■. - ■ 'liSSHBJBWtaWBVHs-jW— GJnrneU Haui ^rljnnl ICibraru, <$tft of NEVIN STETLER, ESQ. Cornell University Library KFP421.S21 The validity of statutes in Pennsylvania 3 1924 017 920 285 The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924017920285 THE Validity of Statutes IN Pennsylvania I. TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY II. ENACTMENTS BY KEFERENCE TO FORMER LEGISLATION III. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION BY JOHN F. SANDERSON Of the Allegheny Count)' Bar PHILADELPHIA T. & J. W. JOHNSON & CO. 1898 Copyright by T. & J. W. JOHNSON & CO. 1898. PREFATORY NOTE. The purpose of this work is not to expound the several constitutional provisions treated, but to show how our courts have expounded them. As a rule, the decisions of authority are the basis of the text, those of the lower courts of the notes. The decisions of the courts of other States upon similar pro- visions have been deemed irrelevant. So far as they agree with ours they are useless, and so far as they relate to unset- tled questions they exceed the purpose, are not themselves in harmony and their use would tend only to confuse. Where our own cases "do square and vary" there is no discussion nor attempt to reconcile them. They are usually grouped in such manner as to enable the learned reader to judge of their con- sistency, and thus the work is made suggestive, rather than critical or argumentative. It is recognized that the law upon the subjects treated is yet in a formative condition, and the effort has been to indicate the settled points, to exhibit the reasoning in the language of the cases, and to formulate the general principles without vainly attempting a final exposi- tion of their scope and application — a thing forbidden alike by the present state of the authorities and the nature of the subject-matter, Pittsburgh, Nov. ist, 1897. CONTENTS. PART I. TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY, PAGE i. The provision is mandatory. . . i 2. The title is part of the Act, 6 3. The purpose of the provision, . 10 4. The construction of the provision, 12 5. The scope of the Act is measured by the title, . 14 6. The subject must be clearly expressed, . . 16 7. Fair notice of the scope of the Act must be given, 19 8. The title must be in terms sufficiently specific, . 19 9. The title must not be inconsistent with the enact- ment, ... . .21 10. The title must indicate the effect of the Act in rela- tion to persons or matters not necessarily affected by the general legislative purpose, . 23 11. The subject must be single, ... 29 12. The Act may properly include matters germane to the subject expressed in the title, 34 13. Two subjects, .... 40 14. Original Acts and general supplements and amend- ments, . . 42 15. Original Acts and specific supplements and amend- ments, . . .47 16. Repeal and re-enactment, . 48 17. Provisos, exceptions, and exemptions, 52 18. Appropriation bills, ... -53 CONTENTS. PART II. ENACTMENTS BY REFERENCE TO FORMER LEGIS- LATION. PAGE i. The object of the provision, . . .61 2. The provision is mandatory, .... 62 3. It is not necessary to recite at length the pre-existing statute, or portions thereof, the provisions of which are revived, amended, extended, or conferred, . 62 4. Express amendments by way of addition must recite, in full, the provision to which the addition is made, 64 5. The provision does not apply to independent enact- ments, ....... 64 6. The provision does not apply to supplements, 65 7. The provision does not apply to repeals, . 67 8. The provision does not apply in case of revival of a pre-existing statute by reason of the repeal of a repealing Act, ..... 67 9. Independent enactments referring to pre-existing law, 68 10. The provision cannot be evaded by an expository statute, . . .... 83 n. Re-enactment of former statute by way of amend- ment, without regarding intervening repeal or amendment, ... . . 84 12. Making a local statute general where the local statute, enacted prior to 1874, extended the provis- ions of a pre-existing statute, . . 89 CONTENTS. VU PART III. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. CHAPTER I. General Principles. page 1. The constitutional provisions generally, . 95 2. What is meant by a special or local law, ... 98 3. The constitutional provisions are to be so construed as to prevent the mischief designed to be remedied by their adoption, ... . . 101 4. The provisions as to local and special legislation apply only to the General Assembly, . . . 107 5. A law is general which contains an exception render- ing it apparently special, if the exception be made pursuant to a special constitutional provision, . 109 6. A law is general though its operation may be im- peded by pre-existing special laws, and hence such laws may be saved by exception, . . .111 7. A law may be general as to a class of persons, and therefore valid, although special and local as to its subject-matter, . ..... 116 8. A general law may contain special provisions neces- sary to render it effective, . . . . 117 CONTENTS. CHAPTER II. Classification and Minor Topics. PAGE i. Classification generally, . . . . . .121 2. The principle of classification is not as a rule affected by the Constitution, . . . . . . 129 3. What is a proper classification is generally a judicial question, ... ... 13^ 4. There can be no classification of cities or counties save by population, . .... 130 5. Classification of cities, counties, or other subdivis- ions, must be complete in order to justify legisla- tion for a given class of either, .... 140 6. Classification must not be pretended, false, evasive, nor excessive, ...... 141 7. Classification by population must not work exclusion, but must be operative from time to time, so as by change of population the subject may pass from class to class, ... .14" 8. Transition from class to class, . . . 14S 9. Option under classification Acts, . .156 10. Option as related to local and special legisla- tion, . . . . . . 165 11. Legislation for cities by classes must be confined to municipal matters proper, . . 172 12. What are municipal matters proper and what are not, 203 13. Acts of Assembly void in part, . 214 14. Validity of things executed under invalid Acts of As- sembly, ... . . 216 15. Curative statutes, 22^ 16. Questions of repeal, . . 230 CONTENTS. CHAPTER III. Summary of Applications of the Foregoing Principles. PAGE i. Local affairs of political subdivisions of the State, 238 Preliminary, . . . . 238 1. Counties, . . . 241 2. Cities, . . . 249 3. Boroughs, . . . 256 4. Townships, . .... 257 5. School Districts, . . . 257 2. Highways, . . . . .261 3. Judicial matters, . . 262 4. Liens, . ... 267 5. Taxation, . . 269 6. Elections, 275 7. Private corporations, . . . 276 8. Cemeteries, etc., ...... 279 9. Labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing, . . . 279 10. Special privileges and immunities, . . 281 11. Partial repeal of a general law, ... . 283 12. Cases within general law or judicial jurisdiction, 283 13. Notice, . 284 A TABLE OF ACTS WITH CITATIONS. This table cites the Acts of Assembly directly involved in the cases referred to in the text and notes following. It is made up principally of those objected to upon constitutional grounds, and either sustained or held invalid in whole or in part. Many other Acts have been supplied by legislation or silently disregarded by the courts and the profession because plainly invalid within the principles declared by the decided cases. 1865, Feb. 4, P. L. 97 Streets Church Street, 54 Pa. St. 353 1865, Mar. 16, P. L. 394 Railways Philadelphia v. Spring Garden Co., 161 Pa. St. 522 1866, Oct. 31, P. L. 1867, p. 1527 Forest Co. Blood v. Mercelliott, 53 Pa. St. 391 1867, Apr. 12, P. L. 1 178 ' Liquors Hatfield v. Commonwealth, 120 Pa. St. 395 1867, Apr. 18, P. L. 91 Courts Commonwealth v. Green, 58 Pa. St. 226 1868, Mar. 3, P. L. 263 Oxford Oxford Borough Street, 2 P. D. R. 327 1868, Mar. 16, P L. 352 Boroughs in Chester Co. Nutt's Avenue, 2 Chester, 49 Phcenixville Road, 109 Pa. St. 44 1868, Mar. 23, P. L. 424 Fences Penna. R. R. v. Riblet, 66 Pa. St. 164 1868, Apr. 1, P. L. 583 Norristown Schall v. Norristown, 3 Luz. Leg. R. yy Schall v. Norristown, 6 Leg. Gaz. 167 1868, Apr. 8, P. L. 752 Liens Dorsey's Appeal, yz Pa. St. 192 1868, Apr. 23, P. L. 1022 Fences Penna. R. R. v. Riblet, 66 Pa. St. 164 1869, Mar. 18, P. L. 393 Streets Hancock Street, 1 W. N. C. 112 Xll TABLE OF ACTS. 1869, Mar. 24, P. L. 513 Liens Mauch Chunk v. McGee, 81 Pa. St. 433 1869, Apr. 9, P. L. 759 Liquors Commonwealth v. Franz, 135 Pa. St. 389 1869, Apr. 10, P. L. 828 Streets Hancock Street, 1 W. N. C. 112 1869, Apr. 15, P. L. 30 Evidence Yeager v. Weaver, 64 Pa. St. 425 1869, Apr. 15, P. L. 965 Streets McGee's Appeal, 1 14 Pa. St. 470 1869, May 3, P. L. 1870, p. 1441 Sewage Company City Sewage Company v. Davis, 8 Phila. 625 1870, Feb. 25, P. L. 241 Taxation Lehigh Iron Co. v. Lower Macungie Township 81 Pa. St. 482 1870, Apr. 5, P. L. 1871, p. 1484 Railroads State Line & Juniata R. R. Co.'s Appeal, yy Pa. St. 429 1870, Apr. 9, P. L. 1056 Sewage Company City Sewage Company v. Davis, 8 Phila. 625 1870, Apr. 9, P. L. 1068 Bottles Commonwealth v. Farley, 6 C. C. R. 433 1870, June 2, P. L. 13 18 Turnpikes, etc. Frederick v. Penna. Canal Co., 109 Pa. St. 50 1870, Aug. 5, P. L. 1871, p. 1548, Appx. Public Buildings Wheeler v. Rice, 83 Pa. St. 232 Lea v. Bumm, 3 W. N. C. 335 1 87 1, Jan. 2, P. L. 1556 Harrisburg State Street, 2 Leg. Chron. 1 1871, Feb. 8, P. L. 31 Coudersport Payne v. School District, 168 Pa. St. 386 1871, Mar. 22, P. L. 1873, p. 1955, Appx. Philadelphia Co. Carother's Appeal, 118 Pa. St. 468 1871, Apr. 25, P. L. 1 138 Allegheny County Allegheny Co. Home's Case, yy Pa. St. yy 1 87 1, May 9, P. L. 639 Boroughs Street in Royersford, 2 Montg. Co. 153 TABLE OF ACTS. Xlll 1871, May 10, P. L. 655 Troy Hill Road Beckert v. Allegheny, 85 Pa. St. 191 Dewhurst v. Allegheny, 95 Pa. St. 437 1871, May 24, P. L. 1096 Mount Joy, etc. Mt. Joy v. Lancaster Tpk., 13 Lane. Law Rev. 180 Mt. Joy v. Lancaster Tpk., 182 Pa. St. 581 1872, Mar. 8, P. L. 264 Railways Phila. v. Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry. Co., 142 Pa. St. 484 Phila. v. Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry. Co., 6 C. C. R. 283 Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Phila., 124 Pa. St. 219 Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Phila., 142 Pa. St. 484 Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Phila., 23 W.N. C. 324 1872, Mar. 9, P. L. 290 Railways Millvale v. Evergreen Ry. Co., 31 Pa. St. t 1872, Mar. 13, P. L. 339 Railroads Union Pass. Ry. Co.'s Appeal, 81* Pa. St. 91 1872, Mar. 16, P. L. 405 Cambria County Commonwealth v. Dillon, 17 C. C. R. 227 Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 2 Super. Ct. 6 1872, Mar. 29, P. L. 651 Roads Philadelphia v. Donahew, 5 Leg. Gaz. 22 Philadelphia v. Donahew, 1 Leg. Chron. 45 1872, Mar. 30, P. L. 679 Loyalsock Creek Rogers v. Mfrs. Improvement Co. 109 Pa. St. 109 1872, Apr. 1, P. L. 707 Roads Beckert v. Allegheny, 85 Pa. St. 191 Dewhurst v. Allegheny, 95 Pa. St. 437 1872, May 6, P. L. 1163 Streets Commonwealth v. Clovis, 33 Leg. Gaz. 53 Commonwealth v. Dickinson, 9 Phila. 561 1873, Jan. 28, P. L. 100 Carlisle Quinn v. Cumberland Co. 162 Pa. St. 55 1873, Mar. 14, P. L. 290 Private Act Commonwealth v. Henderson, 172 Pa. St. 135 Commonwealth v. Henderson, 37 W. N. C. 344 Commonwealth v. Henderson, 43 P. L. J. 207 XIV TABLE OF ACTS. 1873, Mar. 25, P. L. 330 Streets Commonwealth v. Dickinson, 1 W. N. C. 185 Commonwealth v. Clovis, 1 W. N. C. 185 1873, Mar. 25, P. L. 396 Arbitration Cutler v. Richley, 151 Pa. St. 195 1873, Mar. 27, P. L. 54 Danville Hospital Clearfield Co. v. Cameron Poor District, 135 Pa. St. 86 1873, Apr. 28, P. L. 860 Kilbuck Island Allegheny v. Moorhead, 80 Pa. St. 118 1873, May 24, P. L. 1874, p. 379, McKeesport McKeesport v. Owens 6 W. N. C. 492 1873, June 6, P. L. 1874, p. 407, Streets In re Arrott Street, 18 W. N. C. 121 1874, Apr. 20, P. L. 65 Municipal Debt Bruce v. Pittsburg, 166 Pa. St. 152 1874, May 6, P. L. 125 Fees Commonwealth v, Anderson, 178 Pa. St. 171 1874, May 14, P. L. 158 Taxation Sewickley Borough v. Sholes, 118 Pa. St. 165 1874, May 14, P. L. 159 Boroughs Commonwealth v. Dolphin, 2 C. P. Rep. 85 Commonwealth v. Morgan, 178 Pa. St. 198 Commonwealth v. Rynkiewicz, 178 Pa. St. 213 Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 178 Pa. St. 214 Commonwealth v. Taylor, 159 Pa. St. 451 Commonwealth v. Toomey, 178 Pa. St. 215 Commonwealth v. Van Loon, 4 Kulp, 338 Commonwealth v. Williams, 178 Pa. St. 211 1874, May 23, P. L. 230 Cities, Schools Wheeler v. Philadelphia, yy Pa. St. 338 Reading v. Savage, 120 Pa. St. 198 Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 266 Shoemaker v. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. St. 285 Berghaus v. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. St. 289 Klugh v. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. St. 289 Meadville v. Dickson, 129 Pa. St. 1 TABLE OF ACTS. XV 1874, May 23, P. L. 230 — Continued Reading v. Savage, 124 Pa. St. 328 Philadelphia v. Pepper, 181 Pa. St. 566 Philadelphia v. Pepper, 6 P. D. R. 617 Gaston v. Graham, 18 C. C. R. 265 Gaston v. Meadville, 5 P. D. R. 549 Baker v. McKee, 6 P. D. R. 599 Sixteenth Street, 4 C. C. R. 124 Van Storch v. Scranton, 3 C. C. R. 567 Van Storch v. Scranton, 3 C. C. R. 571 Hoopes v. Scranton, 1 Wilcox, 189 1875, Mar. 18, P. L. 15 Cities Scranton School District's Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 176 Commonwealth v. Halstead, 1 C. C. R. 335 Commonwealth v. Halstead, 2 C. P. Rep. 247 Commonwealth v. Halstead, 18 W. N. C. 385 1875, Mar. 18, P. L. 24 Married Women Loftus v. Bank, 133 Pa. St. 97 1875, Mar. 18, P. L. 62 Assessors Pittsburg's Assessors, 7 Leg. Gaz. 117 1875, Apr. 12, P. L. 40 Liquors Commonwealth v. Deibert, 12 C. C. R. 504 Commonwealth v. Deibert, 2 P. D. R. 446 1876, Mar. 31, P. L. 13 Salaries Taggartv. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. St. 354 Rymer v. Luzerne Co., 142 Pa. St. 108 Guldin v. Schuylkill Co., 149 Pa. St. 210 Commonwealth v. Comrey, 149 Pa. St. 216 1876, Apr. 11, P. L. 20 Cities Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 266 Shoemaker v. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. St. 285 Berghaus v. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. St. 289 Klugh v. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. St. 289 Meadville v. Dickson, 129 Pa. St. 1 1876, Apr. 17, P. L. 29 Summary Convictions Commonwealth v. Swift, 17 C. C. R. 95 Mauch Chunk v. Betzler, 19 C. C. R. 27 B XVI TABLE OF ACTS. 1876, Apr. 17, P. L. 29 — Continued Mauch Chunk v. Betzler, 10 York, 151 Mauch Chunk v. Betzler, 6 P. D. R. 330 1876; Apr. 20, P. L. 43 Appeals from Justices of Peace Foster v. Strayer, 19 C. C. R. 417 Foster v. Strayer, 13 Lane. L. R. 285 Foster v. Strayer, 6 P. D. R. 333 Cochran v. McKelvy, 25 P. L. J. 120 1876, Apr. 20, P. L. 44 Taxation Scranton v. Silkman, 113 Pa. St. 191 Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co.'s Appeal, 1 C. C. R. 327 1876, May 1, P. L. 90 Corporations York Telephone Co. v. Keesey, 9 York, 153 Telephone Co. v. Keesey, 5 P. D. R. 366 1876, May 1, P. L. 93 Barrett's Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 486 1876, May 4, P. L. 201 John Robinson School District v. Robinson, 37 Leg. Int. 94 Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. St. 125 1876, May 5, P. L. 124 Cities Bruce v. Pittsburg, 166 Pa. St. 152 Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Fricke, 152 Pa. St. 231 1876, May 5, P. L. 112 Bridges Myers v. Commonwealth, no Pa. St. 217 1876, May 8, P. L. 147 Street Railways Reeves v. Phila. Traction Co., 152 Pa. St. 153 Watkins v. Phila. Pass. Ry.. 152 Pa. St. 153 Haines v. Twenty-second St. Pass. Railway, 152 Pa. St. 153 Watkins v. West Phila. Pass. Ry. Co., 11 C. C. R. 648 Watkins v. West Phila. Pass. Ry. Co.. 1 P. D. R. 4*3 1876, May 8, P. L. 149 Poor Taxpayer's Petition, 26 P. L. J. 146 TABLE OF ACTS. xvl1 1876, May 15, P. L. 109 Bottles ; "J Commonwealth v. Farley, 6 C. C. R. 433 1877, Mar. 22, P. L. 16 Taxes Safe Deposit Co. v. Fricke, 152 Pa. St. 231 Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. St. 401 Commonwealth v. Macferron, 152 Pa. St. 244 McKay v. Trainor, 152 Pa. St. 242 Pittsburg v. Hughes, 13 C. C. R. 535 Bradley v. Pittsburg, 130 Pa. St. 475 1877, Mar. 24, P. L. 40 Poor Taxpayer's Petition, 26 P. L. J. 146 1877, Mar. 24, P. L. 47 Cities Commonwealth v. Denworth, 145 Pa. St. 172 1877, Apr. 7, P. L. 83 Scranton Ruth's Appeal, 10 W. N. C. 498 1877, Apr. 18, P. L. 54 Cemeteries Craig v. Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. St. 42 1877, May 23, P. L. 25 Fees Strine v. Foltz, 1 C. C. R. 490 Strine v. Foltz, 113 Pa. St. 349 1878, Apr. 18, P. L. 29 Courts Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. St. 258 1878, May 3, P. L. 43 Records Beaver Co. Indexes, 6 C. C. R. 525 Lanius' Petition, , 1 York, 221 1878, May 10, P. L. 51 Boroughs Commonwealth v. Morgan, 178 Pa. St. 198 Commonwealth v. Williams, 178 Pa. St. 211 Commonwealth v. Rynkiewicz, 178 Pa. St. 213 Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 178 Pa. St. 214 Commonwealth v. Toomey, 178 Pa. St. 215 Commonwealth v. Taylor, 1 59 Pa. St. 45 1 1878, May 23, P. L. in Street Railways Berks v. Lebanon Electric Ry., 5 C. C. R. 467 Seitz v. Lafayette Traction Co., 5 C. C. R. 469 1878, May 24, P. L. 133 Taxation Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry., 1 C. C. R. 327 XV111 TABLE OF ACTS. 1878, May 24, P.'L. 133 — Continued Scranton v. Silkman, 113 Pa. St. 191 Penna. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 3 C. C. R. 162 1878, May 24, P. L. 134 Executions Wilson v. Downing, 4 Super. Ct. 487 1878, May 25, P. L. 144 Milk Commonwealth v. Hough, 1 D. R. 51 1878, June 3, P. L. 160 Fish Commonwealth v. Nihil, 4 P. D. R. 582 1878, June 12, P. L. 187 Fees Morrison v. Bachert, 122 Pa. St. 322 1878, June 12, P. L. 196 Crime Commonwealth v. Fleckner, 17 C. C. R. 671 1878, June 12, P. L. 198 Dogs Bowen v. Tioga Co., 6 C. C. R. 613 1879, Mar. 19, P. L. 9 Street Railways Weinman v. Passenger Ry. Co., 1 18 Pa. St. 192 1879, Apr. 16, P. L. 24 Taxes Philadelphia v. Kates, 150 Pa. St. 30 1879, Apr. 22, P. L. 30 County Auditors Nason v. Poor Directors, 126 Pa. St. 445 Nason v. Poor Directors, 22 W. N. C. 60 1879, May 1, P. L. 44 Cities Commonwealth v. Denworth, 145 Pa. St. 172 1879, May 21, P. L. 72 Salaries Commonwealth v. Mercer, 9 C. C. R. 461 1879, June 4, P. L. 78 Poor Jenks v. Sheffield, 135 Pa. St. 400 1879, June 7, P. L. 112 Taxation Commonwealth v. Martin, 107 Pa. St. 185 1879, June 11, P. L. 126 Husband and Wife Kelly v. Mayberry, 154 Pa. St. 440 1879, June 11, P. L. 129 Fraudulent Debtors Hortsman v. Kaufman, 97 Pa. St. 147 1879, June 11, P. L. 150 Boroughs Pottstown Borough, 1 Montg. Co. 161 Pottstown Borough, 1 Montg. Co. 189 TABLE OF ACTS. XIX 1879, June 11, P. L. 150 — Continued Pottstown Borough, 4 Montg. Co. 29 Lansdale Borough, ' 1 Montg. Co. 192 1879, J une I2 » p - L. 174 Courts Scowden's Appeal 96 Pa. St. 422 1879, J une 2 §> P- L. 182 Mechanics' Liens Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. St. 377 1879, July 7, P. L. 194 Justices' Jurisdiction Johnson v. Beacham, 2 C. C. R. 108 Wissler v. Becker, 2 C. C. R. 103 Wilkes-Barre v. Myers, 113 Pa. St. 395 1881, Feb. 14, P. L. 3 County Officers Donohugh v. Roberts, 11 W. N. C. 186 1881, Feb. 14, P. L. 6 Cities Commonwealth v. Denworth, 145 Pa. St. 172 1 88 1, June 2, P. L. 41 Taxes Van Loon v. Engle, 171 Pa. St. 157 Townsend v. Wilson, 7 C. C. R. 101 Bryn Mawr v. Anderson, 10 C. C. R. 442 Miller v. Cunningham, 7 C. C. R. 500 Ancona v. Becker, 3 P. D. R. 86 1881, June 2, P. L. 41 County Auditors Nason v. Poor Directors, 126 Pa. St. 445 1 88 1, June 8, P. L. 60 Cities E'ast Grant Street, 121 Pa. St. 596 1 88 1, June 8, P. L. 70 Trespass Commonwealth v. Clark, 3 Super. Ct. 141 1 88 1, June 10, P. L. 79 Fish Commonwealth v. Bender, 7 C. C. R. 620 Commonwealth v. Bender, 8 W. N. C. 73 1881, June 10, P. L. 86 Taxation Second National Bank v. Caldwell, 39 Leg. Int. 414 Second National Bank v. Caldwell, 13 Fed. Rep. 429 1 88 1, June 10, P. L. 93 Interpleader Reynolds Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 4 P. D. R. 573 1883, Feb. 16, P. L. 5 Boroughs Commonwealth v. Taylor, 159 Pa. St. 451 XX TABLE OF ACTS. 1883, Apr. 19, P. L. 9 Taxes Philadelphia v. Kates, 150 Pa. St. 30 1883, May 17, P. L. 36 Boroughs Pottstown Borough, 117 Pa. St. 538 Pottstown Borough, 1 Montg. Co. 189 1883, May 22, P. L. 39 Streets Strohl v. Ephrata, 13 Lane. L. R. 1 1883, June 1, P. L. 51 Taxation Ruth's Appeal, 8 Lane. L. R. 264 Cassel's Appeal, 8 Lane. L. R. 260 La Plume Borough v. Gardner, 148 Pa. St. 192 1883, June 1, P. L. 52 Miners Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 17 C. C. R. 91 1883, June 1, P. L. 58 County Buildings Chester County Court-house, 7 C. C. R. 212 1883, June 4, P. L. 72 Railroads Hoover v. Penna. R. R., 156 Pa. St. 220 1883, June 13, P. L. 99 Prisoners Commonwealth v. Carey, 2 C. C. R. 293 Carey's Petition, 43 Leg. Gaz. 384 1883, June 13, P. L. 116 Wages Evans' Appeal, 152 Pa. St. 401 Rogers v. Glendower Iron Works, 17 W. N. C. 444 1883, June 20, P. L. 134 Foreign Insurance Cos. Kennedy v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 165 Pa. St. 179 1883, June 22, P. L. 139 Salaries McCarty v. Commonwealth, no Pa. St. 243 1883, June 22, P. L. 161 Municipal Claims Philadelphia v. Pepper, 2 C. C. R. 287 Philadelphia v. Pepper, 16 W. N. C. 331 Phila. v. Haddington Church, 115 Pa. St. 291 1883, July 5, P. L. 182 Salaries Commonwealth v. Mercer, 9 C. C. R. 461 Commonwealth v. Evans, 6 Kulp, 145 1885, June 1, P. L. 37 Cities Simon's Case, 4 P. D. R. 189 Betz v. Philadelphia, 18 W. N. C. 121 TABLE OF ACTS. XXI 1885, June 1, P. L. 37 — Continued Betz v. Philadelphia, 21 W. N. C. 155 Betz v. Philadelphia, 4 C. C. R. 481 1885, June 3, P. L. 55 Lottery Gifts Commonwealth v. Moorhead, 7 C. C. R. 513 1885, June 11, P. L. 108 Schools Baker v. McKee, 6 P. D. R. 599 Gaston v. Graham, 18 C. C. R. 265 1885, June 23, P. L. 141 Wolves, etc. Sanders v. Cambria Co., 16 C. C. R. 94 Sanders v. Cambria Co., 4 P. D. R. 24 1885, June 23, P. L. 142 Fences Frost v. Cherry, 122 Pa. St. 417 1885, June 24, P. L. 160 Records Gackenbach v. Lehigh Co., 166 Pa. St. 448 Pierie v. Philadelphia, 139 Pa. St. 573 1885, June 25, P. L 187 Taxes Evans v. Phillipi, 117 Pa. St. 226 Bennett v. Hunt, 148 Pa. St. 257 Bitting v. Commonwealth, 20 W. N. C. 178 Bitting v. Commonwealth, 2 C. C. R. 298 Commonwealth v. Swab, 8 C. C. R. 1 1 1 Evans v. Witmer, 4 Lane. L. R. 105 Commonwealth v. Frutchey, 1 P. D. R. 153 Commonwealth v. Frutchey, 11 C. C. R. 112 Keim v. Devitt, 3 C. C. R. 250 Hannick's Bond, 3 C. C. R. 254 Collector's Bond, 4 Lane. L. R. 166 Commonwealth v. Lackawanna County Commissioners, 7 C. C. R. 173 Evans v. Witmer, 2 C. C. R. 612 Commonwealth v. Lyter, 162 Pa. St. 50 Commonwealth v. Klugh, 162 Pa. St. 50 Commonwealth v. Swatara Town- ship, 1 Super. Ct. 502 1885, June 25, P. L. 170 Turnpikes Carbondale, etc., Turnpike, 17 W. N. C. 310 XX11 TABLE OF ACTS. 1885, June 25, P. L. 170 — Continued Carbondale, etc., Turnpike, 22 W. N. C. 105 Carbondale, etc., Turnpike, 4 Lane. L. R. 361 Little Equinunk, etc., Turnpike Company, 2 C. C. R. 632 1885, June 30, P. L. 193 Taxation Sanderson v. Commissioners, 1 C. C. R. 342 Hawes Mfg. Co.'s Appeal, 1 Monaghan, 353 1885, June 30, P. L. 250 Plumbers; Boards of Health Commonwealth v. Lambrecht, 3 C. C. R. 323 Commonwealth v. Lambrecht, 44 Leg. Int. 196 1885, July 7, P. L. 260 Milk Commonwealth v. Hough, 1 D. R. 51 1887, Mar. 22, P. L. 8 Livery-stable Keepers Commonwealth v. Moore, 2 Super. Ct. 162 Commonwealth v. Moore, 4 P. D. R. 649 Commonwealth v. Moore, 16 C. C. R. 481 Commonwealth v. Lehr, 16 C. C. R. 532 1887, Mar. 22, P. L. 8 Motor Companies Smith v. Reading City Pass. Ry. Co., 13 C. C. R. 49 Smith v. Reading City Pass. Ry. Co., 2 D. R. 490 Smith v. Reading City Pass. Ry. Co., 156 Pa. St. 5 1887, Apr. 13, P. L. 22 Salaries Reid v. Smoulter, 128 Pa. St. 324 1887, Apr. 28, P. L. 263 Poor Straub v. Pittsburg, 38 P. L. J. 89 1887, May 6, P. L. 79 Col. Inh. Tax' Bittinger's Appeal, 129 Pa. St. 338 Del Busto's Estate, 23 W. N. C. in 1887, May 6, P. L. 84 Obscene Literature Commonwealth v. Havens, 6 C. C. R. 545 1887, May 6, P. L. 87 Streets Ruan Street, 1st, 24 W. N. C. 460 Ruan Street, 2d, 25 W. N. C. 349 TABLE OF ACTS. XX111 1887, May 6, P. L. 87— Continued Ruan Street, 132 Pa. St. 257 1887, May 6, P. L. 92 Bridges Boston Bridge Co.'s Case, 13 C. C. R. 190 1887, May 13, P. L. 108 Liquors Commonwealth v. Silverman, 138 Pa. St. 642 Commonwealth v. Sellers, 130 Pa. St. 32 Durr v. Commonwealth, 3 C. C. R. 525 Commonwealth v. McCandless, 21 W. N. C. 162 Commonwealth v. Fowler, 18 Phila. 513 Commonwealth v. Haag, 6 C. C. R. 118 Commonwealth v. Doll, 6 C. C. R. 49 1887, May 13, P. L. 1 16 Wolves, etc. Sanders v. Cambria Co., 16 C. C. R. 94 Sanders v. Cambria Co., 4 P. D. R. 91 1887, May 18, P. L. 118 Mechanics' Lien Smyers v. Beam, 158 Pa. St. 57 Purvis v. Rbss, 158 Pa. St. 20 1887, May 24, P. L. 189 Druggists Commonwealth v. Zacharias, 181 Pa. St. 126 Commonwealth v. Zacharias, 3 Super. Ct. 364 1887, May 24, P. L. 194 Liquors Doberneck's License, 5 C. C. R. 454 Doberneck's License, 45 Leg. Int. 256 Doberneck's License, 35 P. L. J. 476 Commonwealth v. Deibert, 2 P. D. R. 53 1887, May 24, P. L. 204 Cities Meadville v. Dickson, 129 Pa. St. 1 Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 266 Shoemaker v. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. St. 285 Shoemaker v. Harrisburg, 4 C. C. R. 86 Berghaus v. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. St. 289 Klugh v. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. St. 289 Grant Street, 121 Pa. St. 596 Reading v. Savage, 120 Pa. St. 198 Carbondale Township's Appeal, 5 C. C. R. 339 XXIV TABLE OF ACTS. 1887, May 25, P. L. 271 Procedure Krause v. Penna. R. R. Co., 4 C. C. R. 60 Kaufman v. Jacobs, 4 C. C. R. 462 Doud v. Insurance Co., 6 C. C. R. 329 Reeves v. Edsall, 1 Lack. Jur. 96 1887, May 28, P. L. 274 Schools Engle v. Reichard, 4 Kulp, 361 Engle v. Reichard, 4 C. C. R. 48 1887, June 1, P. L. 285 Boroughs Darby & Collingdale, 19 C. C. R. 315 Sharon Hill Borough, 140 Pa. St. 250 Sharon Hill Borough, 4 Del. 252 1887, June 1, P. L. 289 Judgments Stuart's Appeal, 163 Pa. St. 210 1887, June 2, P. L. 310 Corporations Luzerne Water Co. v. Toby Creek Water Co., . 148 Pa. St. 568 1887, June 3, P. L. 332 Married Women Grubb's Appeal, 174 Pa. St. 187 1887, June 3, P. L. 337 Wages Evans' Appeal, 152 Pa. St. 401 1887, June 14, P. L. 386 Streets Pittsburg's Petition, 138 Pa. St. 401 Wyoming Street, 137 Pa. St. 494 King v. Philadelphia Co., 154 Pa. St. 160 Dunn v. Mellon, 147 Pa. St. 11 Donley v. Pittsburg, 147 Pa. St. 348 1887, June 14, P. L. 395 Cities Pittsburg's Petition, 138 Pa. St. 401 Straub v. Pittsburg, 138 Pa. St. 356 Commonwealth v. Morrow, 40 P. L. J. 327 1887, June 17, P. L. 409 Liens McKeever v. Victor Oil Co., 9 C. C. R. 284 Swaney v. Washington Oil Co., 7 C. C. R. 351 Titus v. Elyria Oil Co., 1 P. D. R. 204 TABLE OF ACTS. XXV 1887, June 17, P. L. 413 Liens Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Company, 122 Pa. St. 627 Lucas v. Ruff, 45 L. I. 454 Bennett v. Maloney, 4 Kulp, 537 Gardner v. Gibson, 21 W. N. C. 12; Roth v. Hobson, 5 C. C. R. 17 Roth v. Hobson, 21 W. N. C. 6.1. 1889, Feb. 14, P. L. 4 Constables Allegheny Co. v. Constables, 17 C. C. R. 622 1889, Feb. 14, P. L. 7 Assessors Commonwealth v. Green, 7 Kulp, 151 Commonwealth v. Coleman, 9 C. C. R. 90 1889, Apr. 22, P. L. 39 Boroughs Washington v. McGeorge, 146 Pa. St. 248 1889, Apr. 25, P. L. 54 Foxes and Minks Sanders v. Cambria Co., 4 P. D. R. 241 Sanders v. Cambria Co., 16 C. C. R. 94 1889, Apr. 25, P. L. 52 County Commissioners Young v. Bradford Co., 7 C. C. R. 428 Wren v. Luzerne Co., 6 Kulp, 37 1889, Apr. 28, P. L. 44 Boroughs Greensburg v. Laird, 8 C. C. R. 608 1889, May 4, P. L. 83 Constables Reading's Constables, 8 C. C. R. 101 1889, May 7, P. L. 116 Insurance Agents Commonwealth v. Morningstar, 144 Pa. St. 103 1889, May 8, P. L. 123 Veterans Bearce v. Fairview Township, 9 C. C. R. 342 Bearce v. Fairview Township, 27 W. N. C. 211 1889, May 8, P. L. 129 Roads Cheltenham Road, 140 Pa. St. 136 Cheltenham Road, 7 Montg. 42 Sewer Street, 8 C. C. R. 226 East Avenue, 7 Lane. L. R. 154 1889, May 8, P. L. 133 Cities Commonwealth v. Wyman, 137 Pa. St. 508 XXVI TABLE OF ACTS. 1889, May 8, P. L. 133— Continued Commonwealth v. Green, 7 Kulp, 151 1889, May 9, P. L. 162, Deputy Coroners Commonwealth v. Grier, 9 C. C. R. 444 1889, May 13, P. L. 196 Devers v. York, 150 Pa. St. 208 Devers v. York, 156 Pa. St. 359 Melick v. Williamsport, 162 Pa. St. 408 1889, May 14, P. L. 21 1 Street Railways Penna. R. R. v. Montgomery Co. Pass. R. R., 3 P. D. R. 58 Gettysburg Battlefield Association, 2 P. D. R. 649 1889, May 15, P. L. 222 Dogs Commonwealth v. Depuy, 148 Pa. St. 201 1889, May 16, P. L. 228 Streets Pittsburg's Petition, 138 Pa. St. 401 Donley v. Pittsburg, 147 Pa. St. 348 Dunn v. Mellon, 147 Pa. St. n 1889, May 23, P. L. 272 Assessments Chester City v. Black, 132 Pa. St. 568 1889, May 23, P. L. 274 Schools 1 Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 137 Pa. St. 389 Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 8 C. C. R. 568 Commonwealth v. Reichard, 5 Kulp, 540 Commonwealth v. Reichard, 8 C. C. R. 563 1889, May 23, P. L. 277 Cities Scranton v. Whyte, 148 Pa. St. 419 Harris's Appeal, 160 Pa. St. 494 Lackawanna Township, 160 Pa. St. 494 Gardiner v. Chester, 2 P. D. R. 162 Smith v. Meadow Brook Brewing Company, 3 Lack. Jur. 154 McAskie's Appeal, 154 Pa. St. 24 Jermyn v. Scranton, 3 Lack. Leg. N. 112 Devers v. York, 150 Pa. St. 208 Devers v. York, 156 Pa. St. 359 Melick v. Williamsport, 162 Pa. St. 408 TABLE OF ACTS. XXV11 1 89 1, Apr. 15, P. L. 17 Roads Road in Otto Township, 2 Super. Ct. 20 Road in Otto Township, 181 Pa. St. 390 1 89 1, May 7, P. L. 44 Wages Hoffa's Appeal, 1 Super. Ct. 357 1891, May 12, P. L. 53 Acknowledgments Land Co. v. Weidner, 169 Pa. St. 359 1891, May 16, P. L. 65 Sewers Twenty-eighth Street Sewer, 158 Pa. St. 464 1891, May 16, P. L. 71 Streets Whitney v. Pittsburg, 147 Pa. St. 351 Bingaman v. Pittsburg, 147 Pa. St. 353 Gray v. Pittsburg, 147 Pa. St. 354 Rubright v. Pittsburg, 147 Pa. St. 355 Donley v. Pittsburg, 147 Pa. St. 348 Boggs Avenue, 39 P. L. J. 30S Allen Avenue, 39 P. L. J. 309 1891, May 16, P. L. 75 Streets Strohl v. Ephrata, 13 Lane. L. R. t 1 89 1, May 20, P. L. 96 Semi-monthly Pay Roll Commonwealth v. Isenberg, 4 P. D. R. 5 1 Commonwealth v. Isenberg, 4 P D. R. 579 Bauer v. Reynolds, 14 C. C. R. 497 1891, May 23, P. L. 107 Corporations Commonwealth v. Keystone Benefit Association, 171 Pa. St. 465 1891, June 2, P. L. 176 Mines Durkin v. Kingston Coal Co., 171 Pa. St. 193 1891, June 8, P. L. 214 Counties Cole v. Economy Township, 3 P. D. R. 699 1891, June 8, P. L. 216 Cemeteries Phila. v. Westminster Cem. Co., 3 P. D. R. 151 Phila. v. Westminster Cem. Co., 162 Pa. St. 105 1891, June 8, P. L. 229 Taxation Commonwealth v. Edgerton Coal Company, 164 Pa. St. 284 XXV111 TABLE OF ACTS. 1 89 1, June 8, P. L. 229 — Continued Commonwealth v. Wilkes-Barre & Scranton Ry., 162 Pa. St. 614 1891, June 8, P. L. 247 Divorce Oakley v. Oakley, 1 P. D. R. 781 Oakley v. Oakley, 11 C. C. R. 572 Burdick v. Burdick, 2 P. D. R. 622 1 89 1, June 9, P. L. 248 Liquors South Bethlehem v. Hemingway, 16 C. C. R. 103 1891, June 16, P. L. 313 Druggists Commonwealth v. Zacharias, 181 Pa. St. 126 Commonwealth v. Zacharias, 3 Super. Ct. 364 1 89 1, June 19, P. L. 349 Ballot Law Dewalt v. Bartley, 146 Pa. St. 529 Dewalt v. Commissioners, 1 P. D. R. 199 Meredith v. Lebanon Co., 1 P. D. R. 220 Ripple v. Commissioners, 1 P. D. R. 201 1893, May 11, P. L. 44 Boroughs Smith v. Baker, 3 P. D. R. 626 1893, May 15, P. L. 52 Mines Commonwealth v. Jones, 4 Super. Ct. 362 1893, May 19, P. L. 108 Recording Act Davey v. Ruff ell, 162 Pa. St. 443 1893, May 23, P. L. 1 17 Fees Rupert v. Chester Co., 2 P. D. R. 688 1893, May 24, P. L. 124 Public Buildings Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. St. 554 Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. St. 539 1893, June 6, P. L. 300 Appropriations Commonwealth v. Gregg, 161 Pa. St. 582 1893, June 6, P. L. 328 Poor Poor Dist. v. Clearfield Co., 16 C. C. R. 554 Poor Dist. v. Clearfield Co., 4 P. D. R. 584 Poor Dist. v. Luzerne Co., 17 C. C. R. 83 Poor Dist. v. Luzerne Co., 5 P. D. R. 183 1893, June 6, P. L. 342 Burial Grounds Potters' Field 8 York, 145 TABLE OF ACTS. XXIX 1893, June 6, P. L. 342 — Continued York School District's Appeal, 169 Pa. St. 70 1893, June 8, P. L. 344 Husband and Wife Mink v. Mink, 16 C. C. R. 189 1893, J une 8, P. L- 393 Controllers Commonwealth v. Severn, 164 Pa. St. 462 Commonwealth v. Samuels, 163 Pa. St. 282 Commonwealth v. Severn, 15 C. C. R. 249 Commonwealth v. Samuels, 14 C. C. R. 423 1893, June 10, P. L. 419 Elections Evans v. Willistown Township, 168 Pa. St. 578 Commonwealth v. Weir, 18 C. C. R. 425 1893, June 12, P. L. 451 Roads Lehigh Valley Coal Co.'s Petition, 3 P. D. R. 610 Lehigh Valley Coal Co.'s Appeal, 164 Pa. St. 44 Phila. & Reading C. & I. Co.'s Petition, 164 Pa. St. 248 1895, Apr. 18, P. L. 36 Municipal Debt Senor v. Ephrata, 176 Pa. St. 80 1895, May 8, P. L. 56 Cities Millvale Borough, 43 P. L. J. 411 1895, May 22, P. L. 106 Streets Dorrance v. Dorranceton, 181 Pa. St. 164 1895, May 22, P. L. in Taxes Kenner v. Kelly, 19 C. C. R. 348 Rutt v. Burkey, 14 Lane. L. R. 11 Snyder v. Mogart, 17 C. C. R. 1 Taylor v. Bowling, 5 P D. R. 605 Land v. Wack, 5 P. D. R. 606 Wetzell v. Goodyear, 5 P. D. R. 605 Frampton's Estate, 18 C. C. R. 462 Fryer v. Metz, 12 Montg. 108 Provident Association v. Flanagan, 19 C. C. R. 529 1895, June 18, P. L. 196 Trespass Commonwealth v. Clark, 3 Super. Ct. 141 1895, June 24, P. L. 212 Superior Court Commonwealth v. Reeder, 171 Pa. St. 505 XXX TABLE OF ACTS. 1895, June 26, P. L. 317 Pure Food Commonwealth v. Wickert, 19 C. C. R. 251 Commonwealth v. Wickert, 6 P. D. R. 136 Commonwealth v. Hufnal, 4 Super. Ct. 301 Commonwealth v. Curry, 4 Super Ct. 356 Commonwealth v. Hartman, 6 P. D. R. 136 1895, June 26, P. L. 343 Sureties American Banking & Trust Co.'s Petition, 37 W. N. C. 297 1895, June 26, P. L. 375 Constables Allegheny Co. Constables, 17 C. C. R. 622 1895, June 27, P. L. 403 County Controllers Lloyd v. Smith, 176 Pa. St. 213 1895, July 2, P. L. 428 Lodgings Commonwealth v. Muir, 1 Super. Ct. 578 Commonwealth v. Muir, 180 Pa. St. 47 1895, July 2, P. L. 434 Soldiers' Children Sewickley v. Osborn, 19 C. C. R. 257 Sewickley v. Osborn, 6 P. D. R. 211 1895, July 3, P. L. 588 Schools Chalfant v. Edwards, 173 Pa. St. 246 1895, July 3, P. L. 603 Schools Chalfant v. Edwards, 173 Pa. St. 246 1897, May 12, P. L. 56 Direct Inheritance Tax Portuondo's Estate, 19 C. C. R. 419 Portuondo's Estate, 6 P. D. R. 462 Blight's Estate, 19 C. C. R. 426 Blight's Estate, 6 P. D. R. 459 Lacey's Estate, 19 C. C. R. 431 Lacey's Estate, 6 P. D. R. 499 1897, June 15, P. L. 164 Alien Tax Law Fraser v. McConway, 6 P. D. R. 555 TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. Art. XI. Added Sec. 8. No bill shall be passed by the Legislature containing more than one subject, which shall be expressed in the title, except appropriation bills. Amendment, 1864. Art. Ill, Sec. 3. No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. Constitution. Art. Ill, Sec. 15. The general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the ordinary ex- penses of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Depart- ments of the Commonwealth, interest on the public debt and for public schools; all other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject. Constitution. CONTENTS. 1. The provision is mandatory. 2. The title is part of the Act. 3. The purpose of the provision. 4. The construction of the provision. 5. The scope of the Act is measured by the title. The title must be clearly expressed. Fair notice of the scope of the Act must be given. The title must be in terms sufficiently specific. The title must not be inconsistent with the enact- ment. 10. The title must indicate the effect of an Act in re- lation to persons or matters not necessarily af- fected by the general legislative purpose as ex- pressed. 11. The subject must be single. 12. The Act may properly include matters germane to the subject as expressed in the title. 13. Two subjects. 14. Original Acts and general supplements and amend- ments. 15. Original Acts and specific supplements and amend- ments. 16. Repeal and re-enactment. 17. Provisos, exceptions, and exemptions. 18. Appropriation bills. TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. i. The Provision is Mandatory. There is an intimation in the earlier cases 1 that the consti- tutional provision relating to the title of Acts may be di- rectory, but the whole course of decision, beginning with Dorsey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192, and including all of the cases following in which titles have been held to be insufficient, shows that the provision is mandatory, that the validity of a statute must depend upon the sufficiency of the title, and that where the latter is defective the statute will be sustained only in so far as the title indicates the subject-matter of the law. Indeed, the provision is expressly said to be mandatory in Road in Phcenixville. 2 Commonwealth v. Green, 58 Pa. St. 226; Barton v. Pitts- burgh, 4 Brewst. 373. 2 Road in Phcenixville, 109 Pa. St. 44, 48. Argument to sustain the validity of an Act of As- sembly frequently begins with such propositions as, that the presumption favors the validity of the Act; that the Judicial Department assumes, in deference to the Legislative, that no violation of the Constitution was intended by the latter; that an Act of Assembly is valid unless it is plain and clear that it infringes some specific provision of the Constitution, and that any doubt upon the subject is to be resolved in favor of the Act. It is not to be questioned that these propositions are so well settled as to have become trite and commonplace, and perhaps their application in cases arising under the sev- eral provisions herein treated ought not to be doubted. It may be well to point out, however, that these propositions were established with reference to constitutional provisions prior in time and different in character from those under con- 6 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. sideration; provisions relating to legislative power, not pro- visions governing merely the forms and methods of legisla- tion where the power may be unquestioned. The provisions limiting legislative form and method were adopted for the purpose of establishing what was deemed to be a valuable legislative reform, to end certain legislative practices which had long been considered to be abuses, to prevent log-rolling, deception, and surprise in legislation, and to check what was deemed to be a growing dispo- sition to favoritism in the enactment of special and local laws. The reform was further intended to secure uniformity of law throughout the Commonwealth upon many subjects of legislation, with reference to which a lack of uniformity tended to complicate the administration of the law or give undue local advantages. The reader of the decided cases upon the topics under consideration cannot fail to note a steady determination of the courts to carry out to the full intent the remedial provisions, nor will he fail to notice the difference in argumentative treatment which results from the character of these provisions. In form they are purely technical, and hence the argument must be so. The argu- ment of them does not admit of such broad and practical treatment as arguments upon questions of legislative power necessarily require, and because of their purely technical na- ture these provisions, as a rule, are less difficult of applica- tion; there is less room for doubt. When a given statute is challenged as violative of one of these provisions the issue is upon a demurrer to the indictment. An argument founded upon a presumption of guilt or innocence is not relevant. Putting analogy aside it may be considered in truth that the issue is upon a special demurrer to the statute itself. 2. The Title is a Part of the Act. Prior to the amendment of 1864 it was well settled that the title was not part of an Act of Assembly and could be re- sorted to only when there was doubt as to the meaning of the enacting words. 1 Since the amendment of 1864 the "title of an Act is a part of it. It limits its scope, and is properly used in interpreting its words." 2 1 Commonwealth v. Slifer, 53 Pa. St. 71. 2 Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. St. 554-58. TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 7 "It is objected that the title of the Act is 'An Act allowing parties in interest to be witnesses,' and that since the adop- tion of the Constitutional Amendment of 1864 the title must be regarded as a necessary part of a statute. We may admit this premise. In England the title is no part of a statute. Lord Mansfield gives as a reason for this, that 'it does not pass with the same solemnity. One reading is often suffi- cient:' The King v. Williams, 1 W. Bl. 93. With us, however, it is always read three times. There may be good reason for holding that the title as well as the preamble may be resorted to for the purpose of assisting the construction whenever the enacting clause is doubtful. See Cochran v. Library Com- pany, 25 Leg. Intel. 20, but certainly not to overrule or con- trol it." — Sharswood, J.: Yeager v. Weaver, 64 Pa. St. 425-428. The title of an Act since the first amendment of the Con- stitution of 1864 must now be regarded as a part of it. How- ever it may have been before, this is important rather upon a question of construction than of power: Pennsylvania R. R. Company v. Riblet, 66 Pa. St. 164. "However it was in England, where the title is held to be no part of a statute, indeed, was commonly framed by the clerk of Parliament after the bill had passed, without any vote be- ing taken upon it, certainly since the first amendment of the Constitution adopted in 1864, Article XI, Section 8, it is now necessarily a part of the Act, and a very important guide to its right construction." — Sharswood, J.: Eby's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 311, 314; and see Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 2 Super. Ct. 6; Halderman's Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 251-9; Common- wealth v. Moorhead, 7 C. C. R. 513. In the case of Commonwealth v. Martin, 107 Pa. St. 185, the Act of June 7th, 1879, P. L. 112, was in question. The title of the Act as printed in the Pamphlet Laws was, "An Act to provide revenue by taxation." By the original roll in the custody of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, the title appeared as follows: No. 463. An Act to provide revenue by taxation of corporations associations and limited partnerships It was held in the court below that the record, i. e., the 8 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. roll, was conclusive as to what the title really was, and that the record should be read without regard to the black lines enclosing the words indicated above. His Honor, Judge Simonton, remarked: "We may add that we have looked into the printed journals for informa- tion, and are satisfied that even if they could be received and acted upon they would not enable us to arrive at a sat- isfactory conclusion. They give no intelligible account of the passage of the Act; and, indeed, we think it would be impossible to show from them that it was ever legally passed in any form. "The thing which most clearly appears is that in all the stages of the progress of the bill in question, up to the time when it first passed both Houses and was sent to the Gov- ernor, it contained its full title; and it is manifest that if a bill can be passed with a title which does not denote its sub- ject, and after its passage the title can be amended, so as for the first time to express its purpose, the constitutional pro- vision is of little value. . . . "We have then before us the original Act, with lines drawn around part of the title, as already stated. Can we, looking only at the Act itself, as evidence of its contents, and remem- bering that the title is a part of the Act, give significance to these lines, and understand them to import that the words within them were stricken out? We think the reasons given by Judge McPherson, in the Lehigh Valley Company's case, 39 Leg. Int. 210, are sufficient to show that this cannot be done." Upon this branch of the case the opinion of the Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice Gordon, page 204, is as follows: "The court held that these lines were to be disregarded, and that the title to the Act must be read as though they were not there. If the correctness of this construction be admitted, the conclusion arrived at cannot be gainsaid, for a title expressing an intention to tax corporations, associa- tions, and partnerships only, necessarily excludes natural per- sons, hence, so much of the Act as provides for the taxation of the property of such persons would clearly, under this construction, be avoided by the constitutional provision. We cannot, however, assent to the reasoning by which a conclu- sion of this kind was reached. These marks are part of the original bill, as found upon the files in the Secretary's office, and at most imply only an irregularity; that is, that the bill TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 9 was not transcribed as it ought to have been before it was sent to the Governor for his signature. It is true, as the court suggests, some unauthorized person might have thus mutilated the bill after it was signed, but of this there is no evidence, and, in the absence thereof, we are not warranted in presuming a forgery. Other than this want of transcrip- tion there is neither irregularity nor mark of suspicion about this document. To those acquainted with legislative rules, the marks above mentioned would indicate an amendment properly made in either the House or Senate, and so, had the bill been transcribed, would the transcribing clerk have in- terpreted them, as did the compiler of the pamphlet laws. "The eleventh joint rule requires that such an amendment, as that under discussion, be marked by brackets with a note of the legislative branch in which it is made, so that in the case in hand there is but an irregularity in the neglect to comply with a direction which, whilst it conduces to orderly legislation, is, in itself, of no material importance. Without evidence to the contrary, then, we must take it that these marks were made in the regular course of legislation, and that they indicate an amendment made, by striking out the words embraced within them, during the passage of the bill." The foregoing case suggests, if it does not decide, the in- teresting and important question as to whether the title should accompany a bill in its passage through the Legisla- ture. The learned author, Sutherland, in Statutory Con- struction, Section 91, quotes with approval from the above remarks of Simonton, P. J., and says: "It is during the pas- sage of a bill that its title is intended by the Constitution to impart information to the public and to members of the Legislature of the general subject of legislation. To effect- uate that intent the title should accompany the bill in all its stages through the process of enactment." In Attorney-General v. Rice, 64 Mich. 385, it appeared that to an Act to organize the township of Ironwood, in the county of Ontonagon, it was objected that it had been sub- stituted, after the time for introducing new bills had expired, for a skeleton bill, entitled "An Act to organize the township of Au Train;" that therefore the title of the bill as introduced did not express the object of the Act as passed. The court say: "We cannot extend the provisions of the Constitution beyond its express terms in this respect. If the object of the Act as passed is fully expressed in its title the form or status 10 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. of such title at its introduction, or during any of the stages, of legislation before it becomes a law, is immaterial. To hold otherwise, would, in many cases, prevent any alteration or amendment of a bill after its introduction, as, in legislative practice, it frequently becomes necessary to amend the title as introduced in order to conform to changes in the bill. The title to a bill is usually adopted after it has passed the House, and it is not an essential part of a bill, although it is of a law: Larrison v. Peoria, etc., R. R. Company, yj 111. 17." The facts stated in the contention were not accepted by the court, and it was held that, the journals not showing the facts, parol evidence was not admissible: Sutherland on Stat- utory Construction, Sec. 91; and see 23 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, 163; Bing v. Weber, 81 111. 290. 3. The Purpose of the Provision, Was to avoid improper influences which might result from intermixing in one and the same Act such things as have no proper relation to each other, and to prevent the real pur- pose of the bill being disguised by a title which failed to ex- press it, or was framed in such terms as to mislead. The Constitution of New Jersey, Article IV, Section 7, Paragraph 4 is quoted in Blood v. Mercelliott, 53 Pa. St. 391-3, as indicating the purpose of the amendment of 1864 as follows: "To avoid improper influences which may result from in- termixing in one and the same Act such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title." The opinion further quotes, Parkinson v. The State, 14 Maryland, 185, as follows: "It cannot be doubted that this restriction upon the Legislature was designed to prevent an evil which had long prevailed in this State as it had done elsewhere, which was the practice of blending in the same law subjects not connected with each other and often entirely different. This was not unfrequently resorted to for the pur- pose of obtaining votes in support of a measure which could not have been carried without such a device. And in bills of multifarious character, not inappropriately called omnibus bills, provisions were sometimes smuggled in and passed in TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. II the hurry of business toward the close of a session, which, if they had been presented singly would have been rejected." "Prior to that date (1864) the vicious practice had ob- tained of incorporating in one bill a variety of distinct and in- dependent subjects of legislation. The real purpose of the bill was often and sometimes intentionally disguised by a mis- leading title or covered by the all-comprehensive phrase, 'and for other purposes,' with which the title of many 'omni- bus' bills concluded. Members of the Legislature as well as the general public were thus misled or kept in ignorance as to the true character of proposed legislation. To remedy this great and growing evil the amendment in the first place prohibits the introduction of more than one subject in each bill. But, unity of subject is not enough. The mandatory- clause of the amendment imperatively requires that the sub- ject of proposed legislation, whatever it may be, shall be clearly expressed in the title of the bill. As the means of no- tice to representatives as well as their constituents the latter is quite as essential as the former. We are not called upon, however, to show the necessity or vindicate the wisdom of the constitutional requirement. It is enough for us to know that it is an express mandate of the organic law, which the Legislature ought to obey and courts are bound to enforce. While it may be difficult to formulate a rule by which to de- termine the extent to which the title of a bill must specialize its object, it may be safely assumed that the title must not only embrace the subject of proposed legislation, but also express the same so clearly and fully as to give notice of the legislative purpose to those who may be especially interested therein. Unless it does this it is useless:" Road in Phcenix- ville, 109 Pa. St. 44-8-9. In Commonwealth v. Samuels, 163 Pa. St. 283-6, it is said, referring to the Act of June 8th, 1893, P. L. 393: "So far as appears in the title the Act is merely cumulative, in providing an additional county officer. It is true that the Constitution in enumerating county officers, Article XIV, Section 1, puts the two offices together in the disjunctive, 'auditors or control- lers,' and that those who are familiar with the duties of con- trollers as existing in Philadelphia and Allegheny, would know that they are mainly the same as those of auditors in other counties, and therefore that the creation of the office of controller was likely to interfere with, if not to abolish, the other. But this is not the notice which the Constitution re- 12 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. quires the title of the Act to give of its subject. The object of that requirement is that legislators, and others interested, shall receive direct notice in immediate connection with the Act itself, of its subject, so that they may know or be put upon inquiry as to its provisions and their effect. Sugges- tions or inferences which may be drawn from knowledge ■dehors the language used, are not enough. The Constitution requires that the notice shall be contained in the title itself." 4. The Construction of the Provision. The general principle is applied that it must be a clear case to justify a court in pronouncing an Act, or any part of it, void for a defective title. 1 In Allegheny Home's Appeal, 2 the court remarked: "The course of decision in this court has been intended to carry out the true intent of the amend- ment of 1864, as to the title and subject of bills, instead of resorting to sharp criticism, which must often bring legisla- tion to nought. The Amendment of 1864 was in substance proposed in the Constitutional Convention of 1837-8, and rejected, because it was feared it would render legislation too difficult and uncertain, and lead to litigation. It will not do, therefore, to impale the legislation of the State upon the sharp points of criticism, but we must give each title, as it comes before us, a reasonable interpretation, ut res magis ■valcat quam pereat." Legislative usage has received a partial recognition; thus in State Line & Juniata R. R. Company's Appeal, 3 Mr. Justice Paxson said in relation to an Act gen- erally entitled a supplement to a former Act: "The amend- ment to the late Constitution, under which this question arises, Section 8 of Article XI, was adopted in 1864. An ex- amination of the Pamphlet Laws since that time discloses the fact that one hundred and thirteen 'supplements' and 'further supplements' to railroad charters have been passed. Embracing other corporations, there are about fourteen hundred. This is important, not only as showing the extent of the interests to be affected by our decision, but also as exhibiting the uniform construction placed upon this section TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 1 3 by the legislative and executive departments of the govern- ment. While we are not bound by their construction, it is nevertheless entitled to weight, and should always be treated with respect. In view of this unbroken current of legisla- tion, we are constrained so to treat this question as not to obliterate from our statute book a large number of Acts under which important and costly improvements have been commenced, and rights have become vested. The construc- tion now claimed for this clause of the Constitution, if adopted by this court, would unsettle the business of the State to an extent beyond the capacity of any one to de- fine. That we are not bound to do so is sufficiently clear both upon reason and authority." The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterins is applied in the construction of a title and the scope of the Act will be limited, when the title is specific, to what is therein ex- pressed. 4 Thus, for example, where the title refers to leaseholds and the Act includes freeholds, it is inoperative as to the latter. 5 Where elections of public officers is ex- pressed, elections to increase municipal debts will be ex- cluded. 6 An examination of all the cases will indicate a liberal construction of title in the application of the con- stitutional provision where the purposes of the Act are for the general public benefit; and a strict construction where private or corporate privileges are asserted, or where the Act has a collateral effect upon interests not necessarily or apparently within the legislative purpose as disclosed by the title. An error in the placing of the quotation marks in a sup- plementary Act reciting an original Act will not vitiate the title when the sense is clear. 7 Commonwealth v. Green, 58 Pa. St. 226. 2 Allegheny Home's Appeal, JJ Pa. St. JJ. 3 State Line & Juniata R. R. Company's Appeal, JJ Pa. St. 429-431. 4 Union Pass. Ry. Company's Appeal, 81* Pa. St. 91; Com- 14 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. monwealth v. Martin, 107 Pa. St. 185; Philadelphia v. Spring Garden Farmers' Market Company, 161 Pa. St. 522. 5 Dorsey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192. 6 Evans v. Willistown Township, 168 Pa. St. 578. 7 Commonwealth v. Taylor, 159 Pa. St. 451. 5. The Scope of the Act is Measured by the Title. Only that part of the law is void which is not referred to in the title, 1 thus in Allegheny County Home's Case, 2 the Act in question was entitled "An Act providing for an equita- ble division of property between the county of Allegheny and the city of Pittsburg." 3 Two sections related to the county and city named, the third section extended their provisions to Allegheny City in like manner as they applied to Pitts- burg. The question arose on the first two sections, which were sustained without reference to the third, which was not necessarily involved. In Dewhurst v. City of Allegheny, 4 Mr. Justice Paxson said: "The defendant below objects to paying the assessment upon his property for the grading and paving of Troy Hill Road, in the city of Allegheny, for various reasons, the first of which is, that the Act of Assem- bly of May 10th, 1871, authorizing the same, and the supple- ment thereto approved April 1st, 1872, are unconstitutional, and the assessments thereunder null and void. In Beckert v. The City of Allegheny, 4 Norris, 191, so much of said Act was declared to be unconstitutional as provided for the as- sessment of a part of the cost of the work upon property in Reserve Township, which said township is located wholly in Allegheny County and outside the city limits. The title of said Act was 'An Act relative to grading, paving, curbing, and otherwise improving Troy Hill Road in the city of Alle- gheny,' and this was held not to be notice to property-owners in Reserve Township that their property was to be assessed for the cost of the improvement. There was nothing in that case, however, to throw the slightest doubt upon the consti- tutionality of any part of the Act except in so far as it re- TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 1 5 lated to Reserve Township. It is no injury to the defendant that property-owners in the township have escaped. Their burdens have not been thrown upon his property, but have been very properly assumed by the city of Allegheny. His benefits are the same whether Reserve Township pays or not ; his burden is only increased by his share of general taxation, and of this he has no cause to complain: Bidwell v. City of Pittsburg, 4 Norris, 491. An entire Act is not necessarily unconstitutional because the title fails to give notice of some particular matter contained therein. The rule has been to sustain the portion of which the title gives notice: Dorsey's Appeal, 22 P. F. Smith, 192; Allegheny County Home's Ap- peal, 27 Id. JJ; Lea v. Bumm, 2 Norris, 237; Wynkoop v. Cooch, 8 Id. 450." In McGee's Appeal, 5 the Act in question was 'An Act to authorize the Select and Common Councils of the city of Pittsburg to vacate streets and alleys in said city." 6 In the opinion it was said the vacation of Washington Street, or the ordinance stipulating for its vacation is the precise matter complained of. If it be conceded, however, that the title does not fully cover the subject of the Act it is only those provisions not covered by it that are void. J Per Sharswood, J., in Commonwealth v. Green, 58 Pa. St. 226, a case wherein the title was held to be sufficient. 2 Allegheny County Home's Appeal, yj Pa. St. yy . 3 25th April, 1871, P L. 1138. 4 Dewhurst v. City of Allegheny, 95 Pa. St. 437. 5 McGee's Appeal, 114 Pa. St. 470-478. "April 15th, 1869, P. L. 965; and see Allegheny v. Moore- head, 80 Pa. St. 118; Washington Borough v. McGeorge, 146 Pa. St. 248, 251; Act of April 22d, 1889, P. L. 39, au- thorizing boroughs to license hacks, etc. The Act of June 26th, 1895, P. L. 317, known as the "Pure Food Law," was enforced in a case of adulteration of food, and the rule was applied which holds so much of an Act to be valid as is covered by the title: Commonwealth v. Wick- l6 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. ert, 19 C. C. R. 251; s. p., Commonwealth v. Hartman, 6 P. D. R. 136. In Commonwealth v. Curry, 4 Super. Ct. 356, the title was held to be sufficient. 