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SOCIOLOGY 
 
 IN ITS 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 BY 
 
 CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, Ph.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OP SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OP MISSOURI 
 AUTHOR OP "SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEMS" 
 
 SECOND EDITION 
 
 NEW YORK AND LONDON 
 
 D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 
 
 1913 
 
Copyright, 1912, by 
 D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 
 
 Printed in the United States of America 
 
TO 
 IDA BRECKENRIDGE ELLWOOD 
 
 THIS BOOK IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED 
 BY HER HUSBAND 
 
PREFACE 
 
 This book is an introduction to the psychological theory 
 of society. The time has not yet come to write a system of 
 scientific sociology. But in the meantime it would seem that 
 the science might be advanced by the development of certain 
 of its phases or aspects. This book attempts to deal with the 
 psychological aspects of sociology, often called " social psychol- 
 ogy," but, in the opinion of the writer, more accurately named 
 " psychological sociology." Accordingly, the book does not aim 
 to furnish a comprehensive view of sociological theory, but only 
 of that section of it which rests immediately upon psychology. 
 This part of sociological theory, however, is of the most immedi- 
 ate practical importance in developing a sociology which shall 
 serve at once as a basis for the special social sciences and for the 
 construction of sound social policies. Yet the writer is so far 
 from denying the importance of other aspects of sociological 
 theory that he would make the biological side of sociology co- 
 ordinate with its psychological side. Biological sociology, in- 
 cluding, among other matters, the theory of the growth of 
 population through the surplus of births over deaths, of the 
 influence of selective processes upon social development, and 
 of the social effects of variation and heredity, this book takes for 
 granted, though it is as yet far from satisfactorily worked out. 
 
 The position of the writer is, as implied, that sociology is 
 a study of the biological and psychological factors in the social 
 life with reference to certain problems, especially the problems 
 of social organization and social evolution. As such a biology 
 and psychology of the social life, sociology is as much a natural 
 science as the foundation sciences on which it rests. A scientific 
 sociology, accordingly, must rest upon the assured results of the 
 
 vii 
 
PREFACE 
 
 other positive sciences, especially modern biology and psychol- 
 ogy. The ignoring of results in biology and psychology and the 
 exclusive or preponderating use in sociology of such methods 
 as " mass interpretation " in the name of inductive science, is 
 an unscientific procedure which offers too many temptations to 
 the sociologist to bolster up social theories not in accord with 
 the results of other positive sciences. The sociologist must keep 
 the biological and psychological individual constantly in 
 view, as well as the unity or interdependence of society, 
 if he is to reach a scientific interpretation of the social life. 
 The interpretation of society, in other words, must be in terms 
 of the biological and psychological factors in the individual; 
 but the biological factors find their expression in the social life 
 mainly through the psychological factors. 
 
 The attempt of some so-called objective social thinkers to 
 deny any functional significance to the subjective or psycholog- 
 ical' elements in the social life is not only not in accord with 
 the evolutionary view, but also not in accord with the true 
 spirit of positive science. To make sociology purely objective is 
 to deprive it of its essential character. This book recognizes the 
 psychic elements in the social life as primary and attempts to 
 give them their true value. 
 
 The chief method of this treatise, accordingly, is that of 
 psychological analysis, the method which has been employed so 
 successfully in the development of theoretical economics. Mod- 
 ern functional psychology — the psychology of such writers as 
 James, Dewey, Thorndike, and Angell — rather than the sensa- 
 tionalistic, associational psychology of the Nineteenth Century^ 
 however, has been made the instrument of social analysis. The 
 merit which is claimed for a sociology developed upon the basis 
 of functional psychology is that it is both synthetic and prac- 
 tical. Many apparently conflicting theories of the social life 
 fall into their proper places as aspects of the more fundamental 
 view as soon as one takes the functional standpoint. Thus imi- 
 tation, sympathy, conflict, industry, government, law, religion 
 and even morality itself are all seen to be instruments for the 
 
 viii 
 
PREFACE 
 
 carrying on and perfecting of a collective life-process. The 
 functional point of view, in other words, subordinates social ac- 
 tivities and institutions to the social life itself and finds no 
 difficulty in arranging them all harmoniously as aspects or phases 
 of that life. It is not, of course, claimed that functional psy- 
 chology is of itself adequate to interpret fully the social life 
 of man. It is only claimed that it furnishes a point of view 
 and certain principles of explanation which are indispensable 
 for the right understanding of human interrelations. A prac- 
 tical and functional sociology must be constructed with the aid 
 of functional psychology. 
 
 A brief summary of the theory of society set forth in this 
 work may possibly be of some aid to the reader. A society, in 
 the view of the writer, is a group of individuals carrying 
 on a collective life by means of mental interaction. But a 
 collective life is manifestly only possible on condition that the 
 activities of the individual units are coordinated. The funda- 
 mental fact, therefore, for the sociologist is this coordination or 
 coadaptation of the activities of the members of groups. Mental 
 interaction functions to secure this coordination of the activities 
 of individuals, their adaptation to one another and of the group 
 to its environment. But the life-process necessitates continued 
 change in these adaptations ; consequently, mental interaction is 
 continually carried on within the group to mediate and control 
 the building up of new types of adaptation between the individ- 
 uals of the group, thus giving rise to the more specialized 
 collective mental phenomena. The whole collective mental life 
 of society is thus itself but instrumental or functional to the 
 carrying on and perfecting of the successive adaptations be- 
 tween individuals within the group and between the group and 
 its environment. In human groups, modes of coordinated ac- 
 tivity which are successful become consciously accepted and 
 sanctioned and grow up into " folkways," customs and institu- 
 tions. Such are industry, government, law, religion, morality 
 and education. These may often seem ends in themselves, but 
 from the standpoint of sociology they are merely instruments 
 
 ix 
 
PREFACE 
 
 for perfecting the social life. The higher developments of social 
 organization and evolution are to be achieved only through the 
 development and perfecting of the higher instruments of the 
 social life, especially government, law, religion, morality and 
 education. Without the fullest development of all these, neither 
 harmonious social order nor enduring social progress are pos- 
 sible. While the higher intellectual and spiritual elements in 
 the social life, therefore, must not be made the basis for in- 
 terpreting society from the standpoint of natural science, yet 
 they receive their true place and value in a sociology developed 
 from a functional standpoint, that is, the standpoint of life- 
 process. The result of a functional sociology is, therefore, to 
 perceive the impossibility of understanding or interpreting the 
 social life of man from the standpoint of any single mental 
 element, such as instinct, imitation, sympathy, feeling, desire or 
 intellect, or from the standpoint of any specialism such as geog- 
 raphy, ethnology, economics, or political science. For it con- 
 clusively shows that all of these standpoints view the social life, 
 not synthetically, but from the viewpoint of merely one of its 
 instruments. Only the standpoint of a collective life-process de- 
 veloping within itself the instruments for its own maintenance 
 and perfectioning, is capable of furnishing a synthetic view of 
 the social life. 
 
 No apology need be offered for the frequent references to 
 social practice and policy found throughout the book. The writer 
 believes that all science exists for the sake of the practical 
 applications which may be made of it, and practice in the social 
 sciences, must take the place, to a large extent, of experiment in 
 the natural sciences, becoming the touchstone by which the 
 soundness of any particular social theory is to be tested. Many 
 other practical applications of the theoretical views set forth in 
 this book can easily be made by the reader. 
 
 But the book aims to be practical in a deeper sense, apart 
 from any specific reference to practical problems. Materialism 
 in science and individualism in social practice are bearing bitter 
 fruit just now in our social life. Sociology itself has become 
 
 x 
 
PREFACE 
 
 so tainted with these that to some it appears to be merely a 
 bundle of revolutionary doctrines. It is hoped that the reader 
 of this volume will find in it a view of society which, while ac- 
 cepting the positive results of modern science, avoids the socially 
 negative and destructive doctrines of materialism on the one 
 side and of individualism on the other, and which conserves, 
 therefore, the higher values of our social life. 
 
 The chief theoretical positions of the book will be found 
 developed in Chapters VI to XI inclusive, while in Chapters 
 XVII to XIX inclusive are developed the more important 
 practical conclusions. 
 
 It is impossible for the writer to express his many obligations 
 in the preparation of this work to former teachers, to friends 
 and colleagues, and to other writers along sociological lines. It 
 has not been practicable even to indicate more than a small 
 fraction of the many sources from which he has derived thought 
 or material. He feels, however, under special obligation in the 
 preparation of this particular work to two of his former 
 teachers, Professor John Dewey and Professor Albion W. Small. 
 To Professor Dewey he is indebted for the psychological point 
 of view developed in this book, and to Professor Small he is 
 indebted for much encouragement and guidance in its prepara- 
 tion as well as in all his work. Among his colleagues at the 
 University of Missouri he is especially indebted to Professor Max 
 Meyer and Dr. W. H. Pyle of the Department of Psychology, 
 who have carefully read and criticised the more directly psy- 
 chological portions ; and also to Mr. W. T. Cross of the Depart- 
 ment of Sociology, who has assisted in revising the proofs. 
 
 Charles A. Ellwood. 
 
 University of Missouri, 
 May, 1912. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Various Conceptions of Sociology and of Society . . 1 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 The Subject-matteb and Problems of Sociology . . 20 
 
 . CHAPTER III 
 The Relations of Sociology to Other Sciences . . 29 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 The Relations of Sociology to Philosophy ... 66 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 Scientific Methods in Sociology 82 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 The Psychological Basis of Sociology .... 94 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 The Origin of Society 124 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 The Fundamental Fact for Psychological Sociology: The 
 Social Coordination 143 
 
 CHAPTER VIII— (Continued) 
 
 The Fundamental Fact for Psychological Sociology: 
 Social Self-control 181 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 The R6le of Instinct in the Social Life .... 199 
 
 xiii 
 
CONTENTS 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The R6le of Feeling in the Social Life .... 247 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 The R6le of Intellect in the Social Life . . . 261 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 The Theory of the Social Forces 278 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 The R6le of Imitation in the Social Life . . . 289 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 The R6le of Sympathy in the Social Life . . 309 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 The Social Mind, Social Consciousness, Public Opinion 
 and Popular Will 329 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 The Forms of Association 341 
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 The Theory of Social Order 352 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 The Theory of Social Progress i 366 
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 The Nature of Society 382 
 
 Select Bibliography 397 
 
 Index 405 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL 
 
 ASPECTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 VARIOUS CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY AND OP SOCIETY 1 
 
 Conceptions of Sociology. — The multiplicity of concep- 
 tions of sociology seems to the beginning student, and some- 
 times even to the advanced scientific thinker, an insuperable 
 difficulty in understanding the science. The multiplicity 
 of these conceptions is not, of course, nearly as great as has 
 been often represented, and among sociological writers there 
 is now far more unity in their conceptions of the science 
 than formerly. Moreover, the differences between the va- 
 rious conceptions have often been exaggerated. They are 
 not, for the most part, so entirely opposed to each other as 
 has been represented, but they are often incomplete views 
 of the same subject. So far from being mutually contra- 
 dictory, therefore, they often supplement each other. In- 
 deed, the variety of conceptions of sociology may be made 
 to aid, rather than to confuse, the student in obtaining a 
 proper conception of his own. 
 
 It has often been said that definition is the last stage 
 of any science, and in a sense this is true. Certainly the 
 
 1 The first four chapters of this text were originally published 
 in substance in the American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XIII, pp. 
 300-348 (November, 1907). The chief theoretical positions of the 
 whole work were outlined, though in a crude way, in a series of 
 articles published by the writer in the American Journal of Sociol- 
 ogy, March-September, 1899 (Vols. IV and V), under the title 
 " Prolegomena to Social Psychology." 
 
 1 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 variety of the conceptions which sociologists have held of 
 their science, even though they mutually supplement one 
 another, is further ' evidence of the truth of the dictum. 
 Nevertheless, scientific workers in every field must have 
 relatively accurate conceptions at least of the problems at 
 which they are working before they can do scientific work. 
 The student of any science, therefore, can scarcely do bet- 
 ter than to examine the various conceptions and definitions 
 of his science found in various texts. The value of such 
 examination and comparison of definitions is so great that 
 we shall use it to introduce the subject of psychological 
 sociology. 
 
 The various conceptions of sociology may perhaps be 
 reduced to six leading conceptions, which we shall now pass 
 briefly in review in order to reach, if possible, a tentative 
 working definition of the science. 
 
 1. The most common conception of sociology is that it 
 is a science which' treats of social evils and their remedies. 
 This is, indeed, the popular conception of the science. So- 
 ciologists generally, however, repudiate it as an entire mis- 
 conception. They say that sociology deals with the normal 
 rather than the abnormal in society -, 1 and it might be added 
 that such a conception confuses sociology with scientific 
 philanthropy, an applied science resting upon sociology, 
 which does attempt to deal directly with social evils and to 
 prescribe remedies. However, it must be acknowledged that 
 even this popular conception of the science has a degree of 
 truth in it. Sociology, while not treating directly of social 
 evils, has been developed largely to correct social evils. Just 
 as physiology and the general science of biology were devel- 
 oped largely through the medical sciences, through the 
 studying of bodily disease, so sociology has been developed 
 largely through the study of social evils, and the develop- 
 
 - i Cf. Small and Vincent, Introduction to the Study of Society, 
 pp. 40, 80-82. 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 ment of scientific philanthropy to correct those evils. While 
 sociology deals, to be sure, primarily with the normal, inci- 
 dentally it must deal largely also with the- abnormal, because 
 social evils are frequently incidents in normal social evolu- 
 tion. The development of sociology, therefore, may be ex- 
 pected to assist largely in the correction of social evils, in 
 the elimination of social maladjustments, 1 just as the devel- 
 opment of biology has led to greater scientific exactness in 
 the medical sciences. While sociology treats of social evils 
 only incidentally, therefore, as the science of the normal it 
 must throw light upon ways and means of getting rid of the 
 abnormal. 
 
 2. A second conception of sociology is that it is the 
 science of social phenomena. 2 This conception is current 
 among many scientific men and even among some sociolo- 
 gists. It is not so much erroneous as too broad and too 
 vague. It either leaves no place for the special social 
 sciences, or else it makes sociology simply a convenient col- 
 lective term for all the social sciences. There are other 
 sciences of social phenomena than sociology ; economics and 
 politics, for example, deal not less truly with social phe- 
 nomena than does sociology. The dictum of Professor Wes- 
 termarek" that "the scientific treatment of any social 
 phenomenon " is sociology leaves no place for the special 
 social sciences. It would be difficult to say, for example, 
 why the scientific treatment of trade and markets, according 
 to this conception, would not fall within the scope of sociol- 
 ogy rather than of economics. 
 
 'There is, of course, no objection to using the word sociol- 
 ogy as a convenient general term to cover all the social 
 sciences, just as biology is used as a convenient term to 
 
 i Cf. Small, General Sociology, p. 34. 
 
 2 Cf. Ward, Popular Science Monthly, June, 1902, p. 113; also 
 Bascom, Social Theory, p. 8. 
 
 s American Journal of Sociology, Vol. X, p. 684. 
 2 3 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 cover all the biological sciences. 1 In library classifications, 
 philosophic summaries of knowledge and the like, such a 
 broad use of the term sociology is unobjectionable, but in 
 scientific texts and in academic work we must have a more 
 exact conception to satisfy the requirements of a working 
 definition of a science. 2 
 
 3. A third conception of sociology, which is found im- 
 plied in a few sociological texts, though nowhere stated ex- 
 plicitly, is that it is the science of the phenomena of socia- 
 bility. 3 This conception is, of course, derived from the 
 preceding by giving to the adjective social a narrow mean- 
 ing : it is the science of ' ' social ' ' phenomena in the narrow 
 sense. Now, the phenomena of social attraction, or of socia- 
 bility, in society are very important, but they must not be 
 confused with social phenomena in the broad sense, and the 
 science which treats of such phenomena of sociability can- 
 not be the general science of society. It would only be 
 another special social science coordinate with economics and 
 polities. The non-sympathetic phenomena of society are too 
 important to be excluded from sociology by definition. 
 While it is improbable that a special social science will be 
 developed to treat of the phenomena of social attraction 
 separate from sociology, a sociology which dealt with these 
 
 i " Social science " is, however, preferable to sociology as an 
 encyclopedic term for all the social disciplines, and is now so used 
 by the best authorities. 
 
 2 Cf. the statement of Simmel, Annals of American Academy of 
 Political and Social Science, Vol. VI, p. 53 : " If sociology, in place 
 of a mere tendency in method, which has been falsely denoted the 
 science of sociology, is to be a true science, the entire province of 
 social science, in its broadest sense, must be divided for purposes 
 of investigation, and a sociology in the narrower sense be sepa- 
 rated out." 
 
 8 Cf., e.g., Giddings, Elements of Sociology, pp. 6, 8. If we 
 substitute in the definition of sociology on page 8 the definition of 
 society on page 6, we get the following: "Sociology is the scientific 
 study of any group or number of individuals who cultivate acquaint- 
 ance and mental agreement." 
 
 4 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 phenomena exclusively could only form a few chapters in 
 the general science of society. 
 
 4. A fourth conception of sociology is that it is " the 
 science of human institutions." Under this head comes 
 Professor "Ward's conception of sociology as " the science of 
 human achievement," although he uses achievement in a 
 somewhat broader sense than the ordinary definition of in- 
 stitution. By achievement he means those activities that are 
 permanently incorporated into civilization. The sum of 
 human achievement is civilization. Sociology is, therefore, 
 according to "Ward, the science of civilization and its insti- 
 tutions. 1 
 
 The objection to this conception of sociology is that it 
 omits many of the ephemeral and ordinary phenomena of 
 daily social life with which the sociologist is necessarily 
 concerned. It leaves out of account, for example, such 
 ephemeral and transitory phenomena of society as mobs, 
 crazes, fads, fashions and crimes, all of which are important 
 phenomena for the sociologist to understand. 2 Moreover, it 
 leaves out of consideration also the many instinctive activi- 
 ties of daily social life which do not take on institutional 
 forms and which are, therefore, not visible in the fabric of 
 civilization. 3 Again, if this conception of sociology is too 
 narrow in one sense, it is too broad in another because the 
 special sciences also deal with human institutions, though in 
 a specific rather than in a general way ; thus politics deals 
 with the origin, development and workings of political in- 
 
 1 This is also apparently Spencer's conception of sociology, 
 although it has been claimed that he used the word as an encyclo- 
 pedic term for all the social sciences. Cf . Ward, ■ Pure Sociology, 
 p. 15 ; also Wright, Practical Sociology, p. 1. 
 
 2 Cf. Ross, Foundations of Sociology, p. 5. 
 
 3 As Ross rightly says (op. cit., p. 89) : "If the institution is 
 the thing to be explained, the ground is cut from underneath the 
 lower human and subhuman sociology. For in groups of animals we 
 find interactions, modes of mutual aid, habits of cooperation, etc. 
 But do we find modes of life with a collective sanction annexed ? " 
 
 5 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 stitutions. While this conception, therefore, indicates many 
 of the important problems of sociology, it affords, neverthe- 
 less, an incomplete view of the problems of the science. 
 
 5. A fifth conception of sociology is that which makes 
 it the science of the order, or organization, of society. 1 Un- 
 der this head comes Professor Simmel's conception of soci- 
 ology as the science of the forms, or modes of association. 2 
 Now there is no doubt that if this definition were understood 
 in a broad enough way it could be made to cover all of the 
 problems with which the sociologist deals. If we under- 
 stand by the science of the forms of association the investi- 
 gation of the origin, development and functioning of these 
 forms, as well as their structure, this would cover all the 
 problems of sociology. The trouble with the definition is 
 that it fails to be specific enough, as Professor Simmel's 
 treatment of the subject of sociology itself shows, because 
 he excludes the psychical motivation of these forms of as- 
 sociation, excludes also their psychical content, and would 
 limit sociology to the study of the forms as such, making 
 sociology, as he has himself said, a sort of social geometry. 3 
 
 Now, this study of the structure of society is undoubtedly 
 important; and much of the best sociological literature of 
 the present is occupied with the discussion of these problems. 
 The chief criticism of this definition is that it fails to em- 
 phasize the evolution of social relationships. All science is 
 now evolutionary in spirit and method and believes that 
 things cannot be understood except as they are understood 
 in their genesis and development. A working definition of 
 sociology, therefore, should throw the emphasis, not upon 
 
 i Cf. Mayo-Smith, Statistics and Sociology, p. 1 : " Sociology is 
 the science which treats of social organization." 
 
 2 See American Journal of Sociology, Vol. II, p. 167 ; also 
 Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 
 VI, p. 54. 
 
 s See Simmel's Soziologie, pp. 4-14. For further criticism .of 
 Simmel's conception of sociology, see Chapter XVI. 
 
 6 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 the static aspects of society, but rather upon social change, 
 development, evolution. 
 
 6. A working definition of sociology might, then, be 
 formulated as follows : Sociology is the science of the organi- 
 zation and evolution of society. This definition has the ad- 
 vantage that it indicates at once the problems with which 
 the sociologist deals, namely, problems of the organization of 
 society, on the one hand, and problems of the evolution of so- 
 ciety, on the other. It delimits clearly the problems of soci- 
 ology from those of nearly allied sciences. It is worthy of 
 note that this definition is very nearly that which Auguste 
 Comte, the father of modern sociology, proposed, namely, 
 the science of the " order and progress " of society. 1 The 
 words "organization" and "evolution" are, however, 
 broader terms than order and progress and are, therefore, 
 preferable. " Order " connotes a stable, settled and har- 
 monious condition of the elements of society while ' ' organi- 
 zation ' ' means any relation of the parts of society with ref- 
 erence to each other. " Progress " means advance, change 
 for the better, while " evolution " means, not necessarily a 
 change for the better, but orderly change of any sort. 2 
 
 This definition may, however, be criticised on account of 
 the narrowness of the usual meaning given to the word 
 organization. Social organization is practically synonymous 
 with social structure. It, therefore, fails to include spe- 
 cifically social functioning, or activity. In general also, the 
 definition just given is hardly specific enough. Prof. 
 J. Arthur Thomson, a biologist, has suggested perhaps an 
 
 1 Cf. Positive Philosophy, Bk. IV, Chap. Ill (Martineau's trans- 
 lation) ; also Positive Polity, Vol. II, General Introduction. (In 
 nearly all cases, references in this book are to English translations 
 where such exist.) 
 
 2 In strict scientific usage, of course, the word should not be 
 used in any other way. " Evolution," as used by the biologists, 
 contains no implication of " better *' or " worse," but simply means 
 "orderly change," or the theory of such change. 
 
 7 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 even better working definition of sociology because it is 
 more specific, and indicates, if anything, even more clearly, 
 the problems of sociology; namely, Sociology is the science 
 of the origin, development, structure and functions of the 
 forms of association. 1 While this definition might be re- 
 duced to the same terms as the definition first proposed, if 
 we regard " origin and development " as synonymous with 
 " evolution," and " structure and function " as synony- 
 mous with " organization," yet, because of the ambiguity 
 of the word organization, and because the former definition 
 is not specific enough, we shall accept this definition as, on 
 the whole, the best working definition of sociology that has 
 yet been formulated. This is, of course, not denying that 
 other definitions of sociology may have equal validity. 2 
 Many other definitions might be given in other terms, but 
 in every case they would imply the same problems and, 
 therefore, the same content in sociological science. 3 
 
 i Professor Thomson's own words are (Heredity, p. 508): "The 
 scientific study of the origin, development, structure and functions 
 of human societary forms." 
 
 2 Many examples of other equally valid definitions might be 
 given. For example, Professor Giddings's definition [Principles of 
 Sociology, p. 5 ) : " Sociology is an attempt to account for the origin, 
 growth, structure, and activities of society by the operation of 
 physical, vital, and psychical causes working together in a process 
 of evolution." 
 
 3 Professor Small's definition {General Sociology, p. 35) — "Sociol- 
 ogy is the science of the social process " — comes to the same thing, 
 since, as the context shows, the implication is that sociology deals, 
 not with some specialized phase of the social process, but with 
 the whole process of social interaction. Schaeffle's conception of 
 sociology as "a philosophy of the special social sciences" (Bau 
 und Leoen des socialen Kbrpers, Vol. I, p. 1) might seem at first 
 to be radically distinct from any that have been given. But an 
 examination of Schaeffle's writings shows, on the contrary, that the 
 problems with which he actually dealt were precisely those of the 
 origin, development, structure, and function of human interrelation- 
 ships. Ratzenhofer's definition (American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 
 X, p. 177; also Soziologie, p. 1)— "The science of the reciprocal 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 Conceptions of Society. — It has been questioned by some 
 whether the term " society " is capable of scientific defini- 
 tion. Some sociologists, like Professor Small, have even 
 denied that the term society can be made a scientific cate- 
 gory. 1 They say that the term " association " expresses 
 better the fact which the sociologist is trying to get at. This 
 we shall not deny, as the same conclusion has already been 
 implied in our use of the phrase " forms of association," 
 instead of ' ' society, ' ' in the working definition of sociology 
 which we have adopted. Nevertheless, in the historical de- 
 velopment of sociology, the word society has been used and 
 it seems best to continue its usage on that account, in spite 
 of all the difficulty of giving such a loose popular term, 
 which is continually shifting its meaning, a definite scientific 
 content. 
 
 Even in the social sciences themselves, the word society 
 has frequently been used with a variety of meanings and 
 again we must note the chief of these in order that we may 
 make the conception clear from a scientific standpoint. 
 
 1. One conception of society is that it is synonymous 
 with the state or the nation. This is a conception of the 
 term which is found chiefly among writers on political 
 science, but also found among some sociologists, as for ex- 
 ample Spencer, who often uses the word society where he 
 might as well have used the word nation. 2 In general, how- 
 relationships of human beings " — is seemingly in accord with the 
 fifth conception discussed; but his actual treatment of sociological 
 problems corresponds to the sixth conception, as do indeed those 
 of most leading sociologists from Comte down to the present. Kidd, 
 however, would apparently exclude from sociology the consideration 
 of purely statical problems, as he defines sociology {Eleventh Edition 
 of Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. XXV, p. 323) as "the principles 
 which underlie human society considered in a condition of develop- 
 ment." 
 
 1 See General Sociology, pp. 183-185. 
 
 2 The conception of society as the nation is espeoially common 
 among sociological writers of the continent of Europe. Thus 
 
 9 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 ever, most sociologists of the present would not defend such 
 a use of the term. They regard the state or the nation as 
 simply forms of association and, indeed, not primary, but 
 derived forms. Nevertheless, the state and the nation, as 
 important forms of human association, legitimately occupy 
 a central place in the sociologist's thought. 
 
 2. Another conception of society is that it is synonymous 
 with the cultural group. According to this conception, " a 
 society is all that group of people that have a common civili- 
 zation or who are the bearers of a certain type of culture." 
 A society, then, could hardly be smaller than a nation but 
 might be much more extensive. Western Civilization, or 
 Christendom, would, in this definition, constitute a society. 1 
 There is, of course, no objection to regarding the peoples 
 who have a common culture as forming one large society. 
 The only question is whether we can limit the concept of 
 society to such a group. To limit the term society to cul- 
 tural groups, and the work of the sociologist accordingly, 
 would be an arbitrary limitation which could scarcely be 
 justified upon scientific grounds. The cultural group is 
 again only one of the many forms of human association, and 
 rather than limit the conception of society to it, it would 
 be far better to take the term society with all the variety of 
 
 Schaeffle says {Bau und Leben, Vol. I, p. 1) : "By society, or the 
 social body, is here meant the entire nation {Volk) and national 
 existence, that is, the entire people and folk life.'' Dr. RenS Worms 
 also says {Orgamisme et Socie'te', p. 31): "We reserve the name 
 societies for national groups alone. Society is, then, for us an en- 
 during group of living beings carrying on all their activity in 
 common." Dr. J. Maxwell goes even further, when he says (he 
 Crime et la Socie'te', pp. 3, 4) : "I shall use the word society in 
 the sense of a political group having a legislative unity. France, 
 Spain, Italy, are societies." 
 
 iThis seems to be the conception of society endorsed by Fair- 
 banks, though he also suggests the more general definition given 
 below. He says {Introduction to Sociology, p. 4): "In general, a 
 society coincides with a type of culture." 
 
 10 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 meaning which popular usage has given it and try to give 
 it a scientific content by finding a common element in its 
 varying usages. All recent attempts at the definition of 
 society by sociologists have been directed to this end. 
 
 3. As an example of such a definition we might cite the 
 definition of society proposed by Fairbanks : " A group of 
 men who are bound together in relations more or less per- 
 manent. ' ' * This is substantially a correct definition of 
 the term society as it is used in the concrete sense by most 
 sociologists of to-day. It makes society synonymous with 
 any permanent human group. 2 It is, however, somewhat 
 vague as to what sort of relations constitute a society, and 
 therefore falls short of the requirements of a good working 
 definition. It fails to specify that these relations are not 
 those of mere contiguity in time and space or of mere de- 
 pendence on a common environment, but are those of men- 
 tal interaction. 3 
 
 4. This definition, in order to give it scientific precision, 
 must be modified in at least two respects. While we cannot 
 limit the conception, of society exclusively to human groups, 
 as we shall see later, we cannot, on the other hand, accept 
 the view of Espinas that societies may be formed by indi- 
 viduals of different species ; 4 for that disregards the essen- 
 
 1 Op. tit., p. 3. 
 
 2 Cf. Dealey (Sociology, p. 41) : "The term society ... is regu- 
 larly used in sociology to denote a human group held together by 
 common elements and interests." 
 
 s From Comte down, most sociologists have made the psychical 
 element the constitutive principle of social life, or society in the 
 true sense. See, for example, Schaeffle, Abriss der Soziologie, pp. 
 14-16. Compare also Baldwin (Individual and Society, p. 30) : "A 
 situation which is psychic in character and scope is fundamental. 
 Without it no society could arise." 
 
 4 See his Des SociStis Animates, Section I. Espinas, however, 
 admits that true or "normal" societies can be formed only by 
 members of the same species. Associations of different species 
 (parasitism, commensalism, mutualism) he would call "accidental 
 societies." 
 
 11 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 tial condition of society. We do not think of individuals as 
 constituting a society unless they are psychically interde- 
 pendent. Mere physiological or ecological interdependence 
 is not sufficient to constitute a society. 1 When one speaks 
 of groups of plants or other low organisms as constituting 
 societies, it is probable that he is using the term metaphor- 
 ically, or else attributing to them some degree of psychic 
 life. It is the interdependence in function on the mental 
 side, then, the contact and overlapping of our inner selves, 
 which makes possible that form of collective life which we 
 call society. 
 
 Now, such psychical interdependence implies enough 
 mental resemblance to make possible definite forms of inter- 
 stimulation and response. Professor Giddings is undoubt- 
 edly right, therefore, in insisting that similarity, resem- 
 blance, both physical and psychical, is an essential condition 
 for society. 2 Whether, as he also insists, mutual recogni- 
 tion of resemblance, or " consciousness of kind," is an 
 essential condition is a debatable question ; but it is safe to 
 conclude that without at least the amount of resemblance 
 which is found among individuals of the same species, so- 
 ciety, in the scientific meaning of the word, is impossible. 3 
 
 i Espinas's mistake comes through making mere physiological 
 interdependence or reciprocity sufficient to constitute a society. He 
 says (Des Soci4t6s Animates, p. 158) : "The characteristic trait of 
 the social life is an habitual reciprocity of services among activities 
 more or less interdependent." The opposite mistake of making some 
 relatively specialized psychical element, such as sympathy or imi- 
 tation, the constitutive principle of the social life 'will be discussed 
 at length later. 
 
 2 Elements of Sociology, Chaps. I and VI. 
 
 3 Cornejo (Sociologie Gatfralc, Vol. I, p. 205) goes so far as to 
 define society as " the natural grouping of organisms possessing 
 consciousness of kind (conscience d'espece)." Cornejo and many 
 other sociologists would not recognize as societies ephemeral and 
 accidental groups. These groups, however, are always found within 
 the larger, permanent groups, and their exclusion or inclusion within 
 the conception of society is of no practical importance. 
 
 12 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 We shall assume, therefore, when we speak of individuals 
 as the constituent units of society, that they are individuals 
 of the same species. 
 
 With these assumptions, we may tentatively define a so- 
 ciety, in the concrete sense, as any group of individuals 
 having more or less conscious reciprocal relations to each 
 other ; or, more briefly, any group of psychically interacting 
 individuals. 1 
 
 It may be asked if another qualification should not be 
 added to our definition, namely, that the individuals of the 
 group be friendly or " sociably " disposed toward one an- 
 other. But it is evident that hostility may exist among the 
 members of the group and that it may be but a phase of 
 their social life. Conflict between individuals usually arises 
 because of their social relations (psychical interactions), not 
 because they are socially unrelated. The conception of so- 
 ciety cannot, then, be regarded as implying exclusively 
 friendly relations. However, the prevailing relations be- 
 tween the members of a group are friendly and conflict may 
 be regarded as a sort of a negative and destructive element 
 in the total life of the group. Practically, therefore, the 
 internal conflicts of a group may be disregarded in a con- 
 structive view of its life history. Ultimately, all the 
 members of a group work together in the carrying-on of a 
 common life-process. In this sense they may be said to co- 
 operate. If we mean by cooperation nothing more than this 
 living together and working together in a common life, it is 
 a mark of all social groups whatsoever; and we should be 
 substantially correct if we defined society as any group of 
 
 1 For fuller discussion of the conception of society, see Chapters 
 VII, VIII and XIX. No attempt has been made to discuss in de- 
 tail the many definitions of society found in sociological writings. 
 Among these that of Tarde is easily most novel (Laws of Imitation, 
 p. 68 ) : " Society may be defined as a group of beings who are apt 
 to imitate one another." This conception is discussed in Chap- 
 ter XIII. 
 
 13 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 individuals who either unconsciously (instinctively) or con- 
 sciously (reflectively) cooperate. 1 
 
 Thus, a society may be constituted as readily by two or 
 three individuals as by a million. The only criterion by 
 which we may decide whether any group constitutes a so- 
 ciety or not is its possession or non-possession of the essential 
 mark of a society, namely, the functional interdependence of 
 its members on the psychical side." According to this view, 
 a family and a nation, a debating club and a civilization, are 
 equally entitled to the appellation of society and to be ob- 
 jects of the sociologist's investigation. As Stuckenberg has 
 put it — 
 
 " Society is created whenever men pass from isolation to a re- 
 lation of cooperation or antagonism, of mutuality and reciprocity; 
 whenever they affect each other as stimuli. . . . Society [is] con- 
 stituted by the mental interaction of individuals, that is the essen- 
 tial idea." 3 
 
 It is evident that society is but a broad term standing 
 for the psychical interactions of individuals. It is practi- 
 cally, as Professor Hayes has said, a verbal noun, 4 that is 
 a name of a process, and but a little narrower than the ab- 
 stract term association, which, as we have already seen, is 
 probably the more scientific term. "When used abstractly, 
 indeed, " society " is synonymous with this latter term, 
 
 1 Cf. G-iddings, Inductive Sociology, p. 5. 
 
 2 This is the only possible criterion of " the social," in the view 
 of the writer. Social life, on this view, becomes synonymous with 
 intermental life. 
 
 3 See his Sociology: The Science of Human Society, Vol. I, pp. 
 80-102. Among the earliest writers to define society as essentially 
 an interaction of individuals (and so as a process) was Simmel (see 
 his Sociale Differenzierung, pp. 12-20). Professor Small has espe- 
 cially developed and emphasized this idea (see his General Sociology, 
 Chap. I). 
 
 * American Journal of Sociology, Vol. X, pp. 750-765. 
 
 14 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 meaning the interaction of individuals. 1 The conception of 
 society which we have arrived at, therefore, is not very dif- 
 ferent from that which Comte had, for in his mind society 
 was practically humanity viewed from the standpoint of 
 reciprocal relations. 2 The chief difference between the con- 
 ception which we have reached by analysis and Comte 's con- 
 ception is that he approaches the matter from the stand- 
 point of the species while we have approached it from the 
 standpoint of the individual. Accepting this conception and 
 assuming the essentially psychical nature of the relation- 
 ships, we might substitute in our definition of sociology the 
 phrase " reciprocal relations," which would give us then 
 the following : Sociology is the science of the origin, develop- 
 ment, structure, and function of the reciprocal relations of 
 individuals. 
 
 It is the interrelations themselves, however, not their 
 products, which the sociologist is primarily interested in. 
 What he investigates is not so much the organizations and 
 institutions of society as the associational processes which 
 lie back of these, the processes of individual interaction 
 which constitute them. 3 These processes of individual inter- 
 action, it is manifest, must have both biological and psycho- 
 logical aspects. In explaining them, therefore, sociology, we 
 shall try to show, necessarily becomes a biology and psychol- 
 ogy of these associational processes. 
 
 Definition of " Social." — Much confusion has been in- 
 troduced into sociological discussions through the lax use of 
 the word " social."* On account of this, several writers 
 
 i Cf. Professor Small's definition of "society " ( General Sociol- 
 ogy, p. 405 ) : " That phase of the conditions of human life which 
 consists of inevitable action and reaction between many individuals." 
 
 2 Cf . Positive Philosophy, Book VI, Chap. Ill ; also Positive 
 Polity, Vol. I, pp. 263-70; Vol. II, Introduction. 
 
 3 See Professor Hayes's article, " Sociology a Study of Processes," 
 American Journal of Sociology, Vol. X, pp. 750-765. 
 
 ^ For a. critical discussion of the various conflicting uses of the 
 word social, see Waxweiler, Esquisse d'une Sociologie, pp. 68-71. 
 
 15 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 have proposed other adjectives, such as " societal " and 
 " societary " 1 to mean " of, or pertaining to, society" ; but 
 there is no good reason why the word ' ' social ' ' should not 
 be given in the social sciences the meaning which properly 
 belongs to it,, namely, " of, pertaining to, relating to, so- 
 ciety. ' ' In accordance with our definition of society, there- 
 fore, the word ' ' social ' ' should mean ' ' that which relates 
 to, pertains to, the interactions of individuals." In other 
 words, the social is that which involves the psychic inter- 
 action of two or more individuals, 2 Social phenomena are, 
 accordingly, as Professor Boss says in effect, " all phe- 
 nomena which we cannot explain without bringing in the 
 action of one individual upon another." 3 
 
 " Social," then, is a comprehensive term including the 
 economic, political, moral, religious, educational, and all 
 other phenomena arising from the interactions of individu- 
 als. The economic, political, etc., is not to be distinguished 
 from the social, save as one aspect or phase of the social. 
 Economic and political problems, for example, are at the 
 same time social problems; but not all social problems are 
 economic or political problems. Social problems are eco- 
 nomic, political, moral, religious, educational, etc., problems, 
 or problems which involve several or all of these aspects of 
 
 Waxweiler defines " social " as follows : " All that concerns the 
 actions and reactions effectively exercised by individuals in the 
 relations which they have among themselves without distinction 
 of sex." 
 
 i Cf. Sumner, Folkways, passim; also article by Small, Annals 
 American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. V, p. 120. 
 
 2 In harmony with this, though somewhat broader, is Professor 
 Cooley's definition of the word social. He says (Human Nature and 
 the Social Order, p. 4 ) : "In its largest sense it denotes that which 
 pertains to the collective aspect of humanity." Very different, on 
 the other hand, is Gumplowicz's conception (Outlines of Sociology, 
 p. 83 ) : " By social phenomena we mean the phenomena which appear 
 through the operation of groups and aggregates of men on one 
 another." 
 
 3 Foundations of Sociology, p. 7. 
 
 16 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 the social life — problems, in other words, which are wider 
 and deeper than any single phase of society. It is this latter 
 class of problems which particularly deserve to be spoken 
 of as sociological problems ; but these we shall discuss later. 
 
 Unfortunately the word social is not used popularly in 
 the striet scientific way in which we have defined it, but is 
 used with a variety of loose meanings attached to it. It is 
 especially used as nearly synonymous with the word " so- 
 ciable." The scientific student of society, however, has 
 little excuse for using the word in a loose sense. He can 
 always find some other word, or make use of some qualify- 
 ing phrase, when it is necessary to express a narrower idea 
 than that which logically attaches itself to the word 
 " social " from its connection with the term " society." 
 
 Animal Societies. — It will be noticed that in our defini- 
 tions of sociology, society, and social, we have avoided the 
 use of the words " man," " human being," " humanity," 
 and the like. This is because there are animal groups from 
 which we cannot well withhold the name of " societies," 
 because they have all the characteristics of societies as we 
 have described them. Such, for example, are the groups 
 formed by the so-called ' ' social insects, ' ' the ants, bees, and 
 wasps, 1 and the groups formed by many birds and mam- 
 mals. 2 Objectively and even subjectively, so far as we can 
 see, these groups conform to the definition of society which 
 we have accepted. 3 While there are vast differences between 
 
 i See Lubbock's Ants, Bees, and Wasps; McCook's Ant Communi- 
 ties; Wheeler, Ants, their Structure, Development, and Behavior. 
 
 2 See Kropotkin's Mutual Aid a Factor of Evolution. 
 
 3 Of course, this is assuming that these animal forms have some 
 degree of mental life, and that their mentality influences in some 
 degree their conduct and interrelations. Curiously enough, Pro- 
 fessor Baldwin seems to assume that in animal groups " the essen- 
 tial bond is lacking, the mental oond" (Individual and Society, 
 p. 30). This is because he limits the conception of a mental bond 
 to " common thought and the common apprehension of personality." 
 Hence, according to Baldwin, animal groups never constitute true 
 
 17 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 these animal societies and human societies, these differences 
 are specific, and not generic. 1 The theory of evolution has 
 broken down the wall which so long separated the human 
 from the animal world, and no longer permits us to regard 
 human nature and human interrelations as something alto- 
 gether peculiar and isolated. It is, in fact, impossible to 
 define society in such a way as to include all human groups 
 and only human groups, without resort to some arbitrary 
 procedure. The fact of society is wider, then, than the fact 
 of humanity. 
 
 The question arises, therefore, whether sociology should 
 take account of animal groups as well as of human groups. 
 If we assume the evolution of the human from the subhuman 
 there can be only one answer to this question: sociology 
 must take animal societies into account. Just as psychology 
 cannot stop with the study of the human mind, but goes on 
 to study the manifestations of mental life even in the lowest 
 animal forms in order to throw light upon the nature of 
 mind; so sociology cannot stop with the study of human 
 interactions, but must go on to study the lowest type of psy- 
 chical interactions found among animal forms, in order to 
 throw light upon the nature of society. 2 
 
 But it must be admitted that the psychologist's interest 
 in the mental life of animals is prompted by his desire to 
 explain the mental life of man. So, too, the sociologist's in- 
 
 societies. (See also his Social and Ethical Interpretations in Men- 
 tal Development, Fourth Edition, pp. 503, 524.) 
 
 i For discussion of the differences between animal and human 
 societies, see Chapter VII. What is meant here by saying that the 
 differences are specific, not generic, is that the differences are quan- 
 titative, not qualitative. Cf. Waxweiler, Esquisse d'une Sociologie, 
 pp. 82-84. An excellent discussion of some main differences of ani- 
 mal from human societies can be found in Hobhouse, Mind in Evo- 
 lution, pp. 277, 307, 339-41. 
 
 2 For demonstration that light can be thrown on human society 
 by the study oX animal association, see Espinas, Des Socidtds 
 Animalcs. 
 
 18 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 terest in animal societies is prompted solely by his desire 
 to explain human societies. In each case, the human remains 
 the center of interest. But because we believe that we can- 
 not understand a thing unless we understand it in its gene- 
 sis, and because we believe, furthermore, that the origin of 
 nearly all important elements in human nature is to be 
 found below the human line, we are forced to study animal 
 mental and social life in order to understand fully the social 
 life of man. Sociology is, therefore, essentially a human 
 science; and its comparative chapters form but a brief in- 
 troduction to its treatment of human problems. It would 
 be substantially correct to define sociology wholly in human 
 terms, were it not that some sociologists have denied that 
 sociology has any comparative chapters ; * that animal asso- 
 ciation can throw any light upon human association. 2 The 
 elementary considerations on modern scientific method which 
 we have here introduced are sufficient to refute this posi- 
 tion ; and to establish the proposition that sociology, though 
 distinctively a human science, must take into account at 
 every step the facts of the animal life below man. 
 
 iAs an example, see Ward, Outlines of Sociology, p. 92; also 
 Pure Sociology, p. 29. The motive for such denial in Ward's case, 
 as in nearly all such cases, is his intellectualistic conception of 
 human society. Ward asserts : " It [human society] is essentially, 
 rational and artificial, while animal association is essentially in- 
 stinctive and natural." 
 
 2 Petrucci, in his Origine PolyphyUtique, Somotypie et non- 
 Comparability directe des Socie'tis Animales, is one of the most 
 recent writers to deny that animal societies can throw light on 
 human societies. This idea he repeats in his Les Origines Naturelles 
 de la Proprie'te', even going so far as to deny (p. 226) that social 
 evolution has any sort of connection with organic evolution! But 
 as my colleague, Professor Maurice Parmelee, shows (in the final 
 chapters of a work on The Science of Human Behavior, soon to be 
 published) both human societies and animal societies have been 
 created by the same life forces, and that therefore it is possible to 
 reason from the general facts in animal association to human asso- 
 ciation, provided sufficient precautions are taken. See Chapter VII. 
 3 19 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE SUBJECT-MATTER AND PROBLEMS OP SOCIOLOGY 
 
 The Subject-Matter of Sociology. — Considerable contro- 
 versy has existed over the question as to whether sociology 
 has an independent subject-matter or not. It is evident 
 from our definition of sociology, however, that its subject- 
 matter is the same as that of all the social sciences. The 
 only difference between the subject-matter of sociology and 
 a special social science, like economics, for example, is that 
 sociology takes the whole field of social phenomena for its 
 subject-matter while economics takes only one section or 
 phase of social phenomena, namely, the industrial phase. In 
 the same way, biology or physics has no distinctive subject- 
 matter apart from the specialisms which exist under them. 
 Sociology, then, like all general sciences, has no distinctive 
 subject-matter of its own. This is true, however, more or 
 less of all sciences. The distinction between the sciences is 
 not one of subject-matter, but of problems. The same sub- 
 ject-matter may be investigated by several sciences, but 
 always from different points of view, that is, with reference 
 to different problems. Thus a movement of the human body 
 may be investigated with reference to certain problems by 
 the physiologist, and with reference to quite different prob- 
 lems by the psychologist. The truth is that there are no 
 hard and fast lines in nature upon which to base the di- 
 visions between the sciences. The present divisions have 
 grown up as a result of the division of labor between scien- 
 tific investigators and are largely matters of convenience. 
 That is, they are largely teleological divisions, based upon 
 
 20 
 
SUBJECT-MATTER AND PROBLEMS 
 
 the different problems before the minds of different inves- 
 tigators. 
 
 The subject-matter of sociology, is, then, social phenom- 
 ena, in the broad sense in which that term has just been 
 denned ; or as Professor Small has somewhat more happily 
 phrased it, ' ' the process of human association. ' ' 1 The 
 sociologist considers this process as a whole, in its totality, 
 and especially in its more general and fundamental aspects ; 
 while the students of the special social sciences study rela- 
 tively special products and phases of the same process. Thus 
 the same objective social fact, say the French Revolution, 
 may serve as scientific material for the sociologist, the econo- 
 mist, the political scientist, and many other investigators. 
 
 The Unit of Investigation in Sociology is a topic which 
 has occasioned considerable discussion among sociologists. 
 It is not apparent, however, that a science must have but one 
 unit of investigation, 2 and the outcome of the discussion has 
 been to indicate a number of units of investigation which 
 may be used. Among the more important of these are : (1) 
 the socius, or associated individual, the member of society, 
 the unit out of which all the simpler social groups are com- 
 posed; (2) the group of associated individuals, whether the 
 groups are natural, genetic groups, or artificial, functional 
 groups; (3) the institution, which we may here define as 
 a grouping or relation of individuals that is accepted, usu- 
 ally expressly sanctioned, by a society. 
 
 It is evident that all of these units, and many more, may 
 be employed by the sociologist in investigating social organi- 
 zation and evolution. The object of the sociologist's atten- 
 tion is always, however, as Professor Hayes has demon- 
 strated, the associational process, that is, the psychical inter- 
 actions of individuals. 3 Some phase of the social process is, 
 
 i General Sociology, Chap. I. 
 
 2 Cf. Ross, Foundations of Sociology, pp. 85-99 ; also Giddings, 
 Elements of Sociology, pp. 9-11. 
 
 3 See American Journal of Sociology, Vol. X, pp. 750-765. 
 
 21 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 then, always the real unit of sociological investigation. It 
 may be communication, suggestion, imitation, competition, 
 cooperation, or any one of the many minor processes which- 
 go to make up the whole process of social organization and 
 evolution. It is these 'processes of individual interaction 
 and their many complications which the sociologist investi- 
 gates and is bent on explaining. As soon as he shifts his 
 attention from the interactions between individuals to the 
 individual himself, he is no longer a sociologist, but a psy- 
 chologist or a biologist, for the object of his attention is 
 then either the states of consciousness of the individual or 
 his physical characteristics. The soeius can be a " unit of 
 investigation " in sociology only in so far as he is consid- 
 ered a functional element in the associational process. So 
 far as there is a concrete object of the sociologist's attention, 
 it is the group of associated individuals. 
 
 The Problems of Sociology. — Disregarding the prelimi- 
 nary methodological problems of the science, which are dis- 
 cussed in the first five chapters of this book, the problems 
 of pure sociology fall into two great classes: 1 (1) static 
 problems, or problems of social organization and of social 
 functioning; (2) dynamic problems, or problems of social 
 origin and of social development. 
 
 (1) The static problems of sociology are problems of the 
 coordination of the activities of individuals, and so of the 
 relations of individuals to one another, and to groups, and 
 of groups to one another. They may be divided, as has been 
 already implied, into problems of the organization of the in- 
 
 i Other classifications of sociological problems are, of course, pos- 
 sible;, and may be easily reconciled with the classification into 
 "static" and "dynamic" (possibly "descriptive" and "genetic" 
 would be better words); as, e.g., the classification into biological 
 and psychological problems. A complete enumeration of sociological 
 problems is not attempted in this section. Many so-called sociolog- 
 ical problems (as those in social ethics) are, of course, not problems 
 in pure sociology at all. 
 
 22 
 
SUBJECT-MATTER AND PROBLEMS 
 
 terreiations of individuals, and problems of the functioning 
 of these interrelations ; in other words, into problems of the 
 structure and functions of the forms of association. From 
 a psychological point of view, all these problems reduce 
 themselves to the problem of the types of interaction found 
 among the individuals of a given group under given circum- 
 stances. They are, then, problems of a hypothetically sta- 
 tionary society, such as arise from studying society in cross- 
 section, as it were, when no question as to changes in society 
 is raised. For this reason, Comte called this aspect of soci- 
 ology " social statics." 
 
 As examples of problems of social organization, we 
 might take such questions as the various forms or modes of 
 association ; the various kinds of social groups ; their classi- 
 fication ; the nature of the forces that act in social organiza- 
 tion ; the influence of various aspects of human nature upon 
 social organization; the influence of physical factors (stim- 
 uli) upon social organization; the nature of social organi- 
 zation. 
 
 As examples of problems of social functioning, on the 
 other hand, we might take such questions as how individuals 
 act in groups or cooperate; how ideals, standards, public 
 sentiment, and the like, shape social activities; how the 
 group modifies or controls the individual; and how the 
 individual modifies his group; how certain forms of asso- 
 ciation influence social activity. 
 
 These are but illustrations of the problems that may 
 arise when no question as to change in the type of social 
 structure or function is raised. Other illustrations will eas- 
 ily suggest themselves to the student. 
 
 (2) The dynamic problems of sociology are problems of 
 the changes in the type of social organization and function- 
 ing; that is, in the type of individual interactions. They 
 may be collectively called problems of social evolution, using 
 that phrase to cover social genesis as well as orderly social 
 changes. Under this head come then, the important prob- 
 
 23 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 lems of the origin of society in general— that of association 
 among animals — and of human society in particular, and of 
 the specific forms of association. While the genesis of par- 
 ticular human institutions, such as government, religion, 
 property, and the like, may be considered as belonging to 
 the special sciences which specifically consider these institu- 
 tions, yet the genesis of the forms of association which give 
 rise to these institutions must be considered a problem in 
 sociology. 
 
 Aside from these problems of social origin, there are the 
 problems of social evolution in the narrow sense — the causes 
 of progressive and retrogressive changes in social organiza- 
 tion. There is a sense, to be sure, in which the problem of 
 social progress may be considered a problem in social ethics ; 
 that is, so far as the problem is one of determining a social 
 ideal. But, in a deeper sense, the problem of social progress 
 belongs to sociology. 1 Assuming a given social ideal, then 
 the question of the causes or factors in social progress is 
 purely a sociological question. However, many sociologists 
 use the phrase " social progress " in an entirely relative 
 sense, meaning thereby any advancement toward a higher, 
 
 i It may be admitted that the problem of progress, using the 
 word in its usual sense, is not a problem in " pure " science. The 
 very word has a practical outlook. If sociology were to remain 
 rigidly a pure science, it could only speak of social change, as Ross 
 maintains it should do (cf. Foundations of Sociology, pp. 180-89), 
 and not of progressive and retrogressive changes. However, no sci- 
 ence is " pure " in this sense. All the positive sciences have a for- 
 ward and a practical outlook; and surely sociology need not fear 
 to have such an outlook! All the leaders of sociological thought 
 from Comte down (including Professor Ross!) show very clearly in 
 their writings that their main interest is in the theory of progress. 
 While the theory of social evolution must be regarded as the main 
 problem of pure sociology, yet this very statement implies that in 
 so far as sociology has a practical outlook, its chief purpose is to 
 develop a theory of social progress (the constructive aspect of the 
 theory of social evolution). See Chapter XVIII of this book; cf. 
 also Ward, Dynamic Sociology, Preface. 
 
 24 
 
SUBJECT-MATTER AND PROBLEMS 
 
 more complex type of social organization — higher that is, in 
 the sense of better adapted for survival. The problem of 
 the causes of social progress in this sense is manifestly soci- 
 ological. So also the negative aspect of this problem, the 
 causes of social decline or degeneration, that is, of reversion 
 to lower and simpler forms of social organization. These 
 two problems are perhaps the problems of chief human in- 
 terest in sociology, the former being, of course, the more 
 important of the two. The problem of social progress may, 
 therefore, be said to be the most important problem of 
 sociology and the one to which all other problems lead up. 
 Indeed, the chief purpose of sociology may be said to be 
 to develop a scientific theory of social progress. 1 
 
 Of course, many other problems are included in, or grow 
 out. of, these two chief problems of social evolution; thus 
 in formulating the conditions of progressive and retrogres- 
 sive social evolution, the sociologist necessarily must formu- 
 late the conditions under which certain types of society 
 emerge and develop ; and so also the conditions of social sur- 
 vival, both in general and for particular types of social 
 organization. The problem of the conditions of social sur- 
 vival is, however, evidently the same as the problem of the 
 causes of social progress and decline. 
 
 The study of social evolution, then — that is, of social 
 changes of all sorts, from those of fashions to great indus- 
 trial and political revolutions — is the vital part of sociology. 
 Social evolution, moreover, in its different aspects consti- 
 tutes one large problem and that the central problem of 
 sociology, just as organic evolution in general furnishes the 
 central problem of biology — the problem which differenti- 
 ates that science from the special biological sciences and 
 justifies its existence as a science — so social evolution fur- 
 nishes the central problem of sociology. 
 
 i Cf . Carver's conclusion (Sociology and Social Progress, p. 7) : 
 "The fundamental task of the sociologist is to furnish a theory of 
 social progress." 
 
 25 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 The problems of change — development — in society are 
 evidently problems of movement, hence Comte proposed that 
 this aspect of sociology should be called social dynamics, as 
 " dynamics " in his time was that part of physics which 
 dealt with the laws of motion. Some recent sociologists have 
 called this division of sociology genetic sociology, and some 
 simply social evolution. 1 
 
 Static and Dynamic Sociology.— Shall we, then, preserve 
 the old distinction between static and dynamic sociology? 
 It is worthy of note that even Comte, who made this distinc- 
 tion, said that he made it merely for purposes of scientific 
 analysis, and that it must not be considered as involving 
 ' ' any real separation of the science into two parts. ' ' 2 The 
 truth is that no problem in social organization can be deeply 
 investigated without running into the problem of social evo- 
 lution. "We cannot study social structure without being led 
 insensibly into questions of origin and development ; on the 
 other hand, we cannot study social evolution without consid- 
 ering the structure affected. Complete sociological theory, 
 therefore, does not admit of division into static and dynamic 
 portions. The distinction is merely one of problems, and 
 arises through scientific analysis. It is a useful distinction 
 in sociological investigations and for pedagogical purposes, 
 but it cannot be maintained in a systematic presentation of 
 sociological theory, as all recent sociological writers have 
 discovered. 
 
 Moreover, the terms " static " and " dynamic " are bor- 
 rowed from physics, and are not particularly happy terms 
 when used to describe social processes. Terms borrowed 
 
 i The student would do well to compare the above brief outline 
 of the main problems of sociology with Ratzenhofer's paper on " The 
 Problems of Sociology " in the American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 
 X, pp. 177-188. Of the thirteen problems which Ratzenhofer dis- 
 cusses, many, in the opinion of the writer, are problems of the 
 special social sciences, while some are problems in philosophy. 
 
 2 Positive Philosophy, Bk. VI, Chap. III. 
 
 26 
 
SUBJECT-MATTER AND PROBLEMS 
 
 from the biological sciences are coming, in part, to replace 
 these borrowed from physical science in recent sociological 
 discussions. Such terms as social morphology and social 
 physiology are used instead of social statics, and genetic soci- 
 ology instead of social dynamics. But it must be admitted 
 that these new terms are scarcely more happy than those 
 borrowed from physical science; indeed, in some respects 
 they fail to convey the meaning as clearly as the older terms. 
 There is, after all, little in names, provided they are used 
 with clear and definite connotations. The adjectives 
 " static " and " dynamic " are often convenient in the 
 social sciences and there can be no great objection to their 
 use, since they have been adopted into the vocabulary of 
 nearly all the sciences. We shall continue to speak of the 
 " static " and " dynamic " aspects of sociology, therefore, 
 without implying, on the one hand, any separation of the 
 science into two parts, and, on the other hand, any close 
 analogy between physical and social conditions and changes. 
 The Relation of Sociology to Social Description. — Some 
 sociologists have created another division of sociology which 
 they term descriptive sociology, made up of descriptions of 
 social activities and institutions. It is true that all science 
 presupposes descriptive material. Thus, political science 
 presupposes the description of actual government ; economics 
 the description of commerce and industry; biology the de- 
 scriptive material which we term natural history. But it is 
 true also that mere description is never science in the stricter 
 sense of the word. Science, in the stricter sense, is always 
 explanatory; it is a higher generalization, revealing laws, 
 causes and principles. As Professor Small says, " Like all 
 genuine science, sociology is not interested in facts as such. 
 It is interested only in relations, meanings, valuations, in 
 which facts reappear in essentials. ' ' 1 
 
 1 General Sociology, p. 15; cf. also Comte's statement (Positive 
 Philosophy, Bk. VI, Chap. XIII) : " Science is made up of laws, 
 and not of facts." 
 
 27 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 Moreover, another difficulty in creating a descriptive 
 division in sociology which shall be recognized, is the fact 
 that the field of social description is already covered by 
 three well-recognized departments of knowledge, namely, 
 ethnography, demography and history; ethnography, de- 
 scribing the savage, barbarous and semicivilized peoples; 
 demography, describing the contemporaneous societies of 
 civilized peoples; and history, describing the past events 
 among the civilized. It has been somewhat of a puzzle with 
 which of these three descriptive sociology should be identi- 
 fied. Spencer, in a famous passage, 1 identified descriptive 
 sociology with history— as it ought to be written. Most 
 other sociologists have tended to identify it with demog- 
 raphy; while some have not hesitated to assume that the 
 only social description worthy of attention by the sociologist 
 was to be found in ethnography. 2 It is evident, however, 
 that the descriptive material of which the sociologist must 
 make use is to be found in all three of the above disciplines. 
 
 It would seem that the best way out of the difficulty is 
 to drop the use of the term " descriptive sociology," just 
 as we do not speak of a " descriptive biology." Its use only 
 adds to the confusion already existing as to the relation of 
 sociology to the above three disciplines. There can be no 
 objection, however, to using the term to designate special 
 organizations of descriptive material from the above sources 
 for sociological purposes. This, in effect, is what Spencer 
 attempted to do in his encyclopedic work entitled Descrip- 
 tive Sociology. 
 
 i Study of Sociology, Preface to American edition, p. iv. 
 
 2 Apparently Dr. Haddon would identify sociology with ethnology 
 or ethnography. (See his article on "Ethnology: Its Scope and 
 Problems," in Proceedings of the Congress of Arts and Science, 
 St. Louis, 1904, Vol. V.) For a discussion of the relations of eth- 
 nography and sociology, see Achelis, Soziologie, p. 38; also Stein- 
 metz's article, "Die Bedeutung der Ethnologie fur Soziologie," in 
 Vierteljahrschrift fiir viissenscliaftliche Philosophie und Sociologie, 
 Vol. XXVI. 
 
 28 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE RELATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY TO OTHEE SCIENCES 
 
 The Relation of Sociology to the Special Social Sciences. — 
 The relation of sociology to the special social sciences, eco- 
 nomics, politics, ethics, and the like, has often been com- 
 pared to the relation of a trunk of a tree to its branches. 
 Perhaps, as Professor Ross has suggested, 1 the tree in ques- 
 tion should be thought of as a banyan tree, as many of these 
 sciences have independent roots in psychology and biology. 
 All of these sciences, however, derive their significance from 
 the fact that they deal with some phase of human interac- 
 tions; and they are, therefore, properly styled the special 
 social sciences. The economics, the morality, the religion of 
 a perfectly isolated being, if such could be thought of, would 
 be something far different from the things we know under 
 those names in human society. As was said above, the 
 special social sciences deal with special phases or aspects of 
 the social life; and they do this by a process of scientific 
 abstraction, that is, by studying these phases as more or 
 less separate, or abstracted from the total social life. They 
 deal with problems which are relatively specific and con- 
 crete, concerning usually only one section or aspect of the 
 social process. Their generalizations are, therefore, rela- 
 tively partial and incomplete. Sociology, on the other hand, 
 tries to reach generalizations of a higher order, which pre- 
 sent a more general and fundamental view of the social 
 reality. The social problems which are of a general nature, 
 
 i Foundations of Sociology, p. 27. 
 29 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 therefore, that is, those which pertain' to the social process 
 as a whole, are left necessarily to sociology. What these 
 problems are has already been pointed out. 
 
 The special social sciences are not logically competent to 
 deal with these general social problems, as their basis of in- 
 duction is not sufficiently wide. This fact has not always 
 been sufficiently appreciated by workers in these sciences, 
 and the result has been many one-sided theories of the social 
 life. In constructing a theory of social progress, an econo- 
 mist, for example, would naturally give undue prominence 
 to economic factors, and perhaps even subordinate other 
 factors altogether. This Karl Marx and other students of 
 economic conditions have actually done. It was, in part, as 
 a protest against such ' ' fractional ' ' views of the social life 
 that sociology came into existence. The special social 
 sciences, when pursued by themselves, necessarily furnish 
 only fractional views of the social life ; they must find their 
 logical completion, in a general science of society, which 
 shall furnish a complete view of social organization and 
 evolution. 
 
 There has been much debate as to whether sociology 
 should be regarded as a synthesis of the special social 
 sciences or as a science fundamental to these. The ques- 
 tion could have arisen only through confusion of the logical 
 relations between problems. Sociology may be regarded 
 either as a synthesis of the special social sciences or as a 
 science fundamental to these. All the general sciences are 
 synthetic in method and at the same time fundamental in 
 character. Their fundamental character is a result of the 
 wideness of their syntheses. Their generalizations are not 
 only much wider than those attempted by the special 
 sciences, but, because they are wider, they are also much 
 deeper. Now, sociology, as a theory of social organization 
 on the one hand, and of social evolution on the other, at- 
 tempts generalizations much wider than the special social 
 sciences ; and for that very reason its generalizations are of 
 
 30 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 a fundamental character. But it is only through the syn- 
 thesis — the seeing together — of social phenomena that such 
 fundamental generalizations can be effected. Hence, sociol- 
 ogy is correctly conceived as, in many of its aspects, a syn- 
 thesis of the special social sciences. But we mean by this, 
 not a summing-up of the special social sciences, but rather 
 an all-sided generalization of the social process. Hence, 
 sociology is the fundamental science of the social life, the 
 basis of the social sciences as well as their logical completion. 
 The relation of sociology in its synthetic aspects to the 
 special social sciences may, perhaps, be illustrated by the 
 relation of general philosophy, as a scientia scientiarum, to 
 all the sciences. 1 Modern philosophy is not indifferent to 
 the sciences, but is, in one sense, to be regarded as a result 
 of the synthesis of all of them. The several sciences, dealing 
 as they do each with but narrow segments of reality, neces- 
 sarily present but partial views of the universe ; to philoso- 
 phy is left the task of combining these partial views into 
 a complete and ultimate picture of the universal reality. To 
 philosophy, therefore, are left the ultimate and universal 
 problems, such as the nature of mind and matter, the ulti- 
 mate relations between these two, the nature of causation, 
 etc. In this sense, the relation of philosophy to the several 
 sciences is similar to the relation of sociology to the special 
 social sciences. The matter might be, perhaps, better illus- 
 trated by considering the relation of any general science to 
 the special sciences under it. Thus biology may be consid- 
 ered a synthesis of all the biological sciences, and to it are 
 turned over the general problems of organic life, such as 
 the origin and evolution of species, the nature of nutrition 
 and reproduction, the causes of variation, the theory of 
 heredity, and the like. While these illustrations are imper- 
 fect, it is manifest that the relation of sociology to the spe- 
 cial social sciences must be of the same general character 
 
 i Cf. Flint, Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum, pp. 1-63. 
 
 31 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 as the relation of any general science to the special sciences 
 under it. 
 
 The distinction between sociology and the special social 
 sciences, it may be well to repeat, is only a matter of con- 
 venience based upon the division of labor among scientific 
 workers. The distinction, in other words, as has already 
 been pointed out, is purely one of problems. The sociologist 
 deals with the more general and fundamental problems of 
 the social life, such as the theory of social organization on 
 the one hand, and the theory of social evolution on the 
 other; while the special social sciences deal with relatively 
 specific or concrete problems which primarily concern only 
 special aspects or phases of the social life. 
 
 It must be evident from all that has been said that the 
 practical relations between students of sociology and stu- 
 dents of the special social sciences should be those of sym- 
 pathetic and helpful cooperation. The sociologist needs to 
 know at every point in his work the results of the special 
 social sciences, and, on the other hand, in order that he may 
 have a proper point of view, a proper perspective, the 
 worker in the special social sciences must be well grounded 
 in sociology. 
 
 The dangers of isolation of the special social sciences 
 from sociology, and of sociology from these sciences, are 
 very grave dangers. Over-specialization in any one social 
 science must be discouraged if one-sided views of the social 
 life are not to prevail. Human life is a unity, and it must 
 be studied in all of its aspects, on all of its sides, if a true 
 conception of it is to be attained. Accordingly, we shall em- 
 phasize the close interdependence of the several social 
 sciences with sociology and of sociology with these sciences 
 in discussing the relations of sociology with each of them. 
 We shall note briefly the more important of these sciences 
 and the close interrelations between them and sociology. 
 
 1. Economics. — First among the special social sciences 
 must be placed economics. This is primary among them 
 
 32 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 because it deals with that phase of the social life which is 
 concerned with the production and distribution of the ma- 
 terial means of subsistence. To be more exact, it is " the 
 science of those social phenomena to which the wealth- 
 getting and the wealth-using activity of man gives rise ' ' j 1 
 or in the language of another authority, it " treats of 
 the commercial and industrial activities of men from the 
 standpoint of values and markets. " 2 It is evident, which- 
 ever of these definitions one adopts, that economics deals 
 with a most fundamental phase of man's activity as a social 
 being — the problems connected with the production and 
 distribution of wealth. Its importance, therefore, in un- 
 derstanding the total social life, to the sociologist, cannot 
 be too highly estimated. 
 
 On the other hand, it is evident that the wealth-getting 
 and wealth-using activities of man are strictly an outgrowth 
 of his social life and that economics as a science of industry, 
 must rest upon sociology; for the fact which lies back of 
 human industry is human association. The mistake has been 
 made in the past, at times, of supposing that economics dealt 
 with the most fundamental social phenomena, and even at 
 times economists have spoken of their science as alone suf- 
 ficient to explain all social phenomena. It cannot be ad- 
 mitted, however, that we can explain social organization in 
 general, or social progress, in terms of economic develop- 
 ment. A theory of progress, for example, in which the sole 
 causes of social progress were found in economic conditions 
 would neglect political, religious, educational, and many 
 other conditions. Only a very one-sided theory of society 
 can be built upon such a basis. 3 The sphere of economics is 
 
 1 Ely, Outlines of Economies, p. 82. 
 
 2 Davenport, Outlines of Economic Theory, p. 2. 
 
 »Cf. Carver's statement {Sociology and Social Progress, p. 3) : 
 "The chief danger is that if sociology is to be developed from the 
 economic standpoint, and by an expansion of the method of econom- 
 ics, the purely economic factors will be overemphasized." Never- 
 
 33 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 to explain the commercial and industrial activities of man 
 from the standpoint of values and markets, and not to at- 
 tempt to become a general science dealing with social evolu- 
 tion. This is now recognized by practically all economists 
 of standing, and the only question which remains is whether 
 economics is independent of sociology or whether it rests 
 upon sociology. 
 
 That economics does rest upon sociology is shown by 
 many considerations. The chief problem of theoretical eco- 
 nomics is the problem of economic value. But economic 
 value is but one sort of value which is recognized in society, 
 moral and aasthetic values being other examples of the valu- 
 ing process ; and all values must express the collective judg- 
 ment of some human group or other. The problem of eco- 
 nomic value, in other words, reduces itself to a problem in 
 social psychology ;* and when this is said it is equivalent to 
 making economics dependent upon sociology. 
 
 Again, industrial organization and industrial evolution 
 are but parts or phases of social organization and social 
 evolution in general, and it is safe to say that industry, both 
 in its organization and evolution, cannot be understood 
 apart from the general conditions, psychological and bio- 
 logical, which surround society. Again, many non-economic 
 forces continually obtrude themselves upon the student of 
 industrial conditions, such as custom, invention, imitation, 
 standards, ideas, and the like. 2 These are general social 
 forces which play throughout all phases of human life, and 
 
 theless, Professor Carver concludes (p. 7 ) , " sociology is merely an 
 expansion of the method of economics to include a study of many 
 factors in social development not ordinarily considered by the 
 economist " ! 
 
 i For a demonstration of the social nature of economic value, see 
 Dr. B. M. Anderson's Social Value. This book is, on the whole, the 
 ablest discussion of the sociological basis of theoretical economics 
 which has yet appeared. 
 
 2 Cf. Ross, Foundations of Sociology, pp. 29-40. 
 
 34 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 so show the dependence of industry upon society in general, 
 and therefore, of economics upon sociology. 
 
 All of this argues the importance of sociology, as a 
 science of social first principles, for economics as well as for 
 the other social sciences; in brief, that economics must be 
 grounded upon sociology. The economist, indeed, can less 
 afford to dispense with the guidance which the sociological 
 viewpoint can give him than the sociologist can afford to 
 dispense with the knowledge of facts and principles which 
 economics can furnish. Sociology is indispensable for eco- 
 nomics, and economics is indispensable for sociology, if both 
 are to attain the character of positive science. 
 
 2. Political Science. 1 — Among the oldest of the social 
 sciences is the science of politics, or government. It was 
 first systematized by Aristotle and down to the modern era 
 may be said to have been almost the sole recognized repre- 
 sentative of the social sciences. 2 Its relations with sociology 
 are most intimate; the state is not only the most imposing 
 social structure and the most visible manifestation of social 
 organization, but it may also be regarded as the ultimate and 
 highest form of human association. This, indeed, is exactly 
 Aristotle's view when he argues that the state is logically 
 prior to the individual and also to all other forms of asso- 
 ciation; for he recognizes that the family, the village, and 
 many other forms of association, may have existed chrono- 
 logically prior to the state, but they did not find their com- 
 pletion, or human society its ultimate form, until the state 
 united households and villages for the sake of complete liv- 
 ing. 3 The state must, therefore, be regarded as the last term 
 
 1 For a somewhat fuller discussion of the relations of sociology 
 and political science, see the writer's paper on "The Science of 
 Sociology,'' American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XV, pp. 105-110; 
 also Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 31, 32. 
 
 2 Ethics was not, of course, recognized as a social science in the 
 Middle Ages. 
 
 b Politics, Book I, 2. 
 
 4 35 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 in a long series of free associations, many of which may an- 
 tedate the state historically, but all of which find their com- 
 pletion only under that final expression of social organiza- 
 tion which we term the state. Hence the state is of direct 
 concern to the sociologist. 
 
 Nevertheless, there is little excuse for thinking that po- 
 litical science and sociology deal with the same problems or 
 that either science can supplant the other. The problems of 
 political science are the origin, nature, forms and functions 
 of the state and of government, the nature and location of 
 sovereignty, and the methods of administration. These 
 problems, which are well recognized as the chief problems 
 of political science by all political scientists of standing, are 
 evidently clearly distinct from the problems of sociology 
 which we have already pointed out. The concept of the 
 state is, therefore, clearly distinct from the concept of so- 
 ciety, and this political scientists, in general, recognize. 1 
 Society, that is, human association, is the fact which lies back 
 of the state. Many of the Eighteenth-Century theorists, for 
 example, proposed a contract theory of the state or govern- 
 ment, but distinctly disclaimed a contract theory of society 
 in general. 2 While the phenomenon of authority, or control, 
 is universal in all human groups, political science deals only 
 with the organized authority manifest in the state. 
 
 Now the phenomena of governmental authority and con- 
 trol, and of political organization, however important they 
 may be, are comparatively late developments in social evolu- 
 tion. Therefore, before authority and control as manifested 
 in the state can be understood, social organization and the 
 nature of society in general must be understood. Political 
 science, must depend, therefore, for its knowledge of the 
 
 i Cf. Willoughby, The Nature of the State, pp. 2, 3. 
 
 2 Locke ( Two Treatises of Government ) is a good example of this 
 type of contract theorist, who, while arguing that the state rests 
 upon contract, recognized that many forms of natural association 
 do not. 
 
 36 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 origins of authority and subordination, of social control, and 
 of the springs of political organization, upon the general 
 science which deals with the whole theory of society, that is, 
 sociology. 
 
 3. Jurisprudence. 1 — An important branch of political 
 science is jurisprudence. This is the science of law. Its 
 problems are the nature, genesis and historical development 
 of law. Now, law rests upon custom, that is, social habit. 
 It is not something apart from social organization, but 
 springs from the psychological nature of society. Formal 
 law is, indeed, the expression of organized public control of 
 social activities. It is for the sake of maintaining a given 
 social organization or social order that law exists. The civil 
 law and the criminal law of a nation may be considered the 
 two great props of its social order. Since it is impossible to 
 understand law in the abstract, or any given system of law, 
 without understanding the principles of social organization 
 which give rise to it, it is evident that sociology deals with 
 the foundations of law. 
 
 In its comparative sections, moreover, jurisprudence 
 brings together many facts concerning the laws, customs, 
 and institutions of different peoples. In order to interpret 
 these rightly, sociology is evidently essential. On the other 
 hand, such comparative jurisprudence has made in the past 
 very significant contributions to sociology itself. 
 
 Again, the legal codes of civilized peoples have been 
 built up very largely upon some theory of society. Unfor- 
 tunately, these theories have not always been sound. Much 
 of the legislation and legal theory of the Eighteenth Cen- 
 tury and of the early half of the Nineteenth Century was, 
 for example, founded upon what is known as " the contract 
 theory of society "—a theory long since discredited by social 
 science. In order to be able to criticise intelligently legal 
 
 i For a fuller discussion of the relations of sociology and juris- 
 prudence, see the -writer's article on "The Sociological Foundations 
 of Law," The Green Bag, October, 1910. 
 
 37 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 texts and legal codes, it is evident that the student of juris- 
 prudence or law must have a knowledge of sound, scientific 
 social theory. 
 
 It is evident, then, that political science and jurispru- 
 dence are both closely related to sociology. Government and 
 law are two of the most important aspects of human social 
 organization and evolution ; and they cannot be understood 
 without understanding the principles which underlie all so- 
 cial organization and evolution. On the other hand, these 
 aspects of human social life, because of their importance, 
 present problems of their own, and there can be no doubt 
 that they are legitimate fields for independent special 
 sciences. But they will achieve their best development, and 
 sociology will achieve its best development by a recognition 
 of mutual interdependence. 
 
 4. The Science of Religion. — By the science of religion 
 is meant, not theology, a metaphysical inquiry into the na- 
 ture and attributes of God ; but a study of the actual phe- 
 nomena of religious belief and practice among men. An 
 important section is called comparative religion. Its prob- 
 lems are the origin, nature, forms, and functions of both 
 religious beliefs and religious practices. To superficial 
 thought, religion may seem to be wholly - an individual mat- 
 ter. But close study has shown that nothing is so inextrica- 
 bly interwoven with the social life of man as religion. Not 
 only are the forms of religious belief and practice frequently 
 an outcome of a particular social organization or stage of 
 social evolution ; but every type of civilization seems to rest 
 upon a particular form of religious belief. Religious phe- 
 nomena are, then, social phenomena, 1 and the science of re- 
 
 i Among recent studies which have recognized the essentially 
 social nature of religion, may be mentioned Ames, Psychology of 
 Religious Experience ; King, The Development of Religion; and Pat- 
 ten, The Social Basis of Religion. One should also not forget one 
 of the earliest works to emphasize this point of view, Kidd's Social 
 Evolution. 
 
 38 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 ligion is a social science, though like all the other social 
 sciences it has independent roots in psychology. It is as yet 
 in a comparatively undeveloped and unsystematized con- 
 dition and its development must come through establishing 
 it definitely upon a sociological basis. On the other hand, 
 sociology needs the enrichment which will come from a sci- 
 entific study of religious phenomena from the social point 
 of view. 
 
 5. Ethics. 1 — The relations of ethics to sociology need 
 careful consideration, as those relations are more complex 
 than in the cases of the sciences which we have just consid- 
 ered. By ethics we here mean, not the metaphysics of mo- 
 rality, with which positive science as such can have nothing 
 to do ; but scientific ethics, a doctrine of morality based upon 
 the knowledge furnished by the established sciences. A 
 metaphysical inquiry into the nature of morality may or 
 may not be a necessary part of the science of ethics in its 
 final development ; that does not prevent our consideration 
 of the relation of those phases of ethical theory which rest 
 upon positive science to sociology, and this is the only prob- 
 lem which concerns us here. 
 
 The student will note that ethics, even in this sense, as 
 a positive science of morals, is a science of a different kind 
 from the sciences which we have just considered. All of 
 these latter have been pure sciences, describing and explain- 
 ing processes only. But ethics is a science of norms and 
 ideals; therefore, it may be called a normative science. 
 While ethics may have descriptive portions, these are sub- 
 
 i For a full statement of the writer's views regarding the rela- 
 tions of sociology and ethics, see his article on " The Sociological 
 Basis of Ethics," International Journal of Ethics, April, 1910. Cf. 
 also Professor Hoffding's article " On the Relation between Sociology 
 and Ethics," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. X, pp. 672-79. In 
 his Introductory Study of Ethics, Professor Fite discusses at length 
 the relations between ethics and social theory, thus indirectly the 
 relations between ethics and sociology. 
 
 39 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 ordinated to its normative portions, for its real problems 
 are normative ; that is, briefly put, the problem of ethics is 
 what ought to be in human life. 1 There can be no doubt 
 that ethics in the sense in which we have defined it is a social 
 science, although it is, perhaps, not strictly accurate to con- 
 ceive of it as a special social science ; rather it is the norma- 
 tive science lying beyond all of the special social sciences. 
 Because its problems are those of collective human welfare, 
 some eminent sociologists have considered it to be merely a 
 part of sociology. This was the position of Comte, who at 
 first gave no place to ethics among the sciences. Later, how- 
 ever, he recognized the relatively independent position of 
 ethics as a normative science, lying beyond the pure 
 sciences. 2 On the other hand, there have been many ethical 
 thinkers who have seen in sociology nothing but an exten- 
 sion of ethics. Ethics, they say, has a right to inquire into 
 all phases of human relationships in order to determine the 
 principles of right and wrong, and, in their opinion, soci- 
 ology is simply such an inquiry. Here we have the old fa- 
 miliar situation. One group of thinkers maintaining that 
 one science, in this case, ethics, has no right to exist because 
 its field can be covered by sociology, and another group 
 maintaining that sociology has no right to exist because its 
 field can be covered by other sciences, in this case, ethics. 
 As, »in all of these cases we shall find reasons for pronounc- 
 ing both of these extreme views radically wrong. Ethics is 
 an independent science because it has problems of its own, 
 such as the origin, nature, and validity of moral ideas and 
 ideals, norms of conduct, and the like. These problems are 
 distinct from those which we have already pointed out for 
 sociology. Ethics cannot be reduced, therefore, to a mere 
 
 i See Thilly, Introduction io Ethics, pp. 5-9; Mackenzie, Manual 
 of Ethics, pp. 1, 38; Hyslop, Elements of Ethics, pp. 4-7. 
 
 2 See his Positive Polity, Vol. II, Chap. VII (pp. 352-357 of 
 English translation) ; also Vol. Ill, Introduction (p. 4) and Chap. 
 I (pp. 40-42). 
 
 40 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 chapter in sociology, because its problems are sufficiently 
 distinct and important to constitute it a relatively inde- 
 pendent science; 1 nor, on the other hand, can sociology be 
 regarded as a mere extension of ethics because its problems 
 are not only distinct from, but fundamental to, those of 
 ethics. 
 
 Yet it is impossible to separate ethics from sociology or 
 sociology from ethics in any hard and fast way. It is im- 
 possible to study the various types of social organization and 
 the conditions under which they develop and survive or be- 
 come extinct, without indicating the superiority and infe- 
 riority of the various types. It is impossible, in other words, 
 to study social organization and evolution without indicating 
 advantageous and disadvantageous adjustments, tendencies 
 toward social survival or social extinction. In general, it is 
 impossible for the human mind to study social conditions 
 without perceiving maladjustments or possible economies not' 
 realized ; or to formulate a theory of social progress without 
 implications of social obligation. 2 This is not saying that 
 sociology is ethics or ethics sociology, but it is saying that a 
 system of ethics grows spontaneously out of a system of 
 sociology ; and that the attempt to exclude all ethical impli- 
 cations and judgments from sociology is not only futile and 
 childish, but undesirable. It is the business of sociology to 
 furnish a foundation for ethics ; hence it is desirable to rec- 
 ognize in sociology ethical implications. And such will be 
 frankly the practice of this book. 
 
 On the other hand, ethics cannot discuss the ideal for 
 human life, whether individual or social, without taking into 
 
 i After calling morals " the Master Science," Comte goes on to 
 say (Positive Polity, Vol. II, Chap. VII) : "The distinction between 
 Sociology and Morality [i.e., Ethics] is at bottom not less real and 
 not less useful than the distinction between Sociology and Biology.'' 
 
 2 It is on account of these psychological facts that certain sociol- 
 ogists have claimed that sociology is a normative as well as a pure 
 science. But what can normative sociology be but social ethics? 
 
 41 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 account all social knowledge. 1 If it is to be a science of 
 ' ' the good for man, ' ' it must build up its conception of the 
 good out of the tendencies and potencies of actual human 
 society. Moreover, there can be no application of ethical 
 principles to actual human life without involving again a 
 consideration of the principles of social organization and 
 evolution. All this is equivalent to saying that scientific eth- 
 ics must recognize sociology as one of its necessary founda- 
 tions ; but this is not saying that ethics does not rest, though 
 less immediately, like all the other social sciences, upon psy- 
 chology, nor is it denying that ethics has metaphysical pro- 
 jections which, however, as implied at the beginning, belong 
 rather to metaphysics than to scientific ethics. 2 
 
 What, then, is the exact relation of ethics as a science to 
 sociology 1 Before finally answering this question, it will be 
 well to recall that ethics is a normative science, that is, a 
 science of values and ideals. In character, then, it is mid- 
 way between a pure science and an applied science. All the 
 social sciences have implicit normative aspects, sociology, as 
 the biology and psychology of the collective life, being only 
 the general science which furnishes the basis for the synthe- 
 
 1 Cf. Cooley, Social Organization, Chap. II. 
 
 2 Much of the opposition of ethicists to the sociological point of 
 view in ethics undoubtedly comes from misunderstanding. They fail 
 to realize that sociology is essentially a psychological science; or 
 they confuse the sociological point of view with the historical 
 method. It should be unnecessary to add that the sociological point 
 of view in ethics is not necessarily opposed to the metaphysical 
 point of view. The sociological view of ethics is, of course, no recent 
 development. Comte in the Positive Polity, Spencer in his Prin- 
 ciples of Ethics, Leslie Stephen in his Science of Etliics, and many 
 others have sought to develop ethics more or less upon the basis 
 of sociology. In the case of Spencer, Stephen, and Ward, however, 
 the sociological point of view in ethics was badly confused with 
 utilitarianism or hedonism. This has added greatly to the mis- 
 understanding already existing. It may be suggested that sociolog- 
 ical ethics, so far from having any relations with hedonism, is essen- 
 tially an ethics of universal order. 
 
 42 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 sis of their implied norms and ideals. Now ethics takes 
 these norms and ideals, develops them, criticises them, and 
 harmonizes them. 1 Ethics, in its widest sense, therefore, 
 may be regarded as the normative section of the social 
 sciences, or rather, as we have already said, as the normative 
 science to which all of them lead up. In its narrowest sense, 
 as the principles of right conduct for the individual, scien- 
 tific ethics may be regarded as a synthesis of the normative 
 aspects of sociology, psychology, and biology ; but inasmuch 
 as the sociological comprehends the psychological and bio- 
 logical, it would be sufficiently accurate to say that indi- 
 vidual ethics is the normative aspect of sociology looked at 
 from the point of view of individual conduct ; while social 
 ethics would be the normative aspect of sociology looked at 
 from the point of view of collective activities. The various 
 special branches of social ethics, such as political ethics, in- 
 dustrial ethics, and the like rest, of course, upon the cor- 
 responding special social sciences as well as upon general 
 sociology. 
 
 Scientific ethics, then, presupposes a scientific sociology, 
 as Professor Small and others have clearly shown, 2 and in 
 large measure the development of the one must await the 
 development of the other. The independence of ethics from 
 sociology as a science, as in the case of all the other social 
 sciences, is a matter of methodological expediency, of the 
 division of labor, not of difference of subject-matter. The 
 various social sciences cannot explain what is and what has 
 been in human society without showing at least by implica- 
 tion, what ought to be. On the other hand, these sciences 
 are not complete until their normative implications have 
 been developed, criticised, and harmonized by a general 
 
 i It is, of course, not meant that norms and ideals are delivered 
 by the social sciences to ethics fully developed; rather they are 
 often mere implications in the social knowledge which those sciences 
 furnish. 
 
 2 General Sociology, pp. 674-96. 
 
 43 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 science of ethics ; in other words, they find their completion 
 in ethics. 1 The relations between ethics and the other social 
 sciences, are, then, relations of mutual interdependence, and 
 this is especially true of the relations of ethics and sociology. 
 The scientific moralist and the sociologist, should, therefore, 
 work hand in hand, for they are both working at the great 
 problem of human welfare, the one directly, the other indi- 
 rectly. 
 
 6. Education. 2 — The science of education, or pedagogy, 
 as it used to be called, is an applied science, that is, a science 
 immediately connected with a practical art. On the one 
 side, it is concerned with the development of the latent pow- 
 ers and capacities of the individual ; on the other, with the 
 adjustment of the individual to society, the initiation of the 
 individual into the social life. The science of education 
 thus has two sides — one psychological and the other socio- 
 logical; in other words, it is an application of psychology 
 and sociology. The psychological aspects of "educational 
 science have been sufficiently emphasized but it is only re- 
 cently that its sociological aspects have begun to receive at- 
 tention. It must be evident, however, that if education may 
 be regarded from one point of view, as the fitting of the 
 individual for full and complete membership in the social 
 life, it should proceed with full consciousness of what the 
 needs and requirements of the social life are. There 
 
 iCf. Comte's statement {Positive Policy, Vol. Ill, p. 41) : "Till 
 Moral Science is instituted, all branches of speculation, even Sociol- 
 ogy, using that term strictly, can be only preliminary." 
 
 2 For a fuller discussion of the bearing of sociology upon the 
 science of education, see the writer's article on " The Sociological 
 Basis of the Science of Education,'' Education, November, 1911. 
 Much of the recent work in education emphasizes the sociological 
 point of view. Cf., e.g., Bagley, The Educative Process, Chaps. I- 
 III; Graves, A History cf Education "before the Middle Ages, Chaps. 
 I, II; Monroe, Text-booh of the History of Education, Chap. XIII; 
 Pyle, Outlines of Educational Psychology, Chap. I. 
 
 44 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 can be no such thing as a scientific educational program 
 without an understanding of the first principles of the 
 social life. 
 
 Moreover, education should be not simply the develop- 
 ment and adjustment of the individual; it should aid in 
 social evolution, regenerate society by fitting the individual 
 for a higher type of social life than that at present achieved. 
 And to do this requires an insight into the principles of 
 social evolution as well as an understanding of human na- 
 ture. The science of education rests, therefore, equally upon 
 sociology and psychology. The educator, who would use 
 the educational system as a means of social progress should 
 have a profound knowledge of the principles of social organ- 
 ization and evolution; and even the humblest teacher who 
 comes to his task equipped with such knowledge would find 
 a significance and meaning in his work which he could 
 hardly otherwise obtain. 
 
 7. The applied social sciences. — Many sociologists speak 
 of an " applied sociology," but it is doubtful if there is 
 such a discipline, or division of sociology. As we have al- 
 ready noted, an applied science is one immediately connected 
 with some practical art. Now there are many arts dealing 
 directly with human social life; hence, sociology, like most 
 of the general sciences, serves as a basis, not for one, but for 
 many, applied sciences. Thus biology is the basis for those 
 applied sciences which are grouped together under the term 
 " the medical sciences." It is also largely the basis of the 
 applied sciences of agriculture and horticulture. But we 
 hardly ever speak of ' ' applied biology. ' ' There is scarcely 
 more propriety in speaking of applied sociology, though the 
 term might be justified (1) as a name for such an organiza- 
 tion of the principles of sociology as will show their prac- 
 tical bearing upon human life, which is the sense in which 
 Professor Ward uses it, 1 or (2) as a name for an organiza- 
 
 i In his Applied Sociology. 
 45 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 tion of all our knowledge of practical means and methods of 
 improving social conditions, for which Professor Henderson 
 has proposed the name of " social technology." 1 In our 
 opinion, however, it would be better if the term " applied 
 sociology ' ' were dropped altogether. 
 
 Besides education, among the more important applied 
 social sciences are philanthropy, social economics, and social 
 politics. The best organized of these is the science of philan- 
 thropy, 2 or charitology, as it is sometimes called. This deals 
 with the abnormal classes in society, that is, the dependent, 
 defective, and delinquent classes, their genesis, social treat- 
 ment and prevention. It has numerous subdivisions, one of 
 the most important being penology, which deals with the 
 social treatment of the criminal class. The science of phil- 
 anthropy is perhaps the best developed of any of the special 
 social sciences, resting as it does immediately upon a prac- 
 tical art, and, in its broadest sense, it has good grounds for 
 claiming to be the applied department of sociology. How- 
 ever this question may be decided, it is evident that the, rela- 
 tion of the science of philanthropy to sociology is very simi- 
 lar to the relation of the science of medicine to biology. 3 The 
 tendency to develop a science of philanthropy apart from 
 sociology, is, therefore, to be regretted; and the tendency 
 of some sociologists to ignore the work being done in the 
 field of scientific philanthropy is equally regrettable. Just 
 as many valuable contributions to biology have come 
 through the development of medical science and art; and 
 just as the development of biology has reacted to deepen 
 and broaden medical science; so similar results can be ex- 
 
 i " The Scope of Social Technology," American Journal of Sociol- 
 ogy, Vol. VI, pp. 465-86. 
 
 2 For a fuller discussion of the relations of sociology and scien- 
 tific philanthropy, see the writer's article on " Philanthropy and 
 Sociology,'' The Survey, June 4, 1910. 
 
 s Cf. Dr. Wines's article, Annals' of the American Academy of 
 Political and Social Science, Vol. XII, pp. 49-57. 
 
 46 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 peeted from the close cooperation of the sociologist and the 
 scientific social worker. 
 
 " Home economics. " or domestic science, is a good ex- 
 ample of the complexity of an applied social science. So 
 far as it deals with the practical problems of nutrition and 
 sanitation in the family group, it rests largely upon chem- 
 istry, physiology, bacteriology, and other physical sciences. 
 On the other hand, so far as it deals with the care of chil- 
 dren and the higher life of the family, it rests upon physi- 
 ology, the medical sciences, psychology and sociology. So- 
 ciology comes in, as in the applied social sciences generally, 
 to give a point of view and of approach. Certainly the 
 practical problems of the family life cannot be properly 
 viewed unless something is known of the origin and evolu- 
 tion of the family as a form of association ; and unless the 
 function of the family in the collective life of man is under- 
 stood. Sociology furnishes " home economics " therefore, 
 with its necessary theoretical background. 
 
