewith a view of the state of Germany 
 during the year 1629. After Germany came France. 
 
lOO Gustavus Adolphus. [1628-30 
 
 Richelieu spared no pains to excite Gustavus to 
 attack Austria, against which Power his own King, 
 having just taken the field in Italy, was about to 
 conclude a closer alliance with Holland. The days 
 of Henry IV. seemed about to revive, when, in 
 August, 1629,- the French aided the Dutch to be- 
 siege and take Bois-le-Duc, and when French troops 
 were actually sent into the " Three Bishoprics " to 
 operate against the Spaniards in the Palatinate. 
 
 But Richelieu's own position was still so unstable, 
 that he, over and over again, hesitated to throw away 
 the scabbard, even when he had drawn the sword. 
 Charnacd twice visited Stockholna (winter 1629, 
 spring 1630), and tried to induce Gustavus to take up 
 the peculiar line of action which suited Richelieu 
 best, peace with the Catholic League, and war in the 
 hereditary countries of Austria. The objects of the 
 two leaders were, in fact, different. France natu- 
 rally thought more of the Rhine frontier, of the Palat- 
 inate, and of Italy, than of the Northern Protestants 
 and the Baltic coasts. And France found Gustavus's 
 demands for subsidies very high, six hundred thou- 
 sand dollars a year and a lump sum down to begin 
 with. " And not for tons of gold," said the Swedish 
 diplomats, " will our King take service as the hireling 
 of France or any other power ; his hands must be free, 
 and he must attack Austria in the way that seems 
 good to him." As for an alliance with the Catholic 
 League, which Charnac^ proposed, they scouted the 
 idea. So no direct help came from France, but it 
 must be remembered (i) that Richelieu was at hand 
 to help if things went well, and (2) that France did 
 
1628-30] Gustavuss Preparations. loi 
 
 render an estimable service to Gustavus in this very 
 year, 1629, by fomenting the growing discord between 
 Ferdinand and the Catholic Electors. 
 
 From France Gustavus turned to Holland ; but 
 Holland, having been forcibly persuaded, on at least 
 one occasion* that the German Protestants had 
 little interest in her quarrel, felt very little interest in 
 theirs. With French help she had now little fear of 
 carrying her eighty years' war with Spain to a suc- 
 cessful issue, and it is not in the nature of a commer- 
 cial republic to make great sacrifices for the liberty 
 of its neighbours. This neutral attitude was much 
 strengthened, when, in 1630, England, whom Holland 
 at this time generally followed, made her peace with 
 Spain. Moreover the Dutch hated the idea of the 
 new position which Sweden had acquired in Eastern 
 Baltic waters. Their subsequent hostility to the 
 Vasas was already foreshadowed in this jealousy. 
 
 On one ally, and one only, Gustavus reckoned, — 
 the restless Prince of Transylvania, Bethlen Gabor. 
 But Bethlen died before the year 1629 was out ; and 
 the King of Sweden was left to face the greatest 
 power of Europe in sole reliance upon a land which 
 possessed a million and a half of inhabitants, and 
 which had only just concluded a long and exhausting 
 war. 
 
 We must now consider upon what amount of sup- 
 port from the German princes our Hero could count, 
 when he should land. It will not perhaps be out of 
 place if we pause for a moment to consider the 
 position of these princes as a whole — ^we shall have 
 
 * The fall of Breda. 
 
I02 Gustavus Adolphtis. [1628-30 
 
 enough to do with their individual shiftings and 
 twistings later. We are so accustomed to look upon 
 France as infinitely the superior of seventeenth-cen- 
 tury Germany in military matters, that we are apt to 
 forget that in the year 1629 this superiority was still to 
 be demonstrated. We have seen what steps Spain 
 and Austria were taking towards universal monar- 
 chy: we are too apt to consider these hollow and 
 unreal. In short we judge the relative positions of 
 France and Austria by the condition in which Riche- 
 lieu left them, not by that in which he found them. 
 The German princes, on the whole, would have fol- 
 lowed Austria against France with hearty good-will 
 even now, but for that intolerable persecution of 
 Protestantism (which was the faith of at least half of 
 them) which was sure to result from the triumph of 
 the Hapsburgs. In like manner they would have 
 followed Austria against Sweden but for the same 
 reason. They did follow her on more than one oc- 
 casion against Turkey with hearty good-will. An 
 able sovereign of the House of Austria, in the six- 
 teenth century, ought to have turned Protestant ; 
 such a sovereign would have created an united Ger- 
 many, in a sense in which even our own days have 
 hardly realised that idea. But Austria in the last 
 quarter of the sixteenth century deliberately chose 
 the retrograde path, and Germany had to pay the 
 penalty of finding herself without a head. In the 
 very year now under consideration, Germany was 
 learning to lean upon foreign powers, in a way that 
 was abhorrent to whatever sparks of patriotism might 
 be left in German breasts. It is true that those states. 
 
1628-30] Gustavuss Preparations. 103 
 
 which now, however unwiUingly, became clients of 
 Sweden, did afterwards transfer their confidence to 
 Brandenburg-Prussia, and that thus the later system 
 known as the " Dualism " was founded ; but we 
 must beware, in reading the subsequent history of 
 Germany, of imagining that all German patriotism 
 was ranged on the side of Prussia in her contests 
 with Austria. On the contrary, the smaller states of 
 the Empire were perhaps the most faithful, though 
 by no means the most effectual, allies that Austria 
 had ; and it was not until she had over and over 
 again shown how little she valued German interests, 
 not until she had repeatedly sacrificed Imperial ter- 
 ritory on the western frontier, in exchange for ad- 
 vantages of a purely dynastic character, that the eyes 
 of all good patriots turned to the north. 
 
 Therefore, pour as much contempt as we will upon 
 the sluggishness of North Germany to welcome her 
 deliverer, upon her stupid repugnance to take up 
 arms for the very purpose for which he came, we 
 must pause before we pass by without a word of 
 praise the obdurate tenacity, with which she clung 
 to the v/orn-out idea of the Empire. The spirit of 
 George William and John George was as far as pos- 
 sible from the noble spirit of Gustavus, but it was on 
 a very much higher level than the spirit of a repre- 
 sentative German man of the eighteenth century, 
 who said : " Patriotism seems to me at best to be an 
 heroic weakness, of which I willingly disembarrass 
 myself." * 
 
 The King of Sweden was not unacquainted with 
 
 * Lessing. 
 
I04 Gustavus Adolphus. [1628-30 
 
 the views of his friends across the Baltic ; naturally 
 enough, he looked upon the dark side. If he was in- 
 tolerant of anything, he was intolerant of sloth ; we 
 see it in all his letters, dashed off on the spur of the 
 moment and always going straight to the point ; in 
 all his proclamations, with their vigorous wording. 
 For devotion to a worn-out idea such as the Holy 
 Roman Empire is, it was hardly to be expected that 
 he would make very much allowance, and he did not. 
 But he well knew that he would have to reckon with 
 it as a practical fact. It was all very well for Char- 
 nac6 to tell him that he was awaited like a Messiah 
 in Germany, that its people would pour out their 
 blood for him, and that he might " aspire to the Em- 
 pire of the East." Gustavus knew better, and cold- 
 ly told the Baron, that his opinion of the probable 
 attitude of the German princes was a very different 
 one ; that in particular John George the Elector of 
 Saxony, the most powerful Protestant prince in 
 North Germany, had declared openly that he would 
 side with his Emperor. Very probably John George 
 would have done so, but for an event which hap- 
 pened in 1629 and materially aided to smooth Gus- 
 tavus's path for him. 
 
 Ever since 1627, as we have already partly seen, 
 signs of a rift within the Catholic camp had become 
 visible. The German language possesses an excel- 
 lent word, which we do not possess, and for which 
 we have no equivalent, — grudeln, to growl (in a 
 political sense). The Electors were now beginning 
 to grudle against Wallenstein, and the grujieling in- 
 creased with every increase of Wallenstein's army. 
 
JOHN GEORGE I. 
 
1628-30] Gustavus's Preparations. 105 
 
 France eagerly caught at the opportunity and en- 
 couraged the Electors. The military jealousy be- 
 tween Wallenstein and Tilly, between the army that 
 was paid (or not paid) by the Emperor and the army 
 that was paid by the League, made matters worse. 
 Now the Emperor would perhaps (I say perhaps, 
 because it is somewhat of a riddle to me how far 
 Ferdinand was prepared to acquiesce in Wallenstein's 
 revolutionary designs) have laughed at all this, but 
 for one thing. He was dominated by the idea of the 
 necessity of getting his son elected King of the Ro- 
 mans, which title, as is well known, carried with it the 
 almost certain succession to the Imperial Crown. But 
 only the Electors could confer the title, and on every 
 previous occasion they had taken the opportunity to 
 wrest from the Imperial power new privileges or 
 " capitulations." One via media presented itself to the 
 astute mind of Ferdinand, or of his Father Confessor. 
 There was a whole row of lawsuits depending in the 
 Imperial courts between Protestants and Catholics, 
 especially between those Protestants who had secu- 
 larised bishoprics and the former chapters of those 
 bishoprics, or Catholic claimants to the same. 
 Among those who so possessed secularised ecclesi- 
 astical territory were the Electors of Saxony and 
 Brandenburg, and almost every Protestant prince in 
 Germany. The Peace of Passau in 1552 had solemn- 
 ly confirmed all secularisations made before that 
 time, but most of the great northern bishoprics like 
 Magdeburg and Halberstadt had changed hands and 
 creeds since then. The system it must be admitted 
 was a remarkable one. The new proprietor of 
 
io6 Gustavus Adolphus. [1628-30 
 
 the bishopric was called sometimes an " adminis- 
 trator," sometimes a Bishop ; and it will be remem- 
 bered that the Duke of York, the second son of 
 George III. of England, counted among his other 
 titles that of " Bishop of Osnabriick. Among the 
 strangest products of German conservatism was the 
 survival of the rights of the chapters side by side 
 with the secularisation of the lands of the bishopric. 
 But for this fact probably three fourths of the disputes 
 with regard to the secularised territory would never 
 have arisen. In many places it remained open for the 
 chapter to turn Catholic again, and elect a Catholic 
 successor to a Protestant administrator. Every 
 variety of ecclesiastical and municipal law had 
 been applied to reconcile these mutually divergent 
 rights, the result of which was a confusion which the 
 Peaces of Passau and Augsburg had signally failed 
 to regulate. Behind the Peace of Passau Ferdinand 
 of course could not go (except indeed by the strong 
 hand), but what if he took up a pen and wrote that 
 all the disputes since that date should at once ter- 
 minate in favour of the Catholics? Not only would 
 he be doing an inestimable service to Holy Church, 
 but also this would surely satisfy the League, even 
 better than a reduction of Wallenstein's army. The 
 grateful Catholic Electors could hardly then refuse to 
 crown his son. As for the two Protestant Electors, 
 they had long ago proved how patient they were 
 in such matters ; and at the worst a few months' 
 quartering of Wallenstein's troops on their territo- 
 ries, which had hitherto been spared by the war, would 
 soon bring them to their senses. It was no sooner 
 
1628-30] Gustavuss Preparations. 107 
 
 resolved than it. was done. The edict of Restitution 
 was issued on March 6, 1629. 
 
 Wallenstein was furious — it spoilt all his pet plans 
 — the division in the Empire was apparently to be 
 made perennial. The unity under the Hapsburg 
 monarchy was further off than ever. From that 
 time forward he hated the Jesuits, whom he re- 
 garded, and rightly, as the authors of " this uncon- 
 stitutional act," worse than ever. Except in the 
 case of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, of which it is 
 supposed that he had advised the Emperor, even be- 
 fore the edict, to take forcible possession, with a view 
 of placing a young Hapsburg prince, Leopold Will- 
 iam, in the possession of the line of the Elbe at an 
 important point, he refused to allow his army to be 
 made use of for the purpose of assisting in the trans- 
 fer. He openly told the Hanseatic cities that the 
 edict was a " pleasantry " and that he would take 
 care that it was not executed within their district. 
 But, so far as Ferdinand was able, it was ruthlessly 
 and systematically carried out, commissioners being 
 appointed for the different districts to see to its ex- 
 ecution, All former bishoprics that " held immedi- 
 ately " of the Empire were to be restored, and all 
 ecclesiastical lands which had been secularised since 
 the Peace of Passau. One of these bishoprics, as I 
 have already mentioned, was Magdeburg, which had 
 chosen a Saxon prince as successor to the existing 
 " administrator," Christian William of Brandenburg, 
 and had then ejected the latter. Wallenstein, who 
 saw clearly what a handle this edict would give to 
 Gustavus, was anxious to finish off Magdeburg be- 
 
io8 Gustavus Adolphus. [1628-30 
 
 fore his arrival. But the city which had deiied 
 Charles V. defied the Bohemian condottier, fresh 
 from his failure at Stralsund ; and like that town 
 turned in its agony to the King of Sweden. What he 
 promised and what he did for Magdeburg we shall 
 have to consider after his arrival in Germany. The 
 Imperial commissioners however did get to work in 
 many districts, and, with the aid of the League 
 troops, contrived to eject the administrators from 
 several of the Westphalian Sees. The two Protes- 
 tant Electors were, however, not as yet meddled with, 
 except so far as this matter of Magdeburg concerned 
 John George. 
 
 The end of the Emperor's high-handed proceed- 
 ing turned out after all not at all to his advantage. 
 Not that t\ie grudeling oi the Protestant Electors at 
 the edict affected him much. Imperial diplomacy 
 was not unused to drug the sluggish John George ; 
 he was continually assured by Ferdinand that an 
 exemption should be made in favour of his domin- 
 ioris ; and he utterly failed to see that he was like 
 Ovrii in the cave of Polyphemus. Gustavus was 
 constantly sending messages to him for help, and 
 getting no answer ; and had little better luck with 
 his brother-in-law of Brandenburg, who, moreover, 
 had not very much ecclesiastical territory to dis- 
 gorge. But in June, 1630, when the Catholic Elec- 
 tors met at Regensburg, Ferdinand found that they 
 had not in the least abated their opposition to Wal- 
 lenstein, and were not one whit more incHned to 
 elect his son. Two demands they there put forward 
 — and it proved how completely Richelieu was lead- 
 
1628-30] Gustavuss Preparations. 109 
 
 ing them by the nose : first, that the Emperor should 
 make peace with France, as far as the Italian war 
 was concerned ; and, secondly, that he should reduce 
 his army and dismiss Wallenstein. The Emperor, 
 who still hoped ultimately to secure the election, 
 gave way to the Catholic Electors, and dismissed his 
 general, whose army, reduced to forty thousand 
 men, was handed over to Tilly and incorporated with 
 the League army, which numbered somewhat over 
 thirty thousand. Thus the best general that Austria 
 had yet possessed received his cong^ at the very mo- 
 ment that the worst foe she had yet encountered 
 took the field against her. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE ARMY OF GUSTAVUS. 
 
 > LL being prepared for his expedition, 
 Gustavus assembled his Estates for 
 the last time on 19th May, 1630. 
 Once more he recapitulated his rea- 
 sons, his hopes, and his fears in the 
 presence of his people. Then he stepped forward, 
 with his three-year-old girl in his arms, and solemnly 
 commended her to their protection. Historians 
 have united in attributing to King and people a strong 
 presentiment that it was their last meeting. What- 
 ever the truth of that may be, the occasion was a 
 sufficiently solemn one to remain a life-long posses- 
 sion in the memory of those who were present. 
 For Sweden indeed Gustavus's reign was over. For 
 yet two years and a half his meteor-like course 
 across Europe was followed with intense pride and 
 intense anxiety by those he left behind. Then his 
 name remained enshrined forever in every Swedish 
 heart. 
 
 From the early days of 1630 the assembling of the 
 troops had begun. Regiment after regiment was 
 drafted down to Elfsnabben or to Kalmar. The 
 
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS II. 
 (Full figure in armor.) 
 
1630] The Army of Gustavus. ill 
 
 conscription had been preached from all the pulpits 
 in Sweden ; the male population between fifteen and 
 sixty had been assembled, and all who had no settled 
 dwelling of their own were enrolled. Of the rest all 
 between eighteen and thirty were allowed to draw 
 lots, and the tenth man only was taken. Exemp- 
 tions ran in favour of all who worked in the mines, 
 or at the manufacture of arms or powder ; also 
 peasants, who had already one son in the army, were 
 not obliged to send another, and those who had no 
 sons were free. It was this " primaeval peasantry " 
 that furnished the strength of Sweden's armies. In 
 the Middle Ages many of them had been serfs of the 
 church or the nobles, but even then a great number 
 had been proprietors. When the crown entered 
 upon a large part of the possessions of the Church, 
 the serfs became much more free. They were in 
 fact almost exactly in the position of copyhold ten- 
 ants, with the addition that each peasant's holding 
 was obliged to supply a man to the army, unless its 
 labour or quit-rents were appropriated to some other 
 department. The nobles, were constantly striving to 
 depress their tenants into a servile condition — the 
 Vasas constantly regarded themselves, and acted, as 
 the champions of the peasants. That is the secret 
 of the popularity of their monarchy. 
 
 It is not easy at any given time to estimate the 
 exact strength that Gustavus put into the field — .the 
 numbers are very variously given, but, according to 
 the (probably) best computation, the native Swedish 
 troops raised in 1630 were about forty thousand or a 
 little more. Besides these, however, he raised nearly 
 
112 Gustavus Adolphus. [1630 
 
 another forty thousand from foreign countries. We 
 are all familiar with Captain Dugald Dalgetty, and 
 some of us possibly with " Colonel Andrew New- 
 port," an (imaginary) " Cavalier who served in the 
 £irmies of his Majesty the king of Sweden, and after- 
 wards in that of Charles I. of England," and who 
 left behind him a set of " memoirs," which have been 
 strongly suspected of being the work of one Daniel 
 Defoe of Cripplegate, London. Less familiar but 
 equally interesting is the book from which Scott 
 acknowledges that he partly drew the portrait of 
 the immortal Dugald : " Monro, his expedition with 
 the worthy Scots' regiment called Mackey's regi- 
 ment, levied in August, 1626, by Sir Donald Mackey 
 Lord Rhees, Colonel for his Majestie's service of 
 Denmark, and reduced, after the battle of Nerling, 
 to one company in Sept., 1634, at Worms in the 
 Paltz . . . first under the magnanimous king of Den- 
 mark , . . and afterwards under the invincible king 
 of Sweden during his Majestie's life-time," etc. 
 Monro afterwards served the Covenant in Scotland, 
 and got handsomely beaten by Montrose, but his 
 book is one of the most entertaining that ever was 
 produced on the military art, and I shall have fre- 
 quent occasion to quote from him. His opening 
 pages in Part II. well illustrate the method which 
 Gustavus employed in levying troops, and the read- 
 iness of Scotchmen to serve for pay. " Our regi- 
 ment," he says, " being thanked off by his Majestic 
 of Denmark in May 1629, my Colonel being in Eng- 
 land, I, hearing his Majestic of Sweden much engaged 
 
1630] The Army of Gustavus. 113 
 
 against the Pole in Spruce [Prussia],* did stand in 
 great need of a supply of foot, thought it was a fit 
 time for me, being out of service, to offer my service 
 unto his Majestic of Sweden." So he sent to treat 
 with Gustavus for a commission and money, on terms 
 to which the King instantly agreed. The regiment 
 was then collected together and some companies sent 
 to garrisons in Prussia, others to Sweden, till they 
 should be ready to cross into " Dutch land," The 
 Colonel (Lord Reay) came back and joined Monro 
 in Denmark ; they crossed to Sweden, and made the 
 winter journey from Gothenburg to Stockholm, visit- 
 ing on the way " that worthy Cavaliere, Colonel 
 Alexander Hamilton at his workehouses in Urbowe " 
 (Orebro, which, by the way,Whitelocke in his " Swed- 
 ish Embassy" calls HorseborougH), "being then em- 
 ployed in making of cannon and fireworks for his 
 majestic." 
 
 From the early part of the fifteenth century, and 
 until far on in the sixteenth, the Scots had been in 
 the habit of selling their swords to the court of 
 France; later they found in the Netherlands a field 
 for their valour, their Protestantism, and, it must be 
 confessed, their cupidity ; and they were now prov- 
 ing themselves among the best, but by no means 
 among the best-behaved, foreign troops that served on 
 either side in the Thirty Years' War. The spirit in 
 which such men as Monro undertook the life of mer- 
 
 * Cf. Chaucer's Knight : 
 Full ofte tymes he had the borde begone 
 Aboven alle naciouns in Pruce, 
 
1 14 Gustavus Adolphus. 0630 
 
 cenaries was perhaps a little more religious than 
 that described in the Forfarshire song : 
 
 " Oh Randal was a bonny lad when he gae'd awa 
 To fight the foreign loons in their ain countrie,'' 
 
 but, after all, it was little different in substance. 
 Neither of them much cared what foreign loons he 
 fought, or in whose service. 
 
 Three Scotch and two English regiments at first 
 seem to have followed the King of Sweden, but I can- 
 not ascertain their exact strength.* Besides this, 
 Colonel Falkenberg had been sent to Holland, and 
 another man to Denmark, to raise troops. A large 
 quantity of the disbanded Poles, Brandenburgers, and 
 Dantzickers passed into the Swedish service ; and in 
 the Hanseatic cities, and all along the coasts of 
 Mecklenburg and Pomerania recruiting went on, 
 chiefly by Leslie's agency from his fastness at Stral- 
 sund. 
 
 The total strength of the army, counting the troops 
 in Prussia, Livonia, and Stralsund, is given in the 
 spring of 1630 as seventy-six thousand. It must 
 be remembered that Wallenstein had not yet been dis- 
 missed, and had on foot a victorious army of near one 
 hundred thousand ; while Tilly, with from thirty to 
 thirty-five thousand, was giving proof that a " ragged 
 soldier with a bright musket " can do most things 
 that are required of him. 
 
 Gustavus, however, at his first landing in Ger- 
 many, determined to take with him only thirteen 
 thousand men, of which two regiments of cavalry 
 
 * The foreign regiments varied in strength very much more than 
 the Swedish. 
 
1630] The Army of Gustavus. 1 1 5 
 
 and four of infantry were Swedes ; four other infantry 
 regiments being foreigners. But before the end of 
 the year 1630, other regiments, native and foreign, 
 rapidly followed, making the total in Germany a 
 good forty thousand. Besides this, must be reckoned 
 the perpetually fluctuating garrisons in Prussia and 
 the Baltic Provinces. 
 
 Now it is quite evident that the King cannot have 
 reckoned upon the resources of Sweden alone for 
 any long period for the payment of these enormous 
 armies. His revenue was but little over twelve mil- 
 lion dollars, and there was a deficit of a million. 
 Five sevenths of this revenue was now set apart 
 for the payment of the army. Several interesting 
 contemporary pamphlets give us the scale upon 
 which both branches of the service were paid ; and 
 it must further be remembered that a large sum was 
 required to provide for the artillery and the engineer- 
 ing corps, both by far the best of their kind in 
 Europe. 
 
 The monthly pay scale of a regiment of foot was 
 
 as follows : 
 
 Colonel 184 dollars. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel 80 
 
 Sergeant-Major 61 
 
 Chief Quartermaster 3° 
 
 Two Preachers each, 18 " 
 
 TwoSchultz* 30 
 
 Four Surgeons each, 12 " 
 
 Clerk of Regiment 3° " 
 
 Clerk of Council of War 18 
 
 Four Provosts-Martial each, 12 
 
 *The regimental Schultz were examiners and registrars of criminal 
 cases brought before courts-martial. 
 
1 1 6 Gustavus Adolphus. [1630 
 
 Sergeant of Court of War (Gerichts-Webell) i8 dollars. 
 
 TwoBeadles* 3 " 
 
 Hangman 7 " 
 
 And in each company of the regiment : 
 
 Captain 61 dollars. 
 
 Lieutenant 30 " 
 
 Ancient (Standard-Bearer) 30 " 
 
 Two Sergeants each, 9 " 
 
 Fuhrer (Assistant Standard-Bearer) 7 " 
 
 Furrier (Under Quartermaster) 7 " 
 
 Chief Armourer, or Rustmaster 7 " 
 
 Clerk of Musters 7 " 
 
 Drummers and Pipers each, 4 " 
 
 Six Corporals " 6 " 
 
 Fifteen Fileleaders (Ritt Masters) " 5 " 
 
 Twenty-one Under Ritt Masters " 4 " 
 
 Privates " 3J " 
 
 Four Muster Boys, and Fourteen Passevolants 
 
 (Officers' Servants) " 3 " 
 
 If the pay had to be advanced (and we may readily 
 suppose that such was not infrequently the case), a 
 proportion was deducted and the arrears paid up at 
 the end of the month. 
 
 The Dutch tract, entitled " Sweedsche Oorloghen '' 
 (Arnheim, 1632), gives the following incomplete pay 
 scale of the general staff : 
 
 A Field-Marshall received florins, 2,000 
 
 (The florin = is. i)d. English money, = about half 
 a Swedish rix-dollar.) 
 The Colonel-General in Command of the Artillery. .. , " 1,200 
 
 Colonel Scoutmaster-General " 1,000 
 
 (Chief of Intelligence Department.) 
 
 Colonel Baggage Master " 1,000 
 
 Colonel of a Regiment of Cavalry " 600 
 
 * Beadles, or stock knights, are assistants to provosts-martial. 
 
1630] The Army of Gustavus. 117 
 
 The figures for the foot are, however, somewhat 
 different from those given in the above list, which is 
 taken from the " Swedish Discipline " (London, 
 1632), and which is constantly quoted by both Ger- 
 man and French writers as worthy of reliance. 
 
 As a matter of fact the King knew that if he was 
 successful the cost to Sweden of the war would 
 diminish every year. He was right. In 1632 only 
 one-sixth of the Swedish revenue had to be devoted 
 to it. 
 
 Gustavus decided not to declare war upon the 
 Emperor in the usual fashion by a herald. He al- 
 leged that the war was really a defensive one, in con- 
 sequence of the attack upon his ally Stralsund. Two 
 letters, however, passed between them, in which each 
 made his own cause appear the better. The day of 
 sailing was perhaps hastened by two incidents which 
 happened on the Pomeranian coast. There had been 
 several skirmishes between the Swedish garrison of 
 Stralsund and the Imperialists, who had taken pos- 
 session of Riigen ; and Leslie heard a report that 
 the King of Denmark was in negotiation with Duke 
 Boguslav, for the purchase of that island ; and also 
 that Wallenstein, whose whole object was to embroil 
 the two Northern Powers, had consented to the 
 arrangement, and promised that his troops should 
 evacuate the island, if the sale should be completed. 
 To prevent this Leslie made a bold dash, and occu- 
 pied the whole island, turning out the small Im- 
 perialist garrison of two thousand men with little 
 difficulty. This was in April. The second incident 
 was that the Imperialists began in the following 
 
ii8 Gustavus Adolphus. ti63C 
 
 month the siege of Stettin, the capital of the Duchy 
 of Pomerania, and the seat of the government ; a 
 city, moreover, which absolutely commanded the 
 lower valley of the Oder. It was of vital importance 
 to Gustavus to save Stettin. 
 
 Yet in order to shew the world that he was ready 
 for peace as well as for war, Gustavus allowed nego- 
 tiations to be carried on at Dantzic, up till the last 
 moment, under the so-called mediation of Christian 
 of Denmark. But Christian in fact had no very dif- 
 ferent object from Wallenstein. He was anxious to 
 involve Gustavus in the war, in order (as he believed 
 the result would be) to wreck the Swedish power. 
 The negotiations under such auspices, it is needless 
 to say, came to nothing. 
 
 On the 30th of May the King of Sweden went on 
 board his fleet at Elfsnabben. There he had to wait 
 until the south-west wind, which lasted for nearly three 
 weeks, and detained the ships in harbour till the 
 army had eaten up all its provisions, gradually veered 
 round, and allowed them to creep across the Baltic ; 
 and on Midsummer-day the fleet anchored off the 
 little island of Ruden, at the point of Usedom, close 
 to the mouth of the river Peene. The next evening 
 the landing of the troops began. The coast seemed 
 alive with camp fires, which had been lit by the 
 enemy (a portion of Wallenstein's troops under Tor- 
 quato Conti was then at Anklam, a little to the 
 south), in order to terrify the Swedes. The King led 
 the way in a little boat, not to the isle of Ruden, 
 but the larger one of Usedom. He knelt down, and 
 prayed aloud ; and then, first of his troops, took in 
 
1630] The Army of Gustavus. 119 
 
 hand a spade, and began to labour at the entrench- 
 ments, which were necessary to cover the landing, 
 and to form the first Swedish camp on German soil. 
 No one understood better the duty of a sapper than 
 Gustavus ; it was one of the points about him that 
 particularly struck Monro, who says : " he was ever 
 out of patience till his works were done, that he might 
 see his soldiers secured and guarded from their ene- 
 mies, and when he was weakest he digged most in 
 the ground " ; and again : " spade or shovel are ever 
 the best companions in danger, without which we had 
 lost the most part of our followers." 
 
 During the night of the 26th nearly all the troops 
 were landed, the artillery, cavalry, and baggage last. 
 Soon all stood safe within the now famous entrench- 
 ments of Peenemiinde. The King then addressed his 
 soldiers, and told them that the enemy were largely 
 the same men whom they had already fought in 
 Prussia ; that he would share all danger and priva- 
 tions with them, they all comforts and booty with 
 him. " For booty you must not look to the land or 
 its inhabitants. The enemy have got it all. It is for 
 you to take it from them." 
 
 And now, while Gustavus and his veterans are la- 
 bouring at their entrenchments, let us consider a few 
 of the causes of the superiority of the Swedish army 
 over its foes. The first of these clearly lay in the 
 character of their leader. Gustavus was perhaps not 
 a greater master of strategy than Wallenstein ; he 
 was certainly a greater master of tactics. He was 
 not a greater cavalry captain than Pappenheim, but 
 the latter had not the coup d'ceil, which enables a 
 
1 20 Gustavus Adolphus. W^z^ 
 
 man to grasp a whole battle at once. He had not 
 more endurance than Tilly, but he kept his soldiers 
 better in hand in victory as well as in defeat. More- 
 over, his position as a king, who was his own com- 
 mander-in-chief, and disposed of the resources of a 
 kingdom, limited though they might be, and who 
 was also independent of orders from any superior, 
 gave him, as it afterwards gave to Frederick II. and 
 Napoleon, an inestimable advantage over his rivals. 
 Secondly, he had better troops, and they were bet- 
 tet-armed. Not in every respect, or in every branch 
 of the service. His cavalry, man for man, were prob- 
 ably not equal to the best cuirassiers of Pappenheim's 
 black brigade. His infantry might fairly challenge 
 comparison in swiftness of movement with Tilly's, 
 but they did not by any means excel them in steadi- 
 ness. But his artillery and his engineers were im- 
 measurably superior to anything that the enemy had 
 fo shew! ^t is here fifsFthat he stands out as an in- 
 liovator in the art of war. The first great artillerists 
 had been the Turks, and the early idea of artillery 
 was to have the biggest guns that could be got.^-This^' 
 had already been abandoned, but the science of pro- 
 jectiles was in a very chaotic state. Cannons were 
 of every size and shape. " There was no kind of 
 serpent, beast, or bird, that had not given its name 
 to some kind of cannon," says Montecucculi in his 
 memoirs, which were written in the latter half of the 
 seventeenth century. Gustavus had steadily bent 
 himself to shorten the bore of his cannons, and had 
 greatly improved the pace at which they could be 
 fired. There were three main classes of cannons in 
 
1630] The Army of Gustavus. 121 
 
 his army, ship's guns, siege guns, and field guns. The 
 heaviest of these would need thirty-six horses for 
 transport, and would only be employed in big sieges. 
 The lightest would be a two-pounder, and might be 
 drawn by one horse or two or three men. The 
 enemy had nothing to compare with his light iron 
 four-pounders, a few of which were attached to each 
 regiment, and called " regimental pieces." They 
 could be fired eight times in the same time in which 
 a musketeer could deliver only six shots. The cele- 
 brated " leather cannons," which were used in the 
 Polish war, had been invented by a German officer 
 called Wurmbrandt ; but these, though very light 
 and movable had to be cooled after each ten or 
 twelve shots, and were not much used in this war. 
 They made their last appearance at the battle of 
 Breitenfeld. Accuracy of aim was the point to 
 which Gustavus attached most importance ; at the 
 passage of the Lech he pointed more than sixty of 
 the cannons with his own hand. 
 
 Of his capacities as an engineer officer we have 
 already seen Monro's estimate. The Germans were 
 amazed at the large scientific staff of miners, en- 
 gineers, and sappers that he brought with him. He 
 in his turn was amazed at the ease with which his 
 enemies would abandon as untenable positions 
 which he could make defensible in a few hours ; and 
 Wallenstein was only taking a leaf out of his rival's 
 book when he so fatally strengthened that famous 
 position of the " Alte Veste," above Nuremberg. 
 
 But even more than his own personal greatness or 
 his superiority in artillery, and the scientific depart- 
 
122 Gustavus Adolphus. ti630 
 
 merits of war, he owed his success to his improve- 
 ments in Tactics. Bound up with and dependent on 
 this, are his improvements in the weapons of his 
 cavalry and infantry. SpeakiBg_generally we may say 
 that in the campaigns of 1 630-1-2 the old Spanish 
 sysfem of Weight gave place before the new Swedish 
 system oi Mobility. As in the department of artil- 
 lery, so in that of cavalry and infantry, it was to 
 rapidity of movement that he trusted. And this is 
 the second point in which he was a great innovator. 
 The bat-ties of the Middle Ages had been won by 
 cavalry. For a long time no amount of foot-soldiers 
 could stand the shock of a large man on a large horse, 
 completely clad in heavy armour. Then the Eng- 
 lish archers and the Swiss pikemen respectively found 
 that there were weak places in a mail-clad line, which 
 an arrow could pierce, and that no horse would 
 charge against a steel hedgehog^^f pikesj each with. 
 a three-foot blade on an eighteen-foot ashen shaft. 
 The Spaniards with complete success adopted the 
 Swiss pike-tactics and supported their pikemen with 
 musketeers on the flanks. The result was that cav- 
 alry soldiers lost their proper place in the practice of 
 war. They were used chiefly to skirmish or forage, 
 and, when they charged, were made to do so at a 
 pace not much greater than that of the infantry. The 
 arms of the cavalryman were, when the Thirty 
 Years' War began, mainly firearms — pistols, car- 
 
 * The "hedgehog"' was the last formation of the Swiss pikemen, 
 when hard driven, a solid phalanx of men ten or twelve deep, pre- 
 senting a front of steel in all four directions. See Mr. Oman's ' ' Art 
 of War in the Middle Ages." 
 
1630] The Army of Gustavus. 123 
 
 bines, or even muskets. (The dragoons are said to 
 have fought in some cases with muskets from horse- 
 back, but it is difficult to believe, as the muskets of 
 those days needed a rest, as we shall see further on.) 
 The cuirassiers were in complete armour, and though 
 they carried a sword, hardly ever charged at speed, 
 so that they lost the full advantage of their weight. 
 Their usual tactics were to ride up to the enemy's 
 ranks, discharge their pistols, and then each rank in 
 turn wheeled off to reload. The only light cavalry, 
 the Croats, or Hussars (in the Imperial armies most- 
 ly small Hungarian noblemen), were used chiefly as 
 foragers, and were so little regarded as soldiers, that 
 it was generally understood that they were exempted 
 from quarter. Now Gustavus gave a new complexion 
 to war, when he completely altered the equipment 
 and tactics of his cavalry. He had only cuirassiers 
 and dragoons ; the former alone had defensive 
 armour, a back and breast piece, and a helmet or 
 " pot." They carried a long sword, and two wheel- 
 lock pistols. They were arranged only three, or at 
 most four, deep and charged at a hand gallop, mak- 
 ing their movements entirely independent of those 
 of the infantry. It was to the bright steel, and the 
 shock of charging man and horse, that they trusted. 
 " Rupert of the Rhine " taught the gentlemen who 
 served under him in England the same charge, and 
 Cromwell and his Ironsides, sweeping over the brow 
 of the hill at Naseby, were only putting in practice 
 the lessons of Gustavus. The dragoons carried mus- 
 ket, sword, and axe ; but the dragoon of the period 
 was little more than a mounted infantry soldier. 
 
1 24 Gustavus Adolphus. neao 
 
 He lacked the distinguishing marks of a cavalryman 
 — riding boots and spurs. 
 
 The infantry in both armies, Imperialist and Swed- 
 ish, appear at first sight to have been armed in much 
 the same fashion. They consisted of musketeers and 
 pikemen. But here, too, Gustavus proved himself a 
 great reformer. The musket of those days was an 
 extremely unwieldy weapon, but slightly developed 
 from the arquebus, which again was a descendant of 
 the crossbow. It was over five feet long, and had 
 to be fired by resting it on a fork. Ever since 1626 
 Gustavus had been labouring to lighten the musket, 
 and he had so far succeeded that he had done away 
 with the fork and replaced it with a thin iron spike, 
 called a hogsbristle or " Swedish feather," which 
 could also be used as a palisade stake, when driven 
 into the ground, to receive cavalry.* This may or 
 may not have been the origin of the later bayonet. 
 
 All three kinds of locks, matchlocks, flint-locks and 
 wheel-locks, were in use in the early part of the 
 seventeenth century. The inconvenience of the 
 matchlock was that the match had to be carried 
 burning, and was apt to be extinguished in heavy 
 rain. But, on the whole, it maintained its ground 
 fairly until the middle of the seventeenth century. 
 In the English civil wars, when a garrison marched 
 out with the honours of war, they were described 
 as having " matches burning and bullet in mouth." 
 
 * " Whilk your honour must conceive," says Captain Dalgetty 
 "to be double pointed stakes, shod with iron at each end, and 
 planted before a square of pikes, to prevent an onfall of cavalry." — 
 " legend of Montrose," Chapter I. 
 
1630] The Army of Gustavus. 125 
 
 Gustavus, by his introduction of cartridges, did 
 away with half the difficulties of loading, but the 
 use of them even in his army was by no means 
 universal. They were carried in a bandolier going 
 across the chest. The defensive armour of the 
 musketeers he reduced to the simple pot, and they 
 were thus enabled to bear the weight of a sabre in 
 addition to their principal weapon. The officers of 
 the musketeers carried only a partisan and a sword. 
 Those of the pikemen were armed like their own 
 soldiers. Pikes may be said to have made their last 
 appearance on a large stage in the Thirty Years' 
 War. In the wars of Louis XIV., they gave way more 
 and more to muskets, and to the newly introduced 
 bayonet. In the English civil war (which is, how- 
 ever, hardly a fair criterion), the numbers of pikemen 
 and musketeers were about equal. Gustavus had 
 more musketeers than pikemen in each company (72 
 musketeers to 54 pikemen, and 18 supernumeraries 
 in a company of 144). His Imperialist adversaries had 
 rather more pikes than muskets. Monro had a curi- 
 ous preference for the former. " Pikemen," he says, 
 " shall ever be my choice when going on execution, 
 as also in retiring honourably with disadvantage from 
 an enemy, especially against horsemen, and we see 
 ofttimes, that when musketeers do disbandon, of 
 greediness to make booty, the worthy pikemen 
 remain standing firme with their officers guarding 
 them and their colours," etc. Gustavus shortened 
 the length of the pike shaft from fifteen or eighteen 
 to eleven feet, and frequently replaced it by a par- 
 tisan. These soldiers had full back and breast 
 
126 Gustavus Adolphus. [1630 
 
 armour, and also thigh pieces, but not the arm 
 pieces and greaves which the Imperialists still wore. 
 It is worthy of notice that Gustavus's preference for 
 lightly armed troops may have been the result of 
 personal experience, for, after his wound in 1627, he 
 found his breast-plate galling, and he went into the 
 battle of Lutzen in a hat and a riding coat. Eng- 
 lishmen will recall Sir Edmund Verney's letter the 
 morning before Edgehill, in which he says that he 
 shall only wear his pot and his " back," not his 
 " breast." We have already seen Gustavus's care for 
 the warm clothing of his troops when in Poland ; 
 the same was now applied to an even greater extent. 
 It has been usual to say that he was the creator of 
 uniforms, and to a certain extent this is true ; but 
 the names given to the brigades, the " yellow," and 
 " blue " brigades, for instance, were not those of 
 their uniforms, but of their standards, which were 
 self-coloured with various devices and mottoes em- 
 broidered on them ; and uniforms did not at any 
 rate become universal in the Swedish army until the 
 days of Charles X. Gustavus was, however, undoubt- 
 edly the creator of field hospitals, and travelling 
 medicine chests, and to his general care for his sol- 
 diers' comfort, is to be attributed the fact that 
 they suffered comparatively little from sickness. 
 
 The formation of troops in battle is a subject on 
 which a civilian must speak with diffidence. The 
 Spanish armies relied, both in the case of infantry 
 and cavalry, as I have said, almost wholly on weight. 
 Their infantry, whether musketeers or pikemen, were 
 arrayed in solid masses, ten, twelve, and in some 
 
1630] The Army of Gustavus. 127 
 
 cases as much as fifty deep. Of what use the rear 
 rank can have been it is hard to say, except to fill up 
 the places of those who fell. Gustavus drew up his 
 men six deep, each division of a company having its 
 pikemen in the middle and its musketeers on the 
 wings. He would probably have made the lines even 
 thinner, but for his knowledge that the men were 
 still accustomed to associate the idea of safety with 
 that of compactness. At Breitenfeld, Tilly ranged 
 his infantry in huge oblong battalions of one thousand 
 five hundred or two thousarid men, with all the 
 pikemen in the centre, and all the musketeers on the 
 wings of each battalion. The method of fighting 
 was for the musketeers to fire and then wheel right 
 about and retreat behind the pikemen, who stood to 
 receive or charge, as occasion offered. The King of 
 Sweden, on the contrary, had little oblongs of about 
 one hundred and forty to two hundred men, each 
 mixed in the fashion I have just described. 
 
 It was the same with the cavalry. At Breitenfeld, 
 Pappenheim and Fiirstenburg, who commanded the 
 left and right wings of the Imperial horse, respec- 
 tively, were in line with the infantry, but entirely 
 upon the extreme left or right of the army. They 
 were also in large squadrons, some of one thousand' 
 cavaliers, ten deep. Gustavus, it is true, placed his 
 infantry, as a rule, in the centre, and his main cavalry 
 on the wings, but he generally supported the foot 
 with small bodies of horse immediately behind, and 
 interspersed the horse with platoons of musketeers. 
 This must not be understood to contradict what I 
 said above, that the movements of his cavalry were 
 
128 Gustavus Adolphus. [1630 
 
 independent of those of the infantry, which means 
 that they did not depend, for the speed of their 
 charge, on the pace of their foot-soldiers. Suppose 
 a square of pikemen to be broken by a volley, the 
 small squadron of horse that was nearest would 
 instantly charge the musketeers at a gallop, and thus 
 prevent the rout spreading along the line, and give 
 the broken square time to re-form. The space between 
 the King's lines was generally about three hundred 
 paces, and he almost invariably managed to have 
 a good reserve between the first and second, and 
 another behind the second line, whereas the Im- 
 perialists often had only one, and never had more 
 than two long lines. 
 
 Another great difference between the opposing 
 forces was, that Gustavus always had artillery — his 
 light field-pieces and regimental pieces — posted among 
 his troops, whereas the Imperialists ranged their ar- 
 tillery either on a hill to the side or on a long line in 
 front. It is extremely difficult to get a clear idea of 
 a battle in which the tactics must have been some- 
 what different, although not so different as is general- 
 ly supposed, from those of our own day. Indeed it 
 is said that a civilian would form but a poor idea of 
 what was going on, if he were placed in a favourable 
 position to view a nineteenth-century battle. 
 
 But from Breitenfeld and Lutzen we can learn 
 that the first thing to do was to clear the ground 
 from the small detachments, which were occasionally 
 posted in -front, and which appear in the English 
 civil war under the name of " forlorn hopes." This 
 was generally effected by a charge of cavalry, which 
 
16301 The Army of Gustavus. 129 
 
 sometimes swept up to the first line of the enemy. 
 Then followed a general discharge of artillery and 
 musketry all along the line, under cover of the smoke 
 of which the cavalry would charge from the wings. 
 At this stage the immense advantage of the extra 
 swiftness of Gustavus's horsemen would make itself 
 felt ; and, moreover, their shock would be of the 
 greater advantage, because it would be felt at more 
 places at once, than in the case of the Imperialist 
 troops, who were obliged to charge from the flanks 
 alone, and so either across the main battalion of the 
 foe or else on the opposite cavalry. When the line 
 was even as much as six deep if would be impossible 
 to practise the latter manoeuvre of " rolling it up." 
 The great point in a cavalry charge was to get either 
 through or round the enemy's lines, so as to- capture 
 his guns, and if possible turn them against him. This 
 was effected by Gustavus at the beginning of the 
 battle of Lutzen, and the guns were afterwards re- 
 captured by Wallenstein, and again taken in the last 
 desperate charge of the Swedes. In the event of 
 the cavalry charges being successful, a general ad- 
 vance along the whole line would be ordered at the 
 double, and the men would then come to "push of 
 pike." Now the difference between such an advance 
 in the Swedish and Imperial troops I take to be, that 
 the Swedish cavalry would make repeated charges 
 on the front and flank of the enemy, while their in- 
 fantry were coming up, instead of, as in the case of 
 the Imperialists, mainly on the flank. It most fre- 
 quently happened, however, that, as in a fairly equal 
 battle each side would launch its cavalry at the same 
 
130 Gtisfavus Adolphus. [1630 
 
 moment, cavalry charged cavalry only, and came to 
 a hand-to-hand fight. Indeed it is difficult to avoid 
 the opinion that after the first hour of such a battle, 
 where both lines were engaged at the short ranges 
 then in use, the whole was a most confused business. 
 Superior dispositions before the battle might be com- 
 pletely upset by one brigade failing to do its duty. 
 Not unfrequently, as in the English civil war, each 
 right wing of cavalry beat the left wing opposed to 
 it, (or vice versa), and pursued it off the field, imagin- 
 ing a similar success all along the line ; and then 
 the two centres would come to mortal shock as best 
 they could. 
 