6. The Subject Must be Clearly Expressed. Thus an Act, the title of which purports to authorize a railway company to lay additional tracks, does not clearly express the intent disclosed in the body of the Act to author- ize it to lay an extension of its line; 1 upon this point Mr. Justice Agnew said: "When the title conveys the belief that one subject is the purpose of the bill, while another and dif- ferent one is its real subject, it is evident that it tends to mislead by diverting the attention from the true object of the legislation. Confiding in the title as applicable to a pur- pose unobjectionable to the reader he is led away from the examination of the body of the bill. In such a case the sub- ject is not clearly expressed in the title. Indeed, it is not ex- pressed at all. It may have something colorable in it, but this is merely hinting at the subject, not expressing it. To lay additional tracks on an existing railway is a different thing from extending the railway itself into new territory not before authorized to be used. The difference in purpose is so palpable, and the difference in consequence so grave the mind cannot hesitate a moment in the conclusion that the language which authorizes the former only cannot mean to sanction the latter. To confound these two is to open the door to fraud, and to enable men, expert in the use of phrases, to steal away the rights of the people; and this it was a purpose of the amendment to prevent." . . . "How, then, will the same language in this title be held to 'clearly express' a purpose to extend this railway into new streets and along other lines of railway? If it be said the Legislature might have meant this, the obvious answer is, that this is a mere possibility, a conjecture, not a clear expression of the intent. Nothing ambiguous can be said to be clear, and this is a de- cisive answer to the argument that the title is sufficient to> TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. I 7 lead to inquiry. An inquiry into a dubious or uncertain thing is not the purpose of the amendment. Its requirement is that the subject shall be clearly expressed." The same thought was substantially repeated in Dorsey's Appeal, 2 where it is said: "It would not do to require the title to be a complete index to the contents of the bill, for this would make legislation too difficult, and bring it into constant dan- ger of being declared void. But on the other hand the title should be so certain as not to mislead. The language of the amendment is 'one subject which shall be clearly expressed in the title.' To be 'clearly expressed' certainly does not mean something which is dubious, and therefore is not clearly expressed. If then the title seems to mean one thing while the enactment as clearly refers to another, it cannot be said to be clearly expressed. Now in the present case the words leasehold estates certainly do not express estates of free- hold." Where, however, the term railway is used, which may im- port either a steam railroad or a street passenger railway, or both, if in the plural, it cannot be said that the title is not clear where the Act applies to a railroad incorporated to carry freight and passengers, and use steam as a motive power. 3 A title which purports the creation of the office of County Controller in certain counties does not clearly indicate a pur- pose to abolish the office of County Auditors. The fact that the Constitution places "Auditors or Controllers" together in the disjunctive in Article XIV, Section i, and the fact that the Controllers of Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties per- form practically the same duties as Auditors in other counties is not sufficient to lead to notice that the creation of the office of Controller was likely to interfere with, if not to abolish, the office of County Auditors. 4 The Act of April 22d, 1879, P. L. 30, entitled "An Act ex- tending the powers and authority of County Auditors, au- thorizing them to settle, audit, and adjust the accounts of 1 8 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. the Directors of the Poor of the several counties of the Com- monwealth," clearly expresses in its title the subject-matter. 5 1 Union Passenger Railway Company's Appeal, 81* Pa. St. 91. 2 Dorsey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192. 3 Millvale Borough v. Evergreen Passenger Railway Com- pany, 131 Pa. St. 1. 4 Commonwealth v. Samuels, 163 Pa. St. 282; Common- wealth v. Severn, 164 Pa. St. 462; Commonwealth v. Sam- uels, 14 C. C. R. 423, opinion of court below; Commonwealth v. Severn, 15 C. C. R. 249, opinion of court below. 5 Nason v. School Directors, 126 Pa. St. 445. The sufficiency of the title of the Act of May 12th, 1897, P. L. 56, entitled "An Act taxing gifts, legacies, and inherit- ances in certain cases and providing for the collection thereof," was questioned but not decided: Portuondo's Es- tate, 19 C. C. R. 419; s. c, 6 P. D. R. 462. The Act of May 22d, 1895, P. L. 111, properly construed creates no lien for taxes, but if this were otherwise the title is insufficient for that purpose: Kenner v. Kelly, 19 C. C. R. 348; Taylor v. Bowling, 5 P. D. R. 605; Land v. Wack, 5 P. D. R. 606; Rutt v. Burkey, 14 Lane. L..R. 11; Snyder v. Mogart, 17 C. C. R. 1; Wetzel v. Goodyear, 5 P. D. R. 605; Fryer v. Metz, 12 Montg. 108; Frampton's Estate, 18 C. C. R. 462. But the notice provided for will charge the fund if duly given. The Act was intended to cover two classes of cases; first, where there was a lien for taxes under pre- existing laws; second, where there was none, in which case the provision for notice was operative to create a charge pur- suant to the notice: Provident Association v. Flanagan, 19 C. C. R. 529. The Act of June 26th, 1895, P. L. 317, entitled "An Act to provide against the adulteration of food and provide for the enforcement thereof," has a sufficient title to cover all of its provisions: Commonwealth v. Curry, 4 Super. Ct. 356; Com- monwealth v. Hufnal, 4 Super. Ct. 301; and see Common- wealth v. Wickert, 19 C. C. R. 251 ; Commonwealth v. Curry, 18 C. C. R. 513; Commonwealth v. Hartman, 6 P D. R. 136. titles of acts of assembly. io. 7. Fair Notice of the Scope of the Subject of the Act Must be Given. All the cases agree that the subject of the proposed legisla- tion must be so expressed in the title as to give notice of its purpose to the members of the Legislature and to others specially interested. 1 If the title gives notice of the subject of the Act so as reasonably to lead to an inquiry into the body of the bill, it is all that is necessary. 2 1 Philadelphia v. Ridge Avenue Passenger Railway Com- pany, 142 Pa. St. 484-491; citing Commonwealth v. Green, 58 Pa. St. 226; Dorsey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192; Beckert v. Allegheny, 85 Pa. St. 191; Phcenixville Road, 109 Pa. St. 44; Sewickley Borough v. Sholes, 118 Pa. St. 165; see also Alle- gheny County Home's Case, yy Pa. St. yy; State Line & Juniata R. R. Company's Appeal, yy Pa. St. 429. 2 State Line & Juniata R. R. Company's Appeal, yy Pa. St. 429; Esling's Appeal, 89 Pa. St. 205-210; Blood v. Mer- celliott, 53 Pa. St. 391; Church Street, 54 Pa. St. 353; Dor- sey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192; Mauch Chunk v. McGee, 81 Pa. St. 433; Carothers' Appeal, 118 Pa. St. 468. Numerous cases, beginning with Commonwealth v. Green, state that the title of an Act of Assembly is not intended to be an index to its contents: Commonwealth v. Green, 58 Pa. St. 226. The Act of May 6th, 1887, P. L. 84, entitled "An Act to prevent and punish the making and dissemination of ob- scene literature and other immoral and indecent matter," has a sufficient title. "It states the general subject of the bill, and gives sufficient notice of its contents and object." — Per Ewing, J.: Commonwealth v. Havens, 6 C. C. R. 545. 8. The Title Must be in Terms Sufficiently Specific. Thus, the title of an Act, entitled "An Act to incorporate the Manufacturers' Improvement Company," was held to be too general, and in effect misleading, as no indication was 20 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. given either in the name of the corporation or otherwise, of provisions relating to the power in the Act expressed over the Loyalsock Creek, a public navigable stream, in improv- ing it and charging tolls for logs. 1 But the title of an Act, entitled "An Act to incorporate the Empire Contract Com- pany and define the powers thereof," is probably sufficient to cover the power of eminent domain. In passing upon this title, Mr. Justice Williams said: "Speaking for myself, I would hold the title to be neither insufficient nor mislead- ing." It was decided that the power of eminent domain in question was well derived from the provisions of another statute. 2 Thus an Act, entitled "An Act relating to the Ridge Avenue Passenger Railway Company," is too general to indicate a provision relieving the company from a liability to keep streets in repair, 3 and in another case the title was held insufficient to cover a provision reducing the rate of tax- ation of dividends for city purposes. 4 The title of the Act of May 13th, 1887, P. L. 108, entitled "An Act to restrain and regulate the sale of vinous and spirituous, malt, or brewed liquors, or any admixture thereof," was held to be sufficient to sustain the clause of Section 17 of the Act, prohibiting the furnishing of liquors to minors, persons of known intem- perate habits or persons visibly affected by intoxicating drink, by sale, gift, or otherwise. 5 1 Rogers v. Manufacturers' Improvement Company, 109 Pa. St. 109. 2 Carothers's Appeal, 118 Pa. St. 468. 3 Ridge Avenue Passenger Railway Company v. Philadel- phia, 124 Pa. St. 219. Philadelphia v. Ridge Avenue Passenger Railway Com- pany, 142 Pa. 484: 5 Commonwealth v. Silverman, 138 Pa. St. 642; and see Donley v. Pittsburg, 147 Pa. St. 348. The Act of March 16th, 1872, P. L. 405, was entitled "An Act relating to the County Commissioners of Cambria County." It was objected to "for the reason that the title TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 21 does not indicate that which is embraced in the body of the Act itself." The title was held to be sufficient to give notice of any legislation properly pertaining to the rights, duties, and powers of the Commissioners. All its provisions were held to be germane to a single subject: Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 2 Super. Ct. 6; s. p., Commonwealth v. Dillon, 17 C. C. R. 227; and see Bennett v. Maloney, 4 Kulp, 537. The Act of January 2d, 1871, P. L. 1556, was entitled "A further supplement to the Act incorporating the city of Har- risburg in the county of Dauphin, passed April ninth, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine." His Honor, Judge Pearson, said: "We consider the title of this Act the same as none," because no indication of the subject of the supple- ment was given: In re State St., 2 Leg. Chron. 1 (1873). 9. The Title Must Not be Inconsistent with the Enactment. The Act of May 14th, 1874, P. L. 158, was entitled "An Act to exempt from taxation public property used for pub- lic purposes and places of religious worship, places of burial not used or held for private or corporate profit and institu- tions of purely public charity," and contained a proviso that all property, real or personal, other than that which is in actual use and occupation for the purposes aforesaid, and from which any revenue or income is derived, shall be sub- ject to taxation, except when exempted by law for State pur- poses, and nothing herein contained shall exempt the same from taxation. This proviso upon a construction given in a previous case, 1 having been held to impose taxation, it was held that taxation was not properly the subject of the Act as expressed in the title, namely, exemption, and that the pro- viso was therefore void. 2 The Act of May 19th, 1893, P. L. 108, entitled "An Act to amend an Act, entitled a supplement to an Act, entitled 'An Act for acknowledging deeds,' passed March 18th, 1775, requiring the recording of certain conveyances and designat- ing the time within which they shall be recorded," is ineffect- ive in those provisions which relate to the manner of taking" 22 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. acknowledgments and to the powers of officers in relation thereto. "An attempt to remodel the law relating to ac- knowledgments under such a title would be an attempt to do that of which the title not only gave no notice but against which it closed the door by asserting a different purpose." 3 1 County of Erie v. Commissioners of Water Works, 113 Pa. St. 368. 2 Sewickley Borough v. Sholes, 118 Pa. St. 165; and see Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. St. 554, 156 Pa. St. 539. 3 Davey v. Ruffell, 162 Pa. St. 443. The Act of April 9th, 1870, P. L. 1068, was entitled "An Act to punish the sale and traffic in mineral water bottles and other bottles, and for the protection of bottlers and venders of mineral water and other beverages in this Common- wealth." In the second section of the Act there was a pro- viso that the Act should "apply only to the city of Philadel- phia," the title was held to be misleading and insufficient, in a case arising in Philadelphia, by reason of the difference be- tween the title and the proviso relating to the territorial scope of the Act: Commonwealth v. Farley, 6 C. C. R. 433, 46 Leg. Int. 108. In Swaney v. Washington Oil Company, 7 C. C. R. 351, the sufficiency of the title of the Act of June 17th, 1887, P. L. 409, entitled "An Act relating to the liens of mechanics, laborers, and others upon leasehold estates and property thereon," was doubted. In McKeever v. Victor Oil Com- pany, 9 C. C. R. 284, the title was held to be insufficient be- cause it did not create a lien upon leaseholds, but only upon the property therein specified upon the leaseholds, and because the title was silent as to the extraordinary remedy provided in Section 5 to prevent the removal of the property off the leasehold after a lien was entered. In Titus v. Elyria Oil Company, 1 P. D. R. 204, the same title was also held to be insufficient. The Act of June 3d, 1885, P L. 55, entitled "An Act for the suppression of lottery gifts by store-keepers and others to secure patronage," is insufficient in title in so far as it undertakes to prohibit the giving of tickets entitling the holders to money or articles of value as inducements to purchasers, because the phrase "lottery gifts" does not em- TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 23 brace anything which is free from chance or hazard: Com- monwealth v. Moorhead, 7 C. C. R. 513. The Act of June 1st, 1883, P. L. 52, entitled "An Act to protect miners in the bituminous coal regions of this Com- monwealth," in its third section imposed a penalty for the false weighing of coal. It was held that the provisions of the third section were not covered by the title because the protection contemplated or suggested by the title is that relating to the dangers of the occupation, and not that relat- ing to the misdemeanors mentioned in the third section: Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 17 C. C. R. 91, 5 P. D. R. 148. 10. The Title Must Indicate the Effect of the Act in Relation to Persons or Matters not Neces- sarily Affected by the General Legislative Purpose. This may be first illustrated by cases involving titles re- stricted in expression, but the rule is well established, and has been adhered to in numerous cases where the title is gen- eral in expression. Thus an Act relating to liens of mechan- ics, material men, and laborers upon leasehold estates and property thereon was limited to such leasehold estates, and freehold estates, which were within the purview of the en- acting words, were excluded from its operation. 1 Thus, an Act, entitled "An Act providing for an equitable division of property between the county of Allegheny and the city of Pittsburg," was ineffective in relation to the city of Alle- gheny. 2 Thus, an Act relating to grading, paving, and other- wise improving Troy Hill Road in the city of Allegheny was inoperative as to that portion of Troy Hill Road extending beyond the city limits. 3 Thus an Act generally entitled "An Act relating to boroughs in the county of Chester," con- tained a repealing clause, which in effect shifted the pay- ment of damages for opening roads from boroughs upon the county. It was held ineffective for that pur- pose. In this case, Mr. Justice Stf.rrett said: "The mandatory clause of the amendment imperatively requires tliat the subject of proposed legislation, whatever it may be, 24 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. shall be clearly expressed in the title of the bill. As the means of notice to representatives as well as their constitu- ents the latter is quite as essential as the former. We are not called upon, however, to show the necessity or vindicate the wisdom of the constitutional requirement. It is enough for us to know that it is an express mandate of the organic law which the Legislature ought to obey and courts are bound to enforce. While it may be difficult to formulate a rule by which to determine the extent to which the title of a bill must specialize its object, it may be safely assumed that the title must not only embrace the subject of proposed leg- islation, but also express the same so clearly and fully as to give notice of the legislative purpose to those who may be specially interested therein. Unless it does this it is use- less." 4 Thus, where an Act entitled "An Act to incorporate the Manufacturers' Improvement Company" attempted to destroy the status of a navigable stream as a public highway, and to authorize the taking of tolls for floating logs, the title was held insufficient. 5 Where an Act entitled as relating to assessment of lands divided by county lines contained provis- ions relating to lands divided by township or borough lines, it was held ineffective as to the latter. 6 In so far as an Act entitled "An Act authorizing the Town Council of the borough of Carlisle to establish a Board of Health," provided for the payment of expenses by the county of Cumberland, it was held to be insufficient. 7 The Act of June 8th, 1893, entitled "An Act creating the office of County Controller in counties of this Commonwealth con- taining 150,000 inhabitants and over, prescribing his duties," was held to be defective in title, in that there was no indica- tion of the purpose and effect of the Act to abolish the office of County Auditors. 8 The title of an Act, entitled "An Act to perfect the records of deeds, mortgages, and other instru- ments in certain cases," is insufficient to give notice that the fees, incidents to the work, were to be a charge upon the sev- eral counties. 9 The title of an Act entitled "An Act to enable TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 25 the Board of School Directors of the borough of Coudersport in the county of Potter, to establish and maintain a graded school" is insufficient to cover a provision as to the annexa- tion of the territory of a certain road district named in the Act to "the school district. 10 In Smith v. Reading Street Passenger Railway 11 it was doubted whether the Act of March 22d, 1887, P. L. 8, enti- tled "An Act to provide for the incorporation and regulation of motor power companies for operating railways by cable, electric, or other means," was sufficient in title to validate a provision authorizing such companies to lease the property and franchise of passenger railway companies and operate them. In this case, Mr. Justice Williams said: "It will be seen that the title to this Act gives no hint of a purpose to enlarge the powers of city passenger railways. It is also very clear that there is no express provision in the Act itself that makes such enlargement, or undertakes to do so. The question raised is whether such enlargement of the powers of city passenger railways results by necessary implication from the grant of power to motor companies contained in the eighth subdivision of the first section of the Act of 1887? This is a question of much practical importance in the pres- ent state of legislation on this subject, and it is beset with serious difficulty." This case was an appeal from a decree re- fusing a preliminary injunction. The decree was affirmed, the decision of the question being deferred until final hear- ing. An Act to provide for the incorporation and government of cities of a certain class is sufficient in title to embrace a provision authorizing the annexation of adjacent territory. 12 The Act of June 30th, 1885, P. L. 187, entitled "An Act to regulate the collection of taxes in the several boroughs and townships of this Commonwealth," was held applicable to the collection of county taxes. Upon this point the court below said: "But we take the words 'boroughs and townships of this Commonwealth' were meant to and do include all the 26 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. territory and counties in the State. Boroughs and townships are the territorial divisions and points by which County Com- missioners levy and collect taxes under the general laws of the State . . . these were the limits of each county's dupli- cate and collector before, as well as since, the Act of 1885." After stating the provisions of that Act, the court added: "These provisions, together with long usage, the title of the Act 'boroughs and townships of this Commonwealth' fairly imply that county taxes were meant and intended, they are pertinent to and properly included in the words 'boroughs and townships.' ' The decree was affirmed without an opin- ion. The case arose upon an appeal from the decree of the court below refusing a preliminary injunction. 13 In Com- monwealth v. Lyter, 14 which arose upon the same Act, Mr. Justice Fell said: "The precise question here raised was considered in Bennett v. Hunt, and the constitutionality of the Act of 1885 was distinctly affirmed." 1 Dorsey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192. 2 Allegheny Home's Case, yj Pa. St. jj . 3 Beckert v. City of Allegheny, 85 Pa. St. 191. 4 Road in Phcenixville, 109 Pa. St. 44; and see Oxford Bor- ough St., 2 P. D. R. 327. 5 Rogers v. Manufacturers' Improvement Company, 109 Pa. St. 109; and see Ridge Avenue Passenger Railway Com- pany v. Philadelphia, 124 Pa. St. 219, 23 W. N. C. 324: Phil- adelphia v. Ridge Avenue Passenger Railway Company, 142 Pa. St. 484, 6 C. C. R. 283; Philadelphia v. Spring Garden Farmers' Market Company, 161 Pa. St. 522. 6 La Plume v. Gardner, 148 Pa. St. 192, affirming 2 Lack. Jur. 28; and see Cassel's Appeal, 8 Lane. Law. Rev. 260; Ruth's Appeal, Id. 264, 1 Lack. Leg. Rec. 311, 10 W. N. C. 498. 7 Quinn v. Cumberland County, 162 Pa. St. 55. 8 Commonwealth v. Samuels, 163 Pa. St. 282, 14 C. C. R. 423; Commonwealth v. Severn, 164 Pa. St. 462, 15 C. C. R. 249. TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 27 °Gackenbach v. Lehigh County, 166 Pa. St. 448; Pierie v. Philadelphia, 139 Pa. St. 573, 27 W. N. C. 285, affirming 47 L. I. 154. 10 Payne v. School District, 168 Pa. St. 386. 11 Smith v. Reading City Passenger Railway Company, 156 Pa. St. 5; s. c, 13 C. C. R. 49, 2 P. D. R. 490. 12 Harris's Appeal, 160 Pa. St. 494. "Bennett v. Hunt, 148 Pa. St. 257. 14 Commonwealth v. Lyter, 162 Pa. St. 50, 34 W. N. C. 393; and see Commonwealth v. Geesey, 1 Super. Ct. 502; Sanderson v. Commissioners, 7 C. C. R. 342; Commonwealth v. Commissioners, 7 C. C. R. 173; s. c, 133 Pa. St. 180. In Little Equinunk & Union Woods Turnpike Company, 2 C. C. R. 632, the title of the Act of June 25th, 1885, P. L. 170, entitled "An Act authorizing the acquisition of turnpike roads or highways heretofore or hereafter constructed near or through any borough or township in this Commonwealth upon which tolls are charged the traveling public," was held to be insufficient; said the court: "The title to this Act of 1885 is more clearly in conflict with the constitutional requirements than any of those considered in the Pennsylva- nia cases. It does not clearly express the subject of the bill, it is misleading, it is untrue, and if the constitutional pro- vision means anything or is to serve any purpose whatever, this Act of Assembly falls under its condemnation. . . The title contains no hint that counties are in any way affected by, or interested in, the subject of the bill, but, on the con- trary, directs attention exclusively to boroughs and town- ships, while the Act itself contains no reference to boroughs or townships, but as one of its most important features im- poses upon counties the expenses of the proceedings and damages which may be assessed in favor of the owners of turnpikes, etc., when condemned." — Seely, P. J., and see Carbondale & Prov. Turnpike, 17 W. N. C. 310; s. c, 4 Lane. Law Rev. 361; and s. c, 22 W. N. C. 105, in which the Su- preme Court said that the constitutionality of the Act was more than doubtful, but if it were otherwise it is superseded by the Act of June 2d, 1887, P. L. 306. The title of the Act of May 9th, 1889, P. L. 162, entitled "An Act to provide for the appointing of deputy coroners 25 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. in the several counties of this Commonwealth," is insufficient, in that it fails to give notice as to how such officers are to be appointed and paid: Commonwealth v. Grier, 9 C. C. R. 444. The Act of June 9th, 1891, P. L. 248, entitled "An Act to amend the eighth section of the Act, entitled 'An Act to re- strain and regulate the sale of vinous and spirituous, malt and brewed liquors, or any admixture thereof, approved May 13th, 1887, providing that the license money shall be paid into the treasury of the city, county, borough, and township wherever the licensed places are situated, and increasing the amount of license to be paid in cities of the first and second class," is insufficient in title in so far as it requires commis- sions of the treasurer to be paid for the use of the county, because the title to the Act fails to give notice of its effect upon the compensation of the treasurer: South Bethlehem v. Hemingway, 16 C. C. R. 103. The Act of June 6th, 1893, P. L. 328, entitled "An Act pro- viding for the relief of needy, sick, injured, and in case of death, burial of indigent persons whose legal place of settle- ment is unknown," is insufficient in title. The effect of the Act was to remove certain liabilities of poor districts and place them upon counties, and to make the county liable to the poor district without an order of relief, which effect was not indicated in the title: Poor District v. Clearfield County, 16 C. C. R. 554; s. c, 4 P. D. R. 584; Poor District v. Lu- zerne County, 17 C. C. R. 83, 5 P. D. R. 183. The Act of May 9th, 1871, P L. 639, entitled "An Act relating to streets in the several boroughs of Montgomery County," has a sufficient title. Mr. Justice Gordon, deliver- ing the opinion of the Supreme Court, held that the Act properly construed did not in effect impose the damages upon the county, but that if it did it would have offended the constitutional provision as to titles of Acts of Assembly- Mr. Justice Paxson filed an opinion, holding that the Act did in effect require payment of damages by the county, but that the title was sufficient nevertheless. In this opinion Mr. Justice Green concurred. Either view resulted in affirming the judgment: Street in Royersford, 2 Montgomery County Law Rep. 153 (1886). The Act of January 2d, 1871, P. L. 1856, entitled "A fur- ther supplement to an Act incorporating the city of Harris- burg, in the county of Dauphin, passed April ninth, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine," has an insufficient TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 29 title. It provided, among other things, that the county of Dauphin should build and keep in repair a certain bridge in the city: In re State Street, 2 Leg. Chron. 1. The title of the Act of March 29th, 1872, P- L. 651, en- titled "A supplement to an Act, entitled 'An Act authorizing the supervisors of New Castle Township, Schuylkill County, to make, repair, and keep in good order and condition the public roads, bridges, and culverts in said township,' " has an insufficient title, in so far as the Act relates to Mahanoy Township: Philadelphia v. Donahew, 5 Leg. Gaz. 22, 1 Leg. Chron. 45. The Act of March 3d, 1868, P L. 263, entitled "An Act relative to the borough of Oxford, in the county of Chester, to enable the borough authorities to widen Third Street, and relative to the opening, widening, straightening, and arranging the line of new buildings on the same in said bor- ough," has an insufficient title as to section 2, which im- poses damages on the county: Nutt's Avenue, 2 Chester County, 49. 11. The Subject Must be Single. "An Act to increase the boundaries of Forest County," may properly provide for a change of the county seat; the two provisions form but one subject, or rather, are parts of the same subject. In this case, Mr. Justice Read said: "The Act before us is not open to the objection that it is an omni- bus bill and blends in the same law subjects not connected with each other or entirely different. Nor could any im- proper influence result from combining the provisions con- tained in it, for the objects in it are parts of the same enter- prise, and neither the Legislature nor the public would be misled by the title. The subject of the Act was the enlarge- ment of the county, by the addition of new territory, and this naturally included a relocation of the county seat. If this could not be done in one Act, then two Acts must have been passed, one to enlarge the county, and the other to locate the county seat. If it had been the location of a new county, then provision must have been made for the county seat, and this shows the two provisions form but one subject, or rather 30 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. are parts of the same subject." 1 A provision, in a supple- ment to an Act "to open and straighten" certain named streets, for the assessment of damages, is a part of one subject, to wit, the opening and straightening of the streets. 2 In Dorsey's Appeal, 3 Mr. Justice Agnew said: "The word "subject' has a large signification, often embracing different kinds, different classes, and various modes, all belonging to the general subject. The word estates is itself an example, embracing fees, fee tails, estates for life, and estates for years, commonly called leaseholds. Had the qualifying term 'lease- holds' been omitted in this title, all the various kinds of es- tates of freehold would have been comprehended within the title, and the sale of a freehold interest under the lien would have been good. Mere generality of meaning in the title ought not to avoid a law. For instance the title, An Act re- lating to executions,' is quite general as an expression of the subject of the Act, yet no one could doubt the power of the legislation, under this title, to provide for the various kinds of executions generally comprised within the term execution, as for example writs of fieri facias, liberari facias, levari facias, venditioni exponas, etc. But a restriction in a title which tends to mislead, stands on a different footing." In Road in Phce- nixville, 4 Mr. Justice Sterrett said: "In determining the unity of a subject regard must, of course, be had to the ulti- mate object to be attained. Details leading to the accom- plishment of that object are cognate to the subject of legis- lation, and therefore form a part thereof." The title of the Act of March 31st, 1876, to carry into effect Section 5, Ar- ticle XIV, of the Constitution relative to the salaries of county officers is sufficiently comprehensive to cover the definition of who shall be deemed a county officer, in this case the Con- troller of Philadelphia. Chief Justice Mercur said: "The designation of those officials who should be considered county officers was a natural corollary of the title and proper to give due effect to that part of the Constitution which the Act proposes to enforce. All the provisions of the Act relate,. TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 31 and are cognate, to the purpose stated in the title." 5 The Act of June 2d, 1870, P. L. 1318, entitled "An Act to author- ize turnpike, plankroad, and canal companies to issue bonds and to secure the same by mortgage, and to abandon por- tions of their roads and lines for public use," contains but one subject. The opinion gives no explicit answer to the ar- gument that the Act really embraced several subjects, but merely points out that the title clearly expressed the purpose of the law. 8 The organization, government, and manage- ment of an insane asylum are but one subject. 7 The title of the Act of May 8th, 1889, P. L. 133, viz.: "An Act dividing the cities of this State into three classes, . and designat- ing the mode of ascertaining and changing the classification thereof . ' is sufficient to cover a section designating when the new offices shall be filled by election, and when the terms of superseded officers shall cease. 8 In Pennsylvania R. R. Company v. Riblet, 9 a distinction was marked between the legislative intent as manifested by the title and the legisla- tive subject and purpose as manifested by the law itself. It was argued in that case that the title showed an intention to protect the farmers, the Act relating to the fencing of rail- roads, and not the public generally. Mr. Justice Sharswood said: "If the Act itself is within the scope of the lawmakers' authority, it must stand, and we are bound to make it stand, if it will, upon any intendment. It is its effect, not its pur- pose, which must determine its validity." The title of the Act of May 22d, 1895, P. L. 106, entitled "An Act amending Section 9 of an Act, entitled 'An Act in relation to the laying out, opening, widening, straightening, extending or vacating streets and alleys, and the construc- tion of bridges in the several municipalities of this Common- wealth, the grading, paving, macadamizing, or otherwise improving streets and alleys, providing for ascertaining the damages to private property resulting therefrom, the assess- ment of damages, costs and expenses thereof upon the prop- erty benefited, and the construction of sewers and payment 2,2 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. of the damages, costs, and expenses thereof, including dam- ages to private property resulting therefrom," approved May- sixteenth, Anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and ninety-one, enabling municipal corporations to lay out, open, widen, extend, and vacate streets, or alleys, upon petition or without petition of property-owners," is sufficient. The objection seems to have been that the Act related to more than one subject. 10 1 Blood v. Mercelliott, 53 Pa. St. 391. 2 In re Church Street, 54 Pa. St. 353. 3 Dorsey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192. 4 In Road in Phcenixville, 109 Pa. St. 44. 5 Taggart v. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. St. 354. 6 Fredericks v. Pennsylvania Canal Company, 109 Pa. St. 50. "Clearfield County v. Cameron Township Poor District, 135 Pa. St. 86. s Commonwealth v. AYyman, 137 Pa. St. 50S. '-' Pennsylvania R. R. Company v. Riblet, 66 Pa. St. 164; and see In re Arrott Street, 18 \V. X. C. 121. 10 Dorrance v. Dorranceton, 181 Pa. St. 164. The title of the Act of March 22d, 1887, P. L. S. entitled "An Act for the protection of livery stable keepers."' is suffi- cient. That some of the sections of the Act provide for civil liability and some for criminal does not make it embrace two subjects: Commonwealth v. Moore, 2 Super. Ct. 162; s. c, 4 P. D. R. 649; 16 C. C. R. 481, 1 Lack. Leg. X. 267: and see Commonwealth v. Lehr, 16 C. C. R. 532. In these cases the lower courts held the title to be insufficient. The Act of May 24th, 1887, P. L. 204, entitled "An Act dividing cities of this State into seven classes, providing for the creation and division of wards therein and the annexation of adjacent territory thereto, prescribing general regulations relative to the passage of ordinances and giving out of con- tracts, the management of finances, the terms and duties of officers, and the punishment of certain offenses in all of said cities, and providing for the incorporation and government of cities of the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh classes." has a TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 33 sufficient title: Shoemaker v. Harrisburg, 4 C. C. R. 86. This Act was held invalid as a classification Act: In re Grant Street, 121 Pa. St. 596; Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 266; Shoe- maker v. Harrisburg, Id. 285; Berghaus v. Harrisburg, Id. 289; Klugh v. Harrisburg, Id. 289; Meadville v. Dickson, 129 Pa. St. 1. It seems that cities of divers classes may be legislated for at the same time and in the same Act. In Wheeler v. Philadelphia, yy Pa. St. 338, the title of the Act of May 23d, 1874, P. L. 230, was objected to on the ground that the object of the Act was not clearly expressed in the title. This objection was overruled. The title of the Act was "An Act dividing the cities of this State into three classes, regulating the passage of ordinances, providing for contracts for supplies and work for said cities, authorizing the increase of indebtedness, and the creation of a sinking fund to redeem the same, defining and punishing certain offenses in all of said cities, and providing for the incorporation and govern- ment of cities of the third class." It is a further subject of remark that the said Act in Section 41, under the head of schools and school controller, provided that the said cities of the third class should constitute one school district, and made further provision as to the powers of controllers, their man- agement of schools, their election, the filling of vacancies in, and the organization of, the board, etc. It may be question- able whether legislation with reference to the public schools is germane to the subject of the incorporation and govern- ment of cities. See Chalfant v. Edwards, 173 Pa. St. 246; and also Gaston v. Graham, 18 C. C. R. 265; Gaston v. Mead- ville, 5 P. D. R. 549; Baker v. McKee, 6 P D. R. 599; re- ported since the foregoing was written. The Act of May 6th, 1872, P. L. 1163, entitled "An Act to authorize the opening and paving of certain portions of Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Norris Streets," has a sufficient title: Commonwealth v. Dickinson, 30 Leg. Int. 53, revers- ing Commonwealth v. Dickinson, 9 Phila. 561. The Act of March 25th, 1873, P. L. 330, entitled "An Act to authorize the laying out, opening, and laying of water pipes in Volkmar Street, in the city of Philadelphia," contains but one subject: Commonwealth v. Clovis & Dickinson, 1 W. N. C. 185. The Act of April 20th, 1876, P L. 43, relating to appeals from justices of the peace in cases of recovery for wages of manual labor has but one subject: Cochran v. McKelvy, 25 P. L. J. 120. 3 34 validity of statutes. 12. The Act May Properly Include Matters Ger- mane to the Subject Expressed in the Title. Pertinent details, provisions relative to the mode of ac- complishing the legislative purpose, although the things in themselves may be diverse, if congruous, naturally connected, cognate, or germane may be included. These terms all indi- cate the same idea, and the subject-matter being considered, thetestisoneof commonsenseandnot strict logic. The chang- ing of the county seat is germane to the subject of changing the county boundaries, the latter being expressed in the title. 1 So is theassessmentofdamageswhentheopeningandstraight- ening of streets is expressed. 2 So are provisions as to the ap- pointment of a clerk and the summoning of a grand jury where the establishment of a court of criminal jurisdiction is expressed. 3 Persons in interest not parties to a suit may be permitted to testify by the terms of an Act entitled as re- lating to parties in interest. 4 Authority to construct sewers and drains expressed in the title will cover provisions as to charge for the use of the same when completed. 5 An Act to provide for the erection of public buildings, as expressed in the title, may provide for the raising of taxes and the occu- pation of a certain square. 6 Provision for borrowing money is germane to authority to reconstruct county bridges. 7 A generally entitled supplement to a borough incorporation Act may authorize surveys of the town, plans, and the payment of an engineer for making them. 8 Designat- ing the city controller as a county officer when city and county are co-extensive is germane to an Act entitled to carry into effect the constitutional provis- ion as to the compensation of county officers. 9 All of the provisions of the Act of May 13th, 1887, known as the Brooks Law are germane to the subject as expressed in the title. 10 Costs are germane to the subject of levy, collec- tion, and disbursement of taxes and water rents. 11 Designat- ing when new offices shall be rilled by election and when the terms of superseded officers shall cease, is germane to a title TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 35 relating to the classification of cities and designating the mode of changing the classification thereof. 12 A provision that all dogs in this Commonwealth shall hereafter be per- sonal property and a subject of larceny, is germane to the title of an Act for the taxation of dogs and the protection of sheep, the purpose of the Act being the taxation of that which was not property at common law. 13 A provision for recovery by the wife, of damages to which the husband would otherwise be entitled for loss of services, on his filing a stipu- lation releasing his right, is germane to the title of an Act relative to actions brought by husband and wife, or by the wife alone for her separate property in case of desertion. 14 In this case, Chief Justice Sterrett said: "The first clause of the title indicates with sufficient clearness that one branch of the general subject on which it was proposed to legislate was in relation 'to actions by husband and wife,' the details of which legislation constitute the first section. The other branch of the subject is sufficiently indicated by the latter clause of the title, which relates to actions brought 'by the wife alone for her separate property in cases of desertion;' and the legislation on that constitutes the second section of the Act. Instead of containing more than one subject, the provisions of both sections are cognate, each, respectively, relating not to a separate and independent subject of legis- lation, but to branches of the same general subject, namely, remedial legislation in the interest and for the benefit of married women." Provisions for the annexation of territory and the exten- sion of city limits are germane to an Act entitled An Act providing for the incorporation and government of cities of a given class. 1 '"' All of the provisions of the taxing Act of June 8th, 1891, P. L. 229, are germane to the title. 16 "The title of the Act of April 20th, 1874, relating to increase of indebtedness of municipalities is so manifestly significant of the subject of the bill that it would be a waste of time to dis- cuss the question as to whether it included a power to in- 36 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. crease the indebtedness." 17 The purpose of the Act of May 23d, 1891, supplementary to the Corporation Act of 1874, and relating to beneficial associations, "is expressed fully and in very explicit terms in the title." 18 The Act of June 10th, 1893, P. L. 419, .entitled "An Act to regulate the nomina- tion and election of public officers, requiring certain expenses incident thereto to be paid by the several counties, and pun- ishing certain offenses in regard to such elections," is in- sufficient in title in so far as it attempts to regulate the mode of voting on questions of the increase of municipal indebted- ness. 19 This case may be considered as furnishing an illus- tration of a well-marked distinction. The subject of elec- tions is a single subject, and an Act relating to elections with a title sufficiently general to indicate a purpose to legislate with regard to all elections would not be considered as viola- tive of that branch of the constitutional provision in question which requires an Act to be confined to a single subject. On the other hand, when the subject of legislation as indicated in the title does not comprehend what might have been com- prehended under a more general title but is confined to a subdivision of a general subject, then a provision which might be germane to the general subject is not germane to the sub- ject as expressed in the title in restricted terms, as here, not elections generally, but the election of public officers. a Blood v. Mercelliott, 53 Pa. St. 391. 2 In re Church Street, 54 Pa. St. 353. 3 Commonwealth v. Green, 58 Pa. St. 226. 4 Yeager v. Weaver, 64 Pa. St. 425. ■'Mauch Chunk v. McGee, 81 Pa. St. 433. fi Wheeler v. Rice, 83 Pa. St. 232; Lea v. Brumm, 83 Pa. St- 335- 7 Myers v. Commonwealth, no Pa. St. 217. 8 McKeesport v. Owens, 6 W. N. C. 492. °Taggart v. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. St. 354. "Commonwealth v. McCandless, 21 \Y. N. C. 162; 4 C. C. R. 119: 10 Cent. R. 758; Commonwealth v. Sellers, 130 Pa. TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 37 St. 32; and see Blood v. Mercelliott, 53 Pa. St. 391; citing Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. Rep. 185; contra, Commonwealth v. Doll, 6 C. C. R. 49; Commonwealth v. Fowler, 18 Phil. 513- "Bradley v. Pittsburg, 130 Pa. St. 475. "Commonwealth v. Wyman, 137 Pa. St. 108. ls Commonwealth v. Depuy, 148 Pa. St. 201. 14 Kelly v. Mayberry Township, 154 Pa. St. 440. 15 Harris's Appeal, 160 Pa. St. 494. 16 Commonwealth v. Wilkes-Barre & Scranton Railway Company, 162 Pa. St. 614; Commonwealth v. Edgerton Coal Company, 164 Pa. St. 284. 17 Dean, J., Bruce v. Pittsburg, 166 Pa. St. 152. 18 Mitchell, J., in Commonwealth v. Keystone Benefit Association, 171 Pa. St. 465. 19 Evans v. Willistown Township, 168 Pa. St. 578; Com- monwealth v. Weir, 18 C. C. R. 425; and see generally Com- monwealth v. Wilkes-Barre & Scranton Railway. 162 Pa. St. 614; Grubb's Appeal, 174 Pa. St. 187; Commonwealth v. Morningstar, 144 Pa. St. 103; Washington Borough v. McGeorge, 146 Pa. St. 248; City Sewage Utilization Com- pany v. Davis, 8 Phila. 625; Smith v. Baker, 3 P. D. R. 626; Commonwealth v. Nihil, 4 P. D. R. 582: Bruce v. Pittsburg, 166 Pa. St. 152; Act of May 5th, 1876, P. L. 124, relating to taxation in cities of the second class. The title of the Act of May 24th, 1887, P. L. 194, viz.: "An Act providing for the licensing of wholesales dealers in intoxicating liquors," properly includes the licensing of brewers and distillers. In a broad sense these are also whole- sale dealers: Doberneck's License, 5 C. C. R. 454; s. c, 35 P. L. J. 476; and see Commonwealth v. Deibert; 12 C. C. R. 504: s. c, 2 D. R. 53; Eby's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 311. The Act of June 8th, 1893. P. L. 344, entitled "An Act relating to husband and wife, enlarging her capacity to ac- quire and dispose of property, to sue and be sued, and to make a last will, and enabling them to sue and to testify against each other in certain cases," has a sufficient title. 38 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. The objection made was that the title was misleading in so far as it abridged the rights of the wife in taking away her right in case of desertion to sue her husband for defamation of her character: Mink v. Mink, 16 C. C. R. 189. The Act of April 17th, 1876, P L. 29, is entitled "An Act relating to appeals in cases of summary convictions." Doubted whether this title is sufficient to cover appeals from judgments for penalties: Commonwealth v. Swift, 17 C. C. R. 95. Held insufficient for that purpose: Mauch Chunk v. Betzler, 19 C. C. R. 27; s. c, 6 P. D. R. 330. Railways upon rural highways are plainly compre- hended within the title of the Act of May 14th, 1889, P. L. 211, entitled "An Act to provide for the incorpo- ration and government of street railway companies in this Commonwealth:" Gettysburg Battlefield Association Case, 2 P. D. R. 649; Pennsylvania R. R. Company v. Montgomery County Passenger R. R. Company, 3 P. D. R. 58. The term "street railway companies" in said Act is used in the same sense as it is in the Constitution, Article XVII, Section 9, and previous statutes, to wit, to designate the character of the railway: one to carry passengers only, and to be located on highways, and not its location: Pennsylvania R. R. Company v. Montgomery County Passenger R. R. Com- pany, Id. The Act of April 1st, 1868, P. L. 583, entitled "An Act for the improvement of the borough of Norristown, in the county of Montgomery," has a sufficient title. The subject- matter relating to the laying of pavements and the construc- tion of sewers is germane: Schall v. Norristown, 3 Luz. Leg. Reg. yy\ 6 Leg. Gaz. 167. The third section of the Act of June 10th, 1881, P. L. 86, entitled "A supplement to an Act, entitled 'An Act to pro- vide revenue by taxation, approved the seventh day of June, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine,' " is embraced in the title. The section relates to the elective feature of the bank tax: Second National Bank v. Caldwell, 39 Leg. Int. 414; s. c, 13 Fed. Rep. 429. In Barton v. Pittsburg, 4 Brewster, 373 (1870), an in- junction was refused in the Court of Common Pleas of Alle- gheny County, where there was in question a general appro- priation ordinance of the city of Pittsburg (so entitled), which contained provisions for the assessment of taxes to meet the appropriation. The latter provisions were held to TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 39 be germane. The charter of Pittsburg contained a provision similar to that of Article III, Section 6. By the Act of May 23d, 1874, P. L. 230, relating to cities in Section 3, it is provided that no bill [ordinance] shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. The Act of June 17th, 1887, P. L. 413, has a sufficient title: Lucas v. Ruff, 45 Leg. Int. 454, but it has been held invalid on other grounds: Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil -Company, 122 Pa. St. (127. The Act of June 8th, 1881, P. L. 70, entitled "An Act to protect fruit, gardens, growing crops, grass, et cetera, and to punish trespass," and the Act of June 18th, 1895, P. L. 196, amendatory thereof, which recites the title of the former Act in its title, have sufficient titles. The words "et cetera" refer to things generally the same as those specified, and the titles are sufficiently comprehensive to include provisions relative to trees: Commonwealth v. Clark, 3 Super. Ct. 141. The title of the Act of May 24th, 1878, P. L. 134, entitled "A fur- ther supplement to an Act, entitled 'An Act relating to execu- tions,' approved June sixteenth, one thousand eight hun- dred and thirty-six, providing that one justice of the peace, alderman, or magistrate, shall act where two are now re- quired," has a sufficient title. All of its provisions are ger- mane to the subject: Wilson v. Downing, 4 Super. Ct. 487. The Act of March 14th, 1873, P. L. 290, entitled "An Act to confer upon M. H. the rights, powers, and privileges of a son of B. H.," has a sufficient title to cover an exemption from the collateral inheritance tax: Commonwealth v. Hen- derson, 172 Pa. St. 135; 37 W. N. C. 344. The title of the Act of May 1st, 1876, P. L. 90, entitled "An Act supplementary to an Act entitled 'An Act to pro- vide for the incorporation and regulation of certain corpora- tions,' approved April twenty-ninth, one thousand eight hun- dred and seventy-four, relative to the incorporation and pow- ers of telegraph companies for the use of individuals, firms, and corporations, and for fire alarm, police, and messenger business," is sufficient to include the incorporation of tele- phone companies which are virtually telegraph companies: Telephone Company v. Keesey, 5 P D. R. 366; s. c, York Telephone Company v. Keesey, 9 York, 153. The Act of May 22d, 1883, P L. 39, entitled "A supplement to an Act, entitled 'An Act regulating boroughs,' approved 40 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. the third day of April, Anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one, and empowering the corporate author- ities of boroughs to lay foot-walks along turnpike roads, and assess the cost of paving, curbing, and guttering the same on the owners of the adjoining lands," and the Act of May 16th, 1891, P. L. 75, entitled "An Act in relation to the lay- ing out, opening, widening, straightening, extending, or va- cating streets and alleys, and the construction of bridges in the several municipalities of this Commonwealth, the grad- ing, paving, macadamizing, or otherwise improving streets and alleys, providing for ascertaining the damages to private property resulting therefrom, the assessment of the damages, costs, and expenses thereof upon the property benefited, and the construction of sewers and payment of the damages, costs, and expenses thereof, including damages to private property resulting therefrom," have sufficient titles. Drains are component parts of highways and streets: Strohl v. Ephrata, 13 Lane. L. R. 1. 13. Two Subjects. In Hatfield v. Commonwealth, 1 the Act of April 12th, 1867, P L. 1 1 78, entitled "An Act to prohibit the issuing of licenses within two miles of the Normal School at Mansfield, Tioga County, Penna," was in question. The defendant was indicted under the second section of the Act, which made it a misdemeanor to sell liquors within the limits aforesaid. The defendant sold domestic wines by the bottle, but not for drinking on his premises, which he might lawfully have done under the eighth section of the Act of April 20th. 1858, P. L. 365. It was held that the Act contained two distinct sub- jects, one of which was referred to in the title, and that a conviction could not be sustained. The title was also held to be misleading. 1 Hatfield v. Commonwealth, 120 Pa. St. 395; and see Commonwealth v. Frantz, 135 Pa. St. 389. The Act of May 21st, 1879, P. L. 72, entitled "An Act re- pealing Section 7 of an Act entitled 'An Act to carry into effect Section 5 of Article XIV. of the Constitution, relative TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 4-1 to the salaries of county officers and the payment of fees received by them into the State or county treasury in coun- ties containing over 150,000 inhabitants, approved the thirty-first day of March, Anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six,' and also repealing the supplement to said Act, approved the 23d day of March, 1877, and con- ferring upon Councils of cities of the first class the power of fixing the number and salaries of certain employes," con- tains "three distinct subjects in one title: First, Repeal of Section 7 of the Act of 1876; Second, Repeal of the supple- ment of 1877; and third, giving Councils of cities of the first class power to fix the number and salaries of certain employes . . the title is misleading and fails to give notice of the legislative purpose." — Collier, J., Commonwealth v. Mer- cer, 9 C. C. R. 461. The Act of Mch. 18th, 1869, P. L. 393, and its supplement of April 10th, 1869, P. L. 828, contain more than one subject, in that a new mode of assessing damages is provided for. The former Act was entitled "An Act providing for the appoint- ment of superintendents and the election of supervisors of highways in the Twenty-second Ward of the city of Phila- delphia," the second section of which provided a mode for the assessment of damages different from the general law. The supplement was apparently intended to cure a sup- posed defect in the title of the original Act in failing to refer to the matter of damages, and it was entitled "A supplement to an Act providing for the appointment of superintendents and the election of supervisors of highways in the Twenty- second Ward of the city of Philadelphia, approved March eighteenth, Anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine, giving certain additional powers and imposing certain duties upon said superintendents, and regulating the manner of assessing damages for opening streets in said ward:" In re Hancock Street, 1 W. N. C. 112, C. P. Phila. The Act of January 2d, 1871, P. L. 1556, entitled "A fur- ther supplement to an Act incorporating the city of Harris- burg, in the county of Dauphin, passed April 9th, 1869," has an insufficient title. Pearson, J., points out that the Act contains five different subjects relating: First, to the record of a plot; Second, a new mode of assessing damages; Third, authorizing the opening of Front Street, and provid- ing a new mode of assessing damages; Fourth, vesting title in fee in the city to what was formerly covered by an easement ; 42 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. and Fifth, a provision that the county of Dauphin shall build and keep in repair a certain bridge in the city: In re State Street, 2 Leg. Chron. 1 (1873). 14. Original Acts and General Supplements and Amendments. Where an Act is entitled generally a supplement to an Act referred to by its title, or otherwise sufficiently identified, the title of the former is sufficient. 1 A railroad company was incorporated by an Act, entitled "An Act to incorporate the State Line & Juniata Railroad," afterwards an Act was passed entitled "A supplement to an Act entitled 'An Act to in- corporate the State Line & Juniata Railroad.' " This supple- ment authorized the company to locate their road and branches without reference to the terminal and intermediate points mentioned in the original Act, and to extend their road as the directors might judge would enable them to make proper connections with other railroads, and to erect a tele- graph line. Afterwards an Act was passed, entitled "A fur- ther supplement to an Act entitled 'An Act to incorporate the State Line & Juniata Railroad,' " which gave the com- pany power to build such branches, by such routes, and to such points as the directors might deem expedient, to com- mence the main line and branches at any points the directors might determine, cross other roads at grade, build, and main- tain branches, etc. The validity of the supplementary leg- islation being in question, Mr. Justice Paxson said: "In Allegheny Home's Appeal it was held that 'if the title fairly gives notice of the subject of the Act so as to lead to inquiry into the body of the bill, it is all that is necessary,' applying this rule to the case before us we do not regard the Acts referred to as offending against the Constitution, because their subject is not clearly set forth in their titles. One of said Acts is entitled 'A supplement,' and the other 'A further supplement to an Act entitled An Act to incorporate the State Line & Juniata Railroad.' An examination of the said TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 43 supplement discloses the fact that all the legislation con- tained therein relates to the State Line & Juniata Railroad. The true rule is that where the legislation in the supplement is germane to the title of the original bill, the object of such supplement is sufficiently expressed in the title. . . " 2 In re Pottstown Borough, 3 there was in question the gen- eral borough law of 1851, entitled "An 'Act for the regula- tion of boroughs," the Act of June nth, 1879, entitled "A supplement to an Act for the regulation of boroughs," and the Act of May 17th, 1883, entitled "An Act to amend (the first section of the last mentioned Act) so as to include all incorporated boroughs." This legislation was sustained on the ground that all the provisions of the supplement and amendatory Act were cognate to the subject of the original title. Where a general supplement extended the line of the railroad and conferred powers under the general railroad law of 1849, ^ was h e 'd that the term "railway" in the corporate style of the company did not necessarily import a street passenger railway, and that the right to use steam as a motive power and to carry freight as well as passengers, together with the other provisions of the Act were well covered by the title. 4 An apparently erroneous recital of the title of an orig- inal Act in the title of a supplement caused by misplaced quo- tation marks will not vitiate the latter when the sense is clear. 5 Two street railway companies merged under a new name, to wit, Ridge Avenue Passenger Railway Company, afterwards an Act, entitled "An Act relating to the Ridge Avenue Passenger Railway Company," was passed, which contained a provision repealing "all the provisions in the charters of the two companies so consolidated as above re- cited, not included in this Act." It will be noticed that neither of the consolidated companies was of the corporate name mentioned in the title of the Act. It omitted a pro- vision in the charter of one of the companies charging it with the expense of keeping in repair the streets and avenues tra- versed by it. The title was held insufficient for this purpose. 6 44 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. And in a subsequent case, a provision reducing the rate of taxation of dividends for city purposes was held not to be covered. 