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 American diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, 
 
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American Diplomacy 
 
 under 
 
 Tyler and Polk 
 
THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES 
 ON DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 
 
 By the liberality of Albert Shaw, Ph. D., of New 
 York City, the Johns Hopkins University has been 
 enabled to provide an annual course of lectures on 
 Diplomatic History. The courses are included in the 
 regular work of the Department of History and are 
 published under the direction of Professor John M. 
 Vincent. 
 
THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON 
 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, 1906 
 
 American Diplomacy 
 
 under 
 
 Tyler and Polk 
 
 By JESSE S. REEVES, Ph. D. 
 
 Assistant Professor of Political Science in Dartmouth College 
 
 baltimore 
 
 The Johns Hopkins Press 
 
 1907 
 
Copyright, 1907 
 THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS 
 
 PRESS OF 
 
 KOHN & POLLOCK. Inc. 
 
 BALTIMORE 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Introduction 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 The Northeastern Boundary Controversy i 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 The Ashburton Treaty 28 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 The Relations between Mexico and the United 
 
 States concerning Texas, 182 5- 1840 58' 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 The Relations between the United States and 
 Mexico during the Secretaryship of Daniel 
 Webster, 1 841 -1843 89 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 The Negotiations for Texas under Upshur 114 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 Calhoun and the attempted Annexation of Texas 
 
 by Treaty 1 38 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 The Annexation of Texas by Joint Resolution 162 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 The Northwestern Boundary Controversy . 190 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 The Joint Occupation of Oregon 224 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 The Oregon Treaty . 243 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 Polk's attempted Negotiation for California 265 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 The Outbreak of the Mexican War 288 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 1 848 309 
 
 Index . 331 
 
TO MY BROTHER, 
 WIIvLIAM PETERS REEVES, Ph. D. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The selection of the administrations of Tyler and 
 Polk for treatment in a course of lectures upon 
 American diplomatic history may seem somewhat arbi- 
 trary. Upon closer view, however, one sees that there 
 is so much of continuity in the foreign relations of 
 the United States during the terms of these two Presi- 
 dents, both of whom have been called "accidental," 
 that the years 1841 to 1849 may fairly be said to con- 
 stitute an epoch quite distinct from the Jacksonian era, 
 which preceded them, and the ante-bellum period 
 proper, which followed. Yet it would be misleading 
 to state that this epoch presented for solution prob- 
 lems altogether novel. The problems for the most 
 part were as old as the nation. It was the method 
 of their solution which was new. The questions which 
 dominated the foreign policy of Tyler's and Polk's 
 time were mainly those of boundary, dating from the 
 first treaty of peace with England. The administra- 
 tions of these two Presidents accomplished the settle- 
 ment of three boundary questions : the northeastern 
 and northwestern through negotiation, the southwest- 
 ern by conquest. 
 
 These chapters in the history of American diplo- 
 macy deal principally with the questions of boundary. 
 To have considered all of the diplomatic events dur- 
 ing the years 1841 to 1849 would have exceeded the 
 limits of the present volume. The relations with 
 China, Hawaii, New Granada, and Yucatan, to name 
 
only a few matters of importance, have been omitted 
 in order to give space for sketches of the develop- 
 ment of the three boundary problems. These prelim- 
 inary outlines were necessary for the purpose of show- 
 ing the diplomatic issues as they existed in 1841. 
 
 With the exceptions of Chapters XII and XIII the 
 text is printed substantially as delivered in the form 
 of lectures at the Johns Hopkins University. Chapter 
 XIII appeared in the American Historical Review for 
 January, 1905 ; Chapter XII is largely taken up with 
 the report of Mackenzie upon his visit to Santa Anna, 
 which, I believe, has never before been printed. Per- 
 haps it should be stated that the book was written 
 wholly from materials accessible in the United States. 
 
 I take this opportunity of expressing my obligations 
 to the authorities of the Lenox Library, New York, 
 of the Chicago Historical Society, of the Library of 
 Congress, and of the Department of State for courte- 
 sies had at their hands. To Mr. Worthington C. Ford, 
 of the Library of Congress, and to Messrs. Andrew 
 H. Allen and Pendleton King, formerly chiefs respec- 
 tively of the Bureau of Rolls and Library and of the 
 Bureau of Indexes and Archives of the Department 
 of State, I desire to express my thanks for their un- 
 failing kindness and ready assistance. I am under 
 many obligations to Professor Vincent, of the Johns 
 Hopkins University, for valuable suggestions, and to 
 Miss Mabel M. Reese, of Baltimore, Maryland, for 
 her assistance in seeing the book through the press. 
 
 JESSE S. REEVES. 
 Richmond, Indiana, 
 August 12, 1907. 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 The Northeaste;rn Boundary Controversy 
 1783-1841 
 
 The treaty of peace with England was signed Sep- 
 tember 3, 1783. The second article of the treaty set 
 out the boundaries between the United States and the 
 British possessions on the north as follows : "From the 
 northwest angle of Nova Scotia, viz. that angle which 
 ip formed by a line drawn due north from the source 
 of the Saint Croix River to the Highlands ; along the 
 said Highlands which divide those rivers that empty 
 themselves into the river St. Lawrence, from those 
 which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the northwest- 
 ernmost head of Connecticut River ; thence down along 
 the middle of that river, to the forty-fifth degree of 
 north latitude; from thence, by a line due west on 
 said latitude, until it strikes the river Iroquois or 
 Cataraquy ; ' thence along the middle of said river into 
 Lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake until 
 it strikes the communication by water between that 
 lake and Lake Erie; thence along the middle of said 
 communication into Lake Erie, through the middle of 
 said lake until it arrives at the water communication 
 between that lake and Lake Huron; thence along the 
 middle of said water communication into the Lake 
 Huron ; thence through the middle of said lake to the 
 water communication between that lake and Lake 
 
 'j. e., the St. Lawrence. 
 
2 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 Superior ; thence through Lake Superior northward of 
 tlie Isles Royal and Phehppeaux, to the Long Lake ; 
 thence through the middle of said Long Lake, and 
 the water communication between it and the Lake of 
 the Woods, to the said Lake of the Woods ; thence 
 through the said lake to the most northwestern point 
 thereof, and from thence on a due west course to the 
 river Mississippi." On the east the boundary was to 
 be a line "drawn along the middle of the river St. 
 Croix, from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy to its 
 source, and from its source directly north to the afore- 
 said Highlands, which divide the rivers that fall into 
 the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall into the 
 river St. Lawrence." 
 
 These terms are identical with those earlier used 
 in the provisional articles of peace concluded Novem- 
 ber 30, 1782, and the discussion of the reasons for 
 their adoption belongs to an earlier period of history. 
 At this time it will be necessary to confine ourselves 
 to a consideration of the problems to which the treaty 
 of peace gave rise, and of the methods used in adjust- 
 ing the differences in regard to boundary, which, in 
 1842, were as old as the nation itself. 
 
 The question of the northeastern boundary may be 
 described as a purely geographical question. The suc- 
 cessive negotiations for the settlement of the boundary 
 for sixty years after the treaty was signed proceeded 
 upon the theory that the points described in the treaty 
 were capable of being definitely determined and lo- 
 cated. In other words, sixty years were spent in an 
 attempt to elucidate the terms of the treaty, a period 
 which has been properly characterized as one of "un- 
 certainty and danger." The line as set out in the 
 
treaty was "drawn in much ignorance of geography 
 and in trustful dependence in some parts on anterior 
 definitions of the bounds intended." ' The American 
 negotiators, Adams, FrankHn, and Jay, were deficient 
 in exact knowledge of the places mentioned in the 
 treaty, partly on account of inadequate information as 
 to what had been definitely ascertained, but more on 
 account of the inaccuracy of the maps that they used. 
 This inaccuracy of the maps almost immediately pre- 
 sented questions of dispute. The first was : "Which of 
 the several rivers running into the Bay of Fundy is the 
 St. Croix mentioned in the treaty?" Second: "Where 
 is the northwest angle of Nova Scotia to be found?" 
 Third: "What, and where, are the Highlands along 
 which the line was to run, from the northwest angle 
 of Nova Scotia to the northwesternmost head of the 
 Connecticut River?" Fourth: "Which is the north- 
 westernmost head of the Connecticut River?" and 
 finally: "Are the rivers emptying into the Bay of 
 Fundy those which 'fall into the Atlantic Ocean,' in 
 the words of the treaty?"' To state it otherwise, the 
 whole of the boundary, as agreed upon by the peace 
 commissioners, from the Atlantic Ocean to some point 
 in the forty-fifth parallel of latitude, west of the Con- 
 necticut River, was scarcely a boundary at all. It was 
 like a deed, which, although purporting to convey land 
 by metes and bounds, is based upon inaccurate sur- 
 veyor's notes. Until 1842 diplomatic activity was di- 
 rected in unsuccessful efforts to explain the boundary 
 
 ' Winsor, Narrative and Critical History of America, VII., 
 171. 
 'Webster's Defence of the Treaty of Washington, Works, 
 
 v., 82. 
 
4 DIPI^OMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 line to the satisfaction of both countries, to restate 
 the old Hne, rather than to redetermine it. 
 
 The question as to what river the treaty meant by 
 the St. Croix was ehminated from the controversy as 
 a result of Jay's treaty, which provided that the United 
 States and Great Britain should each appoint a com- 
 missioner and the two thus appointed select a third. 
 This board of commissioners was given power to take 
 evidence and make surveys, and its finding was to be 
 conclusive "so that the same should never be called in 
 question or made the subject of dispute or difference 
 between them." The commissioners met and reported. 
 A decision was made as to what was the true St. 
 Croix ; the source of this river was found and a monu- 
 ment placed there.* 
 
 Thus one portion of the dispute was removed, and an 
 attempt was made by Jefferson in 1802 to settle the 
 remaining questions through Rufus King, the Ameri- 
 can minister at London. King was instructed to press 
 for the extension of the line from the source of the St. 
 Croix. "In fixing the point at which the line is to 
 terminate, and which is referred to as the northwest 
 angle of Nova Scotia, the difficulty arises from a refer- 
 ence of the treaty of 1783 to the 'Highlands,' which 
 
 * Great Britain claimed that the Magaguadavic was the St. 
 Croix of the treaty; the United States insisted upon the 
 Schoodiac. The commission under Jay's treaty adopted the 
 American claim. Moore, International Arbitrations, I., Chap- 
 ter I, "The Saint Croix Commission;" American State Papers, 
 Foreign Relations, L, 486, 488, 492, 493, 520; Webster, Works, 
 v., 82. Explanatory article to Jay's treaty, releasing the com- 
 missioners under the fifth article from particularizing the 
 latitude and longitude of the river St. Croix; in Treaties and 
 Conventions between the United States and Other Powers 
 1889, 396. 
 
are now found to have no definite existence." " The 
 instructions suggested that commissioners, appointed 
 as in Jay's treaty, should determine upon a Hne to be 
 substituted for that following the crest of what the 
 former treaty called the Highlands, from the north- 
 west angle of Nova Scotia to the northwesternmost 
 source of the Connecticut River, that line to be drawn 
 with such references to intermediate sources of rivers 
 or other landmarks as to admit of easy and accurate 
 execution. In the negotiations which followed, King 
 and Lord Hawkesbury agreed upon the northeastern 
 boundary in terms substantially those of Madison's 
 instructions.' The treaty provided for the running, 
 instead of the mere description, of the line between the 
 northwest corner of Nova Scotia and the source of the 
 Connecticut River." Such an arrangement was emi- 
 nently desirable, and so, too, might have been a further 
 provision which King and Hawkesbury included in 
 reference to the northwestern boundary beyond the 
 Lake of the Woods.' Between the time the treaty was 
 agreed upon and its formal signing Livingston and 
 
 ° This is the first official intimation that the boundary as set 
 forth in the treaty of 1783 was incapable of being determined. 
 Madison thus "conceded a point which it was never possible 
 to regain." Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 68. Gallatin 
 long afterward expressed regret that the United States had 
 so blundered. Adams, Gallatin, II., 546. Quoted by Moore, 
 ut sup. 
 
 "Madison to King, June 8, 1802, American State Papers, 
 For. Rel., II., 585 ; J. C. B. Davis's notes in Treaties between 
 the United States and Other Powers, 1324,. and references 
 there given; Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 65-69; 
 American State Papers, II., 584-91. 
 
 'Article 5 of treaty. American State Papers, For. Rel, II., 
 584. 
 
6 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYtER AND POI.K 
 
 Monroe had secured the cession of Louisiana. The 
 Senate struck out the article referring to the north- 
 western boundary upon the ground that it might Hmit 
 the claims of the United States to the territory ac- 
 quired from France.' Madison believed, as did Mon- 
 roe, and probably also many in the Senate, that the 
 United States had succeeded to the claim of France 
 under the treaty of Utrecht. "We have reason to be- 
 Heve," wrote Madison to Livingston, "that the Northern 
 boundary was settled between France and Great Britain 
 by Commissioners appointed under the treaty of 
 Utrecht, who separated the British and French terri- 
 tories west of the Lake of the Woods by the 49th de- 
 gree of latitude." ° But there is no evidence, either in 
 the French or British archives, that a boundary com- 
 mission under the treaty of Utrecht agreed upon such 
 a line. 
 
 With the failure of King's treaty the controversy 
 rested until after the War of 1812." In the prolonged 
 negotiations which led to the treaty of Ghent the ques- 
 tions of boundary filled a large place. Any adequate 
 
 "The treaty was agreed upon April II, 1803 (King to the 
 Secretary of State, December 9, 1803. American State 
 Papers, For. Ret., II., 591), and signed May 12, 1803. The 
 Louisiana treaty was signed April 30, 1803, but King knew 
 nothing of it until May 15. The Senate consented to the 
 ratification of the King treaty after it had expunged the fifth 
 article. Ratifications of the amended treaty were never ex- 
 changed. Am. State Papers, For. Rel, II., 584. 
 
 'Madison to Livingston, Jan. 31, 1804; Am. State Papers, 
 For. Rel, II., 574. 
 
 " A negotiation begun by Monroe and Pinkney in 1807 upon 
 the subject of the northern and northeastern boundaries was 
 interrupted by the Leopard-Chesapeake occurrence. Am. 
 State Papers, For. Rel, III., 162-65, 185. 
 
treatment of the subject would involve a greater space 
 than can be given it here."' The British commissioners 
 early stated that they were authorized to revise the 
 northern boundary, but at first they expressly dis- 
 claimed any intention of acquiring any increase of ter- 
 ritory, saying that they desired a revision merely to pre- 
 vent uncertainty and dispute." The purpose of this 
 revision was soon disclosed, however, when the British 
 commissioners demanded a direct communication from 
 Halifax to Quebec by a cession of that portion of the 
 territory claimed by the district of Maine and of a part 
 of the so-called "Highlands," which intervened between 
 the places named and prevented that communication. 
 This proposal was rejected, the American commission- 
 ers denying any authority to cede any part of the terri- 
 tory of the United States."' To this it was replied that 
 the boundary of Maine had never been ascertained, 
 that possession by the United States of the territory 
 never occupied which interrupted communication be- 
 
 " Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 69-72; Am. State 
 Papers, For. Rel, III., 695-748; IV., 808-11. 
 
 "The American Commissioners to Monroe, August 12, 1814; 
 Am. State Papers, For. Rel, III., 705. Protocol of August 8, 
 1814; ibid., 708. 
 
 " The American Commissioners to Monroe, August 19, 
 1814; Am. State Papers, For. Rel., III., 709. Moore, I., 69. 
 "It must be admitted that the propositions and the explana- 
 tions of the British commissioners did not fit well together. 
 It was they themselves who brought forward the subject of 
 the boundaries; and they at the outset proposed a 'variation' 
 of the line for a specific purpose. Nor had the American 
 government 'asserted' any boundary line but in the lan- 
 guage of the treaty of 1783." But compare Madison's opinion 
 that the Highlands had no definite existence. The American 
 Commissioners to the British Commissioners, August 24, 
 1814; Am. State Papers, For. Rel, III., 712. 
 
8 DIPLOMACY ' UNDBR TYLER AND POLK 
 
 tween Halifax and Quebec was. not contemplated by 
 the treaty of 1783." The American representatives 
 thereupon took the ground, which was afterward main- 
 tained by the United States, that there was no uncer- 
 tainty in the terms of the treaty of 1783, and that 
 nothing further was required than that the boundary 
 line so described should be definitely ascertained by 
 surveys. So the matter stood until the American com- 
 missioners submitted a pro jet of a treaty. In it a stip- 
 ulation was inserted for the location of the boundary 
 line from the St. Croix through the Highlands to the 
 head of the Connecticut River, or to the forty-fifth 
 parallel, by commissioners named and acting similarly 
 to those appointed to determine the true St. Croix 
 under Jay's treaty. This stipulation was agreed to by 
 the British plenipotentiaries." 
 
 The temper of the negotiation, however, marked a 
 new stage in the northeastern boundary contention. 
 The war had demonstrated to Great Britain the desir- 
 ability of communication overland between Halifax 
 and Quebec, and her demand was based upon that fact. 
 On the other hand, the American commissioners took 
 the firm position that no part of the district of Maine 
 could be ceded, a position which was hostile to the 
 spirit of compromise. Not until 1821 did the commis- 
 sioners, appointed under the treaty of Ghent to deter- 
 mine the boundary line, finish their work and then only 
 by agreeing to disagree, each making a separate report 
 
 "The British Commissioners to the American Commission- 
 ers, September 19, 1814; ibid., 717-18. 
 
 "* Articles S and 6, Treaties and Conventions, 402; Davis's 
 Notes, ibid., 1329; Decision of the Commissioners under the 
 Sixth Article of the Treaty of Ghent, June 18, 1822 ; ibid., 407. 
 
to his government." Thus the matter stood as it had 
 since 1794 until 1823, when the United States again be- 
 gan, through Rush and afterward through Gallatin, 
 the negotiations which resulted in the treaty of 1827." 
 In this, resort was had to the arbitration of a friendly 
 sovereign, or state, as was provided by the treaty of 
 Ghent, in case the commissioners thereunder finally 
 disagreed. This arbitration convention of 1827 set 
 forth with definiteness the method of submitting the 
 case for arbitration. Each side was to prepare a state- 
 ment of its case together with all the documents bear- 
 ing thereon, with the understanding that Mitchell's 
 map, which was used by the framers of the treaty of 
 1783, and an agreed map of later date (upon which 
 the watercourses were shown) were to be the only 
 maps to be admitted as evidence.^' Gallatin, who ne- 
 gotiated the treaty and afterward prepared the Ameri- 
 can statement of the case (probably the most complete 
 ever made), correctly predicted the outcome of the 
 arbitration, which was referred to the King of the 
 Netherlands, when he reported that, in his judgment, 
 "an umpire, whether he be King or farmer, rarely de- 
 cides on strict principles of law : he has always a bias 
 to try, if possible, to spHt the difference." Such a de- 
 cision, indeed, was made by the judge early in 1831. 
 Of the twelve thousand square miles in controversy, 
 
 "American State Papers, For. Rel, V., 138-39; VI., 821, 893- 
 945, 999-1000; Davis, Notes, 1329; Moore, International Arbi- 
 trations, I., 72-83. 
 
 "Am. State Papers, For. Rel, VI., 643, 700-6; Adams, 
 Gallatin, II., 544-45; Moore, Int. Arbitrations, I., 85-138. 
 
 " Treaties and Conventions, 429. 
 
10 filPIvOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 about eight thousand were given to the United States." 
 The state of Maine, which had taken strong 
 ground against the encroachment of Great Britain 
 and had memorialized Congress upon the subject, 
 refused to agree to the decision of the arbitrator. 
 Jackson was in favor of adhering to the decision 
 of the King of the Netherlands. The constitu- 
 tional objections to the cession of territory be- 
 longing to, or at least claimed by, a state was 
 not seriously considered by Jackson, who, before 
 making any offer to Maine of a land grant in the west 
 as a douceur for its concession, was determined to 
 accept the award of the King of the Netherlands as 
 final and to issue his proclamation so announcing it, 
 without consulting the Senate. It is stated, upon the 
 authority of Forsyth, that Jackson was driven from 
 this course by the representation of his friends in 
 Maine, who said that such a proceeding would lose 
 the state to the Democratic party. Jackson was further 
 reported to have said that "it was somewhat singular, 
 that the only occasion of importance in his life in which 
 
 " Award of the King of the Netherlands ; Moore, op. cit., 
 I., 119-36. In the place of the line of the Highlands a con- 
 ventional line was suggested by the arbitrator because, while 
 the term "Highlands" was applicable to a watershed even 
 though it might not be mountainous, or even hilly, it was not 
 shown that the boundaries described in the treaty of 1783 
 coincided with the ancient limits of the British province, nor 
 in fact did the line of the Highlands as claimed by either 
 Great Britain or the United States answer the requirements 
 of that treaty. The British claim as to the northwesternmost 
 head of the Connecticut was allowed. Admittmg that Rouse's 
 Point was within British territory, the award recommended 
 that "the United States be left in possession of it." The 
 award was thus "recommendatory rather than decisive." 
 
he had allowed himself to be overruled by his friends, 
 was one of all others in which he ought to have ad- 
 hered to his own opinions." " He then proposed that 
 Maine should accept a million acres of public land in 
 the West as an equivalent for the territory claimed by 
 her beyond the line designated by the award of the 
 Dutch king. Nothing came of the proposal." The re- 
 sults of the arbitration were unsatisfactory to Great 
 Britain and the award was rejected.'" From this time 
 until Tyler's administration nothing was done looking 
 toward the settlement of the northeastern boundary 
 question beyond an intermittent correspondence, which 
 grew more and more bitter in tone. Frequent clashes 
 upon the border, which resulted in the so-called 
 "Aroostook War" of 1839, together with the feeling 
 against Great Britain growing out of the Caroline and 
 McL,eod cases and the domineering attitude of Lord 
 Palmerston's ministry, tended to bring the relations 
 between the United States and Great Britain to a state 
 of high tension, and such it was when Webster suc- 
 ceeded Forsyth as secretary of state. 
 
 Buchanan, as chairman of the Senate committee on 
 foreign relations, reported April 14, 1840, and thus 
 stated the position of the Van Buren administration, 
 
 ^ Webster, Diplomatic and Official Papers, Introduction, 
 IX. ; Benton's Speech, Cong. Globe, 27 Cong., 3 Sess., App., 
 5; Webster, Works, V., 97, note; Sen. Ex. Doc. s, 22 Cong., 
 I Sess. 
 
 ^ Moore, op. cit., I., 138; Sen. Ex. Doc. 431, 25 Cong., 2 
 Sess. In 1832 an agreement to this end was entered into by 
 Livingston, McLane, and Woodbury on the part of the United 
 States and by Preble, Williams, and Emery on the part of 
 Maine, but no ratification followed. 
 
 " Br. and For. State Papers, XXII., 772, 776, 783. 
 
12 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 with which the committee was in accord: "The terri- 
 torial rights of Maine have been imiformly asserted, 
 and a firm determination to maintain them has been 
 invariably evinced; though this has been done in an 
 amicable spirit. So far as the committee can exercise 
 any influence over the subject, they are resolved that 
 if war should be the result, which they confidently 
 hope may not be the case, this war shall be rendered 
 inevitable by the conduct of the British Government. 
 They have believed this to be the surest mode of unit- 
 ing every American heart and every American arm in 
 defense of the just rights of the country. . . . 
 While the Committee can perceive no just cause at the 
 present moment for anticipating hostilities between the 
 two countries, they would not be understood as express- 
 ing th,e opinion that their country should not be pre- 
 pared to meet any emergency." ^^ This was hardly the 
 attitude to take if a successful plan of arbitration was 
 to be arrived at. Fox's pro jet for an arbitration treaty 
 was followed by Forsyth's counter-pro jet in August, 
 1840, and Fox referred it to Palmerston. Webster 
 thus described the last stage of Van Buren's negotia- 
 tion : "L,ord Palmerston would have nothing to do 
 with [Forsyth's counter-projet] . He would not an- 
 swer it ; he would not touch it ; he gave up the nego- 
 tiations in apparent despair. Two years before, the 
 parties had agreed on the principle of joint-explora- 
 tion, and the principle of arbitration'' as a faithful 
 adherence to the stipulations of the treaty of Ghent. 
 "But in their subsequent correspondence, on matters 
 
 '^Reports of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
 v., 6oi. 
 
of detail, modes of proceeding, and subordinate ar- 
 rangements, they had, through the whole two years, 
 constantly receded farther, and farther, and farther 
 from each other. They were flying apart; and, like 
 two orbs moving in opposite directions, could only 
 meet after they should have traversed the whole, 
 circle." '' si 
 
 Early in March, 1839, Forsyth, tiring of the inter- 
 minable discussion of the northeastern boundary ques- 
 tion, suggested to the President that Webster be sent 
 to England as a special envoy to take charge of the 
 embarrassing negotiations and to endeavor to frame 
 a treaty which would effectually remove all causes of 
 irritation. Webster was not displeased at the sugges- 
 tion, although it came from his political opponents, 
 and at once drew up a scheme for the settlement of 
 the boundary question, which he submitted to the sec- 
 retary of state. Forsyth's suggestion was not adopted 
 by Van Buren. Webster, however, outlined a plan 
 for the settlement, of which three years afterward he, 
 himself, made use. Curtis, in his life of Webster, says 
 that he had been unable to find the sketch of Webster's 
 scheme, though he knew such a one had been in ex- 
 istence."" Dr. Van Tyne, in his recently printed "Let- 
 ters of Daniel Webster," has supplied the deficiency .'' 
 When Webster became secretary of state and began 
 the consideration of the boundary question, he adopted 
 mutatis mutandis the scheme which he had submitted 
 to Forsyth three years before. The plan proposed 
 
 "Webster, Works, V., 93- 
 
 ^Curtis, Life of Webster, II., 3, note. 
 
 ^ Van Tyne, Letters of Daniel Webster, 215. 
 
14 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 that the negotiation should be conducted from the first 
 in a manner at once informal and conciliatory, and 
 that the case of the United States should be presented 
 as concisely as possible, in order that England should 
 be bound to take her ground, either by asserting a 
 line conformable to her interpretation of the original 
 treaty, as she had done prior to the former arbitration, 
 or else by assuming the position that, owing to the in- 
 definiteness of the description in the treaty, the boun- 
 dary line could not be found. If she adopted the first 
 position, the United States should show how impossible 
 it would be to reconcile Great Britain's pretensions with 
 the terms of the treaty ; if the second, the United States 
 should urge the ex parte surveys, especially the one 
 made by the state of Maine. "But," Webster con- 
 tinued, "however the argument may stand, it is prob- 
 able that England will not, gratuitously, yield her pre- 
 tensions and something must be yielded by us, since 
 the subject has actually become matter of negotiation. 
 A conventional line, therefore, is to be regarded as a 
 leading and most promising of adjustments," to which 
 the consent of the state of Maine should be first had. 
 Only in case a conventional line could not be agreed 
 upon should recourse be again had to arbitration. 
 That it would be necessary to gain the previous con- 
 sent of Maine and Massachusetts to any settlement was 
 not a new idea with Webster. Van Buren had already 
 attempted it," and so had Jackson after the award of 
 the King of the Netherlands. Nor was the proposition 
 to adopt a conventional line instead of standing upon 
 
 "Moore, Int. Arbitrations, I., 140; S. Ex. Doc. j/p, ^5 
 Cong., 2 Sess. 
 
the terms of the original treaty a new one. The King 
 of the Netherlands had suggested a conventional line. 
 The germ of the idea is referable to Madison, who 
 believed that the Highlands had no existence. In 1838 
 Forsyth, as Van Buren's secretary of state, sounded 
 the government of Maine upon its willingness to agree 
 to a conventional line in preference to another resort 
 to arbitration. The legislature of that state answered 
 that it was equally opposed to a conventional line and 
 to a new arbitration ; the occupation of all the territory 
 claimed by it was insisted upon. 
 
 Palmerston's suggestion, made after the repudiation 
 of the arbitration award, that the disputed territory be 
 equally divided, even if seriously made, was not con- 
 sidered by the United States.^* It can hardly be called 
 a proposal for a conventional line. The adoption of a 
 conventional line would have been as if two parties 
 who had fallen out over a contract, the impossibility 
 of a proper performance of which had been demon- 
 strated, were to agree to a supplementary contract, re- 
 affirming the terms of the original agreement in so far 
 as that was possible, and coming together upon new 
 terms in place of those found impossible of execution. 
 In other words, a new boundary treaty should define 
 the terms of the former instrument without dependence 
 upon any interpretation which might have been placed 
 upon that earlier treaty by either party or by a tribunal 
 of arbitration. Webster's plan was essentially a non- 
 litigious one; concession upon one side implies con- 
 cession upon the other. The impracticability of his 
 idea was that it was essentially a compromise. The 
 
 ^ Walpole, History of England, Ed. 1890, V., 328. 
 
1 6 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYIvSR AND POI^K 
 
 danger of all quid pro quo treaties is that popular ap- 
 proval of them is difficult to obtain. Reference to arbi- 
 tration was a programme of litigation pure and simple, 
 by which each side would be sure to claim every- 
 thing possible in the hope that the award of arbitration 
 would be a compromise of conflicting pretensions. 
 
 Van Buren's administration, instead of adopting 
 Webster's plan because blocked by the opposition of 
 Maine, again proceeded upon the theory that arbitra- 
 tion was the only method of solution. Webster, with 
 some show of partisanship, thus characterized the ne- 
 gotiations immediately prior to his taking office : "The 
 merits of the boundary question were never discussed 
 by Mr. Van Buren to any extent. The thing that his 
 administration discussed was the formation of a con- 
 vention of exploration and arbitration to settle the 
 question. . . . the whole correspondence turned 
 on the arrangement of details of a convention for 
 arbitration. ... It was because these subordinate 
 questions respecting the convention for arbitration had 
 got into so much perplexity, were so embarrassed with 
 projects and counter-projects, had become so difficult 
 and entangled; and because every effort to disentangle 
 them had made the matter worse," that the Van Buren 
 negotiation came to nothing. "It was an endless dis- 
 cussion of details and forms of proceeding in which 
 the parties receded farther and farther from ea,ch other 
 every day." ^ 
 
 The northeastern boundary controversy was but one 
 of the legacies left by the administration of Van Buren. 
 The McLeod case, the seizure of the Caroline, and the 
 
 "Webster, Works, V., 114. 
 
question of right of search in connection with the 
 suppression of the slave-trade — each one of these 
 had been discussed by Great Britain and the United 
 States in such a manner as to arouse the bad feeUng 
 that might end in war. The truculent attitude of 
 Lord Palmerston and the large number of British 
 troops despatched to Canada aggravated the unfriendly, 
 if not hostile, demeanor of the American people. On the 
 other hand, the English were embittered by their losses 
 in American securities through repudiation and bank- 
 ruptcy, and were disgusted by the sundry descriptions 
 of American manners and domestic institutions which 
 travelers such as Mrs. Trollope and Miss Martineau 
 had printed. American society was represented to be 
 a compound of vulgarity, brutality, and dishonesty in 
 which the evils of slavery, rampant speculation, bank- 
 ruptcy, and repudiation filled a large place. Added to 
 these element's of discord was the jealousy with which 
 the growing power and importance of the United 
 States were looked upon. The temper of both peoples 
 was irritable and, without a decided change in diplo- 
 matic manners, might have led to war. 
 
 The case of McLeod and that of the Caroline were 
 closely connected and grew out of the Canada upris- 
 ing of 1837. The circumstances of each, so important 
 constitutionally as well as diplomatically, in which 
 Seward as well as Webster played an important part, 
 remain to be reviewed. The Caroline, an American 
 steamer, had been used in aid of the Canadian rebel- 
 lion. An expedition from Canada crossed the river, cut 
 the vessel loose from her moorings on the American 
 side, fired her, and sent her down over Niagara Falls. 
 During the disturbance an American citizen named 
 
l8 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 Durfree was killed. Some time afterward a British 
 subject, Alexander McLeod, was arrested in New York 
 by the authorities of that state for the murder of Dur- 
 free. The seizure of the Caroline took place late in De- 
 cember, 1837. McLeod was not arrested until Novem- 
 ber, 1840. The position which Great Britain, at first 
 vaguely, and afterward distinctly, assumed was that 
 the seizure of the Caroline in American waters was 
 an act of public force, which it avowed and justified 
 as a proper and necessary measure of self-defense. If 
 this position (and it was one which could not be de- 
 nied by the United States) was as correct as it was 
 bold, the arrest and detention of McLeod by civil or 
 criminal powers were in violation of international 
 rights and usages. The immediate release of McLeod 
 was demanded by Fox, the British minister at Wash- 
 ington, upon the ground that the prisoner, while en- 
 gaged in the Caroline affair, was performing an act 
 of public duty for which he could not be made per- 
 sonally and individually answerable to the laws and 
 tribunals of any country." That the seizure of the 
 Caroline was an invasion and a violation of the terri- 
 tory of the United States had been the position of 
 Forsyth from the time of the occurrence, but nothing 
 looking toward satisfaction for the act had been accom- 
 plished. The arrest of McLeod, nearly three years 
 after the Caroline was burned, aroused the British 
 ministry to such an extent that they overlooked the 
 affront to the United States by the violation of its 
 territory. Avowing responsibility for the former act, 
 
 '" Fox to Webster, March 12, 1841 ; Webster, Diplomatic 
 and Official Papers, 120-21. 
 
Fox formally and peremptorily demanded Mclveod's 
 release. The method of Fox's negotiation and the 
 language which he employed were not calculated to 
 aid in harmonious intercourse, and his usefulness at 
 Washington was really at an end. 
 
 The arrest of McLeod upon a charge of murder 
 awakened all the dormant distrust with which England 
 regarded the United States, and the danger of war 
 was imminent. Webster was informed by a prominent 
 Englishman that there was but one feeling on the sub- 
 ject among all parties and all ranks ; if McL,eod should 
 be condemned it would be such an outrage upon inter- 
 national justice that the scabbard must be thrown 
 away at once." Cass, the American minister at Paris, 
 then, as always, an Anglophobe, wrote : "I suppose you 
 are aware of the instructions given by the British 
 ministry to their minister at Washington. The subject 
 is no secret here, and was freely spoken of to me by 
 one who 'knew. If McLeod is executed, the minister 
 is to leave the United States. It is the casus belli. 
 But any sentence short of this is not to lead to this 
 result." " Again he wrote : "We must not shut our 
 eyes to the fact that a war with us would meet with 
 almost universal support in England." " Palmerston 
 informed Stevenson that McLeod's execution would be 
 the signal for war." 
 
 "Vernon Harcourt to Webster, March 12, 1841 ; Curtis, 
 Life of Webster, II., 62, note. 
 
 "Cass to Webster, March S, 1841 ; Curtis, Webster, II., 62. 
 
 " Cass to Webster, March 15, 1841 ; ibid., 64. 
 
 "Bulwer, Palmerston, III., 46, 49. Quoted by Walpole, 
 v., 332- 
 
20 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 The temper in Washington, which Fox's note to 
 Forsyth aroused, boded trouble. A hostile report was 
 made in the House by the committee on foreign rela- 
 tions, which suggested the advisability of arming the 
 country. This report was referred to the committee 
 on military afifairs, where it fortunately slept while 
 the Van Buren administration went out of office and 
 the Whigs came into power. 
 
 The diplomatic misunderstanding was hot confined 
 to this side of the Atlantic or to the somewhat arro- 
 gant manner of Fox. The United States minister at 
 the Court of St. James was Andrew Stevenson. After 
 twelve years' service in Congress, seven of which were 
 as speaker of the House, he was appointed minister to 
 England by Jackson and was continued in that 
 capacity until Van Buren's term ended. During the 
 last part of his mission he was engaged in a discussion 
 with Lords Palmerston and Aberdeen upon the African 
 slave-trade and the right of visitation and search. 
 These were allied questions which the United States 
 met with growing sensitiveness, a sensitiveness which 
 was the keener from the realization that this country, 
 while committed to the suppression of the slave-trade 
 by a long series of official expressions, found itself 
 disinclined, on account of its domestic institution of 
 slavery, to cooperate with the other nations of Christ- 
 endom for the effectual abolition of the trade."" The 
 European view, first adopted by Great Britain, was that 
 the trade could not be wiped out without some con- 
 cession involving a mutual right, if not of search, at 
 
 '"Du Bois, The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade, 
 passim. 
 
least of visitation, of merchant vessels suspected of 
 being slavers. , As .stated by Du Bois : "If a fully 
 equipped slaver sailed from New York, Havana, Rio 
 Janeiro, or Liverpool, she had only to hoist the Stars 
 and Stripes in order to proceed unmolested on her 
 piratical voyage ; for there was seldom a United States 
 cruiser to be met with, and there were, on the other 
 hand, diplomats at Washington so jealous of the honor 
 of the flag that they would prostitute it to crime rather 
 than allow an English or a French cruiser in any way 
 to interfere." '" Without doubt, the contention of the 
 United States as to England's pretensions to a right 
 of visit was .technically correct. This was a position 
 taken by authorities in international law with almost 
 perfect unanimity. Nevertheless, it was clear that if 
 the slave-trade was to be suppressed, each nation must 
 zealously keep her flag from fraudulent use or, as a 
 labor-saving device, must depute this duty to others 
 for limited places and in special circumstances. 
 
 In connection with his protest against any visitation 
 of vessels flying the American flag, even though they 
 might be known to be slavers and pirates under federal 
 law, Stevenson told Palmerston in 1841 "that there 
 is no shadow of pretense for excusing, much less justi- 
 fying, any such right. That it is wholly immaterial 
 whether the vessels be equipped for, or actually en- 
 gaged in, slave traffic, or not, and consequently the 
 right to search or detain even slave vessels must be 
 confined to the ships or vessels of those nations with 
 whom it may have treaties on the subject." " That the 
 
 "Ibid., 143. 
 
 " H. Bx. Doc. 34, 27 Cong., I Sess., 5-6, quoted by Du Bois, 
 145- 
 
22 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 United States would not be included among nations 
 of this last class was evident from Forsyth's statement 
 that this country had determined not to become a party 
 to any convention on the subject of the slave-trade." 
 
 Such was the unsatisfactory condition of affairs with 
 Great Britain with which Webster had to deal upon 
 his entering into the office of secretary of state. Har- 
 rison had intended offering the state portfolio to Clay 
 and that of the treasury to Webster. Clay declined 
 any position whatever in the Whig administration. 
 Webster's own inclination was not to accept an ap- 
 pointment from Harrison, unless it might be the post 
 of minister at the Court of St. James, but upon the 
 tender by the President of either the state department 
 or the treasury," Webster chose the former. Soon 
 after his acceptance of the position Webster began 
 the consideration of the problems which were to be 
 attacked as soon as he came into office. He undertook 
 the preliminaries for the adjustment of the boundary 
 question, as he had outlined them to Forsyth three 
 years before, by sounding the authorities of Maine and 
 Massachusetts upon the possibility of their acceptance 
 of a conventional line." 
 
 At the time of Harrison's inauguration, however, 
 the McLeod case was pressing for attention. A week 
 
 "Br. and For. State Papers, 1834-5, 136, quoted by Du 
 Bois, 142. 
 
 "' Harrison to Webster, December i, 1840, Webster to Har- 
 rison, December 11, 1840; Curtis, Webster, H., 48, 50. 
 
 " Webster to Theophilus Parsons, January 28, 1841, same 
 to C. F. Adam.s, January 30, 1841 ; Van Tyne, Letters of 
 Daniel Webster, 227-30. Gov. Kent to Webster, February 
 17, 1841; Curtis, Webster, II., 59. Webster to Kent, ibid, 
 II., 60. 
 
THB NORTHEASTERN BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY 23 
 
 after Webster assumed the secretaryship he received 
 the letter from Fox mentioned above, in which the 
 British minister demanded the immediate release of 
 McL,eod. Fox declined to notice the peculiar relations 
 of the various states with the federal government, and 
 refused to admit that the separate state was an inde- 
 pendent body over which the federal government had 
 no control. He looked to the federal government to 
 right the wrong, as that government was the only one 
 with which foreign powers had to deal. Fox pro- 
 ceeded to state that the British government demanded 
 McL,eod's release upon the assumption that he was one 
 of the persons engaged in the capture of the steamboat 
 Caroline, although it believed that he was not, in fact, 
 engaged in that transaction. Whether McLeod was, 
 or was not, a party to the Caroline affair made no 
 difference. He was held under arrest for trial for 
 his alleged connection with a transaction which the 
 British government avowed to be of a public character, 
 for which the persons engaged in it could not incur 
 private or personal responsibiHty." It is questionable 
 if the position assumed by Fox, which his government 
 endorsed, could be sustained by the law of nations if 
 pressed to its logical end. His underlying thesis was 
 that the United States as a nation could not subject to 
 its own municipal laws an alien who had violated such 
 laws if in such violation the alien had express di- 
 rection and authority for so doing. The British de- 
 mand for the surrender of McLeod can only be justified 
 on the ground that the attack on the Caroline was 
 
 " Fox to Webster, March 12, 1841 ; Webster, Diplomatic and 
 Official Papers, 122-23. 
 
24 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 excusable on the plea of necessity." This was the view 
 held by Calhoun in the Senate debate upon the sub- 
 ject, and he was supported in it by Lieber and Law- 
 rence." That the destruction of the Caroline was due 
 to necessity Fox did not claim. Webster expressly 
 denied it, . although Ashburton made that plea. Fox 
 put McLeod's alleged action upon the basis of public 
 duty and not upon the ground of necessity. Upon 
 consultation with the President, Webster decided to 
 accept Fox's view of the case, that as the British gov- 
 ernment had avowed the act of the destruction of the 
 Caroline to be a public act, then McLeod, if engaged 
 in the enterprise, was acting under the authority of 
 his sovereign, and was, therefore, not amenable to the 
 criminal process of the state in which he was arrested. 
 Unfortunately for the carrying through of the policy 
 based upon this view of the case, the federal govern- 
 ment was without power under the law to discharge 
 McLeod, otherwise Webster would have made merely 
 a demand for redress on account of the violation of 
 United States territory, which the seizure and destruc- 
 tion of the Caroline clearly were. McLeod was in the 
 hands of the state authorities of New York and his case 
 had been set for trial in the May following. Upon 
 the receipt of Fox's note, Webster instructed the attor- 
 ney general to furnish McLeod's counsel with authentic 
 evidence that the destruction of the Caroline had been 
 avowed by the British government as an act of force 
 done by national authority. "You will see," said 
 Webster, "that McLeod has skilful and eminent coun- 
 
 " Calhoun, Works, III, 6i8. 
 
 " Wharton, Digest of International Law, Art. 21. 
 
TH5 NORTHBASTBRN BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY 25 
 
 sel, and . . . that it is the wish of this Govern- 
 ment that, in case his defense be overruled by the court, 
 in which he shall be tried, proper steps be taken imme- 
 diately for removing the cause, by writ of error, to 
 the Supreme Court of the United States." " 
 
 Thus began what might have furnished the Supreme 
 Court with an important constitutional question for 
 its decision, but the course of the courts led in a dif- 
 ferent direction. Governor Seward denied that he in- 
 tended to order a nolle prosequi in the case. The 
 government's assistance in McLeod's defense was as- 
 sailed as an unwarrantable interference by Webster in 
 the internal affairs of the State of New York. 
 
 Before Fox's note could be answered Harrison died, 
 and Tyler took up the consideration of the McLeod 
 case as it had been outlined by Webster. The new 
 president approved Webster's plan, which, to restate 
 it, was (i) to stand upon the avowal by Great Britain 
 of the destruction of the Caroline as a public act; and 
 (2) to assist McLeod in making the defense that in 
 taking part in the Caroline imbroglio he was acting 
 under authority, and hence was not amenable to the 
 municipal laws of the State of New York, a plea which 
 Webster believed to be good in law. From this policy 
 he hoped to have two results, (i) the conciliation of 
 Great Britain, by not taking issue on the question of 
 public responsibility ; and (2) the avoidance of a clash 
 with the state authorities on a question of jurisdiction. 
 Webster proceeded to answer Fox's note in a manner 
 which, while it delayed the final issue between them 
 
 "Curtis, Webster, II., 67. 
 
26 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 until the trial of Mclveod was had, produced a quieting 
 effect upon Lord Palmerston and the British people." 
 
 Webster's answer emphasized the importance with 
 which the United States regarded Fox's explicit 
 avowal. "After this avowal, individuals in it might 
 not, by the principles of public law, be holden person- 
 ally responsible in the ordinary tribunals of law for 
 their participation in it." Webster then informed Fox 
 that authentic evidence of the avowal by the British 
 government had been furnished McL,eod's counsel by 
 the President's direction. "It is now competent for 
 McLeod, by the ordinary process of habeas corpus, to 
 bring his case for hearing before the supreme court 
 of New York. The undersigned hardly needs to 
 assure Mr. Fox, that a tribunal so eminently distin- 
 guished for ability and learning as the Supreme Court 
 of the State of New York, may be safely relied upon 
 for the just and impartial administration of the law 
 in this as well as in other cases." " Much to Webster's 
 disgust, however, the writ of habeas corpus was denied 
 and McLeod was remanded for trial. The supreme 
 court of the State of New York, in an opinion which 
 was severely criticised, denied the doctrine that an in- 
 dividual alien can escape personal responsibility for 
 an act if the sovereign of that alien avows the act as 
 a public one. McLeod's counsel dropped Webster's 
 defense and in October proceeded to trial, resting upon 
 an alibi. Perhaps never has this much abused defense 
 done better service. The alibi was proved, McLeod 
 was acquitted, and the casus belli removed as far as 
 
 "John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, XI., 21. 
 " Webster to Fox, April 24, 1841 ; Webster, Diplomatic and 
 Official Papers, 127. 
 
THE NORTHEASTERN BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY T.'J 
 
 McL,eod was concerned. The grievance of the United 
 States against Great Britain for the violation of its 
 territory by the seizure of the Caroline remained to 
 be adjusted. In order to prevent future arrests by 
 state authorities of aliens accused of acts for which 
 their sovereign accepted responsibility, Webster drafted 
 a law which was passed by Congress in August, 1842. 
 This statute gave the federal courts power to grant 
 writs of habeas corpus in all cases where aliens were 
 confined in jail on account of any act done under the 
 authority of a foreign state, the validity of which 
 would depend upon the law of nations." 
 
 John Quincy Adams noted in his diary that the end 
 of the McLeod case relieved the United States from all 
 immediate danger of hostile collision with Great 
 Britain, but left the negotiations with that country 
 "upon the Maine boundary, the South Sea boundary, 
 the slave-trade and the seizure of our ships on the 
 coast of Africa thorns to be extracted by purer and 
 more skilful hands than are to be found in the Admin- 
 istration of John Tyler." " The fall of the Melbourne 
 ministry, of which Lord Palmerston had been the for- 
 eign secretary, and the formation of a cabinet under 
 the premiership of Sir Robert Peel, with Lord Aber- 
 deen as minister of foreign affairs, laid the foundation 
 for a better feeling between the two countries. Out 
 of it came the special mission of Lord Ashburton, to 
 whom, with Tyler and Webster, the credit is due for 
 the removal of the thorns which John Quincy Adams 
 believed could not be removed. 
 
 "United States Compiled Statutes (1901), Section 763. 
 "John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, XL, 27. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 The Ashburton Treaty 
 
 The valedictories of Palmerston as foreign secre- 
 tary under Melbourne and of Stevenson as Vaii 
 Buren's envoy w^ere not calculated to make the prob- 
 lems which confronted their successors any easier 'of 
 solution. Following immediately upon the writing of 
 Palmerston's note to Stevenson, in which he upbraided 
 the United States for its practical, if not intentional, 
 double-dealing in reference to the suppression of the 
 slave-trade, the Liberals were defeated in Parliament' 
 and Sir Robert Peel was sent for by the Queen to' 
 undertake the formation of a new government. In it 
 Lord Aberdeen, who had held the same position from 
 1828 to 1830, was made foreign secretary. A brilliant 
 historian of our own day has thus contrasted the fall 
 from power of the Whigs under Melbourne with the 
 earlier government of Grey ; "The heroic measures 
 which the Whigs promoted under Grey lost them the 
 support of their more timid followers. The constant 
 concessions which emasculated their policy under Mel- 
 bourne estranged from them earnest reformers. The 
 
 ' Palmerston to Stevenson, August 27, 1841. This was an- 
 swered by Stevenson in a note addressed to Aberdeen, Octo- 
 ber 10, 1841, the day Stevenson left lyondon. Everett's intro- 
 duction to Webster's Diplomatic and Official Papers, VII. 
 Edward Everett was appointed in Stevenson's place July 24, 
 1841, but was not presented until the following December. 
 Webster to Cass, April 5, 1842; Curtis, Webster, II., 184. 
 
THB ASHBURTON TREATY 29 
 
 history of the Whigs under Grey thus becomes a chron- 
 icle of great successes ; their history under Melbourne 
 is a story of compromises. There are few things more 
 exhilarating in history than the annals of the Whigs 
 under the one minister; there are few things more 
 disheartening than the story of their decline and fall 
 under the other. Under Grey ,the Whigs lost their 
 popularity, but they retained their credit. Under Mel- 
 bourne they lost their credit without recovering their 
 popularity!" " As to Palmerston's foreign policy, how- 
 ever, a decided exception is made. Palmerston's policy, 
 fortiter in re but not suaviter in modo, was undeniably 
 popular in England. Much of what in later days has 
 been called jingoism was a large ingredient in the 
 foreign policy of the Whig statesman. That it added 
 to the already unpleasant feeling between the United 
 States and Great Britain robbed it of no popularity 
 in England. None of the questions at issue between 
 the two countries was Of transcendant importance to 
 the British mind. "A policy which had foiled the 
 French, and produced a fresh naval victory [i. e., 
 Napier's over Miguel, off Cape Saint Vincent, July 2, 
 1833] was seen to be popular," says the same writer, 
 Walpole. ' "The consistency, moreover, which Palmer- 
 ston had displayed from first to last, the firmness with 
 which he maintained his opinions, the promptitude 
 with which he had acted on them was calculated to 
 make a profound impression upon the public mind. 
 Every one knew the difficulties which he had success- 
 fully surmounted, the faint support which the ministry 
 was receiving from Parliament, and the rabid oppo- 
 
 ° Walpole, History of England, IV., 226. 
 
30 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 sition of the French nation. It was natural in these 
 circumstances that the fame of the British foreign 
 minister should be raised to an extraordinary height 
 by the skill of his plans and the vigor of his blow. 
 Throughout Europe, throughout the East, throughout 
 Britain itself, the name of Palmerston was on every 
 lip. He had raised the honor of Great Britain to a 
 level which it had not reached since the days of Water- 
 loo. Other statesmen had won unanimity by conces- 
 sion; he alone had won unanimity by success." 
 Stripped of the phrase of panegyric, all this means 
 that under Palmerston, as under later statesmen on 
 both sides of the Atlantic, jingoism was popular. 
 
 Palmerston's attitude had resulted in the rabid oppo- 
 sition of the French to the English nation, as Disraeli 
 noted, and it was one of Peel's first duties to overcome 
 this feeling. Although it had been said that Aberdeen 
 was less liberal in his foreign policy than his prede- 
 cessor,' his first endeavor was to smooth away all the 
 bad temper to which Palmerston's aggressive asperities 
 had given rise. Under Palmerston everything was 
 directed toward diplomatic victories for England; 
 Aberdeen's policy was to lay the foundations for a 
 better understanding on the part of England and other 
 nations. The fruits of this policy were soon seen in 
 the negotiation which resulted in the signing of the 
 quintuple treaty by Great Britain, France, Prussia, 
 Austria, and Russia, December 20, 1841. 
 
 By this treaty the four continental powers agreed 
 to adopt the British laws relating to the slave-trade 
 and gave to each other a partial right of search. "It 
 
 'Ibid.. IV., 334. 
 
THE ASHBURTON TREATY 31 
 
 was," said Aberdeen to Everett, "in truth a holy alli- 
 ance, in which he would have rejoiced to see the 
 United States assume their proper place among the 
 great powers of Christendom foremost in power, 
 wealth, and civilization and connected together in the 
 cause of mercy and peace." * This was as much of an 
 overture as was made to have the United States join 
 the five European powers in a combined effort to put 
 down the slave-trade. The tone of this letter of Aber- 
 deen was conciliatory in the extreme. It purported 
 to be an answer to Stevenson's letter of October 21, 
 and as it was the first expression of the new govern- 
 ment upon the question of search, it is of great im- 
 portance. Written upon the same day upon which the 
 quintuple treaty was signed, it shows strikingly how 
 the policy of Aberdeen differed from that of Palmer- 
 ston. At the outset he abandoned the position of his 
 predecessor, and renounced the idea that the right of 
 search was, except under positive treaty stipulations, 
 anything but a belligerent right. Basing his position 
 upon the fact that slavers were usually provided with 
 two sets of papers, one of which was frequently Ameri- 
 can, he stated that the sole purpose of British cruisers 
 was to ascertain whether vessels met with were really 
 American, or whether they were of another nationality 
 fraudulently provided with a set of American papers. 
 It was notorious that the practice of sailing with double 
 sets was a growing one. Trist, the American consul 
 at Havana, was charged with making a regular business 
 of providing Brazilian and other slavers with false 
 
 'Aberdeen to Everett, December 20, 1841; Webster, Diplo- 
 matic and OMcial Papers, 145. 
 
32 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 American papers, and upon investigation he was re- 
 moved. It is undeniable that the American flag was 
 a cloak for the slavers, and the sensitiveness of the 
 American government over any exercise of the right 
 of visitation or search gave slavers practical freedom. 
 There was no chance of being interfered with unless 
 by a vessel of the American navy, and these were few 
 and far between. It was a question whether the 
 United States cared more for the rigid maintenance 
 of freedom from visitation and search than it did for 
 the suppression of the slave-trade. Memories of the 
 War of 1812 and its causes were responsible for much 
 of the excitability upon the subject, but, strangely 
 enough, the government was much more sensitive than 
 it had been twenty years before, when, except for 
 Great Britain's stubbornness, a mutual right of search 
 might have been agreed upon. 
 
 It was for the purpose of putting a stop to the use 
 of fraudulent papers that Aberdeen rested his case. 
 "The right asserted has, in truth, no resemblance to 
 the right of search, either in principle or in practice. 
 It is simply a right to satisfy the party who has a 
 legitimate interest in knowing the truth, that the vessel 
 actually is what her colors announce. This right we 
 concede as freely as we exercise it. The British 
 cruisers are not instructed to detain American vessels 
 under any circumstances whatever; on the contrary 
 they are ordered to abstain from all interference with 
 them, be they slavers or otherwise." ' Stevenson had 
 stated that the flag of the United States could protect 
 
 ' Aberdeen to Everett, December 20, 1841 ; Webster, Diplo- 
 matic and Official Papers, 145. 
 
the; ashburton treaty 33 
 
 only those vessels that were bona Me American. 
 Aberdeen submitted that all Great Britain desired was 
 to stop those slavers that were strongly suspected of 
 fraudulently flying the Stars and Stripes, in order to 
 take such means as were indispensably necessary for 
 ascertaining the truth. In short, the position of Ste- 
 venson had been that upon the high seas the fact that 
 a vessel (even if known to be a slaver) flew the flag 
 of the United States was conclusive of its American 
 nationality. Aberdeen's view was that it was only pre- 
 sumptive proof of its nationality; but owing to the 
 notoriously fraudulent use of the flag, when there was 
 strong suspicion of fraud the flag was not conclusive. 
 "The undersigned begs to repeat," wrote Aberdeen to 
 Everett, "that with American vessels, whatever be their 
 destination, British cruisers have no pretensions, in 
 any manner, to interfere. Such vessels must be per- 
 mitted, if engaged in it to enjoy a monopoly of this un- 
 hallowed trade; but the British government will never 
 endure that the fraudulent use of the American flag 
 shall extend the iniquity to other nations by whom it 
 is abhorred and who have entered into solem.n treaties 
 for its entire suppression." ° Upon the receipt of this 
 note, Webster merely acknowledged its dispassionate 
 tone and forbore any reference to the biting justice of 
 Aberdeen's statement. The strong tone of Tyler's mes- 
 sage to Congress at the opening of Congress in De- 
 cember in referring to the Stevenson-Palmerston 
 correspondence is said not to have been the occasion 
 of Aberdeen's pronouncement. 
 
 Cass, the American minister at Paris, claimed to be, 
 and doubtless was, informed as to the current of poli- 
 
 " Ibid. 
 
34 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 tics, English as well as continental. His long endur- 
 ing hatred of Great Britain, however, made him sus- 
 picious of her every motive. Why, he thought, should 
 Great Britain enter into a treaty for the suppression 
 of the slave-trade with four continental powers of 
 Europe, none of which, save France, had important 
 maritime interests or the remotest connection with the 
 slave-trade? It could only be the purpose of Great 
 Britain to arrogate to herself the right to police the 
 high seas, and so to menace the freedom of the United 
 States upon the ocean. He, therefore, upon his own 
 responsibility, addressed a communication to Guizot, 
 Louis Philippe's prime minister, protesting against the 
 ratification by France of the quintuple treaty in terms 
 as vigorous as they were presumptuous. Cass's letter 
 to Guizot quoted Tyler's message to Congress in which 
 it was stated that however desirous the United States 
 might be for the suppression of the slave-trade, it 
 could not consent to such interpolations into the mari- 
 time code at the mere will and pleasure of other gov- 
 ernments. "We deny," said the President, "the right 
 of any such interpolation to any one or all the nations 
 of the earth without our consent. We claim to have a 
 voice in all amendments or alterations of that code, 
 and when we are given to understand [as by Palmer- 
 ston] that the treaties of a foreign government with 
 other nations cannot be executed without the establish- 
 ment and enforcement of new principles of maritime 
 police, to be applied without our consent, we must em- 
 ploy a language neither of equivocal import or suscep- 
 tible of misconstruction." ' 
 
 'Tyler's First Annual Message, Richardson's Messages, 
 IV., 77- 
 
THS ASHBURTON TREATY 35 
 
 That such was the pretension of Great Britain Cass 
 proceeded to point out, and that as a consequence of the 
 quintuple treaty, France might be forced against her 
 will to assume like ground. "Certainly the American 
 government," Guizot was told, "does not believe that 
 the high powers, contracting parties to this treaty, have 
 any wish to compel the United States by force to adopt 
 their measures to its provisions, or to adopt its stipula- 
 tions. They have too much confidence in their sense 
 of justice to fear any such result; and they will see 
 with pleasure the prompt disavowal made by yourself, 
 sir, in the name of your country at the tribune of the 
 Chamber of Deputies, of any intentions of this nature." 
 Then follows a threat, made all the more amazing by 
 Cass's admission that he was acting without instruc- 
 tions and upon his own responsibility. "Were it other- 
 wise and were it possible the United States might be 
 deceived in this confident expectation, that would not 
 alter in one tittle their course of action. Their duty 
 would be the same and the same would be their deter- 
 mination to fulfill it. They would prepare themselves 
 with apprehension, indeed, but without dismay, with 
 regret, but with firmness, for one of those desperate 
 struggles which have sometimes occurred in the his- 
 tory of the world, but where a just cause and the favor 
 of Providence have given strength to comparative 
 weakness and enabled it to break down the pride of 
 power. 
 
 Such was the belligerent answer given to Europe 
 upon the question of the suppression of that slave- 
 trade which the United States had been the first to 
 
 'Cass to Guizot, February 13, 1842; Webster's Diplomatic 
 and Official Papers, 177. 
 
2,6 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 condemn as piracy. Cass had preceded his fiery note 
 with the publication of a pamphlet, afterwards famous, 
 upon the right of search. This pamphlet, published in 
 French anonymously, was given wide publicity, and 
 Niles, naming the author, printed it in full in his 
 Register. Wheaton, at Berlin, afterwards printed a 
 fuller examination of the right of search, both taking 
 the position, not denied by England, that the right was 
 only that of a belligerent." There can be no doubt that 
 Cass's pamphlet did a great deal toward arousing 
 French sentiment against the quintuple treaty. Cass 
 was given the credit for defeating the ratification of 
 it by France, but it may be said that this is an over- 
 statement. On the day of the assembling of the French 
 Chambers an amendment to the reply to the King's 
 speech was adopted unanimously. This read : "We 
 have also the confidence that in granting its concur- 
 rence to the suppression of a criminal traffic, your 
 government will know how to preserve from every 
 attack the interest of our commerce and the independ- 
 ence of our flag." This amendment was adopted 
 prior to the publication of Cass's pamphlet and also 
 before his note of protest to Guizot was written. It 
 was such a rebuff to Guizot that the ratification of the 
 treaty would have been impossible even if Cass had 
 had no hand in the matter. The vote of the Chambers 
 was the result of a desire to retaliate upon Great 
 Britain for Palmerston's policy toward France, a de- 
 sire which the friendly feeling of Guizot toward Peel 
 could not overcome. 
 
 ' Cf., however, Sir Wm. Gore Ouseley's Reply to an Ameri- 
 can's Examination of the Right of Search, . . . Lon- 
 don, 1842. 
 
THE ASHBURTON TREATY 37 
 
 Tyler said in reading the newspaper accounts of 
 Cass's action that he approved the course taken, based, 
 as it was, upon his annual message."' Webster there- 
 upon wrote Cass of the President's approval of his 
 letter and "warm commendation of the motives which 
 animated him in presenting it." Cass was informed 
 that "without intending to intimate what modes of 
 settling this point of difference with England will be 
 proposed, he might receive two propositions as cer- 
 tain: (i) that in the absence of treaty stipulations, 
 the United States would maintain the immunity of 
 merchant vessels on the seas to the fullest extent which 
 the law of nations authorized; and (2) that if the 
 United States entered into a treaty for the suppression 
 of the trade, the stipulations would be for that single 
 object without embarrassing innocent commerce or 
 being unequal in practical operation." " 
 
 This letter was shown to Guizot and the latter made 
 use of it in framing his answer, which was not written 
 for three months after Cass's note. There was no 
 reason whatever to think that the obligations of the 
 quintuple treaty would be forcibly extended to any 
 nation not a party to that instrument. "I have the 
 less hesitation in here giving the formal, and in my 
 opinion entirely superfluous, assurance that the King's 
 Government on its part places the fullest confidence 
 in the firm resolution so often proclaimed by the 
 Federal Government to aid, by its most sincere en- 
 deavors, in the definitive abolition of the trade. The 
 
 "Tyler's Tylers, II., 233. 
 
 "Webster to Cass, April 5, 1842; Diplomatic and OMcial 
 Papers, 181. 
 
38 DIPI.OMACY UNDE;r TYIvER and POIvK 
 
 dispatch of Mr. Webster is of such a nature as to in- 
 crease this confidence. It seems to show, in fact, that 
 the Cabinet of Washington foresees the probability 
 of concluding with the states which have adhered to 
 the right of reciprocal search for the suppression of the 
 slave-trade, arrangements proper to attain the end 
 which they propose. We should attach the more value 
 to this concurrence of views from the circumstance 
 that, while it would hasten the entire destruction of the 
 slave-trade, it would have the effect of placing all gov- 
 ernments in the same situation as regards the measures 
 adopted for its suppression." '^ 
 
 At about the time of McLeod's acquittal, by which 
 fortunate circumstance a bad matter was mended, with 
 Tyler's authority Webster told Fox, the British minis- 
 ter, that he was prepared to consider the negotiation of 
 a conventional line for the settlement of the long- 
 standing northeastern boundary difficulty. Palmerston 
 had previously instructed Fox that he considered the 
 counter-pro jet, as prepared by Forsyth, to be unreason- 
 able, undeserving of answer, and as withdrawn from 
 consideration. Fox was thereupon directed to submit 
 Palmerston's original pro jet to Webster and to per- 
 suade the new secretary of state that it was reasonable. 
 But, in Webster's own words, "Mr. Webster was not 
 to be so persuaded; that is to say, he was not to be 
 persuaded that it was reasonable, or wise, or prudent, 
 to pursue the negotiations in this form further. He 
 hoped to live long enough to see the northeastern 
 boundary settled; but that hope was faint, unless he 
 could rescue the question from the labyrinth of pro- 
 
 " Guizot to Cass, May 26, 1842 ; ibid., 186. 
 
THE ASHBUETON TRllATY 39 
 
 jects and counter-projects, explorations and arbitra- 
 tions, in which it was involved." '^ 
 
 Webster's overture was not heeded by Palmerston, 
 and that secretary went out of office without an effort 
 to improve the relations between his country and the 
 United States. It may be suspected that such a propo- 
 sition was not altogether to Palmerston's taste. The 
 adjustment of a boundary dispute of sixty years' stand- 
 ing, by means of a conventional or artificial line, could 
 be done only by compromise and mutual concession, 
 siich as might and probably would not be hailed as a 
 diplomatic victory. Not until after Stevenson's de- 
 parture and Everett's presentation was Webster's over- 
 ture considered. On the 20th of December, 1841, the 
 date of the quintuple treaty, Everett was invited by 
 Lord Aberdeen to an interview in which the foreign 
 secretary outlined his plan for the betterment of rela- 
 tions between the two countries. Aberdeen said that 
 in offering to send a special minister to Washington 
 more than an overture to the United States was made, 
 because the minister would go with full powers to 
 make a definitive settlement on every point in discus- 
 sion between the two countries. "In the choice of the 
 individual for the mission,'' the secretary added, "he 
 had been mainly influenced by a desire to select a per- 
 son who would be peculiarly acceptable to the United 
 States as well as eminently qualified for the trust." " 
 The selection of Lord Ashburton as the special envoy 
 was an admirable one. During a long life Alexander 
 Baring, as one of the great banking house of Baring 
 
 ''Webster's Works, V., 97- 
 
 " Everett to Webster, December 31, 1841 ; Webster's Dip- 
 lomatic and Official Papers, 33. 
 
40 DIPLOMACY unde;r tyIvBr and polk 
 
 Brothers, and as a member of Parliament, and finally 
 as the first Lord Ashburton, had consistently striven 
 for the maintenance of a good understanding between 
 the sections of the English-speaking people on either 
 side of the Atlantic. In a private letter to Webster, 
 written soon after the appointment was announced, 
 Ashburton said: "The principal aim and object of that 
 part of my life devoted to public objects during the 
 35 years that I have had a seat in one or the 
 other House of Parliament, has been to impress on 
 others the necessity of, and to promote myself, peace 
 and harmony between our countries; and although 
 the prevailing good sense of both prevented my enter- 
 taining any serious apprehensions on the subject, I am 
 one of those who have always watched with anxiety 
 at all times any threatening circumstances, any clouds 
 which however small may through the neglect of 
 some or the malevolence of others end in a storm 
 the disastrous consequences of which defy exaggera- 
 tion." '" Lady Ashburton, who was the daughter of 
 William Bingham, a member of the Continental Con- 
 gress and afterwards a senator from Pennsylvania 
 from 1795 to 1801, wrote to Webster that the honors 
 which had been thrust upon her husband came from 
 his being the person most zealous in the cause of 
 America and most sanguine as to the possibility of 
 settling the pending differences between the two 
 countries." 
 
 At first Peel's selection was applauded, but upon 
 second thought popular approval was withheld. "Peo- 
 
 "° Ashburton to Webster, January l, 1842; Van Tyne's Let- 
 ters of Daniel Webster, 253. 
 " Lady Ashburton to Webster, January 2, 1842 ; ibid., 254. 
 
THB ASHBURTON TREATY 4I 
 
 pie reflect on his vacillation and irresolution," wrote 
 Greville in his journal, "and think age [Ashburton 
 was then sixty-seven] and absence from affairs are 
 not likely to have cured the defects of his character."" 
 But all gave him credit for his sacrifice. 
 