 I have thus endeavoured to enumerate the main 
 reforms introduced into warfare by Gustavus, and 
 the main causes of his success. Of these, the greatest 
 was undoubtedly, as I have pointed out, his employ- 
 ment of smaller bodies of men, and of swifter move- 
 ments. For the same reasons as those given above, 
 he reduced the size of his regiments. Tilly would 
 have 2,000 or 2,500 men in a regiment ; Gustavus 
 had eight companies, or about 1,000, in the foot, and 
 500 or 600 in the horse. He thoroughly understood 
 the cohesion and esprit de corps which the regiment 
 always possesses. His foreign regiments it is true 
 were somewhat larger, often very considerably so, 
 but they never reached the unwieldy size of those 
 of the Imperialists. 
 
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS 11.-1632. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN POMERANIA AND 
 MECKLENBURG. 
 
 HE first object of the King of Sweden 
 was to secure the coast of Northern 
 Germany, in order to be sure of his 
 communications by sea. With the exception of 
 Stettin, Stralsund, the isle of Rugen, and the 
 ground on which his army stood, it was wholly 
 in the hands of the enemy. But that enemy had 
 allowed him to land unhindered. Wallenstein was 
 away in the south at Memmingen, watching the 
 fluctuations in his master's policy at the Diet of 
 Regensburg. His army was distributed about in 
 various places of strength in Pomerania and Meck- 
 lenburg. In his absence it was more like a band 
 of robbers than an army ; equally undisciplined and 
 equally cruel. As Gustavus had said to his soldiers, 
 it had effectually plundered the land of everything 
 worth plundering. Torquato Conti, who commanded 
 in Pomerania, was among the cruellest, and soon 
 shewed himself among the most incapable of all the 
 Imperial generals. SavelH, his lieutenant in Meck- 
 lenburg, was rather more active, but was unable to 
 
 131 
 
132 Gustavus Adolphus. [1630 
 
 keep his troops in hand. In these circumstances no 
 opposition was made to the first advance of the 
 Swedish King, who in his first campaign of eight 
 months — July, i63C>-February, 1631 — took as many 
 as eighty strong places in the Duchies of Pomerania 
 and Mecklenburg. When Colberg fell in the follow- 
 ing March, Wismar, Rostock, and Greifswald alone 
 remained to the Imperialists. 
 
 The Duchy of Pomerania is divided into two 
 unequal halves by the river Oder, with its double 
 mouths running into the " Frische Haaf," a long 
 shallow fresh-water lake, separated from the sea by 
 the large islands of Usedom and Wollin. The shores 
 of the lake and the coast were then, as now, dotted 
 with innumerable windmills, and from the southern 
 point of the lake it is not more than a couple of 
 hours' sail with a fair wind up the river to Stettin. 
 The King's first point undoubtedly was to get to 
 Stettin. The siege of that city had already been 
 given up, but Conti was still hovering about in its 
 neighbourhood. Gustavus easily made himself mas- 
 ter of the islands of Usedom and Wollin, the enemy 
 retiring before him on one side to Anklam, and on 
 the other to Garz and Greifenhagen farther up the 
 river,' and thus committing the great mistake of 
 dividing his forces. Gustavus saw the chance of 
 cutting him in two, and was not slow to utilise it. 
 He had already begun negotiating with Boguslav, 
 and finding that the old man's chief wish was to save 
 appearances, told him roundly that he (Gustavus) 
 must have Stettin, and that no neutrality on the 
 part of Protestants would be allowed. This was a 
 
1630] Pomerania and Mecklenburg. 133 
 
 principle which he laid down from the very first, and, 
 though he occasionally waived it for a time, there is 
 no doubt that to it he owed his ultimate success in 
 overcoming the sluggish North German spirit, and 
 stimulating it into fighting for itself. On the 9th of 
 July he embarked his troops for the sail up the Oder, 
 and in a few hours was under the walls of Stettin, 
 Stettin was commanded by a brave soldier. Colonel 
 Damitz ; but Colonel Damitz was commanded by 
 Boguslav, who found himself in a somewhat similar 
 position to Charles I., when the Scots ordered him 
 to order Bellasis to surrender Newark. Terror of 
 Gustavus had possessed the old Duke, body and 
 soul ; he came out for an interview, and from the 
 Swedish camp ordered the surrender of the city, 
 stipulating for a show of stratagem, if not of force, in 
 order to save appearances. 
 
 The treaty between Sweden and Pomerania, which 
 was then concluded, provided that Boguslav should 
 pay a round sum of money, and that Damitz and 
 his three thousand Pomeranians should take service 
 under Gustavus. They were enrolled as the White 
 Brigade, and, although we find little mention in the 
 contemporary records of one of their fine qualities, 
 for which their subsequent masters, the Kings of 
 Prussia, most chiefly valued Pomeranian soldiers — 
 their gigantic stature, — they did excellent service in 
 this very campaign. Further, with the usual reserva- 
 tion of the rights of Emperor and Empire, that the 
 King of Sweden should hold Pomerania after the death 
 of Boguslav, until he was indemnified by the Elector 
 of Brandenburg {Bogusla.v's heir-presumptive), or who- 
 
134 Gustavus Adolphus. li630 
 
 ever should succeed the reigning Duke, for the costs 
 of the war. On these conditions Gustavus would re- 
 store to Boguslav all the places he had already taken, 
 who was to admit no other power to occupy them for 
 him. To restore the conquered territory to Bogus- 
 lav, however, was now only to restore it to himself ; 
 the whole effective military strength of the province 
 being incorporated with the Swedish army. It was 
 an excellent treaty for Gustavus from a military 
 point of view ; it can hardly, however, have been 
 likely to encourage other German princes to offer 
 him their alliance. The Elector of Brandenburg 
 might not unnaturally complain that he was thus at 
 one stroke deprived of an inheritance far larger than 
 that of which Ferdinand could possibly deprive him 
 by any number of Edicts of Restitution. But still 
 less was the treaty likely to encourage them to resist 
 Gustavus. No wonder Boguslav begged pardon of 
 the Emperor for concluding it, and alleged that it 
 was all the fault of the Imperial generals, who had 
 practically left him without support. Ferdinand 
 angrily ordered those generals to treat all Pome- 
 ranians as traitors ; and they redoubled, if possible, 
 their cruelties, with the natural result that Gustavus 
 was more and more looked upon as a deliverer. 
 
 The next bit of business was to clear the coast be- 
 tween Stralsund and the mouths of the river Oder, 
 and thus to keep in touch with Leslie. This was 
 not quite so easy, but no stand was made by the Im- 
 perial troops at Anklam, Uckermiinde, or Barth. 
 Wolgast surrendered on the i6th of August to the 
 first appearance of a siege, but Greifswald held out 
 
1630] Pomerania and Mecklenburg. 135 
 
 till the following summer. Against this the Im- 
 perialists had only to set the recapture of the little 
 town of Passewalk farther inland, where they put 
 the new Swedish garrison of three hundred men to 
 the sword. While thus extending his left wing in 
 the direction of Leslie (I place the King with his face 
 to the sea — a glance at the position of Stettin on the 
 map will shew why), Gustavus was anxious not to 
 lose sight of his communication with Pillau and El- 
 bing, where the faithful Oxenstiern was in command, 
 seconding the efforts of the King by all means in his 
 power, and busying himself just at this time in for- 
 warding, or trying to forward, to him troops and 
 supplies. To keep the communication open, the 
 right wing of the Swedish army under Kniphausen 
 was ordered to occupy the strong places in that 
 eastern half of the duchy which is generally called 
 Farther Pomerania. The most important of these 
 were Colberg, Cammin, and Rugenwalde. Himself, 
 with the centre of his troops, proposed to concen- 
 trate on the Oder, in the immediate neighbourhood 
 of Stettin ; but in the autumn he allowed himself 
 to be diverted into a westward march into Meck- 
 lenburg, which was productive of no great success. 
 We have thus to keep our eyes at the same time 
 upon four separate scenes in the war, bearing in mind 
 always that no advance could be made into the in- 
 terior of Germany while a single fortified place re- 
 mained untaken. That was the belief of the time, 
 and for long after. It was not merely sufficient to 
 " block up " a place, however securely, for an enemy 
 might arrive in overwhelming force to relieve it, and 
 
136 Gustavus Adolphus. [1630 
 
 might overrun the whole country, which had just 
 been conquered. If we do grasp this fact, we shall 
 readily acquit Gustavus of having come, as some 
 German historians have asserted that he came, solely 
 for the purpose of conquering Pomerania. 
 
 His centre took possession of the strong post of 
 Damm on the right bank of the river before the end 
 of July, and thus found itself almost face to face 
 with the Imperialist garrison at Greifenhagen and 
 Garz, which, though both Pomeranian, were really the 
 keys of the New Mark of Brandenburg, on the right 
 and left banks of the river respectively. 
 
 What was doing on the right wing we shall learn 
 best from Monro. The town of Cammin was ob- 
 viously the first step towards the occupation of 
 Farther Pomerania, and Cammin had been deserted 
 by the Imperialists almost as soon as Gustavus had 
 landed at Peenemiinde. He had at once sent to oc- 
 cupy it, and, before the end of July, Damitz and his 
 Pomeranians, had possessed themselves of Naugard, 
 Stargard, and Treptow. The last was the next for- 
 tress to Colberg, which had become the rendezvous 
 of the Imperialist forces, and which was reputed the 
 strongest fortress in North Germany. In September 
 General Kniphausen began the blockade of Colberg. 
 Oxenstiern was ordered to hurry up troops from the 
 east to complete its investment. Accordingly, on the 
 1 2th of August, Monro received orders to ship from 
 Pillau to one of the Pomeranian ports with the 
 three Scots regiments. He was shipwrecked a day 
 or two after, and, being driven ashore near Ru- 
 genwalde, thought that it would be better to take 
 
1630] Pomerania and Mecklenburg. 137 
 
 that town, than to perish of hunger, or fall into the 
 hands of the enemy, from whom he had little quarter 
 to expect. By a stratagem, and the treachery of the 
 commander, he possessed himself of it, and held it 
 for nine weeks, until he was relieved by Hepburn, 
 whom Oxenstiern had sent with further reinforce- 
 ments for the service of the siege of Colberg. His 
 next exploit was to advance to capture the outpost 
 of .Schievelbein, where he managed to keep in check 
 some Imperialist troops, which were advancing to the 
 relief of Colberg. Continual alarms of relief, how- 
 ever, made the blockade of the latter a very inter- 
 mittent one : at one time it seemed as if all the enemy 
 were pouring out of Greifenhagen and Garz to save 
 their last eastern stronghold (November) ; but a 
 smart skirmish near " Shivel-beane," as Monro calls 
 it, with an advanced detachment of Conti's army, 
 proved the superiority of the Swedes, and ended in 
 the complete discomfiture of the Imperial troops and 
 the resumption of the blockade of Colberg. 
 
 In the meanwhile, Gustavus, who had been present 
 in person at the taking of Wolgast, had returned to 
 Stettin early in September, to prepare for his expedi- 
 tion to Mecklenburg. Although this expedition 
 was hardly in harmony with the plan he had laid 
 down (or rather, though the time for it had not yet 
 come), it seems that he was prompted to it by the 
 desire to do something for the two Dukes of Meck- 
 lenburg, who, no doubt, were importunate in their 
 demands for assistance. It was important for him to 
 shew German princes, who had been driven out, that 
 he could restore them to their territory. As yet not 
 
138 Gustavus Adolphus. [1630 
 
 a single prince had come forward to meet him, with 
 the exception of Boguslav (and we have seen of what 
 fashion his welcome was), and the young Landgraf 
 William, of Hesse Cassel, who offered to raise three 
 thousand troops on his estates for the service. The 
 Mecklenburg pair had indeed betaken themselves to 
 him, but when they were in the position of men who 
 had nothing left to lose by throwing for high stakes. 
 Moreover he was beginning to be straitened for pro- 
 visions in his camp at Stettin, and (as so often hap- 
 pened on both sides in this war) he was compelled to 
 extend his army over a large space of country in 
 order to feed it. The impatience of the King comes 
 out forcibly at this time in his complaints of the 
 apathy of the population, and in his letters to Oxen- 
 stiern he continually presses for further supplies 
 from Prussia and from Sweden. Gustavus Horn had 
 arrived at Stettin, in the end of August, with con- 
 siderable reinforcements from Finland and Livonia, 
 and he was now left as Field-Marshal in command of 
 the camp at Stettin, while the King went to Meck- 
 lenburg. 
 
 I have little doubt that, from a military point of 
 view, this expedition was a mistake. 
 
 A pretty mixture of piety and worldly wisdom ap- 
 pears in the King's last despatch to the Chancellor 
 before starting : " God, Who at all times hath wonder- 
 fully directed our counsels, can turn everything for the 
 best, but I refer to your earnest consideration the 
 present state of affairs." He reached Stralsund on 
 the 9th of September. Horn was to send him, from 
 time to time, all the reinforcements that he could 
 
1630] Pomerania and Mecklenburg. 1 39 
 
 spare, but really he could spare none. The King had 
 reckoned on the co-operation of a Swedish fleet for 
 the capture of Rostock and Wismar, but bad weather 
 detained it in harbour. The frontier between Meck- 
 lenburg and Pomerania was strongly occupied by 
 Savelli's troops. The King's troops were far inferior 
 in numbers, — he had not more than five thousand 
 foot, and one thousand five hundred horse, with him 
 — ^but he succeeded in out-manoeuvring his adver- 
 sary and taking Damgarten and Ribnitz, the keys of 
 the province, before the end of the month. He got 
 no further, however, than the seizure of one of the 
 " sconces," opposite Rostock, which put him in a 
 favourable position for an attack upon that city, 
 recently occupied by the Imperialists. It is evident 
 that he expected an attack of the enemy in force on 
 the newly won frontier, for he withdrew shortly after 
 (October 6th) to Ribnitz. But then he heard that 
 Schaumburg * had made a bold dash upon the camp 
 at Stettin in his absence, and, divining from this that 
 the enemy was concentrating there, he determined 
 to leave Mecklenburg alone for a time. For the 
 moment the idea of finishing the campaign at a 
 blow on the frontier of Brandenburg seems to have 
 struck him, and Horn urged the same plan. In the 
 end of October the King was back at Stettin, sick at 
 heart that Oxenstiern could send no more troops; 
 obliged to leave numerous garrisons behind him, he 
 could muster no more than twenty thousand men, 
 yet he determined to march on the Imperial camp. 
 
 * Schaumburg, one of Tilly's lieutenants, succeeded Conti in 
 September, the latter retiring to Rome, to the more peaceful com- 
 mand of the Papal Guards. 
 
140 Gustavus Adolphus. [1630 
 
 All November he was preparing his dispositions. 
 He would advance up the Oder and either meet the 
 foe in the field or storm Greifenhagen and Garz. On 
 December 4th, he wrote an affecting letter to Oxen- 
 stiern, which has been often quoted : " The issue of 
 battle is doubtful by reason of our sins, doubtful 
 too is human life's span. I beg you, therefore, if it 
 go hard with us, not to lose heart, but to look to my 
 memory and the welfare of those dear to me. Deal 
 with me and mine as I would with you and yours. I 
 have reigned for twenty years with grievous toil, but, 
 God be praised, with honour too. I have honoured 
 my Father-land and made light of life, riches, and 
 good days for its sake. I have had no other end in 
 life but to do my duty in my station. But, if I fall, 
 my dear ones will be in a pitiable state ; they are 
 women, — the mother none too wise [this is not the 
 first indication Gustavus gives that Maria Eleanora 
 was hardly a help meet for him], the daughter a 
 tiny maiden ; too weak to advise themselves in 
 danger, and equally weak if they receive advice. It 
 is arofyyrj naturalis that drives me to write thus to 
 you, and it is a relief to write. Yet them, and my 
 body, and my soul, and all God hath given me, I do 
 commend to His Holy Keeping." 
 
 During the last two months of the year 1630 rein- 
 forcements did arrive at the King's camp, though 
 from a very different quarter from that which he 
 expected. Wallenstein's troops, over half of which 
 were disbanded, offered to take service with him in 
 great numbers. It is one of his highest titles to 
 praise that he made out of these men soldiers at 
 
1630] Pomerania and Mecklenburg. 141 
 
 least sufficiently disciplined not to sully the fame of 
 his arms during his lifetime. He had a high opinion 
 of the individual German as a soldier, and Ban^r, 
 one of his ablest generals, avowed that he preferred 
 Germans under Swedish discipline to native Swedes. 
 At the same time Falkenberg who had been sent to 
 Holland to negotiate with the States-General for 
 three additional regiments, began to forward his 
 men. The slippery King of England was allowing, 
 underhand, the almost equally slippery Marquis of 
 Hamilton to raise 6,000 Englishmen, but these did 
 not arrive till the following July. 
 
 It was with about * 14,000 men, of whom 6,000 
 were horse, that Gustavus began to advance up the 
 Oder from Stettin against the main Imperial position. 
 Schaumburg had been obliged to widen his canton- 
 ments a little more than he would have liked, in 
 order to collect provisions, for the winter was very 
 severe, and he was even worse off than the hun- 
 gry Swedes. His main body lay at Garz, the rest 
 between Pyritz and Greifenhagen and he then 
 covered both branches of the fiver. Greifenhagen 
 might" be regarded from a military point of view as 
 the tite-du-pont of Garz, and there were bridges over 
 both streams. On Christmas eve the Swedes lay 
 before Greifenhagen and occupied both banks of 
 the river. After service on the morrow the storm 
 began. Don Ferdinand of Capua made a feeble 
 resistance, tried to fly across the bridge, met on 
 
 * Droysen's figures, from the archives and letters. The numbers 
 are given in other historians with every variety that mathematical in- 
 genuity can suggest. 
 
142 Gustavus Adolphus. ti630 
 
 the other side another detachment o{ the Swedes, 
 who drove him back, and was finally taken prisoner 
 with all his guns. Schaumburg saw from Garz what 
 was going on, blew up the bridge over the western 
 stream, threw his artillery into the marsh, and made 
 off at full speed with all his troops for Frankfort-on- 
 Oder. A detachment of the Swedes sent eastwards 
 from Greifenhagen against Pyritz had equal success, 
 and soon the roads to Landsberg and Frankfort were 
 covered with fugitives remorselessly pursued by the 
 Swedes. The King himself followed them almost 
 as far as Landsberg. Three of their regiments, in- 
 cluding that which had been Wallenstein's own, were 
 practically annihilated. 
 
 Landsberg was a place of great strength, and com- 
 manded the pass of the river Warthe, one of the 
 most important tributaries of the Oder. Gustavus 
 anxious as he was to pursue the enemy and relieve 
 Magdeburg, of which more hereafter, found it neces- 
 sary to give his troops a rest. He therefore strength- 
 ened the defences of Garz, so as to keep open his 
 communications with Stettin, quartered his troops 
 at Schwedt and Barwalde, and prepared seriously for 
 the negotiations with the Electors of Brandenburg 
 and Saxony, which should unlock for him the gates 
 of Central Germany. 
 
 So ended the year 1630. Gustavus had cleared 
 the enemy out of all the sea-coast districts with the 
 exception of Wismar and Rostock in Mecklenburg, 
 Demmin and Greifswald in Hither, and Colberg in 
 Farther Pomerania. All these places were either 
 besieged or the sieges could be taken up again at any 
 
1630] Pomerania and Mecklenburg, 143 
 
 moment, for Banfer had been left with four thousand 
 men on the frontier of Mecklenburg, and Colberg 
 was completely isolated from the other four. The 
 King had little doubt that all would fall in a month 
 or two. 
 
 Satisfactory as such success must have been to 
 Gustavus, he would probably have been more 
 pleased, could he have forced on a general engage- 
 ment. He did not quite realise as yet what the dis- 
 missal of Wallenstein meant, and that the enemy 
 only did not fight him, because they had in that part 
 of Germany at the moment no corporate existence. 
 Tilly was far away to the west, busy incorporating 
 the disbanded soldiers of Wallenstein in the League 
 army. The enemy with whom Gustavus had to deal 
 in the first six months of his campaign was nothing 
 but a series of garrisons, under commanders who 
 were indeed, equally with himself, at present incapa- 
 ble of realisiiig that their bond of cohesion was at 
 an end. Gustavus certainly expected to find much 
 larger garrisons in Garz and Greifenhagen, and 
 thought it not impossible that, either there or in 
 Mecklenburg, a concentration of all the old Wallen- 
 stein troops might take place, and give him battle in 
 the open field. But nothing proves more conclusive- 
 ly the awful misery that the Thirty Years' War in- 
 flicted upon the population of Germany, than the 
 fact that it was a year and two months before Gus- 
 tavus could draw Tilly to meet him in a pitched 
 battle. During that weary period the war was part- 
 ly a starvation match, in which the movement of the 
 armies was determined by the rapidity, or the re- 
 
144 
 
 Gtistavus Adolphus. 
 
 [1630 
 
 verse, with which they ate their way through a coun- 
 try, and partly a series of manoeuvres on the side of 
 the Imperial general to avoid a pitched battle alto- 
 gether, with the idea that the discipline of the Swe- 
 dish army must give way under the pressure of hun- 
 ger, and that the German people would pay any price 
 to be rid of their deliverers. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 WHICH WAY? 
 
 VEN if he should be compelled to vio- 
 late all the laws of war, and advance 
 into the interior before Mecklenburg 
 was cleared, there were weighty reasons which urged 
 Gustavus to such a step. There was one su- 
 premely weighty reason. The city of Magde- 
 burg had claimed his protection. Magdeburg was 
 torn with party strife. There was a party for the 
 (recently deposed) " administrator," Christian Will- 
 iam of Brandenburg, a party for the newly elected 
 Saxon administrator, and, of course, an Imperial 
 party. The country districts of the archbishopric, 
 more open than the city to Imperial influences, began 
 to suffer from a restoration of Catholicism even before 
 the publication of the " Edict of Restitution," and 
 Wallenstein had for a short while besieged the city, 
 with the intention of forcing the edict upon it. 
 But in September, 1629, he was in little mood for 
 another hopeless siege, and had allowed himself to 
 be bought off with one hundred thousand dollars. 
 10 145 
 
146 Gustavus Adolphus. ti&tj 
 
 Magdeburg, which was one of the most powerful of 
 the inland members of the Hanseatic League, always 
 endeavoured to induce the other towns to make 
 common cause with her, and in November, 1629, the 
 greater members — Hamburg, Lubeck, Bremen, 
 Brunswick, and Hildesheim — had agreed to come to 
 the help of Magdeburg, or each other, in case of 
 future attacks from the Imperialists. Meanwhile 
 Christian William, the ex-administrator, whose only 
 idea was to get back into possession of his " bishop- 
 ric," worked for that end, both upon his party in 
 the city and also upon the King of Sweden, with 
 whom, in the early days of 1630, he entered into a 
 lively correspondence. He promised Gustavus that 
 he would raise in the city and the archbishopric a 
 large army, if the latter would use his influence to 
 get him restored there. Gustavus considered it a 
 mad plan, as he did not clearly see where Christian 
 was to get his army, but he promised him some 
 money when he should be in possession of Magde- 
 burg. The leading citizens were, no doubt, averse 
 to him and to Swedish influence, but he came in 
 disguise to the city, raised a revolt of his partisans, 
 and became master of the situation (June, 1630). 
 This was followed by a regular treaty between Gus- 
 tavus and the administrator and city of Magdeburg, 
 to stand or fall together (beginning of August). 
 Gustavus promised to interest himself for the city in 
 all dangers, to defend it at his oivn cost, not to forsake 
 it in any need, and to conclude no peace in which it 
 should not be comprised. The whole of the diocese 
 soon fell into the administrator's hands, and he really 
 
1630] Which Way? 147 
 
 seems to have set to work to raise an army for Gus- 
 tavus ; but the treaty was hardly concluded when the 
 Imperial troops began to advance (beginning of Sep- 
 tember). They overran the country districts without 
 difificulty, and, before the end of the month, had 
 taken everything except the city. Gustavus had 
 particularly warned Christian William against scatter- 
 ing his newly raised levies in different places, but the 
 warning was unheeded. 
 
 The rising had come too soon, but the King had 
 no choice but to make the best use of it. Quite 
 apart from all treaty considerations, the possession of 
 the line of the Elbe at the most favourable point 
 possible, which it would give him, was of inestimable 
 value for the prosecution of his march into the in- 
 terior of Germany, and lastly the same reason applies 
 in this case as in the cases of Stralsund and Mecklen- 
 burg, — the importance of shewing to the Protestants 
 that if they rose and trusted to him he would not 
 fail to assist them. He should have been prepared 
 for people rising at the wrong time. He sent money 
 for the levying of new regiments from among the 
 citizens, and an imcomparable commander, Falken- 
 berg, the marshal of his household (the same man 
 who had been employed to raise troops for him in 
 Holland), to animate the resistance of Magdeburg, 
 and, by express agreement, to take full command of 
 the defence, for he knew that Christian William was 
 as incapable as he was weak and selfish. His in- 
 structions to Falkenberg are important. He is to 
 " make at Magdeburg such a diversion, that he shall 
 not only get command of the Elbe, but also keep the 
 
148 Gustavus Adolphus. ii630 
 
 enemy employed in those parts, and so prevent them 
 undertaking anything against himself (Gustavus) ; 
 further, to give room for discontent to spread " 
 (against the Emperor), " and to support the mal- 
 contents in refusing contributions to the enemy; 
 finally, to make this insurrection the torch to kindle 
 an universal rising throughout Germany." 
 
 Again I am compelled to use italics. If the light 
 in which Gustavus looked upon Magdeburg was 
 simply to keep the enemy employed while he him- 
 self mastered Pomerania ; if, careless whether the 
 greatest Protestant city in Germany fell or not, he 
 kept encouraging an insurrection, which he lacked 
 alike the means or the good-will to support, he acted 
 more like a Borgia than a Vasa. The charge was of 
 course made then, and has been made since. But 
 his whole life belies the charge. He never again 
 took his eyes off Magdeburg. It was to be his first 
 goal. As early as August 17th he writes to Oxen- 
 stiern to hurry up his Prussian regiments, and to 
 send them straight to the relief of Magdeburg. His 
 steady advance up the Oder Valley had no other 
 end than that relief. All the subsequent negotia- 
 tions with Brandenburg and Saxony were for the 
 purpose of enabling him to advance to the Elbe. 
 
 But if the verdict be " Not guilty," and it should 
 be so unanimously, on the charge of fraud or indif- 
 ference, it is not so easy to acquit him of a blunder. 
 It was lightly undertaken, that treaty with Magde- 
 burg. Gustavus ought to have reckoned on the im- 
 possibility of clearing the sea-coasts in time to permit 
 him to advance to its rescue ; he ought to have con- 
 
1630] Which Way? 149 
 
 sidered the sluggishness of Brandenburg ; the timid- 
 ity and ill-will of the drunken John George of Sax- 
 ony ; the immense difificulties that Falkenberg would 
 encounter in organising resistance ; finally the thou- 
 sand and one things that might intervene between 
 himself and a city more than one hundred miles, as 
 the crow flies, from Stettin. On two things princi- 
 pally, however, he counted : first, that Magdeburg 
 was capable of enduring any siege that the then 
 divided forces of the enemy would be able to lay to 
 it ; secondly, that he would have met that enemy in 
 the field, and annihilated him before the siege could 
 even begin. The latter was a fair calculation. Had 
 Wallenstein and not Tilly been the leader of Ferdi- 
 nand's army in the end of 1630, the first decisive bat- 
 tle would in all probability have occured a year earlier 
 than it did. The former was a false calculation. There 
 was treachery enough in Magdeburg, as there was in 
 nearly every Imperial town, to make the danger al- 
 most as great from within as from without. Finally, 
 it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Gustavus 
 might have spared three thousand or four thousand 
 veterans to go with Falkenberg, and if need be to 
 die in the breach with him, if only to prove to the 
 world that Sweden would be true to her allies. 
 
 Too great caution carried the day. He wrote to 
 Magdeburg to hold out to the last ; he would do all 
 he could for its relief. In one respect he was not far 
 wrong ; he gave Tilly so much work to do in the 
 early months of 163 1 that the siege never became 
 serious until March. 
 
 Meanwhile, Gustavus was doing his utmost to per- 
 
150 Gustavus Adolphus. t1630 
 
 suade the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony to 
 take up arms for the cause. Even before his sailing, 
 as we have seen, he had negotiated with them, and 
 got no satisfactory answer. He had also written to 
 the whole body of Electors, who promptly told him 
 to mind his own business. While he was at Stettin 
 in July, 1630, he put his demand more plainly before 
 George William, somewhat after this fashion : 
 
 " Now is the most favourable time," he wrote, 
 " for you to occupy and defend your own fortresses. 
 If you wont do that, give me one of them. Give me 
 only Kustrin " (which commands the junction of the 
 Oder and Warthe). " I 'II defend it. What else can 
 you do ? He who makes a sheep of himself will 
 be eaten by the wolf. For I tell you plainly I will 
 hear not a word of neutrality. Your Serenity must 
 be either friend or foe. As soon as I get to your 
 frontier you will have to declare yourself. Here 
 strive God and the devil. If you will hold with God, 
 come over to me. If you prefer the devil, you will 
 have to fight me first. Tertiutn non dabitur, of that 
 you may be sure." 
 
 It was exactly tertium that George William 
 thought might be given to him. The idea of a third 
 party in Germany, which should gradually acquire 
 such power as to be at first independent of the Em- 
 peror and his foreign antagonists, and soon strong 
 enough to dictate peace to both, had been growing 
 fast since the Edict of Restitution. Arnim, who had 
 at one time been Wallenstein's lieutenant, was par- 
 ticularly active in this cause. He was a Saxon and a 
 Lutheran, and at the present time he had the ear of 
 
1630] Which Way? 151 
 
 the Elector John George. If John George had been 
 a man of any worth, the idea might have come to 
 "something. But he was as incapable of adhering to 
 a resolution, as of keeping sober after dinner. To 
 him, however, George William now turned for advice. 
 John George had no advice to give, except to refuse 
 Kiistrin to Gustavus. Accordingly we find the Elec- 
 tor of Brandenburg giving to his commandant at 
 that fortress orders to give the Imperialists "pass 
 and repass " by Kustrin in any case ; if the Swedes 
 came he was to " pray them to turn back." If pray- 
 ers failed he was to let them pass, for it would be a 
 sign that they had won the lower valley of the river. 
 
 Towards the end of the year 1630, the ambassadors 
 of the two Electors had a conference at Annaburg, 
 where they agreed to hold a meeting of all Lutheran 
 states, at Leipzig, in the following February. That 
 was in the very days of Greifenhagen and Garz. 
 Meanwhile the Swedish banners were over the fron- 
 tier, and George William had to decide what to do. 
 He refused Kustrin. Gustavus halted for a moment, 
 loth to proceed to extremities against a Protestant 
 prince. Even while he halted he found a better ally 
 than George William. 
 
 The ubiquitous Charnacd had been with him soon 
 after his landing, and had shewn himself with each 
 turn of fortune in Gustavus's favour, more and more 
 ready to come to terms. On the 13th of January, 
 163 1, the Treaty of Barwalde was concluded between 
 France and Sweden. Hard cash had been the prin- 
 cipal subject of the negotiation, and Louis XIII. had 
 agreed to pay to Gustavus a lump sum of one hun- 
 
152 Gustavus Adolphus. [1631 
 
 dred and twenty thousand dollars in consideration of 
 his recent expenditure, — further a sum of four hun- 
 dred thousand dollars a year for six years to come. 
 Until that time, or until a general peace, if such 
 should supervene earlier, Sweden was to keep in the 
 field an army of thirty thousand foot and six thou- 
 sand horse. The object of the alliance was declared 
 to be " the protection of their common friends, the 
 security of the Baltic, the freedom of commerce, the 
 restitution of the oppressed members of the Empire, 
 the destruction of the newly erected fortresses in the 
 Baltic, the North Sea, and in the Grisons territory, 
 so that all should be left in the state in which it was 
 before the German war had begun." Sweden was 
 not to " violate the Imperial constitution " where 
 she conquered ; she was to leave the Catholic religion 
 undisturbed in all districts where she found it exist- 
 ing. She was to observe towards Bavaria and the 
 League — the spoilt darlings of Richelieu's anti- 
 Austrian policy — friendship or neutrality, so far as 
 they would observe it towards her. If, at the end of 
 six years, the objects were not accomplished, the 
 treaty was to be renewed. 
 
 It was not a magnanimous nor a splendid offer, 
 that the great Cardinal here made. Gustavus was to 
 him as I have said, an important piece upon the 
 chessboard, but still only a piece. He was to fight 
 Richelieu's battles hampered with conditions that 
 would seriously clog his path if he were to observe 
 them. Suppose he were to come to what had once 
 been Magdeburg and find Catholicism " existing 
 there," having been established by force amid the 
 
16311 Which Way? 153 
 
 ashes of the town — was he not to restore Protes- 
 tantism ? Or suppose it were Augsburg, the birth- 
 place of the Lutheran confession, from which an Im- 
 perial garrison might have just ejected the Protestant 
 preachers : what was he to do there ? Or again, sup- 
 pose that the Duke of Bavaria refused him the 
 passage through his territories, that blocked the way 
 to Vienna, and at the same time declared that he 
 was "neutral": what were Richelieu's intentions ? 
 The answer can only be one of two, for Richelieu 
 seldom did anything by halves. Either the religious 
 clauses were only inserted in the treaty in order to 
 flatter the sentiments of Louis XIIL (who had feel- 
 ings akin to those of his great-great-grandson, albeit 
 based upon a much more real religion, with regard to 
 taking part with heretics), and the clauses in favour of 
 the League, because the Cardinal really hoped to 
 work upon Maximilian to desert the Emperor, or else 
 his intention was (and this it really seems to have 
 been) that the King of Sweden should advance 
 straight into the hereditary .countries by way of 
 Silesia, and dictate a peace within the walls of 
 Vienna. 
 
 But, hampered with conditions as the alliance was, 
 it was of inestimable advantage to Gustavus. Even 
 in prestige the chosen ally of the Most Christian 
 King was a very different person from the King of 
 snows and ice. He would not melt so easily now be- 
 fore the beams of the Imperial sun. And money 
 was of more importance than prestige. It was just 
 at that time of supreme importance. The harvest 
 had been a bad one in Sweden, and there had even 
 
154 Gustavus Adolphus. ti63i 
 
 been one or two small ^meutes against the tax- 
 collectors ; the German allies, if allies they could be 
 called, had neither the means nor the will to pay 
 much. Lastly, he would be sure of getting more 
 support in Germany now that his threats and prayers 
 were supported by Richelieu's diplomacy. As for 
 the conditions, for the present they sat lightly on 
 him ; when the time came, he might consider whether 
 they should be observed or modified. 
 
 Full of bright hopes and confidence he writes home 
 to John Casimir, immediately after the treaty with 
 France, — it is his first really cheerful letter, the earlier 
 ones had contained so much grumbling about want of 
 money and the like : " We have now got, by God's 
 grace, a good foot and ' sedes belli ' fashioned in such 
 a kind that the enemy by all human calculation, 
 will not find it easy to eject us from it. The country 
 is not so poor as to be unable to feed a moderate- 
 sized army." With his own troops, he adds, he is 
 well contented, the alliance with France is a great 
 gain, and the German princes and states are gradu- 
 ally drawing away from the Emperor, and will in 
 time learn to lean upon Sweden. If, but only if, 
 Sweden continues to be victorious, great help may 
 be expected from them. Magdeburg, too, and the 
 connection with that, has opened a wide door for 
 deliverance of many oppressed Christians. It must 
 anyhow cut the enemy off from the passage of the 
 Elbe. 
 
 His plans for the year 1631 were calculated upon a 
 scale based rather upon his own impetuous confidence, 
 than upon the actual facts of the situation. His 
 
16311 Which Way? 155 
 
 quarters in the New Mark of Brandenburg were now 
 well provided with necessaries. He issued a proclar 
 mation, recalling to their homes the inhabitants who 
 had fled while the Imperialists were in the land. 
 The rigid discipline which he maintained in his camp 
 encouraged the population to return ; they were 
 obliged however to provide regular contribution of 
 forage and victual proportionate to their means. 
 This was all brought into a common stock, and the 
 soldiers received it at the canteen. In their billets 
 they were to demand nothing but bed, vinegar,* and 
 salt, and the right to cook their provisions at the 
 host's fire. All guides, horses, and provisions at inns 
 were to be paid for in hard money, or a token which 
 at headquarters would be exchanged at once for 
 money. From this quarter he proposed to act out- 
 wards in several directions. His main army, now of 
 forty-two thousand under himself, was to remain on 
 the Oder until the Magdeburg business should have 
 so far ripened that a general rising should take place 
 on the Elbe. Then between these two Protestant 
 armies, the two Protestant Electors would have room 
 to declare themselves without fear of consequences. 
 Horn and Teuffel with two other detachments were 
 to complete the reduction of the northern fortresses, 
 and then advance into Silesia. Lastly, he had hopes 
 
 * Is this on account of the strange appetite of the Northern nations 
 for pungent food, or for the same reason for which Frederick the 
 Great obliged his troops to use vinegar ? I find that Frederick, when- 
 ever he was in a district where the water was bad, compelled his men 
 to put a few drops of the condiment into the water which they drank, 
 in order to avoid sickness. The water is no doubt decidedly indiffer- 
 ent in the Lower Valley of the Oder. 
 
156 Gustavus Adolphus. ti63i 
 
 that a fifth army might be raised on the Weser by the 
 Protestants of Bremen, Hildesheim, Brunswick, and 
 Hamburg, just the districts, be it observed, in which 
 the Edict of Restitution was being actually put in 
 force at this very time. It is hardly likely that he 
 expected to be able to carry out such a plan as this 
 in its entirety. But it was a glaring error of Tilly's 
 to remain as long as he did inactive on the Weser, 
 and to allow unhindered the fall of Greifenhagen 
 and the practical scattering of Schaumburg's corps. 
 In the last days of 1630 the old General, who had been 
 waiting for the Imperial regiments which were com- 
 ing up from Italy (since the conclusion of the peace 
 with France it was no longer necessary for Ferdinand 
 to keep troops there), and for Wallenstein's disband- 
 ed soldiers to be re-formed into regiments under him, 
 advanced slowly towards the Elbe. Bad news met 
 him at every step. Now it was the fall of Garz, 
 now the threatened blockade of Landsberg. This 
 he resolved, if possible, to prevent ; he therefore 
 pushed on more rapidly through Brandenburg and 
 reached Frankfort-on-Oder on the i8th of January. 
 Gustavus resolved to strengthen his garrisons in 
 Pomerania, and to divide the rest of his forces into 
 two parts, with the first of which, thirty thousand 
 strong, he would himself compel Tilly to give battle 
 between the Elbe and the Oder ; with the second, 
 thirteen thousand strong, Horn should clear the 
 coasts, and then advance into Silesia. This was 
 Oxenstiern's plan. No one can deny that it was a 
 more feasible one than the King's. But it took too 
 little account of Magdeburg. 
 
1631] Which Way? 157 
 
 For the moment, however, contenting himself with 
 blockading Landsberg, Gustavus resolved to draw 
 Tilly after him, by another attack upon the yet re- 
 maining fortresses in Mecklenburg. Here Monro 
 comes forward to act as our guide again. His regi- 
 ment had in due course come into the camp at Stet- 
 tin, and now he says : " we brake up from Stettin, 
 taking our march towards New Brandenburg, the 
 earth clad over with a great storm of snow, being 
 hard frost, we carried great cannon of battery, and a 
 number of small cannon being well provided of all 
 things belonging to artillery, our little army con- 
 sisting of about 8,000 horse and foot." Almost 
 without a blow they occupied successively Prenzlau, 
 New Brandenburg, Treptow, and Klempenau, and 
 then sat down before Demmin. Monro can hardly 
 find words to express his admiration of the King on 
 this his first march immediately under his orders. 
 " He did not like so well of an ofiQcer that was not 
 as capable to understand his directions, as he was 
 ready in giving them ; nevertheless he would not 
 suffer an officer to part from him, till he found he 
 was understood by the receiver of the order. Such 
 a general would I gladly serve, but such a general I 
 shall hardly see, whose custom was to be the first 
 and last in danger himself, gaining his officers' love 
 in being the companion both of their labours and 
 dangers," etc. He was impatient, too, of excuses. A 
 soldier complained to him that the ground was fro- 
 zen ; the digging could not be done in time. " Neces- 
 sity " said the King " admits of no such excuses." 
 The want of good maps made frequent recognisances 
 
158 Gustavus Adolphus. [1631 
 
 necessary. In these the King was ever foremost, 
 often to his own great danger. Before Demmin when 
 he was engaged in this work he tumbled through the 
 ice on a marsh and was immersed to his middle, where- 
 on Monro's Captain Dumaine went towards him to 
 help him out. His Majesty "wagged his hand that 
 the Captain might retire, which the enemy perceiving 
 shot above a thousand shot of musket at his Majesty, 
 who at last wrought himself loose, coming off without 
 hurt, and sat awhile by our guard fire." Whereupon 
 the bold Dumaine remonstrated with him for hazard- 
 ing his person, on whom the eyes of Europe were 
 fixed ; " what would become of us," he said, " the 
 brave cavaliers of fortune, if anything should happen 
 to your Majesty ? " The King was grateful for the 
 warning, and confessed his fault, and then " before he 
 had changed his wet clothes in a cold tent, called for 
 meat and dined grossely, and taking a great draught 
 of wine went and changed his clothes." 
 
 Savelli was in command at Demmin, which was 
 immensely strong, yet before the Swedes had taken 
 any of the approaches, except two small sconces, he 
 agreed to surrender (February 13th), and thus Gus- 
 tavus was free either to advance into Mecklenburg 
 or to turn upon Tilly. For his plan had succeeded. 
 He ,^«(/ drawn Tilly after him. Tilly considered that 
 his troops, 15,000 strong, were now sufficiently re- 
 established to be able to offer battle to the Swedes. 
 On his way north-westwards he came before the 
 newly taken Swedish position of New Brandenburg, 
 where the brave old Kniphausen with 2,000 men 
 commanded. Gustavus sent him orders to retire, as 
 
1631] Which Way? 159 
 
 the place was not worth the risk of holding it against 
 such a force. The messenger who carried the letter 
 was intercepted. Kniphausen refused to surrender. 
 Tilly determined to storm. The Swedish com- 
 mander had no guns, and the issue could hardly be 
 doubtful. After a desperate struggle, which cost the 
 besiegers four hundred lives, the town was won, and 
 the entire garrison, except the commander and sixty 
 men, together v/ith the entire male population of 
 the town, were put to the sword (March 13th). The 
 heroic defence of such an untenable place made a 
 great impression on Tilly, and he determined to 
 retreat again. This time, however, not in the di- 
 rection of Landsberg and Frankfort, but towards 
 the Elbe, where Pappenheim had already begun the 
 siege of Magdeburg. It is worthy of note that a 
 few days before the loss of New Brandenburg the 
 far more important fortress of Colberg had sur- 
 rendered, and thus Gustavus's communications with 
 his Prussian base of supplies were safe. 
 
 What was Gustavus to do ? Should he follow Tilly 
 at all costs and prevent his junction with Pappen- 
 heim ? or should he try to draw him back by attack- 
 ing Landsberg and Frankfort ? He decided for the 
 latter. Tilly would surely never abandon such a 
 place as Frankfort, by far the most important east- 
 ward position the Imperialists now held. He must 
 fight in defence of that. To attack Frankfort, 
 however, Gustavus had to get by Kiistrin some- 
 how or other. He therefore simply marched up 
 to that fortress, and terrified its commander into 
 giving him free passage and some of the outworks. 
 
i6o Gustavus Adolphus. !1631 
 
 Then in the night of the 3d of April he stormed 
 Frankfort. 
 