7 In the latter case, the general rule as to supple- mentary Acts was stated as follows: "When an Act of As- sembly is a supplement to a former Act, if the subject of the original Act is sufficiently expressed in its title and the pro- visions of the supplement are germane to the subject of the original Act, the general rule is that the subject of the sup- plement is covered by a title which contains a specific refer- ence to the original, by its title, giving the date of its ap- proval, and declaring it to be a supplement thereto." It will be noticed that the title involved in these cases was not in form supplementary, and that the principle upon which the title was held insufficient was one equally applicable whether the Act were original or supplementary. The Act of May 18th, 1887, P. L. 118, was entitled "A supplement to an Act relating to the lien of mechanics and others upon buildings." This title was held to be sufficient. It was said: "While said Act may be objectionable in form, it is, nevertheless, in substantial compliance with Section 6 of Article III of the Constitution. It not only quotes the title of the Act of June 16th, 1836, but it re-enacts and publishes at length so much thereof as by its supplement of May 1st, 1861, is extended and amended." 8 The Act of June 2d, 1887, P L. 310, was entitled "An Act supplementary to an Act approved April 29th, 1874, entitled 'An Act to provide for the incorporation and regulation of certain corporations, amending the thirty- fourth section thereof, extending its provisions to fuel com- panies, providing for their capital stock, and regulation, and giving them power of eminent domain.' " The title was held to be sufficient, and the judgment of the court below was affirmed for the reasons given in the opinion of his Honor, Judge Rice, who said: "After careful examination of this title we are unconvinced that it is fairly subject to the objec- tion made. The title first declares that the Act is a supple- ment to the general Act providing for the incorporation and TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 45 regulation of certain corporations, and then proceeds to indi- cate the particulars in which it supplements that Act; (a) by amending the thirty-fourth section thereof; (b), by ex- tending its provisions to fuel companies; (c) by providing for their capital stock and regulation; (d) by giving them the power of eminent domain. The words 'amending the thirty- fourth section thereof,' and 'extending its provisions to fuel companies,' are different branches of the same general sub- ject, and we do not think the careful reader would conclude, without examining further, that the latter clause was merely explanatory of the former. Amending an Act or section of an Act is one thing, extending its provisions is another. The provisions of an Act may be extended in the form of an amendment, but if that were the sole purpose of which the title was to give notice, one would naturally suppose that the two clauses would have been connected by the word 'by,' or the words 'so as to extend,' or that the words 'extending the provisions of the thirty-fourth section to fuel companies' would have been used without inserting the first clause at all. As it was written, we think the title gives notice of an amendment of the thirty-fourth section beyond the mere ex- tension of its provisions to fuel companies, which was suffi- cient to lead legislators and others interested to examine into the provisions of the Act, and this, according to the great weight of authority, is the test. "Fuel companies were expressly referred to, not for the pur- pose of diverting attention and misleading, but, as it seems to us, out of abundant caution, because they had not been mentioned in the original Act." 9 This title, it will be no- ticed, was in its terms both general and specific. 1 In re Church Street, 54 Pa. St. 353; City Sewage Utiliza- tion Company v. Davis, 8 Phila. 625. 2 State Line & Juniata R. R. Company's Appeal, jj Pa. St. 429; s. c, Lyon v. State Line & Juniata R. R. Company, 1 W. N. C. 225, 77 Pa. St. 429; see also Horstman v. Kauf- man, 97 Pa. St. 147; s. c, 8 W. N. C. 73; Leowi v. Haedich, 8 46 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. W. N. C. 70; Beckert v. Allegheny, 85 Pa. St. 191; McKees- port v. Owens, 6 W. N. C. 492; Craig v. First Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. St. 42; Commonwealth v. Edgerton Coal Company, 164 Pa. St. 284; Ruth's Appeal, 10 W. N. C. 498, 8 Lane. L. R. 264, 1 Lack. Leg. Rec. 311. 3 In re Pottstown Borough, 117 Pa. St. 538, 1 Montgomery County, 161; 1 Montgomery County, 189. 4 Millvale v. Evergreen Railway Company, 131 Pa. St. 1. 5 Commonwealth v. Taylor, 159 Pa. St. 451. 6 Ridge Avenue Passenger Railway Company v. Philadel- phia, 124 Pa. St. 219; 23 W. N. C. 324. 7 Philadelphia v. Ridge Avenue Passenger Railway Com- pany, 142 Pa. St. 484; 6 C. C. R. 283. s Purvis v. Ross, 158 Pa. St. 20; 12 C. C. R. 193. Affirmed in Smyers v. Beam, 158 Pa. St. 57. 9 Luzerne Water Company v. Toby Creek Water Company, 148 Pa. St. 568; s. c. below, 6 Kulp, 237; and see Hoffa's Ap- peal, 1 Super. Ct. 357. The Act of April 12th, 1875, P. L. 40, is entitled "An Act to permit the voters of this Commonwealth to vote every three years on the question of granting licenses to sell in- toxicating liquors and to restrain and regulate the sale of the same." In sustaining this title the court below said: "The Act has but one subject or purpose, the regulation of liquor traffic; to it every provision is strictly germane. The repeal of the Act of 1872, the classification of retail licenses, the general enactments applicable to wholesalers and retailers, the special ones to bottlers, the penal provisions, and the saving of local laws, are but incidents to the main purpose of the statute, which would have been adequatelv expressed by a simple declaration of intent to regulate the sale of in- toxicating liquors." — Endlich, J., Commonwealth v. Dei- bert, 12 C. C. R. 504; s. c, 2 P. D. R. 446; 2 P. D. R. 53. The title to the Act of May 24th, 1871. P. L. 1096, en- titled "An Act entitled 'A supplement to an Act erecting the village of Mount Joy and Richland, and their vicinity, in the county of Lancaster, into a borough, to be calle'd the borough of Mount Joy,' passed the tenth day of February, one thousand eisrht hundred and fiftv-one," is sufficient TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 47 within the rule as to original and supplemental legislation. In this case the supplement put a charge upon the turn- pike: Mount Joy v. Lancaster Turnpike, 13 Lane. L. R. 180. The Act of June 1st, 1887, P. L. 285, is entitled "A further supplement to an Act, approved the eleventh day of June, Anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine, entitled "A supplement to an Act for the regulation of bor- oughs,' approved the third day of April, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-one, providing for the adjustment of indebtedness and government of the boroughs, townships, and school districts affected by changes of limits of any bor- ough in the Commonwealth." There is no Act correspond- ing to the Act of April 3d, 1871, referred to in this title; the evident intention was to amend the twenty-third and twenty- fourth sections of the General Borough Law of April 3d, 185 1, P. L. 320. The title was held sufficient: Darby & Col- lingdale, 19 C. C. R. 315. 15. Original Acts and Specific Supplements and Amendments. A¥he>e the title of an amendatory or supplementary Act is specific the maxim cxprcssio uiiiits est c.rchtsio alterius applies as well as it does to the title of an original enact ment. 1 t. 1 1 Union Passenger Railway Company's Appeal, 81* Pa. St. 91 ; 4 Leg. Gaz. 381 ; 29 Leg. Int. 380; 9 Phila. 495 ; Phila- delphia v. Spring Garden Farmers' Market Company, 161 Pa. St. 522; and see Sener v. Ephrata, 176 Pa. St. 80; Rogers v. Glendower Iron AA T orks, 17 W N. C. 444; Evans's Appeal, 152 Pa. St. 401 : Davey v. Ruff ell, 162 Pa. St. 443. In Philadelphia v. Pepper, 2 C. C. R. 287, an objection to the title of the Act of June 22d, 1883, P. L. 161, which was a supplementary Act, was overruled. An objection to the Act on other constitutional grounds prevailed. The Act of June 10th, 1881, P L. 79, entitled "A supple- ment to an Act to amend and consolidate the several Acts relating togame and game fish,approvedthe third dayof June, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight, changing the time for hunting and killing deer, squirrels, rabbits, wild tur- 48 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. keys, pheasants, and prairie chickens," is insufficient in title so far as the provisions of the said supplement relate to fish. The specification in the title of the supplementary Act does not include fish, and the Act is valid only in so far as it relates to the certain animals enumerated. The maxim ex- pressio unius, &c, is applied in the opinion of the court: Com- monwealth v. Bender, 7 C. C. R. 620; 8 W. X. C. 7$. The Act of June 23d, 1885, P. L. 141, was entitled "An Act for the destruction of wolves, wildcats, foxes, minks, hawks, weasels, and owls, in this Commonwealth." The Act of May 13th, 1887, P. L. 116, was entitled "An Act to repeal an Act, entitled 'An Act for the destruction of wolves, wild- cats, foxes, minks, hawks, weasels, and owls, approved the twenty-third day of June, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-five,' so far as it relates to foxes, minks, hawks, wea- sels, and owls." The Act of April 25th, 1889, P. L. 54, was entitled "An Act to amend the provisions of the first section of an Act approved May 13th, 1887, entitled 'An Act for the destruction of wolves and wildcats.' ' "The title to the Act as adopted not only makes it amend an Act not on the statute books, but it contains nothing to indicate that the bill has anything to do with foxes and minks, the real subject of the Act:" Barker, J., Sanders v. Cambria County, 16 C. C. R. Q4; s. c, 4 P. D. R. 241. 16. Repeal and Re-enactment. The Act of May 13th, 1887, P. L. 108, is entitled "An Act to regulate and restrain the sale of vinous and spirituous, malt or brewed liquors, or any admixture thereof." This Act in Section 19 provides that all local laws fixing a license rate or fee less than is provided for in this Act are repealed. It was objected that this title was insufficient to give notice of the repeal of local liquor laws. The contrary was held by the court below, 3 whose judgment was affirmed by the Su- preme Court in a per curiam opinion. 2 The Act of April 7th, 1877, P.L.83,was entitled"A further supplement to an Actto incorporatethecityof Scranton,"andprovidedforthe repeal of a clause of a special Act relating to the collection of taxes in said city. The title was held insufficient to cover such repeal, in an opinion of the court below on a motion for a preliminary TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 49 injunction, and the order was affirmed on appeal in a per curiam opinion. Other points were involved in the case. 5 The Act of June 13th, 1883, P. L. 116, entitled "An Act to amend the first section of an Act, entitled An Act for the better protection of the wages of mechanics, miners, labor- ers, and others, approved the 9th day of April, 1872,' amend- ing said Act so that the wages of servant girls, washer- women, clerks, and others shall be preferred, and first paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the property of insolvent debtors owing wages to such servants or employes," enlarged the class of wage claimants and re-enacted a provision of the Act of 1872, requiring the filing of the claim in the prothon- otary's office, which had been repealed by an Act of 1874. It was held that the title of the Act of 1883 gave no notice of an intention to repeal the repealing Act of 1874, nor to impose any restrictions upon wage claimants, and that therefore such provisions were void, and as to them the title was mis- leading.* The Act of May 24th, 1893, P. L. 124, entitled "An Act to abolish the commissioners of public buildings, and to place all public buildings heretofore under the con- trol of such commissioners under the control of the depart- ment of public works in cities of the first class," which by such title and its first section purported the abolition of the said commissioners — i. e., the vacation of their offices, and the transfer of the control to the department of public works, thereby attempting to vest the powers of the commissioners in such department, and which in its second section at- tempted to repeal the Act of August 5th, 1870, whereby the commission was created and its powers defined, was held in- valid, because the latter purpose was not expressed in the title, which purported the contrary, and because the object expressed in the title was contrary to other provisions of the Constitution. 5 The title of the Act of June 3d, 1887, P L. 337, purported it to be a supplement to an Act of June 13th, 1883, which in its title purported to be an amendment to the Act of April 9th, 1872. The title of the Act of 1887 4 50 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. concluded "providing for the manner ot collecting claims when liens have been filed against the real estate of employ- ers." Section i of said Act of 1887 recited the provision of the Act of 1882, relating to the filing of liens in the pro- thonotary's office, which had been repealed by an Act of 1874, and re-enacted the same with amendments. The title was held sufficient, and the Act was held to repeal, by impli- cation, the Act of 1874.° In Commonwealth v. Taylor, 7 there was in question an original enactment of 1874, a sup- plement of 1878 re-enacting and amending certain provisions of the Act of 1874, and thus repealing them, save in so far as re-enacted; a supplement of 1883 to the Act of 1874 not no- ticing the modifications effected by the Act of 1878, but re- enacting the original provisions; and a later Act of 1889 again quoting the Act of 1874 without reference to the provisions of the Acts of 1878 and 1883. It was held that the legisla- tion might all stand, the later provisions being given effect in order, and that the title of the Act of 1878, P. L. 51, en- titled "A supplement to an Act entitled 'An Act to prescribe the manner in which the courts may divide boroughs into wards,' approved the 14th day of May, 1874," was sufficient to give notice of repeal of inconsistent provisions of the Act of 1874, which repeal was expressed in general terms. 1 Commonwealth v. McCandless, 4 C. C. R. 119. Commonwealth v. McCandless, 21 \Y N. C. 162; 10 Cent. Rep. 758. 3 Ruth's Appeal; 10 YV N. C. 498; 8 Lane. L. R. 264; 1 Lack. Leg. Rec. 311. ■'Evans's Appeal, 152 Pa. St. 401. 5 Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. St. 554; 156 Pa. St. 539. "Evans's Appeal, 152 Pa. St. 401 ; and see Rogers v. Glen- dower Iron Works, 17 \V. N. C. 444. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 159 Pa. St. 451 ; and see Ridge Avenue Passenger Railway Company v. Philadelphia, 124 Pa. St. 219; 23 YV. N. C. 324: Philadelphia v. Ridge Avenue Passenger Railway Company, 142 Pa. St. 484; 6 C. C. R. 283; TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 5 1 Union Passenger Railway Company's Appeal, 81* Pa. St. 91; 4 Leg. Gaz. 381 ; 29 Leg. Int. 380; 9 Phil. 495; Philadel- phia v. Spring Garden Farmers' Market, 161 Pa. St. 522; Bit- tinger's Estate, 129 Pa. St. 338; Del Busto's Estate, 23 W. N. C. in; South Bethlehem v. Hemingway, 16 C. C. R. 103; Commonwealth v. Morgan, 178 Pa. St. 198; Commonwealth v. Williams, 178 Pa. St. 211; Commonwealth v. Rynkiewicz, 178 Pa. St. 213; Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 178 Pa. St. 214; Commonwealth v. Toomey, 178 Pa. St. 215; Common- wealth v. Van Loon, 4 Kulp, 338; Commonwealth v. Dol- phin, 2 C. P. Rep. 85. The Act of May 21st, 1879, P. L. 72, entitled "An Act re- pealing Section 7 of an Act, entitled 'An Act to carry into effect Section 5 of Article XIV, of the Constitution, relative to the salaries of county officers and the payment of fees re- ceived by them into the State or county treasury, in counties containing over 150,000 inhabitants, approved the thirty-first day of March, Anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six,' and also repealing the supplement to said Act, approved the 23d day of March, 1877, and conferring upon councils and cities of the first class the power of fixing the number and salaries of certain employes," contains "three distinct subjects in one title: First, repeal of Section 7 of the Act of 1876; Second, repeal of the supplement of 1877; and third, giving councils of cities of the first class power to fix the number and salaries of certain employes the title is misleading and fails to give notice of the legislative pur- pose:" Collier, J., Commonwealth v. Mercer, 9 C. C. R. 461. The Act of March 16th, 1868, P L. 352, entitled "An Act relating to boroughs in the county of Chester," repealed cer- tain provisions of the General Borough Law of 1851, and its supplement of 1856. The title was held sufficient to cover such repealing provisions: Nutt's Avenue, 2 Chester Co. 49. The title of the Act of June 26th, 1895, P. L. 343, enti- tled "An Act relative to bonds, undertakings, recognizances, guarantees, and other obligations required or permitted to be made, given, tendered, or filed with surety or sureties, and to the acceptance as surety or guarantor thereupon of com- panies qualified to act as such," is insufficient to cover pro- 52 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. visions operating to repeal prior Acts relating to sureties: American Banking & Trust Company's Petition, O. C. Phila. 37 W. N. C. 297. 17. Provisos, Exceptions, and Exemptions. A proviso inconsistent with the title is inoperative. 1 1 Sewickley Borough v. Sholes, 118 Pa. St. 165. The Act of April 15th, 1891, P. L. 17, was entitled, "An Act to provide for an appeal by county commissioners, cities, or other municipalities, and all persons interested in the dam- ages awarded for laying out, widening, grading, opening, or changing the lines or grades of any public street, road, or alley in this Commonwealth, from the decree of the Court of Quarter Sessions confirming the report of the viewers assess- ing such damages." To the first section was added: "Pro- vided, The appeal be taken within thirty days after the final confirmation of the report of said jury; provided, that notice be given to the commissioners of the proper county or their clerk of the time and place of holding such view." The latter proviso was held to be void, because not expressed in the title. "In reading the title any legislator, commissioner, or other person interested, could not know or surmise that any- thing in the bill referred to any proceeding prior to the time of the appeal:" Willard, J., Road in Otto Township, 2 Super. Ct. 20. Affirmed, 181 Pa. St. 390; 38 W. N. C. 328. The Act of May -7th, 1891, P. L. 44, was entitled "An Act amending an Act, entitled 'An Act to enable laborers to se- cure and collect their pay for work done in and about the stocking of saw logs,' approved June twelfth, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine, and further providing that the same shall apply to the hewing, making, and hauling of square timber, and the peeling, skidding, and hauling of bark." A proviso to the Act is that "When work as aforesaid shall have been done for a contractor or contractors, and not for the owner or owners of said saw logs, square timber, or bark, all moneys due as aforesaid shall be preferred and paid to laborers as aforesaid, and any payment or payments so made shall be a good charge against the contractor or con- tractors in favor of the owner or owners in settlement of their account." It was claimed that this proviso sought to in- TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 53 troduce a new subject not contained in the Act of 1879, or suggested by its title. "An examination of the original Act, however, shows that the proviso is practically an amendment of the fourth section of the Act, and extends the general pro- visions of the Act as to preference and payment to laborers who work for a contractor or contractors, as well as those who work for the owner or owners. It introduces no new subject into the Act, and the title clearly and fully covers all that is contained in it:" Beaver, J., Hoffa's Appeal, 1 Su- per. Ct. 357. The Act of July 2d, 1895, P L. 428, entitled "An Act to regulate and license public lodging houses in the different cities of this Commonwealth," excepts from its provisions wayfarers' lodges operated under the Act of June 13th, 1883, P L. 101. This Act was sustained in Commonwealth v. Muir, 1 Super. Ct. 578. Affirmed, 180 Pa. St. 47. By the terms of Section 20 of the Act of June 30th, 1885, P. L. 193, entitled "A further supplement to an Act, enti- tled 'An Act to provide revenue by taxation,' approved the seventh day of June, one thousand eight hundred and sev- enty-nine," taxes laid upon manufacturing corporations were abolished, except as to corporations engaged in the manu- facture of malt, spirituous, or vinous liquors, or in the manu- facture of gas. The title of this Act was held to be sufficient notwithstanding: Sanderson v. Commissioners, 1 C. C. R. 342; Hawes Manufacturing Company's Appeal, 1 Monaghan, 353. The Act of April 9th, 1870, P. L. 1068, was entitled "An Act to punish the sale and traffic in mineral water bottles and other bottles, and for the protection of bottlers and venders of mineral waters and other beverages in this Common- wealth." In the second section of the Act there was a pro- viso that the Act should "apply only to the city of Philadel- phia," the title was held to be insufficient and misleading, in a case arising in Philadelphia, by reason of the difference between the title and the proviso affecting the territorial scope of the Act: Commonwealth v. Farley, 6 C. C. R. 433; 46 Leg. Int. 108. 18. Appropriation Bills. Related to Article III, Section 3, is Article III, Section 15, which provides: "The general appropriation bill shall 54 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. embrace nothing but appropriations for the ordinary ex- penses of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the Commonwealth, interest on the public debt and for the public schools; all other appropriations shall be made by- separate bills, each embracing but one subject." The general appropriation Act of 1893, P. L. 308, con- tained the following item: "For the payment of the salary of a clerk in the offices of the prothonotaries of the Supreme Court for the Eastern and Western Districts, respectively, two years, the sum of four thousand eight hundred dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary." Upon a mandamus against the Auditor-General the ques- tion stated for the judgment of the court was whether or not, under the terms of the said Act, the appropriation there- in made for a clerk in the office of the prothonotaries of the Supreme Court for the Eastern and Western Districts, re- spectively, may be lawfully paid by the auditing and fiscal officers of the Commonwealth without further legislation formally establishing such an office. By the judgment of the Supreme Court a mandamus was awarded. 1 Mr. Justice Mitchell, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It is uncontroverted, therefore, that the Legislature could do the substantial thing, and the only question is whether it could do it in the present form. In general it will not be dis- puted that the Legislature is the exclusive judge of the form in which its enactment shall be put, and its mandate in that respect cannot be questioned unless it transgresses a plain prohibition in the Constitution. The only provision invoked here is Section 15, of Article III, 'the general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the ordi- nary expenses of the executive, legislative, and judicial de- partments of the Commonwealth,' etc. The history and pur- pose of that section are well known. It was aimed at the objectionable practice of putting a measure of doubtful strength on its own merits, into the general appropriation bill, in legislative phrase tacking it on as a rider, in order to TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. 55 compel members to vote for it or bring the wheels of gov- ernment to a stop. The same constitutional intent is em- bodied in Section 16 of Article IV, giving theGovernor power to disapprove separate items of appropriation bills. It is the practice of thus forcing the passage of extraneous matters not germane to the purpose of the bill itself that was in- tended to be abolished. As to general legislation the same object among others was secured by the provision of Section 3 of Article III, that 'no bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed, containing more than one subject.' General appropriation bills from their nature usually cover a number of items, not all relating strictly to one subject. They were, therefore, excepted from the requirement of Section 3, and this exception necessitated the special Section 15 re- lating to them. The object of both is the same. Is the present measure within the mischief that was intended to be prohibited? The instances cited by the appellant covering a period of twenty years since the adoption of the Constitu- tion show the legislative understanding on the subject, and we may fairly infer that of the executive also, as the various Acts cited were approved by the Governors. Such under- standing and practice are not, of course, binding on the ju- diciary, who are the ultimate authority in the interpretation of the Constitution; but, as the view of the two co-ordinate branches of the government, they are entitled to respectful consideration and persuasive force if the matter be at all in doubt. "It cannot be assumed that the Constitution meant to com- pel the Legislature even to supervise all the details of the government. That is properly the function of the executive and judicial branches. What work there is to be done, and what clerical force there is to do it, is a questionof detail as to whichmuchmust necessarilybe left to the head of eachdepart- ment. It is clearly the executive province to keep a general control over the expenditure of the public funds, but this it does so long as no money is paid out without a previous ap- 56 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. propriation for that purpose. While it thus holds the purse strings it controls the whole subject as completely as its proper functions under the Constitution demand. In pass- ing general appropriation bills the Constitution limits them to the 'ordinary expenses of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments,' and some other enumerated matters, and every valid appropriation in this form must appear to be reasonably with the description of 'ordinary expenses,' but it would be sticking in the bark to require a separate bill to be passed every time an additional clerk was to be ap- pointed in a public department. In regard to the particular item under consideration, it appears to be intended to pay for part of the regular and ordinary work of the offices named, and therefore to be for their ordinary expenses. It is a rec- ognition by the Legislature that the prothonotary cannot do the whole work of his office proprio manu, and an authority to him to have a portion of it done at the public cost. By such recognition and authority it becomes a part of the or- dinary expenses of his office, and that his office is a part of the judicial department of the Commonwealth does not admit of question. As already said, it is conceded on all hands that the Legislature had ample power to do the substantial thing that it did, to wit, to authorize the appointment of a clerk in the office of the prothonotary and provide for his salary out of the public treasury, and as the purpose of such ap- pointment and the duties of the appointee were to secure the performance of the regular and ordinary work of the office, we are of opinion that the Legislature might constitutionally do it in the form they did, by an item in the general appro- priation bill for the judicial department." Commonwealth v. Gregg, 161 Pa. St. 582. II. ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE TO FORMER LEGISLATION. Art. Ill, Sec. 6. No law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended, or conferred, by a reference to its title only; but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended, or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at length. Constitution. CONTENTS. i. The object of the provision. 2. The provision is mandatory. 3. It is not necessary to recite at length the pre-existing statute, or portions thereof, the provisions of which are revived, amended, extended, or conferred. 4. Express amendments by way of addition must recite, in full, the provisions to which the additions are made. 5. The provision does not apply to independent enact- ments. 6. The provision does not apply to supplements. 7. The provision does not apply to repeals. 8. The provision does not apply in cases of revival of a pre-existing statute by reason of the repeal of a re- pealing Act. 9. Independent enactments referring to pre-existing law. 10. The provision cannot be evaded by an expository statute. 11. Re-enactment of former statute by way of amend- ment, without regarding intervening repeal or amendment. 12. Making a local statute general where the local stat- ute, enacted prior to 1874, extended the provisions of a pre-existing statute. ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE TO FORMER LEGISLATION. i. The Object of the Provision. "The constitutional provision has reference to express amendments only. Its object, like that of Section 2 [3] of the same Article, requiring each Act to have its subject clearly expressed in its title, was to secure to the legislators themselves and others interested, direct notice in immediate connection with proposed legislation of its object and pur- pose." 1 ''The mischief designed to be remedied was the en- actment of amendatory statutes in terms so blind that legis- lators themselves were sometimes deceived in regard to their effect, and the public, from the difficulty in making compari- son, failed to become apprised of the changes made in the laws." 2 Enactments should be self-explanatory and self-sus- taining. 3 *Per Mr. Justice Mitchell. Stuart's Appeal, 163 Pa. St. 210. 2 Cooley, J., in People v. Mahaney, 13 Michigan, 197. Quoted by White, J., the writer of Article III, Section 6; Purvis v. Ross, 12 C. C. R. 193. 3 Barrett's Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 486; Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Company, 122 Pa. St. 627. It is said in the syllabus, Norristown v. Citizens' Passen- ger Railway Company, 148 Pa. St. 87, that the provision in question applies to borough ordinances for the reason that borough councils cannot do what the Legislature is forbid- den to do. Such a dictum is found in the opinion of the court 61 '62 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. below, together with other reasons, probably sufficient to sus- tain the judgment, which was affirmed in a per curiam opin- ion. There is an obvious distinction between limitations upon legislative forms and limitations upon legislative power. Nor does it follow that limitations such as these upon the General Assembly are also limitations upon the legislative authorities of municipalities. See Baldwin v. Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St. 164; Klingler v. Bickel, 117 Pa. St. 326; McCor- mick v. Fayette County, 150 Pa. St. 190. 2. The Provision is Mandatory. That the provision is mandatory is shown by all of the de- cided cases in which a statute has been declared void for fail- ure to comply with the constitutional requirement. 3. It is not Necessary to Recite at Length the Pre-existing Statute, or Portions Thereof, the Provisions of Which are Revived, Amended, Extended, or Conferred. The Act of June 8th, 1881, P. L. 60, was entitled an Act declaratory of the meaning of and amending the thirteenth section of another Act, the title of which was recited, ap- proved May 23d, 1874. The Act of 1881, which contained but one section, declared that the thirteenth section of the Act, the title of which was again recited, is hereby amended, and it is hereby declared that the true intent and meaning of the same is and shall be as follows: Amended Section 13 was then set forth without more. The Act did not recite Section 13 of the pre-existing Act of 1874. Said Mr. Justice Pa-xson, referring to Section 13 of the Act of 1874, P. L. 231 : "As this section, however, is expressly repealed by the Act of June 8th, 1881, P. L. 68 [60] we need not further refer to it. The said Act of June 8th, 1881, repeals, though in the most bungling manner, the thirteenth section of the Act of 1874. The title as well as the body of said Act professes to declare the meaning of the said section of the Act of 1874, ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE. 63 and if this were all, the Act of 1881 would conflict with Sec- tion 6 of Article III of the Constitution, which declares that 'no law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred by a reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended, or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at length.' It is for the courts to declare the 'meaning' of an Act of the Legislature. But the Act of 1881 goes further and amends the thirteenth section, of the Act of 1874, and we may reject as surplusage, or harmless verbiage, so much of it as professes to attach a meaning to the Act of 1874." 1 Reference to the Act of 1881, P. L. 60, will show that it contains no words of repeal. The express repeal referred to by the learned justice is that which follows as the consequence of the enactment of an amended and superseding section. The Act of June 10th, 1881, P. L. 86, entitled "A supple- ment to an Act, entitled 'An Act to provide revenue by taxa- tion, approved the seventh day of June, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine,' ' "does not violate the provision in question; the recital at length of the provision to be amended is unnecessary; it is sufficient if the law in its amended form is re-enacted and published at length." 2 J East Grant Street, 121 Pa. St. 596. 2 Per Acheson, J., Second National Bank of Titusville v. Caldwell, 39 Leg. Int. 414; s. c, 13 Fed. Rep. 429. s. p. Commonwealth v. Fleckner, 17 C. C. R. 671, 8 Kulp, ,225, a case arising on the Act of June 12th, 1878, P. L. 196, supplementary to the Act of March 31st, i860, by amending the 116th, 117th, 118th, and 119th sections. The sections were not recited at length, but the Act of 1878 in separate sections referring to them respectively declared that they were thereby amended so as to read as follows: — thereupon setting forth each section as amended. And see Loftus v. Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank, 133 Pa. St. 97; opinion of court below, page 101 ; s. c, 25 W. N. C. 459; 46 L. I. 46; Act of March 19th, 187=;, P. L. 24: Wilson v. Downing, 4 Super. Ct. 487; Act of May 24th, 1878, P. L. 134. 64 validity of statutes. 4. Express Amendments by way of Addition Must Recite in Full the Provision to Which the Addition is Made. The Act of May 1st, 1876, P. L. 93, provided that the second section of the Act of April 16th, 1875, P. L. 55, which was recited by its title, "be amended by adding thereto as follows:" Here followed the amendment which included only the matter to be added to the section without a recital of the section itself. This Act was held void because it failed to re-enact and publish at length so much of the Act of 1875 as was amended. 1 1 Barrett's Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 486; and see Loftus v. Farm- ers' and Mechanics' National Bank, 133 Pa. St. 97; opinion of court below, page 101; s. c, 25 W. N. C. 459; 46 L. I. 46. 5. The Provision Does Not Apply to Independent Enactments. The eleventh clause of Section 1 of Article VII of the Act of May 24th, 1887, P. L. 208, contained provisions as to grad- ing, paving, and curbing of streets. These provisions were made simply and affirmatively without any express reference to other legislation. It was objected that this clause was invalid because it was an extension or amendment of a pro- vision of the Act of June 2d, 1874, which was not published at length; "but the eleventh clause of Section 1 of Article VII of the Act of May 24th, 1887, is neither a revival, an amendment, an extension, or a conferring in the sense of the Constitution; it is part of an Act of the General Assembly, which is itself the highest exercise of legislative power, and repeals Acts inconsistent with itself, or supplied by its pro- visions. The objection, therefore, is not applicable." 1 The Act in question was subsequently declared invalid as a classi- fication Act. 2 The Act of June 1st, 1879, P. L. 150, entitled "A supple- ment to an Act for the regulation of boroughs, approved the ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE. 65 3d day of April, A. D. 185 1," vested in the courts of Quarter Sessions power to alter the limits of any borough incorpo- rated under the general borough law, and provided a method of procedure in such cases. This method of pro- cedure was practically a re-enactment of the provisions of a former statute not referred to in the Act of 1879, which was held to be a valid Act. 3 x Per Gibson, J., Shoemaker v. Harrisburg, 4 C. C. R. 86. 2 Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 266. 3 Pottsto\vn Borough, 1 Montgomery County, 161, Id. 189, 117 Pa. St. 538; s. p., Lansdale Borough, 1 Montgomery County, 192. 6. The Provision Does not Apply to Supplements. The Act of March 18th, 1875, P. L. 15, was entitled a sup- plement to the Act of May 23d, 1874, relating to the classi- fication of cities and contained six sections in the form of original enactments upon various matters. "The objection, which seeks to break down the whole of the Act of 1875, that it violates Section 6, Article III of the Constitution in that it is amendatory of the Act of 1874, and, therefore, im- properly drawn, because the Act of 1874 is not re-enacted and published at length, is not well taken. Simply because a law, properly expressed by title as a supplement to an Act, the title of which is fully set forth, by construction is inci- dentally amendatory of the previous Act, or even necessarily so when germane to the whole subject-matter, is therefore within the provision of the sixth section, Article III, would be a construction which would create a greater evil than that section was sought to remedy. All supplements are more or less amendatory. It was never intended that, because an Act had this character, it must necessarily include all ver- biage of previous legislation within its language. The object of the section was to give a clear idea to legislators and citi- zens of what was intended as law, and to prevent the cover- 5 66 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. ing up of a design by reference to title only." 1 The revenue Act of June 30th, 1885, P. L. 193, abolished taxes on manu- facturing corporations with some exceptions. It was ob- jected that this was in violation of the provision in question, but the objection was overruled in the following language: "We apprehend that the Legislature complied wholly with the spirit of Section 6, Article III, in thus stating their intention. Clearness of apprehension was the object sought by that sec- tion. An exact and literal repetition of all the revenue laws in the body of this section, and a re-enacting of them, leaving out the manufacturing companies, would rather tend to con- fusion and want of clearness. If such were to be the rule, the repealing clause appended to Acts of Assembly would have no force. As we said, Commonwealth ex rel. Connolly v. Halstead (preceding case), decided at this term, every sup- plement to an Act is, in a sense, amendatory. The sixth sec- tion of Article III sought to remedy an evil, not create one." 2 Where the real purpose is to amend or extend the provisions of a former statute the constitutional provision is not evaded by styling the Act a supplement, thus, the Act of June 8th, 1891, P. L. 247, is entitled "A further supplement to an Act, entitled 'An Act extending the jurisdiction of the courts of this Commonwealth in cases of divorce, approved the ninth day of March, A. D. one thousand eight hundred and fifty- five.' ' It enacts that the jurisdiction conferred in and by said Act to which it is a supplement "is hereby extended to all cases of divorce, from the bonds of matrimony and from bed and board, and for the causes therein mentioned, when it shall be shown," etc. The Act was held invalid. 3 'Hand, P. J., Commonwealth v. Halstead, 1 C. C. R. 335; s. c, 2 C. P. Rep. 247. 2 Hand, P. J., Sanderson v. Commissioners, 1 C. C. R. 342. 3 Oakley v. Oakley, 1 P. D. R. 781; s. c, 11 C. C. R. 572; Burdick v. Burdick, 2 P. D. R. 622; see generally Pottstown Borough, 1 Montgomery County, 161; Id. 189; Lansdale Borough, 1 Montgomery County, 192. enactment by reference. 6j 7. The Provision Does not Apply to Repeals. A section enacted at length intended to supply or amend a corresponding section of a pre-existing statute and thus op- erating by way of repeal of such pre-existing statute need not be accompanied by a recital at length of such pre-existing section. 1 Neither is it necessary that an independent enact- ment, either original or by way of supplement, which in ef- fect repeals pre-existing statutes, should recite or refer to such pre-existing statutes. 2 Nor does the provision in ques- tion apply to a repealing statute, which in terms repeals, by reference to its title only, a previous statute. 3 *East Grant Street, 121 Pa. St. 596; Evans's Appeal, 152 Pa. St. 401. 2 Sanderson v. Commissioners, 1 C. C. R. 342. 3 Commonwealth v. Evans, 6 Kulp, 145; and see Loftus v. Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank, 133 Pa. St. 97; opin- ion of court below, page 101; s. c, 25 W. N. C. 459, affirming 46 L. I. 46. The Act of May 5th, 1876, P. L. 124, fixed the salaries of assessors in cities of the second class. The Act of June 14th, 1887, P. L. 397, empowered the city councils of these cities to fix the salaries of all city officers. This repealed the Act of 1876 to that extent by implication, and the affirmative pro- vision conferring the power on councils was not in violation of Article III, Section 6: Commonwealth v. Morrow, 40 P. L- J- 327- 8. The Provision Does not Apply in Cases of Re- vival of a Pre-existing Statute by Reason of the Repeal of a Repealing Act. The Act of July 5th, 1883, P. L. 181, repealed the Act of May 21st, 1879, P. L. 72. The latter statute repealed the seventh section of the Act of March 31st, 1876, P. L. 13. The question being whether the seventh section of the Act of March 31st, 1876, was in force, it was decided in the affirmative, under the common-law rule, that the repeal of a 68 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. repealing Act revives the former law, and in reply to the ob- jection that such revival by implication was contrary to the constitutional provision in question, it was said, "To compel the publication and re-enactment of all statutes which are restored by reason of the repeal of others would seem to be unnecessary as well as impracticable." 1 "The Constitution does not make the obviously imprac- ticable requirement that every Act shall recite all other Acts that its operation may incidentally affect, either by way of repeal, modification, extension, or supply. The harmony or repugnance of Acts not passed with reference to the same subject can only be effectually developed by the clash of con- flicting interests and litigation, and the settlement of such questions belong to the judicial, not the legislative depart- ment." 2 'Woodward, J., Commonwealth v. Evans, 6 Kulp, 145. 2 Per Mr. Justice Mitchell, Stuart's Appeal, 163 Pa. St. 210. The Act of April 3d, 1872, P. L. 843, which was a local law for the county of Allegheny providing a license rate or fee lower than that which was provided by the general license law of May 13th, 1887, P. L. 108, was repealed by the Act of 1887. It being contended that the effect of the repeal of the Act of 1872 was to revive a former local Act of February 26th, 1855, P. L. 321, it was held that such was not the ef- fect. One of the judges gave as a reason that such implied revival would be a violation of Article III, Section 6. Both judges agreed that repealing the local statute would not have the effect of re-enacting a local law: Durr v. Commonwealth, 3 C. C. R. 525; and see Commonwealth v. Kelly, 5 Kulp, 533; Wishart v. Leslie, 36 P. L. J. 223. 9. Independent Enactments Referring to Pre- existing Law. A pre-existing statute may be referred to by way of illus- tration, and such was held to be the effect of the reference to the Act of 1806, in the procedure Act of May 25th, 1887, P. ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE. 69 L. 271. 1 In this case it was said: "Reference to the Act of 1806 might well have been omitted, and yet the third section of the Act of 1887 would contain a complete grant of the right to file a statement instead of a formal narr. It must be a concise statement of the plaintiff's demand. If this were all that is required, it would be sufficient. It is unnecessary to describe the details of the statement in a statute. That is a matter which has usually been left to the courts to regu- late. But the Act of 1887 goes further, and requires in assumpsit a copy of the note, contract, book entries, or ref- erence to the records onwhichthe plaintiff's claim is founded, and not merely a statement of the date and amount thereof as authorized by the Act of 1806; while in trespass a concise statement of the plaintiff's demand is all that is required. Thus it will be seen that the Act of 1887 contains all the es- sentials of a complete statute without any aid from the Act of 1806. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the third section of the Act of 1887 is not unconstitutional." The Act of June 14th, 1887, P. L. 395, which was entitled an Act in relation to the government of cities of the second class, provided in Section 3 that all executive powers and duties of the several officers of the city should be assigned, by ordinance, to the appropriate department therein pro- vided for, and, when so assigned, all departments, bureaus, and officers now existing should be abolished. The Act con- tinued: Sec. 4. There shall be the following executive depart- ments, the heads of which shall be chosen by city councils: I. Department of Public Safety. II. Department of Pub- lic Works. III. Department of Charities. Sec. 5. For the purpose of redistributing the powers conferred and duties imposed upon the officers, departments, and boards of the city government, contained in existing laws, ordinances, and regulations, not repealed or supplied by the provisions of this Act, every power heretofore conferred or duty imposed upon any municipal executive officer, not inconsistent with the JO VALIDITY OF STATUTES. provisions of this Act, shall be deemed and construed to be the power or duty of the proper department, board, or offi- cer, who shall have control of the subject-matter in the ap- propriate department hereby created or authorized. Sec. 6. Whenever words are used in any existing law, ordinance, resolution, or contract in force prior hereto referring to any department or officer of city government, and such law, or- dinance, or resolution is not supplied or repealed by this Act, they shall be deemed to mean and apply to the proper officer and department having relation to the subject-matter, whether named in this Act or in the ordinance reorganizing the departments. Sec. 7. The police power of taking in- formation, making arrests and preservation of the peace, heretofore vested in the Mayor, shall hereafter vest in the Mayor and five police magistrates, all of whom shall not be of the same political party, to be appointed by the Mayor, subject to the approval of the city councils, in such districts of the city as shall, by ordinance, be designated, whose term of office shall be during good behavior, and until a successsor be appointed and approved. The said magistrates shall each receive such salary as may be fixed by ordinance, and they shall pay into the city treasury all costs and fines received by them in the discharge of their duties as police magistrates, and make such reports as may be required by ordinance. In Pittsburg's Petition, 2 which was a case arising upon the petition of the city of Pittsburg for the appointment of a board of viewers for sewer improvements, Mr. Justice Wil- liams said: "The other position taken is that Sections 1, 5, 6, 7, and 9 offend against Section 6, Article III, of the Constitution, which declares that 'no law shall be revived, amended, extended, or conferred by a reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended, or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at length.' The first section is thought to violate this provision, by the declaration that the legislative powers of cities of the second class shall be vested as heretofore in two branches. This does ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE. Jl not extend or confer powers previously exercised in some other way to the two branches of the councils, but leaves the legislative power just where it was before, with no change in its extent, in the body exercising it or in the name or title of that body. The city councils possessed the power before the city came into the second class, and when it came it brought its councils with it, just as it brought its Mayor, with their powers and titles unchanged. Such a declaration does not violate the Constitution in any particular. The same thing may be said of the ninth section, which declares that certain offices named, including that of city treasurer and controller, 'shall remain as heretofore, except as herein otherwise provided.' These offices, with the incumbents, came also with the city into the new scheme of government, and became a part of it, as did the Mayor and councils. So far as new duties were put upon them, or old ones taken away, the Act made the necessary provisions, but where no change was made, the officers assumed the responsibilities and discharged the duties belonging to them, just as though no change in class had taken place. Nothing was added to or taken from their functions or powers, except by express words. "The objection made to the fifth, sixth, and seventh sec- tions is much more serious. These sections do undertake to confer powers, previously exercised by a number of officers whose offices are discontinued, upon the heads of depart- ments created by the Act. They undertake to extend to these new officers all the Acts of Assembly relating to the duties and powers of all these unnamed and abolished offices, without even a reference to their dates, their titles, or their subject-matter. To understand what was, and what was not, within their control, it would be necessary to digest all the local laws relating to all the officers whose functions are thus gathered up and dropped into the hands of the 'heads of de- partments.' This mode of defining the powers of a newly- created officer is in violation of the letter and the spirit of 72 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. the constitutional provision, and cannot be sustained: Titus- ville Iron Works v. Oil Company, 122 Pa. St. 627; Donohugh v. Roberts, 11 W. N. C. 186." The Act of April 22d, 1889, P L. 39, entitled "A further supplement to an Act regulating boroughs . . authorizing the corporate authorities to levy and collect a license tax on hacks, carriages, and other vehicles carrying persons or prop- erty for pay," etc., being in question, ,Mr. Justice Sterrett said: "The first section of the Act empowers the council of every borough 'to enact ordinances establishing reasonable rates of license tax on all hacks, carriages, omnibuses, and other vehicles used in carrying persons or property for pay, and limit the compensation for the same within the limits of said borough.' The second section provides 'that said ordi- nance shall be enforced as other borough ordinances are by law enforced, and the license tax shall be collected as other licenses, taxes, fines, and penalties are now authorized by law to be collected.' The power of the Legislature tp pass such an Act cannot be questioned. There is nothing either in the title or in the body of the Act that offends against any pro- vision of the Constitution." 3 In the court below, McIl- vaine, P- J., said: "The Act might well be characterized as 'a bunglesome piece of legislation,' yet we are not satisfied that it is wholly unconstitutional. It is true that the enact- ment of the first section is broader than the title, and so far as the power conferred on town councils to 'limit the compensa- tion' for the use of hacks, etc., is concerned, it must be held to be unconstitutional. But, striking this out of the first section, it leaves the enactment the same as expressed in the title of the Act, and hence not repugnant to the clause of the Con- stitution which provides that the title of an Act shall clearly express the subject thereof: Section 3, Article III. Neither do we think the Act repugnant to Section 6, Article III, of the Constitution, for it does not revive, amend, extend, or confer the provisions of an existing law. It is a supplement of the Act of 185 1, and simply adds one more power to the ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE. 73 many already conferred on the corporate officers of a bor- ough. There can be no doubt that 'an entire Act is not nec- essarily unconstitutional, because the title fails to give notice of some particular matter contained therein.' The rule has been 1,o sustain the portion of which the title gives notice: Dewhurst v. Allegheny City, 95 Pa. St. 437, and cases there cited. The first section of the Act confers the power on town councils 'to enact ordinances establishing reasonable rates of license tax on all hacks, carriages, omnibuses, and other vehicles used -in carrying persons or property for pay, within the limits of boroughs.' The title of the Act gives full notice of this enactment, and the first section of the Act is. thus far constitutional and must be sustained. "The second section, in its provision that the license tax shall be collected as other licenses, taxes, fines, and penalties, are now authorized by law to be collected, cannot all stand, because taxes and fines and penalties are not collected in the same way, but in a totally different way. To say that a li- cense tax shall be collected as taxes are collected, and to say that a license shall be collected as fines and penalties are col- lected, is to prescribe two ways of collecting the license tax which are irreconcilably repugnant. And, as but one way of collecting the license tax was evidently intended to be pointed out, the rule is to take the last way pointed out; that is, the license tax is to be collected as fines and penalties are collected, before a justice of the peace under Section 7, Act of April 15th, 1835: Packer v. Railroad Company, 19 Pa. St. 211."* The Act of February 14th, 1881, P. L. 3, relating to the fees of the receiver of taxes in cities of the first class, provided that he should have all powers and privileges and be subject to all the duties and liabilities conferred or imposed on the collector of outstanding or delinquent taxes, by any or all 1 Acts of Assembly heretofore passed. This provision was held to be in violation of Article III, Section 6. 5 The Act of June 17th, 1887, P. L. 409, entitled "An Act 74 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. relating to the lien of mechanics and others upon leasehold estates and property thereon," provided in Section 4, that "all proceedings under this Act to enforce collection of claims shall be as is now provided by law." This provision was held to be in violation of the constitutional provision in question, and it was further held, that as no rights or privileges were conferred which could be enforced without Section 4, the Act must fall in its entirety. 6 1 Arnold, J., Krause v. Pennsylvania R. R. Company, 4 C. C. R. 64; s. p., Kauffman v. Jacobs, 4 C. C. R. 462; Contra, Doud v. Insurance Company, 6 C. C. R. 329; Reeves v. Ed- sall, 1 Lack. Jur. 96. 2 Pittsburg's Petition, 138 Pa. St. 401; and see Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. St. 539, 156 Pa. St. 554; Act of May 24th, 1893, P. L. 124. 3 Washington Borough v. McGeorge, 146 Pa. St. 248. 4 Washington Borough v. McGeorge, 146 Pa. St. 248. B Donohugh v. Roberts, 11 W. N. C. 186, C. P. Phila. 6 McKeever v. Victor Oil Company, 9 C. C. R. 284; Swaney v. Washington Oil Company, 7 C. C. R. 351; Titus v. Elyria Oil Company, 1 P. D. R. 204. The Act of June 10th, 1881, P. L. 93, entitled "An Act to enable the High Sheriff of any county of this Commonwealth to have an interpleader on a claim of property by a third per- son levied on by the sheriff on a writ of foreign attachment, enacted that Section 9 of the Act of April 10th, 1848, re- ferred to by its title, and Section 1 of the Act of March 10th, 1858, referred to by its title, be extended and applied to claims made where property had been seized under process of foreign attachment. This Act was held void: Reynolds Lumber Company v. Reynolds, 4 P. D. R. 573; s. c, 12 Lane. Law Rev. 383, 6 Delaware County, 255. As tending to show the legislative practice upon this sub- ject and its importance and difficulty, the following references gathered by a cursory reading of the last volume of the Pamphlet Laws (1895) are made. The learned reader must judge of the validity of the provisions cited: ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE. 75 Act in relation to the Banking Department, Section 4, page 6, "any wilful false swearing in any inquiry thereunder shall be perjury, and subject, upon conviction thereof, to the same punishment as provided by existing laws for the punish- ment of perjury." Act to establish a department of agriculture, Section 1, page 17, "Said Secretary shall be cx-ofhcio Secretary of the State Board of Agriculture, and shall succeed to all the powers and duties now conferred by law upon the Secretary of said Board." Section 2, page 18, "Said report and bulle- tins shall be printed by the State Printer in the same manner as other public documents." Section 3, page 18, "The said Secretary shall also be and is hereby charged with the ad- ministration of all laws designed to prevent fraud or adul- teration in the preparation, manufacture, or sale of articles of food, the inspection, sale, or transportation of the agricultu- ral products, or imitations thereof, and all laws relating to diseases of domestic animals, and to the manufacture and in- spection of commercial fertilizers." Section 4, page 19, "The Dairy and Food Commissioner shall, under the direction of the Secretary, perform the duties prescribed by an Act ap- proved May twenty-sixth, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-three." Act to provide for additional employes and officers of the House, Section 1, page 22, provides for certain clerks and doorkeepers, "whose compensation and mileage shall be the same as the compensation and mileage now paid to the tran- scribing clerks and assistant doorkeepers." Certain janitors "whose compensation and mileage shall be the same as the compensation and mileage now paid to the janitor of the committee-rooms and basement." Act to establish a separate orphans' court in the county of Schuylkill, Section 1, page 31, "A judge shall be elected and commissioned for the same term and in the same manner as the judges of the courts of common pleas of said county, and the annual salary of said judge shall be the same as is paid to the judges of the courts of common pleas in said county, to be paid in the same manner as the salaries of said judges of the courts of common pleas are now or may be by law pay- able." Section 4, page 31, "The said court shall have and ex- ercise all the jurisdiction and powers now vested in or which may hereafter be conferred upon the orphans' and registers' courts of said county." j6 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. Tenement House Act, Section 5, page 35, "The deputy in- spectors, now and hereafter appointed under the provisions of this Act, shall have the same powers and compensation as those appointed under the provisions of the Factory Act, ap- proved June third, one thousand eight hundred and ninety- three, and shall be subject in like manner to the orders of the Factory Inspector." Act with reference to Boards of Commissioners of Normal Schools, Section 2, page 41, "The expenses incurred by the members of the several boards of examiners shall be paid by the State, as provided by existing laws." City annexation Act, Section 1, page 48, "The said tickets so received shall be counted and return thereof made to the prothonotary of said county, duly certified in the manner required by law, and in receiving, counting, and making re- turns of the votes cast, the officers and clerks conducting said election shall be governed by the laws of this Commonwealth regulating general elections, and all the electors, election officers, and clerks voting at or in attendance upon said elec- tion shall be subject to all the requirements and liable to all the penalties imposed by the election laws of this Common- wealth." Section 1, page 49, councils, "Shall be elected at the February election in said year one thousand eight hun- dred and ninety-eight, under the provisions of the laws regu- lating the election of such councilmen of cities of the second class, . . . the terms of all officers hereafter elected or ap- pointed in the municipality proposed to be annexed under the provisions of this Act to the city aforesaid, shall cease and determine upon the day such annexation takes effect, and all the duties devolving upon such officers shall there- after be assumed and performed by the proper officers of said city of the second class." Section 2, page 50, "Said ballots shall be prepared and distributed in accordance with the gen- eral law relating to the election of public officers." Section 3, page 50, "The said election officers shall make returns of said election and the same shall be counted and duly certi- fied according to law." Annexation Act, Section 1, page 57, "The said tickets so received shall be counted and a return thereof made to the prothonotary of said county, duly certified in the manner re- quired by law; and in receiving, counting, and making re- turns of the votes cast, the officers and clerks conducting said election shall be governed by the laws of this Common- ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE. T] -wealth regulating general elections for public officers; and all the electors, officers, and clerks voting at or in attendance upon said election shall be subject to all the requirements and liable to all the penalties imposed by the election law of this Commonwealth." Section i, page 58, "Who shall organize in the manner provided by law on the first Monday of March next ensuing their election." Section 2, page 59, "Said bal- lot shall be printed and distributed in accordance with the general law relating to the election of public officers." Compulsory School Law, Section 2, page 73, "To be ap- plied and accounted for by such treasurers in the same way as other moneys raised for school purposes; such fines shall be collected by a process of law similar to the collection of other fines." Section 4, page 74, "And the said assessors shall be paid a per diem compensation for their services, a sum equal to the compensation paid under existing laws for assessors of election." Act relating to indexing writs of scire facias, Section 1, page 84, "To enter upon the judgment docket or index all writs of scire facias upon mechanics' liens in the same manner as writs of scire facias upon judgments are now required to be entered." Convict Labor Commission Act, Section 1, page 87. "Vouchers for such expenses shall be paid upon the warrant of the chairman of said commission drawn upon the State Treasurer and audited by the Auditor-General in the usual way." Act to establish the State Live Stock Sanitary Board, Sec- tion 1, page 91, "This board shall consist of . . . and the State Veterinarian, who shall be a competent and qualified person as provided in the Act, entitled 'An Act to create a department of agriculture and define its duties.' " Section 7, page 92, "All necessary expenses . . shall be paid by the State Treasurer upon the warrant of the Auditor-General in the manner now provided by law." Amendment of Street Railway Act, Section 14, page 94, "With the right of appeal now secured under Section 8, Arti- cle XVI, of the Constitution, and of an Act for the further regulation of appeals from assessment of damages to owners of property taken for public use, passed June thirteenth, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-four." See Act to provide for the taking of recognizance and oath on certiorari, page 100. 