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^^t 
 
 J- 
 
 THUCY^^OF^ 
 
 AN-nOUE E IIST., 
 
HISTORY 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK 
 
 THUCYDIDES. 
 
 BY WILLIAM SMITH, A.M. 
 
 XBOTOR or YSH BOLT TRINITY IN CHESTER, AND CHAFLA.IN TO THE RIOET HON. THE EARL OF DERBT. 
 
 \ 
 
 A NEW EDITION, COKRECTED AND EEVISED. 
 
 NEW TOEK: 
 SOLD BY BANGS, BROTHER, & CO., 13 PARK ROW. 
 
 1852. 
 
GENEEAL PEEFAOE. 
 
 Thtjctdides did not estimate his great work above its value wlien he 
 said it should be " an eternal possession." It has proved to be so. In 
 the whole range of ancient and modern historical literature, there is no 
 composition evincing a more conscientious regard for truth and justice, 
 or more concise, explicit, and uniformly satisfactory. Himself a man 
 of good family and the most thorough cultivation, and at the same time 
 an inquisitive actor in the Peloponnesian "War, which is the subject of his 
 great performance, he possessed every advantage for his office, and 
 every claim for the most unquestioning credit. He devoted twenty- 
 seven laborious years to the exhibition of the events of a similar period. 
 All his pages show scrupulous care and diligence in ascertaining facts ; 
 and his strict attention to chronology, and the importance he attaches to 
 it, fn^e proofs of his accuracy. He has no superfluous words ; and when 
 we consider how much his investigations must have cost him, we can 
 not help admiring the self-denial with which he is content to give us 
 theii" results, in naked brevity, without ornament, and without parade of 
 his personal importance. 
 
 Thucydides makes few reflections in the course of his narrative ; but 
 occasionally he has a chapter of political and moral observations, ani- 
 mated by the keenest perception of the motives of action and of moral 
 character. His opportunities, his talents, his personal qualities, and the 
 nature of his subject, all combined to produce a work which stands 
 alone, and, in its kind, has neither equal nor rival. His pictures are 
 frequently striking and tragic, from his severe simplicity and minute 
 particularity, as in the description of the plague in Athens, and in the 
 incomparable account of the Athenian expedition into Sicily and its 
 melancholy termination. Everywhere, his style is concise, vigorous, 
 energetic, and signiflcant. 
 
 Thucydides has been translated into English by Nichols, Hobbes, 
 Smith, and Bloomfield ; but, while all the versions in our language have 
 excellences, that of Dr. Smith is admitted by all judicious critics to be 
 decidedly the best in literal and artistic fidelity, and in every quality 
 desirable in such a performance. The present edition combines the 
 latest corrections, and is as perfect, at least, as any ever printed. 
 
 JSTew Toek, 1852. 
 
TO 
 HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS 
 
 THE PRINCE OF WALES. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 The History of Thucydides hath been studiously read and admired by the greatest 
 princes, and may therefore presume to lay some claim to the protection of your Royal 
 Highness. Great Britain, of all the states now existing in the world, most nearly 
 resembleth what Athens was at the time when the war, which is the subject of it, 
 broke out in Greece. A love of liberty, which hath erroneously been supposed to 
 thrive and flourish best in a democratical government, was then warm and active in 
 every Athenian. Athens, it is true, had thus been raised to a great height of maritime 
 power, and was become a very formidable state : but faction disjointed a noble plan, and 
 at length brought on the loss of her sovereignty at sea. The Athenians soon ceased to 
 be great, when they deviated from those salutary maxims, which their worthiest patri- 
 ots and most consummate statesmen had recommended to their constant observance. 
 
 The maritime power of Great Britain is more substantially founded, and hath ever 
 been more steadily supported, than was that of Athens. The most complete and most 
 lasting form of government that man can invent, happily subsists in this realm under 
 your Koyal Grandfather. The British constitution hath long been, and may it long 
 continue to be, the envy of other nations ! For the future support of it, the public 
 hopes and expectations are fixed upon your Royal Highness. Long may his Majesty 
 your Royal Grandfather live to secure the freedom and happiness of his people, that 
 your Royal Highness may become equal, in every respect, to the same great and glo- 
 rious charge ! 
 
 I have a heart duly sensible of the great honour conferred upon me, by being thun 
 permitted to profess myself. 
 
 Your Royal Highness's 
 
 most devoted and 
 
 most humble Servant, 
 
 "WILLIAM SMITH. 
 LoNnoN, 1753. 
 
SOME ACCOUNT 
 
 O F 
 
 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS 
 
 O F 
 
 DR SMITH, 
 
 BY THE REV. THOMAS CRANE OF CHESTER. 
 
 William Smith, son of the Rev. Richard Smith, Rector of the church of all Samls 
 and Minister of St Andrews, in the city of Worcester, was born in the parish of St 
 Peter's Church in that city, on the 30th day of May, in the year 1711. He was educated 
 in grammar-learning at the College-School in his native city, where he made great 
 proficiency in his studies. In January 1725-6, it pleased God to deprive him of his 
 father. On the 27th day of November, 1728, he was matriculated at New College in 
 Oxford ; where he took the degree of Bachelor of Arts, in June, 1732 ; and that of 
 Master, in July, 1737. 
 
 Soon after he had taken his bachelor's degree, his merit caused him to he recom- 
 mended to the Right Hon. James Earl of Derby, that great patron of arts and sciences, 
 and he was retained three years in his lordship's house, in the office of Reader to his 
 lordship. His connections with my lord of Defby introduced him to the honour of being 
 known to several other persons of fortune and quality ; which was of singular service to 
 him in his progress through life. 
 
 A gentleman by birth, blessed with an excellent capacity and education, and having 
 ready and easy intercourse with the great and good, it is no wonder that he was adorned 
 ■with manners most polite, with literary accomplishments most splendid and solid, and 
 with morals becoming a faithful servant of the holy Jesus. Well qualified for the work 
 of the ministry, he took deacon's orders at Grosvenor Chapel in Westminster, on 
 Sunday the first of June, 1735, from Benjamin, Bishop of Winchester. On the 10th 
 of September following, he was presented by his patron, James Earl of Derby, to the 
 Rectory of Trinity Church in Chester. On the 14th of the same month he took priest's 
 orders in the Cathedral Church of Chester, ffom Samuel, the bishop of that See: was 
 instituted the same day, and inducted the next. ^ 
 
 Mr Smith's first publication was * " Dionysius Longinus on the sublime ; translated 
 from the Greek, with Notes and Observations, and some Account of the Life, Writings 
 and Character of the Author:" in one volume 8vo. ; inscribed to the Right Hon. the 
 
 *Tlic fourth is the best edition of Longinus. The Dean corrected two copies of the third 
 edition; the one for the printer to follow, the other for himself to keep; the Dean's copy I 
 possess. I showed the Dean Mr Toup's criticism of his translation. The Dean, knowing Toup 
 to be in the wrong, thought him not worth answering : he said, " I followed Pearce, and Pearce 
 is the best. I shall take no notice of Toup." The frontispiece to Longinus describes the power 
 of eloquence : it was delineated, not by a professed limner, but by Dr Wall of Worcester, an 
 eminent physician, i 
 
vi LIFE OF DR SMITH. 
 
 Earl of Macclesfield. The anonymous author of "the History of the Works of the 
 Learned," for May, 1739, says of this work :— " The Translation of Loiiginus is, accord- 
 ing to the most impartial judgment I can frame of it, after a comparison with others, 
 the most elegant version that has been made of that author into the English tongue. 
 The Preliminary Discourse excels that of the celebrated Boileau, which he has prefixed 
 to his edition." Father Philips in " A Letter to a Student at a foreign University," 
 published 1756, recommending, among other books, Longjnus on the sublime, says : — 
 " A late English translation of the Greek critic, with notes and observations by Mr 
 Smith, is a credit to the author, and reflects lustre on Longinus himself. As conver- 
 sant as you are in the original language, you cannot but be highly pleased with this 
 performance." In the " Weekly Miscellany," by Richard Hooker, of the Temple, Esq. 
 No. 363, dated Saturday, Decembers, 1739, we read:— Mr Smith, Rector of Trinity in 
 Chester, "justly deserves the notice and thanks of the public for his version of Lon- 
 ginus on the sublime. Though the learned will not be satisfied without tasting the 
 beauties of the original, which cannot be translated in all their perfection, yet they 
 may reap benefit and pleasure from the judicious sentiments and ingenuity of the 
 Translator, in his account of his author, and from the notes which help to illustrate the 
 text, and discover the excellency of the rules. To the unlearned also it may be of use, 
 and give pleasure. It will enable him to read with more satisfaction, when he can 
 read with more judgment, and distinguish the perfections and faults of a writer. He 
 will be the better able to bear his part in a rational conversation, and appear with cred- 
 it, when his observations are just and natural. Such compositions, while they form 
 the understanding to a true taste, kindle an inclination to literature, and excite an 
 emulation in mankind to distinguish themselves -by such excellencies as distinguish 
 men from brutes, Athens and Rome were even the glory of the whole world, when 
 they were the universities of the whole world ; and those were reckoned the most ac- 
 complished gentlemen, who were the greatest scholars, the deepest philosophers, the 
 most eloquent orators, and the best moralists. England — would I could goon with- 
 out reproaching ray country." Mr Hooker sent a copy of his Miscellany to Mr Smith 
 with the following letter : 
 
 " Rev. Sir, 
 
 " Though I have not the happiness of being known to you, yet as I perceive, 
 by your public writings, that you are a gentleman of learning and parts, I take the 
 liberty of desiring your assistance in the public design * committed to my care. 
 Though it is the common concern of every one who wishes well to religion and the 
 Church of England, yet I find the observation strictly verified, that what is every body's 
 business is nobody's business ; and whilst it is generally presumed that I have a great 
 deal of help, I have in fact little or none, though I stand much in need of it. I hope 
 you will excuse the notice I have taken of you in my paper. In hopes of your cor- 
 respondence, I am. Sir, with respect, your very humble servant, R. HOOKER." 
 
 On a state fast, the 4th of February, 1740, our Author preached in Trinity Church on 
 Prov. xiv. 34. " Righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people." 
 This sermon was printed at the request of his parishioners, and inscribed to them. The 
 Right Hon. Edward Earl of Derby had succeeded that nobleman who presented Mr 
 Smith to Trinity Church . but Mr Smith still continued to be esteemed at Knowsley 
 
 • Mr Smith did not comply with this request respecting the Weekly Miscellany. 
 
LIFE OF DR SMITH. vii 
 
 uotwithstanding Knowsley had changed its master. He, who had been long considered 
 as the Earl of Derby's Chaplain, was constituted in form, by letters patent, the 2d day 
 of August, 1743. On the 31st of July, 1746, our Author preached an Assize-Sermon at 
 Lancaster, on St John viii. 32. " Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make 
 you free." This Sermon is inscribed to the High Sheriff and grand Jury, being " pub- 
 lished at their command." 
 
 In the year 1748, the Grammar-school of Brentwood, in the parish of South Weald, 
 in the county of Essex, being vacant, was suffered by Lord and Lady Strange to 
 lapse to the Bishop of London, who, at their recommendation, appointed Mr Smith 
 schoolmaster there for life, by letters patent bearing date 15th day of February, and by 
 license dated the 17th of the same month. He held this school only one year, as he 
 did in no wise relish the laborious life of a schoolmaster. On the 8th of June, 1753, 
 he was licensed as'one of the ministers of St George's Church in Liverpool, on tho 
 nomination of the corporation there. 
 
 In the year 1753, Mr Smith published in two volumes 4to. dedicated to his Royal 
 Highness the Prince of Wales, " The History of the Peloponnesian War, translated 
 from the Greek of Thucydides." The Translator has added three Preliminary Discour- 
 ses : on the Life of Thucydides ; on his Qualifications as an historian ; and a Survey of 
 his History. In these discourses, as well as in the life of Longinus, he has abundantly 
 proved his own excellence in original composition. This work has been several times 
 reprinted in 8 vo. and was highly recommended by the reviewers and others on its first 
 publication, and since that period. 
 
 In January, 1758, the Deanry of Chester became vacant by the decease of the Rev. 
 Thomas Brooke, LL. D. There were many candidates for this dignity : But Mr Smith 
 was so well supported by several of his illustrious friends, especially by his noble patron 
 the Earl of Derby, whose interest was powerful at Court, and who prevailed on the 
 Right Hon. Earl Granville, then Lord President of the Council, and on his Grace the 
 Duke of Newcastle, to unite with him in recommending Mr Smith; that his Majesty 
 King George the Second presented him to the Deanry. He now took the degree ofDr 
 in Divinity. On the 28th of July, Dr Smith received institution, and was installed the 
 same day by that learned and accomplished preacher, the Rev. Mr Mapletoft, Vice-dean. 
 On the 30th day of April, 1766 the Dean was instituted to the Rectory of Handly near 
 Chester, on the presentation of the Dean and Chapter. 
 
 Dr Smith had, since he left the University, if we except short excursions, chiefly re- 
 sided first with my Lord of Derby, afterwards at the Rectory of Trinity in Chester, 
 then one year in Essex, and of late at St George's in Liverpool, from whence he went 
 occasionally to Chester Cathedral. But about the beginning of the year 1767, he re- 
 solved to resign St George's Church, and wrote a letter to that effect to the body cor- 
 porate ; which letter produced the following resolution : — 
 
 " At a council held this fourth day of February, 1767. 
 
 " On Mr Dean Smith's Letter this day to the Council, intimating his desire of resign- 
 ing his Chaplainship of St George's Church into the hands of the common council; 
 therefore it is ordered, that this council do immediately after such his resignation make 
 him a compliment of one hundred and fifty guineas, for his eminent and good servi- 
 ces in the said Church." 
 
 In July the same year, he came to the Deanry-house in Chester, with intent to pass 
 the rest,of his days there. The favourable reception of his Thucydides induced tha 
 
viii LIFE OF DR SMITH. 
 
 Dean, in Ibis lieallhy and pleasant retreat, to finish his translation of" Xenophon's His- 
 tory of the Affairs of Greece :" which he published in one volume 4to. in the year 
 1770: this translation appeared without any dedication. To form a judgment of its 
 merit we may only quote the words of the title page, that it is " by the Translator 
 of Thucydides." 
 
 When the Dean retired within the precincts of his Csthedral, he had resigned Si 
 George's, and held with the Deanry the parish churches of Handley and Trinity only , 
 till the Rectory of WestKirkby, in the Hundred of Wirrall in Cheshire, became vacant 
 by the decease of that excellent magistrate and persuasive preacher, the Rev. Mr 
 Mainwaring, Prebendary of Chester. The Dean was instituted to this Rectory or 
 the 4th of October, 1780. This is a valuable living in the patronage of the Dean ana 
 Chapter. At this time the Dean resigned the Rectory of Trinity. 
 
 Dr Smith was now Dean of Chester, Rector of Handley, and WestKirkby ; but hi? 
 best parochial preferment happened late in life; he was advanced into his seventieth year, 
 and began to feel the infirmities ever attendant on age and a delicate constitution. He 
 had hitherto been a constant and powerful preacher : he began now to preach less fre- 
 quently, as every exertion fatigued him exceedingly. But when he could no longer 
 preach from the pulpit, he preached from the press, by publishing in 8vo. "Nine 
 Discourses on the Beatitudes," in the year 1782.' 
 
 From this time, the Dean's friends saw, with infinite concern, his health gradually 
 declining. In the year 1786, he was exceedingly indisposed. In November, he was 
 confined to his room ; in December, to his bed. 
 
 About eight, on Friday morning, the 12th of January, 1787, the Dean meekly re- 
 signed his spirit into the hands of a merciful Redeemer. On the Friday following, 
 the funeral prbcession passed the nearest way to the Cathedral : the Bishop and five 
 Prebendaries were pall-bearers. The body reposeth on the sou th side of the holy table 
 The Dean's name appears over his grave. ' 
 
 In the broad aisle, at the great pillar on your right hand, as you rejire from the choir. 
 an elegant and costly monument is erected to his memory by Mrs Smith, who was a 
 Miss HSber, of Essex. He only once married. 
 
 The Dean never was a stipendiary curate. The moment he was ordained a priest, 
 he became a rector ; and enjoyed ever after an income which far exceeded his expenses. 
 An enemy to ostentatious legacies, he bequeathed the chief of his fortune, which was 
 very considerable, to his widow and his nephew, for he had no children. He gave one 
 hundred pounds to the Chester Infirmary, and one hundred pounds to the fund for 
 widows of clergymen in the archdeaconry of Chester; these he esteemed useful charities. 
 
 The Dean was tall and genteel : his voice was strong, clear, and melodious. He spoke 
 Latin fluently, and was complete master not only of the Greek, but Hebrew language. 
 His mind was so replete with knowledge, that he was a living library. His manner of 
 address was graceful, engaging, delightful. His sermons were pleasing, informing, 
 convincing. His memory, even in age, was wonderfully retentive ; and his conversa- 
 tion was polite, affable, and in the highest degree improving. 
 
 1 The good and learned Doctor Lowth, late Bishop of London, highly commends these Ser- 
 mons, in a letter to the Dean, dated at Fulham, July 8th, 1782. Bishop Lowth and Dean 
 Smith were contemporaries at Oxford : where an intimate friendship commenced between them, 
 which continued till that year in which these two luminaries of the church of Christ were 
 "snatched — so Heaven decreed! — away." 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 It was not from a priVate choice, but from deference to what was judged a public 
 call, that the following Translation of Thucydides was first undertaken. To explain 
 the motive more largely, might perhaps incur the imputation of impertinence or vanity. 
 The performance, upon the whole, must justify the undertaking. In what manner it is 
 done and not why it was done, will be the point of public arbitration. 
 
 It will be also needless to tell the English reader, how many versions have been 
 made of Thucydides into Latin. Their design was to bring the author more under 
 the observation of what is generally styled the learned world ; as the translations of 
 him into modern languages have aimed at introducing him into general acquaintance 
 as an historian capable of innocently amusing most ranks of men, Jiut of usefully in- 
 structing the persons, who from duty and from passion would guard the rights or se- 
 cure the welfare of public communities. The grand business of history is to make 
 men wiser in themselves and better members of society. For this purpose it recals 
 past ages to their view ; and thus opens a more extensive scope to reflection than any 
 personal experience can offer. To be well versed in a similarity of cases prepares 
 men better for counsel or action on present contingencies. The statesman, the pa- 
 triot, the friend to liberty and reason, will be better enabled to plan and to regulate his 
 own m3asures, when he can see the tendency and consequence of such as were fol- 
 lowed on parallel occasions, and adjust the degrees in which they were either preju- 
 dicial or serviceable to public good. 
 
 All men have neither the turn of mind, nor the leisure, to make themselvss profi- 
 cients in the dead and learned languages. Such as have are certainly honestly, perhaps 
 beneficently, employed, in holding out light to others. The Greek historians, as they 
 take a precedency in time, lay further a strong claim to precedency in merit. Thucy- 
 dides is the most instructive of these ; and, since the restoration of letters in the wes- 
 tern world, each nation, that hath piqued itself at all about humanity or politeness, as 
 his manner was soon found to be excellent, have given thanks to those who have en- 
 deavoured to investigate his matter and lay it open to public view. 
 
 It is to the honour of the French, that they took the lead. The first translation of 
 Thucydides into French, published at Paris in 1527, was that of Claude de Seyssel, 
 bishop of Marseilles. However performed , it went within the space of little more than 
 thirty years, through four impressions. It is said to have been done at the command of 
 Francis I. king of France ; and, to have been carried about with him in his wars, and 
 diligently studied by the emperor Charles V. The Germans had also a translation of 
 him soon afterwards in the year 1533. In 1545 Francis di Soldo Strozzi published an 
 Italian translation dedicated to Cosmo di Medicis. The first English translation made 
 its appearance in London in 1550 ; but, in fact, was only the translation of a translation, 
 since it was intitled a version from the French of Claude de Seyssel. In 1564 he was 
 published in Spanish. A second translation by Louis Jonsaud d'Usez was 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 puWished at Geneva in 1600. The second into English, by the famous Mr Hobbes of 
 Malmsbury, was first published in the year 1628, about which it will be necessary im- 
 mediately to enlarge. A third French translation, by the Sieur d'Ablancourt, was pub- 
 lished at Paris in 1662, and hath since gone through four editions. There is also a 
 Danish translation, which closeth the list given of them in the Bibliotheca Greeca of 
 Fabricius. 
 
 Mr Hobbes declares in his Preface, that " the virtues of this author so took his affec- 
 tion, that they begot in him a desire to communicate him further." He considered 
 also that " he was exceedingly esteemed of the Italians and French in their own 
 tongues, notwithstanding that he be not very much beholding for it to his interpreters." 
 He says afterwards, that, by the first translation of Nicholls froni the French of Seyssel, 
 " he became at length traduced rather than translated into our language ;" alluding 
 perhaps to the Italian sarcasm on translators, Traduttore traditore. He then resolved 
 himself " to take him immediately from the Greek — knowing, that when with diligence 
 and leisure I should have done it, though some errors might remain, yet they would 
 be errors but of one descent; of which nevertheless (says he) I can discover none, 
 and hope they be not many." 
 
 Hobbes, however sorry and mischievous a philosopher, was Undoubtedly a very learn- 
 ed man. He hath shown it beyond dispute in his translation of Thucydides. He is an 
 excellent help, for,any one who consults him, to find out the meaning and adjust the 
 sense. But, though his translation hath now passed through three editions, and hath 
 profitably been read by many, yet (I speak not from my own private judgment) 
 he cannot now be read with any competent degree of pleasure. He is faithful, but 
 most servilely so, to the letter of his author. Even in the orations, he merely acts 
 the interpreter, and hath quite forgot the orator. He translates literally through- 
 out, and numbers rather than weighs the words of Thucydides. By this means the 
 construction is very often intricate and confused, the thoughts pregnant with sense 
 are not sufliciently opened, nor the glowing ideas of the author or his orators trans- 
 fused with proper degrees of warmth and light. Too scrupulous an attachment to the 
 letter of the original hath made the copy quite flat and h%avy, the spirit is evap- 
 orated, the lofty and majestic air hath entirely disappeared. Too many low and 
 vulgar expressions are used, which Thucydides ever studiously avoided. Such fre- 
 quently occur in the midst of some grand circumstance, which they throw into a kind 
 of burlesque, and may excite a reader's laughter. The English language hath gone 
 through a great variation, hath been highly polished, since Mr Hobbes wrote. Hence, 
 though his terms be in general very intelligible, yet they have not that neatness, preci- 
 sion, and dignity, to which the polite and refined writers within the last century have 
 habituated our ears. And, after all, I am inclined to think, that, Mr Hobbes either exe- 
 cuted in great haste, or performed his revisals in a very cursory and negligent manner. 
 I am inclined to think so from the very many passages, necessary and emphatical pe- 
 riods, nay sometimes in the very speeches, which to my great surprise I have found 
 omitted in his translation. A particle, an epithet, or even a comma, may with the 
 greatest attention sometimes be dropped in a long work. But the omissions in Mr 
 Hobbes are too numerous and important, to be excused in any tolerable consistence 
 with repeated care and circumspection. 
 
 Monsieur Bayle hath ascribed the translation of Thucydides by Mr Hobbes to a mo- 
 -tive of wliich he hath not left the least hint himself in his preface :— " in ord cr to show 
 
PREFACE. xi 
 
 the English, n the history of the Athenians, the disorders and confusions of a democra- 
 tical government." Mr Hobbes could not possibly, so long before they happened, fore- 
 see the strange revolutions that were soon to take place in the government of hiscoun- 
 try. The very actors in them could not possibly discern the consequence of their own 
 embroilments. Some violent encroachments had indeed been made on the liberty and 
 property of Englishmen, and aspirit of discontent began to spread throughout the nation. 
 But it cannot be supposed, that the plan of a commonwealth was formed at that time, 
 or for several years after. The History of Thucydides abundantly shows, how danger- 
 ous and destructive is faction in a state ; that severe or wanton power may make men 
 desperate ; and that liberty abused may make them insolent and mutinous. It detects and 
 exposeth venal orators and false patriots ; but it exhibits men, who are studious and elo- 
 quent in behalf of public welfare, and active in support of liberty and honest power, in 
 full beauty and proportion. And his lessons lie not so apposite and ready for the appli- 
 cation of any state now existing in the world, as for that of Great Britain. 
 
 The reader may by this time have caught a glimpse of several reasons, for which the 
 present translation of Thucydides was finished and is now made public. No care hath 
 be'en omitted to make it as correct as possible. It hath been attentively reviewed : the 
 narrative part, more than once ; the oralorial part, with repeated endeavours to reach 
 the spirit and energy of the original. In the former, the author hath been followed step 
 by step : bold deviations here might imperceptibly have misrepresented or distorted the 
 facts, and quite banished the peculiar style and manner of the author. In the latter, it 
 hath been often judged necessary to dilate the expression, in order fully to include the 
 primary idea ; though, where it seemed possible the studied conciseness of the author 
 hath been imitated, provided the thought could be clearly expressed, and the senten- 
 tious maxim adequately conveyed. The turns and figures of expression have been ev- 
 ery where diligently noted, and an endeavour constantly made at imitation. This was 
 judged a point of duty ; or a point at least, where, though something may be permitted 
 to a translator's discretion or to the genius of modern language, yet he must not indulge 
 himself in too wide a scope, lesf, when what ought to be a copy is exhibited, the prime 
 distinctions of the original be lost, and little or no resemblance be left behind. 
 
 It is very just and true what Mr Hobbes hath observed, that " this author so carrieth 
 with him his own light throughout, that the reader may continually see his way before 
 him, and by that which gbeth before expect what is to follow." And he, who applies to 
 any commentator but Thucydides himself for an explanation of his own meaning, must 
 exceedingly often get quite wide of the sense. The writers of Scholia and the notes of 
 verbal critics put us frequently on a wrong scent, and more frequently leave us utterly 
 in the dark. But, if we will be patient at a dead lift, something will soon occur in the 
 author himself to help us out, the obscurity will vanish, and light beam in upon us. 
 Though sometimes we may be forced to divine his meaning, since in many cases it is 
 vain to apply to the aids of Orammar to develop the construction, yet the context at 
 length will show Vhether we havesucceeded, or help us to ascertain the sense. This, 
 however, d emands repeated and attentive re visals. The present translator hath hot been 
 frugal of his time or labour in these points. And whether he hath generally succeeded in 
 ascertaining the thought and properly expressing it in another language, must be left to 
 the decision, not of men of no learning, nor of mere learning, but to that class of judges 
 who are well acquainted with the state of Athens at the time of the history, and are really 
 Attic both in taste and judgment. This class, it may be thought, will be small : it is larger 
 
»i PREFACE. 
 
 however, and higher seated in this our community, than the generahty have either 
 opportunity enough to discover or good-nature enough to own. 
 
 The complaints so often made by the most able translators are indeed alarming. Their 
 performances (they say) may very much disgrace, but can never commend them. The 
 praise of all that is clear, and bright, and pleasing, and instructive, is reflected back up- 
 on the original author : but every appearance of a different nature is laid with severity 
 of censure at the door of the translator. If it be so, we know the terms beforehand on 
 which, either able or unable, we engage, and must patiently acquiesce in the issue. Bu t 
 candour is always expected, nay, everwill be had, from persons of good sense and sound 
 judgment. Few but such may be pleased with Thucydides either in his old native 
 Greek, or in a modem English garb ; and, if such confer the honour of their applause, 
 theclamourofsomewill not terrify, nor thesilenceof others mortify at all. The book- 
 eeller, it is true, forms his own judgment, and then dictates to the judgment of others 
 from the sale. And it must be owned, that every original writer, as well as every copy- 
 ist, is heartily glad to receive that mark of public approbation. 
 
 The present translation of Thucydides is accompanied with a few notes, and three 
 preliminary Discourses. Concerning these something must be added. 
 
 The notes are only designed for the English reader, to give him light into that anti- 
 quity, with which he may be little acquainted: and therefore the first time that any 
 thing relating to the c6nstitution or forms of the Athenian republic, or peculiar to their 
 fleets and land armies, occurs, I have endeavoured in a note to give him a competent 
 perception of it. I have done the same, in regard to the characters of the chief person- 
 ages in the history , whichseemed to need a farther opening than what Thucydides hath 
 given them. The persons were well known when he wrote : but a modern reader may 
 not be displeased to be regularly introduced, and early to be made acquainted, with the 
 characters of the principal agents in these busy and important scenes. In notes of ver- 
 bal criticism or mere learning, I have been very sparing, judging they would never 
 be read with patience. 
 
 Of the preliminary discourses the two first were due , by the rules of decorum observ- 
 ed by editors and translators, to the author. In the last, I have thrown into one contin- 
 ued discourse what might have been broke into pieces, and interspersed occasionally 
 by way of notes. The method observed appeared most eligible, as it will give the 
 reader a clear prospect of the whole history ; preparing him for or inciting him to a close 
 and attentive perusal of it ; or enabling him, after he hath perused it, to recollect the 
 most instructive passages and most material occurrences. By this means, also, a 
 more lively and succinct account could be given of the speakers and the speeches, 
 than could have been done by Way of set and formal arguments. 
 
 I think the English reader can want nothing more, to enable him to read Thucy- 
 dides with pleasure and profit ; especially if he be at all acquainted with the Grecian 
 history, of which few that ever read can now be ignorant, since Mr Stanyan's History 
 of Greece and the Universal History are in so many hands. I dismiss the work with 
 some hope, but more terror, about its success. That hope is encouraged and sup- 
 ported by the list of my Subscribers. There are names that do me honour indeed ; 
 and which, whether'the work may suit the generality or not, will preserve me from 
 (fver repenting, that I have bestowed so much time on translating Thucydides. 
 
THREE DISCOURSES. 
 
 I. ON THE LIFE OF THUCYDIDES, v^ 
 II. ON HIS QUALIFICATIONS AS AN HISTORL&N. 
 III. A SURVEY Of THE HISTORY. 
 
DISCOURSE I. 
 
 THE LIFE OF THUCYDIDES. 
 
 It is a natural piece of curiosity, either when we have read a book we like, or hear one 
 commended, to inquire after the author. We acquiesce not in his bare name ; we 
 immediately seek farther information. The stranger shows an inclination to form some 
 acquaintance with him ; the reader to improve what he already hath. We at length 
 grow inquisitive about all that concerns him, and are eager to be let into the particulars. 
 
 Some claim of this kind will no doubt be made in regard to Thucydides. He who 
 endeavours to introduce him to general notice, ought at least to have something to say 
 about him, and something rather tending perhaps to give favourable impressions. All 
 liis editors and translators have reckoned this a point of duty incumbent upon them : 
 but it hath been generally performed in a very imperfect and slovenly manner. His 
 life wrote by Marcellinus, a crude incoherent morsel, hath been prefixed to all the 
 Greek editions. That by Suidas is an unsatisfactory mere dictionary-account. A third 
 in Greek, by an anonymous author, is also but a very slight and shapeless sketch, and 
 seems the work of a grammarian, who hath read indeed , but very superficially read his 
 history. Some incidental escapes from his own pen are the marks, which should be 
 always kept in view by him who would give any tolerable account of Thucydides. 
 Writers of a better age and class will contribute now and then a little assistance. And 
 the laborious care of a late author,* in adjusting the chronology and clearing away 
 rubbish, will enable one now to give at least a coherent, though by no means an ac- 
 curate, account of him. 
 
 Thucydides, an Athenian, by borough a Halymusian, was born in the year before 
 Christ fou r hundred and seve nty-one ; twenty-five years after Hellanicus, thirteen after 
 Herodotus, according to Aulus Gellius ; and about three years before Socrates, as the 
 birth of the latter is settled by Laertius. He was descended of a very splendid and 
 noble family, though perhaps not so honourable as many others, since it was not purely 
 Attic. Its splendour can no longer be doubted, when it is known to be the family of 
 Miltiades. Miltiades the elder, born a citizen of Athens, had reigned over the Dolonci, 
 a people in Thrace ; and left vast possessions in that country to his descendants : and 
 Miltiades the younger had married Hegesipyle the daughter of Olorus, a Thracian king.f 
 Yet foreign blood, though royal, was always thought to debase the Athenian. The 
 firm republicans of Athens had an hereditary aversion to every circumstance of royalty ; 
 
 * Vitse Thucydidig Synopsis chronologica, ab Henrico Dodwell. 
 t Herodotus in Krato. 
 
 15 
 
xvi ON THE LIFE 
 
 and the polite inhabitants of it abhorred all connexions with Barbarians, the scornfu; 
 title they gave to all the rest of the world, except their countrymen of Greece. Iphi- 
 crates, a famous Athenian in later times, was the son of an Athenian shoemaker and a 
 Thracian princess. Yet, being ac-ked to which of his parents he thought himself most 
 obliged, he replied haughtily—" To my mother. She did all she could to make me an 
 Athenian ; my father would have made me, a Barbarian " The younger Miltiades 
 whom wars had obliged to quithishold in Thrace, commanded the troops of Athens in 
 the famous field of Marathon. He died afterwards in a jail, unable to pay a large fine 
 set upon him by the people of Athens. His son Ciraon contrived afterwards to pay it. 
 The family for a time had been in poverty and distress, but emerged again in Cimon. 
 Cimon the same day gained a victory both by land and sea over the Persians at 
 Mycale. By his' conduct he very much enlarged the power of Athens, and put 
 it in a train of much greater advancement. In civil aflFairs he clashed with Pericles, 
 who was leader of the popular party: Cimon always sided with the noble or the few; 
 as were the party-distinctions in vogue at Athens. 
 
 The proofs that Thucydides was of this family are strong and convincing. Plutarch 
 directly asserts it in the life of Cimon. His father, in grateful at least if not honour- 
 able remembrance of the Thracian king, whose daughter Miltiades had married, bore 
 the name of Olorus. His mother also was another Hegesipyle. He inherited rich 
 possessions in Thrace; particularly some mines of gold. A monument of him was to be 
 seen for many ages after, in the Coele at Athens, amongst the Cimonian, or those 
 belonging to the family of Cimon; and stood next, according to Plutarch, to that of 
 Elpinice, Cimon's own sister. His father's name in the inscription on this monument, 
 at least some latter grammarians have averred it, was OlOrus. Thucydides himself, in 
 the fourth book of his history, calls it Orolus. Can we want stronger authority? 
 Whether any stress ought to be laid on the variation, or whence the mistake, though a 
 very minute one, might proceed, are points too obscure and trifling to take up any 
 attention. 
 
 Such was the family of which Thucydides was descended. His pedigree might be 
 fetched from the gods ; since that of Miltiades is traced down from ^acus. But, like 
 ray author, I should choose to keep as clear of the fabulous as possible. Cicero says 
 of him, " Though he had never written a history, his name would still have been 
 extant, he was so honourable and noble."* I quote this, merely as a testimony to the 
 splendour of his birth, since it may be questioned whether the historian, in the pre 
 sent instance, hath not entirely preserved his memory, and been solely instrumental 
 in ennobling and perpetuating the man. ^ 
 
 His education no doubt was such as might be expected from the splendour of his 
 birth, the opulence of his family, and the good taste then prevailing in Athens, the 
 politest city that then existed, or e^'er yet existed in the world. It is imposeible 
 however to give any detail of it. The very httle to be found about it in writers of any 
 class whatever, seems mefely of a presumptuous though probable kind. It is said 
 Anaxagoras was his preceptor in philosophy, because the name of Anaxagoras was 
 great at this period of time. Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Euripides, of Pericles, and 
 of Socrates, is named also by Marcellinus for the preceptor of Thucydides. And he 
 adds, quoting Antyllus for an evidence, that " it was whispered about that Thucydides 
 was atheistical, because he was so fond of the theory of Anaxagoras, who was generally 
 
 * In the Orator. 
 
OF THUCYDIDES. xvu 
 
 reputed anJ styled an atheist." The solution of an eclipse from natural causes ac- 
 counting for appearances from the laws of motion, and investigating the course of na- 
 ture, were sufficient proofs of atheism amongst a people so superstitious as the Athe • 
 nians. Thucydides, possibly, might be well acquainted with the philosophy of Anax 
 agoras, without having personally attended his lectures. However that be, his own 
 history abundantly shows that he was no atheist ; it may be added, and no polytheist. 
 .By his manner of speaking of the oracles and predictions tossed about in his own time, 
 it is plain he looked upon them as equivocal, or rather insinuates them to be mere for- 
 geries. " And yet." says Mr Hobbes,* "he confirms an assertion of his own touch- 
 ing the time this war lasted, by the oracle's prediction. "The passage occurs in the 
 fifth book of this history. But whoever considers it, will find it only an argumenlum ad 
 hominem, to stop the mouths of such as believed in oracles, from contesting his own 
 computation of the whole time the Peloponnesian war lasted. I can only say, that he 
 was undoubtedly a serious man, and of a large fund of solid sense, which deriving 
 originally from the bounty of nature, he had most certainly improved by a regular and 
 sound education. 
 
 For a reason of much less weight, Antipho is assigned for his master in rhetorjc — 
 because he speaks handsomely of him in the eighth book. He there indeed pays due 
 acknowledgement to the merit of Antipho as a speaker; but it cannot be inferred from 
 hence, that he had ever any connection with him. Others have made Antipho a scholar 
 of Thucydides,f withfuU as little reason. Thucydides certainly was never a teacher by 
 profession. It is pity to w^aste so much time on uncertainties. It is certain Thucydides 
 had a liberal education, though the particular progress of it cannot now be traced. 
 
 But, to show the peculiar bent of his genius, and a remarkable prognostic what sort 
 of person he would prove, the following story is recorded by several authors, and dated 
 by Mr Dodwell in the fifteenth year of his age. — His father carried him to the Olympic 
 games. He there heard Herodotus read his history to the great crowd of Grecians as- 
 sembled at that solemnity. He heard him with fixed attention; and , at length, burst out 
 into tears. " Tears childish indeed," it hath been remarked: but however such as few 
 children would have shed, and highly expressive of his inward spirit. The active as- 
 piring mind of Theraistocles was not stronger shown, when the trophy of Miltiades 
 would not let him be at rest; nor the genius of the lad at Westminster-school, when he 
 could not sleep for the colours in Westminster-hall. Herodotus is said to have observed 
 it, and to have compUmentedOloruson his having a son, that had so violent a bent to 
 letters. A similar passage in any person's life would always be called to mind, when 
 he was the subject of conversation. 
 
 In about two years more, Thucydides was obliged by the laws to take his exercise 
 in the study of arms, and to begin to share in the defence of his country. Every 
 citizen of Athens was also a soldier. They served at first within the walls, or on 
 great emergencies marched, though to no great distance from home. As years and 
 skill advanced, they were called upon to join in more distant and foreign expeditions. 
 We are quite in the dark about the particular services in which he might thus be em- 
 ployed. We are sure at least he much improved in the theory of arms. He quali- 
 fied himself for the great trust of heading the forces of the state; and, in the sequel, W9 
 shall see him invested with a command. 
 
 The anonymous author of his life relates, that Thucydides was one of the number, 
 
 • Of the Life and History of Thucydides. t Plutarch's Lives of the ten Orators. 
 3 b2 
 
xviii ON THE LIFE 
 
 whom the Athenians sent to found a colony at Thuria in Italy. Lampo and Xenocritue 
 were the leaders of this colony, and Herodotus is said to have been associated in it. 
 If Thucydides went the voyage (and the strange inconsistencies of him who relates it 
 render his whole account suspicious,) he must have been about twenty-seven years of 
 age. One thing is pretty certain; his stay at Thuria could have been of no very long con- 
 tinuance. This is notto be inferred from the ostracism, which the same writer says 
 he soon after suffered; a mistake incurred, it is highly probable, by confounding him 
 with Thucydides the son of Milesias, who was of the same family, and being a leader 
 in the oligarchical party at Athens, had the ostracism thrown upon hi m by the interest and 
 popularity of Pericles. But the quarrel between theCorcyreansand Corinthians about 
 Epidamnus broke out soon after this. The enemies of Athens were now scheming the 
 demolition of its growing power. Thucydides writes all the preparatory transactions, 
 marks all the defensive measures of the Athenians, as a person who was privy to eve-> 
 ry one of them. And there should be very strong and very positive proofs of the con- 
 trary, before any reader of his history doubts of his having been all the time at Athens. 
 
 His own Introduction, of itself in a great measure establishes the fact. He perceived 
 the storm was gathering; he knew the jealousies of the states which composed the La- 
 cedemonian league; he also knew the real strength of Athens, and heard all the pre- 
 ventive measures recommended by Pericles to put his countrymen in a proper pos- 
 ture of defence. He himself seems to have been alert for the contention, and ready 
 both with lance and pen, not only to bear his share in the events, but also to perpetuate 
 the memory of them. His own "words (i\>rir«s and rutftxien/imss'j seem to denote the 
 great earnestness and attention of his mind to the wide field of matter which was now 
 going to be opened. He longed to become an historian; he saw a fine subject for history 
 fast approaching; he immediately set about noting all occurrences, began at once to 
 collect materials; and was resolved to write the History of the Peloponnesian War before 
 it was actually on foot. 
 
 Can we doubt then of his residence during this port Ton of time at Athens'! He was ar- 
 rived, at the breaking out of this war, to the full vigour and ripeness of his years and 
 understanding, according to his chronologist, Mr Dod we'll, wasjust forty years old. We 
 learn from himself,* that he knew personally the whole series of things; he was ever 
 present at the transactions of one or other of the contending parties; more, after his 
 exile at those of the Peloponnesians; and consequently, before his exile, at those of the 
 Athenians. He speaks of Pericles, as one who was an eye-witness of his conduct; as 
 one who heard him harangue in the assembly of the people, convincing that a war there 
 would necessarily be, and for that reason they ought not to weaken themselves by ill- 
 judged conces.sions, but gallantly to exert that naval power which had made Athens 
 envied and dreaded, and which alone, as it had made, could keep her great. He must 
 regularly have taken his post upon the walls, and seen the Peloponnesians, in the first 
 year of the war, lay all the adjacent country waste. He must have marched under 
 Pericles to retaliate on the territories of Megara, since the whole force of the state was 
 obliged to take the field on this occasion. He must have assisted at the public funeral 
 solemnized in the winter for the first victims of this war, and heard Pericles speak in 
 honour of the dead and the living, and make his countrymen enamoured of their own 
 laws and constitution. The plague broke out immediately after this; we are absolutely 
 certain he was then in Athens. He himself assures us of it. He was an eye-wiiuess 
 
 *Book the fifth. 
 
OF THUCYDIDES. xix 
 
 to all that horrid scene. He had the plague himself; and hath given a circumstajJlJa*'' 
 detail of it. — ' 
 
 The war proceeds with vigour, and through a great variety of events. Thucydides 
 must have borne his share in the service; the particulars he hath not recorded. No 
 man was ever less guilty of egotism; he never mentions himself but when it is absolute- 
 ly necessary. Hisnextsix yearswere certainly employed in fightingand in writing; the 
 latter was his passion, and the former his duty. In the forty-seventh year of his age, he 
 was joined in the command of an Athenian squadron and land-force on the coast^ of 
 Thrace. He might be assigned to this particular station, on account of his possessions 
 and interest in this part of the world. It was judged at Athens, that he was best 
 qualified to serve his country in this department. The Lacedemonian commander in 
 Thrace dreaded his opposition. Let us wait a little for the event: it is the most im- 
 portant passage in the life of Thucydides. 
 
 It was entirely on the authority of Plutarch, that Thucydides was asserted above to 
 be a descendant from Miltiades, and in the mode of consanguinity to have inherited his 
 fine estate in this part of the world. Marcellinus, who is forever jumbling and con- 
 founding facts, hath also made him marry a Thracian lady, who brought him his gold- 
 mines for her fortune. Mr Hobbes is willing to reconcile the facts, and solves all the 
 difficulty in a very plausible manner. " In Thrace," says he, " lay also the possessionsof 
 Thucydides and his wealthy mines of gold, as he himself professeth in his fourth book. 
 And although those riches might come to him by a wife, (as is also by some affirmed,) 
 which he married in Scapte-syle, a city of Thrace; yet even by that marriage it ap- 
 peareth that his affairs had a relation to that country, and that his nobility was not there 
 unknown." I cannot believe that Thucydides ever married a lady that was not purely 
 Attic. He seems to have been high-spirited in this respect, and proud of his country. 
 Miltiades indeed had married a Thracian princess; and nothing, but the vast estate 
 brought into the family by this match, could have made his descendants easy with such 
 a blemish in their pedigree: for a blemish undoubtedly it must have been thought at 
 Athens. Let ussee how Thucydides himself drops his sentiment of such another match. 
 The passage I have in view occurs in the sixth book. He is speaking of Hippias, the 
 son of Pisistratus, tyrant of Athens. " To ^antidas the son of Hippoclus tyrant of 
 Lampsacus — to a Lampsacene, though he himself was an Athenian — he married his 
 daughter Archedice." I cannot think, that he, who let such a sarcasm fall from his 
 own serious pen, could ever condescend to marry a Barbarian, let her fortune be ever 
 so great. The reader, if it be worth his while to think at all about it, may determine 
 for himself. — This digression was caused by the express mention Thucydides hath made 
 of his mines, the very moment he is going to enter the lists against the most gallant and 
 active commander at this time in the armies of the Lacedemonian league. 
 
 It was Brasidas the Spartan, who was now at the head of the Peloponnpsian troops in 
 Thrace. He had made a forced march thither through Thessaly and Macedonia. By 
 his fine deportment and his persuasive addressjoined to uncommon vigilance and activ- 
 ity, he had hitherto carried all before him. He at length endeavoured to get possession 
 by surprise of the important city of Amphipolis: he had very nearly succeeded. Eucles 
 commanded there for the Athenians. Thucydides was at this time in the isle of Thasus, 
 about half a day's sail from Amphipolis. A messenger was despatched to him, to hasten 
 him up for the defence of that city. He put to sea immediately with a small squadron 
 of seven ships. Brasidas, knowing he was coming, opened a negotiation with the Ara- 
 phipolitans, and gained admission for his troops. Thucydides stood up the Strymon in 
 
XX ON THE LIFE 
 
 the evening, but loo late, since Brasidas had got fast possession of Amphipolis. The 
 city of Eion is situated" also upon the river Strymon lower down, and about two miles 
 and a half from Amphipolis. Thucydides put in here, and secured the place. "Brasi- 
 das (in his own words)' had designed that very night to seize Eion also. And, unless 
 this squadron had come in thus critically to its defence, at break of day it had been lost." 
 Thucydides, without losing a moment, provided for its defence. Brasidas, with armed 
 boats, fell down the river from Amphipohs, and made two attempts upon it, but was re- 
 pulsed in both: upon which, he gave up the scheme, and returned back. 
 
 One would imagine that Thucydides had done all that could be done on this occasion, 
 and deserved to be thanked instead of punished. The people of Athens made a differ- 
 ent determination. Cleon was now the demagogue of greatest iniluence there, and is 
 generally supposed to have exasperated them against the man who had not wrought 
 impossibilities in saving their valuable town of Amphipolis. It is certain their fury 
 rose so high against him, that they stripped Thucydides of his command, and passed 
 the sentence of banishment upon him. It is himself who tells us,* " It was his lot to 
 suffer a twenty years' exile from his country after the affair of Amphipolis." 
 
 We have thus lost Thucydides the commander to secure more fast Thucydides the 
 historian. Though sadly treated, he scorned to be angry with his country. His com- 
 plexion was not at all choleric or resentful; there appears not the least sign of any gall 
 in his constitution. Discharged of all duties and free from all public avocations, he was 
 left without any attachments but to simple truth, and proceeded to qualify himself for 
 commemorating exploits, in which he could have no share. He was now eight and 
 forty years old , and entirely at leisure to attend to the grand point of his ambition, that 
 of writing the history of the present war; a calm spectator of facts, and dispassionate 
 observer of the events he was determined to record. 
 
 To judge of him from his history (and we have no other help to form our opinion 
 about him), he was so nobly complexioned as to be all judgment and no passion. No 
 murmur or complaint hath escaped him upon account of his severe undeserved treat- 
 ment from his country. Great souls are congenial; their thoughts are always of a sim- 
 ilar cast. 
 
 Sweet are the uses of adversity, 
 
 Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous, 
 
 Bears yet a precious jewel in his head. 
 
 Shakspeare has thus expressed what Thucydides, as it is highly probable, must have 
 thought. " Exile, according to Plutarch,' wasa blessing Vi^hich the muses bestowed up- 
 on their favourites. By this means they enabled them to complete their most beauti- 
 ful and noble compositions.'' He then quotes our author for the first proof of his obser- 
 vation — " Thucydides the Athenian compiled his history of the Peloponnesian war at 
 Scaptesyle in Thrace." At that place he fixed his residence. It lay convenient for taking 
 care of his private affairs and overlooking his mines: they lay not within the d£)minions 
 of Athens; for then they would have been forfeited to the state. Hence he made ex- 
 cursionsatproperseasonstoobserve transactions, and pickup intelligence. He was now 
 more conversant in person on the Peloponnesian side. Some private correspondences he 
 might still carry on with Athenians. And he had money to purchase all proper materi- 
 als, was ready, and knew how to lay it out. This was his employment till the very end 
 of the war; and it is certain he collected materials for carrying down his history to 
 
 1 Book the fourth. 2 Book the fifth. 3 Of Banishment. 
 
OF THUCYDIDES. xx. 
 
 that perioJ of time " when (in his own words* ) the Lacedemonians and their allies put 
 an end to the empire of Athens, and became masters of the Long Wall and the Piraeus." 
 Eut whoever reads it, will be inclined to think, that he drew it not up in that accurate 
 and elaborate manner in which it now appears, till the war was finished. He might 
 keep every thing by him in the form of annals; he might go on altering or correcting, 
 as he saw better reason or gained more light. His complete well-connected history, 
 though the first thing in his intention, was the last in execution. 
 
 His exile lasted twenty years. It commenced in the eighth year of the war, in the 
 year before Christ four hundred twenty-three. Consequently, he was restored the year 
 before Christ fourhundred and three, being at that time sixty-eight years old. In that 
 very year an amnesty was published at Athens, in the archonship of Euclides, after the 
 demolition of the thirty tyrants by Thrasybulus. 
 
 Thucydides wasnow at liberty, if he pleased, to return and pass the remainder of his 
 days at Athens. Whether he did so or not, is left quite ih the dark. He lived twelve years 
 alter, and died in the year before Christ three hundred ninety-one, being then about 
 fourscore years old. He was constantly employed in giving coherence and dignity to 
 this History; — with what accuracy, what severity, what toil, the reader may judge, 
 since he will find that after all he left it imperfect. The first seven books are indeed fully 
 and exactly finished. The eighth, though moulded into due form, hath plainly not had 
 a final revisal, and breaks off abruptly. The whole work is said to have fallen into 
 Xenophon's possession, who at the time of the death of Thucydides, was exiled from 
 Athens : and Xenophon is also said to have made it public. This carries a great air of 
 probability with it, since Xenophon became the continuator of Thucydides, not in so 
 lofty and majestic, but in a sweeter and more popular style. There is a chasm indeed 
 between the time the History of Thucydides breaks off, and the Grecian History of 
 Xenophon begins. There is no accounting for this but by conjecture. May I venture to 
 offer one, I believe, entirely new, but which, for that reason, I shall readily give up to 
 the first person of judgment, who thinks it hath no foundation! It is this — That Thu- 
 cydides left somewhat more behind him than now appears. How it came to be suppres- 
 sed or lost, I will not pretend to guess. It is natural to imagine, that his acknowledg- 
 ed continuator resumed the subject at the very spot where his predecessor had left off. 
 Nearly two years are however wanting, in which several important incidents took 
 place. It is pity; but we have no redress. General historians are by other means 
 enabled to supply the deficiency; but the loss of any thing from so masterly a hand is 
 still to be regretted. 
 
 The place of the death and interment of Thucydides was most probably Scaptesyle 
 in Thrace. Long habitude might have made him fond of a spot where he had passed 
 60 many years in studious and calm retirement. The hurry and bustle and engagements' 
 of Athens could not have been much to the relish of so grave, and now so old a man. 
 His monument there among the Cimonian confirms this opinion, since most writers 
 agree, it had the mark upon it which showed it to be a cenotaph, and the words, 'Here 
 lieth,' were not in the inscription.' I have nothing to add about his family. It is said 
 he left a son; but the very name of that son is merely conjectural. I have collected 
 every thing that carries any consistency with it about the Man; I shall proceed with 
 more pleasure to view him in a clearer and more steady light, and mark the charge, 
 terin which it was his ambition to be distinguished, that of an Historian. 
 
 4 Book the fifth. 5 Marcellinus. 
 
DISCOURSE II. 
 
 ON HIS 
 
 QUALIFICATIONS AS AN HISTORIAN. 
 
 It is now to be considered, how well qualified Thucydides was, to undertake thai nice 
 and arduous task of writing history. — No one certainly was ever better fitted for it by 
 outward circumstances; and very few so enabled to perform it well by the inward abili- 
 ties of genius and understanding. 
 
 Lucian, in his celebrated treatise " How a History ought to be written," is generally 
 supposed to have had his eye fixed on Thucydides. And every person of judgment, 
 ■who loves a sincere relation of things, would be glad, if it were possible, to have the 
 writer of them abstracted from all kind of connection with persons or things that are 
 the subject-matter; to be of no country, no party; clear of all passions; indepen- 
 dent in every light; entirely unconcerned who is pleased or displeased with what he 
 writes; the servant only of reason and truth. 
 
 Sift Thucydides careYuUy, and we shall find his qualifications in all these respects 
 very nearly, if not quite, complete. 
 
 No connection with, no favouring or malevolent bias towards, any one person in the 
 world, can be fixed upon him. Nevermansoentirelydetached,or proceeded so far (if 
 I may use the expression) in annihilating himself. He had afather indeed, whose name 
 was Olorus; he was an Athenian born; — but, who are his relations? who were his asso- 
 ciates! what, rival or competitor doth he sneer? what friend doth he commend'! or, 
 what enemy doth he reproach! — Brasidas was the immediate occasion of his disgrace 
 and exile. Yet, how doth he describe him! He makes the most candid acknowledg- 
 ments of his personal merit, and doth justice to all his shining and superior abilities. 
 Cleonisgenerallysupposed to have irritated the people against him, and tohavegothira 
 most severely punished, when he merited much better returns from his country. Doth 
 he show the least grudge or resentment against this Cleon! He represents him indeed 
 inhisrealcharacterof a factious demagogue, an incendiary, a bully, and of course an 
 arrant coward. And how do all other writers! how doth Aristophanes paint this worth- 
 less man, this false bellowing patriot! I would never call Aristophanes for an evidence 
 to character, but in cases where every other writer accorded iuUy with him, on the 
 same foundation of truth though not with the same superstructure of bitterness and 
 abuse. He should notbeavoucherin regard to Socrates, or Pericles; but certainly may 
 be heard about an Hyperbolus or a Cleon. Thucydides never mentions himself as op- 
 
HIS QUALIFICATIONS. xxiii 
 
 posed to any man but Brasidas; and never so much as drops an insinuation that ho 
 was hurt by Cleon. And thus, by general consent, he hath gained immortal honour 
 by giving fair and true representations of men. whom he never felt to be such, but 
 whom succeeding writers have assured us to have actually been his eiremies. — As to 
 things; though in the first seven years of the war he must in some measure have had 
 employment, yet he was soon disentangled from all business whatever, in a manner 
 which bore hard upon his reputation. He hath stated the fact; and then with the great- 
 est calmness and unconcern, he hath left the decision to posterity. 
 
 He was henceforth of no country at all. Cutoff from the republic of Athens, he 
 never sought after or desired a naturalization in any other state of Greece. He waa 
 now only to choose out and fix a proper spot of observation, from whence, like a 
 person securely posted on a promontory, he could look calmly on the storm that was 
 raging or the battle that was fighting below, could note every incident, distinguish 
 every turn, and with a philosophical tranquility enjoy it all. In short, he now was, 
 and continued all the rest of the Peloponnesiau war, a citizen of the world at large, 
 as much as any man ever actually was. 
 
 But before this separation from the community, whilst yet he continued at Athens, 
 where hberty opened the field to all passionate chases after power, where consequently 
 competitions were ever fermenting, and party was always alive and active, — can we find 
 him associated with any particular set of menl can we find him dabbling in political in- 
 triguel a leader of, or led by, any party! or, can we assuredly find out his principles'! or 
 even guess at his real thoughts about the form of government under which he had liv- 
 edl His biographers indeed, though ever parading his candour and impartiality, are of- 
 ten tracing out signs and marks of party-zeal and personal prejudices from the very 
 characters in his history. Marcellinus says, " he described Oleon as a madman because 
 he hated him;" forgetful what Cleon really was, and of the concurrent testimonies to the 
 truth of the character. The anonymous writer says, " he opposed Pericles at Athens, 
 got the better of him, and became the first man in the republic." A ridiculous story! 
 void of all manner of support. Accordingto this writer's way of arguing in other places, 
 who says, "he cajoled the Lacedemonians, and inveighed against the tyrannic all-grasp- 
 ing temper of the Athenians, in his history, because he had no opportunity to rail at 
 them in any other shape ," — he should have left a far different character of Pericles be- 
 hind him, than he had actually left. But these are strange compilers of patch-work, 
 and deserve no regard. From what the former hath said about him, a reader might be 
 tempted to judge him of the oligarchical, from what the latter hath said of him, of the 
 democratical principle. Mr Hobbes imagines he hath dived to the bottom of his real 
 principles, and avers him a tight and sound royalist. He is sure, that he least of all 
 liked the democracy: as sure, he was not at all fond of an oligarchy. He foimds this 
 assurance on a passage in the eighth book — " They decreed the supreme power to be 
 vested in the five thousand , which number to consist of all such citizens as were enrol- 
 led for the heavy armour, and that no one should receive a salary." — Thucydides just 
 after pro nounceth this, in his own opinion, " a good modelling of their go vernment, a fi ne 
 temper between the few and the many, and which enabled Athens from the low estate 
 into which'her affairs were plunged to re-erect her head." If this passage proves any 
 thingof the author'sprinciples, it certainly proves them in apretty strong degree republi- 
 can. Mr Hobbes however set's out from hence to prove him a royalist. "For," says he, 
 " he commendeth the government of Athens more, both when Pisistratus reigned 
 (savin" that it was an usurped power,) and when in the beginning of this war it 
 
XXIV HIS QUALIFICATIONS. 
 
 was democratical in name, but in effect monarchical under Pericles " He praiseth, it is 
 true, the administration at both these periods; and he also praiseth the good effects re- 
 sulting from an administration lodged iu the hands of five thousand men. Under Peri- 
 cles it was lodged in more, but the extraordinary abilities and influence of the man had 
 taught all their voices to follow the dictates of his heart. Yet Pericles was all the time 
 a strong republican, and owned hismasters. Plutarch says, he never harangued thera 
 without praying beforehand, that " not a word might slip out of his mouth, that was 
 not pertinent to the business in hand;" and that he never put onhis armour to lead them 
 out into the field, without saying to himself—" Remember, Pericles, you are going to 
 command free men and Grecians." I leave it to the reader, whether the principles of 
 Thucydides can thus be discovered. It appears only, that he was always candid to a 
 good administration, and might possibly think of government, as Mr Pope has wrote: 
 
 For modes of government let fools contest, 
 That which is best adminlster'd is best. 
 
 That Studied obscurity in which he hath veiled himself, will not let us discover, 
 whether on instant and critical occasions he ever suffered himself to be actuated by any 
 of the darker passions, or too fondly indulged those of a brighter cast. But it cannot ba 
 found from what he writes, that he hath praised any man from fondiiess, or even from 
 gratitude, degraded any one though envy, or reproached any one with malice and ill- 
 nature. Thesame will hold in regard to states or whole communities. Doth he ever 
 censure the Athenians in the wrong placel or commend the Lacedemonians but in the 
 right? Were his name expungedfromthebeginningof the whole workand theconclu- 
 sions of the years, could any one guess to what state he had ever belonged, whether he 
 was a Lacedemonian, a Corinthian, an Athenian, or a Sicilian, except from the purity 
 of the Attic dialect in which he writes] In that dialect he was cradled; he could not pos- 
 sibly swerve from it; without it he could neither write nor speak. Could he have 
 thought that thismight yield suspicion of an impassioned or prejudiced spirit, he might 
 perhaps have endeavoured to write in the Doric or Ionic idiom. 
 
 Independent, further, he certainly must have been, since he had no great man to 
 cajole, and no prince to dread or flatter. The powers of Greece or the monarch of 
 Persia could affect him no more, than the Germanic body or the grand monarch of 
 France the quiet and contented refugee, who lives on the sunny side of a hill in Swit- 
 zerland. The circumjacent powers had no more, perhaps not so much influence at 
 Scaptesyle, than the neighbouring kingdoms can have at Lausanne. The states of 
 Greece had garrisons on the coasts, but were not masters of Thrace. Thrace was full of 
 little communities and petty principalities. Thucydides had credit enough amongst 
 them to insure hispersonalsafety and guard hisretirement. He could disoblige those 
 about whom he wrote, without fear of their resentment, and could praise without be- 
 ing in the reach of a requital. Human nature will not admit of a stricter independence. 
 His unconcern about the opinions of a present generation, is strong and clear. It 
 looks as if he thought they would scarce give him a reading, so little care had he taken 
 to soothe or to amuse them. He had a greater aim than to be the author in vogue for a 
 year. He hated contention, and scorned short-lived temporary applause. He threw 
 himself on posterity. He appealed to the future world for the value of the present he 
 had made them. The judgment of succeeding ages hath approved the compliment he 
 ihus made to their understandings. So long as there are truly great princes, able 
 blatesmen, sound politicians, politicians that do not rend asunder politics from good 
 
AS AN HISTORIAN. xxv 
 
 order and general happiness, he will meet with candid and grateful acsnowledg- 
 ments of his merit. 
 
 Other historians have sooner pleased, have more diffusively entertained . They have 
 aimed more directly at the passions, have more artificially and successfully struck at 
 the imagination. Truth in its severity, and reason in its'robust and manly state, are 
 all the Muses and Graces to which Thucydides hath done obedience. Can we won- 
 der, that he hath not been more generally read ani adniiredl or, could we wonder, 
 if he had not been so much) A great work planned under such circumstances and 
 with such quahfications as I have been describing, cool serious judgment will always 
 commend as a noble design, even though executed it may prove too cheerless to the 
 more lively passions, its relish not sufficiently quick for the popular taste, orpiquanl 
 enough to keep the appetite sharp and eager. 
 
 But to proceed. Thucydides hathbeen censured in regard to the choice of his subject. 
 It hath occasioned the solidity of his judgment and excellence of his taste to be called in 
 question. Dionysius of Halicarnassus hath exerted himself much on his account; hath 
 tried him by laws which have poetry rather than history for their object; and censures 
 him for not delighting, when his profession was only to instruct. Mr Hobbes has gal 
 lantly defended his author, and shown all the arguments of Dionysius to be imperti- 
 nent, and to proceed from partiality and envy. I shall not repeat, it willsuffice to refer 
 the curious reader to what Mr Hobbes hath written upon this topic. Homer hath cele 
 brated the Trojan war, and intermingled in his poems all the historic strokes of that and 
 of preceding ages, enlivening and exalting every thing he touched. That splendid parV 
 of the Grecian history, in which his countrymen resisted and triumphed over the very 
 formidable arms of the Persian monarch, had already been recorded by Herodotus. 
 Should Thucydides plunge back into dark and fabulous ages, and turn a mere legen- 
 dary and romantic writerl He had, he could have, no subject equal to his ambition and 
 his abilities, but the war which broke out in his own days, which he foresaw would prove 
 extensive and important, when the efforts of her enemies would be vigorously exerted 
 to pull down the power of Athens, to demolish that naval strength which gave her the 
 sovereignty of thesea, and made her the dread and envy of her neighbours. Coolly 
 therefore with my reason as an examiner of things, and warmly with my passion as an 
 Englishman, I cannot but applaud his choice, who hath projected the soundest ana 
 best system of English politics, so long before the constitution had existence; and hath 
 left us fine lessons, such as his factious countrymen would not observe, how to support 
 the dominion of the sea on which our glory is built, and on which our welfare entirely 
 depends. In this light itis a most instructive and interestinghistory, and we may fe- 
 licitate ourselves on the choice of Thucydides. I must not anticipate; Thucydides 
 would have his readers pick out their own instructions. I can only add, that Thucy- 
 dides is a favourite historian with the statesmen and patriots of Great Britain : this fits him 
 also to be an historian for the people. Other nations have admired him, and I hope will 
 continue to ad mire him, gratis: we are bound to thank him, and never to lose sight of that 
 grand political scheme, formed by a Themistocles, and warmly and successfully pur- 
 sued by an Aristides, a Cimon, and a Pericles; the swerving from whichat Athensdrew 
 after it the loss of the sovereignty at sea, then sunk her into a petty state, and made her 
 end at last in a mere academy, though most excellent in its kind. 
 
 From such considerations it will also follow, that the history of Thucydides is more 
 useful than that of Livy; at least, that we have more reason to applaud the choice of the 
 former. I design no comparison between these two historians. The performance of 
 4 C 
 
XXVI ON HIS QUALIFICATIONS 
 
 the Jesuit Rapin on that point is in general reading. Li vy's history is certainly more 
 august, more splendid, more amazing: I only insist that it is not more useful. And, 
 though Livy be happier in his subject, this ought not to degrade Thucydides, who 
 Beized the only fine subject that could offer itself to him: in regard to him, it was 
 either this or none at all. The parallel should be only drawn in regard to execution, 
 where muchhath been said on both sides, and the superiority still remains undecided. 
 This brings me to the inward abihties of genius and understanding, which capacita- 
 ted my author to execute his work. His genius was certainly of the highest order: it 
 was truly sublime. Here the critics unanimously applaud. In. the arrangement of his 
 matter he emulated Homer. In the grandeur of his thoughts and loftiness of his sense 
 he copied Pindar. He is ever stately and majestic; his stateliness perhaps too formal, 
 his majesty too severe. He wrote,'as he thought, far beyond an ordinary person. He 
 thinks faster than he can utter: his sentences are full-stored with meaning; and his ve- 
 ry words are sentences. Hence comes his obscurity. Where pure thought is the object, 
 he connects too fast, nor is enough dilated for common apprehension. Eut this is not 
 the case with the narrative part of his history, which is pithy, nervous, and succinct, 
 yet plain, striking, and manly. He never flourishes, never plays upon words, never 
 sinks into puerilities, never swells into bombast. It is a relation from the mouth of a ve- 
 ry great man, whose chief characteristic is gravity. Others talk more ingenuously; 
 others utter themselves with a more cheerful air; yet every one must attend to Thucy- 
 dides, must hearken with serious and fixed attention, lest they lose a word, a weighty 
 and important word , by which the whole story would be spoiled. It is in his Orations, 
 that he is most remarkably obscure. He might not be so in so high a degree to the ap • 
 prehensions of mankind, when his history was first made public. The world was then 
 used to hear continual harangues: no business of a public nature could be carried on 
 without them. In his time, the speakers aimed entirely at strength and brevity. If 
 they were not exceeding quick, the apprehensions of the Athenians would outstrip, 
 or at least affect to outstrip, their utterance. They must think much, and yet leave 
 much of what they had thought to the ready conception of the audience. An orator in 
 the following history* calls them" Spectators of speeches." They affected to discern at 
 the first glance; and without waiting for formal deduction and solemn inference, to be 
 mastersofthepoint asit were by intuition. The more copious and diffusive eloquence 
 was the improvement of the next generation. But the most forcible orator that even 
 Athens ever boasted, improved, if he did not quite learn, his peculiar manner from 
 Thucydides. It was Demosthenes, who copied him in the close energy of his sen- 
 tences, and the abrupt rapidity of his thoughts. Demosthenes is said to have transcrib- 
 ed him eight times over with his own hand : so diligently did he persevere to form an in- 
 timate acquaintance with him, andhabituate himself to hisquickmannerof conception, 
 and to his close and rapid delivery. Cicero says however,f that "no rhetorician of 
 Greece drew any thing from Thucydides. He hath indeed been praised by all; I own 
 it; but, as a man who was an explainerof facts with prudence, severity, and gravity: not 
 as a speaker at the bar, but an historical relater of wars. And therefore he was never 
 numbered amongst the orators." Cicero learned nothing from him: he could not, nei- 
 ther in his own words " would he if he could." His talents were different; he was 
 quite in all respects accomplished; he was eloquence itself. But Demosthenes— and 
 can there be higher praise]— Demosthenes certainly loved and studied Thucydides; 
 
 » Cleon's speech in book the third. t In the Orator 
 
AS AN HISTORIAN. xxvii 
 
 for whose perfection I am not arguing; I would only establish his character of lofti- 
 ness and sublimity. Longinus* proposeih him as the model of true grandeur and 
 exaltation in writing history. 
 
 And now, I have mentioned this princely and most judicious critic, let us call Thu- 
 cydides to take a trial at his bar, and see whether he hath all the genuine constitu- 
 ents of the true sublime. For elevation of thought, for his power in alarming and 
 interesting the passions, for his bold and frequent use of figures, his character will 
 soon be estaWished'. EvenDionysiusof Halicarnassus bears testimony here, who lov- 
 ed liim not, and would have been glad to degrade him. Plutarch calls him the most pa- 
 thetic, and a writer of the greatest energy and variety that ever was. The scenes in his 
 history are strong, most expressive paintings. He makes the past to be present; he 
 makes hearing sight. In the very words of Piularchf — " His readers are thrown into 
 the same astonishment and hurry of passion, as the eye-witnesses to every scene 
 must have felt. Demosthenes drawing up his men on the craggy shore of Pylus^Brasi- 
 das calling out on his pilot to run the vessel ashore, getting himself on the stairs, then 
 wounded, fainting, falling down on the gunnel; here, the Spartans fighting a land battle 
 from the water, the Athenians a naval battle from the shore; — and again, in the Sicilian 
 war, the land armies of both parties on the beach, whilst a naval engagement is yet un- 
 der decision on tlie water, sympathising in all the contest, adjusting themselves to all 
 the various turnsof battle, bynew attitudes, quick contortions of the body; — All these 
 things are set before the readers in actual representation, in all the disposition, all the 
 expression and perspicuity, of picture." Though the whole course of the history, a 
 battle either at land or sea is an object clear and distinct. The writer is never confound- 
 ed himself, nor throws confusion on his reader. That reader sees the whole, from the 
 paean of attack to the erectingof the trophy; he discerns the whole train of fight, and 
 beholds exactly the loss or gain of the victory. He further assists at the assemblies of 
 the people, and all important consultations. He learns the state of affairs from the 
 managers themselves; he hears the debates, is let into the tempers of the assembly, 
 pries into all the politics, and preconceives the resolution. Where the politics are 
 bad, he willown no other could be expected from those who recommend them Where 
 they are sound and good, nor wilfully severed from duty to their country, and in 
 moral consistence with the welfare of their fellow-creatures, the reader will applaud, 
 and think he hath been himself discovering the fine maxims which the author hath 
 been teaching, who never appears in person, never puffs his own integrity and discern- 
 ment, and without digressing into comments or setting up for a pohtician, is found 
 upon reflection the best of the kind that ever wrote. 
 
 To quote passages for the truth of his sublime thought or his pathetic address, would 
 be to transcribe the greater part of the following history. They will be observed in the 
 orations of these two different casts, and the incidents of the work. His figures are 
 thickset; the figures that regard both the sentiment and the diction. His metaphors 
 are strong and uncommon; his hyperboles far but not overstretched, the tone is still 
 preserved, they flow out from a warm pathetic in the midst of some grand circumstance. 
 The figures in which he most delights, are the Interrogation; the Change of number and 
 time; the Hyperbaton, or transposing and inverting the order of things which seem 
 naturally united and inseparable; and above all, the Antithesis. This last ho hath 
 •Vmdly used, almost to satiety. Term is not only opposed to term, but thought to 
 
 *0n the Sublime. Section 14. fDe gloria Atheniensium. 
 
xxviii ON HIS QUALIFICATIONS 
 
 thought, sentence to sentence, and sometimes whole orations to one another even 
 where the latter speaker cannot possibly be supposed to have heard the former. A 
 constant adherence to this method carries with it the danger of glutting the reader. 
 I am sensible there should have been more variety to make the whole quite beauti- 
 ful and graceful. 
 
 As the fourth constituent of sublimity, which according to Longinus is noble and 
 graceful expression, our author's claim cannot be so well established. Noble un- 
 doubtedly he is, but as for the graceful — the reader may wish ho had been more careful 
 in this particular, and I am sure his translator wishes it from his heart. For fear of being 
 vulgar, he is too set and solemn ; and from the passion to be always great , he hath lost the 
 air of ease and genteelness. Dionysjus of Halicarnassus says he studiously affected 
 hard and obsolete words. Bu t yet the same writer sets him up as the standard of Attic 
 purity; nay, hath frequently strengthened his own style by using the hard and obsolete 
 words of Thucydides. However this be, it is certain Thucydides hath in this respect 
 fallen half-way short: and more so, in the fifth constituent of sublimity, composition or 
 structure of his periods. He hath no harmony, hath given little or no proof of having 
 a good ear. He is rough, austere; his periods are sometimes a mile long, in which he la- 
 bours himself both out of tune and time. I acknowledge his imperfections, and beg 
 the reader would weigh them and set them in the.balance with his excellencies: he may 
 judge if the latter do not greatly preponderate. He thinks nobly, affects surprisingly; 
 his expression is noble, but not graceful; his final colouring is neither bright nor cheer- 
 ful. But, though his pieces are not so completely finished as to stand every test, 
 yet they are certainly high--wrought in his own peculiar style, and for greatness of 
 design and strength of expression are beyond every other hand. 
 
 I think no fair comparison can be made of him, e.xcept with the historians who are 
 his countrymen, who like himself are original in their own way, and the first in their 
 manner. These'are only two, Herodotus and Xenophon. In point of life, Thucy- 
 dides was junior a little to the former, and senior to the latter. In stateliness, gran- 
 deur, and majesty, he far surpasseh them both. The manner of Herodotus is grace- 
 ful and manly; his address is engaging; he loves to tell a story; and, however fabulous 
 or trifling that story, he will be heard with pleasure. The course of his history is 
 clear and smooth, and yields a most cheerful prospect: that of Thucydides is deep, 
 rapid, impetuous, and therefore very apt to be rough and muddy. You may clearly 
 perceive the bottom of the one: but it is very hard to dive to the bottom of the othei 
 Herodotus, like a master on the horn, can wind a lofty air, and without any harshness 
 sink down into the lowest and mellowest notes. Thucydides sounds the trumpet; 
 his blasts are sonorous and piercing, and they are all of the martial strain * Xenophon 
 never pretends to grandeur; his character is a beautiful simplicity; he is sweeter than 
 honey; he charms every ear; the Muses themselves could not sing sweeter than he 
 hath wrote. Each beats and is beaten by the others in some particular points. Each 
 hath his particular excellence: that of Herodotus is gracefulness; that of Thucydides, 
 grandeur; and that of Xenophon, sweetness itself If generals, and admirals, and 
 statesmen, were to award the first rank, it would undoubtedly be given for Thucy 
 dides; if the calmer and more polite gentry, it would go for Herodotus; if all in gen 
 eral who can read or hear, Xenophon hath it all to nothing. 
 
 As to the Roftian historians, who saw what these mighty originals had done before 
 
 * Canii quodammodo bellicum. Cicero in the Orator. 
 
AS AN HISTORIAN. xxix 
 
 them, 1 cannot judge it fair to form decisive parallels. Time had enabled them to 
 judge maturely about defects and excellencies of their Greek predecessors. Yet 
 every Roman historian shows plainly he is a Roman himself; he stood not so aloof from 
 his subject as Thucydides. The loss of a Peloponnesian writer is never regretted in 
 regard to the latter: the loss of Carthaginian and historians of other nations is highly 
 regretted in regard to the former. National partiality will admit no comparison here, 
 though excellence of composition may admit a great deal. Sallust is the only one 
 ■who seems to have had our Author ever in his eye, and to have been his professed 
 imitator. Sallust frequently translates his political maxims, copies him exactly in 
 the conciseness and laboured energy of his phrase; and Sallust, for that reason, is 
 like him very often obscure. It is entirely in his manner, that he draws up his ora- 
 tions, contrasts his speakers, and fights his battles. Sallust hath many, hath deserv- 
 edly many admirers: and I hope, if I am so fortunate as to bring Thucydides into more 
 general acquaintance, that the admirers of the one will bestow regard upon the other, 
 and pay due honour to his historic progenitor. 
 
 I shall wind up this essay on Thucydides as an historian with a passage from the 
 Critic ou the Sublime,* only desiring the reader to keep Thucydides in remembrance, 
 as Longinus extended his view to writers both in poetry and prose — 
 
 " I readily allow, that writers of a lofty and towering genius are by no means pure 
 and correct, since whatever is neat and accurate throughout, must be exceedingly lia- 
 ble to flatness. In the Sublime, as in great aflSuence of fortune, some minuter articles 
 will unavoidably escape observation. But it is almost impossible for a low and grovel- 
 ling genius to be guilty of error, since he neverendangershimself by soaring on high, or 
 aiming at eminence, but still goes on in the same uniform secure track, whilst its 
 very height and grandeur exposes the SubHme to sudden falls. Nor am I ignorant in- 
 deed of another thing, which will no doubt be urged, that in passing our judgment 
 upon the works of an author, we always muster his imperfections, so that the remem- 
 brance of his faults sticks indelibly fast in the mind, whereas that of his excellencies 
 is quickly worn out. For my partj I have taken notice of no inconsiderable number 
 of faults in Homer, and some other of the greatest authors, and cannot by any means 
 be blind or partial to them; however, I judge them not to be voluntary faults, so much 
 as accidental slips incurred though inadvertence: such as, when the mind is intent 
 upon things of a higher nature, will creep insensibly into compositions. And for 
 this reason 1 gave it as my real opinion, that the great and noble flights, though they 
 cannot every where boast an equality of perfection, yet ought to carry off the prize 
 by the sole merit of their own intrinsic grandeur." 
 
 * Longinus, Section 33. 
 
 02 
 
DISCOURSE III. 
 
 SURVEY OF THE HISTORY. 
 
 In the preceding discourse we have examined into the capacity and qualifications of 
 our author for writing history, aiidsettled his character. Let us now take a view of 
 the worii itself; first casting our eyes upon and noting the general disposition of the 
 whole; and then surveying it more distinctly in its parts. 
 
 The disposition of the whole is most elaborately exact. Order is Scrupulously 
 observed; and every incident so faithfully arranged in its proper time, that some have 
 doubted whether annals were not a more proper title for it than history. If we should 
 call it annals, it must be owned at the same time that annals were never composed with 
 so much majesty and spirit; and never was history more accurately distinguished by the 
 punctuality of dates so nicely interwoven. Thucydides states every occurrence in 
 just place and time. But he is forced for this purpose to make frequent transitions, 
 and to drop a particular narration, perhaps the very moment a reader's attention may be 
 most fixed upon and most eager for the event. If they cannot bear a disappointment 
 here, the remedy is ready at hand. By turning over a few leaves, they will find it 
 regularly resumed in due place and time; and they at once may satisfy their own cu- 
 riosity, without disarranging the author's scheme, or perplexing' that work which he 
 was determined to keep quite clear and unembarrassed. They will afterwards for- 
 give, perhaps applaud him, for his great care to prevent confusion, and to give a neat 
 and precise conception of all that passeth. He constantly gives notice, when he is 
 necessitated, by the method he laid down for himself, to make such transitions; and, 
 when we have been amused with what looks like a ramble from an engaging part of his- 
 tory, but is really a coincidence of events not to pass unheeded; when we have been 
 60 long at It, that we are convinced it lies in the road, and is no excursion at all; yet 
 we are glad to see him re-connect, and land us on a spot, where we are already well 
 acquainted. He shows a steady and inviolable attachment to chronology, a necessary 
 attendant upon history But the chronology of Thucydides is like a herald, that ex- 
 actly marshals a long stately procession, adjusts the rank, clears the way, and preserves 
 every step distinct and unincumbered. 
 
 No writer had done this before him. No settled era was yet in use, not even the 
 famous one of the Olympiad. The several states of Greece computed time by a method 
 of their own. It was not easy to make those methods coincide with one another. The 
 Athenians reckoned by their annual archons; the Lacedemonians by their ephori; the 
 Arglves by the years of the priestess of Juno. The seasons of the year, when the two 
 former entered on- their offices, were fixed, but did not suit together in point of time; 
 
A SURVEY OF THE HISTORY. xxxi 
 
 the beginning of the years of the latter was variable, since it depended on the death 
 or removal of a predecessor. Thucydides, to avoid confusion, left all these artificial 
 jarring rules, and adhered to the course of nature. He divided the natural year into 
 halves, into a summer and winter. His summer includes the spring, aid reaches 
 from the vernal to the autumnal equinox; the other half-year is comprehended in his 
 winter. He always records eclipses, as strange events, and proper concomitants for 
 the horrors of this war. I must not be so sanguine as to imagine, that he supposed 
 such appearances might some time or other be reduced to exact calculation, and as- 
 tronomy be made the faithful guide of chronology. 
 
 Book I. — The First Book of Thucydides is introductory to the rest. It is a compre- 
 hensive elaborate work of itself It clears away rubbish, opens a view from the 
 earhest ages, strikes out light from obscurity, and truth from fable; that the reader may 
 enter upon the Peloponnesian war with a perfect insight into the state of Greece, and the 
 schemes, interest, and strength, of the contending parties. The author unfolds his 
 design in writing, magnifies his subject, complains of the ignorance and credulity of 
 mankind, rectifies their mistakes, removes all prejudice, and furnishes us with the 
 knowledge of everything proper to be known, to enable us to look at the contention 
 with judgment and discernment, when the point contended for is no less than the 
 sovereignty of the sea, which that of the land must necessarily follow. 
 
 He begins at the source, and traces the original of the Greek communities from 
 certain and indisputable facts; and the growth of Attica in particular, from the natural 
 barrenness of the soil, which tempted no invasions; and from the shelter its inhabitants 
 gave to all who would settle amongst them, and share their polity. — He shows the 
 invention of shipping to have been exceedingly mischievous at first. It filled the sea 
 with pirates, to whom it gave a ready conveyance from coast to coast, enabling them 
 suddenly to seize, and at leisure to carry oflf and secure their booty. No considerable 
 commerce, or rather none at all, could be carried on, till the shore was cleared of such 
 annoyance. And when few durst venture to settle on the coasts, no marts could be 
 opened fortrafEc, and no ports were yet secure. A ship was merely the instrumentof 
 ready conveyance from place to place: it was not yet become an engine of attack and 
 defence on the water. Minos king of Crete made the first attempt with success to 
 obtain a naval strength,* by which he cleared the isles of the pirates, who had settled 
 upon them to set out readier from thence on their plundering excursions. — The grand 
 fleet that carried such a numerous army to Troy, was a mere collection of transports. 
 Thucydides gives us a just and clear idea of that famous expedition After this cele- 
 brated era,f the Corinthians were the first people of Greece, who became in reality a 
 maritime power. Their peculiar situation gave them an inclination and opportunity 
 for commerce; and commerce must have strength to guard and support it. They first 
 improved a vessel of burden into a ship of war ,J and set power afloat as well as wealth. 
 
 Their neighbours in the isle of Corcyra soon followed their example, and, though 
 originally a colony of their own, became a rival power at sea. They fought on their 
 own darling element for superiority.]] This was the most ancient sea-fight, but it was 
 not decisive. They continued for two centuries more to be rival and jarring powers; 
 till a third, that of Athens, grew up, which politically joined with one to gain the 
 ascendant over them both, and to assert the empire of the sea for itself. 
 
 * Years before Christ 1006. |- Before Christ 904. 
 
 ^ Before Christ 697. || Before Clirist 657. 
 
xxxii SURVEY OF 
 
 The claim both of Corcyra and Corinth to the town of Epidamnus had occasioned 
 their most recent embroilment,* and a hot war, in which the Corcyreans applied for 
 the alliance and aid of Athens. On this was afterwards grounded the first pretext 
 for the Peloponnesian war, and therefore our author opens the affair at large. Athens 
 held the balance of power in her hands: how she came to be possessed of it, will 
 soon give room for as pertinent a digression as Thucydides could have wished. 
 Ambassadors from both parties are soon at Athens; one, to negotiate alliance and aid; 
 the other, to traverse their negotiation. Thepeopleof Athens, in whom the supreme 
 power was vested, admitted them both to audience, and orations of course must 
 follow. Our grave historian is now retired, to make way for statesmen and orators to 
 mount the stage, who are very well worth hearing. 
 
 The Corcyreans, who take the lead, recognize " the necessity of alliances, which, 
 though sometimes entanglements, are generally security and defence. Wronged as 
 they now are, they sue for alliance as the means of redress. In granting it to them, 
 the Athenians would show honour and virtue, and at the same time promote their own 
 private interest. The accession of the naval strength of Corcyra to their own was very 
 well worth the gaining; in the end, it might preserve their state. — They open the nature 
 of colonies, show the original contract between them and the mother-country; obedi- 
 ence and protection are reciprocal, and imply one another. — They prove that Athens 
 may grant them alliance, in consistence with all other engagements; by doing it, tiaay 
 secure herself in time against the envy and attack of the Peloponnesians; since the 
 naval strength of Corinth, joined to all the efforts of the latter in a future war, will 
 be weak and ineffectual against the combined fleets of Corcyra and Athens." 
 
 The Corinthians, in their answer, inveigh highly against the Corcyreans. They 
 describe them as " a very designing iniquitous set of men, and a colony in the high- 
 est degree undutiful to its mother-state. They endeavour to prove it unjust, and 
 ungrateful too, in the Athenians, to take them into alliance, and abet their criminal 
 behaviour. They maintain, that true honour points out another conduct; and schemes 
 of interest should never supersede the laws of equity and good faith. What may 
 happen should be less regarded, than what on present occasions is strictly right. 
 They entreat at last, though with a menacing air; and close with warmly adjuring 
 the Athenians to stand neutral in the quarrel." 
 
 The Athenians however resolve to enter into a defensive alliance with Corcyra. 
 The war is renewed; and the Athenians send the Corcyreans a petty aid, which they 
 afterwards reinforce. Corcyra is secured, and all the projects of the Corinthians are 
 baffled, who are highly exasperated against the Athenians, and never will forgive them. 
 Another affair soon happens to embroil them more, and to make the second pretext 
 for a general war. Potidaea, a town in the isthmus of the Pallene, was a Corinthian 
 colony, but at this time tributary to the Athenians. Its situation between two bays, 
 and amongst the Athenian colonies on the coast to Thrace and Macedonia, would 
 enable it to gall the Athenians sorely in case of a rupture. They order it therefore 
 to be dismantled. The Potidaeans refuse obedience, and revolt. Awarensues. The 
 Athenians attempt to reduce Potidaea; and the Corinthians to support the revolt. It 
 is at length besieged by the former. The siege runs out into a great length of time, 
 and at last becomes one of the considerable events of the Peloponnesian war. 
 The Corinthians, after this repeated provocation, are full of resentments, and leave no 
 
 •Before Christ 438. 
 
THE HISTORY. xxxiii 
 
 f tone unturned to stir up a general war in Greece. They were parties themselves in 
 the Pcloponneaian league, of which the Lacedemonians were the head. The Corin 
 thians never set up for a leading state. They were ever content with the secondary 
 rank, though the first in that rank. Their turn was always more to commerce than war. 
 Commerce had long since made them rich; riches had made them luxurious; and, 
 though they often produced great and excellent soldiers, yet they never piqued them- 
 selves on being a martial or formidable people. Athens indeed they hated: Athens had 
 rivalled themiu trade, and very much abridged the extent of their commerce. One of 
 the gulfs on which Corinth is seated, that of Sarone, was now entirely in the jurisdiction 
 of the Athenians, who had also begun to curb and straiten them much in the gulf of 
 Crissa. They were consequently bent on the demolition of this all-grasping rival, but 
 were unable to effect it by their own strength. They solicit all the confederates to re- 
 pair to Lacedemon, all full of complaint and remonstrance against the Athenians. The 
 Corinthians reserve themselves for the finishing charge; and our author repeats (or 
 makes for tliem) their most inveigling and alarming speech on this occasion. 
 
 " They address the Lacedemonians with an artful mixture of commendation and 
 reproach; of commendation, for their strict adherence'to good faith; of reproach, for 
 their indolence and sloth. They had suffered the state of Athens to grow too migh- 
 ty for her neighbours. Though the acknowledged deliverers of Greece, they had 
 now for a length of time taken no notice of the encroachments of the Athenians; 
 but, through wilful ignorance and habitual supineness, had let them grow too big, 
 and able now to enslave them all. — They do all they can to irritate and provoke them. 
 They draw an admirable parallel between them and the Athenians; invidious and 
 reproachful, but directly tending to exasperate those whom they want to exasper- 
 ate* — Then, they warmly renew their applications to the pride of the Lacedemonians; 
 they alarm their fears; they flatter and reproach their foibles. They even threaten to 
 abandon their league, unless they exert themselves in defence of their friends; they 
 endeavour to prove the necessity of active and vigorous measures; and end with a 
 very artful stroke of insinuating and persuasive address." 
 
 An Athenian embassy, now residing at Lacedemon, being informed of these loud 
 and bitter outcries against their masters, beg an immediate audience. Accordingly, 
 they are admitted; not indeed to plead before Lacedemonians, as their judges or su- 
 periors — Athenians scorn such self-debasement; but to vindicate their state from mis- 
 representations, to clear her reputation, and justify her power. 
 
 " With this view, they run over the great services they had done to Greece, in the 
 time of the Persian invasions: they had ever been the most strenuous, most disinterest- 
 ed, and most gallant, champions for hberty. They pompously detail their battles of 
 Marathon and Salamis: their evacuating Athens on the last occasion: and when they 
 had no polity of their own subsisting, fighting ardently and successfully for the other 
 communities of Greece. Their power had been nobly earned; and must they forego it, 
 because it was envied^ They had honourably gained, and justly used it; much more 
 justly, than the Lacedemonians had it either in will or ability to have done. They are 
 calumniated merely from that spite and discontent so common to mankind, who ever 
 hate and abuse their superiors, and ever repine at subjection though to the most gentle 
 masters. — Lacedemonians have neither skill nor judgment for large command, and 
 though most eagerly grasping at it, are unable to manage it with any measure of dexteri- 
 ty and address. They should reflect again and again, before they ventured upon war: it 
 might last longer, and involve them in more calamities, than they seemed willing to ap- 
 5 
 
xxxiv SURVEY OF 
 
 prehend. They had better submit their complaints to fair arbitration: if not, the 
 Athenians invoke the gods to witness their readiness to defend themselves, whenev- 
 er and however their enemies shall attack them." 
 
 All parties now withdraw; and the Lacedemonians go to counsel amongst them 
 selves. Exasperated by the Corinthians, and mortified by the speech of the Atheni- 
 ans, the majority are for an immediate declaration of war. Archidamus one of their 
 kings, rose up to temper their fury. And the speech of his Spartan majesty on this 
 occasion carries all the marks of a good king, an able statesman, and a thorough patriot: 
 it doeshonour both to his heart and head. A Spartan king never made a royal figure 
 but at the head of an army: then he reigned indeed. And yet, Archidamus retains no 
 selfish considerations; they are lost in his regard for the public welfare. 
 
 He tells them, " he is not fond of war himself; raw unexperienced youth alone is li- 
 able to such weakness. The war now under consideration is a most important point. It 
 may run out into a greatlengthof time. Itis against Athenians — aremote people — ana- 
 val power — abounding in wealth — excellently provided in all respects. He demands, 
 in every single article, whether they can presume to become a match for such antago- 
 nists'! They should remember the high spirit, the habits of activity and perseverance so 
 natural to these Athenians, who are not to be dejected at the first loss, nor frightened at 
 big words or haughty threats. Insults indeed must not be brooked; but adequate pre- 
 parations should be made to avenge them, and time be gained to make such prepara- 
 tions. It would be most prudent to begin a negotiation, to spin it out into length. If 
 affairs can be amicably adjusted, it would deserve their choice; — if not, when they are 
 competently enabled, it will be soon enough to act offensively. He dreads not warhim- 
 self, yet war cannot be carried on without money. Ample funds must be provided, a 
 work of time and deliberation. Circumspection is no real reproach; precipitation draws 
 positive mischiefs after it. Lacedemonians aroused to be calm and considerate; they 
 should not now be cajoled or exasperatedout of their judgment. The Athenians are a 
 wise and dextrous people. The Lacedemonians should keep that in remembrance, and 
 support their own character of calmness of spirit and true manly resolution; they should 
 begin with caution, proceed with temper, end all things amicably if they can; if not, 
 when duly prepared and adequately provided, they might trust the decision to arms." 
 
 The kings of Sparta were ever jostled on their thrones by the haughty overbearing 
 Ephori. Sthenelaidas, one of that college, answers Archidamus in a short, blunt, 
 properly Laconic speech. " He is severe upon the Athenians, sneers Archidamus, 
 and avers that Lacedemonians should not deliberate upon, but instantly take the 
 field and avenge their wrongs." He then put the question — whether the peace was 
 broken! — divided the council; told the votes; and declared, in the English style, that 
 the Ays had it. 
 
 The confederates were now called in, and acquainted with the resolution. Yet, 
 it seems the advice of Archidamus had carried some weight, and actual war was to 
 be deferred, till all the parties in the Lacedemonian league had ripened their mea- 
 sures, and were ready to act with unanimity and vigour. 
 
 Here the author again makes his appearance, and assures us the true motive of the 
 determination for a war at Sparta, was a jealousy of the Athenian power, now very 
 great, and a dread of its more extensive growth; the latter of which they were deter- 
 mined to prevent, and to reduce the former within less distasteful and terrific bounds. 
 
 Then follows a most pertinent digression, in which Thucydides points out the steps 
 >iy which theAthenians had so highly exalted their state. In a close and succinct man- 
 
THE HISTORY. xxxv 
 
 nerhe runs over the history of Athens for fifty years, from the invasion of Xerxes to 
 the brealiing out of the Peloponnesian war. He arranges all the incidents in due 
 place and time. Herodotus hath related the splendid passages of the Grecian history 
 during that invasion; hath exhibited Themistocles in all the lustre of his command at the 
 battle of Salamis, where the Athenians, who had abandoned their all, fought, and, 
 through the address of Themistocles obliged all parties to fight, for liberty against 
 Xerxes. On this day they earned a greater title than that of citizens of Athens; they 
 were afterwards acknowledged the sovereigns of the sea. The Lacedemonians be- 
 came mortified at it; but the Athenians had gloriously deserved it. Themistocles waS 
 the very life and soul of Greece on this occasion. In the midst of difficulties he formed 
 a most extensive plan for his beloved Athens, which he began to execute at once. 
 Thucydides describes his address and foresight. He soon sets the city beyond the 
 reach of envy and jealousy. And though soonafterhe lost his country, through the mal- 
 ice of his personal enemies and the enemies of his country in conjunction with them, 
 yet the statesmen and patriots left behind pursued his plan of naval power; and the 
 steps of its progress and advancement are mutually traced out by our historian. 
 
 Themistocles had made all safe and secure at home. The Long Walls were built; 
 the Piraeus, a spacious harbour, opened and fortified , a magazine for traffic, and an arsen- 
 al for war. Aristides, as true a patriot as ever lived, made all secure abroad. Through 
 hishonest management, all Greece submitted to an annual tax, for the guard of their 
 common liberty against future invasions; and the leaders at sea were made collectors 
 and treasurers of this naval fund. The isle of Delos was the place, atflrst, of lodging 
 this fund; but it was soon after removed to Athens; — a shrewd political step, yet' capa- 
 ble however of an ample, if not full, justification. The war is briskly carried on against 
 the Persian monarch; the isles and seas are cleared of the common enemy; the cities on 
 the coast are regained or conquered. Cimon also performs his part nobly; he earns two , 
 victories the same day, by sea and land, on the coast of Ionia, from the Persians. 
 He completed a negotiation with the petty maritime states, confederate with Athens, 
 who were tired of incessant warfare, for accepting sums of money instead of ships 
 and personal attendance. By this means the shipping of those states soon mould- 
 ered away, and their money was by their own agreement sent thither, to increase and 
 strengthen the maritime power of Athens. In spite of all the opposition, which the' 
 Corinthians and Boeotians gave them at home, whose rancour to them was never to 
 be appeased, in the course of no large number of years they had established a very 
 extensive and formidable empire indeed. The isles and coasts of the JEgean sea 
 were mostly their own. The bay of Sarone was entirely in their own jurisdiction: 
 and, by being masters of Naupactus, they considerably awed the bay of Crissa. 
 Their squadrons cruised round and quite awed the coasts of Peloponnesus. Their 
 interest at Cephallene, and the new alliance which gained them the accession of the 
 naval strength of Corcyra, rendered them masters of the Ionian, and they had colo- 
 nies to extend their traffic and influence both in Italy and Sicily. 
 
 These points are opened step by step in this digression by Thucydides, till jealou- 
 sy in the Lacedemonians and malice in the Corinthians irritated all the Peloponnesi- 
 an states and their allies against them, and ended in the determination for war. The 
 Corinthians had now carried their point, and hoped soon to gratify all their resentments. 
 Accordingly, at the second grand congress at Sparta, when all the rest of the states 
 had declared their minds, they warmly encourage them to enter at once upon an 
 offensive war, in a very studied and elaborate speech. 
 
xxxvi SURVEY OF 
 
 " They set out with handsome compliments to the Lacedemonians. They animate 
 the land states of Peloponnesus to join effectually with those on the coasts. A firm 
 and lasting peace can only be obtained by a vigorous war; and the power of Athens 
 must needs be reduced.— Tliey open a plan— for establishing funds— for weakening 
 the marine of Athens, and consequently for improving and strengthening the marine 
 of her enemies — for effectuating the revolts of her dependents-^and raising fortifi- 
 cations in Attica itself. Independence can never be earned at too great a price; it 
 costs as much to be voluntary and obedient slaves. A single state should never be 
 suffered to play the tyrant in Greece. Their own reputation, their dignity, their lib- 
 erty, their welfare, a most righteous cause, nay, the very gods themselves, summon 
 them to action. They close with a very warm and pathetic recapitulation, sounding 
 as it were the alarm for the destruction of Athens." 
 
 Now war is asecond time resolved upon by ballot. All are ordered to get ready, with 
 the utmost despatch, to begin its operations. In the mean time the Athenians are to be 
 amused with embassies aind negotiations, merely to gain time and save appearances. 
 Frivolous they really are, but our author minutely details them, as they give him an 
 opportunity of introducing some notable passages relating to Cymon, Pausanias, and 
 Themistocles. He then shifts the scene to Athens; andintroducesPericles, the most 
 commanding orator, the greatest general, the most consummate statesmen,.and at this 
 time prime minister of the republic — introduces Pericles, I say, in the assembly of the 
 people, to give them an insight into the schemesof their enemies, and a plan for their own 
 conduct; to encourage them to a brave and steady resistance, in strict adherence to 
 such methods, as in the end will infallibly not barely secure but aggrandise their state. 
 The thoughts in this speech of Pericles are so grand, so nervous, so emphatically and 
 concisely just, that if the reader be not immediately struck into an adequate conception 
 of them, I know no method of opening his eyes or enlarging his understanding. He 
 says but little, but says every thing in that little. He demolishes all the assertions of 
 the Corinthians in their last speech at Sparta, as if he had heard them speak. Perhaps-^ 
 Thucydides here hath not sufficiently concealed his art in writing. But the ppeech is 
 entirely in character, completely suited to the heart and head and mouth of Pericles. 
 Pericles, I observe it with pleasure, is an Englishman both in heart and judgment. 
 England hath adhered and will adhere to the lessons which Athens neglected and forgot. 
 — " Of vast consequence indeed," says this enlightened statesman, " is the dominion 
 of the sea. But consider it with attention. For, were we seated on an island," as the 
 force of his argument evidently implies, " we could never be subdued. And now you 
 ought to think, that our present situation is as nearly as possible the same, and so to evac- 
 uate your houses and lands in Attica, and to confine your defence to the sea. If this can 
 
 need a comment, Xenophon will give it in his Polity of the Athenians -'In one point," 
 
 Bays he, " the Athenians are deficient. For if, beside their being sovereigns of the sea, 
 they were seated on an island, it would be ever in their power to ravage others at pleas- 
 ure, and yet they could not be ravaged themselves so long as they held the mastery at 
 sea; their lands could never be laid waste, no enemy could post themselves upon them 
 But now, the occupiers of lands and the wealthy Athenians fly before invaders; whilst 
 the people in general, conscious they have nothing to be burnt and nothing to be 
 plundered, live exempt from fear nor fly before an invader. The expedient used on such 
 occasions is, that the former deposit their most valuable effects in the isles, and trusting 
 to their superiority at sea, slight all the devastations an enemy can make in Attica." 
 England is complete where Athens was deficient. And how fond must both Pericles 
 
THE HISTORY. xxxvii 
 
 and Xenophon have been of the island and maritime power of Great Britain! I will not 
 pretend to anticipate the reader's pleasure by descending into more particularities 
 It may suiEce to add, that the final answer of the Athenians is drawn up by the ad 
 vice of Pericles, that " they will do nothing by command; they had already offered 
 to refer all disputes to a fair judicial decision: so far only, but no farther, compliance 
 must be expected from Athens." — Here all negotiation comes to an end; and the war 
 will very soon commence. 
 
 Thus I have endeavoured to give some idea of the first book of Thucydides. It 
 is a grand piece of work beyond all denial. But Rapin thinks our author hath over- 
 done it " out of a desire of prefixing a too stately portal to his history." Could the 
 portal have been, thought too stately, if the whole fabric had been completely finished! 
 To form a right judgment here, we should examine the design and not the execution: 
 the latter is imperfect, is broke off. So, look at it from the Park, the Banqueting-house 
 at Whitehall is too big for what stands near it. But hath it that appearance in the 
 original plan of Inigo Jones for the magnificent palace once designed to be erected? 
 Something of this nature may justly be pleaded in favour of Thucydides, and teach 
 us not to judge too hastily of a whole, when we cannot survey all the parts, because 
 ihey never were finished. Moved by decorum, I would gladly justify my author, 
 but I by no means pretend to decide the point. 
 
 Book II. — The second book opens with the first act of hostility. The Thebans 
 march by night, and enter by surprise the city of Plataea. This city and petty state, 
 though just within Bceotia, was not comprised in the union, of which all the other 
 cities of Bceotia were constituents, with Thebes at their head; but had ever been 
 firmly attached, even in the worst of times, to the common liberty of Greece, and was 
 under the protection of, and in fast alliance with Athens. This surprise of Plataja 
 our author describes in all its turns, till its enemies are driven out, or slaughtered, 
 and a place is secured for the Athenians. 
 
 A rupture hath now been made, and the war is going to be general. Thucydides 
 Bounds. the charge in all the disposition and spirit of Homer. He catalogues the al- 
 lies on both sides. He awakens our expectation; and fast engages our attention. All 
 mankind are concerned in the important point now going to be decided. Endeavours 
 are made to disclose futurity. Heaven itself is interested in the dispute. The earth tot- 
 ters, and nature seems to labour with the great event. This is his solemn and sublime 
 manner of setting out. Thus he magnifies a war between two, asRapin styles them petty 
 states; and thus artfully he supports a little subject by treating it in a great and noble 
 method. 
 
 Writers who have been long contemplating the vast gigantic size of the Roman 
 erapire,if they cast their eyes on the state of Athens even at the present juncture, are 
 apt to form a low idea of it. Athens, it is true, was at this time in the highest meridian 
 of her power. Yet, why ever to be pitching upon the most disadvantageous and incon- 
 gruous parallels'! His subject was certainly the greatest that to his day had occurred 
 iu the world: and ought Thucydides to be degraded, or even lessened at all, because 
 he was not born in the same age with Livy! As much amusement at least accompanies 
 and as much instruction flows from reading carefully the history of Athens, as from 
 that of Rome. Wonder may be more raised by the latter, and the wonder may end in 
 detestation of a people who became enormously great by the miseries and destruction 
 of their fellow-creatures. The Romans were but brute-like men; they were not toi 
 erably humanized till they had conquered Greece. Greece reconquered them, ani* 
 
 D 
 
xxxviii SURVEY OF 
 
 established a better, more lasting triumph over min&, nan tne others over body. 
 
 Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit. — Hor. 
 Who then best deserves the applause of the heart; the citizens of Athens, or the citizens 
 of Rome] I am not at all in doubt, how men of a calm and considerate spirit will 
 decide the question. Or, let such as judge only by numbers, consider a little more 
 sedately, whether Athens at this time was that diminutive and petty state, which could 
 be magnified and ennobled only by artifice. The first army, that invaded her territo- 
 ries in this war, consisted (according to Plutarch) of sixty thousand men. This is an 
 object big enough to fill the eye. The state of her revenue, when the value of mon- 
 ey is adjusted, will turnout by no means trifling. They were possessed, at the breaking 
 out of the war, of three hundred triremes fit for sea. Two hundred and fifty of 
 them were at one time in commission, in the fourth year of the war; consequently, 
 at two hundred men a ship, the number of seamen employed must have been fifty 
 thousand. If the reader be not yet convinced, that Athens was not a petty state, 
 nothing can get the better of his prejudice. It would be pity, any one should set 
 down to Thucydides with such low prepossessions against his subject. 
 
 The confederate army of Peloponnesians is now assembled, and ready to march 
 into Attica, under the command of Archidamus. Like an able and cautious general 
 he harangues his troops, " encourages them with a sight of their own numbers, but 
 guards them from catching at that sight a contempt of their foes. The strict obser- 
 vation of discipline is always necessary to armies, be they ever So large. No enemy 
 ought ever to be despised, much less Athenians. Though an enemy, he speaks in 
 high commendation of the latter, and establishes the dignity of their characters. He 
 ends with an exhortation to his troops, to observe rules, conform to discipline, and 
 bravely to execute orders; and. Spartan-like, concludes with an encomium on the 
 beauty and strength of strict military obedience." 
 
 He then sends a messenger to Athens, to try if a war were yet to be avoided. The 
 Athenians are as determined as ever to make no submissions. The messenger is eon- 
 ducted out of their territories, and parts from his escort with a pathetic prediction of 
 the miseries in which all Greece is going to be involved. Attica soon after is invaded. 
 The mischief done by the invaders is described ; and the sense at Athens of their suffer- 
 ings and distresses represented at large. The reader, on this occasion, will be let into 
 the form and constitution of the Athenian polity. He will see, how they began to 
 be moulded into one community by the prudence of Theseus, one of their earliest 
 kings. Other historians expatiate on the method, by which, from being under a regal, 
 they had varied gradually into a purely republican form. I shall only mention an ob- 
 servation.* that, contrary to most other nations, they had abolished the regal govern- 
 ment, not from distaste but reverence to kings. Codrus, the last of their kings, had de- 
 voted himself for his country, and was so worthy a man, that they resolved no mortal 
 should afterwards wear that title amongst them. They declared Jupiter king of Athens, 
 about the same time that the Jews rebelled against theocracy, and would have a man 
 to reign over them. Archons for life succeeded; whose term was afterwards abridged 
 to ten years; then, to a single year. All general histories point out the variations, 
 till they came to the popular form which now prevailed. 
 
 The enemy, after heavy depredations, at length evacuated Attica; and the Athenians 
 take the field to retaliate upon them. Their squadron had been all the time at sea, 
 cruising upon and infesting the coasts of Peloponnesus. But, in the winter, we are 
 * Tourreil's Preface Historique. 
 
THE HISTORY. xxxix 
 
 called to Athens to see the public funeral of those who were killed in the first campaign. 
 Here, the first time it occurs, our author describes this solemnity, and Pericles makes 
 the funeral oration. 
 
 I shall make no reflections on this celebrated performance. Should the reader not 
 think it deserving of its high reputation, I fear the translator will be sadly to blame. 
 It is hard to give such noble ideas their proper energy, and such refined ones their 
 due exactness. The great orators of Athens were always glad to display their abil- 
 ities on the same occasion. Plato hath entered the lists with a high spirit of emula- 
 tion, and with a high degree of success: and a great master * this way hath lately 
 made him English. If Thucydides suffers by a comparison, which now the unlearn- 
 ed but judicious reader is empowered to make, the latter must be entreated to observe, 
 that the eloquence of Plato was beyond dispute more smooth and fluent, more accom- 
 plished in all that is beautiful and sweet, than the eloquence of Thucydides, but an ad- 
 judged inferiority in any other respect must be laid at the door of his translator. 
 
 After such an exhilarating and enlivening piece, for such it must have been to all who 
 heard it, and must have determined every Athenian to suffer any thing with intrepidity 
 and patience in the causeof his country, a very mournful scene immediately succeeds, 
 which lays them under such a heavy load of afllictjon and distress, as no arguments, no 
 philosophy, can alleviate. The plague breaks out at Athens; and the reader must be 
 ready to feel very sharp emotions in behalf of his fellow-creatures, and in behalf of mo- 
 rality and virtue too. Amidst their accumulated distresses, Pericles is the only support 
 of the community; and, like the greatest benefactors to ungrateful men, is cursed for be- 
 ing their support, and reproached for being steadily wise and in the right. At last he 
 convenes them, and addresses them with such an air of ingenuity, such spirit, and con 
 scious dignity, and firm reliance on a good cause , as only two orators that I know of have 
 ever equalled on parallel occasions. Those I mean are Demosthenes and St Paul. All 
 the world of letters and good taste are well acquainted with the oration of the former 
 against ^schines about the crown; and every class of readers is surely well versed in the 
 Second Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians. I can but hint these resemblances, since 
 now I must attend on Pericles, who sooths or thunders his countrymen out of all their 
 discontent and malice, and sends them home convinced and ashamed. But domestic 
 distress soon effaceth any other impressions; their passions are again inflamed by in- 
 wardly corroding anguish; and Pericles after all must be fined, and turned out of his 
 employments. Yet people are riot always mad; good-sense and conviction return upon 
 them; and he is begged, because most worthy, again to accept the sole administration. 
 He enjoys it but a little time, before he is carried off by the plague. Athens then 
 lost her ablest, honestest statesman. He was able to have sat at the helm of govern- 
 ment, to have steered the republic safe through every storm, and to have insured her 
 not bare security but open triumph. His successors were very alert at catching hold 
 of that helm; but none of them could hold it long; and the vessel, through their mu- 
 tual quarrels, must needs run aground or founder at last. 
 
 But the next remarkable passage in the history, is the march of the Peloponnesians to 
 invest Plateea, and the solemn parley held at their approach. Archidamus is at the 
 head of this ungenerous enterprise. The malice of the Thebans must be gratified, since 
 theallianceofBoeotia in this war is of mighty consequence, and to be purchased at any 
 rate. Archidamus indeed struggles hard for the Plateeans; he would fain spare them, 
 could he persuade them to a neutrality. But the Platseans have too much honour and 
 
 * Mt Wes". 
 
xl ' SURVEY OF 
 
 gratitude to be neutral, when Athens, their faithful guardian and ally, is principally 
 struck at. They remonstrate in vain from the topics of honour, justice, gratitude, 
 the glory and sanction of the great progenitors on either side. The siege is formed, 
 and strenuously plied, though without success. Our author always shines in exact 
 description; no method of annoyance or defence is omitted. It is at length turned 
 into a blockade; and a sufficient body of troops left behind to carry it on, when the 
 main army marcheth off. 
 
 The war grows warm in more remote quarters; in Thrace; and in Acarnania. An 
 Athenian squadron, stationed at Naupactus in the bay of Crissa, awed all the motions 
 of the Corinthians and allies on their own coasts; and it was determined, to clear away this 
 annoyance. Accordingly they launch out against it with more than double the number 
 of vessels. The Athenians, at one exertion of skill, drive them all on a heap, defeat 
 them, and make prizes of twelve. The Lacedemonians, excellent land men, but 
 very awkward seamen, think this an unaccountable event. They send down their 
 most active commanders to refit and reinforce the fleet, and to try their fortune again 
 at sea. Much artifice is employed on both sides. The short harangues of the admi- 
 rals let us into all the views and designs of either party. Phormio at length is snared; 
 the enemy blunders; then Phormio extricates himself, and gives them a second de- 
 feat. The reader sees every tack, and the motion of every vessel. 
 
 Disconcerted here, they form a bold project indeed to surprise the Piraeus by night, 
 and to finish the war in a moment. The project is described, and the probability of 
 success established. But the very grandeur of the attempt deters the undertakers. 
 Athens indeed is alarmed, and thrown into great consternation; but the project total- 
 ly miscarries, and the Piraeus is better secured for the future. 
 
 All Thrace is now arming under Sitalces against Perdiccas king of Macedonia. A 
 vast army of Barbarians is assembled, marches over a great length of country, strikes 
 a general panic, effectuates no real service, and soon disperses or moulders away. 
 Such bulky unwieldy armies make an awkward figure, compared with the regular- 
 ity, exact discipline, and personal bravery, of the diminutive armies of Greece. 
 
 Thucydides gives us once more a sight of Phormio and his gallant squadron; and 
 thencloseth the book, and the history of the third year of the war. " Never history," 
 says Rapin, " comprised so much matter in so little room, nor so much action in so few 
 words. If any thing can be found fault with, it is that the exploits are- too closely 
 crowded with one another, so that the coherence seems somewhat intricate and con- 
 fused, and the multiplying ofobjects tends only to dissipate the attention of the reader." 
 An historian however is to take his incidents in their natural order, as they subsist in 
 fact. He is not so much to dispose, as to describe them. If he does the latter perti- 
 nently, accurately, and with due attention to their importance, he hath acquitted him- 
 self of his duty. The poet or writer of fiction must pick out and heighten his incidentSi 
 with a view to fill up properly, and give to every distinct object its needful splendour: 
 he is to exert his choice, and by exerting it judiciously to gain applause. The his- 
 torian is not to pick, but to make the best use of his materials. He may give them 
 indeed all possible lustre; but, if they crowd too thick upon one another, the reader 
 may be embarrassed with the number, yet nobody can be justly blamed. 
 
 Book III The Third Book is no less full of matter than the preceding. The inci- 
 dents crowd fast upon one another, and politics and oratory are in full employ. The 
 revolt of Lesbos is the first occurrence of importance. The people of that isle had 
 been long in the Athenian league: but the members of this league were dependents 
 
THE HISTORY. xli 
 
 rather than confederates. Thucydidesalwaysemploysthe same Greek word (ru,i.u«j;o.) 
 for the members of either league: the idea it gives is that of companions in war 
 But there is great difference between such asaccompany,hecause they choose itjan^ 
 such as accompany, because they are summoned and cannot help it. The former was 
 in general the case of those who sided with Sparta; the latter, of those who sided 
 with Athens. The least thought of compulsion is grating to any state, which thinks 
 it ought, and is able to be quite independent. This was the case with the Lesbians, 
 a people considerable in many respects, but especially for their naval strength. It 
 is well worth the while of the Lacedemonians to gain such confederates; it must be 
 a sad blow to the Athenians to lose such dependents. The fact was, all the cities 
 of Lesbos, except Methymne, declare a revolt. The Athenians lose no time, but are 
 at once with a powerful squadron before Mitylene, and block it up. The Mitylene- 
 ans had sent ambassadors to beg immediate aid from the Lacedemonians. They had 
 an audience from them and the rest of their league at Olympia, so soon as the games 
 were ended. The speech they make on this occasion is very artful, very insinua- 
 ting, and nicely adapted to carry their point. 
 
 " They open the nature of a revolt, and the cases in which it merits protection and 
 succour from others. They have been ill used by the Athenians; have been made 
 their tools in enslaving their compatriots of Greece; have been long caressed indeed, but 
 are well a'isured what their own fate would soon have been. Every state hath a 
 natural right to take preventive measures against the loss of their hberfy, and to stand 
 on their defence. They had revolted sooner, would the Lacedemonians have coun 
 tenanced the measure: they had declared it on the first invitation of the Boeotians. 
 It was a noble revolt; it had disengaged them from a combination to enslave the rest 
 of Greece; it had associated them in the cause of honour and liberty. It had been made 
 indeed with too much precipitation; but this should make others more zealous and 
 active in their protection, who wOuld reap a great accession of strength by it; an ac 
 cession of maritime strength; whilst the Athenians would be weakened in point of 
 shipping, and in point of revenue. It would be a signal of revolt to others, and 
 assurance to them that they might do it safely. It would reflect abundant honour 
 on the Lacedemonians to succour the distressed, to save men whose preservation 
 would give them glory and strength, and prove them those hearty friends to hberty, 
 which all Greece with united praises acknowledged them to be." 
 
 Interest without rhetoric was strong enough to insure their success. But the lat- 
 ter helped to gain them a prompt reception from the Lacedemonians, who resolve on 
 sending them a succour, and making diversions on the Athenians, in order to oblige 
 them to raise the siege of Mitylene. 
 
 The blockade of Plataea by the Peloponnesians still continuing, our author relates 
 the bold project, and bold execution of the project, of a party of Plataeans, in ma- 
 king their escape over all the works of the besiegers. It is a most circumstantial 
 and a most clear and intelligible relation. 
 
 Mitylene isnow forced to surrender at discretion. The principal agents in the revolt 
 are sent prisoners to Athens, where the people vote that " not they only but all the Mi- 
 tyleneansin general be put to death; and an order is immediately despatched to their 
 commander at Mitylene to execute his part of the sentence. This bloody decree was 
 carried by Cleon, a furious demagogue. It was he who worked up the people of Athens 
 to such a pitch of inhumanity ; which, however, instantly subsided. They are ?truck 
 6 d2 
 
xlii SURVEY OF 
 
 with horror at their own resolution, and will have it again debated. We shall hear 
 the two speakers on each side of the question, Cleon and Dipdotus. 
 
 " Cleon sets out with all the fury and fire of a man who hath a bad heart. He hath 
 abjured humanity to show himself a most zealous patriot. Eloquent he is acknowledged 
 to have been, and so appears in his invectives against his own masters and his own tools, 
 the people, for their foolish commiseration, for their being the eternal dupes of orators, of 
 subtle and venal speakers. For his own part, he loves his country; and hates her 
 enemies. Guilt shall never find an advocate in him; he calls out for vengeance on the 
 MLtyleneans; none but their pensioners, none but men who are bribed and corrupted 
 can offer a plea in their behalf. He bids his audience throw away all foolish pity, all 
 womanish forbearance; to fix their attention on the crimes of the guilty, and not on 
 the horrors of their punishment: and give this proof to their dependents, that death 
 shall inevitably be the portion of all revolters, that their arms may be henceforth employ- 
 ed in opposing their public enemies, and not in chastising their own subjects." 
 
 Diodotus replies in a speech that shows hira a real patridt, and who thought good 
 manners, a calm considerate temper, and a regard tohumanity, tobe very consistent 
 with the true patriot spirit. " He there defends the re-committing of their former re- 
 solution, since repeated consultations catinot be prejudicial to the public welfare. It is 
 a base and odious method, to lavish the charge of ignorance-and venality on men who 
 differ in sentiment; it robs the public of its ablest counsellors and sincerest friends. 
 Strict justice, in the present instance, may be with Cleon; but the future and lasting 
 welfare of their country is the object now apt to be kept in view. The punishment of 
 death hath never effectually awed the tempers of mankind. To make men desperate is 
 very impolitic; to extirpate their dependents is lopping off their own limbs, and ruining 
 their own revenue. Men should be retained in their duty by mild discretionary precau- 
 tions; severe and sanguinary proceedings never answer the purpose. And what cruelty, 
 to doom a whole people to destruction! to involve the innocent with the guilty! to mur- 
 der even such as had been their friends and benefactors! He advises them not to givei 
 too large a scope to mercy, but to punish the guilty, and the guilty alone. This will 
 sufficiently intimidate others; will secure their interest in Lesbos better for the future; 
 and convince the world how soundly Athenians can deliberate upon all their concerns." 
 Diodotus carries his point. The Athenians, cruel only in fits of choler, but habitually 
 humane, repeal the bloody sentence; and despatch a vessel with all haste to stop exe- 
 cution, which arrives at Mitylene but just time enough to prevent the massacre. 
 
 The next event of importance contrasts the Lacedemonian character with that of the 
 Athenians. The author takes no pains to point it out; but it lies too ready and ob vious 
 to pass unobserved. — Plataea, after a tedious blockade, is obliged by famine to surrender. 
 They surrender however to the Lacedemonians, on condition of being brought to a ju- 
 dicial trial, and only if found guilty ofunjust behaviour, to be put to death. Some dele- 
 gates arrive from Sparta to preside in this court of mere inquisition, since the whole pro- 
 cess is confined to a single question — " Whether they had done any positive service to 
 the Lacedemonians and allies" — that is, to their declared and determined enemies — " in 
 the present war?" The q uestion plainly manifested a deliberate resolution to put them ali 
 to death. And all the favour they obtain is, to be suffered to make a kind of dying 
 speech before men who were styled indeed judges, but in fact were butchers. It was 
 a case of great commiseration, and the speaker lays it open with all that natural elo 
 quence which flows from an inward and keen sensibility. If men were not deaf to pui 
 
THE HISTORY. xliii 
 
 suasion , it must have persuaded. Tiie cause was most alarming, and a more pathet- 
 ic plea hath never been exhibited. 
 
 " They insist that on a fair and explicit condition they had surrendered to the Lace- 
 demonians, whereas now they were prejudged and precondemned to gratify their unre- 
 lenting foes the Thebans. The insidious question left them no plea at all. They 
 could not answer it, and must not be silent. Since life is at stake, something must 
 be said even by men who despair of persuading. Their quarrel with the Thebans 
 had been just and honourable; quarrel with the Lacedemonians they never had any. 
 Nay, merely at the desire of the latter, had they cultivated Athenian friendship, that 
 unpardonable crime for which they were now doomed to destruction. They expati- 
 ate with truth and energy on the great services they had done to the liberty of Greece. 
 All Greece was bound in honour, in gratitude, in deference to positive and solemn 
 oaths, to preserve the Plateeans. Ought every tie to be rent asunder, generosity to be 
 quite expunged, and all benevolence thrown aside, to serve a private turnl Ought Platse- 
 ans to be thus basely reduced, as they really had been, either to be starved or to be butch- 
 ered'! TheLacedemonians should entreat the Thebans for them, should beg them to save 
 the lives of friends and benefactors; at least, should replace them within their walls, 
 and leave them to the fate of war. They apply to their generosity, to their human- 
 ity; to strive to give them some emotions of pity; they represent the liableness of 
 mankind to calamity; how brutal it is to be deliberately hard-hearted; how sinful it 
 is to be resolutely ungrateful! They call upon heaven and earth to interpose in their 
 behalf; they run over every pathetic and persuasive topic; till they can add no more, 
 and yet dare not end; and again entreat the Lacedemonians to save those worthy 
 patriots to whom all Greece is indebted for her liberty and independence.'' 
 
 The Thebans; who were- afraid the Lacedemonians had a higher sense of honour 
 and gratitude than they really had, demand also to be heard. 
 
 In the speech they made on this occasion, " they first accuse the Plateeans of slander 
 and invective. They endeavour to palliate the reproach on themselves for deserting the 
 cause of hberty and joining the arms of Persia. The Plateeans had been active ever 
 since to betray it to the Athenians; that wicked scheme, which with all their power the 
 Thebans had ever opposed. By such iniquitous conduct the Platsans had extinguish- 
 ed their former glory, and eifaced all their former merits. Nobody was bound to re- 
 dress or pity them, but their friends the Athenians. Their temper had been always 
 bad; always bent on violence and mischief; always addicted to tyranny in Greece, 
 provided Athenians were the tyrants. They then endeavour to throw an anti-pathet- 
 ic into their own representations. They paint the death of their countrymen slain 
 at the surprise of Plateea in a mournful light, as put to death contrary to every law, 
 and murdered in the very act of stretching out their hands and pleading a promise 
 of life. The lives therefore of such butchers are forfeited to justice; and they insist 
 the forfeit shall be taken: the Lacedemonians are bound in honour to take it. They 
 beg them therefore to be deaf to vain complaints and entreaties, to revenge the injur- 
 ed, and to punish the guilty; to regard what bad men have done, and not what they 
 have said; to defy eloquence, and heed only simple unsophisticated truth; by which 
 alone men, who preside in judgment, can satisfy their conscience and their duty." 
 An alliance with Thebes is necessary in this war to the Lacedemonians, and 
 they purchase it at a mighty price indeed. The wretched Plataeans, by all man 
 kind abandoned, are butchered one after another, to the number of two hun 
 dred; their wives are sold for slaves; their city is rooted up from its foundation 
 
xliv SURVEY OF 
 
 Thucydides soon after describes the sedition of Corcyra, the horrors of which are 
 scarcely to be paralleled in story. He paints all the dreadful consequences of faction 
 in a community. And what pity it is, that a warm, generous and innate love of liberty, 
 when carried to excess, should be the source of so much misery to reasonable creatures! 
 Our author, contrary to his custom, runs out here into many grave and judicious re- 
 flections, in the interest of no party, a champion for no particular form, but as a friend 
 to man, and a friend to virtue. It is the lust of power, that throws embroilments and 
 confusions into all communities. In governments strictly republican, the ambitious are 
 eager to obtain more than an equal share. In an oligarchical form, the few in power 
 want ever to retain and often to enlarge their share; and the cry of liberty is shouted 
 loudest by those who want most to overthrow it. But yet; was the matter ever mended, 
 or the miseries of mankind prevented, by setting up a single tyrant? Communities 
 have suffered more, for the caprfce, for the support of the nominal glory of such a 
 head, than they have done by a number of popular seditions. The reader will cer- 
 tainly all along reflect on the fine model of government established in his own coun- 
 try; and own that a community may be governed and yet be happy, that the power 
 of the one and of the few and of the many may be tempered into an apt and lasting 
 consistence; and, as it hath been for ages in a train of improvement, keep it but un 
 hurt by intestine faction, may last to the dissolution of this great globe itself. 
 
 After this tragica4 business of Corcyra, Thucydides enters upon the affairs of Sicily. 
 The seeds of war are sowing in that island, which will afterwards grow into a mighty 
 harvest. — He relates other incidents, till he comes to a remarkable scene of war in 
 .SItoUa, where Demosthenes the Athenian commander is totally defeated. — He de- 
 scribes the purification of the isle of Delos by the Athenians; and hath found the art 
 to make it a cheerful and entertaining piece, for the relief of the reader, after he hath 
 been engaged in so many scenes of horror and destruction, and i§ soon going to be 
 engaged in more. — The battles of Olpe and Idomene are sufficiently stored with 
 slaughter, to glut any reader who delights in blood. The armies in this history have 
 been often thought not to be sufficiently numerous. They made no havoc; they do 
 not knock one another on the head fast enough to preserve attention. But these old 
 Greeks were men, and not brutes. And it is pity, that the history of men should be 
 60 much a history of the destruction of the human species. 
 
 Book IV. — In the Fourth Book, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, principals in 
 the war, are matched directly against one another. Demosthenes, a wise and brave 
 commander, had seized and fortified Pylus in the territories of the latter, had placed 
 such a garrison in it as annoyed the whole country, and in the end might wound 
 the very vitals of that state. The Lacedaemonians slight it at first, as if their bare 
 appearance would remedy all. But upon trial, their land armies and their squadrons 
 are unable to dislodge the enemy. It is with the true martial spirit of an experienced 
 and gallant commander, that Demosthenes harangues his small body of Athenians, 
 when he draws them up on the beach of the sea, to beat off the ships of the enemy. 
 Thucydides shines on these occasions; in him the addresses are always made, ana 
 pertinently made, to the soldiers who are present ; they interest and animate, but 
 
 never run into declamation and common-place The turns of war at Pylus are 
 
 fiudden and engage attention. They fight by land, and fight by sea ; nay, what is 
 more, land battles are fought from the water, and naval battles fought from oft' the 
 shore. The eye will distinctly view these strange occurrences; they are painted 
 strong; the groupes are not mere heaps of confusion, and the principal figures are 
 
THE HISTORY. xlv 
 
 eminently distinguished. The body of Spartans intercepted in the isle of Sphacteria, 
 who must either starve, or, what to Lacedfemonians is full as bad, must surrender 
 their persons and their arms, is a point that exceedingly alarms that martial commu 
 nity. Things had long since gone against them; but now, their hereditary honour 
 and military glory, on which, and which alone, they piqued themselves, are in dan- 
 ger of being miserably tarnished. Their proud spirits condescend to beg a truce, that 
 they may send an embassy to Athens to solicit an accommodation. 
 
 It must have afforded a high degree of spiteful joy at Athens, to find the Lacedae- 
 monians lengthening their monosyllables and petitioning for peace. It is curious to 
 hear in what manner they soUcit, when admitted to audience. They declare them- 
 selves sent, " in behalf of' their countrymen, to propose an expedient very much for 
 the honour of Athens, and which would extricate themselves from difficulties that 
 now bore hard upon them. Athens never had so fine an opportunity of raising her 
 credit, securing her acquisitions, and carrying her glory to the highest pitch. They 
 should not be puffed up, but reflect on the strange vicissitude of human affairs. Who 
 could expect, the Lacedaemonians should ever be sunk so low, as to sue for peace 1 
 Yet what was the lot of Sparta might possibly become, sometime or other, the lot of 
 Athens, The latter should be moderate now, should accept of offered, friendship, 
 should cheerfully receive submission, made only to prevent desperation in great and 
 gallant souls, and open a field for mutual benevolence. The rival states may now 
 be reconciled ; and only now, before things are brought to extremities, and disgrace 
 hath rendered one party desperate. At this crisis, the Athenians may confer on 
 Greece the blessing of a firm and lasting peace, and reap all the honour and advantage 
 of it, since all the credit of it will be their own. Lacedajinonians may be obliged, 
 but will not be compelled. At length they propose their expedient, not explicitly, 
 but with a shrewd insinuation; that would the Athenians strike up a bargain with 
 them, they might jointly lord it over Greece for the future, beyond control." 
 
 Had Pericles been now alive, we may easily guess how readily he would have laid 
 hold on this opportunity to end aburthensome and distressful war, which on the side 
 of Athens had at first been necessitated and merely defensive. But success had elevated 
 Athens quite too high ; and no real friend to the state had at present so much influence 
 as Cleon, that loud and boisterous demagogue. Hence it comes, that such terms are 
 insisted upon as the Lacedaemonians cannot in honour accept. The truce expires ; 
 and all the attention of Greece is fixed on the important scene of contention at Pylus. 
 
 The author here interposeth an account of what was now doing in Sicily, and then 
 J-eturns to Pylus. The Spartans in the isle seem as far off a surrender as ever. The 
 people of Athens murmur at the slowness of their troops, and begin to think that after 
 all they shall not carry the point. Cleon amuses them with lies, and exasperates them 
 by slanders. In short, though quite undesigning it, he bullies himself into the com- 
 mand ; and, at the head of a reinforcement, joins Demosthenes at Pylus, The author 
 describes the event with so much state and dignity, that he raises it into another Ther- 
 mopylae. There three hundred Spartans stopped for along time the whole numerous 
 army of Xerxes, and perished in the service. About the same number of (hem strug- 
 gle here as long as they can against the troops of Athens ; but, to the disappointment 
 of all Greece, they at last surrender prisoners of war, and are carried, nay, are carried 
 by Cleon, in triumph to Athens, The territories of Corinth are invaded soon after by 
 the Athenians under Nicias, the consequence of which is the battle of Solygia. We 
 are then recalled to view the last acts of the tragical sedition at Corcyra, quite of a 
 oiece with, or rather in cruelty add horror transcending, the preceding. 
 
xlvi SURVEY OF 
 
 In Iho eighth year of the war, the Athenians proceed with success. The conquest 
 of the isle of Cythera by Nicias is another sad blow to the Lacedfemonians. They are 
 quite dispirited ; and dare no longer face in the field these active and lively, and now 
 more so because successful enemies. 
 
 Our author repasseth to Sicily. The Athenians had been hovering with a squadron 
 on that coast, on pretence of aiding the Egesteans, but in fact to excite a war and 
 embroil the states of that island. Syracuse, the leading state, perceived all their 
 schemes, and endeavoured to prevent them. They first obtain a suspension of arras 
 amongst all the parties at war ; and prevail on the Sicilians to hold a general congress 
 at Gela, for the amicable adjustment of all their quarrels, and a perfect re-union 
 against foreign enemies. Hermocrates, the plenipotentiary from Syracuse, opens the 
 true interest of Sicily on this occasion. The warrior must now give place to the 
 politician, who shows himself a master in the business. 
 
 " He is here," he tells them, " as representative of the greatest of the Sicilian states. 
 As such, he cannot speak from pusillanimity or a sense of fear, though he declares 
 himself averse to war. It is difficult to enlighten ignorance, and difficult to check 
 ambition. But there is a prudence, which all ought to learn ; a prudence, which 
 points out the proper season for every pursuit. It was separate interest, that first 
 kindled the flames of war in Sicily; but separate interest should always be hushed, 
 when the general welfare is at stake. The Athenians have been busy amongst them, 
 to inflame their mutual resentments, to note their indiscretions, and turn them to their 
 own advantage ; that, when the Sicilians have warred one another down, they may 
 seize the whole island for themselves. The great passion of these Athenians is conquest ; 
 they regard no ties of consanguinity ; they aim at acquiring vassals, no matter who. 
 He blames them not ; he can never blame men, who are desirous of command ; but 
 he must blame such as are ready and willing to put on their chains. The Athenians 
 have no strength in Sicily, but in the divisions of its states. Let those states but once 
 re-unite, and Athenians must get them gone ; and may depart with a face of success, 
 as if they had united whom they really wanted to disunite, and had effectually re- 
 settled peace, when their latent design was war." — He touches every topic in a suc- 
 cinct but masterly manner. He hath recourse often to figures ; renders his addresses 
 emphatical,by making his own community speak from his mouth. He applies the first 
 person and the singular number with great energy and weight. He useth those figures 
 in the same manner as Saint Paul does in the Epistle to the Romans. He presseth 
 harmony and cordial re-union amongst them in a manner best fitted to persuade. The 
 whole speech, in a word, is a very interesting and persuasive piece of oratory. 
 
 The consequence is, a peace is settled in Sicily to general satisfaction ; and the 
 Athenian commanders are obliged to return to Athens with their squadrons, to be 
 punished there for what they could not possibly prevent. 
 
 The war continues hot through the remainder of this book. The Athenians take 
 their turn in being checked and vanquished. Their attempt on Megara is related at 
 large ; and this piece of narration is by far the most intricate of the kind to be met 
 with in Thucydides. The matter is quite too much crowded, when he endeavours 
 to comprehend in a few terms the various incidents of this struggle for Megara, the 
 fluctuation of events, the views and motives of the parties engaged. Brasidas at last 
 secures the city, and quite disconcerts the main project of the Athenians. — The latter 
 also had another great scheme in agitation for a total revolution in Boeotia. Arms and 
 intrigues were at once to act, both without and within. The whole force of Athens 
 
THE HISTORY. xlvii 
 
 takes the field on this occasion, under the command of Hippocrates. The famous 
 battle of Dehum ensues, before which the generals harangue their troops. Pagondas 
 the Theban is an excellent speaker on this occasion. The Boeotians are not repre- 
 sented in this history, as that gross and stupid people, which was their character from 
 the succeeding wits of Athens. The Athenian general begins also to harangue his 
 troops, but is cut short by the attack of the enemy. The battle is finely described, 
 and the dispute afterwards about the dead. The Athenians have received a dreadful 
 blow, which will soon make them begin to accuse their own judgments, in refusing 
 the accommodation lately offered from Sparta. 
 
 In other quarters also the balance of war begins to incline in favour of the enemy. 
 Brasidas, that active and accomplished Spartan, had now completed a march, at tho 
 head of a small army, through Thessaly and Macedonia into Chalcidic Thrace. His 
 bravery prevails much, but his conduct more. He disjoins Perdiccas king of Mace- 
 donia from the Athenian league. Whenever he fights, he conquers ; and whenever 
 he harangues, he effectually persuades. His speech to the Acanthians, is strong, 
 pertinent, laconic. He says all that can be said in favour of his countrymen, in re- 
 commendation of the cause of hberty. There is that air of sincerity and good faith 
 in it, which were constantly approved and verified by his personal deportment. The 
 towns revolt to him as fast as he has opportunities to address them. The reader will 
 follow him with pleasure through his many and great exploits, and acknowledge he 
 wears his laurels deservedly, and with peculiar grace. 
 
 Book V. In Book the Fifth, Cleon appears again upon the stage to stop the rapid 
 conquests of Brasidas. The former had been laughed into a general, and is now grown 
 so conceited that he wants to enter the lists against that truly heroic Spartan. He 
 accordingly arrives in Thrace, at the head of a squadron and a fine body of land forces. 
 He retakes a town or two ; is confident he shall soon recover the important city of 
 Amphipolis ; and though contemned by his own soldiers, he endeavours to brave the 
 enemy. Brasidas having harangued his men with his usual spirit, throws open the 
 gates, sallies out of Amphipelis and routs him in an instant. Cleon falls a victim to 
 his own cowardice, and Brasidas also drops a victim to his own valour. The latter 
 lives long enough to know his own side had conquered, and then expires, admired 
 by all that knew him, and most highly regretted by the allies of his country. 
 
 Their riddance from Cleon diminished the loss of Athens in this defeat, and the 
 Lacedemonians had dearly purchased the victory with the loss of their hero. As the 
 principal states were now pretty nearly balanced, and sadly tired of the war, a truce 
 is concluded for a year, and a peace soon after settled by the management chiefly of 
 Nicias. Thucydides hath given us the forms of negotiating and drawing up treaties. 
 They are curious morsels of antiquity, and the reader will see with admiration, how 
 solemn, how concise, and yet how guarded, they are. The peace turns out to be 
 merely nominal. The Corinthians, who cannot relish it at all, set their invention to 
 work in order to embroil Greece afresh, and to rekindle a general war. Several wars 
 break out, in which the Athenians and Lacedaemonians are concerned as auxiliaries. 
 And another state in Greece, which hitherto had been neutral and saving its strength 
 entire, endeavours now to seize the primary of Greece for itself. We shall be made 
 privy to all her negotiations for carrying on the plan, and see it all blasted by one 
 battle at Mantinea. This state was the republic of Argos in Peloponnesus, which had 
 been in long alliance with, but in no dependence at all upon, Athens, and had been 
 a long time also at peace with Sparta, by means of truces of thirty years. Youns? 
 
xlviii SURVEY OF 
 
 Aicibiades doth all he can to promote the quarrel, till at length the troops of Sparta 
 and Argoj come to an engagement near the city of Mantinea. Thucydides introducelh 
 the battle with all the spirit and precision of Homer. The auxiliaries are marshalled 
 and animated by such exhortations, as are best suited to the peculiar circumstances 
 of each. The Spartans are exhibited at last in all their glory. Trained up for a 
 camp apd the day of battle, v/e shall view them in their dicipline and actual exertion 
 of their personal bravery. They were excellent combatants indeed; and the reader 
 will judge whether Thucydides did not love good soldiers, and take a pleasure in 
 doing them justice. It was the greatest battle, which for many years had been 
 fought in Greece. The Spartans, on this occasion, wiped off all the imputations that 
 had lately been thrown on their bravery, because they had not been always success- 
 ful: and the aspiring state of Argos is compelled to acquiesce in her usual rank, and 
 etill l€,ave the contention of supremacy to the leading states of Athens and Sparta. 
 
 This book affords but one incident more, of consequence enough to be particularly 
 distinguished; and that is the conquest of the isle of Melos by the Athenians, which fell 
 out in the sixteenth year of the war. When the Athenians were landed and encamped 
 on that island, they summon the Melians to a conference, of which Thucydides hath 
 drawn out the particulars. It is really an uncommon one, and had sadly puzzled the 
 critics, whether they should praise or condemn it. But is there any thing more unna- 
 tural in reciting what was said at it, than in holding a conference's It is my business 
 only to look at the management of it, and not draw a veil over the Athenian politics, as 
 they are avowed on this occasion, since my author was too impartial to do it. Nothing 
 could tempt him to make palliating representations, or to suppress the truth.. 
 
 "The Athenians, on this occasion,. avow without a blush that principle on which 
 conquerors and tyrants have always acted, and yet have been ashamed to own: they 
 are ever hunting for colourings and pretexts, and would fain give to greedy power a 
 little of the air of equity: but here, without the least shame or remorse, the Athenians 
 assert their right to enslave another community, because it suits their own interest, and 
 because they have power to do it. This is the principle from which they argue; and, 
 how scandalous soever it be, they argue strongly from it. They represent the politics 
 of their own state, of the Lacedemonian state, nay of all mankind, as encroaching, 
 oppressive, rapacious, and totally estranged from humanity, good faith, and the least 
 tincture of morality. The whole conference yields perhaps a just representation of 
 human nature in the gross; but then, the representation is distasteful to a mind that is 
 cool and disengaged. Such a mind must interest itself on the side of the Melians and be 
 sorry that the Athenians have not more equity and honour to qualify their power; or, 
 that the Melians, with the regard they show to honour and justice, should not have 
 had more power, or been able to interest at least one ally in defence of their liberties 
 and rights. In short, through the whole course of this history, the Athenians never 
 made so scandalous a figure as on this occasion." 
 
 Book VI. In the Sixth Book, a spacious theatre is opened for a renewal of the war. 
 The scene is going to shift from Greece to Sicily. The Athenians, who have so bravely 
 resisted all their enemies in Greece, are now going to do for those enemies what they 
 could not do themselves. No patriot, no statesman, no orator, is able to dissuade tiiera 
 from lavishing their strength on the projects of sanguine ambition and foreign con- 
 quests. Their enemies, in the mean time, are at leisure to note their indiscretions, 
 and improve them all to their own advantage, till the great name of Athens is quite 
 
THE HISTORY. xhx 
 
 eclipsed, and an end is put to that empire of the sea, which she had maintained for 
 seventy years with great lustre and reputation. 
 
 The Sicilian war, which some critics* are inclined to think hath no connection with 
 the subject of Thucydides and to be mere digression, whatever it may appear at first, 
 the reader will at length be satisfied, was an essential part of the Peloponnesian war, 
 and hastened its decision. But, supposing it remote from the principal subject, it must 
 however be acknowledged, that it is the history of a war nobly related, well connected, 
 very closely followed, and full of incidents to engage attention, to alarm and interest 
 ihe passions. Thucydides in the course of it, which takes up the two following 
 books, will display the excellencies of the poet and the painter as well asof the histori- 
 an. Let his merit be regulated from tlais portion of his work, it is presumed that, with- 
 out a negative, he will be allowed the master of history. 
 
 He begins with describing the theatre, on which two mighty Slates are going to 
 enter the lists. — The geography and antiquities of Sicily could not in their nature be 
 very entertaining, and therefore they are drawn up in the concisest manner. — The 
 Bearing enterprising genius of Alcibiades hath formed a superb plan for the aggran- 
 dizement of himself and his country. Alcibiades could plan with all the magnificence 
 and wild ambition of an Alexander; but a citizen of Athens could not have the means 
 of executing in so imperial a manner as the monarch of Macedonia and captain-gen- 
 eral of Greece. He was able soon to convince the younger and more numerous part of 
 the Athenian community, that the enterprise was most inviting, and carried with it 
 such a probability of success as overbalanced all expense and hazard. It was long 
 the subject of general conversation ; it gradually inflamed the public ardour ; and at 
 length engrossed all their hopes and wishes. In a word, the expedition to Sicily is 
 formally proposed and decreed in the assembly of the people. A second assembly is 
 convened on ways and means. On this occasion a grand debate ensued, the managers 
 of which are Nicias and Alcibiades. 
 
 Nicias declares himself "totally averse to the expedition; but doth it with that diffi- 
 dence, which was a principal foible in his character. The honour conferred upon him- 
 self in his nomination to the command, shall not suppress his real sentiments. He is 
 neither fond, nor prodigal, of his life; but he loves his country, and would advise 
 them to give up the expedition. — He next runs over the political topics, and shows 
 it to be in every light an undesirable and ill-judged project. And then, without 
 naming him, strikes at Alcibiades; proves him not qualified in any respect for so im- 
 portant a command ; he reflects with some severity on his life and behaviour ; and 
 though owning himself afraid he shall be out-voted, yet he would fain have the ques- 
 tion put again, whether the expedition shall proceed." 
 
 Beside all the natural vivacity and fire of his temper, Alcibiades was now provoked 
 by the personalities that Nicias had thrown out against him. He had beon a constant 
 opposer of the latter, who was beloved at Athens for his amiable qualities. For, though 
 Nicias had not spirit enough to lead the people; yet he had influence enough often- 
 times to check and restrain the aspiring busy Alcibiades. The reply he makes on this 
 occasion strongly marks the character and complexion of Alcibiades ; and, deliverei! 
 with that life and grace, and pretty lisp, for which he was remarkable, must have en- 
 gaged all the attention of his hearers , and drawn their approbation perhaps in spite of 
 their judgment. 
 
 "Censured and provoked by Nicias, he begins with a vindication of himself. He 
 
 *Sce Rapin's Comparison of Thucydides and Livy. 
 » E 
 
1 SURVEY OF 
 
 maintains his right to the command. He hints at the splendour of his birth, his pub 
 ic spirit, the generosity of his heart. He recites, with a haughty and exulting air, his 
 victories at the Olympic games, his magnificence at home, and his capacity for poht- 
 ical intrigue already and successfully exerted. He then justifies the wisdom of the de- 
 cree for the Sicihan expedition. He shows all the political topics in a different light 
 from Nicias. He insinuates the advice of the latter to proceed from indolence and a 
 desire to sow dissensions amongst them. He exhorts to union, and to the observa- 
 tion of order. So Athens rose; so Athens may yet be much higher exalted. The 
 fire of youth, the temper of the middle-aged, and the experience of the old, should ever 
 duly accord and act together. Sloth ruins a community; practice enables it to go 
 through every conflict, and to triumph over all opposition." 
 
 Such an address could not but effect, such arguments could not but bepersuasive 
 with the people of Athens; the expeditions must go forwards. But Nicias makes a 
 second effort, if possible to divert them from it. 
 
 He begins with "a prayer for its success; and a desire, that the preparations may be 
 adequate to the ends proposed. He states the nature, the power and strength, of the 
 people they are going to invade. He then, in general terms, gives in a bulky roll of 
 necessary articles for those who invade them. He hopes to frighten and deter his 
 audience by the vast expense, which he shows must necessarily be incurred on this 
 occasion. The Athenians must provide every thing themselves, and trust nothing 
 to the care and fidehty of Sicihan allies. The pubUc welfare , anr" the safety of all who are 
 to beemployedinthis expedition, demand all manner of previous foresight and care." 
 
 This speech had a different effect to what Nicias designed. Instead of discourag- 
 ing, it animated his countrymen more than ever for execution. Accordingly a de- 
 cree was soon passed, investing himself and his colleagues, who were Alcibiadesand 
 Lamachus, with full power to provide every thing needful for the service. 
 
 All hands now weie soon at work. The quotas from the dependents were deman- 
 ded; the fleet was equipped and manned; the levies went on briskly , since all men came 
 nto the service with alacrity ; and every thing was soon ready for the expedition. 
 
 At this juncture, some drunken frohcs, in which Alcibiades was engaged, threw 
 .\thensinto consternation. They were soon construed by his enemies into a plot to 
 bring about a revolution in the government. Informers came in, and he was directly 
 accused ofbeing a party. He avowed his innocence, insisted on an immediate trial, 
 which he was sure would end in his justification. The plot, which in fact was a plot 
 against Alcibiades, was not yet ripe enough to ruin him ; and therefore, by a strange 
 preposterous stroke of cunning, he is ordered to proceed in the expedition, and take 
 his trial at his return. 
 
 Our author next describes the departure of the grand armament in 5II its solemnity, 
 and with all the medley of hopes and fears shown by the whole people of Athens on 
 this occasion. He laysopentoourview the very hearts of the spectators. The prime 
 flower of their strength, nay, Athens itself, is now sailing out of the Pirseus, never 
 again to return. They make the best of their way to Corcyra, where they are left for 
 a lime, that we may be made privy to the consultations and defensive measures of 
 Sicily. The scene is now removed to Syracuse, the most powerful state in that is- 
 land, inhabited by Grecians, and if indeed inferior, yet second at this time to no other 
 state in Greece but Athens alone. It had frequently been harassed by seditions, had 
 often been plagued with tyrants, but was at present under a democratic constitution. 
 
 Ad vice had been received there of the i ntended invasion. The people are con vened 
 
THE HISTORY. li 
 
 about it. Harangues are made; and the temper of mankind, when party is fermen 
 ting, justly exemplified. Some are incredulous ; others magisterially pronounce it all a 
 falsehood. At length Hermocrales riseth up, and gives them his own sense of the affair 
 
 He assures them, "his country is eminently endangered, and neither incredulity 
 nor ridicule shall awe him into silence. To his certain knowledge, the Athenians 
 are already atsea, fully bent on the conquest of Sicily. The Syracusans ought to be- 
 lieve it, and to prepare for their defence. Fear will unite all Sicily against the invaders. 
 Athens will only reap disgrace, but Syracuse abundant glory on this occasion. Largs 
 armaments are seldom successful ; they moulder away for want of supplies or are 
 ruined for want of conduct. They should therefore prepare for gallant resistance, 
 by getting every thing in readiness at home, and strengthening themselves by foreign 
 alliances. They should do more; they should at once put out to sea, and dispute their 
 very passage with the enemy. A defeat, or even delay thus given them might oblige 
 them to give up the project. He supports his advice by many strong and judicious 
 arguments ; and ends with warm exhortations to his countrymen to be lively and ac- 
 tive, by no means to despise the enemy except inaction, but vigorously and with all 
 their foresight to prepare for resistance, since their enemies are undoubtedly at sea 
 and only not arrived on their coasts." 
 