 Monro, who had taken a short " forloffe " in order 
 to go to Stettin to see his wife and children — he did 
 not see them again for three years which he found 
 " much to his prejudice," — had rejoined the King at 
 Schwedt, on the march to Frankfort. There all the 
 Scots regiments were re-formed into one brigade, and 
 put under the command of Sir J. Hepburn. The 
 brigade had its full share of the dangers and honours 
 of the storm, Hepburn himself being hit in the knee, 
 as he led his men through a great sallying port, 
 " which dazling his senses with great paine, forced 
 him to retire, who said to me, ' bully Monro, I am 
 shot ' whereat I was wondrous sorry." His Major 
 was next shot dead, and the pikes halted for a mo- 
 ment. Up came the fiery Banfer, and urged them to 
 lead on : " whereat Col. Lumsdell and I being 
 both alike at the head of our own colours, he having 
 a partisan in his hand, and I a half-pike, with a head- 
 piece that covered my head, commanding our pikes 
 to advance, we lead on shoulder to shoulder," and 
 so won the gate. The enemy retired in confusion, 
 having neither the wit nor courage to let down the 
 portcullis. So that we, entering the street at their 
 heels, made a stand till our body of pikes were drawn 
 up orderly and flanked with musketeers, and then 
 we advanced," etc. Thereon three thousand * of the 
 garrison were put to the sword, as a reprisal for the 
 
 * Droysen says (but quotes no authority) 1,700 in all was the total 
 loss of the enemy. I prefer Monro in this instance, as he several times 
 reverts to the subject, which evidently made an impression on him. 
 
1631] Which Way? i6i 
 
 New Brandenburg business. Monro bears witness to 
 the great courage with which some Irish troops under 
 Colonel Butler held out. Three hours' plunder was 
 allowed, and for once his troops seem to have got 
 out of Gustavus's hand. He was obliged to draw 
 his sword, and rush in among some of the companies, 
 to check the plunder, at the end of that time. 
 Monro's righteous soul was vexed, not so much at 
 the fact of the plunder, as at the desertion of their 
 colours for three hours together that resulted from 
 it. " In some regiments, I am confident there was 
 not one man with the colours," says he. He was 
 also a little uneasy at the reprisal business, and at 
 the battle having been fought on the " Sabboth." 
 
 After such a lesson as this, Landsberg was not 
 likely to hold out long ; and in fact it capitulated after 
 a ten-days' blockade on April i6th. This was the 
 last stronghold of the Imperialists in the New Mark 
 of Brandenburg. The few fugitives from Frankfort 
 had run till they reached Glogau in Silesia, and had 
 spread all up the valley of the Oder the news that 
 the terrible conqueror was coming. Vienna and 
 Munich felt the shock reverberate. Even in Ingol- 
 stadt men prayed in the litany to be delivered " from 
 the Devil and the Swedes, the Finns and the Lapps." 
 Looking nearer home Gustavus's successes here had 
 partly produced the desired result. They had drawn 
 Tilly back from Magdeburg into Brandenburg ; but 
 they had not unnaturally failed to make him any 
 more eager for the decisive hour of battle. Pappen- 
 heim was furious with him : " Why won't he either 
 go and meet the Swedes in the field, or else come 
 
1 62 Gustavus Adolphus. 11631 
 
 and help me to take Magdeburg ? " he wrote to the 
 Emperor. 
 
 But Tilly was hampered by his double relation to 
 Emperor and League. He hovered about the fron- 
 tier of Brandenburg, ever and anon casting an eye 
 on the Leipzig convention of Protestant princes, 
 who had been in session since February. There 
 were sixty-two princes of the two reformed creeds 
 there. There were committees without end. All 
 the ecclesiastical grievances that oppressed ecclesias- 
 tics could imagine, were presented to the Emperor. 
 There was even an intention declared of arming, at 
 some future time, for the defence of the Augsburg 
 confession. John George said he would contribute 
 eleven thousand and George William five thousand 
 men for such a cause. But there was no word of re- 
 lieving Magdeburg. And the name of Gustavus 
 Adolphus was not mentioned in any public act during 
 the two months conference. An " appeal to the Em- 
 peror," — that was the result of their palavering, and 
 the natural result of that appeal was an angry order 
 to dissolve, or Leipzig should be blown about their 
 ears. 
 
 The King of Sweden had come to that place, to 
 which another Christian so often came in his life's 
 pilgrimage — the place where two ways met. Before 
 him on his left lay Silesia, Bohemia, Vienna, and 
 peace ; a beaten enemy, a few ill-defended fortresses ; 
 no Protestant Electors whose feelings had to be con- 
 sidered and whose territory had to be spared ; the 
 approval of his great ally the King of France, glory 
 without end. And on his right a sea of troubles, 
 
163" miich Way? 163 
 
 drunken John Georges and timid George Williams, 
 incapable Administrators, stingy Hanseatic towns, 
 certain complications with the League, probable dis- 
 approval of Richelieu, Tilly and Pappenheim with an 
 unbeaten army larger than his own. But in the mid- 
 dle of all that lay Magdeburg. 
 
 To his everlasting honour he chose the latter way. 
 The lonely figure of Falkenberg bravely striving to 
 organise that hopeless defence, in a wilderness of 
 treachery and incapability, as the dark masses of 
 the enemy gathered in greater and greater strength 
 on both sides of the river during the month of April, 
 must have been continuously present to his mind. 
 The knot looked almost hopeless, but Gustavus re- 
 solved to do his best to untie it. 
 
 From Landsberg, where in grim northern jest he 
 made a blacksmith, who had acted as guide to his 
 army, burgomaster of the town, he marched straight 
 upon Berlin. Berlin seemed inclined to resist. 
 Once more the King hesitated to quarrel with his 
 brother-in-law. The precious days were wasted in 
 diplomacy between them, and at last on the Sth of 
 May Gustavus by treaty got possession of Spandau. 
 He was promised Kiistrin also, but, at the earnest 
 solicitation of Saxony, George William evaded this 
 part of the agreement. There were now two paths 
 open to Gustavus for the relief of Magdeburg. The 
 easier one by old Brandenburg and Moeckern, the 
 more direct ; the other by Wittenberg or the bridge 
 of Dessau. On the former of these routes the land 
 had just been eaten up by Tilly's troops ; the latter 
 that general had strongly fortified and guarded. On 
 
164 Gustavus Adolphiis. ti63i 
 
 hearing of the fall of Landsberg, Tilly had rapidly 
 retired towards Magdeburg, and was now before the 
 doomed city with twenty-six thousand men. He 
 had laid waste everything behind him, and Gustavus 
 had got nothing from the Elector of Brandenburg 
 but the bare fortress of Spandau — no stores, no pro- 
 visions, no money. On the other hand, if the King 
 should try to free a passage at Wittenberg or Dessau, 
 his way lay through the country of the Elector of 
 Saxony, who had hitherto shewn himself almost an 
 open enemy, yet who was not a person who could be 
 treated as such. If the King got through without 
 the consent of John George, Saxony and Branden- 
 burg would be certain to rise in his rear. The third 
 party in Germany might become a fact, and the 
 whole fruit of Gustavus's conquests might be lost 
 in a day. Could Magdeburg hold out but another 
 three weeks he would have time to terrorise the 
 Elector of Saxony into a treaty, as he had already 
 terrorised the Elector of Brandenburg, and would 
 drag him along with himself to the relief. That was 
 his view of the dilemma. From this aspect it is use- 
 less to blame him for not forcing the passage at Wit- 
 tenberg. How far he knew the actual condition of 
 Magdeburg it is impossible to say. He must have 
 known that it was in the gravest danger. But he 
 also doubtless knew that Tilly was little inclined to 
 risk his reputation on such an uncertain event as the 
 storm of such a city ; very likely he knew that Tilly 
 was continually within an ace of raising the siege, and 
 retreating to the Weser. 
 All his diplomatic efforts to move John George 
 
1631] Which Way? 165 
 
 proved in vain. The Elector even refused a personal 
 meeting. Ten more precious days were wasted in 
 this effort, and then the King resolved to employ- 
 terror. He prepared to advance towards Wittenberg, 
 and his advanced guard were even upon Saxon soil, 
 when the terrible news met them that Magdeburg 
 was down. 
 
 Falkenberg had worked hard at the defence ever 
 since the previous October, and had reported at the 
 end of the year that the city now began to look 
 something more like a fortress. The town council 
 too was coming round to Falkenberg's views of the 
 necessity of sparing no efforts. Christian William 
 was a thorough nonentity and was completely passed 
 over. The wonder was that Tilly did not attack 
 earlier. Pappenheim indeed had appeared before the 
 city in November, but from that time until March 
 the number of troops that he could muster for the 
 siege seems to have depended entirely on the de- 
 mands of Tilly. Sometimes it was eight thousand, 
 sometimes it was only two thousand. On the other 
 hand, Falkenberg's garrison was but little over two 
 thousand four hundred, and the townsmen were 
 disgracefully slack and indifferent. Information of 
 whatever Falkenberg did was promptly conveyed to 
 the enemy by traitors and spies. 
 
 Magdeburg lies on the left bank of the Elbe, shel- 
 tered from the right bank by one small and two large 
 islands. An outwork on the right bank, called, in 
 remembrance of the failure of the general of Charles 
 V. nearly a century before, " Trutz Kaiser," was con- 
 nected with the suburbs by smaller outworks and the 
 
1 66 Gustavus Adolphus. [i63i 
 
 islands themselves were strongly fortified. " Trutz 
 Pappenheim " and " Trutz Tilly " were two sconces 
 farther up the river on the right bank. There were 
 also on the left bank redoubts all around the city it- 
 self. By the 30th of March all the detached oVitviorVs 
 had been stormed, not without heavy loss to the little 
 garrison. In the middle of April, Tilly returned for 
 the last time with twenty-six thousand men. A last 
 gleam of hope shone when it was announced that 
 the Emperor had again recalled him for the defence 
 of Silesia and Bohemia. But Tilly was the servant 
 of the League as well as of the Emperor, and he 
 refused to go. The last outwork on the right bank 
 was stormed on April 19th. There remained only 
 the islands, and they soon followed. Why did not 
 Gustavus come ? 
 
 He wrote continually and frankly, explaining his 
 difficulties and urging steadfastness, but his messen- 
 gers had much ado to get through. On the 24th all 
 the suburbs were burnt by the inhabitants themselves. 
 Tilly sent on the same day three separate summonses 
 to the Council, to Christian William, and to Falken- 
 berg. The Council asked leave to consult their breth- 
 ren of the Hansa ; the administrator returned a vague 
 answer. Falkenberg simply said : " I hold out while 
 I live." As daily news came to Tilly of Gustavus's 
 advance, the determination to take the city, before 
 he could arrive, hardened in him. He sent to destroy 
 the bridge of Dessau and thus cut off one means of 
 relief. On the 7th of May he began the bombard- 
 ment of the city. From the islands and from the 
 north side a perpetual hail of balls poured in for three 
 
Missing Page 
 
MAGDEBURG AT THE TIM 
 1. St. Michael's. 2. Tlie Cathedral of St. Maurice, S. St. Gangolph's 4 Sf <5 
 lO. St. John's. 11. Rath House. 12. Barefoot Cloister. 1 18. St. Catharine's 14 ot''^^"^" 
 gate Rath House. 21. St. Laurence's. 22. St. Peter and Paul's. 28 Surt^nK, ' ^'- ^'ai'y M 
 
 ^"aenoupg. 24. The N, 
 
i AT THE TIME OF THE SIEGE BY TILLY. 
 
 St Sebastian's. 8. St. Nicholas'. 6. Ch. of Oup Lady. 7. St. Anna's. 8. Ch. of Holy Ghost. 9. St. Ulrioh's. 
 14 St Mary Magdalene's. IB. Hunentower. 16. St. Peter's. 17. St. James'. 18. St. Augustine's. 19. High- 
 urg. 24- The New City. 2B. Toll-Redoubt. 
 
16311 Which Way? 167 
 
 consecutive days, under cover of which mines and 
 galleries were incessantly applied to sap the founda- 
 tions. On the 8th the powder of the garrison began 
 to fail, and Tilly demanded unconditional submission. 
 The Council resolved to treat — to the despair of Falk- 
 enberg who still believed the place to be tenable. 
 On the 9th Tilly drew back his cannons and ceased 
 bombarding. He was hardly less irresolute than the 
 Council itself. Finally the advice came from within 
 the city to storm on the morning of the loth, treaty 
 or no treaty. The Council was sitting at 4 A.M. on 
 that morning to consider a new message from Tilly 
 when Falkenberg appeared, coming straight from the 
 walls into the chamber, and represented to the Coun- 
 cil that every day, every hour was of priceless value, 
 that the King of Sweden was on his way. While he 
 was trying to persuade them, a cry of " Pappenheim " 
 resounded through the street. Tilly had not waited 
 for the return of his trumpeter, who was actually in 
 the Council-chamber, when the leading desperadoes 
 of the Imperialists were over the walls. Falkenberg 
 caught up his sword and hurried to the scene of 
 action. His garrison fought desperately till he fell. 
 The subsequent horrors of the two days' sack have 
 become a byword, and it is happily not our duty to 
 look into them. At the end of that time twenty 
 thousand people — I give the lowest computation ; Sir 
 T. Roe, the English diplomatist says forty thousand — 
 had perished, and Magdeburg was in ashes. 
 
 The fall of Madgeburg was by far the most impor- 
 tant event that had happened in the war since the 
 battle of the White Mountain outside Prague ; not 
 
1 68 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
 [1631 
 
 merely on account of the greatness of the city, 
 although that in itself was a serious matter, for it 
 was now manifest, from the history of the siege, that 
 the proud commercial spirit of the German cities was 
 a thing upon which reckoning could no longer be 
 made ; but far more, because it seemed for the 
 moment as if the King of Sweden had come in vain. 
 Loud and high were the accusations against him, 
 raised by those who little understood the difficulties 
 with which he had to contend. He seemed for the 
 moment, to both sides, to be merely a new Christian 
 of Denmark, who would now be only too glad to 
 wriggle out of the war just as that monarch had done. 
 The universal cry of joy raised in Catholic Germany, 
 which, considering the odds against the city, was as 
 ridiculous as it was indecent, and may be aptly com- 
 pared with the one famous smile of King Philip II. 
 of Spain, which he smiled on receiving the news of 
 the massacre of St. Bartholomew, was echoed back by 
 a wail of terror from the opposite party, and even 
 the imperturbable Wallenstein, on receipt of the 
 news, is said to have hurled a piece of his table 
 furniture at the head of the messenger with the 
 words : " It is a lie ! " 
 
CHAPTER- X. 
 
 THE CRITICAL TIME. 
 
 ND how did Gustavus receive the 
 same news ? Gustavus, who at once 
 grasped its full meaning, saw that 
 he must retreat. Tilly would probably press on 
 with his victorious army, would compel the Electors 
 of Saxony and Brandenburg to join him, and would 
 then cut off the Swedes from the sea. That his fears 
 on the score of Brandenburg were not groundless 
 was shewn by the demand instantly made by the 
 Elector that he should restore the fortress of Span- 
 dau. It had been given simply for the purpose of 
 the relief of Magdeburg. Now that that relief was 
 no longer possible, why should the King retain it ? 
 The terms of the treaty had been that it should be 
 restored within a month, if the relief of Magdeburg 
 was effected by that time. Gustavus, utterly broken 
 down by the apathy of the Prdtestant princes, 
 resolved to restore it at the end of the appointed 
 period, and to retreat to his bastion of Pomerania. 
 He published a manifesto, in which he laid all the 
 blame of the destruction of Magdeburg on the 
 i6g 
 
r 70 Gustavus Adolphus. 11631 
 
 Elector of Saxony, and before evacuating Spandau, 
 sent a last message to George William. 
 
 But the situation gradually began to look more 
 favourable. Nearly a month elapsed from the taking 
 of Magdeburg, and Tilly still lay idle on the eastern 
 frontier of Saxony. Pappenheim had complained 
 bitterly of this inaction, and subsequently told the 
 Emperor that they could have conquered the whole 
 of Germany in fourteen days, if the generalissimo had 
 not been so irresolute. Gustavus realised from this 
 inaction that the cause was not yet lost. So he 
 played his last and strongest card against his brother- 
 in-law. " Unless," said he, "you confirm me in pos- 
 session of Spandau, I will retire altogether from the 
 war, and, leaving a strong garrison to hold Pomerania 
 for the crown of Sweden, let you and your fellow 
 Protestants defend yourself against Tilly as best you 
 can." Even then the Elector, in some faint hope 
 that Tilly would let him alone, returned an evasive 
 answer, and talked about defending himself with the 
 help of Saxony. Gustavus laughed aloud. " Then 
 I am going," he said. On June 9th he withdrew his 
 troops from Spandau, and left the fortress unde- 
 fended. On his retreat he came past Berlin, and, 
 whether in grim fun or in earnest, pointed his cannon 
 against the palace. Out came the ladies of the 
 Electoral family to implore the King of Sweden not 
 to desert them — above all, to point those grinning 
 iron mouths another way. The Elector would con- 
 clude the treaty — any treaty — rather than be left at 
 the mercy of Tilly. " And the King answered mer- 
 rily," says Monro, " that if the Duke (Elector) did 
 
1631] The Critical Time. 171 
 
 not conclude with him before night he would send the 
 Duchess and all the Ladies prisoners to Sweden, and 
 that the Duke should follow." On June nth the 
 treaty was concluded. Gustavus got possession of 
 Spandau during the whole period of the war, free 
 pass through Kiistrin, and any other fortresses he 
 might need, and a payment of thirty thousand dol- 
 lars a month, besides the right of levying ample 
 contributions for his army within the Electoral ter- 
 ritories. On the part of George William there 
 followed the usual excuses to the Emperor, which 
 were received in the usual way. To John George 
 he could only advise a course similar to his own. 
 
 Not that by this treaty Gustavus was in any better 
 position to advance southwards. On the contrary, 
 unless he could persuade Saxony to do the like and 
 more, he would have to be content with maintaining 
 himself on the Lower Oder. All the rest depended 
 upon Tilly's coming. But Tilly never came. Tilly 
 seemed wholly to have forgotten Gustavus's existence. 
 After the sack of Magdeburg, he busied himself 
 almost entirely with attempts to disarm the Protes- 
 tants of central Germany, who had flattered them- 
 selves that they would be allowed to remain neutral. 
 Thuringia occupied him a long while, especially Hesse 
 Cassel, whose young Landgraf, having thrown himself 
 heart and soul into Gustavus's cause was endeavour- 
 ing to raise troops for him. Landgraf William 
 resolved to ally himself with Saxe Weimar, and at 
 least make a diversion in favour of the Swedes. Here 
 again the extraordinary slowness of the Imperial 
 commander was of the utmost advantage to Gustavus. 
 
172 Gustavus Adolphus. [1631 
 
 Before Tilly had taken a single important fortress of 
 the Landgraf 's, the King had completed his operations 
 in the north, and had advanced to the Elbe. There 
 is this to be said for Tilly, that, for a few weeks, 
 after the fall of Magdeburg he had no idea what 
 Gustavus was going to do. He was a very old man, 
 and not at all of the temper to go and seek out the 
 enemy wherever he might find him ; and his troops 
 were probably almost as much demoralised by their 
 success at Magdeburg as they could have been by 
 any defeat. Whatever a fiery cavalry leader like 
 Pappenheim might think, a general-in-chief ought to 
 think first of the preservation of what he had got. 
 It was an ungenerous view which most of his con- 
 temporaries took, that Tilly was always looking to 
 his " reputation." The word is an Italian word, and 
 had survived from the Condottiere wars of the 
 fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Wallenstein's 
 letters to Colalto and Arnim are full of expressions 
 indicating " that his reputation is at stake," " that he 
 will not risk his reputation," etc. But Wallenstein 
 had much more of the Condottiere in him than Tilly, 
 a fact of which Protestant pamphlets and squibs 
 were not slow to lay hold. 
 
 If Tilly was slow, Furstenburg, Aldringer, and 
 Gallas, who were bringing up the Italian army, were 
 much slower ; it appears to have taken over a year 
 for some of the regiments to march from the Manto- 
 vese to Thuringia. 
 
 The latter part of the month of June had been 
 employed by Gustavus, despite many discourage- 
 ments, in a third attempt to reinstate the Dukes of 
 
TILLY. 
 
'^^'1 The Critical Time. 173 
 
 Mecklenburg in possession of their duchy. The 
 fruit of this was the surrender of Greifswald (the 
 last fortress in Pomerania) on June isth. This was 
 the work of Ake Tott, a general of great worth, but 
 some sluggishness, to whom the King throughout the 
 rest of the war entrusted the leading position in 
 Mecklenburg. The Dukes were now restored to 
 everything with the exception of Rostock and 
 Wismar. It cannot be said that they shewed much 
 gratitude. Tott had the utmost difficulty in wring- 
 ing contributions out of them, and Gustavus soon 
 came to have small scruples about squeezing a re- 
 luctant German prince. 
 
 Meanwhile, Banfer, who had been left behind in 
 Brandenburg when the King returned to Pomerania, 
 stormed Havelberg (close to the junction of the Elbe 
 and the Havel), and fortified it for the King, June 
 1 2th. The last important garrison (with the exception 
 of the two Mecklenburg ports just mentioned) north 
 of the Elbe was thus cleared from the enemy, and 
 that river naturally became the scene of the summer 
 campaigns, Gustavus determined at the beginning 
 of July to resume the offensive in this direction. 
 Monro describes the march southwards by old 
 Brandenburg, Barnow, and Tangermiinde to the 
 junction of the two rivers, and the formation of the 
 camp of Werben. At Barnow he found the beer 
 remarkably good ; but not so good as some beer he 
 had drunk at Soest, " a good Calvinist town, which 
 brews liquor best for the body and clearest from all 
 filth or barme, as their religion is best for the soul, 
 and clearest from the dregs of superstition." At 
 
1/4 Gustavus Adolphics. [1631 
 
 Tangermunde they crossed the Elbe, and so north- 
 wards again to Werben, where Gustavus " did re- 
 solve to set down his leaguer, and spying a parcel of 
 ground, the most commodious that could be had for 
 situation and air, having first the commodity of trans- 
 portation by water on the river of Haggle (Havel), 
 running into the Elve at the leaguer, he had also the 
 whole country on the other side of the Elve behind 
 him as his friends." The camp was thus on the left 
 bank of the larger river, and a bridge was made 
 across both streams, in case of need for retreat. The 
 town of Werben with its outworks formed the de- 
 fence on one side ; on the other a " long earthen 
 dike made to hold the river off the land, which his 
 Majesty made use of, dividing it by sconces and re- 
 doubts, which defended one another with flankering, 
 heavy batteries and cannons set within them alongst 
 the whole leaguer." Horse and all were quartered 
 inside. Every brigade of foot had a definite post 
 within the earthworks, and a brigade of horse in 
 attendance on it in case the foot should be driven 
 back. There were " voides for letting the troops in 
 and out, with slawght bommes before them, where 
 strong guards were kept for defending the passage," 
 One almost fancies, in reading Monro's description, 
 that one is listening to Captain Tobias Shandy, re- 
 enacting with Corporal Trim the defence of Namur. 
 Regular advanced posts lay continually outside to 
 skirmish with an approaching foe. 
 
 The King had good reason to take every possible 
 precaution, for Tilly was known to be at last advan- 
 cing in force. The month of July, of which he spent 
 
< 
 o 
 
 (/) 
 m 
 
 > 
 
 < 
 
 h 
 M 
 
 D 
 
 
1631] J%g Critical Time. 175 
 
 the greater part in this camp at Werben, with not 
 more than 16,000 men, was without doubt the worst 
 period for him of his whole sojourn in Germany, 
 with the exception of the still more fatal August of 
 the following year under the Alte Veste by Nurem- 
 burg. In the first place, he could not get supplies 
 of money. Provisions indeed he had, but not with- 
 out great difficulty ; not, indeed, as he bitterly com- 
 plains in his letters to Oxenstiern, without having to 
 wink more than once at the depredations of his sol- 
 diers. Pestilence stalked abroad in his camp ; Monro 
 lost thirty soldiers in his own regiment alone. Ham- 
 ilton's troops, which had landed at Peenemunde a 
 little before, were withering away with disease and 
 bad food before they could reach him. On the other 
 hand, he received reinforcements of a few thousands 
 from Sweden, and the Queen herself came over to 
 Pomerania to be near her husband ; and he was now 
 also joined by the young Landgraf of Hesse and 
 Bernard of Weimar, "who were the first that did 
 hazard with a private convoy to come to his Majesty 
 through their enemies, and who were therefore joy- 
 fully received." 
 
 On July 22d, Tilly, who had 22,000 men, and who 
 was continually receiving reinforcements from the 
 Italian army, appeared in the neighbourhood of the 
 camp. Gustavus called his staff officers into his tent 
 and asked them whether they would fight or run 
 away. No one spoke. Gustavus gave his voice for 
 remaining. At the first attack, on the 23d, the Impe- 
 rialists never fairly got up to the camp, but withdrew 
 after a few hours' hot skirmishing outside. At the 
 
1 76 Gustavus Adolphus. [i63i 
 
 second, a few days later, Tilly, who had intelligence 
 that a traitor would spike the Swedish guns at a 
 particular place, — a statement that either proved 
 false or was discovered in time, — led his troops right 
 up to the earthworks. The guns remained silent 
 until he was within pistol-shot. Then they spoke, 
 and with such effect (the Swedish horse at the same 
 time pouring out and charging the Imperialists in 
 flank,) that Tilly found himself obliged to retreat 
 without further attempts. His total loss during 
 these few days in killed and wounded amounted to 
 6,000 men. 
 
 And what was the Elector of Saxony doing ? Ever 
 since the fall of Magdeburg he had been gradually 
 giving way to the conviction that he must do some- 
 thing. It was no doubt an extremely painful con- 
 viction for him to arrive at ; but he began to levy 
 troops. Arnim was the chief director of his con- 
 science in the matter, and it is impossible to do more 
 than guess at Arnim's reasons for his change of 
 front. Probably, however, it was the feeling of the 
 utter failure of the neutral position ; the growing 
 sense of isolation, now that Magdeburg was lost, 
 and Brandenburg, Hesse, and Weimar had openly 
 declared for Gustavus ; above all, it was the change 
 of tone of the Court of Vienna that produced the 
 revolution in Saxon politics. Polyphemus was grad- 
 ually swallowing all who had not contrived to escape 
 out of the cave. For John George the way of escape 
 was still open. But the monster was already stretch- 
 ing out his hands towards him. The Emperor was 
 determined to enforce the Edict of Restitution. At 
 
1631] The Critical Time. 177 
 
 the end ot May Tilly had already demanded that 
 John George should hand over his bishoprics ; all 
 the Saxon embassies to the general and his master 
 had proved equally vain. From Wollmirstadt at the 
 end of July Tilly addressed an ultimatum to Saxony. 
 The Elector must instantly open his territories to 
 the Catholic army, and furnish it with quarters and 
 provisions ; must disband all his new levies, and Join 
 Tilly with the rest of his troops ; must recognise 
 the supreme authority of the Emperor, and use his 
 influence with other princes for the same end. What 
 would Saxony do ? The future of Protestantism 
 seemed to hang on his answer. He returned no 
 answer, but he went on with his levies. Tilly there- 
 fore broke up from Wollmirstadt before the end of 
 August and advanced into Saxony. A line of two 
 hundred burning villages marked his path towards 
 Leipzig. 
 
 Meanwhile Gustavus had not been idle. He la- 
 boured to support the insurrection, which broke out 
 every now and then in Hesse and harassed Tilly's 
 rear ; he took his good old course of threatening to 
 John George that he would withdraw from the war 
 altogether and leave him to the tender mercies of 
 Tilly ; and on the 23d of August, when Tilly ad- 
 vanced towards Leipzig, Gustavus marched out of 
 his camp at Werben, directing his forces straight 
 upon Wittenberg, in full confidence that the good 
 time had come. It had. On August 25th Tilly was 
 at Halle, plundering and destroying on every side. 
 On September ist John George concluded a solemn 
 treaty with Gustavus, wherein the King promised 
 12 
 
178 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
 [1631 
 
 him to stand by him to the last, and ro drive the 
 enemy from his lands ; and the Elector on his side 
 swore to join his troops with the King's, and not to 
 ask them back till the danger was past ; to conclude 
 no peace without him, and to leave him the fullest 
 direction of the war. 
 
 MINNESPINNING. 
 
CHAPTER XL 
 
 BREITENFELD. 
 
 HAT everything indeed hung in the bal- 
 ance, the pamphlets of the day on the 
 Protestant side leave us assured. Droy- 
 sen gives long extracts from some of them. The 
 tone of all is that the war must be carried on 
 offensively. Only one man has proved himself 
 Tilly's equal — that man is the King of Swe- 
 den. To join hands with him and yet not to fight 
 would be like giving a man, whom you wanted to 
 keep alive, insufficient food; for an army lives by 
 fighting. 
 
 Thus everything pointed to the necessity of strik- 
 ing a decisive blow. Gustavus was astonished at the 
 eager way in which John George had thrown himself 
 into his arms. He had at first only asked for Witten- 
 berg, and for the Elector's son to serve in the 
 Swedish army. The Elector had answered : " Not 
 Wittenberg only, but my whole Electorate. Not 
 my son only, but I myself also am at your service." 
 Rage and resentment against the Emperor, who 
 could so requite his faithful sluggishness, had wholly 
 
i8o Gustavtis Adolphus, ti631 
 
 taken possession of John George. Monro says: 
 " He damned himself soule and body if ever he will 
 forsake his majesty and his crowne, if then he 
 will but help him to beate the enemy out of his 
 country again." It was decided, therefore, that the 
 Swedish troops should cross the Elbe at Wittenberg, 
 and advance as far as Duben on the Mulde, where 
 they should join the Saxons, who were to advance 
 from Torgau to meet them. Then, united, they 
 should offer battle to Tilly wherever he might 
 be found. Monro's heart leaped at the thought 
 of battle. It is curious to see the precedence which 
 he gives to the various causes of the war. " I was 
 longing to see a day," he says, " when I might 
 hazard my life . . . for many reasons, but 
 especially for the liberty of the daughter [sister] 
 of our dread sovereign, the distressed Queen of 
 Bohemia " ; (Monro afterwards came to take a some- 
 what less enthusiastic view of his dread sovereign) ; 
 " next for the liberty of our distressed brethren 
 in Christ ; and thirdly for my better instruction 
 in the profession of arms which is my calling." And 
 after the battle, he says : " Oh, would to God I had 
 once such a leader again, to fight such another day in 
 this old quarrell. And though I died standing, I 
 should be persuaded I died well." 
 
 It appears that the number of men that Gustavus 
 could have put into the field had now reached, 
 including the reinforcements from Sweden brought 
 up from the north by Gustavus Horn, and the 
 German troops which were beginning to come in 
 from Hesse, the respectable total of 27,650, of 
 
1631] Breitenfeld. i8i 
 
 whom 7,500 were cavalry. The exact strength of 
 the Saxons is not ascertained ; the numbers given 
 vary from 16,000 to 20,000. Tilly, who had redoubled 
 his plunderings and burnings on the news of the 
 treaty, could not put together more than 32,000. 
 According to a list in the archives at Stockholm, 
 26,800 Swedes were actually present at the battle of 
 Breitenfeld. 
 
 Tilly was thus much stronger than when he had 
 attacked the camp of Gustavus at Werben. The 
 difference is to be accounted for by the reinforce- 
 ments' which Furstenburg had brought up from 
 Italy. He had good hope also that Tiefenbach, one 
 of Wallenstein's former lieutenants, who was in 
 Bohemia and Silesia in command of an army that 
 was rapidly growing formidable, as being strength- 
 ened by Ferdinand for the defence of the hereditary 
 countries, might be able to send reinforcements from 
 thence, which would suffice to overwhelm the allies. 
 Aldringer was also on, his march from the south, 
 with the last detachments of the Italian army, 
 and was now at Jena, not more than five days' march 
 from Leipzig. It was not, however, numbers that 
 were to decide the day. So well did Gustavus know 
 this, that he even, on second thoughts, sent back 
 Tott, whom, with 4,000 men, he had called up from 
 Mecklenburg to his post in the north a few days 
 before the battle. 
 
 It seems to have been undoubtedly a blunder on 
 Tilly's part that he did not possess himself of the 
 passage of Wittenberg, as he had done on a previous 
 occasion when he dreaded the advance of the 
 
i82 Gustavus Adolphus. [1631 
 
 Swedish king. It would not have been difficult 
 in fact, for him so effectually to guard the whole line 
 of the Elbe, that the junction between the Swedes and 
 Saxons might have been prevented ; and as Gustavus 
 would probably have hesitated, before such a junc- 
 tion, to try and force the passage, Tilly might have 
 disarmed the Saxon troops at his leisure. Instead of 
 that he had marched by Eisleben towards Leipzig, 
 and the union of the allies took place unhindered at 
 Diiben, on September 5th. " The Saxons were well 
 mounted," says the King, " and fine fellows to look 
 at." What followed we had better let Gustavus tell 
 himself : 
 
 " The Elector ranged his army in battalions, and 
 signified that he would come and salute me if I 
 pleased. I took therefore a fair squadron of cavalry, 
 and rode a little way to meet him. My brother-in- 
 law, of Brandenburg, was with him. We rode round 
 the Saxon troops together and then to our infantry, 
 and then I took the two Electors with me to my 
 tent. We held a consultation as to whether we 
 should attack the enemy or endeavour to wear him 
 out by diversions only. I advanced my reasons for 
 the latter — the Elector was for the former, because 
 that it was the only way to get the enemy out of 
 his territories. ... At last we resolved to go 
 united against Leipzig under the eyes of the enemy, 
 and offer him battle. We had news that he had 
 taken Leipzig by accord, and that his light cavalry 
 were quartered in the villages almost up to our own 
 position." 
 
 Monro, too, describes the Saxon ofificers as looking 
 
1631] Breitenfeld. 183 
 
 " as if they were going in their best apparel and 
 arms to be painted . . ." whereas the Swedes, 
 " having lyen overnight on a parcell of plowd ground 
 they were so dusty, they looked out like kitchen 
 servants." 
 
 Tilly meanwhile had advanced to Leipzig, and 
 threatened it with the fate of Magdeburg if it did 
 not yield. Th^re was a feeble garrison of Saxons 
 inside, and the town was nearly indefensible from a 
 military point of view. But the inhabitants burnt 
 the suburbs and prepared for a siege. On Septem- 
 ber 4th the bombardment began. On the 6th the 
 townsmen sent to offer Tilly a large sum in ransom, 
 and then capitulated upon condition that the Protes- 
 tant religion should not be suppressed, the privileges 
 of the town or the prerogatives of the Elector 
 of Saxony interfered with, and that the garrison 
 should be allowed to march out with the honours of 
 war. Tilly threw a garrison of 3,000 men into the 
 city and determined to await the attack of the 
 Swedes and Saxons with his back to its walls. 
 
 In the councils of the Catholic camp there was 
 even more hesitation about risking a decisive stroke 
 than in the Protestant. Tilly was himself seventy 
 years old, and had the reputation of never having 
 lost a great battle. His experience at Werben must 
 have given him an uneasy feeling, that he might now 
 be on the point of breaking his fair record. He had 
 won nearly all his previous laurels by waiting for the 
 favourable moment when he should be greatly 
 superior in numbers. He knew now that the con- 
 trary was the case. Therefore his idea seems to 
 
184 Gustavus Adolphus. ti63l 
 
 have been to remain entrenched under the walls of 
 Leipzig, much as Gustavus had remained at Werben, 
 till Aldringer could bring him reinforcements from 
 Erfurt and Jena, and Tiefenbach from Silesia. But 
 the younger leaders, and, above all, Pappenheim, 
 whom Tilly well knew to have got the ear of the 
 Emperor, were burning for a fight. It was their 
 rashness in council, as afterwards on the field, that 
 lost the day. Schaumburg alone was of Tilly's 
 mind, and it was therefore finally decided not to 
 await the attack under the city, but to advance 
 about an hour and a half northwards. Tilly com- 
 forted himself with the reflection, that, if it came to 
 a question of retreat, it would be better to secure 
 a retreat towards Halle, than to be shut up after 
 a beating within the walls of Leipzig. 
 
 To continue the King of Sweden's narrative of 
 the events leading to the battle : " On the 6th we 
 went in early twilight through Diiben, and towards 
 evening reached the village of Wolkau, within i^ 
 [7 English] miles from Leipzig, where we rested 
 the night.* On the 7th, as soon as the sky began to 
 grey, I gave the order for the trumpets to blow for 
 the advance, and, because between us and Leipzig 
 there was no wood, but only great flat fields, I 
 drew out my army in full battle array and marched 
 towards the city. The march lasted a short hour 
 and a half, when we came in sight of the advanced 
 guard of the enemy with his artillery on a hill, and 
 behind it the whole mass of his army." 
 
 * Gustavus slept in his travelling-coach, and Johan Banir and 
 Gustavus Horn with him. 
 
1631] Breitenfeld. 185 
 
 The plain of Leipzig, which was one hundred and 
 eighty-one years later to be the scene of a not less de- 
 cisive nor less important victory of a good cause over 
 a bad one, is a wide extent of arable and pasture land 
 to the north of the city, with here and there a small 
 village, here and there a small grove of trees, to break 
 the horizon. A little brook, the Loberbach, trickles 
 across it between some rather swampy meadows, and 
 crosses the road from Duben to the city, a little to 
 the north of the place where the armies were actually 
 engaged. A gentle slope from both sides rises 
 towards the middle of the plain, on the top of which 
 Tilly had erected some sort of a battery for his 
 artillery. Towards this spot the Imperialists directed 
 their march early on the morning of the 7th. A 
 lovely September morning with a bright sun and a 
 sharp wind at their back, seemed to promise them 
 no inconsiderable advantages to start with. They 
 marched past the villages of great and little Wid- 
 deritsch, leaving Breitenfeld itself a little to the 
 left (west), and established their long line of battle 
 on the gentle hill on which the battery had been 
 erected. Their line reached nearly from Breitenfeld 
 to Seehausen. In front of them lay the village of 
 Podelwitz on the left, Gobschelwitz on the right. 
 Between these four " dorps " would be the decisive 
 point. It is a curious thing that no one quite knows 
 whether Tilly drew up his army in one line or two : 
 there has been at least a lively controversy between 
 historians on the subject. Herr Martin Weibull, the 
 latest Swedish historian of Gustavus, whose ad- 
 mirable description of the battle I have endeavoured 
 
1 86 Gustavus Adolphus. [1631 
 
 to follow throughout, does not touch upon the 
 question, but in making no mention of a second line, 
 he may be considered to agree with the majority of 
 critics and assign to Tilly only one. On the other 
 hand a French writer of great authority, General 
 Grimoard, maintains * (following Gualdo Priorato 
 and his commentators, Colonel Staunfort and Heill- 
 man, " Das Kriegswesen der Kaiserlichen und Schwe- 
 den "), that all the battles of the day were fought with 
 two lines, and that Tilly would never have commit- 
 ted such a glaring error. But on the other hand we 
 have (i) the fact that no single account of the battle 
 mentions two lines with the exception of Gualdo, 
 who is a bad authority, and (2) the fact that none of 
 the contemporary plans or pictures, confusing though 
 they often are, show more than one long extended 
 line ; (3) lastly the great extent lengthwise, which 
 we know the battalia of Tilly to have covered, 
 together with our knowledge of the great depth and 
 solidity of the Imperialist squares, utterly precludes 
 the existence of a second line. 
 
 We are now in a position to examine the actual 
 formation of the two armies. Tilly placed all his 
 cavalry on the two wings, and no doubt intended 
 to execute his favourite manoeuvre of altogether out- 
 flanking his foes by the much greater length of his 
 line. The cavalry were drawn up in huge squad- 
 rons, Pappenheim with his black cuirassiers on the 
 left, Furstenburg on the right, with the horse newly 
 returned from Italy. In the centre the old general 
 
 * His opinion to this effect is quoted by the editors of the " Precis 
 des Campagnes de Gustave Adolphe." Brussels, 1887. 
 
1 88 Gustavus Adolphus. Ii63l 
 
 took his own place, on his well-known white horse, in 
 old-fashioned Walloon dress, among his old-fashioned 
 heavy-armed Walloon troops. They were the best 
 regiments he had. There were men there who had 
 followed him in every battle for the last twenty 
 years. There were very likely men who had helped 
 Spinola to harry the Palatinate and to take Breda ; 
 there may have been men who had served under 
 Parma, and stood firm in their rocky squares against 
 charges led by the white plume of Navarre. When 
 their " Father," as they called Tilly, rode to the 
 front of their line, they raised a cry of joy and greet- 
 ing. Tilly's artillery, as we have seen, had been 
 ranged on the low height. His heavy cannons were 
 placed between the right wing and the centre. His 
 light cannons were in front of the centre itself. Un- 
 fortunately it is impossible to say exactly how many 
 cannons he had ; it seems probable, however, from 
 the description of the battle and of the great havoc 
 at first wrought by the Imperialist cannonade that he 
 had more than twenty-six, which is the number usually 
 given. Certainly he was immensely inferior in this 
 arm to Gustavus, who, counting the Saxon contribu- 
 tion, had nearly a hundred pieces, and of these the 
 Swedish were sure to be admirably served. 
 
 The order of the allies was as follows : to the 
 furthest left, with the road to Diiben between it and 
 the Swedes, lay the Saxon army under Arnim and 
 the Elector in person. (" I was not particularly in- 
 quisitive of the manner of their formation," says 
 Monro scornfully.) In touch with the Saxon right, 
 the Swedish LEFT WiNG under Horn, the field mar- 
 
1631] Breitenfeld. 189 
 
 shal, and second in command. Between each di- 
 vision of cavalry in the first line was a squad of 200 
 musketeers ; in the second line cavalry only [?]. On 
 the Right Wing cavalry under the King himself 
 and J. Banfer. In the first line the East Gothland 
 regiment, the Smaland regiment, the West Goth- 
 land, and two regiments of Finnish cavalry (Stal- 
 hanske's Finns were among the finest of all the 
 King's troops). Musketeers were interspersed simi- 
 larly to those on the left wing. In the reserve of the 
 first line {i. e., between the two lines) one regiment 
 of cavalry. In the second line four cavalry regiments. 
 Centre : the foot under Teuffel and Hall ; four half 
 battalions in the first line, a cavalry regiment, and two 
 divisions of the Scots foot under Monro and Ram- 
 say in reserve between the lines ; in the second line 
 three brigades of infantry, respectively under Vitz- 
 thum (the German brigade), Hepburn (the Scots bri- 
 gade), and Thurn. A final reserve of cavalry besides, 
 behind the second line of the centre. The ARTIL- 
 LERY under Torstenson lay a little to the left of the 
 centre, with the exception of the light regimental 
 pieces, which were in front of each regiment. There 
 was also a small reserve of artillery, the first known 
 instance of such a thing, in the extreme rear. 
 
 It was in the method of composing the infantry 
 squares, however, that the greatest difference, as I 
 have already pointed out in a previous chapter, 
 appeared between the two armies. The deep ob- 
 longs of the Spanish pattern, with the pikemen ten 
 files deep, and fifty along the front, and the mus- 
 keteers at the four corners were " like square castles 
 
I go Gustavus Adolphus. [163I 
 
 with bulwarks at each corner." Gustavus, on the 
 contrary, ranged his infantry in brigades, or half 
 brigades, each divided into small oblongs, the largest 
 of which was little over two hundred. 
 
 In this way the musketeers were covered by the 
 pikemen, and could file out between the ranks of the 
 latter, deliver their volley, and retire. Thus instead 
 of an immovable square castle, says an old writer, 
 " each brigade was like a little moveable fortress with 
 its curtains and ravelins, and each part would be able 
 to come to the assistance of the other." 
 
 " The whole army," says Monro, " did get green 
 branches on their heads, and the word was given, 
 ' God with us ' ; a little short speech made by his 
 Majesty, we marched towards the enemy." Tradition 
 has it that it was in this speech that Gustavus told 
 his musketeers not to fire till they could see the 
 whites of the enemies' eyes. " We tried," says the 
 King (to continue the letter above quoted), " to get 
 the better of the advantages of sun and wind, which 
 the enemy had, and which drove dust in our faces, 
 but in vain : we had some awkward ground to cross 
 in full view of him, and we therefore drew up our 
 battle . . . and advanced in that shape steadily 
 towards the foe, who began to pound us with his 
 cannons ... so that he had fired three salvos 
 before our men were in readiness." 
 
