A'l'lfy'. Wm % ¥ sa> ■fa W ••III fflttttt §MMJ ®&U^t0tt & mtt u 1903 Cornell University Library VA40 .P13 1876 Naval powers and their polic olin 3 1924 030 753 531 Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030753531 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY; TABULAR STATEMENTS OF BRITISH AND FOREIGN IRONCLAD NAVIES: GIVING DIMENSIONS, ARMOUR, DETAILS OF ARMAMENT, ENGINES, SPEED, AND OTHER PARTICULARS. JOHN C. PAGET. Reprinted, with Additions, from the St. James's Magazine. LONDON : LONGMANS AND CO., PATEENOSTEE EOW. PORTSMOUTH : GRIFFIN AND CO. 1876. Hazell, Watson, & Viney, Printers, London and Aylesbury. DEDICATED FEEDEEICK BYNG MONTBESOE. INTRODUCTION. |HE object of the following pages is to convey, in language as little technical as possible, information upon a some- what technical subject, in which every Englishman is interested. My only excuse for submitting them to the public is that the detailed information contained in them is not to be found in any other book. I would not for a moment compare this volume with the many elaborate works on naval sub- jects with which -our own literature and that of other countries, of France in particular, abounds. But these works treat rather of naval architecture as an art, than of the actual and relative power of fleets. Anybody in the least acquainted with these subjects must be aware of the utterly misleading impression con- veyed by the usual description of a fleet as consisting of a certain number of vessels, of a total of so many thousand tons, and one, two, or three hundred guns, as the case may be. "What guns? " is the first question that any- VI INTEODUCTION. body would ask who really desired to know the strength of the fleet in question; "armour- " piercing guns or not ? rifled guns or smooth- " bores? 7-pounders or 700-pounders ? " It is to supply details such as these that the latter part of this work, commencing with the chapter en- titled " Our Ironclads," to which I desire chiefly to direct the attention of the reader, has been written ; and I am not without hopes that the tabular form in which the information is con- veyed will render this work one of reference to public and professional men. For the description of the guns in use in foreign navies, I am indebted to Colonel Owen's great work on modern artillery. I wish also to express the obligation I am under to the Institution of Naval Architects, and to the publications of the Eoyal School of Naval Architecture. To Mr. A. Sedgwick Woolley, of the former society, and to Mr. Or. C. Mackrow, the inventor of the " fixed turret " system for iron- clad ships, my thanks are particularly due for much useful information freely and courteously afforded me from time to time. I have also to thank the Editor and staff of the Navy for many interesting details which have appeared in their columns on professional subjects ; Mr. Thomas Brassey, M.P., for his pamphlets re- lating to unarmoured ships, coast defence, and Naval Artillery Volunteers ; Mr. J. J. Milbank, for important information in reference to the South American fleets ; my friend, Mr. S. E. Towshend Mayer, the Editor of the St. James's Magazine, in whose pages a portion of my work first appeared, for many valuable suggestions ; INTBODUCTION. vil and the Societe Nouvelle des Forges et Chantiers de la Mediterranee, for a detailed statement of the vessels built by them at Marseilles. In the days of "wooden walls," the relative strength of fleets was easily estimated. The only vessel which could take part in a general engagement was a two or a three-decker; hence named a line-of-battle ship. The state which could send twenty of these vessels to sea was stronger than the state which could send fifteen, and the state which possessed fifteen was stronger in its turn than one whose fleet only numbered ten. But the art of war on land was not more changed by the invention of gun- powder than naval battles have been by the inbroduction of armour, rifled guns, and the steam-ram. One powerful vessel, if possessed of sufficient speed, can destroy a squadron. The Inflexible, if she be only fast enough, will, with her twenty- four inches of armour and her 81-ton guns, be fully able to hold her own against the combined attack of a fleet. Engaging at a range at which her own armour will be invulnerable, her tremen- dous guns will pierce the armour of any conceiv- able opponent. The Inflexible, of course, is an exceptional ship ; but in all discussions upon modern naval warfare, the fact that ships must be estimated by their power alone, and no longer by their number, must be remembered. Steam and iron have for some years past been "levelling up " the maritime states to such an extent that it behoves us to look to our laurels. A great disaster at sea would not only put an Vlll INTBODUCTION. end once for all to any external influence on the part of England ; it would lead to the destruc- tion of our trade, and the probable loss of our independence. But without anticipating such a catas- trophe as this, we may well look upon the re- cent growth of foreign navies with disquietude. It seems to be marching side by side with a strong determination on the part of the great powers to obliterate all the old landmarks of Europe, to absorb all nationalities whose re- sources do not enable them to put a million of men into the field, and finally to obtain a sea- board and suitable harbours. But it is not the fact of steam and iron placing us so nearly on an equality with the powers against whom we have so often con- tended which is to be noticed so much as the creation of new ones. And the most remark- able fact in relation to these new powers is that we have ourselves created them. Moreover, as regards naval wars, we have, by the Declaration of Paris (especially by the first article), thrown away most of our maritime rights ; and unless we exercise the greatest vigi- lance, some Ministry, anxious not to offend against the cosmopolitan tendencies of the day, may throw away the remainder. I have said something, too, in reference to the personnel of the service and the training and education of officers. I trust, however, tbat my remarks on this subject may not be misunder- stood. The Navy is, and always must be, a scientific profession. But we must walk before we run, and there seems to be a disposition in INTBODUCTION. IX certain quarters to introduce a system of " cram- " ming" ; it is to this, but to this only, that I allude. Englishmen have so often in the past had reason to regret the confidence reposed in statesmen and officials who were supposed to have the security of the empire in their keep- ing; and the result of the system of popular indifference and official secrecy was so terrible in the last European struggle in which we took part, that it is the duty of the public to judge for themselves as much as possible in these matters. Although the press is generally able to educate the public on almost any subject, even on such technical matters as the construc- tion and maintenance of navies, the information afforded by newspapers is generally given by fits and starts, as the subjects arise. In the follow- ing pages I endeavour to place a few naval ques- tions (which I believe to be national questions) before the reader as clearly as I can ; and I be- lieve that the present is an opportune time to discuss them. As to the motives of the half- dozen people who hold Europe in their hands, we are entirely in the dark; and this alone should induce us to see that our powder is dry ; for whatever ideas they may hold, there is one at any rate which they do not — that, we mean, which was recently laid down by M. Emile de Laveleye — "that no State has any interest in " augmenting its territory, and that the smallest " countries are the happiest." The work of compiling tables of details in reference to our own and foreign fleets has been one of extreme difficulty, especially in regard to X INTBODUCTION. the latter ; this has caused considerable delay in the completion of the book. If, however, the information now for the first time presented to the public in a convenient tabular form should assist to create an accurate public opinion on naval subjects, I shall consider myself repaid. J. 0. P. CONTENTS CHAPTER I. KECENT GROWTH OF FOREIGN NAVIES. PAGE Fallacy of totals .......... 1 Claims of the Navy on public support . . .3 Great increase in offensive power of fleets ...... 4 Sebastopol Land defences generally not equal to fleets Recent growth of foreign navies and rise of new naval powers Brazil • • War between Brazil and Paraguay . New navies ... . . Russia ....... Inventive spirit at work at Russian Admiralty France ....... Turkey ..... Dismissal of English engineers . . ... Battle of Lissa an illustration of the growth of new naval powers Italy Austria .....•••• 9 10 11 12 13 13 13 Xll CONTENTS. PAGE Decisive use of the ram ......... 14 Spain ............ 15 Affair of Cartagena an instance of necessity of maintaining a large fleet in time of peace ......... 16 Superior armament of Venezia to any British ship at Cartagena . 17 Cuban question .......... 19 United States — reconstruction of fleet ...... 19 German fleet 20 CHAPTER II. NAVAL POLICY. Have we a reserve ? . .22 Best defensive is a rapid offensive ....... 23 Policy of naval powers ......... 23 Endeavour of the great military monarchies to possess seaboards . 23 Danger of war from large circulation of English newspapers abroad . 24 Greatest strength of England at sea her power to strike at enemies' commerce ........... 25 Declaration as to enemies' property in neutral vessels . . .26 Its effect on Russian commerce . ..... 27 The Declaration of Paris ......... 28 Mr. Brassey's pamphlet a sign of the times . . . . .29 Building of foreign ironclads in England ...... 30 This system must be stopped at once ....... 31 To have prohibited it at first would have been the most economical course ........... 31 Conferences ....... ... 32 Prevention better than cure ........ 32 A preponderating Navy necessary to England 33 Mr. Disraeli ........ . . 34 CONTENTS. Xlll CHAPTER III. STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE BRITISH NAVY.* PAGffl Eight hundred vessels on the Navy List — the majority useless for fighting purposes . . . . . . . . .35 How to arrive at our actual fighting strength 36 A serious question .......... 37 Nominal strength in ironclads is fifty-six ships, of which number thirty-eight are of very doubtful value . . . . .38 Rams . 38 Old ironclads 38 Old ironclads almost useless 39 Older ironclads in greater danger in action than unarmoured ships . 40 Smaller turret ships for coast .defence should be more numerous . 41 Defenceless condition of our great seaports ..... 41 Actual fighting strength of the ironclad Navy seventeen ships . . 41 Actual fighting ships .......... 42 Cruisers ............ 42 The Monarch 43 Why not protect vital parts of ship only ? . . . . . .43 Cruising ironclads of the first class ....... 44 Of the second class .......... 45 Insufficient ship-building ......... 45 Repairs 46 The present First Lord's efforts 46 Misapplication of surplus ......... 47 No reserve of ironclads ......... 47 * A complete account m detail of our own and foreign ironclad fleets is given in Chapter VII. (Our Ironclads) and the following chapters, accompanied by- Tables. XIV CONTENTS. PAGE Channel fleet ... 47 Mediterranean fleet . ...... 48 West Indies Bquadron . . • .48 South America . ....... 48 East Indies . . 48 China 48 Pacific 49 Small craft — speed and armament ....... 49 Great importance of heavily armed -mi-armoured ships . . .50 The 81-ton gun 50 Armour must be retained for bombardments . . . . .51 A great mistake .......... 51 Why should not Inconstant class carry heavier guns ? ... 52 More unarmoured vessels required ....... 53 Average speed of cruisers, and armament ..... 53 The influence every reader may exercise in bringing about a, better state of things .......... 55 CHAPTER IV. PERSONNEL OF THE BRITISH NAVY. Armament and disarmament ........ 56 Navy should be mainly a standing force ...... 57 Necessity of striking the first blow ....... 58 Plans 58 Royal Naval Reserve . . ...... 59 Manning reserve squadrons of unarmoured vessels in case of pro- longed maritime war ......... 60 Reserve men unfit in many cases for the Royal Navy . . .61 Mr. Stirling Lacon and Captain Wilson ...... 61 Crimps ............ 62 CONTENTS. XV Seamanship indispensable, but difficult to obtain . . . .62 Atrato ........ . . 63 Present system of manning the Navy . . 64 Loss of ten years' men ... . . . 64 Insufficient pay ........... 65 Ships undermanned 65 Economy on the Indian and Bast African station . . . .66 Nominal number of men ......... 66 Desertion ............ 67 Too large a proportion of a blue-jacket's length of service wasted in harbour duty, etc. ........ 68 Officers 69 Promotion and retirement ........ 69 Promotion must be by selection as well as seniority . . . .71 Mr. Ward Hunt's new scheme, August 1875 71 Seven captains to be promoted every year ..... 72 Fifteen commanders 72 Twenty to twenty-five lieutenants 73 Training of Naval Cadets 74 Chaucer's " Canterbury Tales " 75 Competitive examination for Naval Cadets wisely abolished . . 76 Mr. Lowe's fallacies ......... 77 Nelson's famous manoeuvre of "breaking the line" . . . .78 His foresight and care ......... 79 Floating fortresses .......... 79 Britcmma ............ 80 What the training of Naval Cadets should consist of ... 80 Naval College at Greenwich 81 Course of study there ......... 81 Should be modified, or longer time allowed . ... 82 Alternative scheme .......... 83 Small pay of officers of all ranks ....... 84 Midshipmen ........... 84 Sub-Lieutenants . . ....... 85 Lieutenants .... 86 Commanders 86 XVI CONTENTS. PAGE Captains ............ 87 Admirals ............ 87 All the prizes of the service abolished ...... 87 Half-pay ............ 88 Lieutenants' half -pay £73 per annum ...... 88 Alteration in value of money ........ 89 CHAPTER V. FINANCE. No fresh taxes needed 90 Natural growth of revenue ........ 90 Income Tax ........... 91 Unwise and needless remission of taxation . . . . .91 Administrative see-saw 1869-71 92 Surpluses squandered 93 Mistaken policy 94 CHAPTEE VI. NAVAL VOLUNTEERS AND COAST DEFENCE. Defenceless condition of our great seaports and shipping . . .95 Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers 96 Corps in London, Brighton, and East Coast ..... 97 The present corps only a nucleus 97 The fishing population should serve compulsorily . . . .98 Would popularise the Navy 98 Expense for coast defence necessary ....... 99 CONTENTS. XV11 CHAPTEE VII. OUR IRONCLADS. PAGE Arrangement in three classes : modern ironclads ; older ironclads ; cruisers ... 100 Unarmoured ships 101 Abandonment of broadside guns ... .... 101 Returns of speed over measured mile delusive . . . 101 Mode of classification explained ... . . 102 The Dreadnought, Devastation, and Thunderer . . . 102 Essential differences in design of the Dreadnought from the other two vessels .... .... 103 The Monarch . . . 104 Broadside principle ties the hands of naval architects . 104 The cruising ironclads 105 The Glatton, Hotspur, and Rwpert . .... 105 Twin-screws ... 106 Size of guns ... 107 Great speed necessitates great size .... . 107 Unarmoured cruisers 108 One of these vessels building . .... . 108 Thirty of them required to anticipate action of foreign powers . . 109 CHAPTER VIII. THE " INFLEXIBLE.' Reaction in opinion about armoured ships . As regards vertical armour the question is decided The moving, or "fish," torpedo .... The Oberon experiments with fixed torpedoes Probable difficulties in using Harvey torpedoes . Captain Noel's essay "With the moving torpedo in general use close action will be avoided . 117 Guns rather than rams will decide actions in this case . . 117 b 115 115 116 116 116 116 XY1U CONTENTS. PAGE The double wall of armour ■ 118 The four 81-ton guns 119 Power of the Inflexible to repulse a fleet 119 Bombardments 119 Experiments ; why have so few been made to ascertain effect of shot striking armour at an angle ? 119 Experiments in Germany with concentrated broadsides ; should be made in England . 120 Construction of this ship should be hastened . . . 120 CHAPTER IX. THE FRENCH NAVY. Unsatisfactory state of the French Navy Floating batteries . . . . War of 1870 Powerful ships being built The Friedland The JRedoutable ... .... The Richelieu . The TempUe and Tonnerre With immense natural resources of France, the state of depends only on the state of the finances Ironclad line-of-battle ships, Magenta and Solferino . The Invincible and Normandie The Oloire the earliest ironclad .... Division of fleet into four classes . Constructive mistake in French ironclad fleet, composed wood-built ships Even if armour be abandoned, wooden ships are useless Personnel of French Navy French naval expenditur i . . . the Navy mainly of 121 122 122 123 123 123 124 124 124 125 125 125 125 123 127 127 12r CONTENTS. xix CHAPTEE X. THE AUSTRIAN NAVY. PAGE Third place amongst modern navies belongs by right to Turkey . 132 Admiral Tegethoff 132 personnel of Austrian Navy 133 Austrian naval expenditure . . 133 CHAPTEE XI. THE TURKISH NAVY. Personnel of the Turkish Navy 135 Expenditure ... 135 Armament of Turkish ships 135 CHAPTEE XII. THE GERMAN NAVY. Political importance of the German fleet 1 38 German ships on broadside principle copied from Hercules and Sultan 138 Could not hold their own against firBt-class turret ships . . . 139 German Government mistaken in building these vessels . . . 139 German Navy estimates 140 Personnel 140 German ports 140 Powerful armament .... 140 Vessels building ... 141 XX CONTENTS. CHAPTER XIII. THE ITALIAN NAVY. PAGE Personnel of Italian Navy 143 Navy estimates 143 CHAPTER XIV. THE SPANISH NAVY. Personnel of Spanish Navy 145 Expenditure 145 The Nwmancia and Vittoria 145 The Tetucm, Arapiles, Sagunto, Za/ragosa, and Resolution . . . 146 CHAPTER XV. THE RUSSIAN NAVY. Russian naval expenditure 147 Personnel ..... . . 147 CHAPTER XVI. THE SCANDINAVIAN POWERS. Danish naval expenditure 150 Ironclads 150 Naval expenditure of Sweden and Norway 151 Turret ships of light draught 151 CONTENTS. xxi CHAPTER XVII. THE NAVY OF HOLLAND. PAGE Naval expenditure of Holland 152 CHAPTER XVIII. THE NAVY OF GREECE. The King Oeorge ....... . 154 CHAPTER XIX. BRAZIL. Personnel of Brazilian Navy 155 Small ironclads 155 CHAPTER XX. CHILI. Almirante Cochrane and Valparaiso 157 The Ghacabuco and General O'Higgins 157 Expenditure 157 CHAPTER XXI. PERU. Peruvian Navy — the Independencia, Atdhualpa, and Manco Capac . 158 XX11 CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXII. ARGENTINE CONFEDERATION. PAGE Argentine Confederation. — New gunboats armed with the 26-ton gun 159 Exemplify principle of a heavy armament in a small ship . . . 159 CHAPTER XXIII. NAVAL GUNS. A man-of-war is a floating gun-carriage 160 Muzzle-loading versus breech-loading . 160 Method of constructing Woolwich guns 160 Glatton experiment, with 25-ton gun against 14-inch plate at 200 yards 166 First shot 166 Second shot ; results 166 Third shot • . . .167 General summary of results 167 Probable results against 12-inch plates of the same ship . . . 167 Experiment with 35-ton gun against 18-inch plate .... 167 General rule to estimate penetrative power of Woolwich guns . . 168 Time required for manufacture 168 Cost 168 French guns ; cast iron, with steel rings 169 French 34^-ton gun 169 German steel guns 170 Russian steel guns 171 American cast iron smooth-bore guns 172 American rifled guns 172 CONTENTS. XX111 CHAPTEE XXIV. EEMARKS ON THE AMERICAN NAVY. PAGE Want of sea-going ironclads 173 Total number of ships . . 173 Defective system of armament . 174 And of armour . . . 174 Ships available for service . . ... . 174 Ships building ... . . . . 175 Real source of American power at sea .... 175 CHAPTER XXV. SUGGESTIONS. No vessel to be considered a line-of-battle ship without the 25-ton gun ... ... .... 176 Sea-going turret ships .... 177 Arbitrary distinction between armoured and unarmoured ships should disappear 177 Suggestions for protecting vessels of all descriptions when fighting bows-on ... 177 Vessels passing close to each other in action will probably have their broadsides pierced by majority of guns now in use . . . 178 Fighting power of small vessels too much overlooked .... 179 Small ironclads for distant stations . 179 Description of the Vasco da Gama 180 Could not the Warrior, Minotaur, and sister ships be converted into unarmoured cruisers 1 180 " Converted " ironclads should be used for experiments . . . 180 Increase of pay of men and officers ....... 181 Foreign navies better paid than our own . . ... 181 Training of officers ... . 182 TABLES. PAGE The British Navy— I. First class ironclads . 110-111 II. Second class ironclads . 112-113 III. Unarmoured cruisers . 114 The French Navy — First class (frigattes cuirassSet,) . . 129 ,, Second class (corvettes cuir assies) . 130 ,, Third class (garde-cotes cuirassSes) . 131 The Austrian Navy . . 134 The Turkish Navy . . 137 The German Navy . 142 The Italian Navy . 144 The Russian Navy . 148-149 The Navy of Holland . 153 The Navy of Greece . . 154 Rifled muzzle-loading guns in use in the British Navy . 164-165 French naval guns . 169 German naval guns . . 170 Russian naval guns . . 171 American guns . . 172 ADDENDA. THE TURKISH FLEET. (Supplementary Table.) Name of Ship. Assar Shefket ) Neghin Sliefket \ Idjlalieh Latif Gelil Hajiz Rahman Assar Tevfilt i a 4 o m •fa u a a o H 1 Guns. II s ° n a a ■s a w ft. ft. in. ft. ft. inches. (350 210 40 15 17 1583 4- 1 - 5 150-pds. 1300 219 41 15 174 1650 4 5 150-pds. 300 204 43 2 9 9 1751 4* 4 150-pds. 200 275 50 19 21 2143 ** 8 12-ton 750 The armament of several ships mentioned in the tables of British ironclads has lately been altered and improved. Thus the Minotaur and Agincourt each carry 17 12-ton guns, the Achilles 14 12-ton guns. The armament of the Pallas, Favorite, and Repulse is somewhat lighter than is given in the tables ; the first mentioned vessel having 4 and not 8 9-ton guns, the second being provided with 6^-ton and not 9-ton guns, and the third with 9-ton and • not 12-ton guns. The armament of the Hotspur should be 1 25-ton gun, and that of the Rupert 2 18-ton. With the exception of the Inconstant class (iron sheathed with wood),unarmoured ships are not described in detail in this work. NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. CHAPTER I. RECENT GROWTH OP FOREIGN NAVIES. HERE is nothing so fallacious as Fallacy of "facts, except figures," is a maxim the truth of which will be admitted by anybody who has ever, read a Ministerial statement or a Parliamentary debate. And of all figures, totals are the most misleading. Yet they exercise an extraordinary fascination over the minds of many people. To be told that the paper on which a daily journal is printed is a roll so many miles long ; that the speeches of a cer- tain statesman would, if spread out in a single column of print, reach to the top of the Monu- ment ; that there are more Eoman Catholics in London than in Rome ; and that six old people 1 . 2 NAVAL POWEES AND THEIB POLICY. have recently died whose united ages nearly reached five hundred, — are all statements the bearings of which, as the great Bunsby would say, lie in the application of them. A newspaper, when once the difficulty of printing from the " web " has been overcome, must necessarily ab- sorb an immense roll of paper ; no human being would tbink of cutting out the reports of Mr. Gladstone's speeches, and pasting them together in one interminable column; the Roman Catholics in London are not in the proportion of one to twenty Protestants ; and there is no such thing as collective age. Financial aggregates are equally misleading. That the amount of taxa- tion remitted in a certain year came to four millions sterling, sounds like a great relief to the taxpayer ; but if the only benefit he has derived from it is a halfpenny off every pound of sugar he consumes, the result is really too insig- nificant to be worth mention. So, too, when the bare unvarnished fact is stated that we are spending over seventy millions a year, it sounds like extravagance ; but if twenty-six millions are absorbed in the payment of interest on the National Debt, and three or four millions for cost of collection (which is a fair per centage when compared with the same item abroad), the figures, though large, cease to appear exces- EECENT GROWTH OF FOREIGN NAVIES. 3 .sive. And some of this expenditure — that of the Post Office — is actually reproductive ; the Government, in fact, making a handsome profit on their outlay. The cost of munitions of war seems to approach the fabulous when the value of one round fired from a Woolwich Infant is £16. But the fire of a single 35-ton gun is, roughly speaking, equal to the fire of the whole broadside of .a 74-gun ship. Military totals are old offenders. By including every Army Beserve man on his way to Australia, and every Pensioner just able to walk, the British army, with militia and voluh-. teers, shows a paper strength of over 400,000 men. But after putting the whole adminis- trative machinery of the War- Office to a severe strain, we can barely bring a force equal to two corps d'armee into the field within fifty miles of London. Unfortunately, as we shall proceed to show, grand totals quite as misleading have come to be the rule in regard to the Navy. To the Naval Service the people of England claims of are under that obligation which one man (if on public amongst individuals such a state of things were suppor ' possible) would owe to another who had four •times saved him from drowning, delivered him from the stake, preserved both his property and -reputation, and set up all his sons in business in 4 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. the Colonies. The defeat of the Armada, the . preservation of India at the Nile, the destruc- tion of the vast Northern Confederation against ns at Copenhagen, the maintenance of our very existence as a nation at Trafalgar, the command of the ocean in nearly every war for two centuries, the absolute command of it for the last fifty years, the preservation of a Colonial Empire washed by every sea, and the protection of a commerce increasing " beyond the dreams of " avarice," — these are the claims of the Navy upon the support and confidence of England. But it is with the present, not the past, that we must deal. Two facts — each of vital importance to us as a nation — are being brought home to us more and more clearly every day. The first is tbat the importance of a Navy to any country is now Great in- greater than it ever has been. The offensive crc&ss in offensive power of a fleet is immeasurably increased since fleets.