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 i Growth of modern philosophy, by C- Delis 
 
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 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028992190 
 

 
 
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 JOHN LOCKE 
 
 Frontispiece ^1 
 
The Growth of 
 Modern Philosophy 
 
 By 
 C. DELISLE BURNS 
 
 M.A. Cantab. 
 
 LONDON 
 SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY, LTD. 
 
 1909 
 ? 
 
PRINTED BY 
 
 HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD,, 
 
 LONDON AND AyLEHB0RY. 
 
PBEFACE 
 
 PHILOSOPHY may be at once, in the best 
 sense of both words, popular and 
 scientific. Plain speech, does not make exact 
 thinking impossible; and indeed there is 
 authority enough, even in the work of recog- 
 nised philosophers, for treating of the highest 
 problems in the simplest language. Plato 
 did not write textbooks, but dialogues which 
 might be read outside the school ; and Hume 
 confessed to an attempt at being " ambassador 
 from the realms of learning to those of con- 
 versation " — not, perhaps, without a smile 
 at these divided kingdoms. 
 
 The distrust of philosophic terminology, so 
 common in England, is a most valuable 
 corrective for those uncouth obscurities with 
 which philosophers sometimes mistakenly 
 attempt to glorify their subject. Neverthe- 
 less a new thought often produces a strange 
 
4 Preface 
 
 word, and philosophy no less than physical 
 science must therefore master language. We 
 form in language an instrument which is as 
 dangerous as it is useful. The very words 
 which may be an aid to clear thinking may 
 be the destruction of real thought. For it 
 has often happened that a trained mind can 
 do nothing more valuable than juggle with 
 terms. Such conjuring feats are not philo- 
 sophy. Philosophy indeed becomes more real 
 the more intelligible it is : but we need not 
 suppose that to be popular a statement must 
 be intelligible to fools. That would be to 
 estimate too condescendingly the inteUigence 
 of " the people." The art of omission must 
 be practised rather than difEuseness. 
 
 The central idea of this book is the intimate 
 connection between real hfe and real thought. 
 Philosophies are personal and national, and 
 only thus can they be human. For that 
 reason poUtical history has been noticed. 
 The world's hfe gives philosophies birth and 
 death. We are now perhaps at the birth of 
 a less provincial and less wordy philosophy 
 than any which has been produced in the 
 past. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 The Significance of Philosophy. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 . 7 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 
 The Renaissance 
 
 . 20 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 Spinoza and Leibnitz 38 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 The English School 56 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 The French Enlightenment. . . .76 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 The German Aufklarung and Kant . . 90 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 The Critical Philosophy 105 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 The Kantians, Fiohte, and Romanticism . .139 
 
 6 
 
6 Contents 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 FAOB 
 
 HjiGEL 1^2 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 Heebaet and Schopenhauer .... 197 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 Physical Science and Philosophy . . .210 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 Conclusion 244 
 
 Bibliography 261 
 
 Index • 267 
 
 LIST OF PLATES 
 
 John Locke Frontispiece 
 
 paoinq page 
 Thomas Hobbbs 30 
 
 Ren;S Dhscartes 36 
 
 Baruch Spinoza 42 
 
 Gottfried Wilhblm Leibnitz 48 
 
 Geobge Bebkblet .60 
 
 David Hume 72 
 
 IMMANUBL Kant 92 
 
 Johann Gottlieb Fiohth 140 
 
 Gboege William Febdeeic Hegel 164 
 
 Johann Feiedeich Heebaet 198 
 
 Aethue Schopenhauee 208 
 
 Auguste Comte . . 216 
 
 John Stuaet Mill 222 
 
 Hbebeet Spencer . 228 
 
 EuDOLP Hermann Lotze 236 
 
The Growth of 
 Modern Philosophy 
 
 Chapter I 
 
 THE SiaNIPICANCE OP PHILOSOPHY 
 
 THE word " philosophy " has been used to 
 cover many different meanirigs. In its 
 earliest use, as the science of the lover of 
 wisdom, it referred vaguely to the whole of the 
 higher branches of education. That, however, 
 was in the days when the various provinces of 
 intellectual work were not clearly distinguished ; 
 when only the difference of brain from muscle, 
 of thought from action, was seen. The first 
 efforts of thought resulted in the speciahsa- 
 tion of these various provinces ; but " philo- 
 sophy " still meant higher education, and 
 included the first elements of such subjects 
 
 7 
 
8 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 as we now call Astronomy, Literature, and 
 Theology. 
 
 Further progress involved a still more 
 restricted use, and at the present time philo- 
 sophy properly means a severely speciaUsed 
 branch of intellectual work ; but the past 
 history of the word stiU causes many to sup- 
 pose that any vague generahsation, any airy 
 platitude, may be fairly called philosophical. 
 It is useless to dispute about the proper mean- 
 ing of words ; but it is clearly necessary that 
 one definite conception should always be 
 referred to by the same term. For this 
 reason it will be well to state the meaning of 
 the word " philosophy " as used in the following 
 pages. 
 
 Philosophy, then, may be described as an 
 intellectual expression of the highest point of 
 view obtainable, with regard to experience as 
 a whole. That is to say, in the first place, 
 philosophy is truly scientific. It is intellectual 
 rather than emotional, and therefore more 
 closely allied to what we in England know as 
 Natural Science than to Art. Now, the real 
 meaning of science, in its highest sense, is 
 organised or systematic knowledge. Our 
 
The Significance of Philosophy 9 
 
 knowledge, therefore, in order to be scientific, 
 must be such that every part is connected 
 with every other part. There must be no 
 closed compartments. It is for this reason 
 that it has been truly said that " philo- 
 sophy is not a fortuitous concussion of 
 opinions." The collecting of opinions is use- 
 less for understanding philosophy. 
 
 But although philosophy's language, method, 
 and result are purely logical or scientific, 
 although it is concerned chiefly with the true, 
 as contrasted with the good or the beautiful, 
 yet the philosopher has a definite connection 
 with the artist, with the poet, and with him 
 whose Hfe is given up to doing good ; for the 
 philosopher endeavours to attain to the 
 highest point of view obtainable in his time, 
 and the artist, the poet, the worker, have all 
 of them something to give towards this end. 
 Thus the philosopher is often more in sym- 
 pathy with the poet than with the physical 
 scientist. He loses touch with the scientist 
 when the latter becomes a mere calculating 
 machine. The true scientist is something 
 more than that. 
 
 In the second place, philosophy expresses 
 
lo Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 the highest point of view obtainable. This 
 does not mean that philosophy is in any way 
 superior to the other branches of knowledge ; 
 for we may equally well say that philosophy is 
 the logical ground of all knowledge. Some- 
 times, indeed, so deeply laid is the foundation 
 of knowledge that the philosophy upon which 
 it depends is beneath the surface ; but that 
 other metaphor involved in the use of the 
 words " point of view " seems more illumin- 
 ating. For thus it is imagined that we move, 
 in the growth of our minds, up a mountain- 
 side. When we are in the regions of " common 
 sense " we are at the foot of the mountain. 
 The hedges and the trees obscure our view, 
 and, in order to understand the country in 
 which we hve, we need to mount higher. 
 Thus we gain knowledge, by seeing in its 
 setting what we had previously seen in a 
 hmited way. Thu5 also scientific knowledge 
 is an explanation of what the senses show in 
 detail. Now, the more we know the higher 
 we move, and the more we can explain. At 
 the highest point we may have a view of the 
 whole land which we have seen in gradually 
 decreasing detail during our cUmb. That 
 
The Significance of Philosophy n 
 
 view will be our philosophical knowledge. 
 We express it in our philosophy. 
 
 Before we leave this metaphor, however, it 
 is well to consider what each one of us is likely 
 to see. We shall see some fields which we 
 know well, and roads, and perhaps houses, 
 or perhaps some region unexplored ; but for 
 all of us there is an horizon. Beyond that we 
 cannot see ; nor can we hope, by any higher 
 climbing the Mount of Metaphysic, to see 
 beyond some horizon. StiU farther away is 
 the " untravelled land, whose margin fades 
 for ever and for ever as we move." 
 
 This sense of the horizon is present to every 
 true philosopher. He does not forget the 
 fields of common life, or the well-made roads 
 and governed lands of partial sciences. Nor 
 is he any the less a true and clear thinker 
 because he is aware of the dim hmits to present 
 knowledge. Only let it not be imagined that 
 beyond the horizon he ghosts and mysteries, 
 or that the great dragon, the Unknowable, 
 dwells there. As we climb higher we may 
 see that the unknown is not the imknowable. 
 
 It is now possible to consider the third 
 phrase used in the description^offphilosophy. 
 
12 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 The subject-matter of philosophy is " experi- 
 ence as a whole." This is the land over which 
 we look from the highest point of our cHmb. 
 There is no sacred strangeness in the words 
 used. Experience means just what comes to 
 us as we hve and think and feel. All this the 
 philosopher attempts to deal with, and to 
 express in consistent language. Naturally, 
 therefore, much of the detail will be obscured ; 
 for we cannot keep aU our experience before 
 us at one moment. The only possibiUty is 
 that of so arranging our mind and our state- 
 ments as to allow for all the various aspects of 
 our experience, as they appear. 
 
 It is clearly involved in this conception of 
 philosophy that, in a sense, every man is his 
 own philosopher. If a man cannot think out, 
 in some way, his own experience, it is useless 
 for him to read Hume or Kant. He wiU not 
 find much in what follows here ; for philo- 
 sophy, hke charity, begins at home. It is 
 necessary first to think clearly for oneseK : 
 it might almost be said to be the one thing 
 necessary. Kant himself cannot do the think- 
 ing for another. In a more hmited sense, 
 however, it may be truly said that the founda- 
 
The Significance of Philosophy 13 
 
 tion of all philosophy is the experience of an 
 individual. The man in the street or the 
 average man has his philosophy. The crudest 
 " opinion " and the finest knowledge arise 
 from the same kind of root — experience. 
 Thus it is at least barely possible for any 
 man, even without scientific training, to attain 
 to an adequate and not self-contradictory 
 view of " the whole choir of heaven and 
 furniture of earth." 
 
 Although this is possible, yet it is hkely 
 that the untrained mind will be led astray 
 upon side-issues. Thus philosophy, strictly 
 so-called, implies previous training in in- 
 tellectual work. Again, the experience of an 
 individual is fragmentary : it is Hke a piece 
 of paper torn from a larger piece. The jagged 
 edges, where personal experience ends, are 
 fitted into and " explained " by all the work 
 of science and of history. Hence a real 
 philosophy needs to be drawn from an extended 
 experience. The wider the prehminary know- 
 ledge, the more adequate the final explanation 
 will be ; and since the explanation thus 
 attained will apply to more than the frag- 
 mentary experience of a single individual, 
 
1 4 Development of Modem Philosophy 
 
 philosophy becomes as much a special pro- 
 vince of thought as do the various branches of 
 physical science. 
 
 In this stricter sense, the man in the street 
 is not a philosopher. Nor have the homceo- 
 pathic doses of quacks any claim to recogni- 
 tion. Knowledge, as in the special sciences, 
 is the only justification for opinion ; and 
 philosophy is a special kind of knowledge. 
 Thus every age has its philosophers ; for it 
 has men who can see more clearly than others 
 over all the fields at the moment extended 
 before the mountain, up which both the race 
 and the individual are chmbing. In every 
 age, again, the philosophers are in the minority ; 
 and in this subject, as in any other branch of 
 study, the majority have absolutely no right 
 to an opinion. Traditional charms for the 
 difl&culties raised by thinking are of no value, 
 however often they may be repeated. As 
 -well may physical science be judged by 
 comparison with the mythology of a child or 
 a savage, as may philosophy be refuted by an 
 appeal to what is called common sense. 
 
 The philosopher gathers up the results of 
 sciences, whether they deal with event or 
 
The Significance of Philosophy 15 
 
 with fact — whether, that is to say, they are 
 historical or physical. From these results 
 he derives a system of knowledge. Or, to 
 put it in another way, the philosopher thinks 
 out what is imphed in the results of the various 
 sciences, and from this derives a knowledge 
 of the world in which we hve. Thus a true 
 physical science or scientific history involves 
 a philosophy, and a true philosophy imphes a 
 physical science and a history. 
 
 To return, however, to the central point of 
 all that has preceded, the vital core of true 
 philosophy is experience. Now, experience 
 is always changing. The experience of a man 
 to-day is different from what was the experi- 
 ence of those who now are dead ; and from 
 this follows the use of history, for as the 
 point of view changes in an individual hfe, so 
 it does in the hfe of the race. What was the 
 highest point reached by ancient Britons may 
 seem very low to us now. We may even 
 suppose that we can see farther and more 
 clearly than many a Greek philosopher. 
 
 The history of philosophy is a history of 
 those who have seen farthest and clearest ; 
 and it is only by seeing as far and as clearly 
 
1 6 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 as they that we may hope to make one step 
 towards a point of view which is higher. We 
 are related to the great philosophers neither 
 as followers nor as critics ; but we learn 
 through them to see more clearly the world in 
 which we hve, for a great thinker concentrates 
 in his writing the highest expression of the 
 thought of his time. Moreover, because the 
 world is in a great measure the same to-day 
 as it was to Aristotle or to Kant, we may 
 suppose that the great thinker sees more 
 deeply into the make of our world than many 
 who come after him. Thus it is true, in one 
 sense, to say that a great philosophy is never 
 out of date, and, in another sense, to say that 
 the philosophy of yesterday cannot explain 
 the experience of to-day. 
 
 The interest of this history of modern 
 philosophy will therefore he in the tracing 
 of a gradual movement towards the position 
 now held by thinkers. The successive views 
 are but aspects in a steady development ; 
 the disagreement among philosophers is but 
 a sign of hfe in their knowledge. For know- 
 ledge is hke a tree with many branches, which 
 part as the tree grows. 
 
The Significance of Philosophy 17 
 
 The purpose of this history is not the mere 
 recording of events. It is intended that, by 
 understanding the insight of past philosophers, 
 our own philosophic insight may be improved. 
 Least of all should a study of history produce 
 the shallow scepticism that is based upon the 
 disagreement of authorities. The fact that 
 philosophers have disagreed is not a proof 
 that no truth is to be attained. It is the 
 complexity of the problem and not the lack of 
 evidence which causes disagreement in the 
 authorities. Too much has been made of the 
 uncertain nature of some of the conclusions of 
 philosophy : it is supposed that a sceptical 
 attitude is the only possible one after we have 
 put reason to its highest use. This, however, 
 is false, though it may be persuasive. It is 
 not the oflS.ce of philosophy to destroy. For 
 it is by the careful use of logical thought that 
 truth — and in truth the foundation of goodness 
 and beauty — is to be found. It may be that 
 much of popular behef must be destroyed ; but 
 the result is not a bUnd scepticism. Although 
 philosophy may cause revolution, that is not 
 its end. For it does not declare all behefs 
 equally untrue ; and if certain statements are 
 
 2 
 
1 8 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 discovered to be false, it can only be because 
 we have some positive truth, with which to 
 compare them. 
 
 The history of philosophy is the chronicle 
 of a gradual explaining of a growing experi- 
 ence. The Reahty, which is still as im- 
 plumbed by us as it was by the earhest thinkers, 
 is yet more and more understood. The 
 journey may be into the darkness, but we 
 carry with us a hght ; and scepticism as to 
 the progress of thought is more often the 
 result of an inabihty to think than of the 
 despair of a thinker. Men often mistake 
 the narrowness of their own intellects for the 
 Hmitations of knowledge. 
 
 It is always possible that a history of 
 change in philosophic thought may leave 
 the philosophic interest in the subject-matter 
 external to the reader. The number of names 
 and terms often confuses the issue ; for the 
 only view to which this history will appear 
 as a unity is that taken " from the inside." 
 Unless the problems are real to the reader, 
 and he understands the meaning of the solu- 
 tions from the point of view of Hume or 
 Kant, the history of philosophy will fail of 
 
The Significance of Philosophy 19 
 
 its chief interest and of all its importance. 
 That is to say, it is necessary for the individual 
 himself to go through the intellectual stages 
 of the race. 
 
 If the thinker can take any view of the 
 subject-matter that does not leave the 
 interest quite external to himself, then the 
 history of philosophy becomes of great use in 
 the formation of a real philosophy. For 
 what we may call the philosophical perspective 
 is gained more easily from history than from 
 the separate study of any one system, however 
 perfect it may be. The true philosopher is 
 a " spectator of all time, and all existence " ; 
 and to him comes, what the Greeks counted 
 as the great reward of philosophy — un- 
 troubled calm. For he who watches with 
 steady eyes the growth of the tree of hfe and 
 knowledge is not hkely to be disturbed if the 
 wind sometimes shakes the dead leaves to the 
 ground. 
 
Chaptee II 
 
 THE RENAISSANCE 
 
 IN the Renaissance the modern world 
 began. The ghosts which had haunted 
 the Middle Ages were gradually laid. The 
 Holy Roman Empire disappeared hke a dream: 
 the centrahsed and pohtical rehgion of Rome 
 faded into nothing. The barren way of ascetic 
 holiness was deserted, and the world breathed 
 again. 
 
 The old tradition used to say that 
 Scholasticism, the philosophy of the Middle 
 Ages, was refuted by the thinkers of the 
 Renaissance; that men learned then to for- 
 sake authorities in order to think for them- 
 selves. This, however, is not altogether true. 
 Scholasticism was never refuted : it died in 
 a good old age, fuU of works and days. 
 Indeed, the thinkers of the Renaissance were 
 themselves scholastic. Bacon, the supposed 
 
The Renaissance 21 
 
 founder of a new philosophy, used the syllo- 
 gism to prove that the syllogism was useless. 
 It was not abstract thought, but actual Kfe 
 which killed Scholasticism. The experience of 
 men changed utterly, and a philosophy which 
 had arisen in cloisters was too narrow to 
 explain the open world. Bacon was closer 
 to the truth in what he implied than in what 
 he said. But he expressed the real issue 
 when he asserted that scholastic philosophy 
 was " quite inadequate to explain the subtlety 
 of nature." Again, the revelation which the 
 Middle Ages had found in their Arabian 
 Aristotle did not cease when the Renaissance 
 learnt Greek. As soon as the new hterary 
 knowledge showed men the meaning of Greek 
 thought, the day of an authoritative philo- 
 sophy was over ; and, as the scholastics had 
 learnt from Greece, so now did the humanists. 
 It is true indeed that the Renaissance scholars 
 protested against the barren logic-chopping 
 that, at the close of Scholasticism, sheltered 
 itself under the great name of Aristotle. 
 Nevertheless, it is evident that the meaning 
 of the protest lay in the fact that over-subtle 
 commentary had obscured that freshness of 
 
22 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 inspiration which the northern mind has 
 always been able to find in Greek thought. 
 Thus it is rather the truth that the scholastics 
 of the decadence had separated, in spirit if 
 not in words, from their great predecessors, 
 than that the Renaissance was a period of 
 revolt against the spirit and method of the 
 thirteenth century. 
 
 In the Renaissance there were two in- 
 tellectual movements, one Uterary, the other 
 scientific — both, however, based on the new 
 experience. The value of the literary or 
 humanist Renaissance was not so great as that 
 of the scientific movement, with regard at 
 least to positive and obvious effects ; but as 
 a movement towards a general spread of 
 education and an increase of the class to 
 whom philosophic thought could appeal, its 
 value is incalculable. Add to this that, by 
 the very force of its name, the humanist 
 movement caused the development of the 
 study of man in all his various relations, in 
 State and Church. Nothing is stranger in the 
 scholastic philosophy than the complete lack 
 of interest in the romantic lore, the chivalry 
 and the art of the Middle Ages, Philosophy 
 
The Renaissance 23 
 
 among the Schoolmen was far removed from 
 the Ufe of the world in which it arose ; but 
 it was entirely difierent with the humanist, 
 and in directing thought towards all hving 
 experience, he began the restoration of a real 
 philosophy. 
 
 The spread of knowledge and general 
 education is usually connected with the 
 scattering of Greek manuscripts and the 
 wandering of the Greek scholars which 
 followed the dissolution of the Byzantine 
 Empire ; but, as a matter of fact, the fields 
 lay ready long before all this seed was sown. 
 With the dissolution of mediseval ideals, the 
 nations found their true interest to he in 
 independent self-development, and not in 
 eternal conflicts for barren territory or delusive 
 privileges. Common interests united men in 
 the demand for non-interference. Hitherto, 
 war had been the central idea of poKtics ; now 
 commerce took its place. 
 
 Thus it came about that, as in Athens 
 during the period of the Sophists, it was pos- 
 sible for a larger class of men than those within 
 the cloister to find the leisure and knowledge 
 which are necessary for higher thought. 
 
24 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 The effects of humanism were at first 
 confined to the artistic or emotional sphere ; 
 but the mind could not fail to pass beyond 
 the form to the inspiring thoughts of the 
 ancient philosophy. The humanists were 
 therefore soon divided into Platonists and 
 Axistotehans. The general attitude of human- 
 ism has been, well expressed as " the behef 
 that nothing which has ever interested hving 
 men and women can wholly lose its vitahty 
 — no language they have ever spoken, nor 
 oracle beside which they have hushed their 
 voices ; no dream which has once been 
 entertained by actual human minds ; nothing 
 about which they have ever been passionate 
 or expended time and zeal." 
 
 The most striking note in all the writers 
 of this new age, whether philosophical or 
 purely hterary, is that of individuahty. It 
 was the development of all the powers of 
 oneseK that was the ideal of humanism ; and 
 this shows itself in the philosophic hterature 
 through a fearless criticism by individuals of 
 much that had formerly been reserved to 
 authorities, and in an eager search for all 
 kinds of knowledge. The independence, which 
 
The Renaissance 25 
 
 seemed now to be gained for the individual, 
 is expressed both in the sceptical tendency of 
 some writers and in the admiration of others 
 for all forms of strength in character. 
 
 Hmnanism was chiefly an Itahan move- 
 ment, and the scientific learning which 
 followed belonged chiefly to the North. 
 Brmio and Campanella represent the effort 
 of the Itahan mind to attune itseK to the new 
 science. Both acknowledge their indebted- 
 ness to Copernicus and Tycho Brahe, and 
 both are in sympathy with the new view of 
 the phenomenal universe introduced by 
 astronomers. Bruno is enthusiastic over the 
 destruction of those ghostly crystal spheres 
 which had confined the thoughts of the Middle 
 Ages to dull earth ; and Campanella is inspired 
 by the thought of a universe which was no 
 longer supposed to be centred round man 
 and his petty comic tragedies. Half mystic 
 as they were, it is not possible to extract a 
 logical system from their writings ; but for 
 philosophy it is interesting to note that Bruno 
 grasped the relativity of scientific thought, 
 and that Campanella hoped for a philosophy 
 of experience. The latter was author of an 
 
26 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 ideal dream, an earthly paradise, " The City 
 of the Sun," built upon the model of Plato's 
 Eepubhc. It is well to note in the history 
 of these two men the difficulties with which 
 original thought had to deal in southern 
 countries. Bruno suffered much imprison- 
 ment and was eventually burnt at the stake 
 by the Koman authorities. Campanella was 
 imprisoned by the Inquisition for twenty- 
 seven years. 
 
 While humanism in Italy tended to pass 
 into purely formal interest and the thrashing 
 of hterary straw, the new science had already 
 arisen in the North. Not that Renaissance 
 science was wholly non-Itahan — such names 
 as those of Leonardo da Vinci and Gahleo 
 Gahlei should remind us of the contrary ; but 
 Italy, in the later Renaissance, tended more 
 and more to lose the possibihty of thought. 
 She was oppressed with the decadence which 
 followed the brilhant development of her 
 city-states, and for years she was merely a 
 battleground. 
 
 In the North, however, scientific thought 
 had a swift development. This had followed 
 upon a period devoted to the acquisition of 
 
The Renaissance 27 
 
 new facts. Invention and discovery changed 
 the aspect of the world at the Renaissance 
 before men began to speculate on the meaning 
 of the new hfe they had found. It is sufficient 
 to remember that the conception of the earth 
 was changed by the discovery of America, and 
 still more by the new astronomy. " The 
 floor of heaven inlaid with stars had sunk back 
 into an infinite abyss of immeasurable space ; 
 and the firm earth itself, unfixed from its 
 foundations, was seen to be but a small atom 
 in the awful vastness of the universe." Yet 
 men looked forward with the more hope, at 
 the very moment when they seemed to have 
 sunk into insignificance ; for reason, which 
 had revealed the universe, also gave the in- 
 ventions which enabled man to assert his place 
 in it. The compass and the telescope, and 
 the thousand mechanical devices of which 
 printing was the most important, could not 
 fail to arouse enthusiasm. Of this enthusiasm 
 the philosophy of the Renaissance is the result. 
 It was Bacon who first introduced the ideas 
 of the new science into the development of 
 philosophy. Though not himself a speciahst 
 in either philosophy or science, he]^saw and 
 
28 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 stated clearly the attitude of a thoughtful 
 man towards the new experience. It was 
 indeed obvious that the professional learning 
 and official methods of the day had done 
 nothing towards all those acquisitions which 
 now impressed the world. Bacon therefore 
 set about to discover the methods which 
 seemed to have been involved, and to develop 
 the theory by the aid of which the world 
 hoped that progress might be made. He 
 was not a deep thinker, but a keen and prac- 
 tical observer. His aim was generally to 
 acquire such knowledge as might make Hfe 
 more easy. We are prevented from direct 
 knowledge by prejudices (" idols " of race, 
 of our own, of common speech, or of tradi- 
 tion) ; and when these are cleared away, we 
 may begin the examination of experienced 
 facts. Our method, says Bacon, should be 
 " true and exclusive induction " ; which is 
 merely a modified form of the old AristoteUan 
 accumulation of instances. He looked for- 
 ward to a steady accumulation of " facts " 
 by many observers ; and in the end we are to 
 have a New Atlantis, where government will 
 be according to knowledge. Thus far Bacon 
 
The Renaissance 29 
 
 expresses the ideals of his day ; but in actual 
 knowledge he was considerably wanting. He 
 appears to have been ignorant of the possi- 
 biUties that lay in the mechanical conception 
 of nature ; and his theory of method has not 
 proved valuable — except, of course, in so far 
 as he pointed out the obvious fact that actual 
 experience is the most fruitful source of real 
 knowledge. 
 
 A much greater place in the history of 
 philosophy is deserved by Thomas Hobbes. 
 With him philosophic thought was the central 
 interest, and he it was who developed a con- 
 sistent system out of the naturaUstic hypo- 
 theses of Renaissance science. In method and 
 in the results of his work he marks the con- 
 nection between Bacon and Descartes, both 
 of whose systems he knew. Hobbes was a 
 clear thinker, who began with the data of 
 sense-perception as his most tangible starting- 
 point, and would not move forward beyond 
 the test of immediate experience. Such words 
 as " infinite" and "eternal" and "incorporeal," 
 only too common in the metaphysics of his 
 day, were for him only the shelters of ignor- 
 ance and excuses for absurdity. He is practi- 
 
30 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 cally the founder of modern psychological 
 investigation, which deals with states, and 
 not with faculties and essences. His whole 
 philosophy was a definite system of empiricism, 
 and he, not Bacon, is the true founder of this 
 Enghsh type of thought. 
 
 In the theory of social Ufe he attempted 
 an historical explanation of the existing 
 pohtical forms. Previously, thinkers had 
 written as though each form of government 
 had been suddenly inspired. He, however, says 
 that the needs and dangers of isolated in- 
 dividuals led them to make a contract between 
 themselves, abdicating all power and giving 
 it into the hands of one central government — 
 the great Leviathan. As against absolutism, 
 therefore, we may say that the sovereign 
 power is dependent ultimately upon the will 
 of the people ; and, as against individuahsm, 
 that the State once formed must be obeyed. 
 
 The course of pohtical events in England, 
 the war between King and ParUament, had 
 attracted the attention of Hobbes ; and, crude 
 as his theory was, it was immensely important 
 for the future of philosophy. But nothing 
 further was accomphshed in England, in the 
 
p. 30] 
 
 THOMAS HOBBES 
 
The Renaissance 31 
 
 problems of pure thought, until after the 
 Revolution of 1688. 
 
 In France, however, the Renaissance had 
 reached a system of philosophy from which 
 all modern thought can trace a direct descent. 
 The way by which modern thinkers have 
 reached knowledge undreamt of by the Greeks 
 or the Scholastics was first shown by Rene 
 Descartes ; but although his attitude of mind 
 and his method are those of the new thought, 
 much of the system which he imagined himself 
 to have discovered was a survival of efiete 
 ideas. There are indeed two distinct move- 
 ments in the thought of Descartes : one 
 analytic or critical — in this his work is of 
 permanent value ; and the other synthetic 
 or constructive — and this gave results be- 
 yond which we have long passed. 
 
 The early training of Descartes was 
 mathematical. It was by contrasting the 
 acknowledged certainty and precision of 
 mathematics with the uncriticised traditions 
 and vague platitudes of Scholastic metaphysics 
 that Descartes conceived the idea of a philo- 
 sophic knowledge of the world which would 
 be of mathematical type. He had therefore 
 
32 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 to begin with a thorough examination of 
 experience and of all that was supposed to 
 be knowledge, in order to estabUsh some 
 position upon which he could safely construct 
 a real philosophy. His critical attitude is 
 expressed in the formula, " One must doubt 
 everything." This, however, must not be 
 understood as mere scepticism ; for the doubt 
 is a transitory position, adopted for an end 
 which would destroy doubt. Cartesian doubt 
 precedes, it does not follow knowledge. 
 
 The method thus adopted is clearly based 
 upon the conception that real knowledge is 
 a systematic construction or growth in the 
 mind of an individual. The system of know- 
 ledge, our philosophy, can only arise by con- 
 nection with some definite basis — with what 
 is fundamental in the mind of the knower : 
 and this presupposition of all knowledge 
 Descartes expressed in the statement, " Cogito 
 ergo sum " — " I am conscious, that is to say 
 I exist," or " I exist in so far as I am think- 
 ing." The awareness of one's own existence 
 is the basis for all reasoning. Beyond this 
 we cannot go : the individual thinker exists. 
 
 Now, although it was susceptible of many 
 
The Renaissance 33 
 
 meanings, this phrase has founded_^the modern 
 conception that real knowledge begins at 
 home. Descartes himseK did not make clear 
 all its impUcations. Indeed, he was but making 
 more exphcit the concept of individuahty with 
 which the best Scholasticism ended. The 
 Terminists, or Occamites, had attempted to 
 express it in an obsolete terminology ; the 
 Mystics had attempted the same thing in 
 their return to the Augustinian idea of self ; 
 but of all this Descartes does not seem to have 
 been aware. A man is not less great if he 
 takes the elements of his thought from the 
 achieved results of his predecessors or con- 
 temporaries ; but, in the spirit of the Re- 
 naissance, Descartes develops this thought 
 of the individual as though it had no human 
 parentage. He actually speaks of himself as 
 having learnt nothing from Aristotle and the 
 philosophers. 
 
 The result was only too apparent when 
 Descartes went on to elaborate his own 
 philosophy. He began at once to reintro- 
 duce the old concepts of metaphysics. He 
 states that the postulate of individual exist- 
 ence is Uke a mathematical hypothesis, and is 
 
 3 
 
34 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 therefore a statement from which argument 
 may proceed. Our awareness or certainty 
 of this postulate is described as " intuitive." 
 Hence we may say that intuition gives us 
 certain clear or distinct ideas as principles 
 from which to start : in view of their immediate 
 connection with self-consciousness, these are 
 called " innate ideas." On this kind of basis 
 every kind of uncriticised thought may be 
 introduced. For, if a man declares this or the 
 other idea to be innate in him, there is no 
 evidence upon which anyone else can con- 
 vince him of his error. Among the clear ideas 
 Descartes found the most prominent to be 
 that of an infinite and perfect Being ; but 
 since, he argued, I am neither, this clear 
 idea must be caused from outside me. There- 
 fore God exists. Thus the old concept of 
 efficient cause is smuggled in. The next 
 step in his philosophy was for Descartes to 
 introduce as intuitively certaiu the dis- 
 tinctions used in every-day language. He 
 finds that experience gives him two kinds of 
 " substance " — ^namely, " things " and human 
 " selves " (" res extensse " and " res cogi- 
 tantes "). 
 
The Renaissance 35 
 
 With the " selves " or " thinking sub- 
 stances " Descartes was not much concerned. 
 They are said to be independent beings, or souls, 
 connected at one point (the pineal gland) 
 with certain portions of extended substance, 
 called bodies. The old mediaeval " soul " is 
 thus gradually changing into the modern 
 " self," and is therefore gradually disappear- 
 ing. Descartes, however, is far from clear 
 on the point. It remains only to observe 
 that we have in his philosophy, as regards 
 " souls," what is nowadays ordinarily called 
 the common-sense view. 
 
 It is interesting to note that common sense 
 means out-of-date metaphysics. The ordinary 
 talk of soul and body, as though the himian 
 self were composed of parts, is not by any 
 means based upon evidence ; it is as much a 
 theory as the extremest idealism, and it is a 
 theory which is useless in accounting for the 
 facts. 
 
 On the other hand, in his conception of 
 " extended things " Descartes laid the foun- 
 dation of the modern view of Nature as a 
 machine. Yet this is just the point in which 
 he thought himself least original. Indeed, he 
 
36 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 owed mucli to the mathematics of his day, 
 and to the work of Kepler ; but Descartes 
 applied these to the treatment of " matter " 
 as nothing else but " extension," and by means 
 of this conception the phenomenal world has 
 gradually been explained with mathematical 
 exactness. Thus the various " things " of 
 experience already tend, in Descartes' lan- 
 guage, to be regarded as fundamentally one 
 " thing-substance." This is no other than 
 the " matter " of physical science. Homo- 
 geneity of nature and uniformity of action 
 are thus postulated for the whole phenomenal 
 world ; and the fundamental idea of this world 
 is that of spatial extension. Here, it is 
 interesting to observe, we have the statement 
 which still satisfies many who are called 
 scientists : the world of extended matter is a 
 theory — in philosophy, an out-of-date theory. 
 Whatever the value of the conception of the 
 world thus gained, it is not adequate as an 
 explanation of the ordinary world of experi- 
 ence. The resulting difficulties in explaining 
 " thought " or " emotion," or other realities 
 of that nature, are not difficulties which arise 
 out of the mysterious nature of " thought." 
 
BENE DESCAKTES 
 
 e- 30] 
 
The Renaissance 37 
 
 There is nothing mysterious about that ; but, 
 because the original theory of a world-machine 
 is wrong, a difficulty arises — thought cannot 
 be explained. As Berkeley put it, " we raise 
 the dust, and then complain that we cannot 
 see." 
 
 Descartes himself was puzzled to explain 
 the occasional connection of an alien sub- 
 stance, a thinking thing, with this phenomenal 
 world of invariable law. The world of thought 
 is no less real than the world of colour and 
 size ; but the dualism, which Descartes treated 
 as intuitively certain, and with which many 
 to-day are satisfied, made it impossible to 
 solve the problem. Hence arises the long list 
 of " difficulties " — the " freedom-and-law " diffi- 
 culty, and the rest. It may be well to observe 
 that difficulty in explanation is due more often 
 to the falsity of some hypothesis from which we 
 have started than to the intrinsic nature of 
 " the world " ; indeed, we are often led to 
 suppose that the world is a puzzle through 
 turning ourselves round and round so rapidly 
 that we cannot see it clearly. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 SPINOZA AND LEIBNITZ 
 
 "pvESCARTES had left the world a bluntly 
 ■^-^ stated dualism ; but, since the one word 
 "thing " was used to describe the substantial 
 existence of thinking things and extended 
 things, there was a ground for monism. The 
 two kinds of " thing," matter and mind, had 
 something in common by force of which each 
 could be called a " thing " or a reaUty. This 
 is only to say that reahty is essentially one ; 
 and this at least is what is meant by all 
 systems of monism. Spinoza it was who 
 created the first systematic monism of modern 
 times. The ideal of method, the mathematical 
 or geometrical form of argument, was accepted 
 by Spinoza from Descartes, and the half-ex- 
 pressed principles of Cartesianism were carried 
 to their legitimate conclusions. 
 To appreciate Spinoza's philosophy, some 
 38 
 
Spinoza and Leibnitz 39 
 
 knowledge of his life is necessary. Indeed, 
 tlie life of a philosopher is never unimportant 
 to the consideration of his philosophy ; for, 
 as it has been said, every real philosophy 
 begins from the experience of the individual 
 thinker. Moreover, in the history of philo- 
 sophy there are the names of many whose 
 character was as immortal as their thought. 
 Spinoza was one of these. 
 
