?^^<;^.ii :#:': :<<*1-' cif»y failed was dng ^to _two cau sesi__ First, our representatives were ignorant of the conditions in Central and Eastern Europe. Otto Bauer, the ablest man in present-day public life of German- Austria, said to me: "The reason that the treaties were badly drawn was on account of the ignorance of the American and in a measure of the British representatives about conditions in these coimtries. « The French and Italians were much better informed." Second, all decisions for the United States were made by one man. Not only was this perhaps an impossible task in itself, but this man's weaknesses in negotiations were as great as were his wisdom and farsightedness in enunciating the principles of lasting peace. In this book I have ventured to enumerate the results of my observations in Central and Eastern Europe made during repeated journeys there since the armistice. These observations have led me to the conclusion that the execution of the treaties of peace in their present form wUl lead not only to the permanent economic decadence of Europe, but to future wars. I have undertaken to point out not only the reasons for this conclusion, but also in a general way what seems to me a possible action by the Allies which might give to the nations an opportunity to become self-supporting and to live in peace with bne another. The bulk of the discussion of the treaty of Ver- 10 THE PEACE TANGLE sailles in our Senate centered around those provi- sions of the League Covenant which directly affected this country and excluded any detailed or adequate discussion of the many provisions of the treaty themselves which contain matters of life and death to various European Nations and consequently niake a prolonged peace of the civilized world impossible. "We have an indirect but tremendous stake in that issue. The great war proved beyond question that it is an issue which we cannot escape, even under our previous policy of complete isolation. It is probably too early to forecast the future with any accuracy. But certain vital obstacles to the sur- vival of some nations and to the peaceful develop- ment of others are already apparent to the most casual observer. The United States has not yet determined upon its final action relative to the vari- ous treaties of peace. That action will, in all probability, be determined soon. CHAPTEE n Secret Tbeaties As I write, almost two years after the signing of the armistice, the front page of my morning paper is covered with the news of many wars in operation and in preparation. All of these conflicts may be traced to the after- effects of The Great War and more especially to the work of the Paris Peace Conference in drafting terms of peace for the world. There is the civil war in China now going on between those favoring Japan — those who would accept the Shantung decisions of the Peace Confer- ence — and those who are opposed to the settlement of the treaty of peace which places China at Japan's mercy. Again, there is the French expedition against Emir Feisal, a direct result of the division of Turkey under the Allies' treaty with Turkey. Again, the Bolsheviks are united in a foreign war as a result of Polish nationalist imperialism. Furthermore, the Italians have been fighting the Albanians and so have the Serbs. The Jugoslav (Serbian, Croat and Slovene) State and Italy are eying each other in armed expectation of actual hostilities. Moreover, Greece is fighting the Turks. England is attacked by the Arabs in Mesopotamia. 11 12 THE PEACE TANGLE Persia is in upheaval and British troops are retir- ing to the Persian Gulf. From India to Morocco a Mohammedan upheaval threatens — one might enumerate indefinitely these conflicts, symptoms of impending chaos and disin- tegration. If one examines into the causes of this chaos, it is found that they lie in nearly all instances in the spirit and terms of the secret agreements made dur- ing the war among the four Great Powers of the Entente. The influence of these treaties is little known to the Entente peoples. It is my intention to examine briefly: How these agreements or secret treaties were made at the expense of the freedom of the peoples for whom the Entente statesmen loudly declared they were conducting the war. How these treaties have prolonged the war. How they have maintained causes of rivalry and conflict between peoples. How they are everywhere the generators of future wars whose tjonsequences cannot be foreseen. How they revealed the Entente governments' real spirit and purposes in fighting the war and in mak- ing the peace. _ Up to November, 1917, governments and diploma- tists alone knew of their terms. Journalists knew something about them, but could not publish what they knew. It was Trotsky who, when he took pos- session of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, found in the archives of that department the texts of these treaties. He published them in the official journal of the Soviets. As a' result, these treaties were widely published and discussed in Germany and SECRET TREATIES 13 the German government was able to show by them that the Allied governments, despite their solemn declarations that they were fighting for justice, lib- erty and the freedom of small peoples, were really pursuing aims of political imperialism. In Allied countries, on the other hand, there has been no wide discussion of the secret treaties and in these coun- tries their real significance still remains hidden under a conspiracy of silence. Trotsky had foreseen the uses which the Central Powers would make of the texts. of these treaties. He therefore accompanied their publication wi|;h the following statement : The political men and bourgeois