 Such advice was now given to the people of Syracuse by Hermocrates. That 
 community, it is evident, was full of cabal and faction, since this worthy patriot was 
 regarded as a party-tool and a public incendiary. Athenagoras, the blustering dem- 
 agogue who replies, treats him in this light. His virulence shows that he regarded 
 Hermocrates, as one who wanted by any means whatever to force himself into em- 
 ployment. He seems more alarmed for the lucrative posts of the state than for the 
 welfare of his country. He throws out a deal of good sense, but in a very imperti- 
 nent and scurrilous manner. Such are the persons, who study popularity more than 
 duty, and sacrifice all their talents to ambition or private lucre. 
 
 He affirms, that " none but cowards and traitors wish the Athenians might not in- 
 vade them, and so infallibly meet their destruction: but the whole account is a glaring 
 falsehood, the glory of a factious cabal. He appeals to his audience whether it carries 
 the least probability with it. Athenians invade them! The Athenians esteem themselves 
 happy they are not invaded by the Syracusans. Yet, supposing them so mad, nothing 
 but their own disgrace and ruin can be the consequence. But it is all a fiction; a 
 scheme to dishearten the friends of the people, and seize the government of the state. 
 Some men have ever been, and ever will be, dabbling in such vile machinations. 
 But let them not hope to escape detection. The intention is plain already, and ought 
 to be punished like open treason. He then exhorts the people or the many to sup- 
 port their friends, and entirely to disarm the malice of their domestic foes; and in- 
 veighs severely against the few, or the party whom he supposeth to be bent on the 
 overthrow of the democracy at Syracuse." 
 
 This speech of Athenagoras was so full of ill-timed choler and party animosity, that, 
 had the debate proceeded, dissentions might have run very high at a season when 
 unanimity was so needful in all the members of that community. A general of great 
 eminence and weight thinks it high time to interpose; who, in a short speech repri- 
 mands Athenagoras, recalls the general attention to their own preservation from the 
 imminent danger, and adjourns the assembly. 
 
 The grand fleet of Athens is now putting to sea from Corcyra. The historian takes 
 a ••eview of the whole, and gives a short account of its numbers and strength. They 
 
Hi SURVEY OF 
 
 arrive on the coast of Italy, where they are refused a reception. Every thing yields 
 them a discouraging and gloomy aspect. They soon find they had been grossly deluded 
 by their Sicilian friends, who instigated them chiefly to the expedition. The trick, 
 which the Egestians had put on their ambassadors, is particularly recited. The com- 
 manders at a council of war, diiFer highly in opinion, and at last come to no sound re- 
 solution, Theyhover about the coast of Sicily, and parade in sight of Syracuse. Al- 
 cibiades endeavours to persuade the Cataneans to join with and receive them, but a 
 mere accident accomplishes what his eloquence could not. The command of Alcibi- 
 ades came here to an end. One of the state-vessels arrives, and summons him to Ath- 
 ens, to take his trial for the late frolics and irregularities committed there. That city, 
 ever since the departure of the fleet, had been filled with confusion and horror. A 
 plot there was, or rather a plot it was determined there must be, to set up a tyrant, that 
 most odious sound to Attic ears. Recollection of the most dismal things they had heard 
 about the tyranny of the Pisistratidee increased their fears, and drove them into furious 
 and desperate proceedings. Thucydides here digresseth to settle some facts relating to 
 that set of tyrants, and their demolition; particularly the aiFair of Harmodius and Aris 
 togiton, one of the most famous incidents in the annals of Athens. He differs indeed 
 from most other writers, and the moderns have not thought proper to rest the point up- 
 on his authority, great as it is; though no man ever traced out facts, or made his in- 
 quiries, with more sedateness and impartiality. 
 
 But 10 return to Alcibiades; he was obliged to quit the command, and he seemed 
 quietly to submit to the orders of the state. But, determined not to face his country- 
 men in their present mood nor to hazard a trial, he gave them who were sent for him 
 the slip, and sheltered himself in Peloponnesus. He became instantly a most violent 
 and dangerous enemy to his country. He is gone to pave the way for the ruin of 
 Athens; of Athens, which he loved better than any thing except the parade of his 
 own personal importance, and the gratification of private caprice. 
 
 Nicias and Lamachus, who now remained in the command of the fleet, by help 
 of a stratagem, land at Syracuse without opposition, and seize a strong post for their 
 encampment. The Syracusans determine on a battle to dislodge them. Both sides 
 form in order. Nicias encourages his men by a short, but spirited and forcible, ha- 
 rangue. Thucydides paints the battle with the exactness, perspicuity, and ardour, 
 of Homer. The Athenians had the better; yet not so decisively, as to think proper 
 to continue in their post, since they re-embark, and sail back to Catana. 
 
 The winter, it is true, was approaching, which both sides spend in negotiations for 
 the acquisition of allies. That at Camarina, where ambassadors from both the warring 
 parties are at the same time admitted to an audience, is particularly recited. — Hermo 
 crates, in behalf of Syracuse, makes the first address. " It is masterly, like all that Her 
 mocrates performs. It is designed to convince the Camarineans, how insidious and 
 how vile the schemes of the Athenians had ever been, and still continue to be. He 
 arraigns all their politics and their conduct since the Persian invasion; and gives that 
 artful turn to his remarks, which might well deter others from entering into any con- 
 nexion or alliance with them. His strokes are severe and cutting. He makes use of 
 the figures, which give force and energy to discourse. No person better understood 
 the common welfare of Sicily; and no person could better explain it. He unfolds the 
 political scheme at present in agitation; declares the consequence in case the Atheni- 
 ans prevail, to alarm the concern of the Camarineans for their country, and further to 
 alarm their fears for themselves. He even threatens them with a severe revenge, in 
 
THE HISTORY. liii 
 
 case the Syracusans, without their aid, get the better of the invaders." In short, i' 
 the Camarineans had been good Sicilians, his arguments must have prevailed. 
 
 Euphemus, who is the mouth of the Athenian embassy on this occasion, makes a 
 bold and spirited defence for his country. " He at once briskly attacks Hermocrates 
 for the bitter imputations he had cast upon Athens. He asserts her fair reputation, 
 and justifies her series of politics ever since the invasion of Xerxes. Liberty had been 
 the object of all her care and all her conduct. The Athenians had guarded, had 
 established it in Greece ; and were come to support and secure it in Sicily. He 
 throws back the charge of enslaving-projects on the Syracusans, who now are eager 
 to deprive the rest of Sicily of their best defence, by raising distaste towards the 
 Athenians. He spares no artifice, omits no topic that is likely to effect. He proves 
 a notable advocate for his Athens, pompously celebrates her passion and her care for 
 liberty, and most ingeniously strives to conceal her present ambition under a veil 
 of most generous and disinterested principles." 
 
 The issue is, that the orators have just counterpoised one another's arguments, 
 and the Camarineans declare a neutrality. 
 
 The embassies from Syracuse succeed much better in Peloponnesus. The Corinthians 
 are zealous and active in their behalf; and they have now got an advocate to rouse up 
 and inflame the phlegmatic Spartans, who was born to be of every party, and to be the 
 best support of whatever party he by times espoused. It is the exiled Alcibiades who 
 pleads most eflfectually in their behalf at a grand consultation at Sparta. His speech on 
 this occasion is a masterpiece. "He insinuates himself into the favour and confidence 
 of men who had feared and hated him. Whilst he is making his own personal justi- 
 fication, he praiseth and magnifieth himself. He betrays all the schemes of Athens, 
 discloseth all her plan, points out her weak and unguarded parts, directs towards them 
 the attack of her foes ; and, full as he is of resentment against, and skilful to annoy 
 her, she totters whilst he speaks." Syracuse and Sparta are now to grow famous by 
 the debasement of this mighty and imperial republic. Her glory hath reaehed its 
 summit : it immediately will begin to sink, and her laurels will fade away'apace. 
 
 In the summer of the eighteenth year of this war, the Athenians stand away from 
 Catana, and land by night at Syracuse. They instantly march, and seize Epipolae, a 
 strong post that commanded the city. The Syracusans fight, but without success, to 
 beat them from it. The siege now commenceth in form. It is clearly represented in the 
 whole of its progress, in all its forms. Every skirmish is a distinct and lively picture. 
 In one of them old Lamachus is killed, and Nicias of course left singly in the whole 
 command. He carries on the siege with vigour and success for a short space of time ; 
 but Gylippus from Sparta, and the Peloponnesian aids, are now only not arrived. 
 
 Book VIZ. " If you would read truly great things," said a Spartan to Augustus Caesar, 
 " read the Seventh Book of Thucydides." Thither we have now brought this cursory 
 survey. The reader of it will undoubtedly own, that no historian ever executed so 
 closely, so strongly, so clearly, and so pathetically, as Thucydides. " No fleet but that 
 of the Athenians," it is the observation of Cicero,* " was ever able to enter the harbour 
 of Syracuse. The fleet was only able to achieve it by the mighty force and number 
 of three hundred ships. But here first was the power of Athens defeated, lessened, 
 depressed. In this harbour the fame, the empire, the glory of Athens, are judged to 
 have suffered a total wreck." Schemes projected and actions conducted by Hermo- 
 crates and GvlioDus the Spartan prove too hard for Nicias, whose phlegm and natura-^ 
 
 * Orat. qujnta in Verrein. 
 e2 
 
hv SURVEY OF 
 
 diffidence are no match against such vigilance and activity. The besieging party 
 soon becomes as it were the besieged. The letter of Nicias to the people of Athens, 
 represents all the difficulties to which he finds himself reduced. No man ever wrote 
 so precisely and perspicuously about military affairs. The reader of it wants no light, 
 no dictionary of arts, or' an adept in war, to explain the terms; and can judge, as 
 could the meanest citizen of Athens lo whom it was read, what was proper to be done. 
 Secure in the consciousness of his own integrity, he neatly reprimands his country- 
 men for the great foible in their behaviour, justifies his own conduct, and begs to be 
 recalled. In short, Nicias is finely characterized by his own pen in this epistle. 
 
 The Athenians are too high-spirited to recall their troops; and have too good an 
 opinion of Nicias to dismiss him from the command. Though Attica was now invaded 
 by the Peloponnesians, and a fortress raised by them within sight of Athens itself for 
 their lasting annoyance, they send a powerful reinforcement to Nicias under the 
 command of Demosthenes. They empty Athens of the residue of her strength, so 
 highly wanted for domestic support. The Syracusans, when advised of this rein- 
 forcement, redouble their alacrity, and hope to finish the war before it could arrive. 
 They had had a career of success against Nicias, h^d just beat him both by land and 
 sea, when Demosthenes steered into the harbour of Syracuse. The sight caused a 
 Btrangs alternative of elevating hope and dreadful apprehensions in the contending 
 parties. The Syracusans again become the besieged ; and Demosthenes is intent to 
 put an end to the seige, if possible, by vigorous and daring measures. 
 
 His attempt to retake Epipolee is, in our author's description of it, as fine a night- 
 piece as can possibly be drawn, and no pencil, could express it stronger. The moon 
 shines just bright enough, to show us the Athenians gaining the ascent, and to giye 
 a glimpse of the approaches of the armies and their first struggles with one another. 
 The whole soon becomes gloomy confusion and horrid tumult. What a medley of 
 singing their paeans, of conflict, of flight, of pursuit ! friends and countrytaen routing 
 one another, till numbers come tumbling down the precipices, and perish in the fall ! 
 The hope of the Athenians is blasted : Syracuse erects her trophies fast. 
 
 Demosthenes is now convinced the most prudent step they could take is to raise 
 the siege, and Nicias at last complies. The very moment they are going to embark 
 their troops, the moon is eclipsed. Who but must pity the weakness of Nicias at so 
 dangerous a crisis 1 who but be sorry indeed, that so good and amiable a man should 
 stop an array from a principle of superstition, and detain them for so long a time on 
 a spot of ground, where nothing but ruin and destruction could befal themt' Men 
 60 dispirited can make but faint opposition against an always high-spirited and now 
 6ucces.sful enemy. They soon lose another battle, and the decisive engagement is 
 fast approaching. 
 
 But before it is fought, Thucydides, animated with more than historic spirit, emulates 
 his admired Homer, reviews the parties concerned, and catalogues the troops now war- 
 ring against and in defence of Syracuse. This catalogue is far from being a mere muster- 
 roll of names. It is full of such strokes as must imprint many useful and moral reflec- 
 tions in the mind. His little incidental sketches represent mankind in a true light, as 
 Homer's do the world of nature. Homer paints the soil, and Thucydides the people. 
 
 The mouth of the harbqur is now barred up by the enem)'. The Athenians mus: 
 fight their way out ; or, burn all their ships, and march off by land. It is determined to 
 attempt the former ; and the consequence is the battle within the harbour of Syracuse. 
 A more striking, more astonishing battle-piece Was never exhibited ; and a masterly 
 
THE HISTORY. Iv 
 
 pencil, though none but a masterly one, might exactly delineate it from this description 
 The present temper of the combatants on both sides is strongl ymarked in the harangues 
 before the engagement. Nicias then said all, and the Athenians in action did their best ; 
 but all was unavailing. Ishall say no more about it, since the reader hath nothing to do 
 but turn his eye towards it, and distinctly view it through the whole of its process, till the 
 Syracusans sail in triumph to their city, and raise the most glorious of all their trophies. 
 
 The wretched perplexities of the Athenians, the raising of the siege, the mournful 
 decampment, the good heart of Nicias sympathising in all their distress, and endea- 
 vouring to cheer a httle their desponding minds, their laborious marches whilst the 
 e^emy is harassing them both in front and in rear and on all sides, the surrender of 
 the column under Demosthenes, the carnage in the river Asinarus of the troops 
 under Nicias, his surrender too, the butchery of the generals, and the miseries of the 
 captivated residue of once so flourishing and gallant an army — these are the several 
 incidents of this book, for which an attentive reader will give the highest commen- 
 dation to the historian, when he hath read thfem through: he will have no leisure 
 till then to think of Thucydides. 
 
 Book VIII. The catastrophe hath now taken place in this history, and the reader is 
 assured how all will end. The wings of this soaring republic of Athens are clipped, 
 never to reach their full growth again : yet, hke an eagle in the same situation, she 
 will struggle hard a long time (as it were) with beak and talons, and would yet rupulse 
 her assailants, did she not grow sick at heart. Intestine faction will assist her enemies 
 to finish her ruin, as a state imperial and commercial A regular deduction of such 
 incidents as these is the subject of the eighth and last book of Thucydides. As a 
 writer, he now performs in a more faint and less engaging manner, compared with 
 what hath gone before. He hath but drawn his lines, but just sketches his pieces . but 
 the drawings and sketches will still manifest the master's hand. We will give them 
 a cursory view : the reader will give them a more exact and deliberate perusal. 
 
 He sets out in his usual grave and solemn manner, to describe the people of Athens, 
 dispirited and distressed as they are by the overthrow in Sicily. All the passions and 
 emotions of the human nature take their train. They are incredulous; they are an- 
 gry ; they are convinced ; and then, they despond ; they pluck up their spirits again, 
 and are resolved to stand it out, nor abandon their own preservation. They now cast 
 their thoughts towards every resource, and prepare again for war with spirit and 
 resolution. All the rest of Greece is ready to concur with the victorious party j all 
 are eagerly running in to share the glory and the spoil. Their own dependents are 
 meditating revolts, and some make them at once without premeditation. The Lace- 
 daemonians, amidst the many apphcations made to them, are puzzled which of the 
 revolting states they shall first countenance and assist. Alcibiades is busy at Sparta, 
 advising proper measures, and guiding their counsels. Even the Persian monarch, 
 by his lieutenants, enters into league against them ; and some of their finest islands 
 are immediately rent asunder from subjection to the Athenians. 
 
 The various turns of the war at Chios, and on the coast of Ionia, are distinctly but 
 concisely related; till Alcibiades appears in action, and exerts his busy and intriguing 
 genius. Suspected at length, and hated by the Lacedasmonians, he became again their 
 enemy, and turned all his projects on accomplishing his return to Athens, and saving 
 his country from impending ruin. His partizans, in the fleet and troops of Athens now 
 lying at Samos, cabal in his favour. A change of government is judged a necessary 
 measure to bring about his recalment. It is the scheme of Alcibiades himself; butitia 
 
Ivi SURVEY OF THE HISTORY. 
 
 opposed and disconcerted by Phrynichus ; by Phryniehus, who soon after turns out a 
 violent enemy to the democracy, whilst Alcibiades is active and zealous in its support. 
 None but our author's pen could havs so clearly unfolded that series of caballing, that 
 fluctuation both in principle and conduct, and that horrid embroilment of the leading 
 members of the Athenian stale amongst themselves, which brought on seditions amongst 
 the troops abroad, and a revolution of government in the city of Athens. The demo- 
 cracy is at length overturned ; and an oligarchy, consisting of four hundred persons, 
 erected in its stead. The Athenians at Samos, where the project was first laid, declare 
 against the Athenians at Athens. Alcibiades is grown again a hearty republican j and 
 Thrasybulus alone manifests throughout a sincere love and regard for his country. 
 Parties newly formed are broke again into divisions ; and Athens was indebted to 
 nothing but the indolence of the Lacedaemonians, that she did not fall immediately 
 into their hands, through the violence of her own intestine seditions. But the new 
 administration proved of short continuance ; the democracy, though on a model 
 somewhat varied, is again established ; and Athens thus obtains a respite. 
 
 Full of matter as this part of the history is, ThUcydides hath kept his narration clear 
 and unembarrassed. But then, it is a simple unadorned narration, and never re-' 
 ceived the finishing hand. There are scattered occasionally throughout it some short 
 accounts, in what manner the principal agents delivered their sentiments at important 
 junctures. They seem to have been memorials, laid down as the ground-work, for 
 regular and full orations. The reader will be sorry the author was hindered, by what 
 accidents can only be guessed, from drawing out some of them at least into full pro- 
 portion ; particularly that of the deputation from the army at Samos to Athens, in 
 which " the people are persuaded to part with their darling democracy ;" of Thrasy- 
 bulus to the troops at Samos, when they mutiny in favour of the democracy, in which 
 " he must pathetically have expatiated on the revolt of Athens from liberty and her 
 choicest patriots, who might now form another Athens at Samos, and preserve her 
 empire, though they had lost the cily ; that of Alcibiades further, when on his recal- 
 ment he harangues the army at Samos which recalled him, where " he deplores the 
 malignity of his fate, magnifies his ability yet to serve his country, and again shines 
 in the character of an able statesman, a subtle politician, and a zealous patriot." 
 
 Upon the whole. One point more must be particularly distinguished in honour of the ' 
 Athenians. The characters of them and of the Lacedemonians are strongly contrasted 
 through the whole course of this history, and highly to the credit of the former. Their 
 spirits rise with difficulties, and patriotism starts out of mutiny and faction. The Lace- 
 daemonians are indolent in success, and show neither alacrity nor address in promoting 
 that cause of liberty, which was the grand pretext of engaging in this destructive war. 
 They seem at last more intent on pocketing the royal subsidies, than doing their duty, 
 as leaders and champions of ttreece. They have not yet learned to make a figure at sea. 
 The last view we have of them is at the battle of Cynos-sema, where they receive a 
 signal defeat from those very men, whose ruin they judged as well nigh completed. 
 When Athens is totally to be vanquished, as her doom is fast approaching, she must aid 
 her own conquerors and tyrants, in demolishing her own trophies, and trampling under 
 foot her liberties and rights. Her own factions will help to accomplish, what without 
 them no foreign enemy could have done. Whatever is human must decay. The best 
 constituted state in the world may be undermined By its own members, when they 
 could not be conquered, and at length be rendered an easy prey to foreign powers 
 iVIay Gkeat Bkitain prove an exception to this affecting but just observatfon ! 
 
THE 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 Introduction, containing the Author's reasons for writing this History, upon a review of the affairs of Greece 
 from the earliest times — The true reason of the Feloponnesian war was a jealousy of the Athenian power. 
 Those pretended were, I. The affair of Epidamnus, which is opened at large ; II. The revolt of Fotidxa, the 
 circumstances of which are exactly related. Consultations held at Sparta by the members of the Laceds- 
 monian league, where at length war is decreed, but the rupture protracted for a year. The Lacediemonians act 
 from a dread of the growing power of Athens. A digression showing how that power arose, which gives the 
 author opportunity to relate the history of fifty years between the retreat of Xerxes, and the breaking out of 
 this war. Embassies accusing and recriminating are sent to and fro, in the account of which are interwove the 
 stories of Cylon, Fausanias, and Themistocles. The Lacedcemonians send a final demand to Athens; and the 
 Athenians, at the persuasion of Fericles, return a resolute answer, upon which all negotiations are ended, and 
 an open rupture ensueth. 
 
 Thuctbides an Athenian hath compiled the 
 history of the war between the Peloponnesians 
 and the Athenians, as managed by each of the 
 contending parties. He began to write upon 
 its first breaking out, from an expectation that 
 it would prove important, and the most deserv- 
 ing regard-of any that had ever happened. He 
 grounded his conjecture on the earnestness of 
 both the flourishing parties to make all neces- 
 sary preparations for it; and he saw that all 
 the rest of Greece was engaged on one side or 
 the other, some joining immediately, and others 
 intending soon to do it ; for this was the great- 
 est commotion that ever happened amongst the 
 Grecians, since in it some Barbarians, and it 
 may be said the greatest part of mankind, were 
 concerned. The actions of an earlier date, 
 and those still more ancient, cannot possibly, 
 through length of time, be adequately known ; 
 yet, from all the lights which a search into the 
 remotest times hath afforded me, I cannot think 
 they were of any great importance, either in re- 
 gard to the wars themselves, or any other con- 
 siderations. 
 8 
 
 It is certain, that the region now knovm by 
 the name of Greece was not formerly possessed 
 by any fixed inhabitants, but was subject to 
 frequent transmigrations, as constantly every 
 distinct people easily yielded up their seats to 
 the violence of a larger supervening number. 
 For, as to commerce there was none, and mu- 
 tual fear prevented intercourse both by sea and 
 land, as then the only view of culture was to 
 earn a penurious subsistence, and superfluous 
 wealth was a thing unknown, as planting was 
 not their employment, it being uncertain how 
 soon an invader might come and dislodge them 
 from their unfortified habitations, and as they 
 thought they might every where find their daily 
 necessary support, they hesitated but little 
 about shifting their seats : and for this reason 
 they never flourished in the greatness of their 
 cities or any other circumstance of power. 
 But the richest tracts of country ever were more 
 particularly Uable to this frequent change of in- 
 habitants, such as that which is now called Thes- 
 saly, and Boeotia, and Peloponnesus mostly ex- 
 cept Arcadia, and in general every the most 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book I. 
 
 fertile part of Greece. For the natural wealth 
 of their soil increasing the power of some 
 amongst them, that power raised civil dissen- 
 tions, which ended in their ruin, and at the 
 same time exposed them more to foreign at- 
 tacks. It was only the harrenness of the soil 
 that preserved Attica through the longest 
 space of time, quiet and undisturbed, in one 
 uninterrupted series of possessors. One, and 
 not the least convincing, proof of this is, that 
 other parts of Greece, because of the fluctuat- 
 ing condition of the inhabitants, could by no 
 means in their growth keep pace with Attica. 
 The most powerful of those who were driven 
 from the other parts of Greece by war or sedi- 
 tion, betook themselves to the Athenians for 
 secure refuge, and as they obtained the privi- 
 leges of citizens,' have constantly, from re- 
 motest time, continued to enlarge that city 
 with fresh accessions of inhabitants, insomuch 
 that at last, Attica being insufficient to support 
 the number, they then sent over colonies into 
 Ionia. 
 
 There is another, and to me a most convinc- 
 ing proof of the weakness of the ancients. 
 Before the aifairs of Troy, it doth not appear 
 that Greece (or Hellas) was ever united in one 
 common undertaking ; nor had the whole coun- 
 try that one general appellation; not indeed 
 did the same subsist at all before the time of 
 Hellen, the son of Deucalion ; the several na- 
 tions taking then- distinguishing names from 
 their own selves, and Pelasgicum being that of 
 the greatest tract. But when Hellen and his 
 sons had acquired power in Pthiotis, and led 
 out their dependents by way of aid to other 
 cities, conversation made the use of this name 
 become much more frequent among the several 
 people, though it was long before it so prevail- 
 ed as to become the general appellation of 
 them all. For this Homer is my principal 
 authority, who, though born a long time after 
 the Trojan war, hath no where mentioned 
 
 I They were admitted to the same privileges with free- 
 horn native Athenians. But this was practised only in 
 the infancy and early growth of that state.' It was 
 afterwards an honour very seldom and with difficulty 
 granted. Those who came from other places to settle 
 at Athens are distinguished from ^t-oxitc*! citizens, by 
 the name of ^sToijtoi sojourners, who had taken up their 
 residence and cohabited with them. They performed 
 several duties as subjects to the state which gave tbcm 
 protection, but never became Athenians, or citizens of 
 Athens, in the cmphatical sense of those terms. The 
 English reader will please to remember this, as the dis- 
 tinction often occurs in the sequel of our history. 
 
 them all in this general style, but hath appro, 
 priated it to those who came with Achilles 
 from Pthiotis, and were the first that bore this 
 name of Grecians (or Hellenes). In his poems 
 Danaans, and Argives, and Achseans are their 
 distinguishing titles. Nor hath he farther once 
 mentioned the Barbarians, for this plain rea- 
 son in my opinion, because Grecians were not 
 yet distinguished by this one comprehensive 
 name in contradistinction to that other. These 
 Grecians therefore whatever, whether so apart 
 in their different cities, or united by mutual 
 converse, or at length comprehended in one ge- 
 neral name, for want of strength and correspon- 
 dence, never acted together in joint confede- 
 racy before the war of Troy: nor was it till 
 the use of the sea had opened free communi- 
 cation amongst them that they engaged to- 
 gether in that expedition. 
 
 For Minos is the earliest person whom we 
 know from tradition to have been master of a 
 navy, and to have been chiefly lord of the sea 
 which is called the Grecian. To him were 
 the isles of the Cyclades subject ; nay, most 
 of them he planted himself with colonies, hav- 
 ing expelled the Carians, and substituted his 
 own sons in the different commands. And 
 then of course he exerted his utmost power to 
 clear that sea of pirates, for the more secure 
 conveyance of his own tributes. 
 
 The Grecians formerly, as well as those 
 Barbarians who, though seated on the conti- 
 nent, lived upon the coast, and all the islanders, 
 when once they had learned the method of pass- 
 ing to and fro in their vessels, soon took up 
 the business of piracy under the command of 
 persons of the greatest ability amongst them, 
 for the sake of enriching such adventurers and 
 subsisting their poor. They landed, and plun- 
 dered by surprise unfortified places and scat- 
 tered villages, and from hence they principally 
 gained a subsistence. This was by no means 
 at that time an employment of reproach, but 
 rather an instrument of glory. Some people 
 of the continent are even to this day a proof 
 of this, who still attribute honour to such ex- 
 ploits if genteelly performed :^ so also ore the 
 ancient poets, in whom those that sail along 
 the coasts are every where equally accosted 
 
 ^ " With dire respect, with humanity," as the scho 
 liast explains it. For then tliey never made booty of, 
 or carried away by stealth, the labouring cattle; they 
 never made their attacks by nigllt, nor committed any 
 murder. 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 with this question, Whether they are pirates ; 
 as if neither they to whom the question was 
 put would disown their employment, nor they 
 who are desirous to be informed would reproach 
 ihem with it. The people of the continent 
 also exercised robberies upon one another: 
 and to this very day many people of Greece 
 are supported by the same practices: for in- 
 stance, the Ozolian Locrians, and jEtolians, 
 and Acarnanians, and their neighbours on the 
 continent; and the custom of wearing their 
 weapons, introduced by this old life of rapine, 
 is still retained amongst them. 
 
 The custom of wearing weapons once pre- 
 vailed all over Greece, as their houses had no 
 manner of defence, as travelling was full of 
 hazard, and their whole lives were passed in 
 armour, like Barbarians. A proof of this is 
 the continuance still in some parts of Greece 
 of those manners, which were once with uni- 
 formity general to all. The Athenians were 
 the first who discontinued the custom of wearing 
 their swords, and who passed from the disso- 
 lute life into more polite and elegant manners. 
 And it is not a long time since those amongst 
 the rich, who were advanced in years and stu- 
 died tl^eir ease, left off wearing the linen garments 
 and fastening the hair of their head behind with 
 grasshoppers of gold;' though the aged amongst 
 the lonians have constantly persevered in the use 
 of those ornaments as marks of their aifinity. 
 That modest uniformity of dress, which is still 
 in vogue, was first introduced by the Lacede- 
 monians ; amongst whom in other points also 
 there was the greatest equality of dress and 
 diet observed, both in the highest and meanest 
 ranks. They also were the first who performed 
 their exercises naked, stripping themselves in 
 public and anointing with oil before they en- 
 tered the lists ; though, before, the custom 
 had prevailed at the Olympic games for the 
 champions to wear scarfs about their loins : 
 and it is only a few years since these were 
 quite disused."* But even yet, amongst some 
 Barbarians, more especially those of Asia, 
 where the matches of boxing and wrestling are 
 in repute, the combatants engage with scarfs 
 
 > To intimate their being the origin.il posscssorg and 
 pure nativcp of the soil, as mucli as tlie very-grasshop- 
 pers, wliich they supposed to be a natural and sponta- 
 Tieous production of the earth. They regarded them- 
 selves as cotemporary with the insects. 
 
 * See Mr West's Dissertation on the Olympic Games, 
 p. 50. 
 
 round their loins. Many other arguments 
 might with ease be alleged to prove that an- 
 cient Greece had forms and modes of living 
 quite similar to those of the present Barbarian 
 world. 
 
 As for cities, so many as are of a later foun- 
 dation, are better placed for the increase of 
 wealth, since the improvement of naval skill , 
 all these have been built on the sea-shore, and 
 walled about, and are situated upon necks of 
 land jutting out into the sea, for the sake of 
 tratfic and greater security from the insults of 
 neighboring people. But those of an earlier 
 date, having been more subject to piratical de- 
 predations, are situated at a great distance from 
 the sea, not only on islands, but also upon the 
 main. For even those who lived upon the 
 coast, though inexpert at sea, were used to 
 make excursions up into the country for the 
 sake of plunder: and such inland settlements 
 are discernible to this very day. 
 
 But the people of the islands, that is, the 
 Carians and the Phoenicians, were by much the 
 most expert at these piratical adventures : for 
 by them the greatest part of the isles was in- 
 habited. This is proved from the expiation 
 solemnized at Delos in the course of this war ; 
 on which Occasion all the sepulchres of the dead 
 in that island being broken open, more than 
 half of the number appeared to be Carians, 
 known to be such from the weapons found m 
 their graves and a particularity of interment 
 still used amongst them.* It was not till 
 after the equipment of fleets by Minos, that a 
 communication was opened at sea. For by him 
 the mischievous banditti were ejected from the 
 islands, and many colonics of his own planted 
 there in their stead. And from this period it 
 was that the maritime people, grown more in- 
 tent on the acquisition of wealth, became more 
 fond of settled habitations ; and such of them 
 as then surpassed in wealth, strengthened their 
 settlements by walling them about. And this 
 their passion for gain continuing to increase, 
 the poorer hired out their services to those who 
 had affluence ; and the great, who had all nced- 
 
 'The Carians first invented the boss of shields and 
 the crest of helmets. In remembrance of this, a small 
 shield and a crest were always buried with them. By 
 this means were the Carians known. The Phojnicians 
 were distinguished by the manner of their interment i 
 for, whereas other nations laid the faces of their deart 
 towards the east, the Phanicians reversed the posture 
 and laid them to the west. Scholiast 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book I. 
 
 ful supplies at hand, reduced less powerful 
 cities into their own subjection. And their 
 power by these methods gradually advancing, 
 they were enabled in process of time to under- 
 take the Trojan expedition. 
 
 It is farther my opinion, that the assemblage 
 of that armament by, Agamemnon was not owing 
 so much to the attendance of the suitors of 
 Helen in pursuance of the oaths they had sworn 
 to Tyndarus, as to his own superior power. It 
 is related by those who received from their an- 
 cestors the most certain memorials of the Pelo- 
 ponnesian affairs, that Pelops, arriving there 
 from Asia with abundance of wealth, soon 
 gained so great an influence over those needy 
 people, that, though a foreigner, he had the 
 honor to have the country called after his own 
 name ; and that the power thus gained by him 
 was successively enlarged by his posterity. 
 Eurystheus, indeed, whose mother was the sister 
 of Atreus, perished in Attica by means of the 
 Heraclidte ; and Eurystheus, when he departed 
 on that expedition, left the government of My- 
 cence and his kingdom, because of his affinity, 
 in the care of Atreus, who then resided with 
 him, having fled from his father upon the mur- 
 der of Chrysippus. When therefore the return 
 of Eurystheus was prevented by death, and the 
 Myceneans from a dread of the Heraclidse were 
 well inclined to Atreus, as a person of great 
 abilities and deep in the affections of the people, 
 he easily obtained the kingdom of Mycenae and 
 all the territories which had belonged to Eu- 
 rystheus ; and from hence the family of Pelops 
 quite overpowered the family of Perseus. To 
 these enlargements of power Agamemnon suc- 
 ceeding, and being also superior to the rest of 
 his countrymen in naval strength, he was enabled 
 in my opinion to form that expedition more from 
 awe than favour. It is plain that he equipped 
 out the largest number of ships himself, besides 
 those he lent to the Arcadians. Homer is my 
 witness here, if his testimony have any force ; 
 who hath farther, at the delivery of the sceptre, 
 styled him, 
 
 " Of many isles, and of all Argos, king." 
 
 And a king who lived upon the continent could 
 not possibly be lord of islands, except such as 
 were adjacent, the number of which must needs 
 oe small, unless he had a competent strength 
 at sea ; but from this armament we have good 
 light afforded to guess at the preceding. 
 
 What though Mycenae was a small city, or 
 
 though any place at that time remarkable ap- 
 pear at present inconsiderable to us 1 yet, no 
 one ought on these motives prematurely to im- 
 agine that armament to have been less consider- 
 able than it is described by the poets and re- 
 ported by tradition. Supposing the city of 
 Lacedemon to be now in a ruinated condition, 
 nothing left but the temples and the pavements 
 of the mass, I fancy, in process of time, pos- 
 terity could not easily be induced to believe 
 that their power had ever been proportioned 
 to their glory. Of the five divisions of Pelo- 
 ponnesus' they are actually possessed of two. 
 having the command of the whole, and of many 
 confederate states without: yet, as the city is 
 neither closely built, as the temples and public 
 edifices are by no means sumptuous, and the 
 houses detached from one another, after the 
 old mode of Greece, it would suffer disparage- 
 ment from such a view. If we farther sup- 
 pose the Athenians in the same reverse of for- 
 tune, from the view the city theii would afford, 
 it might be guessed that once it had double the 
 strength which it really hath. We ought not 
 therefore to be incredulous, Jior so much to 
 regard the appearance of cities as their power ; 
 and of course, to conclude the armament 
 against Troy to have been greater than ever 
 was known before, but inferior to those of our 
 age. And whatever credit be given to the 
 poetry of Homer in this respect, who no doubt 
 as a poet hath set it off with all possible en- 
 largement, yet even according to his account it 
 appeareth inferior. For he hath made it to 
 consist of twelve hundred ships ; those of the 
 Boeotians carrying each one hundred and twen- 
 ty men, those of Philoctetes fifty; pointing 
 out, as I imagine, the largest and the smallest 
 rates; for of the rate of other ships he hath 
 not made the least mention in his catalogue, 
 though he hath expressly informed us that 
 every person of the crews belonging to the 
 ships of Philoctetes were both mariners and 
 soldiers, since he hath made all who pUed at 
 the oar to be expert at the bow. It is not pro- 
 bable that any ships carried supernumeraries, 
 excepting kings or persons in command, espe- 
 cially as their point was a mere transportation 
 with all the necessary habiliments of war, as 
 their ships were not decked, but built entirely 
 
 « These were Laconia, Arcadia, Argolica, Messenia, 
 and Elis. The Lacedemonians were possessed of La 
 conia and Messenia. — Scholiast. 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 in the fashion of the old piratical cruisers. If 
 therefore a mean be taken between the largest 
 and smallest rates, the number of the whole 
 will turn out of small account for quotas sent 
 in general from the whole of Greece.' The 
 reason of this was not so much a scarcity of 
 men as want of money. They adjusted the 
 number of men to the slender store of provi- 
 sions they already had, and the probability of 
 procuring a competent subsistence in the course 
 of the war. On tlieir first landing they got 
 the better in fight ; the proof is, that they could 
 not otherwise have fortified their camp with a 
 wall. Neither doth it appear that they exerted 
 all their strength at once, numbers being de- 
 tached for supplies of provisions, to till the 
 Chersonesus, and to forage at large. Thus 
 divided as they were, the Trojans were better 
 able' to make a ten years' resistance, being 
 equal in force to those who were at any time 
 left to carry on the siege. For had the stores 
 of provision at the first landing been ample 
 enough for the whole number of men they 
 brought, alid had they been able to prosecute 
 the war free from the avocations of foraging 
 and tillage, their superiority in the field must 
 have given them an easy and expeditious con- 
 quest. But in fact they did not ply the work 
 with all their number, but only with a part 
 constantly reserved for the purpose : had they 
 formed the siege with their whole force, in 
 less time and with less diiEculty they must 
 have taken Troy. Through want of money 
 it was that expeditions prior to this, and even 
 this the most celebrated of all that ever hap- 
 pened, are plainly found to have been less in 
 reality than they are in fame or current esti- 
 mation at present through poetical assistance. 
 
 Nor did the prosperous event of the Trojan 
 expedition put an end to the unsettled and 
 fluctuating state of Greece, or secure that tran- 
 quility so necessary to advancement. The re- 
 turn of the Grecians from Ilium, after so long 
 an absence, gave rise to many innovations. Se- 
 ditions were excited in almost every city ; and 
 those who were forced to withdraw, built cities 
 for themselves in other places. The present 
 
 1 Tbucydides makes it of small account, in re^^ard to 
 the war which is his subject. But the number of men 
 employed in the expedition against Troy was 102,000. 
 For the mean between 130 and SO is 83, and 63 X ^/ 
 1,300 = 102,000. 
 
 Boeotians, for instance, being driven out of 
 Arne by the Thessalians, sixty years after the 
 taking of Troy, planted themselves in the coun- 
 try now called Bccotia, though before that time 
 Cadmeis : but a body of them had already 
 seated Ihemse'ves there, of whom were those 
 who went in the expedition against Troy : and 
 eighty years after it, the Dorians with the 
 Heraclidte took possession of Peloponnesus. 
 It was not without much ado and length of 
 time, that Greece, quiet and settled at home, 
 had opportunity to send colonies abroad. Then 
 the Athenians planted Ionia and most of the 
 islands; the Peloponncsians the greatest part 
 of Italy and Sicily, and even some colonics in 
 the different tracts of Greece. But all these 
 transactions are of a later date than the Tro- 
 jan war. 
 
 But when once the state of Greece was 
 grown more robust, and an increase of %vealth 
 became their study more than ever before, as the 
 public revenues grew apace, in many places 
 tyrannies started up : for before this, kingdoms 
 were hereditary and with limited authority. 
 Now Greece throughout was employed in 
 building navies, and became addicted to naval 
 affairs with unusual application. The Corin- 
 thians are said to have been the first, who, by 
 varying the make of their ships, brought them 
 to that model which is now in use, and Co- 
 rinth to be the first place of Greece where tri- 
 remes' were built. It is a known fact, that 
 Aminocles, a ship-carpenter from Corinth, 
 built four ships for the Samians; now, from 
 the arrival of Aminocles at Samos to the con- 
 clusion of the war which is now my subject, 
 there passed at most but three hundred years. 
 The oldest sea-fight we know any thing of 
 was that of the Corinthians against the Cor- 
 cyreans: but the distance between that and 
 the same period is not more than two hundred 
 and sixty. For the city of the Corinthians, 
 being seated on the isthmus, hath ever been a 
 place of trade, as formerly the Grecians both 
 within and without Peloponnesus, more ac- 
 
 ' The triremes were the ships of war, of the galley 
 kind, and take their name from the three banks of oars 
 with which they were furnished. Tlicy were also 
 masted and carried sails ; but they generally lowered 
 the sails when they came to action, and relied chiefly on 
 their oars, that they might be more able to tack about, 
 or to run down upon the enemy with more force ana 
 steadiness. Sec Potter's ArchEologia, vol. ii. c. 14 
 
6 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book I. 
 
 customed to land than sea, could have no 
 traffic with one another without passing through 
 their territory. They were also remarkable 
 for wealth, as clearly approveth from the an- 
 cient poets, who have given that city the epi- 
 thet of rich. And, when once navigation was 
 practised in Greece, they lost no time in their 
 own equipments; they cleared the sea of pi- 
 rates ; and, opening their town ,as a public 
 mart, both by land and sea, made Corinth 
 powerful by the increase of its revenue. The 
 lonians had no naval force till a long time after 
 this, in the reign of Cyrus first king of the 
 Persians, and his son Cambyses; and, waging 
 war with Cyrus, they were for a time masters 
 of the sea which lieth upon tlieir own coast?. 
 Polycrates, also, who was tyrant of Samos, in 
 the reign of Cambyses, having a powerful navy, 
 subdued many of the islands, and among the rest 
 Rhenea, which as soon as conquered he con- 
 secrated to Delian Apollo. The Phoceans 
 also, when planting their colony at Marsoillos, 
 had a successful engagement at sea against the 
 Carthaginians. 
 
 These were the most remarkable equip- 
 ments of a naval force; and these, though 
 beyond contest many generations later than 
 the war of Troy, had a very small number of 
 triremes, but consisted chiefly of vessels of 
 fifty oars and barges of the more ancient model. 
 And it was but a little while before the Me- 
 dian war and the death of Darius, who suc- 
 ceeded Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, 
 that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyreans 
 became masters of any considerable number of 
 triremes. For these last were the oply in- 
 stances of a naval strength in Greece, before 
 the invasion of it by Xerxes, that deserve par- 
 ticular mention. The vessels of the ^ginetae, 
 of the Athenians, and some others, were few 
 in number, and most of them but of fifty oars. 
 It was not till later times, when the Athenians 
 had war with the jEginetae and also expected 
 the approadn of Xerxes, that at the persuasion 
 of Themistocles they built those ships with 
 which they fought successfully against the Bar- 
 Darians; and even these were not yet com- 
 pletely decked over. 
 
 Such therefore were the navies of Greece, 
 Loth of an earlier and later date. And the 
 states to which they belonged gained by them 
 considerable strength, through an increase of 
 their revenue and the enlargement of their do- 
 minions. Embarkations grown more frequent, 
 
 especially to those who were pent up in a nar- 
 row soil, occasioned the reduction of the isles ; 
 but for a land war, and, in consequence of that, 
 an accession of power, none such was at that 
 time known. All conflicts of that sort which 
 ever happened, were disputes of boundaries 
 between contiguous states. The Grecians had 
 not yet launched forth into distant expeditions, 
 nor aimed ambitiously at foreign conquests. 
 There were no dependent cities, which fur- 
 nished quotas at the will of others who gave 
 them law ; nor did those who were upon equa- 
 lity concur in any joint undertaking; each 
 petty state took up arms occasionally in its own 
 defence against the encroachments of its neigh- 
 bours. At most, the greatest division of Greece 
 that ever happened was in the old rupture be- 
 tween the Chalcideans and Eretrians, when 
 leagues were formed in favour of both. 
 
 By these means was the growth of many 
 states prevented, and that of the lonians by a 
 different cause — the great and surprising growth 
 of the Persian power. For Cyrus, after he had 
 completed the conquest of Croesus, and all the 
 country which lieth between the river Halys 
 and the sea, invaded them and enslaved their 
 towns upon the continent; and Darius after- 
 wards, victorious by the strength of a Phoeni- 
 cian fleet, did the same by the islands. 
 
 As for those tyrants who had any where 
 usurped the government of Grecian cities, — 
 their whole application being confined to their 
 own private concerns, to the guard of their 
 persons, or aggrandizement of their families— 
 they resided in their own cities so far as was 
 consistent with their own security. Nothing 
 worthy of remembrance was achieved by them, 
 unless we take into account the frequent broils 
 between them and their neighbours. Not but 
 that the tyrants in Sicily had advanced their 
 power to a great height. But Greece, in 
 general, was thus withheld for a long course of 
 time from performing any remarkable exploit, 
 by the strength of her united, or the adventu- 
 rous efforts of her separate states. 
 
 But after that the tyrants of Athens, and all 
 the tyrants of other parts of Greece, generally, 
 and of old, subject to these violent encroach- 
 ments, notwithstanding their number and the 
 fresh vigour of the last, were all (except those 
 of Sicily) demolished by the Lacedemonians 
 — For Lacedemon, ever since it came into th>. 
 hands of the Dorians, in whose possession it 
 still continueth, though harassed with seditious 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 the longest of any place we know, yet hath 
 ever been happy in a well regulated govern- 
 ment, and hath always been exempt from ty- 
 rants ; for, reckoning to the conclusion of this 
 present war, it is somewhat more than four 
 hundred years that the Lacedemonians have 
 enjoyed the same polity. On this basis was 
 their power at home founded, and this enabled 
 them to exert it in regulating other states. — 
 But, after that the tyrants were by them extir- 
 pated fi'ora Greece, not many years intervened 
 before the battle of Marathon was fotight by 
 the Modes against the A.thenians ; and in the 
 tenth year after that, the Barbarian (Xerxes) 
 again, with a vast armament, invaded Greece 
 in order to enslave it. Hanging then on the 
 very brink of ruin, the Lacedemonians, on ac- 
 count of their pre-eminent power, took the 
 command of all the Greeks combined together 
 in their own defence ; whilst the Athenians, 
 on the approach of the Modes, having already 
 determined to abandon their city, and laid in 
 their necessary stores, went on board their 
 ships, and made head against him by sea. 
 Having thus by their common efforts repulsed 
 the Barbarian, the Grecians, not only those 
 who revolted from the king, but those also 
 who had combined together against him, were 
 soon after divided among themselves, siding 
 either in the Athenian, or in the Lacedemo- 
 nian league ; for the mastery appeared plainly 
 to be in their hands, since these were the most 
 powerful by land and those by sea. The agree- 
 ment between the Athenians and Lacedemo- 
 nians was but of short continuance ; variance 
 ensued ; and they entered the lists of war 
 one against another, each with the additional 
 strength of their own respective allies : and 
 hence, if any other Grecians quarrelled, they 
 went over in parties to these as their principals. 
 Insomuch that from the invasion of the Modes 
 quite down to the breaking out of this war, 
 one while striking up truces, another while at 
 open war, either with one another or the con- 
 federates revolting from either league, they had 
 provided themselves with all military stores, 
 and much improved their skill by constant 
 practice exercised in dangers. 
 
 As for the Lacedemonians, they gave law to 
 their confederates without the heavy imposition 
 of tiibutes. Their study was only to keep 
 them wrll affected to themselves, by introduc- 
 ing the oligarchy among them. But the Athe- 
 nians lorded it over theirs, having got in course 
 
 of time the ships of all those who might op 
 pose them, into their own hands, excepting the 
 Chians and the Lesbians, and imposed on them 
 a certain payment of tribute. And their own 
 particular preparations for the present war 
 were more ample than former times had known, 
 even during the greatest vigour of their state 
 and the most perfect harmony between them 
 and their allies. 
 
 Such are the discoveries I have made con. 
 corning the ancient state of Greece; which, 
 though drawn from a regular series of proofs, 
 will not easily be credited ; for it is the cus- 
 tom of mankind, nay, even where their own 
 country is concerned, to acquiesce with ready 
 credulity in the traditions of former ages, with- 
 out subjecting them to the test of sedate ex- 
 amination. Thus, for instance, it is yet a 
 received opinion amongst the bulk of the 
 Athenian people, that Hipparchus was the ty- 
 rant, and therefore slain by Harmodius and 
 Aristogiton ; and they have not yet discovered, 
 that Hippias then governed by virtue of his 
 being the eldest of the sons of Pisistratus, 
 and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his 
 brothers. Harmodius and Aristogiton, on tho 
 very day appointed, and just at the crisis, 
 suspecting that information had been given to 
 Hippias by some who were privy to the design, 
 made no attempt upon him, as put already on 
 his guard. Yet willing, before they were ap- 
 prehended, to show their resolution and con- 
 tempt of danger, they accidentally found Hip- 
 parchus at the Leocorium superintending the 
 Panathenaical procession,* and immediately 
 slew him. There are many other things of a 
 more recent date, and of memory not yet in- 
 validated by time, about which the other Gre- 
 cians are very viTong in their notions ; such as, 
 that the Lacedemonian kings had each of them 
 a double and not a single vote in public ques- 
 tions ; and that amongst them the Pittanato 
 was a military band, which never yet existed. 
 So easy a task to numbers is the search of 
 
 * Tliis profession was mnde at the great Ponatlienaia, 
 which festival was celebrated once in five years in com- 
 memoration of the union of all the people of Attica Iiy 
 Theseus. The lesser Panatheniea was celebrated every 
 tliird year, some .say every year, and was lengthened out 
 by public games. These were also used at the preat 
 Panatheniea, in which the greatest splendour and mag 
 nificenre were employed, and the procession added, 
 here mentioned by Thucydides, and of which the cu 
 rious reader may see a particular account in rotter's Ar 
 chffiologin, vol. i. p. 421. 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 
 
 trutli ; so cagei are they to catch at whatever 
 lieth next at hand ! 
 
 But, from the testimonies alleged in support 
 ot what I have hitherto advanced, any one 
 may depend on my account of things, with- 
 out danger of false opinions. • Let him witli- 
 hold hia credit from the songs of poets, whose 
 profession it is to give all possible enlarge- 
 ments to their subjects ; let him do so 
 farther, by the writers of prose,' who study 
 more that artful composition which captivateth 
 the ear than the plain and simple recital of 
 truth, where proper attestations are never to 
 be found, and many things through length of 
 time have incredibly sallied out into mere 
 fable ; and then he will be convinced upon the 
 plainest proofs, that the state of ancient Greece 
 was very nearly the same as I have described it. 
 And this present war, when considered in all 
 its operations, notwithstanding the propensity 
 of mankind to imagine that war in which they 
 are personally engaged, to be the greatest that 
 ever happened, and so soon as it is over to re- 
 place their admiration upon others more an- 
 cient, will easily be owned to have been the 
 most important of all. 
 
 As to the speeches of particular persons either 
 at the commencement or at the prosecution of 
 the war, whether such as I heard myself or 
 such as were repeated to me by others, I will 
 not pretend to recite them in all their exact- 
 ness. It hath been my method to consider 
 principally what might be pertinently said upon 
 every occasion to the points in debate, and 
 to keep as near as possible to what would 
 pass for genuine by universal consent. And as 
 for the actions performed in the course of this 
 war, I have not presumed to describe them 
 from casual narratives or my own conjectures, 
 but either from certainty, where I myself was 
 a spectator, or from the most exact informa- 
 tions I have been able to collect from others. 
 This indeed was a work of no little difficulty, 
 because even such as were present at those 
 actions disagreed in their accounts about them, 
 according as affection to either side or memory 
 prevailed. 
 
 My relation, because quite clear of fable, 
 may prove less delightful to the ears. But it 
 will afford sufficient scope to those who love a 
 
 I Thucydides is here supposed to glance at Herodotus; 
 and again a little after be justly thinks, ttiat fictimiani 
 fable ought to havo uo place in history. 
 
 sincere account of past transactions, of such as 
 in the ordinary vicissitudes of human affairs 
 may fully occur, at least be resembled again, 
 I give it to the public as an everlasting posses- 
 sion, and not as a contentious instrument of 
 temporary applause. 
 
 Of former transactions the greatest was that 
 against the Medes, which however, by two en- 
 gagements on sea and as many at land, was 
 brought to a speedy conclusion. But the con- 
 tinuance of this war ran out into a much great- 
 er length ; and Greece in the course of it was 
 plunged into such calamities as were never 
 known before in an equal space. Never had 
 so many cities been made desolate by victories, 
 some by Barbarians and some by the violence 
 of intestine feuds ; to say nothing of those 
 where captivity made room for new possessors ; 
 never so many instances of banishment ; never 
 so many scenes of slaughter either in battles or 
 seditions. Such calamities, farther, as were 
 known only by report, but had rarely been felt 
 in fact, now gained credit from experience; 
 earthquakes, for instance, which affected the 
 largest part of the habitable globe, and shook it 
 with the utmost violence : eclipses of the sun, 
 which happened more frequently than former 
 times had remembered : great droughts in some 
 places, the consequence of which was famine ; 
 and, what made not the least ravage, but did its 
 share of destruction, the noisome pestilence. 
 For all these things ensued in the sequel of this 
 war, which was carried on between the Athe- 
 nians and PelopOnnesijns, after breaking the 
 thirty years' truce concluded between them 
 upon the reduction of Euboea. 
 
 The reasons for which this truce was broke, 
 and their course of variance, I have in the first 
 place thought proper to write, that none may 
 be at a loss about the origin of so momentous 
 a war aniong the Grecians. The growth of 
 the Athenian power I conceive to have been 
 the truest occasion of it, though never openly 
 avowed; the jealousy struck by it into the 
 Lacedaemonians made the contest necessary. 
 But the pretences, publicly alleged on either 
 side for breaking the truce and declaring open 
 war, shall now be related. 
 
 Epidamnus is a city on the right hand as 
 you sail into the Ionian gulf: adjoining to it 
 live the Barbarian Taulantii, a people of Illyria. 
 The Corcyreans settled a Colony here, the lead- 
 er of which was Phallus the son of Heratocli- 
 des, a Corinthian by birth, of the liw^go of 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 Hercules, invited to the office out of the mo- 
 ther-city, according to the custom of ancient 
 times : and beside this, some Corinthians and 
 others of Doric descent joined themselves to 
 this colony. In process of time, the city of 
 the Epidamnians became great and populous. 
 Yet, having been afterwards harassed with se- 
 ditions of many years' continuance, they were 
 brought very low (according to report) by 
 war waged against them by the neighbour- 
 ing Barbarians, and were deprived of the 
 greatest share of their power. But the most 
 recent event at Epidamnus before the present 
 war was, that the people there had driven the 
 nobles out of the city. These sheltering them- 
 selves amongst the Barbarians, began depreda- 
 tions on those who remained behind, both by 
 land and sea. The Epidamnians of the place, 
 suffering vastly from these depredations, des- 
 patched ambassadors to Corcyra as their mother- 
 city, beseeching»them, " Not to behold their de- 
 struction with eyes unconcerned, but to recon- 
 cile their exiles to them, and to deliver them 
 fi-om this Barbarian war." The ambassadors, 
 sitting down submissively in the temple of Ju- 
 no, offered these supplications. But the Corcy- 
 reans refusing to receive them, sent them home 
 again without effect. The Epidamnians, thus 
 convinced that no redress could be had from 
 Corcyra, and ignorant how to proceed in their 
 present perplexities, sent to Delphos to inquire 
 of the god, " Whether they should surrender 
 their city to the Corinthians as their founders, 
 and should seek security from their protection!" 
 He answered, that " they should surrender and 
 take them for their leaders." The Epidam- 
 nians, in pursuance of this oracle, arriving at 
 Corinth, make there a tender of the colony, re- 
 presenting that " the leader of it had been at 
 Corinth," and communicating the oracle ; and 
 farther entreated them " not to look on with 
 eyes of unconcern till their destruction was 
 completed, but to undertake their redress." 
 The Corinthians granted them their protection 
 from a regard to justice, imagining themselves 
 to bo no lees interested in their colony than the 
 Corcyreans. But they were also actuated by 
 a hatred of the Corcyreans, from whom, though 
 a colony of their own, they had received some 
 contemptuous treatment : for they neither paid 
 them the usual honour on their public solem- 
 nities, nor began with a Corinthian in the 
 distribution of the sacrifices, which is always 
 done by other colonies. This their contempt 
 9 
 
 was founded as well on the sufficiency of their 
 own wealth, in which at that time they equal- 
 led the richest of the Greeks, as on the supe- 
 riority of their military force. Their insolence 
 became greater in time with the enlargement 
 of their navy, and they assumed glory to them- 
 selves in a naval character as succeeding the 
 Phffiacians in the possession of Corcyra, This 
 was their chief incentive to furnish themselves 
 with a naval strengtji, and in it they were by no 
 means inconsiderable : for they were masters of 
 a hundred and twenty triremes, when they be- 
 gan this war. Upon all these reasons the re- 
 sentments of the Corinthians rising high against 
 them, they undertook with pleasure the relief 
 of Epidamnus ; encouraging all who were so 
 disposed, to go and settle there, and sending 
 thither a garrison of Ambraciots and Leuca- 
 nians and their own people. These marched 
 by land to Apollonia, which is a colony of the 
 Corinthians, from a dread of the Corcyreans, 
 lest they should have hindered their passage 
 had they attempted it by sea. 
 
 As soon as the Corcyreans heard that the 
 new inhabitants and garrison were got to Epi- 
 damnus, and that the colony was delivered in- 
 to the hands of the Corinthians, they grew hot 
 with indignation : and putting out immediately 
 with twenty-five ships which were soon follow- 
 ed by another equipment, they command them 
 "at their peril to receive their exiles ; — for those 
 who had been driven out of Epidamnus had al- 
 ready been at Corcyra, where, pointing to the 
 sepulchres, and claiming the rights of consan- 
 guinity, they had entreated them to undertake 
 their restoration : — " and to send away the gar- 
 rison and new inhabitants which they had receiv- 
 ed from Corinth." The Epidamnians were quite 
 deaf to these haughty commands. And upon 
 this the Corcyreans, with a squadron of forty 
 ships, accompanied by the exiles whom they 
 pretended to restore, and an aitl of Illyrians, 
 began hostilities. Having blocked up the city, 
 they made proclamation, " that all Epidamnians 
 who were willing and the strangers might de- 
 part without molestation, or otherwise they 
 should be treated as enemies." But this ha • 
 ving no effect, the Corcyreans beset the place 
 which is situated upon an isthmus, on all sides, 
 in regular siege. 
 
 The Corinthians, upon the arrival of messen- 
 gers from Epidamnus with an account of the 
 siege, draw their forces together. They also 
 gave public notice, "that a new colony wa« 
 r2 
 
10 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book I. 
 
 going to Epidamnus, into which all that woiuld 
 enter should have equal and like privileges with 
 their predecessors; that, if any one was un- 
 willing to set out immediately, and yet chose to 
 have the benefit of the colony, he might depo- 
 'sit fifty Corinthian drachmas, and be excused 
 his personal attendance." The number of 
 those who entered for immediate transporta- 
 tion, and of those who deposited their money, 
 was large. They sent farther to the Megare- 
 ans, requesting a number of ships to enlarge 
 their convoy, that their passage might not be 
 obstructed by the Corcyreans, from whom they 
 received a supply of eight, and four more from 
 Pale of the Cephallenians. The same request 
 was made to the Epidaurians, who sent five. 
 A single ship joined them from Hermione ; two 
 from TrcBzene ; ten from the Leucadians ; and 
 eight from the Ambraciots. Of the Thebans 
 and Phliasians they requested money ; of the 
 Eleans, empty ships and money. And the num- 
 ber of ships fitted out by themselves amounted 
 to thirty and throe thousand heavy-armed. 
 
 When the Corcyreans were informed of 
 these preparations, they went to Corinth, pur- 
 posely accompanied by ambassadors from La- 
 cedemon and Sicyon. There they charged the 
 Corinthians " to fetch away their garrison and 
 new settlement from Epidamnus, as having no 
 manner of pretensions there : that, if they had 
 any thing to allege to the contrary, they were 
 willing to submit to a fair trial in Peloponne- 
 sus before such states as both sides should ap- 
 prove; and to whichever party the colony 
 should be adjudged, by them it should be held." 
 They also intimated " their readiness to refer 
 the point in dispute to the oracle at Delphos ; 
 — war, in their own inclinations, they were 
 quite against : but if it must be so, on their 
 sides, (they said) mere necessity would pre- 
 scribe the measure ; and if thus compelled to 
 do it, they should for assistance have recourse 
 to friends not eligible indeed, but better able 
 to serve them than such as they already had." 
 The Corinthians answered, that " if they would 
 withdraw their fleet and their Barbarians from 
 before Epidamnus, they would then treat of an 
 accommodation : but, till this was done, their 
 honour would not suffer them to submit to a 
 reference, whilst their friends were undergoing 
 the miseries of a siege." The Corcyreans re- 
 plied, that " if they would recall their people 
 from Epidamnus, themselves also would do 
 the like ; but were ready further to agree, that 
 
 both parties should remain in their present sit- 
 uation, under a suspension of arms, till the af- 
 fair could be judicially determined." 
 
 The Corinthians were not only deaf to every 
 proposal, but so soon as ever they had manned 
 their ships and their allies were come up, des- 
 patching a herald beforehand to declare war 
 against the Corcyreans, and then weighing an- 
 chor with a force of seventy-five ships and two 
 thousand heavy-armed, they stretched away for 
 Epidamnus to make head against the Corcy- 
 reans. The commanders of this fleet were 
 Aristeus the son of Pellicas, Callicrates the 
 son of Callias, and TimanOr the son of Timan- 
 thes ; those of the land forces were Archo- 
 timus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the 
 •son of Isarchus. 
 
 When they were come up as far as Actium 
 in the district of Anactorium, where standeth 
 the temple of Apollo, in the mouth of the 
 gulf of Ambracia, they were met by a herald 
 despatched expressly in a row-boat by the Cor- 
 cyreans, forbidding them " at their peril to pro- 
 ceed." But at the same time the Corcyreans 
 were busied at home in manning their own 
 ships, repairing such as were old to make them 
 fit for service, and equipping the rest with .the 
 utmost expedition. When the herald brought 
 back nothing pacific from the Corinthians, and 
 their squadron was now completed to eighty 
 ships (for they had had forty employed in the 
 siege of Epidarnnus), they sailed in quest of 
 the enemy, and drawing up against them came 
 to an engagement. The victory fell beyoud 
 dispute to the side of the Corcyreans, and fif- 
 teen ships of the Corinthians were utterly de- 
 stroyed. 
 
 Their good fortune was such that on the ve- 
 ry same day Epidamnus was surrendered to the 
 besiegers upon a capitulation, by which "all 
 the strangers in the place were to be sold for 
 slaves, but the Corinthians to be detained pris- 
 oners at discretion." 
 
 After the engagement at sea, the Corcyreans 
 having erected a trophy' upon Leucimna apro- 
 
 * This was constantly done by the Grecians upon a vic- 
 tory. Nay, wlien the victory wag claimed on both sides, 
 both Bides erected trophiea, of which several instances 
 occur inThucydideg. Tlie tropliiesfor a victory atland 
 were declced out with the arms they had taken ; those 
 for a victory at sea, with armg also and tlic shatters of 
 the enemy's ships. " To demolish a trophy was lookc.t 
 on us unlawful, and a bind of sacrilege, because they 
 were all consecrated to some deity; nor was it less a 
 crime to pay diviae adoration before them, or to repair 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 11 
 
 Tnontory of Corcyra, put to deatli all the pri- 
 soners they had talten, except the Corinthians 
 whom they kept in chains. And after this, as 
 the Corinthians and allies having been vanquish- 
 ed in fight were forced to retire within their 
 own harbours, they were quite masters of all 
 the adjacent sea ; and, sailing first to Leucas, 
 a colony of the Corinthians, they laid Its terri- 
 tory waste ; and then burned Cyllene, a dock 
 of the Eleans, because they had supplied the 
 Corinthians with ships and money. In this 
 manner they continued masters of the sea a 
 long time after their naval victory, and in their 
 cruises very much annoyed the allies of the 
 Corinthians. It was not until the beginning 
 of the summer, that a check was given them 
 by a fleet and land army, who were commis- 
 sioned, in order to relieve their harassed allies, 
 to station themselves at Actium and round the 
 Chimeriura of Thesprotis. There they lay, 
 to cover Leucus and other places which were 
 in friendship with them from the ravage of the 
 enemy. The Corcyreans, upon this, with a 
 naval and land force stationed themselves over- 
 against them at Leucirana. But, neither party 
 venturing out to attack the other, they lay quiet 
 in their opposite stations the whole sum'mer ; 
 and, on the approach of winter, both sides 
 withdrew to their respective homes. 
 
 During the remainder of the year, after the 
 engagement at sea, and all the- following, the 
 Corinthians, whose indignation was raised in 
 this their Xvar against the Corcyreans, were 
 building new ships, and sparing neither labour 
 nor cost to get a strong armament ready for sea, 
 and sent throughout Peloponnesus and the 
 other parts of Greece to hire marines into their 
 service. The Corcyreans, hearing of these 
 great preparations, were terribly alarmed, and 
 with reason ; for at that time they were in no 
 aUiance with any of the Grecians, nor compre- 
 hended either in the Athenian or Lucedcemo- 
 nian league. And hence, they thought it quite, 
 expedient to go and sue for the alliance of the 
 Athenians, and endeavour to obtain some suc- 
 cour from them. The Corinthians gaining in^ 
 
 them when decayed, as may he likewise observed of the 
 Rom:in triumphal arches; this being the means to re- 
 vive the memory of forgotten quarrels, and engage pos- 
 terity to revenge the disgrace of their ancestors; for 
 the same reason, those Grecians, who first introduced 
 the custom of erecting pillars for trophies, incurred a se- 
 vere censure from the ages they lived in." — Potter^s 
 ^rckaologia, voi. ii. c. 13. 
 
 telligence of their design, despatched an embas- 
 sy at the same time to Athens, instructed by 
 any means to prevent the junction of the Atbe- 
 nians to the naval strength of the Corcyreans, 
 which might hinder them from bringing this 
 war to a successful issue. The Athenians be- 
 ing met in general assembly,^ both embassies 
 rose up to plead their own cause ; and the 
 Corcyrean spoke as follows ; 
 
 " It is quite proper, Athenians, that those 
 who address themselves to a neighbouring 
 power imploring their succour, which is now 
 our case, without being able to plead the merit 
 of prior good services or an old alliance in their 
 
 a Tlie txxxtjria or assembly of the people. In this the 
 sovereignty was vested ; and it is proper the English 
 reader should grow acquainted with this particular form 
 in tlie Athenian democracy. 
 
 The people of Athens were divided into ten tribes, 
 which presided by rotation. The year was divided into 
 ten courses, and each tribe presided about five weeks. 
 The tribe in course elected fifty persons to manage by 
 their autliority and in their name: tliese were called 
 Prytanes. These being ton large a number forbuainesa 
 they were subdivided into tens, each of these divisions 
 presiding for a week; and these were called Proedri, 
 One of the Proedri presided or was in the chair for a 
 day, nnd was styled Epistates. For that day, and he 
 never enjoyed this pre-eminence a second time in his 
 life, he was invested with the highest trust in the go- 
 vernment. He kept the public seal and the keys of the 
 citadel and treasury. In the assembly of the people he 
 ordered all the proclamations, regulated proceedings, 
 put the question, and declared the majority. 
 
 The assemblies of the people were of two kinds, ordi- 
 nary and extraordinary. Of the first kind, four were 
 regularly held during each presidency of the tribes, and 
 at the third of them ambassadors from foreign states 
 had public audience. The latter were occasionally con- 
 vened by the presidents in courses or by the general of 
 the state. Some days beforehand, notice was publicly 
 given by the senate or council of five hundred upon 
 what subjects they were to deliberate; but this could 
 'not be observed upon sudden emergencies. 
 
 They met early in the morning, generally, in the 
 Pnyx, at the summons of the public crier. At the se- 
 cond summons they were obliged to attend at their peril. 
 For then the proper officers ran along the forum with a 
 rope stretched across and rubbed over with vermilion, 
 and all upon whom a mark was found were fined ; but 
 those who attended early and regularly, received half 
 a draclima each for attendance. The number which 
 attended generally amounted to five or six thousand. 
 
 The assembly opened with the sacrifice of a young 
 pig to Ceres, and the blood was sprinkled round by way 
 of purification. Then a prayer was pronounced aloud 
 by the rrier for the prosperity of the commonwealth of 
 Athens; which ended, a curse was next pronounced 
 on every citizen who did any thing to the prejudice of 
 his country. Then the presidents of the week opened 
 the points upon which they were convened, and Itm 
 assembly proceeded to business. 
 
12 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 
 
 own behalf, should previously convince them, 
 chiefly, that a compliance with such requests 
 must turn to their advantage ; at least, that it 
 Vfill cause no manner of inconvenience ; and 
 then, that the favor will be returned with ef- 
 fectual gratitude. If they are unable to give 
 satisfactory conviction in any of these particu- 
 lars, they can have no reason to be angry if 
 their suit be rejected. The Corcyreans, confi- 
 dent that they can clear up these points beyond 
 (he reach of scruple, have sent us hither to re- 
 quest your alliance. 
 
 " The method, indeed, which hitherto we 
 have fondly observed, hath proved in fact ab- 
 surd towards you in this our exigency, and pre- 
 judicial to our own affairs in our present situa- 
 tion. In preceding times, we never chose to 
 grant our alliance to any, yet now are we come 
 to sue for alliance from others, being through our 
 own maxims quite destitute of friends in this our 
 war against the Corinthians : and that which be- 
 fore appeared the conduct of refined prudence, to 
 keep clear of danger by shunning the entangle- 
 ments of a foreign alliance, we now find by the 
 event to have been both impolitic and weak. 
 
 " Once already we have engaged the Corin- 
 thians at sea, and repulsed them merely by our 
 own strength. But since, with a greater force 
 collected from Peloponnesus and the rest of 
 Greece, they are again preparing to attack us ; 
 since we perceive ourselves, unable to resist 
 them merely with our own domestic strength ; 
 since further with our subjection the danger 
 will spread abroad ; we are necessitated to ap- 
 ply to you and everywhere else for succour ; 
 and though now emboldened to act in opposi- 
 tion to our former inactive maxims, yet we 
 deserve your pardon, as they were not the re- 
 sult of bad designs, but of mistaken judgments : 
 and could we but obtain redress from you, this 
 incidental necessity of ours will turn out high- 
 ly to your honour upon several accounts. 
 
 « In the first place, you will favour those with 
 your assistance who have felt but never com- 
 mitted injustice. In the next place, by protect- 
 ing those whose lives and liberties are at stake, 
 you will confer so vast an obligation that the 
 memory of it can never be abolished. We are 
 now masters of the greatest naval force except 
 your own. Consider therefore how fair an 
 occasipn, very seldom to be met with, of the 
 greatest advantage to yourselves, of the greatest 
 vexation to your enemies, now lieth before 
 you : when that very power, the accession of 
 
 which you would readily have purchased with 
 ample sums of money and a weight of obliga- 
 tion, Cometh here to invite your acceptance 
 and make a tender of itself without any danger 
 or expense to you; nay, what is more, enabling 
 you to gain the praise of the world, the grate- 
 ful acknowledgments of those ypu defend, and 
 an increase of power to yourselves. Few peo- 
 ple, in preceding ages, have ever had at any 
 one time so many fine opportunities within 
 their reach. And few there are, who, suing 
 for alliance, do it not rather from a view of re- 
 ceiving than conferring security and reputation 
 by their suit. 
 
 " If there bo any one amongst you, who 
 imagineth that war will never happen in which 
 we may do you service, in such imagination he 
 is quite mistaken, ^e doth not penetrate the 
 designs of the Lacedemonians, who, alarmed 
 at your power, are intent on war ; nor those of 
 the Corinthians, who, powerful of themselves, 
 and your enemies, have begun with us to open 
 the way for attacking you ; that, united by com- 
 mon resentments, we might not stand up in our 
 mutual defence against their violence ; nor they 
 be disappointed at least in one of their views, 
 either effectually to humble us, or securely to 
 establish their own power. It is your interest 
 to prevent them, by accepting that alliance 
 which we offer, and rather to anticipate their 
 designs than counterplot them when ripening 
 into act. 
 
 " If farther, they tax with a breach of justice 
 your presuming to interfere with their colonies ; 
 let them learn, that every colony, whilst used 
 in the proper manner, payeth honour and regard 
 to its mother-state, but, when treated with inju 
 ry and violence, is become an alien. They are 
 not sent out to be the slaves, but to be the equals, 
 of those who remain behind. Their violence 
 and injustice require no proofs. For, invited 
 by us to submit the business of Epidamnus to 
 a judicial trial, they chose rather to prosecute 
 their claims at war than at equity. And let 
 such behaviour towards us their relations put 
 you timely on your guard, that you may not 
 be over-reached by their collusions, nor hesitate 
 one moment to grant our petitions. For he 
 who findeth the least room to repent of having 
 gratified his enemies, is most likely to persevere 
 in uninterrupted security. 
 
 " You will not break your treaty with the 
 Lacedemonians by our admission, who are 
 allied to neither of you. By that treaty it is 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 13 
 
 expressly stipulated, that " If any of the states 
 of Greece be not at present in alliance with 
 either of the contracting parties, permission is 
 given them to go into either league, at their 
 own discretion." — And terrible indeed it is, if 
 they must be at liberty to man their fleets out 
 of places in their alliance, nay, more than that, 
 out of Greece at large, and to small amount, 
 even out of your dependents : and we must be 
 debarred not only your most inviting alliance, 
 but every possible expedient of succour : then 
 after all, they must raise a cry of injustice, if 
 we offer our requests to you and have them 
 granted. But much greater reasons of com- 
 plaint will lie with us, if we canngt prevail 
 upon you. For then you will throw at a dis- 
 tance those who are beset with dangers, and 
 never were your enemies ; you will not only not 
 restrain the encroachments of enemies and in- 
 vaders, but will behold them through your ne- 
 gligence assuming strength out of your domin- 
 ions, which you ought never to endure. You 
 ought either to hinder them from seducing 
 your subjects into their pay, or send an imme- 
 diate succour to us, in what manner you may 
 be persuaded is the most expedient; but the 
 course you ought principally to take is, to 
 form with us a defensive alhance, and to act 
 immediately. 
 
 " The advantage of such a measure, as we 
 premised at first, we are clearly proving. But 
 that which carrieth the greatest weight is this, 
 that our enemies are enemies also to you (a 
 point too clear to require proof), and enemies 
 by no means despicable, but able to make re- 
 volters fed their vengeance. The bad conse- 
 quences of rejecting a land cannot be equal to 
 those of rejecting a naval alliance, especially to 
 you, who should exert your utmost efibrts to let 
 none be masters of a fleet beside yourselves ; or, 
 if that be not feasible, to make the most power- 
 ful in that respect your fast allies. And who- 
 soever, allowing the plain advantage of the~se 
 our arguments, may yet dread a rupture if their 
 influence prevail, — let such a one know, that 
 the event he feareth, accompanied by strength, 
 will strike greater dread into all your enemies, 
 but that the zeal of him who would have us 
 now rejected, since it is founded on a weak 
 presumption of their strength, must the sooner 
 encourage those enemies to attack you. The 
 present consultation is not confined to Corcyra, 
 but very nearly concemeth Athens also : — 
 let him therefore be assured, that he doth not 
 
 provide the best for the welfare of Athens, 
 when, directly foreseeing a war fast approach- 
 ing and only not on foot, he hesitateth the 
 least about gaining a people provided with all 
 the necessary means of being a most serviceable 
 friend or a most prejudicial foe ; — a people op- 
 portunely situated in the course to Italy and 
 Sicily, so capable to hinder the accession of 
 any naval force from thence to the Pelopon- 
 nesians, and to secure a passage from hence to 
 any of those coasts, not to mention the com- 
 modiousness of it in many other respects. 
 
 " To reduce the whole to one short point, 
 wherein all and every individual of you is con- 
 cerned, learn from hence that we are not to be 
 abandoned : there are but three naval powers 
 amongst the Grecians of any consideration, 
 your own, our own, and that of the Corinthi- 
 ans. If you indolently suffer two of these to 
 be incorporated, by leaving us a prey to the 
 Corinthians, you must for the future malce 
 head against the Corcyreans and Peloponnesi- 
 ans both : but, if you grant your alliance to us, 
 the contest will lie against them alone, and 
 your own naval strength be considerably aug- 
 mented." 
 
 In this manner the Corcyreans spoke : and 
 when they had concluded, the Corinthians took 
 their turn as followeth ; — 
 
 " Since these Corcyreans have not confined 
 their discourse merely to solicit the favour of 
 your alliance, but have enlarged it with invec- 
 tives against our injustice in making war upon 
 them, we also lie under a necessity to make some 
 previous observations on both of those points, 
 before we proceed to other matters. By this 
 means you will perceive your own great secu- 
 rity in complying with our demands, and what 
 weighty reasons you have to reject their im- 
 portunate solicitations. 
 
 " They allege it as a maxim of prudence 
 that they have been hitherto averse to any fo- 
 reign alliance : but their motives in this were 
 founded upon malice, and not upon virtue. 
 They would have no ally to be a witness of 
 the wrongs they do ; they declined the society 
 of such as might put them to the blush. Their 
 very island farther, which is finely situated for 
 such arbitrary tempers, suffercth them alone to 
 judge those outrages they themselves commit 
 exempting them from fair and equitable trials, 
 because they seldom go abroad to visit their 
 neighbours, as their harbours arc the constant 
 and necessary resort of others. Here then 
 
14 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 
 
 licth the modesty of their unassociating max- 
 im : it was designed to prevent their having 
 any partners in violence, that they miglit have 
 it all to themselves ; that, when they were su- 
 perior, they might oppress without control, 
 when there was none to watch them they 
 might engross the spoil, and might enjoy their 
 rapine without danger of a blush. Had they 
 been those virtuous souls they proclaim them- 
 selves, then, clear of every bad imputation from 
 their neighbours, they had a fine opportunity to 
 manifest their integrity to the world by doing 
 and by submitting to justice. 
 
 " But such neither we nor any other people 
 have in fact experienced them. For, though 
 planted by us, they have ever disowned their 
 allegiance to us, and now wage open waf 
 against us, pleading that they were not sent 
 abroad to be maltreated and oppressed. We 
 also aver in our own behalf, that neither did 
 we send them to receive their injurious re- 
 quitals, but to retain them in lawful depen- 
 dence, and to be honoured and reverenced by 
 them. Such dutiful returns the rest of our 
 colonies punctually make us, and. by such no 
 other people are so well respected as ourselves. 
 From the great satisfaction therefore we give 
 to all the rest, it plainly appeareth, that we 
 afford no reasonable disgust to these alone, 
 and that without some glaring injury, we should 
 have had no inclination to declare war against 
 them. But, though we had actually trans- 
 gressed, it would have been quite decent on 
 their part to have shown condescension when 
 we were angry ; and then it would have been 
 base in us to have pressed too far on such 
 moderation. To their pride and the insolence 
 of wealth their many transgressions against us 
 are justly to be ascribed. Hence it was, that 
 they laid no claim to Epidamnus, which be- 
 longeth to us, whilst harassed with intestine 
 feuds ; but when we came to its redress, then 
 by force they seize and detain it. And now 
 they pretend that previous to that they were 
 willing to have submitted to a fair arbitration. 
 — Such pleas are not to be regarded, when of- 
 fered by men who are already masters in pos- 
 session, and on that security make appeal to 
 justice : they are only of weight, when facts 
 and words are equitably to be judged, before 
 the point hath been decided by arms. And it 
 was not before they had besieged that city, but 
 when they thought that we were intent on sav- 
 ing it, that they had recourse to the specious 
 
 pretence of a fair arbitration. And here they 
 are at present, by no means content witli the 
 wrongs they have there committed, presuming 
 to ask conjunction from you, not in league but 
 in violence, and on the merit of being rebels 
 against us to bog your protection. Then was 
 the proper time for such an address to you, 
 when their affairs securely flourished ; not now 
 when we have been outraged by them, and they 
 are beset with dangers ; not when you, who 
 have shared no benefit from their former power, 
 are to relieve their distress, and by no means 
 their accomplices in crimes are to come in for 
 an equality of censure from us. A prior con- 
 junction ,of force justly entitleth to a share of 
 what may be the event : but those who had no 
 participation in the guilt ought to be exempted 
 from the consequences of it. — And thus we 
 have clearly shown, that we have addressed 
 ourselves before you with all the requisites of 
 a rightful cause, and that their proceedings are 
 violent and rapacious. 
 
 " It is now incumbent upon us to convince 
 you, that you cannot with justice receive them 
 into alliance. For, granting it to be expressly 
 stipulated in the treaty that any of the states 
 not particularly mentioned may go into either 
 league at their own discretion, yet the intent 
 of the stipulation reacheth not to those who 
 join one party to the prejudice of another, but 
 to such as having withdrawn from neither side 
 are in need of protection — to such as bring not 
 war instead of peace to those who receive 
 them, — if they know their interest. And yet 
 the latter must be your portion, if our argu- 
 ments lose their influence: for you will not 
 only beconie auxiliaries to them, but enemies 
 also to us who are your allies by treaty. Of 
 necessity, if you join with them, our vengeance 
 must be levelled at them without separating 
 you. Eight ab ove all things it would be for 
 you to keep yourselves at a distance from us 
 both ; — if that will not please, to reverse your 
 proceedings, and join with us in opposition to 
 them. For, to the Corinthians you are bound 
 by firm and lasting treaties, with the Corcy- 
 reans you have never yet transacted even for a 
 truce, and by no means to establish a new law 
 for receiving revolters from the other league. 
 We ourselves did not, upon the Samian revolt, 
 give our suffrage against you, when the rest of 
 the Peloponneslans were divided upon the 
 question — whether they ought to be supported : 
 but we openly maintained, that every state had 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 lb 
 
 a right to proceed against its own dependents. 
 For if you receive and undertake the defence 
 of those who have behaved amiss, the event 
 will show that the greater number will come 
 over to our side, and that you establish a law 
 prejudicial to yourselves much more than to us. 
 " The points of justice we have thus sufficient- 
 ly cleared up to you, according to the general 
 laws of Greece. We have only to add a word 
 of advice and the claim of a favour, such a one 
 as we now affirm upon a principle of gratitude 
 ought not to be denied us, who are neither 
 your enemies so far as to hurt you, nor ever 
 were your friends so far as to burden you. 
 When formerly before the invasion of the 
 Modes, you were in want of long ships in your 
 war against the .^Hginetse, you were supplied by 
 the Corinthians with twenty. The service 
 which we then did you, and that other more re- 
 cent about the Samians, when we prevented 
 their receiving any support from the Pelopon- 
 nesians, enabled you in their turns to vanquish 
 the jffiginetffi and to chastise the Samians. And 
 these services were done you at a season when 
 the human attention, fixed entirely on war, re- 
 gardeth nothing but what tendeth to victory. 
 Whoever forwardeth this, men esteem their 
 friend, though he was before their foe ; and him 
 who checketh it, their foe, though perhaps he 
 may be their real friend. For even domestic 
 affairs are sorrily conducted at a time when the 
 mind is inflamed by contention. 
 
 " Recollect these things. Let the young man 
 learn the truth of them from his elders, and ac- 
 knowledge that we ought to be properly requit- 
 ed. Let him not entertain the thought, that 
 what we say is agreeable to equity, but that in 
 case of a war interest inclineth another way : 
 for interest is most surely to be found there 
 where the least injustice is committed. The 
 contingency of that war, from the dread of 
 which the Corcyreans encourage you to act un- 
 justly, lieth yet in obscurity, and ought not to 
 inflame you into open and immediate hostilities 
 against the Corinthians. It would be prudent, 
 farther, to lessen that jealousy we have already 
 conceived from the proceedings at Megara. 
 For a later obligation, by the favour of time, 
 though of less weight in itself, is able to cancel 
 a charge of greater moment. Neither sufler 
 yourselves to be allured with the promise of a 
 powerful conjunction of naval force : for never 
 to act unjustly against equals is a firmer se- 
 curity of power than to be elevated upon pro- 
 
 sent plausibilities, and enlarge it through a 
 series of dangers. Our present circumstances 
 resemble those concerning which we explicitly 
 declared at Lacedemon, that every state had a 
 right to proceed against its own dependents : 
 and now we beg that liberty from you ; and 
 that you, who have reaped the benefit of such 
 a suffrage from us, would not prejudice us by 
 yours. Render us for it the just requital; 
 remembering that this is the critical season, in 
 which he who aideth is the best of friends, and 
 he that ogposeth the greatest foe. And, as 
 for these Corcyreans, take them not into your 
 alliance in despite of us, nor abet them in the 
 injuries they have done us. By acting in this 
 manner you will discharge the obligations in- 
 cumbent upon you, and will take those mea- 
 sures which are most for your own advantage." 
 This is the substance of what was said by the 
 Corinthians. 
 
 The Athenians having heard both parties, 
 ' met twice in full assembly on this occasion. 
 At the first meeting they thought there was 
 validity in the arguments of the Corinthians ; 
 but, at the second, they came to a different re- 
 solution — not indeed to form such an alliance 
 with the Corcyreans as to have the same ene- 
 mies and the same friends (for then, if the 
 Corcyreans should summon them to join in an 
 
 » Here the English reader should be informed, in 
 what manner business went on when difficulties, diver- 
 sities of opinion, and consequently debates ensued. 
 
 When it appeared that the point proposed would not 
 pass unanimously, the crier, at the command of the pre- 
 sident in the chair, proclaimed aloud, " What citizen 
 above fifty years of age hath a mind to speak?" When 
 such had been heard, the crier made a second proclama- 
 tion.that "any Athenian whatever had liberty to speak." 
 The debate being ended, the president in thecliair hade 
 the crier put the question. It was decided by holding 
 up of hands. The chairman distinguisiied the numbers 
 in the affirmative and negative, and declared tlie major- 
 ity. Then the resolution or decree was drawn up in 
 form ; and the Archon's name who gave title to the 
 year, the day of the month, and the name of the prcsid- 
 ing tribe, were prefixed. 
 
 The public decorum of the Athenians is worthy oh- 
 servation. The sentiments of age and experience were 
 first to be heard, ai.d then the spirit and resolution of 
 the younger were called in to assist at the public con- 
 sultation. Nay, they carried it farther ; no person con- 
 victed of profaneness, debauchery, cowardice, or pub- 
 lic misdemeanour, was suffered to speak in this as- 
 sembly. From them they expected no sound instruc- 
 tion, no disinterested advice. If any sucli offered to 
 speak, the presidents of tlie assembly immediately en- 
 joined them silence; or, if they were refractory, order- 
 ed their officers to pull them down and turn them out 
 of the aasezLbly. 
 
16 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 
 
 expedition against Corinth, their treaty with ! trine, and between these two rivers ariseth the 
 the Peloponnesians would be broke ;) but an '. cape of Chimerium. The Corinthians there- 
 alliance merely defensive, for the reciprocal i fore anive at this part of the continent, and fix 
 
 succour of one another, if either Corcyra 
 or Athens, or any of their respective allies 
 should be assaulted. A war with the Pelo- 
 ponnesians seemed to them unavoidable ; and 
 they had no mind to leave Corcyra, which 
 had so great a naval force, for a prey to the 
 Corinthians ; but, to break them to the utmost 
 of their power against one another, that upon 
 occasion they might be the better able to war 
 with the Corinthians, thus weakened to their 
 hands, though joined by other states of Greece 
 which had power at sea. At the same time 
 that island appeared to them most conveniently 
 situated in the passage to Italy and SiSily. 
 Upon these motives the Athenians received 
 the Corcyreans into their alUance: and, not 
 long after the departure of the Corinthians, 
 sent ten ships to their aid under the command 
 of Lacedemonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus 
 the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son 
 of Epicles. Their orders were, " by no means 
 to engage the Corinthians, unless they stood 
 against and endeavoured to make a descent at 
 Corcyra, or any of its dependent places ; if 
 they did so, to resist them with all their efforts." 
 These orders were given with a view of not 
 infringing the treaty: and this their aid of 
 shipping arriveth at Corcyra. 
 
 The Corinthians, when they had completed 
 their preparations, set sail for Corcyra with a 
 fleet of one hundred and fifty ships. Of these, 
 ten belonged to the E leans, twelve to the Me- 
 gareans, ten to the Leucadians, twenty-seven 
 to the Ambraciots, one to the Anactorians, and 
 the other ninety were their own. The quotas 
 from the allied cities had each of them their 
 respective commanders; but the Corinthian 
 squadron was commanded by Xenociides the 
 son of Euthycles, with four colleagues. So 
 Boon as they were all assembled at that part of 
 ihe continent which looks towards Corcyra, 
 they set sail from Leucas, and arrive at the 
 Chimerium in Thesprotis. A harbour open- 
 eth itself here, and above it is the city of 
 Ephyre, at a distance from the sea, in Eleatis, 
 a district of Thesprotis : near it is the outlet 
 into the sea of the lake of Acherusia, into 
 which the river Acheroir, having run through 
 Thesprotis, is at last received ; from which also 
 it deriveth- its name. The river Thyamis also 
 runneth here, diriding Thesprotis from Ces- 
 
 their station there. But the Corcyreans so 
 soon as ever advised of their sailing, having 
 manned a hundred and ten ships under the 
 command of Miciades, ^simides, and Euiy- 
 batus, took their station at one of those isles 
 which are called the Sybota, accompanied by 
 the ten Athenian ships. Their land-force was 
 left at the promontory of Leucimna, with an 
 aid of a thousand heavy-armed Zacynthians. 
 The Corinthians had also ready upon the con- 
 tinent a numerous aid of barbarians : for the 
 people on that coast ever continued their 
 friends. When every thing was in order among 
 the Corinthians, taking in provisions for three 
 days, they weigh by night from Chimerium 
 with a design to fight ; and having sailed along 
 till break of day, they discover the ships of the 
 Corcyreans already out at sea, and advancing 
 against them. When thus they had got a view 
 of each other, both sides form into the order 
 of battle. In the right wing of the Corcyreans 
 were the Athenian ships ; the rest of the fleet 
 was all their own, ranged into three squadrons, 
 each of which was respectively under the orders 
 of the three commanders : in this manner was 
 the order of the Corcyreans formed. In the ' 
 right of the Corinthians were the ships of the 
 Megareans and Ambraciots ; in the centre the 
 other allies in their several arrangements ; the 
 Corinthians formed the left wing themselves, 
 as their ships were the best sailers, to oppose 
 the Athenians and the right of the Corcyreans. 
 When' the signal flags were hoisted on both 
 
 • To give tlie Enjlish reader, once for all, a propff 
 lilht into their metliod of beginning an engagement, I 
 eliall quote tlie following paragraph from archbishop 
 Potter's ArchiEOlogia, vol. ii. c. 21. 
 
 " Before tliey joined lattle, both parties invoked the 
 gods to their assistance liy prayers and sacrifices; and 
 the admirals, going from ship to ship in some of the 
 lighter vessels, exhorted their soldiers in a set oration to 
 behave themselves like men ; then all things I eing in 
 readiness, the signal wr.s given by hanging out of the 
 admiral's galley a gilded shield, as we read in Plutarch, 
 or a red garment or banner, which was termed «ip«'» 
 c-Kfii^. IJuringthc elevation of thisthe fight continued, 
 and by its depression or inclination towards the rightor 
 left, the rest of tl;c ships were directed in what manner 
 to attack their enemies, or retreat from them. To this 
 was added the sound of tr-impets, which was begun in 
 the admiral's galley, and continued round the whole na- 
 vy ; it was likewise usual for the soldiers before the fight 
 to sing a pajan or llymn to Wars, and after the fight 
 another to Apollo." 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 17 
 
 sides, they ran together and began the engage- 
 ment; both sides having stowed their decks 
 with bodies of heavy-aimed, with many further 
 that drew the bow or tossed the javelin. 
 Their preparations still retained something of 
 the awkward manner of antiquity. The engage- 
 ment was sharply carried on, yet without exer- 
 tions of skill, and very much resembling a 
 battle upon land. When they had laid one 
 another close, they were not easily- separated 
 again, because of the number and hurry of the 
 vessels. The greatest hope of victory was 
 placed in the heavy-armed fighting on the decks, 
 who fixed to their post engaged hand to hand, 
 whilst their ships continued without any mo- 
 tion. They had no opportunity to make their 
 charges and tacks, but fought it out by dint of 
 strength and courage without any dexterity. 
 The tumult was great on all sides, and the 
 whole action full of disorder: in which the 
 Athenian ships relieved the Corcyrean where- 
 ever they were pressed too hard, and did what 
 they could to intimidate the enemy ; but their 
 commanders refrained from any direct attack, 
 remembering with awe the orders of the Athe- 
 nians. The right wing of the Corinthians suf- 
 fered the most ; for the Corey reans with twenty 
 ships, having put them to flight, chased them 
 when dispersed to the continent, and continu- 
 ing the pursuit to their very camp, landed imme- 
 diately, where they set fire to their abandoned 
 tents and carried off all the baggage : in this 
 part therefore the Corinthians and their allies 
 were vanquished, and the Corcyreans were 
 plainly superior. But in the left, where the 
 Corinthians personally engaged, they easily 
 prevailed, as twenty ships of the Corcyreans, 
 and those too from a number at first inferior, 
 were gone off in the pursuit. But the Athe- 
 nians, seeing the Corcyreans thus distressed, 
 now came up to their support more openly than 
 before, having hitherto refrained from any direct 
 attack. And when the chase was clearly be- 
 gun, and the Corinthians followed their success, 
 then every one amongst them applied himself 
 to action. There was no longer any time for 
 discretion; Corinthians and Athenians were 
 forced by absolute necessity to engage one an- 
 other. 
 
 The chase being thus begun, the Corinthians 
 towed not after them the hulks of the vessels 
 they had sunk, but turned all their attention 
 to the men who were floating about, and cruiz- 
 ed at large more to slaughter than take alive. 
 10 
 
 And, having not yet discovered the defeat of their 
 right, they slaughtered through ignorance their 
 own friends. For the number of ships being large 
 on either side, and covering a wide extent of sea, 
 after the first confusion of the engagement they 
 were not able easily to distinguish which were 
 the victors or which the vanquished : since Gre- 
 cians against Grecians had never at any time be- 
 fore engaged at sea with so large a number of 
 vessels. But after the Corinthians had pursued 
 the Corcyreans to land, they returned to look 
 after their shattered vessels and their own 
 dead. And most of these they took up and 
 carried to Sybota, where also lay the land-force 
 of their barbarian auxiliaries : this Sybota is a 
 desert haven in Thesprotis. Having performed 
 this duty, they gathered together again into a 
 body and went in quest of the Corcyreans, who 
 with those damaged vessels that yet could 
 swim, and with all that had no damage, to- 
 gether with the Athenians, came out to meet 
 them, fearing lest they might attempt to land 
 upon their shore. It was now late in the day, 
 and they had sung their psean as going to at- 
 tack, when on a sudden the Corinthians' 
 slackened their course, having descried a rein- 
 forcement of twe.ity sail coming up from 
 Athens. This second squadron the Athe- 
 nians had sent away to support the former ten, 
 fearing (what really happened) lest the Corcy- 
 reans might be vanquished, and their own ten 
 ships be too few for their support. The Co- 
 rinthians, therefore, having got a view of them, 
 and suspecting they came from Athens, and 
 in a larger number than they yet discovered, 
 began gradually to fall away. They were not 
 yet descried by the Corcyreans (for the course 
 kept them more out of their ken), who were 
 surprised to see the Corinthians thus slacken 
 their course, till some, who had gained a view, 
 informed them that such ships are coming up, 
 and then they also fell back themselves : for 
 now it began to be dark, and the Corinthians 
 being turned about had dissolved their order. 
 In this manner they were separated from one 
 another : and the naval engagement ended with 
 the night. 
 
 The Corcyreans having recovered their sta- 
 
 * The original is Trgvi^vxv ExeouowTo. they Itiiockeil tl'C 
 hind deck, a phrnse elegantly applied I»y Tliur.ydidea 
 to those that retreat lighting, and still facing their ene- 
 mies. Il was done by running their ships backwards 
 upon their hind decks in order to tack about. See Pot- 
 ter's Archaeologia, vol. ii. c. 20. 
 
18 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book I. 
 
 tion at Leucymna, those twenty ships from 
 Athens, under the command of Glauco the 
 Bon of Leager, and Andocides the son of Leo- 
 goras, having passed through floating carcases 
 and wrecks, came up to the station, not long 
 after they had been descried. Yet the Cor- 
 cyreana (for now it was night) were in great 
 consternation lest they should be enemies : 
 tut they were soon known, and then came to 
 an anchor. 
 
 Next morning the thirty Athenian ships, 
 accompanied by such of the Cdrcyreans as were 
 fit for sea, weighed away and made over for 
 the haven at Sybota where the Corinthians 
 fay, designing to try whether or no they would 
 engage again. The Corinthians, putting their 
 ehips from off the shore and drawing up into 
 order in the deeper water, remained there with- 
 out advancing. They had no design or in- 
 clination to begin another engagement, as they 
 were sensible of the junction of the fresh 
 Athenian ships, and of the numerous difficul- 
 ties with which they were beset, about the 
 custody of the prisoners whom they had on 
 board, and the want of necessary materials to 
 repair their ships upon this desert coast. Their 
 thoughts wore more employed upon their re- 
 turn home, and the method to accomplish it, 
 from the apprehension lest the Athenians, 
 judging the league to be broke as they had come 
 to blows, might obstruct their passage. For 
 this reason they determined beforehand to des- 
 patch a boat with proper persons, though with- 
 out the solemn protection of a herald, and so 
 to sound their intentions. The message to be 
 delivered was this : 
 
 " You are guilty of injustice, ye men of 
 Athens, in beginning war and violating treaties : 
 for you hinder us from taking due vengeance 
 upon our enemies, by lifting up your arms 
 against us. If you are certainly determined to 
 hinder our course, either against Corcyra or 
 any other place whither we are willing, to go, 
 and so violate treaties, take us first who are 
 here in your power, and treat us as enemies." 
 
 The persons sent thus delivered their mes- 
 sage : and the whole company of the Corcyre- 
 ans who heard it, shouted out imm.ediately to 
 " apprehend and put them to death." But the 
 Athenians returned this answer. 
 
 " We neither begin war, ye men of Pelo- 
 ponnesus, nor violate treaties. We are come 
 hither auxiliaries to these Corcyreans our al- 
 lies If therefore you are desirous to sail to 
 
 any other place, we hinder you not. But, if 
 you go against Corcyra or any other place be- 
 longing to it, we shall endeavor to oppose you, 
 to the utmost of our power." 
 
 Upon receiving this answer from the Athe- 
 liians, the Corinthians prepared for their return 
 home, and erected a trophy at Sybota en the 
 continent. But the Corcyreans were employed 
 in picking up the wrecks and bodies of the 
 dead, driving towards them by favour of the 
 tide and the wind, which blowing fresh the 
 night before had scattered them all about ; and, 
 as if they too had the victory, erected an op- 
 posite trophy at Sybota in the island. The 
 reasons upon which each side thus claimed the 
 victory, were these. The Corinthians erected 
 a trophy, because they had the better of the 
 engagement till night, and so were enabled to 
 pick up most of the shatters and the dead ; 
 they had, further, taken a number of prisoners, 
 not less than a thousand, and had disabled about 
 seventy ships of the enemy. — The Corcyreans 
 did the same : because they also had disabled 
 about thirty ; and, upon the coming up of the 
 Athenians, had recovered all the wreck and 
 dead bodies driving towards them ; and because 
 the Corinthians tacking about had retired from 
 them the night before, so soon as they descried 
 the Athenian ships ; and when they came to 
 offer them battle at Sybota, durst not come out 
 against them. In this manner -did both sides 
 account themselves victorious. 
 
 The (>orinthians, in their passage home- 
 wards, by stratagem seized Anactorium, which 
 lieth in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia. 
 It belont;ed in common to the Corcyreans and 
 themselves. They put it entirely into the 
 hands of the Corinthian inhabitants, and then 
 retired to their own home. Eight hundred of 
 their Corcyrean prisoners who were slaves, 
 they sold at public sale. Two hundred and 
 fifty they reserved in safe custody, and treated 
 them with extraordinary good usage, that after 
 their ransom they might serve them in their 
 design of gaining Corcyra : for the majority of 
 them wei;e persons of the greatest authority in 
 that state. Thus, therefore, is Corcyra pre- 
 served in the war of the Corinthians ; and the 
 ships of the Athenians after such service left 
 them. But this was the first ground of war 
 to the Corinthians against the Athenians, be- 
 cause they had assisted the Corcyreans in a 
 naval engagement against themselves, who 
 were in treaty with them. 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 19 
 
 Immediately after this transaction, other 
 misunderstandings also happened between the 
 Athenians and Peloponnesians, tending to a 
 war. For all the schemes of the Corinthi- 
 ans aiming at revenge, the Athenians, jealous 
 of their enmity, sent an order to the inhabi- 
 tants of Potideea situated upon the isthmus 
 of Pallene, (and, though a Corinthian colony, 
 yet allied with and tributary to them,) " to 
 demolish that part of their wall which faceth 
 the Pallene, to give them hostages, to send 
 away the epidemiur^^ and not to receive those 
 magistrates for the future, who were annually 
 sent them from Corinth." They were appre- 
 hensive of a revolt at the instigation of Perdic- 
 cas and the Corinthians, and their seducing 
 into the same defection the other dependents 
 of Athens in Thrace. These steps the Athe- 
 nians thought proper to take with the people 
 of Potidiea, immediately after the sea-fight of 
 Corcyra. For the Corinthians were manifestly 
 at variance with them, and Perdiccas the son 
 of Alexander king of the Macedonians was 
 now become their enemy, who before had been 
 their ally and friend. His enmity was occa- 
 sioned by an alliance the Athenians had form- 
 ed with his brother Philip and Derdas, who 
 were jointly in opposition against him. Alarm- 
 ed at this, he sent proper persons to Lacedemon 
 to stir up against them a Peloponnesian war, 
 and to draw over the Corinthians into his in- 
 terest, in order to bring about the revolt of 
 Potidaea. He had also been tampering with 
 the Chalcideans of Thrace and the Bottiseans 
 to persuade them to revolt at the same time ; 
 concluding, that if he could bring about a junc- 
 tion of the adjacent people, he might venture a 
 war against them with greater probability of 
 success. The Athenians perceived his scheme, 
 and were desirous to prevent the revolt of the 
 cities. They had begun an expedition against 
 his territories with a fleet of thirty ships and a 
 thousand heavy-armed, under the command of 
 Archestratus the son of Lycomedes associated 
 with ten others in this service. They gave 
 particular orders to the commanders to take 
 hostages from the Potidseans and to demolish 
 their walls, and to keep a watchful eye over 
 the neighbouring cities that they might not 
 revolt. The Potidseans had already sent am- 
 bassadors to the Athenians, to dissuade them 
 if possible from the execution of any new 
 designs against them ; and had at the same 
 time despatched an embassy to Lacedemon 
 
 along with the Corinthians, instructed to pro- 
 cure a promise of redress if there should be oc- 
 casion. But, when their long negotiation at 
 .\thens p oved quite ineffectual, and tlio fleet 
 was gone out to sea both against Macedonia 
 and themselves ; when, farther, the regency at 
 Lacedemon had given a promise to make an 
 irruption into Attica, if the Athenians should 
 attempt any thing against Potidsea ; upon this 
 encouragement, without loss of time, they revolt 
 in conjunction with the Chalcideans and Bot- 
 tia;ans, all combined by an oath of mutual de- 
 fence and support. Perdiccas, farther, prevail- 
 eth with the Chalcideans to abandon and de- 
 molish all their towns upon the sea-coast, and 
 then to remove to Olynthus and fortify that 
 town by a junction of all their strength. And 
 to these people, thus abandoning their own 
 homes, he made a cession of that part of Myg- 
 donia which lieth round the lake of Bolbe, for 
 their subsistence during the war with tho 
 Athenians. -Having thus demolished their own 
 cities, they went to another place of residence, 
 and were employed in preparations for the war. 
 
 The thirty ships of the Athenians, arriving 
 on the coasts of Thrace, find P-otidaea and the 
 other cities already revolted. The comman- 
 ders, judging it impossible with their present 
 strength to act against Perdiccas and the re- 
 volted cities both, turn their course towards 
 Macedonia, pursuing the first design of the ex- 
 pedition. Landing there they joined in the 
 war with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, 
 who with an army had made an irruption from 
 the inland country. 
 
 In the mean time, Potidjea being now in 
 revolt and the Athenian fleet on the Macedo- 
 nian coasts, the Corinthians, anxious for the 
 security of that place, and making the danger 
 their own, despatched thither some volunteers 
 of their own people and other Peloponnesians 
 taken into their pay, in all sixteen hundred 
 heavy-armed' and four hundred light-armed. 
 The command of this body of men was given 
 to Aristeus the son of Adamantus ; since, out 
 of their own private affection to him who had 
 
 I The heavy-armed wo-e a complete suit of armoui 
 and f.iigaged with hroad shields and longspears. They 
 were the flower and strength of the Grecian armies, and 
 had tlie highest ranii of military honour. The light- 
 armed were designed for skirmishes and fighting at a 
 distance : their weapons were arrows, darts, or slings. 
 Tlie targeteers mentioned often in ttis history, were a 
 middle sort of soldiery, armed with targets or narrow 
 shields and spears, neither large nor heavy. 
 
20 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 
 
 ever been a steady friend to Potidsea, most of 
 the volunteers from Corinth had undertaken 
 the service ; and the time of their arrival in 
 Thrace was the fortieth day after the revolt of 
 Potidsea. 
 
 An express soon arrived at Athens with the 
 news of the revolt of the cities, and when after- 
 wards they heard of the arrival, of that body 
 under Aristeus, they send away two thousand 
 of their heavy armed, and forty ships under the 
 command of Callias the son of Calliades, and 
 four colleagues, to reduce the revolted. These, 
 arriving first of all in Macedonia, find the 
 former thousand employed in besieging Pydne, 
 having a little before got possession of Ther- 
 me. They sat down with them for a time to 
 carry on the siege of Pydne ; but afterwards, 
 making with Perdiccas a composition and alli- 
 ance the best they could in their present exi- 
 gency, since Potidaea and the arrival of Aris- 
 teus were very urgent points, they evacuate 
 Macedonia. They marched next to Bersea ; 
 and turning from thence, after having first 
 made an unsuccessful attempt upon the place, 
 they marched by land towards Potidtea. Their 
 army consisted of three thousand heavy-armed 
 of their own, without including a large body of 
 auxiliaries, and six hundred Macedonian horse, 
 who had served with Philip and Pausanias; 
 seventy ships at the same time sailed along the 
 coast. And thus, by moderate marches, they 
 came up in three days to Gigonus, and there 
 encamped. 
 
 The Potidieans, with the body of Pelopon- 
 nesians commanded by Aristeus, excepting the 
 Athenians, had formed a camp near Olynthus, 
 within the isthmus, and had a market kept for 
 them without the city. The command of the 
 infantry had been given to Aristeus by the 
 voice of the confederates, and that of the 
 cavalry to Perdiccas; for now again he had 
 abruptly broken with the Athenians and joined 
 the Potidaeans, deputing lolaus to command in 
 his absence. It was the design of Aristeus, 
 by encamping the body under his own com- 
 mand within the isthmus, to observe the 
 motions of the Athenians if they advanced, 
 whilst without the isthmus, the Chalcideans 
 and allies, and two hundred horse belonging to 
 Perdiccas, should continue at Olynthus, who, 
 when the Athenians came forwards against 
 them, were to throw themselves in their rear, 
 aJid thus shut up the enemy between the two 
 b"diea. But Callias, the general of the Athe- 
 
 nians, in concert with his colleagues, detaches 
 the Macedonian horse, and a few of their allies, 
 to Olynthus, to prevent any sally from thence ; 
 and then, breaking up their camp, they marched 
 directly for Potidsea. But, when they were 
 advanced as far as the isthmus, and saw their 
 enemies drawn up in order to fight, they also 
 formed ; and in a little time they came to an 
 action. The wing under Aristeus, Corin- 
 thians and the very flower of their strength, 
 who engaged with him, soon compelled theit 
 enemies to turn their backs, and pursued exe- 
 cution to a great distance ; but the rest of the 
 army, composed of Potidseans and Pelopon- 
 nesians, were defeated by the Athenians, and 
 chased to the very walls of Potidaea. Aristeus, 
 returning from his pursuit, perceived the rout 
 of the rest of the army, and knew not whither, 
 with the least hazard, to retreat, whether to 
 Olynthus or Potidffia. But, at last, he deter- 
 mined to embody together those he had about 
 him, and, as Potidaea lay at the smallest dis- 
 tance, to throw himself into it with all possible 
 speed. This, with difficulty, he eflfected, by 
 plunging into the water near the abutments of 
 the pier, amidst a shower of missive weapons, 
 with the loss, indeed, of some of his men, but 
 the safety of the larger number. 
 
 Those who should have come to succour the 
 Potideans from Olynthus, which is at no 
 greater distance than sixty stadia,' and situ- 
 ated in view, at the beginning of the battle, 
 when the colours were elevated,^ advanced, 
 indeed, a little way, as designing to do it, and 
 the Macedonian horse drew up against them 
 as designing to stop them. But, as the vic- 
 tory was quickly gained by the Athenians, and 
 the colours were dropped, they retired again 
 within the walls, and the Macedonians marched 
 away to the Athenians : so that the cavalry of 
 neither side had any share in the action. After 
 the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and 
 granted a suspension of arms to the Potidaeans 
 for fetching off their dead. There were killed 
 of the Potidseans and allies very near three 
 
 » About six miles. 
 
 a Tile elevation of tlie ^olours or ensigns, was the 
 signal of joining battle, and they were kept up during 
 tlie whole continuance of it : the depression of them, 
 was a signal to desist, or the consequence of a defeat. 
 The depression of the colours in this instance, was a 
 proof to the Macedonian cavalry, that all was over. 
 The Athenians in their colours bore an owl, as sacred to 
 Minerva, the tutelary goddess of Athens. See Potter's 
 ArchiEOlogia Grasca, vol. ii. c. 9. 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 21 
 
 himdied, and of the Athenians one hundred 
 and fifty, with Callias their general. 
 
 The Athenians without loss of time, throw- 
 ing up a work against the wall which faceth the 
 isthmus, blockaded the place on that side, but 
 the wall towards the Pallene they left as they 
 found it. For they thought their number was 
 by no means sufficient to keep the guard 
 within the isthmus, and to pass over to the 
 Pallene side, and block it up also there. They 
 were apprehensive, that thus divided, the Poti- 
 diEans and their allies might fall upon them. 
 And the Athenians at home, hearing there was 
 no work on the Pallene side, sent thither a 
 thousand and six hundred heavy-armed of 
 their own people, under the command of Phor- 
 mio the son of Asophius, who arriving upon 
 the Pallene, and having landed his men at 
 Aphytis, marched forward to Potidaa, advan- 
 cing slowly and laying waste the country as he 
 moved along. And, as nobody ventured out to 
 give him opposition, he also threw up a work 
 against that side of the wall which faceth the 
 Pallene. By these methods was Potidjea close- 
 ly blocked up on either side, and also by the 
 ehips which lay before it at sea. 
 
 The blockade being thus perfected, Aristeus, 
 destitute of any means of saving the place, un- 
 kss some relief should arrive from Pelopon- 
 nesus, or some miracle should happen, proposed 
 it as his advice, that " all excepting five hun- 
 dred men should lay hold of the first favourable 
 wind to quit the place, that the provisions 
 might for a longer time support the rest;" 
 declaring his own readiness to be one of 
 those who staid behind." Though he could 
 not prevail with them, yet willing in this 
 plunge to do what could be done, and to 
 manage affairs abroad in the best manner he 
 was able, he made h-'- "scape by sea undis- 
 covered by the Athenian guard. Continuing 
 now amongst the Chalcideans, he made what 
 military efforts he could, and killed many of 
 the inhabitants of Sermyle by an ambuscade 
 he formed before that city ;, and endeavoured 
 to prevail with the Peloponnesians to send up 
 a timely relief. Phormio, also, after com- 
 pleting the works round PotidaEa, with his 
 sixteen hundred men ravaged Chalcidica and 
 Bottisa ; and some fortresses he took by storm. 
 
 These were the reciprocal causes of dissen- 
 lion between the Athenians and Pelopon- 
 nesians. The Corinthians were enraged at 
 thei blockade of Potidsea, a colony of their 
 
 own, in which were shut up both Corinthians 
 and other Peloponnesians. The Athenians 
 resented the proceedings of the Peloponnesians, 
 in seducing to a revolt a city in alliance with 
 and tributary to them, and siding openly, by a 
 voluntary expedition, with the warring rebels 
 of Potida;a. Yet a war, open and avowed, 
 had not yet broke out between them ; hostilities 
 were suspended for ■■ time. Hitherto it was 
 merely a private quarrel of the Corinthians. 
 
 But when once the blockade of Potidsea 
 was formed, the Corinthians could hold no 
 longer. In it their own people were shut up, 
 and they were at the same time in anxiety 
 about the place. They summoned their allies 
 to repair immediately to Lacedemon, and 
 thither they went themselves, with loud ac- 
 cusations against the Athenians, "that they 
 had violated the treaty, and injured Pelopon- 
 nesus." The ^ginetSE, indeed, from a dread 
 of the Athenians, did not openly despatch 'their 
 embassy ; but underhand they had a great share 
 in fomenting the war, asserting, that " they 
 were restrained in the privilege of governing 
 themselves, which had been allowed them by 
 the treaty." 
 
 The Lacedemonians, summoning to appear 
 before them, not barely their allies, but who- 
 ever had any manner of charge to prefer against 
 the Athenians, assembled in grand council, as 
 usual, and commanded them to speak ; others 
 who were present laid open their respective 
 complaints, but the Megareans preferred the 
 largest accusations, in particular, that, " they 
 had been prohibited the use of all the harbours 
 in the Athenian dominions, and the market of 
 Athens, contrary to the treaty." The Corin- 
 thians were the last who stood forth. Having 
 first allowed sufficient time to others to exaspe- 
 rate the Lacedemonians, they preferred their 
 own charge as followeth :. — 
 
 "That faith, ye Lacedemoniails, which ever 
 , both in public conduct and In private life, you 
 so punctually observe, rendereth what others, 
 what we ourselves, may have to say, more 
 difficult to be believed. By it you have'gained 
 indeed the reputation of probity, but contract 
 a prejudicial ignorance in regard to remote 
 occurrences. For, though we have frequently 
 suggested to you, what wrongs we were appre- 
 hensive of receiving from the Athenians, yet" 
 have you not deigned to make inquiry into the 
 grounds of those suggestions, but rather have 
 suspected our ingenuity as speaking from selfish 
 g3 
 
22 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 
 
 views ami private resentments. And it is not 1 
 to prevent our sufferings, but now, when we 
 already feel their weiglit, that you convene 
 these confederates together ; before whom, we 
 ought to be indulged in a larger share of dis- 
 course, as wo have by much the largest share 
 of complaints to utter; wronged as we have 
 been by the Athenians, and by you neglected. 
 
 " If indeed by treachery, lurking and unob- 
 served, they had violated the , peace of Greece, 
 those vpTio had not discerned it might justly 
 have demanded explicit proofs. But now, 
 what need can there be of multiplying words, 
 when some you already see enslaved ; against 
 others, and those not the meanest of your alUes, 
 the same fate intended; and the aggressors 
 fully prepared to receive you, if at length a war 
 should be declared 1 With other views, they 
 had not clandestinely laid hands on Oorcyra 
 and forcibly detained it from us, nor had they 
 dared to block up Potidsea; of which places, 
 this latter lieth the most convenient for ex- 
 tending our power in Thrace, the former could 
 supply Peloponnesus with the greatest navy. 
 But to your account these events are to be 
 charged, who after the invasion of the Medos 
 first suffered the strength of Athens to be in- 
 creased, and afterwards their long walls to be 
 erected. Ever since you have connived at 
 liberty overthrown, not only in whatever com- 
 munities they have proceeded to enslave, but 
 now where even your own confederates are 
 concerned. For not to the men who rivet on 
 the chains of slavery, but to such as, though 
 able, yet neglect to prevent it, ought the sad 
 event with truth to be imputed ; especially 
 when assuming superior virtue they boast them- 
 selves the deliverers of Greece. 
 
 " With much ado we are now met together 
 in council, but not even now upon the plain 
 and obvious points. We ought not to be any 
 longer debating whether we have been injured, 
 but by what measures we should avenge our- 
 selves. The aggressors, having long since 
 planned out their proceedings, are not about to 
 make, but are actually making attacks upon 
 those, who are yet come to no resolution. Nor 
 are we unexperienced by what steps, what 
 gradual advances, the Athenians breali in upon 
 their neighbours. Imagining themselves to be 
 still undiscovered, they show themselves the 
 less audacious because you are insensible. But 
 when once they know you alarmed and on your 
 guard, they will press more resolutely forwards. 
 
 For you, Lacedtemonians, are the only people 
 of Greece, who sit indolently at ease, protecting 
 not with present but with promised succour : 
 you alone pull down, not the commencing but 
 the redoubled strength of your foes. You have 
 indeed enjoyed the reputation of being steady, 
 but are indebted for it more to report than 
 fact. We ourselves know, that the Persian 
 had advanced from the ends of the earth quite 
 into Peloponnesus, before you exerted your 
 dignity in resistance. Now also you take no 
 notix'e of the Athenians, not remote as he was 
 but se.ited near you; and, instead of invading 
 them, choose rather to lie upon your defence 
 against their invasions; and, to expose your- 
 selves more to the hazards of war, against a 
 grown augmented power. And all this while 
 you know, that the Barbarian was guilty of 
 many errors in his conduct: and the very 
 Athenians frequently, in their contests with 
 us, have been defeated more- through their own 
 blunders than the vigour of your resistance; 
 for their confidence in you hath caused the 
 destruction of some, who upon that very confi- 
 dence were taken unprepared. 
 
 " Let no one in this assembly imagine, that 
 we speak more from malice than just grounds 
 of complaint. Complaint is just towards 
 friends who have failed in their duty; accusa- 
 tion is against enemies guilty of injustice. And 
 surely, if any people ever had, we have good 
 reason to think we have ample caUse to throw 
 blame upon our neighbours ; especially, when 
 such great embroilments have arose, of which 
 you seem to have no manner of feeling, nor 
 ever once to have reflected, in regard to the 
 Athenians, with what sort of people, how far, 
 and how in every point unlike yourselves, you 
 must soon contend. They are a people fond 
 of innovations, quick not only to contrive, but 
 to put their schemes into effectual execution : 
 your method is, to preserve what you already 
 have, to know nothing further, and when in 
 action to leave something needful ever unfin- 
 ished. They again are daring beyond their 
 strength, adventurous beyond the bounds of 
 judgment, and in extremities full of hope : 
 your method is, in action to drop below your 
 power, never resolutely to follow the dictates 
 of your judgment, and in the pressure of a 
 calamity to despair of a deliverance. Ever 
 active as they are, they stand against you who 
 are habitually indolent : ever roaming abroad, 
 against you who think it misery to lose sight 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 23 
 
 of your homes. Their view in shifting place is 
 to enlarge their possessions : you imagine, that 
 in foreign attempts you may lose your present 
 domestic enjoyments. They, when once they 
 have gained superiority over enemies, push 
 forward as far as they can go ; and if defeated, 
 are dispirited the least of all men. More than 
 this, they arc as lavish of their lives in the 
 public service, as if those lives were not their 
 own, whilst their resolution is ever in their 
 power, ever ready to be exerted in the cause of 
 Iheir country. Whenever in their schemes 
 they meet with disappointments, they reckon 
 they have lost a share of their property : when 
 those schemes are successful, the acquisition 
 seemeth small in comparison with what they 
 have farther in design : if they are baffled in 
 executing a project, invigorated by reviving 
 hope, they catch at fresh expedients to repair 
 the damage. They are the only people who 
 instantaneously project, and hope, and acquire ; 
 so expeditious are they in executing whatever 
 they determine. Thus, through toils and 
 dangers they labour forwards so long as life 
 continueth, never at leisure to enjoy what they 
 already have, through a constant eagerness to 
 acquire more. They have no other notion of 
 a festival, than of a day whereon some needful 
 point should be accomplished; and inactive 
 rest is more a torment to them than laborious 
 employment. In short, if any one, abridging 
 their characters, should say, they are formed 
 by nature never to be at quiet themselves, nor 
 to suffer others to be so, he describeth them 
 justly. 
 
 " When such a state hath taken the lists of 
 opposition against you, do ye dally, O Lacede- 
 monians'! do you imagine that those people 
 will not continue longest in the enjoyment of 
 peace, who timely prepare to vindicate them- 
 selves, and manifest a settled resolution to do 
 themselves right whenever they are wrongedl 
 You, indeed, are so far observers of equity, as 
 never to molest others, and stand on your 
 guard merely to repel damage from yourselves ; 
 — points you would not without difficulty se- 
 cure, though this neighbouring state were 
 governed by the same principles as you are; 
 but now, as we have already shown you, your 
 customs, compared with them, are quite obso- 
 lete; whereas, those which progressively im- 
 prove, must, like all the works of art, be ever 
 the best. Were, indeed, the continuance of 
 peace ensured, unvarying manners would cer- 
 
 tainly be preferable; but such people as aro 
 liable to frequent vicissitudes of foreign con- 
 test, have need of great address to vary and 
 refine their conduct. For this cause, the man- 
 ners of the Athenians, improved by a long 
 tract of experience, are formed in respect of 
 yours upon a model entirely new. Here, there- 
 fore, be the period fixed to that siow-moving 
 policy you have hitherto observed. Hasten to 
 the relief of others, to that of the Potidaans, 
 as by contract you are bound. Invade Attica 
 without loss of time, that you may not leave 
 your friends and your relations in the mercy of 
 their most inveteiate foes, and constrain us, 
 through your sloth, to seek redress from a new 
 alliance. Such a step, if taken by us, could 
 neither scandalize the gods who take cognizance 
 of solemn oaths, nor men who own their obli- 
 gation ; for treaties are not violated by those 
 who, left destitute by some, have recourse to 
 others, but by such as, being sworn to give it, 
 withhold their assistance in the time of need. 
 Yet, if you are willing and ready to perform 
 your parts, with you we firmly abide. In 
 changing then, we should be guillj of impiety ; 
 and we never shall find others so nicely suited 
 to the disposition of our own hearts. Upon 
 these points form proper resolutitins ; and exert 
 yourselves, that the honour of Peloponnesus be 
 not impaired under your guidance, who have 
 received from your ancestors this great preem- 
 inence." 
 
 To this effect the Corinthians spoke. And it 
 happened, that at this very juncture an Athenian 
 embassy was at Lacedemon, negotiating some 
 other points ; who, so soon as they were ad- 
 vertised of what had been said, judged it 
 proper to demand an audience of the Lacede- 
 monians. It was not their design to make the 
 least reply to the accusations preferred against 
 them by the complainant states, but in general 
 to convince them, that " they ought not to 
 form any sudden resolutions, but to consider 
 matters with sedate deliberation." They were 
 further desirous " to represent before them, 
 the extensive power of their own stan.', to 
 excite in the minds of the elder a recollection 
 of those points they already knew, and to give 
 the younger information in those of which 
 they were ignorant ;" concluding, that " such a 
 representation might turn their attention more 
 to pacific measures than military operations." 
 Addressing themselves, therefore, to the Lace- 
 demonians, they expressed their desire to. speak 
 
24 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 
 
 iti thfe present assembly, if leave could be ob- 
 tained. An order of admittance being imme- 
 diately sent tliem, they approached, and deliv- 
 ered themselves as followcth : 
 
 " It was not the design of this our embassy 
 to enter into disputations with, your confe- 
 derates, but to negotiate the points for which 
 our state hath employed us. Yet, having been 
 advertised of the great outcry raised against us, 
 hither we have repaired : not to throw in our 
 plea against the accusations of the complainant 
 states ; for you are not the judges' before whom 
 either we or they are bound to plead : but, to 
 prevent your forming rash and prejudicial re- 
 solutions, upon concerns of high -importance, 
 through the instigation of these your confede- 
 rates. Our view is, farther, to convince you, 
 notwithstanding the long comprehensive chargd 
 exhibited against us, that we possess with cre- 
 dit what we have hitherto obtained, and that 
 the state of Athens is deserving of honour and 
 regard. 
 
 " And what need is there here to go back 
 to remote antiquity, where hearsay tradition 
 must establish those facts to which the eyes of 
 the audience are utter strangers'! This we 
 shall wave ; and call forth first to your review 
 the Persian iii^asions, and those incideats of 
 which you are conscious, without regarding 
 that chagrin which the remembrance of them 
 will constantly excite in you. Our achieve- 
 ments there were attended with the utmost 
 danger : the consequence was public benefit, of 
 which you ■ received a substantial share: and 
 though the glory of that acquisition may not 
 be all our own, yet of a beneficial share we 
 ought not to be deprived. This shall boldly 
 be averred ; not with a view of soothing you, 
 but doing justice to ourselves, and giving you 
 to know against what a state, if your resolu- 
 tions now arc not discreetly taken, you are 
 going to engage. For we aver, that we alone 
 adventured to engage the barbarian in that most 
 dangerous field of Marathon. And when, upon 
 the second invasion, we were not able to make 
 head by land, we threw ourselves on shipboard 
 with all our people, to fight in conjunction 
 •with you by sea, at Salamis ; which prevented 
 his sailing along the coasts of Peloponnesus, 
 and destroying one by one your cities, unable 
 to succour one another against that formidable 
 fleet. The truth of this, the barbarian himself 
 Lath undeniably proved : for, thus defeated at 
 va. and unable to gather together again so 
 
 large a force, he hastily retired with the greatest 
 part of his army. In this so wonderful an 
 event, where beyond dispute the preservation 
 of Greece was achieved at sea, the three most 
 advantageous instruments were contributed by 
 us — the largest number of shipping — a person 
 of the greatest abilities to command — and the 
 most intrepid courage. For the number of 
 ships, amounting in all to four hundred, very 
 nearly two-thirds were our own. Themistocles 
 was the commander, to whom principally it 
 was owing that the battle was foiight in the 
 straits, which was undeniably the means of 
 that great deliverance : and you yourselves paid 
 him extraordinary honour on that very account,' 
 more than ever to any stranger who hath ap- 
 peared amongst you. We ourselves showed 
 further, on this occasion, the most daring 
 courage; since, though none before marched 
 up to our succour, and every state already en- 
 slaved had opened the road, against us, wo 
 bravely determined to abandon even Athens, 
 to destroy our own effects, nor, like the gene- 
 rality of those who were yet undemolishcd, to 
 desert the common cause, or dispersing our- 
 selves to become useless to our allies, but — to 
 embark at once, to face the urgent danger, 
 without the least resentment against you for 
 
 ■ Herodotus relates, that after the great victory at 
 ■Salaniis, "the Grecians sailed to the Isthmus, to iiestow 
 the prize upon him who had deserved best of Greece, 
 hy his behaviour in the war. But upon their arrival, 
 when the commanders gave in their billets on tlic altar 
 of Neptune, in which they had wrote the name of him 
 who had behaved best, and of him wlio was second, 
 each of them had given the preference to his own self, 
 hut most of them agreed in awarding the second place 
 to Themistocles. Thus, while each competitor was 
 only honoured with his own single voice for tlie first 
 place, Themistocles was clearly adjudged to deserve 
 the second. Envy prevented the Grecians from procee- 
 ding to a just declaration, and they broice up and de- 
 parted, leaving the point undecided. Themistocles, 
 however, was celebrated and honoured as the man 
 who in prudence far surpassed all the Grecians tllen 
 alive. Thus denied tlio iionour due to him, for having 
 undoubtedly excelled them all in llie affair of Salauiis, 
 he immediately repaired to Lacedemon, desirous to have 
 justice done him there. The Lacedemonians received 
 liim nobly, and honoured iiimalmndantly. They gave, 
 indeed, to Euribiadcs the crown of olive.as first in valour; 
 but for wisdom and dexterity they bestowed a second 
 crown of olive on Themistocles. They presented him 
 further with the first chariot in Sparta. And after so 
 much applause, he was conducted, in his return, 10 the 
 frontier of Tcgea, by three hundred picked Spartans, 
 who composed the royal guard. He was the only per- 
 son ever known tb have received such a compliment 
 from the Spartans." Herodotus in Urania. 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 25 
 
 your preceding backwardness of aid. So tliat 
 we aver the service we then did you, to be no 
 less than what we afterwards received. For 
 to our aid, indeed, at last you came, from 
 cities yet inhabited, from cities you ever de- 
 signed should still be inhabited, when once 
 you were alarmed for your own safety much 
 more than for ours. So long as we were 
 safe, your presence was in vain expected : but 
 we, launching forth from a city no longer our 
 own, and hazarding our all for a place we al- 
 most despaired of recovering, effected our own 
 preservation, and with it in a great measure 
 yours. Had we, overcome with fear, gone 
 over early to the Mede, as others did, to save 
 our lands ; had we afterwards not dared, as 
 men undone beyond recovery, to throw our- 
 selves on board; you had never been obliged 
 to fight at sea, as not having suiEcient strength 
 to do it ; but the invader without a struggle 
 would have leisurely determined the fate of 
 Greece. 
 
 " Do we then deserve, Lacedemonians, that 
 violence of envy with which the Grecians be- 
 hold us, for the courage we manifested then, 
 for our judicious resolution, and the superior 
 power we now enjoy 1 That power, superior 
 as it is, was by no means the eifect of violent 
 encroachments. You would not abide with 
 us to glean away the relics of the Barbarian 
 war. To us the associated states were obliged 
 to have recourse, and entreat us to lead them 
 to its completion. Thus, by the necessary 
 exigence of affairs, obliged to be in action, we 
 have advanced our power to what it now is : 
 at first, from a principle of fear ; then from 
 the principle of honour ; and at length, from 
 that of interest. When envied by many, when 
 obliged to reduce to their obedience some who 
 bad revolted, when you, no longer well dis- 
 posed towards us, were actuated by jealousy 
 and malice ; we thought it not consistent with 
 our security to endanger our welfare by giving 
 up our power, since every revolt from us was 
 nn accession of strength to you. No part of 
 mankind will fix any reproach on men who try 
 every expedient to ward off extremities of dan- 
 ger. Nay, it is your own method also, Lace- 
 demonians, to manage the states of Pelopon- 
 nesus as suits your own interest best, and to 
 prescribe them law. And, had you abided 
 with us, and persevered in that invidious su- 
 periority as we have done, we are well con- 
 vinced that you would soon have grown no less 
 11 
 
 odious to your allies ; and eo obliged either to 
 have ruled with rigour, or to have risked the 
 loss of your all. It followeth, therefore, that we 
 have done nothing to raise surprise, nothing 
 to disappoint the human expectation, in ac- 
 cepting a superiority voluntarily assured, in 
 firmly maintaining it thus accepted, upon those 
 most prevailing principles of honour, and fear, 
 and interest. 
 
 " The maxim by which we have acted was 
 not first broached by us, since it hath been ever 
 allowed, that inferiors should be controlled by 
 their superiors. To be the latter we thought 
 ourselves deserving : you thought so till now, 
 when private interests engaging your attention, 
 you begin to cry out for justice, which no people 
 ever yet so studiously practised, as, when able 
 to carry a point by strength, to check their in- 
 clination and let it drop. And worthy, farther, 
 are they of applause, who pursuing the dictates 
 of human nature, in gaining rule over others, 
 observe justice more steadily than their scops 
 of power requireth from them. And so far 
 we have reason to conclude, thit were our 
 power lodged in other hands, plain evidence 
 would soon decide with what peculiar modera- 
 tion we use it : though, so hard indeed yis our 
 lot, that calumny and not appluise hath been 
 the consequence of such our lenity. In suits 
 of contract against our dependents we are often 
 worsted ; and though ever submitting to fair . 
 and impartial trials in our own courts,, we are 
 charged with litigiousness. Not one of them 
 reflecteth, that those who are absolute in other 
 places, and treat not their dependents with that 
 moderation which we observe, are for that very 
 reason exempted from reproach : for, where 
 lawless violence is practised there can be no 
 room for appeals to justice. But our depen- 
 dents, accustomed to contest with us upon 
 equal footing, if they suffer never so little 
 damage where they fancy equity to be along 
 with them, either by a judicial sentence or 
 the decision of reigning power, express no 
 gratitude for the greater share of poverty 
 they yet enjoy, but resent with higher cha- 
 grin the loss of such a pittance, than if at 
 first we had set law aside, and seized their all 
 with open violence ; even in this case, they 
 could not presume to deny, that inferiors ought 
 to submit to their superiors. But mankind, 
 it seemeth, resent the acts of injustice mora 
 deeply than the acts of violence : those, coming 
 from an equal, are looked upon as rapines 
 
23 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 1. 
 
 these, coming from a superior, sae complied with 
 as necessities. The far more grievous oppres- 
 sion of the Mode they bore with patience, but 
 our government they look upon as severe ; it 
 may be so ; for to subjects the present is always 
 grievous. If you therefore by our overthrow 
 should gain the ascendant over them, you 
 would soon perceive that good disposition 
 towards you, which a dread of us hath occasion- 
 ed, to be vanishing away ; especially should 
 you exert your superiority according to the 
 specimens you gave during your short com- 
 mand against the Mede. For the institutions 
 established here amongst yourselves have (no 
 affinity with those of other places : and more 
 than this, not one Spartan amongst you, when 
 delegated to a foreign charge, either knoweth 
 how to apply his own, or make use of those of 
 the rest of Greece. 
 
 " Form your resolutions therefore with great 
 deliberation, as on points of no small import- 
 ance. Hearken not so far to the opinions and 
 calumnies of foreign states as to embroil your 
 own domestic tranquility. Reflect in time on 
 the great uncertainty of war, before you engage 
 in it. Protracted into long continuance, it is 
 generally used to end in calamities, from which 
 we are now at^an equal distance ; and to the 
 lot of which of us they will fall, lieth yet to be 
 determined by the hazardous event. Men 
 who run eagerly to arms are first of all intent 
 on doing some exploits, which ought in point 
 of time to be second to something more impor- 
 tant ; and when smarting with distress, they 
 have recourse to reason. But since we are by 
 no means guilty of such rashness ourselves, nor 
 as yet perceive it in you, we exhort you, 
 whilst healing measures arc in the election of 
 us both, not to break the treaty, not to violate 
 your oaths, but to submit the points in contest 
 to fair arbitration, according to the articles sub- 
 sisting between us. If not, we here invoke 
 the gods, who take cognizance of oaths, to 
 bear us witness, that we shall endeavour to 
 revenge ourselves upon the authors of a war, 
 by whatever methods yourselves shall set us an 
 example." 
 
 These things were said by the Athenian 
 embassy. And when the Lacedemonians had 
 thus heard the accusations of their allies against 
 the Athenians, and what the Athenians had 
 urged in their turn, ordering all parties to with- 
 draw, they proceeded to serious consultation 
 amongst themselves. The majority agreed in 
 
 the opinion, that " the Athenians were already 
 guilty of injustice, and that a war ought to be 
 immediately declared." But Archidamus their 
 king, esteemed a man of good understanding 
 and temper, standing forth, expressed his own 
 sentiments thus : 
 
 " I have learned myself by the experience of 
 many wars, and I see many of you, ye Lace- 
 demonians, as great proficients in years as I 
 am, that no one should be fond of an enterprise 
 because it is new, which is a vulgar weakness, 
 judging it thence both advisable and safe. 
 The war, which is at present the subject of 
 your consultation, you will find, if examined 
 discreetly, to bode a very long continuance. 
 Against Peloponnesians, it is true, and borderers 
 upon ourselves, we have ever a competent force 
 in readiness, and by expeditious steps can ad- 
 vance against any of them. But against a 
 people whose territories are far remote, who 
 are further most expert in naval skill, who with 
 all the expedients of war are most excellently 
 provided, with wealth both private and public, 
 with shipping, with horses, with arms, and 
 with men, far beyond what any other state 
 in Greece can singly pretend to ; who, more 
 than this, have numerous dependent states 
 upon whom they levy tribute — where is the 
 necessity sanguinely to wish for war against 
 such a people ] and wherein is our dependence, 
 if thus unprepared we should declare it against 
 them 1 Is it on our naval force 1 But in that 
 we are inferior : and if to this we shall apply 
 our care, and advance ourselves to an equality 
 with them, why this will be a work of time. 
 Or, is it on our wealth 1 In this we are yet- 
 much more deficient ; and neither have it in any 
 public fund, nor can readily raise it from pri- 
 vate purses. But the confidence of some may 
 perhaps be buoyed up with our superiority in 
 arms and numbers, so that we may easily march 
 into their territory and lay it waste : yet other 
 territories, and of large extent, are subject to 
 their power, and by sea they will import all 
 necessary supplies. If, further, we tempt their 
 dependents to a revolt, we shall want a naval 
 strength to support them in it, as the majority 
 of them are seated upon islands. What there- 
 fore will be the event of this oui war 1 For 
 if we are unable either to overpower them at 
 sea, or divert those revenues by which their 
 navy is supported, we shall only by acting pre- 
 judice ourselves. And in such a situation 
 to be foreed to give it up will be a blemish 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 27 
 
 on our honour ; especially if we shall be thought 
 to have been the authors of the breach. 
 For let us. not be puffed up with idle hope 
 that this war must soon be over, if we can lay 
 their territory waste ; I have reason on better 
 grounds to apprehend, that we shall leave it 
 behind as a legacy to our children. It is by no 
 means consistent with the spirit of Athenians 
 cither to be slaves to their soil, or, like unprac- 
 tised so diers, to shudder at a war. Nor again, 
 on the other hand, am I so void of sensibility 
 as to advise you to give up your confederates 
 to their' outrage, or wilfully to connive at their 
 encroachments ; but only not yet to have re- 
 course to arms, to send ambassadors to prefer 
 our complaints, without betraying too great an 
 eagerness for war, or any tokens of pusilla- 
 nimifj'. By pausing thus, we may get our own 
 affairs in readiness, by augmenting our strength 
 through an accession of allies, either Grecian 
 or Barbarian, wheresoever we ean procure sup- 
 plies of ships or money. And the least room 
 there cannot be for censure, when a people in 
 the state we are in at present, exposed to all 
 the guiles of the Athenians, endeavour to ,savc 
 themselves not merely by Grecian but even by 
 Barbarian aid. And at the same time let us 
 omit no resource within the reach of our own 
 ability. 
 
 " If, indeed, upon our sending an embassy, 
 they will hearken to reason, that will be the 
 happiest for us all. If not ; after two or three 
 years' delay, then better provided, we may, if 
 it be thought expedient, take the field against 
 them. But in good time, perhaps, when they 
 see our preparations and the intent of them 
 clearly explained by our own declarations, they 
 may make each requisite concession, before 
 their territory is destroyed by ravage, and whilst 
 yet they may save their property from utter 
 devastation. Regard their territory, I beseech 
 you, in no other light than as a hostage for 
 their good behaviour; and the more fitaly such 
 the better may be its culture. Of this we 
 ought to be sparing as long as possible, that 
 we drive them not into desperate fury, and 
 render more unpracticable their defeat. For 
 if, thus unprovided as we are, arid worked up 
 to anger by the instigations of our confeder- 
 ates, we at once begin this ravage, reflect 
 whether we shall not taint its reputation, and 
 the more embroil Peloponnesus; since accu- 
 sations as well of states as private persons it is 
 possible to clear away ; but in a war, begun by 
 
 general concurrence for the sake of a single 
 party, which it is impossible to see how far it 
 will extend, we cannot at pleasure desist, and 
 preserve our honour. 
 
 " Let no one think it a mark of pusillani- 
 mity, that many as we are we do not rush imme- 
 diately upon one single -state. That state has 
 as large a number of dependants who contri- 
 bute to its support ; and a war is not so much 
 of arms as of money, by which arms are ren- 
 dered of service; and the more so, when a 
 landed power is contending against a naval. 
 Be it therefore our earliest endeavour to pro- 
 vide amply for this, nor let us prematurely be 
 too much fermented by the harangues of our 
 allies. Let us, to whose account the event, 
 whatever it be, Vvill be principally charged — 
 let us, with sedate deliberation, endeavour in 
 some degree to foresee it ; and be not in the 
 least ashamed of that slow and dilatory temper 
 for -which the Corinthians so highly reproach 
 you. For through too great precipitaiicy you 
 will come more slowly to an end, because? you 
 set out without proper preparations. The 
 state of which we are the constituents, hath 
 ever been free and most celebrated by fame : 
 and that reproach can at most be nothing but 
 the inborn sedateness of our minds. By this 
 we are distinguished, as the only people who 
 never grow insolent with success, and who 
 never are abject in adversity. And when again 
 they invite us to hazardous attempts by utter- 
 ing our praise, the delight of hearing must not 
 raise our spirits above our judgment. If any, 
 farther, endeavour to exasperate us by a flow 
 of invective, we are not by that to be provoked 
 the sooner to compliance. From tempers 
 evenly balanced it is, that we' are warm in the 
 field of battle, and cool in the hours of debate : 
 the former, because a sense of duty hatl^ the 
 greatest influence over a sedate disposition, 
 and magnanimity the keenest sense 'of shame: 
 and good we are at debate, as our education 
 is not polite enough to teach -us a contempt 
 of laws, and by its severity giveth us so much 
 good sense as never to disregard them. We 
 are not a people so impertinently wise, as to 
 invalidate the preparations of our enemies by a 
 plausible harangue, and then absurdly proceed 
 to a contest ; but we reckon the thoughts of 
 our neighbours to be of a similar cast with 
 our ovm, and that hazardous contingencies 
 are not to be determined by a 'speechi We 
 always presume that the projects of our ^ne- 
 
28 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 
 
 miea are judiciously planned, and then seri- 
 cfusly prepare to defeat ihem. For we ought 
 not to found our success upon the hope that 
 they will certainly blunder in their conduct, but 
 fliat we have omitted no proper step for our own 
 security. We ought not to imagine, there is so 
 mighty difference between man and man ; but 
 that he is the most accomplished who hath been 
 regularly trained through a course of needful 
 industry and toil. 
 
 " Such is the discipline which our fathers 
 have handed down to us ; and by adl^ering to 
 it, we have reaped considerable advantages. 
 I/et us not forego it now, nor in a small por- 
 tion of only one day precipitately determine a 
 point wherein so many lives, so vast an expense, 
 so many states, and so much honour, are at 
 stake. But let us more leisurely proceed, which 
 our power will warrant us in doing more easily 
 than others. Despatch ambassadors to the 
 Athenians concerning Potidtea ; despatch them 
 concerning the complaints our allies exhibit 
 against them ; and the sooner, as they have 
 declared a readiness to submit to fair decisions. 
 Against men who offer this we ought not to 
 march before they are convicted of injustice. 
 But, during this interval, get every thing in 
 readiness for war. Your resolutions thus will 
 be most wisely formed, and strike into your en- 
 emies the greatest dread," 
 
 Archidamus spoke thus. But Sthenelaidas, 
 at that time one of the ephori, standing forth 
 the last on this occasion, gave his opinion as 
 foUoweth : 
 
 " The many words of the Athenians, for my 
 part, I do not understand. They have been ex- 
 ceeding large in the praise of themselves ; but 
 as to the charge against them, that they injure 
 our allies and Peloponnesus, they have made no 
 reply. If, in truth, they were formerly good 
 against the Modes, but are now bad towards 
 us, they deserve to be doubly punished; be- 
 cause, ceasing to be good, they are grown very 
 bad. We continue the same persons both then 
 (uid now ; and shall not, if we are wise, pass 
 over the injuries done to our allies, nor wait 
 any longer to revenge them, since they are past 
 waiting for their sufferings. But — other peo- 
 ple, forsooth, have a great deal of wealth, and 
 Slips, and horses — we too have gallant allies, 
 whom we ought not to betray to the Athenians, 
 par refer them to law and pleadings, since it 
 was not by pleadings they were injured : but 
 WB ought, with all expedition and with all our 
 
 strength, to seek revenge. How we ought to 
 deliberate when we have been wronged, let no 
 man pretend to inform me : it would have bet- 
 ter become tho.se who designed to commit such 
 wrongs, to have deliberated a long time ago. 
 Vote then the war, Lacedsemonians, with a 
 spirit becoming Sparta. And neither suffer the 
 Athenians to grow still greater, nor let us be- 
 tray our own confederates ; but, with the gods 
 on our side, march out against these authors of 
 injustice." 
 
 Having spoke thus, by virtue of his office as 
 presiding in the college of ephori,' he put the 
 question in the Lacedtemonian council. But, 
 as they vote by voice and not by ballot, he said, 
 " he could not amidst the shout distinguish the 
 majority ;" and, being desirous that each of 
 them, by plainly declaring his opinion, might 
 show they were more inclined to war, he pro- 
 ceeded thus — " To whomsoever of you, Lace- 
 demonians, the treaty appeareth broke, and the 
 Athenians to be in the wrong, let him rise up 
 and go thither," pointing out to them a certain 
 place : " but whoever is of a contrary opinion, 
 let him go yonder." They rose up and were 
 divided ; but a great majority was on that side 
 which voted the treaty broke. 
 
 Upon this, calling in their confederates, they 
 told them, " They had come to a resolution that 
 the Athenians were guilty of injustice ; but 
 they were desirous to put it again to the vote in 
 a general assembly of all their confederates, 
 that by taking their measures in concert, they 
 might briskly ply the war, if determined by com- 
 mon consent." 
 
 Matters being brought to this point, they 
 departed to their respective homes, and the 
 Athenian ambassadors, having ended their ne- 
 gotiations, staid not long behind. This decree of 
 the Lacedsemonian council that " the treaty was 
 broke," was passed in the fourteenth year of 
 the treaty concluded for thirty years after the 
 conquest of EubiEa. But the Lacedcemonians 
 voted this treaty broke and a war necessary 
 not so much out of regard to the arguments 
 
 I The college of Ephori (or inspectors) at Sparta con- 
 sisted of five. They were annually elected hy thepfeo- 
 ple from their own body, and were designed tobechecka 
 upon the regal power. They never forgot the end of 
 their institution, and in fact quite lorded it over the 
 kings. In a word, the whole administration was lodg- 
 ed in their hands, and the kings were never sovereigns 
 but in the field at the head of their troops. One of the 
 Ephori had the honour to give its style to the year, in 
 the same manner as the 5rst arcbon did at Athens, 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 29 
 
 arged by their allies, as from their own jea- 
 lousy of the growing power of the Athenians. 
 Tliey dreaded the advancement of that power, 
 as they saw the greatest part of Greece was al- 
 ready in subjection to them. 
 
 Now the method by which the Athenians 
 had advanced their power to this invidious 
 height was this.' 
 
 After that the Medes, defeated by the Gre- 
 cians both at land and sea, had evacuated Eu- 
 rope, and such of them, as escaped by sea, were 
 utterly mined at Mycale, Leotychides king of 
 the Lacedemonians, who commanded the Gre- 
 cians at Mycale, returned home, drawing away 
 with him all the confederates of Peloponnesus. 
 But the Athenians, with the confederates of 
 Ionia, and the Hellespont, who are now revolt- 
 ed from the King, continuing in those parts, 
 laid siege to Scstus then held by the Medes ; 
 and pressing it during the winter season, the 
 Barbarians at length abandoned the place. Af- 
 ter this they separated, sailing away from the 
 Hellespont, every people to their own respec- 
 tive countries. 
 