 He was born of Jewish parents at Amster- 
 dam (1632). The Jews with whom he was 
 connected had taken refuge in the Netherlands 
 when the persecutions of the Inquisition under 
 Phihp III. had driven them from the Spanish 
 peninsula. Thus Spinoza was of the same 
 race of Jews whose writings educated the 
 Scholastics during the Middle Ages ; for it 
 was to the Spanish Jews as well as to the 
 Spanish Arabs that the Schoolmen owed their 
 most brilhant theories. 
 
 Spinoza received his education at the schools 
 of the Synagogue at Amsterdam, where the 
 teaching was strictly orthodox. " Though I 
 was nurtured," he writes, " in the current 
 views of the Scriptures, and my mind filled 
 with their teaching, I was compelled to break 
 
40 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 with my early beliefs." His very silence in 
 regard to orthodox opinions aroused sus- 
 picion, and at last, partly because of his 
 non-attendance at the Synagogue, his reserve 
 became a ground for accusation. He was 
 badgered by two of his former school-fellows, 
 whose zeal for orthodoxy led them to care 
 for the consciences of others. He was then 
 delated to the Synagogue. There statements 
 were made as to what he really beheved, and 
 he was called upon to retract. Spinoza found 
 it impossible to retract what he had never 
 uttered ; yet, seeing that he would not state 
 what he did beheve, he was anathematised 
 and excommunicated. This meant expulsion 
 from his home, and Spinoza continued barely 
 to Uve by employment as an usher in a small 
 school. Afterwards he foimd a more con- 
 genial way of hviug by working as an optician. 
 During the years which followed he made 
 himself thoroughly acquainted with the Car- 
 tesian philosophy. Men were dogmatic and 
 difficult to hve with even at Amsterdam and 
 at Rhynsberg, so he eventually found a home 
 at the Hague. His writings had made his 
 name known, and he was offered a post at 
 
Spinoza and Leibnitz 4^ 
 
 the University of Heidelberg ; but Spinoza felt 
 that in such an official position his " liberty 
 of philosophising " would be curtailed, so he 
 continued to grind lenses. He died at the 
 Hague (1677), leaving the greatest of his 
 works, " The Ethics," still unpublished. 
 
 The central idea of Spiaoza's philosophy is 
 that of substance. He found the word loosely 
 used, sometimes for that unknown bond in 
 the ceaseless change of experience which makes 
 us say a thing is the same ; sometimes for that 
 which beyond all appearances could alone be 
 called truly real. In its more definite mean- 
 ing, as the permanent and the real, substance 
 had been used to explain the world of pheno- 
 mena ; but it is obvious that the " things " 
 of our every-day speech are by no means 
 permanent. Besides the change which takes 
 place in the size, for example, of a tree, there 
 is that other change which takes place on the 
 total destruction or disappearance of the tree. 
 Substance, therefore, if it means the perma- 
 nent, must lie beyond the existence of any 
 individual things, and so ultimately we may 
 speak of change and contrast as really oc- 
 curring in one medium. Already Descartes 
 
42 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 had seen that the whole phenomenal world 
 was of one essential type, in that it was 
 extended. Here, therefore, the old Scholastic 
 things, the separate and independent sub- 
 stances, had disappeared for ever from the 
 language of philosophy. Further, exactly 
 the same method of argument wiU show 
 that the other type of Cartesian substances, 
 conscious selves ("res cogitantes "), are ulti- 
 mately reducible to modifications of one 
 absolute reaUty; for, in so far as substantial 
 existence is the basis and presupposition of 
 all change, the thinking selves, which are 
 in continual change, which themselves come 
 and go, cannot be conceived as independently 
 real and substantial ; so we may be but 
 waves upon the ocean which is G-od. This 
 Grod is no theological one, but merely 
 " natura naturans " — the cause, the ultimate 
 reality, of the phenomenal world. 
 
 Thus the double world of things and selves 
 can be reduced by the same forcible logic to 
 an ultimate unity ; and here alone will 
 thought rest, for this is the ultimate explana- 
 tion of the world in which we live. Opposition 
 demands a ground beyond itself in which the 
 
BARUCH SPINOZA 
 
 p. 42] 
 
Spinoza and Leibnitz 43 
 
 opposition may occur ; and, if the world be 
 conceived as consisting of modifications in two 
 kinds of substance, it follows that because 
 these two kinds can be contrasted they must 
 be in some way ahke. They are ahke, says 
 Spinoza, because ultimately they are seen to 
 be the same. " All bodies, however various, 
 are full of soul." This same thing of which 
 all are made is the eternal and immutable, 
 undistinguished and absolute substance, " God 
 or Nature." Of this supreme Eeality nothing 
 can be known intellectually, for it is above 
 all attributes, and no qualities can be pre- 
 dicated of it. 
 
 We have here an argued system of mystical 
 philosophy, in which all the detail and oppo- 
 sition of immediate experience has disap- 
 peared. Its wording is almost that of the 
 old negative theology, which rises by negation 
 of this and that to a concept of the ultimate 
 ground of all experience ; but so far the 
 result is barren of explanation in regard to 
 the finite and immediate world of every-day 
 experience. Indeed, the idea of Substance, 
 with which Spinoza's " Ethics " begins, is not 
 really the starting-place for his thought. We 
 
44 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 know that it is a habit of philosophers to 
 take that idea from which they begin their 
 reconstruction as if it were the idea from which 
 their whole system arose ; but in fact, before 
 the philosopher reaches the first page of his 
 writing, he has been through a long process 
 of thinking. Thus it seems often that the 
 greatest difl&culty in imderstanding a philo- 
 sopher is that which occurs at the very 
 beginning ; and the philosopher himself tends 
 to forget that the logical order in which he 
 sets out his thought is not the order in which 
 he himself developed it. So Spinoza begins 
 his explanation of the ordinary world from 
 the idea of substance ; but we may well suppose 
 that it was the ordinary world which gave 
 rise to that idea. Spinoza's philosophy is a 
 finished lens, through which he saw more 
 clearly the same world which he had dimly 
 seen before. 
 
 This, then, is the explanation of the world 
 of ordinary hfe : Of substance there are two 
 great modifications — the Cartesian extended 
 matter and a world of thought or spirit. The 
 whole of the finite world is therefore dual ; 
 each part is a perfect whole within God or 
 
Spinoza and Leibnitz 45 
 
 Nature, and within each part subdivision is 
 determined by subdivision. That is to say, 
 the divisions of the apparent world are real 
 divisions only if looked at from within ; or 
 again, we see the world divided because we 
 are ourselves each a division. We may thus 
 conceive that separation as such is unreal, 
 and that ultimately the whole, from a point 
 of view which is higher, may be regarded as 
 two sides of one thing. The world of science 
 is nature that has been produced, and the 
 force which produces hes within that world. 
 
 But is the world of human individuahty 
 also appearance ? Spinoza says it is ; yet 
 he does not mean that it is all an illusion. 
 He never denies that for the man a separate 
 and independent individuahty is true as a 
 practical postulate ; but for him who has 
 risen to some vision of the whole it is also 
 true to say that reahty is one unbroken 
 system, all self-determined. The practical 
 postulate of Ufe, the idea of an independent 
 individual, gives rise to the basis of all good 
 life — the force of self-assertion (" conatus sui 
 conservandi "). It is therefore true moraUty 
 to develop the self to the uttermost, and all 
 
46 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 limitation is to be regarded as a means to this 
 end. Now, the greater the knowledge of the 
 whole, the greater the development of the 
 individual is likely to be : for this reason it 
 is said that virtue is knowledge. The attitude 
 of the will is absolutely determined by what 
 is thought to be good, and so in fact intellect 
 absorbs all the supposed functions of a freely 
 choosing will. Hence also it is the positive 
 side of hfe that we must commend, in the 
 faith that evil and all negatives do not ulti- 
 mately exist. Grief and abjectness are to be 
 done away with, and we are to go forward 
 with the assurance that God or Nature does 
 not mislead us. We are not to suppose, how- 
 ever, that we can cast ourselves free from the 
 circumstances of our nature. True freedom 
 is not a right with which we are born, but a 
 prize which we must win. 
 
 With such resolute logic as his, it is hardly 
 to be wondered at if Spinoza was isolated 
 from the thought of his day. A thousand 
 interests other than those of pure truth were 
 in conflict with what seemed to be a violation 
 of all the estabhshed conceptions of hfe. 
 Thus it was that Spinoza's conception of his 
 
Spinoza and Leibnitz 47 
 
 own meaning, and the judgment passed on 
 him by contemporaries, were absolutely op- 
 posed. He whom a future age recognised as 
 " drunk with godhead " was regarded by men 
 of his own time as an atheist. 
 
 But, quite apart from popular misunder- 
 standing, there are obvious hmitations in 
 Spinoza's philosophy. His thought did not 
 express a complete insight into the world of 
 his day. And in fact we find that the de- 
 ficiencies of the grinder of lenses were supphed 
 by a courtier-philosopher. Leibnitz was not 
 so great a man as Spinoza ; but his position in 
 the development of philosophy is important 
 as supplementing that of his opponent. For 
 whereas Spinoza saw the unity of the world, 
 Leibnitz saw its infinite variety. 
 
 No more starthng contrast could be desired 
 than is to be found in the lives of these two. 
 This fact will prepare us for a contrast of 
 view, if once it is granted that the philosopher's 
 own experience is the ground for all his 
 speculation. Leibnitz was no recluse. He 
 not only stands in definite relation to all 
 parties of his own day, but is himself a 
 link between the periods of history. He is 
 
48 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 an example of the polymath of the Renais- 
 sance, knowing classic and scholastic Hterature 
 as well as the empirical science and mathe- 
 matics of his own age ; and he is also one 
 of the first exponents of the ideal of personal 
 culture peculiar to the Aufklarung — the Ger- 
 man Enlightenment. 
 
 Leibnitz (1646-1716) was the son of a 
 professor of moral philosophy at Leipsic. 
 His education was varied, and his later 
 life was fiUed with different employments. 
 Travel and the meeting with great men 
 of his day — Arnauld, Boyle, and Spinoza — 
 further widened his views. In the theory of 
 language he was far in advance of his time ; 
 and he published an improved version of 
 the differential calculus, which had just 
 been discovered. He was energetic in sup- 
 porting the foundation of Scientific Academies 
 and in attempting to reunite Christendom. 
 
 A system of philosophy was but slowly 
 estabhshed in the mind of Leibnitz. This 
 had its efiect in the comprehensiveness of 
 the result. Feeling as he did the gain to 
 thought which had been due to the mechanical 
 conception of nature, he was aware, never- 
 
GOTTrKIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ 
 
 p. «] 
 
Spinoza and Leibnitz 49 
 
 theless, that the formation of a philosophy 
 upon that model had been too hurried. 
 Important elements of experience had been 
 omitted. Thus Leibnitz first appears as a 
 critic of the Cartesian philosophy of nature, 
 in behalf of the aesthetic and moral elements 
 in human life. In spite of opposition, how- 
 ever, Leibnitz was at one with the new 
 philosophy in so far as it denied the " forms " 
 and " occult powers " of Scholasticism. His 
 language as to clear ideas and the opposition 
 of soul and body remains Cartesian ; though 
 doubtless the meaning is transformed when 
 these terms have been, placed within his 
 new system. 
 
 The problem which first attracted Leibnitz 
 was that of the opposition between the 
 mechanical or determinist philosophy and 
 the teleology or purposes upon which all the 
 value of life seemed to depend. Here we 
 have the clear opposition of determined 
 Nature and free-willed Man. So certain and 
 logical is the determinist conception of the 
 world that no reasonable man could deny it 
 all value. Are we then to think of the 
 waves of law rising to cover the last vestige 
 
 4 
 
50 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 of personality ? Is individuality to dis- 
 appear into a scientific formula ? Or are we 
 to say, " Thus far and no farther " ? Leibnitz 
 faced the spectre of mechanism, and, by 
 discovering the limitations of the new philo- 
 sophy, he reached a point of view from 
 which he could explain both the truth which 
 it contained and the interests it opposed. 
 Of course the same battle had to be fought 
 again in different lands, because the vision 
 of Leibnitz was partial and inadequate. 
 Nevertheless, it was he who made the first 
 step. For the mathematical and stable re- 
 lations to which Cartesianism had reduced 
 the world, Leibnitz substituted active centres 
 of individual force which he called Monads. 
 The connection of these monads, and the 
 establishment of that ultimate unity which 
 is a necessity for metaphysics, he sought in 
 an idea of Pre-estabKshed Harmony. The 
 most striking elements of his thought may 
 be explained under these two terms. 
 
 First, with regard to Monads, the mathe- 
 matical knowledge of Leibnitz led him to 
 doubt the hypothesis of infinitely divisible 
 extension as the ultimate nature of bodies. 
 
SpJnoza and Leibnitz 51 
 
 It is obvious that such an hjrpothesis is 
 insufiicient to account for motion and change. 
 The concept of force must be introduced 
 before it can be even a scientific theory ; 
 but the idea of force, if regarded as funda- 
 mental, will explain both change and the 
 dependent extension. Activity will explain 
 passivity ; but passivity can never explain 
 activity. Thus, as with Spinoza, the demand 
 is made for the reduction of hypothesis to a 
 simple form ; not two substantial existences 
 are to be admitted, but the world is to be 
 conceived as consisting of one substance 
 which is force ("vis viva," force primitive). 
 Substance may be defined as " a being capable 
 of action." This does not mean that force 
 is so much " material " ; but it means that 
 force is what is ultimately real, the inde- 
 pendent upon which all determination de- 
 pends. Thus in itself force is merely " that 
 which brings about change." 
 
 We are here not far from the nature as 
 producing ("natura naturans") of Spinoza. 
 Leibnitz, however, proceeds to show that there 
 are many substances, and not one only. The 
 correction of Spinoza rests upon the nature 
 
52 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 of self-consciousness, for the world of ex- 
 perience can clearly be divided into self 
 and not-self. It is not clear, it must be 
 confessed, why Leibnitz should think himself 
 justified in supposing that experience gives 
 innumerable such divisions ; but, having 
 fixed upon the conception of self and many 
 selves, he finds the self to be a type of force. 
 The centre of force is called a monad, or 
 individual, because it is independent. Now, 
 the force of which we are aware in ourselves 
 is immanent, for, having separated the self 
 from the not-self, we cannot reunite them. 
 Thus the monad is described as having no 
 windows, nor any means of influencing what 
 is outside. Within the self we find a suc- 
 cession of states passing upwards from the 
 subconscious " petites perceptions " to per- 
 ception or sensory life, and thence to apper- 
 ception, or the conscious appropriation of 
 sensory data by the self. 
 
 The whole world is a world of individuals. 
 No amount of metaphysical thinking can 
 justify us in denying that fundamental division 
 upon which all such thinking is based — the 
 division of the self from what is not the 
 
Spinoza and Leibnitz 53 
 
 self. Nothing is but monads. These mo- 
 nads are of all kinds, united only in so far 
 as they are all the expressions of force. 
 Some are " sleeping monads," such as what 
 we call dead matter ; some are half-awakened, 
 such as trees or animals. 
 
 Of the poetic beauty of such a conception 
 there can be no doubt ; but a cruel logic 
 must ask for reasons. What ground is there 
 for supposing that the whole of this world 
 of monads is not merely a subjective dream 
 — and this more especially since we have 
 asserted that no influence can pass from 
 one monad to another ? Leibnitz replies with 
 the theory of a pre-estabhshed harmony. In 
 each monad the internal activities are har- 
 monious with the changes in every other 
 monad, so that each is a unique synthesis 
 of the various states in all the others ; and, 
 because of this content in each, the monads 
 are all bound together in harmony. At first 
 the harmony was spoken of by Leibnitz 
 as an external connecting-link between all 
 monads ; but later it becomes itself a force, 
 and therefore the Monad of monads — God. 
 Then we may say_the harmony regarded as 
 
54 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 the link between finite monads is " caused 
 by " God. Because the harmony is a logical 
 presupposition of a world of monads it is 
 called pre-estabhshed. The relation of the 
 finite monads to the infinite Monad is spoken 
 of, neo-platonically, as " continual fulgura- 
 tion." 
 
 With the theological learning of Leibnitz 
 we are not concerned. He wrote a justifica- 
 tion of " God " in a very different and more 
 orthodox meaning of that term. He also 
 discovered that pleasant fable, based upon 
 a mistake of formal logic, that this is the best 
 of all possible worlds. 
 
 Leibnitz thought he could maintain the 
 orthodox view of the world ; but, like other 
 and better men, he imagined he had found a 
 new meaning in orthodoxy, when he had 
 only found a new name for it. The violence 
 of his opposition to Spinoza, if honest, was 
 due to his zeal for orthodoxy. Spinoza, 
 however, was already beyond the reach of a 
 courtier's zeal against the heresy of a recluse. 
 
 In their thinking, these two men express 
 a very old contrast. It is nothing less than 
 the relation of the individual to the absolute 
 
Spinoza and Leibnitz 55 
 
 which was in question. Approached from 
 one side all the world seems one reality, and 
 from the other side plurality is obvious and 
 omnipresent. Spinoza, perhaps, with Eastern 
 leanings, loses the individual in the absolute : 
 Leibnitz, with his Western mind, could never 
 forget that the living individual is the basis 
 of all thought and life. 
 
CHAPTEB IV 
 
 THE ENGLISH SCHOOL 
 
 WHILE the great thinkers of the Con- 
 tinent were employed in the making 
 of comprehensive systems, Philosophy was 
 being developed in England with a different 
 purpose. A precision of knowledge rather 
 than an all-embracing system seemed most 
 valuable. The field viewed was confined 
 within the limits of almost personal observa- 
 tion, and hence it has been sometimes doubted 
 whether we can even speak of an English 
 Philosophy of that period. For philosophy 
 must at any rate attempt a comprehensive 
 view of experience. It is, however, true to 
 say that a comprehensive view must involve 
 exact observation of detail, and in this the 
 great system-makers have often been at 
 fault. Hence we may count as within the 
 main stream of development those thinkers 
 , 56 
 
The English School 57 
 
 whose office it has been to test, by continual 
 reference to immediate experience, the com- 
 prehensive thought reached by their pre- 
 decessors. In fact, the course of thought 
 which we have now to trace in England and 
 in France makes the necessary antithesis to 
 the dogmatic systems of Spinoza and Leibnitz. 
 Out of the opposition between these two types 
 of thought, the unifying and the analysing, 
 arose the philosophy of Kant. 
 
 Although Locke and his followers were 
 inspired by Cartesianism, their continual 
 reference to ordinary experience for the 
 data of their philosophy serves to connect 
 them with the EngUsh philosophy attempted 
 by Bacon and Hobbes. Since the days in 
 which direct thinking had been practised by 
 Hobbes in England, poUtical revolutions had 
 been accompUshed. The whole scheme of 
 mediaeval life was gone. The passions of 
 opposing parties, from which Hobbes had 
 suffered, were almost cooled, and the time 
 seemed ripe for constructive thought. In 
 the intellectual world an obsolete Scholasticism 
 held the Universities, and Cartesianism was 
 still unorthodox. Oxford was consistently 
 
58 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 Aristotelian. At Cambridge, where the Be- 
 naissance had produced such criticism as 
 that of Bacon, a kind of anti-Cartesianism 
 was attempted. The Cambridge Platonists, 
 as the new thinkers were called, are con- 
 nected with the literary rather than with the 
 scientific Renaissance. They are of interest 
 chiefly as indicating the tendencies which 
 were opposed to the efforts of Locke and 
 Hume. Of far greater importance for the 
 future of philosophy was the work of Isaac 
 Newton, who, though no philosopher, carried 
 to its legitimate consequences the mechanical 
 view of nature. 
 
 The purely philosophical movement which 
 we have now to discuss may be conveniently 
 regarded as a single whole. It begins in 
 Empiricism, it changes with Berkeley into an 
 Idealism only half-developed, and it ends in 
 the Scepticism of Hume. In many ways 
 Berkeley stands apart from those who precede 
 and follow him. He is, perhaps, too impor- 
 tant to be regarded as a step between Locke 
 and Hume ; but, viewed historically, his work 
 must be valued differently from the way in 
 which we should judge it if he stood alone. 
 
The English School 59 
 
 The fact is that his own generation seems 
 to have understood only his subsidiary ideas 
 and orthodox language ; and the great in- 
 fluence of Hume over the later Continental 
 philosophy obscured the importance of 
 Berkeley. 
 
 Three great names, therefore, are united 
 in the historic development of English 
 philosophy — those of Locke, Berkeley and 
 Hume. Their Uves are of the greatest im- 
 portance for the understanding of their 
 philosophy. 
 
 John Locke (1632-1704) was born at 
 Wrington, near Bristol. He was educated 
 at Westminster and Christ Church. To the 
 Scholasticism of the University he added 
 private reading in the Cartesian philosophy. 
 After some secretarial employment he became 
 physician and personal friend of Lord Shaftes- 
 bury, whose fortunes in politics afiected 
 Locke's movements. He Uved in exile in 
 France for a time (1675-1679), returned, and 
 departed again with Shaftesbury to Holland 
 when James II. showed himself hostile. 
 Thus it was that Locke entered England 
 eventually attached to the party of WiUiam 
 
6o Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 of Orange. For a time he was a Commissioner, 
 and afterwards lived at Gates in Essex, 
 at Sir Thomas Masham's — whose wife, it is 
 interesting to note, was a daughter of Ralf 
 Cudworth, the Cambridge Platonist. The 
 work of Locke that is most important for 
 philosophy is the " Essay concerning Human 
 Understanding," written about 1687 and 
 published about 1689. There were many 
 editions of this book, introducing revisions 
 and additions ; and apparently, in the sixth 
 edition, the chapter on the Association of 
 Ideas was introduced in this way. The 
 letters on " Toleration," and on " Civil 
 Government," and the work called " The 
 Reasonableness of Christianity," express 
 Locke's views on religion and poUtics. In 
 reUgion he thought he was conservative ; in 
 pohtics he was a Whig. 
 
 George Berkeley (1685-1753) was born in 
 Co. Kilkenny, in Ireland, of an Enghsh family. 
 He studied at Trinity College, Dublin. After 
 the first development of his philosophical 
 ideas, his position as a clergyman led him 
 first to attempt the correction of free-thinkers. 
 Then, with his enthusiasm for simplicity in 
 
GEOKGE BERKELEY 
 
 00] 
 
The English School 6i 
 
 life and thought, he went out as a 
 missionary, accompanying the colonists of 
 Rhode Island. He returned disappointed, 
 and adopted the quiet ideals of a scholar ; 
 he never, however, lost his love for a life 
 untrammelled by the fashions of the eighteenth 
 century. He became Bishop of Cloyne in 
 1734, and afterwards retired to Oxford, where 
 he died. His philosophy was almost fully 
 developed in his first efforts : his earliest and 
 most important works are the " New Theory 
 of Vision " (1709) and the " Treatise on the 
 Principles of Human Knowledge " (1710). The 
 other works of interest are more popular — 
 " Three Dialogues between Hylas and 
 Philonous " and " Alciphron ; or, the Minute 
 Philosopher" (1732). 
 
 David Hume, the son of a Scottish advocate, 
 was born at Edinburgh in 1711. He lived for 
 some years in France (1734-1737), during which 
 time he composed the " Treatise on Human 
 Nature " (published in London, 1739). He was 
 inspired with literary and philosophic ideals, 
 and is almost a Renaissance Humanist in the 
 manner in which he speaks of fame. After 
 some time spent as secretary to the embassies 
 
62 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 in Vienna and Turin, Hume was able to settle 
 down to literary pursuits, as librarian in 
 Edinburgh.. During this time he published 
 his "History of England" (1754-1762), and 
 showed his religious position in " The Natural 
 History of Religion " (1755). He had now 
 attained the position of fame for which he 
 had hoped, and, on accompanying a political 
 mission to France in 1763, found himself a 
 person of consequence in the intellectual world. 
 Hume was Under-Secretary of State at the 
 Foreign Ofl&ce for about two years, and retired 
 to Edinburgh on a pension in 1769. There he 
 lived in philosophic calm, which the disease 
 that came to him in 1775 could not destroy, 
 until his death in 1776. His character was 
 generous ; he could meet with equal pleasure 
 the philosophical coterie and the men and 
 women of the world. He thought himself 
 happy in the kind attitude of all men towards 
 him, even of those who, as he says, had most 
 reason to attack him. His chief works are 
 the " Treatise of Human Nature," which 
 marked a stage in the history of thought, and 
 a smaller rendering of the same theories, the 
 "Enquiry concerning Human Understanding" 
 
The English School 63 
 
 (1749), which, he published owing to the failure 
 of his great work to attract attention. There 
 are also " An Enquiry concerning the Princi- 
 ples of Morals " (1751), " The Natural History 
 of Religion " (1755), and " Essays " (1748). 
 The " Dialogue concerning Natural Eeligion " 
 was published after his death by his friend 
 Adam Smith. Of Hume as a philosopher i^ 
 might be said that he " pricked many bubbles 
 and blew none." 
 
 The whole movement represented by these 
 men began with a demand for reference to 
 observed facts, as a protest against the anti- 
 quated jargon of the Universities and the 
 ready-made systems of the Cartesians. The 
 problem of philosophic thought was necessarily 
 stated in Cartesian language, and Locke at 
 many points uncritically accepted Cartesian 
 conceptions ; but in the main he used a sane 
 criticism of experience. His purpose he con- 
 fesses to be a very Kmited one. He will not 
 construct a metaphysical system, but will 
 attempt only to think out the meaning of the 
 most obvious facts. Now, those " facts " 
 which appear to him most prominent are 
 " ideas " or thoughts. One class of thoughts 
 
64 Development of Modern Philosophy- 
 is supposed to lie beyond criticism — the so- 
 called innate ideas, whether logical or moral. 
 Locke denies the existence of any such class. 
 His disproof of its existence is unreal to us 
 now. " A child/' he says, " knows not that 
 three and four are equal to seven till he comes 
 to be able to count seven " — such ideas depend 
 upon experience. Therefore we cannot be said 
 to be born with them. The valuable part of 
 Locke's argument is the implication that 
 criticism must cover the whole of thought, 
 and thought itself is at no point independent 
 of experience. 
 
 If, then, we wish to explain experience we 
 must begin with its simplest elements. The 
 data of experience are first of all sensations, 
 which are run together to make complex ideas, 
 such as that of substance. With this crude 
 description is connected the first reasoned 
 account of the association of ideas (" Human 
 Understanding," ii. 32). It is here also that 
 Locke makes the famous distinction between 
 primary qualities, or those which are perceived 
 by more than one sense {e.g. extension), and 
 secondary quahties, such as colour. Primary 
 qualities are said to belong to objects, and 
 
The English School 65 
 
 secondary qualities are caused by the action 
 of the percipient. 
 
 The thought has so far proceeded upon the 
 supposition that the idea is a veil rather than 
 a revelation of the " thing." The idea inter- 
 venes between the subject and the object. 
 In a brilliant treatment of the value of words 
 Locke now hints at the nominalism which 
 tends to relegate the " thing " to the region 
 of the unknowable. The contrast follows be- 
 tween the intuitive knowledge of ideas and 
 the unknown connection between the ideas 
 and the " things." The secret is out, and the 
 way is prepared for Berkeley and Hume. We 
 are supposed to know ideas and not things. 
 Locke himself was not clear as to what had 
 happened. He continued to have the most 
 pathetic faith in his reasoning ; and, more 
 strangely still, he seems to have thought that 
 he had reached by his own unaided criticism 
 these relics of a dead metaphysic — the " idea " 
 and the unknown " thing." 
 
 Logic, however, wiU not always stop where 
 its servants expect. Berkeley, as a Cartesian, 
 accepts self-consciousness for the basis of his 
 philosophy, and, as a learner from Locke, he 
 
 5 
 
66 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 accepts the certain knowledge of our own 
 states (ideas) ; but, as to the mysterious sub- 
 stratum of which sensory ideas are supposed 
 to be the outcome, he boldly says that it is a 
 superfluous hypothesis. All qualities depend 
 upon the subject perceiving, and to speak of 
 " matter " which supports them is mere 
 absurdity. For then the reality is said to be 
 that which never enters into experience, and 
 our knowledge of this reality is dependent upon 
 the qualities which in no way present it to us. 
 Such an abstraction as " matter," therefore, 
 must be put aside, in the interests of common 
 sense and philosophy. It is plain that an 
 object is merely what is opposed to the 
 subject ; its reality is its being perceived 
 (" esse " is " percipi "). In fact " there is not 
 any other substance than spirit, or that which 
 perceives " (§ 7). From this critical reasoning, 
 but without any reference to the real move- 
 ment of Berkeley's thought, arose a meta- 
 physical " freak " of the eighteenth century, 
 called at that date Egoism and now known 
 as Solipsism. It was argued that one's self 
 and its modifications were all that could be 
 known. The ordered world of things was a 
 
The English School 67 
 
 subjective dream. Of course such a belief is 
 not Idealism, nor has it any claim to be called 
 philosophical ; it may, however, usurp the 
 language of philosophy. A fatal objection to 
 it is that it gives one no means of distinguish- 
 ing illusion from appearance ; and Berkeley 
 himself had to attempt further explanation 
 of his view. What is the meaning of the 
 common experience of being " afiected with 
 ideas " (§ 18) 1 To this Berkeley replies, with 
 less cogency and less originality than one 
 might have expected, by postulating a uni- 
 versal cause, an infinite Spirit — God. The 
 realities, of which the ideas of body and such 
 things as body are the result, are the ideas of 
 God, imprinted by Him upon us. Things 
 therefore " are external with regard to their 
 origin, in that they are not generated from 
 within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a 
 Spirit distinct from that which perceives 
 them " (§ 90). With such a reduction of the 
 whole problem to infinities and eternities, the 
 current conceptions of religion and morals find 
 a place and a justification. After all, Berkeley, 
 although a philosopher, was a bishop. His 
 religious meditation in what follows, and 
 
68 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 his philosophy, are not unlike those of 
 Malebranche, the Cartesian of the Paris 
 Oratory. 
 
 Once again, however, the thought which a 
 great man begins goes farther than he can 
 imagine. Berkeley had destroyed the hypo- 
 thesis of " extended things " ; and Hume pro- 
 ceeded farther along the way that now was 
 open. " That all the arguments," he says, 
 " of that ingenious author [Berkeley], though 
 otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely 
 sceptical, appears from this, that they admit 
 of no answer and produce no conviction." ' 
 The premise had been that all knowledge, 
 whether of ideas or of things, came from dif- 
 ferent sensations or impressions, and Berkeley 
 had said that the connection between the idea 
 and the thing was arbitrary. Hume now saw 
 that the position was exactly the same with 
 regard to intuitive ideas. The idea of self, 
 for example, is arbitrary in exactly the same 
 way as the idea of a table. For indeed it is 
 obvious that all ideas are the ideas of a per- 
 ceiving subject : the result depends upon the 
 process — " this is the universe of Imagina- 
 
 1 "Enquiry," § 12, pt. 1, note. 
 
The English School 69 
 
 tion." ' If it is false to say that an unknown 
 thing, " matter," is the postulate of what is 
 given to us in externally caused impressions, 
 it is no less false to say that an unknown thing, 
 " spirit," is the postulate of what is given to 
 us as a succession of states. If " matter " is 
 misleading, " spirit " is as bad ; for, in fact, 
 the very idea of substance is misleading : it 
 is nothing but an unwarrantable hypothesis 
 acting as a ghostly substratum or support 
 for what is, in experience, a mere succession 
 of states. The conclusion that would follow 
 in regard to the substance which was regarded 
 as the ground or explanation for the whole of 
 experience is not stated by Hume. The motto 
 chosen by him for his great work indicated 
 " the fewness of those periods in which one 
 can think what one hkes and say what one 
 thinks." In Hume's day it was not prudent 
 to speak too plainly on reUgious and theo- 
 logical subjects ; but as to immediate ex- 
 perience, it is plainly stated that there is no 
 ground for the common assumption of " in- 
 dependent " reaKties.^ It is pure fiction to 
 
 1 " Treatise," i. 315. 
 3 " Treatise," i. 504. 
 
70 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 suppose that these exist ; just as it is fiction 
 to suppose that an object is still coloured when 
 it is in the dark, because we see that it is 
 coloured when it is in the light.' Hume's 
 reasoning went still farther ; having explained 
 the current conceptions of metaphysics as de- 
 lusions, he proceeds to show how such delusions 
 arise. 
 
 Berkeley had introduced a " Deus ex ma- 
 china," as Hume calls it, to account for the 
 delusion about " matter " ; but Hume had 
 not even this resource, for even substance-self 
 and spirit had disappeared. He looked there- 
 fore to immediate experience once again, to 
 find by closer inspection some kind of ex- 
 planation. In the world of ideas he finds 
 association. There are some ideas that have 
 afl&nity to others, and, by continual repetition 
 of a certain concomitance, a feeling of 
 necessary connection between associated ideas 
 arises within us. This causes a customary or 
 habitual attitude, and serves to explain the 
 past and foretell the future. Hume, of course, 
 does not deny the fact of the continuity of 
 conscious fife : he states that experience gives 
 
 1 " Treatise," i. 406. 
 
The English School 71 
 
 us a bond between ideas, and of the nature of 
 this bond he knows nothing/ The self as the 
 unifying bond is never given to thought.^ 
 
 With regard to the external world, the 
 necessary connection which is supposed to be 
 the postulate for our unifying of perception is 
 that of cause and efEect. This is the object 
 of Hume's further criticism.^ We must be 
 aware that at one time the word " cause " seems 
 to have meant " active agent." The present 
 scientific use of the word, as meaning the sum of 
 the pre-conditions, is partly due to the influ- 
 ence of Hume. It was he who corrected the 
 popular idea of activity in " things." " As 
 all philosophers since Hume have recognised, 
 the ' activity ' of the cause results from an 
 ascription to it of the characteristic feeUng of 
 self-assertion and self-expansion which accom- 
 pany our own voluntary interference in the 
 course of events." * 
 
 In the first place, it is clear that the con- 
 nection of cause and effect is not the same as 
 
 1 " Treatise," § 2, p. 4. 
 
 2 " Treatise," i. p. 463. 
 
 3 " Treatise," bk. i. pt. 3. 
 
 * Taylor, "^Metaphysics," p. 109, 
 
The English School 73 
 
 however, were we to omit the work they did 
 in the theory of morals. Before further dis- 
 cussing the growth of purely philosophical 
 thought, we must therefore deal with that 
 department of it which treats of the basis for 
 morals. Hobbes had long ago begun the 
 Enghsh tradition of criticism with regard to 
 moral sentiments. The later philosophers 
 followed him in searching rather for psycho- 
 logical connections than for metaphysical 
 grounds for the moral ideas. Now, in the 
 world of moral judgments the most obvious 
 criterion of good and bad is that of conse- 
 quences. What was conceived to be " good " 
 was explained as so judged because it had 
 advantageous consequences. This was the 
 beginning of the Utihtarian theory. At first 
 the advantage or utihty to which reference 
 was made was individual or " selfish " ; but 
 it soon became evident that a large section of 
 moral judgments involved the recognition of 
 common interests. Hume made these vague 
 ideas into a keen psychological anatomy of 
 morals.^ He dissects the feehngs to find in 
 
 » In the " Treatise,'' pt. iii., and the " Enquiry concerning 
 the Principles of Morals." 
 
