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 Corneir University Library 
 JX 1428.S7L35 
 
 The diplomatic relations of the United S 
 
 3 1924 007 471 422 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tliis book is in 
 tlie Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924007471422 
 
The 
 
 Diplomatic Relations 
 
 of the 
 
 United States 
 
 and 
 
 Spanish America 
 
THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES 
 ON DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 
 
 By the liberality of Albert Shaw, Ph. D., of New 
 York City, the Johns Hopkins University has been 
 enabled to provide for three years a series of lectures 
 on Diplomatic History. These courses are given in 
 the Department of History and Economics and are 
 published under the direction of Professor Herbert B. 
 Adams. 
 
THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON 
 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, 1899 
 
 The Diplomatic Relations 
 
 of the 
 
 United States and Spanish America 
 
 By JOHN H. LATANE, Ph. D. 
 
 Professor of History in Randolph-Macon Woman's College 
 
 baltimore 
 
 The Johns Hopkins Press 
 
 1900 
 
p^.-s^flS iH-4- 
 
 PRINTED BY 
 
 ^5e ^vit^tnwai^ Company 
 
 BALTIMORE, MD., U. S. A. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Preface 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 Introductory — The Spanish-American Revolt . 9 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 Part played by the United States and England 
 
 in founding the Spanish-American Republics 56 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 The Diplomacy of the United States in regard 
 
 to Cuba 89 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 The Proposed Central American Canal . .176 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 French Intervention in Mexico 221 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 The Present Status of the Monroe Doctrine . 266 
 
PREFACE 
 
 This volume is based upon a course of lectures de- 
 livered by the writer in January, 1899. The chapter 
 on the policy of the United States in regard to Cuba 
 is reprinted with some slight alterations from the 
 annual report of the American Historical Association 
 for 1897. Certain parts of the same chapter also 
 appeared in a modified form in the North American 
 Review for March, 1898, under the title, " Intervention 
 of the United States in Cuba." 
 
 The introductory chapter was added in order to 
 give clearness to the main theme by means of a 
 concise presentation of the prominent facts of the 
 Spanish-American Revolution. No attempt has been 
 made to cover the whole field of our diplomatic rela- 
 tions with Spanish America. Only the topics which 
 illustrate the general principles of our policy have 
 been chosen. The present volume is intended to 
 serve as an introduction to the subject. 
 
 Since the body of this work has gone through the 
 press a convention has been signed at Washington by 
 Secretary Hay and Lord Pauncefote, in modification 
 of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The new agreement 
 provides for the neutralization of any canal that may 
 
8 PREFACE 
 
 be constructed between the Atlantic and the Pacific 
 oceans, and adopts as the basis of such neutrahzation 
 the rules laid down in the treaty of Constantinople of 
 October 29, 1888, in regard to the use of the Suez 
 canal. This was the policy advocated by President 
 Cleveland and urged in the fourth chapter of this 
 volume. 
 
 In publishing these lectures, acknowledgment is due 
 to Dr. Albert Shaw, editor of the American Monthly 
 Review of Reviews, and founder of this lectureship ; to 
 Professor Herbef^ B. Adams, of the Johns Hopkins 
 University, who first directed my attention to diplo- 
 matic studies and whose kindly counsel and encour- 
 agement have been of the greatest assistance. To Mr. 
 Herbert Putnam, Librarian, to Messrs. David Hutche- 
 son and A. P. C. Griffin, Assistant Librarians of the 
 Library of Congress; and to Mr. Andrew H. Allen, 
 Librarian of the State Department, my thanks are due 
 for privileges accorded me and for valuable aid in 
 prosecuting my investigations in Washington. Finally, 
 I am indebted to Professor J. M. Vincent, of the 
 Johns Hopkins University, for assistance in getting 
 the volume through the press. 
 
 John Holladay Latane. 
 
 Lynchburg, Virginia, 
 March 30, 1900. 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 Introductory: the Spanish-American Revolt 
 
 The English colonies of North America renounced 
 all allegiance to their sovereign more through fear of 
 future oppression than on account of burdens actually 
 imposed. The colonies of Spain in the southern hemi- 
 sphere labored for generations under the burden of 
 one of the most irrational and oppressive economic 
 systems to which any portion of the human race has 
 ever been subjected, and remained without serious 
 attempt at revolution, until the dethronement of their 
 sovereign by Napoleon left them to drift gradually, 
 in spite of themselves, as Chateaubriand expressed it, 
 into the republican form of government. To carry 
 the contrast a step further, when the conditions were 
 ripe for independence, the English colonies offered 
 a united resistance, while the action of the Spanish 
 colonies was spasmodic and disconcerted. The North 
 American revolution gave birth to a federal republic, 
 that of the South to a number of separate and inde- 
 pendent republics, whose relations with one another 
 have at times been far from amicable. The causes 
 for these striking differences are to be explained not 
 alone by race psychology, but by a comparison of the 
 English and Spanish colonial systems and of the two 
 revolutions as well. The history of the English col- 
 onies and of their revolt has been pretty well ex- 
 ploited, but information in regard to the Spanish- 
 
lO THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 American revolution and its causes, although the 
 sources are unusually complete, is not easily acces- 
 sible to English-speaking people. 
 
 By virtue of the celebrated Bull of Pope Alexander 
 VI., the Spanish- American colonies were looked upon 
 as possessions of the crown, and not as colonies of 
 Spain. Their affairs were regulated by the king, 
 with the assistance of a board called the Council of 
 the Indies. This council, which was on a footing 
 of equality with the Council of Castile, was established 
 by Ferdinand as early as 1511, and was modified by 
 Charles V. in 1524. It was to take cognizance of all 
 ecclesiastical, civil, military and commercial affairs 
 relating to the colonies. From it proceeded the so- 
 called Laws of the Indies, and all colonial offices in 
 the gift of the crown were conferred by it. In the 
 course of time, however, the personnel of this council 
 became merged with that of Castile, and for all prac- 
 tical purposes the colonies became dependencies of 
 the Spanish nation. 
 
 There were from the first establishment of Spanish 
 rule in America, two viceroyalties on the continent. 
 The viceroy of New Spain ruled over Mexico and 
 Central America, whilst all South America subject to 
 Spanish control was for about two centuries under 
 the viceroy of Peru. In regions too remote to be 
 under his immediate control, audiencias, or courts of 
 justice, were established, the president of the audiencia 
 being known by the title of captain-general. Thus 
 audiencias were established at Quito in 1542, at Char- 
 cas (in Modern Bolivia) in 1559, in New Granada in 
 1564, in Chile in 1568, and later at Caracas and at 
 Buenos Ayres. In 1740, New Granada was raised to 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT II 
 
 the rank of a viceroyalty, with its capital at Bogota; 
 and in 1776 the same dignity was conferred on Buenos 
 Ayres. There were thus on the southern continent 
 three viceroyalties widely separated; one on the Main, 
 one on the Atlantic, and one on the Pacific. 
 
 The powers of the viceroy, or captain-general, as 
 the case might be, were limited, only by the audiencia, 
 consisting of from three to five members, always of 
 Spanish birth, whose functions were largely advisory, 
 but who had the privilege of corresponding directly 
 with the Council of the Indies, and who in case of 
 emergency sometimes went so far as to depose the 
 viceroy. 
 
 It should be borne in mind that in Spanish America 
 the native Indian races were not driven beyond the 
 frontier of civilization, as they were by the English 
 settlers, but became, and remain to this day, an in- 
 tegral part of the population. There was thus in the 
 Spanish colonies an unusual admixture of races. 
 There were (i) European Spaniards; (2) Creoles, or 
 children born in America of Spanish parents; (3) 
 Indians, the indigenous race; (4) Negroes of African 
 race; (5) Mestizos, children of whites and Indians; 
 
 (6) Mulattoes, children of whites and negroes; and 
 
 (7) Zambos, children of Indians and negroes. 
 
 The maladministration of Spain's colonies may be 
 summarized under two heads: (i) acts of oppression 
 against the native Indian race, and (2) regulations of 
 a commercial and political character, which acted in 
 restraint of the economic and social development of 
 her own offspring in America. 
 
 Under the first head may be mentioned the mita, or 
 forced labor in mines, farms and factories, and the 
 
12 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 repartimiento, or encomienda, which was an allotment 
 to Spaniards of territory including the native inhabi- 
 tants as peons or vassals. In spite of humane re- 
 strictions placed by law upon them, these institutions 
 degenerated into systems of fearful oppression, which 
 led, in 1781, to the heroic but unsuccessful efforts of 
 Tupac Amaru, the last of the Incas, to free the land 
 of his fathers from the cruel rule of the Spaniard. 
 So deep-seated was the dissatisfaction and so formid- 
 able the revolt, that it was suppressed only after two 
 years of arduous efifort on the part of the viceroy. 
 
 The economic and commercial restrictions imposed 
 upon the colonies require fuller notice. The whole 
 object of Spain's colonial policy was to extract gold 
 and silver from America and to force Spanish manu- 
 factures and products upon that country. Commerce 
 was confined to Spain and to Spanish vessels. " No 
 South American could own a ship, nor could a cargo 
 be consigned to him; no foreigner was allowed to 
 reside in the country unless born in Spain; and no 
 capital, not Spanish, was permitted in any shape to be 
 employed in the colonies. Orders were given that no 
 foreign vessel, on any pretence whatever, should 
 touch at a South American port. Even ships in dis- 
 freiss were not to be received with common hospitality, 
 but were ordered to be seized as prizes, and the crews 
 imprisoned."^ As late as 1816, when the United 
 States protested against the blockade established by 
 General Morillo, as contrary to international law, M. 
 Onis, the Spanish minister, replied that the object of 
 the blockade was to maintain the laws of the Indies, 
 
 " Hall's Journal on Chili, Peru, and Mexico, 2 Vols. Edin- 
 burgh, 1824, Vol. I, p. 249. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 1 3 
 
 which during the Napoleonic wars had been somewhat 
 relaxed, adding: " You are aware that, agreeably to 
 those laws, no foreign vessel was allowed to trade 
 with the dominions of his majesty on that continent 
 without a special license, and that vessels found near 
 or evidently shaping a course towards them were 
 liable to confiscation as interlopers." When, later in 
 the year, a United States commissioner was sent to 
 Cartagena to reclaim American vessels so seized, the 
 Spanish viceroy gave him to understand that he did 
 not pretend to be acquainted with the law of nations." 
 
 Not only were the colonists prohibited from engag- 
 ing in manufactures which interfered with those of 
 Spain, but restrictions were even placed on agriculture 
 in the interests of the Spanish producer. Thus the 
 cultivation of flax, hemp, and saffron was forbidden 
 under severe penalty; the cultivation of tobacco was 
 not allowed; and grapes and olives could be raised 
 only for table use, so that oil and wine had to be 
 imported from Spain. Upon one occasion (in 1803) 
 orders were sent " to root up all the vines in certain 
 provinces, because the Cadiz merchants complained 
 of a diminution in the consumption of Spanish wines."' 
 
 The carrying out of this commercial system in all 
 its details was entrusted to the Casa de Contratacion, 
 or House of Trade, which was located at Seville until 
 1 71 7, when it was transferred to Cadiz. The India 
 House, as it was called, was established by warrant 
 of Queen Joanna in 1503.' To this house were to be 
 
 ' Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 156-9. 
 
 ' Hall's Journal, Vol. I, p. 296. See also Rodney's report 
 on South America, in Vol. IV, Am. St. Pap., For. Rel. 
 
 *A full history of the India House and an account of its 
 regulations is given by Veitia Linage in his Norte de la 
 
14 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 brought all merchandise for the colonies and all pro- 
 ducts from them of whatever character. The colonial 
 trade was thus limited to one Spanish port. The 
 affairs of the house were in charge of three commis- 
 sioners or judges, who had jurisdiction, civil and 
 criminal, over all cases arising out of the trade with 
 America. Their authority was subordinated to no 
 other court or council but that of the Indies. 
 
 Not only were no foreigners allowed to go to the 
 Spanish colonies, but careful restrictions were placed 
 on the movement of Spaniards to and from America. 
 In 1 511 King Ferdinand had by a special order per- 
 mitted all subjects of Spain without distinction to go 
 over to the Indies upon entering their names at the 
 India House; but in the years 1518, 1522, 1530 and 
 1539 several orders were passed " that no person 
 reconciled, or newly converted to our holy Catholic 
 faith, from Judaism or Mahometanism, nor the chil- 
 dren of such, nor the children or grandsons of any 
 that had worn the St. Andrew's Cross of the Inquisi- 
 tion, or been burnt or condemned as heretics, or for 
 any heretical crime, either by male or female line, 
 might go over to the Indies, upon pain of forfeiting 
 all their goods, of an hundred lashes, perpetual ban- 
 ishment from the Indies, and their bodies to be at 
 the king's disposition.'" 
 
 Contratacion, Seville, 1672; translated into English by Captain 
 John Stevens under the title, Spanish Rule of Trade to the 
 West Indies, London, 1702. Linage was for a number of 
 years Treasurer and Comptroller of the India House. A 
 good summary of the history and regulations of the House 
 is given by Prof. Bernard Moses in his Casa de Contratacion 
 in the Papers of the Am. Hist. Ass. for 1894, and in the third 
 chapter of his Establishment of Spanish Rule in America. 
 ' Linage, p. 107. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 1 5 
 
 The commissioners might " grant passes to mer- 
 chants to go over, or return if they came from thence, 
 including married merchants, provided they have leave 
 from their wives, and give looo ducats security to 
 return within three years.'" 
 
 There were also strict rules about passing from one 
 province in America to another. This could not be 
 done without special leave from the king.' " The 
 inhabitants of the Indies may not come to Spain with- 
 out leave from the viceroys, presidents or governors 
 of the places of their habitation, in which they are to 
 express the causes of their coming, and whether it is 
 to stay here or return."' " In the Indies, the mag- 
 istrates are directed to apprehend any persons they 
 find are gone over without leave, to imprison them 
 till they can send them back into Spain, upon pain of 
 losing their employments." ' In 1594 and 1602 it was 
 decreed that persons going over without leave should 
 be sent to the gallies for four years. In 1622 King 
 Philip IV. decreed that a person simply going aboard 
 a ship bound for the Indies without leave should be 
 immediately sent to the gallies for eight years." 
 
 In order to keep the trade strictly under control 
 and to properly protect it, intercourse with the colo- 
 nies was held only once a year. Two squadrons, con- 
 sisting of merchant ships and convoys under com- 
 mand of an admiral and vice-admiral, made the trip 
 each year. The fleet for New Spain (Mexico) sailed 
 in the spring, and that for the mainland in the early 
 fall. The first touched at some of the islands and 
 then went to Vera Cruz; the latter touched first at 
 
 'Linage, p. no. 'Linage, p. 113. 'Linage, p. 114. 
 
 ' Linage, p. 109. " Linage, p. 109. 
 
1 6 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 Cartagena and passed on thence to Porto Bello, where 
 the fair was held about the middle of March. This 
 fair was the great event of the year, and lasted forty 
 days from the time of the arrival of the fleet. From 
 this point goods were distributed by way of Panama 
 to Peru, Chile, and even across the continent to 
 Buenos Ayres. The gold bullion was sent in turn to 
 this point by the viceroy of Peru. It came in fifteen 
 days from Potosi to Arica, thence by sea in eight days 
 to Callao, and in twenty days from Callao to Panama. 
 The viceroy of Peru was to take care to have the 
 plate at Panama by the middle of March. At Porto 
 Bello it was taken aboard the galleons. About the 
 middle of June the galleons met the fleet from New 
 Spain at Havana, and from that point the two fleets 
 with their convoys proceeded in greater safety to 
 Spain. Thus for two centuries all intercourse be- 
 tween Spain and her colonies at one end of the line 
 was limited at first to Seville, and then to Cadiz; and 
 at the other to Vera Cruz and Porto Bello." At a 
 later period this arrangement was modified to some 
 extent, and Buenos Ayres was made a port of entry. 
 
 While the relations of the colonies with Spain were 
 kept under the strictest control, intercourse with for- 
 eign nations, although absolutely prohibited under the 
 severest penalties, could not be entirely prevented. 
 In speaking of Spain's restrictive policy, a British 
 naval officer, who was on the South American station 
 during the revolution, says: " Unfortunately, however, 
 for that system, the South Americans, notwithstand- 
 ing the network of chains by which they were en- 
 veloped, had still some sparks of humanity left, and, 
 
 " Linage, pp. 191-193 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 1 7 
 
 in spite of all their degradation, longed earnestly for 
 the enjoyments suitable to their nature; and finding 
 that the Spaniards neither could nor would furnish 
 them with an adequate supply, they invited the assist- 
 ance of other nations. To this call the other nations 
 were not slow to listen; and, in process of time, there 
 was established one of the most extraordinary systems 
 of organized smuggling which the world ever saw. 
 This was known under the name of the contraband or 
 forced trade, and was carried on in armed vessels, 
 well manned, and prepared to fight their way to the 
 coast, and to resist, as they often did with efifect, the 
 guarda castas, or coast blockades of Spain. This sin- 
 gular system of warlike commerce was conducted by 
 the Dutch, Portuguese, French, English and latterly 
 by the North Americans. In this way goods to an 
 immense value were distributed over South America; 
 and although the prices were necessarily high, and the 
 supply precarious, that taste for the comforts and 
 luxuries of European invention was first encouraged, 
 which afterwards operated so powerfully in giving a 
 steady and intelligible motive to the efforts of the 
 Patriots in their struggle with the mother-country. 
 Along with the goods which the contraband trade 
 forced into the colonies, no small portion of knowl- 
 edge found entrance, in spite of the increased exer- 
 tions of the Inquisition and church influence, aided 
 by the redoubled vigilance of government, who en- 
 forced every penalty with the utmost rigour. Many 
 foreigners, too, by means of bribes and other arts, 
 succeeded in getting into the country, so that the pro- 
 gress of intelligence was gradually encouraged, to 
 the utter despair of the Spaniards, who knew no other 
 
1 8 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 method of governing the colonies but that of mere 
 brute force, unsupported by the least shadow of opin- 
 ion, or of good will."" The trade carried on by 
 foreign interlopers grew to such alarming propor- 
 tions that before the middle of the eighteenth century 
 Spain found it necessary to relax the restrictions upon 
 the private trade of her own subjects. This led, about 
 1748, to the discontinuance of the annual fleets or 
 galleon trade. 
 
 The political administration of the country was 
 absolutely in the hands of Spaniards, who as a rule 
 were not allowed to marry, acquire property, or form 
 any permanent ties in America. In the summary of 
 charges against Spain appearing in the Argentine 
 Manifesto of 181 7, one of the specifications is, that of 
 one hundred and sixty viceroys who had governed in 
 America, four natives of the country alone were num- 
 bered; and of six hundred and two captains-general, 
 all but fourteen had been Spaniards. 
 
 The monopoly of Spanish trade in South America 
 was partially surrendered by the treaty of Utrecht, 
 signed in 1713, at the close of the War of the Spanish 
 Succession. By this treaty England agreed to recog- 
 nize Philip V. as king of Spain and the Indies, and in 
 turn was granted the asiento, or contract for supply- 
 ing the Spanish colonies with African slaves." The 
 importation of negroes into the Spanish possessions 
 had been carried on under contract from the very first. 
 The asiento, which had been previously granted to 
 
 " Hall's Journal, Vol. I, pp. 253-4. 
 
 " The Assiento; or Contract for Allowing to the Subjects of 
 Great Britain the Liberty of Importing Negroes into the Spanish 
 America. Printed by John Baskett, London, 1713. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT I9 
 
 Spanish subjects, was, in 1696, granted to the Por- 
 tuguese Company of Guinea, and in 1702 to the Royal 
 Guinea Company of France; but in 1713 England 
 secured this lucrative monopoly and became the great 
 slave-trading power of the world. 
 
 The asiento of 1713, which was very carefully drawn 
 up in 42 articles, granted to an English company the 
 sole right of supplying slaves to the Spanish West 
 Indies and to South America for the period of thirty 
 years from May i, 1713. By it the Queen of England 
 undertook to see that the company chartered by her 
 should introduce into the Spanish West Indies, in- 
 cluding South America, 144,000 negroes of both sexes 
 and all ages within thirty years, at the rate of 4800 a 
 year. The company was to pay a duty of 33^^ pieces 
 of eight (dollars) for each negro imported. In addi- 
 tion to the 4800 a year, other negroes might be 
 imported at a duty of 16% dollars each, thus encour- 
 aging larger importations. The negroes could be 
 brought in either Spanish or English vessels, manned 
 with English or Spanish sailors, provided only no 
 cause of offence be given to the Catholic religion. 
 The majority of the negroes were to be taken to 
 Cuba and Porto Rico, and to the ports on the Main; 
 but of the 4800, the company had the right to take 
 1200 to Buenos Ayres, 800 to be sold there and 400 
 to be carried to the provinces up the Plata and to 
 the kingdom of Chile. They were also allowed to 
 carry negroes across the isthmus from Porto Bello 
 to Panama, and there re-ship them to Peru. Either 
 Englishmen or Spaniards could be employed in the 
 business, provided that there were not more than four 
 or six Englishmen in any port, and that these should 
 
20 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 be amenable to the laws in all respects as Spanish 
 subjects. By no means the least remarkable provis- 
 ion of this treaty was that their British and Catholic 
 majesties were each to receive one-fourth of the profits 
 of this traffic. 
 
 Ships engaged in this trade were to be searched on 
 arrival at port, and all merchandise found on board 
 was to be confiscated and heavy penalties inflicted. 
 On condition, however, that the company should not 
 attempt any unlawful trade, his Catholic Majesty 
 granted them the privilege, during thirty years, of 
 sending annually a ship of 500 tons to the fair at Porto 
 Bello. The Spanish king was to be concerned one- 
 fourth in the profits." It seems that the company 
 stretched this privilege to the utmost. The ship 
 always stopped at Jamaica, took on all the goods she 
 could, and carried along with her five or six smaller 
 vessels laden with goods. When she got near Porto 
 Bello, all her provisions were put in the tenders and 
 the goods these bore taken aboard. She then entered 
 the harbor laden down to the water's edge. Thus this 
 single ship was made to carry more than five or six 
 of the largest galleons." 
 
 Thirty years before the Spanish colonies began their 
 war of independence, the British government had en- 
 tertained the idea of revolutionizing and separating 
 them from Spain. This idea seems to have arisen in 
 1779, during the administration of Lord North, when 
 Spain joined France in the alliance with the American 
 
 " The Assiento; or Contract for Allowing to the Subjects of 
 Great Britain the Liberty of Importing Negroes into the Spanish 
 America. London, 1713. 
 
 "UUoa: Voyage to South America. English translation, 
 London, 1806, Vol. I; p. 105. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 21 
 
 colonies against Great Britain.'" It was suggested at 
 first, no doubt, as a measure of retaliation, but was 
 frequently agitated in later years with the avowed 
 object of opening up South America to British com- 
 merce. The same idea was the basis of Miranda's 
 scheme for the liberation of his native land. 
 
 Francesco de Miranda (1754-1816), a native of 
 Caracas, Venezuela, was the first Spanish-American 
 patriot. He was with the American army for a time 
 during the Revolutionary War, but in what capacity 
 is not quite settled. It is stated by some writers that 
 he held a commission under La Fayette. The success 
 of our war inspired him with the hope of freeing his 
 own country from Spanish control. He confided his 
 views to his friends in the United States, particularly 
 to Alexander Hamilton," " upon whom he fixed his 
 eyes as a coadjutor in the great purpose of his life." 
 Shortly after Miranda had returned to his native land 
 his schemes were discovered. He fled to the United 
 States, and later to England, where he had repeated 
 conferences with Pitt. Finding no help for his revo- 
 lutionary schemes in England, he went to the conti- 
 nent and traveled through France, Germany, Turkey 
 and Russia. At the Russian court he was warmly 
 received, but was soon disrhissed at the demand of the 
 Spanish minister. At news of the dispute between 
 England and Spain about Nootka Sound in 1790, he 
 hastened to England and communicated his scheme 
 to the British ministry. Pitt lent a ready ear to his 
 
 " Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh, Vol. VII, p. 266 ff. 
 This volume is rich in information in regard to England's 
 Spanish-American policy. 
 
 " Life of Hamilton, Vol. VII, p. 212. 
 
22 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 views as long as the dispute lasted, with the intention 
 of making use of him in the event of a rupture with 
 Spain. But when the dispute was peaceably settled, 
 Miranda's hopes fell to the ground and he left Eng- 
 land. He considered himself to have been ill-used by 
 Pitt on this occasion, as he subsequently stated to 
 Rufus King, the American minister to England. 
 
 The French Revolution was now well under way, 
 and the wars upon which the republic was entering 
 offered an attractive field for a soldier of republican 
 ideas. In April, 1792, Miranda went to Paris with 
 introductions to Petion and the leading Girondists, 
 hoping that the revolutionary party might help him in 
 his plans. He was given a commission as brigadier- 
 general in the French army, and served in responsible 
 posts under Dumouriez on the eastern frontier. He 
 conducted the siege of Maestricht and commanded the 
 left wing of the French army at the disastrous battle 
 of Neerwinden, March, 1793, in which Belgium was 
 reconquered by the Austrians. Dumouriez now de- 
 clared against the convention, but his troops having 
 refused to follow him, he went over to the Austrians 
 in company with the Duke of Chartres, Louis 
 Philippe. Miranda fell under suspicion of treason 
 and was forced to undergo a court-martial, but was 
 acquitted. For some unexplained reason he was 
 shortly after thrown into prison. He soon secured 
 his release, but for several years disappears from pub- 
 lic view. His services in behalf of the republic re- 
 ceived in time due recognition. His name appears on 
 the Arc de Triomphe in Paris in the list of the heroes 
 of the revolution. 
 
 In January, 1798, Miranda returned to England. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 23 
 
 As Spain was now the close ally of France, he hoped 
 to secure the cooperation of Great Britain in his 
 scheme. He also hoped to secure aid from the United 
 States. The people of Kentucky and Tennessee were 
 far from satisfied with the provisions of the Spanish 
 treaty of 1795 in regard to the navigation of the Mis- 
 sissippi river. Then, too, just at this time, war be- 
 tween the United States and France seemed inevitable, 
 on account of the resentment by France of the Jay 
 treaty and her treatment of the American representa- 
 tives. Washington had been called from his retire- 
 ment at Mt. Vernon to assume the post of commander- 
 in-chief of the army, while the active command was to 
 be given to Hamilton. Hamilton had expressed great 
 interest in Miranda's projects and was a man of known 
 ambition. His appointment, therefore, as the virtual 
 commander-in-chief of the American army made 
 Miranda hopeful of his cooperation. 
 
 Mr. King, the American minister at London, en- 
 tered heartily into the plans of General Miranda, and 
 his correspondence on that subject, during the year 
 .1798, with his government and with Hamilton is quite 
 voluminous." For a time it seemed as if Great Britain 
 and the United States would cooperate for the pur- 
 pose of revolutionizing Spanish America. The plan, 
 as entertained by Miranda and Hamilton, was for 
 England to supply the naval force and the United 
 States the land forces. Miranda believed that six or 
 eight vessels of the line and four or five thousand 
 
 " Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, New York, 
 1894, Vol. II, App. S. For further information regarding his 
 relations with Miranda, see extracts from his Memorandum 
 Book, in Vol. Ill, App. 3- 
 
24 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN. REVOLT 
 
 troops would be sufficient," though Hamilton thought 
 it would require ten thousand troops. England's par- 
 ticipation in the scheme depended upon the relations 
 between France and Spain. Mr. King wrote to his 
 government, February 26, 1798: "Two points have 
 within a fortnight been settled in the English cabinet 
 respecting South America. If Spain is able to pre- 
 vent the overthrow of her present government and to 
 escape being brought under the entire control of 
 France, England (between whom and Spain, notwith- 
 standing the war, a certain understanding appears to 
 exist) will at present engage in no scheme to deprive 
 Spain of her possessions in South America. But if, 
 as appears probable, the army destined against Por- 
 tugal, and which will march through Spain, or any 
 other means which may be employed by France, shall 
 overthrow the Spanish government, and thereby place 
 the resources of Spain and of her colonies at the 
 disposal of France, England will immediately com- 
 mence the execution of a plan long since digested and 
 prepared for the complete independence of South 
 America. If England engages in this plan, she will 
 at Philadelphia propose to the United States to co- 
 operate in its execution. Miranda will be detained 
 here, under one pretence or another, until events shall 
 decide the conduct of England.'"" England's policy 
 in regard to South America for the next twenty years 
 substantially confirmed the interpretation of her mo- 
 tives here given by Mr. King. 
 
 During the summer of 1798 Mr. King had several 
 
 " See Miranda's letter to President Adams, March 24, 1798. 
 Life and Corresp. of King, Vol. II, p. 654. 
 " Life and Corresp. of King, Vol. II, p. 650. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 25 
 
 conferences with the British ministry in regard to the 
 Spanish-American question, but it was always under- 
 stood that they were personal and wholly unauthor- 
 ized. What occurred at these interviews was, of 
 course, always communicated to the government at 
 Washington, but as they were unofificial and commu- 
 nicated merely in the nature of information, the State 
 Department preferred to keep the matter on the same 
 basis and did not refer to the matter in its dispatches 
 to Mr. King. This caused him no little annoyance." 
 In the same way no notice was taken of General 
 Miranda's letter to President Adams. 
 
 Hamilton, however, was very frank in the expres- 
 sion of his views both to General Miranda and to Mr. 
 King. Under date of August 22, 1798, he wrote to 
 the latter : " I have received several letters from Gen- 
 eral Miranda. I have written answers to some of 
 them, which I send you to deliver or not, according 
 to your estimate of what is passing in the scenes where 
 you are. Should you deem it expedient to suppress 
 my letter, you may do it and say as much as you think 
 fit on my part in the nature of a communication 
 through you. With regard to the enterprise in ques- 
 tion, I wish it much to be undertaken, but I should 
 be glad that the principal agency was in the United 
 States — they to furnish the whole land force necessary. 
 The command in this case would very naturally fall 
 upon me, and I hope I should disappoint no favorable 
 anticipation." 
 
 The United States, moreover, succeeded in coming 
 to an understanding with France and in maintaining 
 
 " See King's letter to Hamilton, March 4, 1799. Life and 
 Corresp., p. 662. 
 
26 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 the principle of neutrality in the great Napoleonic 
 conflict about to break upon Europe, while England 
 was unwilling to deal such a serious blow to Spain 
 as long as there was a chance of arraying her against 
 Napoleon. The communication of the views of the 
 British government at Philadelphia, to which Mr. 
 King referred as a preliminary, was never made. 
 Miranda's hopes finally fell through at the re-estab- 
 lishment of peace in Europe by the treaty of Amiens, 
 which lasted until 1804. He lingered in Europe some- 
 time longer, until, wearied out by years of fruitless 
 negotiation with the British government, he, for 
 the time being, gave up all hope of success in that 
 quarter and returned once more to the United States. 
 Arriving in New York from England in November, 
 1805, Miranda proceeded to lay his cause once more 
 before Mr. King, who had so warmly befriended him 
 in London, and to solicit his cooperation in fitting 
 out an expedition for South America. While express- 
 ing his full sympathy "With the cause, Mr. King stated 
 emphatically that he could render him no assistance, 
 nor could any individuals safely do so, without the 
 countenance of the government. He, therefore, ad- 
 vised Miranda to go to Washington and lay his plans 
 before the administration. This Miranda did. He 
 was admitted to informal conferences both with Presi- 
 dent Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison. Upon 
 his return to New York he represented to those in- 
 terested in his schemes that he had secured from the 
 government a secret sanction of his project, and that 
 the administration, though unwilling to take the ini- 
 tiative, would support the undertaking so soon as the 
 standard of revolution should once have been raised 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 27 
 
 on the Spanish Main. Miranda's chief supporter was 
 Colonel Smith, surveyor of the port of New York, 
 whose influence as a public official in close touch with 
 the administration was decisive in persuading many 
 adventurous spirits to join the expedition with the 
 belief that it was really secretly backed by the govern- 
 ment of the United States. 
 
 Miranda left New York in the early part of Feb- 
 ruary, 1806, in the Leander, with an imperfectly 
 equipped force of about 200 men, most of whom were 
 commissioned as officers and promised commands in 
 the South American army, which was expected to 
 spring from the soil at the magic touch of Miranda's 
 step upon the shores of his native land. The ship 
 proceeded to Jacquemel, San Domingo, where Mi- 
 randa expected to get the necessary supplies and 
 reinforcements. Here disappointments awaited him, 
 disputes with the ship's captain ensued, and over a 
 month was fruitlessly spent, while the Spanish au- 
 thorities on the Main had time to put themselves on 
 the alert. It was not until the last of April that the 
 expedition, reinforced by two schooners, appeared off 
 the coast of Venezuela near Porto Cabello. They 
 were attacked by two Spanish vessels, which captured 
 the schooners with about sixty men and large stores, 
 while the Leander ignominiously took to flight. 
 
 Miranda then sailed for Barbados, where he solic- 
 ited aid from the British admiral. Lord Cochrane, in 
 command on the West Indian station. Lord Coch- 
 rane, without definite instructions from his govern- 
 ment, but acquainted with its general policy in regard 
 to South America, and knowing of the close relations 
 in which Miranda had stood for years with the British 
 
28 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 ministry, decided to assist him in landing. With this 
 understanding he signed with Miranda an agreement 
 to the effect that in the event of the success of the 
 expedition, Great Britain should always be held on a 
 footing with the most favored nations, and that British 
 ships should receive a deduction of ten per cent, upon 
 duties paid by all other nations, except the United 
 States.''' On the twentieth of June, the expedition left 
 Barbados under convoy of a part of Admiral Coch- 
 rane's squadron, and on August 2, 1806, effected a 
 landing near Coro, Venezuela. They easily took pos- 
 session of the town, the unarmed inhabitants fleeing 
 before them. Here Miranda remained about ten days, 
 issuing proclamations and vainly waiting for the 
 natives to join him. His position, meanwhile, was 
 becoming unsafe, so he abandoned it and took pos- 
 session of the little island of Aruba off the coast. 
 Lord Cochrane, seeing that the expedition was a 
 failure, and not wishing further to compromise his 
 ■government, sent no reinforcements and finally 
 ordered the withdrawal of the ships that had accom- 
 panied the expedition. Miranda was offered a con- 
 voy back to Trinidad, which he accepted, leaving 
 Aruba, September 27, 1806. At Trinidad the mem- 
 bers of the expedition dispersed.^ 
 
 The Americans who had taken part in the expedi- 
 tion and survived were prosecuted in the United States 
 courts for violation of the neutrality laws. They 
 claimed that they had enlisted in the undertaking with 
 the connivance of the government at Washington. 
 
 " Castlereagh's Letters and Despatches, Vol. VII. 
 " See Sherman's General Account of Miranda's Expedition 
 N. Y., 1808. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 29 
 
 Mr. Jefferson's enemies made great political capital 
 of the affair. Members of the cabinet were sum- 
 moned as witnesses, but refused to appear. Privately 
 Jefferson and Madison both denied most emphatically 
 having in any way committed the government to 
 Miranda's undertaking, or having acted in any way 
 in disregard of our obligations to Spain." 
 
 Aside from accomplishing nothing, the expedition 
 of 1806 was a great injury to Miranda's cause. He 
 himself lost prestige as a military leader and brought 
 his character into question as having misrepresented 
 his connection both with the British and United States 
 governments. However, upon the occupation of 
 Spain by Napoleon in 1808, Miranda again hastened 
 to England and urged upon the ministry the claims 
 of his country, in whose interests he had now been 
 laboring incessantly as an exile for more than twenty 
 years. We cannot but admire his tenacity of purpose 
 in the face of the most disheartening failures. 
 
 Not only did the British government lend its en- 
 couragement, through Lord Cochrane, to the filibus- 
 tering expedition from the United States with which 
 Miranda hoped to revolutionize Venezuela, but about 
 the same time it sent an expedition against the prov- 
 inces of the Plate. This attack, like the assistance 
 given to Miranda, was ill-timed and not properly fol- 
 lowed up. The policy seems to have been outlined 
 by Pitt, but was put into execution after his death 
 by the short-lived ministry of Grenville and Fox. 
 The government of the Duke of Portland, which 
 succeeded after a few months, and in which Castle- 
 
 " Jefferson's Works, Vol. V, p. 474; Madison's Writings, 
 Vol. II, pp. 220, 225. 
 
30 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 reagh and Canning were the most conspicuous 
 figures, did not deem it expedient to follow up the 
 undertaking."" In fact, the fate of the expedition was 
 already sealed when Portland came into power. 
 
 The victory of Trafalgar had given the English 
 control of the Atlantic. A force of some 6000 men 
 was dispatched to the South Atlantic without its des- 
 tination being known. It proceeded to Rio Janeiro, 
 Portugal then being in alliance with England. The 
 viceroy of the Plate became alarmed and prepared to 
 defend Montevideo, which he thought would be the 
 first point of attack. The expedition, however, passed 
 by and proceeded to the Cape of Good Hope, which 
 it wrested from the Dutch. In 1806 a dash was made 
 from the Cape for the river Plate. Sir Home Pop- 
 ham commanded the fleet, and General Beresford the 
 land force, which amounted to 1635 men. On the 
 6th of June the squadron arrived at the mouth of the 
 Plate. The ships had some difficulty in ascending 
 the river, but on the 25th they came to anchor at a 
 point fifteen miles below Buenos Ayres. The city 
 was captured with little or no resistance, the inhabit- 
 ants having been led to believe that the British had 
 come to liberate them. The contents of the public 
 treasury were handed over to the invaders. The 
 inhabitants were required to swear allegiance to 
 George III., private property was respected, the free 
 exercise of their religion was allowed, and all officials 
 who took the oath were continued in office. When 
 Beresford refused to proclaim the independence of 
 the province, or to give any assurance for their future 
 independence, the inhabitants, who had now learned 
 
 " Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh, Vol. VII, p. 314 ff. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 3 1 
 
 how insignificant the invading force really was, began 
 to prepare for resistance. A leader was readily found 
 in the person of Jacques Liniers, a Frenchman, who 
 had been for thirty years in the service of Spain. He 
 and Juan Martin de Puyrredon began an organized 
 movement for the expulsion of the English. On the 
 i2th of August, Beresford, who had remained all this 
 time without reinforcements, was compelled to sur- 
 render. Troops ordered to his support from the Cape 
 did not arrive until later. 
 
 Sobremonte, the viceroy, had deserted Buenos 
 Ayres and established himself at Montevideo. The 
 people of Buenos Ayres, therefore, deposed him and 
 chose Liniers in his place. 
 
 During the fall other English reinforcements 
 arrived, and in January, 1807, Montevideo was taken 
 by assault. As soon as the defeat of Beresford was 
 known. General Whitelocke was sent to take com- 
 mand of the united English forces of the Plate, now 
 some twelve thousand in number. He arrived in the 
 spring. The reconquest of Buenos Ayres now 
 seemed an easy matter. It had been taken in the first 
 instance by sixteen hundred men; there were now 
 ten thousand available. On the 28th of June the 
 British landed at the small port of Enseiiada, fortyr 
 eight miles below Buenos Ayres. The fighting con- 
 tinued on the outskirts of the city in a desultory 
 manner and without any decisive action for several 
 days. But finally, owing to the bad generalship and 
 incompetency of Whitelocke, his troops got into such 
 a muddle that half the force was captured or disabled. 
 On July 6, Liniers decided to send a flag of truce 
 with the proposal to surrender all the English prison- 
 
32 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 ers, including those taken with Beresford, provided 
 Whitelocke would evacuate the territory of Buenos 
 Ayres. One of Liniers's associates, Alzaga, insisted 
 that the terms of surrender should include Monte- 
 video. This demand seemed preposterous, but the 
 clause was finally inserted, and to their surprise agreed 
 to, so complete was the demoralization of the English. 
 On the 7th of July the terms of capitulation were 
 signed."" Thus through a lack of decision in the 
 cabinet and a display of incapacity in the field, with- 
 out parallel in British annals, the empire of the Plate 
 was lost." 
 
 With Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808, the 
 Spanish-American question came to the front once 
 more. Miranda returned to London and was detained 
 'there by the cabinet, as before by Pitt, with a view to 
 using him if occasion should require. At the same 
 time Castlereagh, now Foreign Secretary, had other 
 solutions of the question in view. It was proposed, 
 and the matter seriously discussed in the cabinet, to 
 alienate the colonies from Spain, if possible, without 
 revolution; and, instead of establishing republics 
 according to Miranda's plan, to unite them all under 
 a prince of the House of Bourbon. Louis Philippe, 
 Duke of Orleans, was suggested as the most suitable 
 person for the new crown. Some thirty years prior 
 to this, immediately upon the recognition by Spain 
 of the independence of the United States, Count de 
 Aranda had advised Charles IIL to forestall the move- 
 
 " See Watson : Spanish and Portuguese South America. 
 2 Vols. London, 1884, Vol. II, p. 271 ff. 
 
 " See Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh, Vol. VII 
 p. 316 ff. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 33 
 
 ment for independence, which must inevitably come in 
 his own provinces, by establishing among them three 
 great empires — one in Mexico, one in Peru, and one 
 on the Main — each to be ruled by a prince of the 
 royal family of Spain/' 
 
 Chateaubriand brought forward a similar plan sev- 
 eral years later at the Congress of Verona. The 
 present scheme was suggested by General Dumouriez 
 in the interests of his friend, the Duke of Orleans. 
 Several memorials on the subject, both by Dumou- 
 riez and the duke were presented to the British gov- 
 ernment in 1807 and 1808." 
 
 Napoleon's invasion of Spain constitutes at once 
 the most contemptible and the most disastrous chap- 
 ter in his career. In 1807, under the terms of an 
 agreement with Godoy, the unworthy favorite of the 
 queen and the virtual ruler of Spain, a French army 
 was introduced into the kingdom for the nominal 
 purpose of punishing Portugal for her refusal to join 
 the continental system. The Portuguese royal family, 
 fully appreciating the danger in which they stood, 
 fled to America and founded the empire of Brazil, 
 which in 181 5 was declared independent of Portugal. 
 The Spanish rulers attempted to follow their example, 
 but their intended flight became known and they were 
 prevented by the populace from leaving the capital. 
 In the meantime a disgraceful quarrel having arisen 
 between the old king, Charles IV., and Prince Ferdi- 
 nand, Napoleon, whose troops were now firmly es- 
 tablished in Spain, stepped in as arbiter between 
 
 "^ Romero: Mexico and the United States, Putnam, 1898, 
 p. 287. 
 " Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh, Vol. VII. 
 
 3 
 
34 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 father and son and summoned them both to meet him 
 on the northern frontier. Having purposely lingered 
 in France beyond the appointed time, he succeeded in 
 enticing them over the border to Bayonne, where he 
 compelled them both to renounce forever the crown 
 of Spain and the Indies, which he forthwith bestowed 
 upon his brother Joseph. When the truth dawned 
 upon them, the Spanish nation rose to a man. Napo- 
 leon had unwittingly aroused the latent principle of 
 nationality; he had put into action a force which was 
 new and one which the statesmen of Europe had 
 hitherto left out of account, but which was to prove 
 the most potent factor in the new epoch of political 
 history introduced by the French Revolution. 
 
 Provisional juntas were rapidly organized in the 
 various provinces of the kingdom of Spain and affairs 
 administered in the name of Ferdinand VII. The 
 Junta, or as it is better known, the Regency of Cadiz, 
 rapidly gained a position of national importance and 
 became the chief executive body of the Spanish nation. 
 The American provinces, which had long been restive 
 under Spanish rule, now claimed the same right of 
 self-government that the provinces of the Peninsula 
 had assumed, and began to depose the Spanish gov- 
 ernors and to set up juntas of their own, still acting 
 in the name of Ferdinand VII. The Americans 
 claimed that they were not politically a part of Spain, 
 but connected only through the sovereign, and that 
 with the removal of the sovereign the connection 
 ceased. The Regency of Cadiz, on the other hand, 
 maintained that the colonies were integral parts of 
 Spain, and claimed, therefore, the right to govern 
 them in the absence of the sovereign. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 35 
 
 The first throes of revolution were felt in 1809, 
 almost simultaneously in Upper Peru, Quito and 
 Mexico. These movements were quickly suppressed 
 with great cruelty. In the year 1810 the revolution 
 opened upon a vast scale. All the Spanish colonies 
 on the mainland, with the exception of Lower Peru, 
 revolted at the same time and proclaimed their inde- 
 pendence of Spain, although still professing allegiance 
 to Ferdinand VII., the dethroned king. 
 
 The colonial authorities were deposed in most cases 
 by force of public opinion and without violence. The 
 revolution was municipal in character, that is to say, 
 the cabildos, or town councils, the only popularly con- 
 stituted political bodies in the colonies, assumed the 
 initiative in the work of revolution and named the 
 juntas. The junta of the capital city in each province 
 was usually recognized as the chief executive body 
 for that province, and assumed for the time being 
 all the functions of government. National conven- 
 tions were then called in many cases to decide upon 
 the form of government. These in most cases en- 
 trusted the executive power to regencies or triumvi- 
 rates, almost all of which rapidly gave way to military 
 dictatorships. 
 
 The Regency of Cadiz had anticipated trouble from 
 the colonies and had recognized their rights as free- 
 men by inviting them to send deputies to the national 
 Cortes, but at the same time had abridged those rights 
 by allowing them only a very limited representation, 
 absurdly out of proportion to their population and 
 commercial importance. Upon the establishment of 
 the provisional governments or juntas in the colonies, 
 the Regency refused them the freedom of trade that 
 
36 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 had been promised, declined the proffered mediation 
 of England, and proceeded to stigmatize the Ameri- 
 cans as rebels and to declare them guilty of high 
 treason, although they had been guilty only of the 
 same conduct that the Spaniards themselves were pur- 
 suing at home. 
 
 Venezuela then (1811) declared herself independent 
 of both the Spanish nation and of the Spanish mon- 
 arch, and adopted a republican constitution. The 
 promulgation of the Spanish constitution of 1812 
 further encouraged the spirit of independence in the 
 colonies, but when Ferdinand was restored in 1814, 
 the colonies were still governed in his name, for the 
 revolution in Venezuela, which alone had declared 
 for independence, had been crushed out. Had Ferdi- 
 nand acted with any moderation or judgment his 
 American possessions would have been saved to his 
 crown. But the refusal of the colonies, which had 
 now enjoyed practical self-government for several 
 years, to take upon them without conditions the yoke 
 of absolute authority, was met with the proclamation 
 of a war of reconquest. Reconciliation was thereafter 
 no longer possible, and independence only a question 
 of time. By the close of 181 5 the revolution had 
 been put down in all the provinces except La Plata. 
 There it was never suppressed. For this reason we 
 shall first trace rapidly the course of the revolution 
 in the south, of which San Martin was the directing 
 power. 
 
 Jose de San Martin was born in 1778 in Paraguay, 
 his father being the governor of Misiones. When 
 eight years of age, his family went to Spain and he 
 was entered as a pupil in the Seminary of Nobles at 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 37 
 
 Madrid. At the age of twelve, he joined a regiment 
 as cadet and saw his first service in Africa. He 
 served in the Spanish army for more than twenty 
 years, and won promotion as well as special distinc- 
 tion for bravery. In the battle of Baylen, where a 
 detachment of Napoleon's disciplined troops was 
 beaten by an army of recruits inspired by patriotism, 
 San Martin, then a captain, won a gold medal and a 
 commission as lieutenant-colonel for his conduct. 
 Hearing of the struggle for liberty in his native land, 
 he resigned his commission and returned to America. 
 He was almost unknown personally, but his reputa- 
 tion as a brave soldier and a skilful tactician procured 
 for him immediate employment. At this time the 
 Argentine Republic had two armies in the field, the 
 one operating near at home against the Portuguese 
 in Uruguay and the Spanish in Montevideo, and the 
 other in Upper Peru (Bolivia) against the forces sent 
 by the viceroy of Peru to suppress the Argentine 
 revolution. San Martin was soon given the command 
 of this army in the north, succeeding General Bel- 
 grano. He soon placed his army in an excellent state 
 of discipline and put a check to the advances of the 
 Peruvian army. 
 
 On the i6th of May, 1814, the Argentine naval 
 force, under command of an Irishman named Brown, 
 defeated and almost entirely destroyed the Spanish 
 squadron stationed at Montevideo, and that city soon 
 after surrendered to the besieging army of Alvear, 
 San Martin's old comrade in the Spanish army. 
 Alvear, whose political influence was much greater 
 than San Martin's, now aspired to the conquest of 
 Peru, and therefore desired the command in the north. 
 
38 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 This San Martin willingly relinquished to him. He 
 had other plans in mind, and the state of his health 
 demanded rest. Upper Peru had been the high-road 
 from Peru to Buenos Ayres in times of peace, and 
 was, therefore, naturally looked upon as the line of 
 advance for the liberating army. San Martin, how- 
 ever, after a careful study of the question, had become 
 convinced that this was not the strategic line of 
 approach, that the Argentine Republic would never 
 succeed in conquering Peru from this quarter. His 
 idea was to carry the war to the west, to cross the 
 Andes, occupy Chile, and having secured a base there, 
 to attack Peru from the coast, continuing military 
 operations in the north merely as a diversion. The 
 success of this plan depended upon the performance 
 of two apparently impossible tasks — the passage of 
 the Andes and the creation of a navy on the Pacific. 
 San Martin was by far too shrewd a man to advocate 
 such an undertaking before maturing his plans. He, 
 therefore, confided it only to a few of his intimate 
 friends, and, taking advantage of his ill health, asked, 
 as a favor for himself, the government of the 
 obscure province of Cuyo, where from its capital of 
 Mendoza he could place himself in communication 
 with the Chilean patriots. 
 
 On the loth of August, 1814, San Martin was 
 appointed governor of Cuyo, and at once devoted 
 himself to the development of the plans which led to 
 the emancipation of half a continent and gave him his 
 place in the world's history. The revolutionary 
 movement in Chile had just been crushed out. It 
 was begun in 1810 and the general course of events 
 had been somewhat similar to the Argentine move- 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 39 
 
 ment, but it had fallen a victim first to disputes be- 
 tween the Patriot leaders and finally to the troops of 
 the viceroy of Peru. It would require more space 
 than we can give to trace the varying fortunes of the 
 cause in Chile through the stirring events that marked 
 the leadership of Dr. Rosas, of the Carrera brothers, 
 and of Bernardo O'Higgins. After the final collapse, 
 O'Higgins, with a number of other Patriots, fled over 
 the Andes to Mendoza and readily entered into the 
 plans of San Martin. It took the latter two years to 
 organize and equip an army and to convince the gov- 
 ernment of Buenos Ayres of the practicability of his 
 plan. 
 
 At length, on January 17, 1817, he began the passage 
 of the Andes with about 5000 men, 1600 horses, and 
 9000 mules, the latter carrying the field artillery, am- 
 munition and provisions. The summit of the Uspal- 
 lata Pass is 12,700 feet above the sea-level, 5000 feet 
 higher than the Great St. Bernard, by which Napoleon 
 led his army over the Alps. In many other respects 
 San Martin's achievement was more remarkable. 
 Each piece of artillery had to be carried suspended on 
 a pole between two mules, or where the road was par- 
 ticularly dangerous, dragged by ropes. There were 
 chasms that could be crossed only by cable bridges. 
 The march over the Andes occupied three weeks. 
 Both men and animals suffered greatly from soroche, 
 the illness caused by rarefied atmosphere. 
 
 At the foot of the mountain, at Chacabuco, the 
 vanguard of San Martin's army defeated a body of 
 4000 Royalists, and thus opened the road to Santiago, 
 which San Martin entered February 14, 1817. The 
 Chileans chose him Supreme Director of their govern- 
 
40 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 ment, but he declined the office, and O'Higgins was 
 chosen. 
 
 San Martin's great object, was to crush the colonial 
 power of Spain in its stronghold, Peru. Having by 
 the successful passage of the Andes and the victory 
 of Chacabuco in a measure justified his plan of cam- 
 paign, he returned to Buenos Ayres for reinforce- 
 ments. The Royalists meanwhile retreated to the 
 south. On the i8th of February, 1818, the independ- 
 ence of Chile was proclaimed. A month later the 
 Patriots were surprised at Cancha-Rayada and almost 
 routed, but within two weeks the army was again 
 ready for action, and on April 5, 1818, encountered 
 the Royalists at Maypu. This battle was a complete 
 victory for the Patriots and decided the fate of Chile. 
 Only one or two fortresses in the south were now held 
 for Spain. Five days after the battle of Maypu, San 
 Martin returned once more to Buenos Ayres and be- 
 gan organizing an expedition for the liberation of 
 Peru. Puyrredon, now Supreme Director, supported 
 his undertaking. 
 
 While San Martin was soliciting aid from the Ar- 
 gentine Republic, the Chilians were not idle. They 
 saw that the only way of insuring their independence 
 was by the creation of a navy. Through its agent in 
 London, the Chilian government secured the services 
 of Lord Cochrane, an English naval officer of great 
 distinction and remarkable talents, who by a curious 
 turn of fortune had been brought into unmerited dis- 
 grace and dismissed from the British service." He 
 reached Valparaiso in November and hoisted his flag 
 
 '° See Cochrane (Earl Dundonald) : Services in Chili. 2 
 Vols. London, 1859. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 4I 
 
 on board the O'Higgins, December 22, 1818. During 
 the course of the next year, Cochrane made two at- 
 tempts to take Callao, the seaport of Peru, but with- 
 out success beyond harassing the enemy in some of 
 the smaller coast towns. In February, 1820, by a 
 brilliant move, he captured Valdivia, a strongly-forti- 
 fied town still held by the Spaniards in southern Chile. 
 
 San Martin returned to Chile in January, 1820, and 
 began to assemble the army destined for the invasion 
 of Peru at Valparaiso. Of the 5000 men, two-thirds 
 were from Buenos Ayres, while nearly all of the ofifi- 
 cers were Argentine or European volunteers. Of 
 65 foreign officers, 37 were British and 3 were from 
 the United States. There were besides 30 English 
 officers in the Chilian navy. The expedition sailed 
 on the 21 st of August, 1820, on board the fleet com- 
 manded by Cochrane. San Martin landed his army 
 at Pisco, to the south of Lima, and sent an expedition 
 into the interior under General Arenales, who had 
 served the Patriots for years in Upper Peru. In 
 October, San Martin reimbarked his troops and 
 landed them again at Huacho, a point 70 miles north 
 of Lima. Meanwhile the Spanish squadron, com- 
 pletely demoralized by the appearance on the Pacific 
 of Lord Cochrane, whose daring exploits were well 
 known, was lying under the guns of Callao Castle. 
 On the night of November 5, 1820, Lord Cochrane 
 led a force of volunteers, consisting of 180 seamen and 
 100 marines, in open boats right under the batteries 
 of Callao, surprised and overpowered the crew of the 
 Esmeralda, the largest Spanish frigate, and, cutting 
 her loose, carried her ofif to his own squadron. 
 