78 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. Act relating to county solicitors, Section 3, page 102, "Shall perform all duties now enjoined by law upon county solicitors." Life saving companies, Section 5, page 104, "Said fine to be recovered by suit as other fines and taxes are now by law recoverable." Street Act, Section 2, page 106, "In exercising the power aforesaid all proceedings for the ascertainment of damages and the assessment of benefits incident thereto shall be as now provided by law in reference to payment of costs, dam- ages, and expenses of public improvements within municipal corporations." Act relating to poor and road taxes, Section 1, page in, "To collect either road or poor taxes by levy and sale in the same manner as school and county taxes are now by law col- lected." Recording Act, Section 2, page 113, "In the same manner and subject to the same rights and restrictions as to the time and manner of recording and indexing the same as is now provided by the laws of this Commonwealth for the proving, acknowledging, and recording of deeds." Act as to recording plans, Section 1, page 124, "Said sum or sums to be recovered as debts of like amount are by law recoverable." Act to provide for the employment of a stenographer in the Adjutant-General's department, Section 1, page 127, "And the stenographer so selected and appointed shall be paid in the same manner as other clerks and employes of the State government." Act as to tipstaves, Section 1, page 129, "Shall be paid in the same manner as such tipstaves are now paid." Elevator Act, Section 2, page 129, "Said fine to be col- lected as other debts due the Commonwealth." Public safety Act, Section 43, page 166, "By the same process and proceedings and under the same restrictions as are now provided for or required by law for the collection of any fines or penalties in such city." Appropriation Act, Section 1, page 167, "The said appro- priation to be paid upon the warrant of the Auditor-General drawn in the usual manner." Library Act, Section 2, page 170, "Such tax to be levied and collected in the like manner with the general taxes of said cities and to be known as a library fund." ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE. 79 Judicial apportionment Act, Section 2, page 193, "The election of judges shall be held and conducted in the several election districts in the same manner in all respects as elec- tions for representatives are or shall be held and conducted, and by the same judges, inspectors, and other officers, under provisions of existing laws regulating elections in this Com- monwealth." Section 7, page 194, "The said additional law judge shall possess the same qualifications which are required by the Constitution and laws for the president judge of said district, and shall hold his office for a like term and by the same tenure, and shall have the same powers, authority, and jurisdiction, and shall be subject to the same duties, restric- tions, and penalties, and shall receive the same compensa- tion as the president judge of said district." Superior Court Act, Section 1, page 212, "The vote for said office shall be cast and counted according to law." Sec- tion 3, page 213, "The necessary dockets, books, seals, sta- tionery, and other supplies shall be obtained and furnished by the Secretary of the Commonwealth in the same manner as books and supplies are furnished to his own department." Section 11, page 220, "The compensation of each judge in the Superior Court shall be seven thousand five hundred dollars per annum, to be paid quarterly, upon the certificate of the judge, according to the practice of the accounting depart- ments of the Commonwealth." Ship canal Act, Section 5, page 223, "They shall, if author- ized by a majority of the stockholders at a meeting called for that purpose in the manner provided by law, file with the Secretary of the Commonwealth a certificate setting forth the amount of such increase." Repealing Act, Section 2, page 242, "That the provisions of the general road laws of this Commonwealth are hereby extended to the township of Apolacon, in the county of Sus- quehanna, any law or part of any law to the contrary notwith- standing." School Act, Section 3, page 245, "The township auditors shall pass upon such bills, and their action thereon shall have the same effect as upon other expenditures of such school boards." Act as to indexing Federal judgments, Section 1, page 247. Transcripts of judgments of the Federal courts duly certified are to be "indexed in the same manner as tran- scripts of records of judgments and decrees obtained in any 8o VALIDITY OF STATUTES. of the courts of general jurisdiction of this State are entered and indexed, to make them liens, and (prothonotaries) are authorized to charge and receive the same fees for the same." Poor Law, Section i, page 271, "That said county shall, in all cases, have full recourse to recover all expenses incurred in behalf of said person so committed, from the parties or persons or poor district properly chargeable therewith under the laws of this Commonwealth." Act as to witnesses, Section 1, page 279, "Testimony . . . may be taken upon a rule entered in the office of the prothon- otary of the court of common pleas in the county where such cause or matter is pending in like manner as rules are now entered for the taking of testimony of witnesses residing within the Commonwealth upon notice to be given to the other side in like manner as now provided by existing law or rule of court." Memorial Day Act, Section 1, page 298, "To pay the same out of such moneys in their respective treasuries as are not otherwise appropriated, in the manner appropriations are now made and paid." Corporation Act, Clause 7, page 313, "Subject to the same penalties for obstructions thereof as may now or shall here- after be enforced for the obstruction of public streets in the municipality in which said approaches may be located." Pure Food Act, Section 6, page 318, "The agent of the De- partment of Agriculture, known as the Dairy and Food Com- missioner of this State, shall be charged with the enforce- ment of all the provisions of this Act and shall have the same power to enforce the provisions of this Act that is given him to enforce the provisions of the Act by which he receives his appointment." Indigent insane Act, Section 1, page 321, "Shall hereafter be entitled to the same allowance for the care and treatment of the indigent insane as is given by the Commonwealth to State hospitals for the insane, under the conditions pre- scribed by the Act of Assembly, approved June thirteenth, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three." Night watchman Act, Section 1, page 333, "All persons so appointed with the approval aforesaid, as night watchmen shall have, exercise, and enjoy all the rights, powers, and privileges now vested by law in constables or police officers duly elected or appointed in said cities or boroughs." Road Law, Section 14, page 341, "All warrants for the ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE. Ol payment of any portion of the money raised for the purposes aforesaid shall be issued by the said commissioners, or a ma- jority of them, in the manner now provided by law in the several counties." Park Act, Section 2, page 350, "In exercising the power aforesaid all proceedings for ascertaining damages and as- sessing the benefits incident thereto shall be in accordance with the law authorizing cities of this Commonwealth to ac- quire, by purchase, or otherwise, private property for public park purposes." Stock brokers' Act, Section 3, page 398, "Which penalty shall be collected on an account settled by the accountant officers as taxes on bank dividends are now collected and settled." Insurance Act, Section 2, page 402, "Any company enti- tled to the benefits of this Act and desirous of availing itself of the same, shall furnish the affidavit as to paid-up capital required by the said supplementary Act, and conform to all other conditions and requirements thereof applicable to com- panies organized under the provisions of the said Act, ap- proved the twenty-ninth day of April, A. D. 1874, and the aforesaid supplement thereto." Controllers' Act, Section 15, page 407, "That all duties de- volved on the county auditors by the Act of April fifteenth, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-four, and all powers conferred on them by said Act shall be performed and exer- cised by the county controller so far as regards county ac- counts and State taxes for which the county is or may be lia- ble, and all other accounts with the treasurer with the Com- monwealth shall be audited by the auditor of the accounts of prothonotaries, clerks, et cetera, appointed by the court of common pleas under the Act of April twenty-first, one thousand eight hundred and forty-six, and its supplements. And the report required by the seventh section of this Act shall have the same effect as the report of the auditors under said Act of the fifteenth of April, one thousand eight hun- dred and thirty-four, with like rights of appeal therefrom." Teachers' institute Act, Section 9, page 416, "The superin- tendent of the schools of said city or borough shall have power to call a teachers' institute and to draw from the county treasury money for the support of the same in like manner and to the same extent as the county superintend- ents of this Commonwealth are now empowered to do." 6 82 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. Act relating to board of commissioners of public grounds and buildings, Section 2, page 423, "The superintendent of construction shall be paid a per diem salary out of the fund appropriated for the improvement which he is to supervise in like manner as superintendents are now paid out of said fund by the architect or trustees of the institute so benefited." Consideration of the foregoing, which instances many phases of legislation and illustrates many difficulties in the drafting of bills, may lead to question whether " the two clauses of Article III, Section 6, should not be construed together by regarding the second as an amplification of the first for greater emphasis, and thus limiting the scope of the article to cases wherein the attempt is to revive, amend, or extend or confer the provisions of, specific statutes directly referred to. Article III, Section 6, may be regarded as owing its origin, in part, to that stress for reform which had for its principal object the eradication of local and special legislation. So re- garded, it may be placed with a number of other cumula- tive provisions found in the next article, which deals with that subject. One of the greatest abuses in legislative practice in connection with local and special bills was the covering up of snakes under the form of legislation prohibited by Section 6. But after the substance had been prohibited it was in vain to denounce the form, and hence it follows that, under pres- ent conditions, Section 6 must be so construed as not unduly to hamper general legislation. It was intended to remove a mischief, not to create one. Legislation upon general, as distinguished from special and single subjects, which involves not one but many other laws, is always difficult, and its effect must usually be settled by litigation. The necessity for the comparison and construc- tion of laws by the judiciary cannot be removed in such cases by a constitutional provision. Statutes related to or forming part of a system, or designed to transform it at a given point, or to reproduce it with modifications, or under other author- ity, cannot always be self-sustaining or self-explanatory. They must usually be expressed in general terms and can never be understood save in connection with the system to which they relate. This observation may be illustrated by reference to the instance given above relating to the creation of a separate orphans' court in the county of Schuylkill. If the section be deemed applicable to such a case, then a statute must be drafted comparing in size with a volume of the Pamphlet Laws, ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE. 83 and being enacted, its validity is imperiled under Article V, Section 26, by the smallest deviation either of defect or ex- cess, from existing law relating to the jurisdiction and prac- tice of orphans' courts. 10. The Provision Cannot be Evaded by an Exposi- tory Statute. The Act of June 17th, 1887, P. L. 413, entitled "An Act relating to the liens of mechanics and others upon buildings," enacts in its first section that the provisions of the Act of Assembly of June sixteenth, Anno Domini one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, entitled "An Act relating to the lien of mechanics and others upon buildings," and the Act of Assembly of April sixteenth, Anno Domini one thou- sand eight hundred and forty-five, entitled "An Act concern- ing sheriffs' and coroners' sales and for other purposes," ac- cording to the true intent and meaning thereof, shall be con- strued to include claims for labor done by mechanics and laborers in the erection or construction of a building, as liens are now allowed for material furnished: Provided, That no lien will be allowed for a sum less than ten dollars. In Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Company, 1 Mr. Justice Williams said: "The first section declares that the provisions of the Acts of 1836 and 1845 shall be construed to include claims for labor done by mechanics and others in the erection and construction of buildings — i. e., for all labor done, no matter at whose instance or upon whose credit it was done. It would be difficult to imagine a plainer violation of the constitutional provision." He further said: "Exposi- tory statutes, and statutes directing the courts what con- struction should be given to previous legislation were not uncommon prior to 1874, and the courts, while pronouncing all such legislation to be judicial in its character and void as to any retroactive effect intended, yet sought to give effect to the legislative will however expressed as to future cases. As the Constitution prescribed no form or order into which the legislative expression was to be cast, the court sought to 84 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. give effect to the purpose, however expressed. But the Con- stitution of 1874, Section 6, of Article III, already referred to, requires all statutes to be self-explanatory and complete in their provisions, and forbids the extension, amendment, revival, or the use of any other method of conferring the ben- efits of previous legislation short of a re-enactment at length. This effectually closes the old and well-worn short-cut route, and we cannot, no matter how much inclined we might be to do so, give effect, even as to future cases, to expository Acts like that under consideration. They are void as an unauthor- ized exercise of judicial power, and they are void because of the infraction of Section 6, of Article III. "It has been suggested that the second section of the Act might stand, though the first should, for the reasons given, fall. We do not think so. An examination of the Act as a whole shows that its provisions all relate to the same class of claimants, and were intended to add for the benefit of that class some provisions not found in the Acts of 1836 and 1845. If, as we hold, these claimants are not brought under the Acts referred to by the first section, the remaining sections have nothing on which they can take effect. They are a headless trunk, and our system of liens for the benefit of me- chanics and materialmen remains as it was before the Act of 1887 was passed." 1 Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Company, 122 Pa. St. 627; and see East Grant Street, 121 Pa. St. 596; Gardner v. Gibson, 21 W. N. C. 121; Roth v. Hobson, 5 C. C. R. 17; 21 W. N. C. 64; Phillip's Estate, 6 C. C. R. 499; Bennett v. Maloney, 5 Kulp, 537. 11. Re-enactment of Former Statute by way of Amendment Without Regarding Intervening Repeal or Amendment. The third proviso to the first section of the Act of April 9th, 1872, P. L. 47, entitled "An Act for the better protection of the wages of mechanics, laborers, and others," required ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE. 85 that claims should be filed in the office of the prothonotary of the proper county in the same manner as mechanics' liens. This proviso was repealed by the second section of the sup- plementary Act of May 8th, 1874, P. L. 120. The Act of June 13th, 1883, P. L. 116, indicated by its title a purpose to amend the first section of the Act of 1872 so that the wages of servant girls, washerwomen, clerks, and others, should also be preferred, and its obvious purpose was to ex- tend to new classes of claims the provisions of the Act of 1872. The draftsman of the Act of 1883 copied the whole of the first section of the Act of 1872, interpolating such words as were requisite to extend the same to include the new classes of wage claimants, but copied and so caused to be re-enacted the third proviso which had been repealed by the Act of 1874. The title gave no notice of this, and the Act of 1883 was held inoperative as to the said proviso. In a case arising upon this statute, 1 the learned auditor, Hon. Charles R. Buckalew, said: "But independent of any constitutional question aris- ing upon this statute, we may be greatly aided in its con- struction by considering the title in connection with the body of the Act, as will be apparent upon an examination of the latter. The Act of 1883 recites as existing law the whole of the first section of the Act of 1872 in its original form, and appears also to leave the whole of it in force. The section is left unchanged in the second recital except by the insertion of additional words conformed to the title, and which words have no necessary connection with the proviso. That the Act was carelessly drawn appears from both text and title, and from the known relations of the Act to both prior and subsequent laws. It begins by saying, 'so much' of the first section of the Act of 1872, which reads 'as follows,' and then proceeds to recite the section at full length, so that the 'so much' is found to be the whole, and to include that part of the original section which had been previously repealed. Af- ter the recital of the section, the Act goes on to say that the 86 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. section 'is hereby amended to read as follows,' and proceeds to recite over again precisely the same form of section with an addition of the interpolated words above mentioned. By this language, upon the face of the Act, it already appears that the amendment intended was the interpolated words and nothing else. "The section read before without them, and it was to read with them, but otherwise exactly as before. It may be added that the implication from the face of the Act that the proviso was to be law in future is no stronger than the implication that it was existing law when the Act was passed — an impli- cation which we know to be false. We get away from diffi- culties by rejecting both implications, and accepting the re- citals of the old section — outside of the new matter inserted — as formal and not as enactive parts of an amendatory law. There was apparently a bungling attempt to adapt a form of the new statute to the requirements of the sixth section of the third Article of the Constitution, which resulted in re- citing and republishing both the existing and repealed parts of the old section which it was proposed to amend. It is evi- dent that the writer of the Act did not intend, at the outset, to copy or recite the whole of the old section, or revive or enact the whole, but only to recite so much of it as he in- tended to amend by the new matter indicated in the title; but afterwards by mistake, or in supposed conformity with constitutional form required for an amendatory Act, the en- tire section was copied and republished in the new Act. The Act of 1883 has no repealing clause, nor any reference what- ever to the repealing Act of 1874. But that Act of 1874 was too conspicuous and important to have been overlooked when the Act of 1883 was under consideration, if attention was at all directed to the question of filing labor claims. Therefore, the fact that the Act of 1874 was not repealed in express terms is strong evidence that it was to remain un- disturbed. Repeals by implication are not favored by the law, and when admitted the repugnancy of the new statute ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE. 87 to a former one must be clear, palpable, and beyond honest dispute." A still more complicated state of legislation is found in another case, 2 which involved an original enactment of 1874, a supplement of 1878, amending the Act of 1874, by provid- ing that a certain part should read as provided in the supple- ment, thus repealing the original provisions, save as amended, and a supplement of 1883, in which no notice was taken of the repeal by the supplement of 1878, but which adopted the original provisions of 1874, a part of which had been included in the supplement of 1878, and re-enacted them as intended to be amended by the said supplement of 1883. It was held that the supplements of 1878 and 1883 might both stand, except in so far as the provisions of the supplement of 1883 were inconsistent with those of 1878. In 1889 another supple- ment was passed which again quoted the provisions of the Act of 1874, without reference to the previous enactments of 1878 and 1883. It was held that all three enactments might stand and be given effect in order, the later provisions prevailing over the earlier. The Act of April 4th, 1789, Sm. L. 331, relating to the lien of judgments, was amended by the Act of March 26th, 1827, P. L. 129. The Act of February 24th, 1834, Section 25, P. L. jy, provided that the lien of a judgment should continue to bind the estate of a decedent for five years with- out revival, and during that term judgments should take rank according to their priority at the time of death. The Act of June 1st, 1887, P. L. 289, amended the Act of 1827, by adding a clause preventing the continuance of the lien of a judgment as against a terrc tenant whose deed is re- corded, unless he be named as tcrrc tenant in the original scire facias. In a case involving the application of this legislation, 3 Mr. Justice Mitchell said: "This appears to be the whole scope of the amendment, but in obedience to the constitu- tional requirement the Act quotes the whole of section first of the Act of 1827, and then re-enacts it in the same words, 88 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. with the addition above mentioned. In so doing it neces- sarily re-enacts the words 'and no judgment shall continue a lien . . for a longer period than five years . . . unless revived,' etc., and the argument is strongly urged by appel- lant, first, that the Act of February 24th, 1834, continuing the lien of judgments against the lands of a decedent, being in pari materia, is repealed by the general negative words of the Act of 1887, and, secondly, that it cannot be considered as excepted from such effect, and allowed to remain as an amendment to the Act of 1827, because it is not 're-enacted and published at length,' as required by Section 6, of Article III, of the Constitution. "The second proposition may be disposed of first. The Act of 1887 does not undertake to amend the Act of 1834, and therefore did not need to repeat its terms. The constitu- tional provision has reference to express amendments only. Its object, like that of Section 2, of the same article, requiring each Act to have its subject clearly expressed in the title, was to secure to the legislators themselves and others interested, direct notice, in immediate connection with proposed legisla- tion, of its object and purpose. The Constitution does not make the obviously impracticable requirement that every Act shall recite all other Acts that its operation may incidentally affect, either by way of repeal, modification, extension, or supply. The harmony of repugnance of Acts not passed with reference to the same subject can only be effectually devel- oped by the clash of conflicting interests in litigation, and the settlement of such questions belongs to the judicial, not the legislative department. No constitutional provision is in- volved in the present case. "The words of the Act of 1887, 'no judgment shall continue a lien,' etc., are general and negative, and prima facie there- fore repeal everything in conflict with them. But they are not to be extended to subjects not within the legislative in- tent. They are part of the Act of 1827, and are re-enacted without change, pro forma, in order to add the subsequent ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE. 89 provision about terre tenants. . . . The Act of 1834 was entitled 'An Act relating to executors and administrators,' and not only its title, but its seventy carefully drawn sec- tions show that it was intended to deal directly only with that subject, and touched the subject of judgments only incident- ally in connection with the estates of decedents. The Legis- lature, therefore, in 1887 had before it a clear distinction be- tween classes of judgments, existing for more than half a century under separate statutes, and when under such cir- cumstances it took up one of those statutes for amendment, we must assume that it legislated with that established dis- tinction in view, until it shows a clear intention to disregard or abolish it. Notwithstanding, therefore, the generality and the negative character of the language of the Act of 1887 we are of opinion it has not affected the Act of 1834." Rogers v. Glendower Iron Works, 17 W. N. C. 444. 2 Commonwealth v. Taylor, 159 Pa. St. 451. 3 Stuart's Appeal, 163 Pa. St. 210. 12. Making a Local Statute General Where the Local Statute, Enacted Prior to 1874, Ex- tended the Provisions of a Pre-existing Statute. The Act of May 1st, 1861, P. L. 550, was entitled a sup- plement to an Act relating to the liens of mechanics and others upon buildings, approved the 16th day of June, 1836, so far as it relates to certain counties, and enacted in its first and only section that the said recited Act and its supplements shall hereafter be held and taken to apply to repairs, altera- tions, etc., provided that this Act shall apply only to Chester, Delaware, and Berks counties. The Act of May 18th, 1887, P. L. 118, entitled "A supple- ment to an Act relating to the liens of mechanics and others upon buildings," recited the title as well as the first and only section as above, and declared that the same be and is hereby 90 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. extended to all the counties of the Commonwealth. The validity of this Act was sustained. Said White, P. J.: "It must be remembered when the Act of 1861 was passed it was entirely constitutional to extend the provisions of existing statutes by reference to their title only, and such was a pre- vailing practice of legislation. Being then a valid Act so as to extend the provisions of the Act of 1836 by reference to its title, the Legislature of 1887, under the new rule prescribed by the existing Constitution could extend this Act of 1861 and give it full effect throughout the State by re-enacting and publishing it at length as was done. ... It was not nec- essary to re-enact and publish at length again the Act of 1836, to require this to have been done by the Act of 1887 would have denied practically the validity of the form of the Act of 1861." 1 The Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion affirming the judgment of the court below said: "While said Act may be objectionable in form, it is, nevertheless, in substantial com- pliance with Section 6, of Article III, of the Constitution. It not only quotes the title of the Act of June 16th, 1836, but it re-enacts and publishes at length so much thereof as by its supplement of May 1st, 1861, is extended and amended." 2 x Purvis v. Ross, 12 C. C. R. 193. 2 Purvis v. Ross, 158 Pa. St. 20; Smyers v. Beam, 158 Pa. St. 57. III. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. Article I, Section 5. Elections shall be free and equal, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to pre- vent the free exercise of the right of suffrage. Article III, Section 7. The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law. (1) Authorizing the creation, extension, or impairing of liens. (2) Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs, or school districts. (3) Changing the names of persons or places. (4) Changing the venue in civil or criminal cases. (5) Authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, or maintaining roads, highways, streets, or alleys. (6) Relating to ferries or bridges, or incorporating ferry or bridge companies, except for the erection of bridges cross- ing streams which form boundaries between this and any other State. (7) Vacating roads, town-plats, streets, or alleys. (8) Relating to cemeteries, graveyards, or public grounds not of the State. (9) Authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children. (10) Locating or changing county seats, erecting new counties, or changing county lines. (11) Incorporating cities, towns, or villages, or changing their charters. 9i 92 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. (12) For the opening and conducting of elections, or fix- ing or changing the place of voting. (13) Granting divorces. (14) Erecting new townships or boroughs, changing township lines, borough limits, or school districts. (15) Creating offices, or prescribing the powers and du- ties of officers in counties, cities, boroughs, townships, elec- tion, or school districts. (16) Changing the law of descent or succession. (17) Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or chang- ing the rules of evidence in, any judicial proceeding or in- quiry before courts, aldermen, justices of the peace, sheriffs, commissioners, arbitrators, auditors, masters in chancery, or other tribunals, or providing or changing methods for the collection of debts or the enforcing of judgments, or prescrib- ing the effect of judicial sales of real estate. (18) Regulating the fees or extending the powers and duties of aldermen, justices of the peace, magistrates, or con- stables. (19) Regulating the management of public schools, the building or repairing of school-houses, and the raising of money for such purposes. (20) Fixing the rate of interest. (21) Affecting the estates of minors or persons under dis- ability, except after due notice to all parties in interest, to be recited in the special enactment. (22) Remitting fines, penalties, and forfeitures, or refund- ing moneys legally paid into the treasury. (23) Exempting property from taxation. (24) Regulating labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing. (25) Creating corporations, or amending, renewing, or extending the charters thereof. (26) Granting to any corporation, association, or indi- vidual any special or exclusive privilege or immunity, or to any corporation, association, or individual the right to lay down a railroad track. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 93 (27) Nor shall the General Assembly indirectly enact such special or local law by the partial repeal of a general law, but laws repealing local or special Acts may be passed. (28) Nor shall any law be passed granting powers or privileges in any case, where the granting of such powers and privileges shall have been provided for by general law, nor where the courts have jurisdiction to grant the same, or give the relief asked for. Article III, Section 8. No local or special bill shall be passed unless notice of the intention to apply therefor shall have been published in the locality where the matter or the thing to be affected may be situated, which notice shall be at least thirty days prior to the introduction into the General Assembly of such bill, and in the manner to be provided by law; the evidence of such notice having been published shall be exhibited in the General Assembly before such Act shall be passed. Article III, Section 21. . . No Act shall prescribe any limitation of time within which suits may be brought against corporations for injuries to persons or property, or for other causes, different from those fixed by general laws regulating actions against natural persons; and such Acts now existing are avoided. Article V, Section 26. All laws relating to courts shall be general and of uniform operation, and the organization, juris- diction, and powers of all courts of the same class or grade, so far as regulated by law, and the force and effect of the pro- cess and judgments of such courts, shall be uniform; and the General Assembly is hereby prohibited from creating other courts to exercise the powers vested by this Constitution in the judges of the courts of common pleas and orphans' courts. Article VIII, Section 7. All laws regulating the holding of elections by the citizens, or for the registration of electors, shall be uniform throughout the State, but no elector shall be deprived of the privilege of voting by reason of his name not being registered. 94 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. Article V, Section 17. . . . The General Assembly shall by general law designate the courts and judges by whom the several classes of election contests shall be tried, and regulate the manner of trial and all matters incident thereto. . . . Article IX, Section 1. All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the au- thority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws; but the General Assembly may by general laws exempt from taxation public property used for public pur- poses, actual places of religious worship, places of burial not used or held for private or corporate profit, and institutions of purely public charity. Article XVI, Section 7. . . . The stock and indebtedness of corporations shall not be increased except in pursuance of general law. . . . Article XVI, Section 18. Any association or corporation organized for the purpose, or any individual, shall have the right to construct and maintain lines of telegraph within this State, and to connect the same with other lines; and the Gen- eral Assembly shall, by general law, of uniform operation, provide reasonable regulations to give full effect to this sec- tion. . . . Constitution. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. CHAPTER I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 1. The constitutional provisions generally. 2. What is meant by a special or local law. 3. The constitutional provisions are to be so construed as to prevent the mischief designed to be remedied by their adoption. 4. The provisions as to local and special legislation ap- ply only to the General Assembly. 5. A law is general which contains an exception render- ing it apparently special, if the exception be made pursuant to a special constitutional provision. 6. A law is general, though its operation may be im- peded by pre-existing special laws, and hence such laws may be saved by exception. 7. A law may be general as to a class of persons, and therefore valid, although special or local as to its subject-matter. 8. A general law may contain special provisions neces- sary to render it effective. 1. The Constitutional Provisions Generally. The constitutional provisions related to the present sub- ject are of two kinds, affirmative and negative. Those of 95 96 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. Article III, Section 7, are negative. The article begins, "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law," and proceeds to enumerate the subjects within the prohibi- tion. The provision of Article III, Section 21, as to limita- tion of suits is negative. Other provisions are affirmative; thus, Article V, Section 26, declares that all laws relating to courts shall be general and of uniform operation, and the organization, jurisdiction, and powers of all courts of the same class or grade, so far as regulated by law, and the force and effect of the process and judgments of such courts, shall be uniform. These provisions may be considered in connec- tion with the negative provisions of Article III, Section 7, upon judicial subjects. Article VIII, Section 7, declares that all laws regulating the holding of elections by the citizens, or for the registration of voters shall be uniform throughout the State. Upon the same subject, Article III, Section 7, prohibits local and special laws for the opening and conduct- ing of elections, or fixing or changing the places of voting. The Bill of Rights provides that all elections shall be free and equal. Article VIII, Section 17, requires the General Assembly to designate, by general law, the courts and judges by whom the several classes of election contests shall be tried, and regulate the manner of trial and all matters incident thereto. Article IX, Section 1, requires that all taxes shall be levied and collected under general laws, and provides that exemptions so far as permitted shall be likewise made. A prohibition as to exempting property from taxation is to be found in Article III, Section 7. By Article XVI, Section 12, certain matters relating to telegraphs are to be subjected to reasonable regulation by general law of uniform operation. The affirmative provisions are usually general. The negative provisions are usually specific. The prohibition, in Article III, Section 7, of local or special laws changing the law of descent or succession, or fixing the rate of interest, are related to the provisions already referred to designed to secure uniformity of law. Other provisions of LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 97 the same section may be classified as relating to govermental affairs, either political, executive, or administrative, such as those relating to the affairs of counties, cities, townships, bor- oughs, wards, and school districts; to roads, highways, streets, alleys, ferries, bridges, town-plats, cemeteries, grave- yards, and public grounds not of the State; to elections; to changing the names of persons or places and to the release of fines, penalties, and forfeitures. Others relate to more purely legislative matters, such as those relating to the estates of minors and persons under disability, to regulating labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing; to the creation of corpora- tions, or the altering or amending their charters; to grant- ing special privileges or immunities, or granting powers or privileges where the granting of such powers and privileges shall have been provided for by general laws, or where the courts have jurisdiction to grant the relief asked for, and to evasions by partial repeal of general law. Other provisions relate to the judicial power, such as those relating to liens, divorces, venue, adoption, and the regula- tion of the practice, jurisdiction, and procedure of judicial tribunals. In this connection reference may be made to certain pro- visions made in the singular; thus, in Article IX, Section 8, "any city the debt of which now exceeds seven per centum of such assessed valuation may be authorized by law to increase the same three per centum in the aggregate at any one time upon such valuation;" and in Article XVI, Section 10, "the Gen- eral Assembly shall have the power to revoke or annul any charter of incorporation," &c, and in Article III, Section 27, "any county or municipality may appoint (inspection) officers when authorized by law." How far these special provisions may be regarded as exceptions to the general declarations elsewhere made upon the same subjects and whether they authorize special laws, may be a question. 1 Other provisions expressly contemplate exceptional special legislation; for example, Article V, Section 6, relating 7 98 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. to increasing the number of courts or judges; Article V, Sec- tion 22, relating to the establishment of separate orphans' courts; Article V, Section 12, relating to magistrates courts in Philadelphia. 1 Wheeler v. Philadelphia, JJ Pa. St. 338-351, wherein Mr. Justice Paxson (arguendo) said: "If the complainants were right in their position in regard to the classification of cities, and that the Act classifying cities is a special Act applicable to Philadelphia alone, it would not help them. The Legisla- ture is authorized by the express terms of the Constitution to empower by special Act a city to increase its debt. The lan- guage of that instrument is 'but any city, the debt of which exceeds seven per centum, may be authorized by law to in- crease the same.' It was entirely competent for the Legis- lature to have passed an Act authorizing the city of Phila- delphia, by name, to increase its debt." The provision re- ferred to was exceptional and temporary. A city whose in- debtedness exceeded seven per centum at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, but passed afterward below that limit, fell into the category of all the other cities of the Com- monwealth, was thereafter governed by the general pro- visions of the Constitution, and could not act under this one: Pepper v. Philadelphia, 181 Pa. St. 566; s. c, below, 6 P. D. R. 317. 2. What is Meant by a Special or Local Law. A special law within the meaning of the Constitution is one applicable to less than a class of subjects. A local law is one applicable to less than a class of places; it is a special law of local application. Both definitions involve the principle of classification, and a right understanding of this principle frequently solves all difficulty in the application of the con- stitutional provisions. Instances of prohibited special legis- lation tending to illustrate the foregoing definition may be found in Article III, Section 7, as follows: Laws changing LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 99 the names of persons or places; authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children; granting divorces; creating corpora- tions, or amending, renewing, or extending the charters thereof; granting to any corporation, association, or indi- vidual any special or exclusive privilege or immunity, or to any corporation, association, or individual the right to lay down a railroad track. Instances of prohibited legislation, both local and special, may be found in the same section as follows: Laws regulating the affairs of counties, cities, town- ships, wards, boroughs, or school districts; authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, or maintaining roads, highways, streets, or alleys; vacating roads, town-plats, streets, or al- leys; relating to cemeteries, graveyards, or public grounds not of the State; locating or changing county seats, erecting new counties, or changing county lines; incorporating cities, towns, or villages, or changing their charters; erecting new townships or boroughs, changing township lines, borough limits, or school districts; regulating the management of pub- lic schools, the building or repairing of school houses, and the raising of money for such purposes. "All legislation is necessarily based on a classification of its subjects, and when such classification is fairly made, laws enacted in conformity thereto cannot be properly charac- terized as either local or special. A law prescribing the mode of incorporating all railroad companies is special, in the nar- row sense that it is confined in its operations to one kind of corporations only, and, by the same test, a law providing a single system for organization and government of boroughs in the State would be a local law, but every one conversant with the meaning of those words, when used in that connec- tion, would unhesitatingly pronounce such statutes general laws:" Sterrett, J., Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 266. "The subject of this statute is, therefore, street railway companies, which is a subject for general legislation, while the statute professes to deal only with a limited number of these railways, and these are selected by reference to their location in certain cities. Under the guise of a general law we have here one which is special, because it relates to a few members IOO VALIDITY OF STATUTES. of the general class of corporations known as street railway companies, and local because its operations are confined to particular localities, viz., cities of the second and third class:" Williams, J., Weinman v. Passenger Railway Company, 118 Pa. St. 192. "We have repeatedly held that the power to classify being conceded, the conclusion that an Act passed for a class was not a local law within the prohibition of the Constitution was irresistible. It may not be a general law in the same sense that one applicable to the Commonwealth at large is general; but it is general, in another and strictly legal sense, since it embraces all the members of a class which the Legis- lature has created, without any violation of the fundamental law, and which is therefore a proper subject for legislation:" Per Williams, J., Commonwealth v. Macferron, 152 Pa. St. 244. "An Act of Assembly that relates to a subject within the purposes of classification is a general law, although it may be operative in a very small portion of the territory of the State, if it relates to all the cities of a given class. For ex- ample, an Act relating to the lighting of streets in cities of the third class would be a general law for the following rea- sons: (a) It relates to the exercise of 'corporate powers;' (b) It affects all the cities of a given class in the same manner; (c) It affects the inhabitants and property-owners in such cities, because of their residence and ownership therein, and the circumstances and needs that are peculiar to the class to which their city belongs. But a law that should provide that all applications made by guardians, administrators, and exec- utors for leave to sell the real estate of a decedent for the pay- ment of his debts, in cities of the third class, should be made, not in the court having jurisdiction of the petitioner's ac- counts, but in the court of quarter sessions would be a local law, and therefore unconstitutional. It would be applicable to the same sub-divisions of territory as the law relating to the lighting of streets, but it would relate to the exercise of no corporate power residing in a city, nor to the duties of any municipal officer, nor to the needs or welfare of citizens of a city of the third class, as distinguished from other citi- zens of the Commonwealth. On the other hand, it would affect the jurisdiction of the State courts, modify the duties of public officers whose functions are not local, but general, and touch the inhabitants of cities of the given class in the LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. IOI exercise and enjoyment of their rights as citizens of the State, not as dwellers in the municipality:" Per Williams, J., Wy- oming Street, 137 Pa. St. 494. "It was not, then, a general Act, applicable to every part of the Commonwealth. It did apply to a great number of counties, but there is no dividing line between a local and a general statute. It must be either the one or the other. If it apply to the whole State it is general. If to a part only, it is local. As a legal principle it is as effectually local when it applies to sixty-five counties out of the sixty-seven, as if it applied to one county only. The exclusion of a single county from the operation of the Act makes it local:" Per Mercur, J., Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. St. 377. "The Act in question is clearly local; it applies to the township of Ayr only. It gives no power or authority to the officials of any other township or district. The exer- cise of all power thereby given is restricted within the bounds of the one school district. It is also special. The tax was to be levied and collected for one specific purpose; that pur- pose was to pay a certain sum of money to the persons named in the Act. The money could not be used for any other or different purpose:" Per Mercur,, J., Montgomery v. Com- monwealth, 91 Pa. St. 125. 3. The Constitutional Provisions are to be so Con- strued as to Prevent the Mischief Designed to ee Remedied by Their Adoption. In Ayars' Appeal, 1 Mr. Justice Sterrett said: "During the session of the Legislature immediately preceding the adoption of the present Constitution, nearly one hundred and fifty local or special laws were enacted for the city of Phila- delphia, more than one-third that number for the city of Pittsburg, and for other municipal divisions of the State, about the same proportion. This was by no means ex- ceptional. The pernicious system of special legislation, prac- ticed for many years before, had become so general and deep- rooted and the evils resulting therefrom so alarming that the people of the Commonwealth determined to apply the only remedy that promised any hope of relief. Doubtless, it 102 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. was a proper appreciation of the magnitude of these evils as much as anything else that called into existence the conven- tion that framed the present Constitution, and induced its adoption by an overwhelming vote. One of the manifest ob- jects of that instrument was to eradicate that species of leg- islation, and substitute, in lieu of it, general laws whenever it was possible to do so. This is so clearly apparent that no unbiased mind can contemplate the seventh section of Article III, and kindred provisions, without reaching that conclu- sion. That section contains a schedule of nearly fifty prolific subjects of previous special and local legislation, and ordains that 'The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law,' relating to either of them. As an additional safeguard in cases where special legislation is not expressly prohibited, the next section declares 'No local or special bill shall be passed unless notice of the intention to apply therefor shall have been published,' etc." This point is further illustrated by the remarks of Mr. Justice Paxson in the case of Morrison v. Bach- ert: 2 "Prior to the adoption of the present Constitu- tion there was hardly an approach to uniformity in the fees of public officers throughout the State. Local Acts had been procured for many of the counties, in some in- stances through the influence of the officers themselves, fix- ing the fees more in harmony with their own greed than the interests of the people, who may fairly be presumed to have known nothing of it until they came to pay the fees. It was to cut this system up, root and branch, with other evils of like nature, that the clause in question was inserted in the Constitution. It was a wise provision, and will be sternly en- forced. It is our purpose to adhere rigidly to that instru- ment that the people may not be deprived of its benefits. It ought to be unnecessary for this court to make this judicial declaration, but it is proper to do so, in view of the amount of legislation which is periodically placed upon the statute- book in entire disregard of the fundamental law. Much of LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. IO3 this legislation may remain unchallenged for years, only to be overturned when it reaches this court. In the meantime, parties may have acted upon it, rights may have grown up, and the inconveniences and losses entailed thereby may not be inconsiderable. As we view it, this note of warning at this time is needed." It is further illustrated by the remarks of Mr. Justice Green, in Appeal of the City of Scranton School District: 3 "It is the duty of the court to enforce the Constitution as they find it. Attempts in covert modes to defeat its plain pro- visions must be set aside with the same certainty as when the methods are open. Even if the intention be innocent and yet the legislation comes within the constitutional prohibi- tion it must not be tolerated." In Ayars' Appeal (supra), it was further remarked by the learned justice: "The purpose of the provision under con- sideration was not to limit legislation, but merely to prohibit doing, by local or special laws, that which can be accom- plished by general laws. It relates not to the substance, but to the method of legislation, and imperatively demands the enactment of general instead of local or special laws, when- ever the former are at all practicable." In harmony with the foregoing is the construction placed upon the word "affairs" in the second clause of Section 7, of Article III. Thus, in Morrison v. Bachert (supra), Mr. Jus- tice Paxson said: "It was held by the learned judge of the court below, however, that an Act regulating the fees of the prothonotary or other county officers was not a law 'regulat- ing the affairs of counties,' and he defines the 'affairs of coun- ties' to be such 'as concern counties in their governmental and corporate capacity.' This will not do. It is too narrow a construction of the Constitution. That instrument was in- tended for the benefit of the people, and must receive a lib- eral construction. 'A constitution is not to receive a tech- nical construction, like a common-law instrument or statute. It is to be interpreted so as to carry out the great principles 104 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. of government, and not to defeat them:' Commonwealth v. Clark, 7 W. & S. 127. When it speaks of the affairs of a county, it means such affairs as affect the people of that county. The prothonotary is a county officer, while his fees, when received by him, are his private property, they are paid by the people of the county, not indeed assessed upon all the taxpayers as a salary would be, but upon all citizens who have business with the office or litigation in the courts. As every citizen of the county may be affected by such an Act, and most of them surely will be, how can we say that it concerns no one but the officer entitled to the fees? "The word 'affairs' is one of broad signification, and the convention used it understandingly. Mr. Buckalew, who was a prominent member of that body, thus refers to the subject in his very excellent work on the Constitution, at page 72: 'In the Pennsylvania provision the word "affairs" is the im- portant one to be examined. It was obviously borrowed from the Constitutions which were, in 1873, of most recent formation, in which it was made to supply the word "busi- ness," found in the earlier Constitutions above mentioned. The substitution of a French for a Saxon word — "affairs" for "business" — was probably made in consequence of judicial opinions which had assigned a somewhat restricted effect to the word business, as found in the earlier Constitutions, and was intended to give to the prohibition upon local legisla- tion a more extended application.' " In Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 4 wherein was in ques- tion an Act for the relief of individuals who had advanced moneys in commutation for men drafted into the military service to fill the quota of the township, and who had not been fully reimbursed therefor, by providing money to pay the deficiencies, to be raised from taxpayers of the township, it was said by Mr. Justice Mercur: "It is contended that this Act of Assembly does not profess 'to regulate the affairs' of the township or school district. Affair is well defined to be business, something to be transacted, matter, concern. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 105 Public affairs are matters relating to government. It is clear that the Act does profess to deal with the affairs of the district. It imposes this specific business on the district, which it was not chargeable with before. It gives to the col- lector of this tax authority to pay over to persons to whom he could not pay before. It imposes taxes on the people which they were not legally chargeable with before. It is then a matter which concerns every person in the district, who was thereby made subject to this additional taxation. One of the highest attributes of governmental power is thereby ap- plied to them. Their property is to be taken from them and given to others. It does then relate to the public affairs of the district. It seeks to regulate them by designating the manner in which, and the persons by whom, these affairs shall be conducted. It gives relief where no legal remedy existed before, and directs and regulates the action of the officers of the district. Thus it is a special Act for a special purpose to regulate the affairs of the school district, and is in clear violation of Article III, Section 7, of the Constitution. As this is decisive of the case it is unnecessary to consider whether the Act is in conflict with Article IX, Section i, which declares all taxes shall be levied and collected under general laws." 1 Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 266. 2 Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. St. 322; and see City of Scranton v. Silkman, 113 Pa. St. 191. 3 Scranton School District's Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 176. 