 But the Athenian community, when the 
 Barbarians had evacuated their territory, im- 
 mediately brought back again from their places 
 of refuge their wives and children and all their 
 remaining effects, and vigorously applied them- 
 selves to rebuild the city of Athens and the 
 walls : for but a small part of these had been 
 left standing ; and their houses, most of them, 
 had been demolished, and but a few preserved 
 by way of lodgings for the Persian nobles. The 
 Lacedaemonians, informed of their design, came 
 in embassy to prevent it; partly, to gratify 
 themselves, as they would behold with pleasure 
 every city in Greece unwalled like Sparta; 
 but more to gratify their confederates, inviting 
 them to such a step from the jealousy of the 
 naval power of the Athenians, now greater 
 than at any time before, and of the courage 
 they had so bravely exerted in the war against 
 the Medes. They required them to desist 
 
 The series of history on which Thucydides now 
 enters, though not strictly within the compass of his 
 su'iject, yet most needful to give it light, and to show 
 how present events are connected with, and how far 
 they resulted from, preceding, is excellent in its kind. 
 He states important facts in the clearest and and most 
 orderly manner; he opens before us the source of the j 
 Athe'iian power; and hy a neat and concise enumer- 
 ation of notable events, conducts it to that height, which j 
 evcited the jealousy of other states, and was the true 1 
 political cause of the succeeding war, I 
 
 from building their walls, and rather to join 
 with them in levelling every fortification what- 
 ever without Peloponnesus. Their true mean- 
 ing and their inward jealousy they endeavoured 
 to conceal from the Athenians by the pretence 
 that " then the Barbarian, should ho again in- 
 vade them, would find no stronghold from 
 whence to assault them, as in the last instance 
 he had done from Thebes;" alleging farther, 
 that " Peloponnesus was a place of secure re- 
 treat and certain resource for all." To these 
 representations of the Lacedaemonians, the 
 Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, 
 made this reply, that " they would send 
 ambassadors to them to debate this affair ;" 
 and so without further explanation dismissed 
 them. Themistocles next advised, that "he 
 himself might be despatched forthwith to 
 Lacedjemon, and by no means hastily to send 
 away the others who were to be joined in the 
 commission with him, but to detain them till 
 the walls were carried up to a height necessary 
 at least for a defence ; that the work should 
 be expedited by the joint labour of all the in- 
 habitants without exception of themselves, 
 their wives, and their children, sparing neither 
 public nor private edifice from whence any'pro- 
 per materials could be had, but demolishing 
 all." Having thus advised them, and suggested 
 farther what conduct he designed to observe, 
 he sets out for Lacedsemon. Upon his arrival 
 there, he demanded no public audience, he pro- 
 tracted matters and studied evasions. When- 
 ever any person in the public administration 
 demanded the reason why he asked not an aud.- 
 ence, his answer was, that "he waited for 
 the arrival of his colleagues, who were detained 
 by urgent business : he expected that they 
 would speedily be with him, and was siu^rised 
 they are not yet come." As they had a good 
 opinion of Themistocles, they easily acquiesced 
 in such an answer. But other persons after- 
 wards arriving and making clear affirmation that 
 " the wall is carrying on, and already built up Ic 
 a considerable height," they had it no longer in 
 their power to be incredulous. Themistocles 
 knowing this, exhorts them, " not rashly to be 
 biased by rumours, but rather to send awaj 
 some trusty persons of their own body, who 
 from a view might report the truth." With 
 this proposal they comply ; and Themistocles 
 sendeth secret instructions to the Athenians 
 how to behave to these delegates : — " to de- 
 tain them, though with as little appearance 
 H 
 
30 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book I. 
 
 of design as possible, and by no means to 
 dismiss them before they received again their 
 o^n ambassadors : for his colleagues were by 
 this arrived, Abronychus the son of Ljsicles, 
 and Aristides the son of Lysimachus, who 
 brought him an assurance that the wall was 
 sufficiently completed. His fear was, that the 
 Lacedasmonians, when they had discovered the 
 truth, would put them under arrest. The 
 Athenians therefore detained the delegates ac- 
 cording to instruction. And Themistocles, 
 going to an audience of the Laceda;monians, 
 there openly declared, " that Athens was now 
 60 far walled, as to be strong enough for the 
 defence of its inhabitants : for the future, when 
 the Lacedaemonians or confederates sent am- 
 bassadors thither, they must address themselves 
 to them as to a people who perfectly knew 
 their own interest and the interest of Greece ; 
 since, when they judged it most advisable to 
 abandon their city and go on ship-board, they 
 asserted their native courage without Lacedce- 
 monian support ; and, in all subsequent mea- 
 sures taken in conjunction, had shown them- 
 selves pot at all inferior in the cabinet or the 
 field : at present therefore they judge it most 
 expedient to have Athens defended by a wall, 
 and thus to render it a place of greater security 
 for their own members and for all their allies : 
 it would not be possible, with strength inferior 
 to that of a rival power, equally to preserve and 
 evenly to balance the public welfare of Greece." 
 ■^From hence he inferred, that " either all 
 cities of the states which formed the Laceda;- 
 monian league should be dismantled, or it be 
 allowed that the things now done at Athens 
 were just and proper." The L&cediemonians, 
 upon hearing this, curbed indeed all appearance 
 of resentment against the Athenians: — they 
 had not sent their embassy directly to prohibit, 
 but to advise them to desist upon motives of 
 general good : at that time also, they had a 
 great regard for the Athenians, because of the 
 public spirit they had shown against the Mede : 
 — but however, thus baffled as they were in 
 their political views, they were inwardly pro- 
 voked ; and the ambassadors on each side re- 
 turned home without farther embroilments. 
 
 By this conduct the Athenians in a small 
 space of time walled their city around : and 
 the very face of the structure showeth plainly 
 to this day that it was built in haste. The 
 foundations are laid with stones of every kind, 
 in some places not hewn so as properly to fit. 
 
 but piled on at random. Many pillars also 
 ftom sepulchral monuments and cawed stones 
 were blended promiscuously in the work. For 
 the circuit of it was every where enlarged be- 
 yond the compass of the city, and for this reason 
 collecting the materials from every place with- 
 out distinction, they lost no time. 
 
 Themistocles also persuaded them to f nish 
 the PirsEus ; for it was begun before this, dur- 
 ing that year in which he himself was chief 
 magistrate at Athens.' He judged the place 
 to be very commodious, as formed by nature 
 into three harbours ; and that the Athenians, 
 grown more than ever intent on their marine, 
 might render it highly conducive to an en- 
 largement of their power. For he was the 
 first person who durst tell them, that they 
 ought to grasp at the sovereignty of the sea, 
 and immediately began to put the plan into 
 execution. And by his direction it was, that 
 they built the wall round the Pirseus of that 
 thickness which is visible to this' day. For 
 two carts carrying the stone passed along it by 
 one another: within was neither mortar nor 
 mud ; but the entire structure was one pile of 
 large stones, hewn square to close their angles 
 exactly, and grappled firmly together on the 
 outside with iron an4 lead : though in height it 
 was not carried up above half so. far as he intend- 
 ed. He contrived it to bo, both in , height and 
 breadth, an impregnable rampart against hostile 
 assaults ; and he designed, that a few, and those 
 the least able of the people, might be sufficient 
 to man it, whilst the rest should be employed 
 on board the fleet. His intention was chiefly 
 confined to a navy ; plainly discerning, in my 
 opinion, that tlie forces of the king had a much 
 easier way to annoy them by sea than by land. 
 He thence judged the Pirseus to be a place of 
 much greater importance than the upper city. 
 And this piece of advice he frequently gave 
 the Athenians, that " if ever they were pressed 
 hard by land, they should retire down thither, 
 and with their naval force make head against 
 all opponents." In this manner the Athe- 
 
 » The number of the Archons or Rulers was nine. 
 They were annually elected by lot, and were required to 
 be of noble birth, of a pure Attic descent, irreproach- 
 able both in moral and political character, dutiful 10 
 their parents, and perfectly sound in body. The first 
 of the nine gave its style to the year, and was there- 
 fore called Eponymus or the Namer: the second was 
 styled King; the third Po^crnarch; the other six in com- 
 mon ThosmothetiE. All the civil and religious affairs 
 of the stale belonged to their apartment. 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 31 
 
 nians, without losing time, after the retreat 
 of the Medes, fortified their city, and pre- 
 pared all the necessary means for their own se- 
 curity. 
 
 Pausanias the son of Chemhrotus was sent 
 out from Lacedaemon, as commander-in-chief 
 of the Grecians, with twenty sail of ships from 
 Peloponnesus, joined by thirty Athenian and 
 a number of other allies. They bent their 
 course against Cyprus, and reduced most of 
 the towns there. From thence they proceeded 
 to Byzantium, garrisoned by the Medes, and 
 blockaded and carried the place under his di- 
 rections. 
 
 But, having now grown quite turbulent in 
 command, the other Grecians, especially the 
 lonians and all who had lately recovered their 
 liberty from the royal yoke, weire highly cha- 
 grined. They addressed themselves to the 
 Athenians, requesting them " from the tie of 
 consanguinity to undertake their protection, 
 and not to leave them thus largely exposed to 
 the violence of Pausanias." This request 
 was favourably heard by the Athenians, who 
 expressed their willingness to put a stop to their 
 grievances, and to re-settle the general order, 
 to the best of their power. — But during this, 
 the LacedEemonians recalled Pausanias, that 
 he might answer what was laid to his charge. 
 Many of the Grecians had carried to them ac- 
 cusations against him for an unjust abuse of 
 his power, since in his behaviour he resembled 
 more a tyrant than a general. And it so fell 
 out, that he was recalled just at the time when 
 the confederates, out of hatred to him, had 
 ranged themselves under the Athenian orders, 
 excepting those troops which were of Pelopon- 
 nesus. Upon his return to Lacedjemon, he 
 was convicted upon trial of misdemeanours to- 
 wards particulars, but of the heaviest part of 
 the charge he is acquitted ; for the principal 
 accusation against him was an attachment to 
 the Medish interest ; and it might be judged 
 too clear to stand in need of proof. Him 
 therefore they no longer intrust with the public 
 command, but appoint in his stead Dorcis with 
 some colleagues to command what little force 
 of their own remained. To these the confede- 
 rates would no longer yield the supreme com- 
 mand ; which so soon as they perceived, they 
 returned home. And here the Lacediemonians 
 desisted from commissioning any others to 
 take upon them that post ; fearing, lest those 
 wh" snould be sent might by their behaviour 
 
 still more prejudice the Lacedaemonian iiiterrst, 
 a case they had reason to dread from the be- 
 haviour of Pausanias. They were now grown 
 desirous to rid themselves of the Medish 
 war : they acknowledged the Athenians had 
 good pretensions to enjoy the command, and 
 at that time were well affected towards them. 
 
 The Athenians having.in this manner ob- 
 tained the supreme command, by the voluntary 
 tender of the whole confederacy in consequence 
 of their aversion to Pausanias : they fixed by 
 their own authority the quotas whether of ships 
 or money which each state was to furnish 
 against the Barbarian. The colour pretended 
 was " to revenge the calamities they had 
 hitherto suffered, by carrying hostilities into the 
 dominions of the king." This gave its first 
 rise to the Athenian office of General Keceiv- 
 ers of Greece,' whose business it was to col- 
 lect this tribute : for the contribution of this 
 money was called by that title. The first tri- 
 bute levied in consequence of this amounted 
 to four hundred and sixty talents. Delos was 
 appointed to be their treasury ; and the sittings 
 were held in the temple there. 
 
 Their command was thus at first over free 
 and independent confederates, who sat with 
 them at council, and had a vote in public revo- 
 lutions. The enlargement of their author- 
 ity was the result of wars, and their own 
 political management during the interval be- 
 tween the invasion of the Medes and the 
 present war, when the contests were against 
 the Barbarian, or their own allies endeavour- 
 ing at a change, or those of the Peloponne- 
 sians who interfered on every occasion on pur- 
 pose to molest them. Of these I have sub- 
 joined a particular detail, and have ventured a 
 digression from my subject, because ' this piece 
 of history hath been omitted by all preceding 
 writers. They have either confined their ac- 
 counts to the affairs of Greece prior in time. 
 
 » This nice and difficult point was adjusted by Aria- 
 tides, to tlie general satisfaction of all parties concern- 
 ed. Greece conferred upon liim this most important 
 trust, lie was called to this delicate commission Vy the 
 united voice of his country; " Poor (says Plutarcli) when 
 he set about it, but poorer when he had finished it " 
 The Athenian state was now furnished with a large 
 annual fund, by which it was enabled not only to annoy 
 the foreign enem'es of Greece, but even tl ose Greeks 
 who should at any time presume to oppose the mea- 
 sures of Athens. They soon found out that their own 
 city was a more convenient place for keeping tliia 
 treasure than the isle of Delos, and accordingly took 
 care to remove it thither. 
 
32 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 
 
 or to the invasions of the Medes. Hellanicus 
 is the only one of them, who hath touched it 
 in his Attic history ; though his memorials are 
 short, and not accurately distinguished by pro- 
 per dates. But this, at the same time, will 
 most clearly show the method in which tlie 
 Athenian empire was erected. 
 
 In the first place, under the command of 
 Cimon son of Miltiades,' they laid siege to 
 Eion a town upon the Strymon possessed by 
 the Medes, which they carried, and sold all 
 found within it for slaves. — They afterwards 
 did the same by Scyros an island in the Egean 
 Sea, inhabited by the Dolopes, and placed in 
 it a colony of their own people. — They had, 
 farther, a war with the Carysthians singly, in 
 which the rest of the Eubosans were uncon- 
 cerned, who at length submitted to them upon 
 terms. — After this they made war upon the 
 Naxians who had revolted, and reduced them 
 by a siege. This was the first confederate 
 state, which was enslaved to gratify their as- 
 piring ambition ; though afterwards all the rest, 
 as opportunity occurred, had the same fate. 
 
 The occasions of such revolts were various ; 
 though the principal were deficiencies in their 
 quotas of tribute and shipping, and refusal 
 of common service. For the Athenians ex- 
 erted their authority with exactness and rigour, 
 and laid heavy loads upon men, who had 
 neither been accustomed nor were willing to 
 bear oppression. Their method of command 
 was soon perverted; they no longer cared to 
 make it agreeable, and in general service dis- 
 allowed an equality, as it was now more than 
 ever in their power to force revolters to sub- 
 mission. But these points the confederates had 
 highly faciUtated by their own proceedings. For, 
 through a reluctancy of mingling in frequent ex- 
 peditions, a majority of them, to redeem their 
 personal attendance, were rated at certain sums 
 of money, equivalent to the expense of the ships 
 they ought to have furnished. The sums paid 
 
 ' Cimon was a great general, a worthy patriot, brave, 
 open, and ingeniotis, upriglit in hia political conduct 
 like Aristides, and though an able politician, yetnotso 
 miscliievously refined as to discard honesty and sincer- 
 ity from puhljc measures. His father Miltiades, after 
 performing most signal services to his country, was 
 henvily fined, thrown into prison, because unable to 
 pay, and there ended his days. Cimon afterwards 
 paid the fine, is now going also to perform great servi- 
 ces lo the state, is afterwards banished, but recalled, 
 and again employed in foreign commands, dying at last 
 in the service of his country, highly regretted not on- 
 ly at Athens, but throughout Greece. 
 
 on these occasions to the Athenians, were em- 
 ployed by them to increase their own naval 
 force ; and the tributaries tlius drained, when- 
 ever they presumed to revolt, had parted with 
 the needful expedients of war, and were with- 
 out resource. 
 
 After these things it happened, that the 
 Athenians and their confederates fought against 
 the Medes, both by land and sea, at the river 
 Eurymedon in Pamphylia. Cimon, the son 
 of Miltiades commanded ; and the Athenians 
 were victorious the very same _day in both 
 elements. They took and destroyed the ships 
 of the Phoenicians, in the whole about two 
 hundred. 
 
 Later in time than this, happened a revolt 
 of the Thasians, arising from disputes about 
 places of trade on the opposite coasts of Thrace, 
 and the mines which they possessed there. 
 The Athenians with a sufficient force sailed 
 against Thasus; and, after gaining a victory 
 by sea, landed upon the island. — About the 
 same time, they had sent a colony, consisting 
 of about ten thousand of their own and con- 
 federate people, towards the Strymon, who 
 were to settle in a place called the Nine-ways, 
 but now Amphipolis. They became masters 
 of the Nine-ways, by dispossessing the Edo- 
 nians. But advancing farther into the mid- 
 land parts of Thrace, they were all cut off at 
 Drabescus of Edonia, by the united force of 
 the Thracians, who were all enemies to this 
 new settlement now forming at the Nine-ways. 
 — But the Thasians, defeated in a battle and 
 besieged, implored the succour of the Lacedffi- 
 monians, and exhorted them to make a diver- 
 sion in their favour by breaking into Attica. 
 This they promised unknown to the Athenians, 
 and were intent on the perfornvance, but were 
 prevented by the shock of an earthquake. The 
 Helots,^ farther, had seized this opportunity, 
 
 a Helots was the name given in general to the slaves 
 of the Lacedaemonians. The first of the kind were the 
 inhabitants of Helos in Messenia, wb.o were conquered 
 and enslaved by the Laceda:monians; and all their slaves 
 in succeeding times had the same denomination. The 
 tillage'of the ground, Jthe exercise of trades, all manual 
 labour, and every kind of drudgery, was thrown upon 
 them. They were always treated by their Spartan 
 masters with great severity, and often with the utmost 
 barbarity; at their caprice, or sometimes for reasons of 
 state, they were wantonly put to death or inhumanly 
 butchered. There is a remarkable instance of tlie latter, 
 in the fourth book of this history. According to Plu- 
 tarch, it was a common saying in Greece, " That a 
 
ELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 33 
 
 in concert with the neighbouring Thuriatm and 
 Etheans, to revolt and seize Ithome. Most of 
 the Helots were descendants of the ancient 
 • Messonians, then reduced to slavery, and on 
 this account all of them in general were called 
 Messenians. This war against the reyolters 
 in Ithome, gave full employ to the Lacedjemo- 
 nians. And the Thasians, after holding out 
 three years' blockade, were forced to surrender 
 upon terms to the Athenians : — They were " to 
 level their walls, to give up their shipping, to 
 pay the whole arrear of their tribute, to advance 
 it punctually for the future, and to quit all pre- 
 tensions to the continent and the mines." 
 
 The Lacedxmonians, as their war against 
 the rebels in Ithome ran out into a length of 
 time, demanded the assistance of their allies, 
 and amongst others of the Athenians. No 
 small number of these were sent to their aid, 
 under the command of Cimon. The demand 
 of assistance from them, was principally owing 
 to the reputation they then were in for their 
 superior skill in the methods of approaching and 
 attacking walls. The long continuance of the 
 siege convinced them of the necessity of such 
 methods, though they would fain have taken 
 it by storm. The first open enmity between 
 the Lacedjemonians and Athenians broke out 
 from this expedition. For the Lacedsemonians, 
 when the place could not be carried by storm, 
 growing jealous of the daring and innovating 
 temper of the Athenians, and regarding them 
 as aliens, lest by a longer stay they might be 
 tampering with the rebels in Ithome, and so 
 raise them fresh embarrassments, gave a dis- 
 mission to them alone of their allies. They 
 strove, indeed, to conceal their suspicions, by 
 alleging, " they have no longer any need of 
 their assistance." The Athenians were con- 
 vinced, that their dismission was not owing to 
 this more plausible colour, but to some latent 
 jealousy. They reckoned themselves aggrieved ; 
 and thinking they had merited better usage 
 
 freemnu at Sparta was tlie freest, and a slave the great- 
 est slave in the world.'* — Thus miserably oppressed, 
 no wonder they seized an opportunity of revolt. The 
 earthquake here mentioned was so violent, that (ac- 
 cording to Plutarch) it demolished all the houses in 
 Sparta, except five. The Helots rose at once effectually 
 to demolish those Spartans too, who were not buried in 
 the ruins. But Archidamus had already, by way of 
 precaution, sounded an alarm, and got them together in 
 a body. The Helots thus prevented, marchetl ofT, and 
 seized Ithome, where tliey made a long and obstinate 
 resistance. 
 13 
 
 from the hands of the Lacedaemonians, were 
 scarcely withdrawn, than in open disregard to 
 the league subsisting between them against 
 the Mede, they clapped up an alliance with 
 their old enemies, the Argives; and in tho 
 same oaths and in the same alliance, the Thes- 
 salians were also comprehended with them 
 both. 
 
 The rebels in Ithome, in the tenth year of 
 the siege, unable to hold out any longer, sur- 
 rendered to the Lacedsemonians on the follow- 
 ing conditions — that " a term of security be 
 allowed them to quit Peloponnesus, into which 
 they shall never return again ; that if any one 
 of them be ever found there, he should be 
 made the slave of whoever apprehended him.** 
 The Pythian oracle had already warned the 
 Lacediemonians " to let go the suppliants of Ju- 
 piter Ithometes." The men therefore, with their 
 wives and children, went out of Ithome, and 
 gained a reception from the Athenians, who 
 acted now in enmity to the Lacedjemonians, 
 and assigned them Naupactus for their resi- 
 dence, which they had lately taken from the 
 Locrians of Ozoli. 
 
 The Megareans also deserted the Lacedajmo- 
 nians, and went over to the Athenian alliance, 
 because the Corinthians had warred upon them 
 in pursuance of a dispute about settling their 
 frontier. Megara and Pegse were put into 
 the hands of the Athenians, who built up for 
 the Megareans the long walls that reach down 
 from Megara to Nisa;a, and took their guard 
 upon themselves. This was by no means the 
 least occasion of that violent enmity now be- 
 ginning to arise between the Corinthians and 
 Athenians. 
 
 Inarus the son of Psammetichus, a Libyan, 
 and king of the Libyans, bordering upon Egypt, 
 taking his route from Maraea, n. city beyond 
 the Pharos, had seduced the greatest part of 
 Egypt into a revolt from king Artaxerxes. 
 He himself was constituted their leader, and 
 he brought over the Athenians to associate in 
 the enterprise. They happened at that time 
 to be employed in an expedition against Cyprus, 
 with a fleet of two hundred ships of their own 
 and their allies r but relinquishing Cyprus, 
 they went upon this new design. Being arriv- 
 ed on that coast, and sailed up the Nile, they 
 were masters of that river, and two thirds of 
 the city of Memphis, and were making their 
 attack upon the remaining part, which is called 
 the white wall. It was defended by the Per- 
 u2 
 
31 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 
 
 sians and Medes who had resorted thither for 
 refuge, and by those Egyptians who had stood 
 out in the general defection. 
 
 The Athenians, further, having made a de- 
 scent at HaliiE, a battle ensued against the Co- 
 rinthians and Epidaurians, in which the victory 
 was on the Corinthian side. — And afterwards 
 the Athenians engaged at sea near Cecryphelea 
 with a fleet of Peloponnesians, and completely 
 gained the viptory. — A war also breaking out 
 after this between the ./Eginetae and Athenians, 
 a great battle was fought at sea by these two 
 contending parties near JEgiha. Both sides 
 were joined by their respective confederates ; 
 but the victory remained with the Athenians ; 
 who having taken seventy of their ships, landed 
 upon their territory, and laid siege to the city, 
 under the command of Leocratcs the son of 
 Stroebus. The Peloponnesians, then desirous 
 to relieve the .iEginetie, transported over to 
 ^Egina, three hundred heavy-armed, who be- 
 fore were auxiliaries to the Corinthians and 
 Epidaurians. In the next place they secured 
 the promontory of Geranea. The Corinthians 
 now with their allies made an incursion into 
 the district of Megara, judging it impossible 
 for the Athenians to march to the relief of the 
 Megareans, as they had so large a force already 
 abroad in jEgina and in Egypt; or, if they 
 were intfint on giving them relief, they must 
 of necessity raise their siege from ^gina. 
 The Athenians however recalled not their 
 army from iEgina, but marched away all the 
 old and young that were left in Athens to the 
 aid of Megara, under the command of Myro- 
 nides : and having fought a drawn battle against 
 the Corinthians, both sides retired, and both 
 sides looked upon themselves as not worsted 
 in the action. The Athenians, however, upon 
 the departure of the Corinthians, as being at 
 least so far victorious, erected a trophy. The 
 Corinthians at their return heard nothing but 
 reproaches from the seniors in Corinth ; so, 
 after bestowing an interval of about twelve 
 days to recruit, they came back again ; and, to 
 lay their claim also to the victory, set about 
 erecting a ttophy of opposition. Upon this, 
 the Athenians sallying with a shout out of 
 Megara, put those who were busy in erecting 
 this trophy to the sword, and routed all who 
 cndeavoured'to oppose them. The vanquished 
 Corinthians were forced to fly ; and no small 
 part of their number, being closely pursued 
 
 and driven from any certain route, were chasod 
 into the ground of a private person, which 
 happened to be encompassed with a ditch so 
 deep as to be quite impassable, and there was 
 no getting out. The Athenians, perceiving 
 this, drew up all their heavy-armed to front 
 them, and then forming their light-armed in a 
 circle round them, stoned every man of them 
 to death. This was a calamitous event to the 
 Corinthians ; but the bulk of their force got 
 home safe again from this unhappy expedition. 
 
 About this time also, the Athenians began to 
 build the long walls reaching down to the sea, 
 both towards the Phalerus, and towards the 
 PirsBus. 
 
 The Phocians y/ere now embroiled with the 
 Dorians, from whom the Lacedsmonians are 
 descended. Having made some attempts on 
 Boeon, and Cytinium, and Erineus, and taken 
 one of those places, the Lacedsemonians march- 
 ed out to succour the Dorians with fifteen hun- 
 dred heavy-armed of their natives, and ten 
 thousand of their ajlies, commanded by Ni- 
 comedes thei son of Cleombrotus in the right 
 of Pleistionax son of Pausanias their king, who 
 was yet a minor ; and having forced the Pho- 
 cians to surrender upon terms the town they 
 had taken, were preparing for their return. 
 Now, in case they attempted it by passing over 
 the sea in the gulf of Crissa, the Athenians 
 having got round with a squadron were ready 
 to obstruct it. Nor did they judge it safe to 
 attempt it by way of Geranea, as Megara and 
 Pegse were in the hands of the Athenians ; for 
 the pass of Geranea is ever diiBcult, and now 
 was constantly guarded by the Athenians ; and 
 should they venture this route, they perceived 
 that the Athenians were there also ready to 
 intercept them. They determined at last to 
 halt for a time in Bceotia, and watch for • an 
 opportunity to march away unmolested. Some 
 citizens of Athens were now clandestinely 
 practising with them, to obtain their concur- 
 rence in putting a stop to the democracy and the 
 building of the long walls. But the whole 
 body of the Athenian people rushed out into 
 the field against them, with a thousand Argivcs 
 and the respective quotas of their allies, in the 
 whole amounting to fourteen thousand. They 
 judged them quite at a loss about the means of 
 a retreat ; and the design also to overthrow their 
 popular government began to be suspected. 
 Some Thessalian horsemen came also up to 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 35 
 
 join the Athenians, in pursuance of treaty, who 
 afterwards in the heat of action revolted to the 
 LacedEmonians. 
 
 They fought at Tanagra of Bojotia, and the 
 victory rested veith the Lacedamonians and 
 allies: but the slaughter was great on both 
 sides. The Lacedemonians afterwards took 
 their route through the district of Megara; 
 and having cut down the woods, returned to 
 their own home through Geranea and the Isth- 
 mus. 
 
 On the sixty-second day after the battle of 
 Tanagra, the Athenians had taken the field 
 against the Boeotians, under the command of 
 Myronides.' They engaged them, and gained 
 a complete victory at Oenophyta;^ in conse- 
 quence of which, they seized all the territories 
 of BiEotia and Phocis, and levelled the walls 
 of Tanagra. They took from the Locrians of 
 Opus one hundred of their richest persons for 
 hostages ; and had now completed their own 
 long walls at Athens. 
 
 Soon after, the ^ginetse surrendered to the 
 Athenians upon terms. They " demolished 
 their fortifications, gave up their shipping, and 
 submitted to pay an annual tribute for the fu- 
 ture." 
 
 The Athenians, farther, in a cruize infested 
 the coast of Peloponnesus, under the command 
 of Tolmidas, the son of Tolmjeus. They 
 burnt a dock of the Lacedemonians, took 
 Chalcis, a city belonging to the Corinthians, 
 and landing their men, engaged with and de- 
 feated the Sicyonians. 
 
 During all this interval, the army of Athe- 
 nians and allies continued in Egypt, amidst 
 various incidents and events of war. — At first. 
 
 t Plularcb in liis Apothp^m relates, that when My- 
 ronides was putting himself at the head of thft Atl'.e- 
 nians on this occasion, liis offirers to'd Jiim " they were 
 not all come out yet into the field;" he replied hriskly, 
 " All are come out that will fisht," and marched of. 
 
 s This battle is represented Ity some ns more glorious 
 to the Athenians than even those of Maratlion or Pla- 
 taea. In the latter they fought, accompnnied hy their 
 allies, against BnrVarians; hut here with their own sin- 
 gle force, they defeated a far more numerous body of 
 the choicest and best-discip'ined troops in Greece. 
 Plato hath marked it in his Funeral Oration, and told 
 us those who fell in this battle were the first who were 
 honoured with a public interment in the Ceraniicus, 
 " These brave men, (says he, as translated hy Mr West) 
 having fought against Grecians for the liberties of 
 Grecians, and de'ivered those wliose cause they bad 
 undertaken to defend, were the tlrst after the Persian 
 war upon whom the commonwealth conferred the hon- 
 onr of being buried in this public cemetery." 
 
 the Athenians had the better of it in Egypt, 
 Upon this, the lung* despatcheth to Lacedaj- 
 raon Megabazus, a Persian noble, furnished 
 with great sums of money, in order to jirevail 
 uppn the Lacedsemonians to make an incursion 
 into Attica, and force the Athenians to recall 
 their troops from Egypt: when Megabazus 
 could not prevail, and some money had been 
 spent to no manner of purpose, he carried back 
 what was yet unexpended with him into Asia. 
 He then sendeth Megabazus, the son of Zopy- 
 rus, a Persian noble, against them with a nu- 
 merous army, who marching by land, fought 
 with and defeated the Egyptians and their al- 
 lies ; then drove the Grecians out of Memphis ; 
 and at last shut them up in the isle of Proso- 
 pis. Here he kept them blocked up for a 
 year and six months ; till having drained the 
 channel by turning the water into a diflerent 
 course, he stranded all their ships, and rendered 
 the island almost continent. He then marched 
 his troops across, and took the place by a land 
 assault. And thus a war, which had employed 
 the Grecians for six continued years, ended in 
 their destruction. Few only of the numbers 
 sent thither, by taking the route of Libya, got 
 safe away to Gyrene ; the far greater part were 
 entirely cut off. Egypt was now again reduced 
 to the obedience of the king : Amyrteus alone 
 held out, who reigned in the fenny parts. The 
 large extent of the fens prevented his reduc- 
 tion ; and besides, the Egyptians of the fens 
 are the most remarkable of all for military 
 valour. Inarus king of the Libyans, the au- 
 thor of all these commotions in Egypt, was 
 betrayed by treachery, and fastened to a cross. 
 Besides this, fifty triremes from Athens and 
 the rest of the alliance, aniving upon the coast 
 of Egypt to relieve the former, were come up 
 to Medasium, a month of the Nile, quite igno- 
 rant of their fate. These, some forces assault- 
 ed from the land, whilst a squadron of Phoeni- 
 cians attacked them by sea. Many of the vesoels 
 were by this means destroyed, but some few 
 had the good fortune to get away. And thus 
 the great expedition of the Athenians and al- 
 lies into Egypt was brought to a conclusion. 
 
 But farther, Orestes, son of EchecratiJaa 
 king of the Thessalians, being driven from 
 Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to under- 
 take his restoration. The Athenians, in con- 
 junction with the Boeotians and Phocians now 
 
 3 Alexander Tjongimanus. 
 
33 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book I. 
 
 their allies, marched up to Pharsalus of Thes- 
 8alj'. They became masters of the adjacent 
 country, so far as they could be whilst keeping 
 m a body ; for the ThessaUan cavalry prevented 
 any detachments. They took not that city, 
 neither carried any one point intended by the 
 expedition, but were obliged to vfithdraw, and 
 carry Orestes back again with them, totally un- 
 successful. 
 
 Not long after this, a thousand Athenians 
 going on board their ships which lay at Pegae, 
 for PegiB was now in their possession, steered 
 away against Sicyon, under the command of 
 Pericles' the son of Xantippus. They made 
 a descent, and in a battle defeated those of the 
 Sicyonians who endeavoured to make head 
 against them. From thence they strengthened 
 themselves by taking in some Achseans; and 
 stretching across the gulf, landed in a district 
 of Acarnania, and laid siege to Oenias ; yet, 
 unable to carry it, they soon quitted, and with- 
 drew to their own homes. 
 
 Three years after this, a peace to continue 
 for five years was clapped up between the Pe- 
 loponnesians and Athenians. Upon this, the 
 Atheni%.n3, now at leisure from any war in 
 Greece, engaged in an expedition against Cy- 
 prus, with a fleet of two hundred ships of their 
 own and allies, commanded by Cimon. Sixty 
 of these were afterwards detached to Egypt, at 
 the request of Amyrtffius king of the fenny 
 part ; but the rest of them blocked up Citium. 
 Yet, by the death of Cimon, and a violent fa- 
 mine, they were compelled to quit the blockade 
 
 1 Here the name of Pericles first occurs, and a hint 
 Bhould be given to those who are not well acquainted 
 with him, to mark a person that wiis a true patriot, a 
 consummate statesman, a good general, and a most sub- 
 lime speaker. He was born of one of the most illustri- 
 ous families in Athens. He was educated in the best 
 manner, and learned his philosophy or the knowledge 
 of nature from Anaxagoras, whose doctrines agreed so 
 little with the superstitious practices and tempera of 
 the Athenians, that the mrsterand all his disciples were 
 charged with atheism, for which many of tliem were 
 pi oseciited, and the divine Socrates most injuriously put 
 to death. He engaged early in public affairs, gained the 
 ascendant over all his competitors, became at length, 
 and continued to his death, master of the affections and 
 libertios too of the Athenian people, and though master, 
 yetgiiaritianand increaser of the latter. In short, accor- 
 ding to writers of the best authority and the gravest his- 
 torians, he was one of tlip most able and most disinteres- 
 ted ministers that Athens ever had, Athens the most de- 
 mocr.Ttical state that ever exis'ed, so fertile in every tiling 
 great and glorious, and so overrun at the same time with 
 faction, licentiousness, and wild tumultuary caprice. 
 
 of Citium ; and being come up to the height 
 of Salamis in Cyprus, they engaged at one time 
 an united force of Phoenicians, and Cyprians, 
 and Cilicians both by land and sea. They 
 gained the victory in both engagements ; and 
 being rejoined by the detachment they had sent 
 to Egypt, they returned home. 
 
 After this, the Lacedemonians engaged in 
 that which is known by the name of the holy 
 war ; and having recovered the temple at Del- 
 phi, delivered it up to the Delphians. But no 
 sooner were they withdrawn, than the Atheni- 
 an.'! marched out in their turn, retook it, and 
 delivered it into the hands of the Phocians, 
 
 At no great interval of time from hence, the 
 Athenians took the field against the Boeotian 
 exiles, who had seized Orchomenus and Cha- 
 rontea, and some other cities of Bceotia. Their 
 force, sent out upon this service, consisted of 
 a thousand heavy-armed of their own with pro- 
 portional quotas from their allies, and -was 
 commanded by Tolmidas the son of TolmEeus. 
 Having taken and enslaved Ohseronaea, they 
 placed a fresh garrison in it, and so withdrew. 
 But upon their march, they are attacked at 
 Coronea by a body of men, consisting of the 
 BcBOtian exiles sallying out of Orchomenus, 
 joined by Locrians, and the exiles from Euboea 
 and others of their partizans. After a battle, 
 the victory remained with the latter, who made 
 great slaughter of the Athenians, and took 
 many prisoners. Upon this, the Athenians 
 evacuated Bceotia, and, to get the prisoners re- 
 leased, consented to a peace. The Bceotian 
 exiles, and all others in the same circumstances, 
 were by this resettled in their old habitations, 
 and recovered their former liberty and rights. 
 
 It was not a great while after these last oc- 
 currences that Euboea revolted from the Athe- 
 nians. And Pericles was no sooner landed 
 upon that island with an Athenian army to 
 chastise them, than news was brought him that 
 " Megara also had revolted ; that the Pelopon- 
 nesians were going to make an incursion into 
 Attica ; that the Athenian garrison had been 
 put to the sword by the Magareans," excepting 
 
 2 This revolt of Megara, a little republic almost sur. 
 rounded by the dominions of Athens, leagued closely 
 with her, and under her protection, gave rise to that 
 decree which excluded the Megaroans from the ports 
 and markets of Athens. Others add, that they slew an 
 Athenian herald, who was sent to expostulate with 
 them on this account. Could such outrages be pocketed 
 by". Athenians? could Pericles dissuade the people of 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAK. 
 
 37 
 
 ihose who had thrown themselves into Nissea ; 
 and that the Mejareans had effected this revolt 
 by a junction of Corinthians, and Sicyonians, 
 and Epidaurians." Upon hearing this, Peri- 
 cles re-embarked with the utmost expedition, 
 and brought back his army from Eubcea. And 
 soon after, the Peloponnesians, marching into 
 Attica, as far as Eleusis and Thria, laid the 
 country waste, under the command of Pleis- 
 tionax," the son of Pausanias king of Sparta : 
 and then, without extending the ravage any 
 farther, they withdrew to their own homes. 
 Now, again the Athenians transported a mili- 
 tary force into Eubcca, under the command of 
 Pericles, and soon completed its reduction. 
 The tranquility of the rest of the island was 
 re-established upon certain conditions ; but they 
 wholly ejected all the inhabitants of Hestiffia, 
 and re-peopled it with a colony of their own. 
 — And not long after their return from Euboea, 
 they concluded a peace for thirty years, with 
 the Lacedemonians and their allies, in pur- 
 suance of which they restored them Nisaea and 
 Chalcis, and PegB^ and Trtezene ; all which 
 places, though belonging to the Peloponnesians, 
 were in the hands of the Athenians. 
 
 In the sixth year of this peace* a war broke 
 
 9 
 
 Athens from showing rnsentmenl? They decreed far- 
 ther, though noi explicitly mentioned by Thu(;ydi(ics, 
 ihat the generals of the state should swear at their elec- 
 tion, to ninke an incursion twice n year into the Megaris. 
 We shall soon seo tliat the Peloponnesians made it a 
 pretext for tlie ensuing war, and that Pericles justified 
 the decree, and persuaded the Athenians to hazard a 
 war rather than repeal it. This is the true history of 
 the point, tliough comedy, and railleVy, and libelling, 
 ■ftrangely vary the acdount, 
 
 » As Pleistionax on this occasion evacuated Attica on 
 « sudden, he was ban'shed from Sparta, as having been 
 bribed by the, Athenians, to quit their territory. Dio- 
 dorus Siculus relates, that he did it by the advice of 
 Cleandridas his guardian, who attended him in the field 
 on account of his youth; and that Pericles, afterwards 
 passing his accounts at Athens, charged " ten talents 
 properly laid out for the service nf the state," which 
 passed without farther evplanation or e-xccption. 
 
 « Pericles here performed a great and signal service 
 lo his country, Tlie motives to this war arc, according 
 to our historian, sufficiently strong, upon the scheme 
 now carrying on by Pericles, to extend the sovereignty 
 of Athens by sea. Yet the comic poets, and writers of 
 memoirs and private liistory, give another account of 
 the affair, which it is surprising to find the authors of 
 the Universal History, inclined to think as well founded 
 as what is given by Thucydides, that " Pericles engaged 
 the republic in this war, merely to gratify the resent- 
 ment of Aspasia, who was a native of Miletus, against 
 the Samians." As this Aspasia had all the honour of 
 PericlCB's merit imputed to herself, and be hath suffered 
 
 out between the Samians and Milesians about 
 Priene. The Milesians, having the worst in 
 the dispute, had recourse to the Athenians, to 
 whom they bitterly exclaimed against tho 
 Samians. Nay, even some private citizens of 
 Samos joined with them in this outcry, whose 
 scheme it was to work a change in the govern- 
 ment. The Athenians, therefore, putting to 
 sea with a fleet of forty sail, landed upon 
 ^amos, where they set up a democracy ; and 
 exacted from them fifty boys and as many 
 grown men for hostages, whom they deposited 
 at Lemnos. They had farther, at their de- 
 parture, left a garrison behind to secure that 
 island. But a body of Samians, who would 
 not submit to the new form of government, 
 and therefore had refuged themselves upon tho 
 continent, having gained the correspondence of 
 the most powerful persons abiding in Samos, 
 and the alliance of Pissuthnes, son of Hys- 
 taspes, at that time governor at Sardis, and 
 collected a body of seven hundred auxiliaries, 
 passed over by night into Samos. They first 
 exerted their efforts against the popular party, 
 and got a majority of them into their power : 
 in the nest place, they conveyed away tho 
 hostages from Lemnos by stealth ; they openly 
 declared a revolt ; and deUvcred up the Athe- 
 nian garrison, with their officers whom they 
 had seized, to Pissuthnes; and then imme- 
 diately prepared to renew their war against 
 Miletus. The Byzantines farther joined with 
 them in the revolt. 
 
 a weight of reproach ih her behalf, the reader will ac- 
 cept a short account of this famous lady. She is allow- 
 ed on all hands to have Leen a woman of the greatest 
 beauty, and the first genius; but averred by some to have 
 been a libertine, a prostitute, a bawd, nay, every thing 
 scandalous and vile. Pericles wasdotingly fond of her, 
 and got divorced from a wife whom he did not love, lo 
 marry her. She taught him, it is said, his refined max- 
 ims of policy, his lofty imperial eloquence; nay, even 
 composed the speeches on which so great a share of his 
 reputation was founded. The best men in Athens fre- 
 quented her house, and brought their wives to receive 
 lessons from her of economy and right deportment. 
 Socrates himself was her pupil in eloquence, and gives 
 her the honour of that funeral oration which he delivers 
 in the Menexenus of Plato. There must liavc been 
 some ground even for complimenting her in this extra- 
 ordinary manner. And after every abatement, what 
 must we think of a lady who was in such high cstnem 
 with the greatest men that ever lived at Athens, who 
 taught force to orators, grace to philosophers, and con- 
 duct to ministers of state; in a word, who had Pericles 
 for her lover, and Socrates for her encominsl? Seo 
 Bayle's Dictionary under Pericles, and Universal His- 
 tory, vol. vi. p. 415, note 
 
38 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book I. 
 
 No sooner were the Athenians informed of 
 this, than they put out against Samos, with 
 sixty sail, though sixteen of them were de- 
 tached for other services. Some of the latter 
 were stationed upon the coast of Caria, to 
 observe the motions of a Phoenician fleet, and 
 the rest were ordered to Chios and Lesbos, to 
 give there a summons of aid. The remaining 
 forty-four, commanded by Pericles' and nine 
 colleagues, engaged near the isle of Tragi^ 
 with the Samian fleet, consisting of seventy 
 sail, twenty of which had land soldiers on 
 board, and the whole was now on the return 
 from Miletus ; and here the Athenians gained 
 a signal victory. Afterwards forty sail arriv- 
 ed from Athens to reinforce them, and twenty 
 five from the Chians and Lesbians. With 
 this accession of force they landed upon the 
 island, overthrew the Samians in battle, invest- 
 ed their city with a triple wall, and at' the same 
 time blocked it up by sea. 
 
 But Pericles, drawing off sixty of the ships 
 from this service, steered away with all pos- 
 sible expedition towards Caunus and Caria, 
 upon receiving advice that " a Phoenician 
 fleet is coming up against them." Stesagoras 
 also and others had before been sent from 
 Samos with five ships to meet that fleet. In 
 this interval, the Samians launched out in a 
 sudden sally, fell upon the unfortified^ station 
 
 * The Athenians in the assembly of the people chose 
 ten generals every year, according to the number of 
 their tribes, 'j'hey were sometimes, as in the present in- 
 stance, all sentoutin tlie same employ. They rolled, 
 and each in his turn was general of the day. Thucy- 
 dides seldom gives more than the name of one, whom 
 we may conclude to have been the person of the greatest 
 weight and influence amongst them, in fact a general in 
 chief. Philip of Macedon was used to joke upon this 
 multiplicity of generals. "For my part (said he) I have 
 never had the good fortune to find more than one general 
 in all my life; andyct the Athenians find ten fresh ones 
 every year." Not but that these generals were often re- 
 elected, and continued years in commission. Pericles, 
 'tis plain, did so; and in latter times Phocion is said to 
 have been elected five and forty limes. Their power 
 was great not only in the field, but at Athens. Every 
 point that had relation to war came under their de- 
 partment. Pericles in a foreign employ was always 
 first of the generals, and within the walls of Athens 
 was the first or rather absolute minister of state. 
 
 « When the Grecians continued long on a station, or 
 were apprehensive of heirtg attacked by an enemy, they 
 fortified their naval station and camp towards the land 
 with a ditch and rampart, and towards the sea with a 
 palisade. At other times a number of their ships lay 
 out more to sea, by way of guard or watch to the rest, 
 which were generally dragged ashore, whilst the soldiers 
 lay round them in their tents. Sometimes they were 
 oi.:y moored to the shore, or rode at anchor, that they 
 
 of the Athenians, sunk the vessels moored at a 
 distance by way of guard, and engaging those 
 who put out against them, victoriously execut- 
 ed their purpose, were masters of their ot*n 
 seas for fourteen days' continuance, and made 
 whatever importations or exportations they 
 pleased: but, as Pericles then returned, they 
 were again blocked up by sea." He after- 
 wards received fresh supplies from Athens, 
 forty ships under Thucydides, and Agnon, and 
 Phormio, and twenty under Tlcpoiemus and 
 Anticles, besides thirty others from Chios and 
 Lesbos. And though after this the Samians 
 ventured a short engagement at sea, yet they 
 now found all farther resistance impracticable, 
 so that in the ninth month of the siege they 
 surrendered on the following terms — " To de- 
 molish their wall ; to give hostages ; to de- 
 liver up their shipping: and to reimburse 
 by stated payments the expenses of the 
 war."* — The Byzantines also came in, upon 
 the engagement of being held only to such 
 obedience as had formerly been required of 
 them. » 
 
 Not many years intervened between this 
 period of time, and the rise of those diflerences 
 above recited concerning Corcyra and Potidsea, 
 and all occurrences whatever, on which the pre- 
 tences of ffiis Peloponnesian war were ground- 
 ed. All these transactions in general, whether 
 of Grecians against Grecians, or against the 
 Barbarian, fell out in the compass of fifty' 
 years, between the retreat of Xerxes and the 
 commencement of this present war; during 
 
 which period the Athenians had established 
 
 I , 
 
 might be ready upon an alarm. See Potter's Archxa- 
 logia,'Vo]. II. c. 20. 
 
 3 The manner of doing this, "was to environ the 
 walls and harbour with ships, ranged in order from one 
 side of the shore to the other, and so closely joined to- 
 gether by chains and bridges, on which armed men 
 were placed, that without breaking their order there 
 could be no passage from the town to ti.e sea."— Pot- 
 her's Archaologia, 
 
 * Samos thus reduced, which in maritime power vied 
 with Athens herself, and liad well nigh defeated her 
 grand plan of being mistress of the sea, Pericles was re- 
 ceived upon his return with all the honours a grp.teful 
 people could give him. and was pitched upon to make 
 the funeral oration for those slain in the war. ITc per- 
 formed his part with high applause. The ladies in par- 
 ticular were loud in their acclamations, and were eager- 
 ly employed in caressing and crowning him with gar- 
 lands. But for a smart p'cce of raillery from one of 
 thein, on this occasion, and his smarter repartee, the rea- 
 der may consult the Universal History, vol. vi. p. 429, 
 the note. In the latter part of that note, the authors 
 seem willing both to deny a nd to allow Pericles the merit 
 of having served his country in the reduction of Samoa 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 39 
 
 Iheir dominion on a solid basis, and had rose to 
 a high exaltation of power. The Lacedemo- 
 nians were sensible of it, yet never opposed 
 them, except by some transient efforts ; and 
 for the most part of the time were quite easy 
 and indifTerent about it. That people had never 
 been known in a hurry to run to arms ; their 
 wars were indispensably necessary ; and some- 
 times they were entangled in domestic broils. 
 Thus they looked on with indolent unconcern 
 till the Athenian power was manifestly estab- 
 lished, and encroachments were made upon 
 their own alliance. Then indeed they deter- 
 mined to be no longer patient ; they resolved 
 iipon a war, in which their utmost force should 
 be exerted, and the Athenian power, if possible, 
 demolished. 
 
 On these motives was formed the public re- 
 solution of the Lacedemonians — that " the 
 treaty was violated, and the Athenians were 
 guilty of injustice." They had also sent to 
 Delphi, to inquire of the god, " Whether 
 their war would be successful 1" He is repor- 
 ted to have returne'd this answer, that " if they 
 warred with all their might, they should at last 
 be triumphant, and he himself would fight on 
 their side, invoked or uninvoked." 
 
 They had now again summoned their con- 
 federates to attend, and designed to put it to a 
 general ballot, " Whether the war should be 
 undertaken V The ambassadors from the se- 
 veral constituents of thfeir alliance arrived, and 
 assembled in one general council. Others 
 made what declarations they pleased, the majo- 
 rity inveighing against the Athenians, and in- 
 sisting upon war ; but the Corinthians (who 
 had beforehand requested every state apart to 
 ballot for war), alarmed for Potidasa, lest for 
 want of some speedy relief it might be utterly 
 destroyed, being present also at this council, 
 stood forth the last of all, and spoke to this 
 effect : 
 
 " We can no longer, ye confederates, have 
 any room to complain of the Lacedsemonians, 
 since their own resolution is already engaged 
 for war, and they have summoned us hither 
 to give our concurrence. For it is the duty of 
 a governor and leading state, as in private con- 
 cerns they observe the equitable conduct, so 
 ever to keep their view intent upon the general 
 welfare, suitably to that superior degree of hon- 
 our and regard, which in many points they pre- 
 eminently receive. , 
 " For our parts, so many of us as have i 
 
 quitted Athenian friendship for this better as. 
 sociation, we require no farther trialji to 
 awaken our apprehen.sions. But those amongst 
 us, who are seated up in the inland parts, at a 
 distance from the coast, should now be con- 
 vinced, that unless they combine in the defence 
 of such as are in lower situations, they will 
 soon be obstructed in can-ying out the fruits of 
 the lands, and again in fetching in those neces- 
 sary supplies which the sea bestoweth upon an 
 inland country. Let them by no means judge 
 erroneously of what we urge, as not in the 
 least affecting them ; but looking upon it as a 
 certainty, that if they abandon the guard of the 
 maritime situations, the danger will soon ad- 
 vance quite upon them, and they of course no 
 less than we are concerned in the issue of our 
 present determinations. For this reason they 
 ought, without the least hesitation, to make 
 the timely exchange of peace for war. 
 
 " It is indeed the duty of the prudci.t, so 
 long as they are not injured, to be fond of 
 peace. But it is the duty of the brave, when 
 injured, to throw up peace, and to have re- 
 course to arms : and, when in these successful, 
 to lay them down again in peaceful composition; 
 thus never to be elevated above measure by 
 military success, nor delighted with the sweets 
 of peace to suffer insults. For he who, appre- 
 hensive of*losing this delight, sits indolently at 
 ease, will soon be deprived of the enjoyment 
 of that delight which interesteth his fears ; and 
 he whose passions are inflamed by military suc- 
 cess, elevated too high by a treacherous con- 
 fidence, hears no longer the dictates of his 
 judgment. Many are the schemes which, 
 though unadvisedly planned, through the more 
 unreasonable conduct of an enemy turn out 
 successful ; but yet more numerous are those 
 which, though seemingly founded on mature 
 counsel, draw after them a disgraceful and op- 
 posite event. This proceeds from that great 
 inequality of spirit, with which an exploit is 
 projected, and with which it is put into actual 
 execution. For in council we resolve, surround- 
 ed with security; in execution we faint, through 
 the prevalence of fear. 
 
 "i We now, having been grossly injured, and 
 in abundant instances aggrieved, are taking up 
 arms ; and, when we have avenged ourselves on 
 the Athenians, shall at a proper time lay them 
 down again. Success, upon many considera- 
 tions, wo may promise ourselves ; in tho first 
 place, as we are superior in numbers and mill 
 
40 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book I. 
 
 tary skill ; m the next, as we all advance with 
 uniformity to accomplish our designs. A na- 
 val force, equal to that in which their strength 
 Gonsistsj we shall be enabled to equip, from 
 competent stores we separately possess, and 
 the funds laid up at Delphi and Olympia.' 
 If we take up those upon interest for im- 
 mediate service, we are able, by enlarging their 
 pay, to draw away all the foreigners who 
 man their fleets. The Athenian power is not 
 supported by a natural but a purchased strength. 
 And our own is less Uable to be injured by the 
 same method, as we are strong in our persons 
 more than in our wealth. Should we gain the 
 victory but in one single engagement at sea, 
 in all probability we have done their business ; 
 or,, in case they continue the struggle, we shall 
 then have a longer space to improve our naval 
 practice : and when once we have gained an 
 equality of skill, our natural courage will soon 
 secure us the triumph. For that valiant spirit 
 which we enjoy by nature, it is impossible for 
 them to acquire by rules : but that superiority 
 with which at present their skill invites them, 
 we may easily learn to overmatch by practice. 
 
 " Those suras of money by which these 
 points are chiefly to be compassed, we will re- 
 spectively contribute. For would it not in real- 
 ity be a grievous case, when their dependents arc 
 never backward to send in those sums which 
 rivet slavery on themselves, if we, who want 
 to be revenged on our foes, and at the same 
 time to secure our own preservation — if we 
 should refuse to submit to expenses, and 
 should store up our wealth to be plundered by 
 them, to purchase oppressions and miseries for 
 ourselves 1 
 
 " We have other expedients within our reach 
 to support this war, — a revolt of their depend- 
 ents ; and, in consequence of that, a diminution 
 of their revenue, the essence of their strength ; 
 erecting forts within their territory ; and many 
 others not yet to be foreseen. For war by no 
 means yields to the direction of a pre-deter- 
 roined plan ; but of itself, in every present exi- 
 gence, confines and methodizeth its own course. 
 In war, who moves along with n. temper in 
 proper command, hath got the firmest support ; 
 
 ' Tn tlio temple of Apollo at Delphi, and that of Ju- 
 piter at Olympia. The wealth reposited in these places 
 must have been very large, considering the great vene- 
 miion universally paid these deities, and the numerous 
 ftnd valuable otTcrings sent annually to these famous 
 tfmplcB. 
 
 but he who hath lost his temper is, for that 
 reason, more liable to miscarry. 
 
 " Let U9 remember, that if any one single 
 state amongst us had a contest with its foes 
 about a frontier, there w.ould be need of perse- 
 verance. But now, the Athenians are a match 
 for us all united, and quite too strong for any 
 of us separately to resi^: so that unless we 
 support one another with our collective forces, 
 unless every nation and every state unanimous, 
 ly combine to give a check to their ambition, 
 they will oppress us, apart and disunited, with- 
 out a struggle. Such a triumph, how grating 
 soever the bare mention of it may be to any 
 of your ears, yet, be it known, can end in 
 nothing else but plain and open slavery. To 
 hint in mere words so base a doubt, that so 
 many states may be enslaved by one, is disgrace 
 to Peloponnesus. In such a plunge we should 
 either be thought justly to have deserved it, or 
 through cowardice to suflfer it, the degenerate 
 oflspring of those fincestors who were the de- 
 liverers of Greece. And yet we have not 
 spirit enough remaining to defend our own 
 liberty. We suffer one single state to erect 
 itself into a tyrant, whilst we claim the glory 
 of pulling down raonarchs in particular soci^ 
 ties. We know not by what methods to ex- 
 tricate ourselves from these three, the greatest 
 of calamities, from folly, or cowardice, or sloth. 
 For exempt from these in fact you are not, by 
 taking up the plea of contempt of your enemies, 
 for which such numbers have suflTerod. The 
 many misfortunes arising from this have chang- 
 ed the sense of the word, and caused it to stand 
 for arrant folly. 
 
 " But on the past what necessity is there to , 
 enlarge t or to blame any farther than may be 
 necessary for the present t To prevent worse 
 events for the future we ought by immediate 
 efforts, with toil and perseverance, to seek for 
 redress. Through toil to acquire virtues, is 
 hereditary to Peloponncsians. This custom 
 is not to bo dropped, though now in wealth 
 and power you have made some petty advance- 
 ments : for it never can become you to let go 
 in affluence what was gained in want. It be- 
 comes you rather, upon many accounts, with 
 manly confidence, to declare for war. The 
 oracle of a god prescribeth it; — that god 
 himself hath promised his assistance; — and 
 the rest of Greece is ready to join you in tho 
 contest, some from a principle of fear, and 
 some from a principle of interest. Neither op 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 41 
 
 you will the first breach of the peace be charged. 
 The god who adviseth war plainly judgeth that 
 to be already broke : you will only act to re- 
 dress its violation. For the breach is not to be 
 charged on those who arm to revenge it ; but 
 on those who were the first aggressors. 
 
 " Since then war, considered in every light, 
 appears honourable in regard to you, ye Lace- 
 dtemonians ; since we, with united voices, en- 
 courage you to it, as most strongly requisite 
 for our general and separate interests, — defer 
 no longer to succour the Potidaeans, Dorians 
 by descent, and besieged by lonians, (the re- 
 verse was formerly the case,) and to fetch 
 again the liberty of others. The business will 
 admit of no longer delay, when some already 
 feel the blow ; and others, if it once be known 
 that we met here together, and durst not un- 
 dertake our own defence, will in .i very little 
 time be sensible of the same. Reflect within 
 yourselves, confederates, that affairs are come 
 to extremities, that we have suggested the most 
 advisable measures, and give your ballot for war. 
 Be not terrified at its immediate dangers ; but 
 animate yourselves with the hope of a long last- 
 ing peace to be procured by it. For a peace 
 produced by war is ever the most firm; but 
 from tranquility and ease to be averse to war, 
 can by no means abate or dissipate our danger. 
 With this certain conclusion, that a state in 
 Greece is started up into >i tyrant, and aims 
 indifferently at the liberty of us all, her arbi- 
 trary plan being partly executed and partly in 
 agitation, let us rush against and at once pull 
 her down. Then shall we pass the remainder 
 of our lives exempt from dangers, and shall 
 immediately recover liberty for those Grecians 
 who are already enslaved." 
 
 In this manner the Corinthians spoke : and 
 the LacediEmonians, when they had heard them 
 all deliver their several opinions, gave out the 
 ballots to all the confederates that were pre- 
 sent, in regular order, both to the greater and 
 lesser states : and the greatest part of them 
 balloted for war. But, though thus decreed, 
 it was impossible for them, as they were quite 
 unprepared, immediately to undertake it. It 
 was agreed, therefore, that " every state should 
 get in readiness their several contingents, and 
 no time to be last." However in less than a 
 year, every thing needful was amply provided : 
 and, before its expiration, an irruption was 
 made into Attica, and the war openly on foot. 
 But even this interval was employed in send- 
 13 
 
 ing embassies to Athens, charged with accu- 
 sations, that reasons strong as possible for mak- 
 ing war might appear on their side, if those 
 should meet with disregard. 
 
 By the first ambassadors therefore whom the 
 I.acedsDmonians sent, they- required the Athe- 
 nians " To drive away the pollution of the god- 
 dess." And the pollution was this : 
 
 There was one Cylon an Athenian, who had 
 been victor at the Olympic games, a person of 
 noble descent, and of great consequence in 
 his own person. He married a daughter of 
 Theagenes, a Megarean, who in those days 
 was tyrant of Megara. This Cylon, asking 
 'advice at Delphi about a scheme he had pro- 
 jected, was directed by the god " To seize 
 the citadel of Athens upon the greatest festival 
 of Jupiter." In pursuance of this, being sup- 
 plied by a party of men by Theagenes, and 
 having obtained the concurrence of his own 
 friends, upon the day of the Peloponnesian 
 Olympics, he seized the citadel as instrumental 
 to his tyranny. He imagined that to be the 
 greatest festival of Jupiter, and to bear a par- 
 ticular relation to himself, who had been an 
 Olympic victor. But whether the greatest 
 festival meant was to be held in Attica, or any 
 other place, he had never considered, nor had 
 the oracle declared. There is a festival of 
 Jove observed by the Athenians, which is 
 called the greatest festival of Jupiter the pro- 
 pitious. This is celebrated without the city, 
 in full concourse of the people, where many 
 sacrifices are offered, not of real victims, but 
 of artificial images of creatures peculiar to the 
 country. Concluding, however, that he had 
 the true sense of the oracle, he put his enter- 
 prise in execution. The Athenians, taking the 
 alarm, ran out of the country in one general 
 confluence to put a stop to these attempts, and 
 investing the citadel, quite blocked them up., 
 But in process of time, being wearied out with 
 the tediousness of the blockade, many of then* 
 departed, leaving the care of it to the nine- 
 archons, with a full power of " acting in what- 
 ever manner they should judge most expe- 
 dient:" for at that time most parts of the 
 public administration were in the management 
 of the archons. The party with Cylon, thus 
 closely invested, were reduced very low through 
 scarcity of bread and water. Cylon, therefore, 
 and his brother privately escape. But the 
 rest, reduced to extremities, and some of them 
 had already perished by famine, sit themselvw 
 I 
 
42 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book I. 
 
 down as suppliants by the altar in the citadel. 
 The Athenian guard, having ordered them to 
 arise, as they saw them just ready to expire in 
 the temple, to avoid the guilt of profanation, 
 led them out and slew them. But some of the 
 number, who had seated themselves at the 
 venerable goddesses, at the very altars, they 
 murdered in' the act Of removal. And for'this 
 action, not only the persons concerned in it, 
 out their descendants also, were called the sa- 
 crilegious and accursed of the goddess. The 
 Athenians, indeed, banished those sacrilegious 
 persons out of the city ; Cleomenes, the Lace- 
 dsemonian, drove them out again, when he was 
 at Athens, on account of a sedition ; nay, on 
 this occasion they not only drove away the 
 living, but even dug up the bones of the dead, 
 and cast them out ; yet, in process of time, 
 they returned again, and some of their posterity 
 are still in Athens. 
 
 This was the pollution which the Lacedse- 
 monians required them to drive away ; with a 
 face, indeed, of piety, as vindicating the honour 
 of the gods ; but knowing, at the same time, 
 that Pericles, the son of Xantippus, was tainted 
 with it by the side of his mother ; and thence 
 concluding, that if he could be removed, the 
 Athenians would more easily be brought to an 
 accommodation with them. They could not 
 carry their hopes so far as actually to effect his 
 banishment, but to raise against him the public 
 odium, as if the war was partly owing to the 
 misfortune they suffered in bim. For, carrying 
 with him the greatest sway of any Athenian 
 then alive, and presiding entirely in the ad- 
 ministration, he was most steady in opposition 
 to the Lacedaemonians, dissuading the Athenians 
 from any concession, and exciting them to war. 
 
 The Athenians, in return, required the La- 
 cedffimonians " to drive away the pollution 
 contracted at Tanarus ;" for the Lacedsemo- 
 nians, some time ago, having caused their sup- 
 plicant Helots to rise out of Neptune's temple 
 at Tsenai-us, and led them aside, and slew them. 
 And to this action they themselves impute thfe 
 
 ' Wlien these suppliants were ordered to conic out, 
 ..hey tied a strinj; round the altar in the citadel, and 
 keeping hold of it, were come as far as the altars of 
 The venerable goddesses. Just there the strings happen- 
 ed to hreak, upon which the archons rushed in to seize 
 them, as if Minerva had thrown them out of her pro- 
 tection. Some of the number sat instantly down for 
 fresh protection at the altars of the venerable goddess- 
 es: it was an unavailing resource, and they were imme- 
 diately slain upon tlie spot. Plutarch in Solon. 
 
 great earthquake which happened afterwards at 
 Sparta. 
 
 They further required them " to drive away 
 the pollution of the Chalciaecan Pallas," the 
 nature of which was this ; 
 
 When Pausanias, the Lacedasmonian, upon 
 his being first recalled by the Spartans from his 
 command in the Hellespont, and brought to his 
 trial before them, was acquitted of the charge 
 of mal-administration, but was no longer in- 
 trusted with the public commission ; fitting out 
 a Hermionian trireme on his own private ac- 
 count, he arriveth in Hellespont, without any 
 authority from the Lacedsemonians. He gave 
 out that he did it for the service of the Gre- 
 cian war ; but his intention was to carry on his 
 negotiations with the king, which, aspiring to 
 the monarchy of Greece, he had begun before. 
 He had formerly conferred an obligation upon 
 the king, from which the whole of his project 
 took its date. When, after the return from 
 Cyprus, during his first appearance there, he 
 took Byzantium, which was possessed by the 
 Modes, and in it some favourites and relations 
 of the king were made his prisoners, he releas- 
 eth them all, to ingratiate himself with the king, 
 without the privity of the other confederates, 
 giving it out in public that they had made their 
 escape. He transacted this affair by means of 
 Gongylus, the Eretrian, to whose keeping he 
 had intrusted Byzantium and the prisoners. 
 He also despatched Gon^lus to him with a 
 letter, the contents of which, as was afterwards 
 discovered, were these : 
 
 " Pausanias, general of Sparta, desirous to 
 oblige you, sends away these his prisoners of 
 war. And by it I express my inclination, if 
 you approve, to take your daughter in marriage, 
 and to put Sparta and the rest of Greece into 
 your subjection. I think I have power suffi- 
 cient to effectuate these points, could my scheme 
 be communicated with you. If therefore any 
 of these proposals receive your approbation, 
 send down to the coast some trusty person, 
 through whom for the future we may hold a 
 correspondence." 
 
 Thus much was contained in the letter ; and, 
 on the reception of it, Series was delighted, 
 and sends away Artabazus the son of Pharna- 
 cus, down to the coast, with an order to take 
 upon him the government of Dascylis, having 
 first dismissed Megabetes who was the gover- 
 nor. To him he intrusted a letter for Pausa- 
 nias at Byzantium, with an injunction to for- 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 43 
 
 ward it with all possible expedition, and to let. 
 him see his signet; and that, if Pausanias 
 should charge him with any affairs, he should 
 execute them with all possible diligence and 
 fidelity. Artabazus being arriyed, obeyed all 
 the other injunctions with exactness, and 
 forwarded the letter, which brought this an- 
 swer : 
 
 " Thus saith ;king Xerxes to Pausanias. — _ 
 The kindness done me in those persons whom 
 from Byzantium you delivered safe on the 
 other side the sea, shall be placed to your ac- 
 count in our family, eternally recorded : and 
 ■with the other contents of your letter I am de- 
 lighted. Let neither night nor day relax your 
 earnest endeavours to effectuate those points 
 you prjjmise me : nor stop at any expense of 
 gold or silver, or greatness of military force, if 
 such aid be any where requisite. But confer 
 boldly with Artabazus, a trusty person, whom 
 I have sent to you, about mine and your own 
 concerns, that they may be accomplished in 
 the most honourable and most advantageous 
 manner for us both." 
 
 Upon the receipt of this letter, Pausanias, 
 who before had been in high credit with the 
 Grecians, through the lustre of his command 
 at Plataea, was elevated much more than ever, 
 and could no longer adjust his demeanour by 
 the modes and customs of his native country. 
 He immediately dressed himself up in Per- 
 sian attire, and, quitting Byzantium, travelled 
 through Thrace, attended with Persian and 
 Egyptian guards, and refined his table into 
 Persian elegance. His ambition he was un- 
 able any longer to conceal, but by short sketches 
 manifested too soon, what greater schemes he 
 had formed in his mind for future accomplish- 
 ment. He then showed himself difficult of 
 access, and let his anger loose so violently and 
 so indiscriminately upon all men, that no one 
 could approach him. And this was not the 
 least motive to the confederacy for going over 
 to the Athenians. But the Lacedsmonians, 
 informed of this, recalled him the first time 
 upon the account of such behaviour ; and, when 
 he was returned again in the Hermionian ves- 
 sel vrithout their permission, he plainly ap- 
 peared to have re-assumed again his former 
 practices. And when forced to remove from 
 Byzantium by the opposition raised against 
 him by the Athenians, he went not back to 
 Sparta ; but withdrawing to Colonae of Troas, 
 Information was given that " he was negotiating 
 
 with the Barbarians, and had fixed his residence 
 there for very bad designs." Upon this they 
 could no longer be patient, but the ephori 
 despatched him a herald and the Scytale,' with 
 an order " Not to stay behind the herald ; if 
 he did, war was proclaimed against him by the 
 Spartans." And he, desirous to clear himself 
 as much as possible from suspicion, and confi- 
 dent that with money he could baffle any accu- 
 sation, returned the second time to Sparta. 
 The first treatment he met with there was, to 
 be thrown into prison by order of the ephori : 
 for the ephori have so large an authority, even 
 over a king. But afterwards, by some private 
 management, he procured his enlargement, and 
 offers to submit to a trial against any who were 
 willing to accuse him. The Spartans indeed 
 had no positive evidence against him, not even 
 his private enemies, nor the general community 
 — none, to support them in proceeding capitally 
 against a person of the royal descent, and at 
 that time invested with the regal dignity : for, 
 being uncle to Pleistarchus the son of Leoni- 
 das, their king, though yet in minority, he was 
 regent guardian. But, by his disregard of the 
 laws, and his affectation of the Barbarian man- 
 ners, he afforded them strong reasons to sus- 
 pect, that he would never conform to the equal- 
 ity then in vogue. They called to remem- 
 brance those other passages of his behaviour, 
 in which he had at any time deviated from the 
 institutions of his country ; and that further 
 upon the tripod at Delphi, which the Grecians 
 offered as the choicest part of the Persian 
 spoils, he had formerly presumed, by his own 
 authority, to place this inscription : 
 
 » The Scytale is a famous instrument peculiar to tlie 
 Lacedxmonians, and used by tliem for the close convey- 
 ance of orders to their ministers abroad. It was a long 
 black aticit, and the contrivance was this—" When the 
 magistrates gave commission to any general or admiral, 
 they took two round pieces of wood exactly equal to one 
 anotherj one of these they kept, and the other was de- 
 livered to the commander; to whom when they had any 
 thing of moment to communicate, they cut a long nar- 
 now scroll of parchment, and rolling it about their own 
 stuff, one fold close upon another, they wrote their busi- 
 ness upon it; then taking it off, despatched it away to 
 the commander, who applying it to his own staff, the 
 folds exactly fell in one with another, as at the writini;* 
 and the characters, which, before it was wrapped up, 
 were confusedly disjoined and unintelligible, appeared 
 very plain." Potter's Archieologia, vol. ii. c. 13. 
 
 If it be asked (says the @choliastJ how Pausanias 
 came to have the Scytale with him now, as he was 
 abroad without the public commission? the answer ia. 
 He had kept it ever since his former employments. 
 
44 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book I. 
 
 For Persia's hosts overthrown, and Grscia freed, 
 To Phctbus THIS Pausanias hatli decreed. 
 Who led the Grecians in the glorious deed. 
 
 These verses indeed the Lacedsmonians im- 
 mediately defaced from the tripod, and placed in 
 their stead the names of the several states 
 Vfhich had joined in the overthrow of the Bar- 
 barian, and in making this oblation. This 
 therefore was now recollected to the prejudice 
 of Pausanias ; and, in his present situation, it 
 was interpreted, from the circumstances of his 
 late behaviour, as an argument that he had been 
 equally guilty long before. They had more- 
 over got an information that he was tampering 
 with the Helots, which in fact was true : for 
 he promised them their liberty and the privilege 
 of citizens of Sparta, if they would rise at his 
 command and co-operate with him in the whole 
 of his project. But even this would not pre- 
 vail : they disdained to place so much confi- 
 dence in the informations given by Helots, as 
 to run into irregularities to punish him. They 
 adhered to the custom ever observed amongst 
 them, never to be hasty in forming a sentence 
 never to be recalled against, a citizen of Sparta, 
 without unquestionable evidence. At length, 
 they obtained the fullest conviction, as it is 
 said, by means of an Argyllian, an old minion 
 of his, and the person most in his confidence, 
 who was to convey to Artabazus the last letter 
 he wrote to the king. This man, alarmed by 
 the recollection that no person sent on these 
 errands before him had ever returned again, hav- 
 ing already counterfeited the seal, to the end 
 that if he was deceived in his suspicions, or 
 Pausanias should demand them again to make 
 any alteration, he might avoid discovery, breaks 
 open the letters. He found by them, that he 
 was going on the errand his fears foreboded, 
 and that his own murder was expressly enjoin- 
 ed. He carried upon this the packet to the 
 ephori, who were now more than ever con- 
 vinced, but still were desirous to hear them- 
 selves from the mouth of Pausanias, an ac- 
 knowledgment of the truth. They therefore 
 contrived, that this person should go to sanc- 
 tuary at Tienarus as a suppUant, and refuge in 
 a cell built double by a partition. In the 
 inner part of this cell he hid some of the 
 ephori : and, Pausanias coming to him and 
 demanding the reason of his supplication, they 
 heard distinctly all that passed. The man 
 complained bitterly to him about the clause in 
 
 the letters relating to himself, and expos, 
 tulated with him about every- particular— 
 " why he, who had been so trusty to him dur 
 ing the whole course of his negotiations with 
 the king, should now be so highly honoured, 
 as to be murdered upon an equal rank with 
 the meanest of his tools V Pausanias con- 
 fessed the truth of all that he alleged ; begged 
 him, " not to be exasperated with what at 
 present appeared ;" assured him, " he should 
 not be hurt if he would leave his sanctuary ;" 
 and earnestly entreated him, " with all pos 
 sible speed to go the journey, and not to ob 
 struct the schemes that were then in agitation." 
 The ephori, having exactly heard him, with 
 drew : and now, beyond a scruple convinced, 
 they determined to apprehend him in the city. 
 But it is reported, that at the instant fixed foi 
 his arrest, as he was walking along, and beheld 
 the countenance of one of the ephori, ap- 
 proaching towards him, he immediately dis- 
 covered his business : and another of them out 
 of kindness intimating the matter by a nod, he 
 took to his heels, and fled~away faster than 
 they could pursue him. The Chalciaecan hap- 
 pened to be near, and into a little house within 
 the verge of that temple, he betook himself, 
 and sat quietly down to avoid the inclemency 
 of the outward air. They, who had lost the 
 start, came too late in the pursuit. But after- 
 wards, they stripped the house of its roof and 
 doors ; and, watching their opportunity when 
 he was within, they encompassed him round 
 about,' immured him within, and placing a 
 constant guard around, kept hira beset that he 
 might perish with hunger. When he was 
 ready to expire, and they foilnd in how bad 
 a state he lay vrithin the house, they led him 
 out of the verge, yet breathing a little ; and, 
 being thus brought out, he immediately died. 
 They next intended to cast his body into the 
 Caeada, where they are used to throw thei 
 malefattors ; but afterwards changed their 
 minds, and put him into the ground, some- 
 where thereabouts. But the god at Delphi 
 warned the LacedSmonians, afterwards by an 
 oracle, " to remove his body to the place where- 
 he died :" — And now it lies in the area, before 
 the temple, as the inscription on the pillars 
 showeth : — « and, as in what they had done 
 
 1 Alcitliea, the mother of Pausanias, is said to have 
 brought the lirst siono on this occasion: Euch was the 
 spirit of the ladies at Lacodsmon. 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 45 
 
 they had violated the laws of sanctuary, to re- 
 store two bodies to the Chalcisecan for that one.'' 
 To this they so far conformed, as to dedicate 
 there two statues of brass, as atonements for 
 Pausanias. 
 
 (The Athenians, upon the principle that the 
 god himself had judged this a pollution, required 
 of the LacediBmomans, by way of retaliation, to 
 clear themselves of it.) 
 
 The Lacedaemonians, at that time sent am- 
 bassadors to Athens, to accuse Themistocles 
 also of carrying on the same treasonable cor- 
 respondence with the Mede, as Pausanias, 
 which they had discovered from the papers, 
 which had been evidence against Pausanias, 
 and demanded that " he should be equally 
 punished for it." The Athenians complied 
 with this demand. But, as he then happened 
 to be under the ostracism,' and residing chiefly 
 at Argos, though he frequently visited other 
 parts of Peloponnesus, they send a party along 
 with the Lacedaemonians, who readily joined 
 in his pursuit, with orders to seize him, where- 
 ever they could find him. Themistocles, ad- 
 vised in time, flieth out of Peloponnesus into 
 Corcyra, to which people he had done a signal 
 kindness.' The Corcyreans expressing their 
 
 » The ostracism w.ns a compliment of an extraordinary 
 kind paid by the people of Athens to superior merit. 
 When a person had done them great services, and they 
 grew apprehensive they might possihly show him too 
 much gratitude, to tlie prejudice of their own liberties. 
 they banished him for ten years. On some particular 
 day each citizen gave in the name of a person, wrote 
 upon an ostracum (a shell, or piece of tile), who he de- 
 sired should be sent into retirement. Six thousand of 
 these votes carried the point; and he, who had thus a 
 legal number of votes, was obliged to quit Athens with, 
 in ten days. The most disinterested patriot, and most 
 successful commander, received, for the most part, this 
 public acknowledgement of their services. At length, 
 a scoundrel fellow, one Hyperbolus, was thus honour- 
 ably distinguished by the public voice. The Athenians 
 thought afterwards they had profaned the ostracism by 
 treating him like a Themistocles, an Aristides, or a Ui- 
 mon, and therefore abolished this strange injurious 
 privilege, by which wanton liberty was enabled to tri- 
 umph over its best friend, public spirit. Other republics 
 in Greece had something of the same nature amongst 
 them. Authors vary much about the circumstances 
 of the ostracism; I have mentioned those points only 
 which are universally agreed. 
 
 a At the time of the Persian invasion, the Corcyreans 
 had refused to join in the common cause of Greece. 
 The Grecians, therefore, had afterwards a design to fall 
 upon and destroy them. But Themistocles interposed, 
 and saved them by remonstrating, that by such pro- 
 ceedings Greece would be plunged into greater calam- 
 ities, than it would have suffered under the despotic 
 power ol Xerxes. I 
 
 fear of giving him refuge, lest it might expose 
 them to the resentment both of Lacedaemonians 
 and Athenians, he is conveyed away by them 
 to the opposite continent. Now, pursued by 
 those who were appointed to do it, and who 
 had by inquiry discovered his route, he is com- 
 pelled, by mere distress, to turn in to Admetus 
 king of the Molossians,^ who was by no means 
 his friend. It happened that Admetus was 
 not at home ; and Themistocles, the suppliant, 
 addressing himself to the wife, is by her di- 
 rected to take their child in his hand, and sit 
 himself down upon the hearth. Admetus re- 
 turning soon after, he tells him who he was, 
 and conjures him — "though he had formerly 
 opposed him in a suit he had preferred to the 
 people of Athens, not to take revenge upon 
 an exile ; to make him suffer now, would be 
 taking those advantages over a man in distress, 
 which he ought to disdain ; the point of honour 
 consisted in equals revenging themselves upon 
 equal terms ; he had, it is true, stood in op- 
 position to him, but merely in a point of 
 interest, and not where life was at stake ; but 
 if he now gave him up" (telling him by whom, 
 and why, he was persecuted) " he deprives him 
 of the only resource he had left to preserve his 
 life." Admetus, having heard him, bids him 
 rise, together with the child whom he held as 
 he sat down ; for this was the most pathetic 
 form of supplication. And when, not long 
 after, the Lacedtemonians and Athenians ar- 
 rived, and pressed him earnestly to do it, he 
 refuseth to give him up, and sends him under 
 a guard, as he had declared his intention to go 
 to the king, to the other sea, by a journey over 
 land, as far as Pydne, a town belonging to 
 Alexander. He here met with a trading 
 vessel bound to Ionia ; and going on board, 
 is driven by a storm into the Athenian fleet, 
 which then lay before Naxos. Alarmed at his 
 danger, he discovereth himself to the master, 
 for not one person on board suspected vf ho he 
 was, and telleth him the occasion of his flight ; 
 and unless he will undertake his preservation, 
 threatens " to inform against him, as one who 
 had been bribed to further his escape ; — pre- 
 served he still might be, provided no person 
 was suffered, during the voyage, to stir out of 
 the vessel ; — if he would comply, the favour 
 
 " Admetus had formerly negotiated an alliance at 
 Athens, but was rejected by the influence of The- 
 mistocles. 
 
 la 
 
46 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book. 
 
 should be acknowledged with effectual grati- 
 tude." — The master of the vessel promiseth 
 his service, and keeping out at sea a day and a 
 night to windward of the fleet, he afterwards 
 landeth him at Ephesus. Themistocles, to 
 recompense his care, made him a handsome 
 present in money, for there he received those 
 sums which he had ordered secretly to be con- 
 veyed thither from his friends at Athens, and 
 from Argos; and, travelling upwards from 
 thence, in company with a Persian of the 
 maritime provinces, he gets a letter to be de- 
 livered to king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, 
 who had lately mounted the throne, the pur- 
 port of which was this : 
 
 " I Themistoclcs am coming to you, who of 
 all the Grecians have done the greatest mis- 
 chiefs to your family, so long as I was obliged 
 by necessity to resist the invasion of your 
 father. Yet the good services I did him were 
 much more numerous, when my own preserva- 
 tion was secured, and his retreat became full 
 of hazards. My former generosity calls for a 
 requital ;" (here he inserted the message he 
 had sent to Xerxes about the retreat from 
 Salamis ; and that, out of regard to him, he 
 had prevented the breaking down of the bridges, 
 which was mere fiction ;) " and now, able to 
 perform great services for you, I am near at 
 hand, having been persecuted by the Grecians 
 for my friendship to you. I beg only a year's 
 respite, that I may notify to you in person, 
 those points which are the subject of my 
 journey hither." 
 
 The king, it is said, was surprised at the 
 spirit of the man,' and ordered him to act as he 
 desired. The time of respite he had thus ob- 
 tained, he spent in making all possible progress 
 
 » The boldness and intrepidity of Themistocles hMh 
 been the subject of admiration, in throwing himself on 
 the protection of the Persian monarch, who had fixed a 
 price on his heud. And yethe was so high in his esteem, 
 that the night after first giving him audience, he cried 
 aloud thrice in his sleep. " I have got Themistocles tiie 
 Athenian." He afterwards acknowledged himself two 
 hundred tnlents (near 40,000/. sterling) in Iiis debt; '^ for 
 BO much T promised the man that brought you to me.'' 
 Themistocles soon gave him a specimen of his fine un- 
 derstanding. He was desired by the Iting to speak his 
 mind freely in relation to the affairs of Greece: he an- 
 swered by his interpreter, that '' discourse, like a Ter- 
 Bian carpet, had in it a variety of figures, which never 
 appeared to advantage unless it was quite unfolded, 
 but were not to be apprehended, when wrapped up in 
 the piece." By this ingenious plea, he obtained a 
 year's respite to learn the rersi.in language, that he 
 might be enabled to deliver explicitly his own senti- 
 
 in the Persian language, and in learning the 
 manners of the country. When the year was 
 elapsed, appearing at court, he became a 
 favourite with the king, a greater than any 
 Greek had ever been before, as well on ac- 
 count of the former lustre of his lifis, as the , 
 hope he suggested to him Of enslaving Greece ;- 
 but above all by the specimens he gave of his 
 fine understanding ; for in Themistocles, the 
 strength of nature was most vigorously shown ; 
 and by it he was so highly distinguished above 
 the bulk of mankind, as to deserve the great- 
 est' admiration. By the mere force of his 
 natural genius, without any improvement from 
 study, either in his youth or more ajlvanced 
 age, he could give the best advice upon sudden 
 emergencies with the least hesitation, and was 
 happy in his conjectures about'the events of 
 the future. Whatever he undertook, he was 
 able to accomplish ; and wherein he was quite 
 unexperienced, he had so prompt a discernment 
 that he never was mistaken. In a matter of 
 ambiguity, he foresaw with extraordinary acutc- 
 ness the better and the worse side of the 
 Question. Upon the whole, by the force of 
 natural genius, he was most quick at all ex- 
 pedients, and at the same time excellent, be- 
 yond competition, at declaring instantly the 
 most advisable measures of acting upon every 
 occurrence. — But, being seized with a fit of 
 sickness, his life is at an end. Some, indeed, 
 report, that he put an end to his own life by 
 taking poison, when he judged it impossible to 
 perform what he had promised the king. Hia 
 monument, however, is at Magnesia in Asia, 
 in the forum. Of this province he was gover- 
 nor through the bounty of the king, who 
 assigned him Magnesia, (which yielded him 
 'fifty talents yearly,) for his bread, LamJ)sa- 
 ous, for his wine, (which pl^ce was in the 
 greatest repute for wine,) and Myus for his 
 
 mcnts to the king, in his own words and method He 
 became Afterwards so grant a favourite, that the most 
 engaging promise, in future times, that the Persian 
 monarch could make to a Greek, whom he had a mind 
 to inveigle into his service, was, *' that he should live 
 with him as Themistocles did with Artaxerxes." And 
 yet no attachment to his royal friend, ever made him an 
 enemy to his country; nor did hia disinterested patriot- 
 ism, of which never man had more, ever render him 
 ungrateful to his benefactor. Through his liounty, he 
 lived the remainder of his life in pomp and afiluence, 
 and was used to say humorously to his children, " We 
 had been undone, my children, if we had not been 
 undone." 
 ^ 9087i. 10». sterling, 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 47 
 
 meat. His bones are said to have been con- 
 veyed home by his relations, in pursuance of 
 his own desire, and to have been interred in 
 Attica without the privity of the Athenians. 
 For it was against law to bury him there, as 
 he had been outlawed for treason.' 
 
 Such an end had the lives of Pausanias the 
 Lacedtemonian, and Themistocles the Athe- 
 nian, who in their own age made the greatest 
 figure of any Grecians. 
 
 The Lacedismonians, by their.first embassy, 
 had enjoined, what was as amply, in turn, re. 
 quired of them, to do as hath been above 
 recited, concerning the expulsion of the sacri- 
 legious. But, coming a second time to the 
 Athenians, they commanded them " to quit 
 ihe blockade of Potidsea;" and "to permit 
 .^Igina to govern itself at its own discretion ;" 
 and, above all other points, insist upon this, 
 ileclaring most expressly, that in this case war 
 should not be made — " If they would revoke 
 their decree concerning the Megareans, in 
 which they had been prohibited from entering 
 any harbour whatever in the dominion of 
 Athens, and from the Attic markets. 
 
 But the Athenians listened to none of these 
 demands, nor would revoke the decree, but 
 reproached the Megareans for tilling land that 
 was sacred, land not marked out for culture, 
 and for giving shelter to runaway slaves. 
 
 At last, the final ambassadors arrived from 
 Lacedeemon, namely, Eamphias, and Melesip- 
 pns, and Agesander, who, waving all other 
 
 1 Some autliors have related, that his countrj'men 
 afterwards honoured him with a cenotaph in the Pirae- 
 us. Plutarch, however, disbelieves the fact, and thinks 
 it merely a presumption, formed on the following ver- 
 ses of Plato the comic poet: 
 
 To (bee. Themistocles, a tomb is due, 
 
 Placed ID the most conspicuous point of Tiew ; 
 
 Merchants from every port, with just acclaim, 
 
 Should shout thy honour, and confess thy fame; 
 
 Each fleet returned, or selling nut, should join 
 
 In owning all the naval glory thine ; 
 
 It should command, high raised, yon watery plain, 
 
 ^nd point that Sgbt which gave us all the main. 
 
 I cnnnot end Hiis note about Themistocles, without 
 begging the reader to accept a translation of an epigram 
 In the Anthologia, which appears to have been written 
 with a spirit worthy of this illustrious Athenian: 
 
 Be Greece the monument ; and crown the height 
 With all the trophies of the naval fight. 
 Let Persia's Mara and Xerxes swell the base J 
 Such forms alone Themislocles can grace. 
 Next, lilie a column of majestic size, 
 His acts inscribed, let Salamis arise. 
 Swell e-;ery part, and give the hero room, 
 For nothing small should scandalize 'he tomb. 
 
 points which they had formerly required, said 
 thus : — " The Lacedaemonians are desirous of 
 peace, and peace there may be, if you will per- 
 mit the Grecians to govern themselves at theii 
 own discretion." 
 
 The Athenians summoned an assembly, 
 where every one was invited to deliver his 
 opinion. They determined, after deliberate 
 consultation on all the points in contest, to 
 return one definitive answer. Several others 
 spoke on this occasion, and were divided in 
 their sentiments ; some insisting on the neces- 
 sity of a war ; others, that peace should not be 
 obstructed, by that decree, which ought to. be 
 repealed. At length Pericles, the son of 
 Xantippus, standing forth, who was at that 
 time the leading man at Athens, and a person 
 of the greatest abilities both for action and de- 
 bate, advised them thus: 
 
 " I firmly persevere, Athenians, in the same 
 opinion that I have ever avowed — to make no 
 concessions to the Lacedsemonians — though at 
 the same time sensible, that men never exe- 
 cute a war with that warmth of spirit through 
 which they are at first impelled to undertake 
 it, but sink in their ardour as difiliculties in- 
 crease. I perceive it, however, incumbent 
 upon me, to persist in the same uniform ad- 
 vice ; and I require those amongst you who 
 are influenced by it, as they conciir in the mea- 
 sures, either to imite their efforts for redress, 
 if any sinister event should follow ; or else, 
 upon a series of success, to make no parade of 
 their own discernment. It is usually enough 
 for accidents, unforeseen, to baffle the best con- 
 certed schemes ; since human intentions are 
 by nature fallible. And hence it comes to pass, 
 that whatever falls out contrary to our expec- 
 tations, we are accustomed to throw all the 
 blame upon fortune. 
 
 "The treacherous designs of the Lacedae- 
 monians, formerly, against us, were visible to 
 all ; nor are they, this very moment, less clear 
 than ever. For, notwithstanding that express 
 stipulation, that, upon controversies between 
 us, we should reciprocally do, and submit to 
 justice, each party remaining in their present 
 possessions ; yet, they have never demanded 
 justice, nor accept the oflfer of it from us 
 Their allegations against us they are deter 
 mined to support by arms, and not by evidence . 
 and here they come no longer to remonstrate, 
 but actually to give us law. They commano 
 us to quit the blockade of Potidcca, to permit 
 
48 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 
 
 ^gina to govern itself by its own model, and 
 to repeal the decree against the Megareans ; 
 nay, this their last and peremptory embassy, 
 authoritatively enjoins us to restore the Gre- 
 cians to their former independence. But, let 
 not one of you imagine, that we excite a war 
 for a trifling concern, if we refuse to repeal 
 that decree against the Megareans. The stress 
 iney lay upon it, that, if it be repealed, a 
 war shall not ensue, is nothing but a colour ; 
 nor think there will be any ground for self- 
 accusation, though for so trifling a concern you 
 have recourse to arms; since that concern, 
 trifling as it is, includes within it the full proof 
 and demonstration of Athenian spirit. If, for 
 instance, you condescend to this demand, you 
 will immediately be enjoined some other con- 
 descension of greater consequence, as if this 
 your compliance was owing to the prevalence 
 of your fear. But, if at once you strenuously 
 refuse to hearken to them, you will convince 
 them in a manner clearly to be understood, 
 that they must treat with you for the future as 
 with men who axe their equals, 
 
 "From the present crisis I exhort you 
 therefore to form a resolution, either timely 
 to make your submission before you begin to 
 suffer ; or, if we shall determine for war (which 
 to me seemeth most expedient), without re- 
 garding the pretext of it, be it important or be 
 it trifling, to refuse every the least concession, 
 nor to render the tenure of what we now pos- 
 sess precarious and uncertain. For not only 
 the greatest, but the most inconsiderable de- 
 mand, if authoritatively enjoined by equals 
 upon their neighbours, before justice hath de- 
 cided the point, hath the very same tendency 
 to make them slaves. But, from the posture 
 in which the affairs of both parties are at pre- 
 sent, that we may risk a war with a prospect 
 of success as fine and as inviting as our rivals 
 can — suffer me distinctly to set the reasons 
 before you, and be convinced of their weight. 
 " The Peloponnesians are a people, who 
 subsist by their bodily labour, without wealth 
 either in the purses of individuals, or in any 
 public fund. Again, in wars of long continu- 
 ance, or wars by sea, they are quite unprac- 
 tised ; since the hostilities in which they have 
 been embroiled with one another have been 
 short and transient, in consequence of their 
 poverty. Such people can neither completely 
 man out a fleet, nor frequently march land- 
 armies abroad, abandoning the care of their 
 
 domestic concerns, even whilst from these 
 they must answer a large expense, and, more 
 than this, are excluded the benefit of the sea. 
 Funds of money are a much surer support of 
 war, than contributions ei^^acted by force. And 
 men who subsist by the labour of their hands, 
 are more ready to advance a service with their 
 bodies than with their money ; since the former, 
 though exposed, they strongly presume will 
 survive the danger, but the latter they appre- 
 hend must be too speedily exhausted, especially 
 if the war run out into a greater length than 
 they expect, which will probably be the case. 
 In a single battle, it is true, the Peloponne- 
 sians and their confederates are able to make 
 head against united Greece ; but they are not 
 able to support a war of continuance against an 
 enemy, in all respects provided better than 
 themselves ; since by one general council they 
 are not guided, but execute their momentary 
 schemes in sudden and hasty efforts : since 
 farther, havmg all of them an equality of suf- 
 frage, and being of different descents, each of 
 them is intent on the advancement of a separate 
 interest. In such circumstances no grand de- 
 sign can ever be accomplished. Some of them 
 are eager to obtain a speedy vengeance on a 
 foe; others are chiefly intent on preserving 
 their substance from unnecessary waste. It 
 is long before they can meet together to con- 
 sult ; and then, with great precipitancy, they 
 form their public determinations, as the largest 
 part of their time is devoted to domestic con- 
 cerns. Each thinks it impossible, that the 
 public welfare can be prejudiced by his owi) 
 particular negligence, but that others are intent 
 on watching for himself to share the benefit ; 
 and, whilst this error universally prevaileth 
 amongst all the several members, the general 
 welfare insensibly drops to ruin. But the 
 greatest obstruction to them will be a scarcity 
 of money, which as they can but slowly raise, 
 their steps must needs be dilatory ; and the 
 urgent occasions of war can never tarry. 
 
 " As for any forts they can erect within our 
 territory, or their application to a navy, it is 
 beneath us to form any apprehensions from 
 thence. To effectuate the former, would be 
 difficult for a people of equal strength, in a 
 season of tranquility : much more so must it 
 be, upon the lands of an open enemy, and when 
 we are empowered to put the same expedients 
 in execution against them. And, if they should 
 fix a garrison in Attica, they might by excur- 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 49 
 
 8ions or desertions from us annoy some part of 
 our territory ; but, whatevei works they can 
 raise will be insufficient to block us up, to 
 prevent our descents upon their coasts, and 
 making reprisals upon them by our fleets, 
 wherein we are superior. For we are better 
 qualified for land-service by the experience we 
 have gained in that of the sea, than they for 
 service at sea by the experience at land. To 
 learn the naval skill they will find to be by 
 no means an easy task. For even you, who 
 have been in constant exercise ever since 
 the Persian invasion, have not yet attained 
 to a mastery in the science. How then shall 
 men, brought up to tillage and strangers to 
 the sea, whose practice farther will be ever 
 interrupted by us, through the continual annoy- 
 ance which our larger number of shipping 
 will give them, effect any point of eclat 1 
 Against small squadrons they might indeed 
 be sometimes adventurous, emboldening their 
 want of skill by multiplying their numbers : 
 but, when awed by superior force, they will 
 of necessity desist; and so, by practice in- 
 terrupted, the growth of their skill will be 
 checked, and in consequence of it their fears 
 be increased. The naval, like other sciences, 
 is the effect of art. It cannot be learned by 
 accident, nor usefully exercised at starts; or 
 rather, there is nothing wliich so much requir- 
 eth an uninterrupted application. 
 
 " If, farther, they should secrete the funds 
 laid up at Olympia and Delphi, and endeavour, 
 by an increase of pay, to seduce from our ser- 
 vice the foreigners who are on board our fleets ; 
 — in case we were not their equals in strength, 
 and they themselves and such foreigners could 
 entirely apply themselves to the work — this 
 then might be terrible indeed. But nought 
 would it avail them now, whilst — what is our 
 peculiar advantage — we have commanders Athe- 
 nian bom and seamen to man our fleets, in 
 larger number and of greater skill than all 
 the rest of Greece together. Besides, in so 
 dangerous a crisis, not one of these foreigners 
 would think of bartering an exile from his own 
 settlement, and a desertion to that side where 
 the prospect of victory is not near so inviting, 
 for an enlargement of his pay of few days' con- 
 tinuance. 
 
 "The state of the Peloponnesians I judge 
 to be such, or very nearly such, as, I have des- 
 cribed it; whereas, our own is exempt from 
 14 
 
 those defects which I have pointed out in them, 
 and enjoys other great advantages far beyond 
 their competition. Grant, that they may in- 
 vade our territories by land : we too shall make 
 descents upon theirs. And — whether is the 
 greatest damage, only some part of Peloponne- 
 sus, or all Attica put to fire and sword — will 
 admit of no comparison. In the former case, 
 they will have no other land to repair the 
 damage, but what they must earn by dint of 
 arms : whilst we have large tracts already in 
 our power, both in the islands and on the main. 
 — Of vast consequence indeed is the dominion 
 of the sea. But — consider it with attention. 
 For, were we seated upon an island, which of 
 us would be subdued with greater difficulty I 
 — And now, you ought to think, that our pre- 
 sent situation is as nearly as possible the same ; 
 and so, to evacuate your lands and houses here, 
 to confine your defence to the sea, and to 
 Athens itself; and not, exasperated against 
 the Peloponnesians for the sake of those, to 
 hazard a battle against superior numbers. 
 Should we be thus victorious, we must fight it 
 over again with another body not inferior ; and 
 should we be vanquished, at that instant we 
 lose all our dependents, the very essence of 
 our strength. For the moment we cease to be 
 able to awe them by our forces, they will be 
 no longer obedient to our commands. We 
 ought not to wail and lament for the loss of 
 our houses or our lands,, but for the lives of 
 our people: because lands and houses can 
 never acquire men, but are by men acquired. 
 
 " Durst I presume on a power to persuade, 
 I would exhort you to march out yourselves, 
 with your own hands to execute the waste, 
 and let the Peloponnesians see that for things 
 of such value you will never think of compli- 
 ance. I have many other inducements to hope 
 for victory, if, intending this war alone, you 
 will forbear the ambition of enlarging your do- 
 minions, and not plunge into voluntary super- 
 fluous hazards. For, in truth, I am more 
 afraid of our own indiscretions than the schemes 
 of the enemy. But the explanation of what at 
 present I only hint at, shall be reserved till 
 due occasions offer in the course of action. 
 Let us now dismiss the ambassadors with the 
 following answer : 
 
 " That we will open our market and har- 
 bours to the Megareans, provided the Laceds- 
 monians, in their prohibition of foreigners, ei 
 
50 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 1. 
 
 cept us and onr confederates : for neither was 
 that act in us, nor will this act in them be con- 
 trary to treaty. 
 
 " That we will suffer the states to govern 
 themselves at their own discretion, if they 
 were possessed of that right when the treaty 
 was made, and so soon as ever they relax the 
 necessity they lay upon the states in their own 
 league of goyerning themselves by that model 
 which suits best the Lacedaemonian interest, 
 and allow them the choice of their own polity. 
 
 " That, farther, we are willing to submit to 
 a judicial determination according to treaty. 
 
 " That a war shall not begin, but will retali- 
 ate, upon those that do. 
 
 " Such an answer is agreeable to justice, and 
 becomes the dignity of the Athenian state. 
 But you ought to be informed, that a war un- 
 avoidably there will be; that the greater ala- 
 crity, we show for it, the more shall we damp 
 the spirits of our enemies in their attacks ; and, 
 that the greatest dangers are ever the source 
 of the greatest honours to communities as well 
 as individuals. It was thus that our fathers 
 withstood the Medes, and rushing to arms with 
 resources far inferior to ours, nay abandoning 
 all their substance, by resolution more than 
 fortune, by courage more than real strength, 
 beat back the Barbarian, and advanced this state 
 to its present summit of grandeur. From them 
 we ought not to degenerate, but by every effort 
 within our ability avenge it on our foes, and 
 deliver it down to posterity, unblemished and 
 unimpaired." 
 
 In this manner Pericles spoka; and the 
 Athenians, judging that what he had advised 
 was most for their interest, decreed in confor- 
 mity to his exhortation. They returned a par- 
 ticular answer to the Lacedaemonians, according 
 to his directions, nay in the very words of his 
 motion ; and in fine concluded — that " they 
 would do nothing upon command, but were 
 ready to submit the points in contest to a judi- 
 cial determination, according to treaty, upon a 
 fair and equal footing." Upon this, the am- 
 bassadors departed; and here all negotiations 
 came to a conclusion. 
 
 Such were the pretexts and dissensions on 
 both sides previous to the war, and which took 
 their first rise from the business of Epidamnus 
 and Corcyra. These however never inter- 
 rupted their commercial dealings nor mutual 
 intercourse, which still were carried on without 
 the intervention of heralds, but not without 
 
 suspicions. For such incidents manifestly 
 tended to a rupture, and must infallibly end it 
 
 » As the Athenians were a free people, they made use 
 of their liberty on ail occasions to asperse, calumniate, 
 and ridicule the great men amongst them. They were 
 at tliis time exhibited on the st;^^e by name; and Aris* 
 tophanes, whose plays were acted during the Pelopon- 
 nesian war, liath ridiculed the. cotemporary statesmeu 
 and commanders with the utmost petu.'ancy and viru- 
 lence. The Athenians afterwards thought proper to 
 restrain this licentiousness of their comic pools; but it 
 maynot be amiss in the course of the notes to quote oc- 
 casionally some passages from him, to show my coun- 
 trymen how much writing libels differs from writing 
 history; and that where lilierty is abused, no public 
 merit nor private worth can defend its owners from the 
 malice of faction or the petulance of bulfoons. 
 
 Our historian hath laid open the true and pretended 
 causes of the Pelqponncsian war. Let us now see, how 
 affairs were represented on the stage of Athens. His 
 comedy of The Acharnians was exhiSiited by Aristo- 
 phanes at Athens in the sixth year of this war, after 
 the death of Pericles. The decree against Megara is 
 tlie ground-work of it; one Dicsopolis of tlie borough 
 of Acharnte is the droll of the play, and amply ridi- 
 cules it to a set of his neigbours. 
 
 "Do not be angry," says he, "if though a beggar I 
 presume to talk to Athenians about a^airs of state, and 
 for once play tragedian. It the province of tragedy 
 to give a just representation of things; and I am going 
 to speak in a just manner of very sad tilings indeed. 
 Cleon will not be able »o catch me this bout, for tradu- 
 cing my countrymen ^ the hearing of strangers. We 
 are here by ourselves, and to-day is the festival of Bac- 
 chus. The strangers are not yet come, nor the tributes, 
 nor the confederates from other states: we are here snug 
 by ourselves, all of us true-blooded Athenians. Those 
 odd creatures the sojourners, 1 look upon as the chaff of 
 Athens. And now to speak sincerely, I hate the Lace- 
 diemonians from the bottom of my soul; and I heartily 
 wish that Neptune, the god adored at Taenarus, would 
 give them an earthquake, and tumble down all their 
 Iiouees upon their heads. They have made sad work 
 with me, all my vineyards are quite destroyed by the 
 rogues. But, my dear friends and countrymen here pre- 
 sent, why do we blame the Lacediemonians for tills? 
 And mind, Sirs, I cast no aspersion on our own state; 
 1 aim at nobody employed in the affairs of the admini- 
 stration, but at a parcel of sad rascals, scurvy, low, in- 
 famous scoundrels, who are eternally bringing in forma- 
 tions against a Megarean pair of paniers. If they once 
 set eye but on a cucumber, a leveret, a sucking-pig, a 
 sprig of parsley, or a grain of salt, they swear at once 
 they belonged to Megareans, and were sold that very 
 day. These things, however, though the general prac- 
 tice, are of small signification. Aparcel of jolly fellows, 
 deep in their cups, had stole away from Megara that 
 jade SimiEtha. The IMegareans, exasperated at the loss 
 of their wench, made reprisals by carrying off a brace 
 of strumpets that belonged to Aspasia. And thus this 
 cursed war, which plagues all Greece, took its rise from 
 three strumpets. Ay, on account of three wliorcs, 
 Olympian Pericles began to storm, he lightened, he 
 thundered, roused all Greece to arms;, he made new 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 51 
 
 laws as fast as so many balUds, that the poor dogs of 
 Megara must be found neither in the fields, nor the 
 markets, nor by sea, nor by land. Upon this, being just 
 ready to starve, away they go to Lanediemon, to get 
 the decree reversed which had been made oti account 
 of three whores. It would not do, embassy after em. 
 bassy had no avail, and then immediately rose all tliis 
 clr^ttering of shields." 
 
 Calumny hath a dart always left in her quiver, and 
 in another comedy of Aristophanes we find another 
 let fly at Pericles. This was, his being an accomplice 
 with Phidias in eecreting some of the gold issued from, 
 the public treasury for the statue of Minerva in the cit- 
 adel, the workmanship of that celebrated artist. In 
 bis comedy called The Peace, Mercury says — " Ye wise 
 husbandmen, attend to my words, if you have a mind 
 to know how things came into this aad confusion. Phi- 
 dias was the fir^t cause of it by cheating the puhlic 
 Then Pericles helped it forward, for fear he should 
 share the fate of Phidias. He stood in awe of your 
 tempers; he was afraid of falling under your censure; 
 so, to prevent his own personal danger, he set the 
 whole community in a flame, by lighting up first that 
 little spark of the decree against Megara. He then 
 blew up that spark into this mighty war, the smoke of 
 which hath fetched tears from all the eyes of Greece, 
 from Grecians on both sides." 
 
 Pericles had employed Phidias in adorning Athens. 
 The fine taste of the patron and fine execution of the 
 artist have been universally acknowledged. An accu- 
 sation however was preferred against Phidias by one 
 
 
 of his workmen, thai he had secreted eollr-^'^old. By 
 the advice of Pericles he had laid it on so artfully, that 
 it might be taken off without pi-ejudicing the statue. 
 The trial accordingly was made, and the gold found to 
 answer weight. It seems however that Phidias was 
 banished; because, as the enemies of Pericles attacked 
 him at the same time, for impiety, in the persons of his 
 beloved Aspasia and his preceptor in philosophy Anax- 
 agoras, and for acheat in that of his favourite artist, 
 he had only influence enough to save the former, by 
 pleading earnestly for her, and softening his plea with 
 abundant tears. 
 
 Both Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos have recorded a 
 third story of Pericles in relation to this war. It is this 
 — Alcibiades, then a youth, saw him in a very pensive 
 and melancholy mood, and demanded the reason of it. 
 Pericles told him, " great sums of public money had 
 passed through his hands, and he knew not how to 
 make up his accounts." "Contrive then," replied Al- 
 cibiades, " to give no account at all." And in pursu- 
 ance of this advice he is said to have involved the state 
 in the Peloponnesian war. But is not Thucydides more 
 to be depended upon than a whole host of writers of 
 scandal, memoirs, private history, and satire? If we 
 listen to the latter, there never was and never will be 
 any truth in history; there never was, nor is there thia 
 moment, any true worth or merit in the world. A 
 buffoon can degrade a bero, a spiteful satirist cloud 
 every good quality in others, and the ears and hearts 
 of men will be filled with nothing but detraction and 
 slander. 
 
THE 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 BOOK 11. 
 
 T«AB I. Hostilities begin. The Thebans by night surprise Flatiea, but arc afterwards repulsed and slaughtired. 
 The Feloponnesians invade Attica : the Athenians in their turn cruise and make descents on the coast of 
 Peloponnesus, A public funeral solemnized at Athens, for those who fell in the hrst campaign, and the ora- 
 tion spoke on that occasion by Pericles. — II. Early the next year Attica again invaded. The plague breaks 
 
 »out in Athens. Its symptoms, progress, and mortality described. The'Athenians being greatly dejected, 
 murmur against Pericles ; his justification. The Ambraciots war against the Amphilochiana. The surrender 
 ofPotidtea. — III. In the beginning of the third year the Peloponnesians appear before Platxa ; a parley 
 without effect: the siege is begun and carried on with great industry and art. The Feloponnesians beaten 
 at sea by Phormio in the gulf of Crissa ; and when reinforced beaten by him a second time before Nau pactua. 
 A project to seize the Pirsus quite disconcerted. War between Thracians and Macedonians. Motions in 
 Acarnania, with an account of that country. 
 
 Hbitce instantly commenceth the war between 
 the Peloponnesians and Athenians,' and the 
 confederates on both sides — during whiclf they 
 had no kind of intercourse with one another 
 without the herald ; and now once engaged, 
 carried it on without intermission. The parti- 
 cular incidents of it are orderly related by the 
 Summer and the Winter. 
 
 The thirty-years peace, which was made af- 
 ter the conquest of Eubcea, had now lasted 
 fourteen : but in the fifteenth year, when Chry- 
 sis had been forty-eight years priestess at Ar- 
 gos, when .^nesias was EphOrus at Sparta, 
 and Pythodorus ten months Archon at Athens, 
 in the sixth month after the battle at Potidaea, 
 and in the very beginning of the spring — a 
 body of Thebans, somewhat above three hun- 
 dred, under the command of Pythangelus the 
 son of Phylidas, and Diemporus the son of 
 Onetoridas, two of the rulers of Bceotia, about 
 the first sleep, got into Platsea^ of Boeotia with 
 
 • Before Christ 431. 
 
 a Platsa was a city and petty state in Boeotia, on the 
 confines of Attica. The inhabitants of it had ever been 
 so firmly attached to the liberties of Greece, that it 
 drew upon them the lasting rancour of the Thebans, 
 who had joined the Persians when they invaded Greece, 
 and pef suaded them to burn down Flatiea. The FlattB- 
 
 their arms, which place was then in alliance 
 with the Athenians. They were induced to 
 this attempt, and had the gates opened to Ihem, 
 by Nauclides and associates, citizens of Platsa, 
 who had formed a design for the sake of ag- 
 grandizing themselves, to destroy all their fel- 
 low-citizens averse to their schemes, and to 
 gain the city for the Thebans. But the aflait 
 was managed by Eurymachus, the son of Lc- 
 ontiades, a person of the greatest authority 
 among the Thebans. For the Thebans, fore- 
 seeing a war unavoidable, had, even now while 
 peace was actually subsisting and the war not 
 yet declared, a strong desire to get possession 
 of PlatEDa, which had been at eternal enmity 
 with them. No regular watch was as yet kept 
 in it, which was a means of facilitating their 
 entrance. When they had gained admission, 
 they drew themselves up in order of battle on 
 the public forum, contrary to the scheme pto- 
 posed by the conspirators, of marching imme- 
 
 ans engaged with the Athenians on the side of Greece, 
 in the famous battle fought within their own territory. 
 The Athenians, to show their gratitude, gave them a 
 place in the fine battle-piece painted in the Pieclle in 
 honour of the victory, made them all citizens of Atfarns, 
 and ever after cbncluded their religious solemnltiw 
 with n prayer for the prosperity of ttaePIatKans. 
 K 53 
 
54 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book n. 
 
 diately to the houses of their enemies, and put- 
 ting them to the sword. Their own design 
 was, publicly to offer some fair proposals, and 
 gain the city by an amicable composition. 
 With this view, their herald proclaimed aloud, 
 that — " All who were willing to enter into 
 league, according to the ancient custom of all 
 Boeotians,' should come and join their arms 
 with them." By this method they thought 
 the city would easily be brought to an accom- 
 modation. 
 
 The Platseans, when they found that the The- 
 bans were already got in and had surprised the 
 town, being in great consternation, and thinking 
 the enemy more numerous than they really were, 
 for the night prevented a view of them,came soon 
 to a composition ; and accepting what terms they 
 offered, made no resistance ; especially as they 
 found that violence was offered to no man. 
 Yet, by means of the parley, they had disco- 
 vered that the Thebans were few in number ; 
 and judged, should they venture an attack, 
 they might easily overpower them : — for the 
 bulk of the Platseans had not the least inclina- 
 tion to revolt from the Athenians. It was at 
 length concluded, that this point should be at- 
 tempted, after having conferred together, by 
 digging through the partition walls of one an- 
 other's houses, to avoid the suspicion which 
 going through the streets might have occasion- 
 ed. Then along the streets they arranged car- 
 riages without the oxen, to serve them instead 
 of a rampart, and made a proper disposition 
 for every thing necessary for immediate exe- 
 cration. When they had got every thing ready 
 In the Best manner they were able, watching 
 till night began to vanish and the first dawn ap- 
 pear, they marched from their houses towards 
 the Thebans, that they might fall upon them 
 before the full light should embolden their re- 
 sistance, and give them equal advantages in the 
 fight, and that they might be more intimidated 
 by being charged in the dark, and sensible of 
 disadvantage from their ignorance of the city. 
 
 » BcbDtia was one large republic formed by the union 
 of several little states. The sovereignty (as Thucydides 
 informs ua, book the fifth) was lodged in four councils, 
 composed of deputies sent from every city in the union. 
 These were the states general, and sat at Thebes, the 
 principal city of Ba:otia. The executive and military 
 were lodged in eleven persons, chosen annually, and 
 styled Rulers of Bffiotia, in whose election each city had 
 a share. They rolled, and at the battle of Delium, Pa- 
 gondas was in this chief command, in right of Thebes. 
 Platsa had no share in this union, but was closely allied 
 with and under the protection of Athens. 
 
 The attack was immediately begun, and both 
 sides soon came to action. The Thebans, 
 when they found themselves thus circumvented, 
 threw themselves into an oval, and wherevlir 
 assaulted, prevented impression. Twice or 
 thrice they beat them back with success ; and 
 when the assaults were again with a loud noise 
 repeated, when the very women and menial 
 servants were shouting and screaming from the 
 houses all around, and throwing stones and 
 tiles amongst them, incommoded further by the 
 rain which had fallen plentiful that night, they 
 were seized with fear, and abandoning their 
 defence, fled in confusion about the city. The 
 greatest part of them running in the dark and 
 the dirt, knew not any of the passages by 
 Which they could get out, (for this affair hap- 
 pened upon the change of the moon,) and were 
 pursued by men who, knowing them all, preven- 
 ted their escape, so that many of them perished. 
 The gates by which they entered, and which 
 only had been opened, one 6f the Platasans had 
 barred fast by t,hrusting the point of. a spear 
 into the staple instead of a bolt, so that they 
 could not possibly get out there. Thus pursu- 
 ed about the city, some of them got upon the 
 walls, and threw themselves over, but most of 
 these were killed by the fall : some of them 
 found a gate unguarded, and a woman supply- 
 ing them with a hatchet, they cut the bolt in 
 pieces unperceived, though few only escaped 
 by this means, for they were soon discovered. 
 Others were separately slain in the different 
 quarters of the city. But the greatest part, 
 and chiefly those who had kept in abody, threw 
 themselves into a great house contiguous to the 
 walls, the doors of which happened to be open, 
 imagining the doors of this house to be the ci- 
 ty gates and a certain passage to a place of 
 safety. When the Platseans saw them thus 
 shut up, they consulted together, Avhether they 
 should fire the house and burn them all in their 
 inclosure, or reserve them for some other pun- 
 ishment. But at last these, and ail the other 
 Thebans yet surviving, who were scattered a- 
 bout the city, agreed to give up their arms, and 
 surrender themselves to the Platseans prisoners 
 at discretion. Such was the issue of this at- 
 tempt on PlatiEa. 
 
 The other Thebans, who ought during night 
 to have come up with all their strength, to rein- 
 force the first body in case they miscarried, and 
 were still upon the march, when the news of 
 this defeat met them, advanced with all possi- 
 
YEAH I.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 55 
 
 Me expedition. PIfitea is distant from Thebes 
 about 'seventy stadia, and the rain which fell 
 that night had retarded their march ; for the 
 river Asopus vf as so much swelled by it that 
 it was not easily fordable. It was owing to 
 the march in such a rain and the difficulty of 
 passing this, river, that they came not up till 
 their men were either slain or made prisoners. 
 When, the Thebans were convinced of that 
 event, they cast their, attention towards tlie 
 Plataeans who were still without ; for the peo- 
 ple of Platffia,were scattered about the adjacent 
 country with their implements of husbandry, 
 because annoyance in time of peace was quite 
 unexpected. They were desirous to catch 
 some of these as exchange for their own people 
 within the city, if any were yet living and 
 prisoners there. On this they were fully bent ; 
 but in the midst of their project the Platasans, 
 who suspected the probability of some such de- 
 sign, and were anxious for their people yet 
 without, despatched a herald to the Thebans 
 representing to them " the injustice of the at- 
 tempt already made; since, treaties subsisting, 
 they had endeavoured to surprise tlie city;" 
 and then warned them "to desist from any 
 violence to those vrithout. If not, they posi- 
 tively declared they would put all the prisoners 
 yet alive to the sword ; whereas, in case they re- 
 tired peaceably out of their territory, they would 
 deliver them up unhurt." This account the 
 Thebans give, and say farther it was sworn to. 
 The Plataeans disown the promise of an im- 
 mediate disqharge of |the prisoners, which was 
 reseijVed, for ^erms to be agreed on in a subse- 
 quent, ,^rcaty, and flatly deny that they swore. 
 Th,e( Thebans however retired out of their terri- 
 tory, without committing any violence. But 
 the Platffians, when they had with expedition 
 fetched into the city all their effects of value 
 that were out in the fields, immediately put all 
 their prisoners to the sword. The number of 
 those that were taken was one hundred and 
 eighty. Eurymachus was amongst them, with 
 whom the traitors iad concerted the surprise. 
 And this done, they despatched a messenger to 
 Athens : and restored to the Thebans their dead 
 under truce. And then they regulated the af- 
 fairs of the city in the manner most suitable to 
 their present situation. 
 
 The news of the surprisal of Platsea had 
 8oon reached the Athenians, who immediately 
 
 < About seven English miles. 
 
 apprehended all the Boeotians then in Attica, 
 and despatched a herald to Platsa with orders 
 "to proceed no farther against the Theban 
 prisoners, till they should send their determi- 
 nation about them ;" for they were not yet in- 
 formed of their having been actually put to 
 death. The first messenger had been sent 
 away immediately upon the irruption of the 
 Thebans — the second so soon as they were 
 defeated and made prisoners — as to what hap- 
 pened afterwards, they were utterly in the 
 dark. Thus ignorant of what had since been 
 done, the Athenians despatched away their he- 
 rald, who upon his arrival found them all de- 
 stroyed. Yet after this, the Athenians march- 
 ing a body of troops to Platasa, carried thither 
 all necessary provisions, left a garrison in the 
 place, and brought away all the hands that 
 would be useless in a siege, with the women 
 and children. 
 
 After this business of Plataea, and so mani- 
 fest a breach of peace, the Athenians made all 
 necessary preparations for immediate war. The 
 Laoedsemonians also and their confederates took 
 the same measures. Nay, both sides were in- 
 tent on despatching^ embassies to the king,' and 
 to several other Barbarian powers, wherever 
 they had hope of forming some effectual inter- 
 est for themselves, and spared no pains to win 
 those states over to their alliance, which had 
 hitherto been independent. In the Laccda:- 
 monian league, besides the ships already fur- 
 nished out for them in Italy and Sicily, the 
 confederates there were ordered to prepare a 
 new quota, proportioned to the abilities of the 
 several states, that the whole number of their 
 shipping might be mounted to five hundred. — 
 They were farther to get a certain sum of money 
 
 a By this means the intestine quarrels of Greece were 
 goitig to tlirow a power into the ])ands of tlie Persian 
 monarch, which he could not obtain by force. Each 
 partly could cringe to tlie common enemy, in order to 
 obtain subsidies from him toenable them to distress each 
 olficr. And thus the balance of power rested at last in 
 his hands, and lie ticcame for a time supreme arlnter of 
 Greece. Aristophanes, in his comedy of The Achar- 
 nians, halh described these embassies and the Persian 
 monarch too, witli excessive bulfoonery, but quite too 
 low and ridiculous to quote. He bears hard upon tlie 
 Athenian ambassadors for lengthening out the lime of 
 their employ as much as possible, for the lucre of the sa- 
 lary paid them by the state, which isffliere mentioned 
 at two drnclimas a day. Was it eitlier avarice or pub 
 lie rapine— this exorbitant salary of 15id. a day to an 
 ambassador from the republic. of Athena to the great 
 king of Persia? 
 
 3 Artaxerxes Longimanus. 
 
56 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book II. 
 
 in readiness; but in other respects to remain qui- 
 et, and till their preparations could be completed, 
 never to admit more than one Athenian vessel 
 at a time within their ports. — The Athenians 
 made a careful survey of the strength of their 
 own alliance, and sent pressing embassies to 
 the places round about Peloponnesus, to Cor- 
 cyra, to Cephallene, to the Acarnanians, and 
 to Zacynthus ; plainly seeing, that if these were 
 in their interest, they might securely attack 
 Peloponnesus on all sides. — The minds of 
 both parties were not a little elated, but were 
 eager after and big with war. For it is natu- 
 ral to man in the commencement of every im- 
 portant enterprise, to be more than usually 
 alert. The young men, who were at this time 
 numerous in Peloponnesus, numerous also at 
 Athens, were for want of experience quite fond 
 of the rupture. And all the rest of Greece 
 stood attentively at gaze on this contention 
 between the two principal states. Many ora- 
 cles were tossed about, the soothsayers sung 
 abundance of predictions, amongst those who 
 were upon the point to break, and even in the 
 cities that were yet neutral. Nay, Delos had 
 been lately shook with an earthquake, which it 
 had never been before in the memory of the 
 Greeks. It was said, and indeed believed, that 
 this was a prognostic of something extraordi- 
 nary to happen ; and all other accidents of an 
 uncommon nature whatever were sure to be 
 wrested to the same meaning. 
 
 The generality of Greece was indeed at this 
 time much the best affected to the LacedtBrno- 
 nians, who gave out the specious pretence, that 
 " they were going to recover the liberty of 
 Greece." Every one made it both his private 
 passion and his public care, to give them all 
 possible succour both in word and act ; and 
 every one thought that the business certainly 
 flagged in those places where he himself was 
 not present to invigorate proceedings. So ge- 
 neral an invasion was there at this time formed 
 against the Athenians, when some were passion- 
 ately desirous to throw off their yoke, and 
 others apprehensive of falling under their sub- 
 jection. — With such preparations and such dis- 
 positions did they run into the war. 
 
 The states in league with either party, upon 
 the breaking out of the war, were these. — In 
 confederacy with the Lacedtemonians, were all 
 Peloponnesians within the Isthmus, except the 
 Argives and Achsans, for these had treaties 
 subsisting tvith both parties. But of the 
 
 Achseans the Pellenians singly were the first 
 who went over, though they were afterwards 
 joined by all the rest. Without Peloponnesus 
 were the Megareans, Locrians, Boeotians, Pho- 
 cians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians. 
 Of these they were supplied with shipping by 
 the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pel- 
 lenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, Leucadians; with 
 horse by the Boeotians, Phocians, Locrians ; 
 and the other states furnished them with foot. 
 This was the confederacy of the Lacedasmoni- 
 ans. — With the Athenians were the Chians, 
 Lesbians, Platseans, the Messenians of Nau- 
 pactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyre- 
 ans, Zacynthians, and other states tributary to 
 them in so many nations : namely, the maritime 
 people of Caria, the Dorians' that border upon 
 the Carians, Ionia, Hellespont, the cities on 
 the coast of Thrace, all the islands situated to 
 the east between Peloponnesus and Crete, and 
 all the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera. Of 
 these, they were supplied with shipping by the 
 Chians, Lesbians, Corcyreans; the rest sup- 
 plied them with foot and with money. This 
 was the alliance on both sides, and the ability 
 for the war. 
 
 The Lacedffimohians, immediately after the 
 attempt on Platsea, sent circular orders to the 
 states both within and without Peloponnesus, 
 to draw their quotas of aid together, and get 
 every thing in readiness for a foreign expedi- 
 tion, as intending to invade Attica. When all 
 was ready, they assembled on the day fippoint- 
 ed, with two-thirds of the force of every ^i;^,e, 
 at the Isthmus. When the w|ipl? army, -,>ira^ 
 thus^ drawn together, Archidamus king of ,tjie 
 Lacedffimonians, who commanded in th^'ejtpe- 
 dition, convened the commanders from all, the 
 auxiliary states, with all those that were in au- 
 thority, and most fitting to be present, and ad- 
 dressed them as follows ; 
 
 " Peloponnesians and allies, many are the 
 expeditions in which our fathers have been 
 engaged both within and without Peloponnesus. 
 Even some of us, who are more advanced in 
 years, are by no means unexperienced in the 
 business of war. Yet, never before did we take 
 the field with a force so great as the present. 
 But,numerous and formidabfe in arms as we may 
 
 » These were the Dorians, who were seated in the 
 islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Cnidus, according to the 
 scholiast. 
 
 ^ Plutarch informs us that the number amounted to 
 sixty thousand men. 
 
VEAR I.J 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAE. 
 
 57 
 
 now appear, we are however marching against a 
 most powerful state. Thus it is incumbent upon 
 us to .^how ourselves not inferior in valour to our 
 fathers, ii;>t to sink below the expectations of 
 the worU. The eyes of all Greece are fixed 
 attentively on our motions. — Their good will 
 to us, their hatred of the Athenians, make 
 them wish for our success in all our undertak- 
 ings. It is therefore our business, without 
 placing too great confidence in superior num- 
 bers, or trusting to the presumption that our 
 enemies dare not come out to fight us — for no 
 reasons like these, to relax our discipline, or 
 break the regularity of our march — but, the 
 commander of every confederate body and every 
 private soldier ought to keep within himself the 
 constant expectation of being engaged in action. 
 Uncertain are the turns of war ; great events 
 Btart up from a small beginning, and assaults 
 are given from indignation. Nay, frequently 
 an inferior number engaging with caution hath 
 proved too hard for a more numerous body, 
 whom contempt of their enemy exposeth to at- 
 tacks for which they are not prepared. Upon 
 hostile ground, it is always the duty of soldiers 
 to be resolutely bold, and to keep ready for action' 
 with proper circumspection. Thus will they be 
 always ready to attack with spirit, and be most 
 Cimly secured against a surprise. 
 
 " We are not marching against a people who 
 ere unable to defend themselves, but excellently 
 well qualified for it in every respect ; so that 
 we may certainly depend upon their advancing 
 against us to give us battle ; — nor yet perhaps 
 in motion, so long as no enemy appears ; but 
 most assuredly so when once they see us in 
 their territory, wasting and destroying their 
 substance. All men must kindle into wrath, 
 when uncommon injuries are unexpectedly 
 done them, when manifest outrage glares be- 
 fore them. Reflection then may indeed have 
 lost its power, but resentment most strongly 
 impels them to resistance. Something like 
 this may more reasonably be looked for from 
 Athenians than from other people. They es- 
 teem themselves worthy to command others, 
 and their spirit is more turned to make than to 
 Buflfer depredations. Against so formidable a 
 people are we now to march ; and by the event, 
 whatever it be, shall we acquire the greatest 
 glory or disgrace, for our ancestors and our- 
 selves. — Let it therefore be the business of 
 every man to follow his commander, observant 
 ia every point of discipline and the rules of 
 15 
 
 war, and obeying with expedition the orders you 
 receive. The finest spectacle and the strongest 
 defence is the uniform observation of discipline 
 by a numerous army." 
 
 When ArcTiidamus had finished his oration 
 and dismissed the assembly, the first thing ha 
 did was sending to Athens Melesippus a Spar- 
 tan, the son of Diacritus, to try whether the 
 Athenians were grown any thing more pliant, 
 since they found an army upon tlift march 
 against them. But they would not allow him 
 to come into the city, nor grant him a public 
 audience. For the advice of Pericles had be- 
 fore this gained the general assent, that " no 
 herald or embassy should be received from the 
 Lacedsemonians so long as they were in the 
 field against them." They send him back 
 therefore unheard, and ordered him " lO quit 
 their territories that very day ; that farther, the 
 Lacedaemonians shbuld retire within their own 
 frontier ; and then, if they had any thing to 
 transact with them, should send their ambassa- 
 dors for the purpose." They even commission 
 some persons to guard Melesippus back, that 
 he might have no conference with any person 
 whatever. When he was brought to the borders, 
 and received his dismission, he parted from 
 them with these words, " This day is the be- 
 ginning of great woes to the Grecians." Upon 
 his return to the camp, Arehidamus was con- 
 vinced that the Athenians were inflexible as 
 ever, so that he immediately dislodged and ad- 
 vanced with his army into their territories. — 
 The Bceotians sent their quota of foot and 
 their horse to join the Peloponnesians in this 
 expedition, but with the rest of their forces they 
 marched towards Plataea, and laid the country 
 waste. 
 
 Whilst the Peloponnesians were yet assem- 
 bling at the Isthmus, or yet on the march, be- 
 fore they had entered Attica, Pericles the son 
 of Xantippus, who with nine others had been 
 appointed to command the Athenian forces, 
 when he saw an in'uption from the Peloponne- 
 sians unavoidable, had conceived a suspicion 
 that Arehidamus, whom the hospitable' inter- 
 
 » Tlie tic of hospitality was sacred and inviolable 
 amongst tlieanrients. It was a necessary exertion of 
 humanity at tirst from tlie want of inns anii lodging- 
 houses, and was frequently improvetl into friendshiii 
 and endearment. This between Pericles and Arehi- 
 damus was merely of a private nature, between tlia 
 royal family of Sparta and a principal one in the repub- 
 lic of Athens. The family of AIi:i!>iades was the public 
 host of the Spartan state, and entertained their amba» 
 US 
 
58 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book ri. 
 
 course had made his friend, from a principle of 
 good-nalure willing to oblige him, would leave 
 his lands untouched, or, might be ordered to do 
 so by the policy of the Lacedsemonians, as they 
 had already demanded an excommunication on 
 his account ; by which means he must certainly 
 incur the public jealousy. He declared there- 
 fore to the Athenians, in a general assembly of 
 the people — that " though Archidamus was his 
 friend, he should not be so to the prejudice of the 
 state ; and that if the enemy spared his lands 
 and houses in the general ravage, he made a 
 free donation of them to the public ; so that 
 for any accident of that nature he ought not to 
 fall under their censure." He then exhorted 
 ^11 who were present, as he had done before — 
 " to prepare vigorously for war, and to with- 
 draw all their effects from out of the country, 
 — by no means to march out against the enemy, 
 but keep within the walls and mind the defence 
 of the city ; — to fit out their navy, in which 
 their strength principally consisted, and keep a 
 tight rein over all their dependents. By the 
 large tributes levied upon these, he said, their 
 power was chiefly to be supported, since suc- 
 cess in war was a constant result from prudent 
 measures and plentiful supplies. — ' He exhorted 
 them by no means to let -their spirits droop, 
 since, besides their certain revenue, six hun- 
 dred talents were annually paid them by their 
 tributary states, and they had still in the citadel 
 six thousand talents of silver coined." Their 
 primary fund was nine thousand seven hundred 
 talents, out of which had been taken what de- 
 frayed the expense of refitting the gates of the 
 citadel, of other public works, and the exigen- 
 
 «ndors and public miniBters. The state of Atlicns Ilad 
 likewise in nil places a public host who lodged their 
 •miiiiBlers. Yet amongst private persons it was a frank 
 ^iisinterested tie; when once they had eat salt together, 
 or sat at the same table, they regarded themselves as 
 under mutual obligations, which small point sought not 
 to abolish. They who swerved from this laudable oua- 
 ■tom through caprice or ingratitude were looked upon 
 as infamous execrable persons, 
 
 ' The account here given showeth Athens at this time 
 ■to have been a very opulent state. Reduced to English 
 money it stands tlius— The tribute paid them annually 
 amounted to L 1 16,250 sterling. The fund yet remain- 
 ing in the citadel was Z, 1,162,500, sterling. They had 
 expended Lately on their public works 3,700 talents, 
 which is equal to Z.716,875 sterling. The weight of the 
 gold on the statue of Minerva was 40 talents, which, 
 computing the talent only at 631b. Troy, to avoid frac- 
 'tionSj and the gold at i 4 sterling an ounce, amounts in 
 value a /.124,800 sterling. 
 
 , cies of Potidaea — " That, besides this, they 
 had gold and silver uncoined, both in public and 
 private repositories, many valuable vases des- 
 tined for religious uses and their public solem- 
 nities, and the Persian spoils, the whole value 
 of which would not amount to less iian five, 
 hundred talents." — He mentioned furt'iier, " the 
 great wealth that was stored up in other tem- 
 ples, which they had a right to use ; and if this, 
 right should be denied them, they might have 
 recourse to the golden ornaments of the goddess 
 herself." He declared " that her image had 
 about it to the weight of forty talents of gold 
 without alloy, all which might be taken off 
 from the statue. — That, for the preservation of 
 their country it might lawfully be employed ;" 
 but added, " that it ought afterwards to be am- 
 ply replaced." In this manner did he render 
 them confident that their sums of money wotjld 
 suffice. — He told them further, that " they had 
 thirteen thousand men that wore heavy armour, 
 exclusive of those that were in garrisons, and 
 the sixteen thousand on the guard of the city ;" 
 — for so large a number, draughted from the 
 youngest and oldest citizens and sojourners, 
 who wore the heavy armour, was employed 
 in this service upon the first invasion of their 
 enemies. For the length of the Phalerian 
 wall to the place where it joined the circle of 
 the city was ^thirty-five stadia, and that part of 
 the circular wall which was guarded was 'forty- 
 three in length ; but that which lay between 
 the long wall and the Phalerian had no guard. 
 The long walls continued down to the Pirieus 
 are ^forty stadia, but the outermost of them 
 only was guarded. The whole compass of the 
 Pira3us, including Munichia, is 'sixty stadia, 
 but then only one half of this had a guard.' — 
 He then assured them, that " they had, includ- 
 ing the archers, that were mounted, twelve 
 hundred horsemen, sixteen hundred archers, 
 and three hundred triremes fit for sea." — So 
 great in general, and no less in any one article, 
 were the military provisions of the Athenians, 
 when the Peloponnesians had formed the de- 
 sign of invading them, and both sides began the 
 war. — These, and such like arguments, was 
 
 a About ?i English miles. a Above 4 miles. 
 
 * About 4 English miles, » About 6 English miles. 
 
 « The whole compass of the walls of Athens was 178 
 stadia, or above 22 Attic miles. But, according to Dr 
 Arbuthnot, the Attic mile consisted of but 805 pace,s, 
 whereas the English is 1056. Hence, the compass of 
 Athens appears to have been about 17 English miles. 
 
VEAR I.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 59 
 
 Pericles continually employing, to convince 
 them tliat they were well able to carry on a 
 successful war. 
 
 The Athenians heard him with attention, 
 and followed his advice. They withdrew from 
 the country their children, their wives, all the 
 furniture of their houses there, pulling down 
 with their own hands the timber of which they 
 were built. Their flocks and their labouring- 
 cattle^ they sent over into Euboea and the adja- 
 cent islands. But this removal was a very grie- 
 vous business to them, since it had been the 
 ancient custom of many of the Athenians to 
 reside at large in the country. 
 
 Tliis method of living had been more habit- 
 ual to the Athenians than to any other Greeks, 
 from their first commencement as a people. 
 From the time of Cecrops and their first series 
 of kings down to Thesus, Attica had been in- 
 habited in several distinct towns, each of which 
 had its own archons ' and its own prytaneum ; 
 and, unless in times of danger, had seldom re- 
 course to the regal authority, since justice was 
 administered in every separate borough, and 
 each had a council of its own. Sometimes 
 they even warred against one another ; for in- 
 stance, the Eleusimans, when they sided with 
 Eumolpus against Erectheus. But when the 
 regal power devolved upon Theseus, a man of 
 an extensive understanding, and who knew how 
 to govern, in several respects he improved the 
 whole territory ; and besides, dissolving all the 
 councils and magistracies of the petty boroughs,'' 
 he removed them to the metropolis, as it is at 
 present, and constituting one grand senate 
 and prytaneum, made it the point of union in 
 which all concentred. Their private properties 
 he left to them entire, but made them rest 
 contented with Athens alone for their city : 
 which when all its subjects were now jointly 
 contributing to its support, was quickly enlarg- 
 ed, and delivered so by Theseus to the suc- 
 ceeding kings. In memory of this, from the 
 days of Theseus quite down to the present 
 time, the Athenians have held an anniversa- 
 ry solemnity to the goddess, which they call 
 Synoecia or Cohabitation. Before this, that 
 which is now the citadel, and that part which 
 lies on the south side of the citadel, was all the 
 
 1 Thatis — Magistrates of itsovvn, and a common hall, 
 in which those magistrates performed the duties of their 
 office in administering justice, and offering sacrifices, 
 and where they liad their diet at the public expense. 
 
 » The number of the boroughs in Attica was one hun- 
 dred seventy four. 
 
 city. The temples built either within the cita- 
 del or without sufficiently show it. For in the 
 south part of the city, particularly, stand the 
 temples of the Olympian Jove, of the Pythian 
 Apollo, of Terra, and of Bacchus in Limnae, 
 in honour of whom the old Bacchanalian 
 feasts are celebrated on the twelfth day of 
 the month Anthesterion :' which custom is 
 still retained to this day by the lonians of Attic 
 descent. All the other ancient temples are 
 seated in the same quarter. Near it also is 
 the fountain now called the Enneakrounos or 
 Nine-pipe, from the manner in which it was 
 embellished by the tyrants ;* but formerly, when 
 all the springs were open, called Callirrhoe ; 
 and which, as near at hand, they perferred on 
 the most solemn occasions. And that ancient 
 custom is to this day preserved, by making use 
 
 3 The English reader may perhaps .call this a hard 
 word, but I hope will not he frightened. The names of 
 other Attic montlis will occur in the sequel, which I 
 shall leave as I find tliera, because no exact correspon- 
 dence hath been found out between the Attic months, 
 which were lunar, and those now in use. Monsieur 
 Toureil, the celebrated French translator of Demos, 
 thenes, hath made it a very serious point. " I have long 
 doubted (says he) whether in my translation I should 
 give the months their old Greek names, or such as they 
 have in our language. The reason that made me balance 
 is the impossibility of computing the months so that they 
 shall answer exactly to our French. — My first determi- 
 nation was to date in our own manner; I chose to be 
 less exact, rather than frighten the greatest part of ray 
 readers by words to which they are not accustomed. 
 For what French ears would not be appalled at the 
 words, Thergolion, Boedromion, Elapheholian?" &c. 
 He then gives reasons for retaining Greek ones, and 
 adds, "I declare then once for all, that I am far from 
 pedantically affecting the terms of an old calendar con- 
 ceived in a language barbarous to numbers of people 
 who, shocked at the sound, would perhaps impute to 
 me a taste which, thank God, I have not. I protest that 
 to my ear, no less than to theirs, the French name of 
 the word would be more pleasing and would sound bet- 
 ter. But neither false delicacy nor vicious complaisance 
 hath been able to prevail with me to expose myself to 
 reproaches, for knowingly leading others into mistake, 
 and using words appropriated to Roman and solar 
 months, which have no correspondence with the lunar 
 or Attic." He says a deal on the subjecl so little aff^ec- 
 ting his countrymen, that since his death, they have 
 again thrown all the Greek terms into the margin, and 
 placed in the text the incongruous modern ones for the 
 sake of familiar sounds. If the English reader be as 
 delicate, he may read April or May at his option. The 
 ablest chronotogers are unable to exchange them into 
 currency with 'any tolerable exactness. A great deal 
 of learning might be also displayed about the days of the 
 month and the Grecian method of grunting them: but 
 as it is exceeding easy to translate these right, learning 
 may be excused in a point where no light la wanting 
 
 * The Pisistratids. 
 
60 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book II. 
 
 of the same water in connubial and many other 
 religious rites. And further, it is owing to 
 such their ancient residence in the citadel, that 
 it is eminently called by the Athenians to this 
 very day, The City. 
 
 In the manner above-mentioned, were the 
 Athenians for a long series of time scattered 
 about the country, in towns and communities 
 at their own discretion. And as not only the 
 more ancient, but even the latter Athenians 
 quite down to the present war, had still retained 
 the custom of dwelling about the country with 
 their families, the general removals into the 
 city, after they were formed into one body, 
 were attended with no small embarrassment ; 
 and particularly now, when they had been re- 
 fitting their houses, and resettling themselves 
 afler the Persian invasion. It gave them a very 
 sensible grief and concern to think, that they 
 must forsake their habitations and temples, 
 which, from long antiquity, it had been their 
 forefathers' and their own religious care to 
 frequent ; that they must quite alter their scene 
 of life, and each abandon as it were his native 
 home. When they were come into the city, 
 some fow had houses ready for their reception, 
 or sheltered themselves with their friends and 
 relations. The greater part were forced to 
 settle in the less frequented quarters of the 
 city, in all the buildings sacred to the gods and 
 heroes, except those in the citadel, the Eleusi- 
 nian, and any other from whence they were 
 excluded by religious awe. There was indeed 
 a spot of ground below the citadel, called the 
 Pelasgic, which to turn into a dwelling-place, 
 had not only been thought profaneness, but was 
 expressly forbid by the close of a line in a Py- 
 thian oracle, which said, 
 
 " Best is Pelasgic empty." 
 
 Yet this sudden urgent necessity constrained 
 them to convert it tp such a use. To me, I 
 own, that oracle seems to have carried a differ- 
 ent meaning from what they gave it. For the 
 calamities of Athens did not flow from the 
 profane habitation of this place, but from the 
 war which laid them under the necessity of 
 employing it in such a manner. The oracle 
 makes no mention of the war, but only hints 
 (hat its being some time inhabited would be 
 (trended with public misfortune. Alany of 
 them, further, were forced to lodge themselves 
 within the turrets of the walls, or wherever 
 (iey could find a vacant corner. The city was 
 
 not able to receive so large a contux of people. 
 But afterwards, the long' walls, and a great part 
 of the PiriEus, were portioned out to them for 
 little dwellings. At the same time they were 
 busied in the military preparations, gathering 
 together the confederate forces, and fitting out 
 a fleet of one hundred ships to infest Pelopon- 
 nesus. In affairs of such great importance 
 were the Athenians engaged. 
 
 The Peloponnesian army, advancing for- 
 wards, came up first to Oenoe, through which 
 they designed to break into Attica. Encamp- 
 ing before it, they made ready their engines, 
 and all other necessaries for battering the walls. 
 For Oenoe, being a frontier-town between 
 Attica and Boeotia, was walled about, since the 
 Athenians were used, upon the" breaking out 
 of war, to throw a garrison into it. The enemy 
 made great preparations for assaulting it, and 
 by this and other means spent no little time 
 before it. 
 
 This delay was the occasion of drawing very 
 heavy censures on Archidamus. He had be« 
 fore this been thought too dilatory in gathering 
 together the confederate army, and too much 
 attached to the Athenians, because ho never 
 declared warmly for the war. But after the 
 army was drawn together, his long stay at the 
 Isthmus, and the slow marches he had made 
 from thence, exposed him to calumny, which 
 was still heightened by the length of the siege 
 of Oenoe : for, in this interval of delay, the 
 Athenians had without molestation withdrawn 
 all their effects from the country, though it 
 was the general opinion, that, had the Pclopo- 
 ponnesians advanced with expedition, they 
 might undoubtedly have seized them, were it not 
 for these dilatory proceedings of Archidamus. 
 Under such a vfeight of resentment did Archi- 
 damus still lie with his army before Oenoe, 
 His remissness was said to be owing to his pre- 
 sumption, that the Athenians, if their territory 
 was spared, would make some concessions, 
 and that they dreaded nothing more than to see 
 it destroyed. But after this assault on Oenoe, 
 and the successive miscarriage of all the me- 
 thods employed to take it, the Athenians still 
 resolutely refraining from the least show of 
 submission, they broke up the siege and march- 
 ed into Attica, in the height of summer, whe,i 
 the harvest was ripe, about eighty days aftei 
 the Thebans had miscarried in the surprise of 
 FlatiBa. They were still commanded by Ar 
 chidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the La 
 
YEAR 1.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 61 
 
 cedajmonians, and having formed their camp 
 began their devastations. They first of all 
 ravaged Eleusis and the plain of Thriasia. 
 Near Rheiti they encountered and put to flight 
 a party of Athenian horse. Then they advan- 
 ced farther into the country through Cecropia, 
 leaving mount jEgaleon on their right, till they 
 came to Acharnse, the greatest of all those 
 which are called the boroughs _^ of Athens. 
 They sat down before it, and having fortified 
 their camp, continued a long time there, laying 
 all the adjacent country waste. 
 
 The design of Archidamus in stopping thus 
 before Acharnffi, keeping there his army ready 
 for battle, and not marching down there this 
 first campaign into the plains, is said to be this. 
 -He presumed that the Athenians, who 
 flourished at that time in a numerous youth, 
 and who never before had been so well pre- 
 pared for war, would probably march out 
 against him, and would not sit quiet whilst 
 their lands were ravaged before their eyes. 
 But when he had advanced to Eleusis and the 
 plain of Thriasia without any resistance, he 
 had a mind to try whether laying siege to 
 Achamae would provoke them to come out. 
 This place seemed further to him a convenient 
 spot for a long encampment. Besides, he 
 could not persuade himself, that the Acharni- 
 ans, so considerable a body amongst the citi- 
 zens of Athens (for three thousand of them 
 now wore the heavy armour), could see with 
 patience their own properties ruined by hos- 
 tile devastation, without inciting all their fel- 
 low-citizens to rush out to battle. And if the 
 Athenians would not come out against them 
 this campaign, he might another campaign with 
 greater security extend his devastation even to 
 the very walls of Athens. He thought it not 
 likely that the Acharnians, when all their lands 
 had been ruined in this manner, would cheer- 
 fully run into hazards to prevent the losses of 
 others, and that hence' much dissention might 
 
 1 Aristophanes wrote hiscomedy of The Acharnians 
 upon this pJan, and ribundantly ridiculed the public con- 
 duct as injurious to the citizens of Athens. Though it 
 was not brought upon tile stage till the sixth year of the 
 war, it amply shows us, how the Acharnians resented 
 their being thus exposed to the ravage of the enemy; 
 and how the wits, that lived upon the public jiassions, 
 helped stjll more to exnsperate them, and misrepresent- 
 ed the measures of the ablest politiririns, and who per- 
 fectly well understood and aimed atthc general welfare 
 of the whole community, as weak, corrupt, and mischie- 
 vous. No c;irc to redress, and no commiseration for the 
 Acharnians as Dicteopolls hints, who was one of that 
 
 be kindled up amongst them. Of these imagi- 
 nary schemes was Archidamus full, whilst he 
 lay before AcharniB. 
 
 The Athenians, so long as the enemy remain- 
 ed about Eleusis and the plain of Thriasia, 
 conceived some hopes that they would advance 
 no farther. They put one another in mind, 
 that Plcistoanax son of Pausanias king of the 
 Lacedsemonians, when fourteen years before 
 this war he invaded Attica with an army of 
 Peloponnesians, came only as far as to Eleusis 
 and Thrias, and then retreated without pene- 
 trating any farther — that upon this account he 
 had been banished Sparta, because it looked as 
 if he had been bribed to such an unseasonable 
 retreat. But when they saw the enemy ad- 
 vanced to AcharnEB, which was distant but 
 sixty^ stadia from Athens, they thought their 
 incursions were no longer to be endured. It 
 appeared, as it reasonably might, a heavy 
 grievance, to have all their lands thus ravaged 
 within their sight ; — a scene like this the 
 younger sort never had beheld, nor the elder 
 but once — in the Persian war. The bulk of 
 the people, but especially the younger part, 
 were for sallying out and fighting, and not to 
 stand tamely looking upon the insult. ■ Num- 
 bers of them assembled together in a tumul- 
 tuous manner, which was the rise of great 
 confusion, some loudly demanding to march 
 out against the enemy, and others restrain- 
 ing them from it. The soothsayers gave out 
 all manner of predictions, which every hearer 
 interpreted by the key of his own passions. 
 The Acharnians, regarding themselves as no 
 contemptible part of the 'Athenian body, be- 
 cause their lands had been wasted, in a most 
 earnest manner insisted upon a sally. The 
 whole city was in a ferment, and all their re- 
 sentments centred on Pericles. They quite 
 
 borough — " And what? it will be said , Can this possibly 
 be helped? Be helped, do you say? why not? Tell me, 
 if you can. Suppose only, that a Lacedeemonian had 
 stood across in his skiff to Seriphus, and after kill-ng 
 a favourite lap-dog got off again safe: — Would ye now 
 in this case sit still ? Quite the contrary. You would 
 immediately be putting out to soa witii three hundred 
 sail of ships; Athens would roar with the tumult of 
 soldiers; the captains of vessels would be shouting, pay 
 delivering, and our gold tlying a':out. What a bustle 
 would there be in the long portico! what distributing 
 of provisions, skins, thongs, casks full of olives, onions 
 in nets, &.C. &c. &c. I All the decks would be crowded 
 with seamen. What a dashing of oars, music sounding, 
 boatswains bawling; nothing but hurry and confusiou. 
 Such, I am well ussyrcd, would then be the case.' 
 a About six English miles 
 
62 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book h. 
 
 forgot the prudent conduct he had formerly 
 planned out for them. — They reproached him 
 as a general that durst not head them against 
 their enemies, and regarded him as author of all 
 the miseries which their city endured. 
 
 Pericles seeing their minds thus chagrined 
 by the present state of their affairs, and in con- 
 sequence of this, intent upon unadvisable mea- 
 sures, but assured within himself of the pru- 
 dence of his own conduct in thus restraining 
 them from action, called no general assembly 
 of the people, nor held any public consultation, 
 lest passion which was more alive than judg- 
 ment, should throw them into indiscretions. 
 He kept strict guard in the city, and endeav- 
 oured as much as possible to preserve the pub- 
 lic quiet. Yet he was always sending out small 
 parties of horse, to prevent any damage that 
 might be done near the city, by adventurous 
 stragglers from the army. By this means, there 
 happened once at Phrygii a skirmish between 
 one troop of the Athenian horse accompanied 
 by some Thessalians, and the horsemen of Boe- 
 otia, in which the Athenians and Thessalians 
 maintained their ground, till some heavy-armed 
 foot reinforced the Boeotian horse. Then they 
 were forced to turn about, and some few both 
 Thessalians and Athenians, were slain. How- 
 ever, they fetched off their bodies the same day 
 without the enemy's leave, and the next day 
 the Peloponnesians erected a trophy. — The aid 
 sent now by the Thessalians was in consequence 
 of an ancient alliance between them and the 
 Athenians. These auxiliaries consisted of La- 
 risseans, Pharsalians, Parasians, Cranonians, 
 Peirasians, Gyrtonians, Pheraeans. Those from 
 Larissa were commanded by Polymedes and 
 Aristonous, each heading those of this ovpn fac- 
 tion ; those from Pharsalus by Menon ; and 
 those from the rest of the cities had their res- 
 pective commanders. 
 
 The Peloponnesians, when the Athenians 
 made no show of coming out against them, 
 brolse up from Acharnse, and laid waste some 
 other of the Athenian boroughs, which lay be- 
 tween the mountains Parnethus and Brilissus. 
 
 During the time of these incursions, the 
 Athenians sent out the hundred ships they had 
 already equipped, and which had on board a 
 thousand heavy-armed soldiers and four hun- 
 dred archers, to infest the coast of Peloponne- 
 sus, The commanders in the expedition were 
 Carcinus son of Xenotimus, Protcas son of Ep- 
 icled, and Socrates son of Antigenes. Under 
 
 their orders, the fleet so furnished out, weighed 
 anchor and sailed away. 
 
