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STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
STUDIES IN 
 
 APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 OUIDE FOR OFFICEBS PREPARING FOR 
 TACTICAL EXAMINATIONS. 
 
 BT 
 
 KARL VON DONAT, 
 
 LATE LIEUTENANT EAST FETJSSIAN FUSILIER KEGIMENT HO. 33 
 
 (NOW "REGIMENT COUNT ROON"), 
 
 AND FOR THE LAST THIRTEEN TEARS PREPARING OFFICERS, ETC., FOR MILITARY 
 
 EXABIINATIONS IN BKGLAHI). 
 
 • Tactics crystallize in the orders to the troops." — ^K. v. Donat. 
 
 PART I. SECOND EDITION. 
 WITH MAP. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 WILLIAM CLOWES & SONS, Limited, 
 
 13, CHAEING CROSS, S.W. 
 
 1894. 
 
LONDON 
 
 FKINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIUITBD, 
 
 STAMFOSD STREBX AND CHASING CBOSS, 
 
 lAll rights reserved.^ 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 In this little book the attempt is made — for the 
 first time in England, so far as I am aware — to 
 assist in the study of Applied Tactics with small 
 units. Not many have the opportunity of taking 
 part in a " Kriegspiel," but all can read at home. 
 
 If it finds favour, I shall continue with the 
 solution of a series of questions as set in the various 
 tactical examinations, and introduce such as I think 
 ought also to be set. 
 
 To every one who has experience in Tactics it 
 will be apparent that, when solving a question as 
 mostly set in the current examinations, the time 
 allowed to do so properly is altogether inadequate. 
 Latterly three Is the usual number to be done in 
 three hours. 
 
 Two to three hours ought to be allowed for one 
 question, otherwise only a perfunctory answer can 
 be obtained, and thus a superficial student is placed 
 on equality with a serious one. 
 
Tl PREFACE. 
 
 An examiner should be able by one, or at the 
 utmost two, tactical questions to sift the chaff from 
 the grain, and allot to a nicety the marks, however 
 severe the competition. 
 
 It should further be made obligatory to note the 
 time when a candidate has handed in his answer — 
 a point of great importance, particularly in a com- 
 petitive examination. 
 
 It is also very much to be regretted that, in 
 some examinations. Tactics are placed on an equality 
 with Fortification and Topography, which are only 
 auxiliaries to them. Double the number of marks 
 should be allotted to Tactics, for, by making in- 
 telligent use of the map when disposing troops, 
 the candidate shows that he knows half the Topo- 
 graphy, and this should count in his favour. For- 
 tification also frequently forms part of a tactical 
 problem. 
 
 A book is easily learnt by heart, but education 
 and training are only arrived at by application ; 
 therefore questions in Tactics permitting in their 
 answer only quotations from a book, should be 
 limited and a candidate's intelligence be not 
 merely judged by these, but a chance should be 
 given him to show that he can practically apply 
 the information which he has put on paper. 
 
 To the more advanced student I recommend a 
 book called " Staff Duties in the Field," etc., by 
 Captain J. M. Grierson, R.A. (to be had of all 
 
PREFACE. VH 
 
 booksellers). It is an admirable little volimie, too 
 little known, I think, and should be studied by 
 all captains and officers of a higher grade. 
 
 The accompanying map is reproduced by kind 
 permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery 
 Office. 
 
 It represents the eastern portion of the battle- 
 field of Sedan. 
 
 Fleet Eiver is La Givonne River, 
 
 Newtown is Bazeilles, 
 
 Shaw Wood is Bois de la Garenne, etc. 
 
 July, 1892. 
 
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 The references have been brought iu consonance 
 with the new " Infantry Drill " and " Field Artillery 
 Drill," which were issued since the first edition was 
 published, and a few minor alterations have been 
 made in the text as suggested to the author. 
 
 KARL VON DONAT. 
 
 4, Cannins Place, London, W., 
 March, 1891. 
 
STUDIES IN 
 
 APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 INTKODUCTION". 
 
 The following is one of the remarks of the 
 examiner in Tactics, published in the recent " Eeport 
 on the Eesult of the Examination held in November, 
 1891, of OflScers of Regular Forces, Militia, and 
 Volunteers " : — 
 
 He says, " There is frequently an absence of 
 exactness in the orders to the different units, which 
 would render it diflScult for commanding officers to 
 execute them." 
 
 This refers to officers of the regular forces, in 
 particular to captains under examination to qualify 
 for field officer ; so also the following remark : 
 "Some officers are very vague, not so much as to 
 what they would do, but as to how they would do 
 it, which seems to show that they have studied their 
 
2 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 text-books, but have not themselves thought out 
 the matter." 
 
 This same examiner characterizes the answers 
 of field officers and captains of militia and volun- 
 teers in the following words : — 
 
 " I regret that I cannot give a favourable report 
 on this examination. Very few of the papers are 
 even moderately good, and none of the officers 
 examined have any real knowledge of the subject. 
 This is not wonderful, when their limited oppor- 
 tunities of acquiring such knowledge are taken into 
 account; but, on the other hand, it raises the 
 question whether officers of the militia and volun- 
 teers should be examined in the application of 
 troops to ground, and whether the standard required 
 of them should not be limited to the theories of 
 the text-books ; the latter they can, and do, study 
 for themselves, while applied tactics require either 
 special instructions or exceptional talent combined 
 with exceptional opportunities. 
 
 " In a large number of cases they have not (to use 
 the words of one of them) 'grasped the subject,' 
 and they have, as a rule, but faint ideas of what 
 ought to be done, and not at all as to how to do it." 
 So far the examiner. 
 
 To my mind it rather " raises the question " how 
 militia and volunteer officers can be provided with 
 that " special instruction " in " applied tactics " so as 
 to obtain satisfactory results in an examination — the 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 3 
 
 only test to prove that the officer has " grasped the 
 subject," when it is impossible to test by handling 
 troops in manoeuvres or before the enemy. 
 
 A plainer mode of stigmatizing militia and volun- 
 teer officers as amateur soldiers, and of advocating 
 that they should be kept on that level, cannot well 
 be imagined. May they raise a protest ! Others 
 can enlarge upon this particular point. 
 
 In the following pages the attempt is maide to 
 impart that special instruction to those interested, by 
 showing a way to solve a tactical problem set in 
 November, 1891. 
 
 Remembering the remark of the examiner first 
 quoted in these lines, I advise every student of 
 Tactics, above all, to adopt my motto — 
 
 TACTICS CEYSTALLIZE IN THE OEDEES 
 TO THE TEOOPS. 
 
 The solution of the problem will be divided 
 into — 
 
 I. The Process of Development, which means survey 
 or reconnaissance of the given ground, the map, its 
 scale, directions of compass, features of the ground, 
 vertical interval, steepness, practicability for the 
 different arms, relative heights, watercourses, bridges, 
 defiles, villages, woods, etc., review of the forces at 
 disposal, the reports received about the enemy, the 
 instructions under which the force is required to 
 act, the tactical principle involved, how it is to be 
 
4 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 applied in this special case, coming to a determi- 
 nation, how this must be expressed, or, in other 
 words, what an okdee must contain. 
 
 II. The Production of the Order, i.e. what must 
 be despatched to the troops under your command 
 to carry out your determination. This will be, as 
 a rule, the. actual answer to the question. Like 
 a crystal, it must be simple, lucid, unmistakable, 
 and, like such, produced rapidly after the slow 
 process of evaporation; in other words, this part 
 should take the shortest time to answer in an 
 examination. 
 
 III. Testing the Value of the Order (the furity of 
 the crystal). — This means nothing else but giving 
 the reasons for the order or orders, which are usually 
 demanded in an examination ; and here the candi- 
 date has ample opportunity to lay down in writing 
 what has occupied him mentally ia Part I. He can 
 bring forward everything which is to his advantage, 
 and may anticipate and refute any adverse criti- 
 cism of the view he has taken of the tactical 
 situation. 
 
 With this to guide the reader, I begin the 
 
 PEOBLEM I. 
 
 QVide map, OfiBcial Eeport mentioned — November, 1891.) 
 
 " It may be assumed that the Fleet River is im- 
 passable below Morton, except at the bridges. 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 5 
 
 " You are in command of — 
 
 One brigade of infantry and two batteries 
 
 marching on one road ; 
 Two regiments of cavalry in advance ; 
 and are in pursuit of a defeated enemy, 
 
 "At 9 am. on the 7th of September, 1891, as the 
 head of the advanced guard (moving east on 'the road 
 I) debouches from Longside, your cavalry is stand- 
 ing as follows : First regiment at bridge 2 ; second 
 regiment at bridge 7 ; each covered by scouts. At 
 the above hour they report that the enemy (two 
 battalions and three batteries) is in position on 
 Garnant Down, and that the villages Morton and 
 Parton are held by small parties of infantry. At 
 the same moment your advanced guard is fired on 
 from the south-east corner of Shaw Wood. 
 
 " State what dispositions you would make in order 
 to force the enemy from his position, and calculate 
 roughly by what hour those dispositions would be 
 completed. Give your reasons for the plan pro- 
 posed." 
 
 SOLUTION. 
 
 (A pair of oompasses, a pencil, and a piece of paper should 
 always be at hand.) 
 
 I. Proeess of Development, 
 
 . The scale is 3 inches to one mile, or ^j^^-^, a, 
 slightly smaller scale than the original surveys of 
 
6 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS, 
 
 most countries. The usual scale by which troops 
 would be disposed in actual warfare in England 
 would be ^^^0, or one inch to the mile, in other 
 countries iwirTJT or gooao - The larger the scale 
 of the map, the more detail is probably required in 
 the dispositions and the showing of the troops on 
 the map ; this is one point to be kept in view. 
 
 The conventional signs for the marking of the 
 troops are given in Colonel Eichards' " Text-book on 
 Topography," and I advise the student to colour 
 little bits of paper, and pin these on the map where 
 a body of troops is placed, or, still better, to use 
 small cubes of coloured lead or coloured paper (off 
 stamps) gummed to it; the troops can then be 
 moved about, and one map can be used for all sorts 
 of problems. 
 
 The map, measuring about 13 x 8 inches, repre- 
 
 13 X 8 
 sents about — ^ — , or roughly 12 square miles of 
 
 country, on which to operate. 
 
 The compass points are not marked, but the rule 
 is that, where such are omitted, the side margins are 
 to be taken as true north (above) and south (below). 
 Besides, the wording of the question will sometimes 
 give information in this respect, and here in this 
 question it leaves no doubt. 
 
 The Fleet Eiver being impassable (except by the 
 bridges) only below Morton, the other watercourses 
 can safely be disregarded as obstacles, since nothing 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 7 
 
 on the map indicates marshy ground, steep banks, 
 etc. All having their sources within the map, and 
 none exceeding two miles in length, one may 
 consider them as ditches which can be crossed by 
 all arms without the slightest delay. 
 
 The 7th of September is mentioned in the 
 question, but not the state of the weather, which is 
 of great importance in all tactical operations. 
 We may assume, therefore, any probable weather 
 we like, and which would fit conveniently with our 
 dispositions whenever we discuss Part III, men- 
 tioned in the introduction. However, it is safest to 
 assume always ordinary and likely circumstances. 
 It is nearing autumn, and so let it be a temperate 
 air, clear, and a light breeze. This is also in con- 
 formity with the question; for how could the 
 cavalry otherwise have reported so precisely on the 
 enemy ? We assume, therefore, that the surface of 
 the ground is ordinary, and exercises no retarding 
 influence on any movements. 
 
 All the roads except part of one are fenced in. 
 What the nature of these fences is can also be 
 conveniently assumed; they need not cause the 
 slightest delay when deviating from the road ; but 
 still, as one road is marked " unfenced," it may be 
 taken to mean that an obstacle, however slight, 
 exists at the side of the roads, which may also 
 aflford cover from view to troops moving on them. 
 
 Alternate contours are marked thick on the 
 
O STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 njap ; here it signifies nothing particular, and 
 need not be noticed; it makes it only more diffi- 
 cult for the candidate to judge the steepness of the 
 ground, as the shading obscures the lighter contours 
 at the steep places. The hillsides bounding Fleet 
 valley on the west are the steepest, particularly 
 between Morton and Parton, also part of the ground 
 between Challow and Pewsey Wood, and the 
 western slopes of the Forest of Arden. The ver- 
 tical interval being 25 feet and the scale 3 inches 
 to the mile, the ground is altogether gentler sloped 
 than appears to one accustomed to read maps with 
 normal contours, i.e. 40 feet with this scale. The 
 steepest slope on the map is found by measuring 
 the shortest horizontal distance between two 
 adjacent contours, here about 25 or 80 yards, say 
 25 yards ; therefore the gradient at that place 
 
 is ^ -T- or I, which is 20 degrees of slope ; 
 
 otherwise the ground is, on the average, perhaps 
 5 degrees, or gentler. Except at a few places, 
 notably those on the right bank of Fleet Valley, 
 all arms could manoeuvre. 
 
 The east bank of Fleet River has a command 
 over the west bank, but troops debouching from 
 Longside could not be seen from Garnant Down, the 
 visual line, intercepted by the ridge on the west 
 bank, being steeper from this ridge to Longside 
 than to Garnant Down. 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS, 9 
 
 Access to the western half of Shaw Wood, un- 
 observed from Grarnant Down, can be gained by 
 means of the small valley north of Longside, and 
 probably even unobserved from the south-east 
 corner of the same wood, although, debouching from 
 Longside, the head of the advanced guard received 
 fire from there ; the houses of Longside may screen 
 a movement until in that small valley, 
 
 It is to be remembered that the bridges can only 
 be passed over in a front equal to the breadth of 
 the bridge, which appears here everywhere of the 
 same width as the roads. Morton and Parton 
 bridges are probably screened by houses from view 
 and fire of artillery at Garnant Down ; those below 
 Parton, if visible from that hill, which is doubtful, 
 on account of the trees of Shape Copse, are 4000 yards 
 from it, therefore beyond effective artillery range. 
 
 Anyhow, these bridges are so many defiles to be 
 passed over in presence of the enemy, who also may 
 have prepared to blow them up whenever forced to 
 evacuate Morton and Parton. This latter considera- 
 tion would influence the. commander in making his 
 dispositions to force the enemy from his position. 
 
 No detail is given as regards the nature of out- 
 skirts of villages or houses ; it shows that this is 
 immaterial here, and indicates only that the enemy 
 fights, under cover, and can with small numbers 
 resist superior forces. That a part of Morton and 
 Parton lies on the western bank is a source of 
 
10 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 weakness for him, since a sudden seizure of those 
 parts by the attacking force before he determines 
 to give them up might deprive him of the oppor- 
 tunity of demolishing the bridges. 
 
 The nature of the woods is very important in 
 tactical operations, and conventional signs, indicat- 
 ing at least undergrowth or otherwise, ought always 
 to be given. When judging the visibility of 
 ground, the height of the trees, being unknown, 
 makes it impossible to gauge accurately what can 
 be seen and what not. It is best, whenever no 
 certainty exists, to assume the ordinary, and that 
 is, that infantry can pass through a wood every- 
 where, cavalry in single file along the footpaths, 
 and artillery only on rides and roads. 
 
 Shaw Wood favours a covered approach towards 
 Morton to "within decisive ranges. From Morton to 
 Garnant Down is the shorter distance as compared 
 with an approach thither from Parton; and along 
 the foot of Garnant Hill the troops are in the dead 
 angle, and conld gain access to Shape Copse, if 
 unoccupied, with little loss. Once in Shape Copse, 
 the enemy would hardly await the attack on Gar- 
 nant Down, but withdraw. This Shape Copse also 
 favours a covered approach from Parton. The 
 enemy, evacuating Parton, would probably retire 
 into Shape Copse, and finally on Garnant Down; 
 the assailant, following with skirmishers along the 
 watershed south of Shape Copse, and detaining 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 11 
 
 the enemy there, can bring up meanwhile his main 
 force in comparative security along the Parton- 
 Challow valley. The effect would soon become 
 apparent. 
 
 The footpaths through the Forest of Arden and 
 the Pewsey Wood should favour any movement of 
 the cavalry. 
 
 This concludes the survey of the map. On the 
 actual ground the officer commanding would have 
 to go approximately through the same process. 
 Before he acts he must first reconnoitre ; if he has 
 a map, he does so as we have done here, but is 
 aided by actual observation, at least for the imme- 
 diate neighbourhood, and from favourable points 
 for the more distant ground. 
 
 The force at disposal is four battalions and two 
 batteries marching on one road, and two cavalry 
 regiments, these latter in positions as indicated 
 in the question at bridges 2 and 7 respectively, 
 with scouts in front, presumably keeping the enemy 
 under observation. 
 
 "As the head of the advanced guard debouches 
 from Longside " at 9 a.m., the cavalry reports pre- 
 cisely on the enemy, and at the same moment the 
 head of the advanced guard is fired on from the 
 south-east corner of Shaw Wood. 
 
 The immediate action of the commander of the 
 whole, if on the spot, would be — to order the head 
 to halt, to get under the nearest cover outside 
 
12 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 Longside, here the watershed north-east of Long- 
 side, from which they can see the enemy's position 
 in Shaw Wood, the advanced party to move up 
 to and halt under cover at the eastern exit of 
 Lopgside, and the flankers, as patrols, to approach 
 as close as possible to both flanks of the enemy's 
 position from which the fire was received, to ascer- 
 tain its extent ; the left flanker would, behind the 
 watershed above mentioned, move northwards and 
 gain access to Shaw Wood, the right flanker behind 
 jthe watershed south of Longside road to the head 
 of the small valley. If the commanding officer of 
 the whole (we will call him once for all " general ") 
 is not there, as is most likely, the officer com- 
 manding the advanced party would act thus, and 
 report at once to the rear what happened, and his 
 action. 
 
 But before we enter upon the acting phase (Part 
 II. of the solution), we must first ascertain the 
 precise position of the infantry and artillery when 
 the head is stopped. 
 
 Here I refer the reader to the regulations which 
 form the base, viz. « Infantry Drill, 1893;" 
 "Cavalry Drill, 1891, vol. ii.;" "Field Artillery 
 Drill, 1893;" designated as «L D.," «C. D.," and 
 " A. D.," respectively. 
 
 On p. 143, sec. 142 ("L D.") we read, "The 
 advanced guard is subdivided into two parts— the 
 vanguard and the main guard. The vanguard is 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 13 
 
 always composed of cavalry when available, witb a 
 body of infantry as a support. The main guard com- 
 prises the remaining troops of the advanced guard. 
 It is only when the advanced guard is very large 
 that guns are attached to the vanguard." 
 