 After Cochrane's exploit at Callao, the moral effect 
 
42 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 of which was very great, he urged upon San Martin 
 an immediate advance upon Lima, but San Martin 
 had two campaigns before him, the one military, the 
 other political. On first landing at Pisco he had 
 issued an order to his army in which he said " Re- 
 member that you are come not to conquer, but to 
 liberate a people; the Peruvians are our brothers." 
 And in spite of the impatience and restlessness of his 
 officers, he steadily adhered to his plan, to the no 
 small loss of his military prestige and ultimately to 
 his retirement from the scene of activity. His pur- 
 pose was by the presence of the liberating army to 
 give the people of Peru a chance to rise and throw 
 off the yoke of Spain. To this end he scattered 
 proclamations and addresses of a revolutionary char- 
 acter broadcast through the land and quietly awaited 
 results. The contest in Peru, he said, was not a war 
 of conquest and glory, but entirely of opinion; it was 
 a war of new and liberal principles against prejudice, 
 bigotry and tyranny. " People ask why I don't 
 march to Lima at once; so I might, and instantly 
 would, were it suitable to my views, which it is not. 
 I do not want military renown; I have no ambition 
 to be the conqueror of Peru; I want solely to liberate 
 the country from oppression. Of what use would 
 Lima be to me if the inhabitants were hostile in polit- 
 ical sentiment? How could the cause of independ- 
 ence be advanced by my holding Lima, or even the 
 whole country, in military possession? Far different 
 are my views. I wish to have all men thinking with 
 me, and do not choose to advance a step beyond the 
 gradual march of public opinion. The capital is now 
 ripe for declaring its sentiments, and I shall give them 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 43 
 
 the opportunity to do so in safety. It was in sure 
 expectation of this movement that I have hitherto 
 deferred advancing; and to those who know the full 
 extent of the means which have been put in action, a 
 sufficient explanation is afforded of all the delays that 
 have taken place. I have been gaining, indeed, day 
 by day, fresh allies in the hearts of the people, the 
 only certain allies in such a war. In the secondary 
 point of military strength, I have been, from the same 
 causes, equally successful in augmenting and improv- 
 ing the liberating army; while that of the Spaniards 
 has been wasted by want and desertion. The country 
 has now become sensible of its true interests, and it 
 is right the inhabitants should have the means of 
 expressing what they think. Public opinion is an 
 engine newly introduced into this country; the 
 Spaniards, who are utterly incapable of directing it, 
 have prohibited its use; but they shall now experience 
 its strength and importance." °' 
 
 The campaign of Arenales iti the interior was suc- 
 cessful. In the presence of the liberating army, the 
 people everywhere rose in revolt. San Martin's 
 method of conducting the campaign was the correct 
 one. Public opinion was soon aroused in the capital 
 itself, and the Royalists finally decided to evacuate 
 Lima. The viceroy retired with his forces to Cuzco 
 in the highlands. In response to an invitation from 
 the city authorities, the Patriots entered Lima on the 
 6th of July, 1821. San Martin himself entered with- 
 out ceremony after dark a few days later. The inde- 
 pendence of Peru was proclaimed on the 28th of July 
 
 " Hall's Journal, Vol. I, p. 181. Report of Conversation 
 with San Martin in Callao Roads. 
 
44 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 with imposing ceremonies in the great square of 
 Lima. San Martin was proclaimed Protector of Peru. 
 He proceeded to organize a civil government, and 
 established the celebrated Order of the Sun, distinct- 
 ively aristocratic in character. 
 
 San Martin had played a great part thus far, but 
 he had reached the zenith of his influence and power. 
 Dissensions soon arose. The task he had under- 
 taken was difficult in the extreme. It was much easier 
 to acquire power than to use it. At the time of the 
 evacuation of Lima by the Spaniards, he said to 
 Captain Hall: " For the last ten years I have been 
 unremittingly employed against the Spaniards; or 
 rather in favor of this country, for I am not against 
 any one who is not hostile to the cause of independ- 
 ence. All I wish is that this country should be 
 managed by itself, and by itself alone. As to the 
 manner in which it is to be governed, that belongs 
 not at all to me. I propose simply to give the people 
 the means of declaring themselves independent, and 
 of establishing a suitable form of government; after 
 which I shall consider I have done enough and leave 
 them." '" When the time came he kept his word. 
 
 While San Martin was leading the army of libera- 
 tion from the Argentine Republic to Chile, and from 
 Chile to Peru, Simon Bolivar, the liberator of the 
 north, was pursuing his chequered career in Vene- 
 zuela and Colombia, unfurling the standard of revolu- 
 tion wherever he could get a foothold. He was a 
 man, in every respect, the opposite of San Martin, 
 fiery, impetuous, wholly given over to personal am- 
 bition, neither a statesman nor a soldier, but one of 
 
 ■" Hall's Journal, Vol. I, p. 194. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 45 
 
 the greatest revolutionary leaders of any age or 
 country. His ignorance of military afifairs led him 
 into undertakings from which an experienced soldier 
 would have held back, but his indomitable pluck 
 carried him safely through all calamities, and his 
 wonderful enthusiasm fired his followers even in the 
 midst of disaster. 
 
 This remarkable man, whose reputation in the new 
 world stands second to that of Washington alone, 
 was, like Miranda, a native of Caracas. Sprung from 
 a family of wealth and influence he had, like most 
 young South Americans of his class, received his 
 education abroad, and had for several years led a 
 dissipated life in Paris. At first he held himself aloof 
 from the revolutionary leaders, but after the accom- 
 plishment of the revolution of Caracas, April 19, 1810, 
 he was persuaded to join the Patriot cause, and was 
 sent to London to solicit assistance from Great 
 Britain. 
 
 The junta of Caracas, like those subsequently 
 formed in the south, professed to act in the name of 
 Ferdinand VII., and fearing the influence of Miranda, 
 then in London, whose advocacy of absolute inde- ' 
 pendence had been open and avowed, they instructed 
 Bolivar and theil- other agents not to allow him to 
 come to Venezuela. Miranda came in spite of them, 
 however, under an assumed name, and was every- 
 where received with enthusiasm. Under his influence 
 a congress was elected which, on July 5, 181 1, de- 
 clared Venezuela a republic, free and independent of 
 all foreign dominion. Miranda was appointed Direc- 
 tor. This was the first South American declaration 
 of independence. The formal independence of the 
 
46 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 Argentine Republic was not declared until July 9, 
 1816. 
 
 The Patriot cause was ruined, however, by the 
 earthquake of March 25, 1812, which almost destroyed 
 the city of Caracas and several towns of importance. 
 Twenty thousand people are supposed to have per- 
 ished. As the disaster occurred on Holy Thursday, 
 the clergy were not slow to turn it to political account 
 and to persuade the people that it was a direct chas- 
 tisement of Heaven upon them for their rebellion 
 against Spain. The cause of the Patriots steadily lost 
 ground until the fall of Porto Cabello, through the 
 inefficiency of Bolivar, caused its complete collapse. 
 Miranda was forced to sign with Monteverde the 
 treaty of Vittoria, July 26, 1812, on the basis of com- 
 plete submission and a general amnesty. It is hardly 
 necessary to add that the Spanish general did not 
 abide by the terms of the capitulation. Miranda him- 
 self was detained by Bolivar, as he was on the point 
 of embarking for England, accused of having received 
 bribes from the Spaniards and of being unwilling to 
 share the fate of his followers, and treacherously 
 handed over to the Spaniards. He was sent to Spain 
 and after languishing for three years in a dungeon at 
 Cadiz, died July 14, 1816. His fate was a sad blot 
 upon the reputation of Bolivar. 
 
 The revolution in New Granada, which had been 
 inaugurated on the 20th of July, 1810, was still hold- 
 ing out and thither Bolivar proceeded to offer his 
 services to the Patriots of that province. As soon 
 as he had firmly established himself in influence and 
 power, he persuaded the government that their only 
 safety lay in the reconquest of Venezuela. He was 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 47 
 
 provided with troops, and in May, 1813, crossed the 
 frontier and took several important cities. He now 
 assumed a new attitude and became a self-appointed 
 dictator. He proclaimed a war of extermination 
 against Spaniards and adopted a new system of dates : 
 " 3d year of Independence and ist of the War to the 
 Death." He entered Caracas in triumph on the 6th 
 of August, 1813. He proclaimed himself dictator 
 with the title of Liberator. Meanwhile Marino, an- 
 other Patriot leader, had landed in the eastern part 
 of Venezuela near Cumana and declared himself dic- 
 tator. There were thus two dictators and no cor- 
 diality between them. Before they could come to an 
 agreement the enemy had recovered their position. 
 In December, 1814, the last Patriot force was defeated. 
 
 Bolivar and Marino retired once more to New 
 Granada. Bolivar was made captain-general of the 
 forces of New Granada, his title of Liberator was 
 recognized, and another, that of Illustrious Pacifica- 
 tor, bestowed upon him. A second time he under- 
 took the conquest of Venezuela from the west. Dis- 
 sensions soon arose between Bolivar and the other 
 leaders. He was refused reinforcements and foolishly 
 marched against the Patriot garrison of Cartagena. 
 He was now forced to give up his command, and em- 
 barked for Jamaica, May, 1815. 
 
 Meanwhile Ferdinand had been restored to the 
 throne of Spain, and an army of 10,000 men, com- 
 manded by Marshal Morillo, the ablest Spanish gen- 
 eral of the time, had been sent to reduce the provinces 
 on the Main. This expedition reached Cumana in 
 April, 1815, and before the end of the year all the 
 colonies, with the exception of the provinces of the 
 River Plate, were reduced to submission. 
 
48 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 Far from giving up hope, however, Bolivar pro- 
 ceeded to Hayti, and from that island, in May, 1816, 
 made a descent upon the eastern part of Venezuela, 
 but was routed by the Spaniards in July, and soon 
 returned to Hayti. A few of the Patriots still kept 
 the field, and towards the close of the year Bolivar's 
 partisans secured his recall. On the 21st of Decem- 
 ber he left Hayti with a second expedition for the 
 relief of his native land. He determined now to 
 direct all his efforts, not as hitherto, to the support 
 of the Patriot cause in the capital, but to the holding 
 of the great plains of the Orinoco. With this territory 
 as a base, he carried on, during the year 181 7, in 
 conjunction with the Llanero horsemen of General 
 Paez, a desperate struggle with the Spaniards. When 
 the rainy season of 1818 began, Bolivar's army had 
 been cut almost to pieces, he had lost prestige as a 
 general, and his civil authority amounted to nothing. 
 Only the cavalry of Paez maintained the Patriot cause. 
 Still the position of the Spaniards was not much bet- 
 ter. Morillo had 12,000 men scattered about, but 
 neither money, arms, nor supplies. He reported to 
 the viceroy of Peru: "Twelve pitched battles, in 
 which the best officers and troops of the enemy have 
 fallen, have not lowered their pride or lessened the 
 vigor of their attacks upon us." 
 
 In February, 1819, the second Congress of Vene- 
 zuela convened at Angostura. The Dictator resigned, 
 but was unanimously elected President and given 
 absolute power in all provinces which were the actual 
 theatre of war. The army was reorganized by the 
 accession of foreign troops, in particular the British 
 legion, consisting of 2000 well-equipped men, which 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 49 
 
 achieved much of the success of the next year. Boli- 
 var now conceived the idea of crossing the Cordillera 
 and reconquering New Granada. General Paez was 
 to attract the attention of Morillo on the plains in 
 front, and a demonstration was to be made on the 
 coast near Caracas, while Bolivar marched to the west. 
 This movement changed the whole face of affairs and 
 had a similar effect to the passage of the Andes by 
 San Martin. New Granada was won by the battle 
 of Boyaca, August 7, 1819. Morillo was now isolated 
 in Venezuela. In December, 1819, a congress of 
 delegates from Venezuela and New Granada met and 
 decreed the union of the two provinces in the Republic 
 of Colombia. Bolivar was named provisional Presi- 
 dent. An armistice was signed by Bolivar and 
 Morillo in November, 1820, which gave the Patriots 
 breathing time. The Spanish troops remaining in 
 Venezuela were defeated by Bolivar in the battle of 
 Carabobo, June 23, 182 1. Only a few fortresses on 
 the coast were still held by the Spaniards. 
 
 Bolivar entered Caracas once more in triumph and 
 tendered his resignation, an act always considered by 
 him necessary for giving the proper dramatic effect 
 to such occasions. Congress took no notice of it, but 
 drew up a constitution providing for a limited presi- 
 dential term of four years. The Liberator, " as he 
 feared," was elected President. He repeated his res- 
 ignation, but added that he would yield if Congress 
 persisted. Congress did persist. 
 
 After the battle of Boyaca, Bolivar had sent General 
 
 Sucre by sea to Guayaquil, nominally to aid the new 
 
 state against the RoyaUsts, but in reality to induce it 
 
 to join the Republic of Colombia. Sucre met with 
 
 4 
 
so THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 reverses and had to call on San Martin for assistance 
 from Peru. Meanwhile Bolivar was advancing by 
 land. On the nth of July, 1822, he entered Guaya- 
 quil in triumph, and two days later, on his own 
 responsibility, announced its incorporation with 
 Colombia. The junta resigned and took refuge on 
 board the Peruvian squadron in the harbor. On the 
 25th San Martin arrived by sea, and Bolivar sent two 
 of his aides to welcome him " on Colombian soil." 
 On the following day San Martin went ashore and he 
 and Bolivar met for the first and last time. They had 
 two private interviews, after which San Martin sent 
 his baggage aboard his ship and announced that he 
 would sail after attending the ball to be given that 
 night in his honor. At the public banquet that even- 
 ing Bolivar rose and proposed a toast: " To the two 
 greatest men of South America — General San Martin 
 and myself." San Martin also proposed a toast : " To 
 the speedy conclusion of the war; to the organization 
 of the different republics of the continent; and to the 
 health of the Liberator of Colombia" — ^words which 
 well contrasted the personal and political aims of the 
 two men. San Martin and Bolivar had been unable 
 to agree upon any plan for the expulsion of the 
 Spaniards from the highlands of Peru. The self- 
 denying patriot gave way before the man of ambition. 
 To O'Higgins he wrote : " The Liberator is not the 
 man we took him to be." 
 
 Upon his return to Peru San Martin wrote to 
 Bolivar: "My decision is irrevocable. I have con- 
 vened the first Congress of Peru; the day after its 
 installation I shall leave for Chile, convinced that my 
 presence is the only obstacle which keeps you from 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 5 1 
 
 coming to Peru with your army." On the 20th of 
 September, 1822, he laid his resignation before the 
 Congress, and issued an address to the nation. " The 
 presence of a fortunate soldier," he said, " however 
 disinterested he may be, is dangerous to a newly 
 founded state. I have proclaimed the independence 
 of Peru. I have ceased to be a public man." These 
 words, whether intentionally so or not, were prophetic 
 of Bolivar's subsequent career. San Martin wrote to 
 O'Higgins: " I am tired of hearing them call me 
 tyrant, that I wish to make myself king, emperor, the 
 devil. On the other hand, my health is broken, this 
 climate is killing me. My youth was sacrificed to the 
 service of Spain; my manhood to my own country. 
 I think I have now the right to dispose of my old 
 age." 
 
 Bolivar's jealousy of San Martin prolonged the war, 
 which might have been brought to a close in a few 
 months, for nearly three years. After the withdrawal 
 of San Martin, Bolivar became Dictator of Peru. On 
 the 9th day of December, 1824, was fought the last 
 battle of South American independence. On the little 
 plain of Ayacucho, 11,600 feet above the sea, General 
 Sucre defeated and captured the forces of the viceroy. 
 Upper Peru was organized as a separate republic, 
 with the name of Bolivia. 
 
 Bolivar had been proclaimed President of Peru for 
 life, but the unpopularity of this measure led him to 
 leave the country in 1826, never to return. That same 
 year he summoned the Congress of Panama, but his 
 plans for the union of South America in one republic 
 failed. San Martin's idea finally triumphed. In 1829 
 Venezuela separated itself from Colombia and passed 
 
52 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 a decree of perpetual banishment against Bolivar. In 
 April, 1830, through pressure of public opinion, 
 Bolivar resigned the presidency of Colombia and re- 
 tired into private life. Congress voted him an annual 
 pension of $30,000. A month later Quito and Guaya- 
 quil separated from Colombia and formed the inde- 
 pendent state of Ecuador. Even the name Colombia 
 was dropped by the remaining state, and the old 
 name of New Granada adopted. In 1857 the name 
 Colombia was assumed once more. 
 
 Bolivar died in a small house near Santa Martha, 
 December 17, 1831, having witnessed the failure of 
 his most cherished plans. San Martin had retired to 
 Europe in 1823 with his only child, a daughter named 
 Mercedes. They lived a retired life in Brussels. 
 Once only, in 1828, he returned to his native land, but 
 was received with such denunciation by the press of 
 Buenos Ayres that he quickly turned his face towards 
 Europe again. He died at Boulogne, August 17, 1850. 
 Thirty years later the Argentine people had his re- 
 mains brought back to his native land. In May, 1880, 
 with imposing ceremonies, they were laid to rest in 
 the Cathedral of Buenos Ayres." 
 
 Mexico was twice revolutionized. The first strug- 
 
 " The following are a few of the best books in English on 
 the Spanish- American Revolution: 
 
 Cochrane (Earl Dundonald): Services in Chili. 2 Vols. 
 London, 1859. 
 
 Hall: Journal on Chili, Peru, and Mexico. 2 Vols. Edin- 
 burgh, 1824. 
 
 Holstein: Life of Bolivar. Boston, 1829. 
 
 Miller: Memoirs of General Miller in the Service of Peru. 
 2 Vols. London, 1829. 
 
 Mitre: The Emancipation of South America. Translated 
 by Pilling. London, 1893. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 53 
 
 gle began in 1809 ^^^ 1810, and was carried on 
 spasmodically until 1817. The second revolution 
 broke out in 1820 on receipt of the news from Spain 
 of the revolution of March, 1820, and the re-adoption 
 of the constitution of 1812. The old revolutionists 
 demanded the proclamation of this constitution in 
 Mexico, but the Viceroy Apodaca opposed them. 
 Augustin de Iturbide, a native Mexican, who in the 
 first revolution had steadfastly adhered to the cause 
 of the king, now defected to the popular side with a 
 large body of troops which the viceroy had entrusted 
 to his command. On the 24th of February, 1821, he 
 issued the celebrated document known as the Plan of 
 Iguala, from the town of that name. In it he pro- 
 posed the maintenance of the Roman Catholic religion 
 to the exclusion of all others, the independence of 
 Mexico from Spain, and the establishment of a limited 
 monarchy. The Imperial Crown of Mexico was to be 
 offered first to Ferdinand VII., in the event of his 
 declining, to the younger princes of his house; and 
 in the event of their refusal, the duty of naming an 
 emperor was to fall to the representative assembly of 
 Mexico. The personal and property rights of Span- 
 iards in Mexico were carefully guaranteed. In secur- 
 ing the interests of Spaniards and of the clergy, those 
 who had most to lose, this plan differed essentially 
 from the revolutionary policy of the other Spanish 
 colonies. On the other hand, the Creole element was 
 satisfied with the promise of independence and a rep- 
 resentative government. The revolutionary army 
 became known as "the Army. of the Three Guaran- 
 tees," these being (i) the maintenance of the religious 
 establishment in its present form, (2) independence. 
 
54 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 
 
 and (3) the union of Americans and Spaniards." This 
 ingenious document received immediately the widest 
 approval. 
 
 The Viceroy Apodaca had practically abdicated 
 when his successor, General O'Donaju, arrived from 
 Spain. As the latter had come without troops, there 
 was nothing left but for him to recognize the revolu- 
 tion as an accomplished fact and make the best terms 
 for his country he could. Accordingly he met Itur- 
 bide in conference at Cordova, and after a brief dis- 
 cussion signed the treaty bearing that name, August 
 24, 1821. It was agreed that a provisional junta 
 should be appointed, that O'Donaju should be a mem- 
 ber, and that the junta should proceed to carry into 
 effect the plan of Iguala. O'Donaju then persuaded 
 the Royalists to open the gates of the capital, and on 
 the 27th of September, 1821, Iturbide entered. 
 Shortly thereafter O'Donaju died from the yellow 
 fever, thus leaving Iturbide free to carry out his plans. 
 The Spanish government, of course, repudiated the 
 treaty of Cordova. 
 
 The Congress, which assembled in pursuance of 
 the program of Iguala, was divided between Imperial- 
 ists and Republicans. In spite of the opposition of 
 the latter, Iturbide had himself proclaimed emperor 
 and his family ennobled. Congress soon fell into dis- 
 putes with the emperor, who finally, in October, 1822, 
 dissolved it by force. A few months later Santa 
 Anna inaugurated a counter-revolution from Vera 
 Cruz, which resulted in the abdication of the emperor. 
 Iturbide was allowed to leave the country. He re- 
 tired to Italy, where he resided until toward the close 
 
 " Hall's Journal, Vol. II, p. 188. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REVOLT 55 
 
 of 1823, when he went to London. In May, 1824, at 
 the solicitation of certain of his partisans, he sailed 
 again for Mexico,** ignorant of the decree of perpetual 
 banishment passed against him by the Congress a 
 few weeks before. He landed at Tampico on the 12th 
 of July, but was seized and executed a few days later. 
 The new assembly then in session adopted a constitu- 
 tion, and the Republic of Mexico was launched upon 
 what was to prove, for years to come, a career of 
 turbulence and anarchy. 
 
 °° See the statement of Iturbide in regard to his political 
 life published in the Pamphleteer, London, 1827. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 Part Played by the United States and England 
 IN Founding the Spanish-American Republics 
 
 The struggle of the South American peoples for in- 
 dependence was viewed from the first with feelings of 
 profound satisfaction and sympathy in the United 
 States. From the commencement of the revolution 
 South American vessels were admitted into the ports 
 of the United States under whatever flag they bore. 
 It does not appear that any formal declaration ac- 
 cording belligerent rights to the said provinces was 
 ever made, though a resolution to that effect was in- 
 troduced into the House by committee as early as De- 
 cember lo, 1811.' Such formal action was apparently 
 not deemed necessary and, as there was no Spanish 
 minister resident in the United States at that time to 
 protest, our ports were probably thrown open, as a 
 matter of course.' The fact that they were accorded 
 full belligerent rights from the first was afterwards 
 stated by President Monroe in his annual messages 
 of 1817 and 1818 and in his special message of March 
 8, 1822.' 
 
 At an early date of the revolution commissioners ar- 
 rived in Washington seeking recognition of indepen- 
 
 '■ Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. Ill, p. 538. 
 ' On this point cf. Wharton's Digest, Sec. 69. 
 ' Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. II, pp. 13, 58 
 and 116. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 57 
 
 dence, and agents were forthwith dispatched to South 
 America to obtain information in regard to the state 
 of the revolutionary governments and to watch the 
 movements of England and other European powers. 
 Joel R. Poinsett was sent to Buenos Ayres in 1811, 
 and the following year Alexander Scott was sent to 
 Venezuela.' In 181 7 Caesar A. Rodney, Theodorick 
 Bland, and John Graham were dispatched as special 
 commissioners to South America. They proceeded to 
 Buenos Ayres, where they arrived in February, 1818, 
 and remained until the last of April. Rodney and 
 Graham then returned to the United States while 
 Bland proceeded across the continent to Chile. Their 
 reports were transmitted to Congress November 17, 
 1818.° In 1820 Messrs. J. B. Prevost and John M. 
 Forbes were sent as commercial agents to Chile and 
 Buenos Ayres. Reports from them on the state of 
 the revolutions were transmitted to Congress, March 
 8 and April 26, 1822.' 
 
 In the meantime a strong sentiment in favor of the 
 recognition of South American independence had 
 arisen in the United States. The struggling colonies 
 found a ready champion in Henry Clay, who, for a 
 period of ten years labored almost incessantly in their 
 behalf, pleading for their recognition first with his own 
 countrymen and then, as secretary of state under the 
 Adams administration, with the governments of Eu- 
 rope. His name became a household word in South 
 
 * Lyman: Diplomacy of the United States. 2 Vols. Bos- 
 ton, 1828, Vol. II, p. 432. Romero: Mexico and the United 
 States. 
 
 ° Given in full in Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 
 217-270. 
 
 •Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 818-851. 
 
58 THE SPANISa-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 America and his speeches were translated and read be- 
 fore the patriot armies. 
 
 In spite of the fact that our own political interests 
 were so closely identified with the struggling republics, 
 the President realized the necessity of following a neu- 
 tral course, and in view of the aid the colonies were 
 receiving from citizens of the United States, called 
 upon Congress for the enactment of a more stringent 
 neutrality law. Clay delivered a vigorous speech in 
 opposition to this measure in January, 1817. His 
 greatest effort in behalf of South America, however, 
 was his speech of March 25, 1818, on the general ap- 
 propriation bill. He moved an amendment appro- 
 priating $18,000 for the outfit and year's salary of a 
 minister to the United Provinces of the Plate. With- 
 out waiting to hear the report of the three commis- 
 sioners who had been sent to inquire into the state of 
 the revolutionary governments, he urged that a minis- 
 ter be regularly accredited to Buenos Ayres at once. 
 In a speech, three hours in length, he concluded the 
 arguments he had begun the day before. Painting 
 with even more than his usual fire and enthusiasm the 
 beauties and resources of the Southern continent, he 
 said: "Within this vast region, we behold the most 
 sublime and interesting objects of creation ; the loftiest 
 mountains, the most majestic rivers in the world; the 
 richest mines of the precious metals; and the choicest 
 productions of the earth. We behold there a spectacle 
 still more interesting and sublime — the glorious spec- 
 tacle of eighteen millions of people struggling to burst 
 their chains and be free." ' He went on to say that in 
 the establishment of the independence of the South 
 
 ' Benton's Abridgment, Vol. VI, p. 139. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 59 
 
 American states the United States had the deepest in- 
 terest. He had no hesitation in asserting his firm be- 
 lief that there was no question in the foreign poHcy of 
 this country, which had ever arisen, or which he could 
 conceive as ever occurring, in the decision of which we 
 had so much at stake. This interest concerned our 
 politics, our commerce, our navigation. There could 
 be no doubt that Spanish America, once independent, 
 whatever might be the form of the governments estab- 
 lished in its several parts, those governments would 
 be animated by an American feeling and guided by 
 an American policy. They would obey the laws of 
 the system of the new world, of which they would com- 
 pose a part, in contradistinction to that of Europe.' 
 The House turned a deaf ear to his brilliant rhetoric. 
 The motion was defeated by a vote of 115 to 45. 
 
 Clay's whole conduct in regard to this question was 
 exemplified in his attack upon the administration, 
 which greatly disturbed President Monroe. On the 
 20th of May, 1820, he again introduced a resolution 
 declaring it expedient to send ministers to the " gov- 
 ernments in South America which have established 
 and are maintaining their independence of Spain." 
 His arraignment of the administration became more 
 violent than ever : " If Lord Castlereagh says we 
 may recognize, we do; if not, we do not. A single 
 expression of the British minister to the present secre- 
 tary of state, then our minister abroad, I am ashamed 
 to say, has moulded the policy of our government to- 
 ward South America." A charge of dependence upon 
 Great Britain in affairs of diplomacy was as effective 
 a weapon then as it has been since in matters financial. 
 
 ° Benton's Abridgment, Vol. VI, p. 142. 
 
6o THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 Clay's resolution passed the House by a vote of 80 to 
 75, but still the executive arm of the government did 
 not move. In 1817 and 1818 the question of South 
 American independence was continually before the 
 cabinet for discussion. President Monroe seemed 
 strongly inclined toward recognition, but in this he 
 was opposed by Adams and Calhoun, who were un- 
 willing to act in the matter without some understand- 
 ing with England, and if possible with France. Our 
 relations with Spain in regard to the Indian troubles 
 in Florida were in a very strained condition and any 
 action taken at that time in recognition of South 
 America would have involved us in war with Spain 
 and almost inevitably with other European powers. 
 The President, therefore, as a matter of expediency 
 postponed the action which his sympathy prompted, 
 and, in his annual message of November 16, 1818, ex- 
 pressed his satisfaction at the course the government 
 had hitherto pursued and his intention of adhering to 
 it for the time being.' Under the President's direction, 
 however, efforts were made to secure the cooperation 
 of Great Britain and France in promoting the inde- 
 pendence of South America." 
 
 In 1819 an amicable adjustment of our differences 
 with Spain seemed to have been reached by the nego- 
 tiation of a treaty providing for the cession of the 
 Floridas to the United States and the settlement of 
 long-standing claims of American citizens against 
 Spain. An unforeseen difificulty arose, however, which 
 
 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. II, p. 44. 
 
 " Adams's Diary, September, 1817, to December, 1818. 
 Castlereagh's Letters and Despatches, Vol. XI, pp. 404 and 
 458. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 6l 
 
 proved embarrassing to the administration. The Span- 
 ish monarch very shrewdly delayed ratifying the 
 treaty for two years and thus practically tied liie hands 
 of the administration during that time as far as the 
 South American question was concerned. 
 
 In spite of the awkward position in which the ad- 
 ministration found itself, Clay, who was opposed to the 
 treaty on account of its unwarranted surrender of our 
 claims to Texas, continued to plead the cause of South 
 America. Early in the year, 182 1, a declaration of 
 interest in the South American struggle, introduced by 
 him, was carried by an overwhelming majority (134 to 
 12), but the administration held back another year un- 
 til the de facto independence of the colonies no longer 
 admitted of reasonable doubt. Meanwhile the Florida 
 treaty had been ratified. On the 8th of March, 1822, 
 President Monroe, in a special message to Congress, 
 expressed the opinion that the time had come for rec- 
 ognition and asked for the appropriations necessary for 
 carrying it into effect. The President's recommenda- 
 tion was received with approval, and in due course the 
 sum of $100,000 was appropriated for " such missions 
 to the independent nations on the American continent 
 as the President of the United States may deem 
 proper." In accordance with this act Mr. R. C. An- 
 derson of Kentucky was appointed minister to Co- 
 lombia, Mr. C. A. Rodney of New Jersey to the Ar- 
 gentine Republic, and Mr. H. Allen of Vermont to 
 Chile, in 1824, and Mr. Joel R. Poinsett of South Caro- 
 lina to Mexico in 1826. 
 
 While the United States government was concern- 
 ing itself with the political interests of the Spanish 
 provinces. Great Britain was quietly reaping all the 
 
62 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 commercial advantages to be derived from the situa- 
 tion and was apparently well satisfied to let things 
 follow the drift they had taken. By the destruction of 
 the combined fleets of France and Spain at Trafalgar, 
 in 1805, Nelson had won for Great Britain undisputed 
 control of the Atlantic and laid open the route to South 
 America. Ever since the asiento of 171 3 had placed 
 the slave trade in her hands. Great Britain had real- 
 ized the possibilities of South American commerce, 
 and the intercourse, which had been kept up with that 
 country after the termination of the slave monopoly 
 by smugglers, now that the danger was removed be- 
 came more regular and profitable. During the 
 changes of ministry that followed the death of Pitt, the 
 policy of England in regard to South America was 
 weak and vacillating. We have already called atten- 
 tion to the political indecision that marked the attack 
 upon the provinces of the Plate. With Napoleon's in- 
 vasion of Spain and the national uprising it occasioned, 
 British policy became once more intelligible. It was 
 wisely deemed of more importance to spare the colo- 
 nies and to win Spain over to the European alliance 
 against Napoleon, than to take her colonies at the cost 
 of driving her permanently into the arms of France. 
 Meanwhile British commerce with the South Ameri- 
 can states was steadily growing and that too with the 
 connivance of Spain. 
 
 At the close of the Napoleonic wars, Spain, fearing 
 that England through her desire to keep this trade, 
 would secretly furnish aid to the colonies in their strug- 
 gle for independence, proposed to the British govern- 
 ment to bind itself to a strict neutrality. This England 
 agreed to, and when the treaty was signed, there was, 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 63 
 
 according to Canning, " a distinct understanding with 
 Spain that our commercial intercourse with the colo- 
 nies was not to be deemed a breach of its stipula- 
 tions." " Notwithstanding this tacit compact, British 
 commerce suffered greatly at the hands of Spanish pri- 
 vateers and even Spanish war vessels. Nunibers of 
 British merchantmen were captured by Spanish ships, 
 carried into the few ports left to Spain on the Main, 
 and condemned as prizes for trading with the insurgent 
 colonies. Thus at the time of the acknowledgment of 
 South American independence by the United States, a 
 long list of grievances had accumulated in the hands 
 of the British ambassador at Madrid, and in spite of 
 urgent and repeated remonstrances, remained unre- 
 dressed. 
 
 Canning was deterred from making final demands 
 upon the government of Madrid by the consideration 
 that he did not wish to hamper the constitutional gov- 
 ernment of Spain, which had come into being by the 
 revolution of March, 1820, and against which the other 
 powers of Europe were preparing to act. The condi- 
 tion of affairs on the Spanish Main was, however, 
 critical and demanded instant redress. He decided, 
 therefore, to take matters into his own hands without 
 harassing the government of Spain, and to dispatch a 
 squadron to the West Indies to make reprisals. In a 
 memorandum to the cabinet on this subject, Novem- 
 ber 15, 1822, in which he outlines his policy, he com- 
 mends the course of the United States in recognizing 
 the de facto independence of the colonies, claiming a 
 right to trade with them and avenging the attempted 
 interruption of that right by making reprisals, as a 
 
 " Stapleton: Political Life of Canning, Vol. II, p. 10. 
 
64 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 more straightforward and intelligible course than that 
 of Great Britain, forbearing for the sake of Spain to 
 recognize the colonies, trading with them in faith of 
 the connivance of Spain and suffering depredations 
 without taking redress. It was not necessary, he 
 thought, to declare war against Spain, for " she had 
 perhaps as little direct and available power over the 
 colonies which she nominally retains as she has over 
 those which have thrown off her yoke. Let us apply, 
 therefore, a local remedy to a local grievance, and make 
 the ships and harbors of Cuba, Porto Rico and Porto 
 Cabello answerable for the injuries which have been 
 inflicted by those ships, and the perpetrators of which 
 have found shelter in those harbors." In conclusion, 
 he says, that the tacit compact, which subsisted for 
 years, by which Spain was to forbear from interrupting 
 British trade with the South American colonies having 
 been renounced by Spain, and the old colonial system 
 having been revived in as full vigor as if she had still 
 a practical hold over her colonies and a navy to en- 
 force her pretensions, " no man will say that under 
 such circumstances our recognition of those states can 
 be indefinitely postponed." " 
 
 While Great Britain was thus considering the expe- 
 diency of following the example of the United States 
 in the recognition of Spain's revolted colonies, the 
 powers of central Europe had taken upon them the 
 task of solving the difficulties of that unfortunate 
 country both at home and in America. The restored 
 rule of the Bourbons in Spain had been far from satis- 
 factory to the great mass of the people. In March, 
 
 "Stapleton: Official Correspondence of Canning, Vol I 
 p. 48 ff. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 65 
 
 1820, the army which Ferdinand had assembled at 
 Cadiz to be sent against the rebellious colonies, sud- 
 denly turned against the government, refused to em- 
 bark, and demanded the restoration of the constitution 
 of 1812. The action of the army was everywhere ap- 
 proved and sustained by the mass of the people, and 
 the king was forced to proclaim the constitution and 
 to swear to uphold it. The . March revolution in 
 Spain was followed in July by a constitutional move- 
 ment in Naples, and in August of the same year by a 
 similar movement in Portugal; while the next year 
 saw the outbreak of the Greek struggle for independ- 
 ence. Thus in all three of the peninsulars of Southern 
 Europe the people were struggling for the right of self- 
 government. The movement in Greece was, it is true, 
 of an altogether different character from the others, 
 but it was a revolt against constituted authority and 
 therefore incurred the ill-will of the so-called legiti- 
 mists. The powers of Europe at once took alarm at 
 the rapid spread of revolutionary ideas and proceeded 
 to adopt measures for the suppression of the move- 
 ments to which these ideas gave rise. The principle 
 of joint intervention on the part of allied governments 
 in the internal affairs of European states had been de- 
 veloped in the years immediately following the over- 
 throw of Napoleon and was the outcome of the wholly 
 anomalous condition in which he had left the politics 
 of Europe. In the hands of Prince Metternich, the 
 genius of reaction against French revolutionary ideas, 
 this principle had become the most powerful weapon 
 of absolutism and now threatened the subversion of 
 popular institutions throughout Europe. 
 
 The rapid development of this doctrine of interven- 
 S 
 
66 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 tion in the seven years immediately following the sec- 
 ond fall of Napoleon not only seriously menaced the 
 liberties of Europe, but also threatened to control the 
 destiny of the new world. At the Congress of Vienna 
 Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia 
 had formed a close union and had signed the treaty 
 upon which the peace of Europe rested for the next 
 half century. The agreement arrived at at Vienna was 
 reafRrmed with some minor changes, after the second 
 overthrow of Napoleon, at Paris, November 20, 181 5. 
 France was now practically excluded from the alliance. 
 This treaty undertook especially to guard against any 
 further disturbance of the peace of Europe by Napo- 
 leon or France. One of the most significant features 
 of the treaty, or what was to prove so, was the agree- 
 ment definitely laid down in the sixth article, provid- 
 ing for meetings of the powers at fixed periods. 
 
 The first conference held in accordance with this 
 understanding was that at Aix-la-Chapelle in October, 
 1818. France was readmitted as a member of the alli- 
 ance and her territory evacuated by the allied armies. 
 The Quintuple Alliance thus formed declared that it 
 had no other object than the maintenance of peace; 
 that the repose of the world was its motive and its 
 end. The language of the declaration had been in a 
 large measure neutralized to suit the views of the Brit- 
 ish government. Lord Liverpool had said to Castle- 
 reagh before the meeting of the conference: "The 
 Russian must be made to feel that we have a parlia- 
 ment and a public, to which we are responsible, and 
 that we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into views 
 of policy which are wholly incompatible with the 
 spirit of our government." The members of the Brit- 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 67 
 
 ish cabinet, except Canning, did not object seriously 
 to the system of congresses at fixed intervals, but to 
 the declarations publicly set forth by them. Canning, 
 on the other hand, objected to the declarations and to 
 the conferences themselves, " meetings for the govern- 
 ment of the world," as he termed them. 
 
 It had been generally supposed that the question of 
 the Spanish colonies would come up for discussion at 
 Aix-la-Chapelle. Castlereagh assured the United 
 States, through Bagot the British minister at Wash- 
 ington, that while England would act with the allied 
 powers at Aix-la-Chapelle in mediation between Spain 
 and her colonies, her mediation would be limited en- 
 tirely to the employment of her influence and good 
 offices and that she would not take any measures that 
 might assume a character of force." 
 
 The revolutions that took place in Spain, Naples 
 and Portugal in 1820 presented an occasion for another 
 meeting of the allies. In November the representa- 
 tives of Austria, Russia, and Prussia met in conference 
 at Troppau, and issued a circular setting forth what 
 they had already done for Europe in overthrowing the 
 military tyranny of Napoleon and expressing the de- 
 termination "to put a curb on a force no less tyran- 
 nical and no less detestable, that of revolt and crime." 
 The conference then adjourned to Laybach, where 
 they could, with greater dispatch, order the move- 
 ments they had decided to take against the revolution- 
 ists of Naples. Austria, being more intimately con- 
 cerned with the political condition of the Italian pen- 
 
 " Bagot to Castlereagh, October 31, 1818. Mem. of a Con- 
 versation with Adams. Letters and Despatches of Castle- 
 reagh, Vol. XII, p. (£. 
 
68 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 . insula than either of the other two powers, was en- 
 trusted with the task of suppressing the Neapolitan 
 revolution. The Austrian army entered Naples on the 
 23d of March, 1821, overthrew the constitutional gov- 
 ernment that had been inaugurated, and restored Fer- 
 dinand II. to absolute power. The revolution, which 
 had broken out in Piedmont, was also suppressed by 
 a detachment of the Austrian army. 
 
 England held aloof from all participation in the pro- 
 ceedings at Troppau and Laybach — ^though Sir 
 Charles Stuart was present to watch the proceedings. 
 In a circular dispatch of January 21, 1821, the British 
 government expressed its dissent from the principles 
 set forth in the Troppau circular. 
 
 The next meeting of the allied powers was arranged 
 for October, 1822, at Verona. Here the affairs of 
 Greece, Italy, and in particular, Spain, came up for 
 consideration. At this Congress all five powers of the 
 alliance were represented. France was uneasy about 
 the condition of Spain, and England had to send a 
 delegate out of self-defence, as her interests were 
 largely involved. Castlereagh was preparing to de- 
 part for the congress, when his mind gave way under 
 the stress of work and more remotely of dissipation, 
 and he committed suicide. Canning then became sec- 
 retary for foreign afifairs, and Wellington was sent to 
 Verona. 
 
 The congress which now assembled at Verona was 
 devoted largely to a discussion of Spanish affairs. 
 Wellington had been instructed to use all his influence 
 against the adoption of measures of intervention in 
 Spain. When he found that the other powers were 
 bent upon this step and that his protest would be un- 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 69 
 
 heeded, he wdthdrew from the congress. The four re- 
 maining powers signed the secret treaty of Verona, 
 November 22, 1822, as a revision, so they declared in 
 the preamble, of the Treaty of the Holy Alliance. This 
 treaty of the Holy Alliance, signed at Paris, Septem- 
 ber 26, 181 5, by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, is one 
 of the most remarkable political documents extant. 
 It sprang from the erratic brain of the Czar Alexander 
 under the influence of Madame Crudner, who was 
 both an adventuress and a religious enthusiast. Its 
 object was to uphold the divine right of kings and to 
 counteract the spirit of French revolutionary ideas by 
 introducing " the precepts of justice, of charity, and of 
 peace " into the internal affairs of states and into their 
 relations with one another. No one had taken it seri- 
 ously except the Czar himself and it had been without 
 influence upon the politics of Europe. The treaty of 
 Verona, however, which was avowedly a revision of 
 the Holy Alliance, is a document of the highest im- 
 portance. It contains seven articles, four of which we 
 quote in full: 
 
 "The undersigned, specially authorized to make 
 some additions to the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, 
 after having exchanged their respective credentials, 
 have agreed as follows: 
 
 " Article I. The high contracting parties being con- 
 vinced that the system of representative government is 
 equally incompatible with the monarchical principles 
 as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the 
 divine right, engage mutually, and in the most solemn 
 manner, to use all their efforts to put an end to the 
 system of representative governments, in whatever coun- 
 try it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being 
 
70 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 introduced in those countries where it is not yet 
 known. 
 
 " Art. II. As it cannot be doubted that the liberty 
 of the press is the most powerful means used by the 
 pretended supporters of the rights of nations, to the 
 detriment of those of Princes, the high contracting 
 parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper meas- 
 ures to suppress it not only in their own states, but 
 also, in the rest of Europe. 
 
 " Art. III. Convinced that the principles of religion 
 contribute most powerfully to keep nations in the state 
 of passive obedience which they owe to their Princes, 
 the high contracting parties declare it to be their in- 
 tention to sustain, in their respective states, those 
 measures which the clergy may adopt, with the aim 
 of ameliorating their own interests, so intimately con- 
 nected with the preservation of the authority of 
 Princes; and the contracting powers join in offering 
 their thanks to the Pope, for what he has already done 
 for them, and solicit his constant cooperation in their 
 views of submitting the nations. 
 
 " Art. IV. The situation of Spain and Portugal unites 
 unhappily all the circumstances to which this treaty has 
 particular reference. The high contracting parties, in 
 confiding to France the care of putting an end to 
 them, engage to assist her in the manner which may 
 the least compromise them with their own people and 
 the people of France, by means of a subsidy on the 
 part of the two empires, of twenty millions of francs 
 every year, from the date of the signature of this 
 treaty to the end of the war." 
 
 Signed by Mettemich for Austria, Chateaubriand 
 for France, Bernstet for Prussia, and Nesselrode for 
 Russia. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 7 1 
 
 Such was the code of absolutism against which Eng- 
 land protested and against which President Monroe 
 delivered his declaration. 
 
 The Congress broke up about the middle of Decem- 
 ber, and the following April, the Due d' Angouleme 
 led a French army across the Pyrenees. By October 
 Ferdinand had been restored to absolute power." 
 
 The Congress of Verona was the last of the joint- 
 meetings of the powers of Europe for the discussion 
 of the internal affairs of states. It marked the final 
 withdrawal of England from the European alliance. 
 Henceforth she took up a position distinctly hostile to 
 the principles advocated by her former allies and her 
 policy in relation to Spanish America practically coin- 
 cided with that of the United States. 
 
 The great majority of the English people sympa- 
 thized deeply with the constitutional movement in 
 Spain and were ready to take up arms in support of the 
 Spanish people. The protest of England having been 
 disregarded by the powers at Verona, it became neces- 
 sary for the cabinet, in view of the preparations going 
 on in France for the invasion of the Peninsula, to say 
 what they contemplated doing. In February, 1823, 
 Lord Liverpool circulated among his colleagues a 
 minute prepared by Canning, which gave at length the 
 reasons, military and other, why it would be unwise 
 for England to undertake the defence of Spain. In the 
 
 " For the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Lay- 
 bach and Verona, see Castlereagh's Letters and Despatches, 
 Vol. XII; Life of Lord Liverpool, Vol. Ill; Political Life 
 and Official Correspondence of Canning; Chateaubriand's 
 Congres de Verone. For text of Treaties of Holy Alliance 
 and Verona see Snow's Treaties and Topics in American 
 Diplomacy, p. 243 ff. 
 
72 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 first place, the war against Spain was unpopular in 
 France, and if Great Britain should take part in the 
 war, the French government would avail itself of the 
 fact to convert it into an English war and thus render 
 it popular. Second, England would have to undertake 
 the defence of Spain against invasion by land, and her 
 naval superiority would not materially aid the Span- 
 iards or baffle the French. Third, the continental 
 powers were committed to the support of France. 
 Fourth, there was a possibility that the invasion of 
 Spain would be unsuccessful. Fifth, on the other 
 hand, it might meet with success, in which event 
 France might assist Spain to recover her American 
 colonies. Here, he says, England's naval superiority 
 would tell, " and I should have no difficulty in decid- 
 ing that we ought to prevent, by every means in our 
 power perhaps, Spain from sending a single Spanish 
 regiment to South America, after the supposed termi- 
 nation of the war in Spain, but certainly France from 
 affording to Spain any aid or assistance for that pur- 
 pose." Sixth, in case of the invasion of Portugal by 
 France and Spain, he thought England would be in 
 honor bound to defend her, in case she asked for aid. 
 The military defense of Portugal would not be so diffi- 
 cult as a land war in Spain." 
 
 In accordance with this determination Canning dis- 
 patched a letter to Sir Charles Stuart, British ambassa- 
 dor at Paris, March 31, 1823, in which he spoke of 
 recognition of the colonies as a matter to be deter- 
 mined by time and circumstances, and, disclaiming all 
 designs on the part of the British government on the 
 
 " Life of Lord Liverpool, Vol. Ill, p. 231. Official Corre- 
 spondence of Canning, Vol. I, p. 85. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 73 
 
 late Spanish provinces, intimated that England, al- 
 though abstaining from interference in Spain, would 
 not allow France to acquire any of th^ colonies by 
 conquest or cession. To this note the French gov- 
 ernment made no reply and England took this silence 
 as a tacit agreement not to interfere with the colonies. 
 The British government continued, however, to watch 
 closely the movements of France." 
 
 As the invasion of Spain drew near to a successful 
 termination, the British government had reason to 
 suspect that the allied powers would next direct their 
 attention to the Spanish colonies with a view to for- 
 cing them back to their allegiance or of otherwise dis- 
 posing of them, that is by cession to some other Euro- 
 pean power. It was already in contemplation to call 
 another European congress for the discussion and set- 
 tlement of this question. As this was a subject of 
 vital interest to the United States, Canning invited the 
 American minister, Mr. Rush, to a conference, August 
 i6, 1823, in which he suggested the expediency of an 
 understanding on this question between England and 
 the United States. He communicated to Mr. Rush 
 the substance of his dispatch of the 31st of March to 
 Sir Charles Stuart. Mr. Rush said he understood the 
 import of this note to be that England would not re- 
 main passive to any attempt on the part of France to 
 acquire territory in Spanish America. Mr. Canning 
 then asked what the United States would say to going 
 hand in hand with England in such a policy. Mr. 
 Rush replied that his instructions did not authorize 
 him to give an answer, but that he would communi- 
 cate the suggestion informally to his government. At 
 
 "Stapleton: Pol. Life of Canning. Vol. II, p. 18. 
 
74 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 the sa^ne time he requested to be enlightened as to 
 England's policy in the matter of recognizing the inde- 
 pendence of the colonies. Mr. Canning replied that 
 England had taken no steps in the matter of recogni- 
 tion whatever, but was considering the question of 
 sending commissioners to the colonies to inquire into 
 the condition of affairs. For the present these com- 
 missioners would be sent to Mexico alone." 
 
 Mr. Stapleton in his Life of Canning simply says 
 that as Mr. Rush was not authorized to enter into any 
 formal agreement, Canning thought the delay of com- 
 municating with Washington would render such pro- 
 ceeding of no effect, and so the matter was dropped." 
 This, however, we learn from Mr. Rush's dispatches, is 
 not the whole truth. Several communications passed 
 between them after the conversation above given, 
 which throw a somewhat different light upon the af- 
 fair. 
 
 In an unofficial and confidential letter to Mr. Rush, 
 dated August 20, 1823, Canning asked again if the 
 moment had not arrived when the two governments 
 might come to an understanding in regard to the 
 Spanish-American colonies. He states the views of 
 England as follows: (i) That the recovery of the 
 colonies by Spain was hopeless; (2) That the question 
 of their recognition as independent states was one of 
 time and circumstances; (3) That England was not 
 disposed, however, to throw any obstacle in the way of 
 an arrangement between the colonies and the mother- 
 country by amicable negotiation; (4) That she aimed 
 at the possession of no portion of the colonies for 
 
 " Rush's Residence at the Court of London, p. 406. 
 " Pol. Life of Canning, Vol. II, p. 24. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 75 
 
 herself; and (5) That she could not see the transfer of 
 any portion of them to any other power with indififer- 
 ence. He added "that if the United States acceded 
 to such views, a declaration to that efifect on their part, 
 concurrently with England, would be the most effect- 
 ual and least offensive mode of making known their 
 joint disapprobation of contrary projects; that it would 
 at the same time put an end to all jealousies of Spain 
 as to her remaining colonies, and to the agitation pre- 
 vailing in the colonies themselves by showing that 
 England and the United States were determined not 
 to profit by encouraging it." " 
 
 Prior to the formal recognition of South America, 
 the United States had repeatedly expressed the wish 
 to proceed in the matter hand in hand with Great 
 Britain,''" but that act placed the United States on an 
 altogether different footing from England. Canning 
 seemed to forget in the wording of his proposal that 
 the United States had already, in the most formal man- 
 ner, acknowledged the independence of the Spanish 
 colonies. In reply Mr. Rush reminded him of this 
 fact and of the desire of the United States to see the 
 colonies recognized by England. In other respects, 
 he believed that the views unfolded by Mr. Canning in 
 his note were shared by the United States, but he 
 added that he had no authority to avow these princi- 
 ples publicly in the manner suggested. 
 
 In reply to a third overture from Canning, Rush 
 suggested, August 27, 1823, that it would greatly fa- 
 cilitate matters, especially the negotiations as to joint 
 
 " Rush's Residence at the Court of London, p. 412. 
 "" Castlereagh's Letters and Despatches, Vol. XI, p. 458. 
 Bagot's reports of interviews with Adams. 
 
76 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 action of the two powers, for England to acknowledge 
 at once the full independence of the South American 
 colonies. In communicating an account of these pro- 
 ceedings to the government at Washington, Mr. Rush 
 concludes : " Should I be asked by Mr. Canning, 
 whether, in case the recognition be made by Great 
 Britain without more delay, I am on my part prepared 
 to make a declaration, in the name of my government, 
 that it will not remain inactive under an attack upon 
 the independence of those states by the Holy Alliance, 
 the present determination of my judgment is that I 
 will make such a declaration explicitly, and avow it 
 before the world." ^ In his communication of the 
 27th, Mr. Rush used language which closely fore- 
 shadowed the Monroe Doctrine. He declared to Mr. 
 Canning that his government "would regard as ob- 
 jectionable any interference whatever in the affairs of 
 Spanish America, unsolicited by the late provinces 
 themselves and against their will; that it would regard 
 the convening of a congress to deliberate upon their 
 affairs, as a measure uncalled for, and indicative of a 
 policy highly unfriendly to the tranquillity of the world ; 
 that it could never look with insensibility upon such an 
 exercise of European jurisdiction over communities 
 now of right exempt from it, and entitled to regulate 
 their own concerns unmolested from abroad." 
 
 On the 1 8th of September Rush had another inter- 
 view with Canning, who still urged him to consent to 
 the proposed agreement and tried to show at length 
 that such a declaration would not conflict with the 
 American policy of avoiding entangling alliances, that 
 it was an American question as much as a European, 
 
 '^ Rush's Residence at the Court of London, p. 419. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS "JJ 
 
 if not more. He said if Mr. Rush felt unable to act 
 on the proposition he would call upon him in another 
 way. " If a congress be in fact assembled on the af- 
 fairs of Spanish America, I shall ask that you, as the 
 representative of the United States at this court, be in- 
 vited to attend it; and if you should not be invited, 
 I shall reserve to myself the option of determining 
 whether or not Great Britain will send a representative 
 to it." After a moment's pause he added : " Should 
 you be invited and refuse to gg, I shall still reserve to 
 myself the same option; so you see how essential it is, 
 in the opinion of Great Britain, that the United States 
 should not be left out of view, if Europe should de- 
 termine to take cognizance of the subject." Mr. Rush 
 replied: "The complication of the subject may be 
 cured at once, and by Great Britain. Let Great Bri- 
 tain immediately and unequivocably acknowledge the 
 independence of the new states. This will put an end 
 to all difficulty. . . . The European congress might 
 meet afterwards, if it chose to take so harmless a 
 step."" Several days later, September 26, Canning 
 again brought the subject to the attention of Mr. 
 Rush. He urged the embarrassment England felt in 
 immediate recognition and asked if Mr. Rush could 
 not give his assent to the proposals on a promise of 
 future recognition. Mr. Rush would not accede to 
 anything but immediate acknowledgment of indepen- 
 dence." 
 
 Canning did not care to extend full recognition to 
 the South American states until he could do so with- 
 out giving unnecessary offence to Spain and the allies, 
 
 ^ Rush's Residence at the Court of London, p. 429. 
 ™ Rush's Residence at the Court of London, p. 443. 
 