 " Tattered and torn and dirty," says an eye-witness 
 quoted by Wiebull, " looked our people compared 
 with the besilvered and begilded and beplumed 
 Imperialists. Our Swedish horses were but small 
 compared to the gigantic German chargers : our 
 
1631] Breitenfeld. 191 
 
 Swedish peasant lads made a poor show alongside of 
 the handsome troops of Tilly." The King himself 
 was no splendid dresser : to-day he wore his usual 
 buff coat, and no breastplate nor helmet, only a grey 
 hat with a green feather. The only fault that could 
 be found with his appearance was that he was 
 rapidly getting fat ! — a fault that even his most 
 ardent admirers have been unable to conceal. From 
 mid-day till half-past two the cannonade went on on 
 both sides, and indeed " during the whole battle," 
 says the King, " and naturally did great execution. 
 Ours answered theirs with three shots for one." About 
 that time Pappenheim could stand- it no longer ; with 
 the fury of a Rupert, he and his whole five thousand 
 picked cuirassiers hurled themselves upon the ex- 
 treme left wing of the Swedes. When Tilly saw it 
 he is said to have thrown up his hands and exclaimed : 
 " The fellows have robbed me of my honour and 
 glory, and the Emperor of his empire and his 
 people." It was indeed a grave error, and Pappen- 
 heim made it worse : in his anxiety to come com- 
 pletely down the wind upon the Swedes, he swept 
 round so far to the left that he lost touch with the 
 rest of his army. Worse than all, the charge was not 
 successful. He got fearful volleys from the " com- 
 manded musketeers " who lay between Stalhanske's 
 Finns and the East Gothland men, and between each 
 salvo these splendid troops charged out upon their 
 charging foe. Pappenheim swept round their front 
 towards the rear. Out darted Johan Banfer with the 
 reserve of the first line, and hurled a fresh cavalry 
 regiment upon Pappenheim's already reeling horse- 
 
192 Gustavus Adolphus. [1631 
 
 men. In the desperate hand-to-hand fight that 
 ensued all along the right wing of the Swedes, the 
 finest cavalry in the Imperial service was, after seven 
 heroic charges, completely broken ; those who escaped 
 fled in the direction of Halle. Gustavus knew what 
 he was about well enough to check the pursuit 
 in time. There would be more work for that right 
 wing yet. Tilly, seeing that Pappenheim must be 
 supported if possible, had thrown forward an infantry 
 regiment, under the Duke of Holstein, towards the 
 same place. It was cut to pieces and the Duke 
 killed. 
 
 Very different had been the fate of the battle on 
 the Swedish left. Furstenburg, when he saw that 
 Pappenheim had charged, charged too — upon the 
 unhappy Saxons. " The Saxon cavalry," says the 
 King, " and their artillery-men held themselves 
 bravely at first, but after their best gunners were 
 shot, the rest began to fly and left their cannons. 
 The Saxon infantry did no better ; it ran away by 
 companies, and spread the report that we were 
 beaten and all was lost, which terrified our baggage 
 train, which also ran away as far as Diiben. . . . 
 The Elector, who had remained in the rear, ran away 
 with his whole life guard and never stopped till he 
 got to Eilenburg." Furstenburg followed hard after, 
 and Monro tells us that the Saxons lost more men in 
 their flight than the Swedes lost in the battle. Tilly, 
 seeing the attacks of his two wings, and hoping to 
 improve that on the right into a complete victory, as 
 the Swedish left wing would now be uncovered, being 
 moreover unable to stand longer the fearful accuracy 
 of Torstenson's artillery fire, advanced in good order 
 
1631] Breitenfeld. 193 
 
 with his whole centre, in the same direction as Furs- 
 tenburg. Horn was indeed in the greatest danger ; 
 all might yet have been lost. Had Tilly thrown 
 himself straight upon Horn, probably it would have 
 gone very hard with the latter. But to do so would 
 be to get between Horn and his own artillery. He 
 therefore followed up Furstenburg, as if going after 
 the Saxons, so as to take Horn in flank; and Horn 
 had time to wheel right round, and, while hning the 
 ditches on the Diiben road with musketeers, to 
 present a wholly new front to the enemy. Mean- 
 while the King sent to his help Vitzthum's and 
 Hepburn's brigades from the reserve of the centre, 
 and, right across the battle from the right wing, he 
 sent the West Gothland cavalry. The rest of the 
 victorious right he gathered himself, and, charging 
 Tilly furiously in the rear with the gallant Smaland- 
 ers. East Gothlanders, and Finns, captured his 
 artillery, and turned it against its master. There in 
 front of the Swedish left, hemmed in between two 
 divisions of the foe, the gallant representatives of 
 the old warfare turned to bay. Every moment the 
 gaps in their lines became wider, and at last they 
 began to give way. Those who could, and who 
 had a mind to live, cut their way through the foe 
 and fled to Merseburg or to Halle. But four regi- 
 ments of Walloons, having retreated towards the 
 edge of a small wood, made there a desperate stand. 
 There were seen old soldiers, says the "Soldat 
 Su^dois," who could no longer stand, fighting on 
 their knees, like Widdrington in " Chevy Chase " : 
 " For when his legs were hewn away 
 He kneeled and fought on his stumps." 
 
194 Gustavus Adolphus. 11631 
 
 But when the sun was already down, and the 
 autumn mist lay thick on the field, these veterans, 
 reduced to some 600, formed one last iron ring 
 around their leader, and bore him from the field. 
 The old man had three shots in his body. " How 
 many of the enemy were left dead," says the King 
 of Sweden, " it is impossible to say ..." (the usual 
 number given is 7,000-10,000)* "all the artillery,, 
 106 standards, the whole plunder of the camp is 
 ours. We have so many prisoners that we shall not 
 only be able to fill up the gaps in our old regiments, 
 but to even create new ones out of them " (this 
 curiously illustrates the principles upon which Cap- 
 tain Dalgetty and his kind were wont to take service). 
 The Swedes lost Teuffel, Hall, and Damitz, with 
 about 2,100 men in all. "Though such a loss is 
 profoundly to be regretted, yet this victory, on 
 which the summa ret may be said to have turned, is 
 so decisive that we have every reason to thank God, 
 who has mercifully protected us in danger so im- 
 minent, as we never were in before." This long 
 letter, from which so many extracts have been given, 
 is dated September loth. 
 
 The battle of Breitenfeld was an epoch in war, and 
 it was an epoch in history. It was an epoch in war, 
 because first in it was displayed on a great scale the 
 superiority of mobility over weight. It was an epoch 
 in history, because it broke the force upon which 
 the revived Catholicism had relied for the extension 
 of its empire over Europe. The failure before Stral- 
 
 * The peasants killed some thousands more as they fled towards 
 L.eipzig, Merseburg, and Halle. 
 
1631] Breitenfeld. 195 
 
 sund had reminded the Emperor that there was a 
 limit to his power ; the battle of Breitenfeld fixed 
 that limit, and won Northern Germany for the cause 
 of freedom and the Gospel. " Germany might tear 
 herself and be torn to pieces for yet another half- 
 generation, but the actual result of the Thirty-Years' 
 War was as good as achieved." 
 
 Monro, whose account of the battle itself, in which 
 he played a gallant part in the Scots Brigade, I con- 
 fess to be somewhat confusing, tells us that " His 
 Majesty did under God principally ascribe the glory 
 of the victory to the Swedes and Fynnes horsemen 
 ... for though the Dutch (German) horsemen did 
 behave themselves valorously divers times that day, 
 yet it was not their fortune to have done the charge 
 which did put the enemy to flight, and though there 
 were some brave briggads of Swedes and Dutch 
 (foot) in the field, yet it was the Scots briggad's for- 
 tune to have gotten the praise of the foote service." 
 In fact only the horse and three brigades of infantry 
 had been engaged at all. The Saxons . had con- 
 tributed their share, and that no small one, to the 
 victory, in running away as fast as they did, for it 
 tempted the right wing of the Imperialists to pursue 
 them so far that they returned too late to turn the 
 fortune of the day. 
 
 "We encamped,", says Monro, "upon the place 
 of battaille, the living merry and rejoicing, though 
 without drinke at the night wake of their dead 
 camerades and friends, lying there on the ground in 
 the bed of honour. . . . Our bone-fiers were made 
 of the enemie's ammunition waggons, and of pikes 
 
ig6 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
 [1631 
 
 left for want of good fellows to use them, and all 
 this night our brave camerades the Saxons were 
 making use of their heels in flying ; thinking all was 
 lost, they made booty of our waggons and goods, 
 too good a recompense for cullions that had left 
 their Duke [?], betrayed their country, and the good 
 cause, whenas strangers were hazarding their lives 
 for their freedom." 
 
NCE more the two paths stood 
 open to the King of Sweden — 
 the path of gain and the path of 
 honour. Once more he proved 
 of what stuff he was made by 
 choosing the latter. 
 A day or two after the fight at Breitenfeld a coun- 
 cil of war for the decision of the next step to be 
 taken was held at Halle, whither the Swedes had 
 advanced. Gustavus Horn now urged from a purely 
 military point of view the same thing that Oxen- 
 stiern, speaking wholly as a statesman, afterwards 
 sketched out as the proper course for the King to 
 take — namely, an immediate march upon Vienna. 
 Everything seemed in favour of such a march. Tie- 
 fenbach had in Silesia not more than 10,000 men, 
 and these much demorahsed. A march to Vienna 
 would enable Sweden to dictate peace on her own 
 terms. The Elector of Saxony, who was present at 
 this council, spoke urgently to the same effect, and 
 boasted that he would put the crown of the Empire 
 upon the head of his ally. " Let me," said he, " un- 
 197 
 
198 Gustavus Adolphus. ti631 
 
 dertake the relief of my oppressed brethren in South- 
 western Germany, while you seek out the eagle in 
 his eyrie." 
 
 Exactly opposed to this was the King's own de- 
 cision. In the first place, he was anxious to make 
 Saxony's quarrel with the Emperor a desperate one. 
 He wanted to leave no chance for a reconciliation 
 between them, and no chance for the birth of the 
 unborn third party in Germany. Now, if John George 
 were to go southwestwards with the slippery Arnim 
 at his ear, what more likely than that the moderates 
 — the " politiques," to use an old French civil-war 
 word — should unite under him, to expel from Ger- 
 many both Swedish and Spanish influence. They 
 might for a time get strong enough to make head 
 against both. Tilly would probably be won over ; he 
 was already grudeling at the small amount of support 
 he received from Vienna. What more likely, then, 
 than that this new party would stretch out its hands 
 to the weak Elector of Brandenburg, whose alliance 
 would be all that would be needed to cut off the 
 Swedes from the sea. If a single disaster befell the 
 Swedish army in the intricate and mountainous 
 march through Bohemia, that was what would almost 
 certainly happen. And another idea was no doubt 
 present to the King's mind. If he knew John George, 
 he also was not without experience of the Emperor. 
 Let Vienna be taken — what then ? That man of 
 iron will, over whom the great wooden Christ above 
 the altar had bent its head in blessing, while a heav- 
 enly voice said, " Ferdinand, I will not forsake thee," 
 was not likely to yield a step, though Vienna should 
 
1631] Forwards. 199 
 
 be as Magdeburg. Vienna was then even less than 
 in 1806 the capital of Austria. Yet even in 1806 
 Austria was not conquered when Vienna fell into 
 the hands of Napoleon. Ferdinand would simply 
 retire inch by inch to the wild country on the edge 
 of the Adriatic, and Gustavus was no selfish dare- 
 devil who would risk his army in following his 
 enemy to such a lair as that. Had his object merely 
 been to make a good peace for Sweden, a direct 
 attack upon the hereditary countries would very 
 likely have surprised Ferdinand into granting him 
 investiture of Pomerania ; this was no doubt why 
 Oxenstiern, to whom that " bastion " was the whole 
 object of the war, told the King plainly, when he 
 met him in Mainz, that he " would rather have of- 
 fered him his congratulations in Vienna." 
 
 But — and here lies the noeud of the whole matter 
 — the King's aims were far other than this. Such a 
 course certainly would not have got the Edict of 
 Restitution withdrawn. Such a course would have 
 left the Protestants of the south and west, and 
 even of the north too, just as much at the mercy of 
 the Catholics as before. Nothing proves more con- 
 clusively than this noble decision of Gustavus's what 
 thought was ever uppermost in his mind. Even 
 now there was a small congress of Protestant powers 
 sitting in Frankfort-on-the-Main who sent prayers to 
 him to come and deliver them. Tilly might at any 
 moment gather a fresh army for the defence of the 
 territories of the League ; he would squeeze the last 
 penny out of Augsburg and Nuremberg, and if they 
 resisted, the fate of Magdeburg would await them. 
 
200 Gustavus Adolphus. [I63l 
 
 That must at all costs be prevented. That corner 
 of Germany which lies between the Main and the 
 Danube and the Rhine teemed with small Protestant 
 states, and, above all, with rich Imperial cities, also 
 mostly Protestant or which had been Protestant be- 
 fore the recent persecution had been applied. There 
 was Donauworth, one of the earlier causes of the 
 war. A little to the north lay its last and greatest 
 cause — the Palatinate, all in the hands of the oppres- 
 sor. Between Gustavus and these territories, crying 
 out for liberation, there lay the richest lands of Ger- 
 many — the richest and also the least defensible. The 
 great Abbey of Fulda, the Bishoprics of Wiirzburg 
 and Bamberg, which lay all down the lovely valley of 
 the Main, were connected with the Rheingau by the 
 Electorate of Mainz, and that again with the two 
 northern Rhenish Electorates. This country had ob- 
 tained the name of the " Pfaffen-gasse," that is to say, 
 the " Priests' Alley." What territory could be more 
 fitting for Gustavus to winter his troops in than that 
 of these deadly enemies of the faith ? He had been 
 long enojugh living upon the black bread and beer of 
 his friends ; he would now give his soldiers a taste of the 
 wheaten loaves and wine of their foes. And lastly, what 
 territories could possibly be better than the Priests' 
 Alley to hold as a pledge, to be restored to the Catho- 
 lics only in the event of a satisfactory general peace ? 
 These were the reasons of his decision to lead his 
 army into Franconia immediately after his victory at 
 Leipzig. That he was right there cannot be the slight- 
 est doubt. For him too 
 
 " The path of duty was the way to gloiy." 
 
1631] Forwards. 201 
 
 Geijer quotes from one of the orations made at 
 the University of Upsala on the two hundredth anni- 
 versary of the King's death some words which seem 
 very clearly to prove this. " After the hero's death 
 where was it that Oxenstiern found his best support ? 
 Where was it that he organised the Protestant 
 League? Not in the north, but in the south of 
 Germany ; not among the strong powers, but among 
 the weak ; not with Brandenburg and Saxony, but 
 with the small princes, the small Imperial nobility, 
 the inhabitants of ■ the free Imperial cities, who, sur- 
 rounded as they were in those lands with Catholics, 
 had experienced the greatest oppression, and there- 
 fore rejoiced most over their deliverance. It was 
 their joy that made his road from the field of Leip- 
 zig one long triumph ; it was their thankfulness that 
 over his bloody corpse knit the bond with Sweden. 
 It would not have been knit at all had his banners 
 never waved over them." 
 
 It was decided therefore that Saxony — much 
 against its will — should take the eastward road, 
 while Sweden took the westward. As for the inca- 
 pacity of the Elector, Gustavus did not dread that 
 very much. He did not want him, as is generally 
 believed, to advance at once into Bohemia, but only, 
 into Silesia. For the further campaign on the east, 
 Gustavus had, as we shall see presently, quite an- 
 other plan and quite another leader than John 
 George in his mind. Meanwhile it must be remarked 
 that, in taking the path he did, the King of Sweden 
 took the wrong turning to please Richelieu. Riche- 
 lieu, as we know, looked upon the south-west of 
 
202 Gustavus Adolphus. [1631 
 
 Germany as peculiarly the province of French diplo- 
 macy. In his memoirs he bitterly complains that 
 the King of Sweden did not know how to use his 
 victory at Breitenfeld, which he should have im- 
 proved by at once advancing against Austria. Louis 
 XIII. had little inclination to see this "Goth," 
 as he called Gustavus, stamping about so near the 
 French frontier as the line of the Main. The gaze 
 of the great French statesman was already towards 
 the Rhine. But it speaks volumes for his singleness 
 of purpose and his clear vision that he did not let 
 this jealousy of Gustavus, who treated his complaints 
 somewhat scornfully, interfere with the payment of 
 the French subsidies. Even when the King of Swe- 
 den was over the Rhine, Richelieu knew that he 
 must be supported at all costs. 
 
 The battle of Breitenfeld had one great effect in 
 Europe ; it made Gustavus the hero of Protestantism. 
 An epigram, engraved on a half-length portrait of 
 him that was struck at this time, is quoted by 
 Droysen : 
 
 " Here, Germans, you can see the kingly form 
 Of him who hath delivered you from harm, 
 Half drawn : if on the whole ye seek to gaze 
 Look through the world, the world his fame displays," 
 
 A medal struck at the same period shews on one 
 side the King's portrait, with the inscription : 
 
 ' ' Ensem Gradivus, sceptrum Themis ipsa gubemat ; 
 (Mars guides his sword. Justice his sceptre sways ;) " 
 
 and on the reverse a cross, with " in hoc signo vinces," 
 and a long inscription to the same effect in German. 
 
1631] Forwards. 203 
 
 From that time the name by which Captain Dal- 
 getty always named him, " The Lion of the North 
 and the Bulwark of the Protestant Faith," was in 
 every man's mouth. 
 
 Ferdinand received the news of Breitenfeld with 
 the simple order to raise more troops, and to send 
 forward every thing that could be spared for the 
 reinforcement of Tilly. He was not the man to 
 give way while a foot of land remained or a single 
 brigade upheld the Imperial banner. On the other 
 hand, Maximilian of Bavaria, equally with Ferdinand 
 the pupil of the Jesuits, either lacked that indomi- 
 table confidence in the righteousness of the cause 
 which upheld his Emperor, or else trembled so much 
 for his own country that he constantly sent to Tilly 
 contradictory orders, and prevented that general 
 from retrieving his defeat. For the strange thing 
 is that Tilly, with extraordinary rapidity, recovered 
 his strength. He had fled by Halle to Halberstadt, 
 where he was rejoined by Pappenheim, and from 
 thence they retired on the Weser, gathering up their 
 scattered forces, together with new recruits, which 
 were never wanting at this period in Germany (for 
 " he whose house is burnt," says the proverb, " must 
 become a soldier ") — even from these Protestant re- 
 gions. From Corvey, on the Weser, he advanced to 
 Fritzlar, where he was joined by Colonel Fuggerwith 
 other ten thousand men, and soon after by Aldringer 
 with eight thousand, the last instalment of the Italian 
 army before mentioned. His idea was to draw 
 Gustavus after him, and so turn him aside from 
 the Catholic states. Gustavus would like to have 
 
204 Gustavus Adolphus. 11631 
 
 beaten Tilly again ; he said he would pursue the 
 " Little Corporal " to the end of the world, but the 
 deliverance of South-west Germany and good winter 
 quarters for his army were just at that moment more 
 important. 
 
 The King was by no means sure that he should get 
 beyond Thuringia before the spring, and his first 
 plan, as communicated to Oxenstiern, whom he sent 
 for to attend him in the weighty diplomatic business 
 which would necessarily follow his advance, was 
 to make his winter quarters in that district. He 
 soon, however, found that so little opposition was 
 offered, that it would be better to push on at once 
 to Franconia. He had with him about 26,000 men 
 when he quitted Halle, on September 17th. Before 
 he left there the first fruits of his victory appeared in 
 a regular alliance with the princes of the House 
 of Anhalt, who gave him a monthly contribution and 
 promised free quarters if he should pass through 
 their territory. From Halle he marched straight to 
 Erfurt, which surrendered on the 22d. It had been 
 a Protestant city, but belonged to the Elector of 
 Mainz, the Primate of Catholic Germany. The 
 career of the Liberator was begun. There, too, was 
 concluded the final alliance with the Dukes of 
 Weimar, the eldest of whom, William, agreed to 
 raise an army for the King in his own territories, 
 while the second, Bernard, had already taken service 
 under the Swedish banner and was destined one day 
 to avenge his leader's fall at the battle of Lutzen. 
 The Landgraf of Hesse was equally zealous, and was 
 raising a good force further to the west. 
 
1631] Forwards. 205 
 
 In the last days of September the royal army was 
 led in two columns, partly by night with torches 
 blazing, through the Thuringian forest. The two 
 columns rejoined each other before the fortress 
 of Konigshofen, the key of Franconia, within the 
 territories of the Prince-Bishop of Wiirzburg. Tors- 
 tenson's guns had but to pound one of the towers, 
 and the fortress surrendered. A regular sauve-qui-peut 
 set in all along the Priests' Alley. The Prince-Bishop 
 sent all his valuables to the impregnable stronghold 
 of Marienburg, just opposite Wiirzburg, and took 
 flight himself to the Danube. It was a general 
 flight, not unlike that which took place over the 
 same country in 1792, when the French, under 
 Custine, burst into the Ecclesiastical Electorates. 
 But Gustavus was no wolf in sheep's clothing, 
 proclaiming, as CuStine did, war to the palace and 
 peace to the cottage, and then plundering palace and 
 cottage alike with the greatest indifference. He came 
 not to overthrow but to restore. He treated the Catho- 
 lic inhabitants with the greatest kindness ; no instance 
 of violence against ecclesiastics is reported, with the 
 exception of some monks who were killed at the sub- 
 sequent storm of the Marienburg, and a few Jesuits 
 who had got mixied with the soldiers who fled from 
 Donauworth. The King levied no heavier con- 
 tributions on these countries than they had up to 
 that time paid to the army of the League. Only 
 everywhere the property of the Jesuits, whom he 
 regarded as hostes humani generis was confiscated, 
 and in all places where Protestant worship had ever 
 existed it was at once restored ; the Catholic priests 
 
2o6 Gustavus Adolphus. [1631 
 
 were turned out of the churches and the revenues 
 that they had appropriated ; and Protestants — 
 whether Calvinists or Lutherans, for he shewed him- 
 self, as Monro bears witness, nobly tolerant in this 
 matter — were restored. Even to the Jesuits perfect 
 security from violence was expressly promised, and 
 the promise was kept. In this he did of course no 
 more than his duty, but I think it is not exaggerating 
 to say that it was a marvellous thing to have done 
 in that year 1631. 
 
 As for the governments, that was another thing — 
 Gustavus was not in any way bound to spare them. 
 What he intended to do in the future with his con- 
 quests seems quite uncertain : for the present he 
 possessed himself of all the resources of the Catholic 
 governments, whether of towns or bishoprics ; made 
 the population take an oath to the crown of Sweden, 
 furnish him with ample supplies, and swear to 
 hold no correspondence with the enemy. In each 
 place to which he came he left a trusty governor and 
 a garrison ; the Protestants for the most part agree- 
 ing further to raise troops for the cause. 
 
 Not universally however. The Imperial cities in 
 particular were anxious to remain neutral, especially 
 the greater ones, like Nuremberg and Frankfort, 
 whose existence depended on commerce, and who 
 could perhaps afford to buy off Tilly with a round 
 sum of money. But of neutrality, Gustavus would 
 not hear. From Konigshofen he issued a procla- 
 mation to all the Protestant states of the south: 
 " Up for the Gospel, those of you who believe in it, or 
 it will be the worse for you ! I shall treat neutrality as 
 
1631] Forwards. 207 
 
 equivalent to a declaration of war against me." It was 
 a rough medicine, but Germany needed it. Schwein- 
 furt, a little Protestant city-island in the middle of the 
 bishopric of Wiirzburg, received its deliverer with 
 open arms, and from thence he passed due south, 
 and appeared on the 3d of October before Wurzburg 
 the capital of Franconia. The town itself was capable 
 of but a slight defence ; the garrison of 1,500 men 
 had therefore crossed the river to the before-men- 
 tioned fortress of Marienburg and had broken 
 down the bridge behind them. It was to a detach- 
 ment of the Scots and to Colonel Axel Lilly's regi- 
 ment that the honour of leading the storm of this 
 fortress was accorded ; and it was one of the boldest 
 deeds of the whole war. All the approaches had to 
 be made, and the bridge to be repaired under a 
 shower of musket- and cannon-balls from the rock ; 
 the gate had to be burst open with a petard. But it 
 was done, with fearful loss considering the shortness 
 of the time — two days, — and the garrison after a 
 stout resistance were put to the sword. There, too, 
 in the heat of the conflict, were slain the monks 
 already mentioned, a bloody deed, for which no excuse 
 can be made. The riches taken were enormous, for 
 half Franconia had deposited its treasures in this 
 fortress, over which the Virgin was believed to 
 extend a special protection. The northern peasants 
 had seen with their eyes and tasted with their lips 
 the riches of the south. " Our Finnish boys," says 
 Salvius, the diplomatist, " make rich wine soup in 
 their helmets ; they will hardly care to go back to 
 their savolax again." The cathedral library of 
 
2o8 Gustavus Adolphus. [1631 
 
 Wiirzburg, which was part of the spoil of the storm, 
 was sent to Upsala, a reprisal indeed for the pre- 
 vious sending of the far more precious library of 
 Heidelberg to the Vatican, but a bad precedent; 
 later on in the war the Swedish commanders got 
 into the habit of sending home everything precious 
 upon which they laid their hands. Even Gustavus 
 made a present of the library of Mainz to Oxenstiern, 
 and the result was that the ship which carried it 
 foundered in the Baltic. 
 
 A whole month the Swedish army rested at Wiirz- 
 burg, while detachments were employed to take in 
 the small surrounding places, which were either 
 abandoned by their feeble garrisons or stormed 
 without difficulty. The Bishop of Bamberg alone 
 was clever enough to outwit the King. He kept on 
 negotiating, in the hope of the advance of Tilly to 
 his rescue, until Gustavus turned his arms in another 
 direction. Tilly meanwhile would willingly have led 
 his troops into Franconia. The Duke of Lorraine, 
 ever a free lance in the politics of Europe, one of 
 whom it might be said, as it was of Savoy, that " his 
 geographical position was the measure of his hon- 
 esty," reinforced the Imperialists with I2,ocxd men; 
 Tilly was thus again at the head of an army 40,000 
 strong, larger by several thousands than that he had 
 led at Breitenfeld. But they were not the same 
 men — the flower of his troops had fallen on that 
 field ; and Maximilian was so well aware of this, and 
 in such a state of trepidation for Bavaria that he 
 sent positive orders to Tilly not to risk a battle. 
 Tilly, who in his professional ardour eagerly longed 
 
1631] Forwards. 209 
 
 to retrieve his laurels, was bitterly vexed ; and Pap- 
 penheim in a rage left the army and retired to raise 
 new forces of a more independent character on the 
 Weser; but Maximilian was now to all intents and 
 purposes the League itself ; most of the other mem- 
 bers were either " groaning under the oppression of 
 the Antichrist from the North," or in such a state of 
 fear before the said Antichrist, that they dared not 
 send a penny nor a recruit to Tilly. Even from his 
 own point of view Maximilian here acted, I think, a 
 mean part, unworthy of the rest of his career, which 
 contains much that is worthy of our admiration. He 
 kept moving Tilly and his army about from Franco- 
 nia to Westphalia, and Westphalia again to Bavaria, 
 while his enemy got free hand to strengthen himself 
 on the Main and the Rhine. There were, as was 
 natural, some smart skirmishes between the armies 
 during the last three months of the year ; for in- 
 stance, the Swedish general, Baudissin (whom Monro 
 calls Bawtish), surprised and took prisoners four 
 thousand Lorrainers about the middle of October, a 
 little to the south of Asschaffenburg, and soon after 
 the King himself destroyed four Imperial regiments 
 in the neighbourhood of Wertheim. But on the whole 
 the Swedes took possession of Franconia more with 
 the spade and shovel than with the sword. 
 
 Not that the King was by any means at his ease on 
 the subject of Tilly. His army was decidedly infe- 
 rior in numbers ; the Catholic population if cowed 
 was by no means friendly, and the attitude of France 
 seemed to him uncertain. " I never did see," says 
 Monro, " his Majesty so much troubled in mind and 
 14 
 
2IO Gustavus Adolphus. [1631 
 
 resolution as at this time, not knowing well himself 
 what to resolve, the enemy being behind him and 
 before him ; able to pursue Wurzburg and Oxen- 
 ford " (Ochsenfurt, one of the small Main fortresses 
 taken by Gustavus) "alike: and to my mind if he 
 had, he might have carried both at that time, for our 
 army was not only scattered and dispersed but also 
 we were weak, and, which was worse, we were all of 
 us discontented ; being too much toyled with march- 
 ing, watching, and working without any pay or 
 gaines for honest men." That this last piece of 
 information was not merely a grumble from our 
 worthy Scot, we have evidence from the fact that 
 the King was compelled to coin base money at this 
 very time, though he took good care that it should 
 not spread to Sweden. There were probably large 
 arrears owing, for we find Monro telling us a little 
 further on that the King " gave them some moneys 
 in hand, and, to content them, hand-writ with assig- 
 nations for more moneys to be paid unto them out 
 of Nuremberg within six months afterwards. More- 
 over, two letters to Banfer, who had been left behind 
 to take in the country round Magdeburg, bear wit- 
 ness to Gustavus's lively anxiety. " The enemy," he 
 writes in the beginning of December, " has so 
 strengthened himself in these parts, that I am not 
 in proportionate strength to risk a battle. He has 
 spread himself out towards Schweinfurt, and looks 
 like coming between us and Thuringia, and so cut- 
 ting off our communications with Saxony. Look 
 well before you ! Keep well in touch with the 
 Duke of Weimar at Erfurt, and strengthen him if 
 
'6311 Forwards. 2 1 1 
 
 he is in danger of a siege. Mind that you get hold 
 of Magdeburg, and, in order that you may be strong 
 enough to hold the lines of the Elbe and the Havel, 
 go on enrolling troops and appoint your rendez-vous. 
 . . . If you are driven back retire upon Werben ; 
 keep in touch too with Tott " (Tott was finishing off 
 Rostock and Wismar in Mecklenburg). " Do not 
 let me come to any harm owing to your jealousies ; 
 help one another without other thought than the 
 good of our Fatherland. Amend your lazy ways, 
 and send me a messenger at least once a week." 
 
 This, however, is rather anticipating. The alliance 
 of Duke George of Liineburg, of the House of Bruns- 
 wick (October 14th), was of less importance to Gusta- 
 vus than that of the mighty city of Nuremberg, which 
 concluded a treaty with him before the end of Octo- 
 ber. As early as from Halle he had sent messages 
 thither, but the city was under pressure from an im- 
 perial commission at the time, and the greater mer- 
 chants were extremely anxious to preserve their 
 neutrality. The populace however manifested en- 
 thusiastically Swedish sympathies. The Nurember- 
 gers were almost the only town population in the 
 Empire who h^d kept up military exercises, and who 
 were ready to make sacrifices for their defence. They 
 now, October (nth), accepted the King's terms, and 
 agreed to raise a regiment of 3,000 men for defence ; 
 and, without receiving a Swedish garrison, put all 
 their warlike resources at Gustavus's disposal, and 
 agreed to stand by him to the last drop of their 
 blood. He on his side promised to succour them in 
 all danger, and to relieve them whenever they should 
 
2 1 2 Gustavus Adolphus. [1631 
 
 be besieged. He did not forget the promise, and 
 Nuremberg remained to the last his firmest ally, and 
 the object of his special protection. Anspach and 
 Baireuth joined him in the same month. 
 
 From Wiirzburg too he sent a threatening message 
 to the three Ecclesiastical Electors on the Rhine, 
 Mainz, Trier, and Cologne. Of neutrality he would 
 not hear a word : they must either pay him the 
 monthly contribution, which before had gone to 
 the League, give him free pass and provision, and 
 allow the Protestant faith to be tolerated in their 
 territories, or else . 
 
 The Elector of Mainz had already run away, and, 
 as Tilly was nearer to the other two than Gustavus 
 was, they, not unnaturally, refused this somewhat 
 imperious demand ; whereupon the King resolved 
 to let Bamberg alone for the time and advance down 
 the Main towards the Electorates. And the Palat- 
 inate! To deliver that would indeed be a deed 
 worthy of him. For ten years it had groaned under 
 Catholic oppression, that was once the head centre 
 of German Protestantism. But it was a serious 
 matter and would probably involve him in a breach 
 with Spain, with whom, for the sake of Swedish com- 
 merce, he was anxious to avoid open hostilities. 
 Still he would see what could be done. At the end 
 of October, therefore, he sent his blue brigade to take 
 Hanau. Hanau surrendered, and, leaving Horn at 
 Wurzburg to complete the subjection of Franconia, 
 the King advanced in two lines down the Main as 
 far as Frankfort. The Frankforters sent to request 
 that they might be allowed to consult the Elector of 
 
1631] Forwards. 213 
 
 Mainz before treating for surrender. The King re- 
 plied that inasmuch as he already possessed the 
 greater part of that prince's dominions he himself 
 was, as far as they were concerned, the Elector of 
 Mainz, and they had better consult him. 
 
 On the 1 8th November, after much hesitation on 
 the part of the town council, and some threats from 
 the other side, Frankfort surrendered, and Gustavus 
 entered the ancient capital of Germany. It was in 
 Frankfort that the German crown was still voted to, 
 and still placed on the head of, the Holy Roman 
 Emperor. Had Gustavus been a Revolutionist, it 
 might then and there have been placed upon his 
 own. 
 
 There he was joined by the Landgraf of Hesse, 
 whom the southward march, which Tilly undertook 
 about this time, freed for action ; he brought 14,000 
 men and the King felt himself sufficiently strong to 
 advance towards the city of Mainz itself. The whole 
 Electorate on the right bank of the Rhine had already 
 been overrun. Bernard of Weimar was at this time 
 preparing to throw his troops over at Bingen ; all 
 looked for a decisive attack on Mainz, when the 
 news arrived that Tilly on November i8th, the day 
 of Gustavus's entry into Frankfort, had made a sud- 
 den dash at Nuremberg. Gustavus did not forget 
 his promise. " The old Devil " he wrote to John 
 Casimir in Sweden, " with all his young ones, Lor- 
 raine, Pappenheim, Furstenburg, Gallas, Ossa, is now 
 lying before Nuremberg. By God's help, I march 
 to-morrow to relieve the city. The enemy is strong, 
 but God is my aid and I have 17,000 foot and 9,000 
 
214 Gustavus Adolphus, ti63l 
 
 horse." It was the readiness with which Nuremberg 
 had received Gustavus that attracted Tilly's ven- 
 geance ; he threatened the city as usual with the fate 
 of Magdeburg, but to his surprise was received with 
 a heavy fire and some vigorous sorties, which de- 
 stroyed his first siege works. When a sudden ex- 
 plosion blew up part of his ammunition waggons, he 
 resolved to retreat (November 24th). It was then 
 that Pappenheim left him in disgust. 
 
 Gustavus had just completed his preparations for 
 the relief of Nuremberg when the news came that 
 Tilly was gone. He therefore crossed the Rhine 
 a little above Oppenheim, where he met -the first 
 Spanish garrison. One of the outworks had to be 
 stormed and some of the defenders were killed in the 
 fight. "Is this a breach with Spain ? " he wrote to 
 the Council in Sweden. " Shall I declare war on the 
 King of Spain ? Or shall I seek peace with him, in 
 order to have my hands free in case I should have to 
 do with France, whose King is drawing this way with 
 a large army, and is even now at Metz ? " 
 
 How far, and into what strange adventures had 
 Gustavus's fortune led him ! He had sent an ambas- 
 sador to Louis XIII., to explain how willingly he 
 would have kept peace with the League, if only they 
 would have separated their cause from that of the 
 Emperor, and how careful he had been not to perse- 
 cute Catholics ; also to complain of the hostility of 
 Louis's restless neighbour, the Duke of Lorraine. In 
 the letter above quoted he continues : " But on the 
 other hand, Spain will not consent to give up what 
 he possesses in the Palatinate without a struggle, 
 
1631] Forwards. 215 
 
 and without a full restoration of the Palatinate 
 there can be no secure peace. Against Spain I am 
 sure that England and Holland would assist me. 
 I think anyhow you had better look to the defences of 
 Gothenburg"* The Swedish Council, anxious to avoid 
 the responsibility, " left it to his Majesty, advising 
 him at the same time to put off a declaration of war 
 on Spain as long as possible." As for France, Riche- 
 lieu was not seriously hostile ; Gustavus did not 
 understand Richelieu ; no one really did. 
 
 The Spanish garrison made but a feeble show of 
 defending Mainz. On December 12th, after two 
 days' siege, they marched out with the honours of 
 war, but left all their ammunition to the King of 
 Sweden, by whom a provisional government was set 
 up, and a heavy imposition demanded — 80,000 dollars 
 from the city itself and another 80,000 dollars from 
 the Catholic clergy, of whom there were great num- 
 bers ; the Jesuits to pay half of the latter tax. Mainz 
 was the richest ecclesiastical province in Germany, but 
 this was a heavy sum considering that the Spanish 
 garrison had taken care to plunder, before evacuat- 
 ing the city. There was, however, no forcible resto- 
 ration of Protestantism, and the Jesuits alone were 
 expelled. In Mainz, Gustavus determined to take 
 up his winter quarters, in order to prepare for the 
 ensuing campaign. 
 
 There, then, we must leave him for a moment, to 
 consider the fortune of the war in the other parts of 
 Germany. In the Palatinate Bernard of Weimar, 
 
 * The port of Sweden that was most open to a Spanish naval attack, 
 as being on the North Sea, 
 
2i6 Gustavus Adolphus. [1631 
 
 was already busy ; before the end of the year he had 
 occupied Worms, Speyer, and Mannheim, and had 
 got even as far south as Germersheim. Speyer, 
 being a free city surrounded by a bishopric, re- 
 ceived him with enthusiasm, and everywhere the 
 emigrants of 1621 began to return to their homes. 
 In Mecklenburg Tott had reduced Rostock soon 
 after the defeat of Tilly at Leipzig, and was laying 
 vigorous siege to Wismar, which capitulated on the 
 I2th of January in the following year. Ban^r had 
 succeeded just about the same time in possessing 
 himself of the ruins of Magdeburg. 
 
 And how fared it with the Elector of Saxony? 
 The Emperor had, as we have seen, about ten thou- 
 sand men in Silesia under Tiefenbach, and was also 
 raising troops in Bohemia for the defence of the 
 hereditary countries. Aldringer and Gallas were to 
 take the command of this new army. In the face 
 of these two armies, the Elector of Saxony, after 
 reducing Leipzig and overrunning the province of 
 Lusatia, marched straight into Bohemia and placed 
 himself between them. This, as we now know, was 
 in direct contravention of the orders of Gustavus, 
 who had enjoined him to march first into Silesia and 
 drive out Tiefenbach's men. Almost without a blow 
 the Saxons occupied the northern and western places 
 like Teschen, Eger, and Leitmeritz, and on Novem- 
 ber 1st entered Prague, the Imperialists everywhere 
 retreating before them. As in the Palatinate, so in 
 Bohemia, back came the emigrants of 1620. The 
 mouldering heads and limbs of their companions of 
 that fatal year, which still decorated the Moldau 
 
1631] Forwards. 217 
 
 Bridge, were taken down and laid to rest. Mean- 
 while the Imperialists held fast on to the southern 
 fortresses, Budweis, Pilsen, and Tabor; and Gallas 
 arrived to organise the Catholic resistance. The 
 Elector of Saxony, whose habits of body ill fitted 
 him to endure the fatigues of a winter campaign, 
 retired to Dresden, and he and Arnim set to work 
 to excuse themselves as best they could to their 
 commander-in-chief (for such Gustavus was, by the 
 treaty of September 5th), for disobedience to orders. 
 Arnim boldly lied, and said he was invited to enter 
 Bohemia — by Wallenstein himself. 
 
 It was a very prudent lie, and no doubt really 
 deceived the King. For it must now be stated that 
 Gustavus had been, throughout a considerable por- 
 tion of his late campaign, in correspondence with 
 Wallenstein. Although the letter is now lost, it is 
 known, from a state paper of Oxenstiern's, that as 
 early as October 30, 1630, the King wrote to him 
 from Stralsund — that is, very soon after Wallenstein 
 had laid down his command. This letter was proba- 
 bly a merely complimentary one, but either the idea of 
 making use of Wallenstein's anger at his own dis- 
 missal to get him to enter the Swedish service, or at 
 least to act in Bohemia for Sweden, or the King's 
 anxiety lest Wallenstein should be reinstated in his 
 post by the Emperor, induced him, in the following 
 year, to make several distinct offers. In February, 
 1 63 1, Tilly writes to Maximilian that he knows 
 Wallenstein has been tampered with by the Kings 
 of Sweden and England, to induce him to take up 
 arms against the Emperor in Bohemia: "he has 
 
2 1 8 Gustavus Adolphus. [i63i 
 
 answered that he thanks their Majesties for the great 
 honour they have done him, and when he sees their 
 armies in the field — and especially those of the King 
 of England in the Palatinate — he will not lose the 
 opportunity." The ubiquitous Arnim had a hand 
 in the matter, hoping, no doubt, to get Wallenstein 
 to appear at the head of his third party; and it 
 seems to have been a great blunder on Gustavus's 
 part that Arnim was allowed in any way to be privy 
 to the negotiations. Gustavus, however, did not 
 know Arnim as well at the beginning of 163 1 as he 
 did at the end ; he was also employing a much more 
 honest agent. Count Thurn, formerly the leader of 
 the Bohemian Revolution, and now the head of the 
 emigrant party. One of the best things to be said 
 for Wallenstein is his steady friendship with Thurn, 
 and the way in which the Bohemian emigres always 
 looked upon him, both as a patriot and a possible 
 restorer. In June, 163 1 — that is, when things looked 
 bad for Gustavus after the fall of Magdeburg, the 
 first definite demands of Wallenstein were laid 
 before the King. They were high. Gustavus must 
 first complete the reduction of the sea-coasts, ally 
 himself with Saxony and attack Tilly, and then send 
 him, Wallenstein, 12,000 men under Count Thurn. 
 With this nucleus he would soon raise 50,000. 
 Gustavus, in his then situation, agreed to these 
 terms, and further promised to make Wallenstein 
 Viceroy of Bohemia. So matters stood until Sep- 
 tember. Wallenstein, whose whole soul revelled in 
 secret intrigue, may or may not have been honest 
 in the matter ; it is certain that he was at the same 
 time in correspondence with the Emperor, who 
 
163T] Forwards. 2ig 
 
 never had a suspicion of his uprightness, and con- 
 tinued to be advised by him until the time he was 
 reinstated in the command. With cynical frankness 
 and with a view of raising his price, Wallenstein, in 
 his letters to Gustavus, told the latter that the Em- 
 peror was seeking to put him again at the head of 
 his armies ; and cursed the Jesuits and Father Lam- 
 mermann. As a matter of fact he knew which way 
 the wind blew, and thought — after Breitenfeld, at 
 least — that he was more likely to secure his own 
 interests by an alliance with the victorious King 
 of Sweden than with the Emperor, who, after Breit- 
 enfeld, was reported to be meditating a flight to 
 Gratz. Wallenstein told Gustavus, while congratu- 
 lating him on the victory, that he would soon chase 
 the Emperor out of his Empire. 
 
 This then was the commander of the eastern ex- 
 pedition whom the King of Sweden had in his mind. 
 Wallenstein and Thurn should raise Bohemia, while 
 John George cleared Silesia. All three might in the 
 following year meet Gustavus, after the successful 
 conclusion of his campaign in Swabia and Bavaria, 
 under the walls of Vienna. It was a splendid pros- 
 pect, but the burden of its fulfilment rested upon a 
 man who knew neither faith nor honour. Well 
 enough the King of Sweden knew how shifty his 
 ally was ; and after his own unexpected success in 
 the month of October he gradually came to the reso- 
 lution to do without him. Rightly indeed, when 
 the whol« cause was at stake, he had resolved to 
 make use of such a powerful agent as Wallenstein 
 would undoubtedly have been ; now that the sky 
 was clear, there was no need to avail himself of such 
 
220 Gustavus Adolphus. ti63l 
 
 means. A feeling of the incongruity of such an 
 alliance gradually came over Gustavus ; he excused 
 himself diplomatically from sending the 12,000 
 troops to Wallenstein: "Wismar was not yet 
 down," or "he could not spare so many troops 
 at present." In the following year, when he was 
 again in imminent danger in the camp before Nurem- 
 berg, Gustavus tried to tempt Wallenstein to take 
 up the negotiation at the place where it had 
 dropped, but this time without effect. Of the black- 
 ness of Wallenstein's treachery towards the Em- 
 peror in the summer of 1631 there can be no two 
 opinions ; it will not even do to say that he, a prince 
 of the Empire, had as much right to negotiate with 
 Gustavus as other princes. They were princes by 
 the grace of God ; he had no one's grace but Ferdi- 
 nand's to thank for his position. 
 
 It was, however, as I said a great stroke of policy 
 on Arnim's part to tell Gustavus that Wallenstein 
 had invited the Saxons to Bohemia. As a matter of 
 fact it was the unwillingness of the Elector to fight 
 even Tiefenbach that turned him aside from Silesia ; 
 on his way eastward he heard that Prague was 
 defenceless, and the march from Dresden up the 
 valleys of the Elbe and Moldau was about the 
 easiest that he could under the circumstance per- 
 form. Thus it may be said that the Elector of 
 Saxony practically effected nothing. Probably Gus- 
 tavus, when he began to abandon the idea of Wallen- 
 stein, expected even less results. As we shall soon 
 see, it was speedily proved that the Saxons had no 
 sort of hold on Bohemia, and that whenever force 
 should be applied they would be rapidly driven out. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 DIPLOMACY. 
 