74 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 them tke ground for the moral judgments. 
 Whatever the origin of the moral sentiments, 
 Hume is as clear as Spinoza in his acceptance 
 of their validity. A non-rational origin did 
 not seem to involve any deficiency in the 
 product. Hume's position, then, if not deeply 
 introspective, is cogent. His treatment of 
 sympathy as the appreciation of another's 
 experience served as a basis for the social 
 morals of his friend, Adam Smith (1732- 
 1790). From this came, as a consequence 
 of the theory of the mechanical relation of 
 the individual and the social organism, 
 the new theory of Political Economy. 
 Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) forms the 
 link between these thinkers and the later 
 Utilitarians. 
 
 An opposition to the method and results of 
 Hume was formed almost immediately. Even 
 before his day Shaftesbury had attempted to 
 express a different view of morals. His 
 manner was violent and often unphilosophical ; 
 but his attitude had much influence in his 
 day, for it was that of the " gentleman of 
 the period." The reaction in pure philosophy 
 was attempted by Thomas Reid (1710-1796), 
 
The English School 75 
 
 who, in the name of Common Sense, appealed 
 against Hume's destroying logic. 
 
 Protests, however, were insufficient to stem 
 the current of criticism. Men passed from 
 the discussion of Morals to the discussion of 
 Religion. In Hume's " Dialogues on Natural 
 Rehgion " we are already in the world of the 
 Deists and the Encyclopaedists. The conclu- 
 sion of criticisms seemed to be this : There 
 might be some principle of unity, a " Supreme 
 Being " which might be called God ; but as 
 to the nature of this Being — the sum of it 
 all was, we cannot know. The sense of all- 
 pervading law, gained during the Renaissance, 
 led thinkers to reject apologies for religion 
 which were based upon the supposed value 
 of exceptions (miracles). Revelation was 
 explained away, and " natural " religion 
 was advocated. " Free-thinker " and " pan- 
 theism " are terms invented during this period, 
 to express an attitude and a philosophy. At 
 this time, however, the real force of the critical 
 movement rapidly passed from England to 
 France, and we must therefore examine the 
 development of thought in that country. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT 
 
 A MOVEMENT closely related to the 
 -^--*- EngUsh Empiricism was taking place 
 at the same time in France. It is known as 
 the Enlightenment {V Illumination) ; and al- 
 though the name can be applied to the 
 movement of English and of German thought 
 during the eighteenth century, there is a 
 tone in the French thought of the period 
 which seems to make this word " enlighten- 
 ment " specially applicable to it. It must be 
 recognised, however, that in essentials the 
 movement is one which began as the empiri- 
 cism of individual experience in England, was 
 continued in the scepticism as to authority 
 in France, and became in Germany a gospel 
 of intellectual culture. The three countries 
 formed three distinct backgrounds for the 
 
 same movement of thought. 
 
 76 
 
The French Enlightenment 77 
 
 At first the French lUmnmation was repre- 
 sented by the spread of a scientific attitude 
 towards experience. The attempts of the 
 old Cartesianism to establish a metaphysics 
 of all reality were rejected as preposterous, 
 and the more moderate and more cogent, 
 if less exalted, efforts of empiricism were 
 accepted.' But, once again in the history 
 of thought, external interests were soon 
 involved ; for the Illumination was taking 
 place in an environment by no means suited 
 to philosophic reflection. Political and re- 
 ligious corruption were too obvious and too 
 omnipresent to be excluded from the phi- 
 losopher's study. Therefore the scientific 
 movement became definitely opposed to the 
 accepted forms of the religious consciousness. 
 In this the French Illumination was closely 
 
 1 Cf. Condillao, " Essai sur rOrigine des Conn.," latrod. : 
 " II faut distinguer deux sortes de m^taphysique. L'une, am- 
 bitieuse, veut peroer tous les mysteres, . . . I'autre, plus 
 retenue, proportionne ses reoherohes h, la faiblesse de I'esprit 
 humain. ... La premiere fait de toute la nature une espece 
 d'enohantement qui se dissipe comme eUe : la seconde, ne 
 cherchant h, voir les choses que comme elles sont en effet, est 
 aussi simple que la verity meme. . . . Les philosophes se sont 
 partioulierement exerc6s sur la premiere. . . . Locke est le 
 seul que je crois devoir excepter." 
 
78 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 connected with the Sceptical and Deist move- 
 ment in England ; but in its last stages it 
 had a character all its own, for it was also 
 definitely in opposition to the accepted 
 poUtical theory. Whereas English Empiricism 
 had found a poUtical revolution already 
 accomphshed, and Locke merely gave reasons 
 for a " res judicata," in France the old order 
 and the ghosts of feudaUsm still remained 
 in possession when philosophers turned their 
 attention to the theory of government. In 
 order, therefore, to understand the movement 
 of French thought, it is necessary to refer to 
 circimistances lying outside the scope of 
 philosophy. 
 
 In the poUtical world the most prominent 
 feature was the severance of social strata. 
 This survived even in the attitude of thinkers. 
 They regarded themselves as an elite, in 
 comparison to the " vile canaiUe," who could 
 not be caUed " rational animals." The di- 
 visions of society were not less marked when 
 a new element, the wealthy bourgeoisie, rose 
 to importance. To the aristocracy of brains 
 and cash rather than to that of family the 
 philosophers of the EnUghtenment were 
 
The French Enlightenment 79 
 
 related. There was thils a gradual loosening of 
 the ties that once had bound educated men to 
 the estabUshed social order. The language of 
 Voltaire on this point is in striking contrast with 
 that of the thinkers of the next generation. 
 
 Sceptical conservatism, that will destroy 
 everything but its own comfort, found a means 
 of bowing to the established order, while 
 King Louis wandered over Europe with his 
 mistresses, and a tinsel aristocracy supported 
 cruelty and famine. Closely connected with 
 all this, however, was an established order 
 of ecclesiastical custom : to this and to the 
 privileges it involved for its exponents, not 
 even the aristocracy were reverent. The 
 very foundations of rehgion had been sapped 
 by controversy. MoUnists and Jansenists 
 and GalUcans, and the thousand types of 
 opposition to these, had made theological 
 subtlety a ready mark for the sceptical 
 sarcasms of the cultured, whether philosophic 
 or otherwise. That theological scepticism 
 does not always involve intellectual pre- 
 eminence was known to philosophers. As 
 Vauvenargues says: "Not all who mock at 
 auguries have more intellect than those who 
 
8o Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 believe in them." There was, however, a ten- 
 dency, which became supreme when philosophy 
 had become more popular, for the estabUshed 
 pohtical forms to be closely connected with 
 the forms of religious observance. It could 
 not be readily forgotten that the greatest 
 figures in the French Church were connected 
 with an anti-popular Government. To the 
 preachers of the Revolution both rehgion and 
 politics seemed artificial. It was in this world 
 of old privilege, of feudal and ecclesiastical 
 absurdities, and of a new bourgeoisie that the 
 EnUghtenment of France occurred. The work 
 was done by a succession of men less great 
 as individual thinkers than the philosophers of 
 England and Germany ; but although less 
 great in abstract thought, they had perhaps 
 a more real connection with life. The results 
 of their thinking showed this. They produced 
 no great philosophic conceptions, but they 
 changed the attitude of men towards the 
 world in which they hved. 
 
 The intellectual movement ' may be said 
 to have begun with Bayle, although the 
 
 1 Cf. Lange : " Hist, of Materialism " (Eng. trans,). Vol. II, 
 i, ii., iii. 
 
The French Enlightenment 8i 
 
 writings of Montaigne (1533-1593) had had 
 a great influence already in giving a sceptical 
 tone to French thought. With Bayle, how- 
 ever, the attitude towards reality becomes 
 more positive : the very fact of definite 
 knowledge in regard to immediate data is 
 his ground for an all-destroying scepticism 
 as to what are known as reUgious truths. 
 Now, this attitude harmonised well with the 
 positive results, if not with the stated con- 
 clusions, of English Empiricism ; and the 
 movement was carried further in the writings 
 of Voltaire. With him thought made no 
 new efiorts ; but his clear, if limited, insight 
 was of immense service in spreading the 
 knowledge that had been already acquired. 
 His pitiless dissection of estabUshed creeds, 
 whether philosophic or religious, gave men 
 a confidence in the power of individual 
 thinking that no authority cotdd destroy. 
 If his outlook was narrow and his prejudices 
 irrational, this did not lessen his influence. 
 He is the Sophist of the Illumination, and 
 he became the central figure of intellectual 
 Europe in the eighteenth century. In political 
 theory he is preceded by Montesquieu (1685- 
 
 6 
 
82 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 1775), whose " L'Esprit des Lois" and ad- 
 miration for the English Constitution, once 
 paradoxes, have now become platitudes. In 
 such positive philosophic knowledge as Vol- 
 taire acquired, he was preceded by Condillac, 
 who carried to its extremest consequences the 
 Lockian doctrine of sensation. Closely con- 
 nected with Voltaire, but chiefly following him 
 in date, are the names of the Encyclopaedists. 
 Diderot and d'Alembert, the editors of the 
 Encyclopedic, represent the central force of 
 the movement it embodied. La Mettrie (1709- 
 1751), with his book " L'Homme Machine," 
 and Helvetius, with his sensualisms, marked 
 the intellectual and positivist elements of 
 thought, which were in some way concen- 
 trated in the " Systeme de la Nature " of 
 Dietrich von Holbach. In the meantime 
 an opposing force, that of sentiment, was 
 developed in the writings of Jean Jacques 
 Rousseau. To him we may perhaps trace 
 the Romanticism which in the early nineteenth 
 century was to reverse the positivism of the 
 eighteenth. His supposed influence on the 
 Revolution is perhaps due to the force of senti- 
 mentaUty, which takes the place of thought 
 
The French Enlightenment 83 
 
 during periods of transition. In theory 
 directly based upon the practical, Turgot and 
 Condorcet deserve mention : the former as an 
 economist, the latter a keen observer and the 
 thinker who alone saw the first " bitter in- 
 gatherings of the harvest " in the Revolution.' 
 
 In the development of thought on the 
 lines of empiricism, the French Illumination 
 does not materially improve upon Locke and 
 Hume. The premises are perhaps more 
 clearly conceived, there are more brilliant 
 flashes of insight, and the conclusions are 
 more fearlessly stated — as, for instance, by 
 Holbach ; but, for philosophy, there was 
 perhaps too much quasi-scientific precision and 
 too uncritical a method : the scepticism of the 
 French illuminati did not extend to their 
 own knowledge. Again, for pure thought, 
 there was too extreme an opposition to what 
 was popular and accepted.^ 
 
 In the sphere of theory as to the nature 
 
 1 For these see " Critical Miscell.," by J. Morley, vol. li. 
 
 2 This was of coxirse necessary. " Philosophical thought 
 was turned into a weapon of warfare. The peaceful soul of 
 thought was interrupted by the sound of the signal to turn 
 out and do spiritual battle with the traditions and institutions 
 of former times, which the impatient spirit of man was now 
 calling into question." — Hoffding, vol. i. p. 455. 
 
84 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 of reality as a whole, French thinkers found 
 the lumber of a mediaeval metaphysics. 
 Their sense of the difficulty of gaining and 
 stating scientific knowledge made them the 
 more ready to suppose that a knowledge 
 of reality as a whole was not likely to be 
 so easily acquired, or so correctly stated, as 
 was popularly supposed. The Cartesian re- 
 construction seemed merely to have put 
 together the old lumber on a new plan. To 
 many, therefore, metaphysical theory seemed 
 negligible foUy, and they turned their atten- 
 tion to scientific detail ; but to less closeted 
 thinkers metaphysical lumber seemed ob- 
 structive, and they turned to move it.' In 
 this they are at one with the Deist movement 
 in England ; and at first the general position 
 as to Natural Rehgion repeats itself in France. 
 The positive forms of rehgious theory then 
 in vogue were tried and found wanting in 
 logic and in morality. In regard to logic, the 
 supposed " argxmient from design " is piti- 
 lessly dissected ; for this was the special 
 
 1 Cf. the quotation adopted by Carlyle for his " French 
 Revolution " : X""?'* ^^ Boyfiaraiv liera^oKrjs, ri oKKo ^ SovXila 
 (j-TevovTtiiv KoX iTfiOfcrdai npoajroiovnevav ; 
 
The French Enlightenment 85 
 
 argument developed during the Renaissance, 
 when physical knowledge had driven the old 
 " primum movens " from the empyrean. In 
 Leibnitz it is stated that this is the best of 
 all possible worlds. " What must the others 
 be like ? " asks Candide, especially con- 
 sidering the earthquake at Lisbon.^ Wolff 
 had even been at pains to show that this 
 world is a convenient place for man ; there- 
 fore, to this illogical logic, it seemed that 
 the universe was provided for the enter- 
 tainment of " Tanimal rationnel." Voltaire 
 could see that this was absurd : the cause 
 of the fallacy he could not see. He admits 
 that the postulate of moral order involved in 
 this argument was necessary for Ufe : "Si 
 Dieu n'existait pas, il faudrait Tin venter." 
 
 When, however, the mind turned to the 
 categories of morahty in which the established 
 form of religion seemed to find its chief 
 support, these also were found opposed to 
 established theories. Shaftesbury had already 
 shown, with all his contempt for " enthusiasm," 
 that it was possible to criticise the average 
 
 1 This took place in 1765, and did more than many arguments 
 to shake the popular belief in the " argument from design.'' 
 
86 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 religious theory from the point of view of 
 morality. Ideals of true goodness, even in their 
 most inconsistent form, seemed able to dispense 
 with the doubtful support of a vindictive 
 tyrant for the maintenance of moral discipline. 
 In this Voltaire and Diderot follow Shaftes- 
 bury. And at this stage we find the attempted 
 estabhshment of a Natural Religion, as a 
 safer and truer " sanction " for morality. 
 It is perhaps at this point that Rousseau 
 becomes separated from the main body of 
 thinkers, for he is the preacher of sentiment- 
 alism in religion as elsewhere. His " Savoyard 
 Vicar " attempts to preach a mild form of 
 the " cosmic emotion." " Morahty touched 
 by emotion " is perhaps not an unfair defini- 
 tion for the religion of these " intellectuels " ; 
 but logic will not stop for good intentions. 
 The sentimentaUst view of religion is his- 
 torically false, and an undogmatic rehgion is 
 a fiction of deficient thought. Yet the 
 insight of the Enlightenment found nothing 
 to take the place of the old metaphysical 
 systems. Therefore, at the end of the move- 
 ment it was forcibly stated that the old 
 view of the world was untrue, that sentiment 
 
The French Enlightenment 87 
 
 was no criterion of truth, and that no reason- 
 able world-view existed. It was then seen 
 that the falsehood of the argument from 
 design lay in the arbitrary assumption that 
 our own logical schemata are the premises 
 according to which reality is constructed. 
 
 The mind therefore turned from the 
 celestial dreamlands of an obsolete meta- 
 physics to seek for the shape and form of 
 an earthly paradise ; but the world upon 
 which thinkers looked, when they left the 
 sceptical salons and found themselves in the 
 brutish streets, was by no means the best 
 possible. They trusted that the force which 
 they had learnt to revere in logic was sufl&cient 
 for life : and they set out to right the world 
 by thinking. The moral and pohtical scheme 
 of hfe demanded reconstruction. 
 
 Lastly, therefore, the eighteenth century 
 in France is marked by a logical deduction 
 from the Benaissance concept of the Law 
 of Nature as the foundation of morality. 
 In nothing more than in this are we separated 
 from the Enlightenment ; for to the phi- 
 losophers of that time the moral standard 
 appeared absolute, but for us history h^§ 
 
88 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 made even this relative. That the practice 
 was variable they knew ; but they seem to 
 have explained this by the prevaihng ignorance 
 of the ideal code. To them the ideal of 
 morahty appeared fixed and immutable, and 
 — never doubting their own enlightenment 
 — readily discoverable. To this philosophical 
 ideal they referred when criticising the 
 morality and the laws of their country and 
 their time. The comparison was the more 
 easy because the morality was corrupted 
 and the laws obsolete : the ideal seemed 
 plain. With such a contrast before them, 
 it is hardly strange that the language of 
 philosophers should have seemed revolution- 
 ary. Yet in such men as Turgot and Condorcet 
 a critical attitude seldom involved extreme 
 violence of opposition : to them, as phi- 
 losophers, reform did not mean revolution. 
 The pressure of social circumstances would 
 not, however, allow of slow movement ; and 
 the deluge of the French Revolution swept 
 away all barriers of law and morality and 
 thought — the good with the evil. The phi- 
 losophic movement is not immediately con- 
 cerned with the events of 1789 and 1792 ; 
 
The French Enlightenment 89 
 
 but it is doubtless true that the critical 
 thought of the eighteenth century is con- 
 nected with the ultimate attempt at social 
 reconstruction. For the Revolution does not 
 seem to have been to its own eyes a period 
 of mere destruction : an ideal vision— it may 
 have been illusion — moved the heart and 
 stirred the passions even of Septembriseurs. 
 This vision was an inheritance from the 
 abstract thinkers of the preceding generation ; 
 and what was in essence an economic up- 
 heaval took upon itself the vesture and used 
 the thoughts of a philosophic movement. 
 
 But philosophy had already passed beyond 
 this stage : the " Critique of Pure Reason " 
 had been written. The dogmatic world of 
 the Scholastics and of Leibnitz and the 
 Cartesians, as well as the sceptical thought 
 of Hume, had passed into a new form. No 
 step in the development of modern philosophy 
 is more important than that which was made 
 in Germany at the time of the Revolution. 
 For Germany had inherited both the dog- 
 matism of the French and the scepticism of 
 the English schools, and it was there that 
 the new philosophy of Criticism first arose. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE GERMAN AUFKLARUNG AND KANT 
 
 IN Germany the Aufklarung had akeady 
 been partially expressed by Leibnitz ; 
 yet it is not clear whether that great man 
 more truly represents the polymath of the 
 Renaissance or the scholar of the scientific 
 EnUghtenment. The more hmnanist elements 
 in his thought were, in any case, lost by his 
 immediate successors, and the extreme of 
 rationalist dogmatism was reached by the 
 scholars of Wolff. Thus during the period 
 of Deist controversy in England and revolu- 
 tionary empiricism in France, the purely 
 philosophical thought of the day was repre- 
 sented in Germany by a systematic but 
 unpersuasive metaphysics. This metaphysics 
 was at first opposed in the interests of the 
 fuller rendering given to Ufe by the old 
 
 go 
 
The German Aufklarung and Kant 91 
 
 forms of religious theory ; but Pietism soon 
 found it necessary to form some kind of 
 alliance with the metaphysics of Wolff ; and 
 this metaphysics, on its side, adopted a more 
 concihatory and even apologetic tone in 
 regard to the interests of the orthodox 
 theology. Thus it came about that a kind 
 of inward and ethical emotionalism was in 
 the end adopted as the logical attitude 
 towards which philosophy pointed : this was 
 called Eeligion, and is obviously related to 
 the natural reUgion of England and France 
 in the eighteenth century. But in Germany 
 this attitude did not seem opposed to the 
 accepted forms of the reUgious consciousness. 
 The strength of this ethical and emotional 
 movement was made still greater by the 
 adoption of that side of the French Bnhghten- 
 ment which was expressed by Bousseau. 
 To this is due the interest in aBsthetics and 
 the sentimentalism of the current literature. 
 Thus, an artificial culture, largely adopted 
 from France, became the ideal of education, 
 and the influence of Frederick the Great was 
 directed along these lines ; but there was, 
 perhaps, also a stirring of the depths that 
 
92 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 were to bring forth more forcible thought 
 and more genuine emotion.^ 
 
 The unholy alliance of an arbitrary ration- 
 ahsm with an artificial aesthetic and ethical 
 culture could not long survive. Even before 
 logical thought had freed itself, the force of 
 a new movement, which yet had in it the 
 truth of the past, was expressed by Leasing 
 (1729-1781). His life had in it the promise 
 of the future : a stern critic and a fearless 
 destroyer, he was also a strenuous and hope- 
 ful creator. In philosophical thought he 
 was a mystic, and expressed reverence for the 
 much-decried Spinoza ; but it is perhaps as a 
 Uving character that he has influenced thought, 
 through and beyond Kant. Fate was not 
 gentle with him, yet his head was never bowed. 
 In the sphere of pure thought meanwhile 
 another movement was preparing, and in 
 the year of Lessing's death the " Critique of 
 Pure Eeason " was pubHshed by Immanuel 
 Kant. Kant (1724^-1804) was a Scot by 
 descent : he was born at Konigsberg, in 
 
 1 Cf. the half-prophetic words of Frederick himself : " Nous 
 avons nos auteurs classiques ; . . . nos voisins apprendront 
 I'allemand." 
 
The^German Aufklarung and Kant 93 
 
 East Prussia, where his father had established 
 himself as a strap-maker. He grew up under 
 the influence of a kindly pietism. His parents 
 died while he Was still young ; his sisters 
 went out as servants, and he, with his younger 
 brother, for many years earned a bare liveli- 
 hood as a private tutor. He had, indeed, kept 
 himself during the years of his own education 
 by coaching some of his fellow students. In 
 1755 he returned to Konigsberg and became 
 a Privatdozent at the University there. 
 His publications of this period are chiefly 
 of interest by contrast to those of his later 
 life. It is recorded that he was much in- 
 fluenced by Rousseau, and he made himself 
 thoroughly acquainted with English thought. 
 He had been educated in philosophic thought 
 by a disciple of Wolfi, and during the fifteen 
 years of waiting for an oflicial position he 
 had gained an extensive knowledge of the 
 best mathematics and science of the day. 
 In fact, his lectures and his publications of 
 this period relate more to these subjects 
 than to pure metaphysics. His interest in 
 extra-rational experiences led him to study 
 Swedenborg also ; and the result of these 
 
94 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 various influences was expressed by him in 
 the " Dreams of a Visionary, Explained by 
 Dreams of Metaphysics " (1766). The year 
 
 1769 is said by Kant to have marked his real 
 turning from empiricism and scepticism, as well 
 as from the estabhshed metaphysics ; and in 
 
 1770 he was made Professor of Philosophy in 
 Konigsberg. The strenuous severity of his 
 life and thought after this is reflected in the 
 elaborate arguments and the inartistic form of 
 his later writings. Such was the regularity 
 of his life that, as Heine says, the inhabitants 
 of Konigsberg " set their watches by him," 
 and such the precision of his thought that 
 aU modern philosophy has been guided by 
 reference to it. The " Domesday-book " of 
 philosophy, the " Critique of Pure Reason " 
 (" Kritik der reinen Vernunft "), was pubHshed 
 in 1781, and was followed by the " Prole- 
 gomena to any future Metaphysics " ("Prole- 
 gomena zu einer jeden kiinftigen Metaphysik, 
 die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten konnen," 
 1783), which is a more popular rendering of 
 the same thoughts. The remainder of Kant's 
 life was devoted to working out the implica- 
 tions of the Critical Philosophy. 
 
The German Aufklarung and Kant 95 
 
 In 1788 the practical results of the new 
 philosophy as a doctrine of ethics appeared in 
 the " Critique of Practical Reason " (" Kritik 
 der praktischen Vernunft"), and two years 
 afterwards Kant made the attempt to system- 
 atise the dualism with which he seemed to 
 be left in the " Critique of the Judgment " 
 (" Kritik der Urteilskraft," 1790). 
 
 In addition to controversial writings in 
 defence of his ideas and further elaboration 
 of them, Kant pubhshed (after being granted 
 the imprimatur of the Konigsberg theo- 
 logians) the conclusions he had reached on the 
 subject of rehgion in the " Rehgion within 
 the Bounds of mere Reason" ("Religion 
 innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernimft," 
 1793). Frederick the Great and his ministers, 
 with the rationalism of the EnUghtenment, 
 had passed away, and given place to a pious 
 obscurantism in high quarters at Berlin. 
 Kant's book was condemned by the 
 theological politicians, and a Cabinet order 
 threatened the philosopher with dire conse- 
 quences if he presumed to say what he thought 
 about rehgion. Kant consented to be silent 
 during the lifetime of the king then reigning. 
 
Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 A few essays more were, however, all that 
 Kant was able to manage ; and in 1797 he 
 gave up lecturing. Old age was already 
 upon him. His mind was no longer capable 
 of its former grasp, and the history of his 
 closing years is one of slow and painful decay. 
 
 In Kant's thought the many influences of 
 the Enlightenment were drawn together ; 
 and in his works the swelling of the stream 
 can be noticed ; for if Kant may be said 
 to have assimilated all the knowledge of his 
 day, he did not do so with that kind of 
 acquisition which leaves the acquired know- 
 ledge unchanged and the learner a mere 
 sciolist. It was because the mind of Kant 
 hved through the difierent attitudes prevalent 
 among the learned of his day that he was 
 able to move forward towards a new stage 
 of thought. The greatness of Kant lies 
 chiefly in this, that he embodied his own 
 principle of rising above controversy : he 
 was able, by appreciating opposite points of 
 view, to rise above the opposition. Or it may 
 be stated in this way: much that had ap- 
 peared absolute to his predecessors, Kant saw 
 was relative ; and he said that what had been 
 
The German Aufklarung and Kant 97 
 
 supposed to be absolutely true was true only 
 from the human point of view. For this reason 
 he called himself a Copernicus of philosophy. 
 
 This position was reached gradually, Kant 
 was educated in the metaphysics of Wolff, and 
 his scientific thought was for many years 
 developed on the hues of that system. Look- 
 ing back even, through Wolff and Leibnitz, 
 we may find in Kant traces of that earlier 
 philosophy of Nominalism with which Scholas- 
 ticism had ended ; for when Kant had freed 
 himself from what he called dogmatism in 
 metaphysics he stiU kept the old prejudices 
 in favour of the precision of formal logic ; and, 
 as may be seen even in the " Critique of Pure 
 Reason," the forms of syllogistic reasoning are 
 uncritically for ced upon the experience of r eaUty . 
 
 The most important years of the develop- 
 ment of Kant's mind were marked by a 
 close attention to mathematics and physics. 
 Newton's teaching exercised a great influence 
 upon him ; and he was gradually led to an 
 appreciation of the value of scientific know- 
 ledge in comparison with the useless vagaries 
 of the current metaphysics. In conjunction 
 with this was the influence of an empiricism 
 
 7 
 
98 Development of Modem Philosophy 
 
 in psychology which had been adopted from 
 Locke even by the followers of Wolff — so 
 obvious was the value of a method of observa- 
 tion in regard to the facts of consciousness, 
 as opposed to the airy theorising as to spiritual 
 powers. Now, this psychological empiricism 
 had ended in an analysis of the subject- 
 matter of the theory of consciousness into 
 knowing, wiUing, and feehng. This division 
 Kant appears to have adopted even in his 
 later thought from Tetens (1736-1805), and 
 it is the basis for the divisions of the critical 
 philosophy, as rendered in the Critique of 
 Reason, of Practice, and of the Judgment. 
 More important, however, than the question 
 of a suitable method was the influence of 
 the theory which this empiricism involved. 
 This had been bluntly stated by Hume, and 
 this statement wakened Kant from his " dog- 
 matic slumber." ' The contrast which Kant 
 
 1 " I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume was the 
 very thing which, many years ago, first interrupted my 
 dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigation in the field of 
 speculative philosophy quite a new direction." — "Prolego- 
 mena," Introd. Kant appears to have been unacquainted 
 with Hume's " Treatise," and therefore depended on the 
 smaller works. 
 
The German Aufklarung and Kant 99 
 
 felt to exist between the vague teachings of 
 metaphysics and the definiteness of mathe- 
 matical and scientific knowledge seemed to 
 be due to the neglect of the principle expressed 
 by Hume, that the experience embodied in 
 sense-perception was the true and only sphere 
 of certainty. Now, Kant's interest remained 
 philosophical, in spite of the deficiencies of 
 the philosophy of his day : it was through 
 him that the contempt for metaphysics 
 became a popular attitude ; and through 
 the usual popular misunderstanding of philo- 
 sophic thought, the deficiencies of pre-Kantian 
 metaphysics were supposed to prove the 
 vanity of aU philosophical knowledge. On 
 the other hand, the object of Kant's speculation 
 was to restore metaphysics to the " secure 
 path of science," that is to say, to replace 
 the old theorising by a scientific metaphysics 
 depending upon experience. For this reason, 
 although admitting the cogency of Hume's 
 arguments, he did not wholly agree with 
 the conclusions' — not indeed as though 
 these were false, but on the ground that they 
 were inadequate. 
 
 ^ Cf. "Prolegomena," loc. cU. 
 
loo Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 Yet another influence directed the thought 
 of Kant. His early pietistic training, his 
 strenuous Ufe, and his interest in all that 
 claimed to be great and noble led him to 
 feel the antithesis between the scientific and 
 the rehgious view of the world. He examined 
 the claims of the new mysticism of Sweden- 
 borg, and doubtless felt the deficiencies of a 
 cold and abstract rationahsm from the point 
 of view of Romanticists Uke Rousseau. Of 
 the conception of religion gained by the 
 Enlightenment Kant was not ignorant. 
 Therefore, although, with the ambition of a 
 true philosopher, he directed his attention 
 to truth only, yet he never lost sight of the 
 other interests of Ufe. The true reading of 
 Kant's thought seems to be that which looks 
 upon the " Critique of Pure Reason " as 
 intentionally a stage in the development 
 which later is marked by the " Critique of 
 Practical Reason " and the " Critique of the 
 Judgment." If he is opposed to a dogmatic 
 metaphysics, he is no less opposed to the 
 " counter-dogmatism of unbelief that comes 
 into conflict with morahty." 
 
 Kant gathered up the influences of hia day ; 
 
The Gcfman Aufklarung and Kant loi 
 
 nevertheless it may be admitted that his 
 attitude towards thinkers of the past is some- 
 what deficient,' His absorption in the meaning 
 of his own thought prevented him from seeing 
 his own position historically : he therefore, 
 through the illusion of greatness in what is 
 near, conceived himself to be more isolated 
 from the course of thought than we can 
 consider him. He was not even aware that 
 in the study of philosophic questions as much 
 is gained by scientific historical as by scientific 
 mathematical methods ; and again, he did not 
 recognise how much he himself owed to the 
 past ; hence he seems to have thought that 
 he had reached by abstract and introspective 
 argument the principles of the judgment and 
 the syllogism which he really adopted from 
 outside.' To these deficiencies are due the 
 changes he makes in philosophic terminology ; 
 and the fashion he set in the coining of words 
 or the recasting of meaning in old words 
 
 1 For a forcible, if perhaps exaggerated, statement of this, 
 of. Lovejoy in Mind, N.S. 15, p. 171. 
 
 " Hence it could be said by Schelling : " His philosophy 
 is a building which at the best rests upon the empirical 
 earth, but in part also on the rubbish-heaps *of forgotten 
 systems." 
 
I02 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 (sometimes in defiance of history ') has had 
 unfortunate consequences — for it forms an 
 unnecessary barrier to the popular apprecia- 
 tion of philosophic truth. 
 
 In the working out of his own thought 
 Kant's development continued ; the problem 
 changed as he attempted to solve it.^ As 
 often happens in the history of thought, Kant 
 found that the usual statement of the problem 
 made any solution impossible. Beginning 
 therefore from acknowledged premises, the 
 Kantian philosophy by imperceptible steps 
 reconstitutes the premises in the course of 
 its development. Hence at the end of the 
 Kantian regress in the examination of know- 
 ledge itself, we find ourselves in a new world 
 of thought. 
 
 The task that Kant set himself proved 
 ultimately too great for his powers. In the 
 " Critique of Pure Keason," and in the 
 " Critique of Practical Eeason," a careful 
 analysis had given the basis and indicated 
 
 ' Cf. transcendental, sesthetios, category, matter and 
 form. The fashion thus set has been only too well followed' 
 by the majority of German philosophers. 
 
 " Cf. Caird, " Critical Philosophy of Kant," vol. i. ch. ii. 
 
The German Aufklarung and Kant 103 
 
 the nature of a systematic metapliysics. 
 There remained, according to the psychologi- 
 cal division adopted, that part of experience 
 which is referred to as emotion. This part 
 is analysed, and the beginnings of a synthetic 
 view of the whole of experience are to be 
 found, in the " Critique of the Judgment." 
 In this work, therefore, and in his labours in 
 the theory of religion, are to be found his 
 attempts at an ideal and scientific meta- 
 physics. From the very beginning indeed 
 he had recognised the danger of a premature 
 synthesis in philosophy ; ' but that such a 
 synthetic view of experience as a whole can be 
 had is the implied postulate of all his thought. 
 Hence it is that the thought of Kant not 
 only marks a departure from the philosophy 
 that preceded him, but also had in it the germs 
 of the philosophy that followed. If therefore 
 we end, in tracing the Critical Philosophy, 
 
 1 Of past metaphysicians he says : " They are anxious to 
 have a grand philosophy ; but the desirable thing is, that it 
 should be a sound one.'' Cf. Mr. Moore, in his " Prinoipia 
 Ethioa,'' p. 222 : "To search for ' unity ' and ' system ' at the 
 expense of truth is not, I take it, the proper business of 
 philosophy, however universally it may have been the practice 
 of philosophers." 
 
I04 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 with no definite and conclusive view of experi- 
 ence as a whole, it is only in so far as the 
 great founder of that philosophy himself thus 
 ended ; but if the position of his philosophy 
 is to be adequately judged, its history must be 
 traced through the IdeaUsm that it originated. 
 Kant himself as a thinker is not to be con- 
 ceived as the sculptor of some finished and 
 perfect form, but as the man who kindled a 
 destroying and re-creating flame. Within the 
 space of about thirty years from the com- 
 pletion of Kant's labours, there appeared in 
 Germany alone a series of the most magnifi- 
 cent productions of philosophic thought.^ 
 
 I 1795, Fichte's " Wissenschaftslehre " ; 1801, Sohelling's 
 " System der Philosophie " ; 1817, Hegel's " Encyolopadie " ; 
 1819, Schopenhauer's " Die Welt als WiUe und VorsteUung." 
 
CHAPTEK VII 
 
 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
 ~rN treating of the Critical Philosophy as 
 -*- it appears in the work of Kant himself 
 we may adopt the main divisions of the 
 problem given in his works. Some also of his 
 terminology is so characteristic that its use 
 is unavoidable ; but it is not essential to 
 follow the subdivisions which Kant makes, 
 nor to adopt the whole of his philosophical 
 language. Historical accuracy and philoso- 
 phical depth may on this account be lost, but 
 it will be more than sufficient recompense to 
 the memory of the great thinker if his conquests 
 in " the secure path of science " be made to 
 seem more real. Too often the value of a 
 philosopher's work is made unintelligible by 
 close adherence to the language in which his 
 work had to be done. 
 We shaU treat, in order, of the theory of 
 
 105 
 
io6 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 knowing in the " Critique of Pure Keason " 
 and the " Prolegomena," of the theory of 
 wilUng in the " Critique of Practical Reason " 
 and the " Metaphysic of Ethics," and of the 
 theory of emotion and synthetic stages of 
 philosophy in the " Critique of the Judgment" 
 and the works on Religion. The subdivisions 
 of these works will, as we have said, be dis- 
 regarded, except in so far as they are logically 
 valid ; and the treatment of the problems 
 will be directed towards an appreciation of 
 their real value in the historical sequence of 
 thought. 
 
 I. Reason 
 
 First therefore we shall deal with the 
 problem of knowledge.^ This, regarded as 
 part of a greater whole, is preparatory for a 
 metaphysics of experience. Regarded as an 
 independent problem it is a question as to the 
 constitution of real knowledge ; but it is not 
 the psychological fact to which we now refer, 
 it is the validity of what is ordinarily supposed 
 to be implied in knowledge that we must 
 discuss. Not " ideas " or " thoughts " as 
 
 1 " Critique of Pure Reason," and "Prolegomena." 
 