78 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 but he determined, since lie could not come to a for- 
 mal understanding with the United States, to make a 
 frank avowal of the views of the British cabinet to 
 France. To this end he had an interview with Prince 
 Polignac, the French ambassador at London, October 
 9, 1823, in which he declared that Great Britain had no 
 desire to hasten recognition, but that any foreign in- 
 terference, by force, or by menace, would be a motive 
 for immediate recognition; that England "could not 
 go into a joint deliberation upon the subject of Span- 
 ish America upon an equal footing with other powers, 
 whose opinions were less formed upon that question." 
 This declaration drew from Polignac the admission 
 that he considered the reduction of the colonies by 
 Spain as hopeless and that France "abjured in any 
 case, any design of acting against the colonies by 
 force of arms."'* This admission was a distinct vic- 
 tory for Canning, in that it prepared the way for ulti- 
 mate recognition by England, and an account of the 
 interview was communicated without delay to the al- 
 lied courts. The interview between Canning and Polig- 
 nac was not communicated to Rush until the latter 
 part of November,'"' and therefore, had no influence 
 upon the formation of Monroe's message of Decem- 
 ber 2. 
 
 Before the close of the year the British government 
 appointed consuls to the South American states, and 
 about the time of their departure, an invitation was 
 sent to the courts of St. Petersburg, Paris, and Vienna 
 to a conference to be held at Paris to " aid Spain in 
 adjusting the affairs of the revolted colonies." A copy 
 
 '* Political Life of Canning, Vol. II, p. 26. 
 
 " Rush's Residence at the Court of London, p. 448. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 79 
 
 of this invitation was also handed to the British am- 
 bassador at Madrid, but in such a form as to leave him 
 in doubt as to whether his government was invited to 
 the conference or not.'" While the discussion as to the 
 proposed conference was going on and before Canning 
 had announced what action his government would 
 take in the matter, President Monroe's message of 
 December 2, 1823, arrived in Europe. 
 
 The formulation of this message was of course greatly 
 influenced by Mr. Rush's reports of his conferences 
 and correspondence with Canning during August and 
 September. Of such moment did the President con- 
 sider the questions involved that he submitted Rush's 
 communications to Jefiferson and Madison for their 
 advice. Jefiferson considered it the most momentous 
 question that had arisen since that of Independence 
 and advised the President to accede to the proposal of 
 Canning and join in the declaration against the Holy 
 Alliance, even at the expense of renouncing all designs 
 upon Cuba, which he had always looked upon " as 
 the most interesting addition which could ever be made 
 to our system of states." " Madison not only favored 
 the idea of a joint declaration, but did not see why it 
 should not apply also to Spain and Greece."' 
 
 Spanish America was not the only part of the western 
 continent threatened at this time by European aggres- 
 sion. On the 4th of September, 1821, the emperor 
 of Russia had issued an ukase, in which he claimed the 
 northwestern coast of North America down to the 51st 
 
 ^ Political Life of Canning, Vol. II, p. 33. 
 ^ Jeflferson's Works, Vol. VII, p. 3iS- 
 " Madison to Monroe, October 30, and to Jefferson, No- 
 vember I, 1823. Madison's Writings, Vol. Ill, p. 339. 
 
80 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 degree. Tliis claim was incompatible with the pre- 
 tensions of both England and the United States, and 
 was stoutly opposed by them. This was a part of 
 the territory, known as the Oregon country, which 
 continued in dispute between England and the United 
 States until 1846. In July, 1823, Adams declared to 
 Baron Tuyll, the Russian minister to the United 
 States, "that we should contest the right of Russia to 
 any territorial establishment on this continent, and that 
 we should assume distinctly the principle that the 
 American continents are no longer subjects for any 
 new European colonial establishments." This lan- 
 guage was incorporated substantially in the President's 
 message. 
 
 From Adams's diary it appears that almost the whole 
 of November was taken up by cabinet discussions on 
 Canning's proposals and on Russia's aggressions in 
 the northwest. The composition of the message re- 
 mained in doubt until the 27th, when the more con- 
 servative views of Adams were, according to his own 
 statement of the case, adopted. He advocated an in- 
 dependent course of action on the part of the United 
 States, without direct reference to Canning's propos- 
 als, though substantially in accord with them. He 
 also wished the declaration of our policy, in whatever 
 related to the allies, to be limited to the American 
 question, and not to be complicated with objectionable 
 references to their conduct in Spain or their attitude 
 toward Greece. 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine is comprised in twoi widely 
 separated paragraphs that occur in the message of De- 
 cember 2, 1823. The first, relating to Russia's en- 
 croachments on the northwest coast, and occurring 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 8l 
 
 near the begfinning of the message, was an assertion to 
 the effect that the American continents had assumed 
 an independent condition and were no longer open to 
 European colonization. This may be regarded as a 
 statement of fact. No part of the continent at that 
 time remained unclaimed. The second paragraph, re- 
 lating to Spanish America and occurring near the 
 close of the message, was a declaration against the ex- 
 tension to the American continents of the system of 
 intervention adopted by the Holy Alliance for the sup- 
 pression of popular government in Europe. 
 
 The language used by President Monroe is as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 I. "At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Gov- 
 ernment, made through the minister of the emperor 
 residing here, a full power and instructions have been 
 transmitted to the minister of the United States at 
 St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the 
 respective rights and interests of the two nations on 
 the northwest coast of this continent. A similar pro- 
 posal had been made by His Imperial Majesty to the 
 government of Great Britain, which has likewise been 
 acceded to. The government of the United States has 
 been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifest- 
 ing the great value which they have invariably attached 
 to the friendship of the emperor and their solicitude 
 to cultivate the best understanding with his govern- 
 ment. In the discussions to which this interest has 
 given rise and in the arrangements by which they may 
 terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for as- 
 serting, as a principle in which the rights and interests 
 of the United States are involved, that the American 
 continents, by the free and independent condition which 
 6 
 
82 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not 
 to be considered as subjects for future colonization by 
 any European powers." " 
 
 2. " In the wars of European powers in matters re- 
 lating to themselves we have never taken any part, 
 nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is 
 only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced 
 that we resent injuries or make preparations for our 
 defence. With the movements in this hemisphere we 
 are of necessity more intimately connected, and by 
 causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and 
 impartial observers. The political system of the allied 
 powers is essentially different in this respect from that 
 of America. This difference proceeds from that which 
 exists in their respective governments; and to the de- 
 fence of our own, which has been achieved by the loss 
 of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the 
 wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under 
 which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole 
 nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor 
 and to the amicable relations existing between the 
 United States and those powers to declare that we 
 should consider any attempt on their part to extend 
 their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dan- 
 gerous to our peace and safety. With the existing 
 colonies or dependencies of any European power we 
 have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with 
 the governments who have declared their indepen- 
 dence and maintained it, and whose independence we 
 have, on great consideration and on just principles, 
 acknowledged, we could not view any interposition 
 for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in 
 
 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. II, p. 209. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 83 
 
 any other manner their destiny, by any European pow- 
 er in any other light than as the manifestation of an 
 unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In 
 the war between those new governments and Spain 
 we declared our neutrality at the time of their recogni- 
 tion, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue 
 to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in 
 the judgment of the competent authorities of this gov- 
 ernment, shall make a corresponding change on the 
 part of the United States indispensable to their se- 
 curity."" 
 
 The President's message reached England while the 
 discussion in regard to the proposed congress at Paris 
 was still going on. It was received with enthusiasm 
 by the liberal members of Parliament. Brougham 
 said: "The question with regard to South America 
 is now, I believe, disposed of, or nearly so ; for an event 
 has recently happened than which none has ever dis- 
 persed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude over all 
 the free men of Europe; that event, which is decisive 
 on the subject, is the language held with respect to 
 Spanish America in the message of the President of 
 the United States." Sir James Mackintosh said: 
 "This coincidence of the two great English common- 
 wealths (for so I delight to call them; and I heartily 
 pray that they may be forever united in the cause of 
 justice and liberty) cannot be contemplated without 
 the utmost pleasure by every enlightened citizen of 
 the earth." " They evidently had reference to the sec- 
 ond clause alone, the one relating to Spanish America. 
 The other clause, the one against European coloniza- 
 
 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. II, p. 218. 
 "^ Wharton's Digest, Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 276. 
 
84 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 tion in America, seems not to have attracted much at- 
 tention. Canning, however, saw the bearing of it and 
 objected to the principle it set forth, which was directed 
 against England as much as against the allies. He 
 was evidently a little taken aback at the turn his pro- 
 posal had taken. The President's message really set- 
 tled the question before Canning had announced what 
 action his government would take. Some little cha- 
 grin is apparent in the tone of his letter to Sir William 
 a Court, British minister at Madrid, December 21, 
 1823. "While I was yet hesitating," he says, "what 
 shape to give to the declaration and protest which ul- 
 timately was conveyed in my conference with P. de 
 PoHgnac, and while I was more doubtful as to the 
 effect of that protest and declaration, I sounded Mr. 
 Rush (the American minister here) as to his powers 
 and disposition to join in any step which we might 
 take to prevent a hostile enterprise on the part of the 
 European powers against Spanish America. He had 
 no powers; but he would have taken upon himself to 
 join with us, if we would have begun by recognizing 
 the Spanish-American states. This we could not do, 
 and so we went on without. But I have no doubt 
 that his report to his government of this sounding, 
 which he probably represented as an overture, had a 
 great share in producing the explicit declaration of 
 the President." " 
 
 The conference with Prince Polignac here referred 
 to was that of October 9th quoted above. It was not 
 until after the receipt of President Monroe's message 
 in Europe that Canning framed his answer to the 
 Spanish communication informing him of the pro- 
 
 " Wharton's Digest, Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 272. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 85 
 
 posed meeting in Paris for the discussion of the South 
 American question. In that reply he stated to the 
 Spanish government very fully his views upon the 
 question at issue. He said that while England did 
 not wish to precede Spain in the matter of recognition, 
 yet she reserved to herself the privilege of recogniz- 
 ing the colonies when she deemed it best for her in- 
 terests and right to them. He said that these views had 
 been communicated fully from time to time to the 
 powers invited to the congress and he concluded with 
 the statement: "It does not appear to the British 
 cabinet at all necessary to declare th^t opinion anew, 
 even if it were perfectly clear (from the tenor of M. 
 Ofalia's instruction) that Great Britain was in fact in- 
 cluded in the invitation to the conference at Paris." "^ 
 
 While Canning and Monroe acted independently of 
 each other, the expression that each gave to the views 
 of his government was no doubt rendered more em- 
 phatic and of more effect by the knowledge of the 
 other's attitude in the matter. Another point to be 
 noted is that Monroe's message was made public, while 
 Canning's answer was for some time known only to 
 the diplomatic corps. 
 
 The determination of both England and the United 
 States to oppose the intervention of the allies in South 
 America had the desired effect. Conferences in an- 
 swer to the invitation of Spain were held in Paris, but 
 they were participated in only by the ordinary repre- 
 sentatives of the powers invited, resident in that capital, 
 and their only result was to advise Spain not to listen 
 to the counsels of England. 
 
 All further discussion that took place between Eng- 
 
 ^ Political Life of Canning, Vol. II, p. 42. 
 
86 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 land and Spain in reference to recognition of the colo- 
 nies by Great Britain was confined to the status of the 
 revolutionary governments, and upon this, point their 
 views were so divergent that Canning finally an- 
 nounced to the Spanish government that, " His Ma- 
 jesty would, at his own time, take such steps as he 
 might think proper in respect to the several states of 
 Spanish America without further reference to the 
 court of Madrid; but at the same time without any 
 feeling of alienation towards that court, or of hostility 
 towards the real interests of Spain." " 
 
 The French troops continuing to occupy Spain after 
 the time stipulated by treaty, Canning sought an ex- 
 planation from France, but without satisfactory re- 
 sults. He therefore determined at a cabinet meeting 
 held December 14, 1824, to recognize Mexico and 
 Colombia forthwith. On January i, 1825, after the 
 ministers had left England with instructions and full 
 powers, the fact of recognition was communicated offi- 
 cially to the diplomatic corps and two days later it was 
 made public. That this recognition was a retaliatory 
 measure to compensate England for the French occu- 
 pation of Spain was understood at the time and was 
 distinctly avowed by Canning two years later." In a 
 speech delivered December 12, 1826, in defence of his 
 position in not having arrested the French invasion of 
 Spain, he said: " I looked another way — I sought for 
 compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating 
 Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I re- 
 
 " Political Life of Canning, Vol. II, p. S4- 
 
 '^ Official Corresp. of Canning, Vol. II, p. 242. Letter to 
 Granville. On the general question of recognition, see Life 
 of Lord Liverpool, Vol. Ill, pp. 297-304. 
 
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 8/ 
 
 solved that, if France had Spain, it should not be Spain 
 with the Indies. I called the New World into exist- 
 ence to redress the balance of the Old." In spite of 
 the great indebtedness of South Arrierica to Canning, 
 this boast falls somewhat flat when we remember that 
 the Spanish colonies had won their independence by 
 their own valor and had been recognized as indepen- 
 dent governments by the United States two years be- 
 fore Great Britain acted in the matter." 
 
 Mr. Stapleton, Canning's private secretary and bio- 
 grapher, says that the recognition of Spanish-Ameri- 
 can independence was, perhaps, the most important 
 measure adopted by the British cabinet while Canning 
 was at the head of the foreign office. He sums up the 
 reasons and results of the act as follows : " First, it 
 was a measure essentially advantageous to British in- 
 terests; being especially calculated to benefit our com- 
 merce. Next, it enabled this country to remain at 
 peace, since it compensated us for the continued oc- 
 cupation of Spain by a French force, a disparagement 
 to which, otherwise, it would not have become us to 
 submit. Lastly, it maintained the balance between 
 conflicting principles; since it gave just so much of 
 a triumph to popular rights and privileges, as was 
 sufficient to soothe the irritation felt by their advocates 
 at the victory, which absolute principles had obtained 
 
 " In the fall of 1897 an interesting controversy took place 
 in the pages of the North American Review between Senor 
 Romero, Mexican Minister to the United States, and Senator 
 Money, as to whether the United States really afforded any 
 material or moral aid to the Spanish colonies in their struggle 
 with Spain. The same question is discussed in Romero's 
 book on " Mexico and the United States." Putnam, 1898, 
 pp. 316 ff. 
 
88 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS 
 
 by the overthrow of the constitutions of Spain, Portu- 
 gal, and Naples ; and it dealt a death-blow to the Holy 
 Alliance, by disabusing its members of the strange 
 fancy, with which they were prepossessed, that the 
 differences between them and the British ministers 
 (where they did differ) were merely feints on the part 
 of the latter to avoid a conflict with public opinion." " 
 The United States government did not relax its ef- 
 forts in behalf of the South American states with the 
 recognition of England, but continued to exert itself 
 in order to secure the acknowledgment of their inde- 
 pendence by the other powers of Europe, particularly 
 Spain." Mr. Clay tried to get the other members of 
 the alliance, especially the emperor of Russia, to use 
 their good offices with Spain for the purpose of induc- 
 ing her to recognize her late colonies, but the emperor 
 of Russia, the head of the alliance, continued to preach 
 to Spain " not only no recognition of their indepen- 
 dence, but active war for their subjugation." To the 
 request of the United States he replied that, out of re- 
 spect for "the indisputable titles of sovereignty," he 
 could not prejudge or anticipate the determination of 
 the king of Spain."' It was some ten years before 
 Spain could be persuaded to renounce her ancient 
 claims. 
 
 " Political Life of Canning, Vol. II, p. i. 
 ''Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, pp. 794-796, and 
 Vol. VI, pp. 1006-1014. 
 " Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 850 ff. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 The Diplomacy of the United States in Regard 
 TO Cuba 
 
 The Cuban question had its origin in the series of 
 events that have been narrated in the two preceding 
 chapters — the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the 
 resulting paralysis of Spanish power in America. The 
 declaration of President Monroe, enforced by the well- 
 known attitude of England, dealt the death-blow to 
 Spanish hopes of recovering the Southern continent, 
 hence the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, which had 
 remained loyal to the king, were clung to with all the 
 greater tenacity as the sole remains of the imperial pos- 
 sessions over which the successors of Ferdinand and 
 Isabella had ruled for three centuries. The " Ever- 
 faithful Island of Cuba " was rewarded for her loyalty 
 by the concession of certain liberties of trade and in- 
 vited to send representatives to the Spanish Cortes — a 
 privilege which was subsequently withdrawn. Spain 
 was now too weak to protect her two West Indian de- 
 pendencies — ^the remains of her former glory, but her 
 very weakness secured their possession to her. The 
 naval and commercial importance of Cuba, " the pearl 
 of the Antilles," made it a prize too valuable to be ac- 
 quired by any one of the great maritime powers with- 
 out exciting the jealousy and opposition of the others. 
 Henceforth, to borrow the figure of a contemporary 
 journalist, Cuba was to be the trans-Atlantic Turkey, 
 
90 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 trembling to its fall, but sust^uned by the jealousies of 
 those who were eager to share the spoils. 
 
 Apart from her marvellous productivity, geographi- 
 cally Cuba occupies an unique "position among her 
 sister islands of the West Indian group, in that she 
 commands both the Gulf of Mexico and the Carib- 
 bean sea. The strategic importance of the island, 
 commanding to a large extent the commerce of the 
 West Indies and of the Central American states, and, 
 what was of vital interest to us, the traffic of the 
 Mississippi valley, attracted at an early period the 
 attention of American as well as of European states- 
 men. In a letter to President Madison in 1809, Jeffer- 
 son, in speaking of Napoleon's policy in regard to the 
 Spanish- American colonies, said: 
 
 " That he would give up the Floridas to withhold 
 intercourse with the residue of those colonies cannot 
 be doubted. But that is no price; because they are 
 ours in the first moment of the first war; and until a 
 war they are of no particular necessity to us. But, 
 although with difficulty, he will consent to our receiv- 
 ing Cuba into our Union, to prevent our aid to Mexico 
 and the other provinces. That would be a price, and 
 I would immediately erect a column on the southern- 
 most limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a ne plus ultra 
 as to us in that direction. We should then have only 
 the north to include in our Confederacy, which would 
 be of course in the first war. ... It will be objected 
 to our receiving Cuba that no limit can then be drawn 
 to our future acquisitions. Cuba can be defended by 
 us without a navy, and this develops the principle 
 which ought to limit our views." ' 
 
 ^ Jefferson's Works, Vol. V, p. 443. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 9I 
 
 President Madison expressed his views on the Cu- 
 ban question in a letter to Wm. Pinkney, October 30, 
 1810: 
 
 "The position of Cuba gives the United States so 
 deep an interest in the destiny, even, of that island, 
 that although they might be an inactive, they could 
 not be a satisfied spectator at its falling under any 
 European government, which might make a fulcrum 
 of that position against the commerce and security of 
 the United States.'"' 
 
 This was the first statement in the evolution of a 
 Cuban policy consistently adhered to by the United 
 States until the successes of the Mexican war superin- 
 duced larger ideas of the mission and destiny of the 
 Union. 
 
 As early as 1817 apprehensions of alarm, as to the 
 fate of Cuba, were raised in the minds of the Ameri- 
 can public by newspaper reports to the efifect that Eng- 
 land had proposed a relinquishment of her claim 
 against Spain for supplies and maintenance of the 
 British army during the Peninsular campaign, amount- 
 ing to £15,000,000, in return for the cession of the 
 island of Cuba.' Reports of this nature were circu- 
 lated for several months on both sides of the Atlantic, 
 but the question did not assume any very great im- 
 portance until 1819, when the treaty for the cession 
 of the Floridas to the United States was being nego- 
 tiated with Spain. It was then insisted by the British 
 press that the acquisition of the Floridas would give 
 the United States such a preponderating influence in 
 West Indian afifairs as to render necessary the occu- 
 
 " Madison's Works, Vol. II, p. 488. 
 
 ' Niles's Register, under date November 8, 1817. 
 
92 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 pation of Cuba by Great Britain as the natural and 
 only off-set. A writer in the London Times described 
 Havana as a port second to none in the world-^" a 
 station from which the British navy would have com- 
 plete command over the whole line of the southern 
 and eastern coasts of the United States." * 
 
 An amusing incident which occurred in this connec- 
 tion at a dinner given by Lord Castlereagh, June 17, 
 1819, is recorded by Mr. Rush. Baron Just, the Sax- 
 on minister, who was seated next to Mr. Rush, asked 
 if he did not think that, after the execution of two 
 British subjects (Arbuthnot and Ambrister) by United 
 States authorities and the cession of the Floridas, Eng- 
 land would aim at obtaining Cuba from Spain. Mr. 
 Rush replied that he would be happy if Baron Just 
 would inquire of his neighbor on the other side, who 
 happened to be the Spanish minister, M. Onis, and 
 favor him with the result. This the Baron did, M. 
 Onis replying just loud enough for Mr. Rush to hear, 
 " The American minister may feel easy — Spain has not 
 ceded Cuba to England, and does not mean to." ° 
 
 The Florida treaty was ratified after some delay, 
 which, however, does not appear to have been caused 
 by the British government as was supposed at the 
 time. The British papers, nevertheless, continued to 
 
 * Quoted in Niles's Register, December, 1819. 
 
 "Rush's Residence, p. 112. For a full discussion of the 
 question see the pamphlet by J. Freeman Rattenbury, enti- 
 tled, " The Cession of the Floridas to the United States of 
 America and the Necessity of Acquiring the Island of Cuba 
 by Great Britain." London, 1819. The author makes the 
 statement that a deputation of Cubans visited Washington 
 during Jefferson's administration in the interests of annexa- 
 tion. No importance, however, is to be attached to this 
 statement. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 93 
 
 condemn in strong terms the treaty as well as the in- 
 action of their government in not making it a pretext 
 for the seizure of Cuba. Great Britain was watching 
 the Spanish-American situation with the deepest in- 
 terest, but she wis not satisfied that the time had 
 come for action, although the outrages perpetrated 
 upon her commerce by the pirates who infested the 
 coasts of Cuba and were secretly encouraged by the 
 Spanish government, gave her ample cause for inter- 
 ference. 
 
 The United States also was annoyed by the pirates 
 who made Cuba their headquarters, and reports that 
 the United States was considering the questior^ of the 
 acquisition of that island gained some currency. Can-/ 
 ning seems to have feared that the United States might) 
 seize Cuba as a guarantee against further depredations 
 before England should be aroused to action. In the 
 memorandum addressed to the cabinet November 15, 
 1822, he says: "It may be questioned whether any 
 blow that could be struck by any foreign power in any 
 part of the world would have a more sensible effect on 
 the interests of this country, and on the reputation of 
 its government. The possession by the United States 
 of both shores of the channel, through which our Ja- 
 maica trade must pass, would, in time of war with the 
 United States, or indeed of a war in which the United 
 States might be neutral, but in which we continued (as 
 we must do) to claim the right of search, and the 
 Americans (as they would do) to resist it, amount to 
 a suspension of that trade, and to a consequent total 
 ruin of a great portion of the West Indian interests." 
 
 It was not necessary, he thought, to declare war 
 against Spain, for " she has perhaps as little direct and 
 
94 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 available power over the colonies which she nominally 
 retains, as she has over those which have thrown off 
 her yoke. Let us apply, therefore, a local remedy to 
 a local grievance, and make the ships and harbors of 
 Cuba, Porto Rico, and Porto Cabello answerable for 
 the injuries which have been inflicted by those ships, 
 and the perpetrators of which have found shelter in 
 -^ those harbors." Canning recommended, therefore, 
 that the naval force in the West Indies should be 
 strengthened so as to completely blockade the ports of 
 Porto Rico and Porto Cabello. As to Cuba, the squad- 
 ron already in the neighborhood of that island he 
 thougljt sufficient to clear it of pirates. " In any case," 
 he concludes, "the presence of our squadron in the 
 neighborhood of the Havannah cannot be otherwise 
 than desirable with a view to keep in check the Ameri- 
 cans, who, whatever they might do in the absence of 
 an English squadron, would hardly venture in the face 
 of one to assume the military occupation of the 
 island."' 
 
 The presence of the British squadron in Cuban 
 waters caused considerable uneasiness in the United 
 States. The unheeded protest of Great Britain at the 
 Congress of Verona seemed to render probable an al- 
 liance with Spain, in which case it was feared that a 
 compensation would be sought in the occupation of 
 Cuba by Great Britain as a guarantee of Spanish 
 bonds, if not as a permanent acquisition. In order to 
 counteract British influence, Mr. Forsyth, our repre- 
 sentative at Madrid, attempted in conversation with 
 officials and members of the Cortes to remove all ap- 
 
 'Stapleton: Official Correspondence of Canning, Vol. I, 
 p. 48 ff. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 95 
 
 prehensions as regarded the designs of the United 
 States upon Cuba, by stating that as there was little 
 chance of its passing into our hands and as a transfer 
 to England or France would be followed by the aboli- 
 tion of slavery which would jeopardize the peace of 
 our Southern states, it was to our interests for Spain 
 to remain in possession. Furthermore, he suggested 
 unofficially to members of the Cortes that if Spain 
 would immediately recognize the governments of Co- 
 lombia and Mexico and adopt a liberal system of com- 
 merce, a guarantee of the island from Colombia, Mexi- 
 co, and the United States might be procured.' 
 
 The government at Washington was in great doubt 
 as to the designs of the European powers upon Cuba 
 and consequently as to the means of counteracting 
 them. As regarded cession to Great Britain, Mr. Ad- 
 ams wrote that Spain, though disinclined to the trans- 
 fer, might resist it with more firmness, if, for a lim- 
 ited period of time, she could obtain the joint guar- 
 antee of the United States and France, securing the 
 island to herself.' 
 
 As the preparations of France for the invasion of 
 Spain progressed the fate of Cuba became a question 
 of absorbing interest in America. There was little 
 hope that the island would continue a dependency of 
 Spain. It was again reported that Great Britain had \y 
 engaged to supply the constitutional government of 
 Spain with money in her struggle with France and 
 would occupy Cuba as a pledge for its repayment. 
 Both Spanish and French journals spoke of British 
 
 ' Mr. Forsyth to Mr. Adams, November 20, 1822. H. Ex. 
 Doc. No. 121, Thirty-second Congress, First Sess. 
 ' Mr. Adams to Mr. Forsyth, December 17, 1822. lb. 
 
96 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 occupation of Cuba as a matter no longer to be doubt- 
 ed, and the presence in the West Indies of an extra 
 British squadron, sent nominally for the purpose of 
 suppressing piracy, seemed to lend color to the re- 
 ports.' 
 
 The British- press was clamoring for the acquisition 
 of Cuba. The Packet declared: "The question then 
 comes to this, shall England occupy Cuba, or by per- 
 mitting its acquisition by the United States (which 
 they have long desired) sacrifice her whole West India 
 trade? There can be no hesitation as to the answer." 
 
 At the same time certain memoranda relative to the 
 seizure of Cuba, prepared by Colonel De Lacy Evans, 
 were presented by Canning to the cabinet. The first 
 deals with the subject from a military point of view, 
 claiming that the occupation of the island would not 
 be so difficult a task as usually stated. The second 
 stated that the possession of Cuba would counterpoise 
 the acquisition of the Floridas by the United States, 
 which enlargement of dominion in itself menaced the 
 British West Indies. Great Britain would also be in 
 a better position for dealing with the complicated prob- 
 lem of slavery. 
 
 The third memorandum gives the arguments that 
 might morally and politically be insisted on under the 
 circumstances of the French invasion and occupation 
 of Spain and the cession of the Floridas to the United 
 States." 
 
 The British government, however, officially dis- 
 claimed all designs upon Cuba, but this disclaimer did 
 not fully reassure the American government, and our 
 
 ° Niles's Register, March and April, 1823. 
 
 " Official Correspondence of Canning, Vol. I, p. 116. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 97 
 
 representatives abroad were instructed to exercise a 
 close scrutiny upon all negotiations between Spain and 
 England. In the 'spring of 1823 Mr. Forsyth was sue-! 
 ceeded by Mr. Nelson at the court of Madrid. In his 
 instructions to the new minister, which went much be- 
 yond the usual length and were occupied almost ex- 
 clusively with a discussion of the Cuban question, John 
 Quincy Adams uses the following remarkable words: 
 
 " In looking forward to the probable course of 
 events for the short period of half a century, it seems 
 scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the an- 
 nexation of Cuba to ovir Federal Republic will be in- 
 dispensable to the continuance and integrity of the 
 Union itself." 
 
 We were not then prepared for annexation, he con- 
 tinued, " but there are laws of political as well as physi- 
 cal gravitation ; and if an apple, severed by the tempest 
 from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the 
 ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnat- 
 ural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-sup- 
 port, can gravitate only towards the North American 
 Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast 
 her off from its bosom." " 
 
 President Monroe consulted Jefferson on the subject 
 of Spanish-American affairs and the entanglements 
 with European powers likely to arise therefrom. Jef- 
 ferson replied, June 11, 1823: 
 
 " Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of 
 war to us. Its possession by Great Britain would 
 indeed be a great calamity to us. Could we induce her 
 to join us in guaranteeing its independence against all 
 
 '" H. Ex. Doc. No. 121, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; 
 also Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. XLIV, pp. 114-236. 
 7 
 
98 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 the world, except Spain, it would be nearly as valuable 
 as if it were our own. But should she take it, I would 
 not immediately go to war for it; because the first war 
 on other accounts will give it to us, or the island will 
 give itself to us when able to do so." " 
 
 Jefferson, however, withdrew this suggestion several 
 days later, after receiving information that the inhabi- 
 tants of the island were not themselves inclined to 
 British supremacy. He says: 
 
 " I had supposed an English interest there quite as 
 strong as that of the United States, and therefore to 
 avoid war and keep the island open to our commerce, 
 it would be best to join that power in mutually guaran- 
 teeing its independence. But if there is no danger of its 
 falling into the possession of England, I must retract 
 an opinion founded on an error of fact. We are surely 
 under no obligation to give her gratis an interest which 
 she has not; and the whole inhabitants being averse to 
 her, and the climate mortal to strangers, its continued 
 military occupation by her would be impracticable. 
 It is better, then, to lie still in readiness to receive 
 that interesting incorporation when solicited by her- 
 self, for certainly her addition to our confederacy is 
 exactly what is wanted to round our power as a nation 
 to the point of its utmost interest."" 
 
 Again, October 24, 1823," Jefferson advocated the 
 peaceful acquisition of Cuba, but preferred to see it 
 independent rather than obtained by war. 
 
 Henry Clay had espoused the cause of the South 
 American republics at an early period of their struggle 
 and labored incessantly for the recognition of their 
 
 " Jefferson's Works, Vol. VII, p. 288. 
 
 " Jefferson's Works, Vol. VII, p. 299. " lb., p. 316. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 99 
 
 independence, which was acknowledged by the United 
 States in the spring of 1822. The declaration of Presi- 
 dent Monroe the following year in his annual message 
 to Congress, followed shortly afterwards by the re- 
 fusal of Canning to take part in a conference to be 
 held at Paris by the powers of Europe for the consid- 
 eration of Spanish-American affairs, put a final check 
 upon the combined action of Europe against the young 
 republics. The fate of Cuba, however, still continued 
 to furnish an interesting topic for newspaper conjec- 
 tures and for several years reports of a cession to 
 France or of a temporary occupation by French troops 
 were rife. 
 
 What further complicated matters, was the determi- 
 nation on the part of the governments of Mexico and 
 Colombia, in case of a continuance of the war by Spain, 
 to seize the island for purposes of defence. Early in 
 the year 1825 the United States had undertaken to 
 mediate with Spain for recognition of her late colo- 
 nies, and had requested the principal European powers 
 to advise Spain of the justice and expediency of a 
 speedy termination of hostilities. In order that these 
 efforts might not be thwarted, the United States urged 
 Colombia and Mexico to withhold their attack upon 
 Cuba until sufificient time should have elapsed to as- 
 certain the result of the pacific efforts which the pow- 
 ers of Europe were believed to be making on Spain." 
 
 Mr. Clay's efforts to. secure the mediation of the 
 powers were hopeless and their success would have 
 been useless, for Spain was determined not to listen to 
 counsels that warned her against her fatal persistency 
 
 " Mr. Clay to Mr. Salazar, December 20, 1825. Brit, and 
 For. St. Pap., Vol. XIII. 
 
\j' 
 
 lOO THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 in a ruinous policy. England was greatly interested 
 in the suspension of hostilities, but her relations with 
 Spain were not such as to admit of her offering advice. 
 France had the strongest interest in securing an ad- 
 justment, but France was under the influence of the 
 Holy Alliance; while the head of the alliance, the em- 
 peror of Russia, upheld on principle the sovereignty 
 of Spain. 
 
 Meanwhile Mr. Clay urged upon Spain the necessity 
 of terminating the war as the only means of preserv- 
 ing her dominion over the islands of Cuba and Porto 
 Rico. " If the war should continue," he says, " be- 
 tween Spain and the new republics, and those islands 
 should become the object and the theatre of it, their 
 fortunes have, such a connection with the prosperity 
 of the United States that they could not be indifferent 
 spectators; and the possible contingencies of such a 
 protracted war might bring upon the government of 
 the United States duties and obligations which, how- 
 ever painful it should be, they might not be at liberty 
 to decline."" 
 
 During the summer of 1825, while the negotiations 
 above related were in progress, a large French squad- 
 ron visited the West Indies and hovered for several 
 weeks about the coasts of Cuba. This action on the 
 part of the French government, without explanation, 
 excited the alarm of both England and the United 
 States and drew forth strong protests from Mr. Can- 
 ning and from Mr. Qay. Canning wrote to Gran- 
 ville, the British minister at Paris, that he could not 
 
 " Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 850 ff. 
 " Slidell's Report on Cuba, 1859. Sen. Report, No. 351, 
 Thirty-fifth Cong., Second Sess. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA lOI 
 
 consent to the occupation of Havana by France, even 
 as a measure of protection against the Spanish-Ameri- 
 can republics." Again some two months later he 
 writes : 
 
 " As to Cuba you cannot too soon nor too amicably, 
 of course, represent to Villele the impossibility of our 
 allowing France (or France us, I presume) to meddle 
 in the internal affairs of that colony. We sincerely 
 wish it to remain with the mother-country. Next to 
 that I wish it independent, either singly or in connec- 
 tion with Mexico. But what cannot or must not be, 
 is that any great maritime power should get posses- 
 sion of it. The Americans (Yankees, I mean) think 
 of this matter just as I do." " 
 
 The expressions of the United States, as to the de- 
 signs of France, were equally emphatic as those of 
 England. Mr. Clay declared " that we could not con- 
 serrt to the occupation of those islands by any other 
 European power than Spain under any contingency 
 whatever." " 
 
 In this connection Canning wished to bring about 
 the signature, by England, France, and the United 
 States, of " ministerial notes, one between France and 
 the United States, and one between France and Great 
 Britain, or one tripartite note signed by all, disclaim- 
 ing each for themselves, any intention to occupy Cuba, 
 and protesting against such occupation by either of 
 the others."" The government of the United States 
 
 " Official Corresp. of Canning, Vol. I, p. 265. 
 '" Official Corresp. of Canning, Vol. I, p. 275. 
 " Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 855. Also Wharton's 
 Digest, Sec. 60. 
 "Stapleton: Pol. Life of Canning, Vol. Ill, p. 154. 
 
I02 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 held this proposal under advisement, but on France 
 declining, it was dropped." 
 
 In 1826 when an attack upon Portugal was feared 
 Canning advised, in case of such an attack, the imme- 
 diate seizure of Cuba by Great Britain as more efifect-- 
 ive than half a dozen Peninsular campaigns.'" 
 
 The Cuban question was involved in the long debate 
 on the proposal of the executive of the United States 
 to send delegates to the congress of Spanish-American 
 republics assembled at Panama in 1826. This debate 
 occupied the attention of Congress during the winter 
 and spring of 1826, and was engaged in with great 
 earnestness. One of the chief objections to the pro- 
 posed mission was the fact that the question of Cuba 
 and Porto Rico would come up and that the United 
 States government had already committed itself to the 
 foreign powers on that subject. The report of the 
 Senate committee on foreign relations declared that, 
 " The very situation of Cuba and Porto Rico furnishes 
 the strongest inducement to the United States not to 
 take a place at the contemplated congress, since, by so 
 doing, they must be considered as changing the atti- 
 tude in which they hitherto have stood as impartial 
 spectators of the passing scenes, and identifying them- 
 selves with the new republics." " 
 
 The Southern members were united in their opposi- 
 tion to the Panama mission, and in fact to any closer 
 alliance with the new republics, for the reason that 
 the latter had adopted the principle of emancipation 
 
 °' Mr. Clay to Mr. King, October 25, Wharton's Digest, 
 Sec. 60. 
 " Canning to Earl of Liverpool, October 6, 1826. 
 " Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 863. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA IO3 
 
 and any further extension of their influence would i 
 jeopardize the institution of slavery in the United 
 States. For the same reason they were opposed to' 
 the transfer of Cuba to any other European power. If 
 a change from its connection with Spain were neces- 
 sary they favored annexation by the United States, 
 and meantime they were strongly opposed to the gov- 
 ernment entering into any engagement with foreign 
 powers or in any way committing itself on the Cuban 
 question.^" 
 
 The declaration of Mr. Qay against the interference 
 of England and France in the affairs of Cuba was con- 
 sistently adhered to under the administrations of Jack- ^ 
 son and Van Buren.f 
 
 Meanwhile the open violation on the part of Spanish 
 subjects of the provisions of the Anglo-Spanish treaty 
 of 1817 for the suppression of the slave trade, and the 
 inability or disinclination of the Spanish government h 
 to secure the observance of that treaty afforded the 
 British government a strong pretext for interference 
 in Cuba. Under the treaty a mixed commission had>; 
 been organized at Havana to adjudicate upon the 
 claims of the commanders of British cruisers for the 
 condemnation, as prizes, of vessels taken by them en- 
 gaged in the illicit traffic. The decisions of this com- 
 mission were more or less of a farce. As the two 
 commissary judges rarely ever agreed upon the evi- 
 dence submitted, they usually found it necessary to call 
 in an arbiter. As Spanish arbiters always decided in 
 favor of the Spanish commanders and English arbiters 
 in favor of the English commanders, the judges regu- 
 
 '^ Benton's Abridgment, Vol. VIII, pp. 427, 428, and 
 Vol. IX, pp. 90-218. 
 
I04 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 larly resorted to the device of choosing by lot the ar- 
 biter for each individual case. Thus thousands of 
 slaves fresh from the coast of Africa were yearly ex- 
 posed for sale on the barracoons of Havana.'" 
 
 In 1838-39, the British government dispatched spe- 
 cial commissioners to Cuba and Porto Rico to report 
 on the condition of the slave trade. The presence of 
 these agents in Cuba gave rise to reports that Great 
 Britain contemplated revolutionizing the island, or at 
 least occupying it for the purpose of suppressing the 
 slave trade. The United States gave Spain to under- 
 stand that we would not consent to British control in 
 whatever way it might be brought about. Mr. For- 
 syth wrote to Mr. Vail, our representative at Madrid, 
 July IS, 1840: 
 
 " You are authorized to assure the Spanish govern- 
 ment, that in case of any attempt, from whatever 
 quarter, to wrest from her this portion of her territory, 
 she may securely depend upon the military and naval 
 resources of the United States to aid her in preserv- 
 ing or recovering it." " 
 
 Again, Mr. Webster in January, 1843, wrote to Mr. 
 Campbell, United States consul at Havana: 
 
 " The Spanish government has long been in posses- 
 sion of the policy and wishes of this government in 
 regard to Cviba, which have never changed, and has 
 repeatedly been told that the United States never 
 would permit the occupation of that island by British 
 agents or forces upon any pretext whatever; and that 
 
 ''"Turnbull: Cuba, Porto Rico and the Slave Trade, pp. 40- 
 41, London, 1840. 
 
 " H. Ex. Doc. No. 121, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess. ; 
 also Wharton's Digest, Sec. 60. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA IO5 
 
 in the event of any attempt to wrest it from her, she 
 might securely rely upon the whole naval and mili- 
 tary resources of this country to aid her in preserving 
 or recovering it." " 
 
 A copy of this letter was also sent to Washington 
 Irving, our representative at Madrid to make such use 
 of as circumstances might require.'' 
 
 In reference to a report that Great Britain was en- 
 deavoring to cause the Creoles and blacks to unite in 
 the emancipation of slaves and to convert the island 
 into a black military republic under British protection, 
 Mr. Webster wrote: 
 
 " If this scheme should succeed the influence of Bri- 
 tain in this quarter, it is remarked, will- be unlimited. 
 With 600,000 blacks in Cuba, and 800,000 in her West 
 India islands, she will, it is said, strike a death-blow 
 at the existence of slavery in the United States." °° 
 
 During the first period of our Cuban diplomacy the 
 efforts of this government were directed toward pre- 
 venting the acquisition of the island or the establish- 
 ment of a protectorate over it by Great Britain or , 
 France. With the Mexican war, however, and the/ 
 consciousness of national expansion and the growing 
 conviction of " manifest destiny," our foreign policy 
 assumed a much bolder and more aggressive character, 
 and during the next fifteen years all manner of 
 schemes for the southward extension of our territory 
 were suggested and many of them actually undertaken. 
 
 "• Wharton's Digest, Sec. 60. 
 
 " Mr. Upshur, who succeeded Mr. Webster as secretary 
 of state, wrote to Mr. Irving to the same effect, October 10, 
 
 1843. 
 '° Mr. Webster to Mr. Irving, January 17, 1843. 
 
I06 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 Cuba became an object of desire, not only in the eyes 
 of the slave-holding population of the South as an 
 acquisition to slave territory, but of a large part of 
 the nation, by reason of its strategic importance com- 
 manding the inter-oceanic transit routes of Central 
 America, which formed the most available line of com- 
 munication with our rapidly-developing interests in 
 California. Consequently various attempts were made 
 to annex the island to the United States, both by pur- 
 chase from Spain and forcibly by filibustering expe- 
 ditions. 
 
 As early as 1845 meetings were held in Illinois and 
 memorials were addressed to Congress urging the 
 expediency of authorizing the President to purchase 
 Cuba, with the consent of the white population thereof.'' 
 During the next two years a number of resolutions to 
 this efifect were introduced in Congress and the mat- 
 ter was advocated extensively by the press. In July, 
 1847, the New York Sun had an editorial in favor of 
 annexation, in which it was stated that Spain would 
 part with Cuba for $100,000,000, and that the inhabi- 
 tants of the island were so eager to be received into 
 the American Union that they would raise the entire 
 sum of the purchase money at a week's notice." 
 
 In 1847 certain members of Parliament openly ad- 
 vocated the seizure of Cuba by Great Britain as a 
 security for the interest on Spanish bonds held in 
 England. This danger was considered another mo- 
 tive for a more aggressive policy on the part of the 
 United States. 
 
 In June, 1848, under the administration of President 
 
 " Niles's Register, September, 1845. 
 "' Niles's Register, July, 1847. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA IO7 
 
 Polk, Mr. Buchanan, secretary of state, wrote to our 
 minister at Madrid, directing him to open negotiations 
 with the Spanish government for the purchase of Cu- 
 ba. After referring to the dangers of British occupa- 
 tion and to the advantages of annexation, he says: 
 
 " Desirable, however, as this island may be to the 
 United States, we would not acquire it except by the 
 free will of Spain. Any acquisition not sanctioned by 
 justicfe and honor would be too dearly purchased." 
 
 He stated that the President would stipulate for the 
 payment of $100,000,000, as a maximum price." This 
 offer was rejected by the Spanish government. The 
 minister of state after several months' delay finally re- 
 plied " that it was more than any minister dare to en- 
 tertain any such proposition; that he believed such to 
 be the feeling of the country, that sooner than see the 
 island transferred to any power, they would prefer 
 seeing it sunk in the ocean." 
 
 Under the Whig administration of Taylor and Fill- 1 
 more no effort was made for the purchase of Cuba. ' 
 August 2, 1849, Mr. Clayton wrote to Mr. Barringer 
 that the government did not desire to renew the nego- 
 tiation for the purchase of Cuba made by the late ad- 
 ministration, since the proposition had been consid- 
 ered by the Spanish government as a national indig- 
 nity; that should Spain desire to part with Cuba, the 
 proposal must come from her. 
 
 About this time active preparations were going on 
 for the invasion of Cuba by an armed expedition under^/ ^ 
 the Cuban patriot Narciso Lopez, a native of Venez- 
 
 " Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Saunders, June 17, 1848, H. Ex. 
 Doc. No. 121, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess. ; also Brit, and 
 For. St. Pap., Vol. XXVI. 
 
I08 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 uela, who had served with the rank of major-general 
 in the first Carlist war and as governor of Valencia, 
 and had subsequently held offices of honor under Spain 
 in Cuba. On the nth of August, 1849, President 
 Taylor issued a proclamation warning all citizens of 
 the United States against taking part in such expedi- 
 tion and saying, " No such persons must expect the 
 interference of this government in any form on their 
 behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be re- 
 duced in consequence of their conduct." " 
 
 A few days later the entire force of Lopez was ar- 
 rested by United States marshals just as it was on the 
 point of leaving New York. 
 
 Nothing daunted, Lopez traveled through the 
 southern and southwestern states secretly enlisting 
 men and making arrangements for their transporta- 
 tion to Cuba. Many men of prominence at the south 
 were in open and avowed sympathy with the enter- 
 prise. In the spring of 1850, Lopez called upon Gen. 
 John A. Quitman, governor of Mississippi, who had 
 served with great distinction in the Mexican war, and 
 offered him, in the name of his compatriots, the leader- 
 ship of the revolution and the supreme command of 
 the army. Quitman's sympathies were thoroughly en- 
 listed in the movement, but he declined the honor on 
 account of the serious aspect of political affairs, par- 
 ticularly what he considered the encroachments of the 
 federal government upon the rights of the states. He 
 made liberal contributions of money, however, and 
 gave Lopez sound advice about his undertaking, in- 
 sisting that he must have an advance column of at 
 
 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. V, p. 7. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA IO9 
 
 least 2000 men to maintain a footing on the island un- 
 til reinforcements could go to their aid." 
 
 Unfortunately for Lopez he did not follow the ad- 
 vice of Quitman. A company of volunteers altogether 
 inadequate for the successful accomplishment of the 
 enterprise was collected at New Orleans. There Lo- 
 pez chartered a steamer, the Cr£ple, and two barks, 
 the Georgicma and the Susan Loud. Three-fourths of 
 the volunteers had served in the Mexican war. The 
 first detachment comprising 250 men left New Orleans 
 in the bark Georgiana, April 25, 1850, under the com- 
 mand of Col. Theodore O'Hara. They proceeded to 
 the island of Contoy ofif the coast of Yucatan in the 
 territory of Mexico. There they were joined three 
 weeks later by Lopez and 450 followers in the Creole. 
 The entire command, with the exception of the crews 
 
 ^ Life and Corresp. of John A. Quitman, by J. F. H. 
 Claiborne, Vol. II, pp. 55-56 and Appendix p. 385. 
 
 In June the Grand Jury of the United States Circuit Court 
 at New Orleans found a bill against John A. Quitman, John 
 Henderson, Governor of Louisiana, and others, for setting on 
 foot the invasion of Cuba. Quitman's view of state sover- 
 eignty did not admit the right of the United States Courts 
 to proceed against the chief executive of a sovereign state. 
 He sought the advice of friends throughout the south as 
 to what course he should pursue. None of them admitted 
 the right of the United States Courts to indict him and 
 several of them advised hini that it was his duty to assert the 
 principle of state sovereignty even to the point of calling 
 out the state militia to protect him against arrest. Others 
 advised him to submit under protest so as to avoid an open 
 breach. This course was finally adopted, and when the 
 United States marshal appeared on the 3rd of February, 1851, 
 to take him into custody, he yielded, causing at the same 
 time an address to be issued to the people of Mississippi, in 
 which he resigned the office of governor. After proceedings 
 which lasted two months, Henderson was acquitted and the 
 charges against Quitman and the others dismissed. 
 
no THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 of the two barks and a few others to guard the stores, 
 was embarked in the Creole and started for Matanzas, 
 which had been chosen as the first point of attack, 
 but later fearing that the Spaniards were aware of their 
 intentions, they decided to land at Cardenas instead. 
 The landing was easily effected about midnight, the 
 garrison surprised, and the fort taken by assault. In 
 about three hours the filibusters held the town and the 
 terminus of the railroad connecting it with Matanzas. 
 Then Lopez issued his call for volunteers, but not a 
 native responded. 
 
 Meanwhile the alarm had gone forth, the Spaniards 
 were collecting and arming, and the position of the 
 invaders was becoming hourly more critical. After 
 holding the city for twelve hours Lopez reluctantly 
 gave orders to his men to reimbark. A council of 
 war was then held and the officers having decided 
 against the protest of Lopez, that it was inexpedient 
 to attempt another landing, owing to the indecision of 
 the native population, the steamer headed for Key 
 West. Thither they were pursued by the Pizarro, a 
 Spanish war vessel, which steamed into the harbor 
 just as they cast anchor. For a few moments the 
 Spaniards seemed to be on the point of preparing to 
 open fire on the Creole, but when they saw the United 
 States custom-house officers take possession of her 
 they changed their minds and left the harbor. 
 
 The two barks, Georgiana and Susan Loud, which 
 had been left with a small guard at the island of Con- 
 toy, were captured by Spanish war ships, taken to 
 Havana, condemned as prizes and the men put on 
 trial for participation in the Lopez expedition. As 
 these men had committed no act of hostility against 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA III 
 
 Spain, and had, moreover, been seized on neutral ter- 
 ritory, the United States government at once issued 
 its protest and demanded their release. The Spanish 
 government replied that these men had been described 
 as pirates by the President of the United States in 
 his proclamation warning citizens against joining the 
 expedition and were, therefore, beyond the pale of the 
 protection of the United States. After heated nego- 
 tiations which lasted several months and seriously 
 threatened the peace of the two countries, the prison- 
 ers were released, but it was declared to be an act of 
 grace on the part of the Queen and not a concession 
 to the demands of the United States." 
 
 Lopez was prosecuted by the United States govern- 
 ment for violation of the neutrality laws, but escaped 
 conviction and at once set about organizing another 
 expedition. On the 3rd of August, 1851, the third 
 and last expedition of Lopez, consisting of over 400 
 men, left New Orleans. Some time before, a slight 
 insurrectionary movement, which was soon suppress- 
 ed, had broken out in the eastern part of the island of 
 Cuba. The extent of this insurrection had been 
 greatly exaggerated and had led the filibusters to ex- 
 pect upon their arrival a rising of the whole Creole 
 population. After touching at Key West the steam- 
 er proceeded to the coast of Cuba and landed the ex- 
 pedition at Bahia Honda on the 12th of August. The 
 main body under Lopez proceeded into the country 
 where they had been led to expect a general uprising 
 of the Cubans. Col. W. S. Crittenden, who had served 
 with bravery in the Mexican war, was left in command 
 of a smaller body to bring up the baggage. This de- 
 
 " Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 41, Thirty-first Cong., Second Sess. 
 
112 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 tachment was attacked on the 13th and after a bloody 
 fight forced to retreat to the place where they had land- 
 ed, where about fifty of them obtained boats and tried 
 to escape. They were, however, intercepted off the 
 coast, taken to Havana, sentenced before a military 
 court, and executed on the i6th. 
 
 The main body under Lopez were overcome and dis- 
 persed by Spanish troops on the 24th. Lopez was 
 taken prisoner, tried and sentenced. The execution 
 was carried out on the first of September. He was 
 strangled by the garrote. Many of his followers were 
 killed or died of hunger and fatigue and the rest made 
 prisoners. Upon receipt of this news Commodore 
 Parker was at once ordered to proceed in a frigate to 
 Havana to inquire into the charges against the pris- 
 oners executed, and the circumstances of their cap- 
 ture, trial and sentence. To these inquiries the cap- 
 tain-general replied that he considered those executed 
 as pirates, that they had been so denounced by the 
 President of the United States in his proclamation, 
 that he was not at liberty to furnish a copy of the 
 court records, but would send them to Madrid and to 
 the Spanish minister at Washington." 
 
 When the news of the executions at Havana reach- 
 ed New Orleans the excitement was intense. The 
 office of the Spanish consul was broken into, por- 
 traits of the Queen and Captain-General of Cuba de- 
 faced, the Spanish flag torn in pieces, and the consul 
 burned in effigy in La Fayette Square. The consul 
 had to flee from the city for safety and the property of 
 
 "H. Ex. Doc. No. I, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; 
 also 2d Annual Message of Fillmore, December 2, 1851. 
 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. V, p. 113. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA II3 
 
 certain Spaniards residing in New Orleans was de- 
 stroyed. A lengthy correspondence ensued between 
 the two governments. The United States agreed to 
 pay an indemnity for injuries to the public property 
 of Spain, but not' for the destruction of property be- 
 longing to Spanish residents, who were entitled only 
 to the same protection afforded our own citizens." 
 ■ A few weeks after the last Lopez expedition the 
 British and French representatives at Washington 
 notified our government that orders had been issued 
 to their squadrons in the West Indies to repel by force 
 any attempts at the invasion of Cuba from any quar- 
 ter. Our government replied that such action on the 
 part of England and France could "not but be re- 
 garded by the United States with grave disapproval, 
 as involving on the part of European sovereigns com- 
 bined action of protectorship over American waters." °" 
 In order to allay the uneasiness caused by the at- 
 tempts of filibusters, supposed to be encouraged or at 
 least connived at by the government of the United 
 States, the Spanish government requested Great Bri- 
 tain and France, in January, 1852, to secure the signa- 
 ture by the American government in conjunction with 
 them of an abnegatory declaration with respect to 
 Cuba." Accordingly in April, 1852, the British and 
 French ministers at Washington brought the subject 
 to the attention of this government in notes of the 
 same date, suggesting a tripartite convention for the 
 
 " H. Ex. Doc. No. I, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess. 
 
 " Mr. Crittenden to Comte de Sartiges, October 22, 1851. 
 See also Pres. Fillmore to Mr. Webster and Mr. Webster's 
 reply. 2 Curtis's Life of Webster, p. 551. 
 
 "Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. XLIV, Lord Howden to 
 Earl Granville, January 9, 1852. 
 8 
 
114 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 guarantee of Cuba to Spain, the main article of the 
 proposed draft being as follows: 
 
 " The high contracting parties, by the present con- 
 vention, disavow separately and collectively, for the 
 present as for the future, all intention to obtain posses- 
 sion of the island of Cuba; and they respectively bind 
 themselves to discountenance, as far as it shall be in 
 their power, all attempts to that effect on the part of 
 any power or individuals whatever. 
 
