THE^PEGmL CAMPASQn'sERSES 
 
 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 BY 
 COL. F. N. MAUDE <iate R.E) 
 
CORNELL 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 GIFT OF 
 
 Mrs, Dana B. Van Dusen 
 In memory of her husband 
 
 
B Cornell University 
 9 Library 
 
 The original of tliis book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924024321782 
 
DC 236.6:M44 """"''** '•'""T' 
 
 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 1813 
 
THE SPECIAL CAMPAIGN 
 SERIES 
 
 Price 51. net each, 
 
 I. SAARBRCCK to PARIS ! Thk 
 Fkanco-Gskman Wak. By Coi. 
 SissoN C. PiiATT, late R. A. 
 
 II. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 
 1877. By Major F. Mauhice. 
 
 III. FREDERICKSBURG : A STUDY 
 
 IN WAR, 1 862 . By Major G. W. 
 
 RiDWAY. 
 
 IV. THE CAMPAIGN OF MAGENTA 
 
 and SOLFERINO, 1859. By Col. 
 H, C. Wylly, C.B. 
 
 V. THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA, 
 1866. By Lt.-Col. GlOnickr. 
 
 VI. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. 
 By Col. Sisson C. Pratt, late R.A. 
 
 VII. THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN, 
 18x3. By Col. F. N. Maude, 
 C.B.,late R.E. 
 
 VIII. GRANT'S CAMPAIGN JN 
 VIRGINIA, 1864 (The Wilderness 
 Campaign). By Capt. Vauguan- 
 Sawyer, Indian Army. 
 
 In Preparation. 
 
 IX. THE JENA CAMPAIGN, 1806. 
 By Col. F. N. MavDe, C.B., late 
 R.E. 
 
SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES. No. 7 
 
 THE 
 LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 1813 
 
 By 
 COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. 
 
 (lATE R.E.) P.S.C. 
 
 LONDON 
 
 SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIM 
 
 New York: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 1908 
 
ib 
 
 ddi 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 " AiORS, un homme s'el^vera, peut-etre reste jusque-la 
 dans la foule et I'obscurite, un homme qui ne se sera 
 fait un nom ni par ses paroles, ni par ses eorits un 
 homme qui aura medite dans le sUenoe, un homme enfin 
 qui aura peut-etre ignore son talent, qui ne I'aura senti 
 qu'en I'exergant, et qui aura fort peu etudie. Get 
 homme s'emparera des opinions, des circonstances de 
 la fortune ; et il dira du grand theoricien ce que I'archi- 
 tecte praoticien disait devant les Atheniens de I'archi- 
 tecte orateur ; ce que mon rival vous a dit, je I'execu- 
 terai." ^ 
 
 In these words Guibert, one of the ablest military 
 writers of his day, predicted the coming of the great 
 Napoleon, and perhaps few prophecies have received 
 more prompt or more startling realization. 
 
 They describe Napoleon to the letter — he had not 
 studied much; using words in their ordinary sense, 
 
 '■ Then will arise a man, hitherto lost in the obscurity of the crowd ; 
 a man who has not made his name either by speech or writing. 
 A man who has meditated silently, and ignoring his own talent, 
 has only been conscious of its power whilst actually exercising it ; ' 
 one who has studied but very Uttle. This man will seize hold of 
 opinions of circumstances and of fortune, and will say of the great 
 theoretician what the practical architect said of the orator, ' All 
 that my rival tells you, I will carry out.'" — Guibert, TraM de grand 
 Tactiqye, 1778. 
 
xiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 and reducing the thoughts they 6onvey to relative 
 values ; he had not thought much, he never- had time 
 for that ; he had simply " done things." Then, from 
 that time forward, the problem has continued to vex 
 men's minds, What w a s the tru e secret.pf his^PP^er of 
 execution? 
 
 JkJ^&-SJgfefr?JSars or there^bflu^_a|fer.,iisjdosa^ 
 jaU_at "Vyaterloo, no glhmner of a_sQljJi|i^_ was dis- 
 covered. Even the acuteness of a mind like that of 
 the keenest military critic which the nineteenth century 
 produced, viz., Clausewitz, failed to shed light on the 
 Napoleonic secret, and the deeds of his most distin- 
 guished pupU, von Moltke, shew no signs of its appre- 
 ciation. Napoleon's own commen ts on his campaigns, 
 dictated, as they mostly are, with the desire to justify his 
 conduct from the standpoint of his own contemporaries, 
 seemed the most barren in suggestion of any, and it was 
 not tmtil the collective intelligence of the whole French 
 General Staff was brought to bear upon his correspond- 
 ence and the archives which till recently had remained 
 locked up within the walls of the War Ministry in Paris, 
 that it became possible to reconstruct an outhne of 
 the train of reasoning which so often led him to vic- 
 tory. This reconstruction explains in the most remark- 
 able manner the true solution of the ethical problem 
 which the persistence of war, "as an act of human 
 intercourse," (to quote Clausewitz's definition) has 
 always involved. 
 
 But this solution stiU leaves us face to face with a 
 psychological problem of extreme interest, that finds 
 its completest expression in the incidents of this cam- 
 paign of 1813. for it reveals to us Napoleon at his best. 
 
INTRODUCTION xv 
 
 and at his Vorst, and compels us to face the question 
 whether he himself was at all times conscious of his 
 own secret — or, in other words, were his successes the 
 outcome of mental processes, or did they spring from 
 impulses of intuitive genius ? Was the mind that 
 executed the brilliant manoeuvres which culminated on 
 the field of Liitzen the same as that which remained 
 hesitating in ^tiful indecision during the crisis of 
 events around Dresdeiv)and then again rose to a climax 
 of grandeu r in the "movements by which he final^ 
 brought a nearly two to one numerical superiority on 
 to the decisive point of the battlefield of Leipzig ? 
 
 The great difficulty to the student of the present day 
 in studying these campaigns is to form an adequate 
 mental picture of the nature of the troops opposed to 
 one another, their courage, intelligence and aptitude 
 for War generally. Progress in armaments and scienti- 
 fic inventions applicable to War has been so vast during 
 the century that has since elapsed that we are apt to 
 lose sight of the fact that, though education of the 
 masses is certainly higher, the ultimate nature of the 
 man has varied very little indeed, and it is this which 
 counts most essentially in War. On the other hand, 
 the means of controlling the masses and generating the 
 " resultant thought wave " which sways alike both 
 armies and crowds, have enormously increased. Where 
 during the Napoleonic epoch it took months, even 
 years, to lash a whole nation into full fighting fury, the 
 Press nowadays can electrify an Empire widespread 
 even as ours into frenzy, and the point of psychological 
 interest is this, that once individuals are united into 
 " crowds " either by contiguity or by community of 
 
xvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 sentiment, which is asc^tained and comnmnicated by 
 the electric telegraph, to say nothing of other more 
 subtle sympathetic currents of forces less generally 
 recognized though equally real, the ultimate unit of 
 ,the crowd ceases to be a free agent, and becomes an 
 automaton directed and controlled by the will of the 
 majority, almost to the same extent as if he were actu- 
 ally hypnotized ; his courage and endurance are in- 
 creased or diminished far beyond the Emits of his own 
 I individual will. No average man alone could act with 
 the cowardice of which a panic-struck mob is capable, 
 nor could he rise to the subhme heights of self-devotion 
 ' a well-led assaulting column on a breach has often 
 displayed. Look at the mere physical obstacles such 
 men have overcome in cold blood, and judge by your 
 own feelings. Empirically this fact has always been 
 recognized, and mUitary discipUne with aU its forms 
 and ceremonies is the direct consequence of centuries 
 of such experience. Its object is to control and regulate 
 such manifestations of the " resultant thought wave," 
 j and to ensure that it acts in the direction of self-sacrifice, 
 ' not of seK-preservation. This art of raising men col- 
 \ lectively above the fear of death may be considered to 
 have reached its highest development in the days of 
 Frederick the Great. Certainly troops of his nation 
 have never shown equal endurance since ; but he had 
 both war-experienced men, time, and physically ade- 
 quate men to train. 
 
 Napoleon had neither time nor rea lly suitable material 
 to work upon , for ^e Bevoluti on and the years of 
 previous famine had lowered thephysical standard of 
 the race, and his officers, though war-experienced, had 
 
tNTRODUCTlOM xvli 
 
 been trained to a different standard.^ Hence he had 
 to find means to win battles with inferior troops , and 
 this problem he solved, first by the strategical concen- 
 tration of greater numbers, and second by a more skil- 
 ful combination of the three arms, more particularly 
 of the^^ji^j, which had at length developed mobility 
 sufficient for his requirements. In Frederick the Great's 
 day battles had been essentially infantry duels, in which 
 the cavalry intervened at the decisive moment. Under 
 Napoleon the infantry to whom the decisive attack 
 was committed were held back until, as in a siege, the 
 approaches and breaching batteries had so far dis- 
 turbed the equilibrium, that no serious resistance to 
 the storming colimms could any longer be anticipated. 
 His infantry carried position after position, not be- 
 cause th^y were intrinsically braver than their adver- 
 saries, but because, when the time came to launch them 
 forward, they were good enough to face such punish- 
 ment as their exhausted opponents were stUl in a con- 
 dition to administer. Naturally this is not the view 
 the French Infantry took of it. On the contrary, 
 they were taught to consider themselves irresistible 
 with the bayonet, as, indeed, all infantries must beheve 
 themselves to be. Whether they are so or not depends 
 on the skill of the leader who employs them, in suiting 
 the task to their quality ; and when that leader fails to 
 grasp the true point, viz., that it is the previously- 
 acquired fire superiority, whether of infantry or of 
 
 1 Contrast the losses during the battles of the Seven Tears' War 
 and those in the encounters of the French Revolution. Average 
 of the principal battles in the former, 17 per cent. ; in the latter, 
 about 3 per cent. 
 
xviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 artillery, o r o f bot^ that deterimnes_success, the results 
 are generally disastrous, as in the American Civil War 
 and the Bohemian campaign. 
 When our own troops are called upon again for a 
 J \^ Great War on the Napoleonic scale (and such a War must 
 be the inevitable outcome of the struggle for commercial 
 supremacy now in progress around us), we shall find 
 ourselves very much in the position of the French 
 Generals of the Eevolutionary era, viz., with immense 
 numbers of relatively untrained men driven by starva- 
 tion behind them, and the problem will be how to 
 make the best use of the spirit of self-sacrifice which 
 these men will bring with them, as the necessary con- 
 sequence of their coming forward at aU. Such a War 
 win be very different indeed from any of which the 
 present generation has had direct experience, the 
 only thing that can with certainty be predicted about 
 it being that since it must be fought out under Western 
 conditions of civilization — ^roads, railways, telegraphs, 
 etc. — ^it Tvill approximate far more closely to modern 
 French and German conceptions, which are in turn 
 the outcome of the study of the Napoleonic period-^ 
 than to any more recent model, such as the magnified 
 poHce raid into the Transvaal, or the eighteenth century 
 methods forced upon the Japanese by the roadless 
 condition of Manchuria. 
 
 Now the cardinal point of the Napoleonic strategy, 
 the spirit underlying the form in which it found ex- 
 pression, was his doctrine of the " economy of forces," 
 which rnerely meant that every body of troops, com- 
 mitted^undCT'jfije, ^whether tactically or stjategically 
 3idnot signify, had to be fought out to its utmost limit^ 
 
INTRODUCTION xix 
 
 of endurance. There was no iialk in the old Grand 
 Aimy of troops being " sacrificed," because every rank 
 knew that self-sacrifice was exactly what their leader 
 expected of them — ^what they were there for, in fact — 
 because it was only by this sacrifice on their part that 
 he could save up really fresh intapt troops for the final 
 act of decision. Generals were strictly called to account 
 by him, if they wasted their men by tactical incompe- 
 tence ; but the spirit of his Army never allowed the 
 men to think for themselves that their chief individual 
 pre-occupation should be " to live to fight another day." 
 
 Once this idea is allowed to take root in an Army it 
 always takes a long time and much unnecessary loss of 
 life to eradicate it. Witness the early attempts at battle 
 fighting in the French Revolution and in the American 
 Civil War. It takes many defeats before a whole Army 
 comes to realize that no decisive victories have ever 
 been won by the uncontrolled prowess of individual 
 skirmishers alone ; but once it has been learnt, experi- 
 ence shows that even battalions formed of nine-tenths 
 sixty day conscripts, or raw illiterate farmer lads, 
 such as were the East Prussian and Silesian Landwehr, 
 can be trusted to charge home with bayonets and pike 
 in the teeth of the case fire from manv batteries. i.e. 
 against a storm of buUets greater by far tha n anv line j 
 of breechloaders haa~TyCT yfeT d^vg^ISuaclaa^ 
 and whether this sacrifice of life has been futile or the 
 reverse has depended, and always will depend, on the 
 skill of the General who ordered it, whether he has 
 correctly seized his opportunity or rashly anticipated it. 
 
 It seems to me that, especially with troops of very 
 short service, it is far more imperative to cherish this 
 
XX INTRODUCTION 
 
 desire to get killed than the reverse, and fortunately it 
 is the easier of the two to obtain, for all men love the 
 excitement of a charge, even if it is only a mimic one. 
 The newspapers may tell them next day that they 
 would all have been dead men, and that in face of 
 modern weapons, etc., etc., such things are impossible ; 
 but they don't beUeve what they, read — ^perhaps some of 
 the others might have fallen, but not they individually ; 
 and there is always the recollection of the wild excite- 
 ment of the last rush forward, the hoarse roar of cheering 
 from thousands of throats, that brings home to them 
 what it means to be one with a " crowd " and feel its 
 irresistible forward impulse, to be remembered and 
 talked over.^ 
 
 With the men of the intelligence we now obtain it 
 would seem to me easy to find a way out of our diffi- 
 . culties, provided our officers are saturated by educa- 
 tion with the true spirit of the old time fighting, and 
 understand that bloodshed is a necessary consequence 
 of a;ll armed encounters, and that the degree of it de- 
 pends finally on the skill with which the supreme Com- 
 mander prepares the way for the final decision. Then 
 we can go back to the fundamental proposition on 
 which aU the old drill-books were based, viz., that all 
 
 ^ The real reason why both in the oavahy and infsintry the prac- 
 tice of charging in peace fell into disuse was because during the 
 long peace after Waterloo promotion became very slow, and the 
 officers grew too old and infirm tokeeptheirleadiufrontof the men; 
 they got jostled about by young excited recruits, and very naturally 
 disliked it very much. Some twenty-five years ago it was con- 
 sidered by many cavalry officers as a quite unheard-of thing to prac- 
 tise the " charge," as they said it unsteadied the horses, whereas 
 the only way to " steady " the horses is to make them gallop to- 
 gether so constantly that they find nothing unusual about the 
 process to get excited about. 
 
INTRODUCTION xxi 
 
 prescribed movements can be carried out on the battle 
 field, that it rests with the judgment of the ~ leader 
 which one to employ in each case as it arises, and that 
 absolute obedience must be rendered to him, because 
 he alone can overlook the whole situation; at any 
 rate no one else can be in an equally good position to 
 do so. 
 
 Then bring home to them the peculiarities of the 
 fighting best adapted for each of the successive stages 
 of a great battle. The careful preliminary skirmishing 
 — to cover the advance to the first fire position — the 
 fire preparation in each of its successive stages, and 
 lastly, the final assault, rally and pursuit, when by a 
 combination of artillery and infantry fire the fire su- 
 periority has been definitely acquired. The men are 
 quite intelligent enough to appreciate the difference in 
 their leading each of these stages requires, and would 
 enjoy their camps very much more if each ended up 
 with a httle excitement, and above all the concentra- 
 tion of reaUy formidable masses. No one who has 
 taken part in the rush of 10,000 men is likely to forget 
 the sensation. 
 
 This is the real cause of the extraordinary popularity 
 of the great manoeuvres on the Continent. In antici- 
 pation every one dreads the terrible fatigues and the 
 downright suffering often entailed on the men by the 
 tremendous marching, but it all vanishes in the glow of 
 enthusiasm evoked by the final charges on the last 
 days ; and the men march back to their quarters or 
 their homes, proud of the fatigues they have overcome, 
 and stni throbbing with the excitement of the last few 
 hours. I have seen it both in France, Germany and 
 
xxii INTRODUCTION 
 
 England, and it is indeed a well-established psychological 
 fact. 
 
 In conclusion, let me call attention to the genesis of 
 this little book in my own mind. I spent the early years 
 of my life in Germany, in districts which had been 
 repeatedly overrun by the French Armies, and heard 
 from the lips of the the survivors — sufficiently numerous 
 in the early sixties of the last century — what the great 
 struggle for German liberation had meant to them. In 
 J893 I began collecting material for a study of the 
 period, but learning in Berhn that the whole of the 
 Archives were then being investigated by the General 
 Staff with a view to the preparation of an authoritative 
 history of those times, I abandoned my plan for the 
 moment ; and only resumed it again lately when the 
 reorganization of our own forces, and the discussion 
 which has grown up in connexion with it, seemed to 
 me to render it advisable to call attention to what has 
 been done under pressure of necessity by other nations, 
 and to show the kind of heroism of which troops fighting 
 for their very existence have been capable of in the not 
 far distant past. Death was the same in those days as 
 jt„.is, .JLOW^ and wounds many times worse.l- _whilst. the 
 losses from disease and privation were greatCTb;^^fa|r 
 lhajr'a^"weTaTC"IiLad'to~Sacounter ol recent years, 
 except in the Bast. Yet these raw levies, averaging 
 less service than our own militia and volunteers, as 
 they actually stood a few weeks ago, sufficed by their 
 self-devotion to completely neutralize and defeat the 
 greatest concentration and perhaps the finest tactical 
 feat of the greatest General of modern times. Want of 
 space prevents my including a complete bibliography of 
 
INTRODUCTION xxiii 
 
 the whole period dealt with, and, moreover, it can be 
 found in many other places already ; but the following 
 are the most recent works on the subject, and are those 
 which I have more particularly followed : — 
 
 Geschichte der Novel Armee im Jahre, 1813. ^enl. 
 
 von Quistorp . 
 Geschichte des Fruhjahrsfeldzuges, 1813. General von 
 
 HoUeben. 1904 . 
 Geschichte des Herbstfeldzuges, 1813. Maior Fried- 
 rich. 19Q5 . 
 KriegsgeschichtUche Einzehtudien herausgegeben vom 
 
 qrossen Genemlstahe. 
 VrkundUche Beibrdge und Forschungen zwt Geschichte 
 des Preussischen Heeres. (iafiBfiialsliabO 
 Bautien. fin1„ fynnparb, "Pffn's, ^ftOI 
 La Manoeuvre de iMzen. Col, de Lanrezac . 
 V Education Militaire de Napoleon. Colin, Paris, 
 1901. 
 
 '. ^jlA'TVAX 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 GiriBEET Pebdicts the Advent op Napoleon, v — ^What 
 
 WAS THE SeOBET OF HIS POWBB ? vi — ClAUSBWITZ FAILED 
 TO SHED LXQHT ON IT, vii — ITS OtITLINB BECONSTRtTCTBD 
 
 FROM Napoleon's Co^ispondence, by French General 
 Staff, 1895-1905, vii — A Psychological Problem of 
 Extreme Interest in Campaign of 1813 .... xiii 
 
 :. s CHAPTER I 
 
 THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 
 
 The Ethical Eight of a Nation to exist, 3 — ^Wherb 
 MiLiTAEY Theory fails, 3-4 — ^What the Student 
 shotjld know, 4 — fundamental conception of 
 Strategy, 4-5 — Frederick the Great's Oblique 
 Order, 5 — ^The Austrians become more cautious, 6— 
 The Echelon Attack , 6 — ^Excellence of each Unit 
 OF Greater Value than Superior Numbers, 7 — 
 Essentials of a Mobile Army, 7 — Frederick the 
 Great's Disregard of them after I^ossbace, 7 — 
 Magnetic Quality of Great Commanders, 8— gAusa 
 OF Prussian Decline, 8 — System op Eecruitino in 
 Eighteenth Century, 9 — ^Rbvoluhonaby Propaganda 
 IN Prussia, 10 — ^Ruchel's Speech, 10 — Causes of 
 Defeats nv vmr. AT.T.nta 11 — SoHAENHOEST and the 
 
 XXV 
 
xxvi TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 •H 
 
 PAGE 
 
 SpnaT OF THE " Nation m Asms," 11— Absence of this 
 Spirit KUiNED Phussla, 12 — Foundation of an Officer's 
 Training, 12— CompuI/SORY Service, and Knbsb- 
 bbck's Memobandtjm, 12-13 — Frederick the Great's 
 . Speech at Potsdam, 13-14 — Co^gsmoN_OF_ARMY_AT_ 
 Jena, 15 — Defect s of Divisiona l Organization , 16 — 
 Battle of Jena, 17 — Reason why Frederick the 
 Great's Army ceased to exist, 17 — ^Aftbb Conse- 
 quences of Jena, 18 — Prussian Generals, Fear of 
 Eesponsibility, 18 — False Humanitarianism, 19 — Von 
 der Goltz's " Von Jena bis Prbussischb Eylau," 19 — 
 schabnhorst and blttcher's attitude, 20 — ^frederick 
 William IV and the Russians, 20 — After the Treaty 
 
 OF Tilsit, 21 — So harnhorst's Scheme the Startino 
 
 III ~— ^«^™-^»™» 
 
 PflgcsT_ OF Modern^Gbrman^Army, 21 — Soharnhorst's 
 Scheme {eon.), 22 — Contusion of Reformers, 22 — Soharn- 
 horst's Idea of a National Guard, 23 — Efforts of 
 Reformers to circumvent Napoleonic Decree, 23 — 
 Custom of " Krumpebs," 23 — ^Napoleon's Attempt 
 to force Was. between Prussia and Russia, 24 — His 
 Threat to occupy Prussia forces Alliance between 
 Prussia and France, 25 — ^Nucleus of New Prussian 
 Army 25 
 
 ■A CHAPTER n 
 
 THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 
 
 .§X§™M_0F RBORUmNO UNTIL THB_REV0LUT10N^ 29^PIRIT 
 
 OF French Army until 1812 , 29-30^ourdan's Law 
 0F~ Conscription, 30 — The Central Feature of Napo- 
 leonio^Warfare and the Conclusions drawn from 
 it, 30-r31— Composition of Grand Army, 1812, 31— 
 The " Cohorts," 31 — ^Napoleon and the Contingents 
 of 1808-9-10, 32 — Provisional Battalions, their 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS xxvii 
 
 Dbili. aud Maeching, 33— Sta te of the Abtiixeby , 
 
 CAVAUtY AND Staff, 33 — Taotioal EVOLTJTIOy , 34 — 
 
 Gbowth op the Army Corps, 35 — The Best Gttabantbb 
 FOB Effioteitcy, 35 — D bcentbauzat iom' of Commaitd, 
 AiTD EKQSMQ-gaJEcogOH y ^ TmB , 35-36 — Essential 
 Factors of Cayaijs y TBAiNiNa , 36 — Differbnoe 
 between I^bderick the Great and Napoleon, 36 — 
 Napoleon's Mtt.ttaby Education, 36-37 — French Mtu- 
 
 TARY AuTHOEITIBS IN HIS TOTJTH, AND THEIR LEADINO 
 
 Characteristics, 37-38 — ^Thb Fbactioe of the Eiqh- 
 TBBNTH Century, 38 — The Ulm Campaign, 39 — ^Why 
 Napoleon cbitshbd Mack, 39 — ^Austbrutz and its 
 Lesson, 39 — " The Independent Will Powbb of 
 the Adversary," 40 — Reason fob Napoleon's " Bat- 
 talion Square," 40 — The Attack and the " Fixed 
 Point," 41 — ^The Tactical Errors of the Prussians, 
 41 — " Win the Battle First," 42 — General Concep- 
 tion OF Strategical Man(euveino, 42-^Characteristio 
 of Napoleon's System, 42 — ^Its Importance, 43 — 
 Strength of the Old Revolutionary Army, 43 — ^Thb 
 ^MT OF the F benct Infantry aft bb Pol^ jp, 43 — 
 Napoleon's BAT-n-E Tactics . 43 — ^Napoleon and " Human 
 Sympathy," 44 — TTta Instinct that the " Battle was 
 BiPE," 44 — ^Association of Infantry and ARiniBRY 
 IN Permanent Divisions, 44 — The Cavalry of the 
 Allies in 1813, 44 — ^Napoleon's Fall into Over-Con- 
 FiDBNCE, 45 — Note, Charge of the Rhattob Horse . 45 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 
 
 Thb Wreck of thb Grand Abmy, 49 — Napoleon in Paris, 
 Dboembeb 19, 1812, 49— The Empeeob's Orders to 
 
 d 
 
xxviii TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 DAVO-&T, 50 — RliPOBT OF THE Q.M.6. OF KONIQSBBBQ 
 
 ON Napoleon's beaten Abmy, 50 — Convention ov 
 Tatjeogqen, 51 — ^Yoeok's Subebndbb as told in 
 Von Wranqel's Memoirs, 51 — ^The late Emperor Wn,- 
 liam's Letter of May 15, 1869, gives another Vbbsion 
 op the Surrender, 52 — Delight of Prussia, 53 — Chae- 
 
 AOTBR OF THE KiNO OF PRUSSIA, 53 — REFORMS OF STEIN 
 
 AND Hardenbbbg, 54 — ^Napoleon's Opinion of Yobck's 
 Action, 54 — ^Testimony of Clausewitz regarding 
 Yorok's Action, 55 — ^The King leaves Beblin fob 
 Bbeslau, 55 — His Letter to Napoleon re Treaty 
 Obligations, 56 — ^Meeting of Estates of East Prussia 
 at konigsbebq, 65-56— frederick william and the 
 Russians, 56 — ^Difficulties of Prussian Reorganiza- 
 tion, 57 — Schaenhoest's Plan for a Landwehr, 58 — 
 King's Permission to form Volunteer Corps, 59 — 
 LtJtzow Free Corps, 59 — Foreign Battalion " Von 
 Reusz," 59 — ^Volunteer Rbplbs, " Von Reiohb," 59 — 
 Hellwig's Partisan Cavalry, 59 — ^Von Schill's 
 Hussars, 59 — State of Troops at End of March, 60 — 
 Prussians alive to Necessity for Personal Servicb, 
 60-61 — The Chief Differencb between Feancb and 
 Germany re Civil and Military Administbation, 
 61 — England's Response to Thbeat of Invasion, 
 61 — ^Failure of Tugbndbund to bouse True 
 Pateiotism, 61 — Difficulty of fdiding New Officebs 
 
 FOE THE FOECES, 62— gUPPLY OF WiE^PONS AND_gUN3, 
 
 62 — ^Maewitz on Real Secebt of Excellence of Old 
 Febdbriokian Cavalry, 63 — English SuBsiDgs, 63 — The 
 Russians, 63 — The Grand Army, 64 — ^Murat hands his 
 Command over to Pbjnoe EuoSine, 64 — The Grand 
 Abmy {con.), 65 — Re ynier's Corps — Durutte — Schwabt- 
 zbnbeeg's Command, 66 — ^Peince EuoJine oeganizbs his 
 FouB Divisions, 65 — PBicfOB Eugene's Retreat to 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS xxix 
 
 PAQB 
 
 Fbaukfobt, 65 — ^Napoleon's Letter to EuaiiNE, 65 — 
 The Old School op Steatboists and Napoleon's 
 Depiancb op thbib Theoetbs, 65-67 — ^Napoleon's 
 Comments on the Abandonment op Beblin, 67-68 
 — ExtqJsnb has Little Choice op Line op Retreat, 
 69 — Emperor's Reproaches apter his Report, 69 — 
 Napoleon on the Defence op the Elbe, 70-72 — 
 EuoiiNE's Mistake in withdrawing Davo'&t prom 
 Hamburg, etc., 72 — Napoleon's Opinion thereon, 72 — 
 Emperor's Plan Adopted, (73 — ^Alarming News prom 
 Hamburg, 73 — ^Napoleon's Reproof to EttgJinb, 73 — 
 Combat op M6ckbrn, 74 — ^The Allies' Sttccess, 74 — 
 Contrast op EuaiiNE's and Napoleon's Action and 
 Orders , 75 — Viceroy moves to Lower Saale, 76 — 
 The Allies call a Halt for Improvement op Com- 
 munications, 76 — ^Rumour op Napoleon's Advance 
 startles them into Activity 76 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD— CONCENTRATION OF 
 GRAND ARMY— OPERATIONS TO BATTLE OF LUTZEN 
 
 Composition op Grand Army, 79-80 — The I Corps, 80 — 
 The II Corps, 81— The III Corps, 82— The IV Corps, 82 
 —The V Corps, 83— The Vt Corps, 83— The VII Corps, 
 84— Thb XI Corps, 84,— The XII Corps, 85— The 
 Guards (Morties), 85— The Cavalry, 86— The Em- 
 peror's Army on May 1, 1813, 86-87— ExraAOR DiNiUtY 
 Results of UNPRomsiNa Mate mal, 87 — ^Momke's 
 Definition of the Art of War, 88 — ^Napoleon plans 
 A Raid on Bebun, 88 — Chief Criticisms against this — 
 Emfbrob's Reason foe abandohinq the Idea, 89 — 
 Action op the Alues, 90 — Positions on April 11, 
 
XXX TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 1813, 91 — Orders foe CoNCBNTEATioif, 91 — Napoleon's 
 Careful REcoNiifAissANCES, 92 — Cavalry Raids by 
 THE Allies, 93 — ^Na poleon's Or ders. 94 — -BERTm^j 
 EijgraDA3TON__0F jraEM,_94 — Supply Service, 94 — ^Napo- 
 leon's liETTBB TO DUROO, 95 — COMMUNICATIONS (LDSTES 
 
 or), 95— BLENCH Positions, April 30, 1813, 96— Napo- 
 leon's Expedient to Compensate fob Deficiency op 
 Cavalry, 96 — ^Napoleon's Orders, May 1, 1813, 97 — 
 Cavalry of Allies repulsed, 98 — Emperor at LtJTZEN, 
 May 1, 98 — C omment s on the Emperor's Disposition 
 OF HIS Troops fob Battle of Lutzbn, 99 — The Battle 
 OF LtJTZEN, 100 — Emperor's Orders on the Battle- 
 field,' 100 — Movements of the Allies, 101-102 — 
 Orders of the Allied Generals on May 1, 1813, 102- 
 103 — Comments, 103 — ^Attack by the Allies, 103 — 
 Prussians carry Gross Gorschen, 104 — Napoleon 
 ON ^B.JBuTLBmLp, 104-^Hig, Effect on the Troops, 
 104-105 — Charges of Cavalry and Cossacks on 
 Marmont's Infantry, 105 — Napoleon's B eKjY to 
 
 RBQTTBJT_F0R^_ItemFOEgB^NTS, 105 — 'JhB^^ObISOAL 
 
 Moment for Napoleon, 106 — The Emperor raijlibs 
 jps TRopps , 106 — ^Napoleon's Psychological Influence 
 AND Heroism of French Troops, 106 — ^Napoleon's De- 
 cisive Attack, 106 — ^Retreat of the Allied Cavalry, 
 107 — Comments on the Conduct of the Prussians at 
 Jena and LStzen, 107 — Coolness and Courage of 
 Prussian Army at LtJtzen, 108 — The Blow to the 
 Imperial Prestige, 108 — ^Thb EtGHinsra Quality of 
 the French Troops, 108 — Comment s on the Battle, 
 109— I^,Fundambntal Conception of the Old Linh 
 Tactics , 110 — The Letter of T HE^^RESjgRVBs " Fqbm 
 sssut RULES, lll^teB EssENfflEOFTHEjEHOLE. Master,. 
 Ill — ^Losses as oompabbd to Seven Years' War . 111-112 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxi 
 
 FAOB 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 FROM LUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 
 
 The Allies decide to oontinub Retreat, 115 — Feenoh 
 nr PTTEStnT, 115 — Obdbe dtj Joub, May 6, 1813, 116 — 
 The Viceroy's Incurable Slowuess, 116 — ^Abuse of 
 Pbivate Tbauspobt, 117 — Empbeor's Letter to Prince 
 EtroiiNE (The Viceroy) amee Colditz, May 4, 117 — 
 Reports received on Night or May 4, 118 — ^A New 
 Army under Ney, 118 — ^Thb Empbeob oottnts on 
 Saxon Co-opbbation, 119 — ^Allies contest French 
 Advance, 119 — French Army enter Dresden, 119 — 
 Rate oe March ing op Feench Teoops, 120 — Passage 
 OF the Elbe, 120 — Affair of Neustadt, 121 — Passage 
 AT Briesnitz, 121 — ^KiNQ OF Saxony's Oedee to Thiel- 
 man at Toegatt, 121 — Occupation of Toesau by French, 
 122 — ^Retreat of the Allies, 122 — ^Napoleon's Order 
 
 to PMNCE EuGiSNB TO START FOR ITALY, 123 — ThE 
 
 Aemy OF THE Elbe broken up, 123 — Composition of 
 Grand Army on May 15, 1813, 123-124 — Dresden as a 
 Base, 125 — Routes de L'ABMiiE, 125 — Comments taken 
 FROM Col. Lanrbzao on the Situation, 125 — Pursuit 
 OF the Allies, 126 — The Emperor's Letter to Ney, 
 126 — Comments on Ney's Orders, 127 — ^Action at 
 Wbissig near Stolpen, 127 — Russians withdraw to 
 blschofswbeda, 127 — disposition of iv and vi coeps, 
 128 — French Dlffioultibs of Supply, 128 — Cossack 
 Raids, 128 — Oedbes for May 14, 1813, 129 — Instruc- 
 tions to Ney, 129 — Beethibb's Mistak e about Napo- 
 leojt's Oedee to Ney, 130— ;^a.^M?EE0E., issues 
 Contradictoby Oedbes to Nby, 130 — Position of Nby's 
 Teoops"on Moening of May 18, 131— Napoleon's 
 Lettbb to Beethiee on May 18, 131— Comment , 13^133 
 — Counter Attack by the Allies, 133 — Ney saved by 
 
xxxii TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Obdebs to Maboh on Klix, 1 34 — ^Napoleon beoonnoitees 
 Bautzen, 134 — Disposition of Allies' Teoops, 134^135 — 
 The Empeeoe's DuFicirLT Problem, 135 — His Obdebs 
 FOR THE Battle of Bautzen, 136^Battle op Bautzen, 
 137 — Slackening of Prussian Resistance, 138 — 
 Napoleon's Order for Final Advance, 138 — ^The 
 Allies' Opportunity, 138 — Napoleon's Second Failuee, 
 138 — The French Pursuit, 139 — Rbyniee asks fob a 
 Halt, 140 — Death of Dueoc, 140 — Dissensions among 
 THE Allies, 140 — The Surprise of Haynau, 141 — The 
 Armistice, 141 — Comments ..... 142-144 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE ARMISTICE— FRENCH PREPARATIONS FOR THE 
 AUTUMN CAMPAIGN 
 
 The French Army in August, 147 — " Les Rbpeaotaibes " 
 (note), 147 — Composition of the French Army at the 
 Close op Armistice, 148 — Garrisons of Elbe Foe- 
 TBESSES, 149 — Second Line Teoops, 149 — Garrisons 
 op Fortresses in Poland and Germany, 149 — Quality 
 OF THE Troops, 149 — Armies op the Allies, 150 — The 
 Pbusslan Aemy, 151 — The Landwehb, 151 — Obganiza- 
 TioN OF Landwehb, 162-153 — Russian Abmy, 153 — The 
 Austeian Army, 154 — The Field States in August, 
 1813, 154 — The Swedish Contingent, 155 — The Anglo- 
 Gebman Continqbnt, 155 — Note on Stamina of Teoops 
 standing up to Heavy Losses, 155 — The Mecklenburg 
 
 CONTINQENT, 156 — ThE COMMAND OP THE ALLIED AeMIES, 
 
 156 — Field-Marshal Prince Schwabzbnbbeg, 157 
 
 Chief op Staff Radbtzsky, 157 — Langbnau's Effect 
 ON Conduct op Operations, 167 — Comments, 158 
 
 MORBAU AND JOMINI, 158— BLiJOHEE, 159— YORCK, 160 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxiii 
 
 FAGS 
 
 — Langbeon, 160 — Saoken, 160 — Bbenadottb, 161 — 
 Agreement of Trachtbnbeeq, 161 — ^Its Caeddjal 
 Pbotciple, 161 — ^Napoleon's Elans, 162-163 — Comments, 
 
 163 — ^MaBMONT'S IiBTTEE TO NaPOLEON, 164 — I^ENOH 
 
 Positions on Conolitsion oe Abmistice, 164-165 — 
 The Situation from Standpoint os Stbatbgical 
 Criticism, 165 — ^Napoleon's Reply to St. Cyb, 165 — 
 Comments, 166 — Magnitude of the Alubs' Decision, 
 166 — Night of August 11, 1813, 166 — Order of Battle 
 of the Allied Armies, 167-170 — Comments . . 171-172 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 KATZBACH— DRESDEN— KULM 
 
 Blucheb's Reason fob iNFBiNGiNa the Lbttbe of Abmis- 
 tice, 176 — Prussia breaks the Tbuob, 176— Want of. 
 Experience in Prussian Staff, 176— Bluchbr and 
 Gnbisenau, 176— Blucher's Retreat, 176 — ^Yohok's 
 Complaint to the King, 177 — Blucher's Position, 
 177 — ^Lesson drawn feom Battle of Katzbach 
 (note) 177 — Rising of Katzbach River favours 
 Blucher, 177-8 — ^Napoleon on Intebiob Lines, 178 — 
 Position of his Troops a Model foe All Timb, 
 178 — Disadvantages of the " Defensive," 178 — 
 Reason foe Napoleon's Desibino Advance against 
 LBiFzfo, 179 — Oeder to Maodonald, 179 — Disadvan- 
 tages of Imperfectly Train ed Staff, 179 — Napoleon 
 retuens to GtOELiTZ, 179 — ^Plans of the Alubs, 180 — 
 Discussion of Heads of Allibd Cobps, 180 — Bohemian 
 Abmy changes Dibection, 181 — The Allied Monarchs 
 
 AND PeINCE SoHWARZENBERG ABOVE RaCKNITZ LONO 
 
 Discussion, 181 — ^Time bequibed to draft Orders 
 AFTER Decision, and Comment, 181-182 — Effect of 
 
xxxiv TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Napoleon's Abbival at Dresden, 182 — ^Mystery of 
 Signal Gun eob Attaokinq Dresden, 182 — ^Napoleon 
 AT GoBLiTz, 182 — Contact with Bohemian Advance 
 ON May 22, 182 — ^Napoleon's Views on the Situation 
 AND Orders to Macdonald and St. Cyb, 183 — Calls 
 UP the Guards — Letter to St. Cyb, 183 — Letter to 
 RoQNiAT, Chief Enoinebr, 183 — Letter to Van- 
 DAMME, May 23, 184 — ^Napoleon's Great Design, 184 
 — ^Letter to Marbt in Paris, 184 — ^Ridbs to Bautzen 
 AND Stolpbn, 185 — Unwelcome News at Stolpbn, 
 183 — First Overt Act betraying Spirit of his German 
 
 CONTINOENT, 185 — OrDBBS TO DISMOUNT WeSTPHALIAN 
 
 Cavalry, 186— Gourgaud's News from Dresden, 186 — 
 Napoleon's Reso lution fails, 186 — Ebtubns ,to 
 Dbbsden, 186^0n e of thb mo st Rbmabkable Marches 
 
 ONjREOfflRD, 186 — EXTRAORDINABILY GoOD PbRFOEM^ 
 ANCE OF THB YOUNG !PbENCH CONSCRIPTS, 187 — BATTLE 
 
 OF Dresden, 187 — ^Napoleon's Arrangement for Great 
 
 COUNTERSTROKB AGAINST ALLIES, 188 — ItS BfFEOT 
 
 only Local, 188 — Napoleon's Letter to CAMSAoiiREs, 
 189 — ^His Fear fob Macdonald, 189 — ^Napoleon's 
 
 Pursuit, 190 — Suffebings of Allied Abmibs, 190 
 
 Vandamme at Pibna, 190 — ^Vandamme defeats EUGiiNE 
 of Wubtbmbbbg on the Elbe, 190 — ^Macdonald'S 
 Defeat at Katzbaoh, 191 — Escape of the Allies, 191 
 — Duke EuoiiNE and Osteemann, 191 — Ostbbmann's 
 
 OBSTQfAOY, 191 — ^EZNG OF PRUSSIA TURNS OSTEriittANN 
 
 BACK TO Pribsten, 192 — The Tsar also grasps Danger 
 
 OF the Allies and helps them to avoid Defeat, 192 
 
 Oollorbdo's Austrian Corps, 193 — The Battle of 
 KviM, 193 — Capture of Vandamme and his Staff, 194 
 — ^Kleist's Corps and their Fortunate Intbevbntion 
 AT THE Battle of Kulm, 194— Comments . .195-200 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxv 
 
 CHAPTER Vni PA0K 
 
 GROSS BEEREN— DENNEWITZ— WARTENBURG 
 
 Bkfobt ibom Oudinot, 203 — ^Napoleon's Notes on the 
 Situation, 203 — ^Napoleon's Resolve to Maeoh on 
 Beblot, 204 — ^Napoleon hears of Disaster at Kulm, 
 204 — Baron Pain's Dbsobiption of Napoleon's Recep- 
 tion OF THIS News, 205 — ^Von Geksdobf's Comment 
 on Napoleon, 203 — ^Movement on Berlin Suspended, 
 206 — Obdbbs to Maodonald and Ney, 206 — Pbepajba- 
 TioN OF Troops about Dresden to meet Allied Offen- 
 sive, 206^Obdkbs to St. Cyb, Viotob, Dukes of Ragusa, 
 Tbeviso, and Latoub-Mauboubg, 206 — Lobau com- 
 mands Vandammb's Wbecked Corps, 206 — Napoleon 
 
 DECIDES on HoOERSWERDA AS A CENTRAL POSITION, 206 
 
 — Orders to Ney, 206 — ^Necessity for Rapid Action, 
 206 — Comment s on Above, 206 — ^Ney's Movements, 
 209 — Battle of Dennewitz, 209 — Tauentzien and 
 
 his IiAIfDWEHB, THEIR LESSON TO US, 209 — ^NeY AND 
 
 Oudi wot-^^ffect of Latter' s Personal Bad Temper 
 — ^Its Punishment, 210 — Ney's Command ceases to 
 Exist, 211 — Napoleon's Obdebs t o Romtiat, abb__ 
 
 MaSTEBPIEOES, ^O his lNSTBUCTipNSJCO_ST;J>B, 211 — 
 
 Napoleon joins Macdonald, 211 — Napoleon at 
 Bautzen, 212 — His Euey with Sebastiaiti, 212 — 
 Blu'Cheb bbtbeats on Lobau, 213 — ^Napoleon Returns 
 TO Dresden, 213 — Comments, 213-214 — ^Napoleon's 
 Order to the Army at Bautzen,] 214 — Emperor 
 dissatisfied with Intelligen ce Service, 215 — The 
 Bohemian Army, 215 — Cost of Abortive Expedition, 
 215 — Breakdown ,_0F French Commissariat, 216 — ' 
 Briqandaqb of Cossacks, 216— Results of Allied Vic- 
 tobies AT Kulm — Gboss Beebbn, Katzbaoh, 216 — 
 MoNABOHs' Caix ON Blttchbb, 217 — ^Want of Oboanized 
 AuuxD Co-OPBBATioN, 217 — Bbbnadotte, 217 — Comment, 
 
xxxvi TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAOE 
 218 — BlUCHER'S AtTTOQBAPH LETTER TO KtJESBBBCK 
 
 (Teanslation dt Note), 218 — Liliensteist's Verbal 
 Instbtjctions, 219 — Problem of Bernadotte's Con- 
 DtrcT, 219 — UsruER-ouBEBNTS of Intriotje in Allied 
 Armies, 220 — Bohemian Army advances, 220 — Ritmoub 
 OE Napoleon's Advance against Blucheb, 220-221 — 
 Allied HEADguABiERs' Amazinq Request, 221^-Napo- 
 LEON REJOINS Si. Cye, 221 — ^Napolbon on the Geibrs- 
 BEEG, 221 — French Reconnaissances on the Eve 
 op Contemplated Battle op Teplitz, 221 — ^Impos si- 
 bi lity OT_MAN(EUVRINa HIS AsTILLERy, 222 — COMMENTS, 
 
 222 — ^Napoleon's Obdbrs prom Dresden, 223^ 
 Bernadotte, 223 — Renewed Advance op Bohemian 
 Aemy, 224 — Napoleon's Reconnoitring from Nollen- 
 DOEF ON September 17 and 18, 1813, 224 — Obders to 
 Guards — His Return to Pirn a, 224 — ^Austrians 
 
 iSUEPEISE AND OAPTUEE FbBIBEEG, 224 — CONDITION OP 
 THE Fbench Tboops Deploeablb, 225 — ^Napoleon's 
 Losses in Men, Ammunition and Matbeial, 225 — 
 Napoleon eetuens to Debsden, Septembee 21, 225 — 
 Joins Macdonald on 22nd, 226— Positions op Feench 
 Aemy on Septembee 27, 226-227^Empeeor Reorga- 
 nizes Army, 227 — Decree op September 27, 1813, 227 
 —Orders to Mueat, 228— Comments, 228— Onj,,^avb 
 Dbpbot op .IJapolbon's Masteelx.Dispositions,-228 — 
 Blucher's Movements, 228-229— One op Blttchbr's 
 Bedrock Facts, 229— Novelty of Silesian Army's 
 Maech deceives Napoleon, 229— Blucher's Maeoh 
 Undisturbed, 230 — Attempts to force the Passage of 
 THE Elbe by the Allies, 230— Bbrtrand's Provision 
 for Defence and his Mistakes, 230 — Prussian Ignor- 
 ance of the Country, 230— Fighting across the 
 Elbe, 231 — Prussians find Unsuspected Fords and 
 TURN French Right, 231— State op Yoeck's Corps . 231 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxyii 
 
 FAOB 
 
 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII 
 Strength op Febnch Army, end of September, 1813 . 233-234 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 LEIPZIG 
 
 Positions op the Silesian Army — The North Army (Bbr- 
 nadottb) — The Bohemian Army's Strength — Napo- 
 leon at Brbsdbn, his War Strength, 237— Comments . 
 237 — Defects of Dresden Position, 238 — ^Napoleon's 
 Orders to the Troops, 238 — Napoleon's Letter to 
 Mabmont (October 7), 239 — ^Napoleon's Orders to 
 St. Cyr, 239 — Napoleon's CotmTER Order to St. 
 Cye, 240 — Comments, 240 — Bltjcher and Bernadottb, 
 241 — Their Determination to march on Leipzig, 241 
 — Orders to Sackbn, Langeron and Yorck, 241 — 
 Thb North Army, 242 — Danger op Napoleon's Lea vino 
 Dresden dawns upon the Allies, 242 — Allied Head- 
 quarters discuss Emergencies, 242 — Blucheb — 
 Bernadottb — Von Ltlibnstein, Interview between 
 Bernadottb and Von Lilienstbin, 243 — Bernadottb 
 suggests both Abmibs rbvbrt to Saale Position, 
 244 — Bluoher accedes — Silbsian Army escapes Napo- 
 leon, 244 — Bad Scouttng of French Cavalry, 244 — 
 Napoleon's Orders for October 11, 1813, 244 — 
 Orders half EXEgCTJa-^RY Half-starved Troops, 
 245- ^omment s, 245-247 — Napoleon's Concentration 
 on Leipzig, 247 — His Note to Marmont, October 12, 
 247 — ^His Doubt as to Tenability op Murat's Position, 
 248 — The Silbsian Army -r- Signs op Bbrnadottb's 
 Anxiety m Correspondence with Bluchbr, 248 — 
 Bernadottb loses his Head after Ney's Attack on 
 Dessau, 249 — The Consequence of this Aberration, 
 
xxxviii TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 249 — Blttoher's Coolness — His Opposition Plans, 
 249 — Beenadottb follows Blijcher's Lead, 249 — 
 The Bohemian Abmy, 250 — Schwabzenberg's Recon- 
 NAiSANCE and Obdbbs, 250t-Stobm evoked by his 
 Obdee, 250 — Battle oe Leipzig inevitablb, 250 — 
 Wittgenstein's Reconnaisanob, 250 — The Action 
 OE Libbertwolkwitz, 251 — Mtjbat's Geeat Cavalby 
 Chaeqes, 251 — Reason why Napoleon took vv Deeec-.^ 
 tive Position eob Battle of Leipzig, 251 — Schwabzen- 
 bebg's Oedees foe Battle, 251 — Exteaoedinaey 
 Effect of Rblyino on Langbnatj's Local Knowledge 
 OF Gboond, 251 — Defects of the Disposition of Allied 
 Teoops, 252 — Peotest of Russian Staff, 252 — The 
 Empeboe Alexandbb's Interview with Schwabzbn- 
 ebrg, 252 — Alexander's Disposition of Russian 
 Forces, 252 — ^Napoleon's Abeival at Leipzig, 253 — ■ 
 Pboblem of Schwabzbnbeeg's Conduct — His Lbttee 
 TO HIS Wife, 253 — Contrast between Napoleon and 
 
 SoHWAiRZENBBRG, 254 — BaTTLB OF LEIPZIG, 254 — 
 
 Typical Piece of Bad Staff Management, 255 — 
 NAP0LEqN];s^lNSTRUC33;QNS..TO^ Berthiee, 255 — The 
 Moment of the Attack, 255 — Accounts of First 
 Engagements read like Early Battles of 1870, 256 — 
 Maodonald's Corps, 256 — Bordesoullb's Cavalry 
 Chaegb, 256 — Countee Attack by Allied Cavalby, 
 256 — French Squadeons charge to the Rescue, 257 
 — The Austrian Attack on Connewitz, 257 — The 
 R eason of N apoleon's Defeat, 257 — Comments, 257 — 
 Patbiotio Enthusiasm of At,t,ted~Armib3, 258 — ^Night 
 AFTER the Battle, 258 — Battle of Mockern, 259 — 
 Maemont's Defeat, 259 — Desobiption of Battle, 260 
 — Comments, 260-261 — Napoleon's ^ laCDNeBEoaow— of 
 
 JjYUTiM^S__POTITION,^_261r:7REASOgS^ FOB NaPOLEON's 
 
 Dbosion _io. resume the Battle on^ TffiSLJJSi^ISB^^- 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS xxxix 
 
 PEBmnNABT Attempt to bbopbn Diplomatic Rela- 
 tions, 262 — Allies' Refttsal — Bltjoher's Attack on 
 NoBTH-wEST of Leipzio, 262 — Disposition of Napo- 
 leon's Troops, 262 — Ootobee 16, 1813, 263 — Strength 
 OF French Army, 263 — ^Vicissitudes of the Struggle, 
 263 — Napoleon sends out Orders fob Retbeat by 
 Linden AU, 11 a.m., October 18, 263-264 — ^Thb Allies 
 CABBY Leipzig by Stobm, October 19, 264 — Comments, 
 264-267 — Why Napo leon lost t he Campaign o f 1813 , 
 267 — ^Necessity of Studying the very Soul of a 
 Nation, 267 — Comments, 268-269 — Test by which the 
 Pate of Nations is decided 270 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS xli 
 
 LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS 
 
 1. Napoleon's C!oncbnteation on the Saale, \ / 
 *\ 
 
 AKD Movements to Battle of LtStzen, 
 Mat 2, 1813 . . . . 
 
 2. Napoleon's Concbntbation on Bautzen, May 
 
 21 and 22, 1813, AND PuBsriT to date op 
 Abmistice 
 
 3. Operations prom end of Abmistioe to end 
 
 OP August, 1813 
 
 4. CJONCBNTEATION OF ALLIES ON LEIFZIO IN OCTO- 
 
 1 
 
 
 6. Diagram of Napoleon's Movements, August- 
 October, 1813 
 
 6. Diagram op Napoleon's Man<euvbes at Jena, 
 
 October 12 and 13, 1806 
 
 7. Battle of Dresden, August 26 and 27, 1813 
 
 8. Battle op Lutzen, May 2, 1813 
 
 9. Battle op Bautzen, May 20 and 21, 1813 . 
 10. Battle op Leipzig, October 16, 1813 . . / 
 
 ■3 
 
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 The Prussian Army in 1813 
 
 In the struggle for the survival of the fittest amongst 
 the Nations, ever in progress around us, and of which 
 " War " is the name we apply to its most intense mani- 
 festation, the battlefield is the last Court of Appeal. 
 Its decision is for the time being final, and it is right 
 that it should be so, for each Army as it stands facing 
 the other is the ultimate expression of the ethical right 
 of the Nation it represents to continue to exist. Its 
 numbers reflect the spirit of its race, its skill the sense 
 of duty guiding that spirit, and its equipment in every 
 detail reveals the standard of probity guiding the daily 
 relations of its individual units. Is the Nation high- 
 spirited ? then its soldiers will be numerous and wilhng ; 
 is its sense of duty high ? they will be well trained, 
 well led, and ready to die at their Commander's word ; 
 is the standard of honesty high, then they wiU be well 
 fed, and there will be no cartridges loaded with saw- 
 dust in their pouches, and no brown paper soles on 
 their boots. 
 
 History sufficiently proves the truth of these ele- 
 mentary propositions and their converse, and it is pre- 
 cisely because military theory has so consistently 
 neglected them in the past that its conclusions for so 
 
THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 long have failed to commend themselves to the common- 
 sense of our coimtrjmien, whose own evolution has 
 impressed upon them, often with dramatic intensity, 
 the absurdity of the contention that the fate of Nations 
 can be reduced to a question of the relations of angles, 
 bases and the counting of heads. 
 
 For this reason the student of a campaign should 
 set himself to acquire, as a first step in his task, as com- 
 plete a knowledge as possible of the nature of the two 
 contending forces, and the circumstances which con- 
 ditioned their growth. It is not enough to be able to 
 write down with accuracy the exact number of men, 
 horses and guns each Commander may have had avail- 
 able at a particular time or place ; the essential thing 
 is to reaUze whether, having regard to the composition 
 and previous history of his command, the General 
 had a right to expose his men at that time and place 
 to the risks which hostile colKsion invariably entails. 
 Funda- driven two Armies of approximate 
 mental equaUty marching to meet one another from 
 
 rfTf^ate^P^"^^^®^ ^^^^ (*^<^ ^* ^^ always the first care 
 of a General to make his base parallel to 
 that of his adversary, whatever the relations' of the 
 imaginary lines indicating his frontier may be,) then 
 neither can manoeuvre so as to threaten his adversary's 
 communications without exposing his own, nor can 
 he endeavour to surroimd his enemy without running 
 the risk of seeing his own Army cut in two. One risk 
 or the other, one or both Commanders must accept to 
 bring about a result at all, but the result alone decides 
 whether or not they were justified in accepting the 
 risk. 
 
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 5 
 
 This result, however, depends, as akeady pointed 
 out, on the relative fighting value of the two Armies, 
 and since this relation may vary from year to year, 
 even from hour to hour, it is sufficiently apparent that 
 every human being will seek to guarantee himself 
 against the chance of proving mistaken in his estimate 
 by discovering some method which wiU ensure a suffi- 
 cient margin of superior force (moral, material or nu- 
 merical) at a point of his own selection. - 
 
 If his enemy will only remain perfectly stiU, as he 
 does, for instance, in a permanent fortress, or in less 
 degree in an entrenched position, the solution is simple 
 and can be applied with almost unfailing regularity 
 time after time, as in the formal attack of an old- 
 fashioned fortress in Vauban's days. But the matter 
 assxunes a totally different aspect when the enemy is 
 free to move also, and the difficulty increases till it 
 becomes insurmountable when your adversary can 
 maintain an average rate of speed about twice as great 
 as your own. 
 
 Now this is precisely what occurred during 
 the Great's t^^ period of hostilities which culminated 
 
 Oblique in the Seven Ye.ars' War. The Prussians, 
 handled by a single resolute man respon- 
 sible to no one but himself, gained the time their adver- 
 saries spent in making up their minds, and devoted it 
 to marching. As the whole ethical standard of their 
 Nation was intrinsically high, the King could exact a 
 correspondingly higher standard of training and discip- 
 line from his men, hence when the two Armies met 
 numerical superiority was no longer required along 
 the whole front of battle, but the result could be 
 
THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 obtained by local superiority only. This was the origin 
 of Frederick the Great's " obUque " order, and when 
 once a succession of victories had been won by the 
 Prussians, because they kept the spirit of this form 
 before their minds' eyes, (in practice the letter was never 
 quite realised), the Austrians became more and more 
 cautious, and taking to entrenchments to avoid the 
 risk of surprise always threatening them through the 
 greater mobility of the Prussians, the task of the latter 
 became ever easier until the idea was stereotyped 
 throughout their Army, that it was the form of the 
 manoeuvre which decided, and not the fighting. 
 
 This idea brought others, equally detrimental to true 
 efficiency, in its train. The success of the manoeuvres 
 ultimately depended on the superior fighting quality of 
 that body of troops which came first into contact with 
 the enemy. If, for instance, the Austrians at A. shot 
 
 yAUSTRIANS. 
 
 straighter and faster than their assailants, the latter's 
 
 line would be broken through, no matter what its length 
 
 (or in other words, its numbers), and through this gap 
 
 The cavalry might pour and work what mis- 
 
 fechelon chief it pleased. To remedy this the idea 
 
 of the " Echelon " arose, for in this formation 
 
 it is evident that the _units not j jirgnjjyaflectej^ 
 
 b y^ the attack would still remain under control , and 
 
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 7 
 
 this being an obvious improvement on the original 
 model, it took root in the minds of the many, and 
 became a veritable shibboleth of victory. 
 
 In either case, however, since it was clearly impossi- 
 ble to predict in advance on which particular unit ol , 
 the force the brunt of the fighting was to fall, it fol- 
 lowed that the excellence of each unit in the essential 
 task of man killing, i.e. the dehvery of the most rapid 
 fire from the greatest number of musk§ts, and the bayo- 
 net attack, came to be looked upon as of far greater 
 importance in the decision than superiority of numbers. 
 
 To attain the standard of excellence held to be re- 
 quisite to fulfil these requirements took a great deal 
 of time, and also limited the recruiting area, for men, 
 say of 5 ft. 2 in., were out of place in a bayonet charge. 
 Hence the finished soldier became a most valuable 
 article, representing, in fact, so much invested capital, 
 and it was clearly poor economy to waste him by un- 
 necessary hardships on the march and in bivouacs, or 
 to impair his resisting power by subjecting him to 
 short rations or inferior food. 
 
 Hence the idea sprang up that tents and heavy pro- 
 vision trains were absolute essentials for a mobile Army.^ 
 
 Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War 
 never allowed himself to be hampered by any such 
 sentiments. Wfeen, as after Eossbach (November 5, 
 1757), the need demanded it, he marched his men to 
 Leuthen as light and as fast as ever did Napoleon, 
 
 ' Bunjit Singh exactly hit off the prevailing sentiment when, 
 on seeing the British Infantry after the first Sikh War in 1846, he 
 said : " Ah, if I had such soldiers as yours, I would have every 
 man carried to the battlefield in palanquins," to prevent their being 
 unnecessarily fatigued before the fighting began. 
 