 In this instance the cavalry must have been sent 
 in advance independently of the remainder of the 
 force, otherwise the tactical situation is not a likely 
 one, there being no more cavalry in the immediate 
 front; the infantry must therefore be assumed as 
 taking its own measures for security, for the cavalry 
 might at any moment be dispersed, and the screen 
 no longer be in front, or it might be suddenly 
 driven in by superior hostile cavalry, the enemy 
 during his retreat having received reinforcements. 
 These measures of security are, therefore — an ad- 
 vanced guard sending forward the vanguard, this 
 securing itself by the advanced party, and this 
 again sending forward a file or two under a non- 
 commissioned ofiScer as head or point, all 
 infantry. 
 
 Of what strength will this advanced guard be ? 
 Eefer to p. 146, sec. 145 (« I. D."). There it is 
 said — 
 
 "The strength of an advanced guard will be 
 proportionate to the strength of the force it is 
 covering. TJiis will be further influenced by the 
 nearness or distance of the enemy. The larger the 
 force, the larger in proportion may be the advanced 
 
14 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 guard. This proportion may vary from a fourth to 
 an eighth, but its strength is mainly regulated by 
 the work it is meant to perform. 
 
 " When the force is large, its movements will 
 usually be covered by a detached body of cavalry, 
 whose special duty is to search for the enemy and 
 report his position and movements. 
 
 " When the force is small, or cavalry for scouting 
 is not available, this work will be done by the 
 advanced guard. But in all cases the advanced 
 guard is responsible for the security from surprise 
 of the troops it is covering." 
 
 The latter sentence makes it here necessary 
 for the infantry to subdivide as above stated. 
 
 The pursuing force is comparatively small, the 
 distances at which the various bodies will have to 
 follow each other are not great, as will be seen; 
 and the time it takes the general to come to any 
 decision, and make his dispositions at any place 
 and at any moment, is readily filled up by the 
 closing up of the various bodies on the front ; thus 
 no time is lost in having the whole force con- 
 centrated, and striking with it a blow in any 
 required direction. For this reason also no 
 artillery need be distributed to the advanced 
 guard. 
 
 HaK a battalion may be considered a proper 
 one. 
 
 This strength can, of course, be argued against ; 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 15 
 
 probably nobody will advocate less, but many more. 
 To my mind, the point is indifferent ; no principle is 
 involved, only opinion. Besides, the cavalry is for 
 all practical purposes here part of the advanced 
 guard, and then the proportion of the latter to 
 the force it covers is at once more than one- 
 fourth. 
 
 To satisfy any one disagreeing with the non- 
 distribution of artillery, I quote p. 147, sec. 146 
 ("I. D.")— 
 
 " The organization of an advanced guard pro- 
 vides for the double duty of reconnoitring and 
 fighting; it should therefore, when possible, be 
 composed of all three arms. 
 
 " The proportion of each arm in an advanced 
 guard depends on the nature of the work to be 
 done, and the character of the country to be 
 traversed. The number of cavalry should be at 
 least adequate for reconnoitring. In an open 
 country the number of cavalry and guns is pro- 
 portionately much greater than in a close or 
 mountainous country. The bulk of an advanced 
 guard is usually composed of infantry." 
 
 Also p. 152, sec. 3 (« A. D.")— 
 
 "A battle usually commences with the fire of 
 artillery; therefore artillery should march at the 
 head of columns. But artillery, being defenceless 
 on the march, would, if it led the column, be at 
 the mercy of small bodies of cavalry, or even of the 
 
16 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 armed inhabitants of the country ; it should there- 
 fore have some escort. 
 
 " Moreover, artillery, when pushed forward into 
 action far in advance of the main body of the 
 troops to which it is attached, requires protection 
 to its flank against the advanced cavalry and in- 
 fantry of the enemy. 
 
 " Artillery, therefore, when on the march, should 
 immediately follow whatever troops are considered 
 sufficient for its protection. The artillery of an 
 advanced guard might march in rear of the leading 
 battalion." 
 
 Of course, this means more than one battery, 
 for a smaller unit than one battalion would suffice 
 for the protection of one battery or less. 
 
 This is apparent from the lines immediately 
 preceding the above quotation, viz. — 
 
 " On the above principle, the divisional artillery 
 (three or four batteries) would probably follow the 
 leading battalion of the main body of the division 
 to which it belongs." 
 
 Horse artillery naturally gets its protection from 
 cavalry only, if attached to such preceding an 
 army. 
 
 All this refers more to large bodies of troops. 
 The force here at disposal, if considered as quite 
 independent, is too small to form an advanced guard 
 composed of all arms; its fighting power lies in 
 its concentration, and in not splitting up its units. 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 17 
 
 The battery, if not with the advanced guard, has 
 only to traverse the distance from the main body 
 to the main guard, say one mile, which it can do in 
 ten minutes, if signalled to advance ; it would take 
 the battery commander, who may be with the 
 advanced guard, all this time and perhaps more to 
 reconnoitre and choose a position for his battery. 
 But if the force is not an independent one, then it 
 is, probably ihe advanced guard, which has its 
 artillery and has secured itself against surprise by 
 detaching forward the half-battalion mentioned as 
 a vanguard. This vanguard is too small to have 
 guns, as explained on p. 13. 
 
 The advanced guard of this force being half a 
 battalion, it remains now to be determined what 
 distance intervenes between its head or point and 
 the tail of the column it is covering. 
 
 The length of the main body is three and a half 
 battalions in column of route ; i.e. 
 
 3^- X 400 = 1400 yards; 
 two batteries, also in column of route, 
 2 X 224 = 44§ yards. 
 Total length of column to be covered, disregarding 
 ammunition and baggage waggons, is roughly one 
 mile. 
 
 EeferriDg to the " Infantry Drill," p. 148, sec. 147 
 (3), we find the following rule laid down for 
 the distance the advanced guard should be sent 
 ahead : — 
 
 c 
 
18 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 , !"No fixed distance can be laid down between 
 the advanced guard and the body of troops it is 
 covering. The primary duty of the advanced 
 guard is to protect the troops moving in rear 
 from surprise. The main guard should therefore 
 be suflBciently far in advance to enable the troops 
 it is covering to form up in sufficient force to re- 
 ceive the enemy should he drive in the advanced 
 guard. Thi» distance will depend on the length 
 of the column. It must always be sufficient to give 
 the column time to form for battle." 
 
 From this we arrive at the conclusion that the 
 advanced guard will precede about one mile, for the 
 last man in the column must march one mile to be 
 
 on a level with the first man, and form up on him 
 
 in battle order. 
 
 The advanced guard naturally secures itself by 
 
 forming a vanguard, and this will probably consist 
 
 of one company ; we will assume it here to be of 
 
 such strength, , - ; 
 
 The main guard of three companies covers a 
 
 length of road equal to f, of 400 yards, or 150 
 
 yards. 
 
 The distance which should intervene between it 
 
 and the vanguard is laid down in the "Infantry 
 
 Drill," on p. 148, sec. 147 (1), as follows :^ 
 
 " The main guard of the advanced guard follows 
 
 the vanguard at a distance depending on the 
 
 strength of the whole. When the advanced guard 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 19 
 
 is small, its main guard will be proportionately 
 nearer the vanguard. The duty of the main guard 
 is, by timely support, to enable the vanguard to 
 continue its work of exploration. The distance 
 therefore between these two bodies should be such 
 as would meet this requirement." 
 
 The vanguard in this instance has only to fulfil 
 one of these requirements, the exploration being 
 carried out by the preceding independent cavalry ; 
 it should therefore be within supporting distance of 
 the following body, but should also be enough in 
 advance to prevent the body it 'precedes from 
 coming at once within effective musketry range 
 of the enemy, if the covering bodies of the van- 
 guard are suddenly driven in. 
 
 About a quarter of a mile would be ample. 
 
 The latter reason also chiefly determines the 
 distance which intervenes between the vanguard 
 and its advanced party, which may consist here of 
 one or two sections of the company of the van- 
 guard, and, between the advanced party and the 
 point or head, usually one or two files under a 
 non-commissioned officer. 
 
 The possibility of keeping connection with these 
 small parties also determines the distance, as they 
 cannot detach connecting files. 
 
 To^ recapitulate, the length from head to tail 
 is — 
 
20 
 
 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 Main hody (J battalion, 2 batteries, 3 battalions) 
 
 Distance ... 
 
 JWai» jfjKird (3 companies), about 
 
 Distance ... ... ... ,,. 
 
 Vangiiard Q company) 
 
 Distance ... 
 
 Advanoed party Q company). . . 
 
 Distance ... 
 
 JeocJ or point (few men) 
 
 ' 1 mile. 
 1 mile. 
 
 150 y{ls. 
 
 400 „ 
 
 25 „ 
 
 300 „ 
 
 25 „ 
 
 150 „ 
 
 .. 
 
 Total 
 
 Say roughly, 2J to 3 miltis. 
 
 2 miles 1050 yds. 
 
 Marching at the rate of two and a half or three 
 miles per hour, it would therefore take ahout one 
 hour for the rear to form upon a level with the 
 head. Orders or signals also take some time to be 
 brought from front to rear, but this may be counter- 
 balanced by a quicker pace of the infantry in an 
 emergency for such a short distance. 
 
 This estimate of time and space would usually 
 have to be made, even if the question is not asked 
 directly as in this case, viz. — 
 
 " Calculate roughly by what hour those disposi- 
 tions would be completed." 
 
 The question is not precise in stating who 
 receives the report at 9 a.m. " that the enemy (two 
 battalions and three batteries) is in position on 
 Garnant Down, and that the villages Morton and 
 Parton are held by small parties of infantry," 
 but it may be taken for granted that you, the 
 general in command of the whole, have received 
 this report. 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 21 
 
 At oQce the question arises: where are you as 
 a commander? If your force is not followed by 
 larger bodies, and not an advanced guard, you are 
 probably at the head of your main body, and a 
 distance of one and a half to two miles separates 
 you from the head of your force, and about three 
 miles from the nearest enemy. In about fifteen 
 minutes you can gallop to the head and bring 
 forward your artillery, which would therefore be in 
 ample time, if it were not, as here assumed, with 
 the advanced guard ; in fact, it would then pro- 
 bably be sooner on the spot than wanted. 
 
 The infantry, continuing its march, would be 
 assembled in about one hour or under, at the east 
 entrance of Longside. 
 
 If your force is an advanced guard, you, as its 
 commander, would be with the vanguard, in this 
 case with the three companies a mile ahead ; for the 
 regulations say on p. 149, sec. 148, (1) ("ID."): 
 '' He (the commander of the advanced guard) will 
 usually accompany the vanguard." 
 
 On the whole, this or the former case would here 
 not make much difference, and we will assume the 
 former. 
 
 Under our assumption the ofScer commanding 
 the half-battalion in front will have, as commander 
 of the advanced guard, precise instructions how to 
 act in case the enemy is met ; for the " Infantry 
 Drill," on p. 149, sec. 148, (1) and (2), says— 
 
22 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 " The commander of the advanced guard should 
 receive clear instructions on the subject of engaging 
 the enemy. But these instructions must necessarily 
 allow considerable latitude to his own judgment 
 and discretion. He should, however, be perfectly 
 informed of the general intentions of his superior, 
 so as to enable him to frame his action in accord- 
 ance with. these intentions. . . . 
 
 "The commander of an advanced guard must 
 avoid becoming seriously engaged in any way at 
 variance with his instructions, or in a manner that 
 may disarra.nge the plans of his superior as far as 
 he has been made acquainted with them. But 
 as the work of the advanced guard is to prevent 
 the force it is covering from being retarded or. 
 molested in its march, he must not hesiljate to 
 attack and drive in the enemy's advanced parties 
 that he may come in contact with, when not in 
 superior force." 
 
 This requires for our purposes some explanation. 
 The tactical situation is the following : — 
 
 The head of the advanced guard is stopped by 
 fire, and acted as previously stated. The com- 
 mander of the advanced guard has not received 
 the report about the enemy, but only the general ; 
 he hurries forward, and is probably on the spot 
 before the commander of the advanced guard has 
 had time to find out what is in front of him, and 
 long before he had a chance to make up his mind 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 23 
 
 how to act; for, however precise his instructions 
 may be, in actual warfare he cannot go headlong 
 against anything which fires at him; he is bound 
 to feel his way somewhat, and thstt takes time. 
 Meanwhile the general has arrived, and he will 
 supplement his former instructions," and- take com- 
 mand of the whole before the eomimander of the 
 advanced guard could have acted. 
 
 The whole force involved is too small, and its 
 action partakes of that of an advanced guard 
 itself, to which the above-quoted regulations apply. 
 It becomes here, therefore, quite apparent, as 
 has been said before, that for the solution of this 
 problem it is quite indifferent whether the force 
 here is independent or an advanced guard of a 
 larger body. 
 
 The force is in pursuit of a ^defeated enemy. 
 Under what instructions it acts is not precisely 
 mentioned in the question; but "state what dis- 
 positions you would make in order to force the 
 enemy from his position " must be taken to mean 
 that something like : " you will pursue the enemy 
 and attack him whenever met," or "drive him 
 away whenever he attempts resistance," precedes 
 that sentence. Sueh is implied in the term " de- 
 feaiedr" enemy. 
 
 On p. 143, sec. 142 ("I. D."), we read— 
 "The- general duties of an advanced guard 
 are):' • . , 
 
24 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 " (1) To search for the enemy, and guard against 
 surprise. 
 
 " (2) When the enemy is met, to push back his 
 advanced troops, and prevent the march of the force 
 from being interrupted. 
 
 "(3) If the enemy is met in superior force, to 
 check his advance so as to enable the necessary 
 dispositions for opposing him to be made." 
 
 And further, on p. 145, sec. 144 (4) — 
 
 "As long as the enemy is not met in superior 
 force it will be the duty of the advanced guard to 
 attack and drive hack any hostile troops it encounters. 
 If the enemy be found occupying a position in 
 superior force, the commander of the advanced 
 guard must act in accordance with the special 
 instructions he may have received for such a case. 
 If the enemy be met advancing iu superior force, 
 the most favourable ground at hand should be at 
 once occupied, with a view to checking his advance. 
 How far the defence of this position should be con- 
 tinued depends on whether the commander of the 
 force intends to move up in support of the advanced 
 guard, or decides to fight on some position in rear. 
 In the latter case the advanced guard should fall 
 back fighting and delaying the enemy's advance." 
 
 The student will have noticed that only part of 
 all this applies, and should be clear in seeing now 
 what tactical principle is involved, namely, — 
 For the half-battalion composing the advanced 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 25 
 
 guard, the troops in the south-east corner of Shaw 
 Wood, in Morton and Parton, are the enemy's 
 advanced troops, which it should "push hack to 
 prevent the march of the force (three and a 
 half battalions and two batteries) from heing 
 interrupted." 
 
 Having done so, it will "find the enemy occupy^ 
 ing a position in superior force" viz. on Garnant 
 Down (two battalions and three batteries), when " the 
 commander of the advanced guard must act in 
 accordance with the special instructions he may have 
 received for such a case." 
 
 We have seen that the general will be on the 
 spot, and he will give that "special instruction ;" 
 in fact, the moment he arrives he has to come 
 to a determination how he will act in regard to 
 the enemy's advanced troops, and then to turn 
 over in his mind "the dispositions he will make to 
 •force the enemy from Garnant Down ; " for we know 
 the officer commanding the half-battalion of the 
 advanced guard has not had time yet to act. 
 
 The general then determines — 
 
 To clear at once Shaw Wood, to enable the artillery 
 to take up a position on the ridge above Fleet Valley, 
 to seize Morton and Parton without delay with the 
 troops at hand in order to secure the bridges, and to 
 hold these villages until the whole force is ready to 
 cross and attack Garnant Down. 
 
 This is WHAT has to be done and, must be done, 
 
26 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 f&r we are to force the enemy from Garnant 
 Down. 
 
 But now comes the , question how it is to be. 
 done, and here it is where skill steps in, and when 
 orders must be issued, in which the tactics of 
 the general crystallize. 
 
 He ought not to fight for fighting's sake — he only 
 does fight because he cannot gain his object as a 
 rule otherwise ; but he ought, without sacrificing the 
 least iota of the object he wishes to gain, to dispose 
 and handle his troops in such a manner that they gain 
 an easy but thorough victory, ending, if possible, 
 with the annihilation of the adversary, completed by 
 a well-directed pursuit. Skilful dispositions and 
 a proper framing of the orders to the troops to 
 carry out these dispositions will lead to it. 
 
 Unfortunately the regulations indicate only, 
 scattered throughout the book, the points an order 
 disposing troops for attack or defence should con- 
 tain, neither does the authorized text-book, Clery's 
 "Minor Tactics," give any precise information 
 thereon to the eager student. 
 
 I think, therefore, that I cannot do better than 
 translate the paragraphs treating on this point in the 
 authorized Gernian text-book on tactics used, 
 at the Royal Prussian War Schools, which are an, 
 equivalent to the English Eoyal Military College, 
 at Sandhurst. ^ 
 
 This book says— 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 27 
 
 "The written .oiAev is the rule when troops are 
 disposed by superior commanders from, the division 
 upwards. Even if the order can be given verbally — 
 for instance, when troops are assembled at a rendez- 
 vous — it is dictated, if of any length. 
 
 "One has to distinguish between ' operation '- 
 orders (corps, division, detachment, advanced 
 guard, and outpost orders), which have only 
 reference to the movements of the troops, and 
 daily orders, referring only to daily routine, reports, 
 supply, etc. 
 
 " Both are issued separately. 
 
 " (If special orders — communications with maga- 
 zines — are to be issued to ammunition columns 
 and army service corps, they will be as such dis- 
 tinguished, and only communicated to those con- 
 cerned.) 
 
 "An 'operation-order,' besides following the 
 general principles previously mentioned in regard 
 to communications in writing (for our purposes 
 here irrelevant), must fulfil the following require- 
 ments : — 
 
 "1. The order must be simple, cleab, and written 
 as briefly and decisively as possiWe, taking into 
 consideration the mental ^capacity of the receiver. 
 He who issues the order must therefore imagine 
 himself v6ry vividly to be placed in the position 
 of the receiver. Miswnderstandings are mostly the 
 fault of him who orders. 
 
28 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 " 2. The order must also be clearly abranged. 
 Orders of any length, in which the actioas of 
 different bodies are prescribed for a common pur- 
 pose, are divided up by numbers, whereby the 
 important is mentioned first, and everything is 
 mentioned under the same number, which is 
 naturally connected with it. 
 
 " 3. The order must contain everything, and, on 
 the other hand, should also only contain what the 
 subordinate cannot on his own account and re- 
 sponsibility order, for gaining the object. One 
 should therefore avoid meddling with details belonging 
 to the sphere of the subordinate leader. 
 