 The Peloponnesians, continuing in Attica 
 till provisions began to fail them, retired not by 
 the same route they came in, but marched away 
 through Bojotia. And passing by Oropus, they 
 wasted the tract of ground called Piraire, which 
 was occupied by Ihe Oropians, who were sub- 
 ject to Athens. On their return into Pelopon- 
 nesus, the army was dispersed into their seve- 
 ral cities. 
 
 After their departure, the Athenians settled 
 the proper stations for their guards both by land 
 and sea, in the same disposition as they were 
 to continue to the end of the war. They also 
 made a decree, that " a thousand talents should 
 be taken from the fund of the treasure in the 
 citadel, and laid up by itself; that this sum 
 should not be touched, but the expense of the 
 war be defrayed from the remainder — and, that 
 if any one moved or voted for converting this 
 money to any other use than the necessary de- 
 fence of the city, in case the enemy attacked it 
 by sea, he should suffer the penalty of death." 
 Besides this, they selected constantly every year 
 an hundred of their best triremes, with the due 
 number of able commanders. These als" they 
 made it capital to use upon any other oc asion, 
 than that extremity for which the reserve of 
 money was destined. 
 
 The Athenians on board the fleet of one 
 hundred sail on the coasts of Peloponnesus, 
 being joined by the Corcyreans in fifty ships 
 and by some other of their confederates in 
 those parts, hovered for a time and infested 
 the coast, and at length made a descent and as- 
 saulted Methone, a town of Laconia, whose 
 walls were but weak and poorly manned. It 
 happened that Brasidas' the son of Tcllis a 
 Spartan had then the command of a garrison 
 
 » Here the name of Brasidas first orxurs, and F must 
 be;; the reader to note him as one who is to mnke no or- 
 dinary figure in the sequel. Trained up through the 
 regular and severe discipline of Spnrta, he was Iwave, 
 vigilant and active. He wjis second to none of his 
 countrymen,' in those ?ood qualities which did honour 
 to the Spartans; and was free from all the hlemishea 
 which their peculiarity of education was apt to throw 
 upon them, such as haughtiness of carriage, ferocity of 
 temper, and an arrogance which studied no deference 
 or condescension to others. lie serves his country 
 much by his valour and military conduct, and more by 
 his gentle, humane, and engaging behaviour. In a 
 word, the distinguishing excellencies both of the Spar- 
 tan and Athenian characters seem to have been united 
 in this Brasidas. 
 
TEAK I.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 63 
 
 eomewhere near Methone. He was sensible 
 of the danger he was in, and set forwards with 
 one hundred heavy-armed to its relief. The 
 Athenian army was then scattered about the 
 country, and their attention directed only to 
 the walls ; by which means, making a quick 
 march through the midst of their quarters, he 
 threw himself into Methone, and, with the 
 loss of but a few who were intercepted in the 
 passage, effectually secured the town. For 
 this bold exploit, he was the first man of all 
 who signalized themselves in this war, that re- 
 ceived the public commendation at Sparta. 
 Upon this the Athenians re-embarked and 
 sailed away, and coming up to Pheia, a town 
 of Elis, they ravaged the count y for two days 
 together. A body of picked men of the lower 
 Elis, with some other Eleans, that were got 
 together from the adjacent country, endeavour- 
 ed to stop their devastations, but coming to a 
 skirmish, were defeated by them. But a storm 
 arising, and their ships being exposed to dan- 
 ger on the open coast, they went immediately 
 on board, and sailing round the cape of Icthys, 
 got into the harbour of Pheia. The Messe- 
 nians in the meantime, and some others who had 
 not been able to gain their ships, had marched 
 over-land and got possession of the place. 
 Soon after the ships, being now come about, 
 stood into the harbour, took them on board, 
 and quitting the place put out again to sea. 
 By this time a great army of Eleans was drawn 
 together to succour it, but the Athenians were 
 sailed away to other parts of the coast, where 
 they carried on their depredations. 
 
 About the same time, the Athenians had 
 sent a fleet of thirty sail to infest the coast 
 about Locris, and at the same time to guard 
 Euboea. This fleet was commanded by Clea- 
 pompus the son of Clinias, who making several 
 descents, plundered many maritime places, and 
 took Thronium. He carried from thence 
 some hostages, and at Alope defeated a body 
 of Locrians, who were marching to its relief. 
 
 The same summer, the Athenians transport- 
 ed from jEgina all the inhabitants, not only 
 the men but the children and the women, re- 
 proaching them as the principal authors of the 
 present war. And judging they might securely 
 keep the possession of ^gina, which lay so 
 near to Peloponnesus, if they peopled it with 
 a colony of their own — with this view, not 
 long after, they fixed some of their own people 
 in possession of it. The Lacedsemonians re- 
 
 ceived the jEgineta on their expulsion, and 
 assigned them Thyrsea for their place of resi- 
 dence, and the country about it for their sub- 
 sistence, not only on account of their own en- 
 mity to the Athenians, but the particular obli- 
 gations they lay under to the JEgineUB, for the 
 succour they had given them in the time 
 of the earthquake and the insurrection of 
 the Helots. The district of Thyraja lies be- 
 tween Argia and Laconia, declining quite down 
 to the sea. Here some of them fixed their 
 residence, but the rest were dispersed into 
 other parts of Greece. 
 
 The same summer, on the first day of the 
 lunar month, at which time alone it can possi- 
 bly fall out, there was an eclipse of the sun in the 
 afternoon. The sun looked for a time like the 
 crescent of the moon, and some stars appeared, 
 but the full orb shone out afterwards in all its 
 lustre. 
 
 The same summer also, the Athenians, who 
 had hitherto regarded as their enemy Nym- 
 phodorus, the son of Pythes of Abdera, whose 
 sister was married to Sitalces, and who had a 
 great influence over him, made him their public 
 friend and invited him to Athens. They 
 hoped by this to gain over Sitalces the son of 
 Teres king of Thrace to their alliance. This 
 Teres, father of Sitalces, was the first who 
 made the kingdom of Odrysae the largest in all 
 Thrace ; for the greater part of the Thracians 
 are free, and governed by their own laws. 
 But this Teres was not in the least related to 
 Tereus, who married from Athens Proone the 
 daughter of Pandion, nor did they belong both 
 to the same part of Thrace. Tereus lived in 
 Daulia, a city of that province which is now 
 called Phocis, and which in his time was in- 
 habited by Thracians. Here it was that the 
 women executed the tragical business of Itys : 
 and many poets who make mention of the 
 nightingale, do it by the name of the Daulian 
 bird. And it is more probable that Pandion 
 matched his daughter to a person at this lesser 
 distance from him, from the view of mutual 
 advantage, than to one seated at Odrysae, which 
 is many days' journey further off. But Teres, 
 whose name is not the same with Tereus, was 
 the first king of Odrysae, and compassed the 
 regal power of violence. This man's son Sital- 
 ces the Athenians admitted into their alliance, 
 hoping he might gain over to their side the cities 
 of Thrace and Perdiccas. Nymphodorus arriv 
 ing at Athens finished the alliance with Sitalces 
 
64 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book II. 
 
 and made his son Sadocus an Athenian. He 
 also undertook to brin^ the war now in Thrace 
 to an end, and to persuade Sitalces to send to 
 the Athenians a body of Thracian horsemen 
 and targeteers. He also reconciled Perdiccas 
 to the Athenians by procuring for him the re- 
 stitution of Therme ; immediately after which, 
 Perdiccas joined the Athenians and Phormio 
 in the expedition against the Chalcideans. 
 Thus was Sitalces the son of Teres a Thracian 
 king, and 'Perdiccas the son of Alexander 
 a Macedonian king, brought into the Athenian 
 league. 
 
 The Athenians in the fleet of one hujndred 
 sail, still continuing their cruize on the coast 
 of Peloponnesus, took Solium a fort belonging 
 to the Corinthians, and delivered the place 
 with the district of land belonging to it to the 
 Palirensians, exclusively of other Acamanians. 
 They took also by storm Astocus, of which 
 Evarchus was tyrant, whom they forced to fly 
 away, and added the town to their own associ- 
 ation. .Sailing from hence to the island Ceph- 
 allene, they reduced it without a battle. Ceph- 
 allene lies towards Acarnania and Leucas, and 
 hath four cities ; the Pallensians, Cranians, 
 Samieans, Pronseans. Not long after this the 
 fleet sailed back to Athens. 
 
 In the autumn of this summer, the Atheni- 
 ans, with all their forces, citizens and sojourners, 
 made an incursion into the territories of Megara, 
 tmder the command of Pericles the son of 
 Xantippus. — Those also who had been cruiz- 
 ing about Peloponpesus in the fleet of one 
 hundred sail (for they were now at ^gina,) 
 finding upon their return that all their fellow 
 citizens were marched in the general expedition 
 against Megara, followed them with the fleet 
 and came up to them. By this means, 
 the army of the Athenians became the larg- 
 est they had ever at any time got together, the 
 city being now in its most -flourishing state, and 
 as yet uninfected with the plague : for there 
 
 1 Macedonia at this time was not reckoned a pari of 
 Greece, and botli kins; and people were regarded as Bar- 
 barians. Alexander, father of tliis Perdiccas, was 
 obliged to plead an Argive pedigree, in order to assist 
 at tli'e Olympic games. And Perdiccas now himself, 
 whose successor Alexander the Great, not many years 
 after, was leader of Greece and conqueror of Asia, was 
 at this time balancing between IheLacedaimonlansand 
 Athenians, important to either merely as a neighbour 
 to their colonies in Thrace. The Greek generals will 
 bn sometimes seen in Shis history to use the monarch of 
 Macedonia very cavalierly. 
 
 were of Athenian citizens only no less than ten 
 thousand heavy-armed, exclusive of the Ihreo 
 thousand who were now at Potidsea: the sojourn- 
 ers of Athens who marched out along with them, 
 were not fewer than three thousand heavy-arm- 
 ed: they had besides a very large number of light- 
 armed soldiers. They laid waste the greatest part 
 of the country, and then returned to Athens, 
 Every succeeding year of the war the Atheni- 
 ans constantly repeated these incursions into 
 the territory of Megara, sometimes with their 
 cavalry, and sometimes with all their united 
 force, till at last they made themselves masters 
 of Nissea, 
 
 In the close also of the summer, A'alante, 
 an island lying near the Loorians of Opus, till 
 now uninhabited, was fortified and garrisoned 
 by the Athenians, to prevent the pirates of 
 Opus, and other parts of Locris, from annoy- 
 ing Eubcea. — These were the transactions of 
 the summer, after the departure of the Pelo- 
 ponnesians out of Attica. 
 
 The winter following, Evarchus the Acar- 
 nanian, who had a great desire to recover As- 
 tacus, prevailed with the Corinthians to carry 
 him thither, with a fleet of forty ships, and a 
 force of fifteen hundred heavy-armed, and en- 
 deavour to re-establish him. He himself also 
 hired some auxiliaries for the same purpose. 
 This armament was commanded by Euphy- 
 madas son of A.ristonymus, Timoxenus son of 
 Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis; 
 who sailing thither executed their business. 
 They had a mind to endeavour the reduction 
 of some others of the maritime towns of Acar- 
 nania, but miscarrying in every attempt they 
 made, they returned home. But in their pas- 
 sage touching at Cephallene, and debarking 
 upon the lands of the Cranians, they were 
 treacherously inveigled into a conference, where 
 the Cranians, falling suddenly upon them, killed 
 some of their men. It was not without difiiculty 
 that they drew the others safely oflf, and gained 
 their own ports. 
 
 But the same winter the Athenians in con- 
 formity to the established custom of their coun- 
 try, solemnized a public funeral for those who 
 had been first killed in this war, in the manner 
 as follows : 
 
 The bones of the slain are brought to a 
 tabernacle erected for the purpose three days 
 before, and all are at liberty to deck out the 
 remains of their friends at their own discretion. 
 But when the grand procession is made, the 
 
IXAK I.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 65 
 
 cypress coiHns are drawn on carriages, one for 
 every tribe, in cacli of wliicli are separately 
 contained the bones of all who belonged to 
 that tribe. One sumptuous bier is carried along 
 empty for those that are lost, whose bodies 
 could not be found among the slain. All 
 who are willing, both citizens and strangers, 
 attend the solemnity ; and the women who 
 were related to the deceased, stand near the 
 sepulchre groaning and lamenting. They de- 
 posit the remains in the public sepulchre, which 
 stands in the finest suburb of the city ; — for it 
 hath been the constant custom here to bury all 
 who fell in war, except those at Marathon, 
 whose extraordinary valour they judged proper 
 to honour with a sepulchre on the field of bat- 
 tle. As soon as they are interred, some one 
 selected for the office by the public voice, and 
 ever a person in great esteem for his under- 
 standing, and of high dignity amongst them, 
 pronounces over them the decent panegyric — 
 and this done, they depart. Through all the 
 war, as the occasions recurred, this method was 
 constantly observed. But over these, the first 
 victims of it, Pericles the son of Xantippus 
 was appointed to speak. So, when the proper 
 time was come, walking from the seprdchre, and 
 mounting a lofty pulpit erected for the purpose, 
 from whence he might be heard more distinctly 
 by the company, he thus began : 
 
 " Many of those who have spoken before me 
 on these occasions, have commended the 
 author of that law which we are now obeying, 
 for having instituted an oration to the honour 
 of those who sacrifice their lives in fighting for 
 their country. For my part, I think it suffi- 
 cient, for men who have approved their virtue 
 in action, by action to be honoured for it — by 
 suih as you see the public gratitude now per- 
 forming about this funeral ; and that the vir- 
 tues of many ought not to be endingered by 
 the management of any one person, Virhen theiy 
 credit must precariously depend on his oration, 
 which may be good and mav be bad. Difficult 
 indeed it is, judiciously to handle a subject 
 where even probable truth will hardly gain as- 
 sent. The hearer, enlightened by a long ac- 
 quaintance, and warm in his aflection. may 
 quickly pronounce every thing UAfa^oorably 
 expressed, in respect to what be wishes and 
 what he knows, — whilst the stranger pro- 
 nounceth all eyafgerated. through envy of those 
 deeds which he is conscious are above liis own 
 achievement, I'or tha praises bestowed upon 
 16 
 
 others, are then only to bo endured, when men 
 imagine they can do those feats they hoar to have 
 been done : they envy what they cannot equal, 
 and immediately pronounce it false. Yet, as 
 this solemnity hath received its sanction from 
 the authority of our ancestors, it is my duty also 
 to obey the law, and to endeavour to procure, 
 as far as I am able, the good will and approba- 
 tion of all my audience. 
 
 " I shall therefore begin first with our fore- 
 fathers, since both justice and decency require 
 we should on this occasion bestow on them 
 an honourable remembrance. In this oui 
 country they kept themselves always firmly 
 settled, and through their valour handed it 
 down free to every since-succeeding generation. 
 Worthy indeed of praise are they, and yet more 
 worthy are our immediate fathers ; since, en- 
 larging their own inheritance into the extensive 
 empire which we now possess, they bequeathed 
 that their work of toil to us their sons. Yet 
 even these successes, we ourselves here pre- 
 sent, we who are yet in the strength and vigour 
 of our days, have nobly improved, and have 
 made such provisions for this our Athens, that 
 now it is all-sufficient in itself to answer every 
 exigence of war and of peace. I mean not 
 here to recite those martial exploits by which 
 these ends were accomplished, or the resolute 
 defences we ourselves and our fathers have 
 made against the formidable invasions of Bar- 
 barians and Greeks — your own knowledge of 
 these will excuse the long detail. But by 
 what methods we have risen to this height of 
 glory and power, by what polity and by what 
 conduct we are thus aggrandized, I shall first 
 endeavour to show ; and then proceed to the 
 praise of the deceased. These, in my opinion, 
 can be no impertinent topics on this occasion ; 
 the discussion of them must be beneficial to 
 this nuHiei-ous company of Athenians and of 
 [ Btranp;era. 
 
 " We are happy in a form of government 
 which cannot envy the laws of our neighbours ; 
 — for it hath served as a model to others, but 
 ii original at Athens. And this our fonn, as 
 committed not to the few, but to the whole 
 body of the people, is called a democracy. How 
 different soever in a private capacity, we all en- 
 joy the same general equality our laws are fit- 
 ted to preserve ; and superior honours just as 
 we excel. The public administration is not 
 confined to a particular family, but is attainable 
 only by merit. Poverty is not a hindrance 
 L 
 
66 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book II. 
 
 since whoever is able to serve liis country, | 
 meets with no obstacle to preferment from his ■ 
 first obscurity. The offices of the state we go I 
 through without obstructions from one another ; 
 and live together in the mutual endearments of i 
 private life without suspicions ; not angry with 
 a neighbour for following the bent of his own 
 humour, nor putting on that countenance of 
 discontent, which pains though it cannot pun- 
 ish — so that in private life. we converse with- 
 out diffidence or damage, whilst we dare not 
 on any account offend against the public, 
 through the reverence we bear to the magis- 
 trates and the laws, chiefly to those enacted for 
 redress of the injured, and to those unwritten, a 
 breach of which is allowed disgrace. Our laws 
 have further provided for the mind most fre- 
 quent intermissions of care by the appointment 
 of public recreations and sacrifices' throughout 
 the year, elegantly performed with a peculiar 
 pomp, the daily delight of which is a charm that 
 puts melancholy to flight. The grandeur of 
 this our Athens causeth the produce of the 
 whole earth to be imported here, by which we 
 reap a familiar enjoyment, not more of the de- 
 licacies of our own growth, than of those of 
 other nations. 
 
 " In the affairs of war we excel those of our 
 enemies, who adhere to methods opposite to 
 our own. For we lay open Athens to general 
 resort, nor ever drive any stranger from us 
 whom either improvement or curiosity hath 
 brought amongst us, lest any enemy should 
 hurt us by seeing what is never concealed. 
 We place not so great a confidence in the pre- 
 paratives and artifices of war, as in the native 
 warmth of our souls impelling us to action. In 
 point of education, the youth of some people 
 are inured by a course of laborious exercise, 
 to support toil and exercise like men ; but we, 
 notwithstanding our easy and elegant way of 
 life, face all the dangers of war as intre- 
 pidly as they. This may be proved by facts, 
 since the Lacedsemonians never invade our ter- 
 ritories barely with their own, but with the 
 united strength of all their confederates. But, 
 when we invade the dominions of our neigh- 
 bours, for the most part we conquer with- 
 out difficulty in an enemy's country those who 
 
 fight in defence of their own habitations. The 
 strength of our whole force no enemy yet hath 
 ever experienced, because it if divided by our 
 naval expeditions, or engaged in the different 
 quarters of our service by land. But if any 
 where they engage and defeat a small party of 
 our forces, they boastingly give it out a total 
 defeat; and if they are beat, they were cer- 
 tainly overpowered by our united strength. 
 What though from a state of inactivity rather 
 than laborious exercise, or with a natural rath^ 
 than an acquired valour, we learn to encounter 
 danger] — this good at least we receive from it, 
 that we never droop under the apprehension of 
 possible misfortunes, and when we hazard the 
 danger, are found no less courageous than those 
 who are continually inured to it. In these res- 
 pects our whole community deserves justly to 
 l3e admired, and in many we have yet to 
 mention. 
 
 / " In our manner of living we show an ele- 
 gance tempered with frugality, and we cultivate 
 philosophy without enervating the mind. We 
 display our wealth in the season of beneficence, 
 and not in the vanity of discourse. A confes- 
 sion of poverty is disgrace to no man, no effort 
 to avoid it is disgrace indeed. Th ere is visibly 
 in the same persons an attention to their own 
 private concerns and t hose of the publicj and 
 |n_others ..engagecLin^the la bours of life, th ere 
 is a compete nt skil l in the affairs of government. 
 EpL Ji'e are t he_oi|ly people who thi uk- him that 
 does notmfiddlein state-affairs — not indolent; 
 
 t Resitiea the vast number of festivals, which were 
 celebrated nt Athens with pompous processions, costly 
 sacrifices, and sometimes public games, the presidents 
 in course offered up sacrifices every morning constant- 
 ly for tix public welfare 
 
 hut good for nnthjng. And yet we pass tKe 
 soundest judgments, and are quick at catching 
 the right apprehensions of things, not think- 
 ing that words are prejudicial to actions, but 
 rather the not being duly prepared by previous 
 debate, before we are obliged to proceed to ex- 
 ecution. Herein consists our distinguishing 
 excellence, that in the hour of action we show 
 the greatest courage, and yet debate beforehand 
 the expediency of our measures. The courage 
 of others is the result of ignorance; deliber- 
 ation makes them cowards. And those un- 
 doubtedly must be owned to have the greatest 
 souls, who, most acutely sensible of the mise- 
 ries of war and the sweets of peace, are not 
 hence in the least deterred from facing danger. 
 " In acts of beneficence, further, we differ 
 from the many. We preserve friends not by 
 receiving but by conferring obligations. For 
 he who does a kindness hath the advantage 
 over him who by the law of gratitude becomes 
 
5:i!AE I.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 67 
 
 a debtor to his benefactor. The person oblig- 
 ed is compelled to act the more insipid part, 
 conscious that a return of kindness is merely a 
 payment and not an obligation. And we alone 
 are splendidly beneficent to others, not so much 
 from interested motives, as for the credit of 
 pure liberaUty. I shall sura up what yet re- 
 mains by only adding — that our Athens in 
 general is the school of Greece ; and, that ev- 
 ery single Athenian amongst us is excellently 
 formed, by his personal qualification, for all the 
 various scenes of active life, acting with a most 
 graceful demeanor, and a most ready habit of 
 despatch. 
 
 "That I have not on this occasion made 
 use of a pomp of words, but the truth of facts, 
 that height to which by such a conduct this 
 state hath risen, is an undeniable proof. For 
 we are now the only people of the world 
 who are found by experience to be greater 
 than in report — the only people who, repelling 
 the attacks of an invading enemy, exempts their 
 defeat from the blush of indignation, and to 
 their tributaries yields no discontent, as if 
 subject to men unworthy to command. That 
 we deserve our power, we need no evidence to 
 manifest. We have great and signal proofs of 
 this, which entitle us to the admiration of the 
 present and future ages. We want no Homer 
 to be the herald of our praise ; no poet to deck 
 off a history with the charms of verse, where 
 the opinion of exploits must suffer by a strict 
 relation. Every sea has been opened by our 
 fleets, and every land hath been penetrated by 
 our armies, which have every where left be- 
 hind them eternal monuments of our enmity 
 and our friendship. 
 
 " In the just defence of such a state these 
 victims of their own vahmr, scorning the ruin 
 threatened to it, have valiantly fought and 
 bravely died. And every one of those who 
 survive is ready, I am persuaded, to sacrifice 
 life in such a cause. And for this reason have 
 I enlarged so much on national points, to give 
 the clearest proof that in the present war 
 we have more at stake than men whose public 
 advantages are not so valuable, and to illustrate 
 by actual evidence, how great a commendation 
 is due to them who are now my subject, and 
 the greatest part of which they have already re- 
 ceived. For the encomiums with which I have 
 celebrated the state, have been earned for it by 
 the bravery of these, and of men like these. 
 And such compliments might be thought too 
 
 high and exaggerated, if passed on any Grecians 
 but them alone. The fatal period to which 
 these gallant souls are now reduced, is the sur- 
 est evidence of their merit — an evidence begun 
 in their lives and completed in their deaths. 
 For it is a debt of justice to pay superior ho- 
 n ours to men, vvho have devoted their lives in 
 fighting for their country, though inferior to 
 others in every virtue but that of valour. 
 Their last service effaccth all former demerits, 
 
 it extends to the public; their privat e dc- 
 meanors-reached only to a few . Yet not one 
 of these was at all induced to shrink from dan- 
 ger, through fondness of those delights which 
 the peaceful affluent life bestows, — not one was 
 the less lavish of his life, through that flattering 
 hope attendant upon want, that poverty at length 
 might be exchanged for affluence. One pas- 
 sion there was in their minds much stronger 
 than these, — the desire of vengeance on their 
 enemies. Regarding this as the most honour- 
 able prize of dangers, they boldly rushed to- 
 wards the mark, to glut revenge, and then to 
 satisfy those secondary passions. The uncertain 
 event, they had already secured in hope ; what 
 their eyes showed plainly must be done, they 
 trusted their own valour to accomplish, think- 
 ing it more glorious to defend themselves and 
 die in the attempt, than to yield and live. 
 From the reproach o f cowardice inde ed they 
 fled , but presented their bodies to the shock o f 
 b attle ; when, in sensibl e of fear, but triumph- 
 i ng in hope, in the doubtful charge they in- 
 stantly dropp ed — ajid_thu^_disjsharged_the duty 
 whic h brave men owe t o their country. 
 
 " As for you, who now suryive_them^it is 
 yourbusine ss to pray for a better fate — but, 
 tojhink it your duty also to preserve the sam e 
 spirit and wnrmth of courage against jgvT 
 pnemies ; not judging of the expediency of 
 this from a mere harangue — where any man 
 indulging a flow of words may tell you, what 
 you yourselves know as Well as he, how 
 many advantages there are in fighting valiantly 
 against your enemies — but rather, making the 
 daily-increasinn- prnndeiir nf this Vommnnity 
 the object of your though ts, and growi ng 
 quite enamoured of it. And when it really 
 appears great to your apprehensions, think 
 again, that this grandeur was acquired by 
 brave and valiant men ; by men who knew 
 their duty, and in the moments of action were 
 sensible of shame ; who, whenever their at- 
 tempts were unsuccessful, thought it dishonour 
 
68 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book ir. 
 
 tlieir country should stand in need of any thing 1 
 their valour could do for it, and so made it j 
 the most glorious present. Bestowing thus I 
 their lives on the public, they have every one ' 
 received a praise that will never decay, a se- 
 pulchre that will always be most illustrious — 
 not that in which their bones lie mouldering, 
 but that in which their frame is preserved, to 
 be on every occasion, when honour is the em- 
 ploy of either word or act, eternally remem- 
 bered. This whole earth is the sepulchre of 
 illustrious men : nor is it the inscription on the 
 columns in their native soil alone that show 
 their merit, but the memorial of them, better 
 than all inscriptions, in every foreign nation, re- 
 posited more durably in universal remembrance 
 than on their own tomb. From this very mo- 
 ment, emulating these noble patterns, placing 
 your happiness in liberty, and liberty in valour, 
 be prepared to encounter all the dangers of 
 war. For, to be lavish of life is not so noble 
 in those whom misfortunes have reduced to 
 misery and despair, as in men who hazard the 
 loss of a comfortable subsistence, and the en- 
 joyment of all the blessings this world affords, 
 by an unsuccessful enterprise. Adversity, 
 after a series of ease and affluence, sinks Jeeper 
 into the heart of a man of spirit, than the stroke 
 of death insensibly received in the vigour of life 
 and public hope. 
 
 " For this reason, the parents of those who 
 are now gone, whoever of them may be attend- 
 ing here, I do not bewail, — I shall rather com- 
 fort. It is well known to what unhappy acci- 
 dents they were liable from the moment of 
 their birth ; and, that happiness belongs to 
 men who hav» reached the most glorious period 
 of life, as these now have who are to you the 
 source of sorrow, — these, whose life hath re- 
 ceived its ample measure, happy in its continu- 
 ance, and equally happy in its conclusion. I 
 know it in truth a difficult task, to fix comfort 
 in those breasts, which will have frequent re- 
 membrances in seeing the happiness of others, 
 of what they once themselves enjoyed. And 
 sorrow flows not from the absence of those 
 good things we have never yet experienced, but 
 from the loss of those to which we have been 
 accustomed. They who are not yet by age 
 exempted from issue, should be comforted in 
 the hope of having more. The children yet 
 to be born will be a private benefit to some, in 
 causing them to forget such as no longer are, 
 and will be a double benefit to their country 
 
 in preventing its desolation, and providing for 
 its security. For thosu persons cannot in 
 common justice be regarded as members of 
 equal value to the public, who have no children 
 to expose to danger for its safety. — But you, 
 whose age is already far advanced, compute 
 the greater share of happiness your longer time 
 hath afforded for so much gain, persuaded in 
 yourselves, the remainder will be but short, 
 and enlighten that space by the glory gained by 
 these. It is greatness of soul alone that never 
 grows old : nor is it wealth that delights in 
 the latter stage of life, as some give oiit, so 
 much as honour. 
 
 " To you, the sons and brothers of the de- 
 ceased, whatever number of you are here, a 
 field of hardy contention is opened. For him 
 who no longer is, every one is ready to com- 
 mend, so that to whatever height you push 
 your deserts, you will scarce ever be thought 
 to equal, but ^o be somewhat inferior to these. 
 Envy will exert itself against a competitor, 
 whilst life remains : but when death stops the 
 competition, affection will applaud without 
 restraint. 
 
 " If after this it be expected from me to say 
 any thing to you who are now reduced to a 
 state of widowhood, about female virtue, I shall 
 express it all in one short admonition ; — It is 
 your greatest glory not to be deficient in the 
 virtue peculiar to your sex, and to give the men 
 as little handle as possible to talk of your be- 
 haviour, whether well or ill. 
 
 " I have now discharged the province allotted 
 me by the laws, and said what I thought most 
 pertinent to this assembly. Our departed 
 friends have by facts been already honoured. 
 Their children from this day till they arrive at 
 manhood shall be educated at the public ex- 
 pense of the state' which hath appointed so 
 beneficial a meed for these and all future re- 
 lics of the public contests. For wherever the 
 greatest rewards are proposed for virtue, there 
 the best of patriots are ever to be found. — 
 Now, let every one respectively indulge the 
 decent grief for his departed friends, and then 
 retire." 
 
 Such was the manner of the public funeral 
 solemnized this winter, and with the end of 
 which, the first year of this war was also ended. 
 
 » The law was, that they Bhou]i] be instructed at the 
 public expense, and when come to age presented with 
 a complete suit of armour, and honoured with a seat iu 
 ail public places. 
 
TEAR n.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 69 
 
 In the very beginning of summer, the Pelo- 
 connesians and allies, with two-thirds of their 
 forces, made an incursion as before into Attica, 
 under the command of Archidamus son of 
 Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedsmonians, and 
 having formed their camp, ravaged the country. 
 
 They had not been many days in Attica, be- 
 fore a 'sickness began first to appear amongst 
 the Athenians, such as was reported to have 
 raged before this in other parts, as about Lem- 
 nos and other places. Yet >i plague so great 
 as this, and so dreadful a calamity, in human 
 memory could not be paralelled. The physi- 
 cians at first could administer no relief, through 
 utter ignorance ; nay, they died the faster, the 
 closer their attendance on the sick, and all hu- 
 
 » The historian in the funeral oration hath given us a 
 very exalted idea of the Atlienian state, and the distin- 
 guishing excellencies of thatliumaneand polite people. 
 The plague, which now broke out, enables him to con- 
 trast his pieces, and give his history a most agreeaitle 
 variety. It is now going to be exceeding solemn, seri- 
 ous, and pathetic. It is as an historian and not as a 
 physician that he gives us tlie relation of it: a relation, 
 which in general hath been esteemed an elaborate and 
 complete performance. He professeth to give an accu- 
 rate detail of it. The accuracy hatli generally been 
 allowed, but it hath heen blamed as too minute. Lucre- 
 tius however hath transferred all the circumstances 
 mentioned by Thucydides into his own poem, 1.6. en- 
 larging still more minutely upon them; and yet, this is 
 the greatest ornament, and certainly the least exception- 
 alile part of his poem. Lucretius, an excellent poet, 
 affected to write witli the precision of a philosopher; 
 and Thucydides, the historian, always composed with 
 the spirit of a poet. Hippocrates hath left some cases 
 of the plague, which he hath recited as a physician; I)ut 
 none of them is dated at Athens. Thucydides hatli 
 mentioned nothing of liis practising there, much 'pbs of 
 his practising with success. He says on the con.iary 
 that "all human art was totally unavailing;" --"^ his 
 follower Lucretius, that, " Musgabat tacito nicuicina 
 timore." The letters of Hippocrates, wljich mention 
 this affair, are certainly spurious; the facts they would 
 establish are without any grounds, as Le Clerc hath 
 proved to conviction in his Histoire it la medecine, I. 3. 
 They make the plague to have broken out first in Eu- 
 rope, and to have spread from thence into the domin- 
 ions of the king of Persia. This is quite contrary to the 
 account of Thucydides: and to the experience of every 
 age. All plagues and infectious distempers have had 
 their rise in Africa. Need I say more than that Dr 
 Mead hath proved it? But wliether his account of tliis 
 plague at Athens be duly succinct, not too minute, se- 
 rious, affecting; and, whether Thucydides hath well 
 managed the opportunity it gave him to moralize like 
 a man of virtue and good sense, every reader will judge 
 for himself. The translator hath chiefly endeavou.'-ed 
 to preserve that solemn air, which he thought the prime 
 distinclion of the original. 
 
 man art was totally unavailing. Whatever sup- 
 plications were offered in the temples, whatever 
 recourse to oracles ami religious rites, all were 
 j insignificant ; at last, expedients of this nature 
 ! they totally relinquished, overpowered by cala- 
 I mity. It broke out first, as it is said, in that 
 j part of ^Ethiopia which borders upon Egypt ; 
 i it afterwards spread into Egypt and Libya, and 
 into great part of the king's dominions, and from 
 thence it on a sudden fell on the city of the 
 Athenians. The contagion showed itself first 
 in 'the Piraeus, which occasioned a report that 
 the Peloponnesians had caused poison to bo 
 thrown into the wells, for as yet there were no 
 fountains there. After this it spread into tho 
 upper city, and then the mortality very much 
 increased. Let every one, physician or not, 
 freely declare his own sentiments about it ; let 
 him assign any credible account of its rise, or 
 the causes strong enough in his opinion to in- 
 troduce so terrible a scene — I shall only relata 
 what it actually was ; and as, from an informa- 
 tion in all its symptoms, none may be quite at 
 a loss about it, if ever it should , happen again, 
 I shall give in exact detail of them ; having 
 been sick of it myself, and seen many others af- 
 flicted with il. 
 
 This very year, as is universally allowed, had 
 been more than any other remarkably free from 
 common disorders ; or, whatever diseases had 
 seized the body, they ended at length in this. 
 But those who enjoyed the most perfect health 
 were suddenly, v^ithout tny apparent cause, 
 seized at first with head-aches extremely vio- 
 lent, with inflammations, and fiery redness in 
 the eyes. Within — the throat and tongue be- , 
 gan instantly to be red as blood ; the breath 
 was drawn with difficulty and had a noisome 
 smell. The symptoms that succeeded these 
 were sneezing and hoarseness ; and not long 
 after, tho malady descended to the breast, with 
 a violent cough : but when once settled in tho 
 stomach, it excited vomitings, in which was 
 thrown up all that matter physicians call dis- 
 charges of bile, attended with excessive torture. 
 A great part of the infected were subject to 
 such violent hiccups without any discharge, as 
 brought upon them a strong convulsion, to 
 some but of a short, to others of a very long 
 continuance. The body, to the outward touch, 
 was neither exceeding hot, nor of a pallid hue, 
 but reddish, livid, marked all over with little 
 pustules and sores. Yet inwardly it was scorch- 
 ed with such excessive heat, that it could not 
 l2 
 
70 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [bock II. 
 
 bear the lightest covering or the finest linen 
 upon it, but must be left quite naked. They 
 longed for nothing so much as to be plunging 
 into cold water ; and many of those who were 
 not properly attended, threw themselves into 
 wells, hurried by a thirst not to be extinguish- 
 ed ; and whether they drank much or little, 
 their torment still continufed the same. The 
 restlessness of their bodies, and an utter inabil- 
 ity of composing themselves by sleep, never 
 abated for a moment. And the body, so long 
 as the distemper continued in its height, had 
 no visible waste, but withstood its rage to a 
 miracle, so that most of them perished within 
 nine or seven days, by the heat that scorched 
 their vitals, though their strength was not ex- 
 hausted ; or, if they continued longer, the dis- 
 temper fell into the belly, causing violent ul- 
 cerations in the bowels, accompanied with an 
 incessant flux, by which many, reduced to an 
 excessive weakness, were carried off. For the 
 malady beginning in the head, and settling first 
 there, sunk afterwards gradually down the 
 whole body. And whoever got safe through 
 all its most dangerous stages, yet the extremi- 
 ties of their bodies still retained the marks of 
 its violence. For it shot down into their privy- 
 members, into their fingers and toes, by losing 
 which they escaped with life. Some there 
 were who lost their eyes ; and some who, being 
 quite recovered, had at once totally lost all me- 
 mory, and quite forgot not only their most in- 
 timate friends, but even their own selves. For 
 as this distemper was in general virulent be- 
 yond expression, and its every part more grie- 
 vous than had yet fallen to the lot of human 
 nature, so, in one particular instance, it appear- 
 ed to be none of the natural infirmities of man, 
 since the birds and beasts that prey on human 
 flesh either never approached the dead bodies, 
 of which many lay about uninterred ; or cer- 
 tainly perished if they ever tasted. One 'proof 
 
 1 This passage jg translated close to the letter of the 
 original. U was intended hy the author to show the ex- 
 cessive malignancy of the plague, as the very flesh of the 
 dead I'od'es was so fatally pestilential to carnivorous 
 animals; — "Either they never tasted ; or, if they tast- 
 ed, died." One proof of this is presumptive, arising 
 from the disappearance of all birdsof prey. The second 
 was certain, and an object of sensible observation. Eve- 
 ry body could see that dogs, those familiar animals who 
 live with and accompany men abroad, either never tast- 
 ed : or, if hunger at any time forced tliem to it, they 
 certainly lost their lives. Lucretius literally translates 
 lie circumstance itself, but hath enlarged in the proofs, 
 and intimates that the distemper raged amongst those 
 
 of this is the total disappearance then of such 
 birds, for not one was to be seen, either in any 
 other place, or about any one of the carcases. 
 But the dogs, because of their familiarity with 
 man, afforded a more notorious proof of this 
 event. 
 
 The nature of this pestilential disorder was 
 in general — for I have purposely omitted its 
 many varied appearances, or the circumstances 
 particular to some of the infected in contradic- 
 tion to others — such as hath been described. 
 None of tjie common maladies incident to hu- 
 man nature prevailed at that time ; or what- 
 ever disorder any where appeared, it ended in 
 this. Some died merely for want of care ; and 
 some, with all the care that could possibly be 
 taken ; nor was any one medicine discovered, 
 from whence could be promised any certain re- 
 lief, since that which gave ease to one was pre- 
 judicial to another. Whatever difference there 
 was in bodies, in point of strength or in point 
 of weakness, it availed nothing ; all were 
 equally swept away before it, in spite of regu- 
 lar diet and studied prescriptions. Yet the most 
 aflfecting circumstances of this calamity were 
 — that dejection of mind, which constantly 
 attended the first attack ; for the mind sink- 
 ing at once into despair, they the sooner gave 
 themselves up without a struggle — and that 
 mutual tenderness, in taking- care of one 
 another, which communicated the infection, 
 and made them drop like sheep.^ This lat- 
 ter case caused the mortality to be so great. 
 For if fear withheld them from going near one 
 
 animals, even without eating the flesh of the dead, and 
 was general to every living species. 
 
 Muliaque humi cum inhutnatajacerent corpora nupra 
 
 Corpnribua, lamen aliluum gcDiis aique ferarum, 
 
 Aut procul absiliebat, ut acreni exiret odorem, 
 
 Aul, ubi gUBlaral, languebal inorte propinqua. 
 
 Nee lamen nninioo lemere illis solibuB ulla 
 
 Comparebat avis, nee nnctibu* saecia feraniin 
 
 Exibanl sflvis: langucbant pleraque morbo, 
 
 Et moriebantur: cum primis fida canum vis . 
 
 Strata viia animam pouebat in omnibus aegran) ; 
 
 Extorquebal cnim vitam vis morbida membris. 
 
 2 This passage is thus translated upon the authority 
 of Dr. Mead, in his treatise on the Plagv.e, which con* 
 vinced me that the comma should be omitted in the ori- 
 ginal after cte^ou, and 5£f»;ret«5 be governed of mk-c 
 Lucretius has given it a different turn, as if the resem- 
 blance to sheep was not in their dying fast, hut to the 
 forlorn and solitary manner in which those creatures 
 die ; and he hath put before it what follows a little af- 
 ter in Thucydides. 
 
 Nam quicunqoe Buos fogilabant visere ad atignn, 
 Vital Dimium cupidi, mortisque limenlei, 
 FeribaDt pauio post turpi morte malaque 
 Deserlos, opia expertes, incuria maclans, 
 Lanigerai tanquam pecudea, et buccra laecli. 
 
TEAR II.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 71 
 
 another, they died for want of help, so that 
 many houses became quite desolate for want of 
 needful attendance ; and if they ventured, they 
 were gone. This was most frequently the 
 case of the kind and compassionate. Such per- 
 sons were ashamed, out of a selfish concern for 
 themselves, entirely to abandon their friends, 
 when their menial servants, no longer able to 
 endure the groans and lamentations of the 
 dying, had been compelled to fly from such a 
 weight of calamity. But those especially, who 
 had safely gone through it, took pity on the dy- 
 ing and the sick, because they knew by expe- 
 rience what it really was, and were now secure 
 in themselves ; for it never seized any one a 
 second time so as to be mortal. Such were 
 looked upon as quite happy by others, and 
 were themselves at first overjoyed in their late 
 escape, and the groundless hope that hereafter 
 no distemper would prove fatal to them. Be- 
 side this reigning calamity, the general removal 
 from the country into the city was a heavy 
 grievance, more particularly to those who had 
 been necessitated to come thither. For as 
 they had no houses, but dwelled all the summer 
 season in booths, where there was scarce room 
 to breathe, the pestilence destroyed with the 
 utmost disorder, so that they lay together in 
 heaps, the dying upon the dead, and the dead 
 upon the dying. Some were tumbling one 
 over another in the public streets, or lay expir- 
 ing round about every fountain, whither they 
 had crept to assuage their immoderate thirst. 
 The temples, in which they had erected tents 
 for their reception, were full of the bodies of 
 those who had expired there. For in a cala- 
 mity so outrageously violent, and universal de- 
 spair, things sacred and holy had quite lost 
 their distinction. Nay, all regulations observed 
 before in matters of sepulture were quite con- 
 founded, since every one buried wherever he 
 could find a place. Some, whose sepulchres 
 were already filled by the numbers which had 
 perished in their own families, were shamefully 
 compellad to seize those of others. They sur- 
 prised on a sudden the piles which others had 
 built for their own friends, and burned their 
 dead upon them ; and some, whilst one body 
 was burning on a pile, tossed another body 
 (hey had dragged thither upon it, and went 
 their way. 
 
 Thus did the pestilence give their first rise 
 to those iniquitous acts which prevailed more 
 und more in Athens For every one was now 
 
 more easily induced openly to do what for de. 
 cency they did only covertly before. They 
 saw the strange mutabihty of outward condi- 
 tion, the rich untimely cut off, and their wealth 
 pouring suddenly on the indigent and necessi- 
 tous ; so that they thought it prudent to catch 
 hold of speedy enjoyments and quick gusts of 
 pleasure ; persuaded that their bodies and their 
 wealth might be their own merely for the day. 
 Not any one continued resolute enough to form 
 any honest or generous design, when so uncer- 
 tain whether he should live to effect it. What- 
 ever he knew could improve the pleasure or 
 satisfaction of the present moment, that he de- 
 termined to be honour and interest. Rever- 
 ence of the gods or the laws of society laid no 
 restraints upon them ; either judging that piety 
 and impiety were things quite indifferent, since 
 they saw that all men perished alike ; or, 
 throwing away every apprehension of being 
 called to account for their enormities, since 
 j ustice might be prevented by death ; or rather, 
 as the heaviest of judgments to which man 
 could be doomed, was already hanging over their 
 heads, snatching this interval of life for pleasure, 
 before it fell. 
 
 With such a weight of calamity were the 
 Athenians at this time on all sides oppressed. 
 Their city was one scene of death, and the ad- 
 jacent country of ruin and devastation. In 
 this their afBiction they called to mind, as was 
 likely they should, the following prediction, 
 which persons of the greatest age informed 
 them had been formerly made ; 
 
 Two heavy judgments will at once ^efall, 
 
 A Doric war without, a plague within your wall. 
 
 There had indeed been a dispute before, 
 whether their ancestors in this prediction read 
 7.0(^0; a plague, or >.t/*o; a famine. Yet in their 
 present circumstances all with probability a- 
 greed that xoi^ct a plague, was the right : for 
 they adapted the interpretation to what they 
 now suffered. — But in my sentiments, should 
 they ever again be engaged in a Doric war, and 
 a famine happen at the same time, they will have 
 recourse with equal probability to the other 
 interpretation. It was further remembered 
 by those who knew of the oracle given to the 
 Lacedaemonians, that when they inquired of the 
 god, « whether they should engage in this 
 war," his answer was, that — " if they carried it 
 on with all their strength, they should be victo- 
 rious, and he himself would fight on their side ;" 
 — and therefore they concluded that what now 
 
72 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book II. 
 
 befell was the completion of the oracle. The 
 pestilence broke out immediately upcn the 
 irruption of the Peloponnesians, and never ex- 
 tended itself to Peloponnesus, a circumstance 
 which ought to be related. It raged the most, 
 and for the longest time, in Athens, but after- 
 wards spread into the other towns, especially 
 the most populous. And this is an exact ac- 
 count of the plague. 
 
 The Peloponnesians, after they had ravaged 
 the inland parts, extended their devastations to 
 those which are called The Coast, as far as 
 Mount Laurium,' where the Athenians had sil- 
 ver-mines. And here they first ravaged the 
 part which looks towards Peloponnesus, and 
 afterwards that which lies towards Euboca and 
 -Andres. But Pericles, who was then in the 
 command, persisted in the same opinion as be- 
 fore in the former incursion, that " the Athe- 
 nians ought not to march out against them." 
 Yet, whilst the enemy was up in the country, 
 before they had advanced as far as the coast, 
 he had equipped a fleet of a hundred ships to 
 invade Peloponnesus: and when every thing 
 was ready, he put to sea.^ On board these 
 ships he had embarked four thousand heavy- 
 armed Athenians; and in vessels for transport- 
 ing horse, now first fitted up for this service 
 out of old ships, three hundred horsemen. The 
 Chians and the Lesbians joined in the expedi- 
 tion with fifty sail. At the very time this fleet 
 went to sea from Athens, they left the Pelo- 
 ponnesians on the coast of Attica. When they 
 
 t Tlie pilvcr-mines attLnurium originally belonged to 
 private persons, but were united to the public domain 
 by Themistocles. A grerit number of slaves were cm- 
 ployed in working them, and the produce paid amply 
 for all the labour bestowed upon them. Whether the 
 state was much enriched by them, is a question ; the 
 undertakers and proprietors of the slaveswho wrought 
 them drew great wealth from them, as we are told by 
 Xenophon in his treatise of rev^ue. 
 
 2 Plutarch relates in the life of Pericles, that on this 
 occasion, when all was ready, " when the forces were 
 Shipped, and Pericles liimself had just gotten on board 
 his trireme, the sun was eclipsed. It soon grew so dark, 
 that all men were astonished at so dreadful a prodigy. 
 Pericles, seeing his own pilot quite terrified and con- 
 founded, threw a cloak over his face, and wrapping him 
 up in it, asked. Whether he saw any thing dreadful or 
 any thing that portended danger? The pilot answering 
 in the negative, What difference thRn (he went on) 
 between this affair and that, unless that what hath 
 darkened the sun is bigger than a cloak? Pericles had 
 easily learned of his preceptor Anaxagoras how to ac- 
 count for eclipses. But whether Plutarch hath placed 
 this incident in right time, is a question : for Thucydi- 
 des, who is exact in these things mentions no eclipse 
 af the sun this summer 
 
 were arrived before Epidaurus, a city of Pelo- 
 ponnesus, they ravaged great part of the coun- 
 try about it, and makiiig an assault on the city 
 itself, had some hopes of taking it, but did not 
 succeed. Leaving Epidaurus. they ravaged the 
 country about Troexcne, Halias, and Hermione ; 
 all these places are situated on the sea-coast 
 of Peloponnesus. But sailing hence, they 
 came before Prasite, a fort of Laconia, situated 
 upon the sea, around which they laid the coun- 
 try waste ; and having taken the fort by assault, 
 demolished it. After these performances they 
 returned home, and found the Peloponnesians 
 no longer in Attica, but retired within their 
 own dominions. 
 
 The whole space of time that the Pelopon- 
 nesians were upon the lands of the Athenians, 
 and the Athenians employed in their sea ex- 
 pedition, the plague was making havoc both in 
 the troops of the Athenians, and within the 
 city. This occasioned a report that the Pelo- 
 ponnesians, for fear of the infection, as having 
 been informed by deserters that it raged in tho 
 city, and been witnesses themselves of their 
 frequent interments, retired out of their terri- 
 tory with some precipitation. Yet they per- 
 severed in this incursion longer than they had 
 ever done before, and had made the whola 
 country one continued devastation; for the 
 time of their continuance in Attica was about 
 forty days. 
 
 The same summer, Agnon the son of Ni- 
 cias, and Cleopompus the son of Clinius, joined 
 in the command with Pericles, setting them- 
 selves at the head of the force which he had 
 employed before, carried them without loss of 
 time against the Chalcideans of Thrace. But 
 when they were come up to Potidaea, which 
 was still besieged, they played their engines of 
 battery against, and left no method unattempted 
 to take it. But the success in this attempt did 
 not answer expectation, nor indeed was the 
 event in any resspect the least proportioned to 
 their great preparations ; for the plague follow- 
 ed them even hither, and making grievous 
 havoc among the Athenians, destroyed the 
 army ; so that even those soldiers that had 
 been there before, and had from the beginning 
 of the siege been in perfect health, caught the 
 infection from the troops brought thither by 
 Agnon. — Phormio, and the body of sixteen 
 hundred men under his command, had be- 
 fore this quitted Chalcidice, so that Agnon 
 sailed back with the ships to Athens, of his 
 
YEAH II.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 73 
 
 four thousand men the plague having swept 
 away one thousand and fifty in about forty days : 
 but the soldiers who were there before were left 
 to carry on the siege of Potidsea. 
 
 After the second incursion of the Pelopon- 
 nesians, the Athenians whose lands were now 
 d second time laid waste, who felt the double 
 affliction of pestilence and war, had entirely 
 changed their sentiments of things. The blame 
 was universally thrown on Pericles, as if at his 
 instigation they had engaged in this war, and 
 by him had been plunged in all these calamities. 
 They desired with impatience to jnake up the 
 breach with the Lacedsemonians ; but though 
 they despatched an embassy for this purpose, 
 no terms could be agreed on. Thus grievously 
 distressed, and no method of resource occurring 
 to their minds, their resentments fell still hea- 
 vier on Pericles. He, seeing them quite dispi- 
 rited with their present misfortunes, and intent 
 on such projects as he had reason to expect 
 they would, called a general assembly of the 
 people, which, by contiiiuing in the command 
 of the army, he was authorized to do. He had 
 a mind to encourage them, to soothe the hot re- 
 sentments fermenting in their breasts, and bring 
 them into a more calm and confident temper. 
 He presented himself before thera, and spoke as 
 follows : — 
 
 " I fully expected, I freely own it, to become 
 the object of your resentments. I am not ig- 
 norant of the causes of it ; and for this purpose 
 have convened this assembly, to expostulate 
 with, nay, even to reprimand you, if without 
 any reason you make me the mark of your dis- 
 pleasure, or cowardly sink under the weight of 
 your misfortunes: for it is my firm opinion, 
 that by the full health and vigour of a state the 
 happiness of its consfituents is better secured, 
 than when each separate member is thriving 
 whilst the public welfare totters. Be the situ- 
 ation of any private person prosperous and fine 
 as his heart can wish — if his country be ruined, 
 he himself must necessarily be involved in that 
 ruin. But he that is unfortunate in a flourish- 
 ing community, may soon catch hold of expe- 
 dients of redress. When therefore your coun- 
 try is able to support the misfortunes of its 
 every member, and yet each of those members 
 must needs be enveloped in the ruin of his 
 country, why will you not join and unite your 
 efforts to prevent that ruin— and not (as you 
 are now going to do, because confounded with 
 your domestic misfortunes) basely desert the 
 17 
 
 public safety, and cast the most unjust censures 
 upon me who advised this war, upon your own- 
 selves also who approved this advice ? What 
 — I am the man that must singly stand the 
 storm of your anger ! — I am indeed the man 
 wlm I am confident is not inferior to any one 
 amongst you in knowing what ought to be 
 known, and in speaking what ought to be spoke, 
 who sincerely loves his country, and is superior 
 to all the sordid views of interest. For he 
 who thinks aright, and yet cannot communicate 
 his own thoughts, is just as insignificant as if 
 he could not think at all. He that enjoys both 
 these faculties in perfection, and yet is an ene- 
 my to his country, will in like manner never 
 say any thing for his country's good : or, though 
 he love his country, and be not proof against 
 corruption, he may prostitute every thing to 
 his own avarice. If therefore you judged my 
 qualifications in all these respects to be in some 
 moderate degree superior to those of other 
 men, and were thus drawn into a war by my 
 advice, there can certainly be no reason why I 
 should be accused of having done you wrong. 
 Those indeed who are already in the fast pos- 
 session of all the ends attainable by war, must 
 make a foolish choice if they run to arms : but, 
 if once under a necessity, either through tame 
 submission to be enslaved by a neighbour power, 
 or by a brave resistance to get the mastery over 
 them — he who flies danger in such a case, is 
 much more worthy of reproach than he who 
 meets it with bold defiance. 
 
 •' I indeed am the man I was, and of the 
 mind I was. It is you whose resolutions have 
 wavered ; — you who, whilst unhurt, through 
 my persuasion resolved on war, and repent so 
 soon as you feel its strokes — who measure the 
 soundness of my advice by the weakness of 
 your own judgments, and therefore condema 
 it, because the present disasters have so entirelj! 
 engaged the whole of your attention, that yoi» 
 have none left to perceive the high importance 
 of it to the public. Cruel indeed is that 
 reverse of fortune which hath so suddenly 
 afflicted you, dejecting your minds and dis- 
 piriting your former resolutions ! Accidents 
 sudden and unforeseen, and so opposite to tha» 
 event you might reasonably have expected, en- 
 slave the mind ; — which hath been your case 
 in all the late contingencies, and more parti- 
 cularly ■ so in this grievous pestilence. Y et 
 men who are the constituents of such a mighty 
 state, and whoso manners have been by educa 
 
74 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book n. 
 
 tion formed for its support, ought never to want 
 that inward fortitude which can stem the great- 
 est of afflictions, nor by self-desertion utterly 
 to efface their native dignity. The world will 
 always have equal reason to condemn the person 
 who sinks from a height of glory by his own 
 pusillanimity, and to hate the person who im- 
 pudently pretends to what he never can deserve. 
 It must be therefore your duty to suppress this 
 too keen a sensibility of your owu private losses, 
 and with united fortitude to act in the defence 
 of the public safety. Let us therefore bravely 
 undergo the toils of this war ; and if the toil in- 
 creaseth, let our resolution increase with it. And 
 let these, added to all those other proofs of my 
 integrity I have exhibited on other occasions, 
 suffice to convince you that your present censures 
 and suspicions of me are rash and groundless. 
 
 " I shall now lay before you a point, which, 
 BO far as I can judge, you have as yet never 
 properly considered, nor have I in any former 
 discourse insisted upon — ' the means within 
 your reach of rising to supreme dominion. 
 Nor should I meddle even now with a' point, 
 pompous beyond poetic visions, did I not see 
 you beyond measure fearful and dejected. You 
 think you are only masters of your own depen- 
 dents ; but I loudly aver that you are greater 
 masters now both at land and sea, those ne- 
 cessary spheres for carrying on the services of 
 life, than any other power ; and may be greater 
 yet, if so inclined. There is not now a king, 
 there is not any nation in the universal world, 
 able to witlistand that navy, which at this junc- 
 ture you can launch out to sea. Why is not 
 this extensive power regarded in balancing the 
 loss of your houses and lands, those intolerable 
 damages which you think you have suffered ? 
 — It is not so reasonable to grieve and despond 
 under such petty losses, as to despise from the 
 thought, that they are merely the trappings and 
 
 » Pericles liere is alioiit to convince tlie Atlienians, 
 tliat tiiey may rise to suprenie dominion in consequence 
 of tiieir nnval superiority. It was liis ainliition to ex- 
 ecute tliR trrand extensive plan wliicli was formed ori- 
 einally by Themistocles. And tlie words, in wiiich he 
 introducctli this topic, are so full of energy, tliat they 
 Iienr hard upon a translator. He calls it a point — 
 
 K,/ijr^J.'(rT(p;ev.%oi'Ti Tia» 7rp^a-7ritt<riv. My first attempts 
 
 at them were very faint and imperfect. T was soon 
 ronvinccd of it by the greatest Genius of the age, who 
 
 .did me the honour to read over this speech in manu- 
 script, and who as he thinks and speaks like Pericles, 
 rouid not endure that any of his wordsshould be depre- 
 ciated. I hope now I have expressed all the ideas which 
 tlin orisrinal words include. Mr Hobbcs hath entirely 
 
 . dropped them in his translation. 
 
 embellishments of wealth ; to fix the firm re- 
 membrance within us, that liberty, in defence 
 of which we are ready to hazard our all, will 
 easily give us > those trifles again ; and that by 
 tamely submitting to our enemies, the posses- 
 sion of all we have will be taken from us. We 
 ought not in either of these respects to degen- 
 erate from our fathers. By toil, and toil alone, 
 they gained these valuable acquisitions, de- 
 fended themselves, in the possession, and be- 
 queathed the precious inheritance to us. And 
 to lose the advantages we have possessed, will 
 be much more disgraceful than to have miscar- 
 ried in their pursuit. But we ought to en- 
 counter our enemies not with valour only, but 
 with confidence of success. Valour starts up 
 even in a coward, if he once prevails through 
 lucky ignorance ; but such a confidence must 
 be in every mind, which is seriously convinced 
 of its own superiority, as is now our case. Nay, 
 even when the match is equal, the certainty of 
 what must be done arising from an inward 
 bravery, adds the greater security to courage. 
 Confidence llien is not built on hope which 
 acts only in uncertainty, but on the sedate de- 
 termination of what it is able to perform, an 
 assurance of which is more guarded against 
 disappointments. 
 
 " It is further your duty to support the pub- 
 lic character (as in it to a man you pride your- 
 selves) with which its extensive rule invests 
 our community, and either not to fly from toils 
 or never to aim at glory. Think not you have 
 only one point at stake, the alternative of 
 slavery instead of freedom ; but think also of 
 the utter loss of sovereignty, and the danger of 
 vengeance for all the offences you have given 
 in the practice of it. To resign it, is not in 
 your power, — and of this let him be assured, 
 who refines through fear, and hopes to earn 
 indemnity by exerting it no longer. In your 
 hands it hath run out into a kind of tyranny. 
 To take it up seems indeed unjust, but to lay 
 it down is exceeding dangerous. And if such 
 dastardly souls could persuade others, they 
 would soon bring this state to utter ruin, or 
 indeed any other, where they were members, 
 and enjoyed the chief administration of affairs. 
 For the undisturbed and quiet life will be of 
 short continuance without the interposition of 
 a vigilant activity. Slavery is never to be en- 
 dured by a state that once hath governed — such 
 a situation can be tolerable only to that which 
 hath ever bees dependent. 
 
YEAK II.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 75 
 
 " Suffer not yourselves therefore to be se- 
 duced by men of such mean and grovelling 
 tempers, nor level your resentments at me — 
 since, though I advised the Vfar, it was not be- 
 gun without your approbation — if the enemy 
 hath invaded you in such a manner as you 
 could not but expect from your own resolutions 
 never to be dependent. What though beyond 
 our apprehensions we have suffered the sad 
 visitation of pestilence^ — Such misfortunes no 
 human foresight will be able to prevent — though 
 I know that even this hath in some measure 
 served to sharpen your aversion to me. But 
 if this be just, I claim as my lawful right the 
 glory of all those happy contingencies, which 
 may ever befall you beyond your expectation. 
 The evils inflicted by heaven must be borne 
 with patient resignation ; and the evils by ene- 
 mies with manly fortitude. Such rational be- 
 haviour hath hitherto been habitual in Athens ; 
 let it now be reversed by you ; — by you, who 
 know to what a pitch of excellence the state 
 hath rose in the esteem of the world, by not 
 yielding to adversity ; but, by braving all the 
 horrors of war, and pouring forth its blood in 
 the glorious cause, hath reached the highest 
 summit of power, and ever since retained it. 
 The memory of this, time itself will never be 
 able to efface, even though we may suffer it to 
 droop and perish in our hands — as what is hu- 
 man must decline — Our memory I say, who, 
 though Grecians ourselves, gave laws to all 
 other Grecians, stood the shock of most formi- 
 dable wars, resisted them all when combined 
 against us, conquered them all when separately 
 engaged, and maintained ourselves in possession 
 of the most flourishing and most powerful state 
 in the world. These things let the indolent 
 and sluggish soul condemn, but these let the 
 active and industrious strive to emulate, for 
 these they who cannot attain will envy. 
 
 " To be censured and maligned for a time, 
 hath been the fate of all those whose merit 
 hath raised them above the common level ; — 
 but wise and judicious is the man who, enjoying 
 the superiority, despiseth the envy. An aver- 
 sion so conceived will never last. His merit 
 soon breaks forth in all its splendour, and his 
 glory is afterwards handed down to posterity, 
 never to be forgot. You, who have so clear a 
 prospect before you, both of what will be some 
 time glorious, and of what at present is not 
 disgraceful, recollect your own worth and secure 
 hoth. Sink not so low as to petition terms 
 
 from the Laceda;monians ; nor let them ima- 
 gine that you feel the weight of your present 
 misfortunes. The man whose resolution never 
 sinks before it, but strives by a brave opposi- 
 tion to repel calamity, such — whether in a 
 public or private capacity — must be acknow- 
 ledged to be the worthiest man." 
 
 By arguments like these did Pericles en- 
 deavour to mollify the resentments of the 
 Athenians against himself, and to divert their 
 minds from their public calamities. In regard 
 to the public, they seemed to be satisfied with 
 all that he had urged ; they desisted from soli- 
 citing an accommodation with the Lacedaemoni- 
 ans ; and were more hearty than ever for con- 
 tinuing the war. Yet, in their own private 
 concerns, they were grievously dejected under 
 their present mis'brtunes. The poor citizens 
 who had but little, could not bear with patience 
 the loss of that little. The rich and the great 
 regretted the loss of their estates, with their 
 country-seats and splendid furniture ; — but 
 worst of all, that instead of peace they had the 
 sad alternative of war. However, neither poor 
 nor rich abated their displeasure to Pericles, 
 till they had laid upon him a pecjiniary fine.' 
 And yet, no long time after — so unsteady aro 
 the humpurs of the people — they elected him 
 general again, and intrusted him with the ad- 
 ministration of affairs. The keen sense they 
 had at first of their own private losses soon 
 grew blunt and unaffecting, and they could not 
 but allow him the most capable person to pro- 
 vide for all the urgent necessities of the pub- 
 lic. For the supreme authority he enjoyed in 
 times of peace he had exercised with great mo- 
 deration ; he was vigilant and active for the 
 good of the community, which never made so 
 great a figure as under his administration ; and 
 after the war broke out it is plain te best knew 
 the reach of its ability to cany it on. He 
 lived two years and six months from its com- 
 mencement : and after his death,^ his judicious 
 
 I Plutarch (in the life of Pericles) says. Authors aro 
 not agreed ahout the quantity of the fine at this lime 
 laid upon Pericles. Some lower it to fifteen talents, 
 others mount it up to fifty. The demagogue, who in- 
 cited the people to fine him, is also said by some to have 
 heen Cleon, with whose genius and character the rea- 
 der will soon become acquainted. 
 
 ^ As the historian is here going to take his leave of 
 Pericles, he adjoins a true representation of liis patriot- 
 ic spirit, his great aliilities, his judicious foresight, and 
 successful administration. And here, the reader may bo 
 informed of some points, which Thucydides eithor 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book II. 
 
 foresight in regard to this war was more and 
 more acknowledged. For he had assured them 
 they could not fail of success, provided they 
 ' would not meddle by land, but apply themselves 
 solely to their navy, without being solicitous 
 to enlarge their territories in this war, or ex- 
 posing Athens itself to danger. But they had 
 recourse to schemes quit opposite to these, nay 
 even to some that had no connection at all with 
 this war, wherein private ambition or private 
 interest pushed them to such management as 
 was highly prejudicial to themselves and their 
 
 ttiought needless when he wrote, or foreign to his sub- 
 ject. — PericleH had two sons hy his former wife. ,Tlie 
 eldest of them proved a great vexation to hia father, 
 who was unable to support him in his ex pensive way of 
 living. Pericles had no Inrgc estate, and he was not 
 richer for fingering the public money. He laid it all 
 out in adorning his Athens, and was rewarded for it by 
 t;iving so many magnificent and lasting proofs of his 
 fine taste in painting, sculpture, and building. For the 
 city of Rome received not so much decoration from her 
 foundation till the time of the Cssars, as Athens did 
 frrfm Pericles alone. Yet economy was his passion at 
 home, as that of his son Xantippus was luxury. This 
 son however was taken off by the plague, as was after- 
 wards a sister of Pericles, most of his intimates and 
 relations, and his other son Paralus. This last was the 
 heaviest blow; he felt it deeply: and all Athens did all 
 that lay in their power to comfort him, since, contrary 
 to a law of Pericles' own making, they enrolled his son 
 Pericles, whom he had by Aspasia, an Athenian of the 
 full lilood.. At length he was seized himself by the 
 plague; and, after languishing a long time in a manner 
 different to most others, died of it. In his last moments 
 he showed to a friend who was visiting him a charm 
 which the women had hung about his neck, as if he 
 was sick indeed when he could submit to such foolery. 
 When several of them were sitting round hia bed, and. 
 Chinking he did not hear them, were enumeratini the 
 great exploits Of his life, the shining incidents of his 
 administration, his victories, and the nine trophies he 
 had erected, he interrupted them with these words, " I 
 wonder you lay stress upon such actions, in which for- 
 tune claims a share along with me, ami which many 
 others have performed as well as myself, and yet pass 
 over the highest glory and most valuable part of my 
 character, that no citizen of Athens ever put on mourn- 
 ing through me." The wonderful man, though engaged 
 for forty years in business, and constantly attacked by 
 every furious, seditious, and turbulent Athenian, had 
 rever amidst all his power given way to the spirit of 
 revenge. For this, as Plutarch finely observes, he in 
 some measure deserved the lofty title of Olympian, too 
 .trrogant in any other light for man to wear; since 
 genllencsa of manners and thehabilsof mercy and for- 
 giveness raise men to the nearest resemblance of the 
 gods. Plutarch adds, that the Athenians never regretted 
 nny man so much, and with so much rer,son. — If the 
 reader he willing to hear any more of Aspasia, the 
 snme writer tells us that after the death of Pericles, 
 she married one Lysicles, a low and obscure man, and 
 a dealer In cattle, whom however she improved into an 
 Athenian of the first class.' 
 
 allies. Wherever these politic schemes suc- 
 ceeded, private persons carried off all the ho- 
 nour and advaiitage; — whenever they miscarried, 
 the hardships of the war fell more severely on 
 the state. The reason was this — Pericles, a 
 man of acknowledged worth and ability, and 
 whose integrity was undoubtedly proof against 
 corruption, kept the people in order by a gentle 
 management, and was not so much directed by 
 them as their principal director. He had not 
 worked himself into power by indirect methods, 
 and therefore was not obliged to soothe and 
 honour their caprices, but could contradict and 
 disregard their anger with peculiar dignity. 
 Whenever he saw them bent on projects inju- 
 rious or unreasonable, he terrified them so by 
 the force of his eloquence, that he made them 
 tremble and desist ; and when they were dis- 
 quieted by groundless apprehensions, he ani- 
 mated them afresh into brave resolution. The 
 state under him, though styled a democracy, 
 was in fact a monarchy. His successors more 
 on a level with one another, and yet every one 
 affecting to be chief, were forced to cajole the 
 people, and so to neglect the concerns of the 
 public. This was the source of many grievous 
 errors, as must unavoidably be the case in a 
 great community and possessed of large do- 
 minion ; — ^but in particular of the expedition to 
 Sicily ; the ill conduct of which did not appear 
 so flagrantly in relation to those against whom 
 it was undertaken, as to the authors and 
 movers of it, who knew not how to make tho 
 proper provision for those who were employed 
 in it. For, engaged in their own private con- 
 tests for power with the people, they had not 
 sufficient attention to the army abroad, and at 
 home were embroiled in mutual altercations. 
 Yet, notwithstanding the miscarriage in Sicily, 
 in which they lost their army with the greater 
 part of their fleet, and the sedition which in- 
 stantly broke out in Athens, they bravely re- 
 sisted for three years together, not only their 
 first enemies in the war, but the Sicilians also 
 in conjunction with them, the greater part of 
 their dependents revolted from them, and at 
 length Cyrus the king's son, who, favourini; 
 the Pcloponnesians, supplied, them with money 
 for the service of their fleet ; — nor would at 
 last be conquered, till by their own intestine 
 feuds they were utterly disabled from resisting 
 longer. So much better than any other person 
 was Pericles acquainted with their strength, 
 when he marked out such a conduct to them a» 
 
TEAK II.] 
 
 PELOPOiNNESlAN WAR. 
 
 77 
 
 would infallibly have enabled the Athenian 
 state to have continued the war longer than the 
 Veloponnesians could possibly have done. 
 
 The Lacedsemonians, in junction with their 
 allies, the same summer fitted out a fleet of 
 one hundred ships against the island Zacynthus 
 which lies over against Elis. They are a co- 
 lony of the AchiEans of Peloponnesus, and 
 were then in league with the Athenians. On 
 board this fleet were a thousand heavy-armed 
 Lacedffimonians : and Cnemus the Spartan 
 commanded in the expedition. Making a de- 
 scent upon the island, they ravaged great part 
 of the country, — but finding the entire reduc- 
 tion of it impracticable, they re-embarked and 
 returned home. 
 
 In the close of the same summer, Aristeus 
 the Corinthian, Aneristus, Nicolaus, Protode- 
 mus, and Timagoras of Tegea, ambassadors 
 from the Lacedaemonians, and Polls the Argive, 
 without any public character, travelling into 
 Asia, to engage the Persian king to supply them 
 with men and money for carrying on the war, on 
 their journey stop first in Thrace and address 
 themselves to Sitalces the son of Teris. They 
 had a mind to try if they could prevail upon 
 him to quit the Athenian alliance, to march to 
 the relief of Potidasa, now besieged by the 
 Athenians, to desist for the future from giving 
 the latter any assistance, and to obtain from 
 him a safe-conduct through his territory for 
 the continuance of their journey beyond the 
 Hellespont to Pharnaces son of Pharnabazus, 
 who would afterwards conduct them in safety 
 to the royal court. Learchus the son of Calli- 
 machus, and Ameiniades the son of Philemon, 
 happening at that time to be with Sitalces, on 
 an embassy from Athens, persuade the son of 
 Sitalces, who had been made a citizen of 
 Athens, to seize and deliver them up to them, 
 that they might not go forward to the king, to 
 the prejudice of that community of which he 
 was a member. He, hearkening to their advice, 
 arrests them just as they were going on ship- 
 board to cross the Hellespont, after they had 
 travelled through Thrace to the spot marked 
 for their embarkation. He executed this by 
 means of some trusty persons despatched pur- 
 posely after them along with Learchus and 
 Ameiniades, and expressly ordered to deliver 
 them up to the latter : they, so soon as they 
 had got them in their power, carried them to 
 Athens. Upon their arrival there, the Atheni- 
 nians standing in great fear of Aristeus, lest 
 
 upon escape he might do them further mischief, 
 since before this he had been the author of all 
 the projects to their prejudice both at PotidaBa 
 and in Thrace, put them to death on the very 
 day of their arrival, unjud^ed and suing in vain 
 to be heard, and cast them into pits. This 
 cruel usage of them they justified from the ex- 
 ample of the Lacedaamoniahs, who had in the 
 same manner put to death and cast into pits 
 the Athenian merchants and those of their 
 allies, whom they had seized in the trading 
 vessels upon the coiasts of Peloponnesus. For, 
 in the beginning of the war, the Lacedaamonians 
 had put to death as enemies all those whom 
 they could take at sea — not those only who 
 belonged to the states in alliance with the 
 Athenians, but even such as were of the yet 
 neutral communities. 
 
 About the same time in the end of summer, 
 the Ambraciots • in conjunction with many of 
 the Barbarians, whom they had excited to take 
 up arms, invaded Argos of Amphilochia, and 
 made excursions over all its dependerit terri- 
 tory. Their enmity against the Argives took 
 its original from hence. — This Argos was first 
 built, and this province of Amphilochia first 
 planted, by Amphilochus the son of Amphi- 
 araus, immediately after the Trojan war, who 
 on his return home, being dissatisfied with the 
 state of affairs in that other Argos, founded 
 this city in the gulf of Ambracia, and gave it 
 the same name with the place of his nativity. 
 It soon became the largest city of Amphilochia, 
 and the inhabitants were most powerful of any 
 thereabouts. Yet many generations after, 
 being sunk by misfortunes, they prevailed upon 
 the Ambraciots bordering upon Amphilochia 
 to unite with them. This community of resi- 
 dence brought them to their present use of one 
 common language, the Greek ; but the rest of 
 the Amphilochians are still Barbarians. Yet 
 in process of time, the Ambraciots j^rive the 
 Argives from amongst them, and keep posses- 
 sion, of the city for themselves. Upon this 
 event the Amphilochians threw themselves 
 under the protection of the Acarnanians, and 
 both together implored the succour of the 
 Athenians, who sent thirty ships to their as- 
 sistance under the command of Phormio. 
 Upon Phormio's arrival they take Argos by 
 storm, niade all the Ambraciots slaves, and 
 then both the .\mphilochians and Acarnanians 
 settle themselves together in the city. To 
 these incidents was first owing the loaguo 
 M 
 
78 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book II. 
 
 offensive and defensive between the Athenians 
 and Acarnanians. The chief cause of the 
 inveteracy vrhich the Ambraciots bore to the 
 Argives, was their having made them in this 
 manner slaves ; and which afterwards impelled 
 them in the confusion of this war, to form this 
 invasion with the junction of the Chaonians and 
 some otherneighbouring Barbarians. Advanc- 
 ing up to Argos, they were entire masters of 
 the whole territory, but in vain endeavoured to 
 take the town by assault; upon which they 
 again returned home, and dispersed to their re- 
 spective nations. — Such were the transactions 
 of the summer. 
 
 On the first approach of winter, the Atheni- 
 ans sent out twenty ships to cruize on the 
 coasts of Peloponnesus, under the command of 
 Phormio ; who, fixing his station before Nau- 
 pactus, kept so strict a guard, that nothing 
 durst pass in or out from Corinth and the 
 gulf of Crissa. — Six other ships they send to 
 Caria and Lycia, under the command of Mele- 
 Bander, to levy contributions there, and to stop 
 the excursions of the Peloponnesian privateers, 
 harbouring in those parts, from molesting the 
 course of their trading vessels from Phacelis, 
 Phoenicia, and the adjacent continent. Mele- 
 sander, with the Athenian and confederate 
 force he had on board his ships, landed in 
 Lycia, and was defeated in the first battle, in 
 which he lost part of his army and his own life. 
 
 The same winter the Potidasans, as they 
 were no longer able to hold out the siege ; and 
 as besides, the irruptions of the Peloponnesians 
 into .\ttica had not induced the Athenians to 
 raise it; their provisions being quite spent; 
 and amongst other calamities to which their 
 extremities had reduced them, having been 
 forced to feed upon one another ; they held a 
 parley about their surrender with the Athenian 
 officers, who commanded in the siege,' Xeno- 
 
 1 In this siege of PotidiEa, two persons served amon;,'st 
 tlie heavy-armed as private soldiers, one of whom was 
 the glory of Iniman nature; and the other the glory and 
 bane of his country: I mean the divine Socrates, and at 
 tills time young Alcibiades. Plutarch (in the life of Al- 
 ciliiades) says, they lay in the aame tent, and fought 
 always side hy side. Once, in a sliarp skirmish, hoth of 
 them distinsuished themselves above all their fellow-sol- 
 diers. Alcibiades at length was wounded, and dropped; 
 Socrates stood over and defended him, and saved both 
 him and hisarmsfromtlie enemy. Socrates therefore 
 had the jusfest right to the public reward, as the per- 
 son who had Iiehaved best in this action. But when the 
 generals, on account of Alcibiades' quality, showed a 
 great desire to confer honour upon liim, f?ocrates, will- 
 ing also to increase his ardour for gallant actions, turned 
 
 phon the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus the 
 son of Aristoclides, and Phanomachus the son 
 of Callimachus. They, sensible of the hard- 
 ships their troops suffered by long lying abroad 
 in the winter season, and that the carrying on 
 of the siege had already cost Athens two thou- 
 sand talents,^ granted them a composition. 
 The terms agreed on were these — " That 
 they should quit the place with their wives, 
 their children, and auxiliaries, every man with 
 one suit of clothing, but the women with two ; 
 and with a certain sum of money to~defray the 
 expense of their departure." — By virtue of 
 this composition they went away to Chalcis, 
 where every one shifted for himself. But fhe 
 Athenians called their generals to account for 
 their conduct, because they had signed this 
 composition without their privity (for they 
 thought it in their power to have made them 
 surrender at discretion,) and afterwards sent to 
 Potidsea some of their people whom they set- 
 tled in a colony there. — These things were done 
 this winter, and so ended the second year of 
 this war, the history of which hath been com- 
 piled by Thucydides. 
 
 TEAH III." 
 
 Eault the next summer, the Peloponnesi- 
 ans and their allies, omitting the incursion as 
 before into Attica, marched their forces against 
 Plataea. Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus king 
 of the Lacedaemonians, commanded, who hav- 
 ing encamped his army, was preparing to ravage 
 the adjacent country. He was interrupted by 
 an embassy from the Platseans, Who addressed 
 themselves to him in the following manner. — 
 
 " The war, O Archidamus and Lacedsemoni- 
 ans, you are now levying on Platsea, is a flar 
 grant breach of common justice, a blemish on 
 your honour and that of your fathers. Pau- 
 sanias the Lacedaemonian, son of Cleombrotus, 
 when — aided by those Grecians, who cheerfully 
 exposed themselves with him to the dangers of 
 that battle which was fought on our land — he 
 had delivered Greece from Persian slavery, at 
 
 witness in his favour, and procured him the wreath and 
 the public present of a complete suit of armour. So- 
 crates coveted no recompense for brave exploits but the 
 consciousness of havin? performed then, and young 
 Alcibiades was to be nursed up to virtue. He was 
 capable of every degree either of virtue or vice; and 
 Sorrates always endeavoured to encourage him in the 
 former, and gave his eager and enterprising soul th« 
 jtist direction. 
 
 2 £387, 500 sterling, 
 
 1 Before Christ, 439. 
 
YEAK in.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 79 
 
 d public sacrifice to Jupiter the deliverer, 
 solemnized by him on that occasion in the 
 public forum of Platsea, called all the confede- 
 lates together, and there conferred these 
 privileges on the Plataeans — ' That they should 
 have tree possession of the city and territory 
 belonging to it, to be govenied at their own 
 discretion i — that no one should ever unjustly 
 make war upon them, or endeavour to enslave 
 them ; and in case of such attempts, all the 
 confederates then present should avenge it to 
 the utmost of their power.' — Sucti grateful re- 
 turns did your fathers make us in recompense 
 of our valour and the zeal we excited in the 
 common dangers. Yet their generosity you 
 are now reversing — you, with the Thebans our 
 inveterate foes, are come hither to enslave us. 
 But by the gods, who were then witnesses to 
 the oath they swore, by all the tutelary deities 
 both of your own and of our community, we 
 adjure you to do no damage to Platsean ground, 
 nor to violate your oaths, but to retire and 
 leave us in that state of independence which 
 Pausanias justly established for us." — To these 
 words of the Platieans, Archidamus made this 
 reply : 
 
 " What you have urged, ye men of PlataBa, is 
 just and reasonable, if it be found agreeable to 
 your actions. Let the declarations of Pau- 
 sanias be observed ; be free and independent 
 yourselves, and at the same time vindicate their 
 own freedom to others, to those who, after 
 participation of the same common dangers, 
 made that oath in your favour, and yet are now 
 enslaved by the Athenians. To rescue them 
 and others from that slavery have our prepara- 
 tions been made, this war hath been undertaken. 
 You who know what liberty is, and are such 
 advocates for it, do you abide firmly by your 
 oaths ; at least, as we heretofore advised you, 
 keep at quiet, enjoying only what is properly 
 your own ; side with neither party ; receive 
 both in the way of friendship, in the way of 
 enmity, neither. To a conduct like this we 
 never shall object." 
 
 When the Platsean ambassadors had heard 
 this reply of Archidamus, they returned into the 
 city, and communicating what had passed to the 
 body of the citizens, they carried hack in an- 
 swer to him — " That they could not possibly 
 comply with his proposals, without the consent 
 of the Athenians, because their wives and 
 children were in their power — that they were 
 apprehensive a compliance might endanger 
 
 their whole community, since m such a caso 
 either the Athenians might not confirm the 
 neutrality, or the Thebans, who were compre- 
 hended in the same neutral oath to the two 
 principal powers, might again attempt to seize 
 their city." — Archidamus to remove their ap- 
 prehensions spoke as follows : " Deliver up your 
 city and your houses to us Laceda;monians ; 
 let us know the bounds of your tcrritorj' and 
 the exact number of your trees, and make as 
 true a calculation as you possibly can of all that 
 belongs to you. Depart yourselves, and reside 
 wherever you please, so long as the war conti- 
 nues ; at the end of it we will restore every thing 
 again. In the mean time, we will make the 
 best use of every thing intrusted to us, and pay 
 you an annual equivalent for your subsistence." 
 Upon hearing this, they again returned rnto the 
 city, and the whole body of the people assisting 
 at a general consultation, they returned for an- 
 swer — " That ihey desired only to communi- 
 cate the proposals to the Athenians, and then 
 with their approbation would accept them. In 
 the meantime they begged a suspension of 
 arms, and to have their lands spared from de- 
 predation." He granted them u truce for the 
 time requisite to receive an answer, and forbore 
 ravaging the country. 
 
 The ambassadors of Platiea, having been at 
 Athens, and consulted with the Athenians, re- 
 turn again with* this answer to their city : " The 
 Athenians say that in no preceding time, ever 
 since we entered into confederacy with them, 
 did they ever suffer us in any respect to be in- 
 j ured ; that neither will they neglect us now, 
 but send us a powerful aid. And you they 
 solemnly abjure by the oaths which your fathers 
 have sworn, to admit no change or innovation 
 in the league subsisting between you and 
 them." — When the ambassadors had thus de- 
 livered the answer of the Athenians, after 
 some consultation, the Flatseans resolved, " ne- 
 ver to desert them, to bear any devastation of 
 their lands, nay, if such be the case, to behold 
 it with patience, and to suffer any extremities to 
 which their enemies might reduce them ; — that, 
 further, no person should stir out of the city, 
 but an answer be given from the walls — That 
 it was impossible for them to accept the terms 
 proposed by the Lacedffimonians." 
 
 This was no sooner heard than Archidamus 
 the king made this solemn appeal to all their 
 tutelary heroes and gods. — "Ye gods and 
 heroes," said he, "who protect this region of 
 
80 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book II. 
 
 Platisa, bear witness to us, tliat it was not till 
 after a violation of oaths already sworn, that 
 we have marched into this country, where our 
 fathers through the blessings you sent down 
 upon their prayers overcame the Medes, and 
 which you then made that fortunate field 
 whereon the arms of Greece were crowned 
 with victory — and that whatever we shall here 
 undertake, our every step shall be agreeable to 
 justice. We have offered many honourable 
 conditions to them, which are all rejected. 
 Grant therefore our supplications, that the 
 first transgressors of justice may receive their 
 punishment, and that those who fight with 
 equity may obtain revenge." After this solemn 
 address to the gods, he roused up his army into 
 action. 
 
 He fnrst of all farmed an inclosure round 
 about them with the trees they had felled, so 
 that no one could get out of the city. In the 
 next place, they raised a mount of earth before 
 the place, hoping that it could not long hold 
 out a siege against the efforts of so large an 
 army. Having felled a quantity of timber on 
 mount Cithaeron, with it they framed the mount 
 on either side, that thus cased it might perform 
 the service of a wall, and that the earth might 
 be kept from mouldering away too fast. Upon 
 it they heaped a quantity of matter, both stones 
 and earth, and whatever else would cement to- 
 gether and increase the bulk. This work em- 
 ployed them for seventy days and nights with- 
 out intermission, all being alternately employed 
 in it, so that one part of the army was carrying 
 it on, while the other took the necessary re- 
 freshments of food and sleep. Those Lace- 
 diemonians who had the command over the 
 hired troops of the other states, had the care 
 of the work, and obliged them all to assist in 
 carrying it on. The Platffians, seeing this 
 mount raised to a great height, built a counter- 
 work of wood, close to that part of the city- 
 wall against which this mount of earth was 
 thrown up, and strengthened the inside of it 
 with bricks, which they got for this use by 
 pulling down the adjacent houses. The wooden 
 case was designed to keep it firm together, and 
 prevent the whole pile from being weakened 
 by its height. They farther covered it over 
 with sheep-skins and hides of beasts, to de- 
 fend the workmen from missive weapons, and 
 to preserve the wood from being fired by the 
 enemy. This work within was raised to a 
 great height, and the mount was raised with 
 
 equal expedition without Upon this, the 
 Plataeans had recourse to another device. 
 They broke a hole through the wall, close to 
 which the mount was raised, and drew the 
 earth away from under it into the city. But 
 this being discovered by the Peloponnesians, 
 they threw into the hole hurdles made of reeds 
 and stuffed with clay, which being of a firm 
 consistence could not be dug away like earth. 
 By this they were excluded, and so desisted 
 for a while from their former practice. Yet 
 digging a subterraneous passage from out of 
 the city, which they so luckily continued that 
 it undermined the mount, they again withdrew 
 the earth from under it. This practice long 
 escaped the discovery of the besiegers, who 
 still heaping on matter, yet the work grew rather 
 less, as the earth was drawn away from the 
 bottom, and that above fell in to fill up the void. 
 However, still apprehensive, that as they were 
 few in number, they should not be able long to 
 hold out against such numerous besiegers, they 
 had recourse to another project. They desisted 
 from carrying on the great pile which was to 
 counterwork the mount, and beginning at each 
 end of it where the wall was low, they run 
 another wall in the form of a crescent along 
 the inside of the city, that if the great wall 
 should be taken this might afterwards hold out, 
 might lay the enemy under the necessity of 
 throwing up a fresh mount against it, and that 
 thus the further they advanced the difficulties 
 of the siege might be doubled, and be carried 
 on with increase of danger. 
 
 When their mount was completed, the Pelo- 
 ponnesians played away their battering-engines 
 against the wall ; and one of them worked so 
 dexterously from the mount against the great 
 pile within, that they shook it very much, and 
 threw the Plataeans into consternation. Others 
 they applied in different parts against the wall, 
 . the force of which was broken by the Platieans, 
 who threw ropes around them ; they also tied 
 large beams together, with long chains of iron 
 at both ends of the beams, by which they 
 hung downwards from two other transverse 
 beams inclined and extended beyond the wall ; 
 — these they drew along obliquely, and against 
 whatever part they saw the engine of battery 
 to be aimed, they let go the beams with a full 
 swing of the chains, and so dropped them down 
 directly upon it, which by the weight of the 
 stroke broke off the beak of the battering ma- 
 chine. Upon this the Peloponnesians, finding 
 
YEAR III.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 81 
 
 all their engines useless, and their mount 
 effectually counterworked by the fortification 
 within, concluded it a business of no little 
 hazard to take the place amidst so many ob- 
 stacles, and prepared to draw a circumvallation 
 about it. 
 
 But at first they were willing to try whether it 
 were not possible to set the town on fire, and 
 burn it down, as it was not large, by help of a 
 brisk gale of wind ; for they cast their thoughts 
 towards every expedient of taking it without 
 a large expense and a tedious blockade. Pro- 
 curing for this purpose a quantity of faggots, 
 they tossed them from their own mouiit into 
 the void space between the wall and the inner 
 fortification. As many hands wercS employed 
 in this business, they had soon filled it up, and 
 then proceeded to toss more of them into the 
 other parts of the city lying beyond, as far as 
 they could by the advantage which the emi- 
 nence gave them. Upon these they threw 
 fiery balls made of sulphur and' pitch, which 
 caught the faggots, and soon kindled such a 
 fiame as before this time no one had ever seen 
 kindled by the art of man. It hath indeed 
 sometimes happened, that wood growing upon 
 mountains hath been so heated by the attrition 
 of the winds, that without any other cause it 
 hath broken out into fire and flame. But this 
 was exceeding fierce ; and the Platseans, who 
 had baffled all other efforts, were very narrowly 
 delivered from perishing by its fury ; for it 
 cleared the city to a great distance round about, 
 BO that no Plataean durst approach it : and if 
 the wind had happened to have blown along 
 with it, as the enemy hoped, they must all un- 
 avoidably have perished. It is now reported, 
 that a heavy rain falling on a sudden, attended 
 with claps of thunder, extinguished the flames, 
 and put an end to this imminent danger. 
 
 The Peloponnesians, upon the failure of this 
 project, marched away part of their army ; but, 
 continuing the remainder there, raised a wall 
 of circumvallation quite round the city, the 
 troops of every confederate state executing a 
 determinate part of the work. Both inside 
 and outside of this wall was a ditch, and by 
 first digging these they had got materials for 
 brick. This work being completed about the 
 rising of Arcturus,' they left some of their 
 own men to guard half of the wall, the other 
 half beins left to the care of the Boeotians ; 
 
 lEeginnmg of September. 
 
 18 
 
 then marched away with the main army, and 
 dismissed the auxiliary forces to their respective 
 cities. — The Platieans had already sent away 
 to Athens their wives, their children, their old 
 people, and all the useless crowd of inhabitants. 
 There were only left in the town during this 
 siege, four hundred Platsians, eighty Athenians, 
 and one hundred and ten women to prepare their 
 food. This was the whole number of them 
 when the siege was first formed ; nor was 
 there any other person within the wall, either 
 slave or free. — And in this manner was the 
 city of Platsea besieged in form. 
 
 The same summer, and about the time that 
 the army appeared before Platasa, the Atheni- 
 ans, with a body of their own people, consist- 
 ing of two thousand heavy-armed, and two hun- 
 dred horsemen, invaded the Chalcideans of 
 Thrace and the Bottisans. The corn was in 
 the ear, when this army was led against them, 
 under the command of Xenophon the son of 
 Euripides and two colleagues. Coming up to 
 Spartolus, a town in Bottiaia, they destroyed 
 the corn, and hoped to get possession of the 
 place by the management of a faction they had 
 within. But a contrary party, haying sent in 
 good time to Olynthus, had procured from 
 thence an aid of heavy-armed and other force 
 for their protection. These even made a sally 
 out of Spartolus, and forced the Athenians to 
 a battle under the walls of the town. The 
 heavy-armed Chalcideans, with some of their 
 auxiliaries, are defeated by the Athenians, and 
 retire into Spartolus. The horse and light- 
 armed Chalcideans get the better of the horse 
 and light-armed Athenians; but they had with 
 them a small number of targeteers from the 
 province called Crusis. On the first joining 
 of battle other targeteers came to their assist- 
 ance from Olynthus. The light-armed of 
 Spartolus seeing this reinforcement just como 
 up, and reflecting that they had received no 
 loss before, with re-animated courage again 
 charge the Athenians, in conjunction with the 
 Chalcidean horse, and the fresh reinforcement. 
 The Athenians retire to the two companies 
 which they had left to guard the baggage. 
 Here they drew up again, and whenever they 
 thought proper to charge, the enemy fell back ; 
 when they retreated from the charge, the enemy 
 pressed upon and infested them with missive 
 weapons. The Chalcidean horse rode up where 
 they thought they could break them, and falling 
 in without fear of a repulse, put the Athenians to 
 m2 
 
82 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book II. 
 
 flight and pursued them to a great distance. 
 The Athenians fly for refuge to Fotidaea ; and 
 afterwards, obtaining a truce to fetch off their 
 dead, return with their shattered army to Ath- 
 ens. In this action they lost four hundred and 
 thirty men, and all their commanders. The 
 Chalcideans and Bottiseans erected » trophy, 
 and having taken proper care of their dead, 
 separated to their own cities. 
 
 Not long after this, in the same summer, the 
 Ambraciots and Chaonians, who aimed at the 
 total reduction of Acarna'-ia, and to compass a 
 general defection there from the Athenians, 
 prevailed upon the Lacedajmonians to supply 
 them with shipping from their confederate ci- 
 ties, and to send a thousand heavy-armed into 
 Acarnania. They told them, that — " if they 
 would join them with a land and a naval force 
 at the sarno time, it would be impossible for 
 the Aearnanians to succour one another by 
 sea ; that hence they might easily get all Acar- 
 nania into their power, from whence they might 
 become masters of Zacynthus and Cephallene, 
 and a stop would then be made to the Atheni- 
 an cruises on the coasts of Peloponnesus ; 
 nay, that there was even a hope of reducing 
 Naupactus." — This scheme was pleasing to the 
 Lacediemonians, who ordered Cnemus (yet 
 their admiral) to sail thither with a few ships, 
 having on board the heavy-armed : and circula- 
 ted orders to their confederates to fit out their 
 ships, and repair with all expedition to Leucas. 
 The Corinthians were, those who showed most 
 zeal for the Ambraciots, a colony of their own ; 
 and the shipping of Corinth, Sicyon, and the 
 adjacent places, was prepared with all possi- 
 ble expedition ; but that of Leucas, Anactori- 
 um, and Ambracia, was already at Leucas, and 
 waiting for the rest. Cnemus and the thou- 
 sand heavy-armed performed their voyage un- 
 discovered by Phormio, who commanded the 
 Athenian fleet of twenty sail, stationed round 
 Naupactus, and immediately landed his men 
 for the destined service. Besides the thousand 
 Peloponnesians he brought with him, he was 
 now joined by the Ambraciots, Leucadians, 
 Anactorians, of the Grecians ; — of the Barba- 
 rians, by a thousand Chaonians not subject to 
 a regal government, but commanded by Pho- 
 (ius and Nicanor, men of those families which 
 had a right to command by annual election. 
 With the Chaonians came the Thesproti^T-s, 
 who also had no king. Sabylinthus, guardian 
 of their king Tharyps, yet a minor, led the 
 
 Melossians aiid Antitanians. The Paravaians 
 were head^ by their dwn king Ordceus, who 
 had also the command of a thousand Orestians, 
 subjects of Antiochus, which served with his 
 troops by the permission of Antiochus. Per- 
 diccas sent also a thousand Macedonians, of 
 which the Athenians were ignorant, but these 
 were not yet come up. 
 
 With these forces Cnemus began his march, 
 without waiting the arrival of the ships from 
 Corinth, and passing through Argia they de- 
 stroyed Limnaea, a village unfortified. They 
 march next for Stratus, the capital city of Acar- 
 nania, judging that if they first took this, all 
 other places would readily submit. The Aear- 
 nanians, finding a large army broke in amongst 
 them by land, and more enemies coming to at- 
 tack them by sea, gave up all view of .succour- 
 ing one another, and stood separately on their 
 own defence. They sent information to Phor- 
 mio, and requested him to come up to their re- 
 lief. He sent them word, " he could not possibly 
 leave Naupactus without a guard, when a fleet 
 was ready to sail from Corinth." The Pelo- 
 ponnesians and their allies, dividing themselves 
 into three bodies, advanced towards the city of 
 the Stratians, with a design to appear before it, 
 and if it did not surrender at once, to storm it 
 without loss of time. The Chaonians and the 
 rest of the Barbarians marched in the middle ; 
 to the right were the Leucadians, Anacto- 
 rians, and their auxiliaries ; to the left Cne- 
 mus with his Peloponnesians and Ambraciots ; 
 each body at so great a distance from the rest, 
 that sometimes they were out of one another's 
 sight. The Grecians, in their march, kept 
 firm within ranks, and guarded all their mo- 
 tions, till they came up to the spot fit for their 
 encampment. But the Chaonians, confident 
 of their own bravery, and valuing themselves 
 as the most martial people in that part of the 
 world, could not bear the delay of encamping, 
 but with the rest of the Barbarians rushing ea- 
 gerly forwards, thought to take the town at a 
 shout, and carry all the honour. The Strati- 
 ans finding them thus advanced, thought that, 
 could they master them thus detached, the 
 Grecians would become more averse to attack 
 them. With this view, they place ambuscades 
 in the approaches of the city ; and when the 
 enemy was near, rush up at once from tlie 
 places of ambush, and out of the city ; charg- 
 ing them on all sides. The Chaonians are 
 thrown into consternation, and many of them 
 
YEAR III.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR 
 
 83 
 
 are slain. The rest of the Barbarians, 
 when they saw them give way, durst not 
 keep their ground, but fled immediately. 
 Neither of the Grecian bodies knew any-thing 
 of this engagement, so hastily had those ad- 
 vanced, and were supposed to have done it 
 only to encamp with greater expedition. But 
 when the Barbarians came running back to 
 them in disorderly rout, they received them 
 into shelter, and all closing firm together stopd 
 quiet the rest of the day. The Stratians durst 
 not directly assault them, because the other 
 Acarnanians were not yet come up to their 
 assistance, but were continually slinging at 
 them from a distance, thus harassing them 
 abundantly, but unable, without better wea- 
 pons, to make them dislodge ; the Acarnanians 
 only could have attacked them with effectual 
 vigour. 
 
 By the favour of a dark night, Cnenius with- 
 drew his army by a quick march to the river 
 Anapus, which is eighty stadia' distant from 
 Stratus. The next day he obtains a truce to 
 fetch off the dead. And the CEniadie coming 
 up in a friendly manner to his relief, he went 
 to take refuge amongst them, before the Acar- 
 nanians could draw their succours together, and 
 from thence the forces which composed his army 
 marched to their own homes. But the Stratians 
 erected a trophy on account of their victory 
 over the Barbarians. 
 
 The fleet of Corinth and the other con- 
 federate states, that was to sail from the gulf 
 of Crissa, to attend the orders of Cnemus, and 
 prevent the Acarnanians on the coast from 
 succouring those within the land, never arrives : 
 for about the time of the action at Stratus, 
 they had been compelled to fight the Athenian 
 squadron of twenty ships, stationed at Nau- 
 pactus under the command of Phormio. Phor- 
 mio had watched their coming out of the gulf, 
 intending^ to attack them so soon as ever they 
 got out to sea. The Corinthians and their allies 
 sailed out indeed, yet not so well prepared to 
 fight by sea, as to forward the land-expedition 
 on Acarnania. They never imagined that the 
 Athenians with their twenty ships durst pre- 
 sume to attack them who had forty-seven. 
 Yet when they saw them steering the same 
 course on the opposite shore, they kept first 
 along their own coast, and afterwards from 
 Patraj of Achaia stretched over to the opposite 
 
 * About eight miles. 
 
 side in order to make for Acarnania. But 
 now again they descried ihem standing diruclly 
 against them from Chalcis and the river Eve- 
 nus, and found they had observed their anchor- 
 ing the night before. Thus are they compelled t6 
 come to an engagement in the midst of the open 
 sea.^ The ships of every state were under the 
 'command of those who had been appointed by 
 their principals : over the Corinthians were 
 Machon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The 
 Peloponnesians draw up their ships in form of 
 a circle, as large as they possibly could, with- 
 out leaving open a passage for the ships of the 
 enemy. The heads of the ships stood to sea, 
 the sterns were turned inwards. Within were 
 ranged the small vessels that attended the fleet, 
 and five ships that were prime sailers, which 
 were to start out at narrow passages, wherever 
 the enemy should begin the attack. The 
 Athenians drawing up their ships in a line, 
 and sailing quite round them, brushed along by 
 them in their passage, and making successive 
 feints of engaging, forced them to draw into a 
 smaller compass. Phormio had beforehand 
 given strict orders not to engage without the 
 signal :. for he hoped the enemy could not long 
 preserve that order of battle like a land-army, 
 but that the ships must fall foul upon one 
 another, and the small vessels within give them 
 no little embarrassment ; that further, the wind 
 would blow out of the gulf, as was usual every 
 morning : in expectation of which he continued 
 to sail round about them, and then they could 
 not possibly keep firm in their statiojis for any 
 time. He thought farther, that the time of 
 engagement was entirely in his power, as his 
 ships were best sailers, and that it was most 
 advisable to begin at such a juncture. As 
 soon as that wind began to rise, and the greater 
 ships, now contracted into a narrow circle, were 
 
 a Pliormio was watching to catch them in the opon 
 sea. iv Ti) £upux'jpfy. as Thucydides words it ahove 
 They were now out of the gulf, stretching across the sea, 
 in the midst of wliich Phormio came up to tiiem, and 
 engaged, Jt«TM ujo-ow to jrapiftov. The sea without t\)o 
 cnpes that form tije mouth of the gulf of Crissa, is in- 
 deed a narrow sea, or-^pj^o^, butthenitwasopen sea 
 in re<rard to the gulf witi in the rapes, and gave Phor* 
 mioatl the advantnges which more expert senmen knew 
 how to use. As the Peloponnesian fleet stood out from 
 Patrse in Achaia, nnd the Athenian from Ohalcis in 
 ^tolia, the situation of those two places easily guides 
 to tl.e place of the engagement. Phormio got a deal of 
 lionour by this action, wliich Plutarch in his piece about 
 the gtory of the Athenians, reckons up aiiiongat the 
 most remarkable exploits related by our historian 
 
84 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book n. 
 
 disordered both by the wind and the smaller 
 vessels within, one. falling foul upon another, 
 the poles were applied to push them off again ; 
 amidst the noise caused by this confusion, call- 
 ing out to take care, and cursing one another, 
 they could no longer hear the orders of their 
 commanders, or their masters; and the sea begin- 
 ning to run so high as to render useless the oars 
 of unexperienced mariners, as they were, they 
 left the unmanageable ships to the pilot's art. 
 Exactly at this juncture Phormio gives the sig- 
 nal. The Athenians engage, and at the first 
 shock sink one of the admiral-ships, and several 
 more afterwards in the different parts of the en- 
 gagement. They pursued their success with so 
 much fury, that amidst the general disorder not 
 one durst think of resisting, but all, with the 
 greatest precipitation, fled towards Patrae ind 
 Dyme of Achaia. The Athenians pursuing and 
 taking twelve of their ships, and having slaugh- 
 tered most of the crews, draw off to Moly chrium : 
 and having erected a trophy on the promontory,, 
 and consecrated a ship to Neptune, returned to 
 their station at Naupactus. 
 
 The Peloponnesians, without loss of time, 
 crept along the coast with the remnant of their 
 fleet saved at Patrse and Dyme, to Cyllene, a 
 dock belonging to the Eleans ; whither, after 
 the battle of Stratus, arrive also from Leucas, 
 Cnemus and the ships of that station, which 
 ought to have been joined by these other. 
 The Lacedemonians send thither Timocrates, 
 Brasidas, and Lycophron, to assist Cnemus 
 in his naval conduct, ordering him to get ready 
 for a more successful engagement, and not to 
 leave the dominion of the sea to such a small 
 number of ships. For their late defeat appear- 
 ed to them quite unaccountable, especially as 
 this was the first trial they had of an engage- 
 ment at sea ; nor could they think it so much 
 owing to a want of skill in naval affairs, as to 
 a want of courage, never balancing the long 
 experience of the Athenians with their own 
 short application to these matters. These per- 
 sons therefore they sent away in anger, who 
 coming to Cnemus, issued their circular orders 
 to the states for new quotas of shipping, and re- 
 fitted what was already there for another engage- 
 ment. Phormio also sends messengers to Athens 
 with an account of these preparations, and to re- 
 port the victory they had already gained; and re- 
 questing a further reinforcement of as many ships 
 as they could expeditiously despatch, since he 
 was in daily expectation of another fight. 
 
 Twenty ships were the number they agree to 
 send him, but they ordered him who was to 
 carry them to touch by the way at Crete. For 
 Nicias a Cretan of Gortys, a public friend of 
 the Athenians, had persuaded them to appear 
 before Cydonia, assuring them that this place, 
 which had been an enemy to them, should soon 
 be their own. This he insinuated merely to 
 gratify the Polychnitae, who I (ordered upon 
 the Cydonians. The commander therefore 
 with these ships went to Crete, and joining the 
 Polychnitae, ravaged the territory of the Cydo- 
 nians ; by which, together with adverse winds 
 and weather unfit for sea, no little time was un- 
 seasonably wasted away. 
 
 The Peloponnesians at Cyllene, during the 
 time that the Athenians lay weather-bound in 
 Crete, having got every thing in readiness for 
 another engagement, sailed along the coast to 
 Panormus of Achaia, where the land-forces of 
 the Peloponnesians were come to forward their 
 attempts. Phormio, likewise, with the twenty 
 ships which had fou^t the former battle, sailed 
 up to cape Molychrium, and lay at anchor just 
 without it. This cape belonged to the Athe- 
 nian alliance, but' the other cape ovcr-against it 
 belonged to the Peloponnesians. The arm of 
 sea which divides them is about seven' stadia 
 over ; and this is the mouth of the gulf of Crissa. 
 The Peloponnesians with a fleet of seventy- 
 seven ships rode also at anchor, under the cape 
 of Achaia, which is not far distant from Panor- 
 mus, where their land-forces lay. When they 
 had here a sight of the Athenians, both parties 
 lay for six or seven days over-against each 
 other, intent on the needful preparations for 
 engaging. The scheme on each side was this : 
 — The Peloponnesians, struck with their for- 
 mer defeat, would not sail from without the 
 capes into the open sea : — The Athenians 
 would not enter into the straits, judging it 
 would be an advantage to the enemy to fight 
 in a narrow compass. At length Cnemus, 
 Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian com- 
 manders, desirous to come soon to an engage- 
 ment, before the Athenian squadron should re- 
 ceive a reinforcement, called first their soldiers 
 together, and seeing some of them not yet re- 
 covered from the terror occasioned by the former 
 
 » The cape on the Peloponnesian side was callcu 
 Rhium, or th« Rhium of Achaia; tlie opposite cape An 
 tirrliiuin, or Molychrium. 
 
 ^ About three quarters of a mile. 
 
TEAR III.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 85 
 
 defeat, and by no means eager to fight again, en- 1 
 deavoured to animate and rouse up their courage 
 by the following harangue : 
 
 " If the former engagement, ye men of Pelo- 
 ponnesus, affects any of you with sad appre- 
 hensions about the event of another, know 
 that it by no means affords yi5u any reason- 
 able ground for such desponding thoughts. 
 That was owing, as you well know, to a defi- 
 ciency in all needful preparations ; for you 
 were not then fitted out for service of sea, but 
 for the service of land. We then were dis- 
 tressed in several respects by the adverse turns 
 of fortune ; and in some, we who fought for the 
 first time at sea run into errors through want 
 of skill. It thus happened that we were de- 
 feated, but not through any cowardice of our 
 own. There can be no reason for men, who 
 were not conquered by superior courage, but 
 who can explicitly account for the means of 
 their defeat, to let their spirits be sunk by a 
 calamity merely accidental ; but they ought to 
 reflect, that though fortune may disconcert the 
 human enterprises, yet that men can never be 
 deserted by' their own valour ; and where true 
 valour is, they ought not to catch a plea from 
 want of experience to palliate what signs of 
 cowardice they betray. Inferior skill in you is 
 by no means a balance for your superior va- 
 lour. The expertness of your enemies which 
 you so much dread, if it be accompanied with 
 valour, will indeed direct them in a performance 
 of their duty, amidst all the hazards of war; 
 but if it wants true valour, those hazards will 
 be too hard for all human art. For fear ba- 
 nisheth the remembrance of what ought to be 
 done ; and art without strength is quite unavail- 
 ing. Place therefore your own superior valour 
 in the balance against their superior skill ; 
 and remove the apprehensions flowing from 
 your defeat by the recollection that you were 
 not prepared to fight. You have now the 
 advantage of a larger number of ships, and an 
 opportunity of fighting on your own coasts, in 
 sight of a land army of your own. Victory is 
 generally obtained by those who are most in 
 number and best provided. So that upon close 
 examination, no reason appears why we should 
 dread the event. Our former miscarriages 
 make not against us ; nay, the past commission 
 of them will instruct us now. Let every 
 master therefore and every mariner act his part 
 with manly resolution ; let each take care to 
 perform his duty, npr quit the post to which he 
 
 is appointed. We shall take care to order the 
 engagement, in no worse a manner than our 
 predecessors have done ; and shall leave no 
 man any reason to excuse his cowardice. Yet — 
 if any one will be a coward, he shall certainly 
 receive the punirhment he deserves ; but the 
 valiant shall be honoured with rewards proper 
 tioncd to their merit." 
 
 In such terms did their commanders animate 
 the Peloponnesians. But Phormio — who be- 
 gan to apprehend a depression of spirits in his 
 own men, since he plainly saw tliat by keeping 
 their ships close together they wore afraid of 
 the numerous ships of the enemy — had a mind 
 by calling them together to re-inspire them with 
 courage, and give them an exhortation suitable 
 to their present condition. He had hitherto 
 in all his discourses insisted, and induced them 
 to give him credit, that " no number of ships 
 could be got together large enough to make 
 head against them." And his seamen had 
 long since been elated with this presumption, 
 that " as they were Athenians, they ought not 
 to avoid any fleet of the Peloponnesians, how- 
 ever numerous." But, when he saw them intimi- 
 dated by the formidable object before their eyes, 
 he thought it high time to endeavour to revive 
 their sinking courage. The Athenians being 
 gathered round him, he harangued them thus : 
 
 " I have observed, my fellow-soldiers, that 
 the number of your enemies hath struck you 
 with fear, — I have therefore called you to- 
 gether, as I cannot bear to see you terrifiea 
 with what is by no means dreadful. These 
 enemies of yours whom you have already con- 
 quered, who in no wise think themselves a 
 match for you, have got together a great number 
 of ships and a superior force. In the next 
 place they come confidently to attack you with 
 the vain presumption, that valour is only pe- 
 culiar to themselves. Their confidence is oc- 
 casioned by their skill in the service of the 
 land. Their frequent successes there induce 
 them to suppose that they must also for cer- 
 tainty be victorious at sea. If they have any 
 reasdn to presume so far upon their excellence 
 at land, you have more to form presumptions 
 in your own favour, since in natural courage 
 ihey are not in the least superior to us, and if 
 larger degrees of skill give either side an ad- 
 vantage, we have hence an argument to be 
 more confident of success. The Lacedaemoni- 
 ans, now at the head of their league, merely tu 
 preserve their own reputation, have dragged 
 
86 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book ii. 
 
 numbers hither to fight against their will ; 
 otherwise, they durst never have attempted to 
 engage us a second time, after receiving so sig- 
 nal a defeat Frighten not yourselves with 
 extravagant suspicions of their courage — but 
 rather strike a panic into them; a panic, for 
 which they have more ample reason, as you 
 have already gained a victory over them, and 
 as they are certain you would not give them an- 
 other opportunity to fight, unless you had some 
 grand design to execute. An enemy, that like 
 them exceeds in number, in action depends 
 more on their strength than on their conduct. 
 They who are far inferior in strength of num- 
 bers, and dare, though uncompelled, to fight, 
 must do it through the prevalence of some ex- 
 tensive views. This they cannot but know, 
 and hence dread more this our diminutive 
 than they would an equal force. Large armies 
 defeated, through defect of skill, or sometimes 
 through defect of courage, by an inferior force, 
 are cases that have often happened. Yet 
 neither of these defects can be imputed to us. 
 For my own part, I shall not willingly hazard 
 the event within the gulf, nor will I sail into 
 it. For I am not ignorant that want of sea- 
 room is very improper for a few ships that sail 
 best, and are best managed, against a number 
 which those on board them know not how to 
 govern. In such a situation, no one can pour 
 dovm to an attack in the proper manner for 
 want of having a clear view of the enemy ; nor, 
 if he is forced to sheer off, can he do it with 
 safety. There is no room to break through, 
 or to tack at pleasure, which is the business of 
 ships that are better sailers ; but the fight must 
 of necessity be the same with a battle at land, 
 and in this case the greater number of ships 
 must have the advantage. I shall take the 
 greatest care I am able to prevent these incon- 
 veniencies. And you I expect to stand regu- 
 larly to your posts on board every ship. Re- 
 ceive your orders with alacrity, especially as 
 we lie so near our enemy ; and above all things, 
 when we come to action, observe the rules of 
 discipline without hurry and noise : for these 
 are matters of great importance in every scene 
 of war, and of not the least in a naval engage- 
 ment ; and charge your enemies with a spirit 
 ■worthy of your former achievements. Great 
 indeed are the points you are now to decide, 
 the hopes of the Peloponnesians of making a 
 figure at sea are now either to be totally de- 
 molished, or the power of the sea must become 
 
 precarious to the Athenians, even near their 
 own homes. Once more I call to your remem- 
 brance that great part of these enemies you have 
 already conquered — and the courage of enemies 
 once conquered, is seldom equal to what it was, 
 when unconscious of defeat." 
 
 In this manner Phormio encouraged his 
 men. — But the Peloponnesians, when they 
 found that the Athenians would not sail into 
 the gulf and straits, had a mind to compel 
 them to it against their inclinations. At 
 break of day they began to move, their ships 
 being ranged in lines, consisting of four, and 
 stood along their own coasts within the gulf, 
 the right wing leading the course in the same 
 order as they had lain at anchor. In this wing 
 they had ranged twenty of their best sailers, • 
 with a view that if Phormio should imagine 
 they had a design upon Naupactus, and he 
 himself should hasten to its succour, the Athe- 
 nians might not be able to out-sail them and 
 escape their outermost squadron, which com- 
 posed the right wing, but be surrounded on all 
 sides. He, just as they expected, being alarm- 
 ed for that place, which he knew was de- 
 fenceless, no sooner saw them under sail, than 
 against his will and in no little hurry he got 
 on board and sailed along his own coast — the 
 land forces of the Messenians marching along 
 the adjacent shore to be ready with their assist- 
 ance. The Peloponnesians seeing them move 
 along in a line, ship after ship, and that they 
 were now within the gulf and near the shore, 
 which was what they chiefly wanted, — on a 
 signal given, at once altered their course, pour- 
 ing down directly upon the Athenians, all as 
 fast as their ships could advance, in full ex- 
 pectation of intercepting the whole fleet. 
 Eleven of the Athenian ships, which were a- 
 head of the rest, being too quick for the wing 
 of the Peloponnesians and their shifting of 
 their course ran safely off.' Yet intercepting 
 
 1 The Latiil translators, w]iose chief aim is a grr.m- 
 matical construction, have made a slip here in point of 
 chorography; they say, " Subterfufferunt or fugerunt 
 in apertvm mare." But it is surprising that Mr Hohbes 
 should be guilty of so much inadvertence, as to make 
 eleven Athenian ships " get out into open sea." Th*? 
 Peloponnesians made their tack towards the open sea, 
 on purpose to prevent them from getting out of the gulf, 
 which gave opportunity to the foremost ships in th3 
 Athenian line to run away up the gulf towards Wau- 
 pactus, forthesakeof Becuring^which, they bad thought 
 themselves obliged, though contrary to their judgment 
 and inclination, to come within the capes. Had they 
 run out to sea, they never could have reached Naupac- 
 tus, but would have run directly from it. 
 
TEAR III.J 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 87 
 
 all the rest, they run them aground and so dis- 
 abled them. The Athenians on board, who 
 could not escape by swimming, were slaughter- 
 ed to a man: some of these empty ships 
 they got off again and carried away in tow ; 
 and one they had already took with the 
 whole crew on boaid. The Messenians got 
 down to the succour of some of them. They 
 waded with their arms through the water, and 
 climbing on board and fighting from the decks, 
 saved some which were already in tow. — In 
 this manner did the Peloponnesians defeat and 
 destroy the Athenian ships. 
 
 Their twenty ships which were of the right 
 wing, gave chase to the eleven Athenians, 
 which, on the shifting of the course, had ran 
 off amain. But all these, excepting one ship, 
 outsailed them, and got safe into Naupactus. 
 Having gained their harbour, they tacked about 
 under the temple of Apollo, and stood ready to 
 defend themselves, in case the enemy should 
 make an attempt upon them so near the shore. 
 Soon after, they appeared sailing along and 
 singing their psan, as having gained a victory. 
 One ship belonging to Leucas was shot far 
 a-head of the rest, giving chase to that only 
 ship of the Athenians which was left behind. 
 It happened that h trading vessel was then 
 lying out at anchor before the harbour. The 
 Athenian ship came up first with this vessel, 
 and fetching a compass round her, runs directly 
 against the Leucadian that was chasing, and 
 instantly sinks her. By this accident so sud- 
 den and unexpected, the Peloponnesians are 
 thrown into consternation ; and having besides 
 followed the chase without any regular order, 
 as secure of victory, some of the ships now 
 dropping their oars, stopped further motion. 
 This was an unlucky expedient when so near 
 the enemy ; but their design was to wait for 
 the greater number of ships that were yet 
 behind. Some of them being ignorant of the 
 coast, ran upon the shelves and were stranded. 
 When the Athenians saw them suffer these dis- 
 tresses, their courage began to revive. Shout- 
 ing out aloud with one voice, they encouraged 
 one another to attack. The miscarriages of 
 which they were this moment sensible, and 
 their irrecoverable disorder, prevented the 
 others from making any long resistance. And 
 they soon were forced to run back again to- 
 wards the station of Eariormus, from whence 
 they came. The Athenians chasing them 
 
 hind, and recovered their own, which were in 
 the enemy's hands by having been run ashore, 
 and afterwards brought off in tow. Some 
 men besides they killed, and made some pri- 
 soners. 
 
 On board the Leucadian, which was sunk 
 near the trading vessel, was Timocrates the 
 LacedaBmonian, who, when the ship received 
 the stroke that sunk her, immediately slew 
 himself,' and floated afterwards into the har- 
 bour of Naupactus. The Athenians returning 
 thither again, erected a trophy near tlie place 
 from whence they had pursued this victory 
 They took up their dead, and the shattered 
 pieces of their ships, whatever they found on 
 their own coasts, and by a truce gave permission 
 to the Peloponnesians to fetch off theirs. 
 
 The Peloponnesians also erected a trophy, 
 in token of a victory gained by forcing ashore 
 and damaging some of the enemy's ships. The 
 ship they took they consecrated on the Khiura 
 of Achaia, near their trophy. Yet, after this, 
 being in some dread of the reinforcement ex- 
 pected from Athens, all of them, except the 
 Leucadians, sailed away by favour of the night 
 into the gulf of Crissa and Corinth. The 
 Athenians, in the twenty ships from Crete, 
 that ought to have been up with Phormio 
 before the engagement, not long after the abovB 
 retreat of the other ships arrived at Naupactus 
 And here this summer ended. 
 
 Before the separation of the fleet that with- 
 drew into Corinth and the gulf of Crissa, 
 Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other commanders 
 of the Peloponnesians, by the advice of the 
 Megareans, formed a design, in the beginning 
 of this winter, to make an attempt on the 
 Piraeus, the haven of the Athenians. It waa 
 not guarded or secured in the usual manner ; 
 nor was this judged requisite, as the naval 
 power of Athens was become so extensive. 
 
 thither, took the six ships that were most be.-^ should be drownwl 
 
 1 We lijive Iitjre a notable proof of tlie peculiar spirit 
 and genius of the Spartans. They regarded the land as 
 their own e'enient, in which they were superior lo the 
 restof tie world. And yet now they were convinced, 
 that without practice at sea, they should never l:c able 
 to pull down the power of Athens. Their first attempts 
 are au-kward and unsuccessful. The art shown by tlie 
 Athenians in tacking round, darting out again, and sink- 
 ing a ship at one stroke, put tbcm all to a stand; and it 
 sf-eins made so sudden and strong an impression on 
 Timocrates, whose passion it was to die fighting, and 
 with wound.s all before, that be could not endure the 
 thought of perishing in a wbolo skin, and therefore 
 snatched the moment, and killed himself for fear hn 
 
8S 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book II. 
 
 Their project was, that every mariner carryins 
 with him an oar, a cushion, and a leathern 
 thong, should march over-land from Corinth, 
 to the sea on which Athens is situated, and 
 that, making the best of their way to Megara, 
 and drawing out the forty ships that lay there 
 in the Nisaean dock, they should immediately 
 stand into the Pirseus, For there was not so 
 much as one ship appointed to its guard ; nor 
 was there the least suspicion at Athens that 
 the enemy would atten\pt in this manner to 
 surprise them : for, openly, and in a regular 
 train, they durst not attempt it; nor could a 
 project which required deliberate procedure 
 have escaped discovery. But no sooner had 
 they resolved upon, than they set out to exe- 
 cute, the present scheme. Arriving in the 
 night, they drew the ships out of the Nisaean 
 dock; but instead of making directly for the 
 Pira;us, as they at first intended, dismayed 
 with the danger of the attempt, and, as it is 
 said, forced by a contrary wind to steer another 
 course, they went over to that promontory of 
 Salamis which faceth Megara. Upon this 
 promontory was a fort, and three ships Were 
 stationed below to prevent all importation and 
 exportation at Megara. This forttBey assault- 
 ed, and carried the three ships, though empty, 
 away with them. Other parts of Salamis they 
 plundered, as the inhabitants never dreamed of 
 this invasion. 
 
 The lights,' that signify the approach of 
 enemies, were however held up and waved to- 
 wards Athens, which caused as great a conster- 
 nation there as was known during all the series 
 of the war. Those in the city imagined the 
 enemy to be already within the Pirseus, 
 Those in the Piraeus concluded the city of the 
 Salaminians to be taken, and that the enemy 
 was only not within their port, which indeed 
 they might easily have been, had they not been 
 hindered by their own fears and a contrary 
 wind. At break of day, the Athenians ran 
 down in general concourse to the Pirajus. 
 They got their ships afloat, and leaping on 
 
 ' These, (according to the scholiast) wore lighted 
 torches, which persons on the wall reared aloft in the air, 
 to notify o ueighboucing and confederate places, that 
 they discerned the approach of enemies, in order to put 
 Ihem on their gnard. The eaine thing was also done 
 nt the approach of friends, to notify what succour was 
 at hand. In the latter case, they held the lighfsteady 
 and unmoved; In the former they waved them to and 
 fro as an indication of fear. 
 
 board with the utmost expedition and uncom- 
 mon tumult, sailed away for Salamis, but left 
 what land-forces they had to guard the Pirseus, 
 When the Peloponnesians had notice of the 
 approach of this succour, having now over-run 
 great part of Salamis, and got many prisoners 
 and a large booty, beside the three ships sta- 
 tioned at Budorus, they made the best of their 
 way back to Nisaea. They were afraid of 
 trusting too much to their ships, which having 
 been long laid up were become leaky. After 
 thus getting back to Megara, they returned 
 again over-land to Corinth. The Athenians, 
 finding they were gone from Salamis, sailed 
 home again. But ever after this they guarded 
 the Piraeus in a stricter manner, barring up the 
 mouth of the haven, and omitting no method 
 of securing it effectually for the future. 
 
 About the same time, in the beginning of 
 this winter, Sitalces the Odrysian, son of 
 Teres, a Thracian king, marched an army 
 against Perdiccas, the son of Alexander, king 
 of Macedonia, and the Chalcideans bordering 
 on Thrace, to enforce the execution of two en- 
 gagements, one made to and the other by him- 
 self. For Perdiccas, who had entered into 
 some engagement to him, for reconciling him 
 to the Athenians when he was formerly press- 
 ed hard with war, and for not restoring his 
 brother Philip, then at enmity with him, to his 
 throne, had not yet performed that engage- 
 ment. And he himself was under an engage- 
 ment to the Athenians, since the late alliance 
 offensive and defensive made between them, 
 that he would finish the war for them against 
 the Chalcideans of Thrace. On both these 
 accounts, he undertook the present expedition, 
 carrying along with him Amyntas the son of 
 Philip, to restore to him the kingdom of Mace- 
 donia, with the Athenian ambassadors commis- 
 sioned to attend him on this occasion, and 
 Agnon an Athenian general : though the Athe- 
 nians had obliged themselves by treaty to 
 accompany the expedition with a fleet by sea, 
 and a numerous land army. 
 
 Beginning the march himself from Odrysae, 
 he summons to attend him first all his Thra- 
 cian subjects that live within the mountains 
 Hasmus and Rhodope, quite down to the 
 Hellespont and Euxine sea ; next, the Getse 
 beyond mount Hsmus, and as many other 
 nations as lay between the river Ister and along 
 quite di'Wn to the Euxine. The Gets, and the 
 nations no situated, border upon the Scythians, 
 
YEAR III.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 89 
 
 wearing the Bame habiliments of war, and all 
 like them drawing the bow on horseback. 
 He procured also to join him many of the free 
 Thracians that live upon the mountains, and 
 make use of scimitars, who are distinguished 
 by the name of Dians, and dwell most of them 
 about Rhodope. Some of these he took into 
 pay, but some of them voluntarily attended. 
 He had levies also from amongst the Agriani- 
 ans, Leasans, and the other nations of Pceonia 
 subject to himself. These were the furthest 
 people in his dominions, reaching up to the 
 Grateans and Leseans of Pseonia and the river 
 Strymon, which deriving its source from mount 
 Scomias waters the Graseans and LesEans, and 
 is the boundary of his empire from those Pteo- 
 nians who still are free. Towards the Tribal- 
 lians, who are also a free people, the boundary 
 is formed by the Trerians and Tilatseans. 
 These live to the north of mount Scomius, and 
 reach westerly as far as the river Oscius, which 
 riseth out of the same mountain with the Nes- 
 tus and the Heber, a great but barren mountain 
 adjoining to the Rhodope. 
 
 The kingdom of Odrysse is of this large 
 extent along the coast, reaching from the city 
 of Abdera to the mouth of the river Ister in 
 the Euxine sea. The shortest cut round its 
 coast requireth four days and as many nights 
 for a trading-vessel, of the round built, sailing 
 directly before the wind. A good walker will 
 also be eleven days in going the nearest way by 
 land from Abdera to the Ister. So large was 
 its extent along the coast. But towards the 
 continent, to go along it from Byzantium to the 
 Lesans and the Strymon, for so far does it run 
 upwards from the sea, would cost an expedi- 
 tious walker thirteen days' continued journey. 
 The yearly tribute ex;acted from this tract of 
 Barbaric land, and his cities in Greece, by 
 Seuthes, who succeeding Sitalces in these do- 
 minions, very much improved the revenue, 
 amounted to four hundred talents of silver,' 
 though it might be paid either in silver or gold. 
 The presents constantly made to him either of 
 gold or silver were not less in value, besides 
 gifts of vestments both figured and plain, and 
 all kinds of furniture, which were not only 
 made to him, but to all his oiBcers, and the 
 noble Odrysians. The custom observed by 
 them and general to all the Thracians, " of 
 receiving rather than bestowing," was contrary 
 
 £78,9-10 sterling 
 
 19 
 
 to that which prevails in the Persian court, 
 where it was a greater shame to be asked and 
 to deny, than to ask and be denied. Yet, as 
 their power was great, this practice continued 
 long in vogue aihongst them ; for nothing could 
 be obtained by him who brought no present ; 
 and this afforded a large increase of power to 
 his kingdom. It had the greatest revenue, and 
 was in other respects the most flourishing, of 
 all the kingdoms in Europe between the gulf 
 of Ionia and the Euxine sea. But in military 
 strength and numerous armies, it was the se- 
 cond, though at a great distance from the Scy- 
 thians. For there is no one nation in Europe, 
 nor even in Asia, that in these points can in 
 any degree be a match for them ; or when stand- 
 ing singly, nation against nation, is able to 
 make head against the Scythians, united and in 
 good harmony with one another. Yet, at the 
 same time, in every point of conduct, and 
 management of all the necessary affairs of life, 
 they fall vastly short of other people. 
 
 Sitalces therefore, who was king of so large a 
 country, got his army together; and, when 
 every thing was ready, marched against Mace- 
 donia. He first of all passed through his own 
 dominions ; then over Cercine, a desert moun- 
 tain, the boundary between the Sintians and 
 Paeonians. He went over it by a passage he 
 had, by cutting down the wood, made formerly 
 himself, in an expedition against the Pseonians. 
 In their march from Odrysae over this moun- 
 tain, they left the Pseonians on their right, 
 but on their left the Sintians and Masdians. 
 On their descent from it, they arrived at Do- 
 berus, a city of Paeonia. He lost none of hia 
 army in the march, but by sickness ; notwith- 
 standing which it was very much increased ; 
 for many of the free Thracians came daily in 
 without invitation, and followed for the sake 
 of plunder ; so that the whole number is said 
 at last to have amounted to a hundred and fifty 
 thousand. Of these, the greater part were 
 foot, but about a third of them were horse. 
 The greatest share of the horse was provided 
 by the Odrysians, and next to them by the 
 Getse. Of the foot the free Thracians that 
 came from about mount Rhodope, and used 
 scimitars, were the most valiant : all the rest 
 that followed were a mixed crowd, formidable 
 only in their number. All these therefore 
 were got together at Doberus, and preparing to 
 brealc into the lower Macedonia, subject to Per- 
 diccas, under the ridge of the mountains. Foi 
 N 
 
90 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book II. 
 
 in the general name of Macedonians are com- 
 prised the Lyncestians and Helimiotians and 
 other nations lying upwards, allied to and de- 
 pendent upon the rest, yet governed as distinct 
 kingdoms. The dominion over the maritime 
 Macedonia was first obtained by Alexander, 
 father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors the 
 TemenidEB, who derived their original from 
 Argos. These by a successful war had driven 
 the Pierians out of Pieria, who afterwards 
 fixed their residence at Phagres under mount 
 Pangfflus, on the other side the Strymon, and 
 at other places ; for which reason, the tract of 
 ground lying under Pangseus towards the sea 
 is still called the gulf of Pieria. From the 
 region called Bottiasa they also expelled the 
 Bottiaeans, who now live upon the confines of 
 the Chalcideans. And further, they seized in 
 Pajonia, near the river Axius, a narrow tract of 
 land running along from the mountains down to 
 Pella, and the sea ; and got possession of that 
 which is called Mygdonia, lying between the 
 Axius and the Strymon, by driving away the 
 Edonians. They expelled the Eordians out of 
 what is now called Eordia (of whom the gi-eat- 
 est part were destroyed, but a small number 
 dwell now about Physca ;) and out of Almopia, 
 the Almopians. These Macedonians also 
 conquered other nations, of which they are 
 still in possession, as Anthemus, Grestonia 
 and Bisaltia, and a large part of the territories 
 belonging to the other Macedonians. But 
 this whole tract of country hath the general 
 name of Macedonia, and Perdiccas, son of 
 Alexander, reigned over them when Sitalces 
 formed this invasion. 
 
 The Macedonians, unable to make head 
 against the numerous army by which they were 
 invaded, retired within the walled and fortified 
 places of the country, which at this time were 
 not many. But Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, 
 succeeding his father in the kingdom, built 
 those fortresses which are now there, opened 
 the roads, and made many other regulations 
 both in the military way about horses and arms, 
 and in other public matters, more than all the 
 eight preceding kings put together. The 
 Thracian army from Doberus broke first into 
 that part of the country, which was formerly 
 in the possession of Philip. They took Eido- 
 mene by storm ; and got Gortynia, Atalante, 
 and some other places, by composition, which 
 were readily brought to capitulate, out of their 
 regard for Amyntas, whose sou Philip now 
 
 appeared amongst them. They also laid siege 
 to Europus, but were not able to reduce it. 
 They afterwards advanced into the otlier Mace- 
 donia, lying to the left of Pella and Cy rrhus. 
 Within these, they did not advance into Bot- 
 tisea and Pieria ; but ravaged Mygdonia, Gres- 
 tonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians never 
 once thought of being able to make head 
 against them with their foot ; but, sending for 
 horse from their allies in the upper Macedonia, 
 wherever by the advantage of ground a few 
 could encounter with many, they made fre- 
 quent attacks upon the Thracian army. They 
 made so strong an impression, that nothing 
 could resist such excellent horsemen and so 
 completely armed. For this reason, the enemy 
 inclosed them about with their numerous for- 
 ces, and thus made it exceeding hazardous 
 for them to fight against such manifold odds 
 of numbers ; so that at last they were forced 
 to give over these skirmishes, judging it im- 
 prudent to run any hazards against so large an 
 inequality of strength. 
 
 Sitalces, at a parley held with Perdiccas, 
 imparted to him the motives of the war. And, 
 as the Athenians were not yet come up 
 with their fleet, because diffident of his punc- 
 tuality to the engagement between them, and 
 had only sent him presents and • ambassadors, 
 he detached part of his army against the Chal- 
 cideans and Bottiffians ; where, by driving them 
 into their fortresses, he, ravaged the coun- 
 try. During his stay in these parts, the 
 southern Thessalians, Magnetians, and other 
 people subject to the Thessalians, and the 
 Grecians as far as Thermopylse, grew appre- 
 hensive that his army might be turned against 
 them, and prepared for their defence. Under 
 the same apprehensions were the northern 
 Thracians beyond the Strymon that inhabit 
 the plains, the PauEeans, the Odoniantians, 
 the Droans, and the Dersaeans, who are all of 
 them free and independent. He further gave 
 occasion for a rumour that spread amongst the 
 Grecians, enemies to Athens, that this army, 
 brought into Greece by virtue of an alliance 
 with them, would invade them all in their 
 turns. Yet, without advancing any farthei, 
 lie was at one and the same time continuing 
 his ravage upon Chalcidica, and Bottisea, and 
 Macedonia. But unable to execute any of 
 those points for which he formed this invasion, 
 when his army began to want provisions, and 
 to suffer by the rigour of the winter's cold, ho 
 
YEAR III.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 91 
 
 is persuaded by Seuthes the son of Sparadoxus, 
 and his own cousin-german, who had a greater 
 influence over him than anj' other person, to 
 march bade again with the utmost expedition. 
 This Seuthes had been secretly gained by 
 Pcrdiccas, who promised to give him his sister, 
 and 11 large dower with her. Thus persuaded, 
 after a stay upon the whole of but-thirty days, 
 and eight of these in Chalcidica, lie retired 
 precipitately into his own dominions. Perdic- 
 cas, according to promise, soon after gives his 
 sister Stratonice in marriage to Seuthes. And 
 to this end came this grand expedition of Si- 
 talces.' 
 
 The same winter, the Athenians at Nau- 
 pactus, after the separation of the Pelopon- 
 nesian fleet, coasting from thence under the 
 command of Phormio, appeared before Astacus. 
 Making there a descent, they pierced into the 
 midland parts of Acarnania, with four hun- 
 dred heavy-armed Athenians from on board the 
 fleet, and four hundred Messenians ; and ex- 
 pelled from Stratus, Coronta, and other places, 
 the disaffected part of the inhabitants ; and 
 having re-established at Coronta Cynes the 
 son of Theolytus, embarked again on board 
 their ships. They judged it not advisable, in 
 the winter season, to undertake any thing 
 against the Oeniadse, the only people of Acar- 
 nania who had persisted in continual hostilities 
 against them. For the river Achelous, that 
 takes its rise from mount Pindus, and runs 
 through Dolopia, the provinces of the Agrsans 
 and the Amphilochians, and all the plain of 
 Acarnania, passing above by the city of Stratus, 
 
 I Sitalces, and his son Sadocus, wlio, as Tliurydides 
 relates above, was made a citizen of Athens, have not 
 escaped the bufToonery of Arlstoplianes, in his comedy 
 of ' The Acharnanians.' Act I. Sc. 4. " Crier. Ambas- 
 sador to Sitalces, come into court. .Smbass. Here. 
 Vicaopolis . Oh ! here's another icnave summoned to 
 malce his appearance. jSmbass. We should not have 
 staid so long in Thrace — DictBopolis. I believe you, un- 
 less you had been well paid for it. Ambass. Had not a 
 great snow fallen and covered all the country, and all 
 the rivers at the same time been frozen over. When 
 Thcognis was contending here for glory, we were drink- 
 ing all the time with Sitalces. He is an honest heart, 
 and loves Athenians dearly. In good truth, he is dot- 
 ingly fond of you all ; he is for ever writing upon the 
 wall, ' O rare Athenians !' And his son, whom we 
 made an Athenian, longs mightily for some of your 
 dainty sausages, and hath pressed his father to succour 
 his dear countrymen, ile, at a solemn sacrifice, swore 
 he would ; and hath got such a numerous army at his 
 heels, that the Athenians cry out — What a vast swarm 
 of gnats is coming along here 1" 
 
 and discharging itself into the sea near the 
 Oeniadae, renders all the adjacent country one 
 continued morass, and by a stagnation of 
 water makes it impracticable for an army in 
 the winter season. Most of the isles of the 
 Echinades lie over-against the Oeniada, not 
 greatly distant from the mouth of the Ache- 
 lous; insomuch that the river, being great, 
 causeth a continual afflux of sand, and by 
 it some of these islands are already joined to 
 the main-land ; and it is expected that all 
 the rest in a short time will be so too : for the 
 current is large and rapid, and brings down 
 with it great quantities of sand. The isles 
 stand thick ; and stopping, bind fast together 
 from farther dissipation, the sands brought 
 down by the current. They lie not in a line, 
 but in an alternate situation one from another, 
 preventing the straight course of the waters for- 
 wards into the sea. They are further unculti- 
 vated, and of no large extent. The tradition 
 is — that Apollo, by an oracle, made a grant of 
 this land to Alcmieon the son of Amphiaraus, 
 when a vagabond, after the murder of his 
 mother, telling him, that " he never should be 
 freed from the terrors that haunted him, till he 
 found a place for his residence, which at the 
 time he slew his mother had never been seen 
 by the sun, and then was not land ;" because 
 every other part of the earth was polluted by 
 the parricide. After great perplexities, he at 
 length, as it is said, discovered these rising heaps 
 of sand at the mouth of the Achelous, and 
 thought enough cast up to suffice for his sup- 
 port, after the long course of wandering about 
 to which he had been necessitated ever since 
 he murdered his mother. Fixing therefore his 
 residence in the parts about the Oeniadee, he 
 grew powerful, and left to the whole country 
 the name of Acarnania, from his son Acarnas. 
 This account of Alcmseon we have given ex- 
 actly as we have received it from tradition. 
 
 The Athenians and Phormio weighing from 
 Acarnania, and touching again at Naupactus, 
 very early in the spring returned to Athens. 
 Thither they brought all the freemen whom 
 they had made prisoners in the late naval en- 
 gagements (these were afterwards exchanged 
 man for man,) and the ships taken from the 
 enemy. 
 
 And thus the winter ended, and with it the 
 third year of the, war, the history of which 
 hath been compiled by Thucydides. 
 
THE 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 Year IV. Attica invaded.— Lesbos revolts from the Athenians ; the latter sent out a fleet to reduce them.— Con- 
 tinuation of the siege of PlatEa.-The escape of a body of Platieans over all the works of the besiegers-V. Attica 
 invaded.— Surrender of Mitylene in Lesbos.— A bloody decree made at Athens against all the Mityleneans; but 
 re-considered and repealed ; though very near being put in execution.— Platsea surrenders : and the inhabitants 
 are put to death.— The sedition at Corcyra.— The Athenians meddle in the wars of Sicily.— The plague rogelh 
 again at Athens.— VI. Earthqualtes.- The affairs of Sicily.— Expedition of Demosthenes into jEtolia, whore 
 he receives a total defeat. — Delos purified by the Athenians.— Invasion of Argos in Amphilochia: battle of 
 Olpe: a second battle, orrathersiaughter of the Ambraciots at Idomenc. — Eruption of Mount ^Etna. 
 
 TEAR IT. 
 
 Is Hie succeeding summer, the Peloponnesians 
 and allies, when the com was full-grown, made 
 incursions into Attica, under the command of 
 Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus king of the 
 Lacedasmonians, and having fixed their camp 
 ravaged the country. The Athenian cavalry 
 at all convenient places skirmished with them 
 as usual, and checked the greater number of 
 the light-armed from advancing before the 
 heavy-anned, and infesting the parts adjacent 
 to the city. Having continued here till provi- 
 sions began to fail, they retired and were dis- 
 banded to their respective cities. 
 
 Upon this irruption of the Peloponnesians, 
 Lesbos immediately revolted from the Atheni- 
 ans, excepting Methymne. They were well 
 inclined to such a step before the war broke 
 out, but were discountenanced by the Lacedas- 
 monians, and now were necessitated to make 
 their revolt sooner than they intended. They 
 would have been glad to have deferred it, till 
 they had completed the works they were about 
 for securing their harbour, perfecting their 
 walls and the ships then upon the stocks — till 
 they had received what they wanted from Pon- 
 tus, both archers apd com, and whatever they 
 had already sent for thither. 
 
 The reason was — the people of Tenedos 
 
 I Before Christ 438. 
 
 then at enmity with them, those of Methymne, 
 and even some persons of Mitylene underhand, 
 who in a civil broil had received the hospitable 
 protection at Athens, had sent the Athenians 
 advice — " That they are compelling all Lesbos 
 to go into Mitylene, and are getting every thing 
 in readiness for a revolt by the aid of the Lace- 
 daemonians and their kindred Bosotians ; and 
 if timely prevention be not given, Lesbos will 
 be lost." 
 
 The Athenians, at present miserably distress- 
 ed by the plague .and a war now grown very 
 brisk and vigorous, knew that the accession of 
 Lesbos to their enemies, possessed as it was 
 of a naval force and fresh in strength, must be 
 a terrible blow, and would not listen at first 
 to the accusations sent, chiefly from the earnest- 
 ness of their own wishes, that they might be 
 groundless. But when they had in vain des- 
 patched an embassy to the Mityleneans to put a 
 stop to the forced resort of the Lesbians thither 
 and their other preparations, their fears were 
 increased, and they became intent on some ex- 
 pedient of timely prevention — and ordered 
 thither on a sudden forty sail that lay ready 
 fitted out for a cruize on Peloponnesus. Cleip- 
 pides, son of Deinias, with two colleagues, had 
 the command of this fleet. Information had 
 been given them, that the festival of ApolUi 
 Maloeis was soon to be celebrated without 
 the city, at which solemnity the whole peopln 
 k2 93 
 
94 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book iir. 
 
 of Mitylcne are obliged to assist. — It was there- 
 fore hoped, that they might surprise them on 
 this occasion, and by one sudden assault com- 
 plete the work. Should it so fall out, it would 
 be a happy turn : — but, if this miscarried, they 
 were to order the Mityleneans to deliver up 
 their ship'ping and demoUsh their works, and, in 
 case they refused, to make instant war. 
 
 With these instructions the fleet went to sea. 
 And the Athenians seized ten triremes belong- 
 ■ ing to the Mityleneans, which happened at that 
 time to be lying in their port as an auxiliary 
 quota in pursuance of treaty, and cast into 
 prison all the crews. But a certain person 
 passing over from Athens to Euboea, and hast- 
 ening by land to Gerjestus, finds a vessel there 
 ready to put off, on board of which he gets a 
 quick passage to Mitylene, and on the third 
 day after his setting out from Athens, gives 
 notice to the Mityleneans that such a fleet was 
 coming to surprise them. Upon this they ad- 
 journed their festival, and patching up their 
 half-finished walls and harbours as well as they 
 could, stood ready on their guard. Not long 
 after the Athenian fleet arrived, and finding the 
 alarm had been given, the commanders notified 
 to ihem the injunctions they brought; with 
 wh'ch as the Mityleneans refused to comply 
 they ranged themselves for action. 
 
 The Mityleneans, unprepared as they were, 
 and thus suddenly necessitated to make some 
 resistance, advanced on board their ships a little 
 beyond the mouth of their harbour, as willing 
 to engage. But being forced to retreat upon the 
 approach of the Athenian fleet, they begged a 
 parley with the commanders, from a view, if it 
 were possible upon easy conditions, to rid them- 
 selves of that fleet for the present. And the 
 Athenian commanders readily accorded, from 
 the apprehension, that they had not sufficient 
 strength to support thewar against all Lesbos. 
 
 Hostilities having thus ceased for a time, the 
 Mityleneans despatched their agents to Athens, 
 and amongst the number one of those persons 
 who had sent intelligence of their motions, but 
 had now repented of the step — to procure if 
 possible the recalment of the fleet, by assurances, 
 that they were not bent on any innovation. But 
 in the meantime, undiscovered by the Athenian 
 fleet which lay at anchor in the road of Malea, to 
 the north of the city, they send a trireme to 
 carry an embassy to Lacedsemon ; for they had 
 no room to believe they should succeed in their 
 negotiation at Athens. This embassy, after 
 
 a laborious and dangerous voyage, arriving at 
 Lacedffimo]!, began to solicit a speedy succour. 
 And when their agents returned from Athens 
 totally unsuccessful, the Mityleneans and all the 
 rest of Lesbos, excepting Methymne, prepare 
 for war. This last place sent in aid to the 
 Athenians, as did also the Imbrians and Lem- 
 nians, and some few other of their allies. 
 
 The Mityleneans once indeed made a gene- 
 ral sally with all their people against the sta- 
 tion of the Athenians. Hereupon a battle 
 ensued, after which the Mityleneans, though 
 by no means worsted, yet durst not continue 
 all night in the field, but diffident of their own 
 strength retreated behind their walls. After 
 this they kept themselves quiet, unwilling to 
 run any more hazards, till they had got some 
 additional strength from Peloponnesus, and 
 were in other respects better provided. By 
 this time , Meleas a Lacedaemonian and Her- 
 maeondas " Theban are arrived among them, 
 who had been despatched on some business be- 
 fore the revolt, and unable to compass the re- 
 turn before the Athenian fleet came up, had 
 now in a trireme got in undiscovered since the 
 battle. It was the advice of these to despatch 
 another trireme and embassy in company with 
 them, which is accordingly done. But the 
 Athenians, as the Mityleneans remained in so 
 quiet « posture, became more full of spirits 
 than before, and sent summons of aid to their 
 confederates, who came in with more than or- 
 dinary alacrity, as they saw such an appearance 
 of weakness on the side of the Lesbians. Hav- 
 ing now formed a station on the south side of 
 the city they fortified by .^ wall two camps, 
 which invested the place on both sides, whilst 
 their shipping was so stationed as to shut up 
 both the harbours. By this means the commu- 
 nication by sea was quite cut ofi" from the 
 Mityleneans. Of the land indeed the Mityle- 
 neans and other Lesbians, who had now flocked 
 to their aid, were for the most part masters. 
 The quantity which the Athenians had occu- 
 pied by their camps was but ina)nsiderable, as 
 the station of their shipping and their market 
 was held chiefly at Melea : and in this posture 
 stood the war against Mitylene. 
 
 About the same time this summer, the 
 Athenians send out thirty sail of ships against 
 Peloponnesus, under the command of Asopius 
 the son of Phormio, in pursuance of some so- 
 licitations they had received from the Acar- 
 nanians to send them either a senior some re 
 
YEAIi IV.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 9b 
 
 lation of Phormio to command in those parts. 
 These ships sailing along the coasts of Laconia 
 ravaged all the maritime places. After this, 
 Asopius sends back the greatest part of his 
 ships to Athens, but with a reserve of twelve 
 proceeds himself to Naupactus, And raising 
 afterwards the whole force of the Acarnanians, 
 he leads them against the Oeniadse. With 
 his ships he sailed up the Achelous, and the 
 army marching by land laid the country Waste. 
 But when this was found ineffectual, he dis- 
 missed the land-force, and stretching over him- 
 self to Lcucas, and having made a descent upon 
 Nericum, was intercepted in his retreat — ^by 
 those of the adjacent country, who ran together 
 for mutual aid, supported by a small party that lay 
 there for guards, — with the loss of his oven life 
 and a part of his army. After this, the Athe- 
 nians staid only to take up their dead by favour 
 of a truce obtained from the Leucadians, and 
 then steered homewards. 
 