™ the introduction of modern guns. "When the allied squadrons of England and Erance bom- sebasto barded Sebastopol, they can scarcely be said to have done more than scratch the forts, whilst ship after ship was set on fire. But those days are over. With ironclads steaming rapidly past, and delivering their tremendous blows in the shape of " concentrated broadsides," every gun pol. RECENT GROWTH OF FOREIGN NAVIES. O being fired at the same instant by the electric current, and six or eight gigantic shells bursting within a space of a few feet; with the ships themselves painted slate grey, and only present- ing their broadsides as targets to the enemy when they fired, and not necessarily even then ; with turret ships of possibly still better qualities for close fighting than these ; with such a power of offence and defence, and such rapidity of movement among the assailants, Sebastopol would probably have been in ruins, whilst the fleet itself might have come out of action minus only one or two ships. Nor does the fact that land defences have also been radically changed tell much against this theory. For ships are moving objects, whilst forts are stationary. Moreover, everyone knows that as a matter of fact land defences are not, in most parts of the Land de- f 6T1CGS world, equal to fleets. Our own new defences of generally Plymouth, Portsmouth, and the Thames -and- to fleets. Medway system, are very powerful, and Sir William Jervois well deserves his honours ; but what guns are they to carry ? We hear that 18- ton guns are -being mounted in most of them— , powerful weapons, no doubt, but against recently built ships almost useless; for the latter would carry guns of 35 tons as in the Devastation, of 38 tons as in the Thunderer, or, as in the In- 6 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIE POLICY. flexible now building at Portsmouth, actually of 81 tons. To those non-professional readers in whose minds a fort is suggestive of a massive structure, against which no ship has any chance of success, we recommend a visit to Shoebury- ness. There — a couple of hours' journey from London — they will see facsimiles of the most powerful forts absolutely pulverized by modern shells. Moreover, recent experiments seem to show that the power of torpedoes as a means of harbour defence has been exaggerated. Recent The second fact — unfortunately only too growth of foreign closely connected with the first — of grave na- D£LY1°S and rise of tional importance, is the rapid and gigantic powera! va growth of foreign navies. On this subject details are of so much value that it will be necessary to go into them at some length, though no better illustration of the great changes being effected around us could be found than the interest excited some time ago by the launch of the Independencia. That vessel, one of the most powerful men-of-war in the world, intended to be fully rigged as a sea-going ship, carrying 35- ton guns in her turrets, very heavily armoured, and possessing the great advantage of an outer skin of coppered wood (under water), which would enable her to keep the sea and move freely, whilst the iron bottoms of other iron- BECENT GROWTH OF FOBEIGN NAVIES. 7 clads were getting fouler every day, belongs to a power whose flag a few years since was never seen upon the water. The noticeable fact is this : whereas a short time ago, in the event of a disturbance in Brazilian waters, a gunboat or Brazil. a corvette would have been told off to watch British interests, in the present day it would be necessary to send a fleet ; that empire now possessing seventeen ironclads. Nor will it be safe to rely too exclusively on the proved capacity of our men and officers to carry us through any conflict. Nelson said no captain could be far wrong who laid his ship alongside the enemy, and the instructions sometimes were " not to fire until you see the white of the French- " man's eye." Once alongside, we could resort to boarding. But a weak vessel would now invite destruction by such an attempt. The ram, which is the modern equivalent for "cutlass and pike," would give the weaker assailant a chance of success if she could get near enough to use it. But if the enemy carry guns that will pierce her armour at a thousand yards, whilst her own shells are bursting in vain against the sides of her antagonist, the attempt to use the ram becomes desperate. Curiously enough, boarding has been attempted in quite recent times in Brazilian waters, and with a most unexpected 8 NAVAL P0WEES AND THEIB POLICY. War be- result. The war between Brazil and her allies tween Brazil and on the one hand, and Paraguay on the other, is Paraguay. a signal instance of the change that has taken place in naval warfare (corresponding exactly with a similar change on land) since the intro- duction of modern armaments. Weight of metal, length of range, and overwhelming numbers are now sufficient to crush courage and skill under ordinary circumstances. In that war the fine fighting qualities were with Paraguay, but numbers were with Brazil; and Paraguay was defeated accordingly. In one action a number of Paraguayans boarded a Brazilian monitor. The crew were " battened down " below ; the Paraguayans found nothing on deck but smooth surfaces of iron, and whilst they looked for their enemies they were shot down by the fire from other Brazilian ships. New Nor has Brazil the onlv South American navipfl ** navy. Peru and Chili both have their iron- clads. Even China and Japan have made a beginning. But the greatest changes have been effected in Europe. " Close with a Frenchman, but " fight at long-bowls with a Bussian or a Dutch- man," was Nelson's maxim. But what if the Erenchman has no intention of allowing you to close ? navies. EECENT GEOWTH OP FOBEIGN NAVIES. 9 • Let us turn to Bussia. In 1871 the clause of Russia, the Treaty of Paris neutralizing the Black Sea to the navies of the world was repealed, and a Black Sea fleet is now being re-established. The first important vessel completed — the Nov- inventive spirit at gorod — is about as singular a specimen of naval work at , Kussian architecture as it is possible to imagine, but her Admiral- construction shows an inventive spirit at the Bussian Admiralty. She is circular. Bussian naval officers are not, it is said, very enthu- siastic about her, but for coast defence she ought to be useful. Admiral Popoff's main idea in de- signing this ironclad tub appears to have been that« this shape will carry a greater thickness of armour with a comparatively small draught of water. She carries powerful guns, but is of. course slow, and would come to fearful grief if caught out beyond her depth by an opponent determined to use the ram. Another of Admiral Popoff's ships, not intended to hug the shore quite so closely, and greatly resembling our own Devastation, is the Peter the Great. Of course there are many considerations which tend to lessen the offensive power of Bussia at sea. An ally older than Prussia may almost be said to take away with one hand what he gives with the other. He even presumes on his friendship so far as to dictate, to a great extent, the nature of 10 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIE POLICY. the operations which Russia shall undertake. he bon General Janvier is the friend in question. Still, if Cronstadt is hermetically sealed m winter, Sebastopol (since the Conference of 1871) is not. But in considering the power of Eussia, or of any other state, it will not do merely to say that they have so many ships, and we so many more. It is against a combination of powers that we shall be called upon to contend, if at all ; and in that case an addition of two ships to a hostile confederation may make au important difference, even if we are only called upon to detach ships for blockading. France. " Our ancient enemy of France " possesses the enormous number of sixty-two ironclads. But no reliance is to be placed upon totals. Some of these vessels were launched in 1861, and only built to resist 68-pounders. The pur- chase of the Dunderberg (now called the Boch- ambeau) from the United States for ,£400,000 reflects no credit on the administration of the French Navy. The Taureau is an excellent steam ram, but carries an inferior armament. The position of France since the last war is so peculiar, and her interest in keeping on good terms with this country so evident, that it may seem unnecessary to point out possible differences between us. But we must not forget that in BECENT GBOWTH OP FOEEIGN NAVIES. 11 that great continent round which it has been said we are now putting a girdle, and where we shall continue to extend our influence by some such gradual process as that by which we have become the masters of India, French influence has of late been active, and anything but friendly. Neither in Egypt nor at Zanzibar are our inter- ests identical. But the real danger is lest in her desperate want of an ally France should turn to Russia ; in which case perhaps other than white squalls may be looked for in the Mediterranean. In a Mediterranean struggle, or in one further east, Turkey, as regards materiel at least, stands Turkey, high among maritime states. "At anchor in "idle state in sight of the Imperial palace" at Constantinople, there lies from one year's end to another one of the finest ironclad fleets in the world ; some twenty ships all told. Of these thirteen carry 12-ton guns amongst their arma- ment, and ten may be considered line-of-battle ships.* The two most powerful vessels are the * The continual and inevitable changes in shipbuilding of late years render any systematic classification of ships well-nigh impossible ; but there is one expression which should certainly be changed. A "line-of-battle ship " is a ship which can bear her part in the line of battle, — that is to say, a powerful iron- clad or ram. Nevertheless it is still limited to wooden two and three-deckers. 12 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIE POLICY. Mesondive and the Mendouhije. They are of 9,000 tons, 332 feet long, with a breadth of 59 feet ; and they each carry the tremendous arma- ment of twelve 18-ton guns, three 6^-ton guns, and six light twenty-pounders. Their armour is 10 and in some places 12 inches in thickness, and their engines of 1,250 nominal horse-power. Two other vessels deserve notice as being of a design which might perhaps be worth copying. These are the Avni Illah and the Muin Zaffer, of 1,400 tons and 600 horse-power, with an armament of four 12-ton guns and a right-ahead and right- astern fire. The armour, averaging 5} inches in thickness, is perhaps insufficient, but the great speed of these vessels would enable them to choose their own range with any but exceptional opponents, and in this respect they are said to possess extraordinary powers. Has it ever entered into the heads of the responsible Secre- taries of State who govern us, or of the irre- sponsible writers of leading articles who govern them, that this great fleet might change hands ? Our position at Constantinople has been com- pletely altered since the Conference of 1871. It is true that the Turkish fleet is always com- manded by an English officer; but if "Hobart Dismissal " Pasha " has been unable to prevent the dis- enginferl missal of English engineers, and our representa- EECENT GROWTH OP FOREIGN NAVIES. 13 tive is not properly supported at critical times, there is certainly cause for apprehension. No more striking illustration can be given of the manner in which steam and iron are bringing states hitherto scarcely known as maritime into the second rank of naval powers than the battle Battle of Lissa an of Lissa, fought during the Seven Weeks' War iiiustra- of 1866, between the Austrian and Italian fleets, growth of The only battle, in fact, in European waters since powers. the new revolution in naval warfare has been fought under flags of which one certainly seldom entered into the calculations of English states- men and naval commanders in the past, and the other until a few years since was not in exist- ence. In dealing with navies, we of course allude solely to ironclads. To give the total numbers of any navy would be most misleading, as it would include wooden ships unable to take part in a general engagement, sailing ships, guard- ships, and despatch boats. Turning to Italy, we find that she possesses Italy. eleven ironclads, four of which may be considered of the first class. To one of these vessels, the Venezia, we shall presently have occasion to allude more particularly. Austria enjoys the distinction of having won Austria. the only naval victory on the open sea in modern use of the ram, 14 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. times. The name of Tegethoff alone entitles Aus- tria to the respect of Englishmen, who through- out their history have ever followed the fortunes of fleets and sailors with close interest. Ironelad navies have developed such unprecedented powers of offence and defence, even in the short period since 1866, that it may not be altogether safe to rely too much on the lessons of the battle of Lissa. Still, we may safely draw two deductions : one Decisive is the extraordinary power of the ram in a sea- fight ; the other, that notwithstanding all modern mechanical inventions, coolness and courage are important factors of victory, though we dare not trust to these alone as of yore. The Austrian fleet was formed into three triangles or phalanxes, the apex of each being towards the enemy ; the ironclads leading. "I simply rammed away at "everything I saw painted grey," is the sailorlike description of his tactics given by Tegethoff. Nor did the wooden ships shrink from encoun- tering the ironclads ; they even rammed them. The Kaiser Max, a wooden liner, rammed the B6 d'ltalia, and sunk her. Against the com- paratively moderate armour-plating of that day it was found that a " concentrated broadside " from a wooden liner was more than enough. The victory was complete, and there are few actions by sea or land whose record reflects more BECENT GEOWTH OF FOBEIGN NAVIES. 15 honour on the victors. While speaking of the Austrian navy, we cannot omit to mention that the unfortunate Emperor Maximilian, of Mexico, who had himself been a naval officer, wrote warmly congratulating Admiral Tegethoff on the success of his old comrades in arms. Austria possesses four ironclads of the first class, six of the second class, three of which are being rebuilt, and a considerable number of un- arm oured vessels. Three centuries have nearly elapsed since Spain. Drake and Howard fought their nine days' battle in the Channel for the independence of these islands. They were indeed " Thrice famous deeds she wrought in ancient days ; When that great fleet invincible against her bore in vain The richest spoils of Mexico, the stoutest hearts in Spain." From the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century the contest between England and Spain can scarcely be said to have ceased. The influ- ence of the House of Bourbon combined the French and Spanish fleets against us many times, though always with one result. In the long struggle, not only did the empire of the sea pass into the hands of England, but colonies in every quarter of the globe. The commencement of the last century gave us 16 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICT. Gibraltar, and it closed with the acquisition of Malta. To the nineteenth century Englishman Spain is simply an incomprehensible country, which pays no interest on her bonds. But even now, low though she has sunk in the scale of nations, she is far from insignificant at sea. A nation which has practically defied the United States cannot be classed with the small powers, how- ever weak may be her forces on land, however torn - by civil war. We suppose there can be.no dispute about the fact that the United States did "cave in" on the Virginius question on account of their utter inability to cope with the Spanish fleet. Seven ironclads, including three of the first class, constitute the armada which the United States refused to face. As if to show how great are the responsibilities of England, and in what unexpected places the services of our Navy may suddenly be called Affair of upon, we may direct attention to the affair of gena a an Cartagena in the autumn of 1873. The Intran- instance of ... . -. . . n -, . 1 „ , necessity sigente rising in that town placed three powerful tafaSnga ironclads, with some wooden frigates and the !n r time ee of strongest fortress in Spain, in the possession of peace. a mim \ ) Qj- f desperadoes differing little from pirates. To establish the immortal principles of the Commune, these vessels proceeded to visit EECENT GEOWTH OP FOEEIGN NAVIES. 17 various places along the coast (mostly unfortified), and made "requisitions" for money and pro- visions. That they should never have been allowed to leave Cartagena on their errand of plunder is obvious. The capture of the Almanza and Vittoria, and their retention at Gibraltar, was the least we could do to repair this error. On that occasion, as our readers will doubtless remember, our Mediterranean squadron was cleared for action, and sharp was the disappoint- ment of officers and men when Galvez " thought " better of it," and refused to fire. We mention the incident simply as showing how in a moment a complication may arise demanding the presence of the fleet. We have said that there was a vessel in the Italian navy to which it would be necessary to allude particularly. Among the ironclad squadrons which flocked to Cartagena at the outbreak of the insurrection was the Italian ; and English readers should lay well to heart the fact that an Italian ship, the Venezia, superior carried the heaviest guns of all. If our position of'rw^ at sea is to be maintained, such a. thing must not 3,.^ be repeated.* A heavy account will be demanded q^? gena, * The Venezia carried 18-ton guns. The heaviest guns carried in the British squadron were of 12 tons. The Italian Government have lately ordered six 100-ton guns from an English firm, thus eclipsing even the Inflexible. 2 18 NAVAL POWEES AND THEIR POLICY. of any English Ministry, whether Conservative or Liberal, which permits a disaster to befall a single English ship through an insufficient armament. We are not anticipating any. differ- ences with Italy. On the contrary, an '.' under- " standing " of a cordial character with that power and with Austria, combined with the adoption of a firm tone and great vigilance at Constantinople, would, we are convinced, be attended with the happiest results. The reconciliation of the two powers which was recently celebrated by the Em- peror of Austria and the King of Italy at Venice, is one of the few royal meetings of modern times calculated to give much confidence to those who wish to see not only peace but freedom prevail in Europe. Nevertheless, the country which is still first amongst naval powers cannot afford to be surpassed even by one ship on one station. The two facts to which we have already drawn attention are these : that the offensive power of a fleet is now greater than ever, and that foreign navies are increasing at a rate which is sufficient to cause us considerable disquietude. This alone would necessitate the utmost vigi- lance in regard to the numbers and efficiency of our fleet. But the truth is that at all times the demands upon the British fleet are bounded only by the world. We have alluded to Spain EECENT GBOWTH OF FOEEIGN NAVIES. 19 and the United States. Can there be a doubt that in the event of the Cuban question coming Cuban to the front, our West Indian squadron would que ' have to be increased ? The Cuban question may sleep whilst the Navy of the United States is in its present United condition; but a large sum has been voted byreoon^ - Congress to reconstruct it. The state to which of r fleet? a it has been allowed to fall is almost indescrib- able. Of course there is a " grand total " of forty-eight ironclads, but amongst them there is scarcely one genuine modern fighting ship. In the event of the American Government seriously persisting in the' work of creating a Navy, the independence of Cuba may become of pressing importance ; and it must be remembered that to " take a side " in any conflict is not the only circumstance that may necessitate our ironclads being cleared for action. The affair of Cartagena showed how suddenly we may be involved in other people's differences even when " the assurances from foreign powers " continue to be satisfactory." But it is not upon her Navy that the United States relies. She possesses a weapon of tre- mendous power as against ourselves, of which we have with extraordinary blindness deprived ourselves — let us hope but temporarily. 20 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIB POLICY. German The youngest naval power of the world is Germany. Eleven ironclads are at present in the service of that empire, of which five — the Kaiser, Deutschland, Grosser Kurfurst, Friedrich der Grosse, and Preussen — are of the first class. The Konig Wilhelm is already considered obso- lete even as a broadside ship, so far and fast has the race between guns and armour carried us in the seven years since she was launched. It is true she was never the powerful vessel she was represented, but she would have been a formid- able antagonist to any of the " converted " wooden ships which, until quite recently, formed our Mediterranean squadron. Neither the Kronprinz nor the Prinz Friedrich Karl can be considered fit to take part in a modern battle with much effect. There has been so much ex- aggeration current in reference to the German fleet (due partly to the alarm caused by a state building ironclads which is in no great need of such vessels for defence, and partly to flourishes of trumpets from time to time in the German press) that it may be well to bear in mind that it has not as yet reached any great proportions. The serious part of the question is that the German ironclads are from their build and rig evidently intended for distant cruising. At present probably the German Government are RECENT GROWTH OF FOREIGN NAVIES. 21 desirous of gaining time, in order to increase their naval strength. There is no doubt that the creation of a German Navy will he no easy- task, and service in it can scarcely be popular in Germany. It is true that service can be en- forced if necessary, but it is not so easy to man a fleet as it is an army efficiently under such a system. Modern changes may have lessened the force of the maxim, current in England during the Bevolutioaary war, that " one volun- teer is worth three pressed men;" neverthe- less there must still be some truth in it. But in estimating the forces of the new naval powers at sea, it will be well to face the possibility of some great European convulsion. Should such occur, the neutrality of the kingdoms of Holland and Belgium may be infringed, possibly not from deliberate design, bat from military necessity. Once infringed, there will not be wanting advo- cates of annexation. The possession of Antwerp by France was said by tbe first Napoleon to be a pistol pointed at the heart of England : the possession by Prussia, not only of a seaboard, but of the services of the countrymen of Van Tromp and De Buyter, might be a greater peril. It would carry with it also the possession of Java. WSMSSBEKfo. CHAPTER II. NAVAL POLICY. ASSING- in review the position of the principal naval powers, we have briefly indicated some of the duties which our Navy may be called upon to perform in different parts of the world, without mentioning its minor though important tasks of suppressing the slave traffic, and acting as the police of the seas in distant waters, — tasks which keep a very large portion of the service in constant employ- ment. Is the Navy equal in point of numbers and armaments to these world-wide calls ? Is Have we a it equal to possible emergencies? Is there a reserve of ships and men available to meet a great combination such as that which was nipped in the bud by Nelson at Copenhagen ? Is the Board of Admiralty ready with its plans for an offensive movement anywhere and everywhere ? We say an offensive movement, because the STRENGTH OP THE BBITISH NAVY. 23 truth of the axiom, that the best defensive is a Best de- good offensive, becomes daily more and more a rapid apparent. These questions we are glad to see the country beginning to take up. Their im- portance has been greatly increased by recent events. The policy of other naval powers at present Policy of naval is cautious and tentative, but it is none the powers, less one whose main features may be discerned clearly enough. The great military monarchies Endea- whose ambition (in some cases the more menac- great mm- tary mon- ing from being the exponent of national aspira- archies to tions) has now reached the sea, have lately seaboards, developed an extraordinary solicitude for the welfare of the smaller states. They propose in the interests of humanity to revise and codify the usages of war so strictly that it will scarcely be possible for any invaded country not possessed of the splendid military machinery of the great powers to make a national resistance, or prolong the contest, when once the regular army is defeated. It is obviously impossible that, with our present chaos in military matters, we could interfere to save any smaller state ; yet the over- throw of some of these may bring us face to face with naval questions of the last importance. Moreover, there is great danger of our repeating the mistake which brought on the Crimean war; 2 24 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. economy, retrenchment, peace-at-any-price, and then a sudden revulsion of opinion. There is, we repeat, great danger of some power or powers falling into the same error as that of the Em- peror Nicholas. In quiet times our country is mainly led by some half-dozen, or at the most dozen, news- papers, not one of which is much read by the working classes ; and their comfortable platitudes about peace and progress find very little echo amongst the masses, whose instinct is sometimes sounder than the laboured conclusions of poli- Danger of ticians and theorists. There is moreover a war from large cir- serious danger to our country and to Europe in dilation ° J r of certain the great reputation enjoyed by certain English English. news- journals on the Continent. They are generally abroad, quoted as exponents of English public opinion. They have no right to be thus quoted. Their utterances of friendship for Russia, and of abso- lutely boundless devotion to Prussia, are doing a world of harm. The first time any continental government goes one step too far, the tens of thousands of people who never read these jour- nals, and utterly disagree with their views — tens of thousands of voters now, be it remembered, — will find means to let their opinions be known. Then, to the astonishment of foreign readers, these papers will suddenly veer round, and we STEENGTH OP THE BEITISH NAVY. 25 may find ourselves where we did in 1854. But at any rate, if we ever are suddenly plunged into a conflict, we ought to be armed. And we have surrendered a weapon which enabled us to strike at the very heel of Achilles. Lord Chatham once said that he would not argue with the man who failed to see the import- ance to England of maintaining the integrity of Turkey. We shall certainly waste no words in arguing that the command of the seas is our only safeguard, both for the colonies and the mother- country; and that the one weak point of our possible adversaries is their commerce. The Greatest knowledge that we can if necessary strike with of Erfg- tremendous effect against them there, must s ^ her always induce them to think "once — twice — sMteat " thrice " before proceeding to extremities, and is commerce. therefore a guarantee of peace. But although our fast unarmoured cruisers of the Inconstant class might do great service, they are scarcely numerous enough, and under certain circum- stances would be found too large. The right of privateering, then, must be resumed without delay. The United States — the one power able to make much use of this right, and only likely to exercise it against ourselves — has refused to part with it. In self-defence, therefore, we should have to resume it on the first outbreak 26 NAVAL POWEES AND THEIE POLICY. of hostilities. Why not honestly announce our intention of doing so beforehand ? When, fifty years hence, the history of Eng- land in the nineteenth century comes to be written — for it is not until the confidential correspondence of statesmen is published that we can arrive at anything like the truth — the true story of the Declaration of Paris will become public property. Englishmen will then be able to judge of the amount of wisdom dis- played by the Government of that day in sur- rendering those maritime rights for which Nelson had contended at Copenhagen. The whole history of our dealings with Bussia immediately before the Crimean War is one of indecision and weakness. Having by a flagrant exhibition of these qualities brought on a war which they certainly did not as a body desire, the Ministry of Lord Aberdeen proceeded to throw away our most powerful weapon of offence. It almost seemed as if they desired nothing so much as to benefit our enemy. On the 28th March, 1854, the London Gazette contained a declaration in which occurred the following words : — tionasto " Her Majesty will waive the right of seizing property " enemies' property on board a neutral vessel, vessels. 