 " 4. The order must not contemplate the carry- 
 ing out of anything which cannot be foreseen with 
 some certainty. Dispositions which go into detail, 
 or such as anticipate time, can rarely be carried 
 out to their fullest extent; but particularly sucli 
 orders must omit all detail, the despatch of which 
 require some time, within which the circumstances 
 may have altered, or when issuing the order it 
 cannot at all be foreseen under what circumstances 
 it will have to be carried out. 
 
 "5. Conjectures, expectations, minute pre- 
 scriptions for all eventualities which possibly 
 may arise, are to be omitted, for they are, if some- 
 thing else happens, little conducive to strengthen 
 the confidence of the troops in leadership. Just as 
 little is it admissible to embody in an order the 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 29 
 
 REASON for it, since, if the order is properly worded, 
 it will sustain itself. 
 
 "The order, for instance, for an advance can be 
 worded in the following manner : — 
 
 " Place. Date. Time. 
 
 " (right hand upper corner). 
 
 " Heading {e.g. Detachment Order). 
 " 1. Report about the enemy, as far as of import- 
 ance to the subordinates, and news about other 
 friendly troops, as far as their march or position 
 may influence one's own march. 
 
 "2. One's own general intentions, as far as it is 
 necessary to communicate such to the troops. The 
 better the subordinate is informed of the intentions 
 of the leader, the better he will be able to aid him 
 
 without orders to gain his object - 
 
 "3. Dispositions for the 'independent cavalry' 
 {i.e. starting-point and time, road to be followed, 
 reconnaissance, or, according to circumstances, dis- 
 tinct order up to which point, whenever possible, 
 patrols are to press forward). 
 
 "4. Dispositions for the advanced guard {i.e. 
 starting - point and time, reconnaissance, special 
 duties). 
 
 " 5. Dispositions for the main body {i.e. distance 
 at which to follow the advanced guard, or starting- 
 paint and time). 
 
 " 6. Dispositions for a flank giuzrd which may be 
 formed (similar to (4); under certain conditions 
 
so STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 mentioning the place from which the flank guard 
 is to branch off). 
 
 " 7. Dispositions for the hmvy haggage and ammu- 
 nition columns and trains as far as concern the 
 troops. 
 
 "8. Place of the commanding ofiScer for the 
 beginning of the march, in order that reports may 
 reach him without delay, 
 
 " Name and rank. 
 
 "At the end of the order is briefly to be noted the 
 mode how it was communicated (e.g. 'verbally to 
 the assembled leaders,' or 'dictated to the adju- 
 tants,' or 'verbally to the main body, in writing 
 by orderly to the right flank guard '). ' 
 
 " The order of march and svhdivision of the troops 
 are, as a rule, noted marginally on the left of the 
 order. 
 
 "Number (3) would be omitted if the cavalry, 
 
 -instead of being formed independently, had been 
 
 .attached to the advanced guard; the order for the 
 
 advanced guard (perhaps also for the flank ^uatd) 
 
 would then have to be supplemented. '. ' 
 
 "Dispositions for a eeteeat are only communi- 
 cated to those nearest the commander, and always 
 only confidentiallyi 
 
 "Telegbaphic otoEES are to be worded as briefly 
 as possible, yet intelligibly. Conventional polite 
 addresses are omitted. Special attention is to be 
 paid to the time of despatch and arrival as particu- 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS SI 
 
 arly important, on account of frequent interruptions 
 and delays." 
 
 At another place this text-boob, when treating 
 on the attack of a position, says — 
 
 "The attack on a fully developed, per- 
 haps even' pbepabed defensive front, must be 
 a planned one by the leader from its beginning, 
 such that, as a rule, an order for the attack can 
 be issued in common for all troops. 
 
 " Such an order for the attack might contain — 
 
 "Place. Date. Time. 
 
 " Heading {e.g. Detachment Order). 
 
 " 1. Information on the whole situation (enemy 
 and co-operating friendly troops). 
 
 " 2. General intentions. 
 
 " 3. Order for the artillery (position, object). , 
 
 " 4. Order for the secondary attaek (quite general) 
 and the main attack (road, object). 
 
 " 5. Order for the reserve (troops, distance at which 
 to follow or where to be placed). 
 
 " 6. Order for the cavalry (as a rule; on both 
 wings). 
 
 "7. Special directions {e.g. regarding company 
 ammunition waggons, employment of engineers, 
 establishing ambulance on the iield, etc.). 
 
 " 8. Order for the heavy baggage. 
 
 " 9. Place of commanding officer. 
 
 " Signature. 
 " Mode and manner how the order 
 is issued to the troops." 
 
32 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 The latter form of order concerns us here chiefly, 
 as the force is to attack a position. 
 
 All that has been so far written, flashes through 
 the mind, and must be more or less considered 
 when solving this problem in an examination. 
 
 Practice will embrace it at a glance, but half the 
 time allotted for the solution of the question should 
 be devoted to this process of development. 
 
 The student who has carefully followed the above 
 will now be able, probably without my aid, to 
 frame the order, i.e. give his answer to the question 
 asked in the examination, and should attempt it 
 before reading on. He can then compare and test 
 whether he has gained or not. 
 
 One comfort I will give him. It is often said 
 that the examiner has laid a trap in such and such 
 a question, and if it is not solved in a certain way 
 the marks will be missed. That is impossible. No 
 trap can exist for any one who has grasped the 
 tactical principles and knows how to apply them. 
 Trap or no trap, the candidate who cannot do so is 
 caught anyhow. The truer the solution is, the 
 simpler will the answer turn out, like every truth 
 in nature. This is the best test the candidate can 
 have to judge for himself whether he is ma^ or 
 less right ; for hardly any one who has sound gensds 
 as an officer can be absolutely wrong. Think cor- 
 rectly, and you will act correctly. 
 
 We proceed, then, to discuss — 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS, 33 
 
 II. The Production of the Order. 
 
 This is essentially the answer which the candi- 
 date is required to give, and what I propose as 
 the least he should write and hand in is printed in 
 italics. It is better if he can give all that follows 
 up to the end of this part, but his time will pro- 
 bably not admit of it. 
 
 The general riding at the head of the main body, 
 when receiving the report about the enemy, will at 
 once gallop forward and take up a position on the 
 knoll 775 (not numbered on the map), north of 
 Longside and south of western part of Shaw Wood, 
 arriving there about 9.15 a.m. From here he will 
 send back those who have brought in the reports 
 about the enemy with the following order : — 
 
 " To O.C. 1st Cavalry " Knoll 775, north of Longside 
 
 Begiment at bridge 2. and south of Shaw Wood, 
 
 " 7th of September, 1892, 9.15 a.m. 
 
 " Remain in observation. Ascertain whether, and 
 how strongly, Shefford is occupied. Try to send one 
 squadron on footpath through Arden Forest, but 
 not debouch from there. Seize opportunity to 
 charge by Mickley Mill when enemy forced to 
 leave Morton. Report to knoll 775, and await fur- 
 ther orders at bridge 2. Hand this to next in com- 
 mand, and repair to me on knoll with least delay. 
 
 "X. General. 
 " Handed written to : 
 
 Orderly. 
 "Pace: trot." 
 
 D 
 
34 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 Arrival of orderly at bridge 2 : 9.30 a.ta. 
 Arrival of officer commanding regiment at knoll : 
 9.45 a.m. (about). 
 
 " To O.C. 2nd Cavalry " Place, date as above, 9.17 a.m. 
 
 Regiment at bridge 7. 
 
 " Kemain in observation. Ascertain practicability 
 of footpath through Pewsey Wood, and, if so, send 
 squadron through it unobserved into valley ; do not 
 debouch from northern exit, if visible to enemy's 
 artillery. Ascertain by road F D whether, and 
 how strongly, Challow is occupied. Report to above 
 place, and await further orders at bridge 7, which 
 is to be held, as also bridge 6. Hand this to next in 
 command, and come with least delay to knoll 775. 
 
 "X. General. 
 " Handed written to : 
 
 Orderly. 
 " Pace : trot." 
 
 Arrival of orderly at bridge 7 : 9.33 a.m. 
 
 Arrival of officer commanding regiment at knoll : 
 9.50 a.m. (about). 
 
 Before these orderlies have been despatched, the 
 whole of the advanced guard (half-battalion) will 
 have arrived at Longside, and immediately after their 
 despatch the general will give the following order 
 verbally to the officer commanding the advanced 
 guard : — 
 
 " My adjutant has told you the reports received 
 ^bout the enemy and the position of our cavalry. 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 35 
 
 Send a company of the main guard by road " I " 
 unobserved into south-west corner of Shaw Wood, 
 to attack without hesitation in the direction 
 of road Olton Hill-Morton, another company to 
 follow in support. With the company of the van- 
 guard attack south-east corner of Shaw Wood as 
 soon as those companies are heard to be in touch 
 with the enemy. Follow up this attack at once 
 with all three companies, rush the bridge, secure 
 Morton, examine the bridge for mines, repair at 
 once if damaged, report result, and await further 
 orders, holding Morton firmly. At the same time 
 the fourth company will, in a direct line from Long- 
 side, and without delay, drive the enemy from Parton, 
 and act there as prescribed for the force against 
 Morton. This company will endeavour to rejoin 
 the others towards the front by way of Shape Copse 
 on arrival of troops of equal strength from the 
 rear." 
 
 Time when this order can have been executed : 
 about 10.15 a.m. 
 
 The general will next send the following order 
 to the officer commanding the main body : — 
 
 " To officer commanding main body. 
 
 "Knoll 775, etc. 
 
 " 7/9/92, 9.20 a.m. 
 
 " Send the batteries at a trot through Longside, to 
 take up a position under cover, ready to unlimber 
 on the ridge south of south-east corner of Sliaw 
 
36 STtTDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 Wood, somewhere between this wood and the Long- 
 side road, halting under cover north-east of Long- 
 side if Shaw Wood is not cleared of the enemy. 
 The infantry will continue its march, pass through 
 Lotigside, and rendezvous in quarter column under 
 cover, north of Longside road. I will see the bat- 
 talion and battery commanders at 9.50 on knoll 775. 
 
 "X. General. 
 
 " Sent verbally by : 
 
 Orderly Sergeant. 
 " Pace : gallop." 
 
 Time of probable arrival of batteries on ridge: 
 9.40 a.m. 
 
 Time of probable arrival of main body at place 
 of rendezvous : 9.50 a.m. 
 
 Awaiting these orders to take effect, it being 
 now about 9.20 or 9.25, the general will wa,tch the 
 course of events, endeavour to obtain a view be- 
 yond the Fleet Valley "to shape his further plans, 
 leaving a staffrofficer or an orderly on the knoll to 
 direct to him any incoming reports, and veill return 
 at 9.50 to knoll 775, at which time also the bulk 
 of the main body will be in position as stated. 
 
 He will then make the following disposition, 
 embodying it in a verbal order addressed to the 
 commanding officers, who all will have meanwhile 
 arrived, an adjutant noting in writing the salient 
 points of the order, or the order fully, if he is a 
 shorthand writer ; this for reference, when reporting 
 on the action to superior authority. 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 37 
 
 DETACHMENT OBDEB. 
 
 " Knoll 775, etc. 
 
 " 7/9, 9.50 a.m. 
 
 "(1) The enemy is reported to occupy Garnant 
 Down with two battalions and three batteries, with small 
 advanced posts holding Morton and Parton, and ap- 
 parently the south-eastern edge of Shaw Wood. The 
 advanced guard is ordered to clear this wood, seize 
 Morton and Parton, and hold both until further 
 orders. The company at Parton is ordered to rejoin 
 its half-battalion as soon as relieved from the main 
 body. The cavalry at bridges 2 and 7 is watching 
 the enemy, each regiment having probably a squadron 
 near Shefford. and the northern edge of Pewsey Wood. 
 
 " (2) My intention < is to drive the enemy from 
 Garnant Down as soon as the bridges at Morton and 
 Parton are in our hands, and if possible to cut off 
 his force with the aid of our cavalry. 
 
 " (3) The batteries will open fire on the enemy's 
 artillery from the position indicated as soon as Shaiv 
 Wood is clear of the enemy, sustaining the infantry 
 attach until the position is carried, aud then moving 
 up to Garnant Down by the shortest route without any 
 further orders. 
 
 " (4) The remaining half-battalion of the battalion 
 fwrnishing the advanced guard will at once move up 
 in support of the companies attacking Morton, detain- 
 ing the enemy in front u/ntil the attach of the main 
 force is fully developed. Battalions Nos. 2, 3, and 4 
 
38 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 ■will immediately cross at Farton, and attack Qarnant 
 Down hy way of Shape Copse and the Challow 
 Valley ; one iattalion first line, one and a half second 
 line. The third line will be formed hy the reserve. 
 
 " (5) One-half of No. 4 battalion will remain in 
 Parton at my immediate disposal as a reserve. 
 
 "(6) Theregiment at bridge 2 willsendhalfa squadron 
 hy way of Shaw Wood as escort for the batteries. If 
 the footpath through Arden Forest is foum,d practicable 
 and Shefford UMoeoupied, the whole regiment, leaving 
 half a squadron at bridge 2, will move on to this 
 village, ready to fall upon the enemy when driven from 
 Garnant Down. The regiment at bridges 7 and 6 will 
 move on road D towards Challow, withdrawing the 
 squadron from Fewsey Wood, and ,&e ready to charge 
 and pursue the enemy. 
 
 " (7) The whole of the regimental ammunition will 
 follow the 1st battalion into Morton. One cart and 
 one mule will follow each half of the other 
 battalions ; the remainder will park under coTcr of 
 Parton. The ambulance will establish a hospital 
 at Longside ; the slightly wounded will be attended 
 and retained at Morton and Parton. 
 
 " (8) The heavy baggage will park outside the east 
 entrance of Longside. 
 
 " (9) I shall be with the batteries. 
 
 "X. General. 
 
 " Verbal : to assembled 
 
 com. officers. 
 "Taken down in writing by: 
 
 Adjutant, 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 39 
 
 This completes the dispositions. 
 
 It is now about 10 o'clock, and the movements 
 can begin from the moment the commanding 
 oflScers arrive at their respective units, which for 
 the farthest will be about 10.15 a,m. 
 
 It remains now to treat— ^ 
 
 III. Testing the Value of the Order. 
 
 This means, as explained in the introduction to 
 these pages, giving reasons for everything that has 
 been ordered and written in the previous part. 
 
 Here again is printed in italics what is the 
 least the candidate should hand in. Much will 
 be a repetition of what was kept in view in Part I., 
 and, as this study is not meant to give merdy 
 a solution of the problem, but also some instruc- 
 tion how tactics in general should be learnt and 
 applied, much will be said which it is unrieces- 
 sary to write in an examination. 
 
 On the other hand, it is impossible that all the 
 points can be touched which may seem to require 
 explanation, as it would lead beyond our limits, and, 
 besides, the subject is inexhaustible. 
 
 At the beginning of Part II. we read the general 
 arrives on the knoll 775 at 9,15 a.m. ; for as general 
 in command of the whole independent force riding 
 at the head of the main body, he is separated by 
 about one and a half to two miles from his 
 
40 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 leading troops, and assuming his rate of progress 
 to be eight miles in one hour, it takes him about 
 fifteen minutes to cover that distance. He goes 
 to the knoll, since this position affords him the 
 best view of the coiantry immediately concerned, is 
 beyond effective rifle range, and is on ground 
 already traversed by his advanced guard ; for he 
 could not go very well beyond his own further- 
 most troops. 
 
 ■ When solving these problems reality is too 
 frequently overlooked, and positions are assigned to 
 commanders which they would never be able to 
 take up, or often their position is never indicated, 
 which is worse. Reports must always find him 
 readily and quickly, and therefore the less he 
 moves the better for the direction of the whole. 
 Eiding about and going too near the smaller units, 
 seeing perhaps details in movements not to one's 
 taste, and yet unimportant for final success, are not 
 conducive to the calmness so necessary in a com- 
 mander. There are naturally phases in an action, 
 when it seems to have come to a standstill, re- 
 quiring a fresh outlook for the commander to 
 rearrange badly executed orders or such as were 
 given under a wrong impression, or a new phase 
 has been entered upon necessitating closer observa- 
 tion by the commander. 
 
 Imagination combined with reasoning power, a 
 .■fiery nature tempered by a good deal of patience. 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 41 
 
 sliould be assumed as teharacteristic of the com- 
 mander. If these qualities appear in the answer 
 a candidate gives he is likely to find favour with 
 an examiner. 
 
 It was considered necessary to send the orders 
 to both cavalry regiments, for it is important to 
 know how far actually the position of the enemy 
 extends, and whether he receives reinforcements. 
 A squadron should attempt to penetrate Arden 
 Forest on the footpath, because . it is well to know 
 whether the cavalry can be near the line of retreat, 
 ready to cut into the artillery when it is forced to 
 retire, and when perhaps its escort has been for- 
 gotten. The squadron should not debouch and 
 show itself to the enemy, for it is unlikely that the 
 enemy would be induced to give up his position 
 without fighting, by the mere appearance of cavalry. 
 It would only induce the enemy to take precautions 
 which he might otherwise neglect. We could of 
 course adopt bold tactics, send the whole regiment 
 to Shefford, dismount some men, and make the 
 enemy believe he had to deal with infantry. He 
 might evacuate his position, fearing for his line of 
 retreat, and we gain it without much bloodshed. 
 There is absolutely nothing wrong if a candidate 
 disposes thus; for, if the movement has not the 
 desired effect, nothing is lost and the general can 
 still dispose afterwards as we have done ; only the 
 retreat of the enemy would not likely be so effectu- 
 
42 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 ally cut off afterwards, for the cavalry regiment 
 might become useless for further action on that day. 
 
 Bold tactics on paper will have the effect of pro- 
 ducing overcautious tacticians on the battle-field. 
 Officers conducting a " Kriegspiel " will probably 
 testify to this, that players knowing war only from 
 theory are bold in their dispositions, and officers 
 who have been " tried and were not found wanting," 
 and whose experience is tempered by theory, will 
 usually give the impression to others of being too 
 cautious. In both cases the effect is the same, only 
 the mode is reversed. 
 
 The object of the fight tactically should be the 
 cmmhilation of the ad/oersary, no matter what strategy 
 prescribes, and those dispositions are best which will 
 have the greatest chance of gaining this end. If 
 there is no longer an adversary, the position, the 
 town, the province, the country, or other object is 
 merely the ripe apple. 
 
 It must not be forgotten that some cavalry should 
 remain to cut off the enemy's advanced posts, when 
 driven back. 
 