 The ambassadors of Mitylene, who were sent 
 in the first ship, having been ordered by the 
 Lacedjemonians to repair to Olympia, that their 
 applications might be addressed, and resolutions 
 formed about them, in the grand resort of their 
 whole alliance, arrive at that place. It was that 
 Olympiad in which Dorieus the Rhodian was 
 a' second time victor. So, when the solemnity 
 was ended, and an^ audience was granted them, 
 they spoke as follows — 
 
 " Ye men of Lacedsemon, and you their con- 
 
 1 Olympi.-Lil 88. 
 
 a In this manner for private ends and tlirougli party 
 feuds, w:is a most noble and sacred institution abused. 
 All Grecians in general paid tlieir attendance at tbe 
 Olympic Games ; and were obliged by all the ties of ho- 
 nour and religion to suspend their animosities and quar- 
 rels, and meet together as countrymen and brethren, 
 with frank and open ingenuity. And yet, in the present 
 instance, they are going to contrive the means of annoy- 
 ing one another, so soon asthat solemnity is over, which 
 was calculated to teach them union and concord, and a 
 steady attachment to the interests of Greece their com- 
 mon mother. The policy however of the present proceed- 
 ing is remarkable. The Athenians who assisted at the 
 games could suspect nothing from the presence of the 
 Milyleneans, who were equally hound in duty to attend. 
 The Lacedaemonians and allies hadthus an opportunity 
 of assem'iling together to receive complaints, and toen- 
 conra^fi revolts from Athens, without danger of sus- 
 picions or a detection of their counsels, till they were 
 ripe for execution. " The Laceda;monians, (it is a rc- 
 mar^k which will afterwards occur in this history,) 
 amongst one another, and in paying all duo regard to 
 the laws of their country, gave ample proofs of honour 
 and virtue, in regard to tl:e rest of mankind, they re- 
 puted as iionourable the things which pleased them, 
 and as just the things whicli promoted their interest." 
 
 federates, we are sensible of that method of 
 procedure, which hath hitherto prevailed 
 amongst the Grecians — Revolters, whilst a war 
 is on foot, and deserters from a former alliance 
 they readily receive, and so long as their own 
 interest is furthered by it, abundantly caress 
 them ; yet, judging them traitors to their for 
 mer friends, they regard them as persons 
 who ought not to bo trusted. To judge 
 in this manner is certainly right and proper, 
 where those whd revolt, and those, from whom 
 they break asunder, happen to be equal to one 
 another in turn of principle, in benevolent 
 affection, and well matched togeflier in expe- 
 dients of redress and military strength, and no 
 just reason of revolt subsist. — But the case is 
 quite different between us and the Athenians. 
 And we ought not to be treated with censure 
 and reproach, from the appearance of having 
 deserted them in extremities, after having been 
 honourably regarded by them iii the season of 
 tranquility. This our conduct to justify and 
 approve, especially as we come to request your 
 alliance, our words shall first be employed, as 
 we know that friendship can be bf no long 
 continuance in private life, nor public associa- 
 tions have any stability, unless both sides engage 
 with an opinion of reciprocal good faith, and 
 are uniform in principle and manners. For out 
 of dissonancy of temper, diversities of conduct 
 continually result, 
 
 " An alliance, it is true; was foimcrly made 
 between us and the Athenians, when you 
 withdrew yourselves from the Median war, 
 and they staid behind you to complete what 
 was yet to be done. We grant it — we made 
 an alliance with the Athenians — not to enslave 
 the rest of Greece to Athenians, but to de- 
 liver Greece from the Barbarian yoke. And 
 whilst they led us on in just equality, so long 
 with alacrity we followed their guidance. But 
 when once we perceived that they relaxed in 
 their zeal against the Mede, and were grown 
 earnest in riveting slavef-y upon allies, we then 
 began to be alarmed. It was impossible, 
 where so many parties were to be consulted, 
 to unite together in one body of defence, and 
 thus all the allies fell into slavery, except our- 
 selves and the Chians. We indeed, left in 
 the enjoyment of our own laws, and of nomi- 
 nal freedom, continued still to follow them to 
 war : but, from the specimens we had hilherto 
 seen of their behaviour, we could no longer re- 
 gard these Athenians as trusty and faithful 
 
96 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book III. 
 
 leaders. For it was not in the least probable, 
 that after enslaving those who were compre- 
 hended in the same treaty with ourselves, they 
 would refrain from treating such as yet were 
 free in the same tyrannic manner, whenever 
 opportunity served. Had we all indeed been 
 left in the free exercise of our own laws, we 
 should then have had the strongest proof that 
 the Athenians acted upon honest uninnovating 
 principles. But now, when they have laid their 
 yoke upon the greater number, though they 
 still continue to treat us as their equals, yet 
 undoubtedly it highly grates them ; and they 
 cannot long endure, when such numbers couch 
 beneath their power, that our state alone 
 should stand up and claim equality. Nor it 
 cannot be! For the more their power hath 
 swelled in bulk and strength, by so much are 
 we become more desolate. The only secure 
 pledge of a lasting alliance is that mutual awe, 
 which keeps the contracting parties in proper 
 balance. For then, if any be disposed to make 
 encroachments, he finds he cannot act upon 
 advantage, and is effectually deterred. Our 
 preservation hitherto hath not been owing 
 to their honesty, but their cunning. Their 
 scheme hath been, gradually to advance their 
 empire by all the specious colourings of justice, 
 by the road of policy rather than of strength. 
 And thus we have been reserved to justify 
 their violence, and to be quoted as a proof, 
 that unless those whom they have enslaved had 
 deserved their fate, a state upon an equal foot- 
 ing with themselves would never have marched 
 in conjunction with them to execute their ven- 
 geance. By the same strain of policy, their 
 first step was to lead out those that were strong- 
 est against the weaker parties, designing to 
 finish with them, when left destitute of any 
 outward resource, by the prior reduction of the 
 rest. Whereas, if they had begun with us, the 
 confederate body remaining yet possessed of 
 its strength, and able to make a stand, their 
 enslaving project could not have equally suc- 
 ceeded. They were besides under some appre- 
 hension of our naval force, lest uniting with 
 yours or any other state, such an accession 
 might have endangered the whole of their plan. 
 Some respite was also gained, from the respect 
 we Iiave ever shown to their whole community 
 and to the series of magistrates who have pre- 
 .sided amongst them. We knew, however, that 
 we could not long hold out, had not this war 
 come timely to oui relief. We saw our own 
 
 fate in the examples which had been made of 
 others. 
 
 " What friendship, therefore, wtiat assurance 
 of liberty could subsist, when, receiving each 
 other with the open countenance, suspicion lay 
 lurking vrithin 1 — when, in war apprehensive 
 of our power, to us they paid their court ; and 
 we, from the same principle, paid our court to 
 them in the season of tranquility 1 The bond 
 of union, which mutual good-will cements in 
 others, was in us kept fast by fear. For 
 through the prevalence of fear, and not of 
 friendship, we have thus long persisted in alli- 
 ance. And whichever side security had first 
 emboldened, that side would first have begun 
 encroachments upon the other. Whoever 
 therefore chargeth us with injustice for revolt- 
 ing, whilst they were only meditating our ruin, 
 and before we actually felt the miseries design- 
 ed us, — that person chargeth us without a rea- 
 son. For had our situation been such, that 
 we could have formed equal schemes to theii 
 prejudice, and disconcerted all their projects, 
 what necessity did we lie under to resign our 
 equality and receive their law? But, as the 
 power of attempting was ever within their reach, 
 we ought certainly to lay hold of every proper 
 expedient to ward off the blow. 
 
 " Such are the reasons, ye men of Laceda- 
 mon, and you their confederates, such the 
 grievances which induced our revolt ; — reasons 
 so clear, that all who hear them must justify 
 our conduct — grievances so heavy, that it was 
 time to be alarmed, and to look for some expe- 
 dient of safety. We long since showed our in 
 clination to find this expedient, when during 
 the peace we sent you to negotiate a revolt, 
 but by you rejected, were obstructed in our 
 scheme. And now, no sooner did the Boeotians 
 invite, than we without a pause obeyed the call 
 Now we have determined to make a double re- 
 volt ; — one from the Grecians, no longer in con- 
 cert with the Athenians to force the load of 
 oppression upon them, but with you to vindi- 
 cate their freedom — another from the Atheni- 
 ans, that we may not in the train of affairs be 
 undone by them, but timely vindicate our own 
 safety. 
 
 " Our revolt, we grant it, hath been too pre- 
 cipitate and unprepared. But this lays_ the 
 stronger obligation upon you to admit us to 
 alliance, with the utmost expedition to send us 
 succours, that you may show your readiness to 
 redress the oppressed, and at the same instant 
 
YKA.R rV.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 97 
 
 annoy your foes. Such a juncture for this 
 was never known before. What with the 
 plague and the exorbitant expense of the war, 
 the Athenians are quite exhausted. Their 
 fleet is divided, some to cruise upon your coast, 
 others to make head against us. It is not pro- 
 bable they can have now the competent reserve 
 of shipping, should you invade them a second 
 time this summer both by land and sea ; so 
 that, either they must be unable, thus divided, 
 to make head against you, if you singly attack 
 them, or the union of us both they will not be 
 able to face. 
 
 " Let no one amongst you imagine, that this 
 will be endangering your own domestic welfare, 
 for the sake of foreigners with whom you have 
 no connexion. For though Lesbos lies ap- 
 parently at a great distance from you, yet the 
 conveniences of it will lie near at hand for your 
 service. For the war will not be made in At- 
 tica, as such a one supposeth, but in those parts 
 whence Attica deriveth its support. Their 
 revenue ariseth from the tribute paid by their 
 dependents. And that revenue will be increas- 
 ed, if they can compass the reduction of us. 
 For then not a soul will dare to revolt, and 
 their own will be enlarged by the addition of 
 our strength, and more grievous burdens will 
 be laid upon us, as being the last who have 
 put on their yoke. On the other hand, if with 
 proper alacrity you undertake our support, you 
 will gain over a state possessed of a consider- 
 able navy, that acquisition you so greatly want ; 
 and you will more easily be enabled to demolish 
 the Athenians, by withdrawing their dependents 
 from them : for then, every one of that number 
 will with assurance and confidence revolt — and 
 you yourselves be cleared of the bad imputation 
 you at present lie under, of rejecting those who 
 fly to you for protection. If, added to this, you 
 manifest your views to re-establish the general 
 freedom, you will so considerably strengthen 
 the sinews of war, that all resistance will be 
 unavailing. 
 
 " Reveiencing therefore as you ought, these 
 hopes which Greece hath conceived of you ; — 
 reverencing further Olympian Jove, in whose 
 temple we now stand, like supplicants distress- 
 ed and suing for redress — grant to the Mity- 
 leneans the honour of your alliance, and under- 
 take their protection. Reject not the entrea- 
 ties of men, who have now indeed their lives 
 and properties exposed to dangers merely their 
 cwn, but whose deliverance from their present 
 20 
 
 plunge will reflect security and advantage upon 
 all; and who, if you now continue to be deaf to 
 their entreaties, must drop into such a ruin as 
 will at length involve you all. At this crisis 
 show yourselves to be the men, which the voice 
 of Greece united in your praise and our dread- 
 ful situation require you to be." 
 
 In this manner the Mityleneans urged their 
 plea; and the Lacedsemonians and confederates, 
 having listened with attention, and owned them- 
 selves convinced, admitted the Lesbians into 
 their alliance, and decreed an incursion into 
 Attica. To put this in execution, orders were 
 issued to the confederates then present, expedi- 
 tiously to march with two-thirds of their forces 
 to the Isthmus. The Lacedtemonians them- 
 selves arrived there first, and got machines ready 
 at the Isthmus to convey their ships over-land 
 from Corinth to the sea of Athens, that they 
 might invade them at the same time both by 
 land and sea. They indeed were eager and in- 
 tent on the enterprise : but the other confed- 
 erates were very slow in assembling together, as 
 they were busy in getting in their harvest, and 
 began to be sadly tired of the war. 
 
 When the Athenians found that such prepara- 
 tions were made against them, as an avowed 
 insult on their imagined weakness, they had a 
 mind to' convince their foes that such imagina- 
 tions were erroneous, and that they were well 
 able, without countermanding their fleet from be- 
 fore Lesbos, to make head against any force that 
 could come from Peloponnesus. Accordingly, 
 they manned out a hundred ships, obliging all, 
 as well sojourners as citizens (those excepted 
 of the first and second class)', to go on board. 
 
 1 The original is, " except those who were worth 
 five hundred medimns, and the horsemen or knights." 
 The Athenians were ranged intoxlasses by Solon. Pla. 
 tarch hath described the manner in the life of Solon, aa 
 thus translated in Potter's Antiquities of Greece, v, i. p^ 
 14. 
 
 " Solon finding the people variously affected, some in- 
 clined to a monarchy, others to an oligarchy, others to 
 a democracy, the rich men powerful nnd haughty,, the 
 poor men groaning under the burden of their oppression, 
 endeavoured, as far as was possible, to compose all their 
 differences, to ease tl-e grievances, and give all reason- 
 able persons satisfaction. In the prosecution of this 
 design, he divided the Athenians into four ranks, accord- 
 ing to every man's estate; those who were worth flvo 
 hundred medimns of liquid and dry commodities iif 
 placed in the first rank, calling them Pentacosiomedim- 
 ni. The next were the horsemen, or Ippcis, being such 
 as were of ability to furnish out a horse, or were worth 
 three hundred medimns. The third class consisted of 
 those that had two hundred medimns, who were called 
 
98 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book iu. 
 
 showing themselves first before the Isthmus in 
 great parade, they displayed their force, and 
 then made descents at pleasure all along the 
 coajst. The Lacedasmonians seeing them thus 
 strong beyond what they had imagined, conclud- 
 ed that the Lesbians had purposely amused 
 them with fictions ; and being perplexed how 
 to act, as their confederates were not yet come 
 up to join them, and as information was brought 
 them, that the first Athenian squadron, consis- 
 ting of thirty sail, was layijig waste the territory 
 round about their city, they retired to their own 
 homes. 
 
 Afterwards they self about the equipment of 
 a fleet to be sent to Lesbos ; and ordered the 
 confederate cities to send in their contingents, 
 the whole amounting to forty sail ; and further 
 appointed Alcidas to be admiral in chief, who 
 was ready to put himself at the head of the ex- 
 pedition. The Athenians departed off the coast 
 with their hundred sail, when they saw their 
 enemies had retreated. 
 
 During the time this fleet was out at sea, 
 though the Athenians at, the commencement 
 of the war had as large, if not a larger number 
 of ships, yet they never had their whole navy 
 so completely fitted out for service and with 
 60 much pomp as now. One hundred of their 
 ships were stationed for guards round Attica, 
 and Eubcea, and Salamis ; and another hundred 
 were coasting all along Peloponnesus, beside 
 those that were at Potidaa, and in other parts, 
 — insomuch that the whole plumber employed 
 this summer amounted to two hundred and 
 fifty sail. The expense of this, with that of 
 
 ZeugitJB. In the last he placed all the rest, calling tliem 
 Tlietes, niid allowed them not to be capahle of tearing 
 any office in the government, only gave them a liberty 
 to give their votes in all pulilic assemblies; Which, 
 Ihough at the first it appeared mconsiderahle,was after- 
 wards found to Ic a very important privilege; for it I e- 
 Ing permitted every man after the determination of 
 the magistrates to make an appeal to the people rs- 
 sembled in convocation, hereby it came 10 prss, that 
 xausesof the greatest weight and moment were brought 
 before them. And thug he continued the power and 
 [magistracy in the hands of the rich men, and yet nei- 
 'ther exposed the inferior people to their cruelty and op- 
 pression, nor wholly deprived them of having a share 
 an the novernment. And of this equality he liimself 
 diiakcs mention in this manner; 
 
 What power was fit I did on all bestow, 
 Nor misMl Ibe poor loo liigh, nor pressed too low; 
 The rieli that i uled aow e\er7 oflice botv, 
 Confined by laws rhey could not press the poor: 
 'Eoth par:ie3 I securei) trom lawless mijih;, 
 So Done preyail'd opon another's right,* 
 
 Mr Cruch. 
 
 Potidffla, quite exhausted their treasure. For 
 the pay of the heavy-armed who were stationed 
 at Potidsea, was two drachmas a-day, each of 
 them receiving a drachma' for himself and an- 
 other for his servant. The number of the 
 first body sent thither was three thousand, and 
 not fewer than those were employed during the 
 whole siege; — but the sixteen hundred who 
 came with Phormio were ordered away before 
 its conclusion. The whole fleet also had the 
 same pay. In this manner was their public 
 treasure now for the first time exhausted — and 
 such a navy, the largest they ever had, complete- 
 ly manned. 
 
 The Mityleneans, during the time the Lace- 
 daimonians lay at the Isthmus, with a body of 
 their own and auxiliaries, marched by land 
 against Methymne, expecting to have it be- 
 trayed to them. Having assaulted the place, 
 and being disappointed in their expectations, 
 they marched back by way of Antissa, and 
 Pyra, and Eressus. In each of these places 
 they halted for a while, to settle affairs in as 
 firm order as possible, and to strengthen their 
 walls, and then without loss of time returned to 
 Mitylene. 
 
 Upon their departure, the Methymneans 
 marched out against Antissa. The Antisseans 
 with a party of Auxiharies sallying out to meet 
 them, gave them a terrible blow, so that many of 
 them were left dead upon the spot, and those who 
 escaped made the best of their way back. 
 
 The Athenians — advised of these incidents, 
 and that further the Mityleneans were quite 
 masters of the country, and that their own 
 soldiers were not numerous enough to bridle 
 their excursions — about the beginning of au- 
 tumn, send a reinforcement of a thousand hea« 
 vy-armed of their own people commanded by 
 Paches the son of Epicurus. These having 
 rowed themselves ihe transports which brought 
 them, arrive ; and biiild a single wall in circle 
 quite round Mitylene, and on the proper spots of 
 ground strengthened it by erecting forts. Thus 
 was Mitylene strongly besieged on all sides, both 
 by sea and land. — And by this time it began to 
 be winter. 
 
 But the Athenians, wanting money to carry 
 on the siege, determined now to tax themselves, 
 and by their first contribution raised^ two 
 
 X Seven pence three farthings. 
 
 t> It was a voluntary rontriliulion: the original term 
 implieth it. The manner was no doubt the STme as was 
 observed in succeediag times, when the necessities of 
 
STEAR IV.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 99 
 
 hundred talents' for the present service ; and 
 at the same time despatched twelve ships under 
 the command of Lysicles and four colleagues 
 to levy money abroad. He, intent on raising 
 contributions, made a visit for this purpose to 
 several places ; and, having landed at Myus in 
 Caria, intending to pierce through the plain of 
 Mteander as far as the hill of Sandius, he was 
 attacked on his route by the Carians and Anaei- 
 tans, where himself and a great part of his army 
 perished. 
 
 This winter the Plataeans — for they were still 
 blocked up by the Peloponnesians and Bceo- 
 tians — finding themselves much distressed by 
 the failure of their provisions, giving up all hope 
 of succour from the Athenians, and qiyte des- 
 titute of all other means of preservation, formed 
 a project now in concert with those Athenians 
 who were shut up with them in the blockade, 
 " first of all to march out of the town in com- 
 pany, and to compass their escape, if possible, 
 over the works of the enemy." The authors 
 of this project were Thseanetus the son of Ti- 
 medes a soothsayer, and Eumolpidas the son of 
 Daimachus, who was one of their commanders. 
 But afterwards, haJf of the number, affrighted by 
 the greatness of the danger, refused to have a 
 share in the attempt. Yet the remainder, to 
 the number of about two hundred and twenty, 
 resolutely adhered to attempt an escape in the 
 following manner : 
 
 They made ladders equal in height to the 
 enemy's wall. The measure of this they learn- 
 ed from the rows of brick, where the side of the 
 wall facing them was not covered over with 
 plaster. Several persons were appointed to 
 count the rows at the same time ; some of them 
 might probably be wrong, but the greater part 
 would agree in the just computation ; especial- 
 ly as they counted them several times over, and 
 were besides at no great distance, since the part 
 marked out for the design was plainly within 
 their view. In this method, having guessed the 
 measure of a brick from its thickness, they 
 
 tnc state called for an cxtraonlinary supply. In such 
 ocrasioiis, the president of the nssembly laid before tiic 
 Athenians the present want of money, aiid nxliorted 
 Ihom with cheerfulness and generosity to contribute to- 
 wards the nationai support. Sucll as were willing rose 
 up in turn saying, " I contribute so much," and naming 
 the sura. Such bs, thougll rich, were niggardly and 
 Btrangcrs to all public spirit, sat silent on these occa 
 eions, or, as fast as they could, stole out of the as- 
 Bcmbly. 
 
 . jE38,750. 
 
 found out what must he the total height for tho 
 ladders. 
 
 The work of' the Peloponnesians was of the 
 following structure : it was composed of two 
 circular walls ; one towards Platasa, and the 
 other outward, to prevent any attack from 
 Athens. These walls were at the distance of 
 sixteen feet one from the other ; and this inter- 
 mediate space of sixteen feet was built into 
 distinct lodgments for the guards. These 
 however, standing thick together, gave to the 
 whole work the appearance of one thick entire 
 wall, with battlements on both sides. At 
 every ten battlements were lofty turrets of the 
 same breadth with the whole work, reaching 
 from the face of the inward wall to that of the 
 outward ; so that there was no passage by the 
 sides of a turret, but the communication lay 
 open through the middle of them all. By night, 
 when the weather was rainy, they quitted the 
 battlements, and sheltering themselves in the 
 turrets, as near at hand and covered over-head, 
 there they continued their watch. Such was tho 
 form of the work by which the Platajans were 
 inclosed on every side. 
 
 The enterprising body, when every thing 
 was ready, laying hold of the opportunity of a 
 night tempestuous with wind and rain, and 
 further at a dark moon, marched out of the 
 place. The persons, who had been authors of 
 the project, were now the conductors. And 
 first they passed the ditch which surrounded 
 the town ; then they approached quite up to 
 the wall of the enemy, undiscovered by the 
 guards. The darkness of the night prevented 
 their being seen, and the noise they made in 
 approaching was quite drowned in the loudnes.'S 
 of the storm. They advanced also at a great 
 distance from one another, to prevent any dis- 
 covery from the mutual clashing of their arms. 
 They were further armed in the most compact 
 manner, and wore a covering only on the lefl 
 foot for the sake of treading firmly in the mud. 
 At one of the intermediate spaces between the 
 turrets they got under the battlements, know- 
 ing they were not manned. The bearers of 
 the ladders went first, and applied them to tho 
 wall. Then twelve light-armed, with only a 
 dagger and a breast-plate scaled, led by Am- 
 meas the son of Chortebus, who was the first 
 that mounted. His followers, in two parties 
 of six each, mounted next on each side of the 
 turrets. Then other light-armed with javeUus 
 succeeded them. Behind came others holding 
 
100 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book III. 
 
 the bucklers of those above them, thus to faci- 
 litate their ascent, and to be ready to deliver 
 them into their hands, should they be obliged 
 to charge. When the greater part of the num- 
 ber was mounted, the watchmen within the tur- 
 rets perceived it. For one of the Platseans, 
 in fastening his hold, had thrown down a tile 
 from off the battlements, which made a noise in 
 the fall ; and immediately was shouted an alarm. 
 The whole camp came running towards the 
 wall, yet unable to discover the reason of this 
 alarm, so dark was the night, and violent the 
 storm. At this crisis the Platseans, who were 
 left behind in the city, sallied forth and assaulted 
 the work of the Peloponnesians, in the part op- 
 posite to that where their friends were attempt- 
 ing to pass, from them to divert as much as 
 possible the attention of the enemy. Great 
 was the confusion of the enemy yet abiding in 
 their posts, for not one durst leave his station 
 to run to the place of alarm, but all were great- 
 ly perplexed to guess at its meaning. At last 
 the body of three hundred, appointed for a re- 
 serve of sUtcour upon any emergency, marched 
 without the work to the place of alarm. Now 
 the lighted torches, denoting enemies, were 
 held up towards Thebes. On the other side, 
 the Platseans in the city held up at the same 
 time from the wall many of these torches already 
 prepared for this very purpose, that the signals 
 given of the approach of foes might be mistak- 
 en by their enemies the Thebans, who judging 
 the affair to be quite otherwise than it really 
 was, might refrain from sending any succour, 
 till their friends who had sallied might have 
 effectuated their escape, and gained a place of 
 security. 
 
 In the meantime those of the Platseans, 
 who having mounted first, and by killing the 
 guards had got possession of the turrets on either 
 hand, posted themselves there to secure the 
 passage, and to prevent any manner of obstruc- 
 tion from thence. Applying further their lad- 
 ders to these turrets from the top of the wall, 
 and causing many of their number to mount, 
 those row upon the turrets kept off the ene- 
 mies, running to obstruct them both above and 
 below, by discharging their darts ; whilst the 
 majority, rearing many ladders at the same 
 time, and throwing down the battlements, got 
 clean over , at the intermediate space between 
 the turrets. Every one, in the order he got 
 over to the outward side, drew up upon the in- 
 ner brink of the ditch, and from thence, with 
 
 their darts and javelins, kept off those who 
 were flacking towards the work to hinder their 
 passage. When all the rest were landed upon 
 the outside of the work, those upon the turrets 
 coming down last of all, and with difficulty, 
 got also to the ditch. By this time the reserve 
 of three hundred was come up to oppose them, 
 by the light of torches. The Platseans by this 
 means, being in the dark, had a clear view of 
 them, and from their stand upon the brink of 
 the ditch, aimed a shower of darts and javelins 
 at those parts of their bodies which had no ar- 
 mour. The Platseans were also obscured ; as 
 the glimmering of lights made them less easy 
 to be distinguished ; so that the last of their 
 body got over the ditch, though not without 
 great difficulty and toil. For the water in it 
 was frozen, not into ice hard enough to bear, but 
 in a watery congelation, the effect not of the 
 northern but eastern blasts. The wind blowing 
 hard, had caused so much snow to fall that night, 
 that the water was swelled to a height not to be 
 forded without some difficulty. However, the 
 violence of the storm was the greatest further- 
 ance of their escape. 
 
 The pass over the ditch being thus com- 
 pleted, the Platasans went forward in a body, 
 and took the road to Thebes, leaving on theii 
 right the temple of Juno built by Andocrates. 
 They judged it would never be supposed, that 
 they had taken a route which led directly towards 
 their enemies : and they saw at the same time, 
 the Peloponnesians pursuing them with torches 
 along the road to Athen?, by Cythasron and the 
 'Heads of the Oak. For ^six or seven stadia 
 they continued their route towards Thebes, 
 but then turning short, they took the road 
 to the mountains by Erythrse and Hysise ; and 
 having gained the mountains, two hundred and 
 twelve of the number completed their escape 
 to Athens. Some of them indeed turned back 
 into the city, without once attempting to get 
 over ; and one archer was taken prisoner at the 
 outward ditch. 
 
 The Peloponnesians desisted from the fruit- 
 less pursuit, and returned to their posts. But 
 the Platseans within the city, ignorant of the 
 real event, and giving ear to the assurances of 
 those who turned back, that " they are all to a 
 man cut off," despatched a herald as soon as it 
 was day to demand a truce for fetching off the 
 dead ; but learning hence the true state of thii 
 
 1 Dryosceplials. 
 
 ••' About half a mile 
 
YEAR v.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 101 
 
 affair, they remained well satisfied. And in this 
 manner these men of Platiea, by thus forcing a 
 passage, wrought their own preservation. 
 
 About the end of this winter, Salsthus the 
 Lacedaemonian was despatched in a trireme 
 from Lacedsemon to Mitylene; who being 
 landed at Pyrrha, went from thence by land, 
 and having passed the Athenian circumvallation 
 by favour of a breach made in it by a torrent 
 of water, gets undiscovered into Mitylene. 
 His commission was, to tell the governors of 
 the place, that " at the same time an incursion 
 will be made into Attica, and a fleet of forty 
 sail be sent to their relief, according to pro- 
 mise ; that he himself was despatched before- 
 hand, to assure them of these, and to take all 
 proper care of other points." Upon this the 
 Mityleneans resumed their spirits, and grew 
 more averse to any composition with the Athe- 
 nians. 
 
 The winter was now past, and iu this man- 
 ner ended the fourth year of the war, of which 
 Thucydides hath compiled the history. 
 
 In the beginning of the ensuing summer — 
 after that the Feloponnesians had despatched 
 Alcidas, admiral appointed, and the forty-two 
 shi^s under his command, to the relief of Mi- 
 tylene, with the most pressing orders — they 
 and their confederates invaded Attica. Their 
 design was, by this diversion to give the Athe- 
 nians so much employ on all sides, that they 
 might be unable to give any obstructipn to their 
 squadron bound for Mitylene. This present 
 invasion was led by Cleomenes, who was his 
 father's brother, in the right of Pausanias son 
 of Pleistionax the king, but yet in his minority. 
 They now utterly destroyed those parts of 
 Attica that had been ravaged already. What- 
 ever again began to flourish, and whatever had 
 been spared in former incursions, now fell be- 
 fore their fury. And this incursion, next to 
 the second, was the sharpest they ever made 
 upon the Athenians. For, having continued 
 their stay so long, as to give time to their squad- 
 ron to arrive at Lesbos, and send them news of 
 their success, they had leisure to extend their 
 devastations over almost all the country. But 
 when all their expectations ended in disappoint- 
 ment, and forage began to fail, they withdrew 
 and were disbanded to their respective cities. 
 
 1 Before Christ 427. 
 
 In the meantime the Mityleneans, when ; 
 they saw nothing of the squadron from Pelo- 
 ponnesus (which was loitering in the course,) 
 and their provisions began to fail, are necessi- 
 tated to capitulate with the Athenians upon 
 this occasion — Satethus, who had also himself 
 given up all hopes of relief, causeth the popu- 
 lace, who were before light-armed, to put on 
 heavy armour, with a design to make a sally 
 on the Athenians. But they, so soon as they 
 had received their armour, would no longer 
 obey their governors, but assembling together 
 in bodies, ordered those in authority either pub- 
 licly to produce what provisions they had, and 
 divide equally among them, or otherwise they 
 would immediately make their own terms with 
 the Athenians, and give up the city. Those 
 in command being sensible that they had not 
 force sufficient to hinder this, and that their 
 own danger would be extreme, should they by 
 standing out be excluded the capitulation, join 
 with them in procuring the following terms 
 from Paches and the Athenians : 
 
 " That it should be submitted to the people 
 of Athens to determine as they please in rela- 
 tion to the Mityleneans. 
 
 " That the Mitylenians should immediately 
 receive their army into the city — and despatch 
 an embassy to them to know their pleasure. 
 
 " That sufBcient respite should be indulged 
 for this, during which Paches should put no 
 one Mitylenean in chains, should make none a 
 slave, should put none to death." 
 
 These were the terms of the surrender — But 
 those of the Mityleneans who had been most 
 active in all the negotiations with the Laceds- 
 monians, were thrown into the utmost conster 
 nation, and being quite in despair when the 
 army took possession of the place, seat them- 
 selves down at the altars for refuge. Paches, 
 having ordered them to arise with a promise 
 of protecting them from insults, sends them 
 over to Tenedos, till he could know the pleasure 
 of the Athenians. Having further despatched 
 some triremes to Antissa, he took it in, and 
 made all other dispositions he judged expedient 
 in regard to his army. 
 
 The Peloponnesians on board the squadron 
 of forty ships, who ought to have made the ut- 
 most expedition, but instead of that had loiter 
 ed upon the coast of Peloponnesus, and made 
 the rest of the voyage in a leisurely manner, 
 had proceeded so far as Delos, before their mo- 
 tions were known at Athens. Being advan- 
 O 
 
102 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book III. 
 
 ced from Delos to Icarus and Myconus, they re- 
 ceive the first intelligence that Mitylenewas ta- 
 ken. But being desirous of certain information, 
 they sailed forwards to Embatus of Erythrasa. 
 Mitylene had been taken about seven days be- 
 fore they came up to Embatus. Here assured 
 of the truth, they consulted what was now to be 
 done : and Teutiaplus an Elean, gave his opin- 
 ion thus : 
 
 " To you, AlciJas, and as many other 
 Peloponnesians as are joined with me in the 
 present command, I freely declare it to be my 
 own opinion that we should sail to Mitylene, 
 as we are, before the enemy is apprized of our 
 arrival. It is probable, as they are so lately 
 possessed of the city, we shall find it very re- 
 missly and imperfectly guarded: and towards 
 the sea entirely neglected, as on that side they 
 cannot in the least expect the approach of an 
 enemy, and our strength in that element is 
 superior. It is probable also that their land- 
 force is dispersed, in that negligent manner 
 Vfhich victory indulgeth, into the scattered 
 houses of refreshment. If, therefore, we can 
 come upon them by surprise and by night, I 
 hope by the assistance of our friends within, if 
 really within we have a friend remaining, to 
 give a new turn to our affairs. Let us not be 
 staggered at the danger of the attempt, but re- 
 member, that all the turns of war are owing to 
 some such reverse as this ; which that comman- 
 der who is most on his guard against, and who 
 can discern and seize such critical moments for 
 assaulting his enemies, must be most frequently 
 successful." 
 
 He gave his opinion thus, but it had no 
 effect upon Alcidas. Some other persons, 
 exiles from Ionia, and some Lesbians who 
 were also on board, advised him further 
 — " That since he seemed to be discouraged 
 by the apparent danger of that attempt, he 
 should seize some city in Ionia, or Cyme in 
 JEtoWa; that by favour of such a hold for war, 
 they might bring about the revolt of Ionia; 
 that in such a step success might justly be 
 hoped, as his presence would be highly accept- 
 able there : that, if they could cut off the very 
 great revenue which accrued thence to the 
 Athenians, the loss, added to the expense of 
 endeavouring a recovery, must drain their trea- 
 sure — That they further thought they could pre- 
 vidl on Pisuthnes, to join with them in the war." 
 
 But Alcidas would not listen to these pro- 
 jiosals, and got a majority to support his own 
 
 opinion — " That, since it was too late to suc- 
 cour Mitylene, they should without loss of 
 time return to Peloponnesus." Weighing 
 therefore from Embatus, he put again to sea ; 
 and touching at Myonesus of the Tcians, he 
 there butchered in cold blood a number of pri- 
 soners, whom he had taken in the voyage. 
 Putting afterwards into Ephesus, he was at- 
 tended there by an embassy from the Samians 
 of Antsa representing to him — " That it was 
 no honourable method of vindicating the liberty 
 of Greece, to butcher men who had not so 
 much as lift up the hand against him, who were 
 not enemies in heart, but of mere necessity de- 
 pendent on the Athenians : that, unless he 
 changed his conduct, he would bring over but 
 few of his enemies into friendship, but turn a 
 far greater number of friends into enemies." — 
 He was wrought upon by this remonstrance, 
 and set all the Chians and others, whom he 
 had yet reserved, at liberty. For those who 
 had at any time descried this squadron, had 
 never thought of flying, but boldly approached 
 it as certainly Athenian. They really had no 
 ground to imagine, that whilst the Athenians 
 were masters of the sea, a Peloponnesian fleet 
 should dare to put over to Ionia. 
 
 From Ephesus, Alcidas made the best of his 
 way, or rather fled outright, for he had been 
 discovered by the Salaminian and the Paralus, 
 whilst he lay at anchor near Claros. These 
 vessels happened at that time to be on a course 
 from Athens. He was now apprehensive of a 
 chase, and so stretched out to sea ; determining, 
 if possible, not to make any land again till he had 
 reached Peloponnesus. Notice of him came 
 first to Paches and the Athenians from Ery- 
 thrsea; it was then repeated from all parts. 
 For as the country of Ionia is quite unfortified, 
 the sight of the Peloponnesians on that coast 
 had struck a panic, lest, though their intention 
 was not to continue there, they should at once 
 assault and destroy their cities. The Salami- 
 nian' also and Paralus, after they had descried 
 
 > These two vessels seem to have been tlie packets or 
 yjichts of the state of Athens. Their force was small 
 in comparison of the ships of war, as they were cliiefiy 
 designed for nimblenessand expedition. Theycarrieil 
 ambassadors to and fro, went on all public errands 
 whether of a civil or religious nature, and transported 
 magistrates and generals to and from their posts. They 
 were navigated only by free-l-orn citizens of Athens, 
 who besides receiving more pay, esteemed it also a 
 greater honour to serve on board tliesc vessels, which 
 were sacred. 
 
YEAR v.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 103 
 
 him at Claros, came voluntarily to notify the 
 tidings. Paches set upon the chase with 
 warmth, and pursued it as far as the isle of 
 Latmos. But there giving up all hope of reach- 
 ing him, he turned hack again for his post ; and 
 since he had not been able to come up. with 
 them by sea, thought a great point was carried 
 in not finding them refuged in any harbour, 
 where they must have been under a necessity 
 to fortify their station, and oblige him to a re- 
 gular procedure and attack. 
 
 In sailing back he touched at Notium of the 
 Colophonians, in which at this time the Colo- 
 phonians resided, the upper city having been 
 taken by Itamenes and the Barbarians who had 
 broke in by favour of an intestine sedition. It 
 was taken about the time that the Peloponne- 
 sians made their second incursion into Attica.' 
 But in Notium a second sedition broke out, be- 
 tween those who resorted thither for refuge and 
 the old inhabitants. The latter having obtain- 
 ed an aid of Arcadians and Barbarians from 
 Pisuthnes, kept within a part separated by a 
 transverse wall, and the management of affairs 
 was in the hands of some Colophonians of the 
 upper city, who were in the Medish interest, 
 and had been received amongst them as an aid. 
 But the former, who had resorted hither for 
 refuge, and were a body of exiles, apply to Pa- 
 ches for protection. He invited Hippias, the 
 commander of the Arcadians within the trans- 
 verse wall, to come out to a conference, assur- 
 ing him, " if they came to no agreement, he 
 would replace him within both safe and sound." 
 Upon this Hippias came out : and Paches im- 
 mediately put him under an arrest, but laid no 
 bonds upon him. This done, he on a sudden 
 assaults the wall ; by favour of the surprise 
 carries it : and puts all the Arcadians and Bar- 
 barians within to the sword. After this he re- 
 placcth Hippias within, in the same state he had 
 promised ; but when he had him there, imme- 
 diately apprehends him again and shoots him to 
 death with arrows. Notium he delivers into the 
 hands of the Cclophonians, excluding those on- 
 ly who were in the interest of the Mede. In 
 process of time, the Athenians having sent lea- 
 ders thither on purpose, and declared Notium 
 an Athenian colony, settled in it the Colopho- 
 nians that were any where to be found, under 
 the accustomed regulations. 
 
 Paches, being returned to Mitylene, complet- 
 ed the reduction of Pyrra and Eressus; and 
 having apprehended Satethus the Laceda;mo- 
 
 nian who had "been concealed in the city, senda 
 him to Athens along with those citizens of Mi- 
 tylene from Tenedos, whom he had kept in 
 safe custody there, and all others who appeared 
 to have been concerned in the revolt. As an 
 escort to these he sends away also the greater 
 part of his army. With the remainder he him- 
 self staid behind to regulate the affairs of Mity- 
 lene and the rest of Lesbos, to the best of his 
 discretion. 
 
 When the authors of the revolt and Salaethus 
 were arrived at Athens, the Athenians instant- 
 ly put Salaethus to death. He made them 
 many fruitless proposals to save his Ufe ; and 
 amongst the rest, that the siege of Platsea 
 should be raised, which was still besieged by 
 the Peloponncsians. They next entered into 
 consultation, what should be done with the re- 
 volters ; and in the warmth of anger decreed 
 — "That not only those who were now at 
 Athens should be put to death, but the same 
 sentence should extend to all the men of Mi- 
 tylene who were adult; and the women and 
 children be sold for slaves." They were ex- 
 asperated against them not only because they 
 had revolted, but because they had done it 
 without the provocation which others had re- 
 ceived in the rigour of their government. The 
 Peloponnesian fleet added the greater impetu- 
 osity to this their resentment as they had' dared 
 to venture so far as Ionia in aid of the rebels. 
 For it plainly appeared to them, that the revolt 
 had not been made without much previous de- 
 liberation. In short, they despatch a trireme 
 to notify their decree to Paches, with orders to 
 see it put in immediate execlition upon the Mi- 
 tyleneans. 
 
 The day following, repentance on a sudden 
 touched their hearts, moved by the reflection, 
 that they had passed a savage and monstrous 
 decree in dooming a whole city to that destruc- 
 tion, which was due only to the authors of the 
 guilt. This was no sooner perceived by the 
 Mitylenean- ambassadors then residing at 
 Athens, and such of the Athenians as inclining 
 to mercy had a mind to save them, than they 
 addressed themselves to the magistrates, beg- 
 ging the decree might be again debated. Their 
 request was the more easily granted, as the 
 magistrates had discovered that the bulk of the 
 city were desirous to have a second opportunity 
 of declaring their sentiments. An assembly of 
 the people is again convened, and various opin- 
 ions were offered by different persons, till Cleon 
 
104 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book iu. 
 
 the son of Cleanetus, who in the former assem- 
 bly had proposed and carried the murdering 
 sentence, who in all other respects was the 
 most violent of all the citizens, and at this 
 time had hy far the greatest influence over 
 the people, stood forth again and spoke as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 " Upon many other occasions my own expe- 
 rience hath convinced me, that a democracy is 
 incapable of ruling over others ; hut I see it 
 with the highest certainty now in this your 
 present repentance concerning the Mityleneans. 
 In security so void of terror, in safety so ex- 
 empt from treachery, you pass your days with- 
 in the walls of Athens, that you are grown 
 quite safe and secure about your dependents. 
 Whenever, soothed by their specious entreaties, 
 you betray your judgment or relent in pity, 
 not a soul amongst you reflects that you are 
 acting the dastardly part, not in truth to confer 
 obligations upon those dependents, but to en- 
 danger your own welfare and safety. It is then 
 quite remote from your thoughts, that your 
 rule over them is in fact a tyranny, that they 
 are ever intent on prospects to shake off your 
 yoke — that yoke, to which they ever reluctantly 
 submitted. It is not forgiveness on your part, 
 after injuries received, that can keep them fast 
 in their obedience, since this must be ever the 
 consequence of your own superior power, and 
 not of gratitude in them. 
 
 " Above all, I dread that extremity of danger 
 to which we are exposed, if not one of your de- 
 crees must ever be carried into act, and we re- 
 main for ever ignorant — that the community 
 which uniformly abides by a worse set of laws, 
 hath the advantage over another, which is fine- 
 ly modelled in every respect, except in prac- 
 tice ; — that modest ignorance is a much surer 
 support than genius which scorns to be con- 
 trolled ; — and that the duller part of mankind 
 in general administer public affairs much bet- 
 ter than your men of vivacity and wit. The 
 last assume a pride in appearing wiser than the 
 laws 4 in every debate about the public good 
 they aim merely at victory, as if there were no 
 other points sufficiently important wherein to 
 display their superior talents ; and by this their 
 conduct they generally subvert the public wel- 
 fare : the former, who are diffident of their own 
 abilities, who regard themselves as less wise 
 than the laws of their country — though unable 
 to detect the specious orator, yet being better 
 judges of equity than champions in debate, for 
 
 the most part enforce the rational conduct. 
 This beyond denial is our duty at present ; we 
 should scorn competitions in eloquence and wit, 
 nor wilfully and contrary to our own opinion 
 mislead the judgment of this full assembly. 
 
 " For my part, I persist in my former decla- 
 rations, and I am surprised at the men who 
 proposed to have the affair of Mitylene again 
 debated, who endeavour to protract the execu- 
 tion of justice, in the interest of the guilty more 
 than of the injured. For by this means the suf- 
 ferer proceeds to take vengeance on the cri- 
 minal with the edge of his resentment blunted ; 
 when revenge, the opposite of wrong, the more 
 nearly it treads upon the heels of injury, gen- 
 erally inflicts the most condign punishment. 
 But I am more surprised at him, whoever he 
 be, that shall dare to contradict, and pretend to 
 demonstrate, that the injuries done by the Mity- 
 leneans are really for our service, and that our 
 calamities are hardships on our dependents. 
 He certainly must either presume upon his own 
 eloquence, if he contends to prove that what 
 was plainly decreed was never decreed ; or, 
 instigated by lucre, will endeavour to seduce 
 you by the elaborate and plausible artifice of 
 words. In such contentions, the state indeed 
 awards the victory to whom she pleaseth, but 
 she sustains all the damage herself. You are 
 answerable for this, Athenians — you, who 
 fondly dote on these wordy competitions — you, 
 who are accustomed to be spectators of speeches 
 and hearers of actions. You meas\jre the pos- 
 sibility of future eflects by the present eloquence 
 of your orators ; you judge of actions already 
 past, not by the certain conviction of your own 
 eyes, but the fallible suggestions of your ears, 
 when soothed by the inveigling insinuating 
 flow of words. You are the best in the world 
 to be deceived by novelty of wit, and to refuse 
 to follow the'dictates of the approved judicious 
 speaker, — slaves as you are to whatever trifles 
 happen always to be in vogue, and looking 
 down with contempt on tried and experienced 
 methods. The most earnest wish that the 
 heart of any of your body ever conceived is, to 
 become a speaker ; if that be unattainable, you 
 range yourselves in opposition against all who 
 are so, for fear you should seem in judgment 
 their inferiors. When any thing is acutely ut- 
 tered, you are ready even to go before it with 
 applause, and intimate your own preconception 
 of the point, at the same time dull at discerning 
 whither it will tend. Your whole passion, in- 
 
YTLA.R v.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAK. 
 
 105 
 
 a word, is for things that are not in reality and 
 common life ; but of what passeth directly be- 
 fore your eyes you have no proper perception. 
 And, frankly, you are quite infatuated by the 
 lust of hearing, and resemble more the idle 
 spectators of contending sophists, than men 
 who meet to deliberate upon public affairs. 
 From such vain amusements, endeavouring to 
 divert you, I boldly atfirm that no one city 
 in the world hath injured yon so much as 
 Mitylene. 
 
 " Those who, unable to support the rigour of 
 your government, or who, compelled to do it by 
 hostile force, have revolted from you, I readily 
 absolve. But for a people who inhabit an 
 island, a fortified island ; who had no reason to 
 dread the violence of our enemies, except by 
 sea ; who even at sea, by the strength of their 
 own shipping, were able to guard themselves 
 against all attacks ; who enjoyed their own 
 model of government, and were ever treated by 
 ■ w with the highest honour and regard — for such 
 a people to revolt in this manner is never to be 
 forgiven. Is not their whole procedure one 
 series of treachery 'i Have they not rather 
 made war upon than revolted against us 1 for 
 revolt can only be ascribed to those who have 
 suffered violence and outrage. Have they not 
 further sought out our implacable foes, and 
 begged to participate with them in our des- 
 truction 1 This certainly is » much greater 
 aggravation of guilt, than if merely on their 
 own domestic strength they had rebelled against 
 us. They would not be deterred by the cala- 
 mities of their neighbours, who have frequently 
 before this revolted, and been punished for it 
 by a total reduction : nor would they so far 
 acquiesce in present felicity, as not to hazard 
 the dangerons reverse of misery. Audacious 
 in regard to the future, presumptuous above 
 their strength, but below their intention, they 
 made war their choice, and in perferring vio- 
 lence to the just observance of duty have placed 
 their glory. For, though uninjured and un- 
 provoked, the first moment they saw a proba- 
 bility of prevailing, they seized it and rebelled. 
 
 " It is the usual effect of prosperity, especi- 
 ally when felt on a sudden, and beyond their 
 hope, to pufT up a people into insolence of man- 
 ners. The successes of mankind, when attain- 
 ed by the rational course, are generally of much 
 longer continuance than when they anticipate 
 pursuit. And in a word, men are much more 
 expert at x-epelling adversity than preserving 
 21 
 
 i 
 
 prosperity. By this ought we long ago to have 
 adjusted our conduct towards the Mityleneans, 
 never distinguishing them above others with 
 peculiar regard ; and then, they never would 
 have been that insolent people we have found 
 them now. For so remarkably perverse is the 
 temper of man, as ever to contemn whoever 
 courts him, and 'admire whoever will not bend 
 before him. 
 
 " Let condign punishments therefore be 
 awarded to their demerits. Let not the guilt 
 be avenged upon the heads of the few, and the 
 bulk of offenders escape unpunished. The 
 whole people to a man have rebelled against us, 
 when it was in their power to have been 
 sheltered here, and now again to be reinstated 
 in their former seats. But they judged the 
 danger would be lessened by the general con- 
 currence with the few, and so all revolted in 
 concert. 
 
 " Extend further your regards to the whole 
 body of your dependents ; for if you infiict the 
 same punishments on those who revolt by com- 
 pulsion of enemies, and who revolt on pure 
 deliberate malice, which of them, do you think, 
 will not seize the least pretext to throw off 
 your yoke ; when, if he succeeds, his liberty is 
 recovered, and, though he fails, the hurt is so 
 easy to be cured 1 Besides this, our lives and 
 fortunes will be endangered upon every single 
 attempt which shall be made. Suppose we 
 succeed, we only recover an exhausted ruinated 
 city, but shall for the future be deprived of the 
 revenue arising from it, the essence of our 
 strength : but if we cannot prevail, we shall 
 enlarge the number of enemies we already have , 
 and at a time when we ought to be employed 
 in resisting our present adversaries, we shall be 
 entangled in wars against our own dependents. 
 We ought not therefore to encourage the hope, 
 whether raised by the force of entreaty, or pur- 
 chased by the force of corruption, that their 
 errors are but the errors of men and shall 
 therefore be forgiven. The damage they have 
 done was not involuntary, but they have been 
 deliberate determined villains: forgiveness is 
 only for those who erred not by design. 
 
 " Moved by the ardency and zeal of my for- 
 mer plea, you made the decree ; and now I 
 earnestly conjure you, not to repent of your 
 own determinations, not to plunge yourselves 
 in inextricable difficulties, through pity, through 
 delight of hearing, and soft forbearance, the 
 three most prejudicial obstacles of power. It 
 o2 
 
106 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book ni. 
 
 is just to show pity to those who are its proper 
 objects, and not to men who would never have 
 felt compassion for us, nor to foes who of ne- 
 cessity must be implacable. The orators, those 
 delights of your ears, will hUve room in debates 
 of lesser moment to catch at your applause, but 
 should be silenced here, where they only can 
 give the public a short-lived pleasure, whilst 
 they embroil it with perplexities not easy to be 
 surmounted, and themselves alone, in requital 
 of speaking well, will be well rewarded for it. 
 Forbearance, further, may be shown to those 
 who are willing to be, and will for the future 
 prove themselves, our friends ; but not to such 
 inveterate souls as these, who,, if suffered to 
 live, will Jive only to wreak their malice against 
 you. 
 
 " I shall wave enlargements, and give you 
 only one short assurance, that if you hearken 
 to my admonitions, you will at the same time 
 do justice to the Mityleneans and service to 
 yourselves ; but if you resolve in any other 
 manner, you will receive no thaiiks from them, 
 and will establish the clearest evidence for your 
 own condemnation. For, if these men had 
 reason to revolt, it follows that you have ty- 
 rannically ruled them. Grant the injustice of 
 such a rule, but yet that you have presumed to 
 be guilty of it ; — why then, upon the mere 
 motive of interest, you ought now to chastise 
 them beyond what is right, or immediately to 
 forego your power, and dropping yourselves 
 down into impotent security, to set about the 
 practice of humanity and virtue. But adieu to 
 this vain expedient! and at once resolve to 
 make them feel that weight of misery they 
 designed for us. Convince them that those 
 who have escaped it can feel as strong resent- 
 ments as those who projected the fatal blow. 
 Determine now, by recollecting with yourselves 
 what kind of usage you would have received 
 from them, had they succeeded in their plots ; 
 they ! the uninjured, unprovoked aggressors. 
 It is an allowed truth, that men who without 
 the least provocation have recourse to acts of 
 malice, will be sated with nothing less than com- 
 plete destruction, as they must ever be terrified 
 at the sight of a surviving foe. For he who 
 suffers from a quarter whence he never deserv- 
 ed it, will not so easily lay down his resent- 
 ments, as when mutual enmity hath kindled 
 the' contention. Be not therefore traitoi's to 
 your ownselves. Figure to yourselves, as 
 strongly as you can, the miseries they designed 
 
 you ; remember how you wished for nothing 
 in this world so much as to have them in your 
 power, and now retaliate upon them. Kelent 
 not at the scene of horror imagination may 
 present to your fancy, but fix your remembrance 
 fast on that weight of misery which was just 
 now suspended over your own heads. Punish 
 these v^retches according to their deserts; 
 make them a notable example to the rest of 
 your dependents, that death must be the por- 
 tion of whoever dares revolt. For when once 
 they are certain of this, your arms will be no 
 more recalled from your foreign enemies, to be 
 employed in the chastisement of your own de- 
 pendents." 
 
 In this manner Cleon' supported the decree, 
 and when he had concluded, Diodotus the son 
 of Eucrates, who in- the former assembly had 
 most strenuously opposed the bloody sentence 
 against the Mityleneans, stood forth, and thus 
 replied :-^ 
 
 " I neither blame those who proposed the 
 resumption of the decree against Mitylene, noi 
 do I praise the men who inveigh against re. 
 peated consultations on points of the greatest 
 importance. But I lay it down for certain, 
 
 » From the short sketch of Cleon's character given 
 before by Thucydides, and the speech he hath now 
 made, it is likely he can be no favourite with the reader, 
 Cicero hath styled him "a turbulent but eloquent Athe- 
 nian.". By means of his eloquence, and an impudence 
 that never could be dashed, he was now a prime favour- 
 ite with the people, but the scorn and terror of all good 
 men at Athens. He had ever been a snarlcr at Pericles, 
 hut so long as he lived could obtain no share in the pub- 
 lic administration. He had now got the ascendant by 
 cajoling the people, and by his loud and daily invectives 
 against their ministers and commanders. He will make 
 a very splendid and very despicable figure in the sequel. 
 Aristophanes, who bad a particular grudge against him, 
 hath exhibited him in the most disgraceful light. His 
 comedy of the Horsemen or Knights is entirely employ- 
 ed to show him off. He calls him throughout the 'Paph- 
 lagonian,' to brand his low and brutal disposition, who, 
 *' quitting his original trade of selling leather, vile lea- 
 ther, since people rather swam than walked in the shoes 
 made of it, was now become the leading politician, the 
 scourge and pestof the republic." The chorus of the 
 play salutes him with the most villainous titles. And 
 an oracle is cooked up, which prophesieth that they 
 shall never get rid of Cleon, till he is overpowered by a 
 greater scoundrel than himself. A dealer in black-pud- 
 dings is at last procured to be his competitor. The con- 
 test is carried on with all the ribaldry and scurrility 
 that unbridled wit could forge for such characters, and 
 Cleon is at length defeated. This is the event upon the 
 stage, but was by no means so in the state of Athens 
 The wit of Aristophanes seldom hurt knaves and 
 scoundrels; it wounded and was niischiovous only to 
 the ablest ministers and the warmest patriots. 
 
VEAR v.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 107 
 
 that there are no two greater impediments of 
 sound mature counsel than precipitation and 
 anger ; of which, the one is closely connected 
 with madness, the other with raw inexperience 
 and short limitary judgment. 
 
 " It may indeed be warmly asserted, that 
 words are not the proper guides to action^. 
 But the author of such an assertion is either 
 wanting in discernment, or confines it only to 
 his own selfish views. He is wanting in dis- 
 cernment, if he imagines there is any other pos- 
 sible method of putting light into things that 
 are future or unseen ; or confines it only to 
 himself, if willing to recommend a scandalous 
 measure, and conscious he hath not eloquence 
 enough to support it openly, he launcheth out 
 into plausible calumnies, to intimidate his op- 
 ponents as well as his audience. 
 
 " But odious beyond all support is their pro- 
 cedure who prematurely condemn the advice 
 of others as purchased and corrupt. For would 
 they only acquiesce in the charge of ignorance, 
 the defeated opponent goes oflT with the bare 
 character of a man less enlightened indeed, 
 but quite as honest. If he be charged with 
 corruption, his point he may carry, but his 
 honesty will ever be suspected : and if his 
 point be lost, he must pass for knave and block- 
 head 'both. Such methods can never be con- 
 ducive to the public good. The men best 
 able to advise, are by this means intimidated : 
 though the public welfare would then be best 
 secured, if every person of so disingenuous a 
 temper was not able to open his mouth ; for 
 then, by his seducements, the public could 
 never be misled. But it is the duty of every 
 true patriot to despise the slanders of oppo- 
 nents, and on fair and impartial views to get his 
 own advice accepted. It is the duty of every 
 well-regulated public, not indeed to load a man 
 with honours for having given the best advice, 
 but, never to abridge him of his present por- 
 tion ; and if he cannot prevail, by no means to 
 disgrace, much less to punish him : for then, 
 neither would the successful debater, from a 
 view of enhancing his own personal honours, 
 ever speak against conscience, or aim merely 
 at applause ; nor would he, who hath been un- 
 successful in his motions, be greedy of propos- 
 ing whatever may cajole, and so earn popularity 
 for himself. But the method in vogue with us 
 is the reverse of this ; and what is worse, if a 
 person be suspected of corruption, though he 
 advise the most prudent expfedienfs, yet the 
 
 odium raised against him upon the weak sug- 
 gestion of lucre, quite weighs him down, and 
 we are deprived of the manifest service he could 
 do to the state. Nay,- such is our method, 
 that even the best advice, if readily offered, can 
 escape suspicion no more than the worst. And 
 hence it is necessarily incumbent, as well upon 
 him who would persuade the public into the 
 most "prejudicial measures, to seduce the peo- 
 ple with art ; as upon him who would advise 
 the best, to disguise the truth in order to pre- 
 vail. Amidst these jugglings, the public alone 
 is debarred the service of its most able counsel- 
 lors,' since in a plain and open method they can- 
 not possibly act, and artifice must clear the 
 way before them. For the man who openly 
 bestows any benefit upon it, is constantly sus- 
 pected of doing underhand a greater to himself. 
 
 " When affairs therefore of so high concern 
 are before you, when the general temper is so 
 over-run with jealousy, we, who presume to 
 advise, must enlarge ou/ prospect farther than 
 yttu, who only assist at a transient consulta- 
 tion ; because we are accountable for what we 
 propose, and you are not accountable for the 
 prejudices with which you hear. For if not 
 only he whd proposed, but he who complied, 
 were equally answerable for events, your deter- 
 minations would be better framed than they 
 are at present. But now, hurried along as you 
 are by your hasty resentments on any sinister 
 event, you wreak your fury only upon the single 
 opinion of the person who advised, and not 
 upon your own joint opinions, by concurrence 
 of which the miscarriage was incurred. 
 
 " For my part, I neither stand up to deny 
 certain facts in favour of the Mityleneans, nor 
 to waste the time in fruitless accusations. 'We 
 are not debating now what wrongs they have 
 done us, since that would be a reproach to 
 sense ; but what determination about them is 
 best. For, though I can prove, beyond a scru- 
 ple, that they have injured us in the most out- 
 rageous manner, yet I shall not for that reason 
 advise you to butcher them, unless it be expe- 
 dient ; nor, were they objects of forgiveness, 
 should I advise forgiveness, unless I judged it 
 for the interest of the public. I appreliend, 
 that our consultations turn more upon a future 
 than a present view. And Cleon here most 
 confidently asserts, that the surest expedient 
 of your future welfare is, to prevent all other 
 revolts by inflicting death in doom of this ; but, 
 equally confident of the just expedient of future 
 
108 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book III. 
 
 security, I declare quite on the other side. 
 And I entreat you, by no means to reject the 
 real advantage of mine for the specious colour- 
 ings of his advice. Strict justice, I grant, may 
 be with him ; and, enraged as you are against 
 the Mityleneans, may have a sudden influence 
 upon you. But we meet not here in judgment 
 upon them, and justly to decide is not now our 
 employment; we are only to consult haw to 
 dispose of them best for our own advantage. 
 
 " In the public communities of meii, death 
 is the penalty awarded to several crimes, to 
 such as are not enormous like this, but of a less 
 guilty nature. Yet puffed up with hope, men 
 run all hazards, and no one ever yet hath boldly 
 incurred the danger, if self-convinced before- 
 hand, that he could not survive the attempt. 
 Where was the city so bent on revolt, that, 
 when its own domestic strength, or the aid of 
 others, were judged unequal to the work, durst 
 ever attempt it 1 The whole of mankind, whe- 
 ther individuals or communities, are by nature 
 liable to sin : and a law of infallible prevention 
 will never be enacted. Men by repeated trials 
 have enforced all kinds of punishment, attentive, 
 if possible, to restrain the outrages of the wick- 
 ed. And in the early age it is probable, that 
 milder j)enalties were assigned for the most 
 enormous wrongs; but, being found by expe- 
 rience ineffectual, they were afterwards extend- 
 ed generally to loss of life : this however is not 
 yet effective. Some terror therefore must be 
 invented, even more alarming than this, or this 
 will never sufliciently restrain. But then there 
 is a poverty which renders necessity daring ; 
 there is a power which renders pride and inso- 
 lence rapacious. There are other contingen- 
 cies, which, in the fervour of passions, as every 
 human mind is possessed by some too stubborn 
 to admit a cure, drive them on boldly to con- 
 front extremities. But the greatest incentives 
 of all are hope and love : this points out a path, 
 and that moves along according to direction : 
 this thoughtlessly proposeth the scheme, and 
 that immediately suggesteth a certainty of suc- 
 cess. These are the sources of all our evils ; 
 and these invisible principles within us are too 
 strong for all the terrors that are seen without. 
 To these add fortune, who contributes her am- 
 ple share to divest the mind of its balance. 
 She shows herself by unexpected starts, and 
 encourageth even the incompetent to venture 
 dangers, and hath a greater influence over com- 
 munities, as the ends proposed by them are 
 
 of the greatest concern, such as liberty or do- 
 minion, where every individual, amidst the uni- 
 versal ardour, unaccountably plumes himself up, 
 and acts with a spirit above himself. But in 
 truth, it is quite impossible ; it is a proof of 
 egregious folly to imagine, when human nature 
 is impelled by its own impetuous passions to- 
 wards such objects, that the force of laws or 
 any intervening terror is strong enough to, di- 
 vert them from the mark. Hence therefore 
 ariseth the strongest dissuasive to us from con- 
 fiding in the penalty of death as the only pledge 
 of our future safety, which must betray us into 
 weak prejudicial measures, which must drive 
 all revellers into utter despair, by showing them 
 plainly, that we shall never accept repentance, 
 shall not give them one moment's indulgence 
 to palliate their offences. 
 
 " Consider with yourselves, in the merciful 
 light, that a revolted city, when for certainty 
 assured that it cannot hold out, may submit 
 upon our own conditions, whilst yet in a ca- 
 pacity to reimburse our expenses, and to ad- 
 vance the future tribute. But in the opposite 
 case, can you imagine there is any city which 
 will not better prepare itself for revolt than 
 Mitylene hath done, and hold out a siege to 
 the last extremity t Is there no difference be- 
 tween a quick and a slow submission 1 Shall 
 not we be hurt, if forced through their despair 
 to continue a tedious and expensive siege ; and, 
 when the place is taken, to be masters only of 
 one heap of desolation, unable for the future 
 to squeeze the least pittance or revenue from 
 it 1 It is revenue alone which renders us a 
 terror to our foes. We ought not therefore 
 with the rigour of judges to inflict the exactest 
 punishments upon these offenders. We ought 
 rather to provide for futurity, and by moderate 
 correction still to preserve those cities in a full 
 capacity of paying us the needful tribute. To 
 keep men firm in their duty, we should scorn 
 the expedient of severe and sanguinary laws, 
 since mild discretionary caution would better 
 answer the purpose. This prudent conduct we 
 are now reversing, if, when re-possessed of a 
 city stripped of its former liberty and ruled with 
 violence, sufficient motives of evolt, that it 
 may again becomeindependent; if now we judge, 
 that this ought to be avenged with a weight of 
 severity. Men who have known what liberty 
 is, ought not to be too severely chastised, if they 
 have dared to revolt ; but we ought to observe 
 them with timely vigilance before they revolt, 
 
V31A.R v.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 109 
 
 to prevent their taking the least step towards 
 it or even once entertaining a thought about it; 
 at least, when we have quelled the insurrection, 
 the guilt should be fastened upon as few as 
 possible. 
 
 " Consider, I beseech you, with yourselves, 
 how greatly you will err in this, and in another 
 respect, if Cleon's advice be approved. For 
 now, the populace of all the cities are gene- 
 rally well-afifected towards us. They either re- 
 fuse to concur with the few in their revolts ; 
 or, if their concurrence be forced, they instant- 
 ly turn enemies to those who forced them ; — 
 and you proceed to determine the contest, as- 
 sured that the populace of the adverse city 
 will be active in your favour. But if you doom 
 to general excision the people of Mitylene, 
 those who had no share in the revolt — who, 
 when once they had got arms into their hands, 
 spontaneously delivered up the place; — you 
 will be guilty, first, of base ingratitude, for mur- 
 dering your own benefactors, — and you will, 
 next, establish such a precedent, as the factious 
 great above all things wish to see. For then, 
 whenever the latter effect the revolt of cities, 
 they will instantly have the people attached to 
 their party ; since you yourselves have enforced 
 the precedent, that punishment must fall upon 
 the heads, not only of the guilty, but even of 
 the innocent. Whereas, indeed, though they 
 had been guilty, we ought to have dissembled 
 our knowledge of it, that we might not force 
 the only party which ever takes our side into 
 utter enmity and aversion. And I esteem it 
 much more conducive to the firm support of 
 empire, rather to connive at the wrongs we may 
 have felt, than in all the severity of justice to 
 destroy those persons whom in interest we 
 ought to spare. And thus, that union of jus- 
 tice to others and duty to yourselves in this in- 
 stance of punishing the Mityleneans, as alleged 
 by Cleon, is plainly found to be grossly incon- 
 sistent, to be utterly impossible. 
 
 " Own yourselves therefore convinced, that 
 the greatest advantages will result from the 
 conduct which I have recommended; and, 
 without giving too wide a scope to mercy or 
 forbearance, by which I could never suffer you 
 to be seduced, follow my advice, and in pur- 
 suance of it resolve — ' To judge and condemn, 
 at your own discretion, those guilty Mitylene- 
 ans whom Paches hath sent hither to attend 
 your decisions, and to let the others continue as 
 Ihcy are.' These are expedients of your fu- 
 
 ture welfare, and of immediate terror to your 
 foes. For they who can form the soundest de- 
 liberations, stand stronger up against hostile op- 
 position, than the men who rush to action with 
 indiscreet unpremeditating strength." 
 
 Diodotus ended here. And when these two 
 opinions, diametrically opposite to one another, 
 had been thus delivered, the Athenians fiad a 
 stiff contest in support of each, and upon hold- 
 ing up of hands there seemed near an equality ; 
 but the majority proved at last to be along with 
 Diodotus. 
 
 Upon this they immediately sent away an- 
 other trireme, enjoining all possible despatch, 
 lest this second, not coming in time, might 
 find the city already destroyed, as the other had 
 got the start of a day and a night. The Mity- 
 lenean ambassadors amply furnished them with 
 wine and barley-cakes and promised them 
 great rewards if they arrived in time. By 
 this means they were so eager to accelerate the 
 passage, that even whilst plying the oar they 
 eat their cakes dipped in wine and oil ; and 
 whilst one half of the number refreshed them- 
 selves with sleep, the others kept rowing amain. 
 So fortunate were they that not one adverse 
 blast retarded their course. The former vessel, 
 as sent on a monstrous errand, had not hasten- 
 ed its passage in the least ; and the latter was 
 most intently bent on expedition. That indeed 
 got before to Mitylene, but only long enough 
 for Paches to read over the decree, and give or- 
 ders for its immediate execution. At that crisis 
 the latter arriveth, and prevented the massacre. 
 To such an extremity of danger was Mitylene 
 reduced. 
 
 The other Mityleneans, whom Paches had 
 sent to Athens as deepest concerned in the re- 
 volt,' were there put to death, according to the 
 advice of Cleon. And the number of these 
 amounted to somewhat above a thousand. 
 
 The Athenians, further, demolished the walls 
 of Mitylene and took away their shipping, 
 They did not for the future enjoin an annual 
 tribute upon the Lesbians, but dividing the 
 
 * We hear no more in this Iiistory of Paches, whu 
 certainly in the reduction of Lesbos had done a great 
 service to his conntry, and liad behaved through tile 
 whole affair with great discretion and humanity. And 
 yet Plutarch tells us in two passages, (in the lives of 
 Aristides and Nicias) that at his return he was called 
 to account for Jiis conduct during his command, and 
 finding he was going to he condemned, his resentment 
 and indignation rose so high that he instantly slew him- 
 self in court. 
 
110 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book hi. 
 
 whole island into shares (except what belonged 
 to Methymne), three thousand in the whole, 
 they set apart three hundred of these as sacred 
 to the gods, and sent some of their own people, 
 who were appointed by lot, to take possession 
 of the rest, as full proprietors. The Lesbians, 
 as tenants of these, were obliged to pay them 
 two minse' yearly for every share, in considera- 
 tion of which they had still the use of the soil. 
 The Athenians also took from them several 
 towns upon the continent, which had belonged 
 to the Mityleneans, and which continued after- 
 wards in subjection to the Athenians. Thus 
 ended the commotions of Lesbos. 
 
 The same summer after the reduction of 
 Lesbos — the Athenians, commanded' by Nicias^ 
 the son of Niceratus, executed a design upon 
 
 1 £e 9s. Hd. sterling. 
 
 a Niciasis now forlhe first time in the chief command, 
 who Is to act parts of very great importance in the se- 
 quel of the war. We should therefore taUe some notice 
 of him on his first appearance. Plutarch, who hath 
 wrote his life, gives light into several circumstances, 
 which fall not within the cognizance of a general his- 
 torian. He was born of a noble family in Athens, and 
 was oneof the most wealthy citizens. Besides his estates, 
 he had a large annual income from the silver mines at 
 Laurium. Not that those mines belonged to him, as 
 one would infer from Plutarch; for they were the patri- 
 mony of the state, annexed to it by Themistocles for 
 the support of the navy: but, as Xenophon relates in 
 his treatise of revenue, Nicins had a thousand slaves 
 constantly employed in working these mines. He hired 
 tliem out to Sosias the Thracian, who was undertaker 
 of the work, on condition to receive a clear obole a-day 
 for every one of them; and he always kept up the num- 
 her. plis income from hence wastherefore near jCSOOO 
 sterling a-year. He acted under Pericles so long as he 
 lived, and after his death, was set up by the more so- 
 ber and sensible Athenians as a balance to Cleon. who 
 was the idol of the people. Nicias was a true lover of 
 his country, of unblemislied integrity, and very gentle 
 and complacent in his manners. His good qualities 
 were numerous and shining; his foibles were, a great 
 diffidence of himself, and a dread of the people, which 
 made him court them by laying out his wealth in public 
 games and shows for tlteir entertainment. He had an 
 inward fund of real piety: but was superstitiously at- 
 tached to the ceremonial ufthe religion of hiscountry. 
 His great wealth drew agreat number of followersarid 
 parasites about him; and his benevolent disposition was 
 always seeking occasions of doing good. In short, says 
 Plutarch, " bad men had a suie fund in his piisillani- 
 inity, and good men in his humanity." -Nobody couid 
 cither hate or fear him at Athens, and therefore his in- 
 terest there was great. He was always cautious, and 
 always diffident, and under such an awe of the people 
 in the general assemblies, that they would shout out to 
 him by way of encouragement, as his modesty was ami- 
 able and engaging when opposed to the impudence of 
 Cleon. — Thus much may suffice at present, since his. 
 military expeditions and the whole of his political con- 
 duct will be related by Thucydides. 
 
 Minoa, the island which lies before Megara. 
 The Megareans, having built u fort upon it, 
 used it as a garrison. But it was the scheme 
 of Nicias, to fix the post of observation for the 
 Athenians there, as being much nearer situated, 
 and to remove it from Budorus and Salamis. 
 This would prevent the sudden courses of the 
 Peloponnesians, frequent from thence ; would 
 curb the piratical cruises ; and, at the same 
 time, stop all importations into Megara. Be- 
 ginning therefore with the two forts detached 
 from Nisffia, he took them by means of the 
 engines he played against them from the sea ; 
 and having thus opened the channel between 
 them and the island, he took in by a wall of 
 fortification that part of the mainland from 
 whence, only by crossing the morass and the 
 help of a bridge, a succour could be thrown 
 into the island, which lay at a very small dis- 
 tance from the continent. This work was 
 completed in a few days, after which Nicias, 
 leaving behind in the island a sufficient garrison 
 to defend the works, drew off the rest of his 
 army. 
 
 About the same time this summer, the Pla- 
 tseans, whose provisions were quite spent, and 
 who could not possibly hold out any longer, 
 were brought to a surrender in the following 
 manner. The enemy made an assault upon 
 their wall, which they had not sufficient strength 
 to repel. The Lacedaemonian general being 
 thus convinced of their languid condition, was 
 determined not to take the place by storm. In 
 this he acted pursuant to orders sent him from 
 Lacedaemon, with a view that whenever a peace 
 should be concluded with the Lacedaemonians, 
 one certain condition of which must be recipro- 
 cally to restore the places taken in the war, 
 PlatiEa might not be included in the restitution, 
 as having freely and without compulsion gone 
 over to them. A herald is accordingly des- 
 patched with this demand — " Whether they are 
 willing voluntarily to give up the city to the 
 Lacedaemonians, and accept them for their 
 judges who would punish only the guilty, and 
 contrary to forms of justice not even one of 
 those." — The herald made this demand aloud. 
 And the Plataeans, who were now reduced to 
 excessive weakness, delivered up the city. 
 
 The Peloponnesians supplied the Platscans 
 with necessary sustenance for the space of a 
 few days, till the five delegates arrived from 
 Lacedaemon to preside at their trial. And yet, 
 when these were actually come, no judicial 
 
YEAR v.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 Ill 
 
 process was formed against them. They only- 
 called them out, and put this short question to 
 them — " Whether they had done any service to 
 the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the pre- 
 sent war 1" — Their answer was, "That they 
 begged permission to urge their plea at large ;" 
 which being granted, they pitched upon Asty- 
 machas the son of Asopalaus, and Laco the 
 son of Aeimnestus, who had formerly enjoyed 
 the public hospitaUty of the Lacedaemonians, 
 to be their speakers, who stood forth and plead- 
 ed thus : 
 
 " Placing in you, LacedaBmonians, an en- 
 tire confidence, we have delivered up our city ; 
 but never imagined we should be forced to such 
 a process as this, when we expected only to be 
 tried by justice and laws — when we yielded to 
 plead, not before other judges as is now our 
 fate, but only before yourselves. Then indeed 
 we thought that justice might be obtained. — 
 But now we have terrible grounds for appre- 
 hending, that we Jiave at once been doubly 
 overreached. Strong motives occur to alarm 
 our suspicions, that the point most in view is 
 to deprive us of our lives, and that you will 
 not prove impartial judges. We cannot but be 
 too certain of this, when no manner of crime 
 is formally objected, against which we might 
 form our defence ; when barely at our own en- 
 treaty we are heard, and your concise demand 
 is such, that if we answer it with truth we con- 
 demn ourselves ; if with falsehood, must be in- 
 stantly refuted. 
 
 " Thus on all sides beset with perplexities, 
 something of necessity must be said in our own 
 behalf;' nay, where the danger is so urgent, 
 the only small glimpse of security appears in 
 hazarding a plea. For persons like us distress- 
 ed, in silence to abandon their own defence — 
 this may with sad compunction torture them 
 at last, as if their safety might have been earn- 
 ed by speaking for themselves — though never 
 was persuasion so much to be despaired of as 
 at present. Were we indeed, who are the per- 
 secuted party, entirely unknown to our judges, 
 we might then allege such evidence as through 
 ignorance you could not overturn, and so fur- 
 ther our defence. But now we must speak be- 
 fore men who are informed of every point. 
 Nor do our fears result from the prior know- 
 ledge you have had of us, as if you were now 
 proceeding against us for having in valour been 
 inferior to yourselves ; but from our own sad 
 forebodings, that we are cited to a tribunal 
 
 which hath already condemned us to gratify 
 others. Yet, what we can justly say for our- 
 selves in regard to all our differences with the 
 Thebans, we shall boldly allege ; the good ser- 
 vices we have done to you and the rest of 
 Greece we shall fairly recite — and strive, if 
 possible, to persuade. 
 
 " To your concise demand — Whether we 
 have done any good service in this war to the 
 Lacedaemonians and their allies 1 — we answer 
 thus : If you interrogate us as enemies, though 
 we have done you no good, yet we have done 
 you no harm ; if you regard us as friends, you 
 have offended more than we, in making war up- 
 on us. — In regard to the peace and against the 
 Mede, we have ever honestly performed our 
 duty : the peace was not violated first by us 
 against him ; we alone of all the Boeotians at- 
 tended you in the field to maintain the liberty 
 of Greece. For, though an inland people, we 
 boldly engaged in the sea-fight at Artemisium ; 
 and in the battle fought upon this our native 
 ground, we assisted you and Pausanias ; and 
 whatever the danger to which Greece, in that 
 troublesome period of time, was exposed, in 
 all we bore a share beyond our strength. To 
 you in particular, ye Lacedaemonians, in that 
 greatest consternation Sparta ever felt, when 
 after the earthquake your rebellious Helots had 
 seized upon Ithome, we immediately despatch- 
 ed the third part of our force for succour. 
 These things you are bound in honour never 
 to forget. For thus upon former, and those 
 most critical occasions, we with honour showed 
 ourselves your friends. — But at length we be- 
 came your enemies ! — For that blame only 
 yourselves: because when we stood in great 
 want of support against the violence and op- 
 pression of the Thebans, to you we applied, 
 and by you were rejected. You commanded 
 us then to address ourselves to Athens. Athens, 
 you said, was near, but Sparta lay too remote 
 to serve us. Yet, notwithstanding this, in the 
 present war we have committed no one disho- 
 norable act in regard to you, nor should ever 
 have committed. You enjoined us indeed to 
 revolt from the Athenians, and we refused to 
 comply ; but in this we have done no injustice. 
 For they marched cheerfully to our" succoui 
 against the Thebans, when you shrunk back : 
 and to betray them afterwards had been base m 
 us ; in us, who were highly indebted to them, 
 who at our own request were received into then 
 friendship, and honoured by them with the 
 
112 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book III. 
 
 freedom of Athens. No, it was rather our 
 duty boldly to advance wherever they pleased 
 to order. And whenever either you or the 
 Athenians lead out your allies into the field, 
 not such as merely follow you are to be censur- 
 ed for any wrong you may respectively com- 
 mit, but those who lead them out to its copi- 
 mission. 
 
 " Manifold and notorious are the instances 
 in which the Thebans have injured us. But 
 outrageous above all is the last, about which 
 you need no information, since by it we are 
 plunged into this depth of distress. A right 
 undoubtedly we had to turn our avenging arms 
 upon men, who, in the midst of peace, and what 
 is more, upon the sacred monthly solemnity, 
 feloniously seized upon our city. We obeyed 
 herein, that great universal law, which justifieth 
 self-defence against a hostile invader ; and 
 therefore cannot with any appearance of equity, 
 be now doomed to punishment at their own in- 
 stigation. For, if your own immediate inter- 
 est, and their present concurrence with you in 
 war, is to prescribe and regulate your sentence, 
 you will show yourselves by no means fair 
 judges of equity, but partially attached to pri- 
 vate interest. What though these incendiaries 
 seem now a people well worth your gaining 1 
 there was a season, a most dangerous and criti- 
 cal season, when you yourselves, and the other 
 Grecians, were in different sentiments. Now 
 indeed, incited by ambition, you aim the fatal 
 blow at others ; but at that season, when the 
 Barbarian struck at enslaving us all, these 
 Thebans were then the Barbarian's coadjutors. 
 And equitable certainly it is, that our alacrity at 
 that season should be set in the balance against 
 our present transgressions, if transgressors at 
 present we have been. You then would find 
 our greater merits quite outweighing our petty 
 offences ; and our merits to be dated at a time 
 when it was exceeding rare to see Grecian 
 bravery ranged in opposition to the power of 
 Xerxes ; when praise was ascribed, not to those 
 who, intent on self-preservation, dropped all 
 the means of withstanding his invasion, but 
 who chose, through a series of danger, coura- 
 geously to execute the most glorious acts. Of 
 this number are we, and as such have been, 
 pie-eminently, most honourably distinguished. 
 And yet, from this original we fear our ruin 
 now may have taken its rise, as we chose to 
 follow the Athenians from a regard to justice, 
 rather than you from the views of interest. 
 
 But so long as the nature of things continues 
 to be the same, you also ought to convince the 
 world, that your sentiments about them are not 
 changed, that your principles still suggest it to 
 you as your greatest interest, that whenever your 
 gallant compatriots have laid upon you an obli- 
 gation strong enough to be eternally in force, 
 something on every present occurrence should 
 be done for us by way of just acknowledg- 
 ment. 
 
 " Reflect further within yourselves, that you 
 are now distinguished by the body of Greece 
 as examples for upright disinterested conduct. 
 Should you therefore determine in regard to 
 us what in justice cannot be supported — for 
 the eyes of the world are now intent on your 
 proceedings, and as judges applauded for their 
 worth you sit upon us whose reputation is 
 yet unblemished: take care that you do not 
 incur the general abhorrence, by an indecent 
 sentence against valuable men, though you 
 yourselves are more to be, valued; nor repo- 
 site in her common temples those spoils you 
 have taken from us the benefactors of Greece. 
 How horribly will it seem for Plata:a to be 
 destroyed by Lacedaemonians ; that your fa- 
 thers inscribed the city upon the tripod of 
 Delphos in justice to its merit, and that you 
 expunged its very being from the commu- 
 nity of Greece to gratify the Thebans ! To 
 such excess of misery have we been ever ex- 
 posed, that if the Medes had prevailed we must 
 have been utterly undone ; and now must be 
 completely ruined by the Thebans, in the pre- 
 sence of you who were formerly our most corr 
 dial friends ! Two of the sharpest, most pain- 
 ful trials we are to undergo, who but lately, 
 had we not surrendered our city, must have 
 gradually perished by famine ; and now stand 
 before a tribunal to be sentenced to death. 
 Wretched Plataeans, by all mankind abandon- 
 ed ! We, who beyond our strength were once 
 the supports of Greece, are now quite desti- 
 tute, bereft of all redress ! Not one of our old 
 allies to appear in our behalf; and even you, 
 ye Lacedaemonians, you our only hope, as we 
 have too much reason to apprehend, determined 
 to give us up. 
 
 " But, by the gods, who witnessed once the 
 social oaths we mutually exchanged ! by that 
 virtue we exerted for the general welfare of 
 Greece ! by those we adjure you to be moved 
 with compassion, and to relent, if with the 
 Thebans you are combined against us ! Id 
 
YEAR v.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 113 
 
 gratitude to us, beg the favour of them, that 
 they would not butcher whom you ought to 
 spare; demand such a modest requital from 
 them for your base concurrence, and entail not 
 infamy upon yourselves, to give others a ' cruel 
 satisfaction. To take away our lives will be 
 a short and easy task ; but then, to efface the 
 infamy of it, will be a work of toil. You have 
 no colour to wreak your vengeance upon us as 
 enemies, who have ever wished you well, and 
 bore arms against you in mere self-defence. 
 Your decisions can in no wise be righteous, 
 unless you exempt us from the dread of death. 
 Recollect in time, that you received us by free 
 surrender, that to you we held forth our hands ; 
 the law forbids Grecians to put such to death ; 
 and that we have been from time immemorial 
 benefactors to you. For cast your eyes there 
 upon the sepulchres of your fathers, who fell 
 by the swords of the Medes, and were interred 
 in this our earth: these we have annually ho- 
 noured with vestments, and all solemn decora- 
 tions at our public expense. Whatever hath 
 been the produce of our soil, to them we have 
 ever offered the first-fruits of the whole ; as 
 friends, out of earth that was dear to them ; as 
 companions, to those who once fought together 
 in the same field ; and, lest all this by a wrong 
 determination you instantly disannul, mature- 
 ly reflect. For Pausanias interred them here, 
 judging he had laid them in a friendly soil, and 
 in the care of men with friendly dispositions. 
 If therefore you put us to death, and turn this 
 Plataean into Theban soil, what is this but to 
 leave your fathers and relations in a hostile 
 land, and in the power of those who murdered 
 them, never again to receive the sepulchral ho- 
 noursl Will you further enslave the spot 
 on which the Grecians earned their libertyl 
 Will you lay desolate the temples of those 
 gods to whom they addressed their vows before 
 that battle against the Medes, and so were vic- 
 toriousl And, will you abolish the solemn 
 sacrifices, which those gallant patriots have 
 founded and anointed? 
 
 " It cannot, Lacedeemonians, be consistent 
 with your glory, to violate the solemn institu- 
 tions of Greece, the memory of your own fore- 
 fathers, arid your duty to us yovir benefactors, 
 thus, merely to gratify the malice of a hostile 
 party, to put men to death who have never 
 wronged you. No ; but — to spare, to relent, 
 to feel the just emotions of compassion, to re- 
 call (he idea not only what miseries we are de- 
 33 
 
 signed to suffer, but what persons they are for 
 whom they are designed; and to remember the 
 uncertain attack of calamity; upon whom, and 
 how, undeservedly, it may fall ! To you, as in 
 honour and necessity too obhged we address 
 our entreaties ; invoking aloud the gods whom 
 Greece at her common altars and with joint 
 devotion adores, — to accept our plea : alleging 
 those oaths which your fathers have sworn, — 
 to pay them reverence. We are suppliants now 
 at the sepulchres of your fathprs, we call upon 
 the dead reposited there, to be saved from The- 
 bans, that the kindest of friends, as we have 
 been, may not be sacrificed to the most deadly 
 foes. Again, we recall to memory that day, in 
 which having performed the most splendid 
 achievements in company with them, we are 
 yet this day in danger of the most deplorable 
 fate. Conclude we must — though it is hard 
 for men in our distress to conclude ; when the 
 very moment their words are ended, their very 
 lives are most imminently endangered : yet still 
 we insist that we surrendered not our city to 
 the Thebans, rather than that we should have 
 chose the most miserable end by famine ; but 
 confiding in you, into your hands we gave it. 
 And highly fitting it is, that if we cannot pre- 
 vail, you should reinstate us in it, and leave us 
 there at our own option to take our fate. But 
 once more we conjure you, that we, who are 
 citizens of Platsea, who have showed ourselves 
 the most steady patriots of Greece, and now, 
 O Lacedaemonians, your suppliants, — may not 
 be turned over, out of your hands, out of your 
 protection, to the Thebans, our unrelenting 
 enemies ; — that you would become our saviours, 
 and not doom to utter destruction the men to 
 whom all Greece is indebted for her freedom." 
 
 In this manner the Plata:ans spoke ; and the 
 Thebans, fearing lest their words might work 
 so far upon the Lacedaemonians as to cause 
 them to relent, stood forth, and declared a de- 
 sire to be also heard; " since the PlatEeans, as 
 they conceived, had been indulged in a much 
 longer discourse, than was requisite to answei 
 the question." Leave accordingly was given, 
 and they proceeded thus : 
 
 " We should not have requested your atten- 
 tion to any thing we had to ofier, if these Platse- 
 ans had replied in brief to the question, and had 
 not run out into slander and invective against 
 us ; — if they had not defended themselves in 
 points quite foreign to the purpose, and not at 
 all charged against them as crimes; and launched 
 P 
 
114 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book III 
 
 forth into their own praise, uncensured and 
 unprovoked. But now it is incumbent upon 
 us, in some points to contradict and in 
 some to refute, to prevent the bad effects which 
 might result, either from the criminations ut- 
 tered against us, or the pompous praise they 
 have bestowed upon themselves ; that you, un- 
 der proper information with whom the greater 
 truth remains, may fairly decide between us, 
 
 " Our enmity against them we openly avow, 
 as it proceeded from just and hojiourable mo- 
 tives ; since to us, who were the founders of 
 PlatEea, after we had gained possession of 
 Bosotia and of other towns as well as Plataa, 
 ■which, after being purged from extraneous mix- 
 tures, remained in our jurisdiction, — these men 
 disdained to pay submission, and scorned origin- 
 al and fundamental laws. They wilfully divi- 
 ded from the other Boeotians, transgressing the 
 laws of their country, and, when likely to be 
 forced back into their duty, they went over to 
 the Athenians, and in concert with them accu- 
 mulated wrongs upon us, which have since been 
 justly retaliated upon them. 
 
 " But, when the Barbarian invaded Greece, 
 they were the only Boeotians who did not join 
 the Mede. — This they allege, and henc^ they 
 arrogate applause to themselves, and lavish 
 their calumnies upon us. We grant indeed 
 they did not join the Mede ; and the reason 
 was, because the Athenians did not join him. 
 Yet afterwards, when with the same all-grasp- 
 ing ambition the Athenians invaded Greece, 
 they were the only Boeotians then who joined 
 those Athenians. But consider further the re- 
 spective situation from which such conduct 
 ensued in both. Our city at that time was not 
 administered by the few who presided with an 
 equal and steady rule, nor directed by the gene- 
 ral voice of the people. Its state was such, as 
 with laws and policy is quite incompatible ; it 
 bordered close upon a tyranny : the encroach- 
 ing ambition of a handful of men held fast pos- 
 session of it. These, with no other view than 
 the strong establishment of their own private 
 authority in the success of the Mede, by force 
 overawed the people^ and opened their gates 
 to the invader. This was not the act of a 
 whole city, of a city master of its own conduct ; 
 nor ought she to be reproached for offences 
 committed in despite of her laws. But on the 
 other hand, when the Mede was once repulsed 
 and the city repossessed of her ancient polity, 
 you ought then to consider — fresh invasions 
 
 being formed by the Athenians, projects, at* 
 tempted to bring the rest of Greece and oiu 
 dominions also into their subjection, sedition 
 fomented amongst us, by favour of which they 
 seized the greater part — Whether in the field of 
 Coronea we fought them and prevailed, recover- 
 ed the liberty of Bceotia, proceed even now 
 with all alacrity to regain their liberty for others, 
 supplying them with horse and all other mili- 
 tary provision, far beyond any other confeder- 
 ate. Such is the apology we make for all the 
 charge against us in having joined the Mede. 
 But — that you have been the most outrageous 
 foes to Greece, and are most deserving of what- 
 ever punishment can be inflicted upon you, we 
 shall next endeavour to demonstrate. 
 
 " In order to procure some revenge on us, it 
 is your own plea, ' you became confederates and 
 citizens of Athens.' — Be it so. You ought 
 then to have marched in their company only 
 against us ; you ought not to have followed 
 them in their expeditions against others. Had 
 your own wills been averse to attend them on 
 these occasions, it was always in your power 
 to have recourse to that Lacedaemonian league, 
 in which you concurred against the Mede, and 
 about which you make at present the greatest 
 parade. That would have been amply suflacient 
 to turn aside our enmity from you; and, what 
 is above all, had securely enabled you to ftctify 
 your measures. But it was not against youi 
 will, neither was it upon compulsion, that you 
 have solely adhered to the Athenians. 
 
 " But, then you rejoin — ' It was base to be- 
 tray your benefactors.' — Yet it was much more 
 base and more enormous to betray at once the 
 whole body of Grecians, with whom you had 
 sworn a mutual defence, than the single Atheni- 
 ans : the Athenians truly have enslaved your 
 country ; and the others would regain its free- 
 dom. You have not made your benefactors 
 the requital, which gratitude enjoined, or which 
 is exempted from reproach. — ' Injured and op- 
 pressed, you applied,' it is pretended, ' to 
 them for redress ;' — and then you co-operat- 
 ed with them in oppressing others. But it 
 is not more dishonourable to be wanting in 
 any act of gratitude, how justly soever it 
 may be due, than to make the return in a 
 manner in itself unjust. You yourselves by 
 acting thus have afforded undeniable proofs, 
 that you alone did not join the Mede from a 
 zeal for the Grecians, but merely because the 
 Athenians did not join him. You were desLr- 
 
STEAK v.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 115 
 
 ous to act. in concert with the latter, but in I 
 opposition .to the former; and now modestly 
 claim to be recompensed by your country, for 
 all the iniquitous services you have done to a 
 party. But justice will never suffer this. To 
 Athenians you gave the preference, strive 
 therefore from them to obtain redress. Cease 
 vainly to allege the mutual oaths you once ex- 
 changed, as if they were obliged at present to 
 preserve you : — you renounced, you violated 
 first those oaths, who rather concurred to en- 
 slave the jEginetie and some other people of the 
 same association,^ than endeavoured to prevent 
 it ; and all without compulsion ; still happy in 
 the uninterrupted possession of your own rights, 
 and not compelled to receive law from others, 
 as was our fate. Nay, to the very last moment, 
 before this blockade was formed against you, 
 when we calmly invited you to be quiet and 
 neutral, you insolently refused. Which there- 
 fore is the people, on whom all Greece may 
 fasten her hatred more deservedly than on you, 
 who have made it a point to exert your bravery 
 in ruining your country? Those former good 
 dispositions you have so largely boasted, you 
 have now shown plainly to be repugnant to 
 your genius. What your natural turn hath 
 ever been, the event hath with truth ascertain- 
 ed. The Athenians took the road of violence, 
 and you attended them through all the journey. 
 — And thus, ample proof hath been exhibited 
 by us, that against our wills, we served the 
 Persian, and that you with most cheerful dis- 
 position have promoted the Athenian tyranny. 
 " But in regard to your finishing charge 
 against us as guilty of excessive outrage and 
 injustice : — that, contrary to every law, in the 
 midst of peace, on a day of sacred solemnity, 
 we seized upon your city — this great offence, 
 in our opinion, is less to be imputed to us than 
 to yourselves. Had we marched indeed against 
 your city in a hostile manner, had we scaled your 
 walls and put your property to fire and sword, 
 the charge had then been just. But if men of 
 the first rank amongst you both for wealth and 
 birth, desirous to put a stop to your foreign 
 combinations, and recall you to the common in- 
 stitutions of all Boeotians ; if such at their own 
 free motion invited our presence, wherein are 
 we unjusti for the leaders, in all cases, are great- 
 er transgressors than the followers. Though, 
 in the present, neither are they in our judg- 
 ments, nor are we, transgressors. They were 
 citizens as well as you ; they had larger con- 
 
 cerns at stake ; and therefore, opening their 
 gate and receiving us within their walls as 
 frieitds and not as foes, they intended to pre- 
 vent the corrupted part of your body from 
 growing worse, and protect the worthy and 
 good according to their merit. They calmly 
 studied the welfare of your minds and your 
 bodies, not suffering your city to become an 
 alien, but recovering it again to its duty and 
 relations, exempting it from being the foe of 
 any honest Grecian, and re-uniting it in the 
 bonds of amity with them all. — There are 
 proofs besides, that we did not intermeddle in 
 a hostile manner. We did no manner of vio- 
 lence to, any one : we proclaimed aloud, that 
 " whoever was desirous to conform to the 
 primitive institutions of all Boeotians, should 
 come and join us." — You heard our voice with 
 pleasure; you came in and entered into articles 
 with us ; you remained for a time without dis- 
 turbance ; but at length, having discovered the 
 smallness of our number, and then perhaps we 
 were judged to have proceeded inhumanly in 
 presuming to enter without the consent of your 
 populace, you then returned us not such treat- 
 ment as you had received from us, you made 
 no remonstrances against innovations, nor 
 persuaded us to depart, but in open breach of 
 articles you rushed upon us. We lament not 
 here so much the death of those whom you 
 slew in this base attack upon us ; some colour 
 of law might be alleged for their destruction : 
 but when, contrary to every law, in cold blood, 
 you murdered men who had spread their arms 
 for mercy, and had surrendered themselves 
 prisoners on promise of their lives, — was not 
 that a monstrous act] In one short interval of 
 time you were guilty of three outrageous 
 enormities, an infraction of articles, the suc- 
 ceeding butchery of our people, and a breach 
 of the solemn promise made to us, that you 
 would not kill them, provided we refrained 
 from plundering your lands. Yet still you cry 
 aloud, that we . are the breakers of law ; you 
 still remonstrate, that you are not debtors to 
 justice. It is false. The point, we presume, 
 will soon be determined right : and for these, 
 for all offences, you shall have your reward. 
 
 " We have thus, distinctly run over this af- 
 fair, for your sakes, O ye Lacedemonians, as 
 well as for our own ; that you may be convin- 
 ced with how much equity you are going to 
 condemn them, and that we have pursued the 
 offenders upon yet stronger obligations of jus- 
 
116 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book III. 
 
 tice. Let not the recital of their former 
 virtues, if virtues truly they ever had, mollify 
 your hearts. Virtue should be pleaded by men 
 who have suffered ; but, on those who have 
 committed baseness, it should redouble their 
 punishment, because they sin in foul contra- 
 riety to their former selves. Let them not save 
 themselves by lamentations and pathetic com- 
 plaints, though they cried out so movingly 
 upon the sepulchres of your fathers, and their 
 own destitute forlorn condition. For, to stop 
 their cries, we have proved against them, that 
 our youths, when butchered by them, met with 
 a more cruel and unjust fate : those youths, 
 some of whose fathers, reconciling Bceotia 
 with you, died in the field of Coronea ; the 
 rest, now advanced in years, bereft of their 
 children, their houses desolate, prefer a suppli- 
 cation far more just to you, to avenge them 
 upon these Platasans. Those are most de- 
 serving of pity, who have suffered some great 
 indignity ; but when vengeance is duly inflicted 
 on such men as these Platieans, the world hath 
 cause to triumph. Their present destitute for- 
 lorn condition is the work of themselves. They 
 wilfully rejected a better alliance ; and, though 
 uninjured, broke every law against us; execu- 
 tioners of hatred more than justice, though now 
 tibout to suffer less than the precedent they 
 set requireth. For they shall be executed by 
 lawful sentence ; not like men who with stretch- 
 ed-out hands obtained fair quarter, as they de- 
 Icribe themselves, but who surrendered on this 
 condition — to submit to justice. 
 
 " A venge therefore, O Lacedcemonians, the 
 law of Greece, so grossly violated by them. 
 Retaliate all the injuries we have suffered, re- 
 quiting so that cheerful friendship we have ever 
 shown you ; and let not their flow of words 
 overturn our just demands. Make now a pre- 
 cedent for Greece hereafter to follow. Show 
 them, that decisions must be formed, not ac- 
 cording to what men may say, but according to 
 what they have done : if their actions have 
 been right, that a short simple narration may at 
 any time suffice ; but, if those actions have 
 been wrong, that all studied ornamental periods 
 are intended to disguise the truth. If those 
 who preside at judgments, as you at present, 
 would proceed in a summary way, to a general 
 determination against the guilty, little room 
 would be left to disguise unjustifiable actions 
 by plausible speeches." 
 
 In this manner the Thebans replied ; and 
 
 the Lacediemonian judges agreed in the resolu- 
 tion, that the question, — " Whether they had 
 received any good service from them in the 
 warl" — was properly and fairly conceived. 
 They grounded this, upon the former proposal 
 made to them to remain neutral, according to 
 the old treaty of Pausanias after the Medish 
 invasion, and upon another more lately, which 
 they had offered before they had blocked them 
 up, to be common friends to both sides in con- 
 formity to the same treaty. But after this dou- 
 ble refusal, looking upon themselves as no 
 longer bound to observe those articles, which 
 others had deliberately infringed to traverse 
 their interest, — they now proceed again to 
 bring them forwards man by man, and put the 
 question — " Whether they had done good ser- 
 vice to the Lacedemonians and allies in the 
 present war 1 " — and upon their answering 'No,' 
 led them aside and slew them. Not one of 
 the number did they exempt ; so that in this 
 massacre there perished of Platffians not fewer 
 than two hundred, and twenty-five Athenians 
 who had been besieged in their company ; and 
 all the women were sold for slaves. The 
 Thebans assigned the city, for the space of a 
 year, to be the residence of certain Megareans, 
 who had been driven from home in the rage of 
 a sedition, and to those surviving Plataeans 
 who had been friends to the Theban interest. 
 But afterwards they levelled it with the earth, 
 rooted up its whole foundation, and near to 
 Juno's temple erected a spacious inn, two hun- 
 dred feet square, partitioned within both above 
 and below into a range of apartments. In this 
 structure they made use of the roofs and doors 
 that had belonged to the Platasans ; and of the 
 other moveables found within their houses, of 
 the brass and iron, they made beds, which they 
 consecrated to Juno, in whose honour they also 
 erected a fane of stone one hundred feet in 
 diameter. The land being confiscated to pub- 
 lic use, was farmed out for ten years, and occu- 
 pied by Thebans. So much, nay, so totally 
 averse to the Plataeans were the Lacedsemoni- 
 ans become ; and this, merely to gratify the 
 Thebans, whom they regarded as well able to 
 serve them in the war which was now on foot.' 
 
 1 Thucydides hath hcreheen very sparingof his cen- 
 sure. Nothing bad enough can be said of the Laceds- 
 nionian behaviour on this occasion. To put brave men 
 to death coolly and deliberately, who had most gallantly 
 defended tiiemselves, and merely for their steady at- 
 tachment to liberty and the Athenians, were hated bv 
 
TEAR v.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 117 
 
 And thus was the destruction of Plataea com- 
 pleted in the ninety-third year of its alliance 
 with Athens. 
 
 The forty sail of Peloponnesiana, which had 
 been sent to the relief of Lesbos, after flying 
 through the open sea to avoid the pursuit from 
 Athens, were driven by a tempest on the coast 
 of Crete ; and from thence they separately 
 dropped into Cyllene, a Peloponnesian harbour, 
 where they find thirteen triremes of Leucadi- 
 ans and Ambraciots, with Brasidas the son of 
 Tellis sent thither purposely to assist Alcidas 
 with his counsel. It was now the project of 
 the Lacedaemonians, since they had miscarried 
 at Lesbos, to augment their fleet, and sail im- 
 mediately for Corcyra, now embroiled in sedi- 
 tion, as there were no Athenians in those parts, 
 excepting only twelve ships which were station- 
 ed at Naupactus — and thus their design might 
 be effectuated, before a fleet large enough to 
 obstruct them could be sent from Athens. — 
 This was their plan, and Brasidas and Alcidas 
 prepared for its execution. 
 
 The Corcyreans were now embroiled in a 
 sedition, excited by the return of the prisoners, 
 whom the Corinthians had taken in the naval 
 engagements of Epidamnus. They had obtain- 
 ed their release, as was publicly given out, for 
 the sum of eighty talents,'^ for the payment of 
 which their former friends at Corinth had 
 joined in a security ; but, in fact, for a secret 
 promise they had made the Corinthians, to put 
 Corcyra into their hands. To fulfil their en- 
 gagements they tampered with every single Cor- 
 cyrean in order to bring about a revolt from the 
 Athenians. An Athenian and Corinthian 
 ship arrived at the same time with ambassadors 
 on board. These were admitted together to 
 an audience, at which the Corcyreans decreed 
 " to maintain their alliance with the Athenians 
 according to treaty, — but to be friends to the 
 Peloponnesians as in preceding times." Py- 
 
 the Thebans, shows the public spirit of Spartans at this 
 time to have been none at all. — The city of Platiea, thus 
 barbarously demolished, was rebuilt after the peace of 
 Antalcidas, which put an end to the Peloponnesian war. 
 But not long after, it was again detuolished by the The- 
 bans, for arefusal to join them against the Lacedtemoni- 
 ans. However, Alexander the Great once more re-es- 
 tablished it, in a generous acknowledgement of the ser- 
 vices that little stale had rendered to Greece; and the 
 FlatEeans continued even in the time of Plutarch, to 
 celebrate the annual festival in honour of those, who at 
 the famous battle of Platiea had died for the liberties of 
 Greece. 
 
 ■> £15,500 sterling. 
 
 thias, who at that time was at the head of the 
 people, entertained and lodged the Athenians 
 without the public warrant. And therefore 
 against him the accomplices prefer an accusa- 
 tion, as plotting how to subject Corcyra to 
 Athenian slavery. Pythias being acquitted, 
 in his turn exhibits a charge against five of the 
 most considerable of their number, for having 
 cut pales in the sacred grove of Jupiter and 
 Alcinus. The fine for every pale was by law 
 a stater.' Being condemned to pay the whole, 
 they fled into the temples and sat down as sup- 
 plicants, in hope to obtain a mitigation of their 
 fine, which was quite exorbitant*- Pythias, 
 who was also strong in the senate, gets a fresh 
 order to have it levied in all the rigour of law. 
 Thus debarred of any. legal redress, and con- 
 scious further that Pythias, so long as he con- 
 tinued in the senate, would prevail upon the 
 people to declare those their friends and those 
 their foes who were so to Athens, — they rise 
 up from the sanctuary, and seizing daggeis rush 
 suddenly into the senate-house, where they 
 stab Pythias and others both senators and pri- 
 vate persons, to the number of sixty. Some 
 few indeed who were the adherents of Pythias, 
 saved themselves on board the Athenian vessels 
 which yet lay in the harbour. 
 
 After this bold assassination, they summon- 
 ed the Corcyreans to assemble immediately, 
 where they justified their proceedings " as most 
 highly for the public good, and the only expe- 
 dient of preventing Athenian slavery ;" — advis- 
 ing them " for the future to receive neither of 
 the rival parties, unless they came peacefully 
 in a single vessel ; if in more to declare them 
 enemies ;" and in conclusion they forced the 
 ratification of whatever they had proposed. 
 They also instantly despatch ambassadors to 
 Athens, representing the necessity they lay un- 
 der to act as they had done, and to persuade those 
 who had fled for refuge thither, not to rush into 
 such measures as might hurt the welfare of 
 their country, from a dread of the miseries 
 which might thence ensue. 
 
 When these ambassadors were arrived at 
 Athens, the Athenians laid them and all their 
 adherents under an arrest as enemies to the 
 state, and sent them prisoners to .lEgina. 
 
 In the meantime, those of the Corcyreans 
 who had thus seized the government, animated 
 by the arrival of a Corinthian trireme and a 
 
 rS 
 
 > £1 0). 9d. 
 
118 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book III. 
 
 LacediEmonian embassy, attack the people and 
 overpower them in battle. The people, by- 
 favour of the night which approached, fly to 
 the citadel and more elevated parts of the city, 
 where they drew up together and secured their 
 posts ; they also got possession of the Hyllaic 
 harbour. But their opponents . seized the fo- 
 rum, where most of their own houses were situ- 
 ated, and the harbour which points towards the 
 forum and the continent. 
 
 The day following they skirmished a little 
 with their missive weapons, and both parties 
 sent out detachments into the fields, to invite 
 the concurrence of the slaves, upon a promise 
 of their freedom. A majority of slaves came 
 in to the assistance of the people, and the other 
 party got eight hundred auxiliaries from the 
 continent. 
 
 After one day's respite they come again to 
 blows. The people get the better now, by the 
 advantage of their strong posts and their num- 
 bers. The women with iiotable boldness as- 
 sisted in the combat, by throwing tiles from 
 the tops of the houses, and sustaining the tu- 
 mult beyond their sex. About the close of the 
 evening, the few were forced to fly, and then, 
 apprehensive lest the people should rush down 
 upon, and so at a shout seize the dock and put 
 them to the sword, in order to stop their pass- 
 age they set fire to the houses all round the 
 forum and to such as were adjacent, sparing 
 neither their own nor those of their enemies. 
 The large effects of the merchants were con- 
 sumed in the flames, and the whole city was in 
 danger of being reduced to ashes, had a gale of 
 wind arose to drive the flame that way. This 
 put a stop to the contest, and brought on a ces- 
 Bation, when both sides applied themselves to 
 strict guard for the night. The Corinthian 
 vessel, after this victory on the side of the peo- 
 ple, stole privately away; and many of the 
 auxiliaries, who crept off unperceived, repassed 
 to the opposite shore. 
 
 The day following, Nicostratus the son of 
 Uiotrephes, who commanded the Athenian 
 squadron, comes up to their assistance with his 
 twelve sail from Naupactus and five hundred 
 heavy-armed Messenians. He forthwith nego- 
 tiated an accommodation, and persuades them 
 to make up the affair with one another, by in- 
 stantly condemning the ten principal authors 
 of the sedition (who immediately fled), and 
 permitting all others to continue in the city, 
 Wpoa articles signed between both parties and 
 
 the Athenians—" To have the same friends and 
 the same foes." Having so far carried his 
 point, he was intent on immediate departure. 
 But the managers for the people made him a 
 proposal, to leave five ships of his squadron 
 with them, to deter the enemy from any fresh 
 commotion, which should be replaced by five 
 of their own, which they would instantly man 
 to attend him on his station. With this pro- 
 posal he complied ; and they named distinctly 
 the mariners, who to a man were of the o^- 
 posite party. Affrighted at this as a pretext 
 to convey them to Athens, they sit down in the 
 temple of the Diosuri. Nicostratus endeavour- 
 ed to raise them flp and to cheer their despon- 
 dency. Yet all he could say was unavailing; 
 and the people ran again to arms, pretending 
 that such a refusal to put to sea was a plain 
 proof, that their intentions were insincere 
 throughout. Then they rifled their houses of 
 all the arms they could find ; and some of them 
 who fell into their hands had immediately been 
 butchered, if Nicostratus had not interposed. 
 
 A second party, terrified at these proceed- 
 ings, take their seats also as suppliants in the 
 temple of Juno. The number of these was 
 not less than four hundred. The people, grown 
 now apprehensive of some fatal turn, persuade 
 them to leave their sanctuary ; and having 
 prevailed, transport them into that island which 
 faceth the temple of Juno, whither every thing 
 needful for their sustenance was carefully sent 
 them. 
 
 The sedition continuing in this posture, 
 about the fourth or fifth day after the transpor- 
 tation of the latter body into that island, the 
 Peloponnesian ships, which had assembled at 
 Cyllene after the voyage of Ionia, appear in 
 sight to the number of fifty-three. Alcidas 
 was commander-in-chief as before, and Brasidas 
 attended as his council. They came to anchor 
 in the harbour of Sybota on the main ; and next 
 morning, at break of day, steered directly for 
 Corcyra. 
 
 Great was the tumult now at Corcyra : they 
 were afraid of the malcontents within, and the 
 hostile fleet approaching the city. They got 
 sixty ships immediately on float, and each so 
 fast as it was manned advanced to meet the foe. 
 The Athenians indeed proposed to put out first 
 to sea themselves ; and that the Corcyreans 
 should afterwards come out and join them, 
 when they had got all their ships together. 
 But, as they advanced in a straggling manner 
 
TEAR v.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 ]]9 
 
 kowards the enemy, two ships went directly 
 over to them ; and on board others the mari- 
 ners were at blows with one another. In short, 
 there was no manner of order in any of their 
 motions. The Lacedaemonians, perceiving 
 how it was, with twenty of their ships drew 
 up to engage the Corcyreans, and opposed 
 the remainder to the twelve Athenian, two of 
 which were only the Salaminian and the Paralus. 
 
 The Corcyreans, who charged in this disor- 
 derly manner, and with few ships in a line, were 
 on their side terribly distressed ; while the 
 Athenians, fearing lest the other,vastly superiour 
 in number, might quite surround their little 
 squadron, would not venture to attack them 
 when altogether, nor to break upon the mid- 
 dle of the enemy's line ; hut, assaulting them 
 towards one of the extremities, sink one of 
 their ships. Upon this, the Peloponnesians 
 having formed a circle, the Athenians sailed 
 round and round, and endeavoured to break 
 their order. Those who pursued the Corcyre- 
 ans perceiving this, and fearing what had hap- 
 pened formerly at Naupactus, steered away 
 from thence to support their own squadron. 
 And now, with their whole embodied strength, 
 they designed to pour upon the Athenians. 
 They, having already shifted the helm, fell 
 gradually away. They were desirous to favour 
 the flight of the Corcyreans beyond the possi- 
 bility of 1 chase, and so they fell oft' entirely 
 at their own leisure, keeping the enemy in 
 their front still ranged in order. Such was this 
 engagement, which at the setting of the sun 
 was quite ended. 
 
 The Corcyreans were afraid lest the enemy, 
 in prosecution of their victory, should immedi- 
 ately assault the city, or take up the persons in 
 the island, or by some other method attempt to 
 distress them. For this reason, they removed 
 the prisoners again from the island, into the 
 temple of Juno, and applied themselves to 
 guard the city. But the enemy, though vic- 
 torious at sea, durst not think of proceeding to 
 attack the city ; but satisfied with taking thir- 
 teen ships- belonging to the Corcyreans, they 
 returned to the main, from whence they had 
 sallied to the engagement. The next day also, 
 they refrained from making any attempt upon 
 the city, where the disorder and consternation 
 were as great as ever. Brasidas is reported ur- 
 gently to have pressed it upon Alcidas, but 
 in the council of war it was quite overruled. 
 
 They landed however at cape Leucymne, and 
 plundered the country. 
 
 The Corcyrean people, whose fears were 
 still suggesting that they should be attacked by 
 the enemy's fleet, had conferred with the 
 suppliants and others about the only mean.s to 
 preserve the city. And some of them they 
 persuaded to join in navigating their ships; 
 for by some means or other they had again 
 manned thirty, expecting every moment the 
 enemy's approach. But the Peloponnesians 
 continued the ravage of their fields only till 
 noon, and then repassed to their former stations. 
 Yet before the dawn of the succeeding day, 
 they saw sixty lights held up, to denote an equal 
 number of Athenian ships advancing from 
 Leucas. The Athenians, advertised of the 
 sedition and the course of the fleet under Al- 
 cidas against CoTcyra, had sent away this rein- 
 forcement under the command of Eurymedon. 
 the son of Thucles. Upon this the Pelopon- 
 nesians, whilst yet it was night, crept home- 
 wards along the shore, and carrying their ves- 
 sels over the isthmus of Leucas, lest they 
 should he discovered in going round it, 
 are safely retreated within their own con- 
 fines. 
 
 When the Corcyreans had discovered the 
 approach of the Athenian reinforcement, and 
 the departure of the enemy, they received the 
 Messenians within their walls, who till now 
 had lodged without ; and, having ordered the 
 ships which they had manned to come about 
 into the Hyllaic harbour, whilst they were going 
 about in pursuance of this order, they put all 
 the adverse faction whom they found to the 
 sword. Those f\irther, who had taken on in 
 the ships at their persuasion, they threw into 
 the sea and then retired. They afterwards 
 went to Juno's temple, and persuaded a party 
 of suppliants there, to the amount of fifty, to 
 undergo a judicial trial, in which they were all 
 condemned to die. The majority of suppliants, 
 who refused to hear such persuasion, no sooner 
 saw the fate of their brethren, than they either 
 slew one another within the temple, or hung 
 themselves up upon the trees within its verge : 
 each finding some expedient for his own des- 
 patch. During those seven days that Eury- 
 medon with his reinforcement continued at 
 Corcyra, the people of that city extended the 
 massacre to all whom they judged their enemies 
 The crime on which they justified their pro- 
 
120 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book III. 
 
 ceedings, was their attempt to overturn the de- 
 mocracy 
 
 Some perished merely through private en- 
 mity ; some for the sums they had lent, by the 
 hands of the borrowers. Every kind of death 
 was here exhibited. Every dreadful act usual 
 in a sedition, and more than usual, was perpe- 
 trated now. For fathers slew their children ; 
 some were dragged from altars ; and some were 
 butchered at them. And a number of persons 
 immured in the temple of Bacchus were starv- 
 ed to death. So cruel was the progress of 
 this sedition, and so excessively cruel did it 
 appear, because the first of so black a nature 
 that ever happened. But afterwards the con- 
 tagion spread, one may say, through the whole 
 extent of Greece, when factions raged in every 
 city, the popular demagogues contending for 
 the Athenians, the aspiring few for the Lace- 
 daemonians. In peace, it is true, they were 
 void of all pretext, of all opportunity, to invite 
 these rivals. But now, amidst declared hostil- 
 ities, and the quest of alliance to afflict their 
 enemies and add an increase of strength to 
 themsfelves, opportunities were easily found by 
 such as were fond of innovations to introduce 
 the side they favoured. The consequence of 
 this was sedition in cities, with all its nu- 
 merous and tragical incidents. Such were 
 now, and such things ever will be, so long as 
 human nature continues the same ; but under 
 greater or less aggravations and diversified in 
 circumstances, according to the several vicis- 
 situdes of conjunctures, which shall happen to 
 occur. In the seasons of peace and affluence, 
 communities as well as individuals have their 
 tempers under better regulation, because not 
 liable to that violence which flows from neces- 
 sity. But war, which snatcheth from them 
 their daily subsistence, is the teacher of vio- 
 lence, and assimilates the passions of men to 
 their present condition. 
 
 By these means were cities harassed with 
 seditions^ And those to whose fate the later 
 commotions fell, through inquiry what had 
 happened in such instances before, grew enor- 
 mously ambitious to suppress the machination 
 of others, both in policy of attempts and ex- 
 travagance of revenge. Even words lost now 
 (heir former significance, since to palliate ac- 
 tions they were quite distorted. For truly, what 
 before was brutal courage, began to be esteemed 
 that fortitude which becomes a humah and soci- 
 
 able creature; prudent consideration, to bo 
 specious cowardice ; modesty, the disguise of ef- 
 feminacy ; and being wise in every thing, to be 
 good for nothing. The hot fiery temper was ad- 
 judged the exertion of true manly valour ; cau- 
 tious and calm deliberation, to be a plausible pre- 
 text for intended knavery. He who boiled with 
 indignation was undoubtedly trusty ; who pre- 
 sumed to contradict was ever suspected. He 
 who succeeded in a roguish scheme was wise, 
 and he who suspected such practices in others, 
 was still a more able genius. But was he pro- 
 vident enough, so as never to be in need of 
 such base expedients ; he was one that would 
 not stand to his engagements, and most shame- 
 fully awed by his foes. In short, he who 
 could prevent another in executing villany, or 
 could persuade a well-designing person to it, was 
 sure to be applauded. 
 
 Men now, who were allied in blood, were 
 less valued or caressed, than such as were 
 connected by voluntary combination ; since the 
 latter, unscrupulous and uninquisitive, were 
 more ready to embark in any scheme whatever. 
 For now associations were not formed for such 
 mutual advantage as is consistent with, but for 
 the execution of such rapines as are contrary 
 to human laws. In mutual trust they persist- 
 ed, not out of any regard to religious obligation, 
 but from the bond of communicated guilt. To 
 the fair and honest proposals of adversaries, 
 they hearkened indeed when such by active 
 strength could controul them, but never through 
 candid ingenuity. Revenge upon another 
 was a more valued possession than never to 
 have suffered injury. Oaths, if ever made for 
 present reconciliation, had a temporary force, 
 so long as neither knew how to break them : 
 but never when either party had power to abet 
 their violation. He who, at inviting oppor- 
 tunity, durst first incur the perjury, if the ad- 
 versary was off his guard, executed his rancour 
 with higher spirit than from enmity open and 
 avowed. Such a step was thought most se- 
 cure ; and, because he had thus surpassed in 
 guile, it was certainly extolled as a master-piece 
 of cunning. Large is the number of villains, 
 and such obtain more easily the reputation of 
 dexterity than their dupes can that of goodness • 
 the latter are apt to blush ; the former most im 
 pudently triumph. 
 
 The source of all these evils is a thirst of 
 power, in consequence either of rapacious or 
 
^■] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 121 
 
 ambitious passions. The mind, when actuated 
 by such, is ever ready to engage in party-feuds. 
 For the men of large influence in communities 
 avowing on both sides a specious cause, some 
 standing up for the just equality of the popular, 
 others for the fair decorum of the aristocratical 
 government, by artful sounds, embarrassed those 
 communities for their own private lucre. Both 
 sides, intent on victory, carried on the conten- 
 tion with the keenest spirit. They most dar- 
 ingly projected, and then regularly executed, 
 the most dreadful machinations. Their revenge 
 was not limited by justice or the public wel- 
 fare ; it aimed at more ample satisfaction. 
 Either side constantly measured it by such re- 
 taliation as was judged the sweetest, either by 
 a capital condemnation through an iniquitous 
 sentence, or by earning the victory with their 
 own hands, in which they were always ready to 
 glut the present rancour of their hearts. And 
 hence it was, that the pious and upright con- 
 duct was on both sides disregarded. And, 
 when any point of great importance was be- 
 fore them, to carry it by specious collusive ora- 
 tory was the greatest enchancement of their 
 credit. Yet all this while, the moderate mem- 
 bers of such communities, either hated because 
 they would not meddle, or envied for such ob- 
 noxious conduct, fell victims to both. 
 
 Seditions in this manner introduced every 
 species of outrageous wickedness into the 
 Grecian manners. Sincerity, which is most 
 frequently to be found in generous tempers, 
 was laughed out of countenance and for ever 
 vanished. It was become the universal practice, 
 to keep up a constant enmity of intention 
 against one another, and never to believe. No 
 promise was strong enough, no oath sufficiently 
 solemn, to banish such mutual diffidence. 
 Those who excelled in shrewd consideration 
 resigned all hope of any lasting security, and 
 stood ever on their guard against whom it was 
 impossible for them to trust. But persons 
 of meaner understandings took more effectual 
 means for their preservation. Living in con- 
 stant apprehensions, from their own inferiority 
 and the craft of their opponents, lest by words 
 they should be over-reached, or that such sub- 
 tile heads might execute their treacheries upon 
 them unawares, they boldly seized the present 
 moment, and at once despatched the men they 
 dreaded ; who, presuming too much on their 
 own penetration, and that it was superfluous 
 to aim a blow at those whom they could at any 
 S3 
 
 time supplant by cunning, despised them so fur 
 as to neglect a proper guard, and so contributed 
 to their own destruction. 
 
 Many such daring outrages were now by way 
 of precedent committed at Corcyra ; nay, all 
 whatever, that men, who are wreaking revenge 
 upon such as before were their masters, and 
 had exerted their superiority with savageness 
 more than humanity, can in turn retaliate upon 
 them, were executed there. — Some joined in 
 these acts of violence to procure a dircharge 
 from their former poverty ; but the greater 
 number, through a passionate desire to seize 
 the property of their neighbours : or, though 
 they were not lured by the lust of rapine, but 
 engaged in the contest upon fair and open views, 
 y<5t hurried to wild extravagence through tnad 
 and undisciplined anger, they proceeded to cruel 
 acts, and with inexorable fury. The whole 
 order of human life was for a season confounded 
 in this city. The human temper, too apt to trans- 
 gress in spite of laws, and now having gained 
 the ascendant over law, seemed pleased with ex- 
 hibiting this public manifestation, that it was 
 too weak for anger, too strong for justice, and 
 an enemy to all superiority. Men could not 
 otherwise have awarded the preference to re- 
 venge over righteous duty, and to lucre over 
 that habit of justice in which envy never yet 
 had power to annoy them. But more than 
 this, when the point in view is revenge upon 
 others, men haughtily make precedents against 
 themselves, by infringing those laws which are 
 binding by the ties of nature, and from which 
 alone any hope of safety can be extracted for 
 themselves in a plunge of misery, precluding 
 thus all possibility of redress, should the)' be 
 reduced in some future extremity to make the 
 same appeal. 
 
 And thus the Corcyreans continued to. ex-v 
 ecute the rage of such cruel passions, upon, the 
 heads of one another, within the precincts of 
 their own city, of which this was the first ex- 
 ample in Greece, till Eurymedon* with the 
 Athenian fleet under his command put out 
 again to sea. 
 
 But, after his departure, they who by flight 
 had preserved their lives, to the number of 
 about five hundred, having seized their forts 
 upon the opposite shore, got possession of their 
 own land, on that side the water. Putting out 
 hence, they plundered the Corcyreans in the 
 island, and made such havoc that a violent 
 famine ensued in the city. They further sent 
 
122 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book hi. 
 
 a depntation to Lacedasmon and Corinth, to ne- J 
 gotiate the means of their restoration. But 
 notliing of this kind succeeding, they got to- j 
 gether afterwards a body of auxiliaries and J 
 transports, and so passed over to the island of I 
 Corcyra, to the amount of six hundred men. ' 
 Having now set fire to their transports, to pre- 
 clude every other expedient but gaining firm 
 footing where now they were, they marched up 
 to the mountain Istone, and having fortified 
 themselves there, made cruel work with those 
 in the city, and were masters of the country 
 round about. 
 
 About the end of the same summer, the 
 Athenians sent out twenty sail for Sicily, under 
 the command of Laches the son of Melanopus 
 and Charoeadas the son of Euphiletus. A war 
 was now on foot between the Syracusans and 
 Leontines. Confederate with the Syracusans 
 were, excepting Camarina, all the Doric cities, 
 which had formerly entered into alliance with 
 the Lacedsemonians before this war broke out, 
 but had yet no where effectually joined them. 
 With the Leontines were the Chalcidic cities, 
 and Camarina. Of Italy, the Locrines sided 
 with the Syracusans : and the Ehegians, from 
 the motive of consanguinity, with the Leon- 
 tines. The allies therefore of the Leontines 
 sent to Athens,' petitioning the Athenians in 
 respect of their old alliance and their Ionic de- 
 scent, to send them a succour of shipping : for 
 the Syracusans had now blocked them up both 
 by land and sea. The Athenians immediately 
 sent one, giving out that they were bound in 
 duty to take this step ; but their real motive 
 was, to prevent the exportation of corn from 
 thence to Peloponnesus, and also to sound the 
 possibility of bringing Sicily into their own sub- 
 jection. Their squadron therefore arriving at 
 Rhegium on the Italian shore, supported their 
 
 I One of the persons, or the chief, employerl on this 
 occasion, is said to be Gorgias of Leontium, the first 
 rhetorician of that or of any age. When he had his 
 audience from tiie Athenians to deliver the reasons of 
 his embassy, he made a speech so smooth and flowing, 
 so new in the manner of its turns, so pretty in the ex- 
 pression, rind so nicely diversified hy a change and op- 
 position of figures, that he won their hearts, and suc- 
 ceeded in i'is negociation. Our historian indeed, who 
 tjiltrs no notice of Gorgias, gives two political reasons 
 just after the ready compliance of the Ath eiiians on this 
 occasion. It is a step which draws great consequences af- 
 l«r it. Thucydides in the sequel will open all the plan, 
 nnd give an exact detail of the operations of this new war, 
 into which tlie Athenians are beginning to emharlc. 
 
 allies in the present war ; and in this the sum 
 mer endcid. 
 
 In the beginning of the winter the plague 
 broke out a second time at Athens, not that 
 during this whole interval of time it had wholly 
 ceased, though its rage had very much abated 
 But now the mortality began again, and con- 
 tinued not less than a year: but the former 
 had raged for the space of two. There was 
 nothing which lay upon the Athenians so hard 
 as this, or so much impaired their strength. It 
 appeared from the muster-rolls, that there per- 
 ished four thousand and four hundred of those 
 citizens who wore the heavy armour, and three 
 hundred of the horsemen. The number of the 
 lower people that died was not to be computed. 
 — There happened at the same time many 
 earthquakes ; at Athens ; in Eubcea ; amongst 
 the Boeotians, and especially at the Bceotian 
 Orchomenus. 
 
 The same winter, the Athenians and Rho> 
 gians, on the coast of Sicily, form an expedi- 
 tion with thirty sail, against those which arc 
 called the isles of jEolus. This was not feasi 
 ble in the summer season, for want of water 
 These isles are inhabited by the Liparcans 
 who were a colony from Cnidus. Their resi 
 dence was chiefly in one of them called Lipare 
 though by no means large. They go from 
 hence to the tillage of the others, Didyme and 
 Strongyle and Hiera. It is believed by thoso 
 people, that Vulcan^ keeps his forge ir. Hiera, 
 because in the night it visibly throws forth a 
 great quantity of fire, and in the day, of smoke. 
 These isles are situated over-against the shore 
 of the Siculi and the Messenians, and were al- 
 lied with Syracuse. The Athenians having 
 plundered the soil, and finding the inhabitants 
 would not come in, put back again to Rlicgium. 
 — And here the winter ended, and the fifth 
 year of this war, the history of which Thucy • 
 dides hath compiled. 
 
 TEAK VI. 
 
 The following summer, the Peloponnesians 
 and confederates assembled at the Isthmus, in 
 
 = So Virgil, I. viii. iW. 
 
 Insula Sicanium juxia lalus^olianique 
 Ertgilur Lipairn, fumanlibus ardua Basis : 
 Quam sub!er specus el Cyclopum cxcsa raminiB 
 Antra iEtnaea tenant, 7ali(lique incudibus ictus 
 Audit! rcTerunt gcmitum, striduntque cavernis 
 Striclurae Chalybum, et fornacibus jgnia anbcht; 
 Vulcani domus, et Vulcania nomiao teltua. 
 
 > Before Christ 426. 
 
YEAR VI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 123 
 
 order to make the usual iroad into Attica ; 
 and Agis son of Archidamus, king of the La- 
 cedaemonians, was there ready for the command. 
 But the frequent earthquakes which happened 
 about this time, caused them to return back, 
 and entirely put a stop to the designed incur- 
 sion. 
 
 About the same space of time shocks of 
 earthquakes were felt in Eubcea, where at Oro- 
 bioB the sea breaking over what was then land 
 with impetuous swells, laid a part of that city 
 under water : some of which stagnated there, 
 though some washed its way back ; however, a 
 tract now continues sea which before was land. 
 All those who could not reach the higher 
 grounds in time, by running before the surge, 
 were drowned. — A similar inundation happen- 
 ed at the isle of Atalantas, amongst the Lo- 
 crians of Opus, where it washed away the 
 Athenian fort, and of two vessels that lay dry 
 upon the beach, staved one to pieces. — At 
 Peparethus also the surge of the sea rose very 
 high, but did not overflow. An earthquake 
 however demolished part- of the fortification,' 
 the townhouse, and some few dwelling-houses. 
 — My solution of such effects is this: where the 
 shock of the earthquake was most violent, it 
 forcibly drove away the sea before it, which 
 suddenly returning again occasioned these more 
 violent swells. And without an earthquake I 
 deem all such accidents impossible. 
 
 The same summer, many of the other na- 
 tions, as they happened to be drawn into the 
 quarrel, were engaged in the war of Sicily, as 
 well as the Sicilians themselves, who took up 
 arms one against another, and the Athenians 
 together with their allies. Yet, the most me- 
 morable actions alone, either of the allies thus 
 aided by the Athenians, or of the common ene- 
 my against the Athenians, shall I now relate. 
 ■ — Charceadas the Athenian commander having 
 lost his life in the Syracusan war. Laches who 
 had now the sole command of the fleet, in 
 junction with the allies, appeared before Mylae 
 of the Messenians. The garrison of Mylae 
 consisted of two companies of Messenians; 
 and these had formed an ambuscade to cut off 
 the enemy when landed. But the Athenians 
 and allies drive them from the place of ambush 
 with great slaughter. Then they proceeded to 
 assault the works, which necessitated the de- 
 fendants to give up their citadel by capitulation, 
 
 Flytaneum, 
 
 and even to attend them against Messene. But 
 after this, the Athenians and allies were no 
 sooner approached, than the Messenians also 
 compounded, giving hostages and all other secu- 
 rities required for their future behaviour. 
 
 The same summer, the Athenians with 
 thirty sail of ships commanded by Demos- 
 thenes'' the son of Alcisthenes and Procles the 
 son of Theodorus, appeared upon the coast of 
 Peloponnesus ; whilst a linger armament of 
 sixty, and two thousand heavy-armed, was em- 
 ployed against Melos, under the command of 
 Nicias son of Niceratus. Melos is ^n island ; 
 and as the inhabitants of it were averse to the 
 Athenian subjection, and had refused to accede 
 to their alliance, they were now bent on its re- 
 duction. Having laid the island waste, and the 
 Melians still refusing to submit, the Athenians 
 put again to sea, and crossed over to Oro- 
 pus on the opposite shore ; where arriving at 
 night, the heavy-armed were detached to march 
 with all expedition by land towards Tanagra of 
 Boeotia. Notice being given of their arrival 
 there, they were instantly joined by the whole 
 force of Athens, which had marched out of the 
 city under the orders of Hipponicus the son of 
 Callias and Eurymedon the son of Thucles. A 
 camp they formed ; and having for the space of 
 a day laid the territory waste, they reposed them- 
 selves there the succeeding night. But the 
 next morning, having gained a victory over the 
 Tailagreans, who aided by a party of Thebans 
 sallied out upon them, they only staid to gather 
 up the arms and erect a trophy, and then march- 
 ed away — these back again to the city ; and 
 those to the fleet. Nicias upon this, putting 
 out again with his sixty sail, plundered all the 
 sea-coast of Locris, and then returned into the 
 harbour of Athens. 
 
 It was about this time that the Lacedajmo- 
 nians founded the colony of Heraclea in Tra- 
 
 5 This Demosthenes will make a considerable figure 
 in the course of this war. The most celebrated orator 
 of the same name hath ranked him amongst the great 
 est of his countrymen, with Aristides, Pericles, and Nic- 
 ias. He styles him also an orator; and Thucydides will 
 give UB hereafter a specimen of his manner of harangu 
 ing. His Tiame-sake indeed hath carried off all tlie 
 glory of eloquence: but the Demosthenes, who is the sub 
 ject of this note was an able general, very enterprising 
 and very brave; always vigilant in the service of his 
 country, though more as a soldier than a Etatesma n; and, 
 provided his country was served, not too anxious about 
 who carried off the honour. In short, he was an open- 
 hearted, disinterested, worthy Athenian. 
 
124 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book III 
 
 chinia. Their view in doing it was this; — 
 those, who in genera! are styled Meliensians, 
 are divided into three bodies ; Paralians, Hier- 
 cnsians, and Trachinians. The last of these 
 the Trachinians, who had been terribly distress- 
 ed by a war made upon them by the bordering 
 Oetseans, had first of all intended to throw 
 themselves under the Athenian protection ; 
 but afterwards, apprehending they might not be 
 hearty in their sufjport, they made application 
 to liacedsemon by Tisamenus, the delegate ap- 
 pointed by them on this occasion. The Dori- 
 ans too, from whom the Laceda;monians are 
 descended, sent their ambassadors also to ac- 
 company and join with him in the negotiation, 
 for they likewise were infested by these Oetse- 
 ans. The Lacedsemonians, after an audience, 
 resolved to send out this colony, as a sure ex- 
 pedient not only to protect the Trachinians and 
 Dorians from insult, but to annoy the Atheni- 
 ans more sensibly in the course of the war, 
 from a city so commodiously seated. For 
 thence they could at any time make an attack 
 upon Eubcea, as the passage was but short; and 
 further, it lay most conveniently upon the road 
 to Thrace. In a word, they were very eager 
 about building this city. In the first place, 
 therefore, they begged the advice of the god at 
 Delphi. His answer being favourable, they 
 sent out a colony composed of their own and 
 the neighbouring people ; encouraging further 
 all Grecian adventurers whatever to j oin in this 
 settlement, except lonians and Achaeans, and 
 some of foreign nations. Three Lacedaemoni- 
 ans are ^appointed to be the leaders of this 
 colony; Leon, and Alcides, and Damagon. 
 These arriving at the spot, erect' upon a new 
 foundation and wall round the city which is 
 now called Heraclea, distant about forty stadia' 
 from Thermopylae, and twenty from the sea. 
 They proceeded next to build the naval docks ; 
 and these they began at Thermopylae close un- 
 der the straits, since there they were capable of 
 the strongest defence. 
 
 The Athenians, when they saw the large 
 resort to this colony, were £(t first under great 
 apprehensions. They suspected it to be chiefly 
 intended for the annoyance of Euboea, as the 
 passage from it was short to Cenasum in Eu- 
 boea ; though, in the sequel, their apprehen- 
 sions proved entirely groundless. Not the 
 
 ■ About four miles. 
 
 least damage accrued to them from this colony ; 
 and the reason was this; the Thessalians, who 
 were masters of all the country round about it, 
 and upon whose very land it was built, fearing 
 lest this new settlement might prove too power- 
 ful a neighbour at last, gave it all possible 
 annoyance, and harassed the new inhabitants 
 with continual war, till from the large number 
 they were at first they mouldered into nothing. 
 When the Lacedaemonians first declared the 
 colony, the whole world was eager to get a set- 
 tlement in a city which they thought would 
 want no support. Not but that its sudden 
 decay was owing also in great measure to the 
 Lacedaemonian leaders. From the first moment 
 of their arrival they had spoiled every thing 
 wherein they meddled; they reduced their 
 numbers to a handful of men, because their 
 fears had driven away the rest, as the govern- 
 ment was always severe and not always just. 
 The neighbouring people surprising them in 
 such a state, prevailed against them with the 
 utmost ease. 
 
 The same summer, and even during that 
 interval of time, the Athenians were employed 
 at Melos, the Athenians of the fleet of thirty 
 sail who were upon the Peloponnesian coast, 
 in the first place, having placed an ambush at 
 Elomenus of Leucadia, intercepted and cut off 
 a part of the garrison. In the next place, with 
 an augmented force they came up to Leucas, 
 being attended now by the whole strength of 
 the Acarnanians except the Oeniadae, by the Za- 
 cynthians and Cephallenians, and fifteen saiU 
 of Corcyreans. The Leucadians, though their 
 territory was laid waste both without and with- 
 in the Isthmus, where the city of Leucas and 
 the temple of Apollo are seated, yet durst not 
 venture out against such superior numbers. 
 Upon this, the Acarnanians vehemently pressed 
 it upon Demosthenes the Athenian general, 
 to block them up by a wall of ciroumvallation : 
 imagining they might easily reduce them, 
 and rid themselves of a city which had been 
 their eternal foe. But Demosthenes chose, 
 rather to hearken at this time to the sug- 
 gestions of the Messenians ; " how glorious 
 it would be, as he was now at the head 
 of so large a force, to invade the ^tolians, 
 who were such plagues to Naupactus; and, 
 if their reduction could be completed, the 
 rest of that continent might easily be brought 
 into the Athenian subjection. For, though 
 the iEtolians were a great and warlike people, 
 
EAK VI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 125 
 
 yet as tliey dwelled in open villages remote 
 from one another, as light armour only was in 
 use amongst them, they presumed he might 
 easily complete their reduction, before any 
 succour could reach them." They advised 
 him further, "to begin with, the Apodoti, to 
 take the Ophionians next, then to proceed to 
 tlie Eurytanians (which is the most numerous 
 ■people of ^tolia, reported also to speak in a 
 most barbarous dialect, and to feed upon raw 
 flesh) ; that, if these could be surprised, the 
 rest of jStolia would submit of course." Ho, 
 therefore, willing to oblige the Massenians, and 
 incited above all by the thought, that without 
 exposing the Athenian forces, after he had 
 done with the ^tolians, he might march with 
 the allied strength of the continent, and pene- 
 trate by land as far as Bceotia, through the 
 Locrians of Ozoli, to Cytinium in Doris, keep- 
 ing Parnassus on his right till he got down 
 amongst the Phocians, who, he reckoned, from 
 their constant friendship with the Athenians, 
 would readily join him, or however might easily 
 be compelled to do it ; and then, that Boeotia 
 borders next on the Phocians : — Demosthenes, 
 I say, weighing from Leucas with his whole 
 force, to the great regret of the Acarnanians, 
 coasted along to Solium. He there communi- 
 cated his plan to the Acarnanians, in which 
 they refused to join, because he had refused 
 the blockade of Leucas. Demosthenes, with 
 his other force, the Cephallenians, and Messe- 
 nians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred 
 soldiers draughted from on board the Athenian 
 ships (the fifteen Corcyrean were already de- 
 parted), set about this expedition against the 
 .<Etolians. He began it from Oeneon in 
 Locris : for the Locrians, called Ozote, were 
 allies, and had notice to meet the Athenians 
 with all their force in the midland parts. These, 
 being not only borderers, but using also the 
 same kind of arms with the .33tolians, were 
 judged most proper to accompany the expe- 
 dition, as they knew so well their method of 
 battle, and their country. Having reposed his 
 army one night within the verge of the temple 
 of the Nemejan Jove (in which the inhabitants 
 have a tradition that Hesiod' the poet expired. 
 
 1 Tlie story of Hesiod's death is related by Plutarch 
 in The Banquet of the seven wise men. Solon inler- 
 posing here said, "Such things, Diodes, must be re- 
 ferred immediately to the gods, they are above human 
 condition. But the case of Hesiod is within the lot of 
 humanity, and concerns us all. But perhaps you know 
 
 in pursuance of an oracle Which had fixed 
 Nemea for the place of his death), he marched 
 again at break of day, and entered ^tolia. 
 On the first day he taketh Potidania, on the 
 second Crocylium, and on the third Tichium. 
 There he halted, and sent away the booty to 
 Eupolium, of Locris. It was now his resolu- 
 tion, after he had subdued the rest, to march last 
 of all against the Ophionians, if they did not 
 voluntarily submit beforehatid, in his retreat 
 back to Naupactus. 
 
 This preparation against them did by no 
 means escape the iEtolians. The scheme was 
 no sooner formed than they had gained intel- 
 ligence of it ; and by the time the army was 
 within their borders, they were all drawn to- 
 gether in a numerous body for their mutual 
 defence ; nay, even the most distant Ophio- 
 nians, who are seated upon the Meliac bay, 
 the Bomiensians and Calliensians, were already 
 come up. 
 
 The Messenians continued to amuse Demos, 
 theneswith the same suggestions as at first: they 
 still insisted, that the conquest of the ^tolians 
 would be an easy performance, and advised him 
 to advance immediately against their villages, nor 
 give them time to gather together in a body to 
 oppose him, but to attack every place he came 
 to, and take it. This advice being quite to his 
 own taste, and relying upon his own good for- 
 
 the story." I do not, he replied. *' It is then well wortii 
 your hearing. A certain Milesian, it seems in whose 
 company Hesiod was hospitably lodged and «ri1^;itained 
 in Locris, had secretly debauched the daughter of their 
 host. When the affair came to light, it was suspected 
 that Hesiod had all along been privy to the intrigue, 
 and concealed such base behaviour; and, though he was 
 entirely innocent, he fell n victim to hasty resentment 
 and foul calumniation. The brothers of the damsel laid 
 wait for, and slew him at the Nemean temple in Locris, 
 and with him his servant, whose name was Troilus. 
 Their bodies being thrown info the sea. that of Troilus, 
 indeed, floating up into the river Dapbnus, was stopped 
 at a rock quite surrounded with water, a small distance 
 from tne sea. But the moment Hesiod's body was 
 thrown into the sea, a shoal of dolphins caught it and 
 carried it to Rhium and Molycrium. The Locrians that 
 very day were assembled at Rhiumfor a solemn festival 
 and sacrifice, which they still continue to celebrate at 
 the same place. The dead body was no sooner beheld 
 in i.ts approach, than full of wonder, as wtis likely, they 
 hurried down to the beach, and, kno'ving it to be the 
 body of Hesiod, and very fresh, they postponed every 
 other care to the discovery of this murder, from their 
 high regard for Hesiod. This was soon done; the assas. 
 sins were found oiit, whom they threw headlong into 
 the sea and demolislied their houses. Ilut Hesiod waa 
 buried by them in the temple of the Nemean Jove." 
 
 Q 
 
126 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book hi. 
 
 tune, which hitherto had never been chedied, 
 without wating for the Locrians who were 
 very much wanted, and were to have joined 
 him (for he stood most in need of light-armed 
 darters), he advanced to .-Egitium, and assault- 
 ing, takes it by storm. The inhabitants made 
 their escape, and posted themselves upon the 
 hills which overlook the town. It was situated 
 amongst lofty eminences, and distant froin the 
 sea about eighty stadia.' 
 
 But now the ^tolians, who were come up 
 for the preservation of jEgitium, running down 
 in separate bodies from different eminences, 
 made an attack upon the Athenians and allies, 
 and poured in their javelins amongst them : 
 and whenever the Athenian army approached 
 to charge, they plied before them ; when they 
 again fell back, these again returned to the 
 charge. This kind of engagement continued 
 for a long time, a series of alternate pursuits 
 and retreats, in both which the Athenians 
 suffered most. So long however as their 
 archers had darts, and opportunity to use them, 
 they lost no ground ; for the light-armed JEto- 
 lians fell back to avoid the darts. But when 
 the chief of the archers dropped, his party was 
 soon dispersed, and the whole army began to 
 incline. Their strength was quite exhausted 
 by so many repeated charges; and now, the 
 .^tolians pressing hard upon them, and pour- 
 ing in whole showers of missive weapons, they 
 turned about and fled. Now tumbling into 
 caverns from whence they could not recover 
 themselves, or bewildered in places of which 
 they had no knowledge, they were niiserably 
 destroyed. For Cromon the Messenian, who 
 laid out all the routes,'had been killed in the 
 battle. The j?2tolians pursued with their darts, 
 and being not only swift of foot, but also 
 lightly armed, easily overtook many of them in 
 their flight, and did great execution. A large 
 party, who had lost their way, threw them- 
 selves into a wood which was quite impassable. 
 The jEtolians set the wood on fire, in the 
 flames of which they were all consumed. 
 Kvery affecting species of flight and destruc- 
 tion was now the fate of the Athenian army. 
 Those who had the good fortune to escape, 
 effected it by reaching the sea and Oeneon of 
 Locris, from whence they first began the expe- 
 dition. 
 
 The number of the allies who thus perished, 
 
 1 About eight miles. 
 
 was large; that of heavy armed Athenians was 
 about a hundred and twenty ; so considerable 
 was the loss, and all of them in the very flower 
 of their youth. In the whole course of this 
 war, the state of Athens never lost at any one 
 time so many of her most gallant citizens as 
 now. Procles also, the other commander in this 
 expedition, perished. 
 
 They afterwards fetched off their dead by a 
 truce obtained from the ^tolians. This being 
 done, they retired to Naupactus, and there 
 shipped themselves for Athens. Demosthenes 
 however was left behind at Naupactus, and 
 the parts adjacent. After such a miscarriage 
 he durst not presume to face the people of 
 Athens. 
 
 About the same time, the Athenians on the 
 Sicilian statioil, having sailed towards Locris, 
 landed upon that coast. They destroyed a 
 party of Locrians who endeavoured to make 
 head against them ; and then take PeripoUum, 
 a town situated on the river Halex. 
 
 The same summer the -iEtolians, who had 
 some time before despatched an embassy to 
 Corinth and Lacedsemon, composed of Tolo- 
 phus the Ophionian, Boriades the Eurysthan- 
 ian, and Tisander the Apodotian, prevail there 
 in their suit for a diversion against Naupactus, 
 because the Athenians had invaded their terri- 
 tories. It was about autumn when the Lace- 
 dsemonians marched away three thousand heavy- 
 armed of their allies ; of which number five 
 hundred belonged to Heraclea, the city so 
 lately founded in Trachinia. Eurylochus, a 
 Spartan was appointed to command in the ex- 
 pedition, and was accompanied by two other 
 Spartans, Macarius and Menedaeus. The army 
 being drawn into a body at Delphi, Eurylochus 
 despatched a herald to the Ozolian Locri ; his 
 route to Naupactus lay through their territory. 
 He was also desirous to detach them from the 
 Athenian alliance. The Amphissensians were 
 the readiest of all the Locri to give their con- 
 currence, as standing in perpetual awe of the 
 hatred bore them by the Phocians. These 
 therefore were the first who sent in hostages, 
 and who persuaded others to follow their ex- 
 ample, from a dread of this army which was 
 now approaching. Accordingly, the Myonen- 
 sians, their own borderers, were the first who 
 complied ; for their part of Locris is most diffi 
 cult of access. These were followed by the 
 Ippensians, and Messapians, and TritEeensians 
 and Challseans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and 
 
YEAR VI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 127 
 
 Oeanthians ; and all these gave a personal at- 
 tendance in the expedition. The Olpeans 
 indeed sent in their hostages, but would not 
 attend. The Hyseans refused their hostages 
 till one of their villages called Polls was seized. 
 
 When all things were ready, and the hosta- 
 ges placed securely at Cytiniura of Doris, Eu. 
 rylochus with his army taking the route of 
 Locris, advanced against Naupactus. He seized 
 upon Oeneon and Eupolium as he marched, for 
 refusing to concur. When they had entered 
 the territory of Naupactus, and were joined by 
 the jEtolian aid, they wasted the country to the 
 very suburb, of which also, because unfortified, 
 they took possession. Turning thence to Mo- 
 ly«rium, a Corinthian colony, but now subject 
 to the Athenians, they reduce it. 
 
 But Demosthenes the Athenian (for he had 
 continued at Naupactus ever since the ^tolian 
 miscarriage) having received intelligence of 
 this army, and dreading the loss of this place, 
 had addressed himself to the Acarnanians, and 
 with some difficulty, owing to his departure 
 from Leucas, persuades them to send a suc- 
 cour to Naupactus. Accordingly, they put a 
 thousand of their heavy-armed under his or- 
 ders, whom he threw into the town by sea, 
 which effectually preserved it. For the danger 
 before was manifest, as the wall was very large 
 in compass, and the number of defendants in- 
 considerable. 
 
 When Eurylochus and his council had dis- 
 covered that such a succour had been received 
 into the town, and that its reduction was now 
 impracticable, they marched away their forces, 
 not towards Peloponnesus, but to that ^tolia 
 which is now called Calydon, to Pleurou, to 
 the neighbouring towns, and to Proschion of 
 .^tolia. The Ambraciots had now been with 
 and prevailed upon them, to join in some at- 
 tempts upon Argos in Amphilochia, upon the 
 rest of that province, and Acarnania ; assuring 
 them, that could these be reduced, the whole 
 continent there would instantly go over to the 
 Lacedajmonian league. Eurylochus having 
 assured them of his concurrence, and given 
 the ^tolians their dismission, halted there- 
 abouts with his army, till the Ambraciots had 
 entered upon the expedition against Argos, and 
 it was time for him to join them. And here 
 the summer ended. 
 
 The Athenians in Sicily, the beginning of 
 the winter, putting themselves at the head of 
 their Grecian allies, and as many of their 
 
 Sicilian as, unable to support the Syracusan 
 yoke, had revolted from Syracuse to join them, 
 began fresh operations of war in concert, and 
 assaulted Nessa a town of Sicily, the citadel ol 
 which was in the hands of the Syracusans, 
 But the attempt was unsuccessful, and they 
 again determined to draw off. During the re- 
 treat, the Syracusans sallying forth, fell upon 
 those allies of the Athenians who marched in 
 the rear, and with such force, that they put a 
 part of the army to flight, and slew a consider 
 able number, 
 
 After this, Laches and the Athenians, hav- 
 ing made some attempts, and landed on the 
 coast of Locris near the mouth of the river 
 Caicinus, were engaged by a party of Locrians 
 consisting of about three hundred, under 
 Proxenus the son of Capaton. These the 
 Athenians defeated, and having stripped them 
 of their arms, went off the coast. 
 
