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 The veto power in the United States 
 
 olin 
 
 3 1924 030 488 286 
 
The original of tliis book is in 
 tlie Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030488286 
 
The Veto Power 
 
 UNITED STATES. 
 
 WHAT IS IT? 
 
 BY J. H. BENTON, Jr. 
 
 BOSTON : 
 
 AliP^llpI) C. GETCHBLL, BOOK AND JOB PRINTER, 
 
 No. 55 Oliver Street. 
 
 1888. 
 
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 THE VETO POWER 
 
 RhJELL 
 \JJBRARV>. 
 
 United States. 
 
 7 
 
 WHAT IS IT ? 
 
 COMPLIMENTS OF 
 
 J. H. BENTON, Jr. 
 
 passed a 
 was duly 
 house of 
 ing com- 
 
 where it 
 I town of 
 Beverly Farms," together with my objections thereto. 
 
 If it involved only the question of the division of the town of 
 Beverly, I should hesitate to set up my opinion against that of the 
 legislature; but under your recent investigation, now familiar to 
 the public, it appears that very large sums of money, altogether 
 disproportionate to the honest necessities of the case, have been 
 raised and expended in the promotion of the passage of the bill. 
 
 While, of course, no member of the legislature has taken, or 
 would take, money for his vote, yet some $20,000 have been spent 
 to indirectly influence the action of the legislature. It is no 
 excuse that such things, or worse, have happened before without 
 exposure. This time the abuse has been investigated, exposed, 
 and rebuked in scathing terms by the committees of both houses. 
 
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 THE VETO POWER 
 
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 CORNELL' 
 UfM^VERblTY 
 LIBRARY y 
 
 United States. 
 
 ^ 
 
 WHAT IS IT ? 
 
 In May, 1887, the Legislature of Massachusetts passed a 
 bill for the division of the town of Beverly, which was duly 
 presented to the governor, who returned it to the house of 
 representatives on the 21st of May, with the following com- 
 munication : — 
 
 I herewith return to the house of representatives, where it 
 originated, a bill entitled " An act to incorporate the town of 
 Beverly Farms," together with my objections thereto. 
 
 If it involved only the question of the division of the town of 
 Beverly, I should hesitate to set up my opinion against that of the 
 legislature; but under your recent investigation, now familiar to 
 the public, it appears that very large sums of money, altogether 
 disproportionate to the honest necessities of the case, have been 
 raised and expended in the promotion of the passage of the bill. 
 
 While, of course, no member of the legislature has taken, or 
 would take, money for his vote, yet some $20,000 have been spent 
 to indirectly influence the action of the legislature. It is no 
 excuse that such things, or worse, have happened before without 
 exposure. This time the abuse has been investigated, exposed, 
 and rebuked in scathing terms by the committees of both houses. 
 
I regard it as mj' diitj' to the commou wealth, and to the mainte- 
 nance of a wholesome public sentiment in behalf of legislation 
 which shall be above suspicion, to act upon the reports made by 
 these committees and adopted by their respective houses, and to 
 strike emphatically at the evil thus unearthed. Not to do so is to 
 excuse and encourage a monstrously bad and corrupting practice. 
 I believe that the legislature, which had committed itself to the 
 bill before exposure of the methods of its promotion, will agree 
 with me that it is better that the executive, approaching it for the 
 first time and finding it tainted with offensive furtherances, should 
 veto it. I cannot doubt, too, that on reflection the committee 
 which seeks division, and to which we look for so many of the ele- 
 ments of good-citizenship, will gladly sacrifice, or at least delay, 
 any present convenience for the sake of an emphatic lesson in the 
 public behalf. 
 
 If, as seems to be true, both sides have been guilty (which 
 almost makes me sympathize with the judge who wanted to decide 
 against both parties) , so much the worse ; two wrongs do not 
 make a right. It is a just as well as an equitable maxim, that 
 those on whom is the burden of making out a case shall come 
 with clean hands, and not seek to excuse the lack of them on the 
 ground that an opponent's are soiled. It seems a fitting oppor- 
 tunity to enforce the principle that, in order to ensure legislation, 
 the thing to do is to show a good case on its merits ; and that it 
 is not only not necessary, but detrimental, to rely on pecuniarj' 
 influences such as have been disclosed in the committee's reports. 
 
 I am sure that the pernicious system therein set forth is offen- 
 sive to nobody so much as to the members of the legislature, and 
 that you will heartily co-operate with me in hitting it a blow in 
 the intersst of more decent methods, and in furtherance of the 
 suggestion in your own reports on the subject to which I call 
 attention. 
 
 Your committee closes its report with these words : "Legisla- 
 tion cannot be pure unless free and untrammelled by insidious 
 influences. These influences, however, wherever or by whomso- 
 ever exerted, should be and must be emphatically and sternly con- 
 demned." 
 
 The senate committee says, " It is to be greatly regretted that 
 
there has been a growing demoralization in the methods pursued 
 in promoting private bills and private interests before the general 
 court, deserving the strongest condemnation and the most eflfect- 
 ive remedy." 
 
 " The strongest condemnation and the most effective remedy" 
 I can apply is a veto. 
 
 If the system thus condemned is to prevail and to be justified 
 by executive approval of bills to which it has been most notori- 
 ously and offensively applied, then the lobbyist will understand it 
 is an accepted and permissible system, involving no risk except 
 that of being called hard names in a report. 
 
 The reputation of the Legislature of Massachusetts for hon- 
 esty and probity is deservedl}' so high that it should not miss the 
 opportunity for reconsideration, with a view to denounce and can- 
 demn in the most emphatic manner anything that tends to dis- 
 credit it. 
 
 Some question was made at the time as to whether this 
 communication was a valid exercise of the governor to neg- 
 ative a bill. But when the house reached the consideration 
 of the bill and of the message, the question was put by the 
 speaker : " Shall the bill pass notwithstanding the objections 
 of his Excellency the governor?" and 113 members voted 
 in the affirmative and 99 in the in the negative, so that, un- 
 der the provisions of the constitution requiring a vote of 
 two thii'ds of the members present to pass the bill against 
 the objections of the governor, the bill failed of a passage. 
 
 In October, 1887, the Legislature of New Hampshire 
 passed an act entitled, " An act of in amendment of chapter 
 100 of the laws of 1883, entitled 'An act providing for the 
 establishment of railroad corporations by general law,'" which 
 was duly presented to the governor, and returned by him on 
 the same day to the house, with the following communi- 
 cation : — 
 
State of New Hampshire, 
 
 Executive Department, 
 
 Concord, October 18, 1887. 
 To the House of Representatives : 
 
 I hereby return the house bill entitled "An act in amendment 
 of chapter 100 of the laws of 1883, entitled ' An act providing for 
 the establishment of railroad corporations by general law,' without 
 m_y signature. 
 
 It is with great regret that I feel called upon to exercise the 
 power given to the executive by the constitution, and withhold my 
 approval from a measure which has passed both branches of the 
 legislature by decided majorities after a thorough and able discus- 
 sion covering a period of nearly four months, and prolonging the 
 session far beyond the usual limits, at great expense to the state. 
 
 Without entering upon the intrinsic merits of the measure to 
 express any opinion upon a question of such vital importance to 
 the state, and upon which the people may wish to be heard, I am 
 moved to object to the bill for the reason that corrupt methods 
 have been extensively used for the purpose of promoting its pas- 
 sage. The two powerful railroad corporations which have antag- 
 onized each other in the contest have had in attendance a paid 
 lobby of unprecedented magnitude, and, as a consequence, the 
 representatives have been persistently followed and interfered with 
 in the free performance of their legislative duties. 
 
 The widespread rumors and scandalous tales of bribery and 
 corruption which have been freely current during the progress of 
 the contest, finally materialized through charges preferred in the 
 senate, and also in the house, after the passage of , the bill. By 
 the courtesj' of the chairman of the judiciary committee of the 
 house, upon my request, I have received the official records of the 
 testimony thus far taken by that committee in their investigation 
 of the charges. The provision of the constitution limiting the time 
 within which the executive veto may be interposed, together with 
 the probable early adjournment of the legislature, forces me to take 
 action upon the measure without waiting for the completion of the 
 investigation and report of the committee. The evidence thus far 
 obtained is, in my opinion, sufficient to justify the action here taken. 
 
While I am glad to be able to say that no evirlence has yet been 
 produced to show that any member of the legislature has been un- 
 faithful to his trust and oath of office, yet to my mind it is con- 
 clusively shown that there have been deliberate and systematic 
 attempts at wholesale bribery of the servants of the people in this 
 legislature. 
 
 It matters not that both of the parties are probably equally 
 guilty. The fact that this bill, if it should become a law, would 
 go on to the statute book, carrying with it the suspicion that it had 
 been fraudulentlj^ enacted, is sufficient reason why it, and all legis- 
 lation similarly effected, should be condemned. 
 
 The danger of permitting the use of such methods as have been 
 here employed is too obvious to require extended comment, and 
 the most effectual way to elude such practices is to have it under- 
 stood that no bill attempted to be passed bj"^ such means can be- 
 come a law. 
 
 When the promoters of a measure see fit to offer bribes to mem- 
 bers, they cannot be allowed to excuse themselves on the ground 
 that their offers were not accepted. If it comes to be understood 
 that unsuccessful attempts of this nature will not imperil the pas- 
 sage of a bill, such offers will become much more frequent. If the 
 oflfer is accepted, neither party will be likely to disclose the fact. 
 If it is rejected, it is in this view to be considered as of no conse- 
 quence, and hence no harm would be done to the prospects of the 
 bill. 
 
 The bare statement of such a doctrine is its best answer. In 
 degrees as these corrupt practices are allowed to pass unnoticed, 
 the moral sense of not only legislators but also of the people will 
 become dulled to their enormity, and in the end make government 
 a farce and an object of contempt. 
 
 As the honor of the individual should be above price, so in a 
 larger sense should the honor of the state be jealously guarded. 
 Being strongly impressed that the honor and good name of the 
 state and its legislature are involved in countenancing the methods 
 that have been practised to secure the passage of this measure, 
 and that all other considerations should be set aside, and feeling 
 that my duty is plain, I veto the bill. 
 
 Charles H. Sawtee, 
 
 Governor. 
 
6 
 
 The question was at once raised whether this communica- 
 tion, which was evidently modelled upon that of the gov- 
 ernor of Massachusetts, was a valid exercise of the power of 
 the executive to negative the bill, and on the 4th of Novem- 
 ber, when the house reached the consideration of the bill 
 and of the communication from the governor, it passed a 
 preamble and resolution as follows : — 
 
 Whereas a bill entitled " Au act in ameudmeut of chapter 100 
 of the laws of 1S83, entitled ' An act providing for the establish- 
 ment of railroad corporations by general law,' " which originated 
 in the house of representatives, duly passed both houses of the 
 general court, and was presented to the governor on the eighteenth 
 day of October, 1887, according to the requirement of the consti- 
 tution, and the governor on the same daj' returned said bill to the 
 house in which it originated, without his signature, and therewith 
 transmitted a communication in the following words : — 
 
 [Here was inserted the message of the governor to the 
 house. ] 
 
 And whereas it a|i|)ears by the aforesaid communication of the 
 governor that his excellency did not examine or consider the 
 intrinsic merits of said bill, and did not form or express any opin- 
 ion upon a question of such vital importance to the state as that 
 involved in the merits of said bill, and did not in said communi- 
 cation state any nbjection or objections to said bill ; 
 
 And whereas the constitution of this state provides that " Every 
 ])ill which shall liavc passed 1)otli houses of the general court shall, 
 before it becomes a law, be pi'esented to the governor. If he 
 approve, he shall sign it ; but if not, he shall return it with his objec- 
 tions to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter 
 the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider 
 it." And further, that " If any bill shall not be returned by the 
 governor within five days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have 
 been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as 
 if he had signed it, unless the legislature by their adjournment 
 prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law ; " 
 
And whereas it is the sense of this house that the true intent 
 of the constitution in requiring the governor, in case he does not 
 approve a bill which shall have passed both houses, to return his 
 objections to it with the bill to the house in which it originated, 
 is to give the two houses the benefit of those objections, and the 
 reasons and arguments adduced bj' him in their support, to aid 
 them in their further deliberations upon the bill when they come 
 to reconsider it in compliance with the requirement of the consti- 
 tution, and it is the constitutional right of the two houses to have 
 the objections of the governor to the merits of a bill returned with- 
 out his signature to aid them in its reconsideration, therefore no 
 reconsideration such as is required of them by the constitution can 
 be had by the two houses without a statement of those objections ; 
 
 That each house of the general court is invested, by the consti- 
 tution, with ample power for the protection of its own integrity, 
 honor, and dignity, and the safety and honor of its members, and 
 no other department of the government is charged with that duty 
 or intrusted with that power ; 
 
 That the independence as well as integrity of the two house of 
 the general court must be protected in order that the integrity 
 of the scheme of government established by the constitution be 
 preserved ; and therefore, in the discharge of the responsible 
 duties of his ofBce, each member is answerable to the house to 
 which he belongs and to the people of the state, and not other- 
 wise ; 
 
 That inasmuch as the only reasons which appear in the afore- 
 said communication of his excellency the governor, whj' he 
 returned the said bill without his signature, are such as necessa- 
 rily imply that the governor is invested with power to inquire into 
 the conduct of the two houses of the general court, and further 
 imply that the governor is charged with the duty of protecting the 
 integrity, honor, and dignity of the two houses of the general 
 court and their members, those reasons are not such as are con- 
 templated and required by the constitution, and are therefore of 
 of no validity or legal effect ; 
 
 And whereas it is the sense of the two houses of the general 
 court that the true intent of the constitution in requiring the 
 governor, when he returns without his signature a bill which has 
 
passed both houses, to return therewith his objections, is to ena- 
 ble the two houses, upon recousideration of the bill, to remove 
 and obviate those objections should thej- deem it wise to do so ; 
 
 That the assumption by the governor of power to negative a 
 bill by returning it unsigned, without stating any objections to its 
 provit.ious, necessarily implies a power in him practically equiva- 
 lent to an absolute and arbitrary veto, inasmuch as the two houses, 
 without being informed what his objections are, could not intelli- 
 gently reconsider it, and so, in tlie opinion of this house, works a 
 fundamental and dangerous change in the organization of the 
 government by changing the constitutional distribution of its 
 powers between the two houses and the governor ; 
 
 That the veto power of the governor, as given and defined by 
 the constitution, is strictly limited to approving or disapproving 
 bills which have passed both houses of the general court, upon 
 reasons appertaining to the provisions thereof; and in case of dis- 
 approval, the statement of those reasons by way of argument to 
 the house in which the bill originated, in order that such reasons 
 and arguments miiy be duly considered and given their just weight 
 when the bill comes to be duly reconsidered by the two houses in 
 the performance of the duty enjoined upon them by the constitution ; 
 
 That in the exercise of the veto power of his office the governor 
 is not invested with authority to examine into or pass judgment 
 upon the conduct or motives of either house, or of the members of 
 either house ; and when he assumes to do so his action consti- 
 tutes a violation of that article in the bill of rights which declares 
 that " In the government of this state the three essential powers, 
 to wit, the legislative, executive, and judicial, ought to be kept as 
 separate from and independent of each other as the nature of a 
 free government will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of 
 connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one 
 indissoluble bond of union and amity," and is of no effect ; 
 
 And whereas it is the sense of this house that the omission of 
 the governor to examine and consider the aforesaid bill, and there- 
 upon to determine whether he ai)proved or disapproved it, and 
 his omission to return with said bill a statement of his objections 
 thereto, were omissions of acts made indispensably necessarj- by 
 the constitution to the withholding of his signature therefrom, and 
 
9 
 
 that inasmuch as more than five daj's (Sundays excepted) have 
 elapsed since said bill was presented to the governor, and the 
 same has not been returned by him to the house in which it 
 originated, with his objections, according to the true meaning and 
 intent of the constitution, and the legislature has not in the mean 
 time adjourned, said bill has become and is a law without the sig- 
 nature of the governor : 
 
 Therefore, be it Resolved by the house of representatives, that 
 no further action be taken by this house upon the bill entitled 
 "An act in amendment of chapter 100 of the laws of 1883, entitled 
 ' An act providing for the establishment of railroad corporations 
 by general law ; ' " but that said act and this resolution be trans- 
 mitted to the secretary of state, to the end that said act be pub- 
 lished with the other laws passed at this session. 
 
 Subsequently it was claimed in legal proceedings in the 
 Supreme Court of New Hampshire that the house of repre- 
 sentatives were right in treatina: the communication from the 
 governor returning this bill as not an exercise of his consti- 
 tutional power to negative the bill, and that the bill became 
 a law notwithstanding it. The case in which that question 
 was raised is still pending, and it is claimed by one party 
 thereto that it is immaterial to the issue raised in it whether 
 the bill became a law or not. If the Court should be of 
 this opinion, the question as to the eflect of the governor's, 
 message returning the bill will not be decided in that suit. 
 The importance of the question, however, is obvious, for if 
 under the United States Constitution and the state constitu- 
 tions the executive, in the exercise of the power to approve 
 or disapprove a bill which has passed both branches of the 
 legislature, can refuse to examine into the merits of the bill 
 and negative it without entering upon its merits by the mere 
 statement of objections which have nothing to do with the 
 provisions of the bill itself, the power of the executive with 
 
10 
 
 reference to the action of the leo;islature is much greater 
 than has been heretofore understood. 
 
 The following are substantially the suggestions made 
 to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in the argu- 
 ment of the question raised before them with reference to 
 the effect of the communication of the governor of that 
 state above set forth. It is thought that, in so far at least 
 as they emljody the history of the provision giving the ex- 
 ecutive the power to revise and negative legislative acts in 
 the United States, and the discussions and comments of 
 others upon that subject, they may be of general interest. 
 
 It appears that this bill was enacted by both houses of the 
 General Court of New Hampshire and duly presented to the 
 governor for his approval, and that the legislature did not 
 adjourn within five days (Sundays excepted) after it was 
 thus presented to the governor. The l)ill therefore became 
 a law unless the communication which the governor sent to 
 the house of representatives on the 18th of October was an 
 exercise of the power given to the governor by article 44 of 
 the constitution to disapprove a bill and return it with his 
 objections to that house in which it originated. If this com- 
 munication was not an exercise of the power of revision and 
 negative given by this article of the constitution, the bill 
 became a law on the twenty-fifth day of October, as alleged 
 in the defendant's answer. 
 
 ' This question must be decided by the judiciary, for it is 
 simply a question of whether certain acts of the executive, 
 which are of record, are such acts as the constitution pro- 
 vides shall prevent a bill duly enacted by both houses of 
 the general court from liecoming a law. The house in 
 which the bill originated declared by a formal resolution 
 that in its opinion these acts did not prevent the bill from 
 
11 
 
 becoming a law. The question is whether these acts thus 
 shown by the record are such acts as the constitution pro- 
 vides shall have that effect, and that is a pure question of 
 law which the judiciary must pass upon when properly 
 raised in a cause before them, precisely as they must pass 
 upon the legal effect of any other facts in the case. 
 
 " As the judges are bound to take notice of a general law, so it 
 is their province to determine whether it be a statute or not." 
 
 BolandevY. Stevens, 23 Wend. 103. 
 Gardner v. The Collector, 6 Wall. 499. 
 Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189. 
 People V. Hatch, 19 111. 283. 
 Ottawa County v. Perkins, 94 U.S. 260. 
 Tarlton v. Peggs, 18 Ind. 24. 
 
 This communication was a statement of the objections 
 of the goveimor to signing the bill, but it was not an ob- 
 jection to the provisions of the bill. The communication 
 itself states that the governor expresses no opinion upon the 
 merits of the measure, that is, of the bill, but that he is 
 moved to object to the bill because " corrupt methods have 
 been extensively used for the purpose of promoting its pas- 
 sage," and because "the representatives have been persist- 
 ently followed and interfered with in the free performance 
 of their legislative duties." The communication is not even 
 an objection to the conduct of the legislature or of any mem- 
 ber of it, for it carefully states " that no evidence has yet 
 been produced to show that any member of the legislature 
 has been unfaithful to his trust and oath of office." The 
 communication is simply a statement that the governor 
 objects to signing the bill because to do so would counte- 
 nance the methods that have been practised to secure its 
 
12 
 
 jiiissaoe. And in :i siili^sccjiieut cDiiiuiuuication to the senate 
 on the first of Xovember, returning without his signature a 
 bill entitled " An act to authorize the lease of the Northern 
 Railroad," the governor said that the substance of it was an 
 important part of the bill returned to the house on October 
 18 without the exceutive signature, "by reason of corrupt 
 methods and attempted bribery in promoting its passage." 
 
 N.H. Senate Journal, 1887, p. 483. 
 
 It clearly appears, therefore, l)y the communication itself, 
 that the governor did not examine the bill, and he does not, 
 in the communication, express any opinion upon it; i.e., 
 his communication does not state objections to the bill 
 itself, but only olijections to the conduct of persons not 
 members of the legislature, and whose conduct did not im- 
 properly affect any member of the legislature with reference 
 to the passage of the bill. In short, the communication is 
 only a statemcnit, — 
 
 First. That the governor has not examined the merits of 
 the bill. 
 
 Second. That he exjjrcsscs no opinion of the bill itself. 
 
 Third. That he is of the opinion that no member of the 
 legislature has been improperly influenced with reference to 
 the passage of the bill. 
 
 Fourth. That he is of the opinion that "deliberate and 
 systematic attempts" have been made to improperly influence 
 the members of the legislature with reference to the passage 
 of the bill, and therefore, for the purpose of condemning 
 such ineifectual attempts to improperly influence the legisla- 
 ture, he refuses "to enter upon the intrinsic merits of the 
 measure to express any opinion upon them ; " i.e., refuses to 
 examine and express any opinion upon the bill itself. 
 
 The whole effect of the communication of the governor with 
 
13 
 
 reference to this bill, depends upon article 44 of the constitu- 
 tion. If it was not such action as that article requires, it was 
 of no eflfect, and the bill became a law. What did that section 
 require the governor to do to prevent this bill from becom- 
 ing a law ? 
 
 What is the nature of the power given to the governor by 
 this provision of the constitution ? Is it a power to prevent 
 a bill duly enacted by both branches of the legislature from 
 becoming a law, by returning it without examination of it, 
 and with no objection to its provisions, or only a power to 
 revise the pi'ovisions of the bill and prevent it from becoming 
 a law, by a statement of objections to its provisions, unless 
 the legislature, upon reconsideration of the bill in the 
 light of such objections, shall again pass it by a vote of two 
 thirds of each house ? Is it a power to revise and negative 
 bills passed by the legislature, or a power to negative them 
 without revision? Does it I'equire an expression of opinion 
 as to the merits of the bill, in the form of objections returned 
 with the bill to the house in which it originated, to prevent 
 its passage, or is the duty which it imposes upon the gov- 
 ernor fulfilled by returning the bill without examination, 
 with no expression of opinion as to its merits or demerits, 
 but simply with objection to signing it without reference to 
 its provisions? 
 
 The defendant's claim is that an examination of the bill 
 and a statement of objections to its provisions is essential to 
 an exercise of the qualified negative of the governor upon the 
 action of the legislature, and that as this communication of the 
 governor stated that he had not examined the bill, and that he 
 expressed no opinion upon the merits of it, and stated no 
 objections to its provisions, it was not an exercise of the qual- 
 ified negative power of the governor under the constitution, 
 and therefore the bill became a law. 
 
14 
 
 It is true that the governor say.s, "It is with great regret 
 that I feel called upon to exercise the power given to the ex- 
 ecutive by the constitution, and withhold my approval from 
 a measure which has passed both branches of the legislature 
 by decided majorities after a thorough and able discussion 
 covering a period of nearly four months and prolonging the 
 session far beyond the usual limits, at great expense to the 
 state." And if he said nothing more, we should be obliged to 
 assume that he withheld his approval from the measure be- 
 cause upon examination of it he did not approve it ; but he 
 says in the next sentence, " Without entering upon the in- 
 trinsic merits of the measure to express any opinion upon a 
 question of such vital importance to the stale, upon which 
 the people may wish to be heard, I am moved to object to 
 this bill for the reason that corrupt methods have been ex- 
 tensively used for the purpose of promoting its passage." 
 Taken as a whole, this is a declaration that he will not 
 enter upon the intrinsic merits of the measure, that is, 
 will not examine it, and that he will not express any opin- 
 ion upon it, i.e., will not ajjprove or disapprove it, but that he 
 objects to it for reasons wholly outside of the provisions 
 of the bill itself. But the constitution does not say the 
 governor may object to a l)ill simply. A jierson may 
 object to that of which he knows nothing and of which 
 he refuses to know anything. Oljjection does not presup- 
 pose examination or knowledge, but approval or disapproval 
 does, and the constitution says that the governor must approve 
 or disapprove. The vital, operative word of the provision is 
 "approve," which necessarily implies examination, considera- 
 tion, revision. There can be no constitutional approval or 
 disapproval without examination of the bill approved or dis- 
 approved. The duty and power of the executive under this 
 provision of the constitution are plain. His constitutional 
 
15 
 
 action under it is limited to two things : First, to the ap- 
 proval or disapproval of the bill or resolve presented to him; 
 second, to the expression of the result of his approval or dis- 
 approval by signing the bill if he approves it, or by return- 
 ing it with objections if he disapproves it. He has no con- 
 stitutional right to sign it or to return it unless he approves 
 it or disapproves it, and for him to refuse to approve or dis- 
 approve is to refuse to perform the primary duty imposed 
 upon him and to render it impossible for him to exercise the 
 qualified negative power by returning the bill. The power 
 to negative the bill by return of it with objections depends 
 absolutely upon the disapproval of it, which in the nature of 
 things requires an examination and consideration of it. For 
 the governor to say that he refuses to express any opinion of 
 the bill is for him to refuse to do that upon which alone his 
 power to return it with objections absloutely depends. 
 
 For the governor to say, as he does in this communication, 
 that he does not express any opinion upon the bill, is to say 
 that he does not approve or disapprove it, i.e., does not per- 
 form his constitutional duty with reference to it. 
 
 To approve is " To be pleased with ; to think well of, to 
 admit the propriety or excellence of" (Webster) ; "To think 
 or judge favorably of; to commend ; to express a liking to " 
 (Worcester). How can this be pi'edicated of that which is 
 not examined or considered ? To disapprove is " To pass un- 
 favorable judgment upon ; to condemn by an act of the 
 judgment; to regard as wrong or inexpedient; to censure" 
 (Webster) ; "To censure, to dislike, to condemn" (Worces- 
 ter). 
 
 How can this be done with reference to that which is not 
 examined or considered ? 
 
 To disapprove is an act of the judgment ; to object to is 
 an act of the will. The constitution subjects the acts of the 
 
16 
 
 legislature to the judgment of the executive, not to his will. 
 It authorizes him to examine and pass judgment upon them, 
 not to object to them without examination. If he refuses to 
 examine and pass judgment upon an act of the legislature, 
 he refuses to exercise the only legislative power which the 
 constitution lias conferred upon him. If he refuses to ex- 
 amine and express his opinion of the act itself, he refuses to 
 do that which the constitution makes essential to the exercise 
 of his qualified negative upon the act. The constitution 
 authorizes the executive to ivy the completed acts of the 
 legislature and condemn them by a negative, not to condemn 
 and negative them without a trial. 
 