 In the order to the cavalry at bridge 2 it is not 
 mentioned, as in the order to the cavalry at bridge 
 7, that the bridge should be held, because there 
 would be no object in it, the river being passable 
 above Morton. 
 
 The regiment; at bridge 7 has a good road to 
 Challow, and can be in ample time to fall upon the 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 43 
 
 enemy, when he is driven from Garnant Down. 
 One squadron should try Pewsey footpath, in order 
 to be at hand to disperse the enemy's retreating 
 advanced posts, for the squadron would probably 
 not be in time to effect this when starting from 
 bridge 7. 
 
 The regiment is also wanted at bridge 7 to secure 
 it as well as bridge 6 for the force, in case Parton 
 bridge has been demolished, the distance from Parton 
 to Morton, or to these bridges, being about the same, 
 but the latter being safer for crossing. 
 
 The general summons both regiment - com- 
 manders, because personal intercourse is always 
 preferable to written orders, whenever possible. 
 
 The orderlies have to ride from the knoll to their 
 respective bridges, a distance under two miles, 
 which would take them about fifteen minutes, going 
 eight miles in one hour. It takes also some time to 
 write the orders. The officers commanding the 
 regiments, taking the same time to repair to the 
 knoll, can therefore arrive at about 9.50, as stated. 
 
 The advanced guard, stretching over about half to 
 three-quarters of a mile, and marching at the usual 
 rate of three miles an hour, would be in Longside by 
 the time these orderlies are sent off. 
 
 Knowing from the reports of the cavalry that the 
 advanced guard has to deal only with small parties, 
 the general orders it to drive them away and secure 
 the bridges. The commander of the advanced 
 
44 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 guard, as stated repeatedly, could not have acted, 
 because the time was too short, and, besides, he 
 could only gain precise knowledge about the enemy 
 after the general came up. The general would natu- 
 rally now assume direction of the advanced guard, 
 and employ it as might best fit his general plan. 
 
 He uses three companies against Shaw Wood and 
 Morton, because they lie on the most direct line 
 towards Granston, and the most natural instinct is, 
 if you feel strong, to go straight for your adversary. 
 
 A commander is, of course, to a certain extent, in 
 a different position from a single man ; he has to 
 consider many things, and above all, he should 
 always ask himself, how can, I arrive at the most 
 decisive result in the shortest possible time with the 
 least amownt of loss to my own troops ? 
 
 On second thoughts he will frame then his proper 
 dispositions, and he can only do so here, after driving 
 in the advanced posts and viewing the enemy's 
 main position. 
 
 Shaw Wood must be cleared before the artillery 
 has any chance to take up a position against 
 Garnant Down. 
 
 The general orders the leading company to hold 
 the enemy in front until two other companies pass 
 unobserved into and through Shaw Wood, cutting 
 off perhaps what is in the south-east corner, because 
 if he would send that company headlong into the 
 south-east corner, he has nothing in his front. 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 45 
 
 and the enemy might come out in force from; 
 Parton, for there is no certainty in war, and what 
 might have been only weak forces in Parton, as 
 reported by the cavahy, may have become strong 
 ones in the mean time, before fresh reports have 
 reached him. 
 
 He sends only one company against Parton, 
 because at first sight this village lies too far 
 away from his line of attack, and he wishes to 
 keep his small force concentrated ; yet he must 
 occupy the enemy there, if he cannot succeed in 
 taking the bridge and village of Parton at a rush, 
 in order to succeed more easily at Morton. Besides, 
 the artillery, when coming into action, might be 
 molested ! too much by the hostile infantry at 
 Parton, if it were not occupied. 
 
 The bridge at Morton is not so important, as 
 the stream can be crossed immediately above 
 Morton; yet this would cause delay, and be 
 probably under hostile artillery fire. The bridgfe 
 at Parton is more important to get possession of, 
 if the main attack is to cross over it. The general 
 directs, therefore, the main body to halt outsid« 
 Longside to await the reports of the advanced 
 guard about the bridges, as only then can he 
 decide which way to move. 
 
 The companies are ordered not to go beyond 
 Morton and Parton, because they are too weak to 
 follow up success, and may be driven in, and the 
 
46 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS, 
 
 passages lost by a counterstroke of the enemy 
 before the main body can take part in the action. 
 
 Tactical units should be preserved and always 
 be re-established as soon as practicable, when 
 necessity has caused a rupture, and, therefore, the 
 order contains directions for the company at Parton 
 to seek re-union towards the front. 
 
 The reason why 10.15 a.m. is given as the time 
 when the verbal order to the advanced guard can 
 have been carried out is, that the distance from 
 Longside through Shaw Wood to Morton is about 
 one and a half to two miles, which would give 
 thirty to \ forty minutes, going at three miles an 
 hour. But in an action, however weak the resisting 
 forces, the progress is naturally, as a total, slower ; 
 therefore, about one hour has been allowed, namely, 
 from 9.20 a.m., when the movements begin, to 10.15 
 a.m., when they may be considered completed. 
 
 The next order — that for the officer commanding 
 the main body — was found necessary because the 
 regulations say, on p. 175, sec. 15 ("A. D.") : — 
 
 " The action of the artillery of an advanced guard 
 will depend upon the instructions given by the 
 officer commanding the troops to the officer com- 
 manding the advanced guard. 
 
 " It should not be less than a battery, and the 
 ammunition wagons should be with the battery. 
 
 "The advanced guard may be called upon to 
 drive the enemy, if in small force, from a position 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 47 
 
 in which he might delay the advance of the main 
 body. As the essence of success in this case is to 
 prevent the enemy from gaining time, the artillery 
 must be prepared to commence action at once at 
 a decisive range. 
 
 "If on the other hand the object of the officer 
 commanding the advanced guard is to delay the 
 enemy until his main body can come up, the 
 artillery will open fire as soon as the enemy 
 becomes visible, firing slowly at ' distant ' ranges, 
 bat holding its ground at any risk should the enemy 
 make a serious attack." 
 
 The problem here is practically an advanced 
 guard action, and the half-battalion should not 
 be delayed in the capture of Morton and Parton; 
 if, therefore, Shaw Wood causes such delay, the 
 artillery is at hand to support the attack from 
 knoll 775; it is otherwise directed on to the 
 heights bordering Fleet Valley, to remain there for 
 the present under cover, because the commander 
 has not had time yet to reconnoitre from those 
 heights the position at Garnant Down. 
 
 The infantry of the main body is directed to ren- 
 dezvous outside Longside, for the reason explained 
 when treating on the order for the advanced guard. 
 
 The arrival of the artillery at 9.40 on the 
 heights bordering Fleet Valley is estimated as 
 follows : — 
 
 When the sergeant is despatched it is 9.20. The 
 
48 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 advanced guard having arrived, the head of the 
 main body is less than one mile off. Whilst he 
 gallops back, the main body advances to within 
 perhaps half a mile, which would be covered by him 
 in about three minutes; the batteries trotting one 
 and a half mile to the position, with a quarter of a 
 mile added for their length before they are in it, 
 would take them about thirteen to fifteen minutes. 
 From the despatch of the sergeant to the arrival 
 in position would elapse, therefore, about 3 + 13 
 or 8 + 15, say 20 minutes, which means 9.40 a.m. 
 
 The general has disposed to assemble the com- 
 manding officers at 9.50 on knoll 775, because he 
 has roughly estimated that by that time every one 
 can be present ; because by personal intercourse he 
 can hear more from the cavalry leaders about the 
 enemy and his position, and can in a shorter time 
 issue the necessary orders; and because, till then, 
 he has had time to make up his mind how he 
 will dispose to force the enemy from his main 
 position. 
 
 The regulations on p. 120, sec. 124, (16), and p. 
 98, sec. 112, (« I. D.") say :— 
 
 " Before assuming formations for attack, an officer 
 commanding any body of troops will explain to 
 those under his command the points in the enemy's 
 position he proposes to assault, and the manner in 
 which he purposes to carry out the attack. He will 
 draw attention to any peculiarities of ground he 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 49 
 
 wishes turned to account during the adyance, and 
 prescribe which part of the force is to direct. 
 
 " He should also point out any ground that might 
 favour the enemy in threatening the flanks of the 
 attacking force, and explain the dispositions neces- 
 sary to guard against a flank attack, should it be 
 made. 
 
 " The orders for the distribution must be clear, 
 concise, and condplete. To secure united action it 
 is necessary that a definite object of attack or 
 specific duty should be allotted to each body of 
 troops ; the orders should, if practicable, be given 
 in writing to their commanders, the choice of the 
 manner in which the duty is to be performed being 
 left to them. The object aimed at, the direction 
 and compass bearing of the attack, and the extent 
 of frontage to be occupied, should be distinctly 
 stated. If an enveloping or flank attack be in- 
 tended, it should be provided for in the primary 
 distribution." 
 
 The student should test here whether the " de- 
 tachment order" given contains all these .points, 
 and where they are, and how they are expressed. 
 
 The " reasons for the plan (apparent in the order) 
 proposed," "to force the enemy from Ms position," are 
 that — 
 
 By holding him in check in front, where a direct 
 attach over the glacis-like slope would be very costly, 
 the main attack can be delivered v/nder letter cover, 
 
 E 
 
50 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS, 
 
 therefore probably with less loss, and on the left flank, 
 which is the most vulnerable pa/rt of the enemy's posi- 
 tion; for Shape Copse, being too extended for the 
 enemy to hold with his weak force strongly everywhere, 
 should be easy to captwre when the position is practi- 
 cally won. 
 
 By using the cavalry as proposed the enemy's line 
 of retreat is seriously threatened when evacuating the 
 position, and the whole force might be obliged to lay 
 down its arms, and thereby effectually disappear alto- 
 gether from every fu/rther field of action. 
 
 By using the artillery in the manner prescribed, 
 it is in a position where it best can prepare and aid 
 the infantry attack up to the very last moment, where 
 it is secure against surprise, and from which it can 
 readily move, being near the road, by Morton on to 
 Garnant Down, when necessary. The position on Jmoll 
 920, north of Shaw Wood, perhaps equally good, is 
 not chosen because it is farther off from Qarna/nt 
 Down, a/nd therefore the fire probably not so effective. 
 That position is also higher than the one chosen ; but 
 it would take longer time before the artillery could 
 come into action there ; and, besides, it would not be so 
 easily controlled by the general. 
 
 The attach of the brigade is delivered on a front 
 more extensive than that usual for a brigade, namely, 
 half a mile to one-third of a mile ; but by the con- 
 centric movement from the villages, on Ga/rnant Down, 
 qM the f woes will wnite at the fmal moment, and it is 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 51 
 
 considered that these frontages are laid down only as 
 a guide for the distribution when large hodies acting 
 together and not independently are concerned. 
 
 A battalion for the secondary attack from Morton 
 is considered sufficient, because if the enemy should 
 sally out and make a cowiter-attack against it, such 
 would he flanked by the forces advancing from Barton 
 into Shape Copse. 
 
 The troops to make the real attack are disposed 
 with one battalion in first line, one and a half bat- 
 talion in second line, and half-battalion in reserve, or 
 third line, because the second line, delivering the final 
 assault, should be strong enough to do this, and at the 
 same time he able to guard against Challow, and fill 
 up a gap between the troops delivering the Tnain and 
 secondary attacks. The third line or general reserve 
 consists only of half a battalion, because against a 
 previously defeated and apparently weaker enemy a 
 reverse is not so likely. 
 
 {Mere should be added briefly the calculations of the 
 time when the dispositions of the general would be 
 completed; they can be readily gathered from what 
 has been given further hack, namely, how the time is 
 filled wpfrom 9 a.m. to 10.15 a.m.^') 
 
 These reasons are based on the following regu- 
 lations : — 
 
 «I. D.," p. 96, sec. 110, (1) and (2). "The com- 
 mander of the force will base his plan of attack on 
 the information gained by a thorough reconnaissance 
 
02 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 of the enemy's position and the approaches to it. 
 If it be found to offer no cover to troops attacking, 
 he should seek to attack a flank, or threaten the 
 enemy's rear, in preference to attacking him in 
 front, as, unless the ground offers peculiar advantages 
 for the artillery of the offence, a direct attack across 
 open ground is costly and difBcult. 
 
 "During this reconnaissance, the main body of 
 the infantry will close up from column of route, and 
 will, in convenient situations for the subsequent 
 advance, form mass or line of battalion quarter 
 columns, or other suitable formation beyond the 
 range of the enemy's artillery, or nearer, if sheltered 
 by the formation of the ground." 
 
 "I. D.," p. 97, sec. Ill, (1), (2), (3), (4). "When 
 the commander has decided generally on his plan 
 of attack, orders for the distribution of the force 
 will be issued. 
 
 " The general principle on which troops are dis- 
 posed for an engagement is that they are formed in 
 greater strength, especially in depth, opposite the 
 point or points where it is intended to drive the 
 attack home, and in lesser strength opposite those 
 portions of the enemy's line where it is intended 
 merely to hold him to his ground. Their distribu- 
 tion should, in every possible manner, be concealed 
 from the enemy. 
 
 "An attacking force is formed into three bodies 
 distributed in depth: the first to develop the 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 53 
 
 attack, the second to support and carry it out, and 
 the third to confirm a success, cover a retreat, or 
 meet any emergency. 
 
 "There is a further reason for distribution in 
 depth, and it applies to the smallest fractions of a 
 force in the same degree as to the largest. A com- 
 mander can only exercise a direct influence on his 
 command so long as he retains at his disposal a 
 portion of his force with which to meet the varying 
 contingencies of an engagement. Without a body 
 of troops in hand, he can neither develop nor support 
 an attack, nor is he in a position to meet any un- 
 expected movement on the part of the enemy, such 
 as the sudden assumption of the offensive in force. 
 
 " It is not here intended to imply that the force 
 is to be at once distributed in the form in which it 
 will actually carry through the attack to its con- 
 clusion ; the distribution should, on the contrary, be 
 limited to that form which lends itself most readily 
 to the development of the plans the commander has 
 immediately in view." 
 
 « I. D.," p. 128, sec. 127, (3). «... If a brigade 
 be ordered to assault and carry a particular point 
 in the enemy's position, its frontage should not 
 exceed about a third of a mile, and may be required 
 to be less. ..." 
 
 "I. D.," p. 117, sec. 124, (7) and (8). "... The 
 troops destined for the second line will ordinarily be 
 about equal to, or slightly greater than those in the 
 
54 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 first line, and the third line will vary from one-fifth 
 of the whole force employed to, in a large force, 
 one-third, or even one-half if the enemy be out- 
 numbered. 
 
 " The frontage allotted to an attacking force 
 should not exceed that which the troops composing 
 its first line would cover were they deployed two 
 deep." 
 
 "I. D.," p. 98, sec. 113, (1), (3). "The com,- 
 mander having given his cavalry and artillery 
 commanders full information as to his proposed plan 
 of attack, the mass of the artillery will be brought 
 into action, protected by the infantry of the advanced 
 guard and cavalry. 
 
 " Fire will be opened simultaneously at a range 
 that must, to a great extent, be determined by the 
 configuration of the ground, subject to the general 
 rule, that artillery in its first deployment should 
 avoid coming within long range infantry fire." 
 
 " I. D.," p. 99, (1). " Under cover of artillery 
 fire, the infantry will now be ordered to advance to 
 the attack. ... As the attention and fire of the 
 hostile infantry becomes directed on the infantry of 
 the attack, it may be advisable to advance the 
 artillery to closer ranges, whence it will, at all 
 hazards and regardless of losses, support the infantry 
 advance." 
 
 " I. D.," p. 96, sec. 108, (4). " The subsequent 
 action of the attacking cavalry will depend on the 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 55 
 
 nature of the ground and the number and distribu- 
 tion of the hostile cavalry. Patrols should, how- 
 ever, remain in observation of the enemy's flanks to 
 give timely notice of any impending counter-attack. 
 If the ground be favourable, the attacking cavalry 
 will be best employed in vigorous action against 
 the enemy's flanks, and against the hostile cavalry ; 
 but in any case it should remain in observation of 
 the enemy's proceedings." 
 
 The conditions for the choice of a position for the 
 artillery will be found in the " Artillery Drill," p. 
 156, sec. 6, to which I can only refer the student. 
 I must also, as regards orders for the ammunition of 
 Infantry, refer him to the "Infantry Drill," pp. 135 
 to 138, sec, 132. 
 
 For the baggage the following is prescribed : — 
 
 « 1. D.," p. 139, sec. 133. « Distinct orders should 
 be issued as to the exact position to be maintained 
 by all transport proceeding with or following any 
 body of troops." 
 
 The position of the general commanding is 
 defined in the "Infantry Drill," p. 127, sec. 127, 
 (1), as follows : — 
 
 "The officer commanding an attacking force 
 should be where he can best watch the troops 
 engaged, issue his orders, and receive reports, and 
 should arrange for instant communication with 
 those troops which he keeps in hand at his own 
 disposal. He will notify to those under his command 
 
56 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 where he is to be found. If he quits his position, 
 he will leave a staff officer to state where he is to be 
 found. It is equally the duty of officers command- 
 ing battalions, brigades, and divisions, to keep them- 
 selves at all times acquainted with the position of 
 their immediate commanders." 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 If these pages have incited the student to solve 
 the problem better, the writer considers that they 
 have fulfilled their purpose. 
 
 )X>KnOH : PEINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWEa AKD SONS, LIUmSD 
 SIAUFOBD BTREEX AKI* CHAUKG C&OSS. 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
STUDIES IN 
 
 APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 GUIDE FOR OFFICERS PREPARING FOR 
 TACTICAL EXAMINATIONS. 
 
 KAEL VON DONAT, 
 
 LATE LIEUTENANT EAST PRUSSIAN FUSILIER REGIMENT NO. 33 
 
 (NOW "REGIMENT COUNT EOON"), 
 
 AND FOR THE LAST THIRTEEN TEARS PREPARING OFFICERS, ETC., FOR MILITARY 
 
 EXAMINATIONS IN ENGLAND. 
 
 ■•Tactics crystallize in the orders to the troops." — K. v. Donat. 
 
 PART n. 
 
 WITH HEAP. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 WILLIAM CLOWES & SONS, Limited, 
 
 13, CHAEING CEOSS, S.W. 
 
 1893. 
 
LONDON : 
 
 PRINTED ET WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, 
 STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS, 
 
 lAll rights reserved.] 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The Author is grateful for the kind and encouraging 
 criticism, which his first little volume has met with, 
 both publicly and privately, and hopes that this 
 second one will find a like favourable reception. 
 
 With regard to certain remarks on tactical ex- 
 aminations in general and particular, which are 
 made in the text, the author would willingly have 
 withheld them; but he thought it would serve a 
 good purpose to take the present opportunity of 
 speaking out, and that reticence would be rather a 
 shirking of duty. 
 