The Critical Philosophy 107 
 
 objects, but their peculiar nature (that is 
 to say, their supposed reference to a reality 
 beyond themselves) is now in question. Thus 
 the first step of Kant is epistemology. 
 
 Now, there are examples of knowledge that 
 every one will admit to be such : for if there is 
 any real knowledge at all, that which concerns 
 immediately given objects is the most obvious. 
 That is to say, the awareness of an object in 
 perception (called by Kant " Anschauung," 
 intuition) seems fundamental. If conscious- 
 ness therefore may be divided into perception 
 and thought, it is the first of these which we 
 must now consider. What is the nature of this 
 kind of consciousness ? As regards its contrast 
 with thought we may say that in perception 
 the objects are given, whereas in thought the 
 objects seem in some way to be made ; but 
 this does not tell us the nature of perception 
 in itself. Looking therefore at the knowledge 
 we suppose ourselves to have in perception, 
 we find that two elements are involved, a 
 universal element and a particular ; for there 
 are peculiarities in each perception, yet all 
 perception is bound together. The element of 
 knowledge which thus stands apart or is the 
 
io8 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 postulate of all particular examples of know- 
 ledge is called by Kant the a priori, and the 
 contingent or particular (the given, as merely 
 given) is by contrast called the a posteriori. 
 The contrast is of course logical and not 
 temporal. There are no such things as innate 
 ideas on the one hand, nor, on the other, 
 atomic and independent perceptions ; for the 
 a priori and the a posteriori exist only to- 
 gether. The implications of this will be seen 
 when we treat of thought ; but now our con- 
 cern is only with perception. Obviously the 
 nature and vaHdity of perception will depend 
 upon the universal element in it. What 
 therefore is the a priori in perception? It 
 has two forms, space and time. All external 
 objects are determinations of space, and as 
 given they always imply space. All objects 
 of immediate perception not conceived as 
 external are determinations of time, and 
 always imply time (e.g. thoughts, etc.). Of 
 these two a priori forms of perception we 
 may say that they are not conceptions because 
 they refer only to objects as given (they are 
 themselves unique but not universal), and 
 they are not themselves objects of perception, 
 
The Critical Philosophy 109 
 
 for they are implied in all perception. They 
 are modes of receptivity; and since all 
 knowledge begins with perception, and indeed 
 with sense-perception, no part of knowledge 
 is quite absolved from the influence of, and 
 the modification due to, the nature of the 
 receiving medium. 
 
 The a friori conditions of perception, or 
 features in perception, are the subject-matter 
 for mathematics. Its precision and certainty 
 as knowledge are due to the a priori nature of 
 this subject-matter : that is to say, the basis 
 for mathematics does not lie in the inde- 
 pendent world, but only in the world of per- 
 ception. Yet its reality as knowledge depends 
 upon the fact that its subject-matter is only 
 given in the experience which we have called 
 perception. 
 
 In his earlier discussions Kant does not go 
 on to show the method by which perception 
 becomes knowledge, or the way in which it 
 may be regarded as knowledge ; but later it 
 was seen that the method is one of synthesis 
 even here. Hence it became necessary to 
 say that mathematics as real knowledge was 
 possible only because " synthetic judgments 
 
no Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 a priori " were possible in respect to its 
 subject-matter. Even from the beginning of 
 his Criticism it was clear to Kant that real 
 propositions, of however seemingly abstract 
 a type, are all synthetic. In other words, 
 every real judgment marks a growth in know- 
 ledge by the fact that in it something is 
 gathered in and systematised with the pre- 
 ceding knowledge ; ' but we may leave this 
 for the present, and continue the examination 
 of perception. 
 
 Further, there are characteristics of percep- 
 tion which are universal, besides the all- 
 embracing forms of space and time. General 
 principles are conceived to hold true with 
 regard to perception, and they are, for the 
 nature of physical science, just what space 
 and time are for the quantitative world of 
 
 1 " Critique of Pure Reason," Transcend. Anal. § 2 : " The 
 explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgments is a 
 subject of which general logic knows nothing, not even its 
 name, while in a transcendental logic it is the most important 
 task of all, nay even the only one, when we have to consider 
 the possibihty of synthetical judgments a priori, their con- 
 ditions and the extent of their vaUdity. For when that task 
 is accomplished, the object of transcendental logic — namely, 
 to determine the extent and limits of the pure understanding — 
 will have been fuUy attained." 
 
The Critical Philosophy iii 
 
 mathematics. That aspect of reasoning 
 which relates to the world of nature is called 
 by Kant the understanding. It is the work of 
 the understanding to attend to the world of 
 colour and sound, and all the other sensations ; 
 and here we begin to feel the connection as 
 well as the contrast between perception and 
 thought. For in real knowledge separate and 
 independent perceptions cannot exist. If they 
 did, then knowledge itself would be a mere 
 collection in which each exhibit was kept in 
 a totally different compartment. Obviously 
 what we find in knowledge is a connection of 
 every part with every other part ; but if 
 sensation be that which gives us the parts as 
 separate, then thought must be that which 
 welds the parts together. Hence the activity 
 of thought (understanding) is synthetic. This 
 is the argument of what Kant calls transcen- 
 dental as opposed toi formal logic. Never- 
 theless, since thought as such {i.e. in itself, and 
 not in its immediate connection with the 
 data of sense) is active on already acquired 
 data, the method of its dealing with experience 
 can be conceived as analytic. Hence Kant 
 adapts from the analytic and formal logic the 
 
112 Development of Modern Philosophy- 
 various modes in whicli tliought is conceived 
 to be active. The judgment is, as we have 
 seen, the type of that activity which we call 
 knowing ; and there are, or were, four kinds 
 of judgment — those of Quantity, Quality, 
 Relation, and Modality. These are the forms 
 of synthesis, as Kant believes, and under each 
 of these are three modifications, each based 
 upon the idea that thought-process involves 
 first the acceptance of the unanalysed, then 
 analysis, and then interrelation or synthesis. 
 Hence there are twelve " categories." ' The 
 arbitrariness of this classification did not 
 obstruct the progress of Kant's thought, nor 
 are its details necessary to his argument. 
 
 Returning to the actual world of synthetic 
 thought-process, we find that in our know- 
 ledge of the world of nature there are the same 
 
 1 QuaniUy. Quality. 
 
 1. Unity. 1. Reality. 
 
 2. Plurality. 2. Negation. 
 
 3. Totality. 3. Limitation. 
 
 Relation. Modality. 
 
 1. Substance and Accident. 1. Possibility. 
 
 2. Cause and Effect. 2. Existence. 
 
 3. Action and Reaction. 3. Necessity. 
 
The Critical Philosophy 113 
 
 elements as in our knowledge of the world 
 of perception in general — that is to say, an 
 a jyriori and an a posteriori. Here most 
 obviously is it true that " conceptions without 
 perceptions are empty, and perceptions without 
 conceptions are meaningless or blind." The 
 bare world of atomic sensations is not the 
 " nature " of science ; but if this " nature " 
 be an " ordered system " " bound by laws," 
 this system and these laws (the a priori in 
 understanding) cannot be found otherwise 
 than in the one common ground which sensa- 
 tions have — their reception in a percipient 
 subject. The law does not itself occur as 
 an object of perception ; for if it did, then 
 knowledge would depend upon a chance 
 experience ; but, in fact, if we look at what 
 we suppose ourselves to have in the knowledge 
 of nature, the law is seen to be a common and 
 necessary truth, one universal to aU men who 
 vmderstand, however varying the particular 
 experiences of each of these individuals may 
 have been. This universality and necessity, 
 therefore, are due to nothing but the a priori 
 forms of the understanding ; the laws are of 
 our making, the system is the expression of 
 
 8 
 
114 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 our point of view ; and the other side of the 
 relation observed in knowledge (the particular, 
 the " examples " of the law) is nothing but 
 " what appears " — phenomenon. For the 
 understanding makes nature, though it does 
 not create it. Thus we have reached a new 
 conception of knowledge. The problem of 
 knowing may be supposed to have started with 
 the question as to how it is possible for us to 
 be certain of the application of what we say 
 to the world conceived as whoUy independent 
 of our saying : that is, the diflS.culty arose 
 from the gap supposed to exist between the 
 thought and the thing (of which the thought 
 was supposed to be the copy or reflection). 
 In attempting to answer this question and 
 solve this difl&culty by looking at the evidence 
 we possess, we find that the question is mean- 
 ingless and the diflSiculty non-existent ; for 
 there is no " independent " object to be found 
 in real knowledge, and there is no conceivable 
 thing which is not what it is precisely because 
 of the mode of its conception. All knowledge 
 is relative — and that is no objection to it. 
 
 Thus Kant reaches the thought which was 
 to develop later into systems of philosophy 
 
The Critical Philosophy 115 
 
 absolutely difierent from all preceding ; for 
 now it seemed that independent reals, things 
 out of all relation to experience, could not be 
 subject-matter for scientific knowledge. Kant 
 had transcended, at least in part, the dualism 
 of common sense with its absolute separation 
 of the thinker from the thing ; for hitherto 
 subject was conceived to " enter into " rela- 
 tion with object in the process of knowledge •, 
 but now, at least dimly, it is seen that only in 
 that relation are the terms themselves con- 
 stituted. Before the process of thought there 
 is neither thinker nor thing : in the process of 
 thought both are simultaneously created. 
 
 There yet remained a dualism in Kant, that 
 of sense and intellect, which originated anew 
 the old difficulty ; but first we must trace the 
 course of Kant's thought when he turned his 
 attention to the supposed facts of psycho- 
 logical distinction. He supposed Leibnitz 
 and his followers to be entirely mistaken in 
 treating perception and conception as essen- 
 tially the same process, though in different 
 stages ; and with his usual analytical method, 
 he proceeded to treat these two as essentially 
 different in kind. When he looked back, 
 
ii6 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 however (in the " Critique of Pure Reason," 
 div. i. bk. i. ch. ii.), along the way he had come 
 to the transcending of an old opposition, 
 when he found that each step had been but 
 a repetition of the same thought, that real 
 knowledge contained elements and not kinds, 
 then he saw that he must bind together all the 
 stages of the process of knowledge. Con- 
 fused with this is the difficulty of treating 
 those forms of understanding, which we have 
 said are the a priori conditions of experience, 
 as what common sense would caU " objectively 
 valid." ' If knowledge is relative it seems to 
 be no better than a dream ; if all our con- 
 ceptions of the world are coloured by the 
 nature of our own thought, how can we 
 attempt to say anything of the " real " world ? 
 Kant was afraid of the power he was using. 
 He feared to be called an " idealist " because 
 of the popular conception of reality ; and 
 though he talked of his method as transcen- 
 dental idealism, he never quite drew his own 
 premises to their conclusion. 
 
 1 The confusion is marked by the changes made in the 
 second edition of the " Critique," in the matter of the " De- 
 duction of the Categories." 
 
The Critical Philosophy 117 
 
 We are compelled by the " realist " diffi- 
 culty to discuss the nature of thought-process 
 or consciousness as a whole ; and in its first 
 stages, in sensation or perception, we observe 
 that activity or spontaneity appears. For 
 no consciousness is conceivable in which 
 the recipient can be regarded as purely 
 passive : and further, his activity takes the 
 form of synthesis, or a grasping into imity 
 of what is " given " as a manifold. The 
 unification which has thus taken place in 
 the earliest or simplest stage of conscious- 
 ness is carried through in all its stages : for 
 the manifold of perception is synthesised in 
 thought. 
 
 Not indeed as though the rough matter of 
 sensuous experience were the only medium 
 of thought-synthesis ; for thought also may 
 grasp the a priori conditions of experience. 
 The synthesis that arises then is called the 
 synthesis of (pure) imagination : this is the 
 ground for mathematics, and hence it is that, 
 as we said above, the essential note of all 
 systematic knowledge is in the synthetic 
 " functionising." The synthesis of percep- 
 tions, however, is useless, and the synthesis of 
 
ii8 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 imagination is a delusion, if both be not 
 bound together in an experience which is 
 essentially one. This last binding is nothing 
 less than the interrelation of every stage of 
 conscious life ; but this takes place only by 
 reference to one essential principle, which is 
 " the transcendental unity of apperception." 
 Thus the analytical sundering of the various 
 modes or stages of conscious life is concluded, 
 and the parts are gathered together. Experi- 
 ence is thus a coherent and systematic whole, 
 and the objective phenomenal world is unified 
 by reference to what we call the single point 
 of view. 
 
 Now, within the whole of conscious life are 
 the various modes of the reception of pheno- 
 mena which we have named categories. Here, 
 then, arises the old difficulty. What vaUdity 
 have these modes in their application to 
 phenomena ? 
 
 Such application of the categories to the data 
 of experience (phenomena) is called by Kant 
 schematisation. It is by this process that 
 the synthesis takes place between the lower 
 and higher stages of conscious life (sense and 
 intellect). The categories, which in them- 
 
The Critical Philosophy 119 
 
 selves are dead, correct but empty forms, are 
 now called the principles of understanding, 
 and the problem before us is that of the 
 validity of abstract thought. It is indeed 
 but a new form of the old problem of universals 
 and of reality, but Kant has examined the 
 data upon which the answer must rest, and 
 therefore we are nearer a solution. For now 
 it becomes increasingly clear that the only 
 " objects " of knowledge are such as are 
 found within the subjective forms of know- 
 ledge. In the first place, the categories of 
 Quantity and Quality give respectively the 
 Axiom of perception and the Anticipation of 
 empirical perception : that is to say, by these 
 categories we are led to find all objects of 
 knowledge as determinations of time, and as 
 appearing in various degrees. This means that 
 the data of thoi^|*lt (phenomena), when found 
 in thought, are continuous in extension and 
 in " intension " (" Trans. Analytic," ii. p. 147. 
 Eng. trans.). Connected always with the 
 all-embracing form of time, there now appears 
 the use of the third group of categories — that 
 of Belation. Under these we find the meta- 
 physics of nature, and the old concepts of 
 
I20 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 substance, cause, and reciprocity appear now 
 with a new meaning ; for it is true that the 
 " given world," all phenomena, can only enter 
 into thought on the postulate that there is a 
 permanence in reaUty, and yet again this 
 permanence is merely the ground for change. 
 Once more, change must take place according 
 to rule — the world for thought appears as a 
 connected system, a continuous succession 
 that cannot be reversed. 
 
 Finally, there is a community between the 
 phenomena of experience such that co-exist- 
 ence is postulated in the thought of them. 
 Reciprocal influence is necessary for our 
 concept of nature. Thus we have the 
 three great " analogies of experience," 
 as Kant calls them ; and it is seen 
 that this is the result of an examination 
 into the scope of pure thought — viz., that 
 knowledge constitutes its objects in the very 
 process of knowing, that the " nature " and 
 the " world " of all knowledge is a world of 
 phenomena.' 
 
 1 Of the " Postulates of Empirical Thought " arising from 
 the categories of Modality, with which Kant next deals, 
 nothing need be said here, as they refer to the difficult contrast 
 between the possible and the actual and necessary. 
 
The Critical Philosophy 121 
 
 The word " phenomena " may serve as a 
 
 connecting Unk between the Analytic and the 
 
 Dialectic ; for after a long discussion of the 
 
 contrast between phenomena and noumena, 
 
 or things in themselves, Kant proceeds, in the 
 
 Dialectic,' to show how vain are the efforts of 
 
 pure thinking where it has none of the hard 
 
 facts of experience to discuss. We have seen 
 
 that all knowledge is of phenomena. But 
 
 what is " the thing " which common sense 
 
 speaks of as " appearing " in this way and 
 
 that ? Obviously it can only be a vague 
 
 problematic entity for our thought. Kant's 
 
 followers simply denied its existence, but he 
 
 himself, feehng the Hmitations of individual 
 
 knowledge, imagined behind the veil of 
 
 appearance a reality which might be an 
 
 object to a mind quite different from his. 
 
 Such a mind would be " pure " of the 
 
 dross of sensation, and its object would be 
 
 "thought-object" or noumenon. Suggestions 
 
 of such objects appear in our thought as 
 
 1 The third part of the problem in the " Critique of Pure 
 Reason," forming the greater portion of that work. Here 
 first appears the pare Reason of Kant's terminology, that 
 delusive function which attempts to construct without data, 
 to think without experience. 
 
122 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 insoluble problems: these are the Ideas of 
 pure Reason. 
 
 Now, as a matter of fact, precisely such 
 objects had been dealt with as objects of 
 knowledge by the pre-Kantian, or Dogmatic 
 Metaphysics. There are three of these 
 " Ideas " — the Soul, the World, and G-od ; and 
 we have only to refer back to the earher part 
 of the " Critique " to find that nowhere in the 
 sphere of real knowledge and real experience 
 are such ideas to be found : for these are 
 ex Jiypothesi not phenomena, and all know- 
 ledge is of phenomena. The object therefore 
 of the transcendental Dialectic is not to refute 
 these delusions, but merely to show how they 
 have arisen. Speaking generally of all three, 
 the most striking characteristic is that these 
 ideas give the unconditioned, the infinite, the 
 eternal permanent, and in this they are quite 
 opposite to anything to be found in actual 
 knowledge. It is this characteristic which 
 condemns them, for real knowledge can never 
 hold anything which ex hypothesi denies any 
 dependence on or relation to the forms of 
 thought. In fact, the illusion by which we 
 suppose ourselves to know anything when we 
 
The Critical Philosophy 123 
 
 use in the sense of dogmatic metaphysics 
 such words as " soul," " world," " God," is due 
 to our readily supposing a problem solved 
 which we desire to be solved. The wish is 
 father to the thought, and we attain dog- 
 matism. 
 
 In detail, with regard to the soul : we hear 
 of it as a simple and immortal substance ; 
 but this is due to the paralogisms of pure 
 reason, for we merely confuse ourselves by 
 supposing that because the " ego " is a logical 
 postulate for the unity of experience, there- 
 fore it is given as an object. The subject 
 can never become an object : in the very 
 efiort to make it an object the " me " is 
 substituted for the " I " ; and yet only of 
 objects in the world of phenomena can we 
 use the concept of simple substance. Again 
 we confuse ourselves when we say that 
 because the thinker and the thing can be dis- 
 tinguished, therefore I, the thinker, exist, in- 
 dependent of all things such as are ordinarily 
 necessary for human thought. The whole 
 of what was called " rational psychology " 
 is thus a pseudo-science : we as philosophers 
 can say nothing either for or against the 
 
124 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 ultimate meanings of the propositions it 
 advances, for its subject-matter is not data 
 for knowledge.' 
 
 Next, with regard to the world as a whole,' 
 there arise the antinomies of pure reason. 
 The usual statements of dogmatic cosmology 
 are stated and proved, and then statements 
 the direct contradictories of these are likewise 
 proved. Thus we have four antinomies, of 
 which the first two are : 
 
 Thesis Antithesis 
 
 1. The world has a begin- 1. The world has no limit 
 ning (a limit) in time and in time or space. 
 
 2. Everything is simple ul- 2. Nothing is simple (i.e. 
 timately (cf. monads, all is infinitely divisible), 
 
 atoms). 
 
 These are the mathematical concepts of 
 the world as given in space and time. Kant's 
 proofs are strict and cogent, and the result 
 
 1 This old psychology dealt with eternal and intangible 
 "souls." No reference of course is made to modem 
 psychology. 
 
 2 Treated as the whole of the data of external perception. 
 It is to be noted that Kant's criticism is as opposed to the 
 shallow dogmatism which sometimes poses as natural science 
 as to that of theology. The universe as such is just as much 
 an " idea " (and not an object of knowledge) as the soul or God. 
 
The Critical Philosophy 125 
 
 is a plain contradiction. Yet this does not 
 give a sceptical conclusion, for Kant shows 
 why the contradiction arises. The reason is 
 this : both theses and antitheses have treated 
 as an object what is never an object — i.e. the 
 world as a whole. 
 
 Besides these we have : 
 
 Thesis Antithesis 
 
 1. There are in the world 1. There is no freedom (but 
 
 free causes. everything takes place 
 
 by laws of nature). 
 
 2. There is a necessary 2. There nowhere exists a 
 
 Being, either as part or necessary Being as cause 
 
 cause of the world. of the world. 
 
 There are dynamical concepts of the world, 
 as a world of change and perhaps interaction. 
 The proofs on either side are again given ; 
 but this time the contradiction reached in the 
 conclusions is of a different nature. For 
 instead of both propositions being false, both 
 may be true. The seeming contradiction 
 arises therefore because they do not refer to 
 the same objects; but whereas the theses 
 attempt to deal with man and the world as 
 possibly things-in-themselves (postulates or 
 problems, not data of scientific knowledge), 
 the antitheses continue the arguments from a 
 
126 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 scientific view of the world as phenomenal. It 
 results, however, from all these arguments that 
 dogmatic cosmology is, like the old rational 
 psychology, a pseudo-science. Strict thinking 
 can never deal with the universe as such. 
 
 Finally, dogmatic philosophy had arrived at 
 an ideal of pure reason, called God, by which 
 was meant the absolutely unconditioned ground 
 of all reahty. This concept bound together 
 the concept of the soul and that of the world ; 
 and, like these two, it is an illusion. What- 
 ever the means by which historically the idea 
 of God has reached its present popular form, 
 three philosophical processes are supposed to 
 express the real way towards that idea. These 
 are the three " proofs of the existence of 
 God " — the ontological, the cosmological, and 
 the teleological. These are roughly to be 
 conceived as the arguments, (1) from the idea 
 of a necessary Being, (2) from the idea of cause 
 and necessity, (3) from the " design " or 
 " order " in the world. As to the ontological 
 proof, it cannot follow that, because we have 
 an idea of a perfect Being, such a Being exists.' 
 
 1 The ontological proof may indeed be differently rendered ; 
 but then it is not the proof to which Kant is referring. To 
 
The Critical Philosophy 127 
 
 In the cosmological proof it is argued that 
 because the concept of cause and dependence 
 breaks down, therefore there is an uncaused 
 Cause ; but this only proves that we cannot by 
 the concepts which have meaning only within 
 experience validly transcend that experience. 
 The argument from design seemed cogent to 
 Kant, if the world can be regarded as in the 
 main good and beautiful ; but even so it is 
 no absolute wisdom that is proved, but only a 
 very limited mechanical agent, and that is 
 not the ideal of pure reason. It is not to be 
 considered, however, that Kant's position is 
 purely negative with regard to these so-called 
 " proofs " : his argument is rather that on 
 this subject scientific and logical reasoning 
 can have nothing to say. From the point of 
 view of reason, therefore, it is equally possible 
 to seem to prove or to disprove the existence 
 of God. That the effort was made to " prove " 
 God's existence is a sign of a power which lies 
 beyond reason, with which we deal later. 
 Meantime it is clear that the natural theology 
 of dogmatic metaphysics is a pseudo-science. 
 
 >iiTn it appeared in the form given by Anselm and Descartes 
 and Leibnitz. 
 
128 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 II. Will 
 
 Following the psychological division already 
 named, we have now to discuss that part of 
 experience which is connected with the will ; 
 and by the will Kant understood a function- 
 ising in the sphere of means and ends. This 
 is plainly the division under which we shall 
 find the concepts of what ought to be, or of 
 the ideal : it is therefore contrasted with the 
 function of thought, which deals only with 
 what is. Here, then, we enter upon Ethics — 
 not as an afterthought, but as a necessary 
 part of the philosophy of experience which 
 Kant from the beginning had proposed. 
 Although his theory of ethics forms thus 
 the second part of his philosophy, yet in fact 
 the influences which went to make the result 
 were originally independent of such thought 
 as we find in the " Critique of Pure Eeason." 
 The early training in Pietism and the influence 
 of such thinkers as Shaftesbury left in Kant 
 a rigorist view of life. In theory he began 
 with the view of the origin of morals in mere 
 feehng, but later he conceived even will as 
 implying logical grounds. Again, his study of 
 history gave Kant an early appreciation of 
 
The Critical Philosophy 129 
 
 the development of the whole race towards 
 some vague goal/ The pessimistic view of 
 the results of all action seemed to him to 
 involve the false hope of individualistic, even 
 egoistic, happiness ; and such hope was false, 
 because history showed that sensuous satis- 
 faction, " a paradise life," is not an end, but 
 an historical origin, from which the farther we 
 moved the better. The stress and strain of 
 moral endeavour pointed to a higher solution ; 
 and this solution, as an anticipation, was 
 present to the individual in his sense of the 
 moral law. The end of the race as one 
 was present as an ideal to the individual. 
 Hence arose the form in which the principle 
 of morality was afterwards stated by Kant — 
 " so act that the rule followed in your action 
 may be the expression of a universal law " ; 
 and against egoistic or selfish happiness as an 
 end — " regard every human being as an 
 end and not a means." 
 
 When Kant's studies of the theory of know- 
 ledge and the concept of reality were 
 finished, a new attitude resulted in regard to 
 
 1 Cf. " Ideas for a Universal EQstory from a Cosmopolitan 
 Point of View " (1784). 
 
 9 
 
13° Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 ethical questions. They are discussed in a 
 more definite form ; and since the form is 
 largely that used in purely logical questions, 
 it tends to make Kantian ethics seem 
 pedantic. The dichotomy of moral life, the 
 antithesis between what is and what ought to 
 be, is treated as parallel to the division of the 
 empirical and the universal in knowledge. 
 Hence in examining the data of moral philo- 
 sophy Kant distinguishes two elements — an 
 a priori universal element, which is the binding 
 force of the whole subject-matter, and a 
 secondary a posteriori element, which as it 
 were consists of various and disconnected 
 actions. The possibility of a moral philosophy 
 rests upon the nature of the universal element. 
 This, Kant says, is a categorical imperative, 
 an unconditional command. It is a com- 
 mand because we are deahng with the region 
 of will, and in this sphere command is parallel 
 with universal statement in the intellectual 
 sphere. It is unconditional — that is to say, it 
 does not assert any consequences or give any 
 choice : for morality is not a means to any 
 other end, but is an end in itself. Thus 
 the voice of conscience does not say — " if 
 
The Critical Philosophy 131 
 
 you want this, you must do that," but simply 
 and plainly, " you must do that." When we 
 judge a moral action we refer not to success, 
 but to intention. Duty for duty's sake is 
 the only principle of morality ; and in the 
 categorical " ought to be " is the contrast 
 with inclination which makes duty seem 
 disagreeable. It remains to be seen how this 
 a priori element of morality is related to the 
 details of actual life, and first we find that it 
 has no meaning except in definite combination 
 with individual life. For the law of duty is 
 not an external principle, but an internal 
 force ; an externally imposed code may give 
 legality but not morality to actions. Morality 
 therefore consists in an attitude of actual life 
 towards an internal law : hence Kant says 
 " nothing is good but the good will." The 
 perfectly moral man fights his own battles 
 upon his own battlefields, and does not at- 
 tempt to avoid responsibiUty by invoking 
 authority. Hence it is that the Kantian 
 ethics is conceived to be individualistic ; but 
 in the description of the content of the moral 
 law, Kant adopts a universalism that is so 
 wide as to seem unreal. The law is said 
 
132 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 to command that in every action, not an 
 individual desire, but a " universal law of 
 nature " may be expressed. The impulses 
 and inchnations are to be resisted as being 
 determinations or influences from the outside, 
 from the phenomenal, and the rational will 
 alone is to be followed as embodying the 
 moral principle of autonomy and self-deter- 
 mination. The freedom which is conceived 
 as the basis for morahty is nothing less than 
 self-determination — although Kant himself 
 sometimes falls back into the old concept of 
 the freedom of indeterminism, according to 
 which morality involves the possibiUty of a 
 choice between opposites at any moment. 
 This latter concept, however, in so far as it 
 neglects the fact that character determines 
 choice, has almost disappeared from ethics 
 since the days of Kant. 
 
 When at length he discussed the meta- 
 physical basis of ethics, Kant found that the 
 very possibility of the contrast between 
 external determination and self-determination 
 involved as a postulate that the self of experi- 
 ence must be regarded as " free." Further, 
 the concept of the moral law involved the 
 
The Critical Philosophy 133 
 
 postulate that what was good was also 
 ultimately real as contrasted with mere 
 phenomena ; but since the self of ordinary- 
 experience always held the contrast between 
 what is and what ought to be, we might 
 reach a second postulate — immortality — 
 in which this contrast might be solved. 
 Finally, the opposition between the desire 
 for happiness of the sensuous will and the 
 desire for virtue in the rational will might 
 imply a third postulate — the existence of God. 
 God, freedom, and immortality, though not 
 to be known, may yet be hoped for. 
 
 From these postulates of the practical reason 
 reUgion arises : it is in truth nothing but a 
 moraUty in which the moral law 'is conceived 
 as a divine command. The moral man will 
 therefore, generally speaking,' be reUgious in 
 so far as he lives in the faith of optimism 
 that good is triumphant. All the detail of 
 the metaphysics ordinarily connected with 
 reUgion is therefore conceived to be symbohsm, 
 and thus to subserve an ideal morahty. 
 Original sin, atonement, and the rest are 
 
 1 This, Kant says, is not necessary ; of. " Criticism of Judg- 
 ment," § 87. 
 
134 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 inadequate and almost picture-renderings of 
 deep moral truths. 
 
 III. Feeling 
 
 We are left at the end of the Kantian Ethics 
 with a conviction of a conflict between the 
 practical and theoretical interests of life. 
 In fact, for long it was said that Kant had 
 put back under the name of practical postu- 
 lates all the concepts he had before rejected 
 as misleading in theory. The ground for such 
 a statement is to be found in the fact that 
 Kant held the subject-matter discussed from 
 the point of view of pure reason absolutely 
 apart from the subject-matter of practical 
 life. A synthesis was found for reasoning, 
 and a synthesis for will ; but now the same 
 principle of critical thought demanded that 
 these two aspects should be themselves 
 synthesised. Psychologically the sphere re- 
 maining to be discussed was that of feeling ; 
 under this, value or approval might be con- 
 ceived to be found ; and in a logical system 
 the function exercised in feelings might be 
 called the judgment, both because the judg- 
 
The Critical Philosophy 135 
 
 ment intervenes between the reason and the 
 understanding and because in the " reflecting " 
 judgment the particulars are subsumed under 
 a universal purpose. Hence we have a 
 Critique of Judgment. 
 
 The vague judgment of approval may be 
 subdivided into the aesthetic and teleological, 
 in so far as one is the judgment of an object 
 as gratifying, the other of an object as fitting 
 (purposive) ; and with regard to the aesthetic 
 judgment we have first to ask whether there is 
 any a priori or universal element in judgments 
 of taste. Is there, as we loosely put it, any 
 real beauty ? Or is every man's taste as 
 good as his neighbour's ? Kant was without 
 special training in aesthetic questions, and 
 examples of his taste which have come down 
 to us are often more than suspicious. Never- 
 theless his keen logical insight served him 
 well even in this subject. He begins with an 
 analysis of subjiective artistic appreciation, 
 and concedes to popular conception the truth 
 that logical dispute as to the beautiful leads 
 nowhere ; but this does not mean that there is 
 no a priori universal " standard " of beauty, 
 for there are such things as universally valid 
 
136 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 feelings or emotions. To these the beautiful 
 is given. It is not the significance or the 
 worth of its object which constitutes its 
 beauty, but only its fitness to cause a harmony 
 between the perceptive and the reasoning 
 functions. Thus in the beautiful the im- 
 mediate and the ideal are synthesised. And 
 since this sense of beauty in the individual 
 percipient is, as it were, merely a sign of a 
 purposiveness in the object in reference to a 
 system far greater than the individual can 
 grasp, the a priori in aesthetic judgments is 
 based upon this higher world. The sublime, 
 on the contrary, gains its effect through almost 
 crushing the percipient, and creates an aesthetic 
 effect when the sensuous side of our activity 
 (which is felt to be so inadequate) is con- 
 trasted with the rational side, in which we 
 stand above nature. 
 
 Next, in regard to the teleological judgment, 
 we have to synthesise the abstract and 
 mechanical concepts of nature with the ideas 
 of purpose, means, and end with which we 
 explain part of our experience. Kant says 
 that there are limits to the mechanical and 
 SQJentific concepts, for " life " of which we 
 
The Critical Philosophy 137 
 
 have experience cannot be explained by the 
 mechanical theories of determination from 
 the outside. This is not due to a mere present 
 lack of data, for the very nature of the subject- 
 matter demands another principle of explana- 
 tion. This new principle may be called that 
 of organism. In view of this we can regard 
 from a teleological point of view all that part 
 of experience in which " life " is given, and 
 talk of the means and ends of an organism. 
 Kant also says that, regarded as a whole, 
 nature may be explained teleologicaUy. The 
 mechanical explanations of science are then 
 the description of aspects in the carrying out 
 of a great rational and moral purpose in all 
 nature. With this thought Kant gave im- 
 petus to the various phases of romantic 
 ideahsm that followed him. 
 
 In spite of the obvious Umitations of his 
 philosophy, we cannot fail to see how im- 
 portant a position in the history of thought 
 is occupied by this Germanised Scotsman. 
 His Umitations were perhaps conditions for 
 the exactness of his thinking. What he 
 lost in comprehensiveness he gained in 
 
138 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 intensity. Therefore his work may still be 
 regarded as one of the turning-points in the 
 history of thought. 
 
 But the individualism and abstractness 
 of Kant's thought should not bhnd us to the 
 fact that all real philosophy grows out of the 
 experience of a certain man in a certain time 
 and place. The influence of Pietism in the 
 Ethics we have already remarked. But we 
 can also see in all his thought the untiring 
 argument of the Scottish and the German 
 theologian. Kant, more international than 
 those who precede or follow him, was never- 
 theless an outcome of a particular type of 
 national experience. In reference to him 
 it is most true that German philosophy is the 
 granddaughter of Protestant theology. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE KANTIANS, PICHTE, AND ROMANTICISM 
 
 THE movement of thought in the immediate 
 successors of Kant is largely dependent 
 upon his statements of the problems and 
 his conclusions ; and the concept of the 
 " thing-in-itself " was naturally that which 
 first attracted attention. In Kant's state- 
 ment this concept had been rather a problem 
 for knowledge than a definite starting-point, 
 but the other-worldliness with which the 
 thing-in-itself seemed to be surrounded was 
 attractive to many minds at this time. Even 
 during the lifetime of Kant there appeared 
 signs of the coming Romanticism. The re- 
 action from the intellectuaUsm of the 
 eighteenth century was finding voice in the 
 literature of Germany, and soon attempted 
 to confuse philosophy. Some protest was in- 
 
 139 
 
14° Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 deed necessary against what is to be found even 
 in Kant, the dividing of human nature ac- 
 cording to the abstract rules of the intellect ; 
 but the exaggeration of those other elements 
 in hfe, beauty and goodness, to the detriment 
 of truth, was harmful. The revival of interest 
 in Spinoza expresses in philosophers of this 
 date a straining after mysticism. 
 
 The Kantians who attempted the develop- 
 ment and correction of Kant in this mood 
 were chiefly Jacobi and Maimon. Taking 
 Kant at his word, Jacobi pointed out that 
 there was no method of escaping in thought 
 the charmed circle of mere appearances. 
 Reahty, which is distinguished from these 
 appearances, must therefore always he beyond 
 thought — that is, beyond knowledge ; but 
 it is not therefore unconnected with us, for 
 we have immediate {i.e. unmediated) know- 
 ledge in feeling : the act of connection is 
 called " faith." The way is therefore open 
 to anything and everything, for we are thus 
 placed beyond the realm of logical process. 
 
 With Maimon, however, the object is more 
 purely rational. He, discussing the value of 
 the thing-in-itself, observes that, although 
 
Kantians, Fichte, and Romanticism 141 
 
 inconceivable, it was introduced as a kind of 
 formula for the insoluble difficulty as to the 
 nature of " the given " in consciousness. It is 
 an irrational quantity which yet can be used 
 philosophically ; it is comparable to such a 
 mathematical symbol as -/ 2. 
 