1 " unless it be contraband of war." NAVAL POLICY. 27 Now although, there is something to be said on both sides in regard' to our surrendering the right of capturing enemies' goods in neutral vessels, the step is one of such tremendous magnitude, and as a matter of fact had during the war so great an effect, that it seems in- credible it could have been taken without the Legislature or the nation having been consulted on the matter. Yet so it was. Russian com- it' effect 1 on Russian merce went into the hands of neutrals, . and commerce, instead of being utterly destroyed, suffered a mere partial injury. The plenipotentiaries who were sent to Paris to conclude a peace, travelled beyond their powers when they made the final and famous Declaration which was appended to the Treaty, but did not actually form part of it. The act, wise or unwise, appears to have been perfectly gratuitous on the part of France and England (not England and France, for we were sacri- ficed to our allies throughout almost as much as to our enemies). Even the representative of Russia seems to have been staggered by the proposal at guch a time. Count Orloff said — " That the powers with which he is furnished "having for their sole object the restoration of "peace, he does not consider himself authorised 28 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIE POLICY. " to take part in a discussion which his instruc- " tions had not provided for." The Austrian plenipotentiary stated that "not " being authorised by his instructions to express " an opinion upon a matter of such importance," he should have to request the orders of his Sovereign. The De- The Declaration of Paris contains four articles, claration i • i , -i of Paris, which are these : — I. Privateering is, and remains, abolished. II. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. III. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag. IY. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective ; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. It is of tbe first two articles that we would here speak. Whatever differences of opinion ■may exist as to the expediency of maintaining the second article — and we freely admit that even amongst those most anxious for our naval supremacy such difference does exist — there must be very little as to the injury we bave inflicted on our own country by the adoption of the first. Our merchant navy is incomparably greater than NAVAL POLICY. 29 that of any other nation, and we are particu- larly strong in fast steamers. The United States have not relinquished the right, and the moment a war broke out would use it without stint or scruple. The form of the first article of the Declaration, moreover, is objectionable, for pri- vateering is not abolished. A nation which found itself in straits through the possession of an inferior naval force would at once resort to it. If adopted against ourselves we should have no option but to follow the same course. Only we should most probably come to this decision too late to benefit by its full effects. Mr. Thomas Brassey's pamphlet on "Un- Mr. Bras- armoured Ships" is not only a symptom of apMeta reaction against the idea that speed and handi- the times, ness in a ship, and courage and skill in the officers and ship's company, have had their day ; it is also a sign that the idea is at last beginning to take root in Parliament that the commerce of England is both her greatest weak- ness and her greatest strength. One ship, the Alabama, swept the United States flag from the sea; what could not twenty A labamas do? Mr. Brassey is also quite right in pointing out the invaluable services which might be rendered by our magnificent fleet of merchant steamers in time of war. But in order to utilise our 30 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. .strength to the best effect we must be prepared. Everything must be thought of beforehand. If it were generally known that our mercantile marine was available for warlike purposes, it would be a great guarantee of peace ; for that power would be rash indeed which entered upon a conflict with a power fully able to detach Alabarnas by the score and carry on her mari- time commerce all the while. An ironclad can be built in England in about a fourth of the time necessary in some foreign yards. We have even heard of one foreign iron- clad being five or six years on the stocks. It must be perfectly obvious, therefore, that had Building the building of ironclads in England for foreign of foreign n ironclads powers been prohibited, as it ought to have been, in Eng- land. at the time the Warrior was built, we should now have to cope practically with only two iron- clad navies — the Erench and the Eussian ; only one of these possessing regular seagoing iron^ clads. We have therefore, by our own folly, al- most created four naval powers. Of the German fleet, the Kaiser, Deutschland, Konig Wilhelm, and Kronprinz were built on the Thames. The Turkish fleet was almost entirely constructed on the Thames and the Clyde. Of the seven iron- clads constituting the naval force of Spain, six were built in England. We live in days when NAVAL POLICY. 31 u single powerful ship can decide a battle ; and such a ship we have built, in the shape of the Independencia, for Brazil. Not content with arming other nations in the Baltic and the Mediterranean, we must needs add to our work in the Pacific by building another Independencia - — not so powerful as her namesake, it is true, but still formidable — for Peru. We do not hesitate to declare that this svstem This sys- ^ _ tern must must come to an end. It is a pressing question be stopped - — too pressing to be referred, like almost every subject of interest for some time past, to a Select Committee. It may be said that to adopt measures of this kind is to alienate powers who might be our friends. It would perhaps involve us also in a considerable expenditure by way of compensation to shipbuilding firms. To these objections we can only say that these navies have been built for powers who, in the event of a naval war, would, as a rule, be only too delighted to cripple us. Expenditure in these matters there must be, whatever policy we adopt ; and had we prohibited the building To have of foreign navies in England, we should have ft r a t first been saved some millions of our own subsequent have been expenditure. With regard to causing ill-will econom?- • among foreign nations, we can scarcely be worse calcourse - off than we are. Our isolation is complete ; and 32 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. Confer- the history of modern Conferences, actual or Gil CCS projected, seems to indicate a pretty determined attempt to undermine the - freedom of smaller states and the rights of those older maritime powers whose existence is the sole remaining guarantee of national freedom anywhere. Russia and the United States are not given to sym- pathise much with powers they do not respect, nor to respect powers they see no reason to fear. As for the Germans, their views on this subject are as peculiar as the arguments of their sym- pathisers in the English press. They meet you on the highroad, as it were, and demand your sympathy or your life. Even in the late Count Bernstorff's despatches this curious state of mind, this inability to understand how anybody could conscientiously hold a different opinion from that current in Germany, was very appa- Preven- rent. At the most, the measures we advocate than cure, would lead only to a wordy war of despatches, and might save much future trouble. They ought, we think, to be initiated at once. Better rivers of ink now than torrents of blood here- after. But whatever our policy, there must be no mistake as to the condition of the fleet. On this point the unanimity of public sentiment would be curious but for its being, in an insular NAVAL POLICY. 33 people, so natural. Tories who, like Mr. Baillie Cochrane, propose the withdrawal of this country from the ill-advised Declaration of Paris, concur with Liberals such as Sir William Harcourt, and Eadicals such as Sir Wilfrid Lawson, in advo- cating the maintenance of a fleet, able not only to rival those of other powers, but also to hold its own against all comers. The country, we know, prefers to wait until actual danger is staring it in the face before grappling with the subject, and many people seem to forget that we require a preponderating A pTe p 0n . Navy, not only to defend these islands, our^ e a r ^™|_ colonies, and our commerce, but to enable us ^Tilnd to fulfil our treaty engagements. Fortunately, the least accident to any ship provokes discus- sion all over the country. If the Secretary of State, for War were to say that the army was numerically unequal to providing the necessary reliefs for India and elsewhere, the fact would be accepted as part of an unpleasant but un- avoidable state of things which it was almost impossible to alter. When, however, as has happened twice in quite recent times, a First Lord of the Admiralty has, on assuming office, found the number of ships at his disposal in- adequate to the demands of the public service, the press and the people at once condemned his 3 34 NAVAL POWEBS AND THEIB POLICY. predecessors. Lord Hampton (then Sir John Pakington) in 1866, and now again Mr. Ward Hunt, each had to tell the same tale to the House of Commons. Mr. Ward Hunt, indeed, at the present moment is not in an enviable posi- tion. He can scarcely fail to see that a great effort is needed to restore the service to its proper condition. But a Minister, however zea- lous, must remember his colleagues. And there Mr. is the statesman who told Lord Melbourne forty years ago that he was entering Parliament "to " become Prime Minister of England ; " and who, having attained his ambition, hardly sees why the position achieved with so much labour should be lost by his administration acquiring a repu- tation for "extravagance;" and who devotes himself therefore to reproducing the elaborate comedy of the Palmerston Government. But Tadpole and Taper are wrong after all. Mr. Disraeli and his colleagues would incur more unpopularity in one day if a disaster traceable to parsimony should occur to the fleet than by years of heavy expenditure. CHAPTER III. STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE BBITISH NAVY. |0 put the question in a clear light, we must now consider what the strength of the British Navy really is, and how it is distributed. We have indicated a few of the tasks which may at any moment devolve upon the service. Within the last few months a new danger has arisen in connection with Belgium ; and the existing confusion in our military system only increases the necessity we are under of raising the fleet once for all to such a point of numbers, material, and efficiency as to leave behind all competitors, and that the absolute command of the sea may be confidently reckoned upon in the event of European dis- turbances. Eight . hundred The grand total of vessels in the naval service vessels on the Navy is more than eight hundred, and certainly it is List^-the one which looks as if there were no intention useless for on the part of this country to surrender her ptosis. 36 TJAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. naval supremacy. But no faith can be placed How to in totals. To get at the actual fighting strength tirrivc 8/t our actual of the service, we must employ a process not strength, unlike that of unpacking some curious Chinese ball. First the outer shell is opened, and inside appears another which is merely a case for a third, and so on through a long series, dwindling down at last to one not a twentieth the size of the first. In like manner, when analysing England's naval strength, we must commence by striking out of the list a hundred and ten vessels for harbour service — hospital ships, water police, training ships, quarantine ships, cooking depots, and " sheer hulks." Fifty-nine sailing ships must also come out. Thirty-one steam-tugs can hardly be included among the defences of the country. Troop-ships (including those fine floating palaces employed in convey- ing regiments to and from India, the Euphrates, Jumna, Serapis, Malabar, and Crocodile) must also come out. Numbers of wooden line-of- battle ships and frigates, provided with auxiliary steam power, but whose days were passed mainly under canvas ; vessels in whose outlines the beauty of naval architecture may be said to have culminated, and which will always remain asso- ciated with the names of Sir Baldwin Walker and Mr. Oliver Laing, must all go too. Whole STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH NAVY. 37 squadrons of the most beautiful vessels that ever floated may still be seen at Portsmouth, or under the wooded slopes of the Hamoaze and the Tamar, bearing famous names, "pierced for" 101 or 51 guns, but all as useless for modern purposes as the Victory herself. Yachts, royal or otherwise, tenders, old paddle frigates and sloops, are all included in the total, but of course go for nothing. Thus at last we come to the genuine fighting strength of the service, which we must divide into three heads : I. Ironclads ; II; Fast unarmoured cruisers for special purposes ; III. Corvettes, sloops, and gunboats. On the ironclads hinges the whole controversy as to whether our fleet is or is not efficient. The details we are about to give will show clearly that it is by no means " a phantom fleet." But we are afraid they will also show that its numbers are only just equal to its multitudinous tasks. Under these circumstances there may be no cause for panic, but there is abundant ground for investi- gation. The magnitude of the work entrusted to the a" serious Navy is not lessened by the fact that although questlon - one ship may now almost be said to be a fleet in herself, she is more subject to accidents, ■ less able to keep the sea for any length of time (as 38 NAVAL POWEES AND THEIE POLICY. in a blockade), and consequently likely to require being relieved sooner by a ship of equal power than were men-of-war of the Nelson times. Nominal We begin by giving the nominal strength in iron- of Great Britain in ironclads, new, old, and fifty-six obsolete, good, bad, and indifferent, at fifty-six which ships. This strength includes the turret-ships thirty/ Abyssinia and Magdala, built for the defence of of g very Te Bombay, the Cerberus, for the defence of Mel- Tabief 111 bourne, and the gunboats Viper and Vixen, stationed at Bermuda. We must strike out of the list at once the Enterprise and Research, two vessels of 900 and 1,200 tons respectively, and of 200 horse-power ; and the two confiscated Eams. " Birkenhead Bams," the Scorpion and Wivern, Will share their fate. The Waterwitch is a gun- boat propelled by hydraulic power, on Admiral George Elliot's plan. She is simply an experi- ment to test that principle, and cannot be classed amongst fighting ships. As to ironclads proper, a question arises to which we cannot oid iron- S^ Ye a decided answer, "Of what use are the ciads. it older ironclads ? " Probably every naval officer would reply " None," and the answer would expunge from the effective strength of the service no less than seventeen ships, several of which were considered only a few years since to STBENGTH OF THE BRITISH NAVY. 39 be the most formidable vessels afloat. Amongst on ironclads them, and this is a serious consideration, are the almost useless. only ironclad ships which have attained a high rate of speed. The beautiful Warrior, the first ironclad built in England, and her sister ship the Black Prince, the Achilles, Minotaur, Agin- court, and Northumberland, might almost be reckoned amongst the fast cruisers rather than the ironclads ; and for the special purposes to which those vessels may be devoted they might be found very useful, but for their unfortunate armour. However, they were constructed as ironclads ; they can do very little under canvas — an important consideration in a cruiser, — and they have not, of course, the advantage of being coppered. As ironclads they are, in spite of their appearance, of very problematical value. We now come to eight wooden line-of-battle ships, cut down and converted into ironclad frigates ; and we are glad to see that Mr. Ward Hunt is about to depart from official routine, and recognise facts, in removing most of these vessels from the list of fighting ships. The ships to be struck out are the Lord Clyde, Caledonia, Ocean, Prince Consort, Boyal Oak, and Zealous. The Boyal Alfred, and Lord Warden, of the same build, should be struck out also. 40 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIE POLICY. oideriron- Nearly as useless are the Hector, Valiani t greater Defence, and Resistance, constructed between action 1861 and 1863. None of these four ships would armoured be seen above water half an hour after the com- s ip9 ' mencement of a battle. We have mentioned the names of six of the older ironclads which might be of some use. They are certainly fast, very large, and, though the days for studying appearances at sea are gone by, very handsome. It may seem paradoxical to the general .reader to say that the armour of a certain ship is her greatest danger. Nevertheless, if the armour be insufficient this is the case, not merely from the enormous and useless weight added to the ship, but from another circumstance, which requires to be constantly borne in mind in all ' discussions about ironclads. The large conical shells used on board ship are intended to pierce the armour plates of an adversary, and in so doing become, from the tremendous friction, red-hot, and thus explode the bursting charge. Unless, therefore, a ship is provided with suffi- ciently thick plates to keep the shell out, she is better without armour at all, for the shell will pass clean through both sides of an unarmoured Inconstant without bursting. It is obvious, therefore, that the plating of all but the most recent ships is simply an invitation to the shell STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH NAVY. 41 to burst between decks — with what effect we need not say. -The question of whether turret-ships of the Smaller u r turret Devastation class can be safely sent to sea, is ships for too large to be discussed here ; but whatever the fence Devastation may do, it is quite certain that the be more smaller turret-ships are good for coast defence only, where, if supported by innumerable gun- boats of the Staunch class, of which we un- fortunately possess very few, each carrying an 18-ton gun, they would do good service, by leaving the fleet free to act elsewhere on the offensive. The Glatton, Cyclops, Gorgon, Hecate, and Hydra, axe well adapted to the work, but such vessels should be far more numerous. It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the defenceless condition of our great ports. Defence- Liverpool and Edinburgh would be in great tion of our danger in a naval war from isolated attacks. In ports. 86 ' a couple of hours incalculable destruction of life and property could be effected by a single ship. The Boyal Sovereign and Prince Albert, though included in the Navy List, are not modern fighting ships. The actual fighting Navy of Great Britain, Actual fighting then, consists of seventeen ironclad ships, strength Whatever their disadvantages, and the innumer- Navy able difficulties and dangers attendant upon Sips. ee " 42 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIE POLICY. fi C htbicr bringing them into action beyond the narrow shi P s - seas, there is no question that, once within range of the enemy, the Devastation, Thunderer, and the new Dreadnought would make mince- meat of any number of opponents. Their armour averages twelve inches in thickness (in some places fourteen inches), and their armament is for the Devastation four 35-ton guns, and for the Thunderer four 38-ton guns. The Dreadnought, we presume, will carry the same armament. The two rams, Rupert and Hotspur, are un- questionably very formidable vessels, as the part played by the ram in a modern battle is certain to be considerable ; and these ships, with armour of twelve and fourteen inches, and 18-ton guns, but built specially for ramming, are the most powerful of their class yet constructed. In the British fleet the word " cruiser " has come to be associated with un- armoured vessels. But the whole question of what is to constitute our fighting fleet in distant waters is still in debate. It seems a pity that we should lose the services of our most power- ful vessels in the very place where they may be most wanted, and be obliged, owing to the peculiarity of their construction, to keep them for the defence of our coasts, which might well be entrusted to less powerful ships and to gun- Cruisers. STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH NAVY. 43 boats. If heavier guns can be carried amidships than on a broadside, and at the same time turret-ships with low freeboards are dangerous at sea, a compromise seems the natural result. The design of the Monarch, a vessel combining The a high freeboard with turrets, has always appeared to us to have had but scant justice done to it. But if the guns are placed in the most natural position, and on the steadiest plat- form, in a rolling sea, — that is to say, amidships, " —why is it absolutely necessary that they should be in a turret ? And why, if protection be required for thewhynot vital parts of a ship, should it be considered vital parts right to load the vessel from'end to end with°n!y ! ? p armour whose defensive power, unless of great thickness, is very doubtful ? It may be con- tended that for the guns' crews to fight on an open turntable, with no armour in front of them, would be to expose them to certain destruction, and perhaps with them the gun, the disablement of which would be equal to the loss of fifty guns to a three-decker. But in stating this objection, one of the most important of modern naval in- ventions has been overlooked. If a gun can be loaded below, and raised by hydraulic power to be fired (and of this there seems no doubt), the problem is solved, and it will be possible to 44 NAVAL POWEES AND THEIR POLICY. combine in one ship a tremendous armament, a fair amount of protection to the vital parts, and great speed. In fact, it may not be impossible to unite some of the best qualities of the cruiser and the ironclad. But there seems a conven- tionality about our recent shipbuilding which condemns us to see power always separated from mobility. Cruising In cruising ironclads we are rich, though oTthefirst hardly so rich as we should be considering the number of our colonies, and the great efforts being made by the German Empire in that class of construction. The Monarch, Hercules, Sultan, and Alexandra stand at the head of the list. The Monarch, with her cruising capacity and her 25-ton guns in turrets, is certainly our finest sea-going ship for general purposes. The Alex- andra, with 25-ton and 18-ton guns, comes next; then those two very powerful and very hand- some ships the Sultan and Hercules, armed with 18-ton guns. These four vessels are certainly the finest specimens we possess of sea-going ironclads. But it must be borne in mind that the new ships being built for the German Govern- ment are all of the Sultan or Hercules type, and that in the course of a year or two they will be able to match this, on the whole, our finest class of vessel. Of course they have nothing STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH NAVY. 45 to match the Devastation class, and nothing to match the Audacious class ; nevertheless the fact is most significant that their shipbuilding efforts should be devoted so exclusively to this kind of ship. We may rely upon it that the German fleet is not being built for nothing. Closely resembling the Hercules and Sultan, of the. ■ • i n second but not quite so powerful, inasmuch as they are class. armed with 12-ton guns, are the Bellerophon, Audacious, Invincible, Iron Duke, Swiftsure, Vanguard, Triumph, and Penelope. It will thus be seen that our ironclad fleet is unquestionably the most powerful in the world. But its preponderance over other fleets is di- minishing every day. Shipbuilding does not pro- insuffi- ceed so rapidly nor is it on so large a scale as is building. required to keep us well ahead of other nations. The tonnage ordered for 1874-1875 was 12,593, of which 8,253 was for ironclads. But it has been estimated that 20,000 tons per annum are necessary to keep the fleet up to the standard imposed upon us by the rapid increase of foreign navies. The difficulties which the present administration have had to encounter in this matter are very considerable, and must be re- collected when criticism falls upon them from their own supporters for their want of firmness. Last year Mr. Ward Hunt declared, very pro.