 I desire to acknowledge the kind assistance which 
 I have received from Lieut.-Colonel John Graham 
 in the revision of the manuscript of this sftid the 
 first part of the series. 
 
 KAEL VON DONAT. 
 
 4, Cakninq Place, Kensingtoh Gate, 
 London, W., 
 
 October, 1893. 
 
STUDIES IN 
 
 APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 PEOBLEM 2. 
 
 (Vide Official Eeport, Promotion Examination, November, 1891.) 
 
 N.B. — " It may be assumed that the Fleet Kiver 
 is impassable below Morton, except at the bridges. 
 
 " You are in command of a similar force to that 
 given in question 1 (four battalions of infantry, 
 two batteries and two regiments of cavalry), and 
 are acting .as the rearguard of a body of troops 
 which is retiring to the north, up the Fleet Valley. 
 
 " State how you would proceed, given the follow- 
 ing conditions : — 
 
 " (a) The enemy is three miles to the south of 
 Newtown (where your troops are cantoned), at the 
 moment when you receive orders to delay his 
 advance sufBciently to gain time for the passage of 
 the Forest of Arden by your main body. 
 
 " (b) The roads through Ashley and Challow are 
 guarded by other detachments." 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 SOLUTION. 
 I. 
 
 To commence with, one must imagine one's self in 
 the position of the commander of the rearguard. 
 
 In actual warfare he would know, when he 
 receives the orders, the exact time of the day, the 
 exact day of the year, and conseq[uently the season 
 (weather), the strength of the main body and its 
 exact position and probable state of preparedness to 
 march off, more or less the exact position, strength 
 and composition of the neighbouring detachments 
 guarding the roads through Ashley and Challow, 
 the exact strength, composition, and position of his 
 own outposts, also whether his force is retreating 
 on account of a previous defeat or otherwise. These 
 are certainly items which would considerably weigh 
 in his mind, and undoubtedly influence the details 
 of the decisions governing his proceedings. 
 
 Of the enemy he probably, or almost certainly, 
 does not know much more than is stated in the 
 question. But we may at once assume that the 
 enemy has arrived "three miles to the south of 
 Newtown " with his leading troops only, and that 
 it will take about one hour before they arrive in 
 front of Newtown ; probably we can count upon 
 more time as available for the rearguard to make 
 ready for receiving the enemy, as he must advance 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 3 
 
 more cautiously than with no hostile troops in his 
 front to harass and delay his reconnoitring forces. 
 In addition, the commander of the rearguard may 
 reckon upon the time it takes the enemy's forces to 
 close up. 
 
 The considerations, so far, have provided us with 
 an important item, which helps to solve this problem, 
 viz. — i 
 
 The rearguard has about one and a half hours' 
 time available for carrying out its dispositions to 
 receive the enemy. 
 
 The next question is. How long will the com- 
 mander of the rearguard have to delay the enemy ? 
 
 If the commander receives the orders in the 
 afternoon, after a day's march, the progress of the 
 main body to get out of the way will in all proba- 
 bility be slower than in the morning, after a night's 
 rest, or after having been stationary, and conse- 
 quently the delay required of the rearguard will be 
 longer. If the troops have been stationary for 
 some time, retreat is carried out more rapidly, and 
 the enemy's advance and attack are probably less 
 vigorous, owing to his fatigue from the day's march, 
 and consequently not so much resistance is required 
 of the rearguard. 
 
 But the problem says that the troops are " can- 
 toned " at Newtown, and they are therefore either 
 stationary, and the orders may then have been 
 received at any hour of the day, or they have slept 
 
4 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 only there during the night, and the order is 
 received early in the morning, the enemy having ap- 
 proached so closely, unobserved during a night march. 
 
 Again, however, if we read the problem carefully, 
 we must come to the conclusion that the troops 
 have not been stationary, for " you are acting as the 
 rearguard of a body of troops which is retiring to 
 the north up the Fleet Valley." 
 
 We have therefore no option left, but to assume 
 either, that the troops receive the orders in the 
 evening, having cooked, fed and rested after a 
 day's march; or, that the orders are received in 
 the morning after a night's rest. 
 
 In the first instance, night will soon cover a 
 retreat, and not much resistance is required, for it 
 is surprising how fast retreating troops can march 
 even after a day's fighting; thus, after the battle 
 of St. Quentin, on the 19th of January, 1871, the 
 orders issued to the victorious troops for the 20th 
 of January were : " To-morrow everybody will march 
 twenty-three miles," and yet the remnants of the 
 Vanquished were never reached. So much the 
 ■ faster, therefore, will they march, if necessary, after 
 feeding and resting. We can dismiss this case as 
 not a likely one in the mind of the examiner, and 
 assume that the orders are simply received in the 
 morning after a night's rest. 
 
 If such is the case, it is astonishing that the 
 enemy could get so close without his approach 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 5 
 
 being announced sooner by the cavalry patrols of 
 the outposts, thus enabling the main body to get- 
 out of the way without necessitating a facing of the 
 enemy by the rearguard. We cannot help thinking 
 that the cavalry must have done its reconnoitring 
 duty decidedly badly, and the troops we have to 
 handle seem to be very indifferent, consequently 
 we cannot risk much with them. It is an advantage 
 of course for the rearguard that the enemy must 
 have made a night march — though he may have 
 come up by rail, only nothing in the problem 
 warrants such an assurnption^-and cannot be so 
 fresh as we are ; yet, from the fact that the outpost 
 duty was done so badly, we here become aware 
 that our force is retreating on account of having 
 suffered a defeat, and is therefore probably morally 
 and physically inferior to the enemy. 
 
 The defeat cannot have been suffered the previous 
 day, as the force would most likely have made use 
 of the cover of night to place a day's march distance 
 between itself and the enemy, and not have " can- 
 toned " in such dangerous proximity to him. There 
 is, of course, no limit to speculation how it is that 
 the enemy got within an hour's march the next 
 morning, and whether we have been defeated, and 
 on what day, but such speculation must be cut 
 short by again referring to the question, which 
 says, "the body of troops ... is retiring," which 
 must be taken to mean that, after a defeat, it did 
 
6 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 80 yesterday, will do so to-day, and may do so to- 
 morrow. 
 
 If the rearguard appears indifferent, the main 
 body will be worse, as for the former the best 
 and most trustworthy troops are usually selected. 
 Much disorder and delay may therefore be expected 
 before the latter is beyond the reach of the enemy ; 
 consequently the rearguard will have to resist for 
 some time, yet should not risk obstinate fighting, as 
 it might be driven pell-mell on to the main body 
 before that is beyond the enemy's reach. With 
 troops that have not suffered a defeat previously, 
 and are retreating perhaps for other reasons, a 
 commander of a rearguard can pursue bolder 
 tactics than are here, under our assumption, per- 
 missible. 
 
 In the previous problem was given a date — the 
 7th of September — here there is none; but the 
 examiner most likely had the same time of the year 
 in his mind when framing this question ; for in 
 winter the river Fleet might be frozen, but it is here 
 assumed to be unfordable ; and in summer, at full 
 moon, we might fight almost day and night. During 
 winter artillery and cavalry may have the greatest 
 difficulty even in moving along the roads, and hardly 
 any chance of doing so elsewhere. No special diffi- 
 culty need be created, and so we assume an ordinary 
 September day. 
 
 The rearguard will face to the south, and there- 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 7 
 
 fore has additional difficulties in delivering its fire 
 and observing the effect, particularly the artillery 
 on account of the sun, should the sky be clear. 
 
 Observation of the enemy's movements is also 
 more difficult than when having the sun behind. 
 
 The length of time the rearguard will have to 
 resist and fight is considerably influenced by the 
 strength of the main bodyj by its position, and 
 readiness to withdraw. 
 
 As the problem says, "to delay the enemy's 
 advance sufficiently to gain time for the passage of 
 the Forest of Arden by the main body," we can assume 
 the latter to be on this side of that forest. 
 
 The rearguard being " cantoned," the main body 
 is certainly also " cantoned," and is so, probably, in 
 the villages Longside, Parton, Ghallow, and in those 
 north of that line, and in the farms. These troops 
 will all start from their quarters, at the latest, when 
 the commander of the rearguard receives his orders. 
 No delay need be apprehended in collecting all the 
 troops, and putting them into one column of route 
 on the road to " A," for if they were bivouacking at 
 one place near the road, we should have to estimate 
 the time it would take them to get into that column ; 
 and this time we may reckon to be the same as 
 marching to the road from the different places, with 
 the troops gradually falling into their correct posi- 
 tion in the order of march. Still, the state of pre- 
 paredness to withdraw is not so great when scattered 
 
» STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 about in the villages and farms as when collected 
 in a bivouac; additional time must therefore be 
 allowed to admit of a safe withdrawal. 
 
 In actual warfare the commander of the rear- 
 guard must, of course, know the strength of the 
 force he is covering. The examiner withholds that 
 information from the candidate. We need not 
 inquire into his reasons for this, but must try to 
 supply the want if we consider it necessary to know 
 the strength. The " Infantry Drill " does not pre- 
 scribe any proportion which the rearguard should 
 bear to the whole force to which it acts as such ; 
 all that it says in section 151, 2., is, " The first 
 thing a defeated force requires is to be relieved 
 from the pressure of a too-close pursuit. This is 
 done by detaching a portion of the force to make 
 head against the enemy's advance. . . ." 
 
 As a rule, it is assumed that the rearguard, under 
 ordinary circumstances, is somewhat stronger than 
 a similar advanced guard, particularly stronger in 
 artillery, as only that arm is able to force the enemy 
 to deploy for attack at a distance. By the " Infantry 
 Drill," section 145, 1., the advanced guard varies in 
 strength from one-fourth to one-eighth; and assuming 
 here for the rearguard a proportion of one-fourth 
 of the whole force, the main body would be about 
 one and a half divisions, i.e. twelve battalions of 
 infantry, minus one or two battalions furnishing the 
 detachments guarding the roads through Ashley and 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 9 
 
 Challow, and four batteries, all the cavalry being 
 with the rearguard. 
 
 The length of that column would be roughly 
 calculated as follows : — 
 
 11 Battalions . . = 11 x 350 = 3850 yards. 
 
 4 Batteries . . = 4 x 224 = 896 - „ 
 
 Intervals . . . . = 13 x 25 = 325 „ 
 
 Divisional Intervals = 1 x 50 = 50 „ 
 
 Proper length . . = 5121 „ 
 
 Opening out 25 per cent. = 1280 „ 
 
 Total length of column = 6401 „ 
 or roughly 3J miles. 
 
 We can count, therefore, that about one and a 
 half hours will elapse before the last man of the 
 main body will start, if the rate is two and three^ 
 quarter miles per hour ; and assuming the last man 
 to be at Parton, the tail of the column will be 
 separated from the enemy about two miles, as he 
 will have arrived before Newtown within that time, 
 as previously shown, presuming, of course, that the 
 main body will start with its first troops at the 
 moment the commander of the rearguard receives 
 his orders to delay the enemy. 
 
 As a rule the rearguard is also further distant 
 from its main body than an advanced guard. 
 
 The distance of the latter being determined by 
 the time it takes the rear of the column which it 
 covers to form up on its front before the enemy could 
 reach the bead, that for the advanced guard would 
 
10 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 be about three and a half to four miles in this 
 instance, and therefore between our rearguard and 
 its main body a distance of at least five miles should 
 intervene. 
 
 It was shown that two miles intervene already, 
 and so we have to delay the enemy sufSciently to 
 enable the main body to traverse three miles more, 
 which it will do in one to one and a half hours, 
 allowing for unavoidable delays in such a long 
 column in its passage through a forest defile. 
 
 The commander of the rearguard thus knows how 
 long, approximately, he has to delay the enemy at 
 Newtown when the latter appears in front of that place. 
 
 All these calculations would lead naturally to 
 quite different results if the main body could use 
 the roads through " L " and " B " as well ; but they 
 do not pass through the Forest of Arden, so far at 
 least as can be gathered from the map ; and such is 
 the condition of the problem. 
 
 To the two divisions the corps artillery may also 
 have been attached, which would make the column 
 longer, and necessitate a longer resistance by the 
 rearguard. 
 
 The trains encumbering the two divisions are also 
 left out of the calculation, firstly, because their 
 composition is not exactly known ; secondly, because 
 a retreating army would probably have sent them 
 ahead; and, thirdly, because the regimental trans- 
 ports can be collected and moved onward at a more 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. ll 
 
 rapid rate than the troops can march to a point 
 beyond the map. 
 
 The problem says that "the roads through Ashley 
 and Challow are guarded by other detachments." 
 The question naturally suggests itself to the candi- 
 date, Do these detachments belong to the force we 
 are immediately covering, or to other forces moving 
 on parallel roads ? I would assume the former, as 
 otherwise the examiner would probably have used 
 the expression, "by other rearguards." These de- 
 tachments cannot be strong; both are perhaps at 
 the utmost only a half-battalion, being left at Long- 
 side and Challow respectively, the former sending 
 perhaps a company to "H," the other two com- 
 panies to " D " and the southern edge of Pewsey 
 Wood. If these detachments were stronger, well- 
 nigh half of the whole force would practically be 
 employed on rearguard duty. 
 
 The rearguard, being " cantoned " at Newtown, 
 has without doubt secured itself by outposts the 
 strength and position of which are unknown, but 
 must be guessed. As an adequate strength I would 
 suggest, half-battalion of infantry, and half-squadron 
 of cavalry. 
 
 Their position is mere speculation, for the river 
 might take a decided turn to the west ; in that 
 case the cavalry only would be beyond it, the 
 infantry guarding the bridge, and needing less 
 strength than was just assumed ; but the river may 
 
12 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 just as well take such a turn to the east ; we shall 
 then have to push the infantry some distance beyond 
 Newtown as support for the cavalry, which can be 
 assumed with its vedettes one and a half miles to 
 the south of the town. The latter disposition will 
 probably also be adopted if the river continues in 
 its general course to the south, which we will assume 
 here as the most natural ; in that case we must 
 imagine one troop of the outpost cavalry to be 
 stationed on the left bank of Fleet River, on the 
 road beyond " F," one troop on the right bank on 
 the road " G," a little over a mile beyond Newtown, 
 with vedettes about half-mile in advance ; two com- 
 panies as supports at suitable ^places half-mile 
 beyond Newtown, and two companies as an imme- 
 diate reserve at the south entrance of Newtown in an 
 alarm-house, the rest of the rearguard : three and a 
 half battalions, two batteries, and seven and a half 
 squadrons, being " cantoned " in alarm quarters at 
 Newtown, furnishing perhaps with one section of 
 infantry a special guard for bridges 6 and 7 as a 
 lean-to for the cavalry of the left bank. 
 
 To summarize the results so far arrived at by the 
 above considerations, we find — 
 
 1. The commander has one and a half hours' time 
 
 to prepare his actual rearguard position. 
 
 2. The orders to delay the enemy's advance are 
 
 received by him in the morning after a night's 
 rest. 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 13 
 
 3. His troops had retreated the previous day and 
 
 appear indifferent, as the outpost duty was 
 done badly. 
 
 4. His operations take place on an ordinary 
 
 autumn day. 
 
 5. His main body is cantoned in the villages and 
 
 farms this side of the Forest of Arden, and 
 consists of one and a half divisions. 
 
 6. He will have to delay the enemy for at least 
 
 one and a half hours in the first position he 
 takes up. 
 
 7. The main body retreats on one road only, and 
 
 has furnished the detachments guarding the 
 Ashley and Challow roads at places and with 
 a force as indicated. 
 
 8. The outposts of the rearguard consist of a half- 
 
 battalion of infantry and half-squadron of 
 cavalry, with their foremost troops about one 
 and a half miles south of Newtown. 
 It may appear that many of these considerations 
 are irrelevant for solving this problem. To my 
 mind they are not so ; for a candidate must first of 
 all be clear about the tactical situation, which con- 
 cerns his force and himself, otherwise he gropes in 
 the dark. He may hit perchance upon a good 
 rearguard position and show the examiner vaguely 
 what is to be done, which is here easy enough, but 
 he cannot show him properly how it is to be done, 
 and this is the point the examiner complains of. 
 
14 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 It is an error, at least to my mind, to assume 
 that a vague tactical problem is difficult to answer 
 properly ; for in such a case usually any answer may 
 be right; on the contrary, the more precisely the 
 tactical situation is given, the more difficult it is 
 to give the only correct and only reasonable solution. 
 To substantiate this remark, I point to the question 
 on outposts set for the entrance examination to the 
 Staff College, in 1888, and to a similar question set 
 as late as November, 1892, for promotion of lieu- 
 tenants. In both cases outposts were to be shown 
 in position across the map, and not even the direction 
 whence the enemy was coming was vouchsafed to the 
 candidate. Certainly any position taken up across 
 the map must have been right, and must have been 
 accepted by the examiner, as long as ground, 
 distances, and proportion of the various bodies 
 according to the rules laid down by the regulations, 
 were duly taken into consideration, although one 
 candidate may have shown his face, the other his 
 rear, to where the examiner had supposed in his 
 mind the enemy to be. Hardly any one will call 
 this a test of applied tactical knowledge. I am 
 writing in the interest of tactics in general, and 
 may therefore be excused for this slight digression 
 from the problem to be here solved. I wish to re- 
 assure disheartened candidates. ' 
 
 To resume the thread — 
 
 Having made clear the tactical situation as it 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 15 
 
 depicts itself in the mind of the commander of the 
 rearguard at the moment he receives the orders, 
 and having thus supplied the candidate, who is 
 supposed to be the commander of the rearguard, 
 with what he may have felt to be a want, he will at 
 once sound the alarm for the assembly of his troops 
 at the place or places previously assigned, send the 
 necessary orders to his outposts, give directions re- 
 garding any regimental baggage which may still be 
 with the troops in the cantonments; despatch his staff 
 ofiRcer or brigade major to reconnoitre the ground 
 north of Newtown in regard to suitable defensive 
 positions, and himself glance at the map, and weigh 
 in his mind how he will best employ his troops " to 
 delay the enemy's advance sufficiently to gain time for 
 the passage of the Forest of Arden by the main body." 
 
 In the "Infantry Drill," section 151, 4-5., we 
 read, and the commander of the rearguard will recall 
 to his mind — 
 
 "The manner in which a rearguard carries out 
 its mission of gaining time for the remainder of the 
 force to retreat in good order, is by compelling the 
 enemy's troops to halt and deploy for attack as 
 frequently as possible. This is usually effected by 
 taking up a succession of defensive positions, which 
 the enemy is compelled to make dispositions for 
 attacking or turning. When these dispositions are 
 complete, the rearguard moves off and repeats this 
 action on the next favourable ground. All this 
 
16 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 consumes time, and time is what is most needed by 
 a retreating force." 
 