 While the earUest developments of the 
 Critical Philosophy were in progress, events 
 in the political world were influencing the 
 course of thought. We have already seen 
 that when the Revolution culminated in 
 France, philosophy there was dead, and in 
 Germany the " Critique of Pure Reason " had 
 been written. The chaos which followed the 
 Revolution then gradually became settled, 
 and one great figure appears upon the 
 ruins of the old regime. Napoleon was the 
 life-spirit of France in the years that followed ; 
 and Europe, at first interested only theoreti- 
 cally in the course of French events, was soon 
 wakened by him into a practical appreciation 
 of the changed order. Through Napoleon 
 changes came over the whole scheme of poHti- 
 cal hfe in the West, comparable only to the 
 changes of the Renaissance. Whether or not 
 Revolution and Renaissance are to be regarded 
 
14^ Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 as essentially the same movement, it is 
 certain that the one accomplished what the 
 other began ; for not only was the political 
 system changed, but the whole attitude ex- 
 pressed in real life became different, and the 
 difference is apparent in the philosophies 
 which arose from this changed experience. 
 So complex, indeed, is the web of history that 
 it is almost impossible to follow a single line 
 of cause and effect. Just as Kant's criticism 
 arose not only out of abstract philosophy, 
 but also from a fuller view of life, so now the 
 greatest of Kant's successors were influenced 
 not less by the new values and problems 
 of experience than by the Critiques. 
 
 Germany, where philosophy was now to 
 make progress, was at this time a collection 
 of small States. Prussia was indeed the most 
 powerful, but had not yet risen to the con- 
 sciousness of power, and the smaller States 
 were united politically in a loose confedera- 
 tion of Central Europe, of which Austria was 
 the chief member. 
 
 France, meanwhile, tired of internal 
 struggles, had been roused by her soldiers to 
 ambitions of conquest abroad. Carrying with 
 
Kantians, Fichte, and Romanticism 143 
 
 them and sowing in their path a new political 
 and national enthusiasm, the French armies 
 had acquired an influence over half Europe. 
 The new-born national spirit swept every- 
 thing before it in the brilliant successes at 
 Marengo (1800), Austerlitz (1805), and lesser 
 battles on the continent ; and it was not yet 
 perceived that its defeats at sea — Copenhagen 
 (1801) and Trafalgar (1805)— at the hands of an 
 older national spirit, had already decided that 
 its dreams were not destined to be realised. 
 
 Prussia, seeming to gain for herself, had 
 remained neutral while Napoleon consolidated 
 his power and secured his hold on the sur- 
 rounding countries ; but at last popular feeling 
 forced the authorities to declare war. The 
 result was the total collapse of Prussia at Jena 
 and Auerstadt (1806) ; and Napoleon entered 
 Berlin in triumph. Worse than defeat was the 
 apathy with which, on the whole, subjection 
 was received by Germany. During the few 
 years following. Napoleon was the supreme 
 force of all Europe ; and yet the gospel of 
 national ideals, which was to be his ultimate 
 overthrow, was being preached even during 
 these years by enthusiasts like Fichte ; and 
 
144 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 the reconstruction of Germany by education 
 and public spirit was steadily progressing. 
 
 A similar process, fostered and furthered by 
 English aid, had resulted in Napoleon's with- 
 drawal from Spain ; and when the Russian 
 campaign ended in the hopeless retreat from 
 Moscow (1812), Europe rose from its ashes. 
 The General of revolutionary France was 
 forced to abdicate the Empire he had won, 
 and the political world was able to attempt 
 reconstruction. 
 
 Such was the turmoil in the midst of which 
 the great systems of German philosophy 
 arose. The very spirit of these systems was 
 the same which in the poHtical world produced 
 through infinite travail the single German 
 nation. In place of the critical insight of 
 Kant we find an effort to establish complete 
 and unified systems ; so that in this change 
 from Kantian to purely German philosophy, 
 we have once again the proof that all real 
 philosophy arises from a new experience. 
 Life always goes before logic. However abso- 
 lute the claims of any system of thought, its 
 vaHdity depends upon its expression of a real 
 individual and national life. In the work 
 
Kantians, Fichtc, and Romanticism 145 
 
 of Fichte the Critical Philosophy underwent 
 a development of the greatest importance 
 for the future. Fichte's primary object was 
 to systematise the results attained by Kant, 
 but in attempting this he was led to develop 
 a fundamental thought to its ultimate con- 
 sequences. That thought was contained in 
 what Kant had called the synthetic unity of 
 apperception : it indicated, in a more precise 
 way than the vague Cartesian " cogito, ergo 
 sum," that the individual thinker was the 
 universal element or the unifying point in all 
 real experience. Hence Fichte, developing 
 this, is the philosopher of the Ego. 
 
 Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) was 
 born in Lusatia. His precocious genius and 
 exact memory attracted the attention of a 
 rich man, at whose expense his education was 
 begun ; but on the death of his patron, 
 Fichte had to struggle on at school as best 
 he might. After schooling, he contrived to 
 continue his studies at Leipzig, with a view 
 to becoming a pastor. From the beginning, 
 however, the clerical profession was distaste- 
 ful to him, and he soon became a literary 
 
 10 
 
146 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 essayist. At Zurich he met Johanna Kahn, 
 whose love influenced the remainder of his 
 life. After some years of wandering as tutor 
 at various places, he was almost accidentally 
 attracted by the " Critique of Pure Reason." 
 Therein, as he said, his scheming spirit found 
 rest, and he consciously became a philosopher. 
 His poverty forced him still to live by tutor- 
 ing ; but, after a disagreeable experience at 
 Warsaw, he journeyed to Konigsberg (1790) 
 to see Kant. The old philosopher was 
 brusquely kind to him, but poverty again 
 forced him to the distasteful tutoring. In 
 the meantime an essay by Fichte was anony- 
 mously pubhshed, which attempted to draw 
 conclusions as to reUgion from the Critical 
 Philosophy (An Essay towards a Critique of 
 all Revelation, 1792). This was mistaken by 
 readers and reviewers for a work of Kant's 
 own hand ; and when the real authorship 
 was revealed, Fichte's position as a philo- 
 sopher was secured. He was then able to 
 marry, and was soon after called to be Pro- 
 fessor at Jena (1793). There he stayed, 
 attempting reform in the University, and 
 stating views by no means palatable to the 
 
JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE 
 
 p. 146] 
 
Kantians, Fichte, and Romanticism 14? 
 
 authorities, in consequence of which he was 
 expelled from his position in 1799 ; but he 
 had already conceived the splendid system of 
 his " Wissenschaftslehre." He found a home 
 in Berlin, where he developed his thoughts, in 
 lectures, in the direction of absolute Idealism. 
 At tTiis time political events changed his 
 ideals of reform into ideals of patriotism. He 
 fled before the victorious advance of Napoleon, 
 but after a short stay at Konigsberg, where 
 he lectured, he returned to Berhn in 1807. 
 Then he deUvered his famous "Addresses to the 
 German Nation," inciting Prussia to renewed 
 efforts. He was made first Rector of the 
 new Berlin University. His greatest en- 
 thusiasm was excited by the struggles of 
 1812 and 1813 against Napoleon. His wife, 
 nursing the wounded, was attacked by fever, 
 and Fichte caught the disease from her, and 
 died of it. In character he was a passionate 
 idealist, impatient of a world by no means 
 ideal. Indeed, even in his strictest processes 
 of reasoning, he is something of a preacher 
 and a poet ; in his later works ' the language 
 is almost that of an inspired visionary. 
 
 1 Of these the three most striking — " The Nature of the 
 
148 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 The system of Fichte's results is often 
 artificial, and the process of his reasoning 
 often arbitrary, but the essentials of his 
 philosophy are immortal. The grandeur of 
 Spinoza's thought led him through the pre- 
 cise analytics of Kant to an intuition almost 
 Platonic. In the development of the Critical 
 Philosophy Fichte gradually felt his own 
 power ; and by the force of his own thought 
 he moved forward through what may be re- 
 garded as two definite stages. At first, like 
 his master, he is absorbed by the problems of 
 knowledge and reality as given ; then he is 
 attracted by the fuller reality which seemed to 
 be given in active life. He leaves the barren 
 controversies as to the thing-in-itself, and in 
 the end explains away altogether this bug- 
 bear of reasoning. 
 
 Philosophy is called by Fichte " Wissen- 
 schaftslehre " ; thus he conceives it as a syste- 
 matic thinking out of conscious knowledge. 
 Later it changes into what he has called " a 
 pragmatic history of consciousness." For a 
 
 Scholar," " The Vocation of Man," " The Doctrines of Re- 
 ligion " — were translated into English by Dr. Smith (Trubner 
 & Co., 1873). 
 
Kantians, Fichte, and Romanticism 149 
 
 systematic philosophy it is necessary to com- 
 mence from the ultimate datum of all experi- 
 ence, which is, as Kant had shown in " syn- 
 thetic apperception," the universal element in 
 all experience. Now, in its first stage, ex- 
 perience involves merely a unity of opposites, 
 which may be called the self and the not-self. 
 In the act of awareness (Anschauung) the con- 
 nection or unifying contrast is directly given, 
 and the opposites are not clearly conceived ; 
 but if this awareness be an act, in so far as it 
 is a basis of knowledge it is directed towards 
 the ultimate necessity of all real knowing — 
 a full self-knowledge. That we do not 
 observe the part our self plays in our experi- 
 ence is due to the familiarity which breeds 
 contempt, for the self alone is omnipresent in 
 all experience. But the first act aiming at 
 self (or ego) finds it only by opposition to 
 not-self (non-ego) ; this not-self therefore is 
 merely an intermediate postulate or limita- 
 tion by which to reach the self, in and for 
 which the original opposition arose. Now, 
 this beginning of philosophy with act and 
 not fact is at variance with the popular 
 conception of experience. It is therefore 
 
ifo Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 wrong to suppose that Fichte is talking of 
 the " things " and " selves " of common sense 
 as the members of his opposition. 
 
 When we come to think out the meaning 
 of real experience, it is possible to speak of 
 this opposition either in terms of causation 
 (to say that the non-self determines or modifies 
 a passive ego) or in terms of substance — to say- 
 that the self (ego) is active in producing its 
 own states and in positing itself. If we say 
 the former, we are realists ; if the latter, we 
 are subjective idealists. Both statements are 
 false ; for it is only as mutually determined 
 that these opposites have any reality at all. 
 
 Starting, therefore, from the beginning of 
 all consciousness, we find that the first act, 
 sensation, gives no determination at all. 
 Its results are thus conceived as " given," 
 because not consciously made.' The " pro- 
 ductive imagination " beyond and above this 
 gives (out of the opposition) definite opposites, 
 which are now subject and object. This, 
 therefore, is the first and fundamental act of 
 real knowledge ; but productive imagination 
 
 1 The self is " felt " as passive because this is the first act 
 of self -limitation. 
 
Kantians, Fichte, and Romanticism 1 5 1 
 
 is merely a new stage in what is essentially 
 the free activity of experience, and the next 
 stage is that by which the products of the 
 primary intuitions are fixed in classes. Thus 
 the world of understanding arises in and for 
 an activity which is itself productive of both 
 elements in knowledge, the a ^priori and the 
 a posteriori. If the whole of this abstract 
 world of our construction be now made an 
 object, we have the ultimate act of conscious 
 life. Here will be found the purest Ego of 
 philosophic thought by opposition to the 
 purest form of non-Ego ; but we have not 
 even here reached any such mysterious sub- 
 stratum as ordinary thought thinks the " I " 
 to be.' Does all our dialectical movement 
 
 ^ So long as the Piohtean " ego " is regarded as the indi- 
 vidual and personal unit (which is ordinarily spoken of as a 
 substance), no understanding of Pichte is possible. StiU less 
 is it possible to foUow him if some mjrsterious " soul " be 
 postulated, for " soul " and " body " are constructions of 
 activity, the one as the active, the other as the passive con- 
 nection with the not-self. The ordinary soul-and-body 
 hypothesis is in truth nothing but a residue of early meta- 
 physics. So Pichte says : " The existence of a soul is abso- 
 lutely denied, and the whole concept rejected as a bad inven- 
 tion. And this is not an indifferent matter, but an essential 
 criterion of our system. With the beUef in such a soul a 
 man cannot abide in pur system, nor even enter it." 
 
152 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 (by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis) lead to 
 any definite end ? Certainly not, if the end 
 be conceived as a substance or a cause, for 
 both these have appeared only in the activity, 
 and must be transcended when we deal with 
 that activity as such. 
 
 Turning back to our original experience, we 
 find that throughout the world of our theo- 
 retical construction there has been no ex- 
 planation given of the meaning of the original 
 limitation or opposition ; indeed, no theo- 
 retical explanation is possible, for the original 
 activity is the ground of all theory, and that 
 original activity is of the type not of thinking, 
 but of wilUng. In fact, all our thinking is 
 purposive ; the very meaning of our thoughts 
 depends upon our purpose in constructing 
 them. " Will is in a special sense the essence 
 of reason." " The whole system of our ideas 
 depends upon our impulses (Trieb) and our 
 will." Thus we take up again Lessing's 
 concept of " eternal striving " ; and here 
 Fichte passes from the " Critique of Pure 
 Eeason " to the " Critique of Practical 
 Keason." The real itself is merely a postu- 
 late in a process whose whole meaning is 
 
Kantians, Fichte, ^nd Romanticism 153 
 
 movement towards the ideal. The realisation 
 of the ideal self is the end, and the concept 
 of this is the summit of philosophy; but 
 such realisation takes place in an infinite 
 series of activities. 
 
 The later form of the " Wissenschaftslehre " 
 and the popular works mark the progress from 
 these concepts to a transcendental system 
 which is an attempt to read the real world in 
 its relation to the ideal ; for the force that 
 expresses the individual's first (unconscious) 
 activity is not his own, and the end he moves 
 towards is not merely personal. Also the 
 limiting world is not, as limit, the construc- 
 tion of that which exists only by being limited 
 (finite activity). On every side the finite self 
 goes out into infinity ; and the infinity, as to 
 meaning, is the Divine Idea : the Absolute is 
 God. Here, then, Fichte, the ideal moralist, 
 becomes a mystic — not a dreamy despiser of 
 thought, but rather one who has thought life 
 out to the end. " There is no other Being 
 than life. The only life that exists entirely 
 in itself, from itself and by itself, is the life 
 of God, or of the Absolute ; . . . the truth 
 is, the Absolute is Life and Life is the 
 
154 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 Absolute." ' But this again is a philosophic 
 truth, not mere mystic assertion, " To me 
 it is — not so certain as the sun in heaven or 
 as the feeling of my own body — but infinitely 
 more certain, that there is Truth, that it is 
 attainable by man, and clearly conceived 
 by him." ^ The metaphysic of the whole 
 of experience involves a synthesis of all the 
 forms of knowledge and the series of practical 
 life ; and this synthesis is in itself an active 
 unity upon which the system of finite selves 
 and the nature which arises out of their 
 finiteness is dependent. This one activity in 
 and for itself (" hidden," as Fichte called it) 
 may be conceived as stable and unchanging ; 
 but for us it is manifested as the eternal 
 striving of the ideal in the real ; this is the 
 "Universal Ego" ("allgemeinen Ich"). 
 
 From such a height did Fichte speak to 
 the world of ordinary experience, and in his 
 practical ethics he attempted to show how the 
 limitations of social life and civil law are them- 
 selves directed towards the true development 
 of the free and ideal self of the individuals. 
 
 1 " Nature of the Scholar," Bng. trans., p. 148. 
 
 2 " The Doctrine of Religion," Eng. trans., p. 552. 
 
Kantians, Fichte, and Romanticism 155 
 
 All communities, even the highest, Church 
 and State, arise out of the nature of the finite 
 self, which by limitation realises the infinite 
 in the empirical world. The free fulfilment 
 of a duty whose command is from within and 
 not from without (authority) is the sole 
 object of laws and limits. Thus Fichte could 
 be at once the first socialist of " the complete 
 industrial State," and the patriot who felt 
 the divine idea to be realised in the natural 
 community of which he was a member. He 
 died with the gospel of strenuous idealism 
 upon his lips. Above his grave is written — 
 " The teachers shall shine as the brightness 
 of the firmament, and they that turn many to 
 righteousness as the stars that shine for ever." 
 Even during Fichte's development of philo- 
 sophic thought, an ahen principle had begun 
 to influence reasoning. It is indeed false to 
 life to regard intellectual exactness as the 
 only criterion of progress, and the only thing 
 valuable. In protest against this Rousseau 
 had written, and later literature had taken 
 up the cry of return to the roughness and 
 the strength of full life — " the native hue 
 of resolution." The arbitrary standards of 
 
156 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 eighteenth-century intellectualism were re- 
 jected, and " naturalism " was adopted. The 
 real world had been and was then obviously 
 fuller than science found it. Now this move- 
 ment was at last reduced to systematic 
 coherence in " Romanticism.^' The principles 
 of this, indeed, are hard to define, espe- 
 cially as its latest exponents appear to be 
 weak-minded enthusiasts. But in its first 
 stages Romanticism may be conceived as an 
 expression of the aesthetic appreciation of 
 real life, and it is therefore intimately con- 
 nected with naturalism. In Germany at first 
 it expressed the new-found strength of the 
 German nation rising against alien ideals 
 and foreign power. Thus it was connected 
 with an interest in the Middle Ages, which in 
 thought and art had been so prominently 
 Teutonic. Soon, however, Schiller and Goethe 
 give place to Schlegel and Novalis, and 
 Romanticism becomes a barren protest against 
 scientific thinking. At this stage, too, it 
 becomes connected with religious enthusiasm 
 and political reaction. Thus a thousand 
 currents swell the stream whose whole force 
 is directed along other channels than that of 
 
Katitians, Fichtc, and Romanticism 157 
 
 pure thought. At first it seemed as if philo- 
 sophy itself would be expressed in terms of 
 Romanticism. 
 
 Fichte had been influenced by the en- 
 thusiasms of his contemporaries, though he 
 never consciously allowed his logical thinking 
 to suffer. With weaker men the result was 
 different. We have already seen how the 
 earliest commentators on Kant's Critiques, 
 such as Jacobi, attempted to assert the security 
 of immediate feeling in defiance of critical 
 thought. Other thinkers had attained a kind 
 of reasoned scepticism ; but in Schelling the 
 opposing interests meet in conflict ; and as he 
 ended in a negative attitude towards scientific 
 thinking, he may be regarded as typical of the 
 philosophy of Romanticism. Together with 
 him ^may be mentioned that graceful but 
 inadequate thinker, the poet Novalis, and 
 the theorising aesthete Fr. Schlegel. 
 
 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775- 
 1854) was a native of Wiirtemberg, and was 
 educated at Tiibingen. He was a follower and 
 afterwards an assistant of Fichte at Jena, 
 and he was made Professor there in 1798. 
 
158 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 There he was connected with the two Schlegels 
 and Novalis, among others, and thus originated 
 Romanticism. But the enthusiasm of Schelling 
 at this time was anti-religious and purely 
 naturahstic ; his speculation also was wholly 
 concerned with nature and art. When, how- 
 ever, external circumstances forced the more 
 popular interests of life upon his view, his 
 attitude was entirely changed, and he at- 
 tempted religious mysticism ending in theo- 
 sophy. For some years after 1841 he lectured 
 in Berlin ; but his active thinking ceased very 
 soon after the change in his attitude. Hegel 
 had in the interval attained success in philo- 
 sophic circles ; and when the Hegelians 
 seemed to be unorthodox in speculation 
 Schelling reappeared as the champion of 
 orthodoxy, but to little effect. 
 
 Schelling's first object was purely philo- 
 sophical. It was to obtain a conception of 
 nature from the point of view of the idealism 
 of Fichte ; for not only did philosophy demand 
 that science should be brought into harmony 
 with her, but science itself seemed to confess 
 the inadequacies of its own hypotheses.^ The 
 
 1 Apart from the difBculties of a mechanical explanation 
 
Kantians, Fichte, and Romanticism 159 
 
 method adopted was a reversal of the scientific 
 point of view ; and whereas all science had 
 been, as it still is, based upon mathematical 
 and mechanical rules, Schelling explains nature 
 by teleological concepts, and conceives it to 
 be a gradual development of a spiritual 
 principle.' Nature, therefore, is the Odyssey 
 of spirit ; the aim and closing synthesis of its 
 many duahsms (of force, negative and positive 
 electricity, etc.) is consciousness. Poetically 
 valid, this concept did not prove philosophic- 
 ally or scientifically valuable. There followed 
 a strange attempt to substitute symbolism 
 for science ; rational meaning (why ?) and not 
 mere connection (how ?) was demanded. With 
 such a theory, beauty may easily be confused 
 with truth ; and, just as Kant had hinted 
 that the last synthesis of his critical analysis 
 would be emotional or aesthetic, so now artistic 
 
 of biological facts, the newly discovered phenomena of 
 electricity were attracting attention. Hence the idea of 
 " polarity " to be found in Schelling. 
 
 1 The contrast may be fovmd stiU within science : for 
 whereas chemistry, for instance, reduces the quahtative 
 differences of colour to a quantitative proportion of ether- 
 waves, biological evolution, on the other hand, demands that 
 organic changes should be regarded as purposive (i.e. teleo- 
 logical). 
 
i6o Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 intuition was held to be the ultimate ground 
 of philosophic knowledge. 
 
 When, however, we have reached an emo- 
 tional attitude in regard to the whole of known 
 reality as the conclusion of philosophy, we are 
 already on the threshold of some form of 
 religion. The artistic interest and religious 
 enthusiasm of Romanticism now appear as 
 real life in opposition to the abstract reasoning 
 as to nature. Thus Schelling re-reads his 
 system with a view perhaps of finding what 
 is supposed to be necessary to the rehgious 
 consciousness. The spiritual unity of nature 
 now becomes a personal Spirit, and the actual 
 world of finite existences is described, neo- 
 platonically, as a falling away from this. In 
 the interests also of religious ethics this per- 
 sonal world-ground is conceived as all good, 
 in opposition apparently to the chaos of the 
 irrational which is somehow within Him. 
 So that the world is the development of God, 
 the conquest of evil which yet only exists in 
 good.' There is here the struggle to sever 
 the concept of " Grod " in religion from that 
 
 1 " The battle becomes a game, a divine joke." — Hoffding, 
 ii. p. 172. 
 
Kantians, Fichtc, and Romanticism i6r 
 
 of the Absolute in philosophy. But the 
 method is arbitrary, and the results did not 
 have any great influence. A somewhat similar 
 attempt was made by Fr. Schleiermacher, an 
 unorthodox Moravian (1768-1834). His pur- 
 pose was to reach a consistent and rational 
 mysticism, and his method depended upon a 
 revival of the Kantian thing-in-itself. This 
 was the last great attempt to use scientific 
 thought as a basis for colourless orthodoxy. 
 Afterwards it was seen by all thinkers that 
 the popular creed could not be reinstatedj 
 even by mystical symbolism. 
 
 11 
 
CHAPTEE IX 
 
 HEGEL 
 
 r I "iHE positive side of the development 
 -*- of German philosopliy culminated in 
 Hegel. With him the Critical Philosophy is 
 an " overcome standpoint," and Absolute 
 Idealism takes its place. An all-embracing 
 system is attempted by means of a method 
 already implicit in the thought of Fichte and 
 ScheUing — the Dialectic. 
 
 George WiUiam Frederic Hegel (1770-1831) 
 was a native of Stiittgart, and was educated 
 at Tiibingen. He seems to have been a 
 quiet student, with none of the precocious 
 genius of Schelling, who was his contemporary 
 at Tiibingen. His earliest enthusiasm was 
 for the Greeks ; but in connection with literary 
 and romantic interests he was already studying 
 
 162 
 
Hegel 163 
 
 Kant. In 1793 he began his " Wanderjahre," 
 and acted as tutor first at Berne and after- 
 wards at Frankfort. His interests during 
 these years of formation were concerned with 
 religion : he had been intended for the Church 
 while at Tiibingen, and he seems never to 
 have lost his interest in and appreciation of 
 the ordinary religious consciousness. At this 
 time he was attracted towards mysticism 
 and the thought of the Middle Ages. His 
 genial nature was gradually becoming over- 
 clouded while he struggled to arrive at a de- 
 finite conclusion as to the problem now present 
 to him. This was nothing less than the 
 question as to the value of the principle of 
 individuaUty as expressed in the Reformation 
 and the Enlightenment. Thus Hegel seems 
 to have hved through the various attitudes 
 expressed in what later on he called the 
 Dialectic. His attention to exact and philo- 
 sophic thought had naturally left him with a 
 conception of the human individual such as 
 is expressed by Kant and Fichte. In this, 
 independence and isolation seemed to be the 
 prominent notes, and these notes appeared 
 to Hegel embodied in the principle of Chris- 
 
164 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 tianity ; ' but on the other hand Hegel's 
 enthusiasm for the Greeks, and his apprecia- 
 tion of the truth embodied in the Eomantic 
 principle of the unity of human Ufe, led him 
 to see the falsehood of the abstract postulate 
 of the Enlightenment. The Greeks seemed to 
 him to show in their history how the true and 
 fully developed human individual was only 
 to be found when completely taken up in the 
 community of which he was a member. It is in 
 this sense that Hegel agreed with the principle 
 of authority as expressed in Romanticism, and 
 even with the philosophy of identity preached 
 by SchelKng. Further thought, however, led 
 him to see that the harmony reached by the 
 life of a Greek city-state was exceptional, and 
 even that it was possible to exaggerate the 
 principle of authority and the idea of the unity 
 of human life to such a point as to destroy all 
 individuality. Along with these pregnant 
 thoughts, Hegel was developing the idea of a 
 systematic use of the method exhibited by 
 
 1 Thus it is clear that his concept of Christianity was pre- 
 dominantly Lutheran at this time. He treats Christianity 
 as essentially Judaic in his early " Studies of Jewish and 
 Christian Religion from a Greek Point of View." H!is later 
 judgment corrected this. 
 
p. 104] 
 
 GEORGE WILIJAM FREDERIC HEGEL 
 
Hegel 165 
 
 Kant and Fichte. They had shown that logical 
 thinking on philosophic subjects must be 
 carried out by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis 
 — the new names of the old " methodus sic et 
 non." With such preparation Hegel sketched 
 in outline the system he was afterwards to 
 develop. Philosophy was to be the systematic 
 study of reality as given in experience, 
 or simply a study of experience. Its first 
 effort was to be an attempt to grasp the 
 general structure of reality (Logic or Meta- 
 physic) ; the next was to exhibit that part of 
 reality which is seen by us " from the outside," 
 as common language has it (Philosophy of 
 Nature) ; and the third and last effort was to 
 examine " from the inside " such reality as 
 could be so studied (Philosophy of Mind), and 
 by this means to gather together all the 
 different elements into one concrete whole, 
 which as a system would give a relative place 
 to all aspects of reality. Thus the whole 
 might be called, from its highest point, a 
 Philosophy of Spirit. 
 
 In 1801 Hegel went to Jena and appeared 
 as a champion of Schelling's philosophy. To- 
 gether they attacked the analysis of Kant and 
 
1 66 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 Fichte as too extreme ; but gradually Hegel 
 drew apart, for Schelling's protest appeared 
 to him to be a kind of emotional mysticism, 
 and as such, to be anti-scientific. The philo- 
 sophy of identity seemed no better than the 
 philosophy of substance as expressed in 
 Spinoza ; the highest reality, the Absolute, 
 was " a dark night in which all cows look 
 black." And in consonance with this attitude 
 some mysterious and sacred intuition was 
 supposed to sever the philosopher, as an artist, 
 from the common herd. Such poetic gener- 
 alities did not appeal to Hegel : and in his 
 " voyage of discovery," as he called the 
 " Phenomenology of Spirit " (1807), he showed 
 how philosophy was related as a scientific 
 study to the other spheres of knowledge, and 
 said that the true work of a philosopher was 
 to plunge headlong (" hineinstiirzen ") into ex- 
 perience. Thus, in opposition to Schelling, 
 the subject-matter of philosophy was said to 
 be reahty as given here and now, and the 
 subject-matter in its highest aspect never 
 passed beyond thought-experience; again, 
 the method of philosophy was a continua- 
 tion of the same logical process by which 
 
Hegel 167 
 
 physical science arose out of common 
 sense. 
 
 While Hegel was thus thinking, pohtical 
 events had led up to the battle of Jena. 
 Before the battle Hegel had watched Napo- 
 leon, " the world-mind on horseback, reaching 
 over the world and remoulding it," as he says ; 
 and when war left no further opportunity for 
 higher studies, Hegel became Rector of the 
 Gymnasium at Niirnberg, where he remained 
 for some years (1808-16). During this 
 period he married (1811), and afterwards pub- 
 lished his " Science of Logic " (" Wissenschaft 
 der Logik," 1812-16, three volumes).' This 
 work brought him fame. He was offered a 
 position by three universities, and accepted 
 the offer from Heidelberg. There he lectured 
 on philosophy (1816-18). Naturally at that 
 date he developed further the thought on the 
 individual and authority, especially with 
 regard to pohtical Kfe. His moderate views, 
 tending, by contrast to the current "indi- 
 vidualism," to seem conservative, attracted 
 
 ^ This is the " greater " Logic, translated in part (Quality 
 and Quantity) by Stirling in his " Secret of Hegel." The 
 smaller Logic, the first part of the Encyclopedia, is translated 
 by Dr. Wallace. 
 
1 68 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 attention in BerKn. He therefore was called 
 to succeed Fichte there in 1818. From this 
 time he was the greatest power in the philo- 
 sophic world. He published his " Philosophy 
 of Right," and attempted to solve the opposi- 
 tion of an exaggerated individualism — ex- 
 pressed in the " Aufklarung," and partly in the 
 ethics of Kant and Fichte — and an exaggerated 
 view of government as parental, the principle 
 of authority — as expressed by the reaction 
 against the Revolution. In spite of a philo- 
 sophic intention of standing above controversy, 
 as was natural to a philosopher who would 
 not separate his theories from the real and 
 immediate world, Hegel's views underwent 
 a hmitation. His ideals were inevitably 
 coloured by the circumstances in which they 
 were developed ; and therefore the claim 
 that he stood outside and beyond the process 
 of development, if we can imagine it seriously 
 urged, cannot be accepted. His idea of 
 government is Prussian, and his idea of rehgion 
 is Lutheran. Work of greater value was done 
 by him in pure philosophy. His lectures had 
 already been embodied in the " Encyclopedia," 
 which expresses the system of which he had 
 
Hegel 169 
 
 drawn the scheme at Frankfort. Of this 
 work, the first part (Logic) was influential 
 in forming the systematic philosophy of 
 Germany ; and the third part (Philosophy 
 of Spirit), full as it was of Hegel's deep 
 historical learning, established scientific 
 idealism ; but the second part (Philosophy 
 of Nature), perhaps owing to his lack of 
 physical science, has not proved valuable. 
 Of other works may be mentioned a " History 
 of Philosophy " and a " Philosophy of 
 History." 
 
 Hegel died of the epidemic of cholera, 
 having lectured with his usual force up to 
 within two days of his death. 
 
 If Kant showed that criticism must be the 
 beginning of all philosophic thought, by 
 which no ipse dixit of authority can be 
 admitted as a barrier to individual thought, 
 Hegel showed that dialectics must be the 
 method of philosophy. No individual can 
 take his first thoughts as an absolute be- 
 ginning, for all is relative ; and yet the 
 relativity of all thought cannot invahdate 
 its result. The precision of method gave a 
 
lyo Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 systematic coherence to the results attained 
 by Hegel, by which his development of 
 philosophy is connected in its general tone 
 with the great systems of the past — the Aristo- 
 telian and the Thomistic. For, like the 
 earliest thinkers of the North, Hegel's method 
 is by " sic et non," and his result is a justi- 
 fication of the postulate " omne ens est 
 verum," " the real is the rational." There is 
 no unknowable, however much may be un- 
 known. In the width of his outlook Hegel is 
 like an Aristotle — a successor to the Platonic 
 Fichte. It will perhaps appear that his de- 
 ficiencies also connect him with the great 
 systematic thinkers. Hegel fails, perhaps like 
 Aristotle, through not appreciating the value 
 of the mechanical (atomistic) principle of 
 physical science ; and he fails, like Thomas 
 Aquinas, because his precise abstract thinking 
 seems, at any rate to many, to lack definite 
 application to immediate reality.' 
 
 However distasteful the result may be, the 
 first efforts of Hegel's thinking can hardly be 
 
 1 Thus Aristotle appears to neglect Demooritus, as Hegel 
 did Kepler and his followers ; and Thomas Aquinas was 
 criticised as an abstract " panlogist " by Scotus, much in 
 the same way as Hegel was by Schopenhauer, 
 
Hcgel 171 
 
 called unreal, even by the man of "average 
 intelligence." Those efforts were directed 
 towards restoring philosophy to the sanity of 
 a science of ordinary experience ; for the 
 last efforts of his predecessors seemed to 
 Hegel to have removed philosophic study into 
 the mists of special intuition and exceptional 
 types of experience. Thus Hegel went 
 through, in his own thought, the course of 
 all preceding thought. The first essays in 
 critical and reflective thought seemed to be 
 embodied in Kant and Fichte. In them the 
 prejudices of the Enlightenment in favour of 
 analytic thinking seemed to have reached 
 their logical results ; and apart from the 
 difficulty of treating the elements of experi- 
 ence in isolation, there was the more ob- 
 trusive difficulty of treating the human 
 individual as, in essence, isolated. True it 
 may be that without reference to the indi- 
 vidual all experience and all thought is 
 meaningless ; and, from this premise, Kant 
 and Fichte had seemed to exalt the ego so 
 much as to leave the individual unrelated to 
 his community and the general environment. 
 Thus in ethics, where the results of an exag- 
 
172 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 gerated metaphysical postulate are tested, 
 the cold moralism of Kant was followed by 
 the enthusiasm of the Idea-Ego in Fichte. 
 Looking back, we can see with Hegel " the 
 dead sea of moral platitudes " that was the 
 ethics of the Enlightenment. And if Hegel 
 is too severe upon a principle which in the 
 main was true and valuable — that the in- 
 dividual conscience is fundamental in moral 
 life — ^it may perhaps be due to the fact that 
 he felt most keenly the popular exaggeration 
 of this in a fatuous " individualism." 
 
 Upon cool inquiry it soon appears that the 
 human individual is not in fact isolated, that 
 man is a " social animal," and is to be under- 
 stood only through the relation in which he, 
 as particular, stands to the universal, his 
 community. History indeed teaches that the 
 individual attains his highest development 
 when he lives not as a hermit, but as a citizen. 
 Here Hegel was taught by the Greeks ; for 
 in that nation we find the most entire sinking 
 of individuaUty in the State, and at the same 
 time the development of the highest types of 
 the individual. This loss of individuality in 
 the community was practically the same as 
 
Hegel 173 
 
 that preached by Schelling. The other type 
 of perfect community seemed to the philo- 
 sophers of Eomanticism to be found in the 
 Middle Ages ; ' but to this Hegel does not 
 refer, for it had not yet reached definite ex- 
 pression. In the Greeks, however, not only 
 were the particular interests of the individual 
 subordinated to the more universal, but the 
 two were bound together. To the Greeks life 
 was a rounded whole. To them the ideal 
 was found in and through the real, as may be 
 seen in their art. Now, from this last position 
 Hegel never receded. Romanticism remained 
 to him the name for the highest type of 
 artistic intuition ; and by it he meant that in 
 art so conceived the ideal was reaUsed, or 
 found in the real world, in one inspired 
 moment. In the wider interests of life, again, 
 and particularly in religion, the Greeks were 
 at one with actual experience ; for, while 
 
 * The fact that the Middle Ages of artistic and leUgious 
 thinkers never existed does not affect the argument. The 
 meaning was that this was an ideal time, when authority did 
 all the dirty work, and the individual was required only to 
 give a graceful obedience. The Middle Ages of Romanticism 
 are no more and no less historically untrue than the Greece 
 of Winokelmann and Goethe — to whiohHegel referred. 
 