 Social economics is a term which has lately been used to 
 cover the whole field of social betterment, and so as synony- 
 mous with philanthropy in the widest sense. Strictly, 
 however, it should be applied only to the betterment of 
 economic conditions, that is, to industrial betterment. In 
 this sense, it may be regarded as an application of sociology 
 and economics to a particular phase of the social life. 
 Social polities is the science and art of bettering social 
 conditions through the agency of the state or government. 
 It may be regarded as an application of sociology and 
 political science. 
 
 However the various applied social sciences may be de- 
 fined, it is evident that they overlap ; that they are closely 
 related to sociology and the other theoretical social sciences ; 
 and that they are of interest to the sociologist. 
 
 The Relation of Sociology to History. — There remain to 
 be considered the relations of sociology to one other body 
 of knowledge which concerns human society, and that is 
 
 47 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 history. History is a concrete, descriptive science of the 
 past of human society. Its problem is, " What was the 
 social reality in the past? " — that is, past events and their 
 connections. Sociology, on the other hand, as we have re- 
 peatedly noted, is an abstract, theoretical science of the 
 social life, 1 having as its problems the laws or principles of 
 social organization and evolution. It might seem from this 
 that history is the descriptive material which sociology 
 presupposes ; and as we have already seen, some sociologists, 
 notably Spencer, would make history synonymous with de- 
 scriptive sociology. "We are now speaking, of course, of 
 written history, history in the subjective sense. But to un- 
 derstand the relations of sociology to history in this sense, 
 one must first understand the relation of sociology to ob- 
 jective history. 
 
 Objective history is simply that which actually occurs 
 in human societies ; it is the procession of events in the en- 
 tire life of humanity. History, in this sense, is evidently 
 but a convenient name for the whole movement of human 
 societies from the beginning of human life up to the pres- 
 ent. Sociology, on its genetic side, is concerned with the 
 constant factors in that movement, the laws or principles 
 of social evolution. Objective history, if we include in it 
 present social phenomena, is, therefore, the subject-matter 
 of sociology; and in this sense, sociology is the science of 
 history. 2 But objective history is not only the subject- 
 matter of sociology; in its various phases it furnishes the 
 subject-matter for all the social sciences. It is also the 
 subject-matter of that organized body of knowledge which 
 we term written history, or historiography. 
 
 i One of my colleagues, Professor J. II. Coursault, has suggested 
 that the relation of sociology to history is not unlike the relation 
 of grammar to literature. An even better comparison might be the 
 relation of biology to the " natural history " of plants and animals. 
 
 2 Cf. Flint, Philosophy as a Soientia Scientiarum, p. 334. 
 
 48 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 The Relation of Sociology io Historiography. 1 — Histo- 
 riography, or history in the subjective sense (the sense in 
 which the term is ordinarily used), is the description or 
 narration of past events in the life of humanity. It is the 
 mental picture of some portion of the human past which 
 we are enabled to form by means of documents and other 
 remains. The knowledge of past social phenomena which 
 we get from history is particularly dependent upon docu- 
 mentary evidence. It is, therefore, only a partial picture 
 of the past, more or less accurate according to the character 
 and abundance of this documentary evidence. Moreover, 
 because it rests chiefly upon the evidence of written records, 
 history, as a body of knowledge, is limited to what is known 
 as " the historic period " in the life of humanity. Thus it 
 furnishes no knowledge of a most important stage of social 
 evolution, the period before written records began, during 
 which social institutions were slowly forming and the foun- 
 dations of culture being laid. To reconstruct this period 
 the sociologist has to turn to the descriptions of the life of 
 present savage and barbarous peoples furnished him by 
 ethnography and cultural anthropology. 
 
 Again, because the method of history is the indirect 
 method of investigating, that is, by means of documentary 
 evidence, rather than by the direct method of observation, 
 it rarely includes descriptions of present society. For his 
 knowledge of present social phenomena, the sociologist has 
 to turn to demography, various collections of descriptive 
 and statistical material concerning present societies, be- 
 sides, of course, making use of his own powers of personal 
 observation. But this knowledge of present social phenom- 
 ena is of primary importance in a scientific interpretation 
 
 i For discussions of the relation of sociology to written history, 
 see Barth, PHlosopHe der G-eschichte als Sociologie, pp. 1-14; 
 Small, General Sociology, pp. 15-18, 44-46; Forrest, The Develop- 
 ment of Western Civilization, pp. 376-393. 
 
 49 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 of society, in accordance with the general principle that the 
 scientific value of a fact decreases in proportion to its re- 
 moteness from the observer. 
 
 Thus written history, as a body of knowledge, falls short 
 of furnishing a complete presentation of the subject-matter 
 of sociology. 1 It fails to furnish knowledge of the facts of 
 the earlier stages of social evolution; and it also fails to 
 furnish knowledge of the facts of present social life. In 
 studying social evolution, or the evolution of any particu- 
 lar institution, therefore, the sociologist must turn to eth- 
 nography and demography as well as to history. For ex- 
 ample, the sociology of the family cannot be constructed 
 from the knowledge which written history affords. All the 
 earlier stages of the evolution of the family as an institu- 
 tion can only be made out by recourse to ethnography, 
 while the latest stages, the present tendencies of the family, 
 can be discovered only by recourse to demographical and 
 statistical material relating to present society. 
 
 Moreover, history, as it is usually written, has certain 
 shortcomings from the scientific standpoint which still fur- 
 ther limit its utility to the sociologist. Perhaps the worst 
 of these is the predominance of the literary over the scien- 
 tific spirit in the presentation of its subject-matter. This 
 leads to the story-telling type of historical narrative, and 
 to over-emphasis of the dramatic elements in the life of so- 
 cieties. Now, the essence of the dramatic lies in the per- 
 sonal and individual; hence the literary historian crowds 
 his narrative with striking personalities and personal inci- 
 dents, neglecting not only the less obvious psychical and 
 
 i The limitations of the " historical method " in the social sci- 
 ences here discussed must be evident even to Listorians! The truth 
 is sociology (though it would be an abortive affair) could exist 
 even if there were no written history. To paraphrase Mackenzie 
 (Introduction to Social Philosophy, p. 32), sociology without his- 
 tory would be empty, but without psychology and biology it would 
 be blind. 
 
 50 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 physical influences at work in the social process, but also 
 the commonplace, recurrent events of the social life. Un- 
 doubtedly the personal and particular have a legitimate 
 place in historical narrative; for without their proper em- 
 phasis history could not give a true picture of the social 
 reality; but their over-emphasis serves to obscure the real 
 and deep undercurrents in the social life which chiefly de- 
 termine its course. 1 The literary method of presenting his- 
 torical facts is, therefore, subversive of scientific ends ; the 
 story-telling interest is opposed to the scientific interest. 
 Consequently, the sociologist can look to the literary his- 
 torian for but little help. 
 
 In a similar way, the exclusive attention of the historian 
 to one or only a few aspects of the social life serves to dis- 
 tort the picture of the social reality. Thus much of the 
 history written down to the present has been political his- 
 tory, the history of the state or government. This has been, 
 perhaps, helpful to the political scientist, but it has been 
 insufficient to reveal for the sociologist the forces at work 
 in social organization and evolution. Political history, and 
 in general, one-sided history of all kinds, falls far short of 
 making that exhibit of all phases of a people's life which 
 alone is a sufficiently wide basis for induction for the soci- 
 ologist. 
 
 1 Professor Ross ( Foundations of Sociology, pp. 81-83) seems to 
 justify the predominance of the literary over the scientific spirit in 
 the presentation of historical subject-matter by claiming that the 
 historian deals with the unique and individual ( " this individual 
 quality is the staple of the historian"), whereas "the sociologist 
 cancels out the particular." This is an impossible distinction be- 
 tween the tasks of the historian and the sociologist, as is shown by 
 contemporary developments in both fields. At the very time when 
 Professor Ross is justifying the " purple patches " of the historian, 
 scientific students of history are paying more attention to the real 
 and deep undercurrents which determine a nation's life. (See Rob- 
 inson, The New History, especially p. 16 and many passages in 
 Chaps. I, III, and V.) 
 
 5 51 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 Although written history furnishes but a part of the 
 facts with which the sociologist deals, nevertheless the co- 
 operation between the sociologist and the scientific historian 
 — the historian who employs scientific methods and who 
 aims at the faithful representation of the social reality — 
 should be of the closest sort. They are both working in the 
 same field and to a large extent have the same aim. The 
 sociologist needs scientific history. He cannot complete his 
 inventory of the social world without its aid. Moreover, 
 sociology cannot content itself, as one author has well re- 
 marked, with being merely illustrated psychology ; it must 
 also be, at least in its final development, analyzed and com- 
 pared history. 1 Finally, the historical method of study is 
 of supreme importance to the sociologist, and this fact alone 
 makes a scientific history of all ages and peoples perhaps 
 the greatest desideratum of the sociologist. On the other 
 hand, the scientific historian has need of sociology. With- 
 out some knowledge of the principles of social organization 
 and evolution he can scarcely obtain a proper perspective 
 of his facts; nor can he rightly interpret his facts or ex- 
 plain the causes of social changes without reference to such 
 principles. The scientific historian could do his work more 
 scientifically if he had a critical knowledge of sociological 
 laws and principles. "We conclude, then, both that scientific 
 history is necessary to the sociologist, and that sociology is 
 equally necessary to the scientific historian. 
 
 The Relation of Sociology to the Philosophy of History. 
 — In the Eighteenth Century there grew up a body of spec- 
 ulative thought about human progress known as the philos- 
 ophy of history. Among the founders of this discipline 
 were Vico, Herder and Condorcet. 2 The attempt of these 
 
 i Bougl6, Revue Internationale do sociologie, March, 1904. 
 
 2 The work of these men was not metaphysical, but waa essen- 
 tially the same as that of the modern sociologist, save for their 
 faulty methods. 
 
 52 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 men and their successors was to find certain laws or princi- 
 ples which underlie historical phenomena and which would 
 explain human progress. It is evident that the problem 
 which the philosophers of history undertook to solve is the 
 same as one of the main problems of sociology, namely, the 
 problem of social evolution, or of progress. The method of 
 the philosophers of history was, however, entirely different 
 from that of the modern sociologist. In the first place, their 
 method was speculative rather than scientific. For the most 
 part they deduced their theories of progress from a priori 
 assumptions rather than built them up out of the facts of 
 history. In the second place, the philosophers of history 
 usually sought some one all-pervading principle, which 
 would be " a key to history," and which would explain 
 everything in the historical movement; while the modern 
 sociologist seeks not some abstract universal principle which 
 will explain everything, but the psychological factors at 
 work in producing social changes. It is not too much to 
 say that sociology is the modern scientific successor of the 
 philosophy of history. 
 
 Dr. Paul Barth, of the University of Leipzig, has 
 claimed that sociology is identical with a scientific philoso- 
 phy of history. 1 But sociology includes the static as well as 
 the genetic study of societies. A scientific philosophy of 
 history would be at most a genetic explanation of the his- 
 torical movement— that is, a theory of social evolution. It 
 is only by stretching the term philosophy of history beyond 
 what it logically connotes, that it could be made to include 
 all of sociology. As Comte clearly indicated, a scientific 
 philosophy of history would coincide merely with genetic 
 or dynamic sociology. It would, however, be better to drop 
 
 i Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie, pp. 4-13. Barth 
 was by no means the first to make substantially this claim. Even 
 Comte claimed " social dynamics " as the science of history and 
 recognized the philosophy of history as its speculative predecessor. 
 
 53 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 the name philosophy of history altogether, both on account 
 of its past unfortunate associations, and because the two 
 aspects of sociological theory — the theory of social organi- 
 zation and the theory of social evolution — are now seen to 
 be inseparable. 1 
 
 A word should be said in conclusion about the relation 
 of the philosophical historian to the sociologist. The philo- 
 sophical historian is one who is not content with mere faith- 
 ful description or narration of past events, but seeks to in- 
 terpret them, and in some degree to unify them, through 
 the light of general principles. In this interpretation, the 
 older philosophical historians made use chiefly of meta- 
 physical assumptions, such as fate, providence, and the 
 like; but the modern philosophical historian makes use 
 chiefly of psychological principles. He offers a psycho- 
 logical interpretation of social movements. He is, there- 
 fore, very close to the sociologist. Indeed he may be said 
 to be a sociologist rather than a historian, to the extent that 
 he makes use of general principles in order to interpret 
 history. If his work is rightly done, it becomes a sort of 
 illustrated sociology, and is of great value to the sociologist 
 in the narrow sense. This type of historian, the sociological 
 historian, we might call him, is becoming increasingly com- 
 mon, and from the sociological standpoint should be wel- 
 comed as a valuable auxiliary worker in the field of the 
 social sciences. 
 
 The Classification of the Social Sciences. — Using the word 
 science in its broadest sense to include all systematized 
 knowledge, the social sciences would, then, in accordance 
 with what has been said, be classified as follows: 
 
 i There is, however, a place for a '' philosophy of history " in the 
 senae of a metaphysics of the historical movement. But this is 
 beyond the domain of positive science, and can hardly be regarded 
 as a part of sociology. 
 
 54 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 CLASSIFICATION 
 
 OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 Descriptive 
 Social 
 Science 
 
 Pure or Theoretical Social 
 
 Science 
 
 Normative 
 Social 
 
 Science 
 
 Applied 
 Social 
 
 Science 
 
 History: 
 General and 
 Special, such 
 as Political 
 History, etc. 
 
 Ethnography; 
 Demography 
 (including 
 Statistics). 
 
 I. General 
 
 II. Special 
 
 Ethics: 
 
 General and 
 Special, such 
 as Political 
 Ethics, etc. 
 
 Education, 
 Philan- 
 thropy, So- 
 cial Eco- 
 nomics, So- 
 cial Politics 
 (Legisla- 
 tion), Home 
 Economics, 
 etc. 
 
 Sociology: 
 Static and 
 Dynamic ; 
 Biological 
 and Psycho- 
 logical (So- 
 cial Psychol- 
 ogy). 
 
 Economics, 
 Political 
 Science, Ju- 
 risprudence, 
 Science of 
 Religion,etc. 
 
 The Relation of Sociology to Biology. — It is now necessary 
 to examine the relation of sociology to the other general 
 sciences. The other general sciences, usually recognized as 
 antecedent to sociology, are mathematics, physics, chemis- 
 try, biology and psychology. Upon all of these sociology 
 is more or less dependent, but especially upon biology 
 and psychology, as these sciences deal with the phenomena 
 of life. 
 
 "We must first consider the relation of sociology to biol- 
 ogy. Biology is the general science of life. In its broad 
 sense it is inclusive of all the special biological sciences, 
 such as zoology, botany, physiology, anatomy, embryology 
 and the like. In its narrow sense, it is a science funda- 
 mental to these, dealing with certain general problems of 
 life, such as cell structure, heredity, variation, natural 
 selection and organic evolution. In both of these senses, it 
 is evident that biology bears a close relation to sociology. 
 The phenomena of association are phenomena of life; the 
 general laws of biology, therefore, must hold in sociology. 1 
 
 i For an excellent discussion of the relations of biology and 
 sociology, see Thomson's Heredity, Chap. XIV. Especially note- 
 worthy, coming as it does from a biologist, is Professor Thomson's 
 
 55 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 General biology, in this sense of the science which deals 
 with the laws and factors of organic evolution, must be re- 
 garded as one of the immediate foundations of sociology. 
 All of the factors in organic evolution are also at work in 
 social evolution, and show themselves not only in the bio- 
 logical, but also in the psychological phases of the social 
 life. Thus heredity shows itself as native impulse or in- 
 stinct, variation as individuality and originality, while 
 natural selection shows itself not only in the natural elimi- 
 nation of the least fit, but also as the basis of all forms of 
 social selection. It is not necessary to dwell upon these re- 
 lations between the two sciences as they will necessarily 
 become evident in our discussion of the problems of soci- 
 ology. 
 
 Of the special biological sciences, some are, of course, 
 much more closely related to sociology than others. Thus 
 physical anthropology, which has been happily defined as 
 " the zoology of man," with its problems of man's origin 
 and place in the animal series, has many important bearings 
 upon sociology, especially upon the question of social ori- 
 gins. Also physiology, in the sense of the laws which gov- 
 ern the bodily activity of the individual, especially the 
 physiology of the brain and nervous system, must be under- 
 stood in order to interpret scientifically mental activity and 
 the mental interactions of individuals. 
 
 Biology, however, usually limits itself to a considera- 
 tion of the physical aspects of life, passing on to psychol- 
 ogy, in the scientific division of labor, the consideration of 
 the mental aspects. For this reason some have claimed that 
 biology is not directly related to sociology, but only indi- 
 rectly through psychology. In other words, they claim 
 
 protest (p. 510) against regarding sociology as "merely a higher 
 department of biology." He says : " The fallacy of regarding sociol- 
 ogy as no more than a recondite branch of biology is not merely 
 verbal . . .; it involves a misconception of what human society is, 
 a misconception which is discredited by history and experience." 
 
 56 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 that all the phenomena of society are psychical, and that all 
 the problems of the social life are psychological. 1 This view 
 is incorrect only because it is extreme. As we have already 
 seen, society is constituted by the psychical interaction of 
 individuals ; but this does not preclude the existence of in- 
 teractions between individuals which are predominantly 
 physical, as, e.g., in reproduction. Thus it comes about 
 that there are some social problems which are largely bio- 
 logical. Among these problems are the laws of the growth 
 of population (birth and death rate), the social influence 
 of heredity (degeneration and eugenesis), and the influence 
 of natural selection upon social evolution. Not only are 
 these problems included in sociology, but their solution is 
 an indispensable step in framing any theory of social or- 
 ganization and evolution. We must conclude, therefore, 
 that sociology rests in part directly upon biology. Indeed, 
 whether such problems as those just mentioned are treated 
 in sociology or biology, is simply a matter of the scientific 
 division of labor. They have always been considered social 
 problems, however, and will doubtless continue to occupy 
 the attention of social investigators. 
 
 But inasmuch as the vast majority of social problems 
 are in the main psychological, the relation of sociology to 
 biology is chiefly indirect. Biology furnishes the back- 
 ground for both psychology and sociology in giving them 
 the laws of organic life. Human society, we may well re- 
 peat, is but a phase of organic life; and the laws of all 
 life must apply to the social life of man. The biological 
 sciences, then, dealing with the physical aspects of the life- 
 process, are the preliminary foundation of all the social 
 sciences, even though the latter rest more immediately upon 
 psychology. 
 
 1 See article by Tosti on " Social Psychology and Sociology," 
 Psychological Review, Vol. V, July, 1898. Cf. also article by Lipps 
 on " Die Sociologische Grundfrage," Archw fur Rassen- und Gesell- 
 schaftsbiologie, September, 1907. 
 
 57 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 The Relation of Sociology to Psychology. — As we have 
 just said, psychology is the immediate basis of all the social 
 sciences, since the interactions between the individuals of a 
 group are mainly psychical; that is, they are processes 
 which involve consciousness ; or, as the psychologists would 
 say, they are mediated by consciousness. In plainer lan- 
 guage, nearly all of the interactions between individuals are 
 interactions of thought, feeling and will. Now, psychol- 
 ogy is the science of consciousness, 1 or of the mental life. 2 
 A somewhat more elaborate definition would be that psy- 
 chology is the science of the origin and development, struc- 
 ture and function of the forms of consciousness or experi- 
 ence. 3 Now, consciousness, experience, is an individual 
 matter ; hence psychology, is, in effect, a science of individ- 
 ual human nature. It investigates the consciousness of the 
 individual to discover the forms and methods of his experi- 
 ence. And as the, individual is alone a center of experience, 
 it would seem that psychology, if defined as the science of 
 immediate experience, 4 or consciousness, must be limited to 
 the individual. 
 
 Still, it must be admitted, there is nothing in the nature 
 of things to prevent the psychologist from going on to in- 
 vestigate the laws of individual interaction, the forms or 
 modes of association, and the evolution of social organiza- 
 tion. Some psychologists have done so ; but there are prac- 
 tical reasons which prevent the majority from doing so, 
 similar to the practical reasons which prevent the physicist 
 from taking up the problems of chemistry. The psycholo- 
 gists' own problems of the forms and methods of the men- 
 
 i Angell, Psychology, p. 1 ; also Judd, Psychology, p. 1. 
 
 2 James, Principles' of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 1 ; cf. also Thorn- 
 dike, Elements of Psychology, pp. 1-3. 
 
 sCf. Pyle's definition (Outlines of Educational Psychology, p. 7) : 
 " The science which undertakes to work out the structure, function, 
 and genesis of mind." 
 
 * Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, p. 3. 
 
 58 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 tal life in the individual are so vast that practically they 
 have no time left to investigate the interrelations of in- 
 dividuals. Hence, sociology is a practical necessity 
 as 'a matter of the scientific division of labor. The psy- 
 chologist, therefore, turns over to the sociologist the prin- 
 ciples of individual human nature which he has discov- 
 ered; and these the sociologist uses to interpret the inter- 
 actions, combinations, and progressive organization of in- 
 dividuals. 
 
 The distinction, then, between sociology and psychology 
 is the same as that between all other sciences — it is funda- 
 mentally a distinction of problems. The problems of the 
 psychologist are those of consciousness, of the individual 
 mind, as we commonly say ; while the problems of the soci- 
 ologist are those of the interaction of individuals and the 
 evolution of social organization. To put it in other lan- 
 guage, the distinction between sociology and psychology is 
 one of point of view. The psychological point of view is 
 the individual and his experiences; the sociological point 
 of view is social organization and its changes. Whatever, 
 then, aims at explaining the psychical nature of the indi- 
 vidual is psychological; while whatever aims at explaining 
 the nature of society is sociological. 1 
 
 Prom the point of view which we have given, sociology 
 presents itself as mainly an application of psychology to 
 the interpretation of social phenomena. Indeed, from this 
 standpoint, all the social sciences become psychological dis- 
 ciplines. This is not saying, however, that the psychology 
 worked out in the laboratory or found in the text-book may 
 be readily and easily applied to explain all social phenom- 
 ena. The method of the social sciences is not so simple as 
 that. History and the daily life around us afford psycho- 
 
 i Cf . Baldwin's statement (The Individual and Society, p. 14): 
 " Psychology deals with the individual and sociology deals with the 
 group." 
 
 59 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 logical principles of interpretation quite as important as 
 any offered us by the texts. Statistics reveal great tenden- 
 cies of human nature which laboratory methods would 
 never suffice to discover. Nevertheless, a mastery of psy- 
 chology, no matter whether the knowledge is gained from 
 daily life, from text-books, or from the laboratory, is essen- 
 tial to the sociologist. Though all sciences contribute of 
 their principles for the interpretation of human life which 
 the sociologist attempts, yet because of the psychological 
 nature of his subject-matter (social phenomena) psychology 
 contributes more than all of the rest. Equipment in psy- 
 chology is, therefore, absolutely indispensable for the soci- 
 ologist. 1 If it is true that ' ' no one is a psychologist unless 
 he is a biologist, " 2 it is even more true that ' ' no one is 
 a sociologist unless he is a psychologist." 
 
 The Relation of Sociology to Social Psychology. — In recent 
 years there has grown up a discipline known as social or 
 collective psychology. What, then, is the relation of this 
 science to sociology ? If what has been said is correct, it is 
 evident that sociology is mainly a psychology of the asso- 
 ciational process. Now, this is usually exactly what is 
 meant by social psychology. Social psychology is, there- 
 fore, the major part of sociology. This has been recognized 
 by many sociologists, as, for example, Ward, who speaks 
 of " that collective psychology which constitutes so nearly 
 the whole of sociology. ' ' 3 But social psychology is not the 
 
 1 Cf. the statement of Judd (Psychology, p. 368) : "The explana- 
 tion of human society, considered as an interrelation of highly 
 organized individuals, requires that there shall be a full account of 
 the nature of the individuals which enter into the organization.'' 
 
 2 Hall, Adolescence, Vol. II, p. 55. 
 
 8 Pure Sociology, p. 59. Cf. also Comte's statements [Positive 
 Polity, Vol. Ill, p. 40) : "Mental Science must needs form far the 
 largest part of Sociology '■' ; " Sociology is essentially reducible to 
 true Mental Science." Comte's position, however, was that all psy- 
 chology (except physiological psychology) was a part of sociology, 
 
 60 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 whole of sociology, as some have claimed ; for sociology has, 
 as has been already pointed out, also important biological 
 aspects. 
 
 It must be noted, however, that the term " social psy- 
 chology " is often loosely used to designate, not only the 
 psychology of the associational process, but the genesis of 
 the so-called social states of mind of the individual. 1 In 
 this latter case, social psychology is evidently a section of 
 the genetic psychology of the individual. Though very 
 important for the sociologist, it would be better to recog- 
 nize, for the sake of clearness, that this sort of social psy- 
 chology is a part of individual psychology. With social 
 psychology in this sense, we have, at present, noth- 
 ing to do. 
 
 In the former sense, social psychology is simply an ap- 
 plication of the principles of psychology to the interpreta- 
 tion of social phenomena. But this is what we said soci- 
 ology mainly is. Social psychology, as a theory of society, 
 
 and so differs from the position of the text which recognizes the 
 independence of psychology and the predominatingly psychological 
 character of sociology. 
 
 i This is apparently the meaning which Professor Baldwin ( Social 
 and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, Fourth Edi- 
 tion) at times gives to "social psychology"; at other times, how- 
 ever, he expressly speaks of it (pp. 80, 90) as " a theory of society." 
 According to Baldwin's own principle, however, that " psychology 
 deals with the individual and sociology deals with the group," a 
 theory of society should be regarded as sociology. McDougall (In- 
 troduction to Social Psychology ) would apparently make " social 
 psychology " both the psychology of the social states of mind of the 
 individual and the psychology of the associational process. Only 
 Section II of McDougall's work professedly deals with sociological 
 problems, but as a matter of fact constant references to such prob- 
 lems are made throughout Section I. Professor Thomas also {Amer- 
 ican Journal of Sociology, Vol. X, p. 445) would make social 
 psychology include both the social aspects of individual consciousness 
 and the mental aspects of association. The ambiguity of the term 
 is obvious. 
 
 61 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 usually discusses such problems as the role of certain 
 instincts, feelings and intellectual processes, such as sym- 
 pathy, imitation, suggestion, consciousness of similarity, 
 reason and the like, in the social life. It also deals with 
 the origin, development and function of all psychic uni- 
 formities, correlations and variations in society, such as 
 public opinion, social consciousness, popular will, concerted 
 action and the like: It discusses all these problems, 
 however, with reference to the larger problems of social 
 organization and evolution. Thus public opinion is studied 
 with the purpose of showing its function in the activities, 
 order, and changes of the social life. The consideration of 
 all of these psychical elements or aspects of the social life 
 must be, if not to throw light upon individual experience, 
 then to throw light upon the organization and evolution of 
 society. 
 
 Concerning the identity of social psychology, in the 
 sense ordinarily used, with the larger part of sociology, 
 then, there can be no doubt. 1 They have the same prob- 
 lems and the same point of view; and the distinction 
 between sciences is, as we have repeatedly said, a distinc- 
 
 i The failure to recognize this fact is the source of many errors 
 and curious statements in the scientific literature of the present. 
 One of the least flagrant examples of such statements is found in 
 Professor J. Harvey Robinson's article on " The Relation of History 
 to the Newer Sciences of Man" (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, 
 and Scientific Methods, March 16, 1911). Professor Robinson sees 
 little value in sociology for the historian, but emphasizes at length 
 the great value of social psychology! 
 
 It must be said, on the other hand, that many scientific -writers 
 other than sociologists have for a long time recognized the identity 
 of social psychology with sociology. Most of these, however, have 
 mnde the mistake of failing to recognize also the biological aspects 
 of sociology, making it (like Tosti and Lipps) merely social psy- 
 chology. Thus Karl Pearson (Grammar of Science, p. 527) says: 
 " The latter branch of Psychology dealing with men in the group is 
 termed Sociology." 
 
 62 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 tion of problems. The aim of social psychology is to 
 give a psychological theory of social organization and evo- 
 lution. It may, be, therefore, best defined as the psycho- 
 logical aspect of sociology. A more accurate name 
 for social psychology would be, then, " psychological soci- 
 ology." 1 
 
 Psychological Sociology and Biological Sociology. — The 
 content of pure sociology, is, then, the biology and the psy- 
 chology of the assoeiational process (i.e., of the interactions 
 of individuals). Every social problem, every problem of 
 human interactions, is resolvable into psychological and 
 biological elements, and may be approached from either 
 side. Just as sociology has its static and dynamic aspects, 
 so it has its biological and psychological aspects; and just 
 as it has been found that the static and dynamic aspects 
 
 i The effort of Professor Ross and several other sociologists to 
 make social psychology a distinct, specialized division of psychological 
 sociology (Social Psychology, p. 2; Howard, Social Psychology, Sylla- 
 bus, p. 14 f . ) seems to the writer to be without any adequate scien- 
 tific warrant, and to add very greatly to the confusion already 
 existing. (See the writer's review of Ross's Social Psychology in 
 The Psychological Bulletin, Vol. V, December 15, 1908.) Ross 
 would limit social psychology to the consideration of " the psychic 
 planes and currents that come into existence among men in conse- 
 quence of their association"; that is, he practically limits social 
 psychology to the study of the effects of suggestion and imitation 
 in society. According to this text, on the other hand, this is but a 
 small part of social psychology in the sense of a psychological 
 theory of the social life. " Social psychology," in the opinion of 
 the writer, is a term which had better be confined to the psychology 
 of the social phases of individual consciousness and of the social 
 tendencies of individual human nature (the interest being in ex- 
 plaining the individual ) ; while what sociologists have called " so- 
 cial psychology" (a psychological theory of society) had better be 
 styled "psychological sociology," or "psycho-sociology," and recog- 
 nized as including all the psychological aspects of sociology. The 
 distinction between social psychology and psychological sociology is, 
 of course, of academic importance only. Cf. the discussion by Pro- 
 fessors Ross and Mead, Psychological Bulletin, December, 1909. 
 
 63 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 cannot be kept separate in complete sociological theory, so 
 it will be found that in a complete theory of social organi- 
 zation and evolution, the biological and psychological fac- 
 tors must be harmonized. Social biology and social psy- 
 chology, so-called, 1 are simply different ways of attacking 
 the same problem. They have the same problems, and they 
 constitute one unified science — sociology. This does not, of 
 course, reduce sociology to mere biology and psychology any 
 more than physiology is reduced to mere physics and chem- 
 istry by saying that it is essentially a physics and chemistry 
 of organic processes. Every science derives its principles of 
 interpretation from the sciences immediately beneath it. 
 Besides, since every social problem has both biological and 
 psychological aspects, the science of sociology remains a 
 unity, not portions of two sciences. 
 
 Biological sociology, however, dealing mainly with the 
 influence of natural selection upon social evolution, with 
 the social effects of heredity, and with the principles of 
 population, may, for our purposes, be regarded as the foun- 
 dation for the larger part of sociological theory — the psy- 
 chological part. Though far from a settled condition, and 
 still unsystematized, it is so much better worked out 2 that 
 it may well be taken for granted in developing a psycho- 
 logical theory of social organization and evolution. Ac- 
 cordingly, this book will deal directly only with the psy- 
 chological aspects of sociology. The point of view, however, 
 will remain in a broad sense biological, since the point of 
 
 1 The terms bio-sociology and psycho-sociology are rapidly coming 
 into use in European sociological literature. 
 
 2 Keference need be made here only in a general way to the works 
 of Galton, Pearson, Thomson, Geddes, Saleeby, Ellis, Davenport, 
 Woodruff, and many others dealing with the application of the 
 principles of heredity, variation, and selection to human society. 
 My colleague, Professor Maurice Parmelee, also deals with some 
 phases of biological sociology in a work soon to be published on 
 The Science of Human Behavior. 
 
 64 
 
SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES 
 
 view of modern psychology is broadly biological. Our 
 standpoint, in other words, will be that of a collective life- 
 process. 1 
 
 i It is barely possible that some explanation is needed of such 
 phrases, in common use throughout this book, as " life-process," 
 " common life," " collective life," " collective life-process," since so- 
 ciological criticism of recent years has developed such metaphysical 
 subtlety that words are now not allowed to have their usual, com- 
 mon-sense meanings. I wish to say, therefore, that I am not using 
 these terms or any others in a metaphorical or unusual sense. 
 When one speaks of a group having a " common life," good sense 
 would indicate that he is not using a mere metaphor nor does he 
 mean that the group is a big animal! The common-sense meaning 
 is somewhere between extremes. By " life-process," for example, 
 I mean simply the process of living, or the activities or changes 
 connected with the maintenance and development of life. We may 
 speak of life-processes, therefore, from the standpoint of the indi- 
 vidual, of the group, of the race or species, or of life generally. The 
 context will indicate the exact reference. By " a common life " or 
 " a collective life " I mean eimply the integration or coordination 
 of the life-processes of the individual members of a group, such that 
 the life activities become interdependent in functioning. By " a col- 
 lective life-process" I mean She activities or changes connected with 
 the maintenance and development of the life of a group. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE RELATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY 1 
 
 Sociology and Philosophy. — Sociology was the last, his- 
 torically, of the great sciences to be differentiated from 
 philosophy. For a long time prior to the definite organi- 
 zation of sociology as a science, there existed a body of 
 speculative thought about human society which was known 
 as social philosophy. This older social philosophy is related 
 to sociology much as the older natural philosophy is re- 
 lated to modern physics and chemistry. It had the same 
 problems as sociology— the origin, nature, and processes of 
 development of human society. It differed from scientific 
 sociology mainly in its methods, which were almost wholly 
 speculative, or a priori. Of course, sociology in its more 
 general aspects still remains a philosophy of society. 2 
 
 Philosophy is no longer to be sharply separated from 
 science. On the contrary, all modern philosophy is scien- 
 tific in its spirit and methods, in that it has its beginnings 
 in the established results of the special sciences, and in 
 that it bases speculation upon the empirical study of re- 
 ality. In a generic sense, philosophy is a term often used 
 to designate the more general and speculative aspects of all 
 the sciences. 3 It is entirely right, therefore, to speak of 
 sociology as both a science and a philosophy. 
 
 i The substance of this chapter, as of the three preceding, was 
 first published in the American Journal of Sociology for November, 
 1907. In the present revision the alterations are only verbal. 
 
 2 Cf. Stein, Wesen und Aufgabe der Bociologie, pp. 6, 7. 
 
 s All modern science contains a large element of hypothesis. 
 If " science,'' in the strict sense, be limited to what is demon- 
 
 66 
 
RELATIONS TO PHILOSOPHY 
 
 In the stricter sense, however, the word philosophy has 
 now two generally accepted meanings. First, it is used 
 as a general term for all the so-called philosophical disci- 
 plines, such as psychology, logic, ethics, aesthetics and meta- 
 physics. Secondly, it is used in a narrower sense as 
 synonymous with metaphysics, including in that term 
 epistemology as well as cosmology and ontology. "We have 
 already discussed the relations of sociology to ethics and 
 psychology. It remains only to consider the relation of 
 sociology to philosophy in the narrow sense, that is, to meta- 
 physics. Before doing this, however, let us note that soci- 
 ology as a general science has much in common with the 
 so-called philosophical disciplines. Like them, it deals 
 mainly with mental phenomena. Like them, also, it em- 
 ploys the method of generalization — of logical inference 
 from facts — to a greater degree, perhaps, than the sci- 
 ences of physical nature. Two general conclusions may 
 be drawn from what has been said. The first is that soci- 
 ology itself may be regarded as a philosophical discipline, 
 quite as much as psychology; but this is not inconsistent 
 with maintaining at the same time that it is a natural 
 science. The second is that the study of other philosophical 
 disciplines, and especially training in philosophical meth- 
 ods of reasoning, will be found of great help to the student 
 of sociology. 
 
 Sociology and Natural Science. — Sociology is a natural 
 science in the sense that it studies definite processes in real 
 space and time. Like physics and biology, sociology does 
 not question the reality of its subject-matter. 1 It may be 
 
 strated, then the hypothetical element in any science would be its 
 philosophical part. In the general sciences, this hypothetical or 
 philosophical element is very large. In the sociology of the present, 
 both because of the complexity of the science and of its undeveloped 
 condition, it is necessarily larger even than in the other general 
 sciences. 
 
 i Cf. James's argument to show that psychology is a natural sci- 
 ence {Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 183). 
 6 67 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 that there is no such thing as the interaction of individuals, 
 as one mind acting upon another mind ; but this is a postu- 
 late which sociology refuses to question. Its attitude 
 toward its subject-matter — the social process — is the naive, 
 uncritical attitude which all the natural sciences assume 
 toward their subject-matter. It starts with the common- 
 sense view of the world, assuming the existence of real indi- 
 viduals, who are both physical and psychical beings, and 
 who are in mental interaction with one another. 
 
 Again, like all natural sciences, sociology aims only at 
 answering the question, " how? " "in what way? " It 
 traces the coexistences and sequences among social phenom- 
 ena, showing the method, or technic, of the processes in- 
 volved. Beyond this it does not go. It does not attempt 
 to give the what or the why of the social life. The what, 
 or objective content, belongs to the descriptive sciences, 
 history and demography. The why, or the subjective mean- 
 ing of the social life, belongs to philosophy and religion. 
 Though sociology may throw light upon such problems, as 
 a natural science it makes no attempt to penetrate into the 
 ultimate nature and meaning of things. 
 
 The term ' ' natural science ' ' is, we must note, however, 
 sometimes used as synonymous with physical science. In 
 this sense, of course, sociology is not a natural science. De- 
 spite the fact that it has certain biological aspects, it is 
 properly placed among the psychical sciences. It is, then, 
 a natural science only in the same sense in which psychology 
 is a natural science. 
 
 The Relation of Sociology to Metaphysics. — The natural 
 science point of view saves the sociologist from settling 
 beforehand many troublesome metaphysical problems. It 
 excludes metaphysical problems from sociology, though it 
 does not, of course, exclude metaphysical implications ; for 
 these are found in all sciences and in every view of the 
 world. Metaphysics, as Professor James said, means only 
 an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and con- 
 
 68 
 
RELATIONS TO PHILOSOPHY 
 
 sistently about the universal reality. 1 It deals with the 
 ultimate problems of reality and of knowledge. It takes 
 the established results of the special sciences, criticises and 
 harmonizes them, so as to present an ultimate view of re- 
 ality. In this modern sense, metaphysics is not non-scien- 
 tific in character; it is rather a science of the sciences, a 
 clearing-house of the sciences. It is as presumptuous, 
 however, and unscientific for the sociologist as such to at- 
 tempt to settle metaphysical problems as it would be for 
 a physicist to deal with sociological problems; and it is a 
 reversal of scientific method to attempt to build up a system 
 of sociology upon some shadowy hypothesis concerning the 
 ultimate nature of reality. 2 
 
 While sociology must keep to the natural-science point 
 of view, it is better to recognize frankly, however, the meta- 
 physical elements in many of its problems. These words 
 are necessary ; for many sociologists have kicked metaphys- 
 ics out of the front door, but have ended by lugging it in 
 again through some back door. They ha^e rejected as un- 
 scientific the idealistic view of the world, but have accepted 
 as scientific the materialistic view. Now, materialism is 
 just as much a metaphysical theory as idealism, and the 
 sociologist as such has no more right to assume the one 
 theory than the other at the outset of his investiga- 
 tions. He is not called upon to assume anything as to 
 the ultimate nature of reality; but like all scientific in- 
 vestigators, he should start with the naive view of the 
 world. It is true that this naive view has a great deal 
 
 i Psychology, Briefer Course, p. 461 ; also Principles of Psychol- 
 ogy, Vol. I, p. 145. 
 
 2 It must not be inferred that the writer is hostile to meta- 
 physics. On the contrary, he believes that it is an inevitable intel- 
 lectual task. But he would keep sociology from unnecessary meddling 
 with metaphysical problems by proceeding, like all natural sciences, 
 upon the basis of the naive view of the world. Science, as Comte 
 emphasized, is simply " a prolongation of common sense/' or as 
 Huxley said, " organized common sense." 
 
 69 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 of metaphysics implied in it; but it does not pretend to be 
 a definite theory of the nature of reality, and is, therefore, 
 merely provisional, subject to correction and revision in the 
 court of last resort — metaphysics itself. Thus the sociolo- 
 gist has no right to assume that mind can be derived from 
 matter and motion, nor that matter and motion can be de- 
 rived from mind; but he must accept as a fact the exist- 
 ence of physical and psychical phenomena alongside of each 
 other -with no discoverable way of deriving either one from 
 the other. 1 Again the sociologist must not assume that all 
 is necessity in the universe; but he must accept the exist- 
 ence of that relative freedom of individual action which 
 consciousness seems, at least, directly to testify to, until in- 
 vestigation proves the contrary. 
 
 The sociologist is, perhaps, more excusable for getting 
 entangled in metaphysical problems than any other scien- 
 tist ; for he deals with both the bodies and the minds of men, 
 with physical necessity and free choice; in a word, with 
 human beings in all their complexity and with their inter- 
 actions. Certain metaphysical problems inevitably obtrude 
 themselves in his investigations. The more important of 
 these are (1) the relations of mind and matter; (2) the 
 freedom of the individual will; (3) the existence of immu- 
 table laws in social phenomena. In each of these problems 
 it is so important that the sociologist should preserve a neu- 
 tral attitude that we shall consider briefly some of the con- 
 ditions of each problem. 
 
 1. The Relations of Mind and Matter.— The naive view 
 of the world sees in mind and matter two interacting ele- 
 
 i Nothing has so hampered the development of sociology, and 
 often made it ridiculous from the standpoint of common sense, as 
 metaphysical "monism," parading as science. The assumption of 
 two distinct orders of phenomena, physical and psychical, is simply 
 a methodological necessity for the sociologist in the present state of 
 knowledge. Such an assumption, based upon common sense, of 
 course in no way implies an ultimate or metaphysical " dualism " 
 between mind and matter. Cf. Small, General Sociology, p. 81. 
 
 70 
 
RELATIONS TO PHILOSOPHY 
 
 merits, each relatively independent of the other, but each 
 a factor in a complex, unified whole. According to this 
 "dew, mind may act upon and modify matter; while phys- 
 ical facts act upon and condition mental facts. As opposed 
 to this view, materialism asserts that physical facts (matter 
 and motion) are, in the last analysis, alone determinative 
 of all processes; that mind is a derivative of these; and 
 that we are, from an a-posteriori view, automatons. Again, 
 idealism asserts that the physical universe is a mental con- 
 struct, and has no existence independent of some perceiving 
 subject. Without going farther into metaphysical theories 
 of the relations of mind and matter, it is evident that for 
 the sociologist to assume either of the above theories in his 
 investigation and reasoning is for him to shut his eyes to 
 half of his facts. The sociologist has nothing to gain, and 
 much to lose, through his assuming either that the mind 
 cannot modify and control physical forces, or that physical 
 forces do not modify and condition mind. 1 Through assum- 
 ing either hypothesis, he surrenders the uncritical point of 
 view of natural science and becomes a metaphysician. And 
 he reverses the true method of all science when he attempts 
 to build a science upon a metaphysical theory. It is pre- 
 posterous, therefore, for a man to offer to the world a view 
 of human society embedded in his metaphysical philosophy 
 as scientific sociology. It may be a valuable contribution to 
 sociological thought, but it is not scientific sociology, be- 
 cause it has abandoned the method of science. 
 
 2. The Freedom of the Individual Will. — Has the indi- 
 vidual a limited freedom in his deliberate actions (that is, in 
 any one of several courses of action open to him), or is this 
 freedom an illusion ? This is a metaphysical problem which 
 
 1 This is equally true of psychology. A functional psychology 
 can, indeed, be based only upon the common-sense view that con- 
 sciousness does modify and control to a greater or less degree 
 psycho-physical activity. Cf. Stratton, Experimental Psychology and 
 Culture, pp. 281-82. 
 
 71 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 has puzzled the wisest minds. The general impression is 
 that science pronounces in favor of the latter view — that 
 freedom is an illusion, that we are really automatons — but 
 this is an erroneous impression. Necessitarianism, or deter- 
 minism, as it is usually called, is purely a metaphysical 
 theory. 1 It is the view that everything in the world is me- 
 chanically predetermined by forces acting from behind (by 
 a vis a tergo). Preedomism, on the other hand, is the doc- 
 trine that human actions may be determined teleologically, 
 that is, by purposes or foresight of ends. It is almost un- 
 necessary to point out that necessitarianism is based upon a 
 mechanical view of the world, and that historically this 
 theory has been prevalent in proportion as the mechanical 
 view of the world, which is more or less based upon the 
 physical sciences, has been dominant. Determination of 
 activities by purpose or foresight of ends has been called 
 teleologieal 2 or inner necessity ; but this is exactly what is 
 meant by freedom ; and it is hard to see how this is identi- 
 cal with physical or mechanical necessity. 3 The fact is that 
 
 i The principle that science is " organized common sense " would 
 suggest that the correct methodological procedure for the sociologist 
 would be not to assume mechanical necessity in social phenomena 
 until in each particular case it was demonstrated. 
 
 2 Cf. Stein, Wesen und Aufgabe der Sociologie, p. 15f. 
 
 s The real contrast, as has often been pointed out, should be made, 
 not between necessitarianism and freedomism, but between physical 
 and psychical (or teleologieal) determinism. Cf. Stein, Die Sociale 
 Frage im Lichte der Philosophie, pp. 40-50. The existence of psy- 
 chological " laws," it may be pointed out, in no way prevents freedom 
 in the sense of conscious self-determination. The whole issue (and 
 the only conceivable issue which anyone would care to debate from 
 the standpoint of modern science ! ) is whether the conscious indi- 
 vidual is an automaton or not (i.e., is determined entirely by extra- 
 personal and extra-psychical forces). See James, Principles of Psy- 
 chology, Vol. I, Chap. V. 
 
 Of the many reconciliations of " freedom " and " necessity " 
 which philosophers have proposed, it is not necessary here to speak, 
 except to say that most of them involve logical inconsistencies. 
 
 72 
 
RELATIONS TO PHILOSOPHY 
 
 mechanical necessity is the only necessity known to science ; 
 and this conception has been built up exclusively within the 
 physical sciences, and purely for practical reasons. To 
 carry over such a conception from the physical sciences and 
 apply it dogmatically to all phases of human life is, there- 
 fore, an unwarrantable piece of metaphysical assumption. 
 
 It is not necessary, then, for the sociologist to take sides 
 on this metaphysical question ; and it is especially not neces- 
 sary for him to view human society as a theater of physical 
 necessity. It is the business of the sociologist to trace uni- 
 formities in social phenomena without reference to any 
 metaphysical theory of human action, explaining them as 
 determined, now by forces acting from behind, and now 
 (when it is more reasonable to do so) by intelligible motives 
 and foresight of ends. 
 
 3. The Existence of Laws in Social Phenomena. — Are 
 there " eternal iron laws " x in social phenomena as in the 
 physical world? This question would be at once answered 
 in the negative if we assumed that the human individual 
 has a relative freedom ; or if strict metaphysical neutrality 
 be maintained, no position regarding it need be taken. The 
 question is, however, methodologically even more important 
 than the other two which we have just discussed. It is said 
 that if there are no laws in social phenomena, there can be 
 no social science; that science is a causal explanation of 
 phenomena through reference to laws; that a sociology 
 without laws is not a science. 
 
 That there is some truth in these assertions we have 
 already practically admitted by frequently using the word 
 " laws " in discussing the problems of sociology. The real 
 
 For example, Comte, while proclaiming that social phenomena are 
 subject to " invariable natural laws," held at the same time that 
 they are modifiable by deliberate action. This would be incon- 
 sistent unless the individual were conceded some measure of free 
 variation and of self-determination through foresight of ends, 
 i The expression is Gumplowicz's. 
 
 73 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 methodological problem is, however, In what sense shall the 
 word " law " be used in the social sciences? Shall it be 
 used to imply the metaphysical theory of necessitarianism, 
 that is, that the concept of mechanical necessity can be 
 made to cover all phases of human life? Or, shall " law " 
 be used in a broader sense, without implying any support 
 to any metaphysical theory? 
 
 In deciding in what sense the word " law " shall be 
 used in sociology, it is first necessary to call the attention 
 of the student to nearly synonymous words. The words 
 "truth," "truism," "rule," "generalization," "uni- 
 formity," " regularity," and " principle," are all often 
 loosely used as more or less nearly synonymous with the 
 word " law." But it is important that they be discrimi- 
 nated from one another, for the word " law " has become 
 peculiarly specialized. "Without stopping to define all of 
 the above terms, it must be said at once that most, if not 
 all, of the so-called laws in the social sciences belong to one 
 of the above categories — that is, they are generalizations, 
 uniformities or principles, rather than laws in the sense in 
 which the physical sciences would use that word. 1 Thus 
 Comte's famous Law of the Three States is only a generali- 
 zation; while the so-called law of least effort (that the 
 greatest gain is always sought for the least effort) is really 
 a psychological principle. Now exactness in the use of 
 terms is desirable in science ; hence it is important that we 
 inquire the exact meaning which the word " law " has ac- 
 quired in the older sciences — the physical sciences. At first 
 in the physical sciences law meant the manifestation of an 
 outer force, controlling the action of things. But as the 
 passive view of nature came to be given up, it came to mean 
 
 i Cf. the statement of Worms {Les Principes biologigues de V Evo- 
 lution sociale, p. 19) : "We dare not quite speak of laws [in sociol- 
 ogy], for this last term implies a precision quasi-mathematical to 
 which up to the present the social domain seems to be repugnant. 
 But at least we can speak of principles." 
 
 74 
 
RELATIONS TO PHILOSOPHY 
 
 merely the uniform way in which things occur. Later, 
 under the influence of the growth of the mechanical view of 
 nature, law came to mean a fixed, unchanging, and so neces- 
 sary relation between forces. The concept of a law of 
 nature thus became deeply tinged with the idea of physical 
 necessity. 1 Indeed, in the physical sciences, it became prac- 
 tically synonymous with physical necessity. Hence the 
 expression " eternal iron laws," embodying the idea that 
 nature is a theater of mechanical necessities. 
 
 Now it is the carrying over of this idea which has grown 
 up in the physical sciences to the social sciences which we 
 have called metaphysical. This can only be done by assum- 
 ing that the subject-matter of the social sciences is homoge- 
 neous with the subject-matter of the physical sciences, as 
 Comte assumed f but this, at present, is an entirely gratui- 
 tous metaphysical assumption. 
 
 In order to prove that " eternal iron laws " exist in 
 social phenomena as in physical phenomena we should have 
 to prove (1) that physical necessity rules in human affairs; 
 
 i Professor Karl Pearson ( Grammar of Science, Chap. Ill ) de- 
 nies that the conception of a " law of nature " contains any impli- 
 cation of necessity. He defines » scientific law (p. 77) as "a brief 
 statement or formula, which in a few words resumes a wide range 
 of facts." In other words, he defines it as a mere generalization. 
 If such were the general usage among scientific men, there would 
 of course be no objection to extending the conception of natural law 
 tg the social sciences without explanation. But physical scientists 
 generally recognize as " laws " only quantitative statements ( mathe- 
 matical formulae) of relations between variable forces. Hence 
 " laws " in physical science are conceived of as fixed, invariable, and 
 hence practically necessary, relations between forces. Moreover, 
 Professor Pearson speaks in the name of " a sound idealism," and 
 unlike many scientific men denies that mechanism is at the bottom 
 of phenomena (see Preface, second edition). He has therefore left 
 the naive or common-sense point of view, and his whole discussion 
 may be regarded as metaphysical in the sense that it criticises 
 the presuppositions of knowledge. 
 
 2 See Positive Philosophy, Bk. I, Chap. II. 
 
 75 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 (2) that stimulus and response are equal to mechanical 
 cause and effect. As regards the first proposition, we have 
 already said that it is a mere gratuitous assumption, and 
 is not capable of proof. As regards the second proposition, 
 it must be said that psychology teaches that stimulus and 
 response are something quite different from mechanical 
 cause and effect, 1 though the popular mind and even soci- 
 ologists sometimes assume the contrary. And as psychol- 
 ogy is fundamental to sociology, its verdict must be ac- 
 cepted as final by the sociologist. 
 
 In the language of physical science, a " cause " has 
 come to mean the invariable, necessary, and equivalent ante- 
 cedent of a consequent which we call " the effect." Now, 
 the " stimulus " in psychology is not the equivalent of the 
 " cause," but rather the opportunity for the discharge of 
 energy; and the " response " is not the mechanical effect 
 of the stimulus, but is always teleological, that is, directed 
 to some end. Hence, it is incorrect, from the standpoint of 
 physical science, to speak of a stimulus as the cause of a 
 response, or of a bodily state as the cause of a mental state. 2 
 
 i Cf. Titehener, Outline of Psychology, p. 343 ; Text-book of 
 Psychology, pp. 39-41. 
 
 2 There is no objection, of course, to speaking of the stimulus 
 as the cause of the response, or of a mental state as the cause of 
 conduct, or vice versa, provided the word " cause " is freed from its 
 physical science connotations. For, as every psychologist acknowl- 
 edges, there is no invariableness of sequence between stimulus and 
 response and no equivalence between the two. We are not denying, 
 therefore, that causation, in » wider sense than the mechanical, 
 operates in social phenomena; that social phenomena, like mental 
 phenomena, grow, develop, out of antecedent mental and social 
 phenomena according to fixed principles which are fully as intelli- 
 gible as mechanical laws. This is the sine qua non of all social sci- 
 ence. What we are insisting upon is that there are two sorts of 
 causation, physical causation and psychical causation, just as there 
 are two sorts of phenomena; and that from the standpoint of a sci- 
 ence which is nonmetaphysical, both sorts of causation and their pe- 
 culiarities must be recognized. Interpreting causation in this broad 
 
 76 
 
RELATIONS TO PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Now the connections between individuals in society are 
 almost entirely those of mental interaction, of stimulus and 
 response. Men influence each other, act upon each other, 
 though acting as stimuli to each other. Hence the word 
 " cause " must be used in the social sciences in a sense dif- 
 ferent from its use in physical science; for, from the stand- 
 point of physical science, there are no causal connections 
 between the minds of individuals. 
 
 The interaction between individuals which constitutes 
 society, then, is upon the plane of stimulus and response 
 rather than upon the plane of mechanical cause and effect. 
 This is one of the first truths which the beginner in soci- 
 ology needs to learn. The social process cannot be inter- 
 preted in terms of ' ' natural ' ' causation, if by " natural ' ' 
 is meant physical or mechanical causation. Physical causa- 
 tion operates between individuals in the main indirectly, 
 through their relation to a common physical environment, 
 and only directly in the case of heredity. This does not 
 bar sociology from becoming a science. Psychology also as 
 a science makes practically no use of the categories of cause 
 and effect as they are used in the physical sciences. 1 Just 
 as psychology has been obliged for the most part to inter- 
 pret the mental processes of the individual in terms of 
 stimulus and response, so sociology will for a long time to 
 come have to content itself with an interpretation of social 
 processes in terms of stimulus and response. 2 Now, what we 
 
 sen8e as any process of development, one can agree with Professor 
 Yerkes when he argues for a purely psychical causation between 
 mental processes {Introduction to Psychology, pp. 313-323) or with 
 James when he argues {Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 137) 
 that ideas and feelings have causal efficacy. 
 
 1 Cf. the writer's article on " Sociology and Social Progress " 
 in The Sociological Review, October, 1910. 
 
 2 Of course, there is no objection to using the words " cause " 
 and " effect " in the social sciences in the broad sense of stimulus 
 and response, provided that this is recognized. Under such cir- 
 cumstances, we could speak of the " cause " of a social occurrence, 
 
 77 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 have said answers the question whether there are laws in 
 sociology in the same sense in which there are laws in the 
 physical sciences. The laws of physical science are laws of 
 cause and effect in the mechanical sense. No such laws are 
 possible in social phenomena. 
 
 But are there no laws at all in sociology? There is no 
 objection to using the word " law " in the social sciences, 
 provided we do not carry with it all the implications which 
 it has come to have in the physical sciences. By a " law " 
 in the social sciences we can only mean a relatively regular 
 or uniform way in which things occur. 1 In other words, 
 we go back to the older and more general meaning of the 
 word " law," meaning by it simply a uniformity or regu- 
 larity among phenomena. Even though we grant that hu- 
 
 meaning its psychical motivation, not its mechanical cause. Several 
 sociologists have recognized that the word " cause " cannot be used 
 in the social sciences in the same sense in which it is used_ in the 
 physical sciences. Thus Ross says (Foundations of Sociology, p. 
 55), "the causes, i.e., the motivation of (social) occurrences"; 
 and again (p. 80), " the ultimate cause of a social manifestation 
 must be motive or something that can affect motive." That is, the 
 ultimate " cause " of a social phenomenon is something psychical — 
 something that influences will. But as we have already pointed out, 
 this is not cause and effect in the physical science sense. These 
 terms, if used, therefore, in sociology, like the term " law," will have 
 to be used in a wider sense than that given them in the physical sci- 
 ences. For the sake of clearness it would often be better to use the 
 terms stimulus and response. 
 
 Professor Giddings also ( " Theory of Social Causation," Publi- 
 cations of American Economic Association, Third Series, Vol. V, 
 p. 144; also Descriptive and Historical Sociology, pp. 129, 148) 
 recognizes stimuli as causes of social phenomena. But in his earlier 
 work, The Principles of Sociology, he speaks of sociology as " an 
 interpretation of human society in terms of natural causation " 
 (p. 7) and argues that an objective or mechanical interpretation in 
 terms of the redistribution of matter and energy is equally valid 
 with a subjective interpretation. 
 
 i This is by some writers called a " relative " or " empirical " 
 law. 
 
 78 
 
RELATIONS TO PHILOSOPHY 
 
 man freedom is not an illusion, and that the mental proc- 
 esses of individuals and the processes of society do not 
 illustrate cause and effect in the sense in which those terms 
 are used in physical science, still it does not follow that 
 human nature is haphazard and that society is without 
 regularities. On the contrary, human nature is remarkably 
 uniform, and the interactions of individuals exhibit sur- 
 prising regularities. But the uniformities of human nature 
 and society are due to instincts and habits, that is, teleo- 
 logical adaptations rather than mechanical necessities. 1 The 
 habits of action of individuals — using that phrase in its 
 broadest sense, to cover the inborn tendencies and charac- 
 teristics of human nature as well as acquired habits 2 — give 
 rise, then, to regularities in social phenomena (the interac- 
 tions of individuals) almost as invariable as those which 
 characterize physical nature. This is what makes the social 
 sciences possible. Law in the social sciences, then, rests 
 upon the fact of habit. We arrive, therefore, at this defini- 
 tion of a social or sociological law : A social law is a state- 
 ment of the habitual way in which individuals, or groups 
 of individuals, interact. 
 
 But it may be said that these habitual ways of interact- 
 ing among individuals are not invariable, and that there- 
 fore there can be no sciences of social phenomena. It may 
 
 i Instincts are, of course, teleological only indirectly ( see Chap- 
 ter IX). They are adaptations, brought about, not by intelligence, 
 but by selection. But they function toward maintaining the life of 
 the species, and so are objectively teleological, that is, directed to 
 an end. The teleological element in life and mind, it may be added, 
 (which mechanistic theorists would totally exclude from science) is 
 apparently rooted in the very character of the life-process. Modern 
 psychologists, at any rate, almost universally admit that mind, or 
 consciousness, is selective, that is, teleological, from the start. See 
 Chapter VI. 
 
 2 The use of " habit " in this broad sense as a convenient term 
 to cover all the uniformities of action or behavior is sanctioned by 
 the best psychologists, such as James, Angell, and others. 
 
 79 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 be granted that the social sciences can never become exact 
 sciences like the physical sciences, but it does not follow 
 from this that they are not trustworthy bodies of scientific 
 knowledge, capable of affording guidance in all the prac- 
 tical affairs of life. A slight degree of inexactness does not 
 invalidate scientific knowledge because science deals with 
 large masses of facts and general situations. Thus if cer- 
 tain exceptions are found to some social law, it does not 
 invalidate that law for the purposes of the sociologist, be- 
 cause ninety-nine times out of a hundred he can count on its 
 working. 
 
 Again, it is not true that science consists chiefly of laws, 
 unless that word is used in a very broad sense. A science 
 consists equally, at least, of principles. Principles are gen- 
 eralizations, which usually explain the ways of working 
 of certain forces or agencies; 1 while laws are more super- 
 ficial formulations of the observed uniformities of the re- 
 sulting phenomena. In physical science, principles explain 
 by referring phenomena to mechanical cause and effect, ac- 
 tion and reaction. But in the social sciences, the agent, 
 man, acts teleologically ; hence social phenomena must be 
 explained in teleological terms. Thus it is quite as scien- 
 tific to explain human actions in terms of habit, adaptation, 
 purpose, stimulus, and response as it is to explain physical 
 phenomena in terms of mechanical cause and effect. This 
 is only saying, in effect, that sociology is a psychological 
 science; but it is not, of course, saying that sociology is a 
 metaphysical science. 
 
 To sum up : It is not the business of the sociologist to 
 settle metaphysical problems, nor has he any right to as- 
 
 lYerkes (Introduction to Psychology, p. 248), following Poin- 
 carS, defines a principle as " a generalization which must prove true 
 if our definition of our object is to remain correct.'' In other words, 
 a principle involves a logical relation between phenomena rather 
 than a mechanical. Hence principles are more fundamental truths 
 than laws, that is, are less relative. 
 
 80 
 
RELATIONS TO PHILOSOPHY 
 
 sume, at the present time, that they are settled. It is rather 
 his business upon the basis of a common-sense view of the 
 world, to trace uniformities among social phenomena so far 
 as he can, and to explain social processes, now in terms of 
 physical causation, where such can be traced, and now in 
 terms of mental activity, when the process is evidently one 
 of stimulus and response. Only thus can sociology escape 
 from the barren wastes of fruitless, metaphysical discussion ; 
 and only thus can it make its own proper contribution to 
 that ultimate world-view to which general philosophy seeks 
 to attain. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 SCIENTIFIC METHODS IN SOCIOLOGY 
 
 It is impossible to treat adequately within the limits 
 of a single chapter the subject of scientific methods in so- 
 ciology. Nevertheless, a few words about methods seem 
 important in order that the point of view of this text may 
 be thoroughly understood. 
 
 For the beginner in sociology, perhaps the most useful 
 things that can be said about methods of thinking and in- 
 vestigating are mainly negative. First of all, it is neces- 
 sary that metaphysical assumptions and personal bias be 
 eliminated if the problems of the social life are to be studied 
 from the scientific point of view at all. The necessity of 
 avoiding metaphysical assumptions so far as possible has 
 already been discussed. The peculiar thing is that some 
 sociologists do not seem to understand that such assump- 
 tions as monism and materialism are just as metaphysical 
 as assumptions of dualism 1 or idealism. As we have 
 already insisted, the assumption of monism is as methodo- 
 logically illegitimate from the standpoint of pure science 
 as any other metaphysical assumption. The standpoint in 
 approaching all purely sociological problems must be that 
 of the naive consciousness, which is the standpoint of all 
 the natural sciences. As we have already shown, even such 
 an assumption as that of the absolute universality of me- 
 
 i The recognition of a phenomenal duality, as has just been 
 pointed out in the preceding chapter, is not to be confused with 
 metaphysical dualism. Such recognition is as necessary for positive 
 science as for common sense. 
 
 82 
 
SCIENTIFIC METHODS IN SOCIOLOGY 
 
 chanical cause and effect, or of physical necessity in the 
 social life, is a metaphysical assumption, and therefore 
 unwarranted in sociology. Such an assumption is war- 
 ranted in the physical sciences because it is in accord with 
 the common-sense view of the world and will work. For 
 the same reason it' is not warranted in the social sciences, 
 because it is not in accordance with a na'ive view and be- 
 cause it has not been found to work in their investigations. 
 
 As regards the effect of personal bias in the scientific 
 study of social problems, Herbert Spencer performed an 
 invaluable service for sociology when he showed the bane- 
 ful effect of various class, party, sectarian, and personal 
 biases upon the work of the sociological investigator. 1 It 
 is difficult for us all to see social facts as they are, and 
 the prejudices which each one of us has received from his 
 environment prevent us from forming true judgments about 
 social conditions and movements. These prejudices con- 
 stitute what may be called, to borrow a phrase from the 
 physical sciences, the " personal equation " of the soci- 
 ologist. 2 This must be carefully allowed for in all social 
 investigations and so far as possible eliminated. Of course, 
 no one can free himself entirely from these influences 
 which warp judgment and betray even the best thinkers 
 into serious errors, but much more might be done through 
 a careful study of scientific methods and through taking 
 thought than is at present accomplished. It is only in so far 
 as the mind raises itself above the personal and the local 
 into true universality that such a science as sociology is 
 even possible. 
 
 A peculiar sort of personal bias is frequently gotten 
 from the study of the special social sciences, and this must 
 be carefully guarded against. As we have already seen, 
 these special social sciences are peculiarly apt to give the 
 
 1 See his Study of Sociology, Chaps. IV-XII. 
 
 2 Cf. Spencer, op. tit., p. 10. 
 7 83 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 student one-sided views of the social reality, and in certain 
 types of mind such one-sided views become readily mistaken 
 for the whole truth. Sociologists themselves, however, 
 have frequently gotten the same one-sidedness from fol- 
 lowing up with too great faith some single clew or theory 
 regarding the social life. Now it is evident that all such 
 one-sidedness or partialness of view is the bane of the 
 sociologist, whether it comes from personal bias, from long 
 study of some one phase of the social life, or from too 
 great faith in some single social perception. The sociolo- 
 gist, and particularly the beginner in sociology, must have 
 no pet theories in his thinking and investigating; rather 
 he must keep in his mind several working hypotheses, test- 
 ing each by his facts and striving to see all sides of the 
 truth. 1 
 
 Inductive Methods. — It is only after the sociologist has 
 cleared away all these hindrances to the scientific study 
 of the social reality that he is ready for the complicated 
 processes of the inductive method. All inductive methods 
 are very complex, and we can do no more in this place 
 than barely note the more important kinds of induction 
 used in sociology. 
 
 (1) The primary form of the inductive method is ob- 
 servation. Too much emphasis cannot be laid in sociol- 
 ogy upon the observation by the student of the daily so- 
 cial life around him. He usually has opportunity in almost 
 any community to observe the principal forms of association, 
 the types of interaction between individuals, and the vari- 
 ous social classes. In the study of social organization, 
 social activities, and social changes as they exist about us, 
 a great deal of deduction is, of course, necessarily mixed 
 with the inductive process; nevertheless, such practical 
 observations are rightly regarded as preeminently induc- 
 
 i See Professor Chamberlain's admirable article on " The Method 
 of the Multiple Working Hypothesis " in the Journal of Geology, 
 November, 1807. 
 
 84 
 
SCIENTIFIC METHODS IN SOCIOLOGY 
 
 tive, and when intelligently and systematically carried out 
 they are of the greatest value to the student, especially in 
 studying the problems of social structure and function. 
 
 Experiment is a form of observation when the condi- 
 tions can be controlled by the observer and he can vary, 
 independently, some of the factors of the situation and 
 observe the result. Obviously, the method of experiment 
 which has been so fruitfully used in many of the natural 
 sciences can be but seldom used in the social sciences, 
 although governmental agencies and great endowments for 
 social investigation, like the Sage Foundation, have it 
 within their power to conduct true experiments along so- 
 ciological lines. 
 
 (2) A second form of the inductive method of great 
 value to the sociologist is the statistical method. This is 
 where social facts are observed, colligated, tabulated, and 
 compared, usually several persons being employed in this 
 process. This method is more complex than ordinary ob- 
 servation, not only because of the great number of persons 
 involved in observing and colligating facts, but also on 
 account of the many mathematical processes involved in 
 their tabulation and comparison. 1 While there are many 
 opportunities for error, therefore, in this method, still when 
 carefully carried out, it yields the nearest approach to 
 exact measurement of social phenomena which we have in 
 the social sciences. For this reason it has been claimed that 
 the statistical method is the only method competent to 
 produce sciences of social phenomena, since it is only by 
 measuring phenomena that we can secure exact or scientific 
 knowledge. "Without endorsing this extreme view, it must 
 be admitted that in the statistical method, the student of 
 
 i The statistical method is by some writers regarded as a form 
 of the comparative and historical methods. Inasmuch as it in- 
 volves a combination of several methods, it is best regarded, how- 
 ever, as an independent method. Use is made of it, more or less, 
 in all the natural sciences. 
 
 85 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 the social sciences finds an indispensable aid in the scientific 
 study of social phenomena, especially of mass movements, 
 and general tendencies. Statistics, as the only means of 
 measuring mass movements and general tendencies, must 
 come into a larger and larger use in the social sciences. 1 
 General psychological influences and tendencies can often 
 be measured in this way no less than the influences of 
 factors in the physical environment. In so. far as it is 
 possible to measure the phenomena of collective life, the 
 statistical method is, then, all important. 
 
 (3) When the study of social phenomena is extended 
 to the past by means of documents and other remains, we 
 have the historical method. This method has been thought 
 by many students of the social sciences in the past,, as 
 well as by historians, to be the most important method 
 of studying social problems. This opinion was indeed 
 held by Comte, who declared the historical method! to be 
 the method par excellence of the social sciences. 2 There 
 can be no question that the historical method is indis- 
 pensable in the social sciences, and that it is especially 
 valuable to the sociologist in the study of social evolution. 
 
 i Professor Walter F. Willcox has for many years ably advocated 
 the value of statistics as a method for the social sciences. Pro- 
 fessor Giddings has also been one of the chief advocates of the sta- 
 tistical method in sociology. He says {American Journal of Soci- 
 ology, Vol. X, p. 176): "It has become the chiefly important 
 method of sociology; and assuredly, in the course of time, it will 
 bring our knowledge of society up to standards of thoroughness 
 and precision comparable to the results attained by any natural 
 science." 
 
 For doubts as to the value of the statistical method in sociology, 
 however, see Waxweiler, Esquisse d'une Sociologie, Chap. IV, pp. 
 103-106. 
 
 2 See Positive Philosophy, Bk. VI, Chap. III. Comte was, how- 
 ever, right in claiming that the historical method is in a sense the 
 peculiar method of the social sciences, since only the social sciences 
 deal with historical phenomena in the strict sense. 
 
 86 
 
SCIENTIFIC METHODS IN SOCIOLOGY 
 
 Still it does not deserve to be considered of greater im- 
 portance than certain other scientific methods. 1 Its limi- 
 tations in sociology have already been so fully discussed 
 that it is not necessary to enlarge upon this subject. The 
 great advantage of the historical method is, manifestly, 
 that it allows the survey, in broad outlines at least, of 
 processes widely extended in time. In this way the stu- 
 dent may perceive the trend of development and the dif- 
 ferent factors involved in bringing about social changes. 
 Though the historical method does not permit of exact 
 measurements or exact determinations of any sort, there 
 can be no doubt that the emphasis laid upon it by certain 
 students of the social sciences is in part justified because 
 when rightly used, it serves to correct misconceptions and 
 one-sided views of the social life perhaps better than any 
 other single method. 
 
 (4) The comparative or ethnographical method is the 
 study of different types of society scattered over the globe 
 in more or less contemporary times. It is the study of 
 social phenomena as extended in space rather than in 
 time. It makes use of the descriptions, more or less ac- 
 curate, by travelers, missionaries and scientific investi- 
 gators of various peoples in different stages of culture. 
 These types of society, representing different stages of 
 social evolution, throw more or less light upon the prob- 
 lems of social development. Consequently, this method of 
 study of sociological problems has been preferred alto- 
 gether by certain sociologists, notably Spencer, who used 
 it almost exclusively in his sociological inductions. In 
 many university courses in sociology in the past, indeed, 
 little or nothing was heard of any other method of sci- 
 
 i The claim formerly made by certain historians that only stu- 
 dents of history (and of history alone) are competent to interpret 
 history, or to put forth sound theories of social evolution, betrays, of 
 course, not only too great confidence in the historical method, but 
 also in induction generally. 
 
 87 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 entific approach to the problems of sociology. 1 The ob- 
 jection to this exclusive use of anthropological and ethno- 
 graphical material in approaching sociological problems 
 is that it gives those problems an appearance of unreality 
 and of detachment from the practical concerns of life. 
 While this method is indispensable in any exhaustive study 
 of sociological problems, yet it is quite wrong in principle 
 to start the study of sociology with an examination of 
 the social life of peoples remote in culture from our own. 
 There are too many opportunities for fallacy in sociological 
 inductions of this sort, and, as has already been said, the 
 resultant sociology frequently has little apparent connec- 
 tion with real life. 
 
 It is evident that the various inductive methods just 
 discussed overlap, and it should be evident that the ideal 
 inductive method lies in a combination of all of these four 
 methods and not in the exclusive use of any one of them. 
 The well-trained sociologist will make practically equal 
 use of all of them. 
 
 Deductive Methods. — Beyond the inductive methods of 
 sociology lie its deductive methods. Deduction, as we have 
 seen, really accompanies induction at every step of sci- 
 entific reasoning. It is impossible to make an induction 
 
 i Even recently, it has been claimed that in university courses in 
 sociology the approach to sociological problems should be through cul- 
 tural anthropology and ethnography. It must be said emphatically 
 that such a claim rests either upon a misapprehension of the nature 
 of sociology or upon one-sidedness in scientific method. If the people 
 of England existed alone on the earth, and if all knowledge of history 
 stretching back farther than a, lifetime were swept away, they could 
 still have, biology and psychology remaining, a very respectable soci- 
 ology. Anthropology and ethnography, like history and statistics, 
 serve to perfect sociology, but they are not indispensable to it, 
 while biology and psychology are. Cultural anthropology and eth- 
 nography are even more dependent upon sociology for the proper 
 interpretation of their facts than sociology is dependent upon them. 
 Cf. Waxweiler, Esquisse d'une Sociologie, pp. 109-115. 
 
SCIENTIFIC METHODS IN SOCIOLOGY 
 
 from facts without some hypothesis in mind. It is only 
 for the sake of analysis, then, that we separate induction 
 from deduction. While all modern science is inductive in 
 spirit and proceeds from the fact to the hypothesis, rather 
 than from the hypothesis to the fact, yet, certain sciences 
 are more deductive than others. In the general sciences, 
 built up from the results of other sciences, such as soci- 
 ology is, deduction is even more important than induction. 
 The legitimate use of deduction in sociology is obviously, 
 not deduction from metaphysical assumptions or speculative 
 hypotheses, but rather deduction from the laws and prin- 
 ciples of other established sciences which have more or 
 less bearing upon the social life. The deductions of so- 
 ciology, it is obvious, must be chiefly from the laws and 
 principles of biology and psychology. It is psychology, 
 in particular, which furnishes the principles of social in- 
 terpretation. Deduction from psychology, or the so-called 
 psychological method, is the most fruitful method in sociol- 
 ogy at the present time. As Professor Giddings says, 1 ' ' At 
 present all serious work in sociology starts from psychologi- 
 cal data, and proceeds by combination of psychological with 
 statistical and historical methods." The method of psy- 
 chological analysis, it may be added, has practically cre- 
 ated modern economics, the most developed of the social 
 sciences. There can be no doubt as to its value in soci- 
 ology, 2 and it will be the chief method employed in this 
 text. 
 
 . i Science, Vol. IX, p. 16. 
 
 2 Professor Carver rightly says (Sociology and Social Progress, 
 note, p. 64) that psychological analysis of familiar tacts deserves to 
 rank as » distinct scientific method in the social scences, and that 
 the economists, led by the Austrian school, have carried this analysis 
 further (though often on the basis of a faulty psychology — see 
 Anderson's Social Value) than any other workers in the field ot 
 the social sciences. Carver concludes : " So fruitful has been this 
 method in economics that the student of sociology must look for- 
 
 89 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 A special phase of the psychological method in soci- 
 ology is known as sympathetic introspection. 1 The social 
 observer puts himsef in imagination in the situation of 
 a person or class of persons whom he wishes to understand. 
 By so doing he can get at, with more or less accuracy 
 through inference, the psychological processes of the per- 
 sons studied, and foresee their probable social conduct. The 
 psychological sociologist makes use of this method con- 
 stantly in studying the social life from the psychological 
 point of view. 2 He makes large use of this method in 
 particular to understand special social classes, such as chil- 
 dren, races, the poor, criminals and the like. It is evi- 
 dent that this method of sympathetic introspection, while 
 it involves a large amount of social observation, is essen- 
 tially deductive in character, and unless carried out upon 
 the basis of adequate knowledge of psychological laws and 
 principles, it is a method which is peculiarly liable to 
 error. When based, however, upon an adequate knowledge 
 of psychology and fortified by inductive evidence, it is a 
 peculiarly invaluable and fruitful method. 
 
 It is never safe, it should be needless to remark, to 
 make the social sciences simply deductions from biological 
 and psychological principles. Biology and psychology are 
 not sufficiently developed as yet to warrant any such pro- 
 cedure. The slower but safer inductive methods of study 
 must be used in sociology, then, to check deductive proc- 
 esses at every step. Deduction may furnish the hypothe- 
 sis in sociology, as in other sciences, but induction must 
 always furnish the testing of the hypothesis. 
 
 ward with confidence to its application to many of the wider prob- 
 lems of sociology and politics." 
 
 i Introspection in the strict sense (self -introspection) is not, as 
 is so often assumed, directly available in sociology. In psychology 
 proper, on the other hand, it is the characteristic method, and so 
 furnishes facts and principles which may by deduction be used in 
 sociology. 
 
 2 Cf. Cooley, Social Organisation, p. 7. 
 
 90 
 
SCIENTIFIC METHODS IN SOCIOLOGY 
 
 Certain other deductive methods, largely employed in 
 sociology in the past, call for brief notice. One of these 
 is deduction from the analogy between society and an 
 organism. Another is deduction from the general parallel- 
 ism between the individual and society. Both forms of 
 deduction make assumptions as to similarities which have 
 not yet been fully established. Nevertheless, both of these 
 methods may be legitimate within certain bounds. In so 
 far as a general likeness in organic and social structure 
 has been established, it is, of course, legitimate to use this 
 fact as a clew to discovery in sociology, but it is hardly 
 safe to carry such deductions from analogy further than 
 that. The same holds true of deductions from the as- 
 sumed parallelism between the individual and society. 
 There can be no doubt that there is an apparent rough 
 parallelism in function and development between the indi- 
 vidual and society which may suggest to the sociologist 
 many valuable hypotheses, which, however, should always 
 be tested by study of objective social facts. 
 
 From what has been said it is evident that an adequate 
 method for sociology must be very complex. It must be 
 a combination of practically all the more important induc- 
 tive and deductive scientific methods. The method of so- 
 ciology may be best described perhaps as a constructive 
 synthesis; 1 for it takes the deductive elements of the dif- 
 ferent sciences and the inductive results of observation 
 and history and fuses them into a new and all-sided view 
 of the social life-process. At any rate, no sociology worthy 
 
 i While the chief method employed in thia text is that of psycho- 
 logical analysis, the author feels that the work may with justice be 
 described as an outcome of the method of synthesis, since it repre- 
 sents sociological studies along many lines with the use of many 
 different methods (only a small part of which is indicated in his 
 elementary text, Sociology and Modem Social Problems). While) 
 the method of this book is psychological in form ,it is intended to 
 be truly synthetic in spirit. On the method of "psychological syn- 
 thesis," see Giddings, Principles of Sociology, pp. 66-69. 
 
 91 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 of the name can be built up through the employment of 
 any single scientific method, and the employment of many 
 methods implies that synthesis must finally be relied upon 
 to bring their results into harmony. 
 
 Sociology and Mathematical Methods. — It remains only to 
 say a word about the relation of sociology to the regula- 
 tive or methodological disciplines, mathematics and logic. 
 The physical sciences acknowledge no investigation or dem- 
 onstration as final unless it is mathematical. On this ac- 
 count some have claimed that if the social sciences are 
 to become true sciences they must also reduce their phe- 
 nomena to mathematical formulae. Without stopping to 
 criticise the view that science consists of quantitative meas- 
 urements, it must be evident to all who have sufficiently 
 considered the matter that only a small portion of social 
 phenomena will submit to mathematical treatment, 1 for 
 mathematical treatment always presupposes measurements 
 of some sort. Now, social phenomena are largely subjec- 
 tive and qualitative and many of the most intimate things 
 concerning man's social life cannot be measured. The 
 physical sciences, on the other hand, have as their subject 
 matter external and quantitative phenomena-, hence they 
 submit to mathematics, the science of quantities and meas- 
 urements, as their regulative discipline. 
 
 What, then, shall be the regulative discipline of the 
 social sciences 1 Manifestly, it must be logic, which, as the 
 science of right reasoning, is fundamentally the regulative 
 
 i Of course, social measurements are greatly to be desired wher- 
 ever they are possible. Too great faith in the application of mathe- 
 matical methods in sociology, however, is unwarranted, not only 
 by the condition of present knowledge, but also by the nature of 
 social facts themselves. The writer, of course, is unwilling to accept 
 the claims of certain mathematicians who would conceive their sub- 
 ject so broadly as to make it practically synonymous with logic itself 
 ("the science which draws necessary conclusions" — Benjamin 
 Peirce). On the contrary, mathematical treatment of any subject is 
 only possible where measurement is possible. 
 
 92 
 
SCIENTIFIC METHODS IN SOCIOLOGY 
 
 discipline of all the sciences, including mathematics itself. 
 Logic has a peculiarly close hearing upon the psychical 
 sciences, including sociology, inasmuch they must look to 
 logic, rather than mathematics, for the validation of their 
 reasoning, since their phenomena, for the most part, will 
 not- submit to measurement. In order to perfect an ade- 
 quate scientific method, therefore, the sociologist must 
 have recourse to the principles of logic at every step. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 1 
 
 We have already called attention to the fact that psy- 
 chology is the immediate basis of sociology; and that no 
 one can be a sociologist unless he is, in some measure, a 
 psychologist, since the interconnections between individuals 
 are largely interconnections between their mental processes 
 through interstimulation and response. Social processes 
 may, indeed, be regarded as combinations of the mental 
 processes of individuals; or, to put the matter in simpler 
 language, the interrelationships of individuals are expres- 
 sions of the influence which the thought, feeling, and will 
 of one individual has upon the thought, feeling, and will 
 of another individual. At any rate, we maintain that the 
 essential element in the social process is the psychical 
 element. 
 
 From all this, it follows that the development of so- 
 ciology must depend upon the development of psychology. 
 But, as a matter of fact, the development of psychology 
 has not always afforded clearer insight into social ques- 
 tions. Much of the psychology which the student learns 
 in text-books and in the laboratory seems so abstract and 
 
 i For the point of view in this and in the two succeeding chapters 
 the writer is indebted to two of his former teachers, Professor John 
 Dewey, now of Columbia University, and Professor G. H. Mead, of 
 the University of Chicago. This chapter, like the five preceding, 
 was written in 1907 in practically its present form. Since then a 
 number of psychological works embodying the same point of view 
 have been published. 
 
 94 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 remote from real life that it has but little evident bearing 
 upon human conduct. This is because hitherto psycholo- 
 gists have been more concerned with analyzing the structure 
 of human consciousness than with developing a psychology 
 of human action. The latest developments in psychology 
 are, however, developments toward such a psychology of 
 human activities or behavior; and it cannot be doubted 
 that when such a psychology has been fully developed, 
 that it will supply the missing key for the interpretation 
 of social phenomena. 1 
 
 Knowledge of the psychology of the human individual 
 in action being indispensable to the student of sociology, 
 it seems almost necessary to begin a text in psychological 
 sociology with some account of individual human nature. 
 Just as psychologists have found it convenient and even 
 necessary to preface their discussions of mental processes 
 with a brief description of the structure and functioning 
 of the brain and the nervous system, so sociologists will 
 find it convenient to preface their discussions of social 
 processes with some account of the psychical characteristics 
 
 iSays Professor Max Meyer: "Mind is a subject fit to be studied 
 only because it is, and to the extent to which it is, significant for 
 social intercourse. Because of this relation psychology is the foun- 
 dation upon which sociology and all the special social sciences rest. 
 But social intercourse is not a mystical transference of thought, 
 a transference of the kind which exists only in the dreams of the 
 spiritualistic deceivers and deceived. Social intercourse is conduct, 
 behavior, or whatever name can be used as meaning action of organ- 
 isms upon other organisms. But not all such actions are of the 
 conscious type. What a folly when ' psychologists ' for thousands 
 of years took it for granted that they could afford to ignore all 
 activity except that of which the actor was supposed to be con- 
 scious. The larger part of the activity of a human being is uncon- 
 scious, but no less important on that account. If psychology is to 
 be of any service to mankind, it must be, not an analysis of con- 
 sciousness primarily, but a study of the biological laws governing 
 human activity, human behavior." — University Missourian, April 
 16, 1911. 
 
 95 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 of the human individual. Moreover, it is desirable that the 
 psychology which each sociologist makes use of in inter- 
 preting the social life should be made as explicit as prac- 
 ticable, so that there can be no misunderstanding on the 
 part of the reader. We shall accordingly devote this chap- 
 ter to a brief statement of some of the results of modern 
 functional psychology. 
 
 Structural and Functional Psychology. — Let us first, how- 
 ever, stop to distinguish more clearly the two great divi- 
 sions of psychology from each other. Structural or de- 
 scriptive psychology is concerned with the analysis of the 
 mental content of the individual mind — that is, with the 
 analysis of states of consciousness into their constituent 
 elements. 1 While an important part of general psychology, 
 it is of little value to the sociologist, as he deals wholly 
 with the person in action. We shall accordingly devote no 
 special attention to this phase of psychology. Functional 
 or dynamic psychology, on the other hand, is the science 
 of the mind in action. 2 It deals with individual human 
 conduct or behavior in the widest sense, explaining its 
 genesis and function in the life-process. Thus it furnishes 
 the principles for interpreting the interactions of indi- 
 viduals and the evolution of social organization. We shall 
 now attempt to give a brief outline of these principles of 
 functional psychology, though for any detailed and com- 
 prehensive account of them the student must turn to some 
 work on psychology. 3 
 
 lit must always be borne in mind that these should be consid- 
 ered merely two aspects of one science — psychology — not distinct 
 sciences. Other divisions of psychology, such as genetic, physiolog- 
 ical, etc., are of course not inconsistent with the above division. 
 See Angell's article on "The Province of Functional Psychology," 
 Psychological Review, Vol. XIV. 
 
 2 Cf. Thorndike, Elements of Psychology, p. 184. 
 
 s Perhaps the best brief statement of the principles of functional 
 psychology for the student of sociology is Thorndike's Elements of 
 Psychology, Part III. Angell's Psychology is also excellent, while 
 
 96 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 Consciousness and Bodily Movement. 1 — Consciousness 
 seems to be intimately connected with the katabolic nature 
 of the animal organism — that is, with the tendency to ex- 
 pend energy rather than to store up energy. Thus the 
 plants, in which the anabolic tendency predominates, show 
 no evidence of consciousness. Indeed, it can be accepted 
 as a general truth that the more complex and varied the 
 bodily movements are in a species, the higher its intelli- 
 gence. This is practically the same as saying that the 
 more rapid the metabolism, that is, the more rapidly the 
 process of bodily change goes on, the greater will be the 
 degree of mentality. 
 
 Whatever may be the exact relation of consciousness to 
 katabolic tendencies, it is certain that mind is fundamen- 
 tally connected with the activities of the organism. 2 The 
 dictum of James that ' ' all consciousness is motor " 3 is 
 accepted as one of the corner stones of modern psychology, 
 not only in the sense that all conscious states tend to express 
 themselves in bodily movements, but also in the sense that 
 all conscious states are the outcome of bodily movements. 4 
 One writer has even gone so far as to declare that " the 
 muscles in their active state are as much organs of thought 
 as the brain itself." At any rate, bodily activity is the 
 basis of the mental life. The act, or rather, the coordina- 
 tion of the organism (muscle fibers and nerve cells) in 
 some activity is the real fundamental fact with which the 
 psychologist has to deal. 5 
 
 Miller's Psychology of Thinking presents (Chaps. I- VI) the func- 
 tional point of view with admirable clearness, though largely from 
 the pedagogical standpoint. 
 
 i Cf . Miller, Psychology of Thinking, Chap. VI ; James, Psychol- 
 ogy, Briefer Course, pp. 117-18, 370-72. 
 
 2 Cf . James, Briefer Course, p. 5 ; Angell, Psychology, p. 283. 
 
 3 Briefer Course, p. 370. 
 
 *Cf. Miller, Psychology of Thinking, pp. 48-52, 55-58. 
 5 See Dewey, " The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," Psycho- 
 logical Review, Vol. Ill, July, 1896. Some recent functional psy- 
 
 97 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 But not all bodily activities, or even acts, are accom- 
 panied by consciousness. Consciousness seems to appear 
 at only those points where the purely physiological mech- 
 anism of the body is incapable of meeting the demands of 
 the environment. 1 In other words, consciousness appears 
 at those points where changes, new adjustments, in rela- 
 tively complex activities occur. Consciousness is connected, 
 then, with the process in living creatures which we know 
 as adaptation, or adjustment to the environment, especially 
 when the process of adaptation is rapid and complex. 2 In- 
 deed, the function of consciousness in the life-process seems 
 to be the mediation of adaptive processes which are too 
 complex to be brought about by purely physiological means. 
 In other words, as Professor Angell says, " Mind seems to 
 be the master device by means of which the adaptive op- 
 erations of organic life may be made most perfect." 3 
 
 Mind, then, according to the view of modern psychology, 
 is not something apart from the life-process, but is a 
 functioning element in that process. It is subject to the 
 laws of life, to the laws of its evolution, like all other ele- 
 ments in life. The things that act as stimuli to it, its 
 valuations of stimuli, and its methods of response, are all 
 in the long run as much determined by natural selection 
 as the form and color of a leaf or a flower. 4 Thus our 
 
 chologists would make " behavior " the fundamental fact with which 
 the psychologist has to deal; but as the unit of behavior (s the act, 
 there is practically no difference in the point of view. 
 
 1 Cf. Angell, Psychology, p. 50. 
 
 2 Cf. Miller, Psychology of Thinking, pp. 18, 40-45. 
 
 3 Psychology, p. 7. 
 
 4 Cf . the statement of Balfour : " Eyes and ears, and all the 
 mechanism of perception have been evolved in us and in our brute 
 progenitors by the slow operation of Natural Selection." Presi- 
 dent's Address, Report of the British Association for the Advance- 
 ment of Science, 1904, p. 12. 
 
 The selection hypothesis lies at the basis of a functional view of 
 mind, and so is one of the assumptions of this text. The impression, 
 
 98 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 sensations, our percepts, our feelings, our likes and dis- 
 likes, our emotions, and even our reason itself, are all rele- 
 vant to the life-process, 1 and, barring the individual varia- 
 tions, are outcomes of natural selection. If we start at 
 the sound of a loud noise, if we fear the dark, if we are 
 attracted by the smell of the rose, if we find the taste 
 of certain fruits delicious, if we like people who are like 
 ourselves, it is because these or similar methods of reaction 
 have proved of advantage to the race in the past — barring 
 again, of course, the possibility that they are individual 
 variations or reactions acquired in the lifetime of indi- 
 viduals. The thought of evolution thus dominates modern 
 functional psychology. But it must be borne in mind, of 
 course,, that natural selection is merely the elimination of 
 the least favorable variations, 2 and is thus a framework, 
 so to speak, marking the limits of variation which nature 
 
 current among some, that the mutation theory of de Vries and Men- 
 delism have negatived the whole theory of evolution by selection 
 (Darwinism) is, of course, a gross mistake. Says Professor Bateson 
 ( Mendel's Principles of Heredity, p. 289 ) : " There is nothing in 
 Mendelian discovery which runs counter to the cardinal doctrine 
 that species have arisen by means of Natural Selection." For a 
 defense of the selection hypothesis, see Thomson and Geddes, Evo- 
 lution, Chap. V. 
 
 i Life must not, of course, be thought of as reduced to its low- 
 est physical terms, but as an expanding process which, potentially 
 at least, is inclusive of even its most developed forms. See defini- 
 tion of "life-process " on page 65. Says Professor Miller, " When 
 the biological view of mind is urged, its advocate is often thought 
 to be making the body and its physical life the end, viewing mind 
 and all its processes as mere means to that end. But mind, when 
 it appears in the living organism, becomes a part of the whole, an 
 integral aspect of the self" (Psychology of Thinking, p. 19). 
 
 2 Some of the earlier exponents of the selection hypothesis greatly 
 exaggerated the part which natural selection plays in organic evo- 
 lution. The idea of de Vries and of the Mendelians that selection 
 is to be likened in its effects to a sieve was greatly needed as a cor- 
 rective. Natural selection permits an indefinite amount of free 
 variation within certain limits, though in the long run all forms of 
 8 99 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 permits, but within which a large amount of free variation 
 is possible. 
 
 The Spontaneity of the Organism : Stimulus and Response. 
 