 The same winter also the Athenians purified 
 Delos, in obedience to an oracle. Pisistratus 
 the tyrant had purified it formerly, not indeed 
 the whole, but so much of the island as lies 
 within the prospect of the temple. The puri- 
 fication now was universal, and performed in 
 the following manner : 
 
 They broke up all the sepulchres of the 
 dead without exception, and prohibited for the 
 future any death or birth in the island, both 
 which were to be confined to Rhencea. For 
 Khenaea lies at so small a distance from Delos, 
 that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who was 
 formerly of great power by sea, amongst other 
 isles he reduced to his dominions, took Rhentea 
 also, which he consecrated to Delian Apollo, 
 and fastened it to Delos by a chain. " And 
 after this purification, the Athenians made the 
 first institution of the Delian games to be so- 
 lemnized every fifth returning year. Not but 
 that in the earlier times there was used to be a 
 great conflux of lonians and neighbouring 
 islanders to Delos. They resorted to the so- 
 lemn festivals there with their wives and chil- 
 dren, in the same manner as the lonians do 
 now to Ephesus. Games of bodily exercise 
 and of music were a^ually celebrated, and 
 cities exhibited their respective choruses. - For 
 this we have the testimony of Homer in the 
 following verses of his hymn to Apollo : 
 
 Totliee, O Phoebus, most the DeVan isle 
 Gives cordial joy, excites the pleasing smile; 
 When gay lonians flock around tliy fane; 
 Men, women, children, a resplendent train, 
 
128 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book III. 
 
 Whose flowing garments sweep the sacred pile, 
 Wliose grateful concourse gladdens all tlie isle, 
 Where champions fight, where dancers beat the 
 
 ground, > 
 
 Where cheerful music echoes all around, 
 Thy feast to honour, and thy praise to sound. 
 
 That there was also a iQUsical game to which 
 artists resorted to make trials of their skill, he 
 fully showeth in other verses to be found in the 
 same hymn : for, having sung the Delian chorus 
 of females, he closeth their praise with these 
 lines, in which further he hath made mention 
 of himelf : 
 
 Hail! great Apollo, radiant god of day. 
 
 Hail! Cynthia, goddess of the lunar sway; 
 
 Henceforth on me propitious smile! and you, 
 
 Ye blooming beauties of the isle, adieu! 
 
 When future guests shall reach your happy shore, 
 
 And refuged here from toils lament no more: 
 
 When social chat the mind unbending cheers. 
 
 And this demand shall greet your friendly ears — 
 
 " Who was the Bard, e'er landed on your coast, 
 
 Who sung the sweetest, and who pleased you most?" 
 
 With voice united, all ye blooming fair, 
 
 Join in your answer, and for me declare; 
 
 Say — *'Tlie blind bard the sweetest notes may boast. 
 
 He lives at Cliios, and he pleased us most." 
 
 Such an evidence hath Homer left us, that 
 in early times there was a great concourse and 
 festival at Delos. But afterwards the people 
 of the islands and the Athenians sent in their 
 parties for the chorus with victims. But the 
 usual games, and the most of the solemn rites, 
 had been disused, through some sinister events, 
 till the Athenians now made a fresh institution 
 of this solemnity, with the addition of a chariot- 
 race, which had not formerly been a part of it. 
 
 The same winter, the Ambraciots, in pursu- 
 ance of their engagements with Eurylochus, 
 who waited their motions, march away with 
 three thousand heavy-armed against the Am- 
 philochian Argos. Accordingly, breaking into 
 .\rgia, they seize Olpte, a strong place, situated 
 on an eminence on the sea-side. This place 
 had been formerly fortified by the Acarnanians, 
 who used it for the public tribunal of justice. 
 It is distant from the city of Argos, which is 
 altio a maritime town, about twenty-five stadia.' 
 The Acarnanians wer^ow in motion, some 
 running to the defence of Argos, others to en- 
 camp at the important post of Crenas in Am- 
 philochia, to observe the motions of the Pelo- 
 ponnesians commanded by Eurylochus, that 
 they might not perfect their junction with the 
 
 1 About two miles and a half. 
 
 Ambraciots, without some molestation on their 
 route. They also send to Demosthenes the 
 Athenian general in the .^tolian expedition, 
 to come and put himself at their head ; and to 
 the Athenian squadron of twenty sail, which 
 was then upon the coast of Peloponnesus, un- 
 der the command of Aristotle, son of Timo- 
 crates, and Hieroplipn son of Antimnestus. 
 
 The Ambraciots at Olpse sent also a messen- 
 ger to their own city, ordering them, to a man, 
 to come out into the fiield. They were afraid 
 lest Eurylochus might not be able to pass the 
 Acarnanians, and so they should be compelled 
 cither to fight alone ; or, should they attempt 
 a retreat, to find it full of danger. 
 
 But the Peloponnesians commanded by 
 Eurylochus had no sooner heard that the Am- 
 braciots were at Olpa;, than dislodging from 
 Proschium they marched with all expedition to 
 their support. After passing the Achelous, they 
 took the route of Acaniania, desolate at pre- 
 sent, as the inhabitants were fled to the defence 
 of Argos, having on their right the city and 
 garrison of the Stratians, and the rest of Acar- 
 nania on their left. When they had passed 
 through the territory of the Stratians, they 
 crossed Phytia, and again through the extre- 
 mity of Mcdeon, and then marched across 
 Limnaaa. They now entered the kingdom of 
 the Agrajans, which had deserted the Acarna- 
 nian to favour the Pcloponnesian interest. 
 Securing then the mountain Thyamus, a wild 
 uncultivated spot, they crossed it, and de- 
 scended thence by night into Argia. They 
 afterwards passed undiscovered betwixt the city 
 of the Argians, and the post of the Acarna- 
 nians at Crenae, and so perfected their junction 
 with the Ambraciots at Olpoe. After this 
 junction, their numbers being large; they take 
 possession next morn, at break of day, of a 
 post called MetropoUs, and there fix encamp- 
 ment. 
 
 Not long after this the Athenian squadron 
 of twenty sail comes into the bay of Ambracia, 
 to succour the Argians. Demosthenes also 
 arrived, with two hundred heavy-armed Mes- 
 senians, and sixty Athenian archers. The 
 station^of the fleet was fixed under the fort 
 of Olpa;. But the Acarnanians, and some 
 few of the Aniphilochians, who had already 
 gathered into a body at Argos, (for the majori- 
 ty of them was obstructed by the Ambraciats,) 
 got every thing in readiness to engage the ene- 
 my. They elect Demosthenes to be the com 
 
YEAK VI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 129 
 
 inander of the whole associated force, with the 
 assistance of their own generals. He caused 
 them to advance near Olpaa, and there encamped 
 them. A great hollow lay between the armies. 
 For five days they remained in a state of inac- 
 tion, but on the sixth both sides drew up in 
 order of battle. The Peloponnesians were 
 more numerous, and their line of course was 
 further extended. Demosthenes therefore, 
 that he might not be inclosed, placeth an am- 
 buscade of the heavy and light-armed, to the 
 number in all of about four hundred, in a hol- 
 low way overgrown with shrubs and bushes, 
 with orders that in the heat of the charge they 
 should rise up and attack the over-extended 
 line of the enemy in their rear. When all 
 things were ready on both sides, they came to 
 blows. Demosthenes led the right wing, com- 
 posed of the Messenians, and his few Atheni- 
 ans. The other consisted of the Acarnanians, 
 drawn up in the order they happened to fall 
 into as they came up, and the Amphilochian 
 darters who were at hand. But the Pelopon- 
 nesians and Ambraciots were drawn up pro- 
 miscuously, except the Mantineans. The 
 Mantineans stood embodied rather to the left, 
 but not in the extremity : for Eurylochus, 
 with a select party, was posted there over-against 
 the Messenians and Demosthenes. 
 
 No sooner was the battle joined, and the 
 Peloponnesians on that wing were moving for- 
 ward their superior numbers to surround the 
 right of their adversaries, than the Acarnanians, 
 starting up from their ambuscade, falling upon 
 them in the rear, assault and put them to flight. 
 They gave way before the very first shock, and 
 struck such a consternation into the bulk of the 
 army, that they also began to run : for they no 
 sooner saw the party with Eurylochus, and 
 which was the flower of their strength, entirely 
 broken, than they felt a panic for themselves. 
 And the Messenians, who fought at the same 
 post with Demosthenes, behaved so very well 
 that they finished the rout. The Ambraciots 
 in the meantime, and those in the right, had 
 got the better of their opponents, and were 
 pursuing them towards Argos ; for beyond a 
 doubt they are the most warlike people of any 
 in those parts. But when they were returned 
 from the pursuit, they perceived the bulk of 
 their army was defeated ; and the rest of the 
 Acarnanians beginning to charge them, with 
 much difficulty they threw themselves into 
 24 
 
 Olpae. The number of the slain was great, aa 
 they had made their attacks without any order, 
 and with the utmost confusion ; vye must ex- 
 cept the Mantineans, who kept most firmly 
 together, and retreated in the best order of the 
 whole enemy. The battle was ended only with 
 the night. 
 
 The next jnorning, as Eurylochus was killed 
 and Macarius also, the command devolved upon 
 Menedaeus. The defeat was irrecoverably 
 great, and he was highly perplexed — whether 
 he should abide a siege, in which he must not 
 only be shut up by land, but by the Athenian 
 ships be blocked up also by sea, — or whether 
 he should endeavour to secure his retreat. At 
 length he treats with Demosthenes and the 
 Acarnanians for a suspension of arms both for 
 his own departure and the fetching of the 
 dead. The dead they at once delivered, and 
 set up a trophy themselves, and took up their 
 own dead to the number of about three hundred. 
 But a truce for their departure was not openly 
 granted to them all. Demosthenes, in concert 
 with the Acarnanian generals, agreed to a 
 secret article with the Mantineans, and Mene- 
 dasus and the other Peloponnesian officers, and 
 as many others as were of any consideration — 
 that " they should depart immediately." His 
 policy was, to have the Ambraciots and- the 
 promiscuous body of mercenaries left quite des- 
 titute, wishing above all things for such a pre- 
 text to calumniate the Lacedaemonians and 
 Peloponnesians amongst the Grecians of those 
 parts, " as men who wilfully abandon their 
 friends, from a mere selfish treacherous regard 
 to their own safety." Having leave therefore 
 to fetch off their dead, they interred them all 
 as well as their hurry would admit. And those 
 in the secret, were busy in concerting the means 
 of their departure. 
 
 But now intelligence is brought to Demos- 
 thenes and the Acarnanians, that the Ambra- 
 ciots of the city, with their whole collected 
 force, had, in pursuance of the former summons, 
 begun their march for Olpa;, through Amphi- 
 lochi, designing to join their countrymen at 
 Olpaj, and quite ign,prant of the late defeat. 
 Upon this, he immediately detacheth a part of 
 his army, to beset all the passes, and to seize all 
 the advantageous posts upon their route, and 
 got ready at the same time to march against 
 them with the remainder of his force. 
 
 In the meantime, the Mantineans and these 
 9,2 
 
130 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book III. 
 
 comprehended in the secret articles, got out 
 of the town upon the pretext of gathering 
 herbs and fuel, went gradually off in small 
 parties, gathering what they pretended to come 
 out for as they passed along. But when they 
 had thus straggled to a considerable distance 
 from OlpiE, they moved away in a more nim- 
 ble pace. The Ambraciots and otfeers, who in 
 great numbers came out in their company, when 
 they perceived them thus stealing oif, felt an 
 inclination to follow, and so taking to their 
 heels, ran speedily after them. The Acarna- 
 nians imagined at first, that they were all equal- 
 ly endeavouring to escape without permission, 
 and therefore set out in pursuit of the Pelo- 
 ponnesians. Their oflBcers endeavoured to 
 stop them, crying out, that " leave was given 
 for their escape." — Upon which a soldier, con- 
 cluding their officers had been guilty of treach- 
 ery, darted his javelin amongst them. But 
 afterwards they connived at the escape of the 
 Mantineans and the Peloponnesians, but made 
 slaughter of the Ambraciots. Great indeed 
 was the tumult, and the perplexity also to dis- 
 tinguish which was an Ambraciot, and which 
 was a Peloponnesian ; and amidst the confusion 
 about two hundred were slain. The rest made 
 tlieir escape into the bordering kingdom of 
 Agrseis, where Salythius king of the Agrseans, 
 who was their friend, took them under his pro- 
 tection. 
 
 The Ambraciots of the city were now ad- 
 vanced as far as Idomene. There are two lofty 
 eminences which are called by this name, The 
 higher of the two, by favour of the dark, the 
 detachment sent before by Demosthenes from 
 the camp had seized, without being discovered, 
 and had posted themselves upon it. The Am- 
 braciots had possessed themselves already of 
 the lower, and halted there for the night. 
 Demosthenes after his evening repast, and the 
 remainder of the army, about shut of evening, 
 began to march. He himself took half of them 
 to attack the enemy in front, whilst the other 
 was fetching a compass round the mountains of 
 Amphilochia. 
 
 The next morning was no sooner in its dawn, 
 than he comes upon the Ambraciots yet in 
 their beds, still ignorant of all that had passed, 
 and rather supposing these new-comers to be 
 their friends. For Demosthenes had politicly 
 placed the Messenians in the van, and ordered 
 them to discourse as they moved along in the 
 Doric dialect, thus to prevent any alarm from 
 
 their advanced guards, who further, so long as 
 the dark continued, could not possibly distin- 
 guish their faces. By this means, he no sooner 
 assaulted the camp than the rout began. Num- 
 bers of them were slain upon the spot. The re- 
 mainder fled amain towards the mountains. But 
 the passes were all beset ; and more than this, 
 the Amphilochians, who were well acquaint- 
 ed with their own country, were pursuing in the 
 light enemies who were encumbered with the 
 heavy armour. Quite ignorant of the country 
 nor knowing whither they were flying, they 
 rushed headlong into hollow ways, into all the 
 ambuscades laid ready by the enemy, to their 
 own destruction. Yet as no possible method 
 of escape was unattempted, some of them turn- 
 ed towards the sea, which was not greatly dis- 
 tant. And when they beheld the Athenian 
 ships moving along the shore, in so fatal a con- 
 currence for their ruin, they plunged into the 
 water, and swam up to them, chosing rather, 
 in the present consternation, to be destroyed 
 by the Athenians on board of those ships, than 
 by the Barbarians and their most inveterate 
 foes, the Amphilochians. Through such a 
 series of misfortunes, but few out of the nu- 
 merous body of Ambraciots were so happy as to 
 escape to their own home. The Acarnanians, 
 having stripped the dead, and erected the tro- 
 phies, marched back to Argos. 
 
 On the following day they were addressed by 
 a herald, sent from those Ambraciots who had 
 escaped from Olpse, and were now in the 
 Agrseis. His commission was to obtain the 
 bodies of the dead who had been killed since 
 the first engagement, as they were attempting 
 without permission to escape along with the 
 Mantineans and others who were going off by 
 agreement. This herald, casting his eyes up- 
 on the arms of the Ambraciots from the city, 
 was astonished at the number. He knew no- 
 thing of that fresh calamity, but concluded 
 they all belonged to the party for whom he was 
 now employed. Somebody asked him the rea- 
 son of his surprise, and what he judged to be 
 the number of the dead 1 Now he who asked 
 the question supposed the herald to havt been 
 sent by those of Idomene. " Not more than two 
 hundred," says the herald. The demandant 
 then replied, " It should seem otherwise by the 
 arms, for these are the arms of more than a 
 thousand men." The herald rejoined, " Then 
 they cannot belong to those of our party." The 
 other replied, " They must, if you fought yes- 
 
YEAK VI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 131 
 
 terday at Idomene." " We fought nowhere 
 yesterday : we suflTered the day before in our 
 retreat from OIpos." " But we fought yester- 
 day against those Ambraciots, who were ad- 
 vancing from the city to relieve you." When 
 the herald heard this, and found that the army 
 of relief from the city was thus destroyed, he 
 burst into a groan ; and, quite overpowered 
 with the weight of the present calamities, he 
 went off abruptly, and without renewing his de- 
 mand about the dead. 
 
 During the whole course of this war, no 
 other Grecian city suffered so great a loss in so 
 short a time. I have not presumed to mention 
 the number of the slain, because it is said to 
 have been incredibly great, when compared 
 with the size of their city. But I am well con- 
 vinced that if, in compliance with the advice of 
 the Athenians and Demosthenes, the Acarna- 
 nians and Amphilochians would have proceeded 
 to the excision of Ambracia, they might have 
 done it with the bare shout of their voice. But 
 they dreaded its falling into the hands of the 
 Athenians, who might prove worse neighbours 
 to them than the old. 
 
 But to return. A third part of the spoils 
 was bestowed upon the Athenians, the rest 
 was divided amongst the confederate cities. 
 Those allotted the Athenians were lost at sea. 
 For the three hundred suits of armour which 
 are reposited in the temples of Athens, were 
 selected for Demosthenes, who now returned 
 thither, and brought them with him. The 
 dread he had been under ever since his mis- 
 carriage in jEtolia was quite dispelled by the 
 good service he had now performed. 
 
 The Athenians, with their squadron of 
 twenty sail, were now returned to Naupactus ; 
 and, since the departure of the Athenians and 
 Demosthenes, the Acarinanians and Amphilo- 
 chians had granted by treaty to those Ambra- 
 ciots and Peloponnesians, who had refuged 
 with Salynthius and the Agrasans, a safe retreat 
 from amongst the Oeniadae, who had also gone 
 over to Salynthius and the Agrseans. And 
 afterwards the Acarnanians and Amphilochians 
 concluded a peace and an alliance for a hun- 
 dred years with the Ambraciots, upon these 
 conditions : 
 
 " That neither the Ambraciots should be 
 obliged to join the Acarnanians in any at- 
 tempts against the Peloponnesians; nor the 
 Acarnanians to act with the Ambraciots against 
 the Athenians. 
 
 " That if either were attacked, the others 
 should march to their defence. 
 
 " That the Ambraciots should restore all 
 the places and frontier belonging to the Am- 
 philochians, which were at present in their 
 hands. And, 
 
 " That they should in no shape sup- 
 port Anaptorium, which was then in hostility 
 with the Acarnanians." 
 
 These articles being mutually agreed to, the 
 war came to a conclusion. But after this, the 
 Corinthians sent a party of their own people, 
 consisting of three hundred heavy-armed, com- 
 rtianded by Xenoclides the son of Euthycles, 
 for the guard of Ambracia, who arrived, after 
 great difficulties, as they marched all the way 
 over-laud. And this is the account of trans- 
 actions in Ambracia. 
 
 The Athenians in Sicily, this same winter, 
 made a descent against HimerEea from their 
 ships, whilst the Sicilians, pouring down from 
 the upper country, were ravaging its frontier. 
 They steered their course also against the isles 
 of jEolus. But when they were returned to 
 their old station at Khegium, they found there 
 Pythodorus the son of Isolochus, who was 
 commissioned to take upon him the command 
 of the fleet, in the room of Laches. For the 
 confederates of Sicily had sent a deputation to 
 Athens, to solicit a more ample succour of 
 shipping. Because, as in fact the Syracusans 
 were masters of all their lands, and they were 
 also awed at sea by a few Syracusan vessels, 
 they were now intent on gathering together 
 such a naval force as might strike an effectual 
 terror. The Athenians equipped out forty 
 sail as a reinforcement for Sicily. Their mo- 
 tive was, not only to bring the war in those 
 parts to a speedy determination, but also to 
 keep their own mariners in constant practice. 
 Pythodorus, one of the admirals appointed for 
 this service, they sent off immediately with a 
 few ships : Sophocles son of Sostratides, and 
 Eurymedon son of Thucles, were soon to follow 
 with the main body of the fleet. But Pytho- 
 dorus, who had now took the command from 
 Laches, steered, about the close of the winter, 
 against that fortress of the Locrians which 
 Laches had taken before. But, being defeated 
 at his landing by the Locrians, he returned 
 again to his station. 
 
 About the spring of the year, a torrent of 
 fire overflowed from mount JEttm, in the same 
 manner as formerly, which destroyed part of 
 
132 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book III. 
 
 the lands of the Cataneans, who are situated at 
 the foot of that mountain, which is the largest in 
 all Sicily. It is said that fifty years intervened 
 between this flow and the last which preceded ; 
 
 and that in the whole the fire hath thus issued compiled, expired. 
 
 thrice since Sicily was inhabited by the Greci 
 ans. Such were the occurrences of this winter, 
 at the end of which the sixth year also of thia 
 war, the history of which Thucydides nath 
 
THE 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 
 Ikar VII. The AtheniatiB seize and fortify Pylus in Lnconia. The LacediEinonians malce slight of it at first, 
 yet afterwards exert their utmost efforts to dislodge them, though in vain. Their body thrown into Sphacteriji 
 is intercepted, and bloclted up by the Athenian fleet. A suspension of arms and a truce ensue, but soon brolce, 
 Proceedings in Sicily : a naval engagement in the strait of Messene. At Athena, Cleon is drawn in by his own 
 bravado to undertake the reduction of Sphacteria. He repairs thither, and completes the work beyond all ex- 
 pectation. The LacedfEinonians, terribly distressed, send many proposals for a peace, but none are accepted. 
 The Athenians invade the Corinthians : battle of Soligia. Tragical period of the sedition at Corcyra. Dc-ath 
 of Artaxerxes Longiinanus. — VIII. Expedition againsfCythera. Continuation of affairs in Sicily. The sur- 
 prise of Megara unsuccessfully attempted. A project formed for a total revolution in Bobolia. Brasidas begin- 
 neth his march for Thrace, and by his noble behaviour carries all before him. The battle of Delium. Successful 
 progress of Brasidas in Thrace.— IX. Truce for a year. The affairs of Tlirace continued. 
 
 The ensuing summer, when the com was be- 
 ginning to ear, ten sail of Syracusan, joined 
 by an equal number of Locrean vessels, at the 
 invitation of the inhabitants, stood away for 
 Messene in Sicily, and toolc possession of the 
 place. And thus Messene revolted from the 
 Athenians. But this event was chiefly owing 
 to the practices of the Syracusans, who, fore- 
 seeing that this town might open the way for 
 the reduction of Sicily, were greatly afraid lest 
 the Athenians should get established there, 
 and, with augmented forces, pour out from 
 thence upon them. The Locrians assisted 
 out of enmity to the Rhegians, whom they 
 were desirous to have it in their power to at- 
 tack both by land and sea. At the same time 
 also, these Locrians broke in upon the terri- 
 to.y of the Khegians with their entire force, 
 to deter them from any attempt to save Mes- 
 eene, and to gratify also those fugitives from 
 Rhegium, who acted now in combination with 
 them. For Rhegium had for a long time been 
 embroiled in sedition, and so was unable to 
 take the field against these invaders, who for 
 che same reason were more eager to distress 
 
 1 Before Christ 455. 
 
 them. When the ravage was completed, the 
 Locrians marched their land-forces back, but 
 their ships were stationed on the guard of 
 Messene. They also were very busy in the 
 equipment of an additional number, which 
 were to repair to that station, and be ready to 
 move from thence to any future operations of 
 war. 
 
 About the same season of the spring, before 
 the corn was fully grown, the Peloponnesians 
 and allies made their inroad into Attica. Agis, 
 the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedte- 
 monians, commanded. They fixed their camp, 
 and ravaged the country. 
 
 The Athenians now sent out to sea the 
 forty ships already prepared for the Sicilian 
 voyage, under the command of Eurymedon 
 and Sophocles, who staid behind to bring up 
 this reinforcement, since Pythodorus, the third 
 in the commission, was already in his post at 
 Sicily. They had orders also in the course of 
 the voyage to touch at Corcyra, and provide 
 effectually for the preservation of those in the 
 city, who were sadly infested by the outlaws 
 posted on the mountain. Sixty sail of the 
 Peloponnesians were now upon that coast, to 
 act in support of those on the mountain, who, 
 as the city was sorely oppressed with famine, 
 presumed they' should with ease carry all be- 
 
 133 
 
134 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 (ore them. Demosthenes, further, who had 
 been in no public employ since his return from 
 Acarnania, procured leave to go on board this 
 fleet, with authority to employ it on the coast 
 of Peloponnesus, if he judged it for the service. 
 When they were got to the height of Laco- 
 nia, intelligence is brought them, that " the 
 Peloponnesian fleet is now in Corcyra." Eu- 
 lymedon and Sophocles were for making the 
 best of their way thither. But it was the ad- 
 vice of Demosthenes to go first to Pylus, and 
 after they had secured that place, to proceed 
 in their voyage. This was positively refused ; 
 but it so happened, that a storm arose which 
 drove the whole fleet, to Pylus. Demosthenes 
 insisted that they should immediately fortify 
 the place, since this was the motive of his at- 
 tendance in the fleet. He showed them, that 
 "there was, at hand plenty of timber and stone 
 for the work ; that, besides the strength of its 
 natural situation, the place itself was barren, 
 as was also the greatest part of the adjacent 
 country." For Pylus lies at the distance of 
 about four hundred stadia" from Sparta, in the 
 district which was formerly called Messenia ; 
 but the name given it by the Lacedemonians 
 is Coryphasium. The others replied ; " there 
 are many barren capes in the Peloponnesus, 
 which those may secure who have a mind to 
 plunge the commonwealth into needless ex- 
 penses." This place, however, seemed to him 
 to be better marked out for this purpose than 
 any other, as being possessed of a harbour; 
 and as the Messenians, who formerly bore 
 some relation to it, and still used the same 
 dialect with the Lacedaemonians, might from 
 hence give them great annoyance, and at the 
 same time effectually keep possession of it. 
 But when neither the commanders nor sol- 
 diers, nor the inferior offices,^ t<\ whom he 
 afterwards communicated his project, would 
 be brought to a compliance, he quietly let it 
 drop till the mere love of employment, during 
 the idleness of their suspended voyage, sedi- 
 
 » About forty English miles. 
 
 » Tlie word in tlie original is Taxiarclis. They seem 
 to lie nearly the same with captains of a company, in 
 Jie modern style, as their command was aver about one 
 hundred men. Taxiarclis were also officers of a higher 
 class, in number ten, every Athenian tribe appointing 
 one, whose business it was to marshall the armies, to 
 order the marches and encampments, to take care of 
 provisions, and to punish military otTences. But the 
 former seem to be the officers to whom Demosthenes 
 applied himself in the present instance. 
 
 fiously inclined the private soldiers to compass 
 it with a wall. They took the work in hand, 
 and plied it briskly. Tools they had none for 
 hewing and fitting the stones ; but picked out 
 and carried such as they judged most proper 
 for the work, and laid them one upon another 
 as compactly as they could. The mud that 
 was any where requisite, for want of vessels, 
 they carried on their shoulders, bending for- 
 wards as much as passible, that it might have 
 room to stick on, and holding it up with both 
 hands clasped fast behind that it might not 
 slide down. They spared no pains to prevent 
 the Lacedffimonians, and to put the place in a 
 proper posture of defence, before they could 
 come to their disturbance. For the largest 
 part of it was so well fortified by nature, that 
 it stood in no need of the defence of art. 
 
 The news of this arrived at Sparta during 
 the celebration of some public festival. They 
 set light by it ; assured, that so soon as they 
 appeared in sight, the enemy would either 
 abandon it, or the place be recovered by an 
 easy effort. And they were something more 
 dilatory, because their army was yet in Attica. 
 
 The Athenians, having completed their 
 works on the side towards the land, and on 
 the other necessary spots, in the space of six 
 days, leave Demosthenes with five ships to 
 guard it, and with the larger number resumed 
 their voyage for Corcyra and Sicily. 
 
 But the Peloponnesiana in Attica were no 
 sooner advertised of this seizure of Pylus, 
 than they marched back with all expedition. 
 The Lacediemonians, and Agis their king, re- 
 garded this affair of Pylus as their own do- 
 mestic concern. And besides, as they had 
 made the inroad early in the year, and whilst 
 the corn was yet green, many of them laboured 
 under a scarcity of provisions. The weather 
 also, which proved tempestuous beyond what 
 was usual in that season, had very much in- 
 commoded the army. In this manner, many 
 accidents concurred to accelerate their retreat, 
 and to render this the shortest of all their in- 
 vasions. For the whole of their stay in Attica 
 was but fifteen days. 
 
 About the same time Simonides, an Athe- 
 nian commander, having gathered together a 
 small party of Athenians from the neighbour- 
 ing garrisons, and a body of the circumjacent 
 dependents, took possession of Eion in Thrace, 
 a colony of the Medeans. It had declared 
 against the Athenians, but was now put into 
 
YEAR VII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 135 
 
 their hands by treachery. Yet, the Chalci- 
 deans and the Bottiseans coming immediately 
 to its relief, he was beat out of it again, and 
 lost a great number of his men. 
 
 After the retreat of the Peloponnesians out 
 of Attica, the Spartans,' in conjunction with 
 tliose of their allies, marched without loss of 
 time to the recovery of Pylus. The rest of 
 the Lacedaemonians were longer in their ap- 
 proach, as but just returned from another ex- 
 pedition. Yet a summons had been sent all 
 round Peloponnesus, to march directly for 
 Pylus. Their fleet of sixty sail was also re- 
 manded from Corcyra, which, being transported 
 by land over the isthmus of Leucas, arrive 
 before Pylus, undescried by the Athenians 
 who lay at Zacynthus. And by this time the 
 land army had also approached. 
 
 Demosthenes, before the coming up of the 
 Peloponnosian fleet, had timely despatched two 
 vessels to Eurymedon, and the Athenians on 
 ooard that fleet now lying at Zacynthus, press- 
 ing them to return, as the place was in danger 
 of being lost ; which vessels made the best of 
 their way, in pursuance of the earnest com- 
 mands of Demosthenes. But the Lacedasmo- 
 nians were now preparing to attack the fortress 
 both by land and sea, presuming it would easily 
 be destroyed, as "the work had been raised with 
 BO much precipitation and was defended by so 
 small a number of hands. But, as they also 
 expected the return of the Athenian ships from 
 Zacynthus, they designed, in case they took 
 not the place before, to bar up the mouths of 
 the harbour, so as to render the entrance im- 
 practicable to the Athenians. For an isle which 
 is called Sphacteria, lying before and at a small 
 distance, locks it up and rendereth the mouths 
 of the harbour narrow ; that near the fortress 
 of the Athenians and Pylus, a passage for two 
 ships only abreast ; and that between the other 
 points of land, for eight or nine. The whole 
 of it, as desert, was overgrown with wood and 
 quite untrod, and the compass of it at most is 
 about fifteen stadia.^ They were therefore 
 intent en shutting up these entrances with 
 ships moored close together, and their heads 
 towards the sea. And to prevent the moles- 
 tation apprehended, should the enemy take 
 
 » The reader will he pleased to take notice, that the 
 word Spartans is here emphatical. It means those of 
 the first class, tlie nohlest persona in tlie community, as 
 is plain from the sequel. 
 
 * One mile and a lialf. 
 
 possession of this island, they threw into it a 
 body of ,their heavy-armed, and posted another 
 body on the opposite shore ; — for by these 
 dispositions the Athenians would be incom- 
 moded from the island, and excluded from 
 landing on the main land ; and as, on the op- 
 posite coast of Pylus without the harbour, there 
 is no road where ships can lie, they would be 
 deprived of a station from whence to succour 
 the besieged : and thus, without the hazard of 
 a naval engagement, it was probable they should 
 get possession of the place, as the quantity of 
 provisions in it could be but small, since the 
 seizure had been executed with slender pre- 
 paration. Acting upon these motives, they 
 threw the body of heavy-armed into the island, 
 who were draughted by lot out of all the bands. 
 These for a time were successively relieved by 
 others. But the last body, who guarded that 
 post, and were forced to continue in it, consisted 
 of about four hundred and twenty, exclusive of 
 the Helots who attended them, and these were 
 commanded by Epitadas, the son of Molobrus. 
 
 Demosthenes, perceiving by these dispo- 
 sitions that the Lacedtemonians would attack 
 him by land and sea, provided for his own de- 
 fence. The triremes yet remaining with him 
 he drew ashore, and ranged them by way of 
 palisade before the fortress. The mariners he 
 armed with bucklers, sorry ones indeed, as most 
 of them were only twigs of osier plaited. Better 
 arms were not to be procured in so desert a 
 place. And even these they had taken out of a 
 cruizer of thirty oars and a light packet belonging 
 to Messenians, who happened accidentally to 
 put in. The Messenians on board were about 
 forty heavy armed, whom he ranged amongst 
 his own body. The gi'eater part therefore of 
 the unarmed, as well as some who had armour, 
 he placed on the strongest parts of the fortress 
 towards the continent, with orders to beat off 
 the land army whenever they approached. And 
 having selected from his whole number sixty 
 heavy armed and a few archers, he marched out 
 of the fortress to that part of the beach where 
 he supposed the enemy would endeavour to 
 land. The shore indeed was rough and rocky, 
 and bordered on the main sea ; yet, as the wall 
 was weakest in this quarter, he judged it would 
 soonest tempt and animate an assault. For 
 never imagining they should be out-numbered 
 in shipping, they had left the wall on this side 
 but weak ; and should the enemy now force a 
 landing, the place would undoubtedly be lost. 
 
136 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 Sensible of this, and determined if possible 
 to prevent their landing, Demosthenes posted 
 himself with his chosen band on the very edge 
 of the water, and endeavoured to animate them 
 by the following harangue : 
 
 " My fellow soldiers, here posted with me 
 in this dangerous situation, I conjure you, in 
 50 urgent an extremity, to throw away all su- 
 perfluous wisdom. Let not a soul amongst 
 you compute the perils which now environ us, 
 but regardless of the issue and inspirited by 
 hope let him charge the foe, and be confident 
 of success. A situation desperate like this 
 alloweth no room for calm consideration, but 
 demands the most precipitate venture. Supe- 
 rior advantages however are along with us ; — •* 
 of this I am convinced, provided we only stand 
 firm together, and scorning to be terrified at 
 the number of our foes, do not wilfully betray 
 those advantages which are now in our favour. 
 The shore is most difficult of access : — this in 
 my judgment makes abundantly for us ; — this 
 will support us, if we keep our ground. But 
 if we give way, difficult as it is now, their 
 landing will be easy — when there are none to 
 obstruct it. Nay, what is worse, we shall make 
 the enemy more furious, when, if we may 
 afterwards press l^Srd upon him, it is no longer 
 in his power to re-embark with ease For so 
 long as they continue on board they may most 
 easily be encountered ; whilst they are busy in 
 landing, they cannot so far overmatch us, as 
 that we ought to shrink before their numbers. 
 Large though they be, the spot of action will 
 be small for want of ground to draw up in 
 or3er. What though their force be superior 
 for the land 1 that advantage will be lost in 
 their present service, when they must act from 
 their vessels and on the water, where many 
 lucky contingencies are requisite. And thus I 
 am satisfied, that with these disadvantages they 
 are but merely a balance for our smallness of 
 number. 
 
 " As for you, Athenians, who are now 
 present, and who, by the long experience, of 
 frequent descents, are perfectly convinced that 
 men, who stand firm and scorn to give way 
 before the dash of the surge or the menacing 
 approach of a vessel, can never be beat off — 
 from you I insist, that, firmly embodied together 
 and charging the enemy on the very margin of 
 the water, you preserve all us who are here, 
 and preserve this fortress." 
 
 In this manner Demosthenes having encour- 
 
 aged his men, the Athenians became more 
 animated than ever ; and, marching forwards 
 to the very rqargin of the sea, posted them- 
 selves there in order of battle. The Lacedas- 
 monians were also in motion ; their land force 
 was marching to assault the fortress, and their 
 fleet was approaching the shore. It consisted 
 of forty-three vessels, and a Spartan, Thrasy- 
 melidas the son of Cratesicles, was on board 
 as admiral. He steered directly for the spot 
 on which Demosthenes expected his coming. 
 In this manner were the Athenians assaulted 
 on both sides, by land and sea. 
 
 The ships of the enemy came on in small 
 divisions, because there was not room for lar- 
 ger. They slackened by intervals, and endea- 
 voured by turns to force their landing. They 
 were brave to a man, and mutually animated 
 one another to beat off the Athenians and seize 
 the fortress. 
 
 But Brasidas signalized himself above them 
 all. He commanded a trireme ; and observing 
 that the other commanders and pilots, though 
 they knew they could run aground, yet kept 
 aloof because the shore was craggy, and shun- 
 ned every hazard of staving their vessels, he 
 shouted aloud, " that it was shameful for the 
 saving of timber to sufier enemies to raise 
 fortifications within their territory." He en- 
 couraged them on the contrary " to force their 
 landing, though they dashed their vessels to 
 pieces ;" begging the confederates " in this 
 juncture not to refuse bestowing their ships on 
 the Lacedsemonians in lieu of the great servi- 
 ces they had done them, but to run them ashore, 
 and landing at all adventures to seize the ene- 
 my and the fortress." In this manner he ani- 
 mated others, and having compelled his own 
 pilot to run the vessel ashore, he was at once 
 upon the stairs, and endeavouring to get down 
 was beat back by the Athenians. After many 
 wounds received, he fainted with the loss of 
 blood ; and falling upon the gunnel, his shield 
 tumbled over into the water. It was brought 
 ashore and taken up by the Athenians, who 
 afterwards made it a part of the trophy, which 
 they erected for this attack. 
 
 The others indeed with equal spirit endea- 
 voured, but yet could not possibly land, as the 
 ground was difficult of access, and the Athen- 
 ians stood firm, and no where at all gave way, 
 Such now was the strange reverse of fortune, 
 that the Athenians upon land, upon La- 
 conic land, beat off the Lacedaemonians who 
 
YEAR VU.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 137 
 
 were fighting from the water ; and the Lacedoj- 
 monians from ships were endeavouring a de- 
 scent upon their own now hostile territory 
 against the Athenians. For at this period of 
 time it was the general opinion, that those 
 were landmen and excelled most in land en- 
 gagements, but that these were seamen and 
 made the best figure at sea. 
 
 The attack was continued the whole day 
 and part of the next before it was given 
 Up. On the third day, they detached some 
 vessels to Asine to fetch timber for engines, 
 hoping by them to accomplish the taking of 
 the wall adjacent to the harbour, which, though 
 of a greater height, yet might easier be ap- 
 proached by sea. 
 
 During this pause, forty sail of Athenians 
 came up from Zacynthus. This fleet had 
 been enlarged by the accession of some guard- 
 ships from off the station of Naupactus, and 
 four sail of Chians. These no sooner dis- 
 covered the main land about Pylus and the 
 island Sphacteria to be full of armed soldiers, 
 the harbour also to be occupied by the ships of 
 the enemy, which lay quiet in their posts, than, 
 perplexed how to act, they sailed back for the 
 present to the isle of Prote not far distant and 
 desert, and there spent the night. 
 
 The day following, being formed into the 
 order of battle, they showed themselves again 
 as ready for engagement, should the enemy 
 venture to stand out against them into the 
 open sea; and if not, were determined to 
 force their way into the harbour. The enemy 
 still kept in the same quiet posture, nor set 
 about executing their former design of barring 
 the entrances. They continued in their usual 
 position along the shore, when they had man- 
 ned their vessels, and got every thing ready to 
 engage the assailants should they break into 
 the harbour, where there was no danger of 
 being straitened for room. The Athenians, 
 perceiving their intent, broke into the harbour 
 at both entrances. Falling there upon the 
 greater number of vessels now advanced into 
 deep water to obstruct the passage, they put 
 them to flight ; and following the chase, which 
 could be but short, they shattered several, and 
 took five, one of which had her whole crew on 
 board. They proceeded, to attack the rest, 
 which had fled amain towards the shore. 
 Some moreover, which had just been manned, 
 were disabled before they could launch into 
 the deep. Others, deserted by the mariners 
 25 
 
 who had fled along the shore, they fastened tn 
 their own, and towed away empty. The 
 Laceda;monians seeing these things, and pro- 
 digiously alarmed at the sad event, lest now 
 the communication should be cut oflf with the 
 body in the island, rushed down with all their 
 force to prevent it. Armed as they were they 
 plunged into the water, and catching hold of 
 the vessels in tow pulled them back towards 
 the shore. It was'-now the apprehension of 
 every soul amongst them, that the business 
 flagged wherever he himself was not present. 
 Great was the tumult in this contest for the 
 ships, inverting the general custom of both con- 
 tending parties. For the Lacedasmonians, in- 
 flamed and terrified, fought a sea-fight (if it 
 may be so expressed) from the shore: the 
 Athenians, already victorious, and eager to 
 give their good fortune its utmost completion, 
 fought a land-battle from on board. The 
 struggle on both sides was long and laborious, 
 and blood was abundantly shed before the dis- 
 pute could be ended. But at length the 
 Lacedaemonians recovered all their empty ves- 
 sels, excepting such as had been taken on the 
 first onset. Each party being retired to their 
 respective posts, the Athenians erected a trophy, 
 and delivered up the dead, and were masters of 
 all the wreck and shatters of the action. Then, 
 without loss of time, they ranged their vessels 
 in circuit quite round the island, and kept a 
 strict watch, as having intercepted the body of 
 men which was posted there. But the Pelo- 
 ponnesians on the main-land, with the accession 
 of their auxilliaries who had now joined them, 
 remained upon the opposite shore near Pylus. 
 
 When the news of this action at Pylus was 
 brought to Sparta, it was resolved, as the great 
 calamity was so urgent, that the magistrates in 
 person should repair to the camp, and consult 
 upon the very spot what resource they had left. 
 And when their own eyes had showed them 
 the impossibility of relieving their men, and 
 they were loath to leave them in the wretched ex- 
 tremity either of perishing by famine, or, over- 
 powered by superior numbers, of being shame- 
 fully made prisoners, it was concluded " to send 
 to the Athenian commanders to ask a suspension 
 of arms at Pylus, whilst they despatched an em- 
 bassy to Athens to procure an accommodation, 
 and to obtain leave as soon as possible to fetch 
 ofl' their Spartans." These commanders ac- 
 cepting the proposal, the suspension was agreed 
 upon on the following conditions : 
 R 
 
138 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 "That the LacedaBmonians should imme- 
 diately deliver up the ships in which they had 
 fought ; and all the ships of war in general, 
 which they had ^ny where in Laconia, they 
 should bring to Pylus, and deliver up to the 
 Athenians. That they should refrain from 
 making any attempt whatever upon the fortress, 
 either by sea or land. 
 
 " That the Athenians should permit the 
 LacedoDmonians on the main-land to carry over 
 a stated quantity of provisions to those in the 
 island, two Attic chosnixes' of meal, with two 
 cotyls of wine, and a piece of flesh, for every 
 Spartan, and a moiety of each for every servant. 
 These provisions to be carried thither under 
 the inspection of the Athenians : and no 
 vessels whatever to cross over without permis- 
 sion. 
 
 " That the Athenians, notwithstanding, be 
 at liberty to continue their guard round the 
 island, but not to land upon it: and should 
 refrain from giving any annoyance to the 
 army of the Peloponnesians, either by sea or 
 land. 
 
 " That if either party should violate these 
 conditions, either in the whole or any part 
 whatever, the truce to be immediately void ; 
 otherwise, to continue in force till the return 
 of the Lacedffimonian embassy from Athens. 
 
 " That the Athenians should convey that 
 embassy thither and back again in a trireme. 
 
 " That upon their return the truce should be 
 ended, when the Athenians should restore the 
 ships now delivered to them, in the same num- 
 ber and condition as they were in before." 
 
 On these conditions a suspension of arms 
 took place, in pursuance of which the ships 
 were delivered up to the number of sixty, and 
 the ambassadors despatched away, who arriv- 
 ing at Athens, addressed themselves as foUow- 
 eth : — 
 
 " Hither, Athenians, we are sent on the 
 part of the Lacedsemonians, to negotiate with 
 you in behalf of their citizens in the island, and 
 to propose an expedient which will tend very 
 much to your advantage, and will at the same 
 lime preserve as much as possible our own 
 honour in the great calamity with which we are 
 at present beset. It is not our purpose to run 
 out into a long unaccustomed flow of words. 
 We shall adhere to the rule of our countiy, to 
 
 1 More than two pints of meal, and one pint of wine, 
 English measure. 
 
 spare many, words where few may suffice ; and 
 then only to enlarge, when the important occa- 
 sion requireth an exact detail for the more 
 judicious regulation of necessary acts. Receive 
 therefore our discourse with an attention cleared 
 of enmity. Be informed as men of understand- 
 ing ought : and conclude that you are only to be 
 put in mind of that judicious method of pro- 
 cedure, of which yourselves are such competent 
 judges. 
 
 " You have now an opportunity at hand to 
 improve a present success to your own interest 
 and credit, to secure the possession of what 
 you have hitherto acquired, and to adorn it 
 with the accession of honour and glory. You 
 are only to avoid that insolence of mind so fre- 
 quent to men who have been, till the present, 
 strangers to success. Such men are ever apt 
 to presume too much on larger acquisitions, 
 though merely because their present prosperity 
 was beyond their expectation : whilst they, who 
 have experienced the frequent vicissitudes of 
 fortune, have gained a more judicious turn, 
 and presume the least upon continuance of 
 success. And there is the highest reason to 
 conclude, that experience hath improved the 
 commonwealth of Athens and us Lacedaemo- 
 nians in this piece of wisdom, much more than 
 any other people. 
 
 " But be assured of it now, when you behold 
 the calamities with which we are at present 
 environed ; we, who are invested with the 
 highest honours and dignity of Greece, are 
 this moment addressing ourselves to yon, 
 begging such favours as we formerly thought 
 were more peculiarly lodged in our ov/n dis- 
 pensation. Not that we are thus reduced 
 through failure of our strength, or through 
 former strength too haughtily exerted, but 
 merely through the weight of such unfore- 
 seen disasters as continually happen, and to 
 which the whole of mankind alike are ever sub- 
 ject. And from hence it is right thatyou should 
 learn, amidst the present strength of your state, 
 and its late acquisitions, that fortune may not 
 always declare upon your side. Wise indeed 
 are they, who in their es(;imates of success 
 make judicious allowances for chance. Such 
 are best able to bear the alternatives of 
 calamity with prudence and temper. Such 
 will form their judgments of war, not as the' 
 infallible means of accomplishing whatever 
 scheme they please to undertake, but as de- 
 riving its effects from the guidance of fortune. 
 
SEAR VII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 139 
 
 Such are the persons who are most of all ex- 
 empted from fatal miscarriages ; because they 
 are not puffed up by presuming too far on pre- 
 sent prosperity, and would gladly acquiesce in 
 the peaceable enjoyment of what they now 
 
 " It cone ems your honour, Athenians, to deal 
 in this manner with us, lest, in case you now 
 reject our proposals, when you yourselves in 
 future times miscarry (many such events must 
 happen), your present good fortune may then 
 be perversely ascribed to chance, even thojjgh 
 you are now able to deliver down to poster- 
 ity the fame of your power and moderation be- 
 yond a possibility of blemish. The LacedaB- 
 monians invite you to agreement, and a conclu- 
 sion of the war. They offer you peace and 
 alliance, nay friendship in its whole extent, and 
 the exchange of good offices mutually revived ; 
 demanding nothing in return but their citizens 
 out of the island. To this step they have con- 
 descended rather than be exposed to the dangers 
 incidental on either side, should they either 
 seize some favourable opportunity to force 
 their escape by arms, or holding out to the 
 last against your blockade, be reduced with all 
 the aggravations of defeat. Great enmities, in 
 our opinion, may the soonest be brought to a 
 firm determination — not when either party hav- 
 ing exerted all their strength, and gained the 
 far greater superiority in war, disdains the fair 
 accommodation, and relieth on that forced ac- 
 quiescence which necessitated oaths impose ; 
 but rather, when, though victory be within their 
 reach, they recollect humanity, and having suc- 
 ceeded by valour quite beyond their expecta- 
 tions, determine the contest with temper and 
 moderation. Then the foe, who hath not felt 
 the extremity of force, is henceforth disarmed 
 by the strength of gratitude, and is more se- 
 curely bound by the affections of his own mind 
 to abide for the future by all his compacts. 
 Such ready deference mankind are more apt to 
 show towards those who have been with a re- 
 markable superiority their enemies, than to 
 such as they have opposed in more equal com- 
 petition. It is natural when men take the me- 
 thod of voluntary submission, for the pleasing 
 contest of generosity to be kindled between 
 them ; but to hazard the last extremities and 
 even grow desperate against that haughtiness 
 which will not relent. 
 
 " Now, if ever, is the crisis come to effect 
 such a pleasing reconciliation between us both. 
 
 before the intervention of some incurable event 
 to ulcerate our passions, which may lay us un- 
 der the sad necessity of maintaining an eternal 
 enmity both public and private in regard to 
 you, and you lose the benefit of those advan- 
 tageous offers we now lay within your option. 
 Whilst the event is yeUundetermined, whilst 
 the acquisition of glory and of our friendship , 
 is within your reach, whilst yet we only feel 
 the weight of a supportable calamity, and are 
 clear from foul disgrace, let us now be mutually 
 reconciled ; let us give the preference to peace 
 over war, and effectuate a cessation of miseries 
 to the other Grecians. The honour of such an 
 event will by them be more abundantly ascrib- 
 ed to you. At present they are engaged in a . 
 perplexing warfare, unable yet to pronounce its 
 authors. But in case a reconciliation now 
 take place, a point for the most part within 
 your decision, they will gratefully acknowledge 
 you for generous benefactors. 
 
 " If then you thus determine, you gain an op- 
 portunity to render the liacedaemonians your 
 firm and lasting friends, since now they request 
 your friendship, and choose to be obliged 
 rather than compelled. Reflect within your- 
 selves how many benefits must in all probabiUty 
 result from such a lucky coincidence. For you 
 cannot but know, that when we and you shall 
 act with unanimity, the rest of Greece, con- 
 scious of inferiority, will pay us the utmost 
 honour and regard." 
 
 The Lacedffimonians talked in this- strain 
 upon the presumption, that the Athenians had 
 formerly been desirous of peace, and had been 
 obstructed merely through their opposition ; 
 but now, thus freely tendered, they would ac- 
 cept it with joy, and give up the men. The 
 Athenians, on the contrary, reckoning the 
 Spartans in the island already in their power, 
 imagined that a peace would be at any time in 
 their own option, and were now very eager to 
 improve their present success. But such a 
 measure was insisted upon most of all by Cleon 
 the son of Clsenetus, the greatest demagogue at 
 this time, and most in credit with the people. 
 It was he who persuaded them to return the 
 following answer. 
 
 « That, previous to all accommodation, the 
 Spartans shut up in the island must deliver up 
 their arms and their persons, and be brought 
 prisoners to Athens, When this was done, 
 and the Laceda8monians had surrendered Nissea 
 and Pegffi, and Troezene and Chalcis, (of which 
 
140 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 places they had not possessed themselves by- 
 arms, but in pursuance of a former treaty, when 
 Vlistress exacted compliance from the Athenians, 
 and they had been obliged upon any terms to 
 purchase peace,) then, they might fetch away 
 their countrymen, and conclude a peace for 
 whatever term both parties should agree." 
 
 To this answer the Lacedaemonians made no 
 direct reply,' they only requested that a com- 
 mittee might be appointed, with whom, after 
 the arguments on each side should be freely of- 
 fered and discussed, they might agree upon 
 some expedient to mutual satisfaction. Cleon 
 upon this broke out into loud invectives against 
 tliem, affirming, " he knew beforehand that 
 they intended nothing just or fair; but now their 
 view was mainfest to all, as they had absolutely 
 refused to have any transactions with the body 
 of the people, and had thus expressed a desire 
 to negotiate with a small committee : if their 
 views were fair and upright, he called upon 
 them to explain themselves, in the presence of 
 all." But the LacedEemonians, perceiving that 
 nothing they could urge would have any influ- 
 ence on the people, and in case, to ward off the 
 distress they feared, they should make too large 
 proposals, these offered and unaccepted, would 
 expose them to the censure of their confeder- 
 ates ; and that further, the Athenians would 
 not comply with their demand on any reasona- 
 ble terms ; they broke off all further confer- 
 ence, and quitted Athens. The very moment 
 they return to Pylus, the truce was at an end. 
 The Lacedremonians re-demanded their ships, 
 according to the article for that purpose agreed 
 on. But the Athenians objecting some infrac- 
 tions to them, such as an incursion towards the 
 fortress, expressly prohibited by the articles, 
 and some other matters of little consequence, 
 absolutely refused a restitution. They justi- 
 fied the refusal upon this express stipulation 
 between them, that " if the conditions were in 
 any degree violated, the truce should immedi- 
 ately be void." The Lacediemonians protested 
 against these proceedings, and charging the de- 
 tention of their ships with the higest injus- 
 
 i Diodorus Siculus, 1. 12. siiya further, Tliat the La- 
 cedffimonian ambassadors olTered to set at liberty an 
 equal number of Athenians, who were now their pri- 
 ■oners. And, when this offer was rejected, the ambas- 
 Badars replied freely, " It was plain they set a higher 
 value on Spartans than on their own citizens, since they 
 ndged an equal number of the latter not to be an equi- 
 valent." 
 
 tice, broke off all further debate and prepared 
 for war. 
 
 Pylus was now the scene in which both these 
 warring parties exerted their utmost efforts. 
 The Athenians sailed the whole day round the 
 island with two ships in an opposite course ; in 
 the night, their whole fleet was stationed round 
 it upon guard, except on that side towards the 
 main sea when the weather was tempestuous. 
 And to strengthen their guard they had now re- 
 ceived a reinforcement of twenty sail from 
 Athens, so that the number of their shipping 
 amounted in the whole to seventy. The Pelo- 
 ponnesians maintained their post on the conti- 
 nent, and made frequent assaults upon the fort ; 
 intent all along to seize the first favourable op- 
 portunity, and to accomplish the preservation 
 of their countrymen. 
 
 In Sicily, this while, the Syracusans and con- 
 federates, augmenting the number of their 
 guard-ships on the station of Messene with an- 
 other squadron they had since equipped, from 
 Messene renewed the war. The Locrians 
 spared no pains to spur them on from the great 
 aversion they bore to the Rhegians. ' They had 
 now broke into the territories of the latter with 
 their whole force. They had even a mind to 
 hazard a naval engagement against them, as 
 they saw the number of Athenian ships at hand 
 to be very inconsiderable, and had received in- 
 telligence that the larger numbers designed for 
 this service were stopped for the present to 
 block up the isle of Sphacteria. For should 
 they once get the better at sea, they hoped, as 
 they then might attack Rhegium both by sea 
 and land,, to find it an easy conquest, and so the 
 posture of their own affairs would be consider- 
 ably strengthened. For as Rhegium, which is 
 a promontory of Italy, lies at a very small dis- 
 tance from Messene in Sicily, they could then 
 prevent the approach of the Athenians, and be 
 entirely masters of the strait. This strait is 
 that part of the sea which runs between Rhe- 
 gium and Messene, and over which lies the 
 shortest cut from Sicily to the continent. It is 
 the place which was formerly called Charybdis, 
 and through which Ulysses is said to have 
 sailed. As the current here sets in strongly 
 from two great seas, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, 
 and runs with great rapidity, it is not at all 
 strange that it should have been esteemed a 
 dangerous passage. 
 
 Yet in the very middle of this strait the 
 Syracusans and confederates, with a number of 
 
VEAB VII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 141 
 
 ships little more than thirty, were forced to 
 engage in the evening of the day, the dispute 
 beginning about a vessel that vfas passing 
 through. They stood away to oppose sixteen 
 sail of Athenians and eight of Ehegians. They 
 were worsted by the Athenians ; but each side 
 separated in hurry and confusion, just as they 
 could, to their several stations at Messene and 
 Ehegium, They lost one ship in this action, 
 which was stopped by the sudden approach of 
 night. 
 
 But after this the Locrians evacuated the 
 territory of Rhegium, and the whole collected 
 fleet of the Syracusans and confederates, took 
 a new station at Peloris of Messene, and their 
 whole land-force attended. The Athenians 
 and Khegians sailing up to their station, and 
 finding none at present on board the ships, 
 rushed in amongst them. Yet they lost one 
 of their own vessels by the force of a grappling- 
 iron fastened upon it, the crew of which was 
 saved by swimming. Immediately after this 
 the Syracusans got on board, and being towed 
 along the shore towards Messene, the Athe- 
 nians came up again to attack them ; but, the 
 enemy running oiF into the deep and giving the 
 first charge, they lose another of their ships. 
 Though continuing to be towed along the 
 shore, and to charge in this manner, yet the 
 Syracusans, without suffering any loss, got safe 
 into the harbour of Messene. And now the 
 Athenians, having received intelligence that 
 Camarina was betrayed to the Syracusans by 
 Archias and his accomplices, stood away for 
 that place. 
 
 In the meanwhile the Messenians, with 
 their whole force by land, and accompanied by 
 their ships, marched away against Chalcidic 
 iV axus, which bordered upon their own terri- 
 tory. The first day they force the Naxians to 
 shelter themselves behind their walls, and then 
 they plundered the country. The day follow- 
 ing, sailing up the river Acesine, they plundered 
 along the shore, and with their land-force made 
 an assault upon the city. The Siculi, who live 
 upon the mountains, were now pouring down 
 in numbers to repel the Messenians. This the 
 Naxians perceiving, became more outrageous, 
 and animating one another with the thought 
 that the Leontines and their other Greek allies 
 were now marching to their relief, they sud- 
 denly sally out of the city and fall upon the 
 Messenians, whom they put to flight, and 
 slaughtered more than a thousand of them ; 
 
 the remainder with difficulty, escaping to their 
 own homes : for the barbarians attacked them 
 upon their road, and made great havoc of them. 
 The ships upon the station of Messene broke 
 up soon after, withdrawing respectively to their 
 own harbours. 
 
 Immediately the Leontines and allies, in 
 concert with the Athenians, appeared before 
 Messene, as now reduced to a very low ehj). 
 They assaulted it on all sides ; the Athenians 
 making their attempt from their ships on the 
 side of the harbour, whilst the land-forces did 
 the same on the body of the place. But the 
 Messenians, and a party of Locrians com- 
 manded by Demoteles, who after their late blow 
 had been left there for the security of the 
 place, made a sudden sally from the city, and 
 falling unexpectedly on the army of the Leon- 
 tines, put the greater part to flight, and did 
 great execution upon them. This was no 
 sooner perceived by the Athenians, than they 
 threw themselves ashore to succour their con- 
 federates, and falling in with the Messenians, 
 who had lost the order of their battle, drove 
 them again behind their walls. This done, 
 having erected a trophy, they put over to Rhe- 
 gium. And after this, the Grecians of Sicily 
 continued a land war against one another, in 
 which the Athenians had no particioation. 
 
 At Pylus, the Athenians still kept the 
 Lacedaemonians blocked up in the island, and 
 the army of the Peloponnesians remained in 
 their old post upon the continent, in a state of 
 inactivity. Their constant guard subjected the 
 Athenians to excessive hardships, since pro- 
 visions and fresh water were equally scarce. 
 There was but one single fountain for their 
 use, which lay within the fortress of Pylus, 
 and yielded but a slender quantity of water. 
 The majority of them were forced to dig into 
 the gravel upon the beach of the sea, and take 
 up with such water as could thus be got. They 
 were further very much straitened in their 
 station for want of room. They had not road 
 enough for their ships to ride in with tolerable 
 convenience, so that alternately one division lay 
 ashore to take their necessary repasts, whilst the 
 other launched more to sea. But what discou- 
 raged them most was the length of the blockade, 
 so contrary to what they had expected. They 
 had imagined a few days' siege would have worn 
 out a body of men shut up in a barren island, 
 and having only salt water for their drink- 
 But this had been redrfessed by the Lacedse 
 ii2 
 
142 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 monians, who had by a public edict encouraged 
 all who were willing to carry over into the 
 island meal, and wine, and cheese, and any 
 other eatable which might enable them to hold 
 out, assigning a large pecuniary reward for any 
 successful attempt of this nature, and promising 
 freedom to every Helot who carried them pro- 
 visions. This was performed through a series 
 of dangers- by several ; but the Helots were 
 most active of all, who putting off from Pelo- 
 ponnesus (wherever they chanced to be) landed 
 by favour of the dark on the side of the island 
 which lies upon the main-sea. Their chief 
 precaution was to run over in a hard gale of 
 wind. For whenever the wind blew from the 
 sea, they were in less danger of being discover- 
 ed by the guard of triremes, which then could 
 not safely lie quite round the island. In ex- 
 ecuting this service, they put every thing to 
 hazard. As a prior valuation had been given 
 in, they run their vessels on shore at all adven- 
 tures; and the heavy-armed soldiers were 
 ready to receive them at every place most con- 
 venient for landing. Those, however, who 
 ventured out when the weather was calm, were 
 certainly intercepted. Such, further, as were 
 expert at diving, swam over through the har- 
 bour, dragging after them by a string bottles 
 filled with poppies mixed up with honey and 
 the powder of linseed. These for a time 
 escaped discovery, but were afterwards closely 
 watched. No artifice was left unpractised on 
 either side ; some being ever intent to cany 
 provisions over, and other to intercept them. 
 
 At Athens, in the meantime, the people, 
 being informed of the hardships to which their 
 own forces are reduced, and that those in the 
 island receive supplies of provisions, were per- 
 plexed how to act. They were full of appre- 
 hensions lest the winter should put a stop to 
 their siege, being conscious of the impossibility 
 of procuring them subsistence from any part of 
 Peloponnesus ; and more so, as the soil about 
 them was barren, and that even in summer 
 they were not able to furnish them with neces- 
 sary supplies; that further, as no harbours 
 were in the parts adjacent, there would be no 
 commodious road for their shipping; so that, 
 in case they relaxed their guard, the besieged 
 would go securely away; or otherwise, they 
 might get off, by the favour of stormy weather, 
 in those vessels which brought over provisions. 
 But they were most of all alarmed at the con- 
 duct of the Lacediemonians, who because they 
 
 had now a safe resource in prospect, had dis- 
 continued all manner of negotiation. In a 
 word they highly repented the refusal of their 
 former offers. 
 
 Cleon, conscious to himself that the blame 
 of baffling that accommodation would be thrown 
 upon him, taxed them who brought the last 
 advices as broachers of falsehoods. But those 
 who had been sent to make the report, demand- 
 ed, " since they could not be credited, that a 
 deputation might be sent to know its truth." 
 For which office Cleon himself was nominated 
 by the Athenians, in conjunction with The- 
 ogenes. 
 
 But now he plainly saw that he must either 
 be necessitated to make the same report as 
 those had done whom he had charged with 
 falsehood ; or, should he report differently, 
 must soon be convicted of a lie. He perceived 
 also, that the inclinations of the people were 
 mostly bent on an ample reinforcement ; upon 
 which he ventured to give them this further 
 advice — That " sending a deputation on such 
 an errand was quite superfluous, since oppor- 
 tunities might be lost by so dilatory a measure : 
 if they were really convinced of the truth of 
 the report, they should at once put to sea 
 against their enemies." He then proceeded 
 to a malicious glance against Nicias son of 
 Niceratus, who at that time presided over the 
 military affairs. He hated him, and sneered 
 him thus — That " if their generals were really 
 men, it would be an easy matter to sail thither 
 with an additional strength, and make a seizure 
 of those in the island ; for his own part, was 
 he in command, he would do it in a trice." 
 The Athenians began immediately to clamour 
 and rail at Cleon, for not instantly setting 
 about that enterprise himself, which to him 
 appeared so easy. This Nicias laying hold of, 
 chagrined at the same time by the sneer upon 
 himself, called upon him aloud — " To take 
 what force he pleased, and to perform the ser- 
 vice in his stead." Cleon, imagining this to 
 be a mere verbal offer, declared himself ready. 
 But when he found that Nicias was earnest in 
 the point of resignation, he drew back, alleg- 
 ing, that " it could not be, since not he 
 but Nicias was general." He trembled now, 
 since he never suspected that the other would 
 venture to give up his office to him. Nicias 
 however called a second upon him, and form- 
 ally surrendered his office to him, so far as re- 
 lated to Pylus, desiring the Athenians to be 
 
YEAR VII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 143 
 
 his witnesses. The people now, for such is 
 the temper of the multitude, the more pains 
 Cleon took to decline the voyage, and disentanr 
 gle himself from his own bravados, called out 
 so much the more vehemently upon Nicias to 
 give up the command, and roared aloud at the 
 other to go on board. Unable now to extricate 
 himself, he intimates his acceptance of the em- 
 ploy, and standing forth, averred, that "he was 
 not under the least dread of the Lacedemoni- 
 ans ; would not be accompanied by so much as 
 one Athenian, but would take only what Lem- 
 nians and Imbrians were at hand, and those 
 targeteers who were come to their aid from 
 ^nus, and the four hundred archers from 
 other places. With these, he said, added to 
 the military force already at Pylus, he would 
 either in the space of twenty days bring off all 
 the Lacedaemonians alive, or put them all to 
 death upon the spot." 
 
 This big way of talking raised a laugh among 
 the people ; all men of sense however were not 
 a little delighted. They concluded, they should 
 compass by it one of these two desirable ends ; 
 either to rid themselves effectually of Cleon, 
 which they chiefly expected ; or, should they 
 be disappointed of this, to get those Lacedemo- 
 nians into their power.' 
 
 » The honour of Athens was very deeply concerned 
 in the point, which had been the subject of this day's 
 debate in tlie assembly of the people, and yet it hath 
 turned out a mere comic scene. The dignity of the re- 
 public had never been well supported on these occasions, 
 Bincethe death of Pericles. Cleon had introduced all 
 kinds of drollery and scurrility into the debates; and it 
 was now become quite the same thing to the people, 
 whether they laughed with or laughed at him. He hath 
 now railed Nicias, though none but a person of so dif- 
 fident and fearful a tern per as Nicias could so have been 
 railed, out of an honourable command ; and then is 
 laughed himself into it, and though an arrant poltroon 
 is metamorphosed into a general of the first class, and 
 soon after swells into a very hero. However, the Athe- 
 nian good sense, whatever turn Thucydides gives it, 
 can hardly bejustified on this occasion, in thrusting so 
 important a commission upon Cleon purely for a joke. 
 Plutarch says, they always bore his impertinent and 
 mad way of talking, because it was humorous and di- 
 verting. Once, when the assembly had been met some 
 time, and the people had sat long expecting his coining, 
 nt length he made his appearance with a garland on his 
 head, and begged the favour of them to adjourn till the 
 morrow, " For, at present, said be, I am not at leisure, 
 since I have sacrificed to-day, and must entertain my 
 friends." A loud laugh ensued at his impudence, and 
 then they rose and adjourned. This affair of Pylus, 
 was. however, far from a jocular point : and the Athe- 
 nians might have paid very dear for their mirth, had 
 not Cleon 'icen wise enough to associate Demosthenes 
 With lum in the cor^mand. 
 
 Having thus transacted the requisite points 
 in the public assembly, where the Athenians 
 had awarded the expedition to him by a formal 
 decree, and Demosthenes, at Cleon's own re- 
 quest, was joined in the commission of com- 
 manders at Pylus, he hastened to his post with 
 the utmost speed. His reason for associating 
 Demosthenes in the command, was owing to 
 some notice received that he was bent on land- 
 ing' upon the island ; as the soldiers, terribly in- 
 commoded by the straitness of their stations, 
 and resembling besieged more than besiegers, 
 were eager for this bold adventure. Demos- 
 thenes was animated more to the attempt be- 
 cause the island had lately been set on fire. 
 Before this accident, as it had been quite cov- 
 ered over with wood, and was pathless, because 
 ever uninhabited, he durst not think of such a 
 step, and judged all these circumstances, to be 
 for the enemy's advantage. For, though a more 
 numerous army should have landed against 
 them, they were enabled terribly to annoy them 
 from posts undescried. What errors might be 
 committed, or how large their strength, might 
 be more easily concealed on that side by the 
 covert of the woods ; whfereas all the errors of 
 his own army would lie clear and open to ob- 
 servation, when the enemy might suddenly at- 
 tack, and in what quarter they pleased, since 
 battle must be entirely in their own option. On 
 the other side, should he force them to a close 
 engagement on rough and woody ground, the 
 smaller number by being skilled in the passes, 
 he imagined, must prove too hard for a superior 
 number without such experience ; Hhat by this 
 means his own force, merely on account of its 
 numbers, might be iraperceptiby destroyed, as 
 it could not be discerned which part of it was 
 hardest pressed, and stood most in need of sup- 
 port. 
 
 These inward suggestions were more preva- 
 lent in the mind of Demosthenes from the re- 
 membrance of his ^tolian defeat, which v/as 
 partly owing to the woods amongst which he 
 engaged. But as the narrowness of their station 
 had necessitated his soldiers to land sometimes 
 upon the skirts of the island, and under the 
 cover of an advanced guard, to dress their re- 
 past, a soldier, though entirely without design, 
 set the wood on fire, which spread but slowly 
 till a brisk gale happening to arise, the great- 
 est part of it was unexpectedly destroyed by 
 the flames, Demosthenes, having gained by 
 this means a clearer view of the Lacedsemo 
 
144 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 nians, found them more numerous than from 
 the quantity of victuals sent in by stipulation 
 fie was used to compute them. He then judged 
 it highly to concern the Athenians to exert 
 their utmost efforts : and, as the island was 
 now become more opportune for a descent, he 
 got every thing in readiness for its execution, 
 having sent for a supply of men from the ad- 
 jacent confederates, and busied himself about 
 all the dispositions needful for success. He 
 had further received an express from Cleon 
 notifying his approach, who now, at the head 
 of the supply he himself had demanded, ar- 
 riveth at Pylus. No sooner were they joined, 
 than they despatched a herald to the camp on 
 the continent, demanding, " Whether they were 
 willing to order their people in the island to 
 surrender their arms and persons, without risk- 
 ing extremites, on condition to be kept under 
 an easy confinement till the whole dispute 
 could be properly accommodated 1" — This be- 
 ing positively refused, they remained quiet one 
 day longer ; hut on the succeeding day, hav- 
 ing embarked their whole strength of heavy- 
 armed on hoard a few vessels, they put out by 
 night, and a little before the ensuing dawn, 
 landed on each side of the island, both from 
 the main sea and the harbour, amounting in 
 the whole to eight hundred men in heavy ar- 
 mour. They jflvanced with their utmost 
 speed towards the first guard on the island. 
 This was done in pursuance of a previous dis- 
 position : for this first guard consisted of 
 about thirty heavy-armed : the main body un- 
 der Epitaaas was posted about the centre, 
 where the ground was most level and watery : 
 and another party guarded the extremity of the 
 island facing Pylus, which, towards the sea, 
 was a rocky cliff, and by land, altogether im- 
 pregnable. On the top, further, of this cliff 
 was seated a fort, built some ages before of 
 stones picked carefully for the purpose. This 
 they judged might be serviceable to them,' 
 should they be forced to shelter themselves 
 from superior violence. In this manner was 
 the enemy posted. 
 
 The Athenians immediately, in their first 
 career, put the whole advanced guard to the 
 sword, having surprised them yet in their huts, 
 and but seeking to lay hold of their arms. 
 Their landing was yet undiscovered, since the 
 enemy judged their vessels to be only the usual 
 guard which was every night in motion. 
 
 No sooner also was the dawn completely 
 
 broke, than the remainder of the Athenian 
 force was landed from a number of vessels, 
 somewhat more than seventy. All the mari- 
 ners came ashore, in their respective distinc- 
 tions of arms, excepting the rowers of the low- 
 est bench.' They were eight hundred archers, 
 and a body no less numerous of targeteers. 
 The Messenian auxiliaries attended, and all in 
 general who had been employed at Pylus, ex- 
 cept such as were necessarily detained for the 
 guard of the fortress. 
 
 According to disposition formed by Demos- 
 thenes, they advanced in separate bodies, con- 
 sisting of near two hundred, more or less, and 
 took possession of all the eminences. The 
 design was, thus to reduce the enemy to a 
 plunge of distress by surrounding them on all 
 sides, and puzzling them in their choice which 
 party first to make head against, that at the 
 sight of numbers on all sides they might be 
 quite confounded ; and, should they then attack 
 the body in their front, they might be harassed 
 by those in their rear ; or should they wheel 
 towards those on either flank, they might be 
 exposed to the bodies both in front and rear. 
 Which way soever the enemy might turn, they 
 were sure to have behind them the light-armed 
 and less martial of their opponents, infesting 
 them with their bows, and darts, and stones. 
 These would do execution from a distance : an 
 enemy could not possibly engage with them ; 
 since even flying they would prevail, and when 
 the enemy retreated would return briskly to 
 their work. With so much address had De- 
 mosthenes previously planned the order of 
 landing, and in close adherence to it brought 
 them now to action. 
 
 The body commanded by Epitadas, and 
 which was the bulk of the whole force in the 
 island, when they saw their advanced guard en- 
 tirely cut off, and the enemy advancing to attack 
 
 1 It is in the original, excepting the Thalamii. The 
 rowers on the different benches were distinguislied by 
 a peculiar- name. Tliose of tiie uppermost were called 
 TharnitEc: those of the middle, Zeugitie; andthoicof 
 the lowest, Thalamii. Thelabourof the TliaiomiJ was 
 the least, though most constant, iiecallse of their near- 
 ness to the water, and the shortness of their oars. 
 Much more strength and skill were required on the 
 upper benclies, and most of all on the uppermost, who 
 for that reason had better pay. Those on the lowest 
 bench seem to have been mere drudges at the oar, and 
 qualified for nothing better ; theotliers were more com- 
 plete seamen, and ready on all occasions for the duty 
 both of rowing and fighting. 
 
VEAK VII.j 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 145 
 
 (hem next, drew up in order and marched 
 towards the heavy-armed of the Athenians, de- 
 signing to engage them. For the latter were 
 so placed as to oppose them in front; the 
 light-armed were posted on either of their 
 tlanks, and in the rear. But against these 
 heavy-armed they could not possibly come to 
 action, nor gain an opportunity to exert their 
 own distinguishing skill. For the light-armed 
 pouring in their darts on either of their flanks, 
 compelled them to halt ; and their opposites 
 would not move forward to meet them, but 
 stood quiet in their posts. Such indeed of the 
 light-armed, as adventured in any quarter to 
 run up near their ranks, were instantly put to 
 flight; however, they soon faced about and 
 continued their annoyance. They were not 
 encumbered with any weight of armour ; their 
 agility easily conveyed them beyond the reach 
 of danger, as the ground was rough, and ever 
 left desert had never been levelled by culture. 
 In such spots the liacedsemonians, under the 
 load of their arms, could not possibly pursue. 
 In this kind of skirmish, therefore, they were 
 for a small space of time engaged. 
 
 When the Lacedaemonians had no longer 
 sufficient agility to check the attacks of these 
 skirmishing parties, the light-armed soon took 
 notice that they slackened in their endeavours 
 to beat them off. It was then, that their 
 own appearance, many times more large than 
 that of their foes, and the very sight of them- 
 selves began to animate them with excess of 
 courage. Experience had now lessened that 
 terror in which they had been used to regard this 
 foe. They now had met with no rough recep- 
 tion from them, which fell out quite contrary to 
 what they firmly expected at their first landing, 
 when their spirits had sunk very low at the 
 thought, that it was against Lacedemonians. 
 Contempt ensued ; and embodying, with a loud 
 shout they rushed upon them ; pouring in 
 stones and arrows and darts, whatever came 
 first to hand. At such a shout, accompanied 
 with so impetuous a charge, astonishment seized 
 their foes, quite unpractised in such a form of 
 engagement ; at the same time the ashes of 
 the wood, which had been burnt, were moun- 
 ting largely into the air. So that now each 
 lost sight of what was close before him, under 
 the showers of darts and stones thrown by 
 such numbers, and whirling along in a cloud of 
 dust. 
 
 Amidst so many difficulties the Lacedaemo- 
 26 
 
 nians now were sorely distressed. The safe* 
 guards on their heads and breasts were no 
 longer proof against the arrows, and their jave- 
 lins were broke to pieces when poised for throw- 
 ing. They were quite at a loss for some means 
 of defence ; they were debarred the prospect of 
 what was passing just before them ; and the 
 shouts of the enemy were so loud that they 
 could no longer hear any orders. Dangers thus 
 surrounding them on all sides, they quite des- 
 paired of the possibility of such resistance as 
 might earn their safety. At last, a great part 
 of that body being woimded, because obliged to 
 adhere firmly to the spot on which they stood, 
 embodying close, they retreated towards the 
 fort on the skirt of the island, which lay at no 
 great distance, and to their guard which was 
 posted there. But when once they began to 
 move oif, the light-armed, growing more reso- 
 lute and shouting louder than ever, pressed 
 hard upon their retreat ; and whatever Lacede- 
 monian fell within their reach, in the whole 
 course of the retreat, was instantly slaughtered. 
 The bulk of them with difiiculty recovered the 
 fort, and in concert with the guard posted there 
 drew up in order to defend it, in whatevei 
 quarter it might possibly be assaulted. The 
 Athenians, speedily coming up, were hindered 
 by the natural site of the place from forming a 
 circle and besetting it on all sides. Advancing 
 therefore directly forwards, they endeavoured 
 to beat the defendants off. Thus, for a long 
 time, for the greatest part of the day, both sides 
 persisted in the contest, under the painful pres- 
 sures of battle and thirst and a burning sun. 
 No efforts were spared by the assailants to 
 drive them from the eminence ; nor by the de- 
 fendants to maintain their post. But here the 
 Lacedaemonians defended themselves with more 
 ease than in the preceding engagement, be- 
 cause now they could not be encompassed on 
 their flanks. 
 
 When the dispute could not thus he brought 
 to a decision, the commander of the Messeni- 
 ans, addressing himself" to Cleon and Demos- 
 thenes, assured them, "they took a deal of 
 pains to no manner of purpose ; but would they 
 be persuaded to put under his guidance a party 
 of the archers and light-armed, toget a round 
 about way on the enemies' rear by a tract which 
 he himself could find, he was confident he could 
 force an entrance." Having received the party 
 he demanded, marching off from a spot unde- 
 scried by the Lacedaemonians, in order to con 
 
146 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV 
 
 ceal the motion, and continuing to mount higher 
 and higher along the ridge of rock that lay upon 
 the verge of the island, in the quarter where the 
 Lacedemonians, depending upon its natural 
 strength, had placed no guard, with great diiB- 
 culty and fatigue he got behind them undis- 
 covered. Now showing himself on a sudden 
 upon the summit and in their rear, he astonished 
 the enemy with this unexpected appearance ; 
 and his friends, who now beheld what they so 
 earnestly looked for, he very much emboldened. 
 The Lacedaemonians were now exposed to the 
 missive weapons on both sides ; and (if a point 
 of less consequence may be compared to one of 
 greater) were in a state parallel to that of their 
 countrymen at Thermopylse.' For those being 
 hemmed in by the Persians in a narrow pass, 
 were utterly destroyed: these now, in like 
 manner beset on both sides, were no longer able 
 to contend. Being but a handful of men op- 
 posed to superior numbers, and much weakened 
 in their bodies for want of food, they quitted 
 their post. And thus the Athenians became 
 masters of all the approaches. 
 
 But Cleon and Demosthenes, assuredly con- 
 vinced that should the foe give way too fast, it 
 would only conduce to their expeditious 
 slaughter under the fury of the victorious troops, 
 began to stop their fury, and to draw off their 
 men. They were desirous to carry theiri alive 
 to Athens, in case they would so far hearken 
 to the voice of a herald as to throw down their 
 arms dejected as they must be in spirit and 
 overpowered with the instant danger. It was 
 accordingly proclaimed, that " such as were 
 willing should deliver up their arms and their 
 persons to the Athenians, to be disposed of at 
 discretion." 
 
 When this was heard, the greater number 
 threw down their bucklers and waved their 
 hands, in token of accepting the proposal, A 
 suspension of arms immediately took place, and 
 a conference was held between Cleon and 
 Demosthenes on one side, and Styphon the son 
 
 1 The famous three hundred Spartans wit)i king Le- 
 onidas at their head, who stopped the vast army of 
 Xerxes at the pass of Thermopylte, and at length per- 
 ished all to a man. They were all afterwards entomhed 
 on the spot where they fell with this short epitaph : — 
 
 Teil, traveller, al Sparta what you saw, 
 Tliat here we lie obedient to her law. 
 
 The same spirit and resolution was at this time gener- 
 ally expected from the Spartans, now encompassed 
 round about by their enemies, in the isle of Sphacterla. 
 
 of Pharax on the other. Of those who had 
 preceded in the command, Epitadas, who was 
 the first, had been slain, and Hippagretes, who 
 was his successor, lying as dead among the 
 slain, though he had yet life in him, Styphon 
 was now the third appointed to take the com- 
 mand upon him, according to the provision 
 made by their law, in case their generals drop, 
 Styphon intimated his desire of leave to send 
 over to the Lacedsemonians on the continent for 
 advice. This the Athenians refused, but how- 
 ever called over some heralds to him from the 
 continent. Messages passed backwards and 
 forwards twice or thrice ; but the last who 
 crossed over to them from the Lacedeemonians 
 on the continent brought this determination, — 
 " The Lacedsemonians permit you to take care 
 of your own concerns, provided you submit to 
 nothing base." In consequence of this, after a 
 eliort consultation with one another apart, they 
 delivered up their arms and their persons. The 
 remainder of the day and the succeeding night 
 the Athenians confined them under a strong 
 guard. But the day following, having erected 
 a trophy upon the island, they got themselves 
 in readiness to sail away, and distributed the 
 prisoners to the custody of the captains of the 
 triremes. The Lacedaemonians, liaving ob- 
 tained permission by a herald, fetched off their 
 dead. 
 
 The number of those who were slain, and 
 those who were taken alive, stood thus : they 
 who had thrown themselves into the island 
 amounted in the whole to four hundred and 
 twenty heav3'-armed. Of these three hundred , 
 wanting eight were carried off alive, the rest 
 had been destroyed. Among the prisoners were 
 about one hundred and twenty Spartans. The 
 number of Athenians slain was inconsiderable : 
 for it was not a standing fight. The whole 
 space that these men were besieged in the 
 island, from the engagement at sea, till the 
 battle in the island, was seventy-two days. 
 Twenty of these during the absence of the 
 ambassadors to negotiate an accommodation, 
 they were supplied with food : the remainder 
 of the time, they were fed by such as got over 
 by stealth. Nay, meal and other eatables were 
 found in the island, even when all was over. 
 Their commander Epitadas had made a more 
 sparing distribution than his stores required. 
 
 Now the Athenians and Peloponnesianti 
 
 respectively drew off their forces from Py- 
 
 I lus to return home : and the promise of 
 
YEAK VII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 147 
 
 Cleon, mad as it had been, was fully executed. 
 For within the twenty days, he brought them 
 prisoners to Athens, and made his words good,' 
 
 The expectation of Greece was more disap- 
 pointed by this event, than by any other occur- 
 rence whatever in the series of the war. It 
 was generally presumed that neither famine 
 nor any extremity could have reduced these 
 Lacedaemonians to deliver up their arms, but 
 that, sword in hand and fighting to the last 
 gasp, they would have bravely perished. They 
 could not afterwards believe that those who 
 surrendered were like to those who were slain. 
 Some time after, a soldier in one of the con- 
 federate bands of the Athenians, demanding 
 with a sneer of one of them who were taken 
 prisoners in the island, " if the slain were not 
 of true gallantry and courage!" the other re- 
 plied, that " a spindle (by which he meant ah 
 arrow) would be valuable indeed, if it knew 
 how to distinguish the brave ;" intimating by 
 this answer, that the slain were such as stones 
 and darts despatched in the medley of battle. 
 
 When the prisoners were brought to Athens, 
 it was the public resolution there " to keep 
 them in bonds, till some definitive treaty could 
 be agreed on. And if, previously to this, the 
 Peloponnesians should repeat their inroad into 
 the Attic territory, they should all undergo a 
 public execution." They established also a 
 garrison for Pylus. And the Messenians of 
 Naupactus sending thither the most proper of 
 their own people, as into their own nativp 
 country (for Pylus is a part of the ancient 
 Messenia,) infested Laconia with depredations 
 and did them vast damage, the more because 
 they spoke the same dialect.^ 
 
 As for the Lacedcemonians, who never knew 
 before what it was to be thus plundered, war 
 
 1 It should be added liere, that he also robbed for the 
 present a very able and gallant officer of the praise he 
 merited on this occasion. The whole affair- of fylus 
 wns planned, carried into e.\'ecution, and brought to a 
 successful and glorious issue, by the conduct and bravery 
 of Demosthenes. Aristophanes (in the Knights) hath 
 made a low comic character of the latter, and in- 
 troduced him venting sad complaints against Cleon for 
 pilfering the honour from him. "This Faphlagonian 
 (says he) hath snatched from every one of us whatever 
 nice thing we had got to suitthepalateof our Lord and 
 master (the people). 'Tis but the other day, I myself 
 had cooked up a noble pasty of Lacediemonians at 
 Pylus, when this vilest of scoundrels came running 
 thither, pilfered it away from me, and hath served it 
 up to table as if it was of his own dressing." 
 
 > Tile Doric. 
 
 in such a shape being new to them, and their 
 Helots deserting continually to the foe ; ap- 
 prehensive farther, lest such unusual proceed- 
 ings within their own district might draw worse 
 consequences after them — they had a painful 
 sense of their present situation. This com- 
 pelled them to send their embassies to Athens, 
 desirous however at the same time to conceal 
 what they really thought of their own state, 
 and spare no artifice for the recovery of Pylus 
 and their people. But the Athenians grew 
 more unreasonable in their demands, and after 
 many journeys to and fro, sent them finally 
 away with an absolute denial. Such was the 
 course of proceedingsin relation to Pylus. 
 
 The same summer, and immediately on the 
 close of the former event, the Athenians set 
 out to invade Coriiith with a fleet of eighty 
 ships which carried two thousand heavy-armed 
 of their own people, and, with some horse- 
 transports, on board of which were two hun- 
 dred horsemen. They were also attended by 
 some of their confederates, by the Milesians, 
 and Andrians, and Carysthians. Nicias the 
 son of Niccratus with two colleagues com- 
 manded this armament. At the early dawn of 
 morning they came to anchor between Cer- 
 sonesus and Reitus, on the shore of that place 
 which the Solygian hill overhangs, of which 
 formerly the Dorians possessing themselves 
 made war upon the Corinthians then in Corinth 
 who were of JEoHan descent. Upon that 
 eminence there is now a village called Solygia. 
 From the shore where the armament came now 
 to anchor, this village was distant about twelve,* 
 the city of Corinth sixty,'' and the isthmus 
 twenty stadia.* 
 
 The Corinthians, who had already been 
 advised from Argos of the approach of the 
 Athenian armament, had long since by way of 
 prevention drawn their whole force together 
 at the isthmus, excepting what was in employ 
 without the isthmus, and the five hundred 
 absent in the guard of Amtracia and Leucadia. 
 With all the rest of their people able to bear 
 arms they were posted on the isthmus, to 
 watch the approach of the Athenians. But 
 when the Athenian fleet had passed by undis- 
 covered by favour of the night, and signals 
 notified their approach elsewhere, leaving half 
 their force at Cenchrea to obstruct any al- 
 
 3 Near one mile and a quarter. 
 * Six miles. s Two miles. 
 
148 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 tempt of the Athenians upon Crommyon, they 
 marched- with all speed against the enemy. 
 Battus, one of their commanders, (for there 
 were two such in the field) at the head of a 
 separate body marched up to the open village 
 of Solygia, in order to defend it, whilst Lyco- 
 phron with the remainder advanced to the 
 charge. The Corinthians fell first upon the 
 right wing of the Athenians, who were but 
 just landed before Chersonesus, and then pro- 
 ceeded to engage the whole of that army. 
 The action was warm, and fought hand to 
 hand. The right wing, consisting of the Athe- 
 nians, and also the Carysthians, who were 
 drawn up in the rear, gave the Corinthians a 
 warm reception, and with much difficulty re- 
 pulsed them. Retreating therefore upwards to 
 a wall built of stone, for the ground was a con- 
 tinued ascent, and being there above the enemy, 
 they annoyed them with stones ; and having 
 sung their psean, rushed down upon them again. 
 The Athenians having stood the shock, they 
 engaged the second time hand to hand. But a 
 band of Corinthians being come up to the 
 support of their own left wing, occasioned the 
 rout of the right wing of the Athenians, and 
 pursued them to the sea-side. But the Athe- 
 nians and Carysthians now turned again, and 
 beat them off from the ships. 
 
 In other parts of the action the dispute was 
 resolute on both sides, especially where the 
 right wing of the Corinthians, with Lycophron 
 at its head, was engaging the left wing of the 
 Athenians. They were apprehensive the ene- 
 my would endeavour to force their way to the 
 village of Solygia. For a considerable space 
 the battle was obstinate, neither side giving 
 way ; but at length, through the advantage on 
 the Athenian side of being assisted by a party 
 of horse, whereas their opposites had none, the 
 Corinthians were broke and driven up the 
 ascent, were grounding their arms, they came 
 down no more to the charge, but remained in a 
 quiet posture. In this rout of the right wing, 
 numbers of the Corinthians perished, and Ly- 
 cophron their general. But the rest of the 
 body had the good fortune to make a safe re- 
 treat, and so to secure themselves upon the 
 eminence, as they could not be briskly pursued, 
 and were not compelled to move off with pre- 
 cipitation. When the Athenians perceived 
 that the enemy would no more return to the 
 charge, they rifled the bodies of the foes 
 whom they had slain, and carried off their own 
 
 dead, and then without loss of time erected 
 their trophy. 
 
 That division of the Corinthians, which had 
 been posted at Cenchrea to prevent any at- 
 tempt upon Crommyon, had the view of the 
 battle intercepted from them by the mountain 
 Oneius. But when they saw the cloud of 
 dust, and thence knew what was doing, they 
 marched full speed towards the spot. The 
 aged inhabitants also, when they are informed 
 of the battle, rushed out of Corinth to succour 
 their own people. The Athenians perceiving 
 the approach of such numerous bodies, and 
 judging them to be succours sent up by the 
 neighbouring Peloponnesians, threw them- 
 selves immediately on board their ships, with 
 what spoil they had taken, and the bodies of 
 their own dead excepting two, which not find- 
 ing in this hurry they left behind. They were 
 no sooner re-embarked than they crossed over 
 to the adjacent islands, from whence they des- 
 patched a herald to demand leave, which was 
 granted, to fetch off the dead bodies they had 
 left behind.' 
 
 The number of Corinthians slain in the bat- 
 tle was two hundred and twelve; that of 
 Athenians somewhat less than fifty. 
 
 The Athenians, leaving the islands, appear- 
 ed the same day before Crommyon, situated in 
 its territory, and distant from the city of Co- 
 rinth one hundred and twenty stadia.'^ They 
 landed and ravaged the country, and that night 
 reposed themselves there. The day following 
 thfiy sailed along the coast, first to Epidaurus ; 
 and, after a kind of descent there, arrived at 
 
 I This incident is rel.ited by Plutarch, in the life of 
 Nicias, as a proof of the great piety and humanity of 
 Niciae. His asking leave to fetch off these two bodies 
 was, accordine; to that writer, an actual rennnciation 
 of the victory; since it was against all rules, for persons 
 who had condescended to such a submission, to erect a 
 trophy. But, without disparaging the good qualities of 
 Nicias, or his obed ience to the institutions of his country 
 in regard to the dead, which were ever most sacredly 
 observed, it may be questioned, whether he renounced 
 the victory on this occasion. Thucydides says, the 
 trophy was already erected, which ascertained, with- 
 out doubt, the honour of the victory, and nothing is 
 said of its demolition by the Corinthians, when they re- 
 ceived this request of truce from Nicias. His re-em- 
 barking in a hurry seems a distinct affair. It had no 
 connection with the late battle, which had been clearly 
 and fairly won; but was owing to a fresh army coming 
 into the field on the side of the enemy. This stopped 
 him indeed from gaining any fresh honour, but surely 
 did not deprive Iiim of what he was already possessed 
 of. 
 
 3 About 12 EogliEh miles. 
 
YEAR VII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 149 
 
 Methane, which lies between Epidaurus and 
 TrcEzen. Possessing themselves there of the 
 isthmus of Chersonesus on which Methone is 
 situated, they run up a wall across it, and 
 fixed a garrison of continuance in that post, 
 which for the future extended their depreda- 
 tions over all the districts of Troezen, Halias, 
 and Epidaurus. But the fleet, when once 
 this post was sufficiently secured, sailed away 
 for Athens. 
 
 During the space of time which coincided 
 with these transactions, Eurymedon and So- 
 phocles, who with the ships of the Athenians 
 had quitted Pylus to proceed in the voyage to 
 Sicily, arrived at Corcyra. They joined the 
 Corcyreans of the city, marching out against 
 those who were posted on the mount of Istone, 
 that party who repassing soon after the sedi- 
 tion were at this time masters of the country, 
 and committed sad ravage. Accordingly they 
 assaulted that post, and carried it by storm. 
 The defendants, who had fled away in a body 
 towards another eminence, were soon forced to 
 capitulate, " giving up their auxiliaries, and 
 then giving up their own arms, to be proceeded 
 with afterwards at the pleasure of the people 
 of Athens." The commanders removed them 
 all for safe custody into the isle of Ptychia, 
 till they could conveniently be conveyed to 
 Athens, with this proviso, that "if any one 
 person should be caught in any attempt to get 
 off, the whole number should forfeit the benefit 
 of the capitulation." 
 
 But the leaders of the populace at Corcyra, 
 apprehending that the Athenians, should they 
 be sent to Athens, might possibly save their 
 lives, contrive tiie following machination.— 
 They tamper successfully with some of those 
 who were confined in the isle, by the means of 
 some trusty agents whom they sent privately 
 amongst them, and instructed that " with great 
 professions of regard for them, they should in- 
 sinuate no other resource was left for them 
 but to make their 'escape with all possible ex- 
 pedition, and that themselves would undertake 
 to provide them with a bark, for it was the 
 certain resolution of the Athenian commanders 
 to give them up to the fury of the Corcyrean 
 populace." — When they had given ear to these 
 suggestions, and were on board the bark thus 
 treacherously provided for them, and so were 
 apprehended in the very act of departure, the 
 articles of capitulation came at once to an end, 
 and they were all given up to the Corcyreans. 
 
 Not that the Athenian commanders did not 
 highly contribute to the success of this treach- 
 ery ; since, in order to make it go down more 
 easily, and to lessen the fears of the agents in 
 the plot, they had publicly declared that " the 
 conveyance of those persons to Athens by any 
 other hands would highly chagrin them, be- 
 cause, then, whilst they were attending their 
 duty in Sicily, others would run away with all 
 the honour." The Corcyreans had them no 
 sooner in their power, than they shut them up 
 in a spacious edifice. Hence afterwards they 
 brought them out by twenties, and having 
 formed two lines of soldiers, in all military 
 habiliments, facing one another, they compelled 
 them to walk between the lines, chained one 
 to another, and receiving blows and wounds as 
 they passed along from those who formed the 
 lines, and struck at pleasure so soon as they 
 perceived the objects of their hatred. They 
 were followed by other-s who earned scourges, 
 and lashed those forwards who moved not 
 readily along. Threescore persons had been 
 brought forth and destroyed in this manner, 
 before those who remained in the edifice be- 
 came sensible of their fate. For they had 
 hitherto imagined, that those who fetched them 
 out did it merely to shift their confinement. 
 But when they learned the truth from some 
 person or other whom they could not dis- 
 believe, they called out aloud on the Atheni- 
 ans, and implored as a favour to be put to 
 death by them. To stir from the place of 
 their confinement they now absolutely refused, 
 and averred, that to the utmost of their power 
 they would hinder every body from coming in 
 to them. But the Corcyreans had not the 
 least inclination to force an entrance by the 
 doors. They mounted up on the top of the 
 edifice, and tearing off the roof, flung the 
 tiles and shot arrows down upon them. The 
 others protected themselves to the best of their 
 power ; and many of them were employed in 
 making away with themselves by cramming 
 the arrows shot from above down their own 
 throats. Others tearing away the cordage 
 from the beds which happened to be within, 
 or twisting such ropes as they could find from 
 shreds of their own garments, so strangled 
 themselves to death. No method was omitted 
 during the greatest part of the night (for night 
 dropped down upon this scene of horror) till, 
 either despatched by their own contrivance, or 
 shot to death by those above, their destruction 
 S 
 
150 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 was completely finished. So soon as it was 
 day, the Corcyreans having thrown their 
 Dodies on heaps into carriages, removed them 
 out of the city. But their wives, so many 
 as had been taken prisoners in company with 
 their husbands, they adjudged to slavery for 
 life. 
 
 In this manner the Corcyreans from the 
 mountains were destroyed by the people. And 
 a sedition so extensive was brought to this 
 tragical period, so far at least as relates to the 
 present war. For nothing of the same nature 
 broke out afterwards so remarkable as to need 
 a particular relation. 
 
 The Athenians departed from Corcyra, 
 made the best of their way for Sicily, whither 
 they were bound at first setting out, and pro- 
 secuted the war there in concert \vith their 
 allies. 
 
 In the close of this summer, the Athenians 
 on the station of Naupactus, marching injunc- 
 tion with the Acarnanians, possessed them- 
 selves of Anactorium, a city of the Corin- 
 thians, situated on the mouth of the gulf of 
 Ambracia. It was put into their hands by 
 treachery. In conse(iuence of this, the Co- 
 rinthian inhabitants were ejected, and the place 
 re-peopled by new inhabitants invited thither 
 from all parts of Acarnania. And the sum- 
 mer ended. 
 
 The ensuing winter, Aristides, the son of 
 Archippus, one of those who commanded the 
 squadrons which the Athenians had put out to 
 raise contributions among their dependents, ap- 
 prehended Artaphernes, a noble Persian, at 
 Eion on the river Strymon. He was going to 
 Lacedsemon on a commission from the king. 
 Being conveyed to Athens, the Athenians had 
 his letters, which were wrote in Assyrian, 
 translated and read in public. Their contents 
 were large, but the principal was this passage 
 addressed to the Lacedaemonians, that " he 
 was not yet properly informed what it was 
 they requested of him. For though he had 
 been attended by frequent embassies, yet they 
 did not all agree in their demands. If there- 
 fore they were desirous to make an explicit 
 declaration, they should send some of their 
 body to him in company with this Persian." 
 But the Athenians afterwards send Artapher- 
 nes back to Ephesus in a trireme, and with an 
 embassy of their own, who meeting at that 
 place with the news that Artaxenes, the son 
 of Xerxes, was lately dead, (for about this 
 
 time that monarch died,) the ambassadors re- 
 turned back to Athens. 
 
 The same winter also, the Chians demo- 
 lished their new fortifications. The Athe- 
 nians had expressly ordered it, suspecting that 
 they were intent on some innovating schemes. 
 It availed nothing, that they had lately given 
 the Athenians all possible securities, and the 
 strongest assurances that they would in no 
 shape attempt or think of innovations. And 
 thus the winter ended ; and with it the seventh 
 year of this war, of which Thucydides hath 
 compiled the history, was brought to a con- 
 clusion. 
 
 TEAK Till. 
 
 Early in the following summer, at the 
 time of the new moon, the sun was partially 
 eclipsed ; and in the beginning of the same 
 month, the shock of an earthquake was felt. 
 
 The fugitives from Mitylene and Lesbos in 
 general, who, to a great number, had sheltered 
 themselves on the continent, assemble in a 
 body, and having hired some additional suc- 
 cours in Peloponnesus, and drawn them over 
 isafely from thence, surprise Khietium ; but, 
 in consideration of two thousand Phocean 
 staters^ paid immediately down, they restored 
 it again undamaged. This being done, they 
 marched next against Antandrus, and got pos- 
 session of it by the treachery of a party within 
 the city, who betrayed it to them. It was, 
 farther, their intention to set at liberty those 
 cities styled the Actean, which had formerly 
 been possessed by the Mityleneans, but were 
 now in the hands of the Athenians. But 
 their principal view was the possession of 
 Antandrus, which once effectually secured, 
 (for it lay convenient for the building of ships, 
 as it had plenty of timber, and mount Ida 
 stood just above it,) they would then be am- 
 ply furnished with all the expedients of war, 
 nay, might act oifensively from thence, might 
 terribly annoy Lesbos which lies near it, and 
 reduce the jEoIian fortresses along the coast. 
 This was the plan which now they yfera intent 
 to put in execution. 
 
 The same summer the Athenians, with a 
 fleet of sixty ships, and taking with them two 
 thousand heavy-armed, a few horsemen, the 
 Milesians, and others of their confederates, 
 
 1 Before Christ 424. » Above 1800Z. Bterlmg. 
 
YEAR VIII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 151 
 
 made an expedition agiinst Cythera. The 
 command was lodged with Nicias son of Ni- 
 ceratus, Nicostratus son of Diotrephes, and 
 Autocles son of Tolmajus. Cythera is an 
 island : it lies upon the coast of Laconia over- 
 against Malea. The inhabitants are Lacedae- 
 monians, resorting thither from the neighbour- 
 ing coast. A. magistrate was sent over yearly 
 from Sparta by the style of judge of Cythera ; 
 the garrison of heavy-armed established there 
 was regularly relieved ; and no care omitted in 
 the good government and management of the 
 place. It was the port which their trading 
 ships first entered, in their return from Egypt 
 and Libya. It was the chief security of La- 
 conia against those piratical parties which 
 might infest it from the sea, from whence 
 alone they are capable of doing them any mis- 
 chief; for by its situation it hath entirely the 
 command of the seas of Sicily and Crete. 
 The Athenian firmament therefore arriving 
 here, with a detachment of ten ships and two 
 thousand heavy-armed, surprise a maritime town 
 which is called Scandea. With the rest of 
 their force they made a descent on that part of 
 the island which is opposite to Malea, and 
 advanced towards the city of Cythera, situated 
 also on the sea, and they found immediately 
 that all the inhabitants were drawn out into 
 the field in readiness to receive them. An 
 engagement ensued, wherein the Cythereans 
 maintained their ground for a small space of 
 time, but then turning about, fled amain into 
 their citadel. They soon afterwards capitu- 
 lated with Nicias and his colleagues, submit- 
 ting to the Athenians at discretion, barring 
 only the penalty of death. Some of the Cy- 
 thereans had beforehand obtained a conference 
 with Nicias. This rendered the capitulation 
 more easy and expeditious, and not only the 
 present, but all future points were by this 
 means speedily and satisfactorily adjusted. 
 For the Athenians insisted that they should 
 evacuate Cythera, because they were Lacedse- 
 raonians, and because the island lay so conve- 
 niently on the Laconic coast. The accom- 
 modation being once perfected, the Athenians, 
 having secured Scandea, the fortress situated 
 upon the harbour, and fixed a garrison in Cy- 
 thera, stood away for Asine and Helas, and 
 most of the adjacent places on the coast. 
 There they made descents, and reposing them- 
 selves in the nights at the most convenient of 
 
 those places, they spent about seven days iu 
 ravaging the country. 
 
 The Lacedasmonians, though they saw the 
 Athenians had possessed themselves of Cy- 
 thera, and expected further that they would 
 proceed to make more such descents upon 
 their territories, yet nowhere drew together 
 in a body to repulse them. They only sta- 
 tioned their parties of guard in such posts as 
 were of greatest importance. In other re- 
 spects they exerted their utmost vigilance, 
 being under apprehensions that the very form 
 of their government was in danger of subver- 
 sion. Their loss in Sphacteria was unexpected 
 and great indeed. Pylus was now in the bands 
 of the enemy, as was also Cythera. War was 
 bursting in upon them on all sides with irre- 
 sistible impetuosity. This compelled them, 
 contrary to their usual maxims, to form a body 
 of four hundred horse and archers. If they 
 were ever dejected by the prevalence of fear, 
 at this juncture they were more feelingly so, 
 when they saw the necessity of entering the 
 lists, contrary to all that practice of war to 
 which they had been inured, in a naval contest, 
 and in this against the Athenians, whose pas- 
 sion it was to compute as so much loss, what- 
 ever they left unattempted. Their general mis- 
 fortune besides, which so suddenly and so fast 
 had poured in upon them, had thrown theni in- 
 to the utmost consternation. They excessively 
 dreaded the weight of such another calamity, 
 as they had been sensible of in the blow at 
 Sphacteria. Intimidated thus, they durst no 
 longer think of fighting ; nay, whatever mea- 
 sures they concerted, they at once desponded 
 of success, as their minds, accustomed until 
 of late to an uninterrupted career of good for- 
 tune, were now foreboding nothing but disap- 
 pointment. Thus, for the most part whilst 
 the Athenians were extending their devas- 
 tations all along their coasts, they remained in- 
 active. Each party on guard, though the ene- 
 my made a descent in the face of their post, 
 knowing themselves inferior in number, and sad- 
 ly dispirited, made no offer to check them. One 
 party indeed which was posted near Cortyta 
 and Aphrodisia, perceiving the light- armed of 
 the enemy to be straggling, ran speedily to 
 charge them; but when the heavy-armed ad- 
 vanced to their support, they retreated with so 
 much precipitation, that some (though few) of 
 them were killed and their arms rifled. Tho 
 
152 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 Athenians, after erecting a trophy, re-embark- 
 ed and repassed to Cythera. 
 
 From hence they sailed again along the coast 
 of the Limerian Epidaurus ; and, after ravag- 
 ing part of that district, they arrived at Thyrea, 
 which, though it lies in the district called Cynu- 
 ria, is the frontier town which parts Argia and 
 Laconia. This place belonged to the Lacedae- 
 monians, who had assigned it for the residence 
 of the exiled ^Egineta, in requital of the servi- 
 ces they had done them at the time of the earth- 
 quake and the insurrection of the Helots, and 
 further because, though subject to the Athe- 
 nians they had ever firmly abode in the Lace- 
 daemonian interest. The JEginctEe, thus again 
 invaded by the Athenians, abandoned the 
 fortification upon the sea-side which they were 
 busy in throwing up, and retreated into the city, 
 which was the place of their residence, seated 
 higher up, at the distance of about ten stadia' 
 from the shore. A party pf Lacediemonians 
 had been posted there, to assist those who were 
 employed in the new fortification ; and yet, 
 though earnestly pressed. by the jEginetae, they 
 refused to accompany them within their walls, 
 being averse to run the risk of a new blockade. 
 They chose rather to retreat towards the emi- 
 nences, as they judged themselves disabled by 
 the inferiority of their number from facing the 
 enemy, and remained there in a state of inac- 
 tion. 
 
 By this time the Athenians, having com- 
 pleted their landing advanced with their whole 
 force, take Thyrea by storm. They set the 
 city in flames, and destroyed whatever was 
 within it. Such of the j^ginetfe as survived 
 the instant carnage, they carried prisoners to 
 Athens ; and with them Tantalus son of Pa- 
 trocles, who conimanded there as general for 
 the Lacedaemonians. He had been wounded 
 and so taken prisoner. They also carried 
 thither some few persons whom they had taken 
 in Cythera, such as for its security it was expe- 
 dient to remove. These the Athenians, after 
 a consultation, decreed " to be disposed of in 
 the islands, but the rest of the Cythereans still 
 to occupy their own land, subjected to the yearly 
 tribute of four talents ;^ but the JJIginetae, as 
 many as had been taken prisoners, to be all in- 
 stantly put to death," (to gratify that eternal 
 ! ancour they bore them,) " and Tantalus to be 
 
 > About a mile. 
 
 * Seven hundred and seventy -Ave pounds sterling. 
 
 kept in prison along with his countrymen taken 
 in Sphacteria." 
 
 The same summer a suspension of arms 
 was agreed on in , Sicily ; first, between the 
 Camarineans and Geloans : and then, the other 
 Sicilians, holding a general congress at Gela, 
 whither the ambassadors from the several 
 states resorted, entered into conferences about 
 the terms of a general reconciliation. Many 
 different expedients were proposed on all sides, 
 and many disputes arose, each insisting or; a re- 
 paration suitable to their own private serwe of 
 grievance. But Hermocrates^ the son of 
 Hermon a Syracusan, who laboured most of 
 any at a firm reunion, delivered his sentiments 
 thus : 
 
 " I am here the representative, ye men of 
 Sicily, of one and not the meanest of the Sicilian 
 states nor yet the inost exhausted by war ; and 
 what I am going to propose is calculated for, 
 and will, I am convinced, most effectually secure 
 the welfare of our common country. And 
 what need is there now to run over in minute 
 detail the calamities inseparable from war,^in 
 the hearing of men who have experienced them 
 all ? None ever plunge headlong into these, 
 through an utter ignorance of them ; nor, when 
 the views are fixed on gratifying ambition, are 
 men used to be deterred by fear. The acqui- 
 sitions proposed in the latter case, are gener- 
 ally imagined to overbalance dangers : and the 
 former choose rather to submit to hazards, 
 than suffer diminution of their present enjoy- 
 ments. Yet where the parties actuated by 
 these different views, embroil themselves at a 
 juncture when it is impossible to succeed, ex- 
 hortations to a mutual agreeinent are then 
 most highly expedient, 
 
 " To be influenced by such exhortations, 
 must at present be highly for the advantage of 
 lis all. For it was the strong desire of fixing 
 
 3 This great and accomplislied Syracusan seems to bo 
 usliered into this history with peruliar dignity, as the 
 very mouth of Sicily, exhorting them ail to concord and 
 unanimity, and teaching them the method of securing 
 the welfare and glory of their common country, upon 
 the noblest. This is noted merely to draw upon liim the 
 attention of the reader. He will act afterwards in the 
 most illustrioiis scenes, and show himself on all occn' 
 sions a man of true honour and probity, a hrm and 
 disinterested patriot, an excellent statesman, and. a most 
 able commander. The Athenians never had a more 
 determined or a more generous enemy. But that will 
 not hinder our historian from representing bim in all 
 bis merit. 
 
rEAK VIII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 153 
 
 our own separate views on a firm establish- 
 ment, which at first embroiled us in this war, 
 and which at present raiseth such mutual alter- 
 cations even during our endeavours to efTect an 
 accommodation : and, in fine, unless matters 
 can be so equally adjusted as to satisfy all par- 
 ties, we shall again have recourse to arms. But 
 then, we ought to recollect, that not merely for 
 securing our separate interests, if we would 
 act like men of sen^e, is this present congress 
 opened ; but, to concert the best measures 
 within our reach to preserve (if possible) our 
 country from falling, and, as I judge, in great 
 danger of falling, a sacrifice to Athenian ambi- 
 tion. It is to convince you how necessary a re- 
 union is, not so much from what I can urge, as 
 from the light these very Athenians themselves 
 hold out before you. Possessed of a power 
 far superior to any other Grecians, here they 
 lie amongst us with a few ships, to note down 
 our indiscretions ; and, under the plausible pre- 
 text of alliance, though with malice lurking in 
 their hearts, they are studying to improve them 
 in a specious manner to their own advantage. 
 For should war be again our option ; and in it, 
 should the assistance of men be accepted, who 
 though uninvited would be glad to invade us ; 
 whilst we are harassing and exhausting one an- 
 other, and cuttijig open for these Athenians a 
 road to our subjection, it is much to be appre- 
 hended that, when once they behold our strength 
 at the lowest ebb, they will pay us a visit with 
 more formidable armaments, and exert their ut- 
 most endeavours to complete our destruction. 
 
 " It becomes each party amongst us, pro- 
 vided we know what is really our interest, to 
 form alliances and to launch in hazardous 
 attempts, rather to acquire what belongs to 
 others than to prejudice what themselves at 
 present possess ; and to rest assured that sedi- 
 tion must ruin our several states, nay, Sicily 
 itself, of which we, the joint possessors, are 
 ready, are all of us ready, to be supplanted by 
 hostile treachery, whilst mutually embroiled in 
 our domestic quarrels. It is high time we 
 ■were convinced of this, that every individual 
 might be reconciled with his neighbour, and 
 community with community, and all in general 
 combine together to preserve the whole of 
 Sicily ; that our ears be deaf to the mischie- 
 vous suggestions, that those amongst us of 
 Doric descent are enemies to every thing that 
 is Attic, whilst those of Chalcidic, because of 
 that Ionian affinity, arc sure of their protect 
 27 
 
 tion. The Athenians invade us not from 
 private enmity, because we are peopled here 
 from these divided races, but to gratify their 
 lust after those blessings in wliich Sicily 
 abounds, and which at present we jointly pos- 
 sess. Nay, this they have already clearly de- 
 clared, by their ready compliance with the in- 
 vitation of those of the Chalcidic race. For 
 though they have never claimed assistance 
 from hence by virtue of their natural attach- 
 ments here, yet they have shown a greater 
 readiness in support of those than any com- 
 pact between them required. Yet, though the 
 Athenians be in this manner rapacious, in this 
 manner politic, by me at least they ought to 
 be forgiven ; since I blame not men who are 
 greedy of empire, but such as are too eager to 
 bend their necks to their yoke : because it is 
 the constant never-failing turn of the human 
 temper, to controul who will submit, but to 
 make head against more powerful encroach- 
 ments. As for us, who know these things, 
 and yet will not timely provide against them, 
 though each in this assembly be separately 
 convinced, that it demands our greatest atten- 
 tion to unite in dissipating a storm which 
 threatens us all, we err strangely in our con- 
 duct ; especially, when its diversion might be 
 so readily effected, would we only bring our 
 private quarrels to an amicable determination ; 
 for it is not from quarters of their own, that 
 the Athenians rush thus to annoy us, but 
 from ground which belongs to those who in- 
 vited them. Thus, of course, without any 
 intervening trouble, one war will not be termi- 
 nated by another, but dissension will at once 
 subside in peace. And these new-comers, who 
 under specious colours are here for our ruin, 
 must return again with a disappointment, 
 which they may as speciously palliate. So 
 desirable a benefit will at once infallibly accrue, 
 from proper determinations in regard to the 
 Athenians. 
 
 " That peace is the greatest of human bless- 
 ings, is a truth which all the world alloweth ; 
 — What hindereth us then, why we should not 
 firmly establish it with one another 1 or do you 
 rather imagine, that if the condition of one 
 man be happy and that of another be wretched, 
 tranquillity will not contribute sooner than 
 warfare to amend the state of the latter, and 
 to preserve the state of the former from a sad 
 reverse ? or that peace is not better calculated 
 to preserve unimpaired the honours and splen 
 
 r 
 
154 
 
 •PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 dcurs of the happy, and all other blessings, 
 which, should we descend to a minute detail, 
 might largely be recounted, or might be set in 
 the strongest light by opposing to them the 
 calamities which ensue from war 1 Fix your 
 minds therefore on these considerations, that 
 you may not overlook my admonitions, but in 
 compliance with them look out respectively in 
 time for expedients of prevention. 
 
 " In case it be presumed, that success must 
 result from power, without taking into debate 
 the justice or violence of the cause, let me 
 detect the dangerous fallacy of such a sanguine 
 hope, which must be blasted in the end. 
 Many are they, it is well known, who would 
 have gratified their revenge on violent oppres- 
 sors, and many who have exerted their utmost 
 force for their own aggrandizement ; yet the 
 first, so far from accomplishing their revenge, 
 have met destruction in its pursuit ; and it 
 had been the fate of the latter, instead of en- 
 larging, to suffer the loss of what they already 
 possessed. For revenge is not certain, because 
 justly sought after to retaliate violence ; nor 
 is power assured of its end, because invigorated 
 with sanguine expectation. Events are for 
 the most part determined by the fallible unsteady 
 balance of futurity ; which, though deceivable 
 as deceit can be, yet holds out before us the 
 most instructive hints. For thus armed equally 
 beforehand with needful apprehension, we em- 
 bark into mutual contest with wise premedita- 
 tion. Now therefore, checked by the gloomy 
 dread of the yet invisible event, and awed on 
 all sides by the terrors which the presence of 
 these Athenians spread amongst us ; deterred 
 further by those hopes already blasted, which 
 assured us alternately of success against one 
 another, had not they interfered to obstruct 
 and control us ; let us send far away from 
 Sicily these enemies that are hovering about 
 us ; let us enter into firm and lasting union 
 with one another ; at least, let us conclude a 
 truce for so long a time as can possibly be 
 agreed, and defer our own private disputes to a 
 remote decision. In a word, let us acknow- 
 ledge, that, if my advice takes place, we shall 
 continue free in our respective communities, 
 where, masters of ourselves and accountable to 
 none beside, we shall be enabled to recompense 
 both our friends and our foes according to 
 their deserts. But, in case it be obstinately 
 rejected, and the mischievous insinuations of 
 others prevail, why then adieu henceforth to 
 
 the just vindication of our own wrongs ; or, if 
 we are violently bent ,upon effecting it, we 
 must strike up a friendship with unrelenting 
 foes, and must range ourselves in opposition 
 there, where nature hath most closely attach- 
 ed us. 
 
 " For my own part, who now, as I observed 
 at setting out, represent the greatest of the 
 Sicilian states, and in this character am more 
 accustomed to attack another than to defend 
 myself, I here, in her name, conjure you to 
 make use of conviction, and unite together in a 
 speedy accommodation, nor so eagerly to thirst 
 after the damage of our foes as to plunge 
 ourselves into irreparable mischiefs. I am not 
 conscious to myself of that foolish haughtiness 
 of heart, which expects to be absolute in its 
 own private will ; or that fortune, whose mas- 
 ter I am not, should attend my orders ; but I 
 am ready to give way to good sense and reasos. 
 And I require you all respectively thus to give 
 way to one another, and not to wait till you 
 are compelled to do so by your enemies. It 
 can argue no baseness for kinsmen to give way 
 to kinsmen, a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalci- 
 dean to others of his own race. Nay, what is 
 mo^ comprehensive, we are all neighbours, all 
 joint inhabitants of the same land, a land wash- 
 ed round by the sea, and all styled by the same 
 common name of Sicilians. Wars indeed in 
 the course of time I foresee we shall wage 
 upon one another, and future conferences will 
 again be held, and mutual friendship shall thus 
 revive. But when foreigners invade us, let us 
 be wise enough to unite our strength, and 
 drive them from our shores : for to be weaken- 
 ed in any of our members, must endanger the 
 destruction of the whole ; and to such con- 
 federates and such mediators we will never for 
 the future have recourse. 
 
 " If to such conduct we adhere, we shall 
 immediately procure a double blessing for 
 Sicily. We shall deliver her from the Athen- 
 ians, and a domestic war. For the future 
 we shall retain the free possession of her in 
 our own hands, and more easily disconcert 
 any projects that hereafter may be formed 
 against her." 
 
 The Sicilians acknowledge the weight of 
 these arguments thus urged by Hermocrates, 
 and all the several parties joined in one 
 common resolution " to put an end to the 
 war, each retaining what they were at pre- 
 sent possessed of ; but that Morgantina should 
 
jfEAE vni.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 155 
 
 be restored to the Camarineans, upon the pay- 
 ment of a certain sum of money to the Syracu- 
 sans." Such also as were confederated with 
 the Athenians, addressing themselves to the 
 Athenian commanders, notified their own readi- 
 ness to acquiesce in these terms, and their 
 resolution to be comprehended in the same 
 peace. These approving the measure, the last 
 hand was put to the accommodation. 
 
 The Athenian fleet, which had no longer 
 any business there, sailed away from Sicily. 
 But the people at Athens manifested their 
 displeasure against the commanders at their 
 return home, by passing a sentence of banish- 
 ment against Pythodorus and Sophocles, and 
 subjecting Eurymedon, who was the third, to 
 a pecuniary mulct; as if, when able to have 
 perfected the reduction of Sicily, they had been 
 bribed to desist. They had enjoyed so long a 
 career of good fortune, that they imagined 
 nothing could disconcert their schemes; that 
 enterprises of the greatest as well as of small 
 importance, no matter whether adequately or 
 insufficiently supported, must be ended to their 
 wish. This was owing to the unexpected good 
 luck with which most of their projects had of 
 late succeeded, and now invigorated all their 
 expectations. 
 
 The same summer, the Megareans of the 
 city of Megara, pressed hard by the Athenians, 
 who constantly twice a year made an inroad 
 into their territory with their whole united 
 force; harassed at the same time by their own 
 outlaws, who having been ejected by the popu-' 
 lar party in the train of a sedition had settled, 
 at Pegae, and from thence were continually 
 plundering them, began to have some conference 
 about the expediency of recalling their outlaws, 
 that the city might not doubly be exposed to 
 ruin. The friends of these exiles, perceiving 
 such a design to be in agitation, insisted more 
 openly than ever that the aSair should be 
 regularly considered. The leaders of the people 
 being convinced that their own and the strength 
 of the people united in their present low con- 
 dition could not possibly overrule it, were so 
 far influenced by their fears as to make a se- 
 cret offer to the Athenian generals, Hippocrates 
 the son of Ariphron and Demosthenes the son 
 of Alcisthenes, " to put the city into their 
 hands;" concluding, they should be less en- 
 dangered by Eucha step than by the restoration 
 of the exiles whom they themselves had eject- 
 ed. It was agreed, that in the first place the [ 
 
 Athenians should take possession of the long 
 walls (these were eight stadia' in length, reach-' 
 ing down from the city to Nistea their port) to 
 prevent any succour which might be sent from 
 Nisaea by the Peloponnesians, since there alone 
 they kept their garrison for the security of 
 .Megara. Afler this, they promised their endea- 
 vours to put them in possession of the upper city. 
 And this they would be able to effect more easily, 
 when the former point was once secured. 
 
 The Athenians therefore, when all was fix- 
 ed and determined on both sides, crossed over 
 by night to Minoa the island of the Megareans 
 with six hundred heavy-armed, commanded by 
 Hippocrates, and sat themselves down in a 
 hollow whence the bricks for the walls had 
 been taken, and which lay near enough for' 
 their purpose: whilst another body, under 
 Demosthenes the other commander, consisting 
 of light-armed Plateeans, and the Athenian' 
 patroles, concealed themselves near the temple 
 of Mars, which lies still nearer. Not a soul 
 within the city knew any thing of these mo- ' 
 tions, excepting those whose vigilance \it con- 
 cerned this night to observe them. When the 
 morning was ready to break, the plotters of 
 Megara proceeded thus : 
 
 Through a series of time they had estab- 
 lislied a custom to have the gates of the long 
 walls opened to them in the night, by carry- 
 ing out a wherry upon a carriage, which they 
 persuaded the ofiicers posted there, they con- 
 veyed nightly down the ditch into the sea, 
 and so went upon a cruise. And before it was 
 light, bringing it back again to the walls upon 
 the carriage, they conveyed it through the 
 gates, that it might escape the notice of the 
 Athenian watch on Minoa, who by this means 
 might be eluded, as they never v/ould descry 
 any boat in the harbour. The carriage was ' 
 now at the gates, which were opened as usual 
 for the reception of the wherry. This the 
 Athenians observing (for this was the signal ' 
 agreed on) came running from their place of ' 
 ambush to take possession of the gates before ' 
 they could be shut again. The very moment ' 
 the carriage was between, and obstructed the ' 
 closing them together, both they and the Mega- ' 
 rean coadjutors put the watch which was 
 posted at the gates to the sword. The PlatjE- 
 ans, and patroling parties under Demosthenes, 
 rushed in first to that spot where the trophy 
 
 ' About tliree quarters of a mile. ' 
 
156 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 now stands, and having thus gained an entrance 
 (for the Peloponnesians who were nearest had 
 taken the alarm), the Plataeans made good 
 their ground against those who attacked them, 
 and secured the gates till the heavy-armed 
 Athenians, who were coming up with all speed, 
 had entered. Each of these Athenians after- 
 wards, so fast as he got in, advanced along the 
 wall. The Peloponnesian guards, though few 
 in number, made head against them for a time ; 
 some of them soon dropped, and then the rest 
 ran speedily off. They were dismayed at such 
 an attack from their enemies in the night ; and, 
 as the treacherous Megareans fought against 
 them, they concluded that all the Megareans 
 were combined together in betraying them. 
 It happened farther that an Athenian herald 
 had proclaimed of his own accord that " such 
 Megareans as were willing to side with the 
 Athenians should throw down their arras." 
 When , the Peloponnesians heard this, they at 
 once quitted their posts ; and, seriously believ- 
 ing that all the Megareans had combined to be- 
 tray them, fled amain into Nisaea. 
 
 At the time of morning's dawn, the long 
 walls being thus surprised, and the Megareans 
 within the city thrown into a tumult, the 
 agents for the Athenians, in concert with all 
 their accomplices in the plot, insisted on the 
 necessity to throw open the city gates, ^d 
 march out to battle ; since it had been agreed 
 between them, that so soon as ever the gates 
 were thus opened, the Athenians should rush 
 in. There was a method to be observed on 
 their side, in order to be distinguished ; this 
 was, to besmear themselves with ointment, 
 that they might receive no harm. Their secu- 
 rity would have been greater, had they opened 
 the gates at once ; for now four thousand heavy- 
 armed Athenians and six hunjlred horsemen, 
 who had marched in the night from Eleusis, 
 according to a prior disposition, were at hand. 
 But whilst the accomplices, properly be- 
 smeared, stood ready at the gates, one of tlieir 
 own party, who was privy to the whole plot, 
 discovereth it to the other Megareans. These 
 drawing up together, came forwards in a body, 
 and denied " the expediency of marching out, 
 (since formerly, when stronger than now, they 
 dmst not hazard such a step,) or running such 
 a manifest risk of losing the city ; and, should 
 any one affirm the contrary, the point should be 
 instantly determined by blows." They gave 
 not the least hint as if they had discovered the 
 
 design, but strenuously insisted that their own 
 measure was most advisable, and stood firm 
 together for the security of the gates. Thus 
 it was no longer possible for the conspirators to 
 put their plot in execution. 
 
 The Athenian commanders, being sensible 
 that the project had been somehow crossed, and 
 that they were not able themselves to take the 
 city by storm, immediately run up a wall to 
 invest Nissea ; concluding, that could they carry 
 it before any succours came up, it would be 
 impossible for Megara to hold out much longer. 
 Iron and workmen, and all proper materials, 
 were quickly supplied them from Athens. 
 They begun at the wall which they had lately 
 surprised, they ran it along for some time 
 parallel with Megara, and then down to the 
 sea on both sides of Nissea. The work, both 
 of ditch and wall, was divided amongst the 
 array. They made use of the stones and 
 bricks of the suburbs, and having felled some 
 trees and wood, they strengthened what was 
 weak with an additional palisade. The houses 
 of the suburbs, being topped with battlements, 
 served the use of turrets. This whole day 
 they plied hard at the work ; and about the 
 evening of the succeeding day it was only not 
 completed. The garrison within Nissea was 
 in great consternation. They laboured already 
 under a scarcity of provisions, which they had 
 been used to fetch daily from the upper city. 
 Thus concluding that the Peloponnesians could 
 not succour them with sufficient expedition, 
 and imagining the Megareans were combined 
 against them, they capitulated with the Atheni- 
 ans on the following terms : 
 
 " To be dismissed every man at a certain 
 ransom, after delivering up, their arms. 
 
 " But as for the Lacedaemonians, their com- 
 mander, and every other person in that number, 
 these to be disposed of by the Atlienians at dis- 
 cretion." 
 
 These terms being agreed to, they evacuated 
 Nissea. And the Athenians, having thus cut 
 oflf their long walls from the city of the Mega- 
 reans, and possessed themselves of Nisiea, were 
 preparing to accomplish what was yet to be 
 done. 
 
 But Brasidas son of Tellis, the Lacedsemo- 
 nian. happened at this time to be .about Sicyon 
 and Corinth, levying forces to march for Thrace. 
 He was no sooner informed of the surprisal of 
 the walls, than he trembled for the Pelopon- 
 nesians ia If issea, and lest Megara should be , 
 
rEAK vni.J 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 157 
 
 taken. He summons the Boeotians to attend 
 him expeditiously with their forces at Tripo- 
 discus (the place so named is a village of the 
 Megaris under the mountain Geranea), whither 
 he was marching himself with two thousand 
 seven hundred heavy-armed Corinthians, four 
 hundred Fhliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, 
 and what levies he had aheady made upon his 
 own account. He imagined he might come up 
 before IVissea could be taken. But hearing the 
 contrary (for he came up in the night to Tri- 
 podiscus), with a picked body of three hundred 
 men, before the news of his march could be 
 spread, he approached to the city of Megara, 
 undescried by the Athenians, who were posted 
 near the sea. He intended to declare that he 
 was ready to attempt, and in fact would have 
 been glad to have effected, the recovery of 
 Nisaea. But it was principally his view to get 
 admission into Megara, and provide for its 
 security. He demanded admission, assuring 
 them he had great hope of recovering Nisasa. 
 But the factious in Megara, perplexed at this 
 step of Brasidas — on one side, lest he meant 
 to reinstate the exiles by ejecting them ; the 
 other, lest the people with such an apprehension 
 might at once fall upon them, and their city 
 thus plunged into a tumult of arms might be 
 lost, if the Athenians, who lay ready in am- 
 bush, should seize it ; refused him admittance, 
 and both factions thought proper, without any 
 stir, to await the event. For it was severally 
 their full expectation, that a battle must ensue 
 between the Athenians and thes'e new-comers ; 
 and then, without plunging themselves into un- 
 necessary hazards, they might join their own 
 favourite party if victorious. 
 
 Brasidas, when he could not prevail, with- 
 drew again to the main of his army. By the 
 succeeding dawn the Boeotians joined him, 
 who had resolved to succour Megara, even 
 previous to the summons sent by Brasidas, 
 since they regarded the danger that place was 
 in as their own. They were actually advanced 
 with their whole force as far as Platcea ; and, 
 the messenger having met vrith them here, they 
 became much more eager than before. They 
 sent forwards a detachment of two and twenty 
 hundred heavy-armed, and six hundred horse- 
 men, but dismissed the multitude to their own 
 homes. When the whole force was thus 
 united, consisting of at least six thousand 
 heavy-armed, and the heavy-armed Athenians 
 Flood drawn up in order near Nissea and the 
 
 sea-shore, whilst their light-armed wete strag- 
 gling about the plain, the Boeotian cavalry 
 made an unexpected sally against those sti^g- 
 glers, and chased them to the shore : for hither- 
 to no aid whatever had taken the field in behalf 
 of the Megareans. The Athenian cavalfy 
 clapped spurs to repel the Boeotian, and a bat- 
 tle ensued. The horse were a long time thus 
 engaged, and both sides claimed a victory. 
 For the general of the Boeotian cavalry, and a 
 small number of his party, the Athenians drove 
 before them to Nissea, where they put them to 
 the sword and rifled them. They remained 
 masters of the dead bodies, gave them up 
 afterwards by a truce, and erected a trophy : but 
 neither side so keeping their ground as to ren- 
 der the action decisive, they retreated as it 
 were by consent ; the Bojotians to their main 
 army, and the Athenians to Nissea, 
 
 Brasidas, after this, advanced nearer to the 
 sea and to the city of Megara with his army. 
 Having occupied there some advantageous 
 ground, they drew up inxirder and stood still, 
 imagining the Athenians would attack them , 
 and assured, that the Megareans were intently 
 observing for whom the victory might deckre. 
 In both these respects, they judged their pre- 
 sent posture the most judicious ; because it 
 was not their own business to attack, or volun- 
 tarily to run into conflict and danger; and 
 thus, having manifestly exhibited their alacrity 
 to act defensively, a victory might justly be 
 ascribed to them without the expense of a 
 battle. In regard further to the Megareans, 
 the consequence could not but be fortunate : 
 for, in case the latter had never beheld them 
 thus prompt in their succour, they would have 
 stopped all farther risk, and so undoubtedly they 
 should have lost the city, as men completely 
 vanquished; but now, should the Athenians 
 decline an engagement, the points for which 
 they themselves came thither must be secured 
 without a blow ; which proved to be the result. 
 For the Megarians, when the Athenians came 
 out and drew up in order close to the long 
 walls, and then, as the enemy did not advance 
 to attack them, stood quiet in their ranks ; their 
 commanders also judging the hazard by no 
 means equal, and themselves, who had so fax 
 been successful, not at all concerned to begin 
 an engagement against superior numbers, in 
 which, should they prevail, they could only take 
 Megara, but, should they miscarry, must lose 
 the flower of their domestic strength ; especi- 
 
158 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 eially as their opponents would act in probability 
 with more daring resolution, since as the large 
 strepgth they had now in the field consisted 
 only of quotas from several constituents, they 
 hazarded but little ; thus facing one another 
 for a considerable space, and neither side pre- 
 suming to make an attack, till each at length 
 ■wheeled off, the Athenians first towards Nissea, 
 and the Peloponnesians again to their former 
 post : — then, I say, the Megareans in the inter- 
 est of the exiles, regarding Brasidas as victor, 
 and animated by the refusal of -attack on the 
 Athenian side, open the gates of Megara to 
 Brasidas himself, and the several commanders 
 from the auxiliary states; and, having given 
 them admission, proceed with them to consul- 
 tation, whilst the partizans of the Athenian in- 
 terest were in the utmost consternation. 
 
 Soon afterwards, the confederates being 
 dismissed to their respective cities, Brasidas 
 also himself returned to Corinth, to continue 
 tis preparations for that Thracian expedition, 
 in which before this avocation he had been in- 
 tently employed. 
 
 The Athenians also being now marched 
 homewards, the Megareans in the city, who 
 nad acted most zealously in favour of the 
 Athenians, finding all their practices detected, 
 stole off as fast as possible. The others, after 
 concerting the proper steps with the friends of 
 the exiles, fetch them home from Pegae, having 
 first administered to them the most solemn 
 oaths "to think no more on former injuries, 
 and to promote the true welfare of the city to 
 the utmost of their power." 
 
 But these, when re-invested with authority, 
 and taking a review of the troops of the city, 
 having previously disposed some bands of sol- 
 diers in a proper manner, picked out about a 
 hundred persons of their enemies, and who 
 they thought had busied themselves most in 
 favour of the Athenians. And having com- 
 pelled the people to pass a public vote upon 
 them, they were condemned to die and suffered 
 an instant execution. They farther new-mo- 
 delled the government of Megara into almost an 
 oligarchy. And this change, tliough introduced 
 by an inconsiderable body of men ; nay, what is 
 more, in the train of sedition ; yet continued for 
 a long space of time in full force at Magara. 
 
 The same summer, the Mitylencans being 
 intent on executing their design of fortifying 
 Antandrus, Demodocus and Aristides, who 
 commanded the Athenian squadron for levy- 
 
 ing contributions, and were now at Helespont, 
 (for Lamachus the third in the commission 
 had been detached with ten ships towards 
 Pontus,) when informed of what was thus in 
 agitation, became apprehensive that Antandrus 
 might prove of as bad consequence to them as 
 Ana!a in Samos had already done: wherein the 
 ■Samian exiles having fortified themselves, were 
 not only serviceable to the Peloponnesians at sea, 
 by furnishing them with pilots ; but farther, 
 were continually alarming the Samians at 
 home, and sheltering their deserters. From 
 these apprehensions they assembled a force 
 from among their dependents, sailed thither, 
 and having defeated in battle those who came 
 out of Antandrus to oppose them, gain once 
 more possession of that town. And no long 
 time after, Lamachus, who had been detached 
 to Pontus, having anchored in the river Calei 
 in the district of Heraclea, lost all his ships. 
 A heavy rain had fallen in the upper country, 
 and the land-flood rushing suddenly down, bore 
 them all away before it. He himself and the 
 men under his command were forced to march 
 over land through Bithynia (possessed by those 
 Thracians who are seated on the other side of 
 the strait in Asia) to Chalcedon, a colony of 
 Megareans in the mouth of the Euxine sea. 
 
 This summer also Demosthenes, immediately 
 after he had quitted the Megaris, with the com- 
 mand of forty sail of Athenians, arrives at 
 Naupactus. For with him, and with Hippo- 
 crates, some persons of the Bceotian cities in 
 those parts had been concerting schemes how 
 to change the government of those cities, and 
 introduce a democracy on the Athenian model. 
 The first author of this scheme was Ptceodorus, 
 an exile from Thebes, and matters were now 
 ready for execution. 
 
 Some of them had undertaken to betray 
 Siphae : Siphie is a maritime town in the dis- 
 trict of Thespise, upon the gulf of Crissa. 
 Others of Orchomenus engaged for Chteronea 
 a town tributary to that Orchomenus which 
 was formerly called the Minyeian but now the 
 Boeotian. Some Orchomenian exiles were the 
 chief undertakers of this point, and were hiring 
 soldiers for the purpose from Peloponnesus. 
 Chajronea is situated on the edge of Boeotia 
 towards Phanotis of Phocis, and is in part in- 
 habited by Phocians. The share assigned to 
 the Athenians was the surprisal of Delium, a 
 temple of Apollo in Tanagra, looking towards 
 Eubcea. These things farther were to be 
 
YEAR VIII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 159 
 
 achieved on a day prefixed, that the Boeotians 
 might be disabled from rushing to the rescue of 
 Delium with all their force, by the necessity of 
 staying at home to defend their respective ha- 
 bitations. Should the attempt succeed, and 
 Delium once be fortified, they easily presumed 
 that, though the change of the Boeotian govern- 
 ments might not suddenly be effected, yet, 
 when those towns were in their hands, when 
 their devastations were extended all over the 
 country, and places of safe retreat lay near at 
 hand for their parties, things could not long 
 remain in their former posture ; but in process 
 of time, when the Athenians appeared in sup- 
 port of the revolters, and the Boeotians could 
 not unite in a body to oppose them, the de- 
 signed revolution must necessarily take place. 
 This was the nature of the scheme at present 
 in agitation. 
 
 Hippocrates, having the whole force of 
 Athens under his command, was ready at the 
 proper time to march into Bceotia. But he 
 had despatched Demosthenes beforehand to 
 Naupactus with forty ships, that, after he had 
 collected a sufficient force in those parts from 
 the Acarnanians and their other confecterates, 
 he should appear with his fleet before Siphae, 
 which was then to be betrayed to him. A 
 day also was fixed upon between them, in which 
 both of them were at once to execute the parts 
 assigned them. 
 
 Demosthenes, being arrived at Naupactus, 
 found the OeniadsE already compelled by the 
 united Acarnanians into an association with 
 the confederates of Athens. He marched 
 away, therefore, at the head of the whole con- 
 federacy in those parts, and invaded first Salyn- 
 thius and the Agrsans ; and having carried 
 some other points, got all in readiness to show 
 himself before Siphse at the time appointed. 
 
 About the same time this summer, Brasidas, 
 at the head of seventeen hundred heavy-armei, 
 began his march towards Thrace. When he 
 was come up to Heraclea in Thachis, he des- 
 patched a messenger beforehand to his corres- 
 pondents in Pharsalus, to beg a safe-conduct 
 for himself and his army. And as soon as he 
 was met at Melitia of Achaea, by Panserus, 
 and Dorus, and Hippolochidas, and Torylaus, 
 and Strophacus, who had been formerly the 
 public host of the Chalcideans, he continued 
 his march forwards. Others also of the Thes- 
 ealians assisted in conducting him, and from 
 Larissa Niconidps the friend of Perdiccas. 
 
 The passage through Thessaly without propei 
 guides is always difficult, and must be more so 
 to an armed body. Besides, to attempt such 
 a thing through a neighbouring dominion with- 
 out permission first obtained, hath ever been 
 regarded by all the Grecians with a jealous eye, 
 and the bulk of the Thessalians had been ever 
 well-affected to the Athenians. Nor could 
 Brasidas have possibly effected it, had not the 
 Thessalian been rather despotic than free 
 governments. For upon his route he was 
 stopped at the river Enipeus, by some of con- 
 tary sentiments to the rest of their country- 
 men, who ordered him to proceed at his peril, 
 and taxed him with injustice in having come 
 so far without the general permission. His 
 conductors told them in return, that " without 
 such permission he should not proceed ; but, 
 as he had come amongst them on a sudden, 
 they thought themselves obliged in friendship 
 to conduct him." Brasidas also gave them 
 strong assurances, that " he was come thither 
 for the service of Thessaly and of them ; that 
 his arms were not intended against them, but 
 against the common enemy, the Athenians; 
 that he never suspected any enmity between 
 Thessalians and Lacediemonians, why they 
 might not tread upon one another's ground ; 
 that even now, should they withhold their con- 
 sent, he was neither willing nor indeed able to 
 proceed ; but," he conjured them, " however, to 
 give him no molestation." Having heard these 
 declarations, they acquiesced and withdrew. 
 Brasidas now, by the advice of his conductors, 
 advanced with the utmost speed without ever 
 halting, in order to anticipate fresh and more 
 potent obstruction. Nay, the very same day 
 that he left Melitia, he advanced as far as 
 to Pharsalus, and encamped upon the banks of 
 the Apidanus. From thence he proceeded to 
 Phacium, and from thence into Persebia. Be- 
 ing so far advanced, his Thessalian guides re- 
 ceived their dismission ; and the Pertebians, 
 who are tributaries to the Thessalians, escorted 
 him to Dium in the kingdom of Perdiccas : it 
 is a fortress of Macedonia situated under mount 
 Olympus on the Thessalian side. In this man- 
 ner Brasidas, advancing so expeditiously as to 
 prevent all obstruction, completed his passage 
 through Thessaly, and arrived in the dominions 
 of Perdiccas and the region of Chalcis. For 
 those in Thrace who revolted from the Athe- 
 nians, had joined with Perdiccas in procuring 
 this auxiliary force out of Peloponnesus, be- 
 
160 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 cause the great success of the Athenians had 
 struck a terror amongst them. The Chalci- 
 deans were persuaded, that they should he first 
 attacked by the Athenians : and in truth their 
 neighbourrstates, who yet persevered in their 
 obedience, were secretly instigating them to it. 
 Perdiccas, indeed, had not yet declared himself 
 their enemy ; but he dreaded the vengeance of 
 the Athenians for former grudges ; and now he 
 had a scheme at heart for the subjection of 
 Arribseus king of the Lyncestians. 
 
 Other points concurred to facilitate the pro- 
 curement of such a succour from Peloponnesus, 
 such as the misfortunes by which the Lacedae- 
 monians at present were afflicted. For, the 
 Athenians pressing hard on Peloponnesus, and 
 not least of all on Laconia, they hoped in case 
 they could equally annoy them in this quarter, 
 by thus marching an army against their depen- 
 dants, to effect a diversion. And they were 
 more encouraged by the oifers of maintenance 
 for their troops, and solicitations to support re- 
 volts. They were at the same time, glad of a 
 pretext to rid themselves of their Helots, lest, 
 in the present state of affairs, now that Pylus 
 was in hostile hands, they might be tempted to 
 rebel. This farther gave rise to the following 
 event: — Dreading the youth and number of 
 these slaves (for many precautions have ever 
 been put in practice by Lacedaemonians to 
 curb and awe their Helots,) they made public 
 proclamation, that " so many of them as could 
 claim the merit of having done signal service to 
 the Lacedaemonians in the present war should 
 enter their claims, and be rewarded with free- 
 dom." The view in this was, to sound them, 
 imagining that such who had the greatness of 
 spirit to claim their freedom in requital of their 
 merit, must be also the ripest for rebellion. 
 About two thousand claimants were adjudged 
 worthy, and accordingly were led about in so- 
 lemn procession to the temple, crowned with 
 garlands, as liien honoured with their freedom. 
 But, in no long time after, they made away with 
 them all : nor hath the world been able to dis- 
 cover, in what manner they were thus to a man 
 destroyed. 
 
 Now also with alacrity they sent away seven 
 hundred of their heavy-armed under the orders 
 of Brasidas. The rest of his body were mer- 
 cenaries, whom he had hired in Peloponnesus. 
 And it was in compliance with his own parti- 
 cular desire, that Brasidas was employed in this 
 service by the Lacedaemonians. 
 
 The Chalcideans, however, were highly satis- 
 fied with a person who had ever passed iii Spar- 
 ta for one of the most active and accomplished 
 citizens ; and who, in his foreign employments, 
 had performed very signal services for his coun- 
 try. From his first appearance amongst them, 
 his justice and moderation so instantly recom- 
 mended him to the adjacent cities, that some 
 voluntarily submitted, and others were by in- 
 trigue put into his possession. By him the 
 Lacedaemonians were actually empowered, if 
 the accommodation they wished for took place, 
 which it afterwards did, to make exchange and 
 restitution of towns, and so relieve Peloponne- 
 sus from the hardships of war. 
 
 Nay more, even in succeeding time, upon the 
 breaking out of the Sicilian war, the virtue and 
 prudence of Brasidas exerted at this juncture, 
 which some attested by their own experience, 
 others upon sound and unsuspected report, im- 
 printed a zeal on the confederates of Athens to 
 go over to the Lacedajmonians. For, having 
 been the first sent out to a foreign trust, and 
 approved in all respects as a worthy man, he left 
 behind him a strong presumption, that the rest 
 of his countrymen were like himself.' 
 
 So soon therefore as it was known at Athene, 
 that he was arrived to take upon him the con- 
 duct of affairs in Thrace, the Athenians de- 
 clare Perdiccas their enemy, ascribing this ex- 
 pedition to his cabals, and by strengthening 
 their garrisons kept a strict watch over all theii 
 dependents in that quarter. 
 
 But Perdiccas with his own forces, and ac- 
 companied by the body under Brasidas, march- 
 eth against a neighbouring potentate, Arribaeus 
 son of Bromerus, king of the Macedonian Lyn- 
 cestians: enmity was, subsisting between them, 
 and the conquest of him was the point in view. 
 When he was advanced with hig army, and in 
 conjunction with Brasidas, to the entrance of 
 Lyncus, Brasidas communicated his intention 
 to hold a parley with Arribffius, before he pro- 
 ceeded to act offensively against him ; and if 
 possible, to bring him over to the LacedaBmo- 
 nian alliance ; for Arribaeus had already noti- 
 fied by a herald, that he was willing to refer tho 
 points in dispute to the arbitration of Brasidas. 
 The Chalcidean ambassadors also, who followed 
 
 * When Brasidas was beginning his march for Thrace, 
 lie wrote tliis letter to the cphori at Sparta:— "I will 
 execute your orders in this war, or die." Plutarch's 
 Laconic Apophthegms, 
 
VEAK VIII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 J61 
 
 the camp, were continually suggesting to him, 
 that " he ought not to plunge himself rashly 
 into difficulties for the sake of Perdiccas," de- 
 signing to reserve him more entirely for their 
 own service. And besides this, the ministers of 
 Perdiccas had declared it at Lacedsmon to be 
 their master's intention, to bring over all the 
 neighbouring states into this alliance : so that 
 it was entirely with public views, that Brasidas 
 insisted upon treating with Arribffius. But 
 Perdiccas urged in opposition, that " he had 
 not brought Brasidas to be the judge of his con- 
 troversies, but to execute his vengeance on the 
 enemies he should point out to him ; that it 
 would be unjust in Brasidas to treat with Ar- 
 ribaeus, when he supported half the expense of 
 his troops." Yet, in spite of such remonstran- 
 ces, and in open defiance of him, Brasidas par- 
 leyed. And being satisfied with the offers, of 
 Arribaeus, he drew off his troops, without so 
 much as entering his dominions. But hence- 
 forth Perdiccas, looking upon this step as an 
 injury to himself, reduced his contribution of 
 support from a moiety to a third. 
 
 Brasidas however the same summer, without 
 loss of time, continued the operations of war ; 
 and, a little before the vintage, being attended 
 by the Chalcideans, marched towards Acan- 
 thus, a colony of the Andrians, The inhabi- 
 tants of this place were embroiled in a sedition 
 about his reception ; a party, who co-operated 
 with the Chalcideans, were for it ; but the peo- 
 ple opposed. Yet, fearing the loss of their 
 fruit, which was not quite got in, the people 
 were at last prevailed upon by Brasidas, to grant 
 entrance to himself without any attendants, and 
 after giving hira audience to resolve for them- 
 selves. Brasidas is admitted ; and standing 
 forth in the presence of the people, for though 
 a Lacedeemohian he was an able speaker, he 
 harangued them thus : 
 
 " My commission from the LacedEemonians 
 and the march of their troops hither under my 
 command verify, ye Acanthians, the declara- 
 tion made by us, when first we began this war 
 against the Athenians, that we were going to 
 fight for the liberties of Greece. But if our 
 appearance here hath been too long deferred, it 
 should be ascribed to the unexpected turns of 
 war nearer home, whereas we hoped to demo- 
 lish the Athenians speedily without endanger- 
 ing you, we ought to be exempted from any 
 censure here. For now, you behold us oppor- 
 28 
 
 tunely at hand, and intent in conjunction with 
 you to pull these tyrants down. 
 
 "I am surprised indeed that your gates 
 should be barred against me, or that my pre- 
 sence should any way chagrin you. For we 
 Lacedaemonians, imagining we were going to 
 confederates, whose wishes were fastened upon 
 us before their eyes could behold us, and from 
 whom we might depend upon the most cordial 
 reception; we, I say, have pierced forwards 
 through a series of dangers, marching many 
 days together through hostile territories, and 
 surmounting every obstacle by a zeal for 
 your service. If therefore your affections are 
 alienated from us, or if you act in opposition to 
 your own, and to the liberty of the rest of 
 Greece, your conduct must terribly distress us. 
 And that, not only because you yourselves re- 
 ject us, but may by such a step deter all others, 
 to whom I shall afterwards apply, from co-op- 
 erating with me. Such obstacles you will raise 
 before me, if you, to whom first I have ad- 
 dressed myself, you who are masters of a city 
 of great importance, and are in esteem for your 
 good sense and discretion, should refuse to re- 
 ceive me. I shall be utterly unable to put a 
 plausible colour upon such a refusal, and shall 
 be exposed to reproach, as if I meant injustice 
 under the cloak of liberty, or came hither too 
 weak and impotent to make head against the 
 Athenian strength, should it be exerted against 
 me. 
 
 " And yet with that force, of whiqh at this 
 very moment I am honoured with the command 
 I marched myself to the succour of Nisaea, and 
 openly defied a superior number of Athenians 
 who declined the encounter. It is not there- 
 fore probable, that they can send hither a forco 
 to our annoyance equal to that armament 
 they employed at Nisaea : nor am I sent 
 hither to execute the schemes of oppression, 
 but to further the deliverance of Greece. I 
 have the security of most solemn oaths, sworn 
 by the magistrates of Lacedaemon, that what- 
 ever people I bring over to their alliance shall 
 remain in free possession of their own liberties 
 and laws. And farther, we are forbid the use 
 of violence and fraud as the means of render- 
 ing you dependent on us ; but, on the contrary, 
 are to act in support of you who are oppressed 
 with Athenian bondage. Upon reasons so 
 valid do I insist upon it, that I am no longer 
 suspected by you, having given you the strong- 
 T 
 
162 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV 
 
 est assurances, that I am no impotent avenger, 
 and that you may boldly abet my cause. 
 