8 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 living on the country as he went. But, as already 
 mentioned, he was responsible to nobody, and possessed 
 in addition that magnetic quality common to all 
 Great Commanders of being able to exact the utmost 
 from his troops without impairing their devotion to 
 his cause. His subordinates, however, were responsible 
 to him, a very different matter, and when after the 
 Peaice of Hubertusberg it suited his internal policy to 
 favour commerce and agriculture at the expense of 
 military efiSiciency, the idea of few but efficient units, 
 of tents and creature comforts, got completely the 
 upper hand in the Army, and the true secret of Prussia's 
 salvation at the crisis of Leuthen, viz., mobiUty, not 
 the echelon attack, sank into complete obscurity. 
 Cause of That the King's poUcy with regard to 
 Prussian trade and industry was a necessity is 
 ec me ^jearly evident to any one who can realize 
 the state of destitution to which the country had 
 been brought during these seven years of incessant 
 strain. Unfortunately, concessions once made to trade 
 and industries are not easily withdrawn, and though 
 the Nation, being mainly dependent on its agriculture, 
 recovered its wealth within seven years — agricultural 
 countries generally do — the system which had sprung 
 into existence in the meanwhile was continued long 
 after the need for it had disappeared, and the efficiency 
 of the Army, more particularly of the Cavalry, was 
 sacrificed to a cheese-paring policy of economy, to 
 which the worst we have ever known was comparatively 
 spendthrift lavishness. 
 
 All this took place so gradually that it passed un- 
 noticed by all but the keenest minds. 
 
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 9 
 
 The system of recruiting for the Bang's 
 leCTuTtin^ Army, (for it was the " Army of the King " 
 and not of the Nation,) was essentially 
 the same as our own, and had, in fact, sprung from 
 the same feudal principles. In theory every man 
 could be called on to serve in defence of his own 
 district, but practically the liability had been com- 
 muted for a money payment, with which the King 
 maintained a voluntary Army to defend the country. 
 Commercially it paid better to attract foreign recruits 
 than to take the physical pick of the country (5 ft. 6 in. 
 was the minimum height in those days) from the tillage 
 of the fields. In a sense the raising of regiments was 
 decentralized, each district (canton) being Hable for a 
 certain quota of men, which it had to supply by ballot, 
 if necessary, and as a general rule no unit was allowed 
 to enlist more than one-third foreigners (Auslander — 
 a term which included all except Prussian subjects), 
 the remaining two-thirds being " LandesMnder,?' or 
 natives, and it was the presence of these foreigners in 
 the ranks that constituted the gravest evU. These 
 men were easy enough to handle in War, but being long- 
 service men far too proficient in their drill to be kept 
 upon the parade ground, they became idle, and needed 
 an iron hand to keep them in the necessary subjection. 
 They were hated by the civiUans, partly for their 
 idleness and the habits they developed as a consequence 
 of that idleness, but chiefly because they corrupted 
 the bulk of all the " LandesMnder -' who came to the 
 barracks, and every town of sufficient importance to 
 make its voice heard by the King petitioned,, and often 
 successfully, to be exempted from their garrison, and 
 
10 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 to have its inhabitants excused from military service. 
 As each fresh petition was granted, the area for recruit- 
 ing was diminished, and the rift between the soldiers 
 and civilians, which was to prove the ruin of the country, 
 was gradually widened. 
 
 Revolution- The natural reaction in favour of peace 
 ary Propa- after a perio d_ of prolonged War was at_ 
 ^Pruiia" j^ height when the moral storm centre, 
 which culminated in the cataclysm of the 
 Eevolution, developed over France, and communi- 
 cated a fresh impulse to the activity of the peace parties 
 in the towns. These, as the seats of learning and journa- 
 hstic enterprise, became in turn fresh centres of infection, 
 and presently a wave of sickly humanitarianism over- 
 spread the whole of Prussian society, penetrating even 
 into the Aimy itself, which had already been rendered 
 susceptible to the poison by its bloodless campaign in 
 Bohemia. The situation was best summed up in 
 Riichel's speech commemorating Prince Henry of 
 Prussia's career in the Army, in which he extolled 
 him in the following words : " Gliicklicher als Caesar 
 bei Dyrachium, als Conde bei Rocroi, gewana er ohne 
 Schlacht den Sieg." And if a General with Riichel's 
 fighting record could enunciate sentiments like these, 
 it can be imagined to what depths the Peace at any 
 Price party could descend. 
 
 Briefly, these views would have done credit to our 
 present day Hague Conference fanati cs. War was a 
 barbaric method oiTsettHng ~3Isputes' between rival 
 governments, with which the honest citizen could have 
 no concern, and if it should arise, then private property 
 was to be duly respected and arrangements made to 
 
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 11 
 
 carry it out with the least interference with business 
 
 matters possible. 
 
 Causes of These views were coromon to the whole 
 
 Defeats of of Europe at the outbreak of the French 
 
 the Allies Revolutionary Wars, and fundamentally 
 
 conditioned the whole series of defeats suffered by 
 
 the Allies during the years 1792-3 and 4, for _none 
 
 of the Nations fel t the necessity for great sacrifices or 
 
 reaUzed the dangers with which they were about to be 
 
 confronted. " '~^" 
 
 The sequence of cause and effect was, moreover, so 
 obvious to the several Armies engaged, that none of 
 them saw in their defeats a sufficient reason for the 
 sacrifices entailed by the wide-sweeping military reforms 
 which (as subsequent events were to demonstrate) would 
 have been absolutely necessary to ensure their survival. 
 Indeed, from a military standpoint the soldiers were 
 absolutely right, for locally the superiority of the line 
 tactics copied from the Frederickian model had been 
 abundantly justified. Defeat arose essentially from 
 com missariat and transport difficultie s, from which 
 the Jb^rench, by reason of their poverty, had been com- 
 pelled to emancipate themselves. All' the War Offices 
 were bombarded by advice and proposals for reform, 
 identical in spirit, often even in words, to those with 
 which we in England became so familiar after the Boer 
 War. But out of all these German reformers, only one, 
 Scharnhorst, then in the Hanoverian Army, saw the 
 true cause of all their troubles, namely that the French 
 Kevolution had called a new factor into being, the 
 spirit of the " Nation in Arms." ^ 
 
 ^ Die Ursachen unsere Niederlagen in den Niederlanden, 1794. 
 
12 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 In the absence of this spirit in Prussia lay the root 
 cause of all her subsequent misfortunes. The idea that 
 the Prussian Army had fallen asleep on its laurels is 
 entirely untenable. On the contrary, in no Arm v in the 
 Sfi^d iai-WffEe men devoted t hemselves to the stu dy_ 
 of^tte Jugher j^rgajches. of their professicm., or was the 
 daily routine work of maintaining the efficiency of the 
 troops carried out with greater fideUty and precision. 
 
 Nor was this labour entirely devoted to " spit and 
 pohsh," as it is the custom to believe. On the contrary, 
 the diaries of regimental officers and other contemporary 
 documents recently pubUshed by the German General 
 Staff 1 record a succession of experimental field days. 
 days on the ranges, mornings spent in packing waggons, 
 testing camp gear, etc., that remind one most forcibly 
 of months spent on the Indian Frontier, where at least 
 no one has accused the British officer of " slacking." But 
 the resemblance goes deeper here than is' at first obvious, 
 because, in neither case was the spirit of the people 
 prepared to make the necessary financial sacrifices ; 
 in both, nine-tenths of the energy was wasted for want 
 of proper material to work upon. 
 
 The very foundation of an officer's training for higher 
 commands lies in his power of bending hvunan nature 
 to his will, and the development of that will by constant 
 clash and friction with the wills of others. A man 
 learns more in licking a raw company of recruits into 
 shape in six weeks, than in doing duty with a made 
 battalion in as many years. 
 
 Compulsory service in Prussia could alone have given 
 
 * UrkuncUiche Forachungen zur Oeachichte des Prussischen 'Heeres, 
 Berlin. 1902-4. 
 
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 13 
 
 the officers material to work upon. But though the 
 matter was discussed from every point of view and 
 Knesebeck's memorandum ^ foreshadowed almost exactly 
 the steps ultimately taken, and for which the credit 
 is unanimously assigned to Scharnhorst, (although he 
 died of wounds received at Bautzen the year before 
 they were actually embodied in the law), the truth was, 
 that the People were not ready for any sacrifice in- 
 volving either their personal freedom, or their pockets. 
 Further than this, though parliamentary control in 
 Prussia was non-existent, public opinion nevertheless 
 hadVays of making itself felt, which no crowned head 
 could afford to neglect. Hence, since no increase in 
 the estimates could be entertained on any aocoimt, 
 absolutely pressing reforms costing money could only 
 be carried through by robbing Peter to pay Paul. There 
 were, however, a great many Peters^ and a great many 
 Pauls, each of whom had vested interests which cotild 
 not be hampered without creating friction which 
 it required lubrication to overcome. That lubrication 
 was always found by an extension of the system of 
 furloughs and of " watch free " men, and this struck 
 at the very basis of efficiency. 
 
 Frederick That Frederick the Great was well aware of 
 
 the Great's this evil is apparent from the speech he made 
 
 Speec . g^^ Qjjg q£ jj|g jg^g^ Cavalry inspections held at 
 
 Potsdam." 
 
 " Gentlemen, I am entirely dissatisfied with the 
 
 Cavalry. The Eegiments are completely out of hand ; 
 
 there is no accuracy in their movements, no solidity, 
 
 no order. The men ride like tailors. I beg that this 
 
 "• See von der Goltz'a Boazbaeh und Jena. 
 
14 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 may not occur again, ancj that each of you will pay more 
 attention to his duty, more particularly to the horse- 
 manship. 
 
 " But I know how things go on. The Captains 
 think only ,of making money out of their Squadrons, 
 and the Lieutenants, how to get the most leave. You 
 think I am not up to your dodges, but I know them 
 all and wiU recapitulate them. To-morrow, when 
 you start on your march back to your garrison, before 
 you are ten miles on your way, the Squadron Com- 
 mander will ask the Sergeant-Major whether any of 
 the men live in the vicinity, and the Sergeant-Major 
 
 will reply, ' Yes, sir ; there are and — — live quite 
 
 close to here, and will be glad to go on furlough.' ' Very 
 well then,' the Captain will say, ' we can save their 
 pay.i Send the names m to me to-night, and they shall 
 have leave.' And so it goes on every march. The 
 Lieutenants get leave to visit their friends, and the 
 Captain arrives at his garrison with half the Squadron 
 leading the horses of the other half, like a band of 
 disreputable Cossacks. 
 
 " Then when the season for riding drills comes on, 
 the Captain sends for the Sergeant-Major, and says : 
 
 •'I have an appointment this morning at and must 
 
 get away early; teU the first Lieutenant to take the 
 rides.' So the Sergeant-Major goes to the first Lieu- 
 tenant and gives him the message, and the latter says ; 
 ' What ! the Captain is away. Then I am off hunting. 
 TeU the second Lieutenant to take the men.' And the 
 second Lieutenant, who is probably still in bed, says : 
 
 > The money went into the "contingent allowance" thence 
 indirectly to the Captain's pocket. 
 
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 13 
 
 What ! both of them gone ! Then I shall stay where I 
 am ; I was up till 3 this morning at a dance ; tell 
 the Cornet I am ill, and he must take the rides.' And 
 the Cornet says : ' Look here, Sergeant-Major, what's 
 the good of my standing out there in the cold ? You 
 know all about it much better than I do ; you go and 
 take the rides.' And so it goes on. And what must 
 be the end of it all? 
 
 " Now march your Regiments home, and don't let 
 me have to speak like this again." ^ 
 Comoosition -^^^ neither he nor his successors were 
 of Army at able to Suggest a remedy, and the result 
 J®"^ was that at the time of the Jena cam- 
 paign the evil had reached such dimensions that 
 nearly two-thirds of the whole strength of the Army 
 — that is to say, almost the whole of the "Landes- 
 kinder " contingent served only for one month in the year, 
 and when it is remembered how infinitely more 
 complicated the whole drill and training of the soldier 
 was in those days as compared to our own tim e, one 
 can only marvel at the devotion of the permanent stafi 
 who succeeded in this short period in getting such 
 precision in movement and discipline in the field (out 
 of such almost hopeless material) as the battlefields 
 of Jena and Auerstadt undoubtedly proved them to 
 possess. Unfortunately this work fell essentially on 
 the non-commissioned officers, and not on the officers, 
 as it should have done. 
 
 Nevertheless, the troops were, according to the 
 standard of the period, well found in every respect, 
 
 1 Aua meinem Tagebuch, von Manoitz. See also Cavalry Past and 
 Future by the Author. 
 
i6 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 (except in great coats,) ^ and many important reforms, 
 such as the introduction of hght infantry battal- 
 ions, of improved muskets, of rifl es for the_ picked- 
 shots of e ach company, the provision of a small reserve 
 oFtraineTm^rtomeet the first losses of a campaign ; 
 and, last but not least, the formation of independent, 
 DiArisions of all arms on the French model were actually 
 carried into effect. 
 
 This last deserves a paragraph by itself, 
 °DivisToii' for though unquestionably right in principle, 
 Organjza- a defect in its execution proved practically 
 **"" the determining causes of the final dis- 
 aster at Jena. This defect lay in spUtting up the 
 whole of the Cavalry and Artillery and distributing 
 them approximately equally to the Infantry commands. 
 The consequence was that both arms lost the habit of 
 working in " masses," and " masses " under the hand 
 of the Army Commander were absolutely essential to 
 coimter the tactics of the French Army. Fifty squadrons 
 under a Seydlitz at Auerstadt, or a hundred guns under 
 a Senarmont at Jena, might have changed the fate of 
 Europe ; but no such men were forthcoming, and one 
 of the most gallant Armies of which history has any 
 
 * The want of great coats arose in the following manner. In 
 the chronic wars &t the beginning of the 18th century the 
 men wore a long-waisted, sleeved waistcoat; over this a sub- 
 stantial frockcoat, which came down to the knee and was folded 
 back when marching. This cut into a great deal of cloth, and 
 when peace came, the Colonels having the clothing contract found 
 they could economize money by skimping their men's coats, so 
 that by degrees the frockcoat shrank to a ridiculous coatee about 
 as warm as the old waistcoat, which disappeared altogether. Then 
 it was discovered that the men's health suffered through such in- 
 sufficient clothing, and " watchooats " for sentry-go were intro- 
 duced, and it was intended to introduce these for the whole Army 
 when the War broke out. 
 
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 17 
 
 record was destroyed' in driblets, because it lacked 
 a firm skeleton of force to hold tbe fractions together. 
 On the afternoon of October 14, 1806, 
 Jena ** ^P°^ ^^® plains of Jena the Army of 
 Frederick the Great ceased to exist, and only 
 scattered fragments drifted away north and west, without \ 
 plan, or any design for re-union.^ They had been beaten, (y ' 
 not through any fundamental defect in their tactical 
 training. It is necessary to insist on that, but, in so far 
 as any purely military reason can be assigned for their 
 fate, it was because their Grenerals, grown old in the tradi- 
 tions of the Seven Years' War had never realized that 
 the mobUity of an Army is not so much a question of 
 how fast men can swing their legs along a road, but of 
 how long it takes their leaders to decide al oiig which 
 roads they shall ma rch. Never before or since has 
 the fate of a Nation depended so whoUy on what men 
 generally call chance, but which some of us prefer to 
 attribute to the direct iaterposition of the Almighty, 
 to whom, after all, pubHc opinion still attributes the 
 position of Arbitrator of the Battlefield. 
 
 When morning broke on that fateful day, a dense fog , 
 seemingly not anticipated by any one on the field, 
 
 I II II I II iriiiiiii ■ ii .i^. .. iii, r^ i M li.i e wiiii' " -i T i T r r»w »-1 IT- , ,1 if 
 
 (though after aU a very frequeiit phenomenon on an 
 October morning) himg low over the whole plateau, 
 
 ^ This collapse, however, was an absolutely necessary outcome 
 of the false conception of War which had sprung up from the false 
 humanitarianism of the age. War was a cxu-se and an anachronism 
 having no place in its enlightened philosophy. The soldier was 
 a useless drone, living on the hard-earned savings of the honest 
 citizen, and the outcome of these opinions was the tyranny of 
 iVance in Glermany, after the disastrous battle of Jena. — See 
 Voluntary and Compulaory Service, also War and the World's Life, 
 by the Author. 
 
i8 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 on which the Prussians stood, and it was thanks to that 
 acci dent alone that the F rench Emperor, Lannes andthe 
 Impe rial Guard escaped"annihilation. It is utterly incon- 
 ceivable tEt^adTthfi Prussians been able to see their 
 : target of 50,000 men crowded in a dense mass, each 
 i one pressing breast against the knapsack of the man 
 ' in front of him, on the narrow summit of the Landgrafen- 
 I berg, they could have failed to seize their oppor- 
 I tunity. Had they done so, with the Guard, Lannes, 
 i and the Emperor routed, neither Ney, Augereau, or 
 Bemadotte were the men to have saved the situation. 
 After Jena there followed a series of consequences, 
 the absolutely inevitable results which must every- 
 where ensue when a Nation, having lost touch with the 
 realities of life, forgets that War is a necessary incident 
 in its evolution which cannot be evaded by refusing to 
 recognize its existence. The Prussian people, believing 
 the question at issue to be solely the affair of Govern- 
 ments and their instruments (the Armies), welcomed 
 the conquerors as deliverers, and turned their own 
 soldiers, even the wounded, away from their doors with 
 an excess of brutahty which disgusted even the 
 French troops, whose previous experience had rendered 
 them anjrthing but squeamish on the score of humanity. 
 The Prussian Generals, trained for a whole generation 
 to a blind veneration for civil law and the sacred rights 
 of private property, did not dare to accept the respon- 
 sibility of requisitioning the food and shelter of which 
 their men stood so urgently in need. They left the 
 ample resources which the country afforded to fall into 
 the hands of the French, who were restrained by no 
 such pusillanimous scruples. But it was not hunger 
 
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 19 
 
 alone tliat led to the wholesale stirrenders characteristic 
 of this phase of the War. The retreat was in fact the 
 very converse of that of the French five years later 
 from Russia, when hunger brought about the complete 
 disruption of the bonds of discipline, and those fractions 
 of the Army which still held together owed their salva- 
 tion solely to the unconquerable spirit of their Chiefs. 
 Here the German troops stuck to theic ranks imtil they 
 fell from sheer exhaustion. It was the Leaders who 
 betrayed the honour of their men, not through inten- 
 tional treachery or cowardice (their subsequent records, 
 as we shall see hereafter, abundantly clear them of that 
 dishonour), but because they too had become inoculated 
 with that false humanUarianism which places the indivi- 
 dual above the race — and in its shortsightness is ready 
 to purchase immediate rehef at the cost of enhanced 
 sufEering for the many hereafter. 
 
 A perfect epidemic of surrender set in amongst the 
 higher Commanders — ^not only did detachments in the 
 open field lay down their arms by order, but Comman- 
 dants of fortresses, such as Magdeburg, Ciistrin, Torgau 
 and Spandau opened their gates unconditionally, " to 
 avert the further sufEering of the civil population." 
 
 As von der Goltz has explained in his " Von Jena 
 his Preussische Eylau" current military opinion, 
 founded mainly on the events of the latter years of 
 Frederick's life, had led Prussian Generals to look on 
 War more as an intellectual exercise than as the direction 
 and control of elemental forces. 
 
 You played the game according to the rules, and 
 when the rules indicated that you had lost, you sub- 
 mitted with a good grace and cheered the winner, like 
 
20 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 the crew of a beaten yacM after a race. Only Bliiclier 
 and Schamliorst, who being thrown together during the 
 retreat, learnt to know and appreciate each other's 
 characters, seem to have stood out resolutely against 
 the general trend of sentiment, and their chance associa- 
 tion was destined to bear remarkable fruit in years to 
 come. 
 
 Meanwhile most of Pomerania and all East Prussia 
 escaped for the moment the ravages of the invaders, 
 and when on November 5, the last remnants of the Field 
 Army passed into captivity, there stUl remained avail- 
 able, according to von der Goltz, trained men enough 
 to place some 40 battalions and 55 squadrons in the 
 field. But instead of caUing these out to the last man 
 and horse, the talk at the Rqyal Headquarters was 
 only of peace, and peace there probably would have 
 been but for the Emperor Alexander, who, imtroubled 
 by the fate of his AUy, determined to continue his war 
 with Napoleon, and Napoleon's own excessive demands, 
 which simply drove King Frederick William IV into 
 the arms of the Eussians. 
 
 Ultimately, when all hope of pacifying the Emperor 
 by further surrender was at an end, a small field force 
 of some 12,000 men was mobilized and sent to join the 
 Eussians. These, by their timely arrival on the field 
 of Preussische Eylau, succeeded in averting the complete 
 defeat of the Eussian Army, and by the relative ease 
 with which they had driven the exhausted remnants of 
 the Divisions under St. Hilaire and Priant before them, 
 they brought the first gleam of hope to the soldiers of 
 the old Prussian Army. It convinced them that when 
 the time came, under competent leaders, these men 
 
■ THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 21 
 
 could still give an excellent account of themselves 
 even against the victors of Jena. 
 
 Reorgani- '^^® treaty of Tilsit on July 9, 25 days 
 zation after the battle of Friedland, brought the 
 
 a er Jena. ^^^ ^ ^^ ^^^ After that not a moment 
 
 was lost in setting to work at the reform and re- 
 generation of the Prussian Army. 
 
 A Eoyal Commission imder the presidency of Scharn- 
 horst, with Gneisenau, Boyen and Grohnan as members, 
 was assembled on the 25th of the same month at Memel. 
 In January, 1808, it moved to Konigsberg, and early 
 in that year produced a report which may be con- 
 sidered as the starting point of the modem German 
 Army, notwithstanding the fact that at the moment 
 Schamhorst's proposals for universal service were not 
 deemed practicable by the King, and did not in fact 
 become law until September, 1814, nearly a year after 
 that great soldier's death. 
 
 By this scheme the Prussian Army was in future 
 to consist of three Corps, based on Prussia, Pomerania 
 and Silesia respectively, with a total field strength of 
 84 battalions, 96 squadrons and 24 batteries of Artillery. 
 
 The distinction between " Auslander " and " Landes- 
 kinder" was done away with. In principle, though 
 voluntary recruiting was maintained, the law compelling 
 " Cantons," or districts, to furnish their allotted contin- 
 gent of recruits was revised and strengthened. But far too 
 large a number of local privileges with regard to exemp- 
 tion were retained. The whole system of furlough men, 
 and of " Friewaohter " ^ was swept away, and it was 
 
 * Men exempted from duty and allowed to practise their trades 
 in the town. 
 
22 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 decreed that in future no Prussian soldier might be 
 subjected to corporal, or other, degrading punishment. 
 
 At the same time a Court was appointed to inquire 
 into all cases of surrender of fortresses, or in the open 
 field, before which officers of all ranks were cited 
 to appear. Fortunately procedure and communications 
 were both so slow and uncertain, that only some cases 
 had been dealt with, and none of the death sentences, 
 eight in all,^ had been carried out, when the general 
 amnesty announced in the King's proclamation to his 
 people accompanying the declaration of War against 
 France on March 16th, 1813, suspended all proceedings. 
 
 The actual cadres available for the new Army in 
 December, 1807, amounted to 50 Line Battalions, 11 
 Companies of Light Infantry, 9 Companies of Kifles 
 and 86 Squadrons (no Batteries are mentioned by HoUe- 
 ben, which indicates the Httle importance attached to 
 Artillery at the period) but this amoimt, limited though 
 it was in comparison with Prussia's former power, 
 appeared altogether excessive to Napoleon, who on 
 January 1, 1809, pubUshed his celebrated decrees limit- 
 ing the whole Prussian Field Army to 42,000 men, to 
 be apportioned amongst the three arms as follows : — 
 
 10 Infantry Regiments 22,000 
 
 8 Cavalry Regiments (of 4 Squadrons) . . 8,000 
 
 Artillery, and Sappers 6,000 
 
 Guard, Infantry and Cavalry .... 6,000 
 
 42,000 
 No increase was allowed for the next ten years. 
 This blow came like a thunderbolt upon the reformers, 
 abeady well advanced in their great undertaking. 
 
 ' See Lehmann's Life of Scharnhorat. 
 
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN 1813 23 
 
 The idea of Army Corps, even of Divisions, had to be 
 abandoned, and six Brigades substituted as the principal 
 unit consisting each of 7 to 8 battaUons, 12 Squadrons 
 and a Brigade of Artillery, comprising 12 Companies 
 of foot and three of horse artillery — each being armed 
 with 6 guns, 12 or 6-pounders and 2 howitzers. 
 
 Schamhorst also endeavoured to create a " National 
 Guard " on the model of the French organisation, but 
 this was vetoed by Napoleon, though he did allow the 
 inhabitants of Berlin and some of the other large towns 
 to organize themselves for the maintenance of order. 
 
 All the ingenuity of the Reformers was now devoted 
 to the circumvention of the Napoleonic decree, and 
 many were the expedients resorted to. Amongst others 
 a most promising idea was started for the " reUef of the 
 unemployed" by finding them work on the repair of the 
 coast fortresses, always liable to attack froni the British 
 Fleet. As most of the unemployed were old soldiers, 
 and as the only decent clothing available for them 
 happened to be the stores of old uniforms ; in a surpris- 
 ingly short time it became indispensable to issue these 
 uniforms, as after even a few days' work, the rags the poor 
 fellows brought with them became a scandal to pubhc 
 morahty. Thus some 6 to 7,000 good and true men were 
 kept together who only needed muskets to become 
 most formidable soldiers. But this adroit measure 
 did not escape the eye of the French Emperor, and 
 presently this system was vetoed also. 
 
 The chief means of escape from French restrictions 
 was found in the extension of a time-honoured custom 
 of the old Army, by which every miUtary unit had 
 been allowed to entertain a few supernumerary recruits 
 
24 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 known as " Kriimpers " as a part trained reserve against 
 mobilization. 
 
 This system was now extended, and eacli Company, 
 Squadron or Battery was authorized to call up three to 
 four men for one month's training, dismissing them at 
 the end of that time and replacing them by others. 
 But even this seemed superfluous to Napoleon, and the 
 number was finally fixed at eight per Company, and 
 three per Squadron for four months' training. 
 
 Fortunately during 1810-11, smuggling in the Baltic 
 reached such a pitch that Napoleon felt it expedient 
 to relax the stringency of his restrictions, and a few 
 more men found employment as coastguards. 
 
 In August, 1811, the Prussians had actually 74,000 
 trained men available, of whom 48,000 belonged to the 
 Field Army.i But Napoleon had now determined 
 to force the Prussians to declare war against Russia, 
 and to furnish him with a contingent therefor. Accord- 
 ingly on September 13, he instructed St. Marsan, his 
 Ambassador to Berlin, to demand the suspension of 
 their preparations and their agreement to join him in his 
 contemplated enterprise, giving the TCmg only three 
 days in which to decide. At the same time he warned 
 Davout at Hamburg to be ready to move into Prussia 
 at a moment's notice, adding this characteristic instruc- 
 tion as to his behaviour, which advocates of Hague 
 Conferences would do well to remember. " Si vous 
 entrez en Prusse, il ne faut faire aucune proclamation, 
 ni rien dire, mais tout prendre, et desarmer " {Cones. 
 18,139). 
 This threat compelled the King to temporize. All 
 ' P. 13. HoUd>en, VoL I. 
 
THE PRUSSIAN A^Y IN 1813 25 
 
 preparations in excess of Napoleon's limitations were 
 stopped, and Bliicher, Scharnliorst a,nd others to whom 
 the Emperor had taken exception were dismissed. 
 Finally he yielded, and on February 24, 1812, an alliance 
 with France was concluded, by which Prussia agreed to 
 furnish a contingent of 19 Battahons, 24 Squadrons 
 and 60 guns under the command of von Grawert, 
 who was subsequently relieved by von Yorck on 
 August 13 of the same year. 
 
 There remained then in Prussia, as a nucleus for 
 further formations, 26 BattaUons, 54 Squadrons and 108 
 guns, or 22,394 men, field troops, 9,785 for garrisons, and 
 in the 6,052 depots. The field troops were thoroughly 
 efficient, and, thanks to the particular circumstances 
 under which they had fought at Eylau, had recovered 
 confidence in themselves, which was not weakened 
 by their experiences in Russia ; and behind the garri- 
 sons and dep6ts there existed a large number of veterans 
 of 1806-7 who had managed to make their way back 
 to their homes, but could not be enrolled owing to the 
 terms of Napoleon's decree, already referred to above. 
 
THE FEENCH AEMY IN 1813 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 The French Army in 1813 
 
 Up to the outbreak of the French Revolution the 
 French Army had been recruited on a voluntary basis. 
 The power to call out a certain quota of men from each 
 district, to make good any deficiency in the supply 
 of volunteers, existed as in Prussia, but had seldom 
 been enforced, and even after the outbreak of the 
 Revolution the greatest reluctance to enlist men into 
 the Regular Army, except with their own goodwill, 
 was shown. Since numbers, however, had to be found 
 far in excess of the regular Army establishments, all 
 sorts of expedients were attempted. Volunteer regi- 
 ments were formed and the hvee en masse, was 
 decreed. Actually, however, law was so completely 
 in abeyance during the first years of this period, that 
 practically all the men who faced the enemy at the front 
 may be considered essentially as volunteers. Whether 
 raised originally by conscription, or joining of their 
 own free will, the men generally began their service 
 by deserting, and when on return to their homes they 
 found their places filled up by others, and starvation 
 or denunciation staring them in the face, they rejoined 
 the colours as on the whole the safest place, and settled 
 down to their soldiering with a fairly good grace. This 
 requires to be understood, as it explains the excellent 
 
30 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 spirit shown under the greatest hardships and privation 
 by the Armies of the Ehine and of Italy, and accounts in 
 a great measure for the soldierly tone of the troops 
 throughout the following years of Napoleon's conquest, 
 until the horrors of the retreat from Moscow in 1812 
 temporarily destroyed all organization. 
 
 Tourdan's ■'■* ^^® not _ until 1798 that a regular 
 law of Con- system of conscription became law in France, 
 
 scription ^^^ though it was not so rigid as that 
 subsequently adopted by Prussia in 1814 (being more 
 generous in exemptions, and retaining the dangerous 
 system of paid substitutes), yet, incomplete as it was, it 
 formed the whole foundation for Napoleon's subsequent 
 career, for no other ruler in Europe could afford " to 
 expend 30,000 men a month," as he brutally expressed it. 
 
 Actually, in order not to make his rule unnecessarily 
 unpopular, Napoleon did not in his early years exercise 
 to its full extent the power which the law conferred 
 upon him. His Allies at that time had to find the bxilk 
 of his Army, the French Regiments merely replacing 
 casualties and wastage as they arose ; but the men 
 not taken were nevertheless liable for service till their 
 twenty-sixth year, and were thus available to meet 
 any crisis which might arise. Assured of this reserve 
 supply of raw material, the Emperor was free to conceive 
 and practise methods of strategy and tactics to which 
 his adversaries, Austria, England and Prussia, could 
 oppose no reply — because they dared not contemplate 
 (without a certain supply of men to fall back upon) 
 the terrible destruction of troops which his rapid marches 
 and battles entailed. This is the central feature of 
 the whole period of Napoleonic warfa/re, and must he 
 
THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 . 31 
 
 kept steadily in mind, if true condusions from its-phenom£na 
 are to be drawn. 
 
 Composition ^'^* ^^ *^® whole Grand Army of some 
 of Grand 600,000 men, who in 1812 crossed the 
 Army, 1812^^^33^^^^ Frontier, only 200,000, in round 
 numbers, were of French extraction.^ The popula- 
 tion of France being approximately 36 miUions, 
 the annual contingent should have been, in round 
 figures, 360,000 of which at least 180,000 would have 
 been physically fit for service. Hence, making the 
 usual allowance for wastage, and deducting a whole 
 milhon for men killed and permanently disabled during 
 his-campaigns, there should have been in France not 
 less than two arid a half miUion men stilljof_an_ a jge to 
 Jbear arms when Napoleon returned to Paris in January, 
 1813. The extent to which he fell short of raising these 
 numbers is evidence of the growing unpopularity of j 
 his pitiless rule, and of the extraordinary laxity of 
 internal administration. 
 
 There was, therefo re, no real deficiency of men fo r 
 a new Army, after the, calamitieJ_....ol, the. Resign 
 Betreat,,,_.bjfl L.there JKSa, a great ^want^^of^ ofl&cers and 
 non-commissioned officers to form cadres around which 
 to group the men. 
 
 Fortunately, and possibly in view of 
 horts" " *'i6 8'Ctual eventuality. Napoleon had organ- 
 ized a special body of National Guards, 
 strictly for home defence, during the previous year. 
 To mark distinctly the difference between their 
 status and that of troops of the Eegular Army, they 
 
 ' See Max Jahn's Franzoiische Heer, also Bousset and the 
 Duke d'Aumale. 
 
32 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 had been formed in "cohorts," not in "battahons." 
 As a matter of fact, though there was a distinction 
 there was no difference, for these " cohorts," having 
 been recruited from amongst the better class whose 
 position had secured them the favour of the prefets 
 of their districts, and being ofi&cered by men who had 
 seen service, had acquired a very fair standard of drill 
 and discipliae. Consequently the " cohorts " were at 
 once invited to volunteer as units for the emergency, and 
 .since the great majority of their men would have been 
 liable, in case of refusal, to go as conscripts of the 
 previous years, of two evils they accepted the least, 
 and were amongst the first to march for the front, 
 where they did excellent service. 
 
 Napoleon's next step was to caU out 100,000 men 
 of the contingents of 1808-9-10, who had escaped 
 previous drafts, and then in quick succession the whole 
 contingents for 1813 and 1814, which should have 
 given at least 360,000 men. As a fact they did not 
 realize more than 200,000, so great was the incessant 
 wastage from desertion.^ 
 
 To weld this raw material into shape, officers and non- 
 commissioned officers were withdrawn wholes ale^from 
 tite troops in Spain, and as the survivors of the Grand 
 ^nny^drifted back into Germany, all not absolutely 
 required at the front were sent back by post to Mayence, 
 and the Ehine to take up their places in the new units. 
 
 Training ^^ ^*^* ^^ *^® ^^^ recruits arrived 
 
 of the new at the Depots, they were formed into 
 
 '^'^^' provisional Companies, about 100 strong, 
 
 * For details of desertion and measures to stop it, see " Les Refrao- 
 taires" in supplement to MU. Wochblt., 1887. 
 
THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 33 
 
 and marched off to the frontiers by ten to fifteen 
 mile stages, picking up arms and imiform, at the 
 arsenals they passed through, and drilling a couple 
 of hours every afternoon. At the frontier these Com- 
 panies were grouped into provisional Battahons, and 
 again despatched on their way, driUing as they went. 
 As the average number of stages was from forty-five 
 to sixty, with one rest day in five, by the time they 
 reached the front, they had been some sixty to eighty 
 days under arms, were in thorough marching condition, 
 and on the whole were rather better fitted for their work 
 than would be a fair British Militia Battalion at the 
 end of its annual training. The Artillery also reached the 
 front in good condition, the supply of guns and material 
 was ample, though sometimes antiquated in pattern, 
 tlie simply of draught horses suflBtcient and of fair 
 quality, and the traditions of the Service quite admirable. 
 The Cavalry and Staff formed the weakest links in 
 the chain. The former had suffered most of all during 
 the Retreat from Moscow, and the supply of riding 
 horses in France, never of a high stamp, had been so 
 exhausted by previous efforts, that thousands of men 
 had to be marched into Germany on foot, and saw 
 their horses for the fijst time alm ost in jgres enceo f 
 the enemy. British Officers with South African 
 experience can easily picture the consequences of 
 such conditions. Fortunately the demands made on 
 the Staff were not of a high order. With Corps and 
 Divisional Commanders so thoroughly war-trained, 
 little more than courage and goodwill on the part of 
 their assistants was required, and in these qualities 
 the French were never lacking. 
 
 D 
 
34 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN- 
 
 A few words are now needed to explain 
 Evolution tlie evolution of the tactical forms wMcli these 
 troops were about to employ. The old Royal 
 Army of France had been trained essentially on Prussian 
 lines, indeed the drill book for the Infantry of 1791 
 was an adaptation of an edition of the Prussian 
 regulations originally drafted by Guibert, who died 
 before its publication,^ but though the form was 
 the same, the French had never succeeded in assimilat- 
 ing the spirit. French national characteristics were 
 all ^against the extreme rigidity and slowness which 
 characterized the Prussian model, and for years 
 before the Revolution there had existed a school dia- 
 metrically opposed to the regulation methods. The 
 whole nation took sides in the discussions which fol- 
 lowed, the popular side being aU against the official 
 attitude, and it happened that the former received 
 very strong corroboration of their principles from the 
 experiences brought back from Canada and the United 
 States by the men who had fought against us in both 
 countries. Moreover, when the great era of revolutionary 
 warfare commenced in 1792, there was obviously no 
 time to train the raw levies called forth by the Revolu- 
 tion to anything approaching the standard of dexterity 
 in loading and manoeuvring which the old time tactics 
 required. A compromise between the two was the 
 only possible solution, and in face of the enemy the 
 French Infantry evolved a working system of its own, 
 based primarily on adaptation of forms to circumstances. 
 In other words, they fought in line when they could, 
 
 * See Max Jahns, KriegsgeacMchUichen Wiasensehaften, VoL IV. 
 p. 2,594. Compare also Colin's Le DiaUpline et la Taetique 
 dans lea Armies de la Bivolution, 
 
THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 35 
 
 as skirmisliers and in columns when they had to, and 
 by the time Napoleon assumed control over them they 
 had become a supple and finished instrument ready to 
 his hand, and needing only the directions of his genius 
 and the driving power of his will to ensure great results. 
 Growth of -^ further change of far-reaching im- 
 the Army portance had also evolved itself from the 
 ^'P* conditions of their growth. It being im- 
 possible, in the time available, to create the discipline 
 needed for the rigid order of battle of the Frederi- 
 ckian period, more importance had to be conceded to 
 the personal element of command. The more highly 
 discipHned the troops, the less it appears necessary to 
 consult their likes and dislikes ; but raw troops can 
 only be reHed on to follow the man whom they trust, and 
 it takes time, more or less according to the personality 
 of the leader, to win this confidence. Hence, generally, j/- 
 ihe longer men can he held together under the same ftji 
 Commander, the better is the guarantee for their efficiency.TS:: 
 This led, naturally, to the growth, first of the Division, ^ 
 then of the Corps, as an organic whole, the imits of 
 which were kept permanently together till men and officers 
 understood and reUed on each other imphcitly. yi 
 
 This rendered dec entralization of command practicable. 
 Army Headquarters no longer required to issue detailed 
 instructions to every unit in the whole command, but 
 could confine themselves to informing the Commander 
 of the Division or Corps as to the general intention of a 
 manoeuvre, and the part which his unit was expected 
 to play in it, leaving it to him to make his own arrange- 
 ments for carrying out his special task. EssentiaUy, 
 U was the enormous economy in time, rendered possible 
 
36 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 by this decentralization, which gave the French Armies 
 their great swperiority in mobility over all others, on 
 in turn the earlier strategy of Napoleon was 
 
 The growth of the Divisional system led in time to the 
 closer association of the several arms of the service. 
 Infantry, Cavalry and particularly Artillery, learnt to 
 play together, and no longer lost sight of the whole in 
 the pursuit of their own glorification. Thus the Artillery 
 developed in tactical mobility and its officers trained 
 themselves for the part they were destined to play. 
 On the other hand, the Cavalry, no longer being called 
 on to act in masses, lost sight of those essential factors 
 in their training which alone renders possible their 
 action in " mass." In consequence of this they never 
 again found opportunity to make good their short- 
 comings in this respect. It was want of horsemanship 
 primarily, not of horsemastership which lay at the root 
 of their many failures. 
 
 Unlike Frederick the Great, who devised a system 
 of tactics and then forged the tools to suit it, Napoleon 
 paid httle attention to the making of his instruments, 
 his crowded Ufe left him ^too little opportunity, but he 
 took the toots ready to his hand and made the tiesi possible 
 tise of them as he found them. 
 
 Napoleon's ^° *^' however, he remains the " Master " 
 Military for all time. But he did not burst full 
 
 Education flg^gg^ j^^ ^j^e guttle world, he grew to 
 his fuU stature by a process, brief indeed as measured 
 against other great Generals' lives, but presenting, 
 nevertheless, well marked stages which it is impera- 
 tive to keep in mind. 
 
THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 37 
 
 What was chiefly noticeable , about, him , in. hjsjj^gii^ 
 was not conspicuou s mental capacity, but an astonighing 
 power of— conu nan^. which he iexercised apparency 
 unconsciously, the astounding feature being that even 
 in Corsica, his own country, where prophets are usually 
 held in least respect, men, years his superior in 
 experience, rendered him spontaneous and willing 
 obedience, though under no obligation whatever to do 
 so. 
 
 Though Brienne is always spoken of as a miUtary 
 college, in fact there existed at that place no special 
 mihtary curriculum at all — his reading there, and 
 previous to his prolonged leave to Corsica, had been of 
 the most general nature, nor can it be truthfully said 
 that such notes of his as have been handed down to us 
 show any very marked symptoms of unusual genius. 
 It was not until he joined the battaUon of the Royal 
 Artillery whose Headquarters were at Valence in 1791 
 that he appears to have taken up any miUtary study 
 in earnest. Here he ca me-oader thfiinfluence of a first-. 
 rate_AjiJIlfiHSti.BM.on^ Officer, 
 
 who quickly appreciated his abihty, and took him into 
 his confidence. Du Teil was a weU-known military 
 authority in his day, and at his house it is probable 
 that Bonaparte met d'Urtubi and Gassendi, all equally 
 eminent in their way. He certainly read the works 
 of Guibert and Peuquieres, and he could hardly help 
 studying Lloyd's History of the Seven Yeari War. Mar- 
 shal Saxe's Reveries were also not without influence on 
 him, and he had access to the two works on Mountain 
 Warfare of Bosroger and Bouroet, which were con- 
 sidered so important in those days that they were 
 
38 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 never printed, but circulated from hand to hand 
 in manuscript copies.^ The leading characteristic of 
 aU these works can be briefly summarized. All 
 were permeated by the sfirit of aUack, aU saw clearly 
 that the decision of the battlefield was everything, 
 and that ArtUlery was essentially the arm by whose 
 concentrated action the way could be swept clear for the 
 attacking columns, whether of horse or foot, or both, to 
 penetrate or roll up the enemy's line of resistance. 
 
 If the practice of the eighteenth century lagged far 
 behind these principles, this was due to causes inherent 
 in the nature of things, which could only be modified 
 by revolutionary upheaval, and it was Napoleon's good 
 fortune that he arrived on the scene at the very moment 
 when all the barriers of the past had been swept away, 
 and he was able to employ the means at his disposal 
 without hindrance from the causes which had tied the 
 hands of iis predecessors. 
 
 ^jjg His first campaign of 1796 reveals abso- 
 
 Italian lutely nothing beyond what any one of his 
 
 Campaigns ^ap^gpg j^ yfgj. could themselves have 
 
 planned, though all probably woul d have Jacke d the 
 astound ing _j eQersy „ jind potyer. of commanawhiciT 
 was peculiaj ^ to^Eim^,jjiBa.e. In the battles east of 
 Milan,' hisplans were based on the complete pre- 
 eminence of the tools at his disposal, (both in marching 
 and fighting,) over their adversaries — a de Wet might 
 have done as much — and in the Marengo Campaign we 
 find him so over-confident in the fighting qualities 
 of his soldiers, that he threw to the winds all the usual 
 maxims of concentration on the decisive point, all care 
 
 ' See Colin's Education MUitaire de Na/polion, p. 135, et seq. 
 
THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 39 
 
 for his commumcations, and was caught at hopeless 
 disadvantage by the Austrians, only escaping disaster 
 by a miracle. 
 
 It would seem that it was the Ulm 1 
 Camo^*" Campaign^ which first opened his eyes to 
 the poss ibilities whinh mifyht a.rise if his 
 enemy insisted on doirvg the w ro n ci thing, or some- . 
 thing which from the Emyeror's point of view was so ' 
 vMerly preposterous that he had completely failed to 
 provide for such action in his genercd scheme. 
 
 He crushed Mack, not by strategic prevision, but 1 
 simply because he was in full and undisputed command 
 of some 200,000 first-rate fighting men, able to march 
 at least twice as far in twenty-four hours as the 80,000 1 
 Austrians opposed to them. But f o r_ajeries of occur- 
 rences within the Austrian Army which Napoleon neither.. 
 
 I ■ — -^ ■■II --- ■■! Ill"" " " ' -—-~—~'^'- •" — "'°'™^'"-"'»*»n'»i<fiii^,„,„„^.^_^^j^^j„,.iA« fl iJ — ~.-i-tirm ■ Kiifli^Mi 
 
 could, nor in fact did, foresee. Mack would have esca ped 
 his grasp, with consequences for the French Anny « 
 almost as bad as a defeat in the open field. The spec- 
 tacle of six French Corps, some 150,000 men, converging 
 on a geographical point devoid of defenders from 
 which aU food had been removed or destroyed, would ^ 
 have made the Emperor the laughing stock of Europe, 
 and must have shaken his prestige with his own men 
 to a degree which would have rendered it impossible 
 for him to have called upon them to face again the 
 hunger and privation of a similar march. 
 
 At Austerlitz, the enemy attacked him, hence the 
 
 central problem of strategy — ^viz., how to hold fast the 
 
 enemy and compel him to stand to be beaten — never arose, 
 
 and there is no indication in his correspondence, to the 
 
 ' See Campaign de 1805, Alombert et Colin. 
 
40 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 best of my knowledge, to show how he would have 
 solved it. 
 
 j^g But by the opening of the Jena Campaign,^ 
 
 Jena it is clear that Jie had thought the question 
 
 Campaign ^^^ -^ j^^ entirety, and realized to the full 
 
 that the ''\in d,evendent will 'pow er" of the adversa ry^ 
 
 js after a ll the most dijficuU fg/tinr fn r.nnf.r ol jn vm ^ 
 
 1 His first object was to beat the Prussians thoroughly 
 
 I and decisively, before the Russians could join them, 
 
 but how if the Prussians refused to stand to be beaten ? 
 
 ■^ I .....I.! ,- ■■ II 
 
 / He calculated, and as the event proved correctlyTthat a 
 threat at their Capital would be certain to provoke 
 them to attempt its defence. But he could not foresee 
 
 I from which direction his enemy might attempt to inter- 
 fere with his march thither ; hence he resolved to 
 march his troops in such a formation that he would be 
 equally ready to fight him from whatever quarter the 
 attack might come. 
 
 (This led him to his celebrated " battahon s quare of 
 200,000 men." It is the same reasoniag, in fact, that has 
 led us to the formation of squares in the Soudan — ^but 
 with this difEerence, which is very essential. 
 
 The French Army had to cover an area big "enough 
 to afford subsistence for its men, because it had 
 abandoned the magazine system of Frederick the 
 Great's day, and had also to be adapted to the 
 roads of the district they traversed. Therefore it 
 was impossible to march ready for action Uterally 
 at a moment's notice, and consequently Advance 
 Guards or Flanking parties had to be sent out, of such 
 strength and to such distances, that their resistance, 
 ^ See Bonnal's La Manoeuvre de Jena. 
 
THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 41 
 
 even if attacked by overwhelming numbers, could gain 
 time for the remainder of the troops to concentrate. 
 
 A weak advance, or flank, guard, or one of Cavaky \ 
 only, might, of course, give warning of the enemy's 
 approach, but it could not hold that enemy or hinder ( 
 him in the execution of his designs ; but some sixty 
 thousand men attacking with vigour could not be 1 
 neglected, and would force the enemy to turn and 
 fight, thus riveting his attention and creating a fixed 
 point about which the remainder of the assailants could 
 manoeuvre. 
 
 This win be clearer if the accompanying diagram 
 is consulted. Had Lannes and Augereau, for instance, 
 been attacked from the direction of Magdala, by the 
 whole Prussian Army (as might well have happened) 
 they had room to manoeuvre, and^ven 180,000 Prussians 
 could not have wiped out 60,000 of the best French 
 troops unde r tw ent y-four hours' fighting ; but in twenty- 
 lour hours The remainder of the French Army would 
 have appeared on the field, and victory, generally, is to 
 the Commander who can place the last closed forces 
 on the field. The plan would work equally if the 
 Prussians struck the Advance Guard under Davout 
 and Bernadotte. The two combined were quite capable 
 of holding their own until the Emperor with the Main 
 body could arrive, and though in fact, the Prussians did 
 neither, but separated their forces on the eve of the 
 engagement, this only weakened their chances of victory 
 as far as the strategic side of the question was concerned. 
 
 Actually, as we have seen in the previous chapter, 
 the fate of the day turned on the tactical errors of the 
 Prussians. But had Davout and Bernadotte remained 
 
42 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 together, as Napoleon evidently anticipated and desired, 
 the arrival of these sixty thousand men even very late 
 in the day might have been coimted on to avert disaster, 
 if not defeat. 
 j It is, however, clear that the very readiness for imme- 
 diate action which this formation impUed, renders it 
 certain that Na£oleon djc^not^discount tiie consequences 
 ofviotory_beforehand. Not a detachment was made 
 toi^xeaten_ti^ enemy's communications in advanc e, _ 
 ^ t>Tit the troops were_ arranged to wi n the battle first, 
 !/j no matter what ..position_relative^_to Jbhe^ enemy's^ 
 possible lines qfretreat might resrilt_fcomjhe^fighting. 
 The general conception of strategical manoeuvrmg 
 common throughout all Europe until his time (and 
 prevailing in some countries even to-day) aimed at 
 reaping the results of victory before the victory itself 
 was won. In fact they tried to " sell the skin before 
 they had killed the bear." As we shall see later on. 
 Napoleon himself sometimes fell into this error, but 
 this was the outcome of his overweening confidence in 
 the power of his troops to win, when fighting under 
 his direct personal control. 
 
 From 1806 onward, this tendency to hold and fix the 
 enemy so as to obtain a -pivot abotdwhich^to mance/ume 
 became the characteristic of the Napoleonic system. Even 
 though at times one seems to detect marked divergencies 
 from it, as at Pultusk (1807) in particular, analysis only 
 shows that like the rest of us, the greatest Generals 
 have to bow to the old saying " on fait la soupe avec 
 ce qu'on a, non avec ce qu'on vent " and roads and con- 
 ditions of supply at times proved stronger than his 
 desire. 
 
THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 43 
 
 Prom the clutch of this system no enemy could escape 
 unless endued with superior mobility and greater 
 staunchness combined, for only troops of the highest 
 order could endure the strain of repeated retreats 
 without dissolution. Moreover, it was necessary for 
 these tactics of evasion that the theatre of operations 
 should have ample depth, as iti Russia, and this depth 
 was not always forthcoming. It is in the successive 
 variations of these factors that the strategic interest of 
 the Campaign of 1813 principally Ues. 
 
 Meanwhile tactical evolution had also been at 
 work, to which it is now necessary briefly to refer. 
 
 The strength of the old Revolutionary Army had 
 lain, as already pointed out, in its admirable Infantry 
 and its Divisional system, and it was essentially with 
 the " tumiag movements " these two factors facilitated, 
 that Napoleon won his victories up to the time of Jena 
 and Friedland. But after the horrors of the Campaign 
 in Poland the spirit of the French Infantry began to 
 deteriorate, whilst at the same time their opponents 
 not only became more numerous, but the temperature 
 of their fighting spirit steadUy rose. The whole 
 problem of battle-leading now resolved itself into this 
 " How to create conditions which would render it possible 
 for the Infantry, such as it was, to advance at all," and 
 Macdonald's Corps at Wagram * shows one attempt at 
 a solution — ^though an unsatisfactory one. 
 
 1 The accompanying diagram (p. 46) shows the formation of Mac- 
 donald's corps at Wagram. This formation haj9 always been criticized 
 on the assumption that it was intended to break the enemy's line by 
 sheer weight. My impression is that no such idea entered Mac- 
 donald's head, he was far too experienced a man to have made such 
 an error ; rather, it would appear to me, it,ya» del iber ately .adopted 
 on the assnmpti(^ ..:thaJltM Mp tjattery of^lOO guns whichErec^ea 
 
44 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Napoleon's Gienerally the battle developed ia accord- 
 Battle ance with the spirit which underlay the 
 Tactics strategy. The object of the opening 
 attacks was to hold, not merely to see. To meet 
 them the enemy was compelled to bring up his 
 reserves, and then began a struggle of will-power 
 between the opposing leaders, in which Napoleon 
 invariably won, because of his innate gift of command. 
 For the time being he ceased to he open to the play of human 
 sympathy. His best regiments might die in ranks as 
 they stood, his most trusted leaders, seeing themselves 
 on the point of annihilation, might clamour for rein- 
 forcements, but nothing touched him until the moment 
 eamje when his instinct told him that the " hatUe was 
 ripe " as he expressed it, and the psychic force (which 
 really wins battles) was waning faster in his opponents' 
 ranks than in his own. Then the last reserves were 
 brought forward, every available battery dashed to the 
 front, and at case shot ranges blew a hole in the enemy's 
 battle line through which the Cavalry and Infantry 
 could penetrate. This idea was a century old. It is to be 
 found in Guibert, du Teil and other writers, and is 
 based on the analogy of the breach in a fortress, hut 
 not until the association of the ArtiUery with the Infantry 
 in permanent Divisions had been carried into effect 
 
 it woul(i_so far shatter the enemYlS-firg power that it Vyould experi;_ 
 ence but little re siflf ance m"IEe actuai.paaas^e of ^ihySieinv'B pSi^ 
 "tion. t)ii t wouM. Aen, encounter jiKeturioua attacks~oFhi3 reserves,^^ 
 'Jttlront and on the flanks, to imeet" wliicli "it woulJn5e"e9senEraI to 
 have the whole corps in hand ready to fight in any direction. 
 
 Be this as it may, as a fact it failed, for the men threw them- 
 selves down and allowed themselves to be trampled on. There is 
 a tradition in the French Army, cited by Armand du Pic, that only 
 3,000 reached the enemy's position and about 3,000 were killed ; 
 therefore the remaining 24,000 obviously did not go on. 
 
THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1813 45 
 
 was it possible to overcome the teohnical difficulties 
 in its execution. It was not really until the battle 
 of Friedland, in 1807, that the machinery at last over- 
 came its own internal resistance. 
 
 Indirectly this use of ^Napoleon's AxtUlery solved the 
 problem of utiUzuig his very inefficient Cavahy on the 
 battlefield. In Frederick's day, it was normally impos- 
 sible to decide beforehand at what point the services of 
 the Cavalry would be needed, hence a high degree of 
 manoeuvring capacity was necessary to ensure its arrival 
 at the right time and place. Now it became possible to 
 predict with certainty where it would be required a 
 considerable time in advance, and to move it into 
 position without excessive demands on pace or manoeu- 
 vring powers. Once formed it could be let loose to ride 
 down its opponents by sheer weight of numbers, Uke the 
 Bhattor horse against du Boigne's brigades at the 
 battle of Jeypore.^ 
 
 The Cavalry of the Allies throughout 1813 was 
 
 generally of a far higher standard than that of the 
 
 French, but as its Leaders could not determine where it 
 
 was Ukelyjio be required, much greater demands on its 
 
 endurance and drill efficiency were necessarily made, 
 
 which it was not always in a position to satisfy. With 
 
 bhe assured sense of superiority resulting from his 
 
 possession of a strategic system and a tactical proficiency 
 
 ^ C!harge of the Rhattor Hoise. Note : The description of this 
 charge in Skinner's Memoire is unfortunately too long to quote 
 Briefly, 10,000 Rhattor Horse, formed in ft ^i^ ft '':Sb}^"V, attacked 
 the regular Mahratta Infantry under du Boign6, who stood in squares 
 to meet them. They reserved their fire till the horsemen were 
 almost on them, but it hardly checked the momentum of the charge. 
 The mass swept over the squares like a tidal wave, and of 8,000 
 Infantry only 200 are said to have escaped. See Caedky versus 
 Injaittry, p. 167, by the Author. 
 
46 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 superioi to anything Ms adversaries conld oppose to 
 him, Napoleon now tended towards over-confidence, and 
 sometimes discounted his victory in advance, with con- 
 sequences which ultimately iecame fatal both to his Army 
 and himself. This tendency must be kept in mind as a 
 basis of all criticism of the coming Campaign. 
 
 Fornuitinn *!f Macdonald r Corps lalVSi^a] 
 
 
 
 Omnium mud Umty Cvnlry 
 
THE PEOLOGUE OF THE WAE 
 
CHAPTEE III 
 
 The Prologue of the War 
 
 It was on December 4, 1812, that Napoleon left the 
 wreck of the Grand Army, which six months ago he 
 had led across the Niemen, to its fate in the snows of 
 Russia. Handing the command of its pitiful remnant 
 over to Murat, he hurried back to Paris as fast as post 
 horses could carry him. On the 14th he was in Dresden. 
 Prom there he wrote to the King of Prussia, calling on 
 him to raise another 30,000 men,^ an order with which 
 the King was most willing to comply, as it afforded 
 cover under which to continue preparations for the 
 national emergency which all Germans felt must arise 
 sooner or later. On December 19 Napoleon arrived 
 in Paris and wrote to Murat a letter,^ in which he 
 made it appear that the King of Prussia had himself 
 offered these reinforcements. No evidence of any 
 such offer has, however, been found, and the motive 
 which led to this distortion of fact remains obscure, 
 unless Napoleon craftily intended to put fresh heart 
 into his beaten and famishing soldiers by leading 
 them to beUeve that the Prussians still had a good 
 enough opinion of their invincibihty to offer to back 
 them up in spite of their retreat from Moscow. 
 
 1 Cmrea. 19,385. » Oorrea. 19,388. 
 
 49 
 
 E 
 
50 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 On January 19, 1813, the Emperor wrote to Davout, 
 then in Hamburg,^ ordering him to seize Swedish 
 Pomerania forthwith, if there were boots enough in 
 store there to make it worth his while. The order was 
 promptly carried out, but the boots had to be dearly 
 paid for, as this violation of Swedish territory was not 
 the least of the causes which subsequently compelled 
 Bernadotte to throw in his lot with the Allies. 
 
 Meanwhile, the debris of Napoleon's beaten army 
 was reaching the Prussian frontier, and a report of the 
 Q.M.G. of ^onig sberg shows that on December 21 there . 
 were 255 French generals^ 699-- coloiiels, 4,412 captains 
 and subal terns^ and 26,59Q_men, exclusive of 6,000 
 sick in the hospital, quartered in that district alone. 
 
 As the stragglers arrived at the frontier they were 
 ordered to report at the following places : — 
 
 I and VIII Corps at Thorn ; II and III at Marien- 
 burg ; IV and IX at Marienwerder ; V at Warsaw ; VI at 
 Plock ; Artillery and Engineers at Danzig ; Dismounted 
 Line Cavalry at Konigsberg ; Guard Cavalry at Elbing. 
 
 The 30th Division (Heudelet) consisting of Bavarians, 
 together with 8 Squadrons, had only recently reached 
 Danzig, and were the only formed body of troops avail- 
 able for the field. 
 
 The X Corps, (Macdonald), to which the Prussian 
 contingent under Yorck was attached, was still in the 
 neighbourhood of Eiga, and the VII Corps (Eeynier) 
 was with Schwarzenberg close to the Austrian frontier. 
 The Eussians had halted about Vilna, and on the 
 Bug, only following up the French retreat with their 
 Cossacks, who on December 21 crossed the Prussian 
 > Correa. 16,447. 
 
THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 51 
 
 frontier near Gumbinen and Insterburg. On Decem- 
 
 Convention ^®^ ^^ *^^ convention of Tauroggen was 
 
 of Taurog- concluded, hj which von Yorck separated 
 
 ^*" himself from Macdonald and surrendered 
 
 to the Russians. The exact truth of this surrender 
 
 will probably never be ascertained, for many verbal 
 
 messages passed between Yorck and the King in 
 
 Berhn, of which under the circiunstances no written 
 
 record exists. The situation was far too dehcate to 
 
 entrust such secrets to paper. 
 
 General von Wrangel, in his Memoirs, published in 
 1830, says that in August, 1812, he carried verbal in- 
 structions to von Grawert, authorizing him, in case of 
 a general retreat, to separate from the French and 
 withdraw on Graudenz, but von Grawert had just re- 
 signed his command on account of sickness, and the 
 message was delivered to his successor, von Yorck, 
 who, however, did not show himself at all inclined to 
 act upon verbal instructions in a matter of such moment. 
 But already at an early stage of the proceedings a 
 kind of tacit agreement had been arrived at to limit the 
 fighting at the outposts " as far as was compatible 
 with the honour of the Prussian arms," which was 
 also a portion of the verbal instructions conveyed by 
 von Wrangel, then a Major and confidential Staff 
 Officer. The Russians kept Yorck well informed as 
 to the progress of the retreat, and from -time to time 
 made efforts to induce him to desert the French cause, 
 but to all these Yorck returned answer that he had 
 been aU his hfe a soldier, knew. nothing of diplomacy, 
 and must carry out his orders. At length, in December, 
 the collapse of the French Army becoming more evident 
 
52 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 every day, Yorck transmitted a fresh proposal of the 
 Russians to Berlin for the Royal instructions, and a 
 Major von Seydlitz was sent to him again with verbal 
 instructions, the precise import of which cannot be 
 discovered, for the testimony of the eye-witnesses of 
 the several interviews which now took place differs on 
 several essential points. All that seems certain is that 
 von Seydlitz' s verbal message actually did authorize 
 Torek to act " according to circumstances," and these 
 presently became so pressing, with the prospect of 
 becoming immediately worse, that on the night of 
 December 29 Yorck agreed to a meeting for the next 
 day, at which the final terms of surrender were agreed 
 upon with the Russians. 
 
 The King received the news of this surrender with 
 every symptom of the gravest disapproval, and played 
 his part so well that all the Court were convinced that 
 his anger was most real. But a letter of the late 
 Emperor WiUiam I, dated May 15, 1869 1 gives a some- 
 what different complexion to the matter. The news 
 had been brought to the King at Potsdam, who with 
 the old Emperor William, then a boy of about sixteen, 
 and other members of his family, was walking in the 
 grounds of San Souci. The King went away to speak 
 with the messenger, Graf. Henckel von Donnersmarck, 
 and "for about half an hour we waited in extreme 
 anxiety. 
 
 "Then the King returned with an expression of satis- 
 faction on his face which we had not seen for a long 
 time, but which seemed quite out of harmony with 
 the little speech he made to the assembled group, 
 > HoUeben, p. 86. 
 
THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 53 
 
 amongst whom were our respective adjutants and 
 governors. ' Graf. Henckel has brought me bad news. 
 Yorck has capitulated with his corps to the Eussians ; 
 the times of 1806 seem about to repeat them- 
 selves.' " 
 
 The Nation, of course, received the news with the 
 warmest satisfaction, and when, as its immediate con- 
 sequence, the French were found to be resuming their 
 retreat, this satisfaction broke out into enthusiasm, 
 which proved seriously embarrassing to the King, to 
 whose insight into the situation and strength of charac- 
 ter history has never rendered the justice which they 
 deserve. 
 
 Character ^^^ ^^"^ ^*^® ^^®^ ^^^-"^ placed in a 
 of King of more difficult position. Because at the 
 Prussia (jj-igig of Jena, being then a young and 
 inexperienced man, he had not overridden the opinions 
 of the war-seasoned Generals, by whom he was sur- 
 rounded, he has been credited with a weakness of 
 purpose and want of capacity very much in excess of 
 his deserts. 
 
 No unprejudiced man can read, either his comments 
 on the many reform projects submitted to him before 
 the catastrophe, or the regulations for which he was 
 personally responsible, without being struck by the 
 clear, practical common-sense brought to bear upon 
 every subject. This quality of his always grasped the 
 whole of a matter where his relatively irresponsible 
 advisers saw only their own part in it. After the War 
 he had to conquer the confidence of his Army and his 
 people over again. To do so, in the interests of the 
 Nation, he played a part most repugnant to his strictly 
 
54 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 honourable nature, whicli revolted at the duplicity 
 required by the urgency of the situation. 
 
 From the very first it is abundantly clear that he 
 meant to prepare Prussia for the reconquest of her 
 political independence, but as events have abundantly 
 proved, he knew the temper of his people and the 
 amazing power of Napoleon far more thoroughly than 
 did the reformers. He knew quite well that the French 
 Emperor would never rest without an effort to retrieve 
 his fame ; such an effort was indeed a prime necessity 
 of his continued existence, and the King of Prussia 
 not only gauged ^g,_yet^untouched^resources_^of the 
 French Empice with rare accuracy, but he divined, 
 and nghSyTas events were soon to prove, the want as 
 yet of any real depth of national patriotism in his own 
 people. The reforms of Stein and Hardenberg were 
 the corner-stone of real military efficiency, and these 
 needed nearly two generations of activity before the 
 spirit of parochialism, the characteristic of the period, 
 could be welded into a coherent and imperial whole. ^ 
 
 All doubts as to the military importance of Torek's 
 action are set at rest by Napoleon's own opinion. On 
 January 19 he wrote to Jerome in the following words 
 (Corres. 19,462) : " The immediate consequences of 
 this act of treachery are that the King of Naples will 
 have to withdraw behind the Vistula, and that my 
 losses will be increased by all the sick left in the hospitals 
 
 1 The population of -Prussia being 4,800,000, there should have 
 been not less than 420,000 men stiU of an age to bear arms, of which 
 less than 100,000 were actually with the colours ; yet only 10,000 
 responded to the call for volunteers between January 1 and June 
 31. Evidently the spirit of the time was hardly ripe for Scham- 
 horst's reforms. 
 
THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 55 
 
 of Old Pnissia." Ckusewitz , who was present with » 
 Wittgenstein's"^ Headquarters, confirmed this by his '- 
 independent testimony to the effect that the Eussian 
 Army was so completely exhausted by its losses that I 
 jiad Yorck a gd_MacdgnaJd^_renigjne^^ the pur- 
 
 suit must have come to a standstill on the Niemen, ' 
 and all the resources of East Prussia would iave been 
 paralysed for months to come. As it was, East Prussia [ 
 proved the nucleus of the Nation's revival, for the 
 Cossacks pressing on the heels of the French gave the 
 necessary screen behind which the first new forma- 
 tions could be organized, without news of them reaching 
 the French Emperor. 
 The King The situation was indeed one that called 
 leaves for all the King of Prussia's perspicacity. 
 At Berlin he was still within the clutches 
 of his adversary, and might at any moment be taken 
 prisoner. To avoid this risk he left Berhn on Jan- 
 uary 22, and betook himself to Breslau. 
 
 On his way he wrote to Napoleon, pointing out ia 
 diplomatic language that though he was most anxious 
 to fulfil his treaty obhgations, money was an indis- 
 pensable condition of his compliance, and that if the 
 French Government's payment for the supplies issued 
 to French troops during the previous year was forth- 
 coming (as provided for in their agreement) the process 
 of rearmament would be greatly facilitated.^ 
 
 Meanwhile, the Estates of East Prussia met on their 
 
 own initiative at Konigsberg, being cut ofE from direct 
 
 communication with their King, who officially, was still 
 
 the Ally of Napoleon, by the Eussian screen of Cossacks, 
 
 1 The amount claimed was 100 million francs. 
 
55 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 and with great enthusiasm passed a resolution in favour 
 of placing aU the resources of the district at the dis- 
 posal of Yorck, Bulow and Borstell, the principal 
 military representatives on the spot, and they proceeded 
 to call out the quotas of men due under the existing 
 law from the several parishes. But though the towns- 
 people were ready to welcome all signs of military 
 activity, the peasants in the country shewed no cor- 
 responding zeal for the National Cause. The orders 
 directing the recruits to join their headquarters were 
 torn up, the civil authorities were openly defied, and 
 ultimately dragoons had to be sent round the provinces 
 to enforce obedience to the law.^ 
 
 Arrived at Breslau, Frederick William came more 
 within the direct influence of the Eussians, and on 
 February 23 decided openly to throw in his lot with 
 theirs ; but his celebrated proclamation denouncing 
 the French Alliance, and caUing on the whole Nation 
 to rise against their oppressors, was only published 
 on March 16, and the actual declaration of War did 
 not reach Paris until the 27th of the, same month. 
 
 Looking at the numbers actually brought into the 
 field by the date of the iasi great battle of the War 
 of Liberation, Liitzen or Gross Gorschen, on May 2, viz. 
 95,000 Allies against 145,000 French, one is inclined to 
 think that an even longer delay could only have been 
 advantageous, for the great difficulties in raising fresh 
 troops consisted in laying the foundations of a sound 
 organization and system of administration, matters 
 not easily attended to when once active contact with 
 the enemy has been established. Once it is quite clear 
 ' See V. Holleben. 
 
THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 57 
 
 who is really responsible for clothing and equipment, 
 who is authorized to sign requisitions and decree new 
 formations, etc., fresh units are comparatively easily 
 called into existence. But all such machinery was 
 idle in the districts stiU held by the French or occupied 
 by the Russians, who were still technically the enemy ; 
 while the poverty of the country, its comparative 
 roadlessness, and more particxdarly the alternations 
 of frost and thaw, made the circulation of orders and 
 instructions most tedious and unreliable. 
 
 To overcome, as far as possible, these 
 °f'pruS difficulties the King decided on a bold 
 Reorgani- step, i.e. decentralization. Accordingly he 
 ^* °" decreed on March 15 the sub-division of the 
 Kingdom into four Military Grovernments, viz., (a) 
 the district between the Elbe and Oder, General von 
 L'Estocq ; (6) between the Oder and Vistula, Lieut. 
 General von Tauentzien ; (c) between the Vistula and 
 Russian frontier, Lieut. -General von Massenbach, and (d) 
 the district of Silesia, Lieut. -General Graf. Gotzen — 
 within each of which divisions the civil authorities were 
 made responsible for the supply of recruits, equipment, 
 etc., while the military authorities undertook the organi- 
 zation of the men thus suppUed, their training, and all 
 matters of local defence. Bach unit as it was formed 
 and completed was at once drafted to the Meld Army. 
 It will be clear that even a couple of weeks' delay 
 would have been invaluable to aUow this new machinery 
 to work smoothly ; but at the last, events forced the 
 hands of the King. Napoleon's demands for the supply 
 of fresh troops, and his claim to place Prussian com- 
 mands at the disposal of his Marshals for employment 
 
58 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 against the " common enemy " became too insistent, 
 while on the other hand the continuous advance of the 
 Cossacks, who drove the French out of Berlin on March 
 3 and 4, 1813, rendered further delay impossible. 
 
 Beading and re-reading the mass of documentary 
 evidence accumulated by von Holleben, from whom 
 the above figures and facts are principally taken, an 
 unbiassed critic is absolutely forced to the conclusion 
 that the King showed sounder judgment than all 
 his advisers put together, although their Hst comprises 
 such names as Schamhorst, Biilow, Bliicher, Hardenberg 
 and Stein ; their ideas were premature, his were practical. 
 On March 15 Soharnhorst submitted t& 
 horet^Plan*^® Bang a final project for the organiza- 
 for a tion of a Landwehr and Landsturm through- 
 Lan we r ^^^ ^j^^ whole kingdom, which was finally 
 approved on the 17th of the Same month. The 
 project had indeed been under discussion for months, 
 and the fundamental idea, together with the name, 
 can be traced back to 1658 ; but the poverty of the 
 country was so great, and the difEerent degrees in 
 which districts were or had been afEected by the 
 passage through them of French or Russian troops, 
 prevalence of active hostilities, and so forth, had hitherto 
 rendered any attempt to deal with the matter on a 
 uniform basis, if not impossible, at any rate inoppor- 
 tune. Even as it was, such delays arose in its execution 
 that no formed bodies of Landwehr actually took part 
 in field operations until after the Armistice of June 4, 
 though isolated detachments, temporarily called to- 
 gether without uniforms or even muskets, rendered 
 good service in support of the field troops, both m 
 
THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 59 
 
 sieges, and in the operations on the Lower Elbe before 
 Napoleon's reappearance on the scene in the beginning 
 of May. Permission was also given by the King of 
 Prussia to form Volunteer Corps, and though these too 
 were not employed until after the Armistice, a recapi- 
 tulation of their names here will be in place. These 
 volunteers found their own equipment, and were com- 
 manded by ex-regular officers. 
 
 They were "The LiitzowFree Corps," whose forma- 
 tion, sanctioned on February 18, reached on March 21 
 a strength of 1,036 men, organized in 4 Companies, and 
 2 Squadrons, to which subsequently a Battery of 3 guns 
 and 1 howitzer were added. 
 
 The foreign battalion, " von Reusz," and the volunteer 
 rifles, " von Reiche," ^ both formed of volTmteers drawn 
 from the rest of Germany, and nearly all deserters from 
 the Westphalian or other contingents of the " Grand 
 Army." 
 
 Major Hellwig's volunteers 2 Squadrons of partisan 
 Cavalry; Major von SchiU's Hussar detachment — com- 
 manded by a brother of the celebrated, von SchUl, killed 
 in a raid near Stralsund, 1809 — comprised 2 Squadrons. 
 Also a variety of smaller detachments, mostly com- 
 posed of picked foresters, even of poachers amnestied. 
 
 The total of all these formations up to the date of 
 the Armistice only reached the figure of 8,500 men, of 
 whom 2,000 were mounted.^ 
 
 ^ " Von Reusz " and " von Reiche " were the names of their 
 Commanders, not standing, as the names would suggest, in any 
 connexion with the little kiiigdom of Reusz or the Empire. 
 
 ' As an indication of the difiSculties encountered in raising fresh 
 bodies of troops, the case of Colonel yon Thuimen's detachment 
 may be cited. 
 
 Von Thuimen equipped SJ BattaUons in forty-eight hours. 
 
6o THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Bythe end of March there stood ready for the field :— 
 
 (a) 21 Battalions, 40 Squadrons, 1% Batteries, 2 
 companies'' engineers = 646 officers, 26,510 men, 100 
 guns — under Bliioher. 
 
 (&) 27 Battalions, 24 Squadrons, 11^ Batteries, 4 
 Companies' engineers = 646 officers, 25,751 men, 106 
 guns — under Yorok and Biilow. 
 
 (6)4 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, IJ Batteries = 61 
 officers, 2,761 men, 12 guns — under Borstell. 
 
 Other small detachments brought the numhers up to 
 57 Battalions, 70 Squadrons, 27^ Batteries, 7 Companies 
 engineers, 8 park columns, and 1 column tradesmen — 
 in all 1,145 officers, 58,865 men, 234 guns available for 
 field service, but their sick list was very high. In ad- 
 dition there remained 30,077 garrison troops, and 33j,640 
 in the dep6ts, giving a grand total of 122,582 men. 
 
 Compared with the states for August 1, 1811, these 
 figures shew a net increase of 48,169 men, which, even 
 allowing for losses in Russia and a high rate of sickness, 
 seem very small for such an emergency, and appears 
 insignificant compared with the re-creation of the French 
 Army during the same period. 
 
 It cannot be doubted that the Prussians as a race 
 were far more aUve to the necessity for personal service 
 
 and then started on a marcli of 150 miles through country held by 
 the French. To avoid observation, he had frequently to march by 
 night. The inhabitants proved very lukewarm to the cause, many 
 of the men deserted, and more broke down through hardships entailed 
 by want of clothing, shelter and food. 
 
 The origin of the black uniforms of Liitow's Volunteers had nothing 
 to do with the " death or glory" sentiment, but was adopted aa the 
 simplest means of making use of the black civilian coats which the 
 men normally wore, and of the stores of cloth in the tailors' shop. 
 Both cloth and tailors had frequently to be requisitioned. — See Von 
 HoUeben, Vol. I. 
 
THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 6i 
 
 than were the French, who had not felt the burden of 
 invasion for twenty years, and then only very partially, 
 about one-eighth of the total area of that country 
 only having been affected. The chief difference 
 would seem to be that in France civil and military 
 Government had been accustomed to work together 
 for a whole generation, while for nearly two genera- 
 tions in Prussia miUtary Government had been en- 
 tirely subordinate to the civilians, and the Army and 
 Nation had drifted completely out of touch with 
 each other. 
 
 It is interestiag also to compare the relative yield 
 of fresh armed men in Flgl wj in 180.^ under threat of 
 invasion only. In that year we raised nearly 600,000 l 
 fighting men on a population about three times greater 
 than that of 'Prussia, the influx, of course, being greatest 
 during the first six months after the King's message of 
 the 5th March announcing the renewal of hostilities after 
 the Peace of Amiens, and our sick hst of course was much 
 less. Yet, making all due allowances, it would seem 
 that our output per cent, was at least double that of the 
 Prussians.^ 
 
 The most amazing point, however, seems to me to 
 be this, in spite of all the efforts of the Tugendbtmd 
 and other secret societies, to say nothing of the inspiring 
 Volkslieder of Arndt, etc., the two weak battalions of 
 Eeusz and Eeiche appear to have been quite adequate 
 to absorb all the true patriots of the remaining 20 
 milHon Germans. 
 
 Considerable difficidty was also experienced in find- 
 
 ^ The comparison between the realized military output of Francs 
 in 1792 is also interesting. See Haz Jahns, Das Franzosiche Beer. 
 
62 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 ing new officers for the Forces. The conditions of the 
 entrance examinations had to be relaxed, and the two 
 cadet schools were supressed, their pupils being posted 
 direct to Eegiments. Non-commissioned officers of 
 good character and approved conduct in the field were 
 also freely promoted. The cause of the difficulty, of 
 course, lay in the Treasury policy of the past forty 
 years, which had compelled the retention of officers on 
 the active list long after they ought to have been 
 pensioned. It was not that the Generals of the pre- 
 Jena Army had been too old, but the captains and 
 senior subalterns decidedly were so (the former averaged 
 about the same as those who served under Moltke in 
 the Franco-German War, and were younger than the 
 average of French Grenerals ten years ago) ; they had 
 lost aU youth and activity, and collapsed wholesale 
 under the stress of the retreat. 
 
 As regards muskets, there appear to have been suffi- 
 cient for the Field Army, but the depot and garrison 
 troops had to drill with extemporized pikes, while some 
 of the Landwehr, even after the Armistice, were led 
 against the enemy their front ranks provided only with 
 similar weapons. The supply of guns, too, was sufficient, 
 though heavy and antiquated patterns had to be em- 
 ployed,^ and both the draught horses and cavalry 
 
 1 It must not be forgotten that the last fifty years had seen an 
 enormous progress in artillery construction, almost as great as the 
 step from the ordinary B.L. guns of the nineties to the present 
 quick firers. The guns had been rendered immensely more power- 
 ful in proportion to the weight behind the trains, while the method 
 of draught and finish of the carriage had also undergone great im- 
 provement. Gribeauval in France, and Schamhorst in Hanover 
 and Prussia had been principally instrumental in securing these 
 reforms. (See M. Colin' s Education de Napoleon.) 
 
THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 63 
 
 remounts appear to have been fair material, though 
 time was wanted to train them in the systematic manner 
 of former days, and, as Marwitz ^ and others have since 
 shewn us, this training was the real secret of excellence 
 in the old Prederickian Cavalry. 
 
 Enghsh subsidies were largely instrumental 
 Sut«i(Ues ^ rendering the equipment of these troops 
 
 possible. Unfortunately, we also sent over 
 a number of uniforms of English pattern (colour not 
 stated), and, to quote' Von HoUeben, " The King had to 
 submit to the daily annoyance of seeing his men clad 
 in these tasteless garments." Actually this insult 
 seems to rankle in that author's mind even more than 
 all the exactions of the French Marshals, whose charac- 
 ters he now seeks to whitewash at the expense of -his 
 ancestors' reputation for veracity in the past. However, 
 before long the King had his revenge, for shortly after 
 Waterloo the Prussian cap and frock coat was adopted 
 wholesale in the British Army, and at the present 
 moment it would be impossible to distinguish between 
 Prussian and British troops on a misty morning at 
 fifty yards range. 
 
 Meanwhile the Russian Field Army had 
 Russians ^^^^ moving forward, leaving detachments 
 
 behind to observe the fortresses of Thorn, 
 Danzig and Kiistrin — ^in all 36,000 men, 313 guns ; and 
 troops to keep order in Poland — ^21,800 men, 150 
 guns. Making these deductions, however, at the end 
 
 ' Marwitz's book is now very difficult to obtain and was never 
 translated. Prince Hohenlohe von Ingelflngen's Conversations 
 on Cavalry gives the beat information on this subect. I may also 
 rrfgE^ my own Gavalrg, its Pastffnd^ Futiure. which gives useful 
 3eSas*Sli" b'oiS lEe'B¥enoE"'and'(5emaircavalry at this period. 
 
64 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 of March, 1813, the troops available for the Field 
 Army numbered 63,686 men and 436 guns,^ of whom 
 19,000 with 92 guns under Wittgenstein constituted 
 an Advance Guard that was pressing close on the heels 
 - of the retiring French, while the remainder under 
 Kutusow were drawing near to Kalisch on the borders 
 of Silesia. 
 
 It is time now to return to the operations 
 
 y^njy of the wreck of the Grand Army, which, 
 as we have seen above, had been compelled 
 to evacuate in haste the banks of the Vistula on 
 receipt of the news of Torek's defection at Taurog- 
 gen. Murat's orders we have already given; these 
 were the last he issued, as he was immediately after- 
 wards recalled to Paris, and handed over his command 
 to Prince Eugene, Viceroy of Italy. At this moment, 
 January 19, the whole of the six Corps, nominally 
 at the Prince's disposal gave him barely 12,000 fighting 
 men, and these almost worn out by privation. He 
 would have had practically no men for field operations, 
 but for the arrival at Posen of some 10,000 provisional 
 detachments of difierent nationaUties ; for the only 
 other troops which had preserved their formsEtion, viz., 
 the Polish Division, Grand Jean, of Macdonald's Corps, 
 and Heudelet's Division of the XI Corps had been 
 thrpwn into Danzig, raising the garrison of that place 
 to 30,000 men, of whom, however, barely two-thirds 
 were fit for active service. 
 
 On the right wing the VII Corps (Reynier), two Saxon 
 Divisions and the French Division (Durutte) had se- 
 parated themselves from Schwarzenberg's command 
 1 Holleben, p. 266. 
 
THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 65 
 
 when the latter concluded an armistice with, the Rus- 
 sians, and Were marching through SUesia, sufEering 
 continually from the attacks of Cossacks and other local 
 partisans. But Poniatowski's Poles, about 8,000 men, 
 had been cut off in Warsaw, and another 12,000 had 
 been left as garrisons in Modlin, Zamosc and Thorn. 
 In rear of the centre there remained only the 31st 
 division (Lagrange) of the XI Corps, 10,000 strong, 
 but dispersed to hold Berlin and garrison Magdeburg 
 Spandau and the fortresses on the Oder — Glogau, 
 Kiistrin and Stettin, whilst the Division of Grenier, 
 18,000 men, was only due in Berlin on January 25. 
 
 Out of the 12,000 men thus immediately under Prince 
 Eugene's hand he organized four weak Divisions — one 
 Bavarian (General Rechberg), one PoUsh (General 
 Girard), one French (General Gerard), and finally one 
 of the Guard (General Roguet), grouping them around 
 Posen, and drafting all supemimierary officers and 
 non-commissioned officers in excess of their comple- 
 ments back to the depot at Erfurt. The name " Divi- 
 sion "■ was retained in order to deceive the enemy as 
 to their actual weakness. Some 2,000 mounted men, 
 partly surplus to the above detachments, partly rallied 
 to him by force of circumstances, were also organized 
 in two " Divisions.'' With this skeleton force the 
 Prince endeavoured to impose on the Russians and hold 
 the line of the Oder in obedience to the Emperor's 
 orders, until reinforcements from France could reach 
 him. He also summoned Biilow and all other Prussian 
 detachments to his aid, but received evasive answers. 
 Meanwhile the growing imrest in Berlin and its neigh- 
 bourhood compelled him to keep back the new XI 
 
66 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Corps, organized out of Grenier's 18,000 men, for the 
 maintenance of order in his rear. 
 
 His situation soon became hopelessly untenable. 
 Frost held all the rivers in its bonds, and Tettenborn's 
 and Tschitschagow's Cossacks swept all round his 
 flanks. At length on February 12 he began his retreat, 
 reaching Frankfort on the Oder on February 18, where 
 hearing that the Cossacks had already crossed the 
 river further to the north, he continued his movement 
 on Berlin. Meanwhile in the south Reynier's two 
 Saxon Divisions deserted him, and Durutte's Division 
 was surprised on the march and nearly cut to pieces. 
 Viceroy's ^^* ^^^'^ Berlin, (where he had rallied 
 return from on the new XI Corps, to which Gouvion 
 
 Berlm g^ q^ -^^ h&en. appointed in command,) 
 could not, as we have seen, be held for long, and 
 on March 5 the Viceroy's (Prince Eugene's) force 
 withdrew to the Elbe, whilst the wreck of Reynier's 
 troops gathered in Dresden. Napoleon wrote one of 
 his characteristic letters to Eugene, censuring him 
 severely, but more as an elder brother than as a Gene- 
 ralissimo, for his failure to hold the line of the Oder ; 
 but his reasoning, though unanswerable from the arm- 
 chair-critical standpoint, like his letters to Jerome 
 when in Spain, made no sufficient allowance for cir- 
 cumstances of weather and topography. 
 
 If the old school of strategists had gone altogether too 
 far in the attention they paid to the configuration of the 
 ground and other circumstances which exist only to be 
 conquered by skill and determination, he now overshot 
 the limit of the reasonable in ignoring the limits of 
 human endurance and climatic vicissitudes. To him 
 
THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR , 67 
 
 as Graf. Yorck von Wartenburg in his Napoleon as a 
 General has well pointed out, a " Corps " remained 
 always a " Corps," even if its numbers had shrunk to 
 5,000 men or less, while a river or a mountain range 
 was a scratch on a map, unless he happened at the 
 moment to be face to face with it himself. In this 
 instance he had entirely overlooked ^e terrible fro st 
 which still held all the rivers of Eastern Prussia in ife 
 grip. Had the jOder been in ite^ normal unfordable 
 conditio n, undoubtedly the possession of its four for-" 
 tresses, Stettin, Frankfort, Kiistrin and Glogau, might 
 have enabled Eugene to hold it, even with his reduced 
 forces for some weeks longer than he actually did, as 
 the Eussian Army was still a long way ofi and Yorck 
 and Billow's forces were quite insignificant. But in 
 the weather then prevailing the Oder could be crossed 
 almost anywhere, as, in fact, it was, and with a popu- 
 lation on the verge of insurgence behind him, the 
 Viceroy certainly had not a moment to spare when he 
 came to his decision to retreat. 
 
 On the question of the abandonment of Berlin, 
 Napoleon's comments are again masterly from the 
 general point of view, although, as above pointed out, 
 no allowance is made for the actual position of affairs as 
 seen by the average man on the spot. 
 
 "Nothing is less in accord with sound 
 Co^l^^* military practice than your decision to 
 withdraw your Headquarters behind Berlin 
 (viz., to Schoneberg, a preliminary step to complete 
 withdrawal). It should have been evident to you 
 that this step must attract the enemy. If, on 
 the contrary, you had taken up a position in front of 
 
68 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Berlin (i.e. east) commuiiicating by convoys with 
 Spandau, and thence isdth. Magdeburg, and had brought 
 up a Division of the V Corps (from Magdeburg) midway 
 between the two latter poiQts,and had constructed there 
 a few redoubts, the enemy would have beUeved that 
 you intended to offer battle. Hence he would not have 
 passed the Oder until he had united 60,000 to 80,000 
 men, which he was far from being in a condition to do." 
 As a fact, on March 4 the Russians were still five days' 
 march from Berlin, Yorck and Billow even further ; 
 but there is no evidence to show that the Viceroy was 
 aware of this, and in view of the hopeless inadequacy 
 of his mounted forces and the nature of the country, 
 it seems hardly possible that he could have scouted 
 efficiently to that end. Kapoleon then continues : 
 " The day on which your Headquarters retired behind 
 Berlin you practically advertised your determination 
 not to hold that town, and thus lost that attitude of 
 determined opposition which it is the real Art of War to 
 know how to keep. An experienced General ia your 
 place would have established a camp (presumably en- 
 trenched) in front of (i.e. east of) Kiistrin, and thus 
 have gained time to draw forward the CorpI on the 
 Elbe to Berlin. He could not then have been attacked 
 except at the cost of the time it would have taken the 
 enemy to prepare the wide sweeping movements the 
 capture of such a position would have entailed." ^ 
 
 ' References to this maintenance of " an attitude of determined 
 opposition," are frequent in Napoleon's comments and criticisms, 
 and their plain oommonsense is perhaps the reason why they have 
 been so frequently overlooked by his commentators, who were 
 too intent on discovering allusions to the re-entering frontiers, 
 angular relations of lines of operations to bases, etc., to have any 
 attention to spare for the apparently obvious. 
 
THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 69 
 
 Eugene, however, seems to have had but little choice 
 in the matter of his retreat, and appears to have con- 
 sidered even the Magdeburg road, to which the Emperor 
 refers, .as not safe enough for his retrograde movement, 
 for, in fact, he retreated in two columns, the principal 
 one on Wittenberg, the other by Liickau on Torgau, 
 a Saxon fortress stiU held by Saxon troops, who declined 
 to allow the French to pass on the grounds that Saxony 
 was a neutral country. Refused passage here, the 
 column bent ofE up stream to Meissen, where it arrived 
 most conveniently in time to assist Reynier in over- 
 awing the people of Dresden. 
 
 These movements brought the French troops into 
 position along the Elbe, a cordon position of the worst 
 kind ; and here for the moment the Viceroy left them, 
 till, his report having reached the Emperor, a storm of 
 reproaches burst upon his head. 
 
 " I do not see what obHged you to quit Berhn. Your 
 movements are so rapid that you have not been able 
 to take the direction I had prescribed (alluding to a 
 previous letter received too late for compliance with 
 its mandates). You have uncovered Magdeburg with- 
 out having taken steps to assure yourself whether 
 it is sufficiently provisioned or garrisoned. Yet it 
 contains all our Field Artillery, and many other 
 important things. (This is hardly fair, as Eugene had, 
 in fact, left there the whole V Corps, some 30,000 
 men.) 
 
 " By your march on Wittenberg you have left un- 
 protected the whole of the 32nd ' Division Mihtaire ' 
 and the Kingdom of Westphalia. You thus run the 
 risk of losing all the Cavalry which is distributed in 
 
70 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 cantonments, and have left the finest provinces of the 
 Empire at the mercy of an advance guard of a few thou- 
 sand men. I have always told you that you should 
 retire on Magdeburg. In laying yoxir lines of com- 
 munication via Mayence, not only have you com- 
 promised the safety of the 32nd 'Division Militaiie,' 
 but also Holland and my squadrons in the Scheldt. It 
 is really time to begin making war seriously. It is in 
 front of Magdeburg (i.e. to the east of it) that you 
 should have united 80,000 men, whence as a centre 
 you would protect the whole of the Elbe. Our opera- 
 tions make us ridiculous in the eyes of our allies and 
 of our enemies, because you constantly retreat a week 
 before their infantry come within sight of you. It is 
 really time that you should set to work-and begin to 
 operate like a soldier. I have laid down what you 
 ought to do." 
 
 Then foUows in detail the plan the Emperor wishes 
 to see carried out : — 
 
 "Prince Eugene takes position nine to 
 
 on°the" twelve miles east of Magdeburg with the V 
 Defence of and XI Corps, Roguet'a Division, and the 
 the Elbe ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ Cavaby— 65,000-70,000 
 
 men of the best available— and covers his camp with 
 redoubts, leaving ample space to manoeuvre be- 
 tween them. Marshal Victor with the 4th Division 
 (12 Battalions) moves on the left bank of the Elbe to 
 near Dessau, where he establishes a bridge, and till 
 this is complete a ferry, covered by fortifications. His 
 action will extend as far as Torgau, and the garrison 
 of Wittenberg, raised to 2,000 men. General Reynier, 
 with the 7th Corps (which the Emperor imagined to be 
 
THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR yi 
 
 12,000 strong, but which was in reality only 6,000) wiU 
 ensure the watch over the line of the Elbe from Torgau to 
 the mountains of Bohemia (about 70 miles) ; he will fortify 
 the bridge at Meissen. The Saxon General commanding 
 in Torgau will employ two-thirds of his force (4,000 
 men) to watch the river above and below the town ; 
 the rest will remain always in the place. (As we have 
 seen, the Saxon General refused to accept any orders 
 from the French.) 
 
 "MarshalDavout, with the 1st Division (16 Battahons) 
 will place himself on the left of Magdeburg (i.e. north). 
 He knows Hamburg and is known there too, and his 
 proximity to that town wiU be very useful. Hamburg 
 win have a garrison of 8,000 men, sufficient, with the 
 aid of its mimicipal guards, to hold the town against 
 the Cossacks. The King of Westphaha will organise 
 a mixed Division of his troops, to be concentrated two 
 or three marches west of Magdeburg, which wfll be 
 ready to support either Victor or Davout as the case 
 may require. 
 
 " Of course all the boats on the Elbe and its affluents 
 on the right bank must be systematically destroyed, 
 or brought under the protection of our own guns. The 
 Une of conununications will be from Magdeburg on Wesel. 
 
 " The principal Corps, placed in the camp in front of 
 Magdeburg, will send out every day mixed reconnais- 
 sances of 1,500 horsemen and a Division of Infantry. 
 I presume that you do not intend to let yourself be 
 shut in by the Cossacks and a few Battalions. 
 
 " In case of an attack directed against the principal 
 Corps, Marshals Victor and Davout will cross the river 
 and manoeuvre against the enemy's flanks. 
 
72 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 " Your position in the camp in front of Magdeburg 
 will re-establish the ' moral ' of your troops. If the 
 enemy marches in force on Havelberg, he must leave 
 at least 80,000 to mask you (and this is impossible, as 
 the Allies have not a sufficient number of men avail- 
 able). If they make a serious effort towards Dresden, 
 more than Reynier can deal with; then the latter 
 will fall back behind the Mulde, or, further, always 
 keeping on your right. Then an advance of the princi- 
 pal corps from Magdeburg or Brandenburg will frighten 
 them and bring them back to the right bank of the 
 Elbe again. In taking up this offensive position and 
 showing the great number of troops you have in Magde- 
 burg, the enemy will be held ia check and will be unable 
 to undertake anything without bringing at least 100,000 
 men against you ; and seeing himself on the eve of a 
 battle, he will take good care not to make any detach- 
 ments which would weaken him." ^ 
 
 Although throughout this letter Napoleon had syste- 
 matically overestimated Eugene's forces and under- 
 estimated those of the Allies, the form of defence is 
 perfect ; but before this letter reached its destination 
 the Viceroy had made further dispositions which aggra- 
 vated the evils of the first. He had brought Davout 
 from Hamburg and sent him to command all the troops 
 about Dresden, and had written to justify his previous 
 measures. This brought down on him renewed re- 
 proaches, for, as Napoleon very rightly points out, 
 " for General Reynier to withdraw from Dresden means 
 nothing, but for a Corps (however weak) under the 
 Prince of Eckmuhl to be compelled to retreat is quite 
 ^ Letter of March 19. See also Lanresac, p. 65, et seq. 
 
THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 73 
 
 another matter ; it would show that we intended to 
 defend that place, but did not dare to act up to our 
 intention." 
 Emperor's Ultimately on March 18, under renewed 
 Plan pressure from Napoleon and the news of 
 °P ^ the occupation of Hamburg by Tettenbom's 
 Cossacks, orders were issued to concentrate in the form 
 indicated in the Emperor's orders, but with the impor- 
 tant exception that the bulk of his troops were retained 
 on the left bank of the river. 
 
 Meanwhile, the news from Hamburg which reached the 
 Viceroy became alarming. A rumour was in circulation 
 that 10,000 to 15,000 British troops were expected there, 
 to form the nucleus of a Corps of 10,000 Danes, 5,000 
 Russians, and some thousand Swedes, their object being 
 an attack on the 32nd " Division Militaire " and a descent 
 thence on the Viceroy's communications with the Rhine. 
 Napoleon was evidently much annoyed at the facility with 
 which such ruatnours gained credence, and he administered 
 to his unfortunate son-in-law the foUowiag reproof : "You 
 go altogether too quickly, and alarm yourself too readily. 
 You attach too much importance to every rumour. 
 More calm is required in the direction of mihtary 
 matters, and before attaching credence to reports they 
 should be carefully discussed. Everything that spies 
 and agents tell you (unless they have seen with their 
 own eyes) is nothing, and even when they have seen, 
 it is worth very httle. Why do you beUeve that the 
 British are going to disembark at Hamburg ? Where 
 are their means ? AH their efforts are directed towards 
 Portugal. Is it because a number of ships are in view ? 
 But you can see thoxisands every day from the coast 
 
74 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 of France. What I tell you is all useless, because it is 
 only experience which teaches one to reduce these 
 astonishing reports to their true dimensions." 
 
 Actually this censure was in excess of the Viceroy's 
 deserts, for the Cossacks had spread far into the territory 
 of the 32nd " Division Militaire," and as the inhabitants 
 had risen in many places, it was almost impossible for 
 any accurate idea of the enemy's movements to be 
 ascertained. 
 
 On March 31, however, definite news was 
 
 Mockern received to the effect that Wittgenstein had 
 quitted Berlin on the 27th, and was marching 
 on Eosslau to cross the Elbe at that place. The 
 Prince now decided to bring his troops over the river 
 to the position indicated in Napoleon's instructions in 
 front of Magdeburg, and from this movement resulted a 
 straggling encounter known as the "Combat of Mockern" 
 on April 3, 4 and 5, only noticeable from the extreme fury 
 with which the raw Prussian troops fought. Their num- 
 bers, however, were far less than Eugene had been led to 
 expect, hence when by the evening of the 5th it had 
 become apparent that there were not 20,000 men engaged 
 in front of him, he concluded that the real main body of 
 the enemy must still be on the march towards Rosslau 
 with the intention of turning his right flank by the left 
 bank of the river, and a report coming in stating that 
 the bridge at Rosslau actually had been captured (a 
 false rumour, as it afterwards turned out to be), he 
 ordered his troops back to the left bank of the Elbe, 
 and the Prussians were far too spent by their exertions 
 to interfere with them. 
 
 The whole incident was unfortunate for the French, 
 
THE PROLOGUE OF THE WAR 75 
 
 for the Allies made tte most of their success, and the 
 reports of it went far and wide all over Germany, raising 
 confidence everywhere in the hearts of the patriotic 
 party, which as yet was far from being sjTionymous 
 with the whole Nation. Contrasting Eugene's action 
 with Napoleon's orders, one can only ask oneself wonder- 
 ingly, what possible cause there could have been strong 
 enough to compel the Emperor to leave this most 
 important command in such incapable hands, when 
 all the time there was on the spot perhaps the ablest 
 and most determined of all his Marshals : Davout — a 
 man of Ms own age — active and resolute far beyond 
 the common standard, and devoted to Napoleon heart 
 and soul. Every commentator in turn has asked this 
 question, but hitherto no adequate reply has been 
 suggested. 
 
 Viceroy '^^^ Prince now, recognizing the im- 
 
 moves to possibility of continuing to hold the line of 
 
 Lower Saale ^.j^^ j;j{jg^ determined to defend the Lower 
 
 Saale, and during the following days the Army of 
 the Elbe moved into the position shown on Map 
 1. Wittgenstein having now no enemy in front 
 of him crossed the Elbe at Eosslau on the 10th, 
 and moved southward to gaia touch with Winzinge- 
 rode and Bliicher, whose cavalry scouts already watched 
 the whole line of the Saale, and whose troops were 
 disseminated between Leipzig and Dresden, whilst the 
 Kussian Main Army still lay at Kalisch, retained there 
 byKutusow in spite of the protestations of the Prus- 
 sians. It was only on April 7 that the Russian Guards 
 commenced their march on Dresden, distant 200 miles ; 
 hence they could not be expected to reach Leipzig, 90 
 
76 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 miles further on, before the 27th or 28th of the 
 month. 
 
 Till that date therefore the AlUes had not more than 
 70,000 men available. Hence of necessity they called 
 a halt and busied themselves in the improvement of 
 communica'tions-, notably of bridges across the Elbe at 
 Meissen and Dresden, whilst "Wittgenstein attempted 
 to surprise Wittenberg, but was repulsed. 
 
 On April 19 a rumour, premature as it turned out to 
 be, that Napoleon was in full march at the head of 
 the Army of the Maine to effect a junction with that 
 of Prince Eugtoe, startled them into activity. Witt- 
 genstein moved to Diiben, Kleist to HaUe, and Biilow, 
 left before Magdeburg, was reheved by a small Russian 
 corps of observation, and also rejoined the main body 
 (see Map 1). 
 
NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD— CONCENTRA- 
 TION OF THE GBAND ARMY, AND OPERA- 
 TIONS TO THE BATTLE OF LUTZEN 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 Napoleon takes the Field — Concentration of the 
 Grand Army and Operations to the Battle 
 
 OP LiJTZEN 
 
 Composition ^"^ ^ *^® ^°^ *° retum-to the Emperor, 
 of Grand and to review his acti\dty during these months 
 
 ""^ of heavy strain. 
 The general idea governing the reconstruction of his 
 
 Army has abeady been given in Chapter II. Now it 
 
 is necessary to build up the skeleton into which the 
 
 raw material available was to be filled. 
 By a decree issued from the Trianon, March 12,^ the 
 
 composition of the Army was laid down as foUows : — 
 
 I Corps, Marshal Davofit (Prince d'Eckmiihl). Ist, 2nd and 
 
 Srd Bivlsions, 
 n Corps, Marshal Victor (Duo de BeUtino) 4th, 6th and 6th 
 
 Divisions. 
 HI Corps, Marshal JSey (Prince de la Moskova), the existing 
 
 I Corps of Observation on the Bhine, together with the 8th, 
 
 9th, 10th and 11th Divisions. 
 
 IV Corps, General Bertrand, the existing Corps of Observation 
 
 in Italy, with the 12th, 13th, 14th and ISth Divisions. 
 
 V Corps, General Lauriston, the existing Corps of Observation 
 
 on the Elbe, with the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th Divisions. 
 
 VI Corps, Marshal Marmont (Due de Bagusa), the existing II 
 jCorps of Observation on the Bhine, with the 20th, 21st, 22nd, 
 and 23rd Divisions. 
 
 VII Corps, General Beynier, intended to comprise the two, 
 Saxon Divisions, the 24th and 25th, and the 32nd Divisiom 
 (Durutte.) 
 
 » Corres. 19,698. 
 79 
 
8o THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 VIII Corps, General Prince Poniatowaki. Two Polish Divisiona 
 Nos. 26 and 27 (only partly raised). 
 
 IX Corps. No General named. The 28th and 29th Bavarian 
 Divisions (never completed). 
 
 X Corps, General Bapp, in Danzig with the 7th, 30th and 33rd 
 
 Divisions (old numhers), the remains of the old 34th Division 
 were absorbed by the 30th. 
 
 XI Corps, Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, which had hitherto formed 
 
 the Advance Guard on the Elbe, consisted of the 31st, 35th 
 and 36th Divisions. 
 
 Besides these troops, the Westphalians were to supply 
 the 37th Division, the Wiirtembergers the 38th Division, 
 the Hessians, Badeners, and Frankfurters the 40th 
 Division, and ten Battahons organized in Erfurt were 
 made into the 41st Division. 
 
 Subsequently on April 24, the formation of a XII 
 Corps was decreed, and at a later date a XIII, Head- 
 quarters at Bamberg, was called into existence. 
 
 As a whole the plan was never reahzed, for, as already 
 pointed out, circumstances proved even stronger than 
 Napoleon's will, but as far as practicable each fresh 
 unit organized was fitted into its appointed place, so 
 that the framework of an Army existed from the very 
 first, and the commands remained, whatever changes 
 in detail might supervene. This was, of 'course, the 
 fundamental idea in the much criticized paper Army 
 Corps schemes for the British Army of the late Col. 
 Home, R.E., revived by Mr. Brodrick; it is unfortunate 
 that the true paternity of the idea was never put f orvfard. 
 
 The procedure in individual cases may be studied 
 with advantage. 
 
 The debris of the I Corps had rallied in 
 
 ^ '"^ Stettin, 68 officers, 1,536 non-commissioned 
 officers and men, on February 17. An order of 
 January 27 had originally laid down the strength 
 
NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD ISi 
 
 of these Corps at four Divisions of 64 Battalions 
 in all, of whicli tte 1st Division was to be formed 
 by 16 Battalions in Stettin itself, tlie 2nd Division (of 
 another 16) in Erfurt, but on the evacuation of the 
 Oder line this became impossible, and on February 
 10, the 1st Division began its formation in Leipzig. As 
 the battaUons (practically all new formations) only be- 
 came ready in succession, and jgomplete Divisions were 
 required at the earhest possible date, all the 1st Bat- 
 taUons of Regiments went to the 1st Division, the 2nd 
 Battalions to the 2nd Division, the 3rd and ithBattahons 
 in like manner to the 3rd and 4th Divisions, a method 
 which was generally followed throughout the Army. The 
 1st and 2nd Divisions, commanded respectively by 
 PhUlipon and Dumonceau, were available for field 
 service by the end of April. 
 
 The II Corps. — Originally the Emperor 
 had hoped to constitute this Corps out of the 
 wreck of the old II and III Corps, but this proved 
 quite impossible. No attempt, therefore, was made to 
 build up the Battahons at the front. " But the Com- 
 panies in the Oder fortresses will take the numbers of the 
 Companies belonging to the 5th BattaUons, and those of 
 the 5th BattaUons at the depots take the number of the 
 Companiesof thelstBattaUons, thus I shaU have in France 
 aU the 1st BattaUons at full strength " ^ as Napoleon 
 wrote to his War Minister, General Clarke, on March 31, 
 adding, " Each Regiment in the Grand Army will thus 
 have four BattaUons, with one or two Companies of the 
 5th BattaUon in the Oder fortresses, and the balance 
 of the 5th BattaUon Companies will be at the d6p6t." 
 I Oorres. 19,790. 
 
 G 
 
82 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Ultimately the 4tli and 5tli Divisions were formed at 
 Magdeburg and Osnabriick respectively, and by the end 
 of April had attained the strength of — 4th Division 
 (Duberton), 12 Battalions, 8 guns, 7,000 men ; 5th Divi- 
 sion (Dufour), 11 Battalions, 8 guns, (5,979 men) ; and 
 they were then moved up to the Elbe and Saale. The 6th 
 Division did not reach the front till the end of June. 
 
 J.J - The III Corps, the original Corps of 
 
 Observation on the Rhine, was built up 
 of eight Regiments formed of the " Cohorts " (see 
 above, p. 31) of the old 22nd Regiment of the 
 Line (4 BattaUons), 10 provisional Regiments, and the 
 9th and 29th Light Infantry, both of two Battahons 
 in all 60 BattaUons. The Corps Headquarters were 
 fixed at Mainz, and the Divisions were ordered to con- 
 centrate at Hanau, Frankfurt am Main, and Mainz. The 
 39th DiAdsion (Badeners, Hessians and Frankfurters) was 
 also assigned to it as a 5th Division. Four Squadrons 
 of the French 10th Hussars, and five Squadrons of the 
 Baden Dragoons were further allotted to it, and by the 
 end of April 44,764 men and 84 gims were available 
 on the Saale. The Divisional Commanders were: 
 8th Division, Souham ; 9th, Brenier ; 10th, Girard ; 
 11th Ricard ; 39th, Marchand. 
 
 The IV Corps. — Already on January 10, 
 
 IV Corps jfapoigon notified the ItaUan chancellor 
 (Melzi), of his intention to concentrate a Corps 
 of Observation at Verona, and on February 27 
 informed him that the Corps must be ready on 
 March 10 to set out for Augsburg. General Bertrand 
 was to start with the first Division available, 
 the others to follow as they were completed. Eight 
 
~ NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 83 
 
 Battalions of " Cohorts," two Line Regiments with 
 nine Battalions, 16 Battalions, conscripts of 1813, 13 
 Italian, one Algerian and three Neapolitan BattaUons 
 in all, were to supply the Infantry, and two Squadrons of 
 Neapohtans, eight Squadrons of Wiirtembergers, the 
 Cavalry. The Wiirtemberg Division was also assigned to 
 this Corps. Many delays arose in carrying out these 
 orders, and only the 12th (Morand), and 15th (Peyri) 
 Divisions, numbering 18,400 men with 37 guns, were 
 available on the Saale by the end of April. The Wiir- 
 tembergers, 7,204 men, 12 guns, joined on the march, 
 (May 4), at Freyburg (Saxony). 
 
 The V Corps. — Eleven Regiments of 
 V Corps ..Cohorts" (44 BattaUons), the 34th Regi- 
 ment of the Line (four Battalions) and four foreign 
 Battalions were assigned to this Corps, and the four 
 Divisions, 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th were at first 
 ordered to be formed at Magdeburg, Miinster, Osna- 
 briick and Frankfurt am Main, but at the beginniiig of 
 March they were all ordered up to Magdeburg, where 
 Lauriston assumed the command. Towards the end of 
 April they had attained a strength of 28,000 men (with 
 67 guns)' unequally divided in the following manner — 
 16th Division (Maison) eight BattaUons, 17th(Puthbd)12 
 BattaUons, 18th (Lagrange) 15 BattaUons, 19th (Rocham- 
 beau) 12 BattaUons, the 3rd Light Cavalry Brigade being 
 assigned to them. The 17th (Puthod) was detached 
 towards Hamburg and only rejoined on the battlefield 
 of Bautzen, this left available at the end of April only 
 32 BattaUons, 51 guns, in all 20,832 men. 
 
 The VI Corps.— The II Corps of Obser- 
 vation on the Rhine became the VI Corps 
 
84 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 of the Grand Army, by the decree of March 12, and 
 was to be collected about Mainz. The material avail- 
 able was 20 Battalions of Marines, eight provisional 
 Line BattaUons, four Battahons of the 37th Light 
 Infantry, 10 other Light Infantry BattaUons, and 16 
 Line Eegiments. 
 
 The formation of this Corps met with all kinds of 
 difficulties. Only fourteen Battahons of Marines had 
 arrived on April 15. The 23rd Division (Teste) had 
 only received two of its Battahons on the same date, 
 and had to be left behind in Giessen and finally was 
 only completed in Magdeburg in June, after the Armis- 
 tice. 
 
 Thus only three Divisions, the 30th (Compans), 12 
 Battahons, 21st (Bouet) 13 Battahons, and 22nd (Friede- 
 richs) 14 Battahons, with 62 guns, making 24,250 men, 
 were ready on the Saale at the end of April ; only two 
 Squadrons of Hessians had joined on May 1. 
 
 The VII Corps had only the 32nd Division 
 °^^^ (Durutte) available, and on May 1 its 
 strength amounted to only 102 officers, 903 men, with 
 four guns. 
 
 The XI Corps was principally constituted 
 out of the only intact reiaforcements for 
 the Grand Army of 1812, on their way to the front in 
 December of that year, viz. the 31st Division (Lag- 
 range) of the old XI Corps, the very strong Division 
 (Grenier), formed in November, 1812, in Verona, 
 was divided into two Divisions on arrival at the 
 front, which received the number 35 and 36. Seven 
 Battahons of the 31st Division had been left behind 
 in Stettin, and the remaining five were grouped with 
 
NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 85 
 
 five others belonging to a temporary Division under 
 Gerard, who received the command of the whole. 
 Lagrange being recalled to France and given another 
 command instead. Three Polish Battahons were also 
 added, so that by the middle of March the Division, 
 then at Meissen, numbered 13 Battahons, 12 guns. The 
 35th Division consisted of 12 Battalions and 22 guns, 
 the 36th of 11 Battahons and 14 guns, but as the 31st 
 Division was ordered to find 2,000 men for the garrison 
 of Wittenberg, and to make other detachments, it was 
 only six Battahons (about 3,000 strong) on the resumption 
 of hostihties. The total strength of the Corps on April 
 15 was only 661 officers, 21,700 men. On April 22 
 General Gerard was again transferred to the 35th 
 Division. General Ledhu received the 31st Division, 
 and General Charpentier the 36th. 
 
 The XII Corps was formed by a decree 
 
 of April 24, by taking two Divisions, the 
 13th (Pacthod) and 14th (Lorencez), frojn the IV 
 Corps and adding to it a Bavarian Division (Rag- 
 lowich). The command of it was given to Oudinot 
 (Due de Eeggio). On April 30 it was in the vicinity 
 of Saalfeld 24,000 men and 50 guns strong. 
 
 We have already seen how the Viceroy 
 ^fM ^?^f ^ ^a<i gathered a small body of the Old Guard 
 
 under Eoguet around him. On March 13 
 this httle Division numbered 133 officers, 2,896 Infantry ; 
 62 officers, 944 men. Cavalry, 4 officers and 188 men 
 artillery and engineers. 
 
 About 1,000 other officers and non-commissioned 
 officers for whom no men were available had been sent 
 back by post to France, where on a nucleus supplied 
 
86 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 by 3,000 veterans of the Guard, who had volunteered 
 to rejoin, they proceeded to reconstruct sixty Battalions 
 of the Young Guard. Of these only one Division 
 (Dumoustier), 16 Battalions and 52 guns, reached the 
 front in time for the battle of Liitzen, and a second 
 (Delaborde) joined on May 25, at Dresden. 
 
 General Bessi^res received the command of the 
 Cavalry of the Guard, which numbered 2,800 men, with 
 two Horse Artillery batteries. It consisted of two 
 Regiments of the Lancers, one of Chasseurs, one Dragoons, 
 one Grenadiers, the celebrated Mameluke squadron, four 
 Squadrons of " Elite Gendarmerie " and four Regiments 
 of the " Gardes d^hovmew " formed of young men of 
 good family who had hitherto escaped the conscription 
 by paying for substitutes, but at length had been caught 
 by the same trick which was appUed to the " Cohorts." 
 The The Cavalry of the whole Army was, as 
 
 Cavalry before mentioned, by far the weakest 
 element of the whole force. It was organized in three 
 Corps, of which the 1st had attained a strength of 
 172 officers, 3,343 men, 3,705 horses, on the Elbe 
 and Saale, at the end of April. The 2nd, on April 15 
 numbered 149 officers, 3,144 men, and 3,581 horses ; 
 and the 3rd, which on May 1 was at Hanau, 
 reported 3,895 men fit for duty. 
 
 Further formations were in progress throughout the 
 whole of Europe at the time under the Napoleonic 
 dominion, the details of which would require more space 
 than it is possible to afiord. However, the net outcome 
 of the whole was that on May 1, 1813, the Emperor 
 again stood at the head of 226,177 men, with 457 guns, 
 which were subdivided into two Armies, the Army of 
 
NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 87 
 
 the Main under his own command, and the Army of 
 the Elbe under the Viceroy of Italy (Prince Eugene). 
 To the former belonged the III, VI and IV Corps, the 
 Guards on arrival, and the 3rd Cavalry Corps. The 
 latter comprised the Vand XI Corps and such portions 
 of the I, II, and VII Corps as were available, together 
 with the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps. 
 
 The above details will sufB.ce to give some idea of I 
 the extraordinary results that can be accomplished \ 
 with the most unpromising material, under most adverse 
 circumstances, when there is a Man of iron will and 
 resolute purpose at the head of afEairs. If it is objected i 
 that Napoleons are few and far between, the answer ! 
 is that this work of Army reorganization was only a 
 portion of the whole task of Govetmnent which he 
 accomplished, and that his plan bears evidence of haste 
 and want of consideration at every turn, which pre- 1 
 sumably would not have occurred had he been free to ' 
 give his whole mind to this one question. Moreover, 
 the means of execution, i.e. telegraphs, telephones, 
 railways, good maps, and most important of all, a Stafi * 
 trained systematically to deal with these questions, | 
 are everywhere now available to aid the Leaders of 
 to-day. Compared with what the Emperor actually 
 accompUshed in the four months between his arrival 
 in Paris on December 19, and his departure for the front 
 on April 14, any conceivable task that would fall to the [ 
 lot of a British Commander-in-Chief, even the organiza- ' 
 tion of aU the four million and odd trained men ^ in this 
 country into fighting units, of a kind, would be a relatively 
 easy task, for nowadays the power exists (to the hand 
 1 See the tables in War and the World's Life by the author. 
 
88 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 of the man who, knows how to use it) of creating a wave 
 of popular feeling which Vrould sweep all local or indivi- 
 dual opposition before it. The essence of the whole 
 matter is that the man should hnow his own mind, and 
 this the average man, whom we may expect to find in 
 authority at any given crisis,, never wiU succeed in 
 doing until he has steeped himself in the knowledge of 
 what has been done, and deduced therefrom what can 
 be done again when a great need arises. But this work 
 will be all the easier, the greater the number of the men 
 beneath him trained to view matters from the same 
 standpoint as himself and to reahze that after aU the 
 Art of War consists, not in striving after unattainable 
 ideals, but in " making the best praaicable use of the 
 m^ans at hand to the aUxdnmemt of the object in view." ^ 
 To return now to the use the Emperor proposed 
 to make of these great masses. 
 
 „ , Early in March, he entertained and 
 
 Napoleon •' ' i ■ i n i ■ 
 
 plans a drafted an outline plan, which though it was 
 
 Raid on jjgygj. p^^ jj^^ execution, deserves notice 
 
 oerlin ^ .... i • i -j. 
 
 for the amount of._onticism to which it 
 
 has been subjected, and also because its guiding idea 
 recurs repeatedly at a later stage of this campaign (1813). 
 Leaving a retaining force on the Saale, he proposed 
 to cross the Elbe with his main body, march direct on 
 Berlin and thence relieve the garrisons of the Oder 
 fortresses and Danzig. The .chief critic ism directed 
 against this has always been, that neither Berlin nor the 
 rehef of the fortresses afforded a suf6.oient objective 
 for a Field Army, wiich should always aim primarily 
 at the destruction of the Field Army of its adversary, 
 ^ Moltke's definition. 
 
NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 89 
 
 essentially the guiding principle of the whole Napoleonic a> 
 strategy. Further," it i s con dgnmed because it contains \^ 
 no single alIusion^q_t he ^ectstw 6a^fe,.jyhi ch all 
 s omH* st rategy shodd aim at. These criticisms come 
 chiefly from Germ an y, and I confess that for years they 
 Tiad my full adherence, until rcame unde r the influ ence 
 
 of the modem French school, when Napoleon's reasons 
 . am . The chief difficulty of his 
 situation lay in "Kblduig. or inducing his p.TieTnip.a t,o stand, 
 or indeed in controlling their action in any way. The 
 march to Berlin , thence onward, ultimately towards 
 Konigsberg, not only meant the ruin of the Prussian 
 Monarchy for a second time, but also threatened the 
 Eussian communications with Petersburg. It was, 
 therefore, a reasonable calculation that the threat on 
 Berlin, as once before at Jena, would bring the AlUes 
 down in force to oppose it, and marching in his favourite 
 haMdlion carree it was, as already explained, immaterial 
 to him when, where or how they chose to attack him. 
 