 — Living things, and perhaps all things, are charac- 
 terized by spontaneity ; 1 that is, changes, movements are set 
 up within them seemingly without the aid of external 
 causes. This spontaneity is more manifest the higher we 
 ascend in the scale of life and the more pronounced the 
 katabolic constitution of the animal organism becomes. 2 
 The old conception of the organism as passive with refer- 
 ence to its environment is more and more being given 
 up by modern biology and psychology ; the new conception 
 is that the organism is essentially active. '" The organism 
 is, then, a relatively independent center of energy, whose 
 activities are directed to sustaining or maintaining itself. 
 That is, the activities of the organism spring from its own 
 organic needs, such as nutrition and reproduction, and are 
 directed to the satisfying of those needs. No organism 
 could survive unless its activities were thus selective. The 
 organism is teleological, then, in its very constitution, and 
 the essential ground for its activities lies in its own internal 
 condition — in its organic .needs. 4 
 
 It follows from what has been said that the act, which 
 we have said is the fundamental fact in the mental life 
 
 life must be outcomes of natural selection. See Thomson and 
 Geddes, Evolution, p. 248. 
 
 i Cf. Jennings, Behavior of Lower Organisms, pp. 261, 283-85. 
 
 2 Spontaneity is, of course, a direct corollary of the katabolio 
 nature of the animal organism. A " passive " psychology is an im- 
 possibility on the basis of modern biology. 
 
 s Cf. Jennings's statement (op. cit., p. 284): "The organism is 
 activity"; also Thomson's statement {Heredity, p. 172): "The 
 organism is an active, self-assertive, self-adaptive living creature — 
 to some extent master of its fate." This view of the organism as 
 self-active must not be confounded with the neo-vitalism advocated 
 by Driesch in his Science and Philosophy of the Organism. 
 
 * Cf. Jennings, Behavior of Lower Organisms, pp. 302-05 ; 339-42. 
 
 100 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 from a functional point of view, begins from within, not 
 from without. 1 It begins with the physiological impulse 
 which springs from some organic need. In the katabolic 
 animal organism, with its tendency to expend energy, these 
 impulses are incessant, so that the organism is in continu- 
 ous readjustment with its surroundings. It is in this 
 process of continuous adaptation and readaptation to en- 
 vironment for the sake of maintaining and enhancing life 
 that consciousness appears. It appears in order to guide 
 and control activity with reference to the environment. 2 
 If the ground for the beginning of the act is within, it is 
 not less true that the act is developed with reference to 
 the environment, and through the stimuli which the en- 
 vironment affords. 3 The organism is equipped, accord- 
 ingly, with various sense organs which report, through sen- 
 sations, the conditions in the environment of which the 
 organism needs to have knowledge in order to adjust itself 
 successfully. The organism is, therefore, dependent upon 
 the environment for the development and continuance of 
 its activities ; and this dependence is expressed in the men- 
 tal life through the stimulus; but the essential ground for 
 the beginning of its activities lies within — in its own organic 
 
 i Cf. Jennings, Behavior of Lower Organisms, pp. 283-86. 
 
 2 Cf. Miller, Psychology of Thinking, pp. 2, 37. The assumption 
 that consciousness does " guide and control activity," that it does 
 function, does wX>rk, is of course the basic assumption of functional 
 psychology. As this is the assumption of common sense, however, 
 it does not need to be defended from the point of view of scientific 
 method. For arguments for the efficaciousness and survival value 
 of mind or consciousness, see James, Principles of Psychology, 
 Vol. I, pp. 138-144; also Hobhouse, Mind in Evolution, p. 6, Chap. 
 XVII; Stratton, Experimental Psychology and Culture, pp. 281-87. 
 As Miller says (loc. cit.) : "Though we may- not be able to explain 
 satisfactorily either to the materialist or to the idealist the ulti- 
 mate relation between conscious processes and the physiological 
 processes of the brain, yet we may consistently hold that the two 
 sets of activities are functionally related." 
 
 3 Cf. Jennings, Behavior of Lower Organisms, pp. 292-99. 
 
 101 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 needs. In other words, to use the language of some of the 
 psychology of the day, activity depends primarily upon 
 interest. 
 
 The Nature of the Stimulus. — The stimulus is, then, not 
 that which forces action, but that which makes action pos- 
 sible along some line demanded from within. 1 It is, as 
 as has been said, the opportunity for the discharge of 
 energy along some line of organic need. The attitude of 
 the organism toward the stimulus is not passive, but active. 2 
 The organism is keyed up, expectant of the stimulus 
 through its inborn traits or acquired habits (inborn or 
 acquired interests). Ordinarily, indeed, the organism 
 seeks the stimulus. Thus, in daily life we continually seek 
 the stimuli demanded by our inborn or acquired interests 
 (organic needs) . When the organism seems most passive, 
 careful consideration of these cases shows that its passivity 
 is but a high degree of specialized activity. For example, 
 when we start involuntarily at the sound of a loud noise, 
 it is not because the organism is passively forced to re- 
 spond to the stimulus, but because it has been keyed up, 
 made expectant, for such stimuli through many generations 
 of inherited habit. Organisms in the past which did not 
 
 i Cf. Jennings, op. tit., pp. 261, 285, 286, 288. 
 
 2 It is perhaps superfluous to criticise the " passive " psychology 
 of the social thinkers of the past, although such psychology is by 
 no means rare in the sociological literature of the present. Witness, 
 for example, Ward's description of the way a sensory stimulus is 
 converted into a motor impulse: "The impression made at the 
 exterior is communicated through a nerve, by the actual succes- 
 sive alteration of the state of its molecules, to a less differentiated 
 protoplasmic mass in the interior, which receives the impulse by a 
 similar alteration of all its molecules, throwing it into an unstable 
 condition, from which it immediately returns to its normal state 
 by means of a discharge along a second line leading to some organ 
 of locomotion" (Dynamic Sociology, Vol. I, p. 272). This whole 
 passage implies the activity of environment and the passivity of 
 the organism; the activity of the organism being conceived as pro- 
 duced wholly by the stimulation of the environment. 
 
 102 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 respond quickly to such stimuli would be eliminated by- 
 natural selection. Thus natural selection established in us 
 the neural habit of responding quickly to loud noises. 
 Such cases of involuntary attention are, then, to be ex- 
 plained as due to the highly specialized receptivity of the 
 organism for certain stimuli, brought about by natural 
 selection. 1 They express the inborn activities or interests 
 of the organism in contrast to its acquired activities or in- 
 terests. 
 
 One other point implied in the above must be made 
 more explicit ; and that is that the response to the stimulus 
 implies inner organization. There must be a coordination 
 answering to the stimulus, or else no response could be 
 made. Indeed, a stimulus could not be sensed at all unless 
 there were an inner organization answering to it. 2 New 
 stimuli are, for this reason, assimilated to old ones, and 
 the response is made, as it were, by analogy, until the 
 organism readjusts itself, that is, builds up a new coordina- 
 tion answering to the new stimulus. Not everything, in 
 other words, has to be learned by us as individuals. "We 
 receive through our birth a certain stock of hereditary co- 
 ordinations, known as reflexes and instincts, and it is upon 
 the basis of these that the child makes its first responses 
 to stimuli, and builds its new adaptations or habits. 3 These 
 reflexes and instincts, which evidently represent the ac- 
 quirements of the race through long ages of organic evolu- 
 tion, lie at the very basis of our mental and social life, 
 and will frequently concern us later. 
 
 1 Cf. Angell, Psychology, p. 75. 
 
 2 This is implied, of course, in the general fact that the devel- 
 opment of consciousness has run parallel with the development of 
 the nervous system. However, if the " tropism theory " is correct, 
 the inner organization necessary for response to a stimulus would 
 be, not so much anatomical, as chemical. But see Jennings, op. tit., 
 Chap. XIV. 
 
 s Cf. Angell, Psychology, p. 59. 
 
 103 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 The Selective Nature of Consciousness. 1 — The mind, 
 then, presents itself to us, even in its early beginnings, as es- 
 sentially a selective activity. 2 Its whole business jfo' select^ 
 from among the countless stimuli which surround an or- 
 ganism, those which are needful for the maintenance and 
 development of its activities. The basis of this selection is 
 the inner organization of the organism, built up previously 
 through natural selection and habit in response to organic 
 needs. To say that the mind is a selective agency is equiva- 
 lent to saying that it is also an evaluating activity ; for the 
 mind could not select among stimuli without valuing cer- 
 tain stimuli higher than others ; and the basis of this valua- 
 tion, which appears in consciousness under the forms of 
 pleasantness and unpleasantness, is again the inner con- 
 stitution of the organism. 
 
 An important practical conclusion from the above is 
 that the organism is not in subjection to its environment, 
 not at least directly, but only indirectly through natural 
 selection and acquired habit. 3 Natural selection brings 
 about certain innate or instinctive reactions to stimuli, but 
 these are not hard and fast in man and the higher animals ; 
 while acquired habits create certain pathways in the 
 nervous system which give rise to persistent forms of ac- 
 tivity. But the organism plays a leading part, as we shall 
 see, in determining what habits it shall have. 4 Thus the 
 whole psyche presents itself as a delicate apparatus for 
 mastering the environment. In the highest development 
 of psychic life, we should expect, therefore, that the sub- 
 jection to the environment should become less and less. 
 This is the case with man. It is by the might of mind 
 that he has conquered the world. 
 
 i Cf. James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 284-89. 
 2 Cf. Jennings, Behavior of Lower Organisms, pp. 302-5. 
 a Cf. Jennings, op. cit., pp. 237, 284-85. 
 
 << Cf. Angell, Psychology, pp. 57, 58 ; Miller, Psychology of Think- 
 ing, p. 54. 
 
 104 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 Instincts. 1 ' — We have already called attention to the fact 
 that the organism is equipped by heredity, through the 
 working of the principle of natural selection, with inborn 
 capacities to cope with its environment. These are the 
 reflexes and instincts. The reflexes are simple coordinations, 
 like sneezing, coughing, winking, grasping, which are not 
 usually controlled by consciousness. They may be regarded 
 as purely physiological, and concern us only because of 
 their connection with the instincts. The instincts are 
 simply more complex and variable reflexes in which con- 
 sciousness plays a dominant part. They are inborn capaci- 
 ties to act with reference to an end which has been estab- 
 lished by natural selection. In the widest sense, they in- 
 clude all activities or tendencies to activity which are 
 unlearned — are in us apart from training or experience. 2 
 The instincts proper differ from the reflexes chiefly through 
 the fact that (in man, at least) consciousness of some 
 desirable end seems to dominate the series of acts, though 
 the real biological end which the instinct subserves the 
 individual is usually unconscious of. In any case, the 
 instincts are the psychical aspect of race heredity, 3 and 
 represent preformed pathways in the nervous system made 
 in response to the demands of previous life conditions — 
 that is, natural selection. 
 
 i See Thorndike, -Elements of Psychology, Chap. XII; Angell, 
 Psychology, Chap. XV; Judd, Psychology, Chap VIII; James, Briefer 
 Course, Chap. XII; Kirkpatrick, Fundamentals of Child Study, 
 Chap. Ill; also Chapter IX of this text. 
 
 2 Cf. Thorndike's definition of instinct (op. cit., p. 15): "In- 
 stincts include reflexes and all other connections or tendencies to 
 connections amongst thoughts, feelings, and acts which are un- 
 learned — are in us apart from training or experience.'' This defini- 
 tion would make the conception of instinct much broader than the 
 one just given, as it would include much more than instinctive 
 activities. Compare, however, what is said in Chapter IX con- 
 cerning instinctive interests and beliefs. 
 
 3 Cf. Hobhouse's definition of instinct (Mind in Evolution, p. 
 53): "The response of inherited structure to stimulus." 
 
 105 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 Typical instincts are sexual and parental love, though 
 the simpler ones of acquisitiveness, combativeness, and 
 imitativeness are equally in evidence in human society. 
 These examples of instincts suggest at once that human 
 instincts ripen gradually; that they develop only through 
 the presence of appropriate stimuli; and that they are 
 variable in different individuals. 1 Indeed, human instincts 
 are little more than a complex series of instinctive reactions, 
 which are modified by experience and built up into per- 
 manent habits through the influence of successful adjust- 
 ment. But the instincts are all-important as the basis of 
 the mental and social life. They represent the biologically 
 transmitted acquisitions of the race, and hence they are the 
 " psychophores, " or bearers of the mental life. 2 They 
 furnish the nucleus of coordinations by which the organism 
 must begin to master its environment, and all later adapta- 
 tions are but modifications of these original, inherited re- 
 actions. All that we learn, all of our interpretation and 
 mastery of life, is but a superstructure reared upon the 
 basis of our instincts. But it is important for the sociolo- 
 gist to remember that the instincts are at the basis of the 
 social as well as the mental life. All the interactions 
 between individuals, no matter how complex they may 
 become, all social structures and institutions, no matter 
 how elaborate, rest finally upon the basis of instinct. 
 
 Habits. 3 — Instincts are inborn, while habits are acquired. 
 Instincts are race habits; 4 while habits, in the narrower 
 
 i Cf. Thorndike, op. tit., pp. 188-90. 
 
 2 Cf. Hall, Adolescence, Vol. II, p. 61. 
 
 s See Angell, op. cit., Chap. Ill ; Thorndike, op cit., Chap. XIII ; 
 James, Principles, Chap. IV; Judd, op. cit., Chap. VIII. 
 
 * The term " race habit," as describing instinct, is objected to by 
 some because it is said to imply the inheritance of " acquired 
 traits" ("habit" in the strict sense being always acquired). It is, 
 however, a convenient term for racially persistent activities, and its 
 use is sanctioned by the best psychologists (cf. Angell, op. cit., pp. 
 
 106 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 sense in which we now use the term, are modifications of 
 inherited activities acquired by individuals or groups of 
 individuals during their lifetime. 
 
 Habits are due to the fact that nervous currents tend 
 to employ the same pathways which have previously been 
 employed. They may be regarded as expressions in the 
 psychical realm of the law of persistence of force. At any 
 rate, habit is the name we give to the persistence of an 
 activity, though, as we have already said, the name, in 
 strict psychological usage, is usually given only to acquired 
 activities, while the term instinct is reserved for those race 
 habits which are transmitted by heredity. 
 
 All acquired habits are modifications of instincts. 1 In- 
 stinctive reactions become modified by experience, that is, 
 the inherited tendencies of the individual are adapted to 
 new situations, and new ways of reacting are thus acquired. 
 The failure of an instinct to function successfully in a new 
 situation leads to the appearance of consciousness and the 
 reconstruction of the activity through its mediation. When 
 the new coordination thus formed no longer needs atten- 
 
 59, 296), without, of course, any implication of the inheritance of 
 acquired traits. 
 
 i A difference of opinion exists among psychologists as to whether 
 all habits are ultimately modifications of instinctive impulses or 
 not. The view given in the text is that of Thorndike, Angell, and 
 many others. Professor Judd holds, on the other hand {Psychology, 
 p. 216), that there are two classes of habits: (1) those which 
 develop out of instincts; (2) those which develop by selection from 
 diffuse or random activities. Professor John B. Watson (in Harper's 
 Magazine, February, 1912) suggests a reconciliation of these appar- 
 ently different views by pointing out that the " random activities " 
 are of instinctive origin. The difference between the views is evi- 
 dently due to a difference in the definition of " instinct." The 
 word is used in this text in the broad sense of the inherent or hered- 
 itary impulses or tendencies which characterize a race. Of course, 
 habits may also be based upon individual peculiarities, but these 
 again may be regarded as variations in the relatively uniform racial 
 tendencies. 
 
 107 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 tion, no longer exists for its own sake but is used as a 
 means to something else, it drops more or less out of con- 
 sciousness and becomes a habit in the strict sense of the 
 word. Acquired habits, then, have their origin in adapta- 
 tion. A single successful adjustment may be sufficient to 
 establish a new habit. The habit is thus not started by 
 the repetition of an act, but rather it is the habit which 
 gives rise to the repetition. 1 
 
 The earlier-formed habits become, of course, the basis 
 for later ones through their modification by adaptation 
 exactly in the same way that the instincts are modified. 
 Thus are built up the countless habits of the mature indi- 
 vidual. This process of building up habits out of instincts 
 or previously formed habits constitutes the essence of men- 
 tal growth both in the individual and in society. It is 
 the method by which the individual learns, as we say, and 
 it is also the method by which society progresses. 
 
 Adaptation. — We have already repeatedly called atten- 
 tion to the fact that the more important phenomena of 
 consciousness occur in connection with the process of adap- 
 tation, that is, in the transition from one habit or activity 
 to another. It remains to characterize briefly the part 
 which some of the leading conscious processes play in the 
 adaptive process. ' ' Discrimination ' ' is the mental process 
 which marks the breakdown of a coordination. This brings 
 the " sensation " to consciousness which is essentially the 
 sign of the interruption of a habit. " Attention " is the 
 focusing of consciousness for the sake of discovering or 
 selecting the stimuli which are adequate to reconstruct the 
 activity. " Association " is the process by which the dis- 
 criminated elements are built up into a new coordination, 
 
 i Cf. Sisson, The Essentials of Churaelrr, pp. 61-63. This is not 
 denying, of course, that repetition or " practice " may greatly aid 
 in fixing a habit, as all experiments indicate. It is denying, as 
 Professor Sisson says, " that mere repetition of an act will create 
 a habit." 
 
 108 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 the association being primarily of motor tendencies and 
 secondarily of ideas. Thus discrimination, sensation, atten- 
 tion, and the whole list of conscious states, are, from a 
 functional point of view, but factors in the adaptive 
 processes of life, and get their functional significance from 
 their connection with the process of adaptation. 
 
 The whole mental life of the individual, then, centers 
 about the facts of habit and adaptation. The building up 
 of new habits, the breaking down of old ones, the adjust- 
 ment of the countless number of habits to each other — it 
 is in connection with these processes that all the phenomena 
 of consciousness occur. It is also these processes which 
 give rise to the most striking social phenomena. Habit 
 and adaptation are, therefore, fundamental categories for 
 the interpretation of the social life as well as the mental 
 life of the individual. 1 
 
 The Three Aspects of Consciousness. — Every complete 
 mental process has three sides or aspects, the volitional, v 
 the affective, and the cognitive. In other words, thinking, 
 feeling and willing are not separate divisions of the mind, 
 but are simply different aspects of its activity. 2 That is, 
 every conscious state has its motor aspects (will), its affec- 
 tive aspects (feeling), and its cognitive aspects (thinking). 
 Of these three aspects the will, in the broad sense, may be 
 regarded as primary, since the origin of every conscious 
 
 i See Chapter VIII. 
 
 2 As Professor Miller says, " They are not separate structures ; 
 they are rather organizations of consciousness in different ways, each 
 mode of conscious activity being adapted to a particular phase of 
 the work needing to be done in the facilitation of adjustment. They 
 are to be regarded as phases, or attitudes, or aspects of one unitary 
 consciousness which appear within the complete mental act to meet 
 specific needs within the process of adjustment." (Psychology of 
 Thinking, pp. 64, 65.) 
 
 From the standpoint of structural psychology, " will " is, of 
 course, not a distinct mental element, though it has been suggested 
 that it corresponds roughly to kinesthetic sensations. 
 
 109 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 state is in the physiological impulse or activity. The other 
 two aspects of consciousness may be regarded as evaluations 
 of the activity — feeling being an evaluation of the activity 
 with reference to the organism, cognition an evaluation of 
 the activity with reference to. the environment. Every act 
 is evaluated subjectively as to agreeableness or disagree- 
 ableness, and objectively as to its adaptation or non-adapta- 
 tion to the environment. In other words, feeling is the 
 subjective side of the mental process, while thought is the 
 objective side. Both are essentially mediatory in charac- 
 ter, since both are concerned with the mediation or guid- 
 ance of activity. 
 
 Of course, the subjective or feeling side of a mental 
 process may greatly predominate over the objective or 
 thought side, and vice versa. Thus some mental states may 
 seem to be practically all feeling or all thought. But 
 investigation has shown that there is no state of feeling 
 that has not elements of perception in it, nor in the nature 
 of things could there be ; while the most abstract scientific 
 thought has in it elements of feeling. 1 Both are constant 
 aspects of every mental process. However, in the evolution 
 of conscious life, there seems to be a manifest tendency 
 for thought to predominate over feeling in the higher 
 stages, while in the lower stages of life it seems probable 
 that feeling predominates over thought. 
 
 The Will. — In the broad sense, the will is synonymous 
 with psychical activity. As Professor Angell says, " The 
 term will is simply a convenient appellation for the whole 
 range of mental life viewed from the standpoint of its 
 activity and control over movement. " 2 It is in this sense 
 
 i This is. of course, not denying that feeling may approach the 
 point of indifference in mental processes. Some psychologists claim 
 that it is possible to get states of pure cognition. 
 
 2 Psychology, p. 370. Compare the narrower definition of will 
 given by Miller ( op, tit., p. 63 ) : " The controlling of action by 
 ideas is will." 
 
 110 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 that the will is primary in the mental life, and is an aspect 
 of every conscious state. It is, indeed, but a name for 
 the instincts and habits, viewed collectively and from the 
 standpoint of their activity. 
 
 Will manifests itself in consciousness under the form 
 of impulse, which we may define briefly as the more or 
 less conscious tendency toward a movement. When, how- 
 ever, the activity is an habitual one and is unimpeded, the 
 impulse may not rise above the threshold of consciousness, 
 but remains purely physiological. The " impulsiveness of 
 all consciousness " is a fact abundantly demonstrated by 
 psychological experiments, and is simply another way of 
 saying that every conscious state has its motor (volitional) 
 aspects. Activity, then, emerges into consciousness as an 
 impulse, which is at once evaluated by the feelings and 
 the intellect, and which, if in need of control, gives rise 
 to the phenomena of will in the narrow sense, namely, 
 choice, decision, determination. 
 
 Will, in this narrow sense of the power to control 
 action by ideas, that is, the power of choice, decision, is 
 seemingly a comparatively late development in mental 
 evolution. It rests, however, on the selective power of mind 
 which, as we have seen, has characterized it from its earliest 
 beginnings. Conscious choice, decision, could hardly be 
 possible, however, until the selective process came to con- 
 sciousness; that is, until the mind became self-conscious. 
 Of course, in acts of decision, or of " pure will," as they 
 are sometimes called, no impulses are created; there can 
 only be conscious selection among impulses already exist- 
 ing; that is, one impulse is developed at the expense of 
 others. Hence arises in the individual the sense of free- 
 dom of choice, or ' ' freedom of the will, " as we say, though 
 it is manifest that the freedom is very strictly limited by 
 the individual's variety of impulses at a given moment. 
 As Professor Thorndike says, ' ' His will is free in the sense 
 that at any moment what he will attend to and cherish de- 
 Ill 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 pends upon him, upon his attitude toward the situation 
 he confronts." 1 
 
 Feeling. — By feeling, we mean the affective tone which 
 accompanies conscious states. 2 Feeling is used in some 
 works on psychology in a much broader sense, as synony- 
 mous with consciousness itself, 3 but we have used it to 
 designate the agreeable or disagreeable tone of conscious- 
 ness. In ■ this sense, feeling is practically synonymous 
 with pleasure and pain, using those words in a broad way. 
 
 Feeling is, as we have already said, the subjective valua- 
 tion which the organism gives to an activity.* It is, so 
 to speak, the reverberation of the activity in the organism. 
 "When the activity is one which has, on the whole, in the 
 past history of the species been advantageous, the result- 
 ing feeling is usually pleasurable ; when, on the other hand, 
 the activity is one which has been disadvantageous, the 
 feeling is usually disagreeable or painful. 5 Because 
 
 i Elements of Psychology, p. 281. 
 
 2 Cf. Angell, op. cit., Chap. XIII ; Titchener, Tewt-book of Psychol- 
 ogy, pp. 225-26. 
 
 s This is the case with James and also with Thorndike in his 
 Elements of Psychology. 
 
 * As Miller happily phrases it, " Feeling is the me-side of the 
 whole complex of conscious processes involved in adjustment" (op. 
 cit., p. 64). 
 
 5 This is the crude, evolutional view of feeling ( pleasantness and 
 unpleasantness) ; for a more accurate statement, see Professor Max 
 Meyer's articles in the Psychological Review, Vol. XV, on " The Nerv- 
 ous Correlate of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness." According to 
 Meyer, " While the correlate of sensation is the nervous current 
 itself, the correlate of pleasantness and unpleasantness is the in- 
 crease or decrease of the intensity of a previously constant current 
 if the increase or decrease is caused by a force acting at a point 
 other than the point of sensory stimulation." This theory has been 
 rendered more exact by Dr. L. L. Bernard in his Transition to an 
 Objective Standard of Social Control (p. 18): "Feeling," according 
 to Dr. Bernard, "is the result of the correlation, i.e., the supple- 
 mentation or interference, of nervous processes in such a way as to 
 
 112 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 feeling is, however, the inner, subjective side of conscious- 
 ness, representing the evaluation of the individual organism 
 of its own activity, it is subject to all the variations to 
 which the individual organism is subject. Conditions of 
 health, habit, and personal idiosyncrasies often make that 
 which is agreeable to one person disagreeable to another. 
 On the whole, however, pleasure or satisfaction is the rough 
 sign in consciousness of the organically advantageous, 
 while pain or discomfort is the sign of the organically dis- 
 advantageous. And because individual variations are usu- 
 ally not wide, human beings are, after all, remarkably the 
 same in their feelings. 
 
 On account of the obvious importance of pleasure and 
 pain in our psychic life, some psychologists have regarded 
 them as the primary forms of consciousness, from which 
 all other forms have been derived. But as we have already 
 pointed out, feeling never exists in consciousness alone, 
 but is always a tone attached to some other conscious state. 
 It is always attached to cognitive elements and indeed 
 necessarily must be from its very nature. There is 
 no ground, then, for believing that pure feeling is the 
 primary form of consciousness, though it is probably true 
 that in the lower types of mind, feeling greatly prepon- 
 derates and dominates the other forms of consciousness. 1 
 
 Again, it has been claimed that pleasure and pain are 
 the sole springs of action. 2 This was, indeed, the view 
 
 increase or to diminish the neural activity along a given pathway. 
 Where a nervous process is augmented, pleasantness is experienced, 
 and where a nervous process is weakened or diminished, there is 
 unpleasantness." These views are not irreconcilable with the evolu- 
 tionary view of feeling; they are simply more exact. 
 
 i Professor Meyer, on the other hand, holds that feeling is a 
 relatively late product in mental evolution. See the Psychological 
 Review, Vol. XV, p. 320. 
 
 2 Bentham's famous statement, " Nature has placed mankind 
 under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure " 
 (Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chap. I), is but one example 
 
 113 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 of human nature which prevailed during a great part of 
 the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Modern psychol- 
 ogy, however, finds, as we have already stated, that feel- 
 ing is, not the antecedent, but the accompaniment or even 
 consequent of activity. 
 
 Feeling does, however, modify activity. If the feel- 
 ing tone aroused by an activity is pleasurable, the activity 
 is reenforced; but if it is disagreeable or painful, the 
 activity tends to be inhibited. 1 But this is something very 
 different from saying that pleasure and pain are the sole 
 source of the activity. As Professor Thorndike says, ' ' One 
 of the most artificial doctrines about human nature which 
 has ever acquired prominence is the doctrine that pleasure 
 and pain, felt or imagined, are the only motives to action." 2 
 
 To sum up : we are not pushed about hither and thither, 
 by pleasure and pain, as the hedonistic psychology pro- 
 claimed; 3 but pleasure and pain are monitors, rough and 
 inaccurate, but very useful, which indicate to us, without 
 
 of hundreds of similar statements made during the Eighteenth and 
 Nineteenth Centuries. See L. L. Bernard, op. cit., Chap. III. 
 
 1 Why agreeable feeling should reenforce activity and disagree- 
 able feeling tend to inhibit activity, Thorndike thinks to be a totally 
 unsolved problem (cf., e.g., Elements of Psychology, p. 316) ; but if 
 Meyer and Bernard's theory that agreeable feeling results in gen- 
 eral when the main nervous current is reenforced by currents from 
 lower centers and that disagreeable feeling results when the main 
 current is interrupted or diminished by other currents, there would 
 seem to be no mystery about the matter. Cf. Meyer, " The Nervous 
 Correlate of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness," Psychological Re- 
 view, Vol. XV, and Bernard, Transition to an Objective Standard of 
 Social Control, Chap. II. 
 
 2 Elements of Psychology, p. 284. 
 
 8 For further criticism of hedonistic psychology, see Fite, Intro- 
 ductory Study of Ethics, pp. 97-101. Part I of this work contains 
 an extensive criticism of hedonism in all of its aspects, biological, 
 psychological, sociological, and ethical. It may be added that the 
 hedonistic psychology is essentially the same as the " passive " psy- 
 chology spoken of above. 
 
 114 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 the labor of thought, the organically advantageous and 
 disadvanta'geous. 
 
 The compounds of feeling with other conscious states 
 are so important in mental and social life that we must 
 note the chief of these, namely, the emotions, the desires, 
 and the interests. 
 
 The Emotions. — The emotions are hereditary complexes 
 of feeling and sensation which have become attached to 
 certain instinctive reactions. It is the feeling aspect of 
 the emotion, however, which predominates and gives it its 
 significance unconsciousness. As James says, " An emotion 
 *JL%J.S£lency,J2.ieel, an{ i an instinct_is^a J;endency"to '"act 
 characteristically when in the presence of a certain object." 1 
 Typical emotions are fear, anger, hatred, grief, joy, love 
 and sympathy. 2 Their importance in the social life, and 
 the difference in the explanation given of them by the 
 old and the new psychology, make it worth our while to 
 note briefly their origin and function. 
 
 According^ to the older theory of the emotions, they 
 were aroused directly by some object or idea. They were 
 primarily' intellectual and affective states, which brought 
 about certain bodily reactions. According to the newer 
 theory of the emotions, put forth by Professors James and 
 Lange, they are due to certain bodily movements, chiefly 
 of the internal organs, which accompany certain instinctive 
 reactions. 3 The feeling, in other words, which we term 
 the emotion, is the result of bodily movements, and not 
 the bodily movements the result of the feeling. To this 
 theory Profeajor Dewey has added that the peculiar feel- 
 ing which marks each emotion off from other emotions is 
 due to the different reactions which various objects call 
 forth, and that these reactions are the vestiges of acts 
 originally advantageous to the species, and so have been 
 
 i Briefer Course, p. 373. 
 
 2 Angell, op. pit., Chaps. XVIII-XIX; Thorndike, op. cit., Chap. V. 
 
 3 See James, Principles of Psychology, Chap. XXV. 
 
 9 ; 115 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 fixed by natural selection. As Professor James says in 
 effect, it is not true that we run because we are afraid 
 when, for example, we see a bear, but rather we are afraid 
 in proportion as we have the tendency to run. Thus does 
 the new psychology reverse the order set up by the older 
 psychology. It would not be far from correct to say that 
 the object which excites the emotion first excites the in- 
 stinctive reaction, which gives rise to the emotion, while 
 only later is the intellectual perception fully developed. 
 
 It is popularly supposed that the emotions give rise 
 to actions; but at most they only reenforce instinctive ac- 
 tivities. As Professor Thorndike says, " It is often stated 
 that the emotions furnish the energy for action, while 
 the intellectual states only guide and enlighten; that with- 
 out the emotions man would never act vigorously. This 
 is false. Men of vigorous action seem to be moved by 
 strong emotions because acting vigorously itself tends to 
 produce strong emotions, but really clear insight and 
 prompt decision do as much to favor action as do soul- 
 stirring fervor and intense passion." 1 
 
 The emotions do, however, intensify action in certain 
 instinctive ways. The impulsive power of the coarser emo- 
 tions, especially, is marked, and they often lead to the most 
 violent actions. In the social life the emotions powerfully 
 reenforce habits and customs which are based upon native 
 impulses, and in times of excitement they often produce 
 reversions of activity to a purely instinctive type. But 
 above all, they give richness and meaning to the social life. 
 While the emotions are chi efly conser vative in their so- 
 cial action, 2 because they represent, in the main, hereditary 
 evaluations of activity by the individual organism, yet the 
 social emotions form, as we shall see, a part of the psycho- 
 logical basis of progress ; and emotional impulses in general, 
 held in check and guided by reason, may intensify action 
 
 iOp. cit., p. 117. 
 
 2 See Chapter X. 
 
 116 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 in advantageous ways. The emotions, then, while not the 
 primary forces in individual' or social life, are true sec- 
 ondary forces which must be reckoned with both negatively 
 and positively. 
 
 The Desires and the Interests. — The desires are com- 
 plexes of feeling and impulse with the knowledge of the 
 object which will satisfy the impulse. They are most mani- 
 fest in connection with the instinctive impulses; hence the 
 close connection of desire with instinct. 1 An impulse 
 which springs from a purely acquired habit may, however, 
 express itself in desire, though usually not of the strong, 
 passionate sort. That the desires are expressions of habits 
 as well as of instincts is shown by the fact that the de- 
 sires of men differ greatly, but the instincts of all are 
 practically the same. 
 
 Whether the desires are to be classified under the as- 
 pects of feeling or of will psychologists differ. Some place 
 them with the emotions, while others regard them as forms 
 of will. 2 It is evident, however, that inasmuch as desire 
 is a compound of affective, volitional, and cognitive ele- 
 ments, it is of no importance whether it be classified as 
 a form of feeling or of will. Desire arises, however, through 
 the blocking of the impulse by some impediment to activity, 
 which brings the feeling valuation of the activity vividly 
 to consciousness. For the same reason, the cognitive ele- 
 ments in desire often become extremely vivid. 
 
 Although the desires are extremely complex mental 
 states, they occupy a position of fundamental importance 
 in the social life. The relations of individuals may be 
 regarded as more or less direct expressions of their desires. 
 For this reason, Professor "Ward and other sociologists 
 have claimed that the desires are the true social forces. 
 This claim we shall examine later. 
 
 Interest, in the psychological sense, is the subjective or 
 
 iCf. Angell, op. tit., pp. 373-74. 
 2 Cf. Thorndike, op. eit., p. 87, and Angell, p. 374. 
 117 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 feeling side of attention. 1 In a wider sense, interest' is 
 synonymous with, organic need — that which concerns the 
 life of the organism. Inasmuch as the organism is born 
 into the world with instinctive tendencies to attend to 
 those things which concern its life, and is constantly ac- 
 quiring by habit further tendencies of the same sort, it is 
 evident that interest in the subjective sense tends to eon- 
 form to interest in the wider, objective sense. Neverthe- 
 less, it would perhaps be better, in order to avoid 
 ambiguity, to use the word only in the psychological sense. 
 In this sense, interests are of two sorts: inborn, or in- 
 stinctive, and acquired. 2 An individual's inborn tendencies 
 to attend may be called his instinctive interests, while his 
 acquired tendencies to attend may be called his acquired 
 interests. From this classification, it is obvious that the 
 interests are subjective aspects of instinct and habit; and 
 that an interpretation of the social life in terms of interest 
 is essentially the same as an interpretation in terms of in- 
 stinct and habit. 
 
 The Intellect. — The intellect is the objective, universal 
 side of mind. 3 "While the whole mind is concerned with the 
 adaptation of the organism to its environment, the intellect, 
 in the broad sense of cognition, is directly concerned with 
 environmental factors. The various aspects of instinct, 
 feeling and emotion stand peculiarly for the organism itself, 
 while the intellect is turned outward toward the rest of the 
 universe. Again, instinct, feeling and emotion all represent 
 peculiarly the adaptations in the organism's past history, 
 while the intellect stands chiefly for the present and the fu- 
 ture. The intellect is the projective as well as the objective 
 side of mind. All this is equivalent to saying that the cogni- 
 tive elements of consciousness play the decisive role in adapt- 
 ing the organism to its environment. Feeling, at most, can 
 
 iCf. Angell, op. cit., pp. 362-68. 
 z Cf. Thorndike, op. cit., pp. 309-10. 
 s Cf. Dewey, Psychology, pp. 21-24. 
 118 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 only evaluate activity with reference to the organism and its 
 past environments ; while the intellect, in its highest devel- 
 opment, can evaluate activity with reference to present 
 and future environments, and even the universe itself. If 
 man were still living a wild animal life in the woods, his 
 instincts and emotions might be safe guides; but in the 
 midst of a highly complex civilization and a rapidly chang- 
 ing environment, they need criticism and supervision. 
 Hence the demand for the supremacy of the intellect, es- 
 pecially the reason, over the feelings, emotions, and passions 
 — a demand which is acquiesced in by every sane mind, 
 though this is not saying that many persons of compara- 
 tively undeveloped intellect may not find in their feelings a 
 safer guide than in their reason. 
 
 "We must not think of the intellect, however, as some- 
 thing separate and apart from the instincts and emotions. 1 
 As has already been insisted, the intellect is but the more 
 objective and psychological side of the same process which 
 expresses itself in instinct and emotion on its more biologi- 
 cal and subjective side. In the life-process, indeed, the 
 intellect has been developed chiefly as an aid in carrying 
 out the instincts and in satisfying the demands of feeling. 
 Nevertheless, the intellect is not the mere servant of the in- 
 stincts and emotions. In man, at least, it has achieved con- 
 siderable independence of them, and not infrequently is in 
 opposition to them. Chiefly on account of his rapidly 
 changing environment, civilized man depends upon his in- 
 stincts less than any other animal; for him, therefore, the 
 intellect, especially the reason, has become the chief guide 
 of life. 
 
 The reason is simply the most highly developed form of 
 the intellect. It is the most complex of all the devices of 
 consciousness for aiding the organism in adapting itself to 
 its environment. 2 Without attempting to describe its work- 
 
 i Cf. Miller, op. cit., pp. 97, 98. 
 a Cf. Angell, op. cit., p. 246. 
 
 119 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 ings in detail, it may be characterized as " the universal- 
 relating activity of mind ' ' ; that is, it functions to adapt 
 the organism to a wider and more universal environment. 
 By means of it consciousness is able to take account of fac- 
 tors neither present nor tangible to the senses, remote, per- 
 haps, in both space and time. Thus reason aids in adapting 
 the organism to a much wider environment, both in space 
 and in time, than such simple cognitive processes as sensa- 
 tion, perception, memory and recognition could possibly 
 do. Indeed, the goal of reason seems to be to adapt the self 
 to a perfectly universal environment. Thus it explores the 
 unknown and guides in even transforming the environment 
 itself. All the achievements of science, all the conquests of 
 the practical arts, all man's mastery over nature and self, 
 are products of reason. And yet reason has apparently 
 only begun its work of transforming nature and man. 
 
 There is, of course, no foundation for the idea that the 
 reason is essentially individualistic; 1 and that there is, 
 therefore, no rational sanction for altruism, and so also 
 none for progress. The conception of reason as essentially 
 " the calculation of consequences to self " is too narrow to 
 need serious refutation. On the contrary, the reason, as we 
 have seen, is the most imiversal aspect of mind ; and though 
 in some of its earlier stages it may seem narrow and egois- 
 tic, in its higher developments it may be said to represent 
 far more the race than the individual. There is as much, 
 and more hope, therefore, that men will attain to common 
 beliefs and purposes, to spiritual union, through reason as 
 through external authority or emotional appeals. Like the 
 whole mind, the reason has been essentially social in its 
 development. Though unsocialized reason, like unsocialized 
 desire, may be in abundant evidence in the present, it must 
 be considered abnormal, and not that reason is essentially 
 
 iCf. Ward, Pure Sociology, pp. 464, 479-80; also Kidd, Social 
 Evolution, Chap. III. 
 
 120 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 destructive of social unity, because destructive of the spirit 
 of service and self-sacrifice upon which social unity subsists. 
 
 This brings us, however, to the last topic in our direct 
 discussion of individual human nature. 
 
 The Social Character of Mind.— All that we know of mind 
 indicates that it has been developed in and through the 
 social life-process, that is, through the interaction of mind 
 with mind in the carrying on and controlling of a common 
 life-process. 1 "While consciousness exists only in the indi- 
 vidual, every aspect of consciousness is so deeply tinged 
 with the social life around as to suggest to some psycholo- 
 gists that mind belongs primarily to the race or to the 
 group rather than to the individual. Whatever truth there 
 may be in this mystical theory, it is certain that all human 
 consciousness is socially conditioned; that is, conscious- 
 ness, as we know it, has been developed under conditions of 
 association, and has reference to the common life-process 
 of the group quite as much as to the individual life-process. 
 This is as true of the racially inherited aspects of conscious- 
 ness — the feeling-instincts — as it is of its acquired traits. 2 
 Thus the higher human instincts and emotions show very 
 plainly their reference to the social life and function quite 
 as much for the preservation of the group as of the indi- 
 vidual. The so-called social or altruistic states of mind are, 
 then, as natural as the individualistic states ; and to explain 
 the former as derived from the latter is bad psychology, 3 
 
 i Cf. Professor Mead's article on " Social Psychology as Counter- 
 part to Physiological Psychology," especially pp. 403-8, in Psycho- 
 logical Bulletin, Vol. VI; also, Baldwin, Social and Ethical Inter- 
 pretations in Mental Development, Chaps. I and II. 
 
 2 As Professor Mead points out (loc. cit., pp. 403-4), practically 
 all the human instincts have the implication of development in a 
 social medium. In this sense even the consciousness of the infant 
 is, from a genetic point of view, socially conditioned. 
 
 s As Hobhouse says (Mind in Evolution, p. 339), "The concep- 
 tion of a primitive egoism on which sociability is somehow overlaid 
 is without foundation either in biology or psychology." 
 
 121 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 since they were both produced in a common process of 
 evolution. As to the acquired traits of consciousness, it is 
 quite unnecessary to show that practically all that we learn 
 we get from our social environment, and that therefore not 
 only our knowledge and beliefs, but even our percepts and 
 concepts are largely social products. It is in the " give- 
 and-take " of social life that all these mental states are 
 developed as phases of individual consciousness. Philo- 
 sophical individualism as a theory of human nature or as a 
 theory of society receives no support from scientific psy- 
 chology. Individual psychology thus comes to depend upon 
 sociology in certain portions almost as much as sociology 
 depends upon psychology. 1 Man's mental life and social 
 life are inseparable ; so, too, psychology and sociology. All 
 these facts have been so emphasized of late by psychological 
 writers that it is unnecessary to do more here than mention 
 them, 2 while their implications for sociological theory 
 proper will be developed in the succeeding chapters. 
 
 Summary. — If we were to try to sum up this chapter in 
 a few sentences, we should say that man is made for action ; 
 that he is by nature active, not passive, in the presence 
 of the forces of environment; that his mind has been de- 
 veloped in and through his activities, and for the sake of 
 controlling them; that it has reference in all its phases to 
 sustaining and developing the life-process ; that mental life 
 is itself but an aspect, though in man the significant and 
 controlling aspect, of the whole life-process ; and finally, 
 
 i Cf . Mead's statement (loc. tit., p. 408): "The evolutionary 
 social science which shall describe and explain the origins of human 
 society, and the social sciences which shall finally determine what 
 are the laws of social growth and organization will be as essential 
 for determining the objective conditions of social consciousness as 
 the biological sciences are to determine the conditions of conscious- 
 ness in the biological world." 
 
 2 One of the best recent discussions along this line is an article 
 by Professor E. S. Ames on " Social Consciousness and its Object " 
 in the Psychological Bulletin for December 15, 1011. 
 
 122 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY 
 
 that it has reference not simply to the life of the individual, 
 but also to the life of the group and of the race. 
 
 Note on the Use of Psychological Tekminology in Sociology. 
 — Certain objections have been made to the use of psychological 
 terms in sociology. It is said that every science should have its 
 own terminology; that no terms should be brought over from one 
 science to another by analogy; also that sociology should find its 
 terms in common everyday language. With the last two of these 
 propositions the writer is in hearty* sympathy. Every science should 
 use the language of everyday life as far as possible. But all 
 sciences find such language inadequate for their purposes on ac- 
 count of its inexactness. This is unfortunately often as true in 
 the social science as in other sciences. Thus, e.g., common language 
 often describes the interactions of individuals in physical terms 
 when it is manifestly inexact to do so. 
 
 Nothing is more vicious in science than the mere analogical or 
 metaphorical use of terms. Terms should never be taken over from 
 one science to another because 01 mere analogy, but only when 
 they exactly describe processes. If psychological terms are used 
 in sociology it must be shown that they exactly describe the 
 processes to which they are applied. But in a science like sociology, 
 so immediately dependent upon antecedent sciences, terms from 
 those sciences often exactly describe the processes in question. Just 
 as physiology finds it convenient and even necessary to take over 
 many terms from chemistry, so sociology will find it necessary to 
 take over many terms from psychology and biology. Inasmuch as 
 many of the processes which sociology describes are extensions or 
 aspects of psychical processes within the individual, the language 
 of psychology describes them more exactly than any other termi- 
 nology possibly could. 
 
 There seem$, then, to be no good reasons for arguing that sociol- 
 ogy should -have a terminology quite independent of the sciences 
 upon which it depends. It will, doubtless, develop in time a rela- 
 tively independent terminology, although thus far all efforts to 
 give it a, distinct terminology of its own have failed. It seems 
 reasonable to conclude, therefore, that greater progress will be 
 made in sociology if in the psychological aspects of sociology 
 psychological terms are used and in the biological aspects biological 
 terms. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY * 
 
 The Origin of Society in General. — The origin of society 
 in general, that is, of association among animals, and of 
 human society in particular, can no longer be regarded as 
 purely a speculative question. During the Seventeenth and 
 Eighteenth Centuries social philosophers gave so many and 
 so varied answers to this question, from the supernatural to 
 the contract theory, that it deservedly fell into disrepute. 
 The advances of Nineteenth-Century science have made it 
 evident, however, that the problem of the origin of society 
 is no more insoluble than the problem of the origin of spe- 
 cies. This is not saying, of course, that there remain no 
 unexplained elements in the problem, or that there is gen- 
 eral agreement among all sociologists upon this question. 
 Life in general remains a mystery to science, and as long 
 as it does the origin of association as a phase of the life- 
 process must remain also to a certain extent a mystery. 
 
 The Life-Process Essentially Social. 2 — Fundamentally 
 the problem of the origin of society is a biologienl question. 
 
 1 The first two thirds of this chapter appeared as an article in 
 the American Journal of Sociology for November, 1909 (Vol. XV, 
 pp. 394-404). 
 
 2 The point of view of this chapter was originally gotten by the 
 writer from Professor G. H. Mead of the University of Chicago in 
 lectures attended during 1897-98. A number of recent biological 
 works have expressed similar views. The most striking of these is 
 perhaps the work of Mr. Henry M. Bernard on Some Neglected Fac- 
 tors in Evolution (Putnam's, 1911). This work sets forth essen- 
 tially the same theory of the origin of social life as the one here 
 
 124 
 
THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY 
 
 The psychological sociologist, in his discussion of the prob- 
 lem, needs only to point out that the life-process is essenti- 
 ally social from the start; that is, it involves from the first 
 the interaction of individual organisms. This interaction, 
 while in its lowest phases purely physical, gives rise in its 
 higher stages to that psychical interaction which we call 
 association or society. 
 
 Life is not, and cannot be, an affair of individual or- 
 ganisms. The processes of both nutrition and reproduction 
 in all higher forms of life involve a necessary interde- 
 pendence among organisms of the same species, which, ex- 
 cept under unfavorable conditions, gives rise to group life 
 and psychical interaction. Society is no more the result 
 of the coming together of individuals developed in isolation 
 than the multicellular organism is the result of the coming 
 together of cells so developed. Society, that is, the psy- 
 chical interaction of individuals, is an expression of the 
 original and continuing unity of the life-process of the 
 associating- organisms. Looked at from the standpoint of 
 the whole evolution of life, it is really the result of the 
 breaking-up of the life-process into several relatively inde- 
 pendent centers while the process itself remains a unity. 
 The functional interdependence on the psychical side which 
 constitutes a group of organisms a society is a mark at once 
 
 given, though unfortunately mixed up with questionable biological 
 and psychological theories. Says Bernard (p. 395): "When we 
 come to deal with the colonies built up of human units, we feel 
 justified in postulating that, though accidents in the environment 
 may have tended to foster association in some and to destroy it in 
 others, yet the principle of association has been instinctive and or- 
 ganic, since the colonization of human societies belongs to the series 
 of colonizations which have been such conspicuous factors in bring- 
 ing about organic evolution. This point is very important and adds 
 an element to the science of sociology which is much needed. With- 
 out it human societies would have to be regarded as more or less 
 fortuitous aggregates of individuals who are slowly learning to 
 cooperate." 
 
 125 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 of their original unity in a common life-process and of the 
 fact that they now constitute a higher, more complex unity. 
 In this view, the social process is strictly a phase of the life- 
 process, even in the biological sense. 
 
 Social Life in Part a Function of the Food Process. 1 — 
 The social process, then, grows spontaneously out of the 
 life-process. It grows out of both of the fundamental 
 phases of the life-process — the food process and the repro- 
 ductive process. The food process, or the activities con- 
 nected with nutrition, seems to act chiefly in a negative way 
 upon the earliest beginnings of association. As a rule, 
 organisms of one species remain together as long as food 
 is abundant, and they scatter only when the conditions of 
 nutrition become unfavorable. 
 
 The thing to be explained in the organic world is not 
 the living together of large numbers of one species, but 
 rather the scattering and separation of individuals. 2 As 
 has already been said, separation usually takes place on 
 account of lack of food supply, while where food supply 
 is abundant and sufficiently concentrated the individuals of 
 a species remain together in large numbers. Now, where 
 living forms remain in close proximity to each other they 
 tend to take on functional interrelations both in the food 
 process and in the reproductive process. The conditions of 
 food supply thus become the physical basis of the interre- 
 lations among organisms, interrelations which later become 
 psychical. When the conditions of food supply become 
 unfavorable, the tendency to scatter, moreover, may be 
 
 i For a very good discussion of the influence of the function of 
 nutrition upon social origin and development, see Espin.is, Des 
 Boci6t6s Awimales, Section II. 
 
 2 The most serious errors in sociology have been introduced 
 through the assumption of primitive isolation or separateness. One 
 can never get anything but a mechanical unity in society unless 
 there was some sort of vital unity at the beginning. The biological 
 view of life, however, gives but little support to philosophical indi- 
 vidualism. 
 
 12G 
 
THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY 
 
 overcome by new adaptations on the part of organisms 
 which give rise to superior ways of cooperating, so that an 
 adequate supply of food shall be assured. Or when scatter- 
 ing does take place it may be by bands, and those bands 
 whose members cooperate best in finding a food supply 
 would have the best chance of survival. 
 
 The control over the food process is the matter of su- 
 preme concern both to the individual and to the species. 
 Not only is a stable food supply necessary for the survival 
 of the individual, but reproduction can only take place 
 after nutrition has reached a certain height, and it tends to 
 go on only where food supply is abundant. Now, control 
 over the food process can be more easily established by 
 groups of cooperating individuals than by isolated indi- 
 viduals. Natural selection operates, therefore, from the 
 first in favor of such groups, and toward the elimination 
 of individuals living relatively isolated. It must especially 
 favor those groups in which the interactions between indi- 
 vidual units are quick and sure — that is, those groups in 
 which the power of psychic interstimulation and response is 
 fully established, and in which intelligent cooperation and 
 orderly relations between individuals are highly developed. 
 It is not an accident that the most successful, and, in gen- 
 eral, the higher animals live in groups with well-ordered 
 relations and highly developed means of interstimulation 
 and cooperation. 
 
 Thus the collective control over the food process, estab- 
 lished primarily by natural selection, becomes the positive 
 basis of social organization, so that it is possible even to 
 say, in a rough way, that the social process is a function 
 of the food process. The goal, indeed, of much conscious 
 social development seems to be the collective control of the 
 food process. Whether it is the only goal, or the highest 
 goal, of social development will be considered later. It 
 suffices to point out here that social organization and evolu- 
 tion present themselves, from one point of view, largely as 
 
 127 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 a direct outgrowth of that fundamental phase of the life- 
 process which we have called the food process. 
 
 Defense against enemies may be regarded as the nega- 
 tive side of the food process, since it is largely in the efforts 
 to secure and maintain a food supply that the necessity of 
 defense arises. That such defense can be much better un- 
 dertaken by groups of individuals than by isolated indi- 
 viduals; and that natural selection, therefore, operates 
 powerfully in this way alone to favor group life, have long 
 been among the commonplaces of sociologists. The conflict 
 of group with group in the struggle for the possession of 
 the means of subsistence has been one of the most important 
 factors in social evolution, especially in the way of inte- 
 grating groups. It is not our purpose, however, to discuss 
 the workings of this factor in social evolution at this point, 
 but only to recognize that conflict as a phase of the food 
 process has contributed powerfully to the genesis and de- 
 velopment of association or the social life. 
 
 Social Life in Part a Function of the Reproductive 
 Process. 1 — It is not, however, the food process which has 
 played the chief role in the genesis of association among 
 animals. That honor belongs to the reproductive process, 
 using that phrase in a broad way to cover all the activities 
 connected with the birth and rearing of offspring. The 
 study of the reproductive process is, indeed, the keystone of 
 the arch in general sociology. The birth and care of off- 
 spring are essential phases of the life-process, and at the 
 same time are essentially social activities, since in all but 
 the lowest forms of life they involve the cooperation of at 
 least two individuals. Sexual reproduction, necessitating 
 the interaction of two individuals, lays a positive founda- 
 tion for association. It is, however, the production of im- 
 mature or " child " forms which need prolonged and ten- 
 
 i See Espinas, Des Soci6t6s Animates, on the influence of the 
 function of reproduction on the formation and development of social 
 groups. 
 
 128 
 
THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY 
 
 der care on the part of one or both parents which gives rise 
 to that most intimate form of association that we term the 
 family, which produces and reproduces the social life from 
 generation to generation, and which becomes the basis, in 
 large measure, of all later social organization. In the rela- 
 tionship of the mother to the child we have the beginnings 
 of that sympathetic social life, of which the family has re- 
 mained the highest type, and which has become the con- 
 scious goal of civilized human society. Society, in the sym- 
 pathetic sense, then, had its beginnings in the family, that 
 is, in the relation of the child form to the mother form. 1 
 
 The relationship of the child form to the parent form 
 becomes more prolonged and increasingly important as or- 
 ganic evolution advances. While in the lower reaches of 
 life the reproductive process is comparatively unimportant 
 in its social results, in the higher animals with the prolon- 
 gation of the period of immaturity and with the increasing 
 necessity of the cooperation of both parents in the care of 
 the young, it becomes supremely significant for the social 
 life. While it is a law that the higher we ascend in the 
 animal scale, the less energy is devoted to mere physical 
 reproduction, it is equally a law that the higher we ascend 
 in the animal scale the more energy is devoted to the care 
 and rearing of the offspring that are born. The social re- 
 sults of the reproductive process become, therefore, increas- 
 ingly rich, significant, and complex as we ascend in the 
 scale of animal life. It is among the higher animals that 
 the family as a form of association receives its highest de- 
 velopment, and hitherto it has been among the most highly 
 civilized peoples that the family as a human institution has 
 been held in highest regard and most safeguarded in cus- 
 tom and in law. 
 
 It is not, therefore, too much to say that the social proc- 
 ess is a function of the reproductive process quite as much 
 i Cf. Sutherland, Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, Chaps. 
 X-XI. 
 
 129 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 as it is a function of the food process ; that the social order 
 exists to safeguard the birth and upbringing of each new 
 generation quite as much as to assure an adequate supply 
 of material goods to those already existing. Of course, these 
 two phases of the social process are supplementary and 
 should not be set in opposition to each other. They would 
 not need to be distinguished, were there not some who talk 
 as if the only function of the social life were to secure fox" 
 all an adequate supply of material goods. Certain it is that 
 all forms of social life, from the ants and bees to man, and 
 in the human world from savage to civilized, have been 
 determined from considerations of reproduction quite as 
 much as from considerations of nutrition. The goal of 
 social development is, therefore, quite as much control over 
 the reproductive process as control over the food process. 
 The child is not only the center of the family life, but of 
 the whole social system as well. The child's heredity, birth, 
 care, and education are the supreme concern of church and 
 state as well as of the home, and the sooner this is recog- 
 nized the better. 
 
 The Origin of the Social Nature of Consciousness. — If the 
 general forces at work in the genesis of association or 
 group life are now clear, it remains only to say a word 
 about the social character of the individual mind; that is, 
 how consciousness comes to be the chief connecting link 
 between individuals living in association. As far back as 
 we can go in mental evolution, the psychic elements of life 
 are a chief means of binding individuals of the same species 
 together. Instincts, emotions, and sensations of one indi- 
 vidual organism often seem made to fit into corresponding 
 mental processes of another organism ; and varied means of 
 interstimulation and response are developed. The mind 
 seems to be social in its nature from the start, and to be 
 at once a social product and a social instrument. 
 
 The reason for this is now clear. Consciousness is con- 
 cerned with the mediation of the activities of the life- 
 
 130 
 
THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY 
 
 process, particularly those of the food process. But the 
 life-process of the individual is only a part of the larger 
 life-process of the group to which he belongs. The procur- 
 ing of food and the protection against enemies, as we have 
 seen, are activities which can be more successfully carried 
 on by the group than by the individual. But consciousness 
 is concerned with the mediation of these life activities. If 
 they are carried on by groups it is evident that the only 
 way the mind can control them is through some form of 
 psychic interconnection between the individuals of the 
 group. Hence have arisen the various forms of psychical 
 interaction (inter stimulation and response) between indi- 
 viduals. These forms of psychical interaction, in man at 
 least, are so perfect that intelligence controls collective ac- 
 tion almost as easily as individual action. Thus the social 
 character of mind is an expression of the fact that it has to 
 do with the mediation of a process which is carried on by 
 several cooperating individual units ; while society, the psy- 
 chical interrelations of these individuals, means that there 
 is one common process of living carried on by these cooper- 
 ating units on the psychic plane, that is, on the plane of 
 interstimulation and response. Society in the concrete 
 sense, in other words, may be practically defined as a group 
 if individuals who carry on a common life-process by means 
 of interstimulation and response. 
 
 The Origin of Human Society. — The position already im- 
 plied is that the processes involved in human association 
 are fundamentally the same as in animal association; in 
 other words, that animal society is the precursor of human 
 society, and that, strictly speaking, human society is but 
 a form of animal society. Human society is, however, so 
 different from animal society that it is considered by many 
 to be sui generis. But the whole difference between the 
 two, it can readily be shown, is in the forms and definite- 
 ness of the psychical interaction between individuals. 
 What especially distinguishes human society from animal 
 10 131 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 groups is the possession of articulate language. It is this 
 which makes possible the communication of definite ideas, 
 giving a far greater degree of definiteness to the whole 
 process of mental interaction and making possible among 
 human beings many higher forms of cooperation. Ar- 
 ticulate speech, of course, rests in some degree upon the 
 power of forming abstract or general ideas, though it in 
 turn reacts to develop that power. Upon these two great 
 differences between man and the other animals — articulate 
 speech and the power of abstract thought 1 — rest the chief 
 differences between animal and human society; for the 
 other great distinctive marks of human society, such as 
 the rationality and self -consciousness of its individual mem- 
 bers, religion and government, all go back to or are in- 
 timately associated with language and the power of abstract 
 thought. 
 
 Instinctive Origin of Human Society. — If what has been 
 said is true, then human society must be regarded as an 
 inheritance from man's prehuman progenitors, and as a 
 form of animal society. Even many of the forms of human 
 association were doubtless fixed in the subhuman stage. 
 This is notably true of man's family life, which in its es- 
 sential features, as Westermarck and others have shown 
 must be regarded as an inheritance from man's ape-like 
 progenitors. 2 It is also true of such a form of association 
 
 1 These, of course, go back to the more fundamental differences 
 in mental constitution between man and other animals, pointed out 
 by Professor Thorndike among others (see his Animal Intelligence, 
 pp. 124-42). Thorndike sums up these differences in mental con- 
 stitution between man and other animals as chiefly differences in 
 their mental associations. Man's associations " are naturally far 
 mode delicate, complex'and numerous" {loo. cit., p. 137). This gives 
 rise to the great difference that man has " free " or " independent 
 ideas" which are unattached to specific reactions (op. cit., pp. 124, 
 153-54). 
 
 2 See Westermarck's History of Human Marriage, Chaps. I and 
 III. For a judicious summing up of the controverted question of 
 
 132 
 
THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY 
 
 as leader and follower, for the phenomena of leadership 
 are found among many of the higher animals. 
 
 In a word, human society rests upon instincts estab- 
 lished by natural selection during the long prehuman stage 
 of man's evolution. These instincts were the basis of all 
 the primitive forms of association among men, and the 
 addition to these of the intellectual elements of language, 
 abstract ideas, self-consciousness, and reason is what gave 
 rise to the peculiar products of human social evolution, 
 human institutions and civilization. 
 
 Human Social Life Modified by Intellectual Elements. — 
 The origin of these intellectual elements which have given 
 a peculiar color and form, so to speak, to human association 
 we cannot here discuss except to say that they are them- 
 selves largely social products. Language is manifestly a 
 social product, and the fact that man is the only speaking 
 animal is correlated with the fact that he is preeminently 
 the social animal. In the same way, the power of abstract 
 thought and of syllogistic reasoning may be shown to 
 depend largely upon language and other traits developed 
 through association. Even self-consciousness itself, the 
 consciousness of the unity and continuity of our mental 
 life, which many make the distinctive mark of human 
 society, is probably an outcome of association. 1 It certainly 
 depends for its development in the child largely upon lan- 
 guage and the general give-and-take of the social life. All 
 this, of course, is equivalent to saying that the differences 
 between animal and human society are due to the natural 
 social evolution of the human species; that the causes of 
 these differences are to be sought in human social life it- 
 self, and not outside. 
 
 the existence of a primitive state of promiscuity, see Thomas, Source 
 Book of Social Origins, pp. 530f. 
 
 i Cf. Baldwin, Social and Ethical Interpretations, pp. 13f. ; 
 Cooley, Social Organization, Chap. I; Giddings, Elements of Sociol- 
 ogy, Chaps. IX and XX. 
 
 133 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 This is not saying, of course, that there may not be 
 instincts peculiar to man as an animal which account in 
 part for the differences between animal and human so- 
 ciety. But it is saying that these peculiar human instincts 
 are not what give human society its distinctive character, 
 but rather the intellectual elements; and that these in- 
 stincts have evolved, and all man's instincts been modified, 
 under the influence of a social life in which intellectual 
 elements were powerful. Thus are harmonized the in- 
 stinctive and the intellectual elements in human society. 
 
 Contrasts Between the Family IAfe of Man and of 
 Brutes} — The family life of man, as the primary form of 
 human association, will serve to illustrate these points. 
 Though man 's family life in its essentials is undoubtedly an 
 inheritance from his prehuman precursor, yet one is struck 
 at once by the vast differences between the family life 
 of man and that of the higher animals nearest him. There 
 is, for example, in the human species no pairing season, 
 little tendency to natural ornament during the period of 
 courtship, but a strong tendency to artificial adornment, 
 while there seems to be an instinct against incest, 2 prevent- 
 ing close inbreeding. These differences may be perhaps 
 set down to a difference in instincts between man and the 
 higher animals. On the other hand, there are many dif- 
 ferences which cannot be so explained, such as the fact that 
 the endorsement . of society is almost invariably sought 
 among human beings before the establishment of a new 
 
 i The substance of this analysis (developed more fully in my 
 elementary text, Sociology and Modern Social Problems, pp. 66, 
 67), I owe to Professor W. F. Willcox. 
 
 2 The recent criticism of the view that the aversion to incest 
 is instinctive (e.g., that of Havelock Ellis in his Psychology of Sex) 
 amounts only to this, that the instinctive tendency is not so much 
 against incest as toward sexual attraction between relatively strange 
 or unfamiliar persons (the so-called "instinct of exogamy"). But 
 this theory practically comes to the same thing as Westermarck's 
 theory. 
 
 134 
 
THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY 
 
 family, usually through the forms of a religious marriage 
 ceremony ; that there exists a feeling of modesty regarding 
 matters of sex; and that chastity is enforced, on married 
 women at least, among all peoples. While these peculiar 
 traits of human family life may perhaps in part be traced 
 to peculiar " human instincts," yet the element of self- 
 consciousness in each of them is so large and so manifest 
 that they may be safely ascribed largely to man's intel- 
 lectual nature. Thus the human family life illustrates 
 both the instinctive origin of human association and its 
 modification through intellectual elements which have 
 caused it to vary widely from the primitive animal type. 
 Prolongation of Human Infancy. — Here must be no- 
 ticed the influence of the prolongation of human infancy 
 upon human social life. This purely biological fact, whose 
 importance John Fiske was the first to call attention to, 1 
 has had a profound influence on both the instinctive and 
 intellectual elements in human association, and especially 
 on human family life. We have already noted how the 
 prolongation of the period of immaturity of offspring 
 affects social evolution in general, cementing the union 
 between the parents and giving opportunity for the devel- 
 opment of the sympathetic instincts and emotions within 
 the family group. It is, no doubt, largely due to pro- 
 longed human infancy, therefore, that we have regularly 
 in human society a permanent union between the parents 
 lasting throughout life; permanent sympathetic relations 
 between all members of a family group, giving rise to 
 the sentiment of blood kinship; and a high development 
 of sympathetic feeling and altruism in human society gen- 
 erally. It is, however, often overlooked that the pro- 
 longed period of immaturity in man, besides cementing 
 the human family group and generating altruism in an 
 instinctive way, gives opportunity for the intellectual ele- 
 
 i Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. II, pp. 340-46, 360. 
 135 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 ments in human association to assert their influence. It 
 is prolonged immaturity which makes education possible, 
 and gives opportunity for social tradition to mold each 
 individual in conformity with the habits of his social group. 
 Language could hardly be transmitted, and could not be 
 developed and perfected without prolonged immaturity. 
 And so with every other spiritual possession of humanity. 
 Abstract thought, religion, government, and moral ideals 
 could hardly effectively mold individual conduct or in- 
 fluence the social organization, were it not for the period 
 of relatively prolonged plastic immaturity through which 
 every individual passes. Upon this biological circumstance 
 depend, therefore, many of the striking features of human 
 social life, especially the influence of intellectual elements, 
 hence plasticity and, ultimately, the capacity for social 
 progress itself. 
 
 Other peculiar features of human social life, which by 
 some are held to be so peculiar as to make human society 
 in a class by itself and not comparable with animal groups, 
 may now be quickly disposed of. It is said that man 
 transforms the environment while the environment trans- 
 forms the animal. 1 While the contrast in such absolute 
 terms is not justifiable, yet it must be admitted that man's 
 growing mastery over physical nature is one of the most 
 striking facts of human social life. But it is evident that 
 it is but an outgrowth of man's power of abstract thought 
 together with that vast cooperation which human science 
 and art imply. It is a secondary, then, rather than a 
 primary difference between human and animal social life. 
 Again, the existence of a conscious social morality in hu- 
 man groups has been claimed to be an irreducible differ- 
 ence between them and animal groups. But even Aristotle 
 perceived that this was due to the fact that human groups 
 possess language and so social tradition, and we may add, 
 
 i See Ward, Pure Sociology, pp. 16, 17. 
 
 136 
 
THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY 
 
 the power of abstract thought to form ideals. Organized 
 government is a distinctive feature of human societies, 
 although not all possess it. But organized government un- 
 doubtedly rests upon the same foundations as social moral- 
 ity, with perhaps an even larger rational and deliberative 
 element. Finally, religion is a distinctive feature of all 
 human groups whatsoever, but it is probably a product of 
 the interaction of man's self-consciousness and reason with 
 his instinctive life. 
 
 To sum up: we may conclude, then, that the social de- 
 velopment which we find in humanity is in principle the 
 same as the social development which we find in the ani- 
 mals below man; that the origin of human society is in 
 the instincts established by natural selection long before 
 the human stage was reached, though the development of 
 human society has been largely modified by intellectual 
 elements. Though these intellectual elements are impor- 
 tant, human society is not in any sense an intellectual con- 
 struction due to the perceptions of the utilities of asso- 
 ciation. It is not a contract, as was once thought, which 
 can be made over to suit the pleasure of the parties thereto ; 
 neither is it a machine of the gods which man cannot mod- 
 ify. Human society is modifiable in the same sense and 
 in the same degree in which human nature is modifiable. 
 While social organization, customs and institutions rest 
 fundamentally upon instincts which have grown out of 
 the necessities of the life-process, these instincts and the 
 habits which grow out of them are modifiable by intellec- 
 tual elements, especially in the young. Education is the 
 only sure means, and probably, the only safe means, of 
 social reorganization. 
 
 Was Man Primitively a Social Animal? — If this question 
 means whether man lived in association with his fellow 
 human beings at the earliest human stage, not solitarily, 
 there can be but one answer. There is not the slightest 
 evidence that man was ever a solitary creature, or even 
 
 137 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 that he lived in solitary family groups. 1 The evidence 
 from the highest animals, from prehistoric archeology, 
 from the lowest existing savages, from human instincts, 
 from language and other sources, points to the conclusion 
 that primitive man lived in hordes of several related fam- 
 ilies. The full evidence for this conclusion cannot here 
 be given. It is sufficient to say that the remains of paleo- 
 lithic man in Europe clearly show the existence of hordes 
 of considerable size and also indicate the existence of a 
 family unit within the horde. Typical lower savages of 
 the present, such as the Bushmen of South Africa, the 
 Andaman Islanders and the Fuegians likewise live in hordes 
 of related families as do also some of the apes, notably the 
 chimpanzee, which is nearest to man. Finally, the hu- 
 man instincts furnish good evidence that man was adapted 
 primitively to the family and to the kindred group, but 
 not to larger groups. 
 
 "What then about man's antisocial characteristics; were 
 they not primitive? Is it not notorious that man, as the 
 old Latin adage puts it, has always been the wolf of his 
 brother man, and is not this wolfishness in man a survival 
 from more primitive conditions 1 The answer is that while 
 man was primitively social, his sociality was narrow, con- 
 fined largely to the family and to the kindred group, and 
 that consequently he is not as yet well adapted to wider 
 social relations. It is interesting to note, however, that 
 these so-called antisocial traits of man are not found most 
 fully developed among the lowest savages. Rather they 
 characterize peoples that are somewhat advanced in cul- 
 ture, particularly those in the stage of barbarism. Thus 
 cannibalism, evidence seems to show, did not characterize 
 
 i Cf. Giddings, Elements of Sociology, p. 232. The biologists, 
 Thomson and Geddes, speaking even from the biological point of 
 view, say {Evolution, p. 100) : "There can be little doubt that man 
 was from the first distinctively social." For the opposite view, see 
 Ward's writings in general (e.g., Pure Sociology, p. 556). 
 
 138 
 
THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY 
 
 primitive man (except as it may have existed sporadically), 
 but only became developed after the stage of barbarism 
 had been reached. At any rate, the peoples among whom 
 cannibalism is most fully developed at the present time 
 are peoples relatively high in culture. Again, there is 
 good reason to believe that war was not common in the 
 most primitive stages of human evolution, but only de- 
 veloped after population had considerably increased and 
 peoples had begun to press upon each other's territorial 
 limits and food supply. The lowest peoples in point of 
 culture even at the present time we find again to be essen- 
 tially peaceful. "War with its ferocities, cannibalism, and 
 slavery are relatively late products, then, in social evolu- 
 tion and incident to man's adjustment to a wider and more 
 complex social environment. It is, therefore, quite within 
 the truth to say that it is the struggle and conflict that 
 have been developed within the species in its more com- 
 plex stages of evolution that have called forth, sometimes 
 in exaggerated forms, the predatory and antisocial tenden- 
 cies which we see more or less in human society at present. 
 
 Nevertheless, as has just been said, man's sociality and 
 his social instincts are adjusted primarily to a relatively 
 narrow social environment, namely, the primitive environ- 
 ment of the family and the kindred group. It is not, 
 therefore, incorrect to say that man is as yet only partially 
 socialized. With reference to his present complex social 
 life this incomplete socialization of man seems to be pro- 
 nounced, but this is in part due to the fact that the com- 
 plexity of social organization and its attendant competi- 
 tion have made demands upon the individual's instincts 
 and reason which cannot, in the nature of the case, be 
 met at once. As has already been pointed out, man's in- 
 stincts in particular are found to be inadequate for the 
 complex social life of civilized societies, and even individ- 
 ual reason is in part inadequate. 
 
 However, history shows that there has been an expand- 
 
 139 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 ing social consciousness; that is, while man's native im- 
 pulses adjust him only to a relatively narrow group, his 
 intelligently formed habits have been adjusting him to con- 
 tinually wider and wider groups. Accompanying this 
 wider adjustment, brought about through the mediation of 
 intelligence, reason and widening sympathy, are expanding 
 feelings of social solidarity, until the most highly developed 
 man of the present recognizes his oneness with all the rest 
 of humanity, the conscious goal of his endeavor being to 
 adjust himself to humanity collectively rather than merely 
 to his family, his community, his nation or his race. There 
 can be no doubt, therefore, that man is undergoing an evo- 
 lution adjusting him to a wider social environment. In 
 part this adjustment is perhaps taking place through natu- 
 ral selection, though it is even more an adjustment which 
 is brought about through custom, tradition, education and 
 conscious moral ideals. In other words, the most highly 
 developed social groups are making conscious efforts to 
 have all individuals born within their limits acquire habits 
 of thinking, feeling and action which will adjust them to 
 a much wider social life than that to which they are natu- 
 rally adjusted. It is through such conscious efforts of edu- 
 cation that we must expect the new and fully socialized in- 
 dividual to arrive rather than through waiting for the long 
 process of selection to bring about the creation of such an 
 individual type. 
 
 The Solidarity or Psychical Unity of Society. — We have 
 already said that " society is an expression of the original 
 and continuing unity of the life-process of the associating 
 organisms." It is important that the student grasp this 
 conception of the unity of society at the beginning; 1 and 
 that he see that this unity, though primitively biological, is 
 
 i The idea of social unity is, of course, very old, going back to 
 Greek philosophy. C'f. Stein, Wcsen und Aufgabe der Sociologie, 
 pp. 12, 13. 
 
 140 
 
THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY 
 
 now mainly psychic. The picture which modern psychol- 
 ogy presents of the individual mind is apparently at first 
 sight not favorable to this conception of psychic units 
 larger than the individual consciousness; for each mind is 
 wholly unconnected with other minds except through the 
 intervention of physical media, and, as we have already 
 seen, there are no direct causal connections between one 
 mind and another. Each mind, however, responds to phys- 
 ical stimuli, and among these stimuli are the signs or sym- 
 bols created in the physical medium by other minds. Thus 
 through interstimulation, mental interaction (i.e., inter- 
 mental processes) is possible. Development under similar 
 biologic conditions makes all minds of a given social group, 
 moreover, respond in like ways to like stimuli. Thus, from 
 the first the interactions of a group of individuals tend to 
 become orderly ; and as we have just seen, natural selection 
 favors those groups in which orderly and definite forms of 
 interstimulation and response are highly developed. Thus 
 the action and reaction of mind upon mind through the 
 intermediation of physical stimuli becomes an orderly, 
 well-defined, and continuous process, which we know as the 
 " social process," and which we name in its various phases 
 communication, suggestion, imitation, sympathy and the 
 like. It is thus through various forms of interstimulation 
 and response that groups of individuals can act together; 
 and as we have already seen, groups of individuals of the 
 same species living together must act together to survive. 
 Hence from the beginning social groups carry on a common 
 life-process by means of interstimulation and response; 
 that is, they are functional unities in which the unity of 
 function is secured mainly by psychical means. 
 
 "Whether a society shall be called a psychical or a 
 psycho-physical unity is manifestly merely a matter of the 
 choice of terms. The phrase " psychical unity " seems, 
 however, preferable because it expresses the dominantly 
 psychical character of the processes with which the sociolo- 
 
 141 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 gist deals. 1 The process of interaction between individuals 
 is dominantly a psychical process in that its dominant ele- 
 ments are* psychical. The functional unity or solidarity of 
 society is, therefore, essentially psychical, and society is in 
 its essence, though in the broad sense, a psychical unity. 
 
 Thus is justified methodologically the sociological point 
 of view — the view of the group as a functional unity, and 
 the interpretation of its phenomena from the standpoint 
 of its collective life, that is, from the standpoint of the mass 
 as a whole. Hence the sociologist does not consider the in- 
 dividual as such, as we have already emphasized, but only 
 the individual as a functioning element in the larger whole ; 
 while the psychologist, on the contrary, considers the social 
 whole only to throw light upon individual experience as 
 such. It is manifest that the study of interstimulation and 
 response from the side of individual experience would show 
 only half of the whole process. In the interests of science, 
 it is important that the process be studied from the point 
 of view of the larger unity, if the interstimulations and 
 responses of individuals are determined, more or less, upon 
 the basis of the needs and interests of a collective life. It is 
 the task of , the sociologist, then, to interpret the social life 
 from the standpoint of a social life-process. Just what the 
 nature and methods of this social life-process — this process 
 of living together — are, we shall see in the next chapter. 
 
 i Cf. the writer's discussion of this point in American Journal 
 of Sociology, Vol. X, pp. 666-71. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE FUNDAMENTAL PACT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY: 
 THE SOCIAL COORDINATION * 
 
 The Psychological View of Society. — The psychological 
 view of society which we have thus far developed in the 
 preceding pages may perhaps be summed up roughly in a 
 single sentence as follows : Society is a mass of interactions, 
 of interstimulations and responses, between individuals, not 
 haphazard, but regular, coordinated and controlled, work- 
 ing for the most part toward definite ends and making so- 
 cial groups true functional unities, ruled by habit largely, 
 but like all organic unities, undergoing adaptive changes 
 which are themselves regular, and which, moreover, give 
 rise to the more important socio-psychical phenomena. As 
 we have seen, from a psychological point of view, a society 
 may be practically denned as a group of individuals who 
 carry on a common life-process by means of interstimula- 
 tion and response. In other words, society or association 
 is a psychical process, that is, a process immediately made 
 up of and ruled by psychic elements, such as impulse, in- 
 stinct, habit, emotion, desire, interest, sensation, imagina- 
 tion and reason. The fundamental fact, accordingly, with 
 which the sociologist has to deal, is the process of mental 
 interaction, of interstimulation and response, between in- 
 dividuals. It is this interstimulation and response which 
 makes up all social phenomena and which is, therefore, the 
 
 i The substance of the first half of this chapter was presented as 
 a paper before the American Sociological Society, December, 1909 
 (see American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XV, pp. 596-618). 
 
 143 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 subject-matter of all the social sciences, and particularly 
 of sociology. The significant thing for the sociologist, how- 
 ever, is not that mental interactions between individuals 
 exist, but that they are regular ; not haphazard, but coordi- 
 nated and controlled. "Without this regularity in the forms 
 of interaction between individuals, social science in gen- 
 eral would be impossible, for the object of all scientific 
 study of society is to discover regularity in social activity^ 
 that is, in the forms of interstimulation and response among 
 individuals. 
 
 The Social Coordination. — This regularity and coordina- 
 tion in mental interaction, interstimulation and response, 
 which brings to a unity of aim the activities of the indi- 
 viduals of a group, may be called the social coordination, 
 just as the bringing to a unity of aim of physical and psy- 
 chical processes in the body is called a coordination. This 
 coordination or coadaptation of individuals in activity is, 
 of course, what makes group action possible. It creates the 
 unity of the group ; and the coordinations that persist — 
 become habitual — form the substance of permanent social 
 organization. Moreover, just as the conscious life of the 
 individual centers about the process of adaptation, so it is 
 the changes in these social coordinations, the breaking down 
 of old ones and the building up of new ones, which give 
 rise to the more important phenomena of collective mental 
 life. Prom this standpoint, we shall find, the function of 
 the various psychic elements in the social process will read- 
 ily become clear. We are justified in concluding, therefore, 
 that the most important and practically most fundamental 
 fact for the psychological sociologist is this coordination or 
 coadaptation of individuals in activity — the social coordi- 
 nation. 1 
 
 i While the term " social coordination " was borrowed by the 
 writer from the functional psychologists (see American Journal of 
 Sociology, May, 1899), the term was used earlier by other sociol- 
 ogists, though with a narrower connotation (see, e.g., Giddings, 
 
 144 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 To trace out the mechanism of the origin, development, 
 and forms of these coordinations or adaptations between in- 
 dividuals constitutes the task of the sociologist from the 
 psychological point of view. In doing this his point of 
 view, as we have already pointed out, is necessarily that of 
 the group, not that of the individual ; for the individual in 
 his instinctive and habitual reactions gives at most only 
 the starting point for these coordinations. The real reason 
 for the existence of such coordinations, or coadaptations, 
 must always be found in the carrying on of a common life- 
 process by a group of individuals, else they would not ex- 
 ist. The coordinations, in other words, are coordinations 
 of individuals in function, and the group must be consid- 
 ered as a functional unity in order to understand them. 
 
 The Origin of Social Coordinations. — The biological 
 origin of social coordinations is not a concern of the psy- 
 chological sociologist as such, though the matter has re- 
 ceived incidentally some attention in discussing the origin 
 of society. We may note that the development of species 
 and groups under similar biologic conditions gives rise, as 
 has been so much emphasized by Professor Giddings, to 
 such organic and mental similarity that their individual 
 
 Principles of Sociology, pp. 388-90). The term " coadaptation " 
 was borrowed from the writings of Dr. M. M. Davis, whose views 
 of the nature of the social life, as set forth briefly in his Psycho- 
 logical Interpretations of Society, are in many points closely similar 
 to those of the writer. The term " coadaptation " has, of course, 
 long been in use in biological writings (e.g., Darwin in Origin 
 of Species ) . Recently many sociological writers have expressed 
 views of the social life similar to those set forth in this chap- 
 ter. Dr. Rene' Worms, e.g., says (Les Principes oiologiques de 
 I'Evolution sociale, p. 23) : "Adaptation is the most general fact 
 in the social existence. . . . For the solidarity of all elements 
 is the first attestation of social structure [anatomie) , and their co- 
 ordinated action is the first attestation of social function {physiolo- 
 gie) ." Cf. also Waxweiler's discussion of social coordination in his 
 Esquisse d'une Sociologie, pp. 228-48; also the general ideas in 
 Vaccaro's Bases sociologiques du Droit et de I'Etat. 
 
 145 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 units respond in like ways to like stimuli; 1 and that this 
 organic similarity is undoubtedly the biological fact which 
 makes possible coordinated social activity. Moreover, on 
 account of this fact and also on account of the selective 
 processes in nature which favor the existence of group life, 
 the instincts of the individuals of a social species are made, 
 as we have seen, so that they fit into one another, as it were, 
 and thus their instinctive reactions are coordinated with 
 one another. Instinctive reactions thus yield certain co- 
 ordinations or coadaptations between individuals to start 
 with. In the social life of man these instinctive reactions 
 are modified through habit and intelligent adaptation, so 
 that the adjustment of the activities of individuals to each 
 other may reach such a high degree of perfection that 
 groups often act with the spontaneity and certainty of in- 
 dividual units. Through instinct, habit and intelligent 
 adaptation, then, wrought out under similar life conditions, 
 the activities of individuals become socially coordinated or 
 coadapted. 
 
 Practically the psychological sociologist has to start his 
 interpretation of the social life with these social coordina- 
 tions. Just as the psychologist cannot get back of organic 
 activity and have anything left of mental life, so the soci- 
 ologist cannot get back of social activity and have anything 
 left of social life, for we do not think of the group as a 
 unity except in connection with its activities. The coordi- 
 nation of individuals in activity is the sign of social rela- 
 tionship, social organization, social life, throughout the ani- 
 mal scale. Individuals living together in mere proximity 
 cannot be said to have social relationships until they become 
 functionally related to each other as parts of some func- 
 tioning whole. Society is the coordination of the activities 
 of individuals. 2 In a psychological interpretation of so- 
 
 i See Descriptive and Historical Sociology, Chap. II. 
 2 Cf. the statement of Dr. M. M. Davis (Psychological Interpre- 
 tations of Society, p. 9) : "The essence of society is adaptation. . . . 
 
 146 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 ciety, therefore, we must begin with concerted or coordi- 
 nated activity, with the group acting together in some par- 
 ticular way, for it is this which constitutes the group a 
 functional unity, and which is the first psychic manifesta- 
 tion of group life. 
 
 Social Coordination and Social Cooperation. — It may be 
 objected that what we have called the social coordination is 
 nothing more than social cooperation under another name. 
 But social coordination, as already implied, does not neces- 
 sarily mean that the relationship is one of mutual aid. It 
 may be one of exploitation, or even of modified hostility. 
 There is, however, it must be admitted, no objection to em- 
 ploying the phrase " social cooperation " in a very broad 
 way to designate the sum of social coordinations, for social 
 cooperation in this broadest sense is made up of social co- 
 ordinations; popularly, however, social cooperation is used 
 in a much narrower sense as implying a high degree of 
 reflective consciousness on the part of the individuals whose 
 activity is coordinated. Even by some scientific writers 
 the term cooperation is used in exactly this way. Thus, we 
 find Professor Giddings, for example, saying, " There can 
 be no cooperation except among those who are, in a good 
 degree, like minded, and who are so far conscious of their 
 agreement that they can intelligently plan their common 
 activity. " 1 It is manifest that such social cooperation as 
 Professor Giddings is speaking of, implies a high degree of 
 reflective consciousness which hardly exists until man is 
 reached in the animal scale and is not present even in many 
 human groups. The term " social coordination " has been 
 used to express the connection between the activities of a 
 mass of individuals living together and carrying on, 
 
 Millions of brain cells are coordinated to think as one brain. Physi- 
 ology tries to tell how. Millions of brains coordinate themselves 
 and function in many ways as one brain. The how of that marvel 
 is for sociology." 
 
 i Elements of Sociology, p. 77. 
 
 11 147 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 through interstimulation and response, a common life- 
 process, because it is a colorless term, not implying the high 
 degree of consciousness which sometimes attaches to the 
 phrase social cooperation. Manifestly, as has already been 
 said, all social organization is an outcome of social coordi- 
 nation and social coordination can, therefore, be regarded 
 as synonymous with social cooperation only in the sense 
 that all social organization implies cooperation. 
 
 Objective Expressions of Social Coordination. — Social co- 
 ordinations have both objective and subjective expressions 
 in the collective life. Their objective expression is chiefly 
 in those relatively uniform and universal ways of action 
 to which Professor Sumner has given the name " folk- 
 ways. ' ' 1 The folkways are simply regular modes of social 
 activity in a given group of people. The better term would 
 probably be " social habits," since these regular modes 
 of social activity are not, by any means, confined to 
 the large group which we term a folk or a people, but are 
 found in the smallest groups of society as well. Every 
 family group, for example, illustrates these regular modes 
 of social activity which we have termed social coordinations. 
 The family, indeed, beautifully illustrates the whole matter 
 of social interaction and social coordination; for the activ- 
 ity of each member of a family group is coordinated in very 
 definite and regular ways with the activity of all the other 
 members of his group. Just as every coordination in the 
 individual that persists is termed a habit, so every coordina- 
 tion that persists in a social group may be termed a social 
 habit. In those large groups which we term peoples there 
 is, of course, no objection to calling these regular modes of 
 social activity ' ' folkways, ' ' as Professor Sumner does. 
 
 Of course, there are many other ways in which social co- 
 ordinations express themselves objectively. As we have 
 already repeatedly said, the whole matter of social organi- 
 
 1 Cf. Sumner's Folkways, Chap. I. 
 148 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 zation is simply a matter of the types of social coordination 
 that persist among the members of a given group, that is, 
 all the forms or modes of association are simply different 
 objective expressions of social coordination. All of the ob- 
 jective regularities and uniformities in society may, there- 
 fore, be looked at as so many objective expressions of social 
 coordination. A custom, for example, is but a social habit 
 (in this case, a " folkway ") which has persisted long 
 enough in a people to gain a certain prestige, while what we 
 call institutions, are but sanctioned forms of association, or 
 of social coordination. 
 
 .Types of Social Coordination or Forms of Association. 1 
 — The analysis of the various types of social coordination 
 has, as yet, only just begun. It is evident, however, that the 
 types of coordination between individuals are as complex 
 as human life itself, and that an analysis of society into its 
 various types of social coordination would be practically 
 equivalent to an analysis of social structure as a whole. All 
 possible coordinations between individuals exist, and hence, 
 an infinite variety in the forms of human association. The 
 honor of beginning a serious study of the various types of 
 social coordination, that is, of the forms of association, as a 
 definite sociological problem, belongs to Professor Simmel, 2 
 of the University of Berlin, but his analysis is very far 
 from satisfying. What he has studied chiefly are the empty 
 forms of association, that is, the forms themselves without 
 definite content, such as equality, superiority, subordina- 
 tion, and the like. He omits, for example, such common 
 forms of social coordination as are seen in the family, such 
 as husband and wife, parent and child. For a full under- 
 standing, however, of the types of social coordination, we 
 must consider not merely their empty form, but also their 
 content. It is apparently an inexhaustible task to classify 
 
 i See Chapter XVI. 
 
 2 See hia Soziologie, Chap. I ; also American Journal of Sociol- 
 ogy, Vol. XV, pp. 289f. 
 
 149 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 and arrange the various types of persistent interaction be- 
 tween individuals: The progress of sociology as a science 
 is, however, not dependent upon any exhaustive enumera- 
 tion or classification of the types of social interaction. 
 Rather, sociology must show the way in which types of 
 social coordination arise and are changed into other types 
 and the significance of the principal types for the collective 
 life of man. 
 
 Subjective Expressions of Social Coordination. — But the 
 subjective expressions of social coordination are of not 
 less importance than the objective expressions in folkways, 
 customs, institutions and social organization. Those sub- 
 jective expressions are to be found in the mental attitudes 
 which the individuals of the group maintain toward each 
 other. A group of individuals carrying on &• common life- 
 process through interstimulation and response, must main- 
 tain certain habitual psychical attitudes toward each other 
 in order that they may respond quickly and effectively, 
 each to the stimulus which the activity of the other affords. 
 Hence, the significance of feelings, emotions, ideas and be- 
 liefs in all forms of human social life. Feelings, emo- 
 tions, ideas and beliefs are, on the one hand, expressions 
 of common life activities, and en the other, they power- 
 fully reenforce and direct those activities. The family 
 group again illustrates the matter. The mental attitude 
 of the members of a family toward one another is an ex- 
 pression of their common group life and group activities. 
 Corresponding to their habitual modes of interaction, are 
 certain feeling, or emotional attitudes, and even certain 
 ideas and beliefs. Thus, the social coordinations of husband 
 and wife, parent and child, are each subjectively expressed 
 by appropriate feeling, or emotional attitudes. 
 
 Common Feelings, Ideas and Beliefs in the Social Life. 
 — Inasmuch as the family group is organized largely on "an 
 instinctive basis, the subjective expressions of its coordina- 
 tions are chiefly in feeling and emotional attitudes. Hence, 
 
 150 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 we ordinarily think of such relationships as husband and 
 wife, parent and child, in terms of feeling. In larger 
 social groups, however, built up chiefly upon the basis of 
 acquired habits, common ideas and beliefs may be the 
 chief expression of social coordination; but in any case, 
 habitual modes of interaction must come to have attached 
 to them certain feeling tones in the individuals concerned — 
 that is, they must give rise to certain feeling attitudes of 
 certain individuals toward each other. In animal groups, 
 where the interactions are almost wholly instinctive, not 
 much more than the feeling attitude may exist as the sub- 
 jective accompaniment of social coordination, but in hu- 
 man societies, with their larger element of acquired habit, 
 the chief subjective expressions of social coordination are 
 frequently common ideas and beliefs; thus, in a modern 
 nation, unity of action and of life is secured partly through 
 sentiments like patriotism, but even more through certain 
 generally accepted ideas and beliefs. Such generally ac- 
 cepted ideas and beliefs, which form the psychical basis of 
 institutions, may be called " coordinating ideas." The 
 importance of such coordinating ideas in human social and 
 institutional life, although first emphasized by Comte, has 
 not as yet been adequately investigated, or even recognized, 
 by sociologists. 
 
 The whole matter of uniformities of feeling, belief and 
 opinion in social groups, evidently, then, must be studied 
 in connection with social coordinations if it is to be under- 
 stood; for the mental attitudes of individuals toward each 
 other and toward their group as a whole are expressions 
 of the way in which they are socially coordinated. These 
 subjective expressions of social coordination are, of course, 
 since thought and feeling mediate activity, also marks 
 of incipient stages of new forms of social organization as 
 well as of existing forms. In a group of individuals, then, 
 carrying on a common life-process through interstimulation 
 and response, mental attitudes mediating social activities 
 
 151 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 mark the beginning of new coordinations, or coadaptations, 
 as well as those coordinations that have become fixed as 
 social habits. 
 
 Social Habits. — Thus far in this discussion, the point of 
 /view has been that of the social habit, and it may b ( e well 
 to note a little more fully the nature of social habits. As 
 has already been said, in a broad sense, social habits are 
 simply social coordinations that persist. In their various 
 modifications they are known, in the larger human groups, 
 as folkways, customs, manners, morals, laws, institutions 
 and the like. In brief, all the tangible uniformities of 
 the social life are social habits. It is evident that they 
 rest partly on instincts, partly on acquired habits. As has 
 already been noted, in all social species, the instincts of 
 individuals are made so that they fit into each other, as it 
 were, and provide certain social coordinations to start with. 
 This is especially true of man, human family life, as we 
 have just seen, illustrating especially these instinctive co- 
 ordinations between individuals. But it is also true that 
 in man social habits axe largely acquired. "While the orig- 
 inal or instinctive coordinations between human individu- 
 als may be numerous, yet on account of the complexity of 
 man's social life, these original social coordinations have 
 become overlaid with a vast mass of acquired social habits 
 that are even more important for the distinctive character 
 of human society than the instinctive coordinations. Hence 
 the need in human society of definite forms of mental in- 
 teraction, of interstimulation and response, whereby every 
 individual may acquire the habits of his group. Hence 
 also why human groups have developed such definite forms 
 of interstimulation and response, as oral and written lan- 
 guage, and superior types of suggestion and imitation. 
 