 " In occupying positions of this kind, two impor- 
 tant points have to be observed : one, to show as 
 strong a front as possible to the enemy, the other 
 to make sure of good lines of retreat." 
 
 The field of attack is divided into two parts by 
 the unfordable river Fleet. The enemy can attack 
 along the right bank, or on the left, or on both, or 
 he may be attacking on one and demonstrating on 
 the other. The strong cavalry of the rearguard 
 ought to be able to inform the commander in time 
 and in a precise manner which way the enemy is 
 coming in actual strength. We may assume from 
 the wording of the question that the enemy is 
 chiefly on the right bank; if he attacks in force 
 on the left bank, he will need time to transfer his 
 troops, which we thus gain. Encountering Pewsey 
 Wood, he must proceed cautiously, which would 
 also give us time to make ample preparations for 
 receiving and deceiving him there, for the ground 
 " G F " is quite open and overlooked from Newtown. 
 He will probably not operate in equal force on both 
 banks, as that would be a clumsy proceeding on his 
 part, which we cannot assume, as he has defeated 
 us already, and is therefore in all likelihood as good 
 a tactician as we are, if not better. The commander 
 of the rearguard himself, if he were the enemy, 
 would surely keep his forces concentrated on the 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS* 17 
 
 right bank, unless far superior in numbers, as to 
 which the problem reveals nothing, attack there, 
 try to rush Newtown, get command of the bridges 
 6 and 7, and operate then as he chooses on one or 
 the other bank, where he could reach the main 
 body by the shortest route. 
 
 This gives, the clue to how the commander of the 
 rearguard will have to dispose, his troops to meet 
 his adversary successfully. 
 
 Newtown is a strong tactical pivot, as the village 
 of Bazeilles, of which Newtown is a representative, 
 proved, and may cause the enemy considerable 
 delay in, or much preparation for, carrying it ; the 
 high ground in rear affords a,dmirable positions to 
 the artillery for effective fire, even far beyond New- 
 town and upon the ground on the left bank as far 
 as " F." The artillery can remain there even after 
 Newtown is in the hands of the enemy, and can 
 then easily withdraw under cover to the Longside 
 road, where it finds another excellent position. 
 The cavalry finds ample cover in the folds of the 
 ground, and favourable ground for guarding -the 
 flanks, for driving away the enemy's reconnoitring 
 parties there, and for unexpectedly charging the 
 enemy if he ventures upon a too hot pursuit after 
 gaining Newtown, or when attacking it. The 
 numbers of the infantry at Newtown may easily be 
 exaggerated .by. the wemy ; the bridges, 6, 7, and 5, 
 allow a rapid concentration on the left bank in case 
 
 c 
 
18 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 the enemy should after all venture to attack there. 
 Pewsey Wood and the undulating ground easily 
 hide all the weakness of troops possibly sent to 
 there, and Parton forms a rallying point for con- 
 centrating again on either bank, in order to defend 
 Shaw Wood or Shape Copse with Morton. 
 
 The commander being now clear as to how the 
 enemy may operate, how he could meet the enemy's 
 likely operations, and what facilities the ground 
 offers him for these operations, determines upon 
 the following : — 
 
 To order the outposts to delay the enemy as 
 much as possible; to hold Newtown firmly for at 
 least an hour and a half; to send cavalry and per- 
 haps a small infantry force across bridge 6, ready 
 to occupy the south-western part of Pewsey Wood ; 
 to hold the high ground north of Newtown with 
 artillery ; and to keep the remainder concentrated 
 under cover of, and behind, Newtown, with the 
 object of meeting the enemy on whichever side of 
 the river he is advancing in force. 
 
 As this is what the commander determines, it 
 remains for him now to let his troops know how he 
 wishes this determination to be carried out ; in other 
 words, he must embody his determination, i.e. his 
 tactics, in the orders which he issues to the troops. 
 The question of the examiner — 
 
 " State how you would proceed ..." is thereby 
 answered. 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 19 
 
 I must now refer the student to the first volume 
 of these " Studies," where the necessary hints for 
 framing orders are given. 
 
 He must further remember that the "Infantry 
 Drill," section 151, 6., prescribes that — 
 
 " The manner of occupying a rearguard position 
 differs from that of occupying a position meant to 
 be resolutely defended. The object of a rearguard 
 is to compel the enemy to deploy a coasiderable 
 portion of his force before venturing to attack, and 
 then to move off before the attack is pressed home. 
 It can therefore place the greater part of its force 
 in the fighting line from the outset, retaining a 
 proportionately small part in reserve." 
 
 As regards the occupation of any defensive posi- 
 tion, we read in section 128, 2. (a), of the same book — 
 
 " The extent of the position should be suitable to 
 the streiigth and composition of the defending force. 
 As a rough estimate, it may be assumed that a 
 fairly strong position, partly entrenched, would 
 require, including all arms and troops in reserve, 
 about five men per pace. 
 
 " In the event of it being necessary to occupy a 
 position too extended for the numbers available to 
 defend it, it will usually be preferable to occupy 
 the front thinly, keeping a strong reserve to re- 
 inforce at any threatened point, rather than to dis- 
 tribute the force generally throughout the front." 
 
 At this stage the commander will review in his 
 
20 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 mind the forces he has available, in order roughly 
 to determine the front he can fight on, and say to 
 himself — 
 
 4 Battalions ... = 4 x 800 = 3200 men. 
 2 Kegiments of cavalry = 2 x 400 = 800 „ 
 2 Batteries of artiUery = 2 x 150 = 300 „ 
 
 Total ... 4300 „ 
 
 If five men are to defend a pace, then 4300 men 
 defend 4300 ^ 5 = 860 paces, say, roughly, half 
 a mile at least, as we are a rearguard, and have, 
 moreover, an hour and a half's time for entrench- 
 ments. 
 
 We are justified in extending to more than half a 
 mile, because in section 127, 3., of the " Infantry 
 Drill," we read — 
 
 " If a brigade be ordered to assault and carry a 
 particular point in the enemy's position, its frontage 
 should" not exceed about a third of a mile, and may 
 be required to be less. ... 
 
 "Where the attack is not to be pushed home, 
 a brigade will occupy a frontage of about half a 
 mile. ..." 
 
 If, therefore, in the attack, when merely demon- 
 strating, a brigade can fight on a frontage of half a 
 mile, we can extend to more in the defence, where 
 we have entrenched ourselves to some degree, and 
 where we are only demonstrating as a rearguard. 
 
 The student having accompanied the writer thus 
 far, should now, as requested in the previous little 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 21 
 
 volume, at this stage of the solution of the problem, 
 stop reading further and write out his answer in- 
 dependently, as he thinks it should be given, in 
 accordance with the preceding or his own reflections, 
 and then compare his answer with, that given by 
 the writer in the next part. 
 
 II. The Orders. (Answer.) 
 
 The following answer to the problem is suggested, 
 and the candidate should hand in to the examiner 
 what is printed in italics. Repetition in print is 
 unavoidable, as all the foregoing is only a mental 
 operation which the candidate has to perform before 
 he can set to work writing out his answer. 
 
 On receipt of the orders — which are supposed to have 
 arrived on a September morning, after a night's rest — • 
 " to delay the enemy's advance sufficiently to gain time 
 for the passage of the Forest of Arden hy the main 
 body," wnder the conditions "that the enemy is three 
 miles to the south of Newtown at the moment the order 
 is received," and " that the roads through Ashley and 
 Challow are guarded by other detachments" of owr 
 force, the commander of the rear-guard would "pro- 
 ceed " immediately to 
 
 OEDER THE ALAEM TO BE SOUNDED, 
 
 and while the troops are getting ready, despatch the 
 following written order to the senior quarter-master : — • 
 
22 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 " To Senior Q.M. " Blaeh Eagle Hotel, Newtown, 
 
 "7th September, 1893, 6 a.m. 
 
 "Collect all regimental transports at northern egdt 
 of Newtown. When assembled, move to Morton along 
 road this side of river, following main body at a 
 distance of one mile, leaving two carts and two mules 
 per battalion, parking at northern exit of Newtotvn, 
 and remainder of the ammunition carts likewise at 
 the cross-roads west of Parton. You will send a copy 
 of this order to the other quarter-masters. Escort will 
 follow. 
 
 "X. Major-Qeneral. 
 
 " Handed written to : 
 " Dismounted Orderly." 
 
 He will next summon the commander of his outposts, 
 
 who is supposed to he the commander of the 1st battalion. 
 
 The supposed strength of the 
 
 Half of 1st Battalion. j j i ■ 
 
 4 3 2 1 Comp outposts being as per margin, 
 
 I 1 I 1 and the river being assumied as 
 
 continuing its southern course, 
 
 Half of 1st Squadron ^^^^^ disposition is presumably 
 
 2. 1. Troop. as follows : — 
 |X pC 1st troop one mile south of 
 
 Newtown on road " G," with 
 vedettes about half-mile in advance, guarding right 
 bank ; 
 
 2nd troop on road " F," abreast of 1st troop, with 
 similar vedettes, guarding left bank ; 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 23 
 
 No. 1 company, as support, at a point half-mile 
 west of'G" and half-mile south of Newtown ; 
 
 No. 2 company on road " G," half -male south of 
 Newtown ; 
 
 No, 3 and 4 companies as reserve, in an alarm- 
 house at southern exit of Newtown. 
 
 One section of No. 4 battalion is supposed to have 
 leen sent for the night to bridges 6 and 1 as a support, 
 for the 2nd troop. This battalion is also supposed to 
 have furnished the necessary village guards, and the 
 1st squadron of 1st cavalry regiment to have furnished 
 from its 3rd troop two orderlies to each of the sup- 
 ports, the reserve, and the section at bridges 6 and 7. 
 
 Meanwhile the commander of the rearguard will 
 have given to the 'senior medical officer, who is pro- 
 bably quartered in the same hotel, the following 
 order : — i 
 
 " To Senior M.O, " {Same place.) 
 
 " 7th September, 1893, 6.2 a.m. 
 
 "An action is imminent. Select a building at 
 Newtown as hospital for the severely wounded, who 
 cannot be removed without danger to themselves, and 
 whom we must leave in the hands of the enemy when 
 evacuating Newtown. Keep bearer company and 
 field hospital parking at the northern exit of New- 
 town, Orders will reach you when to move to Parton. 
 
 "X. Major- G-eneral. 
 
 " Sent in writing hy : 
 "Infantry Orderly." 
 
24 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 On the arrival of the commander of the outposts 
 the general will give him the following order : — 
 
 "ToO. 0. Outposts. " (Same place.) 
 
 "1th September, 1S93, 6.8 a.m. 
 
 " The enemy is three miles to the south of Newtown. 
 Strength not given hy head-quarters. The rearguard 
 is to delay the enemy sufficiently to gain time for the 
 passage of the Forest of Arden hy the main hody. The 
 roads through Ashley and Ghallow are guarded hy 
 detachments of the main hody', strength not known. 
 We shall have to delay the enemy at Neivtown for one 
 and a half hours at least. Therefore : 
 
 " The outposts will ohstruct his advance as much as 
 possible, and quite in particular, find out on which 
 hank he is advancing in force, reporting immediately. 
 In any case, the outposts of the right bank will retire 
 to the west of Newtown, rallying at the north-western 
 exit, but holding their ground firmly against demon- 
 strations, and only falling hack slowly when the enemy 
 presses in force. Your battalion will under all cir- 
 cumstances obstinately defend Newtown, and for that 
 pu/rpose your 2nd half-battalion will put in a state 
 of defence the western, the southern, and south-eastern 
 edge of that village. The two machine-guns of the 
 brigade are placed at your disposal, and find a posi- 
 tion at the south-eastern salient to sweep the left bank, 
 and stopping anything steaming up the river. The 
 outposts of the left hank will continue to observe, and, 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 25 
 
 if forced to retire, will do so towards the south-western 
 corner of Pewsey Wood. Establish and uphold com- 
 munication with the detachments on your right and 
 left, reporting to me their strength and exact positions. 
 "Ammunition and field hospital for slightly 
 wounded at northern exit of Newtown, whereto also 
 you will send the light-duty men to form an escort. 
 Severely wounded will he attended at Newtown. 
 
 "X. Major-General. 
 
 " Verbal: to O.C. Outposts. 
 " Taken down in writing : 
 " hy Adjutant." 
 
 The commander of the rearguard having thus 
 provided for the immediate measures to ie adopted, 
 will now, while his troops are assembling, himself get 
 ready, and, while doing so, disclose his views to his 
 staff officer, who was probably all the time present 
 and attending to minor measures. He will gradually 
 make up his mind how he will "proceed " fwrther, 
 whereby that staff officer becomes acquainted with 
 the orders which the commander will issue to the rear- 
 guard. He will then send the staff officer to recon- 
 noitre the ground north of Newtown and on the left 
 bank, telling him to return within half an hour, and 
 then himself go to the alarm-post, whither he will 
 summon, or where he will find all commanding officers, 
 and where he mil issue the following, after having 
 read out to them by an adjutant the orders given to, 
 the commander of the outposts : — 
 
26 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 EEABGUABD ORDER. 
 
 " Newtown, 
 "7th September, 1893, 6.15 a.m. 
 
 "1. In pursuance of the outpost orders just read, 
 the artillery will at once move to the spur 600 to 800 
 yards west of the letter " T " in the word " FLEET," 
 and prepare there some cover, opening fire on whatever 
 of the enemy hecomes visible, keeping an eye also on the 
 left lank. 
 
 "2. The 2nd and 3rd battalions will move to the 
 cross-roads immediately north of Newtown and await 
 there further orders, standing with piled arms under 
 cover of Newtown. 
 
 " The Ath battalion will draw in the section stationed 
 at bridge 7 and march at once to the high ground close 
 to where the batteries will take post, throwing up shelter 
 trenches to the left and right of the batteries, then 
 piling arms there and awaiting fwrther orders. It 
 will also send two companies to Parton to prepare 
 that village somewhat for defence. 
 
 " 3. The 1st cavalry regiment will move to the 
 right of the batteries, halting under cover in the valley 
 there, reconnoitring, with whole squadrons even, ward- 
 ing off any of the enemy's reconnoitring parties, and 
 watching any favowrable opportunity for charging the 
 enemy's advanced troops. Connection with the detach- 
 ments to the right is to be constantly maintained. 
 
 " The 2nd regiment will m^ove to the westernmost 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 27 
 
 salient of Pewsey Wood and act in the same spirit 
 as the \st regiment, hut is in addition to defend Pewsey 
 Wood provisionally hy dismounting against any enemy 
 who may he demonstrating on the left hank. The out- 
 post cavalry of the left hanh will in that case act 
 under orders of the 2nd cavalry regiment. 
 
 " 4. By these measures I intend — 
 
 " To hold the enemy in check, at any rate, at New- 
 town for at least one and a half hours ; 
 
 " To he ready to reinforce the hattalion there when 
 needed: or 
 
 " To move with the remainder of the infantry across 
 the river should the enemy advance in force on the 
 left hank, and merely demonstrate on the right hank ; 
 
 " To he able to occupy the high grovmd where the 
 artillery is stationed, when Newtown becomes wntenable 
 and when the enemy attacks in force only on the right 
 bank ; 
 
 " To keep the artillery from the outset in a position 
 where it can remain to the very last, whatever eventu- 
 ality may arise; 
 
 " To demonstrate as mu^ch as possible with owr strong 
 cavalry by dismounted action, in order to deceive 
 the enemy about our actual strength and extent of 
 position. 
 
 " 5. The light-duty men of the infantry, artillery, 
 and cavalry are to he collected at the northern exit 
 of Newtown, and to he marched wider the command 
 of a subaltern, to he fwnished by the ^th battalion, 
 
28 STUDIES m APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 to Marton, to follow up the transport and act as an 
 escort for if, 
 
 " 6. I shall go to the outposts, but reports will find 
 me till 7 a.m. at the southern exit of Newtown ; after 
 that time, where the artillery is stationed. 
 
 " X. Major-General. 
 
 " Verhal : to the assembled 
 
 " Com. Officers. 
 " Taken down in wriling : 
 
 " iy Adjutant." 
 
 The commander of the rearguard will now go 
 to examine the measures adopted hy the outposts ; 
 
 Inform the commander of the outposts of the rear- 
 guard order just issued verbally to the commanding 
 officers ; 
 
 Reconnoitre from a favourable spot the enemy s 
 advance ; 
 
 Then retwm to the high ground where the artillery 
 is posted ; 
 
 Despatch an offi/ier to the main body in order to 
 heep himself constantly informed on the progress of 
 the main body, and who is to looJc out at the same 
 time for suitable defensive positions ; 
 
 Report to the main body by this- officer the measures 
 the rearguard has adopted ; and 
 
 Await the enemy s attack to meet it from whatever 
 direction it may be delivered. 
 
 Tljis completes the answer. When I commenced 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS, 29 
 
 the solution of this problem I was wondering what 
 result I should arrive at, and now that it is finished 
 I am wondering whether the examiner expected 
 guch an answer. To my mind no answer radically- 
 different from this can be given, as it appears to me 
 the least that one could say in order to show " Tiow " 
 the candidate would "^rocee;^." Yet the examiner 
 must have been satisfied with less than that, and 
 have expected a different answer, for the one here 
 given occupies seven pages of foolscap, and to write 
 these,, even from dictation, would almost amount to 
 a physical impossibility in the time available. 
 Where, then, is the candidate to get the time fqr 
 thinking out and arranging his answer if he has 
 only one hour altogether in which to solve this 
 problem ? If two and a half or three hours were 
 allotted to this problem, each candidate could do 
 himself full justice; should he be ignorant, he 
 would, at all events, not know how to fill up his 
 time, and would deliver a Tery poor reply, which 
 must relieve the examiner very much indeed of 
 anxiety as to marking justly. I should think 
 that with only one such tactical problem a candir 
 date's capacity could easily be marked by an ex- 
 aminer, and I often wonder how he can possibly do 
 justice to, the candidates under the present system. 
 But an answer to that would require a special 
 treatise, , 
 
30 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 III. Explanations. 
 
 As far as the examiner is concerned the problem 
 is solved with the preceding part, since he does 
 not ask this time for " reasons ; " but the student 
 probably wishes to have some further explanations 
 and reasons for several little points mentioned in that 
 part, and not touched upon in the " considerations." 
 