 The constitution says, if the governor '"approve, he shall 
 sign it; if not [that is, if he does not ajiprove], he shall re- 
 turn it with his objections," &c. Here the governor does 
 not say that he does not a])pro\-e the ))ill, l)ut explicitly 
 states that he has not entered ui)on the intrinsic merits of 
 the matter [bill] to express any opinion upon the subject, 
 and then he says that he objects to its passage for reasons 
 which ha^■e nothing to do with the merits m demerits of the 
 liill, or even with the conduct of the legislature with refer- 
 c4iee to the bill, but relate wholly to the conduct of persons 
 outside of the Ugislature, and which conduct has not had 
 any effect upon the passage of the bill. But the power of 
 the governor under the constitution to return a Ijill depends 
 upon whether he disapproves of it. The constitution says, 
 if he approves he shall sign it. If he does not approve he 
 shall return it. A return without approval or disapproval 
 of the bill is no return, and there can be no ajjproval or dis- 
 approval without examination. For a governor to say that 
 he has not examined a bill is for him to say that he has not 
 performed the only legislative function which the constitu- 
 tion authorizes him to peiform, for to refuse to examine is 
 
17 
 
 to refuse to approve or disapprove, because there can be 
 neither approval nor disapproval of a thing which is not ex- 
 amined. The constitution does not empower the governor 
 to simply object to the passage of a bill. It makes it his 
 duty to approve or disapprove, and thus renders it impossible 
 for him to object to a bill without examining it. It does not 
 empower him to return a bill if he objects to signing it, but 
 only to return it if he does not approve of it. And in this 
 case he states that he has not examined it and that he does not 
 express any opinion, i.e., does not approve or disapprove, 
 which is precisely the same as though he had said, " As to this 
 bill I refuse to exercise my revisory, qualified negative power." 
 The true construction of the constitution is that the qualified 
 negative of the governor can be exercised only upon the revision 
 of the bill. The constitution makes it the duty of the governor 
 first to approve or disapprove a bill, i.e., to revise and ex- 
 amine, and his whole power to negative the bill depends 
 upon his having examined it. If he does not examine it he 
 cannot return it with objections. It is the plain purpose 
 of the constitution to cause the completed acts of the legis- 
 lature to pass under the revision of the executive, and to 
 authorize him to negative them only upon such revision 
 and a disapproval of their provisions. To say that he may 
 return a bill without examination and with objections which 
 do not relate to its merits, is to strike out of the constitu- 
 tional provision the vital word "approve," and make it read, 
 not " Every bill which shall have passed both houses of the 
 general court shall, before it becomes a law, be presented 
 to the governor ; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not 
 he shall return it," &c. ; but "Every bill which shall have 
 passed both houses of the general court shall, before it be- 
 comes a law, be presented to the governor ; if he signs it it 
 shall become a law, but if he does not sign it, it shall not be a 
 
IS 
 
 law unless two thirds of each house agree to pass it without 
 his signature." 
 
 The question in this ease is as to the efteet of a refusal by 
 the governor to examine a siiiiiio bill. But if he can refuse 
 to examine one bill, saying that he will not enter upon its 
 intrinsic merits, and will not express any opinion of it, and 
 prevent its l)ecoming a law hy the statement to the legisla- 
 ture of objections simply to signing it which have nothing 
 to do with tlie l)ill itself, he can do the same with all bills. 
 Suppose tlie go\eruor should say at a session of the legisla- 
 ture, "I will not examine or express any opinion upon the 
 intrinsic merits of any l)ill which this legislature shall i)ass, 
 but I will return all of them unsigned with the objection to 
 signing them that in my opinion the house has chosen the 
 wrong man for speaker, or because the people have chosen a 
 legislature which disagrees with me politically." Can it be 
 said that such action l)^' the gcjvernor \vould he an exercise 
 of tlie revisionar\', (jualified negative jioAver given him by 
 the c(jnstituti()n? Can it be that the governor can defeat all 
 action by the legislature, except )iy a two-thirds vote, 6y a 
 simple refusal to excunlne its completed acts, and approve or 
 disapprove them upon their merits or demerits, and returning 
 them unsigned with mere statements of his objections to sign- 
 ing them? To say that the governor who did this ought to 
 be impeached, does not meet the difficulty. Because, if his 
 refusal to examine the acts of the legislature is a neglect to 
 perform his reN'isionar}' duty under the constitution, the 
 constitution itself furnislics the remedy by the provision that 
 the bills become laws notwithstanding this neglect. And if 
 a refusal to examine the acts of the legislature is not a 
 neglect to perform this duty, and if he can negative the acts 
 by returning them -with oljjections simply to signino- them, 
 the character of those oljijections is wholly in his discretion. 
 
19 
 
 The objections which the executive is required to send 
 with a bill when he disapproves and returns it to the house 
 in which it originated, are the 7'esuU of his examination of 
 the bill, — a statement of the reasons why he disapproves it, 
 — and must, not only by the plain meaning of the words of 
 the constitution, but in the nature of things, relate to the 
 provisions of the bill disapproved. It was not sufficient 
 for the governor to return this bill saying simply that he 
 declined to sign it. The constitutional provision is not that 
 if the governor approve the bill he shall sign it, but if not, 
 he shall return it witlt a refusal to sign it. It is that if he 
 approve the bill he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return 
 it with his objections. 
 
 If the governor had returned this bill with a communica- 
 tion saying that he had examined it and that he declined to 
 sign it, clearly such a communication would have had no 
 effect. If he had returned it with a communication saying 
 that he declined to enter upon the intrinsic merits of it, that 
 is, declined to examine it, and therefore he did not sign 
 it, the communication would have had no effect. If he had 
 returned it with a communication stating that he had no time 
 to examine it or that he was not able to examine it and express 
 any opinion upon it, and therefore he refused to sign it, the 
 communication would have had no effect. The language of the 
 constitution is explicit that if the governor does not approve, 
 he slrall "return it with his objections; " and unless the plain 
 meaning of it is to be frittered away, the objections must be 
 the result of an examination of the bill and to the bill itself. 
 The language is, "Every bill that shall pass both houses of 
 the general court shall, before it becomes a law, be presented 
 to the governor. If he approve, he shall sign it ; but if 
 not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in 
 which it shall have originated, who shall enter the ol)jec- 
 
20 
 
 tions at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it." 
 That is;, stated fully. Every l>ill shall he presented to the 
 governor. If he approve the bill, he shall sign the bill; but 
 if not, he shall return the bill, with his objections to the bill, 
 to that house in which the liill shall have originated, who 
 shall enter the olijections at large on their journal, and pro- 
 ceed to reconsider the bill. 
 
 It is suggested that this language only requires the gov- 
 ernor to state his oltjections to sirpiing the bill, and that any 
 objection which he says is to him a sufficient reason loliy he 
 should not fiiyn the bill, although it does not relate at all to 
 the merits or to the provisions of the bill, is :i statement of 
 olijections within the meaning of this provision, and there- 
 fore the governor can negative the bill without any examina- 
 tion of it. 
 
 It is obvious, however, that this concedes to the governor 
 the power under this provision to compel the general court 
 to legislate, l)y a two-thirds vote of each house, without any 
 expression of opinion on his part as to the merits of the 
 legislation; tliat is to say, it gives him powci-, l)y a state- 
 ment of any objection to signing the bill which he chooses 
 to state, to compel all legislation by a two-thirds vote of 
 both houses. To test it, suppose the governor should return 
 a l)ill with a communication saying that he had not read it, 
 but that he objected to signing it Ijeeause he was unalde to 
 olitain a quill pen to sign it with; or because he received it 
 on Friday, which he considered an unlucky day ; or because 
 the messenger who brouglit it to him was a colored person ; 
 or suppose he should return the bill saying that he had 
 not examined it, but that he declined to sign it because the 
 legislature had continued its session longer than he thought 
 was proper, or l^ecause he was satisfied a large number of 
 members of the legislature were of the Catholic religion. 
 
21 
 
 or because he had obsei"vcd that many of the members of 
 the legislature used tobacco or intoxicating liquors. Can it 
 be claimed that, by returning the bill with objections hke 
 these, the governor could prevent its becoming a law unless 
 two thirds of both houses should afterwards vote for it? 
 Would this be an exercise of his qualified negative power ? 
 And yet if the governor can prevent a bill from becoming a 
 law by returning it with ol)jections simply to signing it, and 
 not to the bill itself, any objection which he sees fit to state 
 is sufficient. This is not what the constitutional provision 
 giving the governor a qualified negative upon the acts of 
 the general court means. The purpose of that provision is 
 to require the governor to examine every bill which has 
 passed both houses of the general court before it becomes a 
 law, and if he approves the bill, to require him to sign it, but if 
 he does not approve the bill, to require him to return it, with 
 his objections thereto, to the house in which it originated, 
 to the end that that house may proceed to reconsider the 
 bill in the light of the governor's objections to its provisions. 
 It is only by this construction of the provision, which is 
 the natural construction of its language, that full efiect can 
 be given to all its provisions. The house to which the bill 
 is returned is required, first, to enter the objections of the 
 governor at large on their journal, and then to proceed to 
 reconsider the bill, and if, after such reconsideration, two 
 thirds of the house "agree to pass the bill," it is to be sent, 
 together with such objections, to the other house, which is 
 required likewise to reconsider it. For what purpose are the 
 objections to be entered upon the journal of the house where 
 the bill originated, and sent with the bill, if it be passed by 
 two thirds of that house, to the other house, except that both 
 houses may have the benefit of such objections in reconsider- 
 ing the bill ? • To say that objections which do not relate to 
 
-2-1 
 
 the bill itself, which have nothing to do with the merits of 
 the bill, but are only objections which the goxevnor has to 
 signing it, without reference to its merits, are to be entered 
 upon the journals of the houses before the house proceed to 
 reconsider the bill, is to say that something shall be done that 
 is purely idle and unnecessary. 
 
 It is said, however, that as tlie go\'ernor, in his revisionary 
 and qualified negative power upon the action of the legisla- 
 ture, exercises power which is in its nature legislative, there- 
 fore any ol>jection which a legislator could make to proposed 
 legislative action may be made by the governor against the 
 legislative action of the two houses of the legislature; and if 
 this be so, there is obAiously no objection of any possible 
 description which tlie governor cannot inteqioseto the legis- 
 lative action of the two houses, and he may, as I have said, 
 compel them to legislale by a two-thirds vote, by the arbi- 
 trary statement of olijections which have nothing whatever 
 to do with their action, and cannot in the nature of things 
 atfect the reconsideration of the bill in the sliglitest degree. 
 But the constitution has wisely limited the right of the ex- 
 ecutive to participate in legislation to the doing of one thing 
 only, and that is to fevixing and re-examining the acts of the 
 legislature and a'i)i)roving them by signing them, or disap- 
 proving them by a statement of objections to them to be re- 
 turned to the legislature to aid it in reconsideration. 
 
 It has not gi-^-en him a vote ujion the question whether a bill 
 shall become a law equal to that of two tliirds of the members 
 of each branch of the legislature, and which he may cast 
 against the bill in tlie fomi of an objection wliich states no 
 reasons for it, as a member of the legishiture may cast his 
 vote. 
 
 It has only made it his duty to examine the completed acts 
 of the legislature, and approve them by his signature, or dis- 
 
23 
 
 approve them by a written statement of Ms objections to 
 them. 
 
 It has given him five days within which to perform this 
 duty, and has wisely provided that if he fails to perform it 
 within that time, the acts of the legislature shall be la\vs with- 
 out his approval. He cannot defeat the plain requirement of 
 the constitution that he shall examine the acts of the legisla- 
 ture, and approve or disapprove them upon their intrinsic 
 merits, by refusing to enter upon their intrinsic merits, and 
 returning them with objections which have nothing to do 
 with the provisions of the acts, but relate to the conduct of 
 persons outside of the legislature, and which he says have not 
 affected its action. 
 
 If a bill is presented to the governor within the last five 
 days of the session (Sundays excepted), the constitution 
 does not require him to sign it, or to return it with objec- 
 tions, but permits him to retain it, " in which case it shall 
 not be a law." This is obviously because a consideration of 
 the provisions of the bill and an expression of his opinion 
 thereof in the form of objections to the bill, if he does not 
 approve it, are essential to the discharge of his constitutional 
 duty to approve the bill by signing it, or to disapprove it by 
 returning it with objections to its provisions to the house in 
 which it originated. In his message to the senate on the 
 Saint Clair flats bill, February 1, 1860, President Buchanan 
 said that " To require him [the president] to approve a liill 
 when it is impossible he could examine into its merits, would 
 be to deprive him of the exercise of his constitutional discre- 
 tion, and would convert him into a mere register of the de- 
 crees of congress." It is equally true that to allow the presi- 
 dent or the governor to negative the action of congress or 
 the leo-islature without examining into the merits of that action, 
 would be to give him an arbitrary check upon such action 
 
24 
 
 except by a two-thirds vote, and would thus chaui;e the 
 power of the legislature to legislate by a majority vote 
 (except in cases where, upon examination and revision of its 
 action, the executive states objections thereto) into a power 
 to legislate only by a two-thirds vote in all cases where the 
 executive may so direct. 
 
 It may be asked. Do you claim that the governor must 
 sign a bill the provisions of which he approves, and against 
 the intrinsic merits of which he can state no objections, when 
 he knows its ])assage to have been procured by bribery, or 
 liy violence or fraud? To this I reply, in the first place, 
 that that (jucstion is not raised in this case. The governor 
 says that no member of the legislature has been untrue to 
 his trust. His communication declares that the "measure 
 has passed both branches of the legislature by decided ma- 
 jorities, after a thorough and able discussion covering a 
 period of nearly four months," and that he is glad "to be 
 able to say that no evidence has yet been produced to show 
 that any member of the legislature has l)een unfaithful to his 
 trust and oath of office." .So far from it appearing that the 
 passage of this bill was procured by improper means, we 
 have the official certiticate of the governor in the very mes- 
 sage by «-hich he objects to the bill that all attempts to 
 improperly inliucncc the action of the legislature in relation 
 to it failed, and that it was the result of the deliberate and 
 honest action of the legislature. 
 
 In the second place, I answer that the governor cannot, 
 for the purpose of exercising his qualified negative upon the 
 acts of the legislature, officially know that their action has 
 been improper. He can no more inquire into the motives 
 of the legislature in passing a bill than the judiciary can 
 inquire into his motives in approving or disapproving it. 
 Xeitlier branch of the government can officially know that 
 
25 
 
 the action of another branch has been actuated by improper 
 motives. The executive cannot try the honesty of the legis- 
 lature for the purpose of exercising his constitutional func- 
 tion of revising its completed action, any more than the 
 judiciary can try the honesty of the legislature and of the 
 executive for the purpose of ascertaining whether its com- 
 pleted acts are laws. Each branch of the government must 
 necessarily, in the nature of things, assume the honesty and 
 good conduct of the other. When a bill has duly passed 
 both houses of the general court, and is presented to the 
 governor properly authenticated by the signatures of the 
 speaker of the house and of the president of the senate, 
 the governor can no more go behind the bill itself and 
 inquire into the motives of the house or the senate in passing 
 it than the judiciary, when the bill is signed by the governor, 
 can go behind his signature and that of the president of the 
 senate and the speaker of the house, and try the question of 
 the motives of the governor in approving it, or the motives 
 of either branch of the general court in passing it. 
 
 Counsel for the plaintiffs say, " Supijose that the friends 
 of a bill forcibly prevent five senators from entering the 
 state house, and that during the enforced absence of these 
 senators the bill passes the upper branch by a majority of 
 one ; or suppose that the bill passes the house by a majority 
 of one ; that on the very next day fifty members are indicted 
 for receiving bribes to vote in favor of the bill, and that 
 they all plead guilty, and are sentenced and committed to 
 the state prison before the bill reaches the governor, may 
 not the governor, on account ot these facts, refuse to sign 
 the bill?" The illustration is more striking than sound. 
 It might as well be put with reference to the duty of the 
 judiciary to enforce a law which has been duly passed by 
 the general court and approved by the executive, or become 
 
2fi 
 
 a law l)_v the failure of the executive to approve or disap- 
 prove it. 
 
 ^lust the judiciary enforce a law the passage of which was 
 procured by violence, and the apjn-oval of which was ob- 
 tained by bribery? It may seem at first sight that it ought 
 not to do so ; but it is well settled that the judiciary must 
 enforce the law without reference to these facts, for, unless 
 the completed acts of each branch of the government are to 
 be taken as finalities by the other branches, neither is inde- 
 pendent of the other and there is no real constitutional govern- 
 ment. The independence of the three branches is the primary 
 principle of our constitutional government, and it neccisarily 
 requires that each branch, in the exercise of its powers, shall 
 assume the good conduct of the other bi-anches. The only 
 excejition to tliis is tlie constitutional jirovision for impeach- 
 ment trials, in which the official impeached can be condemned 
 only after a hearing and trial. 
 
 Sup])(>s(> the g(.)vernor seasona))ly returns a bill with objec- 
 tions to its juovisions to tlie house in which it originated, 
 and before that house reacb a reconsideration of the bill it is 
 known beyond f|uestion that the governor was bribed to 
 return tlie bill ; is it any less the duty of that house to recon- 
 sider the l)ill, and does it thereby become a law without a 
 two-thirds vote of eacli liouse notwithstanding the objec- 
 tions? Or e\'en supjjose before the house reaches the re- 
 consideration of the bill the go\'(a-nor has been impeached 
 and removed from office for accepting a ))ribe to return the 
 bill with objections, does the bill thereby become a law, 
 notwithstanding its return, without further action by either 
 house? If so, then, as in this state the house can imjieach, 
 and the senate can condemn and remove the governor by a 
 majority vote, the constitutional provision for revision of the 
 
27 
 
 acts of the general couit by the executive can be thereby 
 wholly nullified. 
 
 It is not, as the learned counsel for the plaintiff seem to 
 apprehend, a question of the reparation of the powers of 
 government between the three branches, but of the inde- 
 pendence of each branch in the exercise of its pouters. This 
 independence of the three branches is at the foundation 
 of the scheme of government established by the constitution, 
 and necessarily requires each branch to accept the acts of the 
 others as finalities without any inquiry into their conduct or 
 motives in relation to them. 
 
 The fact that in the revision of the acts of the general 
 court the executive exercises legislative power, does not 
 change the case, for it is not a question of what kind of 
 power either branch exercises, but of whether, in the exer- 
 cise of that power, it must treat the acts of the other branches 
 as final, or can go behind them and pass judgment upon the 
 conduct and motives of the other branches in relation to 
 them. 
 
 While the governor exercises legislative power in the 
 approval or disapproval of the acts of the legislature, he ex- 
 ercises it only in the manner and to the extent specifically 
 pointed out by the constitution, and as an independent 
 branch of the government with reference to the completed acts 
 of another independent branch. Legislative power may be 
 said to be inherent in the legislature, so that the mere estab- 
 lishment of a legislative branch of the government clothes it 
 with power to legislate, but such power is not inherent in 
 the executive branch of the government, and the establish- 
 ment of an executive branch, so far from clothing it with 
 legislative power, necessarily excludes such power. What- 
 ever legislative power the governor has, therefore, must be 
 found within the fair meaning of the words of the constitu- 
 
2S 
 
 tion authorizing him to approve or disapprove tlic acts of 
 the leuishitiue ; and to administer that provision with any 
 regard to the independence of the legislature, the governor 
 must deal with the acts which come to him from the two 
 In-anches of the legislature, without reference to the motives 
 of the legislature in passing them. An ample answer to all 
 suiiuestions such as are made by the counsel for the plaintitfs 
 with reference to the power of the governor to refuse to ap- 
 prove acts of the legislature without reference to their merits 
 hecuuse the legislature were actuated by improper motives 
 in })assing them, is tliat it is not so written. The constitu- 
 tion has not clothed the governor with power to try the con- 
 duct of the lcgislutui"e or of either branch of it. It has 
 simply given him power to try the completed acts of the 
 legislature when they reach him in the foi-m of bills which 
 \\AXQ duly passed both branches and are properly authen- 
 ticated to him as such. It has directed to him to examine 
 and approve or disapprove the bills, not to go behind the 
 bills and approve or disapprove the conduct or inotive of the 
 legislature inj^assivr/ them. 
 
 Once concede the po'\\ or of the governor in the exercise of 
 his function of approving or disapproving bills which have 
 jjassed both branches of the legislature to refuse to examine 
 the bills upon their merits and to go behind the bills them- 
 selves and examine into and try the conduct of either branch 
 of the legislature with reference to their passage, and there 
 is no limit to such inquiry. He may try not only the hon- 
 esty of the conduct of the members of the legislature, but the 
 propriety' of their conduct. He may say, I will not sign this 
 bill because the debate in the legislature has not been decor- 
 ous, or because the legislature have held night sessions, or 
 because debate was unduly restricted upon the bill in one 
 branch or the other, or because the speaker of the house or 
 
29 
 
 the president of the senate ruled improperly with reference 
 to some question raised upon the consideration of the bill, 
 or because the house or the senate suspended its rules and 
 passed the bill without proper consideration. 
 
 If the constitution gives the governor the power to do 
 this, it is his duty to exercise that power and examine into the 
 propriety or honesty of the conduct of the legislature or of any 
 of its members whenever any question is raised with regard to 
 it. And he is thus made not a revisor of the bills enacted by 
 the legislature, but a supervisor of its conduct and its morals ; 
 and the power of the legislature to legislate by a majority 
 vote of each house is made to depend not upon the character 
 of the bills it passes or upon the governor's opinion of the 
 merits of those bills, but upon his opinion of the propriety 
 of its conduct and the rectitude of its motives. 
 
 The framers of the constitution wisely refrained from giv- 
 ing to the governor any such power, and thereby imposing 
 upon him any such duty. They authorized him to deal only 
 with the completed acts of the legislature in a particular 
 manner, and gave to each house ample power to deal with the 
 misconduct of its members or of other persons aifecting its 
 deliberations and conduct. The learned counsel for the 
 plaintiif say, " Suppose the members of the legislature ex- 
 ceeding in number the majority who voted for a bill have all 
 been indicted for taking bribes for voting for the bill, have 
 pleaded guilty and have been sentenced and committed to 
 state prison before the bill reaches the governor ? " Do they 
 know of any statute under which a member of the legislature 
 can be indicted, convicted, and sent to prison by the court 
 for misconduct in his office as a member of the legislature ? 
 Suppose such an indictment to be found and the question of 
 the conduct of the legislator submitted to the decision of a 
 jury. Obviously that question can be and ought to be tried 
 
30 
 
 by the house of which he is a member. Suppose the jury 
 and that house come to different eonchisions. Can the mem- 
 ber be imprisoned and pre\ented from representing his con- 
 stituency because the jury have found Iiim to be guilty of 
 misconduct as such member, while the house of whicli he is 
 a member have found that he has not l)een guilt)' of such 
 misconduct ? 
 
 Or if the jury find him not guilly, is the house of which 
 he is a member thereby prevented from trying and expelling 
 him if it finds he is guilty ? 
 
 The governor seems to have feared that his approval of 
 this bill would be an a^iproval of what he believed to be the 
 improper conduct of those who promoted its passage ; and 
 therefore, obviously because he believed that the character 
 of a bill which, as he said, had "passed both branches of the 
 legislature b}' decided majorities, after a thorough and able 
 discussion covering a period of nearly four months," would, 
 without doubt, prove upon examination to be such that he 
 could not disapprove it upon its merits, in order to show his 
 disapproval of the conduct of those who had promoted its 
 passage, he refused to perform his constitutional duty of ex 
 amining the bill. 
 
 Having the Ijill duly authenticated and presented to 
 him as a completed act of the legislature as an inde- 
 pendent branch of the government, he deliberately dis- 
 regarded the plain mandate of the constitution to him to 
 examine and approve or disapprove the bill, and entered 
 upon an ex parte trial of the conduct and motives of the 
 legislature and of those who had appeared before it in rela- 
 tion to the passage of the bill. Fortunately for the legisla- 
 ture, it was acquitted by his excellency ; but he convicted 
 those who had appeared before it, and, to punish them for 
 the misconduct of which he thus found them guilty without 
 
31 
 
 notice and without hearing, he refused to express an opinion 
 upon the merits of the bill, and attempted to prevent its 
 becoming a law by wholly refusing to perform his constitu- 
 tional duty of examining and approving or disapproving it. 
 It must, of course, be assumed that the motives of the 
 governor were pure and good ; but if he believed that an 
 approval of the bill would be an approval of the conduct of 
 the legislature or of those who promoted the passage of the 
 bill by it, he was clearly wrong. It was the completed act 
 of the legislature, as shown by the bill duly authenticated 
 and presented to him, which he was authorized and required 
 to approve or disapprove, not the methods by which it 
 became a completed act. The governor's approval of a bill 
 is no more an expression of his opinion of the conduct of 
 the legislature with reference to its passage, no more an 
 approval or disapproval of the conduct of those who promote 
 its passage, than the administration of a law by the judiciary 
 is an expression of their opinion of the conduct of the legis- 
 lature in passing it, or of the governor in approving it. 
 
 The governor's communication states that he deems it his 
 plain duty to rebuke the misconduct of which he has found 
 the promoters of the bill to have been guilty, and therefore 
 he says, " Without entering upon its merits, I veto the 
 
 BILL." 
 
 The motive of his excellency must be assumed to have 
 been good, his purpose high and moral ; but where in the 
 constitution is he authorized to rebuke the conduct of suitors 
 before the general court ? Where in the constitution or the 
 law of New Hampshire is the good name of those who 
 appear before the general court committed to the arbitrary 
 decision of the executive to be tried and condemned un- 
 heard ? What right under the constitution has the governor 
 to perform his high constitutional duty of revising the acts 
 
3-2 
 
 of the lesfislature without reference to the merits of those 
 acts, and for the purpose, not of assisting the legislature to 
 make good laws, but of rebuking the conduct of those who 
 have appeared befox'e it? 
 
 Does the constitution authorize the governor to deprive 
 the people of the benefit of a good law the provisions of 
 which he does not disapprove, unless two thii-ds of each 
 house vote for it, merely to enable him to rebuke the conduct 
 of those who promoted its passage, because such conduct 
 does not conform to his moral standard ? 
 
 The constitution authorizes and requires the governor to 
 examine the acts of the legislature and advise it of any 
 objections to them which, upon such examination, he finds 
 to exist ; but it nowhere empowers him to veto or forbid 
 such acts even for the purpose of rebuking conduct which 
 does not meet his approval. His duty is to assist the legis- 
 lature by an examination of its acts and pointing out any 
 objections to them, not to forbid its acts without reference 
 to their merits.* 
 
 It is true the power given to the executive by this provision 
 is purely legislative, and if he exercises it only in the manner 
 and to the extent to which he is authorized to exercise it, the 
 independence of the legislative and executive powers, as de- 
 fined by the constitution, is not thereby interfered with, for 
 the fundamental rule stated by article 37, part 1, of the con- 
 stitution, that "the legislative, executive, and judicial powers 
 of the government ought to be kept as separate and inde- 
 pendent of each other as the nature of a free government will 
 admit," is to be construed in subordination to the express 
 
 * " It is really an abuse of language to term the refusal of the President to approve 
 a bill ' a veto.' The word is not In the constitution. It is borrowed from a state ot 
 affairs essentially different, and does not harmonize with the constitutional notion of 
 the president's co-operation in legislation. The president has no right to forbid con- 
 gress to do anything. He can only say that he does not agree, and declare his reasons 
 therefor." (Von Hoist's Const. Law, sec. .33.) 
 