 " The high contracting parties declare, severally and 
 collectively, that they will not obtain or maintain, for 
 themselves or for any one of them, any exclusive con- 
 trol over the said island, nor assume nor exercise any 
 dominion over the same." "^ 
 
 In acknowledging the notes of England and France 
 proposing the convention Mr. Webster replied sepa- 
 rately of course, but to the same effect. In his note to 
 M. de Sartiges he used the following words : 
 
 " It has been stated and often repeated to the gov- 
 ernment of Spain by this government, under various 
 administrations, not only that the United States have 
 no design upon Cuba themselves, but that, if Spain 
 should refrain from a voluntary cession of the- island 
 to any other European power, she might rely on the 
 Countenance and friendship of the United States to as- 
 sist her in the defence and preservation of that island. 
 At the same time it has always been declared to Spain 
 that the government of the United States could not 
 be expect^ to acquiesce in the cession of Cuba to an 
 European power. . . . The President will take M. de 
 Sartiges's communication into consideration and give 
 
 " Comte de Sartiges to Mr. Webster, April 23, 1852. Sen. 
 Ex. Doc. No. 13, Thirty-second Cong., Second Sess. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA II5 
 
 it his best reflections. But the undersigned deems it 
 his duty, at the same time, to remind M. de Sartiges, 
 and through him his government that the poUcy of 
 the United States has uniformly been to avoid, as far 
 as possible, alliances or agreements with other states, 
 and to keep itself free from national obligations, ex- 
 cept such as affect directly the interests of the United 
 States themselves." " 
 
 The matter was again urged upon the United States 
 by the British and French governments in lengthy 
 notes to Mr. Webster, dated July 9, 1852, in which the 
 indefeasibility of the Spanish title to the island and its 
 bearings upon the neutrality of the proposed Central 
 American canals were dwelt upon. The death of Mr. 
 Webster postponed for some time the answer of the 
 United States to the proposal. 
 
 The government finally set forth its reasons for de- 
 clining to enter into the proposed agreement, in a note j 
 written by Mr. Everett December i, 1852. He said 
 that although the President did not covet the acqui-"^ 
 sition of Cuba for the United States, at the same time 
 he considered the conditio^ of that island as mainly an 
 American question; that it was doubtful whether the 
 treaty-making power could constitutionally impose a 
 permanent disability upon the government; that our 
 policy had always been against "entangling alliances"; 
 that the compact, although equal in terms, would be 
 very unequal in substance, as the relations of the 
 United States with the island were much more inti- 
 mate than those of Europe; and finally that "no ad- 
 ministration of this government, however strong in 
 
 " Mr. Webster to Comte de Sartiges, April 29, 1852. To 
 Mr. Crampton, same date, to same effect. 
 
/ 
 
 Il6 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 public confidence in other respects, could stand a day 
 under the odium of having stipulated with the great 
 powers of Europe, that in no future time, under no 
 change of circumstances " should the inhabitants of 
 this island, like those of the other Spanish possessions 
 on this continent, succeed in rendering themselves in- 
 dependent." 
 
 Although written in a style somewhat too rhetorical 
 for a state paper, Mr. Everett's letter is nevertheless 
 one of the best statements of the Monroe doctrine that 
 has appeared, and although the .question at issue was 
 generally regarded as a southern question, he dealt 
 with it in an unbiased, patriotic and statesmanlike 
 manner. 
 
 In the event of the refusal of the United States to 
 sign the proposed convention, the Spanish govern- 
 ment had requested that England and France would 
 set forth a declaration to the effect that they would 
 never allow any other power, European or American, 
 to obtain possession of Cuba at any time by cession, 
 conquest, or insurrection. This was suggested as an 
 off-set to the declaration made by the United States 
 on former occasions not to allow any European 
 power to obtain possession of the island." 
 
 With the growth of the slavery conflict, which had 
 now become paramount to all other questions, the an- 
 nexation of Cuba had become a party issue, and the 
 return of the Democratic party to power, in 1853, was 
 hailed by the southern extremists as a signal for the 
 acquisition of the long-coveted prize. This expecta- 
 
 " Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 13, Thirty-second Cong., Second Sess.; 
 also Wharton's Digest, Sec. 72, p. 562. 
 " Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. XLIV. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA II7 
 
 tion was further heightened by the declaration of Presi- 
 dent Pierce, in his inaugural address, that the policy 
 of his administration would " not be controlled by any 
 timid forebodings of evil from expansion," and that 
 . the acquisition of certain possessions not within our 
 jurisdiction was " eminently important for our protec- 
 tion, if not in the future essential for the preservation 
 of the rights of commerce and the peace of the world." 
 
 Whatever the personal views of the President on the 
 subject of the foreign policy of the administration may 
 have been, he placed at the head of the department of 
 state a very able man, and one well qualified to handle 
 the difficult problems that arose, Mr. Wm. L. Marcy 
 of New York. He has, nevertheless, been harshly 
 dealt with by the historians of this period, and his 
 conduct of our foreign affairs characterized as " jingo- 
 ism " and base truckling to the slave interests. An 
 impartial study of the diplomatic correspondence of 
 the period reveals the manifest injustice of such a judg- 
 ment. Mr. Marcy's utterances on the Cuban question 
 may creditably be compared with those of John Quincy 
 Adams and Henry Clay, but the student who studies 
 this period with nothing but the slavery conflict in 
 view is easily led to look at them in a different light. 
 
 For the mission to Spain the President selected 
 Pierre Soule of Louisiana, a Frenchman by birth and 
 education, who had been exiled for political reasons. 
 His appointment under the circumstances created un- 
 favorable comment both in this country and in Europe, 
 and his sojourn of several days at Paris on the way 
 to his post at Madrid caused the French government 
 some annoyance. Louis Napoleon advised the court 
 of Madrid not to receive him, as his views on the Cu- 
 
Il8 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 ban question were well known to be of a radical char- 
 acter. 
 
 In his instructions to Mr. Soule, July 23, 1853, Mr. 
 Marcy emphasized the importance of our relations 
 with Spain in view of the rumors of contemplated* 
 changes in the internal afifairs of Cuba and of the re- 
 cent interposition of England and France. In regard 
 to the jKjlicy of the administration with respect to the 
 island, he says: 
 
 " Nothing will be done, on our part, to disturb its 
 present connection with Spain, unless the character of 
 that connection should be so changed as to affect our 
 present or prospective security. While the United 
 States would resist, at every hazard, the transference 
 of Cuba to any European nation, they would exceed- 
 ingly regret to see Spain resorting to any power for 
 assistance to uphold her rule over it. Such a depen- 
 dence on foreign aid would, in effect, invest the auxil- 
 iary with the character of a protector, and give it a 
 pretext to interfere in our affairs, and also generally 
 in those of the North American continent." 
 
 As to the possibility of purchase, he says : 
 
 " Under certain conditions the United States might 
 be willing to purchase it; but it is scarcely expected 
 that you will find Spain, should you attempt to ascer- 
 tain her views upon the subject, at all inclined to en- 
 ter into such a negotiation. There is reason to be- 
 lieve that she is under obligations to Great Britain and 
 France not to transfer this island to the United States. 
 ... In the present aspect of the case the President 
 does not deem it proper to authorize you to make any 
 proposition for the purchase of that island." 
 
 He states that the United States would cordially 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 19 
 
 favor the voluntary separation of the island from 
 Spain, and " would be willing to contribute something 
 more substantial than their good-will " toward estab- 
 lishing its independence. In conclusion he instructed 
 Mr. Soule to try to negotiate a commercial treaty with 
 Spain favorable to our trade with Cuba, and pointed 
 out the urgent necessity of allowing a " qualified diplo- 
 matic intercourse between the captain-general of that 
 island and our consul at Havana, in order to prevent 
 difficulties and preserve a good ui^derstanding between 
 the two countries."" The difficulty of settling dis- 
 putes arising in Cuba had been the subject of frequent 
 remonstrances on the part of the United States. -The 
 captain-general was clothed with almost "unlimited 
 powers for aggression, but with none for reparation." 
 He exercised no diplomatic functions and was in no 
 way subject to the authority of the Spanish minister 
 at Washington. The position taken by Mr. Marcy 
 in this letter and in his letter written a short time be- 
 fore to Mr. Buchanan at the court of London, was in 
 full accord with the views of his predecessors for a 
 generation past 
 
 Upon the arrival of Mr. Soule in Spain, he found 
 that Mr. Calderon, the head of the cabinet, was 
 strongly opposed to any commercial treaty or agree- 
 ment which would promote intercourse between the 
 United States and the dependencies of Spain, and 
 equally averse to allowing the captain-general any 
 diplomatic powers." Mr. Soule was by nature hot- 
 
 *'' H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-third Cong., Second Sess., 
 p. 3- 
 
 " Mr. Soule to Mr. Marcy, November 10, and December 
 23, 1853, and January 20, 1854. 
 
I20 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 headed and impetuous and could suffer anything 
 ix sooner than enforced inactivity. Whatever may have 
 been the intentions of the executive in sending him, 
 he had come to Madrid for the purpose of consum- 
 mating the long-cherished scheme of acquiring Cuba. 
 Accordingly, on the 23rd of February, 1854, he wrote 
 to Mr. Marcy that the affairs of the Spanish govern- 
 ment were about to reach a crisis, that a change of 
 ministry was imminent, and that contingencies involv- 
 ing the fate of Cuba were likely to arise which might 
 be of great interest to the United States. He, there- 
 fore, asked for definite instructions. Relying upon 
 these representations and upon Mr. Soule's judgment, 
 Mr. Marcy transmitted in due time the necessary 
 powers, authorizing him to negotiate with Spain for 
 the purchase of Cuba, or for its independence, if such 
 an arrangement would be more agreeable to Spanish 
 pride, in which event the United States would be will- 
 ing to contribute substantial aid to the result. 
 
 In the meantime, however, the Black Warrior affair 
 had strained the relations of the two countries almost 
 to the point of rupture. This case, involving the 
 seizure of an American steamer by Spanish officials 
 at Havana for an unintentional violation or neglect 
 of custom-house regulations, was of an unusually ex- 
 asperating chara9ter. The Black Warrior, owned by 
 the New York and Alabama Steamship Company, had 
 been running for over eighteen months between Mo- 
 bile and New York, stopping twice a month at Havana 
 to let off and receive passengers and mail without 
 breaking cargo. On the 28th of February, 1854, the 
 ship entered the harbor of Havana with over 900 bales 
 of cotton in transitu for New York. The captain de- 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 121 
 
 livered to the custom-house officers his manifest in bal- 
 last, as had been customary, without mentioning the 
 cotton, according to a form furnished him, he claim- 
 ed, by one of the officers of the port. In any event 
 there was no intention of fraud, as no secret had ever 
 been made of cargo of this kind and the Spanish offi- 
 cials who boarded the steamer twice each month could 
 not plead ignorance. When the ship was ready to 
 leave the harbor and the agent applied for a pass, it 
 was refused on the ground that the cargo had been 
 omitted in the manifest, and he was informed that the 
 cotton was confiscated and the captain fined according 
 to the custom-house regulations. When the officials 
 demanded of the captain the delivery of the cargo, he 
 refused and threatened in case of the use of force to 
 abandon the ship. After some delay the Spaniards 
 returned and began to unload, whereupon the captain 
 hauled down the flag and with his officers and crew 
 abandoned the ship to the Spanish authorities. 
 
 As soon as the department at Washington was fully 
 informed of this outrage, Mr. Marcy forwarded all the 
 documents in the case to Mr. Soule and directed him 
 to demand of the Spanish government a prompt disa- 
 vowal of the act and the payment of an indemnity to 
 the owners of the vessel and of the cargo, the extent 
 of the injury being estimated at $300,000. On the 
 8th of April Mr. Soule presented a formal demand on 
 the part of his government. No answer to this note 
 having been received, on the nth he repeated his de- 
 mands much more emphatically, calling for an indem- 
 nity of $300,000, insisting that all persons, whatever 
 their rank or importance, who were concerned in the 
 perpetration of the wrong, be dismissed from her ma- 
 
122 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 jesty's service, and finally declaring that non-compli- 
 ance with these demands within forty-eight hours 
 would be considered by the government of the United 
 States as equivalent to a declaration that her majesty's 
 government was determined to uphold the conduct of 
 its officers. 
 
 Mr. Calderon replied, on the 12th, that whenever her 
 majesty's government should have before it the au- 
 thentic and complete data, which it then lacked, a re- 
 ply would be given to the demand of the United States 
 conformable to justice and right; that the peremptory 
 tone of Mr. Soule's note suggested to the government 
 of her majesty " a suspicion that it was not so much 
 the manifestation of a lively interest in the defence of 
 pretended injuries, as an incomprehensible pretext for 
 exciting estrangement, if not a quarrel between two 
 friendly powers." To this note Mr. Soule replied that 
 the suggestion made as to the motives of the United 
 States in seeking redress was " but little creditable to 
 the candor of her Catholic majesty's government, and 
 comes in very bad grace from one who, like your ex- 
 cellency, cannot but be aware that the records of this 
 legation, as well as those of her Catholic majesty's de- 
 partment of state, are loaded with reclamations bearing 
 on grievances most flagrant, which have never been 
 earnestly attended to and were met at their inception 
 with precisely the same dilatory excuses through which 
 the present one is sought to be evaded." 
 
 Meanwhile the aspects of the case were altogether 
 changed by a private agreement between the Havana 
 officials and the owners of the Black Warrior, by which 
 the ship and her cargo were restored. Mr. Soule con- 
 tinued, however, according to instructions from Wash- 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 23 
 
 ington, to demand compensation for the damages sus- 
 tained by the owners and passengers not compensated 
 for by the return of the ship and cargo, and also repa- 
 ration for the insult to the United States flag. 
 
 The Spanish government, however, refused to rec- 
 ognize any ground for reparation after the restitution 
 of the ship and cargo, and persisted in contradicting, 
 without the support of any evidence whatever, the 
 facts as presented by the United States, although they 
 were all certified to in proper legal form. 
 
 On the 24th of June Mr. Marcy wrote that the Presi- 
 dent was far from satisfied with the manner in which 
 our demands were treated by the Spanish government, 
 but that before resorting to extreme measures he was 
 determined to make a final appeal to Spain for the ad- 
 justment of past difficulties and for the guarantee of 
 more friendly relations in the future. Although satis- 
 fied with the spirited manner in which Mr. Soule had 
 performed the duties of his mission, the President was 
 considering the expediency of reinforcing the demands 
 of the United States by the appointment of an extra- 
 ordinary commission of two distinguished citizens to 
 act in conjunction with him. He instructed him, 
 therefore, not to press the affair of the Black Warrior, 
 but to wait until the question of the special commis- 
 sion could be laid before Congress. 
 
 During the summer there was a change of ministry 
 in the Spanish government, which, as was not infre- 
 quently the case, was attended with more or less serious 
 disorders. In August Mr. Marcy wrote that in view 
 of the unsettled condition of affairs in Spain and for 
 other reasons not stated, the purpose of sending a spe- 
 cial mission had, for the present at least, been aban- 
 
124 THE UNITED STATES AND CtJBA 
 
 doned. Without pressing matters he was, neverthe- 
 less, to avail himself of any opportunity, which might 
 be presented, of settling the affairs in dispute and of 
 negotiating with regard to Cuba. 
 
 Under same date (August i6, 1854) he proposed to 
 Mr. Soule another plan, that of consulting with Mr. 
 Mason and Mr. Buchanan, our ministers at Paris and 
 London. This suggestion, which led to the celebrated 
 meeting at Ostend and the so-called manifesto, is best 
 stated in Mr. Marcy's own words: 
 
 " I am directed by the President to suggest to you 
 a particular step, from which he anticipates much ad- 
 vantage to the negotiations with which you are 
 charged on the subject of Cuba. ... It seems desir- 
 able that there should be a full and free interchange of 
 views between yourself, Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Ma- 
 son, in order to secure a concurrence in reference to 
 the general object. 
 
 " The simplest and only very apparent means of ob- 
 taining this end is, for the three ministers to meet, as 
 early as may be, at some convenient central point 
 (say Paris), to consult together, to compare opinions 
 as to what may be advisable, and to adopt measures 
 for perfect concert of action in aid of your negotiations 
 at Madrid. 
 
 " While the President has, as I have before had oc- 
 casion to state, full confidence in your own intelli- 
 gence and sagacity, he conceives that it cannot be 
 otherwise than agreeable to you, and to your col- 
 leagues in Great Britain and France, to have the con- 
 sultation suggested, and thus to bring your common 
 wisdom and knowledge to bear simultaneously upon 
 the negotiations at Madrid, London, and Paris." 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA I25 
 
 The explanation of this sudden change of front on 
 the part of the executive is to be found in the general 
 alarm that was felt throughout the south at the pro- 
 posed changes in the internal administration of Cuba, 
 These changes, which involved not only the emanci- 
 pation of slaves, but the inevitable Africanization of 
 the island by the introduction of negroes from the 
 coast of Africa under the name of apprentices, were 
 dictated in whole or in part by Great Britain. 
 
 The British government had long urged upon Spain 
 the expediency of emancipation in the West Indies. 
 In 1851, just after the Lopez expeditions. Lord Pal- 
 merston wrote to the British representative at Madrid : 
 
 " I have to instruct your lordship to say to the Span- 
 ish minister that the slaves form a large portion, and 
 by no means an unimportant one, of the people of 
 Cuba; and that any steps taken to provide for their 
 emancipation would therefore, as far as the black pop- 
 ulation is concerned, be quite in unison with the rec- 
 ommendation made by her majesty's government, that 
 measures should be adopted for contenting the people 
 of Cuba, with a view to secure the connection between 
 the Spanish crown and the island; and it must be evi- 
 dent that if the negro population of Cuba were render- 
 ed free, that fact would create a most powerful element 
 of resistance to any scheme for annexing Cuba to the 
 United States, where slavery exists." 
 
 In 1853 the British government went much further 
 and urged its policy upon Spain with even stronger 
 logic. On the 31st of January, Lord John Russell 
 wrote to Lord Howden, British ambassador to Spain: 
 
 " Your lordship may be assured, that however 
 friendly the councils of her majesty may be to Spain; 
 
V 
 
 126 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 whatever may be the interest of this country not to see 
 / Cuba in the hands of any other power than Spain ; yet, 
 in the eyes of the people of this country, the destruc- 
 tion of a trade which conveys the natives of Africa to 
 become slaves in Cuba will furnish a large compensa- 
 tion for such a transfer. For such an exhibition of 
 public feeling, the government of Spain should be pre- 
 pared. Indeed, fairly speaking, it is impossible to be- 
 lieve that the government of Spain has been sincere in 
 its efforts to abolish slave trade." 
 
 Continuing he calls attention to the fact that France 
 had abolished the slave trade in 1819, and that in 1820 
 the United States had declared it piracy, and that as far 
 as these two states were concerned the slave trade 
 had long ceased to exist." This was a clear intima- 
 tion that Great Britain would see Cuba pass into the 
 hands of the United States or France without raising 
 objection, if such a transfer were the only means of 
 putting a stop to the hateful traffic. 
 
 Spain protested against the threatening tone of this 
 note, but it had its effect. Under date of March 16, 
 Lord Howden wrote to his government that Spain had 
 promised to give freedom to the emancipados of 1817 
 before the end of the year." 
 
 The suspicions of the United States as to the ex- 
 tent of British influence upon Spanish policy were not 
 groundless by any means. The action of Great Britain 
 in offering to protect Cuba against invasions from the 
 United States after the Lopez expeditions, and the 
 proposal of the tripartite convention, as well as the 
 
 " Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. XLIl, p. 335. 
 "Ibid., Vol. XLII, p. 335. See also Ballou, History of 
 Cuba, Chap. 4. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 12/ 
 
 fact that a large part of outstanding Spanish bonds 
 were held by British subjects and that Lord Palmer- 
 ston was pressing for some guarantee, strengthened 
 the conviction that Spain would be compelled to yield 
 to the dictation of British policy in the internal affairs 
 of Cuba. The contemplated changes were never car- 
 ried out in full, as the attention of England and France 
 was soon diverted to the eastern question. 
 
 In accordance with the instructions of the President, 
 Messrs. Soule, Mason, and Buchanan proceeded to 
 make arrangements for the proposed conference, and 
 this was held at Ostend, in Belgium, October 9, 10, 11, 
 1854. They then adjourned to Aix-la-Chapelle for a 
 week, where the reports of their proceedings were pre- 
 pared. 
 
 The greater part of the report is taken up with 
 (i) an enumeration of the advantages that would ac- 
 crue to the United States from the acquisition of Cuba, 
 and (2) an elaborate exposition of the ways in which 
 the interests of Spain would be promoted by the sale. 
 These arguments were perfectly familiar to the people 
 of the United States and had been stated time and 
 time again in the papers, in magazines and books, and 
 on the floor of Congress. The dominant party in the 
 United States needed no convincing on these points, 
 and as for convincing the Spanish nation that it 
 was to their interests to sell Cuba, the arguments of 
 the plenipotentiaries of the United States were per- 
 fectly gratuitous. The only specific recommendation 
 of the report was that a proposal should be made 
 through the proper diplomatic channel to the Supreme 
 Constituent Cortes about to assemble, to purchase 
 Cuba from Spain, the maximum price to be $120,- 
 000,000. The report then proceeds to discuss the 
 
128 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 question, what ought to be the course of the American 
 government should Spain refuse to sell Cuba? The 
 ministers declared: 
 
 " Our past history forbids that we should acquire 
 the island of Cuba without the consent of Spain, un- 
 less justified by the great law of self-preservation. We 
 must, in any event, preserve our own conscious recti- 
 tude and our own self-respect. 
 
 " Whilst pursuing this course we can aflford to dis- 
 regard the censures of the world, to which we have 
 been so often and so unjustly exposed. 
 
 " After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba 
 far beyond its present value, and this shall have been 
 refused, it will then be time to consider the question, 
 does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously en- 
 danger our internal peace and the existence of our 
 cherished Union? 
 
 " Should this question be answered in the affirma- 
 tive, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall 
 be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the 
 power; and this upon the very same principle that 
 would justify an individual in tearing down the burning 
 house of his neighbor if there were no other means of 
 preventing the flames from destroying his own home. 
 
 " Under such circumstances we ought neither to 
 count the cost nor regard the odds which Spain might 
 enlist against us. We forbear to enter into the ques- 
 tion whether the present condition of the island would 
 justify such a measure. We should, however, be re- 
 creant to our duty, be unworthy of our gallant fore- 
 fathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, 
 should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and become 
 a second St. Domingo, with all its attendant horrors 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 29 
 
 to the white race, and suffer the flames to extend to our 
 own neighboring shores, seriously to endanger or ac- 
 tually to consume the fair fabric of our Union." " 
 
 The scope of this report went entirely beyond any- 
 thing outlined in the instructions of Mr. Marcy. The 
 object of the conference was not to discuss the policy 
 of the United States in regard to Cuba. The adminis- 
 tration had already decided upon that. Mr. Soule 
 had been directed, whenever in his judgment the cir- 
 cumstances seemed favorable, to open negotiations 
 with the Spanish government for the purchase of Cuba. 
 For the purpose of furthering these negotiations he 
 was directed to confer with our representatives at Paris 
 and London, in order to prevent, if possible, the gov- 
 ernments of France and England from throwing any 
 impediments in the way of the transfer. The three 
 ministers seem to have overlooked the fact that they 
 were simply the servants of the administration, author- 
 ized to act in accordance with certain definite instruc- 
 tions, and to have assumed the much more important 
 and agreeable role of dictating a policy to their home 
 government. 
 
 The report also recommended that all proceedings 
 in reference to the negotiations with Spain " ought to 
 be open, frank, and public." This recommendation, to- 
 gether with the general character of the report, appar- 
 ently indicates that its authors were rather bent on 
 making political capital of the affair at home than on 
 seriously furthering negotiations at Madrid." 
 
 " H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, p. 127, Thirty-third Cong., Second 
 Sess. 
 
 °° The correspondence relating to the Black Warrior case 
 and to the Ostend conference is contained in H. Ex. Doc. 
 No. 93, Thirty-third Cong., Second Sess. 
 9 
 
130 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 The whole affair was ridiculed at the time and at- 
 tributed by a partisan press to the administration. The 
 objectionable features of the report were politely but 
 firmly repudiated by the state department in Mr. 
 Marcy's reply to Mr. Soule and Mr. Soule promptly 
 resigned his mission. This fact has been generally 
 overlooked, while the unfortunate publicity given to 
 the proceedings at Ostend has brought endless cen- 
 sure upon President Pierce and his cabinet. 
 
 The reply of Mr. Marcy to. the report of the Ostend 
 conference addressed to Mr. Soule was dated, Novem- 
 ber 13, 1854. He says: 
 
 " The measure therein presented — the purchase of 
 Cuba — is probably the only one which would with cer- 
 tainty place the relations of the two countries on the 
 sure basis of enduring friendship. . . . But should 
 you have reason to believe that the men in power are 
 averse to . entertaining such a proposition — that the 
 offer of it would be offensive to the national pride of 
 Spain, and that it would find no favor in any consider- 
 able class of the people, then it will be but too evident 
 that the time for opening, or attempting to open, such 
 a negotiation, has not arrived. It appears to the Presi- 
 dent that nothing could be gained, and something 
 might be lost, by an attempt to push on a negotiation 
 against such a general resistance.'' 
 
 In regard to certain portions of the report implying 
 the alternative of cession or seizure, Mr. Marcy says: 
 
 " To conclude that, on the rejection of a proposition 
 to cede, seizure should ensue, would be to assume that 
 self-preservation necessitates the acquisition of Cuba 
 by the United States; that Spain has refused, and will 
 persist in refusing, our reclamations for injuries and 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA I3I 
 
 wrongs inflicted, and that she will make no arrange- 
 ment for our future security against the recurrence of 
 similar injuries and wrongs." " 
 
 He then directs Mr. Soule to proceed with the ne- 
 gotiations in the Black Warrior case and to try to bring 
 about some understanding between the two govern- 
 ments in regard to such cases in the future. 
 
 That Mr. Soule regarded this dispatch as a disavow- 
 al on the part of the administration of the Ostend 
 manifesto seems evident from his prompt reply tend- 
 ering his resignation. 
 
 His reply, under date of December 17, 1854, says: 
 
 " Your dispatch of the 13th ultimo leaving me no 
 alternative but that of continuing to linger here in 
 languid impotence, or of surrendering a trust which, 
 with the difficulties thrown in the way of its execution, 
 I would strive in vain to discharge, either to the satis- 
 faction of the government or to my own credit, you 
 will not be surprised at the course which a sense of 
 dignity has impelled me to adopt. I resign my com- 
 mission of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipo- 
 tentiary of the United States near this court, and beg 
 of the extreme kindness of the President to be relieved 
 
 " Mr. Marcy's personal opinion is unmistakably expressed 
 in a private letter to L. B. Shepard, Esq., of New York, 
 April IS, 1855: 
 
 " The robber doctrine I abhor. If carried out it would 
 degrade us in our own estimation and disgrace us in the 
 eyes of the civilized world. Should the administration com- 
 mit the fatal folly of acting upon it, it could not hope to be 
 sustained by the country, and would leave a tarnished name 
 to all future times. Cuba would be a very desirable posses- 
 sion if it came to us in the right way, but we cannot afford 
 to get it by robbery or theft." Quoted by Prof. J. B. Moore 
 in the Forum, May, 1896. 
 
132 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 from duty, if at all possible, by the end of next Jan- 
 uary." 
 
 While the negotiations in regard to the settlement of 
 the Black Warrior affair were pending, the Spanish 
 government proposed the establishment of a mixed 
 commission to sit at Madrid, on the basis of the con- 
 vention entered into by the United States .with Great 
 Britain, February 3, 1853, for the purpose of adjust- 
 ing all claims for reparation and indemnity for injuries 
 suffered by private individuals then pending between 
 the governments of the United States and Spain. The 
 government of the United States replied that it would 
 be perfectly willing to entertain the proposed arrange- 
 ment, if it were to apply only to such cases as might 
 involve disputable facts or principles of a doubtful im- 
 port, but that the large majority of the claims it had 
 pressed upon the government of Spain were not of that 
 character. 
 
 In spite of the " jingo " policy attributed to this ad- 
 ministration, the complications arising out of the 
 seizure of the Black Warrior were not made a casus 
 belli, as might easily have been done. After Mr. 
 Soule's return to the United States the negotiations 
 were continued by his successor. The conduct of the 
 officials concerned in the seizure was disavowed, and 
 the indemnity claimed by the American citizens con- 
 cerned was paid. The administration closed on terms 
 of comparative friendship with Spain, although there 
 were numbers of claims still unadjusted. 
 
 The Cuban question figured conspicuously in the 
 
 campaign of 1856. The platform of the Democratic 
 
 j party was strongly in favor of acquisition, while the 
 
 j new Republican platform stigmatized the Ostend 
 
 ' manifesto as the highwayman's plea. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 33 
 
 Until the Buchanan administration all negotiations 
 for the purchase of Cuba had been undertaken under 
 the authority of the executive alone. An effort was 
 now made to get the two houses of Congress to con- 
 cur in an appropriation for this purpose. It was . 
 thought that united action on the part of the legisla- 
 tive and executive branches of the government would 
 produce some impression on Spain. Accordingly, in 
 his second, third, and fourth annual messages, Presi- 
 dent Buchanan brought the matter to the attention of 
 Congress, but his appeal met with little encourage- 
 ment. J 
 
 In January, 1859, Senator Slidell, the chairman of 
 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, reported 
 a bill carrying $30,000,000, to be placed at the disposal 
 of the President as a preliminary sum for the purchase 
 of Cuba." His report was very elaborate, giving all 
 the diplomatic correspondence of importance not 
 hitherto transmitted to Congress, and extracts from 
 that already published. After citing historical docu- 
 ments to show that the acquisition of Cuba was always 
 contemplated by the United States government, he 
 represented that there were but three possible alterna- 
 tives for Cuba: 
 
 (i) Possession by one of the great European pow- ; 
 ers. ' 
 
 (2) Independence, which would be only nominal. 
 It would eventually fall under some protectorate, open 
 or disguised. 
 
 (3) Annexation to the United States. ' 
 This report created violent opposition, and in Feb- ^ 
 
 °^ Sen. Report No. 351, Thirty-fifth Cong., Second Sess., 
 Vol. I. 
 
134 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 ruary the bill was withdrawn by Mr. Slidell at the ur- 
 gent request of his friends. 
 
 -'' The relations with Spain during this administration, 
 although not on as precarious a footing as during 
 Pierce's administration, were nevertheless in a very un- 
 easy condition. There were a large number of claims 
 still outstanding. The most important of these were 
 the demands for the refunding of duties illegally 
 exacted from American vessels at custom-houses in 
 Cuba as far back as 1844. Whenever these claims 
 were urged upon the Spanish government our min- 
 ister was met with the objection that the claimants in 
 the Amistad case '^ had never received satisfaction 
 from our government, although their rights had been 
 recognized by the state department. At first, in 1841, 
 Mr. Webster had declared these claims unfounded. 
 
 ^ The Amistad case was a very peculiar one. In August, 
 1839, two Cubans left Havana in a vessel bound for the 
 eastern part of the island with a cargo of 54 slaves, destined 
 for their plantation. These negroes had been recently im- 
 ported from Africa in violation of Spanish law and sold in 
 Havana. In the course of the voyage the negroes rose in 
 mutiny, murdered the captain and crew and forced their two 
 owners to steer the vessel toward Africa. This they did 
 during the day when the negroes could tell the direction of 
 the vessel by the sun, but at night they turned the course 
 of the vessel to the west. After several weeks they appeared 
 off the coast of Connecticut and were captured by a United 
 States naval vessel and taken into New London. There the 
 two Cubans sued for the recovery of the negroes. The case 
 presented many novel features, as the negroes had not been 
 forcibly brought into the United States, but had brought 
 their masters. The Supreme Court finally ordered the negroes 
 to be set free. The Spanish government demanded that the 
 negroes be sent back to Cuba for the case to be tried, but 
 this demand was refused, as the negroes had been brought 
 to Cuba in violation of Spanish law and no Spanish subject 
 could establish a claim to them. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 35 
 
 The matter was again called to the attention of the 
 government during President Polk's administration, 
 when a different view of the case was taken and the 
 claim was recognized in a letter from the department 
 of state to the Spanish minister, March 19, 1847. I" 
 his annual message of the same year President Polk 
 recommended its payment. The matter was referred 
 to, Congress by President Fillmore in a special mes- 
 sage, January 17, 1853, though without recommenda- 
 tion. 
 
 The payment of this indemnity was again urged 
 upon Congress by President Pierce in his first annual 
 message, December, 1853, and President Buchanan, 
 who as secretary of state in 1847 had first recognized 
 it, made the same recommendation in all four of his 
 annual messages. An appropriation passed the senate 
 at one time, but .went no further. 
 
 In i860 the Spanish government finally agreed to 
 institute a joint commission for the adjustment of the 
 Cuban claims and a convention to that effect was con- 
 cluded with our minister at Madrid, March 5, i860. 
 Under the terms of this convention these demands, 
 amounting to $128,635.54, in which more than 100 
 citizens of the United States were interested, were rec- 
 ognized, and the Spanish government agreed to pay 
 $100,000 of this amount within three months, follow- 
 ing the exchange of ratifications." The payment of the 
 remaining $28,635.54 was to await the decision of the 
 commissioners for or against the Amistad claim; but 
 in any event the balance was to be paid to the claim- 
 ants either by Spain or the United States. As the 
 
 " Fourth Annual Message, Vol. V, p. 641. Messages and 
 Papers of the Presidents. 
 
136 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 validity of the Cuban claims alone was recognized by 
 this convention and all other suits, including the 
 Amistad claim, were referred to a commission, the 
 government of the United States objected to the with- 
 holding the payment of the $28,635.54, and the Sen- 
 ate rejected the convention. 
 
 The annexationist and filibustering schemes of the 
 decade immediately preceding the war of secession 
 were prompted by two motives. The one was the ex- 
 tension of slave territory, or at least the thwarting of 
 the schemes of emancipation for Cuba which Great 
 Britain was urging upon the Spanish government. 
 The other was to secure, by the occupation of this 
 strong strategic position, undisputed control over the 
 proposed interoceanic canal routes of Central America 
 and communication by this means with the new states 
 on the Pacific coast. These motives for annexation 
 were removed, the one by the abolition of slavery in 
 the United States, and the other by the construction 
 of the great transcontine'ntal railroads which estab- 
 lished more direct communication with the Pacific 
 states. 
 
 Since the civil war, therefore, our policy has been 
 mainly concerned in urging upon the Spanish govern- 
 ment the abolition of slavery in Cuba, the establish- 
 ment of a more liberal form of government through 
 independence or autonomy, and the promotion of more 
 untrammelled commercial intercourse with the United 
 States. 
 
 The abolition of slavery in the southern states left 
 the Spanish Antilles in the enjoyment of a monopoly 
 of slave labor, which in the production of sugar, es- 
 pecially, gave them advantages which overcame all 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 37 
 
 competition. This led to the formation of a strong 
 Spanish party, for whom the cause of slavery and that 
 of Spanish dominion were identical. These were 
 known as Peninsulars 6j^ Spanish immigrants. They 
 were the official class, the wealthy planters and slave- 
 owners and the real rulers of Cuba. Their central or- 
 ganization was the Casino Espagnol of Havana, which 
 was copied in all the towns of the island, and through 
 these clubs they controlled the volunteers, who at 
 times numbered 6o,ooq or 70,000. While enlistment 
 in this body was open to any white citizen, it was prac- 
 tically limited to Peninsulars, who, with the pay re- 
 ceived from this service could underbid the native 
 Cubans in all the more important governmental and 
 commercial positions. These volunteers never took 
 the field, but held possession of all the cities and towns 
 and thus were able to defy even the captain-general. 
 They were obedient to his orders only so long as he 
 was acting in close accord with the wishes of their 
 party. 
 
 On the other hand there was a party composed of 
 Creoles, or native Cubans, whose cry was " Cuba for 
 the Cubans ! " and who hoped to effect the complete 
 separation of the island from Spain, either through 
 their own efforts or through the assistance of the 
 United States. Not infrequently in the same family, 
 the father, born and brought up in the Peninsula, was 
 an ardent loyalist, while the son, born in Cuba, was an 
 insurgent at heart, if not actually enlisted in the ranks."' 
 
 The Spanish revolution of September, 1868, was the ^ 
 signal for an uprising of the native or Creole party in 
 
 " Gallenga: The Pearl of the Antilles, Chap. i. London, 
 1873- 
 
138 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 the eastern part of the island under the leadership of 
 Cespedes. This movement was not at first ostensibly 
 for independence, but for the revolution in Spain, the 
 cries being " Hurrah for Prim ! " " Hurrah for the 
 Revolution ! " Its real character was, however, appar- 
 ent from the first and its supporters continued for a 
 period of ten years, without regard to the numerous 
 vicissitudes through which the Spanish government 
 passed — ^the provisional government, the regency, the 
 elective monarchy, the republic, and the restored Bour- 
 bon dynasty — to wage a dogged, though desultory 
 warfare against the constituted authorities of the island. 
 This struggle was almost coterminous with President 
 Grant's administration of eight years. 
 
 At an early stage of the contest the Spanish authori- 
 ties conceived it to be necessary to issue certain de- 
 crees contrary to public law and, in so far as they af- 
 J fected citizens of the United States, in violation of 
 treaty obligations. On the 24th of March, 1869, the 
 captain-general issued a decree authorizing the cap- 
 ture on the high seas of vessels carrying men, arms, 
 munitions, or efifects in aid of the insurgents, and de- 
 claring that " all persons captured in such vessels with- 
 out regard to their number will be immediately exe- 
 cuted." "" 
 
 On the 1st of April another decree came from the 
 captain-general prohibiting the alienation of property 
 except with the assent of the government. This in- 
 cluded sales of produce, shares, stocks, etc., as well as 
 real estate." By another decree the estates of Ameri- 
 
 °' Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 7, Forty-first Congress, Second Ses- 
 sion. 
 " Ibid. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 39 
 
 can citizens suspected of sympathy with the insurgents 
 were confiscated." 
 
 Secretary Hamilton Fish protested against these de- 
 crees so far as they affected citizens of the United 
 States, as they were in violation of the provisions of 
 the treaty of 1795. 
 
 On the 4th of April Count Valmaseda, commanding 
 the district of Santiago de Cuba, issued a proclamation 
 to the effect that every man over 15 years of age 
 found away from home should be shot and that every 
 unoccupied house and every house not flying a white 
 flag should be burned." 
 
 July 7, 1869, the captain-general issued a decree 
 closing certain ports, declaring voyages with arms, am- 
 munition, or crew for the insurgents illegal, and di- 
 recting cruisers on the high seas to bring into port all 
 vessels found to be enemies. 
 
 On the i6th of July, Mr. Fish called the attention of 
 Mr. Lopez Roberts, the Spanish minister to the United 
 States, to the foregoing decree, saying that it assumed 
 powers over the commerce of the United States that 
 could be permitted only in time of war; that the United 
 States would not yield the right to carry contraband of 
 war in time of peace, and would not permit their ves- 
 sels to be interfered with on the high seas except in 
 time of war; that if Spain was at war she should give 
 notice to the United States to that effect, and that a 
 continuance of the decree or any attempt to enforce 
 it would be regarded as a recognition by Spain of a 
 state of war in Cuba.°° This declaration produced a 
 
 " Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 7, Forty-first Congress, Second Ses- 
 sion. ™ Ibid. " Ibid. 
 
140 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 prompt modification of the decree of July 7, as to the 
 search of vessels on the high seas. 
 
 As our commercial interests at large, as well as the 
 interests of individual citizens were deeply affected 
 by the condition of the island, President Grant deter- 
 mined at the beginning of his administration to offer 
 to mediate between Spain and the insurgents. General 
 Daniel E. Sickles was appointed minister to Spain and 
 his instructions, under date of June 29, 1869, directed 
 him to offer to the cabinet at Madrid the good of- 
 fices of the United States for the purpose of bringing 
 to a close the civil war then ravaging the island of 
 Cuba. Mr. Fish instructed General Sickles to ex- 
 plain to the Spanish government that he used the term 
 civil war advisedly, not as implying any public recog- 
 nition of belligerent rights, but a condition of affairs 
 that might not justify withholding much longer those 
 rights from the insurgents. The terms upon which 
 the United States proposed to mediate were the fol- 
 lowing: 
 
 1. The independence of Cuba to be acknowledged 
 by Spain. 
 
 2. Cuba to pay to Spain a sum under conditions to 
 be agreed upon. In case Cuba was unable to pay the 
 whole sum at once, the future payments to be secured 
 by pledge of export and import duties in a manner to 
 be agreed upon. 
 
 3. Abolition of slavery in the island of Cuba. 
 
 4. An armistice pending the negotiations for the 
 settlement above referred to." 
 
 General Sickles was told that the United States gov- 
 
 " House Ex, Doc. No. 160, Forty-first Congress, Second 
 Session. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA I4I 
 
 ernment would, subject to the approval of Congress, 
 guarantee the payment of the sum to be paid by Cuba 
 but he was to avoid such a complication unless it was 
 made a sine qua non by the Spanish cabinet. 
 
 After several interviews had taken place, on Au- 
 gust 13, General Sickles was authorized to state to 
 his government that its gopd offices had been accepted, 
 but on a somewhat dififerent basis from that proposed 
 by Mr. Fish. The Spanish government insisted that 
 it was beneath the dignity of the mother-country to 
 treat with the insurgents while they were in arms, and 
 that whatever agreement was arrived at must be in the 
 nature of a voluntary concession on the part of Spain, 
 consummated according to strict legal or constitutional 
 forms, and not in the nature of a treaty between armed 
 powers. The Spanish propositions were, therefore, as 
 follows : 
 
 1. The insurgents to lay down their arms. 
 
 2. Spain to grant simultaneously a full and com- 
 plete amnesty. 
 
 3. The people of Cuba to vote by universal suffrage 
 upon the question of their independence. 
 
 4. The majority having declared for independence, 
 Spain to grant it, the Cortes consenting; Cuba paying 
 a satisfactory equivalent guaranteed by the United 
 States."' 
 
 These propositions were at once communicated by 
 cable to the department at Washington. Mr. Fish re- 
 plied August 16 directing General Sickles to urge the 
 acceptance of good offices on the basis proposed by 
 the United States. The first proposition of Spain, 
 
 '^ House Ex. Doc. No. 160, Forty-first Congress, Second 
 Session. 
 
142 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 that the insurgents should lay down arms, was incap- 
 able of attainment, and the plan to ascertain the will 
 of the Cubans by a vote was impracticable because of 
 the disorganization of society and the terrorism that 
 prevailed as a result of the violence and insubordina- 
 tion of the volunteers. 
 
 In subsequent telegrams dated August 24, and Sep- 
 tember I, Mr. Fish repeated his directions to General 
 Sickles to negotiate only on the basis suggested by 
 the United States. 
 
 While matters were in this state two unfortunate in- 
 cidents occurred which so excited public opinion in 
 Spain and in the United States as to render the pend- 
 ing negotiations very difficult if not altogether im- 
 practicable. One was the detention bv , the United 
 States of^sQ me gunboa t§_built for the Spanish govern- 
 ment for use against Cuba. This was done at the re- 
 quest of the minister of Peru, with which country 
 Spain was at war. The Peruvian minister claimed 
 that even if these boats should not be used against 
 Peru, they would take the place of boats in use against 
 Cuba and the boats so released might be sent against 
 Peru. The Spanish government claimed that it was 
 not at war with Peru, that hostilities had ceased. This 
 incident caused very bitter feeling in Spain against the 
 United States. The other incident which excited gen- 
 eral indignation in the United States was the illega l 
 execu tion of iwo American citizens. Speakman and 
 Wyeth, at Santiago de Cuba. 
 
 In addition to this the Spanish government allowed 
 the purport of General Sickles's note tendering the 
 good offices of the United States to get out, and it was 
 accepted by the press as indicating the purpose of the 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 43 
 
 United States to recognize the Cubans as belligerents 
 if its offer of mediation were refused. No Spanish 
 cabinet could possibly endure the odium of having 
 made a concession to the Cubans under a threat from 
 an outside power. The Spanish government there- 
 fore requested the withdrawal of the American note. 
 In accordance with instructions from Washington 
 General Sickles withdrew, on the 28th of September, 
 the offer of the good offices of the United States. In 
 acknowledging this communication the Spanish min- 
 ister of state, Mr. Silvela, made the statement that 
 the note was withdrawn. General Sickles at once got 
 him to .correct the statement, as the note contained in 
 addition to the offer of good offices an exposition of 
 the motives of the President in making the offer, and 
 a statement of the general considerations deemed by 
 him essential to a settlement of the Cuban question. 
 It was also the record of an important transaction, 
 which the administration wished to preserve as the 
 basis for further negotiation, if occasion should arise. 
 Whether, during these negotiations, General Sickles 
 broached the question of cession to the United 
 States as a possible solution, in case independence 
 were impracticable, cannot be determined from the 
 published correspondence. There are, however, one or 
 two portions of the correspondence that suggest it, 
 and it is well known that ever since the civil war our 
 representatives at the court of Madrid have been in- 
 structed to keep their ears open for any suggestion or 
 intimation of a willingness on the part of Spain to 
 cede Cuba and to report the same without delay to 
 the department of state. In the published correspon- 
 dence under date of August 24, 1869, appears the 
 
144 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 following statement from General Sickles preceded and 
 followed by lines of asterisks : 
 
 " In general I find less susceptibility to the idea of 
 a transfer of the island to the United States than to the 
 concession of the independence of Cuba. There is an 
 apprehension that the persons and property of Span- 
 iards in Cuba would not be safe under Cuban control. 
 This impression, I hear, prevails in Catalonia."" 
 
 It will have been noted that one of the bases pro- 
 posed by the United States for the independence of 
 Cuba was the abolition of slavery. After the close of 
 the civil war in the United States the federal govern- 
 ment was as strenuous in its efforts to effect, through 
 representations to the court of Madrid, the emancipa- 
 tion of slaves in Cuba as it had been before the war to 
 prevent that measure. Such representations, involv- 
 ing in substance the demand that Cuban institutions 
 should conform to those of the United States, were 
 naturally somewhat exasperating to the Spanish gov- 
 ernment, especially when they were made in a dicta- 
 torial or imperative manner, as they not infrequently 
 were. As early as May 23, 1866, Mr. Seward had writ- 
 ten to Mr. Hale, the American representative at 
 Madrid, directing him to urge upon the Spanish gov- 
 ernment the propriety of speedy emancipation in Cu- 
 ba. He referred to the efforts in the past to annex 
 Cuba to the United States in the interests of the slave- 
 holders, and hinted, in view of the unfriendly attitude 
 of the South American republics toward Spain, at the 
 possibility of a combined movement against Cuba with 
 the object of emancipation. After the failure of the 
 
 " House Ex. Doc. No. 160, p. izi, Forty-first Congress, 
 Second Session. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA I45 
 
 plan of the United States for mediation fell through, 
 General Sickles continued to urge upon Spain the ne- 
 cessity for emancipation. Throughout these negotia- 
 tions the Spanish cabinet insisted that emancipation 
 was a part of the program of the liberal party, through 
 whom the revolution of 1868 had been efiEected and 
 that reforms in accordance with the spirit of the con- 
 stitution of 1869 would have been extended to Cuba 
 already but for the unfortunate insurrection. 
 
 November 28, 1869, General Sickles telegraphed 
 to his government that he was authorized by the min- 
 ister of the colonies to state that the government meas- 
 ures for Porto Rico would include local self-govern- 
 ment, a free press, public schools, impartial sufifrage, 
 gradual but speedy abolition of slavery, civil and po- 
 litical rights without distinction of color, etc. These 
 reforms were to be extended to Cuba as soon as hos- 
 tilities ceased and deputies were chosen in compliance 
 with Article 108 of the Constitution," which is as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 "Article 108. The Cortes Constituyentes shall re- 
 form the present system of government in the trans- 
 marine provinces when the deputies of Cuba or Porto 
 Rico shall have taken their seats, in order to extend to 
 the same, with the modifications which shall be deem- 
 ed necessary, the privileges set forth in the constitu- 
 tion."" 
 
 The Spanish government had suddenly conceived 
 such a respect for constitutional rights that it refused 
 
 "Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 113, Forty-first Congress, Second Ses- 
 sion. 
 
 "' House Ex. Doc. No. 160, Forty-first Congress, Second 
 Session. 
 
 ID 
 
146 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 to grant any reforms for Cuba until the deputies could 
 take their seats for fear of violating this article. 
 
 During the fall of 1869 Spain gave repeated assur- 
 ances to the United States of her readiness to effect 
 emancipation in Cuba as soon as hostilities should 
 cease, but the Spanish government could never be 
 brought to enter into any definite engagement on the 
 subject. In fact as regarded the slavery question the 
 cabinet of Madrid found itself unable to choose be- 
 tween the horns of the dilemma. The United States 
 and Great Britain were urging the immediate aboli- 
 tion of slavery, while the most influential upholders of 
 Spanish rule in Porto Rico as well as in Cuba were 
 the slaveholders themselves. The insurgents on the 
 other hand had abolished slavery by a decree of the 
 assembly of February 26, 1869, promising indemnity 
 to the owners in due time and providing for the en- 
 rolment of liberated slaves in the army." On January 
 26, 1870, Mr. Fish wrote to General Sickles: 
 
 " It becomes more apparent every day that this con- 
 test cannot terminate without the abolition of slavery. 
 This government regards the government at Madrid 
 as committed to that result. . . . You will, therefore, 
 if it shall appear that the insurrection is regarded as 
 suppressed, frankly state that this government, rely- 
 ing upon the assurances so often given, will expect 
 steps to be taken for the emancipation of the slaves in 
 the Spanish colonies." °' 
 
 The British representative at Madrid, Mr. Layard, 
 was instructed to second the suggestions of the United 
 
 *■ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 113, Forty-first Congress, Second Ses- 
 sion. " Ibid. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 47 
 
 States minister in regard to the abolition of slavery 
 in the Spanish colonies. 
 
 In May, 1870, the long-promised reform constitu- V 
 tion for Porto Rico was drawn up. The island was 
 made a province of the Spanish monarchy and the 
 Spaniards residing in it were to enjoy the same rights 
 as those laid down in the constitution of Spain. The 
 captain-general, however, retained his authority un- 
 curtailed, and so far from the constitution providing 
 for the abolition of slavery, it even forbade the public 
 discussion of the subject in the island. A special bill 
 for emancipation of certain classes of slaves in the col- 
 onies became law, June 23, 1870. This bill, known as 
 the Moret Law, from the name of the minister of col- 
 onies; Seiior Moret y Prendergast, instead of being a 
 bona fide measure, simply relieved the slave-owner of 
 the burden of supporting infants and aged slaves and 
 prolonged the institution as to the able-bodied. All 
 slaves born after September 18, 1868, the date of the 
 Spanish revolution, were declared free. All over the 
 age of 66 years and others upon reaching that age 
 were free." The law also provided for the care of the 
 aged by their former masters and for the support of 
 the young until their eighteenth year under a sort of 
 apprenticeship system, but these provisions were not 
 protected by proper safeguards. 
 
 This law was enacted for public effect; as far as 
 Cuba was concerned not only was it not put into oper- 
 ation, but through the all-powerful influence of the 
 Peninsulars it was not even allowed to be published in 
 the island for nearly two years after the outside world 
 thought it was in effect." 
 
 "Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 113, Forty-first Congress, Second Ses- 
 sion. " Gallenga: The Pearl of the Antilles, p. 17. 
 
148 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 Meanwhile the captain-general, following the ex- 
 ample of Abraham Lincoln, freed by proclamation, as 
 a war measure, May 14, 1870, the slaves belonging to 
 the insurgents.™ 
 
 From the outbreak of the insurrection the Cuban pa- 
 triots had the sympathy of the great mass of the 
 American people, and that of the administration, al- 
 though the latter was kept within the bounds of public 
 law and treaty obligation, so as to avoid giving of- 
 fence to Spain. The government did all that treaty 
 obligations demanded of it to prevent the violation of 
 the neutrality laws. Numbers of filibustering expe- 
 ditions did, however, escape from American ports, and 
 those that were arrested at the instance of the Spanish 
 government through its representatives in this country 
 usually escaped conviction in our courts for want of 
 evidence. On January 3, 1870, the secretary of the 
 navy issued the following order to Rear-Admiral 
 Poor, commanding in the southern waters : 
 
 " It is desired that you should keep some of your 
 vessels stationed on the north and south ends of the 
 island of Cuba, or at such ports as the so-called in- 
 surgents should convene for escape from the island. 
 While the department does not desire that you should 
 seek opportunities to encourage these distressed per- 
 sons to seek the protection of the United States flag, 
 you will in no case refuse them shelter on bdard the 
 vessels of your fleet, and when they are once under 
 the protection of the flag, their persons and property 
 will be held sacred against the interference of the Span- 
 ish authorities. In no case will you give up any one 
 
 ™ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 113, Forty-first Congress, Second Ses- 
 sion. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 49 
 
 attempting to escape from the island except by author- 
 ity from this department." 
 
 In June, 1870, the question of granting belligerent 
 rights to the Cubans was brought before Congress in 
 the form of a joint resolution introduced into the 
 House. Personally General Grant sympathized with 
 the Cubans and was disposed to grant thern the rights 
 of belligerents, but his judgment was overruled by the 
 counsels of Mr. Fish, the secretary of state. On June 
 13, during the heat of the debate on the question of 
 belligerency, the President sent to Congress a mes- 
 sage embodying the views of the executive. At Mr. 
 Fish's instance the message took the ground that the 
 facts did not justify the recognition of a state of war, 
 although Mr. Fish himself had made use of the term 
 civil war in his instructions to General Sickles. The 
 Secretary had almost to force the President to sign 
 this message, though General Grant was afterwards 
 satisfied as to the wisdom of the measure." The mes- 
 sage said in part: 
 
 " The question of belligerency is one of fact not to be 
 decided by sympathies with or prejudices against eith- 
 er party. The relations between the parent state and 
 the insurgents must amount, in fact, to war in the 
 sense of international law. Fighting, though fierce 
 and protracted, does not alone constitute war; there 
 must be military forces acting in accordance with the 
 rules and customs of war — flags of truce, cartels, ex- 
 change of prisoners, etc., — and to justify belligerency 
 there must be, above all, a de facto political organiza- 
 
 " Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 32, Forty-second Congress, Second 
 Session. 
 
 " Private journal of Mr. Fish, quoted by Prof. J. B. Moore 
 in the Forum, May, 1896. 
 
150 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 tion of the insurgents sufficient in character and re- 
 sources to constitute it, if left to itself, a state among 
 nations capable of discharging the duties of a state, 
 and of meeting the just responsibiHties it may incur 
 as such toward other powers in the discharge of its in- 
 ternational duties. 
 
 " Applying the best information which I have been 
 enabled to gather, whether from official or unofficial 
 sources, including the very exaggerated statements 
 which each party gives of all that may prejudice the 
 opposite or give credit to its own side of the question, 
 I am unable to see, in the present condition of the con- 
 test in Cuba, those elements which are requisite to con- 
 stitute war in the sense of international law. 
 