 Upon the receipt of Everett's letter containing Aber- 
 deen's proposal, Webster wrote to Reuel Williams, 
 one of the senators from Maine, a Democrat, request- 
 ing him to sound the governor, Fairfield, upon his plan 
 of having the government of that state, preferably 
 through commissioners selected by the legislature for 
 the purpose, become a party to the discussions and con- 
 clusions which might be had between Great Britain 
 and the United States in the proposed negotiation. 
 "It is our purpose," Webster wrote to Williams, "to 
 put the question in the fairest manner to Maine, 
 whether she will consent to be satisfied with a conven- 
 tional line and all the other terms and conditions which 
 commissioners of her own appointment shall have ap- 
 proved. No negotiations for such a line will be ap- 
 proved or entered upon without an express previous 
 consent upon the part of Maine, to acquiesce in any 
 line with all its terms, conditions and compensations 
 which shall have been thus previously approved." " 
 
 Williams replied that although Maine relied upon 
 her claim as just and had, therefore, no desire to change 
 the line of 1783, he believed that she would release to 
 Great Britain such portion of her territory in contro- 
 versy as the convenience of the latter might require, 
 
 " Greville's Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria, II., 71. 
 
 "' Webster to Reuel Williams, February 2, 1842 ; Van Tyne's 
 Letters of Daniel Webster, 256. See also Webster to John 
 Davis, July (?) 15 (February 15), 1842; ihid., 270. 
 
42 DIPLOMACY UNDgR TYLER AND POLK 
 
 on an offer of other territory in exchange or other 
 suitable equivalent, provided it was definitely known 
 before Maine gave any instructions to her commis- 
 sioners that Ashburton would be authorized to treat 
 for a conventional line." Webster could only give 
 Williams assurance that he believed Ashburton would 
 be so authorized. On this account, therefore, no defi- 
 nite action could be taken until the precise nature of 
 Aberdeen's instructions was known. The legislature 
 of Maine adjourned without taking any action on the 
 subject. 
 
 lyOrd Ashburton arrived in Washington early in 
 April, 1842, and his definite authority to treat for a 
 conventional line was officially demonstrated. Web- 
 ster then wrote to Governor Fairfield urging the ap- 
 pointment of commissioners to act as had been sug- 
 gested to Senator Williams.^" The importance of quick 
 action was insisted upon, and he urged that the gover- 
 nor call a special session of the legislature for the pur- 
 pose. A similar communication was sent to the gover- 
 nor of Massachusetts,^ which was equally interested 
 with Maine in the public lands in the disputed territory, 
 although the territorial sovereignty belonged to the 
 latter state. The Maine legislature was called in special 
 session and four commissioners were selected. Massa- 
 chusetts waived the official information as to Ashbur- 
 ton's authority, and its legislature empowered the gov- 
 
 " Williams to Webster; ibid., 258. 
 
 "Webster to Fairfield, April 11, 1842; Webster's Diplomatic 
 and Official Papers, 36. 
 
 "Webster to Davis, February 15, 1842; Van Tyne's Letters 
 of Daniel Webster, 270. 
 
THE ASHBURTON TREATY 43 
 
 ernor and council to adopt any measures which might 
 aid in settUng the controversy.'^ 
 
 It was Webster's hope that the commissioners would 
 be left free to act without specific instructions, and he 
 sent Jared Sparks to Maine to assist in persuading the 
 legislature to forego instructions. In this errand 
 Sparks was unsuccessful, and the commissioners were 
 directed to assent to no concession to Great Britain of 
 any lands lying within the part claimed by Maine as 
 an equivalent for lands ceded by that state.''^ Governor 
 Davis of Massachusetts was also inclined to hold fast 
 to the state's claim, saying to Webster that Massa- 
 chusetts would, "on honorable terms, concede some- 
 thing to the convenience and necessity of Great Britain, 
 but nothing, not a rood of barren heath or rock, to un- 
 founded claims." "'^ 
 
 Such was the unsatisfactory basis upon which Web- 
 ster had to act when the commissioners met him in 
 Washington on June 13. Until that date no official 
 communication had passed between him and the special 
 envoy. Ashburton's note was unfortunate. He opened 
 the way for controversy, and thus increased the sus- 
 picions of the state commissioners, by an elaborate 
 statement of the position of Great Britain. This was 
 done, he stated, in order to correct a certain false im- 
 pression as to Great Britain's motives, which was that 
 his government's claim dated only from 1814, when the 
 course of the War of 1812 had demonstrated the neces- 
 
 ^ Joint Resolution of Massachusetts Legislature, March 3, 
 1842; Congressional Globe, 27 Cong., 3 Scss., 12. 
 
 ^' Curtis's Webster, II., 102, Cf. Adams's Sparks, passim. 
 
 '' Davis to Webster, April 17, 1842 ; Congressional Globe, 
 27 Cong., 3 Sess., 12. 
 
44 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 sity of overland communication between New Bruns- 
 wick and Quebec.^ 
 
 Webster did not rejoin at once with counter-argu- 
 ment, but proceeded to the consideration of a conven- 
 tional line. Contrary to the usual rule, no minutes 
 were kept of the meetings and no protocols were pre- 
 pared for the drafting of the treaty. All the letters 
 were written after agreement, and those of Webster to 
 Ashburton were submitted to Tyler and each received 
 his corrections.^" During the Senate debates upon the 
 ratification the lack of protocols was objected to by 
 Benton as a departure from precedent not to be toler- 
 ated. "Never since diplomacy began and the art of 
 writing was invented, was a negotiation of such mo- 
 ment, or of any moment, so tracklessly conducted," 
 said Benton. The lack of protocols was deliberate. 
 It was Webster's idea that agreement for a conven- 
 tional line must be approached through informality. 
 Written records meant the argument of contesting 
 claims, the opposite of compromise and concession. 
 Webster's note to Ashburton, dated June 17, said 
 merely that he was authorized and prepared to treat 
 for a conventional line."' Ashburton's reply of the 
 same date proposed a conference upon the subject for 
 the following day.'^ "Long will this day," said Ben- 
 ton to the Senate, "this Friday, June 17, 1842, be re- 
 membered and noted in the annals of this confederacy. 
 
 ""Ashburton to Webster, June 13, 1842; ibid., 4. 
 
 ""John Tyler to Robert Tyler, August 29, 1858; Tyler's 
 Tylers, II., 242. 
 
 " Webster to Ashburton, June 17, 1842; Congressional 
 Globe, 27 Cong., ^ Sess., 5. 
 
 '^ Ashburton to Webster, June 17, 1842 ; ihid. 
 
THB ASHBURTON TREATY 45 
 
 In the Roman calendar, it would have had a place 
 among their unlucky days. Its memory would have 
 been perpetuated by a black monument and most ap- 
 propriate will it be for us to mark all the new boun- 
 daries of Maine with black stones, and veil with black 
 the statue of the god Terminus, degraded from the 
 mountain which overlooked Quebec, to the humble 
 valley which grows potatoes." ^ 
 
 Perhaps this delicious bit of bombast might better 
 have remained embalmed in the pages of the Globe, 
 yet it is a fair sample of the attack made upon Web- 
 ster's negotiation. Upon that "black Friday," as Ben- 
 ton persisted in calling it, the question of boundary 
 was not settled ; the negotiation was but begun. It 
 marked the agreement of the two governments for a 
 conventional line. At the conference of the following 
 day Webster asked Ashburton to state his views of 
 the boundary case and the expectations of his govern- 
 ment. This was in accordance with Webster's plan 
 as outlined to Forsyth in 1839: that as soon as pos- 
 sible a place should be found in the correspondence for 
 a clear and concise statement of the case, so that Great 
 Britain would be forced to take a definite position.™ 
 Ashburton then prepared and delivered to Webster the 
 British statement.'' Their duty was, he stated, to 
 trace a new boundary between Maine and New Bruns- 
 wick. Great Britain undertook this without any wish 
 of aggrandizement. Her aim was to make a con- 
 
 " Ibid., appendix, 14. 
 
 "Webster's plan; Van Tyne's Letters of Daniel Webster, 
 216. 
 
 '^Ashburton to Webster, June 21, 1843; Congressional Globe, 
 27 Cong., 3 Sess., 5. 
 
46 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 venient boundary and not to drive a bargain. He then 
 proposed the following line : the river St. John from 
 wrhere the north line of the St. Croix strikes it, up to 
 some one of its sources, with an exception so as to 
 throw the Madawaska settlements (which he claimed 
 were loyal to Great Britain), scattered along both 
 banks of the river St. John, into the British territory. 
 The point where the line was to leave the St. John was 
 to be decided later with Webster. As a concession 
 to the United States, he offered to accept the line 
 surveyed prior to 1774 as the line of forty-five 
 degrees. This line had been shown by later and 
 more accurate surveys to be forty-two seconds of 
 latitude too far to the north. The true line of forty- 
 five degrees would have thrown Rouse's Point into 
 Canada. This fortunate accident gave Ashburton 
 something to use as a quid pro quo, as, according to 
 strictly accurate surveys. Rouse's Point belonged to 
 Great Britain. A further concession was Ashburton's 
 offer of the free navigation of the St. John. In clos- 
 ing his letter, Ashburton said: "It would have been 
 useless for me to ask what I knew could not be yielded, 
 and I can unfeignedly say that, even if your vigilance 
 did not forbid me to expect to gain any undue advan- 
 tage over you, I should have no wish to do so." 
 
 With the receipt of Ashburton's note, the negotia- 
 tion came perilously near ending, first, on account of 
 the attitude of the Maine commissioners, second, 
 through the unwillingness of Ashburton to prolong 
 his stay in the United States, and third, on account of 
 the unpleasant turn taken to the discussion of the 
 Creole case, which had claimed attention since the past 
 winter. After the publication of Ashburton's letter 
 
THB ASHBURTON TREATY 47 
 
 of June 21, the Maine commissioners prepared a long 
 statement of the position of their state, which they pre- 
 sented to Webster. In it they said that if Ashburton's 
 claim of the south and west of the St. John was a sine 
 qua noil, they would have nothing further to do with 
 the negotiation. The statement, the tone of which was 
 altogether uncompromising, was probably prepared by 
 Preble, one of the commissioners."^ Ashburton was so 
 much discouraged by it that it required great tact to 
 keep him from throwing over the business. Webster 
 gave Tyler all the credit for persuading Ashburton to 
 continue it."^ Ashburton then appeared to be hampered 
 by fresh instructions, of the precise nature of which 
 Webster was not informed. On the 28th of June Web- 
 ster reported to Everett that the movement in the ne- 
 gotiation, if any had been made, was backward rather 
 than forward." 
 
 The case of the Creole added to Ashburton's em- 
 barrassment. The facts in reference to the Creole in- 
 cident were imperfectly known, but all accounts of the 
 affair were such as to anger the slaveholding states as 
 much as the arrest of McTeod had incensed the peo- 
 ple of Great Britain. The American bark, Creole, 
 was en route from Richmond, Virginia, to New Or- 
 leans with a cargo of merchandise and slaves. These 
 slaves revolted, imprisoned the officers and crew, and 
 seized the vessel. They then entered the port of 
 Nassau, where they were given freedom and assistance, 
 while the officers and crew were left to take care of 
 themselves. Up to the time of Ashburton's departure 
 
 °" Webster's Diplomatic and Official Papers, 49. 
 
 ==Curtis's Webster, II., 105, note. Tyler's Tylers, II., 218. 
 
 " Webster to Everett ; Curtis's Webster, II., 104. 
 
48 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 Everett had made no complaint of the matter, and 
 the subject of the Creole, therefore, was not one of the 
 immediate objects of the special mission/' Webster 
 instructed Everett to make a protest to Aberdeen about 
 the liberation of the slaves who had captured the 
 Creole. His position in the matter was doubtless in- 
 fluenced by Story, for whose opinion Webster had in- 
 formally asked.'" 
 
 "We insist,'' wrote Webster to Everett, "that in 
 cases of vessels carried into British ports by violence 
 or stress of weather, there shall be no interference 
 from the land with the relation or personal condition 
 of those on board, according to the laws of their own 
 country." " Webster, however, could claim no posi- 
 tive right under the law of nations, and it was not to 
 be expected that Aberdeen would in any wise circum- 
 scribe the broad principle that a slave became free 
 when he stepped upon British ground. Everett was 
 told that the United States should protect herself from 
 such occurrences by convoying her coasting of such a 
 character. Webster replied to Everett in a despondent 
 tone. If the boundary question were again to run a 
 course of surveys and arbitrations, and if the United 
 States were to understand that its coasting trade could 
 not enjoy ordinary safety unless put under convoy, the 
 Ashburton mission would end by leaving things much 
 worse than it found them. "I hardly see how this 
 
 ''Ashburton to Webster, August 6, 1842; Webster's Diplo- 
 matic and Official Papers, 91. 
 
 ""Story to Webster, March 26, 1842; Van Tyne's Letters 
 of Daniel Webster, 263. Pierce's Sumner, II., 200; Moore, 
 Int. Arbitrations, I., 410-12, 417. 
 
 "'Webster to Everett, June 28, 1842; Curtis's Webster, 11. , 
 106, 
 
THE ASHBURTON TREATY 49 
 
 bad result is to be prevented unless we can succeed in 
 beseeching Lord Ashburton to delay his return another 
 month in the hope that the cloud on his brow may be 
 dissipated by the next communication from home." '^ 
 
 It was Webster's desire that the Creole case might 
 be used as a peg upon which to hang a stipulation for 
 extradition in the treaty in which he hoped the Ash- 
 burton negotiation might result. The discussion of a 
 case of this nature was dangerous. In any question in 
 which the domestic institution of the United States 
 was involved might be found a text for antislavery 
 discussion by Aberdeen. Until Ashburton had specific 
 instructions upon the general subject, Webster could 
 not introduce it to him. With this pause in the prose- 
 cution of the special negotiation, Webster drafted an 
 answer to Ashburton's letter on the boundary question. 
 
 It must be confessed that Webster's reply to Ash- 
 burton's well-meant and friendly letter was hardly in- 
 genuous. Ashburton had taken Webster at his word 
 and avoided a long statement of the British case based 
 upon the length of time the various parts of the con- 
 tested territory were occupied. Waiving all con- 
 troversial topics except the position of the Mada- 
 waska settlements, he then proposed the line of the 
 St. John, with a deviation therefrom to be agreed upon, 
 with concessions as to Rouse's Boint and the naviga- 
 tion of the St. John. Webster's rejoinder was an 
 elaborate argument, supporting the proposition that a 
 boundary line might be ascertained, run, and delineated 
 with precision according to the words of the treaty of 
 1783, and he proceeded to demonstrate this by the stock 
 arguments of many years. With this by way of pre- 
 
 ' Ibid. 
 
50 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 face, all doubtless intended as a vindication of the 
 position assumed by the Maine commissioners in a 
 communication addressed to Webster and by him en- 
 closed with his note to Ashburton/' Webster then an- 
 swered Ashburton's proposal for a conventional line. 
 The United States, he said, would never relinquish 
 any territory west of the north line of the St. Croix 
 and south of the St. John, in which were the Mada- 
 waska settlements. He further objected to following 
 the St. John, as the course of the main stream turned 
 back to the south and west toward the Penobscot. 
 "The United States, therefore, would not object, upon 
 the adjustment of proper equivalents, to a line of boun- 
 dary which should begin at the middle of the main 
 channel of the St. John, where that river is intersected 
 by a due north line extended from the source of the 
 St. Croix ; thence proceeding westwardly by the middle 
 of the main channel to a point three miles west of the 
 mouth of the Madawaska; thence by a straight 
 line to the outlet of Long Lake and thence to 
 the highlands which divide the waters of the 
 Riviere Duloup from those falling into the St. 
 Francis.'' This last division was to take the place 
 of the indefinite description in the treaty of 
 1783 of the Highlands whicli divide the waters falling 
 into the St. Lawrence from those falling into the 
 Atlantic Ocean. The manner of following the line of 
 the Highlands to the northwesternmost source of the 
 Connecticut, Webster left for a later conference. The 
 line including Rouse's Point he admitted to be a valu- 
 able concession, as was the navigation of the St. John. 
 
 "' The Maine Commissioners to Webster, June 29, 1842 ; 
 Congressional Globe, 2y Cong., 3 Sess., 14. 
 
THE ASHBURTON TREATY 5 1 
 
 The apparently inflexible attitude was perhaps in- 
 tended for home consumption, and his aggressive re- 
 iteration of the old arguments may have been mere 
 brutum fulmen. At any rate, the character of the 
 correspondence was at once changed. Ashburton re- 
 plied to Webster with no more argumentation than 
 was necessary to preserve his dignity and to keep his 
 case from appearing to go by default, closing his letter 
 with this friendly appeal : "The position in which this 
 negotiation now stands, seems to prove what I have 
 before volunteered to advance, — that it would have a 
 better chance of success by conference than by corres- 
 pondence; at all events, that we should sooner arrive 
 at ascertaining what we can or cannot do. Slow, un- 
 necessarily slow, our progress has hitherto been; and 
 the public seem, somehow or other, to have become in- 
 formed that there are differences. I hope, when we 
 come to discuss them, they will prove less serious than 
 they are supposed to be; but it is very desirable that 
 doubts and distrusts should be set at rest, and that 
 public credit and the transactions of commerce should 
 suffer the least possible disturbance." '" 
 
 During the four days following the receipt of Ash- 
 burton's letter he and Webster had frequent confer- 
 ences upon the subject of the boundary. They agreed 
 upon the line as described in the final treaty. On 
 the 15th Webster submitted the decision to the com- 
 missioners of Maine and Massachusetts. For the con- 
 cessions of public lands which these two states would 
 have to make, in case the compromise line was agreed 
 
 "Ashburton to Webster, July 11, 1842; Congressional Globe, 
 27 Cong., 3 Sess., 9- 
 
52 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 to, he offered the sum of two hundred and fifty thou- 
 sand dollars to be paid by the United States to Maine 
 and Massachusetts in equal parts. The proposed line, 
 Webster stated, was not all that might have been hoped 
 for, but he believed that no more advantageous ar- 
 rangement could be made and he asked assent to it. 
 Of the twelve thousand square miles in dispute the 
 new line gave to the United States seven thousand, or 
 about six hundred less than under the Netherlands 
 award. The line followed the St. John to the St. 
 Francis and up that river to Lake Pohenagamook. 
 Thence, instead of following the "Highlands," the 
 boundary followed an arbitrary line southwest for a 
 distance of some hundred miles to a point near the 
 southwest branch of the St. John. The crest of hills 
 was then followed to the northwest source of the Con- 
 necticut River, known as Hall's Stream, and along the 
 old line of forty-five degrees to the St. Lawrence. 
 
 The treaty of peace of 1783 had proceeded upon the 
 erroneous assumption that there was a communication 
 between Lake Superior and the Lake of the Woods. 
 Ashburton and Webster agreed upon a description 
 based upon recent geographical information, but did 
 not consider the line beyond the Rocky Mountains ; and 
 unfortunately the failure to include the northwestern 
 boundary with the northeastern led the two countries 
 to more warlike expressions than had the troublesome 
 boundary on the northeast. 
 
 The Massachusetts commissioners accepted the pro- 
 position to release the state's claims for the sum 
 named," and so, finally, did the commissioners from 
 
 " The Massachusetts Commissioners to Webster, July 20, 
 1842; ibid., 19. 
 
THS ASHBURTON TREATY 53 
 
 Maine, though not without a final protest against the 
 injustice of it. "The commissioners of Maine, invok- 
 ing the spirit of attachment and patriotic devotion of 
 their state to the Union, would interpose no objection 
 to an adjustment which the general judgment of the 
 nation shall pronounce as honorable and expedient, 
 even if that judgment shall lead to the surrender of a 
 portion of the birthright of the people of their state." " 
 
 The vexed question of the northeastern boundary 
 was thus settled according to the plan which Webster 
 had so long favored. Without the determination of 
 Ashburton that the negotiation should be kept out of 
 formal and written argument his mission would have 
 been a failure, but to Tyler belongs the credit of per- 
 suading Ashburton to continue when his tastes and 
 inclinations would have led him to give up in despair. 
 Webster's part was, perhaps, the most difficult of all. 
 That acquiescence on the part of the Maine commis- 
 sioners was secured was due to his patient and tactful 
 methods. 
 
 The northeastern boundary question thus disposed 
 of by compromise, Ashburton and Webster addressed 
 themselves to the task of settling the non-territorial 
 questions in dispute. 
 
 The first of these was in reference to the sup- 
 pression of the slave-trade. The opposition of 
 the United States to conceding to Great Britain 
 any right of visitation or search was too deep- 
 rooted to permit discussion, much as Aberdeen de- 
 sired it. Indeed, the general subject of the right of 
 search was not entered into by Webster and Ashbur- 
 
 "The Maine Commissioners to Webster; ibid., 19. 
 
54 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYIvER AND POI,K 
 
 ton. Webster -had stated to Cass that any agreement 
 upon the slave-trade must deal with that question alone 
 without drawing into it the ulterior matter of search 
 and visitation. The plan of putting into operation a 
 practicable scheme for the suppression of the trade 
 was Tyler's, who had told Webster that the refusal of 
 France to ratify the quintuple treaty would give greater 
 freedom in dealing with Lord Ashburton. The agree- 
 ment of 1840 between the American and British com- 
 manders for joint cruising in African waters, an agree- 
 ment which had been disavowed by Van Buren's 
 administration, gave Tyler the idea of a method of 
 policing the slave-trade without introducing the dan- 
 ger of search or visitation. Webster presented the 
 plan to Ashburton, who accepted it, and it formed the 
 eighth article of the treaty. By it each of the parties 
 agreed to keep on the coast of Africa a naval force of 
 not less than eighty guns for the suppression of the 
 trade ; each squadron was to be independent of the 
 other, but the government of each was to give such 
 orders as to enable the officers of the respective fleets 
 to act in concert and to cooperate upon mutual con- 
 sultation as exigencies might arise. Such an agreement 
 was, of course, in the nature of a compromise. Aber- 
 deen was assured of the maintenance of a fleet which 
 would act in concert with a British force. Tyler and 
 Webster held to their position of not conceding a right 
 of search. Had the United States maintained the fleet 
 as agreed, the article might have solved the difficulty. 
 As time went on, the support of the United States 
 waned and the slavers continued to make more and 
 more use of the American flag. The agreement upon 
 the subject was of great importance in its results 
 abroad. France and Great Britain made a similar 
 
THB ASHBURTON TREATY 55 
 
 agreement to take the place of the unratified treaty. 
 Wheaton wrote from BerHn that for the first time in 
 our history could it be said that the American govern- 
 ment had exerted an influence on the policy of Europe. 
 It was in regard to the eighth article of the Ashburton 
 treaty that this remark was made, and not, as fre- 
 quently stated, on account of Cass's protest to Guizot. 
 
 The Ashburton treaty also contained an important 
 article providing for the extradition of criminals. Not 
 since Jay's treaty had such a provision been inserted 
 in any treaty negotiated by the United States, and the 
 article in that treaty expired by limitation in 1806. By 
 the Ashburton treaty extradition was conceded to either 
 party, the number of crimes increased over those in 
 the Jay treaty, and the time of duration of the article 
 made perpetual. 
 
 The question of maritime right (as presented by the 
 Creole) and that of violation of territory (in the case 
 of the Caroline) were not settled by the treaty. In- 
 stead Ashburton and Webster exchanged official notes 
 upon these two subjects. In reference to the former, 
 Ashburton pleaded lack of instructions. Webster then 
 asked that Ashburton engage that instructions be given 
 to the colonial authorities in the West Indies which 
 should lead them to regulate their conduct in con- 
 formity with the rights of citizens of the United States. 
 To this Ashburton agreed that the laws of the British 
 colonies should be executed with careful attention to 
 the wish of Great Britain to obtain good neighborhood, 
 and that there should be no officious interference with 
 American vessels driven by accident or by violence 
 into West Indian ports." As to the Caroline affair, 
 
 "Ashburton to Webster, August 6, 1842; Webster's Diplo- 
 matic and OMcial Papers, 93. 
 
56 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 Ashburton was reluctant to place himself on record. 
 After a week of conference he agreed to write a letter 
 deprecating the occurrence, finally saying that no af- 
 front to the sovereign authority of the United States 
 had been intended. "Looking back at what passed at 
 this distance of time," he wrote, "what is, perhaps, 
 most to be regretted is, that some explanation and 
 apology for this occurrence was not immediately 
 made." " Webster . afterwards said that it took him 
 two days to get Lord Ashburton to consent to use this 
 word "apology." " 
 
 So far the Ashburton mission had been a success. 
 The treaty was signed August 9 and sent to the Senate 
 August II. The committee on foreign relations re- 
 ported it without amendment, and after debate it was 
 ratified by a vote of thirty-nine to nine, the opponents 
 being Allen of Ohio, Bagby of Alabama, Benton and 
 L,inn of Missouri, Buchanan and Sturgeon of Pennsyl- 
 vania, Conrad of Louisiana, Smith of Connecticut, and 
 Williams of Maine; all Democrats except Conrad. 
 
 Much has been written in connection with the Ash- 
 burton treaty regarding the so-called "battle of the 
 maps." The subject properly belongs to the discussion 
 of the ratification of the treaty." It would have been 
 foreign to the spirit of the plan for the adoption of a 
 conventional line had Ashburton and Webster intro- 
 duced arguments based upon the old maps. Notwith- 
 standing the amount of attention paid these documents 
 during the Senate debates prior to ratification, it may 
 
 "Ashburton to Webster, July 28, 1842; ibid., 112. 
 
 " Curtis's Webster, IL, 121, note. 
 
 " Foster's Century of American Diplomacy, 284 et seq. 
 
THE ASHBURTON TREATY 57 
 
 safely be said that the matter had no place in the ne- 
 gotiation of the treaty. These Senate debates belong 
 rather to the political than to the diplomatic history of 
 the time, and the opposition to the treaty was due 
 largely to the isolation of Tyler and to the anomalous 
 position of Webster. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 Rei^ations Between Mexico and the United 
 States Concerning Texas, 1825-1840 
 
 The Mexican War and the conquest of CaHfornia 
 formed a distinct episode, completely disassociated 
 from the annexation of Texas. The Mexican War was I 
 not caused by the annexation of Texas to the United I 
 States. That controlling event in Polk's administra- ' 
 tion is fully separated from the earlier question of 
 Texas with which Tyler's name is associated. As his- 
 torical episodes they have no connection, but on the 
 other hand they are rightly viewed _as^ two__distinct 
 phases of southwestern expansion. Both were at the 
 expense of Mexico. Both evidenced the expansionist 
 desire of the American nation, a desire which each 
 generation has been able to make effective. The suc- 
 cessive accessions to national territory in 1803, 1819, 
 1845, and 1848, as well as in 1867 and 1898, mark the 
 impress upon the national consciousness of each gen- 
 eration's desire for novelty, for adventure, and for 
 new opportunities. No one fact, either economic, or 
 social, or even political, can account for it. Perhaps 
 a national idealism — call it manifest destiny or what 
 you will — has had more to do with this expansion 
 movement than anything else. 
 
 In its essentials the expansion of the United States 
 to the southwest is not radically different from its ex- 
 pansion to the west over the Mississippi Valley, to the 
 
me;xico and texas, 1825-1840 59 
 
 northwest into Oregon, and on across the Pacific to 
 Hawaii and the PhiUppines. That this southwestern 
 expansion was an extension of the slave-area does not 
 thereby mark it as different in principle from expan- 
 sion in other directions. This proposition is not made 
 blindly and without reference to the economic principle 
 that the system of slavery was extensive and not inten- 
 sive in its methods, and that the perpetuation of slavery 
 required frequent and constant additions to the slave- 
 area. Doubtless this principle of the expansive neces- 
 sities of slavery has had adequate treatment. It is 
 submitted, however, that instead of slavery's assisting 
 in the expansion of national territory it delayed 
 and almost defeated it. John Quincy Adams, who ' 
 alone of Monroe's cabinet insisted upon the retention 
 of Texas in 1819, opposed the annexation of Texas in 
 1845. Between the two dates slavery had grown to be 
 a national question of paramount political importance 
 through the debates upon the right of petition.'' With- 
 out the introduction of the slavery question opposition 
 to the annexation of Texas would probably never have 
 been the political question which it was m 1844. It 
 cannot be maintained that the acquisition of East 
 Florida under Monroe was for the purpose of extend- 
 ing the slave-area, but that charge has frequently been 
 made as to the annexation of Texas and the conquest 
 of New Mexico and California. Viewed superficially, 
 as isolated events in the administrations of two south- 
 ern and pro-slavery presidents, these steps in south- 
 western expansion might be considered as territorial 
 
 ^ Professor George P. Garrison in the American Historical 
 Review, October, 1904. 
 
6o DIPLOMACY UNDER TYI<i;R AND POI,K 
 
 additions designed solely to increase the slave-area. If, 
 however, it can be shown that from the time the 
 Florida treaty of 1819 was ratified there was a series 
 of attempts to win back what had been surrendered — 
 to state it strongly- — or to gain for the United States a 
 desirable addition to its territory — to speak more cau- 
 tiously — then the charge of premeditated expansion by 
 the United States for the purposes of extending slavery 
 falls to the ground. This does not mean that neither 
 Tyler nor Polk was influenced by the fact that south- 
 western expansion was eminently favorable to the pe- 
 culiar institution of the South. It would be too much 
 to assert this. Tyler's pro-slavery views added to his 
 annexation enthusiasm in that he feared that if Texas 
 were to abolish slavery it would endanger the slave 
 institutions of all the southern states. In consider- 
 ing the question of the annexation of Texas, New 
 Mexico, and California, therefore, it will be necessary 
 to keep in mind that the first step in that direction was 
 not the negotiation for the annexation of Texas under 
 Tyler, but the series of abortive attempts at south- 
 western extension which began early in the adminis- 
 tration of John Quincy Adams. Adams, two years 
 before when secretary of state under Monroe, had 
 offered the position of minister to Mexico to Andrew 
 Jackson without previously sounding Jackson as to 
 whether or not he would accept. The appointment 
 was declined in terms not wholly gracious." After 
 Ninian Edwards had been appointed and had resigned, 
 
 ^Jackson to Adams, March 15, 1823; MS., Archives, De- 
 partment of State. In subsequent notes these manuscripts will 
 be referred to as "MS., Archives." 
 
MEXICO AND TEXAS, 1825-184O 61 
 
 Monroe's term ended. Not until the administration 
 of Adams were diplomatic relations between the United 
 States and Mexico really established. 
 
 The first instructions issued by Henry Clay, as' sec- 
 retary of state under Adams, to Joel R. Poinsett, min- 
 ister to the United Mexican States, dated March 25, 
 1825, discussed the advisability of extending the south- 
 western boundary so as to include Texas. After de- 
 claring that the principles upon which the American 
 policy toward Mexico was based were those set forth 
 in Monroe's famous message of December 2, 1823, 
 Clay proceeded to the matter of boundaries between 
 Mexico and the United States. "Some difficulties," 
 Clay said, "may hereafter arise between the two coun- 
 tries from the line [of 1819] against which it would 
 be desirable now to guard if practicable; and, as the 
 government of Mexico may be supposed not to have 
 any disinclination to the fixation of a new line, . . . 
 the President wishes you to sound it on that subject, 
 or to avail yourself of a favorable disposition, if you 
 should find it, to effect that object. The line of the 
 Sabine approaches our great western mart nearer than 
 could be wished. Perhaps the Mexican government 
 may not be unwilling to establish that of the Rio 
 Brassos de Dios, or the Rio Colorado, or the Snow 
 Mountains, or the Rio del Norte in lieu of it." ° This 
 was intended to be a mere rectification of the frontier 
 line without any further consideration to be paid for 
 the cession of territory than that the United States 
 and not Mexico would be forced to take care of the 
 warlike Indian tribes infesting the plains of Texas. At 
 
 'Clay to Poinsett, March 25, 1825; MS., Archives. 
 
62 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 that early date, however, Mexico was suspicious of 
 the United States. Poinsett protested against any 
 treaty that Mexico might make with any other 
 Spanish-American state in which more favorable terms 
 were given than might be granted to the United 
 States. He then proposed to the Mexican government 
 that a new treaty of limits be entered into, laying aside 
 altogether the treaty of 1819. 
 
 Thus at the outset of our relations with Mexico 
 grave suspicions were aroused as to the intentions of 
 Mexico's growing and powerful neighbor on the north. 
 "It is manifest," Poinsett reported July 22, 1825, "that 
 the [Mexican] government regards all our movements 
 towards Texas and New Mexico with jealous appre- 
 hension." ' "I find that there exists great apprehension 
 in the minds of the people of this country that the gov- 
 ernment of the United States contemplates renewing 
 their claim to the territory north of the Rio Bravo 
 del Norte, and it may be of some importance to con- 
 sider their great sensibilities on this subject. It ap- 
 pears to me that it will be important to gain time if 
 we wish to extend our territory beyond the boundary 
 agreed upon by the treaty of 1819. Most of the good 
 land from the Colorado to the Sabine has been granted 
 by the state of Texas and is rapidly peopling with 
 either grantees or squatters from the United States, 
 a population they will find difficult to govern, and 
 perhaps after a short period they may not be so averse 
 to part with that portion of their territory as they are 
 at present." " 
 
 Poinsett did not persist in the advocacy of a policy 
 
 ■* Poinsett to Clay, July 24, 1825 ; MS., Archives. 
 
 ' Poinsett to Clay, in cipher, July 27, 1825 ; MS., Archives. 
 
MEXICO AND TEXAS, 1825-184O 63 
 
 of delay toward Mexico. He reported that he was 
 very anxious about the boundary line and that, while 
 he thought it politic not to justify the jealous fears 
 of Mexico by extravagant pretensions as to Texas, 
 he felt it of the highest importance that the United 
 States should extend its territory toward the Del 
 Norte, either to the Colorado, or at least to the 
 Brazos." 
 
 The negotiation that followed hinged upon the 
 question as to whether the treaty of 1819 should be 
 adopted as to boundary or a new treaty entered into. 
 For two years the matter never went beyond the stage 
 of preliminary discussion. During all this time Texas 
 was being colonized by settlers from the southern part 
 of the United States. Clay adopted the idea expressed 
 in Poinsett's early letter, that Mexico would be less 
 loath to part with Texas when it was seen that that 
 country was\ being peopled with settlers of a different 
 race, speaking a different language and -importing 
 strange institutions — a mistaken judgment as the sequel 
 showed. Clay's instructions proceeded upon that theory. 
 Instead of depending upon mere argument as to the 
 desirability to both parties of a new boundary line, 
 Poinsett was authorized to pay a million dollars for 
 a line from the Del Norte to the forty-second parallel 
 and thence west to the Pacific. If this cession was 
 found to be impossible, he was authorized to offer 
 half that sum for a line beginning at the Colorado, 
 thence north and west as before. Any treaty so nego- 
 tiated might confirm all land grants made prior to its 
 execution and also include a stipulation similar to the 
 
 'Poinsett to Clay, August S, 1825; MS., Archives. 
 
64 DIPLOMACY UNDgR TYLER AND POLK 
 
 one in the Louisiana treaty providing for the incor- 
 poration of the inhabitants of the ceded lands into 
 the Union.' Poinsett reported that he feared the sum 
 authorized was much too small. "The expenses of the 
 government are so great that they do not regard so 
 insignificant a sum as a million as of much use to 
 them." ' No effort was made to communicate Clay's 
 offer to Mexico, as Poinsett believed the overture 
 would have no other effect than to aggravate the irri- 
 tation between the two countries.' Feeling that any 
 attempt to alter the former treaty of limits (that with 
 Spain in 1819) would prove ineffective and only pro- 
 vocative of unfriendly feelings, he thereupon accepted 
 the proposal of the Mexican government and renewed 
 the old treaty of 1819." This treaty adopted the boun- 
 dary line as set forth in the Spanish treaty, and for the 
 second time Texas was left outside of the boundaries 
 of the United States. 
 
 Such was the state of the relations between the 
 United States and Mexico when Jackson succeeded to 
 the presidency. He found a treaty signed but not 
 ratified which left the Sabine as the western boundary. 
 Haste was not to be expected of the Mexican govern- 
 ment, and Jackson's administration made no effort to 
 hurry ratification. Van Buren instructed Poinsett, 
 upon much the same grounds as those taken by Clay, 
 to open a negotiation for the purchase of Texas or 
 
 ' Clay to Poinsett, March 15, 1827 ; MS., Archives ; John 
 Quincy Adams, Memoirs, VII., 239, 240; Von Hoist, II., 554. 
 'Poinsett to Clay, May 10, 1827; MS., Archives. 
 ' Niles' Register, LXVL, 152. 
 " Poinsett to Clay, January 8, 1828 ; MS., Archives. 
 
MEXICO AND TEXAS, 1825-184O 65 
 
 for as much of it as he could get." It is at this point 
 that Von Hoist perceives a decided change in the atti- 
 tude of the United States toward Texas and Mexico. 
 With the accession of Jackson he sees the first play 
 in the conspiracy of the slaveholding South to extend 
 slave territory. Just how Van Buren's instructions 
 to Poinsett differ from Clay's is not clear, except that 
 the amount to be offered is increased from one million 
 to five — a necessary increase, as Poinsett had pointed 
 out. 
 
 "Van Buren to Poinsett, August 25, 1829; S. Ex. Doc. 
 351, 25 Cong., 2 Sess., 315. MS., Archives, Volume I., num- 
 ber 30. These instructions were drafted by Jackson as 
 follows : 4 
 
 "August 13th, 1829 — 
 
 "The inducements to be presented to the Mexican govern- 
 rnent for the cession of Texas to the United States. 
 
 "ist. The advantage of having a Natural boundary over 
 the one which is now imaginary and unsettled. 
 
 "2d. The aid which the consideration she will receive for 
 it, will give her in repelling such attempts upon her 
 Sovereignety as that recently organized at Havanna; in pro- 
 viding a Navy, and the means of vigorous defence. 
 
 "3d. The removal of those collisions which must grow 
 out of the intercourse of her citizens with ours, seperated as 
 they will be from the efBcient control of their respective 
 governments : and liable to all the excitements natural to 
 the neighbourhood of conflicting laws, habits and interests. 
 
 "4th. Its real necessity to us as a guard for our western 
 border and the protection of New Orleans — furnishing a 
 motive for the cession which will be honorable to the repub- 
 lican character of Mexico, and worthy of that reciprocal 
 spirit of friendship which should forever characterise the 
 feelings of the two governments toward each other. 
 
 "Sth. The Probability of its being settled chiefly by the 
 citizens of the United States, who under a different system 
 of Govt, may become turbulent and dificult of Con- 
 troul, and taking advantage of their distance from Mexican 
 authority might endeavour to establish one independant of it — 
 
66 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 During all the years of Poinsett's residence in 
 Mexico as minister a stream of colonists from the 
 United States had gone into Texas. Most of them, 
 it is true, were southerners and slaveholders. Some of 
 them' were from the North, even from Connecticut 
 and New York. The only differences in the situation 
 of 1829 from that of 1825 were that more Americans 
 were in Texas, more lands had been taken up, specu- 
 lations in lands had been begun, and public attention 
 had been directed thither. 
 
 an event that will be sure to make this Govt, the 
 object of Jealousy, and in conjunction with other causes 
 unavoidable on an imaginary line of boundary of manny hun- 
 dred of miles might seriously weaken those bonds of amity 
 and good understanding which it is the interest and duty 
 of both Republics to cherish, 
 
 "Objects of the United States in obtaining it. 
 
 "1st. The safety of New Orleans. The present boundary 
 would enable an enemy of the Sabine, Red & Arkansas 
 rivers, to organise a force which by a coup de man might 
 reach the Mississippi and thereby prevent the interposition 
 of one by us sufficient for its protection. This disadvantage 
 can only be overcome by having within our possession all 
 the Territory washed by the branches of the Mississippi. 
 
 "2d. The acquisition of additional territory for the pur- 
 pose of concentrating the Indians, adopting a more effective 
 system for their Government, and relieving the states of the 
 inconveniences which the residence within their limits at 
 present afford. 
 
 "3d. The procurement of a natural , boundery — one that 
 cannot become the subject of dispute hereafter, and near to 
 which a dense population on either side can never be settled. 
 
 "These purposes will be accomplished by obtaining a ces- 
 sion to the Grand Prairie or desert west of the Nucees, be- 
 ginning at the Gulf, and following the courses of the centre 
 of that desert. North to its termination on the mountain, 
 thence with a central line on the mountain, dividing the waters 
 of the Rio del Nort from those that run Eastward of them 
 in the Gulf, to the 42d. degree of North latitude until it 
 
MEXICO AND TEXAS, 1825-184O 67 
 
 Before Poinsett had really opened the question he 
 was recalled. Jackson's and Van Buren's ideas as to 
 a suitable boundary are to be gained from Poinsett's 
 last instructions: he was authorized to offer five mil- 
 lions for a line beginning in the centre of the desert 
 between the Del Norte and the Nueces, north to the 
 forty-second parallel and west to the Pacific, but tor 
 proportionately less sums. If the first line was im- 
 possible, he was to try to fix the boundary at Mata- 
 gorda Bay or even at the Brazos. 
 
 strikes our present boundery on that parallel. This line is 
 a natural seperation of the resources of the two nations. 
 It is the centre of a country uninhabitable on the Gulf, and 
 on the mountain so difficult of access and so poor as to 
 furnish no inducement for a land intercourse, and of course 
 no theatre for those causes of difference that belong to a 
 neighbourhood of commercial interests. An advantage which 
 would be lost if we were to stop short of it, either at the 
 Brassos or the Trinity. Beyond either of these rivers and 
 this line on the Gulf is a section of fine land. 
 
 "For these reasons I wish Mr. Poinsett to be instructed 
 to open a Negotiation for the purchase of this Territory, and 
 be authorised to offer as high as five millions subject to the 
 conditions mentioned in my former note. 
 
 "Andrew Jackson. 
 
 "Note — The condition alluded is, that he shall consider 
 five Million as the Maximum, and in the event of success to 
 obtain first the ratification of their constituted authorities, 
 before it is submitted for ratification to this Govt. — 
 and to get it as low as possible — and if the limits cannot be 
 obtained — To obtain to the Brassos or to the Trinity agreably 
 to the ratio of the Maximum stated — and if Cash should be 
 preferred to payment by instalments {and cash I suppose 
 would be a great inducement,) let cash be stipulated to be 
 paid after ratification by our government, as we can in a 
 few days raise it by creating stock. 
 
 "A. J.- 
 MS., Jackson Papers, Library of Congress. 
 
68 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYI,BR AND POLK 
 
 These instructions from Jackson were sent to Poin- 
 sett by one Colonel Anthony Butler, an old comrade 
 m arms of Jackson. Butler lacked moral character 
 and fitness for any position of trust. No worse selec- 
 tion for a diplomatic position could have been made. 
 Poinsett, who had been extremely cautious about mak- 
 ing overtures for the cession of Texas, fearing to 
 arouse the jealous and suspicious national character of 
 Mexico, which was continually harassed by internal dis- 
 sensions, was recalled to make room for Butler, who 
 was charged with being a speculator in Texas lands, 
 a gambler, a drunkard, and a liar. But this last 
 epithet came from Jackson himself some years after- 
 wards, when his shortness of memory afforded him an 
 easy escape from the entanglements of fact. It is safe 
 to say that Butler's mission, discreditable and even dis- 
 graceful, had much to do with the unsatisfactory course 
 of our diplomatic relations with Mexico which ended 
 in war. 
 
 When Butler appears for the first time upon the 
 stage of diplomacy, he had recently been in Texas and 
 professed to be familiar with the proposed river boun- 
 daries. Sent to Mexico as a bearer of despatches to 
 Poinsett, he went overland, again through Texas, and 
 secretly. Upon this mission he was given authority 
 to confer with the Mexican officials upon the subject 
 of limits. Upon Poinsett's recall, he was made 
 charge."" From 1829 to 1836, during practically all of 
 
 " Jackson's reasons for recalling Poinsett were as follows : 
 "From the best consideration I have been able to give to 
 
 this subject, I have come to the following result. 
 "Mr. Poinsett's situation at Mexico must be very unpleasant 
 
 & mortifying — The secretary of Foreign relations his enemy 
 
MEXICO AND TEXAS, 1825-184O 69 
 
 Jackson's term, Anthony Butler represented, or rather 
 misrepresented, the United States in Mexico. It was 
 a se\en years' period of cheap trickery in which, on 
 the one hand, Mexico was led to beheve that the United 
 States government would descend to any level to ac- 
 complish the cession of Texas, and on the other, 
 Jackson was encouraged by hopes of a cession which 
 came to nothing. 
 
 In the spring of 1843 John Quincy Adams, then a 
 member of the lower house, spent many hours in 
 going over the correspondence of Butler. His mission, 
 
 and at the head of the strong minority who he wields to his 
 purposes & in hostility to Mr. P. by which he overaws the 
 Executive of Mexico who is friendly to our Government, & to 
 our Minister — under these circumstances we cannot reason- 
 ably to expect through Mr. Poinsett to effect either, a com- 
 mercial Treaty, or the Settlement of our limits, or cession 
 of Territory in Texas. In proof of this we find, that the 
 President failed, (after being requested by Mr. Poinsett) to 
 notify the Congress when he convened them that one object 
 would be to ratify the commercial treaty that had been re- 
 turned by this Government, and not being thus notified, the 
 Congress could not act on it — This to my mind is sufficient 
 proof that the executive of Mexico is overawed by the Minor- 
 ity with the Secretary of Foreign relations at their head — ■ 
 Therefore let Mr. Poinsett with his secretary be invited home, 
 (recalled) in such a way as will preserve his feelings and give 
 no cause for exultation by this Minority or his enemies. In 
 a firm but decorous languagfe, breathing the best feelings 
 to the Mexican Government, But observing that this govern- 
 ment cannot but be alive to the insult offered to our govern- 
 ment by the insult intended by the public act of the Legisla- 
 ture of one of the States of Mexico, by their resolution 
 passed by that body calling upon their Chief Executive to 
 banish from Mexico our Minister, without making to this 
 government any representation of his improperly interfering 
 with the interior concerns of their government, as well as 
 the deep rooted Jealousy & hostility expressed in their public 
 acts published to the World against our Government, — 
 
70 DIPIvOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 Adams records in his diary, was "chiefly to obtain the 
 cession of Texas." " Butler's instructions were those 
 sent by Van Buren to Poinsett during the previous 
 summer. "The three-fold and double-deahng Hne of 
 negotiations : i — for a commercial treaty ; 2 — indem- 
 nity for all sorts of claims, and 3 — to strip Mexico of 
 Texas, Santa Fe and California, runs into the most 
 curious details of Jackson and Tyler duplicity." " 
 Such was Adams's judgment after a careful review 
 of Butler's correspondence. It became evident that 
 Mexico would enter into no new treaty of limits, nor 
 would she, indeed, ratify the treaty signed by Poinsett 
 in which the line of 1 8 19 was adopted, until the United 
 States was willing to enter into a commercial treaty. 
 In this Butler acquiesced, and a commercial treaty 
 upon a favored-nation basis was signed in April, 1831. 
 Jackson was informed that the question of Texas 
 would be opened at once. Butler did nothing for a 
 
 whilst all the acts of ours, displayed the most sincere friend- 
 ship & good will to thiers, & our instructions to our Minis- 
 ter was to give every assurance of our friendship & good 
 will for the republics of the South, and particularly Mexico — 
 But to preserve our Minister from those continued insults 
 of the Minority & to foster, & continue our friendship a 
 good understanding with the Republic of Mexico, we have 
 withdrawn our Minister & his secretary, & has charged Col 
 Butler to represent our Government at Mexico, as charge de 
 affairs with full powers to carry into effect any commercial 
 regulations, and the settlement of our boundary &c &c &c and 
 to cultivate the most friendly relations with that Govern- 
 ment — With the assurance that whenever Mexico, thinks 
 proper to send a Minister we will receive &c &c 
 
 "Andrew Jackson " 
 
 MS., Jackson Papers, Library of Congress. 
 
 "John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, XL, 343. 
 
 " Ibid. 
 
MEXICO AND TEXAS, 1825-184O "JX 
 
 year thereafter further than to keep up the hopes of 
 the administration, yet excusing himself for the delay 
 by doubts expressed as to the sincerity of Alaman, the 
 Mexican minister of foreign relations." 
 
 In July, 1832, Butler had a conference with Alaman 
 in which he urged the cession of Texas to the United 
 States because he believed that at no distant time such 
 a serious revolt would occur there that the Mexican 
 government would not be able to suppress it. "The 
 revolt once commenced," he said, "Texas is lost to 
 Mexico forever ; upon this subject my government 
 feels the greatest anxiety." " This expression of re- 
 markable prescience on Butler's part failed in its effect. 
 Instead of filling Alaman's mind with fears for the 
 future of Texas, the Mexican secretary replied with 
 a query as to the territorial desires of the United 
 States. These Butler gave him, and the conference 
 ended. Its significance was this : "Unless you sell 
 Texas to us, Texas will soon be independent, and she 
 will be lost to Mexico in any event." 
 
 Butler's direct avowal to Alaman of his desire for 
 Texas gave way to a plan by which the United States 
 should make a loan to Mexico with Texas as security. 
 Jackson was appealed to by his charge for definite 
 instructions upon this plan." Butler's letter was re- 
 ferred by Jackson to Livingston with the following 
 
 '''Butler to Jackson, May 25, 183 1 ; MS., Archives; John 
 Quincy Adams, Memoirs, XI., 362. 
 
 " Butler to Livingston, July 16, 1832 (received October S, 
 1832), MS., Archives. Writing to Jackson, August 12, 1832, 
 Butler despaired of accomplishing his purpose. MS., Jackson 
 Papers, Library of Congress. 
 
 "Butler to Jackson, February 10, 1833; MS., Archives. 
 
72 DIPI^OMACY UNDER TYI^BR AND POLK 
 
 endorsement: "The president, with his respects to E. 
 Livingston, Esq., Sec. of State, encloses a letter just 
 received from Col. A. Butler with a request that he 
 prepare a reply, consistent with the endorsement made 
 on the letter, adding anything that your own judgt. 
 may suggest on this subject. Instruct Col. Butler to 
 bring the negotiations to a close. The Convention in 
 Texas meets the ist of next April to form a constitu- 
 tion for themselves. When this is done, Mexico can 
 never annex it to her jurisdiction again, or control its 
 legislature. It will be useless after this act to enter 
 into a treaty of boundary with Mexico." "' 
 
 Jackson's forecast of the time of the Texas consti- 
 tutional convention was correct although it was not 
 remarkable, as this date had been publicly announced. 
 As to the results of the work of the convention, how- 
 ever, his enthusiasm outran his judgment. The con- 
 stitution which the convention adopted, while repub- 
 lican in form, was in no sense a declaration of inde- 
 pendence. It was put forth in the attempt to make 
 Texas a self-governing member of the Mexican con- 
 federation. While the convention deliberated, Santa 
 Anna, who had overthrown Bustamente in the govern- 
 ment of Mexico, was entrenching himself in power. 
 Austin, one of the bearers of the Texan constitution 
 to Mexico, was imprisoned. The spirit of rebellion, 
 long suppressed, broke into one of independence. 
 "Like the American Revolution, that in Texas was well 
 under way before the colonists were willing to take 
 
 "Jackson's endorsement, dated March ig, 1833, MS., 
 Archives. September 26, 1833, Butler advised Jackson to 
 take possession of Texas, as he saw no hope of negotiation. 
 MS., Jackson Papers, Library of Congress. 
 
MEIXICO AND TEXAS, 182S-184O 73 
 
 the decisive steps of declaring themselves independent. 
 The revolution passes, therefore, through two main 
 phases : at first it was a struggle for the constitutional 
 principles on which the Mexican Federal Republic 
 had been organized [the Constitution of 1824] ; and 
 when this failed because of the complete triumph of 
 Santa Anna in the Mexican states up to the Rio 
 Grande, it became necessarily a struggle for inde- 
 pendence." " 
 
 The treaty of limits negotiated by Poinsett in 1828 
 and ratified in 1832 provided for commissioners to 
 mark the boundary of 1819. The time for the appoint- 
 ment of these had expired, and Butler now signed an 
 additional article extending the time for the perform- 
 ance of the treaty.''" This he brought to Washington 
 in June, 1835. While there he made an extended re- 
 port to Forsyth in which he outlined a new plan for 
 the acquisition of Texas through the bribery of Her- 
 nandez, a priest in Santa Anna's household, "known," 
 he affirmed, "to be the manager of all the recent ne- 
 gotiations of the Palace." Butler stated that if his 
 plan were adopted, the treaty which would give us 
 Texas "would only be the first of a series which must 
 at last give us dominion over the whole of that tract 
 of territory known as New Mexico, and the higher and 
 lower California, an empire in itself, a paradise in 
 climate . . . rich in minerals and affording a 
 water route to the Pacific through the Arkansas and 
 Colorado rivers." ^ Butler elaborated at length upon 
 
 " Garrison's Texas, 189. 
 
 ''"Butler to Forsyth, June 9, 1835; H. Ex. Doc. 256, 24 
 Cong., I Sess., 5. 
 ''Butler to Forsyth, June 17, 1835; MS., Archives. 
 
74 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLIlR AND POLK 
 
 the grandeur of his country's destiny, to be achieved 
 so easily. His argaiment was backed by alleged copies 
 of his correspondence with Hernandez. Santa Anna's 
 agent was asked to state definitely what would ac- 
 complish the transfer of Texas. Upon the assumption 
 that five millions would be the consideration, Hernan- 
 dez replied: "Five hundred thousand judiciously ap- 
 plied will conclude the affair, and when you think 
 proper to authorize me to enter into the arrangement, 
 depend on my closing it to your satisfaction." ^ 
 
 Upon the back of this report is the following en- 
 dorsement in Jackson's own hand: "Mexico-Texas — 
 Nothing will be countenanced by the executive to bring 
 the government under the remotest imputation of being 
 engaged in corruption or bribery. We have no con- 
 cern in the application of the consideration to be given. 
 The public functionary of Mexico may apply it as they 
 deem proper to extingnish private claims and give us 
 the cession clear of all incvimberence [sic] except the 
 grants which have been complyed with. A. J. June 
 
 22—35-" '' 
 
 Butler should have been dismissed from the service 
 at once. Five years had been wasted in attempts to 
 win over Mexico to a decision to sell Texas, and the 
 only fruit of Butler's negotiations was a cheap and low 
 plan of bribery with a priest as a go-between. It was 
 the beginning of the strange infatuation which the 
 government of the United States had, that through 
 Santa Anna's greed and military necessities Mexi- 
 
 ^ Hernandez to Butler, March 2T, 1835. Copy enclosed 
 in Butler's letter to Forsyth, as above. 
 ^' Endorsement of Jackson upon Butler's letter as above. 
 
MEXICO AND TEXAS, 1825-184O 75 
 
 can territory might be purchased, an infatuation 
 which lasted well through the Mexican War. 
 In 1843, when Butler had been charged by the 
 Whigs with having attempted to use dishonest 
 methods toward Mexico, he appealed to Jackson 
 to vindicate him. In his letter he claimed that Jack- 
 son had sanctioned and then angrily denounced the 
 proposed bribery, and afterwards in conversation had 
 signified his willingness, provided the affair was man- 
 aged without his own cognizance.'' Jackson replied 
 to Butler that he was a scamp and a liar. As to what 
 took place in the interview is a question of fact 
 between Jackson and Butler. Jackson's own words, 
 however, do not convey the impression that he disap- 
 proved of Butler's plan, except so far as bribery was 
 connected with it. Instead of dismissing the charge, 
 he was sent back to Mexico to renew his efforts for 
 the cession of Texas. Adams, upon examining But- 
 ler's correspondence, wrote that the letter of June 17, 
 1835 (in which the bribery method was suggested), 
 was the passe-partout of the whole system pursued 
 with inflexible perseverance down to the time of Tylew 
 But even Jackson at last became convinced of Butler'* 
 worthlessness, and he was finally recalled after he had 
 been instructed to press for a cession of Texas and 
 California as far north as San Francisco. Jackson was 
 anxious that if Butler succeeded it should be before 
 Congress met in December, 1835. Following a long 
 silence on the part of the charge, he was removed and 
 Powhatan Ellis of Mississippi appointed. 
 
 '* Cf. Dr. James Schouler in the Atlantic Monthly, February, 
 1905, 220. 
 
76 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYtER AND POI,K 
 
 At this point the course of the relations with Mexico 
 takes a decided turn. Nothing further is heard of the 
 proposal to buy Texas, for the events which Jackson 
 had prematurely foretold in 1833 were at last at hand. 
 Instead there was assumed a bold and determined posi- 
 tion upon the subject of the claims of sundry American 
 citizens upon Mexico. That these were many and 
 aggravated there is no doubt. That in every case 
 Mexico had delayed or refused settlement is equally 
 true. But the moment at which Mexico was hard 
 pressed in its effort to put down the Texan war for 
 independence was chosen by Jackson to push the claims. 
 Ellis was given a memorandum of these and directed 
 to press for immediate settlement. In July, 1836, he 
 was told that unless he received satisfactory assurances 
 from Mexico within a fortnight thereafter that the 
 claims would be adjusted, he should demand his pass- 
 ports.^ Ellis did as instructed, but not until the fol- 
 lowing December. No satisfactory answer having then 
 been received from Mexico, he broke off relations 
 with that government and returned home.^° For three 
 years thereafter the United States had no minister at 
 the City of Mexico. 
 
 During Ellis's unsatisfactory effort the question of 
 the recognition of Texan belligerency and independ- 
 ence arose. Toward it Jackson was as timid as he had 
 been bold in pushing the collection of the claims. 
 Early in November, 1835, Forsyth outlined to Castillo, 
 
 "" Forsyth to Ellis, July 30, 1836; H. Ex. Doc. 105, 24 
 Cong., 2 Sess., 20. 
 
 ^"Jackson's message, February 6, 1837; Richardson's 
 Messages, III., 278; S. Ex. Doc. 160; H. Ex. Doc. 139, 24 
 Cong., 2 Sess. 
 
MEXICO AND TEXAS, 1825-184O 'J'J 
 
 the Mexican minister at Washington, the pdHcy of 
 the administration toward the contest in Texas as one 
 of strict neutraHty; the Mexican government was in- 
 formed that "the President looked with regret upon 
 the existing state of affairs in Texas, and that in the 
 probable event of a protracted war in Texas itself, 
 neither party could be permitted to encroach upon the 
 territorial limits of the United States." " At the time 
 this note was sent the Texans had little chance of 
 immediate success in achieving their independence. 
 Diplomatically hesitating to call a spade a spade, For- 
 syth referred to the "existing state of things" as a 
 "contest" which might ultimately be protracted into a 
 war. The victory of the Texans over the Mexican army 
 at San Jacinto and the capture of Santa Anna gave 
 a very different status to what Forsyth had called "the 
 state of things." On_March 2, 1836, Texas formally 
 declared its independence, and a fortnight later a con- 
 stitution was drawn up and a government organized. 
 Two days after the signing of the Texan declaration 
 of independence, commissioners were sent to Washing- 
 ton, and they left Texas before the battle of San 
 Jacinto. The news of the victory reached Washington' 
 at about the same time as did the Texan commission- 
 ers, George C. Childress and Robert Hamilton. They 
 were welcomed^ as fellow-citizens rather than as en- 
 voys from a revolutionary government. The commis- 
 sioners at once asked for recognition and for relations 
 with the United States of the most friendly character. 
 Favorable to the Texan cause as Jackson was known 
 
 "Forsyth to Butler, November 9, 1835; H. Ex. Doc. 256, 
 24 Cong., I Sess.j 3 
 
78 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 to be, he was very cautious about the reception, and 
 the consequent recognition, of Childress and Hamilton. 
 The Senate held that under the federal constitution 
 there were four ways of recognizing a power as inde- 
 pendent : (i) by treaty; (2) by the passage of a law 
 regulating commercial intercourse; (3) by sending a 
 diplomatic agent, properly accredited, to the new power ; 
 and (4) by the reception by the President of a diplo- 
 matic agent from the new powerJ!, Jackson cautiously 
 threw the responsibility of recognition upon Congress, 
 which took no action until December, 1836. When 
 Congress met it was informed that the President was 
 forced to pause in expressing the opinion that Texas 
 was capable of performing the obligations of an in- 
 dependent nation. "Foreign policy, the conventional 
 faith of nations, or the efforts of Mexico, might detain 
 Texas lingering in her embryo state for many years," 
 so Jackson's confidential agent in Texas, Henry M. 
 Morfit, had reported. The glowing accounts that Jack- 
 son must have hoped for were lacking. Jackson in- 
 formed Congress that "prudence seemed to dictate 
 that we stand aloof and maintain our present attitude," 
 if not until Mexico itself or one of the great foreign 
 powers should recognize the independence of the new 
 government, at least until the lapse of time or the 
 course of events should have proved "the ability of 
 Texas to maintain its separate sovereignty." ^° Con- 
 
 ^ Clay's Report as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
 Relations of the Senate, June 18, 1836; Senate Report 406, 
 24 Cong., I Sess. 
 
 ^'Jackson's message, December 21, 1836; Richardson's 
 Messages, III., 265, Extracts from Morfit's report upon Texas 
 accompanied the message. 
 
MEXICO AND TEXAS, 182S-184O 79 
 
 gress, however, was unwilling to delay the matter. 
 An item in the appropriation bill providing for the 
 salary of a charge to Texas was passed on the last 
 da}' of Jackson's term. Jackson's last official act was 
 the appointment of Alcee La Branche of Louisiana as 
 charge to Texas.™ Soon afterward the Texan com- 
 missioner in Washington was received by Van Buren 
 and the recognition of Texan independence was com- 
 plete. 
 
 From the Mexican legation at Washington came 
 a series of complaints that the United States had vio- 
 lated its professed neutrality in permitting troops to 
 be raised for Texan service and in authorizing General 
 Gaines's forces not only to assemble on the line be- 
 tween Louisiana and Texas but also to encroach upon 
 Texan territory by crossing the Sabine.'' In October, 
 1836, Gorostiza, the Mexican minister, presented a 
 pamphlet reviewing the causes of his protests, and de- 
 manded his passports. "Mexico," he said, "has but 
 little to expect from the United States, seeing that its 
 most sacred rights, as well as its dearest and most posi- 
 tive interests, are now being sacrificed to the shadow 
 of a danger hitherto imaginary. Mexico is outraged 
 and ruined from motives of mere precaution. (Se 
 injuria a Mexico y se le datia por mera precaucion.)" 
 He therefore declared his mission at an end.''' Thus 
 diplomatic relations between the United States and 
 Mexico were suspended, in Mexico by Ellis's uncom- 
 
 '" Jackson's message, March 3, 1837; ihid., III., 281. 
 
 ^'^H. Bx. Docs. 256, 24 Cong., i Sess., and 190, 25 Cong., 
 2 Sess. 
 
 ''Gorostiza to Dickins, October 15, 1836; H. Ex. Doc. 190, 
 25 Cong., 2 Sess. 
 
8o DIPI,OMACY UNDBR TYLER AND POLK 
 
 promising position upon the subject of American 
 claims, and at Washington by Gorostiza's protests 
 against violations of neutrality by the United States. 
 The United States was thus led to adopt a policy in 
 reference to Texan annexation the reverse of its course 
 since 1825."" It was one thing to scheme for the an- 
 nexation of Texas while that province was admittedly 
 a part of Mexico. It was quite another to annex a 
 province in rebellion, thereby precipitating a war with 
 Mexico. 
 
 It is impossible to say how much the fear of war 
 with Mexico cooled Jackson's ardor for annexation. 
 Certainly the force of it cannot be overlooked." Nor 
 on the other hand must one neglect the important bear- 
 ing of the slavery question upon the subject. As has 
 been said, expansion to the southwest was hindered by 
 the question of slavery, which was commingled with it. 
 The battle of San Jacinto resulted in the capture of 
 Santa Anna, who while in captivity agreed that the. 
 war against Texas should cease, that the Mexican 
 troops should retire beyond the Rio Grande, and that 
 he would favor the recognition of Texas. In pur- 
 suance of this agreement the Mexican army was with- 
 dravifn, but the Mexican government gave notice that 
 any agreement with Texas made by Santa Anna while 
 a prisoner was null and void. Santa Anna's appeal 
 to Jackson for aid in ending the contest between Mex- 
 ico and Texas had the appearance of honesty,^' but 
 
 "^ Von Hoist, n., 573-85 : "A more shameless comedy of 
 neutrality was never played." 
 
 ^ Cf. Garrison in American Historical Review, October, 
 1904, 81. 
 
 '^ Santa Anna to Jackson, July 4, 1836 ; Richardson's 
 Messages, III., 274. 
 
MEXICO AND TEXAS, 1825-184O 81 
 
 Jackson declined to consider it on account of Mexico's 
 repudiation of Santa Anna's act. "Good faith to 
 Mexico/' he said, "makes it impossible for me to take 
 such a step." °° At the time Jackson's reply was sent, 
 the Texan commissioners were in Washington vainly 
 attempting to hasten recognition. 
 
 With recognition was inseparably bound annexation 
 to the United States. While the first was delayed, the 
 people of Texas voted almost unanimously for annex- 
 ation." The Texan commissioners reported that Jack- 
 son was undoubtedly in favor of annexation and that 
 his administration would carry the measure through." 
 Jackson's refusal to take the initiative as to recognition 
 was a wet blanket to the hopes of the commissioners. 
 They did not expect so "cold-blooded a policy from 
 him." From Texas the commissioners received urgent 
 instructions to push annexation. The terms of the 
 measure were relatively unimportant, if the result 
 could be accomplished. Henderson, the Texan secre- 
 tary of state, wrote to Memucan Hunt, who had been 
 appointed minister from Texas in December, 1836, 
 
 "Jackson to Santa Anna, September 4, 1836; ibid., 275; 
 Bancroft's Texas, II., 268 sqq; Yoakum, Texas, II., IS4 sqq. 
 Santa Anna in his autobiography ("Mi Historia Militar y 
 Politica, 18 10-1874" Mexico, 190S, page 41) gives an account 
 of his reception by Jackson in November, 1836, at Washmg- 
 ton: "El Presidente Jackson manifesto vivo empeiio por el 
 termino de la guerra. Repetia: 'Mexico reconociendo la 
 independencia de Texas sera indemnizado con seis millones 
 de pesos.' Yo le contestaba : al Congreso mexicano pertenece 
 linicamente decidir esa cuestion." 
 
 " There were 3277 for and 91 against. Garrison, in article 
 cited, 74. 
 
 "Collingsworth and Grayson to Burnet, July 16, 1836; 
 Catlett to Austin, January 11, 1837; quoted by Garrison. 
 
82 DIPCOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 suggesting that annexation be effected by act of Con- 
 gress instead of by treaty in case he should find that 
 a treaty of annexation might lack the necessary vote 
 in the Senate upon the ratification. This is doubtless 
 the first suggestion of the method of annexation by 
 joint resolution that was afterwards adopted when 
 the Senate rejected Calhoun's treaty in June, 1844." 
 Hunt, however, who had to wait for recognition, was 
 'forced to remain silent upon the ulterior question of 
 annexation, and when Jackson went out of office the 
 annexation of Texas appeared to be indefinitely post- 
 poned. 
 
 With the accession of Van Buren began the play 
 of diplomacy that continued until annexation was 
 finally effected. This was to force the question of 
 annexation forward by arousing in the United States 
 the fear that Great Britain, by recognition of, or by 
 commercial treaties and even alliance with, Texas, 
 would control the destinies of the Lone Star Republic. 
 In the instructions in which annexation by joint reso- 
 lution was suggested to Hunt, Henderson stated that 
 "in the event of [a refusal of] that government to 
 receive [Texas] . . . into the Union, either as a 
 State or as a Territory, it may become necessary for 
 Texas to form a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with 
 England or some other European power which would 
 forever and entirely preclude the people pi the United 
 States from enjoying any of the benefits resulting to 
 Texas." *° The negotiation of a commercial treaty 
 
 " Garrison, in article cited, 78. 
 
 " Henderson to Hunt, December 31, 1836. Quoted by Gar- 
 rison, ibid., 78. ^ ,. , 
 
MEXICO AND TEXAS, 1825-184O 83 
 
 with Great Britain, however, depended necessarily 
 upon recognition, and that did not occur until 1839, 
 during the presidency of Lamar, who was opposed to 
 annexation to the United States. 
 