33 
 
 provisions of the constitution itself. To tlie extent that the 
 constitution confers legislative power upon the executive, it 
 is as much his duty to exercise it as it is the duty of the leg- 
 islature to exercise the legislative power confided to it by 
 the constitution, and the exercise of the legislative power 
 conferred upon the governor by the constitution to that extent 
 does not in the slightest degree interfere with the fundamen- 
 tal rule of the constitution that the legislative, executive, and 
 judicial powers of the government ought to be separate and 
 independent. But when we come to consider to what extent 
 the constitution has conferred legislative power upon the ex- 
 ecutive, we are bound to construe the language giving that 
 power in such a way as not to interfere with the operation of 
 this fundamental rule, that the legislative and executive pow- 
 ers are to be kept separate and independent. And if we find 
 two constructions of the language giving that power to the 
 executive possible, one a construction which subjects the 
 completed acts of the legislature to an arbitrary negative 
 without examination and without reasons based upon, the 
 merits or demerits of such acts, and which practically em- 
 powers the executive branch of the government to arbitra- 
 rily compel the legislative branch to act in all cases by a 
 two-thirds vote ; and another construction which subjects the 
 completed acts of the legislative branch only to the revision 
 and re-examination of the executive, and empowers him to 
 compel the legislature to pass such acts as he may negative 
 upon examination, only with the aid of objections liy him to 
 the provisions thereof, so that the executive acts as the ad- 
 viser of the legislature and not as its dictator, — it is our 
 duty to adopt the construction which least interferes with the 
 independence of the legislative branch, and hold that the 
 provision conferring legislative power upon the executive 
 only authorizes him to state objections to the provisions of 
 
34 
 
 legislative acts which he revises, and not that which author- 
 izes him to negative them without i"e\'ision by o))jections 
 which have nothing to do with their merits. 
 
 Even if it were doubtful whether the language of the con- 
 stitution authorizes the executi\e to negative a bill by return- 
 ing it without an examination of it, the contemporaneous and 
 subsequent practical construction of this provision, from its 
 adoption down to the present time, shows conclusively that 
 an examination of the bill and a statement of objections to it, 
 which are the result of such examination, is essential to the 
 exercise of the qualified negative power. 
 
 "Great weight has always been attached, and very rightly 
 attached, to contemporaneous exposition." 
 
 Maushall, C.J., in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 
 41S. 
 
 "The contemporaries of the constitution have claims to our 
 deference upon the question, because they had the best opportuni- 
 ties of informing themselves of the understanding of the framers 
 of the constitution and of the sense put upon it by the people 
 when it was adopted by them." 
 
 Ogden v. /Saunders, 12 Wheat. 290. 
 
 Upon this ground alone the Supreme Couii: of the United 
 States sustained the right of its members to sit as circuit 
 judges. 
 
 Stuart V. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299. 
 
 So also the same Court, in holding that the appellate power 
 of the United States extends to cases pending in the state 
 courts, said, — 
 
 " Sti-ong as this conclusion stands upon the general language 
 of the constitution, it may still derive support from other sources. 
 It is an historical fact that this exposition of the constitution, 
 
35 
 
 extending its appellate power to state courts, was, previous to its 
 adoption, uniformly and publicly avowed by its friends, and ad- 
 mitted by its enemies, as the basis of their respective reasonings 
 both in and out of the state conventions. It is an historical fact 
 that, at the time when the judiciary act was submitted to the 
 deliberations of the first congress, composed as it was not only 
 of men of great learning and ability, but of men who had acted a 
 principal part in framing, supporting, or opposing that constitu- 
 tion, the same exposition was explicitly declared and admitted by 
 the friends and by the opponents of that system." 
 
 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,, 1 Wheat. 351. 
 
 It is therefore proper to show that it is an historical fact 
 that the constitutional provision giving a qualified negative 
 upon the acts of the legislature was, before its adoption, 
 held to give simply a power of revision and not of objection, 
 and that in its exercise by those who were contemporary 
 with its adoption and knew the views of those who framed 
 it, and by all who have exercised it since, it has uniformly 
 been treated as requiring an examination of the legislative 
 acts and an expression of the opinion of the executive as to 
 their provisions. 
 
 The history of this constitutional provision and of the 
 views of those who framed and adopted it, shows conclu- 
 sively that it was intended to give the executive power to 
 revise the acts of the legislature and negative them only by 
 the statement of objections to their provisions, and that a 
 consideration of the provisions of the bill is essential to its 
 exercise. 
 
 The qualified negative of the executive upon acts of the 
 legislature, commonly called the " veto power, " as it exists in 
 the Constitution of New Hampshire and in most of the other 
 states of the Union and in the Constitution of the United 
 
3l! 
 
 States, is peculiar tn those constitutions, and exists no- 
 where else. It is not an arbitrary power to negative the 
 action of the legislative branch of the government without 
 giving reasons, — like the power of the English sovereign to 
 negative acts of parliament,* — but only a power to negative 
 the action of the legislature upon reasons stated to it in a 
 particular manner : that is to say, by objections to its action, 
 reudcrctl to that branch of the legislature in which such 
 action originatt'd, to be entered upon the records of that 
 l)ranch to aid it in the reconsideration of its action, which, 
 upon receiving such objections, it is its duty to reconsider. 
 
 It first appears as the third article of the original Constitu- 
 tion of the State of Mew York, known as the constitution 
 of 1777, wJiich was framed and adopted April 20, 1777, 
 by." The Provincial Congress" which assendiled July 10, 1776. 
 It was introduced into the congress ))y Robert R. Living- 
 ston, and the original draft in his handwriting is still in ex- 
 istence among the miscellaneous papers in the secretary of 
 state's office. It was not amended, but, after some debate, 
 the nature of which is not shown by the journal of the con- 
 gress, was adopted as presented by a vote of thirty-one to 
 four. 
 
 Journal of Provincial Congress, N.Y. , vol. I. pp. 860- 
 
 *" When a bill has passed through both houses the royal assent is given either by 
 her majesty in jicrhoii or by rommission. Wlien her majesty gives lier consent in per- 
 son, her concurrence is previously communi<'atcd to the clerk-assistant, who reads the 
 titles of the bills, on wliich the royal asseut is .sif^iiilieil by a gentle inclination. If it be 
 a bill of supply, the clerk pronouncfs loudly, ' La rcigne remercrc ses bons sujets, 
 accepte leur b^n(iVolence, et ainsi le veult,' — *The Queen thanks her good subjects, 
 accepts their benevolence, and answers. Be it so.' To other public bills the form of 
 assent is 'La reigne le veult,' — * The Queen wills it so.' To private bills, ' Soi fait 
 comme il est desire,'— ' Be it as it is prayed.' When the royal assent is refused, the 
 clerk says, *La reigne s'avisera,' — 'The Queen will consider of it; * but these words 
 are never now pronounced, aud have not been heard since Queen Anne refused to sanc- 
 tion the Scotch jniitia bill in the year 1707." (The Crown, the Senate, and the Bench, p. 
 54.) 
 
37 
 
 It was as follows : - 
 
 " III. And whereas laws inconsistent with the spirit of this con- 
 stitution or with the public good may be hastily or unadvisedly 
 passed : Be it ordained that the governor, for the time being the 
 chancellor, and the judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of 
 them, together with the governor, shall be and hereby are consti- 
 tuted a council to revise all bills about to be passed into laws by 
 the legislature, and for that purpose shall assemble themselves from 
 time to time when the legislature shall be convened, for which, nev- 
 ertheless, they shall not receive any salary or consideration under 
 any pretence whatever. And that all bills which have passed the 
 senate or assembly shall before they become laws be presented to 
 the said council for their revisal and consideration;^ and if upon 
 such revision and consideration it should appear improper to tlie 
 said council, or a majority of them, that the said bill should become 
 a law of this state, that they return the same, together with their 
 objections thereto, in writing, to the senate or house of assembly 
 (in whichsoever the same shall have originated), who shall enter 
 the objections sent down by the council at large in their minutes, 
 and proceed to reconsider the said bill. But if after such consid- 
 eration two thirds of the said senate or house of assembly shall, 
 notwithstanding the said objections, agree to pass the same, it 
 shall, together with the objections, be sent to the other branch of 
 the legislature, where it shall also be reconsidered, and if approved 
 • by two thirds of the members present, shall be law. 
 
 " And in order to prevent any unnecessary delays, be it further 
 ordained that if any bill shall not be returned by the council 
 within ten days after it shall have been presented, the same shall 
 be a law, unless the legislature shall bj' their adjournment render 
 a return of the said bill within ten days impracticable, in which 
 case the bill shall be returned on the first day of the meeting of 
 the legislature after the expiration of the ten days." 
 
 New York Constitution, 1777, Article 3. 
 
 It next appears in the constitution adopted by a conven- 
 tion of the people of Vermont, July 8, 1777, which vested 
 
 * The italics are mine. 
 
38 
 
 the le<risliitivo power in a house of representatives, and the 
 executive power in a governor and eouucil, and provided for 
 the revision of acts of the legislatui'e as follows : — 
 
 "To the end that laws before they are enacted may be more 
 maturely considered, and the iuconveniency of hasty determination 
 as much as possible prevented, all bills of public nature shall be 
 first laid before the governor and council for their peruml and 
 proposals of amendment * and shall be printed for the consideration 
 of the people before they are read in general assembly for the 
 last time of debate and amendment ; except temporary acts which 
 after being laid before the governor and council, may (in case 
 of sudden necessity) be passed into laws; and no other shall be 
 passed into laws until the next session of assembly. And for the 
 more perfect satisfaction of the public, the reasons and motives 
 for making such laws shall be fully and clearly expressed and set 
 forth in their preambles." 
 
 Section 14, Vermont Const. 1777. 
 
 In the Pennsyhania Constitution adopted September 28, 
 1776, the following ]}r()\isii)n was inserted to guard against 
 hasty legislation : — 
 
 "To the end that laws before they are enacted may be more 
 maturely considered, and the inconvenience of hasty determina- 
 tions as much as possible prevented, all bills of public nature shall 
 be printed for the consideration of the people before they are read 
 in general assembly the last time for debate and amendment ; and, 
 except on occasions of sudden necessity, shall not be passed into 
 laws until the next session of assembl}- ; and for the more perfect 
 satisfaction of the public, the reasons and motives for making 
 such laws shall be fully and clearly expressed in the preambles." 
 
 Section l!j, Penn. Const. 1770. 
 
 It next appears as article two, chapter one, of the original 
 Constitution of ^Massachusetts, adopted jNlarch 2, 1780. By 
 
 * The italics are mine. 
 
39 
 
 this article the power of revision was given to the governor, 
 but in other respects the provision is plainly copied, not only 
 in its idea but largely in its language, from the provision of 
 the New York Constitution. This article was as follows : — 
 
 "No bill or resolve of the senate or house of representatives shall 
 become a law, and have force as such, until it shall have been laid 
 before the governor /or his revisal; and if he, upon such revision,* 
 approve thereof, he shall signify his approbation by signing the 
 same. But if he have any objection to the passing of such bill 
 or resolve, he shall return the same, together with his objections 
 thereto, in writing, to the senate or house of representatives, in 
 whichsoever the same shall have originated ; who shall enter the 
 objections sent down by the governor, at large, on their records, and 
 proceed to reconsider the said bill or resolve ; but if, after such 
 reconsideration, two thirds of the said senate or house of represen- 
 tatives shall, notwithstanding the said objections, agree to pass the 
 same, it shall, together with the objections, be sent to the other 
 branch of the legislature, where it shall also be reconsidered, and 
 if approved by two thirds of the members present, shall have the 
 for«e of a law : but in all such cases, the votes of both houses shall 
 be determined by yeas and nays ; and the names of the persons 
 voting for, or against, the said bill or resolve shall be entered upon 
 the public records of the commonwealth. 
 
 "And in order to prevent unnecessary delays, if any bill or 
 resolve shall not be returned by the governor within five days 
 after it shall have been presented, the same shall have the force of 
 
 alaw."t 
 
 Mass. Constitution 1780, ch. 1, art. 2. 
 
 The constitution adopted by the Massachusetts General 
 Court in 1778, and which was rejected by the people, con- 
 tained no provision for any revision of the acts of the legis- 
 lature before they became laws, and the provision for such 
 revision in the constitution of 1780 was evidently suggested 
 
 * The italics are mine. 
 
 t Amended in 1820 by a provision that, if the legislature prevent the return by 
 adjournment within the five days, the bill or resolve shall not have the force of law. 
 
40 
 
 by the provision for a council of revi^^ion in the New York 
 Constitution. 
 
 "When the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was adopted, 
 tlie Xew York council of revision had existed for nearly 
 three years, and had returned ten bills to the legislature 
 with careftilly prepared objections and arguments against 
 their provisions. 
 
 Street's New York Council of Revision, pp. 201-229. 
 
 Mv. Hamilton, speaking of the council of revision about 
 this time, said, "Its utility has become so apparent that per- 
 sons wlio in compilini;' the constitution were violent opposers 
 of it, have from experience Ix'come its declared admirers." 
 
 The usefulness of the revisionar}^ power had been shown 
 liy experience in Xew York, and the constitutional conven- 
 tion of the adjacent Slate of Massacluisetts naturally adopted 
 it without much debate as to the propi'iety of it. But the 
 procecdiniis of the t'onvention, and its address submitting the 
 constitution framed by it, to the people, sliow clearly that 
 the memlicrs of the comention did not understand that the 
 negative power gi\'en to the governor by the constitution 
 was one to l)e exercised without reference to the merits of 
 the bills ncgati\ed. It was first proposed that "the gov- 
 ernor of this commonwealth have a negative iqjon all laws 
 except those which sliall l)e passed and made for the military 
 defence of the state, and that he have a revision upon 
 those," c*tc. 
 
 Journal of ^lass. Const. Convention, 1780, p. 132. 
 
 This provision for an absolute negative, except as to laws 
 for military defence, was rejected, and power of revision 
 was granted in the following language ; viz., — 
 
 "No bill or resolve of the senate or house of representatives shall 
 
41 
 
 become a law and have force until it shall have been laid before the 
 governor for his revisal ; and if he, upon such revision, . . . shall 
 have any objection to the passing of such bill or resolve, he shall 
 return the same, together with his objections thereto, in writing," 
 
 and as given on page 91. 
 
 Ibid. p. 133. 
 
 The purpose of vesting this power in the governor was 
 stated in the address of the convention submitting the con- 
 stitution to the people, as follows : — 
 
 " The power of revisiiig and stating objections to any bill or resolve 
 that shall be passed by the two houses, we are of opinion ought to 
 be lodged in the hands of some one person, not only to preserve 
 the laws from being unsystematical and inaccurate, but that a due 
 balance may be preserved in the three capital powers of govern- 
 ment. . . . We have therefore thought the governor the only 
 proper person that could be trusted with the power of revising the 
 bills and resolves of the general assembly." * 
 
 Ibid. pp. 218, 219. 
 
 May 25, 1787, the Convention met to frame a United States 
 Constitution. 
 
 At that time eleven of the states had adopted constitutions 
 in the following order of time ; viz. , — 
 
 New Hampshire, January 5, 1776. 
 
 South Carolina, March 26, 1776. 
 
 Virginia, June 29, 1776. 
 
 New Jersey, July 2, 1776. 
 
 Delaware, September 21, 1776. 
 
 Pennsylvania, September 28, 1776. 
 
 Maryland, November 11, 1776. 
 
 North Carolina, December 18, 1776. 
 
 Georgia, February 5, 1777. 
 
 * The italics are mine. 
 
42 
 
 New York, April 20, 1777. 
 
 Vermont, July 8, 1777. 
 
 Miissaehusctts, :\[arch 2, 1780. 
 
 The Constitution of South Carolina vested the leii'islative 
 authority in the "president and commander-in-chief" (chosen 
 liy joint liallot of the general assemhly and the legislative 
 council), the general assembly, and tlie legislative council, 
 with a provision that bills which had passed the asscmldy 
 and the council might be asser.tcd to or rejected by the 
 president and commander-in-chief. 
 
 Of the other ten states which had adopted constitutions at 
 that time, only Massachusetts and New York had provided 
 thereby for any revision of legislative acts before they should 
 l)ecome laws, or any qualiiied negative l)y the executive upon 
 the legislative branch of the government. 
 
 The Xew York council of revision had then returned fifty- 
 eight bills and resolves with full and particular objections 
 and arguments against their provisions. 
 
 The go'\'ernor of ^Massachusetts returned two resolves and 
 one bill with careful objections to their provisions.* 
 
 *The first objection by the Governor of MiisBac-hiisctts to an act ol the Legislature is 
 founrtinthe following message of General Hancock, which I think has never been 
 printed, but exists in the original manuscript in the office of the Secretary of State : — 
 
 " Gentlemen of the Senate and Gentlemen of the House of Representatives t 
 
 " Embarrass'd as I find myself to be for want of Time to Consider the important 
 Bills that were laid before me yesterday afternoon, I however feel a Disposition to sub- 
 mit to take upon myself a Burden plac'd upon me by one of them which I had the gi'eat- 
 est Claim to be excus'd from rather than the two Houses should be subjected to the in- 
 convenience of remaining Sitting, when their wishes are so urgent to return home— I 
 therefore will not make any Objections to the Bill intitled " An Act for repealing two 
 Laws of tills State, and for Asserting the rights of this free, Sovereign Commonwealth 
 to expell such Aliens as may be dangerous to the Peace and good order of Govern- 
 ment " And as the Import and Excise Act which was yesterday laid before me, to 
 which I have objections in its present mode, does not take place 'till the 15th of June 
 next, and consequently no Prejudice can arise by the delay of its passing 'till next 
 Session; I am under that Circumstance now ready to Comply with the request of the 
 Two Branches of the General Court for a recess and will direct the Secretary to proceed 
 accordingly if the two Houses Consent to the Suspension of that Bill. 
 
 "John Hancock. 
 " Boston, March 25th, 1784." 
 
 July 1775, Governor Bowdoin returned to the house a resolve appointing "acorn- 
 
43 
 
 This Convention adopted the provision for revision of the 
 acts of the legislature in the Constitution of Massachiisetts, 
 and confided the power of revision to the executive alone, 
 instead of to the executive and the judiciary. But their 
 debates and action and the discussion of this provision by 
 Mr. Hamilton and others before the federal constitution 
 was adopted, show that everyl)ody regarded the revisionary 
 power given by the New York Constitution to the council of 
 revision, and the power of revisal given to the governor by 
 the Constitution of Massachusetts, and the power of stating 
 objections to acts of congress given to the president by the 
 Federal Constitution, as identical, and as only a power to 
 examine and revise the action of the legislative branch of the 
 government by the statement of objections to its provisions. 
 The provision for granting that power first appears in the 
 resolutions proposed by Mr. Eandolph at the opening of the 
 convention, the eighth of which was, — 
 
 " Resolved, That the executive and a convenient number of the 
 national judiciary ought to compose a council of revision,* with 
 authority to examine every act of the national legislature before it 
 
 mittee to receive, examine, ami pass on all accounts that now or may be hereafter ex- 
 hibited against the commonwealth," with the objection that he deemed it unconstitu. 
 tional. (Mass. Res. vol. 6, p. 392.) 
 
 May, 1787, Governor Bowdoin returned " a hill reducing the salary of the governor 
 of the commonwealth," with the objection that he apprehended the bill to be contrary 
 to the constitution, and was therefore compelled to return it for reconsideration. 
 (Mass. Ees. vol. 7, p. 291.) 
 
 March, 1788, Gov. Hancock returned a resolve for payment of a sum of money to 
 Captain Benjamin Heywood, with the objection that Capt. Hey wood had been paid for 
 the same services in pursuance of a previous resolve. (Mass. Res. vol. 7, p. 465.) 
 
 The qualified negative has since been exercised by the governors of Massachusetts 
 as follows: Twice in 1827, once iu 1830, once in 1831, twice in 1833, once in 1837, once in 
 1840, twice in 1851, three times in 1852, three times in 1855, once in 1856, five times in 
 1857, once in 1859, four times in 1860, four times in 1861, twice in 1862, three times in 
 1864, three times in 1865, twice in 18S7, five times In 1868, twice in 1870, twice in 1871, 
 once in 1873, three times in 1874, twice in 1876, three times in 1877, once in 1879, once 
 in 1881, once in 1882, eleven times in 1883, three times in 1884, twice in 1886, twice in 1S87, 
 once in 1888. 
 
 * The italics are mine. 
 
44 
 
 shall operate, and every act of a particular legislature* before a 
 negative thereon shall be final ; and that a dissent of the said 
 council shall amount to a rejection, unless the act of the national 
 legislature be again passed, or that of a particular legislature be 
 again negatived by of the members of each branch." 
 
 Madison's Debates, vol. 5 (Eliot's) p. 126. 
 
 Chief Justice Yates, who had been a member of the council 
 of revision of the State of New York from its creation, was 
 a deleaate to the convention, and his eolleafjucs were John 
 Lansing, Jr. (afterwards chief justice and chancellor, and, as 
 such, a member of the council of revision) and Alexander 
 Hamilton. 
 
 The report by Chief Justice Yates of the discussion and 
 action upon this resolution is quite interesting as bearing 
 upon the views of the convention with reference to the char- 
 acter of the power proposed to be given to the executive. 
 It is as follows : — 
 
 "On the 4th of June, in committee of the whole, — 
 
 " Mr. Gerry, of jMassachusetts, objects to the clause, moves 
 its postponement in order to let in a motion ' that the right 
 of revision should he in the executive only.'' 
 
 " Mr.AVilson, of Pennsylvania, 'contends that the executive 
 and judicial ought to have a joint and full negative ; they 
 cannot otherwise preserve their importance against the legis- 
 lature.' 
 
 "^Ir. King, of Massachusetts, was against the interference 
 of the judicial. They may be biased in the interpretation. 
 He is therefore to give the executive a complete negative. 
 
 " Carried, to be postponed, six states against four. New 
 York for it. 
 
 * The mention ol "every act of a particular legislature" in this resolution referred 
 to the provision of Mr. Randolph's sixth resolution, which was that congress should 
 have power to negative laws passed by the several states which in its opinion were 
 contrary to the national constitution, or any treaty under the authority thereof. 
 
45 
 
 " The next question [was] that the executive have a com- 
 plete negative, and it was therefore voted to expunj^e the 
 remaining part of the clause. Dr. Franklin against the 
 motion. The power dangerous, and would be abused so as 
 to get money for passing bills. 
 
 " Mr. Madison against it, because of the difficulty of an 
 executive venturing on the exercise of this negative, and is 
 therefore of the opinion that the revUional authority is better. 
 
 "Mr. Bedford, of Delaware, is against the whole, either 
 negative or revisional. The two branches are sufficient 
 checks on each other. No danger of subverting the ex- 
 ecutive, because his powers may by the convention be so 
 well defined that the legislature cannot overleap the bounds. 
 
 " Mr. Mason, of Virginia, against the negative power in the 
 executive, because it will not agree with the genius of the 
 people. 
 
 " On this the question was put and decided nem. con. against 
 expunging part of the clause so as to establish a complete 
 negative. 
 
 " Mr. Butler, of South Carolina, that all acts passed by the 
 legislature be suspended for the space of days by 
 
 the executive. 
 
 " Unanimously in the negative. 
 
 "It was resolved and agreed that the blank [in Mr. Ean- 
 dolph's resolution] be filled up with the words ' two thirds of 
 the legislature.' Agreed to. 
 
 " The question was then put upon the clause as amended 
 and filled up. Carried. Eight states for, two against. New 
 York for it. 
 
 " Mr. Wilson then moved for the addition of a convenient 
 number of the national judicial to the executive as a council 
 of revision. Ordered to be taken into consideration to- 
 morrow." 
 
4(1 
 
 On the 6th of June, "Mr. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, moved 
 [in ccthsequence of a vote to reconsider the question of the 
 veviHional powers vested in the executive'] that there be added 
 these words : ' with a convenient number of the national judi- 
 cial.' 
 
 "Upon debate, carried in the negative. Three states for 
 and three against. New York for the addition." 
 
 Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 
 1787, by Eobert Yates. 
 
 Mr. Pinckney submitted a plan of a federal constitution at 
 the same time in ^vhich the provision with reference to the 
 revisionary power was, that — 
 
 " Every bill which shall have passed the legislature shall be pre- 
 sented to the President of the United States for his reuision; * if he 
 approves it he shall sign it, but if he does not approve it he shall 
 return it with his objections to the house it originated in, which 
 house, if two thirds (jf the members pi;esent, notwithstanding the 
 president's objections, agree to pass it, shall send it to the other 
 house, with the president's objections, where, if two thirds of tiie 
 members present also agree to pass it, the same shall become a 
 law ; and all bills sent to the president, and not returned by him 
 within days shall be laws, unless the legislature by their 
 
 adjournment prevent their return, in which case they shall not be 
 laws." 
 
 Ibid, p. 1.30. 
 
 In the debate upon the resolution presented by ]Mr. Ran- 
 dolph with reference to re\ising the acts of the national 
 legislature, the discussion was between those who advocated 
 an absolute negati\e power in the executive and those who 
 favored a revisionary power only. 
 
 Ibid, pp. 15.5, 164. 
 
 * The italics are mine. 
 
47 
 
 Mr. Madison, in supporting the motion to join a conve- 
 nient number of the national judiciary with the executive in 
 the exercise of this power, speaks of it constantly as a " re- 
 visionary function," a "revisionary power." Mr. Pinckney, 
 Mr. Wilson, and all the others who discussed the question, 
 spoke of it uniformly as a revisionary power, a power to 
 revise, and never as a power to negative simply. 
 
 Ibid. pp. 155, 164, 165. 
 
 Subsequently the committee of the whole reported to the 
 convention a plan for the constitution, the tenth resolution 
 of which was, — 
 
 "That the national executive shall have the right to negative 
 any legislative act which shall not afterwards be passed by two 
 thirds of each branch of the national legislature." 
 
 Ibid. p. 190. 
 
 Five days after this Mr. Hamilton, who had taken no part 
 in the debates, presented a sketch of the essential features 
 of such a constitution as he thought should be adopted. The 
 provision with reference to the veto power was, — 
 
 " The functions of the executive to be as follows : To have a neg- 
 ative on all laws about to be passed, and the execution," &c. 
 
 Ibid. p. 205. 
 
 The tenth resolution of the plan reported from the com- 
 mittee of the whole, to wit, that the national executive shall 
 have the right to negative any legislative act which shall not 
 be afterwards passed by two thirds of each branch of the 
 national legislature, was adopted by the convention on the 
 18th of July without debate. 
 
 Ibid. p. 328. 
 
48 
 
 On the 21st of July an amendment was moved l)y INIr. 
 Wilson to the resolution " that the supreme national judiciary 
 should be associated with the executive in the rovisionary 
 power." In support of this I\Ir. Wilson said, "Let the 
 judges have a share in the rc\-isionary power, and they will 
 ha^e an opportunity of taking notice of the characteristics 
 of a law, and of counteracting by the weight of their opinions 
 the improper views of the legislature." 
 
 :\Ir. [Madison argued that "to join the judiciary would be 
 useful to the executive by inspiring additional confidence 
 and firmness in exerting the revisionary power." It would 
 be useful to the legislature by the valuable assistance it 
 would give in preserving consistency, conciseness, and per- 
 spicuity and technical propriety in the laws. 
 