4 Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. St. 125. In Scranton v. Silkman (supra), in which the judgment was reversed, his Honor, Judge PIand, in the court below, at- tempted to distinguish matters of taxation from other mat- ters purely local. He said: "The matter of taxation, in all its branches, is pre-eminently a State affair. The power is a sovereign power. The subject-matter of assessment, the levying and collection of taxes is wholly within the power of the State. It is the internal administration and manage- 106 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. ment of counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs, or school districts that is aimed at in the regulation of those affairs, not the sovereign power and regulation of taxation with all its vital governmental concomitants." "Constitutions are popular as well as legal instruments, and are to be judged in full view of the facts which attend their formation, and with reference to the announced objects of those who made them. Especially in considering those parts of the Constitution, which, like the seventh section of the third article, consist of general propositions in very con- densed form, and consequently without the qualifications and explanations which they require, we are to avoid the mischief of sticking fast in technical construction and losing grasp upon the true meaning of the matter before us. And we are to remember also that the numerous and stringent provisions of this seventh section, detracting as they do largely from the powers of government, are not to be strained beyond their obvious or necessary meaning. Exceptions from the general grant of legislative power must be expressed with distinct- ness or be clearly implied. They are not to be carried beyond the proper import of the words used, nor, where they admit of more than one meaning, are they to be taken in a sense which shall defeat or impair any power which apparently the convention intended to preserve:" Buckalew on the Consti- tution, 99. In speaking of the classification of cities, Mr. Justice Pax- son said: "If the classification of cities is in violation of the Constitution, it follows, of necessity, that Philadelphia, as a city of the first class, must be denied the legislation nec- essary to its present prosperity and future development, or that the small inland cities must be burdened with legislation wholly unsuited to their needs. For if the Constitution means what the complainants aver that it does, Philadelphia can have no legislation that is not common to all other cities of the State. And for this there is absolutely no remedy but a change in the organic law itself. "This is a serious question. We have but to turn to the statute-book to realize the vast amount of legislation in the past, special to the city of Philadelphia. We speak not now of what is popularly known as special legislation, private Acts, etc., but of proper legislation, affecting the whole city, and indispensable to its prosperity. We may instance the laws in regard to the quarantine, lazaretto, board of LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. IO7 health, and other matters connected with the sanitary condi- tion of the city, the laws in regard to shipping and pilotage as affecting its commerce, laws concerning its trade, such as those that relate to mercantile appraisers, inspectors of flour, bark, beef and pork, butter and lard, domestic distilled spirits, flaxseed, leather, tobacco, petroleum, and the laws in regard to building inspectors, the storage and sale of gunpowder, laws affecting its political condition, as by the division and subdivision of wards, and the establishing of ratio of repre- sentation in councils. We have but to glance at this legis- lation to see that the most of it is wholly unsuited to small inland cities, and that to inflict it upon them would be little short of a calamity. Must the city of Scranton, over ioo miles from tide-water, with a stream hardly large enough to float a batteau, be subjected to quarantine regulations, and have its lazaretto? Must the legislation for a great commercial and manufacturing city, with a population approaching 1,000,000, be regulated by the wants or necessities of an in- land city of 10,000 inhabitants? If the Constitution answers this question affirmatively, we are bound by it, however much we might question its wisdom. But no such construction is to be gathered from its terms, and we will not presume that the framers of that instrument, or the people who ratified it, intended that the machinery of their State government should be so bolted and riveted down by the fundamental law as to be unable to move and perform its necessary functions:" Wheeler v. Philadelphia, JJ Pa. St. 338-350. 4. The Provisions as to Local and Special Legis- lation Apply Only to the General Assembly. The constitutional limitations relating to local and special legislation govern the General Assembly; they are not limi- tations upon the legislative power of a municipality. A mu- nicipal ordinance is not a law within the meaning of the Con- stitution when that term is used with reference to the subject under consideration. In Klingler v. Bickel, 1 there was in question the validity of a borough ordinance, prohibiting the erection of wooden buildings within certain prescribed limits, enacted under the provisions of the Act of June 3d, 1885, P. L. 55. The court below held that the ordinance was 108 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. invalid because it prohibited the erection of such buildings in only a portion of the borough, that under the provision of the Constitution prohibiting special or local legislation it was beyond the power of the council as it was beyond the power of the Legislature to legislate for only a portion of the borough. Said Mr. Justice Paxson: "Granted the constitutional prohibition and that under it the Legislature may not pass any law 'regulating the affairs of counties, townships, wards, boroughs, or school districts,' it by no means follows that when the Legislature by a general law confers upon a bor- ough the power of regulating its local affairs it may not do so by ordinances that are special in their character. The object of the constitutional provision was clearly to prevent the Legislature from interfering in local affairs by means of special legislation, and, if the town councils of cities and bor- oughs cannot regulate them, they are in a bad way indeed. The principle contended for would prevent the town coun- cils of a city or borough from passing an ordinance to pave one street, unless it also provided for the paving of all the other streets within the limits of the municipality. In Bald- win v. The City of Philadelphia, 99 Pa. St. 164, it was de- cided that an ordinance of the city was not a 'law' within the meaning of that clause of the Constitution which declares that 'no law shall extend the term of any public officer, or in- crease or diminish his salary or emoluments after his election or appointment.' The reasoning of that case applies equally to that section of the Constitution prohibiting special legis- lation." The declaration of Article IX, Section 1, is more compre- hensive; it is that "all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax." 1 Klingler v. Bickel, 117 Pa. St. 326; and see Norristown v. Citizens' Passenger Railway Company, 148 Pa. St. 87; s. c, below, 9 C. C. R. 102; McCormick v. Fayette County, 150 Pa. St. 191. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. IO9 5, A Law is General Which Contains an Exception Rendering it Apparently Special, if the Ex- ception be Made Pursuant to a Special Con- stitutional Provision. The Act of July 7th, 1879, P. L. 194, enlarging the civil jurisdiction of justices of the peace to three hundred dollars is not rendered local or special by the exclusion of cities of the first class from its operation if in this Act the term "cities of the first class" refers only to the city of Philadelphia, as in that city the office of alderman is abolished and magis- trates provided for whose civil jurisdiction is limited by the Constitution (Article V, Section 11) to one hundred dollars; "were it not for this provision it would be impossible to hold that the exception means only Philadelphia," and the Act would therefore be local. 1 This rule is not applicable, however, where the exception has reference to a special pre-existing statutory provision. The Act of May 24th, 1878, P. L. 133, was entitled "A sup- plement to an Act approved April 20th, 1876, entitled 'An Act authorizing appeals from assessments in this Common- wealth to the court of common pleas,' and limiting taxa- tion without the approval of the court of quarter sessions, until the next triennial assessment, where the county valua- tion has been raised to exceed three hundred and fifty per cent." The first section of this Act limited its effect to coun- ties of less than five hundred thousand inhabitants. This Act was held invalid. 2 In this case Mr. Justice Green said: "There is no doubt much force in the consideration that the only county which is now excluded has a system of appeal of its own, and the present law practically makes the right gen- eral which was before local. But the difficulty we experience is that we cannot consistently hold a principle of construc- tion applicable in one case and not applicable to another where the same conditions exist. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that we are obliged to apply the doctrine of Davis v. Clark to the present case, because we thereby deprive a large class of IIO VALIDITY OF STATUTES. citizens of a valuable privilege. But the remedy is with the Legislature and not with us. It is far better that the law- making power should itself correct the mischief by a new and proper enactment than that the judicial department of the government should pursue a shifting, tortuous policy by executing a rule of construction in one case and refusing it in another when the circumstances of the two are the same." 1 Wilkes-Barre v. Myers, 113 Pa. St. 395; s. p., Wissler v. Becker, 2 C. C. R. 103; Johnson v. Beacham, 2 C. C. R. 108. 2 Scranton v. Silkman, 113 Pa. St. 191. The Act of April 20th, 1876, P. L. 44, entitled "An Act authorizing appeals from assessments in this Commonwealth to the court of common pleas," provided that remedy in fa- vor of any owner of real estate in counties of less than five hundred thousand inhabitants, in cases of decision by the county commissioners. The Act of May 24th, 1878, P. L. 133, supplementary to the foregoing included the like remedy in cases of decision in any city of the third class. The objection was made in the foregoing case by plea to the jurisdiction grounded on the invalidity of the Act of 1878. It was admitted that the Act of March 18th, 1875, P. L. 15, had been accepted by the cities of the Commonwealth ex- cept Lancaster, Allegheny, and Wilkes-Barre, prior to 1878. The opinion of his Honor, Judge Hand, affirmed the valid- ity of the Acts in question for reasons, among others, which may be summarized as follows: 1. A classification was made, based on population, which had been recognized as proper, and which was in fact justified, operating as it did to leave Philadelphia in a class by itself. 2. The Act of 1876 and its supplement made that general which was before special, be- cause Philadelphia had a similar provision for appeals. 3. It was not local nor special for that reason, and because taxa- tion was an incident of sovereignty, an affair of State, and cities and counties were mere instrumentalities. The consti- tutional provision intends only such affairs as are peculiar to and belong to the internal management of the different sub- ordinate political divisions of the State. 4. The supplement is valid because it applies to all cities of the third class. 5. The remedy is given to all owners of real estate in the Com- monwealth. It is not confined to resident owners. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. Ill 6. A Law is General Though its Operation May be Impeded by Pre-existing Special Laws, and Hence Such Laws May be Saved by Exception. It may be stated as a general rule, subject to the exception that certain provisions may be construed as self-efficient, that the Constitution of 1S74 operated prospectively, and that it did not affect pre-existing legislation, either general, local, or special. 1 In the case of Lehigh Iron Company v. Lower Macungie Township (supra), the question was whether a special Act of February 25th, 1870, which authorized a township to collect a tax from owners of ore beds for "every ton of ore mined and carried away with teams" over the roads in the township was abrogated by Article IX, Section 1, of the Constitution, which declares that all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects and shall be levied under general laws. It was held that the provision of the Constitution in question was not operative upon pre-existing local legislation. In this case Chief Justice Agnew said: "The only question now before us is, therefore, upon the effect of the first section of the ninth article of the new Constitution upon such legisla- tion. It is contended that this section is a repeal, per se, of the Act under which this tax is sought to be levied and col- lected. It is a question of very great concern to the whole State, for if the position taken by the plaintiff in error be true, some of the most important laws of the State have fal- len long since, and all acts done under them have been un- lawful and void. An example may be found in the Act known as the Venango County Tax Law, enacted many years ago, and extended from time to time to other counties, until now it is the law of probably one-third of the counties in the State. This is the law which makes the treasurer of the county the collector of the State and county taxes, sends him out into the different townships to receive from the people, and requires him to place all uncollected taxes, on the first day of September, in the hands of the several constables for 112 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. collection, with an addition of five per cent, to the taxes of such person to pay the expense of collection. It allows the taxpayer a reduction of five per cent, for prompt payment before the first of August, and grace by payment of the sim- ple amount between the first of August and the first of Sep- tember. The constables give bond and sureties for collection. This is undoubtedly the cheapest and best system of collec- tion in the State, but it is unquestionably special. Many other laws for particular localities might be mentioned. "In view of the wide and extended effects of an immediate repeal, ipso facto, by the adoption of the new Constitution, it behooves us to be careful in the interpretation of the sec- tions mentioned. Upon all the consideration we can give to this subject, after a very careful argument to assist us, we are of opinion that Section i, of Article IX, is not immediately operative, but was intended by the convention to be manda- tory upon the Legislature to enact laws framed upon its special intent, and to repeal all laws inconsistent therewith, leaving the Legislature, in the exercise of a sound and wise discretion, to time the repeal after proper general laws shall have been passed. Any other interpretation would lead to most ruinous results. So much may be deduced from a com- prehensive view of the section itself and its consequences, in the absence of any language in it to evidence an intent to make it a repeal per se. But beyond this there is strong evi- dence in the immediate context that the convention had a different intention. A part of Section i is the declaration, by way of exception to its generality, of the power of the As- sembly to exempt certain classes of property from taxation. This is followed immediately by Section 2, which provides that 'all laws exempting property from taxation other than the property above enumerated, shall be void.' Thus the sub- ject of repeal was directly before the mind of the convention, and was limited to laws relating to exemption only. The subject of the second section, being directly connected with the subject of the first, indeed might have been incorporated LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 113 with it, and this subject being that of repeal, it is conclusive evidence to our minds that the convention did not intend to repeal special tax laws, but to let them stand until the Legislature had enacted a proper general system of taxation to take their places. The eminent men who composed that body could not fail to perceive the utter confusion into which the State would have been thrown by a repeal per se. "These views derive confirmation from other portions of the instrument. The exception in the seventh section of the third article, relative to legislation, giving power to repeal special and local Acts, strongly indicates the intent that such local and special Acts should remain until legislation had been adopted to harmonize these local and special provisions with the general laws so adopted. There are also instances of immediate repeal of existing laws, for example, Article III, Section 21, relating to damages for personal injuries, and Section 22, relating to investments by executors, etc. Ar- ticle XVI, Section 1, relating to certain existing charters of incorporation, and the section relating to exemption laws, already alluded to (Section 2, Article IX). Then we have the second and thirty-first sections of the schedule bearing di- rectly upon the question. The former continues in force all laws not inconsistent with the Constitution, and all rights, actions, prosecutions, and contracts. This express provision must have its due operation, unless inconsistency plainly ap- pears. The other makes it the duty of the Legislature at its first session, or as soon as may be, to pass such laws as may be necessary to carry the Constitution into full force and effect. This section also necessarily appeals to the conscience of the members, by their oath of office, to perform this necessary duty, and to bring the laws of the State into perfect accord with the Constitution, which is the highest evidence of the will of the people. With the Legislature, therefore, this duty remains to provide general laws for uniform taxation, and to harmonize all parts of the State by repealing local and 114 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. special provisions that stand out upon the body politic as incongruous excrescences." The Act of June 25th, 1885, P. L. 187, entitled "An Act relating to the collection of taxes in the several boroughs and townships of this Commonwealth/' does not violate Ar- ticle III, Section 7, of the Constitution, relating to local and special legislation, nor Article IX, Section 1, requiring uni- formity in the levy and collection of taxes. 2 The last section of the Act of 1885 concluded thus: "This Act shall not apply to any taxes, the collection of which is regulated by a local law." Said Mr. Justice Clark, in Evans v. Phillipi, 3 wherein the validity of this Act was in question: "The single ques- tion then is whether or not a statute, although general in form, is to be treated as a local one simply because of the in- tervention of some local statute unrepealed, which prevents it from taking general effect. There is an obvious distinc- tion between a statute which upon its face is local and special, and one which although general in form is thus obstructed in its application; in the one case the local law cannot become general, except by a re-enactment in general form, whilst in the other by the repeal of the local law the special subject affected by it is brought under the general law, the opera- tion of which was previously obstructed." The Act of May 13th, 1887, P. L. 108, known as the "Brooks High License Law," provides in the nineteenth sec- tion that none of its provisions "shall be held to authorize the sale of any spirituous, vinous, malt, or brewed liquors, or any admixture thereof, in any city, county, borough, or town- ship, having special prohibitory laws." The purpose of this was to avoid any doubt as to the intention of the Legisla- ture to leave intact special prohibitory laws enacted prior to the adoption of the present Constitution. The provision did not render the statute a local statute. 4 The Act of May 18th, 1889, P L. 129, entitled "Fixing the number of road and bridge viewers," contained a pro- vision that "this Act shall not apply to counties having local Acts inconsistent herewith." The Act was sustained. 6 LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. IIS Lehigh Iron Company v. Lower Macungie Township, 81 Pa. St. 482; and see Hays v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. St. 518; Ahl v. Rhoads, 84 Pa. St. 319; Indiana County v. Agricult- ural Society, 85 Pa. St. 357; Perot's Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 335; Allegheny County v. Cibson, 90 Pa. St. 397; Philadelphia v. Wright, 100 Pa. St. 235; Pierce v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. St. 150; Commonwealth v. Handley, 106 Pa. St. 245; Cahill's Petition, no Pa. St. 167; Beaumont v. Wilkes-Barre, 142 Pa. St. 198. 2 Commonwealth v. Lyter, 162 Pa. St. 50. 3 Evans v. Phillipi, 117 Pa. St. 226; and see Bennett v. Hunt, 148 Pa. St. 257; Commonwealth v. Lyter, 162 Pa. St. 50. ^Commonwealth v. Sellers, 130 Pa. St. 32; and see Com- monwealth v. McCandless, 4 C. C. R. 119; Affirmed 10 Cent. Rep. 758; s. c, 21 W. N. C. 162; Commonwealth v. Haag, 6 C. C. R. 118. 5 Road in Cheltenham Township, 140 Pa. St. 136; s. c, 7 Montgomery County Rep. 42; and see Sewer Street, 8 C. C. R. 226. For cases relating to the Act of June 25th, 1885, P. L. 187, the validity of which was sustained in Evans v. Phillipi (supra), see Evans v. Wittmer, 2 C. C. R. 612, 4 Lane. Law. Rev. 105, in which the Act was held invalid; Keim v. Devitt, 3 C. C. R. 250, in which the Act was held valid; Hannick's Bond, 3 C. C. R. 254; s. c, Collector's Bond, 4 Lane. Law Review, 166, in which the Act was held invalid; Common- wealth v. Commissioners, 7 C. C. R. 173, in which the Act was held invalid; Commonwealth v. Swab, 8 C. C. R. in, in which the Act was said to be invalid in so far as it regulated the collection of State and county taxes, but valid in so far as it related to such taxes as were local within each borough or township not included in State or county taxes. In Com- monwealth v. Frutchey, 1 P. D. R. 153, n C. C. R. 112, the validity of this Act was sustained as not in conflict with Ar- ticle III, Section 7, nor Article IX, Section 1 ; and see Swa- tara Twp. School District's Appeal, 1 Super. Ct. 502. The distinction between a general statute containing a saving clause excepting local and special laws, and a statute Il6 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. excluding cities or counties where local or special statutory- provisions on the same subject happen to exist, is obvious. In the former case the exception is unnecessary, under the rule that a general statute will not repeal a pre-existing special statute on the same subject, and a direct repeal of the special statute will ipso facto extend the operation of the gen- eral law to the locality formerly governed by the special stat- ute. In the latter case the statute is invalid on its face, being expressly local, its generality is sought to be helped out by enactments dehors the statute itself, and a repeal of these enactments would not extend the statute to the excepted places, for the exclusion is permanent and express. A law is general which is applicable to all cases except those pending at the time of its passage. The exclusion of all retroactive force does not detract from its general char- acter: Land Company v. Weidner, 169 Pa. St. 359. As to the rule of construction applied in cases where the Legislature, in execution of the duty imposed by the Con- stitution, enacts general laws, and as to their effect upon pre-existing local legislation, see Chapter II, Section 16, Questions of Repeal. 7. A Law May be General as to a Class of Persons, and Therefore Valid, Although Special or Local as to its Subject-matter. The Act of March 18th, 1875, P. L. 24, made it lawful for any married woman owning any of the loans of this Common- wealth or of the city of Philadelphia, or any of the loans, or share or shares of the capital stock of any corporation created by or under the laws of this Commonwealth, to sell and trans- fer the same, with like effect as if she were not married. This Act, so far as it relates to loans of the city of Philadelphia, is not a regulation of the affairs of that city within the meaning of Article III, Section 7, of the Constitution. It is a general law enlarging the powers of married women so as to regu- late the mode of transfer of certain kinds of property owing their existence to Pennsylvania law, and having their legal situs in this Commonwealth. Being a regulation of property made for the public safety and convenience in the transaction LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 117 of business, it is applicable to all owners of the classes of property named, though it may thus accidentally enlarge the powers of some foreign or non-resident wives. 1 ^oftus v. Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank, 133 Pa. St. 97; s. c, below, 46 Leg. Int. 46, s. c, 25 W. N. C. 459. In this case it was argued that the words "or of the city of Philadelphia" might be stricken out without impairing the statute, because without them it would still apply to the loans of all corporations of every kind. The case involved other questions of some difficulty, and that upon the validity of the Act of March 18th, 1875, does not seem by the report to have been fully argued. In Scranton v. Silkman, 113 Pa. St. 191, his Honor, Judge Hand, in the court below, suggested, among other reasons for sustaining the Acts of 1876 and 1878 allowing appeals from assessments in cities of the third class and in counties of less than 500,000 inhabitants, that as the remedy was given to all owners of real estate within the Commonwealth, and was not confined to residents of the proper city or county the Act was general. But these Acts were held invalid. In Williams v. People, 24 N. Y. 405, there is a dictum that an Act making theft from the person of property under $25 in value grand larceny if committed in the city of New York was general, as it concerned every one who might go to that city, and in fact it was probably intended rather for the pro- tection of unsophisticated strangers than of the more wide- awake city folk. The principle suggested has been followed in other New York cases, and these hold as general laws ex- tending to all persons doing or omitting to do an act within the territorial limits described in the statutes: Binney Restr. on Local and Special Leg. in the U. S. 36. 8. A General Law May Contain Special Provisions Necessary to Render it Effective. The fact that the Act of June 14th, 1887, P. L. 395, fixed certain dates for the doing of things necessary to put the city government in operation, compliance with which direc- tion was possible only in the city of Pittsburg, the then sole city of its class, and made no corresponding provision for Il8 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. cities afterward coming into it, did not render the Act in- valid as a local law. 1 In this case Mr. Justice Williams said: "It is urged that Sections i, 2, 10, and 20 make the Act local by fixing dates at which acts necessary to put the gov- ernment in operation are to be done, which were possible only to one city, the city of Pittsburg, and which are impossible to the city of Allegheny, which has come into the class since the Act was passed. The reply to this objection is that, at the date when the Act became a law, there was but one city in the second class. If there had been several such cities the terms employed would have been applied to all alike. It was necessary, in order to give effect in the change of the system of municipal government, that a definite time should be fixed upon at which the change should take place and the new system be put in operation. The trouble with the Act is not that it made such a provision for cities then entitled to a place in the second class, but that it did not also make similar provisions for cities that should thereafter be entitled to come into the class. We cannot hold, however, that the failure to provide a date for the organization of cities afterwards to come into the class, deprives such cities of the benefit of the law, or renders it local, and so inoperative in the cities to which it would otherwise be applicable. It may be that dates following the proclamation of the Governor showing a given city to be entitled to become a city of the second class, cor- responding with the dates following the passage of the Act which were fixed for the cities then in the class would be properly adopted. Something like this was done in Shurley v. Railroad Company, 121 Pa. St. 511. But if this should be thought inadmissible and further legislation should be re- sorted to we do not see that the conclusion of the appellants would follow. The Act of 1887 is general in terms, and it is clearly applicable to all the members of the class as it was then composed, and answered the test laid down in Weinman v. Railway Company, 118 Pa. St. 192, and kindred cases." Pittsburg's Petition, 138 Pa. St. 401. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. IIO- The Act in question in this case was entitled "An Act in relation to the government of cities of the second class." The first section provided that on and after April 1st, 1888, the councils should be constituted in a certain manner; the sec- ond provided that at the February election of 1889 the mem- bers of select council should be classified as to length of term of service, and made other provisions for the years 1890 and 1892 to carry out the classification; the tenth section pro- vided that before January 1st, 1892, councils by ordinance should provide for the carrying the Act into effect by electing heads of departments, etc., and the twentieth section pro- vided that heads of departments should give security for the faithful discharge of duty prior to February jst, li CHAPTER II. CLASSIFICATION AND MINOR TOPICS. 1. Classification generally. 2. The principle of classification is not as a rule affected by the Constitution. 3. What is a proper classification is generally a judicial question. 4. There can be no classification of cities or counties save by population. 5. Classification of cities, counties, or other subdivisions must be complete in order to justify legislation for a given class of either. 6. Classification must not be pretended, false, evasive, nor excessive. 7. Classification by population must not work exclusion but must be operative from time to time, so as by change of population the subject may pass from class to class. 8. Transition from class to class. 9. Option under classification Acts. 10. Option as related to local and special legislation. 11. Legislation for cities by classes must be confined to municipal matters proper. 12. What are municipal matters proper, and what are not. 13. Acts of Assembly void in part. 14. Validity of things executed under invalid Acts of As- sembly. 15. Curative statutes. 16. Questions of repeal. 120 LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 121 i. Classification Generally. It pertains to the province of a general treatise upon con- stitutional law to state the doctrine relating to the power of the Legislature to enact special or particular statutes in cases not embraced within the specific limitations under dis- cussion, and likewise to state the limitations upon the power to classify subjects of legislation. The general subject is implicated, among others, with the provisions of the Bill of Rights and those of the fourteenth amendment to the Fed- eral Constitution. 1 It may, however, be remarked generally, that the principle of classification, like many others pertaining to the exercise of governmental power, is incapable of definition. No form of words can state the power, with its limitations, in such manner as to furnish in advance a rule for every case that may arise. Like the police power and the power of taxation, its limitations can be found only in the particular instances where some one or more, out of the many constitutional pro- visions intended to secure the rights of the citizen and the orderly administration of governmental affairs are touched. The prohibitions of special, as distinguished from local leg- islation, include two things: Primarily, or in the first in- stance, such special or private legislation as was formerly sus- tained as not violative of other constitutional provisions, e. g., granting divorces, changing the names of persons or places, creating corporations, etc.; secondarily, or cumulatively, such special or private legislation as would not formerly have been sustained because violative of other constitutional provisions. This may be illustrated by the cases cited below and by the decisions relating to the power to classify subjects for pur- poses of taxation. It is true the Constitution recognizes the power to classify in immediate connection with the require- ment that taxes shall be levied and collected under general laws, but this tends only to illustrate more clearly what is here attempted to be pointed out, to wit, that as to matters within the latter branch of the distinction the effect of other 122 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. constitutional provisions must be determined before the added prohibitions contained in the particular clauses treated can be applied. For the present purpose it has been deemed sufficient to consider the principle of classification so far as it has been involved in cases arising under the present Constitution in connection with the particular constitutional provisions under consideration. a See Commonwealth v. Zacharias, 181 Pa. St. 126; s. c, 3 Super Ct. 364; Gulf, etc., Railway Company v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150. In Commonwealth v. Zacharias (supra), the provisions of the Act of June 16th, 1891, P. L. 313, amendatory of the Act of May 24th, 1887, P. L. 190, imposing penalties for en- gaging in the business of druggist without being registered were in question. The statute included such as opened or carried on the business as manager, and the case was decided upon another point. In the opinion Mr. Justice Williams said: "The constitutional question raised over the exception in behalf of the widows, administrators, and executors of reg- istered pharmacists is not necessarily involved in this case. The general scope and provisions of the Act of June 16th, 1891, are within a proper exercise of the police power. Their object is the protection of the public health. The require- ment that one conducting such a trade should have such chemical and pharmaceutical knowledge as to qualify him to handle intelligently the dangerous commodities in which he deals is reasonable. It can be supported without regard to the exception which is a repeal pro tanto of the prohibition which it was the purpose of the statute to make. The ex- ception makes a discrimination between equally unqualified parties, giving to one exception from the operation of a rule enforced against the other. This is not protection to the public, but rank injustice to individuals. There is no reason why the administrator or widow of a pharmacist should be permitted to manage a business of which he or she knows nothing than why any other administrator or widow should be allowed to do so. If the reason of the exception is sym- pathy for a widow then all widows are prima facie equally en- LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 1 23 titled to sympathy and have the same reason to claim ex- emption from the operation of the law. The exception would seem to fall squarely under the rule laid down in Sayre Bor- ough v. Phillips, 148 Pa. St. 488. It is a discrimination made between those who are equal under the law. It is an arbitrary gift to one, and an arbitrary denial to another, which cannot be upheld. It declares that all widows except the widow of the pharmacist shall be subject to the prohibition of the statute. All administrators and executors except they rep- resent the estate of a deceased registered pharmacist shall be within the prohibition. They must show their qualifica- tions to conduct the trade or retire from it. If, however, the deceased proprietor was competent under the law, his widow, administrator, or executor may conduct the business, no matter how grossly incompetent he or she may be. But this question is not before us in this case." In Gulf, etc., Railway Company v. Ellis (supra), the pro- vision of an Act of the State of Texas giving an attorney's fee of ten dollars in addition to costs of suit in certain cases for the killing of stock against railway companies, was in question. The provision was held invalid. In this case Mr. Justice Brewer said: "The Supreme Court of the State considered this statute as a whole and held it valid, and as such it is presented to us for consideration. Considered as such it is simply a statute imposing a penalty upon railway corporations for a failure to pay certain debts. No individu- als are thus punished, and no other corporations. The Act singles out a certain class of debtors and punishes them when for like delinquencies it punishes no others. They are not treated as other debtors, or equally with other debtors. They cannot appeal to the courts as other litigants under like con- ditions and with like protection. If litigation terminates ad- versely to them, they are mulcted in the attorney's fees of the successful plaintiff; if it terminates in their favor, they re- cover no attorney's fees. It is no sufficient answer to say that they are punished only when adjudged to be in the wrong. They do not enter the courts upon equal terms. They must pay attorney's fees if wrong; they do not recover any if right; while their adversaries recover if right and pay nothing if wrong. In the suits, therefore, to which they are parties they are discriminated against, and are not treated as others. They do not stand equal before the law. They -do not receive its equal protection. All this is obvious from 124 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. a mere inspection of the statute." . . . "But it is said that it is not within the scope of the fourteenth amendment to with- hold from States the power of classification, and that if the law deals alike with all of a certain class it is not obnoxious to the charge of a denial of equal protection. While, as a general proposition, this is undeniably true (Hayes v. Mis- souri, 1 20 U. S. 68; Railway Company v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578; Bell's Gap Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232; Pacific Express Company v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657; Columbia Southern Railway v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470; Marchant v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 153 U. S. 380; St. Louis & San Francisco Railway v. Mathews, 165 U. S. i).yet it is equally true that such classification cannot be made arbi- trarily. The State may not say that all white men shall be subjected to the payment of the attorney's fees of parties suc- cessfully suing them and all black men not. It may not say that all men beyond a certain age shall be alone thus sub- jected, or all men possessed of a certain wealth. These are distinctions which do not furnish any proper basis for the at- tempted classification. That must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis. "As well said by Black, J., in State v. Loomis, 115 Mis- souri, 307, 314, in which a statute making it a misdemeanor for any corporation engaged in manufacturing or mining to issue in payment of the wages of its employes any order, check, etc., payable otherwise than in lawful money of the United States, unless negotiable and redeemable at its face value in cash or in goods and supplies at the option of the holder at the store or other place of business of the corpora- tion, was held class legislation and void. 'Classification for legislative purposes must have some reasonable basis upon which to stand. It must be evident that differences which would serve for a classification for some purposes fur- nish no reason whatever for a classification for legislative purposes. The differences which will support class legisla- tion must be such as in the nature of things furnish a rea- sonable basis for separate laws and regulations. Thus, the Legislature may fix the age at which persons shall be deemed competent to contract for themselves, but no one will claim that competency to contract can be made to depend upon LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 1 25 stature or color of the hair. Such a classification for such a purpose would be arbitrary and a piece of legislative des- potism, and therefore not a law of the land.' "In Vanzandt v. Waddel, 2 Yerger, 260, 270, Catron, J. (afterwards Mr. Justice Catron of this court), speaking for the Supreme Court of Tennessee, declared: 'Every partial or private law, which directly purposes to destroy or affect in- dividual rights, or does the same thing by affording remedies leading to similar consequences, is unconstitutional and void. Were this otherwise odious individuals and corporate bodies would be governed by one rule, and the mass of the com- munity who made the law by another.' "In Dibrell v. Morris's Heirs, Supreme Court of Tennessee, 15 S. W. Rep. 87, 95, Baxter, Special Judge, reviewing at some length cases of classification, closes the review with these words: 'We conclude upon a review of the cases referred to above, that, whether a statute be public or private, general or special, in form, if it attempts to create distinctions and classifications between the citizens of this State, the basis of such classification must be natural and not arbitrary.' "In Bell's Gap Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, the question was presented as to the power of the State to clas- sify for purposes of taxation, and while it was conceded that a large discretion in these respects was vested in the various Legislatures, the fact of a limit to such discretion was rec- ognized, the court, by Mr. Justice Bradley, saying, on page 237: 'All such regulations, and those of like character, so long as they proceed within reasonable limits and general usage, are within the discretion of the State Legislature or the people of the State in framing their Constitution. But clear and hostile discriminations against particular persons and classes, especially such as are of an unusual character, unknown to the practice of our governments, might be ob- noxious to the constitutional prohibition.' "It is, of course, proper that every debtor should pay his debts, and there might be no impropriety in giving to every successful suitor attorney's fees. Such a provision wotdd bear a reasonable relation to the delinquency of the debtor, and would certainly create no inequality of right or protec- tion. But before a distinction can be made between debtors, and one be punished for a failure to pay his debts, while an- other is permitted to become in like manner delinquent with- 126 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. out any punishment, there must be some difference in the ob- ligation to pay, some reason why the duty of payment is more imperative in the one instance than in the other. "If it be said that this penalty is cast only upon corpora- tions, that to them special privileges are granted, and therefore upon them special burdens may be imposed, it is a sufficient answer to say that the penalty is not imposed upon all cor- porations. The burden does not go with the privilege. Only railroads of all corporations are selected to bear this penalty. The rule of equality is ignored. "It may be said that certain corporations are chartered for charitable, educational, or religious purposes, and abundant reason for not visiting them with a penalty for the non-pay- ment of debts is found in the fact that their chartered privi- leges are not given for pecuniary profit. But the penalty is not imposed upon all business corporations, all chartered for the purpose of private gain. The banking corporations, the manufacturing corporations and others like them are exempt. Further, the penalty is imposed not upon all corporations charged with the quasi public duty of transportation, but only upon those charged with a particular form of that duty. So the classification is not based upon any idea of special privi- leges by way of incorporation, nor of special privileges given thereby for purposes of private gain, nor even of such privi- leges granted for the discharge of one general class of public duties. "But if the classification is not based upon the idea of special privileges, can it be sustained upon the basis of the business in which the corporations to be punished are en- gaged? That such corporations may be classified for some purposes is unquestioned. The business in which they are engaged is of a peculiarly dangerous nature, and the Legisla- ture, in the exercise of its police powers, may justly require many things to be done by them in order to secure life and property. Fencing of railroad tracks, use of safety couplers, and a multitude of other things easily suggest themselves. And any classification for the imposition of such special du- ties — duties arising out of the peculiar business in which they are engaged — is a just classification, and not one within the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment. Thus it is fre- quently required that they fence their tracks, and as a penalty for a failure to fence double damages in case of loss are in- flicted: Missouri Pacific Railway v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 1 27 But this and all kindred cases proceed upon the theory of a special duty resting upon railroad corporations by reason of the business in which they are engaged — a duty not resting upon others; a duty which can be enforced by the Legislature in any proper manner, and whether it enforces it by penalties in the way of fines coming to the State, or by double damages to a party injured, is immaterial. It is all done in the ex- ercise of the police power of the State and with a view to en- force just and reasonable police regulations. "While this action is for stock killed, the recovery of attor- ney's fees cannot be sustained upon the theory just sug- gested. There is no fence law in Texas. The Legislature of the State has not deemed it necessary for the protection of life or property to require railroads to fence their tracks, and as no duty is imposed, there can be no penalty for non-per- formance. Indeed, the statute does not proceed upon any such theory, it is broader in its scope. Its object is to com- pel the payment of the several classes of debts named, and was so regarded by the Supreme Court of the State. "But a mere statute to compel the payment of indebted- ness does not come within the scope of police regulations. The hazardous business of railroading carries with it no special necessity for the prompt payment of debts. That is a duty resting upon all debtors, and while in certain cases there may be a peculiar obligation which may be enforced by penalties, yet nothing of that kind springs from the mere work of railroad transportation. Statutes have been sus- tained giving special protection to the claims of laborers and mechanics, but no such idea underlies this legislation. It does not aim to protect the laborer or the mechanic alone, for its benefits are conferred upon every individual in the State, rich or poor, high or low, who has a claim of the char- acter described. It is not a statute for the protection of par- ticular classes of individuals supposed to need protection, but for the punishment of certain corporations on account of their delinquency. "Neither can it be sustained as a proper means of enforcing the payment of small debts and preventing any unnecessary litigation in respect to them, because it does not impose the penalty in all cases where the amount in controversy is within the limit named in the statute. Indeed, the statute arbitra- rily singles out one class of debtors and punishes it for a fail- ure to perform certain duties — duties which are equally 128 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. obligatory upon all debtors; a punishment not visited by rea- son of the failure to comply with any proper police regula- tions, or for the protection of the laboring classes or to pre- vent litigation about trifling matters, or in consequence of any special corporate privileges bestowed by the State. Un- less the Legislature may arbitrarily select one corporation or one class of corporations, one individual or one class of indi- viduals, and visit a penalty upon them which is not imposed upon others guilty of like delinquency this statute cannot be sustained. "But arbitrary selection can never be justified by calling it classification. The equal protection demanded by the four- teenth amendment forbids this. No language is more worthy of frequent and thoughtful consideration than these words of Mr. Justice Matthews, speaking for this court, in Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369: 'When we consider the na- ture and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to con- clude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.' The first official action of this nation declared the foundation of gov- ernment in these words: 'We hold these truths to be self- evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' While such declaration of principles may not have the force of or- ganic law, or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits of right and duty, and while in all cases reference must be had to the organic law of the nation for such limits, yet the latter is but the body and the letter of which the former is the thought and spirit, and it is always safe to read the let- ter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. No duty rests more imperatively upon the courts than the enforcement of those constitutional provis- ions intended to secure that equality of rights which is the foundation of free government." And see Bill of Rights, Article I, Section 1, of the Con- stitution: All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and repu- tation, and of pursuing their own happiness. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. I2Q A late case upon the subject is that wherein the Act of June 15th, 1897, P. L. 166, known as the Alien Tax Law, was declared invalid by the Circuit Court of the United States: Fraser v. McConway, 6 P. D. R. 555. 2. The Principle of Classification is not, as a Rule, Affected by the Constitution. The constitutional provisions do not, as a rule, abridge the power of the General Assembly with reference to the clas- sification of subjects and the enactment of laws relating to such classes. 1 The Constitution itself, however, has made a classification of some subjects, and such classification is prob- ably final for the purposes for which it is thus made. 2 The Constitution recognizes the power of classification in Article IX, Section i, 3 and where a classification is found in the Con- stitution, laws based on such classification cannot be special or local. 4 1 Wheeler v. Philadelphia, yy Pa. St. 338; Kittanning Coal Company v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. St. 100; Kitty Roup's Case, 81* Pa. St. 211; Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. St. 401 ; Com- monwealth v. Delaware Div. Canal Company, 123 Pa. St. 594; Kennedy v. Agricultural Insurance Company, 165 Pa. St. 179. 2 McCarty v. Commonwealth, no Pa. St. 243; Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. St. 322. 3 Avars' Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 266. 4 Rymer v. Luzerne County, 142 Pa. St. 108; Reid v. Smoulter, 128 Pa. St. 324; Commonwealth v. Anderson, 178 Pa. St. 171. In Evans v. Phillippi, 117 Pa. St. 226, Mr. Justice Clark said: "A law is said to be local and special, however, not under the new Constitution, or of any decision under it, but because it falls within the proper definition of a local law both before and since 1874." In Wheeler v. Philadelphia, yy Pa. St. 338, Mr. Justice Paxson said: "We are aware that it does not follow that because classification is resorted to in I3O VALIDITY OF STATUTES. the organic law, the Legislature may exercise the same power. But the power existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; it had been exercised by the Legislature from the foundation of the government; it was incident to legislation, and its exercise was necessary to the promotion of the public welfare. The true question is, not whether classi- fication is authorized by the terms of the Constitution, but whether it is expressly prohibited. In no part of that instru- ment can any such prohibition be found. For the purpose of taxation, real estate may be classified. Thus, timber lands, arable lands, mineral lands, urban and rural, may be divided into distinct classes, and subjected to different rates. In like manner other subjects, trades, occupations, and profes- sions may be classified. And not only things but persons may be so divided. The genus homo is a subject within the meaning of the Constitution. Will it be contended that as to this there can be no classification? No laws affecting the personal and property rights of minors as distinguished from adults? Or of males as distinguished from females? Or, in the case of the latter, no distinction between a feme covert and a single woman? What becomes of all our legislation in regard to the rights of married women if there can be no classification? and where is the power to provide any future safeguards for their separate estate? These illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely were it necessary." In Kittanning Coal Company v. Commonwealth (supra), Chief Justice Agnew said: "It is clear, therefore, that the mo- ment we concede the power to classify, we have disposed of the question of uniformity, for then all that is required by the Constitution is uniformity of taxes among members of the class. Now the power to classify is not only retained in clear language, but was held by the court to be continued in the case of Kitty Roup v. The City of Pittsburg. This power was possessed under the Constitution of 1790, had been exercised in numerous laws, and existed when the new Constitution was framed and adopted. Thus, real estate had been classi- fied as seated and unseated, and by various kinds, as houses, lands, lots of ground, ground-rents, mills, manufactories, fur- naces, ferries, and others. The classification of personal prop- erty was equally various, to wit: slaves, horses, mules, cattle, carriages, watches, bonds, mortgages, stocks, moneys at in- terest, profits, etc. Some trades, professions, callings, and even single men were taxed by classification. Taxes were LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. I3I laid in various forms, as rates on values, rates on dividends, or profits, and by specific sums on specified articles. These things were well known to the convention of 1873, yet no change was made in the power to classify, but it was recog- nized by saying that all taxes shall be uniform on the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, by the latter clause, even extending the power to classify by limiting the class to certain bounds. We must conclude, therefore, that a classification of coal mining and purchasing and selling companies is not beyond the legis- lative power, and the tax being clearly uniform upon their business measured by the extent of it, is not only within the meaning of the Constitution, but is equal and just." The Constitution furnishes a number of instances recog- nizing classification or in which legislation must follow a given classification. Thus, in Section 5, of Article V, whenever a county shall contain 40,000 inhabitants it shall constitute a separate ju- dicial district. In Section 12, Article V, in Philadelphia there shall be established for every 30,000 inhabitants one court not of record for police and civil causes. In Section 27, Article V, in every county wherein the population shall exceed 150,000 the General Assembly shall establish a separate or- phans' court. In Section 5, Article XIV, in counties con- taining over 150,000 inhabitants all county officers shall be paid by salary. In Section 1, Article XV, cities may be char- tered whenever a majority of the electors of any town or bor- ough having a population of at least 10,000 shall vote at any general election in favor of the same. In Section 17, Article II, every city entitled to more than four representatives and every county having more than 100,000 shall be divided into districts of compact and contiguous territory, etc. In Arti- cle VIII, Section 17, the General Assembly shall by general law designate the courts and judges by whom the several classes of election contests shall be tried. Article IX, Section 1, all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects. In McCarty v. Commonwealth (supra), Mr. Justice Gor- don said: "Moreover as by the Constitution itself, the coun- ties, with reference to the fees of their officers, have been clas- sified, we think a further attempt in that direction not per- missible. By this Act (the one in question) the Legislature seems to have undertaken to correct or modify the provisions of the Constitution. That instrument provides that in coun- I32 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. ties having a population of over 150,000 their officers shall be salaried, and the attempt is here to simply enlarge this class by adding to it counties exceeding in population 100,000." In another part of the opinion he queried: "Where then is the special necessity for the subdivision of this second class?" In Rymer v. Luzerne County (supra), the Act of March 31st, 1876, P. L. 17, regulating the compensation of county officers in counties having over 150,000 was in question. As to this Act the court remarked: "The Act of 1876 is neither a local nor a special law, for the reason that it applies to all counties of a certain class, and that class created by the Constitution itself." It will be observed the Act of 1876 classified counties of over 1 50,000 and fixed a different scale of salaries for each class. The Act of May 6th, 1874, P. L. 125, relating to the com- pensation of clerks of the orphans' court, registers of wills, recorders of deeds, etc., does not violate Article IX of the Constitution providing for uniformity of taxation, or Article III, Section 7, forbidding the Legislature to pass "any local or special law regulating the affairs of counties." The Act requires that clerks of the orphans' court, registers of wills, recorders of deeds, etc., "of this Commonwealth shall pay into the treasury for the use of the Commonwealth, after deducting all necessary clerk hire and office expenses, fifty per centum on the amount of any excess over and above the sum of $2,000, which shall be found by the auditor appointed by the court to settle accounts of county officers to have been received by any office in any one year: Provided, if two or more of said offices shall be held by one person, the auditor- general shall add together the fees received in the offices so held, and shall charge the same percentage on the aggregate amount of fees received by such person holding more than one of said offices." Held also, that in ascertaining what amount should be paid to the Commonwealth by a person holding two offices only one salary should be deducted from the gross receipts: Commonwealth v. Anderson, 178 Pa. St. In the foregoing case his Honor, Judge McPherson, in the court below said: "The defendant's argument is that the body of the Act of 1874 repeals all preceding Acts on this sub- ject, because it provides a new system for taxing the fees of LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 1 33 officers in counties having less than 150,000 inhabitants; but that the proviso of the Act is void because it offends against Article IX of the Constitution providing for uniformity of taxation, and against Article III, Section 7, forbidding the Legislature to pass 'any local or special law . . . regulating the affairs of counties. . . .' "In our opinion this position is unsound throughout. It is not the proviso, however, but the whole Act which the de- fendant ought to attack, if he desires to insist upon an alleged violation of Article III, Section 7, for it is not the proviso but the body of the Act which confines its scope to counties having a specified population. But whatever may be his point of attack we believe that the Act of 1874 does not of- fend against Article III, Section 7, because it is not a local or special law. It applies to all the counties of the State con- taining less than 150,000 inhabitants, and while statutes upon certain other subjects having a similarly restricted scope have been held to be unconstitutional in several cases, which it is not necessary to cite, the Act in question is valid because it is restricted bythe Constitution itself to the class or subject with which it deals, and therefore it is not within the reason of these decisions. In effect this was declared in Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. St. 322. The subject of the Act then under consideration was the fees which the citizens of the State should pay in consideration of the services rendered by cer- tain officers. The statute was held to be unconstitutional because it excluded permanently from its provision every county containing more than 150,000 inhabitants; its subject being clearly a county affair upon which local legislation was prohibited. But the court was careful to distinguish between a fee considered as a sum which the citizen is to pay and a fee considered as the sum which the officer is to receive. In the latter aspect the Constitution itself has made a classification which the Legislature is not at liberty to disregard. 