- 46 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIB POLICY. perly, that he would not have ships upon paper, but that they should be real and effective, and not dummies. Eight ships, he asserted in the debate of the 3rd of August, had been under repair last year, and were therefore all more or less "dummies." The time aud labour occupied Repairs, in repairing the Minotaur were extraordinary. And it is the same with every ironclad after a few years' service. Although, therefore, one ship may be as powerful as ten of former times, we are still under the necessity of keeping a great many ships in reserve. Mr. Ward Hunt may fairly be proud of being told by his profes- sional advisers that the programme of work has never been so nearly up to the estimate for years past as during the current year. He has also stated that when he took office last year the Admiralty were unable to send a reserve squad- ron to sea ; this year, on the contrary, the regular cruise of the reserve squadron, composed mainly of the older ironclads and manned by the Coastguard, has been resumed. So far, so good. mtlrtat Mr - Ward Hunt has done his best - But > as Mr - Efforts Samuda reminded the House, during the last ten years the amount of shipping built has been 25,000 tons less than the estimate. It is, indeed, upon the whole cabinet that the blame must be laid., and not upon the First Lord of STRENGTH OP THE BRITISH NAVY. 47 the Admiralty alone, if our shipbuilding is at all behindhand. The first and gravest mistake committed by Mr. Disraeli's Government was cation^' made when they devoted the surplus which Mr. Gladstone had bequeathed them, to the re- mission of taxation and nothing else. We fear that this weakness will be quoted as a precedent hereafter. The new Government had an excel- lent opportunity of putting a stop to a system which is fatal to the efficiency of the public service. So far as the Navy is affected by it, we have seen that Mr. Ward Hunt has been able to repair eight ships, not one of which can be included among our seventeen first class iron- clads, and has launched the Alexandra; but he has fallen short of his estimated shipbuilding by 3,000 tons. Powerful, therefore, as the fleet is, we believe that in naval matters the nation is living at " agony point." If the Government rely upon the older ironclads as reserves in case of war, they are doing a rash thing. There are, in fact, no reserves of ironclads; and the rapid growth No reserve of guns and armour has rendered most of the dads! 11 ' older vessels nearly useless. The Channel fleet is composed of six ironclad channel ships: the Agincourt (flag ship), Northumberland fleet (flag of second in command), Monarch, Sultan, "48 NAVAL POWEES AND THEIE POLICY. Triumph, and Besistance ; of various power and quality, as a glance at the preceding list will show. Mediter- In the Mediterranean, the Admiral's flag will Aeet. an D y the time these remarks are in print be flying in the Hercules, and the Devastation we trust will be at Malta. Mr. Ward Hunt has been well advised in sending this powerful vessel — let her faults be what they may — to a station where the presence of a great English force is absolutely necessary. The Invincible is the only other ironclad in those waters which can be considered at all up to modern requirement in guns and armour, though the Pallas and Research in the same fleet are both ironclads. There are besides under this command a few small craft. West In the West Indies the squadron consists of squadron, but one ironclad, the Bellerophon (flag-ship), and eight corvettes and sloops. South O* 1 the coast of South America there are America. gt a tioned four small craft. East On the East Indies station the flag-ship is the indies. W00( len frigate Undaunted, and the squadron consists besides of ten small craft, a large pro- portion of which are employed in the suppression of the East African slave trade, china. In China the ironclad Audacious is flag-ship, DISTRIBUTION OP THE BRITISH NAVY. 49 and there are besides twenty small vessels of various sizes. In the Pacific a wooden line-of-battle ship Pacific. "converted" into an ironclad frigate, the Re- pulse, bears the flag, and there are eight small craft. In Australian waters the squadron consists of ten small craft. It will be seen, therefore, that our ironclad fleet is concentrated for the most part near home. The most important fact in connection with them is this — we have absolutely no re- serves of seagoing armoured ships. We have not gone at length into any description of the corvettes, sloops, gunvessels, and gunboats which figure in such large numbers, but we may now inquire whether they come up to the two require- ments which are indispensable to all unarmoured vessels, and might, and should be, the character- istic of every one of them — a fair rate of speed, small and as powerful an armament as they will carry, speed and The answer is simple — they do not. Closely m^t. connected with this question is the still more important one of the number and qualities of unarmoured heavily armed ships of the Incon- stant class. In another place we propose to discuss some questions connected with the personnel of the 4 60 NAVAL POWEES AND THEIE POLICY. Navy, and shall also endeavour to lay that financial spectre which haunts the mind of every First Lord of the Admiralty— Mr. Ward Hunt having been troubled with the apparition like his predecessors. But the question of the speed Great im- and armament of unarmoured ships is, next to of heavily the condition of the ironclads, of such vital im- arSoured" portance that we must refer to it. The ironclad ps> fleet may be considered, as to numbers and capa- city for modern war, to be fairly satisfactory, though without any reserve of ironclads adapted for long voyages. But the state of the Navy as to unarmoured ships is a cause for apprehension, and the sooner the public mind is alive to the fact the better. In the conflict between guns and armour, guns have invariably gained the day. The 8i-ton When the 81-ton gun for the Inflexible was ordered, it was said by the Standard (a journal which has done excellent service in keeping this and similar questions constantly before the public) that the new weapon would ring the knell of every ironclad afloat. This is possible ; but until 81-ton guns are mounted on every im- portant battery, and carried as a general rule by foreign ships, our present system of armour must be continued. It should be remembered that the chances are against the projectile hitting the plate a genuine "facer";" the blow would in STRENGTH OP THE BRITISH NAYY. 51 perhaps a majority of cases be delivered at an angle sufficient to deflect it. For bombardment, muTbe armour must be retained, though we may live to &* bom- see deck-armour adopted in preference to broad- bardments side armour, especially if the system of hydraulic loading — the gun being entirely concealed until the moment of its discharge — be generally adopted. But whatever may be tbe ultimate fate of ironclads, whether destined to fight our battles for generations, or sent in whole squadrons to rust in idleness beside the Wooden line-of- battle ships and frigates at Portsmouth, Ply- mouth, and Chatham, one thing is certain — a great future is in store for unarmoured cruisers. But they will only enjoy it on the two conditions of great speed and of carrying armour-piercing guns. And here we enter our emphatic protest against the recent decree which has substituted a number of light" 64-pounder shell guns in most of these ships in place of a few armour-piercing guns of 12 tons. " A perfect blight," as Mr. E. Agreat J. Keed, the late Chief Constructor of the Navy, mistake - expresses it, "bas fallen upon frigate, corvette, and sloop alike." The reasons alleged for this extraordinary measure are that it would be hope- less for an unarmoured ship to engage an iron- clad ; and that against a troop-ship, a merchant vessel, or any unarmoured ship the peculiar 52 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIE POLICY. qtialities of the 64-pounder shell would be of great service. This reasoning is untenable. If the tinarmoured vessel possesses heavier guns than the ironclad, which she very easily could do, the Inconstant at the present moment throw- ing a heavier broadside (eight 300-pounders) than many ironclads, she can fight at a tolerably long range, and might disable her adversary. Of course an unarmoured vessel overtaken by an ironclad would be sent to the bottom imme- diately; but these vessels, though they need not court an engagement with an ironclad, should not be deprived of proper means of defence. But the whole subject of the arma- ment of our ships is an illustration of the con- why ventionalitv to which we have referred. A very should not J J incon- slight increase of beam would enable fast ships cany ' like the Inconstant to carry 18-ton or 25-ton guns? guns, to be fought, as all heavy guns should be, on a turntable. It ought not to be beyond the power of a naval architect to build such ships tc carry 35-ton guns. The recent change is simplj a wet blanket thrown upon the skill and enter- prise of our officers and men. Then, again, if bombardments are to be undertaken, why is deck-armour never mentioned ? Why, too, have we waited to be taught by a Brazilian ship that it is advisable to place an outer skin of wood STBENGTH OE THE BEITISH NAVY. 53 upon an ironclad, and thus give her the immense advantage of being coppered ? But whatever More un- . . armoured the qualities of our large unarmoured cruisers vessels re- may be, it is clear that there are not enough of q them. A large Supplementary Estimate is needed to raise the Navy to its proper strength, and a portion of the money should be devoted to the construction of these vessels, "with a much heavier armament. At present we only possess five of these ships — the Inconstant, Shah, Maleigh, Active, and Volage. There are four more on the stocks. It is a pity, looking to what unarmoured ships may have to do, that there are not fourteen. Two remarks apply to nearly all our corvettes, sloops, and gunvessels : (1) They are not fast enough ; (2) They are insufficiently armed. If they were faster, and if the authorities would only recognise and act upon a principle the absolute truth of which is not denied, that one gun of great power is of far greater value than a number of lighter ones, even though their aggregate might be the same, the usefulness of all these vessels would be enormously increased. Of thirty-four cruisers large and small, the average speed of twenty-one Average is only from nine to eleven knots an hour. Of cruisers, . , , and arma- course to obtain great speed great size is re- ment. 54 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIE POLICY. quired. But without building all our cruisers on such, a scale as the Inconstant, or even the Baleigh, it would still be possible, we imagine, to have somewhat faster vessels. And if in future shipbuilding we discard such armaments as that borne by several corvettes, namely fourteen 64-pounders, and substitute a mixed armament, every vessel carrying at least one powerful armour- piercing gun (besides 64-pounders), a great im- provement would be effected, and the power of the Navy, particularly on distant stations, where the whole squadron consists of corvettes and sloops, would be greatly increased. It may be well to explain here what are the peculiar qualities of the 64-pounder which the Admiralty have substituted for armour-piercing guns in several unarmoured cruisers. Any person quite unacquainted with gunnery will see that to pierce an iron plate the projectile must be as strong as possible. Consequently, it must be thick; and the thicker it is the less room is there for a bursting charge. The 64-pounder, on the other hand, throws a shell expressly designed to set fire to, or scatter destruction in, an unarmoured vessel. Against a troop-ship or a merchant ship the effect of these shells would be immense. In concluding our comparative survey of the STRENGTH OP THE BEITISH NAVY. 55 offensive power of the Navy, we would call upon The mflu- every reader to use the utmost influence in his wader .!■ ,i , .t may exer- power to bring pressure to bear — not necessarily cise in in an unfriendly way — upon the member for his a wa S county or borough, -in order that the subject may stateof be constantly kept before Parliament and the thmgs ' country. The Government will not act without some manifestation of opinion out of doors. But recent movements on the Continent seem tb show that the question ought to be dealt with at once, and it is the duty of every man who cares for his country, whether Liberal or Con- servative — nicknames which in presence of foreign complications might Well be dropped — to speak out in such a manner that the responsi- bility for the necessary expenditure may be shared by the whole nation. There seems to be little doubt that our naval supremacy is viewed with increasing jealousy on the Continent ; and this fact, combined with the sinister rumours lately afloat, should lead, and we trust will lead, to such Navy Estimates being submitted to Parliament next year as may ensure the main- tenance of the fleet at a pitch of numbers, armament, and material, which will once for all distance every competitor amongst the navies of the world. Arma- ment and disarma- ment. CHAPTER IV. PERSONNEL OP THE BEITISH NAVY. JE have in the course of the present summer heard many discussions upon armaments and some suggestions for disarmament. The latter of course are futile. Armies — that of England excepted — can pass from a peace to a war footing in a few days, and to reduce the number of men with the colours in time of peace under the new system may look like disarmament, but in reality may mean an increase of efficiency. The case is different with navies. Twelve months' training may make a presentable soldier ; it takes half as many years and at an earlier age to make a man-of-war's man. If the continental system, or some modification of it, be adopted in the English army, the transition from a peace to a war footing may become as easy here as in Germany, and Sir Wilfrid Lawson might succeed in carrying his motion to reduce PEBSONNEL OF THE BBITISH NAVY. 57 ' the army by 10,000 men, and find out after all that he had been rather adding to than sub- tracting from our fighting strength. It is often contended that the mercantile marine should be a nursery for the Navy, but this is only true in a limited sense. There are several considera- Navy • it -ikx should be tions which serve to show that our Navy must mamiy a be to a great extent a standing force. In the force, first place, the wonderful revolution in naval gunnery which has taken place during the last fifteen years has made it somewhat unsafe to rely upon reserve men who may or may not have received sufficient drill and training to work with ease and fire with accuracy the complicated and ponderous weapons borne in such vessels as the Devastation and Sultan. Then, again, the ships themselves require the most careful and even delicate handling. You cannot " knock about " a mass of 8,000 tons of iron as easily as you would an old 50-gun frigate. And there is an- other and very pressing reason why the British Navy should never be allowed to fall below a certain standard. In order to maintain our independence we must retain the sovereignty of the seas. But in modern warfare, to ensure success, it is necessary to strike the first blow, in accordance with the weighty opinion laid down by Prince Frederick 58 NAVAL P0WEES AND THEIE POLICY. Charles of Prussia, that the first thing to be Necessity done is to march straight at the main body of th e S first ne the enemy. This blow, to be thoroughly effec- tive, must be delivered within a week from the declaration of war. In all probability the task before us would be twofold. It would involve an attack upon the enemy's fleet, and a vigorous attempt to destroy some great dockyard or seaport. The latter would entail running the gauntlet of a great number of torpedoes ; but no naval officer who could make up his mind to sacrifice a few old ships should hesitate about trying to force the entrance to a river. Our safety depends upon an immense fleet being kept always on a war Plans. footing in every detail; upon plans being pre- pared at the Admiralty in case war should break out with any naval power or combination of powers. The shock, when it occurred, should find the First Lord with everything ready, and nothing to do except to telegraph to the autho- rities at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, and Pembroke, to carry out Plan A — war with Eussia, Plan B — war with Germany, Plan C — war with France, as the case might be. Any standard of efficiency and readiness short of this is delusive. It is one which with the materiel and money at our disposal we could attain to PEBSONNEL OP THE BEITISH NAVY. 59 with no effort at all except a little energy on the part of the Minister in charge of the Navy and a few of his subordinates. It would simply be an exact reproduction of the system in force at the German War Office; it may be summed up in a few words, " Leave nothing to chance." When once, however, squadrons have left Eng- land for their respective destinations — which, if the Government of the day (whoever they may be) are not utterly insane, should be kept a profound secret ; especially bearing in mind the danger sure to arise at such a period from the immense number of foreigners residing in England — the question of reserves will occupy a prominent place. There is no doubt that the institution of the Eoyal Naval Eeserve was an act which reflected E °y al Naval very great credit on the naval administration of Reserve, the Duke of Somerset. But it cannot be said to have entirely fulfilled the purposes for which it was designed. It was intended to give to the Eoyal Navy a reserve of trained men and good seamen to fall, back upon in time of war. As we have said, when once the squadrons have left England for the various places selected for the attack of the enemy's fleets or ports, and the unarmoured cruisers have sailed for such places 60 NAVAL POWEES AND THEIE POLICY. as may seem best adapted for the intercep- tion and destruction of the enemy's commerce, the Coastguard will be called upon to man or partially man a good many of the older ironclads and other vessels intended to be kept in English waters. This thoy will do both easily and well. res™e lg Ifj however, the area of war should be extended, of Tn- 10113 an ^ fresh squadrons be required, the question of vessSsin roanniag them will become serious. The iron- C roion ed °l a ds an ^ the ^ ew — unfortunately very few — maritime unarmoured cruisers at our disposal can be war. J - manned with ease. But unarmoured vessels will be required everywhere, and considerable difficulties are almost certain to arise in man- ning them. If the war be very short, the diffi- culty need never arise. But it does not follow because modern wars on land now seldom exceed six months, and are generally decided (in a military sense) in six weeks, that naval wars should be equally brief. We might, if success- ful at first, have afterwards to maintain a long blockade. Unfortunately the Naval Eeserve hardly seems to give us what we want, though there are competent witnesses who stand up in its favour. But we have ourselves heard from an officer whose duty it had been to superintend the annual drills of the Beserve, an extraordinary PEBSONNEL OE THE BBITISH NAYY. 61 account of their utter unfitness for men-of-war's Reserve men. Some could hardly go aloft, and some in'many were really not sailors at all, though they had tteRoyai been at sea in the course of their lives. A good Navy- seaman belonging to one of the great clipper ships in the employment of leading shipowners whose names are household words in England, would no doubt be a valuable addition to the Navy in time of war. But in the nature of things such men are the exception in the Eeserve. And there are two very cogent reasons for not rely- ing overmuch upon the efficiency of tbis force. Firstly, the mercantile marine is rapidly changing from a sailing fleet to a steam fleet. Secondly, the foreign element is becoming terribly strong throughout the service. Matters have certainly come to a pretty pass when (as actually happened not long ago) a captain finds his sbip in the utmost danger, and cannot make his orders understood in a gale of wind to a crowd of foreign seamen on the forecastle. Mr. Stirling Mr . stir . Lacon, in his speech upon Captain Wilson's anf Lac ° n interesting lecture at the United Service Insti- ^Elo™. tution, reminded his audience of a case even worse than this. The captain of a ship, " shortly " after leaving harbour in a gale of wind, dis- " covered that he had got a crew, not one man " of whom was a sailor. He went below and 62 NAVAL POWEBS AND THEIB POLICY. "took a dose of laudanum." That such things should exist is terrible, and it is a warning to all whom it may concern not to rely upon the Naval Eeserve as at present constituted for sup- plies of men in time of war. The way these miserable beings are " trained " — (save the mark !) — was also described by the same speaker : — crimps. << j n one f the north-eastern ports the crimps "have a large shed, a manufactory of sailors. " They get dock labourers, any refuse of the "population, who a few years ago would not " have been admitted on board any ship. These "they equip in a sailor's jacket, and take him "to the shed, where there is a cart-wheel, by " means of which they teach him to steer. In "the centre of the shed there is a cow's horn " on a pedestal, round which they march, in " order that if any questions are asked, they may " say they have been 'round the Horn.' ' But,' "I asked, 'how are they taught to heaye the "lead?' That, my informant assured me, was "too antiquated an idea altogether." seaman- Those who are accustomed to take their view ship indis- pensable of naval matters from leading articles would not cuit to perhaps imagine that seamanship was such an indispensable requisite in the present day. But as a matter of fact the majority of Her Majesty's ships are generally under canvas, and those on PEBSONNEL OP THE BEITISH NAVY. 63 distant stations certainly make most of their voyages without much aid from the engine. In the ironclads (which of course are only a small portion of the ships in commission), sail drill, except in a few turret-ships, is constantly prac- tised. We are very glad indeed to see this. "No practice can be more dangerous than that of sending large vessels to sea with nothing but their engines to rely upon. Any spars, however light, are better than none. What can be done by a good workman with bad tools is seen in the case of a large steamer (if we remember aright it was the Atrato) only Atrato. brig-rigged, with her propeller disabled, but whose captain managed even with the few scraps of canvas he could set to bring her safe into Plymouth Sound. And we trust that the in- genuity of our naval architects may yet prove equal to the task of designing vessels protected in vital parts only by very thick armour, carrying heavy guns, and capable of ramming, but which shall also be able to steam well and sail at least fairly. We are not now inquiring whether the mer- cantile marine is or is not deteriorating, but whether we can out of the mercantile marine obtain an efficient reserve. The answer seems to us to be somewhat doubtful. 64 NAVAL P0WEP.S AND THEIB POLICY. With regard to the standing force of the Navy itself, we are upon firmer ground. The good and bad points of the system upon which the Present Navy is now manned are very clear. Entering manring as boys, trained from their earliest years for the the Navy. gerv i cej f e( j on the ^ es ^ ^g^ an( j leading the healthiest of lives, they grow up generally fine men, and in every way adapted for the Navy. At eighteen their actual service commences, and is for ten years. At the expiration of that period they can engage to serve for another ten years. Unfortunately, a very large proportion do not Loss of stay after their first ten years. At that period tenyears j^-y^g attained the age of twenty-eight, and being as fine specimens of sailors as can be found in the world, and thoroughly acquainted with the working of our modern guns, they leave, and the British Navy knows them no more. Of course they have several careers open to them. They are a good deal in request for yachts, and it is said that the Fire Brigade in London is mainly composed of men-of-war's men. It is scarcely possible to see one of their fire-engines at work, or to pass one of their stations with all the brass-work glittering, without seeing that the man-of-war element is there. It is unde- niable that they do leave in great numbers at the expiration of their first term of service; -PERSONNEL OP THE BRITISH NAVY". 