 Mr. Mason, Mr. Gerry, j\lr. Gouveneur Morris, and Mr. 
 Luther jNIartin, all spoke of the power proposed to be given 
 l)y this provision of the constitution as a " revisionary 
 power," a "revisionary check," "the action of the judiciary 
 and executive branches in the revision of the laws." It was 
 ol)jected to the plan of joining the judges with the executive 
 that it was contrary to the fundamental principle which had 
 been approved )\v the convention that the three departments 
 of the government should be kept distinct ; to which it was 
 replied that, if such a judiciary check on the laws was incon- 
 sistent with this theory, "it was equally so to admit the 
 executiA'c to any participation in the making of laws, and 
 the revisionary plan ought to be discarded altogether." 
 
 After this discussion, the whole tenor of which shows that 
 the power contemplated to be given to the executive or to 
 the executive and the judiciary, was a power to revise and 
 not a power to negative without examination, the tenth reso- 
 lution was adopted in the form proposed; that is, that the 
 executive should have the right to negative any legislative 
 
49 
 
 act not afterwards passed by two thirds of each branch of the 
 legislature. 
 
 July 26 the convention referred its proceedings to a com- 
 mittee of detail, and adjourned till August 6, that the 
 committee might have time to prepare and report the con- 
 stitution. 
 
 The thirteenth resolution of the draft, as referred, was in 
 these words : 
 
 " Resolved, That the national executive shall have a right to 
 negative any legislative act ; which shall not be afterwards passed, 
 unless by two third parts of each branch of the national legisla- 
 ture." 
 
 Ibid. p. 376. 
 
 In the draft of the report of the committee on the 6th of 
 August, the provision as to the revisionary power of the ex- 
 ecutive was contained in section 13 of article 6 of the draft 
 in these words : 
 
 ' ' Every bill which shall have passed the house of representatives 
 and the senate shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the 
 President of the United States for his reiiision. If, upon such 
 revision, he approve of it, he shall signify his approbation by 
 signing it. But if, upon such revision, it shall appear to him 
 improper for being passed into a law, he shall return it, together 
 with his objections against it, to that house in which it shall have 
 originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, 
 and proceed to reconsider the bill. But if, after such reconsider- 
 ation, two thirds of that house shall, notwithstanding the objec- 
 tions of the president, agree to pass it, it shall, together with his 
 objections, be sent to the other house, by which it shall likewise 
 be reconsidered, and, if approved by two thirds of the other house 
 also, it shall become a law. But, in all such cases, the votes of 
 both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names 
 of the persons voting for or against the bill shall be entered on 
 the journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be 
 returned by the president within seven days after it shall have 
 
50 
 
 been prtseutea to him, it shall be a law, unless the legislature, by 
 
 their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not 
 
 be a law."* 
 
 Ibid. p. 376. 
 
 On the 15th of August, Mr. Madison moved the following- 
 amendment of this article : — 
 
 " Every bill which shall have passed the two houses shall, before 
 it becomes a law, be severally presented to the President of the 
 United States and to the judges of the Supreme Court, for the 
 revision of each. If, upon such revision, they shall approve of it, 
 they shall respectively signify their approbation by signing it ; but 
 if, upon such revision, it shall appear improper to either, or both, 
 to be passed into a law, it shall be returned, with the objections 
 against it, to that house in which it shall have originated, who 
 shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to 
 reconsider the bill ; but if, after such reconsideration, two thirds 
 of that house, when either the president or a majority of the 
 judges shall object, or three fourths, where both shall object, shall 
 agree to pass it, it shall, together with the objections, be sent to 
 the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if 
 approved by two thirds or three fourths of the other house, as 
 the case may be, it shall become a law." * 
 
 Ibid. p. 428. 
 
 In the debate upon this motion, the power given by the 
 proposed provision was alluded to, without exception, as a 
 "revisiduary i)ower," "a power to revise and suggest reasons 
 against the enactment of laws hastily jjassed," &c. This 
 amendment was rejected. The section was then otherwise 
 amended so as to apply to orders, resolutions, or votes of 
 congress, as well as to bills, and so as to require three 
 fourths of each branch to pass an act over the objections of 
 the president. The draft of the proposed constitution was 
 sul)sequently sent to a committee on style, who reported on 
 
 *The italics are mine. 
 
51 
 
 the 12th of September a digest of the plan. It was then 
 moved to reconsider the clause requiring three fourths of 
 each house to overrule the negative of the president, and to 
 insert two thirds in place of three fourths. In the discussion 
 upon this motion all the speakers still treated the power 
 given by this section as a revisionary power, the purpose of 
 it being, first, to defend the executive rights ; second, to 
 prevent popular and factious injustice. The amendment was 
 agreed to, and the section adopted as it was included in the 
 draft of the constitution, as signed by the members of the 
 convention and afterwards adopted by the states, in the fol- 
 lowing words : — 
 
 " Every bill which shall have passed the house of representatives 
 and the senate shall, before it become a law, be presented to the 
 President of the United States. If he approve, he shall sign it ; 
 but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in 
 which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at 
 large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after 
 such reconsideration, two thirds of that house shall agree to pass 
 the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other 
 house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved 
 by two thu'ds of that house, it shall become a law. But, in all 
 such cases, the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas 
 and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against 
 the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house, respectively. 
 If any bill shall not be returned by the president within ten days 
 (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the 
 same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless 
 the congress, by their adjournment, prevents its return, in which 
 case it shall not be a law." 
 
 Ibid. p. 560. 
 
 It will be observed that this provision corresponded sub- 
 stantially with that of the Massachusetts Constitution, except 
 that the president has by it ten days, instead of five, in which 
 to return a bill with objections, and that if congress cut this 
 
52 
 
 time short by adjournment within the ten days, the bill does 
 not become a law.* 
 
 The views of those who framed the United States Constitu- 
 tion, as to the character and extent of the power gi\'en the 
 executive I)}' this provision, were very cleai'ly sot forth by 
 Mr. Hamilton while the constitution was under discussion 
 before its adoption. He says, in discussing this clause of 
 the constitution, — 
 
 " The qualified negative of the president tallies exactly with the 
 revidonari) authority of the council of revision of this state [New 
 York], of which the governor is a constituent part. In this 
 respect the power of the president would exceed that of the gov- 
 ernor of New York, because the former would possess singly what 
 the latter shares with the chancellor and judges ; but it would be 
 precisely the same with that of the governor of Massachusetts, 
 whose constitution as to this article seems to have been the orig- 
 inal from which the convention have copied." f 
 
 The Federalist, No. r,9, Hamilton's Works, Lodge's 
 ed., 1886, vol. IX. pp. 429, 430. 
 
 Again, in discussinii' more at length the nature of his 
 power, ]\Ir. Hamilton said, — 
 
 " The primary inducement to conferring the power in question 
 upon the executive is to enable him to defend himself. The 
 second one is to increase the chances in favor of the community 
 against the passing of bad laws through haste, inadvertence, or 
 design. The oflener the measure is brought under examination, 
 the greater the diversity in the situations of those who are to 
 examine, the less must be the danger of those errors which fol- 
 low from want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which 
 proceed from the contagion of some common passion or interest. 
 . . . Instead of an absolute negative, it was proposed to give the 
 executive the qualified negative already described. This is a 
 
 *TMs last proyision was added to the Mnssarliusetts Constitution l)y amendment 
 In 1821. (See page 69.) 
 t The italics are mine. 
 
53 
 
 power which would be much more readily exercised than the 
 other. A man who might be afraid to defeat a law by his single 
 veto, might not scruple to return it for reconsideration. ... A 
 direct and categorical negative has sometliing in the appearance 
 of it more harsh and more apt to irritate than the simple sugges- 
 tion of argumentative objections to he approved or disapproved by 
 those to whom they are addressed." * 
 
 Federalist, No. 73, Hamilton's Works, Lodge's ed., 
 1886, vol. IX. pp. 458, 461. 
 
 Again, he says, — 
 
 "This qualified negative is in this state vested in a council 
 consisting of the governor, with the chancellor and judges of the 
 supreme court, or any two of them. It has been freely employed 
 upon a variety of occasions, and frequently with success." 
 
 Federalist, No. 73, Hamilton's Works, Lodge's ed., 
 vol. IX. p. 462. 
 
 In the debates of the Pennsylvania convention to ratify the 
 constitution, the qualified negative given to the president 
 by this provision was. also spoken of as identical with the 
 power given to the council of revision by the Constitution of 
 New York State. 
 
 Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions, 1787, 1788, 
 p. 334. 
 
 In Hanson's Essay upon the Federal Constitution, pub- 
 lished while it was under discussion, this provision of the 
 constitution was also treated as one subjecting the bill to the 
 revision of the president. 
 
 Ford's Pamphlets on Constitution, p. 225. 
 
 It may safely be said that there is not a single recorded 
 
 *The italics are mine.' 
 
54 
 
 expression of opinion as to the etiect of this constitutional 
 provision by those who fi'amed tlie federal eonstitution or 
 discussed its provisions before its adoption, which does not 
 treat it as giving only the same power of revision which ^\'as 
 given the New York council of revision by the constitution 
 of that state, and which obviously could he exercised only 
 by specific statements of olijections to the })rovisions of the 
 bills presented to them. 
 
 September 7, ITill, a convention met to revise the Consti- 
 tution of New Hampshire. 
 
 The "form of civil government" adojjtcd by the congress 
 of New Hami)shire January .">, 177(!, had provided for a gov- 
 ernment sok'ly l)y a house of representatives and a council, 
 acting as separate branches of a legislature, and with no re- 
 vision of their acts. 
 
 \.H. State Papers, vol. VIII. p. 2. 
 
 The constitution framed liy the convention of June 10, 
 1778, and which was rejected by the people, had provided for 
 a government solely by a council and a house of representa- 
 ti^es, "to be styled the General Court of the State of New 
 Hampshire, and to l)e invested with the supreme power of 
 the state," with no check u])oii or revision of their acts. 
 
 N.H. State Papers, vol. IX. pp. 838-840. 
 
 AMien the second New Hampshire constitutional convention 
 assembled in June, 18^1 , the New York council of I'evision had 
 been in existence nearly four }'ears, and had returned to the 
 legislature twenty-one bills with full and precise statements of 
 objections to their provisions. The adjoining State of Massa- 
 chusetts had also adopted in its constitution a provision for 
 similar revision of the acts of the legislature by the governor, 
 though he had not then exercised it. Such a revision had 
 
55 
 
 proved to be j)racticable and salutary, and the convention 
 naturally adopted it as a part of the constitution they framed, 
 by exactly copying the provision of the Massachusetts Con- 
 stitution, except that they provided that a bill or resolve 
 should become a law notwithstanding the objections of the 
 governor, only by a vote of three fourths of the members of 
 each house instead of a vote of two thirds, as in Massachu- 
 setts and in New York ; and also that the bill or resolve 
 should have the force of a law if not returned in eight days, 
 instead of five days as in Massachusetts and ten days in 
 New York. 
 
 N.H. State Papers, vol. IX. p. 858. 
 
 No record of the debates of this convention has been 
 found showing why these changes from the New York and 
 Massachusetts provisions were made, but the address of the 
 convention submitting the constitution to the people, states 
 the reasons why this provision for revision of the acts of the 
 legislature was adopted. Its language upon that subject is 
 this: 
 
 "The legislative power we have vested in the senate and house 
 of representatives (with the reserve hereafter mentioned) , each of 
 which branches is to have a negative on the other. . . . We have 
 given the supreme executive power the right of revising and 
 objecting to all acts passed by the legislature." 
 
 Later in the same address, in referring to the qualified 
 negative of the executive, after stating the manner of choice 
 of the governor, his qualifications, and his liability to im- 
 peachment by the legislative branch, they said, — 
 
 " Thus controlled and cheeked himself, the convention thought 
 it reasonable and necessary that he in turn should have some checli 
 on the legislative power. They therefore gave him the right of 
 objecting to and suspending, though not the absolute control over. 
 
56 
 
 the acts of that body, which they thought indispensably necessary 
 to repel any encroachments on the executive power, and to pre- 
 serve its independency." 
 
 N.H. State Paperis, vol. IX. pp. <S47, 850. 
 
 The provisiou of the constitution framed by the conven- 
 tion thus referred to in their address, was as follows : — 
 
 "•No bill or resolve of the senate or house of representatives 
 shall become a law, and have force as such, until it shall have 
 been laid before the guvernor/oi- his revitul; and if he shall, upon 
 such revi>^ioii, approve thereof, he shall signify his approbation by 
 signing the same ; but if he has any objection to the passing of 
 such bill or resolve, he shall return the same, together with his 
 objections thn-eto, in writing, to the senate or house of repre- 
 sentatives, in whichsoever the same shall have originated." * 
 
 Then followed the same provisions as in the present con- 
 stitution for reconsideration hy the two houses. 
 
 After the sense of the inhabitants of the state had been 
 taken uj)on tlie proposed constitution containing this pro- 
 \'ision, the cfinvention prepared a revised plan, eighteen 
 hundred copies of which were distributed to the towns, 
 members of the general court, in August, 1782, and issued 
 therewith another address to the inhabitants, in which they 
 used the following language as to the qualified negative 
 given by the proposed constitution to the governor : — 
 
 "We have given the supreme executive power the right of re- 
 vising and objecting to all the acts passed by the legislature, for 
 reasons hereafter to be mentioned." 
 
 And thereafter, in the address, they gave their reasons in 
 the same language as in the first address, and the language 
 
 * The italics are mine. 
 
57 
 
 giving the qualified negative was the same in the revised 
 plan thus submitted to the people as it was in the first plan, 
 and as is above quoted. 
 
 This constitution did not receive two thirds of the votes 
 of the people, and was not adopted. 
 
 In August, 1782, the convention, having framed another 
 constitution, submitted it to the people with another ad- 
 dress. 
 
 The provision in this second constitution with reference 
 to revision of the acts of the legislature and the language of 
 the address in reference to it, were identical with those of 
 the first constitution and address. 
 
 N.H. State Papers, vol. IX. pp, 877, 896. 
 
 This second constitution was not adopted by vote of the 
 people, and in Januaiy, 1783, the convention framed a third 
 constitution, which was submitted to the people and adopted 
 by them by a two-thirds vote and established as the constitu- 
 tion of the state, October 31, 1783, and is known as the 
 constitution of 1784. 
 
 This constitution vested the supreme legislative power in 
 a senate and a house of representatives, each with a nega- 
 tive on the other, but with no revision of or check upon their 
 acts by the executive. The executive power was given to a 
 magistrate called the "president of the state," elected by the 
 people, and who presided in the senate and had a vote therein 
 " equal with that of any other member, and also a casting 
 vote in case of a tie." 
 
 N.H. State Papers, vol. IX. pp. 903, 909, 910. 
 Early in the year 1783 Thomas Jefferson had prepared a 
 
58 
 
 draft of ;i proposed constitution to bo submitted to the Con- 
 stitutional Convention of Virginia in 1783, in which a pro- 
 vision framed by him for a ijualified negative upon the 
 legislative power was as follows : — 
 
 " The governor, two councillors of state, and a judge from each of 
 the superior courts of chancerj', common law, and admiralty, shall 
 be a council to revise all bills which shall have passed both houses 
 of the assembly, in which council the governor, when present, shall 
 preside. Every bill, before it becomes a law, shall be presented 
 to this council, who shall have the right to advise its rejection, 
 returning the bill with their advice and reasons in writing to the 
 house in which it originated, who shall proceed to reconsider said 
 bill. But if after such reconsideration two thirds of the house 
 shall be of the opinion that the bill should pass finally, they shall 
 pass and send it with the advice and written reasons of the said 
 council of revision to the other house, wherein if two thirds also 
 shall be of the opinion that it should pass finally, it shall there- 
 upon become a law, otherwise it shall not. If any bill presented 
 to the council be not within one week (exclusive of the day of pre- 
 senting it) returned to them with their advice of rejection and 
 reasons to the house in which it originated, or to the clerk of the 
 said house in ease of its adjournment over the expiration of a 
 week, it shall be a law from the expiration of the week. The bills 
 which they [the council] approve shall become laws from the time 
 of such approval." * 
 
 Jefferson's Notes on Virginia, Appendix, p. 322. 
 
 When, therefore, the New Hampshire convention of 1791 
 assembled, a constitutional provision for the revision and 
 qualified negative of legislative acts had been approved by 
 Jefferson and by the federal convention of 1787, as well as 
 by the states of New York and Massachusetts, and the pro- 
 visions on that subject in the Federal Constitution and in the 
 ^Massachusetts Constitution were understood to be identical 
 
 * See comments on this draft in the " Federalist," No. 49. 
 
59 
 
 in their effect with the provision of the New York Constitu- 
 tion establishing the council of revision. 
 
 The New York council of revision had then been in 
 existence more than thirteen years, and had returned to the 
 legislature sixty-nine bills and resolves with full and precise 
 objections and arguments against their provisions. 
 
 The governor of Massachusetts had possessed the power 
 to revise the acts of the general court of that state for more 
 than ten years, and though he had returned but one bill and 
 two resolves under it, these had been returned \vith precise 
 and careful statements of objections to their provisions. 
 
 The Constitution of the United States, with a provision 
 giving the president power to revise the acts of congress, 
 had been adopted about four years (New Hampshire having 
 ratified it without objection to that provision),* and the con- 
 vention naturally included such a provision in the amend- 
 ments and alterations which they made to the constitution 
 of 1784. They did this by copying in exact language 
 the provision which in 1787 had been adopted in the fed- 
 eral constitution, giving the president a qualified negative 
 upon legislation, with the exception that the time within 
 which the bill should become a law without the signature of 
 the goveraor was limited to five days (as in the original pro- 
 vision of the Massachusetts constitution of 1780) instead of 
 ten days. (Sec. 44, N.H. Const. 1792.) 
 
 This provision was among the amendments which the 
 "committee on alterations and amendments," appointed by 
 the convention September 16, 1791, reported on February 8, 
 1792, and it was reported by them in its present form, i.e., 
 as a copy of the qualified negative provision of the Federal 
 Constitution, except that, as reported, it provided that a bill 
 
 *isrevv Hampshire ratified tlie Constitution of tlie United States June 21, 1788, being 
 tlie nintli state to do so, and tliis ratification made up tlie number of states necessary 
 to cause it to take effect by its terms. 
 
60 
 
 retui-ned Ijy the govcruor might become a law by the vt)te of 
 four sevenths of the house in which it originated and of a 
 majority of the other house. 
 
 Journal X. H. Const. Convention (1791-1792), pp. 
 
 85, 88, 89. 
 X.H. State Papers, vol. X. pp. 38, J^ 
 
 On February 11, 179:.', the convention " proceeded to con- 
 sider of the report resperting the governor's power in legisla- 
 tion, or otherwise the neiiutive that the governor may have 
 on the acts of the legislature, and tlie report was accepted 
 with this alteration, that on the return of a bill by the gov- 
 ernor for reconsideration it shall require two thirds of both 
 houses instead of four sevenths of one and a majority of the 
 
 other." 
 
 Journal of Convention, p. 94. 
 
 N.H. State Papers, vol. X. p. 93. 
 
 In the Massachusetts constitution the governor was re- 
 quired to return the bill "with his objections thereto," but in 
 the Federal Constitution and those copied from it, as in the 
 Xew Hampshire constitution, the word "thereto" is omitted. 
 It appears clearly, however, from the debates in the consti- 
 tutional conventions and the puljlished discussions upon the 
 adoption of tlie Federal Constitution, that no other objections 
 were contemplated but objections "thereto," i.e., to the bill 
 itself. 
 
 The word "thereto' was evidently droj^ped by the com- 
 mittee on style in the federal convention, as adding nothing 
 to the force of the word "objections," though it is still re- 
 tained in the Massachusetts Constitution. 
 
 The provision of the Xew York Constitution which gave 
 the council of revision the same power to revise and nega- 
 tive the acts of the legislature which the Federal Constitution 
 
61 
 
 was intended to give the president, was in force from 1777 
 to 1821, a period of forty-four years. It was administered 
 by a council of revision of which George Clinton, John Jay, 
 Chief Justice Morris, Chancellor Livingston, Chief Justice 
 Yates, Chancellor Kent, Chief Justice Lansing, Chief Justice 
 Ambrose Spencer, and other able and learned lawyers of that 
 state were members. 
 
 Six thousand five hundred and ninety acts of the legisla- 
 lature were presented to them for revision, of which they 
 returned one hundred and sixty-nine with objections, only 
 fifty-one of which were passed into laws notwithstanding. 
 These objections, popularly called the vetoes of the council, 
 were in all cases full and cai'cful discussions of the provisions 
 of the acts objected to by way of argument addressed to the 
 legislature. Thirty-eight of them were written by Chancel- 
 lor Kent, a larger number than by any other member of the 
 
 council. 
 
 See Street's New York Council of Ee vision. 
 
 This provision remained in the Constitutioia of New York 
 until 1821, when the power given by it to the council of re- 
 vision was transferred to the governor by the adoption of a 
 provision exactly like that of the Federal Constitution. The 
 debate in the constitutional convention upon this change 
 lasted several days, and was participated in by Chancellor 
 Kent, Chief Justice Spencer, Martin Van Buren, Peter E. 
 Livingston, Judge Piatt, Mr. Duer, Mr. Tallmadge, Eufus 
 King, Erastus Eoot, and other prominent members of the 
 convention. The report of the debate covers one tenth of 
 the entire record of the convention, and from the beginning 
 to the end the power conferred upon the executive by this 
 provision was spoken of as a power of revision only. 
 
 Judge Piatt said (it being conceded that a qualified nega- 
 tive upon legislation was advisable) that the only question 
 
fi2 
 
 was, whether it shall be retained in the council of revision, 
 or transmitted to the o-overnor alone. 
 
 Journal of N.Y. Const. Convention, 1821, p. 54. 
 
 Chancellor Kent spoke to the same effect, and said that as 
 the objections to legislation stated by the council of revision 
 under the then constitutional convention could be overcome 
 only by a two-thirds vote of both branches, he was unwilling 
 to vote to transfer the power of revision to the governor with 
 a provision (which was proposed in the con^'ention) that his 
 objections to bills could be overcome by a majority vote of 
 both branches upon reconsideration. 
 
 Ibid. p. 63. 
 
 General Tallmadge, chairman of the select committee who 
 proposed the change, said that the committee " only proposed 
 to sc\er.thc judiciary from the council of revision, retaining, 
 however, that feature in the government," and they had 
 adopted the language of the Constitution of the United States 
 from the simplicity of its expression, and because the expe- 
 rience of the nation had given it construction, and that in 
 ■ recommending the abolishment of the council of revision, 
 they had acted with the sole view of separating the depart- 
 ments of government. 
 
 Ibid. p. 64. 
 
 Mr. VanBuren said that the purpose of the qualified nega- 
 tive upon legislation was " First, to guard against hasty and 
 improvident legislation, but more especially to protect the 
 executive and judicial departments from legislative encroach- 
 ments." Hasty and improvident legislation, he said, was 
 partially provided against by giving each Itranch of the legis- 
 lature a negative upon the other, Ijut as these blanches might 
 sometimes happen to be actuated by the same feelings and 
 
63 
 
 passions, it was "necessary to establish a third branch to 
 revise the proceedings of the two." Heretofore, he said, we 
 have had the revisory power in the hands of the judiciary 
 and executive united. Now the people call for its separa- 
 tion, and "the report of the committee proposes that the 
 power heretofore vested in the executive and judicial depai-t- 
 ments should henceforth be transferred to the executive 
 alone." This, he said, in his judgment required that the 
 objections of the executive upon the revision of bills should 
 prevent the bills from becoming laws except by the same 
 vote required to make them laws notwithstanding objections 
 by the council of revision, that is, a two-thirds vote, and not 
 a majority, as proposed. 
 
 Ibid. pp. 70, 76. 
 
 Eufus King said that the necessity for the change of this 
 provision proceeded from the conviction that the judiciary 
 should no longer l)e vested with any portion of the revision- 
 ary power, and that the provision proposed (that is, the one 
 found in the Federal Constitution) simply vested in the gov- 
 ernor " the same power which was vested in the council of 
 revision " by the original New York Constitution. 
 
 Ibid. pp. 77, 89. 
 
 To the same effect were the remarks of Chief Justice 
 Spencer, Mr. Root, Mr. Livingston, and other gentlemen who 
 discussed this matter. An examination of this debate, and 
 of the action of the convention upon this point, shows con- 
 clusively that all these gentlemen and the whole convention 
 understood that the qualified negative upon legislation given 
 by the Federal Constitution to the president, and by the 
 Massachusetts Constitution to the governor, was identical with 
 that given ))y the original Constitution of New York to the 
 
u 
 
 council of revision, tliat is, that it was a power to examine 
 and revise bills passed by both branches of tlie legislature, 
 and to prevent their passage except l\v a two-thirds vote, l)y 
 a statement of objections to the bills themselves. The con- 
 vention were unanimous in transferring the power of revi- 
 sion from the council of revision to the executive alone, and 
 the discussion was upon the question whether a two-thirds 
 vote of each house should be I'equired to pass bills notwith- 
 standing the objections of the governor, as was required in 
 the case of liills returned with objections by the council of 
 revision, or whether a majority of each branch should be 
 sufficient. 
 
 All the writers upon the constitution have regarded the 
 qualified negative, or so-called veto power, as a revisionary 
 power only. They have all discussed it as a jDOwer to return 
 the bill for consideration only upon objections to its provisions. 
 
 jNIr. Rawle spoke of this power as " this great share of the 
 legislative power given to the president," and regarded its 
 value as depending upon the fact that, by the use of it, the 
 executive participated in the legislative power, and thereby 
 called the two branches of the legislature to a reconsidera- 
 tion of their measures, and by requiring the measures to be 
 entered on the journal, and the yeas and nays to be required, 
 enabled the people to decide on the soundness of the objec- 
 tions. 
 
 Rawle on the Const., pp. 54, 55. 
 
 See also, Wilson's Law Lectures, pp. 449, 445. 
 
 Chancellor Kent speaks of the importance of the two houses 
 liaving the objections of the president in opposition to the 
 liill spread at large upon their journals to aid them in recon- 
 sideration. 
 
 Kent's Com. I. 240. 
 
65 
 
 Judge Story, speaking of this power, said, — 
 
 "As a qualified negative it does not, like an absolute negative, 
 present a categorical and harsh resistance to the legislative will, 
 which is so apt to engender strife and nourish hostility. It as- 
 sumes the character of a mere appeal to the legislature itself, and 
 asks a revision of its own judgment. It is in the nature, then, 
 merely of a rehearing or a reconsideration, and involves nothing 
 to provoke resentment or rouse pride. A president who might 
 hesitate to defeat a law by an absolute veto, might feel little 
 scruple to return it for reconsideration upon reasons and argu- 
 ments suggested on the return." 
 
 Story on the Constitution (Cooley's ed.) section 888. 
 