'It is fur- ther to be observed,' Mr. Justice Paxson says, on page 330: 'That so far as the compensation to county officers is con- cerned the Constitution has classified the counties of the State.' "Moreover the Act of 1874 does not in any respect regulate 'the affairs of counties.' It does not increase or di- minish the fees which the officers are to receive — thus affect- ing the people who pay, as well as the officer who earns, the fees. Leaving the amount of his fees to be determined by 134 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. other statutes, the Act of 1874 is concerned simply with the subject of taxation by the State upon the receipts of the office. This treats a fee as the compensation of the officer, and taxes it in his hands as his property. From this point of view his fees are in no sense a county affair. The Act affects the profits of the officer and the receipts of the State treas- ury, but, except remotely, no other consideration is involved. Therefore, even if the Act is to be regarded as local it is not forbidden by the clause to which we have just referred." Classification of coal mines as anthracite and bituminous is proper, including a definition of what shall constitute such mines; legislation for each class having relation to the health and safety of persons employed therein is valid: Durkin v. Kingston Coal Company, 171 Pa. St. 193; Commonwealth v. Jones, 4 Super. Ct. 362. In the case last cited his Honor, Judge Smith, remarked: "Speaking for myself, I regard it important, in considering the constitutional prohibition of 'any local or special law' upon the subjects enumerated in Article III, Section 7, to take into account the provision of Article XVI, Section 3, that 'the exercise of the police power of the State shall never be abridged.' "It is difficult to regard the latter provision as merely aimed at a legislative abridgment of the police power of the State. The Legislature may forbear or neglect to exercise the police power, but no legislative enactment on the subject can abridge the power of a subsequent Legislature in the premises, and, as this principle exists independent of the con- stitutional provision, it was unnecessary as a limitation on the power of the Legislature. "These prohibitive provisions are to be so construed that both shall stand if possible. If the prohibition of local or special legislation includes the exercise of the police power in relation to local or special subjects it is a serious abridg- ment of that power. The broad and unqualified terms of the section relating to the police power would seem to imply that no abridgment in any manner was intended. Full effect may be given to this section by regarding it as a qualification of the prohibition of local or special legislation, in the nature of a proviso, excepting from that prohibition the exercise of the police power of the State on the subjects embraced in it. Such a construction would harmonize the two constitutional prohibitions and permit an unabridged exercise of the police power on all matters within its scope, LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. I35 whether general, or local and special, leaving to judicial con- struction, as heretofore, the character and limitations of that power. "In this view the Act of 1893, even if local or special in its application, may be sustained as an exercise of the police power of the State for the protection of life, health, and prop- erty in the mining operations to which it relates. But it is unnecessary to rule the present case on this construction of these constitutional provisions." The Act of June 20th, 1883, P. L. 134, requiring foreign insurance companies to appoint a State agent on whom pro- cess may be served is not special. Foreign insurance com- panies licensed to transact business in this State, are essen- tially a distinct class of corporations justifying and requiring legislation appropriate to the class itself: Kennedy v. Agri- cultural Insurance Company, 165 Pa. St. 179. And such a classification is proper for purposes of taxation: Germania Insurance Company v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. St. 513. 3. What is a Proper Classification is Generally a Judicial Question. Upon this subject it was remarked by Mr. Justice Ster- rett in Ayars' Appeal. 1 "It has also been suggested that the question of necessity for classification and the extent thereof, as well as of what are local or special laws, is a legislative and not a judicial question. The answer to that is obvious. The people, in their wisdom, have seen fit not only to prescribe the form of enacting laws, but also as to certain subjects, the method of legislation, by ordaining that no local or special law relating to those subjects shall be passed. Whether, in any given case, the Legislature has transcended its power and passed a law in conflict with that limitation is essentially a question of law, and must necessarily be decided by the courts. To warrant the conclusion that the people, in ordaining such limitations, intended to invest their law-makers with judicial power, and thus make them final arbitrators of the validity of their own acts, would require the clearest and most em- I36 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. phatic language to that effect. No such intention is ex- pressed in the Constitution, and none can be inferred from any of its provisions. That these limitations were designed to establish a fixed and permanent rule cannot be doubted; but, if the ultimate application of that rule were to rest solely in the judgment of the body on which it was intended to operate, nothing could be more flexible." The foregoing had reference to the classification of cities, sustained upon the ground of necessity, and limited thereby, upon which it was further remarked after referring to cer- tain cases wherein classification of cities had been sustained: "Some of the cases above cited have been quoted at consid- erable length for the purpose of showing that this court never intended to sanction classification as a pretext for special or local legislation. On the contrary, the underlying principle of all the cases is that classification, with the view of legislating for either class separately, is essentially uncon- stitutional, unless a necessity therefor exists, a necessity springing from manifest peculiarities, clearly distinguishing those of one class from each of the other classes, and impera- tively demanding legislation for each class, separately, that would be useless and detrimental to the others. Laws en- acted in pursuance of such classification and for such pur- poses are, properly speaking, neither local nor special. They are general laws, because they apply alike to all that are sim- ilarly situated as to their peculiar necessities." The different grounds of classification are recognized by Mr. Justice Gordon in McCarty v. Commonwealth, 2 where he said: "It is admitted that classification, even where not specially recognized by nature, custom, the laws of trade, or the Constitution, must, in certain cases, be adopted ex neces- sitate." In Commonwealth v. Delaware Division Canal Company, 3 Mr. Justice Clark remarked: "Classification for purposes of taxation, as a general rule is a matter for the Legis- lature." LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 137" The sum of the matter probably is that the subject of clas- sification is legislative in the first instance, that as legislative- power is necessarily exercised through a classification of sub- jects (for a law operating at once and alike upon all subjects is inconceivable), a legislative classification is presumed to be valid and to have been made in the exercise of a wise discre- tion and for sufficient and proper reasons, unless an infringe- ment of some provision of the State or Federal Constitution appears. Whether there is such infringement is for the court. 1 Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 266. 2 McCarty v. Commonwealth, no Pa. St. 243. Commonwealth v. Delaware Division Canal Company, 123. Pa. St. 594. This subject may be further illustrated by the remarks of Mr. Justice Clark, in the case of Commonwealth v. Dela- ware Division Canal Company, 123 Pa. St. 594, with reference to the exercise of the taxing power: "The new Constitution does not withdraw the power of classification from the Legislature (Kitty Roup's Case, 81* Pa. St. 211; Kittanning Coal Company v. Commonwealth,. 79 Pa. St. 100); indeed, the power is necessarily implied in the constitutional provision to which the fourth section of the Act of 1885 is supposed to be obnoxious. The power to im- pose taxes for the support of the government, subject to the limitations of the Constitution, still belongs to the Legisla- ture; the selection of the subjects, their classification, and the methods of collection are purely legislative matters. When the action of the Legislature, with respect to these matters, is not repugnant to the Constitution, it would cer- tainly be a case of the grossest inequality, which would, call for the intervention of the courts: Kelly v. City of Pitts- burg, 85 Pa. St. 170. It may be conceded, however, that classification should be made according to some reasonable,, practical rule, drawn from experience, which would prevent a gross inequality in the burdens of taxation. 'It must,' in the language of Mr. Justice Agnew, 'visit all alike in a rea- sonably practicable way, of which the Legislature may judge,. I38 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. but within the limits of what is taxation. Like the rain, it may fall upon the people in districts and by turns, but still it must be public in its purpose and reasonably just and equal in its distribution, and cannot sacrifice individual right by a palpably unjust exaction. To do so is confiscation, not taxa- tion; extortion, not assessment, and falls within the clearly implied restriction in the Bill of Rights:' Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. 352. "Absolute equality is, of course, unattainable; a mere ap- proximate equality is all that can reasonably be expected. A mere diversity in the methods of assessment and collection, however, if these methods are provided by general laws, vio- lates no rule of right, if when these methods are applied the results are practically uniform. If there is a substantial uni- formity, however different the procedure, there is a compli- ance with the constitutional provisions: Fox's Appeal, 112 Pa. St. 353; even when there be some disparity of results, if uniformity is the purpose of the Legislature, there is a sub- stantial compliance: Hunter's Appeal, 18 W. N. 411, 394; Loughlin's Appeal, 19 W. N. 517. Nor is classification nec- essarily based upon any essential differences in the nature or, indeed, the condition of the various subjects; it may be based as well upon the want of adaptability to the same methods of taxation, or upon the impracticability of applying to the various subjects the same methods, so as to produce just and reasonably uniform results, or it may be based upon well- grounded considerations of public policy. "Hence it is that some classes of corporations are taxed upon net earnings, or income; others upon capital stock, the value thereof to be ascertained by their annual dividends, or in a certain event upon the actual value of the shares; others upon their gross receipts; insurance companies upon the gross amount of their premiums; coal and mining companies at a specific sum for every ton of coal mined, etc. "Real estate, for taxation, has been classified as seated and unseated, and for municipal purposes may, perhaps, admit of further classification: Kitty Roup's Case (supra). Collateral inheritances are distinguished from those that are direct, the former being subject to taxation, the latter not. Foreign in- surance companies have been distinguished from domestic companies, and taxed independently and differently: Ger- mania Insurance Company v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. St., 513. So trades, professions, callings, and even single men have LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 139 been taxed by classification, and it has been said that profes- sional men may be classified as physicians, lawyers, clergy- men, etc. ; tradesmen as merchants, mechanics, etc. ; and other persons as bankers, manufacturers, etc.; and a uniform tax assessed upon each class: Banger's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 79. Not only have taxes been laid in all these various forms, rated on values, on dividends or profits, on premiums, on net earn- ings, and on gross receipts, but also by specific sums on spe- cific articles. The road-bed, station-house, rolling stock, and equipments of a railroad company; the canal-bed, and berm banks, the locks, lock-houses, etc., of a canal company; the banking-house or place of business of a banking company, etc., are withdrawn from the ordinary processes of general taxation and are reached in a tax upon capital stock, which has always been regarded as a tax upon the property and as- sets. These several classifications and departures from uni- formity in methods were intended simply to bring about a just uniformity in results. So places of amusement and the luxuries of life may be taxed in relief of the necessaries. Household and kitchen furniture, gold and silver plate, ex- ceeding a certain value, pleasure carriages, and gold and sil- ver watches, kept for use, prior to the Act of May 13th, 1887, P. L. 114, were selected from the like articles in trade, and from other articles of personal property, and with money at interest, were subjected to a special tax. Illustrations might be multiplied to show that classification does not depend upon differences in the physical nature or condition of the subjects selected, but upon a variety of considerations." 4. There Can be no Classification of Cities or Counties Save by Population. In Commonwealth v. Patton, 1 Mr. justice Paxson said: "There can be no proper classification of cities or counties except by population. The moment we resort to geograph- ical distinctions we enter the domain of special legislation, for the reason that such classification operates upon certain cities or counties to the perpetual exclusion of all others." Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. St. 258. i40 validity of statutes. 5. Classification of Cities, Counties, or Other Sub-divisions, Must be Complete in Order to Justify Legislation for a Given Class of Either. The Constitution, Article XIV, Section 5, requires the compensation of county officers to be salaries instead of fees, in counties having a population of over 150,000 inhabitants, thus in effect classifying counties for this purpose and mak- ing one class of those having over, and another of those hav- ing under the specified population. The Act of June 22d, 1883, P L. 139, undertook to ex- tend the salary system to counties containing over 100,000 and less than 150,000 inhabitants, by provisions similar to those of the Act of March 31st, 1876, P. L. 13, enacted to carry into effect the provisions of Article XIV, Section 5, of the Constitution relating to the compensation of county officers in counties having over 150,000 inhabitants. It was held invalid because among other reasons it related to less than a constitutional class. 1 A similar Act of June 12th, 1878, P. L. 187, was held in- valid which applied to counties having over 10,000 and less than 150,000 inhabitants. 2 The Act of March 31st, 1876, above mentioned, makes a sub-classification of counties having over 150,000 inhabitants, and provides a different scale of salaries for each sub-class. As shown elsewhere this Act is valid, and the foregoing cases suggest what is not explicitly stated, to wit, that a similar Act relating to all counties having less than 150,000 inhab- itants, containing sub-classes with an appropriate scale of sal- aries for each class, might be valid. But in the two cases cited the classification was not complete. In the last case cited, Mr. Justice Gordon said: "General legislation for all the cities of the Commonwealth as a single class having been regarded as impossible, the Legislature first divided these municipalities into several distinct classes, and then provided laws and regulations adapted to each class. This, as we have LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. I4I seen, was recognized as legitimate and proper. There is here, however, a new and complete classification, and not a mere cutting out of one or more cities, designated by popu- lation, from the general class, and in this the Act of 1874 is distinguished from that of 1883, in which no general clas- sification is attempted, but a special legislation adopted for certain counties selected from all others, and to be ascer- tained by their populations rather than by their names. Under the rulings in Davis v. Clark, 10 Out. 377; Commonwealth v. Patton, 7 Norris, 260, and Scowden's Appeal, 15 Id. 425, this is not allowable." 1 McCarty v. Commonwealth, no Pa. St. 243. 2 Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. St. 322. 6. Classification Must not be Pretended, False, Evasive nor Excessive. The Act of April 18th, 1878, P. L. 29, entitled "An Act to provide for the holding of courts in certain cities of this Com- monwealth," enacted "that in all counties of this Common- wealth where there is a population of more than 60,000 in- habitants, and in which there shall be any city incorporated at the time of the passage of this Act with a population ex- ceeding 8,000 inhabitants, situate at a distance from the county seat of more than twenty-seven miles by the usually traveled public road, it shall be the duty of the president judge ... to make an order providing for the holding of one week of court or more . . for the trial of criminal or civil cases in the said city." This Act was held to be invalid as a local law under a false and pretended classification. 1 In this case Mr. Justice Paxson, after quoting the above, said: "This is classification run mad. Why not say all counties named Crawford, with a population exceeding 60,000, that contain a city called Titusville, with a population of over 8,000, and situated twenty-seven miles from the county seat? Or all counties with a population over 60,000 watered by a 142 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. certain river or bounded by a certain mountain? There can be no proper classification of cities or counties except by pop- ulation. The moment we resort to geographical distinctions we enter the domain of special legislation, for the reason that such classification operates upon certain cities or counties to the perpetual exclusion of all others." The Act of June 12th, 1879, P. L. 174, entitled "An Act to provide for the holding of courts in certain cities of this Com- monwealth," was made applicable in all counties where there is or may hereafter be, a population of not less than 60,000 inhabitants, and in which there is now, or may hereafter be, an incorporated city of the fifth class, subject to the provis- ions of the Act of May 23d, A. D. one thousand eight hun- dred and seventy-four, and the supplements thereto, or which may hereafter be incorporated under said Acts. This Act was held to be invalid, and it was pointed out that it was evi- dently framed to avoid the difficulty encountered by the Act of April 18th, 1878. Said Mr. Justice Paxson: "It requires but a glance at the Act to see that it is an attempt to evade the Constitution. It is special legislation under the at- tempted disguise of a general law. Of all forms of special legislation this is the most vicious." 2 The Act of June 8th, 1891, P. L. 216, entitled "An Act to prevent the pollution of the water of streams supplying cities of this Commonwealth," provided that it should be unlawful to hereafter establish any cemetery upon lands located within one mile from any city of the first class of this Common- wealth, the drainage from which empties or passes into any stream from which the supply of water is obtained. This Act was held to be invalid. 3 Said Mr. Justice Williams: "It is not alleged by the applicant that this Act is a general law in the primary sense of the words, for it does not apply to the State at large, but it is contended that it is a general law in a secondary or restricted sense because of the classification of cities, and because its provisions relate to cities of the first class. If, however, we look into its provisions, we shall find LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 143 that they do not relate to cities of the first class or any other class. They relate distinctly and clearly to a strip of terri- tory lying on the outside of the city of Philadelphia, having a breadth of one mile, and a drainage into any stream from which the water supply of the city is obtained. No municipal power, or duty, or officer is the subject of legislative regula- tion by this Act, but it lays its hand on cemeteries and for- bids their establishment \\ ithin this narrow strip of territory. Now cemeteries may be more numerous and more necessary in the neighborhood of cities than in the country, but it will hardly be asserted that they are part of the municipal ma- chinery of a city, even when located within its limits. This Act does not undertake, however, to deal with cemeteries within cities of the first class, but with those that are wholly outside of them. It does not attempt to deal with all ceme- teries that are outside, but only with those that are within one mile from the city lines. Even this limited territory is sub- divided so that in the neighborhood of Philadelphia the law is applicable to those cemeteries lying in the valley of the Schuylkill, but it is not applicable to those in the valley of the Delaware. It would be difficult to imagine a better ex- ample of a law both local and special than this." The Act of June 8th, 1893, P. L. 42, entitled "An Act au- thorizing the regulating, taking, use, and occupancy of cer- tain public burial places, under certain circumstances, for places of common school education," is invalid. 4 The judg- ment in this case was affirmed upon the opinion of the court below, in which it was said: "We think the Act of Assem- bly unconstitutional because it is a local and special Act reg- ulating the affairs of a school district, as well as relating to a graveyard not of the State. Its very title shows that it is special and not general. It is entitled 'An Act authorizing the taking, use, and occupancy of certain public burial grounds, under certain circumstances.' It is well known that this Act of Assembly was prepared and its passage procured for this particular case, to enable this school board to take 144 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. this burial ground, and that this was done after a special law avowedly for the same purpose had been vetoed by the Gov- ernor. It is special legislation in the guise of a general law — the most specious and vicious form that special legislation can assume. That this particular school district and this par- ticular burial ground were intended to be affected is made manifest by the first section of the Act, in which all words of .general operative effect are so hedged in and limited by other words, confining their operation as to render it extremely probable that there is no other graveyard in the Common- wealth within the operation of the Act. Certainly they must be very few in number. The Act would have been little, if •any, more apparently special if it had enacted that 'when- ever the school board of York City desired to occupy the Potter's Field therein, it should be lawful for them,' etc. Localization and specialization may be produced by matter of -description, geographical or otherwise, or by words of limi- tation confining the operation of general terms to an individ- ualized subject-matter. See Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. St. 258; Philadelphia v. Cemetery Company, 162 Pa. St. 105; Weinman v. Passenger Railway Company, 118 Pa. St. 192." Where an Act is general in form, but its provisions are such as to be inoperative, except in a certain city, and in re- lation to a particular building there, it is local; thus, the Act of May 24th, 1893, P. L. 124, entitled "An Act to abolish commissioners of public buildings, and to place all public buildings heretofore under the control of such commission- ers, under the control of the department of public works in cities of the first class," is a local Act, it applies solely to Philadelphia, and to but one particular building in that city, and regulates the affairs of that city by placing in the control ■of the department of public works a particular building. 5 The Act of May 24th, 1887, P. L. 204, dividing the cities 'of the State into seven classes, and providing for the incorpo- ration and government of cities of the fourth, fifth, sixth, LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. I45 and seventh classes, was held invalid because the attempted classification was unnecessary and excessive. The classifi- cation was (VII) under 10,000 (VI), 10,000 to 20,000 (V), 20,000 to 45,000 (IV), 45,000 to 75,000 (III), 75,000 to 150,000 (II), 150,000 to 600,000, and (I) over boo,ooo.° The same cases held the Act of April nth, 1876, P. L. 20, to be invalid for the same reasons. By this Act, an amendment of the Act of May 23d, 1874, P. L. 230, the number of classes of cities was increased to five. In Ayars' Appeal, Mr. Justice Sterrett said: "The broad ground on which the court was asked to declare the Act un- constitutional is, that under the specious guise of classifica- tion, it is local and special legislation pure and simple, and, without pretense of necessity, opens wide the door for fur- ther legislation of the same vicious and inhibited character. It is difficult if not impossible to escape from that position. Classification is not expressly forbidden by the Constitu- tion. On the contrary, it is distinctly recognized for certain purposes. For example, Article IX, Section 1, declares, "All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws." Thus, by necessary implication, authority is given to classify prop- erty for the purpose of taxation, but by express mandate of the last clause above quoted, all taxes must be levied and collected under general and not special or local laws. All legislation is necessarily based on a classification of its sub- jects, and when such classification is fairly made, laws en- acted in conformity thereto cannot be properly characterized as either local or special. A law prescribing the mode of in- corporating all railroad companies is special, in the narrow sense that it is confined in its operations to one kind of cor- porations only, and, by the same test, a law providing a sin- gle system for organization and government of boroughs in the State would be a local law, but every one conversant with the meaning of those words, when used in that connection, 10 I46 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. would unhesitatingly pronounce such statutes general laws. But, as was said in Scowden's Appeal (supra), "classification which is grounded on no necessity and has for its sole object an evasion of the Constitution" is quite a different thing. "The Act of 1874, dividing the cities of the State into three classes, viz.: those containing over three hundred thousand population, those containing less than three hundred thou- sand and exceeding one hundred thousand, and those con- taining less than one hundred thousand and exceeding ten thousand, was sustained, as to such of its provisions as have been involved in adjudicated cases, because it was considered within the spirit if not the letter of the Constitution. As to the number of classes created, that Act appears to have cov- ered the entire ground of classification. It provided for all existing as well as every conceivable prospective necessity. It is impossible to suggest any legislation that has or may hereafter become necessary for any member of either class, .that cannot, without detriment to other members of same class, be made applicable to all of them. If classification had stopped where the Act of 1874 left it it would have been well, but it did not. Without the slightest foundation in neces- sity, the number of classes were soon increased to five, and afterwards to seven, and if the vicious principle on which that was done be recognized by the courts, the number may at any time be further increased until it equals the number of cities in the Commonwealth. The only possible purpose of such classification is evasion of the constitutional limitation, and as such it ought to be unhesitatingly condemned. "The fact that the extended classification of 1876, and more especially that of 1887, is unnecessary, and therefore unwarranted, is manifest from an inspection of the Acts them- selves. With very few and quite unimportant exceptions the charter powers of the fourth to seventh classes, inclusive, under the latter Act, are precisely similar. There is nothing in either of the points of difference that can possibly be re- garded as essential. Aside from the improper consideration LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 147 that five classes furnish greater facilities for special legisla- tion than one class would do, there is nothing to prevent the last four classes from being included in the third class established by the Act of 1874, which comprises all cities of more than ten and less than one hundred thousand popula- tion. Their needs are all so similar that no charter power required for either of them would be unnecessary or detri- mental to any of the others. The larger cities of such a class — that is, a class embracing all cities over ten and less than one hundred thousand population — would doubtless require a larger representation in each branch of councils, but that, of course, would be easily regulated by the adoption of a suita- ble ward and population basis of representation." Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. St. 258. 2 Scowden's Appeal, 96 Pa. St. 422. Philadelphia v. Westminster Cemetery Company, 162 Pa. St. 105; s. c, 3 P. D. R. 151. 4 City of York School District's Appeal, 169 Pa. St. 70; s. c. below sub nom In re Potter's Field, 8 York, 145. 3 Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. St. 554. 6 In re Grant Street, 121 Pa. St. 596; Avars' Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 266; and see Shoemaker v. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. St. 285; Berghaus v. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. St. 289; Klugh v. Har- risburg, 122 Pa. St. 289. 7. Classification by Population Must Not AYork Exclusion, but Must be Operative from Time to Time so as by Change of Population the Subject may Pass from Class to Class. The Act of June 28th, 1879, P. L. 182, extending the pro- visions of the mechanics' lien law to leasehold estates, con- tained in the sixth section a proviso that the Act should not apply to counties having a population of over 200,000 inhab- itants. The Act was held to be local because certain counties were excluded by the proviso. 1 In this case Mr. Justice Mer- I48 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. cur said: "The difficulty here is not of classification only; within reasonable limits and for some purposes classification is allowable. It has been sustained on the basis of popula- tion of counties on the assumption that those having a small population may ultimately have one much larger. Here the larger are excluded. We cannot assume that their popula- tion will ever be reduced to less than the number named. They are, therefore, practically and permanently excluded by the intent and purpose of this Act, which is special in its terms and local in its effect." The requirement that classification must be complete in- cludes the principle that each member of a class shall be sub- ject to transition from class to class according to circum- stances. The very theory of the generality of the city and other like classification Acts also implies this, otherwise spe- cific cities would be selected by population rather than by name. And such in fact is the practical operation of such laws. 2 1 Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. St. 377; and see McCarty v. Com- monwealth, no Pa. St. 243; Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. St. 322; City of Scranton v. Silkman, 113 Pa. St. 191; Ry- mer v. Luzerne County, 142 Pa. St. 108. "Monroe v. Luzerne County, 103 Pa. St. 278; Luzerne County v. Glennon, 109 Pa. St. 564; Guldin v. Schuylkill Count}'', 149 Pa. St. 210; Commonwealth v. Wyman, 137 Pa. St. 508; Commonwealth v. Macferron, 152 Pa. St. 244. 8. Transition from Class to Class. Luzerne County having at the time of the adoption of the Constitution a population in excess of 150,000 was subject to the provisions of the salary Act of March 31st, 1876, P. L. 13, enacted to carry into effect the provisions of Article XIV, Section 5, in relation to the compensation of county officers. P>v the erection of the county of Lackawanna out of the county of Luzerne in 1878 the latter had a population of less LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 149 than 150,000 inhabitants. The effect of this, without legisla- tion, was to restore the operation of the fee system, as gov- erned by the existing statutes, in the county of Lu- zerne. In the case of Monroe v. The County of Luzerne, 1 the facts as to population appeared in the case-stated, and it was held that the plaintiff, who entered upon his duties as prothonotary in January, 1880, was not entitled to salary under the Act of 1876. Referring to the Act of 1876, Chief Justice Mercur said: "This Act is general in its terms. It is designed to apply to counties then containing the requi- site population, and also to those that might thereafter ac- quire it; whenever the effort is made to apply this Act to an officer of any particular county, the fact to be ascertained is whether the county contained sufficient population at the time the officer entered upon the duties of his office. What- ever the population may previously have been or what it may thereafter become, does not control the case. By what mode that population shall be ascertained does not arise in this case." The recorder of deeds who entered upon his duties in Jan- uary, 1884, was a party in a subsequent suit to determine the status of the county officers of Luzerne County. The census of 1880 showed a population of the county of 133,066, and the case-stated set forth that when the incumbent entered on his official duties the population of the county was over 150,000, "based upon the reasons set forth in the following paragraph," which deduced the conclusion from a compari- son of inhabitants and taxables in 1880 with the tax- ables in 1883. The terms of the case-stated were not regarded as furnishing an admission of population, and the office was held to be still subject to the fee sys- tem. 2 Mr. Justice Sterrett said: "The only legally- recognized method of determining the population of any particular county or district is by resorting to the last pre- ceding decennial census; and, according to that the popula- tion of Luzerne County is less than one hundred and fifty I50 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. thousand. We do not say it is not competent for the Legis- lature to provide some other or additional mode of deter- mining the fact; but, until some other legal provision is made, we must be governed by the only-recognized rule applicable to the subject. In Luzerne County v. Griffith, 1 Kulp, 297, this court said: 'In the absence of express legislative declara- tion of the fact, or of any other method provided by the Legislature for ascertaining it, the last preceding decennial census is to be resorted to as the best evidence of the popu- lation of a county in case of classification of counties by pop- ulation.' "In the light of existing legislation, we have no doubt that for the purposes of classification under the various salary- Acts, each county must remain in the class in which the last census found it until it is transferred to another class by a subsequent census. The United States decennial census is the only official determination of population that we now have, and the inconvenience and injustice that would neces- sarily arise from accepting any unofficial guide to the classi- fication of counties, for salary purposes, cannot well be over- estimated. Legislative and judicial apportionments are both based on population determined by the last preceding cen- sus. The Constitution provides that 'whenever a county shall contain forty thousand inhabitants' it shall constitute a separate judicial district; but, in Commonwealth ex rel. Chase v. Harding, 6 Norris, 351, we held that such separate dis- tricts can only be formed after a decennial census showing the requisite population. The cases, it is true, are not exactly parallel, but the analogy is very close." Bv the census of 1890 it appeared that Luzerne County had a population in excess of 150,000 and the salary system was consequently restored. 3 By the same census taken in June, 1890, it appeared that the county of Schuylkill had a population in excess of 150,000. The coroner elected in 1889 who entered upon his office in January, 1890, was party to a suit to determine the compensation of the officers of that LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. I5I county. The claim was that the Act of 1876 governed his compensation for 1891, notwithstanding the provision of Ar- ticle III, Section 13, of the Constitution, which provides that no law shall increase or diminish the salary or emoluments of a public officer after his election or appointment. The court below was of opinion that the case was within the Act of 1876, and that the constitutional provision must be con- strued to mean a law passed after the election or appointment of the officer. But the Supreme Court held otherwise and the judgment was reversed. 4 In Pittsburg-' s Petition, 5 it was held that the fact that the Act of June 14th, 1887, P. L. 395, in relation to the govern- ment of cities of the second class fixed certain dates for the doing of things necessary to put the city government in op- eration, compliance with which direction was possible only in the city of Pittsburg, the then sole city of that class, and made no corresponding provision for cities afterwards coming into it, did not render the Act invalid as a local law. In Commonwealth v. Wyman, 6 Chief Justice Paxson said: "It has been ascertained, in the manner required by law, that the city of Allegheny has now a population which entitled it, under the classification Acts of 1874 and 1889, to become a city of the second class. Prior to the last census it was a city of the third class. It now passes from the one class to the other, by reason of its growth in population, without shock or disturbance. It is the first event of the kind in the political history of the State, and is not without interest. "It is conceded that up to the present time the city of Alle- gheny has been governed by the special Act of March 31st, 1870, P. L. 717, entitled 'An Act to reduce the charter of the city of Allegheny, and the several Acts amendatory thereof, into one Act.' By that Act the powers of the mu- nicipal government were vested in the Mayor and select and common councils. The select council was composed of two members from each ward, to serve for a term of two years, which term was increased by the Act of 1881 to four years. I52 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. There being thirteen wards in the city, the number of select councilmen had hitherto been twenty-six. "It is also conceded that the city of Allegheny, while it has been a city of the third class, under the classification Acts aforesaid, has never accepted the provisions of the general city laws of 1874, and hence, as was decided in Henry Street, 123 Pa. St. 347, was not governed by their provisions, but remained subject to the said special Act of 1870. "The transition from the one class to the other works no change in its government except such as the law makes nec- essary to adjust it to the class into which it goes. It repeals no ordinances; it vacates no offices except those which it abolishes, and makes no vacancies to be filled except by the creation of new offices. The offices of Mayor, and of se- lect and common councils are common to each class of cities. The mere fact of the transition does not necessarily unseat the persons legally filling such offices at the time it occurs, but they serve out their official terms for which they were elected, and their successors are elected under the laws regulating the class into which the city has moved. In the meantime the officers, whose terms have not expired, become possessed of all the powers and are subject to all the duties pertaining to the offices held by them in cities of the class to which it has advanced. In other words, the machinery of the old government is to be used in adjusting the city to its position under the new. Were it otherwise, were all offices to be sud- denly vacated, we would have chaos. We would have a city without a Mayor, without councils, without heads of depart- ments, without police officers to preserve the public peace, and no one authorized to set in motion the machinery by which the new government can be organized." The precise question for determination, in this case, was whether it is the duty of the respondent, as Mayor of the city, to issue his official proclamation, ordering the election, at the next municipal election, of one member of select coun- cil from each ward in the city. The court below was of opin- LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 1 53, ion that such election was necessary, and awarded a man- damus ordering the Mayor to issue his proclamation therefor. From this decision the Mayor appealed. It was held in view of the situation of the municipal government that a proper application of the statutory law did not require an election, and the judgment below was reversed. Counsel in this case submitted a further question, to wit, whether under the Act of June 14th, 1887, P L. 395, pro- viding for the choice by city councils of heads of depart- ments of public safety, public works, and charities, these re- spective officers should be elected by the councils of the new or old city? The court said: "Upon this point we are in no doubt. The present councils are the councils of the new city, if I may use a term which does not quite accurately describe the situation. The city remains the same. It merely passes from one condition to another. It enters the new with all its ordinances; all its officers whose offices have not been abolished; all of its contracts in full force, and sim- ply conforms for the future to the new regulations which the law declares shall supersede the old. The machinery of the latter, as before observed, must be used to start the city under its new government. "We are of opinion that the present councils should pro- ceed to elect the heads of departments." In Commonwealth v. Macferron, 7 a case arising upon the transition of the city of Allegheny into the second class of cities, Mr. Justice Williams said: "This appeal presents a single question. It is one of considerable practical import- ance and has not yet been definitely settled by decision. The Act of 1874 divided the cities of the Commonwealth into three classes upon the basis of population. It also provided that when any city of a lower class had reached the limit of population for the class above it, this fact when properly as- certained should be certified by the Governor to the councils of the city, and upon the recording of such certificate upon the records of councils, the city must pass, eo instanti, into 154 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. the class in which its population entitled it to be. We are now to inquire how much of the legislation peculiar to city, or to the class of cities out of which it goes, it can take with it into the new class of which it becomes a member, and how much it must leave behind? In answering this question we should consider, first, the objects of classification as declared by the Legislature; and, next, the several provisions of the Act of 1874, and supplementary legislation, by which these declared objects are carried into practical operation. "The first section of the Act of 1874 sets out very clearly the object of classification. It is to regulate the exercise of certain corporate powers, and the number, character, powers, and duties of certain corporate officers in the cities composing the several classes. The same section declares that 'the cor- porate powers and the number, character, powers, and duties of the officers of cities of the several classes now in exist- ence by virtue of the laws of this Commonwealth shall be and remain as now provided by law except where other- wise provided by this Act.' Here is a very plain declaration of legislative intent to recast the governments of cities in such particulars as might be necessary to their classification, and to secure uniformity in the general outline of the mu- nicipal government, provided for all the members of each class. Here is also an equally plain declaration of the legisla- tive purpose to leave each city in the full enjoyment of all its powers, rights, and privileges not superseded by the uni- form scheme or plan of municipal government provided for the class into which such city may come. As was held in Commonwealth ex rd. v. Wyman, 137 Pa. St. 508, the transi- tion of a city from one class to another works such change in its government as the law makes necessary to adjust it to the class into which it goes. In other respects it works no change, but the city brings its municipal belongings with it into the new class. It would seem that we are thus provided with an answer to our question by the Act of 1874. So far as the legislation affecting a city of the third class conflicts LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 1 55 with the uniform general plan of municipal government pro- vided for cities of the second class, so far it must, upon its transition into that class, leave its former system behind it; else it could not adjust itself to the class into which it has come, and the whole scheme of classification would fall. So far as its former legislation is not in conflict with the legisla- tive plan of government for the new class so far it remains in full force. "Let us now apply this test to the case before us. The city of Allegheny was provided, while it was a city of the third class, with a system for the levy and collection of its taxes. The law has provided a very different system for cities of the second class. The two cannot stand together. It is clear, therefore, that in order to adjust itself to the class into which it has come, this city must leave its old system behind it, and take on that which the law has prescribed for it as a member of the second class. This is rendered still more apparent when we remember that the power to levy and collect taxes is one of the 'corporate powers' which the classification Acts have undertaken to regulate; and that the officers through whom such levy and collection are made, are 'corporate offi- cers,' whose powers and duties are defined and adjusted by the same Acts. If no provision for the levy and collection of taxes in cities of the second class had been made, the system previously in existence in such cities would have remained undisturbed under the express declaration of the first sec- tion of the Act of 1874, but to the extent to which the law has regulated the exercise of the taxing power, or modified the powers and duties of the officers through whom it is ex- ercised, to that extent the old system is superseded by the new, and upon the transition of a city from the lower to the higher class it exchanges its outgrown municipal dress for that which the law has provided for every member of the class into which it comes. If this was not so, the very objects of classification would be defeated and, instead of uniformity among the members of each class, we should have the same I56 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. diversity in the organization and administration of the gov- ernment of cities as existed when the Act of 1874 was adopted. Under the letter of the Constitution cities consti- tuted a single class, and as local legislation regulating mu- nicipal affairs was forbidden, classification became necessary to avoid intolerable inconvenience and hardship: Wheeler v. The City, 77 Pa. St. 338. Instead of one form of municipal government for all the cities of the Commonwealth we now have three forms, one for each class, and to the forms so pro- vided every member of each class must conform. A reason for this is found in the fact that since 1874 local legislation regulating the affairs of a city is forbidden by the Constitu- tion, so that legislation for that purpose can be had only for a class, and must be applicable to every member of the class." 1 Monroe v. County of Luzerne, 103 Pa. St. 278; and see County v. Griffith, 1 Kulp, 297. 2 Luzerne County v. Glennon, 109 Pa. St. 564; s. p. Guldin v. Schuylkill County, 149 Pa. St. 210. 3 Rymer v. Luzerne County, 142 Pa. St. 108. 4 Guldin v. Schuylkill County, 149 Pa. St. 210; s. p. Com- monwealth v. Comrey, 149 Pa. St. 216. 5 Pittsburg's Petition, 138 Pa. St. 401. 6 Commonwealth v. Wyman, 137 Pa. St. 508. 7 Commonwealth v. Macferron, 152 Pa. St. 244. 9. Option Under Classification Acts. Option under classification Acts was not at first regarded as admissible. The question first arose in the case of the Ap- peal of the City of Scranton School District, 1 which brought in question certain provisions of the Act of 1874, and the sup- plement thereto of March 18th, 1875, P. L. 15. In this case the plaintiff claimed the benefit of that provision of the first section of the Act of 1875 which directed that in cities of the third class, for the purposes of taxation, all real estate and the improvements thereon should be classified and arranged LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 1 57 in three classes upon which different rates of assessment should be imposed. The rate claimed by the plaintiff was less than the full rate levied upon the assessed valuation made for city purposes, at which the defendant, the school district, had caused the school tax to be assessed. The proviso to the fifth section of the Act of March 15th, 1875, excluded from the operation of the Act all cities of the third class, and all cities containing less than ten thousand population, pre- viously incorporated, which did not accept the provisions of the Act by an ordinance duly passed. Accepting cities therefore were subject to the methods of assessment and col- lection prescribed by the first five sections of the Act, while different methods would prevail in non-accepting cities. These provisions of the Act of 1875 were held to be invalid on the ground that the diversities proceeding from the opera- tion of the law rendered it local and special. The case of Reading v. Savage, 2 arose upon the provis- ion of Section 57 of the Act of May 23d, 1874, P. L. 230, making the Act applicable to such cities of the third class or any city of under 10,000 inhabitants theretofore incorporated as might accept its provisions. The city of Reading had ac- cepted the provisions of the Act and the case was upon a lien filed thereunder. The defense was that the acceptance was invalid. Under former legislation the city was without power to enforce such a claim as that for which the lien had been filed. The court below sustained the defense upon the authority of the Appeal of City of Scranton School District (supra), from which the following principle was deduced: "Wherever the provisions of an Act are compulsorily binding upon every city of the particular classification the legisla- tion is general and constitutional. Whenever the provisions are binding at the option of the local authorities the legisla- tion is special, local, and unconstitutional." The judgment was affirmed in a per curiam opinion adopting the opinion of the court below. Upon reargument, ordered by the court of its own motion, the judgment was reversed. 3 158 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. In the opinion the distinction between the provision of the Act of 1875 in question in the Scranton case, and that of the Act of 1874, in question in the case before the court, was pointed out; the former was said to be a disabling, the latter an enabling provision. The former tended to diversity. Cities of the third class under the Act of 1874 might or might not ac- cept the provisions of the Act of 1875. Hence its results were special and local. It did not necessarily govern a constitutional class. The Act of 1874 being a general law without words of repeal did not take away the pre-existing legislation gov- erning those cities whose population made them eligible to the third class. The option was the means whereby the city by proper action might avail itself of the provisions of the Act of 1874. As city after city might do this the results tended to uniformity, such cities thereupon became subject to the provisions of the Act of 1874 and of such subsequent legislation as might relate to cities of the third clas§. Non- accepting cities remained subject to their old charters beyond the reach of improvement by legislation except upon condi- tion of renouncing them and accepting the uniform provis- ions of the Act of 1874. The city of Meadville was originally incorporated under the Act of February 15th, 1866, P. L. 57, and its supple- ments. Under this legislation it was without authority to assess the cost of sewers on adjoining property. The Act of April nth, 1876, P. L. 20, supplementary to and amendatory of the Act of 1874, amending the fifty-seventh section and others, provided that any city of the third, fourth, or fifth class might accept the provisions of the Act, or of any por- tion or portions thereof, by ordinance reciting the provis- ions adopted. The city of Meadville had adopted such por- tions, among others, as related to sewer assessments. In a case arising on such an assessment the defense was sustained by reason of the invalidity of the Act of 1876, upon the au- thority of Avars' Appeal. Such a lien was held to depend upon statutory authority for its creation. As the Act of LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 1 59 1876 was void the question whether a partial acceptance of the Act of 1876 might be sustained was not reached. 4 The city of Wilkes-Barre was eligible to the third class of cities under the Act of 1874, but had not accepted its pro- visions. The Act of May 23d, 1889, P. L. 274, entitled "An Act constituting each city of the third class a single school district, providing for the election of its school controllers, the levy and collection of taxes and the management of its affairs," provided in Section 9 that any city of the third class now incorporated may accept and become subject to the pro- visions of this Act by resolution of its school boards. The boards of the city of Wilkes-Barre having accepted the pro- visions of the Act its validity was questioned in Common- wealth v. Reynolds. 5 After referring to the above provision Mr. Justice Clark said: "It is plain that this provision is precisely similar, in effect, to the Act of 1875, which was passed upon in Scran- ton School District's Appeal (supra): its tendency is not to uniformity, but to diversity; its results are not general, but special and local. It will be observed that 'any city of the third class,' incorporated before its passage, whether by spe- cial charter or under the general law of 1874, may accept its provisions, and any of such cities may refuse to accept them. Wilkes-Barre is a city of the third class by special charter. The local authorities of the city have not yet accepted the provisions of the Act of 1874, but desire to avail themselves of the Act of 1889, which is not an amendment to the Act of 1874, but an original Act. If the Act of 1889 is sustained, we are liable to have cities of the third class: (1) by special charter as before; (2) by special charter and under the Act of 1889; (3) under the general Act of 1874; and (4) under the Acts of 1874 and 1889. Another such statute would double these possibilities, and each succeeding similar enactment would double the possibilities then existing. This diversity, thus increasing in a geometrical ratio, would result in a con- fusion and disorder with which the evils of undisguised special l6o VALIDITY OF STATUTES. legislation cannot be compared. In order to procure special legislation upon any subject relating to the government of cities, it would only be necessary to procure the passage of a •law, in general form, with the specific and special features desired, with a provision that it would apply only to such cities as might accept it, and it would be possible, in this form of legislation, for each city of the third class in the State to have, to some extent, it own peculiar system, with like effect as if enacted by special law. "The Legislature, in the Act of 1874, provided a general system, upon which are found all the cities thereafter incor- porated, and upon which are to be put, ultimately, all other cities of the third class, as beads are put upon a string. The system may be strengthened or extended, but it cannot be parted or divided. The loose beads, as they are taken up, must be put upon the string, and not upon one of the strands of which the string consists. The system, under the Con- stitution, is necessarily an entirety; and the special charter city, in passing upon the acceptance of the provisions, under an elective clause such as is contained in the Act of 1874, must decide to take all or none of them. "We are of opinion, therefore, that the Act of May 23d, 1889, is in contravention of Article III, Section 7, of the Constitution of the State, and that upon this ground the ■entire Act is void. In this view of the case, it is unnecessary to consider the Act with reference to the other provisions of the Constitution referred to." In Commonwealth v. Denworth, 6 the Acts of March 24th, 1877, an d i ts supplements of May 1st, 1879, P- L. 44. and February 14th, 1881, P. L. 26, were held invalid. The first Act was entitled "An Act creating and defining the duties and powers of a recorder for cities whose population does not exceed 30,000, and is not less than 8,500, which accepts the provisions of this Act." After providing for the exercise of the office of recorder in such cities the Act in Section 14 pro- vided, "That this Act shall only apply to cities whose popu- LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. IOl lation does not exceed 30,000, and is not less than 8,500, which shall by ordinance, duly adopted by the council or councils thereof, and approved by the Mayor, accept the pro- visions of this Act." The supplement of 1879 enlarged the jurisdiction of city recorders and made further regulations as to the exercise thereof. In Section 9 of the supplement it was provided, "That so much of the first section of the Act to which this is a supplement, as reads 'That the several cities of this Commonwealth, whose population does not exceed 30,000 and is not less than 8,500,' be and the same is hereby amended to read, 'That the several cities of this Common- wealth, whose population does not exceed 17,000 and is not less than 10,000:' Provided, That the provisions of this amendment shall not affect any city which has heretofore accepted the provisions of the Act to which this is a supple- ment and elected a recorder." The supplement of 1881 amended the said Section 9 of the supplement of 1879 so as to read: "That the several cities of this Commonwealth whose population does not exceed 17,000, and is not less than 10,000, and in addition thereto all cities of the fifth class organized and incorporated in this Common- wealth under and by virtue of the provisions of the Act of May 24th, 1874, and its supplements, which have heretofore or may hereafter accept the provisions of the Act to which this is an amendment and its supple- ments." The defendant was in the exercise of the office of recorder in the city of Williamsport under color of this legis- lation. The population of Williamsport was not more than 30,000, and not less than 8,500, and it had accepted the pro- visions of the foregoing legislation, and the case was a writ of quo warranto against the recorder to test its validity. In this case Mr. Justice McCollum said: "The statutes under which the appellant claims title to the office of recorder are in palpable conflict with Section 7, Article III, of the Constitution. They are local because confined in their opera- tions to cities of a specified population, which shall accept 11 1 62 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. them by ordinance duly adopted by councils and approved by the Mayor. Whether they shall apply to a city of the class described depends on the action of its municipal officers, and in consequence thereof, one city of the class may be sub- ject to their provisions, and other cities of the same class be exempt from them. Without further elaboration of the subject, it is sufficient to say of this legislation that it is such as was condemned in Scranton School District's Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 176." The Act of May 23d, 1889, P L. 277, which was entitled "An Act for the incorporation and government of cities of the third class" made provision for the annexation of terri- tory to such cities. In Harris's Appeal, 7 the validity of pro- ceedings to annex certain territory to the city of Scranton under this legislation was in question. In this case, Mr. Jus- tice Williams said: "The new Constitution provided for the government of the Commonwealth by general laws and denied to the Legislature the power to pass local laws on many subjects. Cities under constitutional provisions con- stituted one class, to be legislated for in future by laws appli- cable to all alike. To relieve against this hardship the classi- fication Act was passed during the following session of the Legislature. The cities were divided into three classes upon the basis of population. There was at that time but one city in the first and one in the second class. Legislation for these classes was therefore easy of accomplishment, but in the third class, there were many cities each of which was provided, at the time of the passage of the Act of 1874, with a form of government of its own selection. These differed quite widely in the terms and duties of some of the municipal offices, and in the powers possessed by the municipalities. The effort to reduce all these, at one time, to a uniform frame of govern- ment was one that would be attended necessarily with some inconvenience. The Act was made to take effect upon all cities to be incorporated after its passage, and upon all those previously incorporated, when and as fast as they should sev- LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 163 erally elect to come in under its provisions. The expecta- tion entertained by the lawmakers was that within a few years all the cities of the third class, then existing, would come, by election, into the class, and adopt the frame of municipal government provided by the Act of 1874. This expectation has been largely realized. A few cities still cling to their old charters, but much the larger part of them have adopted the provisions of that Act and are members of the third class, not only by reason of their population, but by reason of the char- acter of their municipal organization. The class is a steadily increasing one, and the number of cities standing outside of it is steadily decreasing. The tendency is toward absolute uniformity. Legislation for cities of the third class is appli- cable to all the members of that class, and it is general, within the definition we have frequently given to the phrase 'a gen- eral law,' since 1874. If, as is said by the appellant's counsel, Wilkes-Barre is not bound by the provisions of the Act of 1889, it is because that city is still outside the class for which the Act of 1889 was framed. It is for some purposes a city of the third class under the classification Act, but for pur- poses of locad government it remains under its charter and its system of local laws that were in force prior to 1874. For these purposes, therefore, it is not a member of the class, and is not affected by the legislation provided for the class as it exists under the provisions of the law of 1874. For purposes of classification all cities not belonging to the first or second class belong to the third. For purposes of municipal govern- ment only so many of these belong to the third class in the legislative sense of the words, as have taken on the municipal uniform which the Legislature has provided for the class. It follows logically from what has now been said that the \ct of 1889, being for the class and applicable to every member of it, is general, and is not open to the objection which the appel- lants urged against it." The Act of May 23d, 1874, P. L. 230, is not operative in any city of the third class which has not accepted its pro- 164 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. visions. 