 In August, 1837, the well-known anxiety of the 
 Texan people for annexation was officially expressed 
 by Hunt, who, after reviewing the history of Texas 
 and the desirability to both the United States and it- 
 self of its incorporation into the American Union, 
 urged the immediate discussion and negotiation of a 
 treaty of annexation.*' Forsyth answered Hunt's let- 
 ter promptly and reminded him that the questions of 
 recognition and of annexation were quite distinct. As 
 to recognition, the United States decided upon the 
 question of fact, and not upon right. Annexation, 
 however, proceeded upon a different theory. "The 
 question of the annexation of a foreign independent 
 State to the United States had never before been pre- 
 sented to the government. . . . Whether the con- 
 stitution of the United States contemplated the annex- 
 ation of such [an independent] State and if so, in what 
 manner that object is to be effected, are questions in 
 the opinion of the President, it would be inexpedient, 
 under existing circumstances, to agitate. So long as 
 Texas shall remain at war, while the United States 
 are at peace with her adversary, the proposition of the 
 Texan minister plenipotentiary necessarily involves the 
 question of war with that adversary. The United 
 States are bound to Mexico by a treaty of amity and 
 commerce, which will be scrupulously observed on 
 
 "Hunt to Forsyth, August 4, 1837; H. Ex. Doc. 40, 25 
 Cong., I Sess., 9. 
 
84 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLfiR AND POLK 
 
 their part, so long as it can be reasonably hoped that 
 Mexico will perform her duties and respect our rights 
 under it." " 
 
 Thus Forsyth not only refused Hunt's proposal for 
 annexation, but he declined holding out hopes of any 
 reversal of this decision. "The United States might 
 justly be suspected of a disregard of the friendly pur- 
 poses of the compact, if the overture of General Hunt 
 were to be even reserved for future consideration. 
 . . . The inducements . . . [for annexation] 
 powerful and mighty as certainly they are, are light 
 when opposed in the scale of reason to treaty obliga- 
 tions and respect for that integrity of character by 
 which the United States have sought to distinguish 
 themselves." " 
 
 There could be no mistake as to the meaning of 
 Forsyth's reply ; it was a definite and final refusal of 
 Texan annexation, based upon the duties of the United 
 States toward Mexico. Anson Jones, who succeeded 
 Hunt as minister to the United States the next year, 
 was instructed formally to withdraw the offer of an- 
 nexation. Lamar, an active opponent of annexation, 
 became president of Texas in 1838, and the Texan 
 Congress ratified the withdrawal of the annexation 
 proposition." 
 
 In Von Hoist's history is elaborated an argument 
 to show tjiat it was Jackson's policy, followed by Van 
 Buren, to provoke a war with Mexico upon the sub- 
 ject of the claims, and as a result of this war to annex 
 
 " Forsyth to Hunt, August 25, 1837 ; ibid., 12. 
 
 "Ibid., 13. 
 
 " Garrison, in article cited, 96. 
 
MEXICO AND TEXAS, 1825-184O 85 
 
 Texas. This idea had its origin with John Quincy 
 Adams, who gave utterance to it in his long speech 
 delivered in the House during the summer of 1838. 
 Von Hoist called Jackson's attempt to press the 
 payment of the claims an "unworthy hypocritical 
 comedy," " as he had characterized the administration's 
 neutrality policy as a "shameless comedy.'"" Such 
 words are obviously unfair. Considering the public 
 sentiment in favor of the South American revolutions 
 of twenty years before and that shown during the 
 recent Cuban insurrection, Jackson's attitude toward 
 the Texan revolution appears to good advantage, for 
 which he deserves the more credit because his own 
 sympathies and those of a great portion of the Ameri- 
 can people were with the Texans. When one considers 
 the speed with which the United States recognized the 
 Republic of Panama, Jackson's position becomes not 
 only creditable but commendable. He cannot be 
 blamed for refusing to risk a war with Mexico. This 
 is rather to his credit. If his plan had been to push 
 Mexico into war on account of the claims, there was 
 nothing to hinder him from carrying it into execution. 
 Policies are like the men who create them : they are 
 neither wholly good nor wholly bad. Jackson's and 
 Van Buren's attitude toward Texan annexation was 
 cautious, prudent, and founded upon just principles. 
 That the tone adopted toward Mexico upon the sub- 
 ject of claims was severe does not thereby convict 
 Jackson and Van Buren of duplicity, or of hypocrisy, 
 or of shamelessness. It was hardly different from the 
 one Jackson adopted toward France upon the sub- 
 
 "Von Hoist, IL, 597- 
 " Ibid.. IL, 583. 
 
86 DIPLOMACY UNDBR TYLER AND POLK 
 
 ject of claims. For that no criticism was made. That 
 many of the claims urged against Mexico were ex- 
 orbitant and some of them fraudulent does not change 
 the case. Some of the claims were just and of long 
 standing. It is as much the fault of the historian to 
 underestimate their importance as it was the fault of 
 the administration to overestimate them. To any one 
 who has the slightest knowledge of Spanish-American 
 character it is well known that the traditional policy 
 of the Spanish-American states is to delay the admis- 
 sion of any claims, and when, at last, a claim is ad- 
 mitted, to procrastinate in payment as long as patience 
 will permit. Instead of using the Mexican claims as 
 a cloak for war by which annexation might be accom- 
 plished, the reverse may be stated as the truth. The 
 open refusal of the United States to accept the Texan 
 offer of annexation put the United States in a position 
 where demand for payment of its claims upon Mexico 
 could be made without any suspicion of ulterior motive. 
 Ellis had demanded his passports in 1836 and 
 Gorostiza left Washington soon after." Mexico then 
 made an overture to the United States for the reopen- 
 ing of diplomatic relations, and sent a minister, Mar- 
 tinez, to Washington who was instructed to enter into 
 a treaty arrangement for the reference of the claims 
 to arbitration. Mexico's advance was met by the United 
 States. Forsyth and Martinez agreed to arbitrate the 
 claims in a treaty concluded in the spring of 1839." 
 Jackson's policy was justified by its result. 
 
 " Robert Greenhow was appointed bearer of despatches in 
 May, 1837. Martinez was in Washington, August 13, 1838. 
 
 " Treaties and Conventions between the United States and 
 Foreign Powers, 676; H. Bx. Doc. 252, 25 Cong., 3 Sess. 
 
MEXICO AND TEXAS, 1825-1840 87 
 
 The term of Ellis as minister from the United States 
 to Mexico covered the administration of Van Buren 
 and a part of that of Tyler, when he was replaced by 
 Waddy Thompson of South Carolina. Ellis's instruc- 
 tions were to continue to observe the neutral policy 
 adopted by Jackson. He was to be ready to interpose 
 his good offices between Mexico and Texas, but not 
 until Mexico should ask for them." 
 
 On the part of Texas, the election of Lamar and the 
 formal withdrawal of the annexation proposal led into 
 new channels of diplomacy. Hunt had warned For- 
 syth that if Texas were cast off by the United States, 
 she would turn for aid to the powers of Europe, notably 
 to France and England, who, he had no doubt, would 
 be glad to avail themselves of the great advantages 
 which a generous commercial treaty would give them. 
 "The crowned heads of England and France, and their 
 majesties' ministers," he said, "will not be altogether 
 insensible to feelings of sympathy and regard for a 
 people whose government is headed by individuals 
 boasting their descent from the distinguished races over 
 which their majesties preside." °° Commercial advan- 
 tages were more to be reckoned with than the English 
 lineage of Sam Houston or the French ancestry of 
 Mirabeau B. Lamar. The years 1838 and 1839 saw 
 commercial treaties ratified with both France and 
 Great Britain. At the beginning of 1840 Texas had 
 been recognized as an independent nation by the United 
 States, Great Britain, France, Holland and Belgium. 
 It was no longer independent only in the eyes of the 
 
 "Forsyth to Ellis, May 3, 1839; MS., Archives. 
 "Hunt to Forsyth, September 12, 1837; H. Bx. Doc. 40, 
 2S Cong., J Sess., 15. 
 
88 DIPI^OMACY UNDER TYLSR AND POI^K 
 
 United States." Texas had, therefore, a very different 
 position from what she had when Jackson went out of 
 office. Mexico refused to recognize Texas, Spain had 
 refused for many years to recognize Mexico. It 
 is a characteristic of Spanish diplomatic methods, 
 as it is a part of the Spanish humor, to be obhvious 
 of the awkward conditions of the present and to refuse 
 to accept the inevitable. For four years Texas had 
 maintained her independence by establishing relations 
 with the great powers. That Mexico harassed her with 
 threatened invasions and guerilla warfare added to 
 the financial and political troubles of Texas, but it did 
 not convince the world that Texas was stillj de jure 
 any more than she was de facto an integral part of 
 Mexico. 
 
 " See the interesting and comprehensive article by J. L. 
 Worley upon "The Diplomatic Relations of England and the 
 Republic of Texas," in the Quarterly of the Texas State His- 
 torical Association for July, 1905, especially pages 1-15 for 
 the events leading to the recognition of Texas by Great 
 Britain. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 The; Relations Between the United States and 
 
 Mexico During the Secretaryship of 
 
 Daniee Webster, 1841-1843 
 
 The desire for Texas was not a mere creation of the 
 Tyler administration. We know that at least a part 
 of Texas was, and West Florida was not, a part of 
 Louisiana, and that Monroe feared that Texas would 
 prove an ' undesirable addition to the Union, its dis- 
 tance from the center of population tending to weak- 
 ness rather than strength. Adams's opposition to the 
 exclusion of Texas was expressed in his endeavor to 
 purchase that province from Mexico. Jackson, who 
 had not only acquiesced in the terms of the treaty of 
 1819, but approved them, followed Adams's policy 
 until the revolution in Texas changed the whole com- 
 plexion of the question of annexation. Mexico had 
 refused to sell Texas. When that state became inde- 
 pendent, Mexico gave notice that if the United States 
 annexed it she would declare war. Jackson thereupon 
 held aloof and so did Van Buren. The stability of the 
 Texan government was on trial. Texas must prove 
 able to maintain itself. During the years in which 
 Texas was allowed to rest, pending its successful as- 
 sertion of independence, slavery had pushed to the 
 front as the absorbing national issue through the de- 
 bates in Congress upon the right of petition with which 
 the name of John Quincy Adams is forever connected. 
 The bitterness with which these debates were con- 
 
go DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 ducted threw the pro-slavery interests upon the de- 
 fensive. They so remained until after the defeat of 
 the Wilmot Proviso. Expansion to the southwest be- 
 came indissolubly associated with slavery extension. 
 The speeches of Adams and the brilliant although ar- 
 gumentative review of the subject by William Jay be- 
 came the basis upon which Von Hoist built his narra- 
 tive of the Texas question. No one can read Von 
 Hoist's detailed presentation of the subject of annex- 
 ation without being impressed by its plausibility, 
 backed as it is by a mass of authorities, speeches in 
 Congress, public documents, and extracts from party 
 newspapers. At the same time one cannot fail to see 
 Von Hoist's reliance upon Adams, the most uncom- 
 promising as well as the most suspicious of antislavery 
 statesmen. That stupendous human document, the 
 diary of John Quincy Adams, a source of primary im- 
 portance during the whole period of Adams's political 
 life, becomes after 1829 a repository of Adams's caus- 
 tic criticism. No one who differed from him was given 
 the credit of honesty. Those who, like Webster, put 
 the Union above abolition and believed that the carry- 
 ing out of the compromises of the Constitution em- 
 bodied the whole duty of the American statesman, 
 were characterized as panderers to the vices of slavery. 
 Thus Calhoun was "the high priest of Moloch ;" 
 Tyler, "the Virginian slave breeder;" and Webster 
 "the man with a gigantic intellect, an envious temper, 
 a ravening ambition, and a rotten heart." ' All this 
 is interesting, but it is not history, nor is it a safe, 
 source from which to construct an historical narrative. 
 
 'John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, XI., 284. 
 
WEBSTER AND MEXICO, 184I-1843 9I 
 
 Owing to the peculiar position in which Tyler found 
 himself as a president without a party, every act of 
 his became food for suspicion. Even the negotiations 
 of which the Ashburton treaty was the successful out- 
 come, unquestionably pursued in good faith, were said 
 to have been conducted for the purpose of clearing the 
 ground for pro-slavery expansion/ 
 
 As early as October, 1841, upon the reorganization 
 of his cabinet, Tyler expressed to Webster his views 
 upon the annexation of Texas. "I gave you a hint 
 as to the possibility of acquiring Texas by treaty. I 
 verily believe it could be done, could the North be 
 reconciled to it ; would anything," he asked, "throw 
 so bright a lustre around us?' It seems to me that the 
 great interests of the north would be incalculably 
 advanc'd by such an acquisition. Slavery — I know 
 that is the objection, and it would be well founded if 
 it did not already exist, among us, but my belief is 
 that a rigid enforcement of the laws against the slave 
 trade, would in time make as many free States south 
 as the acquisition of Texas would add of slave states, 
 and then the future, (distant it might be), would pre- 
 sent wonderful results." ' Webster's opposition to an- 
 nexation, however, was well known,* and during his 
 period of service under Tyler no attempt was made by 
 the President to force his pro-annexation views upon 
 his secretary of state." How much Tyler's inaction 
 
 ' William Jay, A Review of the Causes and Consequences 
 of the Mexican War, 87. 
 
 'Tyler to Webster, October 11, 1841 ; Van Tyne's Letters 
 of Daniel Webster, 240. 
 
 *Curtis's Webster, I., 560-70. 
 
 'Ibid., II., 227. 
 
92 DIPI,OMACY UNDBR TYLER AND POLK 
 
 was due to deference for Webster, who was engaged 
 with England at first over the McL,eod casei and 
 finally in the Ashburton negotiation, it is difficult to 
 say. Delay was, however, prudent for several rea- 
 sons : the importance of the pending negotiation with 
 England; the objection in the North to southern ex- 
 pansion, which Tyler recognized ; the opposition to an- 
 nexation on the part of the Texan executive, Lamar; 
 and the fear that annexation would be followed by a 
 declaration of war by Mexico against the United 
 States. As 'Tyler's term proceeded these causes for 
 delay disappeared one by one. 
 
 Mexico had been quiescent toward Texas for four 
 years and more. The war between Mexico and her 
 revolted ptovince resembled that between Spain and the 
 Spanish-American states in the twenties. War existed, 
 but it was not prosecuted. Technically there was a 
 state of war ; actually there was nothing more than a 
 succession of threats. Texas, although financially de- 
 pressed and burdened with debt, had managed to main- 
 tain herself for five years and had won not only recog- 
 nition but a position of commercial importance in the 
 eyes of the United States and Europe. Her independ- 
 ence was a fact admitted by all the world save Mexico. 
 Such being the case, the relations between Texas and 
 the United States could not legally concern Mexico. 
 Mexico might protest against annexation, she might 
 declare war against the United States were annexation 
 consummated, but the moral basis of a belligerent atti- 
 tude that she had justly in 1836 was lost after the 
 five years of Texan independence and her impotent 
 attempt at the subjugation of her revolted province. 
 The fears of war, which Jackson and Van Buren 
 
WEBSTER AND MEXICO, 184I-1843 93 
 
 rightly measured, ceased to be a controlling factor after 
 so long a period of waiting. The administration of 
 Lamar ended and Houston, who had proposed annex- 
 ation in 1837, was again president of Texas. Thus 
 another cause for inaction was removed. With the 
 ratification of the Ashburton treaty and the resigna- 
 tion of Webster as secretary of state another hindrance 
 disappeared. There remained but to win over the 
 Senate to the policy of annexation and Tyler would 
 have the credit of doing what Adams and Jackson 
 had failed to do. It was upon the support of the 
 Senate that annexation was to hang. Perhaps it was 
 due to the accident upon the Princeton (in which the 
 secretary of state and other officers of the government 
 were killed) and the appointment of Calhoun in the 
 place of Upshur that the Texan treaty of annexation 
 failed in the Senate. Tyler's plans were not based 
 upon such an unforeseen and disastrous accident. This, 
 however, is somewhat in advance of the story. Be- 
 fore Webster resigned and the annexation question 
 was pushed to the fore, there were certain incidents 
 of considerable importance in the relations between the 
 United States and Mexico. 
 
 The first was the negotiation for the release of a 
 number of American citizens, members of the ill-fated 
 Santa Fe expedition of 1841, who had been captured 
 and were held as prisoners of war. The second was 
 the reopening of the question of claims, into which that 
 of the acquisition of California was interjected. The 
 third was closely connected with the second: the vio- 
 lation of Mexican territory by the capture of Monterey 
 in Upper California by Commodore Jones. 
 
94 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 While Texas had ever since its independence laid 
 claim as far as the Rio Grande, no authority had been 
 exercised over the territory west of the Nueces. Under 
 President Lamar the Texan army had been disbanded 
 for lack of funds with which to maintain it. By an 
 irregular proceeding Lamar authorized members of 
 the Texan army to organize an expedition to go over- 
 land to Santa Fe for the purpose of winning New 
 Mexico for Texas and of extending the authority of 
 Texas west of the Nueces. The expedition, consist- 
 ing of about three hundred men, enrolled in addition 
 to those who had taken the oath of allegiance to Texas 
 a number of Americans and subjects of European 
 powers. The expedition fared disastrously. Six mem- 
 bers were taken prisoners and driven overland some 
 two thousand miles to the City of Mexico, there to be 
 held as prisoners of war. Among them was George 
 M. Kendall, editor of the New Orleans Picayune, 
 whose narrative of the expedition is of fascinating 
 interest as a graphic account of border adventure.' 
 Kendall and the other Americans insisted that they 
 were not in any sense identified with the expedition 
 in so far as it had any hostile purpose toward Mexico. 
 They claimed to be traveling for pleasure, or else that 
 they were only traders. As soon as the capture of 
 these men was reported to Ellis, the American minister 
 at Mexico, he demanded their freedom, claiming that 
 they should not be held as prisoners of war as they 
 were non-combatants and had no connection with the 
 alleged political purposes of the expedition. Ellis de- 
 
 ' Kendall's Santa Fe Expedition; Yoakum's Texas, II., 321- 
 31; Bancroft's North Mexican States and Texas, II., 334-37; 
 Waddy Thompson's Recollections, passim. 
 
WEBSTER AND MEXICO, 184I-I843 95 
 
 manded the release of the prisoners as a right. Santa 
 Anna's government availed itself of the opportunity 
 for delay that the discussion of the alleged right 
 afforded. Mexico claimed that even if the prisoners 
 were non-combatants they had violated a law of Mex- 
 ico which forbade any entrance into the province of 
 New Mexico from Texas, and that the Americans 
 were like Old Dog Tray, in bad company, on account 
 of which they should rightly suffer. The discussion 
 was prolonged until Ellis received word that Tyler 
 had appointed Waddy Thompson in his place. What 
 Santa Anna had refused ^s~a~right he conceded as 
 a matter of courtesy. Ellis's departure was the occa- 
 sion for Santa Anna's promise that Kendall and his 
 companions would be freed. Soon after Thompson's 
 arrival the prisoners were set at liberty. All this was 
 effected by Ellis, who was content to drop the argu- 
 ment if the object of it was attained.' Before the news 
 of the prisoners' release reached Washington, Webster 
 had penned a long protest in which he argued that 
 Kendall and his friends were held in violation of all 
 justice ; that the manner of their incarceration was con- 
 trary to the common dictates of humanity; and that 
 unless the release of the prisoners was made within 
 ten days after it was demanded, all intercourse with 
 Mexico would be suspended. This letter of Webster's 
 finds a place in his published works. Its contents 
 were not made known to the Mexican government, 
 the prisoners being at liberty before Webster's caustic 
 letter was received at Mexico. 
 
 It will be remembered that through Forsyth and 
 
 '//. Ex. Doc. 2^1, and S. Ex. Doc. 325, 27 Cong., 2 Sess. 
 
96 DIPLOMACY UNDI;r TYLIIR AND POLK 
 
 Martinez a convention had been arranged for the set- 
 tlement of the claims of American citizens against 
 Mexico through the arbitration commission. When 
 this treaty had finally been ratified, April 7, 1840, and 
 the necessary acts of Congress passed to carry it into 
 effect, the year 1841 was almost ended. Much time 
 was lost in discussion of the methods to be pursued 
 by the commission, and the period during which it was 
 to sit expired with many claims still unconsidered.' 
 Webster proceeded to urge the settlement of these 
 passed claims, together with a large number of addi- 
 tional ones which had never been presented for arbi- 
 tration. It should' be stated that the really valid claims 
 were admitted by the commission. Much doubt may 
 be cast upon those that were rejected and also upon 
 those presented too late for consideration. Before 
 anything had come of the matter, Mexico blazed up 
 with threats of the subjugation of Texas and the vigor- 
 ous prosecution of the war. Having at this time no 
 minister in residence at Washington, the Mexican sec- 
 retary for foreign affairs sent through an unaccredited 
 person in New York ' a protest against the assistance 
 that citizens of the United States had been allowed 
 to give Texas through the failure to enforce the neu- 
 trality laws. The government of the Mexican Repub- 
 lic protests "solemnly against the aggressions which 
 the citizens of those states are constantly repeating 
 upon the Mexican territory," and declares that "it 
 considers as a violation of the treaty of amity the 
 
 ' H. Ex. Doc. 391; H. Report 1096; S. Bx. Docs. 320 and 
 411, 27 Cong., 2 Sess. 
 
 ° Joaquin Velazquez de Leon to Webster, June 24, 1842 ; 
 Webster's Diplomatic and Official Papers, 301. 
 
WJJBSTER AND MEXICO, 184I-1843 97 
 
 toleration of a course of conduct which produces an 
 incomprehensible state of things, a state neither of 
 peace nor war, but inflicting upon Mexico the same 
 injuries and inconveniences as if war had been de- 
 clared between the two nations." " Tyler characterized 
 Bocanegra's note as impudent and deserving of a 
 severe answer." Webster answered it through Thomp- 
 son, who had succeeded Ellis as minister to Mexico. 
 After a long review of the history of the struggle be- 
 tween Texas and Mexico, Webster denied that the 
 United States had permitted any breaches of neutral- 
 ity. Then he used a direct threat, the harshness of the 
 tone of which comes out in strong relief when it is 
 recalled that at the time he was writing it he had in 
 contemplation a plan for the acquisition of California 
 by pressure on Mexico through the claims. "Mr. de 
 Bocanegra," he wrote Thompson, "is pleased to say 
 that, if war existed between the two countries, proceed- 
 ings more hostile, on the part of the United States 
 could not have taken place. . . . This opinion, 
 however hazardous to the discernment and just 
 estimate of things of those who avow it, is 
 yet abstract and theoretical, and so far harmless. 
 The efficiency of American hostility to Mexico 
 has never been tried; the government has no 
 desire to try it. It would not disturb the peace for 
 the sake of showing how erroneously Mr. de Bocane- 
 gra has reasoned; while on the other hand it trusts 
 that a just hope may be entertained that Mexico will 
 not inconsiderately and needlessly hasten into an ex- 
 periment by which the truth or fallacy of his sentiments 
 
 "Bocanegra to Webster, May 12, 1842; ibid., 302. 
 "Tyler to Webster; Tyler's Tylers, II., 258. 
 
gS DIPI^OMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 may be brought to an actual ascertainment. . . . 
 The United States desires peace. It would be 
 with infinite pain that they should find them- 
 selves in hostile relations with any of the new 
 governments on this Continent. But their Gov- 
 ernment is regulated, limited, full of the spirit 
 of liberty, but surrounded nevertheless with just re- 
 straints ; and greatly and fervently as it desires peace 
 with all states, and especially with its more immediate 
 neighbors, yet no fear of a different state of things 
 can be allowed to interrupt its course of equal and 
 exact justice to all nations, nor to jostle it out of the 
 constitutional orbit in which it revolves." "^ This 
 reply was but a threat. Webster said in effect: 
 "Mexico thinks she has suffered as much as she would 
 have done had war actually occurred between her and 
 the United States. Let her take care to act in such 
 a fashion that she will never have to learn how erro- 
 neous that opinion is." Before Webster's reply reached 
 Mexico, Bocanegra issued a circular note to the diplo- 
 matic corps residing in Mexico in which he protested 
 against the violations of neutrality that the United 
 States had tolerated, and announced that Mexico, 
 though not willing "to disturb the relations which she 
 still preserves with the United States, will assert and 
 maintain the justice of her cause, which she considers 
 to be based on the law of nations, by doing all that 
 is imperiously required for her honor and dignity." " 
 
 " Webster to Thompson, July 8, 1842 ; Webster's Diplomatic 
 and Official Papers, 304-15. 
 
 " Bocanegra to the Diplomatic Corps residing in Mexico, 
 May 31, 1842 ; H. Bx. Doc. 266, 27 Cong., 2 Sess., 19. Thomp- 
 son to the Diplomatic Corps ; ibid., 21. 
 
WEBSTER AND MEXICO, 184I-1843 99 
 
 The purpose that animated Santa Anna in author- 
 izing this bold manifesto is not clear, but it is probable 
 that the circular was intended to offset the force of 
 the understanding between Great Britain and the 
 United States that the Ashburton-Webster negotia- 
 tions seemed to imply. Thompson believed that certain 
 members of the diplomatic corps had instigated Bo- 
 canegra's action. The Mexican notes to Webster and 
 the circular to the diplomatic corps, which stated in 
 substance that if the United States continued to tolerate 
 what Mexico viewed as violations of neutrality Mexico 
 would declare war, created a great sensation in the 
 United States. Newspapers in all sections of the 
 country declared that war with Mexico was inevitable, 
 that Santa Anna had declared conditional war. There 
 is no evidence that Tyler or Webster believed that 
 Santa Anna's threat would be carried out. Thomp- 
 son's reports made light of the danger, and no more 
 was heard of the question until Commodore Jones, 
 stationed with his small squadron off the coast of 
 Chile, read about Mexico's conditional declaration of 
 war in months-old newspapers which foretold imme- 
 diate hostilities with Mexico. Meanwhile that country 
 had recovered from its bad temper, and in the fall of 
 1842 sent a minister to Washington, General Almonte, 
 the first to hold such a position since Gorostiza had 
 demanded his passports in 1837. 
 
 These details of diplomacy are rendered necessary 
 because the charge has been made that Tyler's admin- 
 istration desired to push Mexico into a declaration of 
 war. The same charge was made against Jackson. 
 During Webster's term as secretary of state every 
 effort was directed to the prevention of war. Mexico 
 
lOO DIPI^QMACY UNDEIR TYLER AND POLK 
 
 was told that "the war against Texas was not only 
 useless, but hopeless, without attainable object, injuri- 
 ous to both parties, and likely to be in its continuance, 
 annoying and vexatious to other commercial nations." " 
 All of this was true, but further he did not go save 
 once in the threat made through Thompson. When 
 Almonte arrived in Washington the relations between 
 the two countries were in better condition, with less 
 open friction, than they had been since the battle of 
 San Jacinto. 
 
 The method of publishing diplomatic correspondence 
 in vogue at that day was by a communication to Con- 
 gress upon the call of either house. How much should 
 be printed rested usually in the discretion of the Execu- 
 tive. Extracts were frequently printed, when the 
 whole letter, if known to the world, might have had 
 an embarrassing effect. It was usual, however, but 
 by no means the rule, to indicate what parts of the cor- 
 respondence sent to Congress were extracts and what 
 were full letters. The first despatch from Thompson, 
 dated April 29, 1842, was read by Webster May 30, 
 not long before Bocanegra's note as above quoted was 
 received. Upon a call of the Senate Tyler sent the 
 parts of Thompson's letter upon the subject of the 
 Santa Fe prisoners. Nothing in it showed that a part 
 had been left out, yet a long argument by Thompson for 
 the acquisition of California was omitted. "I believe," 
 wrote Thompson, "that this government would cede to 
 us Texas and the Californias, and I am thoroughly 
 satisfied that this is all we shall ever get for the claims 
 of our merchants in this country. As to Texas, I re- 
 
 " Webster to Thompson, June 22, 1842; MS., Archives, 
 
WEBSTER AND MEXICO, 184I-1843 lOI 
 
 gard it as of but little value compared with California, 
 the richest, the most beautiful, and the healthiest coun- 
 try in the world. Our Atlantic border secures us a 
 commercial ascendency there. With the acquisition of 
 Upper California, we should have the same ascendency 
 on the Pacific. The Harbor of San Francisco is ca- 
 pacious enough to receive the navies of the world. In 
 addition to which California is destined to be the gran- 
 ary of the Pacific. It is a country in which slavery 
 is not necessary and therefore, if that is made an ob- 
 jection, let there be another compromise. France and 
 England both have had their eyes upon it. The latter 
 has yet. I am profoundly satisfied that in its bearing 
 upon all the interests of our country, the importance 
 of the acquisition of California cannot be overesti- 
 mated." '^ Writing privately to Tyler soon afterwards, 
 Thompson begged for special instructions both as to 
 moving in the matter and as to the extent to which he 
 was to go in the negotiation and the amount to be paid. 
 The acquisition of California, he said, would reconcile 
 the northern people, as they had large fishing and 
 commercial interests in the Pacific, and we had liter- 
 affy no pofFTKereT"' WetTsfer'received Thompson's 
 plea toFthe annexation of California favorably. "In 
 seeking acquisitions to be governed as territories, and 
 lying at great distance from the United States," he 
 wrote, "we ought to be governed by our prudence and 
 caution,- and a still higher degree of these qualities 
 should be exercised when large territorial acquisitions 
 are looked for, with a view to annexation. Neverthe- 
 
 " Thompson to Webster, April 29, 1842; MS., 
 See Waddy Thompson's Recollections. 
 "Thompson to Tyler, May 9, 1842; MS., Archives. 
 
102 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 less, the benefits of a good harbour on the Pacific are 
 so obvious, that to that extent at least the President 
 strongly inclines to favor the idea of a treaty with 
 Mexico." " Webster thereupon suggested connecting 
 the claims with the negotiation for California (a plan 
 which Polk afterward pursued), or at least for the port 
 of San Francisco. England, he believed, would not 
 hinder the United States.^ "You will proceed in this 
 matter very cautiously" and quite informally, seeking 
 rather to lead the Mexican Secretary to talk on the 
 subject, than to lead directly., to it yourself. You will 
 be particularly careful not to suffer the Mexican Gov- 
 ernment to suppose that it is an object upon which 
 we have set our hearts, or for the sake of which we 
 should be willing to make large remuneration. The 
 cession must be spoken of rather as a convenience to 
 Mexico, or a mode of discharging her debts." 
 
 Tyler's inclination for California led no further than 
 the writing of Webster's letter to Thompson and the 
 sounding of Great Britain upon the question of the 
 acquisition of California by the United States. Web- 
 ster instructed Everett to make informal overtures to 
 Her Majesty's government "for the settlement of the 
 Oregon question, and the matters in dispute between 
 Mexico and the United States by a tripartite arrange- 
 ment which should, as one provision, embrace a ces- 
 sion to the United States of the port of San Francisco 
 on the coast of California." Lord Aberdeen informed 
 Everett that "though the Queen's Government would 
 not deem it expedient to become a party to any such 
 
 " Webster to Thompson, June 27, 1842 ; Van Tyne's Letters 
 of Daniel Webster, 269. 
 
WEBSTER AND MEXICO, 184I-1843 IO3 
 
 arrangement, they had not the sHghtest objection to 
 our making an acquisition of territory in that direc- 
 tion." " The government at Washington learned early 
 in 1843 that Commodore Jones (who two years before 
 had been placed in command of the Pacific squadron) 
 had seized Monterey in California under the false 
 impression that war existed between the United States 
 and Mexico. This Montery incident, partaking much 
 of the character of opera boufFe, has doubtless had more 
 attention paid to it than its intrinsic importance de- 
 mands. Adams told Webster that he believed it to 
 be, along with the question of the right of search, 
 the bill for the occupation of Oregon, and all the 
 movements for the annexation of Texas, part of one 
 great system looking for a war for conquest and plun- 
 der from Mexico, and a war with England and an alli- 
 ance with France." The Monterey question was no 
 part of any preconceived plan, for it effectually put 
 a stop to Thompson's negotiation for the acquisition 
 of California in exchange^ for the claims against 
 Mexico. 
 
 Jones's orders, which had been issued in December, 
 1841, can by no possible argument be construed as 
 giving authority for any aggressive measures toward 
 
 '' Everett to Calhoun, March 28, 1845 ; MS., Archives. Web- 
 ster's instructions to which Everett referred do not appear 
 in the State Department files. Everett believed that Mexico 
 might sell California because Bunsen told him that Me.xico 
 had previously offered it to Prussia. 
 
 "John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, XL, 346. Webster denied 
 it. Certainly Aberdeen's attitude toward the purchase of 
 California by the United States gave no basis for the belief 
 that Webster looked for war with England. Von Hoist (II., 
 615) quotes Adams's charge but omits Webster's denial. 
 
104 DIPLOMACY UNDBR TYLER AND POLK 
 
 Mexico. On the contrary, while he was instructed to 
 cruise along the coast of California and to explore 
 its bays and harbors, he was cautioned to exercise 
 great prudence and discretion "in avoiding all occa- 
 sions of exciting the jealousy of either of the Powers 
 having possessions or claims in that quarter, with 
 whom the United States are, and desire to continue, 
 at peace." " 
 
 In September, 1842, Jones's squadron was at Callao. 
 A British fleet left that port under sealed orders. 
 Jones believed that it had sailed for California. "The 
 Creole affair, the question of the right of search, the 
 mission of Lord Ashburton, the sailing of a strong 
 squadron from France under sealed orders, for the 
 military occupation, as it now appears, of the Mar- 
 quesas and Washington Islands ; new difficulties be- 
 tween the United States and Mexico, the well-founded 
 rumor of a cession of the Californias [to England] 
 and lastly the secret movements of the English naval 
 force in this quarter, have all occurred since the date 
 of your last order to me. Consequently I am without 
 instructions, or the slightest intimation as to your 
 views and wishes upon what I consider as a vital 
 question to the United States — the occupation of Cali- 
 fornia by Great Britain under a secret treaty with 
 Mexico." ^ At first sight Jones's action was an inde- 
 fensible outrage which had its incentive in his desire 
 as a southerner to conquer California and to extend 
 the area of slavery. A reading of his correspondence, 
 however, tempers one's judgment of the man and of his 
 
 ""//. Ex. Doc. 166, 27 Cong., 3 Sess., 46, 48. 
 
 " Jones to Upshur, September 13, 1842 ; ibid., -68. 
 
WEBSTER AND MEXICO, 184I-1843 I05 
 
 deeds. Rumors of a secret cession of California to 
 England were of long standing."" It was openly stated 
 that Mexico had mortgaged California to secure a 
 large loan. Such indeed was not the case, but the 
 repeated rumor was calculated to operate upon Jones's 
 judgment. The account of Bocanegra's circular to the 
 diplomatic corps, as given in American newspapers, 
 reached Jones months after the incident had closed. 
 At such a distance from home and without instructions, 
 Jones decided to crowd all sail to California, to frus- 
 trate the British fleet and, believing that war would 
 be the inevitable result of Bocanegra's circular, to take 
 possession of Monterey, the capital of Mexico's pro- 
 vince. Jones's judgment was, as the sequel showed, 
 faulty, but had he been right in his conjecture he 
 might have been a precursor of Dewey : the conqueror 
 of California and a hero in our naval history. The 
 commodore appeared off Monterey October 19. He 
 found no British vessels in the harbor. The dilapidated 
 "castle," mounting a few old guns, made no hostile 
 front. Jones demanded the surrender of the town and 
 province. Without the firing of a shot, the Mexican 
 flag was lowered and the American flag raised. That 
 night Larkin, a merchant of Monterey, and afterwards 
 American consul (and an active agent in the final 
 conquest of California), showed Jones that more re- 
 cent advices demonstrated that the United States and 
 Mexico were still at peace. Jones acted promptly, 
 lowered the American flag, raised and saluted that of 
 Mexico, and departed. He was now aware of the risk 
 
 "^Ashburton wrote to Webster, April 28, 1844, that he be- 
 lieved Great Britain never dreamed of acquiring California. 
 Webster's Private Correspondence, II., 192. 
 
I06 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 he had assumed. In his report upon the affair he 
 said : "I may be wrong in all my deductions and con- 
 clusions. If so, I may forfeit my commission and all 
 that I have acquired in seven and thirty years' devotion 
 to my country's service. Terrible as such a conse- 
 quence would be to me and my family, it was not suf- 
 ficient to deter me from doing what I believed to be 
 my duty, when a concatenation of unforeseen and 
 unforeseeable events rendered prompt and energetic 
 action necessary for the honor and interest of my 
 country. Come what will, I have the proud satisfac- 
 tion of believing, that however severely my judgment 
 may be condemned, no one will question the motives 
 which impelled me to action." ^' 
 
 Upon the receipt of the news of Jones's ill-advised 
 action, the secretary of the navy recalled him from his 
 command. He returned to Washington for an inquiry 
 and was temporarily suspended from the service. 
 
 Thompson at Mexico, without waiting for instruc- 
 tions upon the subject, disavowed Jones's act and 
 promised complete reparation for all injuries done. 
 After some correspondence between Thompson and 
 Bocanegra at Mexico and between Webster and Al- 
 monte at Washington, the matter was adjusted. Al- 
 monte demanded Jones's punishment for the "inaudito 
 atentado" against Mexico.^ Webster apologized for 
 the affront to the dignity of Mexico, and expressed the 
 great regret of the President at what had happened 
 and the conviction that "no such unfortunate and un- 
 
 °' Jones to the Secretary of the Navy, October 24, 1842; 
 H. Bx. Doc. 166, zj Cong., 3 S ess., Jo. 
 ^Almonte to Webster, January 24, 1843; ibid., 3. 
 
webstkr and MEXICO, 1841-1843 107 
 
 authorized occurrence ought in any degree to impair 
 the amicable relations subsisting between the two 
 countries so evidently to the advantage of both." ^ 
 
 The Monterey incident peaceably disposed of, atten- 
 tion was again directed to the question of claims, which 
 was never allowed to lie idle for any length of time. 
 In January, 1843, Thompson made an agreement with 
 the Mexican government extending the time for pay- 
 ment of the claims under the arbitration award. As 
 to the claims not adjusted, which he was instructed to 
 press for settlement, Thompson was not enthusiastic. 
 In a communication to Congress Tyler reported a let- 
 ter from Thompson in which he complained that 
 "claims of the most manifest and admitted justice were 
 postponed from day to day and from year to year." 
 A further comment of Thompson's was omitted. 
 Among the pending claims was one of William S. 
 Parrott for six hundred and ninety thousand dol- 
 lars, which was based largely upon the seizure of 
 a lot of bottled porter. "These claims," Thompson 
 reported, "are not of such a character as to justify 
 menace and the execution of that menace if compliance 
 is refused. I am constrained to say that if they were 
 referred to me as a judge, I could not admit them, 
 nay more, I cannot with a clear conscience assist them." 
 Parrott 's claim was exaggerated, he said, to a disgust- 
 ing degree. "To assist such a claim would subject 
 both me and the Government to ridicule, if nothing 
 worse." " Nevertheless he followed his instructions 
 and saw some prospects of success. "When I came 
 
 ^Webster to Almonte, January 30, 1843; ibid., 5 
 ^'Thompson to Webster, November 30, 1842; MS., Archives, 
 
I08 DIPIvOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 here," he said, "the claims were not worth twenty cents 
 on the dollar. I regard them now as worth par." " 
 
 Nothing was accomplished further than this upon 
 the claims while Webster was in office. The pressure 
 which had been exerted upon him to resign had never 
 lost, but had gained force. His reasons for continuing 
 as secretary of state had no longer any binding strength. 
 The Ashburton treaty had been concluded and ratified 
 by a larger vote in the Senate than Webster had hoped 
 for.^ The peace had been kept with Mexico notwith- 
 standing a series of vexatious incidents which might 
 easily have led to a breach. Webster's diplomatic 
 activities during his two years as secretary had been 
 fruitful in other directions, particularly by the opening 
 of diplomatic relations with China and of consular re- 
 lations with Hawaii.^" The subjects of the Danish 
 Sound dues and of the change in our commercial re- 
 lations with the German states by the formation of the 
 Zoll-Verein, a complete discussion of which belongs 
 to a later period, also claimed Webster's attention." 
 But with the Ashburton treaty ratified and in force, 
 Webster had no further desire to remain in Tyler's 
 official family. Fortunately, before he left the cabinet 
 he was able to straighten out a misunderstanding over 
 the article in the treaty of Washington providing for 
 joint cruising against the slave-trade." 
 
 "Thompson to Webster, January 31, 1843; MS., Archives. 
 
 ^'Webster to Jeremiah Mason, August 21, 1842; Webster's 
 Private Correspondence, II., 146. 
 
 ^John W. Foster's American Diplomacy in the Orietit; 
 J. M. Callahan's American Relations in the Pacific and the 
 Far Bast. 
 
 ™ Webster's Diplomatic and Official Papers, 382-92. 
 
 ''Ibid. 
 
WEBSTER AND MEXICO, 184I-1843 IO9 
 
 In his message at the opening of Congress in 1842 
 Tyler approved the course of Cass in protesting 
 against the quintuple treaty. He praised the joint- 
 cruising article of the Ashburton treaty as an indica- 
 tion of the American position as to the right of search. 
 The message reached England and gave rise to a 
 spirited debate in Parliament and a letter of inquiry 
 from Aberdeen as to Webster's construction of the 
 article. Ashburton wrote Webster that the question of 
 the right of search had never been discussed between 
 them, and that the joint-cruising convention had been 
 adopted as a practical measure for the accomplishment 
 of a specific purpose. In this view he was correct. As 
 has been said, it was a plan suggested by Tyler and 
 agreed to by Ashburton. Webster wrote to Everett 
 that the right of search had had no place in his nego-_ 
 tiation with Ashburton ; that no concession was asked 
 of, or given by. Great Britain. Following this up, he 
 elaborated upon the falsity of the distinction made be- 
 tween right of visitation and right of search. 
 Aberdeen, upon reading it, told Everett that he con- 
 curred in every word of the despatch and that he agreed 
 that there was no distinction between the right of 
 search and that of visitation. It was an amiable re- 
 ception of what proved to be Webster's valedictory. 
 The attack upon Ashburton for having signed a "capit- 
 ulation" was changed into a vote of thanks by Parlia- 
 ment, as Webster's so-called "surrender" had been 
 ratified by the overwhelming vote of the Senate. 
 
 The settlement of the northeastern boundary, the 
 adoption of a practical method for the extinction of the 
 slave-trade by preventing a fraudulent use of the 
 
no DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 American flag, and the incorporation into public law 
 of the principle of extradition were diplomatic honors 
 enough. After a short time no one of common sense 
 cared, as Ashburton said, about the precise position 
 of Lake Pohenagamook.^ "The merit of the settle- 
 ment was that it would not stand the description of a 
 sharp bargain." 
 
 The quarrels between Tyler and Congress and the 
 divisions of the Whig party are not within the scope 
 of the present inquiry. The reasons that led Web- 
 ster to resign from Tyler's cabinet, in so far as they 
 were political, do not belong to the diplomatic history 
 of the period. As has been stated, the Oregon ques- 
 tion had'been omitted from the Ashburton negotiation, 
 and Webster hoped to settle this himself by a special 
 mission. During the winter of 1843 such a special 
 mission was contemplated and the consideration of it 
 reluctantly dropped by Tyler."' 
 
 The business to be undertaken by Webster in this 
 special mission was intricate and delicate. The settle- 
 ment of the Oregon question was of course the first 
 and most important. Although Ashburton had not 
 entered into that matter, he was reported to have 
 stated to Webster that he thought England would 
 make no objection if Mexico would concede some- 
 thing south of our boundary of forty-two degrees 
 across the continent, so as to include the ports of San 
 Francisco and Monterey.'* 
 
 "^ Ashburton to Webster, January 2, 1843 ; Webster's Pri- 
 vate Correspondence, II., 162. 
 
 '' Webster to Everett, January 29, 1843 ; Curtis's Webster, 
 II., 176. 
 
 ^'i. Q. Adams, Memoirs, XI., 347; Tyler's Tylers, II., 260. 
 
WEBSTER AND MEXICO, 184I-1843 III 
 
 Then the President suggested sending Everett from 
 the Court of St. James to China as a special commis- 
 sioner to open diplomatic relations with the empire 
 of the Far East. The position of minister to Great 
 Britain was to be the door by which Webster might 
 gracefully let himself out of the cabinet.'" In Sep- 
 tember, 1841, one of Tyler's Virginia friends, Wise, 
 had suggested this : "in no way can we jilt Webster ex- 
 cept by sending him to England." ^ Upshur was to 
 take Webster's place as Tyler's secretary of state. 
 The position of commissioner to China did not tempt 
 Everett, who preferred to remain where he was. Ash- 
 burton, upon hearing that Everett might leave England 
 for the "Celestial Empire," said that he would be much 
 too fine an instrument for such a purpose. "It would 
 be cutting blocks with a razor."" It is no mere coin- 
 cidence that Webster's resignation was placed in 
 Tyler's hands May 8, 1843, the same day upon which 
 Everett's positive declination was received. Everett 
 could not be recalled to make room for Webster. 
 Every consideration of friendship, of loyalty, and even 
 of political expediency prevented that. After the 
 China mission had been suggested to Everett and de- 
 clined by him, no course was left to Webster but to 
 resign. With Webster's place to fill, Tyler's break 
 with the past was complete. Hugh S. Legare, the 
 attorney general, was made secretary of state ad in- 
 
 == Tyler's Tylers, II., 263, note. Cf. Webster to Everett, 
 lanuary 29, 1843, ut sup. lohn Quincy Adams, Memoirs, 
 XL, 347- 
 
 '"Tyler's Tylers, XL, 120. 
 
 ''Ashburton to Everett, April 28, 1844 (1843); Webster's 
 Private Correspondence, XL, 192. 
 
112 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYI,BR AND POLK 
 
 terini. A week after his retirement Webster wrote 
 that in his judgment Upshur, the secretary of the navy, 
 would be appointed. "The President's range for choice 
 is limited," he said. "Mr. Upshur is an accomplished 
 lawyer, with some experience abroad, of gentlemanly 
 manners and character, and not at all disposed to create, 
 or to foment foreign difficulties. How much of gen- 
 eral comprehensiveness and practical ability he pos- 
 sesses is yet to be evinced. I think the President could 
 not at present have done better." °* 
 
 At this time, however, Webster was not as fully in 
 Tyler's confidences as might be supposed. Calhoun 
 seems to have known, two months before Webster's 
 resignation was in the President's hands, that there 
 would be a change in the state department, and that 
 Upshur would be Webster's successor. The choice of 
 Upshur was entirely satisfactory to Calhoun and his 
 friends. "It would give him [Upshur]," so Calhoun 
 wrote to Duff Green, "a commanding position! in 
 which he might exert a very salutary influence over 
 the important questions that are likely to grow out 
 of our foreign relations the next few years." " 
 
 Thus ended the first half of Tyler's administration, 
 and with the resignation of Webster the opponent of 
 the annexation of Texas left the President's councils. 
 In his place came Upshur, who put into execution 
 Tyler's long deferred plan. Thenceforth during the 
 remainder of Tyler's administration every effort was- 
 made to recover what Tyler claimed Monroe's admin- 
 
 ^ Webster to Everett, May 12, 1843 ; Webster's Private 
 Correspondence, II., 173. 
 
 ™ Calhoun to Dufif Green, February (March) 19, 1843; 
 Report of the American Historical Association, 1899, II., 526. 
 
WEBSTER AND MEXICO, 184I-1843 II3 
 
 istration had suffered to be lost. The reannexation of 
 Texas was the policy of Tyler. His new secretary of 
 state lost no time in planning a campaign that might 
 make the policy effective and Texas a part of the 
 American Union. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 The Negotiations for Texas Under Upshur 
 1843-1844 
 
 After the departure of Webster from the cabinet 
 of Tyler the long-suppressed inclination of the Presi- 
 dent for the annexation of Texas manifested itself. 
 With the appointment to the head of the state depart- 
 ment of Upshur, whom Tyler's Virginia friends had 
 been urging for the place since the first reconstruction 
 of the cabinet in September, 1841, the question of 
 Texas pushed to the fore to the exclusion of every 
 other matter of foreign affairs. How long before 
 Webster's resignation the cabinet had been in a fer- 
 ment over annexation it is scarcely possible to state 
 definitely. 
 
 In December, 1841, John Quincy Adams was told 
 that the proffer of annexation, withdrawn by Texas 
 in 1838, would soon be renewed, but he confessed that 
 the developments of the project were not yet suffi- 
 ciently clear and explicit to know how to meet and 
 counteract it.' Newspapers south and north discussed 
 annexation pro and con, but no one believed that there 
 could be found a majority of either house of Congress 
 favorable to the measure upon any former terms. Until 
 Lamar's retirement from the presidency of Texas, late 
 in 1841, no action was taken reversing the decision 
 made three years earlier, which finally withdrew the 
 proposal of Texas to the United States. 
 
 ^John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, XI., 41. 
 
UPSHUR AND TEXAS, 1843-1844 II5 
 
 From the inauguration of Lamar's successor the 
 policy of Texas swung back to what it had been dur- 
 ing Houston's former term, when through him over- 
 tures for annexation had been made to Van Buren and 
 finally declined. There was no mistaking the temper 
 of the people of Texas upon the question, for they 
 could imagine no other outcome than the incorporation 
 of their nation with the United States. As to the 
 officers of the government of Texas, it is not so easy 
 to speak. Houston's sincerity in his favorable attitude 
 to annexation has been questioned and denied. Some 
 have thought that in his heart he really preferred the 
 independence of Texas, if that could be maintained, 
 even with the aid of Great Britain and France. Others 
 have believed that during the years from 1841 to 1844 
 he was merely "coquetting" with Great Britain in 
 order to force the hand of the United States ; and 
 further that he gave all the prominence possible to the 
 alleged intrigues of Great Britain with Texas in order 
 to develop in the United States a sentiment for an- 
 nexation as a measure of defense against the encroach- 
 ments of the former country.'' There is much that 
 points to such an explanation of the sinuous course 
 that Houston adopted, but proof is lacking that any 
 definite understanding existed between the executives 
 of the United States and Texas. Indeed, the evidence 
 points away from any understanding whatever. The 
 truth seems to be that Houston made up his mind that 
 the United States could be forced into a positive atti- 
 tude upon annexation; that Texas and not the United 
 States should appear to be in a receptive attitude ; that 
 
 ' Worley in the Quarterly of the Texas State Historical 
 Association, July, 1905, 40. 
 
Il6 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 the United States and not Texas should be the one to 
 press the proposal for annexation. Houston's idea 
 seems to have been to put the United States into an 
 aggressive position, in which Texas might drive as 
 good a bargain as possible." It is significant that the 
 negotiations for the annexation of Texas were con- 
 ducted at Washington. It is even more significant 
 that the American charge in Texas, William S. Mur- 
 phy, was kept uninformed for two months that his 
 government had proposed annexation. Early in his 
 second administration Houston made an overture for 
 annexation only to withdraw it. Then the United 
 States reopened the question. Houston declined to 
 consider it. The Texan Congress overruled the presi- 
 dent's declination, but it availed nothing until Houston 
 had managed to obtain from the United States assur- 
 ances of protection pending any negotiation. These 
 had, Houston agreed to annexation. This much in out- 
 line is set forth here, in advance of th£ proper and 
 orderly presentation of the narrative, for the purpose 
 of emphasizing what is believed to be the key to 
 Houston's diplomacy during Tyler's administration. 
 During the negotiation with Texas the scene shifts 
 from Washington to Texas, thence to London and 
 back again. All lines of the narrative must be kept in 
 mind. The events in Texas as well as those at Wash- 
 ington and at London are important for a correct ap- 
 preciation of the development of the policies of Hous- 
 ton and Tyler. 
 
 ' Anson Jones (Official Correspondence, passim) impugns 
 Houston's motives and claims to have been alone steadfast 
 for annexation, although he admits that there was a game 
 played toward France and England. 
 
UPSHUR AND TEXAS, 1843-1844 II7 
 
 Before Houston had been in office five months he 
 despatched a new representative to Washington, James 
 Reily, whom he authorized to renew the proposal for 
 annexation.* Reily frankly confessed that the time 
 was not ripe for the United States to act." Tyler he 
 found enthusiastic and "sincerely desirous of consum- 
 mating annexation immediately. . . . The President 
 would act in a moment if the Senate would assent." ' 
 Tyler's enthusiasm was shared by others. "Although 
 annexation was spoken of by the few warm and ardent 
 friends of the measure, including the President, R. J. 
 Walker, Upshur and Gilmer, Dr. Gwin of Mississippi, 
 and others useless to mention, yet at no time [during 
 Reily's short residence at Washington] was it discussed 
 as a probable event. All parties were satisfied that no 
 treaty of annexation would be ratified by the ■ Senate, 
 and there was not even a majority in favor of the 
 policy in the lower House." ' So Reily reported upon 
 the state of feeling during the summer of 1842. There 
 were manifold reasons why the question could not then 
 be brought forward. The Ashburton negotiation was 
 in itself enough to engage the entire attention of Tyler. 
 Webster was opposed to the measure. The character 
 
 * Jones, OKcial Correspondence, 38. 
 
 ' Reily to Jones, March 25, 1842 : "I would rather die than 
 remain here. . . . Nothing can be done here in the way 
 of negotiations for Texas." Ibid., 178. 
 
 'Reily to Jones, July 11, 1842; Yoakum's Texas, II., 347. 
 Houston to Jones, August 2, 1842 : "In Reily's place I have 
 sent Van Zandt to Washington. He will be prudent and will 
 not jump high enough to endanger his safety." Jones, OMcial 
 Correspondence, 186. 
 
 ''Niks' Register, LXXIII., 147, quoted by Tyler, Tylers, 
 II., 256. 
 
Il8 DIPLOMACY UNDBR TYI,^R AND POI,K 
 
 that the Texans had shown in their Santa Fe ex- 
 peditions — the first, which Kendall accompanied, and 
 the second, known as Sniveley's expedition — was not 
 such as to gain them additional moral support. Pos- 
 sibly the former and certainly the latter of these ex- 
 peditions was a mere freebooting enterprise. The 
 members of the first had been captured by the Mexi- 
 cans and liberated only through the determined efforts 
 of the representatives of the United States. Sniveley's 
 command had been disarmed by a detachment of United 
 States troops near the border. "The first step," wrote 
 Jackson to Houston, "that led to the injury of the 
 fame of Texas, was that foolish campaign to Santa 
 Fe; the next the foolish attempt to invade Mexico, 
 without means or men sufficient for the occasion." ° 
 Texan military enterprise came to be looked upon in 
 the United States, even by the friends of Texas, as 
 guerilla warfare, unredeemed by the appearance of a 
 defensive undertaking. Thus the character of Texas as 
 an independent nation had sunk in the estimation of (the 
 American people. A further reason why Tyler de- , 
 ferred any action was that the Mexican claims were 
 under discussion. Finally, the United States and Mex- 
 ico were upon a more friendly footing, so that there 
 were reasons enough for Tyler's declination of Hous- 
 ton's offer delivered through Reily in July, 1842. It 
 would have been a waste of time to hazard the question 
 of annexation. All that Houston's agent accomplished 
 was an agreement with Webster for a commercial 
 treaty. This the Senate rejected upon the ground that 
 
 'Jackson to Houston, August 31, 1843; Yoakum, Texas, 
 II., 406. 
 
UPSHUR AND TEXAS, 1843-1844 II9 
 
 such a treaty with Texas would interfere with 
 the prosecution of the claims against Mexico. 
 In the fall of 1842 Houston sent another agent, 
 Isaac Van Zandt, who repeated the offer made 
 by Reily. Tyler again declined the proposal. 
 So far Houston had met with failure in every 
 attempt looking toward an understanding with the 
 United States. The experience with Jackson and Van 
 Buren was being repeated. 
 
 With this rejection of the offer as proposed by Van 
 Zandt, Houston began upon a new theory. This was 
 to cultivate by every means possible the jealousy with 
 which the United States regarded Great Britain. The 
 first step in this policy was to reconsider the offer made 
 by Van Zandt and declined by Tyler. Houston in- 
 structed Van Zandt to say to the authorities of the 
 United States that it would now be necessary for the 
 United States to make an advance so decided as to 
 open wide the door of negotiation to Texas. Should 
 that be done Texas would renew the proposal for an- 
 nexation!' 
 
 Houston was not compelled to wait long for the 
 sentiment in the United States to assume an aggressive 
 character. Gilmer of Virginia, who with Upshur was 
 in closest contact with Tyler and in his confidence, 
 published a letter in which he put forward the "re- 
 annexation" of Texas to the United States as the im- 
 mediate duty of the government. This letter of Gilmer 
 was, according to Benton, the first step in a great 
 conspiracy which had for its object not only the an- 
 
 ' Jones to Van Zandt, February 10, 1843; Yoakum's Texas, 
 II., 407. 
 
I20 DIPI,OMACY UNDBR TYLER AND POLK 
 
 nexation of Texas (no great wrong in itself in Benton's 
 eyes), but the promotion of the candidacy of Calhoun, 
 who avowedly aspired to be Tyler's successor. This 
 meant the defeat of Martin Van Buren for the Demo- 
 cratic nomination in 1S44. The most detailed treat- 
 ment of the subject is that of Von Hoist, who in fol- 
 lowing Benton's view of an intrigue in the interests 
 of Calhoun makes his narrative revolve about the 
 political situation that resulted in the defeat of Van 
 Buren in the Democratic convention of 1844. The 
 charge of Benton — that Tyler's enthusiasm for Texan 
 annexation was but a part of an intrigue to fasten 
 Calhoun upon the Democratic party — does not seem to 
 be well sustained. If such an intrigue existed, Tyler 
 was obviously ignorant of it. He was from the be- 
 ginning of his term enthusiastic for Texas. We have 
 seen the forces that hindered his enthusiasm from 
 becoming effective. Gilmer's public letter advocating 
 immediate annexation was claimed to be the first direct 
 act of the Calhoun intriguers. The tone of this letter 
 is sufficiently explained by the status of the relations 
 with Texas. That the letter appeared soon after Cal- 
 houn had .resigned from the United States Senate is 
 probably coincidental. There is nothing In Calhoun's 
 correspondence to show that there was any connection 
 between his resignation from the Senate and his presi- 
 dential candidacy on the one side, and the annexation 
 of Texas on the other. It is difficult to see how 
 the advocacy of annexation would at that time have 
 furthered Calhoun's political chances. Perhaps this 
 was merely a ruse. It is difficult to frame a theory of 
 the Tyler-Texas-Calhoun propaganda with which all 
 the facts fit perfectly. Calhoun was, and had been for 
 
UPSHUR AND TEXAS, 1843-1844 121 
 
 a long time, favorable to Texan annexation. So was 
 Tyler. So was Jackson until the responsibility of 
 ofifice and his regard for Van Buren as his successor 
 made him cautious. Tyler, without a party, believed 
 the time ripe for annexation. He was surrounded by 
 Calhoun's friends, Upshur and Gilmer among the num- 
 ber. Calhoun resigned from the Senate and was nomi- 
 nated by South Carolina for the presidency two years 
 before the national convention was to meet. The pur- 
 pose was, of course, to defeat Van Buren. Calhoun 
 emphasized his position upon the tariff, upon which he 
 was in opposition to Van Buren's friends. Upon the 
 tariff, he believed. Van Buren was prostrated in the 
 south," and Texas came after the tariff as a subject 
 upon which the South could unite. Calhoun favored it. 
 Van Buren finally opposed it. Tyler was the instru- 
 ment by which annexation was brought forward by 
 Calhoun's friends, but in the end neither Calhoun, nor 
 Van Buren, nor Tyler made political capital out of the 
 Texas question. It resulted, however, in throwing 
 Van Buren overboard, which many southern Demo- 
 crats had determined upon as early as 1841. Annexa- 
 tion was not broached through Calhoun, but through 
 Calhoun's old enemy, Jackson. Gilmer's letter to 
 the public was sent to Jackson by a member of the 
 House from Tennessee. It was no coincidence that 
 Houston wrote Jackson at the same time. The reply 
 from the Hermitage was couched in as strong terms 
 as the increasing body of annexationists could desire. 
 The suspicions of John Quincy Adams took fire at 
 the aggressive attitude of the annexationists. Early 
 
 "Calhoun to Duff Green, August 31, 1842; Report of Am. 
 Hist. Association, i8i?9, II., 516. 
 
122 DIPLOMACY UNDBjR TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 in March, 1843, he joined with twelve colleagues of 
 the lower house in an address to the people of the 
 United States, warning them against the machina- 
 tions of the administration to secure the extension 
 of slavery by adding Texas to the Union, pointing 
 out the gross violations of our neutral obligations to- 
 ward Mexico, and calling upon the free states for re- 
 newed and increased activity to avert the calamity 
 with which the country was threatened. At the time 
 Adams's address was published there was no propo- 
 sition for annexation pending, so far as the records 
 show. The month before Van Zandt had determined 
 to let the matter rest while the United States made the 
 move." 
 
 At this juncture Houston had the advantage of a 
 series of events which, better than any he could have 
 devised, served to awaken the jealousy of the United 
 States toward Great Britain. Santa Anna had threat- 
 ened to renew the war against Texas, so Houston 
 asked that the United States, Great Britain, and France, 
 acting jointly, mediate between his country and Mex- 
 ico. Great Britain declined to join with the other 
 powers in mediation, but promised by acting alone to 
 interpose her good offices for the termination of the 
 war. Santa Anna was prevailed upon by Doyle, the 
 British charge in Mexico, to submit an armistice to 
 Houston. Doyle, in Mexico, and Elliott, the British 
 charge in Texas, were occupied during the spring and 
 summer of 1843 with the arrangement of this armis- 
 tice. Whether or not Houston was sincere in his de- 
 
 " The petitions for and against annexation presented to 
 both houses of Congress from now on displayed the increas- 
 ing importance of the subject. 
 
UPSHUR AND TEXAS, 1843-1844 I23 
 
 sire for an armistice with Santa Anna is not to be 
 decided. Doubtless the armistice was an effective 
 method of delaying hostile aggressions by Santa Anna, 
 and Houston made the greatest possible use of it to 
 arouse the jealousies of the United States by throwing 
 into prominence the activity of the British agents who 
 arranged the truce. 
 
 Although advised by Elliott that he had no doubt of 
 Mexico's ultimate refusal to treat with Texas unless 
 the sovereignty of Mexico were acknowledged, Hous- 
 ton proclaimed the armistice and sent commissioners 
 to meet those selected by Santa Anna." No 'time was 
 lost in putting the correspondence with Elliott upon 
 the subject of the truce into the hands of the United 
 States government. The reply of Anson Jones to 
 Elliott accepting Santa Anna's proposition was im- 
 mediately sent to Van Zandt at Washington." While 
 Elliott was busy in transmitting the correspondence 
 between Texas and Mexico, the American charge. 
 General William S. Murphy, who had but just arrived 
 in Texas, observed the proceedings with growing in- 
 dignation. He was forced to sit by and see Texas fall 
 into the power of England, as he believed, through the 
 exertions of Houston. Not a word was said to him 
 about the armistice (although it was fully reported to 
 Van Zandt for the information of the administration at 
 Washington), and he was allowed to be as fully im- 
 pressed by the activity of the British agent as was 
 possible. Finally, under professions of great secrecy, 
 Jones gave Murphy copies of the correspondence, with 
 
 •♦jffilouston's proclamation was dated June 13, 1843. 
 ♦1^7ones to Van Zandt, June 5, 1843; Yoakum, Texas, II., 
 409- 
 
124 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 • 
 
 the injunction that Houston must never know that the 
 secret had been let out. Jones's ruse was successful." 
 Murphy wrote home that England's power over Hous- 
 ton was complete; that the executive of Texas was 
 determined to take a position in opposition to the 
 wishes of the people of Texas, which were well known 
 to be favorable to annexation. "The armistice has 
 been accepted by this Government," he wrote, "and 
 proclaimed to the world, but what steps are now in 
 progress, I know not, nor can I know until they should 
 disclose themselves to the world. England may at this 
 time be setting on foot a negotiation of vast conse- 
 quence to the United States, and in all probability such 
 is the case." " 
 
 At about the time that Murphy's report of the 
 armistice was received, Tyler's attorney general and 
 acting secretary of state, Legare, died. Upshur, the 
 secretary of the navy, was transferred to the state de- 
 partment. At this point also appears a new character 
 upon the scene, who on account of his close friendship 
 and intimacy with Calhoun added force to the charge 
 that the Tyler pro-annexation policy was really a part 
 of the Calhoun propaganda. This new factor in the 
 Texas question was General Duff Green, whose 
 daughter had married Calhoun's son. Green's son, 
 moreover, Benjamin E. Green, was the American charge 
 in Mexico. In the summer of 1843 Duff Green was in 
 England endeavoring to sound the public men of Peel's 
 
 " Murphy to the Secretary of State, enclosing copies of the 
 correspondence of Elliott and Jones. MS., Archives. 
 
 " Murphy to the Secretary of State,^ June 5, 1843, received' 
 July 8; MS., Archives. Murphy was not presented to Hous- 
 ton until June 17, 1843. Jones, OMcial Correspondence, 38. 
 
UPSHUR AND TEXAS, 1843-1844 125 
 
 cabinet as well as those of the opposition upon the 
 subject of reciprocal free trade. Soon after fiis de- 
 parture Calhoun wrote him : "I must say, that I have 
 not much hope, that anything satisfactory can be done 
 in the form of an arrangement, although I do not doubt 
 the sincerity of the Government on either side. The 
 difficulties are great, but if an equal and fair arrange- 
 ment can be made, I do not doubt its expediency. I 
 am for free trade; free trade on both sides if it can 
 be had ; but if not, on one side." " Green soon found 
 that he could do nothing with Peel's administration. 
 He then placed his hopes in the Whig opposition. He 
 reported that Lord John Russell told him that the 
 ministry would be assailed in their American policy; 
 that if Palmerston returned to power, his party would 
 "go for free trade with America and an imme- 
 diate adjustment of the Oregon question, for the ad- 
 mission of slave-grown produce, and non-interference 
 in the domestic policy of other nations ; that they will 
 denounce the attempt to emancipate the slaves of 
 Cuba, Brazil, the States and Texas as illegal and 
 unwise interference." " Green's advice was that the 
 United States should assume an aggressive position 
 toward Texas. He believed that the antislavery party 
 in England was losing influence. "If our government 
 can be induced to take strong ground on the question 
 of Texas, the free trade party here will rally for us 
 against the fanatics, and the Whigs will make the re- 
 fusal of ministers to meet the proposition of our 
 Government a matter of serious assaults." " 
 
 "Calhoun to Green, June 7, 1843; Report of Am. Hist. 
 Association, 1899, II., S37- 
 "Green to Calhoun, August 2, 1842 (1843?); ibid., 846. 
 " Green to Calhoun, September 2, 1843 ; ibid., 871. 
 
126 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 While Green was thus sounding the opposition upon 
 its attitude toward the United States, Ashbel Smith, 
 the Texan charge at London and Paris, succeeded in 
 obtaining from Lord Aberdeen the views of the British 
 ministry toward Texas." Great Britain had but re- 
 cently recognized the independence of Texas and was 
 then active, as has been seen, in arranging an armis- 
 tice between Texas and Mexico. Public sentiment in 
 England was outspoken in favor of the abolition of 
 slavery. Stephen P. Andrews, noted as an antislavery 
 agitator, now appeared in London as an agent of the 
 abolitionists of Texas, with a proposition that Great 
 Britain should advance a loan to Texas to be applied 
 to the purchase and emancipation of Texas slaves. 
 Smith repudiated Andrews to Lord Aberdeen, saying 
 that his visit to London was his individual act, unauthor- 
 ized by the government or citizens of Texas. The charge 
 reported to Jones, the Texan secretary of state, the 
 substance of his interview with Aberdeen upon the 
 subject of Andrews's visit and upon the more general 
 topic of Great Britain's attitude toward Texas. He told 
 Aberdeen that he had reason to think no disposition 
 to agitate the subject of slavery existed on the part 
 either of the government or of any respectable portion 
 of the citizens of Texas. "I also stated to Lord Aber- 
 deen that I was informed representations would be 
 sent out to Texas, based on statements made by mem- 
 bers of the Antislavery convention [recently held in 
 London], who had recently called on his Lordship 
 touching this matter, to the effect that Her Majesty's 
 Government would afford in some way the means for 
 
 " Smith to Jones, Paris, August 2, 1843 ; Jones, OMcial 
 Correspondence, 236. 
 