 N Mainz Gustavus held a splendid 
 winter court. Thither came his 
 queen and thither came Oxenstiern. 
 Thither came the German princes 
 of the southwest, and the deputies from towns, to 
 pay their respects to him, and to determine or com- 
 plete the terms of their alliance. Thither came Sir 
 Henry Vane, the English ambassador, and our old 
 friend Charnacd, besides two other agents of Riche- 
 lieu. Thither, too, came the unlucky Frederick of 
 the Palatinate, still clad with the empty title of King 
 of Bohemia. It was indeed a position of great Euro- 
 pean influence in which this king of a million and a 
 half of people, hitherto regarded as almost outside 
 the limits of European courtesy, now found himself. 
 His latest admirer, Weibull, has compared it with 
 the position of Napoleon at Erfurt in 1808. It would 
 be in my opinion as much to the honour of Gustavus 
 
22 2 Gustavus Adolphus. C1632 
 
 to liken him to Attila. He had not come to destroy, 
 but to save. 
 
 The splendour of it all, as the philosophical his- 
 torian of Sweden, Geijer, sees clearly, was more in 
 appearance than in reality. In reality there was one 
 fatally weak place in Gustavus's armour, the uncer- 
 tainty of his own life. If that life dropped, as it 
 might at any moment, in the siege of some obscure 
 town, by the dagger of some obscure assassin (and 
 of such an actual dagger, with which such an at- 
 tempt was made at Frankfort about this time, Wei- 
 bull gives a picture — an ugly-looking tool), there 
 was absolutely no one to take up the reins. His 
 own crown would pass to an infant daughter, and if 
 the crown of a renovated German Empire should be 
 placed with acclamation on his head, that Empire 
 would fall to pieces on his death. Even if he lived 
 out the allotted span as king of this new country, 
 would he be able to teach religious toleration to men 
 who had been tearing each other in pieces for ten 
 years for the sake of religion ? And still more, would 
 not his northern heart be ever turning back to 
 Stockholm and the winter glories of the Malar lake ? 
 Would he, a Swede, be altogether pleased to re- 
 create a strong power in an united Germany ? 
 Would he not thereby only give Sweden a dan- 
 gerous neighbour to the South ? 
 
 Yet, without becoming King of Germany in some 
 shape or other, he could hardly fulfil his allotted 
 work. Had he lived, I think he would have found, 
 as Cromwell found, all other means impracticable. 
 For the present he put the idea resolutely aside. 
 
AXEL OXENSTIERN, 
 Chancellor of Sweden. 
 
1632] Diplomacy. 223 
 
 His main aim, in this little respite at Mainz and 
 Frankfort (for he spent some days there also), was 
 to lay the foundation of a less simple but a less revo- 
 lutionary scheme : a confederacy namely of German 
 Protestants with Sweden at their head, with the King 
 of Sweden as ex-officio commander-in-chief of their 
 forces, charged with the right and duty of protecting 
 them against the Emperor or any other power. For 
 this purpose Sweden should become a member of 
 the Empire, with a regular seat in the Diet in respect 
 of the Duchy of Pomerania, which she claimed as her 
 reward for past services. It was not a very German 
 scheme, for it distinctly recognised the impossibility 
 of uniting Germany, but it was essentially a Protes- 
 tant scheme, and that it was essentially practicable 
 is proved not so much from Oxenstiern's successfully 
 carrying it into execution, among the smaller states 
 at least, in the league of Heilbronn, but even more 
 from the great success that similar confederations, on 
 bases other than religious, afterwards enjoyed under 
 the protection of France. I have only to instance 
 Mazarin's league of the Rhenish princes of 1659, and 
 the confederation of the Rhine, 1806. The peculiar 
 history, as well as the independent character, of the 
 German princes had fitted them far more for such 
 separate confederations than for submission to a 
 central and ordered government. The only two 
 princes who were not likely to come in to such a 
 scheme were the Electors of Saxony and Branden- 
 burg, and it was upon their opposition that the 
 scheme was finally wrecked. That this scheme was, 
 during the period of his stay at Mainz, the sole 
 
2 24 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 thought of Gustavus's mind I do not imagine, but 
 what I wish to make clear is that it was this and not, 
 as has generally been believed, his own elevation to 
 the Empire to which he was looking as a final settle- 
 ment. 
 
 Final settlement, however, there could be none as 
 yet. The question of "universal peace," as it is 
 called in the contemporary records, or " general 
 peace " as we should call it, had been in view for 
 some time past, and continued in view for some time 
 longer ; but at the present moment the more pressing 
 questions were, what was to be done with the Catho- 
 lic League, and what was to be done with the ex- 
 King of Bohemia ? It will be convenient if I am 
 allowed to touch upon each of these three questions 
 separately. And, first, with regard to Frederick. 
 He had more or less given up hope of restoration to 
 the Palatinate, much more to Bohemia, before the 
 appearance of Gustavus on the scene. He now has- 
 tened to the court of the deliverer at Mainz. Before 
 the end of January the greater part of the Lower 
 Palatinate, but with the important exception of 
 Heidelberg, was in the hands of the Swedish troops, 
 and Gustavus had expressly declared that he intended 
 to restore Frederick to his electorate. But the attack 
 on Heidelberg involved a certain breach with Spain, 
 and the King of Sweden was anxious to see what the 
 power's more nearly interested in the Palatinate ques- 
 tion than himself would do towards assisting him in 
 the event of such a breach. Those powers were 
 undoubtedly England and Holland. Nothing more 
 clearly indicates the foolish policy of Charles I. and 
 
1632] Diplomacy. 225 
 
 his utter disregard of the interests of foreign Protes- 
 tantism, than the manner in which he played with 
 the question. Vane, whom he now sent to Gustavus, 
 brought words, words, et prcBterea nihil. " England," 
 says Droysen, " clothed her inactivity with a sort of 
 pride that she alone remembered the original cause 
 of the war, and cared for the interests of the Pala- 
 tinate house," but she avoided any thing that could 
 lead her into a declaration of war in alliance with the 
 Protestant powers. Nay, she went so far at this 
 very time as to offer Ferdinand direct armed help 
 against the Swedes if Ferdinand would restore Fred- 
 erick to his dominions. Gustavus found this out, 
 and it not unnaturally embittered him against Eng- 
 land and the wretched Frederick. Therefore, when 
 the latter presented himself at Mainz, the King 
 treated him with the utmost courtesy, but said 
 frankly he would make no promises until he saw 
 King Charles's fleets and armadas in motion. 
 
 Worse, however, than a breach with Spain, the 
 restoration of Frederick, before the conclusion of a 
 general peace (in which event, as we shall see, Gus- 
 tavus always made that restoration a leading stipu- 
 lation), would involve a breach with France. Maxi- 
 milian, clothed with Frederick's title and in possession 
 of one-half of Frederick's lands (the Upper Palatinate), 
 had taken care to secure Richelieu as his friend. In 
 May, 1631, a. treaty had been concluded between 
 France and Bavaria, in which the former had promised 
 to maintain Maximilian as Elector. It was, indeed, 
 always the wish of Richelieu to substitute Maximilian 
 for Ferdinand on the Imperial throne, but neither 
 
2 26 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 that wish nor the treaty would be allowed to count 
 for much if a more promising way for crushing the 
 House of Austria offered itself. Therefore I think 
 we may take it for granted that, though Richelieu 
 would undoubtedly withdraw from direct assistance 
 to Gustavus, if he at once replaced Frederick at 
 Heidelberg, he would not let that restoration stand 
 in the way of a general peace, if such a peace should 
 express the full humiliation of the Hapsburgs. 
 
 But for the time it was most important for Sweden 
 not to quarrel with France. France alone could set- 
 tle satisfactorily the second of the questions under 
 consideration — namely, the fate of the Catholic 
 League. The League was in an awkward position. 
 Bavaria, it was true, was still untouched by hostile 
 arms ; so were Cologne and Trier ; but the rest of its 
 territories were in the hands of Gustavus, and its 
 princes were at his mercy. Their only hope was in 
 Richelieu. Richelieu, as we have seen, was extremely 
 hampered by the march of the King into the League 
 country, but he could not but acknowledge that even 
 from a military point of view there was something to 
 be said for such a march. The League had not 
 separated, and would not have separated their cause 
 from that of the Emperor, unless their territories had 
 been overrun. All Richelieu's diplomacy had failed 
 to divorce them. But he now hoped to reconcile 
 them with Sweden, at least so far as to free the 
 hands of the latter for the long-deferred march upon 
 Vienna. He failed, and failed just where he thought 
 that his influence would be strongest — namely, with 
 Bavaria. 
 
1632] Diplomacy. 227 
 
 It would be tedious to my readers if I were to go 
 into all the diplomatic correspondence that passed 
 betwee'n the League, Gustavus, and Richelieu at the 
 beginning of 1632. The main points are these: 
 Richelieu tried to get the League to agree to perfect 
 neutrality, and allow Ferdinand and Gustavus to 
 fight out the quarrel. The League as a whole were not 
 altogether unwilling. But such a neutrality must 
 depend upon the consent of Gustavus, and Gustavus 
 would only consent to it upon conditions. The con- 
 ditions he offered to the League were such that all 
 eventually accepted them except Bavaria. And 
 Bavaria, after long hesitation and fierce accusations 
 of treachery against Richelieu, decided to refuse the 
 conditions, throw over his alliance with France, and 
 throw himself into the arms of Ferdinand, and thus 
 enable that monarch, who was in altogether desperate 
 straits, to continue the war. One cannot help 
 admiring Maximilian for thus refusing to make him- 
 self the tool of Richelieu. 
 
 When Richelieu first approached Maximilian on 
 the subject, the battle of Breitenfeld had just been 
 fought. Maximilian said that France ought to send 
 him troops for the defence of his territories in com- 
 pliance with the treaty of the previous May. Riche- 
 lieu pointed out that the treaty had spoken only of 
 defence, whereas he, Maximilian, and the League had 
 been the aggressors by the invasion of Saxony. 
 This failing, Maximilian at the end of the year, pro- 
 fessed himself not unwilling to be neutral, if the 
 Catholic bishops were restored in the Priests' Alley. 
 "And the Protestants all over Germany as before 
 
2 28 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 1629?" asked Richelieu's ambassador. No, Maxi- 
 milian did not mean that. Meanwhile France 
 worked upon the trembling and enraged Ecclesiasti- 
 cal Electors to induce their consent to the neutrality, 
 and with much better success. She also tried to 
 work upon Gustavus to grant moderate conditions to 
 these neutrals. 
 
 But Gustavus, who meant the neutrality to be but 
 a prelude to a general peace, refused to restore the 
 possessions of the League, merely as the basis of a 
 neutrality. He wanted them, he said, as pledges to 
 hand back in return for the Palatinate and other ter- 
 ritories of which Protestants had been dispossessed. 
 Richelieu was not the man to stick at trifles — if the 
 practical neutrality of the League could be gained, 
 only for a time sufficient to enable Gustavus to get 
 at the throat of his and Richelieu's arch enemy, 
 Ferdinand, he cared not how it was gained ; he would 
 force the League to accept any conditions. So it 
 came about on the 9th of January, 1632, Gustavus 
 propounded to Charnac6and De Br6z6 his.ultimatum 
 on the subject. 
 
 1. The reduction of the army of the League to twelve 
 
 thousand men, and its quartering upon the territories 
 of the League only. 
 
 2. The complete withdrawal of all assistance of the 
 
 League from Ferdinand. 
 
 3. The restoration of all territories in Lower Saxony, 
 
 taken from the Protestants since the beginning of 
 the war. 
 
 In return for the acceptance of which Gustavus 
 would consent to restore to the Electors of Trier and 
 
1632] Diplomacy. 229 
 
 Cologne all of their territories (not much) which he 
 had occupied, and to Maximilian all that the latter 
 had possessed before the war (not much) in the 
 Lower Palatinate ; also to leave the Upper Palatinate 
 in his hands till the peace. 
 
 " Rudes Conditions" says Richelieu in his memoirs. 
 So rude that the French plenipotentiaries hesitated 
 to sign them. " Sign," said Gustavus, " or get you 
 home to your King, and tell him to turn back from 
 the path which he has opened into Germany," The 
 conditions were signed. 
 
 The League were of course very angry when they 
 found that France had thus deserted them in their 
 distress, but one by one they came round to see that 
 it was the best way out of the difficulty, and all 
 eventually accepted the terms. All but one. Maxi- 
 milian utterly refused, and concluded a new alliance 
 with the Emperor, to stand or fall together for the 
 defence of the Catholic faith. Therewith the League 
 may be said to have been dissolved, but therewith 
 the King of Sweden was no nearer to the solution of 
 the last of the problems which occupied his mind in 
 the winter of 1631-32 — the general peace. Properly 
 speaking, this question has no special relation to the 
 time of his sojourn at Mainz, for the negotiations 
 for it began considerably before and lasted for a long 
 time after that period ; but it is convenient to treat 
 of it now, so that we may be able afterwards to take 
 a less interrupted view of his campaigns. 
 
 It must be observed in the first place that, whereas 
 the negotiations for neutrality were actively pursued 
 by the Catholic powers, those for a general peace 
 
230 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 owe their history chiefly to the exertions of the 
 Elector of Saxony ; and that they proceeded more 
 from his hatred of that Swedish alliance, which had 
 saved him, than from any desire for the permanent 
 settlement of Germany. One must preface any ac- 
 count of them by saying at once that John George 
 was not, perhaps, quite as black as he has been 
 painted. He was a man of passing impulses ; one day 
 he would sell his soul to Gustavus, the next to 
 Wallenstein ; but as both of these claimants to the 
 valuable possession were usually absent, Arnim, who 
 was usually present, managed, as a rule, to dominate 
 his thoughts and wishes in the long run. Gustavus 
 gradually came to have a well-founded distrust of 
 Arnim ; he had at one time thought of making it a 
 stipulation in the treaty with Saxony that Arnim 
 should be dismissed. Now Arnim's whole desire was 
 to create the third party — in itself a laudable end. 
 What means he employed for that end he did not in 
 the least care. One result of his complete absence 
 of scruple has been that the character of John 
 George, which was quite unpleasant enough before, 
 has been loaded with a weight of treachery, which 
 should more properly have been laid at the door of 
 his adviser. 
 
 A more favourable moment, however, for a gen- 
 eral peace could hardly have been offered than this 
 very winter. Ferdinand was confessedly reduced to 
 great straits. He had sent an embassy to Poland to 
 beg for troops, and had been told that they could 
 not be spared, for a war with Russia might at any 
 moment take place. It is one of those doubts, with 
 
1632] Diplomacy. 231 
 
 which the history of the period abounds, what Gus- 
 tavus had said to a certain Russian ambassador who 
 visited him in Stettin in the early days of 1631. All 
 record of more than the fact of this visit is lost, but 
 we know that the King hurried back to Stettin for a 
 day or two just before the storm of Frankfort-on- 
 Oder. It would not be an extravagant conjecture 
 that he got Russia to promise that she would keep 
 the Poles quiet. A more bitter repulse to Ferdinand 
 was that which came from the Pope. Urban VIII., 
 one of the greatest of the long line, if greatness is to 
 be measured by toleration and wisdom rather than 
 by oppression, told the Imperial ambassador that 
 the war was no religious war, but a war for the 
 extension of Hapsburg influence, to the advance of 
 which he refused to contribute a penny. It has 
 been one of the most curious paradoxes in history 
 that the monarch, who is posing for the time being 
 as champion of the Catholic faith, has very fre- 
 quently found himself snubbed and browbeaten, if 
 not absolutely opposed, by the head of the Catholic 
 world. We have only to instance the strained rela- 
 tions of Philip II. and Mary of England with Paul 
 IV. ; of Louis XIV. and James II. with Innocent 
 XL So it was now. Urban was an open Gustavite. 
 From Spain, from Denmark Ferdinand had nothing 
 active to hope for in the way of help. The Porte 
 was threatening to take advantage of his distress, 
 and to anticipate by half a century its last attempt 
 to plant the Crescent at Vienna. 
 
 In such circumstances it might be expected that 
 Ferdinand would not be unfavourable to any reason- 
 
232 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 able conditions that might be offered him. But as 
 a matter of fact, he had been approached on the 
 subject before. It was in October, 163 1, not so long 
 after Breitenfeld, that there came to the Swedish 
 camp at Wiirzburg an ambassador from the Landgraf 
 of Hesse Darmstadt (not to be confused with our 
 brave William of Hesse Cassel — this was a very dif- 
 ferent sort of prince), to ask Gustavus to allow his 
 master to remain neutral. Gustavus was astonished 
 at the request, for the Landgraf had been one of his 
 hottest opponents before his expedition to Germany. 
 People even said he was secretly a Catholic and a 
 member of the League. Consequently he was now 
 treated very contemptuously, until something sug- 
 gested to Gustavus the idea of asking the question : 
 " Has your master any thing to say to me on the 
 question of Peace?" This was just the subject 
 which Landgraf George had wished to open. He 
 had in fact been quite recently in communication 
 with the Elector of Mainz, and they had agreed 
 to hold a meeting of Catholic and Protestant princes 
 at Mulhausen in December. At first it was pro- 
 posed to exclude Gustavus from being represented 
 there, on the trivial ground that he was not a Prince 
 of the Empire. Gustavus laughed at the idea and 
 said he must be represented. Meanwhile came his 
 extraordinary successes on the Main and Rhine, and 
 the question had obviously shifted its ground ; it was 
 no more a question of whether the princes should 
 allow Sweden, but whether Sweden should allow 
 them to be represented. Gustavus knew enough of 
 the methods of such conferences to be sure that little 
 
1632] Diplomacy. 233 
 
 would come of it, if he was not in a position to 
 enforce his views. The Mulhausen meeting was de- 
 ferred, and the King declared that he must consult 
 first with Saxony and Brandenburg, and that he 
 would decide on nothing without their advice. As 
 for an armistice to allow time for such a conference 
 to assemble, a proposal for which Landgraf George 
 presented to him in January, 1632, he distinctly 
 answered that he would only grant it, if the Emperor 
 would clear his troops out of all places in the valleys 
 of the Elbe and Weser. In fact Gustavus knew that 
 it was not upon the Landgraf or the Elector of 
 Mainz, but upon the more powerful Protestant 
 Princes, and especially upon Saxony that the question 
 of peace would turn. But, before breaking off with 
 the Landgraf altogether, he put forward a series of 
 demands, upon which he would insist in conditions 
 of peace, and which it is very interesting to compare 
 with the exact results obtained at the Peace of 
 Westphalia in 1648. They include, in matters spiri- 
 tual, withdrawal of the Edict of Restitution, resto- 
 ration to Protestants of all churches and ecclesiastical 
 property they have at any time held, inclusion of the 
 Calvinists in toleration, bag and baggage departure of 
 the Jesuits from the Empire. As regards the territo- 
 rial and other arrangements, the King demanded that 
 all Spanish troops should be dismissed, that Chambres 
 mi-parties * should be established in the Imperial 
 
 * " Half-party Chambers " — that is, an equal number of Protestant 
 and Catholic judges in the Imperial law courts. This was copied 
 from the Edict of Nantes, whereby the same system was instituted in 
 France. 
 
234 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 courts, and all outstanding processes against Protes- 
 tants be cancelled ; that there should be " satisfac- 
 tion " for the King of Sweden, such as he should 
 think equitable. In a word, all that the Catholics 
 gained by fighting it out for sixteen years more, was 
 the maintenance of the Jesuits, and of the Upper 
 Palatinate for Maximilian of Bavaria. For in the 
 peace of Westphalia, the year 1624, instead of 161 8, 
 was taken as the model year, and to the existing 
 conditions of that year every thing was to be re- 
 duced, with the exception of the Lower Palatinate, 
 which was restored to the Protestants. Gustavus 
 was undoubtedly wiser than the statesmen of West- 
 phalia in thus taking his stand on the year immedi- 
 ately before the war. 
 
 These demands were dated January 2, 1632. 
 Other plans, other demands poured in during these 
 months, some of them including practical reconstruc- 
 tion of the Imperial Constitution. Landgraf William 
 particularly wanted to sweep away the Ecclesiastical 
 Electors, perhaps — for even heroes are human — not 
 without an eye to some of that Westphalian prop- 
 erty of the Elector of Cologne, which bordered on 
 Hesse Cassel. But such sweeping reforms were not 
 likely to commend themselves to Saxony. John 
 George appears to have become jealous of Gustavus, 
 partly out of sheer puerile spite at the idea of receiv- 
 ing military orders from him (as by the terms of his 
 treaty he was bound to do) ; partly because he 
 intensely disliked the errand on which he was sent — 
 namely, to make active war on the Emperor ; but 
 mostly because he saw Gustavus gradually stepping, 
 
1632] Diplomacy. 235 
 
 and stepping effectively, into the position which it 
 had been the boast of his ancestors, if not of himself, 
 to occupy, that of protector of the Protestant states 
 of Germany. This jealousy increased tenfold when 
 the negotiations for the neutrality of the League 
 began. The comings and goings of French ambas- 
 sadors — " The Devil brought them in to spoil all," 
 he said — revolted his inordinate pride. He was 
 already in a fair way to succumb to the temptation 
 of breaking with his ally, when the tempter appeared 
 in the person of Wallenstein. Arnim had indeed 
 gladly embraced the idea of the expedition to Bohe- 
 mia, as being likely to bring him nearer to Wallen- 
 stein, with whom it is probable he never ceased to 
 communicate, and on whom he always relied as being 
 a valuable ingredient in the third party. And the 
 idea of concluding a general peace through Wallen- 
 stein's means — a peace in which Gustavus might 
 appear in a very secondary position, — seems to have 
 dawned upon John George, about the time at which 
 Gustavus communicated to him the demands which 
 he would put forward in the event of such a peace. 
 Wallenstein's position was becoming a much stronger 
 one in January, 1632, when he began to negotiate 
 with Arnim, than in November, 163 1, when Gustavus 
 finally abandoned the idea of employing him. For 
 in December he again became Imperial Generalis- 
 simo, at first provisionally for three months, it is, 
 true, but at the end of that time for life, as Dictator, 
 Independent, Omnipotent. 
 
 His diplomacy was almost more useful to Ferdi- 
 nand than his sword, for he set himself at once to 
 
236 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 detach Saxony from the Swedish side, and he effectu- 
 ally succeeded. How he spun his wiles, and how he 
 entangled the unhappy John George in them, must 
 be reserved for a later chapter. Meanwhile, it must 
 be noticed that early in 1632 the two Protestant 
 Electors held a meeting, in which they both agreed 
 that the satisfaction for their Swedish ally should be 
 in money and not in land, and that he should not ac- 
 quire the position of a prince of the Empire. In 
 other words, Brandenburg and Saxony, whose terri- 
 tories Gustavus had freed from Tilly's plundering 
 hordes, whose bishoprics he had won back for 
 them with Swedish blood and treasure, and whom 
 he was now preparing to place in the forefront in the 
 negotiations for peace, agreed that when his work 
 was done he should be sent back to his own land, 
 proclaimed to all Europe as a hireling. Then they 
 would resume that position, which they had so no- 
 bly filled before he came, of Defenders of the Faith. 
 The King of Sweden, on hearing of this decision, de- 
 serves much praise for controlling his temper. But 
 it put an end to his hopes of using them as agents for 
 a general peace. 
 
 One more event in connection with this peace- 
 movement, although of somewhat later date, it will 
 be convenient to group with the above. In May, 
 1632, an agent of the Duke of Orleans, called de 
 Hayes, came to Gustavus, who was then at Munich, 
 and brought him word that Ferdinand himself was 
 more inclined towards peace than before (it was no 
 wonder if he was, for Gustavus was half-way across 
 Bavaria), because Wallenstein's demands were so ex- 
 
1632] 
 
 Diplomacy. 
 
 237 
 
 orbitant that he could not satisfy them. We know 
 little of the circumstances of the negotiation except 
 that de Hayes passed twice or thrice between Vienna 
 and Munich, and, from a letter of Wallenstein's, that 
 an armistice of three months had been proposed ; but 
 Arnim did not lose the opportunity to point out to 
 his Electoral master that his ally was negotiating be- 
 hind his back, and it may have been this that finally 
 led John George into the trap which Wallenstein had 
 been so carefully preparing for him. We do not 
 know why this negotiation came to an end without 
 leaving further traces of itself, but from this time 
 forward Gustavus seems to have concluded that only 
 after a decisive overthrow of the Imperial armies could 
 any peace be hoped for. That he made approaches to 
 Wallenstein when he lay before Nuremberg in Au- 
 gust, is less important than that he was preparing 
 to make a renewed offer of his old conditions either 
 to Wallenstein or to the Emperor himself at the very 
 time of his death. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 BAVARIA. 
 
 HE plans of the King of Sweden for the 
 campaign of 1632 are nowhere clearly 
 stated. That they were extensive, and 
 that they included a final march upon Vienna, 
 we cannot doubt. But from the very beginning 
 of the year, and partly in consequence of the very 
 great extension of the theatre of the war, there 
 is a haphazard look about all the operations. The 
 war becomes disconnected, it breaks up into little 
 bits. The most sanguine commander could hardly 
 have expected eight armies to combine and work 
 perfectly together in different parts of Germany with- 
 out a hitch somewhere. Yet Gustavus actually had 
 eight armies on foot at the end of the year 163 1, with 
 an effective strength of some 100,000 men, which he 
 expected to double in the course of the next year. 
 He had 18,000 men under his own command on the 
 Rhine ; Horn had 20,000 men on the Main ; William 
 of Hesse, 8,000 in his own country ; Ban^r, at 
 
 238 
 

 MAXIMILIAN OF BAVARIA. 
 
1632] Bavaria. 239 
 
 Magdeburg, 1 3,000 ; Tott, who was just finishing the 
 Mecklenburg business, and was ordered to advance 
 into Lower Saxony, had 13,000. In Mecklenburg 
 itself the ungrateful Dukes were raising 4,000. Wil- 
 liam of Weimar had 3,000. The Saxons in Bohemia 
 were 20,000, and another 12,000 may be allowed for 
 garrisons. 
 
 It is obvious, however, in the first place, that many 
 of these were new levies, and, like the troops raised 
 in the various counties of England during the civil 
 war, would not be of much use except for defence 
 of their own particular territories. It seems to me 
 that Gustavus, who should have known the German 
 soldiers better by this time, did not sufficiently con- 
 sider how difficult any combination of these armies, 
 especially if requiring great rapidity of movement, 
 would be. If all these armies had been capable of 
 real mobilisation, it surely could not have been neces- 
 sary for him to draw off at once to the support of 
 any part of his line of operations which happened to 
 be temporarily weakened. Yet this was what he did 
 in 1632. He was the indispensable man, flying hither 
 and thither with his own comparatively small " Royal 
 army." Now it is Horn who is in danger, now Nu- 
 remberg, now Saxony. On each occasion the King 
 has to stop in a career of victory in order to strength- 
 en the weak link in his chain. Not that I should 
 venture to criticise his action on each of these occa- 
 sions ; he probably knew that only he could be of 
 use. But I think it proves how weak was the foun- 
 dation upon which were based his great hopes of de- 
 livering Germany, and how unready Germany was to 
 
240 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 take the necessary steps for delivering herself. And 
 again : in his own utmost need before Nuremberg 
 he could not gather together an effective force of 
 much over 5o,cxx), although he waited two months, 
 and sent for all the troops that could possibly be 
 gathered. The task was too hard for him. None 
 the less does he deserve immortal honour for attempt- 
 ing it. 
 
 " That low man seeks a little thing to do, 
 Sees it and does it ; 
 This high man, with a great thing to pursue, 
 Dies ere he knows it." 
 
 Gustavus had got a firm foot in the Palatinate, in 
 which very few places were left over to the Span- 
 iards,* and, after the expiring of the armistice, which 
 he had granted, for the purpose of the negotiation, 
 to Maximilian of Bavaria, had just stormed Kreutz- 
 nach, when he received news that Horn was in 
 danger. Horn had been left in Wiirzburg with 
 orders to overrun the whole of the bishopric of 
 Bamberg, which adjoins Wiirzburg and forms the 
 eastern end of the Priests' Alley. Horn had accord- 
 ingly advanced up the Main, had laid the whole 
 of the two bishoprics under contribution, and had 
 at last got possession of the town of Bamberg. 
 Then, on February 28th, he heard that Tilly had 
 broken up from his quarters in Bavaria, and was 
 advancing against the Swedish position on the Main, 
 40,CKD0 strong. Before Horn could in any way 
 
 * It must be understood that these Spaniards were in the pay of 
 Maximilian of Bavaria, not of the King of Spain, who was still 
 nominally at peace with Sweden. 
 
1632] Bavaria. 241 
 
 fortify Bamberg, whose bishop, as we saw, had 
 trusted rather to diplomatic wiles than to entrench- 
 menrts, the enemy was upon him. The Field Marshal, 
 though himself the bravest of the brave, as he 
 proved at Breitenfeld, and, long afterwards at Nord- 
 lingen, remembered the King's orders to hazard 
 nothing rashly, Bamberg was as good as an open 
 town, and he therefore decided, after one day's stout 
 resistance, to make an orderly retreat on Wiirzburg. 
 Tilly, after occupying Bamberg, followed him for a 
 little while, and then turned aside to besiege 
 Schweinfurt. Horn's forces, so far from being the 
 20,000 which they shew in the calculation made 
 at the end of 163 1, were little over half that num- 
 ber, owing to the exigencies of the Franconian 
 garrisons ; and from a military point of view he did 
 right to retreat. Gustavus, however, to whom a 
 retreat was a thing of abhorrence, gently reproved 
 his trusted friend when they met, and said that 
 he had construed his words rather too literally. 
 "We must not let the enemy get any courage 
 whatever against us," said the King. 
 
 The King had abandoned for a time the enterprise 
 of the reduction of Heidelberg, which was to come 
 next after Kreutznach, and had advanced to meet 
 Horn, with the intention of advancing at once into 
 Bavaria. He left Oxenstiern in command on the 
 Rhine, with Bernard of Weimar under him, but 
 shortly after, finding that the fiery Duke and the 
 prudent Chancellor did not get on very well to- 
 gether, called the former to his side ; not, however, 
 until he, Bernard, had almost cleared the Palatinate 
 
242 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 of the enemy. Horn and the King joined at 
 Schweinfurt, the siege of which Tilly raised at their 
 approach on the nth of March, and resolved to 
 force the old commander to a battle. But Tilly 
 retired before them, in obedience to the instructions 
 of Maximilian, in the direction of the Bavarian 
 frontier. This gave him time to gather all the 
 available forces of the Bavarian army — as we must 
 now call it, for the League had ceased to exist — 
 behind the river Lech. But it also gave Gustavus 
 time to call up Banfer from Magdeburg, and also 
 William of Weimar, whose reinforcements together 
 brought the Swedish army up to a good 40,000 
 men. A small corps of observation was left in 
 Franconia, as well as the garrisons; and with the 
 rest Gustavus advanced in high spirits due south- 
 wards. Right in his path lay Nuremberg, where he 
 met with a most splendid reception on the 21st of 
 March. The patricians of Nuremberg, which is still 
 perhaps the most perfect specimen of a mediaeval 
 city that time has spared, and which was then prob- 
 ably the richest city in Central Europe, rode out to 
 meet him before the gates. There was short time 
 to spend upon processions, for he marched again 
 the same evening ; but Monro saw the " eyes of the 
 Nurembergers streaming with tears of Joy to see 
 two such Kings " (the ex-King of Bohemia was with 
 Gustavus, and stuck to him, indeed, like a leech, as 
 having no hope but in him) " sent by the king of 
 kings for their deliverance. They gifted unto the 
 king of Sweden four half-CartPwes,* with all fumi- 
 
 * Cannons. 
 
1632] Bavaria. 243 
 
 ture belonging unto them, together with two silver 
 globes, one celestial, the other terrestrial ; there 
 were also presented unto him drinking credences 
 many," etc. The silver globes were supported by 
 figures of Atlas and Hercules respectively, and are 
 still to be seen in the museum at Stockholm ; but 
 Gustavus no doubt found the half-cartowes the most 
 acceptable part of the present. Swiftly southwards 
 the march went on. Sending a party to secure Ulm, 
 the King directed all his forces upon Donauworth, 
 and, as he himself says, drove the garrison out of it 
 "almost under the eyes of Tilly," after a hot re- 
 sistance, in which a few Jesuits and monks who had 
 got mixed up with the flying soldiers were killed. 
 Those of the garrison who remained took service 
 with the King ; but, " being papists of Bavaria," 
 says Monro, " as soon as they smelt the smell of 
 their fathers' homes in ten days they were all gone." 
 One more Protestant town delivered, one more 
 original casus belli avenged. Since 1609 Donau- 
 wQrth had groaned under restored Catholicism, 
 having been put to the ban of the Empire in that 
 year for an insult to a Catholic procession in the 
 streets. 
 
 And now the King of Sweden was over the Danube 
 — in a genuinely hostile country, where the peas- 
 ants rose upon him and surprised his stragglers, 
 " cutting off their noses and ears, hands and feet, 
 pulling out their eyes, with sundry other cruelties, 
 which they used, being justly repaid by the soldiers 
 in burning of many Dorpes on the march, leaving 
 also the boores dead where they were found." The 
 
244 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 war had assumed a sharper character, for the deliv- 
 erer had now driven the oppressor to his lair. That 
 lair was defended by the little river Lech, in spring a 
 swollen torrent from the melting snows. Behind it 
 lay Tilly with 30,cxx) men. Between Rain and Augs- 
 burg the country is intersected on the right bank 
 of the Lech with wooded defiles. At the bottom 
 of one of these Tilly had posted himself, intending 
 to wait till Wallenstein could advance to his assist- 
 ance. He never expected that Gustavus would try 
 to force a passage, and indeed it seemed a desperate 
 undertaking. Nearly all his generals urged the King 
 to make along southward detour, and to come round 
 upon Tilly's rear. He has been blamed by histo- 
 rians for not doing so, and for wasting men uselessly 
 at the passage of the river. But his object was in 
 fact not so much the passage of the river as the 
 destruction of Tilly's army. What he most dreaded 
 was that very union of Tilly and Wallenstein, to 
 which the former looked forward, for the blocking of 
 the passage to Vienna. This quite explains and jus- 
 tifies the daring step which Gustavus now took. 
 While he was preparing for the attack he gradually 
 took in the whole of the upper Danube country, and 
 all the passages over that river between Ulm and 
 Donauworth. Tilly meanwhile was strengthening 
 his position. Marshy meadows in front and a woody 
 hill behind, strong entrenchments well furnished with 
 cannon, a plentiful supply of cavalry to scour the 
 banks of the river, — all seemed in favour of the de- 
 fence. Maximilian was present in person — no gen- 
 eral it is true, but eager to fight in defence of his own 
 
1632] Bavaria. 245 
 
 country, of which this was evidently the key. Gus- 
 tavus pitched his main camp right opposite the 
 enemy's, at a little town called Nordheim. A let- 
 ter from that camp says, "we are getting hold of 
 more booty than we know what to do with — a horse 
 will sell for four dollars, a cow for a florin, geese and 
 hens for next to nothing." Bavaria was feeling the 
 stress of the war indeed ; but the same letter says 
 that much of the booty comes in presents from the 
 towns like Ulm and Hochstett, which were friendly 
 to the cause. All the bridges over the Lech had 
 been broken, right down to its juncture with the 
 Danube. Yet without some sort of bridge it would 
 be impossible for Gustavus to cross. 
 
 The armies were within speaking distance of each 
 other. On the night of the 3d of April the King 
 went out alone on a recognisance. He called to a 
 sentinel on the opposite bank, " Good morning, sir, 
 where is old Tilly ? " " Praise God, he is in his 
 quarters at Rain," said the man ; " where is the 
 king, comrade ? " "He 's in his quarters too," an- 
 swered Gustavus. " What ! you don't mean to say 
 he has got any quarters do you ? " " Oh, yes, come 
 over here and you shall have excellent quarters/' ' It 
 was a mild joke, but exactly one of the things which 
 made Gustavus followed and beloved by his soldiers. 
 In the night of the 4th, a pontoon bridge was thrown 
 across the river "right under the fire of the enemy, 
 but the operations of the carpenters were concealed 
 by setting light to damp straw, which smoked so as 
 to make accuracy of aim impossible to the Imperial- 
 ists. Under the same cover 300 Finlanders were 
 
246 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 sent across the river to make a tite-du-pont. Then 
 the cavalry and artillery were brought over, and 
 the latter opened a murderous fire about midday on 
 the Sth. In fact the whole battle was little but a 
 cannonade on both sides. But it raged fiercely for 
 over six hours until Tilly fell mortally wounded in 
 the thigh. Aldringer then took command, but 
 was badly hurt a moment afterwards. Night fell 
 without decisive advantage on either side, but the 
 Swedes had lost 2,000 men, the Bavarians 3,000. 
 On the morning of the 6th Gustavus was amazed 
 to find that his prey had after all escaped him. 
 Maximilian, with great prudence, resolved to quit 
 the pass rather than expose his army to total ruin. 
 He had retreated silently in the night, to Ingolstadt, 
 carrying the dying Tilly with him in a litter. It is 
 pleasing to record that when Tilly sent a message to 
 the King, that he would-permit the " court barber of 
 Anspach, a good and famous chirurgeon," to come 
 to him, Gustavus at once gave permission. But, 
 perhaps not unhappily for the dying man (for the 
 tender mercies of even court chirurgeons were in 
 those days very cruel), the medico arrived too late. 
 The thigh was completely shattered, and the old 
 hero only Hngered 14 days, and died advising Maxi- 
 milian to secure Regensburg at all hazards. It was 
 the place of the greatest importance for keeping 
 communications open with Wallenstein. 
 
 Much as Maximilian hated Wallenstein, and the 
 idea of having to depend on him, whom three years 
 before he had compelled the Emperor to dismiss, he 
 was prudent enough to follow Tilly's advice. But it 
 
1632] Bavaria. 247 
 
 meant the complete surrender of Bavaria into the 
 clutches of Gustavus. From the passages of the 
 Lech, the latter pressed on to Augsburg, defended 
 only by a feeble garrison, hostile to the inhabitants, 
 which was quickly driven out. Augsburg, the cradle 
 of the Lutheran faith, received the King with open 
 arms, a Protestant council replaced a Catholic ; a 
 Swedish garrison was introduced, and a monthly con- 
 tribution levied (14th April). The city was nearly as 
 rich as' Nuremberg, and was renowned for the splen- 
 did banking and mercantile business of the Fuggers. 
 Since the Catholic reaction it had become, much 
 against the will of its inhabitants, " a lesser Rome " 
 and the centre of South German propaganda. Now 
 this was all reversed, and " Gustava et Augusta," as 
 a medal struck on the occasion declared, was once 
 more " Caput religionis et regionis." 
 
 A great deal has been made of the " Oath of 
 Augsburg," in order to prove that Gustavus had 
 ulterior designs, such as the incorporation of the city 
 with the Swedish monarchy. As a matter of fact the 
 oath seems to be the same as that which was admin- 
 istered to the town councils of nearly all the cities in 
 which Gustavus placed garrisons, whether they had 
 been Protestant or Catholic before he came. Such 
 an oath certainly implies the relation of subject and 
 sovereign, but was, and this was the view of both the 
 Swedish diplomat Camerarius, and of the syndic of 
 Augsburg himself, intended to be merely temporary. 
 The King's idea, no doubt, was the retention of these 
 towns, into which he threw garrisons, until the gen- 
 eral peace, a very different idea from that represented 
 
248 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 by his treaty with Boguslav in the matter of Pome- 
 rania, which we have seen he from the beginning 
 intended to serve as a bastion for the Swedish mon- 
 archy. After the King's death the Augsburg depu- 
 ties expressly declared, at a meeting held at Ulm for 
 the deputies of the various Sv/abian allies of Sweden, 
 that their city had never bound itself to the Swedish 
 crown in any more express way than the other cities 
 had done. It would have been easy for Oxenstiern, 
 in forming the League of Heilbronn, to assert the 
 contrary, and possibly to make it good ; yet we hear 
 of no such attempts. 
 
 But if Augsburg was Protestant, it was an island 
 in a Catholic sea. As Gustavus advanced further 
 into Bavaria, his march became more difficult. The 
 next destination was Ingolstadt, the situation of the 
 celebrated Jesuit University. There first he met 
 with a severe repulse. He appeared before the town 
 on the 1 8th of April. It was a maiden fortress, and its 
 defences were in excellent condition. A strong gar- 
 rison under Tilly's nephew was inside, and the Bava- 
 rian army in the immediate neighbourhood, but, after 
 the Swedes had been driven back with great slaughter 
 from a first attack on the outworks, Maximilian, con- 
 fiding in the strength of Ingolstadt, drew off to 
 Regensburg. On the 4th of May the King abandoned 
 the siege. Even Monro found the service before 
 Ingolstadt hotter than to his liking. " At one shot," 
 he says, " I lost twelve men of my own company ; 
 and he that was not that night in that stand afraid of 
 a cannon bullet, might, in my opinion, the next night 
 be made gunpowder of without paine." To fail be- 
 
1632] Bavaria. 249 
 
 fore Ingolstadt, was no doubt a severe check to his 
 victorious career, but if he could draw Wallenstein 
 to fight him before his Junction with the Bavarians, 
 or crush the latter before their junction with Wallen- 
 stein, the resistance of Ingolstadt could matter little. 
 For this purpose his best plan was to overrun Bavaria 
 from end to end. Surely one or other of the two 
 armies would risk a battle to deliver Munich. 
 
 But they did not. Gustavus marched through 
 Landshut, Mosburg, and Freising, and found no or- 
 ganised resistance. On the 7th of May the magis- 
 trates of Munich brought him the keys of their city. 
 To one person in his train at least the entry into the 
 Bavarian capital must have afforded exquisite pleas- 
 ure. Frederick of the Palatinate felt himself avenged 
 for the loss of Heidelberg. And so thought Protes- 
 tant Europe. Bernard of Weimar had penetrated 
 far into the Tyrol, and recruited troops from the 
 Swiss cantons. There were oppressed Protestant 
 peasants even in the hereditary counties of Austria, 
 who woke to life at the news, and sent to beg Gus- 
 tavus to march to their aid. Louis XIII. hesitated 
 to support him longer, and delayed the payment of 
 his subsidies in spite of Richelieu. There is a story, 
 which looks decidedly apocryphal, to the eifect that 
 Richelieu sent to know when the King intended to 
 stop, and that the King haughtily replied : " When 
 my interests demand it." I say apocryphal, because 
 Richelieu's whole wish was that he should not stop, 
 but go on — straight to Vienna. That the conquest 
 of Bavaria was a necessary prelude to that, since 
 Maximilian had refused to agree to the neutrality, 
 Richelieu well knew. 
 
250 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 But Gustavus had other things to do than send 
 haughty messages to allies, or aid insurrectionary 
 Austrian peasants. None knew better than he how 
 the ground was crumbling from under his feet, how 
 much might rest upon the prompt use of a few 
 hours, or the resolute defence of an isolated fortress. 
 While he remained at Munich for twenty-one days, 
 hoping against hope to draw one of the oppos- 
 ing forces southwards, he won golden opinions from 
 every one. As Ranke says, he was in the best sense 
 of the word a " popular " man. He loved to make 
 friends with all classes of people. He walked about 
 the streets of Munich as familiarly and fearlessly as 
 in the streets of Stockholm. Children thronged 
 round him, and he patted their heads and flung 
 pennies to them. The strictest discipline was pre- 
 served among his soldiers (who were nearly all 
 quartered outside the town) ; the Catholic religion 
 was respected everywhere, and the King himself 
 attended high mass on Ascension Day and was 
 there two hours. One enthusiastic monk was so 
 pleased with him, that he fell on his knees before 
 him and implored him to turn CathoHc. The only 
 thing he carried away from Munich was a heavy 
 contribution for the expenses of his army, levied on 
 the town by the magistrates, and a lot of cannons 
 which he had found buried, together with all the 
 mihtary stores that could be discovered. It was a 
 rare example of moderation in that age. From 
 other towns in Bavaria, we have Monro's evidence, 
 that the Swedes carried away considerable plunder 
 in the way of works of art ; " and which was worse 
 
1632] Bavaria. 251 
 
 (wherein his Majesty had neither hand nor direc- 
 tion), many of their houses, dorpes, and castles were 
 burnt to the ground by evil and wicked instruments, 
 that repaid burning with burning, using the Papists 
 at home as they had used the Protestants abroad." 
 
 The toils were fast closing round the Lion of the 
 North. The helpless Frederick began to think it 
 was time to shift for himself before the hard knocks 
 came. He asked Gustavus to restore him at once 
 to his Palatinate, but as Frederick refused to grant 
 toleration to the Lutherans when he should be 
 restored, the King determined to retain that country 
 in his own hands as a pledge until the peace. At 
 the end of May he heard that Ulm was threatened 
 by a detached corps of Wallenstein's soldiers under 
 Ossa. He left Banfer with a strong garrison in 
 Munich, and, with an army now again reduced by 
 garrisons and losses to twenty thousand, he marched 
 backwards through Bavaria to the relief of Ulm. 
 On his way he touched his southernmost point at 
 Memmingen. There he heard still worse news. 
 