174 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 the Jewish religion was the reKgion of great 
 men — the prophets — the Greeks had a greater 
 religion, for theirs was a religion of the people. 
 Thus it seems that Hegel had lost the value 
 of the thought of Kant and Fichte. The 
 individual seems almost to have disappeared 
 in this criticism of individualism. 
 
 It appeared, however, that ScheUing was 
 pressing this criticism of his predecessors to 
 an extreme, and erecting an absolute uni- 
 versalism into the only principle of thought 
 and life. Hegel therefore perceived that the 
 truth lay with neither or with both ; for if 
 the assertion of a unity above difference be 
 held to mean that there is no difference, it 
 is false or unmeaning. If, because the in- 
 dividual exists only in a community, we say 
 that the individual exists only for the com- 
 munity, it is false. In the attempt to explain 
 the universal side of individual life, the prin- 
 ciple of absolute authority leads to a lion's 
 den — towards which all footsteps go, and 
 from which none return. 
 
 At this stage, therefore, Hegel no longer 
 treats the result attained by the Greeks as an 
 ideal to which we may return ; for he sees 
 
Hegel 175 
 
 that the opposition and even antagonism be- 
 tween individuals is no less necessary in real 
 and full life than the sympathy and com- 
 munity. Kant and Fichte were right, and 
 so was Schelling in his original meaning. 
 We cannot return to childhood and accept 
 external direction : the force that moves a 
 perfect community must be the spontaneous 
 force of individuals. On the other hand, 
 the individualism which promotes only the 
 full development of an isolated self is 
 wrong, for self-limitation no less than self- 
 development is necessary for the reahsation 
 of the ideal self. This, however, involves 
 a new ethics, with which we shall deal 
 later. Here it may be noted that Hegel now 
 reached a point of view at which he stood 
 above the original controversy. It is at this 
 point that we can see how Hegel embodies 
 the experience of his time and his nation 
 in a new systematic philosophy. The dis- 
 integrating individualism of the Enlighten- 
 ment needed correction ; it had already been 
 corrected in life, now it was corrected in 
 thought. Hegel was conscious of the process 
 by which he had reached this philosophic 
 
176 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 standpoint ; in re-thinking his position he 
 corrected the methods of Kant and Pichte 
 on the one hand, and of Schelling on the 
 other. For, first, it appeared that the method 
 of pure analysis was misleading. It cannot, 
 of course, be said that Kant was ignorant of 
 the synthetic activity of thought-process, 
 still less Fichte ; but the fact remains that 
 an analytic division of thought from its data 
 (the " given " in experience) had been allowed 
 to remain unexplained by Kant. In place of 
 this Hegel asserted the essential unity of life- 
 process, whether in its lower elements, called 
 experience, or in its higher, called thought. 
 Not thought, but " spirit " (" Geist ") was used 
 to express the unifying principle ; and this 
 is of course not merely a correction, but a 
 development of the Kantian principle — " con- 
 ception without perception is empty, and per- 
 ception without conception is blind." Further, 
 if the process is thus essentially synthetic, as 
 Fichte had seen, yet by Fichte the not-self 
 had been left analytically divided from the 
 self. As the self grew to fulness, the not-self 
 moved ever before it, like a ghost that would 
 not be laid. Yet the not-self was a mere 
 
Hegel 177 
 
 negation, a limitation set up by the very 
 activity which it limited. Fichte had him- 
 self shown the way to avoid this seeming 
 absurdity ; and Hegel developed the thought 
 by showing that both the spontaneous activity 
 and its negation were inadequate aspects of 
 a higher reality, to be reached by synthesis. 
 
 Secondly, as against Schelling, Hegel as- 
 serted that the same process by which scientific 
 thought arose from the immediate statements 
 of common sense is embodied in the change 
 from scientific to philosophic thinking. Thus 
 Hegel forms some of his philosophic language 
 by using the terms of ordinary life in a new 
 sense, for he holds the sense in which he uses 
 them (philosophically) to be the real meaning 
 obscurely intended in their ordinary use. 
 Philosophy is no sacred hortus conclusus 
 such as even art may be imagined to be ; and, 
 however essentially connected with poetry 
 and religion, philosophy is neither. There- 
 fore it is that every man is a possible philo- 
 sopher just as much as he is a possible scientist, 
 but not a possible artist or poet ; for philo- 
 sophy is a systematic and logical study. 
 On the other hand, of course, there is no 
 
 12 
 
1 78 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 ground for supposing that conclusions of 
 value can be reached in philosophy with any 
 greater ease than they can be reached in the 
 higher mathematics. The philosopher is, 
 therefore, one who has been through a stern 
 and difficult logical training, and at the same 
 time he is aware that, as a man, he is not 
 absolved from the fuller and more immediate 
 revelation of ordinary life.^ The history of 
 individual and of racial thought is one of 
 development ; and, in the logical movement 
 from experience, we proceed, correcting ab- 
 straction by abstraction, to an appreciation 
 of that fulness which was impKcit in all 
 experience, but could only become expHcit 
 through an analytic and dialectic considera- 
 tion of experience. These thoughts are 
 worked out by Hegel with great brilliancy in 
 the " Phenomenology of Spirit." 
 
 The most difficult as well as the most 
 characteristic development of thought in 
 Hegel is to be found in his assertion of the 
 identity of the " knowing " process with such 
 process as can be conceived to occur in 
 
 1 Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie, 
 Und griin des Lebens golduei Baum. 
 
Hegel 1 79 
 
 " reality." The essence of the Hegelian 
 Dialectic lies in this ; for if the dialectic 
 method be regarded merely as a rule of logical 
 procedure, it is not distinctively Hegelian. 
 We may reach a more adequate concept by 
 thinking out the opposition between two 
 seemingly contradictory thoughts. We may 
 also from the meaning of our concept evolve 
 a whole system of thoughts which may be 
 called a philosophy. Opponents asserted that 
 such was the practice of Hegel himself ; so 
 that by some the whole Hegelian system is 
 thought to be nothing more than idle word- 
 spinning, or at best a beautiful web produced 
 by poetic genius, but somewhat deficient in 
 its appUcation to " reaUty." Against such 
 a judgment it is hopeless to appeal, for it 
 depends on a metaphysic of reality, conscious 
 or unconscious, which has not yet been de- 
 veloped up to the Hegelian standpoint. If 
 Hegel, however, is deficient, he must be shown 
 to be so from a point of view at which his 
 philosophy can be seen to be relatively true — 
 that is, his own system must be used in order 
 to pass beyond him. Historically, and from 
 Hegel's own words, it is not possible to say 
 
i8o Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 either that he was unaware of the danger of 
 panlogism (making " reality " fit in with 
 logical definitions), or that he thought himself 
 to be discussing only the forms of thought 
 as opposed to some reality. 
 
 There is a further idea necessary for judging 
 the results attained by Hegel. His object 
 was to form a system that should rest upon 
 the critical position. For this purpose he 
 attempted to represent all preceding philo- 
 sophers in their respective positions, both as 
 regards one another and as regards the syste- 
 matic unity of thought to which all pointed. 
 
 The general idea, above stated, that philo- 
 sophy is but the highest stage of the thinking 
 process, which begins in common sense and 
 moves through science, needs closer definition. 
 We may take it for granted that experience 
 does not refer merely to the data of sense- 
 perception. Now, it is this experience that 
 gives birth to the first efforts of thought. By 
 the process of thinking we generally conceive 
 ourselves to be gaining a deeper experience, or a 
 deeper meaning for experience. It is the fijcst 
 effort of philosophy to discover what is the 
 value and meaning of the process thus begun. 
 
Hegel 1 8 1 
 
 In discussing the value of the process we deal 
 with the meaning of the reality discovered 
 in the process. We begin, therefore, from an 
 epistemology with an ontological significance, 
 or an ontology in terms of the knowing process. 
 This is the Hegelian logic' The postulate 
 of the whole work is that all reality is a con- 
 nected system, and that it is all rational 
 (omne ens est verum, voCs ecrrt ttws to, TrdvTa). 
 This is not really a statement requiring proof, 
 as it is merely the assertion of the meaning 
 in the very first efforts of thought ; but, how- 
 ever true, its value is unknown until we have 
 reached what Hegel calls the fourth attitude 
 of thought. Now, the first attitude of thought 
 is one of unreflective faith in its own power. 
 This produced the pre-Kantian metaphysics. 
 In it absolute and independent reality was 
 supposed to be reached by analytic considera- 
 tion of accepted concepts. Thus God, the 
 soul, etc., are discussed but not discovered, 
 and definition of a concept was held to fix a 
 reality. Against this the second attitude, 
 
 1 " Logic in our sense coincides with metaphysics, the 
 science of things in a setting of thoughts, which thoughts, it 
 is allowed, express the essence of things." — " Logic," § 24. 
 
1 82 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 empiricism, protested — half-heartedly ; and 
 by the third attitude, the critical, a new stage 
 was definitely reached. In this, knowledge 
 was strictly examined, and there was left a 
 thing-in-itself. It is against this that the 
 postulate stated above is directed, for the 
 thing-in-itself is a fiction. The long-popular 
 assertion of the limitations and relativity of 
 all human knowledge is here cruelly dissected 
 by Hegel. Of course if these concepts merely 
 mean that no knowledge can exhaust reality, 
 or that much is unknown, they are reasonable, 
 and even obviously true ; but if they imply 
 any unknowable in the sense of a residuum 
 reality, irreducible by thought, they are 
 nothing but unjustifiable assumptions. The 
 faith in the unknown, embodied in all thinking, 
 is a denial of any " unknowable." 
 
 Let us now express in the Hegelian terms 
 the great system of German thought which 
 attempted to explain the whole of human 
 experience according to one aU-embracing 
 law. The language will only have meaning for 
 those who feel the desire for such a system. 
 
 We begin from the logical starting-point of 
 all thinking, whether that of common sense 
 
Hegel 183 
 
 or of philosophy. This starting-point is ab- 
 stract being. Thus we presume ourselves to 
 understand mere existence, expressed in the 
 verb " is " ; but as soon as we begin to discuss 
 this presumption, we find that there is literally 
 nothing to be said for it : for mere " is " 
 without any subject is meaningless, and thus 
 equivalent to or identical with " is not." 
 That is to say, being and not-being are the 
 same, and yet different. The truth which is 
 indicated in both is called " becoming " ; 
 that is to say, determinate being (a thing or 
 somewhat) is and is not. " There is " has 
 become " this is." Now, reality, being found 
 to be essentially determinate, is thought to 
 consist of isolated reals. After saying " this 
 is " it is natural that we should strive to 
 conceive what " this " is. Therefore we have 
 qualification. Here we find the concepts of 
 the one and the many, or the one consisting 
 of many independent ones, and a kind of 
 atomism is reached. Out of this arises the 
 concept of qtmntities, and last of aU that of 
 measure or proportion. We have begun from 
 the presumption that everything was isolated 
 and definable as separate, and, because of the 
 
184 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 contradictions in which that would involve us, 
 we have now reached the concept that all is 
 relative. 
 
 Here, then, is the second stage, the philo- 
 sophy of Essence (" Wesen"), or relativity. At 
 this point the effort of thought shows us reality 
 as a contrast and a conflict between identity 
 and difference, appearance and reality, and, 
 still more prominently, the three great puzzles 
 of old philosophies — substance and qualities, 
 cause and effect, action and reaction. At this 
 point, too, there first appears the contrast 
 between freedom and necessity. Now, just 
 as we corrected the assumptions of our first 
 thoughts as too abstract, so we may correct 
 these efforts in so far as they also give only 
 abstractions. This stage, however, is one that 
 is still popularly identified with philosophic 
 thought, for it has not yet been grasped that 
 philosophy should be the most concrete and 
 not the most abstract of sciences. Therefore 
 we state that, so far from its being true that 
 thinking must stop here, it is rather the fact 
 that here thinking is most obviously inade- 
 quate. Substance, for instance, can only be 
 explained by quality, and quahty by sub- 
 
Hegel 185 
 
 stance ; and no philosophy can remain within 
 that vicious circle. In fact, we notice that 
 the concept of substance presses us forward 
 to the concept of cause, and that again to the 
 concept of activity. The force of the contra- 
 dictions in the sphere of relativity shows us 
 that reality lies beyond these abstractions : 
 not relativity but development is the truth. 
 
 This is the last and highest stage, for it is 
 the plane upon which the grasp of thought 
 (" Begriff ") embraces the fulness of reality. 
 ReaUty is now conceived to be a process : in 
 thought we conceive the permanent and the 
 changing to be somehow the same. The truth 
 is, we may say, that a man, for instance, 
 develops. Within the general process of de- 
 velopment three stages can be marked, for 
 the notion or thought is first subjective, then 
 objective, and lastly absolute. That is to 
 say, the concept of development gives us first 
 reality developing in the form of selves. First 
 comes a bare and colourless universality (for 
 instance, the man is only a human being), and 
 next comes particularity (which, for instance, 
 distinguishes this man from that). Now the 
 particular appears by contrast to other par- 
 
xB6 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 ticulars, just as the judgment seems to divide 
 the thoughts which it unites as well as divides. 
 The bare notion, in Hegel's language, passes 
 into the judgment ; but even that is not final, 
 for the reality of process (or development) 
 does not merely mean a difierentiation of an 
 originallyunanalysed medium. Rather develop- 
 ment involves that universal and particular are 
 inadequate aspects of that which is truly the 
 individual. The notion and the judgment, 
 says Hegel, are reconciled in the syllogism or 
 reasoning. Thus the whole subjective side 
 of reaUty is gradually proceeding through 
 bare universality and particularity to in- 
 dividuality ; and when once we have reached 
 the clearly thought individual we have no 
 longer the mere subject, but an apparently 
 independent " objective " world. The general 
 structure of this objective world of develop- 
 ment is explained as having three aspects — 
 the mechanical (independent " objects "), the 
 chemical (objects with affinity), and teleo- 
 logical (objects as ends or means). Still the 
 cleft between subject and object divides reality. 
 Therefore the notion (development) reaches 
 its final stage in the idea. The opposition 
 
Hcgel 187- 
 
 between subject and object is solved first in 
 life, then in cognition and in Will (" bnine ens 
 est verum, omne ens est bonum ") : and of all 
 these the Absolute Idea is the solution and 
 reconcilement, for in it is found the highest 
 philosophy. " The ideal is the real." The 
 structure of reality as a whole must therefore 
 be conceived as that of a process which, since 
 it produces only itself, must be confessed (but 
 not understood) to stand above process. 
 
 Having thus sketched a Metaphysics or 
 First Philosophy, Hegel proceeds to show its 
 results in a Physics or Philosophy of Nature 
 (" Naturphilosophie "). This is the least valu- 
 able part of his system, because Hegel's training 
 had been more historical than scientific, and, 
 again, the concepts of nature in our present 
 science have largely been formed since Hegel's 
 time ; but the attitude adopted by Hegel 
 toward an ideal unification of all the concepts 
 of science has had great influence. Nature 
 as a whole is regarded as the outward mani- 
 festation of thought. The outward is as such 
 the abstract and the inadequate ; but the 
 movement even within this sphere is that of 
 thought, for the whole can be conceived as 
 
1 88 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 a system having three stages — mechanism, 
 physics, and organism.' 
 
 The third and last stage of systematic 
 philosophy deals with Spirit. This is con- 
 ceived to summarise all the subject-matter 
 of knowledge that lies beyond metaphysics 
 and physical science : thus we are here con- 
 cerned with life in the individual, with the 
 relations involved in that life (morality), and 
 with those highest spheres of activity in which 
 life, now embodied as spirit, stands above 
 the contrast of individual activity and the 
 dead nature of science. These last are the 
 spheres of art, religion, and philosophy. In 
 the whole of this part of the subject-matter 
 Hegel shows his true sympathies : here he is 
 most plainly an Idealist, not of the older type 
 which devoted itself to Ideas, but of the new 
 whose thought is directed by Ideals. His 
 own studies had fitted him for a logical dis- 
 
 1 It is necessary continually to guard against the misxmder- 
 standing of Hegel's meaning through the peculiarity of the 
 form of his thought. For instance, the serial order, which is 
 intended to give a logical cormection, should not be thought 
 of as though it involved a sequence in time of the objects or 
 thoughts dealt with. This is to be understood particularly 
 in regard to the Philosophy of Spirit. Cf . Wallace : Hegel's 
 " Phil, of Mind," I. iii., and Proleg. to Hegel, oh. xviii., xxvi. 
 
Hegel 189 
 
 cussion of the life of men, and his results in 
 this sphere have won approval from many 
 who reject his metaphysics. 
 
 Hegel himself did not consider his philo- 
 sophy as separable into disconnected parts, 
 but the philosophy of spirit was for him the 
 necessary and culminating conclusion of his 
 metaphysics as to the general nature of 
 reality. Here we study the most " concrete " 
 subject-matter possible, for the natiire of 
 spirit (or mind) involves a rejection of any 
 idea of studying by " aspects " or " mani- 
 festations " essentially different from one 
 another. Spirit is said by Hegel to be the 
 ** truth " of nature, or its " absolute prius " — 
 that is to say, we are driven logically from the 
 study of aspects to the study of that deeper 
 reality of which the very word " aspect " re- 
 minds us. Now, we find that the actuality 
 (almost the Aristotelian ivepyeCa ^) of life first 
 appears as individual, almost isolated. First 
 
 1 Hegel himseH says : " The main aim of a philosophy of 
 mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle 
 into the theory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those 
 books of Aristotle (i.e. the ' de Anima ')." It will be remem- 
 bered that there Aristotle had defined i^fux'} (life, or soul) 
 as ivepyeia. 
 
190 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 therefore we study " subjective spirit " or spirit 
 (living-activity) in so far as it involves no 
 direct reference beyond itself. Here spirit 
 may be called " soul " and not yet " mind," 
 although it is in fact the " passive mind " of 
 Aristotle. Thus deep down we find all actual 
 life to be one (the " natiirliche Seele ") : here 
 even man is one with " nature," taken in the 
 poetic and not the scientific sense. From this 
 comes the waking of the individual as sensi- 
 tive, first in antithesis (in interests, and in the 
 contrast which joins en rap fort), then by a kind 
 of synthesis in the sense of selfhood (" Selbst- 
 gefiihl "). With a short note on " habit," 
 the last mechanism from which life rises, we 
 end that part of the philosophy of spirit which 
 would be called nowadays physiological psy- 
 chology ; but the physiological still colours^ 
 the second part of " subjective spirit," in 
 " the phenomenology of spirit." Here we 
 study consciousness, in which form spirit 
 first appears as self-related or refiective. In 
 its first form we have sense-perception and 
 then intelligence ("der Ver8tand"),in which the 
 " I " is at first implicit, and then in complete 
 self-consciousness as desire or nisus (striving). 
 
Hegel 191 
 
 Here at once arises the conflict of life, the first 
 appearance of the everlasting contrast and 
 yet communion between what is individual 
 (and free) and what is universal (and neces- 
 sary). Here we leave mere " anthropology " 
 and begin to study psychology ; for spirit 
 now appears as mind. First, the activity is 
 one of bare reasoning : " theoretical mind " 
 is discussed under perception, recollection, and 
 thinking ; and next we have practical mind, 
 or mind as will. Then, where will has arisen 
 from thought, there first appears the " ought " 
 or ideal of what is to be moral Ufe. The con- 
 trast and conflict of the moral life first appears 
 as practical feeling ; it is momentary — it comes 
 and goes, so to speak ; but out of this comes 
 the higher contrast between natural passion 
 or impulse and the freedom of choice. When 
 this freedom of choice has become the settled 
 attitude of liberty of the ideal self presented 
 in thought, we have reached the fundamental 
 concept of individualistic ethics. Here we 
 part with subjective mind or spirit. 
 
 Once more, however, there is no gap in the 
 system ; for we find that the individual mind 
 of psychology and psychological ethics is not 
 
192 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 the'mind or spirit of our experience. We are 
 Christians, and no longer Greeks and Romans. 
 Mind or spirit, however individual, is by no 
 means isolated. If we look into our experi- 
 ence we find that from the very earliest dawn 
 of consciousness and will we have been 
 related not only to the " lower " unities of 
 " nature " but to the " higher " unities of 
 society. Purposes other than our own cross 
 or run together with ours. Freedom or Uberty 
 is never licence. In fact, in its first forms of 
 reaUsation freedom appears to be absolutely 
 opposed by law or right. The person is in 
 contrast with others in the rights of property, 
 for instance ; or sometimes in communion. 
 Out of this state of things comes the concept 
 of right and wrong, as " law " and the subjec- 
 tive will. There we have only the dry bones 
 of morality. This sense of the equal balancing 
 of personal interests is indeed present in 
 all morality, and it is perhaps the truth 
 of pre-Kantian ethics — the ethics of natural 
 law ; but by looking again at life, we find 
 that there is an independence, an autonomy, 
 involved in the truly " moral " will, such that 
 there must be a " law within " the man, as 
 
Hegel 193 
 
 Kant would say. Conscience, and not extern- 
 ally imposed law, is the true ground of morality. 
 This is the second stage in the appreciation 
 of the full truth of objective spirit or mind, 
 and it is not final ; for the true life of spirit 
 is not in isolation : the contrast of conscience 
 (between " is " and " ought- to-be ") does not in 
 fact take place in a world of selves who are 
 mere unrelated units. The morality of the in- 
 dividualist must pass into social ethics (" die 
 Sittlichkeit"). Here at last we reach the 
 fulness of moral life. The temper of trust, 
 the sense of the duty of benevolence, is the 
 very core of morality : man isolated is an 
 abstraction ; for every man is bound by his 
 past, and by his present social environment. 
 We are not to be said to develop into a social 
 organism units which are essentially isolated. 
 The antithesis between law and conscience 
 takes place within a reality which is fuller 
 than is conceived by philosophies based upon 
 either of these. The ethical spirit appears 
 in three stages as the Family, the Civil Society, 
 and the Pohtical Society, or the State. The 
 Family passes into Society by its own in- 
 adequacy, and in the social bond wants are 
 
 13 
 
194 Development of Modem Philosophy 
 
 supplied and legal justice conceived. Last 
 of all, the State arises out of the Nation (in 
 regard to the family) and the system of wants 
 (in regard to social strata). Here the in- 
 dividual finds his realisation as a citizen, and 
 the last conflict of social morality arises, the 
 contrast between patriotism (or loyalty) and 
 cosmopolitanism ; for the State itself points 
 beyond itself to some vague brotherhood 
 in a Platonic EepubUc. In this prophetic 
 dream appears the last stage of philosophy, 
 wherein we discuss Absolute Mind. 
 
 However high the reaUsation of spirit in the 
 ethical community, there are higher stages in 
 which we stand above even morahty. Here 
 the objective and the subjective mind are 
 one, unified in three " movements " — ^Art, 
 Revealed ReUgion, and (Absolute) Philosophy. 
 In art the ideal appears as the beautiful ; it 
 is a revelation of the eternal, the absolute, 
 but it is momentary. When that revelation 
 is more than a ghmpse of intuition, revealed 
 reUgion takes its rise. This is not any empty 
 creed, but a " dominant conviction of the 
 meaning of reality " ; and the final stage of 
 all is called by Hegel " philosophy," though 
 
Hegel 195 
 
 it is doubtful whether the word will stand 
 the meaning thus put upon it, for it seems 
 that he means a rational and logical mysticism. 
 In it what has been implicit in ordinary 
 religion becomes explicit. We recognise our- 
 selves in the Absolute, which is God. 
 
 Such was the great system of philosophy 
 which Germany presented to the world. At 
 certain points it appears to be arbitrary in its 
 endeavour to be complete and centralised. It 
 is an apotheosis of order such as has been 
 loved by the German nation ; and its value for 
 the world is in abstract form the same as the 
 value of that particular racial expression 
 which was developed in the concrete by the 
 unification of Germany. 
 
 The followers of Hegel, it has been well said, 
 expressed the greatness of their master in the 
 very opposition which arose among them. It 
 is generally the custom to divide the Hegelian 
 school into Hegelians of the Right and 
 Hegelians of the Left. The former, carrying 
 on the language as weU as what they under- 
 stood to be the thought of Hegel, developed 
 philosophy in the direction of theological and 
 political orthodoxy. It wag in the course of 
 
196 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 speculating upon the ultimate problems of 
 philosophy that the Hegelian Left were in- 
 duced to desert the language of their master 
 as disguising his real thought. Thus in the 
 question of theological orthodoxy, this school 
 of thinkers applied a rigorous criticism to 
 the careless thinking which identified the 
 relics of outgrown conceptions with the best 
 results of modern thought. The most brilliant 
 development of thought took place among 
 the Hegelians of the Left. Feuerbach (1804- 
 1872) and D. Strauss (1808-1874) showed 
 the power of fearless logic. The new 
 philosophy of religion arose out of Hegehan- 
 ism. Meantime the value of Hegel's thought 
 in historical subjects was well shown among 
 those of his followers who stood apart 
 from the theological controversies. Zeller 
 and Kuno Fischer were the most remarkable. 
 Finally, any idea of a Hegelian school 
 became an anachronism ; and by the force 
 that Hegel had given, thinkers passed beyond 
 him. The influence of his thought has been 
 strongly felt in France and England, and its 
 force does not yet seem exhausted. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 HERBART AND SCHOPENHAUER 
 
 rriHE Hegelians of all kinds were not 
 -•- without opponents. As might be ex- 
 pected in the case of so comprehensive a 
 system as Idealism, to many it seemed a 
 merely arbitrary construction. Thus it was 
 possible to treat the philosophy of Hegel as 
 no real science, but at best a fantastic poetry. 
 For even before the Romanticists and Hegel 
 had attempted to work out the meaning of 
 Kant in his doctrine of phenomena, a school, 
 with the prejudices of physical science against 
 metaphysics, had developed the doctrine of 
 noumena, or things-in-themselves. In defiance 
 of the results obtained by such thinkers as 
 Fichte, Herbart attempted to make a philo- 
 sophy of "independent reals " ("Realen"). The 
 
 things-in-themselves form the shadowy founda- 
 
 197 
 
198 Development of Modem Philosophy 
 
 tions of his thought ; and, despite success in 
 other spheres, it can hardly be denied that 
 Herbart's metaphysics are illogical. He led 
 the forlorn hope of common sense. " The 
 man of average intelligence " may follow him, 
 but by this way there is no entrance to meta- 
 physics. 
 
 Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) was 
 born at Oldenburg and educated at Jena, 
 under Fichte. He then became a tutor at 
 Berne, and there met the great educationist, 
 Pestalozzi. He was at Gottingen for some 
 years, at first as a private lecturer and later 
 as a professor. After being Professor of 
 Philosophy at Konigsberg (1809-33), he was 
 recalled to Gottingen, and there died. His 
 chief works are an " Introduction to Philo- 
 sophy " (1813), a " Handbook of Psychology " 
 (1816) and " Psychology as a Science " (1824). 
 
 The results of Herbart's thought have 
 gained a certain persuasiveness from his 
 starting-point. Like all logical thinkers, he 
 conceives philosophy to arise by the thinking 
 out of the problems with which everyday 
 thought leaves us. Thus we begin from the 
 
JOHANN FRIEDBICH HEBBART 
 
 p. 198] 
 
Hcrbart and Schopenhauer 199 
 
 secure ground of ordinary experience ; but 
 Herbart did not go over the whole process 
 between common sense and metaphysics. 
 He conceived himself to be a successor of 
 Kant,' and behind Kant's thought he does 
 not go. He accepts the results as to the 
 nature of the subject-matter with which 
 Kant had ended. That is to say, the out- 
 standing problem of experience is thought 
 to involve the duaUsm of phenomena and 
 noumena or things-in-themselves. Now, we 
 have already seen how the positive side of this 
 dualism was developed in Fichte and Hegel. 
 Phenomena, the only ground of knowledge, 
 have been discussed by them ; and the 
 negative " limit of knowledge," the thing-in- 
 itself, becomes with Fichte a shadow and 
 with later ideahsm a nonentity. Nevertheless 
 it is to this negative side of the Kantian 
 duaUsm that Herbart applied his thought. 
 For, he argued, since all knowledge is relative, 
 the " real thing " lies beyond knowledge : 
 in common-sense language we say that know- 
 ing " makes no difference " to " the thing " 
 which we know. The real objects he always 
 
 1 Thus he called himself " a Kantian of 1828." 
 
200 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 beyond knowledge : these absolute points, 
 these positions (without any external implica- 
 tions), are things-in-themselves. They are 
 real, unqualified, absolutely simple, and of 
 them there are many. The concepts of sub- 
 stance and change, however useful, do not 
 apply to " real " things. These arise through 
 seeming or apparent relations between inde- 
 pendent reals. Keeping the same meaning 
 to the terms, the relativity of knowledge is 
 therefore seen to involve that appearance 
 is not reality. These independent reals are 
 in some way connected, they " disturb " one 
 another : and in spite of this disturbance 
 each is really preserved intact and unchanged 
 by the relation into which it has entered. 
 On this basis Herbart gives a description 
 of the " real " world in terms of time and 
 space and motion. Contiguity and contin- 
 uity explain the world as it appears to us, 
 though the " reals " which we are thus ex- 
 plaining lie for ever beyond all explanation. 
 Even if we grant some truth to this conclu- 
 sion, we must remark that absolute common 
 sense is more arbitrary than absolute idealism : 
 for how can we possibly say anything of that 
 
Herbart and Schopenhauer 201 
 
 which ex hypothesi never can enter into our 
 thought 1 How can an unknowable thing-in- 
 itself be the spring from which we draw our 
 knowledge ? If it were, all science would be 
 but the emptying of an ocean with a sieve. 
 
 It is, however, in the psychological part of 
 his studies that Herbart's method has been 
 most valuable. The metaphysical basis may 
 be neglected, for he conceives the soul or 
 self as an independent real which is yet dis- 
 turbed (as passive) by a stimulating and 
 external real. Thus arise independent and 
 atomic ideas. Eidolology is the name given 
 to the science of these ideas or presentations, 
 and a kind of physical science is made of 
 them. They are treated as independent en- 
 tities : we have a statics and a mechanics 
 of them. Mathematical formulas are given 
 by Herbart to indicate the interaction of 
 these ideas, some of which " inhibit " others. 
 The presentation sinks or rises in the dome 
 of consciousness, having once entered over 
 the threshold, and there is a fellowship of 
 ideas which is called apperception. This 
 picture-language of the " synthetic unity 
 of apperception " has proved more valu- 
 
202 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 able to educators than the deeper meta- 
 physics of pure Kantianism. The dealing 
 with psychological problems by means of 
 physical concepts and mathematical formulas 
 has led to an immense growth of " exact " 
 psychology, and to-day we have curves and 
 formulas of mental process. The reality to 
 which these methods refer is not often dis- 
 cussed ; nor is it necessary to discuss it, for 
 psychology, fast becoming a natural science, 
 is already quite separated from metaphysics. 
 All this is due to Herbart. Following him 
 a school of thinkers — the Herbartians — 
 developed " exact " psychology. Into this 
 we cannot enter. For we are seeking the 
 expression of a world-view, and not the 
 elaboration of a partial science. There was 
 a development of psychology in the middle 
 years of the nineteenth century, whose efEects 
 are stiU to be felt. As regards metaphysics 
 the Herbartians have merely represented the 
 recoil of the G-erman mind from the extreme 
 and abstract systematisation of Hegel. 
 
 A more vigorous effort of metaphysical 
 thought is that of Schopenhauer. With him 
 
Herbart and Schopenhauer 203 
 
 also Kant is a starting-point, and particularly 
 that phase of Kant's thought which connects 
 him with empiricism. For Schopenhauer's 
 attitude is that of a man who is blind to no 
 part of reality, however crude and seemingly 
 alien from philosophy/ With him we find a 
 return of the philosophic mind to the living 
 tissue of reality. What he loses in exact 
 thinking he more than gains in his intense 
 appreciation of real experience. On the 
 experience of the northern world, Teutonic 
 and Anglo-Saxon, he relies, and he expresses 
 at once its restless complexity and its sceptical 
 daring. 
 
 Arthur Schopenhauer (1778 — 1860) was born 
 at Dantzic, of educated parents. At first he 
 was intended for business, and with a view to 
 this his education involved travel and an 
 extensive study of foreign languages. He 
 was thus of an altogether different type from 
 that of the ordinary German philosopher. 
 " The great book of the world " was his 
 text-book ; and, whatever the result on the 
 
 1 Cf. Schopenhauer's own words : " Prom every page of 
 Hume there is more to be learnt than from the collected 
 philosophical works of Hegel, Herbart, and Schleiermacher 
 together."—" World as Will," Eng. trans., iii, 394, 
 
204 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 correctness of his abstract thought, such study 
 gave more reality to his thinking than is to 
 be found in many metaphysicians. His career 
 in business at Hamburg was short ; there, 
 however, the violent passions, which alter- 
 nated with brooding melancholy, were fully 
 developed. At his father's death he was free 
 to devote himself to study. He met Goethe 
 at Weimar, and studied under .Fichte at 
 Berlin, eventually taking his degree at Jena 
 in 1813, when he wrote the " Fourfold Eoot 
 of the Principle of Sufficient Reason." Into 
 the enthusiasm of Germany at this date 
 Schopenhauer did not enter ; he was always 
 a critic of the world rather than an actor in it, 
 and he found it of all possible worlds the 
 worst. An attempt at lecturing in Berlin 
 (1820) met with no success, and the lack of 
 the fame he hoped for made him still more 
 critical of an unappreciative world. Travel 
 filled the few years following, and gradually 
 the division in the HegeHan camp and the 
 tendency to return to Kant brought attention 
 upon the brilhant development of Kant's 
 thought which Schopenhauer had made. The 
 closing years of his life were solaced by fame, 
 
Herbart and Schopenhauer 205 
 
 but a delicacy of taste and critical pessimism 
 kept Schopenhauer even to the end from any 
 share in the common hfe of men. From 
 1831 he lived in Frankfort-on-the-Main, 
 and there he died. His chief works are 
 "The Fourfold Root," "The World as 
 Will and Idea," " On the Will in Nature," 
 and Essays. 
 
 Schopenhauer himself had been inspired 
 by his teacher Bouterwek' with the concept 
 he was to make famous. From the percep- 
 tion of the importance of activity in willing, 
 Schopenhauer was led to attempt the ex- 
 planation of all experience in terms of the 
 will. To him the abstract formalism of 
 explanations based upon thought seemed 
 to be their condemnation ; for such intel- 
 lectualism did not seem sufficiently at home 
 in a world of stress and conflict such as we 
 find in our every-day experience. 
 
 In his great work Schopenhauer first shows ^ 
 
 1 This Professor of Gottingen, in his " Apodiktik," had 
 stressed the practical or will aspect of hfe as giving 
 fundamental certainty and a sense of reaUty. The purely 
 intellectual aspect ends, according to him, in a kind of 
 scepticism. 
 
 a " World as WiU and Idea," bk, i. 
 
2o6 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 how the world of our thought is a construc- 
 tion of our own. The objects of experience 
 and science, held in order by the principle of 
 sufficient reason, are seen to be merely ap- 
 pearances. That is to say, our ideas point 
 beyond themselves. The world as idea 
 appears in the forms of space and time ; 
 knowledge leads only into infinity of con- 
 ditions in a world of manifold beings bound 
 together by cause and effect. But philosophic 
 insight grasps the underlying reality of which 
 the phenomenal world is the appearance. 
 This reality is will. " Phenomenal existence 
 is idea and nothing more. All idea, of what- 
 ever kind, all object, is phenomenal existence, 
 but the will alone is a thing-in-itself."^ This 
 thing-in-itself is no mere inference, no " un- 
 known quantity," but, although never an 
 object, the will is " fully and immediately 
 comprehended." It is the same throughout 
 the whole world of our experience : the " force " 
 in mechanical nature, the life-force — what 
 some scientists call " irritabiUty " — and human 
 will are aU forms of the same thing. AH 
 the connections of human will with ideas 
 
 1 " World as WiU," bk. ii., Eng. trans., p. 142. 
 