65 When the Channel Fleet was lying at Thames Haven last year, the effect of looking down the long line of youthful faces as the men were just being "mustered at quarters " was extraordinary. We have heard the same story from naval sources since. It is certainly disheartening that the country should lose the services of its best seamen in their prime, after having been at the expense of training them. The reason is not far to seek ; it lies at the bottom of almost every defect in the public service — false economy. We cannot expect to retain these men if we insuffi- continue to offer them only £28 a year. cient pay ' There is another matter upon which competent naval authorities will be found to speak very strongly at the present time. We allude to the fact that many of our ironclads are under-manned. Ships We have heard of an ironclad in the Mediter-™^ d ranean in which one gun was without a gun's crew, and one gun nowadays means a great deal. The cause may lie to a certain extent in the build of some of the ships; but if Economy, it: behoves 'the public to see to it without- delay. It is scarcely possible indeed to exaggerate the mischief which the parsimonious penny-wise spirit of modern times has wrought in the public service. At the time of the outbreak of the Franco- German war we have heard that at 5 66 NAYAL P0WEBS AND THEIE POLICY. Economy Aden, a most important place, the 18-ton guns Indian intended to be placed (some day) in the fortifi- African cations were lying dismounted on the rocks ; s a lon - -whilst the ships of the East Indies squadron "were unable to obtain a single spare round of ammunition for rifled guns. Here Economy had certainly been at work. On the same sta- tion a ship was supplied with revolvers of one pattern and ammunition of another. The working of this arrangement will be more apparent when we call attention to the fact that the principal duty of that squadron is the suppression of the East African slave trade ; a work in which the boarding of slave dhows, pistol in hand, is natur- ally of frequent occurrence. Nor can matters be as they should when one ship has to send to the flagship for ammunition to fire the necessary number of rounds for the quarterly musketry practice. A Naval Brigade in these days plays so prominent a part in our land operations that it is scarcely possible to exaggerate the import- ance of musketry instruction. It may be well to mention here the total number of men and officers voted by Parliament. Nominal Of seamen there are 33,500 ; boys, including number of 3j000 under tra i n i ng) 7^00; Marines, ashore and afloat, 14,000; and Coastguard 5,500. This gives a total of 60,000. But 33,500 seamen are, men PEBSONNEL OF THE BEITISH NAVY. 67 in the opinion of some naval officers, barely sufficient for our wants. Captain Wilson recommends that each man's pay should be increased by twopence a day (£3 a year) whatever his rating may be, provided it is not below Able Seaman. This would cost about ,£60,000 a year, but in the opinion of that officer would be a gain to the. country by check- ing desertion. In reference to this last subject we have to face the unpleasant fact that from 800 to 1000 men desert every year. Mr. Shaw Desertion. Lefevre, M.P., who was Secretary to the Ad- miralty in Mr. Gladstone's administration, in the course of his remarks during the discussion of Captain Wilson's paper, said : — " I think this (desertion) is in a great measure " due to the pay, which is very considerably " below that of the merchant service. We train " our boys at a great cost, rendering them better " than merchant seamen ; and present pay, and "not the prospective pension, is the one thing that operates; and although I know it is " delicate, and I should be sorry to proclaim "it on the housetops, yet I think it a very " serious question, whether we should not face " this question of pay." Of our total 33,000 men, of whom 18,000 may be called blue-jackets, only 12,000 are able- a 68 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. bodied seamen; which, as Captain Wilson says, is surely as low a number as the most rigid, economist would dare to advocate for the first naval power in Europe. Too large The large proportion of men who are kept a propor- . tionofa doing duty in harbour ships is greatly to be jacket's regretted. That a blue-jacket should, out of a service total of twenty years' service, pass only eleven wasted in . , , . . , . harbour or twelve years at sea is a very serious matter, i y, e c j) ur i n g ^g time they are employed in harbour- service, they have no regular instruction in. drill, seamanship, or boat-duty. Moreover, of this 18,000, there are only 3,230 seamen-gunners- and 6,462 trained men ; leaving more than 8,00Q men not classed as either. As these figures relate to a standing Navy, reared for the service from boys, Captain Wilson puts the question very mildly indeed in saying that such a, state of affairs is "hardly satisfactory." He recommends that as we have in our sea-going squadrons some 4,000 Marines, we might land them, and make room on board ship for nearly half of our young seamen " now rusting in harbour ships with- (l out any adequate professional instruction " either in seamanship or gunnery." The pro- posal is of course open to question, but it at- least deserves a very careful consideration. It must also be remembered that the class of ship PEESONNEL OE THE BBITISH NAVY. 69 most likely to be of use to us after the first stage- of a naval war, an unarmoured cruiser, is of all vessels in the navy the one that most requires a crew of good seamen ; whilst in gunnery an Inconstant or Raleigh would be called upon very likely to display more care than an ironclad; her heavy guns enabling her to pierce the armour of all but the latest-designed vessels in foreign services at a considerable distance. Her object if in presence of an ironclad would always be to fight at a comparatively long range or not at 'all, whilst ironclads are almost certain to rely mainly on the ram. Several questions connected with the present 'position of the officers of the Navy are in our officers. opinion sufficiently important to claim public "attention. We propose to consider four of them, and in 'the following order : Promotion and Retire- ment ; Training ; Education ; Pay. It is a matter of vital importance that we promotion should possess a large reserve of officers for ment! ue ~ employment in an emergency. There is of course a very large half -pay list ; and if the ships of the present day were the same as thos6 of twenty years ago, an officer might remain some years on shore and yet be perfectly able to discharge his duties on being appointed to a ship. 70 NAVAL POWEBS AND THEIE POLICY. But the case is different now. An officer who has been five years ashore may go afloat to find a complete revolution either in ships or guns. And yet the difficulty of finding employment for all these officers is immense. They must be thoroughly aw fait of the very last changes in naval construction: but it seems impossible to keep them employed at sea. Promotion, too, is exceedingly slow. Mr. Ghilders' system of enforced and voluntary retire- ment has certainly accelerated promotion in the higher ranks ; but nothing seems to bring pro- motion to the Lieutenants. In 1870 the numbers wera as follows : Captains employed, 89 ; half- pay, 199. At present there are — Captains employed, 90 ; half-pay, 84. In 1870 the proportion of employed to half- pay Commanders was 171 to 231 ; it is now 163 to 38. In 1870 the Lieutenants were 509 em- ployed to 201 on half-pay. The figures are now 521 to 201. Admitting that some improvement is visible in the prospects of the Commanders and Captains, a very serious question arises as to whether, under the system which allows an officer to receive a lump sum in commutation of his pay, and thenceforward to possess no claim for employment at all, we have not lost tbe services of a great number of young men who PEBSONNEL OP THE BEITISH NAVY. 71 were educated in the wooden navy, but who understood the iron navy; men who were well versed both in seamanship and science. The whole question, however, is exceedingly difficult. And it seems to us beyond a doubt that the rule which compels a Captain to retire at the age of fifty-five must have lost us some valuable officers. A Captain at that age is thoroughly fit for work ; and it certainly must be a bitter dis- appointment to an able man who has toiled in all climates for forty years to be refused at last the very prize for which he has been so long contending. Perhaps the only way out of the difficulty is to promote by selection as well as by Promo- seniority. Unless this is done the Lieutenants be b^Te- will all pass their prime before becoming Com- wen°as as manders, which would be a great misfortune. semont r- We heartily endorse the remarks, in this sense, made in the House of Commons during the debate upon Sir John Hay's motion by Lord Charles Beresford, a young Commander him- self, who we trust will speak freely upon these subjects in future discussions. Mr. Ward Hunt's scheme, which he explained Mr. Ward to the House of Commons on the 3rd of August, new s is temporary in its character. It effects an TugSt' improvement, no doubt, in the existing state of 1 75- things; though neither this nor any other scheme 72 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. seems likely to effect a permanent settlement of the question. The Government, however, are to be commended for taking the step. It will necessitate a slight increase of expenditure ; and when a man of Mr. Gladstone's position and reputation is found to rise in his place and com- plain of an extra ten thousand a year for judges' salaries, and when so many people still hold the idea that all expenditure on public objects is evil, — a necessary evil, if you will ; but still, an evil ; — when the Times has reverted once more to ominous leading articles about the cost of arma- ments, the courage of the First Lord of the Admiralty is remarkable. He stated that during the next nine years there would be five flag vacancies, seven Cap- tains' vacancies, and nine Commanders' vacan- cies ; adding, very rightly, that these were not sufficient to secure a proper flow of promotion in the Navy, and that stagnation in promotion had a very depressing effect on the service. The new serencap- scheme is that seven Captains shall be promoted pf^oted 6 every year to flag rank, with the limitation that ereryyear. ^ e Admirals' list shall not exceed 68. As regards the promotion of Commanders to Captains, there will be, if possible, twelve or Fifteen fifteen promotions every year ; the Captains' list command- , , , _, _ „ ers. not to exceed 175. PERSONNEL OP THE BRITISH NAVY. 73 The next proposal is important. The Com- Twenty to manders' list is to be raised from 200 to 225 ; KL and it is hoped that from twenty to -twenty- tenants - five Lieutenants may he promoted every year. As these promotions will swell the lists of the different ranks, a change is proposed in the age of optional retirement, which will be reduced five years for all ranks above that of Commander, and will in future be as follows : — Admirals at 55 years of age ; Vice-Admirals and Bear- Admirals at 50; and Captains at 45. These retirements will be limited (save under excep- tional circumstances) by a proviso that they do not exceed three Admirals and six Captains a year. There is one clause in this scheme of which it is impossible to speak except in terms of ad- miration. Mr. Ward Hunt proposes that Vice- Admirals, Rear-Admirals, and Captains shall on retirement be entitled, without any qualifying service, to one step in rank. A step from one grade of flag rank to another is a small but still a perceptible increase of rank : it is to the Captains that this concession will be really valuable. The bitterness of retirement from the active ranks of a profession in which an officer has served so many years, and the loss of his chance of commanding a fleet, will be 74 NAVAL POWEBS AND THEIE POLICY. much mitigated by obtaining, if not the power, at least tbe dignity for which he has been working. Training With regard to the training of the " young Cadets, gentlemen" (to use a naval phrase), we are afraid that at this moment the Admiralty are contemplating a step which those who wish to see our young officers grow up good seamen must witness with dismay. The proposal to build a College for the Naval Cadets might under certain circumstances be harmless ; but we fear that it bodes no good. An impression may prevail at the Admiralty that " scientific in- struction," or something of the kind, is needed for these boys, whose ages range from twelve to fourteen. A greater mistake than this can hardly be conceived. They are far too young for anything of the kind. Besides, the authorities at Whitehall are beginning at the wrong end. There is an idea abroad just now that foreign officers are very highly trained in scientific matters, and that we must do as they do. But we have an extra- ordinary knack in this country of copying the worst parts of foreign reforms and of catching at mere names. The Prussian army is generally considered to be as thoroughly efficient as any fighting body can be, and the Germans are in PEKSONNEL OF THE BEITISH NAVY. 75 general well educated. But what is the custom in Prussia as regards the training of officers ? They are first of all taught the minutice of their profession, the regimental routine duties, and the drudgery of the barrack-yard; theory and strategy are taught afterwards. "We are in great danger at present of attributing too much im- portance to mere book-learning. It certainly seems curious that a cavalry officer should be required to possess a knowledge of Chaucer's « ca^ter- " Canterbury Tales."* If any similar mistake tSL" be made in regard to the Navy, we may expect a disaster before we are many years older. It requires more seamanship to manage a long unhandy vessel, with hundreds of tons of armour bolted on to her sides, than it did to handle a wooden line-of-battle ship. The best man to command a modern ironclad is one whose pro- fessional education has been chiefly in old-fash- ioned ships. Without a thorough grounding in seamanship all this scientific knowledge is " only " leather and prunella." We have said that Mr. Ward Hunt is to be commended for a courageous attempt to deal generously and justly with the promotion and * These remarks appeared in the St. James's Magazine for July (p. 355), prior to Lord Strathnairn's speech in the House of Lords on the same subject. 76 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIE POLICY. Retirement of officers. In the matter of naval education he has also wisely and boldly disre- th^e!- 1 ' S ar ded popular clamour in abolishing " competi- f^N^i " ^ ve exam i na ti° n " f° r lads entering the Navy cadets as Cadets. It is, indeed, impossible for anyone abolished, to read the utterances of the Liberal members ■who spoke on this subject on the 3rd of August last in the House of Commons, without the strongest feeling of astonishment. A com- petitive examination at such an age, and for such a purpose, can only have the effect of covering all competition with ridicule. It never seems to have entered into the heads of our modern philosophers that a ship officered by men who are not thorough seamen is in hourly danger, and that so far from modern inventions having lessened that danger, she will be actually in greater peril, except perhaps in a calm, than a wooden ship. The unhandy and unwieldy character of many of our modern ships is not to be overcome by mere theory. Moreover, there is the question of blockading and of distant cruising ; two cases in which the use of canvas will be inevitable at times. Mr. Lowe, acting as mouthpiece for the ignorant claptrap of the Liberal press, says that " what is wanted now is u not mere bulldog courage. The destruction of " a man-of-war of the old. class would be trifling PERSONNEL OP THE BRITISH NAVY/ 77 " as Compared with that of one of the floating "fortresses that are now sent forth from our " naval ports. " And he goes on to say that to direct these floating fortresses " scientific know- " ledge and clear ideas were of more importance " than mere physique. " He concludes by trust- ing that the " standard of intelhgence " may not he lowered in the Navy. Every line of this monstrous speech is in- Mr - , J A Lowes correct. As it embodies popular fallacy and fallacies ... , and ignor- ignorance as completely as it is in the power ance of words to do, we may be pardoned for criticis- ing it at length. In the first place, there never was a period when "mere bulldog courage" was sufficient to lead a fleet to victory. The old battles between fleets of sailing ships exhibited an amount- of strategical and tactical skill worthy of Napoleon or of Frederick on land. To make the subject clear to readers whose avocations or amusements do not take them to sea, we will entirely avoid technicalities in this explanation. Probably most of them are familiar with the banks of the Thames below London Bridge. They will there have seen a barge or a collier " beating to (( windward," scarcely appearing to make any headway at all, but after each tack having made a little progress in the teeth of the wind.. It is 78 NAVAL POWEBS AND THEIB POLICY. obvious that if a fleet of sailing ships got the " weather gauge" of their opponents, — that is to say, were to windward of them, — the enemy were liable to be beaten in detail. One section of their ships was crushed by an overwhelming fire whilst the remainder were slowly toiling their way into action. To cut off the weather ships of the enemy, and destroy them before their consorts could come to their assistance, was the Nelson's p r i nC 2p a l object of the celebrated manoeuvre manoeuvre called " breaking the line." It is not necessary of -break- ° . J ingthe to point out what judgment, experience, and professional skill, — how many qualities, in fact, beyond "mere bxxlldog courage," — were required to carry this manoeuvre to a successful issue. Nelson's victory of the Nile is an instance of fore- thought and tactical skill in a remarkable degree. In this case a portion of the French fleet was placed between two fires ; the rest of the enemy being useless, though anchored in a strong posi- tion protected by batteries on shore. A glance at the history of that memorable action, and at the charts illustrating it, will perhaps convince Mr. Lowe and his friends that something more than mere bulldog courage gave us the victory and saved our Indian empire. Before the battle of Copenhagen, the same great commander spent the whole night dictating orders to a PEBSONNEL OF THE BEITISH NAVY. 79 number of clerks, leaving nothing to chance.* The Danes had removed all the buoys and lights His &«- in their waters, and Nelson himself superin- care, tended the work of taking fresh soundings, and, so far as time permitted, rendering the naviga- tion of the approaches to Copenhagen open to a hostile fleet. The work was one of extreme difficulty. The Admiral who held the chief command, Sir Hyde Parker, was nervous about " dark nights and fields. of ice," and the whole enterprise was one of no ordinary kind. Nelson said that the work had almost worn him out. In the detached actions, and in such enter- prises as those of Lord Dundonald, care, fore- thought, and skill were quite as conspicuous as courage. "With regard to "floating fortresses," the ex- Fioatfag pression is, we greatly fear, inapplicable to many fortresses - ironclads. We shall be quite content if they show themselves useful in their primary capa- city of floating gun-carriages. Of course great presence of mind and skill will be required in an officer who commands one of the new vessels in action. But presence of mind, coolness, and * "All the details of these old battles will repay the trouble of those who care to study them. Nelson's order at the Nile, that every ship should anchor by the stein as she took up her position, is one instance out of many of his wonderful foresight and care. We have not space to discuss it, however. 80 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. the judgment necessary to enable a captain to ram an enemy's ship, to avoid the ram for his own vessel, or to fire a torpedo at the right second of time,— all these are things which will require a long and thorough teaching in a very practical school; and the qualities they entail are not to be taught by books. Britannia Sorue of the Cadets on joining the Britannia training-ship have (according to the evidence of one of their instructors, quoted in the debate to which we are referring) been obliged to study ten hours a day for six months ; a strain suffi- cient to sap their mental power for the rest of their lives, what the The training of the youngsters should in our of Naval opinion commence in a harbour training-ship to should learn the naval ABC. Secondly, they should consist of. B p en( j s i x mon ths in a brig. These six months should be their real training. At present there are sea-going training-ships, but they are too big, and the cadets by all accounts are not quite fit for their work when they join their first ship. The whole object of the training should be to make them good sailors ; everything else will then follow in due course. Thirdly, we think that ar- rangements should be made (and the difficulties in the way of carrying this out do not appear insuperable) for sending Midshipmen (not Cadets) PERSONNEL OE THE BRITISH NAVY. 81 into small ships as often as possible, because in small vessels a great deal is learnt. If it were impracticable by any other means-, they might be lent for a time to any small vessels on the station. And opportunities should be taken, as soon as they have been a year or two at sea, of enabling them, if not actually to " keep officer's watch," which would be absurd, at least to call them up pretty frequently on "the " bridge," and, under the eye of the officer of the watch, accustom them to the souad of their own voice in that position. These suggestions may seem trivial, but many naval officers I am sure will be found to second them. "We tremble at the thought of our future Admirals and Captains being brought up entirely in vessels which spend so large a part of each commission in dock. We would also suggest that cutlass-drill and pistol- practice should be more assiduously cultivated, and should be included in the very earliest train- ing. When a Midshipman has served from two to four years at sea, a period of six, nine, or twelve months might be very profitably employed at a college, and at some future time tbe course of theoretical study could be completed at the Eoval Naval College now established in G-reen- Naval J . ° College at Wich Hospital. Green- We cannot dwell at any great length upon the wich. 82 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. study 6 ° f cotirse °f study prescribed at this establishment. there. j^ w ^ suffice to say that the modern mania for examinations has here culminated. In the short space of nine months, officers who are studying to pass" for Gunnery Lieutenants are expected to digest a mass of theoretical learning which is with difficulty obtained by a three years' resi- dence at Cambridge. The curriculum includes almost every branch of knowledge which a pro- fessor of mathematics might be expected to know at the latter university, and although there is a rumour that the period of study is, in mercy to these unfortunate young officers, to be extended to eighteen months, most readers will concur with us in the opinion that it should be at once "improved off the face of the earth." To encourage a taste for study amongst naval Wrong in fi cers j s excellent. But the practice now pur- practice. x i sued at Greenwich can only have the effect of making our officers hate the sight of a book. The persons who devised this amazing system will never succeed in pursuading the country that it is necessary to teach officers all that is laid down at Greenwich to enable them to super- intend the gunnery practice of a ship at sea. By the plan we have advocated, just at that period of life when a taste for study generally begins to show itself, a Midshipman would have PEESONNEL OP THE BEITISH NATS". 83 tlie advantage of a course of study in a college, and lie might return there or to Greenwich several times. But it should form no part of his early training. If the institution of a College be decided on, however, we would suggest that the question is ti Te r a " well worthy of consideration, whether any boy so eme ' should enter the Navy at a later age than twelve. It would be better, supposing the scheme of a College be finally carried out, that they should go there at eleven or even earlier, and complete such general learning as they require ; whilst if brigs be attached to the establishment they may commence almost in childhood to pick up some knowledge of boatsailing, rowing, the names of parts of a ship, knotting and splicing, and other indispensable tilings which are taught, we should imagine, to the children of fishermen at that or perhaps an earlier age, and in which boys would really find a pleasure and a relaxation from their books. They might, as we have said, return to the College, at a later period, more than once ; and if it be desirable that our naVal officers should be well informed men, there is no reason why facilities should not be afforded at Greenwich for an officer to study the classics if he likes, or in fact any branch of study he chooses to take up. But let us teach sailoring first. 84 NAVAL POWEKS AND THEIE POLICY. The part which, is played by the Navy in maintaining not only the defence but the very existence of our country, and the certainty that the importance of an immense fleet is daily be- coming greater, would naturally induce the belief stnan pay that the Navy was a well-paid service. Highly of officers J * ° •> of aj 1 skilled labour is as a rule highly paid in these Tfl.TlKff, days. But in addition to skilled labour a naval officer sacrifices more to his country than a member of any other profession, for he is absent from his family for two, three, or four years at a time ; usually for three. The Admiralty, too, are very fond of sending an officer to sea about a month or so after his marriage. "We are quite unable to account for this singular custom. Perhaps "My Lords" are under the impression that domestic cares must not be allowed to lessen his " zeal" for the service. But in fact a naval officer, if he marries, generally does so upon an income at which any moderately unsuccessful barrister, solicitor, or man of business would turn up his nose. He enters as a Naval Cadet, and receives a sort of nominal allowance of £18 a year, which is increased when he is promoted to Midship- the rank of Midshipman to £32, subject in each case to a deduction of £5 per annum for the Naval Instructor. After five years' service in the latter rank, an examination embracing the PEESONNEL 0E THE BEITISH NAVY. 85 whole of his professional duties admits him to the rank of Sub-Lieutenant, when for the first time he receives a commission. His pay is then increased to .£91. An exceptionally high place in the examination entitles a Midshipman to immediate promotion to the rank of Lieutenant. As a rule, however, about" three years is the period of service in the rank of Sub-Lieutenant. sub-Lieu- Up to the time of passing the final examination, enan s " therefore, the family of a young officer are at very considerable expense, for his pay is hardly sufficient for the clothes on his back. Of course for the first few years this is well enough. It is a period of training and probation, and so con- siderable a proportion of Midshipmen, from in- validing, death, or leaving the service, fail to reach the rank of Lieutenant, that the country could hardly be expected to maintain them. But if the scheme we have suggested were adopted, we think that as soon as a Midshipman, having served, say three years, in a sea-going ship, commenced his first course of study at the College, the state might then not unreasonably step in and relieve his family from further outlay by raising his pay to the scale of that now enjoyed by a Sub-Lieutenant. But his entrance to the College and his increased pay should alike be dependent upon his passing a severe examina- tion in the practical part of his profession. 