journalists of Germany and Austria-Hungary will seek through the documents here published to throw a favorable light ' upon the diplomacy of the Central Powers. All such efforts on their part are destined to defeat for two reasons. First, because we intend soon to publish secret documents which will show up in its true light the diplomacy of the Central Powers. Second, it is evident that the methods of secret diplomacy are as international in char- acter as the rapacity of imperialism itself. If the German proletariat, through revolution, reached the secret archives of their own foreign offlce^ they would find documents exactly similar to those we here publish. What then were these treaties, conventions and agreements made among the Entente governments? They have been called for the sake of simplicity the Treaty of London because a very important part of them were made in London on April 26, 1915, by Great Britain, Italy, France and Russia. As a mat- ter of fact many of the secret agreements were made either before or after the signature of the Treaty of London. Below I give the details of how the governments of the Great Powers of the Entente divided the more helpless part of the world, without the knowledge 14 THE PEACE TANGLE not only of its own peoples, but also of the small Allies from wliom they were accepting help. England was to receive: The neutral zone of Persia. Southern Mesopotamia and Bagdad. Haifa and Akka in Syria. Eventually a portion of the German colonies. France was to receive : Syria. The vilayet of Adana and other extended territories in Asia Minor including part of the Armenian border, where' are the oil fields of Mosul. Alsace-Lorraine and the Sarre valley with all the mining district and the whole of the old duchy of Lorraine. Temporary occupation of the left hank of the Rhine with permission to make a mutual buffer state and fix such boundaries as she pleased. Eventually a part of the German colonies. Italy was to receive : The Trentino. The country of Gorizla and Gradisca. Trieste and Istria. A generous share of the Dalmatian coast. The islands of the Istrian and Dalmatian coasts. Valona and its neighborhood. The islands of the Dodecanese. Smyrna and its hinterland (this was changed to Adalia and a part of Asia Minor later). Eventually new colonial territories in compensation for the German colonies which Great Britain and France should receive. Rumania was to receive: Transylvania up to the river Theiss. The Banat of Temesvar. The Bukovina. Eussia was to receive : Constantinople and nearly the whole of Turkey-in-Europe The Bosporus, the Dardanelles, and the Sea of Marmora. The islands of Imbros and Tenedos in the Aegean at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Pull liberty of action in northern Persia, including Ispahan and Yezd. SECRET TREATIES 15 Trebizond, Erzerum, Van, Bitlis and other territories in Asia Minor. A free hand in making the Russian western boundary. Serbia and Montenegro were to receive: The southern coast of Dalmatia. Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, and St. John of Medua in Albania. The eventual annexation of the north of Albania. If one glances at the map, beginning at the French boundary and the Adriatic and reaching into the remote depths of Asia, one realizes the gigantic plan of imperialist gain which these treaties contained. One reading of this wholesale distribution of alien territory will show the flagrant political immorali- ties and the fundamental disagreements with every public declaration made by the Entente statesmen to their parliaments and peoples. By these agreements the Allies each took its share of the domain of those it expected to conquer. In doing this they created new territories of dispute and brought under their sovereignty peoples whose annexation could in no way be justified. They did more; they agreed to seize the patrimony of races with whom they were not at war. Thus Russia and Great Britain divided Persia; Italy took Valona and the control over part of Albania, the Greek islands of the Aegean, the Slav populations of Dalmatia and the Turkish people of Adalia; Japan laid hands on Chinese Shantung; Russia took Turkish Constantinople, the Greek Islands of Imbros and Tenedos and the Armenian country from the Black Sea to the Lake of Van; Great Britain took the Arabs of Mesopotamia and some of Syria; France took the Turks and Arme- nians and Arabs of Cilicia and Syria, the Germans 16 THE PEACE TANGLE of the Sarre and old Lorraine, and was to l^ve a free hand to regulate her eastern frontiers; France and Great Britain took the German colonies and practi- cal control over all Germans west of the Rhine; Serbia was to get a slice of Albania. The reasons for the making of these different secret treaties are evident. They do not, as might be supposed, constitute spontaneous conspiracies of governments devised to absorb the world. They were the logical sequence of the hereditary imperialism of the Allied governments, in pursuance of aims which each government had cherished for genera- tions. Defenders of the secret treaties give the follow- ing explanation. England had always been opposed to Russian aims concerning Constantinople. She did not desire to see Russia get an outlet on the Medi- terranean. Nevertheless she found herself forced to make this decision. Since the days of Peter the Great and Catherine, Russia had coveted Constanti- nople. It was the natural outlet from the Black Sea in which Russia had been held bottled with the Turkish cork. There was in Russia a strong Ger- man party, especially at court. This party gained ground as it became apparent that the struggle between the Entente and Germany would be of doubtful