UPSHUR AND TEXAS, 1843-1844 I27 
 
 reimbursing or compensating the slaveholders, provided 
 slavery were abolished in our country. I enquired 
 what grounds there was for these assertions. His 
 Lordship replied in effect : That it is the well known 
 policy and wish of the British Government to abolish 
 slavery everywhere — that its abolition in Texas is 
 deemed very desirable. ... He added that there 
 was no disposition on the part of the British Govern- 
 ment to interfere improperly on this subject, and that 
 they would not give the Texian Govt, cause to complain. 
 He was not prepared to say whether the British Govt, 
 would consent hereafter to make such compensation to 
 Texas as would enable the slaveholders to abolish 
 slavery. The object is deemed so important, perhaps 
 they might, though he would not say certainly." ^ Such 
 was the Texan charge's report of Lord Aberdeen's po- 
 sition upon the subject of abolition in Texas. It was 
 written soon after the event and there is no reason for 
 believing it in any wise incorrect. 
 
 Green, however, disturbed by the increasing senti- 
 ment for abolition, looked upon the activities of An- 
 drews as a menace to the interests of the United States. 
 He wrote that Aberdeen had told Smith that the Brit- 
 ish government deemed it so important to prevent the 
 annexation of Texas to the United States that they 
 were prepared to support the loan if it should be re- 
 quired to prevent annexation.^ Whether Smith im- 
 posed upon Green, or Green colored the correct state- 
 ment, it is impossible to say. The true account of 
 
 ""Smith to Jones, July 31, 1843; Report Am. Hist. Asso- 
 ciation, 1899, II., 867. Cf. Ashbel Smith, Reminiscences. 
 
 ^ 5". Bx. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., I Sess., 1 8. Quoted by Upshur 
 to Murphy, August 8, 1843. 
 
128 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLUR AND POI.K 
 
 Aberdeen's interview with Smith was probably not in 
 the hands of the state department at Washington 
 until the spring of 1844. Green's reports helped to fill 
 Tyler and Upshur with as much jealousy of Great 
 Britain's power over Texas as Houston could possibly 
 have desired. Through the agency of Duff Green, 
 therefore, Tyler's policy toward Texas was to some 
 extent molded. Texas must be annexed 'as a measure 
 of self-protection to the United States against the en- 
 encroachments of Great Britain, which, by obtaining an 
 influence over Texas, might dispute with the United 
 States the commercial and naval supremacy of the Gulf 
 of Mexico. More than this, Texas must be annexed 
 to the United States in order to protect the slave in- 
 terests of the southern states, so jeopardized by Great 
 Britain's advocacy of abolition in Texas. 
 
 For the first time in its history the government de- 
 liberately assumed a position to the world that in in- 
 ternational relations the United States stood for 
 slavery; that the United States was nationally a slave 
 power and opposed to abolition in a neighboring state 
 as a menace to its own interests. Expansion had been 
 postponed until 1843 by fears of a war with Mexico 
 and by the opposition that the antislavery sentiment 
 fostered and encouraged. In the negotiation for Texas 
 which Upshur and Calhoun conducted the extreme 
 position was taken : Texas must be annexed, lest by 
 remaining independent under the domination of Great 
 Britain she might abolish slavery. That the United 
 States should press for annexation as a means of net 
 tralizing the efforts of Great Britain to obtain an as- 
 cendancy over Texas was a legitimate and proper 
 course, if the government sincerely believed that such 
 
UPSHUR AND TEXAS, 1843-1844 129 
 
 was Great Britain's ambition. That Tyler's adminis- 
 tration based its opposition to Great Britain's ascend- 
 ancy upon the ground that it looked toward abolition 
 in the independent state of Texas is quite another 
 matter. Tyler's fear of the influence of Great Britain 
 was in itself not surprising. It is not, however, so 
 easy to defend the ground that he actually assumed^ 
 that anything that tended toward the abolition of 
 slavery in America was a menace to the national 
 interests of the United States. The assertion that 
 American supremacy demanded Texan annexation was 
 logical and natural. The weakness of Tyler's method 
 of asserting that supremacy lay in the declaration to 
 the world that the interests of slavery demanded an- 
 nexation. The United States stood before the world, 
 not as a defender of slavery merely, but as the aggres- 
 sive champion of it, determined that where slavery 
 existed, there it should remain. Duff Green's reports 
 and Upshur's instructions based thereon give, there- 
 fore, the starting point to the negotiations of which 
 the rejected treaty of annexation was the result. 
 
 "I: am authorized by the Texan' minister to say to 
 you, that Lord Aberdeen has agreed that the British 
 government will guarantee the interest [upon a loan] 
 upon condition that the Texan government will abolish 
 slavery." ^ So wrote Green to Upshur. Upon this 
 information incorrectly stated by either Green or 
 Smith the secretary proceeded to act. He wrote Mur- 
 
 " Quoted by Upshur as "a private letter from a citizen of 
 Maryland, then in London," in Upshur's instructions to Mur- 
 phy, August 8, 1843; H. Ex. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., i Sess., 18; 
 S. Ex. Doc. 341, 28 Cong., I Sess.; Ashbel Smith, Reminis- 
 cences, 52-55. 
 
130 DIPI^OMACY UNDER TYLfiR AND POLK 
 
 phy in Texas, quoting Green's letter without naming 
 the writer. A movement by Great Britain of the sort 
 described could not, he said, "be contemplated by us 
 in silence. Such an attempt upon any neighboring 
 country would necessarily be viewed by this Govern- 
 ment with very deep concern, but when it is made upon 
 a nation whose territories join the slaveholding States 
 of our Union, it awakens a more solemn interest. It 
 cannot be permitted to succeed without the most strenu- 
 ous efforts on our part to arrest a calamity so serious 
 to every part of our country." The secretary then 
 proceeded to elaborate his argument for "arresting the 
 calamity." If the movement were confined to the 
 abolitionists of Texas, Tie would find little concern, for 
 he knew tljey were few in numbers and weak in in- 
 fluence. He beheld in England's action, however, a 
 part of a general plan for the abolition of slavery 
 throughout the world, as a means of holding her own 
 commercial supremacy threatened by slave labor. "No 
 other adequate motive can be found for her determined 
 and persevering course in regard to domestic slavery 
 in other countries." England's attitude toward Texas 
 was, he said, based upon this motive. It was the con- 
 trol of the destinies of Texas at which she aimed. 
 Abolition of slavery was but a handle for the raising 
 of such a policy. Important, however, as England's 
 supremacy might be, he further stated, "there was an- 
 other view of the subject still more important to us 
 and scarcely less important to Texas herself." This 
 was the existence of a republic without slavery, ad- 
 joining the slave states of the South. He dwelt 
 upon the horrors of a system by which slaves might 
 escape and their owners have no recourse. If Texas 
 
UPSHUR AND TEXAS, 1843-1844 I3I 
 
 were to be free, he believed that quarrels and even 
 war would soon be the result. "If this government 
 should make itself a party in asserting the rights of 
 the slaveholder, the result could not fail to be unfavor- 
 able to Texas." With regard to her, the question would 
 merely be whether a slave-owner would submit to in- 
 tolerable and ruinous wrongs, or protect himself by 
 force. "Between such alternatives, it is impossible to 
 suppose that he would hesitate a moment." There was 
 no analogy, he said, between Texas and Canada, for. 
 between the slave states and the British province there 
 were free states of the Union, bound to return the 
 fugitive slave. Thus Murphy was told that the United 
 States would not permit abolition in Texas. This is 
 the prevailing idea of the instruction. It is equally 
 noteworthy for what it omits, as there is hot one word 
 about the annexation of Texas." Murphy's answer 
 was not received by Upshur until after annexation 
 had been proposed to Van Zandt at Washington. 
 Murphy was inclined to make light of Andrews and 
 his abolitionist plans in Texas. "The people of 
 Texas," he wrote, "love their constitution and form of 
 government; and ninety-nine out of a hundred would 
 die for their preservation. The constitution of Texas 
 secures to the master the perpetual right to his slave 
 and prohibits the introduction of slaves into Texas 
 from any other quarter than the United States. Take 
 this stand on the side of the constitution and the laws, 
 and the civil, political, and religious liberties of the 
 people of Texas (saying nothing about abolition) and 
 all the world will be with you." "* Houston's apparent 
 
 " Upshur to Murphy; August 8, 1843 ; ut sup. 
 " Murphy to Upshur, September 24, 1843 (received Novem- 
 ber 3) ; H. Bx. Doc. 271, sS Cong., i Sess., 22. 
 
132 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 pro-British tendencies concerned Murphy more than 
 Andrews's abolitionist schemes. He wrote : "Let the 
 United States take some immediate quick step in this 
 subject." ^ Before Murphy's letter had been read by 
 Upshur, the "quick step" had been taken. Murphy 
 was told that as far as the government of the United 
 States was concerned, it would come to the aid of 
 Texas immediately if that were possible, but he feared 
 that the government would not have the support of the 
 people in the policy of assistance. "No negotiation is 
 now pending between this government and Texas," he 
 added." 
 
 Upshur, it will be seen, preferred to build up his 
 policy upon the unofficial reports of Duff Green. Ob- 
 viously, the proper source of information as to British 
 interference in Texas was Everett, the minister to 
 Great Britain; but Everett was not in touch with, nor 
 was he in the confidence of, Tyler, who would gladly 
 have got rid of him for Webster. From Everett's 
 reports Upshur could gain nothing upon which to 
 raise fears of British supremacy in Texas. Everett 
 was then told that the movements of Great Britain rela- 
 tive to African slavery had assumed such a character 
 as to demand the serious attention of the American 
 government. Taking Brougham's interpellation of 
 Aberdeen in the House of Lords, upon the general 
 subject of Texas and slavery, as a peg upon which to 
 hang an essay in defense of slavery as the necessary 
 condition of the African race, Upshur repeated the 
 
 "^ Murphy to Upshur, September 23, 1843 (received Nov. 
 3) ; ibid., 24. 
 
 ^Upshur to Murphy, September 22, 1843. In part printed 
 as above, but this quotation was omitted. 
 
UPSHUR AND TEXAS, 1843-1844 I33 
 
 arguments made to Murphy upon the danger of abo- 
 lition in Texas."' "A leading and fundamental insti- 
 tution, interwoven with the interests of nearly one-half 
 of the States of our Union, is threatened by the policy 
 of a foreign Power. We must be infatuated indeed, 
 if we can quietly submit to any policy of a foreign 
 nation designed or calculated to bring it into danger." '' 
 Everett's report, if Upshur gave it any credit at all, must 
 have shown the secretary that he had been deluded by 
 a hoax, carefully prepared for him by Duff Green. 
 Houston's and Jones's ruse of scaring the United 
 States, played through Murphy in Texas and Van 
 Zandt at Washington, was entirely successful. Ever- 
 ett's reply to Upshur stated that both Aberdeen and 
 Ashbel Smith had distinctly denied that any proposi- 
 tion had been made by Texas in which abolition was 
 mentioned.'^ 
 
 ^Upshur to Everett, No. 61, September 28, 1843; S. Ex. 
 Doc. 341, 28 Cong., I Sess., 27. 
 ^Upshur to Everett, confidential, September 28, 1843; ibid., 
 
 37- 
 
 " Everett to Upshur, November 16, 1843 ; ibid., 40. 
 
 "The subject of domestic slavery was never so much as 
 mentioned or alluded to by the British minister to the gov- 
 ernment of Texas, except to disclaim in most emphatic terms 
 any intention on the part of England to interfere with it here. 
 Indeed, that constituted no part of the policy of that far 
 reaching nation. She might be willing to tickle the abo- 
 litionists (a somewhat venomous but not very respectable or 
 influential class of her citizens) but had no idea of going in 
 a crusade with them to abolish slavery in Texas, or anywhere 
 else. Her Texas policy was to build up a power independent 
 of the United States who could raise cotton- enough to supply 
 the world; of which power slavery would be a necessary 
 element. And this not primarily to injure the United States, 
 but to benefit herself, not from enmity to Brother Jonathan, 
 but love to John Bull, and so with France." Anson Jones, 
 Official Correspondence, 82. 
 
134 DIPI,OMACY UNDER TYLER AND POI^K 
 
 But Upshur had been too powerfully played upon 
 by fears of Great Britain to wait for Everett's report. 
 What he had promised to do for Texas in general 
 terms was now put forth specifically. "Recent occur- 
 rences in Europe," he said, "have imparted to the sub- 
 ject a fresh interest and presented it in new and im- 
 portant aspects." He therefore proposed to Van 
 Zandt that he ask for instructions favorable to a treaty 
 of annexation. He could not guarantee the Senate's 
 ratification of an annexation treaty, but he engaged that 
 the President would urge the measure upon the "con- 
 sideration of Congress." °° 
 
 Van Zandt immediately asked for instructions to 
 proceed according to Upshur's proposal. He wrote 
 to his government that he hoped they would accept 
 annexation, as he believed it the best move possible. 
 "My secret opinion is that Santa Anna won't acknowl- 
 edge our independence now, but we must keep trying — 
 the longer the armistice the better." "^ Upshur's over- 
 ture came as a surprise to Houston. Murphy had not 
 been instructed to offer annexation and he was not 
 informed by Upshur of the proposal to Van Zandt."' 
 All that Upshur vouchsafed to say to Murphy was that 
 the administration desired annexation but it was doubt- 
 ful if it could be effected." 
 
 ^ Upshur to Van Zandt, October i6, 1843 ; ibid., 37. 
 
 " Van Zandt to Jones, October 22, 1843 ; Jones, Official Cor- 
 respondence, 259 
 
 '"Upshur to Murphy, January 16, 1844; S. Ex. Doc. 341, 
 28 Cong., I Sess., 43. Upshur's letters to Murphy of October 
 l8 and October 20 (MS., Archives) say nothing about annex- 
 ation. 
 
 ^ Upshur to Murphy, November 21, 1843, was in reference 
 to the armistice. Extracts printed in H. Ex. Doc. zyi, 28 
 Cong., I Sess., 43. 
 
UPSHUR AND TEXAS, 1843-1844 I35 
 
 In Houston's message to the Texan Congress in 
 December, 1843, he laid stress upon the friendliness 
 of Great Britain and contrasted the efforts made by her 
 to secure peace for Texas with the do-nothing and 
 selfish policy of the United States. Soon afterwards 
 Upshur's overture was received. Houston instructed 
 Jones to decline the proposal for annexation." Thus 
 the policy determined upon and carefully worked out, 
 to force the United States to action through fears of 
 British domination, was carried forward another step. 
 Houston's declination of Upshur's overture was not 
 counter to this policy but was strictly in accord with 
 it. Annexation was refused because Upshur could not 
 promise the ratification of the treaty." The Texan 
 government was unwilling "to risk everything in a 
 single throw of an uncertain die." Upon the receipt of 
 Houston's refusal, Upshur bestirred himself upon the 
 question of ratification. How much he depended upon 
 definite promises from members of the Senate and how 
 much upon hearsay it is impossible to state. He re- 
 peated to Murphy that "measures have been taken to 
 ascertain the opinions and views of Senators upon the 
 subject and it is found that a clear constitutional 
 majority of two-thirds are in favor of the measure." "' 
 This information Murphy gave to Houston. Relyiilg 
 upon the correctness of Upshur's statement (of which 
 he doubtless had independent corroboration"), Hous- 
 
 "Jones's Memorandum, December 17, 1843; Official Cor- 
 respondence, 39. 
 
 ''Ibid., 261. 
 
 "Upshur to Murphy, January 16, 1844; H. Ex. Doc. 271, 
 28 Cong., I Sess., 47. 
 
 " C. H. Raymond, Secretary of the Texan Legation at 
 Washington, to Jones, February 17, 1844; Jones, Official Cor- 
 respondence, 314. 
 
136 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 ton and his cabinet agreed to accept Upshur's proposal 
 and to send a commission to the United States with 
 full powers for the negotiation of a treaty of annexa- 
 tion. Houston, however, took the precaution to in- 
 trench himself against any unforeseen obstacle to the 
 consummation of the treaty. He asked Murphy for a 
 definite tender of protection on the part of the United 
 States during the process of negotiation."' Murphy 
 assured Houston that the United States, having invited 
 Texas to this negotiation, would at once, and before 
 any negotiation was begun, place a, sufficient naval 
 force in the Gulf to protect the coast of Texas, and 
 would hold a sufficient force of troops near the south- 
 western border of the United States in readiness to 
 protect Texas pending the proposed negotiation for 
 annexation.'" 
 
 Van Zandt at Washington had made a similar re- 
 quest to Upshur for protection," but the secretary 
 of state gave no answer to it. Houston was able to 
 extract assurances from the incautious Murphy that 
 Upshur, although enthusiastic for annexation, hesi- 
 tated to give. 
 
 Feeling secure in the assurances that the treaty 
 would be ratified and that the United States would 
 protect Texas during the negotiation, Houston des- 
 
 ^ Murphy to Upshur, February IS, 1844; MS., Archives. 
 Houston determined to send Henderson to Washington Feb- 
 ruary 14. Jones said that guarantees were demanded because 
 it was believed that no annexation treaty could pass the 
 United States Senate. Official Correspondence, 381. But 
 this was written after the treaty had been rejected. 
 
 ™ Murphy to Upshur, February 15, 1844; H. Bx. Doc. 271, 
 28 Cong., I Sess., 92. 
 
 ** Van Zandt to Upshur, January 17, 1844; ibid., 88. 
 
UPSHUR AND TEXAS, 1843-1844 1 37 
 
 patched General J. P. Henderson to Washington to 
 act in conjunction with Van Zandt for the accomphsh- 
 ment of annexation. 
 
 Before Houston's special commissioner arrived at 
 Washington, Upshur, the active friend of annexation, 
 and Gilmer, his strongest aide, with others of Tyler's 
 closest friends, were no longer among the living. The 
 Princeton tragedy, which threw the capital and nation 
 into mourning, had a profound bearing upon the ques- 
 tion of Texas so soon to be presented for final action. 
 Another reconstruction of Tyler's cabinet was made 
 necessary. Calhoun, the aggressive champion of 
 slavery and but recently an avowed candidate for the 
 presidency, was selected for the place of Upshur. By 
 him was the negotiation conducted with Van Zandt 
 and Henderson. The death of Upshur delayed the 
 negotiation until the time for the national political 
 conventions was almost at hand. Calhoun's abilities 
 were exerted earnestly for the signing and ratification 
 of the treaty. In no public matter of his life were his 
 peculiar talents put to more strenuous use. Reasoning 
 from his predilections with merciless logic, he robbed 
 the question of Texan annexation of all its national 
 advantages. He put it before the Senate and people 
 of the United States as a sectional question, necessary 
 to the salvation of the South and of its peculiar insti- 
 tution. Again was expansion halted and not furthered 
 by slavery. The annexation treaty was rejected by 
 the Senate. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 CAI.HOUN AND THE ATTBIMPTED ANNEXATION OF 
 
 Texas by Treaty 
 
 There is a note of uncertainty in the proffer of the 
 state portfolio by Tyler to Calhoun. After the death 
 of Upshur, Tyler was in desperate straits. A new and 
 untried man would not have been able to push forward 
 the delicate negotiation which Upshur had been carry- 
 ing on for the annexation of Texas. On the other 
 hand, the appointment of a man like Calhoun, but re- 
 cently an avowed aspirant for the presidency, might 
 make the agent greater than the principal. The an- 
 nexation of Texas, if accomplished, might be credited 
 to Calhoun, and not to Tyler. The measure, if suc- 
 cessful, might be the victory about which those Demo- 
 crats, totally estranged from Van Buren, might rally. 
 — The events of Calhoun's career immediately preced- 
 ing his acceptance of Tyler's offer of the state de- 
 partment form a curious narrative of political intrigue. 
 Calhoun had resigned from the Senate in 1842 and 
 was immediately nominated for the presidency by the 
 legislature of South Carolina. When the House of Rep- 
 resentatives organized in December, 1843, Calhoun's 
 friends agreed to support for speaker a northern Demo- 
 crat, Wilkins of Pennsylvania. In return for this, mem- 
 mers of the Pennsylvania delegation and others pledged 
 their support to Calhoun as against Van Buren. The 
 deal was discovered before the party contest took place. 
 Ingersoll and Buchanan drove the Pennsylvania 
 
CAI^HOUN AND THE) TEXAS TREATY 1 39 
 
 Democrats from this agreement and Wilkins was de- 
 feated in the caucus.' Soon thereafter Calhoun an- 
 nounced to his friends his determination to issue an 
 address formally withdrawing from the coming presi- 
 dential contest.' Calhoun's public expression upon the 
 Texas question came at the same time.' Gilmer, who 
 had stirred up the Texas matter before, now appealed 
 to Calhoun for his opinion as to annexation, possibly 
 for the purpose of strengthening Upshur's hand in the 
 Senate in favor of the treaty, with the ulterior purpose 
 of drawing credit away from Tyler to Calhoun. Cal- 
 houn was told in strictest confidence that "negotiations 
 had been commenced the object of which was to annex 
 Texas to the Union." Gilmer stated that he was not 
 at liberty to disclose, nor was he informed of, the pre- 
 cise state of the negotiation at present. "As a Candi- 
 date for public favor," he wrote, "I would not have 
 you or any other to be committed upon this question in 
 advance. I do not therefore approach you as one of 
 those now in the public eye as candidates for the chief 
 
 "Rhett to Calhoun, December 8, 1843; Report of Am. Hist. 
 Association, 1899, II., 898. 
 
 ' Calhoun to Duff Green, February 10, 1844 ; ibid., 568. 
 
 "Both of the great parties have degenerated from their 
 original standard so far that they have ceased to represent 
 their original principles. . . . The Democrats are the old 
 Republican party turned spoilsmen." 
 
 ' Writing to McDufBe, December 4, 1843, ihid., 555, Calhoun 
 said: "I see the subject of Texas is destined to be one of the 
 first magnitude. The interference there by Great Britain in 
 order to act on our Southern institutions has presented it in 
 a new and most important aspect, and so changed it, that 
 those who were formerly opposed to the annexation, may well 
 support it now. I think no alternative is left us, and that if 
 the Executive should take a stand for it, he ought to be unani- 
 mously and decidedly supported by the South." 
 
140 DIPLOMACY UNDi;r TYI^ER AND POI,K 
 
 magistracy, but as an illustrious citizen whose opinions 
 would derive no additional force from any station, as 
 I believe they would not be influenced by a desire to 
 obtain it." ' Gilmer wrote from Washington and must 
 have known how Calhoun's plans had miscarried in the 
 Democratic caucus. 
 
 Calhoun had already learned from Virgil Maxcy 
 (another victim of the Princeton disaster) the precise 
 state of the Texas negotiation: "Mr. Upshur informs 
 me — in the strictest confidence however except to you 
 — that the terms of a treaty between him and the Texan 
 Minister have already been agreed on and written out, 
 and that the latter only waits for instructions from 
 President Houston, which are expected in two or three 
 weeks. . . . The President is resolved that he will 
 communicate such a treaty to the Congress, and if the 
 Minister has not firmness to sign he will adopt some 
 other mode of bringing the mattter before Congress. 
 Mr. Upshur is of opinion that this is the only matter 
 that will take sufficient hold of the feelings of the 
 South, to rally it on a southern candidate and weaken 
 Clay and A^an Buren so much there as to bring the 
 election into the House, where the Southern States 
 would not dare to vote for Mr. V. B. and C. 
 . . . The President has some hopes that he may 
 become that Southern Candidate. But Mr. U. 
 considers you as the only one that can be taken up 
 and with a view to your availing yourself of the first 
 moment, after the Executive communication to Con- 
 gress on Texas, to place before the public your views 
 on the question, that all who concur with you, may 
 
 ' Gilmer to Calhoun, December 13, 1843 ; ibid., 904. 
 
CALHOUN AND THE TEXAS TREATY I4I 
 
 at once rally upon you." " Thus in a confidential way 
 Maxcy disclosed what a few days later Gilmer hinted 
 at. If one may trust Maxcy's accuracy in reporting 
 Upshur, the so-called "Calhoun intrigue" appears in a 
 somewhat different light from that in which Benton 
 placed it. That Calhoun's name was connected with 
 Texas from the time Upshur succeeded Webster and 
 the active Texas campaign began (as a part of a plan 
 for furthering the South Carolinian's prospects for the 
 presidency) cannot be shown. Indeed, Calhoun's de- 
 termination to withdraw after the congressional caucus 
 fiasco seems to argue against such a theory. But on 
 the other hand it is plain that Calhoun's friends who 
 were in the cabinet of Tyler were raising the Texas 
 question to advance not Tyler but Calhoun. The de- 
 vious paths of diplomacy are lost in the tangled maze 
 of political intrigue. Upshur, with disloyalty to his 
 chief, was engaged in pushing the Texas question in an 
 effort to strengthen the prospects of Calhoun, who like 
 Tyler courted political success in 1844. Such intrigues 
 explain Upshur's aggressiveness. Tyler, however, be- 
 lieved in his secretary's loyalty to him. As the course 
 of events proved, Upshur's insincerity was never 
 known to Tyler. The accident upon the Princeton 
 lost two friends to Calhoun, as well as two members 
 of the cabinet and active workers for annexation. Only 
 four days before Upshur and Gilmer were killed, 
 Huger, a senator from South Carolina, offered to re- 
 sign his seat in Calhoun's favor, in order that his state 
 might be represented again by her favorite son.' Cal- 
 houn's reentrance into public life was by another chan- 
 
 "- "Maxcy to Calhoun, December 10, 1843; ibid., 903. 
 ' Calhoun to Hammond, March S, 1844 ; ibid., S7i- 
 
142 DIPLOMACY UNDfiR TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 nel. On the reconstruction of the cabinet, the last of 
 a series of such events in the administration of the un- 
 fortunate Tyler, Calhoun's friends were again active. 
 Luckily Calhoun's withdrawal from the presidential 
 contest had just been made public. 
 
 Tyler's biographer admits that the President did not 
 want Calhoun in his cabinet, fearing, among other 
 things, that the senatorial support which Upshur had 
 gained for the ratification of a treaty of annexation 
 might be lost if Calhoun took up Upshur's labors. 
 Tyler accepted Calhoun, it was said, as a choice of 
 evils. Indeed, it was asserted that it was not in respect 
 to Texas at all, a negotiation which Upshur had "vir- 
 tually closed," but on account of the Oregon question 
 that President Tyler contemplated any good results 
 from the appointment of Calhoun. This statement does 
 not bear the test of investigation, for Tyler insisted 
 to Calhoun that "the negotiation for Texas was in the 
 act of competition (sic) and would admit of no delay." ' 
 
 Tyler was drawn into the appointment of Calhoun 
 by the importunities of Calhoun's friends, and those 
 friends were not slow to claim credit for the appoint- 
 ment.' He offered the state portfolio to Calhoun on the 
 6th of March after a "free and frank conversation 
 with our friends. Governor McDuffie and Mr. Holmes 
 of South Carolina." "We have reached a great crisis 
 in the condition of public affairs," he wrote in making 
 the offer, "which, I trust, will assume the place of a 
 commanding epoch in our Country's history. The an- 
 
 ' Tyler's Tylers, IL, 294. Tyler to Calhoun, March 6, 1844; 
 Am. Hist. Association Report, 1899, II. , 939. 
 ' Cf. Schouler's History, IV., 455. 
 
CALHOUN AND THE TBXAS TREATY I43 
 
 nexatioti of Texas to the Union, and the settlement of 
 the Oregon question on a satisfactory basis, are the 
 great ends to be accompHshed. The first is in the act 
 of competition and will admit of no delay. The last had 
 but barely opened, when death snatched from me my 
 lamented friend." ' Tyler did not wait to hear from 
 Calhoun but sent his name without delay to the Senate, 
 which confirmed the appointment immediately. Ten 
 days later Calhoun accepted the appointment, stating 
 to the President that he did so with great reluctance. 
 "Nothing short of the magnitude of the crisis, occa- 
 sioned by the pending negotiations, could induce me 
 to leave my retirement." His acceptance was con- 
 ditional: when the negotiations were completed he 
 should be at liberty to retire." 
 
 Tyler's new secretary of state arrived in Washington 
 late in March. The President had said nothing about 
 annexation in his message to Congress in December, 
 further than to make a decided statement that the 
 war between Texas and Mexico must cease. But as 
 has been seen, Calhoun already knew from reliable 
 sources how far the Texan negotiation had been car- 
 ried. Tyler was waiting for the Texas emissaries to 
 arrive in Washington to frame a treaty upon the lines 
 laid down by Upshur., 
 
 It will be remembered that Houston refused to send 
 Henderson to Washington until Murphy had guaran- 
 teed that the forces of the United States would protect 
 Texas pending the negotiation. Nelson, who was 
 secretary of state ad interim until Calhoun arrived, 
 
 'Tyler to Calhoun, March 6, 1844; ut sup. 
 " Calhoun to Tyler, March 16, 1844 ; ibid., S77- 
 
144 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 repudiated Murphy's guarantee to Houston. Murphy 
 was told that he had allowed his zeal for annexation 
 to carry him beyond the line of his instructions, there- 
 by committing the President to measures for which he 
 had no constitutional authority to stipulate." "The em- 
 ployment of the army or navy against a foreign power 
 with which the United, States are at peace is not within 
 the competency of the President, and whilst he is not 
 indisposed, as a measure of prudent precaution, and as 
 preliminary to the proposed negotiation, to concentrate 
 in the Gulf of Mexico, and On the southern borders of 
 the United States, a naval and military force to be di- 
 rected to the defence of the inhabitants and territory of 
 Texas at a proper time, he cannot permit the authori- 
 ties of that government or yourself to labor under the 
 misapprehension that he has power to employ them 
 at the period indicated by your stipulations." Although 
 Tyler then knew that the armistice between Texas and 
 Mexico had been broken, he professed to believe that 
 hostilities would not be resumed and that "annexation 
 would be speedily and peacefully accomplished." " 
 
 The Texan commissioners. Van Zandt and Hender- 
 son, who now appeared in Washington, were not to be 
 satisfied by such optimistic expressions. They insisted 
 that guarantees in the line of those given by Murphy 
 to Houston be renewed before further negotiation. 
 Calhoun prevailed upon Tyler to make an about-face. 
 The Texan commissioners were informed that orders 
 had been issued to concentrate a strong naval force 
 in the Gulf and to place troops upon the southwestern 
 
 "Nelson to Murphy, March ii, 1844; H. Ex. Doc. 271, 
 zS Cong., I Sess., 95. 
 "Ibid. 
 
CAIvHOUN AND THE TEXAS TREATY I4S 
 
 frontier to meet any emergency. After the treaty had 
 been signed and while ratification by the Senate was 
 pending, the President would deem it his duty to use 
 all the means placed within his power by the Constitu- 
 tion to protect Texas from all foreign invasion/' Prior 
 to this assurance from Calhoun, Henderson wrote home 
 that he had maintained a bold front upon the subject 
 of his negotiation. Every one, even the British min- 
 ister, knew the object of his mission and he made no 
 secret of it. In conversation with members of both 
 houses of Congress he found that all of the 
 Whigs and some of the Democrats were anxious 
 to postpone the subject until after the fall elections. 
 "I have said that this is the third time that 
 Texas has urged this measure upon the United 
 States; that it is now brought up at the instance 
 of the United States government, and that it cannot 
 be postponed without finally and forever defeating 
 it; that the situation of Texas is such that she must 
 now seek safety in some quarter by annexation, alliance, 
 or other engagements, which will secure her peace 
 and immediate safety; that any delay at this time on 
 the part of the United States will be fatal to her hope 
 of annexing us in the future if she indulges in such 
 hope." While some of the Democrats preferred delay 
 because they were afraid of the political capital that 
 Tyler or Calhoun might obtain from the measure, Hen- 
 derson was assured by them that every Democratic 
 senator would vote for the treaty, and he hoped for 
 enough Clay-Whig votes to make up the necessary 
 two-thirds. "Should the treaty be rejected, a bill will 
 
 "Calhoun to Van Zandt, April 11, 1844; ibid., 96. 
 
146 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 be ready to go before Congress to authorize the Presi- 
 dent of the United States to take possession of Texas, 
 with our consent, as soon as it is expressed in a legal 
 way." " 
 
 Doubts as to ratification were already in the minds 
 of Houston and his secretary of state. Houston's 
 policy of scaring the United States into annexation by 
 fear of British ascendancy in Texas was never aban- 
 doned, nor, on the other hand, did he at all relax 
 his efforts to assure Texan independence upon the 
 basis of stability and permanence in case the United 
 States should again reject annexation. 
 
 The excitation of fears upon the, part of the United 
 States toward England, as a strong argument for an- 
 nexation, and the use of every means by which the 
 foundation of Texan independence might be laid, 
 should annexation miscarry, were two parallel lines of 
 one and the same policy. Houston's insistence that 
 the United States guarantee protection pending ne- 
 gotiations was not so much for the purpose of defend- 
 ing Texas against Mexico as it was to force the hand 
 of the United States as against Great Britain.'" 
 
 After Murphy had withdrawn, in accordance with 
 Nelson's instructions, his guarantees of naval and mili- 
 tary aid, Jones remarked that the United States were 
 recovering a little from their alarm. "I will have to 
 give them another scare. One or two doses of English 
 calomel and French quinine have to be administered, 
 and the case will be pretty well out of danger." " 
 
 " Henderson to Jones, March 30, 1844 ; Jones, Official Cor- 
 respondence, 334. 
 "" Murphy to Tyler, April 8, 1844; MS., Archives. 
 "Jones, Official Correspondence, 335. 
 
CALHOUN AND THE TEXAS TREATY 147 
 
 Elliott, the British charge, returned to Texas from the 
 United States and expressed his belief that no treaty 
 of annexation would be ratified by the Senate of the 
 United States." The close relationship of Elliott with 
 Houston and Jones continued. Murphy again became 
 alarmed at the prospect of British influence in Texas. 
 He wrote to Tyler that Houston and his cabinet, as 
 well as all of his leading confidential friends, were se- 
 cretly opposed to annexation. "The number of British 
 agents, crowding Galveston and Houston would as- 
 tonish you. Secret, dark, and diligent in something 
 or other, which men known or suspected to be friendly 
 to annexation cannot find out." " 
 
 At the time Murphy was thus writing to Tyler, 
 Elliott was asking the Texan government for expla- 
 nations as to its position toward his government, which 
 had been active in attempting to put Texas at peace 
 with Mexico." Elliott was told that the United States 
 had done what other friendly nations had refused to 
 do, namely, given a promise that Texas would be pro- 
 tected against invasion ; that the proposition for annex- 
 ation had been made by the United States; and for 
 the sake of peace and security, Texas had accepted 
 it." Hearing that the French and British charges 
 had united in a protest against annexation, Murphy 
 asked for a copy of the paper. Such a protest, if con- 
 
 " He wrote this to Jones as early as February 22, 1844. 
 Murphy to Upshur, February 22, 1844; MS., Archives. 
 
 "Murphy to Tyler, March 10, 1844; MS., Archives. 
 
 "Elliott to Jones, Match 22, 1844; Jones, OMcial Corres- 
 pondence, 329. 
 
 '° Elliott to Houston, March 8 and 22, 1844 ; Houston to 
 Elliott, March — , 1844; Yoakum's Texas, II., 427. 
 
148 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 teraplated, was never made ; for no more certain method 
 of insuring annexation by the United States could 
 have been adopted. However much Houston and Jones 
 would have welcomed such a protest, the representa- 
 tives of Great Britain and France were too wary to 
 proceed as if in possession of a right which they mani- 
 festly did not have." Murphy was led to believe that 
 a good understanding existed between Elliott and 
 Houston. This much was true: Houston and Jones 
 did nothing to estrange Elliott, who might be useful 
 if annexation were defeated. 
 
 At Washington, Calhoun had little trouble in agree- 
 ing upon the terms of a treaty with Van Zandt and 
 Henderson, after he had reversed Nelson's earlier de- 
 cision and promised protection to Texas pending an- 
 nexation by treaty. It had been claimed by Calhoun's 
 correspondent that Upshur and Van Zandt had not 
 only agreed upon the terms of the treaty in December, 
 1843, but that the agreement had been reduced to 
 writing. This may have been the truth. No docu- 
 mentary evidence exists to prove or disprove it. At 
 any rate Calhoun found little difficulty in bringing the 
 Texan commissioners to an agreement, for the treaty 
 was signed as soon as protection had been promised 
 to Texas. 
 
 This annexation treaty was very brief. After reciting 
 that the people of Texas had been, from the time of 
 adopting their constitution, and still were, unanimous 
 in their desire for annexation to the United States, it 
 said that they had determined to accomplish this object 
 
 ^ Murphy to Jones, April 17, 1844 ; Jones, Official Corres- 
 pondence, 338. 
 
CALHOUN AND THfi TEXAS TREATY I49 
 
 SO important to their permanent welfare. After for- 
 mally ceding the sovereignty of the Republic of Texas, 
 together with all its territory, it was stipulated that 
 the "citizens of Texas should be incorporated into the 
 Union and admitted, as soon as consistent with the 
 provisions of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoy- 
 ment of all the rights, privileges, and immunities of 
 citizens of the United States." ^ Thus a document pro- 
 mulgated by the exponent of the most extreme states- 
 rights doctrines proceeded upon the theory that the 
 Constitution did not extend ex proprio vigore to in- 
 habitants of acquired territory, even though such in- 
 habitants were citizens of a republic annexed to the 
 United States. This treaty as drawn by Calhoun 
 adopted the principle of constitutional law associated 
 with the name of Chief Justice Marshall and first found 
 in the case of the American Insurance Co. vs. Canter." 
 
 The treaty further provided that all the public lands 
 of Texas should be ceded to the federal government 
 in consideration of the assumption by the United States 
 of the national debt of Texas, amounting to ten mil- 
 lions of dollars. 
 
 Not a word was said about the boundaries of Texas. 
 Van Zandt and Henderson had been instructed to 
 stipulate that Texas might be divided into four states 
 for admission into the Union, and further that the 
 boundaries should be those already defined by the 
 constitution and statutes of Texas. The former stipu- 
 lation was obviously beyond the treaty-making power. 
 
 "S. Ex. Doc. 341, 38 Cong., l Sess. 
 
 ^Peters, U. S. Reports, I., 511. Compare the terms of the 
 Louisiana and Florida treaties. 
 
150 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 The second remained a matter for further adjustment. 
 Van Zandt and Henderson could rest assured that if 
 annexation became an accomplished fact the United 
 States would make the most of the territorial claims 
 of Texas. 
 
 The treaty was signed April 12. Not until the 
 twenty-second did Tyler 'send it to the Senate with 
 his message and certain documents in aid of the case 
 for annexation. It must be remembered that Calhoun 
 selected from the mass of correspondence upon the 
 subject, heretofore reviewed, only those portions that 
 were in accord with his theory, namely, that annexation 
 was necessary to the salvation, of the United States, 
 because the peculiar institution of the South was en- 
 dangered owing to the efforts of Great Britain looking 
 toward abolition in Texas. That institution placed in 
 jeopardy, the national interests of the Union were 
 threatened. As a foundation for his case, Calhoun 
 selected Upshur's letter to Murphy in which the sinis- 
 ter designs of Great Britain were discussed upon the 
 information had from Duff Green, together with such 
 extracts from Murphy's correspondence as might tend 
 to add to the expressed fear of Great Britain's motives. 
 In addition to this correspondence Calhoun added a 
 letter of his own. If Upshur had sounded an alarm, 
 Calhoun now exerted himself to raise the greatest pos- 
 sible excitement over the fancied menace. He did 
 it by writing a letter to Pakenham, the British minister 
 at Washington, but Calhoun directed it over Paken- 
 ham's shoulder to the American people. Never were 
 the tools of diplomacy put to political use (always a 
 dangerous practice) with more disastrous results than 
 by Calhoun. The attempt to use a diplomatic com- 
 
CAIvHOUN AND THE TEXAS TREATY 15! 
 
 munication as a political manifesto was a signal failure. 
 The Senate refused to ratify the treaty. Again was 
 slavery not the aid, but the obstacle, to expansion. 
 Calhoun's correspondence with Pakenham did much 
 to make it so. 
 
 Just prior to Upshur's death, Pakenham addressed 
 a note to the secretary of state in which he enclosed 
 a letter from Aberdeen, setting forth definitely and 
 officially the attitude of Great Britain toward Texas. 
 Aberdeen admitted that Great Britain took an interest 
 in the welfare of the new republic and that she had put 
 herself forward in pressing upon Mexico the claims of 
 Texas for independence. He denied explicitly that 
 Great Britain had any "occult design," either with 
 reference to any peculiar influence over Mexico or 
 Texas, or "even with reference to slavery in Texas." 
 Had Aberdeen stopped there, the disarming of the 
 American Anglophobes, north and south, would have 
 been complete. He proceeded, however, to avow that 
 he wished to see slavery abolished not only in Texas, 
 but "throughout the world. But the means which 
 she has adopted," he continued, "and will continue to 
 adopt, for this humane and virtuous purpose, are open 
 and undisguised. She will do nothing secretly or 
 underhand. She desires that her motives may be gener- 
 ally understood, and her acts seen by all." Passing 
 to the question of permanent influence in Texas, Aber- 
 deen avowed that Great Britain's objects were purely 
 commercial. "She has no thought or intention of seek- 
 ing to act directly or indirectly, in a political sense, on 
 the United States through Texas." 
 
 The final paragraph of the note was in questionable 
 taste and unfortunate. It was outside the issues of the 
 
152 DIPLOMACY UNDBR TYI,BR AND POLK 
 
 case to incorporate in an official letter to be handed 
 to the representative of the federal government any 
 reference to the free and slave states of the Union. 
 The paragraph, though doubtless well-intentioned, v^ras 
 officious. "The British Government, as the United 
 States well know, have never sought in any way to 
 stir up disaffection or excitement of any kind in the 
 slaveholding States of the American Union. Much as 
 we should wish to. see those States placed on the firm 
 and solid footing which we conscientiously believe is to 
 be attained by general freedom alone, we have never 
 in our treatment of them made any difference between 
 the slaveholding and the free States of the Union. All 
 are, in our eyes, entitled, as component members of 
 the Union, to equal political respect, favor, and for- 
 bearance on our part. To that wise and just policy 
 we shall continue to adhere; and the Governments of 
 the slaveholding States may be assured that, although 
 we shall not desist from those open and honest efforts 
 which we have constantly made for procuring the abo- 
 lition of slavery throughout the world, we shall neither 
 openly nor secretly resort to any measures which can 
 tend to disturb their internal tranquillity, or thereby to 
 affect the prosperity of the American Union." "" 
 
 Upshur, of course, had no opportunity of answering 
 Aberdeen's note. Not until after the Texas treaty had 
 been signed did Calhoun reply. This letter of April 
 18, 1844, is a most amazing piece of diplomatic litera- 
 ture, and all of Calhoun's aptitude for dialectics was 
 brought into play at once. Nowhere did the man's 
 
 " Pakenham to Upshur, February 26, 1844, enclosing Aber- 
 deen to Pakenham, December 26, 1843. S. Ex. Doc. 341, 
 28 Cong., I Sess., 48. 
 
CALHOUN AND THEl TEXAS TREATY I53 
 
 logic carry him to a reductio ad absurdum more clearly 
 than in this reply. Calhoun caught at certain phrases 
 of Aberdeeri's note and rang all the changes possible 
 upon them. The President, he said, was glad to see 
 that Great Britain had no intention of taking any 
 measures to disturb the tranquillity of the slaveholding 
 states of the Union. At the same time, he regarded 
 "with deep concern the avowal, for the first time made 
 to this government, that 'Great Britain desires and is 
 constantly exerting herself to procure the general abo- 
 lition of slavery throughout the world.' ... So 
 long as Great Britain confined her policy to the abo- 
 lition of slavery in her own possessions and colonies, 
 
 no other country had a right to complain 
 
 But when she goes beyond, and avows it to be her 
 settled policy, and the object of her constant exertions, 
 to abolish it throughout the world, she makes it the 
 duty of all other countries, whose safety or prosperity 
 may be endangered by her policy, to adopt such meas- 
 ures as they may deem necessary for their protection." " 
 
 The reply then outlines the history of the relations 
 between the United States and Texas. While since 
 her independence Texas had ardently wished for an- 
 nexation to the United States, the United States had 
 declined to meet her wishes. "The time has now ar- 
 rived when they can no longer refuse, consistently with 
 their own security and peace, and the sacred obligation 
 imposed by their constitutional compact for mutual 
 defense and protection." 
 
 Thus England's avowal of a desire for abolition 
 throughout the world made it necessary by the obli- 
 
 '^ Calhoun to Pakenham, April 18, 1844 ; iUd., SO. 
 
154 DIPLOMACY UND5R TYLKR AND POLK 
 
 gations of the Constitution for the United States to 
 annex Texas in order to defend the institution of 
 slavery from future injury. Such a position really 
 defies comment. It shows how far Calhoun's logic 
 would carry him. The United States had remained 
 passive as long as Great Britain's policy had no im- 
 mediate bearing upon the peace and safety of the 
 United States. It could remain so no longer. Calhoun 
 next passed to the consideration of the general sub- 
 ject of abolition. He condemned it as hurtful to the 
 white and degrading to the black. "It may safely be 
 affirmed, that could she [Great Britain] succeed in 
 accomplishing, in the United States, what she avows 
 to be her desire and the object of her constant exer- 
 tions to effect throughout the world, so far from being 
 wise or humane, she would involve in the greatest 
 calamity the whole country, and especially the race 
 which it is the avowed object of her exertions to 
 benefit." " 
 
 This letter of Calhoun's has been quoted at some 
 length, for the importance of it in the consideration of 
 the rejected treaty of annexation cannot be overesti- 
 mated. Upshur had begun to take the same road, but 
 his letters were not made public until Calhoun made 
 use of them with the treaty. The reply to Pakenham, 
 on the other hand, was written not only for publication, 
 but with the purpose of creating an effect upon the 
 American people. It was a call to arms for the slavery 
 interests to unite against the aggressions of Great 
 Britain, always hated, but now to be dreaded as the 
 militant champion of abolition throughout the world. 
 
 " Calhoun to Pakenham, April i8, 1844 ; ibid., 53. 
 
CALHOUN AND THE TEXAS TREATY 1 55 
 
 It attracted not, as he hoped, the slaveholding interests, 
 but his own friends only. It repelled the southern 
 Whigs and the northern Democrats. It pressed for- 
 ward a new issue upon which the country was not yet 
 prepared to take a stand. 
 
 Pakenham rejoined to Calhoun's reply the follow- 
 ing day."" Although in Tyler's hands when the treaty 
 was communicated, it was not referred to the Senate 
 for another ten days, and then with another reply from 
 Calhoun. Pakenham insisted that Calhoun totally mis- 
 construed Aberdeen's letter. Calhoun rejoined that 
 no other construction could be given it than that the 
 slave interests, now the national interests of the coun- 
 try, were menaced. At this point the correspondence 
 ended. Its effect was, no doubt, quite different from 
 what Aberdeen might have anticipated. It delayed 
 annexation and all but robbed Calhoun of any part in 
 the final success of the measure. 
 
 Tyler's message accompanying the treaty proceeded 
 upon the lines of Upshur's and of Calhoun's corres- 
 pondence, but the President softened the terms and 
 tried to show annexation in its best light as a national 
 question. He could not, however, neglect to remind 
 the Senate of the danger of abolition in Texas, "which 
 would operate most injuriously upon the United States 
 and might most seriously threaten the existence of this 
 happy Union. . . . The Executive saw Texas in a 
 state of almost helpless exhaustion. The question was 
 narrowed down to the simple proposition, whether the 
 United States should accept the boon of annexation 
 
 ^' Pakenham to Calhoun, April 19, 1844 ; Calhoun to Paken- 
 ham, April 27, 1844; ibid., 63, 65. 
 
156 DIPI<OMACY UNDER TYI<ER AND POLK 
 
 upon fair and even liberal terms, or by refusing it, force 
 Texas to seek refuge in the arms of some other power. 
 This might be either through a treaty of defensive and 
 offensive alliance, or by the adoption of some other 
 expedient, vi^hich might virtually make her tributary 
 to a foreign power and dependent upon it for all future 
 time. The Executive has full reason to believe that 
 such would have been the result, without its interposi- 
 tion, and that such will be the result, in the event either 
 of unnecessary delay in the ratification, or of the re- 
 jection of the proposed treaty." ^ Such were Tyler's 
 reasons for annexation and such were the predictions 
 of the dire results to the nation if the Senate did not 
 agree with him. 
 
 Another quarter remained to be heard from and that 
 was Mexico. What would that nation do, after the 
 United States had not only proposed annexation but 
 had guaranteed to defend Texas during the pendency 
 of the treaty? Calhoun instructed Green, the charge 
 at Mexico, to inform the Mexican government that a 
 treaty of annexation between Texas and the United 
 States had been signed and sent to the Senate; and 
 that this had been done without any feelings of disre- 
 spect or of indifference to the honor or dignity of 
 Mexico. "The step was forced upon the Government 
 of the United States," he asserted, "in self defense, in 
 consequence of the. policy adopted by Great Britain in 
 reference to the abolition of slavery in Texas. The 
 Government has been compelled, by the necessity of 
 the case, and a regard to its constitutional obligations, 
 
 "Tyler's message, April 22, 1844; Richardson's Messages, 
 IV., 307- 
 
CALHOUN AND THE TEXAS TREATY 1 57 
 
 to take the step it has, as the only certain and effectual 
 means of preventing it."" This note added to the 
 weight which the already overburdened treaty had to 
 bear. The position which the United States had right- 
 fully taken was that Texas was independent de facto. 
 Why, then, did Calhoun give Mexico an opportunity 
 of discussing a question with which she had no legal 
 concern? Texas had been recognized as independent 
 not only by the United States but by several European 
 powers. With the question of the future relations or 
 status of Texas, therefore, Mexico had nothing to do. 
 Tyler was already aware of Mexico's ultimatum on 
 the subject of annexation. Before Upshur made his 
 offer to Van Zandt he was in possession of Bocanegra's 
 statement to Thompson, that "the passage of an act 
 for the incorporation of Texas with the territory of 
 the United States must be considered by Mexico as 
 equivalent to a declaration of war." *" 
 
 It was a strange position for Calhoun to assume 
 that Mexico, which had already spoken upon the sub- 
 ject, would be appeased by the declaration that the 
 United States accepted annexation as a necessity, made 
 so by Great Britain's attitude toward abolition in Texas. 
 Calhoun's position was the more censurable as the 
 world knew that slavery did not exist in Mexico. 
 
 Weighted down by Calhoun's letters to Pakenham 
 and Green, the treaty went to the Senate as a document 
 already discredited. Tyler's name gave it no prestige. 
 Calhoun's assistance drove from him even those ele- 
 ments upon which the President might have relied. 
 The country was preparing for the quadrennial presi- 
 
 ^ Calhoun to Green, April 19, 1844; S. Ex. Doc. 341, 28 
 Cong., I Sess., S3- 
 " Bocanegra to Thompson, August 23, 1843 ; ibid., 89. 
 
158 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 dential contest. By a strange coincidence, for it was 
 probably nothing more,°^ the two men, who hoped 
 to be nominated for the presidency by their respective 
 parties, came out upon the same day, late in April, in 
 opposition to annexation. The position assumed by 
 both Clay and Van Buren was in no sense surprising. 
 Clay, however, had the support of his party. The 
 Whig convention met soon after the letter appeared 
 and Clay was the unanimous choice of the convention. 
 Not so Van Buren. His star, which had been sinking 
 ever since 1841 (for after he left the presidential 
 chair his support became less and less sincere), 
 fell rapidly after the appearance of his letter upon 
 Texas. 
 
 The Democratic convention was to meet during the 
 last week in May. From the time Van Buren's letter 
 appeared, the Texas treaty was not considered upon 
 its merits, but as a basis for political manoeuvering and 
 intrigue. It must be borne in mind that the delegates 
 in the national conventions of those days were chiefly 
 the senators and representatives at Washington. The 
 Whigs, north and south, would have nothing to do 
 with a Tyler measure. The Democrats loyal to Van 
 Buren were cautious. Those who would displace him 
 feared the political capital which Tyler might gain if 
 the treaty were ratified before the convention met. 
 The forty votes for the treaty, which Upshur had 
 claimed,'^ dwindled to fifteen in the face of the presi- 
 dential campaign."' 
 
 ''Schouler, IV., 465, note. 
 
 "McDuffie to Calhoun, March 5, 1844; Report of Am. Hist. 
 Association, iSgg, II., 934. 
 
 ^Raymond to Jones, April 24, 1844: "I have now scarcely 
 any hope of its ratification but believe delay will strengthen 
 the question." Jones, Official Correspondence, 343. 
 
CALHOUN AND THE TEXAS TREATY 1 59 
 
 A motion to make the treaty and the accompanying 
 correspondence public came to a vote in the Senate ten 
 days before the Democratic convention. The oppo- 
 nents of Tyler and Calhoun showed their strength. By 
 a vote of twenty-six to seventeen the Senate gave 
 Calhoun's and Upshur's pro-slavery manifestoes to the 
 country. Of the seventeen who voted against putting 
 the treaty before the people was one Whig, Archer of 
 Virginia, the friend of Tyler. Of the Democrats ten 
 were from the South, six from the North. Even Cal- 
 houn had not succeeded in making the question of 
 Texas a sectional question. 
 
 The correspondence given publicity, no action was 
 taken upon the treaty until after the Democratic con- 
 vention had adjourned. Polk was taken up by Van 
 Buren's friends in order to defeat Cass." "The imme- 
 diate reannexation of Texas" was adopted as the 
 Democratic war-cry. It was indeed a cry to rally the 
 South, but not around Tyler, nor indeed around Tyler's 
 Mephistophelian attendant, Calhoun. 
 
 The Democratic convention adjourned and the sena- 
 tors returned to Washington to resume consideration 
 of Tyler's treaty. Immediate reannexation of Texas 
 they were agreed upon, but according to the methods 
 dictated by the Democratic party, not under the leader- 
 ship of a president who stood alone. Seven days after 
 the convention adjourned the Senate rejected the treaty 
 by a vote of thirty-six to fifteen. Murphy, who had 
 been Tyler's too zealous agent in Texas, was also con- 
 demned by the Senate, which refused to confirm his 
 
 " "Letters from Pillow to Polk," American Historical Re- 
 view, July, igo6. 
 
l6o DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 appointment. "The treaty," Murphy wrote to Hous- 
 ton, "is rejected and so is my nomination. The tail 
 went with the hide." "" 
 
 So ended the negotiation for Texas by treaty. 
 Against his own will Tyler had made annexation a 
 party question. Houston wrote to Jackson, when Hen- 
 derson was sent to Washington, that Texas was pre- 
 sented to the United States as a bride adorned for her 
 espousals. "If in the confident hope of the union she 
 should be rejected, her mortification would be inde- 
 scribable. She has been sought by the United States, 
 and tliis is the third time she has consented. Were she 
 now to be spurned, it would forever terminate expec- 
 tation on her part; and it would then not only be left 
 for the United States to expect that she would seek 
 some other friend, but all Christendom would justify 
 her in a course dictated by necessity and sanctioned 
 by wisdom. However adverse this might be to the 
 wishes or the interests of the United States, she could 
 not ponder long." " 
 
 With the rejection of the treaty, an outcome which 
 Houston had anticipated, the president of Texas, 
 whether actuated by sincere motives or not, planned 
 for the permanent and secure independence of his coun- 
 try. Again he turned to Great Britain. On the other 
 hand Tyler determined to do what had been suggested 
 when annexation was first discussed. Two days after 
 the Senate refused to ratify the treaty he announced 
 his determination to force annexation by joint reso- 
 lution. "The great question is," he inforjned the 
 
 " Murphy to Houston, July 3, 1844 ; Yoakum, Texas, II., 432. 
 " Houston to Jackson, February 16, 1844 ; H. Bx. Doc. 271, 
 28 Cong., I Sess., no. 
 
CALHOUN AND THB TEXAS TREATY l6l 
 
 House, "not as to the manner in which it shall be done, 
 but whether it shall be accomplished or not." " 
 
 "Tyler's message, June ii, 1844, and correspondence ac- 
 companying it; ibid. 
 
■ CHAPTER VII 
 
 Thb Annexation oif Texas by Joint Resolution 
 1844-1845 
 
 When the treaty was rejected, Calhoun, who had 
 staked all upon the issue of the defense of slavery 
 against the menace of Great Britain's abolitionist in- 
 fluence, felt that annexation was a lost cause. Though 
 he said that the United States had reluctantly taken 
 a position favorable to annexation because it was seen 
 that not only the interests 0/ the nation but the Union 
 itself depended upon it, he now professed to believe 
 that Texas was forever lost to the United States/ 
 
 Calhoun's dejection was, however, of short duration. 
 Tyler determined upon an appeal to the House over the 
 head of the Senate. Calhoun was given to understand 
 that unless he actively cooperated with Tyler, his 
 resignation would be in order." Henceforth Calhoun 
 pursued the subject with inflexible determination, 
 afterwards claiming the credit of annexation.' How 
 much Tyler was influenced in his persistence by a 
 desire to go before the country as a candidate for the 
 presidency upon a platform of "Tyler and Texas" 
 cannot be definitely stated. A handful of office- 
 holders and personal friends had met in convention in 
 Baltimore and nominated Tyler for the presidency, 
 
 "Tyler's Tylers, II., 331. 
 = Ibid. 
 
 " Calhoun's speech in the Senate, February 24, 1847 ; Works, 
 IV., 362. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 163 
 
 but the act of the so-called convention excited only 
 derision. Tyler accepted the farcical nomination in a 
 letter in which he put forward his claims to the public 
 confidence. Upon the subject of Texas he was out- 
 spoken: "If annexation is to be accomplished, it must 
 be done immediately. . . . The question with me 
 is between Texas and the presidency. The latter, even 
 if within my grasp, would not for a moment be per- 
 mitted to stand in the way of the first." * 
 
 The presidency was plainly far from being within 
 Tyler's grasp. The regular Democratic convention, 
 which had nominated Polk and Dallas, declared for the 
 "reannexation" of Texas and the "reoccupation" of 
 Oregon. If Tyler was to be an agent for annexation 
 he must be such during the nine months of his unex- 
 pired term. Threats of impeachment, for having given 
 orders to the army and navy to protect Texas pending 
 the consideration of the treaty, did not deter the Presi- 
 dent from appealing beyond the treaty-making power. 
 
 It has been seen that annexation by act of Congress 
 instead of by treaty had been suggested almost as soon 
 as Texas was recognized. During the negotiation 
 that resulted in Calhoun's treaty the project of an- 
 nexing Texas by act of Congress (under that pro- 
 vision of the Constitution which gave Congress power 
 to admit new states) had been put before the people 
 by R. J. Walker, a senator from Mississippi. When 
 it was definitely seen that the treaty would fail, 
 McDuffie, a close friend of Calhoun, introduced a reso- 
 lution into the Senate along the line of Walker's 
 suggestion." 
 
 * Tyler's Tylers, II., 321. 
 'Ibid., II., 331. 
 
164 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 The first session of the twenty-eighth Congress was 
 nearing its close. As is usual in presidential years, 
 Congress was disinclined to put itself on record 
 upon any question after the presidential conventions 
 had met, nominated, and adjourned. Tyler, however, 
 was not willing to let the matter of Texas rest until 
 Congress met in regular session the following Decem- 
 ber. By that time the presidential contest would be 
 decided. T)der sent a message to the lower house 
 recommending the passage of an act annexing Texas. 
 Writing to Howard, the American charge in Texas, 
 he promised to call a special session for the purpose 
 of pushing annexation through before the fall elec- 
 tions.' In his message to the House Tyler said that 
 the power of Congress was "fully competent in some 
 other form of proceeding to accomplish everything 
 that a formal ratification of the treaty could have 
 accomplished. . . . While I have regarded the 
 annexation to be accomplished by treaty to be the 
 most suitable form in which it could be effected, 
 should Congress deem it proper to resort to any other 
 expedient compatible with the Constitution, and likely 
 to accomplish the object, I stand prepared to yield my 
 most prompt and active cooperation. The great ques- 
 tion is, not as to the manner in which it shall be done, 
 but whether it shall be accomplished or not. The re- 
 sponsibility of deciding this question is now devolved 
 upon you." ' 
 
 Congress adjourned a week after Tyler sent his mes- 
 sage to the House. Just prior to adjournment Tyler was 
 
 'Tyler and Calhoun to Howard, June 18, 1844; MS., 
 Archives. 
 
 'Message of Tyler, June 10, 1844, with correspondence; 
 H. Ex. Doc. 271, 28 Cong., i Sess. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OJf TEXAS 165 
 
 assured in writing by prominent Democrats in the House 
 that the subject of annexation should not be permitted 
 to rest/ The campaign for annexation by act of Con- 
 gress was launched even before Congress adjourned." 
 
 Murphy's nomination as charge to Texas had been 
 rejected ; Tyler then appointed General Tilghman A. 
 Howard of Indiana. Howard was originally from 
 Tennessee and a friend of Jackson. But more im- 
 portant in the present case, he was a friend of the 
 distrusted Houston. When Houston was governor of 
 Tennessee, Howard was in close official relationship 
 with him." The new charge left Washington for 
 Texas with some evidence that annexation was not 
 finally defeated. The pledge of congressmen to sup- 
 port annexation, which Tyler had, was accompanied 
 by a memorandum from Calhoun setting forth the aid 
 that might be counted upon in the Senate. Calhoun 
 believed the Senate committee upon foreign affairs 
 would stand five to four for annexation and that four- 
 teen Whig senators from the slave states, of whom all 
 but one had voted against the treaty, would favor an- 
 nexation by act of Congress."^ 
 
 The necessity for such assurances was plain. How- 
 ard would have been in a most uncomfortable position 
 if he had been forced to urge Texas to stand firm for 
 
 'Tyler to Howard, June 18, 1844; MS., Archives, C. H. 
 Raymond to Jones, June s, 1844; Jones, OMcial Corres- 
 pondence, 360. 
 
 ' The votes upon Tyler's message were : to lay upon the 
 table, for, 66; against, 118; to suspend the rules and print, 
 for, ip8; against, 79. 
 
 "Henderson to Jones, June 2, 1844; Jones, OMcial Cor- 
 respondence, 356. 
 
 " T. A. Howard's memorandum ; MS., Archives. 
 
l66 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 annexation after the United States had refused to con- 
 firm its own offer. It was Howard's duty to impress 
 upon Houston's government that annexation would be 
 accomplished without delay. Calhoun felt no doubt 
 of the continued desire of the people of Texas for 
 annexation, but he feared that there might be a re- 
 vulsion of feeling there on account of the rejection 
 of the treaty, and that this might be played upon by 
 those who were unfriendly to the United States. "The 
 danger is that the revulsion of disappointed hopes 
 highly excited may be seized upon by an interested 
 and wily diplomacy and made the means of seducing 
 them to seek and form another alliance) with the 
 Power, which, there is reason to fear, has been eagerly 
 watching the favorable opportunity." " 
 
 Shortly before the Senate finally rejected the treaty. 
 Rives of Virginia introduced a resolution laying the 
 treaty upon the table and asking the President to 
 cause an additional article to be negotiated, extending 
 the period of ratification, so as to give further time 
 for a full and deliberate expression of an opinion by 
 the American people on the subject and also for a 
 reasonable and amicable effort to obtain the concur- 
 rence of Mexico in a "constitutional arrangement for 
 ascertaining and establishing the boundaries between 
 that country and Texas." Nothing came of the reso- 
 lution. Tyler was known to be opposed to delay. 
 Henderson, one of the Texas commissioners, objected 
 to it upon the ground that he had no authority to con- 
 sent to any such measure. He felt sure that Houston 
 would regard postponement as equivalent to rejec- 
 
 "^ Calhoun to Howard, June i8, 1844; MS., Archives. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 167 
 
 tion." When the news of the Senate's failure to ratify 
 was had, Houston, without consulting his secretary of 
 state, wrote directly to Henderson and Van Zandt 
 ordering them home immediately." 
 
 Jones, Houston's secretary of state, was a candidate 
 for the presidency of Texas, for which an election 
 was to be held in the following September. Between 
 Jones and Houston had arisen a feeling of jealousy, 
 which afterwards grew into open enmity. Each ac- 
 cused the other of being secretly opposed to annexa- 
 tion. How far Houston's determination to scare the 
 United States into annexation carried him along into 
 opposition to annexation one can hardly determine. 
 In the days immediately following the rejection Hous- 
 ton appeared to be the opponent of annexation. The 
 rejection of the treaty he could fairly claim to be the 
 end of all hopes of union. Tyler and his cabinet, al- 
 though fearing that Houston had followed them as 
 far as his dignity would permit, now endeavored to 
 hold the president of Texas firm to annexation by 
 sending one of Houston's old friends and an admirer 
 of Jackson as charge. 
 
 Jones, on the other hand, believed that delay would 
 not defeat annexation. He proceeded upon the theory 
 that Texas must have peace, and this might be had 
 either by annexation, in which case the United States 
 would relieve Texas of responsibility, or by Mexico's 
 recognition of Texan independence. Jones's policy was 
 eminently one of statesmanship. He was accused of 
 
 " Resolution of June 6, 1844, in secret session ; Henderson 
 to Jones, June 7, 1844; Jones, Official Correspondence, 364. 
 
 "Houston to Jones, July 8, 1844; Jones, Official Corres- 
 pondence, 371. 
 
1 68 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 being an opponent of union with the United States, 
 but the accusation was unjust. Although favorable to 
 annexation, he proceeded upon the theory that if an- 
 nexation were impossible (a question which the pend- 
 ing political contest in the United States would soon 
 decide), Texas could pursue her own course without 
 any fear of Mexican invasion or menace. While wait- 
 ing for the decision of the people of the United States, 
 his efforts were directed toward the establishment of 
 peace with, and independence of, Mexico. During the 
 summer of 1844 Houston seemed to be impressed with 
 the idea that annexation was an impossibility ; Jones 
 thought delay would not injure the cause of annexation, 
 but in the event of the final defeat of annexation 
 his CQuntry must be upon a footing of assured peace. 
 Houston's position seems to have been one of emotion, 
 of disappointment and despair, based upon the rejec- 
 tion of the treaty. Jones's position was one of calcu- 
 lating shrewdness, which was founded upon a genuine 
 desire for the welfare of Texas. 
 
 The Texan government did not wait long for a re- 
 newal of Calhoun's assurances of protection pending 
 annexation. The armistice between Texas and Mexico 
 having expired, Woll, commanding the Mexican army 
 at Mier, gave notice to Houston that hostilities would 
 be renewed." Howard, the new charge, was informed 
 of Woll's intentions and requested "to take the neces- 
 sary steps to carry into effect the assurances (already 
 given) and to extend to Texas the aid which the emer- 
 gency required." " 
 
 '° Woll to Houston, June 19, 1844; H. Ex. Doc. 2, z8 Cong., 
 2 Sess.j 27. 
 "Jones to Howard, August 6, 1844; ibid., 25. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 169 
 
 Howard's answer, which Jones characterized as 
 hair-spHtting, was that the assurances of protection 
 extended only during the pendency of the treaty, and 
 that he had no instructions beyond that." Tyler de- 
 cided that the obligation to protect Texas extended not 
 merely during the consideration of the treaty, but 
 also while the question of annexation was pending. 
 Such a position was a dangerous one. "As far as it 
 relates to the executive department he (the President) 
 is prepared to use all its powers for that purpose. But 
 the government of Texas is fully aware that they are 
 circumscribed by the constitution within narrow limits, 
 which it would not be possible for the President to 
 transcend. All that he can do is to make suitable 
 representations to the Mexican government against 
 the renewal of the war pending the question of annex- 
 ation, and the savage manner in which it is proposed 
 to conduct it, and to recommend to Congress to adopt 
 measures to repel any attack which may be made." " 
 After all of Tyler's brave talk of protection, he fell back 
 to the position that Webster had taken: to remon- 
 strate with Mexico against the continuance of the war. 
 Active measures of protection were admitted to be 
 within the power of Congress only. Wilson Shannon 
 of Ohio, who had been tendered and had accepted the 
 position of minister to Mexico some months before," 
 was told to protest against the renewal of the war. 
 Calhoun wrote that Mexico's object was plain: "To 
 defeat the annexation of Texas to the United States 
 and probably to drive Texas into political connections 
 
 " Howard to Jones, August 6, 1844 ; ibid., 28. 
 "Calhoun to Howard, September 10, 1844; ibid., 50. 
 "Shannon to Calhoun, April 17, 1844; MS., Archives. 
 