 " The insurgents hold no town or city; have no es- 
 tablished seat of government; they have no prize 
 courts; no organization for the receiving and collect- 
 ing of revenue; no seaport to which a prize may be 
 carried, or through which access can be had by a for- 
 eign power to the limited interior territory and moun- 
 tain fastnesses which they occupy. The existence of 
 a legislature representing any popular constituency is 
 more than doubtful. 
 
 " In the uncertainty that hangs around the entire in- 
 surrection there is no palpable evidence of an election, 
 of any delegated authority, or of any government out- 
 side the limits of the camps occupied from day to day 
 by the roving companies of insurgent troops. There 
 is no commerce; no trade, either international or for- 
 eign; no manufactures." 
 
 This message provoked a long and animated dis- 
 cussion in the House next day and sharp criticism on 
 the part of the Cuban sympathizers of the President's 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA I5I 
 
 conduct in thus " intruding himself into the House for 
 the purpose of controlling their deliberations." " 
 
 The debate continued and on June 16 the resolution 
 passed the House by a vote of 80 to 68.'* It was taken 
 up by the Senate, discussed and amended, but finally 
 lost. 
 
 Reference has already been made to the sweeping 
 decrees of April, 1869, confiscating the estates and 
 other property of individuals suspected of sympathy 
 with the insurgents. As had been foreseen many cases 
 of complaint arose from American citizens whose prop- 
 erty had been thus taken away from them without 
 legal process, and whose persons in many instances had 
 been placed in confinement. As no redress had been 
 made, Mr. Fish on June 9, 1870, brought this matter 
 to the attention of the Spanish minister at Wash- 
 ington, Mr. Lopez Roberts. Mr. Roberts had been 
 given power to interfere with the captain-general, 
 who, as a rule, was in no way subject to the authority 
 of the minister at Washington, in case of the viola- 
 tion of treaty rights of American citizens in Cuba, and 
 to have property illegally seized restored and those 
 illegally arrested set free, without the delay of referring 
 each case to Madrid. Mr. Roberts said in reply to 
 Mr. Fish's demand for reclamation that these special 
 powers had been revoked and that the matter was no 
 longer in his hands." The matter was then referred 
 to Madrid, when after some delay General Sickles 
 succeeded in concluding the agreement of February 
 12, 1871. By the terms of this agreement a mixed 
 
 " Congressional Globe, Forty-first Congress, Second Ses- 
 sion, p. 4438. " Ibid., p. 4507. 
 
 " Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 108, Forty-first Congress, Second Ses- 
 sion. 
 
152 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 commission was organized at Washington to decide all 
 claims presented to it by the government of the United 
 States for injuries done to citizens of the United States* 
 by the Spanish authorities in Cuba since October i, 
 1868. The labors of this commission did not termi- 
 nate until January i, 1883. There were 130 claims 
 presented to the commission, amounting to $29,946,- 
 183.32. Awards were given in favor of 35 claims, 
 amounting to $1,293,450.55." 
 
 The conclusion of this agreement of February 12, 
 1871, took away all our pressing grievances against 
 Spain and for more than two years our diplomatic rela- 
 tions were on a comparatively friendly basis. Good 
 feeling between the two countries was further pro- 
 moted by the proclamation of the Spanish republic in 
 1873 and by the prompt action of General Sickles in 
 extending to it the recognition of the United States. 
 After striving in vain for more than two years to rec- 
 oncile and unite the contending factions of Spain, 
 King Amadeus on February 11, 1873, abdicated the 
 royal authority and returned to the nation the powers 
 with which he had been intrusted. The Cortes at 
 once proclaimed a republic. General Sickles had on 
 the 30th of January telegraphed to Washington for 
 instructions in case the repubhcans should succeed in 
 their efforts. On the day after the abdication, he 
 received directions to recognize the republican gov- 
 ernment when it was fully established and in pos- 
 session of the power of the nation. Three days later, 
 in the uniform of a general of the United States army 
 he was given an audience by the president of the as- 
 sembly and formally recognized the republic. 
 
 " Treaties of the United States, p. 1388. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 53 
 
 The recognition of the United States was helpful 
 and opportune, for the proclamation of the repubUc 
 was the occasion for the withdrawal of all the Euro- 
 pean powers, except Switzerland, from diplomatic 
 relations with the new government. On March 6, 
 Congress by joint resolution, in behalf of the Ameri- 
 can people, tendered its congratulations to the people 
 of Spain. It seemed at last as if our relations with 
 Spain were on a good footing. General Sickles urged 
 upon the new republican government the abolition of 
 slavery, and the concession of self-government to 
 Cuba. 
 
 But such cordial relations did not long continue. 
 On October 31, 1873, the steamer Virginius, sail- 
 ing under American colors and carrying a United 
 States registry, was captured on the high seas by the 
 Tornado, a Spanish war vessel, and on the afternoon 
 of the first of November taken into the port of San- 
 tiago de Cuba. The men and supplies she bore were 
 bound for the insurgents, but the capture did not occur 
 in Cuban waters. 
 
 General Burriel, the commandant of the city, sum- 
 moned a court-martial, and in spite of the protests of 
 the American consul, condemned to death at the first 
 sitting four of the passengers. General W. A. C. Ry- 
 an, an Irish patriot and three Cubans. They were 
 shot on the morning of November 4. On the 7th 
 twelve other passengers were executed and on the 8th 
 Captain Fry and his entire crew, numbering thirty-six, 
 making the total number of executions fifty-three. 
 
 As soon as news of the capture reached Madrid, 
 General Sickles, November 6, called upon President 
 Castelar and represented to him the difficulties that 
 
154 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 might arise in case the ship had been taken on the 
 high seas bearing United States colors. Upon Gen- 
 eral Sickles's suggestion the President of the Spanish 
 republic at once telegraphed to the captain-general to 
 await orders before taking any steps in regard to the 
 captured vessel and crew. On the seventh Mr. Fish 
 telegraphed to General Sickles that the capture of an 
 American vessel on the high seas presented a very 
 grave question and that the execution of prisoners with 
 such haste was inhuman and in violation of the civili- 
 zation of the age. That if American citizens had been 
 unlawfully executed, the most ample reparation would 
 be demanded. This telegram was communicated to 
 the minister of state, who replied that the Spanish 
 government would spontaneously do all required by 
 public law and treaty obligation. 
 
 On the 13th General Sickles had an interview with 
 the minister of state who informed him of the execu- 
 tion of forty-nine other prisoners on the 7th and 8th, 
 and told him that the telegram of the 6th had not 
 reached Havana until the 7th, and then, owing to in- 
 terruption of telegraphic communication, could not be 
 transmitted to Santiago de Cuba in time to stay the 
 executions, but that they had now ceased. 
 
 In accordance with instructions from Mr. Fish, 
 General Sickles on the 14th protested by note against 
 these executions as brutal and barbarous and stated 
 that ample reparation would be demanded. The next 
 day he received from the minister of state an ill-tem- 
 pered reply, rejecting the protest as inadmissible when 
 neither the cabinet at Washington nor that of Madrid 
 had sufficient data upon which to ground a complaint. 
 On the day this reply was received General Sickles, 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 55 
 
 following out telegraphic instructions from Washing- 
 ton, made a formal demand by note for the restoration 
 of the Virginius, the surrender of the survivors, a sa- 
 lute to the United States flag, and the punishment of 
 the guilty officials. In case of a refusal of satisfactory 
 reparation within twelve days, General Sickles was 
 instructed by his government, at the expiration of that 
 period, to close the legation and leave Madrid. On 
 the 15th Mr. Fish telegraphed that more executions 
 were reported from Cuba and that if Spain could not 
 redress these outrages, the United States would. This 
 report, however, subsequently proved to be erroneous. 
 
 The formal reply to General Sickles's demand for 
 reparation was received November 18. The Spanish 
 government declared (i) that it would make no repa- 
 ration until satisfied that an offence had been com- 
 mitted against the flag of the United States, and (2) 
 that when so convinced through her own sources of 
 information or by the showing of the United States, 
 due reparation would be. made. General Sickles tele- 
 graphed to Mr. Fish that, regarding this as a refusal 
 within the sense of his instructions he proposed, unless 
 otherwise ordered, to close the legation forthwith, and 
 leave Madrid. Mr. Fish's instructions had been to 
 wait twelve days after date of the dispatch, that would 
 have been the 26th. 
 
 The representations made at Washington by the 
 Spanish minister were of a much more satisfactory 
 character than those made to General Sickles at 
 Madrid. Mr. Fish, therefore, instructed General 
 Sickles to remain at his post until the 26th, and 
 if no accommodation were reached by that time 
 he could demand his passports. By the time this 
 dispatch reached Madrid General Sickles had already 
 
156 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 asked for his passports, but had not received the reply 
 of the Spanish government. On the 26th he received 
 a note from the Spanish minister asking for a postr 
 ponement to the 25th of December and promising that 
 if by that time Spain could not show that she had the 
 right on her side — i. e., that the Virginius had no right 
 to sail under the United States flag — she would com- 
 ply with the demands of the United States. General 
 Sickles replied that he could not accept such a 
 proposal, but that he would inform his government 
 of it and take the responsibility of deferring his de- 
 parture. 
 
 Meanwhile the Spanish minister at Washington had 
 proposed arbitration, but Mr. Fish declined to submit 
 to arbitration the question of an indignity to the United 
 States flag. The minister then asked for a delay, but 
 Mr. Fish told him that delay was impossible in view 
 of the approaching meeting of Congress. Unless 
 settled beforehand the question would have to be 
 referred to Congress. 
 
 On the 27th Mr. Fish, thinking that General Sickles 
 had left Madrid accepted a proposition made by Ad- 
 miral Polo. 
 
 The protocol of this conference was drawn up and 
 signed on the 29th of November, 1873. By the terms 
 of this agreement Spain stipulated to restore the vessel 
 forthwith, to surrender the survivors of her passen- 
 gers and crew, and on the 25th of December to salute 
 the flag of the United States. If, however, before that 
 date Spain should provfe to the satisfaction of the 
 United States that the Virginius was not entitled to 
 carry the flag of the United States the salute should 
 be dispensed with, but in such case. the United States 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 57 
 
 would expect a disclaimer of intent of indignity to its 
 flag. 
 
 If it should be proved to the satisfaction of the 
 United States on or before the 25th of December that 
 the Virginius did not lawfully carry the flag of the 
 United States and was not entitled to American 
 papers, the United States agreed to institute legal pro- 
 ceedings against the vessel and against any persons 
 who might appear to have been guilty of illegal acts 
 in connection therewith ; and Spain on her part agreed 
 to investigate the conduct of those of her authorities 
 who had infringed Spanish laws or treaty obligations 
 and to inflict punishment on those who had offended. 
 Other reclamations were to be the subject of consid- 
 eration between the two governments,. 
 
 The time, place, and manner for the surrender of 
 the Virginius and the survivors, and for the salute to 
 the flag were to be arranged between Mr. Fish and 
 Admiral Polo within the next two days." The Span- 
 ish ambassador was unable to carry out this last 
 clause owing to delay on the part of his government 
 in sending the necessary instructions. 
 
 During this delay Congress met and the President 
 in his message December i, 1873, said: 
 
 " I wish to renew the expression of my conviction, 
 that the existence of African slavery in Cuba is a prin- 
 cipal cause of the lamentable condition of the island. 
 
 " The embargoing of American estates in Cuba ; 
 cruelty to American citizens detected in no act of hos- 
 tility to the Spanish government; the murdering of 
 prisoners taken with arms in their hands; and, finally, 
 
 " Foreign Relations, 1874-75, P- 987. 
 
158 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 the capture upon the high seas of a vessel sailing un- 
 der the United States flag and bearing a United States 
 registry have culminated in an outburst of indignation 
 that has seemed for a time to threaten war." 
 
 He also stated that, pending negotiations with 
 Spain, he had ordered the secretary of the navy to put 
 our fleet on a war footing. 
 
 On December 8, an agreement was signed by Mr. 
 Fish and Admiral Polo arranging for the surrender of 
 the Virginius and the surviving passengers, which was 
 duly carried out. 
 
 Two days later the Spanish envoy submitted to 
 the state department a large number of documents 
 and depositions to show that the Virginius had no 
 right to sail under the United States flag. These were 
 referred to the attorney-general, and on the 17th he 
 gave his opinion that the evidence was conclusive that 
 the Virginius, although registered in New York on 
 the 26th of September 1870, in the name of Patterson, 
 who made oath as required by law that he was the 
 owner, was in fact the property of certain Cubans and 
 was controlled by them. In conclusion the attorney- 
 general said: 
 
 " Spain, no doubt, has a right to capture a vessel, 
 with an American register, and carrying the American 
 flag, found in her own waters assisting, or endeavoring 
 to assist, the insurrection in Cuba, but she has no right 
 to capture such a vessel on the high seas upon an ap- 
 prehension that, in violation of the neutrality or navi- 
 gation laws of the United States, she was on her way 
 to assist said rebellion. Spain may defend her territory 
 and people from the hostile attacks of what is, or ap- 
 pears to be, an American vessel; but she has no juris- 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 59 
 
 diction whatever over the question as to whether or 
 not such vessel is on the high seas in violation of any 
 law of the United States. Spain cannot rightfully raise 
 that question as to the Virginius, but the United States 
 may, and, as I understand the protocol, they have 
 agreed to do it, and, governed by that agreement and 
 without admitting that Spain would otherwise have 
 any interest in the question, I decide that the Virginius, 
 at the time of her capture, was without right, and im- 
 properly carrying the American flag." 
 
 This decision was communicated to the Spanish au- 
 thorities and, according to the agreement, the salute 
 to the United States flag was dispensed with, and on 
 the third of January, 1874, Admiral Polo, on behalf of 
 his government, expressed a disclaimer of an intent of 
 indignity to the flag of the United States. 
 
 Meanwhile, December 6, General Sickles by tele- 
 graph offered his resignation in consequence of certain 
 reports that his conduct had been disapproved. Mr. 
 Fish replied that such reports were unauthorized, that 
 no dissatisfaction had been expressed or intimated and 
 that it was deemed important that he remain at his 
 post. Ten days later. General Sickles requested that 
 the telegram tendering his resignation and the reply 
 be published. Mr. Fish decHned to do so as the resig- 
 nation was hypothetical. December 20, General 
 Sickles again tendered his resignation and it was 
 accepted. 
 
 The steamship Virginius foundered off Cape Fear, 
 December 26, 1873, while being conveyed to the 
 United States in charge of an officer of the navy. 
 
 By the protocol of November 29 the question of 
 reciprocal reclamations was left to be decided through 
 
l60 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 the ordinary channel of diplomatic negotiation. On the 
 30th of December the Spanish minister at Washington 
 presented a claim for indemnity for injuries sustained 
 by the Spanish government through the steamer 
 Virginius. These claims were rejected by the state 
 department on the ground that the fraudulent registry 
 of the vessel was an offence punishable by the mu- 
 nicipal law of the United States involving no pt)ssi- 
 ble question of controversy with any foreign govern- 
 ment; that at the time of the departure of the vessel 
 from New York the validity of her papers was not 
 questioned ; that there was nothing in her build, equip- 
 ment, cargo, or destination to excite suspicion or to 
 authorize proceedings against her at law, or detention 
 by the President; and that it was a universally admit- 
 ted doctrine in the law of nations that a neutral or 
 friendly government could not be held responsible for 
 shipments of arms, munitions, or material of war by 
 private individuals at their own risk and peril, and as 
 a private speculation.™ 
 
 On the tenth of February, 1874, Mr. Fish instructed 
 Mr. Caleb Gushing, who succeeded General Sickles 
 at Madrid, to demand of the Spanish government in- 
 demnity for injuries to the passengers and crew of the 
 Virginius, especially for the families of such as were 
 executed at Santiago de Guba. The demand was to 
 be made irrespective of the nationality of the parties, 
 on the general ground of the illegality of the capture. 
 These negotiations were carried on for more than a 
 year before the matter was finally settled. 
 
 Great Britain also made reclamations for indemni- 
 
 " The correspondence relating to the steamer Virginius 
 will be found in the Foreign Relations, 1874, 187S and 1876. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA l6l 
 
 ties for the families of the nineteen British subjects 
 executed at Santiago, and an agreement between 
 Great Britain and Spain was reached during the fall 
 of 1874 by which £7700 was paid to the British gov- 
 ernment to be distributed among the families of the 
 deceased, at the rate of £300 for each of the nine col- 
 ored men and £500 for each of the ten white men. 
 The English government was required to render an 
 account and to refund such part of the amount as was 
 not claimed. 
 
 The case of the United States was much more com- 
 plicated, as several of those executed were neither 
 English nor United States citizens. The United States 
 claimed indemnity for all not claimed as subjects by 
 the British government. This raised many delicate 
 questions of international law, and finally, February 
 16, 187s, an agreement was arrived at between Mr. 
 Gushing and the Spanish minister of state, by which 
 Spain allowed the United States $80,000 in full of all 
 indemnity. The allowance was unconditional, the dis- 
 tribution to be made by the United States government 
 in its discretion, and no accountability was required 
 as in the case of England. This indemnity was prompt- 
 ly paid by Spain. 
 
 One other matter connected with the Virgmius 
 episode still remained open. By the terms of the 
 protocol Spain promised to bring to trial General Bur- 
 riel and the other officials concerned in the massacres 
 of Santiago. General Burriel returned to Spain and 
 attempted in the press to justify his conduct. Soon 
 after reaching Spain, Mr. Gushing was instructed to 
 demand the fulfillment of this part of the agreement. 
 While these points were in dispute between Mr. Cush- 
 
1 62 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 ing and the Spanish government, General Burriel was 
 promoted to be a field-marshal in the Spanish army. 
 This created great indignation in the United States, 
 and the negotiations were pressed at Madrid. For 
 over two years this matter was pressed upon the Span- 
 ish government but the only satisfaction ever obtained 
 was a statement from the minister of state that the 
 supreme council of war had declared itself competent 
 to try General Burriel and had begun proceedings by 
 the appointment of a prosecuting officer and a secre- 
 tary. It is needless to say that Burriel was never 
 brought to justice. 
 
 After the settlement of the Virgmius reclamations 
 the government of the United States addressed itself 
 once more to the task of forcing a settlement of the 
 Cuban question in general. In his general instruc- 
 tions to Mr. Gushing before his departure for his post, 
 Mr. Fish (February 6, 1874), expressed the policy of 
 the administration at considerable length. After re- 
 viewing the main facts of the insurrection which had 
 then lasted more than five years, with little or no 
 change in the military situation, and after referring to 
 the rejection by Spain of the offers of mediation made 
 by the United States at an early day of the trouble, he 
 says: 
 
 " In these circumstances, the question what deci- 
 sion the United States shall take is a serious and diffi- 
 cult one, not to be determined without careful con- 
 sideration of its complex elements of domestic and 
 foreign policy, but the determination of which may at 
 any moment be forced upon us by occurrences either 
 in Spain or in Cuba. 
 
 " Withal the President cannot but regard indepen- 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 163 
 
 dence, and emancipation, of course, as the only cer- 
 tain, and even the necessary, solution of the question 
 of Cuba. And, in his mind, all incidental questions 
 are quite subordinate to those, the larger objects of 
 the United States in this respect. 
 
 " It requires to be borne in mind that, in so far as 
 we may contribute to the solution of these questions, 
 this government is not actuated by any selfish or in- 
 terested motive. The President does not meditate or 
 desire the annexation of Cuba to the United States, 
 but its elevation into an independent republic of free- 
 men, in harmony with ourselves and with the other re- 
 publics of America." " 
 
 For some months Mr. Cushing was, as we have 
 seen, occupied with the negotiations in the Virginius 
 case. After nearly two years had elapsed since the in- 
 structions to Mr. Cushing above quoted, the Grant 
 administration determined, in view of the unchanged 
 condition of the Cuban struggle, to bring matters to 
 an issue and to force, if need be, the hand of the 
 Spanish government. On the Sth of November, 1875, 
 Mr. Fish addressed a long letter of instruction to Mr. 
 Cushing. After reviewing the course of the insurrec- 
 tion, the interests of the United States affected thereby, 
 the numerous claims arising therefrom, many of them 
 still unsettled, the persistent refusal of Spain to redress 
 these grievances and the general neglect on her part 
 of treaty obligations, he concludes: 
 
 " In the absence of any prospect of a termination 
 of the war, or of any change in the manner in which 
 it has been conducted on either side, he (the Presi- 
 dent) feels that the time is at hand when it may be the 
 
 ™ Foreign Relations, 1874-75, P- 859. 
 
164 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 duty of Other governments to intervene, solely with a 
 view of bringing to an end a disastrous and destruct- 
 ive conflict, and of restoring peace in the island of 
 Cuba. No government is more deeply interested in 
 the order and peaceful administration of this island 
 than is that of the United States, and none has suf- 
 fered as the United States from the condition which 
 has obtained there during the past six or seven years. 
 He will, therefore, feel it his duty at an early day to 
 submit the subject in this light, and accompanied by 
 an expression of the views above presented, for the 
 consideration of Congress." 
 
 Mr. Cushing was instructed to read this note to the 
 Spanish minister of state. At the same time a copy 
 was sent to General Robert C. Schenck, United States 
 minister at London, writh instructions to read the same 
 to Lord Derby, and to suggest to him that it would 
 be agreeable to the United States if the British gov- 
 ernment would support by its influence the position 
 assumed by the Grant administration. 
 
 In the course of a few days copies of this note were 
 sent to our representatives at Paris, Berlin, Vienna, 
 Rome, Lisbon, and St. Petersburg, with instructions 
 to communicate its purport orally, or by reading the 
 note, to the governments to which they were accred- 
 ited and to ask their intervention with Spain in the 
 interests of terminating the state of affairs existing in 
 Cuba. 
 
 The success of this move depended upon the atti- 
 tude of the British government with reference to the 
 position assumed by the United States. If Great 
 Britain acquiesced in the position taken by the cabi- 
 net at Washington and promised her influence in sup- 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 65 
 
 port of that position, the mere expression of her ap- 
 proval of intervention would have forced Spain to 
 whatever terms the two governments might jointly 
 have dictated, or to a settlement of the question by 
 the concession of liberal reforms without waiting for 
 any action on the part of those governments. On the 
 other hand, the refusal of Great Britain to cooperate 
 with the United States would strengthen Spain in the 
 policy she was pursuing. Mr. Fish, therefore, in- 
 structed Mr. Gushing to delay the presentation of the 
 note of November 5 until General Schenck could com- 
 municate it to the British government, and find out 
 whether Lord Derby would support his position. In 
 other words, the tone in which Mr. Gushing would 
 communicate the American note to the Spanish cabi- 
 net would depend entirely upon the attitude of Lord 
 Derby. 
 
 An unforeseen event occurred, however, which ma- 
 terially interfered with Mr. Fish's plans. Mr. Gushing's 
 representations at Madrid on the general subject of our 
 differences with Spain met with greater success than 
 was anticipated. On the i6th of November, before the 
 arrival of Mr. Fish's instruction of the 5th, he received 
 from the Spanish minister of state, under date of No- 
 vember 15, in answer to his repeated demands, a note 
 which was eminently friendly in spirit, conceding in 
 substance or effect almost everything demanded by 
 the United States in the way of special grievances, and 
 repeating the assurances of the trial of General Bur- 
 riel. The substance of this note was at once commu- 
 nicated by cable to the department at Washington. 
 This information placed the administration in a rather 
 awkward position. If Spain had really promised to 
 concede all the specific demands of the United States 
 
1 66 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 the American note would fall rather flat upon the ears 
 of the European cabinets. Yet, Congress was about 
 to meet, the country was well weary of the condition 
 in Cuba and was expecting some definite recommen- 
 dation from the executive. The full text of the Span- 
 ish note of November 15 would not reach Washington 
 before the opening of the session. On the 19th Mr. 
 Fish cabled to General Schenck to delay reading the 
 American note to Lord Derby until further instruc- 
 tions. This, of course, put a check upon Mr. Gushing 
 at Madrid, as he had been instructed to await the out- 
 come of events in London. 
 
 The receipt of the American note, on the 2Sth, threw 
 Mr. Gushing into a state of intense excitement. He 
 immediately cabled his opinion to Mr. Fish: 
 
 " If Great Britain cooperates Spain will succumb, 
 in sullen despair, to whatever terms the two govern- 
 ments may jointly dictate; but if Great Britain refuses 
 to cooperate, Spain will conclude that she has the 
 sympathy of all European powers; more especially, 
 as she thinks she has now gone, by her note of the 
 iSth, to the ultimate point in satisfaction of each of 
 the particular griefs of the United States. 
 
 " In other words there will be war, and a popular, 
 though desperate one on the part of Spain, unless she 
 can be convinced that the real and true object of the 
 contemplated measure is to prevent war, as I under- 
 stand it to be intended. But to ward off war will ex- 
 act the steady exercise of all my personal influence 
 here (which my colleagues tell me is great), and will 
 require that influence to be efficiently backed by my 
 government, both here and at Washington." 
 
 He, therefore, asked for further instructions, pro- 
 vided a negative answer came from Great Britain. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 67 
 
 Mr. Cushing's position was delicate in the extreme. 
 Upon the tone in which the American note was com- 
 municated to the Spanish government hung the alter- 
 native of war or peace. On the 26th he again cabled 
 to Secretary Fish asking permission to present a copy 
 of the note to the Spanish minister instead of merely 
 reading it, and adding, " will you authorize me, after 
 the Spanish minister is informed (in whatever way) of 
 the contents of the document, to talk to him as a 
 friend and well-wisher regarding what, in my opin- 
 ion, Spain ought to do and may honorably do in this 
 emergency? " 
 
 On -the 27th Mr. Fish cabled him not to wait for a 
 reply from Great Britain; that he might speak in the 
 manner indicated in his dispatch of the day before, 
 provided that it did not do away with the object of the 
 instruction ; that the note was " not intended as mina- 
 tory in any sense, but in the spirit of friendship, as a 
 notice of a necessity which may be forced upon the 
 President, but which he hopes to avoid, and desires 
 Spain to aid him in escaping." He also indicated the 
 tone of the forthcoming message to Congress. In his 
 message to Congress, December 7, 1875, President 
 Grant discountenanced the recognition of either bel- 
 ligerency or independence; referred to the injuries re- 
 sulting to the United States and to its citizens from 
 the long-continued struggle, which was carried on 
 without regard for the laws of civilized warfare and 
 without prospect of termination; intimated interven- 
 tion as an ultimate necessity unless satisfactory results 
 could soon be reached; and referred to the pending 
 negotiations with the Spanish government, with the 
 hope that the proposals of December 15, not then re- 
 
1 68 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 ceived in full, would afford the relief required and 
 lead to a satisfactory settlement.'" 
 
 When the Spanish proposals were received, the 
 cabinet decided, notwithstanding the concessions on 
 the subject of the specific grievances of the United 
 States, not to back down from the position taken by 
 Mr. Fish in the note of November 5 on the general 
 question of Cuba, and the representatives of the United 
 States abroad were accordingly instructed to continue 
 to press upon the attention of the governments to 
 which they were accredited the question of interven- 
 tion. 
 
 The American note was presented to the Spanish 
 government on the 30th of November, and on the 
 same day General Schenck read it to Lord Derby, who 
 promised to give an answer by the 2d of December. 
 Meanwhile having heard of the Spanish proposals. 
 Lord Derby, in the promised interview, informed Gen- 
 eral Schenck that her majesty's government preferred 
 not to discuss the American note until the President 
 should have had time to consider the Spanish pro- 
 posals. 
 
 Through Mr. Cushing's friendly representations and 
 in view of the President's message discountenancing 
 recognition of either independence or belligerency, 
 the Spanish minister, Mr. Calderon, received the com- 
 munication of November 5 threatening intervention, in 
 good part, and expressed his intention of answering it 
 after he should have had time to consider it carefully. 
 
 The reply of Great Britain was given to General 
 Schenck in an interview with Lord Derby on January 
 
 '" This message was quoted at length by President McKin- 
 ley in his first annual message to Congress, Dec. 6, 1897. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 169 
 
 25, 1876.. It was in substance that he was convinced 
 that Spain would not listen to mediation, and that the 
 British government was not prepared to bring pres- 
 sure to bear upon her in case she refused; that the 
 Spanish government hoped to finish the Carlist war 
 in the spring and would then be in a position to put 
 forth its whole military strength for the reduction of 
 Cuba; in conclusion, therefore. Lord Derby thought 
 " that if nothing were contemplated beyond an ami- 
 cable interposition, having peace for its object, the 
 time was ill-chosen and the move premature." The 
 answers of the other powers were unsatisfactory or 
 evasive, none of them being willing to bring pressure 
 to bear upon the government of young Alfonso, while 
 the Carlist war was on his hands. 
 
 The answer of Spain was finally given in the form 
 of a note dated February 3, 1876, addressed to the rep- 
 resentatives of Spain in other countries, including the 
 United States, communicated to Mr. Cushing Feb- 
 ruary 19. This answer, written by Mr. Calderon y 
 CoUantes was in good temper. He stated that the in- , 
 surrection was supported and carried on largely by ne- 
 groes, mulattoes, Chinese, deserters and adventurers; 
 that they carried on a guerrilla warfare from their 
 mountain retreats, that Spain had sufficient forces in 
 the island to defeat them in the field ; that the triumph 
 of Spain would soon be followed by the total abolition 
 of slavery and the introduction of administrative re- 
 forms. The number of vessels of war and troops in 
 Cuba was enumerated to show that Spain was putting 
 forth a reasonable efifort to bring jthe rebellion to a 
 close, and statistics were quoted to show that the trade 
 between Cuba and the United States, as well as the / 
 general trade of the island, had actually increased ; 
 
170 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 largely since the outbreak of the insurrection. Finally 
 he declared that while individual foreigners had suf- 
 fered, Spain had done justice to all claims presented. 
 
 In conversation with Mr. Gushing, Mr. Calderon in- 
 timated that Spain, although she would resist to the 
 uttermost armed intervention, might be willing under 
 certain circumstances to accept the mediation of the 
 United States in Cuba, and he invited a frank state- 
 ment of what the United States would advise or wish 
 Spain to do with regard to Cuba. In reply to this 
 suggestion, Mr. Fish, after disclaiming on the part of 
 the United States all intention of annexing Cuba, 
 stated the following points as the wish of his govern- 
 ment: 
 
 (i) The mutual and reciprocal observance of treaty 
 obligations, and a full, friendly and liberal understand- 
 ing and interpretation of all doubtful treaty provisions, 
 wherever doubt or question may exist. 
 
 (2) Peace, order, and good government in Cuba, 
 which involves prompt and effective measures to re- 
 store peace, and the establishment of a government 
 suited to the spirit and necessities of the age; liberal 
 in its provisions, wherein justice can be meted out to 
 all alike, according to defined and well-established 
 provisions. 
 
 (3) Gradual but effectual emancipation of the slaves. 
 
 (4) Improvement of commercial facilities and the 
 removal of the obstructions now existing in the way 
 of trade and commerce. 
 
 In reply to these suggestions Mr. Calderon handed 
 Mr. Gushing a note, dated April 16, 1876, in which 
 he represented that his majesty's government was in 
 full accord with Mr. Fish's suggestions. Taking them 
 Tip one by one he replied: 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA I /I 
 
 (i) The government of his majesty is in entire con- 
 formity as regards complying for its part with all the 
 stipulations of the existing treaties, and giving to them 
 a perfect, friendly, and liberal interpretation in all that 
 which may be the subject of doubt or question. 
 
 (2) The government of the king likewise proposes, 
 because it believes it necessary, to change in a liberal 
 sense the regime hitherto followed in the island of 
 Cuba, not only in its administrative but also in its 
 political part. 
 
 (3) Not merely gradual and genuine, but rapid 
 emancipation of the slaves, because the government of 
 his majesty recognizes and unreservedly proclaims 
 that slavery neither can nor ought to be maintained 
 in any of its dominions, by reason of its being an 
 anti-Christian institution and opposed to present civili- 
 zation. 
 
 (4) The government of the king finds itself in com- 
 plete accord not only as to increasing but as to ex- 
 tending to the furthest possible limit all commercial 
 facilities, and causing the disappearance of all the ob- 
 stacles which to-day exist, and which hinder the rapid 
 and free course of commercial negotiations. 
 
 These promises and assurances of the Spanish gov- 
 ernment completely thwarted Mr. Fish's plans, and, 
 together with Lord Derby's reply, put all further at- 
 tempts at intervention out of the question. 
 
 The substance of Mr. Fish's note threatening inter- 
 vention appeared unofScially in the press of Europe 
 and America in December, 1875, and attracted such 
 general attention that in January the House asked for 
 the correspondence. In reply Mr. Fish submitted to 
 the President for transmission on the 21st, the note of 
 November 5, together with a few carefully chosen ex- 
 
172 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 tracts from the correspondence between himself and 
 Mr. Gushing," but nothing was given that might indi- 
 cate that the United States had appealed to the powers 
 of Europe to countenance intervention. As rumors 
 to this effect had, however, appeared in the press, the 
 House called the next day for whatever correspon- 
 dence had taken place with foreign powers in regard 
 to Cuba. Mr. Fish replied that " no correspondence 
 has taken place during the past year with any Euro- 
 pean government, other than Spain, in regard to the 
 island of Cuba," but that the note of November 5 had 
 been orally communicated to several European gov- 
 ernments by reading the same.*" This was putting a 
 very strict and a very unusual construction upon the 
 term " correspondence," to say the least. The dis- 
 patches, notes, and telegrams that pass between a gov- 
 ernment and its representatives abroad are the only 
 recognized means of communicating with foreign 
 powers, and are always spoken of as the correspon- 
 dence with those powers. The whole affair reveals a 
 curious lack of candor and of courage on the part of 
 Mr. Fish. He was trying to shield either the admin- 
 istration or himself, and did not wish the American 
 public to know that he had reversed the time-honored 
 policy of the state department by appealing to the pow- 
 ers of Europe to intervene in what had been uniformly 
 treated, from the days of John Quincy Adams and 
 Henry Clay, as a purely American question. 
 
 This correspondence was suppressed for twenty 
 years. On the 24th of March, 1896, the Senate called 
 
 " House Ex. Doc. No. 90, Forty-fourth Congress, First 
 Session. 
 
 '' House Ex. Doc. No. 100, Forty-fourth Congress, First 
 Session. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1/3 
 
 for " copies of all dispatches, notes, and telegrams in 
 the department of state, from and after the note from 
 Secretary Fish to Mr. Gushing of November 5, 1875, 
 and including that note, until the pacification of Cuba 
 in 1878, which relate to mediation or intervention by 
 the United States in the affairs of that island, together 
 with all correspondence with foreign governments re- 
 lating to the same topic." On the 15th of April Presi- 
 dent Cleveland transmitted the " correspondence " 
 called for, which forms a document of 137 pages.^ 
 
 When Mr. Fish was approached by a reporter on 
 the subject of his alleged departure from the Monroe 
 Doctrine, not only in recognizing the right of Euro- 
 pean powers to intervene in Cuban affairs, but in a 
 measure inviting such intervention, he adroitly turned 
 the question by asserting that the real author of the 
 principle enunciated in President Monroe's message 
 was neither the President himself, nor, as has been fre- 
 quently stated, his secretary of state and successor, 
 John Quincy Adams, but Canning. Mr. Cushing also 
 seemed to think that the United States had taken a 
 long stride forward in cutting loose from its tradition 
 in this particular. In a dispatch to Mr. Fish, Decem- 
 ber 6, 1875, he says: 
 
 " It was a bold step on the part of the President, and 
 it seems to me a wise one, thus to invite the coopera- 
 tion of Great Britain. It opens a wide perspective. It 
 looks like breaking . down the last barrier of distrust 
 between the two great branches of the British race in 
 Europe and America." 
 
 The Cuban struggle continued for two years longer. 
 
 " Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 213, Fifty-fourth Congress, First Ses- 
 sion. 
 
1/ 
 
 u 
 
 174 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
 
 In October, 1877, several leaders surrendered to the 
 Spanish authorities and undertook the task of bringing 
 over the few remaining ones. Some of these paid for 
 their efforts with their lives, being taken and con- 
 demned by court-martial by order of the commander 
 of the Cuban forces. Finally, in February, 1878, the 
 terms of pacification were made known. They em- 
 braced representation in the Spanish Cortes, oblivion 
 of the past in respect of political offences committed 
 since the year 1868, and the freedom of slaves in the 
 insurgent ranks." Iii practice, however, the Cuban 
 deputies were never truly representative, but were 
 men of Spanish birth designated usually by the cap- 
 tain-general. By gradual emancipation slavery ceased 
 to exist in the island in 1885. The powers of the cap- 
 tain-general, the most objectionable feature of Spanish 
 rule, continued uncurtailed. 
 
 The insurrection that broke out in Cuba in Febru- 
 ary, 1895, and continued until the intervention of the 
 United States in April, 1898, presented in a more ag- 
 gravated form the same features as the ten years' war ; 
 the same desultory methods of warfare ; the same dis- 
 regard by both parties of the rules of civilized nations - 
 and the same liberal concessions on the part of Spain 
 when intervention was spoken of. The Spanish gov- 
 ernment showed itself lavish of promises but slow of 
 fulfillment. President Cleveland declared in his annual 
 message of December 7, 1896, that the forbearance of 
 the United States had its limits. " When the inability 
 of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has 
 become manifest," he said, " and it is demonstrated 
 
 "* Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 79, Forty-fifth Congress, Second Ses- 
 sion. 
 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 1 75 
 
 that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes 
 of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle 
 for its re-establishment has degenerated into a strife 
 which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of 
 human life and the utter destruction of the very sub- 
 ject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented 
 in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain 
 will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can 
 hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.'"" 
 
 The struggle dragged on from bad to worse with- 
 out interference on the part of the United States until 
 the blowing up of the United States steamship Maine 
 in Havana harbor, February 15, 1898, rendered a con- 
 tinuance of the existing condition of affairs intol- 
 erable. On the .20th of April Congress passed a joint 
 resolution directing the President to demand the with- 
 drawal of the land and naval forces of Spain from 
 Cuba and Cuban waters and the relinquishment by 
 Spain of all authority and government in the island. 
 The land and naval forces of the United States were 
 placed at the disposal of the President for the purposes 
 of carrying this resolution into efifect. At the same 
 time Congress disclaimed any " intention to exercise 
 sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, 
 except for the pacification thereof." 
 
 The events of the war that followed are still fresh in 
 our minds. Since its close the United States has pro- 
 ceeded in good faith with the work of pacifying the 
 island of Cuba and organizing local civil government. 
 The destiny of the island is still too problematical to 
 fall within the scope of this volume. 
 
 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. IX, p. 722. 
 
 t/ 
 
' CHAPTER IV 
 
 The Proposed Central American Canal 
 
 The recent war with Spain and the voyage of the 
 Oregon, which held for weeks the attention of the 
 civilized world, have brought the question of an inter- 
 oceanic canal into greater prominence than ever. 
 This problem is so closely connected with the gen- 
 eral course of expansion upon which we have 
 recently entered that the construction of a waterway 
 between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in the near 
 future is a matter of reasonable certainty. 
 
 The cutting of the isthmus between North and South 
 America has been the dream of navigators and engi- 
 neers since the first discoverers ascertained that nature 
 had neglected to provide a passage. Yet the new 
 continent which so unexpectedly blocked the way of 
 Columbus in his search for the Indies has opposed 
 hitherto an insurmountable barrier to the commerce 
 of the East and the West. The piercing of the isth- 
 mus has always seemed a perfectly feasible undertak- 
 ing, but the difficulties in the way are greater than 
 would appear at first sight. They are twofold in 
 character. There are (i) the physical or engineering 
 problems to be solved, and (2) the diplomatic compli- 
 cations regarding the control of the canal in peace 
 and its proper use in war. The insignificance of the 
 Spanish-American states, whose territories embrace 
 the available routes, and their recognized inability 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 1 7/ 
 
 either to construct or. protect a canal' have made what 
 might otherwise have been merely a question of 
 domestic economy one of grave international import. 
 In this respect, as in others, the problem presents the 
 same features as the Suez canal. For the last twenty 
 years public opinion in the United States has been 
 divided on the question of American vs. international 
 control, and the policy of the goveirnment publicly 
 expressed has wavered. Until 1880, our policy, as 
 expressed by political parties of all creeds, was in the 
 main consistent and favored a canal open to the com- 
 merce of all nations upon an equal footing and open 
 to the transit of war vessels in peace and in war on 
 condition of the neutrality of the canal being observed. 
 
 In 1880, President Hayes inaugurated a so-called 
 broader American policy, demanding that any canal 
 that might be constructed should be under American, 
 meaning thereby United States, control, and that the 
 line of such canal should be " considered a part of 
 the coast-line of the United States " — language which 
 , implied the reduction of the Central American repub- 
 lics to a position of virtual vassalage to the United 
 States. President Cleveland, however, in his first 
 annual message, reverted to our traditional policy, 
 and there has been no public expression of policy to 
 the contrary since, though public opinion remains 
 divided. 
 
 Until the present century the comparative merits 
 of the Tehuantepec, the Nicaragua and the Panama 
 routes divided the opinion of experts. More recently 
 the Tehuantepec route, with a length of 144 miles and 
 an elevation of 680 feet, has been eliminated, and the 
 controversy has waged as to the relative advantages 
 
178 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 of the Nicaragua and the Panama routes. The length 
 of the Nicaragua route, from Grfeytown on the Atlantic 
 to Brito on the Pacific by way of the San Juan river 
 and through Lake Nicaragua, is about 170 miles. The 
 elevation of the lake above the sea is about no feet. 
 Its western shore is only twelve miles from the Pacific, 
 with an intervening divide 154 feet above the sea. 
 From the southeast corner of the lake flows the San 
 Juan river, 120 miles to the Atlantic, with an average 
 fall of about 10 inches to the mile. Three locks on 
 each side of the lake would- probably be sufficient. 
 The serious objections to this route are: (i) the lack 
 of harbors at the terminals, Brito being a mere inden- 
 tation on the coast, rendering the construction of 
 immense breakwaters necessary, while at Greytown 
 the San Juan broadens out into a delta that would 
 require extensive dredging; and (2) the enormous 
 rainfall at Greytown, exceeding that known anywhere 
 else on the western continent — nearly 25 feet. 
 
 The Panama route from Colon on the Atlantic to 
 Panama on the Pacific is less than 50 miles in length, 
 with an elevation nearly double that of Nicaragua to 
 be overcome. There are natural harbors at each end 
 which are capacious and can be made to accommodate 
 the heaviest shipping. The Panama Railroad, built 
 along the line of the proposed canal, in 1850-55, gives 
 th;s route an additional advantage. There are, how- 
 ever, certain disadvantages: (i) the unhealthfulness of 
 the vicinity, rendering labor scarce and inefficient; (2) 
 the heavy rainfall, 10 to 12 feet at Colon; and (3) the 
 treacherous character of the geologic structure, due 
 to its volcanic origin, through which the cut has to 
 be made. The impossibility of making even approxi- 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL I 79 
 
 mate estimates of the cost of the work in such a deadly 
 climate and through such an uncertain geological 
 formation has been one of the greatest difificulties to 
 be overcome. 
 
 The De Lesseps plan provided for an open cut 
 throughout at the sea-level, at an estimated cost of 
 $170,000,000. The work was begun in 1884 and 
 prosecuted until 1888, when the gigantic scheme col- 
 lapsed, after having expended about $300,000,000 and 
 having accomplished less than one-third of the work. 
 American engineers have always favored the Nica- 
 ragua route as the more practicable and least expen- 
 sive one, and the attention of the United States gov- 
 ernment has been mainly directed to that route. 
 
 Great as the engineering problems of the various 
 canal schemes have been shown to be, the importance 
 to the world's commerce of the object in view would, 
 in all probability, have led to their solution long ago 
 and to the construction of a canal, had it not been for 
 difificulties of an altogether different character, compli- 
 cations arising out of the question as to the status of 
 the canal in international law. The diplomatic diffi- 
 culties in the case of an interoceanic canal are very 
 great. It cannot be regarded as a natural strait, like 
 the Dardanelles, the Danish Belts, or the Straits of 
 Magellan, which were for a long time held under ex- 
 clusive jurisdiction, but are now free to all nations. 
 Nor, on the other hand, could a central American 
 canal be compared to the Kiel canal, which is within 
 the territory of the German empire, and which, 
 although open to foreign commerce, is yet reserved 
 for the exclusive military control of the German gov- 
 ernment. Such canals as this are built by the capital 
 
l8o PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 of the country through which they pass, and are pro- 
 tected and controlled by its government. 
 
 No one of the republics to the south of us, through 
 whose territory it is proposed to build a canal, can 
 raise the capital for its construction or insure its 
 protection when completed. No company chartered 
 by one of these governments could raise the necessary 
 capital without some further guarantee. Hence it is 
 that all companies organized for this purpose have 
 secured their charters from some more powerful 
 nation, such as the United States or France, and their 
 concessions from one of the Central American states. 
 This renders necessary, therefore, a treaty between 
 the state granting the concession or right to construct 
 a canal through its territory and the state chartering 
 the company, and hence granting it its protection. 
 Further complications arise from the demands of other 
 states, who claim, under the most favored-nation 
 clause, from the state granting the concession equal 
 commercial rights with the chartering state, and who 
 protest against the exclusive military use of the canal. 
 
 Bearing these facts in mind, we may now look into 
 the negotiations that have been opened and the 
 treaties that have been made, with a view to deter- 
 mining the diplomatic status of the proposed canal. 
 
 The question of the construction of a ship canal 
 across the isthmus was given a new impetus by the 
 establishment of the independence of the Spanish- 
 American republics, and was one of the proposed 
 subjects of discussion at the Congress of American 
 Republics summoned by Bolivar to meet at Panama 
 in 1826. In the instructions to the United States 
 commissioners to that congress, Mr. Clay authorized 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL l8l 
 
 them to enter into the consideration of that subject, 
 suggesting that the best routes would Hkely be found 
 in the territory of Mexico or of the Central Republic. 
 As to the diplomatic status of the canal, he says: " If 
 the work should ever be executed so as to admit of 
 the passage of sea vessels from ocean to ocean, the 
 benefits of it ought not to be exclusively appropriated 
 to any one nation, but should be extended to all parts 
 of the globe upon the payment of a just compensation 
 or reasonable tolls." ^ 
 
 In 1835, and again in 1839, the United States Senate 
 passed resolutions authorizing the President to enter 
 into negotiations with other nations, particularly Cen- 
 tral America and New Granada, for the purpose of 
 protecting by treaty either individuals or companies 
 who might undertake to open communication between 
 the two oceans, and of insuring " the free and equal 
 navigation of the canal by all nations." Presidents 
 Jackson and Van Buren both commissioned agents 
 with a view to carrying out these resolutions, but with- 
 out success. 
 
 While a prisoner at Ham in 1845, Prince Louis 
 Napoleon Bonaparte secured from the government of 
 Nicaragua a concession granting him power to organ- 
 ize a company for the construction of a waterway to 
 be known as " Le Canale Napoleon de Nicaragua." 
 After his escape from Ham, he published in London 
 a pamphlet entitled " The Canal of Nicaragua, or a 
 Project for the Junction of the Atlantic and Pacific 
 Oceans by means of a Canal." ' 
 
 ' Report of International American Conference, Vol. IV 
 (Hist. App.), p. 143. 
 ' Snow: Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy, p. 328. 
 
1 82 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 Although the United States government has been 
 a party to endless negotiations in regard to an inter- 
 oceanic canal, there are only three treaties of any 
 practical importance by which it has acquired rights 
 and assumed obligations on that account.' These are: 
 (i) the treaty with New Granada (Colombia) of 1848; 
 (2) the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with England of 1850; 
 and (3) the treaty with Nicaragua of 1867. We shall 
 proceed to examine these in detail. 
 
 The treaty with New Granada was signed at Bogota, 
 December 12, 1846, and ratified by both governments 
 in 1848. It did not differ materially from the general 
 draft of treaties, except in the thirty-fifth article, which 
 was of a special character and related to the Isthmus 
 of Panama. By this article " the government of New 
 Granada guarantees to the government of the United 
 States that the right-of-way or transit across the Isth- 
 mus of Panama, upon any modes of communication 
 that now exist or that may be hereafter constructed, 
 shall be open and free to the government and citizens 
 of the United States," for the transportation of all 
 articles of lawful commerce upon the same terms en- 
 joyed by the citizens of New Granada. " And in 
 order to secure to themselves the tranquil and con- 
 stant enjoyment of these advantages, and for the 
 favors they have acquired by the 4th, sth and 6th 
 articles of this treaty, the United States guarantee 
 positively and efficaciously to New Granada, by the 
 present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before- 
 mentioned isthmus, with the view that the free transit 
 
 ' Our treaties with Mexico and Honduras, although cov- 
 ering the case of canal constructions, are of no practical 
 importance, as the routes through these countries are not 
 feasible. 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 183 
 
 from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted 
 or embarrassed in any future time while this treaty 
 exists; and, in consequence, the United States also 
 guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sov- 
 ereignty and property which New Granada has and 
 possesses over the said territory." * 
 
 This treaty was to remain in full force for twenty 
 years, and then, if neither party gave notice of in- 
 tended termination, it was to continue in force, ter- 
 minable by either party at twelve months' notice. No 
 such notice has ever been given and no other treaty 
 on the same subject has been executed. This treaty 
 is consequently binding upon both parties. On more 
 than one occasion the government of the United States 
 has been called upon to enforce its guarantee. Under 
 the protection of this treaty the Panama Railroad 
 Company, composed mainly of citizens of the United 
 States, secured a charter from New Granada, and be- 
 tween 1850 and 1855 constructed a railroad across the 
 isthmus along the line of the proposed Panama canal. 
 In consequence of the riot at Panama in 1856, efforts 
 were made by the United States to modify this treaty 
 so as to give the United States greater control and 
 power to protect the means of transit, but without 
 success.' Other attempts to modify it in 1868 and 
 1870 likewise failed.' 
 
 In 1862 the Granadian government, through its 
 representative at Washington, notified the United 
 
 * Correspondence in relation to the Proposed Interoceanic 
 Canal, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and the Monroe Doctrine. 
 Government Printing Office, 1885, p. S. Referred to here- 
 after as " Collected Corresponde'nce." 
 
 ' Collected Correspondence, pp. 23-27. 
 
 ° Ibid."; pp. 27 and 40. 
 
184 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 States that a revolutionary chief, who was then trying 
 to subvert the Granadian confederation, had sent an 
 armed force to occupy the Isthmus of Panama, and 
 the government of Granada called upon the United 
 States to enforce its guarantee. Simultaneously the 
 same information was received, from the United States 
 consul at Panama, and the President instructed the 
 United States naval commander at that port to protect 
 at all hazards and at whatever cost the safety of the 
 railroad transit across the isthmus. 
 
 The Granadian government, however, was not satis- ■ 
 fied with this action, and urged the United States to 
 land a body of troops at Panama, suggesting that it 
 consist of 300 cavalry. Under the circumstances. 
 President Lincoln hesitated to take such action with- 
 out consulting Great Britain and France, and Mr. 
 Seward instructed our representatives at London and 
 Paris to seek an understanding with those govern- 
 ments in regard to the matter. He declared : " This 
 government has no interest in the matter different 
 from that of other maritime powers. It is willing to 
 interpose its aid in execution of its treaty and for the 
 benefit of all nations. But if it should do so it would 
 incur some hazard of becoming involved in the revo- 
 lutionary strife which is going on in that country. 
 It would also incur danger of misapprehension of its 
 object by other maritime powers if it should act with- 
 out previous consultation with them."' 
 
 In a conference between Mr. Adams and Lord John 
 Russell, the latter declared that he did not consider 
 that the contingency had arisen which called for inter- 
 vention ; that so far as he could learn, no attempt had 
 
 ' Seward to Adams, July 11, 1862. 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 185 
 
 been made to obstruct the free transit across the 
 isthmus. The French government took substantially 
 the same view.' In questions of a similar nature that 
 arose later, the attorney-general of the United States 
 expressed the opinion that the guarantee by the 
 United States of Granadian sovereignty and property 
 in the territory of the isthmus was only against foreign 
 governments, and did not authorize the United States 
 to take sides with one or the other party in the in- 
 testine troubles of that nation. 
 
 In April, 1885, the Colombian government, which 
 was embarrassed by civil war, called upon the United 
 States for the fulfillment of the treaty of 1846, to secure 
 the neutrality and sovereignty of the isthmus. Presi- 
 dent Cleveland at once sent a body of troops to the 
 isthmus with instructions to confine their action to 
 preventing the transit and its accessories from being 
 interrupted or embarrassed. As soon as peace was 
 re-established, the troops of the United States were 
 withdrawn.' 
 
 Four years after the signature of the above treaty 
 with Colombia, and two years after its ratification by 
 the Senate, the United States and Great Britain exe- 
 cuted what is popularly known as the Clayton-Bulwer 
 treaty. It is of great importance to understand clearly 
 the circumstances under which this treaty was nego- 
 tiated. 
 
 For very obvious reasons, the Isthmus of Panama 
 was for many years the objective point of all canal 
 schemes, but as the engineering difficulties of this 
 
 ' Collected Correspondence, pp. 7 and 8. 
 ° Mr. Scruggs to Mr. Bayard, April 16, 1885, For. Rel., also 
 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VIII, p. 326. 
 
l86 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 route began to be fully appreciated, attention was 
 directed more and more to that through Nicaragua. 
 The occupation by Great Britain, under the assump- 
 tion of a protectorate, of the territory about the mouth 
 of the San Juan river, which belonged to Nicaragua 
 and Costa Rica, and in which the Atlantic terminus 
 of the canal would fall, was a source of no little un- 
 easiness and perplexity to the United States. In 
 June, 1849, Mr. Hise, charge d'affaires of the United 
 States in Central America, negotiated without the 
 authorization or knowledge of his government, a 
 treaty with Nicaragua which gave the United States 
 exclusive rights in the construction of a canal through 
 the territory of that state." This treaty was not sub- 
 mitted to the Senate, but was made use of in the nego- 
 tiations that were opened shortly thereafter with Great 
 Britain for the purpose of ousting her from her posi- 
 tion of control over the mouth of the San Juan. 
 A few months later, September 28, 1849, Mr. Squier 
 signed with Honduras a treaty which ceded Tiger 
 Island, in the Bay of Fonseca, to the United States, 
 thus giving us a naval station on the Pacific side of 
 the isthmus. This treaty, like that negotiated by Mr. 
 Hise, was unauthorized and never submitted to the 
 Senate." Both treaties were used, however, in bring- 
 ing England to the signature of the Clayton-Bulwer 
 treaty. This activity in treaty-making was occasioned 
 by the acquisition of California and the rush to the 
 gold fields by way of the isthmus. 
 