issue. The lack of military cooperation between eastern and western fronts led to mutual recriminations. In February, 1915, the Russian gov- ernment asked France and Great Britain to concede Constantinople and European Turkey to her in case of victory. To stimulate Russian zeal in the Allied cause, France and Great Britain granted these demands. SECRET TREATIES 17- The apologists defend the treaties by say- ing that, having granted Constantinople, Great Britain must take steps to protect herself east of the Suez Canal; that if Constantinople went to Russia, then Turkey would be divided and that in the divi- sion of Turkey, Great Britain must protect her own interests. She sought control of the Holy Land as being too near Suez and Egypt to allow foothold to any other power. She sought Mesopotamia because the Bagdad road, the highway to the Far East, must belong to, her, since it led to her possessions. To secure Mesopotamia and the Holy Land, Great Bri- tain gave Syria, Cilicia, and a large strip of Kurdes- tan to France. France always had a predominant influence in Syria which, her statesmen felt, reached back to the Crusades. Great Britain also had to arrive at some arrangement with Russia concerning Persia. Russia was willing to give to Great Britain rights of control in southern Persia, provided she got Constantinople and northern Persia. In further defense of the treaty it is said that when Italy agreed to enter the war on the side of the Allies, some of these secret treaties had already been made. There was talk in the Chancelleries about the secret agreement which gave Constantinople to Russia. All this diplomatic talk stimulated the appe- tite of the Italian government. Italy's demands in the Adriatic, in the Aegean and in Asia Minor were granted by the British and French governments in order to get Italy into the war. The secret treaties, even with their imperialism, had this excuse, they were made with the intention of holding the Allies together in an emergency which threatened their very existence. 18 THE PEACE TANGLE The imperialism of Tzarist Eussia set the pace for the other secret treaties of the Allies. The apolo- gists cap this statement with the declaration that without the secret treaties Italy would never have entered the war, that Tzarist Eussia would havo made a separate peace with Germany and that the war would have been lost for the Allies. Let this defense stand. It nevertheless remains true that, but for the entry of the United States into the war, the secret treaties would have been only the consol- ing dreams of defeated diplomats. In February, 1917, the Tzar's government feU. In April the United States entered the war. In Decenar ber the secret treaties were published to the world. With the fall of Eussia the last excuse to justify the secret treaties fell to the ground. America demanded no concessions for her entry into the war. England need fear no longer for her dominions. As war progressed, it became evident that great social changes were operating within nations which would profoimdly alter their interrelationship. The declarations of President Wilson indicated a direction which these changes might take in inter- national affairs. In 1915 and 1916 many of us knew of the existence of the secret treaties, especially of that which gave Constantinople to Eussia. In 1916 my friend Stanley Washburn, the American war correspondent in Eussia of the London Times, urged British statesmen to make public the agree- ment by which Constantinople was given to Eussia. It seems incredible that, when correspondents were discussing the secret treaties, the United States gov- ernment should be in complete ignorance of their SECEET TREATIES 19 existence. Yet President WUson has stated tliat he did not know of these treaties. The United States might well have made, as con- dition of her entry into the war, the abrogation of all previous agreements. She neglected this oppor- tunity. Another chance arose when the pre-armistice agreement was made in November, 1918. It again became the duty of the United States to investigate these treaties for they had been known to the world since November and December, 1917. When the war ended, the political conditions which existed at the time the treaties were made had changed. Many reasons which influenced the fram- ing of the secret treaties no longer existed. All of ,the Allies were so exhausted by the war that it became extremely dangerous for them to attempt military occupation or expansion in alien lands. Moreover, at the time when the Secret Treaty of London, which brought Italy into the war, was signed, the Allies did not contemplate the disintegra- tion of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Baron Son- nino, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not wish the division of Austria-Hungary because he feared the union of the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes into a strong Jugoslav state. The Treaty of London was almost made to forestall such a union. For this reason Italy, in the treaty, gave Fiume to Croatia, then a province of Hungary. Without a port on the Adriatic, the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was almost an impossibility. The end of the war, however, brought about the union of the Croats, Slovenes and Serbs. Then it was that Italy 20 THE PEACE TANGLE should have changed her policy to conform to the new situation. She should have decided whether she was to have a friend or a foe in the new state of Jugoslavia. Nevertheless her delegates were bound hand and foot by the Treaty of London. This treaty of itself determined the hostility between the two nations. Before the war the relations of Italy to Serbia