 " If there be any person in this assembly, 
 who hesitates upon the apprehension that I 
 may betray the city into the hands of a private 
 cabal, let him bid adieu to his fears, and dis- 
 tinguish himself in open confidence. I came 
 not hither to be the tool of faction ; I am 
 convinced that liberty can never be re-estab- 
 lished by me, if, disregarding ancient constitu- 
 tions, I enslave the multitude to the few, or 
 the few to the crowd. Such things would be 
 more grievous than the yoke of foreign do- 
 minion. And should we Lacedaemonians pro- 
 ceed in this manner, our labours could never 
 merit a return of gratitude, but instead of 
 honour and glory, foul reproach would be our 
 portion. The crimes on which we have 
 grounded this war against the Athenians, would 
 then appear to be our own, and more odious in 
 us for having made parade of disinterested 
 virtue, than in a state which never pretended 
 to it. For it is more base in men of honour to 
 enlarge their power by specious fraud than by 
 open force. The latter, upon the right of that 
 superior strength with which fortune hath in- 
 rested it, seizeth, at once upon its prey ; the 
 other can only compass it by the treachery of 
 wicked cunning. 
 
 " It is thus that in all concerns of more than 
 ordinary importance, we are accustomed to 
 exert the utmost circumspection. And besides 
 the solemn oaths in your favour ; you can re- 
 ceive no greater security of our honest intention 
 than the congruity of our actions with our 
 words, from whence the strongest conviction 
 must result, that with what I have suggested 
 you are obliged in interest to comply. But if 
 all my promises are unavailing, and you declare 
 such compliance impossible ; if, professing 
 yourselves our sincere well-wishers you beg 
 that a denial may not expose you to our resent- 
 ments ; if you allege that the dangers through 
 which your liberty must be sought, overbalance 
 the prize ; that in justice it ought only to be 
 proposed to such as are able to embrace the 
 oITer, but that no one ought to be compelled 
 against his own inclinations ; — I shall beseech 
 the tutelary gods and heroes of this island to 
 bear me witness, that whereas I come to serve 
 you, and cannot persuade, I must now, by 
 ravaging your country, endeavour to compel 
 you. And, in acting thus, I shall not be con- 
 scious to myself of injustice, but shall justify 
 
 the step on two most cogent motives : — for the 
 sake of the Lacedsemonians ; lest whilst they 
 have only your affections, and not your actual 
 concurrence, they may be prejudiced through 
 the sums of money you pay to the Athenians ; 
 — for the sake of all the Grecians ; that they 
 may not be obstructed by you in their deliver- 
 ance from bondage. This is the end we pro- 
 pose, and this will justify our proceedings. For 
 without the purpose of a public good, we La- 
 cedaemonians ought not to set people at liberty 
 against their wills. We are not greedy of 
 empire, but we are eager to pull down the 
 tyranny of others. And how could we answer 
 it to the body of Greece, if, when we have 
 undertaken to give liberty to them all, we in- 
 dolently suffer our endeavours to be traversed 
 by you 1 
 
 " Deliberate serioiisly on these important 
 points, and animate yourselves with the glori- 
 ous ambition of being the first who enter the 
 lists for the liberties of Greece, of gaining an 
 eternal renowri, of securing the uninterrupted 
 possession of your private properties, and in- 
 vesting the state of which you are members 
 with the most honourable' of all titles." 
 
 Here Brasidas concluded. And the Acan- 
 thians, who had already heai-d this affair largely 
 discussed on both sides, and secretly declared 
 their votes — the majority, because the argu- 
 ments of Brasidas were prevailing, and because 
 they dreaded the loss of their fruit, resolved to 
 revolt from the Athenians. Then they re- 
 quired of Brasidas himself to swear the oath 
 of their security, which the Lacedaemonian ma- 
 gistrates had at his /leparture enjoined him^io 
 take, that " whatever people was brought over 
 into their alliance by him should remain in 
 possession of their own liberties and laws," 
 and this done, they receive his army. Not 
 long after, Stagyrus also, another colony of the 
 Andrians, revolted. And thus ended the 
 transactions of this summer. 
 
 Very early in the succeeding winter, when 
 the strong places of Bceotia were to have been 
 betrayed to Hippocrates and Demosthenes the 
 Athenian commanders, preparatory to which 
 Demosthenes was to show himself with his 
 fleet before Siphae, and the other to march to 
 Delium, there happened a mistake about the 
 days prefixed for execution. Demosthenes in- 
 deed, who steered towards Siphae, and had on 
 
 > Free. 
 
VEAR VIII. 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 163 
 
 board the Acarnanians, and many of the con- 
 federates of that quarter, is totally disappointed. 
 The whole scheme had been betrayed by 
 Nicomachus the Phocian of Phanotis, who 
 gave information of it to the Lacedaemonians, 
 and they to the Bcsotlans. All Boeotians now 
 taking up arms to prevent consequences (for 
 Hippocrates was not yet in their country to 
 distress them on that side), Siphas and ChiE- 
 ronea are secured in time. And so soon as 
 the conspirators perceived that things went 
 wrong, they gave up all farther thoughts of 
 exciting commotions in the cities. 
 
 Hippocrates having summoned into the field 
 the whole force of Athens, as well citizens as 
 sojourners, not excepting even foreigners who 
 chanced at that time to be there, arriveth 
 too late before Delium, not before the Boeoti- 
 ans were returned home again from Siphae. 
 He encamped his forces, and set about fortify- 
 ing Deliutn, the temple of Apollo, in the fol- 
 lowing manner. — Round about the temple and 
 its precincts they sunk a ditch : of the earth 
 thrown up they formed a rampart instead of a 
 wall. They drove into the ground- on each side 
 a row of stakes, and then threw on the vines 
 they cut from within the precincts of the tem- 
 ple. They did the same by the stones and 
 bricks of the adjacent buildings which had been 
 demolished, and omitted no expedient to give 
 height and substance to the work. They 
 erected wooden turrets upon such spots as 
 seemed most to require it. No part of the old 
 pile of the temple was now standing : the 
 portico, which stood the longest, had lately fal- 
 len down. They began the work the third day 
 after their marching out from Athens. That 
 day they plied it, and the following, and con- 
 tinued it on the fifth till the time of repast. 
 Then, the work being for the most part com- 
 pleted, they drew off their army to the distance 
 of about ten stadia' from Delium, in order to 
 return home. Their light-armed indeed, for the 
 most part, marched off directly, but the heavy- 
 armed, halting there, sat down upon their arms. 
 
 Hippocrates staid hehind for the time neces- 
 sary to post the proper guards, and to put the 
 finishing hand to those parts of the fortification 
 which were not yet perfectly completed. But 
 during all this space, the Boeotians, had been 
 employed in drawing their forces together to 
 Tanagra. When the quotas from the several 
 
 1 About an English mile. 
 
 cities were come up, and th-ey perceived the 
 Athenians were filing off towards Athens, the 
 other rulers of Bceotia (for they were eleven 
 in all) declared their resolution not to engage, 
 since the enemy is no longer on Boeotian 
 ground : for the Athenians, vvhen they ground- 
 ed their arms, were within the borders of 
 Oropia. But Pagondas the son of ^oladas, 
 one of the Boeotian rulers in the right of 
 Thebes, and at this time in the supreme com- 
 mand, in concert with Arianthidas the son of 
 Lysimachidas, declared for fighting. He judged 
 it expedient to hazard an engagement; and 
 addressing himself to every battalion apart, 
 lest calling them together might occasion them 
 to abandon their arms, he prevailed upon the 
 Bceotians to march up to the Athenians, and to 
 offer battle. His exhortation to each was 
 worded thus : 
 
 " It ought never, ye men of Boeotia, to have 
 entered into the hearts of any of your rulers, 
 that it is improper for us to attack the Atheni- 
 ans, because we find them not upon our own 
 soil. For they, out of a neighbouring country, 
 have rushed into Boeotia, and have fortified a 
 post in it ; from whence they intend to ravage 
 and annoy us. And our eneinies in short they 
 are, in whatever place we find . them, from 
 what place soever they march to execute hos- 
 tilities against us. Now therefore let him who 
 hath judged this step we are taking hazardous 
 and insecure, acknowledge and forego his error. 
 Cautious and dilatory measures are not to 
 be adhered to by men who are invaded, and 
 whose all is at stake : they are expedient 
 only for those whose properties are secure, 
 and who bent on rapine exert their malice 
 in the invasion of others. But it is eter- 
 nally the duty of you Bceotians to combat 
 such foreigners as presume to invade you, 
 either upon your own or your neighbour's 
 ground, no matter which. And this above all 
 must be done against Athenians, not only be- 
 cause they are Athenians, but because they are 
 the nearest borderers upon us. For it is a 
 maxim allowed, that no state can possibly pre- 
 serve itself free, unless it be a match for its 
 neighbouring powers. 
 
 " Let me add farther, that when men are 
 bent on enslaving not neighbours only, hut 
 even such people as are more remote, how can 
 it be judged improper to encounter such, so 
 long as we can find ground whereon to stand 1 
 Call to mind for your present information tho 
 
164 
 
 PKLOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 Euboeans situated in yon island opposite to us ; 
 call to mind the present disposition of the 
 bulk of Greece in regard to these Athenians. 
 Why should we foi get, that neighbouring states 
 so often battle one another about settling their 
 various boundaries ; whereas, should we be 
 vanquished, our whole country will be turned 
 merely into one heap of limitation, and that 
 never again by us to be disputed 1 for when 
 once they have entered upon it, they will re- 
 main the masters of it all, beyqnd control. So 
 much more have we to fear from these neigh- 
 bours of ours, than any other people. 
 
 " Those again, who in all the daring inso- 
 lence of superior strength are wont to invade 
 their neighbours, as these Athenians now do 
 us, march with extraordinary degrees of con- 
 fidence against such as are inactive, and de- 
 fend themselves only on their own soil. His 
 schemes are more painfully completed, when 
 men sally boldly beyond their borders to meet 
 the invader, and, if opportunity serveth, attack 
 him first. Of this truth our own experience 
 will amply convince us. For ever since the 
 defeat we gave these very men at Coronea, 
 when taking the advantage of our seditions 
 they had possessed themselves of our lands, 
 we have kept Boeotia quiet from every alarm 
 till the present. This we ought now to re- 
 member, that the seniors among us may pro- 
 ceed as they then begun ; that the juniors, the 
 sons of those sires who then displayed such 
 uncommon bravery, may exert themselves to 
 preserve unblemished their hereditary virtues. 
 We ought all to be confident, that the god will 
 fight on our side, whose temple they pollute 
 by raising ramparts, and dwelling within its 
 verge. And, as the victims we have offered 
 are fair and auspicious, we ought at once to 
 advance to the charge of these our foes, and 
 make them know, that their lust and rapine 
 they only then can gratify when th*y invade 
 such cowards as abandon their own defence ; 
 but from men who were born to vindicate their 
 own country for ever by the dint of arms, and 
 never unjustly to enslave another — that from 
 such men they shall not get away without that 
 struggle which honour enjoins." 
 
 In this manner Pagondas exhorted the Boso- 
 tians, and persuaded them to march against 
 the Athenians. He put them instantly in 
 motion, and led them towards the enemy ; 
 for it was now late in the day. When he had 
 approached the spot on which they were posted, 
 
 he halted in a place from whence, as an emi- 
 nence lay between, they could have no view of 
 one another. There he drew up his men, and 
 made all ready for the attack. 
 
 When the news was brought to Bippocrates, 
 who was yet at Delium, that " the enemy is 
 advancing to the charge," he sendeth orders to 
 the main body to form into the order of battle. 
 And not long after, he himself came up, hav- 
 ing left about three hundred horse at Delium, 
 to guard that place in case an attempt should 
 be made upon it, or seizing a favourable op- 
 portunity to fall upon the rear of the Boeotians 
 during the engagement. Not but that the 
 Boeotians had posted a party of their own to 
 watch their motions, and find them employ- 
 ment. When therefore the whole disposition 
 was perfected, they showed themselves on the 
 top of the eminence, and there grounded their 
 arms, remaining still in the same order in 
 which they designed to attack ; being in the 
 whole about seven thousand heavy-armed, 
 more than ten thousand light-armed, a thou- 
 sand horse, and five hundred targeteers. The 
 right wing was composed of Thebans and those 
 who ranked with them ; the centre of the Ha- 
 liartians, and Coroneans, and Copiensians, and 
 others that live about the lake (Copreis) ; and 
 the left of Thespiensians, Tanagreans, and Or- 
 chomenians. In the wings were posted the 
 cavalry and light-armed. The Thebans were 
 drawn up in files of twenty five ; the others 
 variously, as circumstances required. And 
 such was the order and disposition of the Baeo- 
 tians. 
 
 On the Athenian side, the heavy-armed, 
 being in number equal to their enemies, were 
 drawn up in one entire body of eight in depth. 
 Their cavalry was posted on either wing 
 But light-armed soldiers, armed as was flttiiig, 
 the Athenians had none at this juncture, nei- 
 ther in the field nor in the city. The num- 
 ber which had taken the field at first to attend 
 this expedition exceeded many times over the 
 number of the enemy ; but then most of them 
 had no arms at all, since the summons had 
 been extended to all who resided in Athens, 
 both citizens and foreigners. The crowd of 
 these, so soon as ever the route was pointed 
 homewards, were, excepting a few, gone 
 speedily off. But, when they were drawn 
 up in the order of battle, and were every 
 moment expecting the charge, Hippocrates 
 the general showing himself in the front of 
 
TEAn vin.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 165 
 
 the Athenians, animated them with the fol- 
 lowing harangue : 
 
 " The admonition, Athenians, I intend to 
 give you will be very concise, but such a one 
 is sufficient to the brave; I pretend not to 
 encourage Athenians, but merely to remind 
 them of their duty. Let the thought be a 
 stranger to every heart amongst you, that we 
 are going to plunge into needless hazards in the 
 territory of a foe. Be it the territory of a 
 foe,, yet in it you must fight for the security of 
 your own. And, if we conquer now, the Pe- 
 loponnesians will never again presume, with- 
 out the aid of the Boeotian horse, to repeat 
 their inroads into Attica. By one battle there- 
 fore you acquire this, and secure your own 
 land from future annoyance. Charge there- 
 fore your enemies, as you ought, with a spirit 
 worthy of the state of Athens — that state 
 which every soul amongst you boasts to be 
 the first of Greece — and worthy of your great 
 forefathers who formerly at Oenophyta, under 
 the conduct of Myronides, defeated these peo- 
 ple in the field, and possessed for a time all 
 Boeotia as their prize." 
 
 Hippocrates had not gone alonghalf the line 
 encouraging them in this manner, when he was 
 compelled to desist and leave the greater part 
 of his army unaddressed. For the Boeotians, 
 to whom Pagondas also had given but a short 
 exhortation, and had this moment finished the 
 psean of attack, were coming down from the 
 eminence. The Athenians advanced to meet 
 them, and both sides came running to the 
 charge. The skirts of both armies could not 
 come to an engagement, as some rivulets that 
 lay between stopped them equally on both 
 sides. The rest closed firm in a stubborn 
 fight, and with mutual thrusts of their shields. 
 The left wing of the Bceotians, even to the 
 centre, was routed by the Athenians, who 
 pressed upon those who composed it, but 
 especially on the Thespiensians. For, the 
 others who were drawn up with them giving 
 way before the shock, the Thespiensians were 
 inclosed in a small compass of ground, where 
 such of them as were slaughtered defended 
 themselves bravely till they were quite hewed 
 down. Some also of the Athenians, disor- 
 dered in thus encompassing them about, knew 
 not how to distinguish, and slew one another. 
 In this quarter therefore the Boeotians were 
 routed, and fled towards those parts where the 
 lattle was y«t alive. Their right wing, in 
 
 which the Thebans were posted, had the better 
 of the Athenians. They had forced them at 
 first to give ground a little, and pressed upon 
 them to pursue their advantage. It happened 
 that Pagondas had detached two troops of 
 horse (which motion was not perceived) to 
 fetch a compass round the eminence and sup- 
 port the left wing which was routed. These 
 suddenly appearing in sight, the victorious 
 wing of Athenians, imagining a fresh army 
 was coming up to the charge, was struck into 
 consternation. And now being distressed on 
 both sides by this last turn, and by the The- 
 bans who pursued their advantage close and 
 put them into a total disorder, the whole 
 Athenian army was routed and fled. Some 
 ran towards Delium and the sea, others to 
 Oropus, and others towards mount Fames; 
 all to whatever place they hoped was safe. 
 But the Boeotians, especially their horse, and 
 the Locrians who had come up to the field of 
 battle just as the rout began, pursued them 
 with great execution. But the night putting 
 an end to the chase, the bulk of the flying 
 army preserved themselves more easily. 
 
 The day following, such of them as had 
 reached Dehum and Oropus, leaving behind a 
 garrison in Delium, which still remained in 
 their possession, transported themselves by sea 
 to Athens. The Boeotians also, having erected 
 a trophy, carried off their own dead, rifled 
 those of the enemy, and having posted a guard 
 upon the field of battle, retired to Tanagra, 
 and called a consultation about the method of 
 assaulting Delium. 
 
 A herald, farther, despatched by the Athe- 
 nians about their dead, meets upon his way a 
 herald of the foeotians, who turned him back 
 by assuring him that his errand would be fruit- 
 less till he himself should be again returned. 
 The latter, being come to ]the Athenians, de- 
 clared to them in the name of the Bceotians : 
 
 " That by their late proceedings they had 
 enormously violated the laws of the Grecians, 
 amongst whom it was an established rule, that 
 amidst their mutual invasions religious places 
 should be ever spared, whereas the Athenians 
 had not only fortified, but.had made Delium a 
 place of habitation, and whatever profanations 
 mankind can be guilty of, had been there by 
 them committed : that the water,, which, it 
 would even be impious for the Boeotians 
 themselves to touch unless by way of ablution, 
 before they sacrificed, had been profanely 
 
166 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 drawn by thcra for common use ; that, for 
 these reasons the Boeotians, in the cause of 
 the god and in their own, invoking the asso- 
 ciated Daemons and Apollo, gave them this 
 early notice to evacuate the sacred place, and 
 clear it of all incumbrances." 
 
 This message being thus delivered by the 
 herald, the Athenians returned this answer to 
 the BcEotians by a herald of their own : 
 
 " That they were hitherto guilty of nothing 
 illegal in regard to the holy place, nor would 
 wiUingly be so for the future. They had no 
 Buch intention when they first entered into it, 
 and their view was merely to give an ejection 
 from thence to persons who had basely injured 
 them. It was a law among the Grecians for 
 those who were masters of any district, whether 
 great or small, to be also proprietors of its 
 temples, which are to be honoured by them 
 with the usual forms, and with what additional 
 ones they may be able to appoint. Even the 
 Boeotians, as well as many other people, who 
 this moment were possessed of lands from 
 which they had ejected the old proprietors, 
 made a seizure first of those temples which had 
 belonged to others, and continued in the free 
 possession of them. For their own parts, 
 could they conquer more of their territory, 
 they should manfully retain it ; and as to the 
 spot they now occiipied, their position there 
 was voluntary, and as it was their own they 
 would not quit it. It was necessity alone made 
 them use the water, which ought not to be as- 
 cribed to any insolent or profane motive, but to 
 the preceding invasions their enemies had 
 made, self-preservation against which laid 
 them under a present necessity of acting as 
 they did. It might with reason be hoped, that 
 every proceeding to which war and violence 
 indispensably obliged, would obtain forgiveness 
 from the god : for the altars are a refuge to 
 involuntary offences, and transgression is im- 
 puted only to those who are bad without com- 
 pulsion, and not to such as urgent necessities 
 may render daring. The guilt of impiety be- 
 longed more notoriously to such as insisted on 
 the barter of temples for the bodies of the 
 dead, than to those who are content to lose 
 their just demands rather than submit to so 
 base an exchange." They farther enjoined 
 him in their name to declare, that " they would 
 not evacuate Bosotia, since the ground which 
 they occupied in it belonged to no Boeotians, 
 but was now their own property, acquired by 
 
 dint of arms. All they required, was a truce 
 for fetching off their dead, according, to the 
 solemn institutions of their common country." 
 
 The Boeotians replied thus: "If they are 
 now in Boeotia, let them quit the ground which 
 belongeth to us, and carry off what they de- 
 mand. But if they are upon ground of their 
 own, they themselves know best what they 
 have to do." They judged indeed that Oro- 
 pia, on which it happened that the bodies of 
 the dead were lying, as the battle had been 
 fought upon the lines of partition, belonged to 
 the Athenian jurisdiction, and yet that it was 
 impossible for them to be carried off by force ; 
 and truce farther they would grant none, 
 where the point related to Athenian ground ; 
 that it was therefore the most proper reply— 
 " they shoujd quit their territory, and so ob- 
 tain their demands." The herald of the Athe- 
 nians having heard this, departed without 
 effect. 
 
 Immediately after, the Boeotians having sent 
 for darters and slingers from the Melian bay, 
 and being reinforced by two thousand heavy- 
 armed Corinthians, and the Peloponnesian 
 garrison which had evacuated Nistea, and a 
 party of Megareans, all which had joined 
 them since the battle, marched against Delium, 
 and assaulted the fortification. They tried 
 many^methods, and took it at last by the l^elp 
 of a machine of u very peculiar structure 
 — Having split asunder a large sail-yard, they 
 hollowed it throughout, and fixed it togethei 
 again in a very exact manner, so as to resemble 
 a pipe. At its extremity they fastened a cal- 
 dron by help of chains, into which a snout of 
 iron was bent downwards from the yard. The 
 inside, farther, of this wooden machine was 
 lined almost throughout with iron. They 
 brought it from a distance to the fortification 
 on carriages, and applied it where the work 
 consisted chiefly of vines and timber. And 
 when near enough, they put a large bellows to 
 that extremity of the yard which was next 
 themselves, and began to blow. But the blast, 
 issuing along the bore into the caldron, which 
 was filled with glowing coals and sulphur and 
 pitch, kindled up a prodigious flame. This 
 set fire to the work, and burnt, with so much 
 fury, that not a soul durst any longer stay upon 
 it, but to a man they abandoned it and fled 
 away amain : and in this manner was the for- 
 tress carried. Of the garrison, some were put 
 to the sword, but two hundred wore made 
 
TEAR Vm.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 167 
 
 prisoners. The bulk of the remainder, throw- 
 ing themselves on board their vessels, escaped 
 in safety to Athens. 
 
 It was the seventeenth day after the battle 
 that Delium was taken. And not long after, 
 a herald despatched by the Athenians came 
 again, but quite ignorant of this event, to sue 
 for the dead, which were now delivered by the 
 Boeotians, who no longer laid any stress upon 
 their former reply. 
 
 In the battle there perished of the Boaotians 
 very little under five hundred ; of the Athe- 
 nians, few less than a thousand, and Hippo- 
 crates the general ; but of light armed and bag- 
 gage-men a considerable number indeed.' 
 
 Somewhat later in time than this battle, 
 Demosthenes, who, on his appearance before 
 Siphae, had heen disappointed in his hope of 
 having it betrayed to him, having the land-force 
 still on board his fleet, consisting of four hun- 
 dred heavy armed Acarnanians, and Agraeans, 
 and Athenians, made a descent on Sicyonia. 
 But before all his vessels could land their men, 
 the Sicyonians had marched down to make 
 head agains,t them. They defeated those that 
 were landed, and chased them again on board. 
 Some they killed, and some they took alive ; 
 and after erecting their trophy, they delivered 
 up the dead by truce. 
 
 During the former transactions at Delium, 
 Sitalces also king of the Odrysians was killed 
 
 1 The Athenians received in trutli a terrible blow on 
 this occasion. The Bceotians,-a people heavy and stupid 
 to a proverb, continued ever after the terror of the 
 Athenians, the politest and most enlightened people 
 upon earth. Nay, that gross and stupid people had, 
 this day, well nigh completed the destruction of all 
 that was pre-eminently wise and good at this time upon 
 earth; and done an irreparable mischief to sound reason 
 and good sense for ever after. When the two troops of 
 horse, after fetching a compass round the hill, had com- 
 pleted the rout of the Athenians, who were now trying 
 away with the utmost speed, the divine Socrates was 
 left almost alone, facing the enemy, and fighting and 
 retreating like a lion overpowered. Alcibiades, who 
 servctl in the cavalry, was making off on horseback ; 
 out, seeing Socrates in such imminent danger, he rode 
 up to him, covered his retreat, and brought him off 
 safe. Pie thus repaid him the great obligation he had 
 formerly received from him at Potidjea. Strabo relates 
 further, (Geog. T. 9.) that Xenophon also the same day 
 owed his life to Socrates. Having fallen from his horse, 
 and being trampled among the crowd, Socrates took 
 him upon his shoulders, and carried him to a place of 
 safety. Upon the whole, brutal strength and mere 
 bodily merit were never so near getting a total conquest 
 over all the light and understanding which human 
 nature hath to boast of, that did not come directly down 
 from heaven. 
 
 in an expedition he had formed against tho 
 Triballians, who encountered and vanquished 
 him. And Seuthes the son of Sparodocus, 
 his nephew by the brother, succeeded him in 
 the kingdom of the Odrysians and the rest of 
 Thrace over which he had reigned. 
 
 The same winter, Brasidas, in conjunction 
 with the allies of Thrace, marched against 
 Amphipolis, an Athenian colony, upon the 
 river Strymon. 
 
 The spot of ground on which this city now 
 standeth, Aristagoras the Milesian formerly, 
 when he fled from king Darius, had endeavour- ■ 
 ed to plant, but was beat oflf by the Edonians. 
 Two and thirty years after, the Athenians 
 made the same attempt, having sent thither a 
 colony consisting of ten thousand of their own 
 people and such others as voluntarily came in, 
 all of whom were destroyed by th& Thraciana 
 at Drabescus. But after an interval of twenty- 
 nine years, the Athenians came hither again 
 with a fresh colony led by Agnon the son of 
 Nicias, who having drove away the Edonians, 
 built this city upon the spot of ground which 
 had formerly been called the Nine Roads. They 
 rushed to the seizure from Eion, a maritime 
 emporium situated at the river's mouth, and 
 belonging to them. Eion is distant twenty 
 stadia" from the spot where the city now 
 standeth, and which by Agnon was named 
 Amphipolis, because it is almost surrounded 
 by the Strymon which floweth aloiig it on both 
 sides. Running therefore a wall from the 
 river to the river, he planted his colony on a 
 spot conspicuous both to the land and to the sea. 
 
 Against this place, Brasidas decamped from 
 Arne of Chalcidica, advanced with his army. 
 About sunset he arrived at Aulon and Bro. 
 mis'cus, where the lake Bolbe issueth into the 
 sea. From hence, after taking the evening re- 
 past, he continued his march by night. It 
 was winter, and a snow was falling. This 
 favoured and encouraged his enterprise, as he 
 intended to surprise the people of Amphipolis, 
 except such as were privy to his design. For 
 there resided in the place' a body of Argyl. 
 lians, who are an Andrian colony, and others 
 who acted in combination with him, some of 
 them at the instigation of Perdiccas, aiid others 
 at that of the Ch'alcideans : but in a more par- 
 ticular manner the Argyllians, who had a plate 
 of residence very near it, who farther had evet 
 
 a About two English miles. 
 
1G8 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 been suspected by the Athenians. And were 
 really intent on the ruin of the place when 
 now a fair opportunity was within their reach, 
 and Brasidas at hand fwho long before had 
 been tampering with these inhabitants of 
 foreign mixture) in order to have the city be- 
 trayed to him. The Argyllians at this junc- 
 ture received him into their own city, and re- 
 volting from the Athenians led his army for. 
 wards that very night to the bridge laid over the 
 Strymon. The city is seated at some distance 
 from this pass ; and it was not then defended 
 by a fort as it is now, but was only the station 
 of a small party of guards. Brasidas therefore 
 easily forced the guard, being favoured in some 
 degree by treachery, not a little also by the sea- 
 son and his own unexpected approadh. He 
 then passed the bridge, and was immediately 
 master of all the effects of those Amphipolitans 
 who reside in all the tract without the walls. 
 This passage was so sudden, that those within 
 the city had no notice of it ; and as to those 
 without, msiny of them being seized, and 
 others flying for preservation within the wall, 
 the Amphipolitans were thrown into vast con- 
 fusion, increased by their mutual suspicions of 
 one another. And it is said, that if Brasidas, 
 instead of permitting his troops to disperse for 
 plunder, had advanced directly against the city, 
 it must unavoidably have fallen into his hands. 
 But he, on the contrary, having, ordered them 
 to halt, employed himself in the ravage of what 
 lay without; and, finding nothing effectuated 
 in his favour by accomplices within, he for the 
 present desisted. But those his accomplices 
 were overpowered in number by the opposite 
 party, who prevented their opening the gates 
 immediately to Brasidas ; and, acting in con- 
 cert with Eucles their commandant, who re- 
 sided there by the orders of the Athenians to 
 guard the place, they despatch a messenger to 
 the other commander in Thrace, Thucydides 
 the son of Olorus, who compiled this history, 
 and was then in Thasus, (Thasus is an island, 
 a colony of the Parians, and distant about half 
 n day's sail from Amphipolis,) pressing him to 
 come instantly to their relief. 
 
 Thucidides no sooner received this notice, 
 than with the utmost expedition he put to sea, 
 with seven ships that happened to be at hand. 
 He designed nothing so much as to prevent if 
 possible the loss of Amphipolis; or, if that 
 was impracticable, to throw himself into Eion, 
 ind secure it in time. 
 
 Brasidas, in the meanwhile, fearing at the ap- 
 proach of this succour from Thasus, inform- 
 ed besides that Thucydides drew an ample re- 
 venue from the working of hds gold-mines in this 
 quarter of Thrace, and was on this account of 
 great credit amongst, the principal persons of 
 this part of the continent, tried all possible ex- 
 ■ pedients to get possession of the city before his 
 arrival, lest his appearance amongst them 
 might animate the Amphipolitans with the 
 hope of succour by sea and from Thrace, 
 which the credit of Thucydides might easily 
 obtain for their effectual preservation, and in 
 pursuance of this they might refuse to capitu- 
 late. He sent them therefore very moderate 
 terms, ordering his herald to proclaim that " the 
 Amphipolitans and Athenians within the city 
 should, if they desired it, be continued in the 
 free possession of their property, and of all 
 their rights and liberties whatever : but those 
 who refused to stay, should have the space of 
 five days allowed them to quit the town and 
 remove their effects." 
 
 This proposal was no sooner heard, than the 
 incUnations of the many took a new turn. The 
 . Athenian interest had but a few supporters in 
 the city ; the bulk of the inhabitants were 
 a mixture of foreign nations, There were also 
 within many persons, relations of those wljo 
 had been made prisoners without. And thus, 
 in their present consternation, the proposal was 
 generally received as mild and gentle. The 
 Athenians for their part, who thought them- 
 selves more exposed to danger than the rest, 
 and had besides no hope of speedy relief, 
 were delighted with the offer of quitting 
 the place. So also were all the rest, that they 
 were not to lose their rights and liberties as 
 citizens, and should thus escape the dangei 
 they had dreaded, even beyond their hopes. 
 Upon this, the agents of Brasidas expatiated 
 only on the mildness and generosity of the 
 terms he had offered, because now they per- 
 ceived that the multitude had altered their 
 sentiments, and would no longer hearken tp 
 the Athenian commandant. In short, an ac- 
 commodation was perfected, and they opened 
 the gates to Brasidas, upon the conditions he 
 had proposed by his herald. And in this man- 
 ner did the inhabitants deliver up Amphipolis. 
 
 But in the evening of the same day, Thucy- 
 dides and the squadron came over to Eion 
 Brasidas was already in possession of Am- 
 phipolis, and designed that very night to seize 
 
YEA.E VIII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 169 
 
 Kion also. And unless this squadron had 
 come in thus critically to its defence, at break 
 of day it had been lost. 
 
 Thucydides instantly took care to put Eion 
 in a posture of defence, in case Brasidas should 
 attack it ; and to provide farther for its future 
 security, when he had opened a refuge there 
 for such as were willing to remove thither 
 from Amphipolis, according to the articles of 
 the late surrender. 
 
 But Brasidas on a sudden fell down the river 
 with a large number of boats towards Eion, 
 designing if possible to seize the point of land 
 that juts out from the walls, which would have 
 given him the command of the river's mouth. 
 He endeavoured at the same time also to as- 
 sault it by land, but was repulsed in both at- 
 tempts. And now he effectually employed his 
 care in resettling and securing Amphipolis. 
 
 Myrcinus also, a city of' Edonia, revolted to 
 him upon the death of Pittacus king of the 
 Edonians, who was killed by the sons of 
 Goaxis and his own wife Braures. Gapselus 
 soon after did the same, and Oesyme : they 
 are colonies of the Thracians. These events 
 were owing to the practices of Perdiccas, who 
 came thither in person immediately after the 
 surrender of Amphipolis. 
 
 The loss of that city cast the Athenians into 
 great consternation, and with reason, because 
 it was 11 place of great importance to them, 
 since from thence they had Biaterials for build- 
 ing ships, and a pecuniary revenue ; and far- 
 ther, because, after a safe-conduct through 
 Thessaly, the route was now open to the 
 Lacedaemonians as far as the Strymon, to annoy 
 their dependents. Yet, had they not possessed 
 • themselves of the bridge, the large lake formed 
 above the river, and the check given by the 
 triremes stationed at Eion, would have hin- 
 dered the Lacedffimonians from penetrating 
 further. But all obstacles appeared to the 
 Athenians now quite easy to be surmounted ; 
 and their apprehensions that their dependents 
 would revolt, alarmed them much. For Bra- 
 sidas in the rest of his conduct gave constant 
 proofs of an excellent temper ; and the declara- 
 tion was ever in his mouth, that " he had been 
 sent thither to restore the hberty of Greece." 
 Accordingly the cities which were subject to 
 the Athenians had no sooner heard of the sur- 
 render of Amphipolis, together with the brave 
 exploits and the mild engaging deportment of 
 Brasidas, than they conceived the most ardent 
 29 
 
 inclination to shake off the yoke. They 
 secretly despatched their agents to him, ear- 
 nestly desiring a visit from him, with respective 
 assurances from each, that they would be the 
 first to revolt. They judged, there was no 
 longer room to apprehend any bad consequen- 
 ces from such a step; falsely estimating the 
 Athenian power to be much less considerable 
 than it afterwards appeared. But this their 
 judgment was founded more upon uncertain 
 presumption than deliberate prudence. It is 
 the turn of mankind, when their passions are 
 warm, to give themselves up to blind and 
 sanguine hope, and to throw aside with des- 
 potic scorn whatever seemeth to be counter to 
 their wishes. It was but lately that the Athe- 
 nians had been vanquished by the Boeotians ; 
 and Brasidas had been making such recitals as 
 might persuade, though in fact they were col- 
 lusive, that at Nisaea with his single force he 
 offered battle to the Athenians and they de- 
 clined it. This made them confident, and they 
 became perfectly convinced, that there was no 
 longer a strength sufficient to chastise them. 
 But what had the greatest influence on their 
 thoughts, and disposed them entirely to run all 
 hazards, was the immediate pleasure they 
 promised themselves in a change, and that now 
 they were going for the first time to experience 
 the sweets of LacedaBmonian friendship. 
 
 These inclinations were perceived by the 
 Athenians, who sent garrisons into each of 
 these cities in order to curb them, with as much 
 expedition as the shortness of time and the 
 wintry season would permit, 
 
 Brasidas also had sent to Lacedcemon, soli- 
 citing a speedy reinforcement, and was busy 
 himself in providing materials to build triremes, 
 in the Strymon. But the Lacedsemonians ne- 
 glected to supply him, partly through the envy 
 which the leading men at Sparta had conceived 
 against him, and partly because their attention 
 was principally confined to the recovery of their 
 people made prisoners in Sphacteria, and to 
 bring the war to a conclusion. 
 
 The sam^ winter the Megareans having 
 recovered their long walls, which were in the 
 possession of the Athenians, leveled them with 
 the ground. 
 
 Brasidas thus master of Amphipolis gather- 
 ed together the allies, and leadeth them into 
 the district called Acte. It is the tract which, 
 stretcheth out into the sea from the canal 
 which was dug by Xerxes, and Athos the 
 
170 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV 
 
 highest mount ip Acte is its utmost verge uppn 
 the jEgean sea. The cities in it are, Sane, a 
 colony of Andrians, seated close to the canal 
 and on that part which faceth the sea towards 
 Euboea ; Thyssus farther, and Cleone, and 
 Acrothous, and Olophyxus, and Dium, which 
 are promiscuously inhabited by various^ sets of 
 Barbarians, who speak both languages. There 
 is also a small number of Chalcideans amongst 
 them, but the bulk are Pelasgians (the issue of 
 those Tyn'henes who formerly inhabited Lem- 
 ntfs and Athens), and Bisaltians, and Cresto- 
 nians, and Edonians : they reside in small 
 fortresses. Most of them went over to Bra- 
 sidas ; but Sane and Slum stood out. He 
 therefore made his army halt on their lands, 
 and laid them waste. Yet as this had no effect, 
 he marched from thence to Torone of Chalci- 
 dica, then possessed by the Athenians. He 
 hastened thither at the invitation of a small 
 party, who were ready to betray the city to 
 him. Being arrived whilst yet it was dark, he 
 sat down about break of day with his army 
 near the temple of Dioscuri, which lieth not at 
 most above three stadia from the city.' The 
 bulk of the Toroneans and the Athenian gar- 
 rison were ignorant of his approach : but the 
 accomplices, who knew he would be punctual, 
 sent some of their body unperceived to observe 
 his approach. When these were thus certainly 
 assured he was at hand, they conducted back 
 with them to their friends seven men armed 
 only with daggers. Twenty had at first been 
 selected for this service, but only seven of 
 them now had the courage to proceed : Lysis- 
 tratus the Olynthian was the person who com- 
 manded. They got in by the wall towards the 
 sea without causing an alarm, and ascending 
 from thence slaughtered the guard in the cita- 
 delj which is seated upon the most eminent 
 spot, the whole city being built on the declivity 
 of a hill, and burst open the postern towards 
 Canastrseum. Brasidas, having since advanced 
 a little with the rest of his force halted agai-n. 
 But he ordereth a hundred targeteers to go 
 before, that, when the gates should be opened, 
 and the signal given which was before agreed 
 on, they might break in first. These after an 
 interval of time wondered at the delay, and by 
 gradually advancing were got close to the city. 
 Such of the Toroneans within as acted in 
 concert with those who had entered, when once 
 
 » Above a quarter of a mile. 
 
 the postern was burst, and the gates leadin^to 
 the forum were thrown open after bursting the 
 bar, in the first place conducting some of them 
 about, led them in at the postern, that they 
 might strike a sudden panic on the ignorant 
 inhabitants when attacked in rear and in flank 
 and on all sides. This done, they lifted up the 
 appointed signal of fire, and gave instant ad- 
 mittance to the rest of the targeteers through 
 the gates which led to the forum. 
 
 Brasidas, when once he saw the signal, 
 roused up his army and led them running to- 
 wards the place, shouting all at once aloud, and 
 thus striking the greatest consternation into the 
 inhabitants. Some immediately rushed in at 
 the gates ; others mounted over the square 
 wooden machines, which, as the wall had lately 
 fallen down and was now rebuilding, lay close 
 to it for the raising of stones. Brasidas, with 
 the bulk of his force betook himself immedi- 
 ately to the upper parts of the city ; intending 
 to seize the eminence, and possess himself 
 effectually of the place. The rest dispersed 
 themselves equally through every quarter. 
 
 Amidst this surprlsal, the majority of the 
 Toroneans, quite ignorant of the plot, were in 
 vast confusion. But the agents in it and all 
 their party quickly ranged with the assailants. 
 The Athenians, (for of them there were about 
 fifty heavy-armed asleep in the forum,) when 
 they found what was done, some few excepted 
 who were slain instantly on the spot, fled away 
 for preservation ; and some by land, others in 
 the guard ships stationed there, got safe into 
 Lecythus, a fort of theif own. They kept 
 this in their own hands, as it was the extremity 
 of the city towards the sea stretched along on 
 a narrow isthmus. Hither also those of the 
 Toroneans who persevered in their fidelity, fled 
 to them for refuge. 
 
 It being now broad day, and the city firmly 
 secured, Brasidas caused proclamation to be 
 made to those Toroneans who had fled for 
 refuge to the Athenians, that " such as were 
 willing might return to their old habitations, 
 and should enjoy their rights without any mo- 
 lestation." But to the Athenians a herald 
 was sent expressly, commanding them "to 
 evacuate Lecythus which rightly belonged 
 to the Chalcideans, and a truce should be 
 granted them to remove themselves and their 
 baggage." An evacuation they absolutely re- 
 fused, but requested one day's truce to fetch off 
 their dead : he solemnly accorded two. Dur- 
 
TEAK IX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 171 
 
 ing this space he was very busy in strengthen- 
 ing the houses adjacent to Lecythus, and the 
 Athenians did the same within. 
 
 He also convened the Toroneans to a general 
 assembly, and harangued them very nearly in the 
 same manner as he had done at Acanthus, — 
 " that it was unjust to look upon those who 
 had been his coadjutors in the surprisal of the 
 city, as men worse than their neighbours, or 
 as traitors ; they had no enslaving views, nor 
 were biassed to such conduct by pecuniary per- 
 suasions ; the welfare and liberty of the city 
 had been their only object. Neither should 
 they who had no share in the event, be more 
 abridged than those who had. He was not 
 come thither to destroy the city, or so much as 
 one private inhabitant of it. For this very 
 reason he had caused the proclamation to be 
 made to those who had sheltered themselves 
 amongst the Athenians, because such an at- 
 tachment had not in the least impaired them in 
 his esteem, since it was entirely owing to their 
 ignorance that they had thus undervalued the 
 Lacedaemonians, whose actions, as they were 
 always more just, would for the future entitle 
 them much more to their benevolence ; their 
 terror hitherto had been merely the result of 
 inexperience." He then exhorted them in 
 general " to take care for the future to be 
 steady and firm allies, since, should they hence- 
 forth offend, they would be made answerable 
 for the guilt. They were not chargeable for 
 the past, as they had rather been sufferers 
 themselves from superior force ; the preceding 
 opposition therefore deserved forgiveness." 
 
 Having spoken thus, and revived their spi- 
 rits, when the truce was expired he made 
 assaults upon Lecythus. The Athenians de- 
 fended themselves from a paltry rampart and 
 the battlements of the houses. One whole 
 day they effectually repulsed them. But on 
 the following, when a machine was to be 
 planted against them by the enemy, from 
 whence they intended to throw fire upon their 
 wooden fences, and the army was now ap- 
 proaching to the spot which seemed convenient 
 for lodging their machine, and whence it might 
 be played off with effect ; they raised for pre- 
 vention a wooden turret, the base of which 
 was an edifice that lay ready at hand, and ear- 
 ned up many buckets and tubs of water and 
 heavy stones; and upon it also many defen- 
 dants were mounted. But the edifice, too 
 heavily laden, on a sudden was crushed by the 
 
 weight. The crash with which it fell was 
 great : and those of the Athenians who stood 
 near and saw it, were rather concerned than ter- 
 rified. But those at a distance, and especially 
 such as were most remote, imagining the place 
 was already taken in that quarter, fled amain to 
 the sea and to their vessels. 
 
 When Brasidas perceived they-were quitting 
 the battlements and had himself beheld the 
 accident, he led his army to the assault, and 
 immediately carried the fortress. Such as were 
 found within it were instantly destroyed. And 
 the Athenians in boats and ships, after having 
 thus abandoned it to the enemy, crossed over 
 to the Pallene. 
 
 But Brasidas, (for in Lecythus there is a 
 temple of Minerva; and before he proceeded 
 to the assault he had publicly proclaimed, that 
 a reward of thirty minje' of silver should be 
 given the man who first mounted the rampart,) 
 concluding now that it was taken less by hu- 
 man than some other means, reposited the 
 thirty minas in the temple, as an offering to 
 the goddess. And having demolished Lecy- 
 thus and cleared all away, he consecrated the 
 whole spot as sacred to her. During the re- 
 mainder of the winter, he provided for the 
 security of the places already in his possession, 
 and was planning future conquests. And with 
 the end of this winter the eighth year of the 
 war expired. 
 
 TEAR IX.* 
 
 Very early in the spring of the ensuing sum- 
 mer, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians made 
 a trace to continue for a year. The motives 
 on the Athenian side were these — that " Bra- 
 sidas might no longer seduce any of their towns 
 to revolt, before they were enabled by this in- 
 terval of leisure to act against him ; and be- 
 sides, that if they reaped any advantage from 
 this truce, they might proceed to a farther 
 accommodation." On the Lacedaemonian side 
 it was imagined that "the Athenians were 
 under such terrors, as in fact they were, and, 
 after a remission of calamities and misfortunes, 
 would more eagerly come into some expedients 
 for a future reconciliation; of course, would 
 deliver up to them their citizens, and come into 
 a truce for a larger term." The recovery of 
 these Spartans was a point on which they laid 
 
 ' 961. 15s. sterling. a Before Christ 433. 
 
172- 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 a greater stress than ever, even during the 
 career of success which attended Brasidas. 
 They foresaw, that in case he extended his 
 conquests, and even brought them to a balance 
 with their foes, of those they must for ever be 
 deprived, and the conflict then proceeding upon 
 equal advantages, the dangers also would be 
 equal, and thfe'victory still in suspense. 
 
 Upon these motives, both parties and their 
 allies agreed to a truce of the following tenor : 
 
 "As to the temple and oracle of the Py- 
 thian Apollo, it seemeth good unto us, that 
 access be granted to all who desire it, without 
 fraud and without fear, according to the laws 
 of our country. The same is approved of by 
 the Lacedaemonians and their aUies now pre- 
 sent; and they promise to send heralds on 
 purpose, and to spare no pains to procure the 
 consent of the Boeotians and Phocians. 
 
 " As to the treasure belonging to the god, 
 care shall be taken by us to find out those who 
 have presumed to embezzle it ; and this fairly 
 and honestly, according to the laws of our 
 country, both by you, and by us, and by all 
 others who are willing ; all proceeding respec- 
 tively according to the laws of their several 
 constitutions. 
 
 " It hath farther seemed good to the Lace- 
 dsmonians and their other allies, if the Athe- 
 nians agree to the truce, that both parties 
 shall keep within their own bounds, and hold 
 what we are at present respectively possessed 
 of; that is to say, the former to keep in Co- 
 ryphasium,' within the mountains of Bouphras 
 and Tomeus ; the latter in Cythera ; without 
 enlarging the communication for the procuring 
 of alliance, neither on our side against you, 
 nor on your side against us. That those in 
 Nissea and Minoa pass not beyond the road 
 that leads from the gates of Megara, adjacent 
 to the temple of Nisus, towards the temple of 
 Neptune, and from the temple of Neptune 
 carrieth directly to the bridge laid across to 
 Minoa. That neither the Megareans nor their 
 allies pass beyond the same road, nor into the 
 island which the Athenians have taken ; both 
 keeping within their bounds, and upon no oc- 
 casion whatever to have any 'intercourse with 
 on& another ; the Megareans still to retain 
 what they possess in Trcezen, and whatever 
 they hold by compact with the Athenians ; to 
 
 > tn wMch stood tlie Tort of Fylus. 
 
 have farther the free use of the sea upon theii 
 own coasts, and those of their alliance. 
 
 " That the Lacedsemonians and allies shall 
 not navigate the sea in a long ship,^ but in any 
 other vessel rowed with oars, and of no larger 
 burden than five hundred talents.' 
 
 " That by virtue of this truce, safe-conduct 
 be granted both of passage and re-passage, 
 either by land or sea, either to Peloponnesus 
 or to Athens, to all heralds and ambassadors, 
 and their whole retinue how numerous soever, 
 commissioned to negotiate the determination 
 of the war, or to get controverted points ad- 
 judged. 
 
 " That so long as this truce be in force no 
 deserters be entertained, neither by you, nor 
 by us, whether they be freemen or slaves. 
 
 " You shall do justice in our causes, and we 
 shall do the same for you, according to the 
 laws of our respective constitutions, to the end 
 that all controversies may be judicially settled 
 without a war. 
 
 " These articles have the approbation of the 
 Lacedaemonians and their allies. But, if any 
 thing more honourable or more just occurs to 
 you, you are to repair to Laceda3mon, and pro- 
 pose it there. For whatever points you may 
 demonstrate to be just, will in no degree what- 
 ever be rejected, neither by the Lacedseinonians 
 nor by their allies: provided the persons 
 charged with these new , commissions be sent 
 with full powers to put to them the finishing 
 hand, in the same manner as you require the 
 same conditions from us. 
 
 " This truce shall be in force for a year." 
 Ratified by the people. 
 
 The Acamantine tribe presided. Phanippus 
 was the notary public. Niciades was in the 
 chair. Laches pronounced — " Be it for the 
 welfare and prosperity of the Athenians, that 
 a suspension of arms is granted upon the terms 
 ofiered by the Lacedaemonians and allies." 
 
 Agreed in the public assembly of the people, 
 
 " That this suspension shall continue for a 
 year. 
 
 " That it shall take place this very day, being 
 the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion, 
 
 " That during this interval, ambassadors and 
 heralds shall pass between them, to adjust the 
 terms upon which the war should be definitive- 
 ly concluded. 
 
 » A ship of war. ' Fiv» and twenty tons. 
 
VEAR IX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 173 
 
 " That the generals of the state and the 
 ]iresidents in course ,shaU first at Athens con- 
 vene an assembly of the people, to adjust the 
 terms upon which their embassy should be em- 
 powered to put an end to the war. And 
 
 '\ That the ambassadors, who were now pre- 
 sent in the assembly, shall give a solemn rati- 
 fication that they will punctually abide by this 
 truce for a year." 
 
 The Lacedsmonians and their allies agreed 
 to these articles, and pledged their oath for the 
 observation of them to the Athenians and their 
 allies at Lacedffimon, on the twelfth day of the 
 month Gerastius. 
 
 The persons who settled the articles and 
 assisted at the sacrifice were. 
 
 For the Lacedaemonians — Taurus the son of 
 Echetimidas, Athenseus the son of Periclidas, 
 Philocharidas the son of Eryxidaidas. For 
 the Corinthians — .^neas the son of Ocytus, 
 Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus. For 
 the Siconians — Damotimus the son of Nau- 
 crates, Onasimus the son of Megacles. For 
 the Megareans — Nicasus the son of Cecalus, 
 Menecrates the son of Amphidorus. For the 
 Epidaurians — Amphias the son of Eupasidas. 
 For the Athenians — Nicostratus the son of 
 Diotrephcs, Nicias the son of Niceratus, Au- 
 tocles the son of Tolmseus, generals of the 
 state. 
 
 In this manner was a suspension of arms 
 concluded, during which they continued with- 
 out interruption to hold conferences with one 
 another, about settling the terms of a firm and 
 lasting peace. 
 
 During the interval these matters were thus 
 in agitation, Scione a city in the Pellene re- 
 volted from the Athenians to Brasidas. The 
 Scioneans indeed in the Pellene give out that 
 they are of Peloponnesus ; that their ancestors 
 who settled in these other seats were driven 
 there originally by a storm, which in their re- 
 turn from Troy dispersed the Achseans. When 
 they had notified their revolt to him, Brasidas 
 passed over to Scione by night. A party of 
 his friends sailed before him in a trireme, and 
 he followed at some distance in a fly-boat, to 
 the end that, if he should fall in with any vessel 
 larger than this boat, the trireme might make 
 head against her; but if another trireme of 
 equal strength should come up to them, he 
 judged she would neglect his smaller boat, and 
 would attack the ship, which would give him 
 lime to complete his passage in security. 
 
 When he was safe landed, and had convened 
 an assembly of the Scioneans, he harangued 
 them as he had done before at Acanthus and 
 Torone. But he added farther, that " they 
 were a people most deserving of applause, 
 since, though the communication with the 
 Pellene, as being an isthmus, was cut off by 
 the Athenians who were masters of Potidasa, 
 and they were by this means become islanders 
 to all intents and purposes, yet they had, with- 
 out prior sohcitation, advanced boldly towards 
 liberty, nor could bear to lie in cowardly in- 
 activity till necessity forced them to such 
 measures as tended to their manifest welfare. 
 This was ample proof that they were ready to 
 undergo any other the greatest perils, to obtain 
 the wished for settlement of their state. He 
 therefore regarded them, as in truth the most 
 gallant friends of the Lacedsemonians, and 
 would in all respects do proper honour to their 
 worth." 
 
 The Scionians were elevated by these hand- 
 some commendations. All of them became 
 full of spirits, not evei) those excepted to whom 
 the prior steps had been by no means agree- 
 able. They cheerfully determined to sustain 
 all future war, and in every shape gave Bra- 
 sidas honourable entertainment. By public 
 vote they placed upon his head a golden crown 
 as the deliverer of Greece, whilst every single 
 Scionean was busy in adorning him with rib- 
 bons, and caressing him like a victor in the 
 solemn games. His stay at present was short ; 
 he only placed a small' party in the town to 
 secure it, and then re-passed to Torone. But 
 soon after, he transported thither the greater 
 part of his force, designing with the aid of the 
 Scioneans to make attempts upon Mende and 
 Potidaea. He concluded however that the 
 Athenians would lose no time in throwing a 
 succour as into an island, and so he endeavoured 
 to be beforehand with them. 
 
 He had already formed an intelligence to 
 the prejudice of those cities, to get them be- 
 trayed : and he was now intent on executing 
 his schemes against them. But during this 
 pause, Aristonymus, despatched by the Athe- 
 nians, andAthenasus by the Lacedaemonians,, to 
 circulate the news, arrived in a trireme, and 
 notify to him the suspension of arms, His for- 
 ces were then transported back to Torone. 
 
 The persons employed cornmunica.ea ha 
 articles of the truce to Brasidas, and all the 
 Lacedaemonian confederates in Thrace declared 
 U 
 
174 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 their acquiescence in what had been done. 
 Aristonymus was well satisfied in other res- 
 pects; but finding, by computing the days, that 
 the revolt of the Scioneans was too late in 
 point of time, he protested against their being 
 entitled tothe benefit of the truce. Brasidas 
 on the other hand urged many arguments to 
 prove it prior in time, and refuseth to restore 
 that city. When therefore Aristonymus had 
 reported this affair at Athens, the Athenians 
 in an instant were ready to take up arms again 
 for the reduction of Scione. But the Lacedae- 
 monians, by an embassy purposely despatched, 
 remonstrated that " they should regard such a 
 proceeding as a breach of the truce," and assert- 
 ed " their right to the city, as they reposed en- 
 tire credit on Brasidas ; however, they were 
 ready to refer the dispute to a fair arbitration." 
 The others refused to abide by so hazardous a 
 decision, but would recover it as soon as pos- 
 sible by force of arms. They were irritated at 
 the thought, that persons seated as it were upon 
 an island should presume to revolt from them, 
 and have such confidence in the unprofitable 
 land power of the Lacedaemonians. There was 
 farther more truth in the date of the revolt than 
 at present the Athenians could evince : for, in 
 fact, the Scioneans revolted two days too late. 
 But at the instigation of Cleon they immedi- 
 ately passed a decree, that " the Scioneans 
 should be reduced by force, and then put to 
 the sword." And their intention was recalled 
 from all other points, to expedite the needful 
 preparations for the execution of this. 
 
 In the meantime, Mende, also a city in the 
 Pellene, and a colony of the Eretrians, revolt- 
 ed from them. Brasidas received them into 
 his protection, thinking himself justified, as 
 they had openly come over to him in the time 
 of truce. Besides, he had himself some rea- 
 sons to recriminate upon the Athenians, as 
 violaters of the articles. Upon this account 
 the Mendeans were more encouraged to the 
 step, as they saw Brasidas was determined to 
 support them ; and were convinced, by the 
 affair of Scione, that he would not abandon 
 them. The design farther had been originally 
 set on foot by the few ; who, though they de- 
 layed it for a time, were resolved to push it in- 
 to execution: for they apprehended that a 
 discovery might prove fatal to themselves ; and 
 so forced the bulk of the people to act against 
 their inclination. But the Athenians, who 
 bad quick intelligence of it, were now exas- 
 
 perated much more than before, and redoubled 
 their preparations against both those places. 
 
 Brasidas, who soon expected the arrival of 
 their armament, conveyed away the wives and 
 children of the Scioneans and Mendeans to 
 Olynthus of Chalcidica, and had them escorted 
 thither by five hundred -heavy-armed Pelopon- 
 nesians and three hundred Chalcidic targe- 
 teers: the commander, of the whole escort 
 was Polydamidas. Those left behind, expect- 
 ing soon to be visited by the Athenians, united 
 their endeavours to get things in good order for 
 their reception. 
 
 In the interval, Brasidas and Perdiccas 
 marched together a second time into Lyncus 
 against ArribiBUs. They commanded their se- 
 parate bodies ; one, the forces of the Mace- 
 donians subject to himself, and the heavy-armed 
 Grecians who dwelled amongst them ; the 
 other, the remainder of his own Peloponne- 
 sians reinforced by Chacideans and Acan- 
 thians, and quotas from other cities such as 
 they were able to furnish. The number of 
 heavy-armed Grecians computed together, 
 amounted to about three thousand : the ca- 
 valry that attended, both of Macedonians and 
 Chalcideans, was upon the whole little less than 
 a thousand, and the remaining crowd of Bar- 
 barians was great. 
 
 Breaking thus into the territory of Arribaeus, 
 and finding the Lyncestians already in the field 
 to oppose them, they also sat down and faced 
 them. The infantry on each side were posted 
 on an eminence, and a plain lay between them. 
 This yielding room for the excursions of the 
 horse, the cavalry of both began a skirmish 
 first. But then Brasidas and Perdiccas, so 
 soon as the Lyncestian heavy-armed were mov- 
 ing first from the eminence to the aid of their 
 cavalry, and were ready to engage, marched 
 also down into the plain to oppose them, where 
 they charged and routed the Lyncestians. A 
 large number of the latter were slain, the rest 
 fled for preservation to the eminences, and there 
 stood quiet. 
 
 The victors after this, having erected a tro- 
 phy, continued for two or three days in the 
 same post, waiting for the Illyrians who were 
 coming up to join Perdiccas for a stipulated pay. 
 And then Perdiccas intended to advance farther 
 against the villages of Arribaus, and sit no 
 longer inactive. Mende however was still up- 
 permost in the care of Brasidas: — that place 
 must be lost, should the Athenians arrive be- 
 
VEAK IX.] 
 
 PELpPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 175 
 
 fore it in the interval : — the Illyrians besidee 
 were not yet come up. He relished not the 
 project, and was more inclined to go back. This 
 engendered some disputes between them, in 
 the midst of which the news was brought, that 
 the Illyrians had deserted Perdiccas, and joined 
 themselves with Arribaeus. Upon which it 
 was soon resolved between them to retire, as 
 there was reason to dread the accession of men 
 Eo renowned for military valour. Yet the dis- 
 agreement between them prevented their fixing 
 on any certain time for filing off. Night came 
 on, in which the Macedonians and the crowd 
 of Barbarians being struck with a sudden panic 
 (as numerous armies are apt to be, without any 
 certain cause,) and imagining that much larger 
 numbers were coming against them than in fact 
 was true, and that they were only not near 
 enough to attack them, they instantly took to 
 their heels and hurried homewards. Perdiccas 
 for a time knew nothing ' of the matter, and 
 when informed of it, was compelled by the fly- 
 ing troops to dislodge in their company, with- 
 out being able to get a sight of Brasidas. For 
 they were encamped at a distance from each 
 other. 
 
 At the dawn of day, Brasidas perceived that 
 the Macedonians had dislodged, and that the 
 Illyrians and Arribteus were approaching to 
 attack him. He therefore drew his forces to- 
 gether, forming a square with his heavy-armed, 
 in the centre of which he disposed all the crowd 
 of light-armed ; and in this form he intended to 
 retreat. He appointed the youngest men to 
 sally out, in case the enemy anywhere attacked 
 them : and he himself with a picked body of 
 three hundred, determined to bring up the rear 
 in person, in order to sustain and make good 
 their retreat against the van of the enemy who 
 should press upon their rear. And before the 
 enemy came near, as well as the hurry would 
 admit, he animated his soldiers thus : 
 
 « Did I not suspect, ye men of Peloponnesus, 
 that thus abandoned as you are, and ready to be 
 attacked by Barbarians, and those numerous 
 too, you were in some consternation, I should 
 judge it needless to instruct or to encourage 
 you. But now, agajnst this desertion of our 
 friends, and this multitude of our enemies, I 
 shall endeavour by a short admonition and ex- 
 hortation to raise within you the full gi-andeur 
 of your souls. Upon you it is incumbent to 
 behave with gallantry in every martial scene, 
 upon the account, not merely of acting in the 
 
 open field in the presence of so many confedo 
 rates, but of your own hereditary valour. Your 
 souls ought not to be dismayed at a multitude 
 of foes, since you were not born under govern- 
 ments where the many control the few, but 
 where the few command the many. And the 
 only means, by which you acquired this noble 
 privilege, was victorious perseverance in the 
 fields of battle. Yet of these Barbarians, your 
 fears of whom are the result of your ignorance, 
 you ought to be informed, from what you have 
 learned yourselves in former conflicts against 
 them with the Macedonians, as well as from 
 what I conjecture, and what I depend upon 
 from > the accounts of others, that in action 
 they will be by no means terrible. For when 
 a hostile force, though in reality weak, carrieth 
 with it the appearance of strength, a true dis- 
 covery of its state is no sooner obtained, than 
 it redoubleth the courage of their opponents. 
 But men in whom valour is firmly implanted, 
 none can assault with extraordinary spirit but 
 such as know them not. These enemies of 
 yours are dreadful for a while, merely till 
 brought to trial. Their multitude rendereth 
 them terrible to the sight; the loudness of 
 their shouts is insupportable to the ear. Their 
 weapons, brandished about and clashing in the 
 air, have a frightful and menacing look. But 
 their spirit will not answer their show, when 
 charging against such as will sustain their shock. 
 They are not drawn up with skill, nor will 
 they blush when compelled to quit their ground. 
 To fly from or to fly after an enemy is equally 
 a matter of glory to them : by such things is 
 their valour established and rescued from re- 
 proach. For a battle where every combatant 
 is his own commander, leaveth a specious and 
 handsome opportunity to each of providing for 
 his safety. They this moment judge it mora 
 safe to intimidate us at a distance than to run 
 to the charge : for otherwise, before this they 
 had attacked us. And you plainly see, that 
 all the terror which now runs before them, 
 will vanish at the onset, as terrible only to 
 sight and hearing. When therefore they ad- 
 vance to the charge, sustain it and repulse 
 them ; and when opportunity serveth, fall back 
 into your ranks again with regularity and order. 
 You shall thus the sooner secure your retreat, 
 and be convinced for the time to come, that 
 such rabbles, to men who can stand the first 
 fury of their onset, have only made, at a dis- 
 tance and by their pausing, a vain and menacing 
 
176 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book rv 
 
 parade of valour ; but such as will give ground 
 and fly before them, they pursue with eager- 
 ness ; and are excellently brave when there is 
 no resistance." 
 
 After this exhortation, Brasidas caused his 
 army to file leisurely offi The Barbarians per- 
 ceiving it pressed forwards with great noise and 
 clamour, supposing that he fled, and that they 
 might intercept and cut him off. But when 
 the appointed parties sallied out from all quar- 
 ters to receive them, and Brasidas himself with 
 his picked body sustained their charge, they 
 repulsed them at their first assault, to the 
 great surprise of the enemy. Afterwards, re- 
 ceiving every repeated attack, they beat them 
 off continually ; and then, during the intervals 
 of pause, retreated in good order ; till at length, 
 the bulk of the Barbarians discontinued their 
 efforts in the plain against the Greeks under 
 Brasidas, and leaving only a part of their body 
 to follow and annoy them in their retreat, the 
 rest wheeled speedily off to pursue the flying 
 Macedonians, and such as they overtook they 
 slaughtered. To the narrow pass farther be- 
 tween two hills, which was the entrance into 
 the territories of ArribiEus, they hurried before 
 in order to secure it, knowing it to be the only 
 route by which Brasidas could retreat. He 
 was now drawing near it, and in the most dif- 
 ficult part of the passage they were spreading 
 themselves circularly to encompass him on all 
 sides. But Brasidas perceiving their design, 
 ordered the three hundred that marched with 
 him to advance full speed up that hill which 
 he thought was most practicable, and possess 
 themselves of it, and this with the utmost 
 expedition, each as he was able without re- 
 garding form, and endeavour to drive the Bar- 
 oarians thence, who were already posting thetn- 
 selves upon it, before they were joined by 
 larger numbers and could invest him on all 
 sides. They did so, attacked, and made them- 
 selves masters of the hill, which enabled the 
 main body of the Grecians to march up with- 
 out obstruction. For now the Barbarians 
 were thrown into consternation, when their 
 detachment had in this manner been beat off 
 from the eminence. And here they discon- 
 tinued the pursuit, imagining the enemy had 
 already passed the frontier, and secured their 
 retreat. 
 
 Brasidas, when once he was master of the 
 eminences, marched on without molestation ; 
 and the very same day reached Amissa, the 
 
 first place within the dominions of Perdicnas. 
 His soldiers indeed, who were exasperated 
 against the Macedonians for having thus pre- 
 cipitately abandoned them, whatever yokes of 
 oxen they met with on their route, or what- 
 ever baggage lay dropped upon the ground, (as 
 such things it was likely should happen in a 
 retreat by night and confused by fear,) the 
 former they unyoked and cut to pieces, and 
 secreted the latter as lawful plunder. Here, 
 Perdiccas first began to regard Brasidas as his 
 enemy, and ever after forced himself against 
 his inclinations to hate the Peloponncsians ; 
 not indeed in his judgment preferring the Athe- 
 nians, but prevailed upon by the exigencies of 
 his own affairs, he cast about for the means of 
 being again reconciled to the latter, and disen- 
 tangling himself from the former. 
 
 Brasidas, having retreated through Mace- 
 donia to Torone, findeth the Athenians already 
 in possession of Mende. Judging it impossible 
 now to pass over into the Pallene and drive 
 out the enemy, he chose to remain there and 
 securely to garrison Torone. For, during the 
 time of the expedition into Lyncus, the 
 Athenians had put to sea against Mendo 
 and Scione with the armament they had pro- 
 vided, consisting of fifty ships, ten of which 
 were Chian, of a thousand heavy-armed of 
 their own citizens, six hundred archers, a thou- 
 sand mercenary Thracians, and a body of tar- 
 geteers furnished by their adjacent dependents: 
 Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus 
 the son of Diotrephes had the command of 
 the whole. They weighed from Potidsea, and 
 landing at the temple of Neptune, marched di- 
 rectly for Mende. The Mendeans, with their 
 own force and three hundred Scioneans who 
 were come to their succour, and the Pelopon- 
 nesian auxiliaries, in all seven hunflred heavy- 
 armed under the command of Polydamidas, 
 were encamped without the city upon a strong 
 eminence. Nicias taking with him a hundred 
 and twenty light-armed Methoneans, and sixty 
 picked men of the heavy-armed Athenians, 
 and all the archers, attempted to mount by a 
 path that led up the eminence ; but, being 
 galled by the enemy, was not able to force the 
 ascent. Nicostratus, with all the rest of the 
 force, having fetched a compass about, in order 
 to mount in a remote quarter, where the ascent 
 was impracticable, was quite thrown into disor- 
 der : and thus the whole Athenian army nar- 
 rowly escaped a total defeat. As therefoK 
 
TXAR rx.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 177 
 
 (he Mendeans and allies maintained their post i the sea, and posted a guard to secure the block 
 the whole day, the Athenians drew off and ade. 
 encamped. And, when night came on, the 
 Mendeans withdrew into the city. 
 
 The next day, the Athenians sailing round 
 to the Scione side possessed themselves of the 
 suburbs, and spent the whole day in ravaging 
 the country, as not a soul sallied out to 
 obstruct them : for some bustles now were on 
 foot in the city inclining to a sedition. The 
 three hundred Scioneans departed also in the 
 succeeding night to their own home: and 
 the day following, Nicias advancing with a 
 moiety of the force within their frontier, ravag- 
 ed the district of the Scioneans ; whilst Nicos- 
 tratus, with the remainder, sat down before the 
 upper gates of Mende, from whence the road 
 leadeth to Potidaea. But Polydamidas, as the 
 Mendeans and the auxiliaries had chanced to 
 ground their arms in this quarter within the 
 wall, drew them up in order of battle, and 
 exhorted the Mendeans to sally out. It was 
 replied in a seditious manner by one of the 
 popular faction, that " they would not sally, 
 and would have nothing to do with the war." 
 At such a refusal Polydamidas having laid 
 hands upon the person, a tumult at once ensued, 
 in which the people ran immediately to arms, 
 and, furious with anger, made towards the 
 Peloponnesians, and all those of the opposite 
 faction who sided with them. They fell upon 
 and routed them in an instant, terrified as they 
 were at this sudden assault; and the gates 
 were thrown open at the same time to the 
 Athenians. They supposed this insurrection 
 bad been made against them in consequence of 
 some previous combination ; and as many as 
 escaped out of the scuffle with life, fled away 
 to the citadel, which was before in their pos- 
 eession. 
 
 But the Athenians (for Nicias was now 
 returned before the city) bursting into Mende, 
 for it was not opened by composition, with 
 their whole united force, plundered it as though 
 taken by storm ; nay, the generals had some 
 difficulty to restrain their soldiers from putting 
 the inhabitants to the sword. And after this 
 they issued their commands to the Mendeans 
 to continue their government in the usual form, 
 and to proceed judicially against those of their 
 body whom they esteemed the principal authors 
 of the revolt. Those in the citadel they shut 
 'ip with a wall extending on both sides to 
 30 
 
 When in this manner they had possessed 
 themselves of Mende, they marched against 
 Scione. The inhabitants, with the Pelopon- 
 nesian aids, coming out to receive them, posted 
 themselves on a strong eminence before the 
 city ; which, unless the enemy could take it, 
 would infallibly prevent their walling them 
 about. But the Athenians stormed the post, 
 and after an engagement forcing them to dis- 
 lodge, they formed their camp, and having 
 erected a trophy, got every thing in readiness 
 for the circumvallation. And no long time 
 after, whilst they were busied in this work, the , 
 auxiliaries blocked up in the citadel at Mende, 
 having forced the guard posted near the sea, 
 get away by night ; and the major part of them, 
 escaping privily through the Athenian camp 
 before Scione, got safe into that town. 
 
 When the circumvallation of Scione was in 
 hand, Perdiccas, having despatched a herald 
 for the purpose to the Athenian generals, 
 strikes up a new treaty with the Athenians. 
 He took this step out of pure enmity to Brasi- 
 das, arising from the retreat out of Lyncus ; 
 and had begun from that time to act in their 
 favour. For it happened, that at this very 
 juncture of time Ischagoras the Lacedaemon- 
 ian was bringing up by land a reinforcement to 
 Brasidas. But Perdiccas, as well to oblige 
 Nicias, who, as he had renewed hiS alliance, 
 commanded him to give some conspicuous 
 proof of his attachment to the Athenians, as 
 to gratify his own resentment in refusing 
 the Peloponnesians a passage through his do- 
 minions, had gained the concurrence of his 
 Thessalian friends, since with the chief per- 
 sons of that country he had ever been closely 
 united by the hospitable ties, and so stopped 
 the reinforcement and their convoy that, they 
 durst not attempt to pass through Thessaly. 
 Ischagoras, however, and Aminias and Aris- 
 teus, reach Brasidas in person, being commis- 
 sioned by the LacedsBmonians to inspect the 
 posture of their affairs, and brought with them 
 some young men of Sparta, though contrary to 
 their laws, who were to take upon them the 
 government of the cities which were no longer 
 to be trusted to their former managers. In 
 effect, Clearidas the son of Cleonymus they 
 place !js governor in Amphipolis, and Epitelidas 
 the son of Hegesander in Torone. 
 u2 
 
178 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book IV. 
 
 This same summer, the Thebans demolished 
 the walls of the Thespiensians, alleging as 
 the reason, that they were practising with the 
 Athenians. This demolition had ever been 
 intended, hut its execution was now become 
 more easy, as the flower of their youth had 
 perished in the late battle fought against the 
 Athenians. 
 
 This summer also, the temple of Juno at 
 Argos was destroyed by fire. Chrysis the 
 priestess had placed a burning torch too near 
 the garlands, and unawares fell fast asleep. 
 The flames broke out and were raging all 
 around before they were perceived. Chrysis 
 indeed instantly, for fear of the Argives, flies 
 away by night to Phlius. They, according to 
 the law enacted for that purpose, appointed 
 another priestess in her room, whose name was 
 Phaeinis. Eight years of this war were elapsed, 
 and it was the middle of the ninth when 
 Chrysis fled. 
 
 The circumvallation of Scione also was com- 
 pleted about the close of this summer ; and 
 the Athenians, leaving behind a sufficient body 
 to guard it, drew off the rest of their army. 
 
 In the ensuing winter, things were quiet 
 Between the Athenians and Lacedsemonians, 
 because of the suspension of arms. But the 
 Mantineans, and Tegeatse, and the confederates 
 on both sides, engaged at Laodicea of Orestis : 
 but the victory was doubtful. Each party 
 
 routed a wing of their opponents, and both 
 sides erected trophies, and sent the spoils to 
 Delphi. Many however we^e slain on both 
 sides, and the battle was drawn, the night put- 
 ting an end to the contest. The Tegeatae in- 
 deed passed the night upon the field, and 
 immediately erected a trophy. But the Man- 
 tineans withdrew to Bucolion, and afterwards 
 erected their.trophy in opposition. 
 
 In the close of this winter, and when the 
 spring was already approaching, Brasidas farther 
 made an attempt upon Potidaea. For having 
 approached it in the night, and applied his 
 ladders, so far he proceeded without causing an 
 alarm. For the bell being passed by, during 
 that interval, before he that carried it forwards 
 could return, the moment was seized for apply- 
 ing them.' However, the alarm was taken 
 before he could possibly scale, upon which he 
 drew off his army without loss of time, not 
 caring to wait for the return of day. And thus 
 ended the winter ; and with it the ninth year 
 of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled 
 the history. 
 
 iTlie officers regularly went their rounds to see that 
 all the sentinels were at their posts. When they 
 approached any of them, a little bell was rung, to 
 which the sentinel was to answer, in proof tliat he 
 was at his post and awake. The interval between the 
 rounds was so considerable, and the vigilance of thp 
 sentinel, as the bell was just gone by, might be so relax, 
 ed, that Brasidas hoped he might execute his scheme. 
 
THE 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 Year X. The Iruceendeth. Cleon sent commander into Thrace ; his proceedings there. The battle of Am- 
 phipolis, in which Brasidas and Cicon are killed. A general peace, styled the Nician, An alliance, offensive 
 and defensive, between the Athenians and LacedBBmonians. — XI. The peace merely nominal ; and Thucydides 
 proceedeth in his history of the Peloponnesian war. The Corinthians practise against the Lacediemonians, 
 An Argive league. No confidence between the principal states. A train of negotiations. A separate alhance 
 between the Lacedaemonians and Bcbotians, contrary to article. Panactum demolished. — XII. The demolition 
 of Panaccum and the separate alliance highly resented at Athens. Many are scheming a rupture, but especially 
 Alcibiades. By his means a negotiation is brought on at Athens, and an alliance formed with the Argives. 
 The Lacediemonians forbidden to assist at the Olympic games. — XIIL War between the Argives and Epidau- 
 rians. The LacedEemonians throw a garrison into Epidaurus; and the Athenians replace the Helots and 
 Messenians In Pylus. — XIV. The Lacedoemonians take the field against the Argives. Two large armies face 
 one another within sight of Argos, yet part without engaging. The Lacediemonians take tbe field a second 
 time. The battle of Mantinea. The Argives enter into league with the Lacedajmonians. — XV. Fresh stirs at 
 Argos in favour of the Athenians. — XVI. Expedition of the Athenians against ihe isle of Melos. The con- 
 ference in form, by way of dialogue. . The Athenians become masters of that island. 
 
 Is the following summer, the truce, made for a 
 year, expired, of course, at the time of the 
 Pythian Games. And, during this relaxation 
 from war, the Athenians caused the Delians 
 to evacuate the isle of Delos ; imagining that, 
 upon the taint of some crimes long since com- 
 mitted, they were not sufficiently pure to per- 
 form due service to the god, and that this yet 
 was wanting to render that work of puijgation 
 complete, in which, as I have already related, 
 they thought themselves justified in demolish- 
 ing the sepulchres of the dead. The Delians 
 settled again, so fast as they could remove 
 themselves thither, at Atramyttinm, bestowed 
 upon them for this purpose by Pharnaces. 
 Cleon,^ having obtained the commission 
 
 » Before Christ 422. 
 
 3 Cleon is now grown perfectly convmced that he is 
 a very hero, and hath prevailed upon a majority of tlie 
 people of Athens to be of the same mind, since, serious- 
 ly and deliberately, they intrust him witha-most impor- 
 tant and delicate commission. He now imagines he can 
 carry all before him, and pluck all the laurels of Brasi- 
 
 from the Athenians, went by sea into the 
 Thracian dominions, so soon as the suspension 
 of arms expired, having under his command 
 twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, three 
 
 das from the head*of that accomplished Spartan, even 
 without having Demosthenes for his second. We may 
 guess to what a height of insolence he was now grown, 
 from the' Knights of Aristophanes. And, to set it in tbe 
 most ludicrous view, the poet opens his play with Ni- 
 cias and Demosthenes, whom he paints in a very inju- 
 rious manner; and, no doubt, it must have been very 
 grating to them, to see themselves represented in so low 
 buflbonery upon the stage of Athens. "Demosthenes 
 begins with a shower of curses on that execrable Paph- 
 lagonian, Cleon ; Nicias seconds him ; then both of tbcnt 
 howl together in a most lamentable duetto. They next 
 lay their heads together about some means of redress. 
 Demosthenes proposeth getting out of their master 
 Cleon's reach. * Let us go, then,' says Nicias. * Ay; let 
 us go,' cries Demosthenes. * Say more,' says Nicias, ' let 
 us go over to the enemy.' ' Ay ; over to the enemy,* 
 adds the other. * But first.' says Nicias, * Jet us go and 
 prostrate ourselyes before the images of the gods. 
 'What images?' says Demosthenes; 'dost thou think 
 then there are any gods?' 'I do,' 'Upon what grounds?' 
 ' Because I am undeservedly the object of their hatred.' 
 —Such are the daring misrepresentations Aristophanes 
 makes of characters that by no means deserve it! De- 
 most lienes afterwards describes the arrogance of Cleon 
 
 179 
 
180 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book \. 
 
 hundred horsemen, and larger numbers of their 
 allied forces. His whole armament consisted 
 of thirty sail. Touching first at Scione, yet 
 blocked up, he drew from thence the heavy- 
 armed, stationed there as guards ; and, stand- 
 ing away entered the haven of the Colophoni- 
 ans, lying at no great distance from Toronc. 
 Being here informed, by the deserters, that 
 Brasidas was not in Torone, nor the inhabitants 
 able to make head against him, he marched 
 his forces by land towards that city, and sent 
 ten of his ships about, to stand into the harbour. 
 His first approach was to the new rampart, 
 which Brasidas had thrown up quite round the 
 city in order to inclose the suburbs within its 
 cincture, and thus by the demolition of the old 
 wall, had rendered it one entire city. When 
 the Athenians came to the assault, Pasitelidas, 
 the Lacedemonian, who was commandant, 
 and the garrison under his command, exerted 
 themselves in its defence. But, when they 
 could no longer maintain it, and at the same 
 time the ships, sent around on purpose, had en- 
 tered the harbour, Pasitelidas, fearing lest the 
 ships might take the town now left defenceless, 
 and, when the rampart was carried by the ene- 
 my, he himself might be intercepted, abandons 
 it immediately, and retired with all speed into 
 the town : but the Athenians were already 
 disembarked and masters of the place. The 
 land-force also broke in instantly at his heels, 
 by rushing along through the aperture in the 
 old wall ; and some, as well Feloponnesians as 
 Toroneans, they slew in the moment of irrup- 
 tion. Some also they took'alive, amongst 
 whom was Pasitelidas the commandant. Bra- 
 sidas was indeed coming up to its relief, but 
 receiving intelligence on his march that it was 
 taken he retired ; since he was forty stadia^ 
 ofi", too great a distance to prevent the enemy. 
 
 thus ; " He hath one foot fixed in Pylus, and the other 
 in the assembly of the people. When he moves, he 
 Btruts and stretches at such a rate, that his bum is in 
 Thrace, his hands in .^tolia, and his attention amongst 
 the tribes at home." — Micias then proposeth poisoning 
 themselves by drinking bull's blood, like Themistocles ; 
 — "Or -rather," says Demosthenes, "a dose of good 
 wine." This is agreed upon, in order to cheer up their 
 spirits, and enable them to confront Cleon, and play off 
 against him, the seller of black-puddings. Nicias ac- 
 cordingly goes and steals the wine. — Yet, in spite of 
 the most outrageous ridicule, and the opposition of all 
 wise and honest men at Athens, we see Cleon now at 
 the head of an army, to stop the rapid conquests of 
 Brasidas. 
 1 About four miles. 
 
 But Cleon and the Athenians now erecteu 
 two trophies ; one upon the harbour, the other 
 at the rampart. They farther doomed to 
 slavery, the wives and children of the Torone- 
 ans. The male inhabitants, together with the 
 Peloponnesians and every Chalcidean that was 
 found amongst them, amounting in all to sev- 
 en hundred, they sent away captives to Athens. 
 The Peloponnesians indeed were afterwards 
 released, by virtue of the subsequent treaty; 
 the rest were fetched away by the Olynthians, 
 who made exchanges for them, body for body. 
 
 About the same time, the Boeotians, by 
 treachery, got possession of Panactum, a fort 
 upon the frontier, belonging to the Athenians. 
 
 As for Cleon, having established a garrison 
 at Torone, he departed thence, and sailed round 
 Athos, as bound for Amphipolis. 
 
 But two vessels about this time, bound for 
 Italy and Sicily, sailed out of the harbour of 
 Athens, having on board Phaeax, the son of 
 Erasistrotus, with whom two other persons 
 were joined in commission, to execute an em- 
 bassy there. For the Leontines, after the depar- 
 ture of the Athenians from Sicily, in conse- 
 quence of the jointaccommodation,had enrolled 
 many strangers as denizens of their city, and the 
 populace had a plan in agitation for a distribution 
 of the lands. The noble, alarmed at this, gain 
 the concurrence of the Syracusans and eject the 
 commons. They were dispersed, and wander- 
 ed up and down as so many vagabonds ; whilst 
 the noble, striking up an agreement with the 
 Syracusans, abandoned and left in desolation 
 their own city, settling at Syracuse as free citi- 
 zens of that place. And yet, soon after some of 
 this number, dissatisfied even here, forsook 
 Syracuse again, and seize upon Phoca;a, a 
 quarter of the old city of the Leontines, and up- 
 on Bi^icinniae, which is a fortress in the Leon- 
 tine. Hither the greater part of the ejected 
 commons resorted to them ; and adhering firm- 
 ly together, from these strongholds they annoy- 
 ed the country by their hostilities. When the 
 Athenians had intelligence of this, they send 
 out Phseax, to persuade, by all proper methods, 
 their old allies in that country, and to gain, if 
 possible, the concurrence of the other Sicilians 
 to take up arms for the preservation of the 
 people of Leontium, against the encroaching 
 power of the Syracusans. Pha;ax, upon his ar- 
 rival, recommendeth the scheme successfully to 
 the Camarineans and Agrigentines. But his 
 negotiations meeting with some obstacles at 
 
JTEAE X.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 181 
 
 Gela, he desisted from addressing himself to 
 the rest, since he was assured he could not pos- 
 sibly succeed. Retiring therefore through the 
 district of the Siculi to Catane, and calling on 
 his road at Bricinniae, and having encouraged 
 the malcontents there to persevere, he depart- 
 ed. Not but that, in this Sicilian voyage, 
 both passing and repassing, and also upon the 
 coast of Italy, he had urged to several cities 
 " how expedient for them was the Athenian 
 friendship." 
 
 He met also in his course with those Lo- 
 crians, who were going to another settlement, 
 after expulsion from Messene. They had been 
 driven to this necessity by seditious factions at 
 Messene, one of which had invited them thither 
 Gince the joint accommodation among the Si- 
 cilians ; and now they were forced to shift 
 again, though Messene had for a time been 
 entirely in their power. Phaeax therefore, 
 meeting with these in their removal, gave them 
 no annoyance ; for the Locrians had been at a 
 conference with him, to concert the measures 
 of an agreement with the Athenians. These, 
 however, were the only party of all the confe- 
 derates, who, when the Sicilians had amicably 
 ended their disputes, refused to treat with the 
 Athenians, wlio were brought to such submis- 
 sion since merely by a war, in which they were 
 embroiled against the Itonians and Meleans, 
 who bordered upon them, and were colonies of 
 their own. And, some time after thisj Phaeax 
 truly returned to Athens. 
 
 But Cleon, who from Torone was gone 
 about by sea against Amphipolis, marching 
 away from Eion, maketh an assault upon Sta- 
 girus, a colony of Andrians, but without suc- 
 cess ; yet Galepsus, a colony of the Thasians, 
 he taketh by storm. He sent farther ambassa- 
 dors to Perdiccas, to summon his attendance 
 in the expedition, according to the tenor of the 
 new alliance. He sent others into Thrace to 
 Polles, king of the Odomantians, that he would 
 hire as large a body of Thracians as could be 
 got, and bring them up under his own orders. 
 And, during this interval, he himself lay quiet 
 at Eion. 
 
 But Brasidas, informed of these proceedings, 
 placed himself in an opposite post at Credylium. 
 This place belongeth to the Argilians, and is 
 seated on an eminence on the other side of the 
 river, and at no great distance from Amphipo- 
 lis. From hence he had a perfect view of all 
 rieon's motions ; sc that now it was impossi- 
 
 ble for the latter to make any approach with 
 his army, from thence to Amphipolis, without 
 being discovered. Brasidas, however, sus- 
 pected that Celon would approach, and, from 
 a contempt of his opponents, would certainly 
 advance thither, without waiting for reinforce- 
 ments. 
 
 He had at the same time, provided himself 
 with fifteen hundred mercenary Thracians, and 
 had assembled all the Edonian targeteers and. 
 horsemen. Of the Myrcinians and Chalcide- 
 ans he had a thousand targeteers, besides those 
 in Amphipolis. But his whole force of heavy- 
 armed of all sorts amounted to about two thou- 
 sand ; and he had three hundred Grecian horse- 
 men. With a detachment, consisting of fifteen 
 hundred of these, Brasidas had posted himself 
 at Cerdylium ; the rest were left in Amphipo- 
 lis, under the orders of Clearidas. 
 
 Cleon remained without stirring for the pre- 
 sent, but was soon forced to such a step as 
 Brasidas expected. The soldiers were cha- 
 grined at their inactivity, and were disparaging 
 his conduct by invidious parallels, " against how 
 much skill and courage, with how much un- 
 skillfulness and cowardice he was matched ;" 
 and that " with the highest regret they had 
 attended him from' Athens on this expedition.'" 
 Sensible of their discontent, and unwilling to 
 disgust them more by too long a continuance 
 in the same post, he drew them up and led 
 them on. He acted now upon the vain con- 
 ceit with which his success at Pylus had puffed 
 him up, as a man of great importance. It 
 cold not enter his heart, that the enemy would 
 presume to march out against and offer him 
 battle. He gave out that "he was only ad- 
 vancing in order to view the place ; he waited 
 indeed the arrival of additional forces, not as if 
 they were needful to his security, should the 
 enemy attack him, but to enable him completely 
 to invest the city, and to take it by storm." 
 Being advanced, he posted his troops upon a 
 strong eminence before Amphipolis, and went 
 in person to view the marshes of the Strymon, 
 and the situation of the city on the side of 
 Thrace, how it really was. He judged he could 
 retreat at pleasure without a battle. Not so 
 much as one person appeared upon the works, 
 or issued out at the gates; for they were all 
 shut fast. He now concluded himself guilty of 
 a mistake in coming so near the place without 
 the machines, "as the town must infallibly 
 have been taken, because abandoned." 
 
182 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR 
 
 [book v. 
 
 Brasidas, however, had no sooner perceived 
 that the Athenians were in motion, than de- 
 scending from Cerdylium, he marcheth into 
 AmjihipoUs. He there waved all manner of 
 sally and all show of opposition against the 
 Athenians. He was afraid of trusting too much 
 to his own forces, as he judged them inferior to 
 the enemy, not truly in numbers, for so far they 
 were nearly balanced, but in real worth ; for 
 the Athenian force, appointed for this service, 
 was composed of the very flower of Athens, 
 and the choicest troops of the Leranians and 
 Imbrians. For this reason, he prepared to 
 assail them with art ; because in case he gave 
 the enemy a view of his numbers, and of the 
 sorry manner in which they were armed, he 
 judged he should be less likely to gain a victory, 
 than by concealing them till the moment of 
 action, and avoiding that contempt which their 
 real state would have inspired. Picking out, 
 therefore, a party of one hundred and fifty 
 heavy-armed for himself, and appointing Clea- 
 ridas to command the rest, he designed to fall 
 suddenly upon the Athenians in their retreat ; 
 concluding he should never again find them in 
 this forlorn manner, when the reinforcements 
 they expected were come up. Calling, -there- 
 fore, all his soldiers around him, as he was de- 
 sirous of animating them, aijd letting them into 
 his scheme he harangued them thus : 
 
 " Ye men of Peloponnesus, let it suffice 
 that I briefly put you in mind that we are 
 natives of that country which hath ever by 
 valour preserved itself free, and that you of the 
 Doric are now going to attack your opponents 
 of the Ionic descent, whom you are inured to 
 defeat. My words are chiefly designed to in- 
 form you in what manner I have planned the 
 method of attack, lest hazarding the event with 
 so small a party, and not with our entire force, 
 may seem unequal to the work, and may too 
 much dispirit you. The enemy, I conjecture, 
 from an utter contempt of us, and a strong 
 presumption that we durst not come out into 
 the field against them, have shown themselves 
 before this city; and this very moment, dis- 
 orderly scattered as they are to view the situa- 
 tion, they heartily despise us. The leader, 
 therefore, who hath the most acuteness in de- 
 tecting such blunders in a foe, and then seizeth 
 the proper moment to fall upon them, as best 
 enabled by his own strength ; not so much in 
 the open and regular manner of a methodical 
 fight, as with a surprise, most advantageous in 
 
 the present juncture ; — such a leader may, for 
 the most part, be assured of success. Such 
 stealths as these draw after them the highest 
 glory : by these the man who over-reacheth 
 his enemy the most, performeth the most sub- 
 stantial service for his friends. Whilst, there- 
 fore, haughtily presuming on their own worth, 
 they remain thus disordered, and, by wha. 
 appeareth to me, are bent more on drawing off 
 than remaining here, — during this their inter- 
 mission of purpose, and before their resolutions 
 can be regularly adjusted, I myself, at the head 
 of my chosen party, will be amongst them, if 
 possible, and will rush with vigour into the 
 centre of their army. And then, Clearidas, 
 when once you perceive that I am engaged, 
 and, as in probability it must bej have 
 thrown them into disorder, then, at the head 
 of yours, accompanied by the Amphipolitans 
 and the rest of the confederates, throw open 
 the gates on a sudden for your sally, and ad- 
 vance with your utmost speed to the charge, 
 And thus, it may confidently be hoped, the 
 enemy must be thrown into the utmost con- 
 sternation ; because a second body, thus run- 
 ning to the charge, is more terrible to the foes 
 than the present which is already engaged. And 
 show yourself now, Clearidas, that gallant man; 
 which in honour, as a Spartan, you ought to be. 
 
 " You, in general, ye confederates, I exhort 
 to follow with manly resolution, and to remem- 
 ber that good soldiers are bound, in duty, to be 
 full of spirit, to be sensible of shame, and to 
 obey commanders ; that, this very day, if you 
 behave with valour, you are henceforth free, 
 and will gain the honourable title of LacediE- 
 monian allies ; otherwise, must continue to be 
 the slaves of the Athenians; where the best 
 that can befall you, if neither sold for slaves 
 nor put to death as rebels, will be a heavier 
 yoke of tyranny than you ever yet have felt, 
 whilst the liberty of the rest of Greece must 
 by you for ever be obstructed. But so das- 
 tardly behaviour I conjure you to scorn, as you 
 know for what valuable prizes you are to cntei 
 the lists. I myself shall convince you, that I 
 am not more ready to put others in mind of 
 their duty, than personally to discharge my 
 own through the whole scene of action." 
 
 Brasidas, having ended his harangue, pre 
 pared to sally out hiihself, and placed the mail, 
 body under the orders of Clearidas, at tht 
 gates which are called the Thracian, to bo 
 ready to rush out at the appointed time. 
 
YEAR X.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 183 
 
 To Cleon now, — for Brasidas had been 
 plainly seen coming down from Cerdylium ; 
 and, as the prospect of the city lay open to 
 those without, had been seen also when sacri- 
 ficing before the temple of Minerva, and form- 
 ing the proper dispositions : — to Cleon, I say, 
 who was now in a remote quarter to view the 
 posts, advice is brought, that " the whole force 
 of the enemy was visibly drawn up within the 
 city, and that, under the gates, many feet of 
 horses and men might be discerned, as ready 
 for a sally." Upon hearing this, he went to 
 the place, and was convinced by his own sight. 
 He determined, however, not to hazard a battle 
 before his succours were arrived ; and though 
 he knew his motions could not be concealed, 
 he went off, and ordered the signal to be given 
 for a. retreat; commanding farther that the 
 left wing should file off first, which indeed was 
 the only method of drawing off securely to 
 Bion. But as they seemed to him to be long 
 about it, he wheeled off himself at the head of 
 the right ; and thus, exposing his men to the 
 missive weapons of the enemy, was drawing 
 off his army. 
 
 At this instant Brasidas, perceiving it was 
 time to attack, since the army of the Athenians 
 was already in motion, says to those about him, 
 and to all that were near, — " These gentlemen 
 wait not for us, that plainly appeareth by the 
 shaking of their spears and heads ; for those 
 who make such motions are not used to stay 
 for the enemy's approach. But let -somebody 
 throw me open the appointed gates and let us 
 boldly and with all speed sally out against 
 them." In effect, Brasidas, issuing at the 
 jates of the entrenchment, and the first of 
 what was then the long wall, advanced with 
 all speed directly along the road, where now 
 standeth the trophy, to be seen by those who 
 pass, along by the strongest part of the town, 
 and, falling upon the Athenians, dismayed not 
 only at their own irregular situation, but also 
 terrified at his bold attack in the very centre of 
 their army, he putteth them to the rout. And 
 now Clearidas, sallying out according to order 
 at the Thrician gates, was advancing to second 
 him. The consequence was, that, by such an 
 unexpected and sudden assault on both sides, 
 the Athenians were thrown into the highest 
 confusion. Their left wing, which inclined 
 the most towards Eion, as having filed off 
 first, was instantly broken, and fled. These 
 were no sooner dispersed in flight, tlian Brasi- 
 
 das, advancing to the attack of the right, ia 
 wounded : — ^he dropped ; — but the Athenians 
 are not sensible of it. Those who were near 
 him took him up and carried him off. This 
 accident, however, enabled the right wing of 
 the Athenians to maintain their ground the 
 longer ; though Cleon, who from the first had 
 never intended to stand an engagement, flies 
 instantly away; and, being intercepted by a 
 Myrcinian targeteer, is slain. But his heavy- 
 armed, embodying together and gaining an 
 eminence, repulsed Clearidas, who twice or 
 thrice attacked them, and maintained their 
 ground till the Myrcinian and Chalcidic cavalry 
 and the targeteers, surrounding and pouring in 
 their darts upon them, compelled them to fly. 
 Thus the whole Athenian army was distressed 
 in a laborious flight : they ran different ways 
 amongst the mountains ; numbers had been 
 destroyed in the charge, others by the Chalci- 
 dic horse and targeteers ; but the remainder 
 escaped in safety to Eion. 
 
 Those who took up Brasidas, when he drop- 
 ped in the action, and bore him off, carried him 
 into the- city yet alive. His senses remained 
 till he heard his party were victorious, and soon 
 after that he expired.' 
 
 The rest of the army with Clearidas, being 
 come back from the pursuit, rifled the dead and 
 erected a trophy. 
 
 This done, all the confederates assisted under 
 arms at the funeral of Brasidas, whom they in- 
 terred at the public expense within the city near 
 the place where the forum now standeth. And 
 afterwards the AmphipoUtans, having inclosed 
 his monument, performed sacrifice to him as a 
 hero. They also enacted solemn games in his 
 honour and annual sacrifices. Nay, they as- 
 cribed their colony to him as founder, after 
 demolishing the edifices of Agnon, and defac- 
 ing every memorial which might continue the 
 memory of his foundation. They acted thus, 
 partly out of real gratitude to Brasidas, whom 
 they regarded as their deliverer, and partly at 
 
 1 Th« first embassy which came from the Grecians in 
 Thrace to Sparta, after the death of Brasidas, made a 
 visit to his mother Argilconia. The first question she 
 aslied them was, "Did my son die bravely?" And 
 when the ambassadors expatiated largely in his praise, 
 and said, at last, " there was not sucn another Spartan 
 left alive ;"— " You mistake, gentlemen," said the 
 mother :" my son was s good man | but there are many 
 better men than he in Sparta ' Plutarch^a Laeonie 
 Apophthegms. 
 
184 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book v. 
 
 this juncture to show their high respect for the 
 Lacedaemonian alliance, as they stood in great 
 dread of the Athenians. For, considering their 
 hostile embroilments with the Athenians, they 
 thought it neither for their interest nor satis- 
 faction to continue the honours of Agnon. 
 
 To the Athenians they also delivered the 
 bodies of their dead. The number of them, 
 on the Atheniau side, amounted to six hundred, 
 whereas the enemy lost but seven men. This 
 was owing to the nature of the fight, which had 
 not been carried on in a regular manner, but 
 was rather a slaughter, in consequence of a 
 surprise and sudden consternation. After the 
 reception of their dead, tho Athenians sailed 
 away for Athens ; but those under the orders 
 of Clearidas applied themselves to re-settle and 
 secure Amphipolis. 
 
 About the same time, in the close of this 
 summer, Ramphias, and Autocharidas, and 
 Epicydidas, Lacedsemonians, were conducting 
 up, for the Thraoian service, a reinforcement 
 consisting of nine hundred heavy-armed. Being 
 arrived at Heraclea, in Trachis, they regulated 
 there such things as seemed to require an 
 amendment; and, during the season they 
 halted here, the battle of Amphipolis was 
 fought, and the summer ended. 
 
 But, early as possible in the succeeding 
 winter, the reinforcement under Ramphias 
 proceeded on their route as far as Pierium of 
 Thessaly. But the Thessalians opposing 
 their farther passage, and Brasidas being now 
 dead, to whom they were conducting this sup- 
 ply, they returned home. They imagined that 
 their aid was no longer wanting, as the Athe- 
 nians, in consequence of their overthrow, had 
 quitted that country : and themselves had not 
 Bufficicnt ability to carry the plans into execu- 
 tion which Brasidas had been meditating. But 
 the principal motive of their return was their 
 ovra consciousness, at setting out, that the 
 Lacedsemonians were more inclined to peace. 
 
 It so fell out indeed, immediately after the 
 battle of Amphipolis and the return of Ram- 
 phias from Thessaly, that neither of the parties 
 meddled any longer with the operations of war, 
 but were more inclined to a peace. The mo- 
 tives on the Athenian side were these : — They 
 had received a terrible blow at Delium, and a 
 eecond lately at AmphipoUs: hence they no 
 longer entertained that assured confidence of 
 their own strength, which had formerly occa- 
 sioned them to reject all accommodations, as 
 
 they imagined, in their then career of success 
 they should soon give law to their enemies. Now 
 also they were under apprehensions of their 
 dependents, lest buoyed up by the late mis- 
 fortunes of Athens, they might the sooner bo 
 induced to revolt. And they heartily repented 
 now, that th^y had neglected^ the fine oppor- 
 tunity, which their success at Pylus gave 
 them, of bringing the dispute to a happy deter- 
 mination. 
 
 On the other hand, the Lacedaemonians 
 acted on these motives : — They found them- 
 selves strangely mistakeli in the events of- war. 
 At its commencement, they imagined, that in 
 the space of a few years, they should entirely 
 have demolished the power of the Athenians, 
 by laying their territory waste ; but they had 
 suffered a terrible calamity in the affair of 
 Sphacteria, such as never before had been tho 
 lot of Sparta. Devastations now were extend- 
 ed over all their country, from Pylus and Cy- 
 thera. Their Helots had also in numbers de- 
 serted to the foe ; and they lived in constant 
 expectation that those, who yet persevered in 
 their allegiance, gained by the solicitations of 
 those who were fled, might, in the present low 
 ebb of Sparta, attempt to subvert their consti- 
 tution, as had formerly been the case. It 
 happened farther, that the thirty years' truce 
 with the Argives was on the point of expiring j 
 and the Argives were unwiUing to renew it, 
 unless the Cynuria was previously restored. 
 They juded it therefore a plain impossibility, 
 to make head, at the same time, against both 
 Argives and Athenians. They had also a sus- 
 picion that some cities of Peloponnesus would 
 revolt from them to the Argives, which proved 
 afterwards true. 
 
 Both parties, then, being respectively influ- 
 enced by such considerations, an accommoda- 
 tion was judged to be expedient." The anxiety 
 of the Lacedsmonlans about it was not the 
 least, as they were eagerly bent on recovering 
 their prisoners that had been taken at Sphac- 
 teria ; for they were all citizens of Sparta, of 
 the first rank, and allied to the most honour- 
 able families. They had begun to solicit their 
 liberty so soon as ever they were taken ; but 
 the Athenians, flushed with conquest, at that 
 time disdained to treat. Yet, after the blow 
 received at Delium, the Lacedsemonians, know- 
 ing then they were become more tractable, laid 
 hold of the favourable juncture, and obtained a 
 cessation of arms for a year, in which space 
 
YEAR X.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 185 
 
 they were, by article, to hold mutual confer- 
 ences, in order to settle an accommodation for 
 a longer time. And since the Athenians had 
 now again more lately been totally defeated at 
 Amphipolis, and as well Cleon as Brasidas 
 was dead, both of whom had most strenuously 
 opposed an accommodation ; the latter, because 
 he was successful and reaped glories in war ; 
 the former, because, in a season of tranquillity, 
 his villanies must needs be detected, and his 
 bold calumniations lose all credit ; the persons, 
 who at present were chief in the management 
 of either state, were more strongly disposed 
 than ever to adjust disputes. These were, 
 Pleistionax, the son of Fausanias, king of the 
 Lacedaemonians, and Nicias, the son of Nicera- 
 tus, by far the most successful general of that 
 age. Nicias desired it, as hitherto he had 
 never been defeated, and was bent on securing 
 his own prosperity on a lasting foundation, on 
 obtaining a relaxation of toils for himself, and 
 of their present burdens for his fellow-citizens, 
 and on leaving his name illustrious to posterity, 
 as one who had never involved his country in 
 calamity. These views, he judged, could only 
 be accomplished by vacuity from danger, by 
 exposing himself, as little as possible, to the 
 uncertainties of fortune ; and vacuity from 
 danger was compatible solely with peace. 
 Pleistionax had been calumniated by his ene- 
 mies on the account of his restoration ; and 
 they inviduously suggested to his prejudice, 
 upon every loss whatever which the Lacedaemo- 
 nians sustained, that such was the consequence 
 of transgressing the laws in the repeal of his 
 banishment. For they laid to his charge, 
 that, in concert with his brother Aristodes, he 
 had suborned the priestess of Delphi to give 
 one general answer to all the deputations sent 
 by the LacedEemonians to consult the oracle, 
 that " they should bring back the seed of the 
 demigod son of Jove from a foreign land into 
 their own country : if not, they should plough 
 with a silver ploughshare ;" and thus, at length, 
 so seduced the Lacedaemonians in the favour of 
 an exile, residing at Lyceum, upon account of 
 his precipitate retreat out of Attica, as though 
 purchased by bribes from the enemy, and from 
 a dread of his countrymen dwelling in a house, 
 one-half of which was part of the temple of 
 Jupiter, that, nineteen years after, they, con- 
 ducted him home with the same solemn pro- 
 cession and sacrifices as those, who were the 
 original founders of Lacedajmon, had appointed 
 
 for the inauguration of their kings. Kepining, 
 therefore, at these calumniations, and judging 
 that, as peace giveth no room for miscarriage, 
 and that, farther, if the Lacedaemonians could 
 recover the prisoners, his enemies would be 
 debarred of a handle for detraction ; whereas, 
 whilst the chances of war subsist, the persons 
 at the helm of government must be liable to 
 reproaches for every disaster ; he was ear- 
 nestly desirous to bring about an accommoda- 
 tion. 
 
 This winter, therefore, they .proceeded to 
 a conference ; and, at the approach of spring, 
 great preparations were openly in hand on the 
 Lacedemonian side, and a scheme for fortify- 
 ing in Attica was circulated through all the 
 states, in ordet to render the Athenians more 
 compliant. Many meetings were held, and 
 many demands, with large justifications, were 
 urged on both sides, till, at length, it was 
 agreed, that « a peace should be concluded, 
 each party restoring what they had conquered 
 in the war, but Nisaea to remain in the hands 
 of the Athenians." Plataea was re-demanded 
 by the latter, but the Thebans urged that it 
 had not fallen into their hands by force or by 
 treachery, but they possessed it in pursuance 
 of a free and voluntary surrender. And, 
 upon the same plea, the Athenians kept 
 Nisaea. 
 
 Things being so far adjusted, the Lacede- 
 monians called together their confederates ; 
 and all their voices, excepting those of the 
 Boeotians, and Corinthians, and Eleans, and 
 Megareans, who were not at all satisfied with 
 these proceedings, concurring for a peace, 
 they ratify the accommodation, and solemnly 
 pledged the observance of it to the Atheni- 
 ans, who, in exchange, swore the same to the 
 Lacedsmonians, in effect as foUoweth : — 
 
 " The Athenians and Lacedemonians, and 
 their allies, have made peace on these terms, 
 and every state hath sworn to their observ- 
 ance. 
 
 " In regard to the common temples : — Per- 
 mission is granted, to all who desire it, to 
 sacrifice, to visit, to consult the oracles, to 
 send public deputations, in the prescribed 
 forms of every people, both by land and sea, 
 without any molestation. 
 
 "That the sacred soil of the temple of 
 Apollo at Delphi, and Delphi itself, be ruled 
 after its own model, be taxed at its own discre- 
 tion, and be administered by its own magi- 
 
18S 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book v. 
 
 fitrates, whose determinations to be final, both 
 in regard to life and property, according to the 
 primitive laws of the place. 
 
 " That this peace continue for the space of 
 fifty years, between the Athenians and the 
 confederates of the Athenians, on the one side, 
 and the Lacedaemonians and the confederates 
 of the LacedaBmonians, on the other, without 
 fraud and without molestation, both at land and 
 sea. 
 
 "Be it farther unlawful for either party to 
 take up arms to the detriment of the other, — 
 neither the Lacedaemonians and their allies 
 against the Athenians and their allies, — nor 
 the Athenians and their allies against the 
 Lacedaemonians and their allies, without any 
 fraud or evasion whatsoever. And, if any 
 difference intervene between the contracting 
 parties, let it be adjusted according to equity, 
 and upon oath, in such manner as they shall 
 agree. 
 
 "Agreed, farther, that the Lacedsemonians 
 and allies deliver up Amphipolis to the Athc- 
 ;iians. 
 
 " That, whatever cities the Lacedaemonians 
 Jeliver up to the Athenians, leave be given 
 to the inhabitants to remove at their own dis- 
 cretion, with all their effects. 
 
 " That the cities, which pay the assessments 
 lated by Aristides, enjoy all their rights and 
 privileges whatever. 
 
 " And, be it unlawful for the Athenians 
 and their allies to take up arms to the annoy- 
 ance of those cities which pay that assessment, 
 from the time that this treaty be in force. 
 Those cities are, Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, 
 Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus ; these cities to 
 observe a strict neutrality, forming no engage- 
 ments with either Lacedaemonians or Athe- 
 nians. — Provided, that, if the Athenians can 
 by fair means prevail upon these cities, it be 
 lawful for the Athenians to admit them con- 
 federates at their own free choice. 
 
 "That the Mecyberneans, and Saneans, 
 and Singeans, shall inhabit their own cities in 
 the same manner as the Olynthians and Acan- 
 thians. 
 
 " Agreed, farther, that the Lacedaemonians 
 and allies restore Panactum to the Athenians. 
 
 " That the Athenians restore to the Lace- 
 dasmonians Coryphasium,' and Cythera, and 
 
 1 Tliis includes tho fort of Pylus, seated on the cape 
 (ofCoryphasiinni 
 
 Methone, and Pteleum, and Atalanta, and atl 
 the Lacedaemonians, now prisoners of the state 
 at Athens, or public prisoners, in any quarter 
 soever within the dominions of Athens; and 
 to give leave of departure to all the Pelopon- 
 nesians blocked up in Scione, and to all the 
 confederates of the Peloponnesians whatever 
 in Scione, and to all persons whatever whom 
 Brasidas placed there. — This article also to 
 extend to any confederates of the Laccdaemo* 
 nians, now public prisoners in Athens, or 
 public prisoners in any other quarter of the 
 Athenian dominions. 
 
 "That, in return, the Lacedsemonians and 
 allies release all the prisoners, both Athenians 
 and confederates, which are now in their 
 hands. 
 
 " That, in regard to the Scioneans, Toro- 
 neans, and Sermylians, and any other city 
 belonging, of right, to the Athenians, the 
 Athenians to proceed with the cities specified, 
 and all the others, at their own discretion. 
 
 " That the Athenians shall swear obser- 
 vance to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, 
 separately, according to their cities. Let both 
 sides swear, in the most solemn manner, ac- 
 cording to the forms of each separate state j 
 and the oath to be conceived in these words ; 
 — " I abide by my compacts and the present 
 articles, honestly, and without equivocation. — 
 Be an oath taken, to the Athenians, by the 
 Lacedaemonians and allies, to the same pur- 
 port. 
 
 " Be this oath renewed annually by the con- 
 tracting parties. 
 
 " Be pillars erected at Olympias, at Pythus, 
 at the Isthmus, and at Athens in the citadel, 
 and at Lacedffimon in the Amycleum, with 
 this treaty inscribed upon them. 
 
 " If any point be in any manner or degree, 
 for the present, through forgetfulness on cither 
 side, omitted ; or, if any thing, upon a serious 
 consultation holden, be judged more proper, 
 the Lacedaemonians and Athenians are em- 
 powered, with all due regard to their oaths, to 
 make additions and alterations, at their joint 
 discretions. 
 
 " Pleistolas, presiding in the college of 
 ephori, putteth this treaty in force at Sparta, 
 on the twenty-seventh day of the month Arte- 
 misius : at Athens, Alcaeus, the archon, on the 
 twenty-fifth day of the month Elaphebolion. 
 
 " Those who took the oath and sacrificed 
 
/EAR X.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 187 
 
 " On the liacedsmonian side, — Pleistolas, 
 Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, 
 Daithus, Ischagoras, Philochardas, Zeuxidas, 
 Anthippus, Tellcs, Alcinidas, Einpedias, Me- 
 naS, Lamphilus. 
 
 " On. the Athenian, — Lampo, Isthmionicus, 
 Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Py- 
 thodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Thea- 
 genes, Aristocoetes, lolcius, Timocrates, Leo, 
 Lamachus, Demosthenes." 
 
 This treaty was perfected upon the close of 
 the winter, in the first commencement of the 
 spring, iinmediately after the Bacchanalian 
 festivals at Athens. Ten complete years, and 
 some few days over, were elapsed, since the 
 first irruption into Attica, and an open com- 
 mencement of the war. And let hira that 
 would be assured of the truth, compute only 
 by the seasons of the year, and not by those 
 who, in the contending states, were either 
 archons, or, by the ofiices they bore, had 
 events distinguished by an enumeration of 
 their names. For it cannot be exactly known 
 in what determinate part, whether, in the be- 
 ginning or middle, or any other portion, of a 
 magistracy, any important event occurred. 
 But, if the computation proceed by summers 
 and winters, which method I have observed, 
 such an inquirer will find, that these two 
 halves being equivalent to a whole year, ten 
 complete summers, and the same number of 
 winters, elapsed in the course of this first part 
 of the war. 
 
 The Lacedsemonians, for to them it fell by 
 lot to make the first restitutions, released im- 
 mediately what prisoners they had in their 
 hands ; and, having despatched Ischagoras, and 
 Menas, and Philocharidas, in the quality of 
 their ambassadors to the cities of Thrace, or- 
 dered Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to 
 the Athenians, and all the confederates there 
 to submit to the terms of the treaty, according 
 to the stipulation given for them. But this 
 they positively refused, as they judged the 
 treaty prejudicial. Clearidas also, to ingratiate 
 himself with the Chalcideans, would not de- 
 liver up Amphipolis, alleging, that, without 
 their concurrence, he could not possibly do it. 
 He himself returned in person soon after with 
 the ambassadors, in order to make his defence 
 At Lacedtemon, should Ischagoras accuse him 
 there of disobeying orders. His view was, 
 farther, to try if the accommodation could by 
 any means be evaded. Bt.«, when he found it 
 
 fast confirmed, he posted back with all speed 
 to his government, having express orders from 
 the Lacedaemonians to deliver up Amphipolis ; 
 or, if that was beyond his power, to cause all 
 the Peloponnesians within that garrison in- 
 stantly to evacuate the place. 
 
 The confederates happened, at this juncture, 
 to be at Lacediemon, where such of them, as 
 had hitherto refused to accept the treaty, were 
 ordered by the Lacedaemonians to accede to it. 
 But this they positively refused, alleging the 
 same reason as before; and plainly aflBrming, 
 that " they would not come in, till better terms 
 than the present were obtained for them." 
 Their remonstrance had no effect upon the 
 Lacedaemonians, who sent them away without 
 redress, and struck up forthvrith an alliance, 
 offensive and defensive, with the Athenians. 
 They had reason to conclude that " the Ar- 
 gives would come to no agreement with them," 
 since they had lately declared a negative to 
 their ambassadors, Ampelidas and lachas ; 
 " and yet these Argives," they judged, " could 
 be no dreadful foe without the Athenians ; 
 and that the rest of Peloponnesus would not 
 now presume to interfere, who, without this 
 method of prevention, would certainly have 
 gone over to the Athenians." An Athenian 
 embassy, therefore, being at this crisis ^resident 
 amongst them, a conference was holden, and 
 the terms completely adjusted. The ratifica- 
 tion was made by solemn oath, and the articles 
 of this alliance, offensive and defensive, were 
 these : 
 
 " The Lacedaemonians enter into this alliance 
 for the term of fifty years. — Provided that 
 
 " If any enemy enter the territories of the 
 Lacedaemonians, and commit any manner of 
 hostilities to their prejudice, the Athenians 
 march forthwith to their succour, with all the 
 possible means of redress, and with their whole 
 united force. 
 
 " And, in case such invaders shall have with- 
 drawn themsdves, that the state under which 
 they acted be declared an enemy both to the 
 Lacedaemonians and the Athenians, both which 
 are to join in acting offensively against that 
 state, nor to lay down their arms without the 
 mutual consent of both the contracting states. 
 
 " These terms to be observed with honour, 
 with alacrity, and without any fraud whatever. 
 
 " Provided, farther, that, if any enemy enter 
 the territories of the Athenians, and commit 
 hostilities to the prejudice of the Athenians, ■ 
 
188 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book v. 
 
 the Lacedsemonians march forthwith to their 
 succour, with all the possible means of redress, 
 and with their whole united force. 
 
 " And, in case such invaders shall have with- 
 drawn themselves, that the state under which 
 they acted be declared an enemy both to Lace- 
 dsemonians and Athenians, both which are to 
 join in acting offensively against that state, 
 nor to lay down their arms without the mutual 
 consent of both the contracting states. 
 
 " These terms also to be observed with 
 honour, with alacrity, and without any fraud 
 whatever. 
 
 " Provided, farther, — That, if there happens 
 any insurrection among the Helots, the Athen- 
 ians march to the succour of the Lacedaemonians 
 with their whole strength, to the full extent of 
 their power. 
 
 " The same persons, on both sides, shall 
 swear to the observance of these articles, whp 
 swore to the former. 
 
 " The oaths to be annually renewed ; for 
 which purpose, the Lacedemonians shall give 
 their attendance at Athens, at the Bacchanalian 
 festival ; and the Athenians theirs at Laceds- 
 mon, at the Hyacinthian. 
 
 " Both parties to erect their pillar ; one at 
 Lacedsmon, near Apollo's, in the Amycleum ; 
 the other at Athens, near Minerva's, in the 
 citadel. 
 
 " And, in case the Lacedaemonians and 
 Athenians think proper to make any additions 
 or alterations in the terms of this alliance, the 
 same lawfully to be done by both, at their 
 joint discretion, 
 
 " The oath of observance was sworn, 
 
 " On the Lacedsemonian side, by 'Pleis- 
 tionax, 'Agis, Fleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, 
 Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, 
 Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Alcina- 
 das, Telles; Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. 
 
 " On the Athenian side, by Lampo, Isth- 
 mionicus. Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Pro- 
 cles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasy- 
 cles; Theagenes, Aristocrateg, lolcius, Timo- 
 crates, Leo, Lamachus, Demosthenes." 
 
 This alliance was concluded in a very little 
 time after the treaty of peace ; and the Athen- 
 ians now released to the Lacedemonians- their 
 Spartans, who were made prisoners at Sphac- 
 teria. The summer also of the eleventh year 
 
 • The kings sign this alliance, but did not sign the 
 former treaty. 
 
 was now begun ; and so far the transactions of 
 these first ten years of this war, closely carried 
 on, have been regularly compiled. 
 
 After the treaty of peace and the alliance, 
 offensive and defensive, between the Lacedte- 
 monians and Athenians ; both which were con- 
 cluded after the ten years' war, at the time 
 when Pleistolas presided in the college of 
 Ephori at Sparta, and Alcaeus was Archon at 
 Athens ; the peace became in force amongst 
 the acceding parties. But the Corinthians 
 and some of the Peloponnesian states were 
 endeavouring the overthrow of all these pro- 
 ceedings : and immediately there arose another 
 great combustion, amongst the confederates, 
 against Lacedsmon, More than this, as time 
 advanced, the Lacedaemonians became suspected 
 by the Athenians, as they showed no great 
 punctuality in executing the conditions of the 
 peace. For the space of six years and ten 
 months, they refrained indeed from entering 
 one another's territory in a hostile manner; 
 but, during such a correspondence which abound- 
 ed in suspicions, they were, in all other re- 
 spects, active in a reciprocal annoyance. And 
 at length, necessitated to dissolve the treaty con- 
 cluded at the ten years' period, they engaged 
 afresh in open war. 
 
 The same Thucydides, an Athenian, hath 
 also compiled an account of these latter trans- 
 actions in a regular series, according to the 
 summers and winters, down to that period of 
 time when the Lacedemonians and their allies 
 put an end to the empire of Athens, and be- 
 came masters of the long walls and the Pirajus. 
 The whole continuance of the war to this 
 period was twenty-seven years. And, if any 
 man be inclined tp think that this intervening 
 accommodation should not be reckoned as war, 
 he will find no arguments to support his opin- 
 ion : for, let him only survey the transactions 
 as they are distinctly related, and he will find 
 it an absurdity to pronounce that an interval of 
 peace, in which neither all the restitutions were 
 made, nor the benefits obtained, which the 
 mutual stipulations required. And, setting 
 these considerations aside, in the Mantinean 
 and Epidauric and other wars, transgressions 
 were committed on both sides. The confede- 
 
 a Before Christ 421 
 
YEAH XI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 189 
 
 rates also of Thrace continued still to be as 
 great enemies as ever. And the Boeotians 
 never agreed to more than a bare cessation of 
 arms, renewable every tenth day. 
 
 Including, therefore, the first war which last- 
 ed ten years, and that suspicious interval which 
 ensued, and ended at last in a second open 
 rupture, the whole continuance, if computed 
 by summers and winters, will turn out, upon in- 
 quiry, to have been so many years, and some 
 fevv additional days. And such as laid stress 
 upon the predictions of oracles can assent only 
 to this computation as genuine. For my own 
 part, I perfectly well remember that, not only 
 at the commencement, but even during the 
 whole course of the war, many such predictions 
 were given out, that " it must needs continue 
 three times nine years." I also lived through its 
 whole extent, in the very flower of my under- 
 standing and strength, arid with a close appli- 
 cation of my thoughts, to gain an exact insight 
 into all its occurrences. It was farther my lot 
 to suffer a twenty years' exile from my country 
 after my employment in the business of Am- 
 phipolis, and to be present at the transactions 
 of both parties, and not the least of those of the 
 Peloponnesians, in consequence of my banish- 
 ment ; by which means I had leisure to gather 
 more ample informations about them. I shall 
 relate therefore the quarrel and breach of the 
 treaty, subsequent to the first ten years, and 
 the incidents of the war which afterwards 
 ensued. 
 
 Upon the conclusion of the treaty of peace 
 for fifty years and the subsequent alliance, the 
 embassies from the diflferent states of Pelo- 
 ponnesus, who had been summoned thither to 
 give their concurrence, withdrew from Lacedae- 
 mon. The rest of them indeed went directly 
 home ; but the Corinthians, stopping in their 
 return at Argos, began first, at a conference 
 with some of the magistracy there, to insinuate 
 *' that since the Lacedaemonians, not in order 
 to serve but to enslave Peloponnesus, had en- 
 tered into a treaty and an alliance, offensive 
 and defensive, with their once most inveterate 
 foes, the Athenians, it highly behoved the Ar- 
 gives now to watch over the preservation of 
 Peloponnesus, and to form a public resolution, 
 — That any Grecian state, which is free and 
 uncontrolled, which enjoyeth and supporteth an 
 equal share of rights and privileges, might en- 
 ter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, 
 with the Argives, for the guard of their mu- 
 
 tuar properties against their common foes: — 
 This to be communicated only to the few who 
 were absolute masters of the decisions of each 
 state, and every where to shun all conference 
 with the bulk of the people, lest the scheme 
 might be detected, in case the multitude should 
 refusetheir concurrence." They assured them, 
 that the majority of the states were so exas- 
 perated against the Lacedemonians, that they 
 would infallibly come in. And, after suggest- 
 ing such a course, the Corinthians also return- 
 ed home. 
 
 The persons at Argos who had listened to 
 these insinuations, reported the scheme, in the 
 next place, to the whole magistracy and people 
 of Argos. The Argives resolved accordingly, 
 and elected a committee of twelve, with whom 
 such Grecians as desired it might agree upon 
 an alliance, the Athenians and Lacedasmonians 
 excepted. Neither of these states were per- 
 mitted to treat with the Argives, without the 
 public consent of the whole people. 
 
 The Argives were the more readily per- 
 suaded to such a measure as they plainly saw a 
 war was unavoidable between themselves and 
 the Lacedaemonians; for the truce between 
 them was on the point of expiring. They 
 were also animated by the hope of gaining into 
 their hands the sovereignty of Peloponnesus. 
 For at this juncture of time, Lacedeemon lay 
 under the greatest discredit, and was fallen into 
 utter contempt upon account of their late 
 disasters ; whereas the Argives were in the 
 high vigour of their strength in all respects, as 
 they had never interfered in the Attic war ; 
 and, having observed an exact neutrality with 
 both, had been thriving in peace and plenty. 
 The Argives, therefore, in this manner invited 
 those Grecians who were willing to enter into 
 their alliance. 
 
 The Mantineans and allies were the first 
 who, out of a dread of the Lacedaemonians, ac- 
 cepted the proposal. For these Mantineans, 
 in the heat of the war against the Athenians, 
 had seized and appropriated to themselves a 
 certain district of Arcadia subject to Lacedse- 
 mon, and now concluded that the Laceda;mo- 
 nians would never leave them in the quiet pos- 
 session of it, when they were at liberty to act 
 for its recovery. This readily induced them to 
 have recourse to the league of Argos, regarded 
 by them as' n powerful state, which had ever 
 been at variance with Lacedasmon, and, like 
 their own, was democratical. 
 x2 
 
190 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [BOOIt V. 
 
 No sooner had the Mantineans revolted, 
 than the rest of Peloponnesus began to mutter 
 that " they ought also to take the same step," 
 imagining that revolt to have been founded up- 
 on some stronger reasons than yet appeared ; 
 exasperated also against the Lacedaemonians for 
 sundry reasons, and, above all, for this article in 
 the peace with Athens, — that, " in case the two 
 states of Lacedffimon and Athens think proper to 
 make any additions or alterations, the same to 
 be lawful." For this was the clause which gave 
 the greatest alarm to Peloponnesus, and inspir- 
 ed a jealousy that the LacedEemoniaus might 
 strike up a bargain with the Athenians to en- 
 slave the other states : since, in justice, no al- 
 teration ought to be made without the concur- 
 rence of the whole confederacy. Alarmed, 
 therefore, at these proceedings, many of them 
 made instant application to the Argives, exert- 
 ing their several endeavours to obtain their alli- 
 ance. 
 
 But the Lacedaemonians, perceiving what a 
 combustion was arisen in Peloponnesus, prin- 
 cipally owing to the insinuations of the Corinth- 
 ians, who were also going to enter into this 
 league with Argos, they despatch ambassadors 
 to Corinth from a desire to prevent what 
 might ensue. Here they represented to 
 them, — " how criminal their conduct had been, 
 in having thus originally fomented the present 
 tumult ; and that, in case they abandoned the 
 LacediBmonlans and went over to the Argive 
 league," they assured them, that, " by such a 
 step, they must break the most sacred oaths ; 
 injustice they had already committed in refus- 
 ing to accede to the Athenian peace, since, pur- 
 suant to old stipulations between them, what- 
 ever a majority of the confederates resolved 
 ■was to be binding on all, unless some god or 
 hero enjoined a dissent." But the Corinthians, 
 in the presence of all those of the confederacy 
 who had not accepted the peace, and whose at- 
 tendance they had previously invited, replied to 
 the Lacedsemonians without entering into a 
 particular detail of the injuries they had done 
 them, in not covenanting with the Athenians 
 for the restitution of Solium, or Anactorium, 
 or any other point in which they thought them- 
 selves aggrieved; but speciously pretending, 
 that " they could never abandon their aUies in 
 Thrace, whom by solemn oaths they were 
 bound to support ; oaths which they had sever- 
 ally sworn when they first revolted in concert 
 with the Potidffians, and had on other occasions 
 
 since renewed :" arguing from hence that 
 "they could not have violated the common 
 oath of the confederates in refusing their ac- 
 cession to the Athenian peace, since, as they 
 had sworn upon the faith of the gods to the 
 former, they could not betray them with- , 
 out the guilt of perjury. The stipulation, in- 
 deed, ran thus : unless some god or hero en- 
 joined a dissent: — their present dissent, there- 
 fore, appeared to them to be a divine injunc- 
 tion." So far they argued from their former 
 oaths ; and, in regard to the alliance offensive 
 and defensive with Argos, — " They would hold 
 consultations with their friends, and take such 
 steps as were expedient and just." JtnH with 
 this answer the Lacedasmonian ambassadors de- 
 parted home. An Argive embassy happened 
 also at the same time to be at Corinth, who 
 pressed the Corinthians to enter into their 
 league without any*farther hesitation. They 
 desired them to attend, at the next public 
 meeting they held, for a final answer. 
 
 There arrived soon after an embassy from 
 the Eleans, who made, in the first place, an 
 alliance offensive and defensive with the Cor- 
 inthians ; and then from Corinth repairing to 
 Argos, became allies of the Argives, according 
 to the scheme pre-established for this purpose ; 
 for a misunderstanding had arisen between them 
 and the Lacedaemonians about Lepreum. In a 
 former war of the Lepreatte against a province 
 of Arcadia, the Eleans had been prevailed upon 
 to join the Lepreatae for a moiety of the land 
 that should be conquered ; and, at the conclu- 
 sion of the war, the Eleans left all the land in 
 the management of the Lepreatae, subject to 
 the annual tribute of a talent' to Olympian 
 Jove. This was regularly paid till the Athen- 
 ian war; but, that war being then made a 
 pretence of its discontinuance, the Eleans 
 would have exacted it by force. The others 
 had recourse to the Lacedsemonians. The 
 dispute was referred to the Lacediemonian ar- 
 bitration ; but the Eleans, taking up a sus- 
 picion that they should not have justice, would 
 not abide the reference, but began to ravage the 
 territory of the Lepreats. The Laced^moni- 
 ansi notwithstanding this, proceeded to a. sen- 
 tence : — that " the Lepreatae were masters of 
 their own conduct, and that the Eleans weie 
 guilty of injustice :" and, as the latter would 
 not abide by their arbitration, they threw a 
 
 > £193 los. sterling. 
 
YEAR XI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 191 
 
 garrison of heavy-armed into Lepreum ; but 
 the Eleans, regarding this step as the recep- 
 tion of a city by the Lacedaemonians which had 
 revolted from them, and alleging the treaty in 
 which it was stipulated, — that, "of whatever 
 places the parties were possessed upon the 
 commencement of the Attic war, the same 
 they should continue to hold at its expiration," 
 as if they had met witji injustice, they revolt 
 to the Argives; and the Eleans entered into 
 that league oflensive and defensive, as hath been 
 already related. 
 
 The Corinthians soon followed their ex- 
 ample, and with the Chalcideans also of 
 Thrace, became the allies of Argos. But the 
 Boeotians and Megareans, though they had 
 threatened the same thing, thought proper to 
 drop it. They had been ill used by the Lace- 
 demonians, but judged however that the demo- 
 cracy of the Argives would be less compatible 
 with their interests, whose form of government 
 was oligarchical, than the polity of the Lacedse- 
 monians. 
 
 About the same time of this summer, the 
 Athenians, becoming masters of the Scioneans 
 after a long blockade, put all who were able to 
 bear arms to the sword, and made their wives 
 and children slaves, and gave the land to be 
 cultured by the Plataeans. 
 
 They also again brought back the Delians 
 to Deles ; induced to it by the many defeats 
 they had suffered in battle, and the express or- 
 acle of the god at Delphi. 
 
 The Phocians also and Locrians began about 
 this time to make war upon one another. 
 
 And now the Corinthians and Argives, 
 united in league, go together to Tegea, to per- 
 suade its revolt from the Lacedsemonians. 
 They saw it was a large district; and, in case 
 they compassed its accession, they imagined 
 the whole of Peloponnesus would be at their 
 beck. But, when the Tegeatse declared, that 
 " they would in no shape oppose the Lacedae- 
 monians," the Corinthians, who till now had 
 acted with great alacrity, slackened in their zea! 
 for contention, and began to fear that no more 
 of the states would come in. They proceeded, 
 however, to the Boeoteans, and solicited them 
 " to accede to the league between themselves 
 and Argives, and to co-operate with them for 
 the common welfare." — And, as there were 
 truces for ten days between the Athenians and 
 Bceotians, which were agreed upon soon after 
 4he peace for fifty years was made, the Corin- 
 
 thians now pressed the Boeotians " to accom- 
 pany them to Athens, and solicit for truces of 
 the same nature for them ; but, in case the 
 Athenians refused to grant them, to renounce 
 the suspension of arms, and for the future never 
 to treat without their concurrence." The 
 Boeotians, thus solicited by the Corinthians, 
 desired a longer time to consider about their 
 accession to the Argivo league. To Athens, 
 indeed, they bore them company, but could not 
 obtain the ten days' truces : for the Athenians 
 answered, — "The Corinthians have a peace 
 already, if they are confederates of the Lace- 
 daemonians." And, upon the whole, the Boeo- 
 tians absolutely refused to renounce their own 
 truces, though the Corinthians insisted upon it, 
 and urged, with some warm expostulations, 
 that it had been so covenanted between them. 
 So there was only a mere cessation of arms be- 
 tween the Corinthians and Athenians, without 
 any solemn ratification. 
 
 This same summer, the Lacediemanians took 
 the field with their whole united force, under 
 the command of Pleistionax, the son of Pau- 
 sanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and marched 
 to the Parrhasians of Arcadia. These were 
 subject to the Mantineans, and, in consequence 
 of a sedition, had invited this expedition. But 
 it was also designed, if possible, to demolish 
 the fortress of Cypsela, which the Mantineans 
 had erected, and, as it was situated in Parrha- 
 sia, towards the skirts of Laconia, had placed 
 a garrison in it. The Lacedaemonians, there- 
 fore, ravaged the territory of the Parrhasians. 
 But the Mantineans, leaving their own city to 
 the guard of the Argives, marched themselves 
 to the support of their dependents. But, find- 
 ing it impossible to preserve the fortress of 
 Cypsela and the cities of the Parrhasians, they 
 retired. The Lacedaemonians also, when they 
 had set the Parrhasians at liberty, and demo- 
 lished the fortress, withdrew their forces. 
 
 The same summer also, upon the return 
 from Thrace of those soldiers who had served 
 under Brasidas, and who came home after the 
 peace under the conduct of Clearidas, the 
 Lacedsemonians decreed " those Helots, who 
 had served under Brasidas, to be free, and 
 to have permission to reside wherever they 
 pleased." And, no long time after, they placed 
 them together with such persons as were new- 
 ly enfranchised, at Lepreum : it is situated 
 between Laconia and Elea ; and they were 
 now at variance with the Eleans. As for 
 
192 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book v. 
 
 Ihose Spartans who had been made prisoners 
 in Sphacteria, and had delivered up their arms, 
 conceiving some fears soout them, lest, should 
 they lay their late disgrace too much to heart, 
 as they were persons of the greatest rank, they 
 might introduce some innovations in the state, 
 they declared them infamous, even though 
 some of the number were, at this time, pos- 
 sessed of posts in the government. But this 
 infamy extended no farther than to disqualify 
 them frOm offices, and from buying and selling. 
 Yet, in a short time afterwards, they were again 
 restored to their full privileges. 
 
 The same summer also the Dictideans took 
 Thyssus, a town seated upon the Athos, and 
 confederate with the Athenians. 
 
 Through the whole course of the sumrtfer, 
 the communication was open between the Pe- 
 loponnesians and Athenians. Not but that the 
 Athenians and Lacedsmonians began to be 
 jealous of one another immediately after the 
 peace, as the reciprocal restitution of places 
 was not punctually performed. For, though 
 it had fallen to the Lacedemonians' lot to begin 
 these restitutions, yet they had not restored 
 Amphipolis and other cities. They had com- 
 pelled neither their confederates in Thrace, nor 
 the BcEotians, nor the Corinthians, to accept 
 the peace, always pretending, that, " should 
 they refuse it, they were ready to join with the 
 Athenians in their compulsion;" nay, they 
 limited to them a time, though not by a regular 
 written notice, " within which, such as did not 
 accede were declared enemies to both." The 
 Athenians, therefore, seeing none of these 
 points were put in actual execution, became 
 jealoiis of the Lacedaimonians, as men who 
 acted insincerely in every step; insomuch, 
 that, when Pylus was re-demanded, they re- 
 fused its restitution, and heartily repented that 
 they had released the prisoners taken at Sphac- 
 teria. They also kept possession of other places, 
 and intended to do so, till the other side had 
 performed their engagements. But the Lace- 
 dsemonians alleged " they had done every thing 
 in their power; that, for instance, they had 
 released such Athenians as were prisoners 
 amongst them, had recalled their soldierS from 
 Thrace, and, wherever they were masters of 
 the execution, had performed it. As to Am- 
 phipolis," they said, "they were not so far 
 masters of it as to make an actual surrender. 
 They had omitted no endeavours to bring the 
 BcEOtians arid Corinthians to a compliance, to 
 
 recover the disposal of Fanactum, and to obtain 
 the dismission of those Athenians who were 
 prisoners of war inBoeotia. Pylus, however," 
 they insisted, " should immediately be restored 
 to them ; at least that the Messcnians and 
 Helots should be withdrawn, as their people 
 had been from Thrace; and then the Athe- 
 nians, if they pleased, might continue to gar- 
 rison that fortress themselves." Many meetings 
 were held, and much argumentation passed 
 between them this summer ; and, at last, they 
 prevailed upon the Athenians to withdraw from 
 Pylus the Messenians and others, as well He- 
 lots as all deserters whatever, out of Laconia, 
 These they transplanted to Crania of Cephal- 
 lene. This summer, therefore, was a season 
 of inaction, and the intercourse was open be- 
 tween them. 
 
 In the ensuing winter, — for other ephori 
 were in office, as the authority of those under 
 whom the peace was made was now expired, 
 and some who were averse to the peace had 
 succeeded — embassies attending from the whole 
 confederacy, the Athenians, and Beeotians, and 
 Corinthians also being present, and after much 
 reciprocal altercation, coming to no regular 
 agreement, the rest of thena separated to their 
 own homes without effect. But Cleobulus and 
 Xenares, those two of the ephori who were 
 most inclined to dissolve the peace, detained 
 the Basotians and. Corinthians for a private 
 conference. In this they exhorted them " to 
 act unanimously in promotion of their scheme ; 
 in pursuance of which the Boeotians should 
 first make themselves a party in the Argive 
 league, and then employ their good offices to 
 form an alliance between the Argives and 
 Laceua;monians : for, by these methods, the 
 Boeotians could least of all be necessitated to 
 take part in the Attic peace ; as the Lacedae- 
 monians would prefer the renewal of friendship 
 and alliance with the Argives to the enmity of 
 the Athenians and the dissolution of the 
 peace; since, to their certain knowledge, the 
 Lacedsemonians had ever been desirous to have 
 the friendship of Argoe, consistently with their 
 honour ; knowing it would facilitate the success 
 of their war without Peloponnesus." — They 
 also requested the Boeotians " to deliver up 
 Panactum to the Lacedaemonians, that, ex- 
 changing it if possible for Pylus, they might 
 get clear of the main obstacle to a fresh rupture 
 with the Athenians." 
 
 The Boeotians and Corinthians, instructed 
 
YEAK XT.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 193 
 
 by Xenares and Cleobulus and the party in 
 their interest at Lacedtemon, departed, both, to 
 report this scheme to their principals. Bat 
 two persons, in the greatest authority in the 
 state of Argos, were attending upon the road 
 for their return. They met, and conferred 
 with them "about the means of gaining the 
 concurrence of the Boeotians in this league, 
 upon the same footing with the Corinthians, 
 and E leans, and Mantineans: for they were 
 confident, were this point once completed, 
 they might easily become the arbiters of war or 
 peace, either in relation to the Lacedaemonians, 
 (if they so determined, and would act together 
 with firm unanimity,) or to any other state 
 whatever." 
 
 The Boeotian ambassadors were highly de- 
 lighted with this discourse. The solicitations 
 of these Argives happened to coincide with the 
 instructions recommended to them by their 
 friends at Lacedaemon. And the Argives, find- 
 ing them satisfied with their motion, assured 
 them they would send ambassadors to the 
 Boeotians, and so they parted. 
 
 But the Boeotians, at their return, reported 
 to the rulers of Boeotia the proposals from 
 Lacediemon, and those from the Argives Upon 
 the road. The Boeotian rulers were delighted, 
 and grew now more zealous than ever ; because, 
 on both sides, from their Lacedffimonian friends, 
 and also from the Argives, the solicitations 
 were concurrent. And, very soon after, the 
 Argive ambassadors arrived to forward the des- 
 patch of the treaty. The Boeotian rulers, how- 
 ever, at present, gave only a verbal approbation 
 of the scheme, and then dismissed them, pro- 
 mising to send an embassy of their own to Ar- 
 gos, to perfect the alliance. 
 
 But, in the meantime, it was judged to be 
 previously expedient, that the Bosotian rulers, 
 and the Corinthians, and the Megareans, and 
 tho ambassadors from the allies of Thrace, 
 should mutually interchange their oaths, " to 
 act in support of one another, if upon any occa- 
 sion such support might be requisite, and to 
 enter neither into war nor peace without joint 
 consent ;" and then the Boeotians and Mega- 
 reans (for these acted in union) to form a league 
 with the Argives, but before such exchange of 
 oaths, the Boeotian rulers communicated the 
 whole of the plan to the four Boeotian councils, 
 in whom the sovereignty is lodged ; recom- 
 mending it, as worthy their confirmation, that 
 " whatever cities were willing might mutually 
 32 
 
 interchange such oaths for their reciprocal 
 advantage." Yet the Boeotians who composed 
 the councils refused a confirmation ; apprehen- 
 sive it might tend to embroil them with the 
 Lacediemonians, should they pledge such an 
 oath to the Corinthians, who were now aban- 
 doning the Lacedsemonian interest : for the ru- 
 lers had not made them, privy to the scheme 
 from Lacediemon, how, " Xenares and Cleo- 
 bulus, of the college of Ephori, and their 
 friends, advise them, to enter first into league 
 with the Argives and Corinthians, and then to 
 extend it to the Lacedaemonians." They had 
 presumed that the supreme council, though they 
 secreted these Kghts, would not resolve against 
 a plan which themselves had pre-digested and 
 recommended to them. But now, as this afifair 
 took so wrong a turn, the Corinthians and am- 
 bassadorS from Thrace went home without ef- 
 fect ; and the Boeotian rulers, who had all along 
 intended, in case their scheme had passed to per- 
 fect an alliance with the Argives, made no far- 
 ther report to the councils in relation to the Ar- 
 gives, sent no embassy to Argos in consequence 
 of their promise, but suffered the whole plan to 
 sink away in careless and dilatory unconcern. 
 
 In this same winter the Olynthians, after a 
 sudden assault, took Mecyberne, which was gar- 
 risoned by Athenians. 
 
 After the former proceedings, — for confer- 
 ences were still continued between the Athe- 
 nians and Lacedaemonians about those places 
 they held from one another, — the Lacedaemoni- 
 ans, conceiving some hope that, if the Atheni- 
 ans could recover Panactum from the Boeoti- 
 ans, they also might regain Pylus, addressed 
 themselves in solemn embassy to the Boeotians, 
 and importuned them to deliver up Panactum 
 and the Athenian prisoners, that they in return 
 might get Pylus from them. But the Boeotians 
 persisted in a refusal, unless they would make 
 a separate alliance with them, as they had done 
 with the Athenians. Upon this the Lacedje- 
 monians, though convinced that such a step 
 would be injustice to the Athenians, — since it 
 had been stipulated that, " without joint con- 
 sent, they should neither make peace nor war," 
 — yet, bent on the recovery of Panactum, that 
 they might exchange it for Pylus, the party at 
 the same time amongst them, who were medi- 
 tating a fresh rupture, incHning to the Bosotian 
 interest, made the requisite alliance in the very 
 close of this winter on the approach of spring. 
 The consequence was, that Panactum was im- 
 
194 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAll. 
 
 [book v. 
 
 mediately levelled with the ground ; and the 
 eleventh year of the war was brought to a con- 
 clusion. 
 
 Early in the spring of that summer which 
 was now approaching, the Argives, — when the 
 expected embassy from Bffiotia was not arrived 
 in pursuance of promise, when they found that 
 ■Panactum was demolished, and a separate alli- 
 ance struck up between the Boeotians and 
 Lacedaemonians, — began to fear they should 
 be totally abandoned, and that their whole con- 
 federacy would go over to the Lacedaemonians.' 
 They concluded that, through the prevalence 
 of the Lacedaemonian arguments, the Boeotians 
 had been persuaded to level Panactum and 
 accede to the treaty made with Athens, and 
 that the Athenians were privy to all these steps ; 
 and so, of consequence, they themselves were 
 now utterly excluded from an alliance with the 
 Athenians, and their former hopes entirely 
 blasted, that, in case disputes should arise, and 
 their treaty with the Lacedsemonians not be re- 
 newed, they might, at worst, depend on gaining 
 the Athenian alliance. The Argives, there- 
 fore, amidst these perplexities, and the dread 
 of being attacked at once by the Lacedemoni- 
 ans and Tegeatoe, by the Boeotians and Athe- 
 nians, as they had formerly refused an accom- 
 modation with the Lacedaemonians, and had 
 grasped in thought at the sovereignty of Pelo- 
 ponnesus ; — the Argives, I say, had no longer 
 one moment to lose, but despatched instantly 
 Kustrophus and ^son, whom they judged to 
 be persons most agreeable there, in embassy 
 to Lacedaeraon. They now judged it their 
 interest to procure the best peace which the 
 present posture of affairs would allow from the 
 Lacedemonians, and then quietly to attend the 
 event of things. In this view, the ambassadors 
 on their arrival had a conference with the La- 
 cedaemonians about the terms of a peace , and 
 at first the Argives insisted, that " to some 
 state or private person should be referred, for 
 equitable arbitration, the controversy between 
 them about the district of Cynuria ;" concern- 
 ing which, as it is frontier to both, they are 
 eternally at variance; in this district stands 
 the cities of Thyrea and Anthena, and the 
 possession of it is in the hands of the Laeedae- 
 
 . Before Clirist 420. 
 
 monians. But, at length, when the Laceds- 
 monians would not suffer any mention to be 
 made of this, declaring only, that, " were they 
 willing to renew the former truce, they should 
 find them complying," the Argivc ambassadors, 
 however, prevailed upon the Laceda;monians 
 to ^gree to these proposals : that, " for the 
 present, a peace should be concluded for the 
 term cf fifty years ; provided, notwithstanding, 
 that liberty remain to either party to send a 
 challenge, when neither was embarrassed by 
 plague or war, and the right of this district be 
 then decided by arms between Lacedaemon and 
 Argos, as had formerly been done" when the 
 victory was equally claimed on both sides : and 
 that, in this case, it be not lawful to carry the 
 pursuit beyond the boundaries of either Argos 
 or Lacedaemon." These proposals, it is true, 
 appeared at first to the Lacedaemonians to be 
 fooUsh : but, at length, as their necessary in- 
 terest made them vastly desirous of the Argive' 
 friendship, they complied with the demand, and 
 the terms agreed on were digested into writing. 
 But the Laceda;monians, before they put the 
 last hand to the treaty, insisted on their previ- 
 ous return to Argos, and reporting it to the 
 people ; and, in case the ratification was given, 
 to repair again to Lacedaemon, at the Hyaein- 
 thian festival, and swear observance. And upon 
 this they returned to Argos. 
 
 2 Herol]Titus relates this remarkable piece of history 
 in Clio. "They had a confererfce," says he, "and came 
 to an agreement, that three hundred men on each aide 
 should decide the point by combat, and the land con- 
 tested should remain the property of the viclors; tiiat 
 both armies in the meantime should retire within their 
 respective dominions, nor he present at tlie combat, lest 
 hy being spectators of it, either of them, seeing their 
 countrymen defeated, might run to their assistance. 
 When articles were settled, both armies drew off"; those 
 selected on each side for the combat staid behind and 
 engaged. They fought il out with equal resolution and 
 fortune : of six hundred men only three were left alive, 
 two of them Argives, Alcinor and Chromius; and one 
 LacedJEmonian, Othryades ; these were all the survivors 
 when night came on. The Argives, as victors, ran in 
 haste to Argos ; but Othryades, for the Lacedirmonians, 
 having stripped the dead bodies of the Argives, atid 
 carried off their arms to the place where his own side 
 had encamped, continued upon the field of battle. Next 
 morning both parties came to learn the event ; and 
 then, truly, each party also claimed the victory: one 
 averring, that a majority survived on their side ; the 
 other maintaining, tliat even those had fled, whilst their 
 own combatant had kept his ground and spoiled the 
 dead. In short, from wrangling they came a;iaiii to 
 blows and a general engagement ; in which, after great 
 slaughter on both sides, the Lacedscmonians obtained 
 the victory." 
 
VRA.TL XII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 195 
 
 Whilst the Argives were employed in this 
 negotiation, the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, 
 Andromenes, and Phsdimus, and Antimenidas, 
 who were commissioned to receive Panactum 
 and the prisoners of war from the Bosotians, 
 and deliver them over into the hands of the 
 Athenians, found, upon their arrival, that 
 Panactum was already demolished by the Bceo- 
 tians, upon pretext that, " in former times, upon 
 occasion of some dispute about it, an oath had 
 been taken by the Athenians and Boeotians, 
 that neither should inhabit that place, excluding 
 the other, but should jointly possess it;" but 
 what Athenian prisoners of war were in the 
 hands of the Boeotians were delivered up to 
 Andromenes and his colleagues, who carried 
 and released them to the Athenians. They 
 also reported the demolition of Panactum, de- 
 claring this to be equivalent to a restitution, as 
 no enemy to Athens could occupy that post for 
 the future. 
 
 These words were no sooner heard than the 
 Athenians conceived the deepest resentments. 
 They thought themselves injured by the Lace- 
 demonians, not only in the demolition of Pan- 
 actum, which ought to have been restored stand- 
 ing, but also in the separate alliance made lately 
 with the Boeotians, of which they now had no- 
 tice, in open contradiction to their own declara- 
 tion, " of joining them to compel by force such 
 as would not accede to the treaty." They re- 
 flected also upon other points in which the en- 
 gagements of the treaty had been in no wise 
 fulfilled, and concluded themselves over- 
 reached. For these reasons they gave a rough 
 answer to the ambassadors, and an instant dis- 
 mission. 
 