 During the period that elapsed between Mr. Ban- 
 croft's withdrawal from London and Mr. Lawrence's 
 arrival as the representative of the United States, Mr. 
 
 " Collected Correspondence, p. 94. " Ibid., p. 14. 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL iS/ 
 
 Clayton instructed Mr. Rives, who was on his way to 
 Paris, to stop in London and hold a conference with 
 Lord Palmerston on the Central American question. 
 At this date the United States was striving simply 
 for equal rights in any waterway that might be opened 
 through the isthmus and not for any exclusive rights. 
 Mr. Rives declared to Lord Palmerston " that citizens 
 of the United States had entered into a contract with 
 the state of Nicaragua to open, on certain conditions, 
 a communication between the Atlantic and Pacific 
 oceans by the river San Juan and the Nicaragua lake; 
 that the government of the United States, after the 
 most careful investigation of the subject, had come 
 undoubtedly to the conclusion that upon both legal 
 and historical grounds the state of Nicaragua was the 
 true territorial sovereign of the river San Juan as 
 well as of the Nicaragua lake, and that it was, there- 
 fore, bound to give its countenance and support, by 
 all proper and reasonable means, to rights lawfully 
 derived by their citizens under a grant from that 
 sovereign." He further said: " That the United States 
 would not, if they could, obtain any exclusive right or 
 privilege in a great highway, which naturally belonged 
 to all mankind, for they well knew that the possession 
 of any such privilege would expose them to inevitable 
 jealousies and probable controversies which would 
 make it infinitely more costly than advantageous ; that 
 while they aimed at no exclusive privilege for them- 
 selves, they could never consent to see so important 
 a communication fall under the exclusive control of 
 any other great commercial power; that we were far 
 from imputing to Her Britannic Majesty's govern- 
 ment any views of that kind, but Mosquito possession 
 
1 88 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 at the mouth of the San Juan could be considered in 
 no other Hght than British possession, and his lord- 
 ship would readily comprehend that such a state of 
 things, so long as it was continued, must necessarily 
 give rise to dissatisfaction and distrust on the part of 
 other commercial powers." "^ 
 
 The negotiations thus opened by Mr. Rives were 
 continued by Mr. Lawrence upon his arrival in Eng- 
 land, but were shortly thereafter transferred to Wash- 
 ington, where Mr. Clayton succeeded in arranging 
 with Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer the terms of a con- 
 vention which were signed April 19, 1850. The inten- 
 tion of the two governments, as declared in the pre- 
 amble, was to set forth " their views and intentions 
 with reference to any means of communication by 
 ship canal which may be constructed between the 
 Atlantic and Pacific oceans by the way of the river 
 San Juan de Nicaragua, and either or both of the 
 lakes of Nicaragua or Managua, to any port or place 
 on the Pacific ocean." 
 
 By the first article Great Britain and the United 
 States bind themselves never to obtain or maintain 
 any exclusive control over the said ship canal; never 
 to erect or maintain any fortifications commanding 
 the same or in the vicinity thereof, or to colonize or 
 exercise dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the 
 Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America; and 
 never to make use of any alliance, connection or 
 influence with any of these states to obtain any un- 
 equal advantages in regard to commerce or navigation 
 through the said canal. 
 The second article provides for the neutralization 
 
 " Collected Correspondence, pp. 11 and 12. 
 
PROPOSED CEMTRAL AMERICAN CANAL I 89 
 
 of the canal in the event of war between the contract- 
 ing parties. The third guarantees protection for the 
 persons and property of the parties legally undertak- 
 ing the construction of the canal. The fourth 
 relates to gaining the consent of the states whose 
 territory the canal shall traverse. The fifth article 
 provides for the neutralization and protection of 
 the canal so long as it is managed without dis- 
 crimination against either of the contracting par- 
 ties, and stipulates that neither of them shall with- 
 draw its protection without giving the other six 
 months' notice. In the sixth article the contracting 
 parties promise to invite every state with which they 
 are on terms of friendly intercourse to accede to this 
 convention. In the seventh article the contracting 
 parties agreed to lend their support and encourage- 
 ment to the first company offering to construct the 
 canal in accordance with the spirit and intention of 
 this convention. The eighth article is of special im- 
 portance. It declares that " the governments of the 
 United States and Great Britain having not only de- 
 sired, in entering into this convention, to accomplish 
 a particular object, but also to establish a general 
 principle, they hereby agree to extend their protection, 
 by treaty stipulations, to any other practicable com- 
 munication, whether by canal or railway, across the 
 isthmus which connects North and South America, 
 and especially to the interoceanic communications, 
 should the same prove practicable, whether by canal 
 or railway, which are now proposed to be established 
 by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama." " 
 
 Such are the main stipulations of the celebrated 
 
 " Collected Correspondence, p. 99. 
 
190 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which has probably called 
 forth more discussion than any other treaty in exist- 
 ence. 
 
 A large number of people on this side of the At- 
 lantic, forgetting the object and aim of the treaty and 
 the circumstances under which it was negotiated, 
 think that the United States conceded too much and 
 violated the principle of the Monroe Doctrine in giv- 
 ing England a position and interest in America which 
 she did not before possess. This opinion was held 
 by many prominent statesmen of that day, notably 
 by Buchanan, who poured forth severe criticism and 
 ridicule upon the treaty. While it was before the 
 Senate for ratification, he wrote to a friend : " If Sir 
 Henry Bulwer can succeed in having the two first 
 provisions of this treaty ratified by the Senate, he will 
 deserve a British peerage. The consideration for our 
 concessions is the relinquishment of the claim to the 
 protectorate of the Mosquito shore — so absurd and 
 unfounded that it has been ridiculed even by the 
 London Times. Truly Sir Henry has brought this 
 claim to a good market when he found a purchaser 
 in Mr. Clayton. The treaty altogether reverses the 
 Monroe Doctrine, and establishes it against ourselves 
 rather than European governments."" 
 
 Let us see what the interests of the two signatory 
 powers were at that time in Central America. 
 
 The United States had recently acquired California 
 by the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, and the rapid 
 development of the Pacific states made the canal a 
 question of greater importance to the United States 
 
 " Mr. Buchanan to Hon. John A. McClernand, April 2, 
 1850, American Hist. Rev., Oct., 1899. 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL I9I 
 
 than ever before. The great transcontinental rail- 
 roads, which some fifteen years later established direct 
 overland communication with the Pacific states, were 
 then hardly thought of. 
 
 England's interest in the canal, on the other hand, 
 was rather a prospective one, but farsighted as usual, 
 she had provided for future contingencies by occupy- 
 ing several years before, under the guise of a pro- 
 tectorate over the Mosquito Indians, Greytown at the 
 mouth of the San Juan river, the Atlantic terminus 
 of the canal. In addition to the Mosquito coast, Eng- 
 land at this time held the Bay Islands and Belize, or 
 British Honduras. The United States, it is true, had 
 never recognized the claims of Great Britain to domin- 
 ion over the Mosquito coast. These claims, which 
 dated back to the eighteenth century, when British 
 pirates and smugglers took refuge in the territory 
 occupied by the Mosquito Indians and established cor- 
 dial relations with them, had been abandoned by the 
 treaty of 1786 with Spain, but were revived in 1841, 
 when a ship of war was sent to San Juan del Norte 
 to announce the protection of England over the lands 
 of the Mosquito king and to raise the Mosquito flag." 
 In 1848 the English and Indians drove the Nicara- 
 guans out of the town and changed the name to Grey- 
 town. 
 
 The United States uniformly denied the rights of 
 the Mosquito king to sovereignty over the district, 
 and consequently the pretensions of the inhabitants of 
 Greytown to political organization or power derived in 
 any way from the Mosquitos. In his instructions to 
 Mr. Hise soon after the occupation of Greytown, Mr. 
 
 " Wharton's Digest, Sec. 295. 
 
192 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 Buchanan said: "The object of Great Britain in this 
 seizure is evident from the policy which she has uni- 
 formly pursued throughout her history, of seizing 
 upon every available commercial point in the world 
 whenever circumstances have placed it in her power. 
 Her purpose probably is to obtain control of the route 
 ior a railroad or canal between the Atlantic and 
 Pacific oceans by way of Lake Nicaragua. . . . The 
 government of the United States has not yet deter- 
 mined what course it will pursue in regard to the 
 encroachment of the British government. . . . The 
 independence as well as the interests of the nations 
 on this continent require that they should maintain 
 an American system of policy entirely distinct from 
 that which prevails in Europe. To suffer any inter- 
 ference on the part of the European governments with 
 the domestic concerns of the American republics, and 
 to permit them to establish new colonies upon this 
 ■continent, would be to jeopard their independence 
 and ruin their interests. These truths ought every- 
 where throughout this continent to be impressed upon 
 the public mind; but what can the United States do 
 to resist such European interference whilst the Span- 
 ish-American republics continue to weaken them- 
 selves by civil divisions and civil war, and deprive 
 themselves of doing anything for their own protec- 
 tion." 
 
 Whatever the rights of the case, Great Britain was 
 in actual possession of the Atlantic terminus of the 
 proposed canal, and the United States was not pre- 
 pared forcibly to oust her, even if such a course had 
 l)een deemed advisable. The United States had no 
 rights in the case at this time by treaty with Nica- 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL I93 
 
 ragua or otherwise, none of the statesmen of that day 
 having been broad enough in their views or bold 
 enough to consider the territory of Nicaragua as " a 
 part of the coast-Hne of the United States." All that 
 could be opposed to England's de facto possession 
 was the Monroe Doctrine, and England held that her 
 claim antedated the declaration of that principle of 
 American diplomacy. 
 
 The Clayton-Bulwer treaty left open several minor 
 questions that required adjustment before the canal 
 enterprise could be pushed forward with success. 
 Chief among these were the dispute between Nica- 
 ragua and Costa Rica in regard to their boundary 
 line and the controversy between Great Britain and 
 Nicaragua in regard to the territory claimed by the 
 Mosquito Indians. In April, 1852, Mr. Webster and 
 Sir John Crampton agreed upon a basis for the set- 
 tlement of Central American affairs, and drew up and 
 signed a proposal to be submitted to Nicaragua and 
 Costa Rica." This proposed basis for a treaty was 
 rejected by Nicaragua, which left the questions in- 
 volved in the same unsettled position. 
 
 A much more serious obstacle to the accomplish- 
 ment of the objects of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty 
 than the failure of the above proposal arose from the 
 wide divergence of opinion between the British and 
 American governments in regard to its interpretation. 
 The discussion involved two principal points: (i) 
 Whether the abnegatory clauses of the "first article 
 were merely prospective in character and directed 
 against future acquisitions in Central America, or 
 whether they required Great Britain to abandon her 
 
 " Collected Correspondence, p. 102. 
 13 
 
194 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 protectorate over the Mosquito coast at once; and 
 (2) whether the Bay Islands came within the purview 
 of the treaty. It was expressly stipulated that Belize 
 or British Honduras was not included in Central 
 America and therefore not affected by the treaty one 
 way or the other. A declaration to this effect was 
 filed at the state department by the British minister, 
 Sir Henry Bulwer. In reply, Mr. Clayton, after con- 
 ference with the chairman of the Senate committee 
 on foreign relations, acknowledged that British Hon- 
 duras did not come within the scope of the treaty, but 
 at the same time carefully refrained from affirming or 
 denying the British title to that settlement or its 
 alleged dependencies." This left open the question 
 as to whether the Bay Islands were dependencies of 
 Belize or of the Republic of Honduras. 
 
 Shortly after the failure of the Crampton- Webster 
 proposals. Great Britain took advantage of the un- 
 certainty that existed in regard to the status of the 
 Bay Islands ahd by a formal proclamation, issued 
 July 17, 1852, converted her settlements on those 
 islands into " The Colony of the Bay Islands." When 
 the United States government expressed its surprise 
 at this proceeding, the British government replied that 
 the Bay Islands were dependencies of Her Majesty's 
 settlement at Belize and therefore, by explicit agree- 
 ment, not within the scope of the Clayton-Bulwer 
 treaty." 
 
 In 1856 an effort was made to terminate the diffi- 
 culties arising out of the different constructions put 
 
 " Collected Correspondence, p. 234, also Wharton's Digest, 
 Sec. 150 (f), Vol. II, p. 190. 
 " Collected Correspondence, p. 248. 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 1 95 
 
 upon the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by the negotiation 
 of a supplementary convention. On October 17 of 
 that year a treaty was signed in London by the Ameri- 
 can minister and Lord Clarendon, known as the 
 Dallas-Clarendon treaty. It provided: 
 
 (i) For the withdrawal of the British protectorate 
 over the Mosquito Indians. 
 
 (2) It regulated the boundaries of the Belize set- 
 tlements on the basis of a compromise. 
 
 (3) It provided for a cession of the Bay Islands to 
 Honduras, upon condition of the ratification of a 
 treaty already negotiated between Great Britain and 
 Honduras, which virtually erected an independent 
 state of the islands, exempt in many particulars from 
 the sovereignty of Honduras, and under the protec- 
 torate of Great Britain. The first two clauses were 
 acceptable to the United States Senate,, but it was 
 deemed proper to amend the third by striking out all 
 that part of it which contemplated the concurrence of 
 the United States in the British treaty with Honduras, 
 and simply to provide for a recognition by the two 
 governments of the sovereignty of Honduras over the 
 islands in question.^" Great Britain rejected this 
 amendment and the Dallas-Clarendon treaty fell 
 through. 
 
 Great Britain and the United States were thus 
 thrown back upon th€ Clayton-Bulwer treaty with 
 its conflicting interpretations. 
 
 In October, 1857, the President was notified in- 
 formally that the British government had decided to 
 dispatch Sir Wm. Ouseley, a diplomatist of well- 
 recognized authority and experience, to Central Amer- 
 
 " Collected Correspondence, p. 286. 
 
196 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 ica to make a definite settlement of all matters in 
 dispute between the United States and England. 
 That the efforts of the new plenipotentiary would be 
 directed to those objects which had been dealt with, 
 in the Dallas-Clarendon treaty of 1856, viz., the ces- 
 sion of the Bay Islands to Honduras, the substitu- 
 tion of the sovereignty of Nicaragua for the protecto- 
 rate of England over the Mosquitos and the regula- 
 tion of the frontiers of Belize. That it was the in- 
 tention of Her Majesty's government to carry the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty into execution according to 
 the general tenor of the interpretation put upon it by 
 the United States, but to do so by separate negotia- 
 tion with the Central American republics, in lieu of a 
 direct engagement with the federal government." 
 
 President Buchanan replied that he would be satis- 
 fied with this course and that upon receiving an offi- 
 cial assurance to that effect, he would change the 
 character of the message he had already prepared for 
 Congress. 
 
 On the 30th of November, 1857, the British govern- 
 ment submitted to the United States the alternative 
 of referring the Clayton-Bulwer treaty to the arbitra- 
 tion of any European power which the United States 
 might prefer to select or of adjusting matters by 
 negotiations with the Central American republics, as 
 already outlined in Sir Wm. Ouseley's prospective 
 mission.''' 
 
 At this stage of the negotiations matters were 
 further complicated (i) by the negotiation of the Cass- 
 Yrissari treaty of November i6, 1857, between the 
 United States and Nicaragua for protection of the 
 
 ™ Collected Correspondence, p. 262-63. "* Ibid., p. 276. 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL I97 
 
 transit route and (2) by the invasion of Nicaraguan 
 territory by a band of filibusters under General 
 Walker, bent on the subversion of the lawful govern- 
 ment of the country. The treaty was not ratified, 
 however, and the Walker expedition was arrested by 
 the interposition of the United States navy. 
 
 The United States government not having given 
 any definite answer to the British proposal to sub- 
 mit the treaty to arbitration, the British government 
 delayed dispatching Sir Wm. Ouseley on his mission. 
 In the negotiations which took place during this delay 
 the question of the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer 
 treaty was discussed between the two governments. 
 In his message of December 8, 1857, President Buch- 
 anan had suggested the abrogation of the treaty by 
 mutual consent as the wisest course that could be 
 pursued in view of the increasing complications to 
 which the varying constructions of it were giving rise. 
 The British government took up this suggestion and 
 expressed its willingness to concur in such a course, 
 but also expressed the opinion that the initiative should 
 be taken by the government which was dissatisfied 
 with its provisions. 
 
 The British minister was, however, directed by his 
 government to make it perfectly clear to the govern- 
 ment of the United States, that to abrogate the treaty 
 was to return to the status quo ante its conclusion in 
 1850; that Great Britian had no kind of jealousy re- 
 specting American colonization in Central America, 
 and did not ask nor wish for any exclusive privileges 
 whatever in that quarter.'" 
 
 Finally, Sir William Ouseley was dispatched on his 
 
 '' Collected Correspondence, p. 280. 
 
198 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 mission and during the years 1859 and i860 succeeded 
 in negotiating treaties with Guatemala, Honduras and 
 Nicaragua, the provisions of which were in substan- 
 tial accord with the rejected Dallas-Clarendon treaty/' 
 
 The treaty with Nicaragua signed at Managua, Jan- 
 uary 28, i860, though restoring to that republic nom- 
 inal sovereignty over the Mosquito territory, reserved 
 to the Indians the right of retaining their own cus- 
 toms, assigned boundaries to that reservation in all 
 probability greatly beyond its true limits, and con- 
 firmed grants of land previously made in that terri- 
 tory. Notwithstanding these facts, in his annual mes- 
 sage of December 3, i860, President Buchanan de- 
 clared that the United States government was satis- 
 fied with the final settlement. His words were: " The 
 discordant constructions of the Clayton- Bui wer treaty 
 between the two governments, which at different peri- 
 ods of the discussion bore a threatening aspect, have 
 resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to 
 this government." " 
 
 The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was negotiated with the 
 expectation that the construction of a ship canal would 
 rapidly follow, but the unfortunate entanglements 
 that grew out of the variant constructions put upon 
 that treaty by the contracting powers deferred to an 
 indefinite period the accomplishment of the object it 
 was designed to promote. By the time these differ- 
 ences were finally adjusted the attention of the Ameri- 
 can public was centred upon the first throes of the 
 gigantic struggle of the war of secession and the canal 
 question was for several years completely over- 
 
 "^ Collected Correspondence, pp. 294-302. 
 
 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. V, p. 639. 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL I99 
 
 shadowed. The government of the United States 
 emerged from that struggle with larger ideas of its 
 position among the powers of the world and with 
 broader views of national policy. Mr. Seward gave 
 expression to that feeling in the purchase of Alaska, 
 in his interposition in Mexico and in his efforts to 
 secure a position for the United States in the West 
 Indies. In order to strengthen the position of the 
 United States he wished to purchase Tiger Island, a 
 possession of Honduras in Fonseca bay on the Pa- 
 cific coast. As this island lay in Central America, Mr. 
 Seward could not take any steps in the matter without 
 the consent of Great Britain, on account of the renun- 
 ciatory clause with respect to that territory in the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty. He, therefore, directed Mr. 
 Adams, April 25, 1866, to sound Lord Clarendon as 
 to the disposition of the British government toward 
 the United States acquiring a coaling station in Cen- 
 tral America. In this dispatch we find the first sug- 
 gestion of a repudiation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty 
 on the ground that it was a special and not a general 
 contract, and that the work for which it had been 
 negotiated had never been undertaken. Mr. Seward 
 uses these words : " At the time the treaty was con- 
 cluded there was every prospect that that work would 
 not only soon be begun, but that it would be carried 
 to a successful conclusion. For reasons, however, 
 which it is not necessary to specify, it never was 
 even commenced, and at present there does not appear 
 to be a likelihood of its being undertaken. It may 
 be a question, therefore, supposing that the canal 
 should never be begun, whether the renunciatory 
 clauses of the treaty are to have perpetual operation. 
 
200 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 Technically speaking, this question -might be decided 
 in the negative. Still, so long as it should remain a 
 question, it would not comport with good faith for 
 either party to do anything which might be deemed 
 contrary to even the spirit of the treaty." ^ 
 
 The subject was brought to the attention of Lord 
 Clarendon in a casual way by Mr. Adams, but it was 
 not pressed and Mr. Seward refrained from disre- 
 garding the renunciatory clause of the treaty. 
 
 In 1867, a treaty was negotiated and ratified be- 
 tween the United States and Nicaragua, covering the 
 case of an interoceanic canal. This treaty need not 
 delay us. It granted to the United States the right 
 of transit between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans on 
 any lines of communication, natural or artificial, by 
 land or by water, then existing, or that might there- 
 after be constructed, upon equal terms with the citi- 
 zens of Nicaragua, and the United States agreed to 
 extend its protection to all such routes of communica- 
 tion, and " to guarantee the neutrality and innocent 
 use of the same." The United States further agreed 
 to employ its influence with other nations to induce 
 them to guarantee such neutrality and protection." 
 
 This treaty, like the treaty with Colombia of 1848 
 and the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, contemplated the neu- 
 trality of the canal. It in no way infringed our en- 
 gagements with England under the Clayton-Bulwer 
 treaty, but in providing for the joint guarantee of 
 other powers, was in accord with the provisions of 
 that treaty. 
 
 In 1873, Mr. Hamilton Fish directed Gen. Schenck 
 to remonstrate, if upon investigation he found it to be 
 
 ™ Collected Correspondence, p. 303. " Ibid., p. 132. 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 20I 
 
 necessary, against .British encroachments upon the 
 territory of Guatemala as an infringement of the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty." 
 
 In spite of the doubts expressed by Mr. Seward in 
 the dispatch to Mr. Adams above quoted, as to the 
 perpetual character of the obligations imposed by the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the obligatory force of that 
 instrument after the readjustment of i860 was not 
 seriously questioned until interest in the canal ques- 
 tion was suddenly aroused anew by the concession 
 granted by Colombia to Lieutenant Wyse in 1878, and 
 the subsequent organization of a French construction 
 company under the presidency of Ferdinand de Les- 
 seps, the engineer of the Suez canal. 
 
 The prospect of the speedy construction of a canal 
 under French control, for which De Lesseps' name 
 seemed a sufficient guarantee, produced a sudden and 
 radical change of policy on the part of the United 
 States. In a special message to Congress, March 8, 
 1880, President Hayes made the following statement 
 of what he conceived to be the true policy of this 
 country in regard to a Central American canal: 
 
 " The policy of this country is a canal under Ameri- 
 can control. The United States cannot consent to 
 the surrender of this control to any European power, 
 or to any combination of European powers. If exist- 
 ing treaties between the United States and other 
 nations, or if the rights of sovereignty or property of 
 other nations stand in the way of this policy — a con- 
 tingency which is not apprehended — suitable steps 
 should be taken by just and liberal negotiations to 
 promote and establish the American policy on this 
 
 " Collected Correspondence, pp. 310-12. 
 
202 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 subject, consistently with the rights of the nations to 
 be affected by it. 
 
 " The capital invested by corporations or citizens of 
 other countries in such an enterprise must, in a great 
 degree, look for protection to one or more of the great 
 powers of the world. No European power can in- 
 tervene for such protection without adopting measures 
 on this continent which the United States would deem 
 wholly inadmissible. If the protection of the United 
 States is relied upon, the United States must exercise 
 such control as will enable this country to protect its 
 national interests and maintain the rights of those 
 whose private capital is embarked in the work. 
 
 "An interoceanic canal across the American isthmus 
 will essentially change the geographical relations be- 
 tween the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United 
 States, and between the United States and the rest 
 of the world. It will be the great ocean thoroughfare 
 between our Atlantic and our Pacific shores, and vir- 
 tually a part of the coast-line of the United States. 
 Our merely commercial interest in it is greater than 
 that of all other countries, while its relation to our 
 power and prosperity as a nation, to our means of 
 defence, our unity, peace and safety, are matters of 
 paramount concern to the people of the United States. 
 No other great power would, under similar circum- 
 stances, fail to assert a rightful control over a work 
 so closely and vitally affecting its interests and wel- 
 fare. 
 
 " Without urging further the grounds of my opinion, 
 I repeat, in conclusion, that it is the right and the 
 duty of the United States to assert and maintain such 
 supervision and authority over any interoceanic canal 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 203 
 
 across the isthmus that connects North and South 
 America as will protect our national interests. This 
 I am quite sure will be found not only compatible 
 with, but promotive of, the widest and most perma- 
 nent advantage to commerce and civilization." " 
 
 Before undertaking a discussion of the merits of the 
 principles laid down in this message, it may be well 
 to state this policy in full as it was elucidated by the 
 state department in its correspondence with England. 
 
 The message itself was accompanied by a report 
 from the secretary of state, Mr. Evarts, in which he 
 called attention to the mutual engagements entered 
 into between the United States and Colombia by the 
 treaty of 1846 in reference to a transit route across 
 the isthmus and declared that the guarantee of the 
 neutrality of the isthmus and of the sovereignty of 
 Colombia over the same would be a very different 
 thing when the isthmus should be opened to the in- 
 terests and ambitions of the great commercial na- 
 tions." 
 
 President Garfield, in his inaugural address, ap- 
 proved the position taken by his predecessor on the 
 canal question,™ and very soon after assuming the 
 portfolio of state, Mr. Blaine outlined the new policy 
 to our representatives in Europe, cautioning them, 
 however against representing it as the development of 
 a new policy and affirming that it was " nothing more 
 than the pronounced adherence of the United States 
 to principles long since enunciated by the highest 
 authority of the government." 
 
 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VII, p. 585. 
 
 ^ Collected Correspondence, p. 313. 
 
 *■ Messages and Papers of the Presidents Vol. VIII, p. 11. 
 
204 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 This dispatch of Mr. Blaine is remarkable for 
 several reasons, but chiefly for the fact that it com- 
 pletely ignores the existence of the Clayton-Bulwer 
 treaty, there being no allusion to that celebrated con- 
 vention either open or implied. Aside from this there 
 are three points to be noted. In the first place Mr. 
 Blaine calls attention to the rights and duties devolv- 
 ing upon the United States from the treaty with 
 Colombia of 1846, and states that in the judgment of 
 the President the guarantee there given by the United 
 States requires no reinforcement, or accession, or 
 assent from any other power; that the United States 
 in more than one instance had been called upon to 
 vindicate the neutrality thus guaranteed; and that 
 there was no contingency, then foreseen or appre- 
 hended, in which such vindication would not be within 
 the power of this nation. 
 
 In the second place, Mr. Blaine declared with em- 
 phasis that during any war to which the United States 
 of America or the United States of Colombia might 
 be a party, the passage of armed vessels of a hostile 
 nation through the canal of Panama would be no 
 more admissible than would the passage of the armed 
 forces of a hostile nation over the railway lines join- 
 ing the Atlantic and Pacific shores of the United 
 States, or of Colombia. This declaration was in direct 
 opposition to the second article of the Clayton-Bulwer 
 treaty. Mr. Blaine then proceeded to expatiate upon 
 the remarkable development of our Pacific slope and 
 the importance of the canal in facilitating communica- 
 tion between our Atlantic and Pacific states, alluding 
 to the canal in this connection, in the very apt phrase 
 of President Hayes, as forming a part of the coast- 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 205 
 
 line of the United States. It does not appear to have 
 occurred to Mr. Blaine that the same arguments 
 applied with equal force to Great Britain's American 
 possessions to the north of us, which likewise extended 
 from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and were likewise 
 entering upon a period of unusual development. 
 
 The third point to be noted in the dispatch is the 
 statement that the United States would object to any 
 concerted action of the European powers for the pur- 
 pose of guaranteeing the canal or determining its 
 status." This declaration was supposed to be nothing 
 more than a reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 A copy of this document was left by Mr. Lowell at 
 the British foreign office on the 12th of July, 1881. 
 No formal notice of the dispatch was taken by the 
 British government until November, when Lord Gran- 
 ville replied that, as Mr. Blaine had made the state- 
 ment that the government of the United States had 
 no intention of initiating any discussion upon this 
 subject, he did not propose to enter into a detailed 
 argument in reply to Mr. Blaine's observations. He 
 wished, however, merely to point out that the position 
 of Great Britain and the United States with reference 
 to the canal, irrespective of the magnitude of the 
 commercial relations of the former power, was de- 
 termined by a convention signed between them at 
 Washington on the 19th of April, 1850, commonly 
 known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and her majes- 
 ty's government relied with confidence upon the 
 observance of all the engagements of that treaty." 
 
 Before this reply reached Washington, Mr. Blaine 
 had again taken up the question of the canal in a 
 
 " Collected Correspondence, pp. 322-326. " Ibid., p. 326. 
 
206 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 special dispatch of November 19, 1881. In this dis- 
 patch he addressed himself specifically to a considera- 
 tion of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and urged upon the 
 consideration of the British government modifications 
 of such a radical character as to amount to a complete 
 abrogation of the treaty. The grounds of objection 
 to the treaty were stated in full. In the first place it 
 was declared that the treaty had been made more 
 than thirty years before under -excepl;ion.aLand_ex=l 
 traordinary conditions, which were at least temporary 
 in their nature and had long since ceased to exist.' 
 The remarkable development of the United States on 
 the Pacific coast since that time had created new 
 duties and responsibilities for the American govern- 
 ment which required, in the judgment of the Presi- 
 dent, some essential modifications in the treaty. The 
 objections to the perpetuity of the treaty were then 
 stated in full. First and foremost was the objection 
 that the treaty by forbidding the military fortification 
 of the proposed canal practically conceded its control 
 to Great Britain by reason of her naval superiority. 
 The military power of the United States in any con- 
 flict on the American continent was irresistible, yet 
 the United States was restrained from using this 
 power for the protection of the canal, while no re- 
 strictions could be placed upon the natural advantages 
 that England enjoyed in this regard as a great naval 
 power. A more serious objection to the treaty, how- 
 ever, was urged in the statement that it embodied a 
 misconception of the relative positions of Great Britain 
 and the United States with respect to interests on this 
 continent. The United States would not consent toi 
 perpetuate any treaty that impeached " our right and] 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 20/ 
 
 long-established claim to priority on the American 
 continent." 
 
 In the third place, at the time the convention was 
 agreed upon, Great Britain and the United States were 
 the only nations prominent in the commerce of Cen- 
 tral and South America. Since that time other nations 
 not bound by the prohibitions of that treaty had be- 
 come interested in Central America, and the republic 
 of France had become sponsor for a new canal scheme. 
 Yet by the treaty with England the United States was 
 prevented from asserting its rights and the privileges 
 acquired through treaty with Colombia anterior to the 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 
 
 In the fourth place, the treaty had been made with, 
 the implied understanding that British capital would 
 be available for the construction of a canal. That' 
 expectation had never been realized, and the United 
 States was now able to construct a canal without aid 
 from outside resources. 
 
 In conclusion, Mr. Blaine proposed several modifi- 
 cations of the treaty which would leave the United 
 States free to fortify the canal and to hold political 
 control of it in conjunction with the country in which 
 it might be located."' 
 
 A few days after the dispatch was written. Lord 
 Granville's answer to Mr. Blaine's first dispatch 
 reached Washington, and on the 29th of November, 
 Mr. Blaine wrote a second dispatch equally volumin- 
 ous with the one of November 19. In this he re- 
 viewed the discussions which had taken place between 
 1850 and i860 in regard to the treaty with a view to 
 showing that it had never been satisfactory to the 
 
 " Collected Correspondence, pp. 327-332. 
 
2o8 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 United States and had been the cause of serious mis- 
 understanding. He failed, however, to make mention 
 of the settlement of i860 and the declaration of Presi- 
 dent Buchanan that the United States was satisfied 
 with that adjustment. 
 
 The reply of the British government to Mr. Blaine's 
 arguments was given in two dispatches dated respec- 
 tively January 7 and 14, 1882. Lord Granville took 
 exception to certain conclusions which Mr. Blaine 
 had sought to establish by analogy with the conduct 
 of Great Britain in regard to the Suez canal. His 
 lordship fully concurred in what Mr. Blaine had said 
 as to the unexampled development of the United States 
 on the Pacific coast, but reminded him that the de- 
 velopment of her majesty's possessions to the north 
 of the United States, while less rapid, had been, never- 
 theless, on a scale that bore some relation even to 
 that of the Pacific states. In the view of her majes- 
 ty's government, the changes desired by the United 
 States would not improve the situation as regarded 
 the canal, while the declaration that the United States 
 would always treat the waterway connecting the two 
 oceans " as part of her coast-line " threatened the in- 
 dependence of the territory lying between that water- 
 way and the United States. 
 
 Her majesty's government believed that the only 
 way to relieve the situation was to extend the invita- 
 tion to all maritime states to participate in an agree- 
 ment based on the stipulations of the convention of 
 1850." 
 
 The task of replying to Lord Granville's two dis- 
 patches fell upon Mr. Blaine's successor in the State 
 
 " Collected Correspondence, pp. 340-352. 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 209 
 
 Department, Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Frelinghuy- 
 sen's voluminous dispatch of May 8, 1882, reiterated 
 in the main the arguments advanced by Mr. Blaine. 
 He adduced evidence at great length to try to show 
 that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was a special contract 
 for the accomplishment of a specific object, which had 
 never been achieved, and was no longer binding; that 
 Great Britain had violated the treaty by converting 
 her settlement of British Honduras into a possession 
 without ever receiving the assent of the United States, 
 and that such act would entitle the United States to 
 renounce the treaty. The dispatch was further char- 
 acterized by a direct appeal to the Monroe Doctrine 
 in these words : " The President believes that the for- 
 mation of a protectorate by European nations over the 
 isthmus transit would be in conflict with a doctrine 
 which has been for many years asserted by the United 
 States. This sentiment is properly termed a doctrine, 
 as it has no prescribed sanction and its assertion is 
 left to the exigency which may invoke it. It has been 
 repeatedly announced by the executive department of 
 this government, and through the utterances of dis- 
 tinguished citizens; it is cherished by the American 
 people, and has been approved by the government of 
 Great Britain." After quoting a part of President 
 Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, and review- 
 ing the circumstances under which it was delivered, 
 Mr. Frelinghuysen said: "Thus the doctrine of 
 non-intervention by European powers in American 
 affairs arose from complications in South America, 
 and was announced by Mr. Monroe on the suggestion 
 of the official representative of Great Britain." " 
 
 "Collected Correspondence, pp. 160-161. 
 14 
 
2IO PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 Those who have read the eariier pages of this volume 
 can judge of the accuracy of this statement. 
 
 In his reply of December 30, 1882, Lord Granville 
 proved conclusively that Article VIII. of the treaty 
 was understood by the American government during 
 the discussions of 1850-1860 as establishing a general 
 principle applicable to all waterways connecting the 
 two oceans. In answer to the second point, Lord 
 Granville adduced the notes exchanged between Mr. 
 Clayton and Sir Henry Bulwer in July, 1850, which 
 made it perfectly clear that, in the understanding of 
 both governments at that time, the claims of Great 
 Britain to Belize or British Honduras were not 
 affected one way or the other by the treaty.'' 
 
 In a later dispatch, August 17, 1883, Lord Gran- 
 ville briefly touched upon Mr. Freylinghuysen's ap- 
 peal to the Monroe Doctrine, reminding him very 
 pertinently that neither the American administration 
 which negotiated the treaty nor the Senate which 
 ratified it considered that they were precluded by the 
 utterances of President Monroe from entering into 
 such a treaty with one or more of the European 
 powers." 
 
 The correspondence on the treaty closed with Mr. 
 Frelinghuysen's dispatch of November 22, 1883, in 
 which he reiterated with no small degree of bluntness 
 and pertinacity the arguments of his earlier dispatches. 
 
 The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was designed at the time 
 of its execution to establish a permanent principle of 
 control over interoceanic communication in Central 
 America. No provision was made, as in most trea- 
 ties, for its abrogation, and the American government 
 
 " Collected Corresp., pp. 353-359- " Ibid., p. 364. 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 211 
 
 could not terminate it without the consent of Great 
 Britain for fear that she would return to her position 
 of vantage at the time the treaty was made. 
 
 Mr. Blaine's efforts to secure a modification were 
 the result of the development of a new policy by the 
 United States. The wisdom of that policy we shall 
 discuss later. Apart from this question, however, it 
 must be admitted that the arguments presented by Mr. 
 Blaine and Mr. Frelinghuysen in support of their 
 policy were disingenuous and flimsy. It may be safely 
 said that no state papers have ever emanated from 
 our government on so serious a question equally 
 lacking in logical consistency and moral force. 
 
 The result was that Great Britain refused to consent 
 to a modification of the treaty and the United States 
 saw before her the alternative of abiding by the terms 
 of the treaty or ultimately resorting to war with 
 England. 
 
 In December, 1884, Mr. Frelinghuysen negotiated 
 a treaty with Nicaragua providing for the construc- 
 tion of a canal by the United States to be under the 
 joint ownership and protection of the United States 
 and Nicaragua. The United States also guaranteed 
 the integrity of the territory of Nicaragua. When Mr. 
 Cleveland became president this treaty was still be- 
 fore the Senate for consideration. Mr. Cleveland with- 
 drew the treaty, and in his first annual message, 
 December 8, 1885, reverted to our traditional policy. 
 He declared himself opposed to entangling alliances 
 with foreign states and declared : " Whatever highway 
 may be constructed across the barrier dividing the 
 two greatest maritime areas of the world, must be for 
 the world's benefit, a trust for mankind, to be re- 
 
212 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 moved from the chance of domination by any single 
 power, nor become a point of invitation for hostili- 
 ties or a prize for warlike ambition." "" 
 
 No discussion as to the validity of the Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty took place between the two govern- 
 ments after the close of President Arthur's adminis- 
 tration. Mr. Cleveland's message above quoted was 
 accepted as a reaffirmation of the treaty on the part 
 of the American government. 
 
 Upon two occasions subsequently questions have 
 arisen between the two governments involving the 
 stipulations of the treaty. In 1888, and again in 1894, 
 the United States felt called upon to protest against 
 British interference in the affairs of the Mosquito 
 coast." The ground of interposition on the part of 
 Great Britain was alleged to be found in the treaty of 
 Managua, signed between Great Britain and Nica- 
 ragua on the 28th of January, i860. This convention, 
 it will be remembered, was one of the three treaties 
 entered into by Great Britain with Central American 
 republics with a view to removing the causes of dis- 
 pute in construction of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 
 The treaty of Managua assigned a district to the 
 Mosquito Indians within the limits of the republic of 
 Nicaragua. The sovereignty of Nicaragua over the 
 district was recognized, but the Indians were secured 
 in the possession and enjoyment of their own domestic 
 customs and regulations. It was agreed, however, 
 that nothing in the treaty should prevent the Mos- 
 quitos at any subsequent date from voluntarily agree- 
 
 " Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VIII, p. 327. 
 " See Mr. Bayard to Mr. Phelps, Nov. 23, 1888. For. Rel., 
 1888, Pt. I, pp. 759-768. 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 21 3 
 
 ing to absolute incorporation with the republic of 
 Nicaragua. By the terms of the treaty the protec- 
 torate of Great Britain over the Mosquito coast was 
 to cease three months after the exchange of ratifica- 
 tions. 
 
 In reply to the protest of 1888, Lord Salisbury said 
 that her majesty's government had no intention to 
 assert a protectorate in substance or in form over the 
 Mosquito nation, but that according to the convention 
 with Nicaragua of i860, Great Britain undertook " to 
 secure certain rights and privileges to the Mosquito 
 Indians, and in the event, which has arisen, of the 
 Mosquito Indians complaining that their rights are 
 infringed by Nicaragua, by whom is remonstrance to 
 be made to Nicaragua unless by Great Britain, with 
 whom she has concluded the convention in ques- 
 tion? " " 
 
 In the spring of 1894, yet more serious trouble 
 arose. The Mosquito territory was invaded by the 
 troops of Nicaragua and Bluefields was surrounded. 
 The British consul at that point protested against this 
 act as contrary to the treaty of Managua. The pro- 
 test being unheeded, a force of troops was landed from 
 the British ship Cleopatra and on March 9, the Nica- 
 raguans were forced to retire. Mr. Bayard was in- 
 structed by telegraph " to ascertain and report fully 
 by cable the occasion for this action." The British 
 government disavowed all intention of violating the 
 Cla3^on-Bulwer treaty, which it recognized " as ex- 
 tant and in full force." 
 
 In July, 1894, United States marines were landed 
 at Bluefields to protect American interests and to 
 
 " For. Rel., 1889, p. 468. 
 
214 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 restore order. Later the British government assured 
 Mr. Bayard that its action had been wholly uncon- 
 nected with any political or conventional question 
 touching the Mosquito reservation, but simply to pro- 
 tect British interests. 
 
 By a convention signed November 20, 1894, the 
 Mosquito Indians surrendered their rights under the 
 treaty of i860 and were incorporated with Nicaragua. 
 This voluntary incorporation took away all further 
 occasion for interposition on the part of Great Britain, 
 and Mr. Bayard reported that it was received with 
 " the most open expression of satisfaction at the for- 
 eign ofKce." " 
 
 In apparent disregard of the incontrovertible facts 
 of the case, public opinion in the United States at the 
 present time seems utterly to ignore the binding force 
 of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and to demand the con- 
 struction of a canal under American, meaning thereby 
 United States, control. 
 
 In 1890, the Maritime Canal Company, which had 
 secured a concession from Nicaragua and a charter 
 from the Congress of the United States, began work 
 on the formation of a harbor at Greytown. The work 
 was carried forward until 1893, when the funds gave 
 out and Congress was asked to make the enterprise 
 a national one. 
 
 By act of March 2, 1895, Congress authorized the 
 appointment of a commission of three engineers for 
 the purpose of reporting on the feasibility, perma- 
 nence and cost of completing the company's plans as 
 detailed by the chief engineer in 1890. After spend- 
 
 " See Foreign Relatione, 1894, App. i, pp. 234-363. " Af- 
 fairs at Bluefields." 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 215 
 
 ing two months in the field and three in examining 
 the papers of the company, the commission reported 
 that they believed a ship canal perfectly feasible, but 
 disapproved of certain features of the company's 
 plans, and about doubled the estimates of cost, rais- 
 ing them from $67,000,000 to $133,500,000." 
 
 In accordance with a recommendation of the com- 
 mission of 1895, Congress provided by act of June 4, 
 
 1897, for another commission to finish the investiga- 
 tions and make final plans and estimates. The report 
 of this commission, which was dated December 26, 
 
 1898, placed the probable cost at $124,000,000. 
 
 In order that the most thorough investigation of the 
 whole subject of trans-isthmian waterways might be 
 made before final action on the part of the United 
 States, a bill was passed by Congress on the morning 
 of the adjournment of the last session, March 3, 1899, 
 placing $1,000,000 at the disposition of the President 
 for defraying the expenses of a new commission. This 
 law expressly authorizes an investigation of the 
 Panama route, but gives the President full discretion 
 in examining other routes. It also gives the Presi- 
 dent authority to negotiate with the Central American 
 countries for cessions or franchises which will give 
 the United States control of the land upon which to 
 construct the canal. This latter provision seems to 
 imply a disregard of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 
 
 Having reviewed the diplomatic and other difficul- 
 ties of the canal problem, we are now in a position to 
 state in a few propositions the present status of the 
 case. 
 
 (i) The commercial interests of the United States 
 
 *° House Doc. No. 279, Fifty-fourth Cong., First Sess. 
 
2l6 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 and of the world at large demand the speedy con- 
 struction of a waterway between the Atlantic and 
 Pacific oceans. 
 
 (2) The weight of public opinion in the United 
 States at the present time seems to favor a canal under 
 the control of the United States and subject to its 
 exclusive military use in time of war. 
 
 (3) The Clayton-Bulwer treaty binds us to share 
 our control of whatever canal may be built with Eng- 
 land and such other powers as may hereafter unite in 
 the guarantee of the canal, and to guarantee its abso- 
 lute neutrality in time of war. 
 
 (4) England has shown herself unwilling to modify 
 the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in our favor, 
 and there is no reason to suppose that she will ever 
 do so without some correspondingly valuable conces- 
 sion on our part. 
 
 Such being the status of the case, it is evident that 
 the government of the United States must proceed 
 with proper precaution in its canal policy and with 
 due consideration for the interests of Great Britain. 
 
 It is still a debatable question whether our real and 
 permanent interests dictate a canal under American 
 control or a neutralized canal. Mr. Blaine wanted 
 both, and thereby placed himself in the somewhat 
 ludicrous position of the little boy who wanted to eat 
 his apple and keep it too. He declared that the guar- 
 antee given by the United States was all-sufficient 
 and did not require " reinforcement, or accession, or 
 assent from any other power." " Mr. Blaine here 
 showed himself obtusely ignorant of the doctrine and 
 
 " Mr. Blaine to Mr. Lowell, June 24, 1881. Collected Cor- 
 respondence, p. 323. 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 21/ 
 
 practice of neutralization. The term neutrality is 
 used in international law to indicate the position of a 
 state which refrains from committing hostile acts 
 against either of two belligerents, and the continuance 
 of this status is altogether optional with the state ex- 
 ercising such neutrality. In other words, a state may 
 at any time cease to be neutral of its own free volition 
 and take part with one or the other belligerent. Neu- 
 tralization, on the other hand, implies an altogether 
 different state of affairs and can be brought about only 
 by international agreement. A neutralized state can- 
 not be the theatre of war and cannot take part in 
 military movements except for purposes of self- 
 defence. There are three instances of neutralized 
 states in Europe at the present time. In 1815, after 
 the final overthrow of Napoleon, the representatives 
 of Great Britain, Austria, France, Russia and Prussia 
 signed at Paris a declaration by which the perpetual 
 neutrality of Switzerland was recognized and the in- 
 violability of its territory guaranteed. That agree- 
 ment has never been violated. In like manner the 
 territory of Belgium was neutralized in 1831, and the 
 Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in 1867, by agreement 
 of European powers. 
 
 This was the sort of neutralization contemplated 
 for the canal by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. A uni- 
 lateral guarantee of neutrality amounts to nothing 
 when the state offering the guarantee is involved in 
 war. The United States might by the display of a 
 strong naval force maintain on her sole guarantee 
 the neutrality of the Central American canal in any 
 war to which she was not a party. But in case she be- 
 came a party to the war, her guarantee would not be 
 
2l8 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 
 
 respected by any power, and she could defend the 
 canal against the seizure of her enemies only by the 
 concentration of a naval force there able to meet all 
 comers. 
 
 The case of the Suez canal establishes the only 
 precedent for determining the status of an interoceanic 
 canal in international law. In the concession to De 
 Lesseps of 1856, the Khedive of Egypt declared that 
 the canal and its ports should always be open as 
 neutral passages to all ships of commerce. When the 
 British intervened in Egypt in 1882, the line of the 
 canal was seized and became the base of their military 
 operations. Against this proceeding, De Lesseps in- 
 voked in vain the unilateral guarantee of the Khedive. 
 His protests were disregarded by statesmen generally. 
 Almost immediately thereafter the British government 
 in a circular dispatch of January, 1883, proposed the 
 neutralization of the canal. As a result of this pro- 
 posal conferences were held at Paris in 1883, and 
 again in 1885, but no definite agreement was reached. 
 In 1887, Lord Salisbury opened negotiations again 
 which led this time to the convention signed at Con- 
 stantinople, October 29, 1888, between Great Britain, 
 Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Russia, 
 Spain, Turkey and the Netherlands. This conven- 
 tion establishes the neutralization of the canal in peace 
 and in war. It is to be open at all times to all ships, 
 whether merchantmen or vessels of war, whether 
 belligerent or neutral; but no hostile act is to be 
 committed in the canal or within three miles of either 
 end." 
 
 It is true that this convention has not yet stood 
 
 " British and Foreign State Papers, 1889 (Egypt). 
 
PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL 219 
 
 the test of war, but there is no reason to suppose that 
 the neutralization of the Suez canal will not prove 
 as effective as that of Switzerland or Belgium, which 
 has stood the test of more than two generations and 
 the strain of the Franco-Prussian war. 
 
 In the case of the Suez canal, neutralization was 
 eflFected through the initiative of the country which 
 exercised practically both the political and financial 
 control of the canal. In 1875 Great Britain had pur- 
 chased from the Khedive of Egypt all his shares in the 
 canal, and thus acquired financial control, and in the 
 intervention in 1882 she had assumed political control 
 of Egypt. 
 
 England stands in relation to the Suez canal in 
 very much the same position that the United States 
 would stand in relation to a Central American canal. 
 Yet England, possessing the most formidable naval 
 force in the world, voluntarily surrendered whatever 
 advantages were to be derived from the exclusive 
 military use of the canal in order to place it under 
 international control and to secure its permanent 
 neutralization. 
 
 The Central American canal will ultimately be of 
 greater importance to the commerce of the world 
 than the Suez. Even if it should be constructed under 
 the exclusive control of the United States, the first 
 war in which it should happen to be used to the sole 
 military advantage of any one power would lead to a 
 demand for its neutralization on the part of the other 
 powers concerned. The development of international 
 law of late has been in the direction of promoting and 
 safeguarding the common interests of the whole 
 family of nations in the face of national greed and 
 aggression. 
 
220 PROPOSED CENTRAL AMERICAN CANAL. 
 
 Why not recognize this tendency and secure the 
 neutralization and inviolability of the canal in the 
 beginning by international agreement? This has been 
 our policy from the beginning with the exception of 
 the correspondence opened by Mr. Blaine in 1881, and 
 to this policy we are already pledged in the most 
 solemn manner by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty." 
 
 " While these pages were in press, a new agreement be- 
 tween Great Britain and the United States was signed by 
 Secretary Hay and Lord Pauncefote. This guarantees the 
 neutrality of any canal across the isthmus, but at the present 
 writing the document awaits the confirmation of the Senate. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 French Intervention . in Mexico. 
 
 The attempt of Louis Napoleon to establish a 
 European monarchy in Mexico under the tutelage of 
 France was the most serious menace that republican 
 institutions in the new world have had to face since 
 the schemes of the Holy Alliance were checked by 
 Monroe and Canning. The thwarting of that attempt 
 may be accounted one of the greatest triumphs of 
 American diplomacy. The internal disorders com- 
 mon to South and Central American republics have 
 always been a fruitful source of embarrassment to 
 the United States, on account of the liability to 
 European intervention to which these governments 
 continually subject themselves in such periods by their 
 open and flagrant disregard of international obliga- 
 tions. Of no country is this statement truer than of 
 Mexico, where the well-nigh interminable strife of 
 parties gave rise between the years 1821 and 1857 
 to thirty-six different governments. In 1857 a favor- 
 able change occurred in the affairs of the republic. 
 A constituent congress, elected by the people of the 
 different states, framed and adopted a republican con- 
 stitution which promised better things for the future. 
 ' Under the provisions of this constitution an election 
 was held in July (1857) and General Comonfort 
 chosen president almost without opposition. His 
 term of office was to begin December i, 1857, and 
 
222 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 to continue four years. Within one brief month, 
 however, President Comonfort was driven from the 
 capital, and ultimately from the country, by an upris- 
 ing headed by General Zuloaga. As soon as 
 Comonfort abandoned the presidency. General Benito 
 Juarez, the president of the Supreme Court of Justice, 
 became according to the constitution, the president 
 de jure of the republic for the remainder of the 
 unexpired term, that is, until December i, 1861. 
 General Zuloaga had, however, assumed the name of 
 president, with indefinite powers, and the entire diplo- 
 matic corps, including the minister of the United 
 States, had recognized his government. But Zuloaga 
 was speedily expelled, and the supreme power seized 
 by General Miramon, the head of the church party, 
 whom the diplomatic corps likewise recognized. 
 Meanwhile Juarez, the constitutional president, had 
 proceeded to Vera Cruz, where he put his adminis- 
 tration into successful operation. 
 
 For several months, Mr. John Forsyth, the Ameri- 
 can minister, continued at the city of Mexico in the 
 discharge of his duties. In June, 1858, however, he 
 suspended his diplomatic connection with the Miramon 
 government. Our relations, which had been bad 
 under former governments, were now rendered almost 
 intolerable under that of Miramon by outrages to- 
 wards American citizens and personal indignities to 
 Mr. Forsyth himself. His action was approved by 
 President Buchanan, and he was directed to return 
 to the United States. All diplomatic intercourse was 
 thus terminated with the government of Miramon, but 
 as yet none was established with the Juarez govern- 
 ment. The ultimate success of the latter became. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 223 
 
 however, so probable that the following year the Presi- 
 dent sent a confidential agent to Mexico to inquire 
 into and report upon the actual condition of the bel- 
 ligerents, and in consequence of his report, Mr. 
 Robert M. McLane was dispatched to Mexico, March 
 8, 1859, " with discretionary authority to recognize 
 the government of President Juarez, if on his arrival 
 in Mexico he should find it entitled to such recogni- 
 tion according to the established practice of the United 
 States." On the 7th of April, Mr. McLane presented 
 his credentials to President Juarez, having no hesita- 
 tion, he said, " in pronouncing the government of 
 Juarez to be the only existing government of the 
 republic." He was cordially received by the authori- 
 ties at Vera Cruz, and during all the vicissitudes of 
 the next eight years the United States government 
 continued to extend its sympathy and moral support 
 to the government of Juarez as the only one entitled 
 to the allegiance of the people of Mexico. 
 
 Juarez thus came forward, in the role of reformer, 
 as the champion of constitutionalism and the suprem- 
 acy of the state against the overreaching power, in- 
 fluence and wealth of the church party. He was a 
 full-blooded Indian, without the slightest admixture 
 of Spanish blood. In December, i860, he finally suc- 
 ceeded in overthrowing the party of Miramon and 
 driving the latter into exile. Immediately, on reoccu- 
 pying the city of Mexico, the Constitutionalists pro- 
 ceeded to execute with severity the decree issued at 
 Vera Cruz nationalizing or sequestrating the prop- 
 erty of the church. 
 
 The most difficult question which the new govern- 
 ment had to face was that of international obligations 
 
224 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 recklessly contracted by the various revolutionary 
 leaders who had successively been recognized as con- 
 stituting the government of Mexico. In consequence 
 of debts contracted and outrages and enormities per- 
 petrated, for the most part during the regime of 
 Miramon and the church party, the governments of 
 England, France and Spain determined to intervene 
 in Mexico. 
 
 The grievances of the British government were 
 based on the following facts: non-settlement of 
 claims of British bondholders; the murder of the 
 British vice-consul at Tasco; the breaking into the 
 British legation and carrying off ^152,000 sterling in 
 bonds belonging to British subjects, besides numerous 
 other outrages committed on the persons and property 
 of individuals.' 
 
 The claims of the British bondholders referred to 
 had been recognized by the Packenham convention of 
 October 15, 1842, and formed into a consolidated fund 
 of $250,000, which was to be paid oflf, principal and 
 interest, by a percentage on import duties at the 
 custom-houses of Vera Cruz and Tampico. This 
 convention was not carried out by the Mexican gov- 
 ernment, and on December 4, 1851, Mr. Doyle signed 
 on behalf of Great Britain a new convention, in which 
 not only the claims under the Packenham convention, 
 but others, recognized by both governments, were 
 likewise formed into a consolidated fund, on which 
 the Mexican government bound itself to pay five per 
 cent, as a sinking fund and three per cent, as interest 
 
 ' British and Foreign State Papers, 1861-62, Vol. LII. Also 
 House Exec. Doc. No. 100, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second 
 Sess. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 225 
 
 until the debt should be paid off. This five and three 
 per cent, were to be met by a percentage of customs 
 receipts. In 1857 the sinking fund was to be raised 
 to six per cent, and the interest to four per cent. 
 