were rattier friendly. Italy had refused to join Austria in an attack on Serbia ia 1913. She had also shown willingness to assist the Entente in secur- ing an outlet for Serbian products to the sea by means of a railroad from the Danube to Valona on the Adriatic. All other Allied nations at the Peace Conference looked upon Jugoslavia as a friendly nation. Thus the Treaty of London also produced a break between Italy and her allies. Furthermore, when France and Eussia made their agreement about the Sarre and the west bank of the Ehine, there was no idea of making an inde- pendent Poland, attached to which would be the coal fields of upper Silesia. These coal fields produced a third of all the German coal. No plan was dis- cussed among the Allies of weakening Germany stUl further by the separation of East Prussia. Yet the French delegates at the Paris Conference remained bound to the ideas of the Eussian agreement; appar- ently they did not see that decisions concerning eastern Germany had direct relation to decisions concerning the western frontier. But the French delegates ultimately insisted on terms in the treaty which one day will bring Prance into disagreement with her Allies concerning Germany's economic situ- ation. With the abandonment of Constantinople by Eussia, the danger to the British Empire at Suez SECRET TREATIES 21 and Egypt disappeared. Nor was the Bagdad road a link in the chain for world conquest, it appeared; the military occupation of Mesopotamia was likely to bring some resentment against the British Empire for world-greediness. Her doings in Persia have been subjected to the same criticism and have brought revolution closer to the British dominions. Weakened as she was by the war, Great Britain's new acquisitions under the secret treaties had become seemingly a burden rather than a benefit. Finally there was the division of Austria-Hungary into small states, and the weakening of Germany changed the situation in Mittel-Europa. "What great changes there are now making in the political and social structure of the world, it is impossible even to estimate, but such a time was certainly badly chosen by the representatives of democratic nations to remain shackled to the old order by obsolete secret treaties. ' Whatever the effect of these treaties on the Allies during the early part of the war, it is no exaggera- tion to say that, after they became known, they pro- longed the war — ^just as it is also true that the war aims, enunciated by the President of the United States, hastened the end of the war. Carefully hidden from the peoples of the Entente, the secret treaties were published and discussed far and wide in the Central Empires. They were used by Pan-Germanists and the militarists to revive the energy of the people in hours of depression. When- ever the peace party in Germany seemed to be gain- ing ground, or whenever the people showed lassitude, the nailitarists brandished these treaties and with 22 THE PEACE TANGLE them rallied t?o public opinion to their support. They oould use the secret treaties to show with apparent finality that they were fighting a war of self-defense against imperialists who desired the dismemberment and destruction of Germany and her allies. On the other hand the secret treaties justified to the Germans their own desires for annexation. On November 28, 1917, the Berlin Kreuz-Zeitung (The Gazette of the Cross) said: If the destiny of war had turned against Germany, her enemies would have torn from her the colonies of Alsace-Lorraine, all the left bank of the Rhine, Eastern Prussia, Fosen, and Silesia, not to mention a war indemnity. The German Socialists have been accused of giving too ardent support to the war and of not protesting against the aim of their government to annex occu- pied territory. But were they none the less justified in their statement published in the Berlin Vorwarts of November 28, 1917? Certainly the policy of Germany Is subject to criticism, but the revelations of the secret treaties must strengthen our resolve to defend out country against such enemies. What is to be said of an agreement like that by which France and Russia give each other mutual freedom to devour as much German territory as they see fit? This phrase alludes to an agreement concluded between France and Eussia. M. Isvolski, Russian Ambassador in Paris, had obtained from the French government through M. Briand, assurances accord- ing to which the Eussian Imperial government and France mutually recognized their right to act in all freedom in determining their future frontiers with Germany. This agreement is defined in two notes sent by M. Isvolski, to M. Pokrovski, Russian Min- SECRET TREATIES 23 ister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonoff's second suc- cessor. An extract from the note of February 1/14, 1917: 1. Alsace-Lorraine will have to be given back to Prance. 