 His reason for abandoning the idea has never to my j 
 knowledge been made clear. The necessity often alleged / 
 for covering the Southern States of Germany to ensure 
 their loyalty has never appealed to me as adequate, 
 because nothing would seem better adapted to secure 
 their wavering attachment than the sight of the beaten 
 Russians and Prussians straggling back upon their 
 frontiers. More probably the scheme was originally ( 
 based on insufficient information, and was given up 
 when it became clear that the total force the Allies 
 could have concentrated to oppose him was altogether 
 too small to offer them a reasonable prospect of success 
 in the battlefield ; therefore they would voluntarily. 
 
go THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 (abandoning Berlin and East Prussia), fall back into 
 
 Russia, when lie would again find himself face to face 
 
 with the terrible problem of the previous year, and with 
 
 far less satisfactory material to enable him to deal with 
 
 it. At the time of its inception also he had still no 
 
 adequate idea of the completeness of the disintegration 
 
 which his old Army had undergone, and he attached 
 
 far more value to its fragments than they actually 
 
 deserved. With them the process of " war seasoning " 
 
 had been overdone, and " war weary " would better 
 
 1 describe them. " IJiave 600 men of_the-..fiaai d with 
 
 ' me here," wrote Rapp from j>anzig^' b ut not two h un-^ 
 
 I ^eTwiir^irnBe. fit for Jhe^field^again " — and if this 
 
 was the case with the Guard, the condition of the rest 
 of the Army may be imagined ! 
 
 Meanwhile, the action of the AUies was 
 the*Mi^' forcing Napoleon's hand, and the question 
 of the neutraUty of the German Southern 
 States became a matter of time, whilst the attitude 
 of Austria was more than threatening. From Dresden, 
 their advance if continued towards the upper waters 
 of the Saale and Main, covered Bavaria and Saxony, 
 and might even jeopardize the arrival of the IV 
 Corps from Italy via Augsburg. On the other hand, 
 the further they continued in this direction, the 
 more they exposed their own conununications to a blow 
 from the north-west, and the chance of catching them 
 in a position in which they would be compelled to fight 
 increased. He, therefore, now busied himself with a 
 plan which was abnost the exact inverse of his Jena 
 Campaign, and issued orders to unite his whole force 
 in the angle of the upper Saale and Elbe. 
 
NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 91 
 
 Positions 0^ •^P"^ 11' ^'^ heads of the several 
 on nth Corps had attained the positions shown on 
 ^P"* Map 1 A.A. The Army of the Elbe lay with 
 its Headquarters at Aschersleben — about 30 miles 
 south of Magdeburg. The III Corps along the road 
 from Aschafienburg to Schweinfurt ; VI Corps around 
 Hanau; Guards at Mainz; the IV and XII coming 
 from Italy with their head at Anspach and the rear- 
 most Division ten days' march behind, near Augsburg. 
 The Emperor knew from a certain source that the 
 Russian Guards had only commenced their march 
 from Kalische on April 1, and could not, therefore, 
 reach the troops abeady iu the field before May 1 ; 
 but it was always possible that the latter might continue 
 their advance without waiting for the Guards, in which 
 case they might reach the Saale by April 20. There- 
 fore, he had to be prepared for this contingency, 
 though it was an improbable one. 
 
 Accordingly he prescribed the next stage 
 
 for of his advance in such a manner that his con- 
 
 Concentra- centration would be assured "whatever case 
 
 °" arose. To this end the Army of the Elbe was 
 
 directed to advance to the line of the Wipper — a small 
 
 affluent of the Saale, with its left resting on the latter 
 
 river and its right on the slopes of the Harz 
 
 Mountains, thus threatening the enemy's right if 
 
 they should attempt to march upon Erfurt. The VI 
 
 Corps and Guards were to move along the great road 
 
 from Mainz through Fulda, Gotha, to Erfurt, the 
 
 III Corps from Schweinfurt to Meiningen, and the 
 
 IV and XII Corps by Bamberg, Coburg, and Graf- 
 enthal. 
 
92 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 The Emperor had caused most careful recon- 
 naissances to be made of all the roads through the 
 Th ujinffl an forest — a mountain ous densely wooded .. 
 I jjistrictro SPn^es rising, some 3.000 feet above the^ 
 plain . He knewtEat from Meiningen and Coburg 
 alternative roads existed which would enable him either 
 to direct the further movement of these Corps on Erfurt 
 or on the Saale, as the case might require. If now the 
 Allies determined to march either direct upon Erfurt 
 or against the Army of the Elbe, in either case the latter 
 could hold them till the centre and right swung in — or if 
 by the time they reached the above-mentioned places 
 it was clear that the enemy was moving southward 
 against the right column, or waiting for the Russian 
 Guards to arrive — the whole of his forces could 
 combine their forward movement, and complete their 
 concentration in the neighbourhood of Leipzig ; and 
 this was what actually happened. 
 
 On April 24 the French had reached the positions 
 shown on Map 1 b.b., and it was clear that no further 
 interference with their concentration about Leipzig 
 was to be anticipated. The Army of the Elbe still 
 lay on Ijhe Wipper, the III Corps at Weimar, followed 
 by the Guards, which had passed the VI Corps at 
 Erfurt, and the VI strung out along the road from 
 Gotha to Vacha for some 30 miles. The IV and 
 Xll-Corps lay with their advance guard at Grafenthal, 
 their main body extending from Coburg to Ans- 
 pach. The Bavarians were on the extreme right 
 at Bayreuth, th e total front Jbdng.>boiit 140 miles. 
 depth 60 nules. But the Eflo^ero r himself had delayed 
 too lon g at Mainz, trusting to hislG enftrala on the spot. 
 
NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 93 
 
 and as us ual they had fallen far short of his reasonable 
 expectation s. .Ney-rhavin g reachgd__Mgiiiiijgfin7~lin^ 
 not hfl,viT\p; fl.pprp.f^iptiprl TJgpp]p oii'B reason for ordering 
 hjm^to make a temporary halt at that place, had con- 
 cluded, that as the road from Meiningen to Weimar 
 across the hills was rather an indifferent one, he would 
 take the easy one down the valley to Eisenach, and cut 
 in on the main road through Erfurt to that place. He 
 thus fouled the line of march of the Guards and VI 
 Corps, blocMng^em^SkaU along the road. 
 
 Cavalry ^^ *^® same time the Cavaby of the 
 Raids by AlUes made a succession of brilliant attacks 
 * '^* in the district between the Wipper and 
 Unstrutt with the result that a series of regrettable 
 incidents, from the French point of view, took place. 
 On April 12, Major Bliicher (son of the Field-Marshal) 
 at the head of some. 200 Prussian Hussars appeared 
 before Weimar, with this result, that the Saxon 
 Battalion on duty immediately laid down its arms. On 
 the 17th, Major Helwig with a Squadron of 150 
 men fell suddenly upon the rearguard of the Bavarian 
 Division (Rechberg) near Langen-Salza, capturing 
 some hundred men and a couple of guns. On the 
 18th the same party dispersed a WestphaUan Cavalry 
 regiment, near Wanried on the road to Cassel, thus 
 creating wild alarm in King Jerome's mind. Finally, 
 reports of all these events reaching Ney at Erfurt on 
 the 19th, caused him serious apprehension of more 'to 
 follow. The result was a series of orders and .cx)unter- 
 orders which narrowly escaped throwing the whole 
 comma n3~ui to disorder. As Marshal BessiSres wrote 
 to Berthier, ^' 1 must tell you frankly that if the enemy 
 
94 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 had been advancing on Naumburg and Jena as the 
 Prince de la Moskova wrote to me that night, we should 
 have been in no position to meet them, or the Prince 
 either." 
 
 Meanwhile the Emperor's orders were 
 '^^d*""'* ^^^*'^y on their way for the whole Army 
 to concentrate on the Saale on April 25. 
 
 " The Army of the Main marches on Jena and Naum- 
 burg ; the Army of the Elbe will move up the Saale 
 and occupy Halle and Merseburg. The Corps from Italy, 
 if circumstances permit, will marchby SaaUeldpn Jena, 
 by the left bank of the Saale." 
 
 ^^ ^lucidation. of this the Major Generalj [Beitbier, 
 .wrQli&.tO LPrince Eugene from Mainz (April 22 ) : — 
 
 " The Emperor is to-day stiU in Mainz. As the Corps 
 of the Prince de la Moskova cannot be completely closed 
 up until the 24th, it is necessary for you to occupy 
 Querfurt so as to maintain direct communication with 
 the Prince, who is going to occupy the heights above 
 Naumburg. Destroy the bridge which the enemy has 
 over the Saale near Wettin. Occupy Halle and Merse- 
 burg as bridge heads, and place these towns in a con- 
 dition of defence against Cossacks by palisa^g the 
 gates. Occupy Halle first, Merseburg afterwards. The 
 Emperm's intention is to guard the whole of the Saale, 
 so that the enemy cannot penetrate to the left bank at any 
 spot. You must be on the alert to march at once against 
 the enemy should he advance from Jena or Naumburg." 
 FoUowing closely upon these orders, 
 
 Iwwce ^^^ Emperor himself reached Erfurt on the 
 
 morning of the 25th April, and the first duty 
 
 to claim his attention was the arrangements of the Supply 
 
NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 95 
 
 Service. Jhe Corps had taken the fiel(L: sjjfliJb:Qm 12 to 
 14days' bre ad, biscui t.e E mea l — four days' rations carried 
 by the men, the remainder in carts, and they had Uved 
 as far as possible on the country they had traversed. 
 But now they were too concentrated to do this, and 
 were to be fed from the magazines Napoleon had ordered 
 to be prepared in Erfurt. Evidently this service had 
 been neglected, for on the evening of the 25th we find 
 a letter to Marshal Duroc. 
 
 " Collect to-night the Intendant and two or three of 
 the principal members of the administration of the 
 country, as well as the Commissary of War, and settle 
 what steps are to be taken to collect supphes at Erfurt. 
 We must have in four days 200,000 rations of bread to 
 issue at the rate of 50,000 a day. They must also pro- 
 cure as soon as possible, two miUion rations of flour — as 
 much beef on the hoof and brandy; also two miUion rations 
 of oats. To get these quicker you are to pay cash." 
 Communi- The main line of communication for the 
 cations, jfg^jjj Army was to be by Mainz, Fulda, 
 Gotha, while the IV and XII Corps after passing 
 Saalfeld were to give up completely their previous 
 line, viz., Coburg and Nuremburg ; and any com- 
 munications necessary with Augsburg were to go by 
 Eulda-Wurzburg, an indication of the growing insecurity 
 of the country. A comparison of the halting places 
 actually attained with the orders issued, shows that in 
 the Army of the Main all the prescribed marches were 
 duly and punctually performed, but the Army of the 
 Elbe was 24hours latein starting and then pnl y^ averaged 
 se ven miles a day . No explanation of this extraordinary 
 slowness is forthcoming, but it is worth while to note in 
 
96 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 passing that, with Napoleon in person on the spot, 
 twenty-five, even thirty miles a day was by no means 
 an unusual effort for bodies of such strength to ac- 
 complish. Singularly, also, there is no trace of any 
 reprimand being administered to Eugene for this 
 dilatoriness. 
 
 French ^'^ *^® 30th, the several Corps at- 
 Positions tained the under-mentioned positions. (See 
 30th April jyj^p 1 ) 
 
 Army op the Main. 
 Headquarters of the Emperor : Weissenfels. 
 The Imperial Guard : Weissenfels. 
 
 III Corps : Headquajters and four Divisions ; East of Weissen- 
 fels. Marchaud's Division : Stossen. 
 
 VI Corps. Headquarters and two Divisions : Naumburg. Fried- 
 rich's Division : Kosen. 
 
 IV Corps : Along the Saale from Domburg to Jena and Rudolstadt. 
 XII Corps: Still in rear, between Saalfeld and Coburg. 
 
 The Abmt or the Elbe. 
 Headquarters and Division Roguet (Guards) : Mersebnrg. 
 1st Cavalry Corps and XI Corps : Three miles east of Merseburg 
 
 V Corps : Three Divisions west of Merseburg ; a detachment 
 
 of four Battalions at Halle. 
 32nd Division : at Schafstedt. 
 4th Division (Victor) : Bernburg. 
 
 The ten Battalions of this Division formed a cordon 
 all along the Saale, which river was henceforth so closely 
 watched that none of the enemy's Cavalry succeeded 
 in crossing it. This cordon defence of a river line was 
 Napoleon's expedient to compensate for his deficiency 
 in Cavalry, for it gave him " security" and ensured 
 secrecy of his own movements, but of course it could 
 not help him to ascertain what his enemy was about. 
 For this, however, he cared little ; he h^ now 145,(XX) 
 men in hand ready to fight in any direction at a moment's 
 notice, and it mattered nothing to him when or where 
 
NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 97 
 
 he met his opponents, if only they would fight to a finish 
 
 when they did encounter him. Secrecy and promptitude 
 
 were, however, the essential factors of the situation, for 
 
 if once the Allies reaUzed the overwhelming numbers 
 
 against them, they would certainly concentrate to the 
 
 rear, as for the moment they had no interest in the 
 
 actual occupation of the groimd on which they stood. 
 
 Experience had shown them the efficacy of a rapid 
 
 retreat as a means of evading Napoleon's sledge hammer 
 
 blows. 
 
 Napoleon's ^^ orders, therefore, for May 1, ran as 
 
 Orders ist foUows, " The Army of the Elbe is to 
 
 *^ advance in front of Merseburg to Schlade- 
 
 bach — placing Merseburg in a condition of defence. 
 
 " The III Corps with the Cavalry of the Guard from 
 Weissenfels towards Liitzen. 
 
 " The VI Corps to support the III with two Divisions, 
 the third remaining at Naumburg. The Imperial Guard 
 (two Division) to Weissenfels. 
 
 " The IV and XII to continue towards Naumburg as 
 rapidly as possible." 
 
 As this movement took the Army out into open country 
 very favourable for the enemy's Cavalry, to avoid any 
 possibility of surprise, the troops now marched in masses 
 straight across country. 
 
 The formation of the III Corps may be taken 
 as the type generally followed. Behind an Advance 
 Guard consisting of all the Corps Cavalry (a Brigade 
 of 10 Squadrons), two Battalions and a half Battery 
 of Light Artillery, the Main Body followed at a 
 distance of about 3,000 yards in as many lines as 
 it contaiaed Brigades. Each Brigade was in line of 
 
98 TEE, LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 columns of Regiments (four Battalions) with double 
 company front at half distance, so as to be able to form 
 regimental squares rapidly. The Artillery of each 
 Division between the leading Brigades. 
 
 As Napoleon had expected, the Cavalry of the Allies 
 attempted several charges during the day, but were 
 easily repulsed with a trifling loss. There was no longer 
 a Seydlitz to lead them, nor were they trained to that 
 great Leader's standard of perfection ; and the day 
 would have ended most satisfactorily but for the unfor- 
 tunate death of Marshal Bessieres, killed dead by a 
 cannon shot at the passage of the Rippach. The bear- 
 ing of the young soldiers had won the approval even of 
 Key, who with many others seems at first to have had 
 serious doubts as to their steadiness. At the close of 
 the day the Emperor was at Liitzen. 
 
 Abmy Off THE Elbe. 
 
 XI Corps from Quentz to Markranstadt. 
 
 V Corps in rear of Gimthendorf. 
 
 1st Cavalry Corps, between Sohladebaoh and Oetzaoh. 
 32nd Division, at Meraeburg. 
 
 Abmy or the Main. 
 Cavalry of the Guard at Liitzen. 
 Imperial Guard (two Divisions) Weissenfels. 
 
 III Corps. Headquarters : Kaja. 
 
 (Souham's Division : Kaja, Bahna, Klein and Grosz Gorsohen. 
 Girard's Division : Starsiedel. 
 Brennier's Division : near Liitzen. 
 Bicard's Division : near Liitzen. 
 Marohand's Division : near Liitzen. 
 
 VI Corps. Headquarters : near Bippach. 
 
 Bouet's Division ; near Bippaoh. 
 
 Compans Division : near L6sau, west of Bippaoh. 
 
 Ireidriohs' Division : at Naumburg. 
 
 IV Corps. Headquarters : Stfissen. 
 
 Morand's Division : StSssen ; Advance Guard : Pretzsoh. 
 • Peyri's Division : Grosz-Gestewitz. 
 Wiirtemberg Division : Jena. 
 
 XII Corp. Head of Column at Kahja, rear near SaalfeW, 
 
N'APOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 99 
 
 Looking at tte Map we see that the 
 corree or lozenge formation, has been modified to suit the 
 circumstances. On the left the flank being protected by 
 the Elbe and Elster, needs no particular precaution, 
 so the whole left and centre are closed up to form the 
 " mass of manoeuvre " — ^the right flank being covered 
 by the III Corps and Guards, from Weissenfels to Liitzen, 
 whilst the IV Corps from Stossen to Jena is in a position 
 to outflank any attack upon the III coming from the 
 southward. 
 
 From the reports of the enemy's movements received, 
 it appeared that the latter was concentrating about 
 Zwenkau, whilst a portion of his troops still held Leipzig. 
 Judging from his knowledge of Wittgenstein's character, 
 the Emperor considered an attack on his right flank 
 during the next day as highly probable. But this threat 
 did not deter him an instant in his determination to 
 gain ground to the front and appear m mass in the 
 plains to the east of the Elster on May 3. 
 
 As a measure of precaution, however, the III Corps 
 around Liitzen was ordered to stand fast till noon, 
 whilst the Army of the Elbe advanced on Leipzig, and 
 all other elemeflts of the Army closed in on the III 
 Corps. 
 
 In case of an attack from Zwenkau the III Corps is 
 thus facing in the required direction to act as Advance 
 Guard — to fix the enemy and allow the remainder of 
 the Army to manoeuvre against him. 
 
 Kaja is about 13 mUes from Leipzig. 16 miles fr om 
 Markranstadt, _5_fr^i. fiippa ch, 10 from Weissenfels. 
 and M from Stosaen . The III Corps 45,000 strong, is 
 therefore amply sufficient to hold its ground imtil 
 
100 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 reinforcements arrive, an d in six hours at latest the 
 
 whole Army, 145,000 men — less the Division ordered 
 
 to Leipzig, wiU be actually deployed in line of battle/ 
 
 In their execution of these orders the 
 
 ^^en ' troops had reached the position shoivn in 
 
 the sketch, when about 11 a.m. a tremendous 
 
 cannonade burst out in the direction of Kaja, and 
 
 Napoleon leaving the Army of the Elbe to continue 
 
 its movement, galloped across country to see what 
 
 had happened. 
 
 Reaching the brow of a low undulation which hid 
 I the field of action from his sight, he suddenly discovered 
 Souham's DiAdsion (part of it already in serious dis- 
 order), beset by overwhelming forces of the enemy. 
 Souham's troops had allowed themselves to be surprised 
 in broad daylight by almost the whole of their adversary's 
 Army. 
 
 The Emperor was not disconcerted even for a moment. 
 Taking the whole situation in at a glance, he issued the 
 following terse and fitting orders. 
 
 " ThelllCorgs^ will hold its position at my cost. 
 Its business is to fix the enemy, and thus form a mvot 
 on which the rest^p^ the Army can manmume. 
 
 " The Vi Corps prolongs the right of the III Corps. 
 
 " The IV Corps moves against the enemy's left. 
 
 " The XI and 1st Cavalry Corps against his right. 
 
 " The V Corps occupies Leipzig with one of its Divisions, 
 the others to be echelonned near Markranstadt ready 
 to move on Kaja. 
 
 " The Guard marches to the sound of the gu ns." 
 
 Here we will leave him and return to the doings of 
 the AUies which had led to this surprise. 
 
NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD loi 
 
 Movements ^® ^^^ them last" on April 19, just at tlie 
 of the moment when a premature rumour of the 
 '^® arrival of the Emperor at the front com- 
 pelled them to decide on a course of action. 
 
 At this date the Corps of Miloradowitch was moving 
 from Dresden to join Bliicher at Altenburg, where he 
 had been since the 14th of the month, and the Russian 
 Guards were still five marches to the west of Dresden. 
 The news of the death of Kutusow had just been 
 received, and Wittgenstein appointed to the Command- 
 in-chief of the whole Army. At this date, inclusive of 
 the troops already on the Saale, it consisted of 65,000 
 Infantry, 22,000 Cavaky, 8,000 Artillery with 450 guns. 
 A rearward movement of concentration would 
 undoubtedly have been the best plan to adopt from a 
 strictly military point of view, but to withdraw without 
 even the show of a fight would have been politically 
 disastrous, in view of the attitude of Austria and the 
 state of pubHc feehng aU over Germany. Moreover, 
 the Prussian troops were still too raw to stand the strain 
 of a prolonged retreat. A defeat in battle even if accom- 
 panied by heavy losses, might, in the exalted condition 
 of patriotism in which they found themselves, be far 
 better for their subsequent cohesion than the depressing 
 influences of a continuous withdrawal. Finally, in view 
 of the reports that had reached them, as to the poor 
 condition of the French Cavalry and conscripts, both 
 Bliicher, Yorck and Wittgenstein felt that with 22,000 
 horsemen behind them, in a theatre of rolling plains 
 especially favourable to their action, the chances in favour 
 of a victory were good enough to justify the risk. The 
 only point unsettled was the best point of concentration 
 
102 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 to select. Wittgenstein had rightly gauged the intention 
 of Napoleon to advance through Leipzig, and had 
 called up Bliichet from the south to Boma, whilst he 
 himself had determined to concentrate between Leipzig 
 and Wiirzen. But the Emperor Alexander, who arrived 
 at this moment, considered that this disposition ren- 
 dered it probable that, in case of disaster, the whole 
 Army would be thrown back on the Elbe about Torgau 
 — and he decided on a more southerly position between 
 Leipzig and Boma. 
 
 They were in this position when, in the course of 
 May 1, the reports of Cavalry — most accurate as to 
 what could actually be seen — led them to conclude 
 that the whole French Army was moving in one long 
 column on Leipzig, hardly guarding their right flank at 
 all. And the opportunity to take advantage of this 
 negligence was too tempting to be allowed to escape 
 them. This conclusion, though in fact erroneous, was 
 an almost inevitable consequence of the failure of the 
 Allied Generals to penetrate the real secret of the 
 Napoleomc methods. 
 
 Accordingly, leaving Kleist in Leipzig to hold the 
 town (a semi-mediaeval fortress) to the last, orders were 
 issued at 11.30 p.m. on May 1, to the following effect : — 
 
 " The Corps of Miloradowitch (12,000 men) on Zeitz 
 to watch in the direction of Naumburg and Jena. 
 
 " The Corps Winzingerode (12,000 men), to Werben, 
 to cover the passage of the main Army over the Elster 
 and Flossgraben. 
 
 " The Corps of Bliicher (27,000 men) in two columns 
 to cross the Elster at Storkwitz and Pegau. 
 
 " The Corps of Yorck (7,500 men) passes the Elster 
 
NAPOLEON- TAKES THE FIELD 103 
 
 at Pegau, after Bliiclier's left column., the troops of 
 Berg at Storkwitz behind the right. 
 
 "The Guards (18,500 men) foUows the troops of Yorck 
 and Berg. 
 
 " The Army will form up beyond the Flossgraben, 
 the right on the canal near Werben, and the left at 
 Griinabaoh near Sohesten, the movement to be com- 
 pleted by 7 a.m." 
 
 The troops were on the march between 1 and 2 a.m. 
 (they were, therefore, probably awaiting the- arrival 
 of the above orders), but from want of clearness in their 
 instructions, the oolunms crossed one another, and 
 the resulting delays postponed the final deployment 
 till 11 a.m. The Army then #tood in three lines, hidden 
 by a roU of the ground, some 2,000 yards south of Gross 
 Gorschen. Owing to the long night march, the men 
 were much exhausted, and it was decided to allow them 
 another hour's rest. Meanwhile Wittgenstein, with ' 
 the Headquarters Staff, rode forward to a mound about 
 1,200 yards south of Gross Gorschen, whence they 
 saw great clouds of dust hanging heavily over the main 
 road to Leipzig, and in the immediate foreground were 
 a large mass of French troops cooking their dinners 
 and completely off their guard. 
 
 J]jis__was Souham's Division of Key's Corps waiting 
 for f urther orders , and what followed was an exact 
 anticipation of the opening of so many actions in the 
 1870 campaign — ^notably that of Vionville, both sides 
 making the same mistakes. 
 
 The whole Army of the Allies being already 
 
 the^Uief deployed, it would have sufficed to launch 
 a Cavalry Division on Souham to overwhelm 
 
104 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 all opposition, and then to advance over the wreck 
 of the French Advance Guard with the whole of the 
 Artillery and Infantry on a broad front, crushing each 
 fresh echelon of the enemy as it came on the ground. 
 Instead of '"this, the Allies grew circumspect, and 
 advancing some 36 guns, opened the attack with a 
 single Brigade, and the first shots fired gave the alarm 
 to the whole of the French Army. 
 
 The first rush of the Prussians easily carried Gross 
 Gorschen, but when they endeavoured to throw a mass 
 of 23 Squadrons on the retreating French— ;g, hne of 
 Batteries came rapidly into action between Rahaa and 
 SSn Gorschen, and brought the former to a stop with 
 case shot. Then Girard's Division arrived on the spot, 
 and immediately afterwards the whole of the VI Corps 
 (Marmont) came up on his right about Starsiedel,sothat 
 bj_10^£jm^ about 40;(P00 French were in action against 
 sonxe ,65j^0pQ^of the Allies. Then followed a series of dis- 
 connected and successive attacks by Brigades, where 
 whole Army Corps would have been more to the purpose, 
 and after desperate fighting the villages of Rahna and Klein 
 Gorschen also fell into the hands of the Alhes, who then 
 prepared to push forward on Kaja, where Ney'in person 
 had in the meantime arrived. Placing himself at the 
 head of Brenier's Division, on whom the remains of 
 Girard's and Souham's commands at once ralhed, Ney led 
 them forward, and with the bayonet drove the AlHes back 
 to Rahna and Klein Gorschen. Again the Prussians threw 
 in another Brigade, and in turn the French gave way. 
 Napoleon ^^ ^-^ Napoleon rode up to Kaja with 
 on the the Guards. His arrival produced an extra- 
 ^*'* ^ ordinary effect on his troops, who saluted 
 
NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 105 
 
 him "with cries of 'Vive I'Einpereur,' in which even 
 the wounded and dying joined " (vide testimony of 
 von Odeleben, a Saxon officer on Napoleon's staff). 
 Instantly taking in the situation ; he sent his A.D.C., 
 General Mouton, to Eicard's Division (the last closed 
 reserve of the III Corps), with orders to execute a 
 counter attack, and again bearing down all opposi- 
 tion, the French became masters of the two villages. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Cavalry and Cossacks of the Allies had 
 been thundering down in a succession of disunited charges 
 on Marmont's Infantry, and the Marshal, impressed by 
 the visible masses of the enemy in front of him, sent 
 to Napoleon for reinforcements. 
 
 The reply he received was characteristic. " Tell 
 your Marshal he is mistaken, the decision Ues at Kaja, 
 not at Starsiedel." 
 
 A lull in the battle now set in, only the Artillery on 
 both sides contiaued their fire, and meanwhile Wittgen- 
 stein^ learning of the approach of the IV and XI Corps, 
 prepared for a final effort. The moment was critical 
 for Napoleon — it was about 4.30 p.m. — the III Corps 
 was practically burnt out and useless, the VT could not 
 be moved, as its presence at Starsiedel was imperative to 
 protect the flank of the III Corps, and only the Guards 
 were available on the spot. But he hesitated to engage 
 them, because he saw that the " battle was not yet ripe," 
 i.e. that the enemy had not yet expended all his reserves 
 and reached that crisis of nervous exhaustion on which 
 the success of the aggressor's final blow depends. 
 
 At this moment, about 4.30, some Battalions of the 
 III Corps broke. TlieEmperor gaUopeTmto"tlLe i ni33Ie 
 OTthem, raUied them by the sheer ma^etic power of 
 
io6 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 his personality (none who hved through this moment 
 could ever forget it), and sending in a Brigade of the 
 Young Guard to give them a lead, led b ack the whole 
 III Corps into the fight. On no occasion in his whole 
 career did Napoleon expose himself" mofe~recEIess]y7' 
 andneverhad" 'ES'exSaorHjnar y poweF of command 
 asserted itself to a greater extent. It was not, and 
 could not be the mere example of personal courage. In 
 an Army numbering such men as Ney, Mouton, and Rapp 
 in its ranks, personal courage in itself would hardly 
 have attracted unusual attention, i It was the indefinable 
 something in the man himself that reawakened the con- 
 fidence and enthusiasm of all ranks, which, to put it 
 gently, had slumbered somewhat during the months 
 succeeding his hurried departure from Smorgoni on 
 December 14, 1812. 
 
 This must be borne in mind throughout the whole 
 of this campaign, if the extraordinary heroism of the 
 French troops immediately under his eyes is to be 
 understood and explained. 
 
 At last towards 5 p.m. the XI Corps •preceded by all 
 its Artillery (60 guns), began to arrive from the direction 
 of Eisdorf and Kitzen, reaching well round the enemy's 
 right wing, and at the same time Morand's Division of 
 the IV Corps appeared upon their left. 
 
 Napoleon's '^^® *™® ^^^ ^*^^ oova.G for the final 
 Decisive " knock out " blow, and T ^rnnnt with sixty 
 ^^^^^ gun s of _the Guard Artillery galloped out_to, 
 the front, and unlimbering at case shot range , began 
 to" tear'^ibhe "very leaft out of the Allied Army, whilst 
 tiie wh ole Infanta^of_theGuard followed in rear, sweep- 
 ing along with it all that~itnniad life in the sorely 
 
NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 107 
 
 shattered III Corps. The Allies gave way at all points, 
 but the blow had been timed a Httle too late, and in the 
 absence of an ef&cient Cavalry, darkness intervened to 
 prevent the victorious Infantry reaping their fuU reward. 
 
 To cover their retreat, the Cavalry of the Alhes made 
 several gallant charges, and finally just before midnight, 
 a party of eleven squadrons, under a Colonel DoKs, 
 in the midst of complete darkness, over difficult 
 ground, and guided only by the bivouac fires, threw 
 themselves into the very heart of the French lines. 
 What followed has never been quite clearly established. 
 The French deny all panics, the Prussians affirm them ; 
 all that is certain is that the French were kept under 
 arms aU night, and morning found them too completely 
 worn out to pursue. 
 
 No more striking contrast, iUustrating the difference 
 of the fighting value between troops raised under the 
 old long service conditions, fighting for " the honour of 
 their arms " and those raised under the new, inspired 
 primarily by a feeling of nationality, can well be desired 
 than is presented by the different conduct of the Prussians 
 on this occasion and at Jena. The Army of Jena, with a 
 Man at the head of it, would probably have overwhelmed 
 the III and VI Corps in an hour (as Frederick the Great 
 had overwhelmed Soubise barely sixty years before within 
 twenty miles of the same spot), then with the impetus 
 of success on its side it would have swept the remainder 
 before it. It would certainly have stood up to far 
 heavier punishment on the field, for compared with 
 Torgau, Zomdorf, and Kunersdorf,^ the losses at Gross 
 
 ' Prussian losses at Torgau 29'8 percent., Zomdorf 37 '5 percent., 
 Kunersdorf 48'2 per cent. 
 
lo8 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Gorschen (or Liitzen as the French call it) were not 
 severe ; but once beaten, they would have dissolved, 
 precisely as they had done at Jena and Auerstadt. 
 
 The new Prussian Army, thoug];i badly beaten, refused 
 to dissolve. Every man wanted to get back to his own 
 Battalion ; and not having lost all sense of locahty 
 by many years' confinement to the barrack yard and 
 one mile beyond it, even a dark- night proved but 
 little obstacle to their doing so. In a surprisingly 
 short time the stragglers had sorted themselves out, 
 and were well on their way from the field, and when 
 next morning dawned not a single gun or trophy of any 
 kind remained as prizes for the victorious French. 
 
 This was a most fatal blow to the Imperial prestige, 
 for it entirely obscured the remarkable strategy that 
 had united about 140,000 men on the battlefield, but 
 called attention to the fact that these 140,000 odd had 
 not achieved sufficient success against the 75,000 of 
 the allies to bring in a single gun or other trophy. 
 All other conditions which might be brought forward to 
 palliate this want of success, i.e. want of Cavalry, 
 the darkness of the night, etc., were overlooked in the 
 general rejoicing in every Foreign Ministry in Europe 
 over this striking contrast between Napoleon's previous 
 victories and that of Liitzen. 
 
 Nor had the Emperor better reason to be pleased 
 with the fighting quahty which his men had shown. He 
 had actually engaged three Corps, about 60,000 men, 
 had expended one completely, and but for his arrival in 
 person on the scene with the Guard, there could be no 
 doubt that both the VI and III Corps, together with 
 any other Corps in the Army except the Guard, would 
 
NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD 109 
 
 have been completely defeated under any of his 
 Marshals. Yet the Allies had not engaged the whole 
 of their forces, for (apart from Biilow, who away to the 
 north near Halle had been left out of the combination 
 entirely) Miloradowitch, delayed on the march by causes 
 no longer possible of elucidation, had failed to reach the 
 battlefield before the resolution to retreat had been taken. 
 
 It will be noticed also that throughout the day the 
 Allies were on interior lines relatively to the French, yet 
 even with the additional advantage of surprise on their 
 side, this could not save them. Had Wittgenstein's 
 original proposal to concentrate 9,bout Wiirzen been 
 adhered to, they would then have been outside the horns 
 of the attack, with the whole Corps of Biilow, (inclu- 
 sive of Kleist) available, and might then have entertained 
 the reasonable expectation of crushing the heads of the 
 French columns as they defiled across extemporized 
 crossings over the Elster, and out of the narrow gates 
 of Leipzig. This is assuming that Kleist had aban- 
 doned that place of his own free will, without any ade- 
 quate garrison, a course he had no reason to adopt, 
 since poor though its fortifications undoubtedly were, 
 5,000 men could have held it for days against an Army 
 unprovided with a siege train. 
 
 It has been pointed out above that the old Prussian 
 Army would have attacked en masse and overwhelmed 
 the III Corps in its first rush. This marks a very 
 important difference between the guiding ideas of the 
 post-Eevolutionary tactics and those of the Frederickian 
 era, and deserves more attention than it has yet received, 
 since it involves the whole theory of the use of reserves 
 in battle. 
 
no THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 » 
 
 The fundamental conception imderlying the old Line 
 tactics lay in the idea of overwhelming the enemy by a 
 single crushing blow, in contradistinction to the plan of 
 VKd/rihg him down by attrition. The same idea still 
 imderlies the employment of Cavalry in action, and 
 may be justified by the following reasoning. If we 
 imagine the " Line," whether of Foot or Horse, to move 
 forward as an irresistible scythe of death, exterminating 
 every Uving thing lying within its swathe, it is quite 
 clear that Keserves following behind it would be 
 useless, except perhaps to collect and bury the dead.^ 
 
 No " Line " has ever quite attained this utmost expres- 
 sion of destructive power — ^but the old " Line " of 
 Frederick the Great's Infantry, giving its four regular 
 voUeys a minute, or SeydUtz's Squadrons sweeping 
 down " knee behind knee " not merely " boot to boot " 
 (see von der Marwitz) made a very close approximation 
 to this ideal, and the nearer it was approached the fewer 
 .the Eeservesthat either required. But for the attain- 
 ment of this ideal, the highest possible skill was needed 
 in every individual concerned, from the Divisional 
 General down to the private, and this skill the short 
 training which was available under the new conditions 
 imported by the Revolution could not supply. 
 
 Hence the necessity for heavy reserves became appar- 
 ent, and in time this provision of reserves came to be 
 regarded as the essential point, and not ike provision 
 of an aU-destroying " Line." But prevision to meet its 
 inevitable shortcomings was also most necessary. 
 
 For nearly twenty years the French had been almost 
 uniformly successful when fighting in this form, i.e. 
 
 * See note at end of chapter. 
 
NAPOLEON TAKES THE FIELD iii 
 
 skirmishers and heavy reserves, hence the conclusion 
 seemed obvious that in the form itself lay the secret of 
 their victories, and not in the causes which led to the 
 evolution of the form. Hence all Europe, except Great 
 Britain, had copied it, and when the opportunity arose 
 to employ the old form, viz. the Frederickian " Line," to 
 its utmost advantage, the spirit of the latter had been 
 lost, and only the letter of the new regulation remained. 
 
 Even now, nearly a century afterwards, the letter of the 
 " Reserves '- form stiH rules, and there is not in Europe an 
 Axmy trained to seize such an opportunity should it 
 again be ofEered. But human nature remains human 
 nature no matter how much weapons may change, and 
 this being the case such opportunities will again arise, 
 and a wise preparation for War would see to it that the 
 troops taking part in it could be employed to the best 
 advantage. 
 
 The essence of the whole matter may be summed up 
 in this. If a General is to control the situation, no 
 matter how or when it arises, then his soldiers must be 
 trained to execute his wishes ; in other words, they must 
 be sufficiently " drilled," even in whole Army Corps if 
 necessary. If the troops are only " trained " in accor- 
 dance with the current conception of what a battle 
 should be, then when an emergency comes the Army 
 controls the General, which is putting the cart before 
 the horse. This was the spirit of the old Peninsular 
 Army, and this it was that Wellington meant when he 
 said that with it " he was prepared to go anywhere and 
 do anything." 
 
 The losses of the day, though, as above mentioned, 
 relatively small compared with those of the Seven Years' 
 
112 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 "War, were nevertheless qiiite sensible. While the A l lies 
 owned to 10,000 theFrenchJtiad to admitlS^OOOTElIedr" 
 woi]33edj^ or prisoners, 12,000 of which wereln'tlie III 
 Craps "aToneTand itjffiuslost"25^r centTH l^STnfantry . 
 But whereas the young FrmcE"conScnplE3ighting witE- 
 out a cause which appealed to them, reported themselves 
 as sick or wounded on the smallest excuse, the young 
 Prussians, fully saturated with the importance of the 
 stakes for which they fought, stuck to the ranks as long 
 as their legs could carry them. The Enssians also have 
 never been good malingerers, their Company was and 
 is their home, and their ambulances held no attraction 
 for them. 
 
 Note. — Compare Lord Lake's tactics at the battle on the Hindun 
 near Delhi, September 11, 1803. The Mahrattaa held a very 
 strong position, numerous batteries sweeping the ground with their 
 fire up to extreme range. Lake's Infantry attacked in a single 
 deployed line — his Cavalry alone available as a Reserve — andoheokmg 
 only to fire a single volley, carried the position with the bayonet. — 
 iSee Pearse's Life and Military Services of Viscount Lake. 
 
FROM LUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 
 
CHAPTEE V 
 
 From Lutzen to the Armistice 
 
 Under cover of Miloradowitch's intact command 
 (12,000 men) and the Cavalry, the Allies rallied their 
 troops which had been engaged, on Frohburg and Borna, 
 and then decided to continue their retreat, the Prussians 
 by Colditz and Meissen, the Russians by Rochlitz, on 
 Dresden. Parks and convoys by Freiburg and Chemnitz 
 ultimately on Dresden also. Biilow, near Halle, charged 
 with the special mission of covering Berlin, was informed 
 of their intentions and invited to withdraw behind the 
 Elbe at Rosslau. 
 
 As soon as order could be restored 
 ^'pureuU^^"^ the French ranks the Emperor pressed 
 on in pursuit, but here his want of Cavalry 
 told severely, and, over and above his deficiency 
 in this respect, lay the hopeless corruption and 
 ineMciencv of his Supply Department . Since the 
 men could draw no rations, they brote up to forage for 
 themselves, and presently this evil attained the most 
 serious dimensions. Thus in a report of the Provost 
 Marshal dated May 15, 1813, quoted by Col. Lanrezac 
 (p. 170) we find that fljdng columns sent in to collect 
 stragglers had found no less than 5,200 between the 
 Elsters and the Elbe, three-quarters of which, it is only 
 
 115 
 
ii6 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 fair to the French to record, were Italians of the IV 
 and XII Corps, neither of which had been actually under 
 fire. 
 
 The following order speaks for itself : — 
 
 Ordee du Joue, 
 
 May 6, 1813. 
 "Many soldiers have wandered into the country to 
 right and left of the road, others follow the columns as 
 stragglers. It is the fault of the officers who allow the 
 men to leave the ranks. It is the fault of the Generals 
 who march without rear guards to pick up the stragglers. 
 The soldiers unload their arms by firing them off, instead 
 of using the cleaning stick to draw the charge. Others 
 roam about the fi eld s firing at the cattl e. This is a 
 crime ; because in War a gun shot is frequently the 
 signal of alarm. It is also a crime, because the bullet 
 might kill or wound persons by accident ; finally it is a 
 crime because it is an act of maraud. His Majesty 
 orders that any soldier who fires ofi his musket either 
 as a marauder or to save himself the trouble of unloading 
 properly, shall be punished by imprisonment and 
 degradation. If the shot wounds or kills any one, he 
 shall be punished by death. 
 
 " Alexandre," 
 "Prince de Neuchatel, Major-General. 
 
 The Army of the Elbe not having been engaged in the 
 battle, and being also nearest to Dresden and the 
 Elbe, was sent on in pursuit of the enemy, but again 
 tlie _yioeroy's incurable slownes s called down upon him 
 the. Emperor's reprimands. It seems that the custom 
 had crept in of allowing an indefinite number of private 
 
FROM LUT ZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 117 
 
 wagons and carriages to accompany the troops, and for 
 second line transport to be inserted in the columns be- 
 tween the combatant Divisions. To put a stop to 
 this abuse, orders were issued that any private vehicles 
 found in the columns- would be burnt, and their horses 
 handed over to the Artillery. Only the Artillery wagons 
 were to march with their Divisions, and the rest of the 
 baggage was relegated to the tail of the columns. Fortu- 
 nately for the French, the Allies were in no hurry to 
 evacuate the ground they held, and soon the pursuers 
 were in touch with rear guards of all arms on the roads 
 towards Dresden and the Elbe, but it was not at first 
 dear by which road the bulk of their forces had moved. 
 Napoleon, therefore, pressed for prisoners, but the 
 admirable order in which the retreat was conducted 
 made it difficidt for his subordinates to comply with 
 the demand. At Colditz, on May 4, the XI Corps came 
 upon a Prussian rear guard, and after a sharp tussle, the 
 latter retired, leaving only some, twenty or thirty pris- 
 oners behind it. The Emperor's reply to the Viceroy's 
 report of this action is characteristic : — 
 
 "My Son, — Yesterday's would have been a very ^ 
 pretty affair had you sent me 3,000 prisoners. How 
 is it that in a hilly and wooded country where the 
 enemy's Cavalry are useless, you cannot catch any I 
 for me ? The Duke of Eagusa marches for Waldheim at 
 4 a.m. to-morrow. Take good care to move off not later 
 than 5 a.m., and close up your columns so as not to 1 
 occupymorethanthreeleagues(ninemile8)ofroad. Place 
 all your baggage at the end of your 3rd Division, so as to 
 march in a soldier-Hke manner, and be able to bring the 
 
ii8 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 I .S^Ste^^JS^"- ^^^ Divisions into action simiiltaneously. 
 ' Put a little order into your Corps ; it wants it badly. 
 The Italians in particidar commit atrocities, robbing 
 ' and pillaging wherever they go. Shoot a few of them. 
 
 " Your affectionate father." 
 
 The reports received on the night of May 4 made 
 it clear that the Russians and Prussians were retreating 
 on Dresden and Meissen, but the strength and where- 
 abouts of Billow's troops to the northward were stiU 
 in doubt. In any case it was not and could not be clear 
 whether the Allies would endeavour to hold the line of 
 the Elbe, whether they would cross the Elbe, then 
 separate, the Prussians retiring on Berlin, the Eussians 
 to Silesia, or whether the two combined would continue 
 their retreat in the latter direction. Moreover, Napoleon 
 appears to have been obsessed with the idea that the 
 King of Prussia attached particular importance to the 
 possession of Berlin, and he also seems to have been 
 unable to rid his mind of the thought of reheving the 
 Oder fortresses ; a proceeding which would only have 
 
 ' set free the investing forces by which their, garrisons 
 were held in check. According to rule these could not 
 
 I well be less than three times the strength of the troops 
 
 • '£hey neutrah^ed. 
 
 A new ^^*^ * double object before him, he 
 Army under therefore decided to form a new Army, 
 ^'^^ under Marshal Ney, out of Ney's own Corps 
 the III, the II provisional Corps under Victor, the 
 VII under Reynier, and another provisional command 
 under Sebastiani which consisted of Puthod's Division 
 of the V Corps, and the 2nd Oavaby Corps, both of which 
 
FROM LUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICB 119 
 
 were still on the Lower Elbe. With this command 
 Ney was to cross the Elbe at Torgau, and hold himself 
 ready to move either up the right bank of the Elbe to 
 Dresden or direct on Berlin as circumstances might 
 dictate. 
 
 The Emperor seems to have counted on Saxon co- 
 operation from the first, for Reynier's Corps on paper 
 comprised the two Saxon Divisions, at that time forming 
 imder General Thielman the garrison of Torgau, and 
 he was disagreeably surprised when on May 7 news 
 reached him that Torgau refused to open its gates, 
 alleging specific orders from the King of Saxony, and 
 simultaneously that the King himself had abandoned 
 Dresden and withdrawn to Prague, taking with him all 
 his heavy bodyguard Cavalry. Prague being in Austrian 
 territory made the matter doubly awkward. 
 
 A messenger of the Diplomatic Staff was at once sent 
 post haste after the fugitive, with an ultimatum giving 
 the King six hours to decide whether he would adhere 
 -to the aUiance still existing between himseK and the 
 Emperor, order Torgau to surrender, at once and return 
 to his capital, or see Dresden and his country treated 
 as conquered territory forthwith. 
 
 Meanwhile the AlUes were resolutely contesting every 
 mile of the French advance, and the operations of 
 Miloradowitch's column are a model for rear guard 
 Commanders to study. Only a resolute push from the 
 southward by the IV Corps could have hastened matters, 
 but this was one of the Itahan Corps, and its 
 men were poor marchers, from want of sufficient disci- 
 pline. On August 8 the advance guard of the French 
 Army with the Emperor's Headquarters entered Dresden ; 
 
120 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 only to see tte last of the Russian troops filing over the 
 bridge to the Neustadt, the suburb on the right bank 
 of the Elbe, and immediately afterwards two spans oj 
 ^S.bridge^were_blownJntojthe air, leaving^^gapsof 140 
 feet to rep air. Unfortunately for the Alhes^ tEe 
 demolition charges were put in too high up, thus the 
 lower tiers of the bridge piles were left untouched, and 
 the work of reconstruction was markedly faciU- 
 tated. 
 
 The French had taken six days to c oyer 80 mjle sr 
 an average which fell far short of i»lapoleon's usual 
 idea of a day's march in pursuit, viz. seven to eight 
 leagues, i.e. 21 to 24 miles. 
 
 All the boats on the river had been 
 the^Hbe Systematically desteoyed or removed, and 
 though the pontonniers were at hand, the 
 pontoons were stUl fifteen marches in the rear. Hence 
 recourse had to be taken to rafts of timber and other 
 improvised material, which led to many delays. Even 
 anchors had to be improvised out of rough timber cases 
 filled with stones. The Emperor, finding it impossible to 
 reconstruct the main bridge in face of the Russian guns 
 and musketry from the Neustadt, decided to force a passage 
 lower down the river at a convenient re-entering bend 
 near Briesnitz ; and this gave rise to one of the classic 
 examples of the passage of a river under fire. The 
 Russians held the opposite bank with Infantry and 
 some sixty guns, but the French brought up eighty, 
 and taking the whole salient bend of the stream, and the 
 plain beyond it, under a convergent fire, soon obtained 
 a fire superiority, under cover of which a few parties 
 of Infantry were first put across. Then the^ontonniers, 
 
FROM LXJTZEli TO THE ARMISTICE 121 
 
 sheltered by the actual bank of the river from direct 
 vision, managed to float their rafts into position and 
 complete the roadway. (/See Sir Howard Douglas' 
 Military Bridges, for details.) 
 
 At the same time another attempt to secure a footing 
 on the right bank at Neustadt was made. Twenty 
 guns unhmbered on the well-known terrace of Briihl, 
 and protected by their fire, 300 Voltigeurs of the Guard 
 nianaged to cross on the few boats which had escaped 
 the general destruction, and seized a strongly built 
 stone building covering the exit from the permanent 
 bridge. Upon this the Russians began to evacuate 
 the suburb, seemingly without sufficient justification. 
 The repair of the bridge was at once put in hand, and 
 on the afternoon of the 10th, a few men of Charpentier's 
 Division passed the principal breach in the bridge by 
 means of long fire-escape ladders. 
 
 As soon as it became clear that the passage at Briesnitz 
 had been won, orders were issued to the XI, IV and VI 
 Corps to prepare to cross on the morrow (May 10). But 
 LQ the night a flood came down the river, canying with 
 it great quantities pf drift wood, the bridge was swept 
 away, and a further delay of some thirty-six hours 
 was thus occasioned. 
 
 For the moment, therefore, the outlook for the French 
 was gloomy, for not a single standing bridge over the 
 river was in their hands. Besides which the same flood 
 that had swept away the bridge at Briesnitz had 
 increased their difficulties everywhere else. Fortu- 
 n'ately, the messenger despatched to the King of Saxony 
 at Prague returned very opportunely with orders to 
 Thielman to hand over the fortress of Torgau. 
 
122 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Accpfdingly, during the course of May 11, troops 
 entered tlie town and Reynier was at last in a position 
 to take over his two Saxon Divisions. 
 
 . This move, however, did not pass off 
 of Torgau without friction. Thielman, who was most 
 bitterly opposed to the French had left 
 for Dresden before they arrived, and throughout the 
 period of Ms command he had done his best to pro- 
 mote a German spirit amongst his men and officers, 
 therefore a good deal of re-organization was necessary 
 before the Saxons could be induced to march under 
 their new masters. Reynier's report to Ney (given 
 in Foucart, p. 137) is amusing in its querulousness, and 
 his troubles did not end there, because an epidemic, ' 
 " nervous^ issffiL. " (prob a bly _" influenz aJlL had broken 
 out, so that it was inadvisable to quarter troops in the 
 town. Neither Victor's nor Sebastiani's Corps had arrived, 
 they were indeed stiU some seven days' march away, their 
 advance being constantly harassed by partisan raids 
 based on Billow's Corps, and it was fortunate that the 
 Allies had already set out on their further retreat, as 
 Ney had only Durutte's Division of the Vll Cgrps and 
 his own III Corps, of reliable troops, at his disposal. 
 
 Much iU feeling had developed between 
 ttfeAUies^ the Prussians and Russians during the 
 retreat to Dresden, of which Napoleon was 
 kept duly informed by rumours collected by his 
 advance patrols. It seems that this ill feehng had 
 penetrated even to the Supreme Command, for the 
 Prussians actually began their march on May 9, from 
 Meissen on Groszenhajoi, i.e. towards Berlin, whilst 
 the Russians from Neustadt took the road to Radeberg 
 
FROM LUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 123 
 
 and Breslau. But on tlie 10th wiser counsels prevailed, 
 and leaving the protection of Berhn to Biilow and 
 his partisans, King Frederick WiUiam directed his 
 troops, by the road through Kamenz towards Bautzen, 
 where the Russians had preceded him. Here the two 
 Sovereigns decided to make a further stand, and pro- 
 ceeded to fortify their position. 
 
 Napoleon's Headquarters remained in Dresden from 
 May 8 to 17, the time being utihzed to re-organize 
 his troops and incorporate into the several Corps the 
 reinforcements completed since the opening of hostiUties, 
 and now on their way to join him. 
 
 On May 12, Prince Eugene received the following / 
 order, which those who have followed his progress so 
 far must admit to have been fully deserved : 
 
 "My Son, — Start to-night for Munich, and from 
 thence proceed to Italy, where you will take over the 
 command of all my troops in that country, and the 
 lUyrian Provinces. It is my intention to form an 
 Army of observation of between eighty and ninety 
 Battahons, haK French, half ItaKan." 
 
 The Army of the Elbe was now broken up, its Corps 
 being absorbed by the Grand Army under the personal 
 command of the Emperor. The following table gives 
 its composition on May 15. 
 
 Divisions. Batts. Squdms. Batteries. Men, 
 
 (Morand (French) . . ."| 
 Peyri (ItaUan) . • • I 34 4 7=25,000 
 
 Franquemont ( Wurtem- 
 berg) ; ! 
 
 fBouet (French) • • -I , „„ „„"„„„ 
 
 ' - ^ . . >■ 39 4 20=22,000 
 
 TTT ^^ rBouet(Fre 
 Marmont|j^g^^rioh 
 
124 
 
 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Batts. Squdins. 
 
 XI Corps 
 
 XII Corps 
 
 Guards 
 
 20 
 
 1st Cay. 
 Corps 
 Latour 
 Maubourg 
 
 r 
 
 45-50 
 
 Divisions. 
 G6rard "j lYenoh and 
 BVessinet \ Italian [■ 31 
 CharpentierJ mixed I 
 Lorenoez (French) . .V 
 
 Paohtod I 33 
 
 .Raglovioli (Bavarian) . j 
 Old Guard . . . . | 6 
 ; 2 Divisions Young Guards ■ 25-30 
 Dumoustier and Bairois J 
 
 Guard Cavalry — 
 
 Bruy^re — 
 
 8 French Regiments = 
 12,000 men 
 
 1 Regiment Italian ] 
 Chasseurs 1 2,400 
 
 2 Regts. Saxons ) 
 Division Chatel — 
 
 1,800 French detached 
 to V Corps . . 
 Division Heavy Cavaky . 
 Division Bourdesoulles — 
 
 6 French Regts., 1,200 
 
 2 Saxon Regts., 1,200 
 Division Doumerc — 
 
 6 French Regts. 1,200 
 
 1 NeapoUtan Regt. 1,000 
 
 Total . 
 
 Army uwdbe Marshal Ney. 
 
 Divisions Batts. Squdms. 
 
 (Souham 1 
 Delmas I 
 Albert j 
 Eicard J 
 
 (Maisons '\ "j 
 
 V Corps J Lagrange ^French . j- 
 Lauriston iRochambeauJ J 
 
 VPuthod (mixed . . 
 VII Corps ( Durutte (French) ■ ■ ■ \ 
 Reynier 1 Sohr (Saxon) . " . . . / 
 II Corps / 1st and 4th French Divi- I 
 
 Victor \ sions ' 
 
 Chatel's Division of Light Cavalry i 
 detached from 1st Cavaky Corps to \ 
 march with V Corps, 1,800 men . J 
 n Cavalry Corps. Sebastian! . 
 
 Batteries. Men' 
 8= 17,000 
 
 7=24,000 
 
 — — = 4,000 
 
 — 14= 15,000 
 
 3= 4,000 
 
 4=9,800 
 
 66 
 
 30 
 
 14 
 16 
 
 22 
 
 8 
 
 . . 115,000 
 
 Batteries. Hen. 
 
 12= 30,000 
 
 — 10= 19,000 
 
 1 
 
 2= 8,000 
 2= 9,500 
 
 — 2= 13,000 
 
 — 9 
 
 15 
 
 — = 1,800 
 — = 3,000 
 
 Total 
 
 84,000 
 
FROM LUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 125 
 
 The two Armies together totalled 200,000 men, but 
 were evidently a very heterogeneous collection, particu- 
 larly weak in Cavalry, and gims for all the. B atterie s 
 were not complete, so ^Jh at the proportion jras^b^ebg^ 
 instead of the normal 3 per thousand bayonet s, but 
 the Allies had received far fewer reinforcements, and on 
 the morning of the battle of Bautzen could not dis- 
 pose of more than 110,000 over the whole theatre of 
 operations, of which only 90,000 could by any possibihty 
 take part in the fighting. 
 
 Simultaneously, whilst re-organizing the 
 
 a Base Army, the Emperor's attention was directed 
 to the preparation of Dresden as a base of 
 operations. 
 
 Three bridges were completed with their approaches 
 and defences, and hospitals, magazines, etc., were all 
 prepared ; that is to say, orders were given to that effect, 
 but subsequent events make it doubtful whether they 
 were aU obeyed. 
 
 The following routes de VArmee were decreed. 
 
 1st. Main road from Mainz to Dresden, by Frankfurt, 
 Fulda, Erfurt, Weimar; with two branches, one by 
 Jena to Altenburg ; the other by Naumburg and Leipzig. 
 
 2nd. A branch from Leipzig to Wittenberg. 
 
 3rd. A branch from Augsburg to Altenburg by 
 Nuremberg, Bamberg Schleiz and Gera. 
 
 The Augsburg-Wiirzburg road was suppressed. 
 Halting-places were arranged every six leagues (18 miles) 
 and troops moving along the roads were given one 
 day's rest for six to seven day's marching. 
 
 As Col. Lanrezac, whose account I am here following 
 almost textually, points out, the suppression of the 
 
126 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 links from Erfurt to Dresden via Altenburg and of the 
 Wiirzburg road was not altogether wise, for partisans con- 
 tinually interfered with the Leipzig line, and orders had 
 to be issued that detachments should march in bodies not 
 less than 500 strong, with all due mihtary precautions. 
 
 The main road from Dresden, to Bautzen niMacross_ 
 the _manv fore gt^cjgd^spurs wbich--.deseend fro m, the 
 crest of the Riese ngebirge. The countiywas ,sgarsely 
 cultivated and always inhpsRitable, whilst every day's 
 delay gained by the resistance of their rear guards was 
 employed by the Allies to drive off cattle and forage. 
 The fact that the t woAxmie s, after pas sing the Elbe^ had 
 utilized every available road, and cover ed the^'r reitTP.ff.i-f 
 with C ossacks, made it very . dif&oult f or jN'§poleon_to 
 decide^^jETJffiil direction'ihaj^^ The 
 
 troops that had gone north to Groszenhayn might very 
 well have been sent to join Biilow before Berlin ; hence 
 the Emperor hesitated before making a final decision, 
 and on May 13, he wrote a letter to Ney, which shows 
 clearly what was in his mind. 
 
 " I cannot yet see clearly what the 
 
 the Allies Prussians are doing; it is certam that 
 the Russians are retreating on Breslau ; 
 but the Prussians — are they also retiring to that 
 town, or have they thrown themselves on Berhn, as^ 
 seems naturcd, to defend their cavital ? The reports I 
 expect to-night will clear the matter up. You wiU 
 understand that with the considerable forces at your 
 disposal there can be no question of sitting down with 
 folded hands. To relieve Glogau, to occupy Berlin, 
 so that the Prince d' Eckmiihl (Davout) can re-occupy 
 Hamburg, and advance with his five Divisions (he had 
 
FROM LUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 127 
 
 only three) through Pomerania to seize Berlin, these are 
 the three objects I propose to attain during the month. 
 By the position I have assigned to you, we shall always 
 be able to concentrate and move either to the right or 
 left according to circumstances." 
 