 It was from Saxony. The Saxons were running 
 away. There was nothing unusual in that, and Gus- 
 tavus had expected nothing else. But the Elector 
 of Saxony was negotiating also. That was more 
 serious. If John George and Wallenstein came to 
 terms, they could bar his passage to the north. At 
 first the King would not believe that his ally could 
 have played him so false; he knew of Arnim's 
 treachery before he knew of John George's, and in- 
 deed the one considerably preceded the other. We 
 must retrace our steps for a while in order to see 
 
252 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 how things had come to such a pass with the Elec- 
 tor of Saxony. A more perfect example of the 
 way in which a good cause can be betrayed by a 
 fool as well as by a knave has seldom been exhibited. 
 I do not think the Elector of Saxony deliberately 
 wished to destroy Gustavus, much less to destroy 
 Protestantism ; but, as I have said, he found his 
 secondary position intensely galling. He had a 
 firm conviction that his ancestors had gained great 
 advantages by adhering to the Emperor — on one 
 occasion at the expense of their consciences ; and so 
 they had. He forgot the second act of the drama 
 of 1 5 50, namely, that Maurice of Saxony had known 
 when to desert the Emperor as well as when to sup- 
 port him. Side by side with this came the " third 
 party movement," on which Arnim was for ever 
 insisting. We have seen that John George left his 
 troops in Prague in December and retired to Dres- 
 den. That was one distinctly backward step. The 
 next was the meeting at Torgau with the Elector of 
 Brandenburg, which also has been already men- 
 tioned (February 16, 1632). There John George 
 urged on George William the advantage to them- 
 selves of a separate peace with Ferdinand. One 
 feels quite a tenderness for George William, be- 
 cause he refused to be drawn into this negotiation, 
 and, while expressing the opinion that Gustavus 
 ought to go away and think himself happy with a 
 round sum of money, would still not conclude any 
 alliance to his prejudice. 
 
 Gustavus knew of all this, for he kept a resident at 
 the court of Dresden, but when Wallenstein took 
 
1632] Bavaria. 253 
 
 command (definitely in April) of the Imperial army 
 matters got much worse than this. All the three 
 months of his provisional command Wallenstein had 
 spent in working upon Arnim ; by April the latter 
 was fully at his devotion. In those three months 
 too the new Generalissimo had got together an army 
 of forty thousand men, one of the worst and wickedest 
 armies that have ever disgraced Europe — an army of 
 men of all nations, all classes, all religious opinions, 
 drawn together simply by the promise of plunder. 
 It was notorious that tlie Imperial treasury was 
 empty — pay was therefore out of the question. But 
 Wallenstein was the prince of plunderers. As to the 
 pay, as Dalgetty said, " an experienced cavalier might 
 get out of the country the pay whilk he could not 
 obtain from the Emperor." The men who sacked 
 Magdeburg were lambs compared to the men of 
 whom Wallenstein was now at the head. It is there- 
 fore an immense tribute to his severity that he was 
 able to keep them in order during their two months 
 of hardship in the leaguer before Nuremberg. It 
 was done simply by terror. When he now undertook 
 the campaign, as the Emperor's general, he stipulated 
 that the Emperor should never appear in the army ; 
 that he, Wallenstein, should have full power of con- 
 fiscating lands ; and that the Emperor's pardon should 
 have no avail unless confirmed by him. Ferdinand 
 must have been reduced indeed before he accepted 
 such terms. They were terms that inevitably led to 
 the overthrow and death of the General as soon as 
 the Emperor thought that he could dispense with 
 him. 
 
2 54 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 Fortified with this power, and with the treachery 
 of Arnim ready to his hand, Wallenstein advanced 
 against the Saxon posts at Prague and Eger at the 
 beginning of May. Whether he eventually meant 
 to spare Saxony or not, it is not easy to say. AH 
 the time the Elector was writing to Gustavus that he 
 hoped to join him in Southern Bohemia in the sum- 
 mer. But the Saxons were soon in full flight north- 
 wards to their own country ; and it became a question 
 not of the Elector meeting Gustavus half-way, but of 
 whether Gustavus should not at once march north- 
 wards to succour the Elector, or to terrify him into 
 remaining firm to the alliance. On the i ith of May, 
 Wallenstein made direct but secret offers to Arnim. 
 He would take off the Edict of Restitution, as far 
 as regarded Saxony, and the two powers united 
 should make war before Gustavus, as soon as the 
 Emperor should have ratified the terms. For the 
 present, however, Wallenstein declared that he would 
 make a feint of war upon Saxony in order to lull the 
 suspicion of the Jesuits at Vienna. For a feint of 
 war, his measures were somewhat strong. He took 
 Prague and pressed on into Saxony, plundering and 
 burning. This was in order to shew the Elector 
 what to expect if he did not come to instant terms. 
 The Elector hesitated, and thought of the strict 
 discipline which his Swedish ally had maintained on 
 his march through Saxony. " How far it was a 
 spark of honour, how far a dread of the Swedish 
 weapons, that made him hesitate to conclude with 
 Wallenstein, is hard to say," adds Droysen.' To 
 the terror of Arnim, who even went so far as to offer 
 
1632] Bavaria. 255 
 
 to resign his command, John George refused for the 
 present to commit himself. Wallenstein, to whom 
 war was, as an even more high-handed robber than 
 himself once said, " a matter of psychology," 
 left his victim to revolve a while on his uneasy bed, 
 and marched southwards at the end of May. It was 
 just at the time at which Gustavus had resolved to 
 march northwards. On the 9th of June the King of 
 Sweden reached Nuremberg. Bad news met him 
 from every side. His Bavarian conquests were fall- 
 ing away. Pappenheim was preparing to swoop 
 down upon Franconia. Last of all, he learnt that 
 Wallenstein was coming south to join Maximilian. 
 That was not quite such bad news, after all. He 
 would prevent that junction. The Viking's heart 
 rose within the man at the prospect of battle. 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 NUREMBERG. 
 
 HE story draws towards a close, 
 melancholy indeed, but not in any 
 degree less glorious than when Europe first 
 stood amazed at the King's success a year 
 before. For the first time in his life Gustavus 
 seems to have been undecided how to act. 
 He had won his battles and all his successes hitherto 
 by always taking the initiative. Now he seemed 
 unable to do so. He turned hither and thither, un- 
 certain to what point he should direct his forces. He 
 sent orders to all his different corps d'arm^e to join 
 him, and then allowed them to waste time in taking 
 towns on their journey. If one might be permitted 
 the use of such an expression, he seems to " have 
 lost his head." 
 
 The Bavarian army lay along the northern bank of 
 the Danube close to Regensburg at the beginning of 
 June, when Wallenstein broke up from his first inroad 
 into Saxony. Gustavus saw at once the importance 
 of preventing a junction between his foes. He made 
 a rapid dash out of the Nuremberg country into the 
 Upper Palatinate, and cut off all the direct roads 
 256 
 
1632] Nuremberg. 257 
 
 between the two armies. But Maximilian had dis- 
 played unwonted swiftness, and had by a flank 
 movement brought his advanced guard as far as 
 Weiben on the 14th of June. There the advanced 
 guard of Wallenstein was ready to join him. "All 
 in thunder and light, all in fire and tempest, he takes 
 and destroys the Prince Palatine's dominions, and the 
 poor Protestant towns before him," says the Swedish 
 Intelligencer. Onwards straight upon Nuremberg. 
 It was not to save the Duke of Bavaria, who could 
 have been but ill pleased at Wallenstein's ravages in 
 a country which for ten years he had held and 
 believed to be his own, but to fight Gustavus, or to 
 drive him out of Germany, that the Generalissimo was 
 Coming. He had now sixty-five thousand troops at 
 his back — troops, it is true, little used as yet to the 
 serious operations of war, but admirably officered, 
 and well in hand where actual business was likely to 
 be going forward. Before such an army as this the 
 King of Sweden, who had yet but eighteen thousand 
 men at the most, retired again upon Nuremberg. 
 There he finally resolved to take his stand. 
 
 The odds seemed almost hopeless, but Nuremberg 
 was a splendidly fortified city, and thoroughly de- 
 voted to the cause. Gustavus had solemnly pledged 
 his word to stand or fall with it. Now the destroyer 
 had come, breathing terrible threats against the 
 Nurembergers for the active assistance they had ren- 
 dered to the " enemy of Germany." Whatever were 
 the cost the King of Sweden must abide the fate of 
 his faithful ally. 
 
 One can see in a moment that, from a military 
 
258 Gustavus Adolphus. ti632 
 
 point of view, his really best course would have been 
 to fall back upon Wiirzburg or Mainz, or the Lower 
 Main and Upper Rhine. With Bernard of Weimar in 
 Swabia on his right, and Oxenstiern in the Palatinate 
 on his left, he might himself have formed the apex 
 of an irresistible triangle at Wiirzburg, and drawn 
 supplies from his two bases. The only army that 
 could have in any way troubled him, except Wallen- 
 stein's, would then have been the small one which 
 Pappenheim was collecting in Lower Saxony, where 
 a desultory war was going on on the Weser between 
 that general and Tott. For once Gustavus had 
 quitted Bavaria, and sacrificed Nuremberg to his 
 enemies, it was not likely that Maximilian would be 
 very forward to hurl himself against Franconia. His 
 was mainly a local patriotism. And of Wallenstein 
 without Maximilian, Gustavus could not have 
 doubted to render a good account, as soon as he 
 could draw all his forces to a head from Swabia and 
 the Palatinate. Wallenstein's army once annihilated, 
 it would take the Emperor a long time to get an- 
 other, and he would probably prefer to listen to con- 
 ditions of peace. 
 
 But victory crowned with peace would have been 
 purchased all too dearly by the surrender of such a 
 city, the sacrifice of such an ally as Nuremberg. As 
 soon as he knew that Wallenstein was advancing 
 against it, Gustavus's hesitation was gone. He called 
 at once all his reinforcements, Oxenstiern from the 
 Rhine, Bernard from Swabia, Banfer from Donau- 
 worth, William of Hesse, and William of Weimar. 
 Then he prepared to make the defence of Nurem- 
 
1632] Nuremberg. 259 
 
 berg an epoch in the war. He had already sent his 
 chief engineer to the city to begin additional fortifi- 
 cations. On June 19th he visited the town in person, 
 and arranged that his camp should be supplied with 
 14,000 pounds of bread per diem. On the 23d the 
 whole of his army was ready to take up the work 
 of fortification, which they found already half done. 
 The Nurembergers were indeed most forward in the 
 matter ; within fourteen days the whole city was 
 surrounded with an entirely new ring of earthworks 
 on the most approved Swedish pattern. Soldiers, 
 burghers, peasants, and even women vied with each 
 other in the good work. The city of Nuremberg is 
 of an oval shape, with the river Pegnitz — a tributary 
 of a tributary of the Main — running through it from 
 east to west. The principal situation of the Swedish 
 camp was towards the south and west ; and the 
 works were strongest upon the south, for the King 
 suspected (as turned out to be the truth) that the 
 enemy was likely to encamp upon the hills, which 
 face that side of the city, and which are divided from 
 it by a plain of about four miles across. At the bot- 
 tom of the hills the little river Rednitz flows to join 
 the Pegnitz some way below Furth. The moat round 
 the whole of the Swedish entrenchments was twelve 
 feet wide and eight deep. Over 300 cannon, partly 
 Swedish, partly out of the arsenal of Nuremberg, 
 and not a few from the arsenal at Munich, defended 
 the whole circuit. The spirits of the Nurembergers 
 were high ; all men between eighteen and fifty were 
 enrolled in the new army, which, though of little use 
 in open field, was of great service in defending the 
 
26o Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 entrenchments, and which reached the respectable 
 total of 7,800 men. 
 
 Provisions were at first in plenty, though a fearful 
 strain soon fell upon the resources of the city, owing 
 to the number of peasants who had fled in from the 
 country. The greatest anxiety was about the defi- 
 ciency of forage for the horses. 
 
 The fortifications were not quite finished when 
 Wallenstein's gigantic army appeared, somewhere 
 about 65,000 to 70,000 strong. Gallas and Aldringer, 
 Hoick and Sparre, Piccolomini, and almost all the 
 ofificers of his former army were in his train. He 
 advanced to the south-western end of the hills, which 
 I have just mentioned, and began to take up his 
 position on them between Stein and Furth. Had 
 he listened to Maximilian he would have attacked 
 Gustavus at once, and indeed the latter expected 
 and hoped that he would. But Wallenstein knew 
 that his troops were not yet of a calibre to cope with 
 the veterans of the King, and he told Maximilian 
 plainly that he meant to shew Gustavus a different 
 fashion of making war. At first Wallenstein's idea 
 seems to have been to compel his enemy not to 
 make war at all, but to make peace. Gradually this 
 changed into a design to starve him out. By cre- 
 ating a great entrenched camp to the south-west of 
 Nuremberg he would cut the King off from his 
 bases of supplies in the upper Danube and Rhine, 
 while his Croats would be able to scour all the roads 
 leading into Franconia.' The camp that he now 
 laid out could not compare in regularity or skilful 
 fortification with that of the Swedes ; but of this 
 
1632] Nuremberg. 261 
 
 there was no need, as the hills themselves formed 
 the best possible natural entrenchment. " He is 
 none of the best spademen," says the Swedish In- 
 telligencer, " nor had he any good engineers with 
 him. Some of his quarters were but slight ones, a 
 little earth cast up, and barricadoed with wagons, 
 trees, and other encumbrements." Such as it was 
 this vast camp was nearly eight miles round, and 
 took in two- or three whole villages. It was divided 
 into two halves by the stream of the Bibert flowing 
 to join the Rednitz at the foot of the hills. On the 
 northernmost point, where the hill is at its highest, 
 the outwork was an old ruined chiteau, called the 
 "Burgstall," or " Alte Veste," hidden in a deep 
 wood, through which avenues were now cut for the 
 passage of the defenders. The whole of the front 
 was lined with cannon. Vainly did the Swedes try 
 to hinder the fortification of this commanding emi- 
 nence ; Wallenstein had broken down all the bridges 
 over the Rednitz, and his cannons were too near for 
 any attempt to repair them. 
 
 There the Imperial general sat — affecting great 
 privacy and retirement in his pavilion when he 
 pleased, and making very little of any advice which 
 Maximilian thought fit to give him. The strictest 
 severity reigned within the camp. " Hang the beast 
 (that is his word) that obeys not with a servile 
 celerity," says the Intelligencer. He had one im- 
 mense advantage over Gustavus in the possession 
 of an eiTective light cavalry in the Croats.* " That 
 
 * It may be remembered what an immense advantage Austria en- 
 joyed over Frederick the Great in the later Seven Years' War from the 
 possession of this same light horse^^^ 
 
262 Gustavus Adolphus. 11632 
 
 which most troubled both armies was want of straw 
 and horse-meat," and at procuring this and all other 
 kind of provisions the Croats were famous. " They 
 are the ranke riders and common harryers of the 
 Imperial army, they are not troubled with an eighth 
 commandment " ; and Gustavus had nothing to 
 oppose to their nocturnal raids. Hence throughout 
 most of the two months during which these two 
 famous generals sat glaring at each othfer, with the 
 eyes of Europe fixed upon them, Wallenstein's 
 success in skirmishes and in the collection of forage 
 was the greater. Soon the pinch of hunger began to 
 be felt : first in the city of Nuremberg, then in the 
 Swedish, lastly in the Imperial camp. The city 
 bakers, of whom there were one hundred and thirty- 
 eight, were unable to supply bread fast enough. 
 The mills (outside the town for the most part) were 
 unable to grind fast enough. Men fought in the 
 streets outside the bakers' shops for their pittance. 
 The town council adopted the expedient of fixing the 
 price of provisions — all to no purpose. The horses 
 starved first, and dying, infected the air. Pestilence 
 always follows on hunger, and pestilence in July in a 
 mediaeval town, crowded for the nonce with double 
 its normal population, is a fearful thing to contem- 
 plate. Every hospital and lazar-house was full : the 
 graves could hardly be made fast enough to hold the 
 dead. Altogether 29,000 human beings died in 
 Nuremberg and in the two camps in the year 1632. 
 
 In the camps too the dead horses proved a serious 
 inconvenience. Monro tells of many " cavaliers that 
 were fain to go afoot." Even the King of Bohemia 
 
ALBERT VOK WALLENSTEIN. 
 Duke of Friedland and Mecklenburg. 
 
1632] Nuremberg. 263 
 
 was " troubled of a flux." And worse than famine 
 or pestilence, came breaches of discipline in the 
 Swedish camp. The King's oration to his soldiers 
 is famous. It was on the occasion of a complaint of 
 the citizens that pillage was becoming the order of 
 the day with his men. " It is rumoured," he said, 
 " that the Swedes are as bad as the Imperialists, but 
 I know better. They are no Swedes that commit 
 these crimes," (and Monro was witness to this also), 
 " but you Germans yourselves. Had I known that 
 you had been a people so wanting in natural affec- 
 tion for your own country, I would never have 
 saddled a horse for your sakes, much less imperilled 
 my life and my crown and my brave Swedes and 
 Finns. I came but to restore every man to his own, 
 but this most accursed and devilish robbing of yours 
 doth much abate my purpose. I have not enriched 
 myself so much as by one pair of boots, since my 
 coming to Germany, though I have had forty tons of 
 gold passing through my hands. By such means as 
 you are now employing, victory will never be won." 
 This speech he followed up by some executions of 
 ringleaders, and a proclamation, " That if, as he 
 heard was rumoured, the Germans should mutiny 
 against his just severity, he with his Swedes and 
 Finlanders would ' undertake to rattle them so that 
 the very shivers of their staves should fly about their 
 ears.' " 
 
 A peasant complained that a soldier had stolen his 
 cow : " My son," said the King, as the soldier pleaded 
 for life, "it is better that I should now punish 
 thee, than that the wrath of God for thy misdeeds, 
 
264 Gustavus Adolphris. [1632 
 
 and his Judgments should fall on me and thee and all 
 of us here present." 
 
 Wallenstein's contempt of human life and human 
 suffering stood him in good stead during that awful 
 time. It was well known in the Swedish camp that 
 the Imperialists were no better off than themselves. 
 It gradually became a contest, who should endure 
 starvation the longest. Gustavus at last fully re- 
 solved, that as soon as his entire reinforcements 
 should arrive, he would try and storm the camp on 
 the hills. These reinforcements yet tarried. It 
 seemed to Oxenstiern a great pity to have to leave 
 the Rhenish campaign, and probably lose all its 
 fruits. He had penetrated far into Alsace, while 
 Gustavus was in Bavaria, but fortune had not been 
 altogether favourable to the Swedes. Speyer in the 
 Palatinate had capitulated shamefully, and Gustavus 
 had the commandant beheaded for cowardice. Horn, 
 ■who had come from the Main to join Oxenstiern at 
 the end of June, had somewhat restored the state of 
 things, and had pressed northwards as far as Cob- 
 lentz, which he took. But then came the King's 
 order to hurry on with all available speed to Nurem- 
 berg. 
 
 During the terrible tedium of these two months 
 Gustavus's restless brain had not been idle. It was 
 from the Nuremberg patricians that he had first 
 learnt to set a true value upon the South German 
 Protestants and their constancy. It was upon his 
 second, and (this) his third visit to Nuremberg, that 
 he sketched out in common with them his great 
 plan for the future defence of German Protestant- 
 
1632] Nuremberg. 265 
 
 ism. The scheme of a " Corpus Evangelicorum " 
 was to be presented to the Emperor as one of the 
 necessary articles of a general peace. In form it 
 was to be a great evangelical confederation — of both 
 confessions — under the presidency of the King of 
 Sweden, who would be bound to come to help them 
 in time of need. For this purpose, and as security 
 for Sweden herself, she was to possess, as a full 
 member of the Empire, the port of Wismar and the 
 duchy of Pomerania. Brandenburg was to be in- 
 demnified for its claims upon the latter with a por- 
 tion of Silesia, Saxony was to have Bohemia or 
 Lusatia, Hesse Cassel and Weimar were also to 
 share in the spoils of the Hapsburgs, upon whom — 
 and justly — all the cost of the war was to fall. It 
 was a statesmanlike scheme, but, as I have said be- 
 fore in speaking of a very similar proposal, it took 
 no account of German patriotism. It is true there 
 was no need to take account of such a thing at the 
 time, for it hardly existed. But it might come into 
 existence, and, if it ever should, Sweden would be 
 the first object of its vengeance. What if it should 
 arise in the now despised and sleepy house of Hdhen- 
 zollern ? 
 
 Gradually from the three principal sources of re- 
 inforcement, Oxenstiern, Banfer, and Duke Bernard 
 drew together towards Nuremberg, and Hesse and 
 William of Weimar approached from the north 
 towards the end of July. Not till the 12th of August 
 was the conjunction of all the troops effected; 
 Gustavus then found himself at the head of fifty 
 thousand men. Vainly he hoped that Wallenstein 
 
266 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 would have attempted to hinder the junction, but 
 Wallenstein sat still. It seemed to be against all 
 the rules of warfare to do so ; the Swedes began to 
 think that the man was bewitched. 
 
 In one respect the addition of thirty-five thousand 
 men made Gustavus's position still more difficult than 
 before. How he contrived to feed them for fourteen 
 days more remains a mystery. He found himself 
 obliged to force on an action for sheer want of food. 
 On August 2 1 St he rose from his camp under the 
 walls, and, advancing northwards by Furth, crossed 
 the Rednitz. Under the very eyes of Wallenstein's 
 northern outposts, under the Alte Veste itself, he 
 began to form another camp. Wallenstein let him 
 form it unhindered, but drew all his own forces to- 
 gether into the northern corner of his entrenchments. 
 The movement in the Imperialist camp made Gusta- 
 vus think that Wallenstein had thrown up the game 
 and was retiring. On the 22d "spying in the 
 morning with his perspective from one of his new 
 batteries a gallant cavalier mounted and prancing 
 before his comrades,— ' that surely,' said the King, 
 'should be either Wallenstein or Aldringer, and 
 have at him.' Causing a piece to be traversed and 
 bent full upon him, the King took his level and 
 bade give fire to it. Up into the air flew the Cava- 
 lier, horse and man, but it proved to be but a colo- 
 nell." Thus disappointed of his man the King on the 
 24th ordered a general assault upon the Alte Veste, 
 and all along the northern side of the camp. It 
 was obviously to be an infantry battle, for no cavalry 
 could charge up that rough and broken hill. Aldrin- 
 
1632] Nuremberg. 267 
 
 ger and Wallenstein himself were in command upon 
 that corner of the position. Twelve hours long the 
 Swedes stormed with undaunted courage against 
 fearful odds and with fearful losses. Bernard, on 
 the extreme right, made good his hold upon one 
 little sconce, and held it all night. On the left Gus- 
 tavus himself was in the thickest of the fight, drag- 
 ging the cannon to convenient spots, and pointing 
 them with his own hands. Three times the Swedes 
 got actual footing in the Burgstall itself. Three 
 times Aldringer hurled them out again. Had they 
 once held that spot for a few hours and been able to 
 bring their cannon up, they could have raked Wal- 
 lenstein's position from end to end. All night long 
 the cannon had roared on both sides. With the 
 early August dawn it began to rain, and the slippery 
 turf could no longer afford foothold for the attack. 
 At ten o'clock Wallenstein with a last charge drove 
 out the gallant Duke of Weimar, and the battle was 
 lost. The Swedes had left over four thousand dead 
 upon the slopes. Torstenson was taken prisoner, 
 Banfer wounded, the King had his boot sole shot 
 away, Bernard's horse had been killed under him. 
 Even the icy Wallenstein confessed to the Emperor 
 that there had been a hot battle. The prisoners 
 assured the King of Sweden that Wallenstein's am- 
 munition must have failed, could the cannonade from 
 below have been kept up but another two hours. 
 
 In truth, to anyone who examines the ground, it 
 would seem to have been a well-nigh impossible 
 enterprise. It was only sheer necessity that com- 
 pelled Gustavus to attempt it. Hepburn, the bravest 
 
268 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 of the Scots leaders, told the King he would follow 
 or lead wherever he was ordered, but that he held 
 it to be impossible. The King had no doubt relied 
 too much upon the reports that Wallenstein was 
 breaking up, but his adversary seemed as unmoved 
 after the battle as before it : he courteously parleyed 
 for an exchange of prisoners, and Torstenson was 
 able to return to the command of the Swedish 
 artillery. For a few days Gustavus seemed de- 
 termined to stay and see the matter out beside his 
 faithful Nuremberg. But knowing that Wallenstein 
 was now in no condition to attempt a siege, he at 
 last decided with a heavy heart to draw away. On 
 the 8th of September, leaving Oxenstiern with the 
 direction of the war and old General Kniphausen with 
 a strong garrison of four thousand picked troops to 
 defend the city, he marched off with drums beating 
 and colours flying, right under his adversaries' camp. 
 His adversary never moved. But on the I2th a row 
 of blazing villages- round Nuremberg told the fam- 
 ished citizens that their enemy was gone. The fight 
 round the Alte Veste had probably been little less 
 disastrous to him than to the Swedes. But in the 
 contest of starvation Wallenstein had been the 
 victor, because he had starved for three days longer 
 than the King. And this victory had put the game 
 into his hands. 
 
CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 LUTZEN. 
 
 ''ALLENSTEIN'S letters are not, as a 
 rule, authorities to which one can 
 trust, but his despatch to the Emperor 
 dated the 8th September, the day of 
 Gustavus's retreat, fairly expresses his view of the 
 situation. "The King lay 14 days at Fiirth, and 
 now having lost nearly one-third of his army from 
 hunger and discomfort, has to-day departed, whither 
 I cannot learn. For military reasons I should imagine 
 that he would betake himself to the Main. I mean 
 at all events to follow him, and again fix my camp 
 close to his, until I have fully consumed him. I 
 hear that Pappenheim is coming this way too, so 
 that we shall probably enclose the King from both 
 sides. ... I did not follow him, first because 
 my cavalry was too scattered to do so, secondly 
 because he is sure to beset all the passes in his rear, 
 thirdly because I did not wish to risk the fruits I 
 have won. For I believe that the King's course is 
 already downwards, that he has completely lost 
 credit, and that he will be utterly done for as soon 
 as Pappenheim arrives." 
 
270 Gustavus Adolphus. W&Zi 
 
 It was then Wallenstein's intention to follow up 
 the King, whom he rightly believed to be anxious 
 to make for the north, both to shield Saxony and 
 to get nearer to the sea-coasts. But the King's 
 courage returned when he found himself free ; once 
 more the initiative was open to him, and for a 
 moment he conceived the brilliant plan of dividing 
 his army so that while sending a strong detachment 
 under Bernard to protect John George, he could 
 himself advance into the hereditary countries. This 
 was Oxenstiern's advice and Bernard's too. It 
 would probably have the effect of drawing Wallen- 
 stein to Austria, and this time the King would find 
 some means of attacking him in the open field. More- 
 over, it would certainly have the effect of dividing 
 Maximilian from the Imperial army, for the former 
 would hasten back for the defence of Bavaria, through 
 which Gustavus's way would first lie. 
 
 Part of this plan the King did actually carry out. 
 He had, after breaking up from Nuremberg, advanced 
 some few days' march towards the north-west. He 
 now left Bernard with some 8,000 men in Franconia, 
 with orders to advance northwards parallel with the 
 enemy and observe his motions. He sent the regt 
 of the troops back to their garrisons, and with not 
 more than 10,000 himself, recrossed the Danube and 
 the Lech and proceeded towards Ingolstadt. Wal- 
 lenstein, rejoiced to find his hands free, gave up his 
 plan of following Gustavus, and, laughing at the 
 request of Maxiinilian that he would accompany 
 him to help in the defence of Bavaria, determined to 
 carry out his deferred plan of attack on Saxony. 
 
1632] ' Lutzen. 271 
 
 Maximilian, with an army reduced by the privations 
 of the camp to some 14,000, hastened to secure 
 Regensburg. Thus both armies were divided. 
 
 It must be remembered that, although a decisive 
 check had been put to Gustavus's victorious career, 
 the Swedish arms were still everywhere on the 
 advance — nothing had as yet been actually lost. 
 Arnim was still in command of a good 20,000 men 
 on the north-east, and Arnim's master still nominally 
 in alliance with the King of Sweden. Horn, who 
 had been left behind in command of a very small 
 force on the Rhine, when Oxenstiern came to 
 Nuremberg in July, had done wonders all up the 
 left bank of the river and in Alsace, and had even 
 possessed himself of Strasburg, then a free Imperial 
 city. The Spaniards and Lorrainers had fled before 
 him, and were nearly driven out of Germany. Pap- 
 penheim and Tott were carrying on a war on about 
 equal terms on the Weser, but the Swedes had got 
 fast foot in the Archbishopric of Bremen. If once 
 Gustavus could beat Wallenstein in the open field, 
 the reaction which both of them saw approaching 
 would be stopped. 
 
 When Wallenstein marched upon Schweinfurt 
 after the separation from Maximilian, Bernard with 
 his little army hurried to the defence of the city, and 
 Wallenstein retired before a corps of half his own 
 numbers. Bernard rendered inestimable service to 
 Gustavus by besetting all the passes through the 
 Thuringian forests, and thus saving Erfurt, for Wal- 
 lenstein would probably have preferred to direct his 
 main body that way, in order to cut off Gustavus 
 
272 Gustavus Adolphus. 11632 
 
 from being able to follow him. But, finding this now 
 impossible, Wallenstein, who, if not a great general 
 in battle, was at least a complete master of the wait- 
 ing game, prepared the way into Saxony by sending 
 forward by a more eastern route Colonel Hoick with 
 the wildest of the Croats, and, while writing hypo- 
 critical instructions to spare the peasantry, made no 
 secret that it was his pleasure that the land should 
 be thoroughly destroyed and wasted. His maxim 
 ever was not to commit himself on paper. He wrote 
 also urgently to Pappenheim to join him in Franco- 
 nia, or at least in Saxony. Pappenheim, though 
 closely /?'/ with Wallenstein, was unwilling, after hav- 
 ing been for some time under no command but his 
 own, to come ; but perceiving the importance of the 
 crisis, he did eventually effect a junction with the 
 Generalissimo at Merseburg a few days before Gus- 
 tavus arrived in Saxony (Oct. 2 1st). 
 
 All this came upon Gustavus quite suddenly. He 
 had reckoned that Wallenstein would surely detach 
 at least part of his troops for the probable event of 
 the defence of Austria. He was just preparing to 
 advance to the siege of Ingolstadt (Oct. 8th), when a 
 courier from Oxenstiern brought the news that the 
 Imperialist main army, twenty thousand strong, had 
 crossed the Saxon frontier on the 5 th. His resolu- 
 tion was instantly taken. He would retire from Ba- 
 varia and Franconia, leaving strong garrisons every- 
 where, cross Thuringia and concentrate at Erfurt. 
 This was no sooner resolved than the execution of it 
 began. He left Bavaria on the 8th, on the loth he 
 was at Nordlingen, on the 12th he turned aside with 
 
1632] Liltzen. 273 
 
 a small detachment of guards to Naumburg, where 
 he picked up Kniphausen and Oxenstiern, sending 
 the army on in advance. On their march through the 
 Thuringian forest (22d and 23d) he communicated to 
 his trusted chancellor, as if with a presentiment of 
 approaching death, his plans for the continuance of 
 the war, in which he, Oxenstiern, was to be the legate 
 of the crown of Sweden, and to bind faster the bonds 
 between it and the South German Protestants. But 
 even more than with the great cause, in these last 
 days, the King's thoughts were with his dear native 
 land, and the little helpless maid who was to inherit 
 the burden of his crown. It was now that he 
 sketched out the form of government which he 
 wished to have established during her minority, 
 which form, practically unmodified, Oxenstiern after- 
 wards presented to the Swedish Estates as the con- 
 stitution of 1634. On the 23d Bernard joined the 
 King. Each had about six thousand foot, and be- 
 tween them they had about seven thousand five hun- 
 dred horse. These numbers were only afterwards 
 diminished by small garrisons, left at Naumburg and 
 Weissenfels, and this may therefore be taken to have 
 been the King's efTective strength at the battle of 
 Liitzen. On October 28th the army was at Erfurt, 
 having marched from Bavaria in eighteen days. 
 Wallenstein was amazed when he heard of such 
 speed. " The Swedes came as if they had flown." 
 Bernard, who had not been pleased that Gustavus 
 had not left him the honour of attempting the deliv- 
 erance of Saxony, was fully reconciled before they 
 left Erfurt. At Erfurt he met his Queen, and after 
 
2 74 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 a hasty supper spent the night in writing despatches, 
 and prepared to start for the Saale the next morning. 
 The market-place was thronged with crowds of peo- 
 ple, who hailed him with cries of joy and triumph. 
 But he felt that his days of triumph were over. 
 " Think not of me," he replied to them, " for I am 
 nothing but a weak and dying man. Think only of 
 the cause." After a tender adieu to his Queen and 
 to Oxenstiern, and a charge to the garrison of Erfurt 
 to stand by them in case of his defeat, he rode after 
 his troops, who were already on the march. On Oc- 
 tober 31st he reached the Saale, and began to en- 
 trench himself at the little town of Naumburg, on the 
 right bank of the river. From thence he wrote 
 urgent letters to the Duke of Brunswick-Luneburg 
 and the Elector of Saxony bidding them hasten 
 to join him. 
 
 In the meantime Wallenstein had advanced in 
 more leisurely fashion by the valley of the Mulde as 
 far as Leipzig. He had taken Merseburg and Weis- 
 senfels and effected his junction with Pappenheim. 
 On the same day, October 21st, he sent to summon 
 the city of Leipzig to surrender. Leipzig, as in Sep- 
 tember of the previous year, was inclined to hold 
 out, but gave way before a day's bombardment. In 
 the last ten days of the month of October the Impe- 
 rialists spread over the whole country between the 
 Elbe and the Saale. Vainly, however, had they at- 
 tempted to possess themselves of Naumburg ; Gusta- 
 vus had been too quick for them. The inhabitants 
 of the town came out and flung themselves on their 
 knees before their deliverer, for the ravages of the 
 
1632] Lutzen. 275 
 
 Croats had barely left a village standing wherever 
 they had come. " Ah," said the King to the Naum- 
 burgers, " now you honour me like a God, and God 
 will surely punish me for receiving such adoration. 
 Vet I hope that He, who knows that I take no 
 delight in such honour, will not suffer my work to 
 fail whatever becomes of me, seeing it is for the 
 glory of His Holy Name." 
 
 Wallenstein was preparing to march upon Dresden 
 when he learnt the news that Gustavus was at Erfurt. 
 He determined to repeat the proceedings of the sum- 
 mer, and entrench himself over against the King. 
 At first he selected Weissenfels, at a distance of 
 about ten miles from Naumburg, for this purpose. 
 Everything seemed to promise the Imperialists 
 that no further attack would be made by the 
 Swedes that winter. The first days of November 
 were suddenly and surprisingly cold, so cold that 
 Gustavus even moved some of his troops out of their 
 camp into nightly billets in the town of Naumburg. 
 This confirmed Wallenstein's idea that he did not 
 mean fighting this year. Consequently he allowed 
 Pappenheim, at the latter's urgent request, to march 
 away again to the Weser and Lower Rhine, where 
 his presence was indispensably necessary for the 
 preservation of the Electorate of Cologne, which 
 was threatened by the Swedish general, Baudissin. 
 Pappenheim was to take some eight thousand troops 
 with him, and to possess himself of Halle on the way. 
 This left Wallenstein with about twenty-five thousand 
 men, and he was determined to shift his quarters a 
 few miles further down the Saale. Leaving Colloredo 
 
276 Gustavus Adolphus. ti632 
 
 with five thousand men to watch the enemy he slowly 
 withdrew toward Lutzen. On the 4th* of November 
 news was brought to Gustavus of these events, the 
 depgirture of Pappenheim, and the retrograde move- 
 ment of the main body of the enemy. The King 
 called for Bernard of Weimar and Kniphausen. 
 " Fight," said the gallant Bernard — it was always 
 his advice — "Wait," said Kniphausen, an equally 
 valiant but rather unlucky old general, in whom 
 however the King reposed the greatest confidence, 
 as is witnessed by the long series of letters which he 
 addressed to him during the campaign, — " Wait until 
 Brunswick and Saxony come up." The King might 
 have waited long for such an event. How Duke 
 George of Brunswick-Luneburg excused himself we 
 do not know ; we know that the Elector replied that 
 he was " so deeply sensible of the importance of the 
 occasion, that he would send two regiments to join 
 the King at once. The rest he wanted for the main- 
 tenance of his own fortresses." So wrote John 
 George on the 6th. Fifteen hundred Saxons ; that 
 was to be his contribution to the army of the man 
 who had thrown up the fairest prospects of victory 
 and peace, and who was now risking his own troops 
 and his own life against considerable odds for the 
 defence of Saxony. But before the letter of the 
 Elector — much more before the fifteen hundred men 
 — had left the Saxon camp, all was over on the plain 
 of Lutzen. On the evening of that council the news 
 that Wallenstein's new cantonments were even more 
 dispersed than was at first believed decided the King, 
 who had rather leant to Kniphausen's view, to adopt 
 
 * Old style. 
 
1632] Lutzen. 277 
 
 Bernard's in preference. To wait for the Saxons 
 was to let Wallenstein wait for Pappenheim ; it was 
 better to attack at once, for the absence of Pappen- 
 heim was worth more than the presence of many- 
 thousand Saxons. At four o'clock on the morning 
 of the 5th, therefore, the King's army advanced tow- 
 ards Weissenfels, still hoping that the Saxons, who 
 were no further off than Torgau, might come to his 
 assistance. Colloredo from the lofty castle at Weis- 
 senfels perceived that there was something moving 
 through the November mist. At ten o'clock Wallen- 
 stein was amazed to hear three cannon shots, which had 
 been Colloredo's preconcerted signal that the enemy 
 was advancing, booming from the southwards. In 
 the greatest haste he wrote off to Pappenheim, who 
 was but two days' march away : " The enemy is ad- 
 vancing. Sir, let everything else be, and hurry with 
 all your forces and artillery back to me. You must be 
 here by to-morrow morning — ^he is already over the 
 pass." This letter, drenched in Pappenheim's blood is 
 still to be seen at Vienna — he had carried it into the 
 battle in his breast. The pass referred to is the pass 
 over the Rippach, a little tributary of the Saale 
 between Weissenfels and Lutzen, which was beset 
 by Croats, whom the Swedes had hurled back with- 
 out much difficulty. But the distance was greater 
 than the King had been led to believe, and the 
 darkness fell before the Swedes could get far enough 
 to do more than skirmish with Wallenstein's out- 
 posts. Two hours more daylight would indeed have 
 delivered the enemy into Gustavus's hands. It was 
 not till late at night that all Wallenstein's regiments 
 
278 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 could be gathered together ; man by man they fell 
 into their places in order of battle as they arrived. 
 And so both armies passed the bitter winter night 
 facing each other, " every regiment lying down in 
 the same order that they had marched, with their 
 arms by them." The King of Sweden slept in his 
 field coach with Bernard and Kniphausen. 
 
 Between the armies lay a flat plain, one of the 
 flattest in Northern Saxony. The road from Lutzen 
 to Leipzig divided it in two, and this road is still 
 bordered on both sides by ditches, which do not 
 then seem to have contained much water. Wallen- 
 stein's spademen were labouring all night at deepen- 
 ing these ditches, and they were then lined with 
 musketeers. These ditches communicate with a 
 canal called the Flossgraben, which sweeps round 
 the eastern side of Lutzen to the south, and there 
 joins another canal, called the Muhlgraben, which 
 runs north and south through the town itself. These 
 canals connect the Saale with its own tributary, the 
 Elster. Probably all the ditches were small enough 
 for cavalry to jump and for infantry to scramble 
 through, for the Swedes crossed and recrossed them 
 many times on that bloody day. Even the Floss- 
 graben was easily wad cable. But it is obvious that 
 irregularities like these afforded the greatest ad- 
 vantage to the slow-moving, heavy-armed troops of 
 the Imperialists, and a corresponding disadvantage 
 to the Swedes — the attacking party, — the essence of 
 whose attack lay in its swiftness. Just as the hedge 
 at Naseby, lined with Okey's dragoons, enabled 
 Fairfax to break the Royalist charge, so the Leipzig- 
 
'632] Lutzen. 2 79 
 
 road ditches, lined with musketeers, enabled Wallen- 
 stein to keep in check the left wing and centre of 
 the Swedish advance. Wallenstein's position was 
 northwards of this high-road to Leipzig, his right 
 resting on the town of Lutzen, where a slight rise 
 and some windmills afforded him a good natural 
 position for nine pieces of heavy ordnance, and his 
 left was towards the Flossgraben. The general 
 arrangement of the "battle" and wings of the two 
 armies was the same as at Breitenfeld in the previous 
 year.* Weight and mobility were again arrayed 
 against each other, the one-line system against the 
 two-line-and-reserve system. But this time the rela- 
 tive numbers of the two armies were reversed. 
 Gustavus had about 18,000 men, Wallenstein 25,000 ; 
 and the latter expected other 8,000 or 10,000 to 
 arrive, with Pappenheim, at every moment. When 
 
 * I follow the Swedish Intelligencer, Droysen, Arkenholtz, and 
 Geijer in representing Wallenstein as having only one line, in prefer- 
 ence to Gualdo, the French writers, and Forster, whose account is 
 apparently based upon i plan for ordering the battle (in three lines) 
 drawn in Wallenstein's own hand, but perhaps not carried out. 
 There is, however, great diversity of evidence and greater discrepan- 
 cies in the account of this battle than in that of any other of the 
 battles of the war. For instance, it is impossible to determine 
 whether or no Pappenheim was killed before the King, or whether he 
 even reached the battle-field before the King's death. One of the 
 most interesting accounts of the battle is a letter from George Fleet- 
 wood to his father in England, written at Stettin on November 22d. 
 It was published in the first volume of the " Camden Miscellany." 
 He adds fresh doubts by saying that it was the heavy guns by the 
 windmills, not the seven pieces in front of the Imperialist line, that 
 were so often taken and retaken. He says that Gustavus was killed 
 between ii and 12 o'clock, and that the battle lasted till 5 o'clock. 
 He hints at the treason of the Duke of Saxe Lauenburg, and says 
 
28o Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 Pappenheim should come he was to take command 
 of the cuirassiers on the left wing, Hoick and Picco- 
 lomini being temporarily placed at their head. 
 Wallenstein himself — carried in a litter, for he could 
 not ride, owing to the gout — was in command of the 
 centre. On the right it is admitted that Wallenstein 
 had taken a leaf out of the Swedish book, and 
 interspersed his cavalry with parties of musketeers. 
 This vi^s probably owing to the nature of the 
 ground, intersected with low garden walls, which 
 afforded good cover for sharpshooters. This wing 
 was commanded by Colloredo. On the extremity 
 of both wings were large parties of Croats. In the 
 first line of the Swedish centre were four half 
 brigades of infantry under Count Nils Brahe, the 
 only Swede besides the King who filled a prominent 
 post that day. Bernard had the left wing of horse, 
 
 that the King had false intelligence the day before the battle. The 
 best case made out for Wallenstein's having two lines is in a pamphlet 
 published in 1832, at Berlin, by von Vincke. Droysen, who, in the 
 Munich " Forschungen zur Deutsche Geschichte," V., wrote an article 
 about the battle, concludes finally that all the contemporary records 
 and broadsheets about the arrangement of the two armies are 
 worthless. Battles in those days were fought absolutely indepen- 
 dently of "terrain." Neither Wallenstein's plan nor Gustavus's own, 
 which is preserved in the archives at Stockholm, give the least 
 indication that they were more than suggestions, and Wallenstein's 
 he inclines to think, is a mere catalogue of regiments. That Wallen- 
 stein had some sort of a reserve appears more from the account of one 
 of his officers, Diodati, who was present, than from any satisfactory 
 plan of the battle which we possess. This has led Droysen to say, 
 in his large work, that the arrangement of the two armies was 
 apparently not substantially different from that adopted at Breiten- 
 feld. In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, I have based 
 my account of the battle on this view. 
 
1632] Lutzen. 281 
 
 the King himself, with whom were Stalhanske and 
 his Finlanders, the right. Henderson with the Scots 
 brigade (but, unfortunately for us, without Monro, 
 who was not present at this battle) formed the 
 reserve of foot between the lines. Kniphausen led 
 the other four half brigades of foot in the centre of 
 the second line, the right and left wings of which 
 were composed of horse under Balach and Hoffkirch, 
 respectively. The final reserve of cavalry, behind 
 Kniphausen, was led by Colonel Ohm. Gustavus had 
 twenty pieces of heavy cannon before his centre and 
 about forty " regimental pieces " in front of the com- 
 manded musketeers, who were interspersed among 
 the horse. 
 