 There is the succession in which the orders are 
 issued'; that will first strike the student. The 
 examiner has asked : " state how you would proceed." 
 The candidate will do well if he always ties the 
 examiner down to his own words ; the latter is 
 thereby continually reminded of the question he 
 has asked, and the former is not so liable to go 
 astray and wander from the subject. If we have to 
 state how the commander of the rearguard "pro- 
 ceeds," then the more realistically we can depict his 
 proceedings the more correct will the answer turn out. 
 
 When a rearguard action is imminent, it will be 
 the anxiety of the commander, more than in any 
 other, to get his encumbrances rapidly and well 
 out of the way, and to provide for the care of the 
 wounded, in order to leave as few as possible in the 
 hands of the enemy, before whom he must in any 
 case retire after a certain time. The enemy should 
 know as little as possible about our losses, and get 
 as little chance as possible to gather information 
 from prisoners. 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 31 
 
 His next care will be to provide the outposts with 
 the necessary instructions, as upon them will fall in 
 the first instance the duty of delaying the enemy 
 until the preparations for defence by the rearguard 
 are completed. As the commander of the outposts 
 is assumed to be in the same village, he can be 
 summoned to the presence of the commander of 
 the rearguard and receive his instructions person- 
 ally, and before those given later on to the other 
 commanding oflScers, and this for two reasons : 
 firstly, because the commander of the rearguard may 
 not have quite made up his mind at that moment 
 how he will act ; and secondly, because that later 
 order can still reach him in time for acting in 
 concert. 
 
 The staff ofScer is sent off on his reconnoitring 
 errand before the orders are issued to the assembled 
 commanding officers, because he knows the inten- 
 tions of his general from the conversation he had 
 with him before leaving his quarters, and need no 
 longer be present, but may better aid his general 
 by making himself acquainted, during the short 
 interval before the enemy's arrival, with the defen- 
 sive capabilities of the ground on which his forces 
 will have to operate. 
 
 These being the reasons why the orders were 
 given in this succession, I now advise the student 
 to turn back to the "answer," while following up 
 the subjoined remarks. 
 
32 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 The time and date when the order was assumed 
 to be received are mentioned at once at the beginning 
 of the answer without any explanations, because to 
 give the latter would be indifferent, and because 
 the examiner should at once see under what assump- 
 tion the answer is given, as this shows him how we 
 understood the situation from the wording of his 
 question. , 
 
 The order to the senior quarter-master is con- 
 sidered necessary, because all the vehicles should 
 be under one command, for vehicles there will be, 
 although the " Infantry Drill " says in section 151, 
 1., at the end: "It (the rearguard) should be lightly 
 equipped and unaccompanied by baggage." That 
 officer is ordered to keep this side of the river, 
 because defiling over the bridges 6 and 7 might 
 cause delay, and at Morton, where defiling must 
 take place, a delay is not so serious, as it may be 
 shortened by the vehicles fording the river on an 
 emergency. Every vehicle which is not an ambu- 
 lance, or carrying ammunition, is ordered to follow 
 the main body at a distance of one mile, because 
 they would come under the term "baggage," and 
 should remain well away from the rearguard, not 
 get into the way of the main body, and be able to 
 turn at once into a side road, if the main body 
 should unexpectedly halt and face the enemy. 
 
 The ammunition carts are disposed as stated in 
 the order, because the " Infantry Drill " prescribes 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 33 
 
 in section 132, 3., at the end, when marching, 
 " as a rule, two small-arm ammunition carts and 
 two mules will follow immediately behind eacli 
 battalion, and the rest of the small-arm ammunition 
 carts will follow the brigade." The reason for the 
 position assigned to the two sections of the ammuni- 
 tion will be quite clear if the student will read section 
 132, 6., of the " Infantry Drill," which is too long 
 to be quoted here. The quarter-master is requested 
 to send a copy of his order to his colleagues, as that 
 simplifies the task of the commander of the rear- 
 guard. 
 
 The strength of the outposts is assumed as a half- 
 battalion of infantry and a half-squadron, because 
 as few men as possible should be employed for that 
 duty, and because the whole rearguard, if cantoned 
 in alarm-bouses, is practically a reserve of outposts. 
 The country seems open to the south, and two good 
 roads lead towards the enemy, and, therefore, 
 cavalry is employed even during night, because it 
 can be pushed further forward and give more rapid 
 information — galloping on the roads — than infantry 
 could. And why should cavalry not always be 
 employed on that duty in the foremost line, when- 
 ever possible, as it can and must be so when em- 
 ployed ahead of the army as a strategical advanced 
 guard, with no infantry available to perform the 
 outpost duty ? 
 
 It was considered necessary to Send a section of 
 
 D 
 
34 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 infantry, independent of the outposts, to guard 
 bridges 6 and 7, because tbe cavalry on the left 
 bank will feel more secure, and a raiding party of 
 the enemy sent during the night to destroy these 
 bridges, in order to prevent the rearguard from 
 rapidly crossing over to meet the enemy on the left 
 bank, where he might intend to operate on the next 
 morning, would find its plans frustrated. The 4th 
 battalion is chosen to furnish this section and the 
 village guard, because it is supposed to be acting 
 the next day as the rearguard of the brigade, if 
 retreat could be continued unmolested, as was pro- 
 bably assumed by the commander of the rearguard 
 on the preceding evening. That battalion would have 
 been the last to leave the village after the outposts 
 had retired through it, if no action were imminent. 
 
 The orderlies are furnished from the other half of 
 the 1st squadron and not from the outpost cavalry, 
 as this would weaken those two troops too much. 
 
 The chief medical officer must know what action 
 is intended, and the probable course events will 
 take, so as to make his arrangements for the slightly 
 and severely wounded, and also where to establish 
 his ambulant hospitals. The hint is given that 
 orders will reach him when he is to move to Parton, 
 as the commander does not know whether the real 
 action will not be fought on the left bank, in which 
 case Parton must be considered as the only suit- 
 able point for collecting the severely wounded. 
 
STUDIES IS APPLIED TACTICS. 35 
 
 All the oi-ders are supposed to be sent by dis- 
 mounted orderlies, because the difference in time 
 otherwise is but small and progress on foot in a 
 village, with everybody hurrying to arms, is safer, 
 and perhaps in the long run more rapid. 
 
 The order to the commander of the outposts is 
 stated to be given at 6.8 a.m. because at 6 a.m. 
 the order to " delay " the enemy is supposed to be 
 received by the commander of the rearguard, and 
 no more than eight minutes need elapse before the 
 commander of the outposts can appear, as he is in 
 the same village and perhaps within a quarter of a 
 mile from head-quarters of the rearguard. 
 
 In the orders to the commander of the outposts 
 these latter are ordered to retire to the west of 
 Newtown, in order to clear and unmask the field of 
 fire of the defenders of that village, and to rally at 
 the north-western exit in order to form a fresh re- 
 serve to their own battalion, and to be stronger on 
 that side, as it is unlikely that the enemy will press 
 hard on the south-eastern side of the village on 
 account of the river. Against demonstrations of the 
 enemy the outposts are ordered to hold their ground 
 firmly, firstly because there is no danger for them, 
 and secondly they thereby oblige the enemy to 
 keep away still further on the left bank if he should 
 attack there, which causes, perhaps, all the delay 
 we need, and relieves us from any other fighting on 
 that day. 
 
36 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 The 1st battalion is charged with the defence of 
 Newtown, and therefore its second half is ordered to 
 prepare that village for defence during the hour the 
 other half is delaying the enemy, for those who 
 defend a locality should also prepare it for defence. 
 
 One battalion is considered a sufficient garrison 
 for the village, because its front to be defended is 
 about 800 to 900 yards long, and one man per yard 
 including inner reserves is considered sufficient as 
 a minimum in ordinary circumstances, and is so 
 certainly here, where we are only making demon- 
 strations. 
 
 The machine-guns at the south-eastern corner of 
 Newtown are well placed to make up any weakness 
 in the defence of the left bank, if the enemy is 
 merely demonstrating there, or to keep him at a 
 respectful distance, if he attacks there in force, 
 until we have made arrangements to meet him in 
 sufficient strength. It may be argued that the 
 machine-guns would for that purpose be better 
 attached to the 2nd cavalry regiment and be placed 
 to more advantage in Pewsey Wood. I quite agree, 
 for also in my opinion the infantry magazine small- 
 bore rifle is quite sufficient, and the machine-gun has 
 no raison d'etre with the infantry, but is an arm that 
 is admirably suited to supply the want of defensive 
 capability of cavalry in such actions as here described, 
 and supplies in a compact and condensed form, 
 whatever a mongrel and cumbersome force like 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 37 
 
 mounted infantry can furnish and perform. How- 
 ever, I have assumed that the cavalry has two 
 machine-guns as well, and by the cross-fire more 
 effect is looked for than by concentrating all the 
 machine-guns of the rearguard in Pewsey Wood ; 
 and, besides, it is against the rule to separate from 
 the tactical units, without adequate reasons, any- 
 thing assumed as necessary by organization. In 
 the paragraphs 114, 3. and 117, 5. of the " Infantry 
 Drill " will be found the necessary hints for the 
 employment of machine-guns in the attack and 
 defence generally. 
 
 It is particularly important for the commander 
 of the rearguard to know the strength, composition, 
 and position of the detachments guarding the 
 Ashley and Challow roads, and therefore the com- 
 mander of the outposts is specially enjoined to ascer- 
 tain this and to uphold constant communications 
 with those detachments, thus effectively securing 
 the flanks and reporting any turning movements of 
 the enemy, which, after all, are not dangerous as 
 occupying too much time, of which we need only 
 one to one and a half hours in order to get the 
 main body away to a safe distance. 
 
 The reasons for everything given in the " Eear- 
 guard Order " are quite apparent and hardly need , 
 for their tactical part, any explanations, as the 4th 
 paragraph of it states all plainly enough. They are 
 based chiefly on the numbers 12, 11, 9, 8, and 7 of 
 
38 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 section 151 of the " Infantry Drill," on section 22, 
 Part III, p. 292, and section 7 (2), Part VII. p. 477 
 of vol. ii. of the " Cavalry Drill," 1891. For con- 
 venience' sake, and knowing how seldom one is 
 inclined to look for references, if the book is not 
 just to hand, they are here repeated. 
 
 From the " Infantry Drill " :— 
 
 " Too great a distance should not be allowed to 
 intervene between the rearguard and the force it is 
 covering. When a rearguard halts to fight, every 
 moment separates it further from the main body ; 
 whereas with a pursuing force every moment brings 
 its reinforcements closer." 
 
 "A rearguard should keep patrols as widely as 
 possible to its flanks. Early information will 
 thus be obtained of any attempt of the enemy 
 to pass between the rearguard and the main body. 
 But it is seldom advisable to detach parties of 
 infantry and artillery to move at a distance on 
 the flanks. If the enemy be in force, these parties 
 could effect little. If he be not in force, his 
 movements in that direction, once they are dis- 
 covered, are of little importance. The rearguard 
 should, as a rule, move concentrated, ready to fight 
 with its full strength, but keeping scouting par- 
 ties well out to its flanks and rear to obtain 
 information. 
 
 " In withdrawing from a position a part only of 
 the force usually moves at a time, the part that 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 39 
 
 moves first occupying the next favourable ground in 
 rear to cover the retreat of the remainder. 
 
 "A point of great importance to the commander 
 of a rearguard is judging the proper time to retire. 
 By retiring too soon he would be only partly 
 carrying out the work required from the rearguard. 
 By holding on too long he may endanger his 
 retreat, and ' the rearguard may be driven back in 
 disorder. 
 
 "Counter-attacks should seldom be resorted to 
 unless for some urgent purpose. It cannot be 
 hoped to inflict an appreciable defeat on the enemy, 
 who is being constantly reinforced by troops in rear, 
 and it is of more importance to save one's own men 
 for the arduous duty assigned than to inflict a 
 loss on the enemy that he can quickly make 
 good." 
 
 From the " Cavalry Drill " (page 292) :— 
 " 1. The arming of ' cavalry with a carbine 
 enables it to carry out its special duties inde- 
 pendently of the other arms, and to attain the 
 object in view under circumstances which preclude 
 the possibility of a mounted combat; but cavalry 
 has not the power, nor is it in accordance with the 
 spirit of the arm, to attempt to carry on a long- 
 continued fight with firearms. Dismounted action, 
 therefore, is to be resorted to only when the 
 mounted combat is unsuitable, or certain to yield 
 inferior results; and when once resolved upon, 
 
40 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 it must be prosecuted vigorously and with sufficient 
 I'orce. 
 
 "2. The cases in which cavalry are most 
 frequently employed dismounted are — 
 
 " (a) To hold localities until the arrival of the 
 infantry. 
 
 «(6)... 
 
 " (c) To offer resistance, during a retreat, sufficient 
 to compel the enemy to deploy, or at any rate to 
 necessitate his making a reconnaissance ; thus, in 
 either case gaining time. 
 
 "(d)... 
 
 "(e) . . . 
 
 " In addition to these cases, dismounted fire-action 
 may sometimes be employed with effect to create 
 alarm or deceive the enemy as to the presence of 
 infantry. . . ." 
 
 On page 477— 
 
 "The long range of field-guns, and the moral 
 and material effect of their projectiles, must always 
 maintain the value of horse artillery in covering 
 the movements of cavalry. The fire of machine- 
 guns will, however, be an important factor in many 
 operations, particularly in those where cavalry has 
 hitherto relied on the effect of carbine fire, or 
 has been obliged to look for support to the fire of 
 infantry." 
 
 The commander of the rearguard could not 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 41 
 
 "proceed" any further or order anything beyond 
 what has been stated, for all the rest depends on 
 the enemy, and the student should carefully bear 
 in mind this point, which is so important in framing 
 orders. In his orders the commander has sufficiently 
 indicated where he will eventually take up his 
 second position after having been driven out of 
 Newtown. 
 
 The escort for the transport is composed of the 
 light-duty men of the rearguard, because the less 
 we weaken the latter the stronger we are where 
 most needed, and a man with a sore foot or other 
 slight disorder may still help and be able to defend 
 on an emergency some waggons, upon which he 
 may find a seat in turn. 
 
 Nothing is said in the order about position of 
 ambulance and transport, as that is gleaned from 
 the orders to the outposts, which were read to the 
 commanding officers. 
 
 The commander himself goes to where the 
 artillery is stationed, because it is there that he 
 gets the best view and has that arm, which is so 
 paramount for the defence, under his immediate 
 control; besides, from there he can easily direct 
 all movements and readily move to any point. 
 
 He has not given any orders for destroying the 
 bridges 6 and 7 or preparing them for demolition 
 after Newtown shall have been abandoned, because 
 no hint was thrown out in the question that such 
 
42 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 a step was to be considered; for the "Infantry- 
 Drill," section 151, 13., says — 
 
 " Clear instructions should be given to the com- 
 mander of a rearguard as to the extent to which 
 he is at liberty to break down bridges, burn villages, 
 destroy property, etc., with a view to impeding 
 the enemy's advance ; for the retreat may be only 
 of a temporary character, and it may be in con- 
 templation soon to re-occupy the country passed 
 through." 
 
 After issuing the "Kearguard Order," the com- 
 mander is said to "proceed" to examine the 
 measures adopted by the outposts, and to reconnoitre 
 the ground there, because the enemy being still 
 some way off, the commander most naturally will 
 at such a critical moment convince himself, if 
 possible, that everything is properly carried out 
 according to his intentions, and judge himself of 
 the defensive strength of the ground and the 
 enemy's first approach. 
 
 He despatches an officer to the main body with 
 the objects as stated, since he must gauge the time 
 of his resistance according to the progress of the 
 main body and because the " Infantry Drill " pre- 
 scribes in the oft-quoted section 151, 10., that — 
 
 " When retreating, it is always advisable to send 
 beforehand a reliable officer to the rear to note 
 favourable positions for defence on the line of 
 retreat of the rearguard." 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 43 
 
 PEOBLEM 3. 
 
 {Vide Official Keport, Promotion Examination, November, 1891.) 
 
 N,B. — It may be g-ssumed that the Fleet Eiver 
 is impassable below Morton, except at the bridges. 
 
 "Tou are in command of three battalions of 
 infantry, which have been pushed forward in carts 
 to support a cavalry screen ; the latter is now five 
 miles beyond the eastern edge of the map, facing 
 east. You are ordered to hold the line of the Fleet 
 Eiver in such a manner as to secure the passages, 
 even should the cavalry screen be driven in. 
 
 " The enemy's cavalry screen consists of six 
 regiments of cavalry and two horse artillery bat- 
 teries, whereas yours is of only half that strength ; 
 he has in addition a battalion- of mounted infantry. 
 " Show on the map how you would dispose your 
 troops, and state what preparations you would 
 make, assuming — 
 
 " (a) That your main army proposes to cross the 
 river on the following day, and to move 
 on B, C, and D. 
 " (6) That you are senior to the cavalry brigadier 
 and take command of the whole force, 
 when the screen is driven in. 
 " (e) That three hours at least will be available 
 for your preparations." 
 
44 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 SOLUTION. 
 I. Considerations. 
 
 At first we are only in command of three batta- 
 lions of infantry which have been pushed forward 
 in carts. As the exact spot is not mentioned at 
 which the battalions have arrived, we can assume 
 that their commander makes his dispositions while 
 still on the road, and that from the moment the 
 troops have arrived at the places as ordered by the 
 commander, there are still three hours at least 
 available for any preparations which he considers 
 necessary. We need not inquire whether he has 
 adopted any special measures of security while his 
 troops are being carted. 
 
 The commander is probably provided with a map 
 of the country; he would scan that, consider the 
 orders under which his force is required to act, and 
 then direct his troops accordingly. If he has no 
 map, he will most likely gallop forward to Grarnant 
 Down, accompanied by his adjutant, and when 
 arriving there request the nearest squadron leader 
 to send a group as orderlies. He would thus be 
 able to despatch his orders to meet the infantry on 
 the march, so as to avoid detours by them. It is 
 therefore indifferent, as regards the disposition of 
 the troops, whether the commander has a map or 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 45 
 
 not ; no appreciable delay in the execution of the 
 dispositions need occur in the latter case. 
 