 According to the orders already sent to him, Ney 
 would occupy on May 16, with the III Corps and his 
 own Headquarters, Luckau, with the V Corps Dobrilugh, 
 VII Corps Dahme and the II Corps with 2nd Cavalry 
 Corps, Schonwald. The centre of this group is about 
 seventy miles from Dresden. Bautzen is thirty-five 
 miles from Dresden, and about sixty from Luckau ; 
 and in view of the fact that the Allies in their own 
 country were always well informed of the French move- 
 ments, the temptation to move behind the screen of 
 forest land to deliver a stroke on Ney with the whole 
 united Army, must have been great for the Prussians, 
 for they at least could change their base from Silesia 
 to Berlin. But Napoleon gauged the consequences 
 of the AUiance correctly, and though he certainly 
 expected that the latter would try to cover their capital 
 (in which case Ney could easily hold them till he arrived 
 in person) he was convinced that the conflicting interests 
 of the two parties could never be reconciled sufi&ciently 
 to admit of concerted action. 
 
 Meanwhile, as we have already seen, the IV, VI, 
 and XI Corps had crossed the Elbe on the 11th, and on 
 the same day Macdonald's Corps (XI) overtook the 
 Eussian rear guard under Miloradowitch at Weissig, 
 on the road to Stolpen, and a sharp action resulted. 
 The Eussians withdrew as night came on, and took 
 post at Bischofswerda, where they were again attacked 
 
128 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 by Macdonald. The fighting on this day was very 
 serious ; the village itself was burnt to the ground, 
 and though the Russians again retreated, morning found 
 them only a few miles east of the position they had 
 abandoned, and quite ready to renew the action. For 
 the next two days the French remained watching them 
 whilst the IV Corps (Bertrand) moved by the main road 
 towards Bautzen as far as Konigsbriick, encountering 
 only Cossacks, the VI Corps (Marmont), following in 
 second line to Reichenburg. 
 
 French Supphes, however, immediately began to 
 
 Difficulties create difficulties, and_ the complaints of 
 
 o "PP y ^jjg Marshals against the barbarous methods 
 
 of the enemy in clearing the coimtry read quaintly 
 
 from the very men who had first set the example 
 
 of making " war support war " under other conditions. 
 
 The Cossacks, backed by Prussian Light Cavalry, also 
 began to make themselves troublesome, and on the 12th, 
 detachments reached the Elbe near Meissen from Gros- 
 zenhayn necessitating the dispatch of Latour Maubourg's 
 Cavalry and a supporting force of Infantry tp keep 
 communication open with Ney. 
 
 The degree of insecurity produced by these raids 
 is indicated by the fact that all important dispatches 
 were now sent ofE in triphcate, and were frequently 
 entrusted to friendly Saxons in disguise, whilst all 
 provisions had to be sent up to the front in convoy 
 under escort. In six days nearly one-third of the 
 Cavalry horses were broken down from want of forage. 
 
 By midnight on the 13th, aU doubts as to the direction 
 of the Prussian retreat were set at rest by the comparison 
 of the reconnaissance reports sent in during the previous 
 
FROM LUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 129 
 
 forty-eiglit hours, but whether the two armies now 
 reunited at Bautzen would stand their ground or 
 retreat further to Breslau required to be cleared up. 
 Orders for With this object, the following orders 
 14th May ^gj.g jgg^g^ at 4 am. on the 14th. 
 
 The XI Corps remains ia position at Bischofswerda. 
 
 The IV Corps by Kamena, advance guard to Kloster 
 Marienstern on the way to Bautzen. 
 
 The VI Corps closes up to I'rankenthal (three miles 
 west of Bischofswerda). 
 
 The XII Corps by Weissig to Fischbach. 
 
 Imperial Guard to remain in and around Dresden. 
 
 On the 15th, Macdonald (XI) resuming his advance 
 beyond Bischofswerda encountered the Eussian rear 
 guard at Goda, and after hard fighting drove it back 
 tUl he came within sight of Bautzen, and the camps 
 of the Allies about that place. 
 
 To the north the IV Corps also came within touch 
 of the enemy about Bautzen and estabhshed communi- - 
 cation with Macdonald on its right. The VI and XII 
 also closed up in support. 
 
 It now seemed clear that the enemy intended to 
 receive battle, for numerous entrenchments weie 
 observed on the heights above Bautzen, and the inhabi- 
 tants reported the arrival of reiaforcements to join 
 the Allied Forces. 
 
 In order to complete the defeat of the 
 "to Ney""^ -^lli^s at Bautzen, it was Napoleon's in- 
 tention to send Ney with his III Corps 
 to join the troops already assembled there. Berthier 
 was directe d to inform Ney i n due course, but by some 
 misund erstanding he fail ed to ma]te "TF cleMj^S 
 
 K 
 
130 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 that the order issued by the Emperor's command 
 was merely a " Corps," and not an " Army " order. 
 Berthier had forgotten that Ney was in command of 
 the whole force, as well as his own special Corps (III). 
 Very naturally, when Ney received his order to advance, 
 knowing the importance of the coming engagement, 
 he took with him on the 17th 85,000 men, including 
 Victor with the II and VII Corps. The Emperor had 
 intended on the 14th to send definite orders to Victor 
 to advance from Liickau towards Berlin, but the matter 
 
 was somehow^yer^akad.„ani^SiZop^ ^^ 18th was_ 
 the omission rectified ; ^an illuminj/tojg j^sta^ceof 
 Siaifi management in the Grand Army as it was. Such 
 an oversight would be inconceivable in a continental 
 Staff nowadays. 
 
 Meanwhile, twenty-four hours later, the Emperor 
 changed his mind again, and Ney received an order 
 to take Victor and the VII Corps with him (II Corps 
 understood, as that was Victor's special command). 
 Now Victor had already marched with Ney, but Ng^ 
 having started in a single column his 85.000 men were 
 strung out over thji ty miles of highway. Had Napoleon 
 been marching to fight, in order to get his men up as 
 quickly as possible, and as nearly as might be close 
 together, he would have marched them in masses of 
 Divisions, with only the guns on the roads. Under these 
 conditions he would have had his troops up to the poiat 
 whence they could deploy into the fighting lines in far 
 less time, and with less confusion, than men marching 
 in column could have been handled. Victor, with his 
 35.000 being in rear of Ney's troops could . no ! get past 
 to obey the E mperor's order as sent to him, and failed 
 
FROM LUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 131 
 
 in consequence to reach the battlefield until after the 
 Allies had made good their retreat from the field of 
 Bautzen. 
 
 On the morning of the 18th, Key's troops occupied 
 the following positions; — 
 
 V Corps (3 Divisions) at Leutenberg 
 
 III Corps and Headquarters at Kahlau. 
 
 VII Corps and Headquarters at Liickau. 
 
 II Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Corps at Dahme. 
 Napoleon's ^^ *^® same day the Emperor left Dres- 
 Orders den with the Guards for Harthau, half 
 
 1 8th May ^^^ ^ Bautzen, and before starting wrote 
 the accompanying letter for Berthier (the "Major- 
 General," as he was always called). 
 
 " Dresden, 4 a.m., I8th May. 
 
 " Send orders to the Due de Treviso (Mortier) and 
 to General Latour Maubourg, to move to-morrow to 
 Bisohofswerda. 
 
 " As soon as the head of his column arrives, the Due 
 de Reggio (Oudinot) will deploy into line of battle. 
 Reiterate the order to him to occupy Neukirch, and 
 the positions on the right, so as to make sure that no 
 enemy remains in those forests. 
 
 " Send orders also to General Latour Maubourg to 
 search out all the country to the right and actively 
 pursue any Cossacks he may find on the roads from 
 Neustadt to Neukirch. 
 
 " Order the Old Guard with the reserves of Artillery 
 to start from 4 to 8 a.m., and make a day's march on the 
 Bautzen road. 
 
 " Give orders to Barrois' Division (Young Guard) 
 
132 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 to hold itself ready to move off at 11 a.m. I think it 
 wiU be necessary to distribute a pound of rice to each 
 soldier of the Old Guard and of Barrois' Division ; 
 that wiU make a reserve for four days in case of a block 
 amoligst the transport. 
 
 "Eeiterate the order to General Bertrand (IV Corps) 
 to place himself in communication with Qeneral Lauri- 
 ston (V Corps) and the Prince de la Moskova, who are 
 due to-day at Konigswerda. 
 
 " I suppose the Field Headquarters have started ; send 
 mOj on everjrthing necessary for a day of battle." 
 ^^\ I have cited this order as tvpicaj ; f or the 
 
 Comment j^ " i n ii i ii n i --- , ^ r.m^.^ i^^w^A— ...^, 
 
 total absence of any form, its want of 
 precision , and the w ay in which points to be attended 
 tq^.are. Jotted dfigzBui^ most at, random , ..^rK gsjgng 
 
 the insight necessary to a ppreciate t he pecuhar 
 functions of the"^Maior^nCTa l^ ~in the machinery 
 of the whole Army. It was his duty to comb out 
 and disentangle these ideas^ and transmit them with 
 the necessary fldd ^'ns.^totheir several addresses, and 
 the slightest want of form or courtesy in the final 
 order seems often to have been bitterly resente^ by the 
 recipients.^ When in addition to these sources of friction, 
 the uncertainty and irregularity in the arrival of the 
 orders themselves at their destination is taken into con- 
 sideration, one can only marvel at the high average of 
 success which this almost casual staff service attained. 
 The chief explanation, of course, is that the whole Army, 
 
 Emperor and Marshals, were so accustomed to War and 
 
 its chances that the latter "played the game" on a 
 
 mere indication from their chief — but as events will 
 
 1 Foueart, p. 258; letter from Oudinot, May 18, 1813. 
 
FROM LUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 133 
 
 presently show, that indication was the essential factor 
 in the whole matter. 
 
 We have seen above ttat mistakes and delay in the 
 receipt of orders had thrown Ney's command twenty- 
 four hours behindhand in the whole combination. On 
 the morning of the 19th his troops resumed their march 
 in accordance with the orders written on the 17th, but 
 received on the evening of May 18, but th^g_were_so 
 laconic, and conveyed so Uttle LQformation as, to ^ the 
 position of tKF enemy, ^^;t_^ev_m^mdgrstood tr|ieir 
 purport altogeffie r, and his columns were actually 
 heading for a position in the left rear of the Grand Army, 
 instead, as intended, to the right rear of the enemy. 
 Counter Fortunately the unexpected action of 
 Attack by the Allies interfered to prevent this 
 the Allies contretemps. They had determined to 
 strike a blow at the converging columns outside 
 the zone of their position, and to this end a force 
 of 18,000 men of all arms imder Barclay de Tolly and 
 Yorck set out very early in the morning, and news of 
 their approach being given to General Lauriston (V 
 Corps) he closed up his troops for action and brought 
 up their right shoulders to meet them. 
 
 This movement left the flank of the IV Corps exposed, 
 and its outermost Division (Peyri's ItaUans), marching 
 in to Konigswartha without proper precaution, was 
 suddenly overwhelmed and severely handled. 
 
 The further advance of the V Corps, however, dis- 
 engaged them, and Yorck and Barclay fell back in the 
 night on their main position. But the unexpecte d 
 at tack completely upset Hev . who now drew up his 
 troops for the 6ight facing east, iostead of south, as 
 
134 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 lie had originally intended doing ; and ia notifying the 
 fight to Napoleon he stated his intention to fall back 
 on Buchwald if the attack were renewed in the morn- 
 ing. - In that event, he begged that support should be 
 sent him from the IV Corps on his tight. Nothing-Could ^ 
 serve better to show hQS_CQjeaB]fit gly Jfey misunder- 
 sto od his own rdle, a nd the whole conception underlying 
 the Napoleonic system ; but fortunately further orders 
 to continue his march via Klix reached him in sufficient 
 time to avert misfortune. 
 
 Napoleon '^^^ Emperor in the meanwhile had 
 Reconnoitres reached the Grand Army in front of Bautzen 
 
 Bautzen. ^^^ Yt^A. reconnoitred the enemy's position as 
 far as it was visible. During the afternoon of the 19th 
 the positions of the several Corps of the Grand Army 
 were corrected for the battle expected on the following 
 day. The sketch shows the arrangement better than 
 many words. 
 
 The enemy held the line of the Spree with strong out- 
 posts, and as before said many entrenchments were visible 
 on the heights to the westward. Bautzen itself, with 
 its mediseval ramparts, was strongly held, and north of 
 the village or townlet a succession of inundations and 
 ponds rendered access to the position beyond some- 
 what difficult. South of the town the stream rapidly 
 decreased in depth as it neared its sources in the main- 
 chain of the Bohemian frontier ; on the other hand its 
 banks became steep and in some places precipitous, 
 whilst numerous patches of forest rendered concealment 
 easy on either side. 
 
 Eecognizing that such ground suited to perfection 
 the tactics which all Europe had come to consider the 
 
FROM LXJTZEl^ TO THE ARMISTICE 135 
 
 especial characteristic of the French Infantry, the Allies 
 from the first regarded this wing, i.e. their left, as the 
 most exposed to attack, and feeling its weakness, had 
 prepared a second position about three miles in rear of 
 the Spree, indicated by the line of the Blossauer Wasser, 
 a smaU affluent of the Spree, where more open groimd 
 on their own side gave greater facility of manoeuvre, 
 particularly for their Cavalry, which formed their 
 main strength. The right wing of the Allies rested on 
 a group of small kopjes about two miles north-east of 
 Bautzen, and throughout the position villages had been 
 fortified, and redoubts and batteries erected. 
 
 Wittgenstein, who still officiated as Commander-in- 
 Chief, had determined to fight a defensive-offensive 
 battle within his prepared position — and his voluminous 
 orders provided for every possible contingency, except 
 the one that arose. The extreme front of the position 
 was a,bou t_1 5,0QQ .j^3:da, altogether too great for the 
 §5,000 men, which seems an outside estimate of the 
 numbers actually available for its defence. 
 
 Owing to the various cxmtretemfs which had arisen in 
 Ney's command, the Emperor had a difficult problem to 
 adjust. Barclay's reconnaissance in force of the previous 
 day must have completely enlightened the Allies as to 
 their danger if they continued to hold their ground. On 
 the other hand, a direct assault on their carefully prepared 
 position could only be attended with very heaArysacrifice, 
 and the Emperor was in no position to throw away men 
 for anything but the prospect of an adequate return. 
 
 Remembering his previous experience of Russian 
 methods, he could not overlook' the very great possi- 
 bility of their retreat during the night if he neglected 
 
136 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 to hold them during the day. His only chance, there- 
 fore, of holding them lay in involving them in such a 
 severe fight that it would be difficult for them to break 
 it off and retire under cover of darkness. With this 
 object the moiJmng of the 20th was spent in ostenta- 
 tious movements of the centre of the Army — which 
 in itself was not numerically imposing enough to 
 frighten the enemy off his ground, whilst they on the 
 extreme left and Oudinot on the right moved into 
 their positions under cover. 
 
 About 4 p.m. he gut his troops in motion, and 
 whilst sendiag Oudinot (XII Corps) against his 
 enemy's left, he advanced the remainder of his Army 
 down to the river, and under cover of a tremendous 
 cannonade threw trestle bridges across the stream and 
 drove in aU the enemy's outposts. 
 
 So far this was exactly what the AlUes wanted. 
 Their hope had been throughout to induce the French 
 to cross over to their side of the Spree, and then to 
 attack out of their prepared and concealed position 
 on the Blossauer Wasser. They had also succeeded 
 in rather more than holding their own against Oudi- 
 not's attack on their left, and no sign of danger from 
 Ney's troops on the north had as yet become apparent. 
 They, therefore, reinforced their left and determined to 
 continue the battle next day. 
 
 , This was what Napoleon had antici- 
 Orders for pated and as the arrival of Ney on their 
 
 the Battle right was now certain, he fully expected 
 of Bautzen ° . . , , , . i -Ck ^ • 
 
 a victory on the grandest scale. jyap"f; 
 
 every allowance for possibl e delays en roitte^ he ordered 
 
 Seyto continue his movement via Klix on Preititz, 
 
FROM LUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 137 
 
 a position well in rear of the enemy's right, and to be 
 there at 11 a.m. Then between 11 a.m. and noon, the 
 general attack would be delivered along the whole line. 
 Meanwhile, Oudinot, reinforced by part of the XI Corps, 
 was to advance against the enemy's left at daybreak, 
 and push the attack home. The centre. of the Army 
 was to stand fast until the Emperor gave the word. 
 
 Thus the battle began with renewed fury on the Allied 
 left, and the Royal Headquarters rode out to a little 
 knoll near Baschiitz, from whence they overlooked the 
 whole of Napoleon's centre, and could watch the progress 
 of the struggle on their left. Their view to the right 
 (north-west) appears to have been interrupted by the 
 ground, in any case their attention was completely 
 absorbed by the scene in front of them. For very soon 
 the French attack began to be held, and presently it was 
 clear that the Russians were making headway. In the 
 excitement of the moment, reports from Barclay on 
 their right appear to have been neglected, at any rate 
 no sufficient attention was paid to them. Here Ney 
 was driving everything before him with overwhelming 
 numbers, and away beyond his left, heavy masses of 
 troops, the V Corps, were showing. 
 
 By 10 a.m. Ney had reached Preititz, but his orders 
 told him to be there at 11 a.m. Unfortunately a roll 
 of the gr ound hid him fr om Napoleon , who had ridden 
 forward to a low kopje near, and being left without 
 giiidance Ney concluded to wait until the appointed time 
 for his appearance. This delay saved the Allies , for now 
 their danger became apparent to them and orders were 
 issued to retreat, but the troops actually in contact 
 with the enemy were to resist as long as was practicable. 
 
138 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 The consequent slackening of resistance along tie 
 centre did not escape Napoleon, who in the interval had 
 brought up the Guards for the decisive blow, and about 3 
 p.m. he gave the signal for the final advance. Meanwhile 
 ^e y had become absorbed in the fight raging to-his right 
 front, and entirely f o rg^etting bis ijast ructions to continue 
 his march from Preititz on Weissenburg, a point well 
 on the line of retreat of the Allies, he made his troops 
 bring up their left shoulders and advanced almost south- 
 west across the field. The sketch now explains what 
 happened. Three French Corps converged on the 
 
 plateau just as the Prussians who had hitherto held 
 
 it had received orders to retreat. As the several 
 French columns rose above the slopes they found them- 
 selves face to face with one another. The jaws of the 
 trap had closed, but they held nothing between them, 
 for the Prussians had vanished unseen. These incidents 
 are not infrequent on manoeuvre groimdp, and take 
 some time even then to straighten out. In the confusion 
 incident to the close range fighting of a century ago. 
 the scene which ensued can be imagined, not de- 
 scribed. , 
 
 This was the opportunity of the Allies, and they seized 
 it. Covered by their excellent Cavalry they withdrew 
 in order, and with all possible rapidity, and by nightfall ' 
 were far on their way towards GorUtz, leaving for the 
 second time not a single trophy to grace the conqueror's 
 victory. 
 
 Napoleon's Situated politically as Napoleon was. 
 Second this second failure to reap the rewards of 
 ** "'^'^ a crushing , success was almost as disas- 
 trous as an actual defeat. With 200,000 men at his 
 
FROM LUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 139 
 
 disposal — 170,000 of whom had actually appeared 
 upon the field, he had failed to capture a single gun 
 or stand of colours. The Allies .with less than half 
 his force had resisted aU his efEorte to beat them for 
 two whole days, and though the reason of this re- 
 sistance was clear enough to him, he could hardly explain 
 the fact away without seriously damaging the prestige 
 of his Army and its Commanders. His one chance of 
 retrieving the situation lay in a rapid and relentless 
 pursuit, which he immediately initiated. But ihe heart 
 was out of his Army . His men had not seen their enemy 
 beaten. The failure of the last great blow which should 
 have shattered the " moral " of the Allies beyond 
 retrieval, and turned them from a fighting Army into 
 a frightened flock of sheep, exalting the courage of the 
 victors in proportion as the panic reaction spread through 
 the flying masses, had robbed the French troops of the 
 chief stimulus for further exertion, and they stumbled 
 on blindly, too weary to guard themselves efficiently 
 against possible attack. Each day of the 
 The French p^jg^i^ brought fresh and bitter experi- 
 ence. On May 22, finding the enemy in 
 position just beyond Eeichenberg, instead of dash- 
 ing at them with the old confidence and Uan, they 
 halted to manoeuvre them out of position, and Napoleon 
 galloping up at the moment, impatient at the way 
 his men were checking, sent forward Latour Maubourg's 
 Cavalry who were suddenly ambushed by a couple of 
 Russian Horse Artillery batteries, and before they could 
 recover from the surprise, they were charged and very 
 roughly handled ^ by the Allied cavalry. The sudden 
 ' Theii losses, however, were only reported at 100 men. 
 
140 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 engagement had to take its course, and after a stubborn 
 fight the Russian rear guard, having gained all possible 
 time, began its retirement. Reynier, whose Corps (VII) 
 had been making forced marches four days running, 
 now begged for authority to halt and rest his men. 
 But Napoleon only ordered him forward, though he 
 had yielded to a similar appeal less well founded, after 
 the battle of Eckmiihl in 1809. A few moments later a 
 spent camion ball struck down Marshal Duroc, his most 
 faithfid and devoted friend. The shock upset even the 
 Emperor's iron nerve ; he was profotmdly affected, 
 and ordered the firing to cease. That night the Alhes 
 bivouacked about Gorhtz. 
 
 On the 23rd, the pursuit was continued, and on the 
 following days also. Each time the Emperor demanded 
 another 20 miles, which the troops were too worn out to 
 accomphsh. 
 
 Dissensions ^^ *^® ^^^'^ °^ *^® Allies the outlook 
 Amongst was also far from promising. They had 
 the Allies Yost on the battlefield about 20,000 men, 
 and what was worse, all confidence in each other and 
 in their leader had departed. Wittgenstein's position 
 had become impossible. He offered his resigna- 
 tion, which was accepted, and Barclay de Tolly was 
 appointed to the chief command in his place. But this 
 scarcely mended matters. Barclay, of Scots extraction, 
 as his name sufficiently indicates, took a very cool and 
 level-headed view of the situation, and refused altogether 
 to satisfy the patriotic but impracticable longings of 
 the Prussians for another battle. The troops were far 
 too spent for there to be any prospect of success were 
 they allowed to fight, and a thorough reorganization 
 
FROM LUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 141 
 
 was essential , but when the opportunity for that might 
 arrive remained very doubtful. 
 
 . On May 26, the Prussian Cavalry, under 
 ofHaynau Bliicher, prepared an ambush for the V 
 Corps, which formed the advanbe guard of 
 the French Left Column. It had been observed 
 marching without adequate precaution, and Maison's 
 Division, which led the march, was ridden into 
 and dispersed. Then the French grew more cautious, 
 but Napoleon had already reopened negotiations 
 begun after Liitzen for an armistice on the basis 
 of uti possidetis. He, therefore, felt it necessary to 
 press on and occupy Breslau. After leaving the hne 
 of the Katzbach at Leignitz and Goldberg, the^ Allies 
 had bent away to the south-east, by Jauer on Schweid- 
 nitz, leaving the road to Breslau open, and in the course 
 of June 1, the French entered that town, whilst the 
 Allies conceniarated on Schweidnitz. The indomitable 
 energy of the Emperor had again triumphed over all 
 obstacles, and if the Allies stood their gtound, as in fact 
 they had resolved to do, it would seem, from the map, 
 that their doom was certain. The French stood on 
 a front of 30 miles from Jauer to Breslau, and in thirty- 
 six hours must have penned them against the Austrian 
 frontier. 
 
 It was probably this fact which induced 
 Armistice ^^^ Emperor finally to agree to the 
 Armistice, a step in his career which has 
 received more unfavourable criticism than any other. 
 That, I take it, is because enthusiasm for the "Art 
 of the Leader," i.e. strategy, has bhnded the critics 
 to the essential fact that strategy is after all only 
 
142 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 the servant of National Policy, and policy rendered the 
 step inevitable, as will now be demonstrated. Theoreti- 
 cally Austria was still the Ally of France. Practically 
 the Emperor aheady knew that she meant to betray 
 him ; for months her conduct had been more than 
 suspect, and it was clear that the large Army he knew 
 she was concentrating in Bohemia was not intended to 
 aid his (Napoleon's) designs. If the AUies stood to 
 receive battle, he had not men enough to surround them, 
 and defeat would only have precipitated a hostUe 
 declaration from Austria. If the AlUes retreated yet 
 further, the danger of the presence of this Austrian Army 
 on the flank of his long unguarded line of communica- 
 tions would become greater with every march in pursuit. 
 Want of Cavalry was the principal mihtary reason 
 which Napoleon put forward in explanation of his con- 
 sent to an Armistice, and his German critics, notably 
 Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, have always maintained 
 that this reason was insufficient to justify his conduct. 
 This, however, I submit, is because they have syste- 
 matically viewed this Cavalry question from the stand- 
 point of its reconnoitring value, and not f^om that of 
 its " victory completing " power. 
 
 Situated as he now was, it must have been 
 quite clear to the Emperor, after the ex- 
 periences of Liitzen and Bautzen, that he could no 
 longer hope to win a reaUy decisive battle, such as 
 would of itself bring the War to a close. His Artillery 
 might tear out gaps in the enemy's line with case 
 fire, but in face of the enemy's superior Cavalry, his 
 Infantry could only avail themselves of the lanes 
 of death thus formed by marching in dense columns, 
 
FROM LUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 143 
 
 ready to form square at a moment's notice. This, 
 he knew, meant delay, which the enemy utilized to 
 break ofE the fighting. If he could afEord to wait for 
 six weeks he could make good this deficiency in the 
 proportion of the Cavalry arm. It would also enable him, 
 not only to fill up the gaps in the existing Corps, due 
 to battle and sickness (principally to the latter — ^there 
 were 90,000 sick on the morning states of the first week 
 in June), but he could place new Corps now in process 
 of formation in his fighting line, and thus bring up his 
 available field forces to a figure that the Allies, even with 
 Austria included, could hardly hope to exceed. If then, 
 Napoleon could once involve the whole Army of the AlKes 
 in a single decisive battle, he had every reason for expect- 
 ing to end the War by a single blow, for his superiority 
 as a Leader rose relatively to the command on the side of 
 his enemies, almost in proportion to the numbers to be 
 controlled. In other words, he, with his Marshals under 
 his own eye, on one battlefield with 200,000 might safely 
 be trusted to make fewer mistakes than would his oppo- 
 nents at the head of an equal number, and the greater 
 the numbers to be handled, the better his chances of 
 necessity became. 
 
 Actually the conduct of operations by his adversaries, 
 as we shall presently see, never gave him his hoped-for 
 opportunity, but at the time it was impossible for him 
 to forecast this. 
 
 To make the picture of the Emperor's situation 
 complete, it must be remembered that he had left 
 Dresden with only ammunition enough for " un jowr 
 de hataiMe," and his march had been so rapid that 
 his trains could not overtake the troops ; and further 
 
144 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 that Oudinot (the Duke of Reggio), who had been 
 detached after Bautzen to cover the French rear from 
 the direction of Berlin, was facing Biilow near 
 Luckau, and was in fact, badly beaten by him on 
 June 9, before the news of the Armistice could reach 
 either side. Further Tschernitschew's Cossacks had dis- 
 persed a regiment of provisional Cavalry on May 25, 
 near Halle, and had captured on the 30th a convoy of 
 Artillery and its escort of 1,600 men near Halberstadt. 
 In addition to this Woronzow, who had been left behind 
 to observe Magdeburg, had made a descent on Leipzig, 
 and was actually driving the French garrison out of 
 its gates when news of the Armistice, arriving very 
 opportunely, put a stop to the fighting. The two most 
 important of these incidents happened after the Armis- 
 tice, it is true, but they suffice to show how very real 
 were the dangers to which the French lines of communi- 
 cation were exposed. 
 
THE ARMISTICE— FEENCH PREPARATIONS 
 FOR THE AUTUMN 'CAMPAIGN 
 
"-^ CHAPTER VI 
 
 The Armistice — French Preparations for the 
 Autumn Campaign 
 
 The French ^^® foundations of the new Grand Army 
 Army in were laid, as we have ah-eady seen, by 
 August jSTapoIeon's Decree of the 12th March. All 
 the Corps therein provided for could not be made 
 ready for the field in time to take part in the opera- 
 tions beyond Dresden in May, but an enormous 
 number of conscripts were already on the march before 
 the Armistice, principally belonging to the levy of 1813, 
 but embodying also many recalcitrants (refractaires)^ of 
 previous years, and these sufficed to fill the ranks of all 
 the existing Corps, at the front, as well as to complete 
 the I, II, XIII, and XIV Corps, whose formation had 
 scarcely been begun when their Headquarters were 
 
 ^ " Les Refraotaires " was the name given to the peculiarly recal- 
 citrant deserters, who had to be hunted down by flying columns of 
 troops like brigands. When a sufficient number had been caught, 
 every tenth man was shot on a public parade and the remainder 
 sent off to the Isles of Oleron and Rhd or similar places, where they 
 were' placed under officers selected for their tact and comprehension 
 of men, and once they understood that escape was impossible, they 
 accepted their fate and often made excellent soldiers. They used 
 to be sent by companies along the coast to Holland, and from thence 
 were marched to the front, so as not to expose them to the temptation 
 of desertion in their own country. They may fairly be compared 
 to the men we " pressed " into the Navy, but were undoubtedly 
 treated with greater humanity. 
 
 117 
 
148 
 
 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 K 
 
 hurried up to the front. The Cavahy Corps were also 
 brought up to full strength or nearly so ;, hence at the 
 close of the Armistice the French Army stood in the 
 following order ^ : — 
 
 The Guards 62 
 
 I Corps. Vandamme 42 
 
 Bat- Sijaad- 
 talions. tons. Guns. 
 
 II 
 
 III 
 
 IV 
 
 V 
 
 VI 
 
 VII 
 
 VIII 
 
 XI 
 
 XII 
 
 XIII 
 
 XIV 
 
 Victor 43 
 
 Ney 62 
 
 Bertrand 36 
 
 Lauriston 37 
 
 Marmont .... 42 
 
 Reynier 33^ 
 
 Poniatowski ' (Poles) . . 10 
 
 Macdonald 38 
 
 Oudinot 30 
 
 Davout 47 
 
 St. Cyr (Gouvion) ... 51 
 
 69 
 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 11 
 
 8 
 
 7 
 
 8 
 
 13 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 14 
 
 15 
 
 12 
 
 218 = 
 76 = 
 76 = 
 
 122 = 
 72 = 
 74 = 
 84 = 
 68 = 
 44 = 
 
 90: 
 
 58 = 
 76: 
 
 92: 
 
 Uen. 
 58,191 
 33,298 
 26,168 
 40,008 
 23,663 
 27,905 
 : 27,754 
 = 21,283 
 : 7,673 
 = 24,418 
 = 19,324 
 = 37,514 
 = 26,411 
 
 
 
 
 372,236 
 
 
 Cavalky Cobps 
 
 
 
 Iflt Cavalry Corps. 
 
 Latoiir Maubourg . 
 
 . 78 
 
 36 = 16,537 
 
 2nd „ „ 
 
 Sebastiani .... 
 
 52 
 
 18 = 10,304 
 
 3rd „ 
 
 Arighi .... 
 
 . 27 
 
 24== 6,000 
 
 4th „ 
 
 Kellermann . . 
 
 . 24 
 
 12= 3,923 
 
 5th „ 
 
 L'H6ritier . . . 
 
 . 20 
 
 6= 4,000 
 
 Bat- 
 talions, 
 . 10 
 
 Squad- 
 rijHis. 
 
 40,764 
 
 Guns. Men. 
 28 = 15,000 
 — = 8,010 
 
 Girard's Corps 
 
 Artillery and Engineers, Reserve Park 
 Corps of Observation at Leipzig. " Gene- 
 
 ralMargaron 10 8 10= 7,800' 
 
 Grand total of Field Troops— 559J battalions, 395 squadrons, 
 1,284 guns = 442,810 men. 
 
 In the above list the numbers IX and X are omitted ; 
 the former was reserved for the Bavarian Corps (Wrede) 
 
 1 From Frieirich, vol. i, p. 62. 
 
 " Poniatowski's Corps had been shut up in Warsaw during the first 
 half of the campaign, but was allowed free passage by the Allies, 
 as their presence in rear of the front detained more men for their 
 supervision than they were considered to be worth. 
 
FRENCH PREPARATIONS 149 
 
 and was subsequently transferred to the Corps of Augereau, 
 
 still in process of formation, and the latter iinder Bapp 
 
 formed the garrison of Danzig. 
 
 Gaebisos op Fobtbesses on the Elbe, 
 excltjslvb op field teoops in the command. 
 
 Hamburg 12,000 
 
 Bremen 1,500 
 
 Magdeburg . ... 3,250 
 
 Wittenberg 2,318 
 
 Torgau 2,000 
 
 Dresden 5,000 
 
 Total on the Elbe • 26,068 
 
 Second Line Teoops. 
 
 Lemoine's Diviaion at Minden .... 5,400 
 
 Augereau' s Corps, about ..... 10,000 
 
 Cavalry Corps Milhaud, in formation . . . 2,500 
 
 Bavarian Corps, Wrede 25,000 
 
 42,900 
 
 Gabeisons op Fobtbesses in Poland and Gbbmany. 
 
 Danzig 25,000 
 
 Zamoscz ........ 4,000 
 
 Modlin 3,000 
 
 Stettin 8,500 
 
 Kiistrin 4,000 
 
 Glogau 5,500 
 
 Erfurt 1,874 
 
 Wiirzburg 2,500 
 
 65,374 
 Add to all these reinforcements on their way to the 
 frontier, sick and wounded in hospital, troops of the 
 BavariaH and Westphahan contingents, not included 
 in the above, and . the grand total of all cannot well 
 fal l short of 700,000, available m ore or less within the 
 (jerman theatre of operations^ " 
 ' On the whole the average quality of the troops must 
 be considered as somewhat better than those that 
 fought at Liitzen, even though the age of the con- 
 scripts who had filled up the gaps in the field Army was 
 
150 . THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 fractionally lower. The troops had fuUy recovered their 
 confidence in the Emperor ; the weakest elements in 
 moral and physique ahke had been ehminated and the 
 remaining cadres of old war- seasoned non-commissioned 
 officer's and men readily absorbed their contingent of 
 recruits, and imbued them with their own rigorously 
 trained spirit. It must be remembered that no man 
 reached the ranks with less than ninety days' training, 
 sixty of which at least had been spent on the line of 
 march, and the physically weak had been removed by 
 the process of the survival of the fittest. 
 
 The Cavalry, however, were still the weakest point in 
 Napoleon's organization. They were, as a whole, miser- 
 ably moimted on horses not broken but broken down, 
 though they possessed some leaders of the highest 
 quaHty, who knew their men and their work (de Brae ; 
 for instance) and their exploits at Dresden and Leipzig 
 prove that under competent commanders they were 
 still capable of efficient service. 
 
 The Artillery was always excellent, and in spite 
 of deficient horse supply showed a uniform superiority 
 over that of the Allies. 
 
 The greatest advantage that the French possessed 
 over the AUies lay not alone in the incontestable super- 
 iority of the Emperor himself, whether as strategist 
 or tactician, but in the uniform war experience of the 
 Marshals, their Divisional Commanders, Staff and 
 subaltern officers. 
 
 The condition of the Allied troops when 
 
 of the Allies for the time hostilities ceased was little 
 
 if at all better than that of their opponents. 
 
 Battalions had shrunk, in some cases to 200 men and 
 
FRENCH PREPARATIONS 151 
 
 even less, and the survivors were spent with the constant 
 strain of marching and fighting. But the Prussians at 
 least were in the heart of their own country, and knew 
 that they were fighting for very existence. The Russians 
 on the whole were older men, of longer service, and 
 far more accustomed to hardship and privation. The 
 men had forgotten, if indeed they had ever known, 
 any other tie but that of the Regiment, and as long as 
 that held together they were at home lq the only 
 " home " they were capable of reahzing. Moreover, 
 they recovered from the depression due to their heavy, 
 almost daily, losses with the fatahsm peculiar to their 
 race. 
 
 The losses of the Prussian field troops 
 Ium AimY ^^^^ made good by recruits with an average 
 of about three months under arms ; and 
 since all were filled with the same spirit of goodwill 
 for the service and a fierce desire to close with the 
 enemy, these new drafts were soon assimilated by 
 the war-seasoned ranks of the older men. 
 
 By the end of July, the Landwehr also were sufficiently 
 ready for the field. Under normal circumstances they 
 would certainly not have passed the easiest of reviewing 
 officers, for in many cases the front rank was armed 
 only with pikes, their clothing was anything but regu- 
 lation, and their foot gear beneath contempt. But 
 events proved, as they so often have done before and 
 since, that a regulation equipment is not absolutely 
 essential for men who really wish to conquer their 
 enemies, therefore once these rough troops had become 
 accustomed to their new surroundings, they did excellent 
 service. In all they made up 37 Regiments in 149 
 
A 
 
 152 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Battalions {Friedrich, ii, 43), averaging about 680 men ; so 
 that we may count them in round numbers as 100,000. 
 
 The Cavalry of the- Landwehr seems to have been 
 on the whole markedly better than its Infantry, but 
 according to the Cavalry officers of the old Army, they 
 were quite deplorable. They were always willing to 
 ■ charge, but the difficulty was to rally them, and Marwitz, 
 in his diary has many anecdotes about them.^ But the 
 spirit was in them, and they were about as good as the 
 bulk of their opponents. Altogether they suppHed 116 
 squadrons of a total strength of about 10,000 men. 
 Addiag Artillery and Engineers, the grand total of 
 armed men available amounted to about 275,000, to 
 which some 25,000 reinforcements joined during the 
 campaign, must be added.^ 
 
 These numbers were organized in the following 
 manner (Friedrich, ii, 47) : — 
 
 Field Abmy. 
 
 Bat- Squad- 
 
 tallons. rons. Guns. Men. 
 (a) In Silesia — 
 
 The Guards 6J 8 16 = 7,091 
 
 I Corps. Torek 46 44 104= 38,484 
 
 n „ Kleist 41 44 112= 37,816 
 
 (6) In Brandenburg — 
 
 in Corps. Bulow 40i 42 80 = 41,135 
 
 IV „ Tauentaien . . . . 48| 29 42= 33,170 
 The Partisans of Liitzow, Beiche and 
 
 Sohill 4 7 8= 4,068 
 
 186J 174 362 = 161,764 
 
 1 See Cavalry Past and Future. 
 
 " 300,000 men out of a, population of 5,000,000 is about 6 per 
 cent. 6 per cent, of our total population gives about 2,500,000, 
 but as a fact we have over 3,000,000 trained to arms between the 
 ages of eighteen and sixty. 
 
FRENCH PREPARATIONS 
 
 153 
 
 • SiEQB Troops. 
 
 Bat- Squad- 
 
 T.1 1 1 p -r talions. rons. Guns. Men. 
 
 For Blockade 01 Kustrin .... 9 5 g = 7,122 
 
 „ „ Stettin 15 7 8= 10,548 
 
 „ „ Danzig 10 6 8= 8,000 
 
 „ Glogau 9 4 16= 5,000 
 
 43 22 40= 30,670 
 Grand total of troops actually organized : 228J battalions, 196 
 squadrons, 402 guns= 192,434 men. 
 
 Russian '^^ *°*^^ number of Eussian troops on 
 Army German territory at the conclusion of the 
 Armistice amounted to 296,000 men, grouped 
 as follows : — 
 
 (a) In Silesia — 
 
 Bat- Squad- Cossack 
 
 ^ , _ talions. rons. Eegts. Guns. Men. 
 
 Langeron's Corps ... 47 15 10 139 = 34,551 
 
 Saoken'a „ ... 18 30 12 60= 18,553 
 
 Wittgenstein's Corps . . 45 38 5 92= 34,926 
 
 St. Priest's Corps ... 20 22 3 36= 13,586 
 Guards and Reserves, imder 
 
 the Grand Duke Constantino 47 71 10 182= 44,347 
 
 177 176 40 509 = 145,763 
 (fi) In Brandenburg — 
 
 Winzengerode . . . . \ 
 
 Woronzow I 29 44 20 92 = 29,357 
 
 TBohemitsohew . . . . ) 
 
 Attached to Billow's Corps — — 3 22 = 1,160 
 
 Attached to Tauentzien's 
 
 Corps — — 1 _= 318 
 
 29 44 24 114= 30,835 
 (c) In Mecklenburg, attached to 
 Walmoden's Corps — 
 
 Detachment Tettenbom . — — 4 = 1,495 
 
 Russo-German Legion . . 6 — — 4,475 
 
 With Domberg's Cavahy 
 
 Division — 8 — — = 1,192 
 
 Russo - German Artillery 
 Brigade — — — 16= 363 
 
 6,525 
 Giving a total for the Keld Army of 212 battalions, 228 aquadrons, 
 61 Cossack regimeats, 639 guns = 184,123 m6n. 
 
154 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 In Second Line. 
 
 About Warsaw — ■« ^ c j /^ » 
 
 T> 1- J , "" . Bat- Squad- Cossack 
 
 eonsb. Army of Observation talions. rons. Begts. Guns. Men. 
 
 under Benningsen ... 70 67 10 198 = 59,000 
 
 Blockading Zamosoz ... 21 5 3 36 = 15,000 
 
 Blockading Modlin . . . . ? ? ? ? = 9,000 
 
 Siege of Danzig . . . 58 12 11 59 = 29,100 
 
 112,100 
 The Austrian The successive campaigns of Austerlitz and 
 Army 'Wagram had reduced Austrian finance to a 
 condition of almost hopeless destitution. As' a measure 
 of economy, the efiectives of the troops had been reduced 
 to the lowest possible point, and, worst of aU, the greater 
 part of the workpeople in all the arsenals and Govern- 
 ment factories had been discharged. ' Hence the efforts 
 to raise new forces in 1813 were most severely hampered. 
 Men existed in abundance, but it was difficult to arm 
 and equip them, and the motive of self-preservation 
 not being so overwhelming as in the case of Prussia, the 
 G-enerals were by no means so ready to take the field 
 without adequate equipment. 
 
 In the middle of the month of August the field states 
 gave the following totals : — 
 
 In Bohemia : 107 battalions, 117 squadrons, 280 guns, 
 
 under F.M. Prince Sohwaizenberg = 127,345 , 
 
 Between the Ems and Traun, under F.M. Prince Reusz . 30,070 
 In the interior of Austria, under F.Z.M. Hiller . . . 35,657 
 
 192,992 
 Garrison troops 27,544 
 
 Grand total 221,525 
 
 Two-thirds of this force consisted of recruits of three 
 months' service, with little enthusiasm for thfeir in'ork, 
 as until a few days before the expiration of the Armistice 
 they did not know against whom they were to fight. 
 
FRENCH PREPARATIONS 155 
 
 As soon as they found ojit that the French were to play 
 the role of their enemy, the whole Army gained courage 
 and enthusiasm. The Cavahy seems to have been 
 considered the most efficient of all the Allied troops, 
 and the Artillery was fairly good. The Infantry, on 
 the other hand, were below the standard of the other 
 Armies ; they had neither the dogged pertinacity of the 
 Russians nor the intense patriotism of the Prussians.^ 
 
 There remain to be considered — 
 
 (a) the Swedish Contingent, amounting in all to 
 27,263 men. These were excellent material, well found, 
 but the poUcy of their Commander-in-Chief never gave 
 them a chance of distinguishing themselves ; 
 
 (6) the Anglo-German Contingent — 
 
 British German Legion . . . 
 Domberg's Cavalry Division. 
 Reserve Artillery of Walmoden's 
 
 Corps 
 
 The Haoseatie Legions . . . 
 
 Bat- 
 talions 
 7 
 
 2 
 9 
 
 Squad- 
 rons. 
 
 9 
 
 8 
 17 
 
 Guns. Men. 
 
 6=4,506 
 
 — = 1,322 
 
 12= 412 
 8 = 3,043 
 
 
 26 9,283 
 
 Note the composition of an " English " battahon — 
 
 111 Dutchmen, 92 Prussians, 80 Italians, 66 Flemish, 63 
 
 Hanoverians and Brunswickers, 46 Frenchmen, 35 
 
 Saxons, 27 Austrians, 18 Hamburgers, 14 Bavarians, 
 
 14 Hessians, 12 Spaniards, 12 Mecklenburgers, 11 Poles 
 
 ^ It is curious to note, taking the- statistics of losses in battle 
 by troops of different Nations, over a long period of time, that the 
 Kussians have always stood up to a heavier percentage of punishment 
 before breaking up than any other troops on the Continent; the 
 Prussians stand next, the Italians last. The French and Austrians 
 are not easy to analyse; with them everything has turned upon the 
 Man who led them. In the Revolutionary Wars, 2 per cent, 
 seems to have been a fair standard of French endurance; under 
 Napoleon it rose to 28 per cent. The losses in the American Civil 
 War head all the lists. 
 
156 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 10 Holsteiners, 10 Swiss, 9 Hungarians, 7 Danes, 5 
 Oldenburgers, 3 Russians, 2 Swabians, and 1 English- 
 man, 1 Portuguese, 1 Swede. 
 
 Of these one Hussar regiment of five squadrons, two 
 horse and one rocket battery were nominally British, 
 and six Battalions in British pay formed the garrison 
 of Stralsund. 
 
 (c) The Mecklenburg Contingent — 
 
 4 battalions, 4 squadroos, 2 guns = 6,149 men. 
 
 The sum total of aU available Field troops, therefore, 
 amounted to 5564 battahons, 572 squadron 1,380 guns 
 and 68 Cossack regiments = 512,113 men; with, in 
 round figures, 350,000 reserve troops behind them. 
 {Fried/rich, vol. i, p. 56 et seq.) 
 
 The Com- -^^^ great difficulty that confronted the 
 mand of the Allies at this juncture was to ensure the 
 
 Arnues harmonious co-operation of these very 
 heterogeneous forces, and after much friction the 
 commands were arranged in the following manner. 
 
 As the three Sovereigns were to accompany the 
 Army of Bohemia, and as it was assumed that Napoleon 
 would turn first with his full force against Austria, 
 this Army was made very materially the strongest, and 
 the command entrusted to Field-Marshal Prince Carl 
 von Schwarzenberg. This appointment was severely 
 criticized at the time, for popular feeling was strongly 
 in favour of the Archduke Charles, the victor of Amberg. 
 Wiirzburg, Stockach, Ziirich and Aspern ; but pohtical 
 complications with his brother, the Emperor, had 
 rendered him impossible ; also he would have been 
 most unpopular with the Russians. 
 
FRENCH PREPARATIONS 157 
 
 Schwarzenberg, on the other hand, 
 shal Prince though of no great talent, was peculiarly 
 Schwarzen- ^ell fitted to act as conciliator of the many 
 and various interests involved. He was 
 stiU in the very prime of life, only forty-two ; his 
 reputation for personal courage stood very high, and 
 his unselfishness and modesty made it possible to him 
 to adjust the petty jealousies of the war-seasoned 
 veterans around him, as perhaps no other man in 
 Europe at the time could have done. It was no small 
 feather in his cap that in the previous year Napoleon 
 had personally requested his appointment to the com- 
 mand of his Austrian contingent. But he was too 
 humane for War as it had developed during the last few 
 years, and the very strong hint he received before 
 leaviQg for the front, to the effect that this was the one 
 and only Army that Austria could furnish, was perhaps 
 hardly needed to deter him from adventurous resolves. 
 Chief of His Chief of th e_Stoffj.^.Radetoky^^had_ 
 Staff seen, if anythi ng, more o f_Wj,r...j^n had 
 adetzsky ev enthe JJ'rench Marshals. . .and, seems^^^J 
 unive rsal co nsent to have been the n^sgLjiMe and 
 courageous _ soldier m the Austrian Army. Unfortu- 
 nately, however, for the Allies, he was too wanting 
 in personal ambition to assert himself sufficiently; 
 thus it happened that the Quartermaster-General, von 
 Langenau, formerly of the Saxon Army, a brilhant 
 but somewhat unscrupulous man, immeasurably behind 
 Radetzsky in the sohd judgment and knowledge of 
 War which characterized the latter, usurped more than 
 his share of the Sovereigns' confidence, with disastrous 
 consequences to the conduct of operations. He was 
 
158 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 only thirty-two years of age , and owed Ms reputation 
 chiefly to the fact that he had served for several cam- 
 paigns under Napoleon, but as events were to prove, 
 he was like Prince Eugene's mule, which, "though it 
 had served in seventeen campaigns under that great 
 General — ^remained still a mule." 
 
 It would probably have been far better for the Allies 
 if they could have agreed to elect any one of the three 
 Sovereigns as Commander-in-Chief ; for all of them 
 possessed considerable military talent, and aU had 
 acquired the habit of command. But poUtical interests 
 rendered this out of the question, and hence, having 
 no real responsibility, but feeling the necessity of action, 
 they frequently interfered, sometimes indeed most 
 opportunely, but generally with the reverse result, and 
 they always required to be consulted when any question 
 arose as to the employment of their own Guards. 
 
 Two renegades attached to the Royal Headquarters 
 
 deserve a word of mention, viz. Moreau and Jomiai. 
 
 The former had been banished from France in 1804, 
 
 and had always been considered by his friends as a 
 
 rival of Napoleon's. However this might be, a cannon 
 
 shot at Dresden terminated his career before he had 
 
 an opportunity of estabhshing this claim. ^™|J£i{ a 
 
 Swiss by birth, had attracted Napoleon's attention in 
 
 1805-6 and 1808-9 in Spain. His military writings 
 
 had given him a European reputation, and as Staff 
 
 ' officer to Ney he had certainly rendered valuable 
 
 service. But he had quarreled with Berthier, and when, 
 
 ' after Bautzen, the latter held him responsible for Ney's 
 
 I many shortcomings, and not without reason one would 
 
 think, he deserted to the AUies, and was received by 
 
 / 
 
FRENCH PREPARATIONS 159 
 
 the Emperor Alexander. His conduct, however, was so 
 universally deprecated by the officers of all three Armies 
 that (though the Emperor's friend) he was practically 
 boycotted. Disgusted with his reception, he withdrew, I 
 after Leipzig, to his native country, and his subsequent / 
 writings were markedly tiaged with the strong personal \ 
 bias one would expect from such a character. 
 
 For the Silesian Army the choice of 
 the Sovereigns fell on General von Bliicher, 
 then in his seventy-first year, and though events 
 have long since justified this selection, at the time 
 it was received by the higher Prussian and Russian 
 officers with almost unqualified disapproval. It was ^ 
 felt that he was far too old, that he was a bom 
 gambler, that he drank freely, and was destitute of 
 all knowledge of any other arm but his own — the 
 Cavalry. Of the higher art of War he was considered 
 to know nothing at all ; he could not write a decent 
 
 .reportj or even spell gg^gg^ly; he never looked at a 
 J^Es and the S taff appointed to keep him straight, 
 Gne isen.au, Miiffling , RilK^ von Lihenstern, and Scham- 
 horst, were all held to be interlopers, or reformers, by 
 the classic old survivors of the Frederickian period, of 
 whom Yorck was the most typical. But Bliicher pos- 
 sessed the one great quahty of supremest importamce 
 in a great emergency of this nature, when men have to 
 be induced to die for their country somehow, the power 
 of exciting enthusiasm in the Nation, and not merely in 
 the rank and file of the Army. Yorck, w ho undoubtedly 
 had higher claims in the Army itself, and who was 
 intellectually and morally immensely Bliicher's superior, 
 was his exact antithesis in this latter respect. His 
 
i6o THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 conduct at Tauroggen ought to have made him the 
 idol of the Nation, but somehow it failed to do so, and 
 though the men immediately under his command loved 
 him for his care of them and devotion to their interests, 
 it was precisely this attitude of fatherly solicitude for 
 their welfare which would have rendered him useless 
 in supreme Command ; he lacked the stern resolution 
 requisite for great emergencies. 
 
 Langeron , one of the Russian Corps commanders 
 placed under his orders, resented his supersession even 
 more bitterly than did Torek himself. He was a French 
 emigre who had joined the Russian Army at the beginning 
 of the Revolution, and since then had made a very 
 briUiant career , having held an independent command 
 against the Turks. He would have hated serving under 
 any foreign officer, but might have submitted with better 
 grace to a man of acknowledged military education, and 
 more courtier-like manners than those of rough old 
 Bliicher. This feeling of dissatisfaction, which Langeran 
 took no pains to repress, soon spread to the remaining 
 thirty-five generals with which his Corps was overloaded,^ 
 and throughout the campaign a veiled hostihty to Head- 
 quarters prevailed, against which the latter were all 
 the more helpless as they did not understand each 
 other's language. Only Sacken seems to have been 
 an exception to this general feeling. He was many 
 years younger than Langeron, of German extraction, 
 and possessed many of the same characteristics as 
 Bliicher ; in consequence the two understood one 
 another, and Sacken was never called upon in vain. 
 
 The numerical strength of Langeron's Corps was about 25,000 
 
 men 
 
FRENCH PREPARATIONS i6i 
 
 g The Army of the North was given by 
 
 acclamation to Bemadotte, Crown Prince 
 of Sweden, whose reputation as a Marshal of France 
 stood higher then, before military histories had been 
 written, than it has done since ; for ai§ Lan independent 
 Army Commander he proved an U dBSBSak able failure, 
 as we shall presently see. 
 
 The commands having been regulated, it 
 
 mentof remained to lay down the principles which 
 
 Trachten- ^ere to guide the co-operation of these 
 
 three Armies operating on widely separated 
 
 lines, and between which inter-communication was, under 
 
 existing conditions, impossible. 
 
 To this end a series of confei; Rnnea were held, at 
 which endless strategic memoirs were read and discussed. 
 The principal ones are to be found in Friedrich's in- 
 valuable work, and deserve attentive study to enable 
 us to get at the spirit of the time. All one can say 
 of them here, is that hke the Bourbons, the Staff offi- 
 cers of the period had learnt nothing and forgotten 
 nothing. 
 
 Since agreement on any one plan was out of the 
 question, a common bond of union was at length 
 found in the universal consensus of opinion that Napoleon 
 himself was the dangerous foe. From this the rest 
 easily followed, and was embodied in a long memoran- 
 dum known, from the place of its signature, as the agree- 
 ment of Trachtenberg. 
 
 ThgjjffidiBaLpHixciBle^,pf_^s 
 under no^,CTrcum4t^ces^LOu]£Lj£j;^one^f the three 
 _Axi^aincuribe^ji^a^cisive_aa^^ 
 in person. Whichever Army he advanced against was 
 
i62 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 to fall back, whilst the others made the best use of 
 their time and opportunities ; and probably no other 
 method could have led to a successful termination 
 of the war. 
 
 But it made tremendous demands on the young and 
 untrained troops, burning, in the case of the Prussians 
 at any rate, with patriotic fixe, and not yet broken in to 
 understand that the soldier's highest duty is to die 
 where is he told, not when and where he would like to 
 do so. Bliioher alone proved equal to the situations 
 thus erected, not that he rivalled Napoleon in this 
 greatest gift of a Commander, the psychological power 
 of leading and influencing men, but at least he did 
 more than any other who could have been chosen to fill 
 his position. 
 
 Meanwhile, we must return to Napoleon, 
 plans"* who was now busily studying his opening 
 moves for the coming campaign. 
 
 His first plan was to arrange for the defence of the 
 whole line of the Elbe, from Kompigmjnjhe Bohemian 
 mojjyat3ioa,.,^,,.IittIeL-naedi3BYy perched^ on^al 
 
 ]^je overlooking theriv^, to Hamburg, a line some 400 
 imIesTn~extKat. Across this river he held all the pas- 
 sages, by works, either permanent or provisional, which 
 in the end proved sufficient for his purposes. Through- 
 out the whole district he organized supply d6p6ts, and 
 also did something towards the improvement of his 
 lateral communications, though that was singularly 
 little in comparison with what might have been done 
 in the time and with the means at his disposal, con- 
 sidering the importance of such work for the execution 
 of his strategic methods, Boad making was as exact a 
 
FRENCH PREPARATION'S 163 
 
 science in those days as it is now, and better roads 
 might have saved him the disaster of Leipzig. 
 
 His first idea was a resuscitation of his plan of March ^ 
 18, viz. to mass the bulk of his troops between Magdeburg 
 and Hamburg, and advance on Berlin, seizing the town 
 and thus relieving the garrisons on the Oder. As 
 before calculated, if the AUies came to meet him, he 
 was certain of a decisive battle under most favourable 
 conditions, whilst if they broke forward to the south 
 of Dresden over the Bohemian mountains, he could 
 fall on them in flank and cut them off from aU commu- 
 nications. Against this plan was the possibility that 
 they might elect not to stand at all, in which case he 
 would have to follow them into Bohemia, and again 
 exhaust himself by his ever lengthening line of com- 
 inunic ation. There was always^efore him this^ absolute 
 necessity foFiKe deUvery of a decisive battle, as near to 
 the Jiead of his communications as itcovM^e fought. 
 tJItimately lie decided that his best chance of securing 
 such an opportunity would be by taking up a central 
 position with the bulk of his forces between the two 
 principal Armies, those of Silesia and Boheinia, and 
 taking advantage of the first opening which either 
 should ofEer him. Meanwhile, separate columns, aggre- 
 gating nearly 120,000 men, should converge on Berlin 
 from Hamburg, Magdeburg, Wittenberg and Bautzen. 
 This latter feature of his plan was so entirely at variance 
 with all his own previous practice, that we can only 
 suppose he adopted it out of complete contempt for 
 the Prussian Landwehr in front of him ; and more par- 
 ticularly for the mihtary abihty of Bemadotte, whose 
 1 See p. 88. 
 
i64 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 probable conduct of operations lie predicted in one of 
 his letters in the following words : " II ne fait que piafEer." 
 It must be clearly understood that it is the form of 
 this movement on Berlin, and not the idea itself, that 
 is here criticized. The threat against his communica- 
 tions contained in the presence of upwards of 100,000 
 men within about four days' march of the single organized 
 line which connected him with his ultimate base in 
 France, could by no means be overlooked, and no 
 merely passive defence of the 400 miles from Dresden 
 to Hamburg could conceivably be undertaken by 
 those of his forces available for such a purpose. But 
 to place Ney and Davout under Oudino|, of all men, 
 and to expect the three to execute a combined march 
 of concentration from points several marches apart, 
 seems to have been a voluntary invitation to disaster. 
 As Marmont wrote in reply to a letter written on 
 August 13, 1813, in which Napoleon, after announcing 
 his final decision, asked for his Marshal's free and 
 unfettered opinion of the project — " It is to be feared 
 that on the same day your Majesty wins a great victory, 
 you will leam that your subordinates have lost two " — 
 a prediction which proved true to the letter. 
 
 The decision, however, having been taken, the troops 
 moved rapidly to their appointed position and on 
 August 17 the date on which the Armistice expired, they 
 stood as shown on sketch. 
 