 Mr. Curtis speaks of it as follows : — 
 
 " The two important differences between the negative thus vested 
 in the President of the United States and that which belongs to 
 the King of England are, that the former is a qualified while the 
 latter is an absolute power to arrest the passage of a law ; and 
 that the one is required to render to the legislature the reasons for 
 his refusal to approve a bill, while the latter renders no reasons, 
 but simply answers that he will advise of the matter, which is the 
 parliamentary form of signifying a refusal to approve. The pro- 
 vision in our constitution which requires the president to com- 
 municate to the legislature his objections to a bill, was rendered 
 necessary by the power conferred upon two thirds of both houses 
 to make it a law notwithstanding his refusal to sign it. By this 
 power, which makes the negative of the president a qualified one 
 only, the framers of the constitution intended that the two houses 
 should take into consideration the objections which may have led 
 the president to withhold his assent, and that his assent should be 
 dispensed with, if, notwithstanding those objections, two thirds of 
 both houses should still approve of the measure. These provisions, 
 therefore, on the one hand, give to the president a real participa- 
 tion in acts of legislation, and impose upon him a real responsi- 
 bility for the measures to which he gives his official approval, while 
 they give him an important influence over the final action of the 
 legislature upon those which he refuses to sanction ; and, on the 
 
fi(l 
 
 other hand, they establish a wide distinction between his negative 
 and that of the King in England. The latter has none but an 
 absolute " veto ; " if he refuses to sign a bill, it cannot become a 
 law ; and it is well understood that it is on account of this abso- 
 lute effect of the refusal that this prerogative has been wholly dis- 
 used since the reign of William III.,* and that the practice has 
 grown up of signifying, through the ministry, the previous opposi- 
 tion of the executive, if any exists, while the measure is under discus- 
 sion in parliament. It is not needful to consider here which mode 
 of legislation is theoretically or practically the best. It is suffi- 
 cient to notice the fact, that the absence from our system of official 
 and responsible advisers of the president, having seats in the legis- 
 lature, renders it impracticable to signify his views of a measure 
 while it is under the consideration of either house. For this rea- 
 son, and because the president himself is responsible to the people 
 for his official acts, and in order to accompany that responsibility 
 with the re<j[uisito power both to act upon reasons and to render 
 them, our constitution has vested in him this peculiar and qualified 
 negative." 
 
 Curtis' History of the Constitution, vol. 11. book IV. 
 ch. 9, pp. 265-267. 
 
 "This power was vested in the president, doubtless as a guard 
 against hasty or inconsiderate legislation, and against any act in- 
 advertently passed which might seem to encroach on the just 
 authority of other branches of the government." 
 
 Web.stcr'H AA'oiijs, vol I. p. 267. 
 
 For ditscussion of the effect of the use of the veto power 
 in connection with the power of the executive to influence 
 lcgi^;lation by use of the appointing power, see A\^ebster'i-i 
 Works, vol. II. pp. 236, 237. See, also, for further re- 
 marks b}' Webster on the use of the veto power, Webster's 
 Works, vol. m. p. 416. 
 
 * This is not connect. It was exercised once since by Queen Anne, who vetoed the 
 Scotch Militia hiU in 1807. 
 
67 
 
 An examination of tlie provisions of the Constitution of tiie 
 United States and of the diiferent state constitutions (a sum- 
 mary of which is given in the Apjjendix, pp. 32 et seq.), 
 giving the executive a qualified negative upon the legislative 
 branch of the government, shows clearly that one primary 
 purpose of them all is to secure to the executive proper 
 time to examine and deliberate upon bills presented to 
 him, and, if he does not approve them, to state fully his 
 objections to their provisions. The Constitution of the 
 United States provides that the president may return the bill 
 with objections, within ten days after it is presented to him, 
 but that if "the congress, by their adjournment, prevent its 
 return, the bill shall not be a law." In Connecticut, Iowa, 
 Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, and Wis- 
 consin, the governor may prevent a bill from becoming a 
 law by returning it, with objections, within three days from 
 the time it is presented to him. In Alabama, Arkansas, 
 Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missis- 
 sippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nevada, Nebraska, 
 Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia, 
 he may return it within five days. In Maryland, he may 
 return it within six days. In California, Colorado, Illinois, 
 Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, 
 and Texas, he may return it within ten days. 
 
 Why all these careful provisions to secure to the execu- 
 tive time for the examination of bills and for deliberation 
 upon their merits and the statement of any objections to their 
 provisions, if he can perform his duty under the constitution 
 by simply refusing to examine them or to express any opin- 
 ion as to their merits, and negative them by the mere state- 
 ment of objections to signing them and not to the bills them- 
 selves? Again, the examination of a bill is as essential to 
 the disapproval of it by a return of it with objections, as it is 
 
(i8 
 
 to the approval of it by yigniiig it. Can it l)e claimed that 
 the executive performs his duty under the constitution by 
 sisrnino- a hill without examination of it and with a statement 
 upon the bill that he expresses no opinion as to the merits 
 of the bill by thus signing it? The signature of the execu- 
 tive to a bill implies an examination of it, ))ecause it is only 
 "if he approve it" that he is to sign it. But would the mere 
 signing a bill with a written statement upon it that it was 
 thus signed without any examination and with no opinion as 
 to its merits, be an exercise of the power to approve? 
 
 In ]\lassacluiselts, by the original constitution of 1780, the 
 question whether if the legislature, ])y its adjournment, ren- 
 dered it impossi))le for the governor to return a bill to the 
 house in which it originated within the time thus limited at 
 the session at which the bill is presented to him, he could 
 exercise his (jualifiied negative by returning it with his objec- 
 tions to that house in which it originated, at its next session, 
 within the time limited, excluding the time which elapsed 
 during the preceding session, was left uncei-tain, the pro- 
 vision being simply that if the l)ill should not be returned 
 by the governor within five days after it was presented to 
 him, it should have the force of a law. In 1810 the gov- 
 ernor of the state acted upon the assumption that he could 
 negative a bill in that manner ; but the house to which he 
 returned it on the first day of its next session, with objections, 
 refused to reconsider the bill , on the ground that the return 
 was too late, although the legislature which passed the bill 
 had adjourned l)efore the five days elapsed. 
 
 The result of this construction was that the legislature 
 could not be adjourned until after all Ijills were signed or 
 returned with objections for reconsideration, or the five days 
 had elapsed within which the governor might return them 
 with objections, so tliat they became laws without his signa- 
 
69 
 
 tui'e. To remedy this difficulty and remcwe the unceilidnty 
 as to the true construction of this proviaion of the constitu- 
 tion, it was amended in 1820, by providing that, — 
 
 " If any bill or resolve shall be objected to or not approved of 
 by the governor, and if the general court shall adjourn within five 
 days after the same shall have been laid before the governor for 
 his approbation and thereby prevent his returning it with his ob- 
 jections, as provided by the constitution, such bill or resolve shall 
 not become a law nor have force as such." 
 
 The reason stated in the convention for this change was 
 that it was plainly the intention of the framers of the con- 
 stitution that the governor should have five days within 
 which to examine and deliberate upon bills presented to him, 
 and that therefore, if the legislature by its adjournment pre- 
 vent his having that time, the bills which he had thus been 
 deprived of the constitutional time for examining ought not 
 to become laws. 
 
 Journal Mass. Constitutional Convention, 1820, p. 97. 
 
 The Presidents of the United States since Washington 
 have i-eturned bills with objections as follows : Madison, 5 ; 
 Monroe, 1; Jackson, 13; Tyler, 10; Polk, 3; Pierce, 10; 
 Buchanan, 8 ; Lincoln, 1 ; Johnson, 21 ; Grant, 42 (including 
 4 private pension bills) ; Hayes, 12 ; Arthur, 4; Cleveland, 
 272 (including 243 private pension bills).* The messages 
 returning these bills have, without a single exception, been 
 statements more or less extended of objections to the pro- 
 visions of the bills returned. An examination of them shows 
 conclusively that the presidents have uniformly treated the 
 constitutional provision giving the executive a qualified 
 negative upon congress, as requiring the president to examine 
 
 * Veto Messages of Prcaidents, 1792 to 1888. 
 
70 
 
 into the merit-s of the legishition, and if he does not approve 
 the bill to return it with specific objections to its provisions. 
 The most full statement upon this point was hy President 
 Bughanan in a message to the senate Fel)ruary 1, 1860, 
 stating why he retained the bill making an appropriation for 
 deepening the channel over the Saint Clair flats until after 
 the adjournment of congress. He said, — 
 
 " The bill was presented to me on the last daj' of the last con- 
 gress. It is scarcely necessary to observe that, during the closing 
 hours of a session, it is impossible for the president, on the instant, 
 to examine into the meiits or demerits of au important hill, in- 
 volving, as this does, grave questions, both of expedience and of 
 constitutional power, with that care and deliberation demanded by 
 his public duty, as well as by the best interests of the country. For 
 this reason, the constitution has in all cases allowed him ten days 
 for deliberation, because, if a bill be presented to him within the 
 last ten days of the session, he is not required to return it either 
 with an ai)proval or a veto, but may retain it, " in which case it 
 shall not be a law." 
 
 " Whilst an occasi(jn can raiely occur when so long a period as 
 ten days would be requiied to enable the president to decide 
 whether he should approve or \eto a bill, yet, to deny him even 
 two days on imiiortant questions before the adjournment of each 
 session for this purpose, as recommended by a former annual mes- 
 sage, would not only be unjust to him, but a violation of the spirit 
 of the constitution. To require him to approve a bill when it is 
 impossible he couhl examine into its merits, would be to deprive 
 him of the exercise of his constitutional discretion, and convert 
 him into a mere register of the decrees of congress. I therefore 
 deem it a sufficient i-eason for having retained the bill in question, 
 that it was not presented to me until the last day of the session. 
 
 " Since the termination of the last congress, I have made a tho- 
 rough examination of the questions involved in the bill to deepen 
 the channel over the Saint Clair flats, and now proceed to express 
 the opinions which I have formed upon the subject." 
 
 The present industrious Chief Magistrate of the United 
 
71 
 
 States has added to the arduous duties of his office by the 
 careful examination and preeise statement of objections to 
 two hundred and forty-three private pension bills, involving 
 in many cases an extended examination of records and doc- 
 uments, all of which he might easily have avoided if he had 
 understood that he could negative the bills without exam- 
 ination by returning them simply with objections to signing 
 them because he thought congress was passing too many 
 such bills, as he evidently did. 
 
 In New Hampshire this practical construction has been 
 clear and conclusive as to the duty of the governor to ex- 
 amine and express his opinion of the merits of bills returned 
 for nearly a hundred years. 
 
 A summary of the contents of all the messages of the gov- 
 ernors returning bills not signed since the adoption of the 
 constitution in 1792, is contained in the Appendix, pp. 1-31. 
 It shows that the governors have returned 48 bills and re- 
 solves with objections ; viz., Governor Gilman returned 14, 
 Governor Langdon 6, Governor Plummer 14, Governor Bell 
 4, Governor Badger 1, Governor Hill 1, Governor Steele 2, 
 Governor Baker 3, Governor Gilmore 4, Governor Smyth 1, 
 Governor Harriman 1, Governor Prescott 1, Governor Hale 
 1, Governor Currier 1, Governor Sawyer 5 (including the 
 one under discussion). 
 
 All the communications returning these bills and resolves 
 (except that under consideration, and one of Governor Cur- 
 rier in 1885, returning a bill at the request of the house) 
 have been precise statements of objections to the bills as the 
 result of an examination and consideration of their provis- 
 ions. 
 
 William Plummer, of Epping, was one of the most active 
 and influential members of the New Hampshire constitutional 
 convention of 1791, and chail-man of the committee which 
 
72 
 
 prepared that portion of tlic draft of the constitution suh- 
 mitted to the people containing- the provision for the quali- 
 tied negative of the governor. 
 
 Journal of Convention, pp. 150, 160. 
 
 He was afterwards governor of the state for four years. 
 During his term of othce he returned to one l)ranch or the 
 other of the general court fourteen bills and resolves without 
 his approval, and the particularity with which he stated his 
 ol)jections to the provision of each indicated what he, and 
 doubth'ss all others who were members of the convention, 
 considered to l)e the nature and extent of the power con- 
 ferred upon the governor ))y this })rovision of the constitu- 
 tion. 
 
 '\\'ashington was piesident of the convention which framed 
 the United States Conslitution, and when, as the first presi- 
 dent under it, he had occasion to return bills to congress 
 without his signature, he did so with messages which showed 
 clearly what he considered the duty and power of the execu- 
 tive under this pro\ision of the constitution was. The mes- 
 sage stating objections to the first bill returned by him was 
 as follows : — 
 
 " Gentlemen of the House of Representatives : 
 
 " I have maturely considered the act passed by the two houses, 
 entitled ' An act for an apportionment of representatives among 
 the several states, according to the first enumeration,' and I re- 
 turn it to your house, wherein it originated, with the following 
 objections : — 
 
 "First. The constitution lias prescribed that representatives 
 shall be apportioned among the several states according to their 
 respective numbers ; and there is no one proportion or divisor 
 which, applied to the respective numbers of the states, will yield 
 the number and allotment of representatives proposed by the 
 bill. 
 
73 
 
 "The constitution has also provided that the number of rep- 
 resentatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, vrhich 
 restriction is, by the context, and by fair and obvious construc- 
 tion, to be applied to the separate and respective states, and the 
 bill has allotted to eight of the states more than one for every 
 thirty thousand. 
 
 " G. Washington." 
 
 February 29, 1797, Washington returned to the house 
 "An act to ascertain and fix the military establishment of 
 the United States," saying that he had "maturely considered 
 the bill, and returned it with his objections," which he then 
 stated in order, first, second, third, &c., as in his first mes- 
 sage, all of them being precise objections to the provisions 
 of the bill. Upon reconsideration of these bills, they both 
 failed of a passage notwithstanding the objections, and new 
 bills, in which the objections were obviated, were passed 
 and approved. 
 
 Veto Messages of the Presidents of the United 
 States, pp. 9, 10. 
 
 The language of the other presidents in their messages 
 returning bills shows clearly that they all regarded it as 
 essential for them to consider the bills and state objections 
 to their merits. President Madison, who, as a member of 
 the convention that framed the constitution, took a promi- 
 nent part in the discussion of the article giving the president 
 power to revise and negative bills passed by congress, began 
 four of his five messages returning bills by saying, " Having 
 examined and considered the bill," &c. His fifth message 
 he began by saying, " Having bestowed on the bill entitled 
 ' An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the 
 United States of America,' that full consideration which is 
 due to the great importance of the subject, and dictated by 
 the respect which I feel for the two houses of congress, I 
 
74 
 
 am constrained to return it with my objections to the 
 same ; " and closed his message l\y saying that "in discharg- 
 ing this painful duty of stating objections to a measure 
 which has undergone the deliberations and received the 
 sanction of the two houses of the national legislature, I con- 
 sole myself with the reflection that if they have not the 
 weight which I attach to them, they can be constitutionally 
 overruled." 
 
 President Monroe liegan his only message returning a 
 bill (that for the preservation and repair of the Cumberland 
 road) by saying that "Having duly considered the bill," 
 &c. ; and further said, "Having stated m^^ objections to the 
 bill, I should now cheerfully communicate at large the 
 reasons on which the}' are founded if I had time to reduce 
 them to such form as to include them in this paper." And 
 later in the same day he transmitted a message giving his 
 reasons at ver}' great length. 
 
 President Jackson began his first message returning a bill 
 by saying, "I have maturely considered the bill," &c. ; and 
 then proceeded to state objections to the provisions of the 
 bill at length : and instead of saying at the close, as the 
 governor of New Hampshire did in the message under con- 
 sideration, "T VETO THE BILI-," he Said, " I now respectfully 
 return the hill which has been, under consideration, for your 
 further deliberation and judgment." 
 
 Neither President Jackson nor President Tyler, in any of 
 their numerous messages returning acts of congress, failed 
 to state distinctly that they had " maturely considered," or 
 "carefully considered," or "fully considered" the bills them- 
 selves. The same course has been followed by all the presi- 
 dents of the United States in substantially all the messages 
 returning bills unsigned, and, in addition, none of them fail 
 to show a careful examination of the merits of the bills 
 
75 
 
 returned, and to give full and precise statements of objec- 
 tions to their provisions. 
 
 December 5, 1833, President Jackson returned to the 
 senate " An act to appropriate for a limited time the pro- 
 ceeds of the sales of the public lands of the United States, 
 and for granting lands to certain states," with a message say- 
 ing that he received it at the close of the last session of con- 
 gress, but the brief period then remaining before the rising 
 of congress, and the extreme pressure of official duties un- 
 avoidable on such occasions, did not leave him "sufficient 
 time for that full consideration of the subject which was due 
 to its great importance ; " and then proceeded very much at 
 length to discuss the merits of the bill and state his objec- 
 tions to it. It was with reference to the retention of this 
 bill that Henry Clay wrote to ex-President Madison asking 
 whether, in his opinion, the president had not violated the 
 constitution by thus retaining the bill and not returning it 
 approved or disapproved. In Mr. Madison's reply he says : 
 
 " It is obvious the constitution meant to allow the president an 
 adequate time to consider the hill, and, on the other hand, that 
 congress should have time to consider and overrule his objections ; 
 and in order to qualify the retention of a bill by the president, the 
 first inquiry is whether a sufficient time loas allowed Mm to decide 
 it on its merits ; the next, whether, with a sufficient time to pre- 
 pare his objections, he unnecessarily put it out of the power of 
 congress to decide upon it."* 
 
 Madison's Works, vol. IV. p. 299. 
 
 With the exception of the message of Governor Ames, of 
 Massachusetts, returning the bill for the division of the town 
 of Beverly, in May, 1887, and that of Governor Sawyer, of 
 New Hampshire, i-eturning the bill under discussion, in 
 
 * The Italics are mine. 
 
/li 
 
 October of the same year, the uniform tind unbroken prac- 
 tical construction of this constitutional provision has been 
 that it required the examination of the bills themselves and 
 a statement of opinion as to their merits. Neither of these 
 governors was a lawyer, and it is evident that they had no 
 legal advice in the i)reparation of these messages. They 
 were both anxious to disapprove what they believed to be 
 corrupt practices, and did not stop to inquire whether the 
 constitution had authorized them to refuse to approve or 
 disapprove the acts of the legislature for that purpose. 
 
 The message of Governor Ames indicates clearly that he 
 did not approve of the bill to divide Beverly ; but until he 
 returned this bill without a statement of specific objections 
 to its provisions, for the purpose, as he said, of rebuking 
 the conduct of those who had procured its passage, it had 
 never occurred to any council of revision, to any president 
 of the United States, or to any governor of any state, that 
 the power to approve or disapprove the acts of congress or 
 of the state legislatures could be exercised without an exam- 
 ination of them, and an expression of opinion as to their 
 merits. 
 
 There are very few reported cases in which the qualified 
 negative of the executive upon legislation has been discussed, 
 but in all the judicial opinions which have in any manner 
 considered the question, the courts have treated this power 
 as one of revision only, requiring by the executive an exam- 
 ination of the bill and a statement of objections to its provis- 
 ions. 
 
 In Harpending v. Haight, 39 California, 189, which was 
 a petition for mandamus to the governor to compel him to 
 authenticate and deposit with the secretary of state a bill 
 which had passed both branches and been presented to him, 
 but which he claimed had been returned to the legislature 
 
77 
 
 by sending it to the chamber of the house in which it origi- 
 nated with a message stating objections to it, and which the 
 messenger, finding that house not in session, had returned with 
 the message to the governor, the court held that the bill had 
 not been returned to the house in which it originated, within 
 the meaning of the constitution, and therefore had become 
 a law by not being returned to that house with objections 
 within the time limited by the constitution for such return, 
 and that the governor could be ordered by mandamus to 
 authenticate the bill and deposit it with the secretary of state 
 as required by the statute of California. In discussing the 
 question whether the governor made the return of the bill 
 required by the constitution, the court said, — 
 
 "There can be doubt whatever of the meaning of the word 
 ' return,' as used in this connection in the constitution. As ap- 
 plicable to the bill itself, it is equivalent to the word ' presented ' 
 as previously used in the same sentence. The bill must, before it 
 becomes a law, be ' presented to the governor.' It might be 
 merely exhibited to that officer ; and even if it should be imme- 
 diately thereafter taken away or withdrawn, it might be contended 
 that it had, nevertheless, been ' presented ' within the very letter 
 of the constitution. But when we come to reflect that the only 
 purpose for wliicli the bill is to be 'presented to the governor' is 
 to afford Mm an opportunity to deliberately consider its provisions 
 and prepare his objections, if any he have, to its passage, we 
 would instinctively reject such a presentation as being fictictious — 
 merely spurious — and certainly not that one contemplated by the 
 constitution, because it would defeat, rather than promote, the 
 very objected intended. 
 
 " And so, upon the other hand, when we come to consider the cor- 
 responding dutjf of the executive to ' return ' the bill to the senate 
 in this case, we know by attending to the results to be brought 
 about by such ' return ' that it must be a step taken by which his 
 own time for deliberation is ended, and that for the deliberation 
 of the senate is begun ; that the bill itself must be put beyond the 
 executive possession ; that it must be placed into the possession, 
 
7,S 
 
 actual or potential, of the senate itself; and that, as part of this 
 return, the executive objections to the passage of the bill must be 
 stated. For, unless these things be effected by the return, how 
 can the senate enter the bill and executive objections upon its 
 journal, or in what way proceed to the consideration of the objec- 
 tions themselves ? Yet the constitution enjoins upon the senate 
 the performance of these several acts upon the return of the bill 
 and objections to it. AVe think it clear that the presentation of a 
 bill to the governor made by the legislature, under such circum- 
 stances as that he is prevented from considering its provisions, and 
 a return of a bill made to the house in which it originated by the 
 executive — but so made that the house can neither reconsider the 
 bill nor examine the objections to its passage — do not in either 
 case constitute the presentation or return required by the constitu- 
 tion." 
 
 In discussing this provision of the constitution in Wolf 
 v. McOall, 76 Va. 885, the court said that it requires 
 hills " to be presented to the governor in such a way that he 
 will be able to consider the merits or demerits of a bill, 
 deliberate upon it, and finally determine whether he will 
 approve or disapprove of it." 
 
 It thus appears not only by the proper construction of the 
 language of this provision of the constitution, but hythe his- 
 tory of its growth and adoption and by its practical construc- 
 tion for a hundred years, that an examination and expression 
 of opinion of the bill itself cither by approval of it by signing 
 it or by the statement of objections to it which are the result 
 of such examination, is essential to the exercise of the power 
 given by it, and that the mere return of a bill without entering 
 upon its merits and with no objections to the bill itself is of 
 no effect. 
 
 It is said by plaintiff's counsel that the communication of the 
 governor as to this bill is not the " first instance where a sov- 
 ernor of New Hampshire has avowedly exercised the veto 
 
79 
 
 power for reasons having no reference to the intrinsic merits of 
 the proposed measure. " And in proof of this, counsel print in 
 their brief a communication from Governor Cui'rier, in 1885, 
 returning a house l)ill without his signature, after a joint 
 resolution requesting him to return the bill for amendment 
 had passed the house and failed in the senate, and in which 
 he said, "I should deem it an act of discourtesy to permit a 
 bill to become a law after the house had so strongly expressed 
 a desire to have it returned for amendment, and therefore, 
 without expressing any opinion with regard to the merits of 
 the bill, I place it again in your hands." If counsel seriously 
 claim that this message was a disapproval of the bill and a re- 
 turn of it with objections within the meaning of the constitu- 
 tion, they are not only wrong, I submit, upon the plain reading 
 of the constitution and of the message itself, but their conten- 
 tion is wholly met by the decision of the Supreme Court of Vir- 
 ginia, in Wolf V. McGall, 76 Va. 885,890, where in a case 
 of a bill returned by the governor in response to a joint 
 resolution of the legislature requesting it, the Court held 
 that the bill became a law by the lapse of the five days 
 limited by the constitution, notwithstanding it was thus 
 returned because it was not returned with objections to the 
 Ijill, but merely as a matter of courtesy on the part of the 
 governor towards the legislature. 
 
 The communication of Governor Ames, of Massachusetts, 
 returning the bill for a division of the town of Beverly in 
 1887, I'eferred to in the brief of plaintiff's counsel, was un- 
 doubtedly the model upon which the communication of the 
 governor of New Hamjjshire returning the bill under discus- 
 sion in this case was formed. But in that case the message 
 clearly indicated that the opinion of the governor was against 
 that of the legislature upon the merits of the bill. He said, 
 " If it [the bill] involved only the question of the division 
 
80 
 
 of the town of Beverly, I should liesitale to set up my opin- 
 ion agninst tliat of tlie legislature," plainly indicating that his 
 opinion was against the bill upon its merits. The objection 
 urged to that messai;e was not that the governor had failed 
 to indicate his opinion of the bill, as was done by the gov- 
 ernor in this case, but that he had failed to state objections 
 to the bill itself, and had only stated olijections to the con- 
 duct of those who had promoted and opposed its passage. 
 In this respect it was considered then by some of the ablest 
 members of the profession in Massachusetts, that the mes- 
 sage was not a valid exercise of the c|ualified negative power. 
 The question could not, however, be practical]}' raised and 
 tested in that case without more difficulty and greater delaj- 
 than would attend another application to the legislature, 
 which was to sit again within seven months. The fact, how- 
 ever, that the message did not state ol)jections to the bill 
 itself excited nmch comment, and I think it is safe to say 
 that no governor of ^lassacliusctts will again risk the validity 
 of the exercise of his qualified negative by a communication 
 which states no objection to the bill. That communication 
 and the communication of the governor of New Hampshire 
 in the case under discussion are the only communications by 
 any council of revision, or any president of the United 
 States, or any governor of any state, in which a bill has 
 been returned with objections which had nothing to do 
 with the merits of the bill returned, during the century 
 which has elapsed since the power of revision and qualified 
 negative of legislative acts was first given. 
 
 In Birdsall v. Carrick, 3 Nevada, 154, cited by plaintiflf's 
 counsel, the bill was returned by the governor with the state- 
 ment that upon examination of it he found the enrolled copy 
 was not signed by the secretary of state as required by the 
 law of the state, and that in his opinion this was so fatal that 
 
81 
 
 his approval would not give the bill the authority of law ; 
 and the court held that this was an objection to the bill within 
 the meaning of the constitution, because it was stated as an 
 objection to the bill. The fact that the court were of the 
 opinion that it was not a valid objection was of no conse- 
 quence, because the court have no power to pass upon the 
 validity of the objections of the governor, but only to decide 
 whether they are objections within the meaning of the con- 
 stitution. The governor disapproved the bill because of an 
 objection to it which he thought existed upon examination of 
 it. He did not refuse to examine it, and he did not return it, 
 as in this case, with a statement of objections which had 
 nothing to do with it. 
 
 Plaintiff's counsel quote the language of an article in 21 
 American Law Keview, page 214, by Mr. Sidney A. Fisher, 
 who seems to regard the function of the executive in ap- 
 proving or disapproving a bill as precisely the same which 
 a member of the legislature exercises when he votes for or 
 against a bill, because as he says, and the plaintiff's counsel 
 say, " The same word ' approve ' is applied to the governor 
 and the legislature alike. If he ' approve,' and if approved 
 by two thirds of that house, and this same word ' approve ' 
 is used as synonymous with ' agree to pass the bill.' The 
 latter phrase is used with reference to one house, and the 
 former with reference to the other house." 
 