 The Psychical Mechanism of Social Change. — We must 
 now leave the point of view of social habit, and ask what 
 happens when social habits change; for we know that in 
 social groups, as in individuals, habitual ways of action 
 
 152 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 are continually being modified. The social coordination 
 that exists to-day in a group of individuals may no longer 
 exist to-morrow. Even the type of coordination itself 
 changes. Now, in a group of individuals carrying on a 
 common life-process, there must be some very definite mech- 
 anism by which habitual ways of interaction are modified 
 or even radically changed. That mechanism is found in 
 the various forms of communication and in other simpler 
 forms of interstimulation, such as suggestion. Psycholo- 
 gists, as a rule, have had little to say about communica- 
 tion, probably because it is so obviously a social process. 
 At any rate, all that we know goes to show that communi- 
 cation is a device to carry on a common life-process among 
 several distinct, though psychically interacting, individual 
 units. All the higher forms of communication had their 
 origin in the needs of, and exist for the sake of perfect- 
 ing, a common life. 1 As we have already seen, the dis- 
 tinctive mark which separates human society from animal 
 groups and which makes it separate and unique, is the 
 possession of language, or articulate speech. 
 
 In the transition from one social habit to another, in 
 the breaking down of one social coordination and in the 
 building up of another, then, various forms of communica- 
 tion come in to mediate the process. Just as in the in- 
 dividual the transition from one habit to another is marked 
 by mental processes of discrimination and association, so 
 in the social group the transition from one social habit 
 to another is marked by processes of criticism and discus- 
 sion. When anything goes wrong with the working of a 
 social habit, various appreciations of the social situation 
 are communicated from one individual to another. Public 
 
 1 Cf. the remark of Professor Mead (Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 
 VI, p. 406 ) : " The probable beginning of human communication 
 was in cooperation, not in imitation, where conduct differed and 
 yet where the act of the one answered to and called out the act of 
 the other." 
 
 153 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 criticism marks, then, the bad working or the breaking 
 down of some social coordination. Discussion of the whole 
 social situation comes in to pick out the elements in the 
 old habit that are unworkable and to select those that may 
 be made the basis of a new habit. Discussion works in 
 society, therefore, very largely as the association of ideas 
 works in the individual mind. Through discussion certain 
 elements in the situation, objective stimuli, or ideas, are 
 selected and fixed upon by the group for the building up 
 of a new coordination. When the ideas for the building 
 up of the new coordination have become relatively settled 
 we have what is called the formation of a public opinion. 
 In order to carry out this public opinion there is usually 
 necessary the selection of certain individuals that are 
 judged to be especially fitted to carry out the new social 
 policy and we have the phenomena of leadership, and of 
 authority resulting. Along with these more tangible 
 processes of intercommunication, there are, of course, those 
 less tangible processes of interstimulation, such as various 
 forms of suggestion and imitation. At any rate, the mech- 
 anism by which the transition from one social habit to 
 another is effected must be made up of various forms of 
 interstimulation and response, and among the more impor- 
 tant of these are public criticism, free discussion, public 
 opinion and conscious social selection of ideas and indi- 
 viduals. It is obvious that without these the process of 
 social change, of continuous readjustment in society, could 
 not go on ; that new habits adapted to the new life condi- 
 tions could not replace the old habits which are no longer 
 adapted. 
 
 The Function of Imitation. 1 — Here must be briefly noted 
 the function of imitation in this process of continuous so- 
 cial readjustment. As Professor Baldwin has insisted, 2 
 
 i See Chapter XIII. 
 
 'Social and Ethical Interpretations, passim. 
 154 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 imitation, in its broadest sense, is undoubtedly the chief 
 means of propagating acquired uniformities in human so- 
 ciety. Its exact function, as just pointed out, is to mediate 
 in the formation of those social coordinations, where uni- 
 form, concerted activity is desirable. It comes in, there- 
 fore, to assist in building up most social habits, and es- 
 pecially in mediating relatively simple and unconscious 
 coordinations between individuals. The error of the imi- 
 tation sociologists consists in fixing attention upon but one 
 element in the building up of social coordinations, rather 
 than upon the whole process. The tacit assumption of 
 the imitation theorists is that it is the uniformity or like- 
 ness of activity which makes social coordination, society, 
 possible; whereas unlikeness of activity is necessary for 
 many of the higher forms of social coordination. In the 
 family, for example, while imitation smooths the way foi # 
 many adjustments, yet many of the coordinations between 
 its members are possible only because of original and ac- 
 quired differences. Imitation does not, therefore, enter 
 into all social relationships — that is, into all forms of 
 interstimulation and response. It is, however, the great 
 and indispensable means of bringing unity in a group when 
 uniform, concerted action is necessary or desirable. Hence, 
 all social species, including man, are highly imitative. The 
 tendency to imitate, therefore, like communication, must 
 be regarded as an outcome, an instrument, of the social 
 life, not its basis. 
 
 The Function of Sympathy and Understanding. 1 — We 
 must also here note briefly the role of sympathy and un- 
 derstanding in mediating the more complex coordinations 
 between individuals in human society. Sympathy and un- 
 derstanding are among the striking products of harmonious 
 social coordination. At the same time they are chief in- 
 struments in effecting harmonious coordinations. Indi- 
 
 iSee Chapter XIV. 
 155 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 viduals whose activities are coordinated in harmonious re- 
 lationships, as, for example, in the family, always develop 
 sympathy and understanding. Instinctive sympathy may, 
 perhaps, be regarded as an outcome of those selective 
 processes which have favored the existence of certain social 
 coordinations between individuals; while habitual sym- 
 pathy accompanies the harmonious coordinations between 
 individuals that are acquired through habit. On the other 
 hand, only individuals who sympathize with each other 
 and understand each other are manifestly fitted to co- 
 ordinate harmoniously their activities in very complex ways. 
 Thus, in all the more complex social coordinations, sym- 
 pathy and understanding are necessary processes for the 
 harmonious adjustment of the activities of individuals. It 
 is the lack of a sympathetic understanding, indeed, which 
 most frequently gives rise to that failure to build up har- 
 monious coordinations between individuals which, as we 
 shall see, is the source of much of the conflict and much 
 of the tragedy of the social life. As sympathy and under- 
 standing are so important in the collective life, groups of 
 all sorts do all that they can to promote sympathy and 
 understanding between their members. Every social group, 
 therefore, strives to promote acquaintance and like-minded- 
 ness between its members. Here comes in the social 
 significance largely of convivial occasions and of " so- 
 ciety " in the narrow sense of the word. Modern civilized 
 societies especially take many artificial measures, through 
 popular education, the deliberate cultivation of altruism, 
 and the like, to promote sympathy and understanding 
 among their members. Moreover, individuals, 'conscious 
 that their successful social adjustment depends upon being 
 understood and sympathized with by their associates, sedu- 
 lously seek sympathy and understanding from one another. 
 It is safe to say that sympathy and understanding are 
 more important in carrying on a collective life than external 
 forms of social constraint. 
 
 156 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 Professor Giddings has formulated a law of sympathy, 
 which we must here note, based upon the degree of resem- 
 blance or likeness between individuals, viz., " The degree 
 of sympathy decreases as the generality of resemblance in- 
 creases." 1 But it seems more probable that sympathy is 
 directly proportionate, not to the amount of resemblance, 
 but to the harmony of the coordination between individuals. 
 The more harmonious the coordination between individuals, 
 the more their sympathy, and vice versa. Resemblance 
 affects sympathy only indirectly, only as it is necessary 
 for the coordination of their life activities. Thus a man 
 may have more harmonious coordinations with his dog, 
 and hence more sympathy, than with many of his fellow- 
 men whom he resembles much more closely. Again, though 
 members of the same family may differ greatly as regards 
 sex, age, temperament, yet if they have a harmonious co- 
 ordination of their activities, they rarely lack an abundance 
 of sympathy for each other. All this does not preclude, 
 of course, sympathy from arising in anticipation of har- 
 monious coordination between individuals; for, as con- 
 sciousness has to do with the mediation of activity, all 
 mental processes may mark the beginning as well as the 
 establishment of activities. If we take sympathy in the 
 very broad sense of all the altruistic impulses and feelings 
 of human nature, whether native or acquired, then evi- 
 dently sympathy in this sense of altruism is necessary for 
 all higher types of social relationship. Those coordinations 
 which involve very complex cooperation or mutual service 
 between individuals, often remote in time and place, in- 
 volve a high degree of reflective sympathy or altruism. 
 Sympathy in this broad sense is so important in human 
 society that it will be necessary for us to examine in some 
 detail later its function in social organization and progress.. 
 
 iSee Elements of Sociology, p. 67; also Inductive Sociology, p. 
 108. 
 
 157 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 The Function of Confidence and Mutual Trust. — Closely 
 connected with sympathy and understanding in the social 
 life are confidence and mutual trust. Confidence and 
 mutual trust are, on the one hand, an outcome of harmonious 
 social relations (coordinations), and on the other, are nec- 
 essary for the establishment of any complex coordinations. 
 Harmonious relationships beget confidence, but on the other 
 hand, confidence is necessary for all but the simplest re- 
 lationships. People cannot live together without some de- 
 gree of mutual trust. Individuals must form a " stable 
 environment ' ' * with reference to each other, if they are 
 going to successfully coadapt their activities. The knowl- 
 edge or belief that we can rely upon the character of 
 others, we call confidence or faith in others, and like all 
 other forms of our knowledge it is concerned with the 
 mediation of activity — in this case with the mediation of 
 the coordination of activities. 
 
 Economists have remarked upon the vast role played 
 by confidence or mutual faith in the transactions of finance 
 and commerce. It is scarcely necessary to add that it plays 
 an equally important part in all other phases of the social 
 life. Without it the family could not exist, government 
 could not be carried on, and philanthropic work would have 
 no basis. The social worker who is trying to lift up a 
 depressed family or class or a backward race must have 
 faith in the persons he deals with if he is to secure help- 
 ful coordinations between his efforts and their own — that 
 is, secure their cooperation in the betterment of their own 
 condition. 
 
 The Function of Stimuli Arising from Intergroup Conflict 
 and Competition. — Another factor in bringing about social 
 coordinations of a high type are the stimuli arising from 
 intergroup conflict and competition. While the stimuli 
 
 1 1 am indebted for this phrase to a former student, Dr. E, B. 
 Kern, now of the George Washington University. 
 
 158 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 afforded by the struggle with the physical environment 
 and with other nonsoeial forces are conceivably sufficient 
 to bring about the highest degree of coordination, unity, 
 and solidarity in the larger human social groups, yet histor- 
 ically they have not done so. Rather, it has been the stim- 
 uli arising from the conflict and competition of one human 
 group with another which has chiefly developed conscious 
 social solidarity in the larger human groups. The con- 
 flict and struggle with natural forces of groups of indi- 
 viduals carrying on a common life has necessitated in 
 some species the development of a high type of social co- 
 ordination, but in humanity it has usually been conflict 
 and competition of human groups with one another which 
 has developed the highest degree of social unity. 
 
 Danger tightens, and security relaxes, the bonds of all 
 social groups j 1 and no danger in historical times has threat- 
 ened human groups comparable to that offered by con- 
 flict with other human groups. This conflict has stimulated 
 in human groups not only imitativeness, sympathy and 
 understanding among their members, but also the develop- 
 ment of consciously coordinated activities and of conscious 
 collective control over the activities of masses of individ- 
 uals. In other words, human groups involved in a life and 
 death competition with other groups, could survive only 
 by the development of high types of conscious coordination 
 of the activities of individuals. While previous to such 
 conflict the members of a group may have but a vague 
 consciousness of their common life and of the ends of 
 their activities, through such conflict and competition these 
 ends become sharply defined in consciousness and the in- 
 dividuals who make up the group become vividly conscious 
 of the relation of the activities of each to the collective life. 
 Thus the group achieves group or social self-consciousness. 
 In the same way it achieves a higher degree of organiza- 
 
 i Cf. Boss, Foundations of Sociology, p. 287. 
 159 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 tion, for the group becomes conscious that definite relations 
 between individuals and some centralized control are neces- 
 sary if the group is to succeed in its competition with 
 other groups; and more definite organization and cen- 
 tralized control are expressions of the closer coordination 
 of the activities of individuals. In the same way, also, 
 the group takes on a more decided individuality. In the 
 intergroup competition, it must develop a definite direc- 
 tion and purpose in its activities and so a definite char- 
 acter. Thus groups develop what may be called a group 
 will. Group individuality and group will are phenomena 
 which will be discussed later. 
 
 Conflict Within the Social Group. — The process of con- 
 tinuous readjustment in society, the breaking down of old 
 social habits and the building up of new ones, ordinarily 
 goes on without shock or disturbance — oftentimes, indeed, 
 without the individual becoming vividly conscious of 
 change. Habits, however, must be continually modified in 
 social life as well as in individual life. "Variations con- 
 stantly arise in individuals and in the environment, mak- 
 ing old social habits no longer workable. Through proc- 
 esses of discussion, suggestion, imitation, the formation 
 of a group opinion, the selection of ideas and ideals, a 
 new social coordination, or adaptation between individuals, 
 is built up, which, if it works well, persists and becomes 
 a new social habit. This process often goes on, as we have 
 already noted, without the individual even being conscious 
 of change; for, though the individual may participate in 
 discussion, may receive suggestions and may imitate, may 
 accept ideas and beliefs, may even select leaders and au- 
 thorities, yet he may be quite unconscious of the end of 
 the process — the construction of a new social coordination. 
 But sometimes a new and harmonious coordination can- 
 not be built up, for a sufficient stimulus for its construc- 
 tion cannot be found. It is here that much of the tragedy 
 of social life comes in, for it is here that the opportunity 
 
 160 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 for conflict and hostility within the group arises. Let 
 us illustrate again from the family life. Parent and child 
 may have a certain coordination — a certain habitual atti- 
 tude toward each other, which works well during the 
 child's younger years; but the parent often forgets that 
 that coordination and his attitude must be modified with 
 the child's growth. As a consequence, the old social co- 
 ordination is maintained too long and when it finally breaks 
 down, no adequate stimulus may be found for the build- 
 ing up of a new harmonious coordination. Hence conflict 
 often arises between parent and child. It is the same with 
 the relations of husband and wife and with all other social 
 relations. Conflict of individuals within a group arises, 
 then, through the failure to build up new social coordina- 
 tions adapted to new life conditions, so that the individuals 
 of a group may form a stable environment with reference 
 to each other. The result is a conflict of habits and the 
 possible disintegration of the group. Conflict of one so- 
 cial group with another is, of course, an entirely different 
 matter. 
 
 Conflict Within National Groups. — It is the same in the 
 wider social organization of nations and peoples as in 
 the more intimate social relations of smaller groups. Nor- 
 mally, a people's institutions are continually changing; 
 old institutions are gradually replaced by new ones as 
 life conditions change. Normally, the breakdown of an 
 old institution is so gradual that by the time it disappears 
 a new institution adapted to the new life conditions is 
 ready to take its place. The change has been brought 
 about from one social form to another through such peace- 
 ful means as public criticism, free discussion, the forma- 
 tion of a public opinion and the selection of individuals 
 to carry out the line of action socially determined upon. 
 But where these means of effecting social readjustments 
 are lacking, or imperfectly developed, social habits may 
 become relatively fixed and immobile. Now, a society, like 
 
 161 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 an individual whose habits become inflexible, is bound to 
 have trouble. It is from such conditions that those vast 
 social disturbances which we term revolutions with their 
 bloody conflicts between classes arise. Revolutions, in 
 other words, are due to certain interferences in the mech- 
 anism by which normal social readjustment is accomplished ; 
 that is, they are disturbances in the social order due to 
 the breakdown of social habits under conditions which 
 make difficult the reconstruction of those habits, that is, 
 a new social order. 
 
 Some degree of conflict and opposition within a group, 
 whether small or large, is, however, a normal accompani- 
 ment of the breaking down of old habits and the build- 
 ing up of new ones. In any mass different individuals 
 will be exposed to different stimuli, and will respond to 
 the same stimuli differently. That is, they will be exposed 
 unequally to life conditions, and will vary in their responses 
 on account of organic variations. Hence, social coordina- 
 tions, customs, institutions and the like, will be unequally 
 suited to various individuals; and in the building up of 
 new coordinations different stimuli, ideas, ideals, or prac- 
 tical interests, will appeal to different individuals as the 
 proper basis (adequate stimulus) for the construction of 
 the new coordination. Hence the degree of conflict which 
 is often seen in criticism, discussion, and other processes 
 connected with social change. Hence also the inevitable 
 and necessary opposition between parties in building up 
 new coordinations and institutions in national groups. It 
 is evidently the proper function of parties to sense and 
 evaluate different stimuli, to bring about discussion of 
 these stimuli, which may serve as adequate (that is, as 
 " coordinating ideas "•) for the construction of new and 
 advantageous coordinations. Parties, however, as we shall 
 see later, tend to become mere " interest groups " and to 
 set up their own advantage or existence as ends in them- 
 selves. 
 
 162 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 Revolutions as Illustrating the Process of Social Readjust- 
 ment Under Abnormal Conditions. 1 — The whole psychology 
 of social coordination and of social change, and the part 
 played by the more obvious factors in the mechanism 
 of social change, cannot be better illustrated than by those 
 convulsive movements in the history of societies which we 
 term revolutions. It will be well, therefore, to examine 
 the psychology of revolutions in order to illustrate the 
 theory of social organization and of social changes which 
 we have just set forth. We are not using the word revo- 
 lution now in a loose sense to designate any sudden po- 
 litical or social change from coups d'etat, or " palace revo- 
 lutions," to mutations in fashions or industrial changes 
 due to great inventions, although, of course, the psycho- 
 logical theory of social order and of social change that 
 has just been set forth apply to these processes. Rather, 
 we are now using the word revolution in its strictly po- 
 litical sense. As Bodin long ago pointed out, the mark 
 of revolutions in this sense is a change in the location of 
 sovereignty. Such movements always imply a shifting of 
 the center of social control from one class to another and 
 inwardly are often marked by change in the psychical 
 basis of social control, that is, a change in the common ideas, 
 beliefs and sentiments upon which the social order rests. 
 Outwardly such movements are frequently characterized by 
 bloody struggles between privileged and unprivileged 
 classes, which not infrequently issue in social confusion 
 and anarchy. Revolutions, in this strict sense, although 
 superficially political, are, then, even more sociological 
 
 1 The substance of this section was published as a separate 
 article on " A Psychological Theory of Revolutions " in the Amer- 
 ican Journal of Sociology for July, 1905. It is utilized here be- 
 cause it exactly illustrates the writer's theory of the nature of the - 
 psychological process in human society. The theory was first out- 
 lined in an article published in the American Journal of Sociology 
 in May, 1899 (Vol. IV, p. 817). 
 
 12 163 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 phenomena, and as such the theory of revolutions must 
 form an important chapter in any theory of social evolution 
 which deals with human history as it finds it. Revolutions, 
 in the sense in which we have used the word, are, perhaps, 
 best typified in modern history by the Puritan Revolu- 
 tion in England and by the French Revolution. Less typ- 
 ical, but still in some sense revolutions, were the American 
 War for Independence and the American Civil War. Many 
 other essentially revolutionary conflicts in modern times 
 might be, of course, instanced. 
 
 We may note that the objective explanations of revolu- 
 tions which have usually been offered by historians and 
 economists — that is, explanations in terms of economic, 
 governmental, and other factors largely external — have 
 been far from satisfactory inasmuch as they have lacked 
 that universal element which is the essential of all true 
 science. These explanations have, to be sure, pointed out 
 causes operating in particular revolutions, but they have 
 failed to reveal the universal mechanism through which 
 all revolutions must take place. The reason for this must 
 be now clear to the student, for as we have already seen, 
 nearly all social occurrences are in the nature of re- 
 sponses to external stimuli. The same response, or similar 
 responses, may be called forth, however, by very different 
 stimuli, since the stimulus is only the opportunity for the 
 discharge of energy. Consequently any explanation of 
 revolutions or other social occurrences in terms of external 
 stimuli is, as we have already seen, foredoomed to fail- 
 ure, because such an explanation will fall short of that 
 universality which science demands. The particular stimu- 
 lus which occasions a revolution will vary in each instance, 
 but the psycho-social mechanism through which the revo- 
 lution is effected in every case remains the same. 
 
 As has already been said, from a psychological point 
 of view, revolutions are disturbances in the social order 
 due to the sudden breakdown of social habits under con- 
 
 164 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 ditions which make difficult the reconstruction of those hab- 
 its — the formation of a new social order. In other words, 
 revolutions arise through certain interferences or dis- 
 turbances in the process of normal social readjustment. 
 Where the normal means of effecting readjustments in the 
 social life are relatively lacking, social habits and institu- 
 tions tend to become relatively fixed and immobile and a 
 conservative organization of society results. Now, societies, 
 like individuals, are in danger when their habits for any 
 reason become inflexible. In the world of life, with its 
 constant change and ceaseless struggle, only those organ- 
 isms can survive which maintain a high degree of flexi- 
 bility or adaptability. It is even so in the world of societies. 
 As Professor Ward says : ' ' When a society makes for itself 
 a procrustean bed, it is simply preparing the way for its 
 own destruction by the on-moving agencies of social dy- 
 namics." * It is evident, then, that a society whose habits 
 become inflexible for any reason is liable to disaster. That 
 disaster may come in two forms: it may come in the form 
 of conquest or subjugation by a foreign foe; or it may 
 come in the form of internal disruption or revolution, 
 when the conditions of life have sufficiently changed to 
 make old habits and institutions no longer workable. It 
 is with this latter case that we are concerned. 
 
 Conditions Giving Rise to Social Immobility. — The con- 
 ditions under which social habits become inflexible, hard 
 and fast, are many. In a general way they have already 
 been indicated by saying that the mechanism by which the 
 transition from one social habit to another is effected — 
 namely, public criticism, free discussion, public opinion — 
 has been partly destroyed. This has occurred most fre- 
 quently, no doubt, under despotic forms of government; 
 and hence the connection in popular thought between 
 tyranny and revolution. Not only absolute monarchies, but 
 
 i Pure Sociology, p. 230. 
 165 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 aristocracies and oligarchies also, have frequently created 
 types of social organization which were relatively inflexible. 
 Despotic government, however, is only one of the many 
 conditions favorable to social immobility. Authoritative 
 religions which have glorified a past and put under ban all 
 progress have also had much to do with creating social 
 inflexibility. Again, the mental character of a race or 
 people has much to do with the adaptability and progres- 
 siveness of the social groups which it forms, and some writ- 
 ers would make this the chief factor. Finally, it is well 
 known that in societies without any of the impediments 
 of despotic government, authoritative eeclesiasticism, or 
 inferior racial character, public sentiment, prejudice, 
 fanaticism and class interest can and do suppress free 
 thought and free speech, and produce a relatively inflexible 
 type of society. 
 
 Possible Consequences of Social Immobility. — Whatever 
 the cause of their immobility, societies with inflexible hab- 
 its and institutions are bound to have trouble. The con- 
 ditions of social life rapidly change, and opposing forces 
 accumulate until, sooner or later, the old habit is over- 
 whelmed. Under these conditions the breakdown of the 
 old habit is sharp and sudden ; and the society, being un- 
 used to the process of readjustment, and largely lacking 
 the machinery therefor, is unable for a greater or less 
 length of time to reconstruct its habits. There ensues, in 
 consequence, a period of confusion and uncertainty in which 
 competing interests in the society strive for the mastery. 
 If the breakdown under these conditions be that of a habit 
 which affects the whole social life-process, and especially 
 the system of social control, we have a revolution. It is 
 consequent upon such a breakdown of social habit, then, 
 that the phenomena of revolutions arise. 
 
 Psychology of Revolt.— But before considering some of 
 these phenomena in detail, let us note somewhat more con- 
 cretely how the old habits and institutions are overthrown. 
 
 166 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 Of course, the opposing forces must embody themselves 
 in a party of opposition or revolt. This party is composed, 
 on the whole, of those individuals whom the changed con- 
 ditions of social life most affect, those on whom the old 
 social habits set least easily. The psychology of the revolt 
 of large numbers of men to an established social order 
 is, at bottom, a simple matter. It is simply a case of the 
 breakdown of a social habit at its weakest point, that is, 
 among those individuals with whom the habit is least work- 
 able, or, in other words, whose interest lies in another di- 
 rection. From these the attitude of revolt- spreads by imi- 
 tation, first among those to whom the old social habits are 
 ill-adapted, and finally among all who are susceptible to 
 the influence of suggestion. Thus the party of opposition 
 grows until it comes to embody all of the influences and 
 interests which make the old habits and institutions ill- 
 adapted or even unworkable. 
 
 The Bole of " Destructive " and " Disintegrating " 
 Ideas. — The party of revolt in attacking the established so- 
 cial order must have weapons. Usually it finds these 
 weapons first of all in certain destructive and disintegrating 
 ideas. Thought, as we have seen, in society may be con- 
 cerned either with the building up or the tearing down 
 of activities. Corresponding to the coordinating ideas, be- 
 liefs or opinions upon which the institutions of a highly 
 developed social life may be based, accordingly, are cer- 
 tain disintegrating ideas upon which can be based no set- 
 tled and harmonious social order. While the criticism of 
 revolutionary periods begins with pointing out defects in 
 existing social arrangements, it not infrequently ends by 
 endorsing purely anarchistic ideas. In any case, ideas of 
 an individualistic sort are made weapons of attack upon 
 the established social order. They also often serve as 
 watchwords and shibboleths to unite the party of revolt. 
 Thus they serve not only as instruments of attack but also 
 as means of rallying and unifying the revolutionary forces. 
 
 167 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 " Peaceful Revolutions." — If these forces continue to 
 grow it is evident that there is possible to the ruling classes 
 only two alternatives: either they must make concessions, 
 that is, attempt themselves the readjustment of institutions ; 
 or they must face actual conflict with the party of opposi- 
 tion. As a matter of fact, historically the former alterna- 
 tive has much more often been chosen, thus open conflict 
 avoided, and so-called " peaceful revolutions " effected. 
 If, however, no concessions are made by the ruling classes, 
 or only such as are insufficient to bring about the read- 
 justments demanded by the life conditions; if, in other 
 words, the relative inflexibility of the social order is main- 
 tained, then the antagonism between the old social habits 
 and the new life conditions can be resolved only by open 
 conflict between the ruling classes and the party of revolt. 
 And when this conflict results in the success of the party 
 of revolt, we call it a " revolution. ' ' 
 
 Anarchy of Revolutionary Periods. — Thus the old so- 
 cial order is overthrown, violently, suddenly, and some- 
 times almost completely. Now in the transition from one 
 habit to another in the individual there is frequently to 
 be observed a period of confusion and uncertainty; and 
 this confusion is intensified if the breakdown of the old 
 habit has been sudden or violent. "We should expect, there- 
 fore, an analogous confusion in society upon the break- 
 down of social habits; and this is exactly what we find. 
 The so-called anarchy of revolutionary periods is not due 
 simply to the absence of efficient governmental machinery, 
 but to the general breakdown of the social habits of the 
 population. The anarchy is, of course, proportionate to 
 the violence and completeness with which the old habits 
 and institutions are overthrown. Again, in such periods 
 of confusion in the individual consequent upon the entire 
 breakdown of a habit, we observe a tendency to atavism, 
 or reversion, in his activities; that is, the simpler and 
 more animal activities tend to come to expression. This 
 
 168 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 tendency not only manifests itself in reyolutions, but is 
 of course greatly intensified by the struggle between the 
 classes ; for fighting, as one of the simplest and most primi- 
 tive activities of man, greatly stimulates all the lower 
 centers of action. Hence the reversionary character of 
 many revolutionary periods. They appear to us, and truly 
 are, epochs in which the brute and the savage in man re- 
 assert themselves and dominate many phases of the social 
 life. The methods of acting, of attaining ends, in revo- 
 lutions are, indeed, often characteristic of much lower 
 stages of culture. These methods, as a rule, are unre- 
 flective, extremely direct and crude. Thus resort to brute 
 force is constant, and when attempts are made at psychical 
 control it is usually through appeal to the lower emotions, 
 especially fear. Hence the terrorism which is sometimes 
 a feature of revolutions, and which conspicuously marked 
 the French Revolution. 
 
 Mobs in Revolutionary Periods. — Here another striking 
 phenomenon of revolutionary epochs must be noted; and 
 that is the part played at such times by mobs and other 
 crowds. 1 It is evident that in the confusion and excite- 
 ment of revolutionary times the most favorable conditions 
 exist for the formation of crowds and the doing of their 
 work. There is an absence, on the one hand, of those con- 
 trolling habits, ideas and sentiments which secure order 
 in a population; and, on the other hand, there is the re- 
 version to the unreflective type of mental activities. Under 
 such conditions, crowds are easily formed, and a suggestion 
 suffices to incite them to the most extreme deeds. Thus 
 much of the bloodiest work of revolutions is done by 
 crowds. But it is a mistake to think that true revolutions 
 can be initiated by mobs, or carried through by a series of 
 tliem. Revolutions simply afford opportunities for mobs 
 
 i Le Bon especially has championed the " mob theory " of revo- 
 lutions. See his works in general, especially The Crowd. 
 
 169 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 to manifest themselves to a much greater degree than they 
 can in normal social life. 
 
 Duration of Period of Anarchy. — The duration of the 
 period of confusion, anarchy and mob rule in a revolution 
 is dependent upon a number of factors. If the party of 
 revolt is united upon a program, and if the population 
 generally has not lost its power of readjustment, the period 
 of confusion may be so short as to be practically negligible. 
 Under such circumstances the reconstruction of new social 
 habits and institutions goes on rapidly under the guidance 
 of the revolutionary party. As an illustration of this par- 
 ticular type of revolution with a happy outcome we may 
 take our War of Independence. In this case the relative 
 unity of the revolutionary party, the incompleteness of the 
 destruction of the old social order, the vigorous power of 
 readjustment in a relatively free population, all favored 
 the speedy reconstruction of social institutions. 
 
 State of " Chronic Revolution." — Unfortunately, this 
 speedy reconstruction of social habits is not the outcome of 
 all revolutions. Too often the revolutionary party is uni- 
 fied in nothing except its opposition to the old regime. It 
 can find no principle or interest upon which a new social 
 order can be reconstructed. Moreover, through a long 
 period of social immobility the population seems often to 
 have lost in great degree its power of readaptation. In- 
 deed, in rare cases, peoples seem to have lost all power of 
 making stable readjustments for themselves. Under any 
 or all of these conditions, it is evident that the period of 
 confusion, anarchy, and mob rule in a revolution must con- 
 tinue for a relatively long time. During this time frequent 
 attempts may be made at the reconstruction of the social 
 order without success. These attempts are continued until 
 some adequate stimulus is found, either in an ideal prin- 
 ciple or in the personality of some hero, to reconstruct 
 the social habits of the population. Or, if no basis for the 
 reconstruction of the social order can be found, revolution 
 
 170 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 may become chronic; and the period of relative anarchy 
 and mob rule may last for years, only to be ended perhaps 
 by the subjugation and government of the population by 
 an external power. 
 
 Sociology of the " Dictatorship." — A more usual out- 
 come, however, to the chronic revolutionary condition is 
 the " dictatorship." How this can arise from conditions 
 in revolutionary times is not difficult to understand. The 
 labors of ethnologists have shown us that democracy in 
 some shape is the natural and primitive form of govern- 
 ment among all races of mankind; that despotism has 
 arisen everywhere through social stresses and strains, usu- 
 ally those accompanying prolonged war, when a strong 
 centralized system of social control becomes necessary, if 
 the group is to survive. Now, in that internal war which 
 we call a revolution, if it is prolonged, it is evident that 
 we have all the conditions favorable to the rise of des- 
 potism. When the party of revolt are unable to agree 
 among themselves, and can offer to the population no ade- 
 quate stimulus for the reconstruction of the social order, 
 nothing is more natural than that that stimulus should be 
 found in the personality of some hero ; for social organiza- 
 tion is primitively based upon sentiments of personal at- 
 tachment and loyalty far more than upon abstract prin- 
 ciples of social justice and expediency. The personality 
 of a military hero affords, then, the most natural stimulus 
 around which a new social order can, so to speak, crystal- 
 lize itself, when other means of reconstructing social in- 
 stitutions have failed, and when continued social danger 
 demands a strong, centralized social control. The dictator- 
 ship, in other words, does not arise because some superior 
 man hypnotizes his social group by his brilliant exploits, 
 but because such a man is " selected " by his society 
 to reconstruct the social order. Caesar, Cromwell and 
 Napoleon, these typical dictators of revolutionary eras, 
 would probably have had their places filled by other, 
 
 171 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 though perhaps inferior, men, had they themselves never 
 existed. 
 
 Reaction After Revolutions. — Here may be briefly ex- 
 plained the reaction which frequently follows revolutions. 
 No revolution is, of course, complete ; it is never more than 
 a partial destruction of old habits and institutions. Now 
 new habits, as we have learned, have to be erected on the 
 basis of old habits. "What remains of the old social hab- 
 its after a revolution must serve, therefore, as the foun- 
 dation for the new institutions, since no other foundation 
 is possible. After repeated attempts at reconstruction of 
 the social order have failed, it is the easiest thing to copy 
 the old institutions, and this is often the only successful 
 means of restoring social stability. Hence the reversion to 
 prerevolutionary conditions. But, in the nature of things, 
 such reaction is usually only temporary. The population 
 has learned that the social order can- be changed, and at 
 some later time is quite sure to attempt it again. 
 
 The practical conclusion from all this is that revolution 
 is impossible in a perfectly flexible and adaptable type of 
 social organization. On the other hand, revolution is in- 
 evitable, barring foreign conquest, in those types of social 
 and political organization which do not change with chang- 
 ing life conditions. 1 If the social sciences cannot foretell 
 social events, they nevertheless can so define the condi- 
 tions under which they occur that social development can 
 be controlled. Thus it is of value to society to know the 
 general conditions under which revolutions occur ; for such 
 knowledge points out the way by which revolutions can 
 be avoided. It is worth while for a society to know that 
 by encouraging intelligent public criticism, free discussion, 
 and free thought about social conditions and institutions, 
 
 1 It is scarcely necessary to add that the recent revolutions, end- 
 ing the reign of the Manchu dynasty in China and the Diaz regime 
 in Mexico, though coming long after these words were originally 
 written, have exactly illustrated the views here set forth. 
 
 172 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 by keeping itself adaptable, flexible, alert for betterment, 
 it is pursuing tbe surest way to avoid future disaster. 
 Social science, if it cannot foretell the future, can never- 
 theless indicate the way of social health and security. 
 
 Confusion in Periods of Transition. — Such social disturb- 
 ances as revolutions, with their confusion, anarchy and 
 conflicts between classes, are distinctly pathological; but 
 we may note that there is often a period of confusion in the 
 transition from one social habit to another, which is nor- 
 mal, because it may take some time for a large mass of 
 individuals to discover an adequate stimulus for the build- 
 ing up of a new social coordination. This fact has often 
 been noted even by nonscientific writers on social prob- 
 lems, but it has not usually been explained as due to the 
 psychological difficulties of reconstructing habits in a large 
 mass of individuals, that is, of building up new social co- 
 ordinations. Temporary social disorganization may, there- 
 fore, result from the breaking down of old social coordina- 
 tions and the normal difficulties in building up new ones. 
 We see this with reference to the family in the United 
 States at the present time. The old authoritative, semi- 
 patriarchal family of past generations has broken down. 
 As a form of institution it will no longer work under mod- 
 ern conditions. As yet, however, the mass of people have 
 not been able to discover a sufficient stimulus in any so- 
 cial ideas or ideals for the reconstruction of the family 
 upon a new and stable basis. "While a new ethical fam- 
 ily of a stable type has emerged among certain elements 
 of our .population, other elements are in a condition of 
 confusion as regards their family life and have not yet 
 developed any new and stable type of the family adapted 
 to the new life conditions. 1 
 
 " Critical " and " Constructive " Periods in History. — 
 Many historical writers, si nce Saint-Simon first put for- 
 
 iCf. the study of "The Problem of the Modern Family" (Chap. 
 VII) in my Sociology and Modern Social Problems. 
 
 173 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 ward the theory, have noted that periods of relative stabil- 
 ity in institutions are followed by periods of criticism and 
 disorganization, only to be succeeded again by periods of 
 upbuilding and relative stability. These periods need not, 
 of course, coincide for all classes of social institutions, a 
 period of breaking down in one class of institutions being 
 not infrequently synchronous with a period of reconstruc- 
 tion in another class. Lately this theory has been revived 
 and restated by the German historian, Professor Karl 
 Lamprecht, 1 who finds that periods of individualism and 
 dissociation are regularly followed by periods of synthesis 
 and reorganization about some dominant idea or intellectual 
 element. Hence he finds that there is a universal psychic 
 mechanism by means of which all social transitions are ef- 
 fected. The reasons for these " critical " and " construc- 
 tive ' ' periods in the historical process are now clear. Quite 
 evidently this theory states in somewhat looser language the 
 alternation between social habit and adaptation which we 
 have just been discussing. Periods of stability in institu- 
 tions are necessarily followed by periods of breaking down, 
 of criticism, and of disorganization when life conditions 
 change, to be followed again by periods of synthesis, of 
 reconstruction when some adequate stimulus (ideas, ideals, 
 opinions) can be found upon which to base new social hab- 
 its or institutions. The period of criticism, of disorganiza- 
 tion, and of confusion is abnormal and socially dangerous 
 only when unduly prolonged. 
 
 " Static " and " Dynamic " Civilizations. 2 — While under 
 normal circumstances social life presents a more or less 
 continuous alternation between habit and adaptation, yet 
 habitual tendencies may predominate under some circum- 
 stances in some societies and adaptive tendencies under 
 others, as we have already seen. The tendency for habit 
 to predominate to the exclusion of adaptation is particu- 
 
 * In his book, What is History? Chap. IV. 
 2 Cf. Dealey'a discussion in his Sociology, Chap. IX. 
 174 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 larly seen under certain very simple conditions of life, 
 such as have usually existed in primitive and barbarous 
 societies, and such as sometimes exist, as we have already 
 seen, under the powerful conservative influences of authori- 
 tative religions and of despotic governments. Under such 
 conditions social habits tend to become fixed and immobile 
 and we have resulting what is usually called static civiliza- 
 tion. Where the conditions of life are comparatively sim- 
 ple and unchanging, relatively static civilization seems to 
 be the normal result. If such a society is not disturbed 
 by outside influences, such as incursions of hostile peoples 
 or by changes in the environment, these static conditions 
 may last for centuries. Sooner or later, however, adapta- 
 tion, as we have already seen, must come, because the 
 growth of population alone usually necessitates some 
 changes in habits. 
 
 Whenever, then, through growth of population or 
 changes in the environment, old habits of life work badly 
 and break down, adaptive processes must come in in the 
 ways which we have already described. In highly ad- 
 vanced societies rapid increase of population and changes 
 in life conditions may go on so rapidly that adaptive proc- 
 esses seem to predominate altogether in the group life. 
 Indeed, the trend of social evolution, as it becomes more 
 complex, seems to be more toward continual change or 
 adaptation in the social life. Under such conditions, we 
 have a " dynamic " civilization, and it is conceivable that 
 dynamic civilizations like the one which we are living in 
 may continue an indefinite period, especially through re- 
 flective interference on the part of man with natural con- 
 ditions with the object of securing man's adaptation to a 
 perfectly universal environment. But while we cannot see 
 any end of a progressive or dynamic civilization, it is 
 evident that just as fast as adaptation is secured to life 
 conditions in any given group, there will be a tendency 
 again for habitual tendencies to predominate; and this is 
 
 175 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 to be welcomed, because, so far as we can see, adaptation 
 is not an end in itself in the social life-process. Social 
 equilibrium and stability are desirable not less thai? social 
 change and adaptation. Every dynamic condition of so- 
 ciety, therefore, looks forward to the reestablishment for a 
 greater or less length of time of static conditions of a 
 higher type than -those which preceded. 
 
 Radicalism and Conservatism in Society. — If human so- 
 jiety alternates between periods of relative stability, or 
 tiabit, and periods of relative instability, or adaptation, we 
 should expect that these tendencies of the social life would 
 appear in the character of individuals. We should ex- 
 pect some individuals to show more the habitual or static 
 aspect of the social life, others to show more of the adap- 
 tive or dynamic aspect, for individuals in society are 
 unequally exposed to the different factors which influ- 
 snee social change. This is exactly what we find. All 
 social populations are divided more or less into conserva- 
 tives and radicals, the conservatives being anxious to main- 
 tain the status in which things are found, the radicals be- 
 lieving in change. Of course, under certain social condi- 
 tions, the conservatives, who, we may say, stand for social 
 tiabit and represent, therefore, the habit type of mind, 
 lominate; while under other conditions, the radicals, who 
 stand for social change and so represent the adaptive type 
 af mind, are in the ascendency. 
 
 "Whether particular persons are conservatives or radi- 
 sals will depend, of course, upon their mental make-up 
 and upon their exposure to certain social influences. Bi- 
 jlogical make-up in the way of natural tendencies to varia- 
 aility has, of course, something to do with determining 
 whether a person is conservative or radical. Most usually, 
 however, the influence of the social environment, especially 
 3f education and economic conditions, will have the con- 
 trolling influence. Those persons with whom existing in- 
 stitutions work badly will under ordinary circumstances 
 
 176 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 become the advocates of social change, and, under certain 
 conditions, may become extreme radicals or revolutionaries, 
 in ways which we have already described. 
 
 Both radicalism and conservatism, therefore, are sim- 
 ply expressions of tendencies of the social life, and in their 
 interpretation are to be brought into line with the general 
 theory of habit and adaptation in human society. The 
 absurdity of extreme forms of either radicalism or con- 
 servatism must be manifest when we consider the role of 
 habit and adaptation in the social life. No society could 
 long exist in which habit wholly predominated and the 
 power of adaptation had been lost. On the other hand, 
 no society that is in a continual process of change or adap- 
 tation, which is always without a settled condition of its 
 institutions, can possibly achieve anything worth while. 
 Society cannot exist, therefore, without conservative tenden- 
 cies, on the one hand, nor without radical and progressive 
 tendencies on the other. Both are necessary for that whole- 
 some alternation of condition and change, habit and adap- 
 tation, which makes up the normal life of human groups. 
 
 The Rhythm of Individualization and Socialization. — 
 Finally it may be pointed out that the alternation of in- 
 dividualization and socialization in human society which 
 Ratzenhof er has specially emphasized 1 is closely connected 
 with this matter of social habit and adaptation. In periods 
 when social habits are relatively fixed and stable the in- 
 dividual becomes seemingly simply an element in a static 
 social order. The adaptation of the individual to the so- 
 cial order is so complete that he seems to lose a great 
 measure of his individuality. Controlled by social habit 
 he seemingly becomes a very insignificant element in the 
 vast social mechanism. On the other hand in periods 
 when social habits break down and there is necessity of 
 social readjustment there is opportunity for the individual 
 to assert himself. At such times the individual becomes 
 i Sociologische Erkenntnis, pp. 201-4. 
 
 177 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 more or less free from the domination of custom, tradition, 
 folkways and even the recognized institutions of social 
 control. The individual is thrown back upon his own in- 
 stincts, habits, feelings, beliefs and ideas. Under such 
 circumstances individualism grows and its growth may 
 even become a menace to the reestablishment of stable rela- 
 tions between the members of the group and between the 
 group and its life conditions. Individualism may, there- 
 fore, tend toward social anarchy, that is, the dissolution 
 of the whole social order. Sooner or later, however, as we 
 have already emphasized, some adaptation of the individ- 
 uals to each other and to their environment must be made, 
 if not upon a higher plane than the previously existing 
 social order, then upon a lower plane. 
 
 Hence the alternation between periods of individualiza- 
 tion and socialization, like the alternation between critical 
 and constructive periods, appears inevitable in human so- 
 ciety, because it is based upon the rhythm of habit and 
 adaptation in all individual and social development. But 
 the outcome, whether of a higher social life or a lower 
 social life, is altogether something within rational control. 
 If there is too great socialization of the individual he 
 loses individual initiative, becomes a- mental and moral 
 weakling, and the resulting social order is static, chang- 
 ing only to revert to a still lower type. On the other hand, 
 if there is too great individualization, the individual sets 
 himself up as a law unto himself. There results unending 
 conflict of social habits and ultimately social dissolution, 
 with inevitable reversion to a lower type of order when 
 order is restored. If a society is to remain in a healthy 
 condition, therefore, neither individualization nor socializa- 
 tion must be carried too far. Individualization must be 
 such as to develop individual initiative, mental and moral 
 character and yet prepare the individual for the highest 
 coordination of his activities with the activities of other 
 individuals. Socialization must aim, therefore, not at de- 
 
 178 
 
THE SOCIAL COORDINATION 
 
 stroying the initiative, freedom, and personal moral char- 
 acter of individuals, but must aim at creating in them a 
 strong mental and moral character which will spontane- 
 ously and harmoniously adjust itself to the highest needs 
 of the social life. Individualism of the right sort is neces- 
 sary for any high type of social life. On the other hand, 
 socialization is necessary for any sort of social order. Not 
 an absolute individualism nor an absolute collectivism, but 
 a socialized individualism and an individualized collec- 
 tivism must be the rational aim of civilized societies. 
 
 Individualism and collectivism are, therefore, merely 
 abstractions from the social life-process just like radi- 
 calism and conservatism. Neither can exist in its pure 
 form in human society. The absurdity of either an abso- 
 lute individualism or an absolute socialism as a practical 
 social creed must be manifest. "While the danger of present 
 civilized societies seems to be from an excessive individual- 
 ism, which at times seems to threaten to dissolve all exist- 
 ing institutions, yet it is evident that these societies could 
 readily go to the other extreme, and that a socialism which 
 would suppress individual initiative and lay no emphasis 
 upon the mental and moral character of the individual is 
 a very real danger which threatens in the future. The 
 evident solution must be some form of education which 
 while socializing the individual will at the same time de- 
 velop a high type of individual character, thus assuring 
 the continuation of social order and progress. 
 
 Summary. — This chapter, as its title indicates, has 
 brought us into the heart of sociology and all of its difficul- 
 ties. All are agreed that the social life is possible only 
 through the mental interaction of individuals. This means 
 that the social process must be described in essentially psy- 
 chological terms. If sociology is to become a science, it 
 must find, therefore, some psychological universal to ex- 
 plain social condition and change, social structure and func- 
 tioning. Three possibilities present themselves in the 
 13 179 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 search for such universal principles of explanation in psy- 
 chology according to the development of psychology itself. 
 First, psychology may develop along mechanistic lines, in 
 which case the universal, or principle of explanation, of 
 social phenomena is to be sought in the physio-chemical 
 processes of the nervous system. 1 In this case psychology 
 resolves itself into the physiology of the brain and nervous 
 system, and consciousness is not a factor, performs no work, 
 in the social life. The second possibility is that psychology 
 may develop along absolutely indeterministic lines and it- 
 self offer no universal principle of explanation for either 
 individual conduct or the social life. In this case conscious- 
 ness is essentially a lawless factor, and neither psychology 
 nor sociology can become sciences in the strict sense. The 
 third possibility, and the one which has been adopted in 
 this book as most in accord with common experience and 
 with the developments of modern psychological science, is 
 that psychology will accept the functional point of view, 
 that consciousness does' work, does function, and as such has 
 a survival value in the life-process; but that consciousness 
 in its functioning is itself regular and does its work within 
 universal organic processes, especially the processes of habit 
 and adaptation. In this case sociology must find its uni- 
 versal in the processes of habit and adaptation in which 
 consciousness appears as a mediating, guiding and con- 
 trolling element. The social life being itself a form of 
 adaptation, a coadaptation of individuals, can be under- 
 stood psychologically only by locating its phenomena within 
 the processes of habit and adaptation. This is what we 
 have attempted to do in the first half of this chapter; but 
 certain other equally valid ways of looking at the social life 
 from the standpoint of functional psychology remain to be 
 indicated. 
 
 i This would seem to be the position of my colleague, Professor 
 Max Meyer, in his recent work on The Fundamental Laws of Human 
 Behavior. 
 
 180 
 
CHAPTER VIII (continued) 
 
 THE FUNDAMENTAL FACT FOE PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY ;• 
 SOCIAL SELF-CONTROL 
 
 In the first part of this chapter we have attempted to 
 state the social process very largely in objective terms, that 
 is, in terms of social coordination, social habit and social 
 adaptation. , It is, of course, possible to state the same facts 
 in various subjective terms. Especially valuable is it to 
 look at the whole process of social coordination and adap- 
 tation from the standpoint of the control which the group 
 has over its own activities and the activities of its mem- 
 bers. We shall therefore attempt to give a partial state- 
 ment of the social life-process in terms of the social control 
 of activity. 
 
 Social Self-Control. — In Chapter VII, we pointed out 
 that collective control of the life-process in all of its phases 
 has been aimed at by social groups from the beginning. 
 This collective control of life-processes, which involves 
 what we may call social self-control, is evidently an 
 aspect of social coordination; for we could not have a 
 coordination of the activities of individuals without 
 some control over those activities. In the lower forms of 
 social life control over collective activities is purely in- 
 stinctive; but in human social life this instinctive control 
 is gradually replaced by intelligent and purposive control. 
 Human societies, therefore, undertake more or less con- 
 sciously, to shape and mold the habits and even the beliefs, 
 desires and ideals of their members, so that their activities 
 may be easily and advantageously coordinated. Thus arise 
 
 181 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 the phenomena of. social control, studied so fruitfully by 
 Professor Ross, in his work on Social Control, and more 
 recently by Professor Giddings in a paper on ' ' Social Self- 
 Control." 1 
 
 In a sense social control is characteristic of all social 
 groups whatsoever. Group action, except perhaps in its 
 simplest forms, is impossible without some degree of col- 
 lective control. But it is only in human groups with their 
 self-conscious units that we get conscious and deliberate, 
 though still perhaps more or less instinctive, attempts to 
 control the activities of the individual. Human societies, 
 therefore, from the first present the phenomena of authority 
 and of social discipline. If an individual varies too greatly 
 from the standards of his group, if he refuses to coordinate 
 his activities in harmonious ways with the members of his 
 group, he is punished ; and from childhood to the grave the 
 individual is surrounded with stimuli of all sorts, though 
 chiefly in the way of rewards and penalties, to get him to 
 coordinate his activities advantageously with those of his 
 group. As Professor Giddings says, " The creation and 
 perfecting of discipline, the standardizing of conduct and 
 character by means of discipline, has been the work upon 
 which society has directed its conscious efforts from the 
 beginning. ' ' 2 
 
 All of this of course involves social constraint upon the 
 individual. Long ago Professor Durkheim claimed that 
 such constraint was the distinguishing fact of society, the 
 criterion of the social. While we cannot agree to this, yet 
 it is evident that social constraint must be present in all 
 social groups whose members have been in any degree indi- 
 vidualized. And with the greater individualization of the 
 units of civilized societies, apparently more and subtler 
 forms of social constraint are necessary in order to get the 
 
 i Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, pp. 569-88. 
 zLoc. cit., p. 579. 
 
 182 
 
SOCIAL SELF-CONTROL 
 
 individual to conform his conduct to the standards of his 
 group. While these constraints may exceed the limits of 
 wisdom, may prevent fruitful variations, that is, may main- 
 tain social coordinations which are no longer best adapted 
 to life conditions as we have just seen, yet unquestionably 
 such social constraints are necessary to carry on a collective 
 life-process at all, and are, therefore, on the whole, benefi- 
 cent to the individual as well as to the group. 
 
 " Conscious of the usefulness of solidarity," as Pro- 
 fessor Giddings says, "the group, as it becomes self-con- 
 scious, endeavors by definite policies so far to prescribe 
 individual conduct as to control and limit variation from 
 type. Society thus becomes a type-conforming group of 
 associates. ' ' 1 But it is not for the end of simply maintain- 
 ing a type that societies attempt to control conduct; for a 
 certain amount of variation, of difference, in social groups 
 is desirable and even necessary; rather it is for the sake 
 of carrying on a collective life-process which involves ever 
 more complex coordination of individual activities. As the 
 collective life-process becomes more complex social activities 
 and habits must be brought more vividly to consciousness 
 for the sake of controlling those activities and habits. 
 Hence, human societies enter upon definite conscious poli- 
 cies of social control, and some of the most important insti- 
 tutions of human society are devoted to developing and per- 
 fecting means of social self-control. These are the so-called 
 regulative institutions of society. 
 
 The Function of Government and Law. — Chief among 
 these institutions are government and law. Evidently the 
 function of government, as the name implies, is to regulate, 
 that is, to coordinate and integrate the activities of social 
 groups. Definitely organized government in human so- 
 ciety, according to anthropological evidence, seems to have 
 arisen mainly through military necessities. Only when war- 
 
 i Popular Science Monthly, July, 1909, p. 86. 
 183 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 fare became common, that is, only when their safety was 
 threatened, did human groups establish permanent authori- 
 ties to more strictly coordinate and direct the activities of 
 their individual members, particularly with reference to 
 external enemies. But while government had its origin in 
 military necessities, in all civilized societies it has under- 
 taken the more positive work of coordinating and control- 
 ling the activities of the members of its group, first, with ref- 
 erence to securing internal order, and then with reference 
 to social welfare generally. This last work of controlling 
 the whole collective life-process in the interest of the well- 
 living of its individual members, as Aristotle saw, seems 
 to be the ultimate function of government in human socie- 
 ties. Government, therefore, becomes the chief regulative 
 organ of civilized societies, and its work in the social life 
 has been not inappropriately compared to the work in the 
 body of the higher coordinating centers of the brain and 
 nervous system. 
 
 Closely connected with government, though having to 
 some extent independent origin, is law. Law undoubtedly 
 had its origins in custom, as the work of all the legal his- 
 torians and sociologists has shown. Law is, therefore, 
 closely connected with social habit, and if connected with 
 habit, inasmuch as all habits are ultimately based upon in- 
 stincts, then connected also with instinct. . Formal laws are, 
 then, merely social habits brought to consciousness for the 
 sake of greater control over the habit. In all social groups 
 individuals vary in their habits and some vary beyond the 
 limits which are judged necessary for group safety. Law 
 is established, then, in its statutory and common law forms 
 for the sake of effecting a higher degree of social self-con- 
 trol and of constraining individuals that vary from the 
 standards which are recognized as necessary to carry on 
 the collective or group life. In other words, laws exist for 
 the sake of maintaining a given social organization or social 
 order, though in recent times they have come to be used as 
 
 184 
 
SOCIAL SELF-CONTROL 
 
 a means of coercing a variant social minority to coordinate 
 their activities with those of a social majority. Law, in 
 other words, has become a chief means by which govern- 
 ment integrates and coordinates social activities. Conse- 
 quently, laws which represent the habits of only a minority 
 of a population are not easily enforced; at least, not in 
 democratic communities where popular will and public sen- 
 timent are the chief means of social coercion. 
 
 The whole structure of the law is designed, on the one 
 hand, to restrain the activities of individuals so as to pre- 
 vent too great a departure from type, and, on the other 
 hand, to coordinate the activities of individuals so as to 
 carry on successfully a collective life-process. On account 
 of its very nature, however, law is necessarily limited as an 
 instrument of social control to overt acts of omission or 
 commission. 
 
 Systems of Intercommunication and of Education. — In 
 large complex social groups the coordination of the activi- 
 ties of a vast number of individuals would be impossible 
 without a highly developed system of intercommunication 
 between the individual units. Modern civilized societies 
 could scarcely survive without such systems of intercom- 
 munication, for only with the help of these elaborate means 
 of interstimulation is it possible for them to carry on their 
 complex life-process. It is not necessary to dwell in detail 
 upon the coordinating and integrating effect upon large 
 masses of individuals of the stimuli communicated by the 
 press, the telegraph, the telephone and other devices; for 
 that has often been done. It is only necessary to point out 
 that these devices were not invented and popularized 
 merely for individual convenience, but rather as necessary 
 means of achieving social coordination, social solidarity, so- 
 cial unity, in large and complex groups. 
 
 In the same way systems of education are necessary for 
 the survival of large and complex groups. In such groups 
 the opportunities for individual variation and differentia- 
 
 185 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 tion, and hence for the conflict of habits, greatly increase. 
 While this can be overcome in part by government, law, 
 religion and other agencies of social control, it can be radi- 
 cally overcome only by a system of education which will 
 coordinate each individual effectively with the group before 
 he actively participates in the carrying on of the collective 
 life-process. Systems of education have not been created 
 for the training and development of individuals as such, 
 but rather to fit individuals for membership in society, that 
 is, to control the process by which they acquire habits, so 
 that they shall advantageously coordinate their activities 
 with those of their group. Such social education remains, 
 however, relatively an ideal in modern societies ; for under 
 the influence of philosophical individualism in the Nine- 
 teenth Century education became essentially an individual- 
 izing rather than a socializing process. Hence, many of the 
 inharmonious adjustments between individuals in modern 
 society. 
 
 The Function of Religion and Moral Ideals. — Finally, 
 the function of religion and morality in the social life as 
 regulative institutions needs to be noted. Religion is essen- 
 tially an emotional attitude toward the universe, especially 
 toward unknown powers or agencies which are supposed to 
 be behind its phenomena. Practically, religion is a desire 
 to come into right relations with these unknown powers or 
 agencies. In all ages and among all peoples, therefore, re- 
 ligion has been a powerful instrument of social control, 
 because it adds a supernatural sanction to conduct. The 
 supernatural sanction of religion in the early stages of so- 
 cial development is especially seen in maintaining the social 
 order, for the religious attitude of mind very generally 
 attaches itself, at least in its earlier developments, to habits 
 of action which have been found to be safe and to conduce 
 to individual and social welfare. On account of the power- 
 ful reenforcement which religion gives to custom and other 
 forms of social habit, it has frequently been, as we have 
 
 186 
 
SOCIAL SELF-CONTROL 
 
 already seen, one of the main factors in producing social 
 immobility or a static condition of society. For this reason 
 many writers have seen in religion only a conservative force 
 which tends always to be an impediment to progress. Even 
 so, however, religion is such a powerful instrument of social 
 control that such a writer as Ward can characterize it as 
 the force which holds the social world in its orbit. 
 
 However, this viewof religion as tending simply to main- 
 taining existing social coordinations is but half of the truth. 
 Religion is an instrument of social control in a higher sense 
 also. All of the more highly developed religions at least 
 are closely connected with social idealism. This is seen not 
 only from the character of their divinities, which usually 
 represent ideals of individual character, but also from the 
 character of their heavens, which are always pictures of 
 ideal societies. The religious sanction early becomes at- 
 tached to idealistic morality ; and moral ideals, for the mass 
 of every civilization, seem to get their chief significance and 
 sanction from religion. Moreover, the higher types of re- 
 ligion are powerful preventives of social pessimism, for 
 they combat the idea that the misery and suffering of life 
 are without meaning and value. Religion thus becomes a 
 powerful instrument of social control for the adult indi- 
 vidual. It gives meaning to life, encourages hope and 
 strengthens loyalty to high social ideals. Thus it gives sta- 
 bility to character and not only makes possible stable and 
 harmonious coordinations between individuals but also 
 stimulates relations of a higher type. This is especially true 
 of the Christian religion, the distinctive social merit of 
 which seems to be that it stimulates especially the altruistic 
 impulses and feelings of the individual ; and, as we have al- 
 ready implied, it is only the highest development of the 
 sympathetic feelings and altruistic impulses which is equal 
 to the task of creating the highest type of social relations 
 among individuals. 
 
 The chief social value of religion, then, is in supporting 
 
 187 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 moral ideals. These moral ideals are merely social ideals. 
 They are standards of conduct or of behavior -which society 
 has reflected upon and sanctioned. In the low stages of 
 mental and social development morality is therefore 
 scarcely more than custom. The folkways, as Professor 
 Sumner has insisted, become the mores, as soon as they are 
 thought of in connection with social welfare. 1 The mores 
 of low civilizations and of the masses of all civilizations 
 may not be, therefore, greatly in advance of the actual so- 
 cial life ; but through intellectual development and with the 
 aid of religion moral ideals of a higher sort come in time 
 to be widely accepted, ideals which represent not simply 
 the order of things but an ideal order. The function of 
 systems of morality is not only, then, to maintain social 
 habits which have been found safe and useful, but also to 
 secure higher types of coordinations between individuals. 
 The virtues bind men together in harmonious social rela- 
 tionships. Things which conduce to social harmony and to 
 social survival receive powerful social sanction, and these 
 moral standards become powerful instruments of social con- 
 trol, the control extending not only to the overt acts of the 
 individuals but to mental attitudes, motives and intentions. 
 Thus moral ideals come to be formed which function toward 
 a higher type of social life ; and idealistic morality, coalesc- 
 ing with religion, comes to be rightly regarded not only as 
 a device for maintaining social order, but also as an instru- 
 ment for securing the highest type of social progress, that 
 is, progress in harmonious adjustment of individuals to one 
 another. 
 
 Social Maladjustment. — Social maladjustment in complex 
 societies may spring from many causes. It may result from 
 the failure of the regulative institutions or machinery of 
 society to control the habits and character of individuals, so 
 that they successfully coordinate their activities. But it 
 
 i Folkways, pp. 30f. 
 188 
 
SOCIAL SELF-CONTROL 
 
 may also result from weakness of the individual, whether 
 hereditary or acquired, physical or mental. Individual 
 variation, in other words, springing from sources more or 
 less independent of social conditions, may give rise to in- 
 dividual defects in body or mind which are fruitful causes 
 of social maladjustment. However, the bulk of social mal- 
 adjustment in modern civilization more probably springs 
 from faulty social arrangements, especially from faults in 
 the economic organization of society and in the training of 
 the young. 1 Especially is it due to lack of adequate stimu- 
 lation, training and education to make the individual ac- 
 quire the habits and ideals of his group, so that he shall be 
 able to participate effectively in the carrying on of the col- 
 lective life-process. In complex social life there are, of 
 course, many social conditions which may make it impos- 
 sible for the individual to adjust himself to these condi- 
 tions, or to the institutions and order of society generally. 
 These conditions destroy the individual's power of harmo- 
 nious adjustment, either through giving him habits which 
 are not adapted to a high type of social life, or through 
 compelling him to live in such circumstances that his nor- 
 mal bodily and mental development cannot be secured. 
 Hence we have the genesis in modern societies of dispro- 
 portionate numbers of dependent persons on the one hand, 
 and of delinquent persons on the other, along with a class 
 of more or less hereditary defectives. Such socially unad- 
 justed persons, if their numbers sufficiently increase, menace 
 the very existence of the societies of which they are a part ; 
 for besides the burden which they impose on the socially 
 normal part of the population, there is always danger that 
 the social degeneracy which they represent will spread to 
 the whole population, rendering it incapable of complex 
 adjustments or coordinations of activity. It is evidently 
 the social function of philanthropy to reclaim to society, if 
 
 i Cf . Devine, Misery and Its Causes, Chap. I. 
 189 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 it can, these socially unadjusted classes, and if it cannot, to 
 seclude them from free social life. 
 
 The revolt of a large number of persons to an estab- 
 lished social order can hardly be considered a case of 
 social maladjustment. It is rather the sign of the bad work- 
 ing or breaking down of social habits for a portion of the 
 population. Usually it is, therefore, the forerunner of 
 more or less social reconstruction. It is conceivable, how- 
 ever, that social revolt and opposition in some cases means 
 nothing more than the love of opposition and conflict for 
 its own sake. It is also conceivable that the exceptional in- 
 dividual, the genius, may be out of adjustment with his 
 social order because he perceives an ideal social order, bet- 
 ter social coordinations, beyond the capacities of his group. 
 In both of these cases, however, the resulting social malad- 
 justments are rarely serious. 
 
 Group Will and Group Individuality. — All human social 
 groups elaborate what may be called a group will; that 
 is, as has already been implied, they act to a certain ex- 
 tent as individuals, and acting as individual units they 
 come to have a sort of individuality or gwasi-personality. 
 This follows from what has been said concerning the ac- 
 tivities of individuals of social groups being necessarily 
 coordinated in certain definite ways to carry on a common 
 life-process. That is, they must be brought to a unity of 
 aim; and therefore, of purpose. In human groups, these 
 aims become conscious and accentuated by habit. Hence 
 it comes about that human groups frequently have quite 
 as distinct characters as individuals. The individuality of 
 national groups is especially pronounced on account of the 
 relative independence and high degree of unity of those 
 groups. 
 
 The phenomena of group will and group individuality 
 are an outcome, the student will note, of the coordination 
 of the activities of the individuals in the group in certain 
 definite ways. Group will, and so also " popular " will, is, 
 
 190 
 
SOCIAL SELF-CONTROL 
 
 therefore, a very definite matter, and needs to be borne 
 . in mind in all study of the social life. By group individu- 
 ality or personality we mean nothing more than that the 
 activities of the members of a group are coordinated in 
 certain definite, and usually in certain conscious ways, and 
 that these have become so habitual that they give a fixed 
 character to the group as a whole. 
 
 From the fact that groups act and behave as individuals 
 do with reference to their life conditions, it follows that 
 groups as well as individuals, as we have already noted, 
 may exhibit selfishness or egoism in extreme degrees. In- 
 deed, all social groups tend to consider their own collective 
 life as of paramount importance, and " success at any 
 price " may as easily become the watchword of groups as 
 of individuals. Hence the danger to cultural and national 
 groups and to humanity of the egoism of minor groups. 
 Parties frequently set themselves above the country which 
 they are supposed to serve. Religious denominations and 
 sects have repeatedly in history been guilty of making the 
 interest of their sect the final criterion of right conduct. 
 Moreover, all institutions, although primarily but sanc- 
 tioned forms of association, tend to become identified with 
 " interest groups," and make themselves rather than the 
 larger social life of which they are a part, an end. Even 
 institutions of learning have been known to make their life 
 an end in itself apart from the larger life of humanity. 
 Thus, it is evident that group individuality is liable to 
 become exaggerated into what we might call group indi- 
 vidualism, or group egoism, and become an even greater 
 peril to the larger collective life than the egoism of indi- 
 viduals. 
 
 Interest Groups. — Every social group of any size tends to 
 differentiate and split apart into several competing groups, 
 owing to the inevitable variation in the life conditions and 
 activities of a number of individuals. Those whose ac- 
 tivities are naturally most harmonious, that is, most easily 
 
 191 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 and spontaneously coordinate in carrying on certain phases 
 of the life-process, tend to form groups of individuals 
 whose activities are closely coordinated, and whose habits 
 vary in certain distinctive ways from the larger group of 
 which they are a part. 1 These subordinate social groups 
 are usually called parties, factions, classes or ' ' gangs ' ' ; but 
 since interest is the subjective side of activity, they may be, 
 and in sociological literature usually are, called " interest 
 groups. ' ' 
 
 Interest groups are, then, subordinate groups of indi- 
 viduals whose activities are coordinated, either purposely 
 or unconsciously, to achieve certain more or less definite 
 ends in the collective life-process. While the end to be 
 achieved may be at first very vague, yet through competi- 
 tion and conflict with other groups the end may become 
 sharply defined in the consciousness of the individuals who 
 make up the group. In the same way the interest group 
 achieves organization and a relative degree of solidarity; 
 for it is the strain and stress of competition, and of danger, 
 as we have seen, which tightens the bonds of groups and 
 unifies them. In other words, when groups in the face of 
 great difficulties attempt to do certain things they can only 
 do them by the closest coordination of the activities of indi- 
 viduals, by what we in ordinary language call " team 
 work. ' ' This implies that each individual lose his personal- 
 ity, as it were, in his group, that is, subordinate his activi- 
 ties completely to those of the larger unity ; it implies great 
 collective control of individual activities, on the one hand, 
 and great social self-control, in the sense of close and har- 
 monious coordination of all the activities of the group, on 
 the other. Like individuals, under such circumstances, in- 
 terest groups develop a definite direction and purpose in 
 their activities and a definite unified character. In other 
 
 i One of the best recent studies of the formation of groups is Dr. 
 George E. Vincent's paper on " The Rivalry of Groups " (American 
 Journal of Sociology, January, 1911). 
 
 192 
 
SOCIAL SELF-CONTROL 
 
 words, they develop a group will and a group individuality. 
 Like individuals, too, they develop, under such circum- 
 stances, tendencies to aggrandize and exploit, and to accept 
 no standards but success and self-interest. That is, they 
 develop group egoism. 
 
 All that has been said thus far concerning the develop- 
 ment of solidarity and unity in interest groups applies 
 equally to national groups. It is of importance chiefly be- 
 cause Gumplowiez and other sociologists of the " conflict 
 school " have carried to an extreme the doctrine of the 
 solidarity and egoism of interest groups. 1 These sociolo- 
 gists proclaim that the national group is nothing but a bal- 
 ance of competing interest groups ; that it is out of an un- 
 mitigated conflict of classes and races that the structure 
 of national governments arise; and that they represent 
 nothing but an equilibrium or compromise between such 
 conflicting " interests." The followers of Marx also advo- 
 cate the view that there has been no other force in human 
 history than the conflict of classes, of economic interest 
 groups. As opposed to this doctrine of the absolute solidar- 
 ity and unlimited egoism of interest groups, it must be 
 said that, while there is always danger that the members of 
 a class, a party, or a faction, may forget the larger social 
 unity which they are supposed to serve, yet normally the 
 members of such interest groups have their activities far 
 more coordinated with the larger social whole than with 
 the subordinate interest group. In other words, the whole 
 personality of the individual is usually not surrendered to 
 his class or his party, but a part of his activities, and usu- 
 ally the more important part, remain harmoniously co- 
 ordinated with those of the larger group. Normally, then, 
 an interest group will not push its victory to extreme limits. 
 The doctrine of the absolute egoism of groups, and that 
 political structures are a balance of the egoistic pressure 
 
 i Cf. the discussion in Ross, Foundations of Sociology, pp. 272-90. 
 
 193 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 of one group upon another, is, therefore, without any ade- 
 quate foundation in fact. Even in the ease of the relations 
 between national groups, where the doctrine of a balance 
 between absolute egoisms should apply if anywhere, it is 
 doubtful if it applies. More and more a larger proportion 
 of the inhabitants of civilized countries, under the influence 
 of humanitarian education and ideals of universal altruism, 
 are seeking to coordinate their activities, not simply with 
 their class, their nation, or even their race, but with hu- 
 manity as a whole. Civilized nations, on account of the 
 influence of these enlightened few, no longer dare to push 
 to the limit any advantage which they may have over 
 weaker nations. 
 
 " Stratified " and Compound Societies. — Groups enter into 
 and form coordinations with other groups as individual 
 units. Thus are formed all sorts of compound societies. In 
 some cases such groups were originally separate, and do not 
 lose their identity to any extent in the larger group, but 
 remain separate and distinct. The familiar historical ex- 
 ample is where one people has conquered another, and the 
 subjugated are reduced to a subject or slave class. In such 
 cases caste lines are apt to continue indefinitely to separate 
 the several groups. "What we have, therefore, in such cases 
 is a coordination between groups, usually in the form of 
 the exploitation of a weaker class by a stronger. The 
 coordinations between the members of the two classes 
 will all tend to be of the same general type, while within 
 each class between its members will develop varied coordi- 
 nations according to life conditions. Only in the ruling 
 class, however, can the mechanism of social coordination 
 and of social change be fully developed and function freely. 
 Hence the whole psychology of group action, group organi- 
 zation, and social change which we have just set forth would 
 have to be considerably modified if applied to " caste " or 
 compound societies. In such cases there seems to be con- 
 siderable warrant for the doctrine of absolute group ego- 
 
 194 
 
SOCIAL SELF-CONTROL 
 
 ism, and it is worthy of note that this doctrine originated 
 where such societies have existed more or less down to the 
 present — in East Europe. 
 
 Limitations of a Functional Interpretation of Social Phe- 
 nomena. — The interpretation of social life and processes 
 which has thus far been offered has been strictly functional. 
 However, it must be pointed out that such a functional in- 
 terpretation has certain limitations. All processes in 
 organic nature tend, as it were, to overflow their limits of 
 utility; that is, nature's method seems to be to produce a 
 superabundance so that actual functional needs will be cer- 
 tain of being met. The functional interpretation of such 
 things in society as communication, imitation and conflict, 
 therefore, breaks down at certain points. We communicate, 
 for example, oftentimes when we have no need of doing so 
 in order to carry on a common life-process. "We talk with 
 each other merely for the sake of talking without refer- 
 ence to the functioning of any coordinated activities. The 
 process of communication has, therefore, been to a certain 
 extent freed from life needs and life conditions. Neverthe- 
 less, to acknowledge this in no way overthrows the view of 
 communication as having to do with the carrying on of 
 common life-processes. Even if communication often does 
 exist in human society for its own sake, from the point of 
 view of the origin and development, structure and function 
 of society, we may say that communication is a device, 
 primitively and also dominantly at the present time, for 
 the carrying on of a common life-process in a group of in- 
 dividuals. 1 
 
 Again, while serious conflict arises in social groups 
 mainly through the failure to build up new harmonious co- 
 ordinations, yet we have to recognize that there is a certain 
 amount of conflict in modern societies which is carried on 
 
 i Koss's criticism of a functional interpretation of social activ- 
 ities (Foundations, p. 154) is, of course, based upon too narrow a 
 conception of function. 
 
 14 195 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 as it were for its own sake. Conflict, with some persons, has 
 become an end in itself, and their love of conflict for its 
 own sake leads them into all sorts of needless oppositions 
 with other individuals. In other words, the combative in- 
 stinct in some persons may become so greatly exaggerated 
 that they take delight in conflict as such, without any refer- 
 ence to the life-process. This is as true of nations even as 
 of individuals. History is filled with examples of such 
 conflicts that are apparently meaningless from the stand- 
 point of the carrying on of a collective life, although we 
 should be cautious about interpreting conflicts of larger 
 groups of individuals as belonging to this type. Even ad- 
 mitting, however, the existence of these meaningless con- 
 flicts between individuals, interest groups, and national 
 groups, this by no means overthrows the view that conflict 
 is primitively and dominantly a matter associated with the 
 carrying on of a common life; that conflict is in the main 
 either an expression of struggle between two competing in- 
 dependent groups, or else an expression of failure to main- 
 tain or build up harmonious coordinations between indi- 
 viduals belonging to the same group. 
 
 The Limits of Social Coordination and of the Complexity 
 of Social Organization. — It is manifest that at any particular 
 stage of the mental and moral development of the indi- 
 vidual there are limits to social .coordination and hence to 
 complexity of social organization. The higher types of 
 social coordination require a corresponding development in 
 the intelligence and self-control of the individuals con- 
 cerned. Hence, also, the more complex types of social or- 
 ganization require a similar development in individuals. It 
 is not true, therefore, that social evolution can proceed 
 independently of individual evolution. Upon the mental 
 and moral development of the individual depends the 
 height to which the complexity of social organization can 
 be carried. The nature of the individual, therefore, marks 
 the limits of social evolution at any particular stage. If 
 
 196 
 
SOCIAL SELF-CONTROL 
 
 individual character and intelligence cannot be raised to 
 meet the requirements which high types of social coordi- 
 nation and organization impose, then social organization 
 must drop back to lower levels. If the social organization 
 of any people, accordingly, becomes so complex that the 
 character and intelligence of its constituent individuals are 
 unable to meet its requirements, then such social organiza- 
 tion must disappear, and there is a chance that in the proc- 
 ess of social dissolution the people or nation itself may 
 likewise disappear. While a people's social organization 
 may therefore be much lower than their fully developed 
 mentality and moral character is capable of sustaining, yet 
 it is an old truth, and one well worth emphasizing, that any 
 great advance in social evolution must ultimately depend 
 upon raising the moral character of the individuals con- 
 cerned. 
 
 Summary. — Activity is fundamental in the social life as 
 well as in mental life. It is the coordination of the activi- 
 ties of the individual units which makes social life possible. 
 The social coordination is, then, fundamental in any inter- 
 pretation of the social life from the standpoint of activity 
 or function. Ideas, feelings, and mental attitudes gener- 
 ally, are secondary, because these are merely mediatory of 
 the social activities made possible by the coordination of 
 innumerable individual activities. The social activities that 
 persist, the more or less permanent social coordinations, 
 resting upon habitual activities or attitudes in the indi- 
 vidual, may be appropriately called ' ' social habits. ' ' These 
 social habits must continually be changed in order to ad- 
 just groups to new life conditions. Changes are made in 
 group habits, collective adaptations are made to new life 
 conditions, through various forms of interstimulation and 
 response, especially through communication. Communica- 
 tion, suggestion and imitation are mainly devices to carry 
 on a collective life — that is, they exist because of the social 
 life and are its instruments. It f ollows that anything which 
 
 197 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 interferes seriously with the mechanism of social adaptation 
 is liable to produce abnormal conditions of the social life 
 and ultimately profound social disturbances. A certain 
 rhythm is to be observed in institutions, and in social life 
 generally, periods of criticism and confusion due to the 
 breaking down of social habits, being followed by the build- 
 ing up of new habits -and institutions which, when estab- 
 lished, result in relatively long periods of social stability. 
 
 In order to carry on any collective life-process, except 
 of the simplest sort, societies must control the activities of 
 their individual members. All social coordination, beyond 
 simple, instinctive sorts, necessitates collective control of 
 individual activities. Hence the phenomena of authority, 
 social control, and social constraint in human groups. 
 Moreover, as social groups take on more complex activities, 
 conscious social self-control becomes increasingly necessary ; 
 and in the more highly organized societies, therefore, social 
 discipline of all sorts — government, law, education, mo- 
 rality and religion — become increasingly important. Con- 
 scious of the direction and purpose of their activities, 
 human groups take on a definite character. They develop 
 a conscious group will, and a well-marked individuality, 
 which often becomes exaggerated. But the whole process 
 of the developing social life is strictly limited and condi- 
 tioned at any given time by the mental and moral character 
 of the individual units. 
 
 Just the part played in the social life by the various 
 psychic elements in the individual, such as instinctive im- 
 pulse, feeling and intelligence, must now be examined 
 before we can construct a theory of social order and 
 progress. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE K&LE OF INSTINCT IN THE SOCIAL LIFE 1 
 
 There can be no psychology of the associational proc- 
 ess, and hence no adequate sociology, until we can answer 
 the question, "What part does instinct play in guiding and 
 shaping that process? "While we have already discussed 
 this problem to a certain extent and indicated roughly our 
 view, we need now to examine more in detail the relation 
 between instinct and social life. 
 
 It is said by some that instinct is a word which merely 
 serves to cover our ignorance ; that when we have explained 
 anything through instinct we really have no explanation 
 and that a sociology which employs such a term must be 
 either very incomplete or very metaphysical in character. 2 
 In reply, it may be said that the psychological sociologist 
 who bases his interpretation upon modern psychology has 
 no alternative but to employ the word instinct. Modern 
 psychology has given a perfectly definite connotation to this 
 term, as we have already seen, and while the biological 
 
 i Perhaps the better title of this chapter would be "The E61e 
 of Instinctive Impulse in the Social Life"; but as most psycholo- 
 gists use the term " instinct " in such a broad way as to make it 
 synonymous with instinctive impulse, this usage has been followed. 
 Those who prefer, therefore, may read " instinctive impulse " wher- 
 ever the term " instinct " is used. 
 
 2 Cf. the remarks of Professor Kelsey, American Journal of Soci- 
 ology, Vol. XV, p. 616. The question at issue is, of course, the old 
 question of the importance and extent of the innate in man. See the 
 writer's article on " The Instinctive Element in Human Society " in 
 the Popular Science Monthly for March, 1912. 
 
 199 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 sociologist may properly refuse to allow the term instinct 
 to stop his investigations, the psychological sociologist, 
 on the contrary, when he has reduced social phenomena 
 to psychological terms cannot he said to have any further 
 duty. Of course, instincts are determined by selective proc- 
 esses in nature, and therefore can always themselves be ex- 
 plained by the biologist, or in the case of human society, 
 by the biological sociologist; but when the psychological 
 sociologist has pushed back his explanation to the biological 
 process of selection that is as far as he can reasonably be 
 required to go. Certainly a psychological theory of society 
 that did not take into account such instincts as mother love, 
 combativeness, acquisitiveness and the like, would be a very 
 one-sided intellectualistic sort of theory. To understand 
 human society on its spiritual side, we must begin, there- 
 fore, with the human instincts. 
 
 Recognitions of Instinct in Historical Social Theories. — 
 The instinctive, or the inborn, has been more or less rec- 
 ognized in all theories of the social life since Aristotle, 
 which take into consideration more than the intellectual 
 elements. Aristotle's theory of society, indeed, may be 
 said to have been that society was of an instinctive nature. 
 From Aristotle down to modern times society has been 
 explained more or less in terms of a so-called social instinct 
 or instincts. The trouble with this theory of earlier so- 
 cial philosophy is manifestly that it based society upon one 
 or more specific instincts, whereas, as we have seen, all 
 man's instincts have been modified by his social life, and 
 he enters into social relations not through any one or even 
 a few, but practically through all of his instincts. 
 
 As we have seen, the instincts of the individuals of a 
 social species like man are made so that they fit into each 
 other, as it were, and so provide certain social coordina- 
 tions to start with. While such instincts as sociability 
 further and make easy the process of coadaptation of in- 
 dividuals to one another in society, it is not true that the 
 
 200 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 social life rests upon some vague specialized social instinct 
 or instincts. To a certain extent, therefore, the older way 
 of explaining man's social life through social instincts was 
 unscientific and perhaps might even be called metaphysical, 
 although Comte, who was extremely keen in detecting any- 
 thing metaphysical in science, accepted the general view 
 that man is by nature a social animal. 1 There can be no 
 objection, therefore, to the essence of Aristotle's instinctive 
 theory of society. The objection is only to the crude state- 
 ments which it has received at the hands of certain the- 
 orists. 
 
 Among practically all writers in the social sciences we 
 find, indeed, more or less recognition, implicit or explicit, 
 of instinct as a factor in the social life. This recognition, 
 however, is often given in such a crude and vague way, as 
 McDougall has shown, that the use of the term instinct 
 by many of these writers must be regarded as highly un- 
 scientific. 2 Likewise, implicit recognitions of the instinctive 
 elements in the social life have been also at times exceed- 
 ingly crude. The earlier economists, for example, made 
 much of certain ' ' properties of human nature ' ' such as the 
 aversion to labor, the love of gain, and the like. Now, by 
 properties of human nature one can only mean, in terms 
 of modern psychology, inborn tendencies or capacities, 
 that is, instincts in a very broad sense. All the explana- 
 tions of the past in terms of such crude psychology must, 
 of course, be replaced at present by explanations which 
 conform to modern scientific psychology, if the social sci- 
 ences themselves are to be made scientific. 
 
 Recognitions of Instinct in Recent Sociological literature. 
 —Comte fully recognized the importance of instinct in hu- 
 man society. 3 He blamed the social theorists of his day for 
 
 i Cf. Positive Philosophy, Bk. VI, Chap. V. 
 
 2 Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 21, 22. 
 
 3 See Positive Philosophy, Bk. V, Chap. VI. Comte anticipated 
 the modern psychological doctrine of instinct. He defined instinct 
 
 201 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 accepting the " fanciful supposition that intellectual con- 
 structions governed the general conduct of human life. ' ' 1 
 Nevertheless, it may be said that in his own theorizing 
 Comte quite lost sight of the principle which he had laid 
 down, when he indulged in the fanciful supposition, not 
 only that society could be organized on a basis of intel- 
 lectual constructions, but that it had in all past stages 
 been actually so organized. 2 Comte, however, may be par- 
 doned for his inconsistency in finally accepting an intel- 
 lectualistic interpretation of human society, for he had 
 not modern psychology to guide him. But the modern 
 sociologist who sets up intellectualistic theories of human 
 society at the present time may be less easily pardoned; 
 yet among modern sociologists there has been, down to 
 recent years, but little recognition of the part played by 
 instinct in shaping and molding our social life. Some so- 
 ciologists, to be sure, like Professor "Ward, have empha- 
 sized the " unconscious " character of social progress in 
 the past and of many present social processes, 3 and by this 
 unconscious element in society they seem to mean very 
 largely, an instinctive or biological element. In "Ward's 
 sociological theories this is still more evident by the use 
 which he makes of " desire " in his social interpretations, 
 for, as we have already seen, the desires are frequently 
 more or less blind impulses connected with the instincts. 
 In general, however, in sociological literature, there was 
 
 as "any spontaneous [native?] impulse in a determinate direction," 
 and even anticipated James's thesis that in this sense there were 
 more instincts in man than in the brutes {loo. cit.). Comte got his 
 view as to human instincts from Gall, who, as every student of the 
 history of science knows, did much to put psychology on a scientific 
 basis, though his just fame was long obscured by his connection 
 with the pseudo-science of phrenology. 
 
 i Op. cit., Bk. VI, Chap. V. 
 
 2 See the discussion of Comte's " Law of the Three States " in 
 Chapter XI. 
 
 s See, e.g., his Pure Sociology, pp. 250, 302-4, 645. 
 
 202 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 little adequate explicit recognition of the large part which 
 instincts play in our social life down to the publication of 
 McDougall's " Social Psychology " in 1908. While many 
 scattered articles and passages had emphasized the im- 
 portance of instinct in particular phases of the social life, 
 McDougall's work first systematically attempted to show 
 the bearing of instinct upon the social life as a whole and 
 upon the social sciences. 1 After showing the large part 
 which instinctive activities play in all social processes, 
 McDougall concludes, " the springs of all the complex ac- 
 tivities that make up the life of societies must be sought 
 in the instincts, and in the other primary tendencies that 
 are common to all men and are deeply rooted in the remote 
 ancestry of the race." 2 
 
 However great or small the part which instinct plays 
 in human society, it is certainly necessary, if we are to 
 study human society psychologically, to begin with the 
 native elements found in the individuals which compose 
 this society, and then to show the part they play in social 
 organization. 
 
 Misconceptions of Instinct. — Much of the denial of any 
 role whatever to the instincts in human social life has 
 been due to many misconceptions of instinct. In the first 
 place, many thinkers have conceived of instinct as some- 
 
 1 While McDougall must be given the credit of being the first 
 sociological writer to emphasize the fundamental importance of 
 instinct in the social sciences, it is only fair to add that several 
 teachers of sociology (including the present writer) had for many 
 years done the same thing in their instruction. The common source 
 of all ideas concerning the importance of instinct in human life 
 among English-speaking psychologists and sociologists was, of course, 
 James's well-known chapter on "Instinct" (Chap. XXIV) in his 
 Principles of Psychology, which the student will do well to read 
 even yet. Sociological writers of psychological training have ac- 
 cordingly long given more or less explicit recognition to the instinc- 
 tive element in human society. See, e.g., Hobhouse, Morals in Evo- 
 lution, Chap. I. 
 
 2 Op. tit., p. 351. 
 
 203 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 thing hard and fast, as a definite, " crystallized," so to 
 speak, mode of activity which characterizes only the lower 
 animals. 1 These persons have in mind particularly the 
 manifestations of instinct seen in insects and other lowly 
 forms of life. It is true that in these low forms of life 
 the inherited, preorganized forms of activity are hard and 
 fast, and being so simple, are relatively definite. They, 
 therefore, preclude all education ; but as James and Thorn- 
 dike and others have shown, in all the higher types of 
 animals, on the contrary, instincts are almost never hard 
 and fast and such as to preclude education. The instincts 
 of many of the higher animals like the horse and the dog, 
 for example, may be easily modified through training and 
 experience in many ways. We must not, therefore, have 
 the conception of instinct as a hard and fast, crystallized 
 mode of action, for this is true only of instincts in the 
 lower forms of life. There may be in the higher forms 
 many preorganized activities without their being so defi- 
 nite as to preclude all modification, and hence all education. 
 
 Another misconception of instinct is that instincts ex- 
 press themselves without reference to the stimuli in the 
 environment. That they are predetermined modes of ac- 
 tivity with which the environment has nothing to do is, 
 of course, not true of the instincts of any animals, and 
 especially is it not true of the instincts of the higher ani- 
 mals. Instinctive activities never develop in the higher 
 animals unless there are stimuli in the environment to 
 develop them. "While they are innate, complex, motor 
 tendencies, they cannot set themselves off of themselves, so 
 to speak, but are dependent for their development upon 
 the appropriate stimuli in the objective world. 
 
 A third misconception is that instincts exclude conscious- 
 ness and reason. We have already seen in a previous chap- 
 
 i This seems to be the conception of instinct held by Professor 
 Lloyd Morgan. See his Habit and Instinct and his Comparative 
 Psychology, 
 
 204 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 ter that the very reverse of this is the case. While a high 
 degree of consciousness may not always attend instinctive 
 activity, yet where any instinct in a higher animal is 
 blocked, there is vivid consciousness through desire of the 
 end sought; and reason, so far from being opposed to our 
 instincts, as we have already seen, is very often merely an 
 instrument in the carrying out of our instincts. 
 
 Instincts cannot be said, therefore, to be " blind " ex- 
 cept in their beginnings and in the lower types of animals, 
 although, of course, it is only the most highly developed 
 mind that understands the meaning of instinct and per- 
 ceives the biological ends involved in instinctive activities. 
 
 Another point which perhaps should be reemphasized 
 is that instincts in the higher animals and in most low 
 animals only come gradually to expression. As Thorn- 
 dike says, " there are all degrees of gradualness in the 
 maturing of instincts. ' ' 1 Consequently it is only the ma- 
 ture individual who shows all of the instincts of his species, 
 and even he may not show all in their full development, 
 on account of the fact that the environment may not have 
 afforded stimuli for their proper development, and also 
 on account of the fact that organic variation may cause 
 certain instincts to be weak or missing altogether in that 
 particular individual. Thorndike goes so far as to say that 
 there is probably " no instinct which is not entirely lack- 
 ing in some individuals " ; 2 and this statement, though dif- 
 ficult to accept as regards some of the more fundamental 
 instincts, is entirely in accord with what we know of varia- 
 tion in organic life. 
 
 i Elements of Psychology, p. 188. 
 
 2 Op. cit., p. 193. Cf. the remark of Royce ( Outlines of Psychol- 
 ogy, p. 303 ) : "In general our most important instincts appear slow- 
 ly, bit by bit, not as at all finished tendencies to specific kinds of re- 
 action, but as at first crude and awkward tendencies in the general 
 direction of a given kind of action. The unfinished form in which the 
 instincts appear in all the higher vertebrates seems to be of great 
 importance for the development of the individual animal." 
 
 205 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 The Nature of Human Instincts. 1 — We are now prepared 
 to see exactly the nature of man's instincts, and in what 
 ways they differ from the instinctive activities of other 
 animals, and particularly those of lower types of animals. 
 In man, then, as in all the higher animals, there is a highly 
 developed nervous system characterized by a multitude of 
 more or less perfectly preorganized reactions. 2 These 
 preorganized reactions have been established through the 
 operation of selection upon variations in the hereditary ele- 
 ments, just as the bodily characteristics of the species have 
 been established; and like the latter, they are transmitted 
 from generation to generation. These hereditary reactions, 
 as we have already noted, have been classified into reflex 
 and instinctive, but for the sake of simplicity we shall call 
 all of these inborn or preorganized activities instinctive. 
 As noted,, these native reactions are not in man fixed and 
 unalterable, but are subject to modification or elimination, 
 according to changes in the environment. Nor are these 
 reactions always specific, but, as Thorndike says, ' ' the ma- 
 jority of instincts are vague, variable, and rough-hewn ' ' ; 
 " they are often indefinite and general." 3 Strictly speak- 
 
 i The view of instinct here presented attempts to trace instincts 
 no further back than the structure of the nervous system and the 
 selective processes in nature which have determined that structure. 
 As is well known, Professor Jacques Loeb has attempted definitely 
 to connect animal instincts with the " tropisms " of organic matter 
 (see especially the chapter on "The Theory of Animal Instincts" 
 in his Comparative Physiology of the Brain and Comparative Psy- 
 chology). This theory, which would make instinct primarily a mat- 
 ter of organic chemistry, though apparently accepted by Royce 
 [Outlines of Psychology) , is very far from being accepted by psy- 
 chologists generally. For criticism of the theory see Jennings, Be- 
 havior of Lower Organisms, Chap. XIV. 
 
 2 In addition to the authorities already mentioned the student 
 will do well to read, for a simple description of the leading human 
 instincts, Kirkpatrick's Fundamentals of Child Study, Chaps. III- 
 XIII. 
 
 » Op. cit., pp. 189, 190. 
 
 206 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 ing, we have, therefore, in man no definite, hard and fast 
 instincts such as characterize the lower types of animals. 
 For that matter, this type of instinct, as we have already 
 seen, is also rare in the higher animals. What we have 
 in man is, rather, a complex series of more or less gen- 
 eralized instinctive reactions which fit man to cope with 
 his environment fairly well from the start, and which, as 
 we have already seen, are the basis of all of his mental 
 life. The instinctive reactions in man are, therefore, but 
 the starting point for his mental and social life. Upon 
 them all habits must be built. Indeed, as Thorndike says, 
 the instincts become ' ' permanent property by being turned 
 into habits. ' ' 1 
 
 Nevertheless, these innate psycho-physical dispositions 
 in man must be taken account of in all social theory and 
 in all social practice. It may be difficult, if not impossible, 
 to see in any concrete situation in human life just how 
 much is to be ascribed to the innate and how much is to 
 be ascribed to the acquired. However, even though we 
 cannot quantitatively determine the relations between 
 these two elements, it is important to know that they both 
 exist and that the former is prior to the latter. 
 