 " The Bride never longed for the wedding morn- 
 ing," says the Swedish Intelligencer, " as the King 
 longed for the day to break." But when dawn 
 came a thick mist overspread the field, and " the sun, 
 as If his great eye had beforehand overread the 
 fatality of the day, seemed very loath to begin it. 
 . . . But the martial King, ever forcing himself to 
 awaken time and hasten on mortality, would needs 
 make his drums beat two hours before daylight." 
 
 Prayers were then read at the head of each regi- 
 ment and Luther's Psalm, " Eine feste Burg ist unser 
 Gott," and the King's own battle hymn, " Versage 
 nicht du Hauflein klein," were sung as the men stood 
 to their arms. The King went into the battle with- 
 out armour as his custom was, and on his usual white 
 charger, and without having tasted food. He made 
 a ^hort speech to his soldiers. To the Swedes he 
 said : " There you have the enemy in front of you. 
 
282 Gttstavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 He is not on a mountain or behind entrenchments 
 this time, but on the open plain. You know well 
 how eagerly he has sought to avoid fighting, and that 
 he is only fighting now because he cannot escape us. 
 Fight then, my dear countrymen and friends, for 
 God, your country, and your King. I will reward 
 you all, and bravely : but if you flinch from the fight, 
 you know well that not a man of you will ever see 
 Sweden again." And to the Germans he spoke in a 
 similar strain. Then he waved his sword over his 
 head, crying : " Forward in God's name ; Jesu ! Jesu ! 
 Jesu ! help us to strive to-day to the honour of thy 
 Holy Name." 
 
 The first object of the Swedish attack was to drive 
 the Imperialists westwards back upon Liitzen, and 
 the road to Halle — at all events to cut them off from 
 the road to Leipzig, so that the junction with the 
 Saxon army, which Gustavus still continued to 
 expect, might be the easier. Towards ten o'clock 
 the mist Hfted, and what sun and wind there was 
 appeared to be in favour of the King. Lutzen was 
 already in flames burnt by Wallenstein, either in 
 order to cut his own men off from the hopes of 
 retreat by the road through it, or to prevent the 
 Swedish left from sweeping round his flank. The 
 day began with artillery fire from both sides, which 
 lasted for about an hour, until the Swedes had 
 pressed forward to the very edge of the Leipzig 
 road. Then the charges began, horse and foot at 
 once all along the lines. From that moment (eleven 
 o'clock) for nine hours the battle raged so wildly and 
 so densely, that no connected or intelligible account 
 
1632] Lutzen. 283 
 
 of it is left to us. The King hurled his right wing 
 over the ditches at the edge of the Flossgraben, 
 drove the Croats in wild flight from the field, and 
 charged pell-mell on Piccolomini's cuirassiers. Stal- 
 hanske afterwards related how he had heard him say, 
 " Never mind the Croats, have at those black fellows, 
 for they are the men that will else undo us," (mean- 
 ing the cuirassiers in their black armour). The black 
 fellows fought like demons. Piccolomini, who led 
 them, was wounded several times, but would not 
 leave the field. Gradually they were driven back. 
 Meanwhile in the centre the Swedes had won the 
 road, cleared the ditches, seized the first battery 
 of the enemy, when a fearful charge from the cavalry 
 of- the Imperialist left and right centres drove them 
 back again and recovered the guns. In the en- 
 deavour to withstand this charge, in one of the 
 Swedish regiments every captain had fallen ; the 
 Yellows, the Blues, one after the other, hurled 
 themselves forward, but were repulsed and almost 
 annihilated. 
 
 A little after midday, Pappenheim arrived with 
 the foremost squadron of his cuirassiers. " Where is 
 the King commanding ? " he cried. The King was 
 the adversary, whom of all others, the fiery cavalry 
 leader deemed worthy of his steel. But it was not to 
 be. Pappenheim fell mortally wounded but a few 
 minutes before Gustavus fell asleep on the bed of 
 honour. Hearing of the disaster to his centre, the 
 King had put himself at the head of the Smaland 
 regiment of cavalry, and flung off to the rally ; far 
 ahead of his men as usual. Just behind him rode 
 
284 Gusiavus Adolphus. C1632 
 
 Duke Francis Albert of Saxe Lauenburg and two 
 pages, one a boy of eighteen named Leubelfing. A 
 sudden wreath of mist came down as the party gal- 
 loped to the left, and hid them from the sight of 
 their following troops — hid from them also a body of 
 cuirassiers who approached. A pistol-shot struck 
 the white charger in the neck, another broke the 
 King's bridle arm. The noble beast began to 
 plunge. " Cousin," says the King to Duke Francis, 
 half fainting, " help me out of the battle, for I 
 am sore hurt." They turned, and a musket-ball 
 struck the King in the back. He fell from the 
 saddle. The Duke rode off with his life, Leubelfing 
 stayed with his master. Up rode the cuirassiers and 
 demanded the name of the fallen man. " I am the 
 King of Sweden," he replied, " who do seal the Reli- 
 gion and Liberty of the German nation with my 
 blood." The horsemen drove their swords again 
 and again into the breast of the dying man, and 
 mortally wounded the faithful page. Then they 
 stripped and plundered the body, and rode off, be- 
 fore the first riders of the regiment that had fol- 
 lowed the King could arrive. To them the news 
 was communicated by the sight of the white horse, 
 riderless and streaming with blood that was too red 
 to be his own. He tore wildly along the Swedish 
 lines. But the battle soon became too fierce even 
 for the rescue of the body ; when it was eventually 
 recovered by Stalhanske it was put in an ammuni- 
 tion waggon and carried to the little village of 
 Meuchen. 
 
 The news had quickly spread to Duke Bernard, 
 
1632] Liitzen. 285 
 
 who had been up to this time successful in beating 
 back the right wing of his enemies towards the blaz- 
 ing town of Liitzen. Bernard had been specially 
 designated by Gustavus to take command, in case 
 he himself should fall. He now rode round to 
 Kniphausen, who, looking ruefully on the debris 
 of the first line of infantry, said that the battle was 
 not so far lost but that they could make an orderly 
 retreat. " Retreat ! " cried the Duke, " the time for 
 that is past. It is vengeance now ! " And he slew 
 with his own hands a lieutenant who refused to lead 
 his men again to the charge. Brahe, who was still 
 unwounded, went to Bernard's former post on the 
 left, Bernard to the King's on the right, and Knip- 
 hausen, melting the first and second lines into one, 
 led on the centre. Manoeuvring there was none any 
 longer, it was simply a death-grapple all along the 
 lines. In the first charge the Swedes, maddened by 
 their loss, carried everything before them ; the body 
 of their beloved leader was rescued, the hostile guns 
 retaken, and Wallenstein's powder waggons blown 
 into the air. But the arrival of the last detachment 
 of Pappenheim's cavalry at about four o'clock turned 
 the tide, and the cavalry battle rolled back over the 
 same ground again. It was then that Nils Brahe 
 fell. The Swedish footmen died where they stood. 
 The flower of Gustavus's army was cut to pieces. 
 The veterans from the Polish and Livonian wars 
 were not used to running away. Nothing could in- 
 duce Duke Bernard to retreat, and Torstenson's 
 artillery could still be plied with deadly effect. The 
 Imperialists could get no further than the high-road. 
 
286 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 There with a last prodigious effort the whole remain- 
 ing horse and foot of Sweden stood firm — advanced 
 — charged — and won. Darkness had set in before 
 Pappenheim's foot arrived, only in time to be borne 
 away in the retreat of the whole Imperial army. 
 Whither they retreated Bernard cared but little. 
 The King was avenged. If his soul like those of 
 his Norse ancestors could rejoice in the multitude 
 of the slain, it would have goodly company on its 
 road to Valhalla. 
 
 But it was not as a heathen Norseman that he had 
 lived and died ; rather as a Christian gentleman. If 
 I were asked to find a parallel to him among those 
 who have controlled the destinies of the world, I 
 should pitch upon Saint Louis, King of France — in 
 whom also were combined the three greatest quali- 
 ties of a ruler of men. Justice, Courage, and Devo- 
 tion. Saint Louis, being born out of due time, 
 lacked the fourth great quality which was so rarely 
 displayed in Gustavus, a quality or virtue which is 
 indeed in itself but a daughter of Justice — Tolerance. 
 The true glory of the King of Sweden was that he 
 was the champion of Protestantism. Protestantism, 
 though here and there it has been intolerant, and 
 has used its triumphs unmercifully, has always led 
 to Freedom, and Freedom to Toleration. And 
 Toleration has been the great — the only really great 
 — achievement of the Modern World. 
 
 Before the altar of the little village church at 
 Meuchen the corpse of the Hero was laid on the 
 evening of the battle. Stalhanske's Finlanders, who 
 
1632] Lutzen. 287 
 
 had recovered it, sat mute on their horses in full 
 armour inside the building, while the village school- 
 master read the Lutheran service for the dead. 
 Then it was carried to the schoolmaster's house — 
 so covered with wounds it was, that the entrails had 
 to be taken out there and then and buried in the 
 Church. Then the schoolmaster, who was also the 
 village carpenter, made a rude cofifin in which the 
 body was borne to Weissenfels, where it was em- 
 balmed, and thence to Wittenberg, accompanied by- 
 four hundred (the only survivers) of the Smaland regi- 
 ment, in leading which the King had fallen. From 
 Wittenberg to Wolgast in Pomerania, and from 
 thence in the following summer it was brought to 
 Sweden. On June 21, 1634, the mortal remains of 
 the Lion of the North were laid to rest in the Rid- 
 darholm church at Stockholm. There in a marble 
 sarcophagus, under the tattered banners which tell 
 of his earthly triumphs, lies the Hero of Sweden. 
 
 What was his character ? If it has not been made 
 clear by the description which I have endeavoured to 
 give of his life, nothing that I could say in conclu- 
 sion would make it any clearer. Simple, brave, pas- 
 sionate, truthful, devout ; with the highest sense of 
 his kingly dignity, and a yet higher sense of his great 
 mission on earth, it is not unfair to say of him that 
 he had a single eye to the work God had given him 
 to do. More cannot be said of any man. 
 
 What were his aims? That has always been a 
 great problem. But, if any one may be supposed to 
 have known his mind, it surely was Axel Oxenstiern, 
 with whom, during his whole reign, he lived upon 
 
288 Gusiavus Adolphus. [1632 
 
 terms of intimacy so affectionate to be very uncom- 
 mon between great men of equal rank, but rare in- 
 deed between a subject and his sovereign. And all 
 Oxenstiern's utterances on the subject have the same 
 ring: "A great Scandinavian Empire, if you will. 
 The Baltic and the Baltic coasts for Sweden. But 
 NOT the crown of the Holy Roman Empire." 
 
 Swede and Vasa to the backbone, it was his own 
 country after all that had most to bewail his loss. 
 But the passionate grief in the streets of Stockholm 
 found more than echo in every Protestant town in 
 Europe — and in many Catholic ; but most in that 
 down-trodden Germany, to which he had appeared 
 like a deliverer from on high, and which a Swedish his- 
 torian finely calls his " dear Fosterland." For that 
 land his death had almost as great an effect as his 
 living deeds. It sanctified a cause which the Ger- 
 man princes themselves had only known how to be- 
 tray. He had been the first to set a bound to the 
 tyranny which Germany was powerless to resist, and 
 which would, if not resisted, have spread far beyond 
 Germany, even far beyond distant Sweden. And 
 for that reason Germany, Sweden, and mankind 
 count him among their heroes. 
 
GRAVE OF GUSTAVUS IN RIDDARHOLM CHURCH. 
 
IT will be perhaps useful if I am allowed to add a 
 few words as to the subsequent connection of 
 Sweden with the Thirty Years' War. Oxenstiern 
 at once assumed the task for which Gustavus had 
 designated him, and for which he was peculiarly fitted 
 — that of creating a real union of South German Prot- 
 estants, and disposing of their resources towards the 
 prosecution of the war. The command of the Swedish 
 armies passed at once, though not so naturally, to 
 
 289 
 
ago Gustavus Adolphus. [1632-48 
 
 Duke Bernard of Weimar, with Gustavus Horn in 
 close conjunction. The French alliance was re- 
 newed, the league of Heilbronn concluded with the 
 four Southern and Western circles of Germany, and 
 the full direction of the war remained as before in 
 the hands of the Swedes. 
 
 But the change which had come soon made itself 
 felt — a regular scramble for pensions, places, and 
 provinces set in. Bernard got himself invested with 
 the Duchy of Franconia ; even the righteous Chan- 
 cellor tried to carve out a principality for himself at 
 Mainz. Regensburg fell to the Duke before the end 
 of the year 1633, as Wallenstein, whose army had 
 been practically annihilated at Liitzen, was in no 
 condition to make head against him or anyone else. 
 Yet in the spring of 1634 Bernard was driven back, 
 and Horn, with far inferior forces, compelled to risk 
 a battle for the defence of Swabia. The result was 
 the crushing defeat of Nordlingen. More and more 
 it became evident to Bernard that without active 
 French help Sweden would not be able to finish the 
 war. France, without any open declaration of war, 
 had overrun all Lorraine, and stood already upon the 
 frontiers of Alsace. And, on the other side, Ferdi- 
 nand was inclined to lean more and more on Spain. 
 He was weary of Wallenstein's exorbitant demands, 
 and the last attempt at a nationalist, or third-party, 
 movement ended when that general's negotiations 
 with Saxony were cut short by his assassination in 
 February, 1634. Then more Spanish troops poured 
 into the Empire, especially upon the Upper Rhine. 
 All this could have but one end, and in March, 1635, 
 
1632-48] Epilogue. 291 
 
 France declared open war on Spain (though strange- 
 ly enough she avoided until 1638 any avowed attack 
 on the Emperor). 
 
 Two months after this the peace of Prague was 
 signed between Ferdinand and John George of Saxo- 
 ny, who was to retain what ecclesiastical property 
 he had held before the Edict of Restitution. Any 
 other states that pleased to come in within the year 
 were to be admitted to do so. Of religious free- 
 dom, or restorations in the Palatinate or elsewhere, 
 the peace said not a word. John George had fully 
 deserted the cause. Some few states did accept 
 the terms, notably, Mecklenburg and poor George 
 William of Brandenburg ; but Hesse Cassel and 
 the Swabian and Rhenish Protestants as a whole 
 remained true to their allies and their memories. 
 
 But how disorganised ! Nordlingen had broken 
 up the league of Heilbronn for good. From this 
 time onward the Swedish Government, and Oxen- 
 stiern particularly, eagerly sought peace, if it could 
 be obtained with honour and security. 
 
 Sweden was growing poorer every year, in spite of 
 the fact that the war was supposed to pay its own 
 way. But she went boldly forward. The truce of 
 1629 with Poland, was turned into a lasting peace in 
 1635, not without some persuasion from a new army 
 of 20,000 men which James de la Gardie managed to 
 levy and to shew to the Poles in their own country. 
 In the spring of that year, Oxenstiern had an inter- 
 view with Richelieu at Compiegne, and learnt how 
 very different were the latter's views from his own. 
 France wanted war, Sweden peace ; the real triumph 
 
292 GustaVUS Adolphus. [1632-48 
 
 for French diplomacy was that war continued. The 
 Emperor was ready enough to accord to Oxenstiern 
 the terms of the peace of Prague. But to the peace 
 of Prague Oxenstiern would not submit. It would 
 not have given Sweden a foot of territory in the 
 Empire, or the least security for the newly won 
 European position. 
 
 It was Banfer who first really picked up the staff of 
 Gustavus and restored the military prestige of the 
 Swedes. Before the end of 1635, hapless Pomerania 
 had been overrun by the Imperialists, with whom 
 were now the Saxons. But in the following year 
 these latter were annihilated by Banfer at the battle 
 of Wittstock. This more than made up for Nordlin- 
 gen and allowed the Swedes to take up winter 
 quarters in Saxony. When driven out of his en- 
 trenched camp at Torgau, where after the model of 
 his great master he had spent four months, Banfer 
 conducted a masterly retreat back upon Pomerania, 
 with 14,000 men opposed to 60,000 ; a retreat which 
 Richelieu in his memoirs calls one of the most glori- 
 ous in history. Yet in the autumn of 1637, the 
 Swedes were driven again to fight for Pomerania, and 
 had no garrisons worth speaking of elsewhere. 
 Bernard was fighting away in Alsace, either wholly 
 for his own hand, or partially in the interest of the 
 Most Christian King. Thus the war in the east 
 became a series of Swedish raids on Bohemia and 
 Moravia, varied with an occasional dash, in concert 
 with the French, upon Bavaria. Banfer also kept his 
 men's hands in by falling upon Saxony in spare 
 moments. Brandenburg was added as we have seen 
 
1632-48] Epilogue. 293 
 
 to the numerous enemies of Sweden, though not 
 actively until 1637, when the death of old Duke 
 Boguslav of Pomerania opened unpleasant questions 
 as to the succession to his territories. In 1637, too, 
 the passions, the bigotry, and the undaunted courage, 
 which had contributed so much to the dcharnement 
 of the war, were buried in Ferdinand's grave. 
 
 The new Ferdinand, an altogether weaker man 
 than his father, was even more entirely a tool of the 
 Jesuits. He concluded a treaty with Brandenburg, 
 which materially aided in keeping the Swedish arms 
 confined to Pomerania during the year 1638. That 
 and the following year saw the last of the mighty 
 deeds of Bernard, who won the great battle of 
 Rheinfelden and took the strong fortress of Breisach 
 in the former of these years. On his death-bed he 
 realised that he had only contributed to hand over a 
 priceless strip of German territory — Alsace — to the 
 worst foe of Germany. 
 
 In 1640, Swedish and French arms were seen for 
 the first time in active co-operation, — the plan being 
 then, as in each successive year of the war from that 
 time, that the Swedes should penetrate through 
 Bohemia, the French through Bavaria, until they 
 joined hands with each other in the hereditary 
 countries of the Emperor. This combination never 
 actually came about, and the Swedes, having much 
 the harder part of the business assigned to them, 
 continually suffered at the hands of the Imperialists 
 much more heavily than did the French. In 1641, 
 when Banfer died (he had practically had complete 
 command since 1636, when Oxenstiern returned to 
 
294 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632-48 
 
 Sweden), the noble Torstenson, the best of all Gus- 
 tavus's generals, though in body a helpless invalid, 
 succeeded to the command in a more favourable 
 state of affairs. The young Elector of Brandenburg, 
 Frederick William, afterwards called the Great, was 
 anxious to marry the Queen of Sweden, and at once 
 cleared his court of the Austrian influences, to which 
 his father had latterly leaned, and though not willing 
 to throw in his lot actively with the Swedes, until he 
 could be sure of Pomerania for a dowry, he allowed 
 them free passage through his territories. Torsten- 
 son made an end of the Saxons at the second battle 
 of Breitenfeld in October, 1642, and Saxony thence- 
 forward, until 1648, ceased to exist as an independent 
 state. In fact the whole Saxon people looked upon 
 their recent losses as a judgment of God for abandon- 
 ing the cause of the Gospel, and only the Elector still 
 continued to cling to an Imperial aUiance. The 
 annual raid into Bohemia of 1643, was less effective 
 than usual, owing to the threatened Danish war 
 which came to an outbreak in the following year. 
 Old King Christian had at last resolved to try his 
 luck once more against the new mistress of the 
 Baltic. Causes of quarrel were never wanting, but I 
 shall no doubt be suspected of prejudice in favour of 
 Sweden, when I say that there had been sufificient 
 provocation on the part of Denmark to justify a 
 much earlier attack. 
 
 Anyhow, in the end of 1643, Torstenson made a 
 tremendous dash north-westwards from Pomerania, 
 and in four weeks was well up in Jutland. Gallas, 
 the Imperial commander, would fain have followed 
 
1632-48] Epilogue. 295 
 
 him, but was unable to do so, as there was nothing 
 to eat in the land which would have to be traversed. 
 The war was as much fought by sea as by land ; but 
 while on the latter element the Swedes carried every- 
 thing before them, the naval battles were hotly con- 
 tested and were equally glorious to both sides. Chris- 
 tian himself was a fine sailor, and was wounded on 
 the quarter-deck of his own ship at the age of seventy. 
 There was no Richelieu now to negotiate a peace ; 
 but Mazarin had begun to take his place, and it was 
 chiefly owing to Mazarin that this short and sharp 
 little war was terminated by the peace of Bromsebro 
 in August, 1645. The terms expressed the complete 
 ■ victory of the Swedes, for, besides large cessions of 
 territory on the Norwegian frontier (Jemtland and 
 Hjerdalen), Sweden got the isle of Gothland, and 
 complete freedom from tolls in the Sound for all her 
 own ships and those of her dependencies ; also she 
 received the province of Halland in pawn for thirty 
 years. 
 
 Even before this peace was negotiated, Torstenson 
 had fallen back upon Gallas and cut his hungry army 
 to pieces, at the beginning of 1645. Then, leaving 
 the Danish war to be continued by the fleets, he ad- 
 vanced right through Saxony, and annihilated an- 
 other Imperialist army at Jankow, near Prague, in 
 February. From thence he pressed on almost to 
 the walls of Vienna, where, however, the natural 
 elasticity of the Austrian territories told heavily 
 against his few (10,000) troops. In broken health 
 he resigned his command, which was taken up by 
 Wrangel. Torstenson's victories, however, had this 
 
296 Gustavus Adolphus. [1632-48 
 
 result — they led to the first serious negotiations for 
 peace. I do not propose to follow the three-year- 
 long discussions, which took place at Osnabriick and 
 Miinster ; it is noteworthy, however, that Sweden at 
 once stated her full demand, and hardly seriously 
 gave way from it at all ; she may therefore fairly be 
 held somewhat less responsible for the continuance 
 of the war than the other powers. 
 
 Wrangel operated in the last three years of the war 
 upon the lines already laid down ; and some interest 
 attaches to the fact that his co-operator was Tu- 
 renne, who, though not uniformly successful against 
 the Austrians (witness his defeat by Mercy at Mer- 
 gentheim in 1645), earned his solid fame as a great 
 master of both tactics and of strategy in these cam- 
 paigns. Not to Turenne or Wrangel, however, but 
 to the Swedish general, Konigsmarck, was to fall the 
 questionable glory of the last feat of arms — the at- 
 tack on Prague in August, 1648, in which part of the 
 city was actually sacked. How completely the sym- 
 pathies of Bohemia had been changed by thirty 
 years of successful persecution, may be learnt from 
 the story of the splendid defence that the city then 
 made. The modern visitor to Prague may perhaps 
 pass by unnoticed a rather glorious old red rag, 
 which streams from the roof of the Jewish syna- 
 gogue, which is situated in one of the dirtiest quar- 
 ters of that city ; it was presented by Ferdinand in 
 memory of the assistance rendered by the Jews to 
 the Catholic cause in the defence. But the modern 
 visitor to the library at Upsala is not likely to pass 
 by unnoticed the famous Codex Argenteus, a iifth- 
 
1632-48] Epilogue. 297 
 
 century manuscript of the Gospels written by Bishop 
 Ulfilas, which, containing as it does the only known 
 fragments of the old Gothic language, has found in 
 the land of the descendants of the Goths a more 
 fitting home than in the Jesuit College of Prague, 
 from which upon this occasion it was taken. 
 
 Meanwhile the month of October in the same 
 year saw the end of the war. The peace of West- 
 phalia gave to Queen Christina and her successors 
 for ever, as members of the German Empire in re- 
 spect thereof, all that part of the Duchy of Pome- 
 rania which lies west of the Oder, and so much of it 
 to the east of that river as would give command of 
 all its three mouths — i.e., the districts of Damm, 
 Golnau, and Stettin ; further, the city and district 
 of Wismar, the archbishopric of Bremen, and the 
 bishopric of Verden ; lastly, 1,800,000 dollars as 
 compensation for the soldiers, whose occupation was 
 obviously a thing of the past. 
 
 France obtained by the same treaty Alsace, to- 
 gether with recognition of her sovereignty over the 
 three Lorraine bishoprics, which she had practically 
 held since 1552. These territories, however, unlike 
 the Swedish indemnifications, were fully separated 
 from the Empire, and it has remained for the heroes 
 of a later day to reclaim them. 
 
 For Germany most of the vexed questions were 
 set at rest. The Calvinists were no longer excluded 
 from toleration. The Lower Palatinate was re- 
 stored to the worthless Charles Louis (Rupert's 
 elder brother), the eldest son of the " King of Bo- 
 hemia," for whom also an eighth electorate was 
 
298 
 
 Gusfavus Adolphus. 
 
 [1632-48 
 
 created ; while Bavaria kept her hold upon the 
 Upper Palatinate. Most important of all, the 
 northern " bishoprics " were saved for Protes- 
 tantism, the year 1624 being taken as the test ; 
 whatever was Protestant then was to be Protestant 
 still ; and the principle of " chambres mi-parties," 
 already suggested by Gustavus, was adopted by the 
 Imperialist tribunals as a safeguard against religious 
 bigotry in the judges of these courts. 
 
 It is hardly necessary for anyone who has followed 
 the story to be told that, with the exception of the 
 Palatinate these results might have been equally 
 attained if peace had been concluded immediately 
 after the first battle of Breitenfeld. 
 
"... \ 
 
 ■ -I ' >. \ ■/ -»^ ,* 
 
 
 ,t 
 •I 
 
 / 
 
 
 /^ 
 
 \. 
 
 \ 
 
 
 i^y 
 
 'aV: ^! 
 
 - 1 
 
 'If -'- * 
 
 ' -w it ' 
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VII. 
 THE ARTICLES OF WAR. 
 
 HE celebrated Articles of War, which 
 were first promulgated by Gustavus in 
 the Polish campaign of 1625, appear to 
 have been originally designed for the 
 foreign soldiers in Swedish pay, but they bound all the 
 army alike, and were strictly enforced throughout the 
 King's lifetime. They appear to have been largely 
 drafted by his own hand. They may be thus con- 
 densed : 
 
 I. For an army on service there was a separate court- 
 martial for each regiment, over which the colonel pre- 
 sided, assisted by assessors elected from the various 
 grades by the whole regiment. There was also an upper 
 court presided over by the Marshal of Sweden, or his 
 deputy, with the leading officers as assessors. The King 
 to be a supreme court of appeal in himself. 
 
 II. The provost-marshal had power to arrest and im- 
 prison, and bring before court-martial, any person whom 
 he suspected of being an offender, but might not "justi- 
 fy " {i.e., hang) him on his own responsibility, except in 
 the case of lesistance to his own actual orders. 
 
 III. To the regimental court-martial belonged all 
 crimes such as larceny, cowardice, insubordination, etc. 
 
 299 
 
30O Appendi. 
 
 X. 
 
 to the upper court, cases of high treason and all civil 
 disputes. 
 
 IV. The punishment of death (loss of head and hand, 
 or hanging) is decreed to every tenth man by lot if a 
 regiment runs away during a battle. The other nine are 
 to serve without their banner, lie outside the quarters, 
 and have to clean out the camp, until they have wiped 
 out their disgrace by a bold deed. Death is the penalty 
 for plundering or outrage. 
 
 V. Other punishments were "riding the wooden 
 horse" (a sharp bar of wood on which the victim sat 
 with a musket tied to each foot), imprisonment in irons, 
 bread and water, fines, etc. Flogging was not allowed. 
 
 VI. A man might have his own wife with him, if he 
 pleased, but no loose women were allowed in the camp. 
 In the German armies so common had their presence 
 become, that there was (we know from other sources be- 
 sides Captain Dalgetty, who calls him " Captain of the 
 Queans ") an officer called Huren-Weibler, charged with 
 the duty of keeping them in order. 
 
 VII. Morning and evening prayer in every regiment. 
 Full service and a sermon on Sundays. 
 
 VIII. No duelling is allowed. Mr. Chapman quotes 
 an excellent story of the King on this subject. Two 
 officers obtained with difficulty his permission to fight a 
 duel. He said he would come and see it. Arrived on 
 the ground, he addressed the combatants as follows : 
 " Now gentlemen, fight away — fight till one of you falls, 
 and I have brought the provost-marshal with me to be- 
 head the survivor." 
 
 That these articles were rigorously observed on such 
 a stage as that of the Thirty Years' War is perhaps too 
 much to hope. But we shall find many instances in 
 
Appendix. 
 
 301 
 
 which Monro's evidence, as well as that of other 
 contemporaries, tends to prove the King's great zeal for 
 their enforcement, and the punishments, which he meted 
 out impartially for all violations of them which came 
 under his knowledge. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Alais, peace of, 93 
 
 Aldringer, brings reinforcements 
 from Italy, 172, i8r, 203 ; 
 takes command when Tilly is 
 wounded, 246 ; with Wallen- 
 stein at Nuremberg, 260, 267 
 
 Alsace secured to France by 
 Peace of Westphalia, 297 
 
 Alte Veste, 261 ; Swedish assault 
 upon, 266 jf. 
 
 Anhalt, Princes of, give contribu- 
 tion to Gustavus, 204 
 
 Anklam, Imperial troops at, 132, 
 
 134 
 Annaburg, conference at, 151 
 Anspach joins Gustavus, 212 
 Army of Gustavus, composition, 
 111-114 ; numbers (1630), 114 ; 
 pay, 115-117; causes of its 
 superiority, iig, 120 ; Gus- 
 tavus's improvements, 120- 
 126 ; numbers (1631), 180, 181 
 Arnim, blockades Stralsund, 83, 
 85 ; with Koniecpolski defeats 
 Gustavus, 88 ; Elector of Sax- 
 ony's adviser, 150, 176, 217, 
 230 ; desire for a third party, 
 150, 230, 252 ; at Breitenfeld, 
 187 ; privy to Gustavus's nego- 
 tiations with Wallenstein, 218 ; 
 communications with Wallen- 
 stein, 235, 252 
 
 Aschaffenburg, Baudissin takes 
 4,000 prisoners near, 209 
 
 Augdoff stormed by Gustavus, 43 
 
 Augsburg, Peace of, 106 ; re- 
 ceives Gustavus, 247 ; Oath of, 
 247, 248 
 
 Austria, attitude in struggle be- 
 tween Sweden and Poland, 14, 
 46 ; Spain's designs on the 
 throne of, 54 ; combination 
 with Spain and Bavaria, 70; 
 relations vrith Germany, 102, 
 103 
 
 B 
 
 Baireuth joins Gustavus, 212 
 
 Balach at Lutzen, 281 
 
 Bamberg, taken by Horn, 240; 
 retaken by Tilly, 241 
 
 Bamberg, Bishop of, outwits 
 Gustavus, 208 
 
 Banir, John, with Gustavus in 
 Poland, 45 ; at siege of Dant- 
 zic, 67 ; on frontier of Meck- 
 lenburg, 143 ; at storming of 
 Frankf ort-on-0. , 160; storms 
 and fortifies Havelberg, 173 ; 
 at Breitenfeld, 188 ; takes 
 Magdeburg, 216 ; called up 
 from Magdeburg, 242 ; left at 
 Munich, 251 ; recalled from 
 Donauworth to Nuremberg, 
 258, 265 ; wounded at Alte 
 Veste, 267 J wins battle of 
 
304 
 
 Index. 
 
 Wittstock, 292 ; retreat upon 
 Pomerania, 292 ; death, 293 
 
 Barueveldt favourable to Sweden, 
 47 
 
 Earth taken hy Gustavus, 134 
 
 Barwalde, Gustavus's troops quar- 
 tered at, 142 ; Treaty of, \ixff. 
 
 Baudissin, takes 4,000 Lorrainers 
 prisoners, 209 j on the Rhire, 
 275. 
 
 Bavaria, combination with Aus- 
 tria and Spain, 70 
 
 Berlin, Gustavus at, 170 
 
 Bernard, of Weimar, joins Gus- 
 tavus, 175, 204 ; in the Pala- 
 tinate, 216, 241 ; gets troops 
 from Switzerland, 249 ; re- 
 called from Swabia to Nurem- 
 berg, 258, 265 ; at storm of 
 Alte Veste, 267 ; left in Fran- 
 conia, 270 ; defenceof Schwein- 
 furt, 271 ; joins Gustavus, 273 ; 
 at Liltzen, 280 ; takes com- 
 mand, 285, 290 ; Duke of 
 Franconia, 2go ; takes Regens- 
 burg, 290 ; wins battle of 
 Rheinfelden and takes Brei- 
 sach, 293 ; death, 293 ; 
 
 Bethlen Gabor, Prince of Tran- 
 sylvania, admirer of Gustavus, 
 62 ; death, loi 
 
 Blekingen in hands of Danes, 28 
 
 Boguslav XIV., Duke of Pom- 
 erania, 79, 83 ; treaty with Gus- 
 tavus, 133, 134, 248. 
 
 Bohemia, revolution in, 54 ; 
 Elector Palatine and crown of, 
 54ir. 
 
 Bohus strengthened by Danes, 28 
 
 Bois-le-Duc taken by Dutch, 100 
 
 Brahe, Ebba, 39 
 
 Brahe, Count Magnus, at Stral- 
 sund, 85 
 
 Brahe, Count Nils, at Liitzen, 
 280, 285 
 
 Brahe, Tycho, casts Gustavus's 
 nativity, 23 
 
 Brandenburg, 34, 35 ; policy, 36 
 
 Biaunsbeig taken by Gustavus, 
 
 65 ; secured to Sweden by 
 Truce of Stuhmsdorf, 88 
 
 Breda, siege of, 73 
 
 Breisach taken by Bernard, 293 
 
 Breitenfeld, battle of, 127, 128, 
 185 _^. ; second battle of, 294 
 
 Bremen, Archbishopric of, cov- 
 eted by Denmark, 57 ; secured 
 to Sweden by Peace of West- 
 phalia, 297 
 
 Bromsebro, Peace of, 295 
 
 Bruges, decline of, 3 
 
 Buckingham, Duke of, 57 
 
 Budweis held by Imperial troQps, 
 217 
 
 Burgstall, 261 
 
 Butler, Colonel, at Frankfort-on- 
 Oder, i6i 
 
 C 
 
 Cammin occupied by Swedish 
 army, 136 
 
 Carelia, 44 ; overrun by Swedes, 
 32 ; ceded to Sweden, 43 
 
 Casimir, John, Gustavus's letters 
 to, 67, 68, 88, 154 
 
 Catherine, Gustavus's half-sister, 
 16 
 
 Catherine Jaghellon, wife of 
 John, King of Sweden, 9 
 
 Chancellor, Captain, 7 
 
 Charles IX., regent, 11, 12 ; 
 king, 15 ; character and policy, 
 21 ; challenge to King of Den- 
 mark, 26 ; wars with Sigif.- 
 mund, 32-34 ; death, 38 
 
 Charles Louis gets Lower Pala- 
 tinate by Peace of Westphalia, 
 297 
 
 Charles Philip, Gustavus's broth- 
 er, 16 ; proposed for Czar of 
 Russia, 32 ; death, 49 
 
 Chamace, Baron de, in Bavaria, 
 etc., go ; mediates between 
 Sweden and Poland, 88 ; tries 
 to induce Gustavus to adopt 
 Richelieu's policy, 100 ; at 
 Mainz, 221 
 
 Christian of Anhalt, 59 
 
Index. 
 
 305 
 
 Christian IV., King of Denmark, 
 war with Sweden, 26-29, 41. 
 42 ; policy, 36 ; attitude in 
 struggle for Bohemia, 57, 58 ; 
 James I.'s promises to, 58 ; 
 alliance with England and 
 Holland, 61, 6g, 70 ; in Eng- 
 land's pay, 71, 72 ; campaign 
 of 1626, 73 ; defeated at Lilt- 
 ter, 74 ; overtures to Gustavus, 
 74 ; Gustavus's letter to and 
 treaty with, 80-82 ; aids Stral- 
 sund, 84, 85 ; neutral by Peace 
 of Ltibeck, gi ; pretended me- 
 diation between Gustavus and 
 the Emperor, 118 ; war with 
 Sweden, 294, 295 
 
 Christian William of Branden- 
 burg, 107 ; ejected from Mag- 
 deburg, 107 ; regains Magde- 
 burg and makes treaty with 
 Gustavus, 146 
 
 Christianopel destroyed by Gus- 
 tavus, 26 
 
 Christina, Queen of Sweden, 297 
 
 Christina, wife of Charles IX., 
 16, 118 
 
 Coblenz taken by Horn, 264 
 
 Colberg, blockaded by Knip- 
 hausen, 136 ; surrenders, 159 
 
 CoUoredo, left to watch Gustavus's 
 army, 275 ; commands right 
 wing at Liitzen, 280 
 
 Conti, Torquato, 131 ; in Pome- 
 rania, 131 ; near Stettin, 132 ; 
 succeeded by Schaumburg, 139 
 
 Croats in Wallenstein's army, 
 261, 262 
 
 D 
 
 Dalecarlia, 42 
 
 Damgarten taken by Gustavus, 
 
 139 
 Damitz, at Stettm, 133 ; takes 
 
 service under Gustavus, 133 ; 
 
 in Pomerania, 136 ; killed at 
 
 Breitenfeld, 194 
 Damm, taken by Swedes, 136 ; 
 
 ceded to Sweden, 297 
 
 Dantzic, virtually "free city,'' 
 35> 63 ; Gustavus wants, as 
 " sedes belli" 63 ; siege of, 63, 
 67, 68 ; assisted by Holland, 
 69 ; again blockaded, 79 ; 
 treaty with Sweden, 89 ; ne- 
 gotiations between Gustavus 
 and the Emperor at, 118 
 
 Demmin taken by Gustavus, 158 
 
 Denmark, relations with Spain 
 and Sweden, 8 ; allowed to 
 develop by John, 9 ; war with 
 Sweden, 26, 29 ; and the Bal- 
 tic commerce, 28 ; unpopularity 
 of monarchy, 30 ; war with 
 Sweden, 41, 42 ; treaty with 
 England and Holland, 61, 69, 
 70, and with Sweden, 81, 82 ; 
 aids Stralsund, 84, 85 ; neutral 
 by Peace of Liibeck, 91 ; im- 
 possibility of its alliance with 
 Sweden, gg ; recruiting in, for 
 Gustavus's army, 114 ; war 
 with Sweden, 2g4, 295 
 
 Dessau, battle at bridge of, 73 ; 
 bridge of, destroyed, 166 
 
 Diodati, account of battle of 
 Lutzen, 2Son. 
 
 Dirschau taken by Gustavus, 
 
 65 
 Donauworth taken by Gustavus, 
 
 243 
 
 Dresden, Elector of Saxony re- 
 tires to, 217 
 
 Duben, union of Swedes and 
 Saxons at, 182 
 
 E 
 
 Eger, Wallenstein advances 
 against, 254 
 
 Eggenberg, Baron von, coun- 
 sellor of Ferdinand, 66 
 
 Eilenburg, Saxons flee to, 192 
 
 Elbing, taken by Gustavus, 65 ; 
 Dutch embassy at, 68 ; secured 
 to Sweden by Truce of 
 Stuhmsdorf, 8g ; Oxenstiem 
 in command at, 135 
 
3o6 
 
 Index. 
 
 Elfsborg, taken by Christian, 29 ; 
 redeemed by Sweden, 42 
 
 Elfsnabben, Gustavus embarks 
 at, 118 
 
 Elizabeth, Queen of England, 
 founds " Muscovy Company," 
 7 ; relations with Eric, 8 ; 
 friendship with the Elector 
 Palatine, 54 
 
 Elizabeth Stuart marries Fred- 
 erick Elector Palatine, 55 
 
 England, champion of Prot- 
 estantism, 4, 6 ; trade with 
 Russia, 7 ; relations with 
 Sweden and Russia, 8, 43 ; 
 attitude in struggle between 
 Sweden and Poland, 14 ; atti- 
 tude in struggle for Bohemia, 
 56-58 ; treaty with Denmark, 
 61, 69, 70 ; and France, 71 ; 
 peace with France, 93 ; peace 
 with Spain, loi ; and the 
 restoration of Frederick, 225 
 
 Erfurt, surrenders to Gustavus, 
 204 ; Swedish army at, 273, 
 
 275 
 Esthonia, acquired by Eric, 8 ; 
 Danes claim free access to, 29 
 
 Falkenberg, Diedrich von, raises 
 troops in Holland, 114, 141 ; 
 at Magdeburg, 147, 148, idsff. 
 Feodor, Czar of Russia, death, 31 
 Ferdinand II., and the Imperial 
 rule in Germany, 52 ; and 
 Spain, 54, 70, 290 ; designs, 
 76 ; peace with Denmark, 78, 
 91 ; struggles with Catholic 
 Electors, 93, 94 ; and the Man- 
 tuan war, 93 ; aims for his son, 
 105 ; issues Edict of Restitu- 
 tion, 106-108 ; dismisses Wal- 
 lenstein, log ; letter to Gus- 
 tavus, 117 ; alliance with Maxi- 
 milian, 229 ; asks help from 
 Poland, 230 ; repulsed by Ur- 
 ban VIII., 231 ; and peace, 
 
 232, 233, 236, 237 ; peace with 
 Elector of Saxony, 291 ; death, 
 
 293 
 Ferdinand III., treaty with 
 
 Brandenburg, 293 
 Ferdinand, Don, of Capua, 
 
 taken prisoner, 142 
 Finland, Ivan's attack on, 7 
 Fleetwood, George, letter re 
 
 battle of Lutzen, 279 n. 
 Flushing, Mansfeld lands at, 72 
 France, and the Thirty Years' 
 
 War, 53, 57, 58, 71, 209, 226 ; 
 
 Peace of Alais and of Susa, 93 ; 
 
 War with Spain, 93 ; aids Hol- 
 land to take Bois-le-Duc, 100 ; 
 
 treaty with Sweden, 151 ; 
 
 treaty with Bavaria, 225 ; 
 
 overruns Lorraine, 290 ; war 
 
 with Spain, 291 ; gets Alsace, 
 
 etc., by Peace of Westphalia, 
 
 297 
 Franconia, Swedes in possession 
 
 of, 209 
 Frankfort-on-Main surrenders 
 
 to Gustavus, 213 
 Frankfort-on-Oder, flight of 
 
 Imperial troops to, 142 ; Tilly 
 
 at, 156; stormed by Gustavus, 
 
 160, 161 
 Frauenberg taken by Gustavus, 
 
 65 
 
 Frederick II., King of Denmark, 
 seeks hand of Mary Stuart, 8 
 
 Frederick, Elector Palatine, mar- 
 ries Elizabeth Stuart, 55 ; 
 head of German Protestantism, 
 54 ; and the crown of Bohemia, 
 55-58 ; Mansfeld proposes to 
 help, 58 ; question of his re- 
 storation, 224^., 251 
 
 Frederick William, Elector of 
 Brandenburg, leans towards 
 Sweden, 294 
 
 Freising, Gustavus at, 249 
 
 Fritzlar, Colonel Fugger joins 
 Tilly at, 203 
 
 Fugger, Colonel, joins Tilly, 203 
 
 FUrth, Gustavus at, 269 
 
Index. 
 