 This, however, is a mere play upon words, and cannot 
 control the obvious purpose of the provision to require the 
 executive to examine and approve or disapprove legisla- 
 tive acts upon their merits. As a matter of fact, the word 
 "approve," although used in the Constitution of the United 
 States, and of New Hampshire and most of the other states 
 as to one house!, is not used as to either house in many of the 
 state constitutions. In California, Florida, and Nevada, the 
 
.S2 
 
 language is, " If the bills shall pass both houses," &c. ; in 
 Georgia, "Two thirds of each house may pass a law notwith- 
 standing the governor's dissent ; " in Iowa, "If it again pass 
 both houses," &c. ; in Maryland, as to the iirst house, "If it 
 shall pass," and as to the second, "If passed by two thirds 
 of the members," &c. ; and in ^lissouri, as to the first house, 
 "If two thirds vote in the affirmative," and as to the second 
 house, "If the bill receive a majority of two thirds of the 
 votes," &c. And there can be no doubt that the nature of 
 the revisionary power given the executive by these constitu- 
 tions is identical with that given by the Constitution of the 
 United States and the constitutions of the other states. 
 
 The article from which this quotation is made is entitled, 
 " Are the Departments of Government Independent ? " It was 
 written by Mr. Fisher, as he says, because he differs from the 
 opinion of Attorney General Bates advising President Lincoln 
 in 1861 that he had a constitutional right " in time of great and 
 dangerous insurrection to arrest and hold persons known to 
 have intercourse with the insurgents, and to refuse to obey a 
 writ of habeas corpus to show cause why he held them" (10 
 Opinions Attorney General, p. 74), and to correct what Mr. 
 Fisher terms " an inordinate respect for the opinions of the 
 Supreme Court of the United States, which now amounts to 
 a superstition." The remarks are under a portion of the 
 article which deals with the question " whether the president 
 may veto a bill because he thinks it unconstitutional, although 
 the Supreme Court has decided the same sort of a bill to be 
 constitutional," and which Mr. Fisher thinks he may do, 
 because, in exercising the revisionary power with reference 
 to the acts of the legislature, the president is exercising 
 legislative power which is in its nature discretionary. But 
 this opinion, which is probably not nearly as valuable as 
 that of the learned counsel for the plaintiff themselves 
 
83 
 
 upon this point, is wholly abroad of the question whether 
 the execntive can exercise the revisionary power without 
 examination of the bill, or can exercise his qualified negative 
 by returning the bill without any objections to its pro- 
 visions. I do not think, from an examination of the article, 
 that even Mr. Fisher considers the power of the executive to 
 extend thus far. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Messages by New Hampshire Governors, with Kefer- 
 ENCE TO Bills not Signed. 
 
 1793. 
 
 Governor Bartlett, in his message adjourning the legisla- 
 ture, referred to three private bills authorizing certain persons 
 to sell lands, in these words : " The short time I have had to 
 consider them prevents my being able to approve them, or 
 to point out with precision the objections that at present lie 
 in my mind against them." 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1793, p. 107. 
 
 This, although not a veto message, indicates very clearly 
 the opinion of Governor Bartlett that the exercise of the 
 qualified negative by the governor required him to point out 
 with precision the objections to the bill. 
 
 1794. 
 
 " An act to incorporate the Congregational Society in Clare- 
 mont," enacted June 17. 
 
 Returned to the house June 18 by Governor Gilman, 
 with the objection that it gave a religions society a common 
 seal, which was not necessary, empowered it to hold a large 
 amount of real estate without stating the purpose for which 
 it was to be held, allowed the society to tax persons coming 
 of age or moving into the town, but did not make the society 
 itself taxable, and was inconsistent with the sixth article of 
 the bill of rights. Upon the question of the passage of the 
 
bill notwithstandiug these objections, 2 members voted in 
 the affirmative and 106 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1794, p. 79. 
 
 " An act in addition lo an act prescribing the time and mode 
 
 of redeeming I'eal estate mortgaged or conveyed by deed 
 
 of bargain and sale with defeasance," enacted January 
 
 14. 
 
 Returned by Governor Gilman to the house January 16, 
 
 with objections that the provisions of the bill which he stated 
 
 and discussed at length might not operate justly, and that 
 
 under it the title to real estate would not be shown by the 
 
 records, the proper place to ascertain it. Upon the question 
 
 of the passage of the bill notwithstanding these objections, 
 
 57 members voted in the affirmative and 17 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, November session, 1794, p. 140. 
 
 1795. 
 " An act for taxing lands and buildings of non-residents," 
 Returned by Governor Gilman to the house December 
 31, with objections that the proposed tax on non-residents 
 for the support of schools would be inequitable, because the 
 proportion of schooling necessary in any town does not 
 depend upon the quality or value of unimproved lands or 
 buildings, but upon the number of persons wanting instruc- 
 tion, and the non-residents thus taxed would have no voice 
 in the disposal of the money, and because the bill provides 
 for an assessment according to an appraised value, but makes 
 no provision for such appraisal. Upon the question of the 
 passage of the bill notwithstanding these objections, 25 mem- 
 bers voted in the negative and 96 in the affirmative. 
 
 House Journal, December session, 1795, p. 142, 
 
1796. 
 Resolution directing "interest on all state notes, bills of the 
 the new emission, and every other evidence of debt due 
 from this state, to cease from and after July 31 next," 
 passed December 5. 
 
 Returned by Governor Gilman December 10, with objec- 
 tion that the payment of such interest was directed by the 
 act of January 16, 1782, for liquidating the public securities, 
 and that the resolution would not repeal that act. Also that 
 the resolution is an infringemnt on the engagements hereto- 
 fore made by the legislature for the payment of the debt of 
 the state. Upon the question of the passage of the resolve 
 notwithstanding these objections, 1 member voted in the 
 affirmative and 108 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, November session, 1796, p. 86. 
 
 " An act for arranging the militia of this state into divisions," 
 enacted December 8, 1796. 
 
 Returned by Governor Gilman December 12, with objec- 
 tion that no material inconvenience will arise if the militia 
 are not thus divided, and that such division would dismiss 
 certain officers in a manner heretofore unknown. Upon the 
 question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding these 
 objections, 69 members voted in the affirmative and 46 in 
 the negative. 
 
 House Journal, November session, 1797, p. 93. 
 
 "An act fixing the time when interest on state notes, bills 
 of new emission, and other evidences of debt shall 
 cease," enacted December 13. 
 Returned to the house by Governor Gilman December 14, 
 
 with objection that the " bjll appears to be an infringement 
 
of solemn engagements heretofore made by the legislature 
 respecting the public debts of the state," and referring speci- 
 fically to legislation upon that subject. Upon the question 
 of the passage of the bill notwithstanding these objections, 
 100 members voted yes and 21 voted no. 
 
 House Journal, November session, 1796, p. 132. 
 
 "An act in addition to the laws now in force relating to 
 proprietary matters," enacted June 14. 
 
 Returned to the house by Governor Gilnian June 16, 
 with ol)jection that the provisions of the bill totally deprive 
 the proprietors of lands of a privilege long had, and com- 
 pel them to travel in many cases long distances to trans- 
 act the necessary business relating to their property, and 
 that it is not apparent that any considerable benefit would 
 result to the inhabitants of the particular towns therefrom. 
 Upon the question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding 
 these objections, 113 members voted in the afiirmative and 
 16 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1796, p. 81. 
 
 1797. 
 
 " An act to give a new trial to Josiah Sanborn in a certain 
 action commenced against him by Samuel Plolland, which 
 had been tried and judgment entered therein by action 
 of review, some time since held in the County of Grafton 
 within this state," enacted December 13. 
 
 Returned to the house by Governor Gilman December 
 18, with objection that "The l)ill is predicated on the princi- 
 ple that the record of the verdict of the jury was altered. 
 If this was the case, the governor must presume, until he 
 has evidence to the contrary, that the court had sufficient 
 
legal reasons therefor ; but having no other evidence of the 
 case except what is contained in the petition and bill, he 
 cannot approve the bill." Upon question of passage of the bill 
 notwithstanding these objections, 97 voted yes, 22 voted no. 
 House Journal, November session, 1797, p. 112. 
 
 1800. 
 " An act to incorporate James Mann and others by the name 
 of the Consociate Society in Pembroke," enacted Novem- 
 ber 22. 
 
 Returned by Governor Gilman to the house November 
 27, with objection that as there are already two distinct 
 religious societies in Pembroke, it is his opinion that the 
 incorporation of a third by the name and on the principle 
 contemplated in the bill will not have a tendency to pro- 
 mote the general tranquillity, and because the bill gives per- 
 mission to the inhabitants of Bow and Allenstown to join said 
 society, which may prove injurious to those towns. Upon 
 the question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding these 
 objections, 69 members voted in the affirmative and 65 in 
 the negative. 
 
 House Journal, November session, 1800, p. 43. 
 
 "An act allowing a larger per centum of interest to pur- 
 chasers of land sold at vendue by collectors of taxes than 
 is by law now established," enacted December 2. 
 
 Returned by Governor Gilman to the house December 6, 
 with the objection that, " While the law determines the rate 
 of interest in other cases shall not exceed a certain per 
 centum, there is no reason apparent to me why it should be 
 increased in the case contemplated in the bill." Upon the 
 question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding these 
 
6 
 
 objections, 108 members voted in the aiErmative and 25 in 
 the negative. 
 
 House Journal, November session, 1800, p. 80. 
 
 1804. 
 
 Resolution " expressing the sentiments of the house and 
 senate respecting the disorganizing sentiment inculcated 
 through the medium of the press, and congratulating 
 their fellow-citizens upon certain measures of the general 
 government, and in the justice and wisdom of the Presi- 
 dent of the United States," passed June 13. 
 
 Returned to the senate by Governor Gilman, June 18, 
 with objection that if the resolution referred to the purchase 
 of Louisiana, he is not sufficiently informed as to the advan- 
 tages of that purchase to enable him to congratulate his 
 fellow-citizens thereon, and that such is his opinion respect- 
 ing some measures of the administration, that he is not 
 prepared to express the unlimited confidence stated by the 
 resolution. Upon the question of the adoption of the passage 
 of the resolution notwithstanding these objections, 5 senators 
 voted in the affirmative and 5 in the negative. 
 
 Senate Journal, June session, 1804, p. 28. 
 
 " An act to divide the state into districts for the purpose of 
 choosing representatives to Congress," enacted June 13. 
 
 Returned to the senate by Governor Gilman, June 20, 
 with objection that in his opinion the choosing of represen- 
 tatives to congress, by the people of the state at large, " is 
 most conformable to the spirit and letter of the Constitution 
 of the United States, and therefore no qualified voter of the 
 state should be debarred from voting for the whole number 
 of representatives to which the state is entitled, unless some 
 
great inconvenience results therefrom." And that no incon- 
 venience has resulted from this method under the law enacted 
 twelve years before and intended to be permanent. Upon 
 the question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding these 
 objections, 4 senators voted in the affirmative and 6 in the 
 negative. 
 
 Senate Journal, June session, 1804, p. 33. 
 
 " An act to ratify an article proposed in amendment to the 
 Constitution of the United States," enacted June 15. 
 
 Returned by Governor Gilman to the house June 20, 
 with objection that the proposed amendment was a conces- 
 sion by the smaller states, and would give four or five of the 
 larger states power to elect the President and Vice-President 
 of the United States, and that no sufficient reason existed 
 for thus amending the Constitution of the United States. 
 Upon the question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding 
 these objections, 76 voted in the affirmative and 68 in the 
 
 negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1804, p. 61. 
 
 "An act for the limitation of actions and for preventing 
 vexatious suits," enacted December 12. 
 Returned by Governor Gilman December 14, with objec- 
 tion that the bill is not definite in its provisions, and that if 
 carried out it would essentially change the former rights of 
 individuals respecting real estate. Upon the question of the 
 passage of the bill notwithstanding these objections, 110 
 members voted in the affirmative and 13 in the negative. 
 House Journal, November session, 1804, p. 103. 
 
1805. 
 
 " An act in amendment of an act entitled An act to incorpo- 
 rate a company by the name of proprietors of Water- 
 quecliee Falls Canal, passed December 19, 1796," enacted 
 June 13. 
 Returned by Governor Langdon to the house June 13, 
 with objection that the power of the court to regulate the 
 tolls of the company under the bill could not be exercised 
 unless the company petitioned therefor, although it should 
 amount to more than twelve per cent upon the capital. 
 Upon the question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding 
 these objections, 40 members voted in the affirmative and 93 
 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1805, p. 45. 
 
 1806. 
 
 "An act for taxing banks within this state," enacted 
 June 19. 
 
 Returned by Governor Langdon to the house June 20, 
 with objections that the tax imposed by the bill was unequal, 
 unreasonable, and unjust, and against the spirit and letter 
 of the constitution. Upon the question of the passage of 
 the bill notwithstanding these objections, 90 members voted 
 in the affirmative and 56 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1806, p. 77. 
 
 1807. 
 
 " An act to constitute a company of cavalry to be annexed to 
 the 18th regiment," enacted June 16. 
 Returned by Governor Langdon to the house June 17, 
 with the objection that a good company of cavalry already 
 
belongs to said regiment, and the annexing of another would 
 be injurions and expensive. Upon the question of the pas- 
 sage of the bill notwithstanding these objections, 16 members 
 voted in the affirmative and 108 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1807, p. 76. 
 
 " An act to constitute two companies of cavalry in the 6th 
 regiment," enacted June 16. 
 
 Keturned by Governor Langdon to the house June 17, 
 with the objection that more than one company of cavalry to 
 a regiment would be injurious and expensive. On the ques- 
 tion of the passage of the bill notwithstanding these objec- 
 tions, 15 members voted in the affirmative and 108 in the 
 
 negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1807, p. 83. 
 
 1808. 
 
 "An act empowering justices of the peace to deputize persons 
 to serve precepts in certain cases," enacted December 22. 
 Eeturned by Governor Langdon to the house December 
 22, with the objection that the laws now in force for the 
 service of precepts in all cases are a greater security to citi- 
 zens than is provided in this bill. On the question of the 
 passage of the bill notwithstanding this objection, 25 mem- 
 bers voted in the affirmative and 76 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, November session, 1808, p. 122. 
 
 1811. 
 "An act to incorporate John L. Sullivan and others by the 
 name and style of the Merrimack Boating Company," 
 enacted June 20. 
 Returned to the house by Governor Langdon June 21, 
 
10 
 
 with the objection that "there has not been a day of hearing 
 had on the subject matter of the bill, and that at the close of 
 the session there is not time to fully consider the business." 
 Upon the question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding 
 this objection, 86 members voted in the affirmative and 68 in 
 the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1811, p. 121. 
 
 1812. 
 
 " An act to incorporate John L. Sullivan and others by the 
 name and style of the Merrimack Boating Company," 
 enacted June — . 
 
 Returned by Governor Plummer to the house June 16, 
 with objections that it does not appear that public necessity 
 or interest requires such a corporation to be created ; that 
 the words of description of the extent of the privilege 
 granted by the bill are uncertain, and that the corporation 
 may restrain citizens from the use of the river, or impose 
 such tribute as it pleases for such use. Also, that the bill 
 is so drawn that it may give the exclusive right to the 
 waters of the river ; that there is no provision subjecting the 
 property of the members of the corporation to the payment 
 of their individual and private debts, and nothing requiring 
 the clerk to be sworn ; and that the whole property of the 
 stockholders in the corporation is declared to be personal 
 estate, to be transferred only by assignment of stockholders. 
 Upon the question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding 
 the objections, no members voted in the affirmative and 140 
 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1812, p. 89. 
 
11 
 
 Resolution empowering the governor to " distribute as he 
 may think proper among the militia when called into 
 active service, the arms belonging to the state that are 
 now in the hands of the commissary general," passed 
 November — 
 Eeturned by Governor Plummer November 26, with the 
 objection that by the resolution, the militia securing arms 
 under it may hold them as their own property, no authority 
 being given the govei'nor to require them to be returned. 
 Upon the question of the passage of the resolution notwith- 
 standing this objection, no members voted in the affirmative 
 and 126 voted in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, November session, 1812, p. 46. 
 
 Resolution granting to "John Goddard, Jeremiah Mason, and 
 Daniel Webster for their services in revising, collecting, 
 and reporting the bills for the criminal code and regu- 
 lating the state prison, ninety dollars, and that they 
 should also have and retain the laws which were pro- 
 cured for them by the late governor for their infor- 
 mation in performing the duties assigned to them," 
 passed December 16. 
 Returned by Governor Plummer December 17, with the 
 objections that "It appears that the gentlemen named re- 
 ceived law books or property of the state as follows ; 
 [enumerating the books], which booliis, to say nothing of 
 the ninety dollars, would sell for more than the services of 
 the commission at a fair price are worth. These books 
 should not be disposed of at any price, being for the use of 
 government and people." Upon the question of the passage 
 of the resolution notwithstanding these objections, 143 voted 
 in the negative and none in the affirmative. 
 
 House Journal, November session, 1812, p. 143. 
 
12 
 
 "Resolution for the relief of Jeremiah Gernsh and Daniel 
 "Webster from a contract for which it is stated they were 
 sureties for the late Timothy Dix, Jr., for the payment 
 of a certain sum of money for a township of unimproved 
 land that he purchased of the state in the year 1805," 
 passed June 21. 
 
 Returned to the house by Gov. William Plummer, June 
 25, with objections that "It is not represented even that the 
 original bargain was founded either in mistake or misrepre- 
 sentation. . . . Since the death of said Dix they have not 
 been able, by entering upon said wild, uncultivated lands, to 
 take such actual possession as to foreclose the right of re- 
 demption and prevent the heirs at law or creditors of said 
 Dix from redeeming the mortgage ; and should individuals 
 acquire title to the lands under cellectors' deeds, or as set- 
 tlers, the state might be obliged to liring suit for breach of 
 covenant in the deed contemplated to be given by said Ger- 
 rish and Webster, and if they should prove unable to respond 
 to the damages awarded in such suit, the state would be 
 without remedy." On the question of the passage of the 
 resolve notwithstanding the objections, 8 members voted in 
 affirmative and 145 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1816, p. 180. 
 
 1816. 
 
 " An act to incorporate sundry persons by the name of the 
 Farmer's Bank," enacted June 21, 1816. 
 
 Returned by Governor Plummer to the house June 27, 
 1816, with objections that the authority to issue bills of cred- 
 it ought not to be granted to a corporation ; that the public 
 interests did not require the establishment of another bank. 
 
13 
 
 and also that the bill did not contain any provision requiring 
 the bank to pay anything to the state for \hQ privilege of trans- 
 acting business, or requiring the bank to lend money to the 
 state, if the exigencies of the treasury required, and that it 
 did not contain any provision subjecting its officers to penalty 
 for neglecting to pay bills when presented, and did not re- 
 serve any authority to the legislature, in case of such refusal, 
 to repeal the act of incorporation. And further, because there 
 was no provision in the bill to secure the payment of out- 
 standing bills and debts at any time when the charter might 
 be forfeited or terminated, or the corporation be dissolved by 
 limitation. Upon the question of the passage of the bill not- 
 withstanding the objections, 5 members voted in the affirm- 
 ative and 121 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1816, p. 223. 
 
 " An act for the further suppression of vice and immorality," 
 enacted June 25, 1816. 
 
 Returned by Governor Plummer to the house June 27, 
 1816, with objections that there was no public necessity for 
 delegating further power to town corporations to exercise 
 authority upon the subject contemplated by the bill ; that the 
 description of offences enumerated in the bill was too un- 
 certain to subject citizens to arrest and imprisonment at the 
 will of a single police officer ; that the proceedings authorized 
 were unnecessary and might be abitrary and exercised from 
 bad motives. Upon the question of the passage of the bill 
 notwithstanding the objections, 2 members voted in the 
 affirmative and 86 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1816, p. 227. 
 
14 
 
 "An act in addition to an act entitled 'An act to incorpo- 
 rate sundiy persons by the name of tlie President, 
 directors, and company of the Cheshire banlt,' passed 
 December 24, 1803 ; " enacted December 14, 1816. 
 
 Returned by Governor Plummer to the house December 
 16, 1816, with objections that the bill contained no provision 
 requiring the corporation to pay any equivalent for the grant 
 of the right to make profits by banking into the state 
 ti'easury ; also that the bill authorized a private bank to 
 make a separate branch not only of deposit, but for transact- 
 ing all banking business, which was contrary to the policy 
 of the state, aiul Ijecause it was questionable whether, if the 
 branch bank, authorized ))y the bill to be established at Wal- 
 pole should refuse to redeem its bills, the Cheshire bank at 
 Keene would he holden to pay them. Upon the question of 
 the passage of the bill notwithstanding these objections, 
 115 members voted in the affirmative and 63 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, JSovember session, 1816, p. 180. 
 
 Joint resolve declaring it " incxi)edient to amend the Con- 
 stitution of the United States upon the subject of elect- 
 ing representatives to the Congress of the United States 
 and the appointment of electors of President and Vice 
 President of the United States, as proposed by the 
 Legislature of North Carolina." 
 
 Eeturned to the house December 25 by Governor Plummer 
 "for reconsideration," with the objection that inasmuch as 
 the object of the amendment proposed by the Legislature of 
 North Carolina was to make provision for the division of each 
 state into equal districts for the choice of representatives and 
 electors, the principle of it was "correct and consonant with 
 the principle estal:)lished by the New Hampshire State Con- 
 
15 
 
 stitution in the choice by districts of senators, and therefore 
 he could not approve the resolve declaring such an amend- 
 ment inexpedient. 
 
 At the same time the governor returned a similar resolve 
 declaring it inexpedient to amend the constitution upon the 
 same subject, as proposed by the Legislature of Massachu- 
 setts, stating that the same objections applied to the approval 
 of that resolve as to the one in regard to the amendment 
 proposed by the Legislature of North Carolina. No vote 
 appears by the journal to have been taken upon the passage 
 of these resolves notwithstanding the governor's objections. 
 
 House Jouunal, November session, 1816, pp. 253, 254. 
 
 1817. 
 
 Kesolution for the " relief of Jeremiah Gerrish and Daniel 
 Webster," passed June 23. 
 
 Returned to the house by Governor Plummer June 24, 
 with the objections that the deed of one Dix to Webster and 
 Gerrish, mentioned in the resolution, was not absolute but 
 conditional, and there was no evidence that the heirs of Dix 
 had been foreclosed of their right to redeem, nor whether 
 Dix was ever in possession of the property, and no informa- 
 tion as to the value of the property. Also that the resolu- 
 tion does not fix any time within which the deed from Gerrish 
 and Webster to the state is to be executed and the balance 
 of money paid to the treasurer. Upon the question of the 
 passage of the resolution notwithstanding these objections, 
 4 members voted in the affirmative and 143 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1817, p. 183. 
 
16 
 
 1818. 
 
 "An act to authorize and direct the clerk of the Court of 
 Common Pleas of the County of Rockingham to issue 
 an execution to be substituted in place of one already 
 issued, but lost or destroyed," passed June 19. 
 
 Eeturned by Governor Plummer June 25, with objec- 
 tions — 
 
 First. That there was no legal evidence that such a 
 judgment was ever rendered, or such an execution ever 
 issued. 
 
 Second. That the petition upon which the resolution is 
 based accuses one Tuckernian of a criminal act, and he does 
 not appear to have had opportunity to appear before the 
 legislature and deny it. 
 
 Third. That it does not appear that notice has been given 
 to Tuckerman and others interested to present their objec- 
 tions to the bill. 
 
 Fourth. That to order the clerk to antedate an alias exe- 
 cution and make an entry of issuing it as of the same time as 
 of the former execution, is contrary to the fact. 
 
 Fifth. Requiring the deputy sheriff to antedate his return, 
 grants to him an authority with which our law has not in- 
 vested deputy slieriffs. 
 
 Sixth. The plaintiff might have obtained an alias execution 
 without applying to the legislature, and it is doubtful whether 
 the proceedings under the bill would ensure a title to him. 
 Upon the question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding 
 these objection, 5 members voted in the affirmative and 112 
 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1818, p. 269. 
 
17 
 
 "An act in addition to an act entitled 'An act for the equal 
 distribution of insolvent estates ; ' " enacted June — 
 Returned to the house by Governor Plummer June 26, 
 with objections that the bill is useless, because the present 
 law covers the subject ; that the bill would unsettle a long- 
 established practice under the existing laws, and " might foster 
 a spirit of litigation respecting former settlements injurious 
 to the peace of society." Also that the provisions of the bill 
 are ambiguous. Upon the question of the passage of the bill 
 notwithstanding these objections, 120 members voted in the 
 affirmative and 31 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1818, p. 284. 
 
 " An act to amend an act to incorporate the inhabitants of the 
 northerly part of Gilmantown into a separate township 
 with all the privileges and immunities of other towns 
 in this state," passed June 24. 
 Returned to the house by Governor Plummer June 26, 
 with the objections that the bill, if it has any validity, will 
 impair or destroy rights now vested in the town of Gilman- 
 town, against their will and without their knowledge. Upon 
 the question of the passage of the bill, notwithstanding this 
 objection, 6 members voted in the affirmative and 134 in the 
 
 negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1818, p. 290. 
 
 "An act to incorporate the Portsmouth Provident Society," 
 enacted June 24. 
 Returned by Governor Plummer to the house June 29, 
 with objections that the bill contains no definite object for 
 which the corporation is to be established ; that it is to hold 
 $6000 worth of real estate which will not be subject to taxa- 
 tion, because " corporate property cannot be taxed unless in 
 
18 
 
 pursuance of statute, and member.s of the corporation may 
 thus avoid taxation." That the bill vests extensive authority 
 for private and indelinite purposes in twenty men, seven of 
 whom may admit or expel other memliers, and as it is a grant 
 to individuals for twenty years, it is doubtful if future legis- 
 lation can constitutionally repeal the grant, and " whatever 
 evils follow, great caution should l)e used in enacting irre- 
 pealable laws." On the question of the passage of the bill 
 notwithstanding these objections, 7 members voted in the 
 affirmative and 106 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1818, p. 312. 
 
 In his message adjourning the legislature Governor Plum- 
 mer, after naming the bills which he had returned with ob- 
 jections, mentioned "An act in addition to an act entitled ' An 
 act to estal)lish the rates at which polls and ratable estates 
 shall be valued in making and assessing direct taxes, made 
 and passed Decem))er 16, 1812,' which had not been approved 
 
 or returned." 
 
 House Journal, June session, p. 338. 
 
 1819. 
 
 Resolution " imposing a penalty upon the commanding officers 
 of the several regiments of the state who shall for a term 
 of six months fail to make a I'eturn to the commissary 
 general of the number of infantry in each town compos- 
 ing such regiments," passed June 29. 
 Returned by Governor Bell July 2, with the objections 
 that an action cannot be maintained for the recovery of a 
 penalty imposed by a resolution. 
 
 Upon the question of the passage of the resolution not- 
 withstanding this objection, the resolution failed of a passage. 
 House Journal, June session, 1819, p. 368. 
 
19 
 
 1820. 
 Resolution " allowing to James Dean $500, to Thomas C. 
 Searl $300, and to Nathaniel H. Carter $184, in full of 
 their salaries as professors of Dartmouth University," 
 passed December 14. 
 
 Returned by Governor Bell Dec. 18, with the objection that 
 he finds nothing in the acts of the legislature respecting Dart- 
 mouth University creating any obligation on the pai-t of the 
 state to pay the salaries of the officers of that institution, and 
 and no evidence from the journals of the legislature, or the 
 acts themselves, or from any source, that it was the intention 
 of the legislature to guarantee such payment ; that there is 
 no evidence that the debts are due from the state, and if they 
 are not it is not wise to impose the burden of mere donations 
 upon the citizens of the state in this time of pressure and 
 embarrassment. Upon the question of the passage of the 
 resolution notwithstanding these objections, 98 voted in the 
 affirmative and 78 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, JSTovember session, 1820, p. 292. 
 