 Two days after the signing of this Doyle convention 
 the Spanish minister in Mexico also signed a conven- 
 tion on behalf of some Philippine missionaries, known 
 as the " Padre Moran " convention, on almost the 
 same basis as the British. The consolidated fund in 
 this case was $983,000, the sinking fund five per cent., 
 and the interest three per cent. 
 
 The interest was paid on both funds in almost the 
 whole amount, but the sinking fund was not kept up. 
 Succeeding agreements were made in 1858, in 1859, 
 and in i860, by which the custom-house assignments 
 to satisfy both conventions (British and Spanish) 
 were raised from twelve per cent, in 1851, to twenty- 
 nine per cent, in i860.' 
 
 It will thus be seen that the British and Spanish 
 claims were perfectly legitimate. The French claims, 
 however, were of a somewhat different character. 
 During Miramon's administration arrangements were 
 made through the agency of Jecker, a Swiss banker, 
 by which $750,000 were to be raised through an issue 
 of $15,000,000 of bonds. These bonds fell into the 
 hands of Jecker's French creditors and were pressed 
 by the French government, which thus demanded the 
 repayment of twenty times the original sum advanced. 
 A claim was made also for $12,000,000 for torts on 
 French subjects." 
 
 When the Liberal party came into power again in 
 
 "- Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 359. 
 ' Wharton's Digest, Sec. 58, Vol, I, p. 312. 
 
 IS 
 
226 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 i860, they were unable to meet the situation and 
 showed a disposition to question the obligatory force 
 of engagements entered into by their various revolu- 
 tionary predecessors. The British government had 
 undertaken to provide against this contingency upon 
 the occasion of extending recognition to the Juarez 
 administration. Under date of March 30, 1861, Lord 
 John Russell wrote to Sir Charles Wyke, recently ap- 
 pointed minister to Mexico, as follows: 
 
 " The instructions addressed to Mr. Mathew, both 
 before and since the final triumph of the Liberal party, 
 made the recognition by Great Britain of the con- 
 stitutional government contingent upon the acknowl- 
 edgment by that government of the liability of 
 Mexico for the claims of British subjects who, either 
 in their persons or in their property, for a long series 
 of years, can be proved to have suffered wrong at 
 the hands of successive governments in Mexico." * 
 
 And further on in the same communication the 
 attitude of the British government is expressed yet 
 more strongly: 
 
 " Her majesty's government will not admit as an 
 excuse for hesitation in this respect the plea that the 
 robbery was committed by the late government. For, 
 as regards this, as indeed all other claims, her ma- 
 jesty's government cannot admit that the party who 
 committed the wrong is alone responsible. Great 
 Britain does not recognize any party as constituting 
 the republic in its dealings with foreign nations, but 
 holds the entire republic, by whatever party the gov- 
 ernment of it may from time to time be administered, 
 to be responsible for wrongs done to British subjects 
 
 * Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 237. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 22/ 
 
 by any party or persons at any time administering the 
 powers of government." 
 
 Mexico, however, was slow to admit this principle 
 of international law. In a letter to Lord John Rus- 
 sell, June 25, 1861, and in other communications. Sir 
 Charles Wyke urged the necessity of a naval demon- 
 stration against Mexico. His plan was to take pos- 
 session of the custom-houses of Vera Cruz, Tampico 
 and Matamoras on the Atlantic, and of one or two 
 on the Pacific, lower the duties so as to attract the 
 great bulk of trade from other ports, and pay them- 
 selves by the percentage to which they were entitled 
 by treaty stipulation. 
 
 On the 17th of July, 1861, President Juarez brought 
 matters to a crisis by the publication of a decree, the 
 first article of which declared that " all payments are 
 suspended for two years, including the assignments 
 for the loan made in London and for the foreign 
 conventions." ' 
 
 On the 23rd, Sir Charles Wyke, the British minister, 
 demanded the repeal of this law within forty-eight 
 hours. On the 24th, the French minister demanded 
 its repeal within twenty-four hours. These demands 
 were not complied with and diplomatic relations were 
 immediately broken off by the British and French 
 representatives. 
 
 The Spanish government had acted somewhat in 
 advance of the other governments and was already 
 preparing to back its claims by an armed expedition 
 against Mexico. The rupture with the British and 
 French governments very naturally pointed to joint 
 action with Spain as the best means of securing their 
 
 ' Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 294. 
 
228 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 interests. The United States government, which had 
 just entered upon one of the greatest struggles of 
 modern times and had its hands practically tied as 
 far as Mexico was concerned, regarded the contem- 
 plated intervention of European powers in Mexico 
 with grave apprehension, not to say suspicion. So 
 great was the uneasiness occasioned in the United 
 States by the measures in contemplation and so 
 strong was the desire to ward oflf the threatened 
 danger to republican institutions on this continent, 
 that Mr. Seward authorized (September 2, 1861) the 
 negotiation of a treaty with Mexico for the assump- 
 tion by the United States of the payment of the in- 
 terest, at three per cent., upon the funded debt of 
 Mexico (the principal of which was about $62,000,000) 
 for the term of five years from the date of the decree 
 of the Mexican government suspending such payment, 
 " provided that the government of Mexico will pledge 
 to the United States its faith for the reimbursement 
 of the money so to be paid, with six per cent, interest 
 thereon, to be secured by a specific lien upon all the 
 public lands and mineral rights in the several Mexican 
 states of Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and 
 Sinaloa, the property so pledged to become absolute 
 in the United States at the expiration of the term of 
 six years from the time when the treaty shall go into 
 effect, if such reimbursement shall not have been made 
 before that time." ' All this, of course, was subject 
 to the confirmation of the Senate. 
 
 This step was communicated informally to the 
 British and French governments, and the validity of 
 
 ° Mr. Seward to Mr. Corwin, Sept. 2, 1861. House Exec. 
 Doc. No. 100, p. 22, Thirty-seventh Gong., Second Sess. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 229 
 
 the convention was to be conditioned upon those 
 governments engaging not to take any measures 
 against Mexico to enforce the payment of the interest 
 of the loan until time should have been given to sub- 
 mit the convention to the ratification of the United 
 States Senate at its approaching session. 'It was also 
 to be a condition that, if the convention should be 
 ratified, Great Britain and France should engage not 
 to make any demand upon Mexico for the interest, 
 except upon its failing to be punctually paid by the 
 United States.' 
 
 Grave objections to Mr. Seward's plan of paying the 
 interest on the Mexican debt were entertained both 
 in Paris and in London. The French minister of 
 state, M. Thouvenel, said to the British minister at 
 Paris : 
 
 " It might not be possible to prevent the United 
 States offering money to Mexico, or to prevent 
 Mexico receiving money from the United States, but 
 neither England nor France ought in any way to 
 recognize the transaction." ' Lord Lyons declared to 
 Mr. Seward " That her majesty's government were 
 as apprehensive as Mr. Seward himself could be, of 
 an attempt to build upon a foundation of debts due, 
 and injuries inflicted, by Mexico, a pretension to es- 
 tablish a new government in that country. Her 
 majesty's government thought, however, that the 
 most effectual mode of guarding against this danger 
 would be for Great Britain, the United States and 
 France to join Spain in a course of action, the objects 
 
 ' Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 325. 
 ' Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, Sept. 24, 1861. Brit, and 
 For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 329. 
 
230 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 and limits of which should be distinctly defined be- 
 forehand. This certainly appeared more prudent than 
 to allow Spain to act alone now, and afterwards to 
 oppose the results of her operations, if she should 
 go too far." ' 
 
 The British government avoided beforehand the 
 necessity of a point-blank refusal of the plan of Mr. 
 Seward, in case the treaty should go through, by 
 declaring that the interest on the funded debt was not 
 the only cause of complaint, but that there remained 
 over and above that the outrages perpetrated upon 
 British subjects still unredressed. 
 
 Mr. Charles Francis Adams, the United States 
 minister to England, did not approve the plan of 
 guaranteeing the Mexican interest, and in his dispatch 
 to Mr. Seward of November i, 1861, he expressed his 
 opinion rather more frankly than is usual for a min- 
 ister to do in discussing an instruction from tlie state 
 department. " You will permit me here, however, to 
 make a single remark in this connection upon the 
 importance of appearing to divest the United States 
 of any personal and selfish interest in the action it 
 may think proper to adopt. The view customarily 
 taken in Europe is that their government is disposed 
 to resist all foreign intervention in Mexico, not upon 
 any principle, but simply because it is itself expecting, 
 in due course of time, to absorb the whole country 
 for its own benefit. Hence any proposal like that 
 which I had the honor to receive, based upon the 
 mortgage of portions of Mexican territory as security 
 for engagements entered into by the United States, 
 
 ' Earl Lyons to Earl Russell, Oct. 14, 1861. Brit, and For. 
 St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 375- 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 23 1 
 
 naturally becomes the ground of an outcry that this 
 is but the preliminary to an entry for inevitable fore- 
 closure. And then follows the argument that if this 
 process be legitimate in one case, why not equally 
 in all. As against Great Britain and France, it would 
 be difificult to oppose to this the abstract principle 
 contained in what has been denominated the Monroe 
 Doctrine, however just in substance." '° 
 
 While Mr. Corwin was still in negotiation with the 
 Mexican government in reference to some method of 
 releasing Mexico from her complications with the 
 allied governments of Europe, the United States Sen- 
 ate, in reply to two several messages of the President, 
 passed a resolution, February 25, 1862, declaring the 
 opinion " that it is not advisable to negotiate a treaty 
 that will require the United States to assume any por- 
 tion of the principle or interest of the debt of Mexico, 
 or that will require the concurrence of European pow- 
 ers." This effectually put an end to Mr. Seward's 
 plan. 
 
 Meanwhile Sir Charles Wyke had reopened nego- 
 tiations with the Mexican government and negotiated 
 a treaty which might have satisfied British claims, 
 but the treaty was thrown out by the Mexican con- 
 gress by a large majority, and also disapproved by 
 the British government in view of an agreement en- 
 tered into with France and Spain unknown to Sir 
 Charles Wyke." 
 
 The agreement referred to was the convention 
 signed at London, October 31, 1861, between Spain, 
 
 " Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess., House Exec. Doc. 
 No. 100, p. 201. 
 
 " Sir C. Wyke to Earl Russell, Nov. 25, 1861. Brit, and 
 For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 398. 
 
232 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 France and Great Britain, in reference to the situa- 
 tion of affairs in Mexico and looking to armed inter- 
 vention for the purpose of securing their rights. The 
 preamble of the convention recites that the three con- 
 tracting parties " being placed by the arbitrary and 
 vexatious conduct of the authorities of the republic 
 of Mexico under the necessity of exacting from those 
 authorities a more efficient protection for the persons 
 and property of their subjects, as well as the perform- 
 ance of the obligations contracted toward them by 
 the republic of Mexico, have arranged to conclude a 
 convention between each other for the purpose of 
 combining their common action." The most impor- 
 tant article of the convention in view of its subsequent 
 violation by the Emperor Napoleon, was the second, 
 which declared that: 
 
 " The high contracting parties bind themselves 
 not to seek for themselves, in the employment of 
 coercive measures foreseen by the present conven- 
 tion, any acquisition of territory, or any peculiar 
 advantage, and not to exercise in the subsequent 
 affairs of Mexico any influence of a character to 
 impair the right of the Mexican nation to choose and 
 freely to constitute the form of its own government." 
 The fourth article, recognizing that the United States 
 also had claims against Mexico, provided " that im- 
 mediately after the signing of the present convention, 
 a copy of it shall be communicated to the government 
 of the United States, that that government shall be 
 invited to accede to it. . . . But, as the high con- 
 tracting parties would expose themselves, in making 
 any delay in carrying into effect articles one and two 
 of the present convention, to fail in the end which they 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 233. 
 
 wish to attain, they have agreed not to defer, with a 
 view of obtaining the accession of the government of 
 the United States, the commencement of the above- 
 mentioned operations beyond the period at which 
 their combined forces may be united in the vicinity of 
 Vera Cruz." '' 
 
 The advisability of inviting the cooperation of the 
 United States had been the subject of considerable 
 discussion and diiiference of opinion among the three 
 European governments. England and France had 
 urged the cooperation of the United States, while 
 Spain had opposed it. 
 
 In compliance with the fourth article the conven- 
 tion was submitted to the government of the United 
 States by a note dated November 30, 1861, signed 
 jointly by the representatives of Spain, France and 
 Great Britain at Washington. 
 
 Mr. Seward's reply conveying the declination of the 
 United States to the invitation to cooperate with the 
 three allied European powers in the demonstration 
 against Mexico was dated December 4, 1861. After 
 reviewing the substance of the convention, he said: 
 
 " First. As the undersigned has heretofore had the 
 honor to inform each of the plenipotentiaries now 
 addressed, the President does not feel himself at lib- 
 erty to question, and he does not question, that the 
 sovereigns represented have undoubted right to decide 
 for themselves the fact whether they have sustained 
 grievances, and to resort to war against Mexico for 
 the redress thereof, and have a right also to levy the 
 war severally or jointly." 
 
 " Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess., House Exec. Doc. 
 No. 100, pp. 186-7. 
 
234 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 In the second place, Mr. Seward expressed the 
 satisfaction of his government that the alHed powers 
 had clearly repudiated in the convention all idea of 
 carrying on the war for their own ambitious ends and 
 all intention of exercising in the subsequent affairs 
 of Mexico any influence of a character to impair the 
 right of the Mexican people to choose and freely to 
 constitute the form of their own government. " It 
 is true, as the high contracting parties assume, that 
 the United States have, on their part, claims to urge 
 against Mexico. Upon due consideration, however, 
 the President is of opinion that it would be inexpe- 
 dient to seek satisfaction of their claims at this time 
 through an act of accession to the convention. 
 Among the reasons for this decision which the under- 
 signed is authorized to assign, are, first, that the 
 United States, so far as it is practicable, prefer to 
 adhere to a traditional policy recommended to them 
 by the father of their country and confirmed by a 
 happy experience, which forbids them from making 
 alliances with foreign nations; second, Mexico being 
 a neighbor of the United States on this continent, 
 and possessing a system of government similar to our 
 own in many of its important features, the United 
 States habitually cherish a decided good-will towards 
 that republic, and a lively interest in its security, pros- 
 perity and welfare. Animated by these sentiments, 
 the United States do not feel inclined to resort to 
 forcible remedies for their claims at the present mo- 
 ment, when the government of Mexico is deeply dis- 
 turbed by factions within, and exposed to war with 
 foreign nations. And of course, the same senti- 
 ments render them still more disinclined to allied war 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 235 
 
 against Mexico, than to war to be waged against her 
 by themselves alone." In conclusion, Mr. Seward 
 referred to the fact that the United States government 
 had authorized their representative in Mexico to enter 
 into a treaty conceding to the Mexican government 
 material aid, which might, he hoped, enable that gov- 
 ernment to satisfy the just claims and demands of the 
 allied sovereigns and so to avert the war which they 
 have agreed among each other to levy against 
 Mexico.'' 
 
 As already related, the efforts of the executive in 
 this direction were not approved by the Senate and 
 the negotiations in regard to guaranteeing the interest 
 on the Mexican loan were broken off. The treaty 
 negotiated by Mr. Corwin was in fact never submitted 
 to the Senate, for by the time it was ready the French 
 forces occupied a part of Mexican territory, and it was 
 feared that a loan to Mexico under such conditions 
 would be considered a breach of neutrality. 
 
 In pursuance of the London convention. Vera 
 Cruz was occupied in the early part of 1862 by a 
 Spanish force of 6000 men under command of Marshal 
 Prim: a French force of 2500, which was largely re- 
 inforced soon afterwards; and a force of 700 British 
 marines. 
 
 The first intimation of the real purposes of the Em- 
 peror Louis Napoleon was given in the letter of 
 instructions of M. Thouvenel to the admiral command- 
 ing the French expedition to Mexico, dated Novem- 
 ber II, 1861. He says that in case of the withdrawal 
 
 " House Exec. Doc. No. 100, pp. 187-190, Thirty-seventh 
 Cong., Second Sess. Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 
 394- 
 
236 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 of the Mexican forces from the coast into the interior 
 of the country, an advance upon the capital might be- 
 come necessary. He reminds the admiral of the self- 
 abnegatory character of the second article of the con- 
 vention, but continues: 
 
 " There are, however, certain hypotheses which 
 present themselves to our foresight and which it was 
 our duty to examine. It might happen that the pres- 
 sure of the allied forces upon the soil of Mexico might 
 induce the sane portion of the people, tired of an- 
 archy, anxious for order and repose, to attempt an 
 effort to constitute in the country a government pre- 
 senting the guarantees of strength and stability which 
 have been wanting to all those which have succeeded 
 each other since the emancipation." To such efforts 
 the admiral was expressly told that he was not to 
 refuse his encouragement.'* 
 
 In view of this order, the British government at 
 once instructed its agent. Sir Charles Wyke, that, 
 while there was nothing to be said against the reason- 
 ing of the French government in reference to the 
 probable necessity of marching against the city of 
 Mexico, he was to decline to take part in the advance 
 into the interior, and that the "fact, that the whole 
 available British force was only 700 marines, would 
 be sufficient reason for declining." 
 
 The seriousness of the situation was fully appre- 
 ciated by the United States government. Shortly 
 after the occupation of Vera Cruz by the Spanish 
 forces and the announcement of the outfit of a French 
 
 " House Exec. Doc. No. 100, p. 174, Thirty-seventh Cong., 
 Second Sess. 
 " Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 381. 
 
_ FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 237 
 
 force to follow up the advantage, Mr. Charles Francis 
 Adams wrote to his government from London: " It 
 is no longer concealed that the inteiition is to advance 
 to the capital, and to establish a firm government, 
 with the consent of the people, at that place. But who 
 are meant by that term does not appear. This issue 
 is by no means palatable to the government here, 
 though it is difficult to imagine that they could have 
 been blind to it. Feeble murmurs of discontent are 
 heard, but they will scarcely be likely to count for 
 much in the face of the obligation under which the 
 action of the emperor in the Trent case has placed 
 them. The military occupation will go on, and will 
 not cease with the limits now assigned to it. It is 
 difficult to understand the nature of the fulcrum thus 
 obtained for operations in a new and a different quar- 
 ter, should the occasion be made to use it. The 
 expedition to the city of Mexico may not stop until 
 it shows itself in the heart of the Louisiana pur- 
 chase." " 
 
 About this time reports began to be circulated that 
 the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria would 
 be invited by a large body of Mexicans to place him- 
 self on the throne of Mexico, and that the Mexican 
 people would gladly hail such a change. To what- 
 ever extent such reports might be credited, the United 
 States could not call into question the good faith of 
 the parties to the London convention. The British 
 government, as the issue showed, acted with perfect 
 sincerity in the matter; and the Spanish government, 
 whatever may have been its original intentions, fol- 
 
 " Adams to Seward, January 24, 1862. House Ex. Doc. 
 No. 100, p. 206, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess. 
 
238 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 lowed the lead of Great Britain. When the reports 
 in regard to Maximilian were first ciretrlated, the 
 British government declared to its agent, Sir Charles 
 Wyke, that : " If the Mexican people, by a spontaneous 
 movement, place the Austrian Archduke on the throne 
 of Mexico, there is nothing in the convention to pre- 
 vent it. On the other hand, we could be no parties 
 to a forcible intervention for this purpose. The 
 Mexicans must consult their own interests." " 
 
 At the time, however, the attitude of the British 
 government was not at all understood. Mr. Adams 
 wrote: " Great Britain occupies the post of holding 
 the door, whilst her two associates, with her knowl- 
 edge, go in, fully prepared, if they can, to perpetrate 
 the act which she, at the outset, made them denounce, 
 at the same time that she disavowed every idea of 
 being made to participate in it." ^' 
 
 In the face of armed invasion, the Mexican govern- 
 ment assumed a more reasonable attitude, and on the 
 19th day of February, 1862, the plenipotentiaries of 
 Spain, Great Britain and France signed, at Soledad, 
 with the secretary of state of the Mexican govern- 
 ment a preliminary agreement or convention, in which 
 they recognized the constitutional government as then 
 organized. Declaring that they had " no designs 
 against the independence, sovereignty and integrity 
 of the Mexican republic," they agreed to open negotia- 
 tions for the settlement of all the demands which they 
 had to make at Orizaba. During the negotiations the 
 forces of the allies were to be allowed to leave the 
 
 " Brit, and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 418. 
 " H. Ex. Doc. No. 100, p. 209, Thirty-seventh Cong., 
 Second Session. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 239 
 
 unhealthy locaHty of Vera Cruz and' occupy the three 
 towns of Cordova, Orizaba and Tehuacan, with their 
 natural approaches. In the event of negotiations be- 
 ing broken o&, the allies agreed to abandon the towns 
 above named before reopening hostilities." 
 
 The convention of Soledad proved, however, of 
 short duration. On the ninth of April, 1862, the rep- 
 resentatives' of the allies announced in a formal note 
 to the Mexican government, " that not having been 
 able to agree about the interpretation which ought to 
 be given in the present circumstances to the conven- 
 tion of the 31st of October, 1861 (the convention of 
 London), they have resolved to adopt for the future 
 an entirely separate and independent line of action. 
 In consequence, the commander of the Spanish forces 
 will immediately take the necessary measures to re- 
 imbark his troops. The French army will concen- 
 trate in Paso Aucho as soon as the Spanish troops 
 have passed from this position, that is to say, prob- 
 ably about the 20th of April, thereupon beginning 
 their operations." '"' According to instructions already 
 alluded to, the British force, which was limited to 700 
 marines, had declined to advance into the interior, and 
 hence was not present when the breach occurred. 
 
 In spite of all appearances to the contrary, the 
 French government still persisted in disavowing to 
 the United States government, in the most emphatic 
 terms, all designs upon the independence of the 
 Mexican republic. Even after the rupture at Orizaba, 
 
 " H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, p. 46, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third 
 Sess. 
 '" H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, p. 48, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third 
 
 Sess. 
 
240 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 M. Thouvenel assured Mr. Dayton, the United States 
 minister at Paris, that all that France wanted was 
 that there should be a stable government in Mexico, 
 not an anarchy with which other nations could have 
 no relations. " That if the people of that country 
 chose to establish a republic it was all well; France 
 would make no objection. If they chose to establish 
 a monarchy, as that was the form of government here, 
 it would be charming (charmant), but they did not 
 mean to do anything to induce such a course of ac- 
 tion. That all the rumors that France intended to 
 establish the Archduke Maximilian on the throne of 
 Mexico were utterly without foundation." " M. 
 Thouvenel's disclaimer to the British government was 
 equally emphatic.'" 
 
 To return to the situation of affairs at Orizaba, the 
 disagreement between the allies requires some expla- 
 nation. The immediate cause of the rupture and 
 of the withdrawal from the convention of London was 
 the protection extended by the French agents to Gen- 
 eral Almonte, Padre Miranda, and other leading men 
 of the reactionary or church party who had been 
 banished from the country and who now from the 
 French camp maintained an active correspondence 
 with Marquez, Cobos, and other notorious chiefs of 
 the armed bands then in open rebellion against the 
 constituted government of the country. Almonte and 
 his associates openly favored the scheme of placing 
 Maximilian on the throne. 
 
 The Mexican government demanded the removal of 
 
 "■ Dayton to Seward, April 22, 1862. 
 
 "^ Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, May 15, 1862, H. Ex. Doc. 
 No. 54, p. 746, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 24I 
 
 General Almonte and .his associates from the camp of 
 the allies, and in this demand the British and Spanish 
 representatives concurred. A somewhat stormy con- 
 ference was held between the commissioners of the 
 allied powers at Orizaba, April 2, 1862, at which the 
 French agents virtually said that they did not regard 
 the convention of London or the preliminaries of 
 Soledad as binding upon them. Specifically then the 
 two causes of the rupture were (i) the persistency of 
 the French commissioners in opposing the removal 
 of the Mexican exiles, and (2) their refusal to take 
 part in the conferences which had been arranged by 
 the convention of Soledad to be held with the Juarez 
 government at Orizaba, April 15, 1862. The British 
 government heartily approvel of the action of its 
 agent, Sir Charles Wyke, in breaking up the confer- 
 ence and putting an end to the joint action of the three 
 powers."" The policy of Spain coincided with that of 
 England. 
 
 The French government was not satisfied with the 
 convention of Soledad, but did not dispute its validity, 
 and declared that if the negotiations should be broken 
 off, its provisions in regard to the withdrawal of the 
 troops from their vantage ground must be observed. 
 The French government further assumed that, when 
 ^negotiations with the Mexican government should be 
 broken off, the allied forces would proceed to act 
 jointly under the convention of London." The British 
 and Spanish governments, however, having become 
 convinced of the duplicity of the French government 
 
 '' Earl Russell to Sir C. Wyke, May 22, 1862. 
 "* Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, April 25, 1862, H. Ex. Doc. 
 No. 54, p. 694, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third Sess. 
 16 
 
242 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 in the matter, terminated the London convention with- 
 out further discussion and ordered the withdrawal of 
 their forces and agents from Mexican territory. 
 
 The government of Louis Napoleon, thus left to its 
 own devices by the withdrawal of Great Britain and 
 Spain, and by the helpless condition, for the time being, 
 to which the war of secession had reduced the gov- 
 ernment of the United States,- greatly reinforced its 
 Mexican expedition and placed General Forey in com- 
 mand. Soon after the withdrawal of the British and 
 Spanish contingents, General Almonte instituted a 
 government in the territory occupied by the French 
 and assumed the title of " Supreme Chief of the 
 Nation," but it soon became evident, as Mr. Dayton 
 expressed it, that instead of the emperor having 
 availed himself of the services of General Almonte, 
 Almonte had availed himself of the services of the 
 emperor. Accordingly, shortly after General Forey 
 assumed command, he issued an order dissolving the 
 ministry of Almonte, depriving him of his title and 
 limiting him thereafter " in the most exact manner to 
 the instructions of the emperor, which are to proceed 
 as far as possible, with other Mexican generals placed 
 under the protection of our flag, to the organization 
 of the Mexican army." 
 
 The misfortunes which had overtaken Mexico and 
 the dangers that threatened the permanence of her 
 republican institutions, had now thoroughly alarmed 
 her sister republics of Central and South America, 
 and a correspondence began between them relative to 
 organizing an international American conference to 
 oppose European aggression. 
 
 During the remarkable series of events that took 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 243 
 
 place in Mexico in. the spring of 1862, Mr. Seward 
 consistently held to the opinion well expressed in a 
 dispatch to Mr. Dayton, June 21, 1862: 
 
 " France has a right to make war against Mexico, 
 and to determine for herself the cause. We have a 
 right and interest to insist that France shall not im- 
 prove the war she makes to raise up in Mexico an 
 anti-republican and anti-American government, or to 
 maintain such a government there. France has dis- 
 claimed such designs, and we, besides reposing faith 
 in the assurances given in a frank, honorable manner, 
 would, in any case, be bound to wait for, and not 
 anticipate, a violation of them." " 
 
 For some months the French troops gradually ex- 
 tended their military operations and occupied a greater 
 extent of territory without, however, any material 
 change in the situation. The Juarez government still 
 held the capital. In the spring of 1863, however, 
 military operations were pushed forward with greater 
 activity, and in June, General Forey organized a junta 
 of government composed of thirty-five Mexican citi- 
 zens designated by decree of the French emperor's 
 minister. The members of this supreme junta were 
 to associate with them two hundred and fifteen citizens 
 of Mexico to form an assembly of two hundred and 
 forty-five notables. This assembly was to occupy it- 
 self with the form of the permanent government of 
 Mexico. The junta appointed an executive body of 
 three, of whom General Almonte was the head. 
 
 On the loth of July, 1863, the capital of Mexico 
 was occupied by the French army, and on the follow- 
 ing day the Assembly of Notables declared: 
 
 '" H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, p. 530, Thirty-seventh Cong., Third 
 Sess. 
 
244 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 " I. The Mexican nation adopts^ as its form of gov- 
 ernment a limited hereditary monarchy, with a Catho- 
 lic prince. 
 
 2. The sovereign shall take the title of Emperor of 
 Mexico. 
 
 3. The imperial crowrn of Mexico is oflfered to his 
 imperial and royal highness the Prince Ferdinand 
 Maximilian, Archduke of Austria, for himself and his 
 descendants. 
 
 4. If, under circumstances which cannot be fore- 
 seen, the Archduke of Austria, Ferdinand Maximilian, 
 should not take possession of the throne which is 
 offered to him, the Mexican nation relies on the good 
 will of his majesty, Napoleon III, Emperor of the 
 French, to indicate for it another Catholic prince." " 
 
 The crown of Mexico was formally offered to Maxi- 
 milian by a deputation of Mexicans headed by Seiior 
 Estrada, October 3, 1863; but Maximilian replied that 
 he could not accept the proffered throne until the 
 whole nation should " confirm by a free manifestation 
 of its will the wishes of the capital." This was a 
 wise decision, had it been given in good faith and had 
 it been wisely adhered to, but the sequel shows that 
 the archduke was either not sincere in his protesta- 
 tions or else was woefully deceived by representa- 
 tions subsequently made to him. Six months later 
 he accepted the crown without the question having 
 been submitted to the wishes of any but a very small 
 portion of the Mexican people. 
 
 In spite of the declaration of the Mexican Assembly, 
 which showed so unmistakably the hand of Napoleon, 
 
 '"Sen. Ex. Doc No. 11, pp. 254-268, Thirty-eighth Cong., 
 First Sess. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 245 
 
 the French government continued to repudiate the 
 designs imputed to it against the independence of 
 Mexico, and Mr. Seward continued to ex;>ress, offi- 
 cially at least, the satisfaction of the American gov- 
 ernment at the explanations vouchsafed by France. 
 September ii, 1.863, he stated the case as follows: 
 
 " When France made war against Mexico, we 
 asked of France explanations of her objects and pur- 
 poses. She answered, that it was a war for the redress 
 of grievances; that she did not intend to permanently 
 occupy or dominate in Mexico, and that she should 
 leave to the people of Mexico a free choice of institu- 
 tions of government. Under these circumstances the 
 United States adopted, and they have since maintained 
 entire neutrality between the belligerents, in harmony 
 with the traditional policy in regard to foreign wars. 
 The war has continued longer than was anticipated. 
 At different stages of it France has, in her intercourse 
 with us, renewed the explanations before mentioned. 
 The French army has now captured Pueblo and the 
 capital, while the Mexican government, with its prin- 
 cipal forces, is understood to have retired to San Luis 
 Potosi, and a provisional government has been insti- 
 tuted under French auspices in the city of Mexico, 
 which being supported by arms, divides the actual 
 dominion of the country with the Mexican govern- 
 ment, also maintained by armed power,. That pro- 
 visional government has neither made nor sougnt to 
 make any communication to the government of the 
 United States, nor has it been in any way recognized 
 by this government. France has made no communi- 
 cation to the United States concerning the provisional 
 government which has been established in Mexico, 
 
246 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 nor has she announced any actual or intended de- 
 parture from the policy in regard to that country 
 which her before-mentioned explanations have au- 
 thorized us to expect her to pursue." " 
 
 The probable acceptance of the crown by Maxi- 
 milian was, however, the subject of frequent com- 
 munications between the governments of France and 
 the United States. In the course of a somewhat 
 familiar conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys,. the 
 French Minister of State, in August, 1863, Mr. Day- 
 ton expressed the fear that in quitting Mexico France 
 might leave a puppet behind her. De Lhuys replied: 
 " No; the strings would be too long to work." 
 
 The chances of Maximilian's success in Mexico had 
 been from the first deliberately calculated on the basis 
 of the probable success of the Southern Confederacy; 
 and, therefore, the cause of the Juarez government 
 and the cause of the Union were considered the same. 
 The active sympathy of the Unionists with the Mexi- 
 can republic made it difficult for the administration 
 to maintain neutrality. This difficulty was further 
 enhanced by the doubt entertained in the United 
 States as to the intentions of France. In this con- 
 nection Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Dayton, September 
 21, 1863: 
 
 " The President thinks it desirable that you should 
 seek an opportunity to mention these facts to Mr. 
 Drouyn de Lhuys, and to suggest to him that the 
 interests of the United States, and, as it seems to us, 
 the interests of France herself, require that a solution 
 of the present complications in Mexico be made, as 
 
 " Seward to Motley, Sept. 11, 1863, Dipl. Corr., 1863; Sen. 
 Ex. Doc. No. II, p. 479, Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 247 
 
 early as may be convenient, upon the basis of the 
 unity and independence of Mexico." '^ 
 
 In reply, the French minister declared that the ques- 
 tion of the establishment of Maximilian on the Mexican 
 throne was to be decided by a majority vote of the 
 entire nation; that the dangers of the government of 
 the archduke would come principally from the United 
 States, and the sooner the United States showed itself 
 satisfied, and manifested a willingness to enter into 
 peaceful relations with that government, the sooner 
 would France be ready to leave Mexico and the new 
 government to take care of itself, which France would, 
 in any event, do as soon as she with propriety could; 
 but that she would not lead or tempt the archduke 
 into difficulty, and then desert him before his govern- 
 ment was settled. He said that the early acknowl- 
 edgment of that government by the United States 
 would tend to shorten, or perhaps to end, all the 
 troublesome complications 'of France in that country; 
 that they would thereupon quit Mexico." 
 
 To this communication, Mr. Seward replied that the 
 French government had not been left uninformed of 
 the opinion of the United States that the permanent 
 establishment of a foreign and monarchical govern- 
 ment in Mexico would be found neither easy nor desir-i 
 able; that the United States could not anticipate the 
 action of the Mexican people; and that the United 
 States still regarded Mexico as the scene of a war 
 which had not yet ended in the subversion of the 
 
 '^ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, p. 464, Thirty-eighth Cong., First 
 Sess. 
 
 " Dayton to Seward, Oct. 9, 1863, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, 
 p. 471, Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess. 
 
248 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 government long existing ther^ with which the 
 United States remained in the relation of peace and 
 friendship™ 
 
 Before formally accepting the crown, the arc)iduke 
 visited England with a view to securing a promise of 
 recognition for his new position. He was, of course, 
 to pass through Paris, and in view of his approaching 
 visit, Mr. Dayton asked for instructions as to his con- 
 duct on the occasion. Mr. Seward replied, February 
 27, 1864: " I have taken the President's direction 
 upon the question. If the Archduke Maximilian ap- 
 pears in Paris only in his character as an imperial 
 prince of the house of Hapsburg, you will be expected 
 to be neither demonstrative nor reserved in your de- 
 portment towards him. If he appears there with any 
 assumption of political authority or title in Mexico, 
 you will entirely refrain from intercourse with him. 
 Should your proceeding be a subject of inquiry or 
 remark, you will be at liberty, in the exercise of your 
 own discretion, to say that this government, in view 
 of its rights and duties in the present conjuncture of 
 its affairs, has prescribed fixed rules to be observed, 
 not only by this department, but by its representatives 
 in foreign countries. We acknowledge revolutions 
 only by direction of the President, upon full and 
 mature consideration." ^ 
 
 The archduke visited London in company with his 
 father-in-law, Leopold of Belgium. The British gov- 
 ernment declined to act on the subject at that juncture, 
 " but gave them reason to hope that, so soon as the 
 
 "Seward to D:iyton, Oct , 23, 1863, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, 
 p. 47r, Thirty-eighth Cong., First Sess. 
 "■ Dip. Corr., 1864. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 249 
 
 action in Mexico woiild appear to justify it, they would 
 acknowledge him." ^ Spain and Belgium were ready 
 to follow in the wake of France. 
 
 About the time of this visit of Maximilian to Eng- 
 land, Mr. McDougall, of California, introduced in the 
 Senate a resolution declaring " that the movements of 
 the government of France, and the threatened move- 
 ment of an emperor, improvised by the Emperor of 
 France, demand by this republic, if insisted upon, 
 war." This resolution was not carried, but some days 
 later, on the 4th of April, 1864, the House of Rep- 
 resentatives passed by a unanimous vote a resolution 
 declaring its opposition to the recognition of a mon- 
 archy in Mexico. Mr. Seward, fearing a rupture with 
 France on this account, took pains to inform the gov- 
 ernment of that country, through Mr. Dayton, that 
 this action of the House was in no way binding on the 
 executive, even if concurred in by the Senate. 
 
 The formal acceptance of the crown of Mexico by 
 Maximilian took place April 10, 1864, at Miramar, the 
 palace he had built near Trieste, in the presence of the 
 Mexican deputation. The next day the Emperor and 
 Empress of Mexico, as they styled themselves, set 
 out for their new dominions by way of Rome, where 
 they received the blessing of the Pope. Before leav- 
 ing Europe Maximilian signed with the Emperor of 
 the French a convention in the following terms: 
 
 The French troops in Mexico were to be reduced 
 as soon as possible to 25,000 men. 
 
 The French troops were to evacuate Mexico in pro- 
 portion as the Emperor of Mexico could organize 
 troops to replace them. 
 
 ^'^ Adams to Seward, March 24, 1864. 
 
250 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 The " foreign legion," composed of 8000 men, was 
 to remain in Mexico six years after all the other 
 French troops should have been recalled. 
 
 The expenses of the French expedition to Mexico, 
 to be paid by the Mexican government, were fixed at 
 the sum of two hundred and seventy million francs 
 for the whole duration of the expedition down to 
 July I, 1864. From July ist all expenses of the Mexi- 
 can army were to be met by Mexico."" 
 
 The resolution of the House referred to above came 
 very near producing the rupture that Mr. Seward was 
 striving to avert, or at least to postpone, during the 
 continuance of the War of secession. When Mr. Day- 
 ton visited M. Drouyn de Lhuys just after the resolu- 
 tion reached Europe, the remark which greeted Mr. 
 Dayton when he entered the room was : " Do you 
 bring us peace, or bring us war? " Mr. Dayton re- 
 plied that he did not think France had a right to 
 think that the United States was about to make war 
 against her on account of anything contained in that 
 resolution; that it embodied nothing more than the 
 principles which the United States had constantly held 
 out to France from the beginning. 
 
 The Confederate agents were taking advantage of 
 the resolution to stir up trouble between the United 
 States and France. In fact they had long caused 
 reports to be spread in Europe, and had succeeded 
 in gaining credence for them, to the effect that the 
 United States government was only awaiting the ter- 
 mination of domestic troubles to drive the French 
 from Mexico. The French naturally concluded that 
 if they were to have trouble with the United States, 
 
 " Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III, pp. 356-849. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 25 1 
 
 it was safest for them to choose their own time." 
 Napoleon was all the while coquetting with the Con- 
 federate government, and holding above Mr. Seward's 
 head a veiled threat of recognition of Confederate 
 independence. The Confederate government quickly 
 caught at the suggestion of an alliance between Maxi- 
 milian and the South with the power of France to 
 back them. A Confederate agent was actually ac- 
 credited to the government of Maximilian, but did not 
 reach his destination. Although Napoleon's calcu- 
 lations were based on the overthrow of the Union, and 
 although he had assumed at the outset, with England 
 and Spain, an attitude decidedly unfriendly to the Fed- 
 eral government, nevertheless he was not willing to 
 go the full length of recognizing the Confederacy 
 as an independent power while the issue of the con- 
 flict was still in doubt. 
 
 In speaking of Slidell's movements in Europe and 
 the encouragement given him in France, Mr. Bigelow 
 wrote to Mr. Seward, February 14, 1865: "I am 
 strongly impressed with the conviction that, but for 
 the Mexican entanglement, the insurgents would re- 
 ceive very little further countenance from the im- 
 perial government, and that a reconciliation of the 
 national policies of the two countries on that question 
 would speedily dispose of all other sources of dissatis- 
 faction." 
 
 As the war of secession seemed nearing its end, the 
 French papers became uneasy in view of possible 
 intervention in Mexico by the United States on the 
 ground of the Monroe Doctrine. This principle of 
 American diplomacy, which was likened to the sword 
 
 "•Dipl. Corr., 1864; also Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, Thirty- 
 eighth Cong., First Sess. 
 
252 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 of Damocles suspended over the head of Maximilian,, 
 was discussed in all its bearings on the present case 
 by the journals of Europe.'' 
 
 Throughout all this period of turmoil, the United 
 States recognized no authority in Mexico but that of 
 the Juarez government. In April, 1864, the French 
 minister at Washington complained that serious com- 
 plications with France were likely to arise out of 
 grants of land made by " ex-President Juarez " in 
 Sonora to emigrants from California. The French 
 government regarded these grants as illegal and pro- 
 posed to send forces there to prevent the parties~from 
 taking " illicit possession." 
 
 In May, 1864, the French government sought ex- 
 planations in regard to a club formed in New Orleans, 
 called the " D. M. D.," Defenders of the Monroe Doc- 
 trine. Mr. Seward replied that the object of the club, 
 so far as the government had been able to ascertain, 
 was to bring moral influences to bear upon the gov- 
 ernment of the United States in favor of a maintenance 
 of the Monroe Doctrine, but not to act in violation of 
 the law, or of the well-understood governmental policy 
 of neutrality in the war which existed between France 
 and Mexico. Members of the association did, how- 
 ever, actually start on an expedition to Brownsville, 
 but the steamer was taken possession of by United 
 States officials. During the year 1864 constant com- 
 plaint was made by the French government of ship- 
 ments of arms to the Juarez government from Cali- 
 fornia and general violation of neutrality, particularly 
 at Brownsville on the Rio Grande. 
 
 Shortly after the surrender of General Lee, several 
 
 ^ Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III, pp. 380-385. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 253 
 
 Confederate officers of high position and influence 
 went to Mexico and identified themselves with the 
 government of Maximilian. Dr. Wm. M. Gwin, a 
 former United States Senator from California, organ- 
 ized a plan for colonizing the states of northern 
 Mexico with ex-Confederates. This scheme was the 
 subject of several representations to the French gov- 
 ernment on the part of Mr. Seward. He reminded 
 them that the sympathies of the American people 
 were already considerably excited in favor of the 
 republic of Mexico; that they were disposed to regard 
 with impatience the continued intervention of France 
 in that country; and that any favor shown to the 
 proceedings of Dr. Gwin by the titular Emperor of 
 Mexico or by the imperial government of France 
 would tend greatly to increase the popular impatience. 
 He further requested an assurance that the pretences 
 of Dr. Gwin and his associates were destitute of any 
 sanction from the Emperor of France. 
 
 Among the most prominent Confederates connected 
 with this scheme were Matthew F. Maury, the dis- 
 tinguished geographer and naval officer, who became 
 a naturalized Mexican citizen and was appointed Im- 
 perial Commissioner of Immigration and an honorary 
 councillor of state; and General John B. Magruder, 
 who was charged with the supervision of the survey 
 of lands for colonization. It was hoped that the 
 prominence of these men and the high rank they had 
 held under the Confederate government would, in 
 the general uncertainty that prevailed as to the treat- 
 ment of the South by the victorious Union party, in- 
 duce many persons to emigrate to Mexico. Maxi- 
 milian issued a special decree, September s, 1865, re- 
 garding colonization with a view to inducing Southern 
 
254 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 planters to emigrate to Mexico with their slaves — 
 the latter to be reduced to a state of peonage, regular 
 slavery being prohibited by the laws of the empire. 
 
 In July, 1865, Maximilian finally made an effort to 
 secure recognition of his government by the United 
 States. On the 17th of July, the Marquis de Mon- 
 tholon, the French minister at Washington, called at 
 the department of state and informed Mr. Seward 
 that a special agent had arrived at Washington, bear- 
 ing a letter signed by Maximilian and addressed to 
 the President of the United States, a copy of which 
 the marquis presented to the secretary of state. On 
 the i8th, Mr. Seward delivered back the copy of the 
 letter to the Marquis de Montholon, and said that, as 
 the United States were on friendly relations with the 
 republican government of Mexico, the President de- 
 clined to receive the letter or to hold any intercourse 
 with the agent who brought it. The French govern- 
 ment expressed to its representative at Washington 
 its annoyance and embarrassment at this step, and 
 said that Maximilian should have taken measures to 
 learn the disposition of the United States before send- 
 ing the agent.^° 
 
 Mr. Tucker, in his book on the Monroe Doctrine, 
 makes the statement that Mr. Bigelow, who succeeded 
 Mr. Dayton as minister to France, announced to the 
 French government that the United States would 
 recognize the empire of Maximilian upon the imme- 
 diate withdrawal of the French troops from the terri- 
 tory of Mexico, but that this statement, made upon 
 the envoy's own authority, was disavowed by the 
 President. This is hardly a correct version of the 
 
 '= Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 255 
 
 case. It seems that Mr. Bigelow, in the course of a 
 conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, asked him, 
 " in his own name, and without prejudicing the opin- 
 ion of his government, if he did not think that the 
 recognition of Maximilian by the United States would 
 facilitate and hasten the recall of the French troops." " 
 
 On the third of October, 1865, Maximilian issued a 
 decree at the city of Mexico, the first article of 
 which said that " All persons belonging to armed 
 bands or corps, not legally authorized, whether they 
 proclaim or not any political principles, and whatever 
 be the number of those who compose the said bands, 
 their organization, character and denomination shall 
 be tried militarily by the courts-martial ; and if found 
 guilty even of the only fact of belonging to the band, 
 they shall be condemned to capital punishment, within 
 the twenty-four hours following the sentence." '^ 
 
 The United States, through Mr. Bigelow, protested 
 to France against this decree, as repugnant to the 
 sentiments of modern civilization and the instincts of 
 humanity. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied with a 
 touch of sarcasm: " Why do you not go to President 
 Juarez? We are not the government of Mexico, and 
 you do us too much honor to treat us as such. We 
 had to go to Mexico with an army to secure certain 
 important interests, but we are not responsible for 
 Maximilian or his government. He is accountable 
 to you, as to any other government, if he violated its 
 rights, and you have the same remedies there that we 
 had." " 
 
 " Tucker, p. 104, Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III. 
 ^ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. S, P- 3, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess. 
 ^ Mr. Bigelow to Mr. Seward, Nov. 30, 1865, Sen. Ex. Doc. 
 No. S, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess. 
 
256 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 The American government was. now relieved from 
 the burden of civil war, and for several months the 
 correspondence of Mr. Seward had been assuming a 
 more decided tone. On September 6, 1865, he re- 
 minded the French government that the attention of 
 the country was now no longer occupied by the civil 
 war, and that henceforth both the Congress and the 
 people of the United States might be expected to 
 give a very large share of their attention to questions 
 of foreign policy, chief among whith was likely to be 
 that of their relations with France in regard to Mexico. 
 
 On November 6 he wrote: "The presence and 
 operations of a French army in Mexico, and its main- 
 tenance of an authority there, resting upon force and 
 not the free will of the people of Mexico, is a cause 
 of serious concern to the people of the United States. 
 • . . They still regard the effort to establish perma- 
 nently a foreign and imperial government in Mexico 
 as disallowable and impracticable. For these reasons 
 they could not now agree to compromise tlie position 
 they have hitherto assumed. They are not prepared 
 to recognize any political institutions in Mexico which 
 are in opposition to the republican government with 
 which we have so long and so constantly maintained 
 relations of amity and friendship." 
 
 Finally, on December 16, 1865, Mr. Seward ad- 
 dressed what was practically an ultimatum to France. 
 He pointed out the likelihood that Congress, then in 
 session, would direct by law the action of the execu- 
 tive on this important subject, and stated that " It 
 has been the President's purpose that France should 
 be respectfully informed upon two points, namely: 
 First, that the United States earnestly desire to con- 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 257 
 
 tinue and to cultivate sincere friendship with France. 
 Second, that this policy would be brought into immi- 
 nent jeopardy, unless France could deem it consistent 
 with her interest and honor to desist from the prose- 
 cution of armed intervention in Mexico, to overthrow 
 the domestic republican government existing there, 
 and to establish upon its ruins the foreign monarchy 
 which has been attempted to be inaugurated in the 
 capital of that country." He then adds : " It remains 
 now only to make known to M. Drouyn de Lhuys 
 my profound regret that he has thought it his duty 
 to leave the subject, in his conversation with you, in 
 a condition that does not authorize an expectation on 
 our part that a satisfactory adjustment of the case 
 can be effected on any basis that thus far has been 
 discussed." 
 
 As late as November 29, 1865, the French govern- 
 ment, through the Marquis de Montholon, still in- 
 sisted on recognition of Maximilian by the United 
 States as the only basis for an arrangement for the 
 recall of the French troops." 
 
 The formal reply to Mr. Seward's note of Decem- 
 ber 16 was received through the Marquis de Mon- 
 tholon, January 29, 1866. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, 
 still insisted that the French expedition had in it noth- 
 ing hostile to the institutions of the new world, and 
 assuredly still less to those of the United States. He 
 called attention to the fact that the United States had 
 acknowledged the right of France to make war on 
 Mexico, and continued : " On the other part, we 
 admit, as they do, the principle of non-intervention; 
 
 "Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 6, p. 98, Thirty-ninth Cong., First 
 Sess. 
 
 17 
 
258 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 this double postulate includes, as <it seems to me, the 
 elements of an agreement." He also contended that 
 the right to make war implied the right to secure the 
 results of war; that they had to demand guarantees, 
 and these guarantees they could not look for from a 
 government whose bad faith they had proven on so 
 many occasions; that they found themselves engaged 
 in the establishment of a regular government, which 
 showed itself disposed to keep its engagements; that 
 the Mexican people had spoken, that the Emperor 
 Maximilian had been called by the will of the country." 
 Mr. Seward's counter-reply was dated February 12, 
 1866. He declared that the proceedings in Mexico 
 were regarded in the United States as having been 
 taken without the authority, and prosecuted against 
 the will and opinions of the Mexican people; that the 
 United States had not seen any satisfactory evidence 
 that the people of Mexico had spoken and called into 
 being or accepted the so-called empire, and that the 
 withdrawal of the French troops was deemed neces- 
 sary to allow such a proceeding to be taken. He 
 added, however, that " France need not for a moment 
 delay her proposed withdrawal of military forces from 
 Mexico, and her putting the principle of non-inter- 
 vention into full and complete practice in regard to 
 Mexico through any apprehension that the United 
 States will prove unfaithful to the principles and policy 
 in that respect which, on their behalf, it has been 
 my duty to maintain in this now very lengthened 
 correspondence." " He concluded with the statement : 
 
 " House Ex. Doc. No. 93, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess. 
 "Dipl. Corr., 1865, Part III; also H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, 
 Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 259 
 
 " We shall be gratified when the Emperor shall give 
 to us . . . definite information of the time when 
 French military operations may be expected to cease 
 in Mexico." 
 
 Napoleon finally decided that he could not risk a 
 war with the United States, and in the issue of April 5, 
 1866, the Moniteur announced that the Emperor had 
 decided that the French troops should evacuate 
 Mexico in three detachments: the first to leave in 
 November, 1866; the second in March, 1867; and the 
 third in November, 1867. In the course of a con- 
 versation with Mr. Bigelow the day following M. 
 Drouyn de Lhuys acknowledged that this statement 
 was official.*^ 
 
 The decision of the emperor was officially made 
 known to the United States in a note of April 21, 1866. 
 Mr. Seward had very fortunately left a loophole in 
 his dispatch of February 12, in the statement that the 
 United States would continue to pursue its policy of 
 neutrality after the French evacuation. De Lhuys 
 says: "We receive this assurance with entire confi- 
 dence and we find therein a sufficient guarantee not 
 any longer to delay the adoption of measures intended 
 to prepare for the return of our army." " 
 
 About the time that the French government an- 
 nounced its intention of withdrawing its forces from 
 Mexico, it was found that troops were being enlisted 
 in Austria for the Mexican " foreign legion." The 
 United States government at once took measures to 
 prevent the French troops from being replaced by 
 Austrians by declaring to the Austrian government, 
 
 " H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, p. 42, Thirty-ninth Cong., First 
 Sess. 
 " H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, p. 42, Thirty-ninth Cong., First Sess. 
 
26o FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 through Mr. Motley, " that in the event of hostilities 
 being carried on hereafter in Mexico by Austrian 
 subjects, under the command or with the sanction of 
 the government of Vienna, the United States will feel 
 themselves at liberty to regard those hostilities as con- 
 stituting a state of war by Austria against the republic 
 of Mexico; and in regard to such war, waged at this 
 time and under existing circumstances, the United 
 States could not engage to remain as silent and neu- 
 tral spectators." " 
 
 Mr. Motley seems to have been somewhat surprised 
 and puzzled at the sudden and emphatic change of 
 tone in the instructions of his government, and failed 
 to carry them out in the spirit intended by Mr. Sew- 
 ard. This brought forth a sharp reprimand. Mr. 
 Seward expressed his strong disapproval of the posi- 
 tion taken by Mr. Motley in his communication of 
 the instructions of the department to the Austrian 
 government, and directed him to carry out his instruc- 
 tions according to the strict letter, adding: " I refrain 
 from discussing the question you have raised, 
 ' Whether the recent instructions of this department 
 harmonize entirely with the policy which it pursued 
 at an earlier period of the European intervention in 
 Mexico.' " 
 
 Mr. Motley was instructed to withdraw from 
 Vienna in case troops were sent from Austria to 
 Mexico. The embarkation of troops for this purpose 
 was stopped. Austria was in a great state of excite- 
 ment over the approaching war with Prussia, and, 
 besides, needing all her available troops at home, did 
 not care to antagonize the United States. 
 
 " Wharton's Digest, Sec. 58, Vol. I, p. 328. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 261 
 
 It was now a, question of great interest in this 
 country and in Europe, whether Maximilian would 
 withdraw from Mexico with the French troops or 
 attempt to maintain himself there without foreign 
 support. Napoleon sent one of his aides to Mexico 
 to make known his intentions to Maximilian. This 
 fact was communicated to the United States govern- 
 ment, October i6, 1866: " Mr. de Castelnau has for 
 his mission to make it well understood that the limit 
 of our sacrifices is reached and that if the Emperor 
 Maximilian, thinking to find in the country itself a 
 point of sufficient support, may wish to endeavor to 
 maintain himself there, he cannot for the future count 
 on any succor on the part of France. But it may 
 happen that, deeming it impossible to triumph through 
 his own resources over the difficulties which sur- 
 round him, this sovereign may determine to abdicate. 
 We will do nothing to dissuade him from this, and we 
 think that on this hypothesis there would be ground 
 to proceed, by way of election, in the establishment 
 of a new government." *° 
 
 When the time came for the withdrawal of the first 
 contingent of French troops, no action to that end 
 was taken by the French government, and the United 
 States had once more to seek an explanation. The 
 emperor assured the American government, how- 
 ever, that he had decided from military considerations 
 to withdraw all his troops in the spring in a body, as 
 the recent successes of the insurgents would render 
 any large reduction of his forces perilous to those 
 who remained. He further stated that he had coun- 
 selled Maximilian to abdicate." To the surprise of 
 
 " Dipl. Corr., 1866, Part I, p. 387. 
 