2. The French frontiers will extend at least up to the bound- aries of the ancient princedom of Lorraine and their drafting will be left to the discretion of the French Government so that this latter could satisfy its strategic needs and incorporate into the French territory all the region of iron mines and all the coal regions of the Sarre. Extract from the notes of February 26 — ^March 11, 1917. The government of the Republic . . . eager to assure to Its Ally all the desirable guarantees, in a military point of view as well as in a strategic, for the security and development of the Russian Empire, recognizes Russia's complete freedom to determine at her will her western frontier. The Entente's desire to follow up the war and not to allow anyone to interfere in its war aims is very clearly shown in the Treaty of London, of April 26, 1915, signed by Sir Edward Grey, M. Jules Cambon, Baron Lnperiali and Count Beckendorf. Article 15 says: France, Great Britain and Russia agree to give their support to Italy by not allowing representatives of the Papacy to take any diplomatic steps tending to bring about peace, or attempt- ing to regulate questions related to this war. Does not this clause throw some light on the Papal policy during the war? Twice, when Austria made advances for a sepa- rate peace with the Entente, the claims of Italy under the secret treaties made negotiations impossible. For this reason General Smuts failed in January, 1917, in Switzerland and the conference at St. Jean de Maurienne rejected the Emperor Carl's proposals. It is not only that during the war the secret 24 THE PEACE TANGLE treaties have had disastrous influence. During the war, ia the face of the enemy, the Entente Powers were obliged to observe a certain measure of unity. But when peace came, each government resumed more or less its freedom of action. Then unbounded ambition came to the fore. It became necessary to inform Allies like Greece and Serbia of agreements of which they had been kept in ignorance. Then it was that Greece learned that, at the very moment when the Allies were urging her to join them, they were agreeing to give to other nations territories which the Greeks had coveted for centuries, for instance, Constantinople and European Turkey to Russia. Moreover, Serbia discovered that Italy was to get the coast line and islands of Dalmatia, which had become toward the end of the war one of the chief war aims of the Jugoslav. Furthermore, Poland learned that its destiny had been decided ia diplomatic correspondence between the Russian and French governments. On February 24, 1916, M. Sazonoff, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, telegraphed thus to the Russian Ambassa- dor in Paris : It Is particularly necessary to insist that the Polish question be excluded from all international discussions. It will not be tolerated that Poland be put under the guaranty and control of the Powers. This statement brought a clearer understanding of the French and Russian agreement of February 26— March 11, which I have mentioned, wherein a free hand was to be allowed each nation in determin- ing its frontiers with Germany. China finally discovered that the violation of her SECRET TREATIES 25 sovereignty in Shantung, wrung from her by Ger- man threats, was to be perpetuated by a grant to Japan. Although the secret treaties had predominant influence in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, they must not be confused with the treaties of peace finally draftefl by that Council. The spirit and texts of two entirely different agreements contended for supremacy at that Conference. The first was the secret treaties of which I have been speaking, made by the five great allied powers. Great Britain, IVance, Italy, Russia,* and Japan during the war. The other contained President Wilson's Fourteen Points, agreed to by the Allied and Associated Powers and by Germany, as the basis of peace before the armistice was concluded. The first kind of agree- ment represented the real war aims of the Allies. The second was a compendium of the purposes of the Allies as expressed in their public speeches dur- ing the war. These had been formidated by the President of the United States in his Fourteen Points and his other declarations. But the secret treaties won out and formed the basis of the five treaties of so-called peace drafted by the Paris Conference.** Yet at the opening of the Conference, the Ameri- * The clauses concerning Russia were not carried out only because Russia was not represented at the Conference. **It migbt seem that in giving freedom to Poland and the nations of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, the letter and spirit of the Fourteen Points were observed. That is only partially true. Dominion by force was the keynote of the Secret Treaties. The Peace Conference, in creating the new friendly nations, did not do so primarily on the principle of nationality. It outlined these new countries with the purpose of maU|ig the friendly ones strong through mutilating tba Bo-called enemy countries. 26 THE PEACE TANGLE can peace delegates innocently believed tliat the Allied statesmen would cooperate in making terms of peace to conform with the agreement on the Four- teen Points just because they had iaduced Germany to accept armistice terms relying upon this agree- ment. Prior to the Peace Conference in Paris, I talked about this situation with Colonel House. He told me that the secret treaties had been abrogated by the subsequent pre-armistice agreement of the Fourteen Points. I asked him whether he had any assurances that the British, French and Italian gov- ernments agreed to this abrogation. He answered that he had not, but, that as the two agreements were contradictory, the latter must stand. As a matter of fact, wherever the text of the secret treaties came in conflict with the Fourteen Points, the former always prevailed. Wherever the text did not apply, the spirit of the secret treaties invariably prevailed over that of the Fourteen Points. I do not mean that there was no struggle between the two conflicting views in the Paris Peace Confer- ence which convened in January, 1919. There was even an effort to reconcile the appetites of all the victors, as partially described in the secret treaties, with the right of nations to govern themselves, which was the fundamental doctrine of the Fourteen Points. But the problem was impossible of solution. It may be explained by the following facts: The incidents of disagreement and confusion