86 NAVAL P0WEES AND THEIB POLICY, The next rank to which an officer rises is about the most important in the service. It is that Lieu- of Lieutenant; ranking with a Captain in the ten nuts, ■*■ Army. During the greater part of the life of a ship, she is, whether by day or night, under the immediate charge of a Lieutenant as " officer of " the watch." At the present rate of promotion an officer will scarcely pass less than ten years in that rank, and his pay during that time—that is to say, during the best years of his life— is ,£182 a year. There is of course extra pay for the senior Lieutenant of each ship, who is known so long as the ship is in commission as the "First Lieutenant." The duties of this officer are quite beyond description. The only parallel to them would be those of a military officer who was Lieutenant-Colonel of his regiment, and Adjutant as well. In some cases he receives an extra £45, in others only £27. But as in a great many ships he is, by the operation of a strong though unwritten law, expected to defray out of his own pocket a good many expenses (in the way of paint, for instance), all tending to produce that spick-and-span appearance so much admired by shore-going visitors, the extra pay does not count for much. Com- The pay of a Commander is £365. In large ships the Commander discharges the duties PEBSONNEL OF THE BEITISH NAVY. 87 which in a smaller vessel belong to the senior Lieutenant, and is under the orders of the Captain. If in command of a ship himself, he receives an additional £68 a year. The first fifty Captains on the list receive Captains. £602 ; the next fifty receive £501 ; the remainder (about seventy or eighty in number) only £410. The very heavy expenses which fall upon an officer in command of a sbip on a foreign station are met by an allowance of " command money," amounting in some cases to £328, though more generally it is only £191 a year. The absolute necessity of paying some civility to foreign naval officers, and of returning the lavish hospitality of our colonial officials, must be obvious to all. The pay of a Bear-Admiral is nominally £1,095 ; Admirals. in reality about twice that sum, as he receives Table Money to the same amount. There is a very slight increase of pay for the three higher ranks of Vice-Admiral, Admiral, and Admiral of the Fleet ; the last mentioned of whom ranks with a Field-Marshal. The expenses of an Admiral in command of a fleet are very great, and the present rate of pay and table-money is barely sufficient. All the great prizes of the service have been ah the -. prizes of abolished. The command of a foreign station the service . -i " -i i • • - • ' abolished. was in some cases considered to give an income 88 NAVAL POWEES AND THEIE POLICY. of several thousands a year, and out of this it was possible to save something. But an Admiral, however distinguished, must now, unless he have private means, end his days in comparative poverty. "We suppose that no economical reformer, however thorough-going, will be found to contend that after fighting his country's battles, and perhaps after very distinguished Haif-pay. services, the half-pay of a Bear-Admiral should be as little as £456. Vice-Admirals receive £593. By the time an officer has risen to the rank of Admiral he can hardly have served less than half a century, and his grateful country allows him the munificent income of £766. The half- pay of Captains ranges from £228 to £301 ; that of Commanders from £155 to £182 ; and of Lieuten- Lieutenants from £73 to £155. With regard to pay £73 the latter rank, we fail altogether to see how any P iZr£ n ' officer is to live like a gentleman on such an income. We are quite unable to understand the reasoning that a naval officer should have private means.' The argument, indeed, has no force unless it be carried a great deal further, and we lay down a rule that, in order to save the public money, all persons entering any of Her Majesty's services are to look upon their pay as purely honorary ; a mark of public esteem, but nothing more. PERSONNEL OE THE BRITISH NAVY. 89 The fact is, the pay of the Navy was fixed at ^iteration ' -i •/ •> in value of a period when the value of money was much money. greater than it is now. If the worth " of any- " thing be just as much as it will bring," then, looking at what a sovereign would purchase when the present scale was instituted, and at what it will purchase now, the truth would seem to be that the pay of the Navy has been steadily decreasing for years. CHAPTER V. FINANCE. No fresh taxes needed. Natural growth of Revenue. IN recommending a more liberal scale of pay and increased expenditure upon ship-building, we do so without the slightest fear that any but the most extreme advocates of that " economy" which was found in the end to be so costly a year or two since, will be found to differ from us. We would call our readers' attention to some points of our recent financial policy which may perhaps serve to show that a considerable increase in the Navy Esti- mates is not a matter that need frighten anybody. The remarkable letter signed " Surplus " in the Times, a little while ago, only calls attention to a tendency which any clear-sighted observer of public affairs might have seen for himself. We allude to the steady and natural increase of the Eevenue. And this expansion is in an inceasing ratio. From 1840 to 1852 the growth of the Eevenue was at the rate of £1,000,000 a year ; FINANCE. 91 from 1852 to 1859 it was at the rate of £1,240,000; and from 1859 to 1865 the rate was £1,780,000. It is now even greater than that; perhaps as high as £2,500,000 a year. Whilst we are no believers in the justice of an Income Tax, except for a great national income emergency, the yield of a tax of one penny in the pound is an excellent test of the growing wealth of the country, and of the generally expansive power of the Eevenue. When first imposed, about thirty years ago, a penny Income Tax yielded, in round numbers, £750,000 ; ten years afterwards it rose to £1,000,000; in 1865 it yielded £1,300,000; and it now actually yields £2,000,000. With such resources our Chancellors of the Exchequer have naturally had an easy time of it. But unfortunately the office has generally been filled by doctrinaires who looked upon the maintenance of the public service of the empire, not as a glory, but as a burden. Seeing for themselves, as they must have done, unless utterly blind, that there were no indirect taxes (we are speaking of the last fifteen years) which really pressed heavily upon the people, they have nevertheless, in pursuance of a mere idea, flung away one source of revenue after ^° d w ^ s e e d another with such headlong haste that before less Te i a[s - u sion of long there will be nothing but direct taxation taxation. 92 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. to rely upon. What that means the " great "middle class," who for years have blindly cheered the foolish fluency "with which one popularity-hunting Minister after another has expatiated on the advantages of throwing away revenue, will soon find out. And in the event of another European disturbance, and of the inevitable panic, they may be certain that no Minister will dream of taxing anybody but them. If, however, the surplus which seems in our pre- sent condition to be nearly a certainty every year, were devoted entirely, as it should be, to effect- ing those administrative reforms of which we stand so sorely in need, there would be no more panics, whatever the condition of Europe might be, and we should be spared such a miserable see-saw between cheeseparing and prodigality as that, to take a glaring instance, which marked Admits- the years 1869, 1870, and 1871. In 1869 Mr. trative J .... see-saw Lowe announced the reductions in the Estimates generally amounting to £2,261,000 ; " for which," he said, "we are mainly indebted to what I will " call the heroic efforts of the Secretary for War " and the Eirst Lord of the Admiralty." In 1870 there was a further reduction of £2,002,000 in the Army and Navy Estimates. But in July of that year the war broke out between Erance and Germany. In a moment all the savings 1869 — 73. FINANCE. 93 vanished. A supplementary grant of £2,000,000 on account of the war in Europe — in other words to repair the mischief that had already been done — was voted. In 1871 the necessity of at least do- ing something towards making the Army a reality, and of keeping the fleet up to its proper standard of numbers and efficiency, had become painfully apparent to all. The idea suddenly burst upon Ministers that armies and navies were realities, and existed for some definite purpose, and that at any moment their services might be required. The effect of this startling discovery, this rude interruption in the midst of the congenial work of felling upas trees, was such that the most economical of Governments was compelled to announce an increase of £3,487,000 in the Army Estimates, and of £386,000 in the Navy. As for the enormous surpluses at the disposal of Mr. Lowe during his term of office, — in 1870 of £4,337,000 ; in 1872 of £3,602,000 ; and in 1873 of £4,746,000— they were literaUy squandered. s s * u r ^ The reduction of the sugar duties, and the ed - abolition of the shilling duty on corn — a mere registration duty scarcely felt at all, but bringing in nearly a milhon sterling to the revenue — can only be cited as instances of the lengths to which a doctrinaire politician will go ; and we sincerely trust that when supplementary grants 94 NAVAL POWEES AND THEIE POLICY. are proposed again in Parliament,' as it is not impossible they may be, the public will remem- ber that they have been rendered necessary only by the unwise reductions of previous Ministers. Mistaken Nor can we hold the Conservatives blameless policy of Conserva- in this matter. On assuming office they had a great opportunity of putting a stop to this frittering away of the national resources. In- stead of which they carried out the policy of their predecessors, and remitted taxes all round, at the same time that one of their number was complaining of a "phantom fleet." CHAPTER VI. NAVAL VOLUNTEEBS AND COAST DEFENCE. EEOBE dealing with several matters involving a considerable amount of statistical and other detail, it may be well to say a few words on a subject of con- siderable importance. Everybody knows the defenceless condition of our great mercantile Defence- seaports. Nobody supposes that a battery of tfon of'our 32-pounders is a sufficient defence for the ports and incalculable amount of national property lying 8hl PP in s- in the docks at Liverpool. Edinburgh, Leith, Greenock, and other places, are in much the same state. No one, we sincerely trust, can be so simple as to suppose that it will be time enough to think of commencing great batteries of 35-ton guns after war is declared. The ironclad fleet cannot be everywhere at once. Its services indeed will be required for an imme^ diate attack upon the enemy's fleet. But if our adversaries have matured their plans before- 96 NAVAL BOWERS AND THEIR POLICY. hand (and we may be sure they will not attack unless they have), a few days after the declara- tion of war their fast unarmoured steamers will be in our waters. Let one of these vessels get into the Mersey with two or three guns, and the destruction of property in an hour or two would be something inconceivable. To provide against Royal dangers of this kind the Koval Naval Artillery Naval Ar- ° J J tmery volunteers have been instituted. Great forti- Volun- ... teers. ncations are the work of years, but gunboats are built in a very short time. The class of vessel of which the Staunch and Arrow are specimens, each carrying one 18-ton gun, which is raised by steam to be fired, and presenting scarcely any target at all to the enemy's fire, can be turned out from Government or private yards in great numbers very quickly, and we should be glad to learn that more were being built. Some twenty men are required for the gun's crew, besides stokers, and it is obviotis that here is the natural field for the seafaring tastes of thousands of our younger countrymen anxious to be of use in the defence of their country. Mr. Goschen was the first to declare that " if the ports would find the " men, the Government would find the ships," and Mr. Alfred Sebastian Boom has been mainly instrumental in bringing the scheme into working order. The command of the London corps NAVAL VOLUNTEBES AND COAST DEFENCE. 97 was entrusted in the first instance to Mr. Thomas Brassey, M.P., who had the advantage, not always found in a volunteer commanding officer, of knowing something of the work bBforehand as a practical seaman and an officer of the Naval Eeserve.* Corps have been formed at Liverpool, Cor ps m Bristol, Brighton, and, we believe, on the east Brighton, coast. A gunboat now lying oft; Somerset House Coast. as (in place of the old Boyalist) is used as a drill- ship by the corps. She is only provided, how- ever, with 64-pounders ; and to learn the drill of a gun such as they would be called upon to use at sea, the men have to go to the West India Docks, to H.M.S. President. A larger vessel is required for their use ; and if Mr. Ward Hunt should find it necessary to propose a supple- mentary estimate this year, he would do well to remember the zeal and cheerful sacrifice of leisure time made by these gentlemen at their regular drill, and during their annual eighb days' cruise, in which they perform all the ordinary duties of men-of-war's men. But the batteries at present raised are con- fessedly only corps d' 'elite. Something on a much The P re - i i • in a -i ,i sent corps larger scale is wanted. As a nucleus the present °my a nu- cleus. * Mr. Brassey has recently resigned the command of the London corps. His successor is Lord Ashley. 7 98 NAVAL POWEBS AND THEIE POLICY. force is excellent. But in order to render our S^ p fi o S pu- coa sts and seaports, particularly the latter, abso- shouid lately secure, there must be a perfect cordon of serve com- defence in the shape of these corps and their pulsonly. r x gunboats all round the coast. For this purpose the fishing population should be enrolled. As the principle of compulsory service is gradually gaining ground everywhere in England in all discussions upon the army, I think that the very slight duties which I am about to propose for our coast population will hardly be objected to. These men, thoroughly acquainted with the navigation of the coast and with every detail of winds and tides, would be invaluable on board a gunboat, though useless in a square-rigged ship or a large ironclad. There are periods in the year during which their work necessarily ceases, and when they would be glad of the small remu- neration which should of course be given them while they are at drill, or out on a short cruise for gunnery practice. The details of the scheme do not appear to present any particular difficul- ties, and it would be popular on the coast. Amongst the boys particularly, it would stimu- late the desire to enter the Navy, and would Would popularise that service everywhere. The ex- popularise x x ^ the Navy, pense of the pay need not be very great, as it would only be for a short period of every year NAVAL VOLUNTEEES AND COAST DEFENCE. 99 the duration of which, after the men had passed a certain examination, would, of course, be re- duced. But a considerable expenditure on gun- f^p^e r ° for coast boats of various kinds adapted for coast defence, defence x ' necessary. for their engines and armament, and for the pay of the officers, petty officers, stokers, and a few blue-jackets, would be necessary ; and if the present Government would only pluck up a little courage and ask for the money, Parliament, we are convinced, would readily vote it. CHAPTER VII. OUR IRONCLADS. |N giving particulars of the dimensions, armour, armament, engines, speed, and cost of the principal ships of the British Arrange- Navy, it may be well to divide those ships as fol- ment m J ' J r three lows : — I. First Class Ironclads. II. Second classes : Modem Class Ironclads. III. Unarmoured Cruisers. ironclads ; -it pi it- • older As the words lme-of-battle-ship and frigate cruisers. ' have lost their original meaning, and as first-rate still means a ship " of 110 guns and upwards," we think it best to divide our fighting ships into the three classes of, firstly, ironclads which may be said to come up to modern requirements as to armour and armament ; secondly, ironclads which do not ; and thirdly, cruisers. But in regard to the latter, the extraordinary edict which has deprived these vessels of their proper means of offence leaves us in doubt whether they should be classed amongst fighting ships at all. With their former armament there would have been no OUE IRONCLADS. 101 question about the matter. Fighting of course at comparatively long ranges, their powerful guns would have enabled them to hold their own against all but the most powerful ironclads ; and their other advantages — speed, handiness, Unarm- ■ oiirsd capacity to keep the sea for a length of time, ships. and good qualities under canvas — need not be dwelt upon. We are very strongly of opinion, that not only should vigorous parliamentary and public pressure be brought to bear upon the Government to rescind the order in question, but that the whole subject should be tho- roughly ventilated of what unarmoured ships can do in the way of attack. And we do not doubt tbat a solution of the question lies in the abandonment of the broadside gun altogether, Abandon- and the substitution of guns fought on a turn- EJ-oadsfde table. This would enable unarmoured vessels guns- to carry guns of much greater power than at present. It should be understood that the step would not necessarily involve the fitting of massive turrets to every ship. The speed given in the tables which follow Ketums of must not be taken, we are afraid, as a true indi- measured* cation of the ordinary performances of each ship, The trial trips of vessels over the measured mile at full speed, with specially chosen coal, special stokers, and every possible circumstance of wind mile delu- sive. 102 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIE POLICY. and weather in their favour, are notoriously delusive. The subsequent trial in the Channel, with the ships' ordinary stokers and coal, is of course more accurate ; but in dealing with ironclads, it must be remembered that the bottoms of these vessels get fouled very quickly, and that not many of them have their boilers in such a condition as to stand the effects of incessant use during a long blockade. Mode of Some surprise may be expressed at a mode classifica- pi •_c j l* i ■ i • i n i t tionex- ot classification wnicn includes vessels so dis- piamed. s j m ji ar an( j f g^^ unequal power as the Mon- arch and the Repulse, or the Hercules and the Penelope, in the same section. Our object, however, is to place in one group all those ironclads which are intended to serve a par- ticular purpose. The armament and armour of the Inflexible will both be so exceptional that she is entitled to a section by herself. The The Dreadnought, Thunderer, and Devast- nought, ation are at present the most powerful men- iJIflnd of-war in the world ; and as the last-named Timn erer vesge i j^g cached the Mediterranean in safety, and seems to be fulfilling the ordinary duties of a cruising ship very satisfactorily, we are justi- fied in believing that her sister ships will be found equally useful. OUB IRONCLADS. 103 The Dreadnought is considerably more power- Essential- u •/ J- differences ful than the Devastation and Thunderer. Her in design of the armour is in general two inches thicker, and she Dread- ■-it i t nought will be faster. The Devastation and Thunderer from the have a central superstructure, which has led to a vessels. comparison between these ships and a " fiat iron "upside down." This superstructure, without which life in these vessels would, we im- agine, be impossible, is of very thin iron; and the first thought of anyone looking at it is the rapidity with which it would be blown away bodily in action by a single broad- side. It is from this elevated platform that the ship is to be directed and fought by her officers. In the Dreadnought the thin central superstructure will be replaced by a strong armoured tower, brought out to the full breadth of the ship, rising, that is, directly from her sides, and large enough to berth within it all the officers and crew. Her armour will be more immersed, especially forward. All three vessels having low forecastles, a serious diffi- culty has arisen as to the anchoring gear. In the Devastation and Thunderer the cables are brought in over the forecastle ; in the Dreadnought they are brought in under- neath. Amongst the masted ironclads specially in- 104 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. The tended for service in distant waters, trie Monarch Monarch. certainly stands first. She is for many reasons the most effective ship in the British Navy. The steady platform afforded by her turrets for her four 25-ton guns, without the drawback of the low freeboard of the Captain; her speed and good qualities generally, are such as to make us wish that, instead of building Sultans, we had re- peated the Monarch type. And here we would again urge upon all who are interested in securing for their country ber proper place at the head of the maritime nations, the import- ance of at once agitating for the abolition of the broadside gun, and the substitution of the turn-table, turret, or en barbette systems, — not only as securing a steadier platform at sea, but as enabling us to mount much heavier guns in all our ships, whether armoured or not. Broadside Nothing ties the hands of our naval architects wSTthe 6 so much as this necessity of building ships to naval 3 ° £ carry heavy guns on a broadside. The ships architect-. cann0 ^ jj e anything but very large. A certain space being necessarily reserved amidships for hatchways, funnel casing, and the like, the guns on each side must also occupy a certain space. The beam of the ship is thus deter- mined, and the length must of course be correspondingly great. To build a vessel of OUE IEONCLADS. 105 moderate size carrying heavy guns under such a system is impossible. The Alexandra, Sultan, and Hercules are The ships of great power and fairly good steaming ""nciads. qualities. The two last mentioned are almost sister-ships to the most recent broadside iron- clads built for the German Government. The five ships of the Audacious class, and the Pe- nelope, are excellent vessels for ordinary cruising purposes, and their armament of 12-ton guns would enable them to meet the great majority of foreign ironclads on terms of equality, or, in many cases, of superiority. The Bepulse, though only a converted wooden line- of -battle ship, wonld probably be found equal to any calls which would be made upon her, whilst employed, as at present, as flag-ship in tbe Pacific. The Glatton, Hotspur, and Bupert constitute The ' , T r . Glatton, another section. The Glatton carries two Hotspur, 25-ton guns in one turret, and is an excellent Rvpcrt. specimen of a turret ship. She cannot, how- ever, be ranked with the Devastation and her sister ships ; whilst, at the same time, she is considerably superior to the Cyclops and her consorts. For offensive and defensive power she may fairly be placed alongside of the next two vessels on our list, the Bupert and Hot- screws. 106 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. spur. These vessels are specially designed as steam rams. The four turret ships of the Cyclops class are very good examples of what such vessels should be, except in one respect. It is doubtful if their draught of water be not too great. Twin- In reference to the double or "twin screw," it should be remarked here that a ship can be propelled, if necessary, by one of these only, should the other be disabled, the two sets of engines being separate. The advantage of rapid turning, especially in action, which this arrangement affords, is obvious. It is, how- ever, a disadvantage when the ship , is under canvas, as the screws cannot be lifted. We have already discussed some questions connected with the future of fast unarmoured ships carrying powerful guns, and deplored the extraordinary edict which has deprived every one of these vessels except the Inconstant of their armament of 12-ton guns. There is, however, still time for the mistake to be remedied, and in any case the ships themselves are comparatively easy to alter. Whether it would not be wise to build some smaller vessels — smaller not only than the Inconstant, but even than the Volage — depends, in our opinion, upon whether we persist in retaining the broadside gun. For reasons OUR IEONCLADS. 107 already stated, this plan necessitates a large ship to carry the large gun. But if the broadside gun be discarded, the power of unarmoured ships will be very greatly increased, perhaps doubled. Vessels such as the Inconstant might carry the Size of ° J guns. 25-ton gun or even the 35-ton gun. It is neces- sary here to remind the reader that the alterna- tive presented to us is not necessarily broadsides versus armoured turrets. If it were, the naval architect might well pause before finally aban- doning the broadside principle. But the gun can be fought in a variety of ways which we have already discussed ; and the invention of hydraulic loading-gear will prove an immense assistance to designers of men-of-war in the future. Closely connected with the question of size, is that of speed. To reach the highest rate of speed Great and to maintain it for any time in a vessel ^States adapted for warlike purposes, great size is indis- §? e e at pensable. This is undisputed, and indeed indis- putable. If the supplies of money are to be limited, then we ought to follow Mr. Brassey's advice and build two Volages capable of steaming fourteen or fifteen knots, rather than one In- constant capable of steaming sixteen or even seventeen knots. But considering all the cir- cumstances of the troubled times in which we live, the evident determination of other powers 108 NAVAL POWEES AND THEIR POLICY. not to allow our supremacy to pass unquestioned, the enormous trade and colonies in every quarter of the globe which we have to protect, it is scarcely credible that Parliament, if Mr. Ward Hunt will only speak out boldly, could refuse suf- ficient supplies to build both, for both are required. unar- iphe vessels at present answering to the modern mourea -"■ ° cruisers, description of an unarmoured cruiser are de- scribed in detail in the following list. For pur- ■ poses of classification we have placed the older ironclads next to the newer and more powerful vessels, to enable the reader to see at a glance how many ironclads of all descriptions we possess. As a matter of fighting power, the fast unar- moured ships, if properly armed, should occupy the second rank. One of There is another of these vessels building, seis Se '' the Bacchante, of 2,679 tons and 700 horse- m ng- power. Looking at the growing power of the naval gun, and the probable development of the. moving torpedo, there is no need to point out at any length how utterly insuffi- cient is the number of these vessels. There is our gigantic trade to be protected, and that of our adversaries, if necessary, to be swept off the sea. Nor is this all ; for whether the building of ironclads be continued or not, we must continue to build unarmoured ships. And OUR IRONCLADS. 