 Resolution "allowing Eliza B. Woodward, executrix of the 
 last will of William H. Woodward, deceased, $471.15 
 in full for the services of William H. Woodward, and in 
 full for moneys by him advanced as secretary and treas- 
 urer of Dartmouth University, " passed December 18. 
 
 Returned to the house by Governor Bell, with the same 
 objections returned with the resolution passed December 14 
 with reference to the salaries of the officers of Dartmouth 
 University. Upon the question of the passage of the resolu- 
 tion notwithstanding these olyections, 72 members voted in 
 the affirmative and 77 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, November session, 1820, p. 345. 
 
20 
 
 "An act to incorporate Thomas S. Bowles and others into a 
 charitable society by the name of Pythagoras Lodge, 
 No. 33," enacted June 19. 
 Returned by Governor Bell to the house June 21, with the 
 objection that the bill creates a private corporation with the 
 right to acquire and hold real and personal estate without lim- 
 itation of amount, whereby the corporation could accumulate 
 large sums and "appropriate them to purposes inconsistent 
 with the public good, and not in the power of the legislature 
 to provide an adequate remedy against." Upon the question 
 of the passage of the bill notwithstanding these objections, 
 1 member voted in the affirmative and 144 in the negative. 
 House Journal, June session, 1820, p. 240. 
 
 1835. 
 
 "An act to establish a cori)oration by the name of the Franklin 
 
 Manufacturing Company," enacted June 16. 
 
 Sent by Governor Badger to the house June 19, with the 
 
 objection that no definite place of location is named in the 
 
 bill, and it is "questionable how far the corporation may be 
 
 amenable to the laws and judicial tribunals of this state." 
 
 These objections being read, the bill was laid upon the table, 
 
 and subsequently returned to the governor with a resolution 
 
 informing him that it did not originate in the house. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1835, p. 111. 
 
 1837. 
 Resolve " to pay $200 to the selectmen of the town of Hamp- 
 ton for the benefit of Joseph L. Shaw, late a convict in 
 the state prison, whose legs have been amjjutated by 
 reason of their having l^een frozen while in said prison." 
 Returned by Governor Hill July 7, 1837, with the objec- 
 
21 
 
 tion that the expense of the maintenance of Shaw should lie 
 borne by the town of Hampton, and that for the state to 
 contribute thereto would establish a dangerous precedent 
 and consume much time of the legislature, and incur laree 
 additional state expense. Upon the question of the passage 
 of the resolve notwithstanding the objections, 26 members 
 voted in the aiErmative and 104 in th-Q negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1837, p. 263. 
 
 1844. 
 
 " An act to incorporate the Trustees of Donations to the 
 
 Protestant Episcopal Church." 
 
 Returned hy Governor Steele to the house December 24, 
 1844, with objections that the bill created " a self- perpetuating 
 board of trust beyond the control of the societies and churches 
 for whose benefit the act was intended ; " also that all the 
 power which ought to be given as to the matter covered by 
 the bill was ali-eady given by the general law, and if not, the 
 defect should be remedied T)y an amendment of the general 
 law rather than by special legislation. The message argues 
 at length the dangers of special legislation as to matters 
 which can be covered by a general law. Upon the question 
 of the passage of the bill notwithstahding the objections, 29 
 members voted in the affirmative, 150 in the negative. 
 House Journal, November session, 1844, p. 270. 
 
 " An act in addition to an act to incorporate the Proprietors 
 of Dalton Bridge." 
 
 Returned by Governor Steele November 6, 1844, to the 
 house, with objections that the bill contained no provision 
 making the stockholders liable in their private capacity for 
 debts and damages, nor any provision reserving to the legisla- 
 
22 
 
 ture the right to alter, amend, or abolish any of its provisions. 
 The message concludes with these words : " For these reasons 
 I deem it incumbent on me to return said bill to the house 
 of i-epresentatives, whence it originated, and respectfully 
 request their attention and reconsideration to the whole 
 matter."' Upon the question of the passage of the bill not- 
 withstanding the objections, 4 members voted in the affirma- 
 tive, 189 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, A^ovember session, 1844, pp. 128, 131. 
 
 1845. 
 Governor Steele, in adjourning the legislature at its request, 
 said that the late hour at which "an act in addition to and in 
 amendment of the laws of this state " was received by him, 
 etfeciually i>revented "that consideration which the impor- 
 tance of the l)ill demanded," and that, believing that its pas- 
 sage would destroy that which it was intended to meet, he 
 was unable to give it his signature, and had not time to 
 return it with his objections thereto, therefore he neither 
 signed it nor returned it. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1845, p. 336. 
 
 1854. 
 
 " An act in amendment of an act entitled ' An act to establish 
 the city of Concord.'" 
 
 Returned to the house July 12, 1854, by Governor Baker, 
 with the objection that " the legislature has no constitutional 
 right to prohibit the use of all intoxicating drinks," and 
 therefore no constitutional right to delegate such power to 
 municipal authorities, which the bill attempts to do. Upon 
 the question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding, 5 
 members voted in the affirmative and 251 in the negative. 
 House Journal, June session, 1854, pp. 430, 434. 
 
23 
 
 "An act to establish the city of Dover." 
 Returned by Governor Baker to the house July 14, with 
 the same objections stated at length as those stated to the 
 bill to amend the charter of the city of Concord. Upon the 
 question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding, 1 
 member voted in the affirmative and 163 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1854, pp. 495, 498. 
 
 Resolution relative to the ventilation of the hall of the 
 house of representatives. 
 
 Returned to the house by Governor Baker July 13, with 
 the objection that the provision of the resolution authorizing 
 the secretary of state to draw on the treasurer for the 
 expense was contrary to the fifty-sixth article of the con- 
 stitution, providing that money should be drawn by the 
 warrant of the governor. Upon the question of the passage 
 of the resolve notwithstanding, there were no votes in the 
 affirmative and 182 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1854, pp. 492, 495. 
 
 1856. 
 " An act to incorporate the Belknap Aqueduct Company," 
 and " An act to incorporate the Manchester Aqueduct," 
 were stated by Governor Metcalf, in his message adjourn- 
 ing the legislature at its request, to have been held by him, 
 because the late hour at which they were received, and the 
 pressure of other business, had prevented him from return- 
 ing them with his objections in season for any action upon 
 
 them. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1856, p. 484. 
 
24 
 
 1864. 
 
 " An act for the relief of the creditors of the Sullivan Eail- 
 
 road Company." 
 
 Eeturned by Governor Gilmore July 1, 1864, to the house, 
 with objections — 
 
 First. That the public interests would not permit the 
 unlimited right of sale of one railroad corporation to an- 
 other. 
 
 Second. That the bill granted an unlimited right to the 
 trustees of the bonds to sell the mortgaged property so that 
 the minority of the bondholders might be deprived of their 
 security. 
 
 Third. That the bill did not clearly retain the right of 
 amendment, alteration, and repeal of the charter of the new 
 corporation constituted thereby, July 14, 1864. 
 
 Upon the passage of the bill notwithstanding, 229 mem- 
 bers voted in the affirmative and 59 in the negative, and the 
 bill passed. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1864, p. 224. 
 
 "An act in relation to the Carroll County Bank." 
 
 Returned by Governor Gilmore to the house August 23, 
 with objections that it did not provide that the stockholders 
 should have an opportunity to sul)scribe for the authorized 
 increase in proportion to their respective holdings, or that 
 any notice should be given to them of such increase. Upon 
 the question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding the 
 objections, the motion was made and put that the bill be 
 indefinitely postponed, upon which 172 voted in the affirma- 
 tive and 24 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, Special session, 1864, pp. 193, 200, 
 
25 
 
 " An act to enable the qualified voters of this state engaged 
 in the military service of the country to vote for electors 
 of President and Vice President of the United States, 
 and for representatives in congress." 
 
 Keturned by Governor Gilmore to the house August 24, 
 1864, during the call of the yeas and nays upon a motion to 
 adjourn, which was carried, and first read to the house as a 
 portion of a message received from the governor on the 26th 
 of August. This message, which was subsequently held by 
 the court not to have been received within the time required 
 by the constitution, stated that the act would, in the opinion 
 of the governor, be unconstitutional. 
 
 On the 26th of August the house passed a resolution de- 
 claring that the act had become a law without the approval 
 of the governor, and the justices of the Supreme Court sub- 
 sequently held this to be the case. 
 
 House Journal, Special session, 1864, pp. 204, 216, 219. 
 Opinion of Justices, 45 N.H. 607. 
 
 Resolution recommending the governor " to apply to banks 
 and moneyed institutions of the state for a temporary 
 loan." 
 Returned to the house by Governor Gilmore August 29, 
 with objections, first, that it was not of a nature to require 
 his signature ; second, that it opened no resources of supply 
 other than those which had been already employed ; third, 
 that the scheme of obtaining money in the manner proposed 
 was impracticable and unwise. This message was referred 
 to the committee on finance, who reported a resolution that 
 the further consideration of the subject be indefinitely post- 
 poned, which was adopted. 
 
 House Journal, Special session, 1864, pp. 223, 241, 247. 
 
26 
 
 1865. 
 "An act entitled 'An act in amendment of chapter 68, Re- 
 vised Statutes, relating to the maintenance of bastard 
 children.' " 
 Returned to the house by Governor Smyth June 30, 1865, 
 with the objection that the act confers authority to make 
 complaint, etc., not upon the board of county commissioners, 
 but upon a minority of the commissioners, because by the 
 distinct provisions of the bill the power is conferred upon 
 any individual memlaer thereof who may make complaint, 
 although both his colleagues ol)ject. Upon the passage of 
 the bill notwithstanding the objections, 6 members voted in 
 the aiErmative and 132 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1865, p. 251. 
 
 1868. 
 
 " An act in amendment of chapter 213, section 2, of the Gen- 
 eral Statutes, abolishing the usury laws." 
 
 Returned to the house July 3, 1868, by Governor Harri- 
 man, with objections that the act was not called for by 
 public necessity, and would produce an additional burden 
 upon the debtors of the state, especially upon the towns, 
 and that the " granting to capital of a license to take any 
 terms which the necessitous might be compelled to offer was 
 not called for, l)ut would be inexpedient and ill-advised." 
 Upon the question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding 
 the objections, 97 meml)ers voted in the affirmative and 173 
 in the negative. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1868, p. 264. 
 
27 
 
 1877. 
 
 "An act to incorporate the Magdalena River Railroad." 
 
 Returned by Governor Prescott to the house July 12, 
 1877, with objections that the bill authorized the construction 
 and operation of a railroad in South America, and that the 
 corporators named were mainly non-residents of New Hamp- 
 shire, and that the bill might be used for improper purposes, 
 and was not required by any interests or persons in New 
 Hampshire. The question does not appear to have ever been 
 stated upon the passage of this bill notwithstanding the objec- 
 tions. 
 
 House Journal, 1877, p. 447. 
 
 1883. 
 "An act to establish a board of railroad commissioners." 
 Returned by Governor Hale to the house September 12, 
 1883, with objections that the method of electing commis- 
 sioners by the joint convention of the houses provided by 
 the bill was unwise and an injurious method ; that an officer 
 to be commissioned by the governor should not be elected 
 by the legislature, and that the provision of the bill provid- 
 ing that one commissioner must be learned in the law, and 
 another, a civil engineer learned and skilled in his profession, 
 was a violation of article 11 of the bill of rights declaring 
 that " every inhabitant of the state having proper qualifica- 
 tions has equal right to elect and be elected into office." 
 This bill was referred to the judiciary committee, who re- 
 ported on September 14 that it was not expedient to pass 
 the bill notwithstanding the objections of the governor, and 
 reported the bill modified to conform to the suggestions of 
 the governor's message. Upon the question of the passage 
 of the bill notwithstanding the objections, 16 members voted 
 
2S 
 
 in the affirmative and 252 in the negative. The bill reported 
 by the judiciary committee was then passed. 
 
 House Journal, June session, 1883, pp. 1110, 1125. 
 
 1885. 
 
 " An act to prohibit shooting and trapping in private 
 grounds," 
 
 Was returned by Gon ernor Currier to the house August 14, 
 with the following message : " I herewith return without my 
 signature house bill No. 20, entitled 'An act to prohibit shoot- 
 ing in private grounds.' I should deem it an act of dis- 
 courtesy to permit a Ijill to become a law after the house has 
 so strongly expressed a desire to have it returned for the 
 purpose of amendment. Therefore, without expressing any 
 opinion in regard to the merits of the bill, I place it again in 
 your hands." On a vote that the l)ill become a law notwith- 
 standing its return, 43 voted in the affirmative and 178 in 
 
 the negative. 
 
 House -Tournal, 1885, pp. 782, 793. 
 
 Note. — The " desire of the house " alluded to in this'message was the passage by the 
 house of a joint resolution, which was rejected in the senate, requesting the governor to 
 return the bill for reconsideration. 
 
 1887. 
 
 "An act in relation to actions." 
 
 Returned to the house by Governor Sawyer October 6, 
 1887, with the objection that the "provisions of section 1 
 annul and invalidate the provisions of section 2, so that the 
 bill as a whole has no force or meaning." The bill and 
 measure were referred to the committee on the judiciary. 
 On October 13 the committee reported a resolution that the 
 vote whereby the bill was passed be reconsidered, and also 
 reported the bill in a new draft, which obviated the objec- 
 
29 
 
 tions of the governor. The vote whereby the bill was passed 
 was reconsidered, the question being stated on the passage 
 of the bill notwithstanding the objections of the governor, 
 182 members voted in the negative and none in the affirma- 
 tive. 
 
 House Journal, 1887, pp. 735, 753. 
 
 1887. 
 
 " An act providing for the establishment of I'ailroad corpora- 
 tions by general law." 
 
 Eeturned by Governor Sawyer to the house October 18, 
 with objections that "without entering upon the intrinsic 
 merits of the measure to express any opinion, I am moved to 
 object to this bill for the reason that corrupt measures have 
 been extensively used for the purpose of promoting its pas- 
 sage, and the representatives have been persistently followed 
 and interfered with in the free performance of their legisla- 
 tive duties, and that while no evidence has been produced 
 that any member of the legislature has been unfaithful to his 
 trust and oath of office, yet to my mind it is conclusively 
 shown that there have lieen deliberate and systematic attempts 
 <at wholesale bribery of the servants of the people in this 
 legislature." The message was referred to the committee on 
 the judiciary, who reported October 19, recommending that 
 the house do not pass the bill. November 4 the bill was 
 taken from the table and a preamble and resolution adopted 
 by the house, declaring it to be the sense of the house that 
 the objections made by the governor to the bill were not 
 such as required by the constitution to prevent its becoming 
 a law by the lapse of time without his signature, and that 
 therefore the bill had become a law without the signature of 
 
30 
 
 the governor, and directing it to be transmitted, together with 
 the resolution of the house, to the secretary of state. 
 House Journal, pp. 781, 795, 943, 946, 951. 
 
 "An act regulating fares and freights on railroads, and to 
 provide compensation to dissenting stockholders in case 
 of railroad leases." 
 
 Returned to the house by Governor Sawyer November 4, 
 with objections that the meritorious part of the bill was made 
 a vehicle to carry through legislation which would, in the 
 opinion of the governor, be detrimental to the best interests 
 of the state, and also that the 6th section is in effect a re- 
 enactment of an essential part of an act in relation to railroads 
 returned on October 18, and that, therefore, the reasons 
 given for refusing the executive signature to that bill applied 
 to this bill. Xo action appears to have been taken upon this 
 message or with regard to this bill. 
 
 House Journal, 1887, p. 960. 
 
 "An act to incorporate the Alliance Trust Company." 
 Returned l)y Governor Sawyer to the senate October 26, 
 with objection that a general provision for the taxation of 
 all loan and trust companies was embodied in the act, thus 
 incorporating a general law into a private act. Upon the 
 question of the passage of the bill notwithstanding the objec- 
 tions, 5 voted in the affirmative and 17 in the negative. 
 Senate Journal, 1887, p. 455. 
 
 Subsequently a bill without this provision was enacted 
 and approved. 
 
 Senate Journal, 1887, pp. 469, 533, 548. 
 
31 
 
 " An act to authorize a lease of the Northern Railroad." 
 
 Returned by Governor Sawyer to the senate November 1, 
 with objection that the same reasons given for disaproving 
 the bill returned to tlie house on October 18 without signa- 
 ture, applied to a large portion of this bill, and with the 
 additional reasons that the roads proposed by the bill to be 
 authorized to lease the Northern have no physical connection 
 with it ; that the interests of the state' and of the Concord 
 Railroad would be affected by the bill, and that it is ques- 
 tionable whether the best interests of the state would not be 
 injured by the railroad consolidation which would result 
 from the bill. Upon the question of the passage of the bill 
 notwithstanding the objections, the bill and message were 
 upon motion laid upon the table, from which they do not 
 appear to have been taken. 
 
 Senate Journal, 1887, pp. 483, 486. 
 
32 
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WITH REFERENCE TO 
 REVISION AND NEGATIVE OF LEGISLATIVE ACTS 
 IN THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 In the Constitution of the United States adopted by the 
 convention September 17, 1787, the provision for revision 
 and negative of acts of congress by the president is found in 
 section 7, article I., as follows : — 
 
 "Every bill which shall have passed the house of representatives 
 and the senate shall, l)efore it become a law, be presented to the 
 President of the United States. If he approve, he shall sign it ; 
 but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in 
 which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at 
 large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after 
 such reconsideration, two thirds of that house shall agree to pass 
 the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other 
 house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved 
 by two thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But, in all 
 such cases, the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas 
 and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against 
 the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house, respectively. 
 If any bill shall not be returned by the president within ten days 
 (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the 
 same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless 
 the congress, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which 
 case it shall not be a law." 
 
 Provisions of State Constitutions. 
 
 Alabama. 
 
 Section 16, article IV., of the original constitution of 1819 
 gave the power of revision and of qualified negative to the 
 governor in the same manner in which the United States 
 Constitution gave it to the president, except that it provided 
 that the bill should become a law unless returned in five 
 
33 
 
 days, and that it mischt become a law, uotwithstanding the 
 objection of the governor, by a vote of a majority of the 
 whole number of merribers elected to each house. 
 
 The same provision was retained in the constitutions of 
 1865 and 1867, and is now section 13 of article V. of the 
 constitution of 1875. 
 
 Ai'kansas. 
 
 The original constitution of 1836 contained the sam^ pro- 
 vision as the original constitution of Alabama. 
 
 The constitution of 1864 retained the same provision, 
 except that it was provided that the bill should be a law 
 unless returned within three days. This provision was 
 retained in the constitution of 1868, with the addition that 
 the governor may "approve, sign, and file in the office of 
 the secretary of state, within three days after the adjourn- 
 ment of the general assembly, any act passed during the last 
 three days of the session, and the same shall become a law." 
 
 This provision was retained, and is now section 15 of arti- 
 cle VI. of the constitution of 1874, except that the bill may 
 be returned within five days, and that if the general assem- 
 bly by their adjournment prevent its return within that 
 time, it shall become a law, unless the governor shall "file 
 the same, with his objections, in the office of the secretary 
 of state, and give notice thereof by public proclamation 
 within twenty days after such adjournment." 
 
 California. 
 Section 17, article IV., of the constitution of 1849 pro- 
 vides that every bill shall be presented to the governor. 
 "If he approve it, he shall sign it: but if not, he shall 
 return it, with his objections, to the house in which it origi- 
 nated, which shall enter the same upon the journal, and 
 proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, it 
 
34 
 
 again pass both houses, by yeas and nays, by a majority of 
 two thirds of each house present, it shall become a law not- 
 withstanding the governor's objections ; " and also provides 
 that the bill, if not returned within ten days, shall become a 
 law unless the legislature by adjournment prevent its return. 
 
 Colorado. 
 
 Section 11, article IV., of the constitution of 1876 gives 
 the power of revision and negative to the governor in the 
 same manner in which it is given to the president, with 
 the additional provision, if the general assembly by their 
 adjournment prevent the return of the bill, it shall become 
 a law unless it is filed by the governor, with his objections, 
 in the office of the secretary of state within thirty days after 
 such adjournment. 
 
 Section 12 of this article also gives the governor power to 
 approve of any part or parts of appropriation bills, and 
 to disapprove of any item or item thereof, by transmitting 
 to the house in which the bill originated a copy of the item 
 or items thereof disapproved, together with his objections 
 thereto ; in which case the items objected to are separately 
 reconsidered, and the same course taken with each as is pre- 
 scribed with relation to bills returned by the governor with 
 objections. 
 
 Connecticut. 
 
 Section 12, article IV., of the constitution of 1818 gives 
 the power of revision and negative to the governor in the 
 same manner that it is given to the president, except that, if 
 upon reconsideration each house shall again pass the bill, it 
 shall become a law notwithstanding the objections of the 
 governor, and that the bill must be returned within thre^ 
 days. 
 
35 
 
 Delaware. 
 Neither the original constitution of 1792, nor the present 
 constitution of 1831, provides for any revision or negative 
 upon the acts of the legislature. 
 
 Florida. 
 
 Section 16, article III., of the original constitution of 
 1838 gave the power of revision and qualified negative to 
 the governor in the same manner that it is given to the 
 President of the United States, except that, upon the return 
 of a bill with objections, it might be passed by a vote of a 
 majority of the wliole number of members elected to each 
 house, and that it must be returned within five days. 
 
 The constitution of 1865 retained this provision, with a 
 change requiring two thirds of the whole number of each 
 house voting to pass the bill notwithstanding the governor's 
 objections. 
 
 Section 27, article V., of the constitution of 1868 re- 
 tains the provision of the constitution of 1865, with the 
 additional provision that if the legislature, by its adjourn- 
 ment, prevent the return of the bill within five days, it shall 
 be a law, " unless the governor, within ten days next after 
 the adjournment, shall file such bill with his objections 
 thereto in the office of the secretary of state, who shall lay 
 the same before the legislature at its next session, and if the 
 same shall receive two thirds of the votes present it shall 
 become a law." 
 
 Georgia. 
 
 The original constitution of 1777 did not provide for any 
 revision or negative of legislative acts. Section 10, article 
 III., of the constitution of 1789 provided that "The gov- 
 ernor shall have the revision of all bills passed by both 
 
36 
 
 houses before the same shall become laws, but two thirds of 
 both houses may pass a law notwithstandinoj his dissent : and 
 if any bill should not be returned l)y the governor within 
 five days after it hath been presented to him, the same shall 
 be a law unless the general asseuil)ly, by their adjournment, 
 shall prevent its return." This provision was retained as 
 clause 6, section 2, article III., of the constitution of 1865, 
 with the change that Sundays should not be counted in the 
 five days, and with the addition that the governor may ap- 
 prove any appropriation and disapprove any other appropri- 
 ation in the same bill, and the latter shall not be eflfectual 
 unless passed by two thirds of each house, and is now clause 
 6, section 2, article IV., of the constitution of 1868. 
 
 Illinois. 
 
 The original constitution of 1818 provided by section 19, 
 article III., that "the governor and the judges of the Supreme 
 Court, or a majority part of them," should be a council to 
 revise all bills about to be passed into laws b}- the general 
 assembly which should be presented to them, and that all 
 bills which passed the senate and house should, before they 
 became hiws, be presented to the council for their revisal 
 and consideration ; and if upon such revisal and considera- 
 tion it should appear improper to the council, or a majority 
 of them, that any bill should become a law, they should re- 
 turn it, together with their objections thereto in writing, to 
 the house in which it originated, who should enter the objec- 
 tions on their minutes and proceed to reconsider the bill ; 
 and if, upon such consideration, it should agree to pass the 
 bill by a majority of the whole number of members elected, 
 it should send the same, together with the objections, to the 
 other branch of the general assembly, who should also re- 
 
37 
 
 consider it, and if approved by a majority of all its members 
 elected, it should become a law. This section also provided 
 that if any bill should not be returned by the council within 
 ten days after it was presented to them, it should be a law 
 unless the general assembly, by their adjournment, pre- 
 vented its return, in which case it should be returned by the 
 council on the first day of the meeting of the general assem- 
 bly after the expiration of the ten days, or be a law.* 
 
 The constitution of 1848 provided for the revision of leg- 
 islative acts by the governor in the same manner in which 
 revision of acts of congress is provided for by the United 
 States Constitution, except that bills returned by the gov- 
 ernor with objections could be passed by a majority of the 
 members of each house elected, and that if the general assem- 
 bly, by adjournment, prevented the return of a bill within 
 ten days, it should be a law unless returned on the first day 
 of the meeting of the general assembly after the expiration 
 of said ten days. > 
 
 Section 21, article IV., 111. Const. 1848. 
 
 The present constitution retains this provision of the con- 
 stitution of 1848, except that it requires two thirds of the 
 members of each house elected to pass a bill notwithstanding 
 the objections of the governor, and provides that in case the 
 general assembly, by adjournment, prevent the return of 
 the bill within ten days, it shall become a law unless filed 
 by the governor with his objections in the office of the sec- 
 retary of state within ten days after such adjournment. 
 
 Section 16, article IV., 111. Const. 1870. 
 
 * This provision, except as to tlie vote required to pass a bill returned, is a substan- 
 tial copy of the provision of the New York constitution of 1777 establishing a council 
 of revision. 
 
38 
 
 Indiana. 
 
 The original constitution of 1816 copied the provision of 
 the Constitution of the United States, except that it provided 
 that a bill returned by the governor with objections might 
 be passed by a majority of all the members elected to each 
 house, and that it should be returned within five days or 
 should become a law, unless the general assembly, by its 
 adjournment, prevented its return, in which case it should 
 be a law, unless returned within three days after their next 
 meeting. This provision is retained in the constitution of 
 1851, with the addition that if the return of a bill is pre- 
 vented by the adjournment of the assembly within the five 
 days, it shall be a law unless the governor, within five days 
 next after such adjournment, shall file it with his objections 
 thereto in the oiEce of the secretary of state, who shall lay 
 the same before the general assembly at its next session in 
 like manner as if it had been returned by the governor, but 
 that no bills shall be presented to the governor within two 
 days next previous to the final adjournment of the general 
 assembly. 
 
 Section 14, article V., Ind. Const. 1851. 
 
 Iowa. 
 
 The original constitution of 1846 gave the power of re- 
 vision to the governor in the same manner in which it is 
 given to the president, but provided that the bill should 
 become a law unless returned within three days after it was 
 presented to the governor, unless such return was prevented 
 by the adjournment of the general assembly, and provided 
 that any bill submitted to the governor for his approval dur- 
 ing the last three days of a session of the assembly should 
 be deposited by him in the office of the secretary of state 
 
39 
 
 within thirty days after the adjournment with his approval 
 or with his objections thereto.* 
 
 Section 16, article HI., Iowa Const. 1846. 
 
 The constitution of 1857 retains these provisions as sec- 
 tions 16 and 17, article III. 
 
 Kansas. 
 The original constitution of 1855 gave the power of re- 
 vision to the governor in the same manner as it is given to 
 the President of the United States, except that any bill not 
 returned by the governor within five days became a law, 
 unless the general assembly, by adjournment, prevented its 
 return, in which case it also became a law unless sent back 
 within two days after the next meeting. 
 
 Section 19, article V. 
 