which took place at the Conference, including the impos- sibility of agreement on such questions as Fiume. The impossibility for the enfeebled Entente to enforce peace in Europe by the methods which the five treaties demand. SECRET TREATIES 27 The general dissatisfaction shown by all peoples with the work of the Conference. The terms and spirit of the secret treaties have been made permanent in the five treaties of peace drafted by the Paris Conference and by the agree- ments of the Allied and Associated Powers concern- ing these five treaties. Their evil influence on the conditions of peoples is everywhere shown in Europe to-day. Let us examine the conditions of the differ- ent nations of the Entente. In the first place, the rapacity of each nation, stimulated by the application of the secret treaties, has engendered mutual distrust and suspicion among the nations. The alliance which stood firm during the war now threatens to dissolve in petty quarrels over the division of the spoils. There is still a super- ficial appearance of unity of purpose, but more and more suspicion and distrust, often unfounded, is moulding the opinion of public men and nations. There is an almost universal feeling that the ofiScial declarations of statesmen must not be relied on and that the truth must be sought underneath — ^in the secret intrigues and machinations of different gov- ernments. For instance, Italy believes that Great Britain and the United States have received eco- nomic concessions in the port of Fiume from the Jugoslav government. The situation of France is growing more and more unsatisfactory. The treaty with Germany almost compels France to seek its enforcement with arms if she is to obtain the benefits which should accrue to her under it and of which she is in pressing need. Her public men believe that if she jdelds an inch a 28 THE PBAGE TANGLE precedent will be set by which. Germany may succeed in abrogating the whole treaty. Germany was tricked into accepting the terms of armistice. Bely- ing on the Fourteen Points she surrendered part of her armament ; she evacuated occupied territory ; she submitted to the occupation of German territory. A consequent hatred of France has been developed in Germany which exceeds that of France for Germany after the war of 1870. Germany is simply biding her time for revenge — ^that is the belief of the public men in France. For self-protection France must down her enemy and keep her weak. The treaty with Ger- many provides for the military occupation of the left bank of the Ehine as a threat of further military occupation to enforce the other terms of the treaty. The military enforcement of a treaty is not peace, it is war. The military enforcement of economic clauses is a contradiction in terms, for one prevents the other. The determination of the French govern- ment to use armed force to secure from Germany the execution of the treaty will produce confusion in Germany and prevent the economic reestablishment of that cotmtry. Great Britain and Italy want above all things the economic rehabilitation of Germany. Therefore France's attitude is alienating her friends more and more. Yet that attitude is perfectly justified by the terms of the treaty with Germany. This situation is complicated by the war in Poland. The French Government developed a policy in Cen- tral and Eastern Europe which would, it believed, meet the conditions created by the German treaty. The Government planned to encircle Germany with a SECRET TREATIES 29 cordon of hostile Allied states. Poland was to be made a big buffer state between Russia and Ger- many. For this purpose her armies were organized by a large French military mission and Poland was encouraged to encroach upon her small neighbors. In this way she surrounded herself with enemies. Later I will speak of the relation of the French government to the new countries carved out of the old Dual Empire of Austria-Hungary. It is suffi- cient to say h'ere that French military policy in respect to Germany and the French diplomacy of strategy in insisting on a hostile cordon of nations is gradually alienating the sympathies of those small nations from France. All those nations need and must have economic support from without. They want German commercial cooperation and can only get it through an orderly Germany with whom they can do business. Furthermore, France finds herself in an unfavor- able situation in the Near East. She has already been obliged to give up the coveted oil wells of Mosul to Great Britain and for this, bears a grudge. The whole Mohammedan population, ' moreover, of Syria and Cilicia is in armed revolt against her. I am told that France has 100,000 men there and that it has already cost her over a billion francs to hold this gift made to her under the Secret Treaties. The French no doubt can pacify Syria, but the drains on her exhausted resources are a serious burden to her financing. Italy, loaded with gifts by the Secret Treaty of London, finds that she does not want all of them. But she dare not let go lest the whole Treaty fall to 30 THE PEACE TANGLE the ground and she be left only the heritage of the hatred of other nations, won for her by her insist- ence on the execution of the Secret Treaties. Those which give to Italy the greater part of Dahnatia also bind her to hand over Fiume to Croatia. Such an agitation has been conducted by the Italian Propa- ganda Department in favor of the annexation of Fiume that it has been quite impossible, in view of d'Annunzio's occupation of the city, for any govern- ment to surrender it and still remain in power. If, however, the Secret Treaties are abrogated, by Italy herself, by refusing Fiume to the Croats, then the