109 if the increased power of weapons of offence should threaten, as it seems to do, another naval revolution, or, to speak more correctly, a counter revolution, would it not be well to be prepared for the change, and to anticipate foreign powers Thirty of i i • them re- by at once laying down twenty or thirty un- quired to armoured cruisers, of different dimensions, for action of different kinds of service, and all designed to p°owS. carry a few of the heaviest armour-piercing guns, as well as some 64-pounders. 110 I.— FIRST CLASS In Five Sections :— A, the Inflexible ; B, First-Class Turret Ships ; C, Masted Turret Name of Ship. S g 11 ID O spe> S3 ,3ow it Ratio. Draught of Water. 6 »■ 1? a 1 it to $5 |3 ■8 J i I i S3 " 9 A *i Inflexible ft. 320 ft. in. 75 4-30 ft. in. 23 ft. 25 in. tons. in. 24 to 16 B 2 Dreadnought, late ) Fury ... \ Thunderer Devastation 320 63 10 5-14 26 6 27 5,030 14 3 4 285 285 62 3 62 3 4-58 4-58 26 2 26 2 26 26 3 3 4,407 4,407 14&12 14&12 C 6 Monarch 330 67 6 5-74 22 7 26 5,102 10 & 8 6 Sultan 325 59 5-50 24 10 27 6 5,234 9 to 6 7 Alexandra 325 63 8 5-10 26 26 6 5,300 12 & 8 8 Hercules 325 59 5-50 23 26 5 5,234 9to3 9 Belleroplwn 300 56 531 21 26 4,270 6 10 11 12 13 14 15 Snriftsvre Triumph Audacious Invincible Iron Dvhe Penelope 280 280 280 280 280 260 55 55 54 54 54 50 5-09 5-09 519 5-19 5-19 5-20 24 1 24 2 22 22 22 15 9 26 26 23 23 23 17 2 2 4 3,893 3,893 3,774 3,774 3,787 3,096 8 to 6 8to6 8 to 6 8to6 8 to 6 6&5 16 Repulse 252 59 1 4-26 25 4 26 2 3,749 C&4J D 17 18 19 Glatton Hotspur Rupert 245 235 250 54 50 53 4-54 4-70 4-72 19 19 21 6 19 20 23 8 6 2,709 2,637 3,159 14 to 12 11 to 8 14 to 9 E 20 21 22 23 Cyclops Gorgon Hecate Hydra 225 225 225 225 45 45 45 45 500 500 500 5'00 16 6 16 5 16 5 16 5 16 16 16 16 5 5 5 5 2,107 2,107 2,107 2,107 10 to 6 10 to 6 10 to 6 10 to 6 It must be underatood that this ship is not completed. Ill IRONCLADS. Ironclads for Distant Service ; D, Glatton, Hotspur, and Rupert ; E, Second Class- Ships. S.S 2« 17 to 25 18 to 15 18 to 16 18 to 16 12 12 to 10 12 to 10 12 to 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10&11 side 31 in. tht. 18 to 20 15 to 12 14 to 10 11 to 9 11 to 9 11 to 9 11 to 9 GUN9. 4 4 4 2 8 4 2 10 8 2 4 (10 i 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 81 -ton. 38-ton. 38-ton. 35-ton. 25-ton. 6^-ton. 18-ton. 12-ton. 25-ton. 18-ton. 18-ton. 12-ton. 64-ton. 12-ton. 6£-ton. 12-ton. 12-ton. 12-ton. 12-ton. 12-ton. 12-ton. 12-ton. 25-ton. 25-ton. 25-ton. 18-ton. 18-ton. 18-ton. 18-ton. Horse Powek. ■a .g a 1,000 800 800 1,100 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,000 800 ,800 800 800 800 600 800 500 600 700 250 250 250 250 8,000 '8,000 5,600 6,649 7,842 8,629 8,000 8,000 6,312 4,913 4,892 4,021 4,832 4,268 4,703 3,347 2,868 3,497 4,200 1,660 1,670 1,755 1,472 tons. 1,700 1,700 1,700 1,700 600 600 600 600 560 45Q 450 450 450 450 450 240 300 350 120 120 120 120 11 ■a.a <»eh T T T T T T T knots. 14-0 14-0 14-0 14-0 14-9 14-13 14-0 13-8 14-05 13-75 14-07 128 14-09 13-6 12-76 12-28 12-1 12-65 13-6 11-03 11-14 10-9 11-2 269,000 245,000 245,000 300,000 280,000 310,000 280,000 256,000 197,000 197,000 174,000 174,000 200,000 113,000 195,000 144,000 125,000 169,000 119,000 116,000 112,000 114,000 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 112 II.— SECOND CLASS In Five Sections :— A, Warrior, Black Prince, Achilles, Minotaur, Northumberland, Defence. D, Wooden Ironclads. E, Abyssinia, Magdala, and Cerberus. and Prince Name of Ship. S J* -S3 ■°% 5 n SB 1 a 1 H m i 8 Draught of Water. d § 1 "g 3 •p ■< H u ft. ft. in. ft. in. ft. in. tons. in. A i Warrior 380 58 4 25 6 26 5 6,109 4* 2 Blach Prince 380 58 4 26 4 27 3 6,109 H 3 Aeliilles 380 58 3 25 10 27 2 6,121 H 4 Minotaur 400 59 3 25 10 26 10 6,621 H 5 Northumberland . . . 400 59 3 25 10 26 10 6,621 64 6 Agincourt ... 400 59 3 25 10 26 10 6,621 • 6* B 7 8 Pallas Favourite 225 225 50 46 9 18 3 19 3 24 3 22 3 2,372 2,094 H 4i C 9 10 11 12 Hector Valiant Resistance Defence 280 280 280 280 56 5 56 3 54 1 54 2 24 25 10 23 9 24 3 25 7 26 10 26 25 6 4,089 4,^063 3,710 3^720 44 44 44 44 D* 13 14 16 16 17 18 19 20 Caledonia .. Royal Oali Prince Consort Occam, Royal Alfred Lord Clyde Lord Warden Zealous 273 273 273 273 273 280 280 252 59 2 58 6 58 5 58 5 58 5 58 9 58 9 58 7 23 6 23 8 23 8 23 6 24 24 6 24 6 24 6 26 9 25 8 25 8 26 9 25 6 26 26 26 4,125 4,056 4,046 4,047 4,068 4,067 4,067 3,716 44 44 44 44 6 44 & 5J 4J & 54 44 E 21 22 23 Abyssinia Magdala Cerberus 225 225 225 42 0' 45 45 1 13 13 13 14 2 14 8 14 2 1,854 2,107 2,115 6-7 on ship 7-8 on breastwk. 8-10 on turrets The Abyssinia anc . Magdah i were bui t for the permanec t defence of Bombay : F ' Research, 1 Viper, | Vixen, Waterrvitch, Enterprise, 1 Scorpion, [ Wivern, { Prince Albert. J * In the Chapter of Suggestions at the close of this volume will be found 113 IRONCLADS. and Agincowt. B, Pallas and Favourite. 0, Hector, VaUant, Resistance, and F, Research, Viper, Vixen, Waterwitch, Enterprise, Scorpion, Wivern, Albert. Guns. Horse Power. ■i I* " a .a £ GGtri * 02 W O -s If i a •J f . CO a •0 a in. 18 110 (16 12-ton. 6J-ton. 1,250 6,469 800 s knots. 14-35 282,000 1 18 IS 12-ton. 64-ton. 1,250 5,772 820 s 13-6 283,000 2 18 1" 12-ton. 6 J -ton. 1,250 5,743 620 s 14-3 375,000 3 10 I 1 ? 12-ton. 64-ton. 1,350 5,722 650 s 14-33 371,000 4 10 110 J16 12-ton. 64-ton. 1,350 6,G21 650 s 15-46 360,000 5 10 I 10 (16 12-ton. 64-ton. 1,350 6,867 650 S- 15-43 363,000 6 22 26 8 10 9-ton. 9-ton. 600 400 3,581 1,773 s s 13-05 11-83 144,000 122,000 7 8 18 18 18 18 18 18 16 16 64 -ton. 64-ton. 6^ -ton. 64 -ton. 800 800 600 600 3,256 3,560 2,428 2,537 s s s s 12-3 12-6 11-8 11-6 238,000 264,000 209,000 203,000 9 10 11 12 SO 80 30 30 30 31* 31 i 30J 24 24 24 24 18 18 18 20 64-ton. 64-ton. 6|-ton. 64-ton. 64-ton. 64-ton. 64 -ton. 6 i -ton. 1,000 800 1.000 1,000. 800 1,000 1,000 800 4,092 3,704 4,234 4,244 3,434 6,064 6,706 3,623 s s s s s s s s 13-0 12-0 13 13-0 12-36 13 43 13-5 11-71 213,000 189,000 174,000 202,000 222,000 212,000 236,000 170,000 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 10 10 10 4 4 4 18-lon. 18-ton. 18-ton. 200 250 250 1,500 1,369 92 120 120 T T T about 9 knots 113.000 113,000 113,000 21 22 23 the Cerberns for the permanent defence of Mt lbourne. Allt aree are tur ret-ships. These vessels are of little use as ironclad The Research, however, still figures a part of the effective strength of th Mediterranean squadron. i. s e some remarks in reference to the use to which these vessels may he put. 8 114 p Pd ts o S n w 8 M *§ P -S O s S GO rt | «i fc s P o © O o o o © © © o o o o X o o o © o o ■HTiH jo ^boq ^ CO 00 ©" lO iq o CO CO t- t- o I— I i-H i-H rH i-H m lO lO o o © o © 'paadg o 3 to CD lO to lO »o *a 'M.aiag 9[Stttg *g w 0Q CO CQ CO 03 w. 03 to lO o O © O © "proo u CO CO U3 © © o © £ r-l rH uaqomfci CO CO * lO * O O ■pj-e-ttioj rH 4qSirar(I j ■* CO . CO * d 1Q ~¥ a "o IQ IQ to ■ai'BpiGTpngdiaj .s° O T— 1 o o ua;> Avpq . ■* ' CO o i^uai * 3 5 Friedland Richelieu Flandre Gauloise Gvyenne S § 8 1 Provence Revanche Savoie ■s 8 •3 ■| s <3 Si 1 Heroine Couronne * Marengo 7^ QJ T3 3 a. *P98dg g CO "1^00 Tons. 226 TBuiraojj; *J8M.0Cl-98J:0H 450 JiQJOg QlSUIg 'g 0Q aOI^dlJ089Q '.Teqnmhi ■3irj3[0'Ba ■pi'BAlJO^; 'ii^pesja B.Ti3xtiotpu0(Liej; U99iwq.9q I ^3 I •I 3 £ 131 w. m < i— i P o m H o o I ft P3 $- 32 <1 I-H o p i— i w essels, ex- e convex- 1 ■s O 1 CD > 8 1 Purchas- i United Generally =A a fail- « « .3 * 13 CD 1 ■a § . 53 *3S rCl ft « 'd rH ? a> s _, P? S S" Pi ° * 03 CO *d f=l 'a © CC 5 pi <1 N ■paatlg i IO IO IO IO O O a (N CN CO I— 1 i— I I-H i-H i-H § o o O O O o •I^oo CO CO o EH i-H r-1 i-H i— 1 ' rH t- ■fBTnnio^ o o CO CO o CO o CO o o O IO o o 'j&Aioj-gsjoH 1Q lO to *0 iO CM o •jiaiog stStirg -g EH H H H H H 02 d d d d d d d d aoiq.c[Lios9(i o o -p -p o -p -p ■p -p -p -p s 5f is -S CO ^ K| ffil 8 1 a s 4 % r3 w ■a w (D <1 CS h-1 rQ o 60 M W % H cfl PI P O tH O CHAPTER X. THE AUSTEIAN NAVY. Third iwfraj^LTHOU GH the third place among the amongst W®M El navies of the world belongs by right ravle™ iJlMLll *° Turkey, in virtue of the number ri e ghtfo by an< ^ power of her ships, we have placed Austria Turkey. nex t to France by reason of her having gained the only naval victory of modern times. What- ever may be the size and weight of metal of Austrian ironclads, the nation which produced Admiral Tegethoff, and whose officers did not hesitate Tegethoff. ° ' to ram with wooden ships against ironclads, must always hold a high place among naval powers. The qualities chiefly conspicuous at Lissa were those without which all the scientific shipbuilding, steam capstans, steam steering- gear, watertight compartments, and steel " prows," of modern navies are of no avail. The annexed table gives the particulars of the principal vessels of the Austrian navy. THE AUSTRIAN NAVY. 133 There are, in addition, gunboats, wooden screw frigates and corvettes, paddle steamers, sailing ships, and boys' training ships. The Austrian Navy on the peace establish- Personnel of Aus- ment last year was manned by 6,000 officers and trian seamen, and 900 marines. In- time of war the total number would be raised to 13,000. The conscription exists, but the Government rely mainly upon voluntary service, especially in the province of Dalmatia. Pola is the principal naval port of the Empire, and Trieste the chief arsenal. The Navy Estimates for 1874 amounted to Austrian £1,014,081. expendi- ture. 134 H 3 « s ho * CD ^ ^ S .n .Sri* 00 CO§| sN „c8: fc« fr! flai' d ^ =i 3 ti ffl.2^ja S i^ 3 SiO m *3> W A * £ rfl ri 03 H p. fe- ci. 3 H •p99dg O O CO IQ IQ U3 Ifl CO 00 00 00 p O CO « fc- 00 a M ^ '-' 1— 1 >o 1— ( ^h tH O - G3 t~ r-fN He 1-1 I-H CD CD O ■loqttmK 00 OO O -*H -* r> ** CO 00 OO CO OO OO CO CO £cq i-< CN CN (N (M 1—1 ■"i ^ I - * r ~ i ' _l 10 U2 O O O ^ a _g p«(3 CrC a> -2 0) £ CD q3 T3 * 3 ^ <1) "S CO Pi com 0) ■3 O a Tt CD CO (=1 14 a 1*5 S rH ■n & C5 ■8 d u to 03 ^ 1 O T) +=> § IS s a hi) a * 03 60 0)53 is fl 0) rM <1> O 0> ho C9 CD r- a 5 1 •s O O p< IS r^ I) ■a ■s ^ B _^i c3 P. t3 03 0) c« +3 III fl 1 ■4J 3 M ^J rt «H CHAPTER XI. THE TURKISH NAVY. jE have already, in our criticism upon trie Personnel position of the Naval Powers, alluded Turkish to the Turkish fleet as very powerful, NaTy " and have described several of the principal ships. The following table will give, we hope, a correct description of the fighting strength of the Otto- man Empire at sea. The Turkish Navy is manned by 30,000 seamen and 4,000 marines, raised partly by con- scription and partly by voluntary enlistment. In the estimates for 1874-7$, the expenditure Expendi. tare. for the Navy was fixed at £909,090. The method of classification we have adopted Armament in the following table is somewhat arbitrary, S Mp" owing to the fact that some of the smaller ships carry heavier guns than the large ones. We have, for reasons frequently given in the course of this work, placed these vessels, though only 136 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. reckoned as " corvettes," amongst the larger ironclads. They are said to be of great speed, and are aboirt the same size as our own ships of the Encounter class, or only a very little larger ; yet they carry four 12-ton guns, mounted in an armoured battery admitting of a right ahead and right astern fire. We would remind our readers that there is no reason why vessels of this size should not carry two 18-ton guns, besides a few 64-pounders for firing at troop- ships or merchantmen, if the principle be once conceded of mounting the gun amidships. We believe that a still heavier gun might be carried were ships of this size, whether armoured or not, designed and adapted for the purpose. For destruction of an enemy's commerce- a very few 64-pounders would suffice (and these all our men-of-war should carry), whilst, with a fair rate of speed and a couple of genuine armour-piercing guns, it would puzzle a large ironclad to capture them. Against the very large number of in- sufficiently plated vessels whose names are recorded in these tables, .three 18-ton guns or two 25-ton guns (for we see nothing impossible, even in this armament, if the broadside principle be abandoned) would perhaps give the smaller ship the victory. We have placed the vessels, therefore, in the order of their armament. 137 w M P H w R Q, O) §«§ CD f* R 8 ° I S B 2 & •a a? +3 O f-( P P c: "■ v- fl> no ^ § -ffl j^ to — CD OJ .a s • s- JhT3 g,g § CU £'w UJ r— '-^ -4J CO -

-Of— I lQHCO"*'«*^-*H-* i— t-rH rH"* C^rHr-( CNr— ii— icMtNcMCNcN ^■(M CN O O O o ;©ooo .5 i-H r-i rH '- 1 >-< ^ • r-i •-» i-H rH •jtioraiv CO to : oj =£ <4J c go co co eo c« 'VY o oooo JO ' 00 O t- CO OO OO o CO to to CO CD •p-IttAUO^ .a w s S5 -^ -^ -* ^ CO o o to ■ t- 1C *G b- CN I-H I-t I-H I O OO O O to to CO to to r. .. r. c. *. si^jnotpugdiaj U99M)9q .9 ° O OOO O IiSOOiO CfT CO CO CO s :!> t3 s ►5 B " ell I 6 o § ^tSJ-^l^!^ -^ 1> ^ "S .s ^ c^ ^ ^ to s I ^ fq S g : : Political impor- tance of the Ger- man fleet. German ships on broadside principle copied from Her- cities and Sultan. CHAPTER XII. THE GERMAN NAVY. N the early part of this work we have alluded to the political importance of the German fleet, being as it is an undoubted proof that the ambition of the great military states is not bounded, as in former times, by the sea. We shall content ourselves in this place with giving the particulars of each iron- clad. If the principles of naval construction em- bodied in those two magnificent ships the Sultan and Hercules be sound, then the German Navy is second only to those of England and Turkey. In building these vessels Mr. Eeed endeavoured to combine all the best qualities of the old wooden cruiser and the modern ironclad* It was an attempt worthy of a man of genius. It partially succeeded. Accustomed to think of ironclads as shapeless monsters of the deep, a visitor is struck with their magnificent appear- THE GERMAN NAVY. 139 ance, which is greatly enhanced by, if not princi- pally due to, the line-of-battle-ships' masts and spars with which they are fitted. The battery on the main deck, with its eight 18-ton guns, is a sight not easily forgotten. But since they were launched (the Hercules in 1868, the Sultan in 1870) the gun has been steadily asserting its power over the iron-plate. The moving torpedo may render the use of the ram, or indeed any fighting at close quarters, too perilous to be often resorted to, and a naval battle may thus be fought at long range. In this case armour will be of some use. But in a long-range battle Couldnot none of the German ships built on this model hold their L own could hold their own against the Dreadnought, against Devastation, and Thunderer, nor against the ^ret . . ships. Peter the Great, to say nothing of the Inflexible. The turret ships would have the additional ad- vantage of a steadier platform for their guns. The attempt to combine all good qualities in German a ship armoured from end to end, and carrying meXmis- broadside guns, must be given up. There is no ^^™ reason, however, we believe, why a vessel pro- *^ Ig tected by strong armour entirely concentrated at the vital parts, and carrying her guns on a rational principle, should not possess them all. The Germans, we fear, are destined to experience the same feeling of mortification which we our- 140 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIB POLICY. selves must endure from time to time as. the gun goes on winning .victory after victory over the armour, and as time continues to show how ex- ceedingly fragile is the life even of the strongest ironclad, how delicate and unstable is the frame- work upon which the massive armour and pon- derous guns are placed. The German fleet possesses no vessel of the Inconstant or Volage type ; the naval authori- ties, however, appear to share the presentiment which unquestionably is floating through the public mind in England, of. a coming change in naval architecture. Ge~man The amount voted for the Navy last vear was Navy J J estimates. £2,600,000. Personnel. The personnel consisted of 5,500 seamen and boys, and 1,500 marines. Conscription is the rule, but every effort is made to procure volun- teers. It must be remembered that the seafaring population is large ; according to one account, 80,000. German The three ports of the Empire for naval pur- ports- poses are Kiel and Danzig on the Baltic, and Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea. The last- mentioned port and dockyard are on a large scale. Powerful It will be seen from the ensuing table that the '' armament of the fleet is very powerful ; but it THE GERMAN NAVY. 141 is extraordinary that the Government do not seem to be aware of how much more powerful it might be, especially for long range firing, by the adoption of some of the arrangements to which we have alluded. Three ships, said to be about equal to the vessels Kaiser, are building. U1 ing " We have included in one list a number of vessels of different build, size, and armament, in order to give the reader at a glance the whole strength of the fleet as regards a general engage- ment at sea. 142 ,JB •5' S M W 3 s "IT CO o fl o 2"£3^s +3^ QJ 6 C3 n* bS S, H t a o-g £ 3.3 SS 3 a 3 S/eSus ■paadS •jl3nraio£[ IN IN 4h co ■ttoi^duoaoa as as aa aa c a go a n OO OO OO QO oo oo o o 0OO5 Q0O5 OO^wQO^«o6'^l«NcA Cft Cft i— I i— I i— I CO r- I CO r-l CO r-H O O -4J 4J C 2 3 o o o ■*? 'Til CS OS He* xh mh t* in •«* in ■* cq Q01C (> b- •■OTn^treg ri # =3 o =8 IN O •3 \monuy ■wv & & jg o o !r r-l r-l OS 00 4i 4 .9 » o est IN ao •t[(pi33.ia jo uoi^odojj i— I i— I o •9Tn9J^xg; •mpiaaaa o IN •siupaoipnatLroj nsoVfeq 1JI|3U91 .9 <= . o * 2S co © 00 cs IN IN O IN •w K k«? cj .a a i« 3 I s IS $ 1 eo •£ S'B O GO ■S - Sfek^ ^^^ " jSfe WugL »^^\ Hk£hh H|§ IP *■ -=^^ **= - JSbm ^ayr^*"jCjii e SESamcSt «S^^S@ CHAPTER XIII. THE ITALIAN NAVY. HE personnel of the Italian Navy con- Personnel sists of 13,130 officers and seamen, Navy. and 3,000 marines. The sum voted for the Navy in the budget for Na ?r ^ u estimates. the year ending the 31st December, 1873, was £1,780,000. We regret that we have been unable to insert a column recording the speed of all the principal vessels in this fleet ; but we have only been able to obtain the following particulars : — Ancona, Regina Maria Pia, Castelfidardo, and San Martino, 13 knots ; Palestro, Varese, Terribile, and Formidabile, 10 knots. 144 •lutmnoii o o o o © o o O o © o © o o o o o S o o XQAMO& 3Sj:oh 05 cs OS OS l> t- t- t> t- CO ■* ci a a a PI PI pi a Pi a a Pi a a ■nonjduosad o o +3 -f» Hi* o o +3 -4J o o ■+1 -*J o -t-3 -u £ -(J S CO IN CO .9® CD CO CO o O O © o © CO "WY t IO -=* rH (N cq Sim ir- '■£> © CO •pXBMJO^ - tmSniucE co **H -* as os as as CO CO t» •HN CN £ '-S ii 5 'S 3 2 Ml I CHAPTER XIV. THE SPANISH NAVY. HE Spanish fleet was manned in 1870 Personnel i-, <-.,-^ i s- ns\s\ • of Spanish by 7,350 seamen and 5,800 marines. Navy. The seafaring population are liable to conscription, and the number of men so avail- able, between the ages of eighteen and thirty, in the year above-mentioned was 66,000. The expenditure on the Navy for the year Expendi- ending the 30th June, 1871, was £965,210. The Numancia and Vittoria are the two most "^fj^t powerful ships in this fleet. The built at Cartagena. She is 313 feet 7 inches in length between the perpendiculars ; breadth 57 feet ; draws 26 feet 7 inches of water ; armour plates 5 inches thick, with 15 inches of backing ; nominal horse-power 1000 ; carries 740 tons of coal ; speed 13 knots ; armament 6' 18-ton guns, 3 9-ton, and 16 7-ton. The Vittoria is 316 feet between the perpendiculars ; 57 feet in breadth ; draws 27 feet ; armour 5| inches, with 10 inches 10 mancta former was * nd . ru ~ tona. 146 ,NAVAL POWERS AND THEIE POLICY. of backing ; nominal horse-power 1000 ; coal carrying capacity and speed about the same as the Numancia ; armament 4 12-ton guns, 3 9-ton, and 12 7-ton. The Te- The Tetuan, Arapiles, and Sagunto, are vessels ArapUes, f 1000 nominal horse-power ; 4£-inch. armour ; Sagunto, zaragom, armament 2 18-ton guns, 5 9-ton, and 10 7-ton. and Reso- ° lucion. The Zaragosa and Besolucion are each of 500 horse-power, but we have been unable to obtain any further particulars. There are, besides the above, 90 unarmoured .vessels, not including sailing ships. CHAPTER XV. THE RUSSIAN NAVY. |HE Navy Estimates for the year 1872 Russian J u naval ex. amounted to ,£2,845,105. penditure. The personnel of the service com- Personnel. prised 60,230 sailors and marines. As the majority of the Bussian ironclads are turret- ships, mainly intended for coast defence, and whose crews are, of course, comparatively small, this large total most probably includes the garrisons of some of the Baltic fortresses. 148 THE RUSSIAN las Name op Ship. 8 H * a. s CO u IE -*3 ■a i s o 1 1 n ft. in. ft. in. ft. in. ft. in. in. in. 1 Peter the Great 321 64 22 9 24 9 14 10 2 Admiral Cieagoff 260 43 6 19 2 19 2 6&5 16 3 Admiral FSjiiridoff 260 43 6 19 2 19 2 6&C 16 4 Admiral Lasareff. 260 43 6 19 19 5&4.1 16 5 Admiral Greig 260 43 6 19 19 5&4* 16 G Alexander Nrfeki 285 6 48 19 23 6 7 Cazodejha, 210 6 42 11 9 11 9 5 8 Jluiallta 210 6 42 11 9 11 9 5 9 General- Admiral 285 6 48 19 23 6 10 Perm 200 46 10 11 11 6&4 10 n CocMin 200 46 10 11 11 6&4 10 12 Stn'UU 200 46 10 11 11 6&4 10 13-15 Vescium and two others 200 46 10 11 11 6&4 10 16 Sevastopol 300 50 10 24 26 H 9 17 Kniaz-Pojarsld 280 49 24 26 4* 14 & 9 18 Pervenetz 220 53 14 6 14 6 H 10 19 Sinertcli 182 38 10 6 10 6 6 k V, 12 & 8 20 Tyfon 200 46 '0 10 6 11 6&4 21 Latnielt 200 46 10 6 11 6&4 22 Luca- 200 46 10 6 11 6&4 23 TJragan 200 46 10 6 11 6 & 4 24 CmcuLAn Monitors. Kiev 120 120 13 13 18 12 & 9 25 Novgorod 101 101 13 13 12J 12&9 Several ships of the Inconstant class are building. The Russian frovernment depend a good deal on English ;.rtisam. 149 NAVY. GrUXS. 4 4 6 6 f 4 12 ■•a 35-ton 36-ton 35-ton 25-ton 25-ton 9-ton 6$-ton 9-ton 6^ -ton £ 5-ton 36-ton 35-ton 35-ton 1 2-ton 12-ton 32-pdrs. 32-ton 40-ton 25-ton It o u "> J ■&P.H 33 Eh "3 o O k Pn-g CD 3 03 O HI tons. T 900 1200 T 300 400 T 300 400 T 300 400 T 300 400 950 900 480 200 1000 900 S 210 160 S 210 160 s 210 160 s 210 160 s 800 s 800 s 265 300 200 200 T 160 T 160 T 160 T 160 6 screws 480 6 screws 480 Remarks. Not yet completed. Very 1 similar to Dread- > nought. ) The limited supply of coal and weak engines of these vessels is their weak point. They are all turret" ships. Sheathed with wood, j Fixed turret. En \ barbette fire. J < Turret ships. (Fixed turret. En bar- ( bette fire. Turret ships. Turret ship. Turret ships, chiefly adapted for coast de- fence. {Sheathed with wood. One fixed turret. En barbette fire. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 r 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ire very much hindered in shipbuilding by the want of skilled labour, and * Most probably 12-ton guns. CHAPTER XVI. THE SCANDINAVIAN POWERS. Danish naval ex- penditure. Ironclads. I. Denmark. HE expenditure on the Navy for the year ending 31st of March, 1875, was £240,000. With so moderate an outlay the maintenance of a large naval force would, of course, be very difficult. The Danish fleet possesses six iron- clads, of which two, the Peder Scram and the Dannebrog, are converted wooden ships of 600 horse-power. The Odin is the most powerful vessel of the remaining four. She is 235 feet long between the perpendiculars; 48 feet 6 inches beam ; draws 16 feet ; armour 8 inches and 5 inches thick : nominal horse-power 500 ; speed 13 knots ; armament 4 18-ton guns. The Bolf Kralce is 98 feet 3 inches between the perpendiculars ; 38 feet beam ; draws 10 feet ; armour 4| inches ; nominal horse-power THE SCANDINAVIAN POWEES. 151 240 ; speed 10| knots ; armament, 2 9-ton guns. The Lindormen and Gorm are protected by 5-inch plates and armed with 2 18-ton guns. All these are turret ships, except the two converted vessels. There are in addition a good many unarmoured ships and gunboats. II. Sweden and Norway. The total sum voted for the united naval Nav ?' - e * m penditure forces of Sweden and Norway for 1874 was of Sweden ana Nor- £530,000. way. The ironclad fleet of Sweden and Norway Turret . ships of consists of twenty-one turret ships, of which none light draught. draw more than 12 feet of water. I hey are small vessels carrying either one or two guns about equal to our 9-ton gun. fiffltt-&>s8i *r$% lliai 3^& IBljykj&S SgSFCj^ <*H> W&S&. W$iA ^^» ^K^»j£QLn WiMt kj^Ss Naval expendi- ture of Holland, ? 1 B 3 CHAPTER XVII. THE NAVY OF HOLLAND. HE expenditure on the Navy for 1874 was £891,208. 153 1-^ O W fa o w H m M M to 3 to GO K +3 +3 -p 4-> +a -+j pj Q 0) co : : tpSuari s CO o o co o ^^ : * : :'l j- , o ^ r_ ^ ■ .a aj . s s -45 : &d 02 14 T3 fc -» aQ ►H rrf 1 1— 1 cS > i — i O Pi en X PS o 9 cs ■rH O •rH w o CD PI crl w £ » O 02 Ph PI •rH CD h3 < PI o CD fH H o cc X o c6 £ is o CD CD p — 1 6 rC| s H w [ Single fixed \ turret, on ■/ Mr. G. C. J Mackrow's ( principle. •psadg knots. 