170 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 with some other power less congenial to her feelings 
 and favorable to her independence, and more threaten- 
 ing to her and our permanent welfare and safety." 
 The President, therefore, would use all his constitu- 
 tional powers to stop the projected renewal of war. 
 "If Mexico has thought proper to take offense [at 
 annexation] it is we, who invited a renewal of the 
 proposition, and not she [Texas] which accepted it, 
 that ought to be held responsible. . . . Mexico 
 would make a great mistake if she should suppose 
 that the President would regard with indifference the 
 renewal of the war." " 
 
 Shannon replied that although efforts were making 
 to increase the army and to rebuild the navy in conse- 
 quence of the belligerent utterances of Santa Anna, 
 he believed that the projected invasion for the sub- 
 jugation of Texas would come to nothing. Sarita 
 Anna and the Mexican congress were mutually an- 
 tagonistic. If the congress voted means to support an 
 army, it would result in the prolongation of Santa 
 Anna's power. If the congress controlled the army as 
 well as the funds, Santa Anna would be driven out. 
 The belligerent manifesto Shannon believed to be 
 brutum fulmen!^ 
 
 Raymond, who continued to look after the interests 
 of Texas at Washington after the departure of Van 
 Zandt and Henderson, wrote to Jones: "Mr. Calhoun 
 informed me on yesterday that Gen. Howard would 
 have been instructed to renew the assurance given to 
 our government in April last, relative to the disposi- 
 
 ^° Calhoun to Shannon, September 10, 1844 ; H. Bx. Doc. 2, 
 28 Cong., I Sess., 29. 
 "Shannon to Calhoun, October 28, 1844; MS., Archives. 
 
THE ANNEXATION Olf TEXAS I71 
 
 tion of the army and navy of the United States for our 
 protection during the pendency of annexation; and 
 that in his despatch to Gen. Howard, he had so di- 
 rected him; but when it came to be submitted to the 
 Cabinet, the gentlemen at the head of the war and navy 
 departments preferred its being omitted, in order that 
 the return of the naval force to the Gulf and Coast of 
 Texas, which they had only left on account of the 
 equinoctial storms, should seem as a mere continuation 
 (as it was in fact) of the April orders, which had al- 
 ready stood the test of the most rigid scrutiny of 
 Congress. I was assured that a continuation of these 
 orders had been made and that these vessels of war 
 would be on the spot before any danger could ap- 
 proach us. I believe this government will do rather 
 more for our protection and support, if necessary, than 
 they desire should appear. They don't like to leave 
 themselves open to an attack by Congress, especially 
 Wilkins, Mason and Nelson. Mr. Calhoun is case- 
 hardened. When he thinks he is right he will go 
 ahead, no matter how great the responsibility; and 
 had he the power, the army would doubtless be ordered 
 right into Texas to repel any attack upon her." ^ 
 
 Tyler and Calhoun were more afraid of the action 
 of other powers than of Mexico. It was under- 
 stood that the British interests in Mexico had repre- 
 sented to Santa Anna that the independence of Texas 
 would be of advantage to Mexico in creating a buffer 
 state against the aggressions of the northern republic. 
 In June, after the rejection of the treaty, Aberdeen 
 
 ^Raymond to Jones, September 13, 1844; Jones, Official 
 Correspondence, 382. 
 
172 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLfiR AND POLK 
 
 proposed to Ashbel Smith, who continued to represent 
 Texas in Great Britain and France, that Texas join 
 in a diplomatic act with Great Britain, France, the 
 United States, and Mexico: "The basis of the pro- 
 posed diplomatic act was peace between Texas and 
 Mexico, and the permanent separate independence of 
 Texas — the parties to the act to be its guarantor's^'' " 
 Aberdeen further told Smith that while the United 
 States would be invited to join with the other powers, 
 it was not to be expected that it would accept. "It 
 was believed Mexico would participate, but in case of 
 her refusal, England, France, and Texas having 
 passed the act as between themselves, Mexico would 
 be forced to abide its time. The act if passed by the 
 three powers would not be abandoned — it would be 
 maintained." Smith asserted that he and Aberdeen 
 agreed definitely upon the terms of the arrangement. 
 "The two European powers asked no privileges, 
 hinted at none, did not propose to touch directly or 
 indirectly, made no alkision even, to any institutions 
 of Texas, or to its domestic or foreign policy outside 
 the express terms of the act. Those were limited abso- 
 lutely to the objects on the face of it; peace and per- 
 manent independence." "" The assent of France Smith 
 claimed to have definitely obtained. On the other hand. 
 Wise, Tyler's minister at the Court of Louis Philippe, 
 reported to Calhoun that there was no truth in the 
 report connecting France with Great Britain in an 
 effort to persuade Texas to withdraw the proposition 
 
 ^ Ashbel Smith, Reminiscences, 61. Smith was opposed 
 to the "diplomatic act." Worley in Quarterly of the Texas 
 State Historical Association, IX., 32. 
 
 "Ibid. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OE TEXAS 173 
 
 to annex on condition that Mexico should be made to 
 acknowledge her independence. King, however, did 
 not obtain from Guizot any definite assurance that 
 France would not join in obtaining Mexico's recog- 
 nition of Texan independence. Calhoun authorized 
 King to state to the French government that if action 
 were taken looking toward the recognition of Texas by- 
 Mexico as a means of assistance to Mexico against 
 the United States, it was a mistaken policy because the 
 United States had no disposition to aggrandize itself at 
 the expense of Mexico. "The fact is the very reverse." 
 Calhoun then dwelt upon the dissimilarity of interests 
 between France and Great Britain. The latter had 
 political, the former merely commercial, motives in 
 treating for Texan independence. But France must 
 know that her commercial interests were not in har- 
 mony with those of Great Britain, who plainly aimed 
 to monopolize all markets. France could be sure of 
 having fair treatment from the United States, and as 
 for her commercial interests with Texas, they would 
 be improved if annexation took place. She could then 
 purchase cheaply the produce raised by slave labor. 
 If Texas were free and independent, France would 
 have to pay more dearly for all products such as Texas 
 raised. King was instructed to urge France not to 
 join Great Britain in her mistaken propaganda for 
 abolition. Calhoun then described abolition as a crime 
 against civilization. "It would be to substitute for the 
 existing relation a deadly strife between the two races, 
 to end in the subjection, expulsion, or extirpation of 
 one or the other ; and such would be the case over the 
 greater part of this continent where negro slavery 
 exists. It would not end there, but would in all prob- 
 
174 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 ability extend, by its example, the war of races all 
 over South America, including Mexico, and extending 
 to the Indian as well as to the African race, and make 
 the whole one scene of blood and devastation. Dis- 
 missing, then, the stale and unfounded plea of philan- 
 thropy, can it be that France and the other great con- 
 tinental powers — seeing what must be the result of 
 the policy, for the accomplishment of which England 
 is constantly exerting herself, and that the defeat 
 of the annexation of Texas is so important toward its 
 consummation — are prepared to back or countenance 
 her in her efforts to effect either ?" ^ In his defense 
 to Pakenham, Calhoun had taken the ground that an- 
 nexation was necessary for the perpetuation of the 
 Union, which abolition menaced. Now he claimed 
 that unless annexation took place, a war of races 
 would drench all America in blood. France was asked 
 to choose the state of things which annexation would 
 offer: low prices for the products of slave labor, in- 
 stead of high prices, for which England was working ; 
 to prefer peace, the outcome of annexation, to Texan 
 independence and the horrors of a race war. 
 
 It is hard to comprehend that such a position was 
 ever assumed by any American secretary of state. 
 Had Calhoun stated (and this was the traditional doc- 
 trine) that Great Britain and France must keep hands 
 off Texas, he would have remained upon safe ground. 
 He could not, however, say this as long as the United 
 States had determined not to permit Texas to remain 
 independent. To draw France away from England 
 
 ^Calhoun to King, August 12, 1844; H. Ex. Doc. 2, z8 
 Cong., 2 Sess., 44. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 1/5 
 
 Upon the Texas question was obviously necessary. If 
 Great Britain and France had jointly guaranteed the 
 independence of Texas with the condition that that 
 independence should be permanent, the United States 
 would have been drawn into a war, provided (and 
 this was unlikely) the people of Texas ratified such an 
 arrangement. Had the United States been told by 
 Great Britain and France that Texas should not be 
 annexed, war would have been necessary in order that 
 the United States should vindicate its position. If 
 Texas had bound herself to Great Britain and France 
 to remain independent, Tyler would have been in the 
 predicament of having placed before the American 
 people an issue which two European powers forbade 
 it to decide. Houston resolved that Texas should bind 
 itself by just that promise. 
 
 In September occurred the contest for the Texan 
 presidency. Jones, Houston's secretary of state, was 
 elected. The date set for his inauguration was not 
 until December. Houston ordered Jones to instruct 
 Smith to conclude the diplomatic act upon the terms 
 proposed by Aberdeen. Houston's order to Jones was 
 as follows : ^° "Let dispatches be forthwith sent to Dr. 
 Smith, to the care of Mr. Rate"" at London. Let the 
 instructions be given Mr. Rate to forward said dis- 
 patches, in the event of Dr. Smith's departure home- 
 ward, to Colonel Daingerfield, at the Hague. Let full 
 powers and letters, of credence be also transmitted to 
 Colonel Daingerfield, to be used by him in the event 
 
 ^'Houston to Jones, September 23, 1844; Niles' Register, 
 LXXIV., 413- 
 
 ^'Mr. Lachlin Mcintosh Rate, a London merchant, and at 
 the same time an agent of the government of Texas. 
 
176 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 of Dr. Smith's leaving Europe, in conducting the 
 necessary negotiations with the Courts of -England and 
 France. Let our representatives (Dr. Smith or Colonel 
 Daingerfield) be instructed to complete the proposed 
 agreement for the settlement of our Mexican difficul- 
 ties, as soon as possible — giving the necessary pledges, 
 as suggested in the late dispatch of Dr. Smith on this 
 subject, but adhering to the Rio Grande as a boun- 
 dary, sine qua non. Also let our representatives be 
 instructed at once to enter into the proper arrange- 
 ments, for the admission of our products into the ports 
 of England, (and France if possible), upon the most 
 favorable terms — suggesting to the European parties 
 that now is the most favorable time for such an ar- 
 rangement with this covtntry, in consequence of the 
 absence of the obstacles which a treaty with the United 
 States might interpose." 
 
 Jones, the secretary of state, relying upon his posi- 
 tion as president elect, disobeyed Houston's orders and 
 failed to issue the instructions.^ Smith returned to 
 Texas believing that Guizot had been impressed by 
 King with the idea that any action on the part of 
 France toward Texas would give umbrage to the 
 United States."* Aberdeen, on the other hand, he 
 thought, still relied upon the cooperation of France 
 and would act provided Texas gave satisfactory as- 
 surances of its determination to remain independent. 
 
 By the time Smith had reached Texas and become 
 secretary of state under Jones, the elections in the 
 United States had been won for Polk. Thanks to the 
 
 ^ Jones, OMcial Correspondence, 43. 
 
 '^ Smith to Jones, December 24, 1844; ihid. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 1 77 
 
 Liberty party in the state of New York, the annexa- 
 tion of Texas seemed to have been endorsed by a 
 popular vote. 
 
 Tyler's message to Congress in Pecember, 1844, was 
 a call for action based upon the vote of the people upon 
 annexation. "Instructions have come up to both 
 branches of Congress from their constituents in terms 
 the most emphatic. It is the will both of the people 
 and the States that Texas shall be annexed to the Union 
 promptly and immediately." °° All of the arguments 
 heard in the treaty-message of the past May were 
 again brought forward. As far as the wishes of Texas 
 were concerned, he believed there had been no change. 
 As for Mexico's threat of war, it should have no effect 
 upon the action of the United States, for Mexico had 
 no rightful concern in the ultimate destiny of a repub»- 
 lie which was de facto independent of her. As for 
 other nations, Tyler stated that he apprehended no 
 serious complaint from them. "No sufficient ground 
 exists for such complaint. We should interfere 
 in no respect with the rights of any other nation. 
 There cannot be gathered from the act any design on 
 our part to do so with their possessions on this con- 
 tinent. We have interposed no impediments in the 
 way of such acquisitions of territory, large and ex- 
 tensive as many of them are, as the leading powers 
 of Europe have made, from time to time in every part 
 of the world. We seek no conquest made by war. No 
 intrigue will have been resorted to or acts of diplomacy 
 essayed to accomplish the annexation of Texas. Free 
 
 " Tyler's Annual Message, December 3, 1844 ; Richardson's 
 Messages, IV., 344. 
 
178 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 and independent herself, she asks to be received into 
 our Union. It is a question for our own decision 
 whether she shall be received or not." 
 
 In all this there is an absence of the futile assertion 
 of Calhoun that the United States reluctantly turned 
 to annexation because forced to do so by the intrigues 
 of Great Britain for abolition in Texas. Tyler dropped 
 the pro-slavery argument and stood upon the question 
 of national right, a position thoroughly tenable. His 
 reference to the possessions of European powers in 
 America was not only conciliatory, it was milder than 
 the facts warranted. Calhoun, however, still feared 
 that Great Britain would "consummate her grand 
 scheme of commercial monopoly, disguised under the 
 garb of abolition." " 
 
 . General Howard, the friend of Houston and Jack- 
 son, died in Texas in August. Tyler offered the posi- 
 tion of charge to Andrew Jackson Donelson, the son- 
 in-law and former private secretary of Jackson, who 
 had taken a prominent part in the successful manceu- 
 vers that won the presidential nomination for Polk. 
 This appointment was designedly made to bring to 
 bear the personal influence of Jackson upon Houston." 
 
 "Calhoun to King, December 13, 1844; Report Am. Hist. 
 Association, 1899, II., 632. 
 
 ^Calhoun to Donelson, September 15, 1844; ibid., 614. 
 Jackson to Van Buren, October 22, 1844; MS., Van Buren 
 Papers, Library of Congress : 
 
 "Hermitage 
 
 Oct^r 22na 1844 
 "My dear Sir, 
 
 "Major A. J. Donelson left me yesterday for 
 Texas, as charge de affairs, to fill the vacancy occasioned 
 by the lamented death of Genl Howard — The Major accepted 
 this appointment by the great solicitude of the Government 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 179 
 
 Duff Green, who had been such a willing instrument 
 for annexation under Upshur, was sent to Galveston 
 as consul with a further duty as bearer of despatches 
 
 & his political friends, and at a great sacrifice of his private 
 interest — but such is the great national importance of Texas 
 to the whole Union, and to the safety of the South & West, 
 & the great interest of this Union so considered by all the 
 democrats — that public duty prevailed over his private in- 
 terest, & he has accepted the mission. 
 
 "The Major has fully exposed to me his private means — ■ 
 They are ample to meet all his pecuniary engagements and 
 to make his family comfortable & independent as I believe. 
 The Major requested me to say to you, that as he passed 
 thro' Neworleans, he vsrould make arrangements, based upon 
 his cotton crop, to remit to his N. York debt six thousand 
 dollars, which thro his present crop of cotton, thinks that 
 he can do — His crop in Mississippi, is promising & he has 
 a fair crop here, and if cotton commands seven cents, I have 
 no doubt thro the commission Merchants, he will be able to 
 comply with what he has authorized me to say to you — at 
 least I hope he may. 
 
 "I have had a Hemorhage a few days ago — I am very 
 feeble, & have been visitted with a chill — The lancet to 
 meet the first, and medicine to meet the last which has very 
 much enfeeble [d] me — I am still able to set up. & wield the 
 pen, but with great difficulty. 
 
 "You see we have lost the election in Ohio — still I hope 
 she may rally and on the fifst of Nov^r regain her democ- 
 racy — We are in good spirits here of your empire state that 
 she is, & will prove sound to the core for democracy — But 
 the Whiggs from corruption, fraud, and pipe laying claim 
 that they will carry New York this their host here — Please, 
 on the receipt of this give me your opinion of the result. 
 Georgia is safe for the Democracy — Polk & Dallas I think 
 will carry Tennessee, and the Democracy of Kentucky are 
 of the opinion they will carry that state. Our friend Col 
 Benton has got himself in hotwater in Missouri I hope he 
 may be able to regain his former high standing with the 
 democracy of the West — I hope he may be again elected— 
 should he fail, he will be politically lost to the democracy — ■ 
 In confidence, I can say to you, that the leading democrats 
 
l80 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 to Mexico.'' Just what Green's duties were does not 
 appear, but he was sent doubtless to aid in strength- 
 ening the desire of the people for annexation, even to 
 the extent, in the opinion of Jones, of fomenting a 
 revolution in Texas if the government of Texas openly 
 favored separate independence." 
 
 Donelson reported the conversations had with FIous- 
 ton and Jones and his conclusion therefrom that the 
 retiring and incoming executives of Texas were in 
 favor of annexation notwithstanding all contrary re- 
 ports. Terrell, a well-known advocate of indepen- 
 dence, had been sent as minister to England and 
 France. Donelson feared that this was an indication 
 of the change in the policy of Texas. Houston tried to 
 disabuse his mind upon this point. "Terrell," Hous- 
 ton said, "was not authorized to conclude a treaty, 
 that he had sent him to England and France to see 
 what bids they would make, what boot they would 
 give — that he was not authorized to commit the gov- 
 
 of both Illinois & Indiana, advise me, that his speeches on 
 the Texan question has been by thousand pubHshed by the 
 Whiggs & circulated to the great injury of the democratic 
 cause, and some of his best friends in Ohio have complained 
 of this, and has confidently assured me, that the Col speeches, 
 and the apathy of Allen & Tapan on the Texan question has 
 lost Ohio to the democrats — but that they will make another 
 struggle on the first of nov^'r next. 
 
 "My whole Household Join me in kind salutations to you 
 & yours, as does Major Donelsons family, and particularly 
 yr little god daughter, Mary — very respectfully" 
 
 [Signature cut off] 
 
 '' Calhoun to Tyler, February lo, 1845 ; Report Am. Hist. 
 Assoc, 1899, II., 643. Shannon to Calhoun, November 12, 
 1844; MS., Archives. 
 
 "* Officers of the Government of Texas to Jones, December 
 30, 1844; Jones, Official Correspondence, 412. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS l8l 
 
 ernment, and power to do so would not be given 
 to him." " Again is the question of Houston's sincerity 
 raised. Donelson believed he had in him, as well as 
 in Jones, a true friend. Jones, whose enmity to 
 Houston soon became no secret, claimed that Houston 
 opposed annexation from the time the Calhoun treaty 
 was rejected. The question, however, is not important. 
 Jones, not Houston, was to occupy the center of the 
 Texan stage after the ninth of December. 
 
 The new charge to Texas emphasized the necessity 
 of haste on the part of Congress. "Every day's delay 
 is adding strength to the hands of those who are 
 playing the game for the ascendency of British influ- 
 ence in this Republic. Delay will increase the dififi- 
 culties already in our way, if it does not make them 
 insurmountable." °° He reported that Houston as- 
 sured him that he would be proud to see annexation 
 accomplished during Donelson's residence in Texas." 
 
 In his valedictory message to the Texan congress, 
 however, Houston did not give utterance to those pro- 
 annexation views with which he had raised Donelson's 
 hopes. He dwelt upon the splendid prospects which 
 Texas would have if she persevered in separate inde- 
 pendence, and drew attention to the friendly attitude 
 of European nations in contrast with the manifest 
 coolness of the United States. Jones's inaugural con- 
 tained not a word upon the subject of annexation." 
 
 °° Donelson to Calhoun, November 24, 1844 ; Report by A. 
 C. McLaughlin, Carnegie Institution Publications. 
 
 '° Donelson to Calhoun, November 23, 1844 (received De- 
 cember 28) ; MS., Archives. 
 
 " Donelson to Calhoun, November 24, 1844 (received De- 
 cember 28) ; MS., Archives. 
 
 ^ Yoakum, Texas, II., 443. 
 
I §2 DIPI.OMACY UNDIlR TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 The question was what the Congress of the United 
 States would do. 
 
 In Mexico, Shannon, whose temperament seems to 
 have been totally unfit for a diplomatic position, was 
 engaged in a blustering correspondence with Rejon 
 upon the subject of annexation. Santa Anna's down- 
 fall was plainly indicated. As the government weak- 
 ened and a revolution became more and more immi- 
 nent, Shannon's tone grew less and less conciliatory.. 
 Green, always a mischief maker, whose desires now 
 went beyond the annexation of Texas and fastened 
 themselves upon the acquisition of California, coun- 
 selled Shannon upon the necessity of humbling Mex- 
 ico. Green reported to Calhoun that Mexico would 
 never consent to the annexation of Texas. "The 
 present Government may therefore temporise, but we 
 have nothing to hope from Mexico. They cannot 
 reconquer Texas but they will not sell Texas." " "The 
 Government of the United States have no alternative, 
 that they cannot be content with the annexation of 
 Texas. They must demand a withdrawal of the in- 
 solent charges and imputations contained in Mr. 
 Rejon's notes, and an immediate adjustment of all out: 
 Claims against Mexico. This will not be done and a 
 war must be the consequence." " Shannon wrote that 
 there was as much probability of the Emperor of 
 China declaring war against the United States as that 
 Mexico would do so. Without any authority from 
 Calhoun, he notified the Mexican government that 
 owing to the insolent tone of Rejon's communications, 
 
 "Duff Green to Calhoun, October 28, 1844; Report of Am. 
 Hist. Association, 1899, II., 980. 
 '° Green to Calhoun, November 12, 1844 ; ibid., 993. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OE TEXAS 183 
 
 he would suspend diplomatic intercourse with it until 
 he had further instructions from home." Coinciding 
 with Green's opinion that the United States "could not 
 have peace with Mexico without a war," " Shannon 
 declared to Calhoun that nothing could be done with 
 Mexico as to the settlement of any of the difficulties 
 we have with her, "until we either whip her, or make ' 
 her believe we will do so." " 
 
 Having assisted Shannon in bringing relations with 
 Mexico to an impasse. Green left to take up the duties 
 of his consulate at Galveston. A quarrel with a fellow- 
 consul soon occurred, and after an altercation with 
 President Jones he was given his passports." 
 
 In Mexico the, storm against Santa Anna, which had 
 long been brewing, finally broke out into revolution. 
 
 "Shannon to Rejon, November 8, 1844; MS., Archives. 
 Niks' Register, LXVII., 260-66. 
 
 "Green to Calhoun, November 12, 1844; Report, Am. Hist. 
 Association, 1899, H., 993. 
 
 " Shannon to Calhoun, November 12, 1844 ; ibid., 995. 
 
 " The source of the Green quarrel was this : Green at- 
 tempted to have the Texan congress pass a bill in aid of two 
 companies, the Texas Land Company and the Del Norte 
 Company. These companies had as objects the conquest 
 and occupancy in behalf of Texas of the Californias and 
 the northern provinces of Mexico by means of an army aided 
 by Indians to be introduced from the United States upon 
 the Texan frontier. Green offered stock in these companies 
 to Jones if he would aid in the scheme. Upon Jones's re- 
 fusal Green threatened to revolutionize the country and 
 overthrow the existing government. Jones revoked Green's 
 exequatur Dec. 31, 1844. Officers of the Government of Texas 
 to Jones, December 30, 1844; Jones, Official Correspondence, 
 412. Elliott to Jones, January 14; 1845 ; ibid., 413. Donelson 
 to Calhoun, January 9, 1845, enclosing Secretary of State 
 Allen to Donelson, January 14, 1845 ; MS., Archives. Donel- 
 son to Calhoun, January 25 (ibid.), stated that the trouble 
 between Jones and Green had been settled. 
 
184 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 It culminated in the overthrow of Santa Anna on De- 
 cemtber 5, 1844. The council of state appointed, as presi- 
 dent ad interim, General Herrera, a man of established 
 probity of character, whose fault was timidity. His 
 tendencies were for peace. Thus Mexico, by expelling 
 the turbulent Santa Anna and replacing him with 
 Herrera, took a long step toward the peaceful adjust- 
 ment of relations with the United States upon the 
 subject of Texas. A more competent diplomat than 
 Shannon would have taken advantage of the change 
 in Mexico's domestic affairs. Shannon, however, 
 whose bad feeling dated from his arrival in the coun- 
 try, wanted Mexico chastised. 
 
 The course of events in Washington centered about 
 the agitation for the passage through Congress of the 
 resolution annexing Texas. Calhoun felt that while 
 the House would favor annexation, the action of the 
 Senate was problematical." Ingersoll's resolutions as 
 amended by Brown of Tennessee passed the House 
 on January 25, 1845, by a vote of one hun- 
 dred and twenty to ninety-eight. In the Senate 
 Benton, reversing his earlier position, in which 
 he demanded the previous consent of Mexico, now 
 came forward with a proposition to annex Texas by 
 what was practically the negotiation of a new treaty. 
 The support of Benton and of those senators who 
 followed him was necessary for the success of any 
 annexation measure. A compromise, which gave to the 
 President the power of selecting the alternative means, 
 was offered and passed by a small majority. The joint 
 
 "Calhoun to R. M. T. Hunter, December 29, 1844; Report, 
 Am. Hist. Association, 1899, II., 636. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 185 
 
 resolutions went to President Tyler March i, many 
 believing that he would leave the final choice of 
 measures to his successor, Polk. 
 
 Tyler's name, however, was to be inseparably asso- 
 ciated with Texas. Calhoun had not been invited to 
 continue with Polk." As soon as the resolutions 
 reached the President, he and Calhoun determined to 
 act at once. Selecting the method suggested by the 
 House in preference to that which Benton claimed was 
 the only constitutional mode, Tyler, on the day before 
 he left the presidential office, despatched a special mes- 
 senger to Texas to carry the joint resolution to 
 Donelson, who was instructed to insist that the Texan 
 government accede to the terms of the joint resolution. 
 The reason for the deliberate choice of the House 
 methods was stated to be that they were more simple 
 in character and might more readily be carried into 
 effect. "Nothing more is necessary than that the 
 Congress of Texas be called together, its consent given 
 to the provisions contained in it, and the adoption of 
 a constitution by the people in convention, the same 
 to be submitted to the Congress of the United States 
 for its approval, in the same manner as when one of 
 our own territories is admitted as a state. The decisive 
 objection to the amendment of the Senate is that it 
 would endanger the ultimate success of the measure." " 
 It contemplated a new compact which must be ratified 
 like any other treaty. Calhoun urged that the joint 
 resolutions be adopted by the Texan congress with- 
 out amendment and immediately. "The last hope on 
 
 "Calhoun to Mrs. Calhoun, March 11, 1845; ibid., 647. 
 " Calhoun to Donelson, March 3, 1845 ; S. Ex. Doc. i, 29 
 Cong., 2 Sess., 32. Tyler's Tylers, II., 364. 
 
l86 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYIvER AND POLK 
 
 the part of any foreign power, which may feel dis- 
 posed to defeat annexation, will be to act upon the 
 government of Texas, and it can scarcely be doubted 
 from the feelings expressed on the part of one of the 
 leading European powers against the measure, that 
 no effort will be spared to induce Texas to reject the 
 proposals contained in the Resolution." " 
 
 It has been seen that Jones's policy as president of 
 Texas was to follow two parallel lines of negotiation : 
 the first, to hold the door open for annexation as long 
 as there remained any reasonable ground for hope of 
 getting it, the second, to lay the foundation for the 
 separate independence of Texas as a nation in case 
 annexation should ultimately fail. "Annexation or 
 Unity, Independence and Peace with all the world." " 
 
 Donelson learned of the passage of the Texas reso- 
 lution while he was at New Orleans. He turned back 
 to Texas with the important news only to find the 
 French and English charges closeted with Jones and 
 the secretary of state, Ashbel Smith. Although ig- 
 norant of what project was under consideration, he 
 felt sure that Jones was a friend of annexation. The 
 result of the conference with Elliott and Saligny, the 
 British and French representatives, was a memoran- 
 dum of a treaty which included the conditions that 
 Mexico acknowledge the independence of Texas, and 
 that Texas promise that she would not annex her- 
 self, or become subject, to any country whatever." 
 Elliott, without Donelson's knowledge, left Galveston 
 
 " Ihid. See Donelson to Calhoun, April 24, 1845 ; Report 
 Am. Hist. Association, 1899, IL, 1029. 
 "Jones, Official Correspondence, 473. / 
 
 "Ibid., Memorandum of March 29, 1845. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OE TEXAS 187 
 
 for Mexico. In the mean time Jones temporized. At 
 no time, however, did Donelson lose faith in the ulti- 
 mate success of the measure, for Jones had assured 
 him that he would submit the question to the people. 
 As soon as Elliott had left for Mexico with the agree- 
 ment for independence, Jones sent his secretary of 
 state to Europe for the purpose of placing the rela- 
 tions of Texas with Great Britain and France upon 
 a satisfactory footing should annexation fail. In case 
 annexation triumphed Smith was to take leave of the 
 two governments and close the legations." The Mexi- 
 can government accepted the proposals of Texas and 
 the preliminary treaty was ratified by the Mexican 
 congress.'"' Elliott returned with the treaty and Jones 
 proclaimed peace with Mexico. It remained for the 
 people of Texas to decide which path Texas should 
 follow, that of independence or of union with the 
 United States. A convention had already been called 
 to consider the resolutions for annexation. The 
 Texan congress indicated the feeling of the people in 
 unanimously rejecting the Mexican treaty and voting 
 for annexation. Upon the Fourth of July the conven- 
 tion of the Republic of Texas passed an ordinance 
 with but one dissenting voice, agreeing to annexation 
 with the United States. In October the people ratified 
 the acts of the convention, and all that Texas could do 
 toward annexation had been accomplished. The steps 
 remaining for the admission of Texas as a state of the 
 Union were to be taken by the Congress of the United 
 States. In December Polk approved the joint resolu- 
 
 " Smith to Jones, April 9, 1845, and memorandum ; Jones, 
 Official Correspondence, 446. 
 '' Ashbel Smith's Reminiscences, 72. 
 
l88 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 tion of Congress admitting Texas as a state, and in 
 February, 1848, upon the surrender of authority by 
 President Jones to Governor Henderson, Texas as a 
 republic legally ceased to exist." 
 
 Tyler gave way to Polk but not before he had 
 signed the joint resolutions for annexation and deter- 
 mined which method of annexation should be followed. 
 No two men could have been more different in char- 
 acter than Calhoun and Buchanan. As far as Texas 
 was concerned, Polk did not reverse the decision of 
 his predecessor. The incoming President proceeded 
 to carry out the plans that Calhoun had decided upon. 
 As soon as Tyler had signed the joint resolution, Al- 
 monte, the Mexican minister at Washington, departed, 
 thus breaking off relations between his country and 
 the United States. In giving notice to Buchanan of 
 the termination of his mission Almonte denounced the 
 action of Congress as "an act of aggression, the most 
 unjust which can be found recorded in the counsels 
 of modern history — namely, that of despoiling a 
 friendly nation like Mexico of a considerable portion 
 of her territory." " 
 
 As Mexico had' long since announced that annexa- 
 tion would be regarded by her as equivalent to a decla- 
 ration of war, Almonte was forced to suspend rela- 
 tions to preserve his self-respect. He could do no less. 
 Polk was justified in thinking that nothing would 
 
 " In the summer of 1845 Polk refused to receive a charge 
 from Texas. Had he then regarded Texas as a foreign state, 
 he would have exceeded his powers in sending United States 
 troops thither. Polk's Diary. 
 
 " Almonte to the Secretary of State, March 6, 1845 ; Brit, 
 and For. State Papers, XXXIII. , 246-48. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 189 
 
 come of Almonte's protest. As the administration of 
 the peaceful Herrera was admittedly too weak to sub- 
 jugate Texas, the prosecution of a war against the 
 United States was at first hardly conside^d. Almonte's 
 protest was received with expressions of regret that 
 Mexico should have taken offense. "The President," 
 Buchanan wrote Almonte, "although entering upon the 
 duties [of his office] , cheerfully declares in advance 
 that his most strenuous efforts will be devoted to the 
 amicable adjustment of every cause of complaint be- 
 tween the two governments and to the cultivation of 
 the kindest and most friendly relations between the 
 sister Republics." °° ' 
 
 With the departure of Almonte really ends the nar- 
 rative of Texas annexation, as far as Mexico was con- 
 cerned. It is commonly said that the Mexican War 
 was the result of the annexation of Texas, but the two; 
 were separate episodes which had no necessary con^ 
 nection. If Polk had had no ulterior designs uponl/ 
 Mexico, the Mexican War would not have taken 
 place. Had the United States only the matter of 
 Texas to settle with Mexico there would have been 
 no difficulty. But Polk had greater ambitions than to 
 act as Tyler's administrator de bonis non as to Texas : 
 he coveted California from his entrance into office. 
 Tyler's name is properly connected with Texas ; with 
 Polk belongs the glory, if glory it be, of the Mexican 
 War and of the conquest of California. 
 
 " Buchanan to Almonte, March 10, 1845 ; ibid. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 Thb Northwestern Boundary Controversy 
 1803-1818 
 
 It has been found necessary to review the history 
 of the northeastern boundary question in order to 
 present with sufficient clearness the problem that 
 Ashburton and Webster essayed to solve. The north- 
 eastern boundary question was essentially one of geog- 
 raphy, having its origin in the inaccuracies of the 
 eighteenth century maps and in the ignorance of those 
 who negotiated the peace treaty of 1783. The north- 
 western boundary difficulty, solved in 1846, was one 
 of totally different nature. Interpretation of maps 
 had nothing to do with it. It was a boundary ques- 
 tion, which grew out of the westward expansion of 
 the Anglo-Saxon people toward the Pacific. It was 
 a controversy nearly as old as the northeastern ques- 
 tion, but the succeeding phases of it had no resem- 
 blance to the controversy over the St. Croix, the High- 
 *lands, and the Connecticut River. That the two mat- 
 ters culminated in angry discussion at about the same 
 time was, perhaps, only a coincidence. The two 
 branches of the English-speaking races spread west 
 beyond the Rockies and came in close contact, after a 
 race across the continent, near the mouth of the 
 Columbia. 
 
 The history of this expansion has In it much of 
 the picturesque. Gray and Vancouver carried on the 
 work of Drake, while the exploits of Lewis and Clark 
 
THE NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION IQI 
 
 and of Mackenzie nobly followed out the hazardous 
 undertakings of Champlain and of La Salle. 
 
 In the attempt to make good the territorial claims 
 for which Gray and Lewis and Clark upon the one 
 hand, and Vancouver and Mackenzie upon the other, 
 furnished the opportunity, both the United States and 
 Great Britain made use of every argument upon which 
 color of title could be founded. Discovery, settle- 
 ment, effective occupation, contiguity, and treaty 
 rights were all made to do duty in some form. All 
 of these lumped together failed to give either party 
 a perfect right to the northwest coast of America. 
 The result was a compromise no doubt just and equi- 
 table. The line of forty-nine degrees carried across 
 the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific gave to Great 
 Britain a stretch of coast that guaranteed to her for 
 all time to come a position of effective commercial 
 rivalry with the United States for the transcontinental 
 and trans-Pacific trade of the world. Had the United 
 States been able successfully to defend against Great 
 Britain her claim up to fifty-four degrees, forty min- 
 utes (and a war would no doubt have resulted in the 
 effort to enforce such a claim), the position of Great 
 Britain, not only in reference to the North American 
 continent, but also to the trade of the world, might 
 have become secondary in importance. Great Britain 
 was secured in' her possession of a transcontinental 
 trade-route long Before such an idea was believed pos- 
 sible. The tortuous path of Mackenzie has been 
 straightened into the line of the Canadian Pacific, 
 whose port of departure to the Orient bears the name 
 of Mackenzie's compatriot, the sailor Vancouver. 
 
192 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 By the treaty of peace of 1783 the western boun- 
 dary of the United States was the Mississippi River 
 south to the thirty-first degree of latitude. On the 
 northwest the limits were from the northwesternmost 
 point of the Lake of the Woods "thence on a due west 
 course to the River Mississippi." Such a boundary 
 was impossible, because a line due west from the north- 
 westernmost point of the Lake of the Woods would 
 have struck far to the north of the source of the Mis- 
 sissippi. It is to be noticed that this line of the treaty 
 would have given Great Britain access to the Missis- 
 sippi. 
 
 The rectification of the geographical error in the 
 description of the boundary line, together with the 
 question as to whether or not Great Britain had access 
 to the Mississippi, is the genesis of the northwestern 
 boundary question. The matter seems not to have had 
 serious attention until the King-Hawkesbury nego- 
 tiations of 1802.' Calling attention to the error of 
 the line of 1783, Madison instructed King that this 
 might be remedied by agreeing that the boundary 
 should run from that source of the Mississippi nearest 
 the Lake of the Woods, "striking it westwardly at a 
 tangent and from the point touched along the water- 
 mark of the lake to its most northwestern point, at 
 which it will meet the line running through the 
 Lake.'" Depending upon Mackenzie's report that the 
 source of the Mississippi nearest the Lake of the 
 Woods was about twenty-nine miles to the westward 
 of the Lake, King agreed to a line drawn between 
 
 ^ Am. State Papers, For. Rel, II., 584-91. 
 ^Madison to King, June 8, 1802; ibid., II., 585. Madison 
 refers to Mackenzie's map, then recently published. 
 
THE NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION I93 
 
 these two points, and the convention, signed May 12, 
 1803, so declared the boundary. The Louisiana 
 treaty, of which King then knew nothing,' upset the 
 agreement that had been reached with Hawkesbury. 
 The Senate struck out the fifth article relating to 
 boundaries upon the recommendation of John Quincy 
 Adams, then chairman of the committee to which the 
 treaty was referred. The Senate feared that, as the 
 King convention antedated the Louisiana treaty by 
 twelve days, it might be held to operate as a limitation 
 of the claims of the United States to Louisiana.' 
 
 Monroe, who had been sent from Paris to London 
 after the execution of the Louisiana treaty, was in- 
 structed by Madison to secure Great Britain's ratifica- 
 tion of the King treaty with the fifth article omitted. 
 Madison believed that there would be no difficulty in 
 prevailing upon the British Government thus to ac- 
 cept the treaty, because, "first, it would be unreason- 
 able that any advantage against the United States 
 should be constructively authorized by the posteriority 
 of the dates in question ; the instructions given to enter 
 into the convention and the understanding of the par- 
 ties at the time of signing it, having no reference what- 
 ever to any territorial rights of the United States ac- 
 quired by the previous convention with France, but 
 referring merely to the territorial rights as under- 
 stood at the date of the instructions for, and 
 signature of, the British convention. . . . Sec- 
 ondly, if the fifth article be expunged, the north boun- 
 dary of Louisiana will, as is reasonable, remain the 
 same in the hands of the United States as it was in 
 
 "King to Madison, December 3, 1803; ibid., II., 591. 
 'Adams to Madison, December 16, 1803; ibid., II., 590. 
 
194 DIPLOMACY UNDgR TYLER AND POLK 
 
 the hands of France, and may be adjusted and estab- 
 Hshed according to the principles and authorities which 
 would in that case have been applicable. Thirdly, 
 there is reason to believe that the boundary between 
 Louisiana and the British territories north of it was 
 actually fixed by commissioners appointed under the 
 treaty of Utrecht, and that this boundary was to run 
 from the Lake of the Woods westwardly in latitude 
 forty-nine degrees ; in which case the fifth article 
 would be nugatory, as the line from the Lake of the 
 Woods to the nearest source of the Mississippi would 
 run through territory which on both sides of the line 
 would belong to the United States. . . . Fourthly, 
 laying aside, however, all the objections to the fifth 
 article, the proper extension of a dividing line in that 
 quarter will be equally open for friendly negotiations 
 after, as, . . . considering the remoteness of the time 
 at which such a line will become actually necessary, 
 the postponement of it is of little or no consequence." ° 
 These instructions are of importance because in them 
 is the first suggestion of the line of forty-nine degrees 
 as a boundary between the United States and the 
 British possessions to the west of the Lake of the 
 Woods. Madison said that "there was reason to be- 
 lieve" that commissioners under the treaty of Utrecht 
 had decided upon that parallel as the division between 
 French and British territories. In support of this as- 
 sertion, Madison enclosed a paper setting forth the 
 reasons for believing that the Utrecht commissioners 
 had decided upon the line of forty-nine degrees. What 
 these arguments were cannot be known except indi- 
 rectly, as the paper referred to is not extant. Madi- 
 
 ° Madison to Monroe, February 14, 1804; ibid., III., 89. 
 
THE NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION I95 
 
 son, however, confessed to Monroe that recourse must 
 be had to the "proceedings of the commissioners, as 
 the source of authentic information." At about the 
 same time Madison urged Livingston at Paris to make 
 a thorough search in support of the Hue of forty-nine 
 degrees." Madison then admitted that he had no official 
 information upon which to rest the claim for the pro- 
 posed boundary. While commissioners were ap- 
 pointed under the treaty of Utrecht after 1719, there 
 is no evidence that they ever marked out a line.' The 
 line of forty-nine degrees, which divides British North 
 America from the United States across more than half 
 the continent, rests upon a mistaken idea. Salmon, in 
 his Modern Universal History, published in 1738, 
 stated that the Utrecht commissioners had chosen as 
 the dividing line between the Hudson Bay territories 
 and Canada one drawn from the coast of Labrador in 
 latitude fifty-eight degrees, thirty minutes, "southwest 
 of Lake Mistissin and thence farther southwest to 
 the latitude of forty-nine degrees." The Topographi- 
 cal Description of Louisiana, by Hutchins, published 
 in 1784, copied this assertion "verbatim without addi- 
 tion or remark." ' 
 
 'Madison to Livingston, January 31, 1804; ibid., II., 574. 
 
 ' At least beyond the Lake of the Woods. Cf. Bancroft to 
 Fish, September I, 1873; MS., Archives. Quoted by J. C. 
 B. Davis, Notes, etc., 1324, n. Cf. Von Hoist, History, 
 III., 33. 
 
 'Greenhow, Oregon, edition of 1847, p. 436. Apparently 
 the first denial that the line of forty-nine degrees was deter- 
 mined by the Utrecht commissioners was made by Greenhow 
 in the Washington Globe of January ij, 1840: "Summary of 
 facts respecting the Northwest coast of America." See 
 his memoir of the Northwest Coast of America, 216. Upon 
 the British side, Twiss, The Oregon Question Examined, 208- 
 14, agrees with Greenhow's contention. 
 
196 DIPLOMACY UNDBR TYLER AND POLK 
 
 It will be noticed that Salmon brought the line down 
 to the forty-ninth parallel. Douglas's Summary of 
 the British Settlements in North America, published 
 in 1749 at Boston, stated that the line went not only 
 to the forty-ninth parallel, but also extended indefi- 
 nitely westward in that latitude. Bolton's map of 
 America inserted in Postlethwayt's Dictionary of Com- 
 merce marked the line of forty-nine degrees, and in a 
 note a statement is made that this line had been settled 
 "by commissaries, after the peace of Utrecht, making 
 a course from Davis's Inlet, on the Atlantic Sea, down 
 to the forty-ninth degree, through the Lake Abitibis, 
 to the North-west ocean." Thus in unofficial maps, 
 dating from the middle of the eighteenth century, 
 the forty-ninth parallel was represented as the dividing 
 line between British and French possessions through 
 to the Pacific Ocean. There was no basis in fact for 
 such an idea. Mitchell's map, as used by the nego- 
 tiators of 1782, which had been the source of so much 
 confusion over the northeastern boundary, showed no 
 such dividing line upon the northwest. Upon it there 
 is no reference to the forty-ninth parallel. This imag- 
 inary line, therefore, was immediately after the pur- 
 chase of Louisiana put forth by the United States as 
 the ancient northern boundary of the newly acquired 
 possession. It was an American and not a British 
 suggestion.* 
 
 Monroe found that it was not so easy to persuade 
 
 ° See excellent maps in Channing's Jeftersonian System, 
 pp. 6 and 70. The substitution of a parallel of latitude for 
 a natural watershed as the boundary of Louisiana accounts 
 in some measure for the erroneous idea, subsequently main- 
 tained, that Louisiana extended indefinitely west. 
 
THE NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION I97 
 
 Great Britain to accept the King-Hawkesbury con- 
 vention without the fifth article. Addington had given 
 way to Pitt, and Lord Harrowby, who took Hawkes- 
 bury's place, strongly reprobated the practice of rati- 
 fying treaties in part "as one unauthorized and un- 
 sanctioned by public law and usage." Monroe at- 
 tempted, in accordance with Madison's instructions, 
 to explain the Senate's action. Harrowby observed 
 with some degree of severity that the United States 
 was not disposed to ratify the fifth article when it was 
 found that by it territory was ceded with which the 
 United States did not wish to part. Monroe resented 
 "the injustice of the insinuation" and offered to leave 
 the ratification, but Harrowby refused to receive it. 
 "The conduct of Lord Harrowby," Monroe reported 
 to Madison, "through the whole of this conference 
 was calculated to wound and to irritate," and he felt 
 that the consideration of the matter was indefinitely 
 postponed." At a subsequent interview Monroe stated 
 that it was not contemplated by either Great Britain 
 or the United States that the latter should convey to 
 the former any right to the territory lying westward 
 of the line between the Lake of the Woods and the 
 Mississippi, "since not a foot of it belonged to her; 
 it was intended to leave it to Great Britain to settle 
 the point as to such territory, or such portion of it 
 as she might want, with Spain, or rather with France, 
 to whom it then belonged." The stipulation of the fifth 
 article had become by the Louisiana treaty nugatory, 
 for, "as Great Britain holds no territory south of the 
 
 "Monroe to Madison, June 3, 1804; Am. State Papers, 
 For. Rel, III., 93. 
 
igS DIPI^OMACY UNDER TYLER AND POEK 
 
 forty-ninth parallel and the United States the whole 
 of it, the line proposed by that article would run 
 through a country which now belongs exclusively to 
 the United States."" Thus the United States took 
 the position that the parallel of forty-nine degrees was 
 the dividing line between Louisiana and the British 
 possessions, whereas the true boundary of Louisiana 
 upon the north was the watershed enclosing the ter- 
 ritory drained by the Mississippi-Missouri rivers. 
 Soon after this second interview with Lord Harrowby, 
 Monroe went to Spain upon his special mission, re- 
 turning to England in July, 1805." Upon his return 
 he waited for some months for Harrowby to resume 
 the consideration of the northwestern boundary. Mon- 
 roe was disappointed at the delay. In Januaryj 1806, 
 Pitt died and Grenville and Fox formed a new minis- 
 try. Monroe hoped that Fox would inaugurate a 
 change in the policy of Great Britain toward the 
 United States.'^ For months Monroe was unable to 
 draw Fox's attention to the question of boundary. 
 Jefferson, holding that Jay's treaty had expired, then 
 sent William Pinkney to act jointly with Monroe in 
 the negotiation of a new treaty." This joint commis- 
 sion was not instructed to discuss the boundary ques- 
 tion, but Monroe was separately authorized to "bring 
 that business to a conclusion. If any repugnance 
 should be shown to the erasure of the fifth article as 
 proposed by the Senate, and thereby leaving unsettled 
 
 " Monroe to Madison, September 8, 1804 ; ibid.. III., 95. 
 Monroe to Lord Harrowby, September s, 1804; ibid.. III., 97. 
 "Monroe to C. J. Fox, February 25, 1806; ibid.. III., 114. 
 "Monroe to Madison, January 28, 1806; ibid.. III., iii. 
 "Jefferson's Writings, Ford's Ed., XIV., 178, n. 
 
THE NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION I99 
 
 for the present the boundaries in the northwest quar- 
 ter of the Union, and preference should be given to a 
 proviso against any constructive effect of the Louisiana 
 convention on the intention of the parties at the sig- 
 nature of the depending convention, you may concur 
 in the alteration with a view to bring the subject in 
 that form before the ratifying authority of the United 
 States." " 
 
 The treaty which Monroe and Pinkney signed with 
 Vassal Holland and Auckland was not submitted to 
 the Senate by Jefferson, as it contained no abandon- 
 ment of Great Britain's claim to impress American 
 citizens." Pinkney and Monroe continued their nego- 
 tiations until Grenville's ministry retired and Canning 
 became secretary for foreign affairs. Monroe and 
 Pinkney reported that Canning's professions were, on 
 the whole, conciliatory." Negotiations were soon re- 
 newed for a convention upon the boundary. The 
 American commissioners proposed that "the division 
 line between our respective territories [upon the north- 
 west] ought to be drawn from the most northwestern 
 point of the Lake of the Woods due north or south 
 until it shall intersect the parallel of forty-nine degrees, 
 and from the point of such intersection due west along 
 and with that parallel." This was agreed to by the 
 British commissioners, who, however, followed by pro- 
 posing that "this line of forty-nine degrees should ex- 
 
 " Madison to Monroe, May 15, 1806; Am. State Papers, 
 For. Rel, III., 119. 
 " Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, February 3, 1807 ; ibid., 
 
 Ill; IS3. 
 
 "Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, April 22, 1807; ihid., 
 III., 160. They had not then heard of Jefferson's attitude 
 toward their treaty. 
 
200 DIPLOMACY UNDEiR TYLER AND POLK 
 
 tend west as far as the territories of the United States 
 extend in that quarter." " The purpose of the British 
 suggestion was evident to Monroe and Pinkney. Both 
 sides agreed that nothing in the article "should be con- 
 strued to extend to the northwest coast of America, or 
 to the territories belonging to or claimed by either 
 party on the continent of America to the westward of 
 the Stony Mountains." " To limit the line of forty- 
 nine degrees so that it would go only as far as the 
 territories of the United States might extend in that 
 quarter would, so Monroe and Pinkney believed, leave 
 it open for Great Britain afterwards to found a claim 
 to any part of the country west of the beginning of 
 that line. The American commissioners feared that 
 such a claim might be made on the ground of occupa- 
 tion or even by purchase from Spain, and their feelings 
 were shared by Madison, who wanted no such proviso. 
 "It would have little other effect," he wrote, "than as 
 an offensive intimation to Spain that our claims ex- 
 tend to the Pacific Ocean. However reasonable such 
 claims may be compared with those others, it is im- 
 politic, especially at the present moment, to strengthen 
 Spanish jealousies of the United States, which it is 
 probably an object with Great Britain to excite by the 
 clause in question." " Before Madison's warning 
 reached Monroe and Pinkney the question of a boun- 
 dary was overshadowed by a more serious affair, that 
 of the Leopard and Chesapeake^ The matter of the 
 
 '* Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, April 25, 1807 ; ibid., 
 III., 162. "Ibid., III., 165. 
 
 ™ Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, July 30, 1807; ibid.. III., 
 i8s. 
 
 ''^Canning to Monroe, July 25, 1807; ibid.. Ill, 187. 
 
THB NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION 20I 
 
 northwestern boundary was not discussed again until 
 after the War of 1812. The negotiation of Monroe 
 and Pinkney, though fruitless, had some lasting effect. 
 Great Britain and the United States were agreed that 
 the line of forty-nine degrees was suitable, at least 
 as far as the Rocky Mountains. Neither Madison, 
 Monroe, nor Pinkney was certain as to the extent of 
 Louisiana to the west, but none of them contended 
 that the United States had any rights to the west of 
 the Rocky Mountains as against Spain. Then, too, 
 Madison was unwilling to discuss the question of boun- 
 dary indefinitely westward along the line of forty- 
 nine degrees for fear of offending Spain. Further- 
 more, as the whole question of right to the western 
 country was at that time deemed of little importance, 
 Madison was perfectly willing to leave the matter in 
 abeyance. 
 
 At the first conference of the American and British 
 peace commissioners at Ghent, held August 8, 1814, 
 the latter proposed the revision of the boundary line 
 without specifying what part of it should be altered. 
 They disclaimed any intention of desiring to acquire 
 additional territory, and represented the proposed re- 
 vision as intended merely for the purpose of prevent- 
 ing uncertainty and dispute.^ At a later conference'^ 
 a more specific proposal was made. The British com- 
 missioners proposed that the boundary line west of 
 Lake Superior and thence to the Mississippi be re- 
 vised and the treaty right of Great Britain to the navi- 
 gation of the Mississippi be continued. Surprised at 
 
 ^American Commissioners to Monroe, August 12, 1814; 
 ibid., III., 70s. 
 ^August 19, 1814. 
 
202 DIPLOMACY UNDBR TYLBR AND POL,K 
 
 such a proposition, the American members asked if 
 the Lake of the Woods were not meant instead of 
 Lake Superior. "The British commissioners repeated 
 that they meant the Hne from Lake Superior to that 
 river." "" The American answer to this was that what- 
 ever the object of Great Britain might be in thus pro- 
 posing to take over a tract of territory larger than the 
 whole island of Great Britain, the duty of the Ameri- 
 can commissioners was plain: "they have no authority 
 to cede any part of the United States, and to no stipu- 
 lation to that effect will they subscribe." ^ To this 
 it was replied that as the necessity for fixing some 
 boundary for the northwestern frontier had been 
 mutually acknowledged, a proposal for a discussion 
 of that subject could not be considered as a demand 
 for a cession of territory, "unless the United States 
 were prepared to assert that there is no limit to their 
 territories in that direction." " The British commis- 
 sioners then proposed the line from the Lake of the 
 Woods to the Mississippi (as set forth in the King- 
 Hawkesbury convention of 1803), but they admitted 
 that they were willing to discuss any other boundary. 
 In the refusal of Adams and his colleagues to permit 
 a boundary line between the territory of the United 
 States and the Indian nations, the British sought to 
 show that the Americans were actuated only by mo- 
 
 ^ Adams, et al, to Monroe, August 19, 1814; Am. State 
 Papers, For. Rel., III., 709. 
 
 ^American to British Commissioners, August 24, 1814; 
 ihid.. III., 712. 
 
 ^British to American Commissioners, September 4, 1814; 
 ibid., III., 714. 
 
THE NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION 203 
 
 tives of aggrandizement "afforded by the purchase of 
 Louisiana from France." "' 
 
 To dwell upon the successive steps of the long and 
 difficult negotiation which resulted in the adoption of 
 the status quo ante bellum, with the exception of the 
 islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, is manifestly im- 
 possible in the limits of this chapter. As the boundary 
 lines were uncertain, it was a logical step to arrange 
 for the appointment of commissioners to trace the dis- 
 puted boundary line according to the terms of the 
 treaty of 1783. In the consideration of the restitution 
 by Great Britain of all the places taken by her of 
 which the United States had possession prior to hos- 
 tilities, Monroe reminded the Americans' at Ghent that 
 "the United States had in their possession at the com- 
 mencement of the war, a post at the mouth of the 
 River Columbia, which commanded the river, which 
 ought to be comprised in the stipulation, should the 
 possession have been wrested from us during the war. 
 On no pretext can the British Government set up a 
 claim to territory south of the northern boundary of 
 the United States. It is not believed that they have 
 any claim whatever to territory on the Pacific ocean. 
 You will, however, be careful, should a definition of 
 boundary be attempted, not to countenance in any 
 manner, or in any quarter, a pretension in the British 
 Government to territory south of that line." ^ Mon- 
 roe thus proceeded upon the same theory according 
 to which Madison had instructed him in 1804. Madi- 
 
 ^' British to American Commissioners, September 19, 1814 ; 
 ibid., III., 718. 
 
 ^ Monroe to American Commissioners, March 22, 1814 ; 
 ibid., III., 731. 
 
204 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 son's assumption was that by the Louisiana treaty the 
 United States acquired an indefinite westward stretch 
 of territory bounded on the north by the line of forty- 
 nine degrees. For the first time the Hne was suggested 
 as extending as far west as the Pacific Coast. As has 
 been seen, there was no foundation for such an as- 
 sumption. The settlement at the mouth of the Colum- 
 bia was not made because of the Louisiana cession. 
 The foundations of a claim for the mouth of the 
 Columbia were (i) the sea-ward discovery of that 
 river by Gray in 1792; (2) the results of the Lewis 
 and Clark expedition, and (3) the settlements made 
 by Astor's fur-traders shortly before the War of 1812. 
 The rights growing out of these various elements 
 appear in the later phases of the discussion. At 
 present it is noteworthy that Monroe did not base the 
 right of the United States to the restoration of As- 
 toria, the settlement at the mouth of the Columbia, upon 
 any of them. It was boldly asserted that Great Britain, 
 if it had any claim on the Pacific, certainly had none 
 south of forty-nine degrees. 
 
 The question as to the sovereignty and possession 
 of the mouth of the Columbia was only incidentally 
 touched upon during the Ghent negotiation. Although 
 the principle of status quo ante helium had been ad- 
 mitted, the British commissioners proposed to limit 
 the restoration of the territory taken by either party 
 during the war to those places that, belonging to 
 one party, had been taken by the other. To this modi- 
 fication of the principle the Americans strenuously 
 objected. Restoration, according to them, should be 
 predicated upon the fact of possession prior to the 
 war and not upon the mere right. The adoption of 
 
TB.t NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION 205 
 
 the British point of view would have entailed endless 
 disputes upon every possession in question. During 
 the discussion Bayard stated that the proposed altera- 
 tion would give rise to a new dispute, even with the 
 utmost fidelity and sincerity on both sides. "One 
 party claims the delivery of territory taken from it, 
 and which it sincerely and honestly believes to belong 
 to it. The other refuses to deliver it, believing with 
 equal sincerity and confidence that it belongs to itself. 
 Suppose the case that the place belongs to neither of 
 the parties. Suppose the case that it belongs to both. 
 On either of these suppositions you have immediately 
 a new dispute. The restoration of the state existing 
 before the war is a plain and simple principle, a mat- 
 ter of fact, about which no dispute can arise." ^ This 
 exposition by Bayard, to which no reply was made, 
 had, as he told Adams, particular reference to the 
 settlement of Astoria, concerning which the American 
 commissioners had been specifically instructed. 
 
 The American commissioners made a proposal simi- 
 lar to the one agreed to by Monroe, Pinkney, Auck- 
 land and Holland in 1807:'° that the Hne drawn due 
 north and south from the Lake of the Woods to the 
 line of forty-nine degrees, thence west along that 
 parallel, should be "the dividing line between His 
 Majesty's territories and those of the United States, 
 as far as the said respective territories extend in that 
 quarter." The British counter-project was that the 
 line should extend only as far as the territories of the 
 United States might extend. Both agreed that the 
 
 ""J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, III., 81. Cf. Greenhow's Oregon, 
 ed. of 1847, 306. 
 "J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, III., 84. 
 
206 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 article should not be construed to refer to any terri- 
 tories to the west of the Rocky Mountains or upon 
 the Pacific Ocean." The British also asked for access 
 to the Mississippi. Upon this last proposition and the 
 attempt to hedge in the claims of the United States 
 to the west the mission disagreed.'" Finally the Ameri- 
 cans offered to omit altogether the article relative to 
 the northwestern boundary ,°* and the treaty of peace 
 was signed with the line of boundary from the Lake 
 of the Woods to the west undetermined. 
 
 The treaty provided for commissioners to run the 
 line to the Lake of the Woods and to fix the most 
 northwest point of that lake, but further than this 
 nothing was stipulated. The line of forty-nine degrees 
 as far west as the Rocky Mountains was acceptable 
 to both parties, and although the article was nearly 
 agreed upon, the discussion went off upon a collateral 
 incident ^ and the treaty left the question open. 
 
 After the ratification of the treaty of Ghent, the 
 question of Astoria presented itself as one distinct 
 from the general question of the northwestern boun- 
 dary. With the history of the settlement of the mouth 
 of the Columbia and the American attempt to dispute 
 the British monopoly of the fur-trade in the northwest 
 
 "Article 8 of projet and counter-projet; Am. State Papers, 
 For. Rel, III., 738. 
 
 °^J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, III., 72, 84. 
 
 ''Ibid., III., 85. Gallatin stated that while it would be a 
 convenience to have the boundary settled, yet the lands were 
 of so little value and the period when they might be settled 
 was so remote that the United States was perfectly willing 
 that the boundary should remain without any further ar- 
 rangement. 
 
 "Adams to Gallatin, May 22, 1818; Am. State Papers, For. 
 Rel, IV., 371- J- Q. Adams, Memoirs, III., 94, 120. 
 
THg NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION 207 
 
 it is impossible here to concern- ourselves. It has been 
 shown that Monroe instructed Adams and his fellow- 
 negotiators to see that Astoria should be restored to 
 the United States because Great Britain was believed 
 to have no claims upon the west coast of America, 
 at least south of the line of forty-nine degrees. Mon- 
 roe's assertion was remarkable for what was omitted: 
 that Astoria had been an effective occupation, the 
 proper sequence of the American discovery of the 
 mouth of the Columbia by Gray in 1792. -This argu- 
 ment was not brought forward until, in later negotia- 
 tions, the question of the sovereignty over the north- 
 west coast had become inseparably connected with the 
 general question of the northwestern boundary. 
 
 The settlement at Astoria under the auspices of the 
 Pacific Fur Company was begun in 181 1. Within a 
 few months thereafter the agents of the British North- 
 west Company reached the American settlement over- 
 land by way of the northern branch of the Columbia. 
 With varying fortunes the factory at Astoria was 
 maintained by the Pacific Fur Company until after 
 the outbreak of the war with Great Britain. In the 
 fall of 1813, in anticipation of capture by a British 
 squadron (information having reached Astoria that 
 a naval force was on its way to take and destroy every- 
 thing American on the northwest coast), the agents 
 of the Pacific Fur Company sold all of their establish- 
 ments, furs, and stock on hand to the British North- 
 west Company."' Some ten weeks after the transfer 
 had been made the British sloop of war Raccoon ap- 
 
 ^ October r6, ' 1813. Greenhow, 442, gives the text of the 
 agreement between the agents of the two companies. 
 
208 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 peared at the mouth of the Columbia. To the disgust 
 of the commander, who had visions of battering down 
 the American fortiiications and perliaps of securing 
 some booty, the place had already been put into the 
 possession of the British company. The establishment 
 of the Pacific Fur Company, which had been dreaded 
 as a rival, no longer existed. Astoria was renamed 
 Fort George, and the Raccoon left the Columbia. 
 Thus was the settlement of Astoria one of those places 
 directly affected by that clause in the treaty of peace 
 which required the restoration of all places possessed 
 by either party before the outbreak of the war. It 
 is manifest that the restoration of Astoria under the 
 treaty, according to the view for which Bayard had 
 so earnestly contended, was wholly inconclusive as 
 to rights of sovereignty over the mouth of the Colum- 
 bia. The question of possession before the war was 
 one of fact, and this the United States was not slow 
 to raise. 
 
 The treaty of peace was proclaimed February i8, 
 1815." During the negotiations at Ghent, Bentzon, a 
 son-in-law of Astor, reported to Gallatin that steps 
 would be taken, as soon as he learned of the terms of 
 the peace agreement, to renew the settlement at the 
 Columbia before the British could anticipate the move- 
 ment." As all the commissioners were under a promise 
 of secrecy, it is possible that Bentzon did not know 
 what the treaty contained until it had been signed." 
 Astor's activities were directed in urging Madison's 
 administration to effect the restoration of Astoria 
 
 ^ Treaties and Conventions, 399. 
 "J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, III., 90. 
 "Ibid., III., 127. 
 
the; northwestern boundary question 209 
 
 under the provisions of the treaty. In July, 181 5, 
 Monroe drew the attention of Baker, the British 
 charge, to the fact that an expedition that had been 
 sent by the British government "against a post of 
 the United States, estabhshed on Columbia River, had 
 succeeded in taking possession of it." Baker was then 
 informed that, as the United States would be entitled 
 to the possession of this post under the treaty, measures 
 would be taken to reoccupy it without delay. "It is 
 probable that your government may have given orders 
 for its restitution ; to prevent, however, any difficulty 
 on the subject, I have to request that you will have 
 the goodness to furnish me with a letter to the British 
 commander there to that effect." '° Baker in reply 
 pleaded lack of instructions upon the subject.*" No 
 further action was taken during Madison's term of 
 office. In September, 1817, the sloop of war Ontario 
 was despatched to the mouth of the Columbia in ac- 
 cordance with the notice peremptorily given Baker. 
 Captain Biddle, commanding the vessel, and J. B. Pre- 
 vost were jointly commissioned to restore the Ameri- 
 can flag over Astoria and to "assert the claim of the 
 United States to the sovereignty of the adjacent coun- 
 try in a friendly and peaceable manner and without 
 the employment of force." No attempt was made to 
 conceal the purpose of this mission, although no com- 
 munication was made to Bagot, the British minister, 
 concerning it." Bagot, after a personal inquiry from 
 
 =" Monroe to Baker, July i8, 1815 ; Am. State Papers, For. 
 Rel, IV., 852. 
 
 " Baker to Monroe, July 23, 1823 ; ibid. 
 
 " Adams said the omission was accidental. Adams to Rush, 
 May 20, 1818; ihid., IV., 853. 
 
210 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 Adams, formally asked for an explanation of the ac- 
 tion of the United States in reference to the settle- 
 ment upon the Columbia. He insisted that while 
 Astoria had been captured during the war, the Ameri- 
 cans had previously retired from it under an agree- 
 ment with the Northwest Company, "who had pur- 
 chased their effects, and who had ever since retained 
 peaceable possession of the coast." " In his interviews 
 with Adams, Bagot suggested that Great Britain had 
 claims upon the northwest coast that would conflict 
 with the American occupation of the Columbia. He 
 then definitely asked what the intentions of the United 
 States were toward the northwest coast. Adams de- 
 clined answering the inquiry or discussing the claims 
 otherwise than in writing. The correspondence ended 
 with a request for an explanation as to the purpose 
 of the Ontario voyage. Castlereagh sought to obtain 
 from Rush, who had just arrived as minister to the 
 Court of St. James, the explanation that Bagot had 
 failed to have from Adams. The British foreign sec- 
 retary coupled for the first time the matter of the 
 possession of the Columbia with the general question 
 of the northwestern boundary. The second step of 
 the negotiation was thus reached. Before this, all 
 discussion turned upon the question of the boundary 
 between the British possessions and the United States 
 to the west of the Lake of the Woods. Possession 
 of the mouth of the Columbia was an isolated ques- 
 tion, at first completely separated from the general 
 one of boundary. From now on until the Oregon 
 compromise was effected the northwestern boundary 
 
 ■^ Bagot to Adams, November 26, 1817 ; ibid., 852. 
 
THE NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION 211 
 
 question was merged into that of Oregon; Oregon be- 
 came the general term to designate the valley of the 
 Columbia. 
 
 Castlereagh, considering jointly the two subjects 
 of the northwestern boundary and of the post at the 
 Columbia River, proposed to Rush that the question 
 of title to the territory upon the northwest coast, to- 
 gether with the northeastern and northwestern boun- 
 dary disputes, should be referred to commissioners for 
 settlement, with a provision for arbitration in case the 
 commissioners could not agree.*^ Rush naturally 
 pleaded lack of instructions. As far as the line 
 west of the Lake of the Woods was concerned, 
 he doubted if any arrangement could be had, 
 as the original boundary did not touch the Mississippi, 
 and any modification of it to the south would bring 
 the line through territory admittedly within the limits 
 of the United States. The Astoria matter Rush declined 
 to discuss further than to declare that the right of the 
 United States to restitution could not be impeached 
 under the stipulations of the Ghent treaty. "I men- 
 tioned the cases of Nootka Sound and Falkland Islands. 
 In these, Great Britain, under circumstances far less 
 strong, had asserted the principle of which we claimed 
 the benefit." " 
 
 The Nootka Sound treaty, which was afterwards 
 to play an important part in the Oregon question, was 
 introduced by the United States as an argument for 
 the restitution of Astoria. In October, 1790, the rep- 
 resentatives of Great Britain and Spain signed the 
 
 *' Rush's Residence, ed. of 1833, 73-76. 
 "■Ibid., 74. Rush to Adams, February 14, 1818; Am. State 
 Papers, For. Rel, IV., 8S3- 
 
212 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 convention of the Escurial, commonly called the 
 Nootka Sound treaty. To attempt in this place an 
 account of the controversy ended by the convention 
 of the Escurial would be collateral to the general 
 subject." In 1789 the Spanish seized two English 
 vessels at Nootka Sound and carried a part of their 
 officers and crews as prisoners to Mexico. Plans for 
 an English establishment at Nootka were thus forcibly 
 interrupted. The action of the Spanish officials, 
 viewed as an isolated event, would, perhaps, have had 
 important results, but taken in connection with the 
 strained relations then existing between Great Britain 
 and Spain, and the general political condition of Eu- 
 rope, the occurrence at far-off Nootka brought the two 
 countries to the verge of war. 
 