 McDougall defines instinct as "an inherited or innate 
 psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor 
 to perceive and to pay attention to objects of a certain 
 class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particu- 
 lar quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in 
 regard to it in a particular manner, or at least, to experi- 
 ence an impulse to such action." 2 But this definition 
 makes the conception of instinct needlessly complex, and 
 McDougall himself is forced to admit that there are many 
 instincts with no clearly defined emotions attached to them. 3 
 
 i Op. cit., p. 188. 
 
 2 Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 29. 
 
 o As Professor Mead says, McDougall has mixed up his doctrine 
 of instincts with his doctrine of the emotions. While the emotions 
 
 207 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 Also he has to exclude, according to this definition, the 
 more general or nonspecific tendencies of organic psychical 
 life, such as imitation and sympathy; but McDougall's 
 treatment of the matter shows that he regards the essence 
 of instinct to be the " innate psycho-physical disposition." 
 It seems, therefore, much better for the purpose of the 
 sociologist to lump all of these innate tendencies of human 
 nature together and call them instinctive tendencies, recog- 
 nizing that there are in man, at least, few definite, specific 
 instincts so well marked that we can point them out and 
 say that this activity belongs to that particular instinct 
 and that activity belongs to another. Rather, it is better 
 to accept Thorndike's view that the majority of human 
 instincts are vague, relatively nonspecific and rough-hewn; 
 and instincts in this sense are, perhaps, as James has as- 
 serted, in man more numerous than in any other animal. 
 The Extent of Instinctive Activities in Human Life. — 
 As we have 'already said, it is impossible to determine as 
 yet, with any quantitative degree of exactness, the propor- 
 tion of human activities that -may be regarded as pri- 
 marily instinctive. In general, we may regard those as 
 instinctive which characterize the species, that is, which 
 are relatively common to all men in all stages of culture. 
 This, however, cannot be exactly true because different 
 groups of man have been exposed to different selective in- 
 fluences. The different races, therefore, as we shall see, 
 may well have certain differences in their instinctive re- 
 actions, and civilized man may have differences from unciv- 
 ilized man. Indeed, the biological conception of instincts, 
 as determined by the operation of selective processes upon 
 hereditary elements, necessitates the view that instinctive 
 
 are undoubtedly complexes of feeling attached to instinctive activ- 
 ities, it does not follow that every instinctive activity has a distinct 
 characteristic emotion, or even that it has any emotion accompany- 
 ing it whatsoever. See the discussion of the nature of feeling in 
 Chapters VI and X. 
 
 208 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 reactions are continually being modified in all groups of 
 man by selection. Various forms of social selection must 
 have modified somewhat, therefore, the instinctive reactions 
 in civilized man, as distinguished from the barbarian and 
 the savage. We need have, accordingly, little hesitancy 
 in affirming that those activities are instinctive or innate 
 -which are, with exceptions, common to a large majority 
 of the species. We may also detect human instincts by 
 comparing the activity of man with animals. Most of 
 the human instincts have their parallel or counterpart in 
 the instincts of the higher animals. Again, through child 
 study it is possible to observe the unfolding of innate 
 psycho-physical dispositions and tendencies where there has 
 been no attempt to modify these through education, and 
 in this way, from the study of the child and the adolescent, 
 we may also perceive, with more or less clearness, some of 
 the instinctive elements in human conduct and character. 
 The task before us, therefore, in determining quali- 
 tatively, if not quantitatively, the role of the instincts in 
 mediating coordinations of individual activity, in shaping 
 forms of associations, and in molding human institutions 
 is not an impossible one. 1 
 
 Human Instincts and Human Institutions. — There can be 
 no question that instinctive reactions are the basis of co- 
 ordinations between individuals in society, that is, the basis 
 of social relationships. Not only do many of the simpler 
 forms of association spring directly from human instincts, 
 but also the instincts or, rather, the feelings connected with 
 instinctive activities, have been instrumental in securing 
 those sanctions which give certain forms of association their 
 institutional character. Human institutions rest, then, 
 upon instincts, not merely as forms of association, but as 
 
 i Psychologists find also many other marks of instinctive reac- 
 tions. As we have already noted, marked emotion is a frequent 
 accompaniment of instinctive activities; and they seem to be in- 
 variably characterized by spontaneous or involuntary attention. 
 
 209 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 sanctioned forms, for the sanctions that are given in social 
 life are as frequently instinctive as purely rational. 
 
 Nevertheless, it is very difficult to trace out the in- 
 stinctive elements in human institutions as they exist in 
 modern civilized societies. This is not only due to the fact 
 that instinctive reactions are overlaid with a mass of habits 
 which we term custom and tradition, but also due to the 
 very complexity of human instincts themselves. We can- 
 not picture the relation of the various native reactions of 
 man to one another as like that of the branches of a tree 
 to each other and to some common trunk. Rather, in- 
 stinctive activities coalesce, run into each other, and re- 
 enforce each other in such complex ways that we can find 
 no figure in external nature to express it. Not only do 
 certain instincts unite in certain modes of individual and 
 social coordination, but they shift in their combinations 
 of one with another so that in civilized society it is im- 
 possible to make out very simple and clearly defined in- 
 stinctive activities, as we have already seen. The social 
 consequence is that human institutions may be expressions 
 of one or more simple instincts or of a number of instincts 
 combined in various ways. The student must remember 
 that we are considering living processes and not static 
 structures, and that instinctive activities, like all living 
 processes, are indefinitely complex and interdependent 
 among themselves. 
 
 The consequence of this complexity of instinctive ac- 
 tivities in man is that no satisfactory classification of hu- 
 man instincts has ever yet been proposed. Henry Rutgers 
 Marshall has proposed to classify instincts into (1) in- 
 stincts which preserve the life of the individual; (2) in- 
 stincts which preserve the life of the species; (3) instincts 
 which preserve the life of groups or societies. 1 "While 
 this is one of the most satisfactory classifications yet pro- 
 
 i See his Instinct and Reason, Chap. V, on " The Classification 
 of the Instincts." 
 
 210 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 posed, it must be noted that it is not, by any means, a 
 clear and exclusive classification. It is difficult to see, for 
 example, whether certain instincts function most to pre- 
 serve the life of the individual, of the species, or of the 
 group. Others have proposed somewhat analogous classi- 
 fications based upon the functional ends of instincts. 1 But 
 these classifications are scarcely more satisfactory than that 
 of Marshall. An ideal classification for sociological pur- 
 poses would be, of course, to classify instincts according 
 to the human institutions with which they are connected f 
 but the same instinct appears in so many institutions, and 
 institutions are so frequently based on more than one in- 
 stinct, that it is practically impossible to classify instincts 
 in this way also. We shall, therefore, make no attempt to 
 give a scientific classification of instincts either from a 
 psychological or a sociological standpoint, but will content 
 ourselves with noticing some of the principal activities of 
 collective life and their connection with certain instincts.* 
 
 1 See, e.g., Kirkpatrick, Fundamentals of Child Study, Chap. IV ; 
 Pyle in his Outlines of Educational Psychology (Chap. IV) fol- 
 lows a similar method. 
 
 2 A very convenient classification of instinctive impulses -which 
 sociological writers frequently find necessary to employ is the classi- 
 fication into " social " or altruistic instincts, on the one hand, and 
 individualistic or egoistic instincts, on the other. While there is no 
 " social instinct," there are " social " instincts, including ( 1 ) those 
 connected with the family group, (2) those connected with larger 
 groups (e.g., gregariousness, love of approbation, self-subordina- 
 tion). The classification of man's natural tendencies into "social" 
 and " antisocial " has, therefore, a certain psychological as well as 
 practical justification. In a larger sense, of course, practically all 
 of man's instincts are social, in that they presuppose an environ- 
 ment of other human beings. 
 
 8 The discussion which follows concerning the relation of specific 
 social activities with certain instincts is, of course, only tentative. 
 Whether any certain alleged instinct is found later to exist or not 
 cannot affect the general trend of the argument of the book. In- 
 telligence, of course, continually functions along with instinctive im- 
 pulse in any specific social activity, as has already been pointed out. 
 15 211 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 Instincts Connected with Nutrition. — Food supply, as 
 we have already seen, is the main thing at any particular 
 time in the carrying on of a collective life. Man, and all 
 other animals, therefore, have strong instincts connected 
 with the getting and keeping of a sufficient food supply. The 
 hunting instinct which is so strong in primitive man be- 
 comes, perhaps, more or less transformed in modern so- 
 ciety into a variety of economic impulses connected with 
 the getting of a sufficient food supply. All races, however, ■ 
 whether obtaining food through hunting or not, seek in- 
 stinctively to secure control over sources of food supply 
 and to store up food. This leads man, and even some of 
 the animals below man, to appropriate feeding grounds and 
 to store food for unfavorable seasons. These feeding 
 grounds and stored-up food supplies constitute the earli- 
 est wealth or property of human groups, though it is to 
 be noted that this form of property is distinctly not pri- 
 vate or personal property. Moreover, all of the higher 
 types of animals, and especially such a highly developed 
 type as man, must have instinctive tendencies to labor in 
 order to secure food. While the older economists empha- 
 sized man's aversion to labor, there is unquestionably in 
 man, and particularly in civilized man, an instinct to work 
 under certain conditions or stimuli. The instinct to labor, 
 primarily connected with the obtaining of food and with 
 bodily nutrition, is something which must be taken into 
 account in all social theory. Man cannot live without 
 work. This has been demonstrated again and again when 
 men are shut away from all forms of productive labor. 
 While the instinct to work must have been originally con- 
 nected with nutrition, it has, of course, in many of its 
 higher developments, quite separated itself from nutritional 
 functions. 1 
 
 i See Professor Veblen's article on "The Instinct of Workman- 
 ship and the Irksomeness of Labor," in American Journal of Sociol- 
 ogy, Vol. IV, pp. 187-201 (also referred to in his Theory of the 
 
 212 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 Many of the practical interests of social life gather, 
 therefore, about food getting and the forms of labor nec- 
 essary to get food. Il is not difficult often to trace move- 
 ments of population, such as migration and the like, to 
 the food-getting impulses and the stimuli connected with 
 food. 1 The more differentiated and individualized mani- 
 festations of this instinct we shall notice later. 
 
 The perversions of the instinctive impulses connected 
 1 with food getting are numerous. Like all self-regarding 
 impulses, they are liable to all sorts of egoistic exaggera- 
 tions from gluttony to subtle kinds of self-aggrandize- 
 ment and selfish exploitation of others. Begging and steal- 
 ing may both be regarded as primarily perversions of the 
 food-getting instinct, though often more immediately con- 
 nected with the great semi-independent instinct of acquis- 
 itiveness which grows out of the food-getting impulses. 
 
 Instincts Connected with Reproduction. — More impor- 
 tant in many ways to the social life than the instincts con- 
 nected with nutrition are the instincts connected with re- 
 production. These are the foundation, not only of the 
 family, but of all institutions connected with the care and 
 education of children. "We have under this head to do 
 with two great primary instincts — the sexual instinct, or 
 sex attraction, and the parental instinct, or maternal and 
 paternal love. These instincts are relatively independent, 
 and often differently developed in the same individual. 2 
 The sexual instinct is evidently the basis for that coordina- 
 tion between individuals of different sex which we term 
 
 Leisure Class, pp. 15f.) . Loeb in his Comparative Physiology of 
 the Brain (p. 197) speaks approvingly of Veblen's theory and says: 
 " One of the most important instincts is usually not recognized as 
 such, namely, the instinct of workmanship. Lawyers, criminolo- 
 gists, and philosophers frequently imagine that only want makes 
 man work. This is an erroneous view." 
 
 i For an example of this, see Woodruff, The Expansion of Races. 
 
 * Cf. the discussion on " The Reproductive and Parental In- 
 stincts " in McDougall's 'Introduction to Social Psychology (Chap. X) . 
 
 213 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 sexual love, and which leads to marriage and the family. 
 In furnishing a basis for such a primary and necessary 
 coordination of individuals, sex attraction becomes one of 
 the great primary forces in society, 1 and about it social life, 
 especially that of the younger members of a group, largely 
 centers. Remote manifestations of this mstinct are not 
 difficult to trace in practically all phases of the social life, 
 as, for example, in the artistic and the religious. In all 
 the larger natural groups of man this instinct must be 
 strong enough to assure that each generation is slightly 
 more numerous than the preceding, otherwise the group 
 would soon become extinct; and the instinct is kept mod- 
 erately strong by rigorous natural selection; for those in 
 whom it is weak are apt to leave no offspring, while those 
 in whom it is exaggerated are apt to leave only degenerate 
 offspring. On account of the strength of the sexual in- 
 stinct its control within the bounds of social utility has 
 always been one of the most difficult problems of human 
 society. Practically all social groups have attempted its 
 control through custom, law, moral precepts or religious 
 sanctions. As already pointed out, on account of its im- 
 portance to the future and to the race, increasing social 
 control over this instinct must characterize the more ad- 
 vanced stages of social evolution. The perversions of this 
 instinct on account of its connection with the family and 
 offspring are, perhaps, more dangerous to society's future 
 than the perversions of any other. 
 
 While the sexual instinct leads to love and marriage, 
 and so is the entrance to the family life, it is the parental 
 instinct which gives stability to the family, and so is the 
 
 i Nontechnical writers on social matters, with a sanity sometimes 
 not attained by professional sociologists, have always recognized this. 
 Thus Professor Eauschenbusch justly remarks {Christianity and the 
 Social Crisis, p. 272) : "The attraction between men and women 
 is just as fundamental a fact in the social life as the attraction of 
 the earth is in physics." 
 
 214 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 real foundation of that institution in all ages and among 
 all peoples. 1 This is shown, not only by the customs and 
 laws of practically all peoples, but also by the fact that 
 among both the civilized and the uncivilized childless 
 couples separate much more readily than those that have 
 children. 
 
 The parental instinct is noteworthy in that it is one of 
 many instincts which differ in strength in the two sexes. 
 Maternal love is notoriously stronger than paternal love. 
 There can be no question, however, as to the instinctive 
 character of paternal love, even though it appears to be 
 often of a more deliberative and rational character. There 
 was a time when even maternal love was thought to spring 
 from such intellectual elements as the perception of the 
 helplessness of the child, and the like. Such a shallow view 
 of human nature failed to see entirely the biological springs 
 of human passions, affections and emotions. It is safe to 
 say that such a universal affection as paternal love is no 
 less biological in its essential nature than maternal love, 
 even though it may seem to have a larger rational and de- 
 liberative element in it. 2 
 
 The parental instinct gives rise to a whole series of 
 coordinations in society. Corresponding to the love of the 
 parent is the filial love of the child, for the child no more 
 needs to be taught to love its caretaker and protector than 
 the parent needs to be taught to love the child. Among 
 the children, too, develops that natural affection which we 
 term brotherly love, and which later expands into the sen- 
 timent of kinship. The coordination between the parents 
 also becomes more complex, as something more than sexual 
 love now unites them. As in humanity, the care of the 
 child is so long continued, this gives opportunities, as we 
 have noted, to build up habits of servic e and self-sacrifice 
 
 iSee the writer's discussion of this point in his Sociology and 
 Modern Social Problems, Chap. IV. 
 2 See McDougall, op. tit., p. 69. 
 
 215 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 which few individuals would develop were there not such 
 a powerful stimulus. Some psychologists, indeed, do not 
 hesitate to trace all the altruism in society to extensions 
 of the parental instinct. However this may be, the high de- 
 velopment of parental and filial love is certainly necessary 
 to any high development of sympathy and altruism in soci- 
 ety generally. It has become a truism among sociologists 
 that the family life is the chief generator of altruism in so- 
 ciety ; 1 and that the amount of altruism in any given society 
 bears a close relation to the quality of its family life. 
 
 Instincts Connected with Self-Defense. — In the older 
 works on social philosophy much is said of the instinct of 
 self-preservation. But modern psychology has resolved 
 this instinct into a number of instinctive impulses of dif- 
 ferent sorts. All animals have instinctive impulses to pro- 
 tect themselves from dangerous forces in the environment, 
 which express themselves negatively in the instincts of flight 
 and hiding, and positively by the tendency to fight or to 
 defend themselves by physical force against enemies, 
 whether of their own species or not. Chief among these in- 
 stincts connected with self-defense is the fighting or com- 
 bative instinct. 
 
 Conflict within a species, as we have already seen, may 
 be considered the negative side of the food and reproduc- 
 tive processes; for, among individuals of a social species 
 the occasions for combat are chiefly connected with the 
 competition for food or mates, or with the protection of 
 offspring. In social species, moreover, the fighting instinct 
 is more apt to manifest itself collectively in the competition 
 of groups for a common food supply. 
 
 On account of the strength of the instinct of pugnacity 
 in man many have argued that primitively it must have 
 been even stronger, and that the primitive condition must 
 
 iCf. Comte's remark (Positive Polity, Vol. II, Chap. V): "In 
 the family life alone can the social instinct find any basis for 
 growth." 
 
 216 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 have been one of unmitigated struggle between individuals 
 or groups of individuals. The erroneousness of this view 
 has already been pointed out. Very few animals will fight 
 unless they are attacked and especially not members of 
 their own species. This seems to have been particularly 
 true of primitive man. Not until the earth filled up and 
 competition for food and territory became intense did 
 man's full ferocity against his fellowmen develop. It is 
 not improbable, therefore, that in the whole course of hu- 
 man evolution the fighting instinct has greatly increased 
 in strength. "While reaching its maximum expression in 
 the barbarian stage of culture, even in civilized man this 
 instinct is still unnecessarily strong. The unregulated 
 struggle of our industrial, political and social life still 
 causes, all too frequently, obscure ferocities between man 
 and man which break out into crime, while modern na- 
 tions seem ready to fly at each other's throats at the least 
 provocation. The removal in society of unnecessary causes 
 of conflict or of unnecessary stimuli to the fighting instinct 
 is one of the greatest tasks of social and moral reform, 
 while the avoidance of occasions for conflict between na- 
 tions is one of the first tasks of modern statesmanship. 
 On the side of the individual, likewise, the control and 
 regulation of the fighting instinct, so that the individual 
 may adjust himself properly to the members of his group, 
 is one of the chief problems of education. 
 
 "We have already pointed out the great role that con- 
 flict and the combative instinct have had in social evolu- 
 tion; how in social defense groups become knit together, 
 better organized and more conscious of their collective 
 life ; how, also, in defensive or aggressive warfare the neces- 
 sity of leadership and organization has greatly stimulated 
 not only political development but all forms of social de- 
 velopment as well. In these ways the fighting instinct has 
 negatively mediated many coordinations in human groups. 
 All military institutions, of course, rest directly upon the 
 
 217 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 instincts connected with self-defense, and especially upon 
 the instinct of pugnacity; and as we have already seen, 
 government and many other institutional forms of the 
 social life were developed in connection with military ac- 
 tivities. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that in 
 history on the whole, the peoples who have been the best 
 fighters have developed the highest types of social institu- 
 tions and of civilization generally. 1 Very often, however, 
 these combative impulses have become so exaggerated that 
 they have resulted in positive injury to their groups, bru- 
 talizing popular sentiment and feelings, destroying the 
 material foundation of a complex civilization, and pro- 
 ducing that " reversal of selection " in human societies 
 which Dr. Jordan and others are inclined to consider one 
 of the chief factors in the social deterioration of a people. 2 
 In other words, historical peoples have often allowed their 
 instincts of pugnacity to thwart all their higher social 
 development. They have literally often fought themselves 
 to pieces. The perversion of the instinct of pugnacity is 
 seen, then, both in the individual and in groups, where 
 fighting is carried on, not as a means of defense, but for 
 its own sake. Whether or not the fighting instinct needs 
 ever to be exercised against human beings in order to 
 maintain it at normal strength is an open question. There 
 seems to be but little danger of the fighting instinct in 
 any race dying out, and the more reasonable view is that 
 its legitimate exercise in civilized society is in combating 
 the moral and social evils which prevent humanity from 
 realizing its ideals, 3 rather than in actual physical con- 
 flict between individuals or groups of individuals. 
 
 Closely connected with the instinct of pugnacity is the 
 
 i Cf. McDougall, op. cit., Chap. XL 
 
 2 See Jordan, The Human Harvest. 
 
 8 The " moral substitute for war " is surely not the conquest 
 of physical nature, as Professor James suggested, but the combating 
 of social and moral evils. 
 
 218 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 instinct of rivalry or emulation. This seems to be, indeed, 
 but an attenuation of the fighting instinct. It is, however, 
 quite different in most of its manifestations. As McDougall 
 says, " While the combative impulse leads to the destruc- 
 tion of individuals and societies that are least capable of 
 self-defense, the emulative impulse does not directly lead 
 to the extermination of individuals or societies. ' ' 1 Bather, 
 he points out, the emulative impulse finds more satisfaction 
 in keeping alive competitors. Emulation is, therefore, a 
 form of competition which is markedly human, and es- 
 pecially adapted to civilized societies. In our modern so- 
 cieties it enters into practically all forms of our social life, 
 being the form of competition which we find chiefly in 
 education, in industry, in art, in science, and in practically 
 all the other more " socialized " forms of activity. Emu- 
 lation thus tends to replace the more brutal form of com- 
 petition by physical conflict in modern society, although, 
 as we have already seen, wherever competition becomes too 
 intense or too unregulated, it tends to pass over into the 
 lower form of conflict. Even in the relations between civ- 
 ilized nations emulation in commerce, science and art 
 unquestionably tends to supersede actual conflict. While 
 competition cannot be gotten rid of in social life for bio- 
 logical reasons, it is probable that well regulated and or- 
 ganized competition in which there is practical equality 
 of opportunity and the " rules of the game are known " 
 will not- stimulate greatly the fighting instinct in man, but 
 only the instinct of rivalry and emulation. It is by this 
 plan, it is thought by many, that human society may escape 
 from the bloody conflicts of the past which have resulted 
 from man's fighting instincts. 
 
 - Instincts Connected with Sociability. 2 — Man, like prac- 
 tically all the other higher animals, has always, so far as 
 
 i Op. cit., p. 294. 
 
 2 That sociability is an instinctive, not an " acquired " trait, prac- 
 tically all of the work in modern psychology and sociology goes to 
 
 219 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 we can discover, lived in groups larger than the family. 
 The reasons for this we have already pointed out. The 
 advantages of group life must have given rise very early 
 in man, or rather in man's precursor, to strong gregarious 
 instincts. While in primitive man these groups or hordes 
 may not, on account of scarcity of food, have been as large 
 as in some other animals, yet man, like many other animals, 
 shows a strong ' ' social ' ' instinct. He wishes to be in and 
 of his group. He is not satisfied to live alone, and solitary 
 confinement has proved in all ages, among the most terrible 
 forms of punishment ever devised. In protecting himself 
 against wild beasts, in obtaining a food supply, and in 
 defending himself against his human enemies, man, as we 
 have already seen, has found it absolutely necessary to live 
 in comparatively large groups in order to survive. More- 
 over, natural selection placed a premium from the first 
 on those individuals that could live in large groups, for on 
 the whole it has been the larger groups that have survived 
 from the struggle of group with group in the past. Thus 
 we find in man powerful impulses to seek the companion- 
 ship of his fellows, to keep closely at home within his own 
 group, to follow his group in all things and to listen, as 
 Mr. Trotter says, ' ' to the voice of the herd. ' ' x 
 
 As McDougall says, it is possible that many of the 
 actions which Professor Giddings attributes to the intel- 
 
 show. For example, Professor Giddings's whole sociology is a, dem- 
 onstration of this. However, sociability, or gregariousness, is not 
 a simple, definite instinct like, say, pugnacity; but rather a general 
 tendency, like imitation, made up of several distinct, though re- 
 lated innate tendencies and impulses. One of the best recent treat- 
 ments of gregariousness from the sociological standpoint is an arti- 
 cle by Mr. W. Trotter on " Herd Instinct and Its Bearing on the 
 Psychology of Civilized Man " in the Sociological Review for July, 
 1908. As Mr. Trotter says, " Gregariousness is a phenomenon of 
 profound biological significance and one likely, therefore, to be re- 
 sponsible for an important group of instinctive impulses." 
 i Op. cit. 
 
 220 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 leetual element, " the consciousness of kind," should be 
 attributed to the gregarious impulses in man, 1 although in 
 fairness to Professor Giddings it should be said that he 
 would doubtless include the gregarious impulse, or the in- 
 stinct of sociability, within his concept of " the conscious- 
 ness of kind. ' ' 
 
 There is, certainly, no instinct which is more important 
 for man's collective life than the gregarious impulse. 
 While it may seem satisfied simply by the presence of 
 other human beings, or living and being at one with one's 
 group, yet when combined with other instincts like the 
 food-getting impulse it gives rise to a vast mass of coordina- 
 tions between individuals of a cooperative character. 
 While we can scarcely speak of a cooperative impulse, in- 
 stinctive sociability, reenforced and combined with other 
 instincts, gives rise to many instinctive forms of coopera- 
 tion. Thus groups seek food together, defend themselves 
 against a common enemy, and engage in many collective 
 activities. As McDougall suggests, man's very tendency 
 to live in immense aggregations of population which we 
 term cities, may be perhaps more or less an expression 
 of man's instinctive sociability or gregariousness, 2 for the 
 tendency to city life is seen almost as soon as material civ- 
 ilization begins, and seems quite natural to man, although 
 the great cities of the present are unquestionably the 
 product of the industrial forces and conditions of. our times 
 rather than of man's gregarious impulses. 
 
 The perversions of the gregarious instinct are many — 
 
 1 Op. oit., Chap. XII. Cf. Judd's statement (Psychology, p. 217) : 
 " There is among 1 all the higher animals an instinct toward contact 
 with members of the same species.'' This is, of course, the impul- 
 sive or motor side of " the consciousness of kind," as Giddings has 
 recognized. Genetically, however, the impulse toward association 
 or living together in groups must have preceded any cognition of 
 kind or similarity. 
 
 2 Op. oit, p. 19G. 
 
 221 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 although not considered very reprehensible by society. The 
 tendency of our times is, perhaps, to exaggerate certain 
 aspects of the instincts of sociability, especially the fear 
 which is shown of being conspicuous, the disinclination to 
 preserve a relatively independent personality. Rather 
 " the voice of the herd " is listened to so attentively that 
 independent moral judgment and character are frequently 
 lacking among many individuals in modern civilized popu- 
 lations. The dangers of these conditions to society are 
 manifest. 
 
 McDougall, Kirkpatrick and others suggest that the 
 gregarious instinct is simply an extension of the various 
 instinctive impulses connected with the family life. 1 How- 
 ever this may be, it is certain that the instincts of sociabil- 
 ity are but a section of that large mass of instincts which 
 we call the sympathetic or altruistic instincts. Through 
 the life in larger groups the sympathetic emotions get ex- 
 pansion along with the instinct of sociability. In this way 
 altruism itself, which perhaps originated in the family life, 
 came to extend, as we have already seen, to larger and 
 larger groups of man. Thus the development of the in- 
 stinct of sociability along with sympathy makes possible 
 wider and wider coordinations between individuals so that 
 social organization tends to embrace in its ultimate de- 
 velopment the whole species of mankind. 
 
 Just how far the social virtues, such as veracity and 
 loyalty, should be considered as resting upon native im- 
 pulses or instincts has long been a matter of debate. Of 
 course, in the strict sense it may be said that any social 
 virtue manifests itself as such only after reflection and a 
 
 i Kirkpatrick's statement is (Fundamentals of Child Study, p. 
 113): "The social instincts and feelings are only an extension of 
 the parental instinct from the family to the larger group." Suth- 
 erland, as is well known, would derive all man's sociability, all 
 sympathetic and altruistic impulses and feelings, from the instincts 
 connected with the family group. 
 
 222 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 definite choice of one or more courses of action. Even this 
 view of virtue does not preclude us from looking to the 
 instincts as a basis of many modes of conduct which we 
 speak of as virtues. Truth-telling, for example, seems to 
 be a natural impulse, and since as a method of conduct it 
 is necessary for the harmonious and effective coordination 
 of the activities of individuals in groups, it may rightly be 
 regarded as having more or less of an instinctive basis, 
 probably closely connected with the general instinct of soci- 
 ability. While veracity may be largely a native impulse 
 of man, this does not preclude, of course, that in certain 
 situations deception and lying may not also be instinctive. 
 We see in children, for example, the native impulse to tell 
 the truth, and yet under certain circumstances we likewise 
 see clearly the impulse to conceal and to deceive. As James 
 and others have pointed out, these contrary impulses are 
 a part of man's instinctive equipment in many directions. 1 
 
 Loyalty to one's group is a conspicuous social virtue 
 which probably has an instinctive basis. Without a native 
 impulse to be loyal to one's group it is impossible to con- 
 ceive any high development of group life. Patriotism as 
 a sentiment or emotion is probably a development of in- 
 stinctive loyalty to one's own group, though patriotism in 
 the strict sense must be considered more of a sentiment than 
 as a simple emotion connected with a simple native impulse. 
 Inasmuch as loyalty plays such a part in the development 
 of all social life, one is forced to conclude that it must have 
 in some degree an instinctive basis, although this by no 
 means precludes the development of loyalty through tra- 
 dition, imitation and other forms of education. Loyalty is, 
 therefore, probably also connected closely with man's natu- 
 ral instincts of sociability. 
 
 Love of approbation, or of the approval of others, is 
 
 i Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, p. 392 : " Nature implants 
 contrary impulses to act on many classes of things." 
 
 223 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 another manifestation, largely instinctive, of man's innate 
 sociability. Individuals, to live together in large groups, 
 must be exceedingly sensitive to the opinion of other mem- 
 bers of their group, and this sensitiveness is the instinctive 
 foundation of the control which groups exercise over their 
 individual members. The love of approbation, therefore, 
 serves to coordinate and integrate groups in many ways. 
 
 We have now, perhaps, emphasized sufficiently the great 
 importance of innate sociability or of the gregarious in- 
 stinct in man for his social life. This importance might be 
 indefinitely illustrated on every hand, for there are very 
 few social activities in which this impulse is not more or 
 less manifest. As Mr. Trotter points out, the gregarious 
 instinct is capable seemingly of indefinite combinations with 
 other impulses, socializing them and at the same time often 
 greatly intensifying them. 1 Moreover, this instinct also re- 
 enforces many acquired beliefs, interests and habits, and 
 through this enforcement these beliefs, interests and habits 
 get the sanction and force of the instinct itself. Thus so- 
 ciety, in one way or another, finds ways of connecting beliefs, 
 interests and habits which are valuable for the social life 
 with man's gregarious impulses and in this way is able to 
 make them of much greater influence in society. 
 
 Instinctive Imitation. 2 — As to whether there is an in- 
 stinct of imitation or not psychologists disagree. Some 
 hold that imitation is only a general neural tendency, that 
 every native impulse tends to discharge itself not only in 
 the presence of appropriate stimuli in the environment, but 
 
 i " Impulses derived from herd feeling will enter the mind with 
 the value of instincts. Acts which it would be absurd to look upon 
 as the results of specific instincts are carried out with all the enthu- 
 siasm of instinctive behavior. Hence herd instinct can confer in- 
 stinctive sanction on any part of the field of belief or action " ( op. 
 cit.). , 
 
 2 See Chapter XIII for the discussion of the r81e of imitation in 
 the social life. 
 
 224 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 also whenever a similar activity is perceived in another 
 individual. 1 According to this view there is no specific in- 
 stinct to imitate, but all instincts develop more or less 
 through imitation, imitation being essentially a similar re- 
 sponse to similar stimuli from a similar instinctive basis. 
 While it must be admitted that much of the imitation that 
 we see among animals is simply a manifestation of the de- 
 velopment of latent instincts, 2 nevertheless there are good 
 grounds for arguing that in addition to imitation as a 
 method of development of instinctive activities there is in 
 man and in other gregarious-animals a distinct specific tend- 
 ency to imitate. In man it is seen in the passion "to do 
 as others do." This tendency to do as others do or to fall 
 into line is one of the most useful, from a social point of 
 view, of all of man's instincts. It helps to bring about 
 many simple coordinations in social groups and enables 
 them to act together in simple ways as against enemies and 
 the like. It is not surprising, therefore, to see this specific 
 tendency to imitate strongest in the gregarious animals, and 
 particularly in man. The imitative instinct proper must 
 be regarded, then, as a differentiation of man's gregarious 
 
 iThis is the position of McDougall (op. cit., Chap. IV). Bald- 
 win also considers imitation to be primarily a general neural tend- 
 ency, though in a somewhat different sense from McDougall. His 
 theory of " organic imitation " will receive consideration in Chapter 
 XIII. It may be remarked that to view imitation as a general 
 neural tendency (as in one sense it undoubtedly is) is in no way 
 opposed to regarding it as instinctive in the broad sense. Since 
 imitation is in the main not " learned " in human society, it is in 
 a broad sense " instinctive." 
 
 2 Thorndike points out ( Animal Intelligence, pp. 76f . ) that ani- 
 mals generally, with the possible exception of the primates, do not 
 " imitate " in the sense of learning to do an act from seeing. Prac- 
 tically all gregarious animals, however, do imitate in the sense 
 of showing sympathetically-induced activities; that is, the seeing 
 of a certain instinctive activity in one animal furnishes the stimulus 
 for a similar action in another animal, usually of the same species. 
 (See McDougall, op. cit., p. 104.) 
 
 225 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 impulses, or, if not, a specific differentiation, a reinforce- 
 ment of the general neural tendency to imitate by the gre- 
 garious impulses. 
 
 Closely connected with man's imitativeness, and also 
 with his native sociability, is his suggestibility. For this 
 reason it has been claimed that suggestion and imitation are 
 the basis of man's social life and that it is through these 
 tendencies that man has come to live in groups, that is, to 
 carry on vast collective life-processes. 1 This theory of 
 society we shall have to examine later, so that it is not 
 necessary to do more at this point than to point out that 
 we have to do in interactions between individuals not only 
 with general neural tendencies to receive suggestions and 
 to imitate, but also with a specific instinct to do as others 
 do and with a sensitiveness to the views of one's group, both 
 of which are unquestionably connected with man's strong 
 gregarious impulses. 
 
 The Instinct of Acquisitiveness. — Acquisitiveness is a 
 native impulse which has probably been more or less devel- 
 oped out of the food-getting impulses. As an impulse, how- 
 ever, it is not confined to the gathering and storing up of 
 food, although it may have had its origin in that tendency, 
 but it extends to the collecting and hoarding of anything. 
 We find many evidences of this instinct in the animal world 
 below man, since it is not infrequent among some of the 
 higher animals for individuals not only to collect and store 
 up a food supply, but also, as we see in monkeys, to collect 
 and hoard things of no specific utility to them. In the low- 
 est savages of the present this instinct seems to be but fee- 
 bly developed, but it might well be argued that that is one 
 of the reasons for their social backwardness, and that in 
 primitive man this instinct of hoarding things of greater 
 or less utility was one of the chief means of bringing about 
 
 i This is, of course, the central position of the imitation school 
 of social theorists. Cf. also the remark of Boris Sidis (Psycholt 
 of Suggestion, p. 310) : "Man is social because he is suggestible." 
 
 226 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 those accumulations of material goods which are essential 
 to progress in human society. Perhaps, as McDougall em- 
 phasizes, the hoarding of grain for food supply among peo- 
 ples was one of the first steps in civilization. 1 In the tem- 
 perate zones especially individuals who did not store up 
 food for unfavorable seasons, such as droughts and the like, 
 would be at a great disadvantage and would be suddenly 
 eliminated. Moreover, those groups and families in which 
 weapons, utensils and precious metals were accumulated 
 would soon come to have a great advantage in any com- 
 petition with other individuals and groups. Thus early 
 civilization favored the development of strong impulses of 
 acquisition in man. Later civilization has scarcely less 
 favored the development of such innate tendencies. There 
 can be scarcely any doubt that the acquisitive instincts of 
 man have laid the foundation for many of the prominent 
 features of our present social life. 
 
 While the acquisitive impulse is not so much a means of 
 coordinating individuals directly, it becomes a powerful 
 social force in that it is taken into account in all groupings 
 and relations of man. It is, however, we may note, the 
 foundation of that most important institution of our civili- 
 zation which we know as private property. 2 All other com- 
 binations and groupings of man have had to take into ac- 
 count more or less the existence of this institution. In 
 consequence there is considerable truth in the view that the 
 instinct of private gain dominates, to a great extent, our 
 present civilization. The socialists are, no doubt, in great 
 degree right when they say that present social organiza- 
 tion immensely stimulates this instinct and causes all sorts 
 of needless exaggerations. Indeed, the civilized man is hav- 
 ing this instinct bred into him perhaps more than any other 
 quality by the processes of selection now going on in society. 
 
 lOp. (At., Chap. XIV. 
 
 2 See Letourneau's valuable study, The Evolution of Property. 
 16 227 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 Instincts of Self -Assertion and of Self -Abasement. — 
 These two classes of instincts which have usually not re- 
 ceived full attention from the psychologist are peculiarly 
 human and have a peculiar significance for man's social 
 life. 1 On the one hand, we find in human beings strong 
 tendencies to assert superiority, to assume leadership, with 
 which may be coupled tendencies toward self -exhibition and 
 self-display. On the other hand, we find also developed, 
 though usually not to the same extent in the same individ- 
 uals, strong tendencies to subordinate oneself to superiors, to 
 follow a leader and to subordinate and abase oneself in cer- 
 tain social situations. These peculiarly human instincts give 
 rise to many of the most striking coordinations between 
 individuals in society. The political tendencies of man and 
 his superior social organization in general are more or less 
 connected with the tendency to assert superiority on the 
 one hand, and to follow a leader or subordinate oneself 
 to an authority on the other hand. While we find leader- 
 ship to some extent in animal groups in general, we do not 
 find the tendency to subordinate oneself to a socially 
 recognized superior anywhere nearly so developed in ani- 
 mal groups as in human groups. Even in those human 
 groups in which there is no organized political authority 
 there is, nevertheless, recognition of the superiority of the 
 elder men and of those who show personal prowess in battle 
 and the like. The tendency of all human groups is, then, 
 to organize about one or more personal leaders or authori- 
 ties. In certain individuals the instinct of self-assertion 
 becomes highly developed through the stimulus of success- 
 ful exploits. The necessities of social organization lead to 
 a selection of those groups in which the tendency for the 
 mass to subordinate themselves and follow one or more 
 leaders is highly developed. Reason also reenforces these 
 
 iMcDougall gives a brief, but trenchant, treatment of these two 
 instincts, op. cit., pp. 62-66. 
 
 228 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 tendencies, so that, given the lust for power or authority 
 on the one hand, as we sometimes designate the instinct of 
 self-assertion, and the tendency to subordinate oneself 
 to an authority or to a leader on the other hand, we have 
 the possibilities of very high types of social organization. 
 Under the necessities of social survival, as we have already 
 seen, these tendencies frequently give rise to a despotic 
 type of society in which the will of the leader or ruler be- 
 comes the representative will of the whole group. 
 
 Of course, the instincts of self-assertion and of self- 
 display are found in many of the more common things of 
 the social life other than political and social organization 
 on a large scale. We see on every hand the tendency of 
 practically all human beings to assert their superiority in 
 one way or another. Coupled with the tendency to imitate 
 this tendency to assert superiority leads at once in society 
 to the imitation of superiors and to the superiors refusing 
 to imitate inferiors, but seeking to differentiate themselves 
 from them in all their activities. It is upon this basis that 
 fashions and conventions proceed, for the most part, in 
 human society. 
 
 Coupled with the instinct of self-assertion, as we have 
 already said, is the closely allied instinct of self -exhibition 
 and display. This is seen quite fully developed in the lower 
 animals as well as in man. It is especially noticeable in all 
 animals, human beings included, during the period of 
 courtship and seems to be in some ways intimately associ- 
 ated, therefore, with the sexual instinct. But self-exhibi- 
 tion and display are tendencies of human beings found in 
 all age periods and in all situations in life. To these 
 instinctive tendencies must be largely ascribed the tendency 
 which we find in all human beings to love ceremonial, 
 parade, public display and ostentation of all sorts. ' With 
 the growth of wealth in society this tendency takes on many 
 forms, especially that of the " conspicuous consumption " 
 of wealth in order to attract the attention and envy of 
 
 229 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 others. 1 Pride of class, especially the pride of noble and 
 wealthy classes, is a sentiment based very largely upon the 
 instinctive tendencies to assert superiority and to display 
 Such superiority in the form of wealth or learning. 
 
 It is manifest that this peculiarly human tendency of 
 self-assertion and self -display is at the basis of much in the 
 life of civilized societies. "While self-display may express 
 itself in present society in more aesthetic forms than it did 
 in the barbarian and savage stage, it is, nevertheless, quite 
 as strong in civilized man as in primitive man. Again, self- 
 assertion may be seemingly held in check by the modern 
 gospel of equality and democracy ; but we see on every hand 
 sufficient evidence to show us that the love of power and 
 the tendency to self-assertion ate quite as strong now as 
 ever they were. In fact it may be doubted whether man 
 has not a greater love for inequality than for equality. 
 Much of the so-called passion for equality is simply due to 
 the desire of those lower in the social scale to assert them- 
 selves as the equals of those who are socially more fortu- 
 nate. It is only in the humanitarian few that the love of 
 equality, based upon a strong development of altruistic in- 
 stincts, may be said to truly exist at all. Hence, upon analy- 
 sis we find that the love of equality in the strict sense must 
 be considered a comparatively weak tendency in human 
 nature. 
 
 On the other hand, the tendency to subordinate one- 
 self to superiors, even to abase oneself before superiors, 
 seems also to be as strong in human nature at the present 
 time as ever. Many of the arrangements of our social life 
 exhibit this tendency. This impulse may be in part, to be 
 
 i Professor Vcblen's Theory of the Leisure Class is the most 
 valuable detailed study which we have of the working of this in- 
 stinct in human society. See especially Chaps. II-VII. It may be 
 added that Professor Veblen's book is one of the best studies in all 
 sociological literature of the working out in human society of in- 
 stincts as against impersonal reason. 
 
 230 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 sure, one of the expressions of fear, and in part it is also 
 an imitative tendency; but self-abasement is also more or 
 less a distinct tendency of human nature which exhibits 
 itself in certain situations and is necessary if we are to have 
 any effective coordinations between leader and follower, 
 between ruler and subject, between social superiors and in- 
 feriors.' Perhaps this tendency is connected with the in- 
 stinctive tendency to obey parents which is seen in children. 
 At any rate, we find universally in human society strong 
 tendencies to follow leaders, to look up to and reverence 
 authorities of all sorts (rulers, heroes, gods), and this tend- 
 ency becomes exaggerated at times into sycophancy and 
 parasitism. The tendency to subordinate and subject one- 
 self to leaders and authorities is, however, whatever its ex- 
 aggerations, one of the socially most valuable of all the 
 native impulses of man. It seems, indeed, to be closely con- 
 nected with the gregarious instincts. Without it complex 
 types of social organization involving leadership and 
 authority in varying degrees would scarcely be possible. 
 Even the family, as we understand it, could hardly exist 
 without this instinctive tendency, and certainly all forms 
 of the state are dependent on the one hand on the tendency 
 to assert superiority, and to assume leadership, and on 
 the other hand, to subordinate oneself to authority and 
 to obey superiors. 
 
 Many other instinctive tendencies have been studied and 
 fairly definitely determined by the psychologists. Nearly 
 all of these have, of course, more or less bearing upon the 
 psychology of man's collective life, but it is not the purpose 
 of this book to enter into any detailed study of the influ- 
 ence of all sorts of instinctive impulses in human society. 
 Only a few others are of sufficient importance to need men- 
 tion. 
 
 Constructiveness is a native tendency which is usually 
 recognized by psychologists. As an instinct it is supposed 
 to have had its origin in the nest-building propensities 
 
 231 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 which primitive man shared along with many other ani- 
 mals. It must have, however, been greatly developed in the 
 early history of the race through the fact that only those 
 individuals who had the capacity to make tools and weapons 
 could have survived in the primitive struggle between man 
 and other animal species. Strong constructive tendencies 
 are, therefore, found in most normal children of the pres- 
 ent. These tendencies in adults appear in what has been 
 called the instinct of workmanship and the love of making 
 things of all sorts, as McDougall says, from mudpies to 
 metaphysical systems. 1 There can be scarcely any doubt 
 that such an instinctive tendency exists in man and that it 
 has been a very great factor in the development of material 
 civilization. From the work of the megalithic builders of 
 the second stone age to the great architectural and engineer- 
 ing triumphs of modern civilization, this instinct has con- 
 stantly been in evidence, working hand in hand with the 
 intellect of man to achieve the conquest of nature. 
 
 While play is not an instinct it represents the free 
 functioning of many instinctive tendencies. As Groos has 
 shown, 2 the various forms of play of all animals secure the 
 development of the instincts for the serious business of life. 
 The play of children, therefore, is filled with instinctive re- 
 actions and illustrates many instinctive forms of associa- 
 tion. The amusements of adults are also more or less 
 largely based upon the instincts. Amusement, as a form of 
 recreation, almost necessarily must make its chief appeal to 
 what is innate or instinctive in man, rather than to what 
 has been learned or acquired, because activities of the latter 
 type usually require more attention and effort to sustain 
 them; hence, the tendencies for amusements, sports and 
 the like to go on upon purely instinctive levels and some- 
 times, therefore, upon relatively low moral levels. The 
 amusements even of civilized peoples are probably best 
 
 i Op. cit., p. 88. 
 
 2 See his works on The Play of Animals and The Play of Man. 
 
 232 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 classified, psychologically, according to the special instincts 
 which they excite. Many of them excite the fighting in- 
 stinct. Games of chance usually excite the gambling in- 
 stinct, the love of hazard, while not a few amusements gain 
 their popularity from exciting sex instincts. The popular- 
 ity of sports like football, in which the fighting element is 
 large, of various games of chance, of dancing, of the roman- 
 tic novel, the sensational drama, the yellow newspaper, the 
 detective story, prize-fighting and the like goes to show 
 that the popular amusements and sports of even the most 
 highly civilized peoples are those which stimulate, as a rule, 
 very primitive impulses. It is because of the large element 
 of instinct in amusements and of the reversionary character 
 of instinct itself that amusements have always given rise 
 to many of the chief ethical problems in society. There can 
 be no doubt that play and amusement serve very largely 
 to mold character, especially in the young, as Aristotle long 
 ago observed. The old Puritan theory of the place of 
 amusement in life has long been outgrown, but the mod- 
 ern view is probably just as wrong and more dangerous, 
 because it tends to encourage the expression of brutal and 
 sensual impulses in man. The great ethical problem in 
 connection with play and amusement, in other words, is, 
 What instincts can we afford to excite through amusement 
 in view of the demands of modern society and of the future 
 society which we have not yet reached? 
 
 In any case 'it is quite evident that in the forms of play 
 and amusement, instinct plays a very large part, indeed 
 the dominant part, even among the most highly civilized 
 peoples. 
 
 Original Differences in Individuals. 1 — According to the 
 general theory of instinctive reactions as the mental aspect 
 of race heredity we would expect that these reactions should 
 
 i Professor Thorndike's educational monograph on Individuality 
 is an excellent brief statement of the causes, nature and social 
 effects of individual differences. 
 
 233 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 vary greatly in individuals. All organic structure is vari- 
 able and this seems to be eminently true of the inherited 
 structure of the nervous system ; hence we have closely con- 
 nected with the instincts proper, which must be regarded 
 as relatively uniform throughout a species or a variety, 
 many inborn individual peculiarities. For the most part 
 these are variations in the strength or weakness of different 
 instinctive impulses in different individuals. The student 
 of sociology has to remember, then, that along with the 
 principle of a fundamental similarity of all human beings 
 in their instincts or native impulses goes the corresponding 
 principle that individuals vary greatly and that these origi- 
 nal individual differences have to be taken into account as 
 well as the original individual similarities. Some indi- 
 viduals are born weak in some lines while other individuals 
 are born strong. It becomes a practical problem of great 
 importance as to how the individual that is weak in certain 
 directions, as e.g., in altruistic impulses, may be stimulated, 
 while another individual who is strong in some other direc- 
 tion, e.g., in combative impulses, may be repressed. All 
 education and practical social work must take into account 
 these original individual differences. 
 
 Certain differences in the native reactions of individuals 
 correspond to large classes of the population and therefore 
 are of peculiar importance to the sociologist. Such are the 
 differences in the native reactions of the sexes and of the 
 principal human races. "We must note these in some detail. 
 
 Original Differences Between the Sexes. 1 — There can be 
 little doubt, as we have already pointed out, that the strength 
 
 1 See Thorndike, Individuality, Chap. II, " The Influence of Sex " ; 
 also Thomas, Sew and Society. The pioneer work in modern biology 
 along this line was Geddes and Thomson's Evolution of Sex, which 
 still remains standard. 
 
 As Professor Thorndike points out, the differences between the 
 sexes are not qualitative, but differences in degree. Hence much 
 overlapping in characteristics, the great mass of the two sexes coin- 
 ciding. The same is true of racial differences. 
 
 234 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 of various native impulses varies greatly as between the 
 sexes. We have already seen that the female sex is char- 
 acterized by a stronger development of the sympathetic 
 impulses and a weaker development of the combative im- 
 pulses. Almost all of the important human instincts seem- 
 ingly vary considerably between the sexes. This may be 
 accounted for in part by the fact that the sexes have been 
 exposed to different selective influences in their evolution, 
 but probably it is even more to be accounted for by the 
 fundamental difference between the sexes, their difference 
 in organic metabolism ;* the male sex being more katabolic, 
 that is, inclined to expend energy and so more inclined to 
 activity and even to violence, the female sex being more 
 anabolic, that is, more inclined to store up energy, to be 
 passive and conservative. Many studies have been made 
 upon these original differences between the sexes which 
 show themselves so markedly in every aspect of social life, 
 and which endow the sexes with different capacities and fit 
 them for different functions in society. Of recent years, 
 however, there has been a growing school who have set out 
 to show that all the mental and social differences of the 
 sexes are due to their social environment. While there can 
 be scarcely any doubt that the original differences between 
 the sexes have been greatly accentuated by social conditions, 
 and even that many feminine peculiarities are to be ascribed 
 wholly to the influence of a particular culture, yet, on the 
 other hand, when savages and children are studied, there 
 is also scarcely any doubt that the original or instinctive 
 differences between the sexes are very great. The attempt, 
 indeed, to explain away these differences as due simply to 
 cultural modifications of a human nature, which is the 
 same in both sexes, must be regarded as one of the serious 
 errors of certain modern schools of thought; for the evi- 
 
 iSee Professor Thomas's Bex and Society, Chap. I; also Geddes 
 and Thomson's Evolution of Sex. 
 
 235 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 dence from child study, from anthropology, and from ani- 
 mal psychology is overwhelmingly on the other side. 1 
 
 Indeed, these variations of instinctive reactions between 
 the sexes, as has been pointed out, furnish the instinctive 
 basis for many of the most important coordinations in so- 
 ciety. Inasmuch as the reproductive processes involve a 
 difference of labor between the sexes, if there were not natu- 
 ral mental and social differences between them, it would be 
 impossible for them to adapt themselves to each other in 
 the carrying on of a common life. The different native 
 reactions of the sexes are then valuable for society, and they 
 are not less valuable in modern society than in primitive 
 society. All intelligent social movements must take into 
 account these natural mental differences between the sexes, 
 and aim, not at their repression, but at their expression in 
 accordance with the demands of present social conditions. 
 
 A general difference which must be noted between the 
 sexes of social import is that woman is more generally 
 guided by her instincts and emotions than man. In other 
 words, the element of instinct seems to dominate more in 
 woman's conduct than in man's. It has been said by some 
 that for this reason woman is nearer the savage or even the 
 animal type than man. It might very well be replied, how- 
 ever, that the reason for this is that woman's instincts show 
 better adaptation to the requirements of the social life than 
 man's. In other words, woman is more inherently social- 
 ized ; hence her instincts and ' ' intuitions ' ' are safer guides 
 for her than man's. 2 All of which results in woman's in- 
 herent social and moral superiority as regards natural 
 
 i See, e.g., Thorndike's study of Heredity, Correlation and Sex 
 Differences in School Abilities for unsuspected differences between the 
 sexes. 
 
 2 Cf. Ward, Psychic Factors of Civilization, Chaps. XIV, XXVI. 
 The word " intuition," as used by Ward and other sociological writ- 
 ers, can only mean psychologically that certain inherent connections 
 in the nervous system favor certain judgments; i.e., "instinctive 
 judgment." 
 
 236 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 tendencies. In a certain sense, therefore, the nature of 
 woman is more fully socialized than man's nature, and so 
 far from representing an inferior social type, the average 
 civilized woman represents a superior social type, to which 
 the average civilized man is only slowly approximating. 
 However, as we have already seen, the instinctive sociality 
 of both sexes is relatively narrow and adjusted chiefly 
 to the family and the kindred group. Superior sociali- 
 zation in either sex implies the cultivation of the highest 
 intellectual capacities and the repression and control of 
 many instinctive impulses by the reason. 
 
 Original Differences Between Races} — There can be no 
 doubt that instinctive reactions are somewhat unlike in 
 different races. All psychological experiments along this 
 line point to this conclusion. This is what we should expect 
 seeing that the great primary divisions of mankind have 
 been evolved under widely different physical conditions in 
 different areas of characterization. While the fundamental 
 mental traits of the negro and the white, for example, are 
 the same, yet differences in native reactions to similar 
 stimuli are patent even to the ordinary observer. It is this 
 difference of reaction which largely gives rise to racial 
 problems, and which makes the harmonious adjustment of 
 widely dissimilar races to each other and to the same en- 
 vironment so difficult. There is every reason for believing 
 because of this difference of instinctive reactions between 
 races that the negro problem in the United States, for ex- 
 ample, cannot solve itself or be solved by any superficial 
 measures. On the other hand, there is no reason for believ- 
 ing that a proper education which shall reach the negro 
 masses cannot solve the problem of adapting the negro to 
 our civilization, for education can unquestionably overcome 
 the slight difference in native reactions between the negro 
 and the white by training and modifying these impulses. 
 
 i Cf. Thorndike, Individuality, Chap. II, " The Influence of Kace." 
 
 237 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 Another instinctive element which probably enters into 
 the difficulty of adjusting widely dissimilar races to each 
 other is racial antipathy. There is good ground for believ- 
 ing that this antipathy rests to some extent upon an in- 
 stinctive basis; but there is no reason for supposing that, 
 so far as this antipathy is irrational, it cannot be modified 
 by humanitarian education and ideals. 
 
 Instinctive Interests and Beliefs. — As we have already 
 seen, interest, in the psychological sense, is the feeling side 
 of attention. "We have also seen that we attend to many 
 objects because of instinct. 1 From this it follows that all 
 . individuals have powerful instinctive interests. This being 
 so, it also 'follows that the instincts of man are enlisted upon 
 the side of some beliefs rather than others. In a certain 
 sense, therefore, ideas do get into the blood. Selection fixes 
 certain native reactions. These reactions have as their 
 mental accompaniment attention and feelings of interest, 
 and interest gives rise to belief. What we think is largely 
 an outcome of what we do, and as what we do is largely 
 a matter of hereditary reactions, so what we think is also 
 powerfully influenced by these reactions. 
 
 Just what beliefs in human society may be traced to an 
 instinctive origin and what to other sources, psychologists 
 as yet are hardly prepared to say ; but it is certain that the 
 nonrational beliefs of humanity are not entirely due to cus- 
 tom, and indeed customs, as we have already seen, as fre- 
 quently represent the instinctive tendencies of man as ac- 
 quired habits. Probably many of the beliefs connected with 
 sex, food, self-defense and adjustment to one's group are 
 essentially instinctive. The belief in marriage 2 is such an 
 instinctive belief among the masses of mankind. Optimism 
 is probably an instinctive mental attitude, since it is found 
 in children and the lowest races no matter how hard their 
 
 i Cf. Thorndike, op. tit., p. 310. 
 
 2 In the natural history sense of the term, as used by Wester- 
 marck. 
 
 238 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 conditions of life may be. Pessimism and meliorism, on the 
 other hand, are outcomes of reflective thought. Many writ- 
 ers have ably argued that our essential religious beliefs are 
 of instinctive origin. The belief in God and the belief in 
 the immortality of the soul seem especially to have the 
 marks of instinctive beliefs, 1 since in one form or another 
 they are found among practically all peoples, and we may 
 safely conclude, therefore, that they are an outcome of cer- 
 tain instinctive tendencies of man in interaction with his 
 self-consciousness and reason. 
 
 Of course, not all the nonrational beliefs of human so- 
 ciety are instinctive. Many of them have arisen simply 
 through invention, and have been perpetuated by example 
 and imitation. Beliefs in the long run, however, must con- 
 form to objective conditions, that is, they must favor sur- 
 vival. That a belief is instinctive, therefore, is no argu- 
 ment against its rational validity. Rather there is a strong 
 presumption in favor of a belief that is widespread and of 
 long standing. Instinctive beliefs which have served long 
 the purposes of the race, controlling, educating, helping in 
 social adjustment and so in social survival in the lives of 
 countless generations, have certainly a strong presumption 
 in their favor. The scientist and the philosopher may ra- 
 tionalize these beliefs, but among the mass of men they do 
 not rest upon any rational ground. Whether the scientist 
 finds them rational or irrational, they will probably con- 
 tinue to be accepted as long as they are necessary for in- 
 dividual and social survival. 
 
 Instincts and Civilization. — Probably civilization is not 
 old enough to have produced as yet any profound modifica- 
 tions in man's instincts. Selection we know modifies native 
 reactions only through long periods of time. Slight modi- 
 
 i See Pratt, The Psychology of Religious Belief, especially Chap. 
 II, on "The Nature of Belief." Cf. Marshall's study of religious 
 belief in his Instinct and Reason. 
 
 239 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 fications have undoubtedly been produced by civilization. 
 We have already noted, for example, that the instinct of 
 acquisitiveness seems much stronger in the civilized man 
 than in the uncivilized, and possibly also the combative in- 
 stinct, as we have seen, may be stronger in the civilized. 
 Apart from such slight modifications, however, it is prob- 
 ably true that man's instincts are more adapted to the bar- 
 barous and savage condition of existence than to civiliza- 
 tion. Hence, human instincts are not sufficient to adapt 
 man to the present conditions of life. They would be a 
 much better guide if we were still living a wild life in the 
 woods than they are in the complex civilized society of the 
 present. As Sir Francis Galton has pointed out, this fact 
 explains much of the difficulties civilized societies experi- 
 ence in securing such adjustments as are required by the 
 conditions of their life. Galton remarks very truly, " Man 
 was barbarous but yesterday, and therefore it is not to be 
 expected that the natural aptitudes of his race should al- 
 ready have become molded into accordance with his very 
 recent advance. We, men of the present centuries, are like 
 animals suddenly transplanted among new circumstances of 
 climate and of food : our instincts fail us under the altered 
 circumstances. ' ' * 
 
 Here, of course, is one of the great reasons for the neces- 
 sity of education in civilized societies. In savage and bar- 
 barous societies instinct plus customary imitation suffices to 
 secure most of the required social adjustments ; but in our 
 complex civilized societies these adjustments can only, be 
 secured by the careful building up of acquired habits 
 through the bending and training, and sometimes perhaps 
 even the suppression, of native impulses. No instinct that 
 man possesses seems to be any more entirely equal in itself 
 to the complex requirements of our modern life. The pa- 
 
 i Hereditary Genius, p. 337 ; quoted by Ward, Pure Sociology, 
 pp. 449-50. 
 
 240 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 rental instinct seems to come nearer being adapted than any 
 other, but even it, we are beginning to discover, needs edu- 
 cation. 
 
 It follows from this that our instincts and the correla- 
 tive emotions are not good guides in the present situation. 
 All of our instincts need the control of intelligence and rea- 
 son. They are insufficient to secure the moral conduct of 
 the individual. Conduct of the highest type, as has always 
 been insisted upon by moralists, comes only by reflection. 
 The instincts at best furnish only presumptions which need 
 to be analyzed. No instinctive reaction, of course, would 
 exist unless such a reaction had had some utility in the past 
 history of the race, but because it is adapted to the past 
 does not show that it is adapted to the present. Instinctive 
 impulses always need to be analyzed in the light of the 
 existing situation. Those persons, therefore, who, like 
 Fourier, claim that the instincts and the correlated emo- 
 tions should be the supreme guide in social life, would 
 plunge society again into barbarism. 1 
 
 Instincts and Social Reconstruction. — It does not follow, 
 however, from what has been said that the instincts should 
 be disregarded by those who are seeking the improvement 
 of social conditions. On the contrary, it is safe to assert 
 that no permanent improvement can be made in human 
 social life which does not take instinct into account. While 
 our instincts are manifestly not adapted to present social- 
 conditions, they are nevertheless the basis, the raw material, 
 out of which the acquired habits of individuals must be 
 built up, which will adapt them to present complex con- 
 ditions. There is no such thing known to the psychologists 
 as habits built up out of nothing. All acquired habits are 
 secured by the bending and training of the native impulses. 
 This has come to be fully recognized in education, and 
 
 - This is the so-called " new hedonism " which would make the 
 gratifying of natural impulses the supreme value in life. 
 
 241 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 scientific education has made the instinctive elements in 
 the child the scientific basis for the training of the individ- 
 ual. It is also time that it should be recognized in social 
 reform, because social reform or reconstruction, as we have 
 already shown, is in its essence not different from individ- 
 ual education. Social reconstruction which ignores the 
 instincts, which attempts to get a higher state of society 
 without building it up out of lower types of reaction, is, 
 therefore, destined to failure. The recognition of the true 
 role of instinct in human social life is, therefore, necessary 
 as a basis for scientific social work and all scientific plans 
 of social reform. Any plan of social reorganization which 
 is made without regard to man's instincts will certainly 
 meet with as great failure as any plan of individual educa- 
 tion which is made without regard to native impulses and 
 capacities. The recognition of the part which instinct 
 plays in our social life is, therefore, necessary for wise 
 social practice. On the other hand, human instincts being 
 indefinitely modifiable, through selection in the race and 
 through education in the individual, present no insuperable 
 barrier to any sane plan for the ultimate amelioration of 
 social conditions. There is nothing in them, therefore, 
 which puts any permanent obstacle in the way of carrying 
 out any rational measure of social reform, but their rec- 
 ognition points to the inevitable conclusion that the one 
 safe method of social reorganization is through education, 
 especially through the education of the young. "When the 
 instinctive element is thoroughly understood, it can be con- 
 trolled and in this sense transcended. 
 
 Reversions to the instinctive level of activity occur in 
 civilized societies under numerous conditions. The chief 
 of these conditions are conditions of excitement such as 
 occur in crowds, in war and in conflicts of one sort or 
 another between classes. The more important phenomena 
 of the crowd are, indeed, to be explained almost wholly 
 by the fact that under conditions of excitement in a crowd 
 
 242 
 
THE ROLE OF . INSTINCT 
 
 men revert to the instinctive level of activities. 1 Hence, 
 the social danger from crowds which many writers have 
 emphasized. As has already been pointed out, in such in- 
 ternal conflicts in societies as revolutions the conditions 
 exist, not only for reversion to an instinctive level of ac- 
 tivities, but for the excitement of the more brutal instincts. 2 
 Attempted transformations of society by means of violent 
 revolution, therefore, almost always result in at least tem- 
 porary reversion of the social life to more primitive lev- 
 els. In fact, any use of force in society, especially when 
 force is directed against large masses of individuals, is 
 apt to produce such reversions to instinctive activity. The 
 use of force in human society is, therefore, to be deprecated 
 and, indeed, all occasions which produce such emotional 
 excitement as to make difficult rational control of instinc- 
 tive impulses. 
 
 Instincts and Social Progress. — The view of instinct thus 
 far presented has been that of a static or even reversionary 
 element in human society. This is essentially the biologi- 
 cal view. Biologists generally look upon instinct as some- 
 thing static, but this is, perhaps, not quite a correct view 
 from the sociological standpoint. Kidd, in his Principles 
 of Western Civilization, attacks this idea of the essentially 
 static nature of human instincts or of the biological equip- 
 ment of the race. 3 He shows that every species in order 
 to survive has to be adapted even more to possible future 
 conditions than to the present. Only those whose instincts 
 are thus adapted to the future can have any chance of 
 surviving in a rapidly changing environment such as we 
 
 1 See Ross, Foundations of Sociology, pp. 119f. ; also his Social 
 Psychology, Chaps. Ill and IV. The numerous studies of the psy- 
 chology of crowds by such writers as Le Bon, Tarde, Ross and Bald- 
 win make unnecessary any treatment of this topic at length in this 
 work. 
 
 2 See Chapter VIII. 
 
 8 See especially Chap. II. 
 
 17 243 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS' 
 
 find at least in civilized human societies. How an instinct 
 can be adapted directly to the future environment, since 
 all instincts were fixed by the selection of past environ- 
 ment, it is difficult to see. What Kidd's argument amounts 
 to is practically this, that in all species which live under 
 the possibility of rapid changes in the environment, in- 
 stincts must be plastic if the species is to survive. This 
 is, as we have already seen, the ease with the instincts of 
 practically all of the higher animals. It is, of course, es- 
 pecially the case with man and possibly even more the 
 case with civilized man than with nature peoples. Plas- 
 ticity of the instincts in man means the possibility of bend- 
 ing them in many directions, and so of building up on them 
 many different acquired habits as the situation may de- 
 mand. Of course, in this sense a species like man which 
 undergoes rapid progress must have great plasticity of 
 instinct in order to survive, and in this sense man's in- 
 stincts are adapted more or less to future possibilities, as 
 well as to present and past situations. Instincts are not 
 therefore adapted to the future in any mysterious way, but 
 simply through plasticity. Therefore, man's instincts are 
 such as to make possible his adaptation to wider and more 
 complex environments than those under which he devel- 
 oped. To this extent progress is conditioned by the nature 
 of man's instincts. 
 
 Of course, man's instincts are the general conditions of 
 social progress from whatever standpoint we may look at 
 the problem. As we have already seen, such instincts as 
 acquisitiveness, . gregariousness and constructiveness have 
 been the very conditions under which intellectual elements 
 have brought about man's civilization. The instincts must 
 be regarded, then, as positive and constructive, rather than 
 as merely negative. The ways in which the various instincts 
 have functioned as aids to progress have been already 
 pointed out. While all the instincts of man have been 
 conditions under which human progress has developed, 
 
 244 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTINCT 
 
 there are certain instincts which, as it were, have a for- 
 ward look, namely, the altruistic impulses. These make 
 possible, as we have already seen, coordinations or adapta- 
 tions between individuals of a wider and wider sort. It 
 is the high development of these altruistic impulses in 
 man which has especially made civilization and progress 
 possible, for they make it possible for human groups to 
 adapt their activities not simply to all other existing hu- 
 man groups but even to future generations. Of course, 
 these altruistic impulses have to be developed through edu- 
 cation before they can make possible coordinations which 
 are as wide as the race itself, and so progressive adapta- 
 tion to the requirements of existence ; but the fact should 
 not be forgotten that they are original, native impulses. 
 We may safely conclude, therefore, that man's progress 
 depends not solely upon his intellect, but also upon his 
 social instincts, although these like many other things are, 
 strictly speaking, to be regarded as the conditions of prog- 
 ress rather than its active agencies. 
 
 Summary. — The native impulses are, then, from the psy- 
 chological point of view the basis of man's social life. 
 Eepresenting the innate or the biological element in the 
 relationships of individuals, they are necessarily the raw 
 material out of which the social life is developed. They 
 are the psychological expression of the biological forces 
 of selection and heredity as these latter well up in the 
 social life at any particular moment. While they furnish 
 only the beginnings of social organization, that is, only 
 certain simpler coordinations between individuals, it is 
 their modification by feeling and intelligence, functioning 
 with respect to the environment, which produces the ac- 
 quired habits out of which all higher forms of social co- 
 ordination and social organization must issue. Concealed 
 beneath these acquired modes of behavior or conduct in 
 the individual and in society, behind them all, are always 
 the various instinctive impulses. As they represent the 
 
 245 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 original motor activities, they may well be characterized, 
 therefore, as the real propelling forces of society, since the 
 feelings and emotions, as has already been pointed out, 
 do not lie behind these activities but rather accompany 
 them. The physiological impulses, then, which, when 
 viewed from the psychological side, we term instincts, are 
 the true primary forces of human society, the ultimate 
 springs of all activity; and their guidance and control 
 through the education of the individual and the organiza- 
 tion of social relationships between individuals, that 
 is, their control through reason, is the ultimate practical 
 problem of human social life. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 THE ROLE OP FEELING IN THE SOCIAL LIFE 
 
 Feeling as a Social Element. — We have already seen 
 that feeling is the organic valuation of our activities; 
 that is, feeling is the value which is given to activity by 
 the individual organism. "We have also seen that when 
 the activity has been in the past on the whole organically 
 advantageous, the feeling accompanying it is usually agree- 
 able, and when, on the other hand, the activity in the past 
 has been organically disadvantageous, the feeling accom- 
 panying it is usually disagreeable. Feeling, therefore, 
 modifies activity in individuals and must be regarded as 
 a relatively independent element. 1 If the primary force 
 in social life is the activity of individuals which springs 
 from native and habitual impulses, then feeling, in modi- 
 fying these activities, must be regarded as a secondary force. 
 This is equivalent to saying that feeling in the form of 
 pleasure and pain can neither be regarded as a primary 
 force in the social life nor can it be utterly disregarded 
 and said to be no factor at all. 
 
 The Older View of Feeling as a Social Element. — The 
 social philosophy of the Eighteenth Century and much of 
 that of the Nineteenth Century was based upon a hedonistic 
 psychology, which proclaimed that all social actions might 
 easily be explained in terms of pleasure and pain. 2 Accord- 
 
 i But compare what was said in Chapter VT on the Meyer-Ber- 
 nard theory of feeling. 
 
 2 See above, p. 113. The words "pleasure" and "pain," as em- 
 ployed throughout this book, are used in the popular sense (as, e.g., 
 
 247 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 ing to this hedonistic psychology, as we have already seen, 
 the springs of human action were always to be found in 
 the calculation of agreeable or disagreeable sensations. Ac- 
 cording to this view, feeling was not only primary in the 
 individual but also in society, and the whole explanation 
 of the social life resolved itself into a calculus of utilities 
 and disutilities to the feeling individual. 1 But the hedonis- 
 tic psychology may now be practically regarded as a thing 
 of the past. All the researches of modern psychology into 
 human nature tend, as we have already seen, to discredit 
 the theory that the springs of human action are in 
 feelings of pleasure and pain. While hedonistic psychol- 
 ogy has been overthrown, it is still found, however, as 
 the premise of much that has recently been written in 
 the social sciences and a hedonistic sociology still holds 
 the field, although it is a manifest absurdity to maintain 
 a hedonistic sociology when hedonistic psychology has been 
 discredited. 
 
 For example, Professor "Ward's sociology, epoch-making 
 and of permanent value as it is in many of its features, 
 is, nevertheless, based upon a hedonistic psychology. "Ward 
 regards the feelings as primary in the individual, and 
 pleasure and pain as the sole springs of action. He ac- 
 cordingly considers that the feelings are the primary so- 
 cial forces. It is true that he speaks also of the desires as 
 the true social force, but the context shows that in most 
 
 in Bentham's writings ) , as the equivalent of the psychological terms 
 " pleasantness " and " unpleasantness." 
 
 i As Dr. Bernard says in effect ( Tlie Transition to an Objective 
 Standard of Social Control, p. 2), the influence of feeling upon social 
 activity has been the central problem in the development of social 
 and ethical theory since the time of Hobbes. It should be added that 
 Dr. Bernard's dissertation is the clearest and the ablest discussion 
 of feeling as a factor in the social life which has thus far appeared, 
 but it came into the writer's hands after the present chapter had 
 been written (1909), and it seemed best to leave his original state- 
 ments unaltered. 
 
 248 
 
THE ROLE OF FEELING 
 
 cases he uses the word " desire " in the feeling sense. 1 He 
 says, indeed, that desire is a form of pain. According to 
 Ward, therefore, it is possible to interpret the whole social 
 life scientifically in terms of feeling. All activities in 
 society are but expressions, according to Ward, of feelings 
 of pleasure or pain in the individual. Other influences in 
 society, such as that of the intellect or reason, are not true 
 forces at all, but simply serve to guide the expression of 
 the feelings. 2 It follows from this that the practical end 
 of the social sciences should be to secure the ' ' organization 
 of feeling " in society. With Ward, therefore, the sub- 
 jective element of feeling is the beginning and also the 
 goal of all social activities. 
 
 Dr. Bentley's View of Feeling as a Social Element. — 
 Quite in contrast to Professor Ward's theories are the views 
 of Dr. Arthur F. Bentley. According to Bentley, all 
 attempts to interpret the social life in terms of either feel- 
 ings or ideas have been scientific errors. 3 Just because these 
 elements are so individual it is not possible, according to 
 him, to make any use of them in the explanation of social 
 phenomena. Rather, we can find sufficient explanation of 
 all social phenomena in social activities themselves. Feel- 
 ing gives no explanation, Bentley says, because feeling is 
 simply the subjective side of activity. To state what goes 
 on in society in terms of feeling may, therefore, have lit- 
 erary or artistic value, but it can have no scientific value. 
 For the most part feelings are vague and unreliable and 
 we cannot argue from them to social activities. On the 
 other hand, whenever we find feelings definite, then they 
 become simply synonymous with activities, and the explana- 
 
 i Ward regards " desire " as feeling acted upon by memory. Cf. 
 Psychic Factors of Civilization, pp. 52-54; also Pure Sociology, pp. 
 99-105 and 124-33. 
 
 2 Pure Sociology, pp. 97, 463. 
 
 a See The Process of Government, Chaps, I and II. The argument 
 of these chapters is summarized in Chap. V. 
 
 249 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 tion of the activity in terms of feeling is simply superflu- 
 ous. Says Dr. Bentley : ' ' When a feeling is as definite 
 as, say, the love of theater-going, or when an idea is as 
 definite, say, as some detail of ballot law reform which we 
 are on point of adopting, it becomes the same thing as our 
 activity itself. . . . Feelings and ideas vanish into the ac- 
 tivity. They stand naked before us as impotent inferences 
 from activity. ' ' 1 Therefore, Dr. Bentley concludes that it 
 is unscientific to regard feelings or ideas as something be- 
 hind the activities of society working upon it as causes, 
 but we must explain the social life in terms of activity 
 itself, or, as he says, in terms of ' ' practical interests, ' ' using 
 that term in a purely objective sense. 
 
 Now there is much in what Dr. Bentley says which is in 
 line with the new psychology and with what has already 
 been said in this text. "We have already insisted that the 
 social life must be approached from the standpoint of 
 activity, that it must be interpreted primarily in terms of 
 activity rather than primarily in terms of feeling or ideas. 
 But Dr. Bentley goes altogether too far — much further 
 than modern psychology would warrant — in excluding feel- 
 ings and ideas altogether from being relatively independent 
 influences in our social life. Dr. Bentley seems to forget 
 that society is made up of biological and psychological in- 
 dividuals and that these individuals are thinking, feeling 
 men whose actions are mediated, guided and controlled 
 by feelings and ideas. All sociology must start its inter- 
 pretation of the social life with the biological and psycho- 
 logical individual whom Dr. Bentley regards, in the way 
 in which he is put to use, as highly " fictitious." 2 We 
 could afford to dispense with all references to feelings and 
 ideas in the scientific study of society if it were true that 
 feelings and ideas are coextensive with activity. But, as 
 
 * Op. cit., pp. 168-69. 
 2 Op. cit., p. 170. 
 250 
 
THE ROLE OF FEELING 
 
 we have already seen, feelings and ideas appear within 
 physiological activities at certain points to evaluate them, 
 mediate and control them. They are, therefore, relatively 
 new and independent elements which must be taken account 
 of by the sociologist. Dr. Bentley's interpretation of so- 
 ciety in terms of mass or group activities amounts prac- 
 tically to the interpretation of society as an immense ma- 
 chine. 1 While it may be admitted, therefore, that we can- 
 not use feelings and ideas in a causal way in explaining 
 society, 2 they must, nevertheless, come into every scientific 
 interpretation of social facts, because, as has already been 
 pointed out, social phenomena are, in the nature of re- 
 sponses to stimuli and these responses are modified, in the 
 mature individual at least, by complex series of feelings 
 and ideas. 
 
 Let us take the family group as an illustration. Any 
 attempt to understand the family entirely apart from the 
 feelings and emotions of its individual members would seem 
 to be very far removed from the actual, concrete life of 
 the family group as we find it. It is true that the life 
 of the family group might be described at any particular 
 moment quite entirely in terms of activity, but if we are 
 to attempt to describe the life of any particular family, 
 or of the family as an institution, we could scarcely do 
 so without reference to the changes or modifications brought 
 about in activity by feeling. While the feelings of agree- 
 ableness or disagreeableness may be neither the beginning 
 nor the end of the life of any family group, they are, 
 nevertheless, an active modifying element in the complex 
 whole and must be taken into full account in any scien- 
 tific interpretation of the life of the group. Dr. Bentley 's 
 
 iThe philosophical implication of such a purely objective 
 " mass " or " group interpretation " is, of course, materialism or a 
 rigid psycho-physical parallelism. 
 
 2 That is, in a causo-mechanical way. See the discussion of the 
 concept of cause in Chapter IV. 
 
 251 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 proposal to interpret the social life entirely in terms of 
 collective activities without regard to the influence of in- 
 dividual feeling upon these activities must, therefore, be 
 rejected as erring as far on one side as Professor Ward's 
 hedonistic sociology does upon the other side. 
 
 The Place of Feeling in the Social Life. — Professor 
 Ward's sociology may, indeed, be regarded as much nearer 
 the truth from the standpoint of the biology and psychol- 
 ogy of the individual than Dr. Bentley's. Professor Ward 
 says the true social forces are the desires, and, as we have 
 already seen, the desires are complexes of physiological 
 impulse and feeling with some cognitive elements added. 
 Many desires are complexes of instinctive impulses and 
 feeling. If we used one word, therefore, to cover both the 
 instincts and the hereditary feelings which are attached to 
 them, such as the word ' ' feeling-instinct, ' ' x then we would 
 have a term which would be very nearly synonymous with 
 the word desire, and in this sense there is no objection to 
 saying that the desires, or the feeling-instincts, are the so- 
 cial forces. The objection to such a statement lies rather 
 in its ambiguity than in its falsity. The word desire, be- 
 cause it covers a complex conscious state, is susceptible of 
 many interpretations. As we have already seen, Professor 
 Ward gives it a hedonistic interpretation, while some one 
 who looked at society mainly from the standpoint of will 
 and activity might interpret it in terms of activity or im- 
 pulse. All this emphasizes what has already been said 
 about the necessity of a careful and scientific use of psycho- 
 logical terms by sociologists. 
 
 The chief danger in using such a complex term as " de- 
 sire " with which to designate the primary forces in the 
 social life is that it opens the way to give greater weight 
 to the feeling element, the element of pleasure and pain, 
 than what properly belongs to it psychologically. Con- 
 
 i Cf. Hall, Adolescence, Chap. X., 
 252 
 
THE ROLE OF FEELING 
 
 scious desire arises, as we have already seen, mainly through 
 the blocking of some physiological impulse ; hence the pain 
 aspect which Ward sees in it so clearly. Inasmuch as the 
 gratification of the desire is usually the working out of .an 
 instinctive or habitual impulse this is usually accompanied 
 by pleasurable feelings. Hence the opportunity for some 
 one who reflects upon the action to say that it was done for 
 the sake of the pleasurable feeling, whereas the exact sci- 
 entific statement of the matter is that the activity has 
 been evaluated as disagreeable by the organism when it 
 was impeded and as agreeable when it functioned success- 
 fully. It is clear, then, that the agreeable and disagree- 
 able feelings have simply accompanied the activity, not 
 originating it, but perhaps modifying it either in the way 
 of inhibition or of reenforcement. Feeling, therefore, 
 shows itself to be clearly not the primary element in in- 
 dividual or social activity but a secondary element which 
 modifies the activity on the individual, or subjective, side. 
 Just because feelings are organic valuations of activity and 
 nothing else they cannot be left out of account wholly in 
 social interpretation. 
 
 The Feeling Aspect of the Instincts, as has already been 
 pointed out, is the emotions. Feeling, indeed, is closely 
 associated with the instincts, the successful functioning of 
 an instinctive activity being usually accompanied by pleas- 
 urable feeling. Thus all that has been said about the place 
 of the instincts in our social life might, with a change of 
 a few words, be practically said about the place of the 
 emotions which accompany the instincts. It matters little, 
 for example, whether we speak of the role o*f the instinct 
 of pugnacity in social life or the role of the emotion of 
 anger. So, too, parental and sexual love are both instincts 
 and emotions. While not all instinctive activities are ac- 
 companied by clearly defined feelings which we term 
 " emotions," yet all the instincts are powerfully reenforced 
 by certain pleasurable feeling tones which give them sanc- 
 
 253 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 tion, as it were, to the individual. Hence feeling indirectly 
 plays a powerful part in the social life in sanctioning and 
 reenforcing instinctive activities. Many of the values which 
 the individual finds in association with the members of his 
 group are due to the feelings called forth by the instinctive 
 tendencies, as we have already pointed out, to associate, to 
 cooperate, and in all ways to be at one with one's group. 
 Thus it is through the feelings that the individual gets 
 largely his values from the social life, and it follows ac- 
 cordingly that feeling is one of the most fundamental as- 
 pects of collective as well as of individual life. The feel- 
 ings of groups of individuals become organized around cer- 
 tain instinctive and habitual ways of action which the 
 group finds to be expedient. This organization of feeling 
 which accompanies the organization of activity in groups 
 we know under such terms as popular sentiment, public 
 feeling, and the like. 
 
 The Feeling Aspect of the Desires and Interests also 
 shows the importance of feeling as an element in the social 
 life. As we have already pointed out, the desires and in- 
 terests cannot be considered as pure feelings, as some writ- 
 ers have made the mistake of doing, nor can the feeling 
 element in them even be considered primary. While the 
 primary element in both desire and interest is undoubtedly 
 activity or impulse, yet the feeling element is strong in 
 both and powerfully reenforces the tendency to activity. 
 That nearly all would unhesitatingly give such a large place 
 to the influence of desires and interests of individuals in 
 society shows that we must recognize also a large place for 
 feeling. These desires and interests, as has already been 
 pointed out, spring largely from the instincts and the 
 early acquired habits of the individual. The feelings which 
 accompany them serve to fix them in individual character, 
 and hence in later life these complexes often enter very 
 largely as units into the determination of individual con- 
 duct. 
 
 254 
 
THE ROLE OF FEELING 
 
 The sympathetic feelings are especially of great im-* 
 portanee in the social life. As has already been pointed out, 
 without them harmonious coordinations of the higher kinds 
 could scarcely exist between individuals. Sympathy 
 among all members of a group is a feeling element which 
 is of the greatest importance, then, in the life of the group. 
 Not only does it reenf orce social organization by an accom- 
 panying solidarity of feeling, but sympathetic feeling is 
 apparently also necessary for any very complex changes or 
 adjustments in society, especially those which involve new 
 relations between individuals. The sympathetic feelings, 
 therefore, bear a relation to social progress as well as to 
 social organization. As Professor Ward and others have 
 emphasized, sympathetic feeling has had much to do with 
 all the reforms in human society which have looked toward 
 the amelioration of the conditions of lower classes and races. 
 On account of this importance of sympathetic feeling, the 
 most highly civilized societies take sedulous measures to 
 cultivate sympathetic feeling among all their members. 
 The role of sympathy as an aspect of feeling in human 
 society is so important that we shall note it at length in 
 another chapter. 1 
 
 The Conservative Tendency of Feeling. — Because pleas- 
 urable feelings usually accompany the functioning of in- 
 stinctive and habitual activities, the influence of feeling in 
 social life is mainly conservative; that is, the sanctions of 
 feeling are usually attached to those activities which are 
 either deep-seated habits or instincts. Changes in activity 
 are usually accompanied by more or less unpleasant feel- 
 ings. 2 It is only when the change in the activity can be 
 associated with some previously formed habit or instinct 
 that it can secure the sanction of feeling. Consequently, all 
 of the customs and usages of society, the accepted social 
 
 i See Chapter XIV. 
 2 Cf. Bernard, op. cit., p. 71. 
 255 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 order of any group, is, as a rule, deeply embedded in feel- 
 ing, and feeling opposes any change. Such an institution 
 as slavery, for example, comes to have in time associated 
 with it the sanction of powerful feelings which make the 
 difficulty of abolishing the institution well-nigh insuperable. 
 The institution of monarchy is another illustration of the 
 way in which feelings become attached to institutions and 
 provide supports for them, since the conservative tendency 
 of habit becomes reenforced by the sanction of the feelings 
 which become attached to the habit. 
 
 It is, therefore, always a problem for the social reformer 
 who wishes to bring about changes in society to overcome 
 the dead weight of feeling which opposes change. The 
 skillful reformer or social worker strives to attach the 
 changes proposed to some social habit of long standing or 
 to some instinctive activity. In this way it is possible to 
 enlist the feelings on the side of social change ; for example, 
 the parental instinct and the emotions which accompany it 
 may be appealed to in bringing about a different social 
 policy as regards the liquor traffic; or humanitarian im- 
 pulses developed from the parental and social instincts may 
 be appealed to in combating many social evils; but the 
 task of enlisting feeling on the side of social change is 
 always a difficult one. Nevertheless, it is manifest that no 
 permanent changes can be made in society successfully 
 without enlisting the feelings on the side of the change. If 
 the intellect alone is enlisted the probability is that the old 
 custom or tradition will soon reassert itself, because, as 
 has already been said, feeling reenforces primarily habitual 
 activities. The social reformer, however, has always this 
 consolation in his efforts to change feeling, and that is, that 
 feelings always follow activities, and if the new activities 
 can be established long enough feeling is sure in time to 
 give them sanction. Thus, while feeling for monarchy may 
 be strong in a people who have but recently abolished mon- 
 archical institutions, yet if republican institutions can be 
 
 256 
 
THE ROLE OP PEELING 
 
 maintained long enough feeling will come to sanction them 
 quite as much as ever it did monarchy. 
 
 What has been said in the past few sentences, however, 
 applies more to changes in habitual activities than to 
 changes in instinctive social activities. The feelings con- 
 nected with the instincts are hereditary no less than the 
 instincts themselves, and therefore they will reassert them- 
 selves in spite of the organization of society more or less in 
 each generation, although even in this case the education 
 of the young may greatly modify, not only instinctive ac- 
 tivities, but also the powerful feelings which reenforce 
 them. 
 
 The Individualistic Character of Feeling. — It is not incon- 
 sistent to say that feeling is individualistic in its social tend- 
 encies and effects as well as conservative. It has been 
 claimed by some that the reason is essentially the individu- 
 alistic force in society. But it might readily be shown that 
 the reason is only individualistic to the extent that it is 
 subservient to feeling. The instincts and the feelings are 
 far more subjective and individual in their nature than the 
 intellect. The instincts, however, represent racial tenden- 
 cies and are, therefore, in a sense less subjective than the 
 feelings. Feeling, as we have already pointed out, is the 
 true subjective or individualistic element in the mental life, 
 since it expresses the valuations which the individual organ- 
 ism gives to an activity. It is, so to speak, the me-side of 
 activity. Peeling, therefore, is necessarily, through and 
 through, an individual matter, and its tendencies must 
 necessarily be individualistic except as it tends to conform 
 to racially uniform tendencies or instincts on the one hand, 1 
 or to social control on the other. 
 
 i The background of feeling is, of course, racial, in so far as feel- 
 ing is attached (as the emotions are) to instinctive reactions. Hence 
 the fundamental similarity in feeling of all human beings. This is, 
 however, only a qualification of the essentially individualistic char- 
 acter of feeling. As the me-side of activity, feeling is individual- 
 
 257 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 The individualism of Rousseau and his advocacy of the 
 worth of the feelings was not, therefore, an accident. Nei- 
 ther was it an accident that the Nineteenth Century was 
 dominantly hedonistic and individualistic at the same 
 time. A society organized upon the basis of feeling 
 must be organized entirely upon the basis of subjective 
 or individualistic valuations of activity. Hence, such 
 a society will be organized also upon an individualistic 
 basis. What has been said about the conservative char- 
 acter of feeling must be modified, therefore, to this 
 extent that when feeling is made the guide or goal of the 
 collective life-process, then there are opportunities for 
 many conflicts of habit within the group; and that gives 
 opportunity to a certain extent for new tendencies in favor 
 'of change and of progress to assert themselves. The recog- 
 nition of feeling as of great importance in the life of indi- 
 viduals and of groups has been in the past, therefore, a 
 step toward progress. Nevertheless, it can easily be seen 
 that any attempt to organize social life entirely upon the 
 basis of feeling must lead to pure individualism and ulti- 
 mately to social anarchy. It would be easy to show that no 
 social group whatsoever can achieve stable organization if 
 individual feeling is accepted as the ultimate and sole guide 
 of social activity. 1 Thus the family, for example, cannot 
 be organized purely upon the basis of feeling. Something 
 more than the feelings and emotions must enter into the 
 organized life of the family group if it is to persist. The 
 attempt to maintain a family life purely upon the basis of 
 feeling and emotion, necessarily, therefore, ends in disaster. 
 It may be suggested that one of the reasons for the grave 
 
 istic; as dominantly attached to habits and instincts it is conserva- 
 tive and even reversionary. 
 
 iVery rightly Dr. Bernard says {op. tit., p. 28) : "Feeling is the 
 least reliable of all subjective criteria or evaluations of action in an 
 objective and social world." We cannot agree, however, when he 
 says that it is "worthless" (p. 43). 
 
 258 
 
THE ROLE OF FEELING 
 
 instability of the family at the present time is that, owing 
 to the emancipation of the individual, marriages are formed 
 frequently with the sole end of individual happiness in 
 view. That is, the union of the family group is formed 
 purely upon a basis of feeling and with feeling as its goal. 
 When the anticipated happiness fails of realization the re- 
 sult is frequently in such families that the organization of 
 the family goes to pieces and relief is sought in the divorce 
 courts. 
 
 It is the same with all the larger groups of society as 
 it is with the family. Feeling cannot be made the basis of 
 organization in them by itself, because of its purely indi- 
 vidual character. Nevertheless, just as it would be a great 
 mistake to leave feeling out of account in the organization 
 of the family it would also be a great mistake to leave 
 feeling out of account in the organization of any social 
 group whatsoever. While feeling is not the primary basis 
 nor the chief end of our social life, yet it is, nevertheless, a 
 legitimate element in the social life and its worth should be 
 recognized as such. While we cannot agree with Professor 
 Ward that the chief end of society is the organization of 
 feeling, or happiness, yet the organization of feeling must 
 be something which is kept in view as a part of the end to 
 be achieved in all rational social endeavors. 
 
 Summary. — Feeling, is, then, a powerful factor in de- 
 termining the coadaptation of individuals to one another 
 which we find in society. The feeling attitudes of indi- 
 viduals toward each other not only express the relation of 
 their habitual activities, but also continually modify these 
 activities. While in the main feeling is a somewhat con- 
 servative and passive influence in society, yet on account of 
 its subjective and individual character it continually brings 
 to bear an individualizing influence upon all social activi- 
 ties. Feeling is, therefore, an active as well as a passive 
 factor in the social life. On the individual side it is con- 
 tinually modifying activity, both in conscious and in un- 
 18 259 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 conscious ways. Feeling must, therefore, be taken into 
 account, not only in any theoretical interpretation of the 
 social life, but in all practical measures for modifying or 
 controlling social activity. "While not a primary force in 
 society, feeling presents itself as an important secondary 
 force. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE ROLE OF INTELLECT IN THE SOCIAL LIFE 
 
 The Intellect as a Social Element. — While the view of 
 social organization and evolution thus far presented is very 
 far from an intellectualistic one, this does not preclude us 
 from recognizing in the fullest degree the place of the in- 
 tellect as a factor or an element in the social life. As we 
 have already seen, indeed, in the chapter on " The Origin 
 of Society," the distinctive character of our human social 
 life is due to the modifying influence of intellectual ele- 
 ments. "While modern science makes impossible the older 
 intellectualistic theories of human society, any sane inter- 
 pretation of modern science also makes it impossible to 
 leave out of account the intellectual element. While in- 
 stinct and feeling may be the basis of our social life these 
 mental elements can go but a little way in explaining the 
 complex social life of modern civilized societies. As we 
 have already seen, the intellect plays a decisive role in 
 adapting the individual organism, in man at least, to its 
 environment. So, too, we shall endeavor to show that the 
 intellect plays a decisive role in bringing about those higher 
 adaptations which characterize civilized societies. 
 