 French A strong advance guard of four Corps 
 
 Positions mnJer Ney in the square Liegnitz, Goldberg, 
 
 elusion of Lowenberg, Bunzlau. The Main Army under 
 
 Armistice Napoleon, at Gorhtz, Zittau, Stolpen and 
 
 Bautzen. A flanking detachment at Liickau of 60,000 
 
FRENCH PREPARATIONS 165 
 
 men under Oudinot ; whilst the XIV Corp (Gouvion 
 St. Cyr) held the Elbe from Konigstein to Dresden, 
 ■^chtown Napoleon believed to be sufficiently strong 
 to hold out for at least eight days with the strong 
 ga^w)n assigned to it. This must be remenSered, as 
 tt was the keystone of all his arranqemeyits, which were 
 "based on the supposition that the whole Silesian Army 
 was still near Breslau, and the Bohemian Army about 
 Theresienstadt. Viewed from the ordinary standpoint 
 of strategical criticism, the situation appears to the last 
 degree strained and unreal, for the Bohemian Army 
 on the South and Bernadotte on the North already 
 overlap the flanks of the forces immediately opposed 
 to them, both are in a friendly coimtry and therefore 
 presumably well informed as to their enemies' where- 
 abouts, and both are far superior in Cavalry to their 
 inamediate opponent. A raid against, or across, 
 Napoleon's communications would therefore seem the 
 obvious plan to adopt, and if strategy really were the 
 " science of communications " as it has sometimes 
 been defined, the extinction of the French Army would 
 seem to be merely a matter of days. 
 
 Napoleon was, in fact, quite prepared for the Bohe- 
 mian Army to make the attempt ; indeed the inten- 
 tion to do so had been announced beforehand. When 
 St. Cjt notified the Emperor of the current rumour 
 to this effect, he rephed, " If the enemy should march 
 into South Germany, as he proposes, then I shall wish 
 him 'hon voyage' and let him go, quite certain that 
 he wiU return quicker than he went. It is only of 
 importance that he should not cut us ofE from Dresden 
 and the Elbe ; I care very Uttle if he severs our com- 
 
i66 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 munications with France," and he concludes with these 
 remarkable words : " What is certain is that you cannot 
 turn 400,000 men, based on a line of strong places and a 
 river like the Elbe, from which they can break out as 
 they please, either at Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg or 
 Magdeburg. All the enemy's far-reaching detachments 
 (against French communications understood) wiU be 
 missing on the day of battle." 
 
 The reply to this is of course obvious ; if you cannot 
 twm 400,000 men, etc., you can starpe i^em ^ and this is 
 indeed what ultimately happened. But it tooF^wo" 
 months to do this and had the Emperor's orders been 
 carried out to the letter it would have taken even longer, 
 so ample were the stores and provisions accumulated, on 
 paper. But in two months many battles might be 
 fought, and a single decisive victory would have com- 
 pletely transformed the situation. 
 
 The truth is that the value of communications is 
 relative and not absolute, and the Art really consists in 
 knowing when and where it is safe to break the letter 
 of the rules and to provide alternative lines and bases 
 in time to permit change of plans. 
 
 The above distribution was arrived at on the basis of 
 the best information available at the time ; but almost 
 on the day the orders were issued, the Allies had made a 
 decision of such magnitude that the Emperor had never 
 taken even its possibility into account On the night of 
 August 11, over 100,000 Russians and Prussian troops 
 broke up from their encampments and set out over the 
 Bohemian mountains to join the Austrians, and some 
 days elapsed before the secret of this sudden movement 
 leaked out. 
 
FRENCH PREPARATIONS 167 
 
 We have given above the total forces of the several 
 contingents, and such notes as to the personal factors 
 of their commands as are indispensable to the student 
 of military history. It remains now to indicate the 
 final grouping of the forces before the Armistice ran 
 out. 
 
 When the above mentioned transfer of 
 Battle of Russian and Prussian troops from Silesia to 
 '/u-^'*^'^ Bohemia was finally efEected the order of the 
 
 Bohemian Army was as follows: — 
 Commander-LQ-Chief : P.M. Prince Schwarzenberg.- 
 Chief of Staff : F.M. Lt. Graf. Radetsky. 
 Quarter Master-General : Major-General Baron Lan- 
 genau. 
 
 1. AusfBiAS Kbld Abmy. 
 1st Light Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Prince Moritz Liechten- 
 stein. 4 battalions, 12 squadrons, 14 guns= 4,399 men. 
 2nd Light Division : Keld-Marshal-Lieut. Graf. Bubna. 3 batta- 
 lions, 18 squadrons, 12 gnns= 4,400 men. 
 Sight Wing. 
 
 Prince von Hessen Homburg. 
 1st Infantry Division. Field-Marshal- Laeut. Graf. Civalatt. 11 
 
 battalions, 18 guns= 9,478 men. 
 2nd Lifantry Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Graf. Oolloredo. 
 
 14 battaUons, 18 guns= 14,252 men. 
 
 1. Lifantry Beserve Division (Grenadiers). Field-Marshal-Lieut. 
 
 Marquis Chasteler. 2 Brigades=8 battaUons, 12 guns, 
 5,807 men. 
 
 2. Infantry Reserve Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Bianohi. 
 
 3 Brigades= 12 battaUons, 13 guns= 10,643 men. 
 
 3. Infantry Reserve Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Graf. Crenne- 
 
 ville. 2 Brigades=5 battaUons, 12 squadrons, 6 guns= 
 
 7,004 men. 
 Cavalry Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Graf. Nostitz. (Cuiraasiers). 
 
 16 squadrons in 2 Brigades, no guns= 2,472 men. 
 Cavalry Division. Pield-Marshal-Lieut. von Sohneller. (Light, 
 
 21 squadrons in 2 Brigades)^ 2,336 men. 
 Pioneers : 8 companies. 
 Pontonniers : 1 company. 
 
 K 
 
i68 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Total : 50 battalions. 
 49 squadrons. 
 72 guns. 
 
 8 Pioneer companies. 
 
 1 Pontonnier company. 
 
 52,736 men. 
 
 Left Wing' 
 Feldzengmeister * Graf. Gyulai. 
 Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Prince Aloys Liechtenstein. 3 
 
 Brigades= 12 battalions, 18 guns= 12,514 men. 
 Division. Field-Marshal- Lieut. Wiszenwolf. 3 Brigades= 13 batta- 
 lions, 18 guns= 12,300 men. 
 Cavalry Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Freiherr-Lederer. 2 Bri- 
 
 gade3= 18 squadrons= 2,608 men. 
 8 Pioneer companies. 
 
 Total: 25 battalions. 
 18 squadrons. 
 36 guns. 
 8 Pioneer companies. 
 
 27,983 men. 
 Avance AUheitung. 
 3rd Light Division. Field- Marshal Lieut, von Meszho. 2 Brigade8= 
 
 5 battalions, 12 squadrons, 12 guns (strength not given). 
 Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Freiherr von Mayer. 3 Brigades 
 
 = 12 battalions, 18 guns (no strength given). 
 Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Prince Hohenlohe-Bartenstein. 
 
 2 Brigades=8 battalions, 12 guns (no strength given). 
 Cavalry Brigade. Major- General Kuttalek von Ehrengreif. 2 
 
 Cuirassier regiments, 1 H. A. battery (6 guns). 
 1 Pioneer company. 
 
 Total : 20 battalions. 
 8 squadrons. 
 36 guns. 
 1 Pioneer company. 
 Artillery Reserve Park= 18 battaUons= 108 guns. 
 Grand total Austrians = 127,000 men. 
 
 Russo-PEUssiAif Troops. 
 Commander-in-Chief : General Graf. Barclay de Tolly. 
 Chief of Staff : Lt.-General Sabanjen. 
 Quarter-Master-General : Lt. -General von Diebitsch 11. 
 
 ' Feldzengmeister means Uterally, Field Ordnance Officer, but 
 has no connexion with Ordnance matters ; is merely a rank next belov 
 Field Marshal — the name dates from the Thirty Years' War. 
 
FRENCH PREPARATIONS 169 
 
 Bight Wing. 
 
 Greneral Graf. Wittgenstein. 
 
 I Infantry Corps. Lt.-General Pnnoe Gortsohakow. 
 14th Infantry Division. Major-General von Helfreich. 
 
 2 Brigades, 8 battalions=: 5,211 men. 
 5th Infantry Division. Major-General Messenzow. 
 
 2 Brigades, 13 battalions= 8,792 men. 
 Artillery : 3 batteries, 36 guiis= 638 men. 
 
 II Infantry Corps. lieut-Geueral Duke Eugene von Wurtemberg. 
 4th Infantry Division. Major-General Piisohnitzki. 
 
 3 Brigades, 10 battalions= 5,370 men. 
 
 3rd Infantry Division. Major-General Prince Sohaohowski. 
 3 Brigades, 12 battalion3= 6,598 men. 
 
 3 Batteries, 36 guns=636 men. 
 
 Cavalry Corps. Lieut.-General Graf. Peter Pahlen III. 
 Irregular Cavalry — Don Cossacks. 
 
 4 regiments^: 1,600 men. 
 
 Ist Hussar Division. Major-General Milesinow. 
 
 2 Brigades, 19 squadrons=: 2,630 men. 
 Lancer Brigade. Major-General Lisanewitch. 
 
 3 regiments, 16 squadrons= 1,940 men. 
 
 Artillery : 2 batteries, 20 guns (6th Battery : 8 guns ; 7th Battery, 
 12 guns). 
 Pioneers : 1 company. 
 Headquarter Guard. 
 
 1 Dragoon regiment, 2nd Brigade Cossacks, 1 Landwehr battalion 
 (Olonetei and Wologda) = 1,000 men. 
 Total : 45 battalions, 38 squadrons, 5 Cossack regiments, .92 guns, 
 1 Pioneer oompany= 34,926 men. 
 
 Left Wixtg. 
 
 II Prussian Army Corps. Lieut. -General von Kleist. 
 
 Chief of Staff : Col. von Tippelskirch. 
 
 Quarter-Master-General : Lieut.-Col. von Grolmann. 
 10th Brigade. Von. Pirch I. 
 
 16 battalions, 4 squadrons, 8 guns= 8,026 men. 
 9th Brigade.' Von. Klilx, 
 
 10^ battaUons, 4 squadrons, 8 guns= 8,021 men. 
 12th Brigade. Prince August von Preuszen. 
 
 10 battaUons, 2 squadrons, 8 guns= 7,172 men. 
 11th Brigade. Von. Ziethen. 
 
 10§ battalions, 6 squadrons, 8 guns= 8,743 men. 
 Reserve Cavalry. Von Eoder. 
 
 Brigade. Von Mutius. Landwehr, 2 regiments. 
 Brigade. Laroche von Starkenfels. Light, 3 regiments. 
 Brigade. Von Wrangel. Cuirassiers, 3 regimente. 
 Artillery. 2 H.A. batteries, 16 guns. 
 
170 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Reserve Artillery, 64 guns. 
 
 2 companies Pioneers. 
 
 Total: 41 battalions, 44 squadrons, 112 guns= 37,800 men (about). 
 
 Susso-Prussian Ouards and Beserves. 
 Grand Duke Constantine. 
 Infantry. General Graf. Miloradowitch. 
 Ill Infantry (Grenadier) Corps. Lieut. -General Rajeovski. 
 2nd Grenadier Division. Major-General Sulima. 
 3 Brigades, 12 battalions= 6,756 men. 
 1st Grenadier Division. Major-General Tsohaglokow. 
 3 Brigades, 12 battalions= 7,206 men. 
 Artillery. 2 batteries, 24 guns= 382 men. 
 
 V Infantry (Guard) Corps. Lieut.-General Yermolow. 
 2nd Guard Division. Major-Geueral Udom I. 
 
 2 brigades, 10 battalions= 5,941 men. 
 1st Guards Division. Major-General Baron Rosen. 
 
 2 brigades, 13 battalions= 7,725 men. 
 Artillery. 3 batteries, 36 guns= 632 men. 
 
 1st Cuirassiers Division. Major-General Depreradowitoh. 
 
 2 Brigades, 19 squadrons= 2,428 men. 
 Light Cavalry Division. Major-General Sohewitoh. 
 
 22 squadrons— 2,345 men. 
 3rd Cuirassiers Division. Major- General Duka. 
 2 Brigades, 16 squadrons^ 2,165 men. 
 Artillery. 2 batteries= 16 guns. 
 Irregular Cavalry. 3 regiments Don Cossacks. 
 Royal Prussian Guard Cavalry Brigade. Col. von Werder. 
 
 8 squadrons, 1 battery (8 guns)= 1,606 men. 
 Reserve Artillery. Major-General Baron Huene. 94 guns. 
 Russo-Prussian Guards= 51,438 men. 
 Grand Total : 
 
 Bat- Squad. Cossack Men. 
 
 talions. rons. Guus. Eegts. 
 
 Austrian 107 117 290 — = 127,345 
 
 Russians 92 109 274 15 = 82,062 
 
 Prussian 47i 62 128 — = 44,907 
 
 246J 278 692 15 264,404 
 
 Royal Prussian Guard Infantry Brigade. Lieut.-Colonel von 
 Alvensleben. 
 6 battalions, 2 rifle companies, 8 guns==: 5,485 men. 
 Cavalry Corps. Lieut.-General Prince Galitzin. 
 4th Cuirassier Division. Kritow. 
 
 2 brigades, 14 squadrons= 1,860 men. 
 
FRENCH PREPARATIONS 171 
 
 The above orders of battle deserve atten- 
 Comments ^. , . , , •>. . , t 
 
 tive study, as they mark very dishrustly the 
 
 transition period between the old and the modern systems 
 of organization. In the grouping of the Prussian forces 
 we see the germ of the methods which in 1866 and 1870 
 acc^uired such renown that they became the universal 
 model for all civilized nations. But in the Austrian 
 and Russian commands we find confusion worse con- 
 founded ; no definite idea seems to attach to any parti- 
 cular name, and one can easily imagine the confusion 
 possible in attempting to direct the operations of a 
 force of 200,000 men in which the terms " Corps," 
 " Division," " Abtheilung "^ appear to be apphed with- 
 out any reference to the magrdtude or the importance 
 of the units thus designated. Where units, not being 
 numbered, are known by the names of their Leaders 
 only, which of course are Uable to change after every 
 action, the confusion is endless. 
 
 I am far from defending the excessive regularity which 
 is characteristic of the modem German method, which 
 leads the superficial thinker to beUeve that 300,000 armed 
 men cannot fight at all unless grouped in Army Corps, 
 of three Divisions, each of two Brigades, etc., or whatever 
 the prevailing fashion of the day may be. There seems 
 no adequate reason for faciMtating the work of the 
 enemy's IntelUgence Department in the field by this 
 
 * Abtheilung means literally " detachment," but the word " detach- 
 ment" was ako frequently used in its French form to signify any 
 body of troops broken off from their usual connection. It is gener- 
 ally translated by the word " group," but group also is used for 
 bodies of all magnitudes. In modem military German ' ' abtheilung ' ' 
 is used to designate a group of three or four batteries and was trans- 
 lated into English by the absurd word " Brigade-Division," a term 
 which has fortunately become obsolete. 
 
172 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 simplification of forms, and every reason why one should 
 not furnish each subordinate Commander with a weapon 
 of the same weight and material, no matter what his 
 capacity may be. But between the hopeless chaos of 
 the Bohemian Army, and the Chinese like precision 
 of modem European forces, there seems room for a 
 happy mean, which is to be found in a reversion to the 
 Napoleonic method, in which the strength of the prin- 
 cipal units varies with the skill of its Commander. 
 A Bertrand or Reynier would have been hopelessly 
 overpowered by the responsibility of a five Division 
 command, whilst a Davout would have been wasted on 
 only two. 
 
 Clausewitz's saying should always be remembered, 
 " there is no worse sub-division of a force possible than 
 one of three parts — except only — one of two." The 
 ideal command will be found in one of four or five, 
 according to the abUity of the Commander, and in 
 support of this contention the conduct of the Prussian 
 Corps Commanders on the battlefields of 1866 and 
 1870 may be cited. Almost invariably, as soon as the 
 bullets began to fly they passed over the Divisional 
 Commanders entirely, and sent orders direct to the 
 Brigades, thus unconsciously reverting to the tj^e 
 estabUshed in the old Silesian Army of 1813. 
 
KATZBACH— DEESDEN— KULM 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 Katzbach — Dresden — ^Kulm 
 
 By the terms of the Armistice a neutral zone some 
 twenty miles in width had been established between 
 the contending forces in Silesia. As the period for the 
 resumption of hostihties (August 17) drew near, it became 
 important to Bliicher to be in close touch with the" 
 enemy to his front so as to have timely warning of his 
 possible manoeuvres. To obtain this the neutral zone 
 must be traversed, consequentl y a pretext for infringing 
 the letter of the Armistice had, to be found. 
 
 Prussia ^^ ^^ fortimate for the Prussians that 
 Breaks the this was not far to seek. The French at 
 ""*^^ the front had been suifering much from 
 want of jogd^nd^fprage, and had from time to time 
 entered the neutral zone in small parties in search of 
 suppUes. On August 13, a number of these foraging 
 parties being reported, Bliicher, affecting to regard 
 them as a prelude to the more formal fighting to be 
 expected after the 17th, ordered the whole Silesian 
 Army forward, in a line of four Corps, one marching on 
 each available road. The advance Cavalry soon came 
 in contact with the French, who were completely off 
 their guard. When on the following day they learnt 
 that strong Infantry columns were moving against them 
 on a front of thirty nules (beiog in entire ignorance of 
 
 176 
 
176 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 the great detachmeiit Bliioher had made to the Bohemian 
 Army) they naturally concluded that the troops in 
 front of them were the advance of the whole Silesian 
 army in force, and concentrated backwards, not without 
 some confusion. Thanks to this, the Prussians gamed 
 several minor advantages in the fighting which ensued, 
 facts which served materially to raise the moral of the new 
 German levies. 
 
 But from the first the want of ex perience in the Pru s- 
 sia n Stafi began to create friction/ TEus on the vS^ 
 first day7'Blucher and Gneisenau separated from each 
 other the better to superintend their observations over 
 the enemy's front, with the result that they did not meet 
 again until late in the afternoon, hence the issue of 
 orders was delayed to such a degree that the troops did 
 not begin to move imtil the following noon, and then 
 had to march late into the night to reach their destina- 
 tions. 
 
 Each day, fresh causes of delay arose, and the resis- 
 tance of the French became more obstinate. Thus 
 every march ended as a night march, and the weather 
 being abominable, the whole Army sufiered so severely 
 that when on the morning of August 20, Bliicher found 
 himself in presence of the whole massed forces of his ad- 
 versary across the Bober river, it only needed the sound of 
 the cheers which announced Na|iin1eim'sj,rriyal to ass ume 
 command of the French Ajmy, to decide^Mga to retreat _ 
 forthwith. 
 
 , Then followed a series of most obstinately 
 
 Retreat contested rearguard actions in which every 
 
 day many lives were lost, and by the 
 
 26th the_ jrhole Silesian Army w a s in a condition 
 
KATZBACH— DRESDEN— KULM 177 
 
 bordering on d i ssolutio n. The Landwehr men had 
 deserted in masses to their homes, Langeron, St. 
 Priest, and even Sacken, were complaining bitterly 
 of the way their troops were being wasted, and 
 Yorck found the position so intolerable that he 
 actually wrote to the King, begging the latter to re- 
 lieve him of his command, as he could not look on 
 and see his troops ruined by the incompetence of the 
 Staff. 
 
 jBliicher's own position w as^aJmost imposable ; he 
 hated retiring even more than did his subordinates, 
 with whom and with the men he thoroughly sympathized. 
 But he was compelled to submit, by the terms of his 
 appointmen t, to the dictation of Gheisenau. For a 
 moment, it is saidTEat he contemplated the extreme 
 step of displacing Gneisenau and appointing von Kaetzler 
 in his place, but learning that Napoleon was no longer 
 in personal control of the French pursuit, on the night 
 of the 24th he decided to turn upon his enemy. Accord- 
 ingly he issued orders for an advance towards the Katz- 
 bach, which resulted on the 26th in the general action 
 which has since borne that name.^ 
 
 Now it was that good luck favoured him in a most 
 
 unusual degree. The Katzbach springing from high 
 
 ■ ground in the mountains to the southward, rose during 
 
 1 This bat t.lft nff^^fHa s<r\nt]\RT inatnuriB nt alijiatifvlafafF service. 
 The KmperOT had ordered Macdonald to adva^e on ffie'^tn, out 
 simultaneously he had directed Ney to report to him. The order, 
 however, was so worded that Ney conceived that it applied both to 
 him in person and his Corps, which he promptly set in motion to 
 join the Emperor. But the III Corps numbered five Divisions, 
 say 50,000 men, and without them Macdonald could not execute his 
 orders, and twenty-four hours were lost before the mistake could be 
 made good. 
 
178 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 the battle in a sudden flood. Carrying away many of 
 the bridges, and destroying all the fords, it out the 
 French Aimy in half as it was moving to the attack 
 of the Prussian position. At the critical moment 
 Bliicher ordered an advance of his right wing, and the 
 muske ts being too w et for-effective use, the battle was 
 practically decided by cold steel, the French, over- 
 whelmed by the fanatical impetuosity of the Prussian 
 assault, being driven into the river, where many hun- 
 dreds were carried away and drowned. This brilliant 
 victory was the making of Bliicher and the Prussian 
 Army. Indeed it was t he salvation of the whole 
 Allied cause, for news of it was brought to the Eoyal 
 'Headquarters at a moment when the general situation 
 seemed hopeless, and more than a possibility existed 
 that Austria might enter into a separate treaty with 
 Napoleon and abandon the coahtion altogether. 
 Napoleon on ^® TUMBt now return to Napoleon, and 
 
 Interior the measures he was taking to utihze to 
 Lines ^j^gjj, £^J2 ^YiQ advantages of the " interior 
 lines " on which he stood as regards his adversaries. 
 
 The positions of his troops are sufficiently indicated 
 by the accompanying Map (No. 3) and the disposition 
 in itself must be pronounced a model for all time ; for 
 notwithstanding its great extent he could" concen-' 
 trate on its centre or on either wing a greater force 
 than his enemies could' possibly bring against him, 
 and provided Dresden could be rehed on to hold out 
 for six or seven days, he felt completely master of the 
 situation. It had however the disadvantage inherent in ali 
 defensive arrangements, viz. that the initiative lay in the 
 hands of hismdversary. Napoleon's first view had been 
 
KATZBACH— DRESDEN— KULM 179 
 
 that the Allies might attempt a direct attack on the 
 hne of the Riesengebirge, and to that end, he had occu- 
 pied, and caused to be fortified, all the passes leading 
 over them into the plains. Being for the time quite 
 independent of his communications with France, and 
 relying solely on Dresden, he desired nothing better than 
 an advance of the Bohemian Army against Leipzig, and 
 he seems hardly to have hoped for so much good fortune 
 as actually befell him. 
 
 His first act on learning of Bliicher's advance was to 
 r econn oitre personally the line of the passes he had 
 taken up, in order to assure himself that he would have 
 ample time to deal with the SUesian Army before the 
 Austrians could arrive. Being satisfied on that point 
 by a reconnaissance made on the 18th, by which he learnt 
 that troops had actually marched from Bliicher's com- 
 mand to Bohemia, he issued orders to Macdonald (now in 
 chief command of the " Army of the Bober," as the 
 troops facing Bliicher were called) to have the troops 
 ready for his personal command on the morning of 
 the 20th. He then spent the 19th in reviewing troops 
 and dealing with the endless details of administration, 
 with which, in the absence of a properly trained Staff, 
 he was compelled to burden himseK. 
 
 His arrival on the morning of the 20th caused, as we 
 have seen, Bliicher's immediate retreat ; and as infor- 
 mation came in which made clear the weakness of 
 the Silesian Army, and hence the exceeding improbabiUty 
 that he could compel it to stand for a decisive battle, he 
 handed over command again to Macdonald on the 22nd, 
 and returned to Gorlitz, taking his Guards with him, 
 there to await further developments. 
 
i8o THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Meanwhile the AlUed Headquarters in 
 ^Slies ^ Bohemia had fallen completely . into the 
 trap he had laid for them. Believing 
 Napoleon to be vitally concerned in the retention of 
 his communications with France, they had, after many 
 conferences, decided on a concentric advance over the 
 mountains across Saxony to Leipzig, their right watching 
 Dresden, about the defences, or perhaps the spirit which 
 animated its defenders, they appear to have been 
 better informed than was the Emperor. The detach- 
 ments of the Prussian and Russian f-orces made by th^ 
 Silesian Army having arrived within supporting distance, 
 the march was started by every available road from 
 the Elbejbo Leipag,-£mly. two-o^-^diioh,. hoyever ^ were 
 niad eand mete lMjiadav.>JEb^UtlJlfi^ httle more 
 tlLaxLmou nMaIi5£ks...&oaroed^^ out of the side 
 
 of the hills withgradients up to 1 in 4 (15°) and no 
 attempt to improve them appears to have been made 
 throughout the campaign. 
 
 The natural consequence was that the heads of the 
 several Corps could not keep their ahgnment, and those 
 unfortunate enough to be on the bad ro|,ds (and these 
 were the majority) were worn out in their efforts to keep 
 up with their luckier comrades. During the 20th the 
 news of Napoleon's personal appearance at the pass of 
 Zittau (on the 18th) created something approaching con- 
 sternation, for many supposed it preluded an advance 
 on Prague, which to the strategists of that day must have 
 loomed up as the prelude to an appalling calamity. 
 Every one in any way entitled to give advice (Moreau 
 and Jomini amongst them) at once assembled, and a 
 discussion enstied in which the only man who appears 
 
KATZBACH— DRESDEN— KULM i8i 
 
 to have maintained an attitude of decorous modesty 
 was Prince Schwarzenberg, the Commander-in-Chief. 
 Ultimately (though it is impossible to trace with whom 
 the idea originated), the meeting decided that the whole 
 Army should bring up its left shoulders, and swing in 
 upon Dresden, which was to be attacked 
 Army and stormed befOTe_Napoleon ^could return. 
 
 changes Orders to .this efiect were prepared and 
 issued. This wheel to the left, however, 
 threw the bulk of the columns from the main roads 
 and tracks upon cross-tracks, which, running transverse 
 to the drainage lines of the district, presented a succession 
 of up and down gradients of the worst description, thus 
 throwing an increased strain upon the already over-taxed 
 marching powers of the Allied troops, and though during 
 the course of August 25 the heads of the columns, 
 driving the French outposts before them, closed in on 
 the city, the tails were left straggling far behind. 
 
 In the afternoon of that day Schwarzenberg, with the 
 three Monarchs and their retinues, rode up to the heights 
 above Racknitz overlooking the town, and here again a 
 long discussion took place. Eventually it was decided 
 that the forenoon of the following day should be devoted 
 to concentrating the several columns for battle, and that 
 the attack itself should begin abaut i p.m^. ; the actual 
 signal for movement was to be given by three gun shots. 
 
 The crowd now separated to prepare the necessary 
 orders. How long Schwarzenberg's StafE required to 
 draft out the prolix and exhaustive memorandum 
 that was to guide every detail of execution, it is im- 
 possible to specify. I should imagine that it would take 
 a man well acquainted with the groimd at least three 
 
i82 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 hours, and after that it had to be dictated, and sent out 
 to about 200,000 men. When, if ever, its pith reached 
 the company officers must remain undecided ; but it 
 must have been late in the following day, if at all. 
 
 Next morning, the Monarchs were out early to watch 
 the preparations, when about 9 a.m .. through the veil 
 of mist which stiU lay over the valley, a great cheer of 
 Vive VEm'pereur surged out of the town, and in a 
 moment the words " too late '-' were on every one's 
 lips. 
 
 Only the King of Prussia stood out, emphasizing the 
 point that for an Army of 200,000 men to back down 
 before the mere threat of a shout, was unprecedented ; 
 it could hardly be called War at all. Again a long dis- 
 cussion, prolonged into the afternoon. Finally counsels 
 of prudence prevailed. Jt w as decide d^ to retreat, and 
 Schwarzenberg rode ofE to prepare the necessary orders 
 for this step. The precise time of this decision cannot 
 be fixed, but the fact remains that at 4 p.m. no 
 orders had reached the troops, who had aU arrived at 
 their appointed places, and were waiting for the word 
 ■ to advance. Suddenly, soma, one, who it never can now 
 be ascertained, fired the si gnal gu^ TanS^ the attack 
 on Dresden began. 
 Napoleon We must now return to Napoleon, whom 
 atGorlitz ^e left on the 23rd at Gorhtz. 
 
 Contact with the Bohemian advance had been estab- 
 lished by the French troops watching the passes, early 
 on the 22nd, and their reports reached Headquarters 
 during the 23rd. For the moment the Emperor's 
 thoughts turned towards Prague, as the Allies had antici- 
 pated that they would, but presently the letters from 
 
KATZBACH— DRESDEN— KULM 183 
 
 St. Cyr became alarming and his attention was directed 
 into another channel. The situation appeared to him 
 as follows. Distance precluded any immediate danger 
 from the Silesian Army, but to make assurance doubly 
 sure, he ordered Macdonald to advance, and attack 
 anything that attempted to stand against him. It 
 was this order in fact which brought on the battle of the 
 Katzbach. Presuming hi s niost exphcit iastructions 
 to have b een obeyed, Dresden was amply seci^aagaiast 
 any attempt to caxry it by storm. At the worst its 
 defenders could retire into the fortified " bridge head " of 
 the Neustadt and so prolong their defence by days. 
 To St. Cyr, together with his own Corps, he had given 
 authority to call upon the II Corps (Victor) and I Corps 
 (Vandamme) for assistance, both of which could reach 
 him in twenty-four hours. 
 
 But St. Cyr did not mention whether he had as yet 
 made any use of this authority, or indeed whether 
 he intended to use it at all. 
 
 For the moment he appears to have made no definite 
 plan. Calhng up the Guards to Grorlitz, where his own 
 Headquarters lay, he wrote an encouraging letter to 
 St. Cyr, pointing out the strength of his position, and 
 the time during which it could be held, also intimating 
 that te would march himself to his assistance, and could 
 if necessary arrive on the 25th. But at the same time a 
 doubt seems to have crossed his mind as to whether the 
 fortifications which he had ordered were in fact as far 
 advanced as they ought to have been. He therefore 
 wrote another letter to Ro^at, his Chief Engineer, 
 couched in a very different tone, sending also Q^oiJIgaud, 
 one of his most trusted personal Staff, to report on the 
 
i84 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 whole situation to him direct. Then he penned the fol- 
 lowing very remarkable letter to VanJdamme : — 
 
 " I have just received a letter from Marshal St. Cyr 
 dated August 22, 11 p.m., telling me that a Russian Corps 
 is advancing through Peterswalde, and that the whole 
 Austrian Army is upon him. If this is the case, then 
 march your whole Corps by the shortest way to Dresden. 
 I assume that the 23rd and 2nd Divisions are already on 
 their way there. If, however, this movement is not 
 yet begun, then march them at once to Stolpen. Send 
 the Division of the young Guard, the Cavalry Division 
 of Lefebvre-Desnouettes there also, leaving only a rear- 
 guard to cover your movement, which will be relieved by 
 the troops of Prince Poniatowski." 
 Napoleon's ■"■* seems quite clear from the above 
 
 Great that when he began to write he was still 
 
 Design dominated by the plan of bringing direct 
 support to St. Cyr, but m the middle of his^ Jetter 
 ai _ fresh idea strikes him, and without pausing for 
 a moment Tooonsidef~that its execution involves 
 depriving St. Cyr of the troops already assigned to him, 
 he changes the destination of Vandamme's command as a 
 preliminary to the execution of a manoeuvre which he 
 does not deign to develop here to his subordinates, but 
 which in its consequences must have surpassed in renown 
 the greatest feat he ever actually accomplished. A few 
 hours later (early morning of 24th) he writes to Maret 
 in Paris, authorizing him to warn the press to prepare 
 the pubhc for great victories in the coming days. 
 
 " My plan is to go to Stolpen. My Army will be united 
 there to-morrow (25th). I will spend the 26th in pre- 
 parations and allow my columns to close up. In the 
 
KATZBACH— DRESDEN— KULM 185 
 
 night of the 26th I cross the river at Konigstein with 
 100,000 men, and occupy the camp of Pima. I shall 
 have two bridges ready to throw at Pima. 
 
 " Either the enemy has taken his line of operations by 
 Peterswalde to Dresden (in that case I shall be with my 
 united Army in his rear, and it will take him four to five 
 days to concentrate). Or, he has gone by the road 
 from Komotau to Leipzig, then he will retire on Komo- 
 tau, and I shall be nearer to Prague than he is, and shall 
 march there." 
 
 Immediately afterwards the foRowing orders were 
 issued. " Prince Poniatowski remains in his position 
 at the defiles at Gabel and Georgenthal. The Duke of 
 Belluno (Victor, II Corps) will reach the district between 
 Stolpen and Bautzen on the 25th, and arrange to cross 
 the Elbe on the morning of the 26th, at a point to be 
 shown to him hereafter. 
 
 "The Duke of Eagusa (Marmont, VI Corps) will 
 reach Eeichenbach to-day, Bischofswerda to-morrow, 
 and cross the Elbe on the 26th." 
 
 There are no orders for the Guard, but they would 
 march under his own eyes. 
 
 During the day he rode to Bautzen, and proceeded at 
 night to Stolpen, where he arrived about daybreak. 
 
 Here disagreeable news awaited him. First came 
 that of Oudinot's defeat by the North Army at Grosz- 
 beeren near Berlin ; but the report is vague" and in- 
 conclusive, and he appears to have attached httle im- 
 portance to it. Next came the unwelcome intelhgence 
 that a regment_ofJW[^l$hglianjCaYa ^ had desert ed 
 to the enemy. This was the first overt act betraymg 
 the spirit of his German contingents. The loss of the 
 
i86 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 actual men was of small account, but the news they 
 happened to carry to the AUies proved subsequently of 
 importance. To prevent such occurrences in the future 
 he ordered all the Westphalian Cavalry to be dismounted. 
 He then transferred their horses to French commands. 
 Followed other disturbing communications from Dresden. 
 At 11 p.m. ^jgirgaud returned with the news that if 
 the enemy had pressed their attack home that after- 
 noon, the town would already have fallen, but they 
 had delayed it and there was yet a chance that if 
 the Emperor returned at once the city might be 
 saved. 
 
 Napoleon's Then at last Napoleon's resolution failed. 
 
 Resolution Cancelling all previous orders, he directed 
 ^* all available troops (except Vandamme's) 
 by the nearest roads to Dresden, and riding on 
 himself in advance, he galloped over the bridge, 
 where his unexpected arrival gave rise to the cheers 
 which so terrified the Allies. Close behind him came 
 the leading files of the Guard. These had marched 
 from Stolpen at 4 a.m. and moving in dense rendezvous 
 formations (mass of columns on a company front at 
 haK distance generally, only the guns bemg upon the 
 road), they went straight across country, and by noon 26 
 battalions were already in Dresden. At nightfall this 
 number had risen to 68 battalions, 117 squadrons, 534 
 guns. In what order the mounted arms actually arrived 
 is uncertain, most of them probably between noon 
 and 5 p.m., the distance (17^ miles) being of course for 
 them inconsiderable. Jiut^^march as a jy hole remains 
 one of the most remarkable on record, and one can only 
 imagine how such a feat must have upset the calculations 
 
KATZBACH— DRESDEN— KULM 187 
 
 of his opponents, who judging the situation by the 
 ordinary rules of the game, could never have believed it 
 possible to transfer a whole Army of this magnitude 
 by a single road in little more than twelve hours. 
 
 The Corps of Victor and Marmont (II and VI) reached 
 Stolpen during the night, and pushing on at daybreak 
 next morning arrived in time to take part in the renewed 
 fighting of the 27th. Considering the material of which 
 these troops were composed — ^young and inexperienced 
 conscripts — and considering also the fact that the 
 Guards were always better fed and cared for than were 
 any other of the units, their performance is even more 
 remarkable, for theyhad traversed a distance of 120 
 miles in four days ; by a single road and through a coun;_ 
 "^Erv practically dStitute of supplies. They ha d had 
 iio proper night quarters, they-ha d-suaply lain, down 
 an d slept wherever the, column halted. Yet as a body 
 they marched in full of swing and life, and remained 
 in touch with the enemy for the next forty-eight 
 hours. 
 
 How many of them fell out and were left along the 
 road it is impossible nowadays to ascertain. The 
 essence of the whole matter is that enough of these ^ra^ 
 immatwre hoys actually reached the field in sufficiently 
 good order to be controlled and directed in action. 
 
 The details of the battle which now ensued 
 
 ih-esden Possess but little interest at the present 
 day. About 4 p.m. of the 26th the columns 
 of the AlHes attacked with considerable vigour, driving 
 in the principal advance posts of the French, but before 
 they could recover from the confusion inseparable from 
 such success, the French Reserves issued forth from the 
 
i88 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 wide openings intentionally arranged to facililate such 
 counterstrokes, and attacking in their turn with the 
 bayonet, promptly recaptured their lost positions. 
 Generally, when darkness put a stop to the fighting, 
 the troops on both sides occupied much the same 
 aUgment as they had held at starting. But during 
 the night Napoleon made his arrangements for a great 
 counterstroke against the left of the Allies. 
 
 Murat was given the command of the Cavalry Corps 
 of Latour Maubourg, and of Pajol's Cavalry Division, 
 68 squadrons in all, with 30 guns, and of Victor's 
 Corps and Teste's Division, 44 battalions, totalling 
 some 25,000 men with 76 guns. These were ordered 
 to work round the enemy's outer, i.e. left, flank, whilst 
 the fight was continued along the front, and fortune 
 favoured this plan in a singular manner. Shortly after 
 midnight the rain came down i n sheets, turning all the 
 counfay off thei aads- in the iQ.w.g rounds into a morass ; 
 on the plateaus between the water courses, the drainage 
 being better, the going was at any rate fair. Whilst 
 Victor and Teste attacked the Austrians in front, Murat 
 took his Cavalry by road right round the prolongation 
 of the enemy's front, and emerging suddenly out of the 
 cover on which their left rested, literally swept away the 
 whole wing, for owing to the continuous rain the flint- 
 locks of the Infantry proved useless, and squares without 
 fire power were entirely inadequate against the momen- 
 tum of his charges. 
 
 The efEect of this success, however, was only local, 
 for owing to the configuration of the ground, the centre 
 of the Allied Army still remained intact, as it was separ- 
 ated from the beaten wing by a broad and deep ravine. 
 
KATZBACH— DRESDEN— KULM 189 
 
 But the Allies' Coininander-in-Chief had already deter- 
 mined that want of both food and ammunition rendered 
 retreat imperative, and during the afternoon the fight- 
 ing was only continued to gain time for the necessary 
 dispositions. <Tn fact, the battle came to an end by the 
 mutual exha ustion of_both. sides. Men_aad horses were 
 . ^ike so worn out that any thing^ approaching anjeffective 
 charge across the rain -sodden_fields was out, pj^^the 
 jjuestion . Napoleon kriew^at Vandamme had already 
 reached Pirna, thus closing the shortest and best line of 
 retreat available for the Allies, and he felt confident 
 that after a night's rest his troops would soon overtake 
 any start the enemy might have obtained. 
 
 About 5 p.m. the Emperor rode back into Dresden, 
 drenched to the skin, and worn out, but stiU in good 
 spirits and hopeful for the morrow, as his letter written 
 the same evening to Cambaceres sufficiently proves : 
 "_I am so tired and so busy that I cannot write at 
 length . . . the Duke of Bassano wilL do so for me. 
 Affairs here are very satisfactory." At dinner in the 
 palace of the King of Saxony, he was most cheerful, 
 and ""after commiserating his unfortunate father-in-law, 
 the Emperor of Austria, he said : " To-day the .jain 
 saved the enemy from compl ete ^.dfiSkHctign. I_ had 
 intended jo^ storm the whole line of heights. However, 
 we shall ^eTiTBohemia Before my colleagues (the three 
 monarchs) after all." Then a Uttle later he added : 
 " I am well satisfied with the results of the day ; but 
 when I am not present, things go wrong. All the troops 
 sent towards Berlin have been beaten, and I fear for 
 Macdonald. He is brave and good, but unfortunate." 
 A true prediction, as it happened. 
 
igo THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Early next morning the French were in 
 '^Pm-suit'* motion ; the Emperor riding out towards 
 their left flank to reconnoitre in person. 
 Everywhere the advancing troops came upon signs 
 of a hasty retreat, and of terrible suffering in the 
 ranks of the Allies. Whole Austrian battalions had 
 moved o ff leaving theur mus^ete still pfledin ranks 7 
 and men top e xhausted to d rag themselves further 
 jav in the fields! wlule some were found suffocated 
 face downwards in the deep mud. It se emed im- 
 oossible that the Arm y could have goi^ fa r. Indeed, 
 the Cavalry reports indicated that the retreat had been 
 made along all the roads over the mountains, far to the 
 south. ^Therefore, it was_a _reasonable conclusion that 
 Vanda mme with his 40,000 men at Pirna (in command of 
 the only Urst-class road in the district) could reach the 
 exits from the mountain passes about Teplitz in time to 
 intercept the bulk of the enemy's forces. St. Cyr and 
 the Young Guard marching by the same good road would 
 be within supporting distance if anything untoward 
 happened, and Marmont following on directly was to 
 bang upon the enemy's rear, whilst Muj^t wy\h. Victor 
 and the Cavalry tried to work round their southern 
 flank. 
 
 As at the same time satisfactory news arrived from 
 Vandamme, who had attacked and driven back the 
 flanking detachment under the Duke Eugene of Wurtem- 
 berg (left to hold the passages of the Elbe at Pirna on the 
 previous day), the Emperor concluded he could give the 
 Yoimg Guard a much needed rest. He accordingly 
 ordered them to bivouac where they stood, and getting 
 into his coach drove back to Dresden, where at 8.30 
 
KATZBACH— DRESDEN— KULM 191 
 
 p.m. the news of Macdonald's defeat on the Katzbach 
 was handed to him. 
 
 The escape of the right wing of the 
 
 ttre AlUes -^^®s from the trap thus laid for them is 
 
 one of the most cniious episod es in military 
 
 history and deser ves to be treat ad-jrith more detail 
 
 iMnifiriB»ijiii»i II !■ I "' ' " T ■"'"■-""'"■' (-"■•••^■"•«» 
 
 than IS usually accorded to it. 
 
 Duke Eugene of Wiirtemberg, in reply to his repeated 
 requests for reinforcements, found himself suddenly 
 superseded in his command by the arrival of General 
 Ostermann wilh a whole Division of the Russian Guards. 
 Ostermann, however, was practically out of his mind, 
 and in charge of two attendants. But in his lucid 
 intervals he agreed not to interfere with the Duke's 
 command. Unfortimately he insisted on riding with 
 him, and when any question concerning his Guards 
 arose, his senses appear to have deserted him entirely. 
 
 The Duke saw quite clearly that Vandamme was 
 endeavouring to reach the defile of Peterswalde, where 
 the road on which he and Kleist's Corps of Prussians were 
 marching opens into the great Pirna-Teplitz chavssee. 
 He therefore implored Ostermann to give him the assist- 
 ance of the Guards to attack, and hold Vandamme in 
 check throughout the day, pointing out the vital im- 
 portance to the whole Army of keeping him at bay. 
 
 But Ostermann was not at all touched by these argu- 
 ments, nor were his subordinates either. The Guards . 
 were the Tsar's own personal property, and their officers 
 felt that they would never be forgiven if the bright paint 
 on their Ruler's expensive toy should be tarnished or 
 chipped in the rough game of war. Deaf to all 
 remonstrances from Duke Eugene, Ostermann marched 
 
192 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 off leaving the Duke to do the best he could with his - 
 very inadequate means to carry out his plan of 
 obstructing Vandamme's movements. 
 
 In the meantime a number of coincidences arose. 
 [[I;!!?.. ..-KiTig^ of Prussia had ridden on alone from the 
 night quarters of the Monarchs, and had chosen a path 
 along a spur of the mountains from whence he had a 
 full view over the plains below. The sound of heavy 
 firing arising from the action between the Duke's . little 
 column and Vandamme's advance guard, reached his 
 ears, and he saw in a moment the inevitable conse- 
 quences if the French General should succeed in driving 
 his opponents beyond the defile of Priesten, through 
 which at that moment Ostermaim's column was retiring. 
 
 The King at once galloped after the madman, and by 
 a happy inspiration pointed out to the Russian Staff 
 the danger in which their Sovereign, still within the 
 mountains, would be placed if Priesten was not defended 
 by the Guard ; this appeal proved efficient. Oster- 
 mann or his representative counter-marched the column, 
 and took up a retaining position, ready to receive the 
 Duke of Wurtemberg as he fell back. 
 
 Simultaneously, almost, the Tsar himself had left 
 Headquarters by another patfi running along a spur 
 parallel to that on which the King of Prussia was riding.' 
 The sound of firing caught his attention also, and in his 
 turn he took in the situation at a glance. From his spur 
 of the mountains he could not see Ostermann, however. 
 What he did see was another large body of Alhed troops 
 away in the plains, and he rode after them to bring 
 them back to the Priesten position. 
 
 They turned out to be Colloredo's Austrian Corps of 
 
KATZBACH— DRESDEN— KULM 193 
 
 14 Battalions and 18 guns moving in direct compliance 
 with Schwarzenberg's orders, issued the night before, 
 and Colloredo did not see his way to acceding at once 
 to the Imperial request that he should reinforce Osler- 
 mann at Priesten. Fortunately at this moment Metter- 
 nich, the Austrian Prime Minister, arrived, in a very 
 dejected frame of mind. Learning from the Emperor 
 Alexander's own lips the yet greater danger that 
 threatened if the French under Vandamme were not 
 promptly opposed, he took the responsibility of ordering 
 Colloredo back to Priesten, at which place the latter 
 arrived so opportunely that Vandamme found himself 
 compelled to delay his final attack until the following 
 morning, as in the long and confused day's fighting 
 his cojnmand had straggled a good deal. 
 
 When the battle was renewed the next 
 ^!f^Cutm* morning the two_, Qp,BQnen^ were .fairly 
 
 well matched, about 46^Q QQ.^.Yictorv jnsgged 
 French against some 50,000 Austrians and Buss ians. 
 Vandamme had taken up his position iiiSeTitEle 
 village of Kulm in face of the Priesten defile. About 
 1 p.m. he had sent forward practically all his troops 
 for a decisive effort. They seemed to be carrying 
 everything before them, when suddenly there was an 
 outbvirst of heavy firing and cheers to his rear. The 
 next moment a mass of Prussians burst into the village, 
 taking the French force completely in reverse, Van- 
 damme was captured with his Staff, and his command 
 was completely destroyed or dispersed. 
 
 We must now retrace our steps to follow the vicissi- 
 tudes of this Prussian Corps which had appeared so 
 exactly at the right moment. 
 
 O 
 
194 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 The Corps of Kleist. som e 1 0,000 strong , had been left 
 in touch with the mairTPrehch Army in the vicinity of 
 Dohna, and in its retreat had found itself gradually 
 shouldered ofE successive Unes of escape by Vandamme's 
 advance. 
 
 On the night of August 29, Kleist found himself in 
 desperate straits. The one roadway still open to him 
 was so completely blocked by broken-down transport 
 that twenty-four hours woxild hardly have sufficed to 
 clear it for the passage of troops, so he decided to cut 
 himself adrift from the map and trust to luck to find a 
 way across country. Calling his officers together, he 
 told them that he intended to fight his way through the 
 French, sword in hand, and his plucky resolution was 
 greeted with cheers. At daybreak next morning his 
 columns climbed the spur which lay between them 
 and the Pirna-Teplitz road. They then moved north- 
 wards along it, till they struck a country track leading 
 down a ravine which ultimately debouched upon the 
 above-iiamed road. Scrambling down through the 
 forests, for some 2,000 feet, they at length reached it. 
 Finding it entirely unoccupied they promptly proceeded 
 to reform their columns, and then marched along it 
 towards the sound of the firing which came from the 
 village of Kulm. « 
 
 Bounding a turn in the road, they saw the battle 
 raging in front of them. Being as yet entirely un- 
 observed, they formed up for attack and rushed the 
 village, almost before the French were aware of their 
 presence. 
 
 ■There can be little doubt that this fortunate in ter- 
 vention changed the whole fate of the campaign, and 
 
KATZBACH— DRESDEN— KULM 193 
 
 the credit for it belongs in fairly equal proportions to 
 the Duke of Wurtemberg for his courage, to the King 
 of Prussia and the Tsar for their timely interference, 
 and to Kleist for his daring acceptance of responsibihty 
 which meant much more in those days of rigid adherence 
 to prescription, than it would do at present. ; 
 
 The proximate cause which led to this I 
 
 ommen complete disappointment of all Napoleon's 
 hopes, lay undoubtedly in St. Cvr's failure to avail 
 himselj of the authpritxiLebgaM to. himJHcJSTapxjleQJL 
 to call Vandamme to hisa^istance. How a man of 
 St. Cyr's distinction, who had himseK exercised indepen- 
 dent command on several occasions, and whose writings 
 prove him to have been one of the first strategists of 
 his day, could have blundered in this extraordinary 
 manner is one of those insoluble problems in human 
 psychology which from time to time arise and upset all 
 calculations and all designs. If Vandamme, ia obedience 
 to St. Cyr's summons, had been already on the march to 
 Dresden when Napoleon sat down to write the letter 
 quoted above, no question as to the safety of that town 
 could possibly have arisen ; while the Emperor would 
 have been free to carry out his design of placing 100,000 
 men in rear of the Allies on August 27, as he wrote to 
 Maret, then in Paris. 
 
 But the question then arises whether but for his 
 uncertainty as to Vandamme's movements, the plan 
 would have occurred to him at all ? Evidently it was 
 not in his mind when he began his letter. It flashed 
 across him as he wrote, and so blinded him for the 
 moment that he failed to notice that by ordering Van- 
 damme back to Stolpen he created the very situation 
 
^® 
 
 196 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 which ultimately caused its abandonment. The letter 
 strikes me as conc lusive evidence of an absolu telj^^ tired 
 ffun^r It 'is 'To^'caTd fiSslr^^^ it is almost 
 
 incredible that he ca n have fead itj a yer a second time, 
 and the following letter confirms the impression ; for 
 / Napoleon, when under the f uU control of his genius, 
 I would never have contemplated a dual objective, and 
 stm less would he have talked about the occupation of 
 Prague as long as his enemy's undefeated Field Army 
 was in existence. 
 
 The-next questions are — How dld..tl^ ^ f^jji gue origin- 
 ate ? Was its cause preventable ? and is not the fact 
 of its appearance in itself the best pro^f of the failure of 
 the Commander to have reaUzed in this instance the 
 whole scope of all that his career had previously taught 
 the world of War, It has been, said by man y critics 
 that.in this campaign the Emperor n o longer gave proof 
 
 of that all comB^ing energy in execution, of that cease- 
 
 less attention to detail, and that absolute disregard of~ 
 
 his personal comfort.wMch]Ea3. distingmahf dJ^J^Ii JILhJg 
 
 earlier da y s ? But Major Friedrichs, with all the docu- 
 mentary evidense-BOw in e xistence beEore him, has no 
 difficulty in rebuttin g thes e a ccusations. It is absolutely 
 clear t hat Napoleon was cease l pssljL . on „t fe Eq.QSB.1 the 
 marvel is how he ever foundtimeto either sleep or wriffe. 
 But all this only confirms the point I propose to bring 
 forward, viz., that he had never intellectiudly reaUzed 
 the secrets of his own success. 
 
 Hitherto, when in command of Armies approximatiaag 
 in magnitude to those he was now directing, he had 
 always acted on the offensive, with a clear and definite 
 purpose before him, a purpose which no possible threat 
 
KATZBACH— DRESDEN— KULM 197 
 
 or movement of his enemies could possibly disturb. 
 Where they moved in darkness, distracted by every 
 passing rumour and threat," he marched confidently 
 forward, convinced of his power of beating down all 
 opposition on the battlefield itself, when and wherever 
 he might encounter them. Now, however, events had 
 thrown him upon the defensive, and at once the increased 
 difficulty of the situation forced itself wpon his. attention. 
 
 It was not only that his Cavahy failed him, for that 
 had happened to him before, notably in 1806 and 1809. « 
 No. the essential diMc uUv now lay in the fact that the^. "iv^^ ' 
 initiative had passed, fro m Ms han dfS tQA hQM..of his adver-^ /?/V- 
 sary, and therefore he w as ccmpelledto wait untitle 
 latter gave him an opening^ o f , which, to take^^ac^ntage. 
 That opening he certainly saw when he penned his 
 letter to Vandamme, but it is clear from the measures 
 he suggested that his inspiration did not suffice to show 
 him the best way in which to avail himself of the chance 
 given to him ; and this simply because his mind was 
 at the time too weary to work out intellectually the full 
 possibilities of the situation. 
 
 Presumably since he had actually prepared three 
 bridges at or near Pima, and held two others in hand to 
 throw across the river as occasion might require — ^the 
 new road, or roads (I can only find mention of one) 
 which he had ordered to be constructed, must have been 
 good enough for 100,000 men to pass along them, during 
 the twenty-four hours he allowed himself. But there 
 was only one road available in. continuation to HeUen- 
 dorf (the objective he mentions in his letters to Maret) 
 and in the defiles of that district, his Army could hardly 
 move on a broad front, as it had done from Bautzen 
 
198 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 and Stolpen on Dresden. His 100,000 men, tlierefore. 
 would have taken about as long to concentrate to the 
 front as the Austrians would have taken to counter- 
 march to their rear. Moreover, the latter would have 
 held the best graded road in the district in their posses- 
 sion, viz., from Freiburg via Dux to Tephtz, by which 
 to manoeuvre against the French flank. 
 
 l^sssts&^sv^^^jMTIt^ NomlmiBLS conduct of. war _ 
 been the resvU o f intellectual, studtf, a nd not the intuition 
 of genius, a far simpler,. .and m ore_effe,ctive plan would 
 have followed from the intellectual apphcation of the 
 forms which he had himself iavented, which depended 
 for their efficacy on the superior marching powers of 
 the French troops under certain conditions, all of which 
 presented themselves in the case now before us. 
 
 I In the campaigns of 1807 and 1812 in Poland and 
 Russia, the formation " in battalion square of 200,000 
 men," had broken down because, owing essentially to 
 
 i difficulties of supply , he had not been able to outmarch 
 his enemy and compel him to stand and give battle. 
 If he had struck towards Prague whilst the Austrians 
 and Allies were stiU in the vicinity, it is^ possible that he 
 might have caught them up. The harvest was just being 
 gathered on the southern slopes of the Bohemian moun- 
 tains, and as the whole district had escaped the ravages 
 of war for the last fifty years, supplies therefore would 
 have been abundant. On the other hand, however, 
 there was no particular reason why the Allies should 
 stand to be beaten, when they had the whole of Austria 
 and Hungary in which to manoeuvre and escape. 
 
 (When once, however, the columns of the Bohemian 
 Army had entangled themselves in the defiles leading to 
 
KATZBACH— DRESDEN— KULM 199 
 
 Saxony, thfi3L3i gere at Napoleon's mercy had he, as before \ 
 said, only realized intellectually the secret of his own 
 successes, viz., superior moW/Uy. Leaving only a weak 
 rear guard under Ney to cover his withdrawal the IV 
 and XI Corps, preceded by Poniatowski (VIII Corps) 
 as an advance guard, should have been set in motion 
 via Zittau, Graben, Leitmeritz, Lobositz, on Teplitz, 
 which they would .have reached during the course of 
 August 28, having started on the 24:th, the distanqe 
 being less than what the II and VI Corps actually accom- 
 plished in their march to Dresden, and the gradients 
 better than those they had surmounted. 
 
 The II and VI Corps, with the Guards, would have 
 reached Hellendorf in the same time ; while Dresden, 
 with St. Cyr and Vandamme would have been perfectly 
 safe for forty-eight hours, even assuming that the town 
 was ever in danger. Further, whilst the centre and 
 right attacked and held the enemy, the left would have 
 taken the Tephtz-Dux-Freiburg road, -and would have 
 swung in on the enemy's rear, wherever and however he 
 might have placed himself. 
 
 Here we shoidd have seen the " lozenge " or " square " 
 formation at its best; wheeling about a fixed point 
 (Dresden) attacking an enemy who practically had no 
 retreat open to him, and therefore could not evade the 
 blow, but would have to countermarch under almost 
 impossible conditions. Meanwhile the French themselves 
 would have lived on their enemies' magazines and trains, 
 with the additional power of supplying themselves with 
 any stores that the Alhes' forethought had not already 
 provided, vii, the line of the Elbe in the first instance, 
 the road through Dippoldiswalde next, and then in 
 
2O0 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 succession the Freiburg and the great Leipzig road. 
 Then, having completed the wheel, they would have 
 reached the Elbe again on the fourth day from Teplitz, 
 in ample time to meet either Bemadotte's or Bliicher's 
 Army had the necessity for this arisen, though after the 
 crushing defeat of the Allies this movement must have 
 entailed, such a contingency would appear most improb- 
 able. 
 
 By this movement, aU uncertainty would have been 
 at once allayed, for once the troops were in motion, the 
 enemy's possible eccentricities could no longer matter. 
 If by any chance they had penetrated Napoleon's 
 design in time to mass themselves against the French 
 left, they must by so doing have weakened their own 
 left, when the French left about Tephtz became the 
 pivot, and the wheel would have been executed in the 
 inverse direction. If they had massed against the 
 centre, then the wings would have swung in like the 
 jaws of a cracker, and a greater blow with more decisive 
 consequences must have been the result. 
 
GROSS BEEREN— DENNEWITZ— WARTENBURG 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 Gross Beeeen — Dbnnewitz — ^Waetenburg 
 
 We left Napoleon on the afternoon of August 28 
 driving back from Pirna, well satisfied with the promise 
 of the day, and pleased with the number of trophies 
 and prisoners which were hourly arriving from the 
 front. A second report from Oudinot relating to his 
 defeat at Gross Beeren, received about noon, was insuffi- 
 cient to disturb his serenity, which remained proof even 
 against the far more serious news of Macdonald's defeat 
 on the Katzbach, and of Girard's reverse at Hagelesberg, 
 which reached him during the evening of the same 
 day. For once, however, no immediate step was 
 taken to remedy either misfortune, and we are amazed^ 
 to^find^he fn-pat. "RmpRrnr, Tn>,Tif]-t.n t.lip. ve ry incarnation 
 of rapid decision, faltering for tbirtY-sL£._h fiHrs before 
 Napoleon's <ieciding on his next move in the great 
 Notes on the game. During these hours he dictated 
 ituation ^^ memoranda on his strategical situa- 
 tion.^ These are so absolutely opposed in their 
 contents and arrangement to anything one could pre- 
 viously have conceived as coming from the mind of 
 this great Master of men and War, that many doubts 
 have been cast on their authenticity. But as the Ger- 
 man General Staff have accepted them, we may bow to 
 their authority. 
 
 ^ "Notes sur la situation gia&vale de mes affaires." 
 
204 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 They are too long for reproduction, but briefly they 
 discuss at considerable length two alternatives, viz., 
 a march with the main Army on Prague, or a march, 
 with Oudinot's command largely reinforced, on Berhn, 
 and the marvel is that the Emperor's decision could 
 have- wavered for a moment. For Prague, it was 
 akeady too late, from the moment when he had said, 
 " I see nothing more to do " at Pirna ; and, as already 
 pointed out, the direction of Prague held out no hope of 
 a decision. The Bohemian Army could always run away 
 faster than he could foUow them. Berlin, on the other 
 hand, held out all the fascination of his original northern 
 plan, heightened by the satisfaction to be derived from 
 administering prompt chastisement to Bernadotte, to 
 say nothing of the more real advantage of a fresh 
 country in which to operate, ajid finally the relief of 
 the fortresses of Danzig, Kiistrin and Frankfurt. 
 
 In the early hoxus of August 30 Napoleon's resolu- 
 tion was taken to march on Berlin, and Berthier was 
 instructed to order the Guards and the Cavalry back 
 from the Bohemian frontier, across the Elbe at Dres- 
 den, and towards Groszenhain. In joonsequence of 
 these orders, during the afternoon the troops began 
 filing ceaselessly over the bridges. 
 