13 ■TBtmnoji 'jOALOj 98.TOH 300 TTO tons. 150 'A\9.ID£ EH to to •uoT^dijosad 12-ton. o \iaqumtj CM ■suppua -■ O •jnota.iv to .5 & tjilSn'BiQ ft. in. 16 •pjBAUO^ ft. in. 14 'oraej^xg ft. in. 33 U9S n?inoipuecT.tej ft. in. 200 a a o o 1 H >> pi H CHAPTER XIX. BEAZIL. SjHE nominal strength of the military Personnel and naval forces of Brazil is very Brazilian great. The actual strength as evi- Navy- denced in the war with Paraguay is considerable. The peace establishment for the Navy was fixed in May 1869 at 4,000 men, to be raised to 8,000 in time of war. The Navy possesses sixteen ironclad vessels, without counting the ironclad floating batteries, and four ironclad vessels in course of construction. Of these sixteen iron- clads, four are of 300 horse-power, carrying from four to eight 150-pounders each, and six of 200- horse-power, carrying from four to eight guns, 68 or 150-pounders, and six of 100 horse-power, carrying one 150-pounder each. The Navy of Brazil consists chiefly of ironclad Small vessels of moderate dimensions and ligbt draught ironclads - for service in Brazilian waters. Their arma- ment consists, as a rule, of 150-pounder, 120- 156 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIE POLICY. pounder, and 70-pounder Whitworth guns. The Independencia alluded to in the early part of this volume has not yet been sufficiently repaired to leave the shores of England. The injuries sus- tained by this ship, though not so great as at first supposed, must have been very considerable, as many months have elapsed since her launch, and she is still here. The estimated naval ex- penditure for the present year is £1,288,000. KV\^i i^sfe® j»_ X. fc^^jSp k ¥0i ^«98kS i«H ST m CHAPTER XX. CHILI. HE most important vessel in the Chilian Aimh-ante Navy is the Almirante Cochrane, &nAVal named after the late Lord Dundonald, parau '" built in England after designs by Mr. Eeed. She is iron built, 210 feet, long by 45 feet beam, with armour of eight and nine inches, and armed with six 12-ton guns. A sister ship, the Valparaiso, is nearly completed. She is building at Hull. The Chacabuco and General^? Cha \ ° camtco and O'Hiqqins are each of 1,100 tons ; 218 feet 6 General in length, by 33 feet 4 inches in breadth ; 300 horse-power ; speed 12 knots ; armoured with 4-inch plates at the water line. The naval expenditure in 1872 (the last year Expendi- of which we have been able' to obtain informa- tion) was £206,600. CHAPTER XXI. PEBU. Peruvian Navy. The Inde- pendencia, Atahnalpa and Manco Capao. HE ram Independencia is the most powerful ship in this fleet, which is not numerous. Her armament con- sists of two 7-ton guns and twelve 70-pounder Armstrongs. The monitors Atahualpa and Manco Capac, were purchased from the United States. They carry three 500-pounder guns,* and possess a singular defence against boarders in an arrangement for throwing jets of boiling water. * Probably smooth-bores, of American pattern. CHAPTER XXII. ARGENTINE CONFEDERATION. |.WO gunboats, built at Deptford by Messrs. Rennie for this Government, deserve notice. Tbey are only a little larger than our own vessels of the Staunch and Arroio type, but each carries a 26-ton gun which is loaded by hydraulic machinery. The range and penetrative power of this weapon would render these gunboats (named the Bermejo and Pilcomayar) very formidable in action. When will England adopt this great and, as we think, vital principle of heavy guns in small ships ? Argentine Confedera- tion. New gunboats armed with the 26-ton gun. Exem- plify principle of a heavy armament in a small ship. CHAPTER XXIII. NAVAL GUNS. A man-of- war is a floating gun car- riage. Muzzle- loading versus breech- loading. Method of construct- ing Wool- wich guns. HE idea of an invulnerable ship has now been so thoroughly exploded that few will be found to differ from us when we describe a man-of-war as a floating gun-carriage. A short description of the nature and penetrative power of the guns in use in our own and foreign navies will not therefore be out of place. The guns now supplied to Her Majesty's ships are all muzzle-loading and rifled. Many eminent men are in favour of breech-loading. But it appears to us that we possess in the present Woolwich guns (built on the Armstrong system as modified by Mr. Fraser) weapons which answer every conceivable want of modern artillery, and possess in addition the invaluable warlike quality of simplicity. The method of construction employed is now too well known to need much description. A long thin bar of NAVAL GUNS. 161 iron is drawn from the furnace red-hot, and coiled round a mandrel \ other coils of various sizes complete the gun. The fibre of the iron is thus arranged to run round the gun, and explosive bursting is impossible. Great care, too, is taken in "shrinking on" the various parts, so that all the coils shall bear their part in resisting the shock of the explosion. It is believed that a gun of this kind is twice as strong as a gun of the same size made of one solid forging. The interior of the gun is lined with steel, which is the best material for standing the strain and friction of a rifled barrel. In the days of cast iron guns, not longer ago than the siege of Sebastopol, a gun struck on the outside by a shot was disabled; for a piece corresponding to the part indented was pushed into the barrel. Of course the slightest graze siifficed to render the gun unserviceable. With a steel lining this is no longer possible. Like many other inventions, this originated with the Chinese. Guns captured in China may be seen at Wool- wich, constructed on this principle. The process of construction of a Fraser gun is exceedingly simple. The inner steel tube is first bored out of a solid ingot, and then toughened in oil. The coils are then shrunk on. The trunnion- ring, owing to its shape, cannot be coiled ; it is 11 162 NAVAL POWEKS AND THEIR POLICY. therefore bored and formed out of a solid forging of wrought iron. The cascable is also a forged block of wrought iron, and is screwed in last of all. lb should be explained that the steel tube is placed upright in a pit, and the first coil, which is too small to go over it when cold, js expanded by heat and dropped down on the steel tube, which it grips in shrinking as it gradually becomes cold. Then the gun is in- verted, and the large breech-coil (itself formed of several coils) is shrunk on in the same manner, and lastly the cascable is screwed in. It is quite needless to dilate upon the enormous strength of a gun thus constructed. A few breech-loading guns are used in the British service, but both by sea and land the muzzle-loading system has now been definitely adopted. In small arms the advantages of the breech-loading arrangement are of course very great, although it is highly probable that a much larger proportion of shots are thrown away than was formerly the case. The saying has been attributed to Count Moltke, that the breech-loader would demoralize every army in Europe except the English and the Prussian. But with great guns, and especially the guns now in use, greater rapidity of fire, even if obtained, which is doubtful, by breech-loading, NAVAL GUNS. 163 is not a paramount object. It is difficult to adduce any good reasons for once more re- opening the controversy on this subject, and for changing our present system of naval ordnance. In such immense guns as the 38-ton or the 25-ton, the breech-loading apparatus is so heavy that there is no rapidity gained in handling the gun, whilst with muzzle-loaders eight rounds can be fired in six minutes ; which, in all probability, is much faster than any ship would be called upon to fire in action. With projectiles weighing 700 pounds, a few well-directed shots or broad- sides would be more effective than a rapid fire. But the contention of the Duke of Somerset and Lord Lauderdale (whose opinions, in the one case as those of a tried naval administrator, and in the other of a gunnery officer of great experience, are entitled to the highest consider- ation), is this : that by loading at the breech, instead of at the muzzle, a heavier charge can be used, the powder chamber being larger than the barrel; and moreover that the guns' crew are entirely concealed whilst loading. But we do not think that these arguments, powerful as they may be, are sufficient to induce us to recast our whole system of gunnery. 164 3 a $ OS rn rt en Ti p. u SI ■3 t>> _y O O © lO o bo--* 53 g,a o "T3 ■? o 28 4-- f 4H C3 O O P =h bo O ft'So -i So I" 2 .So« "S3 I"? O M-d * a S gg.g ■Sofl o 5 p. a i-S P.h o o 3 .9 ►» O ' jo" Nop 17! CO C5 O OS 0O 1— 1 (N co ® fl R ■3 d ej id P-lOOQO t, s a> 51 ° C3 o rt 5 ^ d (fl ra O ja 03 cc co £h co ^ a 03 03 £3 w h 00 03 OJ 03 PhOooO a § § 1 Cj s ft it 1 03 o Jq 03 03 a -e 3 ■uno ■aiqT^O M™ I 165 ■§ io *o CN rH iO CO-* U5^(MO i-l «»: iocqoi' & § a ED H & (So SS5S .g Is S< 3 a g & .a a oj os ca o 0-3 • 111 Q0QO If art CD O id o3 o«ao Mi's DflinO o .a .a to CO -a 02 o T-l l l 4j ^ CO CO 'o d 2 P 5 a d bxi QJ i OS «-yco ni 2 «J a 1 5 166 NAVAL POWEES AND THBIE POLICY. One of the most serious defects in all armoured ships is the very small "margin of protection " left even when a plate has resisted the shot. Gutton We therefore recall the Olatton experiment of me P nt?with July, 1872, at Portland.* ^; ton The hull of the Qlatton is protected by 12-inch 5f!hch iron plates on wood backing. The side of the loo^ards. turret against which the shots were fired has curved plates 14 inches thick, beneath which there is teak backing 17 inches, and a skin of two |-inch plates; supported by strong horizontal and vertical girders, and an inner lining of J-inch plate. The gun selected was not the heaviest in the service. It was the 25-ton 12-inch gun, and was fired from the Hotspur at a distance of 200 yards. First shot. The turret was struck three times. The first shot hit the top of the turret, cutting away two stanchions, second The second shot struck near the horizontal results, joint of the 14-inch plates, forcing them 3 inches apart ; the point of the shot penetrated through the 14-inch plate, making a vertical split through it ; the inner lining was stripped off * This account is taken from Colonel Owen's well-known and exhaustive "Modern Artillery." NAVAL GUNS. 167 behind three vertical ribs which were bent, and one broken ; the double skin was distorted and cracked ; a heavy bolt-head was driven through the skin, and a large number of rivet-heads were forced off into the interior of the turret. The third shot struck the glacis-plate, andj^ d rebounded on to the lower armour plate, which it penetrated to a depth of 13J inches. Thus none of the shot actually entered the tur- General J summary ret, and the gun-carriage and turning-gear of the of resulfcs - turret itself were uninjured. But it is believed that if two of the shot had struck nearly in the same place (an effect easily obtained by firing a concentrated broadside), one would doubtless have passed into the turret. These results were obtained by firing at a Probable results 14-inch plate. Another part of the turret and against the hull of the ship are covered with 12-inch plates of plates, and these could easily be penetrated even ship. by the 18-ton gun. What the 35-ton gun can do may be best Expert- J ment with judged from the following description : — In June, 36-ton gun 1872, this gun was fired at a range of 70 yards is-mch against a total thickness of 18| inches of iron, and twelve inches of wood backing. This powerful target, much thicker than the sides of any man-of-war yet launched, was completely penetrated by the head of the shot. 168 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIE POLICY. General As a general rule the power of the Woolwich rule to ° n . \, . _, estimate guns has been estimated thus : — The gun, at tive power 1000 yards range, can pierce an iron plate wich guiis. rather thicker than its own calibre; the 10-inch (or 18-ton) gun piercing a plate rather more than 10 inches thick, the 9-inch (or 12-ton) gun a 9-inch plate, and so on. At 200 yards they are estimated to pierce a plate 1 inch thicker than the calibre. Time re- The time required to manufacture a Woolwich manufac- gun is stated by Colonel Campbell, in a report of May, 1875, to be one week for each inch of calibre ; the manufacture of a 7-inch (6J-ton) gun occupying about seven weeks, and so on. To this rule the 12^-inch (38-ton) gun would be an exception. Cost. The cost of the guns now used in the British service is about £70 a ton. They are much more economical than those of either Whitworth or Krupp, which cost about £170 a ton. NAVAL GUNS. 169 Section II. The guns used in' the French naval service French are breech-loaders. They are made of cast iron, &on mth strengthened behind the trunnions with steel steelrmgs ' rings shrunk on. The following table* gives the particulars : — FRENCH NAVAL GUNS. ■ CHARGE. Projectile.* Weight. Calibre. Battering. Service. Battering. Service. tons cwt. inches. lbs. lbs. lbs. lbs. Canon de 27 o. m. 21 13 10-82 66-2 53 476 310 „ 24 13 16 9-45 62-9 353 317 220 19 „ 7 17-6 7-64 27-5 176 165 115 „ 16 „ 4 18.5 6-48 16-5 11 99 69-5 * The armour-piercing projectiles are of steel, and pointed. Flat-headed shot are used for close quarters. All the projectiles have copper studs. A 34J-ton gun has lately been added to this p ren ch list. The calibre is 12-6 inches. The projec- j^*"* 011 tile weighs 760-5 lbs., with a charge of 136 - 69 lbs. of large grained powder. * Owen's "Modern Artillery," p. 549. 170 NAVAL POWEKS AND THEIE POLICY. Section III. German Bteel guns. The heavy guns used in the German service are breech-loaders, and are made of steel. They are as follows : — GEEMAN NAVAL GUNS. Gun. Weight. Calibre. Highest Charge. Projectile. Tons. Inches. lbs. lbs. 17 c. m 6-00 6-796 25-35 123-0 21 c. m. short 8-86 8-236 37-48 217-2 21 » long 9-74 » 37-48 217-2 24 „ short 14-52 9-268 62-91 306-4 24 » long 15-26 H 62-91 306-4 26 > 21-65 10-236 70-55 415-5 28 > 27-07 11-024 88-18 516-9 Prismatic powder- is used. NAVAL GUNS. 171 Section IV. The Kussian guns are breech-loaders. The Russian, heaviest guns are of steel. The following are the particulars : — EUSSIAN NAVAL GUNS. Calibre. Projectile. Weight of Gun. Common Shell.* Shell. tons. ewt. inches. lbs. oz. lbs. oz. 3 15 6-03 93 96 (steel) 7 8 8 195 195 „ 8 16 8 195 195 „ 7 3 8-5 196 2 200 13 (hardened iron) 14 12 9 300 300 (steel) 25 11 11 431 550 „ * It may be well to explain that common shell are not available against iron plates. The sides of the projectile simply form a case for a large bursting charge. The shell, when exploding, breaks into many fragments, and its effect against a body of men, or between decks, is very destructive. The steel or hardened iron shell is, in all navies, used to fire against iron plates. A comparatively small space is occupied by the bursting charge ; the piercing of the plate being the principal object, the pro- tectile, therefore, must be strong. Note. — Guns of 40-tons have been supplied to one of the new circular monitors, but we possess as yet no details. 172 NAVAL P0WEBS -AND THEIE POLICY. Section V. American cast iron smooth- The guns used in the American service are smooth-bores, and are made of cast iron. There 8- can be little doubt that the ordnance of the United States stands almost as much in need of reconstruction as the Navy. The following table gives the particulars : — AMERICAN GUNS. Weight of Gun. Calibre. Charge. Weight Shot. Weight of Shell. Remarks. Service. Maximum. tons. 51-42 inches. 20 lba. 100 lbs. lbs. 1000 lbs. (For land service | only. 44-64 20 100 1000 - 18-75 15 35 60 400 16-07 7-14 13 11 40 15 20 280 170 224 130 • For sea service. 5-35 10 124 16 125 100 7.36 10 40 ... 125 100 21-91 15 50 440 330 \ 14-61 6-72 13 10 30 (15 shell 1 18 shot 300 127J 224 100 > For land service. American The rifled guns of the United States are the rifled ° guns. 10-inch, 8-inch, 100-pounder, 30-pounder, 20- pounder, and 3-inch 10-pounder. CHAPTER XXIV. EEMAEKS ON THE AMERICAN NAVY. UE readers may perhaps have experi- Want of enced some surprise at not finding the ironclads. United States included in our survey of the naval powers. Our reasons for not describ- ing their fleet in detail are, that it does not con- tain sea-going ironclads of great power ; that the great majority of their armoured vessels were hurriedly built or adapted for a temporary emer- gency, and were chiefly intended for river service in the war of 1861-1865 ; and that the Wam- panoag, a vessel of the Inconstant class, though capable of a high rate of speed under steam, only attains it by the sacrifice of almost every other quality. It is even said that in order to steam at full speed for any time, half the crew have to be sent ashore. We believe it was the report of the wonderful speed of this vessel which led to the building of the Inconstant. There are nominally forty-eight ironclad ships Total in this Navy ; of these only ten are of more than sMp^ er ° f 174 NAVAL POWEES AND THEIR POLICY. Defective iqoo tons, and all are under 2300 tons. The moder- system of _ ' armament a fc e s i ze f these vessels, however, is not the point upon which we desire to dwell so much as their defective system of armament, which consists of cast iron smooth-bore guns of very large calibre, — a system condemned all over the world, and superseded by rifling. And of Tn e svstem of armour-plating is also unsound. armour. * jr o It is known as the "laminated" system; a number of thin plates being substituted for one thick one. It has been demonstrated, that 4 inches of solid armour are equal to 6 inches of the laminated, in other words 6 1-inch plates. There is no vessel in this fleet capable of meeting even the Sultan class, and none to be compared with the Dreadnought, Thunderer, and Devastation. There are sixty-three unarmoured vessels, many of them of considerable size. These ships are precisely on a par with the fleets of ships which may be seen laid up at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and the Medway. There are signs of activity in the present administration of the United States Navy, but it will be a work of time to bring their fleet up to the European standard of strength. ships Of the ironclads, 24 could be quickly got fOTservice ready for sea. Of the wooden ships, 39 are fit for service. EEMAEKS ON THE AMEEICAN NAVY. 175 There are 11 vessels on the stocks, mostly of sm p, 3 . ' J building. moderate size. The power of the United States at sea lies Real • • p c source or rather in the sea-faring tastes of so many of the American population ; in fact, in the English blood in their sea. veins. They are excellent seamen, and their readiness of resource and invention in modern warfare were abundantly displayed in the war. Vessels were converted into ironclads almost at a moment's notice, and were immediately dis- patched to the seat of war. What an unar- moured ship can do is shown in the astounding career of the Confederate Alabama. We have frequently, in the course of this work, expressed our views on the subject of armour and armament, and our opinion of ironclads in general is not very favourable ; but a very sufficient answer, we think, is given to those who clamour for the immediate abolition of every kind of pro- tective armour by the war we are discussing. The want of powerful ships to drive off the blockading fleet and fight on the rivers caused the downfall of the Confederate cause, quite as much as the operations of the Northern armies. It is surprising that the Navy of the United States should have been so neglected of lafce years. An effort, however, is now being made to increase it. CHAPTER XXV. SUGGESTIONS. HAT the armament of Her Majesty's ships should, as a rule, consist of a few very heavy guns in preference to No vessel a greater number of light ones. We would sug- sidered a gest that no vessel should be considered a line- battieship of-battle ship unless she carried the 25-ton gun. the 25^011 The growth of artillery will speedily render some sun ' such rule as this inevitable, and it would be well for the authorities to recognise the fact. At present, with our mixed squadrons, one ship carrying the 35-ton gun, another the 18-ton, and several the 12-ton and 6§-ton, the maxims that the speed of a fleet is the speed of the slowest ship, and that the strength of a fortress is the strength of its weakest point, will necessitate the fleet engaging, under all circumstances, at a range at which the heavier guns will have no advantage. Thus our unrivalled artillery, upon which by land and sea we have always prided ourselves, will be but of little use to us. SUGGESTIONS. 177 The opinion of naval architects should be asked as to the practicability of adapting such of our present ships as fall short in this respeet, to the reception of a heavier armament. II. This brings us to the question of sea- sea-going going turret ships. The loss of the Captain ships. is, we suppose, the reason why no masted turret ships have been built of late years. But why has the design of the Monarch never been repeated ? III. We venture to submit that the present Arbitrary hard and fast line which is drawn between tion be- " armoured" and "unarmoured" ships should inured*" disappear. It is to this cause that we owe the mour 1 ^" fact of fighting qualities (so far as a general jj^ddis- engagement is concerned) being so seldom found a PP ear - in the same design with good sea-going qualities as a cruiser. We would suggest the construc- tion of partially armoured ships ; and as this is essentially a question of detail, the following system of protection might be tried, especially in vessels of moderate dimensions. As fighting bows-on must certainly play a pro- ^ns lor minent part in the naval engagement of the ^eifo"/ future, an armoured bulkhead might be con- ^j^m structed towards the fore part of the ship," £s htin s x r ' bows-en. 12 178 NAYAL POWEES AND THEIB POLICY. running to a point as in Mr. Mackrow's "fixed turret," but with the additional advantage, if pos- sible, of constructing the sides of a curved shape ; two sections of an ordinary dish-cover would best illustrate our meaning. This curved and pointed bulkhead protection should extend from a little below the level of the waterline, through all decks, to a level with the hammock-nettings. It would have, we believe, this great advantage, that it could be .fitted to a fully armoured, par- tially armoured, or altogether unarmoured ship ; and it is especially to the third that we recom- mend its adoption. Vessels We doubt if its weight would be anything close to very great ; it would certainly be much less inaction than that of the endless series of plates now babiy™ generally affixed to the broadside. The majority broadside's of these are nearly vertical, and when two ships, by ml^ endeavouring to use the ram or the torpedo, pass gu'nf n°i close to each other, broadside to broadside, we may be pretty sure that the majority of guns now in use will pierce the armour opposed to them. Of course the moment the ships are engaged in this manner the bulkhead will cease to be a protec- tion. But it has this advantage, that such pro- tection as it affords is genuine protection, even at comparatively close quarters, and can be fitted to all kinds and sizes of vesesls. in use. SUGGESTIONS. 179 TV. In our remarks upon the Inflexible we Fighting have shown that we do not endorse the view, smaifves- which has heen somewhat hastily adopted of much ° late, that large ships are a mistake. But there looked, has undoubtedly been a tendency for some time past to relegate all vessels below a certain ton- nage to what we may term outpost duty, and to ignore their claims as possible elements even of the "first line." Of course a small ship costs much less and is built in a much shorter time. And there is no reason why an ironclad should necessarily be large, whilst, as drawing less water, small ironclads would be of the greatest ironclads service on many stations ; China, for instance, stations! 11 * That a small and yet powerful ironclad is possible is evidenced by the Vasco da Gama, built a short time since at Blackwall for the Portuguese Government by the Thames Iron- works Company. She was designed by Mr. Mackrow, and her guns are protected by his " fixed turret ; " which is also to be found in the small Greek ironclad King George. This is not circular, as in ordinary turret ships, but more re- sembles a breastwork, running to a rather sharp point forward; the shape of all others best adapted to deflect a shot. Her armour is ten inches in thickness on the turret, and nine inches elsewhere. Her armament consists of two 18-ton 180 NAVAL POWfiBS AND THEIE POLICY. Cescrip. guns, one 6^-ton, and two 40-pounders. Her vhswda* nominal horse-power is 450. Here, then, is a vessel whose guns, though fewer in number, are equal in range and penetrative power to tho" of the Sultan, and whose armour is as thic And yet she is only a corvette. She is a litl over 200 feet in length, forty feet in breadth, ton- nage 1497. She is expected to steam thirteen knots. The shape of the pointed turret enables her to deliver her fire whilst bows-on to the enemy ; and in this position she will present but a small target. could V. The Warrior, Black Prince, Northumber- Warrivr, land, Minotaur, and Agincourt, are fast vessels, ftftTsister' fairly well armed, but encumbered with armour converted which is almost useless against the guns which moured" 7 " nave been steadily growing in power since they cruisers? were DU iifc, Would it not be possible to remove their armour-plates altogether, and thus convert them into fast and powerful cruisers ; consorts, in fact, of the Inconstant class ? »Con- VI. A number of wooden line-of-battle ships iToutfads converted into ironclads still encumber the u^dfo£ e Nav y List > Tneir uselessness is patent. Why menu" uo ^ devote these vessels to experimental pur- SUGGESTIONS. 181 poses ? Much future expense might be avoided by this means. The experiments should range over the whole field of naval warfare. The effect of fire delivered at an angle, the effect of concentrated broadsides, and the relative de- struction effected by Palliser and "common" shell bursting between decks, and the actual effect of torpedoes upon a large ship (the Oberon experiments being scarcely conclusive), might in this way be accurately ascertained. The artillery experiments on Dartmoor some months since should be copied in one respect ; dummies, that is to say, representing men being placed round the guns, at the helm, and in other places. VII. In regard to the personnel of the service, increaseof we recommend an increase Of pay both for men Sma and officers : for the former that we may retain ° those ten years' men who now quit the service, to its great detriment, at the end of that period ; for the latter that the public service may be to them what it has never yet been, an adequate provision for life. It should be remembered Foreign n • .1 n navies bet- that foreign navies, though their importance to ter paid their .respective countries is much less than own. ours, are much better paid. In regard to the training of officers, if a college is to be built, we 182 NAVAL POWERS AND THEIR POLICY. trust that arrangements may be made for entering our would-be Nelsons on its books at ten years of age, and that such rudiments of seamanship as a fisherman's boy picks up when quite a Training child may be instilled into them early ; these ers- things, in fact, should be second nature with them. The French, Spanish, and Italian lan- guages ought to take precedence of historical and classical subjects, if any choice in the matter be necessary ; naval officers in all parts of the world being constantly in want of two of these, and the third being very useful in the Mediterranean. The Eoyal Naval College —^University we think it should be called — at Greenwich would in after times enable an officer to study, at his leisure, the subjects necessarily excluded from the practical curri- culum of the other establishment. Our views on this subject have, however, been dwelt upon in an earlier chapter., In conclusion we would deprecate the practice into which the press seems to have fallen, of casting contempt and ridicule upon the officers of the Navy on account of one or two accidents. We believe that the criticism recently passed upon our officers is unjust, and that the general condition and efficiency of the service as a means of national defence, the professional ability of SUGGESTIONS. 183 the officers, and the discipline and seamanlike qualities of the crews, stand now as high as they have ever done in its long and glorious history. ARTICLES BY THE SAME AUTHOR $U |»tttt$'$ l|lftgs*itt* ^ f #d ifwfliw ^tfifofc rfl'.E EUPHRATES VALLEY RAILWAY. January, 1874. KBIVA AND THE EASTERN QUESTION. February and March, 1875. INKERMAN AND ITS LESSONS. April, 1875. PERSONNEL OF THE BRITISH NAVY. JULY, 1875. IS AN ANGLO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE POSSIBLE ? August, 1875. MAKERS AND BREAKERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. Sep- tember, 1875. CAN WE SUPPORT TURKEYt 'October, 1875. THE LOSS OF THE "VANGUARD." November, 1875. OUR MEDITERRANEAN POLICY. January, 1876. ■