 The first purpose of the Escurial convention was, 
 as Rush suggested, to effect the restitution of the 
 British establishments at Nootka. Spain agreed to 
 restore to the British subjects "the buildings and tracts 
 of land situated on the Northwest Coast of North 
 America, or on islands adjacent to that continent of 
 which the subjects of his Britannic Majesty were dis- 
 possessed in April, 1789." " Mutual restitution was 
 agreed upon for any similar acts of either party 
 toward the other subsequent to the occurrence at 
 Nootka. So far the treaty is easily capable of inter- 
 pretation. In later articles more general terms were 
 employed, and upon the scope of these all claims 
 founded upon the Nootka treaty really rested. It was 
 
 *" For a comprehensive account, see Manning's "The Nootka 
 Sound Controversy" in Report of the Am. Hist. Association, 
 1904, pp. 279-478. 
 
 "Article 2 of Treaty of October 28, 1790. Manning, 454. 
 
THB NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION 213 
 
 agreed that the respective subjects of Spain and Great 
 Britain should not be disturbed or molested either in 
 navigating or in carrying on their fisheries in the 
 Pacific Ocean or in the South Seas, or in landing on 
 the coasts of those seas in places not already occupied, 
 for the purpose of carrying on their commerce with 
 the natives of the country or of making establishments 
 there." This general provision, which was manifestly 
 a concession from Spain to Great Britain, was speci- 
 fically restricted by the stipulation that British sub- 
 jects should not carry on navigation or fishing within 
 ten leagues of "any part of the coast already occupied 
 by Spain." The concession was not to be made a cloak 
 for illicit trade with the Spanish colonies in America, 
 either in North or South America. The fifth article 
 of the treaty refers to the northwest coast only: "It 
 is agreed that as well in the places which are to be 
 restored to British subjects by virtue of the first article 
 as in all other parts of the Northwest Coast of North 
 America or of the isles adjacent, situated to the north 
 of the parts of the said coast already occupied by 
 Spain, wherever the subjects of either of the two 
 powers shall have made settlements since the month 
 of April, 1789, or shall hereafter make any, the sub- 
 jects of the other shall have free access and shall 
 carry on their commerce without disturbance or mo- 
 lestation." " 
 
 What did Great Britain gain by this convention? 
 Did she acquire from Spain sovereign rights, or any 
 title to any part of the Pacific Coast? Or did Great 
 
 " "Pour y former des etablissements." French text in 
 Martens, Recueil, IV., 495. 
 ''Ibid., 455. Cf. Von Hoist, HI, 42. 
 
214 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 Britain succeed in limiting the commercial system of 
 Spain to those parts of America that were Spanish 
 colonies in fact as well as in name? In other words, 
 was the Nootka Sound convention an agreement re- 
 specting territorial title or colonial commerce? "It 
 was the first express renunciation of Spain's ancient 
 claim to exclusive sovereignty over the American 
 shores of the Pacific Ocean and the South Seas. It 
 marks the beginning of the collapse of the Spanish 
 colonial system." "' It was an admission that the 
 Spanish system of monopolizing colonial trade was 
 to be limited to those countries that were in fact 
 colonies ; that in a large part of the territories over 
 which Spain claimed sovereignty it was impossible 
 to extend the Spanish colonial system and to inhibit 
 trade that was in theory illicit. It is impossible to 
 read into the Nootka treaty the broad doctrine that 
 for the northwest coast of America there must be an 
 effective occupation in order to give good title.°° No 
 amount of effective possession by Great Britain south 
 of the actual Spanish settlements of 1790 could have 
 produced under the treaty a good title as against 
 Spain. Viewing the treaty as a whole (and of course 
 in no other way can it be interpreted), the conclusion 
 is irresistible that by it the theory of the Spanish 
 colonial system was modified to meet actual conditions 
 upon the Pacific coast of America. Spain agreed, 
 provided Great Britain did not attempt any exclusive 
 methods in the same territories, not to consider as 
 illicit the trade along those coasts to which she had long 
 
 *" Manning, 462. 
 
 ™ Such a principle as e. g., the Berlin act of 1885, adopted 
 for the conventional basin of the Congo. 
 
THE NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION 2\$ 
 
 claimed title, but over which her colonial administra- 
 tion had not actually extended. 
 
 The treaty was criticised in Spain for having "con- 
 ceded to England what had always been resisted and 
 refused to all powers since the discovery of the 
 Indies." °' "Our right, before the convention," said 
 Fox in opposition, "whether admitted or denied by 
 Spain was of no consequence, — was to settle in any 
 part of South or Northwest America, not fortified 
 against us by previous occupancy ; and we were now 
 restricted to settle in certain places only, and under 
 certain conditions. Our rights of fishing extended to 
 the whole ocean ; and now it was limited, and not to 
 be exercised within certain distances of the Spanish 
 settlement's. Our right of making settlements was not, 
 as now, a right to build huts, but to plant colonies, if 
 we thought proper." °^ 
 
 The sequel to the Nootka treaty is very significant. 
 In January, 1794, a convention was signed at Madrid 
 which provided for the abandonment of Nootka not 
 only by Spain, but by Great Britain as well. Acknowl- 
 edging that by the treaty of 1790 the subjects of both 
 powers had equal rights of frequenting the port of 
 Nootka, it was now agreed that "neither of the said 
 parties shall form any permanent establishment in the 
 said port or claim any right of sovereignty or terri- 
 torial dominion there to the exclusion of the other. 
 And their respective Majesties will mutually aid each 
 other to maintain for their subjects free access to the 
 
 ''' Iriarte to Floridablanca, October 27, 1790 ; quoted by 
 Manning, 457. 
 
 '^^ Quoted by Greenhow, Oregon, 213 ; and by Von Hoist, 
 III., 42. 
 
2l6 DIPi:,OMACY UNDSR TYtBR AND POI,K 
 
 port of Nootka against any other nation which may 
 attempt to establish there any sovereignty or do- 
 minion." "' 
 
 Except as an argument for the restitution of Astoria 
 under the treaty of Ghent as raised by Rush, the 
 Nootlca Sound question was not regarded as germane 
 to the subject of the respective territorial claims of 
 Great Britain and the United States in 1818. Upon 
 Rush's report of his conversation with Castlereagh, 
 Adams wrote, May 20, 1818, that "as it was not an- 
 ticipated that any disposition existed in the British 
 Government to start questions of title with us on the 
 borders of the South Sea," the United States had 
 nothing to conceal about the purposes of the voyage 
 of the Ontario. Adams instructed Rush to suggest 
 to Castlereagh, "though not unless in a manner to 
 avoid everything offensive in the suggestion, that, from 
 the nature of things, if in the course of future events 
 it should ever become an object of serious importance 
 to the United States, it can scarcely be supposed that 
 Great Britain would find it useful or advisable to re- 
 sist their claim to possession by systematic opposition. 
 If the United States leave her in undisturbed enjoy- 
 ment of all her holds upon Europe, Asia, and Africa, 
 with all her actual possessions in this hemisphere, we 
 may very fairly expect that she will not think it con- 
 sistent either with a wise or friendly policy to watch 
 with eyes of jealousy and alarm every possibility of 
 
 ^ I. e., Russia. Cf. Monroe to Madison, September 8, 1804 ; 
 Am. State Papers, For. Rel., III., 95. Text of the Madrid 
 convention in Manning, 469. It was first published by Calvo 
 in 1862, and hence probably nothing was known of it by 
 American diplomats during the Oregon controversy. 
 
THS NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION 21/ 
 
 extension to our natural dominion in North America, 
 which she can have no soHd interest to prevent, 
 until all possibility of her preventing it shall have 
 vanished." " 
 
 This was bold language. There was something of 
 an absurdity in the idea that the United States would 
 leave undisturbed the British possessions in Europe, 
 Asia and Africa. As to her rights in America, a more 
 practical view was taken: the United States desired 
 Great Britain not only to keep within her acknowl- 
 edged limits, but to interpose no objection to the ter- 
 ritorial expansion of the United States as a matter in 
 which she had no concern or interest. It is doubtful 
 if Rush found an opportunity to communicate Adams's 
 surprising suggestion to Castlereagh "without avoid- 
 ing everything offensive," for Rush, soon after the 
 receipt of Adams's letter, had an interview with Cas- 
 tlereagh in which he went over the whole range of 
 unsettled matters between the United States and Great 
 Britain. The conversation was amicable, and Rush 
 offered to reopen the negotiation of the northwestern 
 boundary, joining with it the question of the title to 
 the Columbia."" If Great Britain would consider these 
 two subjects, together with that of the slaves carried off 
 in contravention of the treaty of Ghent and that of the 
 fisheries, in addition to the general question of com- 
 merce, the United States would appoint a plenipoten- 
 tiary to act with Rush. Castlereagh promptly ac- 
 cepted Rush's invitation, and Gallatin, the minister to 
 
 "Adams to Rush, May 20, 1818; Am. State Papers, For. 
 Rel, IV., 854. 
 
 '"Rush's Residence, 269-74. Rush to Adams, July 25, 1818; 
 Am. State Papers, For. Rel, IV., 374, 854. 
 
2l8 DIPI^OMACY UNDER TYLER AND POEK 
 
 France, who had been appointed special minister at 
 the Court of St. James some months before,"" arrived 
 at London in August," and the negotiation was imme- 
 diately begun/* During the negotiation Castlereagh 
 left England to attend the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle. 
 The British case was entrusted to Robinson, president 
 of the Board of Trade, and Goulburn, an under-sec- 
 retary of state. The details of the negotiation as to 
 commerce, fisheries and slaves are outside the scope 
 of the present inquiry. Adams had proposed under 
 separate heads the discussion of the northwestern 
 boundary and the title to the Columbia. Rush noticed 
 that the two subjects could not be kept apart.'" The 
 subject of the northwest boundary line, which as 
 Adams wrote Gallatin was all but agreed upon at 
 Ghent but "went off upon a collateral incident," °° was 
 opened just as it had been in the earlier negotiations 
 in 1806 and 1814. Adams instructed the' American 
 plenipotentiaries that the earlier British proposals 
 could not be agreed to ; this was to take the line of 
 forty-nine degrees westward from the Lake of the 
 Woods as far as the territories of the United States 
 extended in that direction, with a caveat against its 
 extension beyond the Rocky Mountains. Adams made 
 two objections to this: (i) that it was not certain that 
 any part of the Lake of the Woods was in latitude 
 forty-nine, and (2) that Great Britain "always affected 
 
 ™ Adams to Gallatin, May 22, 1818; Am. State Papers, for. 
 Rel, IV., 371. 
 
 " August 16. Rush's Residence, 306. 
 
 "* August 23, at Lord Castlereagh's country seat; ibid. 
 
 '"Ibid., 339- 
 
 ™ Adams to Gallatin, May 22, 1818; Am. State Papers, For 
 Rel, IV., 372. 
 
THE NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION 219 
 
 to apply the indefinite limit of extension 'as far as the 
 territories extend' to the territories of the United 
 States, and not to those of Great Britain, leaving a 
 nest-egg for future pretensions on their part south of 
 latitude forty-nine." " Gallatin and Rush were in- 
 structed to hold to the line of forty-nine degrees as 
 far as the territories of both parties extended, with a 
 proviso against extension beyond the Rockies. Such 
 an instruction separated the northwestern boundary 
 from the consideration of the title to the Columbia. 
 Upon these questions Adams declined an arbitration, 
 especially one by Russia, which had "pretensions" upon 
 the northwest coast. "The delineation of an unsettled 
 boundary across the western deserts of this continent, 
 the title to establishments upon the Pacific ocean, 
 . . where, save pretensions, there is no object 
 
 to any party worth contending for, — to create burden- 
 some commissions and make solemn references to a 
 foreign sovereign for these, appears scarcely to be 
 necessary, if altogether justifiable." °' 
 
 Throughout the course of the negotiation Robinson 
 and Goulburn refused to discuss the boundary line 
 unless some arrangement were made as to the terri- 
 tories west of the Rocky Mountains. Rush and Gal- 
 latin thereupon proposed that the line of forty-nine 
 be extended to the Pacific. "We did not assert that 
 the United States had a perfect right to the country, 
 but that their claim was at least good as against Great 
 Britain." Believing that the line of forty-nine had 
 been fixed under the treaty of Utrecht, there was no 
 reason why it should not be extended to the Pacific. 
 
 " Adams to Gallatin and Rush, July 28, 1818 ; ibid., IV., 377. 
 " Ibid., IV., 378- 
 
220 DIPI^OMACY UNDER TYLfiR AND POI<K 
 
 So far as discovery gave any claim, Rush and Gallatin 
 maintained that Gray's finding of the mouth of the 
 Columbia, followed by the discoveries of Lewis and 
 Clark, gave a claim to the United States that was in- 
 disputable. Robinson and Goulburn answered that the 
 discoveries of Cook forestalled any rights claimed 
 under Gray's voyage, and that no boundary would be 
 agreed to which did not at least leave the mouth of the 
 Columbia in common with the United States. To this 
 the American representatives said that rather than 
 concede any such right they would prefer to leave 
 open the whole question of possession and sovereignty 
 west of the Rocky Mountains. 
 
 Immediate settlement was urged by Robinson and 
 Goulburn, and they proposed a boundary westward of 
 the Rockies as follows : "In order to prevent any dis- 
 putes as to the territorial rights of either of the con- 
 tracting parties on the northwest coast of America, 
 or anywhere to the westward of the Stony mountains, 
 it is agreed that so much of the said country as lies 
 between the forty-fifth and forty-ninth parallels of lati- 
 tude, together with its harbors, bays, and creeks, and 
 the navigation of all rivers within the same, shall be 
 free and open to the subjects and citizens of the two 
 states, respectively, for the purpose of trade and com- 
 merce; it being well understood that, although by vir- 
 tue of this arrangement, the two high contracting 
 parties agree not to exercise as against each other any- 
 sovereign or territorial authority within the above 
 mentioned country lying between the forty-fifth and 
 forty-ninth parallels of latitude, this agreement is not 
 to be construed to the prejudice of any claim to which 
 either of the two high contracting parties may have 
 
THE NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION 221 
 
 to any territorial authority in any part of the country 
 lying within the said limits ; nor shall it be taken to 
 affect the claim of any other Power or State to any 
 part of the said country; the only object of the two 
 high contracting parties being to prevent disputes and 
 differences between themselves." '^ 
 
 In this British proposition is the principle of joint 
 occupancy and possession. There was in it no recog- 
 nition of the sovereignty of either Great Britain or the 
 United States over the territory. No attempt was made 
 to prejudge the claims of Spain. Manifestly it was a 
 proposal to which the United States could not agree. 
 Nothing whatever was said about the territory north 
 of the line of forty-nine, to which as yet the United 
 States had laid no claim. The British representatives 
 sought to gain joint possession of all the territory 
 westward of the Rocky Mountains over which the 
 United States asserted sovereignty. Gallatin and Rush 
 rejected the proposed article, declaring that they would 
 sign no boundary agreement to territory either west or 
 east of the Rocky Mountains rather than acquiesce 
 in such an arrangement. "We did not know with pre- 
 cision what value our Government set on the country 
 to the westward of those mountains, but we were not 
 authorized to enter into any agreement which would 
 be tantamount to an abandonment of the claim to it." " 
 
 The American representatives, however, did not drop 
 the boundary question. They would not throw into a 
 common stock that part only of the country to which 
 
 " Article B, annexed to Protocol of sth Conference, October 
 6, 1818; ibid., IV., 391. 
 
 "Rush and Gallatin to Adams, October 20, i8i8; ibid., IV., 
 381. 
 
222 DIPI,OMACY UNDER TYI^ER AND POLK 
 
 the United States denied the claim of Great Britain, 
 which lay south of forty-nine degrees. They were 
 not authorized to agree to any expressions implying 
 a renunciation of territorial sovereignty, although they 
 did not insist on an extension of the line of forty-nine 
 west of the mountains."" The line of the forty-ninth 
 degree as far as the Rockies was acceptable to both 
 parties. Provided no limits were placed upon the ter- 
 ritory to the west of the mountains, Gallatin and Rush 
 were willing to accept the principle of joint occupation 
 for a limited term of years as a modus vivendi_, and to 
 this, though with a show of reluctance, Goulburn and 
 Robinson agreed.'" 
 
 Thus the idea of joint occupation proposed by Great 
 Britain, in terms unlimited as to time but limited to 
 the territory south of forty-nine degrees, was modified 
 by the representatives of the United States by a limita- 
 tion of time to ten years and the removal of all terri- 
 torial limitations. The British position was intended, 
 of course, to secure the fur-trade of the West. Joint 
 occupation would interfere in no way with the only 
 sort of commerce that the western country then af- 
 forded. The idea that the vast territories beyond the 
 Rockies and along the Pacific Coast were susceptible 
 of settlement had not yet arisen. The acceptance by 
 the United States of the programme of joint occupa- 
 tion had in no sense the character of permanence. As 
 yet the idea of territorial expansion in its proper sense 
 found no place in the discussion of the Oregon ques- 
 tion. Joint occupation was agreed to as a practicable 
 
 "^ Protocol s, ibid., IV., 392. 
 
 "Protocol 6, October 9, 1818; ibid., IV., 393. Gallatin and 
 Rush to Adams, October 20, 1818; ibid., IV,, 381. 
 
THE NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY QUESTION 223 
 
 modus Vivendi under which territorial claims might 
 be conserved until conditions were ready and public 
 sentiment was ripe for a solid and definite assertion of 
 those claims. It was believed that the question had 
 no immediate importance. Though basing territorial 
 claims upon discovery and settlement, the United 
 States admitted that it had no perfect right to the 
 valley of the Columbia and the northwest coast. Upon 
 the receipt of the convention for joint occupation, 
 Monroe accepted the work of Gallatin and Rush, and 
 the Senate ratified it with but little debate." By it 
 the restoration of Astoria was confirmed, the British 
 surrendered all claim to access to the Mississippi, the 
 northwestern boundary was settled as far as the Rocky 
 Mountains, and the territory to the west was left under 
 joint occupation for ten years ; the only object of the 
 whole being "to prevent disputes and differences 
 amongst themselves." That the object failed to serve 
 its purpose will be seen in the next chapter upon the 
 development of the Oregon dispute during the period 
 of joint occupation. 
 
 " Convention signed October 20, 1818, sent to Senate De- 
 cember 29, 1818, and ratified January 30, 1819; Treaties and 
 Conventions of V. S. and Foreign Powers, 415. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 The Joint Occupation of Oregon 
 1818-1846 
 
 The period of joint occupation (1818-1846) cannot 
 be described within the limits of the present volume 
 with all the detail that the proper treatment of the 
 subject merits. The events of these three decades can 
 be discussed but briefly and then only as they bear 
 upon the question of the development of the problem 
 that so many American diplomatists tried to solve. 
 Adams, Clay, Rush, Gallatin, and Calhoun, each of 
 these devoted much attention to it. The attempted 
 settlement of 1823-24 resulted only in a restatement 
 of the conflicting claims of Great Britain and the 
 United States. When the first joint-occupation agree- 
 ment expired by limitation in 1828, the parties to it 
 were so far apart that no solution was possible. Joint 
 occupation was continued indefinitely. In the nego- 
 tiations of 1823-24 and of 1827-28 many new elements 
 entered into the discussion, complicating the general 
 problem. 
 
 Rush's negotiation of 1823-24 was really a collateral 
 incident in the more general matter of the Monroe 
 Doctrine. The discussion began upon the publication 
 of the Czar's ukase of September 4-16, 1821, by which 
 Russian subjects were granted exclusive rights along 
 the western coast of North America north of the 
 fifty-first degree of latitude. In the discussion that 
 followed Adams's protest against the Czar's preten- 
 sions, Poletica, the Russian minister at Washington, 
 
JOINT OCCUPATION OF OREGON 22$ 
 
 stated that the line claimed as the southern limit of 
 Russia's pretension was half way between the northern- 
 most settlement of the United States, that at the mouth 
 of the Columbia in latitude forty-six degrees, and the 
 Russian post of New Archangel in latitude fifty-seven 
 degrees.' Adams forebore entering into an argument 
 with Poletica further than to state that Russia's claim 
 to the fifty-first degree, as a line equidistant from the 
 Columbia and New Archangel, was greater than that 
 made in 1799, when the line of fifty-five degrees was 
 defined as the southern limit of the grant to the 
 Russian-American Company.' 
 
 The ratifications of the Florida treaty of 1819 were 
 exchanged February 22, 1821. By it Spain ceded all 
 of her American territory north of forty-two degrees. 
 Before the treaty was signed Adams had stated to 
 Rush that he did not anticipate that Great Britain 
 would start questions of title with the United States 
 on the borders of the Pacific' The claim of the United 
 States west of the Rocky Mountains and north of 
 forty-two degrees was then based upon discovery, on 
 the Pacific side by Gray and his successors, and over- 
 land by Lewis and Clark, and upon the indefinite ex- 
 tent of the Louisiana Purchase, as well as upon the 
 establishments made along the coast by American 
 traders. As the successor of Spain upon the Pacific 
 Coast north of forty-two degrees, the United States 
 
 'Poletica to Adams, February 28, 1822; Am. State Papers, 
 For. Rel., IV., 861-63. See Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotia- 
 tions of the United States with Russia. Johns Hopkins 
 Univ. Studies, XXIV., 160, sqq. 
 
 'Adams to Poletica, March 30, 1822; Am. State Papers, 
 For. Rel, IV., 863. 
 
 'Adams to Rush, May 20, 1818; ihid., IV., 853. 
 
226 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 began the negotiations by which Adams hoped a de- , 
 Hmitation of the territorial claims of Russia and Great 
 Britain might be effected. The questions raised by 
 Poletica Adams sent to Middleton at St. Petersburg 
 for further discussion. The instructions to Middleton, 
 dated July 22, 1823, and those to Rush at London bear- 
 ing the same date/ are of the utmost importance, not 
 only on account of the statement of the claims of the 
 United States as against Russia and Great Britain, 
 but because they contain the formal statement as to 
 the territorial pretensions of European powers in 
 North America that reappears in Monroe's famous 
 message of December 2, 1823. 
 
 This is no place for a discussion of that much- 
 discussed and much-abused term, "The Monroe Doc- 
 trine," the meaning of which varies with each succes- 
 sive clash between the United States and any European 
 power concerning American affairs. Writing to Mid- 
 dleton, Adams said that the United States had ac- 
 quired all the rights of Spain north of forty-two 
 degrees; that by the treaty of 1818 with Great Britain 
 any country claimed by either party was open to the 
 citizens and subjects of the two powers without 
 prejudice to the claims of either party or of any other 
 state. As Russia had claims upon the Pacific Coast, 
 Adams authorized Middleton to propose an article of 
 the same import for a term of ten years from the 
 signature of a joint convention between the United 
 States, Great Britain, and Russia. "The right of the 
 United States from the forty-second to the forty-ninth 
 parallel of latitude on the Pacific Ocean we consider 
 
 *Ibid., v., 436-48; J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI., 163. 
 
JOINT OCCUPATION O^ OREGON 227 
 
 as unquestionable," and the firmest basis of that right 
 Adams stated to be the cession from Spain under the 
 Florida treaty. "This territory is to the United States 
 of an importance which no possession in North 
 America can be of to any European nation, not only 
 as it is but the continuity of their possessions from 
 the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, but as it offers their 
 inhabitants the means of establishing hereafter com- 
 munications from the one to the other." Adams be- 
 lieved that Russia could have but one reason for de- 
 siring possessions in America, and that was for the 
 purpose of trading with the natives. "By offering free 
 and equal access for a term of years to navigation and 
 intercourse with the natives to Russia, within the limits 
 to which our claims are indisputable, we concede much 
 more than we obtain." Adams's observations as to 
 Russia's claim were given in an enclosure to the letter 
 just quoted. In the course of it Adams made use of 
 the following memorable words : "There can, perhaps, 
 be no better time for saying, frankly and explicitly, to 
 the Russian Government, that the future peace of the 
 world, and the interest of Russia herself, cannot be 
 promoted by Russian settlements upon any part of the 
 American Continent. With the exception of the Brit- 
 ish establishments north of the United States," the re- 
 mainder of both the American continents must 
 henceforth be left to the management of American 
 hands. It cannot possibly be the purpose of Russia 
 to form extensive colonial establishments in America. 
 The new American Republics will be as impatient of 
 a Russian neighbor as the United States ; and the 
 
 °i. e., east of the Rocky Mountains. 
 
228 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POIvK 
 
 claim of Russia to territorial possession, extending to 
 the fifty-first degree of north latitude, is equally in- 
 compatible with the British pretensions." Therefore, 
 "the United States can in nowise admit the right of 
 Russia to exclusive territorial possession on any part 
 of the continent of North America south of the sixtieth 
 degree of north latitude." 
 
 The instructions to Rush, bearing the same date, 
 repeated the arguments given to Middletpn. "It is 
 not imaginable that, in the present condition of the 
 world, any European nation should entertain the pro- 
 ject of settling a colony on the Northwest Coast of 
 America. That the United States should form estab- 
 lishments there, with views of absolute territorial right 
 and inland communication, is not only to be expected, 
 but is pointed out by the finger of nature, and has been 
 for many years a subject of serious deliberation in 
 Congress." As Great Britain had also protested 
 against the ukase of 1821, Adams believed that the 
 proper time had arrived for Great Britain and the 
 United States to come to a "mutual understanding 
 with respect to their respective pretensions, as well as 
 upon their joint views with those of Russia." 
 
 With these instructions of Adams to Middleton 
 and Rush were begun the prolonged negotiations 
 as to Oregon that Polk finally settled upon a 
 compromise basis. They are the starting point 
 of the various lines of argument that succeed- 
 ing secretaries of state made use of. In Adams's 
 position were elements both of strength and 
 weakness. He proposed a tripartite agreement by 
 which Russia, Great Britain, and the United States 
 were to be secured each in its own possessions. He 
 
JOINT OCCUPATION OF OREGON 229 
 
 emphasized the rights that the United States had 
 acquired from Spain. He brought forward the Nootka 
 Sound convention in support of the claims of the 
 United States under the Florida treaty, as a fair and 
 subsisting agreement. His introduction of the doc- 
 trine that the American continent was no longer to 
 be the field for European colonial enterprise became the 
 rock upon which was shattered any hope of agreement 
 with Great Britain, either alone or in a tripartite agree- 
 ment with Russia. The Nootka Sound convention was 
 susceptible of two interpretations : either it was an 
 agreement between Great Britain and Spain, 
 which had expired at the outbreak of the war 
 in 1796 and was not afterwards renewed, or 
 it embodied such general principles relating to 
 commerce, navigation, and territorial possessions 
 on the Pacific as not only to give it perma- 
 nency, but to bind the United States as the successor 
 of Spain. If the latter were the correct interpreta- 
 tion. Great Britain would be in a position to combat 
 the claims of the United States to the exclusive 
 ownership of any territory west of the Rockies and 
 north of forty-two degrees. By Adams's interjection 
 of the Nootka Sound convention into the question of 
 the northwest coast in support of the American claim, 
 the United States was estopped from asserting that 
 it was an agreement concerning a condition of affairs 
 no longer existing." 
 
 ' Cf. Greenhow, History of Oregon and California, 340 : 
 "The introduction. . . of the Nootka convention. . 
 
 appears to have been wholly unnecessary, and vi^as certainly 
 impolitic. No allusion had been made to that arrangement 
 in any of the previous discussions with regard to the north- 
 
230 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 Adams held that the "principles" settled by the 
 Nootka Sound convention were : ( i ) that the rights of 
 fishing and of trade with the natives on the northwest 
 coast and "of making settlements on the coast itself 
 for the purposes of that trade, north of the actual set- 
 tlements of Spain, were common to all the European 
 nations, and of course to the United States, and (2) 
 that Spain's exclusive territorial rights, as they existed 
 in 1790, extended ten miles from the coasts so actually 
 occupied . . . The exclusive rights of Spain to 
 any part of the American continent have ceased. That 
 portion of the convention, therefore, which recognizes 
 the exclusive colonial rights of Spain on these conti- 
 nents, . . . has been extinguished by the fact of 
 
 west coasts, and it was doubtless considered extinct; but when 
 it was thus brought forward by the American government 
 in connection with the declaration against European coloniza- 
 tion, as a settlement of general principles with regard to those 
 coasts, an argument was afforded in favor of the subsistence 
 of the convention, of which the British government did not 
 fail to take advantage." Cf., also, Twiss, The Oregon Ques- 
 tion Examined, 289. "In the course of the conference, the 
 American plenipotentiary stated that he was instructed to 
 insist on the principle that no part of the American continent 
 was henceforward to be open to colonization from Europe. 
 To explain the principle, he stated that the independence of 
 the late Spanish provinces precluded any new settlement 
 within the limits of their respective jurisdictions; that the 
 United States claimed . the exclusive sovereignty of all the 
 territory within the parallels of latitude which include as 
 well the mouth of the Columbia as the heads of that river, 
 and of all its tributary streams [i. e., to fifty-one degrees] ; 
 and that with respect to the whole of the remainder of that 
 continent not actually occupied, the powers of Europe were 
 debarred from making new settlements by the claim of the 
 United States as derived under their title from Spain. 
 
 "The British plenipotentiaries asserted, in utter denial of 
 the above principle, that they considered the unoccupied parts 
 
JOINT OCCUPATION OF OREGON 231 
 
 the independence of the South American nation [sic] 
 and of Mexico. Those independent nations will pos- 
 sess the rights incident to that condition, and their 
 territories will, of course, be subject to no exclusive 
 right of navigation in their vicinity, or of access to 
 them by any foreign nation." From these statements 
 Adams drew the principle of non-colonization: "A 
 necessary consequence of this state of things will be, 
 that the American continents, henceforth, will no 
 longer be subjects of colonization. Occupied by civil- 
 ized independent nations, they will be accessible to 
 Europeans and to each other on that footing alone, and 
 the Pacific Ocean in every part of it will remain open 
 to the navigation of all nations, in like manner with 
 the Atlantic." Without entering on a discussion as to 
 
 of America just as much open as hitherto to colonization by 
 Great Britain, as well as by other European powers, agreeably 
 to the convention of 1790 between the British and Spanish 
 Governments, and that the United States would have no right 
 whatever to take umbrage at the establishment of new colonies 
 from Europe in any such parts of the American continent." 
 Protocol of June 29, 1824; Am. State Papers, For. Rel, 
 v., 563. 
 
 Thus the United States derived the principle of non- 
 colonization from the territorial rights of Spain, to one part 
 of which the Spanish-American states had succeeded by their 
 wars of independence, and to the other the United States under 
 the Florida treaty. Great Britain opposed it upon the ground 
 that by the Nootka Sound convention Spain had waived her 
 exclusive territorial sovereignty in favor of the doctrine of 
 actual settlements. It was unfortunate that Adams and Rush 
 made use of the phrases "actual settlements" and "actually oc- 
 cupied," which appear in the Nootka Sound convention. "The 
 principle upon which England insists is, that the Northwest 
 coast of America, north of the actual establishments of Spain, 
 ought not to be deemed to belong exclusively to any Euro- 
 pean." Confidential iVIemorial, ihid., V., 450. 
 
232 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYI^ER AND POLK 
 
 the correctness of Adams's construction of the Nootka 
 Sound convention, it is manifest that the introduction 
 of the so-called non-colonization principle into the in- 
 structions to Middleton and Rush was largely by a 
 statement of fact, being a description of the condition 
 of affairs in America as they existed June 22, 1823. 
 Adams made a statement of fact which he doubtless 
 believed would assist in settling the claims of the three 
 powers to the Pacific Coast north of latitude forty- 
 two degrees. That the American continents were no 
 longer subject to European colonization was an asser- 
 tion that the American continents contained no un- 
 occupied land. The former colonies of Spain in South 
 America had been recognized as independent nations. 
 What had been the Portuguese colony of Brazil was no 
 longer subject to Portugal, although governed by the 
 House of Braganza. France, Holland, and Great 
 Britain, it is true, supported colonies upon the South 
 American continent, but each colony was hedged about 
 by the territory of an independent state. In North 
 America the conditions south of the line of forty-two 
 degrees were precisely similar. The Central American 
 states were independent, as well as Mexico, and sur- 
 rounded the British colony of Belize, the only Euro- 
 pean colony on the continent between the United 
 States and the Isthmus of Panama. Adams admitted 
 that both Russia and Great Britain had territorial 
 rights upon the northwest coast : "You are authorized 
 . . . with a view to draw a definite line of demar- 
 kation for the future, to stipulate that no settlement 
 shall hereafter be made on the Northwest Coast or on 
 any of the islands thereto adjoining by Russian sub- 
 jects south of latitude fifty-five degrees, by citizens 
 
JOINT OCCUPATION OF OREGON 233 
 
 of the United States north of latitude fifty-one degrees, 
 or by British subjects either south of fifty-one degrees 
 or north of fifty-five degrees. I mention the latitude 
 of fifty-one degrees, as the bound within which we are 
 willing to limit the future settlement of the United 
 States. . . . As, however, the line already runs in 
 latitude forty-nine degrees to the Stony mountains, 
 should it be earnestly insisted upon by Great Britain, 
 we will consent to carry it in continuance on the same 
 parallel to the sea." ' 
 
 That Adams should have sought to arrange a line 
 with Great Britain to the exclusion of Russia or with 
 Russia to the exclusion of Great Britain occasions no 
 surprise or criticism. When Rush made known to 
 Canning the tenor of his instructions, the proposition 
 that the United States should limit Great Britain on 
 the north to fifty-five degrees,' Canning declined to 
 join with the United States in negotiating with Russia. 
 Rush was given to understand that Great Britain would 
 proceed separately. Canning's willingness to enter 
 into a joint negotiation with Russia and the United 
 States had been based upon the idea that Russia's ex- 
 travagant maritime pretensions in the Pacific would be 
 the only subject for settlement. Into the discussion 
 of the relative territorial pretensions of Russia and 
 the United States he refused to enter.' 
 
 "The resumption of its original course by this Gov- 
 
 ' Adams to Rush, July 22, 1822; Am. State Papers, For. 
 
 Rel, v., 446-48. 
 ' Rush to Middleton, December 22, 1823 ; ihid., V., 463. 
 
 "Hildt, Early Diplomatic Negotiations of the United States 
 with Russia, 170. 
 
234 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 ernment [Great Britain] has arisen chiefly from the 
 principle which our government has adopted, of not 
 considering the American continents as subject to future 
 colonization by any of the European powers, a principle 
 to which Great Britain does not accede." " 
 
 The negotiation upon which Rush was instructed 
 was thus discredited before it was begun. He was 
 forced to report in August, 1824, that after eight 
 months the negotiation had been brought to a close 
 without any treaty or other arrangement on any of the 
 subjects entrusted to him." The prolonged discussions, 
 however, gave opportunity for both the British and 
 American claims to be set forth fully for the first time. 
 Rush assumed responsibility for proceeding after Can- 
 ning had refused to enter into a joint negotiation with 
 Russia and the United States. He proposed an ex- 
 tension for a further term of ten years of the joint- 
 occupation agreement of 1818, coupling it with a pro- 
 viso that Great Britain during that time should make 
 no settlements between the fifty-first and fifty-fifth 
 degrees, and the United States should make none north 
 of latitude fifty-one. The British plenipotentiaries, 
 Huskisson and Stratford Canning, promptly declined 
 Rush's proposition. They offered as a counter-propo- 
 sition that the joint-occupation agreement be termi- 
 nated and that the boundary line of forty-nine degrees 
 be extended west beyond the Rocky Mountains "to 
 the point where it strikes the northeasternmost branch 
 of the Columbia, and thence down the middle of the 
 Columbia to the Pacific Ocean." 
 
 "Rush to Middleton, January 9, 1824; Am. State Papers, 
 For. Rel, V., 463. 
 
 " Rush to Adams, August 12, 1824 ; ibid., V., 533-82. 
 
JOINT OCCUPATION OF OREGON 235 
 
 Rush immediately declared his inability to accept the 
 proposed boundary, but in accordance with Adams's 
 permission offered the line of forty-nine degrees to 
 the Pacific. Huskisson and Canning held Rush's final 
 offer under consideration for a fortnight, and then re- 
 jected it, making no new proposal in return. They 
 told Rush that what they had offered was as much as 
 Great Britain would concede. 
 
 In the mean time Middleton at St. Petersburg was 
 endeavoring to reach an understanding with Nessel- 
 rode. He felt himself handicapped by the defection 
 of Great Britain, whose minister was engaged in an 
 independent negotiation. Middleton believed that 
 Great Britain had abandoned all thoughts of keeping 
 open the trade upon the northwest coast. "Her object 
 in this negotiation seems to be to obtain an abandon- 
 ment of the extravagant maritime pretensions set up 
 by Russia, and at the same time to acquire for herself 
 territorial rights." " Although Adams had said that 
 the United States could not admit the right of Russia 
 to exclusive territorial possessions in America south 
 of sixty degrees, he was willing, in case Great Britain 
 and Russia joined in a treaty settling their respective 
 territorial claims, to recognize Russia's claim as far 
 south as fifty-five degrees. Middleton proceeded to 
 treat with Russia according to the terms of the in- 
 structions that were framed for the tripartite agree- 
 ment. 
 
 Middleton's first projet was that "no settlement shall 
 be made hereafter on the northwest coast of America, 
 or on any of the islands adjacent thereto, north of the 
 
 "^ Middleton to Adams, April 19, 1824; ibid., V., 461. 
 
236 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYL^R AND POLK 
 
 fifty-fifth degree of north latitude, by citizens of the 
 United States. . . . nor by the Russian subjects 
 . . . south of the same parallel of latitude."" The 
 line of fifty-five degrees was approximately the south- 
 ern limit of the grant of 1799. Middleton was con- 
 vinced that Russia's claim to so much of the northwest 
 coast was valid, as the ukase of 1799, although a domes- 
 tic act and never communicated to the other powers, 
 had remained unquestioned for more than twenty-five 
 years. The Emperor he found willing enough to 
 rescind the ukase of 1821, but not the earlier one, as 
 "the act of his father must be maintained." " 
 
 "The fifty-fifth degree was therefore a barrier not 
 to be broken through ; and a further small addition was 
 required because the point of an island [Prince of 
 Wales Island] was cut off by that parallel. In conse- 
 quence of this, it was urgently pressed by the Russian 
 plenipotentiaries to make the line of delimitation run 
 upon a parallel of fifty-four degrees, forty minutes, a 
 small deviation from the instructions I had received. 
 To this I thought I could, without impropriety, 
 accede." ^° 
 
 The convention as signed April 17, 1824, preserved 
 Middleton's phraseology: that the citizens of the 
 United States should not form any establishment on 
 the northwest coast of America north of fifty-four de- 
 
 "Projet of the United States of February 8, 1824; ibid., 
 v., 464- 
 
 " Middleton to Adams, April 19, 1824 ; ibid., V., 461. 
 
 ^^ Ibid., v., 461. "The proposal of inserting fifty-four de- 
 grees, forty minutes, instead of fifty-five degrees, was with a 
 view to preserving to Russia two points of the island in which 
 the port, called Bucarelli by the Spaniards, is situate;" ibid., 
 v., 459- 
 
JOINT OCCUPATION OF OREGON 237 
 
 grees, forty minutes, and that Russian subjects should 
 form none south of that hne. The convention further 
 stipulated that for a period of ten years the citizens or 
 subjects of either power should have free access "upon 
 the coast mentioned" for the purpose of fishing and 
 trading with the natives." There was no ambiguity 
 in the terms of this convention, but Russia proceeded 
 upon the theory that while her rights were secure 
 north of fifty-four degrees, forty minutes, the United 
 States had no rights south of that line which she was 
 bound to respect." In February, 1825, Great Britain 
 and Russia concluded a treaty by which it was stipu- 
 lated that "the line of demarkation between the pos- 
 sessions of the high contracting parties upon the coast 
 of the continent, and the islands of America to the 
 northwest" should begin at the southernmost point of 
 Prince of Wales Island, in latitude fifty-four degrees, 
 forty minutes, thence eastward to the Portland Channel, 
 thence to the fifty-sixth degree, "which line shall form 
 the limit between the Russian and British possessions 
 in the continent of America to the northward." " 
 
 The negotiation begun by Adams for the settlement 
 of the northwestern boundary dispute was a failure. 
 His assertion of the "non-colonization" principle put 
 the British government in no proper mood for friendly 
 negotiation. Adams's plan for a tripartite settlement 
 of the questions of boundary was one which, if Great 
 Britain had any territorial rights whatever upon the 
 
 " Treaties and Conventions between the United States and 
 Foreign Powers, 931. The treaty was proclaimed January 
 12, 1825. 
 
 " Greenhow, op. cit., 342. 
 
 "Text of treaty in Greenhow, 479-81. 
 
238 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POIvK 
 
 Pacific coast, she could hardly agree to. Canning told 
 Rush that he could see a motive for the United States' 
 desiring to stop the settlements of Great Britain south- 
 ward, but that the boundary between the British and 
 Russian possessions was not a matter in which the 
 United States could be interested. Canning's position 
 was sound. Adams had stated in 1818 that he did 
 not anticipate that Great Britain would start questions 
 of title with the United States on the Pacific. Four 
 years later he asserted that Russia could have no 
 motive for establishing colonies in America. Yet he 
 offered to limit the claims of the United States if 
 Russia and Great Britain would jointly agree to limit 
 theirs. The convention that Middleton signed fur- 
 nished a phrase that afterwards came perilously near 
 becoming a war-cry, but it gave to the United States 
 no rights that she could use against Great Britain. 
 Middleton's convention merely stipulated that Ameri- 
 can citizens should not settle north of fifty-four de- 
 grees, forty minutes, or Russian subjects south of it. 
 The Russo-British treaty made a definite boundary line 
 between the possessions of the two countries, and each 
 power recognized the right of the other in and to the 
 northwest coast north and south of fifty-four degrees, 
 forty minutes. 
 
 All the lines of argument which in later negotiations 
 were elaborated by Rush and Gallatin, and by Calhoun, 
 were taken up by Adams in the first negotiation after 
 the Florida treaty had made the United States the suc- 
 cessor of Spain north of forty-two degrees. Discovery, 
 settlement, contiguity, and purchase from Spain, 
 Adams argued, together gave to the United States 
 complete title to the northwest coast. But how far 
 
JOINT OCCUPATION Of OREGON 239 
 
 to the north ? As against Russia he first claimed to the 
 sixtieth parallel, then to the fifty-fifth ; as against 
 Great Britain to the fifty-first and finally to the forty- 
 ninth. At the close of Adams's negotiation the posi- 
 tion of the United States was the same as when Polk 
 took up the problem in 1845. The United States, 
 though claiming that her rights extended much farther 
 to the north, was willing as a compromise to accept the 
 line of forty-nine degrees westward from the Rocky 
 Mountains to the Pacific. Great Britain insisted upon 
 the line of forty-nine degrees only as far west as the 
 Columbia. It was upon the Columbia River that the 
 powers split. The exclusive right to the Columbia 
 was one that neither would concede to the other. 
 
 As the ten years' period of joint occupation under 
 the convention of 1818 was about to expire. Canning 
 suggested in April, 1826, that the negotiations for the 
 settlement of the northwestern boundary be resumed." 
 Adams and Clay selected Gallatin to reopen the ques- 
 tion at London. Clay's instructions to Gallatin fol- 
 lowed closely those that Adams had given to Rush 
 three years before.^ The extension of the line of 
 forty-nine degrees to the Pacific coast Gallatin was 
 told to announce as an ultimatum. Later Clay author- 
 ized him to concede to Great Britain the free naviga- 
 tion of the Columbia.^ 
 
 Gallatin's negotiation, which lasted until August, 
 1827, resulted in the renewal of the agreement for joint 
 occupation for an indefinite period, terminable by either 
 
 "Canning to King, April 20, 1826; Am. State Papers, For. 
 Rel, VI., 645, 
 
 ""Clay to Gallatin, June 19, 1826; iUd., VI., 644. 
 '■^ Clay to Gallatin, August 9, 1826 ; ihid., VI., 646. 
 
240 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 party upon twelve months' notice. The text of the 
 convention is brief, reciting that the third article of 
 the convention of 1818 was renewed. The provision 
 of the earlier instrument was continued to the effect 
 that joint occupation should not be construed to im- 
 pair or to affect the claims of either power to the 
 territory west of the Rockies. The convention of 
 1818 reserved the rights of any third power as well 
 as of Great Britain and the United States. As the 
 United States had succeeded to the rights of Spain, 
 and Russia had been limited to the territory north of 
 fifty-four degrees, forty minutes, this clause was not 
 renewed. 
 
 It is impossible to enter into detail as to the nego- 
 tiation of the convention of 1827. The arguments pre- 
 sented by both sides were similar to those of Rush, 
 Huskisson, and Stratford Canning at an earlier date. 
 The temper of the British had not changed, and Gallatin 
 was all the time conscious of the influence that Mon- 
 roe's non-colonization principle had in arousing the 
 jealous suspicions of the British ministry.'"' The Brit- 
 ish commissioners rested their case upon the Nootka 
 Sound convention, and insisted that all of the territory 
 west of the Rocky Mountains and north of forty-two 
 degrees was vacant. Gallatin's argument ably pre- 
 sented the claim of the United States to fifty-four de- 
 grees, forty minutes, and combated the validity of the 
 Nootka Sound convention upon the ground that it was 
 abrogated by the war of 1796. In the course of the 
 proceedings Gallatin's views changed. He soon be- 
 came convinced that there could be no agreement upon 
 
 ^ Gallatin to Clay, December 20, 1826 ; ibid., VI., 659. 
 
JOINT OCCUPATION OF OREGON 241 
 
 the line of forty-nine degrees, but he was opposed to 
 a renewal of the joint-occupation article, fearing that 
 Great Britain would consolidate actual possession of 
 the whole, or nearly the whole, of the territory in dis- 
 pute."^ Later he came to favor the renewal of that 
 article after the reiterated declaration by the British 
 commissioners that Great Britain had no exclusive 
 claim upon the disputed territory. Gallatin was con- 
 vinced that after all "what the United States might 
 want was the very object which Great Britain declared 
 to be hers, viz., the preservation of peace until the 
 whole country was occupied." " 
 
 The approval by George Canning of Gallatin's plan 
 for a renewal of the joint-occupation agreement was 
 about the last act of that statesman. In forwarding the 
 new agreement to Clay, Gallatin remarked : "National 
 pride prevents any abrupt relinquishment of her pre- 
 tensions ; but Great Britain does not seem indisposed 
 to let the country gradually and silently slide into the 
 hands of the United States ; and she is anxious that 
 it should not in any case become the cause of a rupture 
 between the powers. . . . My opinion is that the 
 country must necessarily be settled by the United 
 States, and ultimately fall into their hands, provided 
 the natural course of events is not prevented, and 
 merely by suffering them to take their course." ^ 
 
 The debates in Congress, the various plans of forti- 
 fying the territory held by joint occupation, the schemes 
 for its territorial organization and for the settlement 
 of the country by emigrants from the United States, 
 
 "^Gallatin to Clay, October 30, 1826; ibid., VI., 647. 
 ^Gallatin to Clay, June 27, 1827; ibid., VI., 680. 
 ^ Gallatin to Clay, August 10, 1827 ; ibid., VI., 694. 
 
242 DIPI^OMACY UNDER TYIvER AND POLK 
 
 are outside the scope of the present inquiry. The 
 steady stream of settlers along the Oregon Trail that 
 began in the late thirties showed that Gallatin's judg- 
 ment was correct. The danger was that by aggressive 
 measures on the part of Congress for the occupation 
 pi Oregon the "natural course of events might be 
 prevented." 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 Thb Oregon Treaty 
 1846 
 
 Although Aberdeen had given Ashburton specific 
 and detailed instructions for the settlement of 
 the northwestern boundary question as well as 
 of the other matters in dispute between Great 
 Britain and the United States, little if anything 
 was done toward it. The northeastern question 
 was considered the more pressing, and Webster 
 feared that if he and Ashburton attempted to 
 settle both boundary difficulties the whole of the nego- 
 tiation would fall through.' As soon as the ratifica- 
 tions of the Ashburton treaty were exchanged, Aber- 
 deen urged that the remaining cause of friction be- 
 tween the two countries be removed. Fox communi- 
 cated Aberdeen's overture to Webster, who stated that 
 the President favored giving the Oregon question im- 
 mediate attention.^ In his message to Congress at the 
 beginning of the session in December, 1842, Tyler said 
 that he would not delay to urge upon Great Britain 
 the importance of an early settlement of this long- 
 standing controversy.'' As it was Aberdeen and not 
 Tyler who had opened the door for negotiation, the 
 
 ' Aberdeen to Fox, October 18, 1842 ; Correspondence 
 relative . . . to the Oregon Territory, Parliamentary 
 Papers, 1846, folio, I. 
 
 ^ Webster to Fox, November 25, 1842 ; ibid., 2. 
 
 ' Tyler's message of December 6, 1842 ; Richardson's Mes- 
 sages, IV., 196. 
 
244 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 statement of Tyler was not altogether frank. Aber- 
 deen complained to Fox of Tyler's failure to state 
 "that he had already received from the British govern- 
 ment a pressing overture to negotiate an adjustment." * 
 When the President was called upon by the Senate 
 for information as to the state of the negotiation and 
 the reasons why it had not been included in the Ash- 
 burton treaty, Tyler replied, that as the matter was 
 then pending it was inexpedient to make any communi- 
 cation upon the subject. ° At the time this message 
 was made no step had been taken by Webster in ac- 
 cordance with Aberdeen's suggestion. Tyler contem- 
 plated sending Webster on a special mission to London, 
 and only reluctantly abandoned the idea. Webster 
 left Tyler's cabinet without entering upon the discus- 
 sion of the Oregon question. After Upshur's appoint- 
 ment Aberdeen again urged that the business be taken 
 up, either through Everett at London, or through Fox 
 at Washington." Upshur informed Fox that the Presi- 
 dent was anxious to have the matter settled, and pre- 
 ferred that the negotiation proceed at Washington.' 
 In the face of this do-nothing attitude, Tyler stated 
 in his annual message of 1843 that "our minister at 
 London has under instructions again brought the sub- 
 ject to the attention of that government; and while 
 nothing will be done to compromit the rights or honor 
 of the United States, every proper expedient will be 
 
 ' Aberdeen to Fox, January 18, 1843 ; Correspondence 
 relative . . to the Oregon Territory, 3, 
 
 " Tyler's message of December 23, 1842 ; Richardson's Mes- 
 sages, IV., 210. 
 
 'Aberdeen to Fox, August 18, 1843; Correspondence rela- 
 tive . . to the Oregon Territory, 5. 
 
 ' Fox to Aberdeen, September 12, 1843 ; ibid., 5. 
 
THE OREGON TREATY 245 
 
 resorted to in order to bring the negotiation, now in 
 the progress of resumption, to a speedy and happy 
 termination." " "After the most rigid and, as far as 
 practicable, unbiased examination of the subject, the 
 United States have always contended that their rights 
 appertain to the entire region of country lying on the 
 Pacific and embraced within forty-two degrees and 
 fifty-four degrees, forty minutes of north latitude." 
 This statement, although not conciliatory, was not 
 ofifensively bold, nor did Aberdeen so consider it.' 
 Tyler again recommended the establishment of military 
 posts along the overland routes to Oregon for the se- 
 curity and protection of emigrants against the Indians. 
 "Our laws should also follow [the emigrants], so modi- 
 fied as the circumstances of the case seem to require. 
 Under the influence of our free system of government, 
 new republics are destined to spring up at no distant 
 day on the shores of the Pacific similar in policy and 
 in feeling to those existing on this side of the Rocky 
 Mountains, and giving a wider and more extensive 
 spread to the principles of civil and religious liberty." 
 Late in 1843 Pakenham replaced Fox, and Aberdeen 
 entrusted the Oregon negotiation to him, as he pre- 
 ferred to have it conducted at Washington while Con- 
 
 * Tyler's message of December S, 1843 ; Richardson's Mes- 
 sages, IV., 258. Cf. Tyler's Tylers, II., 439. While Everett 
 was instructed by Upshur, October 9, 1843, to propose the 
 line of forty-nine degrees and "any other terms of compro- 
 mise which in the progress of his discussions might appear 
 to promise a satisfactory adjustment of this important ques- 
 tion," the tender was to be made informally. Aberdeen wrote 
 Pakenham, December 28, 1843, that nothing had been accom- 
 plished since December, 1842. 
 
 "Aberdeen to Pakenham, December 5, 1843; Correspond- 
 ence relative to the Oregon Territory, 7. 
 
246 DIPtOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 gress was in session. Before Pakenham and Upshur 
 began the consideration of the question the disaster 
 upon the Princeton occurred. Not until late in August, 
 1844, did Upshur's successor, Calhoun, announce that 
 he was ready to resume the negotiation, which had re- 
 mained as Gallatin left it in 1827. 
 
 Calhoun's position upon the Oregon question had 
 been fully set forth in his speech in the Senate of 
 January 24, 1843." He favored a policy of "wise and 
 masterly inactivity." In but one way, he stated, could 
 the Oregon territory be preserved to the United States. 
 "Time is acting for us ; and if we shall have the wis- 
 dom to trust its operation, it will assert and maintain 
 our right with resistless force, without costing a cent 
 of money or a drop of blood." He opposed any propo- 
 sition for the occupation of Oregon upon the ground 
 that it would invite a contest by Great Britain resulting 
 in the loss of the whole country. Gallatin's idea, that 
 the preservation of the status quo of joint occupation 
 was the surest method not only of keeping peace but 
 of ultimately holding the disputed region, was adopted 
 by Calhoun. After the failure of the Texas treaty he 
 was disinclined to open the Oregon question. It is 
 stated that he was "peremptorily" ordered to take up 
 the subject where Upshur had left it, and try for a 
 settlement by the line of forty-nine degrees." Tyler 
 was anxious that the long-pending question should be 
 ended during his administration. Calhoun, whose 
 views as to the advisability of delay had not changed, 
 began the discussion with Pakenham. His method 
 was one that promised an immediate settlement upon 
 
 " Calhoun's Works, IV., 238. 
 " Tyler's Tylers, II., 441. 
 
THi; OREGON TREATY 247 
 
 the basis of compromise. The plan that Webster and 
 Ashburton had adopted, of considering the matter 
 without protocols, was abandoned. Pakenham re- 
 newed the former proposal of Great Britain, that the 
 line of forty-nine degrees be extended west from the 
 Rocky Mountains to the Columbia, thence to the 
 Pacific. Calhoun declined the offer, insisting that the 
 United States had a well-founded claim to all the 
 valley of the Columbia. In support of this assertion, 
 he reviewed the history of the question in a long state- 
 ment that rehearsed the earlier arguments of Adams, 
 Rush, and Gallatin. Nothing was added by him to 
 what his predecessors had said, but unlike them he 
 confined his claim, not to all the territory up to fifty- 
 four degrees, forty minutes, but to the valley of the 
 Columbia." 
 
 Pakenham did not contend, as the representatives 
 of Great Britain had formerly done, that all of the 
 country north of forty-two degrees and west of the 
 Rockies was vacant territory to which no nation had 
 a perfect claim. He asserted that the Nootka Sound 
 convention had limited Spain's sovereignty and 
 acknowledged Great Britain's rights on the northwest 
 coast. As the United States and Great Britain owned 
 the country in common the only solution of the diffi- 
 culty was "an equitable partition of the whole between 
 the two powers." " The long arguments of Calhoun 
 and Pakenham left the matter no nearer an adjustment 
 than it had been in 1827. The United States continued 
 to insist upon the line of forty-nine degrees; Great 
 
 ^ Calhoun to Pakenham, September 3, 1844 ; Correspond- 
 ence relative . . to the Oregon Territory, 13. 
 
 '^ Pakenham to Calhoun, September 12, 1844 ; ibid., 19. 
 
248 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYI<ER AND POLK 
 
 Britain claimed to the middle of the Columbia River. 
 Aberdeen thereupon, proposed arbitration." Pakenham 
 delayed offering Aberdeen's proposal until after Tyler's 
 message to Congress had been made public. The 
 President renewed his recommendations for the estab- 
 lishment of military posts across the continent and the 
 extension of the federal laws to protect the emigrants 
 in Oregon. As to the pending negotiation little was 
 said; he hoped for a happy and favorable termination 
 of it in a manner "compatible with the public honor." " 
 In January Calhoun declined the offer of arbitration 
 on the ground that such a method of settlement would 
 retard rather than expedite its final adjustment." Thus 
 Tyler's administration ended with the northwestern 
 boundary question still at issue. It is probable that Cal- 
 houn had been dragged into the controversy against his 
 better judgment. He was opposed to the plank in the 
 Democratic platform of 1844 calling for the "re-occu- 
 pation of Oregon." Tyler proposed to have the credit 
 of accomplishing the settlement of the northwestern 
 boundary question as well as of the annexation of 
 Texas before his term expired. Calhoun made no at- 
 tempt to claim any territory for the United States be- 
 yond the forty-ninth parallel. While he believed that 
 by delay the Oregon country proper, i. e., the valley 
 of the Columbia, would be saved to the United States, 
 he reluctantly asserted the claim and then only to the 
 line of forty-nine degrees. 
 
 "Aberdeen to Pakenham, November i, 1844; ihid., 28. 
 
 " Tyler's message, December 3, 1844 ; Richardson's Mes- 
 sages, IV., 337. 
 
 " Pakenham to Calhoun, January 15, 1845 ; Calhoun to 
 Pakenham, January 21, 1845 ; Correspondence relative . . 
 to the Oregon Territory, 30, 31. 
 
THE OREGON TREATY 249 
 
 Calhoun has been assailed as unfriendly to the in- 
 terests of the northwest; as being, as a southerner, 
 willing to sacrifice northern territory. Such a charge 
 is unjust. Calhoun's attitude upon the Oregon question 
 was deliberately chosen, and it was placed upon the plane 
 of statesmanship, with no eye to popular approval. 
 He believed that the British title under the Nootka 
 Sound convention was a mere usufruct and conferred 
 no exclusive claim ; that the title of the United States 
 as derived from Spain was invalid north of the Colum- 
 bia valley. As far as claims were based upon discovery 
 and occupation, the British had discovered and 'occu- 
 pied Fraser's River and the Americans the Columbia ; 
 neither had a valid title to the country between the two. 
 He was therefore in favor of the line of forty-nine de- 
 grees to the Pacific as a just and equitable division 
 of the territory in dispute." 
 
 In his inaugural address the incoming President 
 stated that it would become his duty "to assert and 
 maintain by all constitutional means the right of the 
 United States to that portion of our territory which 
 lies beyond the Rocky Mountains. Our title to the 
 country of the Oregon is 'clear and unquestionable.' " " 
 Polk did not say that "the whole of Oregon" meant 
 the country as far north as fifty-four degrees, forty 
 minutes, although this was the interpretation given to 
 his words." Calhoun had taken "the whole of Oregon'' 
 to mean the valley of the Columbia. It remained for 
 Polk seriously to assert that our title was "clear and 
 
 "Polk's Diary, January 10, 1846; MS. 
 
 "Richardson's Messages, IV., 381. The phrase quoted was 
 from the Democratic platform. 
 
 " Curtis, Buchanan, 11., 552, so states it. 
 
250 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYI^eR AND POLK 
 
 unquestionable up to fifty-four degrees, forty minutes." 
 "Tyler's term closed soon after the rejection of Aber- 
 deen's offer of arbitration. Soon after Buchanan took 
 charge of the state department under Polk, Paken- 
 ham again urged that the Oregon matter be arbitrated. 
 This was in accordance with Aberdeen's instructions, 
 in the hope that the new administration might reverse 
 Tyler's decision.^" "Mr. Buchanan observed that he 
 had not yet had an opportunity of ascertaining what 
 might be the views of the President on this particular 
 point connected with the Oregon question ; but he said 
 he would not fail to take advantage of the earliest 
 moment to direct the President's attention to it. For 
 his own part, although he did not seem to be much 
 taken with the idea of an arbitration, he did not ap- 
 pear prepared altogether to reject it ; what he said 
 was that he did not at all despair of effecting a settle- 
 ment of the question by negotiation, 'by adopting,' to 
 use his own words, 'the principle of giving and 
 taking.' " "^ "To give and take" may have been 
 Buchanan's idea of the proper method of negotiating 
 with Pakenham. That he would settle the Oregon 
 question was a part of Polk's programme as formu- 
 lated by him before he was inaugurated. Not until July 
 did the President decide how to proceed. Buchanan 
 resumed the subject where Calhoun and Pakenham 
 had dropped it in the preceding September by renew- 
 ing the offer of the line of forty-nine degrees. Bu- 
 chanan's note to Pakenham of July 12, 1845, was a 
 carefully prepared argument in favor of the full 
 
 ™ Aberdeen to Pakenham, March 3, 1845 ; Correspondence 
 relative . . to the Oregon Territory, 31, 
 
 ''■ Pakenham to Aberdeen, March 29, 1845 ; ibid., 32. 
 
THE OREGON TREATY 25 I 
 
 American claim of fifty-four degrees, forty minutes. 
 This he based upon the Florida treaty of 1819, at 
 which time, he alleged, Spain had a good title as 
 against Great Britain to the whole of the Oregon ter- 
 ritory. As Great Britain had attempted to cloud this 
 title by the prior Nootka Sound convention, Buchanan 
 took the ground that that instrument was transient in 
 its very nature ; that it conferred upon Great Britain 
 no right but that of merely trading with the Indians 
 whilst the country should remain unsettled, and mak- 
 ing the necessary settlements for that purpose; that 
 it did not interfere with the ultimate sovereignty of 
 Spain over the territory; and above all, that it was 
 annulled by the war between Spain and Great Britain 
 in 1796, and had never been renewed by the parties.^ 
 The original American title to the valley of the Colum- 
 bia Buchanan grounded, as Calhoun had done, upon 
 discovery, exploration, and possession. It was to the 
 coast-line between forty-six degrees and fifty-four de- 
 grees, forty minutes, that the Florida treaty gave title 
 to the exclusion of Great Britain. Buchanan thus took 
 a position essentially at variance with Calhoun's. If 
 the United States had a claim to the Columbia based 
 upon discovery and settlement it was in derogation 
 of the paper-title of Spain. If Spain's title to all of 
 the northwest coast was not ■ strong enough to with- 
 stand the claim of the United States to the Columbia, 
 it was not sufficient to exclude Great Britain from 
 claiming the Fraser River valley, a claim also based 
 upon discovery, settlement, and possession. 
 
 Buchanan's contention was the reverse of Adams's, 
 
 ^ Buchanan to Pakenham, July 12, 184S ; ibid., 34. 
 
252 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 which was that by the very terms of the Nootka Sound 
 convention, which Buchanan held to be transient in 
 nature, Spain had forfeited her claim to exclusive 
 sovereignty upon the Pacific coast, so that the Ameri- 
 can settlements at the mouth of the Columbia furnished 
 a claim of territorial sovereignty good as against the 
 world. That Great Britain had a show of title be- 
 tween fifty-one degrees and fifty-five degrees had been 
 admitted by the United States, since Adams had pro- 
 posed a tripartite arrangement between the United 
 States, Russia, and Great Britain in 1822. Polk, how- 
 ever, intimated that he was not bound by any previous 
 admissions by the United States. "Our own American 
 title to the extent of the Valley of the Columbia, rest- 
 ing as it does on discovery, exploration, and posses- 
 sion, — a possession acknowledged by a most solemn 
 act of the British Government itself, — is a sufficient 
 assurance against all mankind, whilst our superadded 
 title derived from Spain extends our exclusive rights 
 over the whole territory in dispute as against Great 
 Britain. Such 'being the opinion of the President in 
 regard to the title of the United States he would not 
 have consented to yield any portion of the Oregon 
 Territory had he not found himself embarrassed, if not 
 committed, by the acts of his predecessors." °' 
 
 Polk's offer of the line of forty-nine degrees without 
 conceding the free navigation of the Columbia was, 
 therefore, made only because his predecessors had com- 
 mitted him to it. The inference was that had he not 
 been embarrassed by their spirit of compromise he 
 would inflexibly adhere to the line of fifty-four degrees, 
 
 ''Ibid. 
 
THE OREGON TREATY 253 
 
 forty minutes, thereby excluding Great Britain from 
 the Pacific coast. 
 
 Pakenham's answer was a blunder. He attacked 
 all the points of Buchanan's argument and bluntly de- 
 clined the proposed line of forty-nine degrees. He 
 did not refer the matter to his home government but 
 asked that Buchanan "offer some further proposal for 
 the settlement of the Oregon Question more con- 
 sistent with fairness and equity, and with the reason- 
 able expectations of the British Government." ^ For- 
 tunately for the cause of peace, Pakenham's curt 
 lefusal of Buchanan's offer did not become public 
 until after Congress met in December.*' The answer 
 was ill-considered in that it gave to Polk the oppor- 
 tunity of standing for the whole claim without being 
 "embarrassed" by the admissions of his predecessors. 
 "The only way to treat John Bull," the President told 
 a member of Congress, "was to look him straight in 
 the eye. I considered a bold and firm course on our 
 part the pacific one." '° Buchanan was ordered to with- 
 draw the offer of forty-nine degrees, leaving Great 
 Britain to make the next move. The method of treat- 
 ing Pakenham's answer was Polk's own idea, and 
 Buchanan was opposed to it. He wrote to McLane 
 at London deprecating Pakenham's action and express- 
 ing the hope that the unfortunate result of it might be 
 avoided.^' Buchanan's extended official reply to Paken- 
 
 " Pakenham to Buchanan, July 29, 184S ; ibid., 39. 
 
 ^ Curtis's Buchanan, II., 553, 554. 
 
 °' Polk's Diary, January 4, 1846; Conversation with James 
 A. Black of South Carolina. Polk added : "If Congress fal- 
 tered or hesitated in their course, John Bull would immedi- 
 ately become arrogant and more grasping in his demands." 
 
 " Curtis's Buchanan, II., 553. 
 
254 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 ham of August 30, 1845, was contentious in the ex- 
 treme. He derided the argument that the two grounds 
 for the American title, the one based upon discovery 
 and settlement, the other upon the treaty of 1819, 
 were antagonistic. The British claims were styled 
 mere pretensions with no sufficient foundation. The 
 President, he stated, owed it to his country, with a 
 just appreciation of her title to the Oregon territory, 
 to withdraw his proposition to the British govern- 
 ment.^ "Mr. Buchanan said, 'Well, the deed is done, 
 but he did not think it was the part of wise statesman- 
 ship to deliver such a paper in the existing state of 
 our relations with Mexico.' The President said he was 
 glad it was delivered ; that it was right in itself and 
 he saw no reason for delaying it because of our re- 
 lations with Mexico." " 
 
 Writing privately to McLane, Buchanan said that 
 the Oregon question was now critical ; that a concilia- 
 tory course on the part of both governments was 
 necessary. He thought it improbable that the British 
 government would offer acceptable terms of compro- 
 mise, but said that the withdrawal of the offer did not 
 preclude it from making a new proposal. He then 
 stated that the President would submit to the Senate 
 any proposition that Great Britain might make, if 
 it were such as the Senate would be likely to approve."" 
 Before enough time had elapsed to have an answer to 
 his letter, Buchanan received an account of McLane's 
 
 ™ Buchanan to Pakenham, August 30, 1845; Correspondence 
 relative . . to the Oregon Territory, 46. 
 
 '° Polk's Diary, August 30, 1845; MS. 
 
 '° Buchanan to McLane, September 13, 1845 ; MS., copj', 
 Lenox Library, New York. 
 