whole question of the Dalmatian coast, inhabited by a majority of Jugoslavs, would automatically be open to discussion. If the Jugoslav government has, up to the present, shown little disposition to take mili- tary action to assert her rights in Dahnatia, it is on account of the weakened condition of Serbia by reason of the war and the interior political compli- cations due to the amalgamation of three nationali- ties, the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes, who have never before lived in political union. The future promises an armed conflict between Eome and Belgrade. Further south, Italy has already given up her claims to Valona and has made a treaty with the Albanians guaranteeing the integrity of Albania. In the Levant, an agreement has been reached regard- ing the islands of the Dodecanese, whereby Italy relinquishes the islands she has recently occupied. (These she holds as security for the execution of her treaty with Turkey closing the war in Tripoli — 1911) except Rhodes where a plebiscite will take place in fifteen years. All these islands are inhabited by SECRET TREATIES 31 Greeks and by right belong to Greece. Tbey consti- tute a source of conflict between Athens and Rome. Already the antagonism between Greece and Italy has shown itself in Asia Minor. "When, in 1919, the Greeks occupied Smyrna and advanced into the interior of Anatolia, shots were exchanged between the two forces. Hence the Secret Treaties have assured to Italy the enmity of the principal states which make up Jugoslavia and of Greece, enlarged and strengthened. Nor do the secret treaties leave Great Britain rela- tively in any better condition than they do her Allies. The control over Persia exercised by the British has aroused the hostility of that country and has enabled the Bolsheviks to stir the discontent into open rebel- lion. The British troops were forced to retire to the Persian Gulf. In Mesopotamia the Arabs have risen against the British occupation and have jeopardized Great Britain's control of that country. As I have said before, the dispute between France and Great Britain over the former Turkish areas to be included in the domain of each nation, has been one of the elements which is now enfeebling the Franco-British friendship. If the portions of Turkey were to be taken over simply to keep order, because the peoples are incap- able of Hoing so, the question would be different. If such had been the purpose of the Allied govern- ments, they would have volunteered to take over Armenia and give it quiet and rest. The real objects of the Allies in grasping the ruins of Turkey are twofold: First, to obtain the control of the riches which the development of this country will produce, and, second, to secure strategic positions which will 32 THE PEACE TANGLE assure the integrity of the rest of their empire. Thus we find France and Great Britain squabbling over the oil fields of Mosul. It is said that at Spa a deal was made between France and Great Britain by which France got per- mission to occupy Damascus and to oust Emir Feisal in exchange for which Great Britain receives a pre- dominant influence in the Dardanelles. This whole question of the division of Turkey, provided for by the secret treaties, is full of danger to Great Britain, France and Italy. The religious feelings of Mohammedans the world over have been aroused. They view the division of Turkey as another crusade of Christianity against Islam. How far this movement will go it is difficult to tell at present. It is possible, however, that a holy war might bring an uprising of native populations from India to Morocco. In their enfeebled and impover- ished state the Allies are in no condition to cope wi.th such an uprising. In sporadic uprisings no doubt the British, French and Italian armies could defeat any ill-equipped Mohammedan force, but the united revolt of all the Mohammedan people against foreign rule would be quite a different matter. I have said that it is difficult to estimate how far the Mohammedan education has gone or will go. In Turkey it is a real thing against which the British, the Greek and the French armies are in Mesopo- tamia, Anatolia and Syria respectively. In Egypt agitation has reached such a point that the British Government is negotiating with the Nationalists, and Egyptians say that they have now been granted autonomy. The Indian Khalifat Delegation informs me that the Mohammedans of India have come to SECRET TREATIES 33 an agreement witli the Hindus, the program being at present one of passive resistance. The Delega- tion's object is to reestablish the Turkish Empire and a larger degree of autonomy for India. The plan is, first, that all Indians of importance shall resign the honors conferred upon them by the British Empire; second, that all Indian Government offi- cials shall resign ; third, that Indians shall leave the army in a body. It has been said that the Indian Khalifat Delegation has no important following; future events alone will show how great a hold the movement has secured ov^r the people in India. The Montagu report, made by one of the ablest British officials, seems to indicate that the danger there is real ; this report advocates the gradual development of self-rule for India. In this chapter I have thus tried to outline, some of the misfortunes, past, present and to come, which the secret treaties have loaded upon the Allies' shoulders. CHAPTEE m Psychological Effects Another aspect of the treaties is their indirect, subtle but deep influence on the peoples of Europe. This influence, combined with the after-results of war, threatens the stability of civilized institutions everywhere. T]ie reactions from the Treaties are