 Earlier Views as to the Social Function of the Intellect. 
 — The hedonistic social philosophy of the Eighteenth Cen- 
 tury was peculiarly intellectualistic in some senses. While 
 it held that man could only seek the pleasurable and that 
 the intellect was therefore in thralldom to the feelings, it 
 nevertheless considered that all" social arrangements were 
 an intellectual outcome in the sense that they were due to 
 
 261 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 the deliberate weighing of the advantages and disadvan- 
 tages of such arrangements. Such a social philosophy was 
 at once hedonistic and intellectualistic. The social sciences 
 of the present, as we have already seen, have not altogether 
 outgrown this influence. While sociology was, from the 
 start, more or less of a protest against this intellectualistic 
 view of society, yet even Comte held that " ideas govern 
 the world or throw it into chaos," and that " all social 
 mechanism rests upon opinions. ' ' 1 He also found, quite 
 consistently with these views, that the forms of human so- 
 ciety were practically determined by man's intellectual con- 
 ceptions of the world, the history of society being at bottom 
 the history of the development of man's speculative con- 
 cepts. 2 This view of social organization and evolution was 
 strongly protested against by Herbert Spencer, although 
 many of his views of the family, the state and other human 
 institutions were scarcely less intellectualistic than Comte 's. 
 In Ward's sociological writings we find the transition to 
 another view, because, as we have already seen, Ward's 
 chief theory was that the feelings, or the desires, are the 
 true social forces. Intellect, Ward held, is not a true 
 force in society at all. Nevertheless it guides and directs 
 the social forces much as the rudder guides a ship. 3 While 
 Ward refused to recognize the intellect as a primary force 
 in society or to call it a force at all, he did, nevertheless, 
 recognize that it has an influence in determining the direc- 
 tion and form of social activities. In the work of Dr. Bent- 
 ley and a few other recent writers, as we have already seen, 
 all recognition is refused to the intellectual elements as in 
 any way factors or influences helping to determine social 
 activities. An interpretation of the social life in terms of 
 ideas or ideals, Dr. Bentley holds, is an unscientific inter- 
 
 i Positive Philosophy, Bk. I, Chap. I. 
 
 2 Positive Philosophy, Bk. I, Chap. I; Bk. VI, Chap. V; Positive 
 Polity, Vol. Ill, Chap. I. 
 
 s Pure Sociology, Chap. XVI. 
 
 262 
 
THE ROLE OF INTELLECT 
 
 pretation in no way justified by the social facts that we 
 know. Only when ideas are synonymous with social activi- 
 ties is an interpretation of society in terms of ideas exact, 
 and then it is unnecessary. 1 
 
 The Psychological View as to the Social Function of, the 
 Intellect. — The conflicting opinions as to the role of the 
 intellect in the social life which have just been given, indi- 
 cate that it is possible to take several views, if we examine 
 society in its external aspects. Here again, as so often, the 
 true situation becomes evident only through turning to the 
 psychology of the individual. As we have already seen, the 
 intellect is the cognitive, objective side of the mind, having 
 directly to do with the mediation of the activities of the 
 individual organism toward its environment. The intellect, 
 or cognitive side of the mind, evaluates activities then with 
 reference to the environment, and functions to mediate and 
 control them with reference to environmental factors. In- 
 tellectual processes, therefore, continually modify activities. 
 While the intellect seems to have been developed chiefly as 
 an aid in carrying out the instincts and in satisfying the 
 demands of feeling, in its higher reaches it can and does 
 act more or less independently of these. The intellect modi- 
 fies the instincts profoundly, indeed, through substituting 
 in their place habits which at least in later life become as 
 strong as any of the original activities. The instincts 
 and feelings, as we have already seen, are very insuf- 
 ficient guides in the complex social life of the present, 
 and in all new and complex environments, to which man 
 is not adapted instinctively and biologically, the intel- 
 lect must play the decisive role in bringing about such 
 adaptations. 
 
 The intellect is, then, developed to control activities in 
 individual and collective life which cannot be controlled 
 in any other way. Hence it must be regarded as the 
 
 i The Process of Government, Chap. II and pp. 166-71. 
 263 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 supreme device for controlling activity and modifying 
 environment. This being so we should expect to find, as 
 we do find, that it is only in the higher stages of develop- 
 ment that the full importance of this element becomes mani- 
 fest. Consciousness comes to play a greater and greater 
 part as adaptation becomes more complex. In human so- 
 ciety adaptations, as we have already seen, are made at 
 first relatively unconsciously or instinctively. It is absurd, 
 then, to trace social origins in any large degree to the intel- 
 lectual elements, although, on account of the psychological 
 fallacy of reading our consciousness back into earlier situa- 
 tions, there is an insidious tendency to do so. While we 
 cannot find human social origins to any extent in man's 
 intellect, yet more and more the process of living together 
 needs the interference of reason if successful social adjust- 
 ments are to be made. Later social developments and move- 
 ments in human society, therefore, take on a preponder- 
 atingly intellectual character. Reflective thought, which 
 probably played such an insignificant role in primitive so- 
 ciety, becomes at last the decisive element, because upon it 
 depends the control, not only of the forces of physical na- 
 ture, but also, as we have already seen, of the feelings and 
 impulses of human nature. 
 
 Idea-Forces in Human Society. — If any purely psycho- 
 logical elements are entitled to be called forces at all in 
 human society, intellectual elements are certainly entitled 
 as much to be so designated as feelings. French sociological 
 writers, particularly Prof. Alfred Fouillee, have for years 
 been accustomed to speak of idea-forces in social evolution ; 
 and rightly, since they at any rate become active factors in 
 the later stages of social evolution and absolutely decisive, 
 so far as we can understand, in the making of the more 
 complex individual and social adjustments. Professor 
 Fouill6e says that the revelation of what is, can be, or ought 
 to be, renders possible and even actually commences the 
 modification of what is, the realization of what can be or of 
 
 264 
 
THE ROLE OF INTELLECT 
 
 what ought to be. 1 He argues that ideas are always suf- 
 fused with feeling and impulse. While 4his is probably 
 true, it is scarcely necessary to adopt this line of argument 
 to show that ideas are active factors in the social life, be- 
 cause ideas, in civilized man at least, come in time to con- 
 stitute for the individual and society a sort of ' ' subjective 
 environment," as Professor Ward admits, and this sub- 
 jective environment the mass of individuals respond to quite 
 as they do to the stimuli in the objective environment. 2 In 
 other words, ideas modify activities directly without the 
 interposition of feeling, just as sensation and images coming 
 from stimuli in the objective environment call forth re- 
 sponses. 
 
 This " subjective environment " becomes increasingly 
 important with the growth of civilization until the ideas, 
 ideals and concepts of the intellectual life come to be more 
 determining at any particular moment in the social life 
 process than the factors of the physical environment. As 
 Professor Ross says, " The key to his behavior (civilized 
 man's) lies no longer in the play of stimuli upon him, but 
 in his consciousness. This has gathered in volume and con- 
 sistency until his center of gravity lies here rather than in 
 current impressions. The mental content has acquired such 
 mass, and experience has been wrought up into such forms 
 — idea, concept, formula, ideal — that at each moment they 
 control more than do the external conditions." 3 This is 
 true not only of civilized man, as an individual, but of 
 civilization itself. Civilization is in many respects, indeed, 
 the substitution of such a " subjective environment " for 
 
 i L'Evolutionlsme des Id4es-Forces, Introduction. 
 
 2 The subjective environment of ideas and ideals modifies conduct 
 directly, just as much as do the stimuli (sensations) received from 
 the physical environment. Ideas and ideals are as much entitled to 
 be styled forces in the social life (active factors) as are the stimuli 
 received from the physical environment. 
 
 a Foundations of Sociology, p. 159. 
 
 265 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 the objective environment. All civilizations are dominated 
 by certain ideas, ideals and intellectual beliefs which give 
 color and form to each particular civilization. Many of 
 these ideas, as has already been pointed out, are in the na- 
 ture of coordinating ideas, cementing together, as it were, 
 the activities of vast groups of men into complex wholes. 
 Agreement upon fundamental intellectual notions, as Comte 
 long ago insisted, has always been essential to any high state 
 of civilization and of social stability. Opinions do, there- 
 fore, more or less underlie laws, customs and institutions 
 of all sorts. These opinions may not for the mass of men 
 be reasoned, but they are essentially intellectual states. 
 Such opinions mediate the formation of habit in the mass 
 of individuals and make possible adaptations which could 
 not be secured upon instinctive or unconscious levels. The 
 higher stages of social evolution become increasingly con- 
 trolled and modified by intellectual elements and take on, 
 therefore, a preponderatingly intellectual character. The 
 whole progress of modern civilization has illustrated this 
 fact. Intellectual achievements, and especially achievements 
 which lead to fundamental agreement regarding social ad- 
 justments, are the great moving, dynamic forces of our 
 time. 
 
 The nonfunctional view of intellect is no more justified, 
 therefore, from the social point of view than it is from the 
 individual point of view. Just as there is no ground for 
 asserting that the individual intellect in its forms of im- 
 agination, reason and ideals is in any necessary or absolute 
 subjection to instinct and feeling, so there is no ground 
 either for asserting such subjection of intellectual elements 
 in the social life to the nonintellectual. 1 Only gradually, 
 however, do the intellectual elements free themselves and 
 function efficiently in controlling the forms of the social 
 life ; but inasmuch as they are the supreme devices for con- 
 
 i See the dissuasion in Chapter XVIII. 
 266 
 
THE ROLE OF INTELLECT 
 
 trolling activity they must be the ultimate reliance and hope 
 of civilized human society. 
 
 The Role of Invention and Discovery. — The consideration 
 of the role of invention and discovery as functions of the 
 intellect shows at once the importance of intellectual ele- 
 ments in the social life of man. Invention and discovery, 
 so far as we know, hardly exist below the human level. If 
 they exist at all in animal societies, the general level of in- 
 dividual mental development is such that they have no 
 effect; hence, one reason why animal societies are nonpro- 
 gressive. On the other hand, invention and discovery have 
 from the beginning, as anthropological and ethnological re- 
 searches show, played a very large part in the development 
 of human social life. Civilization, indeed, has been built 
 up, as has often been emphasized, largely through inven- 
 tion and discovery; that is, intellectual perceptions of 
 certain ways in which advantages may be realized and disad- 
 vantages overcome have been at the basis of that progres- 
 sive mastery over nature which is synonymous with prog- 
 ress. The invention of tools, weapons, labor-saving devices, 
 the improvement of communication and transportation, 
 these technical inventions along with scientific discovery of 
 the properties and nature of things, as has often been 
 pointed out, have been not only sources of the most impor- 
 tant social changes, but also the very instruments by which 
 progress has been effected. But it should also not be for- 
 gotten that new conceptions of human society and of the 
 universe have played scarcely less important parts in hu- 
 man history. Invention is not confined to the putting to- 
 gether of material forces in new ways nor is discovery 
 confined to understanding the workings of physical nature. 
 Quite as important a phase of invention in the social life 
 has been the making of new combinations of human activi- 
 ties. Thus new coordinations of individual activity, new 
 modes of associating and cooperating, have been invented 
 in the later stages of social evolution as well as machines. 
 
 267 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 In the same way the intellectual understanding of human 
 nature and of human society has become one of the most 
 important phases of scientific discovery. 
 
 Now invention and discovery are manifestly quite en- 
 tirely intellectual processes. They involve the making of 
 new intellectual conceptions or hypotheses and the testing 
 of those hypotheses. They involve the use of the imagina- 
 tion, therefore, as well as of the reason. Invention has par- 
 ticularly depended upon the creative or constructive imagi- 
 nation and the inventions of the imagination must not be 
 confined, as has already been said, to new combinations of 
 physical forces, for aesthetic and moral ideals also are prod- 
 ticts of the imagination. Artistic and moral development 
 have depended, therefore, upon intellectual processes, that 
 is, upon the imagination and reason. All idealism in so- 
 ciety, therefore, is a product of the imagination and reason 
 of certain individuals. Of course, the copying of such ideas 
 and mental attitudes by the mass of individuals may involve 
 a relatively small amount of intellectual effort compared 
 to the work of original invention and discovery. Neverthe- 
 less, the whole process may be regarded as essentially intel- 
 lectual because the intellectual elements are those which 
 dominate in the process. 
 
 The Individual Genius as a Social Factor. 1 — Not all of 
 the inventions and discoveries of the individual are taken 
 up and generalized by society. Indeed, the variations in 
 intellectual concepts are so slight in the ordinary indi- 
 vidual that they rarely have any considerable social effects. 
 Therefore, it has often been claimed that ideas are really 
 social products and not the products of purely individual 
 mental processes. Though this is true in one sense, it is 
 only the exceptional individual mind which seems capable 
 of producing ideas that are sufficiently different from the 
 
 1 Cf. the discussion in Baldwin, Social and Ethical Interpreta- 
 tions, Chap. V, "The Genius." 
 
 268 
 
THE ROLE OF INTELLECT 
 
 mass and that are socially valuable. The exceptional person 
 who produces such new and socially fruitful ideas is usually 
 called a genius. Modern research has shown that this ex- 
 ceptional individual, the genius, is largely a product of 
 biological variation. The genius, in other words, is a bio- 
 logical variation in the direction of mental equipment along 
 some line which is socially useful and valuable. There can 
 be no doubt, therefore, that in the genius there is a large 
 individual element, the element of individual biological 
 variation in socially superior directions. It is the superior 
 brain power of the genius, in other words, which makes it 
 possible for him to produce the inventions and discoveries 
 which become the instruments of progress in his group, 
 Any mass interpretation of the social life which would 
 neglect this purely individual element in genius would leave 
 out of account one of the most important factors in human 
 progress. As Baldwin and many others have insisted, it is 
 the individual, then, that produces the new variations in 
 society, particularly the variations in those ideas, ideals and 
 concepts which become the instrumentalities of mastery 
 over nature on the one hand and of human nature on the 
 other. Baldwin makes the mistake of calling these thoughts 
 and ideas the content of the social life, 1 whereas they are 
 rather the instruments of social change and adjustment. 2 
 Nevertheless, as instruments of social change and adjust- 
 ment they are of the utmost importance to the sociologist. 
 
 These ideas, of course, which are the inventions of the ex- 
 ceptional individual mind, are of all degrees of social value. 
 Some of them may be so reversionary as to lead man back 
 to the lowest depth of barbarism. Others may be of a sort 
 which will lead him forward to the highest conceivable 
 type of social life. The social value of the inventions of 
 the genius, then, that is, the value of his intellectual ac- 
 
 i Op. cit., Chap. XII, sec. 
 2 See Chapter VIII. 
 
 269 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 tivity, can only be determined by thorough testing in actual 
 social life. Not all genius in this broad sense of ability 
 to produce new ideas and ideals is of value. Just how 
 great influence the thoughts of the genius will have, there- 
 fore, depends upon how much in accord with the general 
 trend or laws of social evolution his intellectual concep- 
 tions are. Whether or not the new thoughts and ideas of 
 the genius are taken up and made any practical use of by 
 the group in which he lives will depend not only upon the 
 adjustment of the genius to his group, but will also depend 
 upon the functional adaptability of his inventions to the 
 group life. Hence, it happens that the inventions of a 
 particular age which are assimilated in the social life are 
 usually only the inventions for which that age or stage 
 of social evolution is ready, and it is manifest that unless 
 genius is socially guided and controlled it is apt to be 
 either socially f unctionless or an actual impediment to real 
 social progress. 
 
 " The ' great man ' theory " of history or of social evo- 
 lution is not, therefore, endorsed because we must recognize 
 the personality of the exceptional individual as a very 
 significant and practically irreducible factor in social evo- 
 lution. On the contrary, as we have already implied, and 
 as has often been pointed out, genius has its receptive as 
 well as its active side. The superior mental endowment 
 of the genius but makes him the more sensitive to many of 
 the forces and tendencies of his time. The " great man " 
 is, therefore, usually a focusing point of many and some- 
 times of nearly all of the tendencies of his age. Indeed, 
 greatness largely consists in being able to sum up in one's 
 own personality some of the more striking tendencies of 
 one's time. Again, unless the ideas, ideals and inventions 
 of the genius are socially workable, his leadership will not 
 be available. The great man who manages to perform a 
 great work for his time is the one that is, as we have already 
 seen, socially selected. Social selection based upon the 
 
 270 
 
THE ROLE OF INTELLECT 
 
 practical workability of the ideas of the genius is, there- 
 fore, what really produces the great man as we know him 
 in history. The genius who is not thus socially selected 
 by his age does not become a great man in the historical 
 senss, unless by some accident his thoughts are preserved 
 and later generations find them workable. In such cases 
 there is still social selection, only, as it were, of a spiritual 
 rather than a living leader. The genius thus has his place 
 in social evolution as a factor which must be taken account 
 of, but it is not a place which is independent of the col- 
 lective life-process. On the contrary, genius finds expres- 
 sion only as it functions in connection with that process, 
 and ultimately only as it furthers rather than impedes the 
 development of the collective life of man. Nevertheless, the 
 inventions of the genius are among the most significant fac- 
 tors of social progress. While not the sole source of social 
 progress, as some writers have maintained, they are in- 
 creasingly important in all the higher stages of social evo- 
 lution and unquestionably are the instruments upon which 
 society must rely for its highest development. 
 
 Intellect and Social Progress. — As has already been im- 
 plied, the role of the intellect is seen chiefly in social prog- 
 ress rather than in social organization. Social organiza- 
 tion at any given moment is so largely a matter of instinct, 
 habit and feeling that interpretation of the social order 
 must be largely in those terms. But social progress, on 
 the other hand, is largely the outcome of man's intellec- 
 tual life. It has been the slow accumulation of knowledge 
 through the activity of the human intellect and the progres- 
 sive rationalization of that knowledge which has been the 
 basis of social progress as we understand that phrase. Civ- 
 ilization has not been built up through the instincts and 
 emotions of man, even though they be regarded as the in- 
 dispensable conditions of intellectual activity. Civiliza- 
 tion is, as has already been said, decidedly an intellectual 
 achievement. The intellect may be justly regarded, there- 
 
 271 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 fore, as the progressive force in human society, the active 
 agent of progress. More and more the progressive rational- 
 ization of knowledge has enabled man to master nature 
 and to control his own nature. Increasingly, man has come 
 to rely upon his intellect in the contest for mastery over 
 the forces, both without and within him, and increasingly 
 social adjustments have been made and perfected upon this 
 basis. 
 
 While we must repudiate the intelleetualistic view of 
 human society as at all adequate from a scientific stand- 
 point, and even such a view as that of Baldwin when he 
 advocates that " the content of the social life is thought " 
 (intellectual processes), yet the functional or instrumental 
 view of intellect compels us to recognize it as an increas- 
 ing factor in social change and as the supreme device upon 
 which man must rely to secure adequate social adjustments. 
 Our whole modern attitude toward science and education, 
 indeed, implies just this. Our modern faith in science is 
 essentially that it is a superior instrument of adjustment, of 
 knowledge of and control over, methods and forces. Edu- 
 cation is essentially the bringing to bear of man's intel- 
 lect upon the problems of individual and social adaptation. 
 Science as an historical factor is simply the progressive 
 rationalization of man's knowledge, while education is the 
 progressive rationalization of individual and social ad- 
 justment. Both move toward the progressive rationaliza- 
 tion of the social life as a whole, that is, the rational adap- 
 tation of collective human life to the requirements of its 
 existence. 1 
 
 Do we, then, accept Comte's generalization that the law 
 of the evolution of society is the law of the evolution of 
 man's intellectual conceptions, that social and intellectual 
 evolution pass through three stages, the theological or prim- 
 
 1 Cf. Hobhouse, Mind in Evolution, p. 9 : " It is the final goal 
 of reason ... to bring all the experience of the race to bear itt 
 organizing the whole life of the race.'' 
 
 272 
 
THE ROLE OF INTELLECT 
 
 itive, the metaphysical or transitionary and the positive 
 or final? 1 This law of Comte's, usually called the Law 
 of the Three States, can, as we have already said, hardly 
 be called more than a rough generalization. It is true 
 that man's intellectual conceptions tend to become increas- 
 ingly positive or scientific. More and more his intellectual 
 conceptions become based upon facts, and scientific knowl- 
 edge replaces vague speculations or instinctive beliefs. 2 
 But this does not mean that there are three well-marked, 
 well-defined stages of man's mental and social life, which 
 we may term the theological, the metaphysical and the 
 positive or scientific, respectively. Some positive knowl- 
 edge based upon facts must have existed from the begin- 
 ning, while it is scarcely possible that man will outgrow 
 the need of making metaphysical inferences from his knowl- 
 edge of facts. 3 But metaphysics itself now tends to be- 
 come positive or scientific, in that it aims to be a series 
 of rational inferences from positive facts and a rational 
 criticism of the presuppositions of knowledge. Even re- 
 ligious beliefs take on an increasingly positive character 
 and strive to show themselves as rational inferences from 
 our positive knowledge of nature and of man. While there 
 is no danger of religious beliefs becoming extinct, they 
 will become increasingly harmonious with scientific knowl- 
 edge as mental and social evolution progresses. Comte's 
 law of the three states could therefore be more accurately 
 stated as the law or principle of the progressive rationaliza- 
 tion of human knowledge and of human society.* 
 
 i The fullest and best discussion of this " law " by Comte is 
 found in his System of Positive Polity, Vol. Ill, especially Chap. I. 
 
 2 Cf. Hobhouse's excellent article on " The Law of the Three 
 Stages " in the Sociological Review, Vol. I, pp. 262-79. 
 
 3 Cf. Flint, History of the Philosophy of History, pp. 610-14. 
 
 4 It is only fair to add that in his Positive Polity Comte himself 
 foreshadowed some such modification of his famous law as the above, 
 as, e.g., when he speaks of it (Vol. Ill, pp. 15, 23) as the law of 
 " the necessary and continual [increasing] subordination of our sub- 
 
 273 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 The Supposed Antagonism Between Intellectual Develop- 
 ment and the Social life. — If the view of the intellect which 
 has been thus far presented is correct, then, the hope of 
 man in the future must be an intellectual development 
 which is in accord with social needs. But just here emerges 
 again the view which we have several times referred to, 
 that man's intellect is essentially antagonistic to social 
 welfare, because it is essentially egoistic. This view of 
 the intellect has been especially championed by Kidd among 
 sociologists and endorsed and developed by Ward. 1 Kidd 
 finds that the intellect, or reason, is destructive of social 
 bonds and has to be restrained by a supra-rational force, 
 namely, religion. 2 Ward also finds that the intellect is 
 essentially egoistic, but its waywardness is held in check 
 by religion and other agencies of social control. 3 At 
 first sight there seems to be much in human history and 
 in the social life of the present time to sanction this view. 
 The Greeks, the most intellectual people of antiquity, had 
 little or no practical moral genius, and their social life 
 was characterized by instability, disharmony, and at length 
 by corruption and degeneracy. Many of the most intellec- 
 tual people of the present are noted as advocates of anti- 
 social and antimoral tendencies.* Even science itself is at 
 times apparently antisocial, or at least regardless of social 
 welfare. As Professor Ross remarks, " The withering in- 
 terrogation of all maxims, doctrines and ideals by men may 
 lead to a denial of everything save one 's own will. ' ' 5 
 There is, therefore, an apparent antagonism between intel- 
 lect and social development. The question arises, there- 
 
 jcctive conceptions to the objective materials of which they are con- 
 structed." 
 
 i Cf. Pure Sociology, pp. 464, 479. 
 
 2 Social Evolution, Chaps. Ill, IV and V. 
 
 3 Cf. op cit., pp. 133-34. 
 
 4 Cf. what Comte says of the anarchical tendencies of the scien- 
 tific class of his time, Positive Philosophy, Bk. VI, Chap. I. 
 
 o Social Psychology, p. 273. 
 
 274 
 
THE ROLE OF INTELLECT 
 
 fore, whether rationalism, or rationality, is consistent 
 ■with the highest and best development of the social life. 
 
 But the antagonism between intellectual and social de- 
 velopment is more apparent than real. Very largely it 
 springs from the fact that the intellect, as the dynamic 
 agent in society, is concerned more with social changes 
 while the instincts and feelings are concerned more with 
 maintaining the social order. But there is unquestionably 
 a sort of intellectual development which is inimical to all 
 sound social progress. This has already been implied in 
 what has been said regarding the genius. While the intel- 
 lect may be rightly regarded as the universal side of mind, 
 functioning to bring about the highest and widest adap- 
 tation of the individual and society, yet, like any other part 
 of man's nature, it is capable of exceedingly narrow and 
 unwholesome development. The unsocialized character of 
 much of the intellectual development of the present is 
 therefore no conclusive proof that reason in its ultimate 
 development is opposed to the highest interests of the social 
 life. The reason which takes account merely of a part of 
 man's nature would unquestionably be so opposed, but of 
 the reason which takes account of all factors in the situ- 
 ation there is no need to have fear. Eationalism is a dis- 
 solving force in society only to the extent that it is a one- 
 sided rationalism exaggerating certain factors in human 
 life at the expense of others. The intellect will become 
 socialized, in other words, only when it is turned fully, as 
 Comte insisted, upon the study of human society itself. In 
 such study the intellect escapes the bonds of a narrow 
 individualism and becomes socialized through becoming 
 itself an instrument of social adaptation. 
 
 Some practical conclusions stand out in our discussion 
 which are well worth emphasizing. The chief of these is 
 the importance of ideas and ideals in the higher stages of 
 social development and a corollary is the practical im- 
 portance of science and education as progressive agencies 
 19 275 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 in the later stages of social development. A clear under- 
 standing of a situation alone makes possible the highest 
 type of adjustment. The work of science is very largely 
 simply the making clear to the intellect of all the factors 
 in a situation, their relative importance and the mechanism 
 of their operations. The intellectual apprehension of the 
 relations between factors or forces in social situations and 
 of economics not realized must of itself greatly conduce 
 to the solution of all social problems. However, when the 
 discoveries of science and the conclusions of reflective 
 thought are formulated into standards and these standards 
 are attached to feeling elements, that is, made ideals, then 
 their social efficacy is increased, at least for the mass of 
 men, manyfold. For example, a clear understanding of 
 the influences which have led to the decay of our family 
 life and of the indicated adjustments necessary for stabil- 
 ity will undoubtedly contribute something to the reestab- 
 lishment of a stable family. If such perceptions become 
 the basis for ideals, however, their efficacy will be greatly 
 increased. "What is most needed, in other words, to secure 
 the reconstruction of the family upon a stable basis is 
 right ideals, and these ideals can only be reached by in- 
 tellectual processes, although their diffusion in the popula- 
 tion may be largely, of course, a matter of imitation. Ideals 
 are judgments as to the value of activities. They express 
 the mental attitudes of individuals toward things, persons 
 and institutions. They are, therefore, indispensable in- 
 struments in bringing about any high type of coordination 
 between individuals. Not only do the higher types of the 
 family depend upon ideals but all the higher forms of 
 association whatsoever. Ideals, as essentially methods of 
 control over activities, deserve, then, all of the weight which 
 practical social reformers, moral and religious teachers, and 
 educators of all ages have given them. 
 
 Summary. — While intellectual elements have been given 
 a place, especially in explaining social origins and social 
 
 276 
 
THE ROLE OF INTELLECT 
 
 organization, in the social theory of the past which is not 
 warranted, yet there can be no doubt as to their increasing 
 importance in connection with social changes in the higher 
 stages of social evolution. Intellectual elements come in 
 chiefly in the building up of new activities, especially in 
 the making of very complex adjustments. As has been 
 emphasized in earlier chapters, intellectual processes are 
 concerned with the transition in the individual and society 
 from one habit to another. Reflective thought may be 
 called a bridge between two types of activities. The vari- 
 ous intellectual processes in the individual and in society 
 come in, therefore, to mediate, guide and control the 
 adaptation of activities with reference to environment. 
 All the higher types of coordination between individuals 
 must therefore be in a large degree intellectual construc- 
 tions in the sense that they are guided and controlled by 
 reason. Social adaptations in the direction of increasing 
 capacity for social survival, social harmony and social effi- 
 ciency must be largely brought about, that is, mediated, by 
 intellectual processes. The generally accepted ideas and 
 ideals of a social group are, therefore, its most priceless 
 possessions, for upon these its whole culture and civiliza- 
 tion must rest; while the socially fruitful ideas and ideals 
 which are the inventions of genius in science and art are 
 the priceless instruments for raising the social life of man 
 to its highest possible levels. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE THEORY OF THE SOCIAL FORCES 
 
 The only sense in which the term force can be used in 
 the social sciences is in the sense of an active element or 
 factor in social situations. There are grave objections to 
 the use of the term force at all in the psychical sciences, 
 and these objections are intensified when there is any as- 
 sumption of a peculiar social force or forces. As Professor 
 Hayes has insisted, the assumption of peculiar social forces 
 is as metaphysical in sociology as the assumption of a pe- 
 culiar vital force in biology. 1 However, just as in biology 
 there is no objection to speaking of the special forces or 
 factors which have shaped a given situation, so in sociology 
 there is no objection to speaking of the concrete factors 
 which are at work in a given social situation as social forces, 
 provided we simply mean by such an expression that they 
 are the active elements or factors in the situation. 
 
 Every factor which has some degree of active influence 
 in shaping and molding the forms of association, the inter- 
 actions between individuals, is, then, a social force. While 
 the preceding chapters have argued that the mind in all 
 of its aspects enters as a unity into the social life and that 
 all phases of mind are active factors or forces in shaping 
 the social life, yet the question remains whether these are 
 
 i See article on " The Social Forces Error," American Journal of 
 Sociology, Vol. XVI, pp. 613-25. With much in this article I am 
 in sympathy. However, the question as to the active or efficient 
 factors in the social life is one of practical as well as of theoretical 
 importance, and in this sense the theory of the social forces is im- 
 portant. 
 
THEORY OF THE SOCIAL FORCES 
 
 the only forces with which the sociologist has to deal. What 
 about the physical factors of climate, soil, geographical 
 conditions? Are not these also true social forces? "What 
 about such factors as heredity, variation and natural se- 
 lection ? Are not these also active factors at work in mold- 
 ing human society? 
 
 Physical Factors in Association. — It has lately generally 
 been held by sociologists that these physical factors are 
 not direct forces in human society ; l that they are only 
 conditions under which human society lives, since it is 
 only through the psychological elements that we find any 
 kind of social life maintained. As long as we adhere to 
 a psychological view of society, such as this book is set- 
 ting forth, that is a convenient and sufficiently accurate 
 way to regard the matter. But it may be doubted whether 
 this view of the matter is anything more than the mental 
 bias of the psychological sociologists. It is true that at 
 any particular moment the physical factors do not shape 
 and mold the forms of the social life. At any particular 
 moment these forms are seemingly quite dependent upon 
 the psychological elements of impulse, feeling and intellect 
 in individuals. But when one surveys human groups over 
 long stretches of time, through many generations, the in- 
 fluence of physical factors is more evident. 2 In part, to 
 be sure, this influence is indicated in the various innate 
 tendencies, or instincts, of the individual, as has been 
 already shown. That is, it is exerted through the selective 
 influence of the environment. But in part, physical in- 
 fluences, like temperature, modify greatly, and apparently 
 
 i See Ross, Foundations of Sociology, Chap. VTI ; Ward, Pure 
 Sociology, p. 101; Small, General Sociology, pp. 532, 533. 
 
 2 For a good statement of the influence of the physical environ- 
 ment, see Miss Semple's Influences of Geographic Environment; 
 also Gregory, Keller and Bishop's Physical and Commercial Geog- 
 raphy. For a brief summary, see Thomas, Source Book of Social 
 Origins, pp. 130f. 
 
 279 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 directly, the immediate responses in masses of individuals. 
 Whether such active modification of instinctive and habit- 
 ual impulses should not lead to the recognition of physical 
 factors in some degree as active agencies or forces at work 
 in modifying forms of association is an open question. The 
 author has always been inclined to view these factors simply 
 as conditions, but inasmuch as we must use the word force 
 in a very broad sense in the social sciences, it would seem 
 that anything that modifies stimulus and reaction must be 
 considered in a certain sense a social force, inasmuch as 
 it is an active factor in modifying human association. Be 
 this as it may, it is certain that most physical factors under 
 normal conditions, and particularly within short periods 
 of time, modify the forms of human association only in- 
 directly and remotely, since they influence society only 
 through influencing the psychic nature of the individual. 
 Physical factors in general, therefore, affect human society 
 only indirectly, and by the psychological sociologist they 
 can be, in a sense, disregarded, that is, they can be lumped 
 together under the general head of stimuli from the en- 
 vironment which more or less modify the interstimulation 
 and responses between individuals. The biological sociolo- 
 gist, on the other hand, considering the selective influence 
 of the physical environment and the influence of heredity 
 and variation, must take physical factors continually into 
 account. From the standpoint of biological sociology the 
 physical factors loom large and become the significant fac- 
 tors in viewing the evolution of society on its physical side. 
 Psychological sociologists had better recognize, therefore, 
 that their limiting the social forces to the various aspects 
 of the psychical nature of the individual is only provi- 
 sional and for their own purposes, not involving a rigid 
 exclusion of physical factors from general sociology. For 
 the purposes of psychological sociology all physical factors 
 can be sufficiently brought in through their effects upon 
 the physiological impulses of the individual, that is, through 
 
 280 
 
THEORY OF THE SOCIAL FORCES 
 
 their modifying effect upon these impulses through their 
 perception by the senses, or the cognitive elements of mind. 
 We shall, accordingly, make no attempt to discuss social 
 forces in general, but only those with which the psycho- 
 logical sociologist is concerned. 
 
 The Psychological Factors in Association. — As has al- 
 ready been said, one of the main things aimed at in the 
 last three chapters has been to impress the student that 
 the mind enters in all of its phases as an influence or force 
 into the various forms of human association. But the 
 objection may be raised at this point that mind or conscious- 
 ness is an entirely individual matter, and, therefore, it 
 can have no influence in shaping the forms of society. 
 Those who believe in the theory of ' ' mass interpretation ' ' 
 would hold that all social movements must be interpreted 
 entirely in objective factors, and that any interpretation 
 in subjective factors is fallacious, or if not fallacious, at 
 least unnecessary. The reply is twofold. In the first 
 place, as we have already shown, the view of mind as en- 
 tirely individual is without any adequate warrant. Mind 
 and all the forms of consciousness have been developed in 
 and through a social life-process. The individual mind, 
 as we have already seen, has been created largely through 
 the process of interaction with other minds. From the 
 sociological point of view mind belongs quite as much to 
 the group as to the individual. If thought and feeling 
 have any functional relationship to individual activity they 
 must have equally a functional relationship to social ac- 
 tivity, since social activity is simply due to the interaction 
 and coordination of individual activities. As the social life- 
 process is carried on by the interaction of individuals, that 
 process as well as the individual life-process is mediated 
 and in all of its higher forms controlled by consciousness. 
 The psycho-physical organisms of individuals with their 
 inherited and acquired tendencies are, then, the spontane- 
 ous source of social activities, and we must start with the 
 
 281 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 biological and psychological individual in interpreting the 
 social life from a natural science point of view. In psy- 
 chological sociology that means that we must consider how 
 these inherited and acquired tendencies are developed, 
 modified and controlled in the activities of the social life. 
 Starting with the original motor activities, we find, as we 
 have already seen, these mediated on the one hand by feel- 
 ing and on the other hand by cognitive processes. We are, 
 therefore, compelled to bring into the discussion of every 
 social situation from a psychological point of view the three 
 elements of motor activity, feeling and cognition. 
 
 The impulsive aspects of our mental life, the feeling 
 aspects, and the intellectual elements, all play some part, 
 then, in determining the form of the social reality as we 
 find it. The various theories which have attempted, there- 
 fore, to offer voluntaristic, hedonistic, or intellectualistic 
 views of human society must be regarded as one-sided. Any 
 sound psychological theory of the social life must make 
 room for all of these elements, the impulsive, the feeling 
 and the intellectual. That this must necessarily be the 
 case can readily be seen by remembering that each phase 
 of the mind has its definite function or part to play in the 
 life of the individual. While these separate aspects of our 
 mental life are but aspects of one process, we must not 
 make the mistake of taking any one of these aspects and 
 building up a theory of individual human nature or of 
 social life upon it at the expense of the others. As we 
 have already seen, the instincts or original impulses of the 
 individual have a definite function in the social life. Again, 
 the, feelings have a perfectly definite function to perform 
 in our mental life as individuals, and it would be strange 
 if they performed no function in our social life. Finally, 
 the cognitive elements have their definite function, with- 
 out which we cannot conceive the individual even to exist. 
 Likewise, in society these cognitive elements have such an 
 important function that we cannot conceive of human so- 
 
 282 
 
THEORY OF THE SOCIAL FORCES 
 
 ciety existing as it is without them. The very fact, indeed, 
 that the different aspects of mind have distinct and definite 
 functions to perform in the individual life imply that they 
 have likewise distinct and necessary functions to perform 
 in the social life. 
 
 Nevertheless, as we have already seen, there is a cer- 
 tain order which may be given to these psychical factors 
 or forces in the social life. Undoubtedly the native im- 
 pulses which have been well termed " race habits " must 
 be regarded as of primordial importance in the social life 
 as well as in the life of the individual. In any study of 
 human association from a genetic point of view these ele- 
 ments of original physiological impulse appear to be pri- 
 mary and for the psychological sociologist they are ulti- 
 mate, although, as we have already said, the biological 
 sociologist would analyze them into various factors. Again, 
 the feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness which either 
 reenforce or inhibit the impulses must be considered to be 
 secondary or modifying factors. Finally, the intellectual 
 elements which guide and direct the activities must be con- 
 sidered also as modifying factors influencing human asso- 
 ciation. 
 
 The Classification of the Social Forces. — Summing up, 
 then, we must note that we have three sets of psychical 
 factors or forces at work in human society, and that each 
 of these is capable of indefinite subdivision. It would seem 
 that the only classification of the psychical factors at work 
 in human society which can be reached must be along the 
 lines of psychological analysis which we have followed: 
 namely, we may divide the social forces (psychical) into 
 the primary forces or the impulses, which may be sub- 
 divided into original and acquired ; secondly, into the sec- 
 ondary forces or the feelings, which may be subdivided 
 according to pleasantness or unpleasantness or according 
 as they are attached to instincts (that is, are emotions) or 
 to habits ; thirdly, into tertiary social forces or intellectual 
 
 283 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 elements, which may be subdivided into the various forms 
 of cognition, such as sensation, recognition, memory, rea- 
 son, etc. 
 
 If this view is correct it is evident that the task of 
 classifying the social forces is much like the task of classi- 
 fying the elements in human nature ; and that it is perhaps 
 most successfully carried out along the lines of conven- 
 tional psychological analysis. However, it is conceivable 
 that these forces might also be classified by the ends for 
 which they function. Numerous sociologists, such as Ward, 
 Ross, Small, Ratzenhofer and others have attempted such 
 classifications. 1 Of these classifications, , according to 
 the functional end involved in the activity, Ward's classi- 
 fication seems to be on the whole the most successful, and 
 accordingly we shall giVe it here in a modified form as 
 an example of a classification of the social forces according 
 to the end which they serve in the collective life : 2 
 
 I. Life-Preserving Activities: 
 
 1. Preserving the life of the individual, 
 (a) connected with, nutrition (food proc- 
 ess), 
 
 (6) connected with defense, 
 ( against inanimate nature, 
 j against animate nature; 
 
 2. Preserving the life of the species, 
 ( a ) reproduction, 
 (6) care of offspring. 
 
 II. Life-Mitigating Activities: 
 
 1. Moral — aiming at the good; 
 
 2. iEsthetic — aiming at the beautiful; 
 
 3. Intellectual — aiming at the true. 
 
 In this classification of Ward 's it will be noted that the 
 life-mitigating activities grow out, as it were, of the life- 
 
 i See Ross's discussion of these classifications, Foundations of 
 Sociology, Chap. VII. 
 
 2 For Ward's statement of this classification (which he makes 
 apply only to the "desires"), see Pure Sociology, Chap. XII. 
 
 284 
 
 Social Forces 
 ( Psychical 
 Activities) 
 
THEORY OF THE SOCIAL FORCES 
 
 preserving activities, the life-preserving activities being the 
 essential processes of animal life, the life-mitigating ac- 
 tivities being processes which are chiefly characteristic of 
 human social life and some of them being only conspicuous 
 in civilized society. For this reason Ward calls the life- 
 preserving activities the essential and the life-mitigating 
 activities the nonessential. The principles of classification 
 and subclassification are clear except in the case of the life- 
 mitigating activities. Here Ward has simply accepted the 
 threefold division of cultural activities recognized by the 
 ancient Greeks. It is not clear what the principle of di- 
 vision is, nor is it clear that this is an exhaustive classifica- 
 tion. The classification is, however, an admirable classifi- 
 cation of the main psychical activities evident in society 
 from the standpoint of their end or function. 
 
 Professor Small has proposed another classification of 
 social activities or forces in more objective terras. He 
 proposes to term the active psychical factors in the social 
 life interests, using that word in a purely practical sense. 1 
 The interests according to Small's conception are the prac- 
 tical social activities functioning toward the development 
 of a more perfect social life. These interests he finds may 
 be classified exhaustively under six heads, namely (1) 
 health, (2) wealth, (3) sociability, (4) knowledge, (5) 
 beauty, and (6) Tightness. 2 He defines each of these in- 
 terests in broad terms. 3 Thus under the health interest 
 he would apparently place nearly all of what Ward terms 
 the life-preserving activities. Using this sixfold classifi- 
 cation of social interests, Professor Small believes that it is 
 possible to express the active forces or factors which are 
 at work in any social situation, and that if sociologists 
 would go to work to study and analyze quantitatively the 
 
 i General Sociology, Chaps. XIV, XXXI, XXXII, XXXV. 
 2 Op. eit., pp. 198, 435, 444, 480, 542-43. 
 
 s See the definitions given in Chap. XXXII, and also in the table 
 of page 542. 
 
 285 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 presence of these interests in certain proportions in given 
 social situations sociology as a science would make much 
 more rapid progress toward quantitative exactness. 
 
 There are, however, many difficulties in applying prac- 
 tically, in the way of quantitative analysis, Professor 
 Small's classification of social forces. Some of his cate- 
 gories such as the health interest and the sociability inter- 
 est are very vague and inclusive of even opposing tenden- 
 cies in the social life. Thus, we have already seen that he 
 places under the health interest, not only practical inter- 
 est in the physical integrity or normality of the individual 
 and the race, but also hunger and sex appetite. Under the 
 sociability interest he includes not only the demand for 
 companionship and personal appreciation but also nearly 
 all of the political activities of human society. Again, it 
 is difficult to discover what principle of classification is 
 employed by Professor Small in making this sixfold group- 
 ing of social activities. He claims that the classification 
 is an exclusive one, and says that " all the acts which hu- 
 man beings have ever been known to perform have been 
 for the sake of (a) health, or (6) wealth, or (c) sociability, 
 or (d) knowledge, or (e) beauty, or (/) Tightness, or for 
 the sake of some combination of ends which may be dis- 
 tributed among these six. ' ' 1 Probably this is claiming 
 a simplicity for human nature and human society which 
 does not exist. It is not difficult to think of many inter- 
 ests which do not fit into this sixfold classification hap- 
 pily, to say the least. The craving for amusement, for ex- 
 ample, can scarcely be ranked wholly under the head of 
 either sociability or health, or any combination of the above 
 classes. 
 
 It is probably impossible to secure a completely sat- 
 isfactory classification of social activities from the stand- 
 point of the end or function which they serve in human 
 
 i Op. (At., p. 444. 
 286 
 
THEORY OF THE SOCIAL FORCES 
 
 life, both because of the complexity of human nature and 
 society and on account of the expanding character of the 
 social life-process. Ward's classification and Small's both 
 have certain merits "and are perhaps as good as can be se- 
 cured just at the present. "Ward's classification is of more 
 value in approaching the matter from the psychological 
 standpoint, Small's in approaching from the objective 
 practical standpoint. It may be remarked in concluding 
 that an exhaustive, logical or psychological classification 
 of the active factors in the social life is not so necessary 
 as some have thought for the scientific study of society. 
 Quantitative exactness could, to be sure, be secured if we 
 could isolate each active force or factor and study it in 
 its variations of intensity in combination with other forces 
 or factors in each social situation; but knowledge has not 
 yet arrived at that stage where this can be successfully done, 
 and in the mean time the progress of scientific knowledge 
 of human society does not, so far as we can see, depend 
 upon any successful classification of social factors or 
 forces. 1 On the other hand, an understanding of what the 
 active factors in the social life are is a necessity for any 
 sound scientific reasoning concerning social situations. In 
 this sense Professor Ross is right when he says that " the 
 corner stone of sociology must be a sound doctrine of the 
 social forces. ' ' 2 
 
 Summary. — By social forces are meant the active factors 
 in the social life. At any given moment these active fac- 
 tors are the psychical activities of individuals, their im- 
 pulses, feelings, beliefs, ideas, ideals, interests and desires. 
 But over long stretches of time physical factors must be 
 recognized to be active, modifying influences upon the form 
 of the social life, such as geographic environment, selection, 
 
 iCf. Bernard's statement (op. cit., p. 74): "The most accurate 
 possible classifications [of social forces or activities] mark only the 
 most elementary stage in the analysis of social phenomena." 
 
 2 Foundations of Sociology, p. 181. 
 
 287 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 variation, racial heredity and the like. For the most part, 
 however, these physical factors are simply the passive con- 
 ditions under which human groups live, their effects being 
 usually seen not directly, but only indirectly, as they affect 
 impulses, feelings, beliefs, interests and desires. Among 
 the psychical factors it is impossible to limit the social 
 forces to any one of the numerous aspects of mental life. 
 Even the desires, though complex combinations of mental 
 processes, cannot be said to be the only true social forces; 
 for social activity as frequently springs from impulse, sug- 
 gestion, unconscious imitation, habit and so on as from 
 conscious desires. The same must be said regarding the 
 interests. Only when the word interest is made synony- 
 mous with social activity itself can the interests be said 
 to be the social forces. But when this is done there is 
 no scientific analysis of the active factors at work in given 
 social situations, and an understanding of these factors is 
 necessary for any scientific study of the social life. We 
 must conclude, then, as has already been repeatedly em- 
 phasized, that, viewing society from a psychological stand- 
 point, the mind in all of its phases, whether simple or com- 
 plex, enters as an influence or force into the various forms 
 of human association. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 THE ROLE OP IMITATION IN THE SOCIAL LIFE 
 
 The Psychology of Imitation. — Imitation is such an im- 
 portant element in human social life and so much has been 
 written upon its role in human society of recent years that 
 it is necessary for us to devote a few pages to the specific 
 discussion of this social factor. It is first of all necessary, 
 however, in discussing imitation in human society to turn 
 back to psychology and attempt to understand, in part at 
 least, the place of imitation in the menial life of the in- 
 dividual. Now, there are at least three very distinct sorts 
 of imitation from a psychological view point. 1 These dif- 
 ferent kinds of imitation need to be noted and distinguished 
 for they have a somewhat different social significance. 
 
 (1) There is, first, imitation as a method of develop- 
 ment of the instincts. In all the higher animals instinctive 
 reactions seem capable of excitation not only through the 
 appropriate stimuli in the environment, but also through 
 seeing the activity going on in other individuals, usually 
 of the same species. In such cases the instinctive response 
 seems to be excited sympathetically. It is set off by the 
 example of other individuals in the immediate environ- 
 ment. The imitation in such cases is almost wholly un- 
 conscious, that is, there is no conscious copying of one by 
 another. But the perception of the activity simply excites 
 a similar activity in the observer from a similar instinctive 
 basis. Imitation in this sense is simply the tendency to do 
 
 iMcDougall distinguishes five different sorts of imitation; see 
 Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 104-6. 
 
 289 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 what we see others doing. It is a similar response from a 
 similar instinctive basis. For example, when we see two ^ 
 men fighting we may experience the impulse to fight also. > 
 
 This sort of imitation is undoubtedly the most primi- 
 tive type of activity to which we should give the name 
 imitation at all, and yet even this sort of imitation is con- 
 fined mainly to the higher animals. 1 Low types of animal 
 life show, strictly speaking, little or no imitative tendencies 
 that we can observe. In their case the instincts are ex- 
 cited, not socially and sympathetically, but only through 
 very definite stimuli. The development of the instincts 
 through imitation, of course, implies plasticity of instinct 
 and developed intelligence, and that is why we do not find 
 imitation in the lower orders of animal life. But in the 
 higher animals, on the other hand, many of the instincts 
 may be stimulated by social suggestion, that is they develop 
 imitatively. 
 
 (2) A second kind of imitation to be seen in man, and 
 probably in certain other highly gregarious animals, is the 
 tendency to conform or to be like one's fellows. It is the 
 desire to do as others do, to be like others. This is prob- 
 ably, as has already been pointed out, a specific instinct in 
 gregarious animals and is simply a differentiation of the 
 gregarious instinct. It may also arise through the rein- 
 forcement of the general neural tendency to imitate by 
 the gregarious instinct. Certainly there can be no doubt 
 that in man at least there is a very definite tendency to do 
 as others do, a desire to be like others, to conform to the 
 ways of living of the group, which is not, so far as we can 
 judge, an acquired tendency, but innate. Imitation in 
 this sense is the more or less conscious attempt to do as 
 others do, to conform to the ways of thinking and acting 
 of one's fellows. It is especially emphasized, of course, 
 
 i Or rather, as was pointed out in Chapter IX, it is confined 
 mainly to the gregarious animals. 
 
 290 
 
THE ROLE OF IMITATION 
 
 in the copying of social superiors, or of certain tendencies 
 which have been sanctioned by the group. 
 
 (3) Still another sort of imitation is rational imitation, 
 ■which is quite different from the others in that it is defi- 
 nitely teleological and purposive in character. It is always 
 highly conscious. The individual may not be conscious, 
 to be sure, of imitation as such, but he is conscious of 
 copying in order to reach certain definite ends of his 
 own. Rational imitation doubtless grows out of the two 
 preceding sorts of imitation, but it is quite different from 
 these on account of its large purposive element. Rational 
 imitation is found only in man, so far as we definitely 
 know, although the beginnings of such rational imitation 
 are perhaps to be found in some of the higher animals. 
 Like the second type of imitation — the passion to do as 
 others do — rational imitation is closely connected with 
 man's social life. 
 
 It must be noted that Professor Baldwin would give 
 a much wider definition to imitation than any which has 
 been indicated. Baldwin finds that underlying all conscious 
 or psychological imitation there is biological imitation 
 which he defines as " the organic reaction which tends to 
 maintain, repeat and reproduce its own stimulation. ' ' * 
 Imitation is the " circular " type of reaction through which 
 the stimulation which has produced a movement is repeated. 
 Imitation is " the unit, therefore, the essential fact of all 
 motor development, ' ' and hence of all mental development. 2 
 It is this biological or organic imitation which accounts, 
 according to Baldwin, for conscious or psychological imi- 
 tation. And organic imitation accounts also for both habit 
 and adaptation in living organisms. 3 Thus it is the foun- 
 dation, or at least the essential method, of the whole life- 
 
 i Mental Development in the Child and the Race, Chap. IX, also 
 pp. 333-34, 466. 
 
 2 Op. tit., p. 466. 
 
 3 Op. tit., pp. 205, 263-64. 
 
 20 291 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 process. Mental development and social development both 
 rest upon it, according to Baldwin. This exceedingly broad 
 conception of imitation has, however, not been generally 
 accepted by psychologists, and there seems to be little war- 
 rant for it. "What Professor Baldwin is really discussing 
 is the persistence of activity in the organism which we 
 have already spoken of as habit or the habit-forming tend- 
 ency. There seems to be only an analogy at best between 
 the persistence of organic activity and the various psy- 
 chological forms of imitation. Upon such an analogy it 
 is hardly possible to build a solid scientific superstruc- 
 ture. There seems to be no necessity of assuming a third 
 somewhat lying back of habit and adaptation which may be 
 called organic imitation. Any such assumption is not only 
 unnecessary but somewhat forced or metaphysical. "What 
 Professor Baldwin calls organic imitation may be safely 
 regarded, ' therefore, simply as the habit-forming tendency 
 of all organic life. Imitation must be regarded as essen- 
 tially a mental and social rather than a biological phe- 
 nomenon; and this is the consensus of practically all psy- 
 chologists. Professor Baldwin's extension of imitation to 
 take in all of habit has no good scientific ground, and hence 
 has not been generally accepted by scientific psychologists. 
 "While imitation is a mental phenomenon which is con- 
 fined to the higher animals, it must be correlated with the 
 other processes of life in order to be understood. It is 
 an outcome of instinct and habit and is largely mediatory 
 of those processes. We have just noted that those racially 
 persistent activities which we term instincts are frequently 
 developed in the higher animals by imitation, by the stim- 
 ulus of a conscious copy, and they are modified in the 
 same way. Again, our acquired habits express themselves 
 continually in imitation as in custom and conformity, while 
 imitation mediates at the same time the modification of 
 these habits. But as has just been said, this mediation of 
 instinct, habit and adaptation by imitation is most con- 
 
 292 
 
THE ROLE OF IMITATION 
 
 spicuous in animals which live in social groups. Imitative 
 tendencies, therefore, are closely connected with group life. 
 "We shall see that they spring from the necessities of a 
 collective life-process, that while not the basis of collective 
 life they are indispensable instruments in its development. 
 The Connections of Imitation with Other Mental Proc- 
 esses. — The close connection of imitation with many other 
 mental processes must also be continually borne in mind by 
 the student. Imitation is not to be conceived of as the 
 relatively isolated and socially universal process which some 
 writers have tended to make it. The close connection be- 
 tween imitation and suggestion has, to be sure, been recog- 
 nized by the whole imitation school of social theorists, but 
 its equally close connection with sympathy in the broad 
 sense has quite generally been neglected. In the broadest 
 sense sympathy is simply feeling with or like others. It 
 is induced feeling. Imitation, on the other hand, is induced 
 activity, while suggestion is induced cognition. Imitation, 
 suggestion and sympathy (in this broadest sense) are not, 
 therefore, three isolated mental processes, but are rather 
 three sides of one process, imitation representing the side of 
 activity, suggestion the side of cognition, and sympathy the 
 side of feeling. 1 It is not meant, of course, that wherever 
 we find imitation there we must also find sympathy, but it 
 is to be borne in mind that sympathy in the sense of feeling 
 as others feel, and imitation in the sense of doing as 
 others do, are continually associated in actual life and must 
 not be set in opposition in social theory. Also, social sug- 
 gestion must be regarded as a type of stimulation which 
 gives rise to imitation on the one hand and sympathy on 
 
 iThis may be expressed in the following simple formula (under- 
 standing by " mental induction " the type of mental interaction 
 which tends toward uniformity in the interacting individuals) : 
 Mental induction = imitation (motor aspect), or 
 
 = sympathy (affective aspect), or 
 = suggestion (cognitive aspect). 
 293 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 the other. If this view is correct, it is evident also that imi- 
 tation has many close connections with social cooperation 
 and with what Professor Giddings calls the consciousness of 
 kind. 
 
 The Imitation Theory of Society. 1 — In 1890 M. Gabriel 
 Tarde, a French sociologist, put forth the theory that hu- 
 man social life could be interpreted fundamentally in terms 
 of imitation. 2 The influence of one mind upon another 
 through the suggestion-imitation process, Tarde thought, 
 could sufficiently explain all changes and movements in so- 
 ciety. " Society is imitation," he proclaimed. 3 Imitation 
 is ' ' the elementary social phenomena^' ' ' ' the fundamental 
 social fact. " 4 It is the criterion of the social and alone 
 constitutes society. The unity of the social life, Tarde ar- 
 gued, is wholly due to the process of imitation. Tarde 
 found the basis of the social life, to be sure, in the minute 
 interagreement of minds and wills, but this he believed to 
 be due, not to organic heredity, but rather to ' ' the effect of 
 that suggestion-imitation process which, starting from one 
 primitive creature possessed of a single idea or act, passed 
 on this copy to its neighbors and then to another and so 
 on. " 5 The social, Tarde says, is the imitative, and imita- 
 tion is, therefore, ' ' the key to the social mystery. ' ' s 
 
 To be sure, Tarde left a place in his sociology for con- 
 
 i See the writer's article on " The Theory of Imitation, in Social 
 Psychology " in American Journal of Sociology, Vol. VI, pp. 721-41 
 (May, 1901). 
 
 2 In his Les Lois de Vlmitation (translation by Mrs. Elsie Clews 
 Parsons, The Laws of Imitation). Tarde had previously set forth 
 his main idea in an article " Qu'est-ce qu'une Sociite"?" published 
 in 1884 in La Revue Philosophique. For detailed exposition and 
 criticism of Tarde's sociology, see Dr. M. M. Davis's Psychological 
 Interpretation of Society, Section Second. 
 
 s Laws of Imitation, p. 74. 
 
 * Social Laws, p. 56. 
 
 b Ibid., pp. 38, 39. 
 
 <*Ibid., p. 47. 
 
 294 
 
THE ROLE OF IMITATION 
 
 flict, or opposition, and invention ; but he found the essential 
 basis for conflict or opposition in the interference of the 
 dissimilar waves of imitation and the basis for invention in 
 the union of harmonious imitations. 1 The laws of imita- 
 tion, Tarde proclaimed to be to sociology '■ what the laws 
 of habit and heredity are to biology, the laws of gravitation 
 to astronomy, and the laws of vibration to physics." 2 As 
 this last statement implies, Tarde would connect the phe- 
 nomena of imitation in society with other phenomena of 
 repetition in the universe, such as vibration in physics, 
 heredity in biology and habit in psychology. 
 
 As we have already seen, Prof. J. M. Baldwin, in 1895, 
 put forth a similar theory of mental and social develop- 
 ment. 3 Professor Baldwin, like Tarde, found imitation to 
 be fundamental in both the mental and social life. He, 
 however, guarded himself against certain exaggerations 
 which Tarde had been guilty of. Baldwin did not say that 
 society is imitation or that imitation is the criterion of the 
 social, as Tarde said, but he found that imitation was, nev- 
 ertheless, the method of social organization and develop- 
 ment. 4 Denning organic imitation as we have seen above, 
 he found it possible to interpret the child's mental devel- 
 opment entirely from this standpoint. 5 It naturally fol- 
 lowed from this conception of individual mental develop- 
 ment that the method or process of social organization and 
 development must be the same. The individual develops 
 intellectually and morally by imitating the mental attitudes 
 and actions of those about him, while society changes 
 through the continued imitation of the thought of some 
 
 i Social Laws, pp. 133-35, 202-4. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 61. 
 
 3 In his Mental Development in the Child and the Race, and 
 (1897) his Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Develop- 
 ment. 
 
 * Social and Ethical Interpretations, Fourth Edition, pp. 427-28. 
 6 Ibid., pp. 67, 109. 
 
 295 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 individual, a leader or a genius. A distinguishing mark 
 of Baldwin's theory in contrast to Tarde's is Baldwin's 
 emphasis upon the idea, that the content or matter of the 
 social life, in distinction from its method, is thoughts. 1 
 While some such idea may be implicit in Tarde's writings, 
 in that Tarde lays stress on beliefs and desires, in Baldwin 
 the imitation theory receives a decidedly intellectualistic 
 trend. Baldwin's whole theory of the social life becomes, 
 therefore, a very simple one and may be briefly stated in 
 four propositions: (1) The matter of social organization, 
 that is, the content of the social life, is thoughts; (2) the 
 method of their organization is imitation; (3) these 
 thoughts originate with the individual; (4) later certain of 
 these thoughts are imitated and so generalized by society. 2 
 Criticisms. — "While the above is an inadequate state- 
 ment of Tarde's and Baldwin's theories, it nevertheless 
 gives the gist of their theories. The difference between such 
 an imitation theory of society and the broader psychological 
 theory which we have thus far set forth must be manifest. 
 In the first place such an imitation theory of society, since 
 imitation in the psychological sense is confined to the higher 
 animals, makes a gulf between human and animal social 
 life which seems difficult to reconcile with the general doc- 
 trine of descent. If, as has already been said, the social 
 development which we find in humanity is in essentials 
 the same as that found in the animals below man, then, 
 this imitation theory of society should be sufficient to ex- 
 plain animal social life, as well as human social life. Tarde 
 believed that his imitation theory was sufficient to explain 
 the beginnings of social life among animals and so used it 
 without hesitation. Baldwin, on the other hand, acknowl- 
 edges that instinct dominates in the social life of the ani- 
 mals below man, and hence he finds them not true societies, 
 
 i Social and Ethical Interpretations, Fourth Edition, pp. 504-24. 
 2 Op. cit., pp. 465-84. 
 
 296 
 
THE ROLE OF IMITATION 
 
 because true societies can exist, according to Baldwin, only 
 where there is self-consciousness and thought can be gen- 
 eralized by imitation. Therefore, Baldwin calls animal so- 
 cieties companies. 1 But such a procedure does not do away 
 with the difficulties in interpreting social life from a psycho- 
 logical standpoint, because the psychological factors which 
 make animal groups, if there be such, are still important 
 in giving a complete psychological interpretation of human 
 society. Professor Baldwin has evaded the difficulties rather 
 than met them. There still remains the question of whether 
 the psychical factors which have functioned in the group 
 life of animals are not really of more importance in the 
 collective life of man than certain factors which like imi- 
 tation do not play a conspicuous part in animal group life. 
 (2) This question naturally brings up another criticism 
 of the imitation theory and that is that it is impossible to 
 understand how a single native tendency, imitation, has 
 come to be so all important in the social life of man to the 
 exclusion of many other native tendencies. Does not this 
 imitation theory unduly simplify human social life? Un- 
 questionably imitation in the psychological sense apparently 
 gees on in human groups in comparatively narrow channels 
 and under very definite conditions of control. Individuals 
 do not imitate everything or everybody. Tarde explains 
 this by saying that they imitate upon the basis of their 
 beliefs and desires which have been themselves acquired by 
 imitation. 2 Baldwin's explanation is similar to Tarde 's. 
 He says, in effect, that we imitate simply what we have 
 gotten in the habit of imitating, 3 and habits are acquired, 
 according to Baldwin, through the imitation process. Thus 
 the process of imitation in society, viewed in its entirety, 
 explains the selective character of imitation at any particu- 
 lar moment. But these explanations are not in accord with 
 
 i Op. eit., pp. 503, 524. 
 
 2 See his La Logique Boeiale. 
 
 3 Op. eit., pp. 131, 192. 
 
 297 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 modern psychology. Habits are not wholly acquired by imi- 
 tation, and besides, far more important than the habits as 
 a basis for selective imitation are the instincts or other 
 native impulses than imitation. Professor Giddings has 
 suggested that we imitate chiefly our similars, those who 
 are like-minded with ourselves, and that imitative tenden- 
 cies are controlled largely by the " consciousness of kind." x 
 But this qualification of the imitation theory is not suf- 
 ficiently radical. The fact is that modern psychology shows 
 that the imitative tendency is mediated and controlled by 
 a great number of other natural tendencies, such as the 
 sexual instinct, the parental instinct, acquisitiveness, com- 
 bativeness, constructi'veness, the self-exhibiting impulse, the 
 self -subordinating impulse and the like. In the adult in- 
 dividual, moreover, the tendency to imitate is controlled by 
 numerous acquired habits, some of which may possibly 
 have arisen quite independently of any imitative process. 
 Again, in the adult the imitative tendency is continually 
 guided and held in check by the reason. This results in 
 more than mere rational imitation, although that type of 
 imitation is of sufficient importance to demand special ex- 
 planation in social theory. The control of reason over imi- 
 tation results in numerous adjustments which are not imita- 
 tive, some of them being instinctive, some inventive, and 
 some in the nature of counter imitation. "We may conclude, 
 therefore, that the imitative process in human society is 
 guided and controlled by many elements in human nature, 
 chiefly perhaps by the native impulses and by processes 
 which modify the native impulses. 
 
 (3) This brings in a third criticism of the imitation 
 theory which is worth some consideration and that is, that 
 it is not closely correlated with the selection hypothesis in 
 biology. Selection, whether natural or artificial, is a means 
 of modifying, as we have already seen, the native tenden- 
 
 i Democracy and Empire, Chap. III. 
 298 
 
THE ROLE OF IMITATION 
 
 cies of a stock, and these native tendencies considered 
 psychologically are the instincts. If the psychology of 
 the social life is to rest upon biology, there must be 
 some reference to the various selective agencies which 
 fix in man various natural tendencies. "While it may 
 be granted that natural selection is an extra social influ- 
 ence, social selection can scarcely be so considered, and in 
 any case our psychological theory of society must be such 
 that it can recognize the possible influence of selection upon 
 human nature and the organization of human society. The 
 imitation theory of society, because it has not sufficient bio- 
 logical roots, tends to divorce the social process from the 
 life-process as a whole, and it takes no sufficient account 
 of those deeper forces connected with species and race 
 which mold the psychical life of the individual and the 
 psychical processes of society. 
 
 The Real Function of Imitation in Society. — This has al- 
 ready been pointed out in the chapter on social coordina- 
 tion. The imitative tendency, as we have already said, does 
 not exist apart from other native and acquired tendencies. 
 Rather imitation comes in to mediate other natural tenden- 
 cies. It helps forward, makes easy, development in certain 
 directions wherein the social life has furnished models. It 
 thus secures social adjustments with greater quickness and 
 ease, and affords greater uniformity of thought and action 
 throughout the social group. Imitation, in other words, is 
 not the foundation of the social life but an instrument 
 which the social life has developed to perfect its coordina- 
 tions. It is true, as Professor Baldwin has insisted, that 
 imitation is the chief means of propagating acquired uni- 
 formities in human society. The uniformities of the social 
 life which are largely furnished by instinct are not sufficient 
 for any high development. It is rather the acquired uni- 
 formities in human society, as we have already emphasized, 
 which make the peculiar developments in human social life 
 possible, and the suggestion-imitation process is the chief 
 
 299 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 factor in building up these acquired uniformities. Imita- 
 tion, therefore, comes in to assist in building up most social 
 habits. The error of the imitation sociologist, as we have 
 already said, consists in fixing attention upon but one ele- 
 ment in the social process rather than upon the whole 
 process. The function of imitation in bringing about the 
 most important adjustments between large masses of men 
 is admittedly, therefore, most important; but this does not 
 excuse the overlooking of other aspects of our social life, or 
 any undue subordination of these other aspects to imita- 
 tion. The only result of attempts to unduly subordinate 
 other elements in the social life to the imitative process is 
 the production again of another one-sided theory of society. 
 Hence, the economic determinists and their like see nothing 
 in the imitation theory but the dry bones of academic 
 scholasticism. 
 
 The true view of imitation in relation to the social life 
 must be that it is but one of the types of interaction be- 
 tween individuals. Imitation is, in other words, one of the 
 simplest coordinations between individuals. It is, as we 
 have already said, the great and indispensable means of 
 bringing about unity in a group when uniform concerted 
 action above the lowest instinctive level is necessary or de- 
 sirable. Just so far as it is desirable for individuals to 
 act, feel and think alike above the instinctive level, so far 
 imitation must play a great part in human society. But 
 from the very beginning coordinations of activity in human 
 society have been made possible not simply through uni- 
 form activity, but also through differences in activity. Un- 
 likeness of activity is necessary for even some of the 
 simplest types of social coordination. Unlikeness of activ- 
 ity is more and more necessary the more complex society 
 becomes. Imitation mediates social uniformity, but it is 
 not sufficient alone for the development of those higher 
 types of social unity in which difference of activity is as 
 necessary as likeness. Imitation is not, therefore, the basis 
 
 300 
 
THE ROLE OF IMITATION 
 
 of all social relationships. It never has been, and it be- 
 comes less and less an adequate basis as social evolution 
 advances. Hence we find that imitation is instrumental 
 in developing the social life chiefly in its middle phases. 
 In its lower phases, as we have already pointed out, so- 
 ciety is instinctive and biological. Imitation in the lower 
 types of collective psychic life seems to be the chief factor 
 making for social unity simply because it makes for social 
 uniformity. But in all higher types of human social life, 
 and especially in the highest civilization, imitation becomes 
 again relatively less important, because in those later 
 phases unlikeness of activity becomes of greater social 
 value. The suggestion-imitation process must be regarded, 
 therefore, as an instrument of the social life, not its 
 basis. 
 
 It may be argued that while imitation may be regarded 
 as one of the simplest types of social coordination or of 
 social relationship, it is in fact the fundamental type of 
 social interaction and is to be found universally throughout 
 society as the basis of all other higher types. Imitation 
 would then present itself as the universal form or method 
 of the social life, as Baldwin and others have claimed. But 
 it is not certain that imitation is the fundamental type of 
 social coordination or of collective life. On the contrary, 
 coordinated activities, collective life, and so social relation- 
 ships in the broad sense, seem to exist far below the level 
 of imitation in the psychological sense. It is only by ac- 
 cepting Baldwin's theory of organic or biological imitation 
 that it is possible to put such a construction upon the proc- 
 esses of collective life, and we have already seen that this 
 particular theory of organic imitation has no very good 
 scientific warrant. Imitator and imitated as a form of so- 
 cial relationship is scarcely to be regarded as any more 
 primitive than many other forms of association nor even 
 as primitive if we confine imitation to the psychological 
 sense. Imitation as a method of the social life cannot be 
 
 301 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 claimed, therefore, to be the exclusive method of carrying 
 on the social life. It is only one of a number of very simple, 
 primary coadaptations between individuals. It is, however, 
 as we have already insisted, one of the most important of 
 these from every point of view, because it is the type of co- 
 adaptation which brings about uniformity of activity. 
 While uniform ways of activity, as we have already in- 
 sisted, are primarily secured through selection and instinct, 
 yet unquestionably " acquired " uniformities are attained 
 chiefly through imitation, and so imitation as a method of 
 the social life is of the very greatest importance for the 
 sociologist. No group could survive in times of danger, for 
 example, without quick and uniform ways of acting to- 
 gether, and while such concerted action might be secured 
 to a limited extent through other native reactions, in all 
 the higher and more intelligent forms of life it must be 
 secured mainly through imitation. Imitation has thus be- 
 come one of the very greatest instruments in the carrying 
 on of the social life, and its importance is such as to necessi- 
 tate a somewhat more detailed analysis of the way in which 
 imitation works in human society. 
 
 Customary and Conventional Imitation. — The exact 
 function of imitation in society is seen most clearly in con- 
 nection with those uniformities which we term customs and 
 conventions. Customs, as social habits persisting through 
 relatively long periods of time, are unquestionably acquired 
 by individuals mainly through the imitation of the past. 
 Convention is a word, on the other hand, which has come to 
 stand mainly for those uniformities in society which are 
 brought about by the imitation of contemporaries. Tarde 
 and Baldwin and more recently Professor Ross have dealt 
 with these matters at such length and with such fullness and 
 clearness of psychological analysis that the only excuse for 
 touching upon them in this book at all is to guard against 
 a misunderstanding which might lead some one to say that 
 the writer had no appreciation of the importance of imita- 
 
 302 
 
THE ROLE OF IMITATION 
 
 tion as a factor in the social life of man. 1 Very briefly, 
 therefore, we shall consider imitation in some of its aspects 
 as a factor in maintaining social order and as a factor in 
 social progress. 
 
 Imitation as a Factor in Conserving the Social Order. — 
 Children get the bulk of their habits, ideas, ideals and pur- 
 poses from association with their elders and chiefly from 
 their parents. Beginning at a very early age the child 
 begins to absorb, as Baldwin and others have shown, imita- 
 tively the copy in the way of activities, ideals and character 
 furnished by his family circle. This process goes on so 
 rapidly that by the time the eighth year is reached it seems 
 highly probable that the foundation lines of the child's 
 social and moral character are already definitely laid. The 
 child has received from his family circle, mainly in an imi- 
 tative way, his language, his ideas of life, his standards of 
 conduct, his aesthetic tastes, his religion and practically all 
 of his essentially social activities. This transmission from 
 one generation to another of the spiritual possessions of the 
 race mainly through imitative processes is what Baldwin 
 and others have called " social heredity." It is also what 
 has been called ' ' tradition. ' ' While the word ' ' tradition ' ' 
 may seem inadequate, the phrase ' ' social heredity ' ' is still 
 more objectionable because the process is only remotely an- 
 alogous to physical heredity, and the biological analogy 
 which is implied in this phrase of ' ' social heredity ' ' is apt 
 to be confusing rather than helpful, leading, as it may, to 
 overlooking the very important differences between this 
 process and that of heredity in the biological sense. What- 
 ever phrase we accept to describe this process, whether it be 
 social heredity or tradition, it is evident that cultural con- 
 tinuity, and so social continuity, is secured mainly through 
 imitation of one generation by its successor. 
 
 1 Professor Ross's admirable treatment of customary and con- 
 ventional (or mode) imitation in his Social Psychology makes un- 
 necessary any detailed discussion of these factors in the social life. 
 
 303 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 Thus imitation preserves the continuity of the social en- 
 vironment and is a vast conservative force in human society. 
 The social achievements of the past are thus preserved and 
 handed down with little or no loss through unending gener- 
 ations. The social importance of custom, of usage, of folk- 
 ways, of tradition is the social importance of imitation. 
 This is so obvious and has been dwelt upon at such length 
 that there seems scarcely any reason for enlarging upon the 
 matter. It may be pointed out, however, that the full sig- 
 nificance of custom, usage, folkways and tradition are even 
 yet not appreciated by some workers in the social sciences, 
 especially in sciences like economics which deal with the 
 immediate present. 
 
 Social order and social organization, therefore, are very 
 largely conserved through imitative processes. Nearly all 
 of the forms of the social life are handed down from one 
 generation to another and unquestionably are acquired 
 mainly through imitation. It is only the simpler forms of 
 human societies that are determined to any very great extent 
 by other native impulses, and even these simpler forms be- 
 come overlaid in time with many customs and usages which 
 are transmitted from generation to generation imitatively. 
 While imitation is not the only force at work in social or- 
 ganization it must be recognized as one method, and that a 
 very important one, of maintaining and transmitting the 
 social order. 
 
 Imitation as a Factor in Social Progress. — Tarde and 
 Baldwin have both emphasized, as we have already noted, 
 that progress comes about mainly through the imitation of 
 certain inventions by the mass of individuals. That is, the 
 copying of socially fruitful variations in the ideas or ideals 
 of individuals is the real method of progress in human so- 
 ciety. There can be no doubt that this is the method by 
 which the most striking advances have been made in civil- 
 ized human societies. The imitation of the leader or the 
 genius becomes, therefore, the factor of supreme importance 
 
 304 
 
THE ROLE OF IMITATION 
 
 in the social uplift of great masses of men. This has al- 
 ready been brought out in our discussion on the role of the 
 intellect in human society. Mere imitation, however, as 
 even Baldwin has emphasized, is not, the thing which secures 
 real progress. It is rather the intelligent assimilation and 
 adaptation of the ideas of the leader. The rise and spread 
 of Christianity, for example, affords an excellent illustra- 
 tion of the' part the imitation of ideas and ideals has 
 played in human progress, and at the same time of the limi- 
 tation of imitation as a factor in progress. There can be 
 no question that Christianity, as a set of moral and social 
 ideals, spread over Western Europe almost wholly through 
 the force of imitation. Such ideals failed to spread in 
 Africa and in Asia to any extent, possibly because imitation 
 was limited by certain racial traits, even more probably 
 because it was limited by certain already acquired habits 
 on the part of African and Asiatic populations. The ac- 
 ceptance of Christianity by Western Europe, however, has 
 been effective for real social progress not in proportion as 
 certain ideas and beliefs were blindly imitated, but in pro- 
 portion as there has been intelligent understanding of the 
 ideas and ideals of Christianity and intelligent adaptation 
 of them to the social life. Almost any other dynamic 
 movement in civilized societies would serve equally well to 
 illustrate the function and the limitations of imitation as a 
 factor in social change. Thus the French Revolution, as we 
 have already seen, illustrated the working of imitation along 
 with many other social psychic factors. In practically all 
 social movements imitation is present, but in all except a 
 few its activity is complicated by very many other factors. 
 Another example of the powerful influence of imita- 
 tion upon human society is to be found in the results which 
 especially Tarde and Ward have dwelt upon of the contact 
 of two dissimilar cultures. 1 In this case mutual imitation 
 
 iPure Sociology, pp. 235-37. 
 305 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 gives rise to very rapid changes in the social life, and this 
 fact favors a general development of social plasticity. Un- 
 der such circumstances many new adaptations and coordina- 
 tions are rendered possible and when the tendencies imi- 
 tated are dominantly progressive these adaptations usually 
 take place upon a higher plane. 
 
 Finally, the study of social origins illustrates in a very 
 striking and conclusive way both the importance and limi- 
 tations of imitation as a factor in progress. In spite of the 
 efforts of certain German theorists to prove the contrary, 1 
 it seems practically certain that human culture in its va- 
 rious stages had its origin in many places instead of one. 
 Early civilization was not brought about simply through 
 copying from some one primitive center. If we take the 
 case of the culture peoples in the two Americas, for exam- 
 ple, we seem to find many independent centers of origin. 
 All the evidence seems to disprove the idea that there was 
 a single center for the origin of culture in the Western 
 Hemisphere and that gradually it was diffused from that 
 center to peoples in the lowest stages of savagery. On the 
 contrary, in a great many centers certain levels of culture 
 seem to have been reached nearly simultaneously. This is, 
 of course, in line with the general contention of the eco- 
 nomic and geographic determinists who look to conditions 
 in the environment for the decisive stimuli in the produc- 
 tion of a given civilization. But it is also in line with our 
 knowledge of human nature. Given, in other words, a simi- 
 lar mental equipment, similar instinctive tendencies and 
 
 » The reference is to the so-called new culture-history school of 
 Graebner and others like him who try to trace civilization back to 
 a single source ( Kulturwelle) . It should, perhaps, be here stated 
 that the writer has thought Jt unwise to burden this text with 
 numerous references to the anthropological and ethnographic litera- 
 ture which he has continually made use of in developing his theories. 
 Some of the chief authorities referred to have been Ratzel, Deniker, 
 Keane, Tylor, Brinton, Morgan, Letourneau, Boas, Starr and Thomas. 
 
 306 
 
THE ROLE OF IMITATION 
 
 intellectual capacity reacting upon relatively similar stim- 
 uli, and a given culture results without borrowing. 
 
 Ethnographic parallels, of which perhaps the Couvade 
 is the most famous, show that imitation has had much less 
 to do with the diffusion of at least the earlier and simpler 
 developments in civilization than men have thought. The 
 Couvade, for example, is found in many places in Africa, 
 South America, Europe and Asia, widely separated and 
 without any possibility of communication. As Ward has 
 shown, the only rational explanation of the Couvade is that 
 in the transition from the low stage of metronymic culture 
 to the patronymic stage, the Couvade spontaneously re- 
 sulted. 1 This is not denying, of course, that, having sprung 
 up spontaneously, within relatively narrow limits, the 
 Couvade was spread by imitation. So it is with almost any 
 other institution of early society. Imitation is found to be 
 a continual factor working for the spread of certain customs 
 and institutions, working, that is, to bring about uniformity 
 in a given group, but it is not conspicuous in social origins. 
 Its part in early society seems to correspond, therefore, 
 exactly to the role to which we have already assigned it. 
 
 Summary. — Imitation is not, then, entitled to be called 
 the constitutive principle of the social life. Rather it is a 
 factor which works harmoniously in combination with many 
 other active factors. Its closest connection is with sugges- 
 tion and organic sympathy, but it works in harmony also 
 with all the specific instincts, with the reason, and with 
 all other external and internal factors in society. This is 
 what we should expect, seeing that in its broadest sense 
 imitation is but a general neural tendency which functions 
 to make easy the development of other native tendencies, 
 being especially closely connected with sympathy, the gre- 
 garious impulses and reason in man. It is seen to work in 
 
 1 Cf. Ward's discussion of the Couvade, Pure Sociology, pp. 
 342-44. 
 
 21 307 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 harmony with all of these in practically all phases of human 
 social life, both on the side of social order and on the side 
 of social progress. It is in fact but one of the simplest 
 types of interaction between individuals and therefore is 
 at the same time one of the simplest and most universal 
 forms of coadaptation between the activities of individuals. 
 It is, however, only one case, though a very important case, 
 of interstimulation and response. While it must be thus 
 regarded as but one factor in the social process, it would be 
 a mistake to suppose with certain social theorists of the past 
 that it is a wholly subordinate factor, quite determined by 
 other elements in the social life process. While these other 
 elements do, as we have insisted, continually condition and 
 limit the role of imitation in human society, yet within 
 those limits imitation is a relatively independent factor. 
 Imitation has continually to be appealed to, therefore, in 
 any rational explanation of human history or of human 
 society as it is. While an interpretation of human society 
 wholly in terms of the suggestion-imitation process gives a 
 superficial and relatively unreal view of man's social life, 
 yet to ignore imitation would leave out one of the most real 
 and potent factors in human association. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE ROLE OP SYMPATHY IN THE SOCIAL LIFE 
 
 The Psychology of Sympathy. — Quite as much is to be 
 said for sympathy as a universally important element in 
 human society as imitation. In the history of sociology, 
 when it is finally written, Professor Giddings, who has es- 
 pecially stood for the recognition of this element of sympa- 
 thy, will be accorded as large a place as Tarde. But sym- 
 pathy is a word which has been used with such vagueness 
 and variety of meaning that some psychological definition 
 of this term is even more necessary than it was in the case 
 of imitation. There are at least three main types of sym- 
 pathy in human society, and while these are closely con- 
 nected, yet their confusion with one another has made the 
 whole role of this feeling element in the social life one of 
 vagueness and uncertainty in the minds of many. Let us 
 try to distinguish the three different senses in which sym- 
 pathy is used in sociological writings. 
 
 (1) First, sympathy is used in a broad way by many 
 psychological writers to mean simply induced feeling. 1 The 
 word sympathy means etymologically feeling with or like 
 others. In this sense sympathy is fellow feeling, or, as we 
 have already said, induced feeling. This sort of sympathy 
 is best called " organic sympathy." It is seen most clearly 
 in children and in animals. When one child cries, another 
 may cry too; when one is angry, another gets angry too. 
 While in a sense this is imitation, yet we have reason to 
 
 * Cf. McDougall, Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 90-6. 
 
 309 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 believe that similar feelings exist at least in higher animals 
 in such eases of the sympathetic excitation of native reac- 
 tions. As we have already said, sympathy in this sense 
 is the feeling side of induced activity or imitation. Even 
 this sort of sympathy, simply the feeling with or like others, 
 is very important in all forms of social life. Like imita- 
 tion it is one of the simplest types of mental interaction, 
 and, as McDougall says, it is the very cement which holds 
 together animal societies and renders all the activities of 
 the group harmonious. 1 For even sympathy in this very 
 broad sense of fellow feeling is, as a reenforcement of uni- 
 form activities, all important in the social life. Giddings 
 would doubtless call this aspect of sympathy, or " organic 
 sympathy," the feeling side of like-mindedness ; and sym- 
 pathy in this broadest sense is, as Professor Giddings has 
 claimed, directly dependent upon resemblance and the per- 
 ception of resemblance. Even in this sense sympathy ex- 
 ists because man lives a social life. It is not so much the 
 basis of the social as an instrument which functions to per- 
 fect the collective life process. 
 
 (2) Another very common meaning given to the word 
 sympathy, especially among sociological writers, is the use 
 of it as a collective name for all of the emotions accompany- 
 ing the altruistic impulses. Sympathy in this sense is not 
 simply feeling as others do, but rather altruistic feeling. 
 It is the feeling accompaniment of the instincts connected 
 with the family life and the group life generally. These 
 are more properly spoken of as the sympathetic or altruistic 
 emotions, but in popular language and often even among 
 sociological writers, these sympathetic emotions are lumped 
 together and called collectively sympathy. There is some 
 psychological justification for this, since, as we have already 
 seen, the gregarious impulses, or the impulses connected with 
 living in large social groups, are probably an expansion of 
 
 i Op. oit., p. 93. 
 310 
 
THE ROLE OF SYMPATHY 
 
 the instincts connected with living in family groups. Even 
 McDougall, who would confine the term sympathy when 
 used by itself to the first sense which we have mentioned, 
 recognizes that what he calls ' ' active sympathy ' ' is closely 
 connected with gregarious impulses. 1 Indeed, sympathy of 
 this sort is based, as McDougall shows, upon the gregarious 
 instinct, and is almost always accompanied by gregarious 
 impulses. If we regard instinctive sociability as more or 
 less connected with the reproductive and parental instincts, 
 then, all of the emotions that are connected with the har- 
 monious association of individuals in groups, whether the 
 family group, community groups or still larger groups, may 
 be very properly lumped together and called the sympa- 
 thetic emotions. Sympathy in this sense is the feeling that 
 accompanies harmonious association and so reenforces pow- 
 erfully the natural tendencies toward association, coopera- 
 tion, and group life of all sorts. In this sense, sympathy is 
 preeminently social emotion, 2 because it is preeminently 
 feeling which accompanies harmonious association. It is in 
 this sense, also, that sympathy is proportionate to the suc- 
 cess and harmony of the coordination of activities between 
 individuals. 
 
 It may be objected that this loose, popular use of the 
 word sympathy, standing for all of the altruistic feelings 
 and emotions, should be excluded from scientific works ; but, 
 as we have just said, there is need for just such a general 
 term for the characteristic emotions accompanying the 
 other regarding impulses. Psychologists have recognized 
 this themselves, and have used the word oftentimes in 
 practically the same sense. It is seemingly in this sense that 
 James uses the word when he speaks of sympathy as an 
 
 lOp. tit., pp. 168-71. 
 
 2 The suggestion of Baldwin (Social and Ethical Interpretations, 
 p. 236) that suggestibility is the social emotion, is from a psycho- 
 logical standpoint, almost unpardonable, coming from a man of his 
 eminence, since suggestibility is not even an affective state. 
 
 311 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 emotion. 1 Strictly, as we have already seen, sympathy in 
 this sense is a name for a class of emotions and not for a 
 single one, but this class of emotions is so important in 
 man 's social life that some name is useful, almost necessary, 
 to designate them as a class, because these emotions are the 
 feeling basis of altruism in human society. 
 
 It is to be noted that sympathy in this broad sense of 
 sympathetic emotion is primarily unreflective in character. 
 It might be classed with the first type of sympathy were it 
 not for its closer association with certain specific instincts, 
 especially gregarious impulses. It is, moreover, essentially 
 other-regarding or altruistic in character, and is rightly 
 considered the basis for all the higher forms of natural 
 affection. Sympathetic emotion is, for example, necessary 
 to love in the family, at least in all of its higher forms, and 
 to any such relation as friendship between individuals. 
 This instinctive sympathy is most important, however, in 
 that it becomes the basis for a third type of sympathy. 
 
 (3) The third type of sympathy is what has been called 
 reflective or rational sympathy. It is simply the second 
 type of sympathetic emotion developed, guided and con- 
 trolled by the reason or reflective thought. It is this ration- 
 alized form of sympathy which is, of course, most valuable 
 to the higher phases of social development. Any such 
 sentiment as the love of humanity, for example, must come 
 from a high development of reflective sympathy. Rational 
 or reflective sympathy thus becomes, as we shall see, one of 
 the chief instruments of progress in human society. It is, 
 however, a great mistake to consider reflective sympathy 
 to be the type of all sympathy in the social life. Many 
 sociological writers have made this mistake, especially 
 Ward, who says, " that sympathy is a rational faculty ad- 
 mits of no doubt. ' ' 2 All sympathy, "Ward thinks, comes 
 
 i Principles, Vol. II, p. 410. 
 2 Pure Sociology, p. 423. 
 
 312 
 
THE ROLE OF SYMPATHY 
 
 from reflection, that is, from the exercise and the use of the 
 imagination and the reason. Hence, sympathy, he thinks, is 
 essentially egoistic. 1 The correct statement, however, would 
 be that sympathy is at first entirely organic and instinctive, 2 
 and in the second sense of the word which we have just noted, 
 it is altruistic. The imagination and reason, however, acting 
 in connection with sympathetic emotions produces a much 
 higher development of sympathy which we call reflective 
 sympathy. The egoistic element in reflective sympathy may 
 often be apparently large, but the real direction and trend 
 of reflective sympathy in society is given by the social or 
 altruistic instincts to which sympathy was originally at- 
 tached. Reflective sympathy, therefore, also unquestion- 
 ably functions for the advantage of the group as a whole 
 rather than the individual, not less than instinctive sym- 
 pathy. 
 
 The Connections Between Sympathy and Altruism need 
 brief attention. Some recent psychologists have argued 
 that sympathy is not the root of altruism and is not in 
 itself altruistic. 3 In a sense, of course, sympathy is not the 
 root of altruism, because the sympathetic emotions are the 
 accompaniment of altruistic impulses rather than the root 
 of them. Feeling, as we have already repeatedly empha- 
 sized, is not the basis of activity, but rather an accompani- 
 ment of activity. Therefore, the roots of altruism have to 
 be sought in the life-process as a whole rather than in any 
 particular form of feeling or emotion. Nevertheless, feel- 
 ing is an essentially conscious mode of the mediation of 
 activity, because, as we have seen, activities are evaluated 
 upon their subjective side by feeling. Inasmuch as feeling 
 reenforces or inhibits activity, it is an essential factor in 
 
 i Op. cit., p. 424. Ward's view, it is almost unnecessary to add, 
 is that of practically all of the associationist school of psychological 
 thinkers. 
 
 2 Cf. Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 197-98, 229-36. 
 
 » Cf. McDougall, op. cit., p. 173. 
 
 313 ;■ 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 the development of activity. In this way sympathy in the 
 sense of the sympathetic emotions is a necessary element in 
 the development of altruistic activities. It is in this sense 
 the feeling basis of altruism, and altruism may be regarded 
 as the active expression of sympathy. It accompanies altru- 
 istic activity and reenforees it everywhere. A high devel- 
 opment of altruism in human society is, therefore, impos- 
 sible without sympathy and particularly impossible without 
 reflective sympathy. Ward's doctrine of the close connec- 
 tion of sympathy and altruism is, therefore, practically 
 correct. 1 
 
 Altruism is, indeed, a word which is most frequently 
 used to cover all of the impulses and feelings of the indi- 
 vidual, whether native or acquired, which are favorable to 
 others, especially to the welfare of large groups. In this 
 sense sympathy becomes the feeling side of altruism ; or, on 
 the other hand, if the sympathetic feeling be regarded as 
 the subjective sanction of the altruistic activity, then, sym- 
 pathy may be properly spoken of as the subjective basis 
 of altruism, and altruism as the active expression of sym- 
 pathy. Certainly no high degree of altruism can exist, as 
 we have just insisted, without sympathy. Humanitarian 
 sentiment and humanitarian impulses are so closely re- 
 lated that they cannot well be sundered except by the 
 psychologist; and humanitarian sentiment is but another 
 name for the widest type of reflective sympathy. All 
 the specifically altruistic activities depend, therefore, upon 
 the development of sympathy, especially the growth of 
 humanitarian doctrines and of philanthropy. Philan- 
 thropic activities, like all other altruistic activities, must be 
 regarded as very largely a development due to the increase 
 of sympathy in the sense of altruistic feeling in human 
 society. Just how this extension of sympathy comes about 
 we shall consider later. 
 
 i Op. cit., pp. 422-26. 
 314 
 
THE ROLE OF SYMPATHY 
 
 The Connection Between Sympathy and " The Con- 
 sciousness of Kind." — As we have already seen, Professor 
 Giddings has especially championed the idea of a close con- 
 nection between sympathy and the consciousness of simi- 
 larity or resemblance, whether actual or potential. 1 There 
 can be no doubt that this connection is close in the case 
 of all three sorts of sympathy which we have just dis- 
 tinguished. The first sort of sympathy may, as we have 
 already said, be indeed regarded as simply the feeling as- 
 pect of like-mindedness. The second and third types of 
 sympathy depending upon the altruistic impulses which 
 have been developed by group life must also be, though 
 less closely, correlated with perceptions of physical, mental 
 and moral resemblance. While it is impossible to think 
 that the most primitive sorts of sympathy depend upon 
 conscious reflection as to similarities between one individual 
 and another, yet, even in the lowest stages of evolution, 
 it is highly probable that the sensing or perception of the 
 points of similarity between individuals of the same species 
 may give rise to responses from the " social " or altruistic 
 instincts. Consciousness of similarity, in other words, 
 though not in any reflective form, may serve, even in the 
 lower stages of development, as the stimulus to set off 
 altruistic impulses, and so give rise to the sympathetic type 
 of emotion. In the higher stages of mental evolution con- 
 sciousness of resemblance plays if anything an even more 
 important part. From a reflective standpoint it is impos- 
 sible for us to sympathize with anyone whom we do not 
 think of as in some degree like ourselves. This is simply 
 one of those necessities of our mental constitution by vir- 
 tue of which, as Baldwin has shown, we can only think 
 of others more or less in terms of ourselves. These per- 
 ceptions of similarity between individuals and the develop- 
 ment of the reflective consciousness of their similarity are 
 
 iCf. Inductive Sociology, pp. 94-7, 108-10; Historical and De- 
 scriptive Sociology, pp. 278-88, 298. 
 
 315 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 indispensable for the development of high types of sym- 
 pathy in a group. Professor Giddings is mistaken only 
 when he attributes to the consciousness of resemblance the 
 principal part in bringing about the existence and organiza- 
 tion of social groups. Bather the consciousness of kind 
 comes in as but one element making for group solidarity 
 and cohesion. Neither the collective life of man nor of any 
 other animal can, from a genetic point of view, rest upon 
 any cognitive element whatsoever. Similarity is, however, 
 within the limits which we have already discussed, neces- 
 sary for harmonious association; and perceptions of simi- 
 larity are the stimuli which in all the more highly devel- 
 oped forms give rise to those instinctive activities, whether 
 reproductive or gregarious, which are the primitive basis 
 of group life. 
 