Herbart and Schopenhauer 207 
 
 must be^omitted.' The will is objectivised 
 as appearance ; first as " a blind striving," 
 an " inarticulate impulse," then in the living 
 forms. The world of the many is a magic- 
 lantern show by which one light, the will, 
 manifests itself,^ This, says Schopenhauer, 
 is the inner meaning of Kant's thing-in-itself, 
 and Plato's idea. The world of nature is an 
 objectification and individualisation of will — 
 not a product of the will, but a result of our 
 own phenomenality. " The many " have not 
 been explained, but explained away as unreal 
 for philosophic insight. To this insight the 
 3esthetic appreciation of the Platonic ideas 
 in nature is nearly related : ' thus we " lose 
 ourselves in contemplation." In the dis- 
 cussion of the forms of art we first see that 
 the world is as nothing, and hear the first 
 note of pessimism in the complaint that " all 
 is vanity." The will to live, a purposeless 
 striving, is seen by true insight to be wrong. 
 
 1 An interesting quotation follows from the first " voliin- 
 tarist" of Western philosophy, St. Augustine ("De CSv. 
 Dei,'' xi. 28). 
 
 s! Bk. ii., Eng. trans., p. 200. " Thus,'' says Plato, " time 
 ia a moving picture of eternity." 
 
 3 Bk. iii. 
 
2o8 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 In the fourth book, after such knowledge, 
 the world as will involves a philosophy of 
 assertion and denial of the will to Uve. The 
 individual form of the wiU is a never-satisfied 
 want, a cry for happiness never to be at- 
 tained ; therefore, as want is pain, practically 
 the whole of individual Ufe is pain. Hence 
 it is seen that the knowledge and apprecia- 
 tion of this lead to the doctrine of the denial 
 of the will to live — " after life's fitful fever " 
 we sleep well.^ Pessimism leads to asceticism. 
 The basis of all ethics is sympathy. The 
 great wrong is the assertion of the individual 
 wiU to hve " so far that it becomes the denial 
 of the will appearing in the bodies of others." ' 
 Right is only the denial of that will in oneself. 
 Suicide is utterly inexcusable, because it is 
 the assertion of will — " for the essence of 
 negation Ues in this, that the joys of life are 
 shunned, not its sorrows." ' Thus we seek 
 through the Maya — the veil of illusion in 
 this world — the bare non-existence of Nirvana. 
 
 1 Cf. Swinburne's Hymn of Man in " Atalanta," Fitzgerald's 
 " Rubaiyat," and Ecclesiaatious. 
 
 2 Bk. iv., Eng. trans., p. 436. 
 
 3 Bk. iv., Eng. trans., p. 515. 
 
p. 208] 
 
 AKTHTJH SCHOPENHATJEK 
 
Herbart and Schopenhauer 209 
 
 And if the wine you drink, the lip you press. 
 End in the Nothing all Things end in — Yes — 
 
 Then fancy while thou art, thou art but what 
 Thou shalt be — Nothing : thou shalt not be less. 
 
 Strange that philosophy should lead us 
 here ! Yet it is undeniable that expression 
 is here given to a very real experience. The 
 influence of Schopenhauer upon such a man 
 as Wagner was itself a proof of how truly 
 he had rendered an experience which has in 
 it more than a suspicion of the brooding of 
 Northern mythology. Perhaps it is true 
 that the validity of Schopenhauer's philo- 
 sophy is not bound up with pessimism. Cer- 
 tainly there is no reason to connect a philo- 
 sophy of the " will " as reality with gloom 
 and death. But the statement of this 
 philosophy as given for the first time to the 
 modern world was pessimistic. The effort 
 of the German spirit seemed to be directed' 
 along lines which have not yet produced any 
 new and comprehensive world-view. 
 
 14 
 
CHAPTEB XI 
 
 PHYSICAL SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
 rriHE production of great systems in philo- 
 -*- sophy gave place in the middle of the 
 nineteenth century to a widespread interest 
 in physical science. Surely and steadily in- 
 creased knowledge led to new concepts of 
 nature, and these in turn reacted upon the 
 whole of Ufe. Outside the region of pure 
 science political influences were causing re- 
 actionary or at any rate traditionalist thought; 
 and when at last scientific thinkers were 
 induced to extend their principles that 
 they might explain the whole of experience, 
 for a time it seemed that pure metaphysics 
 was replaced by a new thing. The same 
 forces were expressed in the thought of 
 France, England, and Germany, though the 
 
 210 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 211 
 
 historical antecedents of thinkers in each of 
 these nations gave a distinctive colour to the 
 thought of each. The full meaning of this 
 new scientific conception and its results upon 
 metaphysical thought cannot yet be stated, 
 for the philosophy of to-day still bears the 
 marks of scientific controversy. 
 
 A. In France 
 
 The history of the Enlightenment in France 
 led us as far as the eve of the Revolution. A 
 period of pohtical turmoil followed which did 
 not allow of philosophic thinking ; and to this 
 again succeeded years of warfare. Thus there 
 is little to record of French thought during 
 the time occupied by German Idealism. A 
 few physiological writers continued the tra- 
 dition of the scientists of the Enlightenment ; 
 but their works are of little importance to 
 philosophy. Some did indeed touch upon 
 pure philosophy. Pierre Laromigui^re (1756- 
 1837), and his follower, J. J. Cardaillac 
 (1766-1845), may be mentioned ; but a 
 keener philosophic insight is to be found in 
 Maine de Biran (1766-1824). He passed 
 
212 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 through a development in his philosophy, for 
 he began in sympathy with the school of 
 physiological psychologists ; and afterwards, 
 through the perception of the spontaneity of 
 consciousness, became somewhat mystical. 
 
 In the meantime foreign thought was being 
 introduced once more to France. Royer- 
 CoUard (1763-1845), a statesman rather 
 than a philosopher, and Jouffroy (1796-1842), 
 whose chief interest was psychology, intro- 
 duced the Scottish philosophy of Reid and 
 Dugald Stewart ; but the most important 
 name is that of Victor Cousin (1792-1867), an 
 eclectic and the founder of an eclectic school 
 which had great vogue in France. Cousin 
 studied under Maine de Biran and Royer- 
 CoUard. His perception of the great value 
 of history in the understanding of philosophy 
 led him to mistake a collection of opinions for 
 a philosophy. Thus he supposed that philo- 
 sophy could be eclectic ; but though he at- 
 tempted to mediate between German idealism 
 and Scottish common sense, the result was not 
 systematic. His own opinions shifted from 
 a Hegelian standpoint in 1828 to a sympathy 
 with any statement which could claim com- 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 213 
 
 mon sense as its basis.' His work on the 
 history of philosophy, especially as regards 
 the Middle Ages, was extremely valuable. 
 
 Even before pure philosophy began to be 
 reincarnated in France, however, a school of 
 thinkers had arisen in protest against the 
 extreme consequences of the Enlightenment as 
 seen in the Revolution. These are known as 
 the Traditionalists. They are indeed rather 
 essayists and pubhcists than philosophic 
 thinkers ; but they expressed a phase of the 
 reaction against the arid intellectualism and 
 extreme individualism of the eighteenth cen- 
 tury. So far as they were concerned with 
 abstract thought their protest was made 
 from a romantic standpoint against the 
 materiahstic empiricism of the day. In prac- 
 tical questions they were all for the restitution 
 of the past ; and, as usual with enthusiastic 
 reformers, it was not the past of real history, 
 but that romantic dreamland of the Middle 
 Ages and the ancien regime. The world-view 
 of the extremists of this school was theological. 
 
 1 Cousin had met Hegel himself, from whom his request for 
 a summa philosophica is said to have met with the reply, 
 " Monsieur, ces ohoses ne se disent pas suocinotement, surtout 
 en frangais." This tale is told of many philosophers. 
 
214 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 Thus its two great prophets — De Bonald 
 (1754-1840), who supposed revelation to be 
 the source of all knowledge, and De Maistre 
 (1753-1821), who imagined Authority to be 
 the principle of all life — both had in view the 
 scholastic days of the Holy Roman Empire. 
 Despite brilHant passages, the writings of 
 these men have but small value for logical 
 thought ; they cut themselves ofi for ever 
 from philosophy by adopting a controversial 
 purpose in their theories. The principle of 
 Authority as opposed to eighteenth-century 
 individualism was, however, by no means 
 necessarily theological. De Lamennais (1782- 
 1854), a priest, began as a theological sceptic 
 to destroy all the possibiHties of certainty in 
 order that men might believe whatever was 
 told them. But he eventually left the Church 
 and attempted a synthetic philosophy of his 
 own ("Esquisse dune Philosophic," 1841- 
 1846). This, however, was a kind of mystic 
 description of the world, after the manner of 
 Schelling, and not unKke the Neo-Platonism 
 of such thinkers as Rosmini. 
 
 It was in Positivism, the philosophy of 
 Comte, that French thought reached a de- 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 215 
 
 velopment of its own. In this form it had 
 some influence upon the course of English 
 thought. 
 
 Auguste Comte (1798-1857) was born at 
 Montpellier. He studied under Saint-Simon : 
 this enthusiast had great influence over men, 
 rather from the brilliancy of his intuitions 
 than from the correctness of his thought. 
 Especially he preached and prophesied a re- 
 generation of society somewhat on the Unes 
 of Socialism, but by other means than those 
 usually advocated by pure Socialists. This 
 enthusiasm of humanity affected the young 
 Comte ; but the logical training, especially 
 in mathematics, which he had gone through, 
 gave him a means of criticising the arbitrary 
 judgments of his poetic master. Eventually 
 they quarrelled. Comte endeavoured to make 
 a living by tutoring, and unwisely he married 
 (1825). He then began to give some lectures 
 upon the " positive philosophy " which he 
 had been meditating ; but poverty and sorrow 
 and overwork made the effort too great, and 
 he went mad. On recovery, his despair of the 
 fame and the position for which he had hoped 
 
2i6 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 caused him to attempt suicide. The lectures 
 were resumed at last in 1828, and Comte 
 obtained a small post. In 1842 domestic 
 quarrels led to a separation from his wife, and 
 he was reduced by ill fortune to great straits. 
 At this time it was that John Stuart Mill and 
 George Grote, with other admirers in England, 
 subscribed for his sustenance. Comte was 
 hurt that the subsidy was not continued. In 
 1845 Comte was much influenced by Clotilde 
 de Vaux, the wife of a man who had been 
 condemned to the galleys for life. She seems 
 to have given to Comte's thought a more 
 definitely emotional tinge. His income being 
 again reduced in 1848 to vanishing point, 
 his admirers, led by his great pupil, Littre, 
 suppUed him with money. He had published 
 the "Cours de Philosophic Positive" in 
 1840-1842; and now, having become more 
 emotional and also more dogmatic, he pub- 
 hshed his " Syst^me de Pohtique Positive " 
 (1851-1854). While this was in course of 
 publication he issued a " Catechisme Positi- 
 viste " (1853), and the scientific philosopher 
 became the founder of a rehgion. Many of 
 his admirers held it a weakness that Comte 
 
p. 216] 
 
 AtTGUSTB COMTE 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 217 
 
 should revert, as it seemed to them, to the 
 stage of thought which he had once called 
 the theological ; but others were attracted 
 by the glamour, and by these Comte was 
 revered as a prophet. 
 
 Three well-marked influences seem to be 
 obvious in Comte's thought : the ^ew en- 
 thusiasm for physical science which descended 
 from the physiologists of France, the historical 
 conceptions popularised by German thinkers 
 and their French followers, and the tradi- 
 tionalist reaction against the sociahstic prin- 
 ciples of the Revolution. Perhaps from the 
 very nature of his training the first results 
 of Comte's thought appear as negative. Thus 
 the extension of a thought almost identical 
 with that of Condillac leads Comte to adopt 
 the mechanical conceptions of science without 
 criticism. Scientifically cogent while used in 
 the sphere for which they were invented, 
 these conceptions are noticeably deficient when 
 Comte attempts to apply them to social 
 science and ethics ; but most noticeable is 
 the entirely negative attitude which Comte 
 is thus led to assume with respect to meta- 
 
2i8 Development of Modem Philosophy 
 
 physics. The very possibiHty of pure philo- 
 sophy is repudiated, and the results of physical 
 science are said to be all that we can have of 
 real knowledge. This attitude, copied in Eng- 
 land and repeated if not copied in Germany, 
 merely involved the substitution of an un- 
 critical metaphysics for pure thought : for it is 
 always the fate of those who repudiate meta- 
 physics to fall victims to pseudo-metaphysics. 
 It is clear that if you know there can be no 
 philosophy you know something about the 
 world. That knowledge is your philosophy. 
 
 In positive results the thought of Comte was 
 governed by a sociological purpose of reform, 
 an enthusiasm for which he was indebted to 
 Saint-Simon : and again his thought was well 
 directed by an ideal of positive knowledge. 
 However Umited his outlook, Comte has all 
 the clearness of vision often found among the 
 French. 
 
 The system which he embodied as the 
 Positive Philosophy had three elements of 
 interest. There was, in the first place, a clear 
 historical conception known as " the three 
 stages." Mankind, says Comte, has passed 
 in thought through the theological stage : at 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 219 
 
 this time experience was explained on the 
 principle of animistic interference by " super- 
 natural beings." The action of thought upon 
 this explanation produced the second, or 
 metaphysical ' stage : abstract forces take 
 the place of personal agents. This was an 
 intermediate stage : abstractions destroyed 
 spirits and were themselves to be destroyed.^ 
 Then came the final, the positive stage. The 
 vain search for origins and ends and absolute 
 truth has given place at last to a sober reason- 
 ing based upon observation and experiment. 
 Thus the sciences have arisen. 
 
 The second element of interest is the classi- 
 fication of the Sciences : for this must take the 
 place of the vain aspirations of metaphysics. 
 The hierarchy of the sciences is supposed 
 by Comte to give a full rendering to all 
 our knowledge of phenomena : and this is 
 all the knowledge possible to us. The pre- 
 supposition of all the sciences is the most 
 abstract — mathematics : upon this depends 
 
 ^ It is to be noted that the very name given to this stage 
 is in itself a repudiation of metaphysics, as a thing long dead. 
 
 2 The essences of the Schoolmen were but the dry bones of 
 the living creatures of poetry which the understanding had 
 slain. (Caird, " Social Philosophy of Comte," p. 11.) 
 
220 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 the less abstract, and so on through biology 
 to sociology. The theory of communities is 
 the highest of all knowledge. With the 
 details of the system we are not concerned ; 
 but it must be noted that, despite the un- 
 critical method, there is much valid thought 
 embodied in the work of Comte on sociology, 
 the subject perhaps nearest his heart. We 
 have, in the sociology for which Comte first 
 invented a name, the rudiments of an exact 
 descriptive science of social wholes. A world- 
 view was doubtless implied, but it was not 
 clearly stated. 
 
 The third of the elements in Positivism is due 
 to the influence of Traditionalism and perhaps 
 to the emotional sympathies of Comte himself. 
 It is the religion of humanity : for Comte did 
 not merely abohsh metaphysics and theology, 
 he provided a substitute for both. When, 
 however. Positivism became a reUgion many 
 of his followers deserted Comte and kept 
 steadily to the development of purely scientific 
 knowledge. In the new moral and religious 
 enthusiasm, the human race as a whole, known 
 as the Grand-Etre, took the place of the God 
 of theologians. Keligion was to be the service 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 221 
 
 of this Being. There was to be an elaborate 
 ritual copied from that of the Catholic Church, 
 and a philosophic priesthood modelled upon 
 that of the Middle Ages, Obviously we are 
 here beyond the sphere of philosophy. In 
 spite of aberrations, Comte's thought re- 
 mains valuable for its devotion to logic and 
 to ethical aims. The limitation of his insight 
 into real experience made it impossible for 
 him to produce a valid philosophy. Comte 
 seems always unaware of the individual 
 elements in any experience — those elements 
 which colour his own system as obviously as 
 they do that of any idealist philosopher. 
 
 B. In Britain 
 
 Contemporaneously with the French philo- 
 sophy after the Eevolution and with the great 
 systems of Germany, British thought was 
 passing through new phases. In protest 
 against the criticisms of Hume, the Scottish 
 School of Common Sense had arisen. Its 
 development, after the publication of Keid's 
 " Inquiry" (1763), took the direction of psycho- 
 logical interests. Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), 
 
222 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 a didactic orator of great influence, gave to 
 this school of thought a wider learning, though, 
 perhaps, not a deeper insight than it had at 
 first possessed. Through him French thinkers 
 were for a time turned away from the cold 
 abstractions of science. With Thomas Browne 
 (1778-1820) there appeared a noticeable return 
 to the attitude of analytic psychology which 
 had been that of Hume. 
 
 From this point the English Empirical 
 School gathers new force ; and the movement, 
 once joined with the Positivism of Comte, had 
 a vigorous and valuable life in the early part 
 of the nineteenth century. James Mill (1773- 
 1836) first gave impetus in the new direction. 
 In pure thought he was a follower of the 
 sensationalism of Hartley and Hume ; and, 
 on the other hand, he was very keenly aUve 
 to the political problems of his day. These 
 two elements may be observed in the develop- 
 ment that now occurs. John Stuart MUl, 
 the son of James Mill, was the vigorous leader 
 of the new thought. 
 
 John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was born in 
 London ; he was educated at home by his 
 
p. 222] 
 
 JOHN STTJART MILL 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 223 
 
 father in a stern intellectualism. In 1823 he 
 became a clerk at the India House, and in 
 1824 was already an exponent (in the new 
 Westminster Review) of the new political 
 LiberaUsm. He published his " Logic " in 1843, 
 and the " Principles of Political Economy " in 
 1848. In 1851 he married Mrs. Taylor, to 
 whose sympathy and intelligence he ascribed 
 much. After her death he pubhshed works 
 on Utilitarianism and a critical effort in " An 
 Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philo- 
 sophy." In 1865 he was M.P. for West- 
 minster. From 1868 till the end of his life 
 he lived quietly at Avignon. He has been 
 called the saint of Rationalism : in philosophy 
 his clear thinking and fearless logic give him a 
 place far above his deserts as a metaphysician. 
 
 Although there is much individuality in 
 Mill's thought, in pure philosophy he may 
 be regarded as one of a school. Of this 
 school Alexander Bain, of the University 
 of Aberdeen, represents the psychological 
 side. With him the modern physiological 
 theories form the most noticeable feature of 
 psychology ; and he did much to elaborate 
 
224 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 the so-called Law of the Association of Ideas. 
 A more thorough Positivist was George Henry- 
 Lewes (1817-1878) : but his negative attitude 
 towards metaphysics, and his criticism of all 
 historical theories from the point of view of 
 Comte, did not materially aid Empiricism. 
 
 It was at this time that a change took place 
 in the world of scientific theories paralleled 
 by only that introduced by Newton. Charles 
 Darwin pubhshed his " Origin of Species by 
 means of Natural Selection " (1859), and this 
 precipitated the thoughts that had been 
 steadily maturing for years. A new life was 
 given to the enthusiasm for scientific know- 
 ledge, and a new method was discovered the 
 immense value of which we can hardly yet 
 estimate. The meaning of the new concept 
 of the unity of nature dawned but slowly even 
 upon trained minds ; but it is now clear that 
 what had happened was that an historical 
 principle, that of development, was made 
 capable of being used to explain physical 
 nature. The unity of subject-matter of the 
 physical sciences was now no longer to be con- 
 ceived as a mechanical addition of parts, but 
 as an organic development. Again, organism 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 225 
 
 itself was to be conceived in view of a purpose 
 to be historically attained. " Natural selec- 
 tion " and the "Survival of the Fittest" 
 became the new charms by which to still aU 
 questioning ; and irrationahsm rebuked the 
 new witchcraft with all its old anathemas. 
 To the spread of clearer concepts the writings 
 of Huxley (1825-1895) contributed much, 
 and success in the work of science gave the 
 new heresy all the prestige necessary for 
 changing the general opinions. Thus the 
 time seemed to have come for a new reading 
 of the nature of experience, as it appeared 
 from the Evolutionary standpoint. To this 
 work Herbert Spencer apphed himself ; but 
 he was not aware of the historical antecedents 
 of Scientific Evolution in the Dialectic Method 
 and the theory of Development. He there- 
 fore approached the problem with a Umited, 
 and almost exclusively EngUsh, preparation. 
 
 Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) first appears 
 as an essayist. His interests were in the 
 direction of sociology and psychology, both 
 of which he understood in a Positivist way. 
 He was, in fact, much influenced by the 
 
 15 
 
126 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 work of Comte ; and when, at a later 
 period of his Hfe, the Evolutionary hypo- 
 thesis had already gained success in some 
 fields of science, Spencer conceived the 
 idea of a " System of Philosophy " which 
 should supply the much-needed unification 
 of scientific thought. The " First Principles " 
 appeared (in part) in 1860 ; later editions 
 were much modified, but on the whole 
 the scientific concepts remained consistent. 
 Following this came works on biology and 
 psychology. While philosophically inade- 
 quate, these works attained popularity 
 through clear and Umited insight. In fact 
 the subject-matter was hardly prepared for 
 so ambitious an attempt, and Spencer's lack 
 of philosophic training rendered it still more 
 impossible for him to succeed. The result, 
 nevertheless, was rather inadequate than 
 untrue. 
 
 The orthodox philosophic thought in Eng- 
 land during the earlier part of the nineteenth 
 century was strictly scientific ; and by science, 
 at this time, was understood a positivist theory 
 of nature : this was readily combined with a 
 positivist disdain of metaphysics. Yet the 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 227 
 
 school is not without value in the history of 
 pure thought, for its chief object was the in- 
 troduction of scientific exactness of thought, 
 and this is so much gained in the direction of 
 pure philosophy, in however limited a way the 
 method may be applied. As against the airy 
 platitudes to which the anti-sceptical Scottish 
 school not seldom yielded, severity of reason- 
 ing was much superior. A rigid limitation 
 of inquiry to the data of physical science 
 made the method seem all the more cogent : 
 and much was done towards organising a new 
 scientific (almost wholly biological) world- 
 view. The very limitation of the subject- 
 matter, however, rendered it impossible that 
 a real philosophy should arise : the non- 
 physical aspects of experience were only too 
 obviously neglected. A second merit may, 
 however, be allowed to this empirical school. 
 The exponents of its principles were keenly 
 aUve to the need and the use of logical thought 
 in the social sphere. A pure Utilitarianism * 
 therefore arose which had valuable influence 
 in the reform of social abuses : a calculus of 
 politics, and even of ethics, easily applied and 
 
 1 Cf. Leslie Stephen, " The English Utilitarians." 
 
228 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 seldom misleading, was given in the utilitarian 
 idea of " good " as " the greatest happiness 
 of the greatest number." And, whatever 
 difficulties this conception may have for 
 metaphysicians, the Empiricists here once 
 again substituted a clear if limited conception 
 for the airy nothings of the traditional ethics. 
 However much may be conceded to the 
 Empirical School, in their theory of the nature 
 of reality, when they condescend to have one, 
 they are lamentably weak. The denial of 
 the possibihty of metaphysics is no security 
 against the use of metaphysical thought, 
 though it renders an adequate metaphysics 
 impossible. So we find that, in its later stages, 
 the metaphysical problems begin to press upon 
 Empiricism, and Spencer yielded to the 
 temptation of expressing his ideas on these 
 points. The result, for popular thought, was 
 an attitude known as Agnosticism, which at 
 this time meant a denial of the knowledge of 
 any but physical truths.' A purely scientific 
 dogmatism took the place of the relics of the 
 
 1 The word " agnosticism " (invented in 1869 by Huxley) 
 haa already changed its meaning several times. It is now 
 not definitely connected with any acientifio dogma, and in on« 
 
p. 238 
 
 HEEBEKT SPENOEB 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 229 
 
 old dogmatism of theology or mediaeval 
 metaphysics. 
 
 The philosophic meaning of the new con- 
 cepts was partially expressed by Spencer and 
 essayists of the same school. It amounted 
 to the postulate of an Unknowable, the 
 Absolute, which was said to be implied in aU 
 scientific knowledge. Of this negative surd 
 nothing could, by hypothesis, be said ; but 
 the Empiricists were, in fact, by no means 
 consistent, for they used this unknowable, 
 now become " the force behind phenomena," 
 as an explanation. That is to say, the un- 
 knowable was used as a logical ground in the 
 explanation of the true nature of known 
 reality. No dogmatic assertions could save 
 such a contradiction. 
 
 For many years an opposite movement 
 had been in progress. This may be roughly 
 classed as Idealistic. It was contempor- 
 aneous with the empirical thought of Mill 
 and Spencer, and when eventually its form 
 had been changed, it outlived Empiricism. 
 
 sense is identical with scepticism. In another sense it ex- 
 presses the empty platitude that no man knows all that is 
 to be known. 
 
230 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 The force of the movement, in so far as it was 
 not directed by German thought, was best 
 expressed by Sir Wilham Hamilton (1788- 
 1856). 
 
 In this form IdeaUsm meant rather an 
 interest in metaphysical studies than any 
 definite metaphysical conclusions. A know- 
 ledge of the past history of thought is a 
 welcome contrast to the neglect of history by 
 the empirical school ; but, although this led 
 to admirable commentary, no original thought 
 of great brilliance is to be found in writers of 
 this school. It was through connection with 
 foreign, and especially German, thought that 
 the opposition to the traditional Enghsh 
 Empiricism became triumphant. The long 
 ignorance of the value of German metaphysics 
 was a remarkable feature in the Enghsh 
 thinkers of this date. The Scottish school was 
 indeed aware of the existence of the Critical 
 Philosophy, but for many years failed to 
 understand its significance ; and when at last 
 German thought was introduced it was done 
 by litterateurs rather than philosophers. It was 
 S. T. Coleridge (1772-1834) who first made 
 German thought intelhgible to EngUshmen, 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 231 
 
 and the Idealism which he appreciated had 
 a mystic and romantic tone which obstructed 
 logical thinking. In the same way Carlyle 
 confused the " truth " of poetic enthusiasm 
 with the truth of scientific thought : yet he 
 too did much to popularise a non-empirical 
 philosophy. A name which stands apart 
 from pure literature is that of J. F. Perrier ' : 
 a name not yet sufficiently honoured. A 
 stern critic of the Scottish School, he was a 
 clear thinker on metaphysical problems ; but 
 even in his writings it is noticeable that the 
 German thought had so far been only partly 
 assimilated. 
 
 A new and more vigorous development 
 was marked by the work of T. H. Green. 
 Positive thought of an EngKsh type began to 
 assert itself, and there was in Green a steady 
 attempt at truth for truth's sake. Yet his 
 ethical and almost traditionalist interests 
 prevented him from reaching any position 
 
 1 J. P. Ferrier (1806-1864) was born at Edinburgli, and 
 educated at Edinburgh and Oxford. He was eventually 
 Professor at St. Andrews. His most remarkable work, " The 
 Institutes of Metaphysio," stands apart from all the philo- 
 sophic writing of his day for brilliancy and force. It is almost 
 a Fichtean rendering of the Critical Philosophy. 
 
232 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 above polemics. His great work is the " Pro- 
 legomena to Ethics," pubhshed posthumously 
 (1877). Already, however, there had appeared 
 " The Secret of Hegel " (1865), by J. H. StirUng. 
 This marked the introduction of Hegelian 
 thought into the course of Enghsh specula- 
 tion : and the influence has been decisive. 
 " The Dialogues of Plato," translated by 
 Benjamin Jowett, expressed in a non- technical 
 way the new attitude of thinkers. English 
 thought, at any rate within the educated 
 classes, was now deeply impressed with 
 Hegelianism, and the effects can be read 
 in the situation of philosophy in England 
 to-day. Such was the external course of 
 history by which thought left the empirical 
 school, and turned once more definitely to 
 metaphysics. The meaning in the whole 
 movement may be now considered. 
 
 At first assimilative and critical, the new 
 Ideahsm was for a long time vague and weak 
 as compared with the still vigorous Empiricism; 
 but no prejudice could keep even Empiricists 
 from metaphysics, and as soon as it became 
 clear that philosophy must discuss the meaning 
 of the whole of reality, scientific detail was 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 233 
 
 seen to be inadequate. The sympathy of 
 deeper thinkers was thus attracted towards 
 anti-Empiricism ; but as a philosophy the new 
 thought still left much to seek. It was 
 hampered by interests wholly irrelevant 
 to philosophy — those of conservatism and 
 theological controversy. The new Ideahsm 
 suffered much from its friends, for they 
 greeted it as a ready weapon against scientific 
 thought. Later, however, when a truer in- 
 sight into the meaning of German thought 
 was possible, it became evident that no true 
 philosophy could have any method but that 
 of logic or any end but truth. It was still 
 possible, indeed, to use words consecrated by 
 popular usage to indicate meanings which 
 they had never intended : not hypocrisy, 
 but a fear of an unreal terminology, had caused 
 this. In fact, Hegel himself had found it 
 possible to use " Revelation " and " God " 
 in metaphysics. Eventually, however, EngHsh 
 Idealism passed beyond a merely controversial 
 attitude towards Empiricism, and all con- 
 nection with theological polemics. 
 
 Thus it was seen that philosophy must 
 acknowledge as fundamental " the synthetic 
 
234 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 unity of consciousness." Experience as a 
 whole was to be accounted the basis for 
 thought. Of this experience the prominent 
 note was activity. Not the stimulation of a 
 hypothetically inert " self " was to be the 
 basis, but an energy which alone could explain 
 the very possibihty of stimulation. Finally, 
 in ethics, it had become apparent that the 
 Individualist and Utilitarian Ethics, though 
 providing an admirable calculus, required a 
 deeper metaphysical concept on which it could 
 be founded. Such were the lines upon which 
 English philosophy was travelling after the 
 decay of Empiricism. The full result can be 
 seen in the state of philosophy as it is 
 to-day. 
 
 C. In Germany 
 
 In Germany the age of the great systems 
 left two clearly defined schools of thought, 
 the Hegelian and the Herbartian. It has 
 already been shown how, within the Hegelian 
 school, there was conflict which centred round 
 the question of the relations of philosophy 
 and religion. There were, however, some 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 235 
 
 Hegelians who stood apart from the con- 
 troversy and devoted their attention to an 
 historical study of metaphysics, and as a 
 whole the school may be regarded as a meta- 
 physical one ; but, on the other hand, the 
 Herbartians had turned away from funda- 
 mental problems and were thinking out the 
 details of science : the subject which had 
 reached its highest development with them 
 was physiological psychology. To this the 
 readers of Schopenhauer tended. 
 
 Now such a division of tendencies must 
 of necessity be inexact. It is not to be 
 supposed to be accurate if applied to the 
 list of philosophic writers, for often one 
 man shows in his thought both tendencies. 
 In fact, the greatest thinker of the period, 
 Lotze, has been often connected with the 
 Herbartians, in spite of his protests, and 
 but seldom with the more abstract thinkers. 
 We shall, however, divide the representa- 
 tives of these two tendencies in accordance 
 with what seem to be the most noticeable 
 elements in their work. Another criterion 
 for division, the contrast between optimism 
 and pessimism, gives somewhat the same 
 
236 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 results. And, apart from all division, it is 
 clear that, to aU the thinkers of this period in 
 Germany, the crucial question was the relation 
 between physical science and philosophy, in 
 method and in results. 
 
 On the side of a philosophic rendering of 
 experience was Lotze. To him physical 
 science seemed a stage through which, and 
 beyond which, the philosopher passes. The 
 emotional results he attained may fairly be 
 classed as optimistic. 
 
 Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) was 
 the son of a physician in Saxony. His studies 
 were in physical science and in philosophy, 
 and at one time he proposed to follow his 
 father's profession. At Leipzig, under S. T. 
 Fechner, he learnt the value of exact scientific 
 knowledge, and under the Hegelian C. H. 
 Weisse he learnt to appreciate the aesthetic 
 and romantic elements of Ufe. He published a 
 "Metaphysics " in 1841, and a " Logic" in 1842. 
 At that time the main lines of his thought 
 were fixed, but his later lectures and writings 
 on physiological subjects led critics to suppose 
 that he was an opponent of metaphysical 
 
BTJDOIF HERMANN" LOTZE 
 
 p. 236] 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 237 
 
 thought. He had succeeded Herbart at 
 Gottingen in 1844 ; and he found it necessary 
 to state definitely that he was not a Herbartian. 
 In 1856 he began to publish his great work, 
 the " Microcosmus." 
 
 The two interests, of physical science and 
 pure philosophy, meet in Lotze. In his con- 
 cept of the data and the starting-point of 
 philosophy he is in agreement with Herbart. 
 He had a wide knowledge of physical science, 
 and an appreciation of its methods such as 
 was then seldom found in German philo- 
 sophers ; but not only did he use science, he 
 also furthered its researches in his extension 
 of the mechanical conceptions to all pheno- 
 mena : even the hitherto closed regions of 
 Ufe and organism were explained by him on 
 mechanical principles. In this he was opposed 
 to the romantic tendencies to be found in 
 Schelling, and even, in a modified form, in 
 Hegel. So also, in agreement with Herbart, 
 he conceived philosojphy to be a remodelling 
 of the concepts of common sense, with a view 
 to consistency of thought. The conclusion 
 with which he ends, in so far as it involves a 
 plurality of conscious beings, looks back with 
 
238 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 Herbart's " Reals " to the monads of Leibnitz. 
 With Leibnitz also the optimism of Lotze is 
 connected. 
 
 On the other hand the philosophy of Lotze, 
 regarded as a whole, may be conceived as 
 teleological idealism. Not scientific law, but 
 ethical value, is for him the highest truth. 
 Thus he is connected with the main current 
 of ideahstic thought. Although he rejects 
 the formaUsm and the dialectic method of 
 Hegel, Lotze is at one with the idealists in his 
 conception of the fulness of human life, and 
 in his interest in those experiences with which 
 physical science is not concerned. Thus the 
 conclusion of his metaphysics is in an Absolu- 
 tism almost Like that of Spinoza ; but remnants 
 of dogmatism prevent clearness in his concept 
 of how the Absolute of philosophy is related 
 to the personal God of religion. 
 
 There are three regions of experience, says 
 Lotze — of facts, of laws, and of values. 
 Thus when thought arises we have to purify 
 it by eliminating those concepts which pre- 
 vent " a consistent and harmonious view " 
 of reality. Prom the first efEort of thought 
 we should conceive the world as a collection 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 239 
 
 of independent " things " ; but further think- 
 ing leads us to see that these " things " are 
 bound together by laws ; it is at this stage 
 that we have science and the plural world 
 of monads. Once again, however, if the 
 connection of " things " is real, obviously we 
 have reached the idea of one aU-pervading 
 substance, and we can only conceive this 
 deep reality in a consistent way if we think 
 of it as essentially of the type of the active 
 self. For in the self we have at once the 
 concept of unity and a plurahty of states. 
 Other interests of life may now lead us to 
 regard this substance as a person, as God, 
 whose thoughts are all things. The world is 
 then the expression of His will.' 
 
 The philosophic value of such conclusions 
 it lies with the future to determine. For us 
 the results do not appear much difierent from 
 those attained by Leibnitz : on the other 
 hand, there is a touch of reality about the 
 philosophy of Lotze which gives him a high 
 place among thinkers. 
 
 1 Cf. the whole of the " Miorooosmus " from vol. ii. p. 646, 
 Eng. trans. The theological comfort to be got from this 
 conclusion must be distinguished from its logical vaUdity. 
 