THE OREGON TREATY 255 
 
 interview with Aberdeen upon the subject of Paken- 
 ham's declination of the line of forty-nine degrees. 
 Aberdeen told McLane of his regret that Pakenham 
 had rejected the offer of compromise, and intimated a 
 willingness to agree to a modified proposition.'" After 
 reading McLane's letter to Polk, Buchanan said that 
 he believed Pakenham had received fresh instructions, 
 and he wanted to know what to do. "The President said 
 our course was a plain one. We had made a propo- 
 sition which had been rejected in terms, not very cour- 
 teous. The British had afterwards been informed in 
 the note of Mr. Buchanan of August 30 that our 
 proposition was withdrawn and no longer to be con- 
 sidered as pending. In the close of that note the door 
 of further negotiations was left open. If the British 
 minister, therefore, called on Mr. Buchanan and made 
 the ingenuous (?) suggestion, all that could be said to 
 him was: that if he had any further proposition to' 
 make on his part, it would be received and considered. 
 This was all that could with propriety be said to him. 
 No intimation should be given to him of what the 
 views or intentions of the administration were, and 
 leave him to take his own course. The President said, 
 it was manifest that the tone of the British Government 
 was considerably lowered on the subject. Mr. Bu- 
 chanan said that if we stopped the negotiation where 
 it was it would immediately lead to war. The Presi- 
 dent went on at some length to state, as he had done 
 on former occasions, the reasons which had induced 
 him in deference to the acts of his predecessors and the 
 commitments of the Government reluctantly to yield 
 
 '^ McLane to Buchanan, October 3, 1845, received October 
 21, 184s; MS., Archives. Polk's Diary, October 21, 1845. 
 
256 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 his assent to the proposition which had been made and 
 rejected and that he was never satisfied with the posi- 
 tion in which the matter stood. He said if the same 
 proposition were now made by the British minister 
 (he, the President, having now discharged his duty) 
 he would not accept it. He said the British minister 
 would not, he was sure, make any new proposal which 
 we could accept; that when his proposal was received 
 (if he made one) he would either reject it or submit 
 it to the Senate for their advice before he acted on 
 [it] according to its character. Mr. Buchanan asked 
 if he might say in the conversation which he antici- 
 pated Mr. Pakenham would seek with him, that if he 
 made a proposition of a character to justify it, the 
 President would submit it to the Senate. The Presi- 
 dent replied that would be improper. Mr. Buchanan 
 thought we ought not to precipitate a crisis. By delay 
 the Oregon territory might be saved; by strong meas- 
 ures hastily taken, we would have war and might lose 
 it. The President said he was satisfied with the state 
 of the negotiation as it stood; that in his message he 
 would take bold and strong ground and re-affirm Mr. 
 Monroe's doctrine against permitting any European 
 power to plant or establish any new colony on the 
 American Continent." "^ The day following Polk's 
 statement to his cabinet Pakenham called upon Bu- 
 chanan, who was impressed with his concern over the 
 awkward position in which he had placed himself." 
 From Buchanan's reports of this and other conversa- 
 tions with Pakenham, Polk continued m the belief 
 that there was no probability of adjusting the subject 
 
 '^Polk's Diary, October 21, 1845; MS. 
 "Ibid., October 22, 1845. 
 
THB OREGON TREATY 257 
 
 by negotiation. The President then submitted the 
 clause of his message referring to the Oregon question 
 and the Monroe doctrine to his cabinet, every member 
 of which agreed with the stand that he had taken. 
 It may be believed, however, that Buchanan's 
 approval was not without reservation, for he still 
 favored the idea that the negotiation should be resumed 
 where it had been interrupted.^* 
 
 At one of the conferences Pakenham left a note 
 with Buchanan, in which he tried to smooth away the 
 asperities of his earlier refusal. Pakenham stated that 
 his government would be glad to hear again from the 
 United States on the subject, and denied that in his 
 earlier letter he had rejected Buchanan's proposal. 
 "What I said was that I did not feel at liberty to ac- 
 cept it." '" This may have seemed to be a distinction 
 without a difference. Buchanan felt that it was 
 enough of a concession to allow the negotiation to be 
 resumed, and he prepared an answer to it accordingly. 
 Polk declared that Buchanan's answer was too concilia- 
 tory and refused to have it delivered." The President 
 then drafted what he believed to be a proper reply to 
 Pakenham, with the injunction that it must be delivered 
 and not merely read to the British minister, and that 
 all of Pakenham's and Buchanan's correspondence 
 must be official. Upon learning Polk's attitude, Paken- 
 ham withdrew his conciliatory note. For this the 
 
 ^ Ibid., October 25, 27, and 29, 1845. 
 
 ^ Pakenham to Buchanan, October 25, 1845 ; MS., copy, 
 Lenox Library, New York. Endorsed : "25 Oct. 45. Copy 
 of a note from Mr. Pakenham, afterwards withdrawn, A 
 true copy taken by me from the original note of Mr. Paken- 
 ham. Oct. 28, 1845. J. Knox. Walker." 
 
 '"Polk's Diary, October 28, 1845. 
 
258 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 President blamed Buchanan. "The result of the 
 whole," Polk noted in his diary, "is that after two cab- 
 inet meetings and much anxious discussion, the mat- 
 ter ended where it began." ^' 
 
 Polk's discussion of the Oregon question in his mes- 
 sage delivered at the opening of Congress was as 
 "firm'' as the most rabid of the Anglophobes, such as 
 Cass and Hannegan, could have desired. He depre- 
 cated the early attempts at compromise with which the 
 names of Adams, Rush, Gallatin, and Calhoun were 
 associated. In his declaration for the "whole of Ore- 
 gon," even to fifty-four degrees, forty minutes, he 
 seemed to rejoice that a compromise line was impos- 
 sible ; as the American title to all of the northwest coast 
 was clear and undisputed. Great Britain had then no- 
 thing but vain pretensions. To gain additional popu- 
 lar approval of his stand, he "re-affirmed" the Monroe 
 Doctrine, with an eye, as he said, as much to California 
 and the fine bay of San Francisco as to Oregon." 
 Surely Polk was looking John Bull firmly in the eye. 
 Was he sincere in his position? 
 
 It has been seen that nearly three months before 
 Buchanan had written to McLane that the President 
 would probably submit a proposition to the Senate if 
 it were reasonable. Buchanan had not abandoned the 
 idea that the line of forty-nine degrees could be agreed 
 upon. It is hard to believe that Polk ever very seri- 
 ously looked for war over the question of Oregon. 
 Late in December Buchanan told him that the next 
 two weeks would mean peace or war, and that he was 
 in favor of vigorous war preparations. Polk agreed 
 
 "''Ibid., October 29, 1845. 
 ^ Ibid., October 24, 1845. 
 
THE OREGON TREATY 259 
 
 as to the latter part of Buchanan's remark. The cab- 
 inet was then expecting Pakenham to propose arbitra- 
 tion. None favored that plan of settling the difficulty. 
 The President thereupon said that if Pakenham would 
 offer an equivalent of free ports to the north of forty- 
 nine degrees, with the Strait of Fuca, he would "con- 
 sult confidentially three or four Senators from different 
 parts of the Union and might submit it to the 
 Senate for their previous advice." " At a later 
 session Polk asked the cabinet what he should 
 do if Pakenham offered the line of forty-nine 
 degrees. "All said he should refer it to the 
 Senate." *° This was the advice that Polk had 
 already received from Allen, the chairman of the 
 Senate committee on foreign affairs. Just when this 
 plan of treating the matter took shape in Polk's mind 
 it is difficult to state precisely. There was no element 
 of novelty in Allen's suggestion, for Buchanan had 
 been urging it for months and he had privately so 
 advised McLane. 
 
 Just at this time Pakenham proposed that arbitration 
 be had of "the whole question of an equitable division 
 of the territory" in dispute." Buchanan said to him 
 that even if the President agreed to arbitration, which 
 was unlikely, the Senate would never sanction it. That 
 there would be a war Pakenham seemed to doubt, for 
 even if arbitration were finally declined, his govern- 
 
 ^ Ibid., December 23, 1845. Curtis's Buchanan, II., 555. 
 McLane to Buchanan, December i, 1845, stated that Aberdeen 
 favored arbitration. 
 
 " Polk's Diary, December 27, 1845. 
 
 " Pakenham to Buchanan, December 27, 1845 ; Correspond- 
 ence relative . . to the Oregon Territory, 65. Curtis's 
 Buchanan, II., 556. 
 
26o DIPI^OMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 ment would let the affair remain where it was and not 
 disturb it. "He said the British Government would be 
 glad to get clear of the question on almost any terms ; 
 that they did not care if the arbitrator should award the 
 whole territory to us. They would yield it without a 
 murmur. I said I had no doubt of it. They never 
 played the part of the fox; but always of the lion. 
 They would preserve their faith inviolate. He said 
 they wished for peace ; but intimated this was not our 
 wish. I asked him why we should desire war. Would 
 not their superiority at sea give them command of the 
 Coasts of Oregon ? Yes, he said, that was true, but the 
 war would not be confined to that region. That he 
 would willingly make a bargain to fight it out with 
 us there, if we would agree to that." " 
 
 Buchanan declined Pakenham's proposal ' for arbi- 
 tration. The British minister renewed the offer, this 
 time agreeing to include the question of title." Bu- 
 chanan replied that the United States would arbitrate 
 no question involving its territorial rights." 
 
 To McLane the secretary of state now opened the 
 door for the British government to come forward with 
 a compromise proposition. The President would never 
 put it into the power of any arbitrator to deprive the 
 United States of a "foot of the soil of the continent 
 south of the forty-ninth parallel of latitude, and of the 
 valuable harbors of Puget Sound." He thought Hkely 
 that Congress would order notice to be given, and 
 therefore if the British government had a proposition 
 
 " Buchanan's memorandum, Curtis's Buchanan, II,, 557. 
 *" Pakenham to Buchanan, January 16, 1846; Correspondence 
 relative to the Oregon Territory, 67. 
 
 " Buchanan to Pakenham, February 4, 1846 ; ihid., 69. 
 
THE OREGON TREATY 261 
 
 it should be made at once. "They have not an hour to 
 lose; if they desire a peaceful termination of this con- 
 troversy." *'' Even while McLane reported that Great 
 Britain was making extensive preparations for war, 
 Polk felt that Peel and Aberdeen, like Pakenham, were 
 for peace." Polk gave it out that his own desire was 
 to stand for fifty-four degrees, forty minutes, but that 
 he would refer any suitable proposition to the Senate. 
 Thus Aberdeen was given to understand that the 
 President would not reject an offer to settle upon the 
 line of forty-nine degrees. Later despatches to Mc- 
 Lane put forth this idea more definitely. McLane 
 suggested that Aberdeen would probably propose that 
 line. Polk consented, although "with reluctance," to 
 submit it, if made, to the Senate, but he stipulated that 
 the negotiation should not be transferred to London. 
 Thus the two powers were as early as February, 1846, 
 not far apart. McLane was certain that Aberdeen 
 was willing to agree to the line of forty-nine degrees. 
 Polk was willing to submit such a compromise to the 
 Senate, knowing that the Senate committee on foreign 
 affairs would favor it. From this time until June, 
 when the treaty was finally signed, there was no 
 serious danger of any rupture. The speeches in Con- 
 gress, it is true, were full of belligerency, but the 
 resolutions for the abrogation of the joint-occupation 
 convention were so amended that they lost all charac- 
 ter likely to embarrass the peaceable settlement of the 
 question. Polk was authorized in his discretion to 
 give the necessary notice, which he did April 28. With 
 
 *^ Buchanan to McLane, January 29, 1846; Cong. Globe, Ap- 
 pendix; 2g Cong., I Sess., 1175. 
 " Polk's Diary, January 10, 1846. 
 
262 DIPI,OMACY UNDER TYI^BR AND POLK 
 
 the copy of the notice sent to McLane, Buchanan in- 
 vited the British government to make a proposal for 
 the settlement of the question. The rest of the nego- 
 tiation was really the formal carrying out of what each 
 government already knew the other would agree to. 
 Upon the receipt of Polk's notice that the convention 
 of 1827 was abrogated, Aberdeen formally instructed 
 Pakenham to offer the line of forty-nine degrees to the 
 Pacific, reserving to Great Britain, however, the whole 
 of Vancouver Island and the free navigation of the 
 Columbia." 
 
 Aberdeen's offer came directly after the repeal of the 
 Corn Laws had passed the House of Commons." 
 Within a few days after the Corn Bill became a law. 
 Peel's ministry resigned and Aberdeen went out of 
 office. Pakenham proceeded at once with the nego- 
 tiations as instructed by Aberdeen. On the fifteenth 
 of June he and Buchanan signed a convention sub- 
 stantially on the lines that Aberdeen had outlined to 
 McL,ane. The line of forty-nine degrees extended to 
 the Pacific ; the whole of Vancouver Island remained in 
 Great Britain's hands and the free navigation of the 
 Columbia was conceded. Before the treaty was signed, 
 Polk stated to the Senate that his own opinions upon 
 the Oregon question remained as they had been ex- 
 pressed in his annual message. It was a wise plan, 
 he stated, which Washington had adopted, of asking 
 the previous advice of the Senate upon pending 
 negotiations. A matter of such magnitude as 
 
 "McLane to Buchanan, May 18, 1846; Cong. Globe, Ap- 
 pendix; 2<) Cong., I Sess., 1 170. 
 
 " The Com Bill passed the House of Commons upon third 
 reading May 15. The Lords passed it June 25. 
 
THE OREGON TREATY 263 
 
 the Oregon question, upon the decision of which 
 hung peace or war, was in his judgment very 
 properly left to the Senate, not only as a part 
 of the treaty- but of the war-making power." 
 The Senate with but little debate resolved that the 
 President was "advised to accept the proposal of the 
 British Government." °° Thus he evaded all responsi- 
 bility for the compromise line. He made it appear 
 that the proposal for such a settlement came wholly 
 from Great Britain. It was true that the official pro- 
 posal did so come, but not until Polk had let it be 
 understood by Aberdeen and Pakenham that he would 
 not reject it. He cast upon the Senate the responsi- 
 bility for the compromise, warning them, however, 
 that its rejection might mean war. 
 
 Polk had looked John Bull firmly in the eye, and 
 John Bull proposed what he had so often refused. 
 But was Polk's firmness the cause of the peaceful and 
 fair settlement? Had Palmerston been in Aberdeen's 
 position at the time of Polk's "firm" pronouncement, 
 Polk might have lost Oregon. That the Oregon ques- 
 tion was settled in the manner it was is one of the 
 glories of the administration of Sir Robert Peel. Aber- 
 deen's large-mindedness and consistent belief that the 
 friendship of the United States was worth much more 
 to Great Britain than a few degrees of latitude on the 
 Pacific coast are responsible for the settlement that 
 Polk thought to gain by a firm policy. That Aberdeen 
 was "bluffed" by Polk is absurd. Peel knew that he 
 could not retain office after the repeal of the Corn 
 
 " Polk's message, June 10, 1846 ; Richardson's Messages, 
 IV., 449- 
 "Cong. Globe, Appendix; 29 Cong., i Sess., 1168. 
 
264 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYI^ER AND POLK 
 
 Laws, and it was the part of great statesmanship not 
 to leave to his successors in office an impasse that 
 had been brought about during his administration. 
 Peel could not go into opposition with a war of his 
 own creation upon his hands. He would not aggra- 
 vate the warlike feelings of England for the purpose 
 of maintaining his hold upon office. McLane was 
 correctly advised of Peel's attitude when Aberdeen 
 sent Pakenham his instructions to propose the com- 
 promise line. He wrote to Buchanan that Peel's min- 
 istry would resign before the end of June, and that 
 in case the new proposal were not accepted promptly, 
 the new ministry might not agree to as favorable 
 terms."^ Upon the day that the Peel ad'ministi'ation re- 
 signed, news came that the United States had agreed 
 to Aberdeen's offer of settlement, and the second great 
 boundary controversy with the mother-country was at 
 an end. 
 
 In all the history of the relations of the United States 
 with Great Britain no Englishman showed himself 
 to be a better friend to the United States than did 
 Lord Aberdeen in his handling of the Ashburton and 
 Pakenham negotiations. 
 
 "McLane to Buchanan, May 18, 1846; ibid., 1170. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 Polk's Attempted Negotiation for California 
 I 845- I 846 
 
 The most important source of information for the 
 administration of President Polk is unfortunately still 
 in manuscript. In the library of the Chicago Historical 
 Society is a set of small note-books in which James 
 K. Polk entered from day to day his comments upon 
 the measures and men of his time. Beginning in 
 August, 1845, the diary continues without a break until 
 he left public life. George Bancroft, whose asso- 
 ciation with Polk was intimate, first as secretary of 
 the navy and afterwards as minister at the Court of 
 St. James, would, had life and mental vigor permitted 
 him, have been the historian and perhaps the apologist 
 of the administration in which he played so conspicu- 
 ous a part. In the Lenox Library at New York is 
 a manuscript copy of Polk's diary made under the 
 direction of Bancroft. In addition to the originals of 
 the diary, the Chicago Historical Society owns a num- 
 ber of letters to and from Polk. A large collection of 
 Polk's correspondence, in all over ten thousand letters, 
 has recently been acquired by the Library of Congress. 
 Of these much is related to the years 1845 to 1849. 
 Thus the material for a study of Polk's administration 
 is enormous, but being divided among the libraries of 
 Washington, New York, and Chicago and still un- 
 printed, it is unfortunately somewhat difficult of access. 
 The writing of a life of Polk and of a history of his ad- 
 ministration based upon the mass of unpublished mat- 
 
266 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYL^R AND POI,K 
 
 ter connected with it is a labor yet to be accomplished. 
 The history of the diplomatic events of this adminis- 
 tration also rests largely upon unprinted material. 
 Those portions of the official correspondence printed at 
 the time can be found only in the executive documents 
 of the Senate and House, which, buried in government 
 publications, rather difficult to obtain, may be said to 
 have been printed and not published. The fragments 
 so printed are but a small part of the letters and in- 
 structions to be found in the department of state. The 
 same may be said of the naval and military history 
 of the Mexican War. It is believed that no one has 
 ever examined all of the records of the war and navy 
 departments from 1845 to 1849 for the purposes of 
 historical investigation. The best history of the war 
 is Ripley's, written soon after the war closed. As to 
 the Mexican sources upon the war, it is to be hoped that 
 before long a report will be made as to their complete- 
 ness and accessibility. 
 
 The reasons for the lack of published materials for 
 Polk's administration are obvious. The results of 
 Polk's policy, namely, the conquest of New Mexico and 
 California, gave rise to such a rapid succession of 
 political events ending in civil war that public atten- 
 tion was drawn away from the causes to the conse- 
 quences of the Mexican War. Polk's administration 
 had no apologists but many vehement critics. The 
 dominating influence of slavery left the Mexican War 
 as a mere incident in the history of the larger question. 
 
 The history of the Mexican War, therefore, aside 
 from the purely military part of it, has been written 
 chiefly as a chapter in the history of the slavery ques- 
 tion. The momentous national issues that pressed 
 
POI,K AND CALIFORNIA 267 
 
 for attention even before Polk retired from office have 
 given a twist to the many accounts of the period from 
 1845 to 1848. Books appearing soon after the event, 
 animated not by a spirit of unbiased historical investi- 
 gation, but written with the professed purpose of pre- 
 senting a brief against the aggressions of slavery, have 
 furnished in large measure the materials for the history 
 of the period. The treatment of the subject of the 
 Mexican War in the "reviews" of Jay ' and Livermore," 
 well constructed and widely distributed as they were, 
 and fortified by an examination of published docu- 
 ments and newspapers, has grown into the narrative 
 of Von Hoist. 
 
 Polk came into the presidential chair with a well- 
 defined programme. It was, in the main, not one dic- 
 tated to the President by his party nor was it formu- 
 lated for him by his political associates and advisers. 
 His mind alone gave form to the last part of it, and 
 four years saw it accomplished. This programme was : 
 ( I ) the reduction of the tariff ; (2) the estabHshment of 
 the subtreasury; (3) the settlement of the Oregon 
 question, and (4) the acquisition of CaHfornia. This 
 was a large task to be performed in four years, but 
 the accession of the Whig party to power found it com- 
 pleted. "Who is Polk?" had been the sneer of his 
 political adversaries of 1844. The question was suffi- 
 ciently answered when he left office. 
 
 At the time of Tyler's retirement diplomatic relations 
 with Mexico had been suspended. Almonte, the Mexi- 
 
 ' William Jay, A Review of the Causes and Consequences 
 of the Mexican War (Boston, 1849). 
 
 "Abie! Abbot Livermore, The War with Mexico Reviewed 
 (Boston, 1850). 
 
268 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 can minister at Washington, surrendered his passports 
 to the secretary of state, accompanying his note of 
 leave-taking with an angry review of the alleged hos- 
 tile attitude of the United States toward his country, 
 as shown by the annexation of Texas. Meanwhile, 
 Wilson Shannon, our minister to Mexico, had de- 
 manded his passports from Rejon, the minister of 
 foreign relations. Shannon's predecessor, Thompson, 
 had pursued the same course but had calculated cor- 
 rectly that the request would not be granted. It was 
 otherwise with Shannon; Rejon gave him his passports 
 and accompanied them with a fierce denunciation of the 
 policy of the United States toward Mexico. 
 
 There is a characteristic vein runnmg through the 
 diplomatic correspondence of Spanish-speaking envoys, 
 from D'Yrujo to De Lome. However much pride 
 and vainglory one may see in it, there has been little 
 hypocrisy. In the communications to Gorostiza, Al- 
 monte, and Rejon, both official and unofficial, invective, 
 accusation, and abuse were set forth in terms hardly 
 diplomatic. On our side there was as well a continu- 
 ous alternation of threat and lecture. The only basis 
 for successful diplomatic negotiation, which rests 
 upon a thorough knowledge and appreciation of the 
 Spanish character, was conspicuously lacking. 
 
 Polk lost no time after his inauguration in making 
 plans for carrying out the fourth item of his scheme. 
 The stipulation in the Texas joint resolution, which 
 left the adjustment of the boundaries of Texas to the 
 United States, gave him his opportunity, and he 
 grasped it at once. Almonte left New York for Mexico 
 April 3, 1845. I'he same ship carried an agent secretly 
 sent by the President to make an effort to reopen dip- 
 
POLK AND CALIFORNIA 269 
 
 lomatic relations with the Mexican government. This 
 secret agent was Dr. William S. Parrott, who had 
 practised dentistry some years previously in the City 
 of Mexico. He had afterwards engaged in business 
 there and had failed, one of his assets being a claim 
 against the Mexican government, though of this claim 
 Polk, at the time of Parrott's appointment, probably 
 knew nothing. 
 
 The instructions given Parrott were to reach the 
 president and other high officials of the Mexican gov- 
 ernment and by every honorable means to convince 
 them that it was the true interest of their country to 
 restore friendly relations between the two republics ; 
 not until he had definitely ascertained the willing- 
 ness of Mexico to receive an envoy from the United 
 States was he to disclose his own official character. 
 "Whilst you ought not to conceal that the re-union of 
 Texas with the United States is already decreed and 
 can never under any consideration be abandoned, you 
 are at liberty to state your confident belief that in 
 regard to all unsettled questions, we are pre- 
 pared to meet Mexico in a liberal and friendly spirit." 
 No specific instructions were given as to the mode of 
 proceeding. "Should you clearly ascertain that they 
 are willing to renew our diplomatic intercourse, then, 
 and not till then, you are at liberty to communicate 
 to them your official character and to state that the 
 United States will send a minister to Mexico as soon 
 as they receive authentic information that he will be 
 kindly received." ^ 
 
 The selection of William S. Parrott as an agent for 
 
 'Buchanan to Parrott, March 28, 1845; MS., Archives. 
 
270 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 the reestablishment of diplomatic relations was a 
 strange one. Parrott had urged his claims against 
 Mexico for a lot of English ale in a manner that 
 disgusted Thompson, as the records of the state de- 
 partment would have shown. Thompson's comment 
 upon Parrott's claim was that it had grown more enor- 
 mously than "Jonah's gourd." * Polk and Buchanan, 
 probably ignorant of the matter, selected Parrott be- 
 cause he had lived long in Mexico and professed an in- 
 timate knowledge of and acquaintance with its leading 
 men. The agent reached Mexico before Shannon left. 
 His official character was an open secret, and although 
 he was persona non grata to the government on account 
 of his claim, he was permitted to remain after Shannon 
 had departed. Parrott complained to Buchanan that 
 British influences prevented him from approaching the 
 members of the Herrera government. From the first 
 he dwelt upon the strength of British influence and the 
 danger of Great Britain's seizure of Upper Cahfornia." 
 Judging from his correspondence, he seems to have re- 
 lied largely upon the newspapers for his information." 
 At first without even a "letter of security," which 
 Black, the consul at Mexico, had unsuccessfully re- 
 quested for him, and fearful each day of expulsion, 
 Parrott managed early in June to get into "indirect" 
 communication with the government.' He reported 
 that no one believed that war would be declared against 
 
 'Parrott's claim of $986,880 was reduced to $114,750 by 
 the award. MS., Awards, II., 45 ; Department of State. 
 
 ' Parrott to Buchanan, May 13, 1845 (received July 2) ; 
 MS., Archives. 
 
 " Parrott to Buchanan, May 30, 1845 ; MS., Archives. 
 
 ' Parrott to Buchanan, June 10, 1845 ; MS., Archives. 
 
POLK AND CALIFORNIA 27I 
 
 the United States on account of Texas. "The pre- 
 sumption and folly of this people are great, it is true, 
 but hardly enough so to force the administration to 
 adopt a measure which if persisted in might erelong 
 endanger the national existence of their country." ' 
 Parrott's disposition, however, was not that of a peace- 
 maker. "Nothing but a severe chastisement," he wrote, 
 "would secure our people in future." ' 
 
 The cabinet of Herrera, which had been loosely held 
 together, was reconstructed in August. Parrott re- 
 ported that the new cabinet was in accord with Herrera 
 and that no war would be waged on account of Texas. 
 "There is a desire, even publicly manifested, to re- 
 ceive a commissioner from the United States and every 
 vessel that arrives at Isla Verde is said to have one on 
 board. I have reason to believe that an envoy from 
 the United States would not only be well received, 
 but his arrival would be hailed with joy. An Envoy 
 possessing suitable qualifications for this Court might 
 with comparative ease settle over a breakfast the most 
 important national question, while such as we have 
 lately had here would make. matters worse."" 
 
 Polk had no intention of returning Shannon. Ten 
 days after the letter just quoted was received from 
 Parrott, Polk instructed Buchanan to write to John 
 Slidell of Louisiana, who had previously been offered 
 and had accepted the Mexican mission, that he should 
 
 ' Parrott to Buchanan, July 12, 1845 (received September i) ; 
 MS., Archives. 
 
 ' Parrott to Buchanan, July 26, 1845 (received August 25) ; 
 MS., Archives. 
 
 " Parrott to Buchanan, August 26, 184s (received September 
 16) ; MS., Archives. 
 
272 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLIlR AND POLK 
 
 hold himself in readiness to leave for his post upon 
 one day's notice." 
 
 On that date, the diary informs us, the President 
 announced clearly to his cabinet that he would try to 
 adjust through this Texas question a permanent boun- 
 dary between Mexico and the United States so as to 
 comprehend Upper California and New Mexico and 
 to give us a line from the mouth of the Rio Grande 
 to latitude thirty-two degrees north and thence west 
 to the Pacific. For such a botmdary he was willing to 
 pay, he said, forty million dollars, but he could prob- 
 ably get it for fifteen or twenty millions. In these 
 views the cabinet unanimously concurred. The ap- 
 pointment of John Slidell followed quickly upon this 
 decision of the cabinet. 
 
 Slidell, upon whom the strictest secrecy concerning 
 his appointment was enjoined, replied that it was be- 
 yond itelief that the Mexican government would so 
 soon receive a diplomatic representative from the 
 United States."^ He felt, as had Polk and his cabinet, 
 that no one would dare make any overtures pending 
 the election of the president of Mexico, which was 
 soon to take place. Parrott's reports, however, al- 
 though corroborated by Black and Dimond, consuls 
 at Mexico and Vera Cruz respectively, did not fully 
 convince the President that Herrera, the president 
 ad interim, who was now reelected, was not trying 
 to win political capital by warlike threats against the 
 United States." 
 
 " Polk's Diary, September 17, 1845. 
 
 ^ Slidell to Buchanan, September 25, 1845 ; Curtis's 
 Buchanan, I., 591. 
 
 " Cf. Curtis's Buchanan, I., 588. 
 
POLK AND CALIIfORNIA 273 
 
 What Parrott had done was, however, no secret in 
 Mexico. On November i, Bl Amiga del Pueblo, aMexi- 
 can newspaper, denounced the government of Herrera 
 as engaged in a "horrible treason." "This vile govern- 
 ment," it said, "has been and is in correspondence with 
 the usurpers. The Yankee Parrott and the American 
 consul at Mexico are those who have agreed with the 
 government for the loss of Texas, and this same Par- 
 rott has departed for the North to say to his govern- 
 ment to send a commissioner to make with our gov- 
 ernment an ignominious treaty on the basis of the 
 surrender of Texas and we know not what other part 
 of the republic. This is as certain as the existence of 
 God in Heaven." The article proceeded in scurrilous 
 fashion to characterize Parrott as a shameless sharper 
 and adventurer, concluding with the statement that 
 Parrott had himself disclosed these secrets on the eve 
 of his departure. From Commodore Conner, com- 
 manding the naval forces in the Gulf, came despatches 
 stating that Mexico was willing to renew diplomatic 
 relations and to receive a minister from the United 
 States." The cabinet thereupon unanimously agreed 
 to Slidell's instructions." 
 
 Parrott's work in Mexico was completed by October 
 18, when he left for Washington with a note from 
 Black, the American consul, which stated that he had 
 positive and official assurance that the Mexican minis- 
 try was favorable to an adjustment of the questions in 
 dispute between the two republics. The cabinet had 
 agreed that Slidell's formal appointment should be de- 
 
 " Polk's Diary, November 6, 1845. 
 ''Ibid., November 7, 1845. 
 
274 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 layed until some official assurances should be had 
 that Mexico would receive an envoy, and Black was 
 asked to procure them. Parrott arrived at Wash- 
 ington November 9. Upon the tenth Buchanan 
 sent Slidell his instructions, which had been drafted 
 seven weeks before." These instructions to Slidell 
 are of fundamental importance in rightly under- 
 standing Polk's policy toward Mexico. The Presi- 
 dent told Bancroft soon after the inauguration 
 that the acquisition of California would be one of 
 the main objects of his administration. Slidell's ap- 
 pointment was a secret. Every precaution was ob- 
 served by Polk to keep his instructions from becom- 
 ing public. While confidential instructions may have 
 been given Slidell before he left Washington in the 
 spring, yet Buchanan's instructions to him are the 
 official expression of Polk's policy toward Mexico, and 
 these were consistently adhered to. That Polk so con- 
 sidered them is proved by the fact that they accom- 
 panied the instructions of Commissioner Trist a year 
 and a half later, and that they were given official pub- 
 licity only when the final treaty was submitted to the 
 Senate for ratification. When the House called for 
 them Polk stood upon his constitutional prerogative 
 and refused to make them public, claiming that to do 
 so "could not fail to produce serious embarrassments 
 in any future negotiation between the two countries." 
 This was as late as January 12, 1848, more than two 
 years after the instructions had been drafted, and when 
 the war was practically at an end. The cabinet agreed 
 with Polk that Slidell's instructions should be kept 
 
 "Ibid., September 22, 1845. 
 
POLK AND CALIFORNIA 275 
 
 secret "because the French and British ministers might 
 try to thwart or defeat the objects of the mission."" 
 
 Parrott's mission and Slidell's instructions taken to- 
 gether prove two things: (i) that the Mexican War 
 was not the result of the annexation of Texas, and 
 (2) that the reopening of diplomatic relations with 
 Mexico was for the purpose of securing California by 
 purchase. These instructions are the key-note to Polk's 
 aggressive policy of expansion. The President de- 
 veloped a plan by which he believed that expansion 
 could be effected by peaceful means. Claims against 
 Mexico, under discussion as far back as Jackson's 
 time, furnished the groundwork of the plan; the joint 
 resolution annexing Texas gave the President some- 
 thing to build upon. Mexico could not pay the claims 
 in cash; the Texan boundary was unsettled. The idea 
 of territorial indemnity was an irresistible conclusion : 
 let her pay in land. 
 
 The instructions to Slidell first dwelt upon the re- 
 ported designs of European countries upon Mexico, a 
 subject which ever afforded an opportunity for decided 
 statement. Buchanan then said that the claims of 
 American citizens upon Mexico would first en- 
 gage Slidell's attention as matters yet unsettled 
 by the unratified treaty of 1843. ^s Mexico 
 was not in a position to settle these claims in 
 money, the United States must assume them. 
 The plan of doing this is then developed. "Fortu- 
 nately," Buchanan said, "the joint resolution of Con- 
 gress, approved March i, 1845, for annexing Texas, 
 presents the means of satisfying these claims in perfect 
 
 "Ibid., September 16, 1845. 
 
276 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYtER AND POLK 
 
 consistency with the interests as well as the honor of 
 both republics" by the reservation therein to the United 
 States of the right to adjust all questions of boundary 
 that might arise between it and Mexico. The Rio 
 Grande boundary was then discussed, and as to it, 
 Buchanan said, "there can be no serious doubt," based 
 upon the independence of Texas as a fact not to be 
 called in question. New Mexico, on the other hand, 
 presented a different question, as it had never been 
 conquered or taken possession of by the Texans. In 
 case Mexico should agree to fix the boundary from the 
 mouth of the Rio Grande up the middle of the prin- 
 cipal stream to the point where it touches the line of 
 New Mexico, thence west and north to the forty- 
 second parallel, so as to include the whole within the 
 United States, then this country would assume the 
 payment of her citizens' claims against Mexico and 
 would pay five millions in addition. The cession 
 of Upper California was the next topic con- 
 sidered. This province, said Buchanan, was al- 
 ready practically lost to Mexico and coveted by 
 Great Britain and France. "If you can obtain 
 a cession of it," the secretary said, "you will 
 render immense service to your country and es- 
 tablish an enviable reputation for yourself. Money 
 would be no object when compared with the value of 
 the acquisition." For it he might offer twenty-five mil- 
 lions, in addition to the assumption of the claims, or 
 five millions less if the southern line was north of Mon- 
 terey but included the Bay of San Francisco. Such was 
 the difficult errand upon which John Slidell went to 
 Mexico ; as his instructions stated, it was "one of the 
 most delicate and important missions which had ever 
 
POLK AND CALIFORNIA 277 
 
 been confided to a citizen of the United States." "The 
 people to whom you will be sent are proverbially jeal- 
 ous; and they have been irritated against the United 
 States by recent events and the intrigues of foreign 
 powers. To conciliate their good will is indispensable 
 to your success. It would be difficult to raise a point 
 of honor between the United States and so feeble and 
 distracted a power as Mexico." " 
 
 Polk's disposition of the military and naval forces 
 of the United States was in thorough accord with his 
 diplomatic policy. In May, 1845, Taylor was ordered 
 to cross the Sabine into Texas to protect it pending 
 annexation. Taylor proceeded to advance as far as 
 Corpus Christi. Jones, the president of Texas, claimed 
 that Donelson, together with Captain Stockton, com- 
 manding the naval forces upon the coast of Texas, 
 attempted to dragoon him into demanding a strong 
 concentration of United States forces, naval and mili- 
 tary, upon the western border of Texas in anticipation 
 of war between Mexico and the United States. Jones 
 even went so far as to state that it was evidently the 
 determination of Donelson and Stockton to force a 
 war with Mexico for the purposes of further territorial 
 aggrandizement. He threw upon Taylor the responsi- 
 bility of his advance to Corpus Christi, claiming that 
 Texas was not seriously menaced." 
 
 Whatever may have been the individual activities of 
 Polk's agents, the President did not proceed to force 
 Mexico into a war. Polk worked for peace, but at 
 the same time prepared for war. If war resulted, the 
 conquest of California should be its fruit. 
 
 " Buchanan to Slidell, November 10, 1845 ; 5'. Ex. Doc. 32, 
 £0 Cong., J Sess., 71. 
 "Jones, OfUcial Correspondence, passim. 
 
278 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 The gulf squadron under Conner was ordered to 
 blockade Vera Cruz in the event of war and to develop 
 the fortifications of San Juan d' Ulloa/° The naval 
 forces in the Pacific under the command of Commodore 
 Sloat were reinforced by parts of the Mediterranean 
 and East India squadrons.^ Sloat was ordered, in case 
 he should hear of hostilities between the United States 
 and Mexico, to seize San Francisco at once, together 
 with such other Pacific ports as his forces would per- 
 mit. In case war did not occur his squadron was to 
 cruise along the coast of California to Oregon, "to 
 cheer our citizens in that region by the presence of the 
 American flag." ^ 
 
 At Monterey, Thomas O. Larkin, the foremost 
 American merchant there, had for some time per- 
 formed the slight duties of the consular office. During 
 the summer of 1845 Buchanan received from him re- 
 ports upon the political conditions of California; the 
 consul reported that the population was apathetic and 
 even disloyal to Mexico, and that Great Britain and 
 France had evident designs upon the province.^ 
 Lieutenant Archibald H. Gillespie of the marine corps 
 was despatched to Monterey to get into communication 
 with Larkin. Gillespie's instructions were secret. No 
 copy of them has been found in the navy department, 
 
 ™ Bancroft to Conner, "confidential" August 16, 1845 ; 
 August 30, 184s, "secret;" MS., Archives, Navy Department. 
 
 ^ Bancroft to Commodore Smith, May 13, 1845 ; Bancroft 
 to Parker, June 24, 1845 ; MS., Archives, Navy Department. 
 
 ^ Bancroft to Sloat, June 24, 1845 ; H. Bx. Doc. 60, 30 
 Cong., I Sess., 231. 
 
 ^'Larkin to Buchanan, June 6, 1845 (received September 16) 
 and July 10, 184S (received October 11) ; MS., Archives. 
 
POLK AND CALIFORNIA 279 
 
 and the precise nature of them cannot be determined." 
 After a dangerous trip through Mexico, in the course 
 of which he was forced to destroy all of his papers, 
 the lieutenant arrived in Monterey in April, 1846, just 
 as active hostilities with Mexico began.^ Gillespie had 
 been sent upon his errand November i, 1845. Shortly 
 before this Stockton, who had been appointed to the 
 command of the Pacific squadron, was instructed to 
 sail under sealed orders to the Sandwich Islands and 
 thence directly to Monterey, California. "You will con- 
 fer with the consul, gain all the information you can on 
 Mexican affairs and do all in your power to conciliate 
 the good feelings of the people of that place toward 
 the United States." " To Stockton was entrusted Bu- 
 chanan's letter to Larkin, a copy of which Gillespie 
 took at the same time." The policy of Polk in refer- 
 ence to the acquisition of California was therein out- 
 lined. 
 
 "In the contest between Mexico and California we 
 can take no part unless the former should commence 
 hostilities against the United States; but should Cali- 
 fornia assert and maintain her independence, we shall 
 render her all the kind offices in our power as a sister 
 
 "Polk's Diary, October 30, 1843. Bancroft to Gillespie, 
 November i, 1845. Gillespie received orders April 26, 1843, 
 November l, 1845, and April 23, 1846. None contained in- 
 structions relative to this errand. MS., Archives, Navy De- 
 partment. 
 
 ^Larkin to Buchanan, April 17, 1846; MS., Archives. 
 
 ^^ Sealed orders to Stockton (not to be opened until he 
 passed the Capes), October 12, 1845; MS., Archives, Navy 
 Department. 
 
 " Gillespie committed to memory the contents of Buchanan's 
 letter to Larkin, and destroyed the copy upon his arrival at 
 Vera Cruz. 
 
280 DIPI^OMACY UNDER TYI^gR AND POI.K 
 
 republic. This government has no ambitious aspira- 
 tions to gratify and no desire to extend our federal 
 system over more territory than we already possess, 
 unless by the free and spontaneous wish of all the in- 
 dependent people of adjoining territories. The exer- 
 cise of compulsion or improper influence to accomplish 
 such a result would be repugnant to both the policy 
 and principles of the government. But whilst these 
 are the sentiments of the President, he could not view 
 with indifference the transfer of California to Great 
 Britain or any other European power. . . . The 
 true policy for the present in regard to this question 
 is to let events take their own course, unless an at- 
 tempt should be made to transfer them [i. e., the people 
 of California] without their consent to Great Britain 
 or any other European power. . . . Lieut. Archi- 
 bald H. Gillespie of the marine corps will immediately 
 proceed to Monterey and will probably reach you be- 
 fore this despatch. He is a gentleman in whom the 
 President reposes entire confidence. He has seen these 
 instructions and will cooperate with you in carrying 
 them into execution." " 
 
 Thus while Polk upon the one hand awaited official 
 assurances from Mexico that she would peacefully 
 reestablish diplomatic relations with the United States, 
 upon the other he signified that he would aid in the dis- 
 memberment of Mexico. The expeditions of Fremont 
 are beyond the scope of the present narrative, but it 
 may be stated here that the instructions to Larkin, the 
 secret mission of Gillespie, and the exploits of Fre- 
 mont are parts of one and the same policy: if peace 
 
 "Buchanan to Larkin, October 17, 1845; MS., Archives. 
 
POLIj: AND CAI,IF0RNIA 28 1 
 
 continued with Mexico, to attempt to purchase Cali- 
 fornia ; if purchase failed, to assist California to throw 
 off the Mexican yoke. The instructions to Larkin and 
 Stockton can be read in no other light. Events, how- 
 ever, moved in a different channel. War and not 
 peace followed. California became part of the United 
 States through conquest. 
 
 John Slidell's appointment was as envoy extraor- 
 dinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico. Upon 
 the capacity in which Slidell presented himself at 
 Mexico turned the question of his reception. The 
 point was that while Mexico might be willing to receive 
 from the United States a commissioner ad hoc to treat 
 concerning the question over which there had been a 
 rupture of diplomatic relations — namely, the annexa- 
 tion of Texas to the United States — it was a totally 
 different matter for her to receive a regular fhinister 
 to take up the usual diplomatic functions of the lega- 
 tion. A commissioner would be instructed to settle 
 one definite dispute and the matters collateral to it. 
 The reception by Mexico of a minister would open the 
 door to the general course of diplomatic negotiations 
 upon which the American minister might be instructed. 
 Again, Mexico as a matter of pride would hesitate to 
 receive a minister, thus acknowledging her announce- 
 ment, that annexation was equivalent to war, to be a 
 vain and empty threat. So far as Polk and Buchanan 
 were concerned they would not have sacrificed any 
 national self-respect had a commissioner been sent in- 
 stead of an envoy. The boundary between Texas and 
 Mexico, since the action of the Texan congress and 
 convention, was unsettled. It had purposely been left 
 so by the joint resolutions of annexation. Why Polk 
 
282 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYI^ERvAND POLK 
 
 and Buchanan insisted upon sending a minister is a 
 matter of conjecture. As far as Parrott's letters re- 
 ported upon the reception of a representative, refer- 
 ence is made to a minister or to an envoy. Polk used 
 the same expression in his diary, though he must have 
 known of the doubts expressed at Washington of the 
 reception of a representative with such general func- 
 tions.^ Mexico's attitude toward Slidell turned upon 
 this one point, which was seized upon as soon as the 
 purport of his instructions became known to Herrera's 
 government. How these secret instructions leaked out 
 is not known. 
 
 Slidell arrived at Vera Cruz late in November and 
 proceeded at once to the City of Mexico. Parrott, who 
 had been appointed secretary of legation, followed him 
 in company with Gillespie, en route with despatches 
 for Larkin at Monterey.'" 
 
 Slidell's arrival at the City of Mexico evidently em- 
 barrassed Herrera, whose government, never a strong 
 one, was beginning to fear a revolution against it. 
 Peiia y Pena, the secretary of foreign affairs, told 
 Black that Slidell was not expected until January, and 
 that if "Mexico received a commissioner" now it would 
 endanger the government." He positively refused to 
 receive Parrott as secretary of legation. The enemies 
 of Herrera were strong and immediately used Slidell's 
 arrival as political capital against the existing admin- 
 istration. As soon as Slidell reached Mexico broad- 
 
 " Tyler's Tylers, III., 176; statement of Benjamin E. Green. 
 
 '"Slidell to Buchanan, December 17, 1845; postcript. MS., 
 Archives. Parrott to Buchanan, December 11, 1845; MS., 
 Archives. 
 
 "Black to Buchanan, December 18, 1845; S. Ex. Doc. 337, 
 2g Cong., I Sess. 
 
POLK AND CALIFORNIA 283 
 
 sides appeared over the city and told of his plans : to 
 negotiate with Herrera's government for the sale of 
 Texas, New Mexico and the Californias. The recep- 
 tion of SHdell by Herrera, said the broadsides, would 
 be an act of treason. 
 
 Slidell's despatch, which enclosed one of these hand- 
 bills, was received in Washington January 12, 1846. 
 Taylor was ordered forward from Corpus Christi to 
 the Rio Grande the following day." Thus the refusal 
 to receive Slidell in his capacity as minister was taken 
 as sufficient grounds for the occupation of the country 
 beyond the Nueces. Slidell, however, did not believe 
 that his rejection was final. Bankhead, the British 
 minister, was requested by Pena y Peria to state to 
 Slidell "that the government had in its present critical 
 position, feared to compromise themselves by receiving 
 him, that had they been free to act they would have 
 pursued a different course, and that, should they suc- 
 ceed in putting down the movements of Paredes, they 
 would take the necessary steps to bring about a renewal 
 of diplomatic relations." " 
 
 Buchanan supplemented Slidell's instructions by 
 stating that the President desired the negotiations 
 brought to a conclusion with as little delay as possible. 
 "He desires to submit the result to Congress before 
 the termination of the approaching session, so that, 
 in the event of a failure, prompt and energetic meas- 
 ures may be adopted on our part to redress the injuries 
 which our citizens have sustained from Mexico." " If 
 
 ^ Polk's Diary, January 13, 1846. 
 
 ^ Slidell to Buchanan, December 29, 184S (received January 
 23, 1846) ; MS., Archives. 
 
 '"Buchanan to Slidell, November 19, 1845; MS., Archives. 
 
284 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 Slidell succeeded in concluding a treaty upon the lines 
 of his instructions, he was to have it ratified by the 
 Mexican government before its transmission to the 
 United States. After the receipt of Slidell's first letter, 
 in which he reported that Herrera declined receiving 
 him immediately, Buchanan advised him of the orders 
 to Taylor and to the gulf squadron, which was to 
 rendezvous before Vera Cruz. "Should war become 
 inevitable, the President will be prepared to conduct 
 it with vigor." " 
 
 The revolution under Paredes gained headway, and 
 soon the government of Herrera was overthrown. 
 Paredes was as belligerent as Herrera had been peace- 
 able. Slidell, however, continued to feel assured that 
 the new government would receive him. He waited 
 until the middle of March, hoping each day that 
 Paredes would direct that he be received. His expec- 
 tations were in vain. The new minister of foreign 
 affairs sent Slidell his passports and definitely refused 
 to receive him." "Be assured," wrote Slidell to Bu- 
 chanan, enclosing Castillo's refusal, "that nothing is 
 to be done with these people until they shall have been 
 chastised." " 
 
 Polk, however, had long since made up his mind to 
 "chastise" Mexico. The Oregon negotiations pre- 
 sented one obstacle to the immediate carrying out of 
 his plans. The danger of having two wars on hand 
 
 " Buchanan to Slidell, January 20, 1846 ; S. Bx. Doc. 337, 
 2') Cong., I Scss., ii^. 
 
 " Castillo y Lanzas to Slidell, March 12, 1846 ; Slidell to 
 Castillo y Lanzas, March 17, 1846; ibid. 
 
 " Slidell to Buchanan, private, March 15, 1846 (received 
 April 17, "night") ; MS., Archives. 
 
POIvK AND CAIylFORNIA 285 
 
 was grave enough to delay active measures against 
 Mexico, although at no time did Polk seem seriously 
 to fear a rupture with Great Britain on account of 
 Oregon. It was apparent that Slidell's mission was 
 a failure. California was not to be purchased as the 
 result of a negotiation upon the claims and the Texas 
 boundary. The next step was to be an openly aggres- 
 sive movement against Mexico. Until the Oregon ques- 
 tion was out of the way, Polk wanted Slidell to tem- 
 porize and not finally to close the door to negotiation. 
 Instead of calling Slidell home, he was ordered to 
 make further efiforts to obtain recognition. Buchanan 
 wrote Slidell, March 12, 1846: "The Oregon question 
 is rapidly approaching a crisis. By the steam packet 
 which will leave L,iverpool on the 4th of April, 
 if not by that which left on the 4th instant, the Presi- 
 dent expects information which will be decisive on the 
 subject. The prospect is that our differences with 
 Great Britain may be peacefully adjusted, though this 
 is by no means certain. Your return to the United 
 States before the result is known, would produce con- 
 siderable alarm in the public mind and might possibly 
 exercise an injurious influence on our relations with 
 Great Britain." "^ 
 
 Slidell, who had previously no intimation that his 
 mission had any connection with the Oregon negotia- 
 tion, was on his way home when Buchanan's last let- 
 ter reached him. "Had such a hint been given to me 
 there could have been no difficulty in procrastinating 
 indefinitely an issue with the Mexican government, 
 and however disagreeable and even false, my personal 
 
 "Buchanan to Slidell, March 12, 1846; MS., Archives. 
 
286 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 position might have been, ... no inconvenience 
 to myself would have prevented me from performing 
 my duty." '" With the departure of Slidell the plan of 
 acquiring Cahfornia by peaceful means was shown to 
 be a failure. 
 
 Slidell did not believe that the Paredes government 
 would be able to maintain itself. The eyes of many 
 Mexicans were turned to Cuba, where Santa Anna 
 was living in exile. No one else could rally about him 
 so much strength as the former popular idol. In the 
 letter in which he reported the definite refusal of the 
 Paredes government, Slidell wrote: "I shall not be 
 surprised soon to hear of Santa Anna arrived at Vera 
 Cruz and of a pronunciamento in his favor by the gar- 
 rison there. If he have the nerve to take the step 
 and get possession of Vera Cruz, he will easily put 
 down Paredes. Should he arrive before my departure, ' 
 I will ascertain his views in relation to the United 
 States, and if I find them favorable, will not hurry my 
 departure from Vera Cruz, but in the meanwhile, my 
 expectation of amicable arrangements through Santa 
 Anna ought not to delay the application which the 
 President intends making Congress." " "Should Santa 
 Anna be the successor of Paredes, the prospect would 
 be better, but some time would be necessary to prepare 
 his partisans for a step so unpopular as negotiation, 
 and should he be disposed to take it, he would not 
 scruple to make the preliminary overtures." " 
 
 " Slidell to Buchanan, April 2, 1846 ; MS., Archives. 
 
 " Slidell to Buchanan, March 15, 1846 (received April i, 
 "night") ; MS., Archives. 
 
 "Slidell to Buchanan, April 2, 1846 (received April 16); 
 MS., Archives. 
 
POLK AND CALIFORNIA 287 
 
 Santa Anna was the successor of Paredes. Polk was 
 already in possession of Santa Anna's pretended views 
 toward the United States. Events were now rapidly 
 approaching war. The clash with Taylor at the Rio 
 Grande was a fortunate circumstance for the adminis- 
 tration. Before the news of Taylor's fight reached 
 him Polk had determined to declare war upon Mexico. 
 His statement that "war existed by the act of Mexico" 
 was as inaccurate as the belief that war was the neces- 
 sary consequence of the annexation of Texas. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 The Outbreak oe the Mexican War 
 
 It has been demonstrated, it is believed, that the 
 Mexican War was not the result of the annexation of 
 Texas. The Mexican War was waged for the pur- 
 pose of conquest, for the fulfillment of Polk's designs 
 Upon California. War would have been declared 
 against Mexico had the Mexicans not crossed the Rio 
 Grande or come into conflict with Taylor. Again, Polk 
 believed war with Mexico would be a small affair, 
 scarcely ninety days in duration, to be terminated by 
 a peaceful surrender of California, arranged by Santa 
 Anna. 
 
 The first part of Polk's policy toward Mexico had 
 been to acquire California by purchase. This attempt 
 failed under Slidell. Herrera's successor, Paredes, re- 
 fused to receive Slidell. Nothing was to be hoped for 
 throHgh diplomacy. 
 
 One day in February, after Polk had ordered Taylor 
 forward to the Rio Grande and was awaiting the news 
 of Slidell's final rejection, a visitor was admitted to the 
 White House for a confidential conversation with the 
 President. Polk, whose diary is usually terse in its 
 comment upon men and things, deemed the communi- 
 cation of his visitor to be of sufficient importance to 
 be entered in full in his book. Through this entry in 
 the diary one is let more fully into the confidences of 
 this close-mouthed and secretive President than were 
 the members of his own cabinet. No less an authority 
 than Bancroft has stated that Polk was the "master 
 
OUTBREAK OF THE MEXICAN WAR 289 
 
 of his own cabinet and not ruled by the ablest of his 
 advisers. One trait which gave him this controlling 
 advantage was his power of secrecy, which was so 
 great that those whose official intercourse was closest 
 with him, were unable to trace the course of his 
 thoughts." The diary has disclosed the secrets kept 
 from the cabinet. 
 
 "Friday, Feby. 13-1846 — Some company today until 
 12 o'clock," says the diary. "Among those who called 
 was Col. Atacha, who called on me in June last. He 
 is a Spaniard by birth, but says he has become a 
 naturalized citizen of the U. S. He has lived at New 
 Orleans and spent many years in Mexico. He was 
 with Santa Anna when his government was over- 
 thrown last year, was himself arrested but it being 
 made known that he was a naturalized citizen of the 
 U. S., he was ordered out of the country. He called 
 on me in June last to present claims against the gov- 
 ernment of Mexico, with a view to have their payment 
 urged by the Govt, of the U. S. Col. Atacha stated 
 this A. M. he had visited Genl. Santa Anna in his 
 exile at Havannah & that he had left him a month 
 ago — His conversation with me, he said, he desired to 
 be confidential. He represented that Santa Anna was 
 in constant communication with his friends in Mexico 
 and received by every vessel that left Vera Cruz hun- 
 dreds of letters. He intimated that the recent revo- 
 lution in Mexico headed by Paredes met Santa Anna's 
 sanction, & that Santa Anna might soon be in power 
 again in Mexico. He said that Santa Anna was in 
 favor of a Treaty with the U. S. and that in adjusting 
 the boundary between the two countries the Del Norte 
 should be the western Texas line and the Colorado of 
 
290 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 the west, drawn through the bay of San Francisco 
 to the sea, should be the Mexican Hne on the north & 
 that Mexico should cede all east and north of these 
 natural boundaries to the U. S. for a pecuniary con- 
 sideration, & mentioned thirty millions of dollars as 
 the sum. This sum, he said, Santa Anna believed 
 would pay the most pressing debts of Mexico & sup- 
 port the army until the condition of the finances could 
 be improved & enable the govt, to be placed on a per- 
 manent footing. Col. Atacha said that Santa Anna 
 was surprised that the U. S. naval force had been with- 
 drawn from Vera Cruz last fall, & that Genl. Taylor's 
 army was kept at Corpus Christi instead of being, sta- 
 tioned on the Del Norte & that the U. S. would never 
 be able to treat with Mexico without the presence of an 
 imposing force by land and sea, & this Col. Atacha 
 added was his own opinion. Col. Atacha did not say 
 that he was sent by Santa Anna to hold this conver- 
 sation with me. He said that he had told Santa Anna 
 he had seen me in June & that he would see me again, 
 as soon as he reached Washington. Col. Atacha re- 
 quested that this conversation should be considered as 
 confidential." ^ 
 
 At the cabinet meeting the next day Polk related the 
 substance of Atecha's conversation. "Different mem- 
 bers . . . expressed opinions concerning it. The 
 idea of sending a confidential agent to confer with 
 Santa Anna was mentioned. Mr. Walker was inclined 
 to favor it & Mr. Buchanan was decidedly opposed to 
 it. I remarked that if such an agent were to be sent 
 Gen. C. P. Van Ness, former minister to Spain, would 
 
 ' Polk's Diary, February 13, 1846. 
 
OUTBREAK OF THE MEXICAN WAR 29I 
 
 be the best selection in the country. I stated that I 
 did not propose to send such a messenger but had 
 merely suggested it, in view of the information given 
 me ... by Col. Atacha. The subject after a 
 short conversation was dropped.'"' Santa Anna's 
 emissary had made enough of an impression upon the 
 President for Polk to cast about for a suitable person to 
 meet Santa Anna. Atecha did not let the matter rest, 
 but, once having the ear of the President, returned at 
 the earliest opportunity for a further conference. The 
 diary records : "He repeated that Gen. Santa Anna 
 was in favor of a treaty between Mexico and the U. 
 States, by which the former should for a pecuniary 
 consideration cede to the U. States all the country 
 east of the Del Norte and north of the Colorado of 
 the West, & had named thirty millions of dollars as 
 a sum that would be satisfactory. I then remarked 
 that Mexico must satisfy the claims of American citi- 
 zens, & that if the Government of Mexico had any 
 proposition to make, such as was suggested, it would 
 be considered when made, to which Col. Ataclia said 
 that no government in Mexico dared to make such a 
 proposition, for if they did so, there would be another 
 revolution by which they would be overthrown. He 
 said they must appear to be forced to agree to such 
 a proposition. He went on to give his own opinion 
 and as he said that of Gen. Santa Anna that the U. 
 States should take strong measures before any settle- 
 ment could be effected. He said an army should be 
 marched at once from Corpus Christi to the Del Norte 
 & a strong naval force assembled at Vera Cruz, that 
 
 'Ibid., February 14, 1846. 
 
292 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 our minister should withdraw from Jalapa & go on 
 board one of our ships at Vera Cruz & in that position 
 should demand the payment of amount due our citi- 
 zens ; that it was well known the Mexican Government 
 was unable to pay in money & that when they saw a 
 strong naval force ready to strike on their coasts and 
 border, they would, he had no doubt, feel their danger 
 & agree to the boundary suggested. He said that 
 Paredes, Almonte & Genl. Santa Anna were all will- 
 ing for such an arrangement, but that they dare not 
 make it, until it was made apparent to the Archbishop 
 of Mexico & the people generally that it was necessary 
 to save their country from war with the U. States. He 
 said the last words which Genl. Santa Anna said to 
 him, when he was leaving Havana, a month ago, was 
 'When you see the President, tell him to take strong 
 measures, & such a treaty can be made & I will sus- 
 tain it.' Col. Atacha said the Government of Mexico 
 was indebted to the Archbishop half a million of dol- 
 lars, & he would be reconciled, by an assurance by the 
 Mexican Government that he should be paid, when 
 this consideration should be paid by the U. States. 
 He said Paredes and Almonte were both in favor 
 of such a settlement if they dare make it, and that 
 Genl. Santa Anna concurring with them would sup- 
 port them in it. He said (Genl. Santa Anna) that the 
 state of things would be in such a condition that he 
 would return to Mexico in April or May, & would 
 probably go into power again, but that he & Paredes 
 must have money to sustain themselves. He said that 
 with half a million in hand they could make the Treaty 
 & sustain themselves for a few months & until the 
 balance was paid. . . . He (Col. A) intimated an 
 
OUTBREAK 0^ THE MEXICAN WAR 293 
 
 intention to return to Havana & as I inferred a desire 
 to bear to Gen. S. A. the views of the Govt. here. To 
 this intimation I gave no reply. My object in the con- 
 versation being to obtain information but not to dis- 
 close my own views. Col. A. is [a] person to who [m] 
 I would not give my confidence. He is evidently a 
 man of talents and education but his whole manner 
 of conversation impressed me with a belief that he 
 would betray any confidence reposed in him when it 
 was his interest to do so. I, therefore heard all he said 
 but communicated nothing to him." ' 
 
 In all this there is no intimation that Polk con- 
 sidered it reprehensible to hold conferences with an 
 agent of Santa Anna, an exile from Mexico, who was 
 plotting to regain power and to that end desired the 
 assistance of the United States. Atecha's proposition 
 was that Polk should assist Santa Anna back into 
 Mexico upon the understanding that the dismember- 
 ment of Mexico would follow. Had Polk done no- 
 thing more than listen to Atecha's suggestions, 
 these entries in the diary would not be of more than 
 passing interest. The confidential communications, 
 however, became the basis for Polk's actions. 
 
 In the cabinet at its next meeting Polk again re- 
 ferred to Atecha's communications. The President 
 told the cabinet that new instructions should be given 
 Slide! 1; that he should press for an immediate decision 
 from Paredes as to his reception; and that in case he 
 were definitely refused he should go upon one of the 
 United States vessels of war off Vera Cruz and from 
 it demand the immediate payment of the claims against 
 
 'Ibid., February 16, 1846. 
 
294 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYI^ER AND POLK 
 
 Mexico. In case no answer was made to SHdell's 
 demand, the President would send a message to Con- 
 gress "calling on that body to cause another demand 
 to be made by Mr. Slidell from on board a vessel of 
 war on the Mexican Government to pay our demands 
 and if this was refused by Mexico to confer authority 
 on the Executive to take redress into our own hands 
 by aggressive measures." * 
 
 Polk's plan did not have the unanimous approval of 
 his cabinet. Buchanan, always timid, opposed it. 
 Walker, Marcy, and Bancroft coincided with Polk. 
 Johnson, the postmaster-general, inclined to side with 
 Buchanan but was willing "to acquiesce." Polk notes 
 that Buchanan was "in a bad mood," but finally, 
 though not with good grace, agreed to prepare SHdell's 
 new instructions as the President desired.' Under 
 more recent information from Vera Cruz Polk delayed 
 the letter to Slidell until March 12, when Slidell was 
 ordered to get a final answer from Paredes as to his 
 reception. A part of these instructions was printed 
 under a call from the Senate. A part of them was 
 omitted. In this suppressed part Slidell was told, be- 
 fore finally closing his mission, to sound Paredes on 
 the subject of the financial necessities of his govern- 
 ment. "It would be easy for you to make known to 
 him in some discreet manner that the United States 
 were both able and willing to relieve his administration 
 from pecuniary embarrassment, if he would do us 
 justice and settle the question of boundary between 
 the two republics. A treaty for this purpose, under 
 your instructions, if ratified by Mexico and trans- 
 
 ' Ibid., February 17, 1846. 
 "Ibid., February 17, 1846. 
 
OUTBREAK OF THE MEXICAN WAR 295 
 
 mitted to the United States, could be returned" in a 
 brief space with the ratification of the President and 
 Senate. In the meantime Paredes could command 
 immediately funds on such an assurance." ' 
 
 As has been seen, by the time Slidell received this 
 communication he had left for the United States. 
 No further overtures were made to Paredes. Polk 
 had Santa Anna in his mind and based his hopes upon 
 that exile's return to power. 
 
 From now on Polk proceeded to act upon his de- 
 cision to call upon Congress to take aggressive action 
 toward Mexico upon the assumption that Slidell's mis- 
 sion was a failure. He took certain members of the 
 House and Senate into his confidence and asked them 
 to support an appropriation of a million dollars to be 
 placed in his hands "to be used in exacting an adjust- 
 ment of our differences with Mexico." Calhoun was 
 willing to grant all the money needed for obtaining 
 the cession of Mexican territory, but he opposed an 
 "appropriation in advance as it would become public 
 and embarrass the Oregon negotiation." ' From Slidell 
 came finally (April 7) the news that Paredes would 
 not receive him. Polk told the cabinet that he would 
 make a communication to Congress asking "for legis- 
 lative measures & take the remedy into our own hands." 
 With this idea all the cabinet agreed.' The message 
 Polk decided to delay until Slidell had returned to 
 Washington, but he was so eager for action that, upon 
 
 'Buchanan to Slidell, March 12, 1846; partly printed in 
 S. Bx. Doc. 337, zg Cong., i Sess., 54. MS., Archives. Curtis's 
 Buchanan, I., 596. 
 
 ' Polk's Diary, March 30, 1846. 
 
 'Ibid., April 7, 1846. 
 
296 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYL^R AND POLK 
 
 Calhoun's remonstrance that nothing be done until the 
 Oregon question was settled, he replied that he would 
 proceed against Mexico during the present session of 
 Congress whether the Oregon difficulty was settled 
 or not.' On the twenty-eighth of April the notice as 
 to Oregon, passed by Congress, was signed. The cabi- 
 net decided that it was time to act toward Mexico." 
 Soon afterwards Slidell arrived in Washington. He 
 told Polk that "but one course towards Mexico was 
 left to the United States, and that was to take the 
 redress of the wrongs and injuries which we had so 
 long borne from Mexico into our own hands and act 
 with promptness and energy. In this I agreed with 
 him and told him it was only a matter of time 
 when I would make a communication to Congress upon 
 that subject and that I had made up my mind to do 
 so very soon." " 
 
 On May 9 the cabinet agreed that if the Mexi- 
 cans at Matamoros committed any act of hostility 
 against Taylor war should follow, with a message to 
 Congress. Polk said he had no new advices, but that 
 we had ample cause for war ; that things could not 
 remain in statu quo nor would he remain silent much 
 longer. He then stated that he expected to make his 
 communication to Congress by the following Tuesday, 
 May 12. He asked the cabinet if he should then de- 
 clare war. All said yes except Bancroft, who stated 
 that he would "feel better satisfied in his course if the 
 Mexican forces had, or should, commit any act of 
 hostility." Thus in a cabinet meeting, confessing that 
 
 •/fciU, April 18, 1846. 
 "■"Ibid., April 28, 1846. 
 "/fejd.. May 8, 1846. 
 
OUTBREAK OF THE MEXICAN WAR 297 
 
 no new advices had been received from Taylor, and 
 acknowledging that the Mexicans had not committed 
 any aggression against the American forces, Polk and 
 his cabinet agreed to ask Congress to declare war 
 against Mexico. Not only this, but the date was set 
 for the delivery of the war message." 
 
 By one of those strange happenings that result in 
 the concealment of man's real motives, on the very 
 night following the meeting of the cabinet at which 
 Polk had named a date for the sending of his war 
 message came the news of the passage of the Rio 
 Grande by the Mexicans and of the killing o-f Taylor's 
 troops. The next day Polk spent in preparing his 
 message. Circumstances now permitted this to be 
 drafted in accordance with the wishes that Bancroft 
 had expressed. That day was Sunday, May 10. Polk's 
 entry in his diary is as follows: "At io>4 o'clock I 
 retired to rest. It was a day of great anxiety to me, 
 and I regretted the necessity which had existed, to 
 make it necessary for me to spend the Sabbath in the 
 manner I have." ^ 
 
 "War exists by the act of Mexico," Polk told Con-\ 
 gress May ii, 1846. Had the news from Taylor notj 
 been received when it was. Congress might have been/ 
 informed that on account of the refusal of Paredes to 
 receive Slidell, who had gone to make settlement of the 
 claims of American citizens, the patience of the United 
 States was exhausted; and that the honor and self- 
 respect of the United States could no longer permit 
 Mexico to delay payment of righteous and long delayed 
 claims. Whether Congress, which followed Polk in 
 
 ''Ihid., May 9, 1846. 
 ^Ibid., May 10, 1846. 
 
298 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 declaring that war existed by the act of Mexico, would 
 have sustained the President in a war that from the 
 outset would admittedly have been one of aggression, 
 it is impossible to state. Taylor's skirmish with the 
 Mexicans was an occurrence that saved Polk from 
 a dangerous situation. 
 
 In all this Polk did not lose sight of Santa Anna. 
 The reports of Slidell, Conner, and finally of Atecha 
 were not forgotten. Two days after the war message, 
 Bancroft sent this order to Conner, commanding the 
 naval forces before Vera Cruz. "Private and confi- 
 dential. If Santa Anna endeavors to enter the Mexi- 
 can ports, you will allow him to pass freely." Atecha 
 had said that Santa Anna would attempt to return to 
 Mexico in April or May. The date of Bancroft's 
 order gives the impression that Polk believed Atecha's 
 prediction would be verified. Polk was premature in 
 this. Paredes was still in control of the government. 
 A month later Polk sent Commander Alexander Slidell 
 Mackenzie to Havana with a copy of Bancroft's order. 
 What Mackenzie was ordered to do further than to 
 get into communication with Santa Anna and to sound 
 him as to his attitude cannot be ascertained from the 
 records of the navy department." 
 