 307 
 
 FUrstenburg, brings reinforce- 
 ments from Italy, 172, 181 ; at 
 Breitenfeld, 186, 192 
 
 Gallas, brings reinforcements 
 from Italy, 172 ; with Wallen- 
 stein, 260 ; defeated by Tor- 
 stenson, 295 
 
 Gardie, De la, Gustavus's tutor, 
 22 ; proposes Charles Philip 
 for Czar of Russia, 32 ; with 
 Gustavus in Poland, 45 ; in 
 Livonia, 62 
 
 Gars, Captain, assumed name of 
 Gustavus, 48 
 
 Garz, Imperial troops at, 132, 
 141, 142 ; Gustavus strength- 
 ens, 142 
 
 George of Hesse Darmstadt, 
 wishes to be neutral, 232 ; 
 proposals for peace, 232, 233 
 
 George William, Elector of 
 Brandenburg, Gustavus tries 
 to get help from, 64 ; com- 
 plains of Gustavus, 65 ; attack- 
 ed by Gustavus, 67 ; neutral, 
 67 ; anxious for peace, 79 ; 
 Gustavus asks help from, 108 ; 
 Gustavus's demands from, 150; 
 treaty with Gustavus, 163, 
 171 ; treatment of Gustavus, 
 236 ; refuses to make peace 
 with Ferdinand, 252 ; treaty 
 with Ferdinand, 293 
 
 Glilckstadt founded, 47 
 
 Gosieowski defeated at Wallhof , 
 62 
 
 Gothenburg founded by Charles 
 IX., 18, 28 
 
 Gothland, Isle of, ceded to 
 Sweden by treaty of Brom- 
 sebrO, 295 
 
 Greifenhagen, Imperial troops 
 retire to, 132 ; Ute-du-poni of 
 Garz, 141 ; Gustavus at, 141 
 
 Greifswald surrenders to Gusta- 
 vus, 134, 173 
 
 Gustaf Gustafson, 40 
 
 Gustavus I., Vasa, why Protes- 
 tant, 6 ; services to Sweden, 6 ; 
 last advice, g ; passion for art, 
 etc., 20 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus, birth, 16 ; 
 education, 22 ; history of the 
 House of Vasa, 22 n. ; stories 
 of childhood, 23-25 ; first war, 
 26 ; refuses to allow Charles 
 Philip to occupy throne of 
 Russia, 32 ; in 1611, 38, 39 ; 
 and Ebba Brahe, 39 ; relations 
 with Oxenstiern, 40, 288 ; 
 king, 41 ; war with Denmark, 
 41 ; war with Russia, 43, 44 ; 
 war with Poland, Aiff-' visits 
 Berlin, etc., 48 ; married, 48 ; 
 attitude in struggle for Bo- 
 hemia, 55-57 ; and the Thirty 
 Years' War. 58/:, 94/'./ last 
 speech to the Estates, 60, 1 10 ; 
 offers to assist Christian, 61 ; 
 campaign of 1625, 62 ; fails to 
 take Dantzic, 63 ; lands at and 
 takes Pillau, 64 ; and the Elec- 
 tor of Brandenburg, 64, 67 ; 
 conquests in West Prussia, 65, 
 66 ; besieges Dantzic, 67, 68 ; 
 wounded, 68 ; Christian turns 
 to, 74 ; third expedition to 
 Poland, 79 ; letter to and treaty 
 with Christian, 80-82 ; treaty 
 with Stralsund, 84, 85 ; plans 
 for war, 87, 89 ; defeated by 
 Arnim and Koniecpolski, 88 ; 
 truce with Poland, 1629, 88 ; 
 treaty with Dantzic, 89 ; sends 
 embassy to conferences at Lil- 
 beck, 90 ; visits Christian, gi ; 
 Richelieu's and Wallenstein's 
 opinion of, 92, 93 ; difference 
 of his policy and Richelieu's, 
 93, 100 ; opposition to his 
 proposals for management of 
 war, 96 ; address to Estates 
 and Council, 97, 98 ; demands 
 for Germany, 99 ; Magde- 
 burg turns to, 108 ; asks help 
 
3o8 
 
 Index. 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus (ccmtinued). 
 from Electors of Brandenburg 
 and Saxony, lo8 ; composi- 
 tion and pay of his army, 
 111-117 ; letter to Ferdinand, 
 117; lands at Usedom, 118; 
 entrenches Peenemunde, 119; 
 compared with Wallenstein, 
 etc., 119, 120: capacity as 
 engineer officer, iig, 121 ; 
 improvements in warfare, 120- 
 126 ; care for his soldiers, 126 ; 
 tactics compared with those of 
 his opponents, 126-130 ; in 
 Pomerania, 132, 133 ; treaty 
 with Boguslav, 133, 134, 248 ; 
 march into Mecklenburg, 135, 
 137, 138 ; at Stralsund, 138 ; 
 takes Damgarten and Ribnitr 
 and returns to Stettin, 139 ; 
 defeats Imperial troops, 141, 
 142 ; conquests in Mecklen- 
 burg and Pomerania, 142, 143 ; 
 position at end of 1630, 143 ; 
 anxiety for general engage- 
 ment, 143 ; treaty with Mag- 
 deburg, 146-149 ; demands 
 from George William, 150; 
 and the treaty of Barwalde, 
 151^. / letter to John Casimir, 
 154; plans fori63l, 154-156; 
 in Mecklenburg, 157 ; storms 
 Frankfort, 160, 161 ; result of 
 his successes, 161 ; gets Span- 
 dau, 163 ; how to get to Mag- 
 deburg, 163, 164 ; manifesto 
 re Magdeburg, 169 ; treaty 
 with Elector of Brandenburg, 
 171 ; reinstates Dukes of Meck- 
 lenburg, 172, 173 ; at Werben, 
 174 ; joined by William of 
 Hesse Cassel and Bernard of 
 Weimar, 175 ; treaty with 
 Elector of Saxony, 177 ; meet- 
 ing with Electors of Branden- 
 burg and Saxony, 182 ; wins 
 battle of Breitenfeld, 185/; / 
 plans after Breitenf eld, loji ff. ; 
 in Franconia, 200 ; Richelieu 
 
 complains of, 202 ; gets con- 
 tributions from Princes of 
 Anhalt, 204 ; alliance with 
 Dukes of Weimar, 204; conduct 
 in Germany, 205, 206 ; procla- 
 mation, 206, 207 ; issues base 
 coin, 210 ; treaty with George 
 of Lilneburg, and with Nurem- 
 berg, 211 ; message to Ecclesi- 
 astical Electors of the Rhine, 
 212 ; joined by William of 
 Hesse Cassel at Frankfort, 
 218 ; at Mainz, 215, 221 ; ne- 
 gotiates with Wallenstein, 
 217 ; plan for confederation of 
 German states, 223 ; and the 
 Catholic League, 226^. / and 
 Russia, 231 ; conditions of 
 peace, 233, 234 ; Electors of 
 Brandenburg and Saxony's 
 proposals, 236 ; plans for 1632, 
 and number of his forces, 238, 
 239 ; Horn joins, at Schwein- 
 furt, 242 ; at Nuremberg, 242, 
 243 ; takes Donau worth, 243 ; 
 takes the " Oath of Augsburg," 
 247 ; failure at Ingolstadt, 248 ; 
 Louis XIII. hesitates to sup- 
 port, 249 ; at Munich, 249, 
 250 ; refuses to restore Fred- 
 erick, 251 ; attempts to pre- 
 vent junction of Wallenstein, 
 and Maximilian, 256 ; retires 
 upon Nuremberg, 257-259 ; 
 speech to his soldiers, 263 ; 
 assault upon Alte Veste, 266 ; 
 plans, 270 ; joined by Bernard, 
 etc., 273; presentiment of 
 death, 273, 274 ; entrenches 
 Nuremberg, 274 ; at Liitzen, 
 281 ; death, 284 ; compared 
 with St. Louis, 286 ; character 
 and aims, 286-288 ; burial, 
 287 
 
 H 
 
 Halberstadt, Fappenheim rejoins 
 Tilly at, 203 
 
Index. 
 
 309 
 
 Hall, Colonel, at Breitenfeld, 
 188 ; slain, 194 
 
 Halland, in hands of Danes, 28 ; 
 handed over to Sweden by 
 Peace of Bromsebro, 295 
 
 Halle, Tilly at, 177 ; Imperial 
 troops flee to, 192, 193 ; coun- 
 cil of war at, 197 ; Gustavus 
 leaves, 204 
 
 Hamilton, Colonel, workshops at 
 Orebro, 113 
 
 Hamilton, Marquis of, troops for 
 Gustavus, 141, 175 
 
 Hanau, surrenders to Swedes, 212 
 
 Hanseatic League, dominion 
 over the Baltic, 3 ; decline, 4, 
 6, 7 ; Diet of, at Liibeck, 74 ; 
 policy, 82 ; and Stralsund, 83 ; 
 orders levy for defence, 86 ; 
 greater members agree to help 
 one another against Emperor, 
 146 
 
 Harrach, Counsellor of Ferdi- 
 nand, 66 
 
 Havelberg, stormed and forti- 
 fied by Banir, 173 
 
 Hayes, De, 236, 237 
 
 Heilbronn, League of, 2go, 291 
 
 Helsingborg, founded, 28 ; in 
 hands of Danes, 18 
 
 Henderson, at Liitzen, 281 
 
 Henry IV., King of France, 13 
 
 Hepburn, Sir John, at Rugen- 
 walde, 137 ; commands Scots 
 at storming of Frankfort-on- 
 Oder, 160 ; at Breitenfeld, 
 188, 193 
 
 Hesse Cassel, Tilly in, 171 
 (See William of Hesse Cassel.) 
 
 Hoffkirch, at LUtzen, 281 
 
 Hoick, with Wallenstein at Nu- 
 remberg, 260 : in Saxony, 272 ; 
 at Liitzen, 280 
 
 Holland, relations with Sweden, 
 30, 43 ; and the Baltic com- 
 merce, 30, 31 ; policy, 31, 36, 
 47, 69 ; treaty with Denmark 
 and England, 61, 69, 70 ; 
 assists Dantzic, 69 ; alienated, 
 
 73 ; tries to induce Gustavus 
 to make peace with Poland, 
 79 ; urges Christian to con- 
 clude peace with Catholic 
 League, 91 ; France aids, 
 against Spain, 100 ; unwilling 
 to join Sweden, loi ; recruit- 
 ing in, for Gustavus's army, 
 1 14 ; gives aid to Gustavus, 141 
 
 Holstein,_ Duchy of. Christian 
 desires to regain, 81 
 
 Holstein, Duke of, killed at 
 Breitenfeld, 192 
 
 Horn, Gustavus, with Gustavus 
 in Poland, 45 ; in Livonia, 67 ; 
 at Stettin, 138 ; sent to com- 
 plete reduction of northern 
 fortresses, 155 ; commands left 
 wing at Breitenfeld, 187, 192, 
 193 ; advises march on Vienn i, 
 197 ; at Wilrzburg, 212, 24 ) ; 
 on the Main, 240 ; retreats to 
 Wilrzburg, 241 ; joins Gu ita- 
 vus at Schweinfurt, 242 ; t; kes 
 Coblenz, 264 ; recalled to Nu- 
 remberg, 264 ; defeated oi i the 
 Rhine, 271 ; at battle of Kord- 
 lingen, 290 
 
 Ingolstadt, Maxmilian rei reats 
 to, 246 ; Gustavus's failu.e to 
 take, 248 
 
 Ingria, 44 ; overrun by Sw.des, 
 32 ; ceded to Sweden, 43 
 
 Ivan the Terrible, wars for Fin- 
 land and Livonia, 7 ; seeks 
 crown of Poland, 9, 10 
 
 James I., King of England, 
 mediates between Sweden snd 
 Denmark, 42 ; attitude in quds- 
 tion of Bohemiam crown, 55- 
 57 ; promises to Christian a.id 
 Mansfeld, 58 ; alliance with 
 Denmark, 61, 69, 70 
 
3IO 
 
 Index. 
 
 Jankow, Imperial army defeated 
 
 at, 295 
 Jesuits, Gustavus's treatment of, 
 
 205, 206, 215, 233 
 John, King of Sweden, g, 11, 
 
 25 
 John, Gustavus's cousin, 16, 
 John George, Elector of Saxony, 
 attitude towards Gustavus, 104 ; 
 Gustavus asks help from, 108 ; 
 refuses to make treaty with 
 Gustavus, 165 ; raises troops, 
 176, 177 ; treaty with Gustavus, 
 177-179 ; at Breitenfeld, 187 ; 
 overruns Lusatia and marches 
 into Bohemia, 216, 217 ; retires 
 to Dresden, 217 ; exerts him- 
 self for general peace, 230 ; 
 jealous of Gustavus, 234, 235 ; 
 treatment of Gustavus, 236 ; 
 uncertain attitude, 251 ff. ; 
 meeting with Elector of Bran- 
 denburg, 252 ; and reinforce- 
 ments for Gustavus, 276 ; peace 
 with Ferdinand, 291 
 
 K 
 
 i^aiinar, 18 ; taken by Christian, 
 29 ; given back to Sweden, 42 
 
 Klempenau taken by Gustavus, 
 157 
 
 Knarod, peace of, 42 
 
 Kniphausen, General, in Farther 
 Pomerania, 135 ; blockades 
 Colberg, 136 ; at New Bran- 
 denburg, 159 ; at Nuremberg, 
 268 ; joins Gustavus at Naum- 
 burg, 273 ; at Liitzen, 281, 
 285 
 
 Koniecpolski, attacked by Gusta- 
 vus, 68 ; conduct of campaign 
 (1628), 79, 88 ; with Amim 
 defeats Gustavus, 88 
 
 KOnigsberg, 35 ; frightened into 
 neutrality, 65 
 
 Kdnigshofen taken by Gustavus, 
 205 
 
 KSnigsmarck sacks Prague, 296 
 
 Kreuznach, Gustavus storms, 240 
 
 Xronborg,'v 28 
 
 Kurland, places in, ceded to 
 Sweden, 50 ; overrun by Gus- 
 tavus, 61, 62 ; restored to 
 Poland, 89 
 
 KUstrin, Elector of Brandenburg 
 refuses to hand over, to Gus- 
 tavus, 150, 151 ; Gustavus 
 marches past, 360 ; Gustavus 
 gets free pass through, 171 
 
 Lammermann, counsellor of Fer- 
 dinand, 66 ; letter, 76 
 
 Landsberg, 142 ; Gustavus pur- 
 sues Imperial troops to, 142 ; 
 Tilly hastens to prevent block- 
 ade of, 156 ; capitulates to 
 Gustavus, 161 
 
 Landshut, Gustavus marches 
 through, 249 
 
 Lauenburg, Duke of, with Gus- 
 tavus at Lutzen, 279 n. , 284 
 
 Lech, bridge over, 245, 246 
 
 Lech, frontier of Bavaria, 244 ; 
 passage of the, 245, 246 
 
 Leipzig, convention at, 162 ; 
 capitulates to Tilly, 183 ; re- 
 duced by Elector of Saxony, 
 216 ; surrenders to Wallen- 
 stein, 274 
 
 Leslie, Sir Alexander, 85 ; ar- 
 rives at Stralsund, 85 ; recruit- 
 ing for Gustavus, 114 ; takes 
 possession of RUgen, 117 
 
 Leubelfing, with Gustavus at 
 Lutzen, 284 
 
 Lilly, Colonel Axel, at storming 
 of Marienburg, 207 
 
 Linkaping, battle near, 14 
 
 Lithuania, Swedish advance into, 
 62 
 
 Livonia, Ivan's wars for, 7 ; 
 gained by Eric, 8 ; Danes 
 claim free access to, 2g ; strug- 
 gle for, between Sweden and 
 Poland, 32-34; attacked by 
 
Index. 
 
 311 
 
 Sigismund, 46 ; ceded to 
 Sweden, 50 ; Gustavus com- 
 pletes conquest of, 62 ; se- 
 cured by Sweden, 88 
 
 Lorraine, Duke of, reinforces 
 Imperial troops, 208 
 
 Louis XIII. hesitates to support 
 Gustavus, 249 
 
 Lubeck, Diet of Hanseatic 
 League at, 74 ; conferences at, 
 go ; Peace of, 91 
 
 Lumsdell, Colonel, at storming 
 of Frankfort-on-Oder, 160 
 
 Lund in hands of Danes, 18 
 
 Lilneburg, Duke of, treaty with 
 Gustavus, 211 
 
 Liltter, battle of, 74, 75 
 
 Liltzen, battle of, 128, 129, 276 
 
 M 
 
 Magdeburg, defies Wallenstein 
 and turns to Gustavus, 107, 
 108 ; state of, 145 ; Christian 
 William master of, 146 ; treaty 
 with Gustavus, 146, 147 ; 
 Falkenberg comes to defence 
 of, 147 ; siege and storm of, 
 165 ff. / retaken by Baner, 
 216 
 
 Mainz, library of, presented by 
 Gustavus to Oxenstiern, 208 ; 
 Gustavus at, 215, 221 
 
 Malmo in hands of Danes, 18 
 
 Mannheim occupied by Bernard 
 of Weimar, 216 
 
 Mansfeld, Count, scheme for 
 helping Elector Palatine, 58 ; 
 relations with James I. and 
 Richelieu, 58 ; in England's 
 pay, 71, 72 ; his army melting 
 away, 72 ; defeated by Wal- 
 lenstein at the bridge of Des- 
 sau, 73 ; marches into Silesia, 
 
 74 
 Mantua, succession to Duchy of, 
 
 93 
 Maria Eleanora, wife of Gusta- 
 
 vus, 48 ; his opinion of her, 
 140 ; in Pomerania, 175 ; at 
 Mainz, 221 ; at Erfurt, 273 
 
 Marienburg, taken by Gustavus, 
 65 ; storm of, 207 
 
 Mary Elizabeth, sister of Gusta- 
 vus, 16 
 
 Maximilian of Bavaria, attitude 
 in Thirty Years' War, 52 ; 
 gets Upper Palatinate, 58 ; 
 contradictory orders to Tilly, 
 203, 208, 209 ; treaty with 
 France, 225 ; relations with 
 Richelieu, 225 ; alliance with 
 Ferdinand, 229 ; secures Re- 
 gensburg, 271 ; Mazarin, 295 
 
 Mecklenburg, Wallenstein's de- 
 signs on, 77 ; overrun by him, 
 78 ; recruiting in, for Gusta- 
 vus's army, 1 14 ; Savelli in, 
 131 ; Gustavus's march into, 
 135. 137. 138 ; restoration of 
 Dukes of, 173 
 
 Memel secured to Sweden by 
 Truce of Stuhmsdorf, 88 
 
 Memmingen, Gustavus at, 251 
 
 Merseburg, Imperial troops flee 
 to, 193 ; junction of Wallen- 
 stein and Pappenheim at, 272, 
 274 ; Wallenstein takes, 274 
 
 Meuchen, Gustavus's corpse car- 
 ried to, 284, 286, 287 
 
 Mewe besieged by Sigismund, 
 66 
 
 Michael, Czar, 32 
 
 Mittau taken by Gustavus, 49 
 
 Monro, account of the war, 112 ; 
 takes service under Gustavus, 
 112, 113 ; takes Rugenwalde, 
 137 ; at Breitenfeld, 188 
 
 Morner, Otto von, tutor of Gus- 
 tavus, 22 
 
 Mosburg, Gustavus marches 
 through, 249 
 
 Mulhausen, proposed meeting of 
 German Electors at, 232, 
 233 
 
 Munich opens its gates to Gus- 
 tavus, 249 
 
312 
 
 Index. 
 
 N 
 
 Naugard taken by Damitz, 136 
 Naumburg, Gustavus at, 273, 274 
 New Brandenburg, taken by 
 Gustavus, 157 ; retaken by 
 Tilly, 159 
 Nordheim, Gustavus's camp at, 
 
 24s 
 Nordlingen, Gustavus at, 272 ; 
 
 battle of, 290, 291 
 Novgorod, Swedes at, 32 
 Nuremberg, treaty with Gustavus, 
 211 ; attacked by Tilly, 213, 
 214 ; receives Gustavus, 242, 
 243 ; fortified, 259 ; famine 
 and pestilence at, 262 ; evac- 
 uated by Gustavus, 268 
 NykSping, Charles, death at, 38 ; 
 DieTof, 41 
 
 O 
 
 Ohm, Colonel, at battle of Lut- 
 zen, 281 
 
 Oland, reconquest of, by Gus- 
 tavus, 26 
 
 Oppenheim, Gustavus passes 
 _ Rhine at, 214 
 
 Srebrb, 18 ; Colonel Hamilton's 
 workshops at, 113 
 
 Ossa, General, at Ulm, 251 
 
 Oxenstiern, Axel, Gustavus's chief 
 adviser, 40, 41, 287 ; plans for 
 German war, 87, 89, 96, 156, 
 288 ; in command at Pillau 
 and Elbing, 135 ; ordered to 
 hurry up troops for blockade of 
 Colberg, 136 ; in command on 
 the Rhine, 241 ; called to 
 Nuremberg, 258, 264, 265 ; 
 left there, 268 ; joins Gustavus 
 at Naumberg, 273 ; attempted 
 union of South German Prot- 
 estants, 289 
 
 Palatinate, Gustavus visits, 48 ; 
 Spain gets part of West Pala- 
 
 tinate, 56 ; Upper Palatinate 
 handed over to Maximilian of 
 Bavaria, 58 ; question of resto- 
 ration of Frederick, 224, 225 ; 
 and the Peace of Westphalia, 
 298 
 
 Pappenheim, General, compared 
 with Gustavus, 119 ; at Mag- 
 deburg, 165 ; at Breitenfeld, 
 186, igi ; rejoins Tilly at Hal- 
 berstadt, 203 ; leaves the army, 
 209, 214 ; collects army in 
 Lower Saxony, 258 ; fighting 
 Tott on the Weser, 271 ; junc- 
 tion with Wallenstein at Merse- 
 burg, 272, 274 ; leaves Wallen- 
 stein, 275 ; arrival at Lutzen, 
 283 ; killed there, 279 n., 283 
 
 Passau, Peace of, 105, 106 
 
 Passewalk taken by Imperial 
 troops, 135 
 
 Peenemunde, entrenchments of, 
 119 
 
 Philip II., King of Spain, gets 
 part of West Palatinate, 56 ; 
 Ferdinand's promises to, 70 
 
 Piccolomini, with Wallenstein 
 near Nuremberg, 260 ; at 
 Lutzen, 280, 283 
 
 Pillau, Gustavus lands at and 
 takes, 64 ; its importance to 
 him, 64 ; Gustavus returns to 
 {1627), 67 ; lands at (1628), 79 ; 
 secured to Sweden by Truce 
 of Stuhmsdorf, 88 ; Oxenstiern 
 .at, 135 
 
 Pilsen held by Imperial troops, 217 
 
 Pleskoff stormed by Gustavus, 43 
 
 Poland, state of, 8-io ; decline, 9, 
 10, 33 ; hostility with Sweden, 
 14. 32-34 ; relations with 
 Brandenburg and Saxony, 35 ; 
 policy, 36 ; war with Sweden, 
 4 5^- /abandoned by Spain, 54 ; 
 war with Sweden, 62 ; Gus- 
 tavus's third expedition against, 
 79 ; truce with Sweden, 88, 89 ; 
 Ferdinand begs help from, 230 ; 
 peace with Sweden, 291 
 
Index. 
 
 313 
 
 Pomerania, 132 ;. overrun by 
 Wallenstein's troops, 78 ; Gus- 
 tavus's designs on, 95, 96 ; re- 
 cruiting in, for Gustavus's army, 
 114; Gustavus's conquests in, 
 132 ; treaty with Sweden, 133, 
 134 ; Ferdinand and, 134 ; 
 ceded at the Peace of West- 
 phalia, 297 
 
 Prague, Frederick at, 55 ; battle 
 of, 56 ; Elector of Saxony 
 enters, 216 ; taken by Wal- 
 lenstein, 254 ; Peace of, 291 ; 
 sack of, 296 
 
 Prenzlau taken by Gustavus, 157 
 
 Prussia, 34, 35 ; really two coun- 
 tries, 65 ; northern part of 
 West Prussia overrun by Gus- 
 tavus, 65 
 
 Pyritz, battle at, 142 
 
 R 
 
 Ramsay at Breitenf eld, 188 
 Reay, Lord, takes service with 
 
 Gustavus, 113 
 Rednitz, Gustavus crosses, 266 
 Regensburg, Diet of, 94 ; meeting 
 
 of Catholic Electors at, 108 ; 
 
 Tilly's advice to secure, 246 ; 
 
 taken by Bernard of Weimar, 
 
 2go 
 Restitution, Edict of, 106- 
 
 108 
 Rheinfelden, battle of, 293 
 Ribnitz taken by Gustavus, 
 
 139 . 
 Richelieu, Cardinal, policy in 
 Thirty Years' War, 58, 59, 92, 
 93, 100 ; compelled to stand 
 aside, 71 ; and the truce be- 
 tween Sweden and Poland, 8g ; 
 endeavours to alienate Catholic 
 League from Wallenstein, go ; 
 and the Peace of Liibeck, 91 ; 
 difference of his aims and those 
 of Gustavus, 93 ; tries to induce 
 Gustavus to attack Austria, 
 roo ; foments discord between 
 
 Ferdinand and Catholic Elec- 
 tors, loi ; and the Treaty of 
 Barwalde, 153 ; complaints of 
 Gustavus, 202 ; friend of Maxi. 
 milian, 225 ; and the Catholic 
 League, 226 _^. 
 
 Riga, siege of, 49 
 
 Rochelle taken, 92 
 
 Rostock, 77, 78 ; taken by Wal- 
 lenstein, 86 ; reduced by Tott, 
 216 
 
 Ruden, Gustavus anchors off, 118 
 
 Riigen, Isle of, 78 ; taken by 
 Leslie, 117 
 
 Rugenwalde taken by Monro, 137 
 
 Russia, extending her territories, 
 7 ; trade with England, 7 ; 
 English sympathy with, 8 ; 
 peace with Sweden, 8 ; war 
 with Sweden, g ; anarchy in, 
 31 ; war with Sweden, 32 ; 
 policy, 36 ; war with Sweden, 
 43 ; and Gustavus, 231 
 
 Salvius, letters quoted, 87, 207 
 
 Sapieha defeated by Gustavus at 
 Wallhof, 62 
 
 Savelli, in Mecklenburg, 131 ; oc- 
 cupies frontier between Meck- 
 lenburg and Pomerania, I3g ; 
 surrenders Demmin, 158 
 
 Saxony, 34 ; importance of, 35 ; 
 Tilly's advance into, 177 ; 
 loses independence, 2g4 
 
 Schaumburg, General, succeeds 
 Conti, I3g ; at Stettin, 139- 
 141 ; retires to Frankfort, 142 ; 
 at Breitenf eld, 184 
 
 Schievelbein, skirmishes near, 
 137 
 
 Schonen in hands of Danes, 28 
 
 Schwedt, Gustavus's troops at, 142 
 
 Schweinfurt, receives Gustavus, 
 207 ; siege of, 241, 242 ; Wal- 
 lenstein attacks, 271 
 
 Scotland, effect of Reformation 
 on, 17 
 
314 
 
 Inde.\ 
 
 Scots, readiness to serve for pay, 
 1 1 2-1 14 ; three regiments with 
 Gustavus, 114 
 
 Sigismund III., King of Poland, 
 10, and of Sweden, 11, 12 ; 
 attempts to introduce Catholi- 
 cism into Sweden, 12 ; his use 
 to Spain, 13 ; defeated at Lin- 
 koping and deposed, 14 ; and 
 the throne of Russia, 31 ; wars 
 with Charles, 32, 33, 34 ; tam- 
 pers with Swedish nobles, 33 ; 
 cedes Livonia, 34 ; backed up 
 by Catholic Europe, 37 ; at. 
 tacks Livonia, 46 ; truce with 
 Gustavus, 50 ; abandoned by 
 Spain, 54 ; besieges Mewe, 66 ; 
 truce with Gustavus, 88 
 
 Sigismund, John, Elector of 
 Brandenburg, 34, 48 
 
 Skytte, John, tutor of Gustavus, 
 22, 44 
 
 Sound, tolls of the, cause of 
 strife between Sweden and 
 Denmark, 28 
 
 Spain, Catholic, 5 ; sympathy 
 with Denmark, 8 ; power, 
 etc., 13 ; attitude in struggle 
 between Sweden and Poland, 
 14, 46 ; and Austria, 54 ; gets 
 West Palatinate, 56 ; combina- 
 tion with Austria and Bavaria, 
 70 ; war with France about 
 Mantua, 93 ; peace with Eng- 
 land, loi ; possible hostilities 
 between Gustavus and, 214, 
 215 ; war with France, 291 
 
 Spandau, ceded to Gustavus, 163 ; 
 Gustavus withdraws from, 169, 
 170 ; handed over to Gustavus, 
 171 
 
 Sparre with Wallenstein near 
 Nuremberg, 260 
 
 Speyer, occupied by Bernard of 
 Weimar, 216 ; capitulates to 
 Imperial troops, 264 
 
 Spinola besieges Breda, 73 
 
 Stalhanske at Liltzen, 281, 284 
 
 Stargard taken by Damitz, 136 
 
 Stephen Bathori, King-elect of 
 Poland, 9 
 
 Sternskjold, Admiral, 68 
 
 Stettin, besieged by Imperial 
 troops, 117, 118 ; taken by 
 Gustavus, 133 ; Schaumburg's 
 attack on Swedish camp at, 139 
 
 Stockholm, 18 
 
 Stolbova, Peace of, 43 
 
 Stralsund, 78, B3 ; besieged by 
 Wallenstein, 83, 84 ; treaty 
 with Gustavus, 84 ; aided by 
 Sweden and Denmark, 84, 85 ; 
 siege raised, 85 ; its value to 
 Sweden, 98 
 
 Strasburg taken by Horn, 271 
 
 Stuhmsdorf, Truce of, 88, 89 
 
 Susa, Peace of, 92 
 
 Swedish army, composition of, ill 
 
 Swedish Council, Gustavus's con- 
 ference with, re the war, 87, 
 
 96, 97 ; Gustavus's address to, 
 
 97, 98 . , 
 
 ' ' Swedish Discipline, ' quoted, 
 
 115, 116 
 
 Swedish Estates, and the war, 
 96, 97 ; Gustavus's last speech 
 to, 60, no 
 
 " Swedish Intelligencer," quoted, 
 257, 261, 279 n., 281 
 
 " Sweedische Oorloghen," quot- 
 ed, 116 
 
 T 
 
 Tabor held by Imperial troops, 21 7 
 
 Tangermiinde, Gustavus crosses 
 Elbe at, 174 
 
 Teuffel, Baron, sent to complete 
 reduction of northern for- 
 tresses, 155 ; at Breitenfeld, 
 188 ; slain, 194 
 
 Thum, Count, at siege of Dant- 
 zic, 67 ; at Breitenfeld, 188 ; 
 friendship with Wallenstein, 218 
 
 Tiefenbach, Colonel, in Bohemia 
 and Silesia, 181, 216 
 
 Tilly, Count, invades Lower 
 Saxon Circle, 61 ; defeats 
 Christian at Llitter, 74 ; oppo- 
 
Index. 
 
 315 
 
 sition of Catholic Electors to, 
 94 ; Wallenstein's army handed 
 over to, 109 ; number of his 
 army, 114 ; compared with 
 Gustavus, 120 ; joined by Fug- 
 gen and Aldringer, 156 ; at 
 Frankfort, 156 ; his inactivity, 
 156, 170-172 ; relations with 
 Emperor and League, 62 ; 
 takes Magdeburg, 166 ff. ; in 
 Germany, 171 ; attack on Wer- 
 ben, 175, 176 ; advances into 
 Saxony, 177 ; number of his 
 forces, l8i ; mistake in not 
 taking passage of Wittenberg, 
 l8l, 182 ! takes Leipzig, 183 ; 
 at Breitenfeld, 185^./ rejoined 
 by Pappenheim at Halberstadt, 
 203 ; attacks Nuremberg, 213, 
 214 ; advances against Horn, 
 241 ; occupies Bamberg, 241 ; 
 besieges Schweinfurt, 241, 242 ; 
 death, 246 
 
 Torgau, meeting of Electors of 
 Brandenburg and Saxony at, 
 252 ; Banir's camp at, 292 
 
 Torstenson, Leonard, with Gus- 
 tavus in Poland, 45 ; commands 
 artillery at Breitenfeld, 188 ; 
 taken prisoner at Alte Veste 
 and ransomed, 267, 268 ; his 
 artillery at Liltzen, 285 ; takes 
 command at death of Baner, 
 294 ; defeats Saxons at second 
 battle of Breitenfeld, 294 ; vic- 
 tories, 295 
 
 Tott, Ake, takes Greifswald, 173 ; 
 sent back to Mecklenburg, 181 ; 
 reduces Rostock and Wismar, 
 216 ; his forces, 239 ; on the 
 Weser, 258, 271 
 
 Treptow, taken by Damitz, 136 ; 
 taken by Gustavus, 157 
 
 Turenne, 296 
 
 U 
 
 UckermUnde, Imperial troops 
 driven from, 134 
 
 Ulm besieged by Ossa, 251 
 Upsala, 18 ; decrees of, 11 ; 
 
 Gustavus's conference with his 
 
 Council at, 96 
 Urban VIII. refuses to assist 
 
 Ferdinand, 231 
 Usedom, Gustavus lands at, 118, 
 
 and takes, 132 
 
 Vane, Sir Henry, at Mainz, 221 
 
 Vasa, House of, 20 ; Gustavus's 
 history of, 22 n. ; popularity of 
 their rule. III 
 
 Venice, decline of, 3 
 
 Verden, Bishopric of, ceded to 
 Sweden by Peace of West- 
 phalia, 297 
 
 Vitzthum, ■ Colonel, at Breiten- 
 feld, 188, 193 
 
 W 
 
 Wallenstein, Duke of Friedland, 
 ascendancy of, 66 ; wishes 
 help to be sent to Sigismund, 
 66 ; generalissimo of Imperial 
 forces, 73 ; defeats Mansfeld, 
 73 ; follows Mansfeld into 
 Silesia, 74 ; policy, 75, 76 ; 
 designs on Mecklenburg, 77 ; 
 peace with Christian, 78 ; over- 
 runs Mecklenburg and Pome- 
 rania, 78 ; attack on Stralsund, 
 78, 79, 83-85 ; takes Rostock, 
 86 ; and tjie Catholic League, 
 go, 94, 104, 109 ; change in 
 his opinion of Gustavus, 92 ; 
 and the Edict of Restitution, 
 
 107 ! Magdeburg defies, 107, 
 
 108 ; dismissed, 109 ; compared 
 with Gustavus, 119 ; intrigues 
 with Gustavus, 217 ff.; and 
 Arnim, 235, 252, 254 ; again 
 generalissimo, 235, 253 ; char- 
 acter of his army, 253 ; ad- 
 vances against Prague and 
 Eger, 254 ; his advanced guard 
 
3i6 
 
 Index. 
 
 joins Maximilian's advanced 
 guard at Weiben, 257 ; at 
 Nuremberg, 260 ff. ; his view 
 of the situation, 269 ; deter- 
 mines to attack Saxony, 270 ; 
 attack on Schweinfurt, 271 ; 
 junction with Pappenheim at 
 Merseburg, 272, 274 ; follows 
 up Gustavus, 275 ; at Ltitzen, 
 279^./ assassination of, 290 
 
 Wallhof, battle of, 62 
 
 Weiben, meeting of Wallenstein 
 and Maximilian's advanced 
 guards at, 257 
 
 Weissenfels, Wallenstein takes 
 and fortifies, 274, 275 
 
 Werben, Tilly attacks, 175, 176 ; 
 Gustavus's camp at, 174 
 
 Westeras, 18 ; Diet of, 6 
 
 Westphalia, Peace of, -compared 
 with Gustavus's conditions for 
 peace, 233 ; Peace of, 297, 298 
 
 Whitelocke's journal quoted, 19 
 
 William of Hesse Cassel, raises 
 forces to assist Gustavus, 138, 
 171 ; joins Gustavus, 175 ; rais- 
 ing forces, 204 ; joins Gustavus 
 
 at Frankfort, 213 ; proposal to 
 sweep away Ecclesiastical Elec- 
 tors, 234 ; called to Nurem- 
 berg, 258, 265 
 
 William of Weimar, comes to 
 help of Gustavus, 242 ; recalled 
 to Nuremberg, 258, 265 
 
 Wismar, 77, 78 ; taken by Tott, 
 216 ; ceded to Sweden by 
 Peace of Westphalia, 297 
 
 Wittstock, battle of, 292 
 
 Wolgast surrenders to Gustavus, 
 
 134 
 
 Wolkau, Swedish army at, 184 
 
 Wollin taken by Gustavus, 132 
 
 Wollmirstadt, Tilly's ultimatum 
 from, 177 
 
 Worms occupied by Bernard of 
 Weimar, 216 
 
 Wrangel, General, with Gustavus 
 in Poland, 45 ; in command of 
 Swedish forces, 295, 296 
 
 Wiirzburg, evacuated, 207 ; li- 
 brary of, sent to Upsala, 208 ; 
 Horn left at, 212, 240 
 
 Wiirzburg, Bishop of, flight of, 
 205 
 
Missing Page 
 
Iberoes of tbe IFlations. 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 EVELYN ABBOTT M.A., Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. 
 
 A Series of biographical studies of the lives and work 
 of a number of representative historical characters about 
 whom have gathered the great traditions of the Nations 
 to which they belonged, and who have been accepted, in 
 many instances, as types of the several National ideals. 
 With the life of each typical character will be presented 
 a picture of the National conditions surrounding hfm 
 during his career. 
 
 The narratives are the work of writers who are recog- 
 nized authorities on their several subjects, and, while 
 thoroughly trustworthy as history, will present picturesque 
 and dramatic " stories " of the Men and of the events con- 
 nected with them. 
 
 To the Life of each " Hero " will be given one duo- 
 decimo volume, handsomely printed in large type, pro- 
 vided with maps and adequately illustrated according to 
 the special requirements of the several subjects. The 
 volumes will be sold separately as follows : 
 
 Cloth extra $15° 
 
 Half morocco, uncut edges, gilt top . . . i 75 
 Large paper, limited to 250 numbered copies for 
 subscribers to the series. These may be ob- 
 tained in sheets folded, or ifi cloth, uncut 
 edges . . ■ 3 5*^ 
 
The first group of the Series will comprise twelve 
 volumes, as follows : 
 
 Nelson, and the Naval Supremacy of England. By W. Clark Russell, 
 author of " The Wreck of the Grosvenor," etc. 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus, and the Struggle of Protestantism for Exist- 
 ence. By C. R. L. Fletcher, M.A., late Fellow of All Souls College, 
 Oxford. 
 
 Pericles, and the Golden Age of Athens. By Evelyn Abbott, M.A., 
 Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. 
 
 Theodoric the Goth, the Barbarian Champion of Civilization. By 
 Thomas Hodgkin, author of " Italy and Her Invaders," etc. 
 
 Sir Philip Sidney, and the Chivalry of England. By H. R. Fox- 
 Bourne, author of " The Life of John Locke," etc. 
 
 Julius Csesar, and the Organization of the Roman Empire. By 
 W. Warde Fowler, M.A., Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford. 
 
 Alexander the Great, and the Extension of Greek Rule and of 
 Greek Ideas. By Prof. Benjamin I. Wheeler, Cornell University. 
 
 Charlemagne, the Reorganizer of Europe. By Prof. George L. Burk, 
 Cornell University. 
 
 Cicero, and the Fall of the Roman Republic. By J. L. Strachan 
 Davidson, M.A., Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. 
 
 Louis XIV., and the Zenith of the French Monarchy. By Arthur 
 Hassall, M.A., Senior Student of Christ Church College, Oxford. 
 
 Sir Walter Raleigh, and the Adventurers of England. By A. L. 
 Smith, M.A., Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. 
 
 Bismarck. The New German Empire : How It Arose ; What It 
 Replaced ; and What It Stands For. By James Sime, author of 
 "A Life of Lessing," etc. 
 
 To be followed by : 
 
 Henry of Navarre, and the Huguenots in France. By P. F. Willert, 
 M.A., Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. 
 
 William of Orange, the Founder of the Dutch Republic. By Ruth 
 Putnam. 
 
 Hannibal, and the Struggle between Carthage and Rome. By 
 
 E. A. Freeman, D.C.L., LL.D., Regius Prof, of History in the 
 
 University of Oxford. 
 Alfred the Great, and the First Kingdom in England. By F. York 
 
 Powell, M.A., Senior Student of Christ Church College, Oxford. 
 Charles the Bold, and the Attempt to Found a Middle Kingdom. 
 
 By R. Lodge, M.A., Fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford. 
 John Calvin, the Hero of the French Protestants. By Owen M. 
 
 Edwards, Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford. 
 Oliver Cromwell, and the Rule of the Puritans in England. By 
 
 Charles Firth, Balliol College, Oxford. 
 
 Marlborough, and England as a Military Power. By C. W. G. 
 
 Oman, A.M., Fellow of AH Souls College, Oxford. 
 
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
 New York London 
 
 27 AND 29 West Twenty-third Street 27 King William Street, Strand 
 
M 
 
 
 
 
 H 
 
 M 
 
 
 11 
 
 X 
 K 
 
 
 
 c 
 
 to 
 
 t4 
 
 
 11 
 
 < 
 
 > 
 
 > 
 
 M 
 
 > 
 a' 
 
 
 
 H 
 
 C 
 M 
 
 s 
 
 
 
 H H 
 
 
 
 CLUl W 
 
 
 
 (D ON IH 
 
 
 
 ^,po 
 
 
 
 
 
 o5 M X 
 
 
 
 
 ra o 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 ^ M »=^ 
 
 
 
 oi,^ S 
 
 g — 
 
 
 ■ss^g. 
 
 2 
 
 II 
 
 M 
 
 ■3 
 
 n 
 
 Ul 
 
 
 10 
 
 GO 
 
 
 John III. 
 
 1568-1592 
 
 tharine Jag 
 
 Q* 
 
 
 5^ 
 
 
 i__i 
 
 2- 
 
 
 o 
 
 
 o%cr- - 
 
 §* 
 
 bd 
 
 3 
 
 9 <^ 
 
 1-1 m M fi 
 00 12! *^ Ps 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 a S' 
 
 O 
 H 
 
 C 
 en 
 
 ON a; 
 *■ > 
 
 3 a. " o ^ 
 
 ay 
 
 M B . M 
 
 ON K a" 
 
 
 P 
 II 
 
 M O 
 
 OnM 
 
 ^?- 
 
 o II 
 
 Oi_,!:r 
 o ffia, 
 
 _S O OT >-s 
 O io'S-.M 
 
W^i 
 
 p 
 
 ^ 
 
 p-T/ 
 
 f^ 
 
 P 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^v^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^"^ 
 
 
 kVTvii^sj 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^«j^ 
 
 
 m 
 
 
 ^^^ 
 
 
 ^^ 
 
 
 ^Jlj? *V{, 
 
 '^^^M(f&^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 \M 
 
 
 y 
 S 
 
 w 
 
 c^ 
 
 
 P 
 
 ^^ 
 
 ^j)l^^ 
 
 XTbe Storip of tbe Bations. 
 
 Messrs. G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS take pleasure in 
 announcing that they have in course of publication, in 
 co-operation with Mr. T. Fisher Unwin, of London, a 
 series of historical studies, intended to present in a 
 graphic manner the stories of the different nations that 
 have attained prominence in history. 
 
 In the story form the current of each national life is 
 distinctly indicated, and its picturesque and noteworthy 
 periods and episodes are presented for the reader in their 
 philosophical relation to each other as well as to universal 
 history. 
 
 It is the plan of the writers of the different volumes to 
 enter into the real life of the peoples, and to bring them 
 before the reader as they actually lived, labored, and 
 struggled — as they studied and wrote, and as they amused 
 themselves. In carrying out this plan, the myths, with 
 which the history of all lands begins, will not be over- 
 looked, though these will be carefully distinguished from 
 the actual history, so far as the labors of the accepted 
 historical authorities have resulted in definite conclusions. 
 
 The subjects of the different volumes have been planned 
 to cover connecting and, as far as possible, consecutive 
 epochs or periods, so that the set when completed will 
 present in a comprehensive narrative the chief events in 
 
the great Story of the Nations ; but it is, of course 
 not always practicable to issue the several volumes in 
 their chronological order. 
 
 The " Stories " are printed in good readable type, and 
 in handsome i2mo form. They are adequately illustrated 
 and furnished with maps and indexes. Price, per vol., 
 cloth, $1.50. Half morocco, gilt top, $1.75. 
 
 The following volumes are now ready (November, 1891): 
 
 THE STORY OF GREECE. Prof. JAS. A. Harrison. 
 " " " ROME. Arthur Oilman. 
 
 " THE JEWS. Prof. James K. Hosmer. 
 " CHALDEA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
 " GERMANY. S. Baring-Gould. 
 
 " NORWAY. PIjALMAR H. BOYESEN. 
 
 ' SPAIN. Rev. E. E. and Susan Hale. 
 
 HUNGARY. Prof. A. VXmb£ry. 
 
 " CARTHAGE. Prof. Alfred J. Church. 
 
 " THE SARACENS. Arthur Oilman. 
 
 " THE MOORS IN SPAIN. Stanley Lane-Poole. 
 
 ' THE NORMANS. Sarah Orne Jewett. 
 
 " PERSIA. S. G. W. Benjamin. 
 
 ■" ANCIENT EGYPT. Prof. Geo. Rawlinson. 
 
 " ALEXANDER'S EMPIRE. Prof. J. P. MAhaffy. 
 
 ■" ASSYRIA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
 
 THE GOTHS. PIenry Bradley. 
 
 " " " IRELAND. Hon. Emily Lawless. 
 
 TURKEY. Stanley Lane-Poole. 
 
 MEDIA, BABYLON, AND PERSIA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
 
 ' MEDIEVAL FRANCE. Prof. Gustav Masson. 
 
 " HOLLAND. Prof. J. Thorold Rogers. 
 
 " MEXICO. Susan Hale. 
 
 " PPICENICIA. Prof. Geo. Rawlinson. 
 
 ' THE HANSA TOWNS. Helen Zimmern. 
 
 " EARLY BRITAIN. Prof. Alfred J. Church. 
 
 " THE BARBARY CORSAIRS. Stanley Lane-Poole. 
 
 " RUSSIA. W. R. MoRFiLL. 
 
 " THE JEWS UNDER ROME. W. D. Morrison. 
 
 " " " SCOTLAND. John Mackintosh. 
 
 " SWITZERLAND. R. Stead and Mrs. Arnold Hug. 
 
 " PORTUGAL. H. Morse-Stephens. 
 
 " THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE. C. W. C. Oman. 
 
 Now in press for immediate issue : 
 
 THE STORY OF SICILY. E. A. Freeman. 
 
 " VEDIC INDIA. Z. A. Ragozin. 
 " THE THIRTEEN COLONIES. Helen A. Smith. 
 " WALES AND CORNWALL. Owen M. Edwards. 
 " CANADA. A. R. Macfarlane. 
 
 G P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
 New York 
 
 T. 
 
 FISHER UNWIN 
 London