240 Development of Modem Philosophy 
 
 An opposite, and, like Schopenhauer's, a 
 non-professional development of philosophic 
 thought, was made by Hartmann. In him, 
 too, the scientific interest is very strong. His 
 own purpose was to use the new knowledge in 
 order to reconcile the conflicting metaphysics 
 of Hegel and Schopenhauer ; but the result 
 in his work appears to be merely a re-reading 
 of Schopenhauer. With that philosopher, 
 Hartmann is a pessimist. 
 
 Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann (1842- 
 1906) was the son of an artillery officer 
 stationed at Berhn. He entered the artillery, 
 but at twenty-three he was obliged to retire 
 owing to chronic ill-health. After this he hved 
 in retirement with his wife. He had first 
 hoped for success in hterary and dramatic 
 work ; but, this faihng, he turned his attention 
 to philosophy. His famous " Philosophy of the 
 Unconscious " (1869) ^ was composed before 
 
 1 The immediate success of this work (it had seven editions 
 in the seven years following its publication) can be put down 
 rather to the briUiancy of treatment and the display of 
 BoientiBo knowledge than to its value in philosophy. In 
 fact, Windelband goes so far as to say that it " could have 
 only the success of a meteor that dazzles for a brief period," 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 241 
 
 he had made any deep study of metaphysics. 
 He was, however, saturated with the physical 
 science of his day, and was then aware of (and, 
 later, appreciative of) the work of Hegel, 
 Schopenhauer, and, above all, SchelUng. 
 Other works developed his fundamental pessi- 
 mistic thought, 
 
 Hartmann's attempt to mediate between 
 optimism and pessimism led him to conceive 
 Schelhng's Absolute as the solution of the 
 apparent opposition between the Will of 
 Schopenhauer and the Idea of Hegel.^ The 
 method adopted by Hartmann is that of 
 scientific induction : thus, in examining ex- 
 perience, we find the ultimate ground to be 
 not merely the non-intelligent force, apparent 
 in the change of things (Schopenhauer's Will), 
 nor the motionless intelligence apparent in 
 the order of things (Hegel's Idea), but an 
 unconscious (" unbewussten ") Absolute which 
 appears both as action and as thought. The 
 evolution of the world takes place by a non- 
 individual and yet teleological striving, which 
 results in " Natural Selection." 
 
 1 Cf. " Philosophy of the Unoonscious," Eng. trans., vol. iii. 
 p. 147. 
 
 16 
 
242 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 From this dark niglit came the organisms 
 of physiology and then consciousness ; but 
 this consciousness is produced so as to over- 
 come, first, the whole sphere of blind striving, 
 and after the victory to lead all back into 
 the nothing from which it came. The illusion 
 of happiness is the joke of the Unconscious, 
 luring on a restless intelUgence : the world 
 is bad, but already the corruption is here 
 that makes an end even of itself. In prac- 
 tical hfe the principle should be, by the 
 absolute resignation of all hope for ourselves 
 or the world, " to make the ends of the Un- 
 conscious ends of our own consciousness." ^ 
 Thus pessimism is to go further than Schopen- 
 hauer's philosophic calm. 
 
 One of the most remarkable phases of 
 thought in Germany was represented by 
 Nietzsche. Although there is a world-view 
 implied in his work, he was rather a poet or 
 prophet than a philosopher. Nevertheless, 
 the place which he will take in future histories 
 of thought may be great, for his influence goes 
 beyond the purely literary and poetic classes. 
 The chief elements in his rendering of ex- 
 
 i Eng. tram., vol. ill. p. 133. 
 
Physical Science and Philosophy 243 
 
 perience are connected with a new indi- 
 vidualism. His followers have not yet ex- 
 plained satisfactorily the meaning implied in 
 the idea of Super-man ; but it seems that 
 the ideal individual of Nietzsche is not the 
 barren opponent of society but the highest 
 embodiment of the whole of human achieve- 
 ment. In certain moods Nietzsche seems to 
 imagine the super-man rising out of the ruins 
 of the past ; but in other, and saner, moods, 
 the ideal is seen to be the complete inherit- 
 ance of the past. The rendering given by 
 Nietzsche of the experience of his day is not 
 sufficiently consistent to be treated as purely 
 philosophical. The salient idea as regards 
 the world seems to be that of rending, or 
 tearing, and conflict. Doubtless this is a 
 reflection of the iron years in which Nietzsche 
 lived. Its permanent value remains still to 
 be discussed. But here we leave the domain 
 of history. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 rFlHE philosophy of the present is almost 
 -L cosmopolitan ; and it seems that we 
 have at last reached the possibility of a 
 Western Philosophy such as will explain the 
 whole of experience as we know it. But even 
 the Western world is not yet so completely 
 one in its experience as to have a philosophy 
 which can be called international. Among the 
 generally acknowledged schools of philosophy, 
 however, there are stiU oppositions. These 
 are to be found among the philosophers of 
 all Western nations ; and, generally speaking, 
 essential differences seem to divide the philo- 
 sophic world into two camps. They are those 
 of the Idealists and of the Empiricists ; but, 
 of course, under these names we include much 
 more than the historical oppositions of the 
 
 244 
 
Conclusion 245 
 
 past. The present situation in philosophy is 
 largely due to the vigorous growth of physical 
 science in the last generation. Out of that 
 state of things and the controversies to which 
 it gave rise, the present opposition has ap- 
 peared. Again, another interest of modern 
 life, that of historical study, has introduced 
 still more complexity into philosophic thought. 
 The period of thinking immediately pre- 
 ceding our own contains names to which, as 
 yet, no certain place can be given in the 
 history of philosophy. The development of 
 thought still continues to reflect the features 
 of national experience. If we follow our 
 former divisions and discuss the nations 
 separately, we shall find that in Germany 
 philosophic thought is divided between 
 scientific and historical interests. On the 
 side of science there has taken place a great 
 development of physiology, and new con- 
 cepts of psychology have arisen. Some 
 thinkers have even revived an extreme 
 materialism. On the other hand, historical 
 interest and commentary upon past meta- 
 physics has led to a vigorous development 
 of thought in an idealist direction. 
 
246 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 The outstanding names are those of Lange 
 (1825-1875), whose " History of Materialism " 
 is a most brilliant essay upon the value of 
 purely scientific thought ; and E. Diihring, 
 who expressed an extreme materialism. Of 
 physiological psychologists the most brilliant 
 is Wundt. He has also done a very great 
 deal in bringing out the will-element in ex- 
 perience. Somewhat apart from these was 
 Richard Avenarius, of Zurich (1843-1896), 
 whose philosophy is a brilliant outcome of 
 the new movement. His work will doubtless 
 be assigned a great place in future histories. 
 The most prominent names of strictly modern 
 times are those of Paulsen, the professor at 
 Berlin, who wrote a " System of Ethics " in 
 which " teleological energism " seemed to be 
 fundamental, and a small " Introduction to 
 Philosophy " ; and of Rudolf Eucken, who 
 stands for a certain mystical interest in thought. 
 
 In France the division of schools is the 
 same. The more metaphysical thinkers owe 
 much to the thought of Hegel. P. Janet 
 and H. Taine were vigorous and independent 
 thinkers. Henri Bergson, whose " L'Evolu- 
 
Conclusion 247 
 
 tion Creatrice " seems to re-embody the will- 
 concepts of Schopenhauer, may be yet valued 
 highly ; but his name does not properly be- 
 long to history. 
 
 It is not yet clear to what constructive ideas 
 the social and individual experience of French- 
 men is giving birth. On the one hand, an 
 extreme exactness and clearness of thought 
 seems to be producing blindness in the more 
 subtle problems of experience, and yet there 
 are indications that Frenchmen may prove 
 themselves competent to express the philo- 
 sophic implications of physical science. 
 
 Since the days of the Renaissance Italy 
 has not been the home of philosophic thought. 
 Political troubles and economic distress made 
 abstract thinking impossible. Then followed 
 a period of gradual pacification, and Italians 
 were influenced by the already mature French 
 thought, and, in a less degree, by German 
 Idealism. Theorising, however, passed into 
 a kind of theosophical Neo-Platonism in its 
 clerical exponents. Official orthodoxy sup- 
 pressed the effort ; and Italian thought, among 
 the educated^ suffered from the opposition 
 
248 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 between physical science and metaphysics 
 which now exists in Europe generally. During 
 the revolutionary period preceding the forma- 
 tion of the Italian nation, thought seemed to 
 concern itself chiefly with emotional problems. 
 The revived metaphysical interests were ex- 
 pressed by Pasquale Galuppi (1771-1845), 
 and in a stronger form by Antonio Rosmini- 
 Serbati (1797-1855). The results appeared to 
 be a mystic absolutism. A like efiect was 
 produced by the work of Vincenzo Gioberti 
 (1801-1832). Free speculation at present in 
 Italy has produced valuable scientific theory. 
 A strong scientific school has been arising, and 
 in so far as it expresses the world-view of the 
 new Italian national experience, it seems to 
 be very closely related to the French schools 
 of thought. 
 
 In England and in the United States the 
 purely scientific thinkers of the last generation, 
 such as Herbert Spencer, have had no philo- 
 sophic successors. In place of these we have 
 now a strong psychological school ; but within 
 this school there are indications of very vary- 
 ing metaphysical conceptions. The more 
 
Conclusion 249 
 
 physiological psychologists may be held to 
 express the scientific attitude as opposed to 
 the metaphysical. Of the physiological 
 psychologists may be mentioned William 
 James (Harvard University), and E. B. 
 Titchener (Cornell University), who is more 
 extreme. The expression of the philosophy 
 implied in their psychology has been, so far, 
 left to other writers. 
 
 Psychologists with a defined attitude to 
 metaphysical problems, generally almost 
 idealist, are G-. F. Stout (St. Andrews) and 
 Hugo Miinsterberg (Harvard). 
 
 On the other hand, the Idealist school, 
 which began in a kind of intellectualism, 
 and depended at first almost wholly upon 
 German thought, has had a most brilliant 
 development. Intellectual formalism and com- 
 mentary have given place to vigorous and 
 independent thinking, and even those who 
 may be classed as adherents of Hegel or Lotze 
 have learnt the truth of Nietzsche's saying — 
 " One ill requiteth one's teacher by remaining 
 always a scholar." 
 
250 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 Among Idealists who are specially con- 
 nected with Hegelian thought the chief 
 names are W. Wallace, the populaxiser of 
 Hegelian concepts ; E. Caird (late Master of 
 BaUiol), who may be called an Hegelian of 
 the right wing ; and J. E. McTaggart, per- 
 haps an Hegelian of the left. To somewhat 
 the same school belongs F. H. Bradley, whose 
 " Appearance and Eeality " marks a valu- 
 able advance in metaphysical thought: with 
 Bradley's name is connected the development 
 of thought made by B. Bosanquet and A. E. 
 Taylor. 
 
 IdeaKsts, sometimes connected with the 
 principles of Lotze, are James Ward (Pro- 
 fessor at Cambridge) and Ladd in America. 
 With these may be classed Josiah Eoyce 
 (Harvard). 
 
 The details of present thought and contro- 
 versy do not belong to history. There is, 
 however, one further division which may 
 have important results in the future. For 
 to many the Idealist attitude, even in its 
 present form, seems to savour too much of an 
 intellectual formalism. A small body of 
 thinkers have therefore attempted, under the 
 
Conclusion 251 
 
 name of Pragmatism, or Humanism, to stress 
 the will-element as the most important aspect 
 for a philosophy of experience. 
 
 With this the names of William James and 
 F. C. S. Schiller are connected ; although 
 many others, who would by no means call 
 themselves Pragmatists, express the same 
 interest in will as opposed to intellect. 
 
 Thus the present state of philosophic 
 opinion seems to be unsettled. And yet there 
 is no doubt that the disagreement of writers on 
 philosophy is a sign of life. We no longer 
 desire a general consensus as a criterion of 
 truth. In fact, disagreement is natural upon 
 so complex a problem as the nature of ex- 
 perience. The world in which we live and we 
 ourselves are not facts of such simplicity that 
 everyone can see them in the same light. 
 But even allowing for difierences in the state- 
 ment of what we now believe to be the nature 
 of theworldand humanity, there isundoubtedly 
 agreement among all competent thinkers as to 
 certain methods and certain limited results. 
 The state of philosophic thought at present 
 seems to point to the formation of some general 
 
2S2 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 view of the world which may become as com- 
 monly acknowledged in the West as was the 
 scholastic philosophy in the Middle Ages. 
 We are not likely, however, to reach common 
 beliefs until we have common sympathies and 
 a common experience of life ; and cosmopoli- 
 tanism, even if we exclude the East, is still 
 an unrealised ideal. 
 
 Here the history of philosophic thought 
 ends. We have indeed discussed only the 
 thought which has appeared in one small 
 corner of the world. But there is good reason 
 to suppose, now that we are at least aware of 
 Eastern thinkers, that Western thought has 
 more than a provincial interest for humanity 
 as a whole. Perhaps once again among 
 modern Idealists the traces of Eastern thought 
 may be found by future historians ; but above 
 all division of East from West must stand the 
 common experience of humanity as a whole. 
 It is impossible for us to distinguish in our 
 own experience and thought those elements 
 which are human and those which are only 
 English. But we may be assured that no 
 real thought will ever arise through the denial 
 of the obvious distinction between nations 
 
Conclusion 253 
 
 and races. The mistake of the Middle Ages 
 was a too hurried unification. CosmopoUtan- 
 ism which denies nationality is doomed to 
 failure. Only through the infinite complexity 
 of real life and thought is it possible to find 
 that harmony which secures unity as well as 
 variety. 
 
 Now if, beyond the mists that still cover 
 the foot of the slope up which we may be 
 imagined to have come, we look back again over 
 the road by which we have travelled, we may 
 find, perhaps, in history something of that 
 calm which the earliest thinkers held to be the 
 chief reward of philosophers. We may see, 
 indeed, that there has been no untroubled 
 progress, no easy and open path in philosophy ; 
 but each pioneer has cut his way. And if we 
 are not yet at the mountain-top — nor can ever 
 hope to be, for the metaphor fails — yet our 
 climbing has not been in vain. For we are 
 above the lower clouds at least, and for the 
 future there is hope — kolXov to d6Xo<s /cat 17 
 IXttis iieydkr]. 
 
 It remains only to glance over the past. 
 Philosophy in the West began in Ionia : to 
 the first thinkers, as to children, the " sohd " 
 
254 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 world was the only real one. They thought 
 physics. Next came the brilliant period of 
 conscious criticism in Greece, the age of 
 Plato and Aristotle : and with the problems 
 of thought, the problems of conduct were then 
 first discussed. There is stiU a living freshness 
 about the thought of this period that belongs 
 to no other. But with the decay of the old- 
 world politics there came the need for a new 
 rendering of experience. Practical doctrine 
 took the place of scientific knowledge. The 
 Stoics and Epicureans stood for the independ- 
 ence of the thinking man in the midst of a 
 falling world. To them succeeded the mystic 
 Neo-Platonists : for one short moment Plotiuus 
 thought, and then the last relics of ancient 
 knowledge were swept away in a tide of 
 emotion. 
 
 A change came over the Western world, as 
 when the form of life is changed by death. 
 But after the dark ages of thought there came 
 again an Athena-birth. The Komans had 
 left their order and their burden of Greek 
 thought impressed upon the North, and on 
 their part the Northern invaders brought new 
 vigour. After vague travailing, the great 
 
Conclusion 255 
 
 scholastics, Abelard and St. Thomas, thought 
 clearly, and the world went after them ; until 
 at last the way that Greece had opened — for 
 the scholastics learnt from the Greeks — led to 
 the Nature the Greeks had known : and 
 commentary once more died. 
 
 The Renaissance was almost another age 
 of darkness for pure philosophy. But the 
 new and vigorous outward Life developed in 
 time the first modern thought. Descartes 
 and Spinoza showed the tendencies : the 
 one is all for the individual experience as 
 basis, the other for the Absolute as conclusion. 
 Leibnitz gathered up the many threads. But 
 doubt was already at work on dogmatism ; 
 Hume's logic and French wit destroyed it. 
 Then, almost in our own day, Kant vaguely 
 understood the new world into which Western 
 thought had entered. To him all truth was 
 relative, and — that was nothing against it. 
 A brilliant development in Germany followed 
 the Critical Philosophy, in some ways hke 
 the short-lived insight at Athens long before. 
 The great systems of IdeaUsm in the genera- 
 tion preceding our own have cast the data of 
 experience in a new mould. 
 
256 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 The history of philosophy is one in so far 
 as the experience, of which it is the reflection 
 is one. But at one time the philosophic in- 
 sight pierces one part of appearances, at 
 another time it reaches even an opposite truth. 
 As Thoreau has put it, " No truth was ever 
 expressed but with this sort of emphasis, that 
 for the time there seemed to be no other." 
 Therefore the history of thought is, in a 
 way, a record of great thinkers and not that 
 of a mass — " collective mediocrity." Thus 
 " every important individuahty is a point 
 of view for the human race from which 
 men catch sight of possibilities and aspects of 
 existence which would otherwise have escaped 
 them." ' 
 
 We, too, belong to the stream : and we 
 have no hope, as Hegel had, that we have 
 even reached the outhne of a final synthesis. 
 Such a hope is a delusion. Our standpoint 
 is not less valid for us because it cannot be 
 that of the twenty-first century. And if 
 history is not merely archaeology it must end 
 on no uncertain note. " There is a dead and 
 a living past in the history of philosophy, and 
 
 1 Hoffding, " History of Modem Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 237. 
 
Conclusion 257 
 
 life is not only to be found in the present. 
 It is not merely strength for which the living 
 ring (of the tree) is debtor to its forefathers, 
 but, by holding them in its embrace, expansion 
 likewise : wherefore for the newly sprouting 
 ring, as for the tree, the first law is really to 
 embrace and enfold all its predecessors; the 
 second, to grow from the root upwards self- 
 independently. The problem how to fulfil 
 these two conditions in philosophy verges on 
 the paradoxical, for they who overlook the 
 situation have usually lost the ingenuousness 
 necessary for making a true beginning, and 
 he who attempts a new departure, generally 
 presents some crude dilettante product from 
 having insufficiently appreciated the previous 
 historic evolution." ' The past, however, 
 holds lessons, not models. We learn by think- 
 ing, not by copying. And, while we follow the 
 long lessons of history, the conclusions may 
 indeed lie only obscurely before us, but in 
 the past we find the hope of the future which 
 is our only ground for movement. Indeed, 
 without such an ideal before us it is impossible 
 
 1 Von Haitmann, " Philosophy of the Unconscious," vol. i. 
 p. S. 
 
 17 
 
258 Development of Modern Philosophy 
 
 even to judge fairly of the past : for the past 
 is not all ready for burial. " It is impossible 
 to march with enthusiasm to the attack upon 
 the institutions of the past without the con- 
 viction that there is something more to be 
 gained than the destruction of those institu- 
 tions." ^ And so in philosophic history we 
 criticise in order to construct. 
 
 Experience remains the only ground for 
 real thought, and experience is necessarily 
 individual and social at once. The inherit- 
 ance of the past is handed on to us even when 
 we are not aware of it. But when we recognise 
 our heritage we have greater power in arriving 
 at a view of the world in which we live. The 
 object of studying the philosophers of the past 
 is not that we may take their thoughts, but 
 that we may think for ourselves. Eeasoning 
 is, and always will be, the only road to truth. 
 There are other interests in life besides truth : 
 there are other and perhaps more splendid 
 tasks than that of philosophy. But some 
 men wiU always be driven by the passion for 
 truth. Reasoning is, indeed, no mechanical 
 or formal logic, but an enthusiasm ; and he 
 
 » Caird, " Comte," p. 12. 
 
Conclusion 259 
 
 little understands the philosopher who be- 
 lieves him to be passionless. The flare of 
 personal passion is but a poor thing compared 
 to that clear flame which burns at the heart of 
 him who desires, at all costs, the truth. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 I. HISTOKIES 
 
 HoFFDiNG : " A History of Modern Philosophy," by 
 Dr. Herald Hoffding (of the University of Copen- 
 hagen), trans. 1900, 2 vols. 
 
 MoREELL, J. D. : " Speculative Philosophy in 19th 
 Century," 2 vols., London, 1847. 
 The Modern Period in the General Histories of 
 Erdman (3 vols., 1890), Ueberweg (2 vols., 1874), 
 Schwegler, Bax, and Alexander (Maclehose, 
 1908) ; also the " Dictionary of Philosophy and 
 Psychology," ed. by J. M. Baldwin (Macmillan, 
 1905), 3 vols. (Vol. III. = bibliography). 
 
 II. MONOGRAPHS 
 
 Bacon : i. by Prof. Nichol, 2 parts in Blackwood's 
 " Philosophical Classics." 
 ii. by T. Fowler, in " English Philosophers," 
 Series (Sampson Low, 1881). 
 Bbntham : by Leslie Stephen, Vol. I. of " The English 
 Utilitarians " (Duckworth, 1900). 
 261 
 
262 Bibliography 
 
 Berkeley, by Prof. Campbell Eraser (Blackwood). 
 Descartes : by Prof. MahafEy (Blackwood). 
 Diderot and the Encyclopaedists : by John Morley. 
 English Thought in the Eighteenth Century : 
 
 by Leslie Stephen. 
 Fichte : by Prof. Adamson (Blackwood). 
 Hamilton : i. by W. H. S. Merick (Sampson Low). 
 
 ii. by Prof. Veitch (Blackwood). 
 Hegel : by E. Caird (Blackwood). 
 
 " Prolegomena to Hegel," W. Wallace (Oxford, 
 1894). 
 HoBBES : by Prof. Croom Robertson (Blackwood). 
 Hume : i. by Prof. Knight (Blackwood). 
 
 ii. by Prof. Huxley (English Men of Letters 
 Series). 
 Kant: i. "The Critical Philosophy," by E. Caird 
 (2 vols., 32s.). 
 
 ii. by W. Wallace (Blackwood). 
 Leibnitz : i. by J. T. Merz (Blackwood). 
 
 ii. by Bertrand Russell (Cambridge, 1900). 
 Locke : by Prof. Campbell Eraser (Blackwood). 
 Mill : by Leslie Stephen, vols. 2 and 3 of " The English 
 
 Utilitarians" (Duckworth). 
 Schopenhauer : " Life," by W. Wallace (London, 1891). 
 
 " Philosophy," etc., by H. Zimmern (London, 1876). 
 Shaftesbury: by T. Fowler (Sampson Low). 
 Smith : by J. A. Farcer (Sampson Low). 
 Spinoza : i. by H. H. Joachim (Oxford, 1891). 
 
 ii. by J. Caird (Blackwood). 
 
 iii. "A Study of Spinoza," by James Martineau 
 (London, 1882). 
 
 iv. " Life," etc. Fr. Pollock (London, 1899). 
 
Bibliography 263 
 
 III. TEANSLATIONS OF THE CHIEF FOEEIGN 
 WORKS 
 
 CoMTE : " The Positive Philosopliy of Aug. Comte," 
 freely translated and condensed by H. Martineau, 
 2 vols. (1875). 
 " A Discourse on the Positive Spirit," trans, by 
 E. S. Beesly. 
 Descartes : " Discourse on Method " (Open Court 
 Publ. Co. ; London, Kegan Paul, Is. Gd.). 
 " Meditations and Extracts from the Principles " 
 {Id., 2s.). 
 Fichte: "PopularWorks," trans. byDr.W. Smith (1873). 
 Hartmann : " Philosophy of the Unconscious," trans, by 
 
 E. C. Coupland, 1884. 
 Hegel : " Logic," trans, by W. Wallace (Oxford). 
 " Philosophy of Mind," Id. 
 
 " Philosophy of History," trans, by J. Sibree 
 (Bell, 5s.). 
 Heebart : " Textbook of Psychology," trans, by M. K. 
 
 Smith, 1891. 
 Kant : " The Critique of Pure Reason," trans, by Max 
 Miiller, 1881. 2 vols. (Vol. I., Introduction). 
 Id., trans, by J. M. D. Meiklejohn (Bell, 5s.). 
 " The Critique of the Practical Reason," trans, by 
 
 T. K. Abbott (London, 1889). 
 " The Critique of the Judgment," trans, by J. H. 
 
 Bernard, 1892. 
 " Idea of a Universal History," trans, by Hartie, 
 
 " Principles of Politics." 
 " Prolegomena," i. trans, by E. B. Bax (Bell, 5s.). 
 ii. trans, by P. Cams (Open Court, 2s. 6d.). 
 
264 Bibliography 
 
 " Selections," by J. Watson (1901, London and 
 New York). 
 Lance : " History of Materialism," 3 vols. 
 Leibnitz : " Metaphysics and Monadology " (Open 
 
 Court, 2s. 6d.). 
 LoTZE : " Logic and Metaphysic," ed. by B. Bosanquet, 
 2 vols. (Oxford, 1888). 
 " Microcosmus," 2 vols. (T. & T. Clark, 1885). 
 Schopenhauer : " The Fourfold Root," trans, by 
 Madame Hillebrand (Bell, 5s.). 
 " Essays," by E. Belfort Bax (Bell, 5s.). 
 " The World as Will and Idea," 3 vols., trans, by 
 R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp. 
 Spinoza : " Ethics," trans, in Will's " Spinoza." 
 
 Chief Works, 2 vols, by R. H. M. Elwer (BeH, 5s.). 
 " Principles of Descartes' Philosophy " (Open 
 Court, 2s.). 
 
 IV. THE CHIEF WORKS OF ENGLISH PHILO- 
 SOPHY 
 
 A. The Older Philosophy 
 
 Bacon : " Physical and Metaphysical Works," ed. by 
 J. Devey, 1853. 
 " Miscellaneous Writings in Philosophy," 2 vols., 
 
 1802. 
 "Novum Organon" (Clarendon Press, 14s.). 
 Berkeley : " Works," 4 vols. ed. by Eraser (Oxford). 
 "Selections," by A. C. Fraser, 1899 (Clarendon 
 Press, 7s. 6d.). 
 HOBBEs : " Works," 16 vols., ed. by Wm. Molesworth, 
 1845. 
 
Bibliography 265 
 
 i. " Leviathan " (Camb. Univ. Press., 4s. Qd. net), 
 ii. in Morley's " Universal Library," vol. 21. 
 Hume : " Philosophical Works," 4 vols., ed. by T. H. 
 Green and T. H. Grose, 1875. 
 " Selections," by H. A. Aikins (New York, 1893). 
 Locke : " Works," 9 vols., 1853. 
 
 " Human Understanding," ed. by A. C. Fraser, 
 2 vols. (Oxford, 1894). 
 
 B. Eecent Philosophy 
 
 Adamson, R. : " The Development of Modern Philo- 
 sophy " (2 vols., London, 1903). 
 Bax, E. B. : " The Roots of Reality." 
 BosANQUET, B. : " Logic," 2 vols. (Oxford, 1888). 
 " The Philosophical Theory of the State." 
 "Knowledge and Reality" (London, 1885). 
 Bradley, F. H. : " Appearance and Reality " (Sonnen- 
 schein, 1902, 12*.). 
 "The Principles of Logic" (1883). 
 "Ethical Studies" (1876). 
 Caied, E. : " Evolution of Religion," 2 vola. 
 
 (Maclehose, 12« net). 
 Caird, J. : " Philosophy of Religion " (Croall Lecture, 
 
 1878). Glasgow, Maclehose, 1880. 
 Feerier, J. F. : " Institutes of Metaphysic " (Black- 
 wood, 1856). 
 Green, T. H. : " Prolegomena to Ethics " (Oxford). 
 
 " Works," 3 vols. (Longmans, 1885). 
 Haxdane, R. B. : " Pathway to Reahty," 2 vols. 
 
 (Murray). 
 HoBHOUSE : " Theory of Knowledge." 
 
266 Bibliography 
 
 Hodgson, H. S. : " The Metaphysic of Experience," 
 
 4 bks. (London, 1898). 
 James, W. : " Pragmatism " (Longmans, 1907). 
 
 " A Pluralistic Universe," 1909. 
 Joachim, H. : " Truth " (Oxford). 
 Ladd, G. T. : " Philosophy of Knowledge " (New 
 
 York, 1897). 
 McTaggabt, J. E. : " Studies in the HegeUan Dialectic " 
 
 (Camb. Univ. Press, 8s.). 
 "Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology" (Id., 8s.), 
 Mill, J. S. : " Logic." 
 
 MooEE, G. : " Principia Ethica " (Cambridge, 1903). 
 Mt)NSTERBERG, H. : " The Eternal Values " (Constable, 
 
 1909, 10«. 6d. net). 
 RoYCE, J. : " The World and the Individual," 2 vols. 
 
 (1901). 
 " Philosophy : its Scopes and Eelations," 1902. 
 SiDGWicK, H. : " The Methods of Ethics " (Macmillan, 
 
 5th ed., 14s.). 
 " The Elements of Politics" {Id. Us. net). 
 Spencer, H. : "A System of Synthetic Philosophy," 
 
 10 vols. (Williams & Norgate). 
 "An Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy," by 
 
 F. Howard Collins, 4th ed., 21s. (Williams 
 
 & Norgate). 
 Stout, G. F. : " Analytic Psychology," 2 vols. 
 Taylor, A. E. : " Elements of Metaphysics " (Methuen, 
 
 1903, 10s. 6d.). 
 Ward, J. : " Naturalism and Agnosticism " (Black, 
 
 1903. 2 vols. 18s. net). 
 
INDEX 
 
 Absolute, 153, 195 
 Activity, 60, 71, 154, 
 
 206 
 Agnosticism, 228 
 Antinomies, 124 
 A posteriori, 108 
 A priori, 108 
 Asceticism, 208 
 
 Bacon, 27 
 Bain, 223 
 Bayle, 80 
 Bentham, 74 
 Bergson, 246 
 Berkeley, 68, 60, 65 
 Bradley, 250 
 Browne, 222 
 Bruno, 25 
 
 Caird, 250 
 Campanella, 25 
 Cardaillac, 211 
 Categories, 112 
 Common sense, 
 
 221 
 Comte, 215 
 Condillac, 82 
 
 189, 
 
 35, 75, 
 
 Condoroet, 83 
 Cousin. 212 
 Critiques, 98 
 
 Darwin, 224 
 Se Bonald, 214 
 Deism, 75 
 De Lamennais, 214 
 De Maistre, 214 
 Descartes, 31 
 Dialectic, 162 
 
 Egoism, 66 
 
 Empiricism, 58, 222, 22» 
 Encyclopsedists, 82 
 Essence, 184 
 Evolution, 225 
 
 FeeKng, 134 
 Ferrier, 231 
 Feuerbach, 196 
 Fichte, 143, 145 
 Fischer, Kuno, 196 
 
 Goethe, 156 
 
 267 
 
268 
 
 Index 
 
 •Green, 231 
 
 Hamilton, 230 
 Hartmann, 240 
 Hegel, 158, 162 
 Helvetius, 82 
 Herbart, 197 
 Hobbes, 29 
 Holbaoh, 82 
 Hume, 61, 68 
 Huxley, 225 
 
 JdeaUsm, 58, 147, 158, 185, 
 
 229, 238, 249 
 Individualism, 167, 172 
 
 Jacobi, 140 
 ■James, William, 249 
 Joufiroy, 212 
 ■Judgment, Critique of, 135 
 
 Kant, 92 
 
 Xa Mettrie, 82 
 Laromiguidre, 211 
 Leibnitz, 47 
 Xessing, 92 
 Lewes, G. H., 224 
 Locke, 59, 63 
 Lotze, 235 
 
 ■MoTaggart, 250 
 JMaimon, 140 
 JMill, J. S., 222 
 Monads, 50 
 
 Montaigne, 81 
 Montesquieu, 81 
 Miinsterberg, 240 
 
 Napoleon, 141 
 Newton, 58 
 Nietzsche, 242 
 Novalis, 156 
 
 Paulsen, 246 
 Pessimism, 208 
 Philosophy, Def. of, 8 
 Positivism, 214 
 Pragmatism, 251 
 
 Reals, 199 
 
 Beason, Critique of, 106 
 Reid, 74 
 Renaissance, 20 
 Revolution, French, 141 
 Romanticism, 139, 156 
 Rousseau, 82 
 Royer, CoUard, 212 
 
 Scepticism, 58, 68, 79 
 Schelling, 157 
 Schiller, 156 
 Schlegel, 156 
 Schleiermacher, 161 
 Schopenhauer, 202 
 Smith, Adam, 74 
 Society, 190 
 Solipsism, 66 
 Spencer, 225 
 Spinoza, 38 
 Stewart, 221 
 
Stout, 249 
 Strause, 196 
 Substance, 34, 36, 41, 51, 64, 
 66, 69 
 
 Teleology, 135, 186 
 The three stages, 218 
 Turgot, 83 
 
 Utilitarianism, 73, 227 
 
 Index 
 
 Voltaire, 81 
 
 269 
 
 Wallace, 250 
 
 Will, 206 
 
 Will, Critique of, 128 
 
 Wissensohaftslehre, 148 
 
 Wolff, 91 
 
 Wundt, 246 
 
 Zeller, 19 6 
 
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 100 Southwark Street, S.E. 
 
^igt of ffew SBoofis 
 
 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 
 CENTENARY, 1909 
 
 The decision to celebrate the centenary of the birth of Oliver 
 Wendell Holmes is one of many indications that bis works are ac- 
 knowledged to be of permanent value. He ranks now with Lamb, 
 Stevenson, Goldsmith, and others who have come to be read and loved 
 by all. 
 
 RIVERSIDE EDITION. 
 
 Four Portraits. Prose Works in Kleven Volumes with Indices. 
 
 Poems in Three Volumes. 
 
 Crown 8vo, cloth, £4 4s. net. Limited Large Paper £<^ition. 
 
 Boards, £14 14s. 
 
 The first uniform, satisfactory edition yet produced. It comprises ; — 
 
 1. The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table ; 2. The Pro- 
 leuor at the Breakfast Table ; 3. The Poet at the Breakfast 
 Table ; 4. Over the Tea Cups ; 5. Elsie Venner ; 6. The 
 Guardian Angel ; 7. A Mortal Antipathy ; 8. Pages from an 
 Old Volume of Life; 9. Medical Essayc ; 10. One Hundred 
 Days in Europe ; 11. Emerson and Motley ; 1 2, 1 3, 14. Poems. 
 Volumes in this set are not sotd separately. 
 
 GEORGE BAXTER, Colour Printer 
 
 His Life and Work. A Manual for Collectors. By C. T. Courtney 
 Lewis. 32 Illustrations. Crown Svo, cloth, price 6s. net. In this 
 book every known Baxter Print is described and priced 
 
 A BOOK OF SIMPLES 
 
 Being a Reproduction of the Still-room Book belonging to an Old 
 Manor House. With Introduction by H. W. Lewer. Printed on 
 
 Sure rag-paper by the Chiswick Press. Demy Svo, parchment, 
 ozed, price 145. net. 
 
 CHINA COLLECTOR'S POCKET 
 COMPANION 
 
 By Mrs. Bury Palliser. Illustrated. Royal i6mo, cloth, 5s. 
 No china collector can afford to be without the valuable and now 
 standard work. 
 
 Demy Svo, pure rag-paper, deckle-edged, bound in green parchment, 
 full gilt Dack, neatly boxed, price 145. net. 
 
 MOSSES AND LIVERWORTS 
 
 An Introduction to their study, with Hints as to their Collection and 
 Preservation. By T. H. Russell, F.L.S. Demy Svo, cloth, with 
 Coloured Frontispiece and 10 Plates, price 4s. 6d. net* With Illus- 
 trations from original Microscopical Drawings. Prospectus on ap- 
 plication, 
 
 UNTRAVELLED BERKSHIRE 
 
 By Miss L. Salmok. Crown Svo, cloth, gilt top, 7s. 6d. net. With 
 Illustrations. 
 Reading Mercury: "Miss Salmon's style is easy and graceful, im- 
 parting: a great deal of information." 
 
 London : SAMPSON LOVF, MARSTON & CO., LTD. 
 
 IPC SOUTHWAKK STREET, S.E. 
 
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