 His orders are : " To hold the line of the Fleet 
 River in such a manner as to secure the passages, 
 even should the cavalry screen be driven in." No 
 doubt can be in the mind of the commander that in 
 this case he has to go with his force beyond the 
 defiles ; that is a tactical principle which admits of 
 no qualification. It is only a question how far 
 beyond the river he will have to go. The " main 
 army proposes to cross the river on the following 
 day, and to move on B, C, and D." The bridges, 
 4, 5, 6, and 7, must therefore be secured under all 
 circumstances, and sufficient space in front of them 
 must be guarded, so that no hostile artillery is able 
 to bear on them, if possible, while the main body is 
 crossing, and that sufficient elbow-room is ensured 
 for the deployment of that body after crossing, 
 should a deployment become necessary. It is not 
 likely that the latter will be necessary, because our 
 cavalry screen is " five miles beyond the eastern 
 edge of the map, facing east." The expression 
 " screen," here, is a little vague, as such a screen is 
 several miles deep ; if by that word " screen " the 
 foremost scouts are meant, then the main bodies of 
 our cavalry can be assumed at the eastern edge of 
 the map. Allowing a mile between the two hostile 
 screens, and the hostile one also to be five miles 
 deep and at least a day's march in advance of its 
 
46 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 army, the enemy's main force is 5 + 1 + 5 + (10 
 or 12) = 21 or 23 miles distant from the eastern 
 edge of the map, and not likely to reach it during 
 a forced night-march. The worst which can happen 
 is that the enemy during night also pushes forward 
 some infantry in carts to support his cavalry in 
 seizing the bridges of the Fleet River. But this 
 can only be a small force, and it is not so easily done 
 with three battalions of 1000 or 800 men each as 
 we were lucky enough to do ; for carts are not so 
 plentiful and not so readily collected, if at all 
 available, in the more or less scattered villages. 
 An omnibus in London, on first-rate, almost level 
 roads, drawn by two strong horses, carries 26 un- 
 armed passengers, but it is estimated that for 10 
 armed men at least one two-horse waggon is 
 required, which means 80 to 100 waggons per 
 battalion, or 240 to 300 for three battalions, re- 
 quiring 480 to 600 horses, which is certainly a 
 large order. 
 
 If bur rearmost cavalry of the "screen" is five 
 miles beyond the eastern edge of the map, then the 
 conditions for us are a little more favourable. But 
 the examiner meant probably the foremost scouts 
 to be five miles beyond the eastern edge, and this 
 shall be assumed here. 
 
 Before the commander can finally decide how far 
 in advance of the river he will dispose his troops, 
 he will have to consider two more points besides 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 47 
 
 the security of the bridges and the room for deploy- 
 ment of the main body, namely — 
 
 1. The facility for defence of the ground in the 
 immediate front of the river, and 
 
 2. The strength of his force — 
 
 (a) In relation to the position he will select, and 
 
 (6) In comparison with the force of the enemy. 
 
 If he reconnoitres the ground, he finds about one 
 mile in advance of the river an admirable position 
 for a manoeuvring bridge-head on the ridge extend- 
 ing from Shefford, Eatby Farm, Garnant Down, and 
 Pewsey Wood, and the Black Brook as an obstacle 
 for the additional security of the bridges 6 and 7 
 on his right flank. If that high ground, with its 
 naturally strong tactical pivots of Shefford, with 
 the Forest of Arden in rear to fall back upon, and 
 that forest itself acting as a formidable barrier for 
 any advancing cavalry, of Shape Copse, and of 
 Pewsey Wood, remains in possession of our force, 
 there will be no possibility of the enemy bearing 
 with his artillery on the bridges, because they are 
 entirely screened from view. The ground between 
 Challow and Pewsey Wood is, besides, so steep that 
 cavalry action there, at least mounted action, is 
 practically impossible ; any one advancing there on 
 foot would be exposed, not only to the frontal fire 
 from shelter trenches, but also from the northern 
 edge of Pewsey Wood or Challow. 
 
 The question is now. Can he occupy such an ex- 
 
48 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS, 
 
 tended position with the small infantry force avail- 
 able ? He has three battalions, but of three regi- 
 ments of cavalry and one battery horse artillery he 
 will take command when the screen is driven in, 
 and therefore has practically all that force available 
 for the actual defence of the position selected. 
 
 The defence against a superior enemy would be 
 difficult ; but is the enemy really superior ? The 
 problem plainly states the force we are opposed to, 
 and we need not consider anything else. We may 
 say that one company of infantry can be matched 
 against one regiment of cavalry, acting mounted 
 or dismounted. It would be hopeless for a cavalry 
 regiment to charge one company of infantry posted 
 in a village or wood ; therefore no danger arises 
 from the enemy's cavalry by mounted action while 
 our infantry is posted in the tactical pivots. If the 
 regiment dismounts, then only half can do so, a 
 quarter holding horses, another quarter acting as 
 an escort ; but a hundred well-armed and disciplined 
 infantry men may certainly be considered equal, if 
 not superior, to two hundred dismounted cavalry 
 men. Therefore the enemy's superiority of three 
 cavalry regiments may be considered as counter- 
 balanced by three companies of our infantry. The 
 remainder of that battalion (five companies) may be 
 considered to make us equal to the enemy's mounted 
 infantry battalion. The commander of our force 
 will surely take care to strike terror into the led 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 49 
 
 horses of the mounted infantry, by singling out a 
 dashing squadron leader, whose only duty would 
 consist in nothing else but to get at the horses of 
 these dismounted foot soldiers, disregarding every- 
 thing else, cutting them down and dispersing or 
 capturing them. The fighting spirit of these mounted 
 infantry men may be considered to have sunk to 
 half its usual level as soon as they leave their 
 horses ; for half the mind is in front, and the other 
 half in rear with the horses, not during manoeuvres, 
 of course, but surely in actual warfare, if we under- 
 stand human nature ; therefore half an infantry 
 battalion (or five companies as here assumed) we 
 consider a match for that battalion of mounted 
 infantry pitted against us in this instance. A balance 
 of two battalions of infantry is therefore left in 
 our favour against the enemy's one battery of horse 
 artillery, by which he is superior. If we allow one 
 battalion to weigh equally in the scale with one 
 battery of horse or field artillery, we are not taking 
 undue advantage over the enemy. 
 
 Theoretically we are therefore superior to the 
 enemy, and it is not boasting if we also say 
 practically. 
 
 It is thus clear that we can hold such an extended 
 position, for we can be superior wherever the enemy 
 attacks us, if we only dispose our troops in such a 
 manner that the enemy is held in check for a short 
 time at any point along the whole line, where he 
 
50 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 might have concentrated the greater part of his 
 forces until reinforcements can be brought up on 
 our side. 
 
 Concluding these considerations, the commander 
 determines the following : — 
 
 1. To leave detachments as special guards at 
 bridges 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
 
 2. To hold the line Shefford, Garnant Down, 
 Pewsey Wood, apportioning to the tactical pivots, 
 small detachments which will be practically outposts. 
 
 3. To concentrate the remainder in a central 
 position to sustain those small, parties distributed 
 in the tactical pivots, or to move in any direction 
 where the enemy might attack in force. 
 
 4. To prepare entrenchments for the artillery to 
 retire into, when the screen is driven in, to order 
 the detachments to entrench themselves as much 
 as possible, being aided therein by special working 
 parties sent from the body kept concentrated, and 
 to order similar parties to throw up shelter trenches 
 or breastworks in suitable places on Garnant Down 
 and the spurs running north and south from there. 
 
 5. To communicate with the commander of the 
 cavalry at once, to acquaint him with the brigadier's 
 dispositions, and in what direction he wishes the 
 cavalry and artillery if possible to retire, when 
 driven in. 
 
 6. To gire a special instruction to the cavalry 
 commander for singling out a squadron which has 
 
STUDIES m APPLIED TACTICS. 51 
 
 only to concern itself with the horses of the mounted 
 infantry. 
 
 It cannot be repeated often enough that, like a 
 commander before he acts, so also a student or 
 candidate in an examination before he gives his 
 answer, which is his part of acting, must above all 
 be clear as to what is wanted of him, and what he 
 is accordingly expected to do. The commander by 
 his orders, that is, the candidate by his answer, then 
 shows how he does it. This is shown in — 
 
 II. The Orders. (Answer.) 
 
 (The actual answer to be handed in at an exami- 
 nation is printed in italics.) 
 
 The examiner requires two distinct answers, viz. — 
 
 1. " Show on the map how you would dispose 
 your troops," and 
 
 2. " State what preparations you would make." 
 The actual showing on the map how the troops 
 
 are disposed is a mere mechanical operation, which 
 I shall not perform, as it unnecessarily adds to the 
 expense of the book, and can be seen on any map 
 accompanying military history. The student can 
 readily put in the troops as he gathers their position 
 from the following orders, and has then given the 
 first answer. It is best if he shows, on the margin 
 afterwards, an explanation thus — 
 
52 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 Explanations : 
 D 1 section of a company. 
 B 1 company. 
 ^m 1 battalion. 
 
 Or, if he is neat, he may write on the map along- 
 side each body of troops, e.g. J I., f IL, noting on 
 the margin — 
 
 Explanations : 
 
 I I. means one section 2nd company, 1st battalion, or 
 I II. means three sections 8th company, 2nd battalion. 
 
 In the orders which the commander actually 
 issues it is difficult to separate the answers (1) and 
 (2) ; however, I will omit to state anything in them 
 about " preparations," which in war would really be 
 mentioned, and reserve that for answer (2), so that 
 the student may see the answer which it is proposed 
 he should hand in without repeating here anything 
 in print. 
 
 The commander will call to his side the three 
 officers commanding the battalions, and give them 
 verbally the following order : — 
 
 " We are to support the cavalry screen, which 
 consists of three regiments and one battery horse 
 artillery, and is with its foremost scouts five miles 
 beyond the eastern edge of the map, and are ordered 
 to hold the line of the Fleet Eiver in such a manner 
 as to secure the passages, even should the cavalry 
 screen be driven in. Our main body proposes to 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 53 
 
 cross the river to-morrow, and to move on B, 0, and 
 T). I shall take command of the cavalry and 
 artillery as well when they are driven in. We 
 shall have three hours at least for preparing any 
 defences. 
 
 " The enemy is reported to have six regiments of 
 cavalry, two batteries of horse artillery, and one 
 battalion of mounted infantry, 
 
 " To carry out our task I intend to hold the 
 line Shefford, Katby Farm, Garnant Down, and 
 Pewsey Wood, and to guard the bridges 4, 5, 6, and 
 7 specially. 
 
 "For this purpose the first battalion will send 
 one and a half companies to ' D,' a half-company to 
 Challow, one company to Shefford, which will leave 
 one section at Katby Farm ; the remaining company 
 of the half-battalion will bivouac south of the un- 
 fenced road Parton — Challow, about two-thirds of a 
 mile west of the latter place, to act as a support 
 for the section Challow — Pewsey Wood, exclusive of 
 that village. 
 
 " The third battalion will leave one company at 
 the river, disposed as follows, as special guards for 
 the bridges : — 
 
 1 section at bridge 4 (Morton). 
 
 1 „ „ 5 (Parton). 
 
 ^ company at bridges 6 and 7. 
 They are to bivouac on the left bank, close to the 
 bridge. 
 
 e2 
 
54 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 " The rest of the force— 
 
 1st battalion (4 companies), 
 2nd „ (8 companies), 
 3rd „ (7 companies), 
 
 will bivouac west of Shape Copse on Garnant Down, 
 between the letters 'N' in 'Garnant' and 'O'in 
 ' Down.' 
 
 " The detachments in the first line will consider 
 themselves as outposts, seeking and maintaining 
 connections with their neighbouring parties, and 
 resisting to the utmost any attack by the enemy, as 
 only dismounted cavalry may chiefly be expected. 
 
 " Whenever retreat becomes absolutely necessary, 
 it will be made by each body to the bridge in its 
 immediate rear. 
 
 " I shall bivouac with the force at Garnant Down. 
 
 « X. Lieut-General." 
 
 The student can now put in his troops, and give 
 the marginal notes as explained, which will be his 
 answer (1). 
 
 I propose, as answer (2), the following : — 
 
 Having disposed his troops as sTioivn and explained 
 on the map, the commander will lest state the pre- 
 parations he would make hy giving the subjoined 
 orders : — 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 55 
 
 " To the Officer commanding at ' D.' 
 
 " The men, being fresh, can feed after dark. Use 
 one company to entangle the roads at ' D,' and, as far 
 as means allow, the southern part of the eastern edge 
 of Pewsey Wood. For entangling the northern part 
 of that edge I will send you two companies of your 
 battalion from Garnant Down, which will have to 
 return as soon as darkness sets in." 
 
 " To the Officer commanding at Ohallow. 
 
 " Barricade the entrance at ' C '; after that feed your 
 men. For putting Challow in a state of defence till 
 darkness sets in, I will send two companies of your 
 hattalion. Supervise their works, or agree on the 
 plan with officer commanding working party, if senior 
 to you." 
 
 " To the Officer at Batby Farm. 
 
 "Prepare your farm for defence, and then, feed 
 your men." 
 
 " To the Officer commanding at Shefford. 
 
 " Use half a company to barricade the road to ' B,' 
 and then let your men have their meal. Two com-, 
 panies 2nd battalion will be sent to put Shefford in 
 a state of defence, who will have to return after sunset. 
 If officer in command of working party is senior, 
 concert with him." 
 
56 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 " To Captain west of Challow on the Farton Boad. 
 " Throw up a shelter trench at eastern edge of slope, 
 using all available implements, beginning at southern 
 end of contowr 850, worJcing northwards; one com- 
 pany of 2nd battalion will work in prolongation north- 
 wards. Feed your men after finishing trenches." 
 
 " To G.O. of 1st Battalion. 
 
 "Send two companies, both under a sabaltern, at 
 once to ' D,' and two companies likewise to Challow, 
 with all available entrenching tools, to prepare Pewsey 
 Wood and Challow respectively for defence as directed 
 by the officer commanding there if senior, or in concert 
 with him if junior. These companies will start to 
 return to bivouac at dusk." 
 
 " To CO. of 2nd Battalion. 
 
 "Send two companies to Shefford for preparing 
 that village for defence in concert with offi/ier com- 
 manding there. The companies start to return from 
 Shefford after dusk. Send another company, each 
 man provided with the ' entrenching implement^ to 
 spur south-west of Challow for throwing up a shelter 
 trench in northern prolongation of that to be executed 
 by the company there. To return as soon as finished. 
 One company will at once construct gun epaulments 
 at Garnant Down where I shall direct, and trenches 
 to right and left as I shall indicate. Two companies 
 will entangle, till dark, the eastern edge of Shape 
 Copse as far as the footpath from Challow." 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 57 
 
 " To the Officers at bridges 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
 
 " Bender approaches to loth ends of bridges difficult, 
 hut in sueh a manner that the obstacle can quiehly 
 and easily he removed from the inside, as troops will 
 pass to-morrow. Watch the river constantly down at 
 6 and 7 and up at Morton, particularly there, for 
 floating bodies. 
 
 " X. Lieut. - General. ' ' 
 
 " No other preparations at Morton and Parton are 
 considered necessary, as these can be undertahen the 
 next morning hy perhaps two companies from the 
 Zrd battalion, if there should appear any need for it. 
 Any stronger profiles required than those entrench- 
 ments mentioned can be executed the next morning at 
 daybreak" 
 
 " To the Officer commanding the cavalry. 
 
 " I am ordered to hold the line of the Fleet Biver 
 in such a manner as to secwre the passages which the 
 main army proposes to cross to-morrow, moving on 
 B, C, and D. I have three battalions brought up in 
 earts and disposed as in the accompanying sketch (vide 
 Map, answer I.), from which you will see that I 
 intend to hold the line ' Shefford — Z).' 
 
 " For that purpose you will co-operate with me in 
 such a manner that, if driven in, yow m^in force will 
 endeavowr to retire, keeping to the southern edge of 
 Rewsey Wood, the rest keeping north of Shefford. 
 You will send then one regiment to Garnant Down 
 
58 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 
 
 for my immediate disposal and the lattery, in any 
 case, hy the straightest road to Qarnant Down as soon 
 as your force has to give way. 
 
 "I particularly enjoin on you, if you should not 
 have done so already, to select one squadron, whose 
 only duty shall he to get hy every and any means at 
 the led horses of the mounted infantry, or to charge 
 it as soon as it is mounted. 
 
 " X. Lieut.-General." 
 
 III. Explanations. 
 
 In addition to the explanations on the margin of 
 the map in answer to the first part of the problem, 
 the candidate may also show there, when answering 
 the second part, the profiles he proposes to give to 
 his entrenchments, or do so on his paper. 
 
 The commander calls the ofBcers commanding 
 the battalions to his side, as it is assumed he has 
 a map, and makes his dispositions on the march. 
 
 The order that each body is to retire to the bridge 
 in its immediate rear is giyen to indicate that the 
 supreme and final effort must be made there, and 
 to ensure that each bridge is properly defended. 
 
 All parties are ordered to return from work to 
 their stations when darkness sets in, as it is assumed 
 that the three hours available for preparations are 
 ending at that moment. It is, anyhow, assumed 
 that, exclusive of feeding, or resting, or moving 
 about, three hours' actual work are available. 
 
STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS. 59 
 
 The entrenchments can be of the ordinary type, 
 up to the breastwork given in the " Text Book of 
 Fortification." 
 
 Nine companies are kept, during these three 
 hours, at Garnant Down, as we must have some 
 force in readiness at any moment. They can give 
 their tools and implements to the working parties, 
 which will also make use of anything of that kind 
 found in the villages and farms. 
 
 The directions for feeding are given, in order to 
 show that it is assumed that we have arrived in the 
 afternoon, and that men brought up in carts need 
 not have rest immediately, as would be necessary 
 after a day's march. These entrenchings, after a 
 long march, are mostly theoretical, and even in this 
 instance would hardly be carried out to the same 
 extent, in practice, as we have put down on paper. 
 
 The numbers of the battalions are stated from 
 which the various parties and detachments are 
 drawn, in order to show the examiner how we 
 endeavour to preserve the tactical units. 
 
 On Garnant Down, the artillery commands most 
 of the ground, and it is directed to retire straight 
 to that height, if the screen begins to give way, 
 because we want to get, as soon as possible, its 
 co-operation with the infantry. 
 
 One regiment is directed to be sent for immediate 
 disposal of the commander at Garnant Down, as he 
 wishes to have a force at hand which he can rapidly 
 
60 STUDIES IN APPLIED TACTICS, 
 
 throw from one place to the other to act as the 
 enemy's mounted infantry is supposed to do. The 
 commander of the cavalry gets no other instructioas, 
 but those to co-operate with the remainder, as he 
 is an experienced elderly gentleman to whom 
 discretion ought to be left, after giving him the 
 general directions which we have mentioned. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 We are living in an age which, perhaps, is more 
 than ever striving after the ideal by the most real- 
 istic means. 
 
 If the student, while attending to these solutions, 
 has, as it is hoped, pictured to himself the measures 
 actually carried out on the real ground, as above 
 described, the writer's efforts to treat Tactics, from 
 a realistic point of view, will not have been entirely 
 unsuccessful. 
 
 LONDON: PKINTED BT WILLIAU CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, 
 SIAUFOBD STEEET AND CHAEING OEOiaS.