 But already the foundations on which this plan had 
 
 been based, flimsy enough at the best, had crumbled to 
 
 pieces under the stubborn logic of events. 
 
 „ . Late in the e vening the Emper or received 
 
 Napoleon •^— — --: — " ■y^z — ' _,"*^ -r r^; — : ■ 
 
 hears of the .a despgrnng appeal from M acdonald. im- 
 
 Disaster at ploringnbls^p^^ce jbg re-estabSsF" ordeF 
 
 and disdgline_ in his defe ated _^command, 
 
 and at 2 a.m. on the 31st came the nerra of Van- 
 
GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ 205 
 
 damme's catastrophe at Kulm. A few hours later, 
 General Coihineau , who, witjh a few cavalry men, had 
 cut his way through the enemy, appeared, and was at 
 once admitted to the Emperor's presence. What 
 followed is thus described by Baron Fain in his Manu- 
 script de 1813 (ii, p. 319) which I translate from Major 
 Fradrichs' work (Vol. ii, p. 8) : — 
 
 " Napoleon received the detailed account of the 
 disaster without betraying any sign of his feehngs. 
 . What he could not understand was how Vandamme 
 could have allowed himself to be tempted so far in pur- 
 suit. " For an Army in retreat one must either build a 
 golden bridge or oppose its progress with a dam of steel 
 andiron." Walking up and down the room in deepest 
 thought, he asked_B^thiSE. :-_lCasI ^e Jiave written 
 anything^wEch could have Jbhiis_ misled Mm ? Fetch 
 me your ordSfbook . Famj_jtDH_me m y notes. Let 
 us see what we said .' 
 
 "The Major-General brought his order book, the 
 Cabinet Secretary the notes, and together they went 
 through the papers. They found nothing which could 
 have justified the unfortunate General in leaving his 
 position at Peterswalde." 
 
 This was perhaps the most magnificent exhibition of 
 his histrionic talent that Napoleon ever gave, and of 
 such exhibitions not a few have been recorded. But 
 the facts were too hard to be explained away, and 
 the._Head(|uarter s Stafi f ailed to b p, impTf-ssed vnfjjn it. 
 General v on G ersdorf , (Saxon) writing in his diary the 
 same evenmg summed up the situation as follows : — 
 
 " The impression made by the successes at Dresden 
 and by Moreau's death have been wiped out ; aU con- 
 
2o6 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 sequences these events might have entailed are simply 
 destroyed. Confidence grows in the camp of the .Allies 
 in proportion as it sinks with us. The Emperor is . 
 ISLilBSliXigJ^y Jike to writ^Jdeoiea sed.' but very 
 pp.Tisivf!^ cnrinnslv hft ia not irritfp.hlyi ; the spirit" of 
 Headquarters generally bears the stamp of the time." ^ 
 
 As an immediate consequence of these disasters the 
 movement on Berlin was suspended. Nothing whatever 
 was done on August 31 . On September 1 the Emperor 
 replied to Macdonald's appeal (received on the night 
 of the 30th) ordering him to hold on to Gorhtz at all 
 costs, meanwhile holding out the hope of his own 
 arrival with reinforcements. He also sent Ney to 
 Wittenberg to relieve Oudinot of his command and to 
 restore order in the disorganized debris which after 
 the defeat of Gross Beeren had rallied about that 
 place. But his chief attention appears to have been 
 devoted to preparing the troops about Dresden to meet 
 a renewed offensive on the part of the AUies. 
 
 With this object St. Cyr (XIV) was ordered to 
 remain at Pima. Victor (II) was sent to Freiberg 
 and Marmont (VI), Mortier (Guards) and Latour- 
 Maubourg's Cavalry were united around Dresden as 
 a central reserve. Lobau received the command of 
 the wreck of Vandamme's Corps, (I) which by using * 
 Teste's Division as a nucleus was raised to about 14,000 
 men and 66 guns (obtained by drafts from other 
 commands) and 300 sabres. 
 
 It was now too late to carry out his march on Berlin 
 in the manner he had originally designed. On the other 
 hand, it was quite impossible for him to remain where 
 » Freidrichs, Vol. II, p. 9. 
 
GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ 207 
 
 he was, and since the outpost reports gave no hope that 
 the " Grand Army " — as it had come to be called — 
 would obUgingly step down into the plains to be beaten, 
 he now resolved to move the Guards, the VI Corps and 
 his Headquarters to a central position equally con- 
 venient to reinforce Macdonald, Ney or Murat, whom 
 he determined to leave in chief command at Dresden. 
 
 This central position Napoleon found in the Uttle 
 village of Hoyerswerda, where the road from Dresden 
 to Berhn vig, Cottbus intersects a second-class road 
 coming from Wittenberg via Leutenberg to Bautzen. 
 During September 2nd Berthier wrote to Ney the follow- 
 ing sketch of the situation, also an outline of Ney's 
 special mission, to supplement such verbal instructions 
 as the latter had taken with him from his personal 
 interview with the Emperor, which seem to have been 
 of the vaguest description: — 
 
 " We have just received news from the 
 j^y ° Duke of Reggio (Oudinot) who has seen fit 
 to fall back to within two marches of 
 Wittenberg. The consequences of this untimely move- 
 ment are that General Tauent2den and a strong body 
 of Cossacks have turned towards Liickau and Bautzen, 
 where they threaten Maodonald's communications. It 
 is really diffic\ilt to show less head than Oudinot. 
 
 " Everything is being set in motion for Hoyerswerda, 
 where the Emperor and Headquarters wiU arrive on 
 the ith. You must march on the 4th, and be in Baruth 
 on September 6. On that day the Emperor will place 
 a Corps at Liickau which can join you. From Baruth 
 it is only three marches to Berlin. Communication with 
 the Emperor will thus be established, and the attack 
 
2o8 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 on Berlin can take place on tlie 9tli or lOth. The 
 whole division of Cossacks, and all this mass of inferior 
 Landwehr Infantry will everywhere be thrown back 
 on Berhn if your march is made in a determined manner. 
 You will understand the necessity for rapid action in 
 order to draw admantage from, the confusion of the Bohe- 
 mian Army, which is sure to set itself in motion as soon 
 as it learns of the Emperor's move. Oudinot never 
 attacked the enemy, and was clever enough to engage 
 only one of his Corps. If he had gone at him resolutely 
 he would have overrun him everywhere." 
 
 The above deserves attentive study, as it was the 
 immeSJate caioL^~ of the calasteopSe' o f Dennew itz, 
 wiich in its " consequences proved the most serious 
 
 reverse which theTfeich had as yitsustamedTNeyr 
 who, m fact (in ml usual impulsive manner), had started 
 for Wittenberg with no definite instructions, had found 
 Oudinot's troops in extreme disorder, penned in with 
 their back against the Elbe by the whole of the Army 
 of the North, which Bernadotte had very skUfuUy dis- 
 posed so as to hide its weak effectives. 
 
 The Emperor in his instructions never alludes to the 
 position of this enemy at all, and they were clearly 
 written under the impression that no serious opposition 
 could be opposed to the prescribed march on Baruth 
 by the Army of the North. But Ney saw only his 
 orders, and with the fate of Oudinot before his eyes, 
 determined not to fall into the error of weak execution, 
 which the context of Berthier's memoranda so strongly 
 condemns. 
 
 Having re-estabhshed some measure of order among 
 the troops (during September 3 and 4), on the morning 
 
GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ 209 
 
 of the 5th Ney broke out of his position with his whole 
 three Corps. He moved straight across country in 
 masses towards Zahna to gain the Liickau-Bautzen 
 road. The weather being clear and dry, the dense 
 dust clouds stirred up by this formidable array gave 
 Bernadotte ample warning of its coming, and though 
 Tauentzien's weak Corps of Landwehr, on whom the 
 blow of Ney's advance directly fell, were rcasily thrown 
 back in dire confusion, all the remainder of his Army, 
 Biilow, Wintzengerode and the Swedes, were immediately 
 set in motion to move parallel to the French and head 
 them off if possible from Jiiterbogk. A cloud of Cos- 
 sacks, and a low roU of the ground concealed this move- 
 ment from Ney, whose troops bivouacked for the night 
 around Zahna, quite unaware that a for midable e nemy 
 was gathering within fiv e_mi[gs of their left flank. 
 
 Early the next morning the maJcETwas renewed, the 
 IV Corps (Bertrand) leading, followed by the VII 
 (Reynier) and XII (Oudinot), each marching in mass of 
 Divisions, the Artillery only on the road. 
 
 Tauentzien had bivouacked near Den- 
 D&mtwitz ii®^*2 and had spent the night in restoring 
 order amongst his Landwehr, and with 
 such success that, confident of prompt support, he 
 was able to take up a position effectively barring 
 the further progress of the French, though he had 
 barely 10,000 men under arms. This is worth noting, 
 for it shows how readily raw troops can be rallied, 
 even from serious panic, if they only know what they are 
 fighting for. Still, an encounter against such odds 
 could only end one way, and after about two hours' 
 fighting the Landwehr were faltering in every direction, 
 
 p 
 
210 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 when Biilow's men appeared on the flank of the French 
 IV Corps. Their attack at once stopped the progress of 
 the latter, and now it was Bertrand who was thrown 
 on the defensive. The arrival of the VII Corps again 
 turned the scale, but fresh Prussian battalions turning 
 up, the left flank of the French gave way, and their 
 position was only saved by the appearance of the leading 
 troops of the XII Corps. 
 
 But just as the whole mass of this new command 
 were preparing for a final counterstroke against the 
 Allies in order to finish the dav. yey. who all this 
 time had been watching the battle with Bertrand's 
 men, and knowing nothing of what was happening 
 on his extreme left, sent orders to Oudinot to con- 
 tinue his march to the front. The latter, who 
 since his supersession by Ney in the command 
 of the Army, had been in that worst of tempers in 
 which a man confines himself to the Hteral obedience 
 of his orders — ^however much circumstances may have 
 altered and his own common sense may apprehend this 
 fact — called off aU his troops, and in spite of Reynier's 
 most urgent remonstrances he resumed his march to 
 join Ney, passing close along the rear of the hardly 
 pressed VII Corps. 
 
 Punishment was not long delayed, for ever since 
 morning the Russians and Swedes had been pressing 
 their march to the utmost, and warned of the urgency 
 of the case, their Horse Artillery and Cavalry had 
 hurried on far in advance. Almost as the last of the 
 XII Corps quitted the line, the storm burst upon the 
 exhausted VII Corps. An advance of every available 
 gun to case shot range preluded the approach of a 
 
GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ 211 
 
 perfect hurricane of horsemen, before whom the French 
 broke, and pursuers and pursued poured down the 
 slopes upon the flanks of Oudinot's masses. 
 
 The defeat was absolut dx,jeaJastrapMc-L,_A_jgald 
 pa nic seized the French, and for the next,JeiHL.Ja.^s 
 Ney's command ceased to exist. 
 
 We must now return to the Emperor, whom we left 
 completing his arrangements for the defence of Dresden. 
 His orders on this subject to Eogniat (his Chief En- 
 gineer) dated September 3 remain as masterp iece s for 
 all _time, and equally so are his instructions to StrCyr 
 of the same date. Thus, having provided for every 
 contingency as far as himian foresight could well go, 
 he started on the afternoon of the 3rd to overtake the 
 Guards and Reserves already on their way to Hoyers- 
 werda (about forty miles north-east of Dresden). But 
 at the last moment a report from Macdonald, dispatched 
 the previous evening, was handed in to him, which 
 again shattered the basis of his whole design. 
 
 Briefly, Macdonald again represented his command 
 
 as absolutely out of hand ; he could find no one to 
 
 support him in his efforts to maintain discipline, and 
 
 only the Emperor's presence could avert utter disaster. 
 
 „ .^„ This time there was no hesitation. Orders 
 
 Napoleon 
 
 Joins Mac- went to all the marching columns to change 
 donald direction towards Bautzen. Ney was warned 
 of the Emperor's alteration of his destination, which 
 might postpone his march on Berlin until Bliicher's 
 Army had been disposed of ; but Ney was to continue 
 the execution of his own march on Baruth to be able 
 to back up the Emperor the moment he returned, and 
 Macdonald was warned to have all his troops in readi- 
 
212 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 ness for inspection early next morning, so that the E m- ^ 
 jeror could ri ds-dognthe front in haK an hour. Then 
 the moment the Guards and Latoui Maubourg arrived, 
 which would be between 2 and 3 p.m., the Emperor 
 proposed to attack the enemy wherever he found him. 
 Napoleon slept that night at Gross Harthau, and 
 rode on in the early morning of September 4 towards 
 Bautzen. That he had expected to find things in a 
 bad way is clear from the steps he had already taken 
 to meet the most urgent necessities, and to replenish 
 both arms and equipment. But what he really en- 
 countered was worse than any one had dreamt of 
 imagining. Swarms of bare-footed, unarmed and starv- 
 ing stragglers met him as he rode : and there was no 
 food to give them, for a big convoy of provisions and 
 ammunition had been intercepted by a raiding command 
 from Bliicher's Army, and only its smoking remains 
 lay by the roadside. AndJierfi. at. length, the Emperor 
 lost his usual self-c ontrol. A miserable dog ran 
 out and yapped at his horse • as he rode by ; he 
 drew his pistol on the poor wretch, but the pistol 
 missed fire, and in a rage he flung it at t^e animal. 
 Then he rode on in gloomy silence, until he met Mac- 
 t donald and his staff outside Bautzen. .Then hjp ten^ )CT_ 
 I conipletdj ^Yermastered him. _ Turning on Sebastian i 
 I (Commander of the 2nd Cavahy Corps), he upbraided 
 I him in such unmeasured terms that Caulaincourt and 
 I the Staff had to close round him to shut off the un- 
 ' dignified scene. Thence he rode on to Hochkirch, 
 where the heads of columns of the SUesian Army were 
 seen approaching. At these he hurled the nearest of 
 his troops at hand, who now, suddenly ashamed of 
 
GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ 213 
 
 themselves and anxious to retrieve their reputation 
 under their Emperor's eyes, attacked with such vigour 
 that Bliicher and his Generals immediately detected 
 the presence of the Master , and at once ordered a 
 retreat behind the Lobau river. This was carried' out 
 successfully, thanks to the desperate fighting of their 
 respective rear guards. 
 
 He then spent the night at Hochkirch, and rode 
 off early in the morning to the Wohlauer hill to recon- 
 noitre the enemy's position in person. But the morning 
 reports made it clear that Bliicher was in fuU retreat, 
 and despairing of bringing him to action, suspecting 
 also a plot to draw him further from Dresden, he re- 
 turned to Bautzen with the Guards, and learning from 
 Ney that he would leave Wittenberg for Jiitebogh 
 on the 5th, orders were issued for the Guards and VI 
 Corps to march on the 6th to Hoyerswerda. 
 Napoleon ^^^ *^° hours after this decision had 
 Returns to been taken again he felt compelled to 
 res en ^-^^^ their destination, for further alarmist 
 reports from St. Cyr at Dresden reached him. 
 Seemingly forgetting aU the orde rs, which he had 
 issued- to meet the contingency of a fresh advance 
 on the part of the Bohemian Army, he hesitated, 
 changed his mind, and forthwith couriers were sent after 
 the Guards and the 1st Cavalry Corps to change their 
 direction from Hoyerswerda to Dresden. Only Marmont 
 (VI Corps) was to continue his march on Kamenz. 
 
 Of the many strange si tuations in this 
 
 CamBaign, this isjertsiP-S the^moS^ifficult 
 
 to unravel . St. Cyr's reports contain nothing to show 
 
 that anything- had occurred in excess of what Napoleon's 
 
214 ' THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 precautions had been intended to provide for. Hence, if 
 his calcidations before leaving Dresden had been correct, 
 there was no particular reason for this extraordinary 
 alarm. Further, even if St. Cyr's story had been many 
 times darker, and the Bohemian Army had, in fact, been 
 in full march over the mountains, this would have been 
 only a repetition of the situation he had already faced 
 and provided for on the 23rd of the previous month. 
 Then he had written, in reply to similar dismal fore- 
 bodings on the part of St. Cyr, " If the Bohemian 
 Army crosses the mountains and advances into Saxony, 
 in that case I will wish them hon voyage ; they will 
 come back quicker than they went." 
 
 His troops at this moment occupied almost identi- 
 cally the same position as on the night of August 25, 
 and if Dresden really was in jeopardy, surely the short- 
 est way to its relief would have been by one side of 
 the triangle from Bautzen to TepHtz, rather than by 
 the two sides from Bautzen to Dresden, Dresden- 
 TepUtz. 
 
 Before leaving Bautzen the following order was pub- 
 lished to the Army : — 
 
 " Every soldier who leaves his colours betrays the 
 first of his duties. 
 
 " His Majesty therefore orders — 
 
 " Soldiers who leave the colours without sufficient 
 reason wiU be decimated. The Corps Commanders, 
 therefore, every time they have collected ten stragglers 
 will cause them to draw lots, and one of them is to be 
 shot." 
 
 On the evening of the 6th Napoleon reached Dresden, 
 
GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ 215 
 
 where he found renewed reports from St. Cyx to the 
 effect that " The Austrians were advancing by Alten- 
 berg, the Prussians and Russians by Boma ^ and Berg- 
 gieszhiibel, where they had akeady ftrrived." There 
 was no indication at all of the forces they had deployed, 
 stUl less as to whether they were moving on Chemnitz 
 and Freiberg, both points of very great importance. 
 The Emperor expressed his dissatisfaction at j^e in; 
 competen ce of ^e_g^le Intelligence Service. To 
 clear up the situation he sent Victor's Corps in support 
 of St. Cyr to Dohna, on the 7th, and rode out next 
 morning at the head of the Guards to conduct a 
 reconnaissance in person. 
 
 It is now time to return to the Bohemian 
 tnianArmy Army, which we left at the moment when 
 the tide of its misfortune had been suddenly 
 arrested by its victory over Vandamme at Kulm 
 (August 30), and when the news of Gross Beer en and 
 the Katzbach, both of which had been received during 
 the previous twenty-four hours, had stiffened its droop- 
 ing spirits. 
 
 But though aU idea of further retreat was abandoned, 
 a halt to re-establish order in the several commands, 
 and to issue fresh ammimition and equipments, especi- 
 ally boots (for nearly half the Army was by this time 
 barefooted) was urgently necessary. 
 
 The abortive expedition had entailed a loss in killed, 
 wounded, prisoners and sick of some 45,000 men, of 
 which 9,000 men with 600 horses fell upon the Prus- 
 sians, nearly 30 per cent, of their original effective. 
 But in spite of this heavy punishment, endured day 
 
 ^ Not to be confused with the " Boma " south of Leipzig. 
 
2i6 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 hj day under the depressing conditions of continuous 
 retreat, the Commanding Officers were all able to report 
 that in their conduct the men had shewn both good- 
 will and devotion beyond all expectation or praise. 
 
 The breakdown of the commissariat had been com- 
 plete, and the Russians, particularly the Cossacks, had 
 sought to make good the deficiencies in their supply 
 by li\dng on the inhabitants, and robbing them right 
 and left. So serious, indeed, were the disturbances and 
 sufferings created by these half-civilized horsemen that 
 flying columns had to be organized, which the inhabi- 
 tants of the country gladly joined, to hunt down these 
 marauders and hang them out of hand. It may be men- 
 tioned here that these same troops proved equally 
 troublesome in the rear of all three Armies, and that 
 behind the Silesian Army they formed themselves 
 into organised bands of brigands, who waylaid, stripped 
 and murdered every civilian and even officer who fell 
 into their hands. 
 I The chief result of these victories, viz., Kulm, Gross 
 Beeren and Katzbach, on the future of the campaign 
 ( was, however, to confirm for good and aU the allegiance 
 of Austria to the Triple Alliance. Up to the Very day 
 ! of the battle of Kulm, Metternich had been carrying on 
 ^ diplomatic relations with Napoleon, and both the 
 Prussians and Russians felt that he might desert the 
 common cause at a moment's notice. Now decisively 
 he flung diplomacy to the winds, and in a final com- 
 munication to the French Emperor formulated such 
 preposterous de mands for the conclusion of peace that 
 I nothing but hopeless defeat could have enabled the 
 ' latter even to consider them. 
 
GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ 217 
 
 Under tke depressing influences of de- 
 Monarchs feat a letter had been despatched to 
 <^1 upon Bliicher on August 29, calling upon him 
 to march with 50,000 men (i.e., more than 
 half his command as it stood) to the assistance of 
 the Bohemian Army, and notwithstanding the victory 
 of Kulm, the demand was not withdrawn. Thence a > 
 long correspondence arose, which reveals very com- 
 pletely the entire want of anything approaching or- 
 ganized co-operation in determining the ultimate issue 
 of the campaign. 
 
 The letter to Bliicher did not convey an absolute 
 order, merely a royal wish, leaving, as far as these things 
 can be left, the final decision to depend on the circum- 
 stances prevailing at the Silesian Headquarters on 
 delivery of the document. 
 
 Now at that moment, unknown, of course,, to Bliicher, 
 Napoleon had actually gathered together his forces 
 for his often proposed march on Berlin, and Ney had 
 received his orders to fall upon Bemadotte and over- 
 whelm him, and it was only Bliicher's resolute pursuit, 
 or, better, pressure upon Macdonald's command which 
 caused the Emperor to abandon his design and turn 
 upon Bliicher. 
 
 Meanwhile, Bemadotte, able to gauge the 
 Emperor's mind far better than did any_^ 
 other of his colleague s, was painfully aware of the 
 imminent danger which threatened his command in 
 its isolated position right in the path of the Em- 
 peror's march on Berlin, which he had divined, from 
 the first, as Napoleon's immediate reply to , the defeat 
 of Oudinot at Gross Beeren. Judging by the light 
 
( 
 
 2i8- THEILEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 of the fuller knowledge now available, there can 
 be no doubt that this counterstroke, had it been 
 carried out, must have been decisive of the whole 
 campaign. Having marched right over the North 
 Army, reUeved Danzig and the Oder fortresses, and 
 then with Davout having reopened communications 
 with Magdeburg, the Emperor again would have been 
 in touch with all the resources of France, and the 32nd 
 Military Division. Indeed, he might have renewed 
 the campaign with an assured numerical superiority 
 and with a wholly re-estabhshed mihtary prestige. But 
 not an inkHng of this possibihty seems to have dawned 
 on the Allied Headquarters, who called on Bliicher for 
 reinforcements, which would only have added to the 
 existing congestion of the district in which they stood. 
 These were refused by Bliicher, not on the grounds of 
 Bernadotte's danger and consequent claim on the 
 loyalty of his nearest comrade, but because neither he . 
 nor Gneisenau desired to have their freedom hampered 
 by the loss of half their troops. 
 
 Bliicher's private autograph letter to Knesebeck is so 
 characteristic that I reproduce it with its original spell- 
 ing ; it was sent under cover with the formal dispatch : — 
 
 " Um des allgemeinen wohl und Besten, bewahren, 
 si mioh vor einer vereinigung mit der groszen armeh; 
 was soil eine solche ungeheure masse auf einen gleich- 
 sam ausgezerten terrain, hir will ich wirksahn sein und 
 kann ich niitzhoh werden, weiche ich von einen den 
 Kronprinzen von Schweden mitgetheUten operations 
 Plan ab, so kriegt er sicher, staht dasz er nu mit starken 
 chritt vorwerts geht ; solte Napoleon naoh Boehmen 
 
GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ 219 
 
 Hneingehn wollen, so musz man iliii in Boehmen 
 vernicliten, ich glaube aber, das2 er die Elbe verlast 
 wenn man gut manouvrirt.^ 
 
 " Bltjchee." 
 Hesnhtjt, den 13 Sept., 1813. 
 
 It will be noticed that in this letter Bliicher does 
 speak of a combined operation with the Crown Prince 
 of Sweden. But Major Riihie von Lilienstein, who 
 carried this dispatch, had verbal instructions to point 
 out to the AUied Sovereigns, not the imminence of the 
 danger which threatened the Crown Prince and his 
 troops as long as Napoleon held the passages over the 
 Elbe, but that no rehance could be placed on the loyalty 
 of the Crown Prince himself unless Bliicher and Gn eisenau 
 were at hand to drive him ; and, in anticipation, it 
 may be added, that a secret intrigue was already on 
 foot by which on the approach of the Silesian Army 
 Billow and Tauentzien were to refuse obedience to the 
 Prince and transfer their forces to Bliicher's comjnand, 
 in case the latter hesitated to press operations with 
 the energy they desired. 
 
 Bemado tte's conduct in every campaign has always 
 rCTaam^~an insoluble problem jbo all studeots. His 
 absence from the battlefield of Jena at the critical 
 moment, and his amazing indiscreetness at Wa^am 
 (for which the Emperor had actually ordered him to be 
 
 1 "For the general good and welfare preserve me from a junction 
 with the great Army ; what can Buch an enormous mass do in such a 
 famine-stricken desert ? Here I can be active and useful ; if I deviate 
 from the plan agreed upon with the Crown Prince of Sweden he is 
 sure to get hcked, instead of going forward at once with confidence; 
 if Napoleon enters Bohemia, he must be destroyed in Bohemia, but 
 I beheve that he will leare the Elbe if we manoeuvre well^" 
 
230 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 tried by court martial) had cast suspicion on him in 
 many quarters. Now the fact that neither at Gross 
 Beeren nor Dennewitz had he nor his Swedes taken part 
 in either battle had completely shaken the confidence 
 of the Prussians in his courage and his loyalty. Yet 
 in the present instance those suspicions prove to have 
 been unfounded, and Major Friedrichs (who is the first . 
 to discuss the situation with adequate documentary 
 evidence at his disposal) is able to establish Bemadotte's 
 hona fides at this period of the campaign beyond all 
 reasonable doubt. In so far as he appeared to be lack- 
 ing in enterprise, the explanation is that he knew his 
 wily adversary and the nature of his own danger far 
 better than could any of his critics. 
 
 Fortunately for the Allies, events moved far more 
 rapidly than the correspondence, but it was necessary 
 to emphasize the point at this period of the narrative 
 in order to throw light upon the undercurrents of intrigue 
 which hampered the movements of the three Armies. 
 
 Bohemian Returning now to the Bohemian Head- 
 Army quarters, we find the troops sufficiently 
 vances j-e-estabUshed to resume operations on 
 September 5. Accordingly, the columns again pene- 
 trated into the mountains by the same roads which 
 they had used previously, and it was the fighting 
 which ensued as the advance guards came in contact 
 with the French outposts that led St. Cyr to send off 
 his alarmist reports to the Emperor at Bautzen. 
 
 But on the 6th, and whilst the first Hne of their Army 
 was stiU in close touch with St. Cyr's troops, news 
 reached the Allies from an unimpeachable source that 
 Napoleon bad again turned against Bliicher, taking 
 
GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ 221 
 
 with Kim the bulk of his troops. Now it was that 
 while still uncertain as to the reply Bliicher would give 
 to the demand for 50,000 men, the Headquarters decided 
 to march 60,000, by Aussig, Leitmeritz and Rumburg, to 
 his support, and the movement was actually initiated. 
 
 We must pause a moment to contemplate the amazing 
 spectacle which would have been presented had Bliicher 
 already complied with the Alhed Sovereigns' request ; 
 60,000 men marching north on one road, whilst parallel 
 to them and only a few miles distant 50,000 marched 
 south on another highway ; 110,000 men neutraU^ed, 
 and Napoleon in the middle of them to take advantage 
 of this incredible opportunity. 
 
 Napoleon ^^* hardly had the troops started their 
 
 rejoins march than the situation once more under- 
 • ^ went an entire change, for Napoleon was 
 again reported as in full march for Dresden, and, as 
 we have seen, the report was confirmed by his appearance 
 in person during the course of September 8 at the head 
 of his Guards in that city. 
 
 A retreat and concentration was immediately decided 
 upon, and the whole Bohemian Army was ordered to 
 be drawn up for battle on a plateau covering TepUtz 
 and the exits from the mountains. 
 
 The retreat of the advance detachments involved 
 severe fighting, but by the evening of September 9 the 
 whole of the Russian and Prussian contingents had 
 taken up their positions, and on the morning of the 
 10th Napoleo n, from th^^iei^ts. of . tl^e^6MCTs]b.^J. was_ 
 able to look down upon, and almost count, the individual 
 men opposed to £im. 
 
 Reconnaissances were at once pushed out to find 
 
222 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 roads suitable for the passage of artillery across the 
 ravine Ijning at his feet, but when jn the eveiu g g Drouot, 
 his most t rusted ArtiUgc y Commander, returiieci with 
 the reTaoiLAhat .th.e^plateau wa s utterly inaocessible to 
 that arm, he made up his mind to abandon the attempt 
 to Jfiiofe^ o n a bat tle. Leaving St. Cyr to make every 
 show of concentration, to send out working parties to 
 ostentatiously repair the roads, etc., he returned to 
 Dresden to attend more closely to the situation which 
 had arisen out of Ney's defeat at Dennewitz, the fuU 
 magnitude of which had at length struck home to him. 
 
 lemoirs has criticized this 
 
 Comment 
 
 decisio n^most adversely, drawing unfavour- 
 able comparisons between the man who crossed the 
 St. Bernard without field artillery in 1800 when 
 entering Italy, and the Emperor who now hesitated 
 because his guns could not follow the Infantry. 
 But this criticism only serves to show how Uttle 
 his cont emporajies hadTjE^ome d the secret of the^^ 
 Leader , or grasped the profound change in the 
 spirit of their own troops and the character of their 
 opponents. In 1800 the French Infantry^ stiU fought 
 with Republican fanaticism, the Long Service Armies 
 of Austria by routine. Now the situatiou'was entirely 
 reversed, and the French could only hope to beat_theij.„ 
 enemies when artillery fire had_ done Jte work. To 
 bring up adequate masses of guns for this purpose on 
 to the plateau being impossible, no decisive action 
 could be hoped for, and only a decisive victory could 
 be of use to the Emperor in his present situation. 
 
 Arrived in Dresden, Napoleon immediately issued 
 orders transferring the Administrative Bureaus of the 
 
GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ 223 
 
 Aimy from Dresden to Torgau, which seems to indicate 
 that for the moment a policy of concentration against 
 the Northern Army, whilst stiU imsupported, flashed 
 through his mind. But if this was the case, the idea 
 was only temporary, for next morning (September 12) 
 he ordered Marmont from Kamen^ to Grossenhain, 
 and sent Murat with the 1st and 5th Cavaby Corps to 
 join him. 
 
 Immediately this movement served to cover the 
 transit of a convoy of 15,000 cwt. of flour up the river 
 into Dresden, but it might also have served as a pre- 
 liminary for a renewed offensive against the Army of the 
 North, and was appreciated in that spirit by Bernadotte. 
 The latter, after his victory over Ney at 
 ' Dennewitz,had detailed Tauentzien to observe 
 the French who had fallen back on Torgau, and Biilow 
 was told off to besiege Wittenberg, whilst the Swedes 
 moved down stream on Rosslau. Wintzingerode and 
 Woronzow were at Zerbst, and Bernadotte was being 
 stronglyurgedbyhis Prussian subordinates to pass at any 
 rate one Corps of his Army over the Elbe to operate on 
 the French communications, a step he had refused to 
 take until Wittenberg was in his possession. His resolu- 
 tion had aU but led to open mutiny on the part of the 
 Prussians, as already noticed above, but Napoleon's 
 threat from Dresden towards Grossenhain so com- 
 pletely vindicated his judgment, that it was impossible 
 to cross the river as long as the Emperor was free to 
 debouch from Dresden, Meissen or Torgau, that this 
 opposition was for the time at least withdrawn, and 
 more harmonious relations were established in his 
 command. 
 
224 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 _ , But a fresh offensive by the Bohemian 
 
 Advance of Army on September 14 against St. Cyr 
 
 ^Ar^""^ caused the Emperor to change his plans 
 again, and on the 15th he marched with 
 two Divisions of the young Guard to Pirna in the 
 hope of surprising the Allies in an unfavourable 
 position. This desire, however, was disappointed. 
 The Allies immediately began their retreat, contesting 
 every position desperately, and concentrating ulti- 
 mately near Kulm, where they appeared as ready to 
 accept battle once more. 
 
 On the 17th Napoleon rode out to reconnoitre from 
 the mountains near Nollendorf, but fog and rain hin- 
 dered all observations until midday. The attack was 
 then begun, but a Prussian Corps defended the advance 
 posts so resolutely that hardly any ground had been 
 gained when a tremendous dowiip our of ra.in puta^_stop 
 tothe_fighting about 5 p.m. 
 
 On the 18th the Emperor again rode out to recon- 
 noitre in person. The air being clear he could s ee 
 evi^^_detail of the enemy's position, and he noted 
 particularly the stream of their reinforcements arriving. 
 Reluctantly he ordered the Guards back to Pirna, and 
 leaving Lobau and St. Cyr to reoccupy their former 
 positions he returned to Pirna, where for the next few 
 days (during which ceaseless rai n made ope rations 
 impossib le) he remain ed s ecluded 1n~I5s~"cEambers, 
 striving to^rapEl£nrtellectuaIly with_the tide^T mis- 
 fortuner^^mt__now_^^ in upon him! 
 
 Prom the south came the news that the Aiistrians 
 had surprised and captured (during the night of Septem- 
 ber 17-18) the garrison of Freiberg ; from the west he 
 
GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ 225 
 
 heard that Merseburg, with a garrison of 1,800 men, | 
 
 had surrendered to a partisan commando under Thiel- 1 
 
 maim and Mensdorf, and finally from Ney came the 
 
 report, premature though it happened to be, that Berna- 
 
 dotte with 80,000 men had crossed the Elbe at Rpsslau. 
 
 To add to all this, the condition of the French troops 
 
 was deplorable ; their rations had been cut down from 
 
 28 oz. of bread to 8 oz. (raised again, it is true, by the 
 
 successful introduction of the 15,000 cwt. of flour into! 
 
 Dresden to 24 oz.) ; but this supply was already beginning 
 
 to give out, and the district offered absolutely nothing 
 
 but potatoes. Meat had scarcely been seen for weeks, 
 
 and the jialf starved men , exposed to the inclement 
 
 weather nigLt aiter nightin rain^^sodden bivouacs, were 
 
 melting away by battalions. 
 
 Since the resumption of hostiliti es^ he_had„lpst^not 
 less than~T5O;OO0'mSi730O guns and a huge a mount ojl 
 war matmaiy^ Upwards of 50,000 sick and wounded 
 still crowdedTthe hospitals, wESoce^it was said only one 
 man in ten came out aUve ; but yet, notwithstanding 
 this accumulation of catastrophes, the iron wiU of this 
 extraordinary man would not bow to the inevitable 
 and sacrifice Dresden, although this city not only was 
 of no further military advantage to him, but on the 
 contrary was a source of gravest danger. And for this 
 reason. His foes had now approached so close on both 
 sides that he had no longer room to manoeuvre, and 
 all the time Bemadotte lay in his direct path to ultimate 
 victory, simply waiting to be destroyed. Here the 
 Ruler undoubtedly sacrificed strategy to the apparent 
 interests of his dynasty. 
 
 On September 21 Napoleon returned again to Dres- 
 
 
 
326 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 den, and on the 22nd, taking witli him his Guards, as 
 usual, he joined Macdonald, who still faced Bliicher, 
 and drove the latter back on the 23rd to the strong 
 position he had already prepared about Bautzen, where 
 this time it was apparent the old fellow had deter- 
 mined to make a stand. But at this moment Ney sent 
 word that the Northern Army had thrown a bridge 
 over the Elbe at Wartenburg, close above Wittenberg, 
 and that he feared to be cut off both from Torgau and 
 Dresden. On receipt of this news (again a premature 
 report) the Emperor at length gave orders for a general 
 withdrawal of the whole of Macdonald's command to 
 the left bank of the Elbe, giving out that it was his 
 intention to afford them the few days' rest which they 
 so urgently needed. In accordance with this intention, 
 by September 27 the French Army occupied the follow- 
 ing positions : — 
 
 I. At Dresden (a) on the right bank of the Elbe — 
 
 XI Corps (Macdonald) at Weissig. 
 2nd Cavaby Corps (Sebastiani) at Pillnitz. 
 Ill Corps (Souham), Dresden and on the road 
 to Grossenhain. 
 (&) On the left bank of the Elbe— 
 
 V Corps (Lauriston) around Dresdea 
 The Guards, Dresden and Pirna. 
 
 II. Facing the Bohemian Army — 
 
 I Corps (Lobau) at Berggiesshiibel. 
 
 XIV Corps (St. Cyr). 43rd Division, Pirna and 
 Pillnitz. 42nd Division, Konigstein. 44th 
 and 45th Division, Borna and Dippoldiswalde. 
 
 II Corps (Victor) at Freiberg. 
 
GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ 227 
 
 VIII Corps (Poniatowski) and Ith Cavalry Corps 
 (KeUermann) at Waldheim. 
 
 III". Facing the North Army — , 
 
 IV Corps (Bertrand), Kemberg and ScMeesen. 
 VII Corps (Reynier) and 3rd Cavalry Corps 
 
 (Arighi). (exclusive Lorge's Division) in Dessau, 
 
 Worlitz and Oranienbaum. 
 
 IV. Covering the Elbe north of Dresden — 
 
 VI Corps (Marmont) between Meissen and 
 
 Wurzen. 
 1st Cavalry Corps (Latour) between Grossenhain, 
 
 Meissen and SchUdau. 
 5th Cavalry Corps (L'Heritier) at Meissen. 
 
 V. To guard the rearward connections — 
 
 2nd Guard Cavalry Division and Leipzig Corps 
 of Observation (Margaron) under the command 
 of Lefebvre-Desnouettes, at Altenberg. 
 
 Dombrowski's Division and Cavalry Division 
 (Lorge) on the march across the Mulde. 
 
 VI. On march to reinforce the Army — r 
 
 IX Corps (Augereau) from Wiirzburg towards 
 the Saar. 
 
 March Division (Lefol) from Erfurt to the Saale. 
 
 For the next few days the Emperor was fully occu- 
 pied in reorgamzmg the Army and, issuing instructions 
 for placi ng tKelbowns along his m§.ijj^ Hne qf^^reat in 
 a state"3~3 efence. Bridge heads w ct c ordered to be 
 con gtructed at al l i mportan t river passages, and all 
 sick and wounded were sent back towards France. 
 
 On September 27 a decree was published calling up 
 120,000 men of the contingents of 1812-11-10 who 
 had hitherto not been drawn as conscripts, and 160,000 
 
3a8 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 men of the contingent of 1815 were ordered to be 
 enrolled in advance. 
 
 In order to obtain more unity in the command of 
 the troops destined to confront the Bohemian Army, 
 the King of Naples (Murat) was ordered to take over 
 the II, V and "VTII Corps with the 5th Cavalry Corps, 
 and one Division of the 1st Cavalry Corps, and to estab- 
 lish his Headquarters at Freiberg. 
 
 If this disposition is carefully studied it will be seen 
 that it is in itself a masterpiece of defensive strate p jy . 
 for each wing is strong enough to resist, for a couple 
 o f days, any force which could reasonably be brought 
 against it, and in that time the strong central reserve 
 could support it with overwhelming numbers. 
 
 Unfortunatel y . -hbwever, i t ..suffered from one a;rave 
 defect, which nuUifi ed-JiILita-manx-adva ntages. viz., 
 the whole army was starving, and th£,ji]mLJM longer 
 possessed the physical s trp,i>)^t.h y.' ^h i/}}i.i/'.h, j^ meet their 
 E mperor' s demands. Yet there is no sign that the idea 
 of retreat had received serious consideration, for such 
 precautionary orders as had been issued are quite 
 insufficient to justify this interpretation.,, 
 
 In the meantime, the SUesian Army, 
 Movemente released from the pressure hitherto exercised 
 upon it by Macdonald's command, had been 
 quick to take advantage of its freedom for action. 
 Posting Sacken to watch Dresden in the vicinity of 
 Grossenhain, Bliicher had directed the whole of the 
 remainder of his forces by Kamenz-Liebenswerda towards 
 Wittenberg, hoping by his presence to drag the Crown 
 Prince of Sweden into activity. 
 
 As already pointed out above, the relations between 
 
GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ 229 
 
 the two commands had been none of the best, and 
 neither Gneisenau nor Bliicher had recognized the ex- 
 treme danger of Bernadotte's position, hence they 
 seem to have been quite unprepared for the cordial 
 reception their proposals evoked from him. In the 
 SUesian Army itself the idea of undertaking this dan- 
 gerous flank march across Napoleon's front, and aban- 
 doning aU their communications, evoked the hvehest 
 anxiety. The Russian Commissary-General, Count 
 Thuyl, protested solemnly, and demanded that the 
 proposed plan should be submitted to a council of all 
 the Generals in the command, but Bliicher here showed 
 the firmness of his character, and dismissed the suggestion 
 with an absolute refusal to hold any council of war. 
 The risk was extreme, and he knew it ; but since the 
 Bohemian Army could not make up its collective mind, 
 and Bernadotte alone was powerless to move, he deter- 
 mined to assert his initiative, and to drag the whole three 
 Armies into motion by the force of accomplished facts. 
 He was precisely one of those strong men who do 
 not hesitate to recognize bed-rock facts, and chief 
 amongst these is the truth that communications were 
 made for Armies, not Armies for communications, and 
 an Army with its own country behind it can never be 
 severed from a base, though that base need not neces- 
 sarily be the most convenient one. Well it was 
 for the cause of the Allies that at length such a man 
 had been found to compel them to act ; for the novelty 
 of the march was so far beyond anything that Napoleon 
 had ever anticipated from any one of his enemies, that 
 he was completely deceived as to its object when the 
 news reached him, which it did very promptly. 
 
230 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 He at once interpreted it as a preliminary to an attack 
 on Dresden from the. north-west, between Meissen and 
 Grossenhain, in order to avoid all the difficulties 
 of manoeuvring presented by the forest land towards 
 Bautzen, and whilst making depositions to deal with this 
 threat, he allowed Bliicher to continue his march undis- 
 turbed, with the result that on October 2 the Silesian 
 Army had concentrated in the immediate vicinity of 
 Wartenburg, and had begun preparations to force the 
 passage of the Elbe at that point. 
 
 The attention of the French had abeady been directed 
 to this spot by an attempt at a crossing made by de- 
 tachments of the North Army on September 20, and 
 Bertrand had provided abundantly, as he thought, 
 for its defence. But though an engineer, he had for- 
 gotten to consult the levels of the river, and had not 
 reaUzed that a fall of a couple of feet might render his 
 position untenable. 
 
 The Prussians, though in their own country, seem 
 to have been equally, or indeed more, ignorant of the 
 nature of the ground. They had selected the point 
 of passage from the best map available (a v^y bad one), 
 and on paper it appeared to present all the most desirable 
 conditions for a river crossing, viz., a great re-entrant 
 bend towards their side (the north), bushes and trees 
 to mask operatioiis, and a convenient tributary (the 
 Elster) ^ in which to collect their material. But the 
 surface within the re-entrant was completely hidden 
 from view by dense undergrowth, and the existence of 
 an old branch of the river, only fordable with difficulty 
 
 ^ ^ot to be ooufoxinded with the " Elster " at Leipzig. 
 
GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ 231 
 
 at a couple of points, seems to have been quite unknown 
 to them. It was on the existence of this old river- 
 bed that Bertrand relied ; he had personally recon- 
 noitred the ground in the spring, and believed it to 
 be quite impassable. But he had not noticed that the 
 river itself was at the moment considerably lower than 
 usual. 
 
 - The Prussians, after several hours of desperate 
 fighting across it at close quarters, ultimately did find 
 unsuspected passages, and pouring through them with 
 both Cavalry and ArtiQery, by almost unequalled 
 efEorts (the result of a fighting spirit which would not 
 be denied) they turned the French right, defeated all 
 counter attacks by case fire and Cavalry charges, and 
 before nightfall were complete masters of the enemy's 
 position. 
 
 Tactical details are beyond the scope of this present 
 work, but the extraordinary tenacity of purpose these 
 troops displayed requires to be brought out to show 
 how infinitely more important is the spirit with which 
 men fight them the forms in which they have heen trained^ 
 or the strategic relations of their fronts to one another. 
 
 The troops, line and Landwehr, side by side, had 
 been marching and fighting incessantly for six weeks, 
 alternately in advance and in retreat, and their priva- 
 tions had been most serious. Torek's Corps, to whom 
 the credit of the whole day belongs, had shrunk, not- 
 withstanding frequent reinforcements, from 38,484 to 
 .12.000 i n the morning of the battle, and of these 12,000, 
 1,600 were left on the field. But this loss does not 
 fairly indicate the strain actually endured by those 
 personally engaged at the decisive points of the fighting 
 
232 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 line, for in the densely wooded ground only the heads 
 of the columns could be hotly engaged ; but these 
 seem to have been shot away again and again, and it 
 was their absolute refusal to admit defeat that in the 
 end turned the scale in their favour. 
 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTEK VIII 
 
 Strength of French Army — End of September, 
 
 1813 
 
 (a) In and around Dresden — 
 
 Imperial Guard .... 
 
 XI Corps. MacdonaJd . 
 
 I Corps. Lobau . 
 
 XIV Corps. St. Cyr . . . . 
 
 2nd Cavalry Corps. Sebastiani . 
 
 (6) Along the Elbe, Strehla to Meissen — 
 
 III Crops. Souham 
 
 (c) On the Mulde, Eilenburg to Bitterfeld — 
 
 IV Corps. Bertrand . 
 VII Corps. Reynier .... 
 Dombrowski's Cavalry Division 
 Detachment. 3rd Cavalry Corps. . 
 
 VI Corps. Marmont 
 
 1st Cavalry Corps. Latour Maubourg (less 
 
 Berckheim's Division) 
 
 (d) Between Altenberg and Freiberg — 
 
 II Corps. Victor 16,000 
 
 V Corps. Lauriston . 
 
 VIII Corps. Poniatowski . 
 
 4th Cavaby Corps 3,000 
 
 Berckheim's Division from 1st Cavalry 
 Corps ... .... 
 
 Men. 
 
 44,000 
 25,000 
 12,500 
 28,000 
 6.800 
 
 Guns. 
 202 
 68 
 47 
 60 
 12 
 
 116,300 
 
 389 
 
 15,000 
 
 61 
 
 15,500 
 
 22,000 
 
 3,600 
 
 2,500 
 
 22,500 
 
 32 
 
 48 
 8 
 6 
 
 82 
 
 6,000 
 
 27 
 
 71,700 
 
 203 
 
 16,000 
 
 14,200 
 
 6,900 
 
 3,000 
 
 66 
 63 
 30 
 12 
 
 1,000 
 
 6 
 
 43,550 
 
 156 
 
234 APPENDIX 
 
 (e) In and aroimd Leipzig — 
 
 Corps of Observation under General Mar- Men. Guns. 
 
 garon 6,700 16 
 
 Cavalry Division. Lorge 1,500 6 
 
 7,200 22 
 
 {/) Between Weissenfels and Naumburg — ^ 
 
 A mixed Cavalry Corps under Lefebvre- 
 
 Desnouettes 6,000 6 
 
 (g) On the march to Leipzig — 
 
 IX Corps. Augerean 9,200 64 
 
 Cavalry Division. Milhaud .... 3,500 — 
 
 12,700 14 
 
 Grand total . . 256,000 men, 784 guns. 
 
LEIPZIG 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 Leipzig 
 
 Whilst the Silesian Army completed the passage of 
 the Elbe at Wartenburg, Bernadotte with the North 
 Army crossed some twenty miles lower down at Rosslau. 
 The two Armies were thus within easy supporting dis- 
 tance of each other, and together constituted a fairly 
 formidable fighting force of about 150,000 men. The 
 Bohemian Army could still put 180,000 in the field, and 
 Napoleon at Dresden lay midway between them with — 
 including reinforcements — about 260,000. From a purely 
 mihtary standpoint, theref orej iis-s ituationhad not been 
 altered for the wo rse^ since he no longer had three 
 separate forces to contend against ; and by continuing to 
 play the game of " interior lines " he could still mass 
 a numerical superiority against either of the Allied 
 enemies, sufficient at least to ensure a victory under 
 t normal conditions ; but absolutely overwhelming when 
 multiplied in fighting power by the magnetism of his 
 personal presence and command. 
 
 The catastrophe of Leipzig, however, was so_ com- 
 plete and dramatic, and its final cau ses were so obvious, 
 that post erity has invariably treajted the subiejBt. a.s Jf 
 theendmu glhaye JjfifiILa§.i!le^fejI!d£?^tP *i&,,a£^ 
 
 237- 
 
238 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 ia it then as it is to us no w ; and instead of seeing in-the 
 Emperor a great General playing his part, stiU with 
 absolute confidence in bis final tr ium ph , it has insisted 
 on regarding him as a hunted animal trying to evade 
 the toils of its trappers, and it has magnified every 
 little incident which has seemed to intensify the animal's 
 J* sufferings. 
 
 Viewed from this standpoint, it is indeed easy to 
 pick holes in Napoleon's strategy ; for his blindness 
 and his hesitation to seize the ^gjiy chances of escape 
 which the blunders of the AlUespcovid:ed lor him, 
 become quite unaccountable. But when we picture 
 the Emperor to ourselves as stiU supremely conscious 
 of his own superiority over his opponents, one can only 
 marvel at the fertility of resource, and the unswerving 
 confidence in his Army and in its marching and fightiag 
 powers which he maintained under the most depressing 
 surroundings. 
 Defects of ^0^1 his point of view his position at 
 
 Dresden Dresden had become intolerable only be- 
 
 Position pause he could not get at his enemies to 
 smash them utterly. 
 
 The Bohemian Mountains formed no suitable setting 
 for a great tactical decision, but once he could temntthe 
 Bohemian Army out into the plains he knew them to 
 be far too slow to evade the consequences of his deter- 
 mined onslaught. On receiving the news of the passage 
 of the Elbe, on the night of October 4, he at once issued 
 orders for the troops about Dresden to march next 
 day towards Meissen, placing the XI, VI and III Corps, 
 together with the 3rd Cavalry Corps, provisionally 
 under Ney's command. He then prepared to follow 
 
LEIPZIG 239 
 
 himself at the head of the Guards, the XI Corps, and 
 2nd Cavaby Corps next morning (October 7). 
 
 His general idea is best expressed in the following 
 letter to Marmont : — 
 
 " I shall be this evening with 80,000 men 
 ^!^g^,® in Meissen ; my advance guard at the cross 
 roads from Leipzig and Torgau, and I 
 shall decide "upon which to choose according to 
 the reports I receive. ... I intend to move to 
 Torgau and from thence down the right bank of 
 the Elbe in order to cut the enemy off and seize 
 all his bridges without the necessity of attacking his 
 bridge heads. An advance down the left bank would 
 have the inconvenience that the enemy might retreat 
 across the river and thus avoid the battle. In that 
 case one certainly might debouch by Wittenberg. 
 But as the enemy still holds the initiative I shall only 
 decide when I learn the situation to-night." 
 
 As regards the fate of Dresden, the Emperor hesitated 
 for some time. On the afternoon of October 6, he sent 
 for St. Cyr and instructed him to take conmiand of 
 the I and XIV Corps in order to defend it. About 
 midnight , however, he sent for him again and told him 
 he had changed his mind. " I shall fight a battle, 
 without doubt," he said. " If I win I shall regret not 
 having all my troops at hand. If I lose, then if I 
 leave you here, you will have been of no use to me, and 
 you will be hopelessly lost. After aU, of what advan- 
 tage is Dresden to me now ? The place can no longer 
 form the pivot of our operations, the district is too com- 
 pletely cleaned out to feed an Army. . . , Once 
 
240 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 the Elbe js frozen over it ceases to form an obs tacle, 
 1 wiU choose another position^ my right oii Erfmrt, 
 centre along the Saale, the left on Magdeburg. It is 
 a big, strong fortress which one can leave to itself as 
 often as one chooses without fear that the enemy can 
 carry it by a surprise assault." Then, after dwelling 
 in detail on the difficulties of fortifying Dresden, he 
 continued : " Dresden is too near the mountains ; 
 as soon as I make the smallest movement from this 
 town against the enemy's Army, it steps back again 
 under their cover, as it has only a short way to go, and 
 I have no means of cutting it ofE, as I cannot get behind 
 it." 
 
 The result of this conversation was drafted into the 
 form of an order, and next morning St. Cyr set about 
 evacuating his advanced positions, not without severe 
 fighting. Later in t he day he recdyed a counter-order 
 from the Emperor, dated 10 a.m. (October 7), instructing 
 him to remain in his position, as he had decided not to 
 give up Dresden after all. 
 
 Probably no orders duang. the whole co urse of the 
 campaign ^h aye evoked mor£.cri|;icismihaji -the above. 
 St. Cyr, in his Memoirs, has dealt with them at length, 
 describing in detail the Emperor's manner on the several 
 occasions, and it is indeed difficult to explain away the 
 obvious vacillation they betray. But if one endeavours 
 to focus^the position from the Emperor 's standpoint 6t 
 certain victory, and remember the. many ^lgjj3a.seething 
 in his mind as to his future conduct in that event, such 
 as the occupation of Berlin, and the rehef of the Oder 
 garrisons ; or a descent on the rear of the Bohemian 
 Army should it venture forth into the Saxon plains, his 
 
LEIPZIG 241 
 
 motive becomes clearer. It is certain that the concen- 
 tration of every available man, horse, and gun on the 
 decisive point is a sound fundamental principle, but 
 just as no engineer t hinks of putting more metal into a 
 bridge than is nece ssary to nqjeet the maximvim strain 
 which experience" shows can be brought to bear upon 
 it, so a General, when obviously he has made sufficient 
 provision for every emergency, is justified in employing 
 the excess of his forces elsewhere. This is more especi- 
 ally the case since the actual striking power of an Army 
 does not increase in direct proportion with its numbers, 
 but may on the contrary lose by them, particularly 
 where, as in this instance, the troops had to live on the 
 district they traversed, and the roads were few and 
 very indifferent. /5\, 
 
 As the Emperor only estimated the combined j^aaa.^"^ 
 of the Silesian and Northern Armies at 100.000 men 
 ^a 20 per cent, under-estima te, a s a m atter of fact), he, 
 waa ^ surely justified Jji bglieying^^that with_himself and 
 160.000 mP Ti he h^,d made sufficient provision f or_all_ 
 possible contingencies . Bernadotte, as we shall presently 
 see, considered them more than ample. 
 
 Meanwhile, Bliicher and Bernadotte after 
 
 B^wnadolrte ^^^"^ passage across the Elbe, determined 
 
 to march upon Leipzig, with a view to 
 
 facilitating the exit of the Bohemian Army into the 
 
 plains by diverting to themselves Napoleon's attention. 
 In pursuance of this plan the Silesian Army was 
 to reach the vicinity of Diiben on October 8, and 
 both Headquarters together were to enter Leipzig on 
 the 9th. Following out these orders, Sacken reached 
 Eilenburg, Langeron Diiben, and Yorck Miihlbach. 
 
 R 
 
242 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 But the main body of the North Army, for some 
 unexplained reason, remained halted at Jessnitz ; 
 and alarmed by a rumour of the approach of a 
 French Corps from the direction of Magdeburg, Bema- 
 dotte sent back a strong force to guard his bridges at 
 Eosslau. The whole Army was thus distaibuifidjQyer_a_ 
 d^th_of some forty miles, needing^ two ^^ole^daysto 
 close on its front for action. Notwithstanding the 
 fact that they were operating iri a friendly country, and 
 possessed a great superiority in Cavalry, their knowled ge 
 of^ the French position was most vague. It was not 
 until late in the afternoon, when the news reached them 
 that the Emperor had left Dresden taking the road to 
 Leipzig, whither a very large force had preceded him, 
 that the full danger of the situation dawned upon the 
 AUies. The extent of this danger may be best estimated 
 from the accompanying map, which shows on the even- 
 ing of October 8, 22 Infantry Divisions and 12 Cavalry 
 Divisions, in all 150,000 _m^ closely concentrated 
 under the Emperor himself, who was actually drafting^ 
 the orders for the battle which he confidently expected 
 to fight near Diiben next morning. « 
 
 During the previous days the Headquarters of the 
 two Armies had discussed, on paper and verbally, the 
 measures to be adopted in every emergency ; and in the 
 particular one that had now arisen, Bliicher was to fall 
 back on Wartenburg, whilst Bernadotte attacked the 
 advancing French in flank. A proceeding which would, 
 in fact, have resulted in the complete destruction of 
 both Generals, for the Emperor in his battalion carree 
 formation was safe from anything which the North 
 Army might attempt against him. But Bliicher's 
 
LEIPZIG 243 
 
 obstinacy saved him from this pitfall. He was abso- 
 lutely determined not to retreat, and his Staff knew it 
 was impossible to move him ; so using this knowledge 
 as a fulcrum, they managed to open a door for escape. 
 
 In any event, the closest co-operation with Bernadotte 
 was indispensable. Fortunately, it was common know- 
 ledge that Bernadotte had been most averse to the 
 movement on Leipzig, and had strongly advocated the 
 occupation of a defensive position behind the Saale. 
 
 Accordingly, an officer of theGeneral Staff, Major Riihle 
 von Lihenstein, was sent to Bernadotte by the Silesian 
 Headquarters to give him the latest intelUgence, and to 
 suggest a recurrence to his previous plan of a position 
 on the Saale. The Staff officer arrived late at night, 
 and found the Crown Prince of Sweden in bed, but he 
 was nevertheless unmediately received, and duly made 
 his report. Bernadotte having heard it, expressed his 
 opinion that under the circumstances aU the rules of 
 War indicated an immediate retreat across the Elbe of 
 both Ajmies, in order to cover Berlin. Von Riihle 
 rephed that the Silesian Headquarters attached no 
 part icular Impocta nce to BerEnT"" The Russians had'" 
 burnt Moscow , and they~couH^ sa^^^^h^ capital 
 also. " further, that he knew for certain that Bliicher 
 would never consent to retreat, but would prefer to 
 withdraw behind the Saale and thence extend a hand 
 to the Bohemian Army. Asked by the Prince what 
 authority he could show in support of his position, he 
 rephed that he had none, except his intimate personal 
 knowledge of the character of his Chief. 
 
 Bernadotte appeared much struck with this asser- 
 tion, and he then proposed himself that both Armies 
 
244 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 should revert to the original plan of the Saale position. 
 It is suggested that in fact he believed Bliicher would 
 not dare to accept this responsibility. With this 
 message then von Riihle returned to his Headquarters. 
 Needless to say Bernadotte, if he really entertained 
 any such idea, was disappointed in the result. Bliicher 
 jumped at the offer, and forthwith the orders were 
 drafted which enabled the Silesian Army to escape 
 the blow which Napoleon had intended should fall 
 upon it, by sacrificing all its communications and 
 moving to its right, though not without some fighting 
 and a series of most fortunate accidents. 
 
 Had the French Cavalry been at aU eq ual t o ite duties, 
 the direction of Bllicher's march could "ha fdlyha/ve 
 escaped detectio n. But in fa^t jthe JH^mch^Arm^^lost 
 
 1 touch of its^adversary altogether, and Napoleon there- 
 lore had recourse to his favourite principle of marching 
 against the most vital point in the enemy's possession, 
 
 I in order to compel him to turn round and fight in its 
 
 I defence. 
 