8 In the case cited Mr. Justice Clark said: "It is contended, however, on the part of the plaintiff in error, that even if this be so, by the (thirteenth section of the more recent Act of May 23d, 1874, P. L. 230, the exclusive control and direction of the opening, widening, narrowing, vacating, etc., of all streets, etc., within the limits of all cities in this Com- monwealth is vested in 'the municipal authorities and the courts having jurisdiction' in such cases, that this jurisdiction must be exercised by the courts in conjunction with the mu- nicipal authorities, and that as the city of Allegheny has in no way consented to or recommended the vacation of Henry Street, the courts cannot entertain jurisdiction. Without en- tering into a discussion of the purpose of this provision of the Act of May 23d, 1874, it is a sufficient answer to this contention that the city of Allegheny has not accepted or become subject to the Act of 1874 nor to the Act of April nth, 1876, P. L. 21, which is a supplement thereto. It is true that certain sections of this Act of 1874 might appear to apply to all cities whether its provisions have been formally accepted or not, but a careful reading of the statute shows that these sections are applicable only to all cities of whatever class which by the terms of the Act or by their acceptance have become subject to its provision. "The design of the Act of 1874 was to establish a uniform and general system of government for all the cities of the Commonwealth; it was not designed, however, to work a re- peal of any municipal charter previously created by special enactment; vet, when the municipality voluntarily relin- quishes the same and accepts the provisions of the Act of 1874, in the manner designated therein, or suffers a repeal of its charter, the effect in either case is to bring the city or its inhabitants within the provisions of the general law of the State. The Act applies not only to any city accepting its provisions, but to all cities hereafter to be created; it may be said, therefore, to apply to all cities of the Commonwealth, as ultimately all may become subject to it without the re- enactment of any of its provisions. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 165 "As it is admitted that the city of Allegheny has never in any way become subject to the Act of 1874, no question arises upon the proper construction of the thirteenth section or upon the constitutionality of that Act; it will be time enough to consider those questions when they are properly presented." 1 Appeal of City of Scranton School District, 113 Pa. St. 176. 2 Reading v. Savage, 120 Pa. St. 198; followed in Hoopes v. Scranton, 1 Wilcox, 189. 3 Reading v. Savage, 124 Pa. St. 328. 4 Meadville v. Dickson, 129 Pa. St. 1. B Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 137 Pa. St. 389; and see Commonwealth v. Reynolds (below), 8 C. C. R. 568. Commonwealth v. Denworth, 145 Pa. St. 172. 7 Harris's Appeal, 160 Pa. St. 494. 8 In re Henry Street, 123 Pa. St. 346; and see generally Commonwealth v. Halstead, 2 C. P Rep. 247, 1 C. C. R. 335; s. c, reversed, 18 W. N. C. 385; s. c, 2 C. P. Rep. 247; Van Storch v. Scranton, 3 C. C. R. 571; 3 C. C. R. 567. In Sixteenth Street Opening, 4 C. C. R. 124, it was held that a city was not estopped from asserting the invalidity of an option provision by having acted under it. 10. Option as Related to Local and Special Legis- lation. The Act of June 23d, 1885, P. L. 142, entitled "An Act to repeal the first section of an Act entitled 'An Act for regu- lating and maintaining of fences, approved A. D. 1700,' re- pealed the first section of the Act referred to in its first sec- tion, and in its second section further provided that in any county wherein a majority voted in favor of repeal, the Act should forthwith take effect, but that the same should not take effect in any county until it had been ascertained that the provisions thereof were deemed expedient and desired therein by such an election. l66 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. In Frost v. Cherry, 1 this Act was held to be invalid. Mr. Justice Paxson said: "It is contended, and the learned judge below so held, that the Act is in conflict with Section 7. Article III, of the Constitution, which provides, inter alia, that 'The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs, or school districts.' "The word affairs, as used in the Constitution, has received a judicial construction by this court. In Morrison v. Bach- ert, 112 Pa. St. 322, it was said: 'When it (the Constitution), speaks of the affairs of a county, it means such affairs as af- fect the people of that county.' We accordingly held in that case that an Act to ascertain and appoint the fees to be re- ceived by prothonotaries and other county officers was an Act regulating the affairs of counties; while in Common- wealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. St. 258, and in Scowden's Appeal, 96 Pa. St. 422, we ruled that an Act of Assembly which au- thorized the holding of special sessions of the courts of Craw- ford County, away from the county seat, offended against this clause in the Constitution. The particular device re- sorted to in these cases to evade the constitutional prohibi- tion was classification. "The Act of 1885 concerns the great body of the people of the county. It affects every farmer, almost every lot-holder and every person who keeps horses or cattle, sheep, hogs, or p-oats. It would seem difficult to frame an Act which should more generally concern the people. Moreover, it prescribes certain duties to the sheriff, the commissioners, and all the election officers. How then can it be said that it does not relate to the 'affairs' of counties within the meaning of the Constitution? "Is it a local law? Upon this point we are free from doubt. It is to be observed that the first section, repealing the Act of 1700, does not go into effect in any county by its own force. If it did we might sustain it even if the rest of the Act were unconstitutional. But the first section is tied to LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 1 67 the second section by an umbilical cord. If we cut it they both perish. The first section is only effective after a vote in favor of it, then the Act takes effect in such county; if the majority should be against it the Act does not take effect. Thus, it may very well happen that Venango Count}' may vote in favor of the repeal and its adjoining counties vote against it. We would then have one law in Venango County regulating fences, and a different law in the adjoining coun- ties, both local laws, the very thing prohibited by the Consti- tution. Nor would it make any difference were ever}' county in the State to vote the same way. The test is not results, but possibilities. The machinery to test the sense of the peo- ple can only be put in operation by the county commission- ers, and when so moved, the fact that it may be rendered local in its effects is fatal to the bill. In City of Scranton School District's Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 176, it was said by Mr. Justice Green, in delivering the opinion of the court: 'The ■circumstance that the power to determine the question is delegated to another body does not at all affect the ques- tion. The practical result is the same; the law of 1875 will be limited to the one or more cities that do accept and that makes it local. All our recent decisions are to the effect that if local results either are or may be produced by a piece of legisla- tion it offends against this provision of the Constitution and is void.' Citing Commonwealth v. Patton (supra), and other cases. Scranton School District's Appeal is upon all fours with the case in hand. The Act of 1875 there referred to was an Act for the assessment, levy, and collection of all taxes authorized to be collected in certain cities, and to which by the proviso of the fifth section no city of the third class shall become subject until they are accepted by ordinance of coun- cils, approved by the Mayor, and it was held that the first five sections thereof were thus limited to the one or more cities that accept, and were therefore local and in conflict with Section 7, Article III, of the Constitution. "If there is anything now settled in the Constitution it is 1 68 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. that the Legislature can no longer pass a valid local or spe- cial law regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs, or school districts. And what the Legis- lature may not do directly, it cannot accomplish by indirec- tion, as by classification resting upon no necessity nor reason of public policy, or by calling in the aid of the people at the polls to breathe life into an otherwise dead statute. "I have not considered it necessary to discuss the question of the delegation of power. The Act of 1885 is in such direct conflict with Section 7, Article III, of the Constitution, that the learned judge below could not have done otherwise than declare it void for that reason." The Act of June 12th, 1893, P. L. 451, was entitled "An Act enabling the taxpayers of townships and road districts to con- tract for making at their own expense the roads, and paying salaries of township or road district officers, and thereby pre- venting the levy and collection of road taxes therein." The Act provided that any one or more taxpayers of any town- ship might acquire the right to make and repair the roads of the township on petition to the court of quarter sessions, setting forth certain facts, viz., that the petitioners are own- ers of property and taxpayers; the approximate number of miles of roads in the township; ability of petitioners to make and repair the roads; and further, filing a bond in a sum equal to $500 for every mile of road in the township with approved sureties; thereupon, the court, on being satisfied of the good faith of petitioners, might grant the prayer, and direct the road supervisors to enter into a contract with the petitioners for the making and repair of the roads of the township for the ensuing fiscal year. This Act was held to be valid. 2 In this case Mr. Justice Dean said: "It is not questioned that townships are a class of municipal sub- divisions of the State, and laws applicable to all townships alike are general and constitutional laws. But it is argued this law would be productive of local results, and therefore is a local law. That is, some townships would take advantage LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 1 69 of its provisions, and contract for making and repairing their roads, while others would go on under the old law, and have the work done as heretofore, directly by the supervisors. Hence, in different townships, the work would be done under two different systems, depending on the notions of the tax- payers of the many townships of the Commonwealth. But this fact, even if it were undoubted, would not necessarily be local legislation. Nearly all the laws which, since its adop- tion, have been declared obnoxious to the constitutional in- hibition of Section 7, Article III, have been those which sought to accomplish a local result under the guise of a nom- inally general law, and which, from the language of the stat- ute and its subject, could have no other result, or which, from the very nature of the case, could not have a general applica- tion. In these cases the Act, though general in terms, was so worded that it could only relate to some members of a class, which members were identified by a geographical loca- tion, a territorial area, or a limit of population, which made them beneficiaries of the law, and excluded all others of the same class. But there is not a single township in the State - which does not come under this law. If the Act had been the first one passed on the subject and had enacted that, in all the townships of the State, public roads should be made and kept in repair by the supervisors: 1, By the assessment of a money tax, collected and expended by them; 2, or by the labor of the taxpayers of each township to the value of their tax, under the direction of the supervisors; 3, or by con- tract of supervisors with a taxpayer or taxpayers, with the approval of the court of quarter sessions, the law would, un- questionably, have been general. But there being three dif- ferent methods of doing the same thing, the roads might have been made and repaired in three different ways by three ad- joining townships. The duty of each township would have been the same, to make and repair the roads within its boundaries; the object of the law, with respect to each, would have been the same, to secure reasonably good roads. That 170 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. any township might adopt any one of three lawful methods to effect the general purpose, it seems to us, could not change its general character. Here not a single township is excluded from the operation of the law because of any local peculiarity. That taxpayers will differ in opinion as to benefits from it, and, in consequence, some townships will adopt the new method, while others adhere to the old, is not a local result, but merely an exhibition of that tendency of the human mind to reach different political conclusions from the same facts." He further said: "Testing this law by its effect it operates upon all townships whose taxpayers choose to invoke it in precisely the same manner. It in substance does nothing more than permit the taxpayers to contract for all road work, where before nothing could be contracted, except such as the taxpayers did not choose to do. The duty of supervis- ion in the supervisor remains the same. "We may say here that, on this subject, we adhere to the principle of construction announced in Ruan Street, 132 Pa. St. 257, 'In order that a given Act of Assembly relating to a class of cities may escape the charge of being a local Act it is necessary it should be applicable to all members of the class to which it relates, and must be directed to the exist- ence and regulation of municipal powers, and to matters of local government.' Or as is said in Wheeler v. Philadelphia, "]J Pa. St. 348: 'A statute which relates to persons or things as a class is a general law, while a statute which relates to particular persons or things of a class is special, and comes within the constitutional provision.' " The subject of option as discussed in the cases in this and the foregoing section may be presented in the following sum- mary: Option laws are, as a rule, invalid, because they pro- duce, or may produce, diversitv of laws in different localities; but that is not an option which applies alike to a given class of localities and which gives to the governing or administra- tive authorities of each a choice of several modes of accom- plishing the same result, either of which may be adopted from LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 171 time to time according to the determination of the proper authority. An option may be offered, however, to a class of localities governed by special laws, to remain as they are, be- yond the reach of any but general legislation, save by way of repeal; or to accept the provisions of a general system gov- erning the class to which they belong. The exercise of this option tends from diversity to uniformity. But the change of system to be effected by the exercise of the option must be complete. It cannot relate to a single function nor to a single branch of government or administration, for this tends from diversity to greater diversity, nor can the option be of- fered to less than a class, nor to a different class than as de- fined by the general classification Acts, for this would be to confound classification. 1 Frost v. Cherry, 122 Pa. St. 417, 4 C. C. R. 579. 2 Lehigh Valley Coal Company's Appeal, 164 Pa. St. 44; reversing s. c, Lehigh Valley Coal Company's Petition, 3 P D. R. 610; Philadelphia Coal & Iron Company's Peti- tion, 164 Pa. St. 248. As related to the subject of option the following constitu- tional provisions are referred to: Article V, Section 2, Clause 2. No township, ward, dis- trict, or borough shall elect more than two justices of the peace, or aldermen, without the consent of a majority of the qualified electors within such township, ward, or borough. Article XV, Section 1. Cities may be chartered whenever a majority of the electors of any town or borough having a population of at least 10,000 shall vote at any general elec- tion in favor of the same. The former provision was derived from the amendment of 1838, Article VI, Section 7. The Constitution of 1776 con- tained something like it. Chapter II, Section 30, "If any city or county, ward, township, or district in this Commonwealth incline to change the manner of appointing their justices of the peace as settled by this article the General Assembly may make laws to regulate the same agreeable to the desire of a majority of the freeholders of the city or county, ward, town- ship, or district so applying." 1/2 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. The sixteenth section of the Act of May 8th, 1876, P. L. 149, amended by the sixth section of the Act of March 24th,. 1877, P. L. 40, entitled "A supplement to an Act, entitled 'An Act to provide for the erection of a poor-house, and for the support of the poor in the several counties of the Com- monwealth,' approved May 8th, 1876," is invalid in that the application of the Act is made to depend upon the adoption of it by the voters of the county or district: Taxpayers' Pe- tition, 26 P. L. J. 146. 11. Legislation for Cities by Classes Must be Con- fined to Municipal Matters Proper. By the Act of 1874, as has already appeared, cities were divided into three classes. This classification was sustained, and laws relating to either class and to municipal purposes were held valid. The Act of 1876 created five classes of cities and the Act of 1887 seven. These Acts were held void as cre- ating an undue and unnecessary multiplication of classes. The option features of various Acts were passed upon and sus- tained or held invalid as they did or did not tend to uniform- ity. The remaining feature of city legislation is that indi- cated above. So -far as Acts relating to classes of cities per- tain to municipal purposes they are valid, but so far as they relate to other purposes within the prohibitions of the Con- stitution against local and special legislation they are invalid. In Philadelphia v. Haddington Church, 1 the Act of June 27th, 1883, P. L. 161, which provided that every writ of scire facias "issued upon a municipal claim for the recovery of any sum of money, the subject of a municipal claim in cities of the first class, shall have the additional force and effect of a writ of scire facias to revive and continue the lien of said claim for a period of five years from the date of said writ," was held invalid as a local and special law within the prohibition of such laws, authorizing the creation, extension, or impairing of liens. The opinion of the Supreme Court does not point out the distinction between municipal and non-municipal purposes, but in the opinion below it was said by his Honor, LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. I73 Judge Arnold, "It is my opinion that classification of cities and laws confined thereto are permissible only in matters relating to their municipal government, but the rights of persons and property must be secured by general laws, which must be uniform and in force everywhere throughout the State." The distinction was first pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Weinman v. Passenger Railway Com- pany, 2 in which was in question the Act of March 19th, 1879, P. L. 9, entitled "An Act to provide for the incorporation and for the government and regulation of street railway com- panies now incorporated, or which may hereafter be incorpo- rated in cities of the second and third classes in this Com- monwealth." It was held to be both local and special. Said Mr. Justice Williams: "The subject of this statute is there- fore street railway companies, which is a subject for general legislation, while the statute professes to deal only with a limited number of these railways, and these are selected by reference to their location in certain cities. Under the guise of a general law we have here 'one which is special, because it relates to a fewmembers of thegeneral class of corporations known as street railway companies, and local because its op- erations are confined to particular localities, viz., cities of the second and third class. The provisions of the Constitution which forbid local and special legislation cannot be brushed aside so easily. "It is urged that this statute is sustainable under the de- cisions of this court, recognizing the power of the Legisla- ture to classify the cities of the Commonwealth for purposes of municipal government, but those cases rest upon a very different principle from that involved in the present case. For purposes of local government the State is divided into counties, townships, and other municipal and quasi municipal corporations. Each class of these subdivisions has purposes to subserve that are peculiar to it, and needs to be invested with the powers necessary to that end. Generally speaking, 174 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. all the members of each class have the same local functions to perform. Classification, therefore, upon this basis has been recognized, and a statute relating to all the townships, all the school districts, or all the members of any particular class of the municipal divisions of the State has been held to be constitutional. "It has been found desirable to divide cities into classes upon the basis of their population. The needs of a great city with half a million or more of people are somewhat dif- ferent in many respects from the needs of a city with 10,000. The organization of their local government and the man- agement of their municipal affairs will be quite unlike. Each of these classes requires legislation peculiar to itself, but such legislation must be applicable to all the members of the class to which it relates, and must be directed to the existence and regulation of municipal powers and to matters of local government. The supposed classification in the Act of 1879 is of a very different character. "The Act provides for the incorporation and government of street railway companies, but it does not affect all such companies. It selects such companies as mav be located in cities of the second and third class, and makes special provis- ion for them, while all other street railway companies remain under the operation of the general law. This is just what the Constitution declares shall not be done." The Act of May 6th, 1887, P L. 87, entitled "An Act re- lating to the opening and widening and assessment and pay- ment of damages and benefits for the opening, widening, and change of grade of streets in cities of the first class, and reg- ulating proceedings therein," made detailed provisions in ac- cordance with the purposes expressed in the title. The Act comprised seventeen sections. It was held to be invalid, ex- cept the first two sections, which were sustained because they repealed an existing system for the assessment of damages, and in effect put in its place a system prevailing generallythrough- out the Commonwealth; the remaining sections were held to LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. 1 75 be void because they did not relate to municipal purposes within the principle justifying the classification of cities. 3 In this case Mr. Justice Williams said: "In order that a given Act of Assembly, relating to a class of cities, may escape the charge of being a local Act, it is necessary, as was said in Weinman v. Railway Company (supra), that it should 'be applicable to all the members of the class to which it relates, and must be directed to the existence and regulation of mu- nicipal powers, and to matters of local government.' A law that will bear the application of this test is within the pur- poses for which classification was designed, and therefore constitutional. A law that will not bear its application is local, and offends against the Constitution. Among the many subjects of legislation which classification presents, we may call attention to such as the establishment, maintenance, and control of an adequate police force for the public pro- tection; the preservation of the public health; protection against fire; the provision of an adequate water supply; the paving, grading, curbing, and lighting of public streets; the regulation of markets and market-houses, of docks and wharves; the erection and care of public buildings, and other municipal improvements. These are mentioned, not because they include all the subjects for the exercise of municipal powers, but as a suggestion of some of the more obvious ones and as an illustration of the character of the subjects upon which legislation for the classified cities may be necessary. These classes are thus seen to embrace, not mere geograph- ical subdivisions of the territory of the State, but organized municipalities, which are divided with reference to their own peculiar characteristics and needs, and the legislation to which they are entitled by virtue of such division is simply that which relates to the peculiarities and needs which in- duced the division. In this way each class ma}' be provided with legislation appropriate to it, without imposing the same provisions on other classes to which they would be unsuitable and burdensome. 1^6 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. "We come now to inquire what legislation remains forbid- den to cities, notwithstanding classification. I reply that all legislation not relating to the exercise of corporate powers, or to corporate officers and their powers and duties, is un- authorized by classification. In Article III, Section 7, the Constitution declares that the Legislature shall not pass any local or special law 'regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in, any judicial proceeding or inquiry before courts, aldermen, justices of the peace, sheriffs, commissioners, arbitrators, auditors, masters in chancery, or Other tribunals.' The same section forbids the passage of any local or special law fixing the rate of interest, exempting property from taxation, changing the laws of de- scent, affecting 'the estates of minors, and many other pur- poses, among which is 'authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, or maintaining roads, highways, streets, or alleys.' It is very clear that the purpose of the constitutional pro- vision is to require that laws relating to the several subjects enumerated in Section 7 shall be general, affecting the whole State, so that the rule upon all these subjects shall be uni- form throughout every part of the territory in which the Con- stitution itself is operative. For example, there cannot be one rate of interest in cities of the first class, another in those of the second or third, and still another for the rest of the State, but the rate, when fixed by law, must apply to all parts and divisions of the State alike. The same thing is true of the law of descent, and so on, through the entire list of sub- jects upon which local and special legislation is forbidden. If classification can relieve against the constitutional pro- hibition as to one of these subjects it can relieve as to all. If it can justify a change in the practice in the courts of law, or the proceedings to assess damages for an entry by virtue of the right of eminent domain, it can, by the same reasoning, justify a change in the law of descents, or the settlement of estates, or the rate of interest, and sweep away the entire sec- tion with all its safeguards." Applying this reasoning the Act LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. IJJ was held invalid in so far as it related to the practice and pro- cedure prescribed in the Act for the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to its subject-matter. The Act of June 14th, 1887, P. L. 386, was entitled as shown in the note, and was an elaborate statute relating to street improvements containing thirty-four sections. Its val- idity was in question in Wyoming Street, 4 and the cases re- ported under the name of Wyoming Street were subsequently epitomized in Scranton v. Whyte by the same learned justice who wrote the opinion in Wyoming Street as follows: "The cases involved the validity of municipal liens, entered upon the awards of a 'board of viewers.' This board was ap- pointed by the court of common pleas of Allegheny County, but only on the nomination of the city. Its members were re- movable by the same court, but only on request of the city. Their salaries were fixed by the city, and paid out of the city treasury. All claims for damages done by the entry of the city on private property were required to be submitted to them for adjustment. Their report was made, not to the court that appointed them, but to the city, which sat as an appellate court to review and revise the awards against itself for the injury it had done its citizens by its entry on their lands, under the right of eminent domain. The judgment thus rendered by the city, in its own case, was conclusive on the citizen, unless he fled to a court of law at a rate of speed that left no dust on his feet. Having assessed the damages done by the city, the board of viewers added all costs and ex- penses to that total, and charged the entire amount on ad- joining property as benefits, without regard to whether the improvement had conferred any benefits on the property charged or not. The measure of 'a lot-owner's liability was, therefore, not the benefit he had received, but his share of the loss some one else had suffered. The statute under con- sideration in that case fell, because the board of viewers, with its powers and functions, was indispensable to the sys- 12 178 VALIDITY OF STATUTES. tem provided by it, and the provisions relating to the board were unconstitutional." In the opinion in Wyoming Street, Mr. Justice Williams said: "Some confusion seems to exist, however, in regard to the definition of a general law, and a theory has been advanced in several recent cases, and has been contended for by the ap- pellee in this case that the division of the cities of the State into classes by the Act of 1874, which was recognized as a nec- essary classification in Wheeler v. Philadelphia, Jj Pa. St. 338, required us to hold any law to be general which em- braces all the cities of a given class, without regard to the subject to which it relates. This theory overlooks the ob- jects and purposes of classification, which are very clearly set forth in the first section of the Act which divides the cities of the State into three classes. These are, to make provision for the municipal needs of cities which differ greatly in popula- tion. Differences in population make it necessary to pro- vide different machinery for 19, 26, 42 Allegheny v. Moorehead, 80 Pa. St. 118. 15 Am. Banking & Trust Co.'s Pet., 37 W. N. C. 297. 52 Ancona v. Becker, 3 D. R. 86. 248, 272 Arrott Street, 18 W. N. C. 121. 3 2 Attorney-General v. Rice, 64 Mich. 385 9 Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 256. 33. 65. 99. Baker v. McKee, Baldwin v. Philadelphia, Banger's Appeal, Barrett's Appeal, Barton v. Pittsburg, Bear v. Eshleman, Bearce v. Fairview, Beaumont v. Wilkes-Barre, Beaver County Indexes, Beckert v. Allegheny, Bell v. Allegheny County, Bell's Gap R. R. v. Penna., Bennett v. Hunt, Bennett v. Maloney, Berghaus v. Harrisburg, 19 101, 103, 105, 129, 137, 145, 147, 194,214,216, 223, 225, 228, 229, 258 6 P. D. R. 599. 33, 261 99 Pa. St. 164. 62, 108 109 Pa. St. 79. 139 116 Pa. St. 486. 61,64 4 Brewster, 373. 5, 38 14 Lane. L. R. 273. 236 9 C. C. R. 342. 247, 265, 27 W. N. C. 211. 282,283 142 Pa. St. 198. 115 Affg. s. c, 6 Kulp, 163. 6 C. C. R. 525. 247 85 Pa. St. 191. 14, 19, 26, 46 149 Pa. St. 381. 231, 235 30 W. N. C. 193. 134 U. S. 232. 124, 125 148 Pa. St. 257. 26, 27, 115, 256, 257, 273, 274 4 Kulp, 537. 21, 84 122 Pa. St. 289. 33, 147 289 290 TABLE OF CASES. Berks v. Lebanon County R. R., Best v. Baumgardner, Betz v. Philadelphia, Bidwell v. Pittsburg, Bing v. Weber, Bingaman v. Pittsburg, Bitting v. Commonwealth, Bittinger's Estate, Blight's Estate, Blood v. Mercelliott, Boston Bridge Co.'s Case, Bowen v. Tioga County, Bradley v. Pittsburg, Brown v. Commissioners, Bruce v. Pittsburg, Bryn Mawr College v. Anderson, Burdick v. Burdick, Butler v. Toledo, Cahill's Petition, Cain v. Goda, Campbell v. Commonwealth, Carey's Petition, Carbondale Twp's Appeal, Carbondale, etc., Turnpike, Carother's Appeal, Cassel's Appeal, Chalfant v. Edwards, Cheltenham Township Road, 5 C. C. R. 467. 278 122 Pa. St. 17. 234 4 C. C. R. 481. 215, 216, 21 W. N. C. 155. 256, 265 85 Pa. St. 491. IS 81 111. 290. 10 147 Pa. St. 353. 230 20 W. N. C. 178. 271, 273 129 Pa. St. 338. 5i 19 C. C. R. 426. 271 6 P. D. R. 459. 53 Pa. St. 391. 10, 19, 32, 36,37 13 C. C. R. 190. 278 6 C. C. R. 613. 245 130 Pa. St. 475. 37 21 Pa. St. 42. 232 166 Pa. St. 152. 37, 188, 234, 236 10 C. C. R. 442. 248. 2J2 2 P. D. R. 622. 66 5 Ohio, 225. 226 no Pa. St. 167. 115 84 Ind. 209. 224 96 Pa. St. 344. 217, 220 43 L- I- 384 246 18 Phila. 668. 5 C. C. R. 339. 255 22 W. N. C. 105. 2 n 4 Lane. L. R. 361. 17 W. N. C. 310. 118 Pa. St. 468. 19. 20 8 Lane. L. R. 260. 26 173 Pa. St. 246. 33. 209. 43 P. L. J. 121. 233. 236, 251., 43 P- L.J- 237. 258. 26l,285, 286, 287 140 Pa. St. 136. "5 7 Montg. Co. 42. TABLE OF CASES. 29I PAGE Chester City v. Black, 132 Pa. St. 568. 225, 227, 229 Chester County Court House, 7 C. C. R. 212. 248 Church Street, 54 Pa. St. 353. 19, 32, 36, 45 City Sewage Co. v. Davis, 8 Phila. 625. 37, 45 Clark v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. St. 129. 217, 219 Clearfield Co. v. Cam. Poor Dist., 135 Pa. St. 86. 32 Cleveland, etc., Railroad Co. v. Erie, 27 Pa. St. 380. 279 Cochran v. Library Co., 25 Leg. Int. 20. 7 Cochran v. McKelvey, 25 P. L. J. 120 33 Cole v. Economy Township, 3 D. R. 699. 247, 264, 283 Collector's Bond, 4 Lane. 166. 115 Columbia So. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470. 124 Colvin v. Beaver, 94 Pa. St. 388. 259 Commonwealth v. Anderson, 178 Pa. St. 171. 129, 132, 245. 271 < Commonwealth v. Bender, 7 C. C. R. 620. 48 8 W. N. C. 73. Commonwealth v. Bitting, 2 C. C. R. 298. 274 Commonwealth v. Carey, 2 C. C. R. 293. 245, 246 Commonwealth v. Clark, 3 Super. Ct. 141. 39,104 Commonwealth v. Clovis, 1 W. N. C. 185. 33 9 Phila. 561. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 9 C. C. R. 90. 272 Commonwealth v. Commissioners, 7 C. C. R. 173. 2,"], 115, 275 133 Pa. St. 180. Commonwealth v. Comrey, 149 Pa. St. 216. 156 Commonwealth v. Curry, 18 C. C. R. 513. 16, 18 P. D. R. 143. 4 Super Ct. 356. Commonwealth v. Deibert, 2 P D. R. 53. 37, 46 12 C. C. R. 504. 2 P. D. R. 446. Commonwealth v. Del. Div. C. Co., 123 Pa. St. 594. 129, 136, 137 Commonwealth v. Denworth, 145 Pa. St. 172. 160, 165 Commonwealth v. Depuy, 148 Pa. St. 201. 37 Commonwealth v. Dickinson, 9 Phila. 561. 33 1 W. N. C. 185. 30 Leg. Int. 53. 292 TABLE OF CASES. PAGE Commonwealth v. Dillon, 17 C. C. R. 227. 21 Commonwealth v. Doll, 6 C. C. R. 49. 37 Commonwealth v. Dolphin, 2 C. P. Rep. 85. 51 Commonwealth v. Evans, 6 Kulp, 145. 67, 68 Commonwealth v. Edgerton C. Co., 164 Pa. St. 284. 37, 46 Affg. 14 C. C. R. 449. Commonwealth v. Farley, 6 C. C. R. 433. 22, 53, 245, 46 L. I. 108. 265 Commonwealth v. Flicker, 17 C. C. R. 671. 63 8 Kulp, 225. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 18 Phila. 513. 37 Commonwealth v. Franz, 135 Pa. St. 389. 40 Commonwealth v. Frutchey, 1 P. D. R. 153. 115 11 C. C. R. 112. Commonwealth v. Geesey, 1 Super. Ct. 502. 27 Commonwealth v. Gregg, 161 Pa. St. 582. 56 Commonwealth v. Green, 58 Pa. St. 226. 5, 13, 15, 19, 7 Kulp, 151. 36, 272 s. c, s Del. 342. Commonwealth v. Grier, 179 Pa. St. 640. 236 Commonwealth v. Grier, 9 C. C. R. 444. 28 Commonwealth v. Grier, 152 Pa. St. 176. 236 Commonwealth v. Haag, 6 C. C. R. 118. 115 Commonwealth v. Halstead, 1 C. C. R. 335. 66, 165, 271 Commonwealth v. Halstead, s. c, 2 C. P. Rep. 247. 271 Commonwealth v. Halstead, 18 W. N. C. 385. 271 Commonwealth v. Handley, 106 Pa. St. 245. 115 Commonwealth v. Harding, 87 Pa. St. 351. 150 Commonwealth v. Hartman, 6 P. D. R. 136. 16, 18 Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 17 C. C. R. 91. 23 5 P. D. R. 148. Commonwealth v. Havens, 6 C. C. R. 545. 19 Commonwealth v. Henderson, 172 Pa. St. 1^. 39 37 W. X. C. 344- 43 P- L. J. 207. Commonwealth v. Hough, 1 D. R. 51. 245, 254 Commonwealth v. Hufnal, 4 Super, Ct. 301. 18 Commonwealth v. Isenberg, 4 V D. R. 579. 281 4 P. D. R. 51. TABLE OF CASES. 293 PAGE Commonwealth v. Jones, 4 Super. Ct. 362. 134, 28 1 Commonwealth v. Kelly, 5 Kulp, 533. 68 Commonwealth v. Key. Ben. Asso., 171 Pa. St. 465. 37 37 W. N. C. 173. Commonwealth v. Lack. Co. Comrs.,7 C. C. R. 173. 274 s. c, 133 Pa. St. 180. Commonwealth v. Lambrecht, Commonwealth v. Lehr, Commonwealth v. Lloyd, Commonwealth v. Lyter, Commonwealth v. Macferron, Commonwealth v. Marshall, Commonwealth v. Martin, Commonwealth v. Mercer, Commonwealth v. Moore, Commonwealth v. Moorehead, Commonwealth v. Morgan, Commonwealth v. Morningstar, Commonwealth v. Morrow, Commonwealth v. Muir, Commonwealth v. McCandless, Commonwealth v. McCandless, Commonwealth v. McCandless, Commonwealth v. Nihil, Commonwealth v. Patton, 3 C. C. R. 323. 255 s. c, 44 L. I. 196. 16 C. C. R. 53-2- 32 2 Super. Ct. 6. 7,2i Affd. 178 Pa. St. 308. 162 Pa. St • 50- 26 ; • 27, us. 34 W. N. < - 393- 251. 256, 257, 271 ,273 152 Pa. St. 244. 100, 148, 153, 156, 186, 188, 210, 232, 236, 251, 264, 269, 271 69 Pa. St. 328. 226. . 227 107 Pa. St. 185. 7. 14 9 C. C. R. 461. 4: [, 51: ■ 245 16 C. C. R, 481. 32 1 Lack. L. N. 267. 4 P. D. R. 649. 2 Super. Ct. 162. 7 C. C. R. 513- ; 7, 23 178 Pa. St . 198. 5i 144 Pa. St. 103. 37 40 P. L. J. 327- 67 1 Super. Ct. 578. 53 180 Pa. St. 47- 4 C. C. R. 119. 36, 50, ii5, 237 Affd. 21 W. N. C. : [62. 50, 237 ,245 10 Cent. R. 758 50, 237 4 P. D. R. ; i&2. 37 88 Pa. St. 258. 139. 141, 144, 147, 166, 167, 245. 249 294 TABLE OF CASES. PAGE Commonwealth v. Reeder, 171 Pa. St. 505. 276 Commonwealth v. Reichard, 8 C. C. R. 563. 260 s. c, 5 Kulp, 540. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 137 Pa. St. 389. 159,165, s. c, 27 W. N. C. 139. 209, 5 Kulp, 547. 216,251, 8 C. C. R. 568. 260 Commonwealth v. Rynkiewicz, 178 Pa. St. 213. 51 Commonwealth v. Samuels, 163 Pa. St. 282. n, 18, 26 14 C. C. R. 423. Commonwealth v. Scheckler, 1 C. C. R. 505. 274 Commonwealth v. Schneipp, 166 Pa. St. 401. 236 Commonwealth v. Sellers, 130 Pa. St. 32. 36, 115 Commonwealth v. Severn, 164 Pa. St. 462. 18, 26 15 C. C. R. 249. Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 178 Pa. St. 214. 51 Commonwealth v. Silverman, 138 Pa. St. 642. 20 Commonwealth v. Slifer, 53 Pa. St. 71. 6 Commonwealth v. Swab, 8 C. C. R. Hi. 115,274, 275 Commonwealth v. Swatara Twp., 1 Super. Ct. 502. 27,115, 271, 275 Commonwealth v. Swift, 17 C. C. R. 95. 38 Commonwealth v. Taylor, 159 Pa. St. 451. 14,46,50, 89 Commonwealth v. Toomey, 178 Pa. St. 215. 51 Commonwealth v. Van Loon, 4 Kulp, 338. 51 Commonwealth v. Weir, 18 C. C. R. 425. 37 Commonwealth v. Weir, 165 Pa. St. 284. 236 Commonwealth v. Wickert, 19 C. C. R. 251. 15, 18 s. c, 6 P. D. R. 136. Commonwealth v. Wilkes-Barre & Scranton Ry., 162 Pa. St. 614. 37 Commonwealth v. Williams, 178 Pa. St. 211. 51 Commonwealth v. Wyman, 137 Pa. St. 508. 32, T,y, 148, 151, 154, 156 Commonwealth v. Zacharias, 3 Super. Ct. 364. 122 181 Pa. St. 126. TABLE OF CASES. 295 Conyngham Twp. v. Luzerne Co., 17 C. C. R. 83. 5 P. D. R. 183. 249 Craig v. Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. St. 42. 46 Darby & Collingdale, 19 C. C. R. 315. 47 Davey v. Ruffell, 162 Pa. St. 443. 22,47 Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. St. 377. 101, 109, 141, 148, 247 , 249, 268 Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 236. 226 Del Busto's Estate, 23 W. N. Cm. 5i Devers v. York, 156 Pa. St. 359. 150 Pa. St. 208. 230 Dewalt v. Bartley, 146 Pa. St. 529. 276 Dewalt v. Commissioners, 1 P. D. R. 199. 276 Dewhurst v. Allegheny, 95 Pa. St. 437. 14, 15.73 Dibrell v. Morris' Heirs, S. C. Tenn.,15 S. W. Rep. 87. 125 Doberneck's License, 35 P. L. J. 476. 45 Leg. Int. 256. 5 C. C. R. 454- 2,7 Donley v. Pittsburg, 147 Pa. St. 348. 20, 226, 230 Donohugh v. Roberts, 11 W. N. C. 186. 72, 7 A Dorrance v. Dorranceton, 181 Pa. St. 164. 32 Dorsey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192. 5, 14. 15. l 7> 18, 19, 26,30, 32 Doud v. Insurance Co., 6 C. C. R. 329. 7--1 Dunn v. Mellon, 147 Pa. St. 11. 216, 223 Durkiu v. Kingston Coal Co., 171 Pa. St. 193. 134,281 Durr v. Commonwealth, 3 C. C. R. 525. 68, 237 East Grant Street, 121 Pa. St. 596. 63, 67, 84 Eby's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 311. 7.37 Engle v. Reichard, 4 C. C. R. 48. s. c, 4 Kulp, 361. 258 Erie City v. Reed, 113 Pa. St. 468. 226 Erie Co. v. Erie City Comrs., 113 Pa. St. 368. 22 Esling's Appeal, 89 Pa. St. 205. 19 Evan's Appeal, 152 Pa. St. 401. 47. 5o, 67 Evans v. Phillipi, 117 Pa. St. 226. 114, 115, 129, 256, 257 , 271, 272, 273. 274 Evans v. Willistown Twp., 168 Pa. St. 578. 14.37 296 TABLE OF CASES. Evans v. Witmer, Fisher v. Harrisburg, Foster v. Strayer, Fox's Appeal, Frampton's Estate, Fraser v. McConway, Frederick v. Penna. Canal Co. Frost v. Cherry, Fryer v. Metz, Gackenbach v. Lehigh County, Gardner v. Chester, Gardner v. Gibson, Gaston v. Graham, Gaston v. Meadville, Germania Ins. Co. v. Commonweall Gettysburg Battlefield Association, Gibbons v. Scranton Poor District, Giozza v. Tiernan, Grant Street, Gray v. Pittsburg, Greensburg v. Laird, Gregg Twp. v. Jamison, Grim v. School District, Grubb's Appeal, Guildin v. Schuylkill Co., Gulf, etc., Railway v. Ellis, Haines v. Pass. Ry. Co., Halderman's Appeal, PAGE 2 C. C. R. 612. HS. 2 74, 4 Lane. L. R. 105 275 2 Gr. 291. 194 19 C. C. R. 417. 282 s. c, 13 Lane. L. R. 285. s. c, 6. P. D. R. 333- 112 Pa. St. 353. 138 18 C. C. R. 462. 18 6P.D. R. 555. 129 109 Pa. St. 50. 32 122 Pa. St. 417. 166, 171, Affg. 4 C. C. R. 579- 214.. 216, 245 12 Montg. 108. 18 166 Pa. St. 448. 27 2 D. R. 162. 265 21 W. N. C. 121. 84 18 C. C. R. 265. 33,215. 216, 261 5 P. D. R. 549. 33 11,85 Pa- St. 513. 135. 138 2 P. D. R. 649. 38 3 Lack. Jur. 241. 236 148 U. S. 657. 124 121 Pa. St. 596. 33, 63, 67, 84. 147 147 Pa. St. 354. 230 8 C. C. R. 608. 256 55 Pa. St. 468. 221 57 Pa. St. 433. 226 174 Pa. St. 187. 37 149 Pa. St. 210. 148, 156 Reversing s. c, 10 C. C. R. 601 • 165 U. S. 150. 122, 123 152 Pa. St. 153. 183, 188, 211, 251, 278 104 Pa. St. 251. *7 / TABLE OF CASES. 297 Hancock Street, Hand v. Fellows, Hannick's Bond, Hanover Borough's Appeal, Harris' Appeal, Harrisburg v. McCormick, Hatfield v. Commonwealth, Hawes Mfg. Co.'s Appeal, Hays v. Commonwealth, Hayes v. Missouri, Henrix's Account, Henry Street, Hepburn v. Curts, Hewitt's Appeal, Hippsly v. Tucke, Hoffa's Appeal, Hoffman v. Matthes, Hoopes v. Scranton, Hoover v. Penna. R. R. Co., Hortsman v. Kaufman, Howard's Appeal, Huidekoper v. City of Meadville, Hunter's Appeal, Hutchinson's Appeal, Indiana Co. v. Agricultural Society Irwin v. McCallin, Jenks v. Sheffield, Jermyn v. Scranton, Johnson v. Beacham, Kaufman v. Jacobs, Keim v. Devitt, Kelly v. City of Pittsburg, Kelly v. Mayberry, Kennedy v. Agricultural Ins. Co., Kenner v. Kelly, Kevserv. McKissan, PAGE 1 W. N. C. 112. 41 30 W. N. C. 72. 235 3 C. C. R. 254. 115,274, 275 150 Pa. St. 202. 236 160 Pa. St. 494. 27, 37, 162, 165, 186, 188, 211, 251, 256 129 Pa. St. 213. 195, 227 120 Pa. St. 395. 40 1 Monaghan, 353. 53 82 Pa. St. 518. 115 120 U. S. 68. 124 146 Pa. St. 285. 232 123 Pa. St. 346. 152, 165 7 W. 300. 224 88 Pa. St. 55. 226, 227 2 Lev. 184. 221 1 Super. Ct. 357. 46, 53, 281 3 Del. Co. 579. 223 1 Wilcox, 189. 165 156 Pa. St. 220. 281 97 Pa. St. 147. 45 162 Pa. St. 374. 234 83 Pa. St. 156. 226 18 W. N. C. 411. 138 4 Pennypacker, 84. 234 85 Pa, St. 357. 115 28 P. L. J. 322. 237 135 Pa. St. 400. 241,244, s. c, 26 W. N. C. 275. 245 3 Lack. L. N. 112. 202 2 C. C. R. 108. no 4 C. C. R. 462. 74 3 C. C. R. 250. 115.274 85 Pa. St. 170. 137, 226 154 Pa. St. 440. 37 165 Pa. St. 179. 129, 135 19 C. C. R. 348. 18 2 Rawle, 139. 220 TABLE OF CASES. 298 Kilgore v. Magee, Kimball v. Rosendale, King v. Lisle, King v. Philadelphia Co., King v. Williams, Kingsbury v. Ledyard, Kittanning Coal Co. v. Com., Kitty Roup's Case, Klingler v. Bickel, Klugh v. Harrisburg, Krause v. Penna. R. R. Co., Lacey's Estate, Lackawanna Twp., Lackawanna Co. v. Stevens, Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. Co.'s Appeal, Land v. Wack, Land Co. v. Weidner, Lansdale Borough, La Plume Bor. v. Gardner, PAGE 85 Pa. St. 401. 129, 194, 215,216 42 Wis. 407. 224 Andrews' Rep. 163. 221 154 Pa. St. 160. 218, 223 1 W. Bl. 93. 7 2 W. & S. 41. 221 79 Pa. St. 100. 129, 130, 137 81* Pa. St. 211. 129,130, 137, 138, 271 117 Pa. St. 326. 62, 107 108 122 Pa. St. 289. 33, 147 4 C. C. R. 60. 74 19 C. C. R. 431. 271 6 P. D. R. 499. 160 Pa. St. 494. 27, 37, 162, 165, 186, 188, 211, 251 105 Pa. St. 465. 236 1 C. C. R. 2,2~. 246 s. c, 16 P. L. J. 161. 5 P. D. R. 606. 18 169 Pa. St. 359. 116,283, 284 1 Montg. 192. 65, 66 148 Pa. St. 192. 26 Affg. 2 Lack. Jur. 28. Larrison v. Peoria, etc., R. R. Co., yj 111. 17. Lea v. Bumm, 3 W. N. C. 335. Lehigh Iron Co. v. Lower Macungie Township, 81 Pa. St. 482. Lehigh Valley Coal Co.'s Appeal, 164 Pa. St. 44. 10 15.36 in, 115 171.249. 257. 271 8 171 Lehigh Valley Coal Co.'s Case, 39 Leg. Int. 210. Lehigh Valley Coal Co.'s Petition, 14 C. C. R. 621. 3 P. D. R. 610. Leitzel v. Center Co., 14 Lane. L. R. 191. 236 TABLE OF CASES. 299 Linn v. Chambersburg Borough, Little Equinunk, etc., Turnpike Co. Loewi v. Haedich, Loftus v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, Loughlin's Appeal, Lucas v. Ruff, Luzerne Co. v. Glennon, Luzerne Co. v. Griffith, Luzerne Water Co. v. Toby Creek Water Co., Lyon v. State Line & Juniata R. R. Company, Magee v. Commonwealth, Malloy v. Reinard, Marchant v. Penna. R. R. Co., Mauch Chunk v. Betzler, Mauch Chunk v. McGee, Meadville v. Dickson, Melick v. Williamsport, Meredith v. Lebanon, Michener v. Philadelphia, Miller v. Cunningham, Mills v. Charleton, Millvale Borough, Millvale v. Evergreen Ry. Co., Mink v. Mink, Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Humes, Moers v. Reading, PAGE 160 Pa. St. 511. 211 2 C. C. R. 632. 27 8 W. N. C. 70. 45 133 Pa. St. 97. 63, 64, 67, s. c, 25 W. N. C. 459- ii7 Affg. 46 L. I. 46. 19 W. N. C. 517. 138 45 L. I. 454- 39 109 Pa. St. 564. 148, 156 1 Kulp, 297. 150, 156 148 Pa. St. 568. Affg. 6 Kulp, 237. 77 Pa. St. 429. 1 W. N. C. 225. 46 Pa. St. 358. 115 Pa. St. 25. 153 U. S. 380. 19 C. C. R. 27. s. c, 6 P D. R. 330. s. c, 10 York, 151. 81 Pa. St. 433. 33 Leg- Int. 272. 3 W. N. C. 33. 129 Pa. St. 1. 33, 216, 162 Pa. St. 408. 1 D. R. 220. 118 Pa. St. 535. 7 C. C. R. 500. 29 Wis. 400. 43 P L.J. 411. 26 P. L.J. 211. 131 Pa. St. 1. 16 C. C. R. 189. 115U. S. 512. 21 Pa. St. 188. 46 45 226 231 124 33 19.36 165,215, 226, 229 230 276 195 248, 272 226 251 18, 46 38 126 278 300 TABLE OF CASES. PAGE Monroe v. Luzerne Co., 103 Pa. St. 278. 148. I49> 156 Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. St. 125. ioi, 104, 105, 2,7 L. I. 94. 257, 270 Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. St. 322. 102,103, 1 C. C. R. 153. 105, 129, 133, 141, 148, 166,245,249 Mount Joy v. Lancaster Tpk., 13 Lane. L. R. 180 47 Reversed 182 Pa. St. 581. Myers v. Commonwealth, no Pa. St. 217. 36 McAskie's Appeal, 154 Pa. St. 24. ] 86, 188,251 McCall v. Coates, 23 Atl. Rep. 1 126. 235 McCarty v. Commonwealth, no Pa. St. 243. 129, 131, 136, 137, 141, : 48, 245, 249 McCleary v. Allegheny Co., 163 Pa. St. 578. 236 McCormick v. Fayette Co., 150 Pa. St. 190. 62, 108 McGee's Appeal, 114 Pa. St. 470. 15 McGunnegle v. Allegheny Co., 163 Pa. St. 589. 236 McKay v. Trainor, 152 Pa. St. 242. 188, 209, 210, 232, 236, 251,253, 264, 269 McKeesport v. Owens, 6 W. N. C. 492. 36,46 McKeever v. Victor Oil Company, 9 C. C. R. 284. 22,74 Nason v. Poor Directors, 126 Pa. St. 445. 18 s. c, 22 W. N. C. 60 Norristown v. Citizens' Pass. Ry. Company, 9 C. C. R. 102. 61, 108 Norristown v. Citizens' Pass. Ry. Company, 148 Pa. St. 87. 61, 108 Nutt's Avenue, 2 Chester Co. 49. 29,5" Oakley v. Oakley, I P. D. R. 781. II C. C. R. 572. 66 Otto Township Road, 2 Super. Ct. 20. 181 Pa. St. 390. 38 W. N. C. 328. 52 Oxford Borough Street, 2 D. R. 327. 26 Packer v. Railroad Company, 19 Pa. St. 211. 7i Pacific Exp. Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339. 124 TABLE OF CASES. 3OI Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 185. PAGE io,37 Payne v. School District, 168 Pa. St. 386. 27 Penna. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 3 C. C. R. 162. 246 Penna. R. R. v. Montgomery Co. Pass. R. R., 3 P. D. R. 58. 38 Penna. R. R. v. Riblet, 66 Pa. St. 164. 7,31.32 People v. Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 495. 226 People v. Collins, 7 Johns Rep. 554. 221 People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 197. 6r Pepper v. Philadelphia, 6 P. D. R. 317. 98 Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. St. 554. 6, 22, 50, 74, 156 Pa. St. 539. 147, 279, 284 , 286, 287 Perot's Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 335. 115 Philadelphia v. Donahew, 5 Leg. Gaz. 22. 29 1 Leg. Chron. 45. Phila. v. Haddington M. E. Ch., 115 Pa. St. 291. 172,187, 194,209,251,255,264, 268, 269 Philadelphia v. Kates, 150 Pa. St. 30. 196, 198, 251, 264, 269, 271 Philadelphia v. Pepper, 2 C. C. R. 287. 47, 255, 269 Philadelphia v. Pepper, 181 Pa. St. 566. 98 s. c, 6 P. D. R. 317. Phila. v. Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry. Co., 142 Pa. St. 484. 19, 20, 26, 6 C. C. R. 283. 46, 50 Philadelphia v. Spring Garden Co., 161 Pa. St. 522. 14,26,47,51 Phila. v. Westminster Cem. Co., 162 Pa. St. 105. 144, 147, 34 W. N. C. 17. 245,279 3D. R. 151. Philadelphia v. Wright, 100 Pa. St. 235. 115 Phila. v. Reading Coal Co.'s Pet., 164 Pa. St. 248. 171, 257,271 Phillip's Estate, 6 C. C. R. 499. 84 Phcenixville Road, 109 Pa. St. 44. 5, 11, 19,26, 30, 3 2 Pierce v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. St. 150. 115 Pierie v. Philadelphia, 139 Pa. St. 573. 2" 2.7 W. N. C. 285. Affg. 47 L. I. 154. 302 TABLE OF CASES. Pittsburg's Assessors, Pittsburg's Petition, Pittsburg v. Hughes, Poor Dist. v. Clearfield Co., Poor Dist. v. Luzerne Co., Portuondo's Estate, Portuondo's Estate, Potter's Field, Pottstown Borough, Pottstown Borough Ext., PAGE 7 Leg. Gaz. n; 7- 254, 266 138 Pa. St. 401. 7c ',74, 118, I5i> 156, 180, 188, 192, 209,215, 216, 251, 262, 264, 266, 268 13C.C.R.535. 2I5> 216,253 16 C. C. R. 554. 28 4 P. D. R. 584. 17 C. C. R. 83. 28 5 P. D. R. 183. 19 C. C. R. 419, 18, 271 6 P. D. R. 462. 271 8 York, 145. 147, 279 117 Pa. St. 538 . 43.46,65, 1 Montg. 161. 66; 256 Price v. Blair Co., Provident Asso. v. Flanagan, Purvis v. Ross, 1 Montg. 189. 4 Montg. 29. 256 Affg. s. c, 1 Montg. 189. 14 Lane. L. R. 134. 236 19 C. C. R. 529. 18 12 C. C. R. 193. 46,61,90 158 Pa. St. 20. 162 Pa. St. 56. 234 162 Pa. St. 55. 26, 236 Reversing 13 C. C. R. 602. 127 U. S. 205. 124 8 C. C. R. 101. 255,266 120 Pa. St. 198. 157, 165, 124 Pa. St. 32S. 194. 23 W. N. C. 332. 22T,. 5 Lane. L. R. 135. 229 128 Pa. St. 324. 129 Reversing 5 Kulp, 145. 1 Lane. J. 96. 74 152 Pa. St. 153. 183, 188, 211, 25I, 278 Reynolds Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 4 P. D. R. 573. 74 12 Lane. L. R. 383. 6 Del. Co. 255. Quinn's Appeal, Ouinn v. Cumberland Co., Railway Co. v. Mackey, Reading's Constables, Reading v. Savage, Reid v. Smoulter, Reeves v. Edsall, Reeves v. Phila. Trac. Co., TABLE OF CASES. 303 Riddle v. County of Bedford, Ridge Ave. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Phila., Ripple v. Commissioners, Rogers v. Glendower Iron Works, Rogers v. Mfg. Improvement Co., Roth v. Hobson, Royersford Street, Ruan Street, Rubright v. Pittsburg, Ruth's Appeal, Rutt v. Burkey, Rymer v. Luzerne Co., Safe Deposit Co. v. Fricke, Sanders v. Cambria County, Sanderson v. Commissioners, Satterlee v. Matthewson, Sayre Borough v. Phillips, Schall v. Xorristown, Schenley v. Commonwealth, Scowden's Appeal, Scranton School Dist.'s Appeal, Scranton v. Silkman, 7 S. & R. 386. 221 124 Pa. St. 219. 20, 26, 46, 50 23 W. N. C. 324. 1 P. D. R. 201. 276 142 Pa. St. 484. 17 W. N. C. 444. 47, 50, 89 109 Pa. St. 109. 20, 26 5 C. C. R. 17. 84 21 W. N. C. 64. 2 Montg. Co. 153. 28 132 Pa. St. 257. 170, 187, 24 W. N. C. 460. 188, 190, 25 W. N. C. 349. 191, 194.. 209, 21c 1, 214, 236, 25 1, 262, 264 147 Pa. St. 355. 230 8 Lane. L. R. 264. 26, 46, 50 1 Lack. L. R. 311. 10 W. N. C. 498. 14 Lane. L. R. 11. 18 142 Pa. St. 108. 129, 13?, 148, 156, 235 152 Pa. St. 231. 188, 197, 199, 201, 209, 210, 215, 216,236,251,254,264,269 16 C. C. R. 94. 4 P. D. R. 241. 1 C. C. R. 342. : 16 S. & R. 169. 148 Pa. St. 488. 3 Luz. L. R. y/. 48 7- 53, 66, 67 227 123 38 36 Pa. St. 29. 224, 226, 227 96 Pa. St. 422. 141, 146, 147. 166, 24.5, 249 113 Pa. St. 176. 103, 105, s. c, 1 Atl. 560. 156,157^ 159, 162, 165, 167,258,271 113 Pa. St. 191. 105, no, 117, 148, 199,245,246, 249,264, 270 304 TABLE OF CASES. PAGE Scranton v. Whyte, 148 Pa. St. 419. 177, 181, 188, 199, 201, 202, 209, 216, 251, 262, 264, 269, 271 Second Nat. Bank v. Caldwell, 39 Leg. Int. 414. 38, 63 13 Fed. Rep. 429. Seifried v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. St. 200. 231 Seitz v. Lafayette Traction Co., 5 C. C. R. 469. 278 Sener v. Ephrata, 176 Pa. St. 80. 47 Sewer Street, 8 C. C. R. 226. 115 Sewickley Bor. v. Sholes, 118 Pa. St. 165. 19,22,52 Sewickley Sch. Dist. v. Osborn Sch. District, 19 C. C. R. 257. 282 s. c, 6 P. D. R. 211. Shaaber v. Reading, 133 Pa. St. 643. 190, 194, 210 Sharett's Road, 8 Pa. St. 92. 193 Shoemaker v. Harrisburg, 122 Pa. St. 285. 33, 65, 147 4 C. C. R. 86. Shurley v. Railroad Co., 121 Pa. St. 511. 118 Simon's Case, 4 D. R. 189. 215,216 Sixteenth Street, 4 C. C. R. 124. 165 Smith v. Baker, 3 P. D. R. 626. 37 Smith v. Meadow Brook Brew. Co., 3 Lack. Jur. 154. 196, 203, 254 Smith v. Reading City Pass. Ry. Co., 156 Pa. St. 5. 25,27 Affg. 13 C. C. R. 49. 2 P. D. R. 490. Smyers v. Beam, 158 Pa. St. 57. 46,90 Snyder v. Mogart, 17 C. C. R. I. 18 South Bethlehem v. Hemingway, 16 C. C. R. 103. 28,51 Spring Street, 112 Pa. St. 258. 191,194 St. L. & San Fran. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1. 124 State Street, 2 Leg. Chron. 1. 21,29,42 State v. Loomis, 115 Missouri, 307. 124 State v. Newark, 34 N. J. L. 236. 226 State Line & Juniata R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 420. 12. 13, 19,4; 1 W. N. C. 225. Strange v. Dubuque, 62 Iowa, 303. 224 TABLE OF CASES. 305 Straub v. Pittsburg, Strine v. Foltz, Strohl v. Ephrata, Stuart's Appeal, Swaney v. Wash. Oil Co., Swatara School Dist.'s Appeal, Taggart v. Commonwealth, Taxpayer's Petition, Taylor v. Bowling, Telephone Co. v. Keesey, Titus v. Elyria Oil Co., Titusville Iron W. v. Key. Oil Co., Townsend v. Wilson, Union Pass. Ry. Co.'s Appeal, Van Loon v. Engle, Van Storch v. Scranton, Van Storch v. Scranton Sch. Dist, Vanzandt v. Waddell, Von Bonnhorst v. Allegheny Co., Walston v. Nevin, Washington Avenue, Washington Bor. v. McGeorge, Watkin v. West Phila. Ry. Co., Weinman v. Pass. Ry. Co., 118 Pa. St. 192. 100,118, 144. 173. i7S> 185- 187. PAGE 38 P. L. J. 89. 180, 188, Affd. 138 Pa. St. 356. 211, 244, 245, 255 113 Pa. St. 349. 264, 28l 1 C. C. R. 490. 13 Lane. L. R. 1. 40 163 Pa. St. 210. 61,68,89 7 C. C. R. 351. 22,74 1 Super. Ct. 502. 115. 271, 275 102 Pa. St. 354. 32-36 26 P. L. J. 146. 172 5 P. D. R. 605. 18 5 P. D. R. 366. 39 1 P. D. R. 204. 22,74 122 Pa. St. 627 • 39.61,72, 83, 84 7 C. C. R. 101. 248, 272 81* Pa. St. 91. 13, 18,47,51 4 Leg. Gaz. 381. 29 Leg. Int. 380. 9 Phila. 495. 171 Pa. St. 157. 188, 248, 251,261, 269, 271, 272 3 C. C. R. 567. 165 3 C. C. R. 571. 165 4 C. P. 99. 2 Yerger, 260. 125 163 Pa. St. 588. 236 128 U. S. 232. 124 69 Pa. St. 352. 138 146 Pa. St. 248. 15.37,74 152 Pa. St. 153. 188 n C. C. R. 648 183, 188, 1 D. R. 463. 211, 251, 278 209, 251, 278 20 306 TABLE OF CASES. Wetzel v. Goodyear, Wheeler v. Philadelphia, Wheeler v. Rice, Whitney v. Pittsburg, Williams v. People, Wilkes-Barre v. Myers, Wilson v. Downing, Wishart v. Leslie, Wissler v. Becker, Wolf v. Philadelphia, Wright v. Barber (S. C), Wynkoop v. Cooch, Wyoming Street, Pittsburg, Yeager v. Weaver, Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, York School Dist's Appeal, York Telephone Co. v. Keesey, Young v. Bradford County, 5 P. D. R. 605. 18 77 Pa. St. 338. 33, 98, 107, 129, 156, 170, 178, 194, 199, 249 83 Pa. St. 232. 36 147 Pa. St. 351. 230 24 N. Y. 405. 117 113 Pa. St. 395. 110,264 4 Super. Ct. 487. 39, 63 36 P L. J. 223. 68 2 C. C. R. 103. no 105 Pa. St. 25. 195 5 W. N. C. 444. 276 89 Pa. St. 450. 15 137 Pa. St. 494. 101, 177, s. c, 27 W. N. C. 136. 180, 184, 187, 194, 209, 215, 216, 251, 262, 264, 268 64 Pa. St. 425. 7, 36 118U. S. 356. 128 169 Pa. St. 70. 147, 279 9 York, 153. 39 s. c, 5 P. D. R. 366. 7 C. C. R. 428. 248 INDEX. PAGE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. see Res Inter Alios Principle. ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. see Original Acts and General Supplements and Amendments. see Original Acts and Specific Supplements and Amendments. see Curative Statutes. challenged pursuant to constitutional provisions herein treated and sustained or held invalid in whole or in part: — see Table of Acts with Citations. ACTS OF ASSEMBLY VOID IN PART. only that portion of Act fails which is not cov- ered by the title 15 general rule 214 manner in which questions arise 215 rule of essential parts 215 rule of single object 215 rule as to two or more objects 215 time and use 216 ADOPTION. see Germane. AFFAIRS. see Construction. ALIEN TAX LAW. invalid 129 AMBIGUITY. in title not permissible. 16 see Clearness of Title. 307 308 INDEX. PAGE AMENDMENTS. see Original Acts and General Supplements and Amendments. see Original Acts and Specific Supplements and Amendments. express amendments intended by Article III, Section 6 6l by addition must recite former statute 64 overlooking intervening amendments 84 ANNEXATION. see Res Inter Alios Principle. see Germane. see Boroughs. see Cities. see Municipal Affairs. ANTHRACITE COAL MINES, see Classification. see Labor, Trade, Mining, and Manufacturing. APPEALS. see Subject. see Germane. see Taxation. see Counties. APPROPRIATION BILL. constitutional provisions relating to I may incidentally create an office 53 ARBITRARY. see Classification. ARGUMENT. of provisions herein treated differs from that of general constitutional questions e INDEX. 309 PAGE ASSESSMENTS. see Subject. see Germane. see Curative Acts. see Taxation. ASSESSORS. see Judicial Matters. see Cities. AUDITORS. see Res Inter Alios Principle. BILL OF RIGHTS. see Classification. BITUMINOUS COAL MINES. see Labor, Trade, Mining, and Manufacturing. BOROUGHS. see Res Inter Alios Principle. see Germane. annexation of territory proper 256 regulation of collection of taxes in boroughs proper 256 authorizing improvements of streets in bor- oughs valid 256 authorizing assessment for benefits in such cases valid 256 BOROUGH LEGISLATION. not within provisions as to local and special legislation 107 these provisions apply only to the General As- sembly 107 BOROUGH ORDINANCES. whether within Article III, Section 6 61 BORROWING. see Germane. 310 INDEX. PAGE BRIDGES. see Germane. see Private Corporations. CASES WITHIN GENERAL LAW OR JUDICIAL JURISDICTION. exclusion of retroactive effect valid 283 cumulative remedy valid 284 CEMETERIES. cases as to 142, 279 see Classification. CENSUS. CITIES. only test of population 149 transition of cities from class to class 151-2-3-4-5 prescribing effect of scire facias in certain class of cities invalid 249 or for incorporation of street railways 249 or providing special judicial procedure for as- sessment of damages 248 or regulating school affairs 250 laying out of highways a municipal subject 250 and deciding when their opening shall take place 250 and institution of proceedings therefor 250 and grading, paving, sewering, and lighting 250 judicial proceedings not within the principle of classification 250 taxation a municipal power 250 provision for liens for assessment proper 250 unusual provisions of doubtful validity 25a validity of perpetual lien of taxes doubtful 250 regulation of street railway motive power proper 250 provision for annexation of territory proper 250 provision as to tax liens excepting certain classes of cities invalid 251 INDEX. 311 PAGE CITIES — Continued. provision that taxes shall be liens without re- gard to whether the true owner is named in- valid 251 provision that judicial sale of real estate shall vest title whether owner named or not in- valid 251-3-4 perpetual lien enforced on distribution 254 priority of lien enforced on distribution 254 regulation of milk traffic doubtful 254 requiring a certain court to appoint assessors invalid 254 regulation of plumbers valid 255 annexation of territory valid 255 election of constables in cities of certain classes valid 255 poor affairs in cities of certain classes valid 255 prescribing effect of judgment in city of cer- tain class invalid 255 see Res Inter Alios Principle. see Germane. see Transition. see Municipal Affairs. see Option. see Judicial Matters. see Liens. see Highways. see School Districts. see Private Corporations. see Taxation. CLASSIFICATION. the test of generality 98 necessary in some cases 106 c. g., cities 106 when not admissible no classification generally 121 principle of not capable of definition 121 312 INDEX. CLASSIFICATION— Continued. the test of special legislation 121 arbitrary 122 e. g., widows of druggists 122 e. g., railroad companies as to certain liabilities 123 equality before the law 123 equal protection of the laws 123 must be reasonable 124 must not be invidious 125 hostile 125 unusual 125 must have adequate basis 126 within the principle of Article I, Section 1, Bill of Rights 128 alien tax law, instance of improper classification 129 legislative power of classification not abridged by Constitution 129, 130 Constitution has made certain classes 129 recognizes power to classify 129 laws based on constitutional classification are general 129 power to classify not abridged 129, 130 e. g., cities 130 e. g., subjects of classification 130 instances of constitutional classification 131 legislature cannot modify 131 sub-classification of constitutional classes 132 classification of coal mines 134 of foreign insurance companies 135 proper classification a judicial question 135 grounds of classification 136 custom 136 nature 136 laws of trade 136 necessity • 136 presumption favors legislative classification 137 infringement of Constitution the test 137 the subject further illustrated 137 INDEX. 313 PAGE CLASSIFICATION— Continued. population the only basis as to cities or counties 139 classification of political sub-divisions must be complete 140 classification must not be false, pretended, evasive nor excessive 141 instance of false classification — courts 141 instance of evasive classification — courts 142 instance of pretended classification — cemeteries 142 instance of pretended classification with indi- vidualizing definition — cemeteries 143 instance of false classification — public buildings 144 instance of excessive classification — cities 144 distinction between general and particular clas- sification 145 three classes of cities final 146 multiplication of classes of cities leads to special legislation 146 classification must be operative from time to time so as to permit transition 147 instance of violation of this rule — counties 148 transition from class to class 148, 155 see Subject. see Germane. CLEARNESS OF TITLE. required. 11 what is clearness 16 not ambiguity 16 not uncertainty 17 nor words used in misleading sense 17 see Ambiguity. COAL MINES. see Classification. see Labor, Trade, Mining, and Manufacturing. CONSTABLES, see Cities. 3H INDEX. CONSTITUTION. does not abridge power of classification 129 save when it makes certain classes 129, 131 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. relating to titles of Acts of Assembly 1 relating to general appropriation bill I reforms intended by those herein treated 6 relating to enactments by reference 57 relating to local and special legislation 91 relating to local affairs of political divisions of the State 240 relating to highways 261 relating to judicial matters 263 relating to liens 267 relating to taxation 269 relating to elections 275 relating to private corporations 276 relating to cemeteries, etc. 279 relating to labor, trade, mining and manufac- turing 279 relating to special privileges and immunities 281 relating to partial repeal of general law 283 relating to cases within general law or judicial jurisdiction 283 relating to notice 284 summary of provisions not infringed 239 affirmative and negative 95 general and specific 96 provisions in the singular 97, 98 provisions for special legislation 97, 98 provisions operate prospectively III not retroactively III provisions classified 204 as relating directly to municipal affairs 204 as having no relation to municipal affairs 205 as relating to municipal affairs or not accord- ing to circumstances 206 INDEX. 315 PAGE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS— Continued. classified as relating to political, executive, or administrative matters 97 as relating to legislative matters 97 as relating to judicial matters 97 primary prohibitions of special legislation 121 these relate to things formerly permitted 121 secondary prohibitions of special legislation 121 they can only be applied cumulatively I2f because they depend on whether the rule of classification has been violated 121 CONSTRUCTION. of provisions relating to titles 12 legislative usage recognized 12 construction generally 13 quotation marks in title 13 of provisions as to local and special legislation 101 construction as remedial 101, 239 historical occasion of their adoption 101, 102 intent to substitute general for local and special legislation 102, 103 construction prevents indirect as well as direct violation 103 prevents incidental as well as direct violation 239 "affairs" construed broadly 103 construction generally 106 construction must be uniform no provisions construed as prospective in CONTROLLERS. see Res Inter Alios Principle. see Subject. see Germane. CORPORATIONS. see Res Inter Alios Principle. see Germane. see Private Corporations. see Cities. 316 INDEX. PAGE COUNTIES. county affairs 103-4-5 can only be classified by population 139 constitutional classification final for some pur- poses 131 law excluding certain counties invalid 148 transition of counties from class to class, 148, 149, 150, 151 option invalid 165 to 172 local provision for courts invalid 241 officers' salaries 241 authorizing appeals 241 regulating fences 241 taxing fees of officers valid 24I doubt as to whether poor districts are included within the provisions 241 police power 245 salaries 245 appeals 246 prisoners 246 indexes in courts 247 actions by veterans against counties, etc. 247 lien of taxes excepting certain classes of cities invalid 248 provision for county buildings excepting a county invalid 248 furnishing offices at county seat valid 248 relief of poor where not cared for at county expense invalid 249 see Res Inter Alios Principle. see Subject. see Germane. see Transition. see Option. see Judicial Matters. see Classification. COUNTY AUDITORS OR CONTROLLERS. title relating to jj INDEX. 317 PAGE COUNTY TREASURER. see Res Inter Alios Principle. COURTS. see Germane. see Classification. see Judicial Matters. CURATIVE STATUTES. legislature may ratify what it may authorize 223 legislature may not ratify what it could not authorize 224 may ratify assessments for local improvements 224 or paving 223 taxation 226 ordinances of de facto city 247 legalized de facto officers 229 relating to judicial sales 267 CUSTOM. see Classification. DEBT, INCREASE OF see Germane. see Questions of Repeal. DE FACTO. de facto officers 217, 220, 221, 229 de facto streets and highways 219 effect of regular proceedings under color of . statute 222 de facto city 223-227 borough becoming a city within invalid classi- fication act remains a city of the third class 223 DEPUTY CORONERS. see Res Inter Alios Principle. DIVISION. of county or township does not affect special law 236, 237 3i8 INDEX. mischief to be remedied, want of notice and PAGE ELECTIONS. contested elections 266 special election law prior to Constitution in ef- fect after its adoption 276 Baker Ballot Law valid 276 Superior Court Act valid 276 see Germane. EMINENT DOMAIN. general title to incorporate may probably carry power of 20 see Cities. see Municipal Affairs. see Judicial Matters. ENABLING AND DISABLING CLAUSE, see Germane. ENACTMENT AND REPEAL, see Two Subjects. ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE. constitutional provisions as to 57 express amendments the object of 61 61 surprise enactment must be self sustaining 61 whether borough ordinances are governed by the provision 61 provision is mandatory . 62 former statute need not be recited at length 62. 63 expository statute violates the provision 62. 82 amendments by addition must recite provision amended 64 independent enactments not within the provision 64 supplements not usually within the provision 65 supplements by way of extension are 66 implied repeals not within the provision 67 nor are express repeals by title 67 INDEX. 319 PAGE ENACTMENT BY REFERENCE— Continued. revival by repeals not within the provision 67 local act not revived 68 reference by way of illustration not within the provision 68 pre-existing system cannot be transferred to new officials 69, 73 provision for enforcement under pre-existing law may be sustained in a supplement 72 but not in an original enactment 74 legislative practice illustrated 74 enactments by amendment disregarding inter- vening legislation 84 provision not evaded by expository statute 83 extending a local statute enacted prior to 1874 which extended another act by title 89 difficulty in drafting bills illustrated 202 EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW. see Classification. EQUALITY. see Classification. ERROR IN RECITAL. of original acts 44, 46, 47 EVIDENCE. see Judicial Matters. EXCEPTION. of locality governed by special constitutional provision proper 109 special laws may be saved by ill, 114, 115 EXEMPTION. see Germane. see Provisos, Exceptions, and Amendments. EXPOSITORY STATUTE. violates Article III, Section 6 62, 83 320 INDEX. EXPRESS AMENDMENTS. are the object of Article III, Section 6 61 EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ULTERIUS. maxim applied to titles 13, 46 FEES. see Classification. « see Counties. FENCES. see Counties. see Option. FISH. not included in title specifying game 47 FOREIGN INSURANCE COMPANIES, see Classification. FORMER STATUTE. need not be recited in amendment 62, 63 unless amended by addition to a section 64 FREEHOLDS. see Res Inter Alios Principle. GAME. see Fish. GENERAL APPROPRIATION BILL. constitutional provisions relating to 1 may incidentally create an office 53 GENERAL LAW. defined and illustrated 99, 100, IOI see Classification. GENERALITY OF TITLE. act entitled to incorporate a company will not affect status of navigable stream 19 but may pass power of eminent domain 20 cannot relieve from liability to repair streets 20 nor reduce rate of taxation 20 INDEX. 32I GERMANE. what germane means 34 county seat and county boundary 34 assessments and streets 34 court and clerk and grand jury 34 persons and parties 34 sewers and drains and charges for use 34 public buildings and public square 34 borrowing money and constructing bridges 34 borough and town plans and surveys 34 city controller designated county officer in salary act 34 Brooks law 34 costs and taxes and water rents 34 city officers and change of class of cities 34 taxing dogs and declaring them property 35 release of husband's claim action by husband and wife 35 annexation and incorporation 35 elections of public officers and to increase debt 36 wholesalers and brewers and distillers ?>7 enabling act containing a disabling clause 37 summary convictions and penalties 38 street railways on rural roads 38 borough improvement and sewers and pavements 38 elective tax in general tax law 38 taxation and appropriation 38 fruits ct cetera may include trees 39 executions 39 adoption and collateral inheritance tax ex- emption 39 telegraph companies and telephone companies 39 what is germane in license laws 46 highways and drains 40 HIGHWAYS. are a municipal subject 261 except in relation to judicial procedure involved 262 21 3 22 INDEX PAGE HIGHWAYS— Continued. assessment for benefits a municipal power 262 liens valid 262 unusual provisions of doubtful validity 262 see Subject. see Germane. HUSBAND AND WIFE, see Germane. IDENTIFICATION. of original acts in supplements and amendments 44 IMPLIED REPEALS. not within Article III, Section 6 67 INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN TITLE AND ACT. not permissible 21 inconsistent proviso void 21 acknowledgments not regulated where title relates to records 21 title relating to leaseholds act to property upon them 22 lottery gifts does not cover gifts 22 protection of miners suggests safety not crim- inal liability 23 inconsistency in proviso 52, 54 INDEPENDENT ENACTMENTS. as affected by Article III, Section 6 64 referring to pre-existing law 68, 82, 202 INDEX. title is not an index to act 17, 19 INDEXES. see Counties. see Judicial Matters. JUDGMENTS. see Judicial Matters. INDEX. 323 PAGtt JUDICIAL MATTERS. authorizing appeals except in certain counties invalid 263 giving special remedies to certain officers invalid 263 enlarging civil jurisdiction of justices of the peace 263 excepting Philadelphia 263 giving special effect to scire facias in city invalid 263 providing special procedure in the exercise of the power of eminent domain invalid 263 perpetual lien of taxes in cities doubtful 264 prescribing effect of judicial sales in cities in- valid 264 providing special remedy and limitation in favor of veterans invalid 264 special rule of evidence in city of certain class invalid 265 special effect of judgment in city of certain class invalid . 265 special procedure invalid 265 provision for election of constables in bor- oughs and townships valid 265 in classes of cities valid 265 authorizing judicial appointment of assessors in city of certain class invalid 266 classification of election contests 266 special jurisdiction thereunder 266 prescribing effect of judicial sales 266 curative laws as to 267 JUDICIAL QUESTION. validity of classification a judicial question 136, 137 JUDICIAL SALES. see Judicial Matters. see Cities. see Municipal Affairs. 3 2 4 INDEX. LIENS. PAGE LABOR, TRADE, MINING, OR MANUFACTURING. prohibiting railway discrimination 279 regulation of anthracite mines valid 279 classification of anthracite mines valid 279 similar provisions as to bituminous mines valid 281 provision for lien in favor of employees in working timber and bark valid 281 semi-monthly pay law doubted 281 see Classification. LAWS OF TRADE. see Classification. LEASEHOLDS. see Res Inter Alios Principle. in title will not cover freehold 17 LEGISLATIVE PRACTICE. illustrating Article III, Section 6 74 see Construction. see Appropriation Bill. see Original Acts and General Supplements and Amendments. LICENSES. see Res Inter Alios Principle. see Germane. see Original Acts and General Supplements and Amendments. special effect of scire facias in cities invalid 172 municipal liens proper subject of city class legislation 181 tax lien whether owner named or not invalid 185 municipal liens are municipal subjects 195, 196 priority of 196 perpetuity of 196 indivestible 196 uniformity of regulation of 198, 199 INDEX. 325 PAGE LIENS— Continued. provision for mechanics' liens excluding certain counties invalid 268 provision for special effect of scire facias in cer- tain cities invalid 268, 269 liens for benefits in cities of certain class valid 268 unusual provisions as to doubtful 268 perpetuity lien of taxes in cities of certain class doubtful 268 lien without regard to whether owner named or not invalid 268 lien for all local taxes certain classes of cities excepted invalid 268 see Judicial Matters. . see Municipal Affairs. see Cities. LIVERY-STABLE KEEPERS, see Subject. LOCAL ACT. not revived by repeal of repealing act 68 extended by title prior to 1874 may be ex- tended by recital 89 see Local and Special Legislation. LOCAL LAW. defined and illustrated 99 definition of not changed by Constitution 129 see Local and Special Legislation. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION. the constitutional provision relating to 91 The Constitutional Provisions Generally 95 affirmative and negative 95 general and specific 96 uniformity of law 96 political, executive, or administrative matters 97 legislative matters 97 326 INDEX. PAGE LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued. judicial matters 97 provisions in the singular 97, 98 provisions for special legislation 97, 98 special law defined 98 local law defined 98 illustrations of definition special law 98 illustrations of definition local law 99 classification the test 98 general law governs a class 99 if limited to part it is special 99 if it embraces all it is general though not operative in the Commonwealth at large 100 distinction between a special and a general law relating to a class of cities 100 on a general subject a law is special if a single county be excluded 101 Construction of the Provisions as Remedial 101 the historical occasion of their adoption 101, 102 intent to eradicate local and special legislation and require general wherever practicable 102, 103 indirect as well as direct violation to be pre- vented 103 broad construction of word "affairs" 103 what are local affairs 103, 104, 105 taxation though an affair of sovereignty is also a local affair 105 construction of provisions — Mr. Buckalew's suggestion 106 classification absolutely necessary in some cases 106 municipal affairs, instances of 106 necessity for classification as to 106, 107 Limitations Govern only the General As- sembly 107 borough ordinance not a law within the pro- visions 107 municipal legislation must necessarily include particular local ordinances 108 INDEX. 327 PAGE LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued. but not in matters of taxation 108 Exception Pursuant to Constitution does not Render Law Special 109 exception of locality governed by another statute renders law special 109 construction must be uniform in like cases 1 10 classification not admissible when no taxation is a local affair no law governing locality local though benefits of it may be available to all inhabitants of the Commonwealth no Special Laws may be Saved by Exception iii in a general statute in Constitution as a rule prospective in effect III Constitution as a rule did not affect pre-exist- ing legislation 111 for example, special tax laws ill general statute may save special laws in for example, special tax laws 114 special liquor laws 114 special road laws 114 distinction between saving special laws and ex- cepting territory in which they are operative 1 15 act is general though not retroactive 116 Act General as to Persons Local as to Sub- ject-Matter 116 act general as to married women and special as to Philadelphia loans 116 act general as to parties entitled to act, but local as to territory invalid 117 General Law may Contain Special Provisions Necessary to Render It Effective 117 special provisions to make a general law opera- tive in a certain city of a class will not in- validiate law 117 Classification 121 general topic beyond scope of this work 121 328 INDEX. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued, principle of classification not capable of defini- tion 121 primary prohibitions of special legislation 12 1 these relate to things formerly permitted 121 secondary prohibitions of special legislation 121 they can only be applied cumulatively 121 because they depend on whether the rule of classification has been violated 121 arbitrary classification 122 "widows of druggists 122 railroad companies as to certain liabilities 123 equality before the law 123 equal protection of the laws 123 classification as affected by Federal Constitution 124 must be reasonable 124 cannot be invidious 125 hostile 125 unusual 125 must have adequate basis 126 governed by principle of declaration of inde- pendence as to equality 128 by Article I, Section 1, Bill of Rights 128 alien tax law an instance of improper classifi- cation 129 Power to Classify not Abridged by Constitu- tion 129 Constitution has made certain classes 129 recognizes power to classify 129 laws based on constitutional classification not local or special 129 definition of local or special laws not changed by Constitution 129 power to classify not abridged 130 for example, cities 130 for example, subjects of taxation 130 instances of constitutional classification 131 legislature cannot modify 131 INDEX. 329 LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued. sub-classification of constitutional class 132 132 134 distinction between local and general statute as to class of officers classification of coal mines police power as affected by prohibitions of local and special legislation 134,245 foreign insurance companies a class 135 Proper Classification a Judicial Question 135 grounds of classification 136 custom 136 nature 136 laws of trade 136 necessity 136 presumption probably favors legislative classi- fication 137 infringement of Constitution the test 137 the subject further illustrated 137 Population the only Basis of City or County Classification 139 Classification of Political Sub-Divisions Must be Complete 140 Classification Must Not be False, Pretended, Evasive nor Excessive 141 instance of false classification — courts 141 instance of evasive classification — courts 142 instance of pretended classification — cemeteries 142 instance of pretended classification with indi- vidualizing definition — cemeteries 143 instance of false classification — public buildings 144 instance of excessive classification — cities 144 distinction between general and particular clas- sification 145 three classes of cities final 146 more than three unnecessary 146 multiplication of classes leads to special legis- lation 146 330 INDEX. LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued. Classification Must be Operative from Time to Time so as to Permit Transition 147 instance of violation — counties 148 Transition 148 Luzerne Co. subject to Act of 1876 148 fee system restored on division of county 148 census the test of population 149 salary system restored in Luzerne county in 1890 150 Schuylkill became subject to in 1890 150 special statutory provisions for transition 151 transition of city 15 1 ef5fect of 151 works only necessary changes to adjust to class 151 office and officers remain as before save as ef- fected by new provisions 152 general laws relating to the class prevail over special formerly applicable 153 for example, general system of taxation super- sedes former special system 155 Option Under Classification Acts 156 not at first regarded as admissible 156 special option for a class invalid 157 general option for a class valid 157 provided the purpose is to substitute a general for special systems 157 option tending to uniformity valid 158 partial option invalid 159 option tending to diversity invalid 159 option must include whole system, not part 160 option for special classes invalid 160 working of valid option law illustrated 162 for purposes of classification all cities not be- longing to the first or second class belong to the third 163 for purposes of municipal government only those belonging to the third class which are governed by the general system 163 INDEX. 331 PAGE LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued, class legislation not operative in non-accepting cities 163 Option as Related to Local and Special Leg- islation 165 local option invalid 165 because it produces, or may produce, local re- sults 166 for example, option in relation to fences 166 the test is possible results 167 local option invalid as an evasion of the Con- stitution 168 such option distinguished from choice of methods applicable to all of a class 168 for example, in the maintenance of roads 168 summary of conclusions as to option 170 constitutional provisions as to option 171 option as to support of poor invalid 172 Legislation for Cities by Classes Must be Confined to Municipal Matters Proper 172 prescribing effect of scire facias in cities invalid 172 incorporating street railways in given classes of cities invalid 173 general rights of persons and property must be secured by general laws 173 class legislation for cities must be confined to municipal purposes 173 incorporation and government of street rail- ways is not such a purpose 174 regulating exercise of power of eminent do- main is not 174 judicial procedure as to such exercise is not 174 instances of proper and improper legislation 175 procedure in the exercise of the power of emi- nent domain in street laws invalid 177 distinction between municipal and non-muni- cipal purposes again pointed out 178 test is the effect of the law 179 332 INDEX. PAGE LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued, it must be confined to municipal powers or duties or municipal officers or duties 179 caring for the poor of the city a municipal function 180 rules as to exercise of power of eminent domain reaffirmed 180 municipal liens proper subject 181 municipal taxation proper subject 181 assessments for benefits proper i8r unusual provisions as to foregoing questionable 182 street railway motive-power proper subject 183 regulation of distinguished from incorporation statutes 184 provision for lien whether entered against owner or not invalid 185 provision that judicial sale shall vest title invalid 185 municipal taxation for municipal purposes 186 properly a subject of class legislation for cities 186 so is annexation of territory 186 confusion of classification in relation to taxes invalid 187 Ruan street, argument of 188 dissents in 188 Ruan street explained 190 Ruan street summary of act in question 191 constitutional classification remarks of Sla- gle, J. 192 municipal highways as municipal subjects 193 how they differ from country highways 193 uniform regulation of right of eminent domain 194 sewers as municipal subjects 194 municipal liens as municipal subjects 195 distinction between assessments for benefits and damages for taking or injuring of prop- erty 195 assessments depend on taxing power 195 taking and injuring on right of eminent domain 19S index. 333 PAGE LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued. municipal tax liens 196 priority of 196 perpetuity of 196 undivestible tax liens 196 uniformity of regulation among different classes of cities 198, 199 how far class legislation may regulate enforce- ment of city taxes 201 municipal liens and taxation as related to en- actment by reference 202 difficulties in drafting bills illustrated 202 unity of subject of volume pointed out 202 What are Municipal Matters Proper, and What are Not 203 clauses of Article III relating to cities 203 how construed 203 tests of validity of class legislation for cities 204 classification of constitutional provisions 204 those relating directly to municipal affairs 204 those having no relation to municipal affairs 205 those relating to municipal affairs or not ac- cording to circumstances 206 provisions under first class 204 provisions under second class 205 provisions under third class 206 explanation of provisions under third class 206 explanation of provisions under second class 207 harmony of decided cases with the foregoing 209 summary of conclusions 211 what are municipal affairs generally 211 provisions of general borough law examined 212 municipal subjects as shown thereby 214 Acts of Assembly Void in Part 214 general rule 214 manner in which questions arise 215 rule of essential parts 215 rule of single object 215 334 INDEX. PAGE LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued. rule as to two or more objects 215 time and use 216 Validity of Things Executed Under Invalid Acts of Assembly 216 rule as to acts done under color of authority 217 rule as to officers dc facto 217 distinction between personal immunity and creation of rights under invalid laws 218 immunity of officer extends to person acting under his direction 218 rule as to dc facto streets and highways 219 de facto officers 220, 221 effect of regular proceedings under color of statute 222 de facto city 223 borough becoming a city within invalid clas- sification act remains a city of the third class 223 Curative Statutes 223 legislature may ratify what it may authorize 223 legislature may not ratify what it could not authorize 224 may ratify assessments for local improvements 224 or paving 225 taxation 226 ordinances of dc facto city 227 legalized dc facto officers 229 Questions of Repeal 230 class legislation unaffected by subsequent laws general in the broad sense 230 class legislation does not repeal pre-existing local legislation 231 class legislation governs when city enters a class 232 hence its prior local laws yield to class legis- lation 233 for example, on the subject of taxation 233 legislation enjoined by the Constitution tend- index. 335 PAGE LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued, ing to uniformity will frequently prevail over special laws 234-236 for example, regulation of increase of indebt- edness for municipalities 234 general legislation sometimes cumulative with class legislation 235 special law remains in effect notwithstanding division of territory 236, 237 Local Affairs of Political Sub-Divisions of the State 239 summary of provisions not infringed 239 the constitutional provisions construed as remedial 239 no distinction between direct and incidental in- fringements 239 provisions as to local affairs which have been construed 240 Counties 241 local provision for courts invalid 241 official salaries and fees 241 authorizing appeals 241 regulating fences 241 taxing fees of officers valid 241 doubt as to whether poor districts are included within the provisions 241 police power 245 salaries 245 appeals 246 prisoners 246 indexes in courts 247 actions by veterans against counties, etc. 247 lien of taxes excepting certain classes of cities invalid 248 provision for county buildings excepting a county invalid 248 furnishing offices at county seat valid 248 relief of poor where not cared for at county ex- pense invalid 249 336 INDEX. PAGE LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued. Cities 249 prescribing effect of scire facias in certain class of cities invalid 249 or for incorporation of street railways 249 or providing special judicial procedure for as- sessment of damages 248 or regulating school affairs 250 laying out of highways a municipal subject 250 and deciding when their opening shall take place 250 and institution of proceedings therefor 250 and grading, paving, sewering, and lighting 250 judicial proceedings not within the principle of classification 250 taxation a municipal power 250 provision for liens for assessment proper 250 unusual provisions of doubtful validity 250 validity of perpetual lien of taxes doubtful 250 regulation of street railway motive power proper 250 provision for annexation of territory proper 250 provision as to tax liens excepting certain classes of cities invalid 251 provision that taxes shall be liens without re- gard to whether the true owner is named invalid 251 provision that judicial sale of real estate shall vest title whether owner named or not in- valid 251,253,254 perpetual lien enforced on distribution 254 priority of lien enforced on distribution 254 regulation of milk traffic doubtful 254 requiring a certain court to appoint assessors invalid 254 regulation of plumbers valid 255 annexation of territory valid 255 election of constables in cities of certain classes valid 255 index. 337 PAGE LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued. poor affairs in cities of certain classes valid 255 prescribing effect of judgment in city of cer- tain class invalid 255 Boroughs 256 annexation of territory proper 256 regulation of collection of taxes in boroughs proper 256 authorizing improvements of streets in bor- oughs proper 256 authorizing assessment for benefits in such cases valid 256 Townships 257 act relating to a certain township invalid 257 regulating collection of taxes in boroughs and townships valid 257 enabling taxpayers to contract for making roads in townships valid 257 School Districts 257 regulation of school affairs in cities of certain class invalid 257, 258, 259, 260, 261 Highways 261 are a municipal subject 261 except in relation to judicial procedure involved 262 assessment for benefits a municipal power 262 liens valid 262 unusual provisions of doubtful validity 262 Judicial Matters 263 authorizing appeals except in certain counties invalid 263 giving special remedies to certain officers in- valid 263 enlarging civil jurisdiction of justices of the peace 263 excepting Philadelphia 263 giving special effect to scire facias in city in- valid 263 22 338 INDEX. PAGE LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued, providing special procedure in the exercise of the power of eminent domain invalid 263 perpetual lien of taxes in cities doubtful 264 prescribing effect of judicial sales in cities in- valid 264 providing special remedy and limitation in favor of veterans invalid 264 special rule of evidence in city of certain class invalid 265 special effect of judgment in city of certain class invalid 265 special procedure invalid 265 provision for election of constables in boroughs and townships valid 265 in classes of cities valid 265 authorizing judicial appointment of assessors in city of certain class invalid 266 classification of election contests 266 special jurisdiction thereunder 266 prescribing effect of judicial sales 267 curative laws as to 267 Liens 267 provisions for mechanics' liens excluding cer- tain counties invalid 268 provision for special effect of scire facias in cer- tain cities invalid 268, 269 liens for benefits in cities of certain class valid 268 unusual provisions as to doubtful 268 perpetual lien of taxes in cities of certain class doubtful 268 lien without regard to whether owner named or not invalid 268 lien for all local taxes, certain classes of cities excepted invalid 268 Taxation 269 requiring levy of tax for certain purpose in certain township invalid 269 INDEX. 339 LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued, authorizing appeals excepting certain counties invalid 270 regulation of collection of taxes in boroughs and townships valid 270 taxation for benefits in class of cities valid 270 perpetual lien in class of cities doubtful 270 municipal taxation a municipal subject 270 authorizing township taxpayers to maintain roads by contract in lieu of paying taxes valid 270 taxation of fees of officers in counties having less than 150,000 inhabitants valid 270 provision for lien of local taxes excepting cer- tain classes of cities invalid 270, 271 direct inheritance tax doubtful 276 classification of real estate valid 271 election of assessors in boroughs and town- ships valid 272 system for collection of taxes in boroughs and townships valid 273, 274, 275 Elections 275 special election law prior to Constitution in ef- fect after its adoption 276 Baker Ballot Law valid 276 Superior Court Act valid 276 Private Corporations 276 provision for incorporation of street railways in certain cities invalid 277, 278 regulation of motive power in cities of certain class valid 277 special classification of bridges valid 278 provisions of Article XVI, Section 10, Clause 2 278 Cemeteries, Etc. 279 cases as to 279 Labor, Trade, Mining, or Manufacturing 279 prohibiting railway discrimination 279 regulation of anthracite mines valid 279 34-0 INDEX. PAGE LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION— Continued. classification of anthracite mines valid 279 similar provisions as to bituminous mines valid 281 provision for lien in favor of employees in working timber and bark valid 281 semi-monthly pay law doubted 281 Special Privileges and Immunities 281 special rights of action in certain officers in- valid 281 special provisions as to actions for wages of manual labor doubtful 282 special provisions for action by veterans invalid 282 special school privileges to children of soldiers invalid 282 Partial Repeal of General Law 283 special provision as to statute of limitations invalid 283 Cases Within General Law of Judicial Juris- diction 283 exclusion of retroactive effect valid 283 cumulative remedy valid 284 Notice 284 presumption of notice 284 whether presumption may be rebutted 285, 286 LOG ROLLING. prevented 10 MANDATORY. provision as to titles of acts is 5 provision of Article III, Section 6, is 61 MANUAL LABOR, see Subject. see Special Privileges and Immunities. MILK. see Cities. INDEX. 341 PAGE MINERS. see Subject. MINES. see Classification. MISCHIEF. intended to be remedied by Article III, Section 6 61 by provision as to titles 10 by provisions as to local and special legisla- tion 101, 102, 103 MOTOR POWER COMPANIES. see Res Inter Alios Principle. MULTIPLICITY. see Two Subjects. MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS. prescribing effect of scire facias in cities invalid 17a incorporating street railways in given classes of cities invalid 173 general rights of persons and property must be secured by general laws 173 class legislation for cities must be confined to municipal purposes 173 incorporation and government of street rail- ways is not such a purpose 174 regulating exercise of power of eminent do- main is not 174 judicial procedure as to such exercise is not 174 instances of proper and improper legislation 175 procedure in the exercise of the power of emi- nent domain in street laws invalid 177 distinction between municipal and non-muni- cipal purposes again pointed out 178 test is the effect of the law 179 it must be confined to municipal powers or duties or municipal officers or duties 179 342 INDEX. MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS— Continued. caring for the poor of the city a municipal function 180 rule as to exercise of power of eminent domain reaffirmed 180 municipal liens proper subject 181 municipal taxation proper subject 181 assessment for benefits proper 181 unusual provisions as to foregoing questionable 18a street railway motive power proper subject 183 regulation of distinguished from incorporation statutes 184 provision for lien whether entered against owner' or not invalid 185 provision that judicial sale shall vest title in- valid 185 municipal taxation for municipal purposes 186 properly a subject of class legislation for cities 186 so is annexation of territory 186 confusion of classification in relation to taxes invalid 187 Ruan street argument of 188 dissents in 188 Ruan street explained 190 Ruan street summary of act in question 191 constitutional classification remarks of Sla- gle, J. 192 municipal highways as municipal subjects 193 how they differ from country highways 193 uniform regulation of right of eminent domain 194 sewers as municipal subjects 194 municipal liens as municipal subjects 195 distinction between assessments for benefits and damages for taking or injuring of property 19S assessments depend on taxing power 195 taking and injuring on right of eminent do- main 195 index. 343 PAGE MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS— Continued. municipal tax liens 196 priority of 196 perpetuity of 196 undivestible tax liens 196 uniformity of regulation among different classes of cities 198, 199 how far class regulation may regulate enforce- ment of city taxes 201 municipal liens and taxation as related to en- actment by reference 202 difficulties in drafting bills illustrated 202 unity of subject of volume pointed out 202 What are Municipal Matters Proper and What are Not 203 clause of Article III relating to cities 203 how construed 203 tests of validity of class legislation for cities 204 classification of constitutional provisions 204 those relating directly to municipal affairs 204 those having no relation to municipal affairs 205 those relating to municipal affairs or not, ac- cording to circumstances 206 provisions under first class 204 provisions under second class 205 provisions under third class 206 explanation of provisions under third class 206 explanation of provisions under second class 207 harmony of decided cases with the foregoing 209 summary of conclusions 211 what are municipal affairs generally 211 provisions of general borough law examined 212 municipal subjects as shown thereby 214 MUNICIPAL ASSESSMENTS. see Municipal Affairs. see Judicial Matters. see Cities. 344 INDEX. PAGE MUNICIPAL LEGISLATION. not within provisions as to local and special legislation 107 these provisions apply only to General Assembly 107 MUNICIPAL LIENS. see Municipal Affairs. see Taxation. see Cities. see Judicial Matters. NATURE. see Classification. NAVIGABLE STREAM. not affected by a title which merely names an improvement company 19 NECESSITY. see Classification. NOTICE. title must give fair notice 18 presumption of notice of special bill 284 whether presumption may be rebutted 285, 286 object of provision as to enactments b)' refer- ence 61 OMNIBUS LEGISLATION. prevented by provision as to titles II OPTION. not at first regarded as admissible under classi- fication acts 156 special option for a class invalid 157 general option for a class valid 157 provided the purpose is to substitute a general for special systems 157 option tending to uniformity valid 158 partial option invalid I5g option tending to diversity invalid 159 index. 345 PAGE OPTION— Continued. option must include whole system not part 160 option for special classes invalid 160 working of valid option law illustrated 162 for purposes of classification all cities not be- longing to the first or second class belong to the third 163, for purposes of municipal government only those belonging to the third class which are governed by the general system 163 class legislation not operative in non-accepting cities 163 option as related to local and special legislation 165 local option invalid 165 because it produces, or may produce, local re- sults 166 for example, option in relation to fences 166 the test is possible results 167 local option invalid as an evasion of the Con- stitution 168 such option distinguished from choice of methods applicable to all of a class 168 for example, in the maintenance of roads 168 summary of conclusions as to option 170 constitutional provisions as to option 171 option as to support of poor invalid 172 ORIGINAL ACTS AND GENERAL SUPPLE- MENTS AND AMENDMENTS. identification of original sufficient 43, 44, 45. general supplement may include what original title might have included 42, 43, 44 apparently erroneous recital not fatal 43 when title of supplement insufficient 43, 46 when sufficient 43, 47 general amendment sufficient 44 generality in license law 46 error in recital 47 346 INDEX. PAGE ORIGINAL ACTS AND SPECIFIC AMENDMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTS. maxim e.rpressio iinius applies 47 fish and game 47 destructive animals specified and not specified 48 PARTIAL REPEAL OF GENERAL LAW. special provisions as to statute of limitations in- valid 283 PENALTIES. see Germane. PERPETUAL LIENS, see Liens. PERSONS. general as to persons local as to subject-matter valid 116 invalid 117 PERSONS AND PARTIES, see Germane. PLUMBERS. see Cities. POLICE POWER. whether affected by provisions as to local and special legislation 134, 245 POOR. see Res Inter Alios Principle. see Cities. see Municipal Affairs. see Counties. POPULATION. the only basis of city or county classification 139 census the only test of 140 index. 347 PRE-EXISTING SYSTEM. not transferred by reference 69, 73, 84 difficulties in drafting bills illustrated 202 PRESUMPTION. favors legislative classification 137 PRIORITY OF LIENS, see Liens. PRISONERS. see Counties. PRIVATE CORPORATIONS. provision for incorporation of street railways in certain cities invalid 277, 278 regulation of motive power in cities of certain class valid 277 special classification of bridges valid 278 provision of Article XVI, Section 10, Clause 2 278 PROCEDURE. see Judicial Matters. PROTHONOTARIES' CLERKS. may be provided for in general appropriation bill 53 PROVISO. inconsistent with title void 21, 52, 53 limiting territorial scope of act 22 PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS, AND AMENDMENTS. inconsistent proviso void 21, 52, 53 amendment by proviso 5 2 exception need not be specified in title 53 exemption need not be specified in title 53 PROVISION FOR ENFORCEMENT. may be extended by reference in a supplement 72 not in original enactment 74 348 INDEX. PAGE PUBLIC BUILDINGS, see Germane. see Classification. see Municipal Affairs. see Cities. PUBLIC SQUARE, see Germane. QUESTIONS OF REPEAL. class legislation unaffected by subsequent laws general in the broad sense 230 class legislation does not repeal pre-existing local legislation 231 class legislation governs when city enters a class 232 hence its prior local laws yield to class legis- lation 233 for example, on the subject of taxation 233 legislation enjoined by the Constitution tend- ing to uniformity will frequently prevail over special laws 234, 236 for example, regulation of increase of indebt- edness of municipalities 234 general legislation sometimes cumulative with class legislation 235 special law remains in effect notwithstanding division of territory 236, 237 see Repeal. QUOTATION MARKS. error in title will be corrected by construction 13 RAILWAY. used in title meaning of 17 REASONABLE INQUIRY. sufficient if title suggests 19 RECORDS. see Res Inter Altos Principle. index. 349 REFERENCE. by way of illustration not within Article III, Section 6 68 REPEAL. by implication not within Article III, Section 6 67 by title not within Article III, Section 6 67 whether repeal must be specified in title 46 see Repeal and Re-Enactment. see Two Subjects. see Questions of Repeal. see Revival by Repeal. REPEAL AND RE-ENACTMENT. when repeal need not be specified in title 48, 51 when repeal must be specified 48, 49, 50, 51 re-enactment not noticing intervening repeal 49 RES INTER ALIOS PRINCIPLE. as related to titles of acts 23 leasehold expressed cannot affect freehold 23 one city and county expressed cannot affect another 23 city expressed townships cannot be affected 23 borough expressed county cannot be affected 23, 24 incorporation expressed navigable stream can- not be affected 24 county lines expressed borough and township not affected 24 county controllers expressed county auditors not affected 24 perfecting records expressed county not chargeable with expense 24 borough expressed road district not affected 24 motor power companies expressed doubt as to leasing passenger railways 25 cities expressed annexation covered 25 taxes in boroughs and townships expressed county taxes covered 25 35° INDEX. RES INTER ALIOS PRINCIPLE— Continued. boroughs and townships expressed county not affected 27 deputy coroners expressed county not charge- able with salaries 27 regulation of licenses expressed treasurer's fee not taken away 27 regulation of the poor expressed county not chargeable 28 city expressed county not chargeable with bridge 28 a township being specified another township not affected 29 borough being specified county not chargeable 29 RETROACTIVE. act is general though not retroactive 116 see Construction. REVIVAL BY REPEAL not within Article III, Section 6 67 local act not revived by repeal of repealing act 68 ROAD DISTRICTS. see Res Inter Alios Principle. SALARIES. see Classification. see Counties. see Transition. SALE. title specifying may cover gift 20 SCHOOL DISTRICTS. regulation of school affairs in cities of certain class invalid 257, 258, 259, 260, 261 SCIRE FACIAS. see Municipal Affairs. see Judicial Matters. see Liens. INDEX. 351 PAGE SELF-SUSTAINING. enactments must be 61 SEWERS AND DRAINS, see Germane. see Municipal Affairs. SPECIAL LAW. defined and illustrated 98 definition of not changed by Constitution 129 SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES. special rights of action in certain officers in- valid 281 special provisions as to actions for wages of manual labor doubtful 282 special provisions for action by veterans invalid 282 special school privileges to children of soldiers invalid 282 see Judicial Matters. SPECIAL PROVISIONS. necessary to render general law effective proper 117 STREET PASSENGER RAILWAY COMPANIES, see Res Inter Alios Principle. see Germane. see Cities. see Private Corporations. STREETS. see Subject. see Germane. see Cities. see Highways. see Municipal Affairs. SUBJECT. unity of II, 29, 30 county and county seat 29 streets and assessments 30 352 INDEX. SUBJECT— Continued. details of subject 30 corollary of subject 30 cognate matters 3° change of classification and result as to officers 31 of title and object of act 31 what included with regulation of highways, etc. 31 protection of livery stable-keepers 32 protection of miners 23 divers classes of cities 32 cities and school districts 33 divers streets (special act) 33 appeals wages of manual labor 33 see Two Subjects. see Appropriation Bill. SUMMARY CONVICTIONS, see Germane. SUPPLEMENTS. not usualty within Article III, Section 6 65 by way of extension are 66 may adopt remedies by reference 72 see Original Acts and General Supplements see Original Acts and Specific Supplements TAXATION. provisions relating to 91, 269 though an affair of sovereignty is also a local affair 105, no general statute may save special tax laws 114 alien tax law invalid 129 classification of subjects of taxation 129, 130, 137 municipal taxation proper subject for muni- cipal class legislation 181,. 186, 250, 270 and so of assessments for benefits 181 confusion of local classification invalid 187 assessments depend on taxing power 195 curative statutes valid 226 index. 353 rAGE TAXATION— Continued. prior local tax laws yield to general where a city enters a class 232, 233 taxation of official fees, counties under 150,000 241 provision for collection of taxes in boroughs proper 256, 270 and so in townships 257, 270 act requiring levy of tax for certain purpose in certain township invalid 269 authorizing appeals except in certain counties invalid 270 taxation for benefits in class of cities invalid 270 municipal taxation a municipal subject 270 taxation fees of officers counties less than 1 50,000 270 direct inheritance tax of doubtful validity 276 classification of real estate for taxation valid 271 election of assessors in boroughs and town- ships valid 272 system of collection of taxes in boroughs and townships valid 273, 274, 275 see Liens. see Cities. see Municipal Affairs. see Classification. TAXES. see Res Inter Alios Principle. see Germane. TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. constitutional provisions relating to 1 the constitutional provisions are mandatory 5 title is part of the act 6 was not so formerly 6 roll is conclusive evidence of title 7 effect of legislative marks on 7 must title accompany bill through the legis- lature? 8, 9, 10 23 354 INDEX. PAGE TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY— Continued. Purpose of Provision as to Title io log rolling prevented io omnibus legislation prevented 1 1 Clearness of Title Required ii title not aided by inference of knowledge of matters dehors the language used 12 must be self-sufficient 14 Measures Scope of Act 14 Construction of Provisions Relating to Titles 12 legislative usage recognized 12 construction generally 13 quotation marks in title 13 maxim ut res magis valeat applies 13 maxim expressio unius applies 13, 46 only that portion of act fails which is not cov- ered by the title 1 5 title is not an index 17, 19 must give fair notice 18 must reasonably lead to inquiry 19 must be sufficiently specific 19 must not be so general as to mislead 19 general title to incorporate may probably carry power of eminent domain 20 may not affect status of navigable stream 19 general title cannot relieve from liability to re- pair streets 20 nor reduce rate of taxation 20 sale may include gift 20 Inconsistency Between Title and Act 21 not permissible 21 inconsistent proviso void 21 acknowledgments not covered where title re- lates to records 21 title relating to leaseholds act to property upon them 22 lottery gifts does not govern gifts 22 index. 355 PAGE TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY— Continued. protection of miners suggest safety not crim- inal liability 23 inconsistency in proviso 52, 54 Res Inter Alios Principle as Relating to Titles 23 leasehold expressed cannot affect freehold 23 one city and county expressed cannot affect another 23 city expressed townships cannot be affected 23 borough expressed county cannot be affected 23, 24 incorporation expressed navigable stream can- not be affected 24 county lines expressed borough and township not affected 24 county controllers expressed county auditors not affected 24 perfecting records expressed county not chargeable with expense 24 borough expressed road district not affected 24 motor power companies expressed doubt as to leasing passenger railways 25 cities expressed annexation covered 25 taxes in boroughs and townships expressed county taxes covered 25 boroughs and townships expressed county not affected 27 deputy coroners expressed county not charge- able with salaries 27 regulation of licenses expressed treasurer's fee not taken away 2"] city expressed county not chargeable with bridge 28 a township being specified another township not affected 29 borough being specified county not chargeable 29 Unity of Subject • 1 1, 29, 30 county and county seat 29 356 INDEX. PAGE TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY— Continued. streets and assessments 30 Details of Subject 30 corollary of subject 30 cognate matters 30 change of classification and result as to officers 31 of title and object of act 31 what included with regulation of highways, etc. 31 protection of livery stable-keepers 32 protection of miners 23 divers classes of cities 32 cities and school districts 33 divers streets (special act) 33 Provisions of Act Must be Germane to the Subject as Expressed in the Title 34 what germane means 34 county seat and county boundary 34 assessments and streets 34 court clerk and grand jury 34 persons and parties 34 sewers and drains and charges for use 34 public buildings and public square 34 borrowing money and constructing bridges 34 borough and town plans and surveys 34 city controller designed county officer in salary act 34 Brooks law 34 costs and taxes and water rents 34 city officers and change of class 34 taxing dogs and declaring them property 35 release of husband's claim action by husband and wife 35 annexation and incorporation 35 elections of public officers and to increase debt 36 wholesalers and brewers and distillers 37 enabling act containing a disabling clause 37 summary convictions and penalties 38 street railways on rural roads 38 index. 357 PAGE TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY— Continued. borough improvement and sewers and pave- ments 38 elective tax in general tax law 38 taxation and appropriation 38 fruits et cetera may include trees 39 executions 39 adoption and collateral inheritance tax exemp- tion 39 Two Subjects 40 prohibiting licenses and including legalized liquor selling 40 enactment and repeal 40 highways and novel mode of assessment 41 multiplicity 40, 41 general appropriation bill may incidentally create an office 53 Original Acts and General Supplements and Amendments 42 identification of original sufficient 42, 43, 44 general supplement may include what original title might have included 42, 43, 44 apparently erroneous recital not fatal 43 when general title and supplement insufficient 43, 46 when sufficient 43, 47 general amendment sufficient 44 generality in license law 46 error in recital 47 Original Acts and Specific Supplements and Amendments 47 maxim expressio unius applies 47 fish and game 47 destructive animals specified and not specified 48 Repeal and Re-Enactment 48 when repeal need not be specified in title 48, 51 when repeal must be specified 48, 49, 50, 51 re-enactment not noticing intervening repeal 49 Provisos, Exceptions, and Exemptions 52 358 INDEX. PAGE TITLES OF ACTS OF ASSEMBLY— Continued. inconsistent proviso void 5 2 > 53 amendment by proviso 5 2 exception need not be specified in title 53 exemption need not be specified in title 53 Appropriation Bills 53 general may incidentally create an office 53 TOWNSHIPS. act relating to a certain township invalid 257 regulating collection of taxes in boroughs and townships valid 257 enabling taxpayers to contract for making roads in townships valid 257 see Res Inter Alios Principle. TRANSITION. Luzerne Co. subject to Act of 1876 148 fee system restored on division of county 148 census the test of population 149 salary system restored in Luzerne County in 1890 150 Schuylkill became subject to in 1890 150 special statutory provisions for transition 151 transition of city 151 effect of 151 works only necessary change to adjust to class 151 office and officers remain as before, save as affected by new provisions 152 general laws relating to the class prevail over special formerly applicable 153 for example, general system of taxation super- sedes former special system 155 see Classification. TWO SUBJECTS. prohibiting licenses and including legalized liquor selling 40 enactment and repeal 40 index. 359 PAGE TWO SUBJECTS— Continued. highways and novel mode of assessment 41 multiplicity 40, 41 general appropriation bill may incidentally create an office 53 UNITY OF SUBJECT. what is 11 see Subject. UT RES AIAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT. maxim applies to titles 12 VALIDITY OF THINGS EXECUTED UNDER IN- VALID ACTS OF ASSEMBLY. rule as to acts done under color of authority 217 rule as to officers dc facto 217 distinction between personal immunity and creation of rights under invalid laws 218 immunity of officer extends to person acting under his direction 218 rule as to dc facto streets and highways 219 VETERANS. see Counties. see Judicial Matters. see Partial Repeal of General Law. VOID IN PART. only that portion of act fails which is not cov- ered by the title 1 5 see Acts of Assembly Void in Part. WAGES. of manual labor see Subject. see Special Privileges and Immunities.