 We may conclude, therefore, that consciousness of re- 
 semblance, even in its lowest forms, is closely connected 
 with sympathy, being largely an intellectual aspect of 
 the same process and that as such it functions for the de- 
 velopment of harmonious types of association and of the 
 solidarity of the group. " Consciousness of kind," in the 
 more developed sense in which Professor Giddings has 
 denned it, however, as " including organic sympathy, the 
 perception of resemblance, reflective sympathy, affection 
 and the desire for recognition," is, of course, only a rela- 
 tively late product of mental and social evolution and can 
 hardly with justice be styled ' ' the simplest of all the states 
 of mind that can be called social," as Professor Giddings 
 styles it. 1 Rather such a consciousness of kind as that is 
 the complex outcome of a long process of social evolution, 
 
 i Elements of Sociology, p. 66. In his later works (Inductive So- 
 ciology and Historical and Descriptive Sociology), however, Pro- 
 fessor Giddings distinctly says, and rightly, that organic sympathy 
 (the first element in "the consciousness of kind") precedes, in the 
 development of consciousness, the perception of resemblance, and so 
 " the total consciousness of kind." 
 
 316 
 
THE ROLE OF SYMPATHY 
 
 not being found probably at all among the animals below 
 man. Consciousness of kind in this sense is little more 
 than a collective name for some of the principal social 
 aspects of the mental life, though it is entirely proper to 
 regard these aspects collectively as most important in- 
 struments from a psychological standpoint in perfecting 
 the social life-process. 
 
 The Sympathy Theory of Society. — Even older than the 
 imitation theory of society is the sympathy theory. It has 
 its roots in Aristotle, was implicitly developed by Bodin, 
 but was not explicitly developed until Adam Smith. 1 
 Smith, as is well known, regarded sympathy as the true 
 basis of the social and moral life of mankind. While 
 more or less of the sympathy theory is to be found in 
 Spencer, it became more fully developed in the writings 
 of Professor "Ward and, especially, of Professor Giddings. 
 It is the views of these writers, to which we have already 
 referred in part, with which we shall especially concern 
 ourselves. As already noted, Professor Giddings, in his 
 Principles of Sociology, found the basis of the social life 
 in what he called ' ' the consciousness of kind, ' ' which, in 
 the third edition, he identified in one of its aspects with 
 sympathy. 2 Professor Giddings 's main thesis has been 
 that social organization, cooperation and all phases of social 
 solidarity depend upon the development of sympathy or 
 " the consciousness of kind." In his later works, to be 
 sure, sympathy and the consciousness of kind are subor- 
 dinated to the more fundamental conception of similarity 
 or resemblance as the basis of the social life, especially 
 mental resemblance, or like-mindedness. Upon this hy- 
 pothesis he has constructed what must be regarded as in 
 
 i Theory of Moral Sentiments, especially Part I. For an exhaus- 
 tive treatment of the significance of Adam Smith in the development 
 of sociological theory, see Small's Adam Smith and Modern Sociol- 
 ogy. 
 
 2 Principles of Sociology, Preface to Third Edition, pp. x-xiv. 
 
 317 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 the main a sympathy theory of the social life, giving sym- 
 pathy and the consciousness of resemblance primal impor- 
 tance in the interpretation of group life. 
 
 So many references have already been made to Pro- 
 fessor Giddings's theories that it is unnecessary to discuss 
 them here further, save to indicate their relation to the 
 general psychological theory of society. It is evident that 
 Giddings, like Tarde, has performed an invaluable work 
 for sociology in calling attention to certain aspects of the 
 social life whose significance had not been adequately em- 
 phasized by other sociological writers. Giddings's theories, 
 in other words, are to be criticised only in so far as they 
 are claimed to be a complete presentation of sociological 
 truth. The system of sociology built upon them is very 
 far from being complete; rather it is, like Tarde 's, merely 
 certain chapters in the psychological theory of society. As 
 we have already emphasized, sympathy and the conscious- 
 ness of kind must be regarded simply as one factor or set 
 of factors in our social life and not as an adequate state- 
 ment of the whole. Sympathy and the consciousness of kind, 
 in other words, must themselves be interpreted as instru- 
 ments in the development of social life rather than its basis. 
 
 Only a word is necessary as regards the place which 
 Ward gives to sympathy in his system of sociological 
 thought. "Ward, as we have already noticed, makes the 
 feelings primary in human mental and social life. But 
 feeling is, as "Ward acknowledges, a subjective and indi- 
 vidualistic matter. Very naturally, therefore, Ward 
 seizes upon sympathy as that phase of feeling which is 
 favorable to others as the basis for all higher developments 
 in the social life. It is sympathy, he finds, which makes 
 possible altruism, and, hence, also sympathy which makes 
 possible all humanitarian advances in society. The sym- 
 pathetic feelings are, then, according to Ward, the essen- 
 tially progressive forces in human social life. 1 
 i Pure Sociology, pp. 422-26, 450-54. 
 318 
 
THE ROLE OF SYMPATHY 
 
 The Social Function of Sympathy. — As has been already 
 pointed out, the feeling attitudes of individuals toward 
 one another are all important in initiating and maintaining 
 types of social coordination or adaptation between those 
 individuals. Common feelings serve to reenforce and to 
 fix common activities. Sympathy in the sense of common 
 feeling we have already spoken of metaphorically as a sort 
 of social cement. In a former chapter we have discussed 
 the very important role of sympathy, in the sense of altru- 
 istic feeling, in initiating and maintaining complex coor- 
 dinations in groups of individuals. If feeling has any 
 value whatsoever in the social life, then, there can be no 
 question of the great importance of sympathetic feeling. 
 The very word society (Latin, societas) originally meant 
 " comradeship " and " comradeship " implies sympathy, 
 at' least in the sense of fellow feeling if not in the sense of 
 altruistic feeling. If we regard society as a mental fact, 
 therefore, sympathy is very nearly coextensive with it. 
 ' Nevertheless, as has just been said, sympathy must be 
 regarded as functional to the social life rather than as its 
 basis. Sympathy and sympathetic understanding (which 
 we may define as understanding plus sympathy) are neces- 
 sary to build up all higher types of harmonious coordina- 
 tions or relationships between individuals. It is sympathy, 
 for example, which makes easy the development of those 
 complex adaptations which we find beginning with the 
 family group and ending, possibly, in the philanthropic 
 activities which we find in a modern nation or great city. 
 "Without those tendencies to feel with and for others, which 
 we gather together under the name of sympathy, it is in- 
 conceivable that any high types of relationship between 
 individuals could be initiated or could persist. To be sure, 
 it may be said that we find much complex cooperation in 
 modern society which is apparently not accompanied by 
 sympathy between the individual cooperators. But even 
 in such cases there is probably a certain amount of common 
 
 319 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 feeling among the individuals concerned and a high de- 
 velopment of general altruistic tendencies in their person- 
 alities. Cooperation, to be sure, is not inconsistent with 
 self-interest, but no complex and stable types of coopera- 
 tion can be developed, so far as we know, upon a basis 
 of self-interest alone. The attempts to develop forms of 
 cooperation in modern society purely upon the basis of 
 self-interest without any sympathetic or altruistic feeling 
 being enlisted must be regarded as a serious mistake from 
 the standpoint of psychology and sociology. Cooperation 
 of stable and complex sorts has never existed, and can 
 never exist in human society, without conscious efforts 
 toward mutual helpfulness. Altruism is, therefore, the in- 
 dispensable basis for all the higher forms of cooperation 
 and this implies that sympathy in the sense of altruistic 
 feeling as well as in the sense of fellow feeling, is a neces- 
 sary element in such forms of cooperation. Professor Gid- 
 dings has especially shown that conscious forms of coopera- 
 tion depend upon the consciousness of kind which is only 
 of course another way of showing that they depend upon 
 sympathy. 
 
 All this is equivalent to saying that sympathy is more 
 or less an element to be found in practically all forms of 
 coadaptation between individuals, or of social coordination, 
 from the lowest to the highest, and that, like imitation, it 
 is a practically universal instrument for developing the 
 social life both on the side of maintaining social order and 
 on the side of furthering social progress. Let us see briefly 
 in what ways sympathy functions in both of these aspects 
 of the social life. 
 
 Sympathy as a Factor in Maintaining Social Order. — 
 While the actual organization of society is perhaps not the 
 work of sympathy, but is rather, as has already been 
 pointed out, primarily the work of instinct and habit func- 
 tioning especially through imitation, yet after any organiza- 
 tion of society has been achieved, then the role of sympathy 
 
 320 
 
THE ROLE OF SYMPATHY 
 
 is that of a social bond of primary importance between 
 all members of the group. It conduces to the solidarity 
 of the group, for the solidarity of feeling reenforces the 
 solidarity of life. Not only the family group, but all nat- 
 ural, genetic groups may be rightly regarded, therefore, 
 as knit together by the bonds of sympathy. The conscious- 
 ness of kind here again, of course, is very manifest as a 
 cohesive element. The sentiment of kinship, which is but 
 a specialized form of sympathy, has played the most con- 
 spicuous part in all ages in maintaining the unity and 
 continuity of the life of groups. The " blood bond " be- 
 tween the members of primitive groups was, of course, a 
 form of the consciousness of kinship, a powerful expression 
 in those communities of natural or instinctive sympathy 
 between their members. As sympathy and the conscious- 
 ness of kind function thus to maintain the unity and 
 continuity of the life of groups, so they also function to 
 maintain habits and customs which have become associated 
 with the activities of the group. Under such circumstances 
 sympathetic feeling becomes a powerful conservative so- 
 cial force, helping to maintain institutions and usages from 
 generation to generation in ways which we have already 
 discussed. 
 
 But even in the most advanced societies, in which the 
 sentiment of kinship no longer plays so conspicuous a 
 part, sympathy is, nevertheless, a cohesive force which can 
 in no degree be dispensed with. It is for this reason that all 
 social groups and classes seek to cultivate sympathy among 
 their members. It is doubtful indeed, as was long ago 
 pointed out, whether moral obligations would be met in hu- 
 man society were it not for sympathy. If self-interest did 
 not prompt the meeting of such obligations, then, the disin- 
 terested tendencies of human nature, of which sympathy 
 is among the more conspicuous, must be relied upon as 
 motives for meeting such obligations. To a very consid- 
 erable extent, therefore, the moral or social order depends 
 
 321 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 upon sympathy. This, however, was long ago set forth 
 by Adam Smith and other English moralists; and it must 
 be acknowledged that morality, as we understand it, could 
 not exist in human society without altruistic feeling. Sym- 
 pathy, both in the sense of common feeling and in the 
 sense of altruistic feeling, is, therefore, a powerful factor 
 in maintaining any given social order. 
 
 Sympathy as a Factor in Progress. — As we have already 
 noted, conscious changes in human society can be satis- 
 factorily brought about only by the enlistment of the feel- 
 ings upon the side of the change. 1 Feeling, as has already 
 been emphasized, is a necessary element in the achievement 
 of any complex adjustment in human life, because it func- 
 tions to sanction such adjustment upon its individual or 
 organic side. Now, the sympathetic feelings are obviously 
 those which can be most easily enlisted on the side of 
 changes advantageous to the group. The constant appeal 
 in any reform movement in human society, therefore, is 
 to the sympathies; and it is successful enlistment of the 
 sympathies in behalf of reformative changes which has ac- 
 complished much of the social and political progress of the 
 past two centuries. As Ward insists, the great humanitar- 
 ian reforms of the Nineteenth Century are to be explained 
 largely through " the growth of sympathy in the human 
 breast." 2 The appeal on behalf of those who suffer wrong 
 and oppression has been mainly an appeal to sympathetic 
 emotions. The moral and mental soil, as Ward says, into 
 which the reformer and agitator have successfully cast 
 the seeds of many social movements, has been the soil of 
 sympathy and humanitarian sentiment. So conspicuous, 
 indeed, has been the growth of sympathy and altruism 
 within the past century and so many have been the changes 
 apparently wrought by it, certainly at least sanctioned 
 by it, that one is not surp rised to find a declaration like 
 
 i See Chapter X. 
 
 2 Op. cit., p. 452. 
 
 322 
 
THE ROLE OF SYMPATHY 
 
 Sutherland's that " the law of sympathy has been the law 
 of progress." 1 Sutherland, however, goes through the 
 whole range of living creatures from the lowest to the 
 highest in order to get proofs for his thesis, and his con- 
 clusion is that " the sympathetic type is the one which is 
 more and more distinctly emergent as we ascend in the 
 animal scale. ' ' 2 This is, indeed, what we should expect 
 seeing, as we have already shown, that mind in all its forms 
 and aspects is more and more emergent as we ascend in 
 the scale of life as a device or instrument for perfecting the 
 life-process. Sympathy in all of its forms is, however, but 
 one aspect of mind and is, therefore, but one of many 
 mental instruments increasingly used for the mediation, 
 control and perfectioning of the life-process. 
 
 Of course, it is the higher or intellectual forms of sym- 
 pathy which are chiefly conspicuous as instruments of 
 progress. It is especially sympathy in its forms of ethical 
 love 3 and the love of humanity which plays a conspicuous 
 part in alleviating miseries and opening the doors of op- 
 portunity to all classes in civilized societies. To be sure, 
 sympathy has always reenforced what Drummond calls 
 " the struggle for the life of others," that is, altruistic 
 impulses and activities. From the mother's care of her 
 child to the martyr's sacrifice of himself for the sake of 
 humanity, sympathetic feeling has been an undoubted, con- 
 stant factor in the reenforcement of altruistic activity. It 
 
 i Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, Vol. I, p. 10. 
 
 2 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 291. Cf. Darwin's remark {Descent of Man, 
 p. 122): "Those communities which included the greatest number 
 of the most sympathetic members would flourish best and rear the 
 greatest number of offspring." 
 
 s By " ethical love " is meant unselfish devotion to the welfare of 
 others. This is, of course, not merely a matter of feeling (sym- 
 pathy), but even more of will. But sympathy in the sense of altru- 
 istic feeling may be said to lie back of ethical love in the way 
 already explained. The love of humanity is only the expansion of 
 ethical love. 
 
 22 323 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 is not to be wondered at, therefore, that a humanitarian 
 writer like Henry Drummond finds that love is the " su- 
 preme dynamic. " 1 In a sense this is true, that is, in the 
 sense that ethical love must very largely prompt and sanc- 
 tion all the highest efforts for the welfare of humanity or 
 even of individuals. But in another sense sympathy and 
 love are but imperfect instruments for bringing about the 
 highest type of adjustment in society. They should always 
 be present, to be sure, in all reform movements, in all 
 humanitarian work, whether for a class or for individuals ; 
 but as sympathy unguided by reason often leads to efforts 
 which are demoralizing to individuals, so sympathy and 
 even the love of humanity must be controlled by reason. 
 There is much evidence to show that maudlin sympathy 
 with the oppressed classes in society may be as demoraliz- 
 ing to those classes as unwise philanthropy is to individuals. 
 The experience of the American people in dealing with the 
 negro is indeed very good evidence of this. Sympathy and 
 love are not always progressive forces in human society. 
 They may work at times retrogressively. They need to be 
 controlled by reason. However, one must admit that the 
 great increase of sympathy and altruism in modern civ- 
 ilized society is probably the surest guarantee of continued 
 progress and of the ultimate social adjustment of all classes 
 in a perfectly coordinated and harmonized social life. 
 
 The Expansion of Sympathy. — We have already spoken 
 of the increase of sympathy and altruism in society as one 
 of the large factors in social progress. But how, it may be 
 asked, does sympathy increase? Does it not increase sim- 
 ply as activities become more widely extended, that is, 
 is not the increase of sympathy a result of higher social 
 organization and of more extended altruistic activities in 
 society rather than vice versa? To a certain extent, of 
 
 i The Ascent of Man, p. 216. For Drummond's full argument, 
 read the whole of Chap. VII on " The Struggle for the Life of 
 Others." 
 
 324 
 
THE ROLE OF SYMPATHY 
 
 course, the growth of sympathy, like the growth of all 
 feeling, is merely a result of the growth of activities real- 
 ized. If we want people to have similar feelings, that is, 
 to have organic sympathy with each other, we have only 
 usually to get them to act alike. If we want to get one 
 individual to entertain an altruistic feeling for another, 
 it is notorious that one of the best ways to accomplish 
 this result is to get that individual to do something for 
 the other. Even altruistic feeling very oftentimes lags 
 behind and is an accompaniment or resultant of altruistic 
 activity rather than otherwise. 
 
 However, the reader will remember that we have in- 
 sisted that feeling attitudes practically mark the beginning, 
 as well as the end of activities, that they have to do with 
 the initiation of activity, that is, with the selection of 
 impulses which are allowed to develop, as well as with the 
 guiding of developed activity. Sympathetic feeling, there- 
 fore, has a very real part in the initiation of practical 
 social activities of an altruistic character. Moreover, in 
 man activities of many sorts are gone through imaginatively 
 before being realized in actual social practice. The im- 
 agination, therefore, has a great deal to do with the de- 
 velopment of feeling. Sympathy in mankind is, therefore, 
 largely developed through the imagination and .the under- 
 standing. Hence, as Professor Giddings has insisted, the 
 expansion of our consciousness of mental and moral simi- 
 larities and identities between ourselves and our fellow 
 human beings has much to do with the expansion of our 
 sympathies. "We cannot, indeed, as has already been in- 
 sisted, sympathize with those whom we do not understand 
 and whom we do not conceive to be in a certain measure 
 like ourselves. On the other hand, sympathy while not in- 
 evitable, is apt to arise spontaneously between those who 
 know and understand their mental and moral resemblances, 
 that is, their similarities in nature and in destiny. The 
 growth of sympathy, therefore, in mankind has been very 
 
 325 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 largely due to the growth of intelligence, and the expansion 
 of sympathy has accompanied the expansion of the con- 
 sciousness of kind. 
 
 Supplementary to these ideas of Professor Giddings, 
 are those of Kidd, who insists that the great expansion of 
 sympathy and altruism in Western Civilization has been 
 due very largely to the influence of Christianity. 1 Kidd 
 is undoubtedly right in this contention, because a leading, 
 if not the distinguishing mark of Christianity, has been 
 its insistence upon the essential moral and spiritual iden- 
 tity of all men. Christianity has insisted upon the brother- 
 hood, that is, the essential kinship of all mankind, and at 
 the same time upon the essential oneness in moral condi- 
 tion of all men before God. In brief, Christianity has 
 taken the sympathies and sentiments natural to the family 
 group and given them a humanity-wide expansion. It 
 has made the bonds of sympathy, love and altruism which 
 are naturally characteristic of the family, the ethical bonds 
 of all humanity. The development of the perception of 
 the moral and spiritual similarities in nature and in destiny 
 of all humanity which has accompanied the growth of 
 Christianity has undoubtedly been responsible for the de- 
 velopment of most, if not all, of modern humanitarianism, 
 or, in other words, as Kidd says, for the growth of that 
 fund of altruism with which our civilization has become 
 equipped and which, as we have already said, is the basis 
 for the largest hopes which one may reasonably entertain 
 for the humanity of the future. 
 
 The Social Function of Charity. 2 — Charity as the f6rm 
 of altruism which shows itself in social help for the weaker 
 members of society may be regarded as an expression of 
 sympathetic feeling or emotions. As a concrete expression 
 
 i Social Evolution, Chaps. IX, X. 
 
 2 See the writer's article in Charities and The Commons (now 
 The Survey), January 4, 1908, on "The Functions of Charity in 
 Modern Society," for fuller discussion. 
 
 326 
 
THE ROLE OF SYMPATHY 
 
 of sympathy in human society, therefore, the working of 
 charity at its best will illustrate the function of sympathy. 
 As we have already noted, charity may lead to grave evils 
 in society. It may perpetuate the degraded, the unfit, the 
 wicked and the worthless. But when guided by intelli- 
 gence, charity is capable not only of performing a useful 
 function but the very highest social function. The func- 
 tions of scientific or rational charity in modern society may 
 perhaps be reduced to three types. The first work of ra- 
 tional charity is evidently to help those out of adjustment 
 with society to get adjusted if possible, that is to reclaim 
 the socially weak when they are capable of being reclaimed. 
 The second function of a rational charity is to care for 
 all that cannot be reclaimed in such a way that they will 
 encumber least present and future generations, but also 
 in such a way as not to injure the finer, that is, the altru- 
 istic, feelings and sentiments of society. It is as much the 
 work of charity to segregate the hopelessly weak and de- 
 generate, to remove them from free society, as it is to 
 reclaim the temporarily weak. The third function of char- 
 ity is to remove the sources of human misery by searching 
 out and removing its causes. Preventive philanthropy 
 which tries to stop the making of the unfit through rational 
 eugenics, through the education and training of the indi- 
 vidual and through the improvement of social conditions, 
 is, of course, the highest form of charity. 
 
 Modern scientific charity itself, needless to add, is per- 
 forming in larger and larger measure all three of the above 
 functions in modern society. It illustrates, therefore, at 
 its best the working or functioning of sympathy as an in- 
 strument of social progress. Scientific charity, therefore, 
 deserves the interest and support of all civilized communi- 
 ties as a scientific means not only of alleviating human mis- 
 ery but of furthering human progress. 
 
 Summary. — Sympathy in the sense of induced feeling 
 is one of the simplest types of mental interaction between 
 
 327 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 individuals. It is a practically universal accompaniment of 
 all coordinated activity between them. In the sense 
 of altruistic feeling or emotion sympathy is a mental atti- 
 tude favorable to the development of the higher and more 
 harmonious types of social coordination and cooperation. 
 It is, therefore, the feeling which especially reenforces 
 activities which are favorable to the group as a whole. 
 While sympathy in the organic sense is practically a feel- 
 ing accompaniment of all forms of association, it is sympa- 
 thy in the sense of altruistic feeling which mediates the 
 more complex activities of group life and especially those 
 activities which demand some sacrifice on the part of the 
 individual. Sympathy in this sense has accompanied all 
 altruistic activities in society from the simplest up, but 
 it is especially the higher forms of such sympathy, as hu- 
 manitarian sentiment and ethical love, which have been 
 definitely progressive forces in man's social life. Crude 
 forms of sympathy, like the sentiment of kinship, seemingly 
 function in an almost wholly conservative way, but the 
 higher forms, like the love of humanity, especially when 
 guided and controlled by the reason, become most important 
 instruments of progress. Our whole conception of sym- 
 pathy in the social life of man must be, therefore, a 
 functional one. It is a mental element which we may de- 
 scribe as the primitive social cement, but which develops 
 with the expanding process of life into one of the chief 
 instruments for maintaining social order and solidarity on 
 the one hand and bringing about progressive changes on 
 the other. It would seem that its place in developed so- 
 cial life can be regarded as subordinate only to reason. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 THE SOCIAL MIND, SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS, PUBLIC OPINION 
 AND POPULAR WILL 
 
 The Concept of the Social Mind.— There are two extreme 
 views of the .psychical life, or mind, in society. One is 
 the individualistic view that the mind or consciousness of 
 the individual is something entirely separate, a unique 
 isolated thing, each individual mind being related in no 
 organic or vital way to other minds. This view, while still 
 championed, is practically a psychological view of the 
 Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century which now has but little 
 scientific evidence in its favor. 1 "We have already endeav- 
 ored to show that the individual mind is not isolated but 
 a part of the larger whole, the content of individual con- 
 sciousness being almost entirely derived from heredity, or 
 the physical life-process, on the one side, and from society, 
 or the social life-process, on the other side. 
 
 The other extreme view is that the individual mind 
 is only a part of some over-soul, a real social mind outside 
 of the individual. This view offers the hypothesis that 
 there is a consciousness over and above individual con- 
 sciousness of which we cannot be conscious, but of which 
 we are in some mysterious way a part. This mystical view 
 
 i It has lately been revived by Professor Fite in a modified form 
 in his Individualism, a book whose psychological postulate is the 
 essentially self-regarding nature of consciousness. See the writer's 
 review of the work in the International Journal of Ethicsior April, 
 1912, pp. 348-52; also Mead's review in Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 
 VIII, pp. 323-28. 
 
 329 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 is not, so far as the writer knows, endorsed by any socio- 
 logical thinker, although strangely enough it has received 
 support as a tentative hypothesis from a prominent psy- 
 chologist, Mr. Henry Eutgers Marshall. 1 
 
 The truth would seem to lie somewhere between these 
 two extremes. Mind has both its individual and its social as- 
 pects. As we have shown, the individual mind is very 
 largely a social product, but on the other hand the indi- 
 vidual alone is a center of conscious experience. The in- 
 dividual alone thinks, feels and wills. Society as a group 
 of individuals carrying on a common life-process thinks, 
 feels and wills only through its individual members. So- 
 ciety, as we have already repeatedly emphasized, must 
 be thought of as a complex unity made up of many indi- 
 vidual psychic units that are in interaction, continually 
 affecting and modifying each other, so that the only unity 
 which we have in society is a unity of process. It is pos- 
 sible that this is the only sort of unity which science may 
 be able to find in the individual, but for the present the in- 
 dividual appears to be a different sort of unity than so- 
 ciety. The individual consciousness is unified both struc- 
 turally and functionally. The mental life of groups is 
 unified only functionally. 
 
 This is equivalent to saying that there is a collective 
 mental life, but no such thing as a social mind in the same 
 sense in which there is an individual mind. The phrase 
 social mind, however, has come into general use not only 
 in sociological writings but also in popular speech. Let 
 us note, therefore, that all that can be meant by it is the 
 psychical aspect of society. It is the psychical side of the 
 social process. The term social mind, in other words, is a 
 convenient term to express the mental unity of our so- 
 cial life. This unity is a very real thing and even though 
 the term social mind is open to many objections because 
 
 i See his Instinct and Reason, pp. 65-7 ; also Consciousness, pp. 
 173-80. 
 
 330 
 
SOCIAL MIND AND SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 of possible misunderstandings, it is certainly convenient to 
 have such a term to describe the functional unity which 
 arises from the interaction between many individual minds. 
 Professor Cooley has compared the unity of the social mind 
 to the unity of the music of an orchestra which though 
 it comes from many different instruments and is made up 
 from divergent but related sounds is a harmonious whole. 
 " The unity of the social mind," Professor Cooley rightly 
 says, " consists not in agreement but in organization, in 
 the fact of reciprocal influence or causation among its parts 
 by virtue of which everything that takes place in it is con- 
 nected with everything else, and so is an outcome of the 
 whole. ' ' 1 This conception of the social mind as due to 
 organization or coordination between the activities of many 
 individual minds is somewhat in advance of the conception 
 of Professor Giddings, who considers the social mind to 
 be essentially ' ' the concert of thought, emotion and will ' ' 
 of individual minds, 2 although this conception of Professor 
 Giddings is not essentially different from that of Professor 
 Cooley. 
 
 It is chiefly convenient to retain the term, the social 
 mind, in sociological discussions because of the fact that 
 we retain other analogous terms, such as social conscious- 
 ness, public opinion and popular will. If it is allowable 
 in scientific usage to speak of social consciousness and 
 public opinion, it should certainly be allowable to speak 
 of the social mind, provided that we understand that that 
 term is simply a name for the mental life, the psychical 
 unity, of society. 
 
 Social Consciousness. — Rejecting the mystical idea that 
 there is a social consciousness over and above the conscious- 
 
 1 Social Organization, p. 4. 
 
 2 Elements of Sociology, p. 120 ; Historical and Descriptive Soci- 
 ology, p. 185. See the excellent discussion of the conception of the 
 social mind in Davis's Psychological Interpretations of Society, 
 Chap. V. 
 
 331 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 rtess of the individual, there remain two rational meanings 
 for the phrase social consciousness. In the first place we 
 may mean by social consciousness simply one aspect of 
 individual consciousness. Practically all consciousness of 
 the human individual is socially conditioned and functions 
 toward social ends. In this sense practically all the con- 
 sciousness which we find in society is social. 1 As has 
 already been repeatedly said, practically all consciousness 
 has its individual and its social aspects, and these two 
 aspects of consciousness are in several ways correlatives. 
 As Professor Cooley says social consciousness in the sense 
 of awareness of society is inseparable from self-conscious- 
 ness, because we can hardly think of ourselves except in 
 reference to a social group of some sort. Social conscious- 
 ness in this sense becomes the correlative of individual con- 
 sciousness. 2 But it is evident that this consciousness of 
 others and of the relations of one's activity to the activity 
 of others may assume a higher form. It may itself become 
 a cooperative activity involving many individual minds. 
 Hence, we come to the second rational meaning which 
 may be given to the phrase social consciousness, and that 
 is a consciousness of social solidarity, a general awareness 
 on the part of each individual in a group of a given so- 
 cial situation. This is the usual sense in which the phrase 
 social consciousness is used by popular sociological writers. 3 
 It is a social state, in other words, in which each individual 
 of a group is conscious of the relation of his activities 
 to the activities of the whole group. Such a social state 
 
 i Cf. the statement of Professor Ames in the article already re- 
 ferred to (Psychological Bulletin, Vol. VIII, p. 415) : " Our minds 
 are fashioned in a social medium and our intellectual operations 
 are conversations from first to last." 
 
 2 This is the chief sense in which Professor Cooley uses the term. 
 He employs " public consciousness " for the second meaning men- 
 tioned. See his Social Organization, Chap. I. 
 
 s As when one speaks of arousing " social consciousness " regard- 
 ing some evil, as, e.g., child labor. 
 
 332 
 
SOCIAL MIND AND SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 might perhaps better be called a state of social self -con- 
 sciousness than a state of social consciousness. It implies 
 a heightening both of the individual's consciousness of him- 
 self and of his consciousness of others. As all consciousness 
 exists to mediate activity such a state of consciousness evi- 
 dently functions especially to mediate complex types of 
 social activity. Under such conditions, the activities of 
 the members of a group can be coordinated more accurately 
 than under conditions of lower consciousness. 
 
 Social consciousness in this sense evidently marks mainly 
 very complex stages of social evolution. It characterizes 
 chiefly recent social developments in modern civilized so- 
 cieties. It would seem as though the most highly evolved 
 societies of the present are moving rapidly toward a con- 
 dition of social self -consciousness in which conscious efforts 
 will be made by the individuals comprising the social 
 group to control their whole collective life-process. Such 
 a state of social self-consciousness should make possible a 
 better collective adaptation of all members of modern so- 
 cieties to the conditions of social existence. Sociology it- 
 self may be regarded as but one manifestation of this 
 increasing social self-consciousness. All the efforts of gov- 
 ernmental bureaus in gathering reports of crops, of me- 
 teorological conditions, of social and economic conditions 
 in this and other countries are, of course, but manifesta- 
 tions of this tendency to bring all phases of the social life 
 under conscious control. 
 
 One cannot doubt that the growth of social conscious- 
 ness in this sense is perhaps the most significant develop- 
 ment in modern history, since it expresses the tendency to 
 bring all phases of our collective life under conscious con- 
 trol. Hitherto mind has seemingly occupied itself more in 
 securing individual adjustment than in securing the adjust- 
 ment of large groups to the requirements of their existence. 
 As has already been pointed out, consciousness itself is 
 becoming more completely socialized by becoming more 
 
 333 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 completely enlisted in the work of social adaptation. In 
 this sense all modern society seems to be moving toward a 
 stage of collectivism or socialism, involving not so much 
 the public ownership of the means of producing material 
 goods as the socialization of individual consciousness, mak- 
 ing it primarily an instrument for the carrying on of 
 the social life-process rather than an individual life- 
 process. 1 There are not wanting, of course, skeptics who 
 tell us that such a socialization of individual consciousness 
 is impossible and others who tell us that if achieved it 
 could only result in social awkwardness rather than in real 
 efficient control over the collective life-process. Be this 
 as it may, we have only to note as scientific students of 
 society the increasing growth of social self-consciousness, 
 that is, the increasing socialization of individual conscious- 
 ness, and that all this increase of social consciousness func- 
 tions toward the bringing about of more complex, more 
 exact and more efficient coordinations between individuals 
 and between groups and their environment. 
 
 Public Opinion. — Highly dynamic societies control social 
 activities by what is known as public opinion. Public opin- 
 ion is not found to any extent in savage and barbarous 
 societies, because social tradition takes its place. By pub- 
 lic opinion we mean a more or less rational collective judg- 
 ment formed by the action and reaction of many individual 
 opinions upon one another. Such collective opinion func- 
 tions in the lift of the group, as has already been pointed 
 out, quite as individual opinion functions in individual life. 
 Just as the individual has to form more or less rational 
 opinions or judgments in order to build up a new activity 
 
 i Cf. Mr. H. G. Wells's definition or description of his own social- 
 ism (First and Last Things, p. 132) : " Socialism is to me no more 
 and no less than the awakening of a. collective consciousness in 
 humanity, a collective will and a collective mind " — a conception 
 of socialism which, however, would scarcely satisfy the party which 
 has appropriated the name. 
 
 334 
 
SOCIAL MIND AND SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 or habit, so masses of men usually have also to come to some 
 collective conscious opinion before some practical course 
 of social activity is entered upon. Otherwise social activ- 
 ities can scarcely be mediated by consciousness. 
 
 Professor Cooley, in his book on Social Organization, has 
 rightly emphasized that public opinion implies, not so much 
 that general agreement has been reached, as that there is a 
 certain coordination and organization of individual opin- 
 ions. Public opinion implies, therefore, no absolute agree- 
 ment or uniformity, but rather organization of the opinions 
 and judgments of individuals. Therefore, public opinion 
 need not represent, as has so often been claimed by soci- 
 ologists and social psychologists, the judgment acquiesced 
 in by the lowest member of the group making the opinion, 
 but it may well represent the matured opinion of leaders 
 and specialists after these have reacted with their public. 
 Inasmuch as public opinion functions to coordinate activ- 
 ity, no absolute uniformity is needed in order to secure 
 such a coordination of activity, but rather a harmonious 
 trend among the various elements which make up public 
 opinion. Professor Cooley cites as an instance the state of 
 opinion in the United States regarding slavery at the out- 
 break of the Civil War. He says " no general agreement 
 had been reached; but the popular mind became or- 
 ganized with reference to the matter until a certain ripe- 
 ness regarding it had been reached." 1 This conception of 
 public opinion as " an organization of separate individual 
 judgments, a cooperative product of communication and 
 reciprocal influence," functioning itself to bring about 
 some new social coordination, is unquestionably the con- 
 ception which is in harmony with the whole psychology 
 of the social life which has thus far been set forth in this 
 book. 
 
 The Development of Public Opinion. — So much has been 
 written upon publ ic opinion, its growth, its development 
 i Op. cit., Chap. XII, p. 401. 
 
 335 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 and guidance that the only excuse for saying anything 
 further regarding the matter is to bring our conception 
 upon this important topic into harmony with what has 
 already been said regarding the psychical life of sociely. 
 It is evident that the growth of public opinion as an im- 
 portant factor or instrument in the social life depends 
 quite entirely upon the freedom of intercommunication, of 
 instimulation and response, which we have already dis- 
 cussed in Chapter VIII under the head of " the psychical 
 mechanism of social change." "Without free speech, free 
 public criticism, a free press and free discussion, the high- 
 est development of public opinion is impossible, since pub- 
 lic opinion is formed by the action and reaction of many 
 separate private judgments. Professor Giddings is right 
 in claiming that the highest type of public opinion, that 
 is, rational public opinion, depends for its development 
 upon the right of free discussion, free speech, freedom 
 of assemblage and the like. He perhaps goes too far, how- 
 ever, in saying that in those countries where free discussion, 
 free speech and freedom of assemblage are interdicted 
 there can be no true public opinion. 1 It is true that under 
 such conditions public opinion can never reach its highest 
 and fullest development; but often in countries where the 
 censorship of the press is very rigorous and where free 
 assemblage is interdicted there are socially many means 
 of intercommunication between individuals. Indeed, inter- 
 communication can go on, although in no very rational 
 form, upon the level of mere suggestion. It is probable, 
 therefore, that even in countries where the mechanism of 
 free intercommunication is interdicted there may still 
 form a true public opinion though it may not be of the 
 highest rationality. 2 This we seemingly see both in France 
 before the Revolution and in Russia. In such cases, how- 
 
 i Principles of Sociology, p. 138. 
 
 2 Professor Cooley says (op. cit., p. 109) : "Even in prison there 
 is public opinion among the inmates." 
 
 336 
 
SOCIAL MIND AND SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 ever, public opinion is of a very low order of rationality 
 and is powerless to effect social changes. The results of 
 such interference in the conscious mechanism of social 
 change have already been fully discussed in the theory of 
 revolutions. The free functioning of public opinion in 
 societies is on the whole a safeguard against violent and 
 revolutionary social changes since it always represents the 
 coordination of many separate individual judgments and, 
 therefore, the more or less rational attempt to control col- 
 lective action. We may conclude then that anything that 
 interferes with the means of intercommunication interferes 
 with the proper development of public opinion and so ulti- 
 mately interferes with the wholesome and rational growth 
 of social life itself. 
 
 The Social Function of Public Opinion. — We have 
 already said that the social function of public opinion is 
 to mediate in the transition from one type of social activity 
 to another. It is a selective process which has to do with 
 the building up of new coordinations in society. This is, 
 of course, equivalent to saying that public opinion is a 
 very important means of adjustment in the higher forms 
 of social life. Upon public opinion in the later stages of 
 development, therefore, come to rest custom, law and many 
 other social institutions. It is a mistake, of course, to trace 
 laws, customs and folkways back to the public opinion of 
 primitive groups, because, as has already been pointed out, 
 laws, customs and folkways very often get their original 
 start from certain instinctive reactions or accidental ad- 
 justments on the part of groups; but in the later stages 
 of social development, especially in free societies, public 
 opinion modifies profoundly all customs, laws and institu- 
 tions. In these later stages of social development, there- 
 fore, the social order comes to rest more or less upon public 
 opinion and may be, indeed very often is, the creation of 
 public opinion in the sense that public opinion has been 
 the decisive element which has brought about certain types 
 
 337 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 of social activity and relationship. The tendency in free 
 societies is undoubtedly to bring custom, laws and all in- 
 stitutional forms under the control of public opinion. 1 In 
 such societies public opinion may be regarded as the chief 
 instrument of social control, inasmuch, as in such societies 
 government very largely rests upon public opinion. Just 
 what rank shall be given to public opinion as a means of 
 social control is, however, a subordinate question. The 
 more important fact to note is that public opinion is play- 
 ing an increasing part in all social regulation and control. 
 It seems capable, indeed, of accomplishing things which 
 government and law are quite ineffective in accomplishing. 
 For example, rational marriages in society can probably 
 never be brought about effectively through legislation or 
 governmental regulation, but a powerful public opinion 
 regarding the conditions under which marriage should take 
 place, backed by a public sentiment which is shared by 
 practically all, many believe, with good reason, could secure 
 the rational regulation, and so the socialization, of the in- 
 stitution of marriage. The bringing of a larger and larger 
 number of matters in our social life under the control of 
 public opinion is, therefore, to be welcomed, if it is pos- 
 sible to have such free discussion that the more rational 
 judgments of men shall come to find expression in public 
 opinion. Many of the most important problems before so- 
 ciety apparently await their solution through the develop- 
 ment of a rational public opinion. Not only the marriage 
 problem, but in the United States the temperance problem, 
 the negro problem, the immigration problem and many 
 others must be solved, if solved at all, by intelligent public 
 opinion. 
 
 A word only need be said upon the guidance and means 
 of formation of public opinion, a topic upon which much 
 has been written. If public opinion plays such an im- 
 
 i Cf. Cooley, op. tit., Chap. XI. 
 338 
 
SOCIAL MIND AND SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 portant part in the adjustments of modern societies, then, 
 the social importance of the guidance and means of forma- 
 tion of public opinion is manifest. Increasingly, in the 
 large complex social groups of the modern world the guid- 
 ance and formation of public opinion is a function of the 
 press. The pulpit, the lecture platform, and the popular 
 assembly seem to be playing a less and less important part 
 in the formation of public opinion. To the press, including 
 in that term not only newspapers but books and magazines, 
 belongs the preponderant part in the guidance and forma- 
 tion of public opinion. Yet it is notorious that the press 
 to-day is very ' largely upon a commercial basis, and is 
 frequently managed to serve individual ends rather than 
 to meet social needs. If we are to leave the control and 
 regulation of much in society to public opinion, it is evi- 
 dent that society must devise some way in which the press 
 shall itself be socially controlled — a system of censorship 
 or control over the press which shall allow for social de- 
 velopment, and yet keep entirely within the limits of social 
 advantage. This is one of the most important concrete 
 problems of present social life and one toward the solution 
 of which as yet few steps have been taken. 
 
 The Popular Will. — Social judgment as reached in col- 
 lective opinion must issue in collective action, just as indi- 
 vidual judgment issues in individual action. "We give the 
 name popular will, or social will, to those decisions which 
 have been reached through public discussion and the for- 
 mation of a public opinion. As has already been said, the 
 popular will is simply the coordination of the activities of 
 the group in a given direction. Like social consciousness 
 and public opinion, the popular will represents, therefore, 
 an organization and coordination of many activities of a 
 group so that they issue in securing a unified result. The 
 whole process of a group carrying on a collective life is, of 
 course, a process of will or activity. Just how far such 
 activities are mediated by social self-consciousness and 
 23 339 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 public opinion depends upon the stage of social evolution. 
 It is apparently only in the higher groups that definite 
 social choice and decision become very conspicuous. While 
 group will has been an inseparable concomitant of group 
 life from the beginning, yet the popular will of recent times 
 is so much more a conscious matter that it seems a relatively 
 new thing, and in a certain sense group action that is defi- 
 nitely mediated and controlled by social self-consciousness 
 and public opinion is a different affair from the social 
 action which is mediated by instinct, custom or tradition. 
 Popular will in this higher sense of deliberate social choice, 
 like social self-consciousness and public opinion, must be 
 regarded as a relatively late product of social development. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 THE FORMS OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 We have repeatedly spoken throughout this text of the 
 forms of association. There remain certain things which 
 must be said in order to clear up this phrase and the nu- 
 merous references which we have made in connection with 
 it. First of all, of course, comes the question, What do we 
 mean by forms of association? 
 
 What is a Form of Association? — A form of association 
 is simply a type of coordination or eoadaptation between 
 individuals. It is the form of relationship to one 
 another which individuals take on in carrying on some 
 phase of a common life. As has already been said, it is 
 largely to be accredited to Professor Simmel that more at- 
 tention has recently been paid to this important phase of 
 the social life. 1 Simmel, however, maintains, as we have 
 already seen, that the form of association must be studied 
 as an abstract or empty form by itself, and that such study 
 alone constitutes sociology. Without denying that valuable 
 results of a certain order might be secured from this sort 
 of social geometry, as Simmel himself calls it, it must be 
 evident that there are grave limitations to the value of such 
 study for understanding the collective life of man. Socie- 
 ties are living unities. Their abstract or empty forms can- 
 not be studied by themselves with any great profit any 
 more than the abstract forms of plants and animals can be. 
 
 1 See his Soziologie : TJniersuchungen uber die Formen der Ver- 
 gesellschaftung. The major part of this work appeared as articles 
 in the American Journal of Sociology (Vols. II-XVI), and so is 
 accessible to the English reader. 
 
 341 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 Just as the biologist finds himself forced to take account of 
 the whole life-process at every moment in accounting for 
 any given organic form, so the sociologist will find himself 
 forced to take account of the whole social life-process in 
 accounting for any social form. The forms in which indi- 
 viduals associate or by which they are held together in 
 groups (Vergesellschaftung) , considered as empty forms, 
 can yield no very valuable knowledge of the social life-proc- 
 ess, unless the psychic factors of instinct, feeling and in- 
 telligence, which give rise to these forms, are studied in 
 connection with them. A geometry of the forms of plants, 
 for example, would tell us little about the processes of 
 plant life. So a geometry of the forms of association will 
 tell us little about the processes of social life. What is 
 needed is, of course, a study of the psychology of these 
 forms of association or types of coadaptation among indi- 
 viduals. Professor Simmel himself, indeed, while profes- 
 sing to treat simply of the forms of association as such, goes 
 very largely into the psychology of these forms, and this 
 is by far the most valuable part of his contribution to 
 sociology. 1 
 
 It follows from what has been said that the mere empty 
 form, we might almost say the geometric form, of social 
 groups is not alone to be considered, but also all the ele- 
 ments at any given moment which make forms of associa- 
 tion in any way peculiar in themselves. Forms of associa- 
 tion are, therefore, synonymous with forms of group life. 
 They include not only such empty forms as superiority and 
 subordination, equality, hierarchy and the like, but many 
 concrete groups which must be classed as i distinct types of 
 coadaptation between individuals. 
 
 The Practical Importance of Forms of Association. — 
 As Simmel and many other sociologists have emphasized, 
 the way in which people are associated together is fre- 
 
 i Cf. the writer's review of Professor Simmel's Soziologie in the 
 Economic Bulletin for March, 1910. 
 
 342 
 
THE FORMS OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 quently very influential in determining their behavior. 1 
 Human nature is such a complex affair that the reactions 
 which may be called forth in any one individual will vary 
 indefinitely according to the way in which he happens to be 
 associated with other individuals. Many a person, for ex- 
 ample, who is a model member of society in a subordinate 
 position may become an altogether dangerous individual in 
 a position of superiority or authority. The reactions be- 
 tween the same individuals when they associate upon a 
 basis of equality may be very different from when they 
 associate, say, as masters and slaves. More and more stu- 
 dents of society are discovering that what the forms of 
 association are is a very important matter in human social 
 life. 2 One of the practical tasks of sociology must undoubt- 
 edly be to discover those forms of association which are 
 most likely to call forth the highest and best development 
 
 1 Cf. Ross, Foundations of Sociology, pp. 116f. 
 
 2 It is these facts which have led some sociological writers to 
 claim that social phenomena are distinct from organic and mental 
 phenomena, and that sociology is absolutely distinct from biology 
 and psychology ( the distinction being not one of problems, but of an 
 entirely different order of phenomena). This seems to be the posi- 
 tion of Professor Hobhouse in, his recent work, Social Evolution and 
 Political Theory (pp. 30-4), a book which Las come into my hands 
 too late to be of any assistance in phrasing my own theories, but 
 which I find to be in general remarkably in harmony with them. 
 However, the importance of social organization, or of forms of 
 association (which I fully concede) does not absolutely separate 
 sociology from biology and psychology; for the only principles of 
 explanation which sociology can invoke must be found in the facts 
 and principles of the two antecedent sciences. Thus while the same 
 persons will behave very differently under monogamy or polygamy, 
 slavery or freedom, the explanation of their behavior is to be found 
 in every case in the complex biological and psychological make-up of 
 the individuals concerned, who respond in different ways to different 
 stimuli. Thus theoretical sociology remains, as we said in the earlier 
 chapters, the biology and psychology of the associational process, 
 the study of the forms of association as such remaining a purely 
 " formal " discipline. 
 
 343 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 of individual personality. The whole history of human 
 progress is to some extent the history of trying different 
 forms of association, because the taking on of one form of 
 institution and the sloughing off of another is just this proc- 
 ess, looked at from one point of view, of testing forms of 
 association. 
 
 Besides the practical value of understanding the forms 
 of association, there is also, it is needless to point out, a 
 large theoretical value in the study of such forms. If the 
 study of several typical or normal forms of association, or 
 types of coadaptation between individuals, is thorough 
 enough, undoubtedly such study will reveal many of the 
 principal laws of human association. As the author has 
 elsewhere attempted to demonstrate, " any form of associa- 
 tion, or social group, which may be studied, if studied from 
 the point of view of origin and development, whether it be 
 a family, a neighborhood group, a city, a state, a trade 
 union, or a party, will serve to reveal many of the problems 
 of sociology . . . and to illustrate concretely the laws 
 and principles of social development. " 1 To be sure, one 
 could not learn thoroughly the processes of plant life by 
 studying intensively just two or three typical plant forms, 
 neither could one learn thoroughly the processes of the 
 social life by studying intensively two or three typical forms 
 of association. Nevertheless, one could scarcely understand 
 the processes of plant life without some such intensive 
 study ; nor can one understand the social life without inten- 
 sive study of concrete forms of association, for the study of 
 large social masses is attended with" many difficulties which 
 can only be overcome by constant reference to simpler 
 units. It is for this reason that many of the illustrations 
 which we have used have been drawn from the family life. 
 The family group, it may be added, because it is biological 
 as well as psychological in its nature, and because it enlists 
 
 i Sociology and Modern Social Problems, p. 9, 
 3-14 
 
THE FORMS OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 so many of the original tendencies and capacities of the 
 individual, is in many ways especially fitted to illustrate 
 the psychological principles which underlie human asso- 
 ciation. 
 
 The Classification of the Forms of Association. — The clas- 
 sification of the forms of association has been attempted 
 by a number of sociologists. No very great success, 
 it must be confessed, has accompanied these attempts, 
 because it is manifest that the types of coordination 
 between individuals are as complex as human nature itself. 
 Indeed, if our hypothesis of the expanding character of 
 the social life-process is correct, we should scarcely expect 
 that any exhaustive classification of the forms of association 
 could be made. Only certain main lines of classification 
 can be suggested. 
 
 First of all, in attempting a classification of the forms 
 of association we come upon the distinction between the 
 sanctioned and the unsanctioned forms. The sanctioned 
 forms are types of relationship between individuals which 
 have been reflected upon by the mass of the group, in which 
 they occur, and agreed to. These sanctioned forms are, 
 then, as we have already said, synonymous with human in- 
 stitutions, because social sanctions can arise only after self- 
 consciousness has appeared. They are not found in the 
 social groups below man. The tendency is manifest in all 
 advanced stages of social evolution to institutionalize all 
 forms of association. Nevertheless, in even the most ad- 
 vanced groups which we know there are many unsanctioned 
 forms or groups. These are the spontaneous, unreflective 
 types of relationship between individuals. They especially 
 characterize animal societies and the lower human groups, 
 but in the form of the gang, the mob, factions, amusements, 
 and conflicts they characterize also the most advanced 
 human groups. It is, of course, frequently very difficult 
 to decide whether any particular form of association be- 
 longs to the sanctioned or unsanctioned class. There might, 
 
 345 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 for example, be some difference of opinion as to whether the 
 saloon and the brothel were institutions in western civiliza- 
 tion or not. 
 
 Cooley's Classification of the Forms of Association. — 
 Professor Cooley suggests a classification of the forms of 
 association into primary and secondary forms. The pri- 
 mary forms are those which are ' ' characterized by intimate 
 face to face association and cooperation," such as, for ex- 
 ample, the family, the play groups of children, and neigh- 
 borhood or community groups. 1 Beside these primary 
 forms of association, there would be numerous secondary 
 and more complex forms, characterized by cooperation, but 
 not necessarily by face to face association. There is cer- 
 tainly very considerable difference, as Giddings has also in- 
 sisted, between forms of association which involve presence 
 and those which do not involve presence. 2 The stimulus 
 of personal presence, it has been abundantly shown, pro- 
 duces very different types of reaction from what are found 
 in those forms of association where there is not personal 
 presence. As Professor Cooley shows, the forms of associa- 
 tion which involve personal presence illustrate much more 
 fully the psychological principles which lie at the basis 
 of our social life than those forms of association which do 
 not involve personal presence. 3 It is possible, therefore, 
 that a very satisfactory classification of the forms of asso- 
 ciation might be worked out upon the basis of how far they 
 involve personal presence. 
 
 Boss's Classification. — Professor Ross has also suggested 
 a very incomplete classification of the forms of association 
 upon the basis of the amount of control and deliberation 
 involved in social action. 1 He finds the lowest of all the 
 forms of association to be the crowd, especially the excited 
 
 i Social Organization, Chap. III. 
 2 Principles of Sociology, pp. 376 f. 
 s Op. cit., Chaps. IV and V. 
 * Foundations, Chap. VI. 
 346 
 
THE FORMS OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 crowd, or mob. The public, or dispersed crowd, differs very 
 much from the real crowd, because it does not involve the 
 association of personal presence, and because it gives more 
 opportunity for reflection and deliberation, though still 
 comparatively unorganized. The mass meeting is, after the 
 crowd, the next lowest form of association which involves 
 personal presence, and shows slight organization, having a 
 chairman who is- supposed to exercise more or less control; 
 then comes the deliberative assembly with a still higher 
 organization, then the representative body, then many asso- 
 ciations which do not involve personal presence and which 
 are higher than the public, such as sects and parties. Fi- 
 nally come corporations, industrial and cultural, including 
 fraternal orders, trade unions, religious orders, and the 
 state. The corporation Professor Ross evidently regards as 
 the highest form of association from the standpoint of or- 
 ganization, though he would restrain the power of the cor- 
 porations by many free associations of lower degrees of 
 social organization, because the oyerorganization which the 
 corporation represents, whether it be the state, the church, 
 the trade union or the business corporation is apt to en- 
 croach too much upon the individuality of its members, 
 reducing men to ciphers. 1 
 
 "While Professor Ross's classification of the forms of as- 
 sociation is evidently very incomplete, and is probably 
 intended as scarcely more than a suggestion, there is in it 
 a possible basis for the making of a more complete scheme 
 of classification. Such a classification would depend upon 
 the degree of control exercised by the form of association 
 over its members, the amount of association of personal 
 presence involved being a secondary consideration. 
 
 Giddings's Classification. — Professor Giddings has sug- 
 gested several other classifications of the forms of associa- 
 
 i " The cause of right," Professor Ross rightly says, " is bound 
 up with the triumph of free associations giving play to the con- 
 science and the judgment of each individual" {op. tit., p. 146). 
 
 347 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 tion. First of all, he would divide all societies into " com- 
 ponent societies ' ' and ' ' constituent societies. ' ' * Compo- 
 nent societies are natural genetic groups composed of both 
 ssxes and all ages, such as families, villages, communities 
 and tribes. Constituent societies on the other hand are 
 associations organized for carrying on a particular activity 
 or for achieving some special end. They are usually made 
 up of members of the same sex and approximately of the 
 same age. They are definite, purposeful forms of associa- 
 tion found only within the limits of human society, so far 
 as we know. Professor Giddings classifies component so- 
 cieties beyond the family group, which is the simplest 
 genetic group, into ethnical societies (which include hordes, 
 tribes and federations) and demotic societies, or the genetic 
 groups of civilized peoples (such as neighborhoods, ham- 
 lets, villages, parishes, towns, communes, cities, counties, 
 provinces, commonwealths and federal nations). The chief 
 forms of constituent societies he finds to be the household, 
 the clan, the state and the numerous voluntary associations 
 within the state, such as political parties, industrial corpo- 
 rations, trade unions, and cultural associations, whether for 
 religious, philanthropic, scientific, educational, ethical or 
 pleasurable purposes. 
 
 This classification of concrete social groups by Professor 
 Giddings is based upon a principle which has often been 
 mentioned in sociological writings, namely, that there are 
 two great types of association, first natural genetic groups 
 whose members are linked together more or less by bonds 
 of physical heredity and the natural physical environment; 
 secondly, artificial, purposive groups whose members are 
 bound together upon the basis of some more or less definite, 
 conscious purpose, and whose association is more or less 
 definitely determined by this conscious purpose. Tonnies 
 has called the first type of association " community " 
 (Gerneinschaft) , while the seco nd type he calls " society " 
 i Elements of Sociology, Chaps. XVII, XVIII. 
 348 
 
THE FORMS OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 (Gesellschaft) } As we have already seen, Professor Bald- 
 win, in a somewhat similar spirit, would limit true societies 
 to those forms of association in which there were definite 
 conscious relations maintained for some definite, conscious 
 end. 2 "While we cannot accept the implication of Tonnies and 
 Baldwin that natural genetic groups are not true societies, 
 it is manifest that such groups differ in their principle of 
 organization from the artificial, functional groups which 
 exist to conserve well-defined ends in the social life. It may 
 be convenient, therefore, to base a classification of the forms 
 of association upon this distinction. While the distinction 
 is a vicious one, if it is made the basis for excluding from 
 sociology the consideration of natural genetic groups, yet, 
 on the other hand, it is a very useful distinction in classify- 
 ing the forms of association. 
 
 In the opinion of the wrijter, the natural genetic groups 
 which Professor Giddings Calls component societies should 
 be regarded as fundamental in attempting any interpreta- 
 tion of collective human life, while the artificial, functional 
 groups, or constituent societies should be regarded as super- 
 added to the natural genetic forms of association through 
 the influence of the intellectual elements which we have 
 already spoken of in the chapter on the " Origin of So- 
 ciety." These artificial, functional forms of association 
 then become in part the distinguishing marks of human 
 societies; and the extent to which they modify natural ge- 
 netic groups, may well be made a basis for classifying 
 human societies according to their stage of development or 
 civilization. 3 
 
 In some of his later writings Professor Giddings has pro- 
 
 i See his work, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. 
 
 2 Social and Ethical Interpretations, p. 503. 
 
 3 Cornejo in his recent work (Sociologie Gine'rale) divides soci- 
 eties (Vol. I, p. 204) into "simple or domestic, formed by genera- 
 tion" and "composite or political, formed by integration." The 
 distinction is in effect the same as that just discussed. 
 
 349 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 posed a second classification of societies which is more upon 
 a psychological basis. He would divide all societies into 
 Instinctive and Rational societies, the Instinctive being lim- 
 ited to the bands, swarms, flocks and herds of animals, the 
 Rational to human groups, since there is no human com- 
 munity in which instinctive response is not complicated by 
 some degree of rational comprehension of the utility of asso- 
 ciation. 1 Human, or Rational, societies Professor Giddings 
 would subdivide into eight distinct types, as follows: (1) 
 the Sympathetic type of society in which the chief social 
 bond is sympathy and which is exemplified by a homoge- 
 neous community of blood relatives; (2) the Congenial type 
 of society in which the social bond is similarity of nature 
 and agreement in ideas, as illustrated by the ' ' Mayflower ' ' 
 band; (3) the Approbational type of society in which the 
 social bond is a general approbation of qualities and con- 
 duct, as illustrated by the frontier settlement; (4) the 
 Despotic type of society in which the social bonds are des- 
 potic power and a fear-inspired obedience; (5) the Authori- 
 tative type of society in which reverence for authority is 
 the social bond; (6) the Conspirital type in which intrigue 
 and conspiracy are the social bonds; (7) the Contractual 
 social type in which the social bond is a covenant or con- 
 tract, as illustrated by the Achean League; (8) the Ideal- 
 istic social type in which mutual understanding, confidence, 
 fidelity and an altruistic spirit form the social bonds. Pro- 
 fessor Giddings adds that to a certain extent these different 
 types of society or forms of association overlap and that 
 the higher types may and usually do include examples of 
 the lower types among their component groups. 
 
 Certain Other Classifications of the forms or stages of 
 human assooiation may be suggested. For example, human 
 societies may well be classified according to the basis of 
 social control in given groups. The lowest form of control 
 is undoubtedly the instinctive control which rests ultimately 
 
 i See Historical and Descriptive Sociology, Chap. HI. 
 350 
 
THE FORMS OF ASSOCIATION 
 
 upon selective processes. This is after all a very imperfect 
 instrument of securing the highest type of adaptation in 
 human societies. Societies which are wholly upon the basis 
 of instinctive control are all below the human level. The 
 next form of control is habitual control, or the control of 
 custom and tradition, which we see in very primitive human 
 groups. A third form of control is the control by despotic 
 government which characterizes the social life of barbarism 
 and lower civilization. Finally the highest type of social 
 control is that secured through such education of the indi- 
 vidual as will give him habits and ideals which will adapt 
 him to relatively free forms of association, and yet meet the 
 requirements of social existence. This last type of associa- 
 tion is evidently a form of association into which human 
 societies are only beginning to enter. 
 
 Summary. — The forms of association are expressions of 
 the mental attitude of the individuals in a group toward 
 one another. They are, therefore, types of coordination or 
 coadaptation between individuals. They are of not less im- 
 portance than individual character, accordingly, in deter- 
 mining the general type of social life. Social evolution is 
 essentially an evolution of the forms of association, and 
 hence social progress is a development of higher forms of 
 association, that is, higher types of adaptation between in- 
 dividuals. The classification of forms of association, while 
 an important matter for sociology, is not of such importance 
 as some sociologists have thought, since, on account of the 
 complexity of human nature and society and also on ac- 
 count of the expansive character of social life, an exhaustive 
 classification of the forms of association is impossible. Only 
 general types can be made out. Such classifications are es- 
 sentially classifications of the mental attitude of individuals 
 toward one another and may proceed upon many different 
 bases. The classifications already made by Simmel, Ross, 
 Giddings and other sociologists while helpful are by no 
 means final. 
 
 351 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
 THE THEORY OF SOCIAL ORDEK 
 
 The Problem of Social Order. — As we have already indi- 
 cated, social order is a term not strictly synonymous with 
 social organization. Social organization refers to any con- 
 dition or relation of the elements of a social group, but by 
 social order we mean a settled and harmonious relation 
 between individuals or the parts of a society. The theory 
 of social order is, then, something more than the theory of 
 social organization. The question arises, how do the rela- 
 tionships between individuals become settled and harmoni- 
 ous? The problem of the social order is, in other words, 
 the problem of harmonious coordination or adaptation 
 among the individuals of a group. Such a problem, it is 
 manifest, is more than a problem in pure science. It is a 
 practical problem as well. The theory of social order has 
 a practical and ethical outlook, in other words, in addition 
 to its purely theoretical aspects. It is at this point that 
 sociology and ethics touch perhaps most closely, although 
 in the theory of social progress, as we shall see, ethical 
 questions also become prominent. 
 
 Social Order and Social Organization. — It is evident that 
 the factors or forces which shape social organization must 
 enter more or less into this problem of the determination of 
 the conditions which make for settled and harmonious rela- 
 tionships among individuals. The whole problem of social 
 order has been indeed continually discussed in the preced- 
 ing pages in elaborating our theory of the organization 
 and evolution of society. Social order in any group, for 
 
 352 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL ORDER 
 
 example, must rest more or less upon human instincts. Har- 
 monious coordinations between individuals are, as we have 
 already seen, more or less mediated by certain native tend- 
 encies of individual human nature, such as the sexual and 
 parental instincts, the gregarious instinct, sympathy and 
 imitation. Moreover, the acquired habits of social groups, 
 whether we call them customs, traditions, usages or folk- 
 ways, also make, as we have seen, for settled and harmonious 
 relationships between individuals. 1 We may say roughly, 
 then, that in lower types of social life social order is almost 
 entirely an outcome of the working of similar instincts and 
 habits in the individuals of a group. In animal groups, 
 order must be almost entirely an outcome of instinct plus 
 more or less intelligently acquired habits. But in all human 
 groups except the very lowest we begin to find evidence of 
 another factor working for social order, namely, conscious 
 means of social control, or regulative institutions. This 
 third factor is, of course, not to be distinguished sharply 
 from the second. The only intention is to emphasize 
 the rise in human society, at a point beginning somewhere 
 in the later stages of savagery, of conscious and deliberate 
 means of coercing the individual. These means are the so- 
 
 i See James's oft-quoted tribute to habit as a conservative factor 
 in society {Principles, Vol. I, p. 121) : "Habit is thus' the enormous 
 flywheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone 
 is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the 
 children of fortune from the envious uprising of the poor. It alone 
 prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being 
 deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisher- 
 man and the deckhand at sea through the winter; it holds the 
 miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log-cabin and 
 to his lonely farm through all the months of snow; it protects us 
 from invasion by natives of the desert and the frozen zone. It 
 dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our 
 nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a, pursuit 
 that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted, and 
 it is too late to begin again. It keeps the different social strata 
 from mixing." 
 
 353 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 called regulative institutions of human society. A natural 
 or spontaneous social order is, to be sure, furnished by 
 instinct, sympathy, custom and tradition; but social order 
 in all very complex human groups, and especially in the 
 great civilized societies of the present, is achieved by many 
 other than these natural means. 
 
 Social Order and Social Control. — Professor Ross in his 
 work on Social Control has presented in an admirable 
 manner the many devices which modern societies employ to 
 control the conduct of individuals. We shall not attempt 
 in this chapter to cover the field which he has worked over 
 so thoroughly, but only to point out certain supplementary 
 conclusions which stand out clearly as corollaries of the 
 psychological theory of the social life which has been pre- 
 sented. The growing complexity of social life as social evo- 
 lution advances calls for increasing means of control over 
 individual character and conduct if conflict between indi- 
 viduals and between classes is to be avoided and settled and 
 harmonious social relationships achieved. Less and less, 
 therefore, are the instincts and other natural tendencies of 
 human nature to be relied upon in securing order in large 
 and complex social groups. More and more certain regu- 
 lative institutions are needed to secure a high condition of 
 social order. One of the great practical problems which has 
 confronted human societies, therefore, almost from their 
 beginning, has been the development of such regulative in- 
 stitutions. 
 
 The problem of social order becomes in human groups, 
 therefore, very largely a problem of effective means of social 
 control over the individual. All social organization, as we- 
 have pointed out, is necessarily more or less compulsory in 
 character. Just how the compulsion shall be applied to get 
 the individual to conform his habits and ways of thinking 
 to those of his group is a practical problem the answer to 
 which historically has varied all the way from the most 
 brutal means of despoti2 government to the most subtle con- 
 
 354 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL ORDER 
 
 trol through suggestion and education. The chief regula- 
 tive institutions which have been employed are, of course, 
 government, law, religion, morality and education. All of 
 these institutions, because they are concerned chiefly with 
 social control, that is, with the problem of social order, have 
 tended at times to become static and thus to become impedi- 
 ments to social progress. A further practical problem has 
 arisen, therefore, in connection with these regulative insti- 
 tutions ; and that is to work out means of control which will 
 be efficient and still in harmony with social development. 
 Let us note very briefly the function of each of these great 
 regulative institutions in securing and maintaining social 
 order. 
 
 Government and Law as Means of Social Control. — 
 Government and law are perhaps the oldest of the agencies 
 consciously employed to secure social control. Government 
 may be, indeed, regarded as the chief regulative institution 
 of human society in that government as an agency to en- 
 force law must be the last resort in controlling individual 
 conduct in any group. While government probably began 
 chiefly as a means of control in time of war, more and more 
 government has tended to absorb to some degree at least 
 all the other regulative institutions of society. Government 
 and law have at any rate become the chief means of social 
 regulation in modern societies and some would have them 
 absorb and direct all social activities. While such an exten- 
 sion of the functions of government must be regarded as 
 unsound in theory and unwarranted in practice, yet there 
 can be no doubt that inasmuch as the purpose of govern- 
 ment is to regulate, its functions are " coextensive with 
 human interests. ' ' There can also be no doubt that one of 
 the great practical problems of modern politics is how to 
 make government more effective as a regulating agency. 
 The problem of government is evidently still not worked 
 out. Modern governments can scarcely be said to be 
 adapted to their work of maintaining a high degree of social 
 24 355 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 order in our complex industrial civilization. Here come 
 in, of course, most of the practical problems of modern 
 politics. 
 
 It should be needless to remark that our whole view of 
 the social life leads to the conclusion that government and 
 law instead of being less needed in the future will be more 
 needed. The regulative functions of government instead 
 of being contracted to a narrow sphere must, as has just 
 been said, be expanded to include practically all human in- 
 terests. There is, therefore, no good foundation for the 
 belief which was current during the first part of the Nine- 
 teenth Century that government would be less and less 
 needed as social evolution advances ; and it follows that the 
 social ideal of no government, or the anarchistic ideal, is 
 based upon an utter misconception of the nature of human 
 social life. 
 
 Nevertheless, it must be admitted that government and 
 law are by themselves relatively inadequate means of social 
 control in very complex societies. The control which gov- 
 ernment and law exert must necessarily be over gross ex- 
 ternal acts. Such control does not go deep enough to secure 
 the highest type of social order, or indeed any type which 
 is adequate for modern social life. The social control which 
 government and law represents, therefore, is relatively 
 crude and primitive compared to the control which may be 
 secured through other means. Hence, government and law, 
 we may safely conclude, are an inadequate means of social 
 control except as they support religion, morality and edu- 
 cation. 
 
 Religion as a Means of Social Control. — Religion, like 
 government, is one of the oldest means of control in human 
 societies, though it was perhaps not used consciously as a 
 method of control over the individual until government had 
 been in some degree developed. The religious sanction for 
 conduct, being a supernatural sanction, all human experi- 
 ence shows, has been one of the most effective means of con- 
 
 356 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL ORDER 
 
 trolling the conduct of normal individuals. The desire to 
 come into right relations with a deity, who represents in the 
 earlier stages of development the authority of the ruler, 
 and in the later stages of development the ideal of personal 
 character, has been an effective means of preventing too wide 
 a variation in conduct in individuals. This fact has so im- 
 pressed practically all students of social history that most 
 would agree with Ward in declaring religion to be " the 
 force of social gravitation that holds the social world in its 
 orbit." 1 There can at least be no question that in the later 
 stages of religious development when religion powerfully 
 reenforces social idealism it is a most effective means of 
 bringing about and maintaining harmonious coordinations 
 between individuals. Christianity with its belief in the 
 divine fatherhood and in universal human brotherhood has 
 been especially powerful as a force making for social order 
 among all peoples that have accepted it. 
 
 The belief that society in the future will be able to do 
 without religion rests upon about as unsatisfactory a psy- 
 chological and sociological foundation as the belief that so- 
 ciety will be able to do without government. Instead of 
 religion becoming less necessary as society advances it be- 
 comes more necessary, for the simple reason that there is 
 more necessity for social control; and as yet no substitute 
 for the transcendental beliefs and ideas which religions offer 
 as a means of social control has been found. One of the 
 gravest and most disturbing signs of the social life of the 
 present, therefore, is the decay of effective religious belief. 
 Such decadence of religious belief in the past has marked 
 the dissolution of social order and even of types of culture. 
 One of the greatest practical needs, therefore, of the pres- 
 ent, from the standpoint of social order, is a religion 
 adapted to the requirements of modern life. The church 
 
 i See his article on " The Essential Nature of Heligion " in Inter- 
 national Journal of Ethics, Vol. VIII, pp. 169-92. 
 
 357 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 instead of being an outworn institution in human society 
 evidently has before it a field of social usefulness such as 
 never existed in any past stage of social development. Until 
 we get a church that is effective socially, law and govern- 
 ment will not do much to maintain a social order that is 
 adequate for modern social life. 
 
 Morality as a Means of Social Control. — What has been 
 said regarding the function of religion in maintaining social 
 order applies with double force to moral codes or systems 
 of morality, for, of course, religion secures its social effects 
 chiefly by giving supernatural sanction to ethical standards 
 and, ideals. Like religion, morality goes to the innermost 
 motives and secures social order through controlling char- 
 acter and conduct at their source. No social order, except 
 of the lowest or savage type, has ever existed or can exist 
 save as it is based upon some accepted moral standard or 
 code. The moral, as we have repeatedly insisted, is nothing 
 but the social raised to an ideal plane. Proper moral ideals 
 in individuals and moral practices, or virtues, of themselves 
 ultimately guarantee the harmonization of relationships be- 
 tween individuals. The virtues, indeed, as we have already 
 said, are what mainly bind men in harmonious relationships. 
 Without loyalty, honesty, veracity and justice in a society 
 there is no possibility of maintaining anything more than 
 the shabbiest semblance of social order. In every phase of 
 the social life this is true. Order is no more to be secured 
 in the economic world than in the domestic world without 
 the virtues, although some current economic philosophy may 
 teach that order in economic matters is quite independent 
 of personal morality. 
 
 Morality is more and more needed as society becomes 
 more complex. The simple virtues that suffice for a rural 
 population living under simple conditions are found to be 
 no longer adequate for complex urban populations. 1 Moral 
 
 i This thought is particularly developed by Ross in his Sin and 
 Society. 
 
 358 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL ORDER 
 
 standards and moral practices have to be continually raised 
 in society as social evolution advances if social order is 
 to be maintained. Increasing population and complexity 
 of social life will try our civilization, as has been well 
 remarked, far more than the limitation of natural re- 
 sources. 
 
 A stable and harmonious social order cannot exist in 
 complex groups without high character in individuals. In- 
 dividual moral character is, therefore, in a certain sense the 
 foundation of social order. Systems of morality, moral 
 codes and moral standards are, therefore, all important in 
 society from the standpoint of social order in so far as these 
 may affect individual moral character. A system of mo- 
 rality adequate to support a complex civilization is a con- 
 cern of the very highest importance in our present social 
 life and so far as one can judge in any society of the future. 
 The struggle to find and secure the general acceptance of 
 a rational system of morality, adapted to the needs of our 
 social life, is certainly one of the greatest practical and scien- 
 tific issues before modern society. The hedonistic system of 
 morals, or the ethics of pleasure, has commended itself in all 
 ages to the thoughtful and experienced as essentially anti- 
 social and anarchistic in character. The ethics of self- 
 realization, on the other hand, appealed to many of the 
 best minds of the Nineteenth Century as in essential accord 
 with the demands of human progress. It must be said, how- 
 ever, that the ethics of self-realization is oftentimes popu- 
 larly interpreted in an extremely individualistic way to 
 mean self-development and self-culture, regardless more or 
 less of the welfare of others. The hedonistic and self- 
 culture ethics of the Nineteenth Century must both, there- 
 fore, be regarded as essentially inadequate for the needs 
 of our social life. The ethics of service implicit in Chris- 
 tianity on the other hand, containing all that is of value 
 either in hedonistic or self-culture ethics, must be the ethics 
 of the future if highly complex types of social life are to 
 
 359 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 survive, because the problem of the social order is the prob- 
 lem of harmonious coordinations among individuals; and 
 these cannot be secured without the high development of 
 sympathy, understanding and altruistic activity which is 
 implied in an ethics of service or of love. 
 
 Education as a Means of Social Control. — The emphasis 
 which has just been laid upon individual moral character 
 as the ultimate basis for high types of social order leads to 
 the conclusion that our ultimate reliance in securing such 
 high types of social order must be the education of the 
 individual. Since human character is formed mainly in 
 the plastic periods of childhood and adolescence, education 
 furnishes the ultimate and most subtle form of social con- 
 trol because it controls the formation of habit and character 
 in individuals. Education, if wisely carried out, can secure 
 undoubtedly more difficult forms of social adjustment than 
 can government, law, or religious sanctions acting upon 
 the adult individual, because education furnishes, at the 
 plastic period of life, a subjective environment for the indi- 
 vidual of ideas, ideals, beliefs, motor and feeling attitudes, 
 which are capable of molding individual character in almost 
 any direction. Of course, the education which can achieve 
 this would be something far different from the educa- 
 tion furnished by the schools of the present. We are 
 speaking of education in the broad sense of training and 
 preparation for life along all lines, especially along lines 
 of social adjustment. Moreover, education is of all the 
 means of social control best adapted to secure a progressive 
 social order. Government, law, and religion and even moral 
 codes have tended to become static; but education can as 
 easily adapt itself to the higher social order which should 
 be as to any social order which exists. Other means of 
 social control are, of course, not to be neglected for all are 
 important in human society in maintaining social order, but 
 it would seem that education as an instrument in developing 
 and maintaining a progressive social order has advantages 
 
 360 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL ORDER 
 
 over any other of the means discussed. Education is, in- 
 deed, itself not so much to be thought of as separate from 
 these other means as simply a method by which other means 
 may be more successfully realized. 
 
 Conflict and Social Order. — Just the place of conflict in 
 the social life in relation to social order may need a word 
 further of discussion. Certain sociological writers of late 
 years have tended to make conflict a normal, if not an ideal 
 element, in the social life. In one sense, of course, there is 
 no objection to this view so far as conflict means simply 
 competition upon high planes of endeavor. So far as it may 
 mean simply struggle for adjustment, conflict is a normal 
 element in the social life and is not inconsistent with social 
 order of the highest type. As we have already pointed out, 
 there is an element of conflict in all social change and 
 adaptation. A progressive competition between interests, 
 ideals and institutions in human society must be welcomed 
 as a necessary method of progress in no sense opposed to 
 social order. But conflict in the sense of hostility between 
 individuals and classes is another matter in human society. 
 Conflict in this sense is opposed to social order, is indeed the 
 antithesis of social order, because there can be no harmo- 
 nious coordination between individuals when conflict of this 
 kind exists. To be sure, such conflict may issue in social 
 order, and in social order of the higher type, through the 
 elimination of lower types of individuals or classes or 
 groups. This was undoubtedly the primitive method of 
 progress. It would seem, however, to be a brutal and un- 
 necessary method in the social life of the future, because 
 through education and through rational eugenics such so- 
 cially unfit types of individuals need not exist. The more 
 regulated and refined forms of conflict which we ordinarily 
 speak of as competition and emulation should suffice for all 
 of the demands of a selective process in the social life of 
 the future. Certain it is that many of the present forms of 
 conflict between individuals and groups which exist in the 
 
 361 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 society of the present ought not to be tolerated. As long as 
 the war between individuals lasts and as long as antagonism 
 and hatred between classes and races exist there can be no 
 guarantee of any settled and stable social order. Conflict 
 of this sort is not a necessary element in the social life 
 process but rather marks a failure to build up proper co- 
 adaptations between individuals and classes. This sort of 
 conflict is, in other words, a negative and destructive element 
 in the social life. Its predominance is simply the sign of 
 social dissolution. The International Peace Movement is to 
 be welcomed as a step in the right direction, but it is far 
 more important, as has just been said, that the war between 
 individuals and classes should cease if there is to be social 
 peace and harmony. Indeed, there can be no guarantee of 
 the cessation of war until the lower and more brutal forms 
 of conflict or competition disappear between individuals, 
 classes and races. 
 
 The Conflict of Ideals and Social Order. — Professor 
 Giddings has emphasized throughout his writings that a 
 stable social order must rest upon like-mindedness. That he 
 is essentially right in this view has been clearly implied in 
 the discussions of the previous chapters. Without such 
 like-mindedness as is furnished by likeness of instincts, 
 habits, feelings, desires and interests in a population social 
 order would be impossible. We have already seen that a 
 natural, spontaneous social order rests upon fundamental 
 similarity in these psychical elements of individuals. While 
 it is undesirable from the standpoint of social order that 
 individuals should be mere copies of each other in their 
 mental and moral make-up, essential resemblance, or simi- 
 larity within limits, is necessary, we have seen, for any 
 harmonious coordination of their activities. Moreover, we 
 have also seen that the higher types of coordination between 
 individuals rest upon and are mediated by coordinating 
 ideas. Common activities and common life of any high 
 type, in other words, depend upon essential intellectual 
 
 362 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL ORDER 
 
 similarity between the individuals constituting the group. 
 A stable social order of a high type, therefore, depends 
 upon agreement, similarity in the ideas and ideals of the 
 individuals who participate in the social life. This has 
 already been quite fully implied in what has been said 
 regarding the necessity of mutual understanding and of 
 mutual trust and confidence between individuals if a high 
 type of society is to exist. 
 
 From all this clearly follows the importance of relative 
 agreement in the ideals of life of the individuals who com- 
 pose a complex society, and the extreme social disadvantage 
 of conflicting ideals regarding the most fundamental rela- 
 tions between individuals. Some conflict of ideals is, to 
 be sure, inevitable and necessary, as has already been 
 pointed out, if there is to be any progress in society. Con- 
 flicting ideals of life become a menace to social order only 
 when the conflicting ideals are too far removed from each 
 other, and involve the most fundamental relations between 
 individuals. When such a conflict, however, exists in fun- 
 damental opinions and ideals there can be no doubt that 
 it is a condition which, if long continued, is radically 
 opposed to the development as well as to the maintenance 
 of any high type of social order. Comte was undoubtedly 
 right when he attributed social disorder and anarchy to 
 such a disagreement concerning fundamentals, and when 
 he declared that " stability in fundamental maxims is the 
 first condition of genuine social order. ' ' 1 
 
 The present age even more than Comte 's age is suf- 
 fering from a disagreement, all but universal, concerning 
 the fundamental ideals of the social life and of right re- 
 lations between individuals. No stability in our institu- 
 tions can be assured as long as the present strife be- 
 tween the conflicting ideals of life continues. In many 
 ways the greatest task of science in society is to settle upon 
 
 i Positive Philosophy, Bk. I, Chap. I. 
 363 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 the basis of fact and reason, these disagreements in opin- 
 ions and ideals among individuals. If there is no hope 
 of science through reason bringing men to more unanimity 
 and more genuine unity in their opinions regarding the 
 meaning and ideals of life, then, there is also no hope of 
 any very high or harmonious type of social order emerging 
 from the strife of the present. It is not, of course, claimed 
 that science alone can in practice bring about this desirable 
 unity with regard to the ideals of life. As we have already 
 indicated, government and law, religion and education, 
 have also their work to do in this connection. But the 
 work of science, and especially of the social sciences, and 
 among the social sciences particularly that of sociology 
 and ethics, is in a sense fundamental; for it is the task of 
 science on the one side to detect error and on the other 
 side to synthetize ideas and ideals into a harmonious whole 
 from which the true view of human life should clearly 
 emerge. 
 
 Summary .—The achievement of social order in the sense 
 of settled and harmonious relations between individuals, 
 if it be of a complex type, is evidently not a simple matter. 
 Many forces must receive careful consideration if such an 
 order is to be achieved. There must be fundamental like- 
 ness among individuals in those primitive elements of hu- 
 man nature — the instincts and impulses. There must also 
 be fundamental likeness and agreement in acquired habits, 
 especially those which children take on through early train- 
 ing and by imitative absorption from their environment. 
 There must also be sympathy and mutual understanding 
 between all the members of the group. Finally, there must 
 be agreement with regard to the more fundamental ideals 
 of life. All this implies, if such relative uniformity and 
 likeness is to be achieved in the mass of individuals com- 
 posing those great societies which we term civilized nations, 
 that government and law, religion and morality, standards 
 and education must be continually used to control and 
 
 364 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL ORDER 
 
 constrain the development of the individual ; and it implies 
 also that the grosser forms of conflict between individuals 
 and absolute conflict between fundamental ideals and max- 
 ims must be overcome by all these agencies working to- 
 gether and guided by humanistic science. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 THE THEORY OP SOCIAL PROGRESS 
 
 The Problem of Social Progress. — The theory of social 
 progress is, as we have seen, not strictly synonymous with 
 the theory of social evolution or change. Progress im- 
 plies at its minimum definition a more complete adaptation 
 to the requirements of existence and an amelioration of 
 the conditions of human life. A theory of social progress, 
 therefore, is possibly outside of the limits of pure science, 
 since such a theory looks to the practical. Some sociologists, 
 therefore, have held that sociology should not concern it- 
 self with the theory of progress but only with social changes, 
 regardless of their direction. But the aim of all science 
 is ultimately practical and the social sciences would them- 
 selves be far from " socialized " if their aim were merely 
 to furnish knowledge regardless of practical considerations. 
 The real psychological motive for the development of the 
 social sciences, as of all science, and hence their real aim, 
 must be to secure the more harmonious adjustment of man 
 to the requirements of his existence. Now, sociology, as 
 we have repeatedly emphasized, is the general and syn- 
 thetic science which deals with man's collective life. No 
 other science is in a position to develop a scientific theory 
 of social progress if sociology fails to do so. Sociology, 
 therefore, must offer a theory of progress if it is not to 
 be an abortive affair, but to take its place among the liv- 
 ing sciences vitally related to human life and destiny. As 
 a matter of fact, the majority of sociologists from Comte 
 down have made the problem of progress the central and 
 
 366 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 
 
 highest problem of their science. As Comte insisted, all 
 the work of sociology necessarily leads up to a scientific 
 theory of progress. 1 It is the main business, therefore, we 
 may rightly conclude, of sociology to furnish to ethics and 
 to the applied social sciences, to moralists, reformers, states- 
 men and social workers of every sort a scientific theory of 
 progress. 2 
 
 This practical aim of sociology has been constantly kept 
 in view in the preceding pages. Practically all that has 
 been said, therefore, has a bearing upon the theory of prog- 
 ress. We have tried to show how the foundations for so- 
 cial progress were laid in the native impulses and feelings 
 of the individual, especially in the so-called social or altru- 
 istic impulses and feelings. We have seen that man 's intel- 
 lect, operating through the imagination and reason by 
 means of discovery and invention, has been the active agent 
 in progress; and that imitation has served to diffuse and 
 generalize progressive adaptations, while social sympathy 
 and the expansion of the consciousness of kind have been 
 extending the benefits of progress to all classes and all 
 races. The reader must look, therefore, for the writer's 
 theory of progress not simply within the limits of the pres- 
 ent chapter but in practically all the preceding chapters. 
 Nevertheless, there remain certain points which have not 
 been discussed, certain conceptions to clear up, and cer- 
 tain positions to summarize. We must first of all see clearly 
 what we mean by social progress in the sociological sense. 
 
 The Definition of Progress. 3 — What we call progress 
 is not anything which can be explained in a simple way 
 
 i Positive Polity, Vol. I, Introduction. 
 
 2 The purpose of this chapter is, of course, not to show that so- 
 cial progress is ethically desirable, but, assuming that it is desir- 
 able, to analyze the conception of social progress and to show the 
 factors at work in progress. 
 
 8 Cf. Professor Hobhouse's chapters on " The Meaning of Prog- 
 ress " and " Progress and the Struggle for Existence " in his Social 
 
 367 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 or defined once for all in a few set phrases. Social prog- 
 ress depends upon social change; but not all changes in 
 society are progressive. In general we call those changes 
 progressive in society which secure ajnore^ harmonious ad- 
 justment of individuals to one another and a better adap- 
 tation of social groups to the requirements of their exist- 
 ence. Social progress, means for one thing, then, the adap- 
 tion of society to a wider and more universal environment. 
 It means increasing mastery of man over nature and in- 
 creasing control and mastery of human nature. Social 
 progress, therefore, means more ha rmonio us coordinations 
 among the members of a group. It means also greater effi- 
 ciency of the group in carrying on its common life — greater 
 capacity for, and greater development of, cooperation. 
 Hence, also it means greater capacity on the part of the 
 group to survive. Social progress includes, therefore, all 
 movements which make, in the long run, for social har- 
 mony, social efficiency and social survival. 
 
 In any large conception of progress we must make hu- 
 manity rather than smaller social groups the subject of 
 progress. We judge those things to be progressive which 
 on the whole aid humanity in mastering physical nature 
 and in adjusting harmoniously its various elements to one 
 another. Mechanical inventions, economic prosperity and 
 the like are considered marks of progress because on the 
 whole they are usually judged to be the means of man's 
 mastering physical nature, and therefore serve to adjust 
 him to a more universal environment. Changes in politi- 
 cal conditions and in moral standards which make for more 
 harmonious relationships between individuals and groups 
 are also judged to be progressive because they aid in 
 man's mastery over himself and his social environment. 
 
 Evolution and Political Theory. Certain factors in progress are 
 stressed by Hobhouse which are only implied in our brief analysis. 
 These chapters are especially, therefore, commended to the reader to 
 supplement what is said in this text. 
 
 368 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 
 
 The ideal of human progress is apparently adaptation to 
 a perfectly universal environment, such an adaptation as 
 shall harmonize all factors whether internal or external, 
 present or remote, in the life of humanity, securing the 
 greatest possible harmony among its various elements, their 
 greatest efficiency in mutual cooperation, and finally the 
 greatest capacity for social survival. 1 
 
 Some writers have made the chief criterion of social 
 progress increased complexity of social organization; but 
 it is doubtful if this is a necessary mark of social progress 
 or anything more than its incidental outcome. Other writ- 
 ers have claimed similarly that social progress consists in 
 the increase of the division of labor and of interdependence 
 in society; 2 but the criticism which we have just made of 
 the conception of progress as increased complexity of so- 
 cial structure applies also to this conception. Still others 
 hold that social progress consists essentially in passage 
 from a general state of hardship, fear and pain to a con- 
 dition of general comfort and happiness, in passage from a 
 " pain economy " to a " pleasure economy." 3 While we 
 would not deny that all true social progress must ulti- 
 mately work for the greatly increased happiness of human- 
 ity, yet a hedonistic criterion of progress cannot be ac- 
 cepted, because again happiness is an incidental outcome of 
 progress rather than its criterion. 
 
 Accepting provisionally the conception of progress 
 which we have set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the 
 
 i Cf. what is said on the meaning of the social life in Chapter XIX; 
 also the suggestion on page 273 that the ideal of progress is, from 
 one standpoint, the progressive rationalization of all social activities. 
 
 2 See especially Durkheim, De la Division du Travail Social. 
 
 3 This view of progress is essentially implied in the whole 
 hedonistic school of social theorists (e.g., Ward, Dynamic Sociology, 
 Vol. II, p. 161). It has been especially developed, however, by 
 Professor Patten in his Theory of Social Forces ( see especially Chaps. 
 IV and V) , to whom we owe the names " pain economy " and " pleas- 
 ure economy." 
 
 369 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 question arises, How then is progress possible? What 
 factors determine that changes shall be progressive rather 
 than retrogressive in their nature? How may these fac- 
 tors be understood and controlled? This question as to 
 the causes of progress has been discussed by pretty nearly 
 every social thinker from the time of Plato down to the 
 present. Every conceivable theory of progress has been set 
 forth but most of these theories while perceiving a part 
 of the truth have been decidedly one-sided, that is, they 
 have been based upon the perception of some single factor 
 at work in progressive social evolution. Our space does 
 not permit that we pass all of these theories in review, but 
 it is necessary before setting forth the sociological theory 
 of progress to briefly review some of these one-sided theories 
 of progress. 
 
 One-Sided Theories of Progress. 1 — The Anthropo-Geo- 
 graphical Theory. According to many social thinkers, the 
 determining factors in human progress have been physical. 
 They have been certain conditions of climate, food and 
 soil. This theory received, perhaps, its classical expression 
 in Buckle's History of Civilization in England 2 in which 
 he endeavored to show that indirectly physical conditions 
 operating upon economic, conditions would absolutely de- 
 termine social progress. The geographical conditions in 
 Europe, the climate, the fertility of the soil, the aspect 
 of nature, for example, have been the prime factors in the 
 development of European civilization. Moreover, no high 
 civilization, Buckle thought, could develop outside of Eu- 
 rope, because only in Europe were physical and geographi- 
 cal conditions suitable for a high development of progress. 
 
 Other theories of this same general school have main- 
 tained that the conditions of food supply are the deter- 
 
 i For an excellent detailed exposition of the one-sided theories 
 of progress, see Barth, Philosophie der Gcschichte als Sociologie, 
 Zweiter Abschnitt. 
 
 2 See especially the famous second chapter. 
 
 370 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 
 
 mining factors in social progress, for food supply deter- 
 mines the size of the population, and the pressure of 
 population upon food supply is the immediate stimulus 
 which gives rise to invention and discovery and all con- 
 trol over nature. The simple equation of food and popula- 
 tion offers, therefore, the solution of the enigma of 
 progress. 1 
 
 All of these physical and geographical theorists have 
 forgotten to question why social decline takes place, though 
 geographical conditions remain the same; or they have 
 failed to show any definite and certain connection between 
 changes in climatic and geographical conditions and well- 
 known historical instances of social retrogression. More- 
 over, progressive evolution does not always take place 
 when physical conditions are favorable, nor have the most 
 favorable physical conditions prevented social retrogression. 
 The anthropo-geographical theory of progress is too simple, 
 and is inadequate to show what are the real determining 
 factors in progress. It has, however, emphasized the part 
 which climate, soil and other geographical conditions do 
 actually play as conditions of the social life and even as 
 stimuli to social development in certain directions. 
 
 The Biological or Ethnological Theory of Progress. — 
 This has been called, with justice, " the stock breeder's 
 theory of progress." It is the theory that the determin- 
 ing element in progress is that of the breed or biological 
 constitution of the group. 2 Quite evidently the anthropo- 
 geographical theory neglects this internal factor of blood 
 or biological" make-up. Otherwise geographical conditions 
 should make progressive societies out of hordes of monkeys 
 or even hordes of lower animals. The biological explana- 
 
 iA good recent example of this sort of anthropo-geographic the- 
 ory may be found in Woodruff's Expansion of Races. 
 
 2 An extreme example of this sort of social theory is to be found 
 in de Gobineau's Essai sur Vlnegalite des Races Humaines (an 
 American popularization is Schultz's Race or Mongrel). 
 25 371 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 tion of progress has this great advantage, that it seems 
 to explain the difference in the life of various species of 
 animals. Why should it not explain also quite adequately 
 the difference in the life of various human groups? 
 
 There can scarcely be any question, considering all that 
 we know of biology, but that blood counts in human so- 
 ciety; that the biological make-up of the individual enters 
 very largely into his social reactions. We may even admit 
 with the eugenists that all progress in human society 
 depends upon the relation between one generation and its 
 successor; 1 that without sound physical heredity there 
 would be but little hope of continuing human progress. 
 Nevertheless, admitting to the full the importance of ra- 
 cial and individual heredity, this theory is inadequate to 
 explain human social progress, because human groups have 
 so much in their collective life which does not come to them 
 by the way of physical heredity, and the impulses and 
 instincts which it furnishes. So much in human society, 
 in other words, is acquired by each individual in his life- 
 time. Social tradition, 2 or " social heredity," as it has 
 been called, plays such a large part in handing down the 
 achievements and possessions of the past that it is doubt- 
 ful if the biological constitution of the individual' does 
 more than furnish the condition of progress. It is doubt- 
 ful, for example, whether the biological conditions of Eng- 
 lish-speaking societies are as favorable to-day as they were 
 two thousand years ago when their ancestors lived in the 
 Teutonic forests, yet there can be no doubt that their 
 social progress during the last two thousand years has been 
 enormous. 
 
 It would seem, therefore, that biological conditions or 
 racial heredity merely furnish the potentialities for social 
 progress. Proper inborn racial traits are the necessary 
 
 i Cf . Saleeby, Parenthood and Race Culture, p. 10. 
 2 See Hobhouse's discussion of the sociological importance of " tra- 
 dition," op. cit., pp. 33-8. 
 