 In 1806 this had been the roads to Berlin, in 1813 it 
 was again the roads to Berlin, but more particularly 
 
 ' th e bridge s which the^ Allies had thrown . .oyer „the 
 Elbe ; and throughout the 9th and lOth the French 
 pursued this general direction ; the Silesian Army 
 
 I continuing its movement to the Saale, and Bema- 
 
 i dotte's marching to join them in a very half-hearted 
 manner. 
 
 For October 11, the Emperor ordered Reynier (VII), 
 Macdonald (XI), Bertrand (IV) and Sebastiani's Cavalry 
 Corps to cross the river at Wittenberg, disperse the 
 Prussian Corps of observation before that place, and 
 
LEIPZIG 245 
 
 move down the right bank of the river to capture and 
 destroy all the bridges. This movement was to be 
 supported by Souham's Corps (III) directed towards 
 Dessau, and the Guards at Kemberg ; all the Cavalry 
 well to the front, and Marmont to remain behind in 
 support at Diiben, scouting towards Halle. ^ 
 
 These orders, h owever, receivedLYery partial execu- \ 
 tion. The weather had again set in very wet, and the 
 exhausted half-starved troops were quite incapable 
 of reaching their assigned destinations, while the infor- 
 mation they collected j)roved insufficient to establish 
 with any certainty the whereabouts of their enemy's 
 main body. 
 
 Napoleon therefore directed the movement to be 
 continued on the following day, and for himself re- 
 mained in Diiben, impatiently awaiting further inteUi- 
 gence. 
 
 If we revert to the ugual standpoint of criticism and^ 
 imafflne the Emp eror as endeavo uring to find a loophole. 
 of. escape, his . appa rent he8itatioja._ait_^s point can 
 easily be construed into aryj etY, afft^, vacillatiop. The 
 road for escape to Magdeburg down the right bank of the 
 Elbe was absolutely open, and the enemy's parks, nules 
 of which were seen by the advanced parties moving 
 along the roads, guaranteed his subsistence, whUst 
 Murat was free to retire at any moment either by 
 Torgau or Wittenberg. Why then should he hesitate, 
 or show any anxiety ? But if we co nceive him as 
 
 b^it_jonsecuring_j;_jrea^_2^^SiIl^li££^^' ^* ^ 
 quite clear that the strain upon his patience must 
 have been immense, and sufficient to justify a 
 certain shortness of temper. For now the idea was 
 
246 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 growing within Mm that a far bigg er^game than the 
 mere destruction of the_ Notj^ctq ^Mid^ SU^aa.. ,Armi^__ 
 was opening out for him. 
 
 , A^ance at the ma p is sufficient t o show that th ese 
 two Arttiies lay absolutely at his mercy . Taiientzien's 
 force at Dessau had been driven over the Elbe in such 
 disorder, that, in fact, it never rallied imtil it reached 
 Berlin, ninety miles away, and a concentric advance of 
 all his available forces must have placed Blucher and 
 Bernadotte, wherever they stood, in an impossible 
 position. But meanwhile to the southward, the 
 Bohemian Army had at length left the shelter of the 
 mountains for the plains and with every hour were 
 laying themselves more and more open to his attack. 
 
 Instead of following boldly in the footsteps of the 
 Emperor's forces, and taking Torgau and Wurzen as 
 their points of direction — in which case Napoleon 
 might have found himself between two fires — ^they had 
 moved to their left via Chemnitz and Altenberg, in 
 order to avoid any risk of an offensive return on the 
 part of the Emperor, and were nearing Naumburg on the 
 Saale. Their right, on the night of the 12th, actually 
 rested on Chemnitz, so that there was a great gap open 
 to Napoleon's attack between that place and the moun- 
 tains, and their direct communications with Bohemia 
 were completely uncovered.^ 
 
 MuTfl it; had hit herto easilv J ifiLL -his opponents i n 
 check, and if N apoleon jio?Lix)in&dJiitn--3Bdt] i his who le_ 
 
 ^ Actually the danger was not so grave as It appears. For some 
 weeks negotiations had been in progress between Austria and 
 Bavaria, and on October 8, the latter had agreed to join the AUies 
 with all her forces'^ a retreat to the Danube through Bavaria was 
 therefore always open to the Bohemian Army, but this was still 
 unknown to Napoleon. 
 
LEIPZIG I247 
 
 Army, he could count upon bringing 200,000 men on^ 
 to the battlefield, a ,_lfflafiI^$£ih,und&:cJbe Emperor's^^ 
 comniand , were mQLeJ;han^miffidgnt_to^ensuxe success. 
 
 Defeat of the Bohemian Army would almost certainly j 
 entail the break-up of the whole Alliance and a peace I 
 on terms of his own dictation. Under such conditions, 
 the idea of safety for his own line of retreat must almost 
 have seemed superfluous to Napoleon, yet since he still 
 held Dresden, Meissen, Torgau and Wittenberg, with 
 the resources of the Oder fortresses and Berlin behind 
 him, his situation even in the event of defeat, could 
 hardly have appeared desperate in his eyes, and one 
 can easily understand both his impatience at the delay 
 until all necessary information for the carrying out 
 of his resolution was in his hands. At the same time f 
 the vein of optimism that runs through all his_ corres- 1 
 pondence of the day is equally easy to understand. 
 
 The one doubt in his mind had been whether the 
 
 Bohenaia nArmy would jjve him ba ttle, and when at 
 length at 9.30 a.m. on October 12, a report from Murat 
 arrived, stating that the Austrians were actually advanc- 
 ing towards Leipzig, and not towards Naumburg, as he 
 had feared, his decision w asjag tantlyt aken, and Berthier 
 was instructed to prepare at once the necessary orders 
 for a general counter-march of the whole French Army. 
 , At 3.30 in the afternoon he wrote to 
 Concentra- Marmont a note which reveals his whole 
 tion on jine of thought. "We have captured the 
 enemy's bridges over the Elbe and it 
 appears that Bernadotte's Apmy has retreated to the 
 right bank. On the other side, the King of Naples 
 is at Crobern in a position which I have ordered him to 
 
248 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 hold all the 13tli. My intention is that whilst the 
 King holds this position, you should march off at 3 a.m. 
 to-morrow and take up a position on the Diiben road 
 with your left on Taucha. I am coming from Diiben 
 with the Old Guard to join you, andCurial's andLef^bvre's 
 Divisions are coming from EUenburg, so that to-morrow 
 about noon, we can unite 70,000 men about Leipzig. 
 My whole Army will be concentrated on the 14th, and 
 I shall give battle to the enemy with 200,000 men." 
 
 Later in the day again, a doubt appears to have 
 
 crossed his mind whether Murat could hold his position 
 
 throughout the 13th ? But the only difference this 
 
 makes in his disposition is to induce him to select a 
 
 point of concentration on the Mulde nearer to his 
 
 hand, at which to halt his troops if the necessity should 
 
 arise, but a battle at all costs he is determined upon. 
 
 In the meahtitne the Silesian Army had 
 
 Army *" taken up its position about Halle on the 
 
 Saale, and the Northern Army lay some 
 
 fifteen miles further down the stream between Wettin 
 
 and Connern. The patrols of the SUesian Army 
 
 had joined hands with those of the Bohemian Army 
 
 and communication between the Headquarters was 
 
 regularly established. 
 
 Desert CTs from the French Army^ ^generally Saxons 
 or Wiirtemb ergers, kept Bliich er well informed_ofthe 
 French movements between Diibwi and Leipzig, but 
 Bernadotte appears only to have received alarmist 
 rumours from his bridges on the Elbe. 
 
 All through October 12, he had shown signs in his 
 correspondence with Bliicher of growing anxiety, and 
 when at length the news of Ney's attack on Dessau 
 
LEIPZIG 249 
 
 reached him, he completely lost his head and ordered 
 his own troops to concentrate forward on Cothen ; 
 that is to say, if the reports on which he acted were well 
 founded, he meant to commit the act of happy des- 
 patch, and at the same moment he wrote to Bliicher 
 to implore him to accompany him in this voluntary 
 suicide. 
 
 Bliicher, however, looked at the situation with far 
 greater coolness. If Bernadotte's information was 
 correct, it was clear that it was too late to retreat, and 
 the greater the number of troops~wEicE^Napoleon 
 had massed on the north, the fewer there must neces- 
 sarily be about Leipzig with Murat. The obvious plan, 
 therefore, was to join the Bohemian Army in crushing 
 the latter's forces. His (Bliicher's) commvmications 
 could look after themselves, for after aU he had eaten 
 up everything the country could contribute in the north 
 whilst the south had almost escaped the ravages of recent 
 War ; and his guns and muskets took the same ammuni- 
 tion as the Austrians, Bavarians and French. Leipzig 
 must fall into the hands of the AUies and was well known 
 to be well stocked with war material. 
 
 He lAierefore decided to continue his movement on 
 Leipzig, and meanwhile set in motion every conceivable 
 means of diplomatic pressure to induce the Crown Prince 
 to renounce the idea of retreat and join him in his 
 manoeuvre towards the Bohemian Army. 
 
 Whether the diplomatic pressure succeeded, or 
 whether the greater fear of being left to face Napoleon 
 single-handed prevailed, cannot now be decided, but 
 in the night Bernadotte changed his mind and ordered 
 his Army to follow and support Bliicher. But the 
 
250 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 delay had left them so far behind that his troops arrived 
 fair too late to render assistance in the desperate combat 
 of Mockern on the 16th. 
 
 j^^ As we have seen, on the night of October 
 
 Bohemian 12, the Bohemian Army lay with its right 
 
 ^""y in Chemnitz and its left on Altenberg, but 
 its advance, in spite of its extreme slowness (about six 
 miles a day), had been so badly regulated, that portions 
 of the troops were stUl far to the rear and a couple of 
 days at least were needed to concentrate it for action. 
 
 For October 13, Schwarzenberg had instructed the 
 leading units of his right wing to report to Wittgen- 
 stein in order to carry out a " forced " reconnaissance 
 towards Leipzig. Owing to the usual delays in the 
 circulation of orders, the troops did not reach their 
 allotted positions of readiness till 4 p.m., when it was too 
 late to carry out the proposed advance — a typical in- 
 stance of ^e hopeless_want of orga nization of the Staff 
 service _thr.o_ughout the whole campaign, and the direct 
 caus^^o f the extraordinary slow ness of aU its opera- 
 tfons. What prompted Schwarzenberg to this recon- 
 naissance is not quite clear, for long before- it could by 
 any possibility haye borne fruit, he issued orders for 
 the whole Army to continue its movement to the left, 
 towards Naumburg. • 
 
 This order, however, evoked a storm of opposition, 
 especially from the Prussians and Eussians, and such 
 pressure was brought to bear upon him that it was can- 
 celled, and in its place fresh instructions were drawn 
 up which poiuted to an advance on Leipzig. And 
 these rendered a battle inevitable. 
 
 As a preliminary Wittgenstein was directed to execute 
 
LEIPZIG ' 251 
 
 the postponed reconnaissance on the following morning 
 ' (14th), and out of this developed the sharp action of 
 Lisbertwolkwitz, notable for Murat's great Cavalry 
 charges in masses ; squadrons following one another 
 at six horses' length distance ; with which the more 
 mobile Cavalry of the Allies, in spite of want of unity 
 in the command, found no difficulty in deaUng.^ 
 
 Though the French Cavalry achieved nothing, their 
 Infantry held their ground without difficulty, and thus 
 Napoleon w as led into ta king up the positioii for the 
 ^ttle of thelGth , wh ich, it ha^ always seemed tojaie^ 
 was the^ pmnary cause of his failure, as the sequel will 
 show. 
 
 Schwarzen- "^^^ general result of the engagement 
 berg's Orders was SO far in favour of the AUies, that it 
 for Battle, ^gg^me practically impossible for their 
 Commander-in-Chief to avoid the battle, and the 
 whole of the 15th was spent in reconnoitring the ground 
 and preparing detailed orders for the attack. Rely- 
 ing on Langenau's local knowledge (as a Saxon 
 officer he was reputed to be intimately acquainted with 
 the ground) a first disposition was issued about noon, 
 which had the extraordinary effect of breaking up the 
 whole Allied Army into three commands ; separated 
 from one another by the unfordable streams of the 
 Pleisse and Elster, which converge in the suburbs of 
 Leipzig itself. 
 
 On the right a body of 72,000 men were to attack the 
 position held by Murat resting its left on the Pleisse ; 
 in the centre 52,000 were to operate in the marshy and 
 densely overgrown district between the Pleisse and the 
 
 ^ Murat had at his disposal on this day the newly-farmed 5th 
 Cavalry Corps (Pajol), which included Milhaud's Division of CniraBsiers 
 
252 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Elster, witli the intention of turning Murat's left which 
 lay in the village of Connewitz ; and 19,000 under Gyulai 
 were to attack the defile of Lindenau through which 
 ran the main road from Leipzig to the west. 
 
 The defects of this disposition were so glaringly 
 apparent that nearly the whole Eussian Staff, including 
 Barclay de ToUy, Diebitsch, ToU, and Jomini, approached 
 Schwarzenberg to induce him to modify it. All their 
 efforts, however, were in vain, and at length in despair 
 they sought the Emperor Alexander and laid the matter 
 before him ; in no measured language it would seem, 
 for Jomini went so far as to say that " one would imagine 
 Napoleon must have dictated it in order to procure for ' 
 himself the most decisive victory possible " (Friedrichs, 
 vol. iii, 11). 
 
 The Emperor Alexander, " surprised beyond measure 
 at this unanimity between his Generals " (ibid) requested 
 Schwarzenberg's attendance, and endeavoured to induce 
 him to modify his "plan. Even this was in vain, until 
 at length the Emperor ended the interview by announc- 
 ing his determination to dispose of all the Eussian 
 troops as he chose, which of course rendered an altera- 
 tion of the plan inevitable. The Eusso-Prussian 
 Guards were withdrawn from the central command "to 
 Eotha, nearly ten nules from the probable battlefield, 
 so that the possibihty at least existed of bringing up the 
 right wing during the course of the battle to 96,000 men, 
 
 from Spain, the 4th Cavahy Corps (Kellermann), Berkheim's 
 Division of the ist Cavaky Corps and a Polish Cuirassier Regiment — 
 in all 75 squadrons =8,550 horses. Against these the Allies 
 could only oppose 34 squadrons = 4,000 horses until late in 
 the afternoon, when another 15 squadrons, about 1,570 strong, 
 appeared on the field. (Friedrichs iii, p. 454). 
 
LEIPZIG 253 
 
 still far too few to encounter, with reasonable hope of 
 success, 150,000 men under Napoleon in person. 
 
 The latter had hoped, as already pointed out, to have 
 his troops in hand for an attack on this very day (15th) 
 when under the circumstances success was, humanly 
 speaking, assured ; but, as already on several occasions 
 during this campaign, hehadovCT-estimatedth^ 
 JBg powers of his men, most materially . The weather 
 had been bad, th e road s almost bottomless seasof^mud, 
 and it had been imposable for the troops to reach their 
 destinations in time. Nevertheless, bringing the Guards 
 with him, the Emperor reached Leipzig about noon, and 
 the cheers with which he was greeted carried the news 
 of his arrival to the enemy's Headquarters, as once 
 before at Dresden. 
 
 Viewed by the hght of subsequent events, Schwarzen- 
 berg's conduct appears almost imbecile, yet, as we have 
 seen, he had been selected by the almost unanimous 
 consent of his contemporaries, indeed by the judgment 
 of Napoleon himself, as a man of the greatest promise, 
 and the only one possible under the circumstances for 
 his position. Of his absolutely single-minded devotion 
 to his duty the following letter, written by him to his 
 wife after the stormy scenes of this day, is sufficient 
 testimony : — 
 
 " When I look out of my window at the almost 
 innumerable camp fires spread out around me, when 
 I reflect that opposed to me stands the greatest Leader of 
 our times, one of the greatest of all times indeed, then, 
 my dearest, I must confess to you that my shoulders 
 seem not strong enough to bear the load. But when I 
 look up to the stars and remember that He who guides 
 
234 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 them in their courses has also pre-determined my 
 career, if it is His will that the just cause, and I hold 
 GUIS to be just, should conquer, then He will enlighten 
 my conduct and give me strength. If He wills that we 
 go imder, my personal misfortune will only be the least 
 of the sad consequences. If I survive defeat, I know 
 I shall not on that account, my darling, seem of less 
 account in your dear eyes. In either case, I have long 
 since conquered my own ambition and egotism, and 
 the judgment of the world will neither punish or reward 
 me." 1 
 
 This letter at least rings true, and only a great char- 
 acter in the best sense could have written it, and one 
 hardly knows which to admire most, the character 
 which could write it, or the wife to whom it was written. 
 When such a man fails one must look far deeper 
 into the chain of cause and effect to find the reason 
 than it is possible to do here. Briefly, it may be 
 said Napoleon controlled his times, Schwarzenberg was 
 controlled by them ; but the former only obtained his 
 chance when the cohesion of society had been practically 
 dissolved. How he would have fared^ under more 
 stable surroundings such as those in which Schwarzen- 
 berg found himself entangled must remain an enigma 
 for all time. 
 
 When the final Army order reached 
 
 Leipzig* Wittgenstein, in chief command of the 
 whole right wing, he proceeded to dis- 
 tribute his available force into five columns of 
 unequal strength, in which all the existing commands 
 
 ' Friedriohs quotes this from Theelen's Erinnerungen aus dem 
 Kriegsleben eines 82, jahrigen Veteranen, 
 
LEIPZIG 255 
 
 were ignored. Russian Divisions and Prussian Bri- 
 gadeSj even Regiments, were distributed about on no 
 system at all ; and though it was impossible for his 
 command to be concentrated within itself before noon, 
 he ordered the leading detachments to commence the 
 attack at 7 a.m., which meant a break up of their 
 bivouacs long before daylight. Yet it seems quite 
 possible that this typical piece of bad Staff management 
 was really the most important factor in the day's success, 
 for it took the French bY -Sarprise at a time when the 
 Emperor had not yet completed his arrangements for 
 the battle ; and though nowadays it is impossible to 
 trace in fuU detail the exact sequence of cause and 
 effect, the best relations of the battle seem to reveal 
 from the outset a want of co-ordination in its direction, 
 unusual where Napoleon was present in person. 
 
 From the Emperor's instructions to Berthier, given 
 out in the early morning of the 16th, it is clear that he 
 meant to hold the direct attack of the Bohemian Army 
 with Murat's command, viz.^ the V, II, and VIII Corps, 
 together with the 4th Cavalry Corps, on the line Con- 
 newitz-Liebertwolkwitz, whilst the IX and XI Corps 
 with the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Cavalry. Corps, pivoting on 
 Liebertwolkwitz, swung in on the right of the Allies ; 
 and the Guards, VI and III Corps, and 3rd Cavalry 
 Corps were to give the decision out of the centre, when 
 " the battle was ripe." Altogether he had about 160,000. 
 men, with 600 guns, against the 96,000 troops of the 
 Allies, which as we have seen could only be engaged in 
 succession, and not handled as a imited whole. 
 
 But at the moment the attack began the XI Corps 
 had not reached its position, and both the III and VI 
 
256 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Corps found themselves held by the advance of the 
 Prussians from the direction of Schlanditz, a possibility 
 for which the Emperor had not made sufficient allowance. 
 
 However, the first rush of the Allies was easily repulsed ; 
 but, quite at variance with their usual custom, the 
 repulsed troops refused to run away, and holding on 
 to such cover as the ground afforded, they formed 
 rallying points on which their reinforcements actually 
 hastening to the roar of the guns formed in succession 
 as they arrived. The accounts of this read exactly 
 like those of the early battles of 1870 ; each detachment 
 independently forcing its way to the front, with the 
 superior Commanders in rear exerting no further influ- 
 ence on the troops engaged, except through such fresh 
 troops as they could find to throw into the combat. 
 
 At length, about 11 a.m., Macdonald's Corps (XI) 
 reached its preliminary position, initiated its turning 
 movement, and about 2p.m., its attack having sufficiently 
 developed, the Emperor ordered the whole line of Corps 
 to advance ; and Drouot \;ithj8 4 gu^ out to 
 
 clear the way for Mortier and the Guards with case 
 shot. But at this moment the _uiif oje seen arrived., 
 GenBraIJBQE!iesoulle^_TO 
 
 CuirasgifirBJiiJ.8 Sauadions^ suddeiil y decided to launch 
 hiswhiQle.lQrce against a great Eussian batte ry from 
 whose fire the leading columns of the French Infantry 
 were suffering severely. The attack was most gallantly 
 ridden, and 26 guns_haiLi>fieQ -Put out of action, when 
 from aU jides_thej^ivaJr^ of the Allies, by Brigades, 
 Regiments, or even Squadrons, just as they came to hand, 
 bore down upon the blown and disordered Squadrons 
 of Bordesoulle's command. Then in turn, to rescue 
 
LEIPZIG 257 
 
 their comrades, all the remaining availahle Squadrons 
 on the French side rode down into the wMee which 
 speedily formed. The confusion which ensued h^s ., 
 ^affled_all attempts at analysis; but, bri^l^, for 
 about an hour and a haljjSir Eordes of horsemen wpre 
 hurled at one ano ther, rallying and charging again and 
 again and completely masking the fire of the guns 
 on either side, and thus preventing their further 
 advance. But when at last the tur moil ceased, the 
 French opportuni ty wa s lost , the Russian ancTKosaan 
 Guards had arrived on the scene, had occupied 
 villages, woods and coppices, and against these fresh 
 troops under cover, the French case fire could achieve 
 nothing. Step by step the French fell back, and as 
 darkness put an end to the fighting, they had been 
 driven back to the Umits of the position they had held 
 in the morning. 
 
 The attack of the Austrians on the bridge at 
 Connewitz had effected absolutely nothing, and thus 
 it came to pass that at length Napoleon on a field 
 of his own choice, with odds of nearly two to one in 
 his favour, had been beaten by the sheer obstinate 
 devotion to their cause of his individual en-emies, and 
 not at aU by the skiU of their leaders 
 
 Thus failed one of the greatest, if not the greatest 
 
 strategical conception i n history ; for had it succeeded 
 Napoleon'ssuccessmust have been final and irreyoMHe. 
 Nothing the Silesian Army could have achieved on the 
 other extremity of the battlefield could have altered the 
 final resvdt, and the Austrian centre columns between 
 the Pleisse and Elster could not conceivably have 
 extricated themselves from their hopeless predicament. 
 
258 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 The cause of this i ncredib le failiiTP . deserves more than 
 a passing notice, in its" simplest form it was merely" 
 this, the men of the Allied armies were wrought up to a 
 white heat of patriotic enthusiasm, fanned by the spirit 
 of revenge, and increased by the reaction throughout 
 aU the junior ranks against the apparently hopeless in- 
 competence of their Commanders.^ The French had 
 fought for the honour of their arms and the personal 
 devotion of their chiefs for their great Leader ; but the 
 hearts of the men in the ranks were not really in their 
 ^ work, for over-fatigue and privation had broken their 
 spirits . 
 
 Still, the French Army, though it had failed, was not 
 beaten, as the events of the next forty-eight hours were 
 to prove. 
 
 The night which followed the battle of Leipzig was 
 one of terrible suffering for both sides. The opposing 
 forces lay so close to one another that the utmost vigil- 
 ance was necessary, and the actual fighting lines practi- 
 cally stood watch and watch all through the hours of 
 darkness. There was no shelter for the wounded, who 
 had to be left where they fell, and, though it rained all 
 f~ nigh t, water except from the puddles in which men and 
 horses had _ bled to death was hardly obtainable. 
 
 Fire-wood, too, was so scarce that the men had to 
 
 Ti I underline the word " apparently " because in fact these men 
 were not incompetent but were experienced veterans, each of whom 
 knew more of battlefields than any living Europeans. They were 
 simply the victims of their surroundings, as were ours too often 
 in South Africa ; but harassed men, longing to get at their enemy, 
 never make allowances in these matters. This is the essential 
 reason why troops should be taught from time to time in large masses 
 and subjected to considierable marching privations. We. cann ot^ 
 er^loy bullets in manceuyres^Jajiwe can make t hings pret^ m iser- 
 
 aBKwitEouB'them. ~~~ — — """" 
 
 f.— • . 
 
LEIPZIG 259 
 
 break up and burn saddle-trees, broken muskets 
 and gun wheels, and the night was most bitterly 
 cold. Exact statistics of the losses on this day 
 are unattainable, but probably about 35,000 killed and 
 wounded cumbergd the ground on w hich the fighting 
 had taken place, i.e., a strip about four miles long by 
 one wide , and Tarou ud the villages ^scenes of the_fiej;S^t 
 fighting) the dead la.y in swathes . Fortunately for 
 those who had been wounded at first, no quarter was 
 either asked or given, thus several thousands escaped 
 the most awful suffering, prolonged, in some cases, for 
 more than a week before they could be moved or help 
 be brought to them. 
 
 Napoleon had his tent pitched in the midst of his 
 Guards' bivouac, and here he spent a wakeful night, 
 while messenger after m esseng;er brought him tidings 
 containing nothing but evU. 
 
 Worst of all these' was the news of 
 
 Mdckern Marmont's defeat at Mockem— about four 
 miles north east of Leipzig. Marmont, on 
 the 14th, had been sent from Taucha by Napoleon with 
 a general mission, to keep the Silesian Army at 
 bay, whilst Ney's command filed into the town behind 
 him. Ney to support him, if necessary, as it was 
 of vital importance to ensure the arrival of all the 
 ammunition trains. On the morning of the 16th, the 
 V Corps had safely passed, the III Corps was in the act 
 of passing, and the VII was due during the early hours 
 of the afternoon. Napoleon had summoned both the 
 VT and III Corps to the main battlefield, believing 
 that distance alone would prevent the Silesian Army 
 from reaching the scene of action in time to take effective 
 
26o THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 part in it. Both Corps were actually moving in accor- 
 dance with this order, when such heavy masses of the 
 enemy appeared in sight that Marmont decided to 
 halt and face them, while Ney promised him the assis- 
 tance of the III Corps. Marmont deployed his men 
 across a low elevation of the ground, his left resting 
 on Mockern and his right on Klein Widderitzsch. Here 
 he was assailed by Torek's Corps and part of Sacken's, 
 whilst Langeron's followed in echelon on their left 
 rear. 
 
 The combat which ensued was most obstinate and 
 sanguinary. Mockern was taken and retaken over and 
 over again, and time after time the Prussians threw 
 themselves upon the French lines. At length came the 
 psychological moment. Marmont was moving his 
 last reserves into the line, when out of a cloud of powder 
 smoke a great mass of Prussian Cavalry suddenly charged 
 down upon their flank. Panic ensued and spread along 
 the position, which, attacked again by the Prussian 
 Infantry, was carried all along the hne. 
 
 Marmont left some 6,000 to 7,000 men on the ground, 
 and Torek's Infantry was reduced from 16,120 according 
 to the morning states of the 16th, to 9,000 at nightfall. 
 Langeron lost 1,500 men ; Sacken's troops only reached 
 the field at the last moment, and suffered less than 
 did the others. It was in this combat in particular 
 that the Prussian Landwehr won its enduring fame. 
 Hitherto they had given the old officers, accustomed to 
 the faultless march discipline which the regular troops 
 had inherited from the old Frederickian Aimy, reason 
 to complain bitterly of their conduct, and this un- 
 steadiness seems to have inspired mistrust of their fight- 
 
LEIPZIG 261 
 
 ing spirit. Hence they had rarely been given a 
 chance of showing what they could do when occasion 
 demanded a supreme efEort. On this day, however, 
 they exceeded all possible expectations ; and the example 
 they afforded is at present being freely cited by German 
 Socialists as an argument for still further reduction in 
 the time of service in the existing Army, and is being so 
 bitterly resented by the Regular Army, that even Major 
 Priedrichs is hardly fair to them in consequence. 
 
 Marmont's defeat certainly aggravated the dangers 
 of Napoleon's situation, and possibly had he_beenawaie 
 that a fresh Corps of R ussians under Bennin^sen^ 30.000 
 s/braa^, was in full march upon the Dresden-Leipzig 
 road to close the gap between the Parthe and the right 
 wing of the Allies, he might even then have reconsidered 
 his position and determined to break back to the north- 
 ward on Wittenberg and Dessau, by the same roads by 
 which he and Ney had just arrived. n 
 
 If Blucher and Bernadotte endeavoured to interpose, 
 his combined force could practically march out over 
 their bodies, for with nearly two to one odds in his 
 favour, victory must still have seemed almost a fore- 
 gone conclusion. Moreover, there was always the very 
 strong probability that Blucher and Bernadotte would 
 never venture on such a bold stroke, but would manoeuvre 
 to their right to join Gyulai in front of Lindenau. 
 Napoleon naturally believed this General to be still 
 in the position he had occupied during the day, he could 
 not know that Gyulai had been ordered to move across 
 to his right to join the Main Army, leaving the great 
 road to the Rhine practically open for the French 
 retreat. As far as the Emperor's knowledge ggtmded. 
 
26z THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 there was still ample ti me to crush the Bohemian_Aimy 
 first of aU , and his lin e of retre a t could not be seriousl y 
 compromised ,, for another . f or te-jeigbj^ours at leastT 
 It was probably this line of reasoning which led Napoleon 
 
 (;■ -n '- I '•■'■■' "•• ^ iiJfi - ■ mil I I II- ■ - — i i i fa i Hiiiiai iiiaii II i ■■ i I nil . il ii ii i iiiiiiii ' ' 
 
 to decide to renew the battle on the 18th. Meanwhil^ 
 probably to create divided counsel atttie Allied Head- 
 quarters, he endeavoured to reopen diplomatic relations 
 by a proposal to treat for peace, with the view of putting 
 a stop to further useless effusion of blood, for nobody 
 could be more humane than Napoleon when it suited 
 his purpose. 
 
 Thfr Allies, however, were in no humour to treat, and 
 with full knowledge of the near approach of Benningsen, 
 they closed their whole Army in on its right (thereby 
 •uncovering the road to the Ehine, as already mentioned), 
 and arranged with the Commanders of the North and 
 SUesian Armies that these two forces should march off 
 by their left, cross the Parthe, some five miles above 
 Leipzig, and join hands with Benningsen, when the 
 semicircle around the French would be completed, its 
 outer flanks resting on the Elster and Parthe respectively, 
 both being susceptible of easy defence. , 
 
 During the day, Bliicher also attacked the north-west 
 suburb of Leipzig (through which run the roads to Halle 
 and Diiben) in order to conceal.still further his ultimate 
 intentions. 
 
 Napoleon, on his part, formed up his Army in a semi- 
 circle, his left still on the Pleisse about Connewitz, his 
 centre at Probst Heyda, and his left thrown back 
 towards the Parthe, whose marshy banks appeared 
 impracticable for troops attacking from the north. 
 Very strong outposts still held the ridge on which the 
 
LEIPZIG 263 
 
 fighting of the previous day had taken place, thus the 
 dispositions of the French Army were entirely con- 
 cealed, and the main position had this further advan- 
 tage, that the Allies in advancing to the attack had, of 
 necessity, to disclose their masses to sight, and found 
 no sheltering woods or copses to conceal them as on 
 the 16th. 
 
 Ney held the command of the whole of the 
 
 Ortobt? "g^* ^^' ^^** °* *^® ^®^ ' Napoleon 
 himself with his Guards and Cavaby covered 
 the junction at the centre, and could move unim- 
 pededly to either flank as occasion required. Only 
 Bertrand (IV Corps) and the garrison of Leipzig were 
 absent from the battlefield, the former remaining to 
 cover the exit of the defile of Lindenau. 
 
 The exact strength of the French Army cannot now 
 be ascertained. Probably 160,000 men with about 
 650 guns stood in the ranks on the morning of the 18th, 
 and against this force the Allied Sovereigns disposed 
 of no fewer than 295,000 men with 1,500 guns, of which 
 some 100,000 never came into ac tion at aU. 
 
 It is impossible nowadays to trace in detail the 
 vicissitudes of the struggle which followed. The French 
 left and centre held their ground imtil the evening, 
 and the decision was given by the junction of the 
 SUesian and Northern Armies 'with Benningsen's 
 colunm, which took place about 2 p.m.^ 
 
 But Napoleon had already realized that further 
 resistance was useless ; his first orders initiating a retreat 
 
 ' About 2 p.m. also some 3,000 Saxons went over to the Allies 
 from the I^ench left. Much has been made of this incident in 
 popular histories, but in fact, it was quite insignificant, and exer- 
 cised no influence whatever on the course of the battle. 
 
264 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 by Lindenau had gone out at 11 a.m., and now fighting 
 was only continued to gain space for withdrawal. 
 \i He himself spent the night on the battlefield, ,_^ajelj- 
 ing a few minutes' sleep sitting upright„pQ, ^.P? ^^^^*^ 
 chair by the bivpu ao^ifae, surrounded by his StaflT" 
 About 5 a.m. a chance round shot struck the embers of 
 the fire, scattering the crowd. The Emperor woke up, 
 and continued at once dictating the necessary orders. 
 
 About 10 a^m. he rode through the town, and took 
 the road to the Rhine, moving through all the turmoil 
 with the same stem set face which his men had learnt 
 ' to know in the Russian retreat just a year before. 
 
 Eventually the AQies carried Leipzig by storm, and 
 owing to the premature destruction of the bridges a 
 large number of French prisoners fell into their hands ; 
 but of a pursuit in the real sense of the word there was 
 no indication, and in a few days the Emperor again 
 had in his hands a total force exceeding 80,000 com- 
 batants, with which he completely routed the attempt 
 made by a combined force of Austrians and Bavarians 
 (about 50,000 strong, under Wrede) to intercept his 
 retreat at Hanau. 
 
 Here we must leave him, whilst we try briefly 
 ^9. to formulate the lesson of this most extraordinary, ^ 
 and„ afmfeyMi(ri!?y most successful of his campaigns, for- 
 
 strategicaUv his concentration at Leipzig will ever remain 
 
 his masterpiece. laJua^arly campaigns he was h andling 
 
 little more than an Army Corps ; in 1814 again his 
 actual effec t ives mustered little more, a nd in both he " 
 was lesidi ng troops animated almost with f anaticism. 
 But in this great struggle in Qie Kaort oF an enemy's 
 country, miles away from his ultimate base, he controlled 
 
LEIPZIG 265 
 
 Aimies, he imparted to them his own spirit, and managed 
 even to make good the mistake s of his General sl But 
 the fighting which centred around Dresden marked the 
 limit of his powers, and it is interesting to note the 
 essential reason why it was so. If we compare the 
 conditions with which he had to contend from the 
 Armistice to the end of September, we find the same 
 enemies, the same masses of men, and the same subordi- 
 nate Commanders, only whereas the enemy had become, 
 bolder. Napoleon's men and officers had grown m ore 
 and more war w earv. the latter indeed were often des- 
 pondent, yet whereas in the earlier part of the campaign 
 his conduct is marked by painful indecision (never due, 
 by the way, to ignorance of his enemies' positions, 
 but to u i abihtv to .con teol, their iritentions) in .the 
 latter, once he had definitely decided to hold on to 
 Dresden, we find hiTn acting always with the fixed 
 determination to inflict upon his opponents the maximum 
 amount of punishment possible. As I have pointed 
 out above, critics hitherto, judg ing him by the fingj. 
 result, have insisted on regarding him as a hunted animal 
 seelsing a loophole of escape, whereas in fact his anxiety 
 for the future, in so far as any genuine feeling of the 
 kind can be proved to exist (see Friedrichs' comments 
 on Yorek von Wartenberg's account of events at Diiben) 
 was ahvays as to the magnitude of the resuU to he 
 achieved, and not its achievement, that, he believed to 
 be beyond question secured to his side. The, only 
 one essential difference between these two phases 
 of the war lies in the fact that about Dresden, force of 
 circumstances compelled him to adopt the def ei^ve^ 
 yhgreas in the end he was free to act as jssailant, and 
 
266 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 the measure of the advantage which the latter form 
 enjoys over the former can be measured by the startling 
 resuscitation of all his powers, once Bliicher's march to 
 join Bernadotte enabled him to change his r61e from 
 defender 'to that of aggressor. 
 
 It is clear that throughout the Dresden episode, from 
 the moment indeed that his memory failed him in the 
 middle of his letter to Vandamne on August 23, he 
 was no longer able to control events, and .^g _evidence 
 available for every day shows the gradual breakdown 
 of hisjgowCTS. The most elastic mind in the world, 
 Eowever, can scarcely throw off the effects of such severe 
 overstrain in forty-eight hours ; and his men and of&cers 
 could hardly thus easily shake off the depressing influ- 
 ences of hunger, useless exertion, and impending retreat. 
 Yet once he was at liberty to act as he chose, and to 
 dictate situations, he mastered the whole situation easily, 
 and if, as alleged, he appeared worried and impatient for 
 news when at Diiben, well ! any man who has ever been 
 compelled to face great odds and to play for really high 
 stakes can understand his frame of mind. 
 
 A further point brought out by this campaign is the 
 purely relative value attaching to communications. 
 Theoretically Napoleon's line was severed again and_ 
 again by organized raids made in considerable force, 
 but he never for one moment allowed these interruptions 
 to hinder his designs. Both Blucher's and Bernadotte's 
 communications lay open for nearly a month, and 
 those of the Bohemian Army for about a fortnight, yet 
 the Emperor simply disdained to strike at either, pre- 
 ferring to direct his blows at the Field Armies them- 
 selves. The curious thing to note is, that no decision 
 
LEIPZIG 267 
 
 became possible until jyractically all pa/rties had renounced 
 the iisual rules of the game, and then at last it fell to the 
 side which, according to all precedent, had placed itself 
 in the most unfavourable position conceivable. This 
 brings us to the root of the whole matter, and shows 
 beyond possibility of discussion wherein the Art of the 
 Leader really lies, viz., in the correct appreciation of the 
 relative fighting power of the opposing forces. Napoleon 
 lost the campaign of 1813, not becaiise Ms communica- 
 tions were cut (they were not), but because he underrated 
 the determination of the soldiers and subordinate officers 
 who opposed him. But when we recall how often he 
 had driven the long service veteran soldiers of all three 
 nations before him, this mistake is seen to be natural ; 
 and for that very reason it brings out more clearly the 
 necessity of studying the very soul of a Nation, and realizing 
 the difference that a really burning patriotism can make 
 in the efficiency of Us Army. 
 
 According to any peace time standard of efficiency 
 that can be conceived, these Prussian, Austrian and 
 Eussian levies must have appeared to their Generals 
 of the old school as the veriest rabble ; many of the 
 (ormer carried only extemporized pikes, and amongst 
 the latter even bows and arrows were still to be found, 
 and discipline in the old sense was so far to seek that 
 men left the colours casually for a week or two, returning 
 after a pleasant rest with their friends, quite ignorant 
 of the fact that they had rendered themselves liable to 
 the death penalty, which, of course, it was impossible 
 to enforce. 
 
 Away from the enemy, their conduct was sometimes 
 disgraceful. Tauentzien's men in the retreat to Berlin, 
 
268 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 about October 12, broke loose from all restraint, and- 
 plundered the villages and suburbs of their own people 
 like the veriest banditti. But then, we must remember 
 that they were more than half-starved and equally in- 
 sufficiently clad. Even in the Silesian Army, before 
 Bautzen, deserters from Prussian Cavalry Regiments 
 formed themselves into regular gangs of marauders, 
 waylaying and plundering in the wake of their Army, 
 whereas in the retreat from Jena, the old Prussian 
 soldiers did not even dare to break up a rail fence 
 for necessary firewood without permission. Yet, in 
 spite of all these departures from the narrow path, 
 and notwithstanding the fact that more than nine- 
 tenths of the whole were conscripts (and none too 
 willing ones either) these Armies, as a whole, endured an 
 almost unexampled strain. It was, of course, impossible, 
 in the space at my disposal, to enter into the daily 
 encounters in any detail, but the fact remains that 
 throughout the whole month of September, both the 
 Bohemian and Silesian Armies were fighting more or less 
 on every day. Sometimes in retreat, sometimes in 
 advance, and in encounters far exceeddng in severity the 
 so-called " disasters " of the Boer War. And all this 
 in the midst of privations and horrors of which the 
 present generation has very little or no idea. It was the 
 fighting backwards and forwards over the same ground, 
 and bivouacking night after night among the unburied 
 dead and uncared for wounded that was so frightful a 
 strain on the courage of the troops, especially the younger 
 men. Things were bad also in the French Army, but 
 in Napoleon's presence men fought with the certainty 
 of victory, and with such blind confidence in his leader- 
 
LEIPZIG 269 
 
 ship that a retreat seemed only a stepping stone to 
 fresh success ; but in the Bohemian Army there was 
 absolutely no confidence in the leading, and from the 
 Corps Commanders downwards men felt they were being 
 uselessly sacrificed. 
 
 Yet in face of the enemy these same men fought tUl 
 sixty per cent, of casualties in a battalion became quite a 
 comimon standard of loss, in spite of which the survivors 
 were ready to fall in and fight again the next morning ! 
 Undoubtedly it was this determination which finally 
 led to their national deliverance, and this standard 
 would, I submit, have been sooner attained, had the level 
 of general iintelligence and 'patrwitis'm, been sufjicienily 
 high to have brought the whole of the troops to the colours 
 without compulsion. 
 
 It must be remembered that very few indeed of these 
 men had the slightest love of fighting for its own sake 
 and that most were thrown into the full sweep of the 
 War with only the most rudimentary training. No 
 doubt they regretted their deficiencies in this respect after 
 very httle experience, but the point is, that in spite of 
 them they succeeded where better trained men had 
 very often failed. Now the lesson for us in all this cam- 
 paign is the necessity of concentrating more on the 
 spirit of our Army than on its externals. 
 
 Again, I must not be understood as wanting to under- 
 rate the importance of drill and regularity in administra- 
 tion — on the contrary I have always stood out for the 
 utmost attainable steadiness and precision of drill, 
 and have been roundly abvised in consequence — but I do 
 most earnestly deprecate the present attitude of mind 
 which insists on condemning as absolutely without 
 
270 THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN 
 
 fighting value our Auxiliary Forces, because they fall 
 short of a purely conventional peace time standard 
 of organization ' and training. Admittedly, these de- 
 fects will have to be paid for in blood and in much 
 additional anxiety to the commanders, but the fact 
 will always remain that, with a determined man at 
 their head, troops willing to die for their country 
 can still be led to victory. It is not by the skill 
 which troops have acquired in dodging losses on the 
 training ground, hut by the amount they are ready to 
 bea/r, that the fate of Nations is decided. 
 
 
7HE SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES. 
 Crown 8vo, each ss. net. Containing Sketches and Maps. 
 
 I. SAARBRUCK TO PARIS, 1870: A 
 Strategical Sketch. 
 
 By Lieut.-Col. SISSON C. PRATT, late R.A. 
 
 " Colonel Pratt is first in the field with a. volume on the war 
 which has been selected as the Special Campaign to be read 
 up by o£5cers preparing for the Competitive Examinations for 
 Commissions in the Army to be held in September, 1905, and 
 March, 1906. It is fortunate for those who have to prepare to 
 face the examiner that Colonel Pratt has now turned his attention 
 to the compilation of volumes on Military History. It is hoped 
 that the Series will not only be useful for examination purposes, 
 but may form the nucleus of an interesting library for the 
 military service." — United Service Gazette. 
 
 " So long a time has elapsed since a military history series 
 has been offered to British soldiers, that Messrs. Sonnenschein 
 may claim the credit of bringing to fruition a virtually new idea. 
 With the limitations common to all or almost all British military 
 writers, the book before us is of great merit. We should select 
 for particular notice the vigorous and even dramatic account 
 of the Sedan Campaign. The book is well illustrated by a good 
 general map and numerous sketch maps." — Broad Arrow. 
 
 " An excellent sketch of what remains the most instructive 
 of modem wars, accompanied by admirable maps upon which 
 the student can follow the tactical as well as the strategical opera- 
 tions of the campaign. Altogether this is a very valuable book." 
 — ^United Service Magazine. 
 
 " A volume (the first) in the Special Campaign Series, sketch- 
 ing the strategy of the German invasion. of France in 1870. 
 Others are to deal with the Russo-Turkish war, and if they 
 maintain the present high quality, the series (or a volume of it 
 certainly) ought to find a place, with the proverbial baton, in 
 every soldier's knapsack. The maps and sketches are clear, 
 full, and excellent." — Pall Mall Gazette. 
 
 " The series will certainly make a unique place for itself on 
 our shelves, if all the volumes display the brilliant qualities of 
 the initial volume." — Birmingham Post. 
 
II. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 
 1877 : A Strategical Sketch. 
 
 By MAJOR F. MAURICE (The Sherwood For- 
 esters). 
 
 " No student who can find time to give Major Maurice's work 
 its due attention should neglect a single page of the narrative. 
 The story is told so succinctly that the imagination is brought 
 into play throughout, and yet no single detail necessary for the 
 right direction of the student's imagination is omitted. The 
 sound, sober common-sense he displays throughout in dealing 
 with tactical problems merits the highest commendations in 
 an age in which all sense of comparative historical treatment 
 seems to have vanished and given place to modern theories. 
 The maps provided are exceptionally good and obviously 
 prepared with the gireatest possible care." — Broad Arrow, 
 
 " This is the second volume of a very useful Special Campaign 
 Series, and will prove of great value to ofificers of all ranks, 
 especially to those who have leanings towards the study of 
 military history, a very necessary disposition in these days, when 
 the officer has to look to proficiency in his profession as the only 
 reliable means for obtaining advancement. The^taoment appears 
 propitious for the publication of an account in English, and 
 no one could have carried out this work in a more capable 
 manner than Major Maurice has done. The book is weU got 
 up, well bound in a neat cover, and has several maps to assist 
 the student." — United Service Gazette. 
 
 " This unpretentious little book — a companion to Saarbruck 
 to Paris, 1870 — deals merely with the strategy and major tactics 
 of the decisive part of the campaign in Europf. There is at the 
 end a large scale map of the theatre of war in Bulgaria, based 
 on the Austrian survey in 1 881 of the Balkan States." — Academy. 
 
 " Written with well-considered conciseness and usefully 
 equipped with illustrative maps, few books, if any, could be ' 
 found better fitted for military students and junior officers 
 desirous of a knowledge of the lessons which the campaign has 
 for a soldier." — Scotsman. 
 
 " This volume maintains the credit of the series admirably. 
 Major Maurice does not pretend to give a complete history of 
 the war, but in fact, except that the final phase of the campaign 
 after the fall of Plevna is very rapidly summarized, the war is 
 very fully and minutely described indeed, considering the limi t- 
 «*t by the style of the volume. The student is indebted to 
 
Major Maurice for the perfection -with which the text is related 
 to the first-class pocket maps, which are on more adequate 
 scales." — Glasgow Herald. 
 
 " There is little English Uterature deaUng with this campaign, 
 and a comprehensive strategical sketch such as Major Maurice 
 gives in the present work was badly needed by the military 
 student. It is a comprehensive and methodical survey of the 
 whole campaign, and he has not failed to underline the points 
 of principal application to English students." — ^Manchester 
 Guardian. 
 
 " Of very great value as a military class book. There is no 
 other way of aquiring the art of war than lay studying the 
 great campaigns of the past, and such a book as this renders 
 the task much simpler and the subject much more intelligible 
 to junior officers." — Nottingham Guardian. 
 
 " As a strategical sketch of a great wax here is an excellent 
 example. The main outUnes of the campaign are described, 
 together with the crucial episodes, but the chief aim is to advance 
 what has been termed the science of war. A number of maps 
 and diagrams serve to illustrate the text and enhance consider- 
 ably the value of the book as a means of military instruction." 
 — Leeds Mercury. 
 
 " Major Maurice makes the Russo-Turkish campaign deeply 
 intere.sting, and brings the lessons of Plevna home to islanders 
 to whom that struggle means much. The maps and plans are 
 extremely clear and are not overburdened with detail.— Wbsx 
 Sussex Gazette. 
 
III. FREDERICKSBURG : A Study in 
 WAR. 
 
 By Major G. W. Redway. 
 
 "The story is very effectively told by Major Redway, a 
 distinguished member of that increasing band of British officers 
 who so satisfactorily disprove the once general impression, that 
 men of high intellectual abilities and abundant professional 
 knowledge, are not too rarely to be found in our army. The 
 student of military history will be well rewarded by following 
 this succinct narratiye assimilating the tactical lessons of the 
 great battle. He will see that the final success was the prize 
 of the most capable general. He was an undoubted master of 
 war, and his opponent Burnside decidedly his inferior in military 
 capacity." — Pall Mall Gazette. 
 
 " Major Redway's narrative is full of instruction for every 
 thoughtful and even for every well-read soldier. His criticisms 
 are fair, temperate and made with an appreciation of the real 
 nature of war which we look for in vain in most of our historians 
 of war." — Broad Arrow. 
 
 " This is the third volume of the ' Special Campaign ' series of 
 books which are now being published by the above named enter- 
 prising firm, and in full maintains the standard of excellence 
 established by its predecessors. In a pocket at the end of the 
 book are four excellent maps of the Eastern Theatre of War and 
 of Fredericksburg and its neighbourhood, all particularly 
 clear, and none of them, as is often the case, overladen with 
 detail." — United Service Magazine. 
 
 ' Itis no faint praise to say that its merits as a literary study 
 of war rival those of its predecessors." — ^Army and Navy 
 Chkoni'clb. 
 
 " Rich in interest for soldiers who wish to understand how a 
 powerful enemy may be beaten by raising the price of success, 
 and wearing out rather than overthrowing his forces. Well 
 based historical studies concisely written, and finished with a 
 good equipment of instructive special maps, the work forms a 
 valuable accession to the scenes in which it appears." — Scotsman. 
 
 " Major Redway has made a very valuable addition to the 
 Special Campaign Series, and also a more than useful contribution 
 to the history of the American Civil War. For he has evidently 
 given time, pains and indubitable skill to the study of the mass 
 of matari^I available to the student, and has produced a story 
 self-contained, careful, vivid, as well as specially adapted by its 
 
method for the military student. All the important movements 
 and dispositions of the troops on either side are lucidly detailed, 
 and can be followed on the maps, of which there are five as admir- 
 able specimens of cartography as one would expect in a much 
 more ambitious military work." — Glasgow Herald. 
 
 " The present volume presents a striking contrast to the story 
 of a European campaign. From Saarbriick to Paris, with which 
 the series commenced, and Major Redway has done his work 
 admirably. His chapter on the ' American soldier — ^his social 
 status and professional ability ' is one of the best studies on the 
 subject that ever came under our notice." — Guardian. 
 
 "The very fact that in the American War the South was so over- 
 matched in wealth and resources makes all the more interesting 
 a close study of their tactics and their strategy, influenced as 
 these on both sides were by poUtical as well as military considera- 
 tions. The ' Campaign Series ' ought to be found in every 
 military library." — Yorkshire Post. 
 
 " The book ofiers an instructive contrast in methods adopted 
 by an unskilful general on one side and by a great master of war 
 on the other/' — Manchester Guardian. 
 
 " While dealing mainly with the technical details of the cam- 
 paign, the author's narrative is so lucid and so skilfully told 
 that it may be followed with enjoyment and ease by the tyro, as 
 well as the expert in military matters." — Dundee Advertiser. 
 
IV. MAGENTA AND SOLFERTNO, 
 
 1859. 
 
 By COL. H. C. WYLLY, C.B. (late Sherwood 
 Foresters). 
 
 " The Special Campaign series form an interesting addition to 
 the literature of war. From the popular and historical side 
 few campaigns have escaped exhaustive treatment, but there 
 is still room for guidance as to the tactical and strategical 
 lessons that are plentifully available. The Special Campaign 
 series will here prove of value. The book is the first serious 
 study of the war in Northern Italy which has appeared in the 
 English language." — Scotsman. 
 
 " Col. Wylly's careful study of this short, and, on the side of 
 the French, skilfully conducted war will be fresh ground to 
 most of his readers. Officers and military students will find 
 Col. Wylly's book a useful addition to their working library." — 
 Manchester Guardian. 
 
 " Col. Wylly has had the advantage of all the official accounts, 
 plus the criticism of Europe on the handling of the contending 
 armies. And, with his own ripe experience to guide him, he 
 has produced a book of considerable practical value." — York- 
 shire Post. 
 
 " This is the fourth volume of the Special Campaign series — 
 a series intended to supply military men, and more particularly 
 junior officers, with technical and critical descriptions of the 
 famous campaigns of the nineteenth century. That which Col. 
 Wylly has made the subject of his study possesses several 
 features of special interest." — Glasgow Herald. 
 
 " We have before spoken of the practical value to military 
 students and junior officers of the Special Campaign series 
 which draw the professional lessons of a series of operations so 
 clearly and simply that the merest tyro can profit by them.: 
 None of them have been more interesting and instructive than 
 No 4. Nothing could be better than the unbiassed and straight- 
 forward way in which Col. Wylly details the plain facts of 
 what was done, both in the movement of troops and in handling 
 them in contact with the enemy." — Notts Guardian. 
 
 " This makes the fourth volume in the Special Campaign 
 series that has already done so much to further the study of 
 military history and to aid officers to prepare for the many 
 examinations in that subject that are now required for a success- 
 ful career in the profession of arms." — Army and Navy 
 Chronicle. 
 
V. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. 
 
 By Col. S. C. PRATT, late R.A., Author of Saar-^ 
 bruck to PariSj etc. 
 
 " The series is a most important and valuable contribution to our military litera- 
 ture. The Waterloo Campaign deals with a subject of perennial interest, and deals 
 with it worthily. To the elementary student it is a readable and intelligent sketch 
 which, moreover, stimulates his desire to know more of these great events ; to the 
 advanced, intimate with its caieful marshalling of facts and its critical probings 
 into the inner working of the staffs, it should become an important volume in his 
 Waterloo collection.'* — ^Broad Arrow. 
 
 " In compiling this excellent pr6cU of the Waterloo campaign, Colonel Pratt 
 has fully ^splayed his accustomed skill. The narrative, although necessarily 
 condensed, embraces all the important incidents, and the comments are invariably 
 to the point. In order to assist the careful searcher after knowledge, the author 
 has inserted very frequent references to the various authorities from whose works 
 his facts have been gleaned." — United Service Magazine. 
 
 " This book appears most opportunely now that t|ie Wateriop ''^"^naiffift K.^ 
 
 sn|^i>f.t. for Dromotion exam inatinn \\n*\\ at.ham^. j^njjjjyjjj^ia" ffnrmArg ynll fituT 
 
 that the study ol tbis campaign is greatly brightened by the clear rendering given 
 by an old gunner. It would be ludicrous to say that it is better than any other 
 book on the subject, but any one who has already read Colonel Pratt's Pr6cis of 1870, 
 will know that they are in safe hands when following the narrative of this short 
 and brilliant campaign." — R.A. Journal. 
 
 " Colonel Pratt's work is an admirable one for the student of the battle who 
 looks at it from a purely military standpoint. The author eschews sensationalism 
 and imagination run riot, and confines himself to hard, stem facts. The Waterloo 
 Campaign will prove useful as a text book in regard to a battle replete with mili- 
 tary lessons." — War Office Times. 
 
 *' A thorough master of the vast literature of his subject, Colonel Pratt, who is 
 no novice in military writing, commands a clear and vivacious manner. He never 
 palms off guesses as established facts, and his text, which is a capital mixture of 
 narrative and comment, is supported by proper paragraph references and a select 
 list of books." — Spectator. 
 
 " It has the merit of tdling the story of the wonderful four days' cam- 
 paign clearly and with sufficient detail, within a moderate compass, and it gives the 
 reader the results of the most recent researches on the subject of British and foreign 
 authorities. Though so many of the conditions of war have changed, the Waterloo 
 campaign is full of important lessons, especially in this point of staff work, the trans- 
 mission of orders and information and the co-ordination of the several parts of a 
 great movement. It shows how the most brilliant plans may be brought ^o nothing 
 by an order being badly drawn up or wrongly forwarded." — Pall Mall Gazette. 
 
 " A most interesting and useful technical study. With the help of seven maps, 
 showing the various movements of the army, the author takes the campaign day 
 by day and traces the movements of each section of the contending forces, Napo- 
 leon's, Blucher's, and Wellington's miscellaneous array. The author deals with 
 the problems that present themselves with clccuness and ability. It may be well 
 to add that though this essay is primarily intended for fighting men, it will be found 
 intensely interesting by the ordinary civilian." — Yorkshire Post. 
 
 " Concise accounts of this instructive campaign are not too numerous, and the 
 student of the military history, or the reader who wishes to have the broad outlines 
 of the operations sketched with some fulness but without the elaborate detail of 
 Houssaye's great work, will find Colonel Pratt's book of much service. Colonel 
 Pratt is a &orough master of his subject. His narrative is acciurate and dear, 
 and in some of the most confusing phases of the campaign, such as the movements 
 on the day of Qufttre Bras, he has worked out the succession of events in an ad- 
 mirable way." — Manchester Guardian. 
 
VI. THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA, 
 1866. 
 
 By Lieut.-Col. G. J. R. GLUNICKE. 
 
 " Succinct, lucid and admirably equipped vnth illustrative 
 maps and plans, the book forms a valuable addition to this 
 useful series, and is sure of a wide welcome among those who 
 profess a knowledge of the arts of war." — Scotsman. 
 
 " Colonel Glunicke's careful piece of work fully maintains 
 the reputation of this excellent series for military students. 
 Like some of its predecessors in the same series, the book has 
 the advantage of dealing with a war that has hitherto been 
 scarcely touched by English writers." — ^Manchester Guardian. 
 
 " These works appeal more to the military student than to 
 the general reader, being mainly concerned with a description 
 of campaigns from the technical point of view. Colonel 
 Gliinicke explains the strategical plans of Moltke and Benedek, 
 examines them with critical acumen, and submits the tactics' 
 of the memorable five weeks' campaign to a searching analysis, 
 pointing out what appear to him to be the blunders on both 
 sides with severe impartiaUty." — Notts Guardian. 
 
 " The cause of the war was the determination of Bismarck 
 to settle finally whether Prussia or Austria was to be the leading 
 power among the states of Central Europe. Colonel Gliinicke 
 gives a very lucid account of the war, and is very definite and 
 emphatic in pointing out the errors committed by commanders 
 on both sides." — ^Bristol Times. 
 
 " He shows himself a lucid writer and deft in the arrangement 
 of his materials. 'The campaign has many points of interest, 
 if only from the fact that Moltke's successful strategy has been 
 the subject of sharp Continental criticism, while the tactics of 
 the opposing Austiians threw away all the advantages of their 
 superior armament. The maps are plentiful and on a large 
 scale." — Birmingham Post. " 
 
 " A useful addition to the Military Student's Library. The 
 opening chapters give an informing account of the causes that 
 led to an appeal to arms, while the campaign itself is described 
 with all the detail necessary to the student, together with the 
 author's comments. A dozen excellent maps, detached from 
 the text, afford ready means for following the movements of 
 the opposing forces." — ^Times of India. 
 
 " This new volume of the Campaign Series is quite up to the 
 high standard of its predecessors. The author. Colonel 
 Gliinicke, served as an Engineer officer in the campaign against 
 France. His book has the clearness and completeness one 
 expects in the works of an experienced teacher." — Pall Mall 
 Gazette. 
 
 " The narrative is good and the criticisms instructive." — 
 United Service Magazine, 
 
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 NAPOLEON'S MOVEMENTS 
 
 August— October 1815. 
 
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 SCHWARZENBERG'S MOVEMENTS 
 
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 DIAGRAM OF 
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 AT Jena 1^^>,13^.^,Oct. 1806. 
 
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 2''^Mciy 1813 
 
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BATTLE OF BAUTZEN 
 
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