so diverse, indirect and interwoven with the effects of the war itself that the connection has escaped general com- ment in the publications of Europe. The story really begins with the war For many years before the war Grermany had taken a leading part in the intellectual organization of modern industrial life. Germany represented the greatest unified effort in this development. With the war it became apparent that military organization, with its inevitable aims, furnished the power for the system. The war proved the failure of the system because it showed that, in the end, the German organization led to the destruction of the very political, economic and social structure it aimed to uphold. The world at large unconsciously imitated this German system. The failure of this system brought home to the peoples of the earth the failure of mod- ern civilization as typified in this highly developed German form. Germany was the most thickly populated of any 34 PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS 35 of the greater civilized nations. Her system there- fore attempted by compact and unified effort of the most complicated character to solve the problem of increasing population. The result showed that, in the end, this system only led to disaster. During the war the leaders of the Entente endeav- ored to stem the tide of world-wide disbelief in mod- em governments and civilization. Perhaps their immediate motive was to maintain the morale of their own people and hold their armies together. In the end, however, the object was to convince the nations that Allied civilizations and governments were of a wholly different character from the German. They emphasized and exaggerated the democracy of Allied governments and institutions. They declared repeatedly that one aim of their govern- ments and institutions was to promote the welfare of all the nations of Europe to bring about an era of freedom and justice in the interrelations of peoples. "When the United States entered the war, a new spirit of hope arose in the hearts of the peoples. This hope was given form by the utterances of the President of the United States. It was finally crys- tallized in the agreement of the Allies to the Presi- dent's Fourteen Points and his other utterances, as a basis of peace. When, however, the Allies failed to embody in the Treaties the principles which they had enunciated and agreed to, a profound pessimism swept over the world. Men saw that the same old principles and methods were applied as those for which Germany was the most logical and able exponent. 36 THE PEACE TANGLE The Treaties proved to the great masses of man- kind the bankruptcy of human intelligence in the directive powers of the world's affairs. In each nation a different set of facts led to this impression. But the same result was obtained almost everywhere. The Treaties were the most voluminous the world had ever seen. The Treaty of Bukarest, which settled the Secohd Balkan "War, contained 2,500 words. The German Treaty alone contained between 70,000 and 80,000 words. Never before had such an attempt been made to regulate the internal affairs of beaten nations by such a wealth of foreign government control; of commissions, restrictions, regulations, and intermix- ture in the internal affairs of conquered nations. Many details of these Treaties brought out the hypocrisy and insincerity of the makers. Too many articles breathed a determination to perpetuate the reign of hate and conflict by nailing down in detailed terms treaties of tyrannous subjection. This the Paris Conference did in the face of its pledged agree- ment to make treaties of reconciliation. It was most profoundly discouraging that, wherever the treaties were applied, their childish- ness and incompetence were brought to public atten- tion. The form was wonderful, but the substance impressed the victims with its inconsequence and irresponsibility. In reading the treaties one runs across some pro- visions which suggest that those who formulated them had retrograded intellectually to the second period of youthful irresponsibility. No doubt much of the trouble lay in the fact that four men attempted PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS 37 to make decisions on all the intricate points of the most intricate and voluminous of treaties. For instance, one reads that Hungary is to give wood to Austria. But Hungary, under the Treaty, is deprived of its forests. Austria, which has few iissi& 14 Mesopotamia*.'.".'.".! 17, 31-2, 71, 301-2 " Russia 14 Thrace 90-3, 289-90 Treaty with 192, 276, 289-91, 299, 306 Trebizond 297 Tyrol, Austrian 87, 160-1, 185 " Italian 160 U Ukraine, The 235-6, 248 Ukraine: Germany 237 Kiev 236. 244. 248, 257 " Language 230 Poland 214, 235, 242, 247-8, 257-8 Valona 14-15, 20, 30, 72, 87, 149, 157 Venetian Republic 45 Venice . 286 Venizelos. Eleutherios 92. 157. 293, 297-4, 236 Versailles, Treaty of (See Treaty of Versailles). Vienna 111-13, 159, 163, 176-9, 186, 189, 244 Vilna 246-7 Vistula River 251 Vorwarts, The Berlin 22 W Warsaw 246, 257-8, 265-6 Washburn, Stanley 18 Wiart, General '. 267-8 William II 123-4 Wilson, President 42, 47-8, 65-8, 122-4, 181 Wilson, President: Addresses 5-7 " " Clemenceau 82-7, 124 " " Czecho-Slovakia 261 •• •' Fourteen Points, 4, 7, 21, 25-8, 35, 53, 56-7, 90, 105, 125, 299, 305, 307-8, 320-1, 324 " " League of Nations 80-1, 111 INDEX 345 Wilson, President: Poland 241, 261 " " Pre-Armlstice Agreement 5, 8, 85-9, 150 Sarre Basin 82-5 " " Secret Treaties 18-19, 81 Self-Determination 41, 87 " " Territorial Boundaries 78 Wrangel, General Baron 236, 271, 274 Zara 149, 286 Cornell University Library D 644.B31 Peace tangle. II i iniiiH III 3 1924 027 875 438