 372 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 
 
 conditions for social progress as much as a proper geo- 
 graphical environment, but like the geographical environ- 
 ment they are only conditions, or at most furnish innate 
 tendencies in certain directions which develop when the 
 proper stimuli appear. 1 
 
 The Economic Theory of Progress. — More popular than 
 either of the two preceding theories is the theory that 
 progress depends upon economic conditions, that is, upon 
 the conditions of the production and distribution of ma- 
 terial goods. This theory, indeed, may be considered to 
 be the dominant theory, not only of social progress, but of 
 social evolution at the present time. 2 . Its vogue is mainly 
 due to its advocacy by the Marxian socialists under the 
 name of " the materialistic conception of history," 
 although its spread and acceptance has been aided not a 
 little by the works of certain economists who advocated 
 the same theory of social evolution under the name of ' ' the 
 economic interpretation of history." According to this 
 theory, in the words of Marx, ' ' the method of production 
 of the material life determines the social, political and 
 spiritual life process in general. ' ' That is, methods of pro- 
 ducing and distributing material goods ultimately deter- 
 mine all other social processes, because all other social 
 processes are mediated and controlled by the economic 
 process. The determining factor in human progress is, 
 therefore, economic conditions, or the methods by which 
 the means of subsistence is produced and distributed in 
 
 1 Cf. Hobhonse, op. <At., Chap. Ill, on " The Value and Limita- 
 tions of Eugenics." 
 
 2 First put forth in definite" form in Marx's Critique of Political 
 Economy; all recent economic literature has abounded with this the- 
 ory in one form or another. Economic determinism is the chief basis, 
 e.g., of Patten's social theories (see especially his Theory of Social 
 Forces and his Social Basis of Religion ) , not to mention the socio- 
 logical doctrines of practically the whole socialist group of writers, 
 and of the ultra-Marxians like Loria (see his Economic Foundations 
 of Society, trans, by Keasbey). 
 
 373 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 social groups. Other factors are recognized as determin- 
 ing only to the extent that they may react upon these 
 economic conditions. In any case the forces of the social 
 life are all mediated and controlled by the economic process. 
 The practical inference, of course, from all this is, that if 
 economic conditions are made right all other social con- 
 ditions will spontaneously right themselves. This, as we 
 have already seen, is the theory of progress upon which a 
 very large number of social movements of to-day are based. 
 Many people, in other words, who are far from ignorant 
 sincerely believe at the present time that all that is wrong 
 with human society is economic conditions, and that if 
 we could straighten out these conditions so as to abolish 
 poverty and assure to everyone an economic surplus the 
 key to human progress, which has so long been sought in 
 vain, would at last be in our hands. 
 
 Any elaborate criticism of such an economic view of 
 our social life is unnecessary here because the basis for 
 such a criticism is amply evident in all that has been said 
 in the preceding pages. 1 Human society, as we have seen, 
 is a complex of living organisms responding, now this 
 way, now that, to external stimuli in the environment. 
 These responses vary according to the inner nature of the 
 individual organisms, that is, according to the hereditary 
 tendencies and habits of the individuals composing the 
 group. Social stimuli may, of course, by a process of ab- 
 straction be classified into several great groups, the eco- 
 nomic, the reproductive, the political, the religious and 
 so on, the economic stimuli being roughly defined as those 
 that have to do with the production and distribution of 
 
 i For a more elaborate criticism, see the writer's article on 
 "Marx's Economic Determinism in the Light of Modern Psychol- 
 ogy" in American Journal of Sociology for July, 1911 (Vol. XVII, 
 pp. 35-46). Seligman's Economic Interpretation of History con- 
 tains a mild criticism of the theory without any attempt at psycho- 
 logical analysis. ■ 
 
 374 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 
 
 wealth. Now, there is no reason why the responses of the 
 social group to these economic stimuli should determine 
 the responses to all other stimuli, that is should determine 
 all other social activities. It is true that our habits of re- 
 sponse to a certain class of stimuli affect to a certain extent 
 our habits of response to all other classes. Thus it follows 
 that the economic phases of human social life do affect to 
 a very great degree all other phases of that life. This is 
 simply a consequence of the unity of individual personality 
 and of the interdependence of all phases of the social life, 
 that is of the psychical unity of society. But there is no 
 reason for believing that economic stimuli determine, in any 
 exact way or to any such extent as Marx and other eco- 
 nomic determinists have thought, responses to other stimuli. 
 Under the doctrine of social interdependence it is just as 
 reasonable to say that the religious and intellectual phases 
 of the social life, for example, determine the eeonomic as 
 it is to say that the method of producing and distributing 
 wealth determines all other phases of the social life. Thus 
 modern psychology leaves the doctrine that other phases 
 of the social life are determined by the economic or are 
 simply reflections of economic processes without any sci- 
 entific foundation. 
 
 "We must admit, however, that the economic element is 
 a very large one in our social life, and particularly in 
 modern social life. There can be no question but that 
 the method of producing and distributing wealth is one 
 of the most important factors affecting our social life, 
 and therefore social progress, to-day ; but it is unfortunate 
 that the emphasis upon the importance of economic condi- 
 tions in social progress should just now be obscuring the 
 importance of many other factors. The true significance 
 of the economic element in the social life is not unlike 
 that of the physical environment. Like the physical en- 
 vironment, economic development presents the platform 
 upon which social progress must go on. Like the physical 
 
 375 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 environment, too, it is not so much a rigidly determining 
 element as a stimulus to development in certain direc- 
 tions. The economic factor in social progrees may justly 
 demand, therefore, a large consideration from the soci- 
 ologist. 
 
 Hence, the sociologist, along with all other students of 
 social conditions, must be heartily in favor of all those 
 social reforms which aim at securing to each individual 
 the economic minimum which is necessary for right living 
 and social efficiency. Sociologists may unite with social 
 workers in approving of such movements as compulsory 
 insurance against the contingencies of life which now cause 
 poverty and dependence ; a minimum wage, sufficiently high 
 to make possible a human standard of living; labor legis- 
 lation which will protect the worker against accident, dis- 
 ease and injustice; a liberal relief system which will meet 
 the needs of those who become accidentally dependent ; and 
 finally such reforms in our systems of taxation as will 
 furnish adequate revenue for social needs and at the 
 same time serve to distribute wealth and economic oppor- 
 tunities more evenly in society. All these and many other 
 economic reforms are certainly necessary preliminaries for 
 any real social progress. Poverty ought to be abolished, 
 and it can be abolished without social revolution, except 
 where it means simply dependence due to accident, or 
 congenital defect or degeneracy. 1 When an economic com- 
 petence is assured to each normal individual in society, 
 then more attention can be paid to the mental and moral 
 factors in progress; but it must be emphasized that an 
 economic competence for each individual will not alone 
 assure progress. That is only a preliminary step to make 
 room for the higher mental and moral adjustments which 
 are necessary before we can have a humanity adjusted to 
 the requirements of its existence. 
 
 i Cf. Devine, Misery and Its Causes, Chap. VI. 
 
 376 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 
 
 The Ideological Theory of Progress. — All the theories 
 of progress which have thus far been mentioned are more 
 or less materialistic in character; but philosophers and re- 
 ligious teachers have emphasized for ages that the char- 
 acter of man's social life, and hence human progress, de- 
 pends upon ideas and ideals. Much ridicule has been 
 poured upon these so-called idealogical theories of progress 
 by the advocates of the materialistic conception of history 
 and by others within recent years; but if the intellect is 
 the supreme device to control individual and social adjust- 
 ment, and if the reason is the highest part of the intellect, 
 these idealogical theories still deserve serious consideration, 
 even from the most rigorous scientific point of view. We 
 have already seen the part that ideas and ideals play in 
 bringing about social changes and especially higher types 
 of adjustment between individuals and groups and their 
 environment. It is noteworthy also that the founder of 
 scientific sociology, though very far from sympathizing 
 with the idealogical philosophers of his time, considered 
 the history of human progress to be essentially the history 
 of human thought. In other words, Comte held that the 
 determining factor in progress was an intellectual one, and 
 that we must control and reorganize society through 
 science. 1 
 
 But the idealogical theory of progress is open to grave 
 objections, even though we admit that the determining 
 factor in human progress must be psychical rather than 
 biological or physical. Much that has been said in the pre- 
 ceding pages has been in opposition, the reader will remem- 
 ber, to an intellectualistic view of human society, though 
 at the same time the writer freely conceded that the 
 intellect was the active agent in social progress. Idealogical 
 theories of social progress have, however, been so stated at 
 times by philosophers, especially those of the Hegelian 
 
 i Positive Philosophy, Bk. I, Chap. I ; Positive Polity, Vol. I, 
 Chap. I. 
 
 377 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 school, that ideas or thoughts were made to seem the social 
 reality rather than simply the instrument in the perfect- 
 ing of the life-process. Hegel himself offered a theory of 
 social evolution whieh was purely in terms of a logic of 
 ideas. With thinkers of this type social movements become 
 entirely movements of ideas, ideas become the social re- 
 ality, and the concrete life of societies, nations and civiliza- 
 tions tends to be lost sight of. Under such circumstances 
 idealogical theories of social progress become as one-sided 
 as any of the theories which we have passed in review. 
 Such theories even detract from the real significance of 
 ideas and ideals, because they lose sight of life itself. 
 
 The Educational Theory of Progress. — From Plato to 
 Prof. Lester F. "Ward, many of the sanest social think- 
 ers have held that the key to social progress, in the future 
 at least, lay in education. Professor Ward in his Dynamic 
 Sociology undoubtedly demonstrated once for all that edu- 
 cation was the initial or proximate means of progress in 
 human society. 1 If this must be admitted even in the nar- 
 row sense which Professor Ward gives to education, as 
 simply meaning the diffusion of knowledge, it must all the 
 more be admitted if we broaden education to mean the 
 fitting of the individual for the social life, not only by 
 giving him knowledge, but also by controlling the formation 
 of his habits and character. The key to progress certainly 
 lies in the psychical adjustment of the individual to so- 
 ciety, and the psychical adjustment of the individual to 
 society is very largely a matter of education even in the 
 narrow sense. This is demonstrated, not only by the ex- 
 perience of every day life, but by the examination of the 
 civilizations of the past, for all civilizations have depended 
 in one way or another upon educational processes, not only 
 for their continuity, but also largely for their development. 
 Not only has culture been passed down in history essentially 
 
 i See Vol. II, Chaps. X-XIV. 
 378 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 
 
 by educational processes, but these processes, controlling 
 the formation of habits and character, and ways of think- 
 ing and ways of acting in individuals, have been the ex- 
 planation of much of the social progress of the past. Prog- 
 ress in human society certainly depends upon the relation 
 of one generation to its successors, but that relation is 
 hot only one of physical heredity, but also one which in- 
 volves the education and training of the young. Much can 
 be said, therefore, in defense of the view that methods and 
 processes of education have determined the social progress 
 of the past. 
 
 But education is not so much an original factor in so- 
 cial evolution as it is a method through which other factors 
 work. When we attribute great importance to education 
 in social progress we are not singling out any one deter- 
 mining factor of social progress because religion, govern- 
 ment and economic factors may all work through education. 
 This is, however, only equivalent to saying that the edu- 
 cational theory of social progress approaches the sociolog- 
 ical theory because of its synthetic character. The education 
 of the individual, we must agree with Ward, is the initial 
 means of social progress and the final reliance in all 
 attempts at social reconstruction. But education may dis- 
 solve the social order and block all social progress. Edu- 
 cation without the proper controlling ideas and ideals 
 cannot be the key to social progress. 
 
 The Sociological Theory of Progress. — If all the above 
 theories of progress must be rejected from the sociological 
 point of view as more or less one-sided and inadequate, 
 what theory, then, has sociology to offer? The reply is that 
 the sociological theory of progress is synthetic; that soci- 
 ology finds some truth in all of the one-sided theories but 
 regards them when taken singly as partial and inadequate. 
 The large synthetic view of the social life which sociology 
 offers shows at once that there can be no single key either 
 to social evolution or to social progress. Just because causes 
 
 379 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 of change in society are complex, so also the causes of 
 progressive evolution are complex. No doubt some of these 
 causes are more important than others. Assuming fairly 
 favorable physical and geographical conditions, the bio- 
 logical factor of heredity, the economic factor, or the meth- 
 ods of producing and distributing wealth, and the educa- 
 tional factor, or the fitting of the young properly for the 
 social life, loom perhaps larger than others. At any rate, 
 we may agree with Professor Dealey that many of the 
 eminent social thinkers of the past have united in agree- 
 ing that race, economic organization and education are 
 the three vital things in social progress. 1 But it is certain 
 that two of these, economic organization and education, 
 must be guided and controlled by ideas and . ideals, and 
 could not become effective without the aid of government, 
 law and religion; all of which is again equivalent to say- 
 ing that any scientific theory of social evolution and of 
 social progress must be synthetic. 
 
 This means with regard to social practice that if we 
 are to secure true social progress in modern society we 
 must have a synthesis of social movements. We will not 
 be able to secure any progress worth while by going from 
 one factor to another, doing a little here and a little there. 
 Something, perhaps, may be secured by this method but 
 not much. Our civilization is obstructed and menaced 
 by one-sided development, one-sided efforts at reform, all 
 based upon one-sided theories of the social life. Social 
 policy must be broadened so as to give equal attention 
 to all factors in the social life, and social movements must 
 be synthetized if any sort of satisfactory social adjustment 
 is to be reached; 2 and the intellectual basis for all this 
 
 i Sociology, p. 198. 
 
 2 Among recent notable expressions by social workers of this idea, 
 see Miss Mary E. Richmond's paper on " The Interrelation of So- 
 cial Movements," Proceedings National Conference of Charities and 
 Correction, 1910, pp. 212-18. 
 
 380 
 
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 
 
 must be the synthetic view which only a scientific sociology 
 can give. 
 
 "While we have repeatedly emphasized that the ultimate 
 reliance in social reconstruction must be the education of 
 the young, yet it is also not inconsistent to say that in 
 a sense the ultimate hope of society must lie in the devel- 
 opment of its own social self-knowledge, that is in the 
 development of the social sciences. It is after all through 
 scientific study and investigation of the social life that 
 the value of each of its phases as a factor in progress be- 
 comes apparent. The perfecting of the instruments of 
 social progress must be largely, therefore, dependent upon 
 the development of the social sciences. With the fuller 
 knowledge of human nature and human society which the 
 development of the social sciences will give us, it will be 
 possible for humanity to control its own social progress 
 even more than it can control the forces of physical nature. 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 THE NATURE OP SOCIETY 
 
 The Nature of Society. — What then shall we conclude as 
 to the nature of the social life from the discussions of the 
 preceding pages? Three great historical theories of the 
 nature of society have been more or less held by the social 
 thinkers of the past and all of them are to some extent still 
 held by thinkers of the present. These theories are the 
 contract, the organic and the psychological theories of 
 society. 1 Other theories relative to the nature of society 
 than these are, of course, possible, such as the materialistic 
 or mechanical view of society. As a matter of fact, how- 
 ever, those who have insisted most strongly upon the me- 
 chanical view of nature have perforce abandoned mechan- 
 ical interpretation when they have come to consider the 
 social life. Mechanistic thinkers have very generally 
 adopted with reference to the social life, strange as it may 
 seem, an extremely intellectualistic view of the social unity ; 
 that is, they usually consider that all such unity is a mat- 
 ter of agreement, or contract, between individuals. Let 
 us now consider briefly these three theories of the nature 
 of society in the order of their development. 
 
 The Contract Theory of Society. — The view that the 
 unity of the social life is a matter of agreement or under- 
 
 i Professor Small suggests that these three theories are not so 
 much absolutely opposed to each other as that they emphasize dif- 
 ferent aspects of the social life. With this suggestion the writer 
 agrees, only he would contend that the psychological theory of soci- 
 ety, rightly understood, offers the only adequate basis for a true 
 synthesis of the opposing contract and organic theories. 
 
 382 
 
THE NATURE OF SOCIETY 
 
 standing between individuals, that is, that it is essentially 
 a matter of contract, is a very old one. It goes back at 
 least as far as the Epicurean school of philosophy in classic 
 antiquity, but it became fully developed only in the hands 
 of the legal and political thinkers of the Seventeenth and 
 Eighteenth Centuries. The sociological thought of those 
 centuries was very largely in terms of the contract theory 
 of society. Such thinkers as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau 
 each gave the contract theory a peculiar expression. While 
 Nineteenth-Century thought very largely renounced the 
 contract theory of society in favor of the organic theory, 
 yet it has by no means lacked defenders even among mod- 
 ern sociologists. 1 De Greef, the Belgian sociologist, finds 
 the essence of society to consist in the phenomena of con- 
 tract. 2 Moreover, all sociological thinkers who find that 
 the social life rests fundamentally upon mutual understand- 
 ing or mutual agreement should be ranked with the con- 
 tract theorists. 
 
 The essence of the contract theory of society is, 
 then, that social organization is primarily an intel- 
 lectual construction depending upon expressed or implied 
 agreement, explicit or implicit contract, between individ- 
 uals. This theory would make, for example, government or 
 the institution of the family to consist essentially in con- 
 tract. All social organization is, according to this theory, 
 an outcome of self-conscious relations between individuals 
 and these relations subsist only by virtue of the mutual 
 consent of the parties thereto. Society is, therefore, an 
 intellectual construction. . 
 
 A modification of this theory is to be found among those 
 writers who hold that while the origin of society was not 
 
 i The most recent defender of the contract theory of society is 
 Professor Fite in his Individualism (Lecture IV). See the writer's 
 review in International Journal of Ethics, April, 1912, already re- 
 ferred to. 
 
 2 Introduction a la Sociologie, Vol. I, pp. 131, 132, 146, 147. 
 
 383 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 in contract or mutual agreement, society should proceed 
 to organize at once upon the basis of contract. Mutual 
 agreement as to the forms of association or of social or- 
 ganization, if it has not been the basis of social order in 
 the past, should speedily become so. Marriage and the 
 family may not have been, for example, originally a con- 
 tract, but marriage and family relations should be wholly 
 of the nature of a contract in the future. These theorists, 
 of course, receive considerable support for their contention 
 through the undoubted fact that the self-conscious and 
 intellectual elements in the social life become more con- 
 spicuous and more influential seemingly as we advance in 
 social evolution. According to this modification of the 
 contract theory, contract is not the origin of society, but its 
 goal. Even with this modification, however, the contract 
 theory assumes that the social life may become, even if it 
 is not yet such already, quite entirely an intellectual con- 
 struction. Biological elements and other psychological ele- 
 ments than the intellectual are usually quite ignored by 
 such contract theorists. 
 
 It is a frequent mistake to confuse the contract theory 
 of society in some of its forms with the psychological theory 
 of society. The contract theory is, however, as has already 
 been said, not psychological in the broad sense, but rather 
 an intellectualistic theory of society. It is also on account 
 of its very terms an individualistic theory. It is to be. 
 sharply distinguished, therefore, even in its modified forms 
 from the psychological theory of society that has been set 
 forth in this book, because it generally neglects or dis- 
 cards as of no importance biological, instinctive and habit- 
 ual elements, to say nothing of the great factor of coercive 
 control or constraint. The contract theory of society is an 
 inheritance, then, from the intellectualistic and individ- 
 ualistic social philosophy of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
 Centuries. However much it may be questioned in the 
 world of theory, we may note that it is still the dominant 
 
 384 
 
THE NATURE OF SOCIETY 
 
 theory of society in the world of practice, especially in the 
 law, in government and to an increasing extent in modern 
 views of the family life. 
 
 Detailed criticism of the contract theory of society is 
 unnecessary at this point, since the whole theory of the 
 social life which has been presented in this book amounts 
 to a criticism of the contract theory. We are very far from 
 denying elements of truth in the contract theory and es- 
 pecially as stated in its modified form. However, it is 
 clear that the contract theory of society, even as an ideal, 
 presupposes that society is made up quite entirely of nor- 
 mal adult individuals each of high intelligence, capable 
 of understanding and acquiescing in all of the regulations 
 and organization which exist in a well-ordered social life. 
 That such a condition of affairs existed primitively or that 
 it even exists in the most highly civilized societies of the 
 present is, of course, ridiculous. The contract theory 
 affords no explanation of social organization as we find it. 
 Many people who see this do not see, however, that it affords 
 no adequate ideal for the social life. They fail to see that 
 society cannot be made over according to agreement to suit 
 the convenience and pleasure of its individual members. 
 They fail to see that in its essence the social life is not, 
 and never can be, a mere matter of contract or agreement 
 between individuals. As we have already seen, the foun- 
 dations of society are far deeper than the intellectual ele- 
 ment in human nature; not only has this been true of the 
 social past but it will also hold true of the social future. 
 Social organization is not, and in its nature cannot be, 
 merely an intellectual construction ; for it is a phase of the 
 life-process, and in the life-process biological factors and 
 forces are fundamental. 
 
 The Organic Theory of Society. — A reaction from the 
 contract theory of society is to be found in the organic 
 conception of society. This is the conception that society 
 is an organism and a product of organic evolution like all 
 
 385 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 other organisms. The essential idea in this theory is the 
 opposite of that in the contract theory, namely, that society 
 instead of being an intellectual construction is a product of 
 the operation of blind forces of organic nature; that it is 
 a growth which has come about through the operation of 
 biological laws. The unity of society is accordingly in no 
 wise different from the unity which we find in the biological 
 organism. Society is an aggregate of the same sort as the 
 living vegetable or animal. Even if there are differences 
 between the social organism and the biological organism, 
 these differences are of relative unimportance in contrast 
 to the many points of resemblance. Society in any case re- 
 mains essentially an organic structure subject to the general 
 laws of organic growth and decay. It may be a super- 
 organism, but it is nevertheless essentially biological in its 
 nature. 
 
 The beginnings of the organic theory of society like 
 those of the contract theory are very old, going back again 
 to Greek philosophy. The organic theory received its full 
 development, however, only as a reaction from the contract 
 theory of society. When the contract theory began to be 
 given up in the earlier years of the Nineteenth Century, 
 nothing was more natural than that with the contemporary 
 growth of biological science the organic theory should have 
 received its full development. This theory came to its full- 
 est and most consistent expression in such writers as 
 Spencer and Lilienfeld, in whose writings society appears 
 as a sort of superhuman organic structure which science 
 might presume to describe but hardly to control. 1 In 
 Lilienfeld and in many minor writers elaborate analogies 
 were traced between the social and biological organisms. 
 These analogies were sometimes even supposed to represent 
 scientific truths. Lilienfeld, indeed, and some other writers 
 
 i Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, Part II. Lilienfeld, 
 Oedanken iihcr die Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft, Vol. I. 
 
 386 
 
THE NATURE OF SOCIETY 
 
 held very logically that the organic conception was not an 
 analogy at all, but an accurate scientific description of the 
 social reality. 
 
 "When the full implications of the organic conception of 
 society began to be perceived reaction from it was inevitable. 
 Many modifications of the organic theory arose. Some 
 writers undertook to interpret the view that society was an 
 organism in a philosophical or psychological way. 1 They 
 held that the concept of organism was essentially philosoph- 
 ical rather than biological and that society was an organism 
 only in this most general or philosophical sense. Other 
 writers, like De Greef and Fouillee, 2 aim to reconcile the 
 contract theory of society and the organic theory, finding 
 society to be essentially a ' ' contractual organism. ' ' 3 
 
 There can be, of course, little objection to the use 
 of the term organism in the broad, philosophical sense 
 to describe human societies, if by it is meant nothing 
 more than to emphasize the unity and interdependence 
 of the social life. 4 In many ways the word organism 
 is the most apt philosophical term which we have to 
 describe the unity of the social life. On the other hand, 
 it often suggests misleading analogies, and the organic 
 theory of society is something quite distinct from this 
 very broad and general use of the word organism in 
 describing the life of social groups. Detailed criticism 
 of the organic conception of society in the strict sense is 
 unnecessary. It is sufficient to say that such a conception 
 is very far from corresponding with the actual life of social 
 groups as we find them. Not only are human social groups 
 made up of relatively independent, self-conscious, self- 
 
 i See especially Mackenzie, Introduction to Social Philosophy, 
 Chap. III. 
 
 2 La Science Sociale contemporaine, Bk. II, Chap. III. 
 
 3 A good summary of the theories of leading organicists is to 
 be found in Coker's Organismic Theories of the State, Chap. IV. 
 
 * See Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory, p. 87. 
 26 387. 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 determining individuals quite unlike, in their nature, rela^ 
 tions and behavior to the cells of a plant or animal organ- 
 ism, but it is also true that these individuals are members 
 now of one group, now of another, and even of many groups 
 at the same time, a condition which has no parallel in the 
 organic world. The organic conception of society in the 
 strict sense, therefore, radically misinterprets the nature of 
 the social life. This is not saying that the conception is 
 void of all elements of scientific value. On the contrary, as 
 a reaction from the contract theory, the organic theory 
 served a very useful purpose in the history of social thought 
 in emphasizing the real connections between life in general 
 and society, between organic evolution and social evolution, 
 and also in emphasizing the compelling nature of the social 
 unity, and the fact that social institutions are by no means 
 arbitrary inventions. The view has been set forth at length 
 in this book that human social life_is_a phase ofjthe whole 
 1 life-process ; that_in_ttiat^ process, J)ioIftgjcal processes and 
 forces are fundamental; and that the unity or solidarity of 
 society is an expression of the original and continuing unity 
 of the life-process. This view brings into sufficient relief 
 the elements of real value in the organic theory ; but they 
 are not sufficient to justify a purely organic conception of 
 society. 
 
 i The Psychological Theory of Society. — The psycholog- 
 ical theory of society is that the unity of the social life is 
 that of a psychical process. It is the theory that has been 
 set forth in the preceding pages and was sufficiently indi- 
 cated in the definition of society which we finally adopted 
 — that a society is a group of individuals carrying on a col- 
 lective life by means of mental interactions. The social 
 unity has for its basis, to be sure, a collective life-process; 
 but that life-process, unlike the life-process of biological 
 organisms, is carried on by means of mental interaction be- 
 tween its different elements. The psychological theory of 
 society, therefore, conceives of the social unity as created 
 
 388 
 
THE NATURE OF SOCIETY 
 
 by this process of mental interaction between psychical in- 
 dividuals. The social process is a psychical process, not, to 
 be sure, in the sense that it is purely subjective, but in the 
 sense that its significant elements are subjective or psychical. 
 
 The psychological theory of society has often been con- 
 fused on the one hand with the contract theory and on the 
 other hand with the organic theory. This is perhaps due 
 to the fact that it gives a place to both the biological and 
 intellectual elements in the social life. It should be evident, 
 however, that the psychological conception of society is a 
 distinct conception and is not to be confused with either 
 of the preceding, but is rather a synthesis of the elements 
 of value in both of them. It gives, indeed, a fundamental 
 place to the blind forces of organic nature, but it gives also 
 a large and increasingly important place to the intellectual 
 elements as we ascend in the scale of social evolution. More- 
 over, it gives a proper place in the understanding of the 
 social life to imitation, to sympathy, to conflict, to control 
 or constraint. Thus, the psychological conception of society 
 is not merely synthetic of certain biological and intellectual 
 elements, but is synthetic of all factors. It is, in fact, 
 inclusive of all the factors which in any way have gone to 
 make the social life of man. The psychological theory of 
 society, leaving ample place as it does to all other factors, 
 must be considered, therefore, when fully developed, to 
 represent the synthetic or final stage in the development of 
 sociological theory. 
 
 If there be in the social life a real coordination or in- 
 tegration of the activities, feelings, thoughts and ideals of 
 individuals and if, moreover, the social life contain the 
 end of its development within itself, what objection is there 
 to calling society a psychical organism ? 1 The reply is that 
 
 i Cf. Giddings, Principles of Sociology, p. 420, also Barth's article, 
 "Unrecht und Recht der Organischen Gesellschaftstheorie," Viertel- 
 jahrschrift fur mssenschaftliche Philosophie und Sociologie, Vol. 
 XXIV, pp. 69f. 
 
 389 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 there can be no objection except that some people so per- 
 sistently misunderstand the use of the word organism in, 
 this broad sense that it is perhaps wise, in order to avoid 
 misunderstanding, for social thinkers to employ it as little. 
 \as possible. To some minds the use of this term immedi- 
 ately suggests the older organic theory of society with all 
 its crude analogies and parallelisms. Moreover, when the 
 sociologist insists that there is a psychical unity in our social 
 life, that the social process is a unified process, he accom- 
 plishes all that he would accomplish by employing the 
 phrase psychical organism. 
 
 The social life is, then, a process. It is a process of liv- 
 ing together. In this process of living together social 
 groups necessarily become functional unities, unities which 
 do work more or less as unities. In this process of living 
 together, however, and in carrying on a common life the 
 psychical elements of impulse, feeling and thought, and 
 their expressions in communication, imitation, suggestion 
 and other types of mental interaction, are the vital, con- 
 stituent elements which make it possible to carry on a com- 
 mon life. The social process is, therefore, essentially psy- 
 chical in its nature and the social life must be interpreted, 
 if interpreted scientifically, not in terms of mechanical 
 causation, but in terms of interstimulation and response. 
 The social life is, therefore, essentially a psychical process, 
 more or less unified, because more or less directed to the 
 carrying on of common, though differentiated and inte- 
 grated, activities. If societies may be styled organisms in 
 any sense they are therefore preeminently' psychical or 
 moral organisms. 
 
 The Meaning of the Social Life. — The question of the 
 meaning of human social life belongs to philosophical ethics 
 rather than to sociology. However, a few words may prop- 
 erly be said upon this question in concluding our discussion 
 in order to gather together and make clear the implications 
 of this text. Three principal theories as to the meaning 
 
 390 
 
; THE NATURE OF SOCIETY 
 
 of our social life are to be found in the ethical and socio- 
 logical writings of to-day. The first is the theory that the 
 goal and purpose of human society, and therefore the whole 
 meaning of our social life, is to be found in the happiness 
 of individuals. According to this theory the subjective con- 
 dition of a preponderance of agreeable over disagreeable 
 feelings in the mass of individuals is the adequate and 
 rational aim of human association. Without entering into 
 a detailed criticism of this hedonistic theory as to the mean- 
 ing of man's social life, it is perhaps sufficient to say that 
 if the view which we have striven to present is at all cor- 
 rect no merely subjective element can be made the goal 
 of human social development or give adequate meaning to 
 that process. And especially so subjective an element as 
 agreeable feeling in individuals cannot be made the mean- 
 ing and goal of social development. The subjective ele- 
 ments, as we have seen, are functional to the whole of life, 
 while the feeling element at any particular moment is 
 merely functional to the individual organism. Moreover, 
 because of the close connection of feeling with instinct and 
 habit people can be happy in almost any situation to which 
 they become habituated, provided that such a situation 
 affords satisfaction to their animal instincts. The concept of 
 happiness is, therefore, all but useless as a guide in the vast 
 'and complex forces of modern social life. No more elusive 
 goal could be set for social science or practical social policy 
 than the maximization of human happiness. It is notorious 
 that it is not certain that civilization has added anything to 
 the happiness of the peoples among whom it has been most 
 highly developed. To be sure, this may be no necessary 
 consequence of civilization; but the futility of the chase 
 after happiness, enjoyment, comfort, and pleasure by all 
 classes in modern society emphasizes the inadequacy of this 
 subjectivistic ideal. This is not saying, however, that the 
 happiness of individuals should not be included as one ele- 
 ment in the end or meaning of the social life. The socio- 
 
 391 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 logical view, as we have already repeatedly emphasized, 
 is a synthesis of all elements of value in human society, and 
 the happiness of individuals is certainly one of these, though 
 by no means the supreme element of value. 
 
 A second theory of the meaning of human society found 
 in the thought of to-day is that human society is for the 
 development of personality, that is, the self-realization or 
 self-development of the individual. Conceived broadly 
 enough there is perhaps little objection to this theory; but 
 as we have already seen the popular interpretation of this 
 theory is that the self -culture and self-development of the 
 individual is an adequate ideal of life by itself. This makes 
 the end of social development again quite entirely subjec- 
 tive and individualistic. It is perhaps sufficient to say in 
 criticism of this social and ethical doctrine that the mean- 
 ing of the social life cannot lie merely in individual devel- 
 opment, because individual development apart from social 
 considerations gives no assurance of an ideal social life. It 
 is this very ideal, indeed, together with the hedonistic ideal, 
 which is the source of most of the anarchistic and disinte- 
 grating tendencies in modern society. If there is to be any 
 sort of unity in the social life, then the ideal of social 
 development cannot be an individual superman or any 
 number of individual supermen. The ideal of development 
 must be some sort of society of individuals. As Professor 
 Adler says, ' ' the moral ideal is to be described as a perfect 
 society instead of a perfect individual. ' ' r 
 
 We therefore come to the third and final theory of the 
 
 i International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XX, p. 394. Professor 
 Adler adds, " Actual human society, the concrete basis upon which 
 this ideal structure is to be superimposed, supplies meaning to the 
 abstract relations stated, while conversely, the abstract ideal fur- 
 nishes a. margin of infinitely possible extension to the system of 
 human relationships upon which it operates." This is the social 
 view of the moral ideal, it is unnecessary to add, which has been 
 constantly implied in this text. 
 
 392 
 
THE NATURE OF SOCIETY 
 
 meaning of our social life, namely, that it is not simply for 
 the sake of happiness, nor even so much for the sake of the 
 development of self, as it is for the sake of the development 
 of a harmoniou s and perfect society of individuals. The 
 goal and purpose of our social life, according to this view 
 is not self-realization, but the progressive realization of a 
 society of harmoniously adjusted individuals. Not the de- 
 velopment of self, but the development of humanity, in a 
 word, is the meaning of society. Self -culture, or self-realiza- 
 tion, is good as an ideal only in so far as it conduces to the 
 development of humanity. Practically, for the individual, 
 therefore, the ideal becomes a life of service, a life, in other 
 words, in which he shares in and strives to realize the high- 
 est life for all humanity. Self-development is thus only 
 a means to a larger end. The individual lives not for him- 
 self but for his race. Happiness and self-development 
 should be for him but means to service. 
 
 This ideal is synthetic, because it includes all elements, 
 of permanent value in human social life ; and it therefore 
 answers the requirements of sociological science. It includes 
 the ideal of self -development, because the development of 
 the individual in accordance with the requirements of a 
 -progressive social life is the first condition for the realiza- 
 tion of humanity. The individual finds his own self-realiza- 
 tion in the development of the life of humanity, not an 
 arbitrary self-realization, but one conditioned and limited 
 by the needs of the larger life of which he is a part. This 
 ideal also includes the happiness of the individual for the 
 most efficient service and most harmonious social life can 
 be secured only when reenf orced by agreeable feeling. Thus 
 the humanitarian ideal is synthetic of all subordinate ideals, 
 giving them their due place and value, but taking from 
 them the danger necessarily inherent in them when given 
 the first place in the social life. 
 
 Moreover, the humanitarian ideal is alone absolutely 
 constructive from a social point of view. Individualistic 
 
 393 
 
..;.' 
 
 SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 and hedonistic ideals are, as we have seen, to a certain ex- 
 tent destructive of social possessions. They work, not 
 toward social conservation, but toward social exploitation 
 for the benefit of special classes and privileged individuals. 
 The great fundamental need of our civilization, therefore, 
 is an ethics of service, a humanitarian ethics which will 
 teach the individual to find his self-development and his 
 happiness in the unselfish service of others, and which will 
 forbid any individual, class, nation, or even race from re- 
 garding itself as an end in itself apart from the rest of 
 humanity. 1 
 
 Only this meaning of our social life — that it is for the 
 development of a humanity, all of whose elements shall be 
 harmoniously adjusted to one another and to the require- 
 ments of existence — is adequate to explain the great social 
 movements of our time. From the International Peace 
 Movement and the Conservation Movement down to the 
 humblest of present-day philanthropies, the ideal of the 
 service of man and of the development of a perfect human- 
 ity dominates, even though it has not yet penetrated very 
 effectively into our business, our politics, or our education. 
 
 It is often said that this ideal is vague and that it has 
 no definite content in it. The reply is that the develop- 
 ment of humanity must in the nature of things be not a 
 static and definite, but a dynamic and expanding, ideal. 
 The ideal is one of progress, in other words, and does not 
 admit any more than life itself of complete definition. The 
 direction of progress is, however, clear, namely, that it is 
 a progress toward a completer adjustment of all factors, 
 both internal and external, in the life of humanity, to the 
 requirements of its existence. This means that the process 
 
 ( i It is a pleasure to add that the trend of much of the best eth- 
 ical thinking of the present, despite eddies in the stream, is in this 
 direction; and it is unnecessary to say that practically all of the 
 literature of high moral purpose since the establishment of Chris- 
 tianity has inculcated more or less this ethical ideal. 
 
 394 
 
THE NATURE OF SOCIETY 
 
 is one of the progressive rationalization of all factors in 
 the social life, and so of progressive control by the higher 
 and spiritual elements in life over the lower and more brutal 
 elements. 
 
 The outcome of any rational sociology must be, there- 
 fore, to point to, even if it does not establish, a humanita- 
 rian ethics and a humanitarian religion. Thus, as Comte 
 foresaw, science in its final development as applied to the 
 social life of man, is in harmony with the highest develop- 
 lent of morality and religion which we know. Science, 
 wrality and religion must all unite in the work of realizing 
 perfected human social life, or in theological phrase, in 
 le establishment of " the Kingdom of God." 
 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 The appended list of selected references will, it is hoped, be 
 found more useful than an extended bibliography. For specific 
 references on the topics treated in the several chapters the reader 
 should consult the foot-notes scattered throughout the book. In 
 using the work as a text, appropriate collateral reading can also be 
 found suggested in the foot-notes. 
 
 Works on Sociology 
 
 Achelis, Thomas. Soziologie Leipzig, 1899. 
 
 Bagehot, Walter. Physics and Politics. New York, 1902. 
 
 Barth, Paul. Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie. Leip- 
 zig, 1897. 
 
 Bauer, Arthur. Essai sur les revolutions. Paris, 1908. 
 
 Bauer, Arthur. Les classes sociales. Paris, 1902. 
 
 Bentley, Arthur F. The Process of Government: A Study of Social 
 Pressures. Chicago, 1908. 
 
 Blackmar, Frank W. Elements of Sociology. New York, 1905. 
 
 Carver, Thomas Nixon. Sociology and Social Progress. Boston, 
 1906. 
 
 Comte, Auguste. Cows de philosophie positive. Fifth edition. 
 6 vols. Paris, 1892. 
 
 Comte, Auguste. Positive Philosophy. Translated by Harriet 
 Martineau. Third edition. London, 1893. 
 
 Comte, Auguste. System of Positive Polity. A Treatise on So- 
 ciology. Translated 4 vols. London, 1875. 
 
 Cornejo, M. H. Sociologie generate. 2 vols. Paris, 1911. 
 
 Dealey, James Quayle. Sociology, Its Simpler Teachings and Ap- 
 plications. New York, 1909. 
 
 De Greef, Guillaume. Introduction a la sociologie. 3 vols. Paris, 
 1886-1904. 
 
 397 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 De Greef, Guillaume. Le transformisme social. Paris, 1902. 
 Durkheim, Emile. Les rkgles de la methode sociologique. Paris, 
 
 1904. 
 Durkheim, Emile. De la division du travail social. Paris, 1893. 
 Eleutheropulos, A. Sociologie. Jena, 1904. 
 Espinas, Alfred. Des societes animates. Paris, 1878. 
 Fairbanks, Arthur. Introduction to Sociology. Third edition. 
 
 New York, 1900. 
 Fiske, John. Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy. 2 vols. Boston, 
 
 1890. 
 Forrest, J. D. Development of Western Civilization. Chicago, 1907.- 
 Giddings, Franklin H. Principles of Sociology. New York, 1896, - ' 
 
 third edition, 1905. 
 Giddings, Franklin H. Elements of Sociology. New York, 1898. 
 Giddings, Franklin H. Inductive Sociology. New York, 1901. 
 Giddings, Franklin H. Descriptive and Historical Sociology. New 
 
 York, 1908. 
 Gumplowicz, Ludwig. Outlines of Sociology. Translated by F. 
 
 W. Moore. Philadelphia, 1899. 
 Gumplowicz, Ludwig. Der Rassenkampf. Innsbruck, 1883. 
 Gumplowicz, Ludwig. Sozialphilosophie im Umriss: Innsbruck, 
 
 1910. 
 Hobhouse, Leonard T. Social Evolution and Political Theory. 
 
 New York, 1911. 
 Howard, George Elliott. General Sociology. An Analytical Refer- 
 ence Syllabus. Lincoln, Neb., 1907. 
 Kidd, Benjamin. Social Evolution. New York, 1895. 
 Kidd, Benjamin. Principles of Western Civilization. New York, 
 
 1902. 
 Lamprecht, Karl. What is History? New York, 1905. 
 Lilienfeld, Paul von. Gedanken uber die Socialwissenschaft der 
 
 Zukunft. 5 vols. Mitau, 1873-81. 
 Loria, Achille. Economic Foundations of Society. Translated by 
 
 L. M. Keasbey. London, 1904. 
 Mackenzie, J. S. Introduction to Social Philosophy. Glasgow, 
 
 1895. 
 Muller-Lyer, F. Phasen der Kultur und Richtungslinien des Fort- 
 
 schritts: Sociologische Uberblicke. Munich, 1908. 
 398 
 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Miiller-Lyer, F. Der Sinn des Lebens und die Wissenschaft: Grundr 
 
 Knien einer Volksphilosophie. Munich, 1910. 
 Novicow, Jacques. Limites et mechanisme de I'association humaine. 
 
 Paris, 1911. 
 Ratzenhofer, Gustav. Wesen und Zweck der Politik als Theil der 
 , , Sociologie. 3 vols. , Leipzig, 1893. 
 
 Ratzenhofer, Gustav. Die sociologische Erkenntnis. Leipzig, 1898. 
 Ratzenhofer, Gustav. Soziologie. Leipzig, 1907. 
 Ross, Edward Alsworth. Foundations of Sociology. New York, 
 
 1905. 
 SchaeiHe, Albert. Bau und Leben des Socialen Korpers. Second 
 
 edition. 2 vols. Tuebingen, 1896. 
 Schaeffle, Albert. Abriss der Soziologie. Tuebingen, 1906. 
 Simmel, Georg. Soziologie. Untersuchungen fiber die Formen der 
 
 Vergesellschaftung. ' Leipzig, 1908. 
 Simmel, Georg. Uber sociale Differenzierung. Leipzig, 1890. 
 Small, Albion W. General Sociology. Chicago, 1905. 
 Small, Albion W. Adam Smith and Modern Sociology. Chicago, 
 
 1907. 
 Small, Albion W. The Meaning of Social Science. Chicago, 1910. 
 Spencer, Herbert. The Study of Sociology. New York, 1873. 
 Spencer, Herbert. Principles of Sociology. Third edition. 3 
 
 vols. New York, 1906. 
 Stein, Ludwig. Die sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie. Ber- 
 , : Tin, 1897. 
 
 Stein, Ludwig. Wesen und Aufgabe der Sociologie. Berlin, 1898. 
 ■Stuekenberg, J. H. W. Introduction to the Study of Sociology. 
 
 New York, 1898. 
 Stuckenberg, J. H. W. Sociology: The Science of Human Society. 
 
 2 vols. New York, 1904. 
 Tonnies, Ferdinand. Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Leipzig, 1887. 
 Vaccaro, M. A. Les bases sociologiques du droit et del' Stat. Paris, 
 
 1898. 
 Ward, Lester F. Dynamic Sociology. 2 vols. New York, 1883. 
 Ward, Lester F. Outlines of Sociology. New York, 1898. 
 Ward, Lester F. Pure Sociology. New York, 1903. 
 Ward, Lester F. Applied Sociology. Boston, 1906. 
 'Waxweiler, Emile. Esquisse d'une sociologie. Brussels, 1903. 
 Worms, Rene\ Organisme et Soci6t&. Paris, 1896. 
 
 r 399 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 Worms, Rend. Philosophie des sciences societies. 3 vols. Paris, 
 1903-07. 
 
 Periodicals: American Journal of Sociology. 
 
 Annates de I'Institut International de Sociologie. 
 
 U annee sociologique. 
 
 Archives sociologiques (formerly Bulletin mensuel) de 
 
 I'Institut de Sociologie Solvay. 
 Archiv fur Rassen und Gesellschaftsbiologie. 
 Revue Internationale de sociologie. 
 The Sociological Review. 
 Vierteljahrschrift fur Wissenschaftliche Philosophie und 
 
 Sociologie. 
 
 A further bibliography of works on general sociology can be 
 found in Professor Howard's General Sociology: An Analytical 
 Reference Syllabus. For recent works the lists in the Archives 
 sociologiques of the Solvay Institute of Sociology cannot be excelled. 
 
 II 
 Works on Psychology 
 
 Angell, James Rowland. Psychology. Third edition. New York, 
 
 1906. 
 Baldwin, James Mark. Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. 
 
 3 vols. New York, 1900-06. 
 Dewey, John. Psychology. New York, 1896. 
 Hall, G. Stanley. Adolescence. 2 vols. New York, 1904. 
 Hobhouse, Leonard T. Mind in Evolution. New York, 1904. 
 James, William. Principles of Psychology. 2 vols. New York, 
 
 1890. 
 James, William. Psychology, Briefer Course. New York, 1893. 
 Jastrow, Joseph. The Subconscious. Boston, 1906. 
 Jennings, H. S. Behavior of Lower Organisms. New York, 1906. 
 Judd, Charles Hubbard. Psychology. New York, 1907. 
 Kirkpatrick, Edwin A. Fundamentals of Child Study. Revised 
 
 edition. New York, 1908. 
 
 400 
 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Kirkpatrick, Edwin A. The Individual in the Making. Boston, 
 1911. 
 
 Kiilpe, 0. Outlines of Psychology. London, 1895. 
 
 Loeb, Jacques. Comparative Physiology of the Brain and Compara- 
 tive Psychology. New York, 1903. 
 
 Marshall, Henry Rutgers. Consciousness. New York, 1909. 
 
 Meyer, Max. Fundamental Laws of- Human Behavior. Boston, 
 1911. 
 
 Miller, Irving E. Psychology of Thinking. New York, 1909. 
 
 Morgan, C. Lloyd. Habit and Instinct. London, 1896. 
 
 Morgan, C. Lloyd. Introduction to Comparative Psychology. New 
 York, 1903. 
 
 Morgan, C. Lloyd. Animal Behavior. London, 1900. 
 
 Parmelee, Maurice. The Science of Human Behavior: Biological 
 and Psychological Foundations. New York, 1913. 
 
 Pillsbury, W. B. The Essentials of Psychology. New York, 1911. 
 
 Pratt, James Bissett. Psychology of Religious Belief. New York, 
 1907. 
 
 Pyle, William Howard. Outlines of Educational Psychology. Bal- 
 timore, 1911. 
 
 Royce, Josiah. Outlines of Psychology. New York, 1904. 
 
 Sisson, Edward O. The Essentials of Character. New York, 1910. 
 
 Stratton, George Malcolm. Experimental Psychology and Culture. 
 New York, 1903. 
 
 Titchener, Edward Bradford. An Outline of Psychology. New 
 York, 1896. 
 
 Titchener, Edward Bradford. Text-book of Psychology. New York, 
 1910. 
 
 Thorndike, Edward L. Elements of Psychology. New York, 1905. 
 
 Thorndike, Edward L. Animal Intelligence. New York, 1911. 
 
 Washburn, Margaret Floy. The Animal Mind. New York, 1908. 
 
 Wasmann, Eric. Instinct and Intelligence. St. Louis, 1903. 
 
 Wundt, Wilhelm. Human and Animal Psychology. New York, 
 1894. 
 
 Wundt, Wi helm. Outlines of Psychology. Translated by C. H. 
 Judd. Leipzig, 1902. 
 
 Yerkes, Robert M. Introduction to Psychology. New York, 1911. 
 
 401 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 Periodicals: American Journal of Psychology. 
 L'ann&e psychologique. 
 British Journal of Psychology. . 
 Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific 
 
 Methods. 
 Mind. 
 
 Psychological Bulletin. 
 Psychological Review. 
 Psychological Index (published by the Psychological 
 
 Review). 
 
 Ill 
 
 Works on Social Psychology and Psychological Sociology 
 In addition to the works listed under I and II, see the following: 
 
 Ames, Edward Scribner. Psychology of Religious Experience. 
 
 Boston, 1910. 
 Anderson, Benjamin M., Jr. Social Value. Boston, 1911. 
 Baldwin, James Mark. Social and Ethical Interpretations in Men- 
 tal Development. Fourth edition. New York, 1906. 
 Baldwin, James Mark. Mental Development in the Child and the 
 
 Race. Third edition New York, 1906. 
 Baldwin, James Mark. The Individual and Society. Boston, 1910. 
 Bernard, Luther Lee. The Transition to an Objective Standard of 
 
 Social Control. Chicago, 1910. 
 Brinton, Daniel G The Basis of Social Relations. New York, 
 
 1902. 
 Cooley, Charles Horton Human Nature and the Social Order. 
 
 New York, 1902. 
 Cooley, Charles Horton. Social Organization. A Study of the 
 
 Larger Mind. New York, 1909. 
 Davis, Michael M. Psychological Interpretations of Society. New 
 
 York, 1909. 
 Ellis, Havelock. Sex in Relation to Society. Philadelphia, 1910. 
 Ellis, Havelock. The Psychology of Sex. Philadelphia, 1905. 
 Fite, Warner. Individualism. Four Lectures on the Significance 
 
 of Consciousness for Social Relations. New York, 1911. 
 402 
 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Fouillee, Alfred. La science sociale contemporaine. Fourth edi- 
 tion. Paris, 1904. 
 
 Fouillee, Alfred. L'evolutionisme des idies-forces. Paris, 1898. 
 
 Hobhouse, Leonard T. Morals in Evolution. 2 vols. New York, 
 1906. 
 
 Howard, George Elliott. Social Psychology. An Analytical Refer- 
 ence Syllabus. Lincoln, Neb., 1910. 
 
 James, William. The Will to Believe. New York, 1897. 
 
 Lacombe, P. La psychologie des individus et des societes. Paris, 
 1906. 
 
 Le Bon, Gustave. The Crowd: a Study of the Popular Mind. New 
 York, 1903. 
 
 Le Bon, Gustave. The Psychology of Peoples. New York, 1898. 
 
 McDougall, William. An Introduction to Social Psychology. Bos- 
 ton, 1909. 
 
 Marshall, Henry Rutgers. Instinct and Reason. New York, 1898. 
 
 Maxwell, J. Psychologic sociale contemporaine. Paris, 1911. 
 
 Novicow, Jacques. Conscience et Volonte sociales. Paris, 1897. 
 
 Patten, Simon N. Theory of Social Forces. Philadelphia, 1896. 
 
 Ross, Edward Alsworth. Social Control. New York, 1901. 
 
 Ross, Edward Alsworth. Social Psychology. New York, 1908. 
 
 Ross, Edward Alsworth. Sin and Society. Boston, 1907. 
 
 Scott, Walter Dill. The Psychology of Advertising. Boston, 1908. 
 
 Sidis, Boris. The Psychology of Suggestion. A Research into the 
 Subconscious Nature of Man and Society. New York, 1906. 
 
 Sighele, Scipio. Psychologie des sectes. Paris, 1898. 
 
 Sumner, William Graham. Folkways. Boston, 1907. 
 
 Sutherland, Alexander. Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct. 
 2 vols. London, 1898. 
 
 Tarde, Gabriel. The Laws of Imitation. Translated by Mrs. 
 Elsie Clews Parsons. New York, 1903. 
 
 Tarde, Gabriel. Social Laws Translated by H. C. Warren. 
 New York, 1899. 
 
 Tarde, Gabriel. La logique sociale. Paris, 1894. 
 
 Tarde, Gabriel. L 'opposition universelle. Paris, 1897. 
 
 Tarde, Gabriel. Etudes de psychologie sociale, Paris, 1898. 
 
 Thomas, William Isaac. Sex and Society. Chicago, 1907. 
 
 Thomas, William Isaac. Source Book for Social Origins. Chi- 
 cago, 1909. 
 
 27 403 
 
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
 
 Thorndike, Edward L. Individuality. Boston, 1910. 
 
 Veblen, Thorstein. Theory of the Leisure Class. New York, 1899. 
 
 Wallas, Graham. Human Nature in Politics. London, 1910. 
 
 Ward, Lester F. Psychic Factors of Civilization. Boston, 1893. 
 
 Westermarck, Edward. Origin and Growth of Moral Ideas. 2 
 vols. London, 1906-08. 
 
 Worms, Ren6, editor. Les rapports de la sociologie et de la psycho- 
 logie (Vol. X, 1904, Annales de I'Institut International de Socio- 
 logie). Paris, 1904. 
 
 Wundt, Wilhelm. Volkerpsychologie. Second edition. 2 vols, in 
 5 parts. Leipzig, 1904-09. 
 
 For further bibliography of works on social psychology, see 
 Howard's Social Psychology: An Analytical Reference Syllabus. 
 The Psychological Index (published by The Psychological Review) 
 has each year a very complete list of all books and articles on folk 
 and social psychology that have appeared within the year. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abnormal classes, 46, 189. 
 Abstract thought, 132-3, 136. 
 Achelis, Thomas, 28. 
 Acquired habits, 106-9, 146, 152, 
 
 155, 207, 210, 299, 303, 353. 
 Acquired traits, 106, 219, 372. 
 Acquisitiveness, instinct of, 
 
 226-7. 
 Activity, the point of view in 
 
 psychology and sociology, 96- 
 
 104, 122, 143-6, 197, 249-59. 
 Adaptation, 98, 101, 108, 110, 
 
 118, 144-5, 174-7, 261, 263, 
 
 291, 368. 
 Adaptation and consciousness, 98, 
 
 104, 108-9, 118-20. 
 Adaptation and society, 109, 144- 
 
 6, 174, 176, 177, 180, 261, 263, 
 
 291-2, 368-9. 
 Adler, Felix, 392. 
 Altruism, 120, 135, 156-7, 222, 
 
 310-2, 313-4, 320, 323-7; defi- 
 nition of, 314; connections with 
 
 sympathy, 313-4. 
 Altruistic impulses, natural, 
 
 120-1. 
 Ames, E. S., 38, 122, 332. 
 Amusements, 232-3. 
 Anarchy in revolutionary periods, 
 
 168, 170. 
 
 Anderson, B. M., 34, 89. 
 
 Angell, James Rowland, 58, 96, 
 
 97, 98, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 
 
 112, 115, 117, 118, 119. 
 Animal societies, 17-9, 297, 350; 
 
 differences from human, 132-7, 
 
 151, 296-7, 349-50. 
 Anthropo-geographical theory of 
 
 society, 370-1. 
 Anthropology, cultural, 49, 88; 
 
 physical, 56. 
 Antisocial traits of man, 138-9. 
 Applied science, 44, 45. 
 Applied social sciences, 45-7. 
 Applied sociology, 45, 46. 
 Aristotle, 35, 136, 184, 200, 201, 
 
 233, 317. 
 Association, 9, 14, 21, 33, 124, 
 
 126, 128, 131, 137, 199, 279, 
 
 281, 341-51; origin of, 124-30; 
 
 nature of human, 131-7, 141- 
 
 54, 382-95; forms of, 6, 8, 24, 
 
 149, 341-51; classification of 
 
 forms of, 345-50; factors in, 
 
 279-88. 
 Association of ideas, 108. 
 Associational process, 15, 21, 60, 
 
 63, 141, 143-54, 199, 343. 
 Attention, 108, 118, 238. 
 Authority, 36, 182-5, 350, 354- 
 
 60. 
 Automaton theory, the, 71, 72. 
 
 405 
 
INDEX 
 
 B 
 
 Bagley, W. C, 44. 
 
 Baldwin, James Mark, 11, 17, 59, 
 
 61, 133, 243, 268, 269, 291, 292, 
 
 295, 296, 297, 299, 301, 303, 
 
 311, 313, 315. 
 Balfour, A. J., 98. 
 Barth, Paul, 49, 53, 370. 
 Bascom, John, 3. 
 Bateson, W., 99. 
 Behavior, psychology as a science 
 
 of, 95, 96, 98. 
 Beliefs, 150-1, 238-9, 273, 357, 
 
 363-4. 
 Bentham, Jeremy, 113, 248. 
 Bentley, Arthur F., 249, 250, 251, 
 
 252, 262, 263. 
 Bernard, H. M., 124, 125. 
 Bernard, L. L., 112, 114, 248, 255, 
 
 258. 
 Biological sociology, 22, 55, 57, 
 
 G3, 64, 280. 
 Biological theory of society, 56, 
 
 280, 371-3. 
 Biology, 31, 45, 46, 55, 56, 63, 121, 
 
 343 ; relation to sociology, 55- 
 
 7, 63-4. 
 Blood bond, 321. 
 Bodin, John, 163, 317. 
 Bougie, C, 52. 
 Buckle, H. T., 370. 
 
 C 
 
 Cannibalism, 139. 
 
 Carver, T. ST., 25, 33, 89. 
 
 Caste societies 194. 
 
 Causation, social, 76-78; physi- 
 cal, 77; psychical, 76, 77; 
 " natural," 77. 
 
 Charitology, 46. 
 
 Charity, social function of, 189, 
 326-7. 
 
 Child, the, social significance of, 
 129, 130, 135, 215. 
 
 Christianity, 187, 305, 326, 344, 
 357, 359. 
 
 Chronic revolution, 170. 
 
 Civilization, 5, 10, 133, 174-6, 
 189, 239, 265, 267, 271; socio- 
 logy as a science of, 5 ; static, 
 174-5 ; dynamic, 175-6 ; and in 
 stinct, 239-42; an intellectual 
 achievement, 133, 267, 271-3. 
 
 Classification, of sociological 
 problems, 22; of the sociil 
 sciences, 54, 55; of human in- 
 stincts, 210-1; of the social 
 forces, 283-7 ; of forms of as- 
 sociation, 345-57. 
 
 Class struggle, 162, 163, 193, 
 361-2. 
 
 Co-adaptation, social, 144-54, 180, 
 181, 300-2, 308, 341-2. 
 
 Coker, F. W„ 387. 
 
 Collective life-process, defined, 
 65. 
 
 Collective or common life, 12, 16, 
 65, 121, 125-9, 131, 143-6, 14S, 
 152-4, 388-90. 
 
 Collectivism, 179, 334. 
 
 Combative instinct, 216-9. 
 
 Communication, 22, 141, 197, 
 153-5, 185. 
 
 Comparative method, 87, 88. 
 
 Component societies, 348-9. 
 
 Comte, Auguste, 7, 9, 11, 15, 23, 
 24, 26, 27, 40, 41, 42, 44, 53, 
 60, 73, 74, 75, 86, 151, 201, 
 202, 216, 262, 266, 272,273,274, 
 275, 363, 366, 367, 377, 395. 
 
 Condorcet, 52. 
 
 Confidence, function of, 158. 
 
 Conflict, 13, 128, 139, 15S-63, 
 166-9, 195, 216-9, 361-4; be- 
 tween groups, 158-60; within 
 
 406 
 
INDEX 
 
 the social group, 160-62 ; with- 
 in national groups, 161 ; of 
 classes, 162-3, 193, 361; of 
 ideals, 362-4; and social order, 
 361-4. 
 
 Conflict school of sociologists, 
 193. 
 
 Confusion in periods of tran- 
 sition, 173. 
 
 Consciousness, and bodily move- 
 ment, 97-9; function of, 98, 
 104, 110, 114, 118, 121; selec- 
 tive nature of, 104; its three 
 aspects, 109, 110; origin of 
 social nature of, 130, 131. 
 
 Consciousness of kind, 12, 294, 
 298, 315-7, 325-6; connection 
 with sympathy, 315-7. 
 
 Consciousness, social, 329, 331-4. 
 
 Conservation, social, 194. 
 
 Conservatism, 176-7, 255-7. 
 
 Constituent societies, 348-9. 
 
 Constraint, social, 182-5. 
 
 Constructiveness, instinct of, 
 231-2. 
 
 Contract theory of society, 37, 
 137, 382-5. 
 
 Control, social 181-9, 198, 350, 
 353-61; and social order, 353- 
 61; government as means of, 
 183-5, 355-6 ; religion as means 
 of, 186-8, 356-7; morality as 
 means of, 188, 358-9; edu- 
 cation as means of, 186, 360. 
 
 Convention, 302. 
 
 Cooley, Charles Horton, 16, 42, 
 133, 331, 332, 335, 336, 338, 
 346. 
 
 Cooperation, 13, 127, 147-8, 221, 
 267, 317, 320; origin of, 127, 
 145-6, 221, 267. 
 
 Coordinating ideas, 151, 167, 
 276. 
 
 Coordination, social, 144-54, 173, 
 181-91, 196-8, 299-302, 319- 
 20, 341, 352 ; expressions of, 
 148-51; origin of, 145-6; types 
 of, 149, 345-50. 
 
 Coordination, the psycho-physi- 
 cal, 97, 103, 107, 108. 
 
 Cornejo, M. H., 12, 349. 
 
 Coursault, J. H., 48. 
 
 Couvade, the, 307. 
 
 Critical and constructive periods, 
 173. 
 
 Criticism, public, function of, 
 153-4, 165, 173. 
 
 Crowds, psychology of, 169, 243. 
 
 Cultural group, 10. 
 
 Custom, 34, 148-9, 256, 302, 304, 
 351, 354. 
 
 D 
 
 Darwin, 145, 323. 
 
 Darwinism, 99. 
 
 Davenport, H. J., 33. 
 
 Davis, M. M., 145, 146, 294, 331. 
 
 Dealey, James Quayle, 11, 174, 
 
 380. 
 Deductive methods in sociology, 
 
 88-92. 
 Defense against enemies, 128, 
 
 158-60, 216-8. 
 DeGreef, G., 383, 387. 
 Democracy, 171, 230. 
 Demography, 28, 49, 50. 
 Desire, 117, 202, 249, 254. 
 Desires, the, as social forces, 117, 
 
 248, 252, 284. 
 Despotism, 165, 171. 
 Determinism, 72, 73; economic, 
 
 373-5. 
 Devine, E. T., 189, 376. 
 DeVries, Hugo, 99. 
 Dewey, John, 94, 97, 115, 118. 
 Dictatorship, sociology of, 171. 
 
 407 
 
INDEX 
 
 Differences, individual, 233-7; of 
 sex, 334-7; of race, 237. 
 
 Discovery, role of in society, 
 S67-71. 
 
 Discrimination, 108. 
 
 Discussion, 153-4, 160, 165, 336. 
 
 Disintegrating ideas, 167. 
 
 Driesch, H., 100. 
 
 Drummond, Henry, 323, 324. 
 
 Dualism, 70, 82. 
 
 Durkheim, Emile, 182, 369. 
 
 Dynamic civilizations, 175. 
 
 Dynamic problems of sociology, 
 23-6. 
 
 Dynamic sociology, 26, 53, 55. 
 
 E 
 
 Economics, a social science, 3, 20, 
 29 ; relations to sociology, 32-5. 
 
 Economic determinism, 300, 373- 
 5. 
 
 Economic theory of social prog- 
 ress, 373-6. 
 
 Economic value, 34. 
 
 Education, 44-5, 136, 137, 186, 
 204, 240, 242, 272, 360, 378, 
 380-1; social function of, 186- 
 7, 240; as means of social con- 
 trol, 360; as means of social 
 reconstruction, 45, 137, 186, 
 242, 378-9, 381. 
 
 Educational theory of social 
 progress, 378-9. 
 
 Egoism, 121, 191, 211, 274, 313; 
 of groups, 191, 193. 
 
 Ellis, Havelock, 64, 134. 
 
 Ely, Richard T., 33. 
 
 Emotions, the, 115-7, 207, 209, 
 241, 253, 311. 
 
 Emulation, instinct of, 219. 
 
 Environment, 98, 100-4, 105-6, 
 110, 118-9, 122, 159, 204, 206, 
 
 279-81, 370-1, 373-5; sub- 
 jective, 265-6. 
 
 Espinas, Alfred, 11, 12, 18, 126, 
 128. 
 
 Ethics, relations to sociology, 39- 
 43; importance of, 44, 188, 
 358-9. 
 
 Ethnographical method, the, 87, 
 88. 
 
 Ethnography, 28, 88. 
 
 Ethnological theory of society, 
 371-3. 
 
 Ethnology, 28, 49, 50. 
 
 Eugenics, 327, 361, 372-3. 
 
 Evaluation, 104, 110, 112. 
 
 Evolution, meaning of word, 7; 
 theory of, 18, 56, 98, 99 ; social, 
 6, 18, 19, 23-5, 48, 56, 124-40, 
 152-4, 173-9, 243-5, 267-73, 
 304-7, 322-7, 370-80. 
 
 Exogamy, instinct of, 134. 
 
 Experiment in sociology, 85. 
 
 F 
 
 Factors in association, 278-88. 
 
 Fairbanks, Arthur, 10, 11. 
 
 Family life, 134, 135, 156, 158, 
 161, 213-5, 222, 251, 259, 276, 
 303, 310, 319, 321, 385. 
 
 Family, the, 129, 130, 148, 149, 
 150, 158, 161, 213-5, 222, 344. 
 
 Feeling, 109, 112-8, 150-1, 247- 
 60, 309-28; role of, in society, 
 150, 247-60, 309-28 ; as a social 
 force, 247-53, 282; as instinct, 
 252-3; as desire, 117, 249, 
 254; as interest, 117, 254; con- 
 servative tendency of, 255-7; 
 individualistic character of, 
 257-9. 
 
 Fiske, John, 135. 
 
 Fite, Warner, 39, 114, 329, 383. 
 
 408 
 
INDEX 
 
 Flint, Robert, 31, 48, 273. 
 
 Folkways, 148, 152, 188, 304, 337, 
 353. 
 
 Food-process, 126-8, 212-3, 216, 
 370-1. 
 
 Forces, social, 117, 246, 247-52, 
 260, 264-6, 278-87; the theory 
 of, 278-87; classification of, 
 283-6. 
 
 Forms of association, 6, 8, 24, 
 149, 341-51; definition of, 341- 
 2; practical importance of, 
 342-5; classifications of, 345- 
 51. 
 
 Forrest, J. D., 49. 
 
 Fouilliie, Alfred, 264, 387. 
 
 Free ideas, 132. 
 
 Freedom of the will, 70-3, 111. 
 
 Freedomism, 71-3. 
 
 Functional interpretation, limi- 
 tations of, 195-6. 
 
 Functional psychology, 95, 96, 
 180. 
 
 G 
 
 Galton, Francis, 240. 
 
 Garner, J. W., 35. 
 
 Generalization, 67, 74, 75, 91. 
 
 Genius, the, as a social factor, 
 268-71, 277. 
 
 Giddings, Franklin H., 4, 8, 12, 
 14, 78, 86, 89, 91, 133, 138, 
 144, 146, 147, 157, 182, 183, 
 220, 294, 298, 309, 310, 315, 
 316, 317, 318, 320, 325, 326,. 
 331, 336, 347, 348, 349, 350, 
 362, 389. 
 , Government, 35-8, 137, 183, 355; 
 function of, 183-4; as means 
 of social control, 355-6. 
 
 Graves, F. P., 44. 
 
 Great-man theory of history, 
 270-1. 
 
 Gregarious animals, 126, 220, 
 
 225, 290. 
 Gregarious instincts, 220-6, 280, 
 
 311. 
 Groos, Karl, 232. 
 Group egoism, 191-4. 
 Group individuality, 160, 190-3. 
 Group, the social, 11, 21, 22, 127, 
 
 138, 140, 143-6, 190-3, 341-2. 
 Group will, 160, 190-3, 198. 
 Groups, formation of, 125-30, 
 
 158-60, 191-2. ' 
 Gumplowicz, Ludwig, 16, 73, 
 
 193. 
 
 H 
 
 Habit, 79, 106-8, 109, 148, 152- 
 4, 160-1, 164-8, 173-80, 197, 
 207, 210, 255, 292, 303, 353. - 
 Habit and adaptation in social 
 
 life, 109, 153-4, 164, 173-80. 
 Habits, social, 148, 152-4, 160-2, 
 
 164-8, 197. 
 Haddon, A. G, 28. .jf 
 
 Hall, G. Stanley, 60, 106, $#2.| 
 Hayes, Edward C, 14, ]J5, $lW 
 278... ;4> .,J| 
 
 Hedonism, 42, 113-4, 241; 247^ 
 
 359, 391. Ji 
 
 Hedonistic theory of soci|ly, ' 
 
 248, 252, 259, 359, 391. •'?' 
 Hegel, 378. - ( 
 
 Henderson, C. R., 46. ■ 
 
 Herder, J. G., 52. , 
 
 Heredity, 56, 57, 64, 99, 105, 1^6, 
 206-7, 234, 237, 245, 279, 280, 
 294, 371-2; racial, 105;' 237, 
 371-2; "social," 303, 372. 
 Historical method, 49, 50, 52, 86, 
 ;, 87. 
 History, relations to sociology, 
 28, 47-55, 86, 87, 163-78, 370- "" 
 
 409 
 
INDEX 
 
 80; objective, 48; subjective or 
 
 written history, 49-52. 
 Hobbes, Thomas, 248, 383. 
 Hobhouse, L. T., 18, 101, 105, 
 
 121, 203, 272, 273, 343, 367, 
 
 368, 372, 373, 387. 
 Hoffding, H., 39. 
 Howard, G. E., 63. 
 Human society, origin of, 131- 
 
 40; peculiarities of, 133-7. 
 Humanitarian ethics, 140, 314, 
 
 324, 326, 393-5. 
 Humanity, the love of, 323, 
 
 334, 326, 328. 
 
 Idea-forces, 264-6. 
 
 Idealism, 69, 71, 82; social, 187, 
 268, 276. 
 
 Idealogical theory of society, 
 377-8. 
 
 Ideals, social value of, 188, 276, 
 363; conflict of, 362-4. 
 
 Imitation, 12, 13, 106, 154-5, 
 224-6, 289-309; the function 
 of, 154-5, 295-309; instinctive, 
 224-6; the r61e of in society, 
 289-309; psychology of, 289- 
 94; definition of, 289-91; con- 
 nections of, 293-4; theory of 
 society, 294-9; customary and 
 conventional, 302; as a con- 
 servative factor, 303-4; as a 
 factor in progress, 304-7. 
 
 [mpulse, 101, 110, 111. 
 
 Impulses, native, see Instinct. 
 
 tndividual, the, 11-5, 21-2, 50-1, 
 58-9, 61, 95, 125-6, 130-1, 142, 
 143, 189, 198, 234, 250-1, 257, 
 268-71, 281, 392; as a social 
 factor, 21-2, 51, 95, 142, 234, 
 250-1, 268-71, 281, 296. 
 
 Individual differences, 233-8. 
 
 Individualism, 122, 125, 174, 
 177-9, 258, 329, 383-5, 391-2; 
 philosophical, 121, 122, 383-5. 
 
 Individualistic character of feel- 
 ing, 112-3, 257-9. 
 
 Individualization, 177-9. 
 
 Inductive methods in sociology, 
 84-8. 
 
 Infancy, prolongation of, 135. 
 
 Instinct, 56, 79, 105, 106, 119, 
 133, 134, 135, 146, 152, 199- 
 246, 253, 255, 283, 290, 310; 
 definition of, 105, 199, 207; 
 r6le of in society, 199-246; in 
 historical social theories, 200- 
 3; misconceptions of, 203-5. 
 
 Instinctive interests, 238-9. 
 
 Instinctive origin of society, 
 132-4, 146, 245. 
 
 Instinctive reactions, 106, 146, 
 206-8. 
 
 Instincts, nature of human, 106, 
 206-9; classifications of, 210- 
 1; and human institutions, 
 209-33; and social progress, 
 243-5. 
 
 Institution, definition of, 21, 
 345. 
 
 Institutions, human, 133-7, 149, 
 174, 209-33, 256, 266, 345, 
 353; regulative, 183-8, 353- 
 60. 
 
 Intellect, the, 118-20, 261-71; 
 rOle of in society, 261-77; as 
 a social force, 262-6, 282 ; and 
 social progress, 271-6. 
 
 Intellectual elements, influence 
 of, 133, 261-71, 374-5, 282, 
 337-9, 377-8. 
 
 Intellectualistic view of society, 
 19, 137, 262, 273, 282, 377, 
 384. 
 
 410 
 
INDEX 
 
 Interaction, mental, 11-6, 21, 23, 
 
 68, 77, 125, 130-1, 141-2, 143- 
 
 6, 153-4, 281, 293. 
 Intercommunication, 153-4, 185. 
 Interest, 102, 117, 118, 238, 250, 
 
 285; inborn and acquired, 102, 
 
 118. 
 Interest groups, 191-4. 
 Interests as social forces, 118, 
 
 250, 285-6. 
 Interests, instinctive, 238. 
 Interstimulation and response, 
 
 12, 14, 77, 80, 127, 131, 141-2, 
 
 143, 153-4, 293. 
 Introspection, self-, 90. 
 Introspection, sympathetic, 90. 
 Invention, r6le of in society, 
 
 267-71, 277. 
 
 James, William, 58, 67, 68, 69, 
 72, 77, 97, 101, 104, 105, 106, 
 112, 115, 202, 203, 204, 208, 
 218, 223, 311, 353. 
 
 Jennings, H. S., 100, 101, 102, 
 103, 104, 206. 
 
 Jordan, David Starr, 218. 
 
 Judd, C. H., 58, 60, 105, 106, 107, 
 221. 
 
 Jurisprudence, relations to soci- 
 ology, 37, 38. 
 
 K 
 
 Kelsey, Carl, 199. 
 
 Kern, R. E., 158. 
 
 Kidd, Benjamin, 9, 38, 243, 274, 
 
 326. 
 King, Irving, 38. 
 Kirkpatrick, E. A., 105, 206, 211, 
 
 222. 
 Kropotkin, P., 17 
 
 Lamprecht, Karl, 174. 
 
 Law, function of, 183-5, 355. 
 
 Law of the Three States, 74, 273. 
 
 Law, the science of, relations to 
 sociology, 37, 38. 
 
 Laws, social, 73-80. 
 
 LeBon, Gustave, 169, 243. 
 
 Letourneau, C. H., 227. 
 
 Life-process, denned, 65; es- 
 sentially social, 124-5; collec- 
 tive or common, 65, 125, 131, 
 142, 143, 153, 181, 185-6, 329, 
 388, 390. 
 
 Like-mindedness, 12, 145, 156, 
 310, 315, 317, 325, 362-4. 
 
 Lilienfeld, Paul von, 386. 
 
 Lipps, T., 57. 
 
 Locke, John, 36, 383. 
 
 Loeb, Jacques, 206, 213. 
 
 Logic and sociology, 67, 82, 93. 
 
 Loria, Achille, 373. 
 
 Love of approbation, 223. 
 
 Love, sexual and parental, 106, 
 213-6, 253; ethical, 323, 324, 
 360; of humanity, 323, 324, 
 326, 328. 
 
 Loyalty, 223. 
 
 M 
 
 McDougall, William, 61, 201, 
 203, 207, 208, 213, 215, 218, 
 220, 221, 222, 225, 228, 289, 
 309, 310, 311, 313. 
 
 Mackenzie, J. S., 40, 50, 387. 
 
 Maladjustment, social, 188-9, 
 327. 
 
 Man, 17, 104, 105, 119, 120, 122, 
 130, 132, 134, 137, 146, 201, 
 206, 208, 212, 219, 225, 232, 
 240, 244, 264, 267, 270, 290, 
 
 411 
 
INDEX 
 
 297, 350; a social animal, 137- 
 9, 201, 219-21. 
 
 Marshall, Henry Rutgers, 210, 
 211, 239, 330. 
 
 Marx, Karl, 30, 373, 374, 375. 
 
 Mass interpretation, 251, 281. 
 
 Materialism, 69, 71, 82, 101, 251. 
 
 Materialistic conception of his- 
 story, 373-5. 
 
 Mathematical methods in soci- 
 ology, 92. 
 
 Maxwell, J., 10. 
 
 Mayo-Smith, Richmond, 6. 
 
 Mead, G. H., 63, 94, 121, 122, 124, 
 153, 329. 
 
 Measurements, social, 85-7, 92. 
 
 Mechanism of social changes, 
 152-4. 
 
 Mechanistic conception of so- 
 ciety, 72-7, 180, 382. 
 
 Meliorism, 239. 
 
 Mendelism, 99. 
 
 Mental interaction, the essential 
 condition of society, 11-14, 94, 
 143; origin of, 125; see Inter- 
 action. 
 
 Metaphysical assumptions in 
 sociology, 69, 71, 82, 83. 
 
 Metaphysics, defined, 67, 68; re- 
 lations to sociology, 68-81. 
 
 Methods, scientific in sociology, 
 82-93. 
 
 Meyer, Max, 95, 112, 113, 114, 
 180. 
 
 Miller, Irving E., 97, 98, 101, 
 104, 109, 110, 119. 
 
 Mind and matter, relations of, 
 70, 71, 180. 
 
 Mind, functional view of, 97-9, 
 101, 104, 118, 122, 180; social 
 character of, 121-2, 130-1, 274, 
 281, 329; as a social factor, 
 11-14, 95, 180, 281, 288. 
 
 Mind, the social, 329-34. 
 
 Monism, 70, 82. 
 
 Monroe, Paul, 44. 
 
 Moral ideals, 40, 43, 140, 188, 
 
 268, 363, 393; function of, 187- 
 
 8, 276, 362-3, 393-5. 
 Morality, 39-44, 136, 140, 188, 
 
 241, 358, 390-5 ; social function 
 
 of, 187-8, 358-9, 393-5; as 
 
 means of social control, 358- 
 
 60. 
 Mores, the, 188. 
 Morgan, C. Lloyd, 204. 
 Motor impulses, 97, 101, 109, 
 
 111, 246, 282. 
 Movement, bodily, 97-104, 111. 
 Mutual trust, function of, 158. 
 
 National group, the, 9, 161, 193. 
 Natural science and sociology, 
 
 67, 68. 
 Necessitarianism, 72, 74. 
 Necessity, mechanical, 70, 72-9; 
 
 teleological, 72. 
 Negro problem, 237, 324. 
 Normative science, 42, 55. 
 Normative sociology, 41. 
 Nutrition, 126-8, 212; instincts 
 
 of, 212-3. 
 
 O 
 
 Objective explanations, failure 
 
 of, in sociology, 164. 
 Objective factors in social life, 
 
 279-82. 
 Observation in sociology, 84. 
 Order, social, 7, 163, 165, 167, 
 
 178, 256, 303-4, 320-2, 352-65; 
 
 theory of, 352-65; problem of, 
 
 412 
 
INDEX 
 
 352-4; and social organization, 
 353-4; and social control, 354- 
 61; and conflict, 361-5. 
 
 Organic analogy, use of, 91. 
 
 Organic theory of society, 385-8. 
 
 Organism, society as an, 385-8. 
 
 Organization, social, 7, 23, 34, 
 38, 143-6, 148-52, 181-9, 196- 
 7, 229, 296, 304, 320, 341-4, 
 352-4. 
 
 Original differences, 233-8; be- 
 tween the sexes, 234-7; be- 
 tween races, 237. 
 
 Origin of association among ani- 
 mals, 124-31. 
 
 Origin of society, 134-40; of 
 human society, 131-40. 
 
 Parental care, 128-30, 135. 
 
 Parental instinct, 106, 213-6, 
 233. 
 
 Parmelee, Maurice, 19, 64. 
 
 Parties, function of, 163. 
 
 Patten, S. N., 38, 369, 373. 
 
 Pearson, Karl, 63, 64, 75. 
 
 Penology, relation to sociology, 
 46. 
 
 Personal equation, 83. 
 
 Petrucci, R., 19. 
 
 Pessimism, 187, 239. 
 
 Philanthropy, the science of, re- 
 lations of to sociology, 2, 3, 
 46, 47. 
 
 Philosophy of history, 52-4. 
 
 Philosophy, relations to soci- 
 ology, 66-81. 
 
 Philosophy, social, 66, 67. 
 
 Physical factors, 279-81. 
 
 Physical science, 74, 75, 76, 78, 
 80. 
 
 Physiology, 56. 
 
 Plato, 378. 
 
 Play, nature of, 232-3. 
 
 Pleasure and pain, 112-4, 247-9, 
 391. 
 
 Political science, 3, 5, 35-8. 
 
 Press, the, social importance of, 
 339. 
 
 Principle, denned, 80. 
 
 Process, society a, 14, 143, 390. 
 
 Progress, social, 34-5, 33, 53, 
 243, 271, 304, 366-81; socio- 
 logical theory of, 379-81; and 
 instincts, 243-5; and the in- 
 tellect, 271-5; and imitation, 
 304-7; and sympathy, 322; 
 the theory of, 366-81; the 
 problem of, 366-70; definition 
 of, 367-70; one-sided theories 
 of, 370-9. 
 
 Psychic interaction, see Inter- 
 action, mental. 
 
 Psychical mechanism of social 
 change, 152-4. 
 
 Psychical unity of society, 140-2. 
 
 Psychological basis of sociology, 
 94-122, 179-80. 
 
 Psychological factors in associ- 
 ation, 281-3. 
 
 Psychological method, the, 89-91. 
 
 Psychological sociology, 3, 15, 
 22, 60-4. 
 
 Psychological terminology in 
 sociology, 123. 
 
 Psychological view of society, 
 143-54, 388-90. 
 
 Psychology, 15, 18, 58, 71, 77, 
 94-122 ; relations to sociology, 
 58-60 ; definitions of, 58 ; 
 social, 60-4; functional, 96-6, 
 180; genetic, 96; structural, 
 96, 109; hedonistic, 114, 247- 
 8 ; passive, 102, 114. 
 
 413 
 
INDEX 
 
 Public opinion, 334-9; social 
 
 function of, 337-9. 
 Pugnacity, instinct of, 216-8. 
 Pyle, W. H., 44, 58, 211. 
 
 R 
 
 Race, as a social factor, 237, 371- 
 
 2, 380. 
 
 Racial heredity, 105, 237, 371-2. 
 Radicalism, 176-7. 
 Rationalism, 120, 275. 
 Ratzenhofer, Gustav, 8, 26, 177, 
 
 284. 
 Rauschenbusch, Walter 214. 
 Reaction after revolution, 172. 
 Reason, the, 119, 120, 268, 272- 
 
 3, 274-5. 
 
 Religion, 38, 137, 186-7, 356-8, 
 380, 395; science of, 38-9; 
 function of, 186-7, 356-8, 380, 
 395; as a conservative factor, 
 186, 274, 356 ; as a progressive 
 factor, 187, 326, 380; as means 
 of social control, 356-8. 
 
 Reproduction, instincts of, 213-6. 
 
 Reproductive process, social func- 
 tion of, 128-9. 
 
 Revolt, psychology of, 166, 167. 
 
 Revolutions, theory of, 163-72; 
 causes of, 164-7, 172; peace- 
 ful, 168; anarchy of, 168-70; 
 mobs in, 169; reaction after, 
 172. 
 
 Richmond, Mary E., 380. 
 
 Rivalry, instinct of, 219. 
 
 Robinson, J. H., 51, 62. 
 
 Ross, Edward A., 5, 16, 21, 24, 
 29, 34, 51, 63, 78, 159, 182, 
 243, 274, 279, 284, 302, 303, 
 343, 346, 347, 354, 358. 
 
 Rousseau, J. J., 258, 383. 
 
 Royce, Josiah, 205. 
 
 8 
 
 Saint-Simon, 173. 
 Saleeby, C. W., 64, 372. 
 Scha'effle, Albert, 8, 10, 11. 
 Science and common sense, 68, 
 
 69, 72, 83. 
 Science, defined, 27. 
 Sciences, divisions between, 20, 
 
 32, 59. 
 Scientific methods, 82-93. 
 Selection hypothesis, the, 98, 99, 
 
 298. 
 Selection, social, 56, 154, 171, 
 
 209, 270-1, 299. 
 Selective nature of consciousness, 
 
 104. 
 Self-abasement, instinct of, 
 
 230-1. 
 Self-activity of the organism, 
 
 100-4. 
 Self-assertion, instinct of, 228- 
 
 30. 
 Self -consciousness, 131-3, 135 ; 
 
 social, 332-4. 
 Self-defense, instincts of, 216-9. 
 Self -exhibition, instinct of, 229- 
 
 30. 
 Seligman, E. R. A., 374. 
 Sensation, 108. 
 Service, need of an ethics of, 
 
 359, 394. 
 Sex, as a social factor, 128, 213- 
 
 4, 234-7. 
 Sex attraction, 213-4. 
 Sidis, Boris, 226. 
 Simmel, Georg, 4, 6, 14, 149, 341, 
 
 342. 
 Sisson, E. O., 108. 
 Small, Albion W., 2, 3, 8, 9, 14, 
 
 15, 16, 21, 27, 43, 49, 70, 279, 
 
 284, 285, 286, 317, 382. 
 Smith, Adam, 317, 322. 
 
 414 
 
INDEX 
 
 Sociability, 4; instincts of, 219- 
 
 24. 
 Social change, mechanism of, 
 
 152-4. 
 Social classes, 90. 
 Social consciousness, 140, 329, 
 
 331-4. 
 Social control, 163, 181-9, 198, 
 
 353-61. 
 Social coordination, 144-52, 173, 
 
 181-91, 196-8, 299-302, 319- 
 
 30, 341; and cooperation, 147; 
 
 objective expressions of, 148; 
 
 subjective expression of, 150, 
 
 151; origin of, 145-6; types of, 
 
 149, 345-50 ; and social control, 
 
 181-91, 198, 352; limits of, 
 
 196-7. 
 Social, criterion of, the, 14. 
 Social, definition of, 15-7. 
 Social description, 27, 28. 
 Social dynamics, 26-7. 
 Social economics, 46-7. 
 Social evolution, 6, 7, 19, 23-6, 
 
 48, 56, 124-40, 152-4, 173-9, 
 
 243-5, 267-73, 304-7, 370-80. 
 Social group, the, 11, 21, 22, 127, 
 
 138, 140, 143-6, 190-3, 341-2. 
 Social habits, 148, 152, 154, 155, 
 
 164-8, 197. 
 Social immobility, 165-7. 
 Social instincts, 200-1, 211, 219- 
 
 24. 
 Social law, definition of, 79. 
 Social laws, 73-80. 
 Social life, meaning of, 390-5. 
 Social mind, 329-40. 
 Social morphology, 27. 
 Social order, 7, 163, 178, 256, 303- 
 
 4, 320-2, 352-65. 
 Social organization, 7, 23, 34, 38, 
 
 143-6, 148-52, 181-9, 196-7, 
 
 229, 296, 304, 320, 341-4, 352-4. 
 
 Social origins, 19, 24, 124-40, 
 306. 
 
 Social phenomena, defined, 16. 
 
 Social philosophy, 66, 67. 
 
 Social politics, 46, 47. 
 
 Social process, defined, 141; na- 
 ture of, 143-180. 
 
 Social progress, 24„ 25, 33, 52, 
 243-5, 271, 304, 366-81; theor- 
 ies of, 366-81; see Progress. 
 
 Social psychology, 60-4. 
 
 Social reconstruction, 45, 137, 
 186, 241, 256, 366-81, 394. 
 
 Social retrogression, 24, 25, 169, 
 178, 242. 
 
 Social science, 4. 
 
 Social sciences, 4, 29, 55; classi- 
 fication of, 55. 
 
 Social self-control, 181-9, 198. 
 
 Social solidarity, 140, 159, 183. 
 
 Social survival, 25. 
 
 Social technology, 46. 
 
 Social unity, 126, 140-2. 
 
 Socialism, 179. 
 
 Societal, 16. 
 
 Societary, 16. 
 
 Societies, classification of, 345- 
 51. 
 
 Society, conceptions of, 9-15; 
 final definition of, 131; consti- 
 tutive principle of, 11-14; 
 meaning of, 390-5; origin of, 
 124-40; psychological view of, 
 143-54, 388-90; solidarity or 
 unity of, 140-3 ; nature of, 382- 
 95; contract theory of, 382-5; 
 organic theory of, 385-8. 
 
 Sociological method, 91. 
 
 Sociological point of view, 59, 
 142. 
 
 Sociological theory of progress, 
 379-81. 
 
 Sociology, conceptions of, 1-8; 
 
 415 
 
INDEX 
 
 working definition of, 7, 8, 15; 
 subject-matter of, 20-1; unit 
 of investigation in, 21, 22; 
 problems of, 22-6; static and 
 dynamic, 26-7; descriptive, 27- 
 8; relations to other sciences, 
 29-65; to the special social 
 sciences, 29 ; to economics, 33- 
 5; to political science, 35-7; 
 to jurisprudence, 37, 38; to the 
 science of religion, 38, 39; to 
 ethics, 39-44; to the science of 
 education, 44, 45 ; to the ap- 
 plied social sciences, 45-7; to 
 the science of philanthropy, 2, 
 46; to penology, 46; to social 
 economics, 46, 47; to social 
 politics, 46, 47; to home eco- 
 nomics, 47; to history, 47-54; 
 to objective history, 48 ; to his- 
 torography, 49-52; to the phi- 
 losophy of history, 52-4; to 
 biology, 55-7; to physical an- 
 thropology, 56; to psychology, 
 58-60, 343; to social psychol- 
 ogy, 60-4; to philosophy, 66- 
 81 ; to social philosophy, 66, 67 ; 
 to metaphysics, 68-81. 
 
 Sociology, a natural science, 67, 
 68. 
 
 Socius, the, 21-2. 
 
 Solidarity, social, 140, 159, 183. 
 
 Spencer, Herbert, 5, 9, 28, 42, 83, 
 262, 317, 386. 
 
 Spontaneity of the organism, 
 100-4. 
 
 State, distinguished from society, 
 9-10, 35-6. 
 
 Static civilizations, 174-6. 
 
 Static problems of sociology, 
 22-3. 
 
 Statics, social, 23, 26-7. 
 
 Statistical method, the, 85-6. 
 
 Stein, Ludwig, 66, 72, 140. 
 
 Steinmetz, S. R., 28. 
 
 Stephen, Leslie, 42. 
 
 Stimulus and response, 76-7, 
 100-4. 
 
 Stimulus, nature of the, 102. 
 
 Stratified societies, 194. 
 
 Stratton, George M., 71, 101. 
 
 Stuckenberg, J. H. W., 14. 
 
 Subjective environment, the, 265- 
 6. 
 
 Subjective factors in the social 
 life, 279, 281-8. 
 
 Suggestibility, 226. 
 
 Sumner, W. G., 16, 148. 
 
 Survival, social, 25. 
 
 Sutherland, Alexander, 129, 323.' 
 
 Sympathetic introspection, 90. 
 
 Sympathy, function of, 155-7, 
 319-20 ; Giddings's law of, 157 ; 
 role of in society, 309-29 ; psy- 
 chology of, 309-13; definition 
 of, 309-12; connections with 
 altruism, 313-4; and conscious- 
 ness of kind, 315-7; theory of 
 society, 317-8; as a conserva- 
 tive factor, 320-2; as a factor 
 in progress, 322-7. 
 
 Synthesis, method of, 91; of so- 
 cial movements, 379-80. 
 
 Tarde, Garbiel, 13, 243, 294, 295, 
 
 296, 297, 302, 305, 309, 318. 
 Teleological element in human 
 
 society, 72, 79, 80, 100, 104. 
 Thilly, Frank, 40. 
 Thomas, W. I., 61, 133, 235. 
 Thomson, J. Arthur, 7, 8, 55, 64, 
 
 138, 235. 
 Thorndike, E. L., 58, 96, 97, 105, 
 
 106, 107, 111, 112, 114, 116, 
 
 416 
 
INDEX 
 
 117, 118, 132, 204, 205, 207, 
 225, 233, 234, 236, 237, 238. 
 
 Titchener, E. B., 76, 112. 
 
 Tonnies, F., 348-9. 
 
 Tosti, G., 57. 
 
 Tradition, social, 136, 223, 256, 
 303-4, 351, 354, 372. 
 
 Tropism theory, the, 103, 206. 
 
 Trotter, W., 220, 224. 
 
 U 
 
 Understanding, social function of, 
 
 155-6, 319. 
 Unity, social, 126, 140-3, 387-8. 
 
 Variation, 56, 73, 99, 160, 205, 
 
 234, 269. 
 Veblen, Thorstein, 212, 213, 230. 
 Veracity, 222. 
 Vico, 52. 
 
 Vincent, George E., 2, 192. 
 Virtues, social function of, 188, 
 
 358-9; the social, 222-4. 
 
 W 
 
 War, 139, 163, 196, 217-8, 361-2. 
 
 Ward, Lester F., 3, 5, 19, 24, 42, 
 45, 60, 102, 136, 138, 165, 187, 
 202, 236, 248, 249, 252, 262, 
 265, 274, 279, 284, 285, 305, 
 307, 312, 313, 314, 317, 318, 
 322, 337, 369, 378, 379. 
 
 Watson, J. B., 107. 
 
 Waxweiler, E., 15, 18, 86, 88. 
 
 Wells, H. G, 334. 
 
 Westermarck, Edward, 3, 132, 
 134, 238. 
 
 Will, popular, 339. 
 
 Will, the, 109-12. 
 
 Willoughby, W. W., 36. 
 
 Wines, F. H., 46. 
 
 Woman, 214, 234-6; social su- 
 periority of, 235-6. 
 
 Woodruff, Charles E., 213, 371. 
 
 Worms, Ren6, 10, 74, 145. 
 
 Wright, Carroll "D., 5. 
 
 Wundt, Wilhelm, 58. , 
 
 Yerkes, R. M., 77, 80. 
 
 (2) 
 
 THE END 
 
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