 " H. Ex. Doc. No. 30, Fortieth Cong., First Sess. 
 
262 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 everyone, however, Maximilian seetned to think that 
 honor demanded that he should remain in Mexico and 
 share the fate of his supporters. 
 
 After the withdrawal of Mr. Corwin, owing to the 
 unsettled state of affairs in Mexico, the United States 
 had no one accredited to that government until 
 May, 1866, when Mr. Lewis D. Campbell, of Ohio, 
 was appointed. He left New York for his post in 
 November, 1866, accompanied by Lieutenant-General 
 William T. Sherman of the army. They proceeded 
 in the U. S. S. Susquehanna by way of Havana, but 
 as they found the principal ports on the Atlantic still 
 occupied by the French, they proceeded to New Or- 
 leans, from which point Mr. Campbell tried to estab- 
 lish regular communication with President Juarez. 
 The President had first decided to dispatch General 
 Grant with Mr. Campbell, in the hope "that some 
 disposition might be made of the land and naval 
 forces of the United States without interfering within 
 the jurisdiction of Mexico, or violating the laws of 
 neutrality, which would be useful in favoring the 
 restoration of law, order and republican government 
 in that country." This demonstration was intended 
 to insure the withdrawal of the French army accord- 
 ing to the promises of the Emperor. A hitch occur- 
 red through some question raised by General Grant 
 and General Sherman was substituted.** 
 
 The French army was withdrawn in the spring of 
 1867, and it very soon became evident that Maxi- 
 milian's cause would speedily collapse. In view of 
 the almost inevitable capture of Maximilian, Mr. 
 Seward telegraphed to Mr. Campbell at New Orleans, 
 
 " Dipl. Corr., 1866, Part III. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 263 
 
 April 6, 1867: " ,You will communicate to President 
 Juarez, promptly and by effectual means, the desire 
 of this government, that in case of capture, the prince 
 and his supporters may receive the humane treatment 
 accorded by civilized nations to prisoners of war." 
 Some of the prisoners already taken had been sum- 
 marily executed. 
 
 Mr. Campbell at once dispatched a special mes- 
 senger, who succeeded in getting through to the 
 headquarters of Juarez, and who returned with an 
 answer from the Mexican government, dated April 
 22, 1867. This answer not only undertook to defend 
 the execution of prisoners above referred to, but also 
 intimated that similar severity would be practiced on 
 Maximilian and his leading associates, if captured, on 
 the ground that, by his harsh decrees, he had placed 
 himself beyond the pale of the law of nations." 
 
 Maximilian and his chief supporters were taken 
 prisoners. May 15, 1867. This information was re- 
 ceived in the United States towards the last of the 
 month, and along with it a report, not well authen- 
 ticated and which afterwards proved to be false, that 
 they had been executed on the i6th. As soon as 
 these rumors reached Washington, Mr. Seward tele- 
 graphed to Mr. Campbell, then at New Orleans, June 
 I, 1867, directing him to proceed at once to the resi- 
 dence of the President of Mexico and enter on his 
 mission, and if necessary to urge clemency to Max- 
 imilian and the other prisoners of war. Mr. Campbell 
 failed to act under these instructions. He requested 
 first that a public vessel of the United States should 
 be detailed to carry him to Mexico. When it was 
 
 " nipl. Corr., 1866, Part III. 
 
264 FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 
 
 found that no ship was available for this purpose, he 
 was ordered to proceed to Havana and thence by the 
 British or French line of steamers to Vera Cruz. He 
 replied that under the circumstances he did not think 
 it becoming the dignity of the representative of the 
 United States to return to Mexico under the flag of a 
 nation which had shown such hostility to that country. 
 He thus remained at New Orleans from the first to 
 the fifteenth of June. He was then ordered peremp- 
 torily to proceed at once according to instructions. 
 He replied that he was ill and was afraid to go by 
 way of Havana, where yellow fever was raging; that 
 he would resign, if desired. The same day Mr. Sew- 
 ard telegraphed him that his resignation would be 
 accepted. 
 
 Mr. Seward then informed Mr. Romero, the 
 Mexican minister at Washington, that Austria, France 
 and Great Britain had appealed to the United States 
 to use its good offices to avert the execution of Prince 
 Maximilian. He strongly recommended clemency to 
 President Juarez, as good policy, and requested Mr. 
 Romero to make the same known to his government 
 at once. This was June 15, the same day that Mr. 
 Campbell's resignation was accepted. On the 21st, 
 Mr. Seward requested Mr. Romero to inform Presi- 
 dent Juarez that the Emperor of Austria would restore 
 Maximilian to all his rights of succession upon his 
 release and renouncing forever all projects in Mexico." 
 
 Meanwhile Maximilian of Hapsburg, Miguel Mira- 
 mon, and Tomas Mejia had been tried by court- 
 martial and sentenced to death, June 14. The sen- 
 tence was confirmed by the government on the 15th, 
 
 °° Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 20, Fortieth Cong., First Sess. 
 
FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 265 
 
 and the execution fixed for the i6th, but at the request 
 of Maximilian's counsel, it was suspended by order 
 of President Juarez until the 19th, in order to allow 
 the prince to arrange certain business affairs of a 
 private character. 
 
 At seven o'clock on the morning of June 19 the 
 prisoners were shot. Thus ended an episode, which 
 proved to be a tragedy for a high-born European 
 prince, which brought discredit and loss of prestige 
 on the government of Napoleon, but which reaffirmed 
 and strengthened the stability of republican institu- 
 tions in the new world. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 The Present Status of the Monroe Doctrine 
 
 In the foregoing chapters we have briefly discussed 
 the origin and several of the most important applica- 
 tions of the Monroe Doctrine. There remain, how- 
 ever, certain interpretations of that principle which 
 require special consideration before passing on to a 
 discussion of its present status. Of the various ap- 
 peals that have been made to the Monroe Doctrine 
 since its first enunciation, some may be regarded as 
 unwarranted extensions and others as natural develop- 
 ments of the original declaration. The public policy 
 of a state develops just as truly as the law of a state 
 develops, and it is a characteristic of all law, but of 
 Anglo-Saxon law in particular, that it is at any given 
 time what it is then understood to be and not what it 
 was originally intended to be. While the Monroe 
 Doctrine has, with the lapse of years, become more 
 widely extended in its application than its authors ever 
 contemplated, its limitations have at the same time 
 "become more clearly defined and there has been a de- 
 cided gain, especially of late, in the precision with 
 which the rule has been interpreted and applied. 
 
 The first step in the development of the doctrine 
 was taken less than two years after the original decla- 
 ration, when, in October, 1825, Mr. Clay, acting under 
 the direction of President John Quincy Adams, the 
 reputed author of the doctrine, notified the French 
 
PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 26/ 
 
 government that we could not consent to the occupa- 
 tion of Cuba and Porto Rico " by any other Euro- 
 pean power than Spain under any contingency what- 
 ever."' Similar declarations were made to the other 
 European powers, the occasion being the fear that 
 Spain would transfer her sovereignty over these is- 
 lands to some other government. 
 
 President Monroe had declared that the American 
 continents were closed to colonization from Europe, 
 meaning by colonization very probably, as Professor 
 J. B. Moore says, " the acquisition of title to territory 
 by original occupation and settlement."^ He had 
 made no declaration against the transfer of sovereignty 
 in America from one European power to another. 
 In fact he positively renounced any such idea, when 
 he said : " With the existing colonies or dependencies 
 of any European power we have not interfered, and 
 shall not interfere." Here then within two years we 
 have a distinct advance upon the position taken by 
 President Monroe. Yet this advanced ground was held 
 by succeeding administrations, until President Grant 
 could say in the case of the same islands in his first 
 annual message : " These dependencies are no longer 
 regarded as subject to transfer from one European 
 power to another. When the present relation of colo- 
 nies ceases, they are to become independent powers, 
 exercising the right of choice and of self-control in 
 the determination of their future condition and rela- 
 tions with other powers." ° And Mr. Hamilton Fish, 
 whose authority on most questions carries great 
 weight with some of the severest critics of the Monroe 
 
 'Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, 8ss; also Wharton's 
 Digest, Sec. 60, Vol. I, p. 367. ' Pol. Sci. Quart., Vol. II. 
 ' Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VII. p. 32. 
 
268 PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 Doctrine, said a few months later, that the President 
 had biit followed "the teachings of all our history" 
 when he made the statement.' 
 
 The interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine which 
 has probably provoked most criticism was that put 
 upon it by President Polk in his message of April 29, 
 1848, in which he recommended the military occupa- 
 tion of Yucatan in order to prevent its passing into 
 the hands of some European power. Yucatan was a 
 state of the Mexican republic which had attained to a 
 position of semi-independence during the war between 
 that country and the United States and had been re- 
 garded by the latter to a considerable extent, as neu- 
 tral territory. The Indians of Yucatan were waging 
 a war of extermination against the whites, and the 
 latter appealed to the United States government for 
 protection, ofifering in return to transfer to it the " do- 
 minion and sovereignty of the peninsula." Similar 
 appeals upon the same conditions were made to Great 
 Britain and Spain. President Polk, in a special mes- 
 sage to Congress, said : " Whilst it is not my purpose 
 to recommend the adoption of any measure with a 
 view to the acquisition of the ' dominion and sover- 
 eignty' over Yucatan, yet, according to our estab- 
 lished policy, we could not consent to a transfer of 
 this ' dominion and sovereignty ' either to Spain, Great 
 Britain, or any other European power. In the lan- 
 guage of President Monroe in his message of Decem- 
 ber, 1823: 'We should consider any attempt on their 
 part to extend their system to any portion of this 
 hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.' " ' 
 
 ■■ Foreign Relations, 1870, pp. 254-260. 
 
 ° Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. IV, p. 581. 
 
PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 269 
 
 This presentation of the case was not only a reaffir- 
 mation but also an extension of both clauses of Mon- 
 roe's declaration. In the colonization clause President 
 Monroe had had in mind the acquisition of unoccu- 
 pied territory, while in the one against intervention 
 in American states he had meant forcible intervention, 
 or " any interposition for the purpose of oppressing 
 them, or controlling in any other manner their des- 
 tiny." But according to President Polk an American 
 state could not be allowed voluntarily and of its own 
 free will to offer its sovereignty and dominion to a 
 European power. Fortunately the whites and Indians 
 of Yucatan made peace before the question went much 
 further. 
 
 One of the most interesting episodes in the history oi 
 this affair was Calhoun's speech in the Senate on the 
 Monroe Doctrine, he having been a member of Presi- 
 dent Monroe's cabinet at the time the message was 
 written. He went fully into the circumstances under 
 which the - declarations of President Monroe were 
 framed — the combination of European powers and the 
 dangers that threatened America. " They were decla- 
 rations — nothing more; declarations announcing in a 
 friendly manner to the powers of the world that we 
 should regard certain acts of interposition of the allied 
 powers as dangerous to our peace and safety; interpo- 
 sition of European powers to oppress the republics 
 which had just arisen upon this continent, as mani- 
 festing an unfriendly disposition, and that this conti- 
 nent, having become free and independent, was no 
 longer the subject of colonization by European pow- 
 ers. Not one word in any one of them in reference 
 to resistance. There is nothing said of it, and with 
 
270 PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 great propriety was it omitted. . . .' Whether you will 
 resist or not, and the measure of your resistance — 
 whether it shall be by negotiation, remonstrance, or 
 some intermediate measure, or by a resort to arms — 
 all this must be determined and decided on the merits 
 of the question itself. This is the only wise course. 
 We are not to have quoted on us, on every occasion, 
 general declarations to which any and every meaning 
 may be attached. There are cases of interposition 
 where I would resort to the hazard of war with all its 
 calamities. Am I asked for one? I will answer. I 
 designate the case of Cuba."" like all other state- 
 ments made in the heat of debate, this was of an ex 
 parte nature and should be received with due meas- 
 ure of allowance. In spite, however, of Calhoun's 
 disparagement of the doctrine as such, he admitted 
 the principle when he acknowledged that we would 
 consider the extension of European influence on this 
 continent as dangerous in certain cases and would be 
 justified in going the full length to check it. 
 
 President Polk's interpretation of the Monroe Doc- 
 trine was not put into actual force by him and at no 
 other time has the executive assumed such a position. 
 The nearest approach to it was a mild protest in 1882 
 against the contemplated cession of territory by Uru- 
 guay to Brazil in payment of debt. The United States 
 has never questioned the right of the Brazilians to es- 
 tablish and maintain an empire on this continent; but 
 in regard to the extension of Brazilian imperial influ- 
 ence, Mr. Frelinghuysen declared : " While the 
 United States wish not to encourage any nation in 
 making default in the payment of its debts, this gov- 
 
 " Wharton's Digest, Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 286. 
 
PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 27I 
 
 ernment would be reluctant to see a republic which has 
 a large bonded debt so hand over its territory to a 
 monarchy that the government of the same would 
 cease to be republican." ' Brazil is no longer an em- 
 pire, so complications of this kind will not occur in 
 the future. 
 
 Not only has the United States opposed the acqui- 
 sition of territory and political power on the part of 
 European powers in America, but even the reference 
 of purely American questions to European arbitration. 
 That "American questions are for American decis- 
 ion " is now a well-established rule of American di- 
 plomacy. It was on this ground that the United 
 States in the war between Chile and Peru refused to 
 enter into negotiations with Great Britain and France, 
 in 1881, for the purpose of joint intervention for the 
 restoration of peace.' 
 
 Where the question at issue is between a European 
 and an American power, the United States has usually 
 tendered its good offices but it countenances arbitra- 
 tion by a European power.' In such questions the 
 United States has repeatedly taken the initiative in 
 invoking the good offices of European powers in favor 
 of conciliation." 
 
 In a dispute between an American and a European 
 state the United States recognizes the right of the lat- 
 ter to wage war for all lawful ends and to determine 
 for itself what it considers a casus belli, but the war 
 
 ' Frelinghuysen to Osborn, July 22, 1882. Foreign Rela- 
 tions. 
 
 ' Blaine to Morton, Sept. S, 1881. 
 
 " See Venezuelan settlement, post. 
 
 " See Seward to Adams and to Dayton in Dipl. Corr., 1864, 
 in case of the war between Spain and Peru. 
 
272 PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 must not be converted into a war of conquest, such as 
 the expedition of Napoleon III. against Mexico. 
 
 The United States has upon more than one occasion 
 opposed the enforcement of what it considered an un- 
 just claim against an American republic. In this con- 
 nection the Pelletier claim against Hayti is especially 
 in point. Secretary Bayard resisted the enforcement 
 of this. claim in the most emphatic language. He said: 
 " The United States has proclaimed herself the pro- 
 tector of this western world, in which she is by far the 
 stronger power, from the intrusion of European sov- 
 ereignties. She can point with proud satisfaction to 
 the fact that over and over again has she declared 
 effectively that serious indeed would be the conse- 
 quences if European hostile foot should, without just 
 cause, tread those states in the new world which have 
 emancipated themselves from European control. She 
 has announced that she would cherish as it becomes 
 her the territorial rights of the feeblest of those states, 
 regarding them not merely as in the eye of the law 
 equal to even the greatest of nationalities, but in view 
 of her distinctive policy as entitled to be regarded by 
 her, as the objects of a peculiarly gracious care." 
 This utterance of Mr. Bayard was quoted at length by 
 Mr. Olney in his celebrated dispatch to Lord Salis- 
 bury of July 20, 1895. 
 
 The policy of the United States in reference to ar- 
 bitration of American questions may be summed up 
 as follows: 
 
 1. The United States always urges arbitration of 
 disputes affecting American interests. 
 
 2. In disputes between American states it insists that 
 they be settled without calling in the aid of European 
 powers. 
 
PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 273 
 
 3. In disputes Jbetween an American and a Euro- 
 pean state the United States usually offers its good 
 offices, but countenances and even encourages refer- 
 ence to a tribunal of arbitration either American or 
 European. The United States has even gone so 
 far as to force arbitration on a European power, which 
 refused to adjust its differences with an American state 
 except on its own terms. This was the course adopted 
 by President Cleveland in the celebrated Venezuelan 
 boundary dispute. 
 
 The Venezuelan question called forth the most posi- 
 tive and far-reaching assertion of the Monroe Doc- 
 trine ever made. The dispute between Great Britain 
 and Venezuela in regard to the boundary line between 
 the latter and British Guiana was of long standing. 
 In 1814, by treaty with the Netherlands, Great Bri- 
 tain acquired "the establishments of Demerara, Es- 
 sequibo, and Berbice," now known as British Guiana. 
 From that time on the boundary line between British 
 Guiana and Venezuela was a matter of dispute. Ven- 
 ezuela always claimed the line of the Essequibo river. 
 
 In 1840, Sir Robert Schomburgk, acting under the 
 instructions of the British government, established a 
 line some distance to the west of the Essequibo river 
 and marked it by monuments on the face of the 
 country. Venezuela at once protested. The British 
 government explained that the line was only tentative 
 and the monuments set up by Schomburgk were re- 
 moved. 
 
 Various other lines were from time to time claimed 
 
 by Great Britain, each one extending the frontier of 
 
 British Guiana farther and farther to the west. The 
 
 British Colonial Office List, a government publication, 
 
 18 
 
274 PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 in the issue for 1885, put the area of British Guiana 
 at about 76,000 square miles. In the issue of the same 
 list for 1886 the same statement occurs in reference to 
 British Guiana with the change of area to " about 
 109,000 square miles." Here was a gain of 33,000 
 square miles without any statement whatever in expla- 
 nation of how this additional territory had been ac- 
 quired. 
 
 After the failure of repeated eflforts on the part of 
 Venezuela to secure an adjustment with England, she 
 finally came to the conclusion in 1882 that the only 
 course open to her was arbitration of the controversy. 
 She persistently urged arbitration, but Great Britain 
 refused to submit to arbitration any but a compara- 
 tively small part of the territory in dispute. 
 
 In 1887 Venezuela suspended diplomatic relations 
 with Great Britain, protesting " before her British 
 majesty's government, before all civilized nations and 
 before the world in general, against the acts of spolia- 
 tion committed to her detriment by the government of 
 Great Britain, which she at no time and on no account 
 will recognize as capable of altering in the least the 
 rights which she has inherited from Spain and re- 
 specting which she will ever be willing to submit to 
 the decision of a third power." 
 
 After repeated efforts to promote the re-establish- 
 ment of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and 
 Great Britain and after repeated offers of its good of- 
 fices for the purpose of bringing about an adjustment 
 of the controversy, the United States government 
 finally determined to intervene in a more positive man- 
 ner with a view to forcing, if need be, a settlement of 
 the controversy. This resolution on the part of the 
 
PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 2/5 
 
 American government and a full statement of its 
 views on the general principles involved in the dis- 
 pute were forwarded to Mr. Bayard for transmission 
 to the British government in Mr. Olney's dispatch of 
 July 20, 189s" After reviewing the history of the 
 controversy Mr. Olney stated in the following concise 
 form what he considered the important features of the 
 situation as it then existed: 
 
 1. "The title to territory of indefinite but confess- 
 edly very large extent is in dispute between Great 
 Britain on the one hand and the South American re- 
 public of Venezuela on the other. 
 
 2. " The disparity in the strength of the claimants 
 is such that Venezuela can hope to establish her claim 
 only through peaceful methods — ^through an agree- 
 ment with her adversary either upon the subject itself 
 or upon an arbitration. 
 
 3. " The controversy, with varying claims on the 
 part of Great Britain, has existed for more than half 
 a century, during which period many earnest and per- 
 sistent efforts of Venezuela to establish a boundary by 
 agreement have proved unsuccessful. 
 
 4. " The futility of the endeavor to obtain a con- 
 ventional line being recognized, Venezuela for a quar- 
 ter of a century has asked and striven for arbitration. 
 
 5. " Great Britain, however, has always and continu- 
 ously refused to arbitrate, except upon the condition 
 of a renunciation of a large part of the Venezuela claim 
 and of a concession to herself of a large share of the 
 territory in controversy. 
 
 6. " By the frequent interposition of its good offices 
 at the instance of Venezuela, by constantly urging and 
 
 " For. Rel., 1895-96, Part I, p. 552. 
 
2/6 PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 promoting the restoration of diplom^c relations be- 
 tween the two countries, by pressing for arbitration of 
 the disputed boundary, by offering to act as arbitrator, 
 by expressing its grave concern whenever new alleged 
 instances of British aggression upon Venezuelan ter- 
 ritory have been brought to its notice, the govern- 
 ment of the United States has made it clear to Great 
 Britain and to the world that the controversy is one 
 in which both its honor and its interests are involved 
 and the continuance of which it cannot regard with 
 indifference." 
 
 The greater part of the dispatch was taken up with 
 a discussion of the bearing of the Monroe Doctrine 
 upon the case and the most striking feature of it was 
 that the Monroe Doctrine was appealed to by name. 
 Mr. Olney's statement of the Monroe Doctrine is 
 worthy of the most careful consideration as it is the 
 fullest and most definite official construction of its 
 meaning and scope that has been given to the world. 
 He said : " That America is in no part open to colo- 
 nization, though the proposition was not universally 
 admitted at the time of its first enunciation, has long 
 been universally conceded. We are now concerned, 
 therefore, only with that other practical application of 
 the Monroe Doctrine the disregard of which by an 
 European power is to be deemed an act of unfriendli- 
 ness towards the United States. The precise scope 
 and limitations of this rule cannot be too clearly ap- 
 prehended. It does not establish any general pro- 
 tectorate by the United States over other American 
 states. It does not relieve any American state from 
 its obligations as fixed by international law, nor pre- 
 vent any European power directly interested from en- 
 
PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 277 
 
 forcing such obligations or from inflicting merited 
 punishment for the breach of them. It does not con- 
 template any interference in the internal affairs of 
 any American state or in the relations between it and 
 other American states. It does not justify any attempt 
 on our part to change the established form of govern- 
 ment of any American state or to prevent the people 
 of such state from altering that form according to their 
 own will and pleasure. The rule in question has but 
 a single purpose and object. It is that no European 
 power or combination of European powers shall for- 
 cibly deprive an American state of the right and power 
 of self-government and of shaping for itself its own 
 political fortunes and destinies." 
 
 Lord Salisbury's reply to Mr. Olney was given in 
 two dispatches of the same date, November 26, 1895, 
 the one devoted to a discussion of the Monroe Doc- 
 trine, the other to a discussion of the rights of the 
 controversy as between Great Britain and Venezuela. 
 In the first dispatch Lord Salisbury argues that Mr. 
 Olney's views go far beyond the scope of the Monroe 
 Doctrine. That no attempt at colonization was being 
 made and that no political system was being imposed 
 upon any state of South America. He then denies 
 that the Monroe Doctrine is a part of international ; 
 law, on the ground that it has not received the consent ! 
 of other nations, and he utterly repudiates Mr. Olney's ' 
 principle that " American questions are for American i 
 discussion." 
 
 In the second dispatch of the same date Lord Salis- 
 bury enters fully into the rights of the controversy be- 
 tween Great Britain and Venezuela, controverting the 
 arguments of the earlier part of Mr. Olney's dispatch, 
 which he characterizes as ex parte. 
 
278 PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 In view of the very positive charactep of Mr. Olney's 
 dispatch and of the assertion that the honor and inter- 
 ests of the United States were concerned, th.e refusal 
 of Great Britain to arbitrate placed the relations of the 
 two countries in a very critical position. The Ameri- 
 can executive, however, had intervened for the pur- 
 pose of settling the controversy, peaceably if possible, 
 forcibly if need be, and President Cleveland did not 
 now shrink from the logic of events. In a message to 
 Congress, December 17, 1895," he laid before that 
 body Mr. Olney's dispatch of July 20, together with 
 Lord Salisbury's reply. He not only reaffirmed the 
 soundness of the Monroe Doctrine and its application 
 to the case in question, but claimed for that principle 
 of American diplomacy a place in the code of interna- 
 tional law. 
 
 In regard to the applicability of the Monroe Doc- 
 trine to the Venezuelan boundary dispute Mr. Cleve- 
 land declared: 
 
 " If a European power by an extension of its boun- 
 daries takes possession of the territory of one of our 
 neighboring republics against its will and in deroga- 
 tion of its rights, it is difificult to see why to that extent 
 such European power does not thereby attempt to ex- 
 tend its system of government to that portion of this 
 continent which is thus taken. This is the precise 
 action which President Monroe declared to be ' dan- 
 gerous to our peace and safety,' and it can make no 
 difference whether the European system is extended 
 by an advance of frontier or otherwise." 
 
 In regard to the right of the United States to de- 
 
 ^ Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. IX, p. 655. 
 
PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 279 
 
 mand the obsejjvance of this principle by other nations, 
 Mr. Cleveland said: 
 
 " Practically the principle for which we contend has 
 peculiar, if not exclusive, relation to the United States. 
 It may not have been admitted in so many words to 
 the code of international law, but since in interna- 
 tional councils every nation is entitled to the rights 
 belonging to it, if the enforcement of the Monroe Doc- 
 trine is something we may justly claim, it has its place 
 in the code of international law as certainly and as 
 securely as if it were specifically mentioned; and when 
 the United States is a suitor before the high tribunal 
 that administers international law the question to be 
 determined is whether or not we present claims which 
 the justice of that code of law can find to be right and 
 valid. The Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in 
 those principles of international law which are based 
 upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights 
 protected and its just claims enforced." 
 
 Mr. Cleveland concluded that the dispute had reach- 
 ed such a stage as to make it incumbent upon the 
 United States to take measures to determine with suf- 
 ficient certainty for its justification what was the true 
 divisional line between the republic of Venezuela and 
 British Guiana. He therefore recommended that 
 Congress make an appropriation for the expenses of a 
 commission, to be appointed by the executive, which 
 should make the necessary investigations and report 
 upon the matter with the least possible delay. " When 
 such report is made and accepted," he continued, " it 
 will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States 
 to resist by every means in its power, as a willful ag- 
 gression upon its rights and interests, the appropria- 
 
28o PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 tion by Great Britain of any lands or^the exercise of 
 governmental jurisdiction over any territory which 
 after investigation we have determined of right belongs 
 to Venezuela." " In making these recommendations," 
 he added, " I am fully alive to the responsibility incur- 
 red and keenly realize all the consequences that may 
 follow." 
 
 The publication of this message and the accompa- 
 nying dispatches created the greatest excitement both 
 in the United States and in England, and called forth 
 the severest criticism of the President's course. 
 
 The main grounds of this criticism were the con- 
 tentions : 
 
 (i) That the Monroe Doctrine was not a part of in- 
 ternational law and therefore its observance as such 
 could not be urged upon other nations. 
 
 (2) That it was not even an established principle of 
 American diplomacy, since the original declaration 
 was merely a protest against apprehended aggression 
 on the part of a combination of European powers 
 which had long since ceased to threaten this continent. 
 
 (3) That even granting that the Monroe Doctrine 
 were a declaration of American policy, it was merely 
 a policy and imposed no obligation on the government 
 to enforce it except where our interests were directly 
 concerned. 
 
 (4) That the occupation of a few thousand acres of 
 uninhabited territory by Great Britain, even if it did 
 rightfully belong to Venezuela, was not a matter that 
 affected the interests of the United States one way or 
 the other or that threatened the permanence or stabil- 
 ity of American institutions. 
 
 (5) That granting the wisdom and correctness of 
 
PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 281 
 
 the President's position, the language of his message 
 and of Mr. Olney's dispatch was indiscreet at best and 
 unnecessarily offensive to British pride. 
 
 It may be well to consider these objections in de- 
 tail. In regard to the first point it may be said that 
 neither President Cleveland nor Mr. Olney asserted 
 or maintained that the Monroe Doctrine was a part 
 of international law by virtue of its assertion by Presi- 
 dent Monroe and succeeding presidents. The position 
 they took was that the Monroe doctrine was an Ameri- 
 can statement of a well-recognized principle of inter- 
 national law, viz., the right of a state to intervene in a 
 controversy between other states, when it deems its 
 own interests threatened. Mr. Cleveland declared: 
 " The Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those 
 principles of international law which are based upon 
 the theory that every nation shall have its rights pro- 
 tected and its just claims enforced." 
 
 Mr. Olney's analysis of the doctrine was clearer and 
 more specific. He said: "That there are circum- 
 stances under which a nation may justly intervene in 
 a controversy to which two or more other nations are 
 the direct and immediate parties is an admitted canon 
 of international law." After discussing the general 
 principle of intervention, he adds: "We are con- 
 cerned at this time, however, not so much with the 
 general rule as with a form of it which is peculiarly 
 and distinctively American."" 
 
 In answer to the second objection it is only neces- 
 sary to refer to accepted works on public law and to 
 the official correspondence of the state department to 
 show that the Monroe Doctrine has for three quarters 
 
 " Olney to Bayard, July 20, 1895. 
 
282 PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 of a century been the cardinal principle of American 
 diplomacy." 
 
 The third point, namely as to the expediency of en- 
 forcing the Monroe Doctrine in all cases of European 
 aggression on this continent, raises an important ques- 
 tion. If, however, the Monroe Doctrine is a wise 
 principle and one which it is our interest to maintain, 
 it is right that it should be asserted on every occasion 
 of its violation. The force of precedent is so great 
 that in the present state of international law, it would 
 be dangerous to do otherwise. 
 
 In the fourth place while it was perfectly true that 
 the occupation of the disputed territory by Great Bri- 
 tain could not in itself conceivably endanger the peace 
 and integrity of the United States, yet as the open 
 violation of a principle upon which we have laid so 
 much stress we could not in honor and dignity have 
 overlooked it. 
 
 As to the tone of Mr. Olney's dispatch and of Mr. 
 Cleveland's message, it must be acknowledged that 
 while the positions assumed were in the main correct, 
 the language was in some cases unfortunate, either 
 from its vagueness or generalization. Thus Mr. Ol- 
 ney's statement, that " 3000 miles of intervening ocean 
 make any permanent political union between a Euro- 
 pean and an American state unnatural and inexpe- 
 dient," — whatever he may have meant by it — appears 
 
 " See in particular Wharton's Digest, Sec. 57 ff. ; also 
 Mr. Fish's Report on Relations with the Spanish-American 
 Republics, July 14, 1870, and Mr. Frelinghuysen's dispatch 
 to Mr. Lowell of May 8, 1882 (found on pp. 305 and 150 re- 
 spectively of the Collected Correspondence rel. to the Pro- 
 posed Canal, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the Monroe 
 Doctrine). 
 
PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 283 
 
 in view of Great Britain's connection with Canada, to 
 have been both untrue and calculated to give offence. 
 Likewise Mr. Cleveland's reference to " the high 
 tribunal that administers international law" was too 
 rhetorical a figure for a state paper. 
 
 It has, indeed, been suggested that President Cleve- 
 land and Mr. Olney deliberately undertook to play a 
 bluff game in order to browbeat the British govern- 
 ment. In any case, it should be remembered that the 
 test of a diplomatic move is its success, and judged 
 from this standpoint Mr. Cleveland's Venezuelan pol- 
 icy has been vindicated by the results. The British 
 government at once adopted the most friendly atti- 
 tude and placed valuable information in its archives 
 at the disposal of the commissioners appointed by 
 President Cleveland to determine the true boundary 
 line. On the 12th of November, 1896, before the final 
 report of this commission was made, a complete accord 
 was reached between Great Britain and the United 
 States by which the terms of a treaty to be ratified by 
 Great Britain and Venezuela were agreed on, the pro- 
 visions of which embraced a full arbitration of the 
 whole controversy. 
 
 This proposed treaty provided that an arbitral tri- 
 bunal should be immediately appointed to determine 
 the true boundary line between Venezuela and British 
 Guiana. This tribunal was to consist of two members 
 nominated by the judges of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States and two members nominated by the 
 British Supreme Court of Justice and of a fifth selected 
 by the four persons so nominated, or in the event of 
 their failure to agree within three months of their ap- 
 pointment, selected by the king of Sweden and Nor- 
 
284 PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 way. The person so selected was tabe president of 
 the tribunal, and it was expressly stipulated that the 
 persons nominated by the Supreme Courts of the 
 United States and England respectively might be mem- 
 bers of said courts. Certain general rules were also 
 laid down for the guidance of the tribunal.'' 
 
 A treaty embodying substantially these proposals 
 was signed by the British and Venezuelan representa- 
 tives at Washington, February 2, 1897." 
 
 The establishment of President Cleveland's conten- 
 tion in the face of British opposition constitutes a pre- 
 cedent, the weight of which will doubtless prove de- 
 cisive in the future. A large part of the criticism 
 which the Venezuelan policy called forth in the United 
 States was merely the effervescence of narrow par- 
 tisanship. The present administration has taken its 
 stand unequivocally on the Monroe Doctrine. Our 
 participation with the powers of Europe in the de- 
 liberations of the recent Peace Conference at The 
 Hague was taken by many Americans to mark the 
 end of the old order and the introduction of a new 
 era in American diplomacy, but contrary to their 
 expectations, this meeting was made the occasion for 
 the most emphatic and effective declaration of our 
 adherence to the principles of both the Farewell Ad- 
 dress and of the Monroe Doctrine that has ever been 
 made to the whole body of European nations. Before 
 
 " Foreign Relations, 1896, p. 254. 
 
 ^° Tlie decision of the Venezuelan Tribunal which met at Paris 
 appears to be in the nature of a compromise. Venezuela's 
 claim was not fully established. This fact is of very secon- 
 dary importance. The principle for which the United States 
 contended was vindicated when the arbitration treaty was 
 signed. 
 
PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 285 
 
 the treaty was adopted, the following declaration on 
 the part of the commissioners of the United States 
 was read by the secretary of the conference, and the 
 treaty was signed by the American delegation under 
 the express reservation of this declaration: " Nothing 
 contained in this convention shall be so construed as 
 to require the United States of America to depart 
 from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, in- 
 terfering with, or entangling itself in the political ques- 
 tions or internal administration of any foreign 
 state; nor shall anything contained in the said con- 
 vention be so construed as to require the relinquish- 
 ment by the United States of America of its traditional 
 attitude toward purely American questions." " 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine properly interpreted, namely, 
 as a declaration against the interference of European 
 powers in the political concerns of the independent 
 states of this continent, has received the almost unani- 
 mous sanction of American statesmen of all shades 
 of political belief for the past three-quarters of a 
 century. Numerous cases have arisen, it is true, 
 where there was a wide divergence of opinion as to 
 whether this principle was really involved. But that 
 this principle, whether it be regarded as a part of in- 
 ternational law or as a mere declaration of policy, 
 was founded in wisdom and prudence, and is still the 
 safest guide in our relations with Europe, will hardly 
 be gainsaid. 
 
 The acquisition of the Philippines and the prospect 
 of their permanent retention by the United States have 
 
 "See President McKinley's Message of December s, 1899. 
 Also article by Frederick W. Holls on The Peace Conference 
 and the Monroe Doctrine in the American Monthly Review of 
 Reviews for Nov., iSpp. 
 
286 PRESENT STATUS OF MONRaE DOCTRINE 
 
 raised questions of deep significanc&-as to the effect 
 of this expansion movement upon our historic policy 
 of political isolation. The Monroe Doctrine has been 
 dragged to the front in this controversy and placed 
 as a bulwark against expansion in the Pacific. It 
 should be remembered, however, that the Monroe 
 Doctrine is only one side of our traditional policy of 
 isolation. Our national policy has from the days of 
 Washington and Jefferson been one of aloofness. We 
 have succeeded in a remarkable degree in keeping 
 ourselves free from entangling alliances. This policy 
 has characterized our dealings not only with European 
 but even with American nations. We have acknowl- 
 edged no obligations in international relations but the 
 established principles of international law and the 
 dictates of a common humanity. " Friendly relations 
 with all nations, entangling alliances with none " has 
 been the key-note of our diplomacy. It will be readily 
 seen that this principle is wholly different from that 
 enunciated by President Monroe. The one laid down 
 in Washington's Farewell Address, imposes a wise 
 restraint on ourselves, the other imposes a restraint 
 on the action of European powers in regard to 
 America. As Mr. Olney has stated with his char- 
 acteristic clearness and precision, the Monroe Doc- 
 trine is the logical outcome of the Farewell Address. 
 " American non-intervention in Europe implied 
 European non-intervention in America." Both prin- 
 ciples were protests against intervention in the domes- 
 tic concerns of independent states and both principles 
 were limited in their application to the relations be- 
 tween the states of Europe on the one hand and the 
 states of America on the other. Further than this, 
 
PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 287 
 
 the reason and iustification for this separation of the 
 political spheres of Europe and America were to be 
 found in the recent dissolution of the ties that had 
 from their birth held the American communities in an 
 unequal bond with the states of the old world. Full 
 emancipation meant the absolute severance of all 
 political ties with Europe. On no other conditions 
 could an independent political development have been 
 insured. 
 
 These principles founded in the wisdom of our early- 
 statesmen and established by the experience of suc- 
 ceeding generations seem at last to have been acqui- 
 esced in by the European powers themselves. From 
 the standpoint of political expediency it seems unlikely 
 that they will be seriously combated in the future. 
 The principle of nationality has received a wonderful 
 impetus during the present century and especially 
 during the last half. The national state with its 
 ethnic and territorial unities has become too firmly 
 established as the normal form of political organiza- 
 tion to be seriously endangered by military conquest 
 from without. Interference in the internal affairs of 
 one state by other states, such as was common during 
 the early years of this century, is now almost out of the 
 question. Intervention in civilized states merely for 
 purposes of conquest, or in the interests of a political 
 system, would hardly be countenanced by the great 
 powers of the present. 
 
 With the uncivilized portions of the earth the case 
 is altogether different. There, intervention is still the 
 order of the day. The activities of the great nations 
 of the world in matters affecting their foreign rela- 
 tions have largely been transferred from the domestic 
 to the colonial field. The recent opening up of the 
 
288 PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 "East has discovered a new sphere of noHtical activity. 
 The colonial development of European powers during 
 the past twenty-five years is one of the most remark- 
 able movements of modern times. About half the 
 earth's surface is now held in protectorate by the 
 civilized nations. The great powers of the earth have 
 taken up the burden of civilizing and enlightening the 
 non-progressive races, and the United States has not 
 resisted the most widely extended movement of the 
 age. That this so-called policy of expansion is radical 
 and novel for us will not be seriously denied. That 
 it is attended with more than ordinary danger will be 
 admitted even by its most enthusiastic supporters. 
 As to the character of that danger, opinions will be 
 found to differ. Those who are best able to form 
 an opinion seem to agree that the greatest danger 
 will come not from entanglements with other nations, 
 but from the reaction upon our domestic institutions 
 due to the adoption in the field of colonial government 
 of the principle that government rests on force rather 
 than on the consent of the governed. This appre- 
 hension may or may not be real. Time alone will 
 prove. 
 
 It is readily conceivable that the permanent occupa- 
 tion of the Philippines may force us, from time to 
 time, into temporary alliances with one or more pow- 
 ers of Europe, and thus cause a break from our tra- 
 ditional policy, but that the new policy upon which we 
 have entered will lead to a disturbance of the existing 
 principle which governs the political relations of 
 Europe and America in their domestic spheres does 
 not by any means follow. There seems a marked ten- 
 dency already on the part of the powers of Europe to 
 differentiate colonial questions from the questions 
 
PRESENT STATUS OF MONROE DOCTRINE 289 
 
 which more intimately concern domestic politics. That 
 we will be compelled to take a hand in the politics of 
 the East seems probable, and the wisdom of placing 
 ourselves in such a position may very well be ques- 
 tioned, but that this will give us a right to interfere in 
 the domestic concerns of any European state, or give 
 any European state a pretext for interfering in the 
 domestic concerns of any state on this continent can- 
 not logically be maintained. If we should interfere in, 
 or in any way be a party to a question concerning 
 the internal politics of Europe, we could not hope to 
 prevent the interference of Europe in America, but 
 now that the United States is in a position to make 
 her weight felt in the councils of the nations, it will be 
 to the interests of European powers to keep us out of 
 purely European disputes, just as it has been our 
 interest in the past to keep them out of purely Ameri- 
 can questions. It may be safely predicted that the 
 time will come when Europe will remind us of the 
 Monroe Doctrine and not we Europe. This proph- 
 ecy is foreshadowed in a recent utterance of the 
 British Prime Minister. Lord SaUsbury's own words 
 implied a full admission of the Monroe Doctrine. In 
 a public address he said: " For several years our rela- 
 tions with and cordial feelings toward our kinsmen 
 on the other side of the Atlantic have been constantly 
 growing, and though neither we interfere in the affairs 
 of their continent nor they interfere in the afifairs of 
 ours, we feel we can now always look for sympathy 
 and a fair hearing among those who share with us 
 so vast a mission for the advancement of mankind." " 
 
 " Baltimore Sun, Nov. 10, 1899. 
 J9 
 
INDEX 
 
 Adams, CharleB Francis, on interven- 
 tion in Mexico, 230, 237. 
 
 Adams, John Quincy, on Monroe Doc- 
 trine, 80; on acquisition of Cuba, 
 97. 
 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Congress of, 66, 67. 
 
 Amadeus, King of Spain, 152. 
 
 Amaru, Tupac, 12. 
 
 American citizens, rights in Cuba 
 violated, 138, 139; illegal execution 
 of, 112, 142, 163. 
 
 Amistad claims, 134-136. 
 
 Arbitration of American questions, 
 271-273. 
 
 Asiento, 18-20. 
 
 Bay Islands, 191, 194. 
 
 Belize, 191, 194. 
 
 Belligerent rights, 56, 149. 
 
 Bigelow, John, minister to France, 
 251, 254. 
 
 Black Warrior^ seizure of the, 120-123; 
 settlement of case, 132. 
 
 Blaine, James G., on interoceanic 
 canal, 203-208, 216. 
 
 Bolivar, Simon, character, 44; career 
 in Venezuela and Colombia, 45- 
 49; in Ecuador and Peru, 49-52. 
 
 Bonaparte, Louis Napoleon, interest in 
 Nicaragua Canal, 181; effort to 
 establish monarchy in Mexico, 235- 
 244; relations with Southern Con- 
 federacy, 251; decides to with- 
 draw troops from Mexico, 259. 
 
 Bonaparte, Napoleon, invasion of 
 Spain, 33-36. 
 
 Brazil, attitude of United States to- 
 ward empire of, 270. 
 
 British Honduras, 191, 194. 
 
 Buchanan, James, on purchase of 
 Cuba, 107; at Ostend Conference, 
 124; policy as President on Cuban 
 question, 133-135 ; on Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty, 190, 197, 198; on 
 British occupation of Greytown, 
 192. 
 
 Calhoun, John C, on Monroe Doc- 
 trine, 269. 
 
 Campbell, Louis D., minister to 
 Mexico, 262-264. 
 
 Canal, Central American, 176 et seq. ; 
 engineering difl3culties, 177-179 ; 
 diplomatic difficulties, 179-180; 
 United States control of, 201-211; 
 neutralization of, 211, 216-220. 
 
 Canning, George, on intervention of 
 Holy Alliance in America, 73-78; 
 on recognition of South American 
 republics, 86; on Cuban question, 
 93, 101. 
 
 Casa de Contratacion, 13. 
 
 Castlereagb, Lord, 66, 68. 
 
 Clay, Henry, on recognition of South 
 American republics, 57-61, 88; on 
 Cuban question, 101; on inter- 
 oceanic canal, 180. 
 
 Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 188, 189; con- 
 flicting interpretations of, 193-198; 
 efforts of United States to annul, 
 203-210; projected modifications of, 
 220. 
 
 Cleveland, Grover, Cuban policy, 174; 
 defends neutrality of Isthmus of 
 Panama, 185; on interoceanic 
 canal, 211; on British aggression 
 in Venezuela, 278-284. 
 
02 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Cochrane (Earl Dundonald), com- 
 mander of Chilian Navy, 40, 41. 
 
 Colombia, Republic of, established, 
 49; threatens to seize Cuba, 99. 
 
 Commerce, restrictions placed by 
 Spain upon, 12-18. 
 
 Confederate Government. See South- 
 ern Confederacy, 
 
 Confederate officers enter sei-vice of 
 Maximilian, 253. 
 
 Congress of Panama, 51, 102, 180. 
 
 Crampton-Webster proposals, 193. 
 
 Cuba, British or French acquisition 
 opposed by United States, 89-105; 
 schemes for annexation of, to 
 United States, 105-136; Ten Years' 
 War in, 136-174; mediation of 
 United States in, 140-143; inter- 
 vention of United States in, 163- 
 171; revolution of 1895-98, 174, 175. 
 
 Gushing, Caleb, minister to Spain, 
 160-170. 
 
 Dallas- Clarendon treaty, 195. 
 
 Dayton, Wm. L., minister to France, 
 240. 
 
 De Lesseps, Ferdinand, 179, 201. 
 
 Derby, Lord, on Cuban question, 166, 
 168. 
 
 Dumouriez, C. F., 22; plan for inde- 
 pendence of Spanish America, 32, 
 33. 
 
 Emancipation of slaves in Spanish- 
 American Republics, 102. 
 
 England. See Great Britain, 
 
 Everett, Edward, on Cuban question, 
 115. 
 
 Expansion policy, 285-289. 
 
 Fair, the annual, at Porto Hello, 16. 
 
 Farewell Addre^ of Washington, 286. 
 
 Ferdinand VII, of Spain, 33-36. 
 
 Filibusters, 107-112. 
 
 Fiah, Hamilton, offers to mediate be- 
 tween Spain and Cuba, 140; pro- 
 poses intervention in Cuba, 163 ; 
 suppresses correspondence on 
 Cuba, 171; views on Monroe Doc- 
 trine, 267. 
 
 Florida treaty, 60, 61, 91. 
 
 Forsyth, John, on Cuban question, 94, 
 104. 
 
 Fi-ance, invasion of Spain, 70-73; de- 
 signs upon Cuba, 100; intervention 
 in Mexico, 221 et seq. 
 
 Fi-elinghuysen, F. T. , on Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty, 209-211; negotiates 
 treaty with Nicaragua, 211. 
 
 Galleons, annual voyage of, 15, 16. 
 
 Garfield, Jas. A., on interoceanic 
 canal, 203. 
 
 Grant, U. S., Cuban policy, 149, 150; 
 on Monroe Doctrine, 267. 
 
 Great Britain, secures monopoly of 
 slave trade in Spanish America, 
 18-20; countenances Miranda's 
 schemes, 21, 27, 28; attempts to 
 conquer provinces of the Plate, 
 29-32; policy on Spanish- American 
 Revolution, 61-79,^ 83-88; alleged 
 designs on Cuba, 91, 94, 96, 103, 
 104, 126; opposes intervention in 
 Cuba, 168, 169; negotiates Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty, 188; protectorate 
 over Mosquito Coast, 191; rejects 
 proposed modifications of Clayton- 
 Bulwer treaty, 205-211; intervenes 
 in Mosquito affairs, 212, 213 ; 
 policy on Suez Canal, 218, 219; 
 intervenes in Mexico, 224; dispute 
 with Venezuela, 273-283; cordial 
 relations with United States, 289. 
 
 Gwin, Wni. M., plan for colonizing 
 ex-Confederates in Mexico, 253. 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, relations with 
 Miranda, 21, 23-25. 
 
 Hayes, Rutherford B., on interoceanic 
 canal, 201. 
 
 Holy Alliance, treaty of the, 69. 
 
 India House, 13. 
 
 Indies, Council of the, 10. 
 
 Indies, laws of the, 10, 12. 
 
 Interoceanic canal. See Canal. 
 
 Intervention, growth of doctrine of, 
 in Europe, 65-70. 
 
 Iturbide, Augustin de, 53-55. 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, interview with 
 Miranda, 26; on Holy Alliance, 79; 
 on Cuban question, 90, 97, 98. 
 
INDEX 
 
 293 
 
 Juarez, Benito, President of Mexico, 
 222; recognized b/ United States, 
 223; suspends payment of interest 
 on foreign debt, 227. 
 
 Juntas, organization of revolutionary, 
 35. 
 
 King, RufuB, relations with Miranda, 
 23-26. 
 
 Lincoln, Abraham, on neutrality of 
 the Isthmus of Panama, 184. 
 
 Liverpool, Lord, on Holy Alliance, 66, 
 71. 
 
 Lopez, Narciso, Cuban patriot, 107-112. 
 
 London, Convention of, 231. 
 
 Louis Philippe, plan for revolution- 
 izing Spanish America, 32, 33. 
 
 Madison, James, on Holy Alliance, 79; 
 on Cuban question, 91. 
 
 Magruder, John B,, enters service of 
 Maximilian in Mexico, 253, 
 
 Maine, U. S. Steamship, blown up, 
 175, 
 
 Managua, treaty of, 212-214. 
 
 Marcy, W. L., on Cuban question, 
 117-132. 
 
 Mason, John Y., at Ostend Confer- 
 ence, 124. 
 
 Maury, Matthew F., enters service of 
 Maximilian in Mexico, 253. 
 
 Maximilian of Austria, suggested for 
 Mexican throne, 237 ; accepts 
 Mexican crown, 249 ; attempts to 
 secure recognition of United 
 States, 254 ; court-martial and 
 death, 263-265. 
 
 McLane, Robert M., minister to Mex- 
 ico, 223. 
 
 Mexico, revolts from Spain, 52-55; 
 threatens to seize Cuba, 99 ; in- 
 tervention of France in, 221 et 
 seq. 
 
 Miranda, Francesco de, plan for revo- 
 lutionizing Spanish America, 21- 
 29; tal^es part in Venezuelan revo- 
 lution, 45. 
 
 Motley, J, L., minister to Austria, 
 260. 
 
 Monroe, James, -»recognition of Span- 
 ish-American Republics, 59-61. 
 
 Monroe Doctrine, enunciation of, TO- 
 SS; application to Cuba, 101, 104, 
 115» 267; to Central American 
 Canal, 209; to French intervention 
 in Mexico, 251 et seq, ; to Yuca- 
 tan, 268-270; to Venezuela, 273 et 
 seq. ; effect of expansion on, 284- 
 289. 
 
 Moore, J. B., 131, 267. 
 
 Moses, Bernard, 14. 
 
 Mosquito Coast, 191, 212-214. 
 
 Neutralization of canals, 216-219. 
 
 New Granada, revolts from Spain, 46; 
 forms Republic of Colombia, 49, 
 52; treaty with United States on 
 canal, 182-185. 
 
 New Orleans, mob attacks Spanish 
 consulate, 112. 
 
 Nicaragua, treaty between United 
 States and, 200. 
 
 Nicaragua Canal. See Canal. 
 
 O'Higgins, Bernardo, Chilian patriot, 
 39. 
 
 Olney, Richard, on Venezuelan ques- 
 tion, 275-283. 
 
 Ostend Manifesto, 124-131. 
 
 Ouseley, Sir Wm., mission to Central 
 America, 195-198. 
 
 Panama Canal. See Canal. 
 
 Panama Railroad, 183. 
 
 Peace Conference at The Hague, 284. 
 
 Philippines, acquisition of, in rela- 
 tion to Monroe Doctrine, 285-289. 
 
 Pierce, Franklin, Cuban policy, 117- 
 132. 
 
 Pirates, Cuban, 93. 
 
 Polk, James K., on Monroe Doctrine, 
 268. 
 
 Porto Rico, Spanish reforms for, 
 145, 147. 
 
 Quitman, John A., relations with 
 Lopez, 108, 109. 
 
 Regency of Cadiz, 84. 
 
 Rush, Richard, minister to England, 
 conferences with Canning on 
 schemes of Holy Alliance, 73-77. 
 
 Russia, encroaches on northwest coast 
 of America, 79. 
 
294 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Salisbury, Lord, on Monroe Doctrine, 
 
 277, 289. 
 San Martin, Job6 de, takes part in 
 Argentine Revolution, 36-38; lib- 
 eration of Chile, 39-41; liberation 
 of Peru, 41-44; relations with 
 Bolivar, 50, 51. 
 Schenck, Robert 0., minister to Eng- 
 land, 164. 
 
 Seward, W. H., on emancipation of 
 slaves in Cuba, 144; on inter- 
 oceanic canal, 184; on expansion, 
 199 ; proposes to pay interest on 
 Mexican debt, 224; refuses to ac- 
 cede to convention of London, 233; 
 on French intervention in Mexico, 
 243, 245; demands withdrawal of 
 French troops from Mexico, 256. 
 
 Sickles, Daniel E., minister to Spain, 
 140-159. 
 
 Slave trade, 19, 20, 103. 
 
 Slavery, abolition of, in Cuba, urged 
 by United States, 140, 144, 145, 
 146, 157. 
 
 Slidell, John, report on purchase of 
 Cuba, 133; agent for Confederate 
 Government in Europe, 251. 
 
 Smuggling in Spanish colonies, 16-18. 
 
 Soledad, Convention of, 238. 
 
 Souie, Pierre, minister to Spain, 117- 
 132. 
 
 Southern Confederacy, relations with 
 Mexico, 246, 250. 
 
 Spain, colonial policy of, 10-20; in- 
 tervenes in Mexico, 224; see Cuba. 
 
 Spanish-American Revolution, 33-55. 
 
 Suez Canal, 218, 219. 
 
 United States, policy in regard to 
 Spanish-American Revolution, 56- 
 61; opposes intervention of Holy 
 Alliance in America, 73-83; op- 
 poses transfer of Cuba to England 
 or France, 89-105; desires annexa- 
 tion of Cuba, 105-136; offers to 
 mediate between Cuba and Spain, 
 140-143; intervention in Cuba, 163- 
 171, 174, 175; policy in regard to 
 interoceanic canal, 176 et seq. ; de- 
 clines to intervene in Mexico, 233- 
 235; protests against establish- 
 ment of Maximilian in Mexico, 
 247-255; demands withdrawal of 
 French troops from Mexico, 256- 
 259; arbitration of American ques- 
 tions, 271-273; opposes British ag- 
 gression in Venezuela, 274-284; 
 participates in Peace Conference 
 at The Hague, 284; policy of iso- 
 lation, 286; policy of expansion, 
 287-289. 
 
 Utrecht, treaty of, 18. 
 
 Venezuela, independence of, declared, 
 46; boundary dispute with Eng- 
 land, 273-284. 
 
 Verona, Congress of, 68-71. 
 
 Viceroy, office of, 10, 11. 
 
 Virginius, case of the, 153-159. 
 
 Walker, Wm., invades Central Amer- 
 ica, 197. 
 
 Webster, Daniel, on Cuban question, 
 104, 114. 
 
 Wellington, Duke of, at Verona, 68. 
 
 Whig policy on Cuban question, 107. 
 
 Wyke, Sir Charles, British representa- 
 tive in Mexico, 226, 227, 231, 241. 
 
 Yucatan, application of Monroe Doc- 
 trine to, 268,