 Among the Bancroft-Polk papers in the Lenox Li- 
 brary, New York, are copies of these reports made by 
 Mackenzie to Buchanan. The following is the fullest 
 
 " MS., Records, Navy Department. Copy of Conner's order 
 placed in Mackenzie's hand June 4, 1846. Mackenzie to Ban- 
 croft, June (July) 7, 1846 (received July 22), says he arrived 
 at Havana June S, and has attended to the matters for virhich 
 he was instructed. Buchanan's overture for peace was dated 
 July 27. Schouler, IV., 536; Benton, II., 681. See also des- 
 patches of Consul Campbell at Havana. MS., Archives. 
 
OUTBREAK OP THE MEXICAN WAR 299 
 
 and is included here in extenso because it is believed 
 not to have been published hitherto. No apology is 
 offered for the insertion of so long a document, for 
 it is a necessary link in the chain of events in which 
 Polk and Santa Anna played so important a part." 
 
 "Havana 7 June 1846 
 
 "Sir. 
 
 "I have the honour to state that I arrived here on 
 the evening of the 5. July, and early on the 6. saw 
 the U. S. Consul, and delivered to him your letter. 
 Mr. Campbell readily and cordially complied with your 
 request to assist me in the business with which I was 
 charged. He immediately conducted me for the pur- 
 pose of introduction to General Santa Anna's house. 
 General Santa had given orders not to be disturbed. 
 I left my card, writing on it that I bore a message from 
 the President of the United States and would return 
 at 8 P. M. I did so, and was courteously received, 
 I had only read to him your letter to the Consul, 
 stating that I possessed the confidence of the Presi- 
 dent, and the copy of the order which had been given 
 by Commodore Connor to allow him to pass, and added 
 a few words of the President's message, when he told 
 me that he had visitors in the adjoining room, but 
 would be glad to see me at 7 the following morning, 
 when he would talk with more freedom. 
 
 "I. waited upon him accordingly this morning and 
 remained with him three hours. I began by reading to 
 him a paper which I prepared on the evening of the 
 
 "These copies are dated June (July) 7 and July 11, 1846. 
 Santa Anna in his autobiography says nothing about Mac- 
 kenzie's visit. 
 
300 DIPLOMACY UNDBR YYLBR AND POLK 
 
 day on which I received the President's instructions, 
 and subsequently submitted to Mr. Slidell who was 
 present, to be verified by his recollections. The fol- 
 lowing is a copy of the paper thus translated to him : 
 
 " 'The United States having taken up arms to re- 
 sist the attack of the intrusive Military Government 
 of General Paredes in Mexico, are determined to 
 prosecute the war with vigour, until full redress is ob- 
 tained for the wrongs which their citizens have re- 
 ceived from Mexico through a long series of years. 
 
 " 'Still the President of the United States is desir- 
 ous, as he stated in his message to Congress, recom- 
 mending the recognition of the existence of the war 
 thus begun by Mexico not only to terminate hostilities 
 speedily, but to bring all matters in dispute between 
 his government and Mexico, to an early and amicable 
 adjustment. 
 
 " 'To attain this object the President would hail with 
 pleasure the over-throw of the existing mihtary des- 
 potism of General Paredes, which has sprung into 
 power by cherishing hostility among his countrymen 
 against the United States, and which has no hope for 
 support but in the prolongation of the war; to be re- 
 placed by a government more in harmony with the 
 wishes and true interests of the Mexican people, which 
 cannot be allowed by a prolongation of the war; a 
 government sufficiently enlightened and sufficiently 
 strong to do justice to foreign nations and to Mexico 
 herself. 
 
 " 'Believing that General Santa Ana best unites the 
 high qualifications necessary to establish such a gov- 
 ernment, and that as a well-wisher of his country he 
 cannot desire the prolongation of a disastrous war, the 
 
OUTBREAK OP THE MEXICAN WAR 3OI 
 
 President of the United States would see with pleasure 
 his restoration to power in Mexico. In order to pro- 
 mote as far as he is able such a result, he has already 
 given orders to the squadron blockading the Mexican 
 ports, to allow General Santa freely to return to his 
 country. 
 
 " 'The President of the United States will agree to 
 no armistice with General Paredes, until he himself 
 proposes to treat of peace, and gives satisfactory guar- 
 antees of his sincerity. With General Santa 'Vna, should 
 he return to power in Mexico, the President would 
 consent to the suspension of active hostilities by land, 
 still maintaining the blockade of the mexican coasts, 
 on either ocean, provided General Santa Ana announces 
 his readiness to treat. In that event an American 
 Minister, clothed with full powers, will be at hand to 
 proceed at once to Mexico, and offer General Santa 
 Ana terms for the settlement of every existing difficulty 
 between the two countries. 
 
 " 'These terms will be liberal ; measured less by the 
 power of the United States, by the comparative weak- 
 ness of Mexico in existing circumstances, by the rights 
 which conquest and the usage of nations might justify, 
 than by a sense of their own magnanimity. As at 
 present advised the President might demand no in- 
 demnification for the expenses of the war. Having 
 obtained full recognition of the claims due for spolia- 
 tions on his aggrieved countrymen — , he would be 
 prompted to pay liberally for the establishment of 
 such a permanent geographical boundary between the 
 two countries as would effectually tend to the con- 
 solidation of both. 
 
302 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYIvSR AND POLK 
 
 " 'Portions of the northern territory of Mexico con- 
 sist of unappropriated lands, or of tracts thinly peo- 
 pled; partly peopled already by natives of the United 
 States. These portions of her territory, probably at 
 this moment in the military possession of the United 
 States, Mexico in the adjustment of such a treaty will 
 be invited to cede for an ample consideration in ready 
 money, which will serve to restore her -finances, con- 
 solidate her government and institutions, and building 
 up her power and prosperity, tend to protect her 
 against further encroachments, and secure her that 
 station among the republics of the new world, which 
 the President of the United States desires to see her 
 occupy; and which he believes will alike contribute to 
 the greatness and happiness of Mexico, and of the 
 United States. 
 
 " 'Such objects being happily obtained, the animosi- 
 ties between the two countries being buried with the 
 conflict in which they have been engaged, the President 
 would hope to see a beneficial intercourse of friendship 
 and commerce grow up between them, to be perpetu- 
 ally augmented with the lapse of years ; and with no 
 other rivalry between them — , than that of a noble 
 competition in the cause of civilization, and in doing 
 honor to their common name of Republics.' 
 
 "General Santa Ana received the message of the 
 President with evident satisfaction, and expressed his 
 thanks for the order that had been given with regard 
 to the Gulf Squadron's permitting him to return to 
 Mexico. He spoke with deep interest of his interview 
 with General Jackson in Washington, and of the man- 
 ner in which that venerable man had himself raised in 
 the bed of sickness on which he was extended, to greet 
 
OUTBREAK OF THE MEXICAN WAR 3O3 
 
 with cordiality a brother soldier in distress ; and seemed 
 duly to estimate the high and noble qualities which dis- 
 tinguished him. He spoke also of the kindness he had 
 received from Mr. Forsyth and of the favorable im- 
 pression that gentleman had made on him. He re- 
 marked that if he was disappointed in his hopes of re- 
 turning to his country; if monarchy should be estab- 
 hshed there, or if it should remain a prey to anarchy, 
 he intended to settle permanently in Texas, and be- 
 coming a citizen of the United States, share with his 
 children the destinies of our country. He dwelt with 
 apparent frankness on his regrets for the errors of 
 his past administration of the affairs of his country, 
 and on his intentions should he be again restored to 
 power to govern in the interests of the masses, instead 
 of parties, and classes. Among the measures of re- 
 form which he contemplated was reducing the wealth 
 and power of the clergy, and the establishment of free 
 trade. He showed me a letter which he had just re- 
 ceived from an influential friend in the City of Mexico, 
 urging his speedy return, and giving a lamentable pic- 
 ture of the conflict of parties in his unhappy country. 
 In the course of our conversation as to the nature of 
 the boundary we would require, he spoke of the 
 Nueces, as having always been the boundary of Texas, 
 and enumerated the various states, portions of which 
 lay to the north of the Rio Bravo. I told him that 
 neither the President nor the people of the United 
 States would ever consent to any line north of the Rio 
 Bravo, which was a large river, indicated by nature 
 as a suitable boundary between two great states ; that 
 I was unacquainted with the precise views of the 
 President, further than they might be in conformity 
 with the general sentiment of the country, as to the 
 
304 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLSR AND POLK 
 
 extent of the cession Mexico would be required to 
 make. That the popular sentiment would look for a 
 line, which, starting from a given point on the Rio 
 Bravo, would run due west to the Pacific along a 
 parallel of latitude, so as at least to take in the port of 
 San Francisco in California. That in general terms 
 we should retain what would be deemed sufficient to 
 give us a permanent boundary, from what we had 
 already, conquered ; but that in doing so we would not 
 avail ourselves, like other great nations, of the rights 
 of conquest, but from a sense of magnanimity, and for 
 our own satisfaction, as well as to conciliate the 
 friendship of Mexico, we would pay liberally for what- 
 ever we might retain. In reply to an enquiry I made 
 of him, he informed me that no commissions for pri- 
 vateers had been issued by the Mexican Government, 
 of whose movements his correspondence kept him fully 
 informed. Such a measure of annoyance had been 
 considered by the existing government, but it had been 
 deemed impracticable. 
 
 "Subsequently to or during the continuance of this 
 conversation in part, he drew up the following note 
 of what he desired to communicate in reply to the 
 President. This I copied at his request and read over 
 to him to see that it corresponded word for word with 
 the original, which he then destroyed. 
 
 " 'Senor Santa Ana says : that he deplores the situa- 
 tion of his country: that being in power, he would 
 not hesitate to make concessions rather than to see 
 Mexico ruled by a foreign prince, which the monarch- 
 ists are endeavoring to introduce ('Elevar,' rather 
 'raise up') ; that being restored his country, he would 
 enter into negotiations to arrange a peace by means of 
 a treaty of limits ; that he especially prefers a friendly 
 
OUTBRE;aK 0^ THE MEXICAN WAR 305 
 
 arrangement to the ravages of war which must be 
 calamitous for his country: that although the repub- 
 licans of Mexico labour to recall him and place him 
 at the head of the governmeijt, they are opposed by 
 the monarchists, headed by Paredes and Bravo : That 
 he desires that republican principles should triumph in 
 Mexico, and that an entirely liberal constitution should 
 be established there; and this is now his programe: 
 That if the government of the United States shall pro- 
 mote his patriotic desires,' he offers to respond with 
 such a peace as has been described. He desires that 
 the mediation of England and France may not be ac- 
 cepted; and that every effort should be directed to- 
 wards promoting his return to power in Mexico, by 
 protecting the Republican party. To attain this object 
 he considers it necessary that General Taylor's army 
 should advance to the city of Saltillo, which is a good 
 military position," compelling General Paredes to fight 
 as he considers his overthrow easy : " and this being 
 effected General Taylor may advance to San Louis 
 Potosi, which movement will compell Mexicans of all 
 parties to recall Santa Ana. 
 
 ""On asking him at this point if Monterey was a good 
 Military position he said it was not." (Mackenzie's note.) 
 
 ""He remarked to me at this point: 'Que Taylor le fes- 
 tija bien!' literally, 'let Taylor feast or entertain him well' — 
 meaning 'follow him up,' 'keep him going.' He added that 
 Paredes was not brave. I told him that the opinion concern- 
 ing Paredes in the U. S. was that he was weak-minded and 
 wrong headed, but impetuous and brave. He said that in 
 a battle which he named, but which I have forgotten, Paredes 
 being his aid-de-camp hid himself in a thicket, from which 
 he had drawn him with reproaches. I know not how far 
 allowance should be made for personal hatred in receiving 
 this statement, though the words were given, and the scene 
 described with particularity." (Mackenzie's note.) 
 
306 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLIlR AND POIvK 
 
 " 'General Santa Ana also desires that the greatest 
 secrecy be observed concerning these communications, 
 and that they be only communicated by the bearer as 
 far as may be necessary, since his countrymen not 
 appreciating his benevolent intentions to free them 
 from war and other evils might form a doubtful 
 opinion, of his patriotism. That all the American 
 cruisers should be directed under the strictest injunc- 
 tions of secrecy not to impede his return to Mexico. 
 He likewise enjoins that the people of the towns occu- 
 pied by the American army should not be maltreated, 
 lest their hatred should be excited."" He considers it 
 important to attack Ulloa, and judges that it would 
 be best first to take the city, whose walls are not strong : 
 the disembarkation of three or four thousand men 
 would effect it easily." He considers important the 
 occupation of Tampico, and wonders that it has not 
 been effected, since it might be so easily done. The 
 climate is healthy in October an(J continues so until 
 March. Finally he desires that his good repute may 
 be protected by the newspapers of the United States, 
 and that they represent him as the Mexican who best 
 understands the interests of his country, and as the 
 republican who will never compromise with the mon- 
 archists, nor ever be in favor of foreign and European 
 intervention. He says that it will be well not to block- 
 ade the ports of Yuchatan, as he counts upon that 
 
 " "I told him that it might be in harmony with our political 
 sentiments to protect the republican party, but opposed to our 
 national character to oppress any one. I told him what had 
 been and would continue to be, the conduct of our army." 
 (Mackenzie's note.) 
 
 " "At my request he named October as the proper month for 
 this service, and the beach, without cannon-shot, as the proper 
 place of disembarkation." (Mackenzie's note.) 
 
OUTBREAK OF THE MEXICAN WAR 307 
 
 state, being in communication with its authorities ; and 
 perhaps he will transfer himself to that point, if cir- 
 cumstances prove favourable.' 
 
 "The military suggestions contained 'in General Santa 
 Ana's note seemed to me of so much importance that 
 in order to save time, so valuable in war, I suggested to 
 him the propriety of their being at once communicated 
 to General Taylor, to be used by him, if he should 
 deem them important, within the limits of his orders 
 and discretionary power. He asked if General Taylor 
 was reserved and incommunicative. I replied that all 
 I knew of him was in common with the public, from 
 his recent acts, and the written reports in which he 
 had made them known to the government, which 
 proved him not only to possess the highest qualities 
 of a commander, but to be a man of prudence, modera- 
 tion and reserve. He admitted that his reports strongly 
 conveyed this impression, and thought favourably of 
 my proposition to proceed at once to the head quarters 
 of our army. This though not contemplated by my 
 instructions I have determined to do. 
 
 "If I have made a mistake and exaggerated the im- 
 portance of this information, I hope that an excuse 
 may be found in my motive, which was by any means 
 in my power to render service to my country. 
 
 "I have the honor to be very respectfully, 
 "your most obedient 
 
 "Alex. Slidell Mackenzie. 
 
 "Hon. James Buchanan 
 "Secretary of State, 
 "Washington." " 
 
 ^ "Rec'd Aug. 3." 
 
308 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 Early in August Santa Anna passed the American 
 blockade and landed at Vera Cruz. That city received 
 him as a hero, and he proceeded to the capital as the 
 savior of the nation. By the middle of August he was 
 in command of the Mexican forces and president ad 
 interim of the Mexican Republic. Hardly had he ar- 
 rived at the City of Mexico when Buchanan's note was 
 submitted to him, suggesting that peace negotiations 
 be forthwith begun." The offer was declined.'"' Santa 
 Anna as a military chieftain was not Santa Anna in 
 exile. Buchanan's answer to the refusal was that 
 henceforth the war- would be prosecuted with vigor 
 until Mexico offered to make terms.'' 
 
 ^ Buchanan to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 July 27, 1846 ; Cong. Globe, Appendix, zg Cong., 2 Sess., 24. 
 
 " The Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs to Buchanan, 
 August 31, 1846, ibid. 
 
 " Buchanan to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 September 26, 1846; ibid. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 1848 
 
 From September, 1846, when Mexico was notified 
 that hostilities would not be interrupted until she 
 offered to mal<e peace, the war was waged in earnest. 
 It appeared no longer to be a little war. Scott took 
 command of the army, and the storm-center shifted 
 from the northern provinces to Vera Cruz. And yet 
 Mexico gave no sign of a desire for peace. Polk there- 
 fore was again compelled to make overtures for settle- 
 ment, and this time by offering a specific proposition. 
 In January Buchanan wrote to the Mexican minister 
 of foreign affairs that although making "a renewed 
 overture for peace" might "be regarded by the world 
 as too great a concession to Mexico, yet he" was "will- 
 ing to subject himself to this reproach." If Mexico 
 so agreed he would send commissioners either to 
 Havana or Jalapa clothed with full powers to con- 
 clude a treaty of peace and given authority to suspend 
 hostilities and raise blockades as soon as the Mexican 
 commissioners met them.' The Mexican answer was 
 in spirit like its predecessors : Mexico would appoint 
 commissioners as suggested, but not until the block- 
 ades were raised and all the territory of the Mexican 
 Republic was evacuated by the invading army.^ Such an 
 answer was tantamount to a refusal, and so Polk con- 
 sidered it. When, in the middle of April, news of the 
 
 ^ Buchanan to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 January 18, 1847; S. Ex. Doc. i, 30 Cong., i Sess., 36. 
 ' Monasterio to Buchanan, February 22, 1847; ibid., 37. 
 
310 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 fall of Vera Cruz reached Washington, it was thought 
 that Santa Anna could no longer refuse to negotiate, 
 for the American arms were everywhere victorious, 
 and Scott's army was on the march toward the capital. 
 Now was the time, in Polk's strange phrase, to 
 "conquer a peace." Buchanan informed Mexico that 
 the offer to negotiate would not be renewed (strong 
 language until the context is heard) until the Presi- 
 dent had reason to believe that it would be accepted 
 by the Mexican government. "The President . . . 
 devoted ... to honorable peace," so wrote Bu- 
 chanan to the Mexican minister of foreign affairs,' "is 
 determined that the evils of the war shall not be pro- 
 tracted one day longer than shall be rendered abso- 
 lutely necessary by the Mexican republic. For the 
 purpose of carrying this determination into effect with 
 the least possible delay, he will forthwith send to the 
 head-quarters of the army in Mexico, Nicholas P. Trist, 
 esq., the officer next in rank to the undersigned in our 
 department of foreign affairs, as a commissioner, in- 
 vested with full powers to conclude a definite treaty 
 of peace with the United Mexican States." Thus did 
 Polk act upon a plan for negotiation by an agent not 
 confirmed by the Senate, a method quite without pre- 
 cedent or parallel. The appointment of public com- 
 missioners might only subject the United States to the 
 indignity of another refusal and give the Mexicans en- 
 couragement in their opinion concerning the Presi- 
 dent's motives for desiring the termination of the war. 
 Influenced by these considerations, he hit upon the 
 
 ' Buchanan to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 April IS, 1847 ; ibid., 38-39. Also in Raphael Semmes, Service 
 Afloat and Ashore during the Mexican War, 303-6. 
 
THE TREATY OE GUADALUPE HIDAEGO 3II 
 
 plan of sending "to the head-quarters of the army a 
 confidential agent, fully acquainted with the views of 
 this government, and clothed with full powers to con- 
 clude a treaty of peace with the Mexican government, 
 should it be so inclined." He would be enabled in that 
 case "to take advantage, at the propitious moment, of 
 any favorable circumstances which might dispose that 
 government to peace." * In the selection of this agent 
 the President again proceeded upon altogether un- 
 ugual lines. General Scott is authority for the state- 
 ment that Polk wanted Silas Wright to undertake the 
 mission, intimating that Scott would be Wright's asso- 
 ciate." This was surely a strange selection, for Wright 
 was a well-known advocate of the Wilmot Proviso, 
 and Scott was personally obnoxious to the President. 
 "Scott," said Polk, "is utterly unqualified for such a 
 business." ' No man of national prominence could be 
 expected to assume the role of a confidential agent to 
 accompany the army and jump at a propitious moment 
 to conclude a treaty. The chief clerk of Buchanan's 
 department, personally little known to the President, 
 was selected for the mission, a man with but meager 
 training in diplomatic affairs, anything but robust in 
 health, irritable, suspicious, and timid, and, moreover, 
 given to great verbosity of statement. 
 
 Nicholas Philip Trist was a Virginian by birth and 
 was for a time a cadet at West Point. He did not 
 graduate, however, but began the study of law under 
 Jefferson, whose granddaughter he had married. At 
 
 ' Buchanan to Trist, April 15, 1847 ; S. Bx. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 
 I Sess., 81. 
 ° Scott's Autobiography, II., 576. 
 'Polk's Diary, July 15, 1847. 
 
312 DIPIvOMACY UNDER TYI,ER AND POLK 
 
 twenty-eight he was a clerk in the treasury depart- 
 ment when Jackson selected him as his private secre- 
 tary. After a short service in that capacity he was 
 consul at Havana for eight years, whence he was re- 
 called on the ground that he had aided the slave-trade.' 
 Soon after the beginning of Polk's administration he 
 was made chief clerk of the state department, and dur- 
 ing his service there he appeared as a hard-working 
 administrative officer in the department presided over 
 by the somewhat timid Buchanan and really directed by 
 the energetic Polk. The chief clerk gave evidence of 
 uncompromising loyalty to the President and thorough 
 sympathy with his plans. His selection for this deli- 
 cate mission was probably due not so much to Polk's 
 overestimation of Trist's diplomatic abilities as to an 
 underestimate of the difficulties of the undertaking. 
 It had appeared a simple thing to send Slidell to 
 Mexico as the representative of a strong power to 
 strike a bargain, through claims and a bonus, for the 
 cession of New Mexico and California — how could so 
 "feeble and distracted a nation as Mexico'' refuse a 
 liberal cash offer? The answer to that question had 
 been war. Now that Congress had placed three mil- 
 lions of dollars in Polk's hands for the "speedy and 
 honorable conclusion of the war," the President seemed 
 to think that to negotiate a peace treaty upon terms 
 dictated by himself was a mere clerical act for an 
 agent accompanying a victorious army. 
 
 ' Trist was commissioned consul at Havana April 24, 1833. 
 Tyler ordered his recall June 22, 1841. There is a mass of 
 correspondence connecting Trist with aiding the slave-trade 
 attached to a complaint from Fox to Forsyth, February 12, 
 1840; MS., Notes from British Legation to the Department 
 of State. 
 
THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 313 
 
 Whatever may have been the oral instructions that 
 Trist received from the President, the official letter 
 from Buchanan gave him small discretionary powers. 
 Trist was handed a pro jet of a treaty, and with it the 
 statement that the extension of the boundaries of the 
 United States over New Mexico and Upper California 
 was to be considered a sine qua non of any treaty. 
 What Buchanan had authorized Slidell to do before 
 the war began was now, thanks to the victorious ad- 
 vance of the army, made an ultimatum. Trist was 
 authorized to pay in addition to the claims not more 
 than twenty millions for the cession of New Mexico and 
 Upper California, and not more than five millions ad- 
 ditional for Lower California, while the right of tran- 
 sit and passage over Tehuantepec was held to be worth 
 another five millions, the consideration to be paid in 
 annual instalments of three millions each. In any 
 event the southwestern boundary was, of course, to 
 be the Rio Grande. What Slidell had been authorized 
 to offer twenty-five millions for, Trist was instructed to 
 secure for twenty. The provisions as to Lower Califor- 
 nia and the right of transit over Tehuantepec were new, 
 no mention of them having been made when Slidell 
 was sent upon his mission. The projet accompanying 
 Trist's instructions contained eleven articles covering 
 the points just referred to. The third article provided 
 that as soon as the treaty was ratified by Mexico the 
 military and naval commanders of both sides should 
 be informed of the action as quickly as possible, after 
 which an immediate suspension of hostilities should 
 take place. Such was the expression of Polk's idea 
 of "conquering a peace." Pending the negotiations 
 of peace the United States was not to bind itself to 
 
314 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLBR AND POLK 
 
 discontinue offensive operations against Mexico ; hos- 
 tilities were not to cease until Mexico had actually 
 ratified the peace treaty upon our own terms/ 
 
 The confidential agent and commissioner left the 
 capital for Mexico, and soon Buchanan began to re- 
 ceive Trist's long and tediously circumstantial com- 
 munications. From New Orleans he wrote a dozen 
 pages minutely describing his trip and the dangers of 
 the journey from Mobile thither. Arrived at Vera 
 Cruz, May 6, he quickly despatched two more reports, 
 filled with his views upon the ofificers of the army and 
 things in general. Illness seems to have held him for 
 a while, as his next letter is from Jalapa, dated two 
 weeks later. By this time he was involved in a high- 
 tempered and wordy epistolary quarrel with the com- 
 manding general. Trist had been directed by Bu- 
 chanan to communicate his instructions in confidence 
 to Scott and to deliver to him Buchanan's letter for 
 transmission to the Mexican minister of foreign affairs. 
 Instead of waiving formalities and putting himself on 
 friendly and confidential terms with Scott, Trist imme- 
 diately on his arrival at Vera Cruz sent the American 
 commander a note inclosing the letter from Buchanan, 
 sealed, and with it orders from Marcy. Scott was ever 
 suspicious of the administration at Washington, and 
 now he opened the vials of his wrath upon the com- 
 missioner. He was ordered by the secretary of war 
 to yield to Trist the right to decide upon the suspension 
 of military operations. It is doubtful if a more astound- 
 ing order was ever sent to a commanding officer in the 
 field, and Scott replied to Trist that the secretary of 
 
 'Buchanan's projet, S. Bx. Doc. S2, 30 Cong., i Sess., 85-89. 
 
THB TREATY OF GUADAI^UPE HIDALGO 315 
 
 war proposed to degrade him by requiring that he, as 
 commander of the army, should defer to the chief clerk 
 of the department of state the question of continuing 
 or discontinuing hostilities.' Consequently Scott re- 
 turned the sealed letter from the department of state 
 and, as a purely military question, declined to obey the 
 order of the secretary of war, unless Trist was clothed 
 with military rank over him. The next month was 
 spent by the commissioner in writing voluminous letters 
 to Scott, which the latter answered in kind. Trist 
 lectured the general upon his lack of respect for the 
 commissioner sent by the President. Scott replied that 
 Trist's letter was such a farrago of insolence, conceit, 
 and arrogance as to be a choice specimen of diplomatic 
 literature and manners. "The Jacobin convention of 
 France never sent to one of its armies in the field a 
 more amiable and accomplished instrument. If you 
 were armed with an ambulatory guillotine, you would 
 be the personification of Danton, Marat, and St. Just, 
 all in one." " On June 4 Scott wrote to Marcy, asking 
 to be recalled, owing to the many "cruel disappoint- 
 ments and mortifications" he had "been made to feel 
 since" leaving "Washington, and the total want of sup- 
 port and sympathy on the part of the War Depart- 
 ment." " The administration responded with orders 
 to each to cease the disgraceful quarrel and to join in 
 carrying out the plans of the government." 
 
 'Much of this quarrel doubtless had its origin in 
 
 "Scott to Trist, May 7, 1847; ibid., 157-59- 
 " Scott to Trist, May 29, 1847 ; ibid., 172. 
 " Scott to Marcy, June 4, 1847 ; ibid., 129-31. 
 "^ Marcy to Scott, July 12, 1847; ibid., 131. Buchanan to 
 Trist, July 13, 1847; ibid., 113. 
 
3l6 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYI,ER AND POI<K 
 
 politics. The military history of the Mexican War is 
 largely made up of jealousy and its consequent wran- 
 gles, which, ending in arrests and courts-martial, were 
 transferred from the field of operations to Washing- 
 ton. "The truth is," Polk wrote in his diary, June 12, 
 "I have been compelled from the beginning to conduct 
 the war against Mexico through the agency of two 
 generals, highest in rank, who have not only no sym- 
 pathies with the government, but are hostile to my ad- 
 ministration. Both of them have assunied to control 
 the government. To this I will not submit and will as 
 certainly remove General Scott from the chief com- 
 mand as he shall refuse or delay to obey the order 
 borne him by Mr. Trist." " For some time, however, 
 as their despatches show, Trist and Scott continued 
 their unseemly altercation. "Between them," the diary 
 says, "the orders of the Secretary of War and the Sec- 
 retary of State have been disregarded and the danger 
 has become imminent that the golden moment for con- 
 cluding a peace with Mexico may have passed." " The 
 President was for recalling both Scott and Trist, but 
 the cabinet was unanimous in the opinion that it would 
 be bad policy to do so. Realizing Trist's inefficiency, 
 Polk then suggested that Soule or Jefferson Davis be 
 associated with him, but nothing came of the sug- 
 gestion." 
 
 Writing from Puebla, June 13, Trist stated that he 
 had had no intercourse with Scott for a month, al- 
 though he had been near him for more than that time." 
 
 "Polk's Diary, June 12, 1847. 
 
 "Ibid. "Ibid., July 9, 1847. 
 
 "Trist to Buchanan, June 13, 1847; 5". Ex. Doc. 52, 30 
 Cong., I Sess., 178-81. 
 
THe TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDAI^GO 317 
 
 His next letter, dated July 7, in which he is supposed 
 to have given his reasons for making peace vifith the 
 general, was never received at Washington. Scott 
 made no report to the secretary of war from June 4 
 to July 25. At that time each asked that the corre- 
 spondence relating to the quarrel be suppressed." What 
 caused the reconciliation, as far as their letters 
 show, must remain a mystery. During the time in 
 which Trist and Scott were quarreling, Trist asked 
 the British minister, Bankhead, and Thornton, the 
 British secretary of legation, to transmit to the Mexi- 
 can authorities Buchanan's letter, which Scott had re- 
 fused to receive. Bankhead and Thornton readily ac- 
 quiesced in his request and forwarded the letter to 
 Ibarra, the acting minister of foreign affairs. In a 
 few days the commissioner received through the same 
 channel of communication the answer of the Mexican 
 government. It was that the determination of the ques- 
 tion of peace must rest with the Mexican congress." 
 
 So far there was no reason to believe the way open 
 for negotiations. Santa Anna sent a message to the 
 congress in which he peremptorily ordered it to state 
 whether or not any propositions for peace should be 
 listened to." When the Mexican congress scattered 
 and made no answer to the message, Santa Anna in- 
 formed Mackintosh, the British consul at the City of 
 
 "Scott to Marcy, July 25, 1847: "Since about the 26th 
 ultimo, our intercourse has been frequent and cordial; and I 
 have found him [Trist] able, discreet, courteous, and amiable." 
 Ibid., 135. Trist to Buchanan, July 23, 1847 : Scott's "character 
 I now believe that I had entirely misconceived." Ihid., 302. 
 
 "^ Ibarra to Trist, June 22, 1847; MS., Archives. 
 
 "'Santa Anna to the Mexican Congress, July 16, 1847; S. 
 Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., I Sess., 302-5. 
 
3l8 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYI,BR AND POLK 
 
 Mexico, that as he was abandoned by the congress, he 
 must, as mihtary chief, endeavor to make peace.''" His 
 secret agents then intimated to Trist that while nothing 
 could be done without the use of money, yet if a mil- 
 lion dollars were placed in his hands at the conclusion of 
 the peace and ten thousand immediately, commissioners, 
 would be sent to meet the American commissioner and 
 negotiations begun."" It was at this juncture that Scott 
 and Trist began to be upon the most friendly terms, 
 and Trist was a welcome guest at Scott's headquarters. 
 Trist reported to Buchanan, upon the authority of 
 Thornton, that Santa Anna would let Scott advance 
 close to the City of Mexico and then negotiate."^ What 
 was not reported was that Scott paid the ten thousand 
 dollars of earnest-money after consultation with his 
 ofHcers."^ The matter did not come to Polk's attention 
 until December, when General Pillow, enraged at what 
 Polk called Scott's persecution of that officer, wrote 
 of it to the President.'^ Scott reported the expenditures 
 
 ^Thornton to Trist, July 29, 1847; MS., copy, Bureau of 
 Indexes and Archives, Department of State. 
 
 ^' Ripley's War with Mexico, II., 148-70. Polk's Diary, 
 December 18, 1847. 
 
 ^ Trist to Buchanan, July 23, 1847 ; MS., Bureau of Indexes 
 and Archives, Department of State. 
 
 ^ Ripley's War with Mexico, II., 148-70. General Shields, 
 however, told Polk that Trist was not present at the confer- 
 ence. Polk's Diary, December 28, 1847. 
 
 ^ Polk's Diary, February 16, 1848 : "The chief clerk of the 
 War Department brought to me today a letter received from 
 Majr. Genl. Pillow, dated at the City of Mexico on the i8th. 
 of January in answer to a letter of the Secretary of War 
 addressed to him in relation to certain proceedings of General 
 Scott and Mr. Trist at Puebla in July last concerning an 
 attempt to use money without any authority or sanction of the 
 government, to bribe the authorities in Mexico, to secure 
 
THB TREATY Ot GUADALUPB HIDALGO 319 
 
 as those for secret service and asserted that he had 
 never tempted the honor or patriotism of any man, 
 but held it as lawful in morals as in war to purchase 
 valuable information or services voluntarily tendered 
 him."" "General Scott's answer is evasive," is the 
 entry in the diary, "and leaves the irresistible inference 
 that such a transaction took place and that it will not 
 bear the light." " Writing to Buchanan, July 23, Trist 
 copied a letter received by him from an unnamed 
 source. Trist's correspondent, in whom undoubtedly 
 the commissioner placed great confidence, wrote: 
 "Santa Anna is afraid to make peace now and cannot. 
 
 M ^ can do nothing with him, even with the aid 
 
 he possesses from you. S. A. now says secretly that 
 he shall allow your army to approach this city 
 [Mexico], even as far as the Pefion, and then 
 endeavour to make peace." " The advance of the 
 army, however, was by no means unobstructed. The 
 decisive victory at Contreras, followed by that at 
 Churubusco, opened the way to the capital. Instead 
 of pushing on to clinch the former victories, as the 
 
 peace. This letter discloses some astounding facts in rela- 
 tion to that infamous transaction and must lead to a further 
 investigation." In the letters-received book of the war de- 
 partment is the following entry under date of March 31, 1848: 
 "Pillow, Maj. Genl. G. J., Mexico, lany. 18, 1848. In answer 
 to letter of Sec. War, Dec. 24, 1847, and relates to negotia- 
 tions carried on at Puebla in July and Aug. 47." The letter 
 referred to cannot be found in the war department. See 
 Tyler's Tylers, III., 172- 
 
 ""Scott to Marcy, February 6, 1848; H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 
 Cong., I Sess., 1085. There is some discrepancy in the date. 
 
 "Polk's Diary, February 19, 1848. 
 
 "Mackintosh? 
 
 ^ Trist to Buchanan, July 23, 1847, P. S., July 25; MS., 
 Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Despatches, Mexico, Vol. 14. 
 
320 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 rules of military science would seem to have dictated, 
 Scott halted his army and proposed an armistice. Was 
 this done, as Scott said, lest the elements of peace 
 might be scattered, or was it with the expectation that 
 Santa Anna, with a part of the consideration cash in 
 hand, would carry out the balance of the bargain? 
 Through the good offices of Thornton, who with Bank- 
 head and Mackintosh played a large part in all these 
 negotiations, the armistice became effective August 24. 
 Santa Anna appointed as commissioners four well- 
 known peace men to meet the American commissioner. 
 The opportunity for which Trist had been waiting 
 since May was now presented. Santa Anna's com- 
 missioners met him as agreed. No further evidence 
 of Trist's utter incapacity is needed than his own 
 account of the conferences. Two days before the first 
 meeting he made known to Santa Anna that in order 
 to secure the boundary defined in his pro jet, with the 
 right of transit over the isthmus, he was authorized 
 and willing to go as high as the highest sum named 
 in his instructions. This amount, he said, might be 
 paid in such a way as to enable Santa Anna to convert 
 all of it into cash as soon as the treaty was ratified." 
 Such an unfortunate admission had the result he might 
 have expected. Santa Anna's commissioners submitted 
 a counter-pro jet conceding nothing but Upper Cali- 
 fornia north of the thirty-seventh parallel, for which 
 the United States was expected to assume the claims 
 and pay a bonus.'" The Mexican commissioners in- 
 sisted on the Nueces as a boundary, declaring that if 
 
 "Trist to Buchanan, September 4, 1847; MS., Bureau of 
 Indexes and Archives, Department of State. 
 ^°S. Ex. Doc. S2, so Cong., I Sess., 339. 
 
THS TREATY OF GUADAI^UPE HIDAI^GO 32 1 
 
 peace were made the line must be at that river. Trist 
 hesitated and then offered to refer the question to 
 Washington, thereby proposing to extend the armis- 
 tice for at least forty-five days." No more flagrant 
 disobedience of orders was ever committed. The war 
 had been begun and waged upon the theory that the 
 Rio Grande was the ancient boundary of Texas. What 
 persuaded Trist to submit the matter for further in- 
 structions is incomprehensible. He himself explained 
 it by saying that the Mexican commissioners led him 
 to believe that a part of New Mexico would be ceded 
 if the Nueces were accepted as a boundary. There was 
 no reasonable foundation in fact, however, for any 
 such belief, for Mexico demanded Trist's decision 
 within three days upon the counter-projet, by the terms 
 of which New Mexico was to remain a Mexican cro- 
 vince. Before that short time had elapsed Santa 
 Anna's violations of the armistice became so notorious 
 that Scott gave notice of its termination. The Ameri- 
 can army moved toward the capital and entered it only 
 after two of the bloodiest battles of the war. Santa 
 Anna's army was scattered and without a leader. Not- 
 withstanding all this, Trist was blind to Santa Anna's 
 duplicity. As late as September 27 he wrote that he 
 was perfectly convinced of Santa Anna's sincere de- 
 sire for peace, but that peace was an impossibility upon 
 the terms of Buchanan's instructions.'^ The armistice 
 was a strategic blunder, giving Santa Anna oppor- 
 tunity to mass his forces for the defense of the capital, 
 and the heavy losses suffered by Scott's army at Molino 
 
 " The Mexican Commissioners to the Minister of Foreign 
 Relations, September 7, 1847; ibid., 344-46. 
 ''Trist to Buchanan, September 27, 1847; ibid., 201. 
 
322 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYL^R AND POLK 
 
 del Rey were the price paid for it. The overtures for 
 peace displayed the gullibility of Trist, whose per- 
 sistent belief that Santa Anna once bought would stay 
 bought led him to ignore his instructions and to dis- 
 obey Polk's most positive orders. 
 
 Before Trist's reports of his inglorious conferences 
 reached Washington, Polk had read the Mexican ac- 
 counts of the affair sent from Vera Cruz. The Presi- 
 dent at once ordered Trist's recall. "Mr. Trist is re- 
 called," says the diary, "because his remaining longer 
 with the army could not probably accomplish the ob- 
 jects of his mission, and because his remaining longer 
 might and probably would impress the Mexican gov- 
 ernment with the belief that the United States are so 
 anxious for peace, that they would ultimate [ly] con- 
 clude one upon Mexican terms. Mexico must now sue 
 for peace and when she does, we will hear her propo- 
 sition." ""^ Trist's actions had surely merited his recall, 
 but Polk's policy of continually making overtures, 
 first by a series of notes suggesting peace and finally 
 by sending a commissioner, gave Mexico exactly the 
 belief that Polk attributed to Trist's blundering ef- 
 forts alone. The policy was ill-advised and its instru- 
 ment incompetent. 
 
 The occupation of the City of Mexico, September 14, 
 completely changed the complexion of affairs. Two 
 days later Santa Anna resigned the presidency, and 
 by so doing removed the one great obstacle to peace. 
 Within a week after Santa Anna's abdication plans 
 were well under way for the reorganization of the 
 government under the auspices of well-known 
 
 "Polk's Diary, October 5, 1847. Trist's despatch of Sep- 
 tember 4 was received October 21, 
 
THB TREATY OF GUADALUPfe HIDALGO 323 
 
 moderados. Before it had been accomplished Trist 
 again asked the Mexican commissioners to meet him. 
 A month elapsed before he had an answer, and he 
 asked Buchanan for permission to return home, as 
 the weakness of the new government might keep him 
 "hanging here for an indefinite period" without accom- 
 plishing anything." Buchanan's letter of recall reached 
 Trist November i6. Trist acknowledged it, waived 
 for the moment any defense of his actions, and stated 
 that he would start home at once. Following hard 
 upon the receipt of his recall Trist received word, again 
 through Thornton, that the new Mexican administra- 
 tion had appointed commissioners." He repHed, No- 
 vember 24, that, as he was about to return to the 
 United States, whatever overtures Mexico desired to 
 make would be forwarded through Scott to Washing- 
 ton."' Despite this statement and notwithstanding his 
 orders to return, he began immediately to negotiate 
 with the Mexican commissioners upon the basis of his 
 original instructions. The reasons for this change in 
 plans are set forth in a letter of sixty pages written 
 December 6." This letter was certainly of a character 
 to arouse the President's indignation. The diary de- 
 scribes it as "impudent, arrogant, very insulting to the 
 government and personally offensive to the President." 
 The writer of it was "destitute of honor or principle 
 and contemptibly base." "It is manifest to me," wrote 
 
 "Trist to Buchanan, October 31, 1847; 5. Ex. Doc. 52, so 
 Cong., I Sess., 213. 
 
 °° Thornton to Trist, November 22, 1847, and to Pefia y Pena, 
 November 24, 1847; ibid., 231. 
 
 " Trist to Pena y Pena, November 24, 1847 ; ihid. 
 
 " Trist to Buchanan, December 6, 1847 (received January 
 IS, 1848) ; ibid., 231-66. 
 
324 DIPIvOMACY UNDER TYtER AND POLK 
 
 Polk, "that he has become the tool of General Scott 
 and his menial instrument and that the paper was 
 written at Scott's instance and direction. I directed 
 the Secretary of War to write to Major General But- 
 ler [who had superseded Scott] , directing him, if Mr. 
 Trist was still with the headquarters of the army, to 
 order him off and to inform the authorities of Mexico 
 that he had no authority to treat." ^ Scott, writing at 
 the same time, said : "No proposition has been made to 
 me, looking to a peace, by the federal government of 
 this republic, or its commissioners ; the latter under- 
 stood to be still in this city. I have not seen them." "" 
 This long despatch of Trist's doubtless justified 
 Polk's suspicion that Scott instigated it. While Trist 
 said that the government would be left at liberty to 
 disavow his act, he set forth his reasons for reopening 
 negotiations as: (i) that peace was still the desire of 
 the President; (2) that unless he seized the oppor- 
 tunity offered, no other chance for peace would re- 
 main ; ( 3 ) that the boundaries stipulated in his instruc- 
 tions were as much as Mexico would ever yield; and 
 (4) that his recall was based upon a supposed state 
 of facts the reverse of the truth. Underlying all of 
 his arguments in support of these reasons is the thinly 
 disguised innuendo that the President had changed 
 his plans and now favored the annexation of all 
 Mexico. In other words, Trist proceeded to make a 
 treaty embodying Polk's original idea of territorial 
 indemnity with the express intention of throwing upon 
 the President the unpleasant alternative of either ac- 
 
 '^ Polk's Diary, January 15, 1848. 
 
 "Scott to Marcy, December 4, 1847; H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 
 Cong., I Sess., 1033-35- 
 
THE TREATY OP GUADAI^UPE HIDALGO 325 
 
 cepting the treaty or rejecting it. If Polk rejected it, 
 he must bear the odium of seeking to annihilate Mexico 
 as a nation and of renewing a war which was now un- 
 popular. If he accepted it, he would then, according 
 to Trist's belief, sacrifice his cherished wish, the con- 
 quest of the whole of Mexico. Such is the import of 
 this unique despatch. Trist's assumption that Polk 
 desired the absorption of all Mexico has been proved 
 to be baseless." Reasonably enough, the President felt 
 that the amount of money to be paid Mexico for the 
 cession should be less than would have been the case 
 had the war ceased seven months before. Pillow was 
 in favor of greater territorial indemnity and claimed 
 while in Mexico to be the President's mouthpiece. 
 Trist shared Scott's hatred of that ofhcer, a;nd the 
 parts of the despatch not directly or by inference at- 
 tacking Polk are filled with venom against Pillow. 
 
 Before Butler had an opportunity to carry out 
 Polk's order, Trist had signed the treaty and sent it on 
 its way to Washington. There are no detailed accounts 
 of the conferences of which the treaty was the result. 
 We know that for two months Trist met the commis- 
 sioners daily, that the original projet was taken as a 
 basis for the negotiation, and that there was apparently 
 little difficulty in agreeing upon boundaries. The ques- 
 tion of claims and of the condition of the inhabitants 
 of the ceded territory occupied most of the meetings. 
 The result was in hand February 2, 1848, when Trist 
 met the Mexican commissioners to sign the treaty at 
 Guadalupe Hidalgo, "a spot," said Trist, "which, 
 
 *° "The United States and Mexico, 1847- 1848," by Professor 
 E. G. Bourne, in American Historical Review, V., 491-502, 
 April, 1900. 
 
326 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 agreeably to the creed of this country, is the most 
 sacred on earth, as being the scene of the miraculous 
 appearance of the Virgin, for the purpose of declaring 
 that Mexico was taken under her special protection." " 
 
 Seventeen days later Polk had in his hands the grant 
 of territory that he had hoped to obtain through the 
 peaceful negotiations of Slidell. The Rio Grande was 
 acknowledged as the boundary of Texas ; New Mexico 
 and Upper California were ours ; and the sum to be 
 paid was that named in Trist's pro jet: the treaty in- 
 cluded all of Polk's sine qua non. That the right of 
 transit over Tehuantepec was not included was a small 
 matter, for the recent treaty with New Granada af- 
 forded a better route to the Pacific. Benton's comment 
 upon the treaty was that it was a fortunate event for 
 the United States and especially for Polk's adminis- 
 tration. "The Congress elections were going against 
 the administration, and the aspirants for the presidency 
 in the cabinet were struck with terror at the view of 
 the great military reputations which were growing 
 up."" 
 
 Haste in acting upon the treaty was of the utmost 
 importance for two reasons : first, that the treaty might 
 be returned to Mexico for ratification before the 
 Mexican government should be overthrown ; and sec- 
 ond, that the growing sentiment for "all of Mexico," 
 both in the cabinet and out of it, a sentiment to which 
 the President was opposed, might be effectually stifled." 
 
 "Trist to Buchanan, February 2, 1848; S. Ex. Doc. 52, 50 
 Cong., I Sess., 102. 
 
 " Benton's Thirty Years' View, II., 710. 
 
 "Professor Bourne's article as cited. The treaty arrived 
 in Washington February 19 ; Polk decided to send it to the 
 Senate for ratification February 21. Polk's Diary, February 
 
THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 327 
 
 Polk made up his mind at once not to reject the treaty 
 because of Trist's conduct. His desire for peace was 
 so great that he did not permit himself to be influenced 
 by his indignation at Trist's insulting letters. He de- 
 cided, after stating his views to the cabinet, to send the 
 document to the Senate, suggesting certain amendments, 
 and by so doing to show a "magnanimous forbear- 
 ance toward Mexico." Every member of the Senate 
 committee on foreign relations, with the exception of 
 the chairman, Sevier, was at iirst opposed to ratifica- 
 tion. The reason for their attitude, as reported by the 
 chairman to Polk, was not the terms of the treaty, but 
 Trist's lack of authority to negotiate. "I told Sevier," 
 the diary records, "that the treaty was the subject for 
 consideration, not Trist's conduct and that if the pro- 
 visions of the treaty were such as would be accepted, 
 it would be worse than an idle ceremony to send out 
 a grand commission to re-negotiate the same treaty." " 
 The Senate committee reported the treaty without 
 amendment on the same day, and after two weeks' dis- 
 cussion the Senate first amended and then ratified it 
 by a vote of thirty-eight to fourteen. The most im- 
 portant of the amendments was made at the suggestion 
 of the President, and by it the tenth article, relating to 
 the disposition of the public lands in Texas, was 
 stricken out. An additional secret article, delaying for 
 
 21, 1848. Calhoun wrote to Clemson, March 7, 1848: "The 
 greatest danger is that the [Mexican] Government may not 
 hold together until the treaty is exchanged. Nothing but the 
 countenance of our Government and the support of capitalists 
 interested in preserving it, can continue it in existence. It is, 
 indeed, but the shadovir of a Government." Report of Ameri- 
 can Historical Association, 1899, II., 746. 
 " Polk's Diary, February 28, 1848. 
 
328 DIPLOMACY UNDER TYLER AND POLK 
 
 eight months the time of Mexico's ratification, was for 
 obvious reasons omitted by a unanimous vote. Sevier 
 and CHfjford, the latter Polk's attorney-general, wrere 
 appointed commissioners in accordance with the pro- 
 vision of the treaty permitting the exchange of ratifica- 
 tions at the City of Mexico. As their duties were 
 merely the gaining of Mexico's consent to the Senate's 
 amendments, and the hastening of final ratification, 
 their task was light. As soon as it was known that 
 the Senate was modifying the terms of the agreement 
 as signed, the Mexican government ceased all efiforts 
 for ratification until the nature of the amendments was 
 known. A few days after the arrival of Sevier and 
 Clifford at Mexico with the amended treaty the Mexi- 
 can congress agreed to ratification by practically a 
 unanimous vote. 
 
 There was no glory in all this for Trist. Polk char- 
 acterized him as an "impudent and unqualified scoun- 
 drel." Upon his arrival at Washington the former 
 chief clerk of the state department found the doors 
 closed to him. He could get the ear of no one, and 
 after vainly trying for some time to collect his salary 
 after the date of his recall, he left Washington. In- 
 sisting on having a hearing, he addressed a long com- 
 munication to the speaker of the House August 7, 
 1848, accusing the President of high crimes and mis- 
 demeanors, including subornation of perjury, and sug- 
 gesting that he be impeached.'" But there was no 
 need for stirring up the matter in the hope of finding 
 political capital against Polk. The time had gone by 
 for that. The letter was received during the last days 
 
 " Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., i Sess., 1057-58. 
 
THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 329 
 
 of the session and referred to the committee on foreign 
 affairs, and there it slept. The war was over; Polk's 
 term was drawing to a close; and the country was in 
 the midst of a presidential campaign. Trist was soon 
 forgotten. The result of the election of 1848 was the 
 choice for president of Taylor, one of the two great 
 Whig generals who had reaped the political popularity 
 that Polk had coveted. Scott was for the time passed 
 by, and nobody had any consideration for the assertive 
 and talkative commissioner who had made the treaty 
 of Guadalupe Hidalgo. But the persistent Trist did 
 not despair, and twenty-two years later he secured 
 from Congress the reward for his successful presump- 
 tion." The feeble old man, who had been one of Jef- 
 ferson's family and afterward the friend of Jackson, 
 was at last secure in the belief that he had been vin- 
 dicated by his government. 
 
 "Senate Report, 41 Cong., 2 Sess. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Aberdeen, Lord, 27; policy of, 31; 
 upon right of visitation and search, 
 32, 33, 109; acquiesces in Ameri- 
 can expansion, 102; and Texas, 
 124, 129; and abolition in Texas, 
 127; on Texan annexation, 151- 
 152; and Texan Diplomatic Act, 
 172; overture on northwestern 
 boundary question, 243; offers 
 line of 49°, 262. 
 
 Adams, John Quincy, comment on 
 Tyler and Webster, 27; favors 
 retention of Texas in 1819, 59 
 attempts by, to regain Texas, 60 
 comment upon Butler, 69, 70, 75 
 comment upon Jackson's attitude 
 toward Texas, 85; and right of 
 petition, 89, 90, 93, 114; address 
 on annexation of Texas, 122; in- 
 structions to Rush on northwest 
 boundary, 216; instructions to 
 Gallatin on same, 218; instruc- 
 tions to Middleton and Rush on 
 same, 1823, 226-231; proposition 
 for tripartite agreement on same, 
 233. 237-238. 
 
 Alaman, conference with Butler, 71, 
 72. 
 
 Almonte, Gen. Juan N., minister to 
 the United States, 99; suspends 
 relations with U. S., 188; leaves 
 U. S., 268. 
 
 Andrews, S. P., 126. 
 
 Annexation of Texas by joint resolu- 
 tion, 162-189. 
 
 Armistice between Mexico and Texas, 
 122. 
 
 Armistice between U. S. and Mexico, 
 317-322. 
 
 Aroostook War, 11. 
 
 Ashburton, Lady, 40. 
 
 Ashburton, Alexander Baring, Lord, 
 27, 39, 42, 43-57, 110. 
 
 Ashburton Treaty, 28-57, 108-110. 
 
 Astoria, 204, 206-210. 
 
 Atecha, Col. Alexander, 288-294. 
 
 Bagot, 210. 
 
 Bankhead, 317. 
 
 Battle of the Maps, 56. 
 
 Benton, T. H., 44, 56, 326; plan for 
 Texan annexation, 184. 
 
 Bocauegra, J. M. de, 97; minister 
 at Washington, 98-100; protest 
 against annexation of Texas, 157. 
 
 Brougham, Lord, interpellation of, 
 upon Texas, 132. 
 
 Buchanan, James, report of, on Maine 
 boundary, 5Q, 138; secretary of 
 state under Polk, 188; negotia- 
 tion with Pakenham over Oregon, 
 250-264; opposition of, to Polk's 
 policy, 253; instructions to Slidell, 
 274; instructions to Trist, 313. 
 
 Butler, Anthony, 68-75. 
 
 Butler, Gen. W. O., 324. 
 
 Calhoun, John C, 90, 112; and the 
 presidency, 1844, 120; offered, 
 state portfolio under Tyler, 138; 
 favorable to Texan annexation, 
 120; and the tariff, 121; and the 
 attempted annexation of Texas by 
 treaty, 138-161; Upshur's suc- 
 cessor, 137; secretary of state 
 under Tyler, 141; reverses Nel- 
 son's position as to Texas, 144; 
 signs Texas treaty, 148; corres- 
 pondence with Pakenham over 
 Texas, 150-155; instructions to 
 Green, charg^ at Mexico, 156; 
 promise of protection to Texas-, 
 170-171; comment upon the so- 
 called Diplomatic Act, 173-174; 
 position upon Oregon question, 
 246-249; negotiation with Paken- 
 ham over Oregon, 246-249; 
 dropped by Polk, 185. 
 
332 
 
 INDEX 
 
 "Calhoun conspiracy," 119-120, 141. 
 California, conquest of, 48, 326. 
 Canning, George, proposes negotiation 
 
 over northwest boundary, 239; 
 
 approves continuation of joint 
 
 occupation, 241. 
 Caroline case, 16, 18, 23-25, 55. 
 Cass, Le-wis, on the McLeod case, 19: 
 
 on the Quintuple Treaty, 33-37, 
 
 109. 
 Castillo y Lanzas, 76. 
 Castlereagh and Rush, and the north- 
 west boundary, 211, 217. 
 Childress, George C, 77, 78. 
 Churubusco, 319. 
 Claims against Mexico, 76, 107. 
 Clay, Henry, 22; instructions to 
 
 Poinsett, 61-64; letter upon 
 
 Texas, 158. 
 CUfford, Nathan, 328. 
 Conventional line for northeast bound- 
 ary, 14, 45-46. 
 Corn laws, repeal of, 263. 
 Creole case, 47-49, 55. 
 Davis, Governor, 43. 
 Donelson, A. J., charge to Texas, 178, 
 
 180-182, 186-188. 
 Doyle, Percy, activity of, on behalf of 
 
 Texas, 122. 
 Edwards, Ninian, 60. 
 ElUott, 122-123; reports to Houston, 
 
 147; arranges armistice, 186-187. 
 ElUs, Powhatan, 75-79, 86, 87, 94-97. 
 Escurial, convention of the, 211-216. 
 Everett, Edward, 33, 39, 48, 102, 109, 
 
 111; reports upon Aberdeen's 
 
 policy, 132. 
 Expansion sentiment, 58. 
 Extradition, 55. 
 Fairfield, Governor, 41, 42. 
 Florida treaty, 59, 60, 63, 64, 70, 73, 
 
 225. 
 Forsyth, John, 10, 12, 13, 73, 78, 83, 
 
 84, 86, 95. 
 Forty-ninth parallel, history of, 193- 
 
 196. 
 Fox, H. S., 12, 23-26, 38. 
 
 France and Texan diplomatic act, 172. 
 
 Gaines, Gen. E. P., 79. 
 
 Gallatin, Albert, 9; negotiation of 
 1818, 218-223; negotiation of 
 1826-7, 239-241. 
 
 Ghent, negotiations at, 201-206. 
 
 Gillespie, Lieut. A. H., 278-281. 
 
 Gilmer, Thomas VV., letter of, 119, 
 120; appeal of to Calhoun, 139. 
 
 Gorostiza, M. E. de, 79, 80, 86. 
 
 Goulburn, 218-223. 
 
 Gray, Captain Robert, 204. 
 
 Great Britain and Texas, 122; and 
 abolition, 133. 
 
 Green, Benj. E., 158. 
 
 Green, Duff, 112; in England, 124-125; 
 report to Upshur, 129; consul at 
 Galveston, 179, 183. 
 
 Greville's Journals, quoted, 41. 
 
 Grey, Lord, 28-29. 
 
 Guadalupe Hidalgo, treaty of, 309- 
 329; signed, 327; terms of, 326; 
 ratified, 328. 
 
 Guizot, 34-37. 
 
 Hamilton, Robert, 77, 78. 
 
 Harrison, W. H. H., 22, 25. 
 
 Hawkesbury, Lord, 5. 
 
 Harrowby, Lord, 197, 198. 
 
 Henderson, Gen. J. P., 81, 82; at 
 Washington, 137, 145. 
 
 Herrera, 189, 284. 
 
 Hernandez, 74. 
 
 Houston, Sam, 87; attitude toward 
 Great Britain, 115-119; overture 
 to U. S., 116; letter to Jackson, 
 121; declines Upshur's overture, 
 135; change in policy of, 136; 
 requests protection from Murphy, 
 136; double poUoy, 146; upon 
 annexation, 160; poUoy after re- 
 jection of treaty, 160; enmity 
 toward Jones, 167; and Diploma- 
 tic Act, 175; final message, 181. 
 Howard, Tilghman A., 165, 178. 
 Hunt, Memucan, 81-87. 
 Ingersoll, Charles J., 138. 
 
INDEX 
 
 333 
 
 Jackson, Andrew, 10; declines ap- 
 pointment as minister to Mexico, 
 60; policy toward Mexico in 1S29, 
 64; instructions to Poinsett, 67; 
 and Butler, 70-75; and Texan 
 revolution, 76-79; and Texan an- 
 nexation, 80-82, 92, 93; and claims 
 against Mexico, 84-86; and Florida 
 treaty, 89. 
 Jay, William, 90. 
 Jay's treaty, 4. 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, 4. 
 
 Joint-cruising agreement, 53, 54, 109. 
 
 Joint occupation of Oregon proposed, 
 221; convention of 1818, 218-223; 
 convention of 1827, 239-242. 
 
 Jones, Anson, 84, 146; agrees to 
 armistice, 123; attitude toward 
 Houston, 167, 175-177; policy as 
 president of Texas, 186. 
 
 Jones, Commodore Thomas Ap C, 93, 
 99, 103-105. 
 
 Kendall, George M., 94. 
 
 King, Rufus, 4, 5. 
 
 King-Hawkesbury negotiation, 192, 
 193. 
 
 La Branche, Alc^e, 79. 
 
 Lamar, Mirabeau B., 83, 87, 93, 94, 
 114. 
 
 LarMn, Thomas O., 105, 278-281. 
 
 Legar^, Hugh S., 111. 
 
 Livingston, Edward, 71, 72. 
 
 Livingston, Robert B,., 5. 
 
 Louisiana Treaty and northwest 
 boundary, 193. 
 
 McDuffie, George, 142, 153. 
 
 Mackenzie, Commander A. S., 298- 
 308. 
 
 Mackintosh, 317, 319. 
 
 McLeod case, 16, 19, 22-27, 38. 
 
 Madawaska settlements, 49. 
 
 Madison, James, 15. 
 
 Manifest destiny, 58. 
 
 Martinez, 86. 
 
 Maxcy, Virgil, 140, 143. 
 
 Melbourne, Lord, 28, 29. 
 
 Mexican War, 58. 288-329. 
 
 Mexico and Texan annexation, 156. 
 Mexico, relations with, 58-88. 
 Mexico, City of, occupied by Scott, 
 
 322. 
 Middleton, negotiations of, at St. 
 
 Petersburg, 226-237. 
 Mitchell's map, 9. 
 
 Monroe, James, 6, 59, 60, 61; negotia- 
 tion of, 198-200. 
 Monroe Doctrine, 61, 224-238. 
 Monterey, capture of, 93, 103-107. 
 MorEt, Henry M., 78. 
 Murphy, W. S., 116; and Houston, 
 123; urges annexation, 131-132; 
 promises protection to Texas, 136; 
 rejected by the Senate, 159. 
 Nelson, John, 143. 
 Nesselrode, Count, 235. 
 Netherlands, King of the, 9. 
 Nootka Sound treaty, 211-216. 
 Northeastern boundary controversy, 
 
 1-16, 38, 41-47, 49-53, 56. 
 
 Northwestern boundary, under treaty 
 
 of 1783, 192; 1803-1818, 190-223; 
 
 1818-1846, 224-242; 1846, 243-264. 
 
 Nueces Rives, 67, 320. 
 
 Oregon question, 102, 110, 190-223; 
 
 224-242; 243-264. 
 Oregon treaty, 243-264; signed and 
 
 ratihed, 263. 
 Pakenham, Richard, and Texas, 150- 
 155, 245; and Oregon, 246-249; 
 and Buchanan, 252, 257. 
 Palmerston, Lord, 12, 15, 17, 26, 28- 
 
 30, 36, 38, 39. 
 Paredes, 284. 
 
 Parrott, W. S., 107; mission to Mex- 
 ico, 269-271. 
 Peel, Sir Robert, 27, 28, 36, 40; and 
 
 Oregon, 263. 
 Petition, right of, 59, 89. 
 Pillow, Gen. G. J., 318. 
 Pinkney, William, negotiation of, 
 
 198-200. 
 Poinsett, Joel R., 61-70. 
 
334 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Polk, James K., 58, 169; election of, 
 176-177; and Oregon, 249-264 
 withdraws offer of 49°, 252-254; 
 policy toward England, 254-257 
 message of 1845, 258; refuses to 
 arbitrate, 259; seeks consent of 
 Senate in Oregon matter, 259, 261; 
 sources for history of administra- 
 tion of, 265; programme as Presi- 
 dent, 267; plans war against 
 Mexico, 294-298; and Santa Anna, 
 298-308; overtures to Mexico, 309; 
 plan for conquering peace, 310. 
 
 Presidential campaign of 1844, 157. 
 
 Princeton disaster, 137, 140, 141. 
 
 Quintuple treaty, 30, 31, 39, 109. 
 
 Reily, James, 117. 
 
 Rio del Norte, 61, 63, 67, 80, 94, 321, 
 326. 
 
 Rives, resolution of, upon annexa- 
 tion, 166. 
 
 Rouse's Point, 46. 
 
 Rush, Richard, negotiation of, 224- 
 235; conversations with Castle- 
 reagh, 21], 217. 
 
 Russian ukase of 1821, 224-225. 
 
 Russo-American treaty of 1824, 236. 
 
 Russo-British treaty of 1824, 238. 
 
 Saligny, 186, 187. 
 
 Santa Anna, 72-74, 80, 81, 99, 122; 
 overthrown, 184; probable suc- 
 cessor of Paredes, 286-287; granted 
 permission to reenter Mexico, 
 298; and Trist, 317-322; abdica- 
 tion of, 322. 
 
 Santa F^ expedition, 93-95, 118. 
 
 Scott, Gen. WinBeld S., 311. 
 
 Sevier, Ambrose P., 328. 
 
 Seward, William H., 25. 
 
 Shannon, Wilson, 169, 170; methods 
 in Mexico, 182; leaves post, 268. 
 
 Slave-trade, 20-22, 30, 35, 36, 53. 
 
 SUdell, John, mission of, 271-277; 
 281-286. 
 
 Smith, Ashbel, 126. 
 
 Sniveley's expedition, 118. 
 
 Spain's claim to northwest coast in 
 1807, 200. 
 
 Sparks, Jared, 43. 
 
 Stevenson, Andrew, 19-22, 28, 31. 
 
 Taylor, Gen. Zachary, 297. 
 
 Texas, annexation of, 58, 60; made 
 a sectional question under Calhoun, 
 137; negotiation for, begun by 
 Tyler, 139; by joint resolution, 
 162-189. 
 
 Texas, commercial treaty with, 70, 
 87, 88. 
 
 Texas, negotiations with Mexico con- 
 cerning, 58-88; negotiations for, 
 under Upshur, 114-137; under 
 Calhoun, 138-186. 
 
 Thompson, Waddy, 87, 100, 106, 107. 
 
 Thornton, Edward, 317, 323. 
 
 Treaty of annexation with Texas, 114- 
 161; doubt as to ratification, 146; 
 terms of, 148, 150; vote upon, 158, 
 159. 
 
 Treaty of 1819, 59, 60, 63, 64, 70, 73. 
 
 Treaty of 1827, 9, 237-242. 
 
 Treaty of 1846, 243-264. 
 
 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 309- 
 329. 
 
 Treaty of Ghent, 6-9, 12. 
 
 Treaty of peace with England, 1, 52. 
 
 Treaty of Utrecht, 6, 194-196. 
 
 Treaty, commercial, with Texas, 70, 
 87, 88; rejected, 118. 
 
 Treaty of Washington, 28-47. 
 
 Trist, N. P., consul at Havana, 31, 
 311-329; mission to Mexico, 313; 
 instructions to, 313; quarrel with 
 Scott, 314-317; and Santa Anna, 
 317-322; recalled, 323; negotiates 
 treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 324- 
 326; payment to, 329. 
 
 Tyler, John, 25, 27, 33-38, 44, 47, 
 54, 57, 58, 60, 90-93, 100, 102, 
 111, 112; presses annexation, 114, 
 116; reasons for delay, 118; offers 
 state portfolio to Calhoun, 138; 
 attitude toward Calhoun, 142; 
 sends Texas treaty to Senate, 
 155, 156, 161; message favoring 
 annexation by joint resolution, 
 160-161; nomination for the 
 Presidency, 162; message to 
 House upon Texas, 164; promise 
 
INDEX 
 
 335 
 
 of protection to Texas, 169; 
 adopts House plan, 185; and 
 Oregon, 243-244. 
 Upshur, A. P., 93, 112; becomes sec- 
 retary of state, 124; instructions 
 to Murphy, 131; proposes annexa- 
 tion, 134; attitude toward Mur- 
 phy, 134; relations with the 
 Senate, 135; and Oregon, 244; 
 killed, 137. 
 
 Utrecht, treaty of, 6, 194-196. 
 
 Van Buren, Martin, 11, 64-67, 82, 85, 
 89; presidential candidate in 1844, 
 120; letter upon annexation, 158. 
 
 Van Zandt, Isaac, 119; requests pro- 
 tection from Upshur, 136; and 
 Henderson, 144. 
 
 Visitation and search, right of, 17, 
 30-32. 
 
 Von Hoist's Constitutional History, 
 65, 84. 85, 90. 
 
 Walker, R. J., 163. 
 
 Walpole, Sir Spencer, quoted, 29. 
 
 Webster, Daniel, criticism on Van 
 Buren, 12; plan for conventional 
 boundary, 13-15; becomes secre- 
 tary of state, 22; and McLeod and 
 Caroline cases, 24-27. 38, 55-56; 
 and the slave-trade, 33; and Cass, 
 37, 109; overture for a conven- 
 tional line, 40-42; negotiation 
 with Ashburton. 42-56; and the 
 Creole case, 47-49. 55; and 
 Texas, 91. 92; and Santa F^ 
 prisoners. 94, 95; and claims 
 against Mexico, 96, 97; attitude 
 toward Mexico, 97-100; and 
 Cahfornia, 100-102. 110; and the 
 Monterey incident, 106. 
 
 Wheaton, Henry, 36. 
 
 Wilkins, 138. 
 
 Williams, Reuel. 41, 42. 
 
 Wilmot Proviso, 90. 
 
 Wise, minister to France, 111, 172, 
 
 Woll. General, 168. 
 
 Wright, Silas. 311.