 The constitution of 1857 retained this provision, except 
 that it provided that a bill not returned by the governor 
 within six days should be a law, unless the legislature, by 
 their adjournment, prevented its return, in which case it 
 should not be a law.j 
 
 The constitution of 1858 adopted the same provision, ex- 
 cept that it provided that a bill returned by the governor 
 might be passed notwithstanding his objections, by a major- 
 ity of each house, and that a bill not returned within three 
 days should be a law unless the general assembly, by ad- 
 journment, prevented its return. 
 
 * Section 17 of this article provided that no bill should be passed unless by the assent 
 of a majoriiy of all members elected to each branch or the general assembly, and that 
 the question upon the passage of all bills should be taken immediately upon its last 
 reading, and by yeas and nays entered on the journal. 
 
 t This was the constitution which was known as the Lecompton pro-slavery consti- 
 tution. 
 
40 
 
 The present constitution of 1859 adopts the provision of 
 
 the United States Constitution, except that it requires a 
 
 vote of two thirds of all the members elected to each house to 
 
 pass a bill returned by the governor notwithstanding his 
 
 objections, and provides that if a bill is not returned within 
 
 three days, it shall become a law unless the legislature by 
 
 its adjournment prevents its return ; in which case it shall 
 
 not. 
 
 Section 14, article II. 
 
 Keutucki/. 
 
 The original constitution of 1792 adopted the provision of 
 the United States Constitution, except that it provided that 
 if the general assembly by their adjournment prevented the 
 return of a bill within the ten days, it should be a law unless 
 sent back within three days after their next meeting. 
 
 The constitution of 1799 retained this provision, except 
 that it provided that a bill returned by the governor might 
 be passed by a majority of all members elected to each house; 
 and the constitution of 1850 retains this provision of the 
 constitution of 1799 as section 22, article III. 
 
 LoiiiKlanu . 
 
 The original constitution of 1812 adopted the provision of 
 the Constitution of the United States, except that it required 
 a vote of two thirds of all the members elected to each house 
 to pass a bill returned by the governor, and provided that 
 if the general assembly by their iidjournment prevented the 
 return of the bill within ten days, it should not be a law if 
 returned, with objections, within three days after their next 
 meeting. 
 
 The constitution of 1845 and the constitution of 1852 
 retained this provision of the constitution of 1812, and thg 
 
41 
 
 constitution of 1864 also retained this provision, with the 
 exception of that part which provided that in case the gen- 
 eral assembly by its adjournment prevented the return of a 
 bill within ten days, it should be a law unless sent back 
 within three days after the next meeting of the assembly, 
 which was not retained. 
 
 The constitution of 1868 retains this provision, except 
 that a bill may be passed by a two-thirds vote of all the 
 members present in each house, and that a bill not returned 
 within five days shall be a law unless the general assembly 
 by adjournment prevent its return ; in which case it shall be 
 a law, unless returned on the first day of the meeting of the 
 general assembly after the expiration of five days. 
 
 Article LXVI. 
 
 Maine. 
 
 The constitution of 1820 adopts substantially the pro- 
 vision of the United States Constitution, except that it 
 specifically provides that a bill reconsidered and passed by a 
 two-thirds vote of each house " shall have the same efi'ect as 
 if it had been signed by the governor," and that any bill or 
 resolution not returned within five days shall "have the 
 same force and effect as if he [the governor] had signed it," 
 unless the return is prevented by the adjournment of the 
 legislature ; " in which case it shall have such force and 
 efi'ect unless returned within three days after their next 
 
 meeting." 
 
 Section 2, article IV., part HI. 
 
 Maryland. 
 The original constitution of 1776 vested the legislative 
 power in a senate and house of delegates, and contained no 
 provision for the revision or negative of their acts. 
 
42 
 
 No such provision was contained in the constitution of 
 1851 or the constitution of 1864, but tiie constitution of 
 1867 provides that "to guard against hasty or partial legis- 
 lation, and encroachment of the legislative department upon 
 the co-ordinate executive and judicial departments," every 
 hill before it becomes a law shall be presented to the gov- 
 ernor, who shall sign it if he approves it, and if not shall 
 return it to the house in which it originated, and then, if 
 three fflhs of the members elected to each house '" shall pass 
 the bill," it shall become a law, but that if the bill be not 
 returned within six days it shall be a law "in like manner as 
 if he signed it," unless the general assembly by its adjourn- 
 ment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law. 
 
 Section 17, article III. 
 
 Massachusetts. 
 
 The original constitution of 1780 contained the following 
 provision as article 2, chapter 1 : — 
 
 " No bill or resolve of the senate or house of representatives 
 shall become a law, and have force as such, until it shall have 
 been laid before the governor for his revisal ; and if he, upon 
 such revision, approve thereof, he shall signify his approba- 
 tion by signing the same. But if he have any objection to 
 the passing of such bill or resolve, he shall return the same, 
 together with his objections thereto, in writing, to the senate 
 or house of representatives, in whichsoever the same shall have 
 originated ; who shall enter the objections sent down by the gov- 
 ernor, at large, on their records, and proceed to reconsider the said 
 bill or resolve. But if, after such reconsideration, two thirds of 
 the said senate or house of representatives shall, notwithstanding 
 the said objections, agree to pass the same, it shall, together with 
 the objections, be sent to the other branch of the legislature, 
 where it shah also be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds 
 of the members present, shall have the force of a law : but in all 
 
43 
 
 such cases, the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas 
 and nays ; and the names of the persons voting for, or against, the 
 said bill or resolve shall be entered upon the public records of the 
 commonwealth. 
 
 " And in order to prevent unnecessary delays, if any bill or 
 resolve shall not be returned by the governor within live days 
 after it shall have been presented, the same shall have the force of 
 a law." 
 
 In 1821, the following amendment was adopted : "If any 
 bill or resolve shall be objected to and not approved by the 
 governor, and if the general court shall adjourn within five 
 days after the same shall have been laid before the governor 
 for his approbation, and thereby prevent his returning it 
 with his objections, as provided by the constitution, such 
 bill or resolve shall not become a law, nor have force as 
 such." 
 
 Michigan. 
 
 The original constitution of 1835 adopted the provision of 
 the United States Constitution, except that it specifically 
 provided that a bill returned with objections might be 
 passed by each house by a two-thirds vote of all the mem- 
 bers present. The constitution of 1850 retains this pro- 
 vision, except that it requires two thirds of the members of 
 each house elected to pass a bill returned with objections, and 
 provides that if the legislature by their adjournment pre- 
 vent the return of a bill within ten days, the governor may 
 approve, sign, and file in the office of the secretary of state 
 within five days after the adjournment of the legislature, any 
 act passed during the last five days of the session, and the 
 same shall become a law. 
 
 Section 14, article IV. 
 
44 
 
 Minnesota. 
 
 The present constitntiou of 1857 adopts substantially the 
 provision of the United States Constitution, but it speciti- 
 cally provides that if the governor approves a bill, "he shall 
 sign and deposit it in the office of the secreteiy of state for 
 preservation, and notify the house where it originated of the 
 fact," and for the return of bills in three days instead of ten ; 
 and also provides that the governor may approve, and sign, 
 and file in the office of the secretary of state, within three 
 days after the adjournment of the legislature, any act passed 
 during the three last days of the session. 
 
 Section 11, article IV. 
 
 Mississippi. 
 
 The original constitution of 1817 adopted the provision of 
 the United States Constitution, except that it provided for 
 the return of bills within six days instead of ten. The con- 
 stitution of 1832 retained this provision, and the present 
 constitution of 1868 retains it, except that it provides for 
 the return of bills within five days instead of ten, and that 
 in case the legislature by adjournment prevent the return of 
 a bill, it shall be a law unless sent hack within three days 
 after its next meeting. 
 
 Section 24, article IV. 
 
 Missouri. 
 The original constitution of 1820 adopted the provision of 
 the United States Constitution, except that it provided that 
 a bill returned by the governor might be passed by a 
 majority of all the members elected to each house. The con- 
 stitution of 1865 retained this provision of the constitution 
 
45 
 
 of 1820, with the addition that if the legislature prevented 
 the return of a bill by adjournment within ten days after it 
 was presented to the governor, he might sign and deposit 
 the same in the office of the secretary of state within the 
 ten days, and it should become a law in like manner as if it 
 had been signed by him during the session of the general 
 assembly. The constitution of 1875 provides for the pre- 
 sentation of bills to the governor on the same day on which 
 they are signed by the presiding officers of the two houses, 
 and that they shall become laws if returned to the house in 
 which they originated, with the approval of the governor, 
 within ten days thereafter ; also that " every bill returned 
 without the approval of the governor and with his objec- 
 tions thereto shall stand as reconsidered in the house to 
 which it is returned. The house shall cause the objections 
 of the governor to be entered at large upon the journal, and 
 proceed at its convenience to consider the question pending, 
 which shall be in this form : ' Shall the bill pass, the objec- 
 tions of the governor thereto notwithstanding ? ' " It also 
 provides that if, upon the vote upon this question, "two 
 thirds of all the members elected to each house shall vote in 
 the affirmative, that fact shall be certified by the presiding 
 officers upon the bill, and it shall thereupon be deposited in 
 the office of the secretary of state, and become a law in 
 the same manner as if it had received the approval of the 
 governor. 
 
 It also provides that if the governor shall fail to perform 
 his duty of approving or disapproving any bill presented to 
 him, the general assembly may by joint resolution recite 
 the fact of such failure and the bill at length, and direct the 
 secretary of state to enroll the same as an authentic act in 
 the archives of the state, and such enrollment shall have the 
 same effect as an approval by the governor, and that such 
 
46 
 
 joint resolution shall not be presented to the governor for 
 
 his approval. 
 
 Sects. 37, 38, 39, 40, art. IV. 
 
 It further provides that the governor shall consider all 
 bills and joint resolutions thus presented to him, and return 
 them within ten days, "with his approval endorsed thereon, 
 or accompanied by his objections ; " but if the general assem- 
 bly finally adjourn Avithin the ten days, he may "within 
 thirty days thereafter return such bills and resolutions to 
 the office of the secretary of state with his approval or 
 reasons for disapproval ; and that the governor may disap- 
 prove any item of an appropriation bill while approving 
 other items of the same bill, by I'eturning a statement of the 
 items disapproved to the legislature in the same manner as 
 a bill disapproved, in which case the same proceedings shall 
 be had as in case of the return of a bill ; and that if the 
 legislature be not in session, he may transmit the items thus 
 approved and those disapproved, with his reasons for disap- 
 proval, within thirty days, to the office of the secretary of 
 state. 
 
 Sects. 12, 13, art. V. 
 
 NebrasTca. 
 
 The constitution of 1874 substantially adopts the provision 
 of the United States Constitution, except that it requires a 
 vote of three fifths of the members of each house elected to 
 pass a bill notwithstanding the governor's objections, and 
 that any bill not returned by the governor within five days 
 shall become a law unless the legislature by adjournment 
 prevent its return, in which case it shall become a law unless 
 he files it with his objections in the office of the secretary of 
 state within five days after such adjournment, and also that 
 
47 
 
 the governor may disapprove any item or items of appropria- 
 tion bills, which shall be stricken therefrom unless repassed 
 in the manner prescribed in cases of disapproval of bills. 
 
 Section 15, article V. 
 
 Nevada. 
 
 The constitution of 1864 substantially adopts the provision 
 of tlie United States Constitution, except that it requires a 
 vote of two thirds of the members elected to each house to 
 pass the bill notwithstanding the governor's objections, and 
 also provides that "bills shall be returned within five days, 
 unless the legislature by its final adjournment prevent such 
 return," in which case they shall become laws, unless the 
 governor within ten days next after the adjournment (Sun- 
 day excepted) shall file them with his objections thereto in 
 the oflEioe of the secretary of state, who shall lay the same 
 before the legislature at its next session in like manner as 
 though they had been returned by the governor ; and if the 
 same shall receive the vote of two thirds of the members 
 elected to each branch of the legislature, they become laws. 
 
 Section 35, article IV. 
 
 New Hampshire. 
 Neither the original constitution of 1776 nor the constitu- 
 tion of 1784 contained any provision for the revision and 
 negative of legislative acts. The constitution of 1792 sub- 
 stantially adopts the provision of the Constitution of the 
 
 United States. 
 
 Section 44, part 2. 
 
 New Jersey. 
 The constitution of 1776 contained no provision for revi- 
 sion or negative of legislative acts. 
 
48 
 
 The constitution of 1844 substantially adopted the pro- 
 vision of the Constitution of the United States, except that 
 it provides that bills returned with objections by the governor 
 may be passed by a vote of the majority of the whole number 
 of each house, but that "in neither house shall the vote be 
 taken on the same day on which the bill shall be returned to 
 it," and that bills shall be returned within five days instead 
 
 of ten. 
 
 Clause 7, article V. 
 
 By amendment adopted in 1875, the governor may "ob- 
 ject to one or more items of an appropriation bill while 
 approving the other portions of the bill," by appending to 
 the bill at the time of signing it a statement of the items to 
 which he objects, and, if the legislature be in session, trans- 
 mitting to the house in which the bill originated a copy of 
 such statement, whereupon the items objected to shall be 
 separately reconsidered, and such of them as may be ap- 
 proved by a majority of the members elected to each house 
 shall be a part of the law notwithstanding the objections." 
 
 Neio York. 
 
 The original constitution of 1777 contained the following 
 provision for revision and qualified negative of legislative 
 acts : — 
 
 " III. And whereas laws inconsistent with the spirit of this con- 
 stitution or with the public good may be hastily or unadvisedly 
 passed : Be it ordained that the governor, for the time being the 
 chancellor, and the judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of 
 them, together with the governor, shall be and hereby are consti- 
 tuted a council to revise all bills about to be passed into laws by 
 the legislature, and for that purpose shall assemble themselves from 
 time to time when the legislature shall be convened, for which, nev- 
 ertheless, they shall not receive any salary or consideration under 
 
49 
 
 any pretence whatever. And that all bills which have passed the 
 senate or assembly shall before they become laws be presented to 
 the said council for their revisal and consideration ; and if upon 
 such revision and consideration it should appear improper to the 
 said council, or a majority of them, that the said bill should become 
 a law of this state, that they return the same, together with their 
 objections thereto, in writing, to the senate or house of assembly 
 (in whichsoever the same shall have originated) , who shall enter 
 the objections sent down by the council at large in their minutes, 
 and proceed to reconsider the said bill. But if after such consid- 
 eration two thirds of the said senate or house of assembly shall, 
 notwithstanding the said objections, agree to pass the same, it 
 shall, together with the objections, be sent to the other branch of 
 the legislature, where it shall also be reconsidered, and if approved 
 by two thirds of the members present, shall be law. 
 
 " And in order to prevent any unnecessary delays, be it further 
 ordained that if any bill shall not be returned by the council 
 within ten days after it shall have been presented, the same shall 
 be a law, unless the legislature shall by their adjournment render 
 a return of the said bill within ten days impracticable, in which 
 case the bill shall be returned on the first day of the meeting of 
 the legislature after the expiration of the ten days." 
 
 Article III. Const. 1777. 
 
 In the constitution of 1821, the provision of the United 
 States Constitution ivas substituted for the foregoing pro- 
 vision, with the specific statement that two thirds "of the 
 members present might pass the bill notwithstanding the 
 governor's objections." 
 
 Section 12, Article I., Const. 1821. 
 
 The constitution of 1846 retained this provision of the 
 constitution of 1821 as section 9, article IV. In 1874, this 
 provision was amended so as to require a vote of two thirds 
 of the members elected to each house to pass a bill notwith- 
 standing the objections of the governor, and that if the leg- 
 
50 
 
 islature prevent the return of a bill by adjournment within 
 the ten days, the governor may approve it within thirty 
 daj's after the adjournment ; and also bj' a provision that 
 the governor may object to one or more of the items of an 
 appropriation bill while approving of the other portion of 
 the bill, hj appending to the bill, at the time of signing it, a 
 statement of the items to which he objects, and, if the legis- 
 lature be in session, transmitting to the house in which such 
 bill originates, a copy of such statement, and that thereupon 
 the items objected to shall be scparatelj' reconsidered, as in 
 case of a bill returned with objections. 
 
 humCarolina . 
 
 Neither the original constitution of 1776, nor the consti- 
 tution of 1868, nor the present constitution of 1876, contains 
 any provision for revision or negative of legislative acts. 
 
 Ohio. 
 
 Neither the original constitution of 1802 nor the present 
 constitution of 1851 contains any provision for the revision 
 or negative of legislative acts. 
 
 Oregon. 
 The constitution of 1857 adopts substantially the provision 
 of the Constitution of the United States, except that it spe- 
 cifically provides that two thirds '' of the members present " 
 may pass a bill, notwithstanding the governor's objections, 
 and that the bill shall be returned within five days instead 
 of ten, and if its return is prevented by the general adjourn- 
 ment of the legislature it shall be a law, "unless the gov- 
 ernor, within five days next after the adjournment, files it 
 with his objections thereto in the office of the secretary of 
 state, who shall lay it before the legislative assembly at its 
 
51 
 
 next session in lilie manner as if it had been returned by tiie 
 
 governor." 
 
 Section 15, article IV. 
 
 Pennsylvania. 
 
 The original constitution of 1776 contained no provision 
 
 for the revision or negative of legislative acts, but provided 
 
 th.at, "to prevent the inconvenience of hasty determinations 
 
 as much as possible," all bills of a public nature should be 
 
 "printed for the consideration of the people before they 
 
 were read in general assembly the last time for debate and 
 
 amendment, and, except on occasions of sudden necessity, 
 
 should not be passed ' into laws until the next session of 
 
 assembly." 
 
 Section 15, Const. 1776. 
 
 The constitution of 1790 adopted the provision of the 
 Constitution of the United States, with the exception that it 
 provided that if the return of a bill by the governor within 
 the ten days was prevented by the adjournment of the assem- 
 bly, it should be a law " unless sent back within three days 
 after their next meeting," and the constitution of 1838 
 retained this provision. 
 
 The constitution of 1873 retains this provision, with a 
 change providing that if the return of a bill is prevented by 
 the adjournment of the assembly within the ten days, it 
 shall be a law unless the governor "shall file the same, with 
 his objections, in the office of the secretary of the common- 
 wealth, and give notice thereof by public proclamation 
 within thirty days after such adjournment," and with the 
 addition of a provision that the governor shall have power 
 to "disapprove of any item or items of any bill making 
 appropriations of money embracing distinct items, and the 
 
52 
 
 part or parts of the bill approved shall he the law, and the 
 item or items of appropriation disapproved shall be void 
 unless repassed according to the rules and limitations pre- 
 scribed for the passage of other bills over the executive 
 
 veto." 
 
 Sections 15 and 16, article IV. 
 
 Rhode Island. 
 
 This state adopted no constitution till 1842, and the con- 
 stitution then adopted contains no provision for the revision 
 or negative of legislative acts. 
 
 South Carolina. 
 
 The original constitution of 1776 provided that the "legis- 
 lative authority be vested in the president and commander- 
 in-chief, the general assembly, and legislative council," and 
 that " bills having passed the general assembly and legisla- 
 tive council may be assented to or rejected by the president 
 and commander-in-chief." 
 
 Article 7, Const. 1776. 
 
 Neither the constitution of 1778, or of 1790, or of 1865, 
 contained any provision for revision or negative of legisla- 
 tive acts. The constitution of 1868 adopts the provision of 
 the United States Constitution, except that it requires bills 
 to be returned within three days, and provides that in case 
 the general assembly by their adjournment prevent such 
 return, they "shall not have force or effect as laws unless 
 returned within two days after the next meeting of the 
 assembly." 
 
 Section 22, article III, 
 
53 
 
 Tennessee. 
 Neither the original constitution of 1796 nor the constitu- 
 tion of 1834 contained any provision for revision or negative 
 of legislative acts. The constitution of 1870 adopts the 
 provision of the Constitution of the United States, except 
 that it provides that bills returned by the governor may be 
 passed by a majority vote of the members elected to each 
 house, and that bills and resolutions shall be returned within 
 five days instead of ten. 
 
 Section 18, article III. 
 
 Texas. 
 
 The " Constitution of the Republic of Texas " provided that 
 every act of the congress of the republic should be approved 
 and signed by the president before it became a law, but that 
 if the president wotild not approve and sign such act he 
 should return it to the house in which it originated, "with his 
 reasons for not approving the same," which reasons should 
 be spread upon the journals of such house and the bill then 
 be reconsidered, and should not become a law unless it 
 should then pass by a yea and nay vote of two thirds of both 
 houses ; also, that if the president failed to return a bill 
 within five days the same should become a law unless the 
 congress prevented its return by adjournment. 
 
 Section 26, article I, Const. Republic of Texas, 
 1836. 
 
 The oritrinal constitution of Texas as a state of the United 
 States in 1845 adopted the provision of the United States 
 Coastitution, except that it specifically provided that a bill 
 returned by the governor might be passed by a vote of two 
 thirds of the members present, that bills should be returned 
 
54 
 
 within five days instead of ten, and if not thus returned 
 should be laws in like manner as if signed by the governor, 
 and also that every bill presented to the governor one day 
 previous to the adjournment of the legislature and not re- 
 turned before its adjournment, should become a law without 
 his signature. (Section 17.) 
 
 The constitution of 1866 retained this provision, with the 
 addition that the governor might " approve any appropriation 
 and disapprove any other appropriation in the same bill, by 
 designating in signing the bill the appropriations disapproved, 
 and returning a copy of such appropriations with his objec- 
 tions, in which case the same proceedings should be had as 
 to the appropriations thus returned as in the case of bills 
 disapproved, and that if the legislature adjourned before a 
 bill was returned, the governor might return it to the secretary 
 of state with his objections," and also to the next session of 
 the legislature. (Section 17.) 
 
 The constitution of 1868 retains this provision of the con- 
 stitution of 1845 as changed by that of 1866, with the further 
 change that if the legislature have adjourned before a bill is 
 returned, the governor "may return it with his objections to 
 the secretary of state, to be submitted to both houses at the 
 succeeding session of the legislature." (Section 25.) 
 
 Vei'mont. 
 
 The original constitution adopted by the people of Vermont 
 in 1777 vested "the supreme legislative power in a house of 
 representatives of the Freemen or Commonwealth or State of 
 Vermont," and the supreme executive power in a governor and 
 council. It contained no definite provision for the negative 
 of legislative acts, but provided that all bills of public nature 
 before they were enacted should be laid before the governor 
 and council "for their perusal and proposals of amendment," 
 
55 
 
 and be printed for the consideration of the people before 
 they were read in general assembly for the last time of 
 debate and amendment, and that except temporary acts, 
 which after being laid before the governor and council might 
 (in case of sudden necessity) be passed into laws, no acts 
 should be passed until the next session of assembly. (Sec- 
 tion 14.) 
 
 The original constitution of Vermont as a state adopted 
 •in 1786 contained this provision: "To the end that laws 
 before they are enacted may be more maturely considered 
 and the inconvenience of hasty determinations as much as 
 possible prevented, all bills which originate in the assembly 
 shall be laid before the governor and council for their revi- 
 sion and concurrence or proposals of amendment, who shall 
 return the same to the assembly with their proposals ol 
 amendment (if any) in writing, and if the same are not 
 agreed to by the assembly it shall be in the power of the 
 governor and council to suspend the passing of such bills 
 until the next session of the legislature. Provided, that if 
 the governor and council shall neglect or refuse to return 
 any such bill to the assembly with written proposals of 
 amendment within five days or before the rising of the legis- 
 lature, the same shall become a law. (Section 16.) 
 
 The constitution of 1793 retained this provision of the 
 constitution of 1786, but in 1836 an amendment was adopted 
 which substituted for it the provision of the United States 
 Constitution, except that it provides that bills may be passed, 
 notwithstanding the objections of the governor, by a major- 
 ity of each house, and that if a bill should not be returned 
 within five days after it is presented to the governor, it shall 
 become a law unless the two houses by their adjournment 
 within three days after the presentment of the bill prevent 
 its return, in which case it shall not become a]law. 
 Section 16, art. XI. Amdts. 1837. 
 
56 
 
 Virginia. 
 
 Neither the original constitution of 1776 nor the constitu- 
 tion of 1830, 1850, or 1864 contained any provision for the 
 revision or negative of legislative acts. The constitution of 
 1870, however, adopts the provision of the United States 
 Constitution, except that it requires bills to be returned 
 within five days instead of ten. 
 
 Section 8, art. IV. 
 
 West Virginia. 
 
 The original constitution of 1863, which appears to have 
 been modelled upon that of Virginia, contained no provision 
 for revision or negative of legislative acts. The constitution 
 of 1872 adopts the pi'ovision of the United States Constitu- 
 tion, except that it provides that a bill returned with objec- 
 tions by the governor may be passed by a vote of a majority 
 of the members elected to each house, that the bills shall be 
 returned within five days, and that if the legislature by their 
 adjournment prevent their return, they shall be filed by the 
 governor, with his objections, in the office of the secretary 
 of state, within five days after such adjournment, or become 
 laws ; and also that the governor may disapprove any item 
 or appropriation in an appropriation bill containing distinct 
 items in the same manner that he may disapprove a bill, and 
 that the items not thus disapproved shall have the force and 
 effect of law according to the original provisions of the bill. 
 
 Sections 14 and 15, art. VII. 
 
 Wisconsin. 
 
 The constitution of 1848 adopts the provision of the 
 United States Constitution, except that it provides that bills 
 shall be returned within three days. 
 
 Section 10, art. V. 
 
57 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 Under the Constitutions of California, Florida, Georgia, 
 Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mis- 
 sissippi, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, 
 Virginia, and Wisconsin, a vote of two thirds of each house 
 is required to pass a bill returned by the governor with ob- 
 jections. 
 
 In Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, 
 Pennsylvania, and New York, a vote of two thirds of the 
 members of each house elected is required to pass it. 
 
 In Nebraska and Maryland, a vote of three fifths of the 
 members of each house elected is required to pass it. 
 
 In Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, New Jersey, 
 Tennessee, and West Virginia, a vote of the majority of the 
 members of each house elected is required to pass it not- 
 withstanding such objections. 
 
 In Connecticut and Vermont, a majority of each house is 
 I'equired. 
 
 In Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, South 
 Carolina, and Wisconsin, the bill must be returned within 
 three days. 
 
 In Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, 
 Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebi'aska, New Hampshire, New 
 Jersey, Nevada, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and 
 West Virginia, within five days. 
 
 In Maryland, within six days. 
 
 In Illinois, Kentucky, New York, Michigan, Missouri, 
 Pennsylvania, and Texas, within ten days, unless the legis- 
 lature, by adjournment, prevent its return. 
 
 In case the legislature adjourns within the time thus given, 
 that time is extended in Indiana, Nebraska, Oregon, and 
 West Virginia, by a provision that the governor may file the 
 
58 
 
 bill, with his olijcctions, with the secretary of state, within 
 five daj's after the adjournment. In Arkansas and Texas 
 the bill and objections may be thus filed and notice given, by 
 public proclamation, within twenty days after adjournment. 
 In Colorado, Iowa, and ^Missouri, and Pennsylvania, the bill 
 of objections may be thus filed within thirty daj'^s after ad- 
 journment. In Florida, Illinois, and Ne^■ada, the bill and 
 objection may he filed with the secretary of state within ten 
 days after adjournment. In Kentucky, IMaine, and Missis- 
 sippi, the bill may be returned to the house in which it 
 originated within three days, and in South Carolina within 
 two days after the next meeting of the legislature. 
 
 In New York a bill may be approved by the governor 
 within thirty days after the final adjournment of the assem- 
 bly, and no l)ill can become a law after such adjournment 
 without the approval of the governor.