 Upon so much umbrage, taken by the Athe- 
 nians against the Ijacedsemonians, such persons 
 at Athens, as were willing to dissolve the peace, 
 set themselves instantly at work to accomplish 
 their views. Others were labouring the same 
 point, but none more than Alcibiades, the son 
 of Clinias ;' a person, in respect of age, even 
 
 1 Alcibiades is here beginning his political intrigues, 
 to open the field for his own soaring and enterprising 
 genius to dilate itself more at large. Pericles Was his 
 near relation and guardian; Socrates was his friend and 
 guide so long as virtue was his care. Warmer passions 
 soon gained the ascendant over him; and he plunged 
 into all the busy scenes of life, with that intense appli- 
 cation and flexible address, to all persons and all occa- 
 sions, which surprised the world; " more changeable 
 than a cameleon, as Phuarch expresseth it, since that 
 creature cannot put on a fair or white appearance." His 
 character is thus drawn in miniature by the neat and | 
 
 then but a youth ; at least he would have passed 
 for such in the other states, though, for the 
 dignity of his birth, he was much honoured and 
 caressed. It seemed to him the most expedient 
 step to form a good understanding with the 
 Argives. Not but that his opposition to other 
 measures was the result of his ambition and a 
 study of contention, because the Lacedsemonians 
 had employed their interest in Nicias and 
 Laches to perfect the treaty, slighting his as- 
 sistance upon account of his youth, nor paying 
 him the deference he expected from the ancient 
 hospitality between that state and the family 
 from which he was descended. This, indeed, 
 his grandfather had renounced ; but he himself, 
 in the view of renewing it, had shown extraor- 
 dinary civilities to the Spartans who were made 
 prisoners at Sphacteria. Thinking himself, 
 therefore, in all respects slighted, at this crisis 
 he began openly to oppose them : he affirmed, 
 that " the Lacedssmonians were a people who 
 could not be trusted; that they had treacher- 
 ously entered into the peace in order to divert 
 the Argives from their alliance, that again they 
 might attack the Athenians when left alone." 
 Nay, farther ; upon the first dissatisfaction be- 
 tween them, he secretly despatcheth his emissa- 
 ries to Argos, exhorting them " at his invitation, 
 to come to Athens, in company with the Man- 
 tineans, and Eleans, and solicit an alliance, 
 since opportunity favoured, and his whole inte- 
 rest should be exerted in their support." 
 
 The Argives, having heard these sugges- 
 tions, and being now convinced that the Boeo- 
 tian separate alliance had been made without 
 the privity of the Athenians, who, on the con- 
 trary, were highly discontented at the Lacedse- 
 
 m,^sterly pen of Cornelius Ncpos: " Nature, says he, 
 seems to have exerted her utmost power in Alcibiades. 
 It is agreed, by all writers who have made liiin the sub- 
 ject of their pens, that a more extraordinary man never 
 lived, either for virtues or vices. Born in a most noble 
 republic, of a most honourable family, by far the hand- 
 somest person of his age, fit for every thing, and full of 
 address: he was a commander that made ihe greatest 
 figure both by land and sea; an orator whom none 
 could surpass; nay, his matiner and matter, when he 
 spoke, were quite irresistible. Exactly as occasions re. 
 quired, he was laborious, persevering, indefatigable, 
 generous; splendid in all his outward appearance, and 
 at his table; full of affability, profuse of civility, and of 
 the utmost dexterity in adapting himself to the exigen- 
 cies of time; and yet, in the seasons of relaxation, and 
 when business no longer required him to keep his fa- 
 culties on' the stretch, he was luxurious, dissolute, lewd, 
 and intemperate. The whole world was astonished 
 that so vast an unlikeness, and so different a nature, 
 should be united in the same person." 
 
196 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 \boos. v. 
 
 monian proceedings, took no farther notice of 
 their embassy at LaceilsBmon, though sent ex- 
 pressly there to negotiate an accommodation, 
 but recalled all their attention from thence to 
 the Athenians. They reflected, that Athens, 
 a state which from long antiquity had been 
 their friend, which was governed by a democra- 
 cy in the same manner as their own, and which 
 was possessed of a great power at sea, could 
 most effectually support them in case a war 
 should break out against them. In short, they 
 lost no time in despatching their ambassadors to 
 the Athenians to propose an alliance, who were 
 accompanied by embassies from the Eleans and 
 Mantineans, 
 
 A Lacedsemonian embassy alsa arrived in 
 great haste, composed of Philocharidas, and 
 Leon, and Endius, persons who were judged 
 most acceptable at Athens. They were afraid 
 lest the Athenians, in the heat of their resent- 
 ments, should clap up an alliance with the Ar- 
 gives. They sent also by them a demand of 
 the restitution of Pylus, in lieu of Panactum, 
 and excuses for the separate alliance they had 
 made with the Boeotians, "which had been 
 concluded without any design of prejudicing 
 the Athenians." Upon these points they spoke 
 before the senate,' notifying at the same time 
 
 1 The Lacedxmonian embassy have, on this occasion, 
 their first audience from tlie senate. The business of 
 this history hatll been hitherto transacted in the assem- 
 bly of the people: for, as the generals of the state were 
 the chief ministers in time of war, and had a power of 
 convening the people at their own discretion, all points 
 that required a speedy determination were brought be- 
 fore the people in the first instance; and the influence of 
 the senate, which operated in ordinary occasions, was 
 checked and suspended in time of war, which starts 
 many extraordinary occasions, or left it in the will of 
 the generals of the state to call and treat as extraordin- 
 ary whatever they pleased. By these mea ns the people 
 bad engrossed the power, the balance which Solon de- 
 signed always to preserve was in a great measure lost, 
 and the arislocratical influence was quite suspended. 
 
 As, therefore, the popular assembly had its note at 
 first setting out, the form and constitution of the senate 
 now require an explanation.— At this time it consisted 
 of five hundred per.tions, and for that reason is often 
 styled the council of five hundred, and sometimes by 
 Thucydides, the council of the bean, from the manner of 
 their election. Every year, on an appointed day, each 
 tribe returned the names of their members who were 
 qualified and stood candidates for this honour. The 
 names were engraved on pieces of brass, and cast into a 
 vessel; the same number of beans were cast into an- 
 other vessel, fifty-of which were white and the rest 
 black. They then proceeded to draw out a name and a 
 bean, and the persons to whom the white beans were 
 drawn became the senators of the year. Each senator 
 
 that " they were come with full power to put 
 an end to all disputes ;" by which they gave 
 some alarm to Alcibiades, lest, should they 
 make the same declaration before the assembly 
 of the people, it might have an influence upon 
 the multitude, and an alliance with the Ar- 
 gives might prove abortive. 
 
 But Alcibiades now contriveth to bafile 
 them by art. He prevaileth upon the Lacedse- 
 monians, by solemnly pledging his faith to 
 them, that " in case they would disown, before 
 the people, the full powers with which they 
 were invested, he would engage for the resti- 
 tution of Pylus; for he hinjself would then 
 persuade the Athenians to it, with as much 
 zeal as he now dissuaded, and would get all 
 other points adjusted to their satisfaction." 
 His view in acting thus was to detach them 
 from Nicias, and to gain an opportunity of in- 
 veighing against them, in the assembly of the 
 people, as men who had nothing sincere in their 
 intentions, and whose professions were dissonant 
 with themselves ; and so to perfect an alliance 
 with the Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans. 
 And this artifice in the sequel took effect : for, 
 when they were admitted to an audience before 
 the people, and replied to the demand, when 
 put, contrary to what they had said in the senate, 
 that " they had no such powers," the Athe- 
 nians in an instant lost all patience. And 
 
 had a drachma, that is, sevenpence three farthings, a 
 day for his salary. 
 
 In the next place, the names of the tribes were th town 
 into a vessel, and into another ni ne black beans and one 
 white one; the tribe, to whose name the white bean 
 was drawn, took the first course of presidency for a 
 tenth part of the year, and the order of the succeeding 
 course was determined in the same manner by the bean. 
 How the fifty in tfourse were again subdivided into tens, 
 and from these tens a chairman chosen for a day, hath 
 been already explained, in the note on the popular as- 
 sembly. Book I. 
 
 The senate sat every day in the prytaneum, or state 
 house, where the presidents had also their diet. They 
 were the grand council of states took into consideration 
 all the afiairs of the commonwealth, debated, and voted 
 by beans; and whatever determinations were thus made 
 in the senate were afterwards carried down to the as- 
 sembly of the people, to be ratified and passed into laws. 
 By Solon's original constitution, nothing was to be pro- 
 posed, to the'people before it had been canvassed and ap- 
 proved in the senate: but this seems to have been eluded 
 by the generals of the state, who had all the military 
 business in their department, and a power to convene 
 the peopleatthcir pleasure, and lay matters before them 
 in the first instance. To restore the aristocratical power, 
 and reduce that of the people, occasioned a usurpation 
 and sad confusion in Athens, as will be seen in tho 
 eighth book of this history. 
 
TTEAR XII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 197 
 
 now, Alcibiades roaring out aloud against the 
 Lacedsmonians with much more vehemence 
 than he had ever done before, they listened 
 greedily to all he said, and were ready instantly 
 to call in the Argives and their companions, 
 and to make them confederates. But the 
 «hock of an earthquake being felt before any 
 thing could be formally concluded, the assembly 
 was adjourned. 
 
 At the next day's assembly, Nicias, — though 
 the Lacedemonians had been thus over-reached, 
 and he himself ensnared by their public ac- 
 knowledgment that they had no full powers, 
 — spoke, however, on the Lacedaemonian side, 
 insisting " on the necessity of maintaining a 
 good correspondence with them, and defer- 
 ring all agreement with the Argives, till they 
 could send to the Lacedemonians, and be dis- 
 tinctly informed of their final resolutions." — 
 " It maketh," said he, " for your credit, but for 
 their disgrace, that a war should be averted : 
 for, as your affairs are in a happy posture, it 
 is above all things elUgible for you to preserve 
 your prosperity unimpaired, but they in their 
 present low situation, should put all to hazard 
 in the hopes of redress." He carried it, in 
 short, that ambassadors should be despatched, 
 he himself to be one in the commission, " ear- 
 nestly to require of the Lacedemonians, that, 
 if their intentions were honest, they should 
 surrender Panactum standing, and Amphipolis ; 
 and should, farther, renounce the alliance with 
 the Boeotians, in case they still refused to ac- 
 cede to the peace; — this in pursuance of the 
 article, that ' neither should make peace with- 
 out joint consent.' " They ordered it to be 
 added farther, that "they themselves, could 
 they have deigned to act unjustly, had con- 
 cluded before this an aUiance with the Argives, 
 as they were already attending and soliciting 
 such a measure." And, having subjoined their 
 instructions in relation to all other points in 
 which they thought themselves aggrieved, they 
 sent away the ambassadors in commission along 
 with Nicias. These being arrived, and having 
 reported their instructions, added, in conclu- 
 sion, that, " unless they would renounce their 
 alliance with the Bceotians, if still refusing 
 their accession to the peace, they would admit 
 the Argives and their associates into league." 
 The Lacedsemonians replied, " they would 
 never renounce their alliance with the Boeo- 
 tians :" for the party of Xenares the Ephorus, 
 and all those who acted in the same combina- 
 
 tion, had still the majority: however, at the 
 request of Nicias, they renewed the oaths. 
 Nicias was afraid of being forced to depart 
 without settling any one point of his com- 
 mission, and of falling under public censure, 
 (which really came to pass,) as undoubted au- 
 thor of the peace with the Lacedaemonians. 
 And when, upon his return, the Athenians 
 had heard that no one point was adjusted at 
 Lacedaemon, they immediately conceived the 
 warmest indignation ; and, looking upon them- 
 selves as highly abused, Alcibiades introducing 
 the Argives and their associates, who were still 
 at Athens, they entered into treaty and an 
 alliance offensive and defensive with them, as 
 followeth : 
 
 " The Athenians, and Argives, and Eleans, 
 and Mantineans, for themselves and their re- 
 spective dependents on all sides, have made a 
 peace, to continue for the term of a hundred 
 years, without fraud and without violence, both 
 at land and at sea. 
 
 " Be it unlawful to take up offensive arms, 
 either by the Argives, and Eleans, and Man- 
 tineans, or their dependents, against the Athe* 
 nians and dependents of the Athenians, or 
 by the Athenians and their dependents, against 
 the Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans, and 
 their dependents, without any artifice or eva- 
 sion whatsoever. On these conditions the 
 Athenians, and Argiv«s, and Eleans, and Man- 
 tineans, to be confederates for one hundred 
 years. 
 
 " Provided, that, in case an enemy invade 
 the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, and 
 Eleans, and Mantineans march to the succour 
 of the Athenians, in strict conformity to a sum- 
 mons received from Athens, in the most vigor- 
 ous manner they may be able, to the fulness of 
 their abilities. 
 
 " But if the enemy, after ravaging, be again 
 withdrawn, the i state under which they acted 
 to be declared an enemy to the Argives, and 
 Mantineans, and Eleans, and Athenians ; and 
 to be pursued with the offensive arms of all 
 those confederate states. 
 
 " And, farther, that it be not lawful for any 
 of the contracting states to lay down their arms 
 against that state which hath so offended, with- 
 out the consent of all the rest. 
 
 " The Athenians also to march to the suc- 
 cour of Argos, and Mantinea, and Elis, in case 
 an enemy, invade the territory of the Eleans, 
 or that of the Mantineans, or that of the Ar- 
 
198 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 
 
 gives, in a strict conformity to a summons re- 
 ceived from any 'of those states, in the most 
 vigorous manner they may be able, to the ful- 
 ness of their abilities. 
 
 " But if the enemy, after ravaging, be again 
 withdrawn, the state under which they acted to 
 be declared an enemy to the Athenians, and 
 Argives, and Mantineans, and Eleans, and to be 
 pursued with the oifensive arms of all these con- 
 federate states. 
 
 " And, farther, that it be not lawful to lay 
 down their arms against the state which hath 
 so offended, without the joint consent of all 
 these contracting states. 
 
 " That no armed force be admitted to pass 
 in order for war through any of their respective 
 dominions, or those of their respective depen- 
 dents, nor along their sea, unless such a pas- 
 sage be granted unanimously by all the contract- 
 ing parties, "by the Athenians, and Argives, 
 and Mantineans, and Eleans. 
 
 " Agreed, farther, that, when the auxiliaries 
 attend, the state which summoned them supply 
 them with thirty days* provision so soon as 
 they shall have entered the territory of the 
 state which summoned their attendance, and 
 the same at their departure. 
 
 " And, if there be occasion for the atten- 
 dance of such an auxiliary force for a larger 
 space, that the state which sent for it maintain 
 that force, by paying to every soldier, heavy- 
 armed, and light-armed, and every archer, three 
 oboli of yEgina' a-day, and a drachma of 
 ./Sgina to every horseman. 
 
 " But the state which sent for auxiliaries to 
 have the supreme command, so long as the war 
 continueth within its district. 
 
 " If, farther, it be agreed by the contracting 
 states to act offensively with their united forces, 
 the command then to be equally divided among 
 all the states. 
 
 " That the Athenians swear to observe these 
 articles in their own names and those of their 
 dependents ; but the Argives, and Mantineans, 
 and Eleans, and the dependents of these, are to 
 swear separately, each state for itself. 
 
 "Each party to take the oath in the most 
 solemn fashion of their own country, in the 
 
 « The value of three oboli of jEgina is about six. 
 pence, and the drachma of ^gina nearly one shilling 
 English; for, according to Dr Arbuthnot, the talent of 
 ^gina consisted of a hundred Attic minse, and there- 
 fore was larger than the Attic talent in the proportion 
 of one hundred to sixty. 
 
 most sacred manner, with the choicest victims. 
 The terms of the oaths to be thus conceived; 
 — ' I will stand by the alliance, according to 
 covenant, justly, honestly, and sincerely ; and 
 I will not transgress its obligation by any fraud 
 or evasion whatsoever.' 
 "To be sworn — 
 
 " At Athens, by the senate and the city- 
 magistrates : the presidents in course to ad-r 
 minister the oath. 
 
 " At Argos, by the senate, and the eightyf 
 and the artynie : the eighty to administer the 
 oath. 
 
 " At Mantinea, by the demiurgi, and the 
 senate, and the other magistrates : the theori 
 and polemarchs to administer the oath. 
 
 " At Elis, by the demiurgi, and the officers 
 of state, and the six hundred : the demiurgi 
 and the keepers of the sacred records to admin- 
 ister the oath. 
 
 " These oaths to be renewed. For which 
 purpose, the Athenians to repair to Elis, and 
 to Mantinea, and to Argos, thirty days before 
 the Olympic Games, But the Argives, and 
 Eleans, and Mantineans, are to repair to 
 Athens, ten days before the great Pana- 
 thenaea. 
 
 " The articles relating to this peace, and 
 these oaths, and this alliance, to be inscribed 
 on a column of stone, 
 
 " By the Athenians, in the citadel : 
 " By the Argives, in the forum, in the 
 temple of Apollo. 
 
 " By the Mantineans, in the temple of Ju- 
 piter, in the forum : and 
 
 " All jointly to erect by way of memorial, a 
 brazen pillar at Olympia, at the Olympics now 
 approaching. 
 
 " If it be judged expedient, by any of the 
 contracting states, to make any additions to 
 these articles already agreed, whatever, in pur- 
 suance of this, be deemed proper, by the joint 
 determination of all parties, the same to be 
 valid." 
 
 A peace and alliance, offensive and defen- 
 sive, was in this manner concluded : and those 
 subsisting between the LacedaBmonians and 
 Athenians were not, upon this account, re- 
 nounced by either side. 
 
 The Corinthians, however, who were con- 
 federates of the Argives, refused to accede ■- 
 but, what is more, they had never sworn to 
 the alliance, made previous to this, between 
 the Eleans, and Argives, and Mantineans,— 
 
YEAR XII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 199 
 
 " to have the same foes and the same friends." 
 They pretended that the defensive league al- 
 ready made was quite sufficient, — " to succour 
 one another, but not to concur in an offensive 
 war." In this manner the Corinthians were 
 drawing off from the league, and again warped 
 in their inclinations towards the Lacedaemo- 
 nians. 
 
 The Olympics were solemnized this sum- 
 mer, in which Androsthenes, the Arcadian, 
 was for the first time victor in the Pancrace, 
 and the Lacedcemonians were excluded the tem- 
 ple by the Elpans, so that they could neither 
 sacrifice nor enter the lists. They had not dis- 
 charged the fine set upon them by the Eleans, 
 by virtue of the Olympic laws, who had charged 
 them with a conveyance of arms into the fort 
 of Phyrcon, and with throwing some of their 
 heavy-armed into Lepreum, during the Olym- 
 pic cessation. The fine imposed was two 
 thousand minae,' at the rate of two minse for 
 every heavy-armed soldier, agreeably to the let- 
 ter of the law. 
 
 I'he Lacedcemoiiians, upon this, despatched 
 an embassy, to remonstrate against the injustice 
 of the sentence ; that " the cessation had not 
 been notified at Lacedsemon when they threw 
 in their heavy-armed." 
 
 The Bleans replied, that " the cessation was 
 already in force: for they proclaim it first 
 amongst themselves ; and so, whilst they were 
 quiet, and expected no- such usage, they had 
 been wronged by a surprise." 
 
 The Lacedsmonians retorted, that, "if so, 
 it was needless for them to proceed to a publi- 
 cation of it in Lacedsemnn, if the Eleans had 
 already judged themselves wronged. But the 
 fact was far different in the light they saw it, 
 and trespass had not been committed in any 
 shape whatever. 
 
 But the Eleans adhered to their first charge, 
 that " they could not be persuaded the Lacedae- 
 monians had not wronged them ; yet, in case 
 they were willing to surrender Lepreum to 
 them, they are ready to remit their share of the 
 fine, and to pay for them that part of it which 
 was due to the god." 
 
 But, when this would not content, it was 
 urged again by the Eleans, that, " if they were 
 unwilling to part with it, they should by no 
 means surrender Lepreum ; but then, as they 
 were desirous to have the use of the temple, 
 
 ' 2000 miiiiE— 6,456;. 6s. Sil. sterling. 
 
 they must go up to the altar of Olympian Jupi 
 ter, and swear, in the presence of the Grecians, 
 that they would hereafter pay tht; fine." — But, 
 as they also refused to comply with this, the 
 Lacedemonians were excluded the temple, the 
 sacrifice, and the games, and performed their 
 own sacrifices at home. Yet the rest of the 
 Grecians, except the Lepreatae, were admitted to 
 assist at the solemnity. 
 
 The Eleans however, apprehensive they 
 would sacrifice by force, set a guard of their 
 armed youths around the temple. These were 
 reinforced by the Argives and Mantineans, a 
 thousand of each, and a party of Athenian 
 horse who were at Argos, in readiness to attend 
 the festival. But a great consternation had 
 seized the whole assembly of united Greece, 
 lest the Lacedsmonians should return with an 
 armed force ; more especially, when Lichas, 
 the son of Archesilaus, a Lacedaemonian, vtras 
 scourged in the course by the under-officers, 
 because, when his chariot had gained the prize, 
 and the chariot of the Boeotian state was pro- 
 claimed victor, pursuant to the exclusion of the 
 Lacedaemonians from the race, he stepped into 
 the midst of the assembly and crowned the 
 charioteer, desirous to make it known that the 
 chariot belonged to him. TJpon this, the whole 
 assembly was more than ever alarmed, and it 
 was fully expected that some strange event 
 would follow ; the Lacedaemonians, however, 
 made no bustle ; and the festival passed regu- 
 larly through its train. 
 
 After the Olympics, the Argives and their 
 confederates repaired to Corinth, in order to 
 solicit the concurrence of that state. A 
 LacediBmonian embassy happened also to be 
 there. Many conferences were held, and no- 
 thing finally determined : but, upon feeling 
 the shock of an earthquake, they parted each 
 to their respective cities. And here the sum- 
 mer ended. 
 
 In the ensuing winter, a battle was fought 
 by the Heracleots of Trachis, against the 
 ^nianians, and Dolopians, and Meliensians, 
 and some of the Thessalians. For the border- 
 ing nations were enemies to the city of Hera- 
 clea, as this latter place had been fortified for 
 their more especial annoyance. From its foun- 
 dation they had ever opposed it, preventing its 
 growth to the utmost of their power ; and at 
 this time they defeated the Heracleots in a 
 battle, in which Xenares, the son of Cnidi» 
 the Lacedemonian commandart, was slain; a 
 
200 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book V, , 
 
 number also of the Heracleots perished. And 
 thus the winter ended : and the twelfth year of 
 the war came also to an end. 
 
 TEAK XIII.' 
 
 The succeeding summer was no sooner be- 
 gun, than the Boeotians, viewing the low estate 
 to which it had been reduced by the late battle, 
 took into their own hands the city of Heraelea, 
 and discharged Hegesippidas, the Lacedfemo- 
 nian commandant, as guilty of mal-administra- 
 tion. They took this city into their own 
 hands, from the apprehension that, during the 
 embroilments of the Laceda?monians in Pelo- 
 ponnesus, the Athenians might seize it. The 
 Lacedeemonians, however, were chagrined at 
 this step of the Boeotians. 
 
 This same summer also, Alcibiades, the son 
 of Clinias, being general of the Athenians, 
 with the concurrence of the Argives and their 
 allies, entered Peloponnesus with a small party 
 of heavy-armed Athenians and archers, and 
 enlarged his forces upon his route by the aids 
 of the confederates in those quarters ; where 
 he not only made such a disposition of affairs 
 as might best answer the views of the alliance, 
 but also, traversing Peloponnesus with his 
 force, he both persuaded the Patreans to con- 
 tinue their works quite down to the sea, and 
 intended also to execute a plan of his own for 
 erecting a fort upon the Rhium of Achaia.'' 
 But the Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and all 
 such as were alarmed at the annoyance this 
 fort might give them, rushed out to prevent 
 him, and obliged him to desist. 
 
 The same summer a war broke out between 
 the Epidaurians and the Argives. The pre- 
 text was grounded on a victim due from the 
 Epidaurians to the Pythian Apollo, as an 
 acknowledgment for their pastures; for the 
 Argives were now the chief managers of the 
 temple. But, this pretended grievance set 
 apart, it had been judged expedient, by Alci- 
 biades and the Argives, to get possession, if 
 possible, of Epidaurus, in order to prevent 
 molestation on the side of Corinth, and to ren- 
 
 ■ Before Christ 419. 
 
 " This was a grand projpct indeed I It aimed at no 
 less than the total ruin of Corinth, and putting an end 
 to all the navigation of that trading and opulent city 
 through the bay of Criasa. The Athenians were al- 
 ready entire masters of the sea on the other side of the 
 Isthmus. 
 
 der the passage of Athenian succours more ex- 
 peditious from ^gina than by fetching a com- 
 pass about Scyllaeum. The Argives, therefore, 
 were intent on their preparations, as resolved 
 to take the field and act against Epidaurus, in 
 order to exact the victim by force of arms. 
 
 But, about the same time, the Lacedemo- 
 nians also marched out, with their whole force, 
 as far as to Leuctra, upon their own frontier, 
 towards Lyceum, under the command of Agis, 
 the son of Archidamus, their king. Not a 
 man was privy to the design of their thus 
 taking the field, not even the states from which 
 the quotas were furnished out. But, when 
 the victims they sacrificed for a successful 
 campaign proved inauspicious, they again mat- 
 ched home, and circulated fresh orders to their > 
 confederates to be ready to take the field again 
 after the next month, which was the rrionth 
 Carneius,' the grand festival of the Dorians. 
 But, when they were thus withdrawn, the 
 Argives, taking the field on the twenty-seventh 
 day of the month preceding Carneius, and 
 though celebrating their own festival that very 
 day, continued ^11 this intermediate time to 
 make incursions and ravages upon Epidauria. 
 The Epidaurians sent about to solicit the suc- 
 cours of their allies ; some of whom excused 
 themselves as bound to observe the approach- 
 ing festivals, though others advanced as far as 
 the frontiers of Epidauria, and then refused to 
 act. And during the space of time that the 
 Argives were in Epidauria, embassies from 
 the several states held a congress at Mantinea, 
 at the request of the Athenians ; and, proceed- 
 ing to a conference, Ephamidas, the Corinthian, 
 remonstrated, that " their words were by no 
 means consistent with their actions ; for whilst 
 they were here sitting together upon the terms 
 of peace, the Epidaurians and allies, and the 
 Argives, were opposing one another iri arms : 
 that, consequently, the first thing to be done 
 was to send deputations on both sides to dis- 
 
 ? This festival was observed by most cities in Greece ; 
 but with the greatest pomp and solemnity at Sparin, 
 where it began the thirteenth of the month Carneius, 
 according to the Lacediemonian style, and lasted nine 
 days. A camp was formed for its celebration, in which 
 they continued during the whole solemnity, and ob- 
 served strict military discipline. By these means, as 
 we find a little lower, the Argives, in this instance no 
 slaves to superstition, attended to the festival and war- 
 fare at the same time, and annoyed the Epidaurians, 
 whilst religious awe restrained the friends of the latter 
 from acting in their defence. See Potter^g Jirchcsologia, 
 vol. i. p. 403. 
 
yEAS XIV.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 201 
 
 Dand those armies, ami then orderly to proceed 
 to treat of peace." Yielding, therefore, to the 
 justice of such a remonstrance, they fetched 
 the Argives out of Epidauria; and, returning 
 to the congress, they were not able even then 
 to agree together: upon which the Argives 
 once more entered Epidauria, and resumed the 
 ravage. 
 
 The Lacedffimonians now had taken the 
 field, and were advanced to Cajyae ; but, as 
 now again the victims sacrificed portended 
 no success to a campaign, they once more 
 withdrew. 
 
 The Argives also, after ruining about a 
 third of the territory of Epidauria, were return- 
 ed home. In this incursion they were assisted 
 by one thousand heavy-armed Athenians, with 
 Alcibiades at their head ; who, having heard 
 that the Lacedsemonians had now left the 
 field, as their service was now no longer need- 
 ful, marched away. And in this manner the 
 summer passed. 
 
 In the beginning of the next winter, the 
 Lacedaemonians, unknown to the Athenians, 
 threw a body of men, to the number of three 
 hundred, with Agesippidas as commandant, in- 
 to Epidaurus by sea. Upon this, the Argives 
 repaired instantly to Athens, with remon- 
 strances, that, " though it was explicitly men- 
 tioned in the treaty that no enemy should be 
 suffered to pass through their respective domin- 
 ions, yet they had perrmitted the Lacedaemoni- 
 ans to make this passage by sea without moles- 
 tation.' Unless, therefore, they would replace 
 the Messenians and Helots in Pylus, to annoy 
 the Lacedsemonians, they should deem them- 
 selves aggrieved." Upon this, the Athenians, 
 at the instigation of Alcibiades, underwrote 
 this charge upon the Laconic column, that 
 " the Lacedaemonians were guilty of perjury ;" 
 and removed the Helots from Crania into Py- 
 lus, to resume their depredations, but refrained 
 from any other act of hostility. 
 
 In the course of this winter, though the 
 Argives and Epidaurians were at war, yet no 
 regular battle was fought between them. The 
 hostilities consisted of ambuscades and skir- 
 mishes, in which, according to the chance of 
 action, some persons perished on both sides. 
 
 But in the close of winter, when the spring 
 
 > The Argives, in this remonstrance, aclcnowledgi! 
 the dominion of the sea, even on the coast of Pelopon- 
 nesus, to belong to Athena. 
 33 
 
 was now approaching, the Argives, provided 
 with ladders for scale, came under Epidaurus, 
 hoping to take it by surprise, as insufficiently 
 manned by reason of the war ; but, failing of 
 success, they soon withdrew. And then the 
 winter ended, and with it ended also the thir- 
 teenth year of the war. 
 
 tSah XIV. 
 
 About the middle of the ensuing summer, 
 when their confederates the Epidaurians, were 
 sadly distressed, when some of the Peloponne- 
 sians had already revolted, and others showed 
 plainly a spirit of discontent, the Lacedsemoni- 
 ans were clearly convinced that, unless expedi- 
 tiously prevented, the mischief would spread 
 abroad. Upon this they took the field against 
 Argos with their whole force, both themselves 
 and their Helots ; and Agis, the son of Arch- 
 idamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, command- 
 ed in chief. They were attended in the field 
 by the Tegeatae, and all the other Arcadians 
 whatever confederated with the Lacedsemoni- 
 ans. But the allies of the other parts of Pelo- 
 ponnesus, and those without the isthmus, were 
 assembled at Phlius : — the Bceotians, consist- 
 ing of five thousand heavy-armed, and the 
 same number of light-armed ; five hundred 
 horsemen, each attended by a soldier on foot : 
 — the Cormthians, of two thousand heavy-arm- 
 ed; — the other confederates with their several 
 quotas ; — but the Phliasians with the whole of 
 their force, because the army was assembled in 
 their district. 
 
 The Argives, who had some time before in- 
 telligence of the Lacedaemonian preparations, 
 and that since they were filing towards Phlius 
 in order to join the forces assembled there, 
 now took the field themsdves. They were 
 joined by a succour of the Mantineans, strength- 
 ened by the addition of their dependents, and 
 three thousand heavy-armed Eleans. Upon 
 their march, they fell in with the Lacedaemoni- 
 ans at Methydrium of Arcadia. Each party 
 posts itself upon a rising ground. The Ar- 
 gives got every thing in readiness to attack 
 the Lacedaemonians whilst yet they were alone ; 
 but Agis, dislodged by night and stealing a 
 march, completed his junction with the body of 
 confederates at Phlius. When this was pel 
 ceived by the Argives, they drew off early the 
 next dawn, first of all to Argos, and then tp 
 
 i2 
 
 > Before Christ 418. 
 
202 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book V 
 
 the pass on the route of Nemea, by which 
 they expected the Lacedemonians, with their 
 confederates, would fall into their country. 
 Vet Agis took not that route which they ex- 
 pected ; but, having communicated his design 
 to the Lacedemonians, and Arcadians, and 
 Epidaurians, he took a different route, though 
 much less practicable, and descended into the 
 plains of Argos. The Corinthians, and 
 Peljenians, and Phliasians, followed by an- 
 other more direct route ; and orders had been 
 given to the Boeotians, and Megareans, arjd 
 Sicyonians, to take the route which leadeth 
 to Wemea, on which the Argives were posted, 
 that, in case the Argives should march in- 
 to the plain to make head against the Laceda;- 
 monians, the last with their cavalry might 
 press upon their rear. 
 
 After these dispositions, and such a descent 
 mto the plain, Agis ravaged Saminthus and 
 other places ; upon intelligence of which, the 
 Argives, so soon as it was day, dislodged from 
 Wemea, to stop the depredations, and on their 
 march met with tjie body of Phliasians and 
 Corinthians; and, encountering, slew some 
 few of the PhliasiaAs, whilst not a much 
 grdater number of their own men were destroyed 
 by the Corinthians. The Boeotians also, and 
 Megareans, and Sicyonians, took the route of 
 Nemea conformably to orders, and found the 
 Argives already dislodged ; but the latter, upon 
 entering the plain, and in view of the ravage 
 made upon their lands, drew up in order of 
 battle. The Lacedaemonians stood regularly 
 drawn up on the other side. And now the 
 Argives were shut up in the middle of their 
 enemies: for, on the side of the plain, the 
 LacedEemonians, and those in their body, inter- 
 cepted their return to the city ; on the high 
 ground above them were the Corinthians, and 
 Phliasians, and Pellenians ; on the other part, 
 towards Memea, were the Boeotians, and Sicy- 
 onians, and Megareans. Calvary they had 
 none : for the Athenians were the only part 
 of their confederacy who were not yet come 
 up. 
 
 The bulk, indeed, of the Argives and con- 
 federates apprehended not the danger, which 
 at present environed them, to be so great ; but 
 rather concluded they might engage with ad- 
 vantage,, and that they had caught the Lacedae- 
 monians fast within their territory, and near to 
 Argos itself. Two Argives, however, — Thra- 
 iiyllus, one of the five in command, and Alci- 
 
 phron, the public host of the Laeedapmonians, 
 — the very instant the armies were moving to 
 the charge, had addressed themselves to Agis 
 and proposed expedients to prevent a battle 
 giving their word, that " the Argives were 
 ready to do and to submit to justice, upon a 
 fair and equitable arbitration, in case the La- 
 cedaemonians had any charge against them ; and 
 for the future would live at peace, if a present 
 accommodation could be effected." 
 
 In this manner these Argives presumed to 
 talk, merely of themselves, and withbut the 
 public authority. Agis also, by his own pri- 
 vate determination, accepted t^e proposals ; 
 and, without reporting them to the council of 
 war, without canvassing things maturely him- 
 self, or at least communicating only with one 
 person of the number which had authority in 
 the army, grants them a four months' truce, 
 " in which space they were to make good what 
 engagements they had now made ;" and then 
 instantly drew off the army, without imparting 
 the reasons of his conduct to the other con- 
 federates. The Lacedaamonians, indce(l, and 
 confederates, followed when he led them off, 
 because their laws enacted such obedience ; 
 yet, amongst themselves, were lavish of their 
 censure against Agis, that, when so fine an 
 opportunity of engaging was in their power, 
 when their enemies were hemmed in on all 
 sides, both by their horse and their foot, they 
 were drawn off, without performing any thing 
 worthy of such mighty preparations ; for, to 
 this very day, a finer army of Grecians had 
 never appeared in the field. A most gallant 
 figure, in truth, it made, whilst they were all 
 together at Nemea. The Lacedemonians were 
 there to be seen with the whole collected force 
 of their state, accompanied by the Arcadians, 
 and Boeotians, and Corinthians, and Sicyo- 
 nians, ' and Pellenians, and Phliasians, and 
 Megareans. The troops which composed their 
 several quotas were all picked men, and were 
 judged a match in the field of battle, not only 
 for the whole Argive alliance, but the addition 
 of double strength. This great army, how- 
 ever, laying all the time most heavy imputa- 
 tions on the conduct of Agis, drew off, and 
 were disbanded to their several habitations. 
 
 On the other part also, the Argives were 
 still much more exasperated against those who 
 had made this suspension without public au- 
 thority. They imagined the Lacedaemonians 
 had escaped them when they had the finest 
 
VEAK XIV.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 203 
 
 opportunity of striking a blow, inasmuch as 
 the contest must have been decided under the 
 very walls of Argos, and in company with a 
 numerous and gallant alliance. And hence, 
 upon their return, at the Charadrum, the place 
 where the crimes committed in an expedition 
 are adjudged, before they enter the city, they 
 were beginning to stone Thrasyllus, who, fly- 
 ing to an altar, escapeth with life : his effects, 
 however, they confiscated to public use. 
 
 But, after this, came up the Athenian suc- 
 cour, consisting of a thousand heavy-armed 
 and three hundred horsemen, commanded by 
 Laches and Nicostratus. The Argives, who, 
 after all, were afraid to break the agreement 
 with the Lacedaemonians, ordered them " to 
 be gone forthwith ;" and, though they requested 
 a conference, refused to introduce them into 
 the assembly of the people, till the Mantineans 
 and Eleans, who were not yet departed, by 
 great importunity obtained a compliance. Here 
 the Athenians,' in the presence of Alcibiades 
 their ambassador, assembled with the Argives 
 and their allies, averred, that " the suspension 
 was not valid, since agreed to without the con- 
 sent of the body of the confederates ; now, 
 therefore, as themselves were come up oppor- 
 tunely to their assistance, they were obliged in 
 honour to prosecute the war." The confede- 
 rates allowed the force of this argument : and 
 the whole alliance, except the Argives, marched 
 instantly away against Orchomenus, of Arcadia. 
 But even the Argives, though they staid be- 
 hind at first, were persuaded by such reasoning, 
 and soon after went also to take part in the 
 expedition. Thus, united, they sat down be- 
 fore and besieged Orchomenus. They made 
 several assaults upon it, desirous for other 
 reasons to get it into their hands, but more 
 particularly because the hostages from Arcadia 
 were lodged in that city by the Lacedaemoni- 
 ans, 
 
 The Orchomenians, terrified at the weakness 
 of their walls and the multitude of their be- 
 siegers, and lest, as no relief appeared, they 
 should soon be exhausted, thought proper to 
 capitulate on these conditions ; — " to be re- 
 ceived ito the confederacy, — to give hostages 
 of their own body, — and to deliver up to the 
 Mantineans those whom the Lacedaemonians 
 had lodged with them." 
 
 Having thus got possession of Orchomenus, 
 
 1 Laches and Nicostratus. 
 
 the confederates, in the next place, held a con- 
 sultation, "against what other city, in their 
 plan of conquest, they should next proceed." 
 The Eleans exhorted them to march against 
 Lepreum, but the Mantineans against Tegea ; 
 and the Argives and Athenians adhered to the 
 Mantineans. The Eleans, upon this, were 
 offended that they had not voted for the siege 
 of Lepreum, and separated to their own home. 
 But the rest of the confederates set about pre- 
 parations at Mantinea, as fully bent on the 
 siege of Tegea ; and even some of the citizens 
 of Tegea were exerting their efforts within that 
 city to betray it to thetn. 
 
 But the Lacedaemonians, after they were 
 withdrawn from Argos, in pursuance of- the 
 suspension of arms for four months, laid heavy 
 charges upon Agis, for not conquering Argos 
 at so fair an opportunity, fairer than ever they 
 had reason to expect, — " since so numerous and 
 so gallant a body of confederates could never 
 again, vi'ithout greater dilficulty, be assembled 
 together." And when afterwards the news 
 arrived that Orchomenus was taken, their in- 
 dignation became more violent than ever. In 
 such a ferment, they instantly resolved, though 
 not consistently with the calm Lacedaemonian 
 temper, that " his house must needs be demo- 
 lished, and a fine of one hundred thousand 
 drachmas' be imposed upon Agis." He ear- 
 nestly pleaded against the execution of the 
 sentence, that, " in another expedition, ha 
 Would purge the charge by some notable service 
 to the state ; if not, they might then proceed to 
 punish him at pleasure." Upon this, they 
 suspended the fine and demolition, but passed 
 a law upon the present occasion, such as nevei 
 before had been made amongst them ; for they 
 elected a committee of ten Spartans to attend 
 him as a council, without whose concurrence 
 he was not permitted to lead out their army in- 
 to the field. 
 
 In the meantime a message is brought thtm 
 from their friends at Tegea, that " unless they 
 come thither with the utmost expedition, Tegea 
 will revolt from them to the Argives and their 
 confederates, and is only not revolted already.' 
 
 To prevent this, the whole Lacedaemonian 
 strength, both of citizens and Helots, is levied 
 with more sharpness than had ever been known 
 before ; and, taking the field, they marched to 
 Oresteum, of Menalia. An order was sent 
 
 > £3239 3s. 4d. sterling. 
 
204 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book v. 
 
 beforehand to their Arcadian allies, to assemble 
 and follow them directly towards Tegea. 
 
 But when the whole Lacedsemonian strength 
 was thus marched to Oresteum, the sixth part 
 of the number, consisting of the more aged and 
 younger classes, was from thence again dis- 
 missed to Sparta, to take upon them the guard 
 of that place, whilst the rest of their military 
 force marcheth to Tegea ; and, not long after, 
 their Arcadian confederates join them. 
 
 They sent also to Corinth, to the Bosotians, 
 Phocians, and Locrians, a summons of speedy 
 aid into the Mantineans. But, for some of 
 these, the summons was too short ; and, for 
 the rest, it was by no means an easy task to 
 take the field in separate bodies, and, waiting 
 for their mutual junction, to force their passage 
 through an enemy's country ; for such lay be- 
 tween to obstruct their advance ; however, they 
 were earnestly bent to attempt it. The Lace- 
 daemonians, in the meantime, enlarged with 
 such Arcadian parties as were already come 
 up, marched on and broke into the Mantinean ; 
 and, having formed their camp near the temple 
 of Hercules, they ravaged the country. 
 
 The Argives and their allies, when their 
 enemy was thus in sight, having posted them- 
 selves on a spot of ground by nature strong 
 and difficult of approach, drew up in order, as 
 ready to engage. The Lacedaemonians also 
 immediately advanced towards them, and even 
 approached so near as within the cast of a stone 
 or a dart. But one of the old experienced 
 Spartans, perceiving that they were to attack 
 so difficult a post, roared out aloud to Agis,' 
 that " he was going to repair one evil by an- 
 other," as if, by his present ill-judged eager- 
 ness, he was bent on making reparation for his 
 censured retreat from Argos, Upon this, 
 either struck with such an exclamation, or 
 whether upon a sudden his own thoughts sug- 
 gested to him a different conduct, he drew off 
 his army again, with all possible expedition, 
 before the battle could be joined. And, wheel- 
 ing from thence into the Tegeatis, he turned a 
 stream of water into the Mantinean, about 
 which, as apt to do great damage to the lands 
 
 > Plutarch says it was an apophthegm of this Agis, 
 that Lacedicmonians never ask concerning their ene- 
 mies. " How many are they ?" but " Where are they?" 
 And that, when he was hindered from fighting at Man- 
 linea, he said, *'They, who would rule over many, 
 must fight against many :" and, being asked what was 
 the number of the Laccdiemonians, he replied " Enow 
 »'> heat cowards." 
 
 on which side soever it flowed, the Mantineans 
 and Tegeatae are eternally at blows. It was 
 his scheme to draw down the Argives and their 
 allies from their strong post, on the eminence, 
 in order to prevent the turning of this stream, 
 so soon as they knew it was in agitation, and 
 thus to gain an opportunity of fighting in the 
 plain. In pursuance of this, he halted the 
 whole day upoi^ the stream, and accomplished 
 its diversion. But the Argives and their allies, 
 surprised at this sudden and precipitate retreat, 
 had been, at first, unable to conjecture what it 
 meant. At length, when the enemy was to- 
 tally withdrawn, and quite out of their view, 
 after lying inactively in their posts, and no 
 orders received for a pursuit, they began a 
 second time to lay heavy imputations on their 
 own commanders ; — that, " on the former oc- 
 casion, the Lacedsmonians, when fairly caught 
 near Argos, had been suffered to escape ; that 
 now again, though they were openly flying, not 
 a soul must pursue them, but, through shame- 
 ful indolence, their enemies are preserved, and 
 themselves are treacherously betrayed." The 
 commanders, upon the first noise of these 
 clamours, were highly chagrined, but after- 
 wards they marched them down from the emi- 
 nence, and, advancing into the plain, encamped 
 them there, as determined to fight the enemy. 
 The day following, the Argives and allies were 
 drawn up to be in readiness for action, should 
 the enemy appear. And the Lacedsemonians, 
 marching away from the stream to re-occupy 
 their former camp near the temple of Hercules, 
 on a sudden perceived that the whole body of 
 their foes were ready drawn up in order of bat- 
 tle, and had quitted their strong post on the 
 eminence. 
 
 At this crisis, the Lacedaemonians were 
 struck with a greater astonishment than the 
 memory of man could parallel. For now, in 
 an interval of time exceeding short, they were 
 bound to get every thing in readiness for fight : 
 yet, such was their diligence, that in an instant 
 they were formed into a beautiful array, Agis, 
 their king, issuing all the necessary orders, ac- 
 cording to law ; for, when a king leadeth their 
 armies, all orders are given by him : he him- 
 self declareth what he willeth to be done to 
 the general officers ;^ they carry his orders to 
 the colonels ; ' these to the captains ; * who 
 afterwards forward them to the subalterns ; * 
 
 3 Polemarchs. 
 * FenteoontatorB. 
 
 3 Iiochages. 
 ■ Enomatarcha 
 
YEA2 XIV.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 205 
 
 by whom they were communicated to all the 
 private men under their respective commands. 
 The orders, when any such are requisite, are 
 in this method dispersed and circulated with 
 the greatest expedition : for, in the Lacedfiemo- 
 nian armies, almost the whole soldiery, few 
 only excepted, have a command assigned in 
 regular subordination ; and the care of execu- 
 ting orders is incumbent upon numbers. 
 
 In their present array, the left wing consist- 
 ed of the Skiritffl, who, of all the Lacedsemo- 
 nians, ever claim this post as their peculiar right ; 
 next them were posted the Brasidean soldiers 
 who had served in Thrace, accompanied by 
 those who had lately been honoured with the 
 freedom of Sparta ; then, along the line, were 
 regularly posted all the troops -which were com- 
 posed of pure Lacedaemonians ; next to them 
 stood the Hereans of Arcadia, and beyond 
 them the Maenalians. In the right wing were 
 the Tegeatae, but in the utmost extent of it 
 some few Lacedaemonians. Their cavalry was 
 equally posted on both the wings : and in this 
 form was the Lacedaemonian disposition made. 
 
 On the side of the enemy, the Mantineans 
 had the right wing, because the business fell 
 upon their ground ; next to them were the 
 allies from Arcadia; then a picked body of 
 Argives, to the number of a thousand, who 
 long had been exercised in the study of arms 
 at the public school at Argos ; and next to 
 them stood the rest of the Argive forces : these 
 were followed by their own confederates, the 
 Cleoneans and Orneatae. The Athenians were 
 ranged in the outermost body, and composed 
 the left wing, supported by their own cavalry. 
 Such was the order and disposition on both 
 
 The army of the Lacedamonians had the 
 appearance of superior numbers: but exactly 
 to write the number, either of the several 
 bodies on each side, or of their whole force, I 
 own myself unable. The amount of the Lace- 
 daemonians was not known, because of the pro- 
 found secrecy observed in their polity ; and the 
 amount of their enemies, because of the osten- 
 tation ordinary to mankind in magnifying their 
 own strength, hath been still disbelieved. How- 
 ever, from the following computation, an in- 
 quirer may discover the number of the Lacedae- 
 monians, who on this occasion were drawn up 
 in the field. 
 
 Besides the Skiritae, who were in number 
 six hundred, seven battalions were in this en- 
 
 gagement. Now in every battalion there were 
 four companies ; and, in every company, four 
 platoons ; in the first rank of every platoon 
 were four fighting spldiers. In regard to depth 
 they were not equally formed, as every colonel 
 determined the depth at his own private discre- 
 tion ; but generally they were drawn up eight 
 deep. The front line of their whole force, ex- 
 cepting the SkiritB, consisted of four hundred 
 and forty-eight men.' 
 
 When both sides were ready, the small res- 
 pite before the engagement was employed by 
 the several commanders in animating the sol- 
 diers under their respective orders. 
 
 To the Mantineans it was urged, — that 
 " the points, for which they were going to fight, 
 were their country and their future fate, either 
 rule or slavery ; that, of rule, whose sweets 
 they had known, they might not be divested, 
 and that they might never feel again what 
 slavery is." 
 
 To the Argives, — it was " for their ancient 
 sovereignty, and the equal share of dignity they 
 had once enjoyed in Peloponnesus, now timely 
 to prevent an eternal submission to such losses, 
 and earn revenge for the many inj uries a neigh- 
 bouring state, unrelenting in its enmity, had 
 done them." 
 
 But to the Athenians, — that, "in honour, 
 they were obliged to signalize their valour in a 
 conspicuous manner, in the company of numer- 
 ous and gallant allies : that should they gain 
 a victory over the Lacedaemonians on Pelopon- 
 nesian ground, their own empire would bo 
 established and enlarged, and no enemy would 
 ever again presume to invade their territories." 
 
 And in this manner were the Argives and 
 their confederates animated to the fight. 
 
 * The LacediEtnonian mora^ or brigade, consisted of 
 four lochi, or hattalions, equal to 20-J8 men : for a 
 lochos, or battalion, consisted of four pcntecostiesy or 
 companifis, equal to 512 men i^ipentecosty, or company, 
 of four enomatits, or platoons, equal to 128 men ; and 
 each enomatia or platoon, consisted of 33. This is the 
 account of Thucydides, who computes the platoon by 4 
 in front and 8 in depth. The platoon consisted there- 
 fore of 32; which, multiplied by 4, is equal to 128, the 
 number of a company ; which also inulliplied by 4, is 
 equal to 512, tlie number of a battalion. The number 
 of battalions was seven, which shows the number of 
 Lacedemonians to have been 3584; and then with the 
 addition of 600 Shiriim, who were posted on the left, to 
 have amounted, in the whole, to 4184 men. Or again, 
 the whole front line, is equal to 448. multiplied by 8, 
 the number in depth, is equal to 3584, added to 60C 
 Skiritts, is equal to 4184. 
 
206 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [cook v. 
 
 But the Lacedffimonians were encouraging 
 one another, and, during martial strains enjoined 
 by their discipline, like men of bravery as they 
 were, each animated his neighbour with the 
 recital of the gallant acts they had performed 
 together. They were persons, who knew that 
 a long experience in the toils of war conduceth 
 more to preservation, than a short verbal ha- 
 rangue, how finely soever delivered. 
 
 A"nd now the armies were mutually ap- 
 proaching : the Argives and their allies ad- 
 vanced in a brisk and angry manner ; but the 
 Lacedaemonians moved slowly forwards to the 
 sound of many flutes, the music which their 
 laws ordained ; not from any religious motive, 
 but for advancing with equal steps, keeping 
 time with the notes,, to prevent all disorders in 
 the ranks ; accidents very frequent in large 
 armies whilst drawing to an encounter.' 
 
 But, during the approach, Agis the king 
 bethought himself of making a new disposition. 
 — It is the constant case with all armies, that, 
 upon the right, their wings, whilst they ap- 
 proach one another, extend themselves too far, 
 so that constantly, on .both sides, the left wing 
 is overreached and flanked by the enemy's 
 right. This proceedeth from the dread every 
 soldier lieth under of being exposed on his 
 unarmed side, which maketh him eager to get 
 it covered by the shield of the next person on 
 his right, and positive that a firm closing to- 
 gether in this manner, will render them im- 
 penetrable to the &ock of the enemy. This 
 turn of the body is first begun by the right- 
 
 1 Milton hath made use of this LacediRmonian inarch 
 to adorn and raise his own noble poetry. It was full 
 and strong in his imagination, when he wrote the fol- 
 lowing lines. Faradise Lost, book I. 
 
 " Anon the; move 
 In perfect phalanx, to the Dorian mood 
 or flutes and soft reeorden ; such as laised 
 To height of noblest tecnper heroes old, 
 Anning to battle ; and, instead of rage, 
 Deliberate valour breathed, firm, and unmoved 
 With dread of death to flight or foul retreat : 
 Nor wanting power to mitigate and suage, 
 With solemn to'jches, troubled thoughts, and chase 
 Anguish, and doubt, and fear, and sorrow, and pain, 
 From mortal or immortal minds. Thus they. 
 Breathing united force, with fised thought, 
 Moved on in silence to soft pipes, that charm'd 
 Their painful steps o'er the burn'd soil : And nov/. 
 Advanced in view, they stand, a horrid front 
 Of dreadful length and dazzling arms, in gnisB 
 Of warriors old with order'd spcsr .Tod shield, 
 Awaiting what command thpir mighty chief 
 Had to impose. He through ihe armed files 
 Darts his experienced eye ; and eoon, traverse 
 The whole battalion, views their order due." 
 
 hand man of the whole front, and is the result 
 of his constant care to shift his defenceless 
 side from the aim of the foe,; and the dread of 
 being in the same manner exposed obligeth all 
 the rest to follow his motion. And thus, in 
 the present approach, the Mantineans in their 
 wing had far overreached the Skiritffi ; but the 
 LacedoBmonians and Tegeatse had done so, 
 more in regard to the Athenians, in propor- 
 tion as they exceeded them in numbers. Agis, 
 therefore, fearing lest the left wing of the 
 Lacedaemonians might bfe quite surrounded, 
 and judging that the Mantineans quite too far 
 overreached them, sent orders to the Skiritse 
 and Brasideans to Tyheel away., from the spot 
 where they were first posted, and fill iip the 
 extremity of the line, so as to render it equal 
 to the Mantineans ; and, to supply the void 
 thus made, he ordered from the right wing, 
 two battalions, commanded by general oflicers, 
 Hipponoidas and Aristocles, to repair thither, 
 and falling in, to close up the ranks ; judging 
 that their own right would still be more than 
 sufficient to execute their parts, and the wing 
 opposed to the Mantineans might, by this dis- 
 position, be properly strengthened. But, as 
 he issued these orders in the very onset and 
 close of battle, it happened that Aristocles and 
 Hipponoidas absolutely refused to change their 
 post, (though for such disobedience, as ap- 
 parently the result of cowardice, they were 
 afterwards banished from Sparta) ; and before 
 the new disposition could be completed, the 
 enemy had begun to charge. Upoii the re- 
 fusal of these two battalions to change their 
 post, Agis countermanded those marching to 
 strengthen the Skiritte to their former places, 
 who now were unable to fall into the ranks, 
 or close together with those whom they had 
 quitted : but on this occasion, more remarkable 
 than ever, the Lacedajmonians, though in all 
 respects outdone in the military art, gave sig- 
 nal proofs of their superiority in true manly 
 valour. 
 
 For, to come to particulars, when once they 
 were at blows with the enemy, the right wing 
 of the Mantineans routs the Skiritse and Bra- 
 sideans. Then the same Mantineans, sup- 
 ported by their confederates and the thousand 
 picked Argives, falling in at the void in the 
 Laccdtemonian line, which was not yet filled 
 up, did great execution upon them ; for, taking 
 them in flank, they entirely broke them, drove 
 them for shelter among their carriages, and 
 
YEAR XIV.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 207 
 
 made a slaughter of the old men who were 
 appointed for their guard. And in this quar- 
 ter, the Lacedasmonians were clearly van- 
 quished. 
 
 But in the other quarters, and especially in 
 the centre, where Agis the king was posted, 
 and round him the horse-guards, styled the 
 three hundred, falling upon those troops which 
 were composed of the elder Argives, and them 
 which are called the pentelochi, and upon the 
 Clconeans, and Orneatas, and those Athenians 
 who ranked along with them, they broke them 
 in an instant, so that many of them durst not 
 stand to exchange a blow, but, so soon as they 
 felt the LaoediBmpnian shock, turned about 
 at once, and others were trampled under foot 
 ra the great hurry they were in to secure their 
 escape. 
 
 But when the main body of the Argives and 
 their allies was in this quarter routed, their 
 foot, on both the flanks, were instantly dis- 
 comfited. Now, also, the right of the Lace- 
 demonians and Tegcatae, by the advantage of 
 superior numbers, had overreached and en- 
 compassed the Athenians. These now, on 
 all hands, were beset with danger; in this 
 quarter they were surrounded by their enemies, 
 in another they were already vanquished ; and 
 they must have suffered the most of any part 
 of the army, had it not been for the excellent 
 support their own cavalry gave them. It 
 happened also that Agis, when he perceived 
 that the Mantineans and the thousand Argives 
 had got the better on the left, commanded 
 the whole army to wheel off to the support of 
 the vanquished. And whilst this was execu- 
 ting, the Athenians laid hold of the interval, 
 which this motion of the enemy, and their 
 drawing off from around them occasioned, to 
 secure their own escape without any opposi- 
 tion, accompanied by the Argives, who were 
 also vanquished with them. 
 
 But the Mantineans, and those who fought 
 in company with them, and the picked band of 
 ArgiveSj were now no longer intent on pres- 
 sing iipon their adversaries ; but, perceiving 
 their own side to be completely vanquished, 
 and the Lacedsemonians approaching to their 
 attack, they turned about and fled. Yet num- 
 bers of them perished, and t|iose chiefly Man- 
 tineans ; for the greatest part of the picked 
 band of Argives completed their escape. 
 
 The flight however was not precipitate, nor 
 the distance- to a place of safety great. For 
 
 the I.acedajmonians, till the enemy flieth, main- 
 tain their combats with long and steady toil ; 
 but, after a route, pursue them neither long not 
 far. 
 
 And thus, or very nearly thus, was the pro- 
 cedure of the whole battle, the greatest that 
 for many ages had been fought amongst Gre- 
 cians, and where the competition lay between 
 most renowned and' flourishing states. The 
 Lacedsemonians, amassing together the arms of 
 their enemies who had been slain,_immediately 
 erected a trophy, and rifled the bodies of the 
 dead. They also took up their own dead, and 
 carried them to Tegea, where they received 
 the rites of sepulture ; and also delivered, upon 
 truce, the slain of their enemy. There fell 
 of the Argives, and OrneatSe, and Cleoneans, 
 seven hundred ; and two hundred of the Man- 
 tineans; two hundred also of the Athenians, 
 including the jEginetse, and their several com- 
 manders. On the Lacedaemonian side, — as the 
 confederates were never hard pressed, what 
 loss they suffered is scarcely deserving of no- 
 tice ; and the exact number of their own dead 
 it is difficult to discover, but it was reported to 
 have been about three hundred. 
 
 When a battle was certainly to be fought, 
 Pleistionax, the other king, marched out to 
 their support, with the whole body of citizens, 
 both old men and youths. But when he was 
 advanced as far as Tegea, he received the news 
 of a victory, and returned to Sparta. The 
 Lacedffimonians also sent messengers to coun- 
 termand their allies from Corinth, and from 
 without the isthmus. And, being themselves 
 returned to Sparta, after giving dismission to 
 their allies, as the Carneian solemnities were 
 at hand, they celebrate the festival. The im- 
 putation also of cowardice, at that time laid to 
 their charge by the rest of Greece, because of 
 their misfortune at Sphacteria, and some other 
 instances of impolitic and dilatory conduct, by 
 this one action, they completely purged away. 
 Now" it was determined that their depression 
 had been merely the result of fortune, but that 
 in inward bravery they were still themselves. 
 
 The day before this battle was fought, it 
 happened that the Epidaurians, with the whole 
 of their strength, had made an incursion in'.u 
 Argia, as left defenceless, and had done great 
 execution on the guards, left behind at the 
 general march of the Argives. 
 
 Three thousand heavy-armed Eleans, as aux 
 iliaries to the Mantineans, came up after the 
 
SOS 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book v. 
 
 battle ; as did also a thousand Athenians to join 
 the former body, upon which the whole alli- 
 ance marched immediately against Epidaurus, 
 whilst the Lacedaemonians were solemnizing 
 the Carneian festival. After an equal distri- 
 bution of the work, they began to raise a cir- 
 cumvallation around that city. The rest, in- 
 deed, soon desisted ; but the , Athenians, con- 
 formably to their orders, completed their^ round 
 the eminence on which stood the temple of 
 Juno. To guard this work, the whole alliance 
 left behind a suificient number draughted from 
 their several bodies, and then departed to 
 their respective homes. And the summer was 
 now at an end. 
 
 In the first commencement of the succeeding 
 winter, and after, the celebration of the Car- 
 neian festival, the Lacedaemonians immediately 
 took the field ; and, advancing as far as Tegea, 
 sent from thence to Argos proposals for an 
 accommodation. There was already in that 
 city » party in their intelligence, who Were 
 also bent in overturning the popular govern- 
 ment at Argos; and, since the event of the 
 late fatal battle, they were enabled to use more 
 cogent arguments to persuade the many into 
 the accommodation. Their scheme was, first 
 to enter into truce with the Lacedsemonians, as 
 preparatory to an alliance offensive and defen- 
 sive, which was next in agitation; and, this 
 point carried, then immediately to execute their 
 plot against the people. 
 
 Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, the public host of 
 the Argives, accordingly arriveth at Argos, 
 charged to make two demands in the name of 
 the Lacedaemonians ; the one, " whether war 
 be still their option 1" the other, " how if their 
 choice be peace 1" Upon this a strong debate 
 arose, for Alcibiades was present. But the 
 party who acted in the Lacedaemonian interest, 
 prevailed with the Argives to accept their pro- 
 posals of an accommodation ; which were as 
 foUoweth : 
 
 " Thus resolved, by the Lacedaemonian coun- 
 cil, to compound with the Argives. — 
 
 " These to restore their - children to the Or- 
 chomenians, and their men to the Maenalians ; 
 to restore also the Lacedaemonians their citizens 
 uow detained at Mantinea; to evacuate Epi- 
 daurus and demolish their works. 
 
 " And the Athenians, if they will not quit 
 Epidaurus, to be declared enemies to the Argives 
 and to the Lacedaemonians, and to the confe- 
 
 derates of the Lacedaemonians and to the con- 
 federates of the Argives. 
 
 " And, if the Lacedaemonians have in their 
 power any young men, to release them to -all 
 the -states. 
 
 " In relation to the god,' we consent that 
 an oath be administered to the Epidaurians, 
 and we grant the form to be prescribed by the 
 Argives. 
 
 " The states of Peloponnesus, both small 
 and great to be, none excepted, free, accordii. 
 to their own primitive constitutions. 
 
 " And, if any state without Peloponnesus 
 shall enter offensively into the lands of Pelo- 
 ponnesus, succours to be united, in pursuance 
 of a general consult of Peloponnesians about 
 the determinate and most expedient methods. 
 
 " All confederates of the Lacedaemonians 
 whatever, without Peloponnesus, shall enjoy 
 the same privileges as those of the Lacedaemo- 
 nians and thosje of the Argives enjoy, each re- 
 maining in free possession of their territories. 
 
 " These articles to be communicated to the 
 confederates, and ratification to be made, if 
 they approve. If different methods seem ad- 
 visable to the confederates, all parties to desist 
 and return directly horoe." 
 
 These proposals, by way of preliminary, the 
 Argives accepted ; and the army of tiie La- 
 cedaemonians was drawn off from Tegea to 
 their own home. And afterwards, in the course 
 of mutual negotiation, the same party at Argos 
 prevailed upon their countrymen to renounce 
 their alliance with the Mantineans and Eleans,' 
 and even with the Athenians, and to strike up 
 a peace, and an alliance offensive and defen- 
 sive, with the Lacedaemonians. The tenor of 
 it was this : 
 
 " Resolved thus, by the Lacedaemonians and 
 the Argives, on a peace and an alliance offen- 
 sive and defensive, for the term of fifty years. 
 
 " They shall do justice to each other recipro- 
 cally, with impartiality and equity, according 
 to their several forms of law. 
 
 " The other states in Peloponnesus, compre- 
 hended in this peace and alliance, shall con- 
 tinue in the enjoyment of their own laws, their 
 own independence, holding the same territories, 
 doing justice with impartiality and with equity, 
 according to their several forms of law. 
 
 » The Pythian Apollo. This article seems designed 
 to adjust the quarrel about the victim, related in the 
 transactions of the last year. 
 
VEAE XV.J 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 209 
 
 "All confederates of the Lacedsemonians 
 whatever, without Peloponnesus, shall enjoy 
 the same privileges with the LacedsEmonians 
 themselves ; and the Argive confederates shall 
 enjoy the same with the Argives themselves ; 
 each holding their respective territories. 
 
 " If a joint expedition be at any time requi- 
 site, a consultation to be held, by the Lacedse- 
 monians and the Argives, about the determinate 
 and most expedient methods of issuing orders 
 to the rest of the alliance. 
 
 " But, if any controversy arise between the 
 states, either those within or those without 
 Peloponnesus, either concerning their bound- 
 aries or any other point, it shall be deter- 
 mined by judges, 
 
 " And, if any confederate state have a dis- 
 pute with another state, they shall go with a 
 reference, to that state which to the contending 
 states shall be thought most impartial. Private 
 persons, however, to be judged by the laws of 
 that state to which they are subject." 
 
 This peace, and such an alliance, was now 
 perfected ; and the reciprocal damages of war 
 and all other offences were now buried in obliv- 
 ion. And, having already settled all points to 
 general satisfaction, they concnrred in a suf- 
 frage, " to receive no herald nor embassy from 
 the Athenians, till they were withdrawn out 
 of Peloponnesus, and had given up their forti- 
 fications at Epidaurus ;" and farther, " for the 
 future to make neither peace nor war but with 
 joint concurrence." Their attention was also 
 extended to objects more remote ; and in con- 
 junction they despatched ambassadors to the 
 cities in Thrace and to Perdiccas, and seduced 
 Perdiccas to swear adherence to their league : 
 not that he instantly declared his revolt from 
 the Athenians, but he was bent on accomplish- 
 ing it ever since he saw the Argives had done 
 it ; for he was originally descended from Argos. 
 They renewed also their ancient oaths to the 
 Chalcideans, and strengthened them by the 
 addition of new. 
 
 The Argives also despatched an embassy to 
 the Athenians, requiring them to quit the 
 works they had raised at Epidaurus. The 
 latter, sensible that their soldiers were but a 
 handful of men when compared with those 
 who were associated with them in that service, 
 sent Demosthenes to draw them off. He, 
 upon his arrival, pretending to solemnize some 
 martial game without the fortress, when the 
 rest of the garrison was gone out to the spec- 
 34 
 
 tacle, barred fast the gates. And afterwards, 
 the Athenians, having renewed the peace vrith 
 them, surrendered the fortifications they had 
 raised, into the hands of the Epidaurians. 
 
 When the Argives had in this manner gone 
 off from the alliance, the Mantineans also, who 
 at first stood out, finding at length that with- 
 out the Argives they could do nothing of them- 
 selves, thought proper to accommodate their 
 disputes with the Lacedsemonians, and resigned 
 their command over the cities of Arcadia. 
 The Lacedsemonians also and Argives, to the 
 number of a thousand each, marched in com- 
 pany to Sicyon ; where, principally by the 
 presence of the Lacedsemonians, the govern- 
 ment was shifted into the hands of a smaller 
 number. And after transacting such points 
 in concert, they soon procured the demolition 
 of the popular government at Argos ; and an 
 oligarchy, suited to the LacedEemonian model, 
 was erected in its stead. 
 
 As the winter was now in its close, these 
 transactions ran out nearly into the spring; 
 and the fourteenth year of the war expired. 
 
 In the following summer, the Dictideans of 
 Athos revolted from the Athenians to the 
 Chalcideans ; and the Lacedaemonians resettled 
 the state of Achaia, which for a time had been 
 under a management not agreeable to them. 
 
 The people of Argos also, combining gra- 
 dually together and resuming their spirits, made 
 an assault upon the few. They waited for a 
 favourable opportunity, till the festival of the 
 naked games was celebrating at Lacedsmon. 
 A battle was fought within the precincts of 
 Argos, in which the people was the victor; 
 some of their opponents they slew, and others 
 they doomed to perpetual exile. The Lacedse- 
 monians, when their adherents implored their 
 succour, were too dilatory in moving ; but at 
 last they adjourned the games, and marched 
 away to their support; and hearing, when 
 they were come to Tegea, that " the few 
 were vanquished," they determined to pro- 
 ceed no farther, maugre all the entreaties of the 
 new exiles ; but, retreating forthwith to Sparta, 
 they resumed the celebration of the games. 
 Yet, being afterwards attended by deputations 
 from those in Argos, as well as by such as had 
 
 ' Before Christ 420. 
 
210 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book v. 
 
 Deen lately banished, in the presence of the 
 whole confederacy, after many arguments had 
 been urged on both sides, they came to a re- 
 solution, that •<■ the Argives in the city were 
 guilty of injustice ;" and a decree was passed, 
 that " they should march against Argos." 
 But, after all, their proceedings are dilatory 
 and remiss. 
 
 In the meantime, the people of Argos, 
 dreading the Lacedeemonian strength, and re- 
 addressing themselves again to Athens for a 
 renewal of alliance, and proceeding to execute 
 a plan which they thought the strongest ex- 
 pedient of preservation, built long walls quite 
 down to the sea, that, in case they should be 
 blocked up by land, all proper supplies might 
 be thrown into the city by sea, through the good 
 offices of the Athenians. To this scheme of 
 new fortifications some cities also of Pelopon- 
 nesus were privy underhand. The whole body 
 of the Argives without distinction, the citizens, 
 their wives, and their servants forwarded the 
 work; and from Athens they were supplied 
 with carpenters and masons. And here the 
 summer ended. 
 
 Winter now succeeding, the LacedEemonians, 
 when advertised of these new fortifications, 
 march their forces against Argos, their own, 
 and all those of the allies, excepting the Co- 
 rinthian. Some new projects in their favour 
 were now also in agitation within Argos itself. 
 The whole army was commanded by Agis, the 
 son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemo- 
 nians. The new turns they expected for their 
 service took not effect within the city ; but 
 they made themselves masters of the new- 
 erected walls, and levelled them with the 
 ground. They also took Hysiae, a town in 
 Argia ; and having put all the freemen found 
 within that place to the sword, they drew off, 
 and dispersed to their several cities. 
 
 After this, the Argives marched their force 
 into PhUasta ; and, after ravaging that district, 
 because the exiles from Argos had met with a 
 reception there, they again retired : for many 
 of those exiles had taken up their residence at 
 Phlius. 
 
 In the same winter, the Athenians, exaspe- 
 rated against Perdiccas, prevented all man- 
 ner of importations into Macedonia. They 
 charged him " with taking part in the late 
 treaty, confirmed by the sanction of oaths, 
 between the Argives and Lacedajmonians ; 
 that, farther, when they had made great pre- 
 
 parations against the Chalcideans of Thrace 
 and Amphipolis, and Wicias, the son of Ni- 
 ceratus, was appointed to command in that 
 service, he had violated his obligations to act 
 in concert, and that expedition came to no- 
 thing purely through his secession: he was 
 therefore an enemy to Athens." 
 
 The winter expired in this manner ; and 
 with it the fifteenth year of the war came also 
 to an end. 
 
 YEAH XVI.' 
 
 When summer came on, Alcibiades, with 
 twenty sail, arrived at Argos, where he seized 
 three hundred of the citizens, whose fidelity to 
 the Athenians, and adherence to the Lacedse- 
 monian interest, was still suspected ; and these 
 the Athenians secured in the neighbouring 
 island, which were subject to their dominion. 
 
 The Athenians also undertook the reduc- 
 tion of Melos with a naval force, consisting of 
 thirty sail of Athenians, six of Chians, and 
 two of Lesbians ; on board of which were 
 transported twelve hundred heavy-armed Athe- 
 nians, three hundred archers, and twenty who 
 drew the bow on horseback. The number 
 also of their dependents, from the continent 
 and islands, which attended, was about fifteen 
 hundred heavy-armed. The Melians are a 
 colony of the Lacedaemonians, ^ and had there- 
 
 ' Before Chvist 416. , 
 
 a The original of this colony \s curious, according to 
 tlie account given of il by Plutarch. — " When the Tyr- 
 rhenes were masters of Lemnos andlmhrus, and made 
 a practice of ravishing the wives of the Athenians, at 
 Brauron, a mtxed breed was the consequence; whom, 
 as half-barbarians, the Athenians drove out of the isles. 
 Thus exiled, they repaired to Tsnarus, and were use- 
 ful to the Spartans in their war against the Helots. 
 They were afterwards rewarded for their good services 
 with the freedom of Sparta and liberty of intermar- 
 riage. Yet, not being allowed the honour of serving 
 the offices of the state, or a seat in the council, they 
 became afterwards suspected, as caballing together for 
 bad designs, and projecting to overthrow the constitu- 
 tion ; the Lacediemonians therefore apprehended them 
 all ; and, throwing them into prison, kept them con- 
 fined under a strong guard, till they could find out 
 clear and incontestable evidence against them. The 
 wives of the prisoners came in a body to the prison, 
 and, after much prayer and entreaty, were at length 
 admitted by the guard to the sight and discourse of 
 their husbands. When once they had gained acresn, 
 they ordered them immediately to strip, and change 
 clothes with them: to leave them' their own, and, 
 dressed in those of their wives, to maice their escape 
 directly in that disguise. It was done ; the women 
 staid behind, determined to endure whatever might be 
 
VEAK XVI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 211 
 
 fore refused to receive law from the Athenians 
 in the same manner as the inhabitants of the 
 other islands received it. At first, however, 
 they observed a strict neutrality ; but, in pro- 
 cess of time, when the Athenians, by ravaging 
 their country, would have obliged them to act 
 ofifensively, they openly took part in the war 
 against them. 
 
 With a force so strong as hath been de- 
 scribed, Cleomedes, the son of Lycomedes, 
 and Tisias, the son of Tisimachus, landed and 
 encamped upon the island. Yet, before they 
 proceeded to hostilities, they sent a deputation 
 from the army to demand a conference ; whom 
 the Melians refused to introduce into the as- 
 sembly of the people, but, in the presence only 
 of the magistrates and the few, commanded 
 them to deliver their instructions. Upon this 
 the Athenian deputation expressed themselves 
 as followeth: , 
 
 " Since to the people in full assembly we 
 are precluded from speaking, lest the many, — 
 hearing their true interest declared at once by 
 us in a continued discourse, and proved by ar- 
 guments fitted to persuade and too strong to be 
 refuted, — might be wrought into our views, 
 for such, we are sensible, is the plain construc- 
 tion of this our guarded audience by the few ; 
 to you also, who now sit here, we recommend 
 a method of making that point yet more secure, 
 — that, to the reasons we offer, you reserve not 
 your objections for one formal deliberate reply, 
 but, in case we offer any seeming incongruity, 
 you immediately interrupt us, and discuss the 
 point. And tell us, first, whether or not this 
 proposal be agreeable." 
 
 The Melians, who composed the synod, an- 
 swered thus : 
 
 " The candour of such leisurely debate, for 
 mutual information, is not to be disapproved ; 
 and yet there seemeth to be great inconsistency 
 between such candour and those warlike pre- 
 
 the consequence ; and the guards, deceived by ap- 
 pearances, let out the husbands instead of the wives. 
 Tliey marched off and seized Taygeta ; then seduced 
 the Helots to revolt, and promised to support them; 
 which struck a great terror amongst the Spartans. 
 They sent to treat with them, and made up the matter 
 on these conditions : ' that they should have their 
 wives restored safe to them ; should be furnished with 
 iTioney and vessels for removal J and, when settled in 
 another country, should he reckoned a colony and 
 kinsmen of the Lacedarmonians.' — A. lody of them 
 settled some time after in the isle of Melos." Of the 
 firtues of Women. 
 
 parations, with which you no longer intend 
 hereafter, but in present act have already beset 
 us. For we perceive, that hither you are 
 come to be autlioritative judges of your own 
 plea, and that the decision must needs prove 
 fatal to us: since if, superior in debate, wo 
 for that reason refuse submission, our portion 
 must be war ; and, if we allow your plea, from 
 that moment we become your slaves." 
 
 AtHEsiAxs. — " To what purpose thisi If 
 here you are met together to retail your suspi- 
 cions of future events, or to talk of any thing 
 but the proper means of extricating and pre- 
 serving your state from the present and mani- 
 fest dangers which environ it, we had better be 
 silent ; but, if the latter be your purpose, let 
 us come to the point." 
 
 Meiiaits. — " There is reason for it, and 
 there ought to be forgiveness, when men, so 
 situated as we are, are liable to much distrac- 
 tion both in speech and thought. The point 
 for which we are assembled is, it is true, no 
 less than our future preservation : if, therefore, 
 it must be so, let the conference proceed in the 
 method you require." 
 
 Athes. — " As, therefore, it is not our pur- 
 pose to amuse you with pompous details, — -how, 
 after completely vanquishing the Mode, we had 
 a right to assume the sovereignty, or how, pro- 
 voked by the wrongs received from you, we 
 come hither to earn redress, — we shall wave 
 all parade of words that have no tendency to- 
 wards conviction : and, in return, insist from 
 you, that you reject all hopes of persuading us 
 by frivolous remonstrances, — that, as a colony 
 of the Lacedaemonians, you were incapacitated 
 from accompanying our arms, or that wrongs 
 in any shape you have never done us. — But, 
 these things apart, let us lay all stress on such 
 points as may really, on both sides, be judged 
 persuasive : since of this you are as strongly 
 convinced as we ourselves are sensible of it, — 
 that, in all human competitions, equal wants 
 alone produce equitable determination ; and, 
 in what terms soever the powerful enjoin obe- 
 dience, to those the weak are obliged to sub- 
 mit." 
 
 Mel. — « If this be so, we boldly aver, — 
 for, as you have discarded justice from the 
 question, and substituted interest in its place, 
 we must follow the precedent, — that you also 
 it concerneth, we shjould not be deprived of the 
 common privilege of men ; but that to human 
 creatures, ever liable to so dangerous a loss, the 
 
212 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 
 
 pleas of reason and equity, even though urged 
 beyond their exact limitations, should be in- 
 dulged and allowed their weight. And more 
 to you than to others is this proper to be sug- 
 gested, lest, after satiating revenge in all its 
 fury, should you ever be overthrown, you may 
 teach your enemies how you ought to be 
 treated." 
 
 Athen. — '< That aiTecteth us not : for, 
 though to our share an overthrow of empire 
 fall, the event would render us neither abject 
 nor desponding ; because men, inured to en- 
 larged command, as the Lacedsemonians ' for 
 instance, are never terrible to the vanquished. 
 But our contest, at present, is not against the 
 Lacedaemonians. That revenge alone is terri- 
 ble, when subjects tumultuously rebel, and gain 
 the ascendant over such as were once their 
 masters ; and truly, to avert such dangerous 
 extremities, be the care intrusted to us. But, 
 on the present occasion, that we are here for 
 the enlargement of our own power, and that 
 what we have to urge concerneth the preser- 
 vation of the state of Melos — these are the 
 points we are to establish. We are desirous 
 to have our power extended over you without 
 obstruction ; and your preservation to be amply 
 secured for the common benefit of us both." 
 
 Mel. — " And how can it turn out as bene- 
 ficial for us to become your slaves as it will for 
 you to be our masters'!" 
 
 Athes-. — " Plainly thus : — because,, instead 
 of suffering the extremities of conquest, you 
 may merely become our subjects; and we, by 
 exempting you from ^ total destruction, shall 
 gain your service." 
 
 Mel. — " But will not these terms content 
 you : — that we be permitted to persevere in 
 quiet : to be friends to you, instead of ene- 
 mies; but, in regard to war, to be strictly 
 neutral V 
 
 Atheit. — " No : for all your enmity cannot 
 hurt us so much as the acceptance of such 
 friendship from you. The latter, to those over 
 whom we rule, would suggest intimations of 
 our weakness : your enmity is a proof of our 
 power." 
 
 Mel. — " Are your subjects then such sorry 
 judges of equity and right, as to place upon the 
 same level those who are under no manner of 
 tie, and who were never indebted for their 
 settlement to you, and those who, revolting 
 from you, have been again reduced!" 
 
 Atbes . — " Why should they not 1 They 
 
 know such a. sense of things may be well 
 grounded in regard to both ; inasmuch as those, 
 who are exempted from our yoke, owe such 
 exemption to their own superior strength, and 
 if we attack them not, it is the pure result of 
 fear. And hence, the reduction of you, be- 
 sides enlarging our empire, will invest it with 
 more ample security ; especially when, seated 
 on an island, you are bound to submit to the 
 masters of the sea, and to remain henceforth 
 too weak for resistance, unless your are victori- 
 ous at the present crisis." 
 
 Mel. — " Do you then conclude that what 
 we have proposed is incompatible with your 
 own security t — For since, excluding us from 
 the plea of justice, you endeavour merely to 
 persuade us into subserviency to your interest, 
 we also are again necessitated to insist once 
 more on the profitable to ourselves, and, by 
 showing that with our welfare your own also 
 coincideth, endeavour to prevail. — What think 
 you of all those states which now stand neutral 
 in your disputes 1 How will you avoid Iheir im- 
 placable hatred when, terrified at such your 
 usage of us, they must live in constant expecta- 
 tion of your hostilities ? And whither can such 
 conduct tend, but to enlarge the number of your 
 declared enemies, and to constrain others, who 
 never designed to be your foes, to take up arms 
 against you, though to their own regret 1" 
 
 Athes- . — " That never can be : since from 
 states seated on the continent we have nothing 
 to apprehend-; they are under no immediate 
 necessity of guarding their liberty against at- 
 tacks from us. Those alone we dread who 
 are seated in islands ; and who, like you, refuse 
 our government ; or who, having felt the pains 
 of subjection, are irritated against us. Such 
 are most likely to have recourse to violent 
 measures, and to plunge themselves and us into 
 imminent dangers." 
 
 Mel. — " If this be so ; — and if you, yt 
 Athenians, can readily embark into so manv 
 perils to prevent the dissolution of your own 
 empire ; if states, by you enslaved, can do as 
 much to throw off your yoke ; — must it not be 
 wretchedly base and cowardly in us, who yet 
 are free, to leave any method, even to the last 
 extremity, untried, of averting slavery V 
 
 Athejt. — " If you judge of things as wise 
 men ought, we answer — Not. For the poin 
 in which your are at present concerned, is not a 
 trial of valour upon equal terms, in order to 
 escape the reproach of cowardice ; but your 
 
TEAK XVI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 213 
 
 deliberations proceed at present about the 
 means of self-preservation, that you may not 
 be obliged to encounter those who must by far 
 overpower you." 
 
 Mei. — "But we, on the contrary, know, 
 that the enterprises of war have sometimes very 
 different events to those which superiority of 
 numbers gave reason to expect ; and, in regard 
 to ourselves, that, if we yield at once, eternal 
 despair must be our fate ; but, by acting reso- 
 lutely in our own defence, we may yet enter- 
 tain a hope of success." 
 
 Athew, — " Hope in this manner is ever 
 applied to be the solace of danger. .4.nd truly, 
 in situations which can afford to be disap- 
 pointed, though ever prejudicial, it is not al- 
 ways fatal. But such as idly lavish their last 
 resource, their very all, upon hope, (for it is 
 prodigal by nature,) are only by their own ruin 
 convinced of its delusion ; nay, when its delu- 
 sion is thus by sad experience discovered, and 
 men should guard themselves against it, it will 
 not yet let go its hold in the human heart. 
 Choose not, therefore, so fatal a resource for 
 yourselves in your present destitute situation, 
 hanging as you are on the very brink of ruin. 
 Let not your conduct resemble the foolish be- 
 haviour of^ the mob of mankind ; who, though 
 by human means their safety might be earned, 
 yet, when calamity hath chased away all visible 
 hopes of redress, betake themselves to .others 
 of a darker cast, to divinations and to oracles, 
 and all such vain expedients as hope suggesteth 
 to draw them to their destruction." 
 
 Mel. — " Difficult indeed, as we apprehend, 
 and you well know, the contest must prove to 
 us against your strength and fortune, matched 
 as we are so unequally together. Yet the 
 confidence still supporteth us, that in fortune, 
 since of divine disposal, we shall not be in- 
 ferior, as with innocence on our side we stand 
 against injustice ; that, farther, our deficiencies 
 in strength will be amplified by the addition of 
 Lacedaemonian aid ; since it is incumbent upon 
 them to support us, if from no other motive, 
 yet from the ties of blood and a sense of 
 honour. And thus it is not entirely without 
 good grounds that we can form the resolution 
 to withstand your efforts." 
 
 Athew. — " Nor have we any reason to ap- 
 prehend, on our own account, that the divine 
 benevolence will not equally exert itself for us ; 
 because neither our opinions nor our acts are 
 worse than those of the rest of mankind, either 
 
 in regard to the worship of the gods or an a{- 
 knowledgment of their providence. For of the 
 divine nature we think like the rest of the 
 world ; and of men, that beyond a scruple they 
 are impelled,^ by the necessary bent of their 
 nature, to seize dominion wherever they have 
 power. As for ourselves, we were not the 
 authors of this constitution, nor were we the 
 first who digested it into practice. We found 
 it already in force ; we have accordingly applied 
 it, and shall leave it behind us (or the practice 
 of every future age ; conscious that you your- 
 selves, and every other state, invested with 
 equal power, would make the same exertion of 
 it. And truly, so far as relateth to the gods, 
 we have no more reason to distrust their pro- 
 tection than our neighbours. But your senti- 
 ments of the LacedGsmonians are such, that you 
 are confident of support from them because it 
 will be base in them to refuse it. Here we 
 bless your simplicity, but envy not <your folly. 
 The Lacedaemonians, we allow, amongst one 
 another, and in paying all due regard to the 
 laws of their country, give ample proofs of 
 honour and virtue : but their behaviour towards 
 the rest of mankind, though it would open a 
 large field of censure were it to be minutely 
 examined, yet at present shall be shown by one 
 concise declaration, — that according to the best 
 lights we have been able to collect, they repute 
 as honourable the things which please them, 
 and as just the things which promote their in- 
 terest. Such maxims are not in the least con- 
 ducive to your preservation : it is all chimera." 
 
 Mei. — " No. We ground our hopes of relief 
 from them upon their own cle^r conviction of 
 what their interest enjoineth them. This never 
 can suffer them to entertain a thought of 
 abandoning the Melians, who are a colony of 
 their own ; of being faithless to the states of 
 Greece, who wish them well ; or of promoting 
 the schemes of the common foe." 
 
 Athes. — " Of consequence you imagine, - 
 that their interest is connected with youi se- 
 curity ; that the duties of justice should inhoii 
 our be observed, though attended with dangers. 
 But these are maxims which the LacedaimO'- 
 nians, least of all men, have resolution enough 
 to observe in, fact." 
 
 Mei. — " We have the strongest grounds to 
 imagine, that in our defence they will hazard 
 any dangers, from a sense that their own pre* 
 servation dependeth more on us than any other 
 people, as we are finely situated for doing them 
 i3 
 
214 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book v. 
 
 service in Peloponnesus, and in affection are 
 more faithfully attached to them through the 
 bands of consanguinity." 
 
 Atiien. — " But the certainty of obtaining 
 succour in the intervals of need seemeth not to 
 depend so much on the merit of those who im- 
 plore it, as on the consciousness of superior 
 strength in those who are implored to give it : 
 a maxim this, to which no state adheres so 
 strictly as the Lacedfemonian, Hence, ever 
 through a diffidence of their own domestic 
 force, they never dare even to invade their 
 neighbours without the concurrence of numer- 
 ous allies. There cannot, therefore, be the least 
 room to expect, that they will transport an 
 aid into an island whilst we are masters of the 
 sea." 
 
 Mei. — " Not perhaps of their own forces ; 
 but they have confederates enough to employ 
 in this service. The sea of Crete is wide and 
 spacious ; a passage through it, even the lords 
 of the sea will find it more difficult to obstruct, 
 than those who are intent on stealing it, to 
 effect with safety. Or, grant they miscarry in 
 the attempt, at worst they can make a diversion 
 upon your territory, or against the remainder 
 of your dependents who escaped the efforts of 
 Brasidas. And then your attention and your 
 arms must be drawn from a quarter where you 
 have no right to fix them, for the necessary 
 defence of your own home and your own ap- 
 pendage." 
 
 Athek. — " Though such turns may inter- 
 vene, your own experience should teach you to 
 distrust them : for you are not, cannot be ig- 
 norant, that the Athenians never yet would 
 condescend to raise a siege through hostile 
 dread. But we cannot avoid observing, that, 
 in the whole course of this debate, though de- 
 clared by you to be held as the means of your 
 preservation, you have not so much as started 
 one single point upon which wise men can pre- 
 sume to fasten the least confidence of redress. 
 Your firmest security is placed in the faint hope 
 of some distant contingencies ; but your pre- 
 sent strength is merely trifling against the ex- 
 tensive scope of your antagonists. Nay, vic- 
 tims you must fall to your own absurd pre- 
 sumptions, unless, when we are once withdrawn 
 to give you time to consult, yon determine to 
 try some other expedient. You will then no 
 longer be controlled by that sense of shame, 
 which, when dishonour glareth before and dan- 
 
 ger presseth on, precipitateth men into ruin. 
 Tor though they see, with their eyes quite 
 open, into what an abyss they are going to 
 plunge, yet to avoid the imputation of what- 
 the world styleth dishonour, — so prevalent is 
 the force of one bewitching sound ! — though 
 vanquished by it, they scorn to yield to reason, 
 wilfully embarrassing themselves with incura- 
 ble calamities, and contracting a more shame- 
 ful weight of dishonour, through their own mad 
 obstinacy, than fortune could award them. 
 Such consequences, you are now concerned by 
 mature deliberations to avoid. You are next 
 to reflect, that no shame can attend your plying 
 under the force of a most formidable state ; a 
 state which dcsigneth to make the moderate 
 demands alone, — that you would accept her al- 
 liance, and securely enjoy your territory upon 
 the condition only to pay her tribute ; and, 
 when war or safety are left to your own op- 
 tion, that you would not peevishly prefer the 
 worse. For those are the men to maintain 
 themselves in credit and prosperity, who never 
 suffer their equals to insult them, who pay 
 proper regard to their superiors, and towards 
 their inferiors behave with moderation. Re- 
 flect on these points whilst we withdraw ; and 
 remember, again and again, that your country 
 now calleth for ail your prudence, since, by the 
 single deliberation of this single day, as either 
 it taketh a prosperous or sinister turn, her fate 
 will be determined." 
 
 Here the Athenians withdrew from the con- 
 ference ; and the Melians, after being some 
 time alone, and resolving finally to reject what 
 they had already refused, gave in their answer 
 thus: 
 
 " We continue, Athenians, in the very same 
 sentiments we have already declared. We 
 shall not in an instant of time abandon that 
 liberty which, in the free possession of our 
 own state, we have enjoyed for the space of 
 seven hundred years; which still we shall 
 spare no endeavours to preserve, intrusting it 
 to that fortune which, by divine permission, 
 hath hitherto preserved it, and to that redresn 
 we expect from human aid and the Lacedse- 
 monians. But thus much again we offer : — 
 to be friends to you, enemies to neither, on 
 condition you quit our lands, after an accom- 
 modation ratified between us to our reciprocal 
 satisfaction." 
 
 The Melians in this manner delivered their 
 
YEAS. XVI.] 
 
 final answer. Bat the Athenians, the very 
 moment they quitted the place of conference, 
 uttered tliemsclves thus : 
 
 "You, Melians, alone of all mankind, are 
 the persons, so far as we can j udge, who re- 
 gard future contingencies as an over-balance 
 for instant dangers, and, through mad presump- 
 tion, value things yet invisible as really actual. 
 But, the greater your dependence, the more 
 rash your confidence upon Lacedsemonians, 
 upon fortune, and upon hope, the more abun- 
 dantly f ital your delusions will prove." 
 
 -4nd, this said, the Athenian deputation re- 
 turned to their camp. 
 
 But the Athenian commanders, upon this 
 refusal of submission from the Melians, applied 
 themselves instantly to the acts of war ; and, 
 dividing the work in shares to the several 
 parties in their army, completely shut up the 
 Melians in a line of circumvallation. And, 
 when this was perfected, and a suificient num- 
 ber, both of the Athenians and their depen- 
 dents, were appointed to slay behind and con- 
 tinue the blockade both by land and sea, they 
 departed with the bulk of their forces. Those, 
 farther, who were left for this service, staid 
 behind and continued the blockade. 
 
 About the same time, the Argives, making 
 an irruption into Phliasia, and caught in an 
 ambuscade laidifor them by the Phliasians, and 
 their own exiles, were slaughtered to the num- 
 ber of eighly. 
 
 The Athenians, by their excursions from 
 Pylus, committed many depredations on the 
 Lacedffimonians. But these had not influence 
 enough upon the Lacedaemonians to cause a 
 renunciation of the peace, or a renewal of the 
 war. They only proclaimed, that, " their peo- 
 ple had free leave to make reprisals on the 
 Athenians." 
 
 The Corinthians also had a war with the 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 215 
 
 Athenians, on account of some private differ* 
 enecs between them ; but the rest of Pelopon- 
 nesus interfered not in the quarrel. 
 
 The Melians, forther, assaulting it by night, 
 carried that part of the Athenian circumvalla- 
 lation which lay close to their market. 'J'hey 
 slew the guards who were posted there ; and, 
 having gained a conveyance into the town for 
 provisions, and all necessary stores they could 
 procure by money, they afterwards withdrew, 
 and discontinued all efforts of resistance : but 
 the Athenians took care for the future to 
 place a stronger guard upon their works. And 
 here the summer ended. 
 
 In the winter which followed, the Lacedse- 
 monians drew out their forces in order to begin 
 an expedition into Argia ; but, when the vic- 
 tims offered on the frontiers boded no success 
 to the expedition, they again withdrew. Yet 
 the Argives, as such an invasion had been in- 
 tended against them, suspected it was owing 
 to the intrigues of a faction within their city ; 
 some of whom they immediately secured, but 
 the rest escaped by flight. 
 
 About the same time also, the Melians 
 carried another part of the Athenian circum- 
 vallation, as the party by which it was guarded 
 was not numerous. But, upon such distur- 
 bances, a strong reinforcement was sent from 
 Athens, under the command of Philocrates, 
 the son of Demeas.- The Melians were now 
 closely invested on all sides ; and, some schemes 
 to betray the town being in agitation amongst 
 them, they thought proper to make a volun- 
 tary surrender. This they did " at the dis- 
 cretion of the Athenians ;" who put to, death 
 all they found within the place able to bear 
 arms, and made the women and children slaves. 
 The town they afterwards re-peopled by send- 
 ing thither a colony of five hundred. 
 
THE 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 BOOK VI. 
 
 The Athenians resolve on the expedition to Sicily. Description of tliat island. — Year XVII. The debate in 
 the assembly of the people at Athens about the expedition. The generals nominated with full powers. The 
 affair of tlie Mercuries. Departure of the grand fleet for Sicily. Proceedings at Syracuse. The Athenian 
 fleet arrives on the coast of Italy, Alcibiades recalled, to take his trial about the Mercuries and profanation 
 of the Mysteries. A digression, — containing the true account of a former revolution at Athens, begun by 
 Harmodius and Aristogiton. Alcibiades tlies, and is proclaimed a traitor. The Athenians land at Syracuse. 
 A battle ensues, in which the Athenians are victorious ; but, soon after, they return to Catena. The negotia- 
 tions at Camarina. Alcibiades at Sparta. — XVIII. The Athenians land again at Syracuse, take Epipola: by 
 surprise, and begin to invest Syracuse in form. Battles ; The Athenians carry on their works ^ counterwork 
 of the Syracusans. Aid sent to Syracuse from Peloponnesus, under the command of Gylippus ; he arrives at 
 Tarentum. The Athenians, by openly joining the Argives against the Lacedfcmonians, violate the treaty 
 of peace in Greece. 
 
 Ijf the same winter the Athenians came to a 
 resolution, to make a second expedition against 
 Sicily, with a larger force than had been sent 
 thither heretofore, under Laches and Buryme- 
 don, and to attempt its total reduction. The 
 bulk of the people was, in truth, ignorant of 
 the largeness of the island, and of the multitude 
 of the Grecians and Barbarians by whom it 
 was inhabited; ignorant, farther, that they 
 were going to embark in a war, not much less 
 considerable than the Peloponnesian. 
 
 The compass of Sicily is little under eight 
 day's sail for a trading vessel ; and, though it 
 be so large, it is severed froin the main land, 
 so as not to be part of the continent, by a gut, 
 in breadth about twenty stadia.' The manner 
 in which it was inhabited in the earliest ages 
 was this ; and the several nations which pos- 
 sessed it these. 
 
 The Cyclops and Lestrigons are said to be 
 (he most ancient inhabitants of some part of 
 this country ; but, from what stock they were 
 derived, or from whence they came hither, or 
 what is become of them since, I have nothing 
 
 1 About two miles. 
 
 35 
 
 to relate. Poetical amusements must here suf- 
 fice, or such information as every man picks up 
 for his own use. 
 
 The Sicanians appear to be the first people 
 who, next those, inhabited this country ; though, 
 according to their own accounts, they are prior ; 
 because they claim to themselves the original 
 tenure : but, according to the truest discoveries, 
 they are found to have been Iberians, who 
 were compelled to remove from the banks of 
 the Sicanus, in Iberia, by the Libyans. And 
 from them, at that time, this island received 
 the name of Sicania, having before been called 
 Trinacria. They continue, to this day, to in- 
 habit the western parts of Sicily. 
 
 .\fter the taking of Troy, some of the Tro- 
 jans, who had escaped the Achaeans, arrive in 
 their vessels upon the SiciUan shore, and, form- 
 ing a settlement adjacent to the Sicanians, 
 •they all took jointly the name of Elymi ; and! 
 their cities were Eryx and Egesta. They were 
 also increased by the accession of some Phocians 
 from Troy, who, having first been driven to 
 Libya by a storm, passed over afterwards from 
 thence into Sicily. 
 
 The Siculi passed over first into Sicily froDV, 
 
 an 
 
218 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VI. 
 
 Italy, for there they originally dwelled. They 
 fled before the Opici ; and as the story is told, 
 not without probability, having observed how 
 the current set within the strait, and seized a 
 favourable gale they crossed over upon rafts, 
 and perhaps by some other methods. There 
 are, even to this very day, a people in Italy 
 called Siculi ; and that region, in a similar 
 manner, obtained its name of Italy from a cer- 
 tain Arcadian king, who bore the name of Ita- 
 lus. These, crossing into Sicily with formid- 
 able numbers, and vanquishing the Sicanians 
 in battle, drove them into the southern and 
 western parts, caused the name of the island 
 to be changed from Sicania to Sicily, settled 
 themselves in, and kept possession of, the rich- 
 bst tracts in the country, since their passage 
 hither was near three hundred years earlier than 
 the landing of any Grecians in Sicily, Nay, 
 they continue, to this very day, in possession 
 of the midland and northerly parts of the is- 
 land. 
 
 The Phojnicians also had settlements quite 
 round the coast of Sicily. They secured the 
 capes on the sea and the small circumjacent 
 isles, for the sake of trafficking with the Sici- 
 lians. But when the Grecians, in considerable 
 numbers, began to cross over and fix their 
 residence here, the Phoenicians abandoned their 
 other settlements, and, uniting together, seated 
 themselves at Motya, and Soloeis, and Panor- 
 mus, near to the Elymi ; secure of their own 
 continuance in these quarters from their friend- 
 ship with the Elymi, and because, from this 
 part of Sicily, the passage to Carthage is ex- 
 ceeding short. — So many were the barbarians 
 seated in Sicily ; and such the order of their 
 settlements. 
 
 The first Grecians who came hither were 
 : the Chalcideans of Eubcea. Thucles led the 
 colony which settled at Naxus, and erected the 
 altar of Apollo the Guide, which is still to be 
 seen without the city ; and on which the depu- 
 ' tations, sent from hence to the oracles, offer 
 sacrifice before they begin their voyage. 
 
 In the year following, Archias, a Corinthian, 
 of the race of Hercules, founded Syracuse, 
 having previously expelled the Sicilians out of 
 that island on which the inner city is seated, 
 though now no longer washed round about by 
 the sea. And, in process of time, the upper 
 city also, being taken in by a wall, became ex- 
 ceeding populous. 
 
 In the fifth year after the foundation of 
 
 Syracuse, Thucles and his Chalcideans sallied 
 forth out of Naxus ; and having, by force of 
 arms, drove away the Sicilians, they build 
 Lcontium, and afterwards Catana. But the 
 Cataneans themselves declared Evarchus their 
 founder. 
 
 About the same point of time, Lamis also, 
 leading a colony from Megara, arrived in Sicily, 
 and planted them on a spot called Trotilus, 
 upon the river Pantacias. But, removing 
 afterwards from thence to Reontium, he asso- 
 ciated himself a short time with the Cataneans 
 for the protection of his party ; yet, being 
 ejected by them, and then having founded 
 Thapsus, he dies. His followers, upon this, 
 removed from Thapsus ; and Hyblon, a Sici- 
 lian king, betraying another place into their 
 hands, and becoming himself their conductor, 
 they settled those Megareans who are called Hy- 
 bliean ; and, after a continued possession of two 
 hundred and forty-five years, they were expelled 
 out of their city and territory by Geloh, tyrant 
 of the Syracusans. Yet, before this ejectment, 
 about a hundred years after their settlement 
 there, they had sent out Pammilns, and built the 
 city of Selinus. Pammilus had come thither 
 more lately from Megara, their mother city, 
 and assisted them in making this new settle- 
 ment at Selinus. 
 
 Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Entimos 
 from Crete, each loading a separate colony, 
 founded Gela in conjunction, in the forty-fifth 
 year after the foundation of Syracuse. The 
 name of this new city was taken from the 
 river Gela : yet the spot where the city now 
 stands, and which was first walled round, is 
 called Lindii. But their polity was framed 
 upon the Doric model. 
 
 In the hundred and eighth year, as near as 
 possible, after this last settlement, the Geloans 
 built Acragas, giving the city its name from the 
 river Acragas. They declared Aristonous and 
 Pystilus to be its founders, and gave it the civil 
 institutions of Gela. 
 
 Zancle was originally founded by a band of 
 pirates, who arrived there from Cyme, a 
 Chalcidic city in Opicia; though afterwards 
 a numerous reinforcement from Chalcis and 
 the rest of Eubcea joined them, and possessed 
 that district in community. The founders 
 were Perieres and Cratasmcncs ; one of them 
 from Cyme, the other from Chalcis. But the 
 name of Zancle was first of all given it by the 
 Sicilians, because in shape it bears a resemblance' 
 
YEAR XVI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 219 
 
 to scythe, and the Sicilians call a scythe zan- 
 clum. But, ill process of time, these people were' 
 driven from thence by the Saraians and other 
 lonians, who flying from the Modes, had land- 
 ed in Sicily. And, after a short interval, An- 
 oxilas, tyrant of the Khegians, ejected the 
 Samians, repeopled the city with a number of 
 mixed inhabitants, and changed its name to 
 Messene, in honour of the country from whence 
 he was originally descended, Himera also was 
 founded from Zancle by Euclides, and Simus, 
 and Sacon. Into this colony came also a very 
 numerous body of Chalcideans. Some exiles 
 farther from Syracuse, who had been worsted 
 in a sedition, and were distinguished by the 
 title of Miletidse, took up their residence 
 amongst them. Hence their .dialect became- a 
 mixture of the Chalcidic and the Doric ; but 
 the Chalcidic model obtained in their civil in- 
 stitutions. 
 
 AcKB and CasmensE tvere founded by the 
 Syracusans ; Acrce seventy years after Syra- 
 cuse, and CasmenJE near twenty after Acrse. 
 Camarina also was first founded by the Syra- 
 cusans, very nearly one hundred and thirty-five 
 years after the building of Syracuse ; its founders 
 were Dascon and Menecolus. But the Cam- 
 arineans being afterwards driven out by the 
 arms of the Syracusans, because of a revolt, in 
 process of time Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, 
 received the lands of the Camarineans as a ran- 
 som for some Syracusan prisoners of war, and 
 taking upon himself to be their founder, 
 replanted Camarina. Yet once more, again it 
 was demolished by Gelon; and replanted a 
 third time by the same Gelon. So many 
 nations of Greeks and Barbarians inhabited 
 Sicily. 
 
 An island so large and so populous the 
 Athenians were passionately bent on invading. 
 Their truest and final view was, to compass 
 its total reduction ; but the pretext, alleged for 
 a colour, was their readiness to succour such 
 as by blood were related, or by prior alliances 
 had been attached, to them. An Egestean em- 
 bassy, now residing at Athens, laboured the 
 point, with all possible industry, and with ex- 
 traordinary earnestness pressed them to engage 
 in it. For the Egesteans, who bordered upon 
 the Selinuntians, had been embroiled in a war 
 with the latter, about some connubial points, 
 and a certain tract of land to which both laid 
 claim. The Selinuntians, farther, assisted by 
 their Syracusan allies, pressed hard upon them 
 
 both by land and sea. And hence, the Eges- 
 teans were now suggesting at Athens, that 
 " they ought not to forget their alliance with 
 the Leontines, made by Laches in the former 
 war;" requesting farther, that a naval force 
 might be sent thither for their succour. To 
 this purpose many other arguments were al- 
 leged by them, but the principal was this : " If 
 the Syracusans, who have overthrown the 
 Leontines, be left in the unmolested enjoyment 
 of their conquest, and proceed still farther to 
 destroy the remaining parties of that alliance, 
 they will get into their hands the whole power 
 of Sicily. Such an event would be attended 
 with the utmost danger ; lest in consequence 
 of it, as they were Doric by descent, they 
 might think themselves bound by the ties of 
 blood to assist with a powerful armament their 
 kindred Dorians, and, in quality of colonies, 
 might succour those Peloponnesians by whom 
 they were originally planted, and thus form a 
 combination to demolish the Athenian empire. 
 In policy, therefore, the Athenians were 
 obliged to support the allies who yet remained, 
 in order to make head against the Syracusans ; 
 and this the more readily, as they themselves 
 would undertake to furnish them with sums of 
 money equal to the exigencies of the war," 
 With such discourse the Athenians were fre- 
 quently entertained in their popular assemblies, 
 as the Egestean ambassadors, still urging their 
 point, had gained many advocates to second 
 their arguments. And at length it was decreed, 
 that " ambassadors shpuld be previously des- 
 patched to Egesta to inspect the state of their 
 wealth, whether they had such sums as they 
 talked of in the public treasury and the tem- 
 ples ; and also to draw up a report of the pre- 
 sent posture of their war against the Selinun- 
 tians. And, in pursuance of this, the ambas- 
 sadors from the Athenians were sent to Sicily. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians, in the same winter, 
 joined by their allies, those of Corinth excepted, 
 and marching into Argia, ravaged a small part 
 of that territory, and carried off the corn, hav- 
 ing brought carriages for that purpose. They 
 also removed the Argive exiles to Ornea, and 
 left them a small detachment from their main 
 army for the security of their persons, A 
 temporary truce being also made, during which 
 the OrneatK and Arq;ives were to abstain 
 from all hostilities against one another, they 
 drew off the army to their respective homes. 
 
 However not long after this, the Athenians 
 
220 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VI. 
 
 arrived with thirty sail of ships and six 
 hundred heavy-armed. The Argives in con- 
 junction with the Athenians, took the field 
 with all their strength, and besieged those in 
 Ornca for the space of a day. But, as at 
 night the besiegers removed to a distance in 
 order for repose, those of Ornea made their es- 
 cape. On the day following, the Argives, 
 when sensible of their escape, levelled Ornea 
 with the ground, and then withdrew. And 
 afterwards the Athenians re-embarked for 
 Athens. 
 
 The Athenians also threw in by sea a party 
 of horsemen into Methone, a frontier town of 
 Macedonia. With these, consisting of their 
 own citizens and such Macedonians as had re- 
 fuged among them, they harassed the counti-y 
 belonging to Perdiccas. But the Lacedtemoni- 
 ans sent a summons of aid for Perdiccas to the 
 Chalcideans of Thrace, who kept terms with 
 the Athenians by truces renewed every tenth 
 day : these however refused to march. Thus 
 ended the winter, and with it the sixteenth 
 year of the war, of which Thucydides hath 
 compiled the history. 
 
 TEAK xvn.' 
 
 Ri the succeeding summer, very early in the 
 spring, tlie Athenian ambassadors returned 
 from Sicily, accompanied by the Egesteans. 
 They brought sixty talents of unooiried silver, 
 being a month's pay for sixty sail of ships, the 
 equipment of which for succour they were in- 
 structed to solicit from the Athenians. Upon 
 this, an assembly of the people was called, and 
 the reports of the Egestean and their own am- 
 bassadors were received, consisting of many 
 points, specious indeed, but false in fact ; and, so 
 far as related to their treasure, that " sums ample 
 enough are already reposited in their temples 
 and their public treasury." In consequence of 
 this, a decree was made that " a fleet of sixty 
 ships should sail for Sicily ; the commanders, 
 Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, Nicias, the 
 son of Niceratus, and Lamachus,^ the son of 
 
 ' liefore Christ 415. 
 
 « liamachua, the third in this commission, seems to 
 I:ave been picked out for the command for the peculiar 
 c^mstitution of his own character, which was a proper 
 mean between the cautious and phlegmatic disposition 
 of Nicias and the fiery impetuous ardour of Alcibiades. 
 Ife was now (according to Plutarch) a brave old expe- 
 rienced officer. In his youth he had been remarkable 
 for heat and fire; a length of service and years mellowed 
 biit) into the right temper, to deliberate beforehand, and 
 
 Xenophanes, to be invested with full powers 
 to act at their own discretion. The whole 
 armament to act as an aid to the Egesteans 
 against the Selinuntians ; to replace also the 
 Leontines in their former habitations, if the 
 state of the war gave them leisure to execute 
 that service ; and to manage all other points in 
 Sicily as they s]iould judge most beneficial for 
 the Athenian interest." 
 
 But the fifth day after this, another assembly 
 of the people was held upon the ways and 
 means to expedite the equipment of the fleet, 
 and by proper decrees to supply the command- 
 ers, with what might be requisite to accelerate 
 their departure. Nicias, who against liis will 
 had been named for a commander, was per- 
 suaded that the public determinations were 
 rash and premature, sijice, on short examina- 
 tion, and motives merely specious, they were 
 bent on the total reduction of Sicily, — an ar- 
 duous undertaking! now therefore he stood 
 up ; and, having a mind to stop proceeding.s, 
 he advised the Athenians as follows : 
 
 " I am aware that the present assembly is 
 held to concert the means of expediting our 
 preparations, and to get all in readiness for the 
 expedition to Sicily. But, in my sentiments, 
 we ought once more to resume the considera- 
 tion of the previous point, ' Whether upon the 
 whole it be advisable to equip out such a fleet ;' 
 and not, by rash and premature resolves on 
 points of such vast importance, through too 
 easy compliance with foreign solicitations, to 
 embroil ourselves in an unnecessary war. For 
 my own part, truly, I am invested with honour 
 by the present measures, and no man upon 
 earth is so little, anxious about his own person- 
 
 then gallantly to carry the point into execution. But 
 then, he wanted the means of properly supporting the 
 authority and dignity of his post. He was now ranked 
 with two of the most wealthy and'noble Athenians; 
 whereas his own condition was low ; nay, he was (ac- 
 cording to Plutarch) so exceedingly poor, tliat before he 
 went to any foreign command, lie was used to petition 
 the state for a little money to furnish him out. and even 
 to buy him some .shoes. Mr Wass, in his notes on 
 Thucydides, refers us for his character to a comedy of 
 Aristophanes, (The Acharnians;) that is, to inquire 
 after the character of a plain blunt officer from a pro- 
 fessed droll, or to seek truth from him who ridiculed all 
 mankind. Aristophanes hath represented Lamaclius 
 as a vain-glorious roaring bully, a mere thing of arms, 
 a creature of verbal pomp and parade ; contrary to 
 all the truth of history. Writers who live by turning 
 great and good men into ridicule, should nev^r be 
 reckoned good evidence as to the truth and reality of 
 characters, when history dissents. 
 
VEAR XVU.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 221 
 
 al safety. But at the same time I pronounce 
 that person to be a valuable member of the 
 public, who makes use of all his prudence to pre- 
 serve his own life and property : for such a one 
 purely for his own private benefit, must be desir- 
 ous that the public welfare flourish and abound. 
 But, however, neither in the preceding assem- 
 blies could the pre-eminence of honour award- 
 ed to me bias me to speak in contradiction to 
 my judgment: nor shall it bias me at present; 
 but what I think tends most to the public good, 
 that only shall I utter. 
 
 " I am also sensible, that what I can urge 
 may have but little influence on Athenians' 
 tempers, when I attempt persuading you to se- 
 cure what you already possess, and to hazard 
 the present for things invisible and future : but 
 that your eagerness is quite unseasonable ; and 
 that the ends which you too sanguinely propose 
 are not easy to be accomplished ; these things 
 I shall clearly demonstrate. 
 
 " To this purpose I aver, that, if the in- 
 tended expedition proceeds, you are going to 
 leave many enemies behind you here, and to 
 take the most certain method of fetching hither 
 more numerous opponents. You imagine, 
 perhaps, that the late peace will be firmly and 
 constantly observed ; though it is merely a no- 
 minal peace, and that only so long as you remain 
 inactive. Nay, such it hath been made by the 
 conduct of some even of our own community. 
 And, should any considerable force of ours 
 have the unhappiness to sink under hostile 
 efforts, our old enemies will be suddenly upon 
 us ; since merely by calamities they were re- 
 duced to an accommodation, and, in a manner 
 more disgraceful to themselves than to us, were 
 necessitated to treat. In the next place, we 
 have found, that in the treaty itself many arti- 
 cles are still controverted. There are, farther, 
 divers states, and those by no means the weak- 
 est, who have not accepted the accommoda- 
 tion ; but, on the contrary, are still in arms 
 against us ; whilst others are inhibited merely 
 by ten-day truces, and that only because the 
 Ijacedasmonian measures are hitherto pacific. 
 But suddenly, perhaps, when once they find 
 our strength divided, the very measure into 
 which we are now precipitating ourselves, 
 they may fall upon us in a general combination 
 augmented by the strength of Sicily, whose 
 accession to their former confederacy they 
 would have bten glad to purchase at any price. 
 On these possibilities we are bound sedately to 
 
 reflect, that we may not plunge a state, so high- 
 ly exalted, into superfluous dangers, nor fondly 
 covet to wrest their empire fVom the hands 
 of others before we have adequately ensur- 
 ed our own, since the Chalcideans of Thrace, 
 though so' many years are now elapsed since 
 they first revolted, arc not yet reduced ; and 
 some other states on the continent render us 
 only a precarious obedience. 
 
 « Yet — ' to the Egesteans, our old allies, 
 who are injuriously oppressed, we are bound in 
 honour to send a most speedy succour.' — And, 
 ill the meantime, we continue to defer aveng- 
 ing ourselves upon tKose whose revolt from us 
 is of long standing now, and whose injustice 
 we are still obliged to sufifer. Though the 
 latter, could we once bring them back to their 
 duty, we might easily control for the future : 
 but the forjner, should we ever become their mas- 
 ters, remote and numerous as they are, we should 
 not without difficulty be able to awe. It must 
 be madness, therefore, to invade that people, 
 whom, though conquered, you can never retain 
 in their obedience ; and who, in case the attempt 
 against them miscarry, will for the future be 
 much more disaffected towards you than they 
 were before that attempt was made. 
 
 " But it is farther my real opinion, that the 
 Sicilians, as their affairs are now circumstan- 
 tiated, would become less formidable to us, if 
 once reduced to the Syracusan yoke ; — and yet 
 on this remote contingency the Egesteans have 
 chiefly insisted, in order to alarm us. Perhaps 
 now it may come to pass, that its single states 
 may combine against us to gratify the Lacedse- 
 monians ; but, in the other case, it is quite im- 
 probable that a united empire would hazard 
 its own welfare to demolish another. For if, 
 acting from a political precaution, they may 
 side with the Peloponnesians to overturn our 
 empire, those very Peloponnesians may proba- 
 bly, from the same principle, concur with us to 
 demolish the Sicilian. As for us, the Gre- 
 cians there may have reason to dread us most 
 if we go not at all amongst them ; and, what 
 is next to that, if we only give them a sight 
 of our power for a short time, and then with- 
 draw. But if, acting offensively, we incur mis- 
 carriage, they will instantly despise us, and 
 join our neighbouring foes to annoy us here. 
 For things that are placeil most remotely from 
 us, as likewise those which yield no opportunity 
 of adjusting our opinion of them by experience, 
 such, it is universally known, are most apt tii 
 3A 
 
222 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR- 
 
 [book VI. 
 
 excite admiration. Reflect, ye citizens of 
 Atliens, that your present elevation of spirits 
 is owing to your success against tlie Lacedse- 
 monians and allies. You crouched for fear 
 under their first attacks ; till, having gained the 
 superiority over them, to their utter disappoint- 
 ment, you instantly despised them. And now, 
 nothing less than Sicily can content you. We 
 by no means ought to be too much buoyed up 
 by the disasters of our foes, but only to be so 
 far confident as we are able to awe their in- 
 triguing tempers. We ought to ascribe no other 
 view to the Lacedsemonians, than a vigilant care 
 to seize the first opportunity of wiping off their 
 disgrace by giving us a blow, and thus recover- 
 ing their former reputation ; and that they are 
 most earnest on accomplishing this, since, from 
 time immemorial, the glory of military valour 
 hath been their warmest, most prevailing pas- 
 sion. Our welfare therefore, if we knew in 
 what our welfare consists, by no means sum- 
 mons us to enter the lists in behalf of the 
 Egesteans of Sicily, who to us are mere bar- 
 barians ; but to exert oar utmost vigilance to 
 guard our own constitution from oligarchical 
 encroachments. 
 
 " My duty obligeth me also to remind you, 
 that we have had but a short respite to breathe 
 from the havoc made amongst us by pestilence 
 and war, and to repair the prodigious waste of 
 our fortunes and our lives. These, according 
 to all the rules of equity, should be reserved for 
 our own domestic exigencies, and not to be lav- 
 ished away on a set of fugitives, who implore our 
 protection, and are bound in interest to tell 
 specious falsehoods ; though, whilst plunging 
 their neighbours into hazards, they have no- 
 thing but words to contribute ; and, should we 
 redress 'them, know not how to be grateful; 
 but, in case we miscarry in the attempt, must 
 involve their friends in their own destruction. 
 
 " If there be, farther, a person, who, ele- 
 vated with his own designation to the command, 
 incites you earnestly to sail ; heedful of nothing 
 but his own private views, nor qualified by his 
 years for so important a trust ; if his passion 
 be merely to excite admiration for his fine 
 breed of horses, or, by the- gains of his com- 
 mission, to repair the havoc of his fortune 
 caused by prodigality ; I conjure you to afford^ 
 no such person an opportunity to make a splen- 
 did figure at the expense of your country ; but 
 rest convmced, that men of sucli a turn will be 
 corrupt in public office, as thty are bad econo- 
 
 mists in private life ; that the enterprise in 
 hand is a very arduous trust, far beyond such 
 measures or such exploits as a stripling can 
 devise or execute. 
 
 " I own myself intimidated by that crowd of 
 youths who sit by this person and abet his . 
 schemes. I am hence obliged to implore the 
 men of years and experience, who happen ^o 
 sit near them, by no means to dread that ap- 
 pearance of pusillanimity, which, in case this 
 decree of war be revoked, might be objected to 
 them ; by no means to indulge the same raw 
 passions by which boys are actuated, so as to 
 doat upon remote contingencies. You, gentle- 
 men, by experience are convinced, that success 
 exceedingly seldom results from hot and san- 
 guine presumption, but most frequently from 
 calm and prudent deliberation. In behalf, 
 therefore, of your country, which is now on 
 the brink of more critical dangers than ever it 
 was known before, hold up your hands in op- 
 position, and support what I am going to move ; 
 namely, — That 'the Sicilians, confining them- 
 selves within their present limits,' which we do 
 not pretend to abridge, with free navigation 
 along the coast of the Ionian gulf, and trans- 
 acting their own affairs at large through the 
 whole extent of the Sicilian seas, be at liberty 
 to take care of their own concerns without any 
 molestation :' — and, in particular, to return the 
 Egesteans the following answer : — ' Since, 
 without the privity of the Athenians, they have 
 already involved themselves in a war against 
 the Selinuntians, let them also, without the 
 concurrence Of the Athenians, bring it to a 
 conclusion : that, moreover, we shall form no 
 alliance for the future, as hath formerly been 
 the case, with men whose indirect behavioui 
 we must be forced to abet, though, when we 
 stand in need of reciprocal assistance from 
 them, we shall get none at all.' 
 
 " And you, sir, who at present preside in 
 this assembly, if your are conscious that it is 
 your duty to superintend the public welfare, if 
 you are desirous to behave like a worthy patriot^ 
 put the question, and call upon the Athenians 
 once more to give their votes. And, in case 
 you are afraid to act contrary to order, in pro- 
 posing what is counter to a former decree ; 
 reflect that, when so great a crowd of witnesses 
 are at hand to justify the step, you only act 
 the part of a physician to your country, which 
 hath swallowed down pernicious counsels ; and 
 that the best dischargeth the duty of firsi 
 
V'EAR XVII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 223 
 
 tnEigistrate, who will render to his country all 
 the service he is able ; at least, with his eyes 
 open, will never suffer it to be hurt." 
 
 In this manner Nicias delivered his senti- 
 ments. But the far greater part of the Athe- 
 nians who were present declared for the 
 expedition, and against the repeal of what had 
 been already decreed. Some however there 
 were, who made a fruitless opposition. 
 
 The person who showed most ardour, and 
 pressed them most earnestly to proceed, was 
 Alcibiades, the son of Clinias ; partly from a 
 resolution to oppose Nicias, with whom, in 
 other political points, he generally clashed, and 
 because he had calumniously glanced at him in 
 his speech ; but, principally, because he was 
 ambitious of being at the head of this expe- 
 dition. He presumed, that not Sicily only, 
 but Carthage also, might be reduced by him- 
 self ; and, when he should be the author of so 
 great a success, that he must needs abound in 
 wealth and glory. His credit was great, at 
 present, amongst the citizens ; but the warmth 
 of his passion threw him into larger expenses 
 than his fortune could support, being sump- 
 tuous in every article of life, and especially in 
 horses. And it was chiefly by him that the 
 final overthrow of Athens was at length oc- 
 casioned. For the bulk of the city, alarmed 
 at the groat irregularity of his private life, the 
 excessive luxury of his dress and diet, as also 
 at that greatness of spirit which ho showed in 
 every single branpli of his conduct, turned out 
 enemies to him as a. man who affected the 
 tyranny. And though, when in public com- 
 mands, he conducted the war with the utmost 
 bravery, yet, at home, each single citizen was 
 chagrined at his manners, and displaced him to 
 make room for others, which soon drew after 
 it the subversion of the state. Upon this 
 occasion, therefore, Alcibiades stood up, and 
 advised the Athenians as follows : 
 
 " Yes ; to me, ye citizens of Athens, in pre- 
 ference to others, this command is due; — for 
 with this I must needs begin, since on this 
 point Nicias hath attacked me ; — and I also 
 judge myself deserving of the trust. In re- 
 gard to those things which have caused me to 
 be so loudly censured ; those very things give 
 splendour to my ancestors and to myself, and 
 are of public emolument also to my country. 
 The great magnificence I displayed at the 
 Olympic solemnities hath raised in the Gre- 
 cians an idea of Athens far beyond its actual 
 
 strength ; though, previous to this, they enter- 
 tained the hope of being able totally to war her 
 down. For I am the man who brought seven 
 chariots thither, more than any private person 
 ever furnished out before ; who carried off the 
 first, and the second, and the fourth prize; 
 and, in all other respects, supported my quality 
 as a victor. Such things, it must be owned, are 
 declared to be honoured by the laws of Greece ; 
 and, whenever achieved, they leave a high opin- 
 ion of power behind them. The splendid 
 figure I have made at home, whether in exhi- 
 biting entertainments for the public, or any 
 other method of munificence, may naturally 
 excite the envy of Athenians, but are to stran- 
 gers instances of our grandeur. And that man's 
 extravagant spirit is not useless to the public, 
 who, at his own private expense, does service 
 not merely to himself, but to a whole commu- 
 nity. Nor can it imply injustice, for a person 
 whose sentiments are generous and exalted, to 
 soar above the ordinary level ; since, should he 
 afterwards be reduced to a state of depression, 
 no man is to share in his reverse of fortune. 
 As therefore in calamity we are not to expect 
 even civil salutations, let others in the mean- 
 time submit, as in justice they ought, to that 
 assuming behaviour which prosperity inspireth ; 
 or, at least, let equality of demeanor be first 
 shown by him who demands it as a debt from 
 another. I am indeed aware, that persons of 
 such uncommon elevation, and all in general, 
 who, in some splendid qualities, outshine the 
 crowd, must, so long as they live, be the objects 
 of spleen, chiefly to those who claim equality 
 with thSm ; and, in the next place, to those 
 amongst whom they are conversant ; and yet, 
 to succeeding generations, they leave an ambi- 
 tion of claiming affinity to them, though quite 
 groundless and chimerical ; and to their country, 
 whatever it be, the haughty boast, that they 
 were not aliens, were not pffenders, but citi- 
 zens of its own growth, .and patriots of true 
 renown and worth. Of such reversionary hon- 
 ours I own myself ambitious ; and, in order to 
 succeed in the pursuit, have ever rendered my 
 name illustrious in private life ; and, as to my 
 public behaviour, reflect, Athenians, whether 
 I am inferior to any person whatever, in per- 
 forming good services to my country. For I 
 am the person, who, without throwing you into 
 hazard or expense, have brought the strongest 
 powers of Peloponnesus to act in your concur- 
 rence ; who reduced the Lacedsemonians to 
 
224 
 
 PELOPONNRSIAN WAR. 
 
 [book vj. 
 
 stake their all upon the fortune of one day at 
 Mantinea. It is true they came off victorious 
 from the contest ; but have not even yet so far 
 resumed their spirits as to dare to act offen- 
 sively. 
 
 " Such are the exploits which my greener 
 years, nay even that unnatural giddiness im- 
 puted to me, hath achieved ; which, by insinua- 
 ting language, hath made the Peloponnesian 
 strength to ply before it, and, giving energy to 
 my frantic humour, hath now persuaded the 
 world that it is no longer to be dreaded, 
 whilst, therefore, I flourish in this manner, 
 whilst Nicias yet continues to be esteemed 
 fortunate, lay hold of that service we are each 
 of us able to perform ; and by no means repeal 
 the decree of our expedition to Sicily, as if in- 
 tended against a people we are not able to en- 
 counter. 
 
 " For in Sicily the cities swarm with crowds 
 of promiscuous, disunited inhabitants ; inhabi- 
 tants for ever used to sudden revolutions and to 
 perpetual fluctuations. And hence, not one of 
 those crowds is equipped with such arms as are 
 requisite to defend a native soil, or to secure 
 even personal safety ; nor is the region sup- 
 plied with the needful stores of resistance. It 
 is the habit of each, either to execute his pur- 
 pose by artful language, or to wrest it from 
 the public by sedition. These are all his 
 resources ; and, if they fail, at the worst, he 
 barely shifts his habitation. It is therefore 
 improbable that a rabble, so jumbled together, 
 will ever be unanimously guided by one con- 
 certed plan, or combine together for its just 
 execution. Each moment they will be veering 
 about to such expedients as happen most to 
 soothe their caprice ; and the more, upon ac- 
 count of these seditions, in which, we are in- 
 formed, they are already embroiled. 
 
 " Their number of heavy-armed, ii must 
 also be observed, is not so large as the pom- 
 pous accounts of fame have made it ; nor does 
 the sum total of the Grecians amongst them 
 turn out so considerable as each city hath 
 computed for her own. But Greece, in this 
 manner ever addicted most terribly to belie 
 her own numbers, hath been found, in the 
 present war, scarce able to provide herself with 
 arms. 
 
 " Such, according to the best informations I 
 have been able to collect, is the present con- 
 dition of affairs in Sicily. Nay, there are 
 means within our reach still more to facili- 
 
 tate its reduction. For we shall obtain tlio 
 concurrence of many barbarians seated there, 
 who, from inveteracy against the Syracusans, 
 will join us to attack them. Neither can any 
 obstacles accrue from the situations of our af- 
 fairs nearer home, if you only view it in the 
 just and proper light. 
 
 " The bravery of our fathers, though oppos- 
 ed by the very same enemies, who at present, it 
 is urged, should we sail for Sicily, must be left 
 behind us, though opposed by all the power of 
 the Mede, erected this our empire, by the solo 
 resource of their superiority in naval power 
 The Peloponnesians, farther, have never had 
 less hopes of being a match for us than at this 
 very juncture, even though their strength be in 
 all its maturity of vigour. It is true, they have 
 it ever in their option to make inroads into oui 
 dominions, even though we wave this expedi- 
 tion ; but, at sea, they never can be able to 
 hurt us : the fleet we shall leave behind will 
 be amply sufficient to make head against them. 
 
 "By what plausible arguments, therefore, 
 can we excuse our behaviour, should we now 
 pusillanimously desist 1 what evasion can we 
 find to deny our confederates the succour they 
 demanded 1 We are bound in honour, by the 
 oaths we have sworn, to undertake their redress. 
 Unavailing is the pretext, that they have done 
 such good offices for us. Our alliance with 
 them was not made on the condition of their sail- 
 ing hither to bring us succour, but of giving such 
 full employ to our enemies there, as might ef- 
 fectually deter them from coming hither. The 
 ready road to empire, as not Athenians only, 
 but every people who have risen to a summit of 
 power, by experience know, is ever to succour 
 those who implore our protection, whether 
 they be Greeks or barbarians. For, had it 
 been the constant method to cherish indolent 
 inactive measures, or minutely to litigate who 
 in justice ought to be protected, the enlarge- 
 ment of our empire had been but trifling, or 
 rather we had been liable to the loss of our 
 original portion. For a state invested with 
 superior power is not only openly opposed in 
 the field, but recourse is had to every precau- 
 tion to prevent their appearance in it. Neither 
 is it in our power to prescribe exact or arbi- 
 trary limitations to our own empire ; but wo 
 are by necessity compelled to cabal against 
 some, and with a high hand to keep others in 
 subjection ; because, should we relax our com- 
 mand over others we endanger our own autho' 
 
YEAR XVII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 225 
 
 ity, and those we will not awe may become 
 our masters. Nor, farther, ought peace to 
 be so much the object of regard to you as it 
 is to other people, unless you new-model your 
 government, and render it conformable to that 
 of your neighbours. 
 
 " Weigh therefore these arguments ; and be 
 convinced, that thus only our interest is capable 
 of any considerable advancement, — if we pro- 
 ceed against Sicily, and execute the expedition 
 in order to deject the haughty Peloponnesian 
 spirit, by so plain an instance how much we 
 despise them, how little fond we are at present 
 of this inactive interval, and how eager to be- 
 gin again with a Sicilian voyage. And, by 
 acting thus, there is probabiUty on our side, 
 that, in case we subdue the people there, we 
 may gain the sovereignty over all Greece ; or, 
 at worst, we shall depress the Syracusan power : 
 the latter point alone will be an important ser- 
 vice to ourselves and our allies. But, in case 
 any measure of success attends us, our ships 
 will enable us to secure our acquisitions, or at 
 worst our departure ; for, though the whole 
 body of the Sicilians combine together against 
 us, we shall be absolute masters of our own 
 retreat. 
 
 " Let not therefore the words of Nicias, 
 calculated merely for the service of sloth, and 
 to raise dissensions between the young and the 
 old, disconcert your plan. But let the usual 
 decorum take place, observant of which our 
 forefathers, at whose consultations both the 
 seniors and the youths assisted, exalted this 
 state to its present height ; and do you now, 
 adhering to the established practice, endeavour 
 its farther exaltation. Remember also, that 
 youth and age, if debarred one another's reci- 
 procal assistance, lose all their influence and 
 weight; that, on the other hand, from the 
 wildness of youth, and the moderation of the 
 middle-aged, and the consummate prudence of 
 the old, when tempered harmoniously together, 
 the most perfect strength must infallibly result ; 
 that a state, which supinely gives way to sloth, 
 like other things, for want of exercise must in- 
 fallibly droop and pine away, and the whole of 
 her skill grow old and obsolete ; but, when 
 inured to uninterrupted conflict, it is continually 
 improving by practice, and will, gain a perfect 
 habit of surmounting every obstacle ; not by a 
 parade of word.s, but by active perseverance. 
 
 " Upon the whole, I am firmly convinced, 
 that a state which hath been accustomed to full 
 36 
 
 employ, must soon droop into destruction if it 
 resigns itself to sloth ; and that such persons 
 take the best method of infallibly securing their 
 welfare, who adhere most steadily to their pre- 
 sent customs and laws, though possibly better 
 might be substituted in their stead." 
 
 In this manner Alcibiades spoke. And the 
 Athenians, moved by his arguments, — which 
 were also seconded by the entreaties of the 
 Egestean and Leontine exiles, who, standing 
 forth in the assembly, implored their protection, 
 and, reminding them of their oaths, adjured 
 them to redress their wrongs, — declared for the 
 expedition with a warmer zeal than at any 
 time before, Nicias was convinced by this, 
 that whatever dissuasion he could allege would 
 be quite incapable to change their resolves. 
 Yet as possibly, by a minute detail of the 
 immense preparations he was going to demand, 
 he might cause them at once to change their 
 sentiments, he stood up again, and re-addressed 
 them as follows : 
 
 " I perceive, Athenians, that your resolu- 
 tions are fixed on this expedition beyond the 
 power of dissuasion ; and may its event be 
 such as your wishes portend ! But I shall once 
 more beg leave to communicate to you my own 
 sense of the aflair. 
 
 " According to the best informations I have 
 been able to procure, we are now going to in- 
 vade a number of powerful cities, cities inde- 
 pendent of one another, nor standing in need 
 of public revolutions, which people who cringe 
 under the yoke of slavery might readily embrace, 
 in order to render their condition more sup- 
 portable. Nor is it, farther, to be presumed, 
 that they will readily exchange their own 
 liberty for subjection to us, as they are numer- 
 ous, at least for one island, and many of them 
 inhabited by Grecians. For, without reckon- 
 ing Naxus and Catana, which I hope, upon 
 account of their affinity to the Leontines, will 
 side with us, there are no less than seven pro- 
 vided in all respects with as good martial 
 habiliments and stores as our own armies; 
 and more particularly those against which we 
 chiefly bend our course, Selinus and Syracuse. 
 These cities abound with soldiers heavy- 
 armed, with archers, and with darters. They 
 have a great number of triremes, and plenty 
 of hands to man them. They possess a 
 large quantity of wealth, not onTy in pri- 
 vate purses, but in their public treasuries. 
 So rich are even the Selinuntians. An'u to 
 2a2 
 
220 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VI. 
 
 the Syracusans, farther, a tribute is paid 
 by several barbarians. But the points in 
 which they most of all eicel us, are, that nu- 
 merous cavalry of which they are possessed, 
 and corn of their own growth sufficient to an- 
 swer all demands without foreign importations. 
 An armament, therefore, simply naval, will by 
 no means be sufficient to cope with such a 
 strength. A large land force must accompany 
 the naval, if we are desirous of performing 
 such achievements as may be worthy the great- 
 ness of our plan, and would not be debarred an 
 opportunity of landing by their numerous 
 cavalry. And this will be yet more needful, 
 should the cities, alarmed at our approach, 
 combine together against us, and no other 
 friends but the Egesteans join us, or supply us 
 with a body of cavalry sufficient to countenance 
 our landing. It would be a terrible disgrace, 
 should we be compelled by force to give over 
 our design, or to send for a larger supply, as if 
 our counsels at first setting out were rash and 
 ill-concerted. We must steer at once against 
 them with preparations in all respects well- 
 proportioned to the design, since we know that 
 we are bound to a land far remote from our 
 own, and are under many disadvantages to 
 grapple with our foes. It will not be now 
 your employment to march to the relief of your 
 dependents seated near to Athens against a 
 hostile invasion, where all the needful supplies 
 would be brought to your camp out of the 
 territories of friends : but you are to roam to a 
 distant climate, where you cannot call one inch 
 of ground your own, and from whence, in the 
 four winter months, you will scarcely be able to 
 send a messenger to Athens. 
 
 " In my opinion, therefore, it is incumbent 
 upon us to carry thither large parties of heavy- 
 armed, to be raised out of our own citizens, our 
 allies, and our dependents, and an additional 
 strength of Peloponnesians, if we are able to 
 procure it by persuasion or by pay. Our 
 archers and slingers must be also numerous, 
 that we may be able to make good our descent 
 in spite of the Sicilian horse. We must also 
 be attended by superwimerary vessels, that we 
 may be enabled with greater ease to fetch in 
 necessaries for our army. We must also carry 
 with us from Athens, in our tenders, a great 
 quantity of com, such as wheat and barley, 
 parched ; with bakers, some of whom, for 
 certain wages, must be obliged to grind, that, 
 if our armament lie any where weather-bound. 
 
 we may not stand in need of the necessaries of 
 life ; for so numerous as we must be, it wi.l 
 not be possible for every city to receive us. 
 All other provisions must be laid in by ourselves 
 to the utmost of our power, and we must trust 
 for nothing to the care of others. 
 
 " But what concerns us most is, to carry 
 from hence a fund of money as ample as we 
 can raise. As for that which the Egesteans 
 pretend is already laid up for our use, conclude 
 it to be so only so far as words are current. 
 For, unless we set out from Athens, not barely 
 provided as well as those we are to encounter. 
 — but, equality in strength for battle alone ex- 
 cepted, in all other respects far surpassing 
 them in every needful appointment, — we shall 
 hardly be able to reduce who are to be reduced, 
 or even to protect who are to be protected. 
 We should regard ourselves in the character of 
 people who arc going to seek a new settlement 
 among aliens and enemies ; and, as such, are 
 necessitated to render themselves victors of the 
 spot the very day they land ; or to rest assured, 
 if they then miscarry, that the whole of that 
 region will be in arms against them. Of this 
 I own myself afraid ; against this I am con- 
 vinced that by repeated consultations we ought 
 timely to provide ; and, after all, must trust 
 still farther to the goodness of our fortune, 
 hazardous, as we are but men. Yet hence, I 
 should be glad to set out in this enterprise with 
 as little occasion as possible to rely on uncer- 
 tain fortune, and to be amply provided with 
 every expedient for a successful expedition ; 
 for these, to my apprehension, are the readiest 
 means to secure the public welfare, and the 
 safety of us who are destined for the voyage. 
 But, if any man thinks my reasons chimerical, 
 I am ready to resign my command to his supe- 
 rior abilities." 
 
 In this manner Nicias delivered himself, 
 with a view, if possible, to discourage the 
 Athenians from proceeding, by so vast a de- 
 mand of articles requisite to the design ; or at 
 least, that, in case he must be obliged to under- 
 take the service, he might set out with such 
 ample expedients of security. 
 
 Yet all this bulky and embarrassing de- 
 mand of appointments could not raise in 
 the Athenians the least aversion to the ex- 
 pedition, but rather fastened their eagerness 
 upon it more intensely than ever ; and Nicias 
 prevailed on that side of the question where he 
 hoped to have been defeated. It was now 
 
VKAK XVII.] 
 
 TELOrONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 universally agreed, that his advipe was just and 
 proper ; and, if obeyed, the expedition must 
 be attended with all imaginable security. All 
 ranks of men were now equally seized with a 
 fondness for the voyage ; for such as were ad- 
 vanced in years were confident that a career of 
 success must attend the enterprise, and that so 
 formidable an armament could not possibly 
 miscarry ; the younger sort were animated 
 with the desire of seeing so remote a clime, 
 and gratifying at large the curiosity of their 
 tempers, assured that safety would attend their 
 course ; the bulk of the populace and the sol- 
 diery in general were pleased with their present 
 assignment of pay, and the hope of enlarging 
 dominion, which would afford them perpetual 
 employ and subsistence. The passions of the 
 generality were for these causes so vehemently 
 elated with the project, that such as could by 
 no means approve were afraid to oppose it by 
 a vote, lest they might be censured as men who 
 malevolently opposed the. public glory. And 
 by this, all opposition was effectually quashed. 
 
 At length, a Certain Athenian, standing 
 forth from amongst the crowd, and calling 
 aloud upon Nicias, told him, " he must no 
 longer cast about for evasions, nor meditate 
 delays; but declare expressly now, in the 
 presence of them all, the particulars of the 
 preparations which the Athenians should vote 
 him." 
 
 Nicias, though sorry at his heart, was ob- 
 liged to reply, that, " in order to be exact he 
 ought to consult more leisurely with his col- 
 leagues. But, so far as he could judge in this 
 sudden manner, they ought to set out with a 
 fleet consisting of at least one hundred tri- 
 remes ; that the Athenians themselves ought 
 to furnish as many transports for heavy-armed 
 soldiers as was possible, and to send for an 
 additional number from their dependents ; that 
 the number of heavy-armed, both of Athenians 
 and dependents, should at least be live thou- 
 sand, and, if possible, more ; that to these the 
 rest of their preparations should be propor- 
 tioned, such as archers to be levied at home, 
 and procured also from Crete, not forgetting 
 slingers; and, in fine, that whatever should be 
 judged ill any degree expedient should be pro- 
 vided in good time, and carried along with them 
 in the fleet." 
 
 This the Athenians had no sooner heard, 
 than they instantly voted, " that the generals 
 were invested with absolute authority, to de- 
 
 termine the numbers of the expedition, and the 
 whole procedure of the voyage, at their own 
 discretion, as might best promote the public 
 welfare." 
 
 In pursuance of this, the preparations were 
 immediately in hand. Summonses for the 
 quotas adjusted were sent to their dependents, 
 and the levies at home went briskly forwards. 
 Athens was now finely recovered from the 
 pestilence and a long-continued destructive 
 war ; both in a multitude of young men now 
 arrived at the vigour of their age, and an in- 
 crease of the public revenues by favour of the 
 peace. 13y this means all the needful supplies 
 were more easily provided ; and thus were the 
 Athenians busied for the present in fitting out 
 their armament. 
 
 But, at this very juncture, almost all the 
 statues of Mercury, wherever found within the 
 precincts of Athens, and according to the 
 established custom they were very numerous, 
 both in the porches of private houses and the 
 public temples, '**»** had their faces dis- 
 figureij in the space of one night. The au- 
 thors of this outrage were not known ; but 
 large rewards were offered by the state in order 
 to discover them, and a decree was also passed 
 that, " If any person knew of the commission 
 of any other impiety of the same nature, he 
 should boldly inform the public of it, whethei 
 he were a citizen, or a foreigner, or a slave." 
 
 This accident in truth made a deep impres. 
 sion on their minds. For it was construed as 
 a bad omen in regard to the expedition in hand, 
 and as an evidence of some terrible combina- 
 tion to introduce innovations and an overthrow 
 of the democracy. 
 
 An information was at length given in by 
 some sojourners and their footmen, relating 
 indeed not at all to the Mercuries, but to 
 the defacements of other images committed 
 formerly by some young men in a frolicsome 
 and drunken mood ; and now, farther, " they 
 
 1 1 have omitted two words in tlie original, because 
 I c;innot translate tliem with any precision or clearness. 
 They are y, -nT^xyaivo; ^eyxtrtx^ opua qnadratum^ say? 
 one Latin translator ; opus ex lapide tjuadrato, says 
 another. Mr Hobhes Iiath it. Mercuries of square stone; 
 how such a descriplion can be appEicahle lo a statue 
 will be hard to conceive. Whether they allude to the 
 inclopure in which the statues were erected, or to the 
 form of the pedestals, or whether a Mercury was carved 
 on any or all the sides of a square stone, I am not able 
 to decide. The Mercuries were very numerous; and 
 many ofthem, it is certain, were strange, uncouth, and 
 very bungling performances. 
 
228 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VI. 
 
 had celebrated the mysteries' in private houses 
 by way of mocltery ;" and amongst others they 
 also accused Alcibiades. The party most in- 
 veterate against him caught readily at this 
 charge. As he was the main obstacle to the 
 advancement of their own popularity and cre- 
 dit, they concluded, that, in case they could 
 rid themselves of him, they might at once 
 become leaders of the state. Hence they 
 aggravated the charge, and bellowed aloud, 
 that " those mystic frolics, and the deface- 
 ments of the Mercuries, struck at the very 
 foundations of the democracy ; and that none 
 of these outrageous acts had been committed 
 without his participation." They alleged, as 
 a circumstance that corroborated the charge, 
 the whole tenor of his behaviour, flagrantly 
 licentious, and quite inconsistent with a demo- 
 cratical constitution. - 
 
 Alcibiades endeavoured forthwith to clear 
 himself the best he could from all appearances 
 of guilt, and declared himself ready, before he 
 entered upon the voyage, to submit to a trial, 
 (for the armament was now almost completed,) 
 and, if proved to be guilty, to suffer the penal- 
 ties of law ; and only, if acquitted, fo take 
 upon him the commanej. He conjured them, 
 farther, " to receive no calumnious accusations 
 against him in his absence ; but if he was 
 really guilty, to put him instantly to death ; — 
 that, in common prudence it could not be 
 justified, to intrust to « person, so heavily 
 charged, with the command of so large an ar- 
 mament, before his innocence had been regu- 
 larly explored." 
 
 But his enemies — apprehensive that, in case 
 he was brought to an immediate trial, he would 
 be supported by all the favour of the soldiery ; 
 and that the people, whose idol he was, might 
 possibly relent, because in compliment to him 
 the Argives and some of the Mantineans ac- 
 companied the expedition, — opposed and put 
 off the prosecution. They put the manage- 
 ment of this point into the hands of a set of 
 orators, who urged that " for the present he 
 might proceed in his voyage, that the expedi- 
 
 > The sacred mysteries celebrated by the Athenians 
 at Eleusis. Plutarch relates, that the informers were 
 brought in by one Androclee, a demagogue, a virulent 
 foe of Alcibiades. They deposed, that one Theodorus 
 acted the part of the crier, Polytion of the torch-be.Trer, 
 Alcibiiides that of the hierophant, and many of bis 
 intimates assisted and were initiated in solemn and 
 formal mockery. 
 
 tion ought not to be deferred on his account, 
 and upon his return a day should be assigned 
 for his trial." Their design was to gather 
 more heavy matter against him, which in his 
 absence could be more easily effected, and then 
 to recall him and force him to his trial. In 
 short, it Was resolved that " Alcibiades should 
 go the voyage." 
 
 Things being thus determined, and the year 
 now advanced to the middle of summer, the 
 fleet set sail for Sicily. Orders had been 
 issued before for the bulk of the confederates, 
 and victualling-ships, and small craft, and all 
 the tenders in general, to repair to, and assem- 
 ble together at Corcyra ; that, from thence, 
 in a body, they might cross the Ionian to the 
 cape of Japygia. But such as were subjects 
 of Athens, and such of the confederates as 
 were then in the city, marching down to the 
 Piraeus on the appointed day by morning's 
 dawn, went on board the ships in order to 
 weigh and be gone. They were conducted 
 thither by a great crowd, it may be said by the 
 whole crowd of Athens, both citizens and 
 strangers. The former attended, to perform 
 the parting decorums where their several at- 
 tachments claimed it ; some to their friends, 
 some to their relations, some to their own 
 sons. The whole company moved along with 
 a medley of hope and lamentation ; with hope, 
 that success would attend their course ; with 
 lamentation, lest they might never meet again. 
 The sad recollection occurred — to how great a 
 distance from their native soil they were going 
 to be sent ! and now that the hour of departure 
 was come, and when this moment they were 
 going to be dismissed into scenes of danger, 
 the impressions of terror were felt with much 
 keener sense than when the expedition was 
 only decreed. However, at the sight of their 
 present strength, of the numerous expedients 
 of a prosperous enterprise which their eyes 
 beheld, their spirits were again elated. 
 
 As for the strangers and bulk of the crowd, 
 they attended merely for the pleasure of gazing 
 at the means intended to accomplish a great 
 and stupendous design. For never did any 
 one state of Greece, before this time, equip by 
 its own strength such a powerful armament. 
 It was the finest and most glorious fleet that 
 to this day the world had seen. It is true, in 
 number of ships and heavy-armed on board, 
 that which sailed against Epidaurus under 
 command of Pericles, and that also againr 
 
VEAR XVII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 229 
 
 Potidsea under Agnon, were by no means infe- 
 ior. For those- carried four thousand heavy- 
 armed soldiers, all native Athenians, with three 
 hundred horsemen : the number of their triremes 
 was a hundred ; fifty more were furnished by 
 the Lesbians and Chians, besides a large num- 
 ber of confederates who attended those expedi- 
 tions. But then they were fitted for a voyage 
 in comparison trifling, and in a slight and pe- 
 nurious manner. 
 
 On the contrary, the present equipment was 
 calculated for a length of time, and completely 
 fitted out for both services, as occasion might 
 demand, either of the sea or of the land. The 
 shipping, at the great expense of the captains 
 of the several triremes and of the state, was 
 quite elaborate. The pay assigned by the 
 public to every mariner was a drachma' a-day. 
 The number of new ships for the battle and 
 chase was sixty ; that of transports for the 
 heavy-armed, forty. The several captains of 
 the triremes were very choice in making up 
 their crews, and gave to such of the mariners 
 as rowed on the uppermost bench, and to the 
 sailors, a gratuity out of their own pockets over 
 and above the public pay. They had farther 
 adorned their vessels with images and all'kind 
 of sumptuous decorations. It was the high 
 ambition of every single captain, to have his 
 own ship excel all the rest of the fleet in splen- 
 dour and in swiftness. 
 
 The land-force was distinguished by the 
 choiceness of their levies and their arms ; and 
 all the individuals vied with one another in the 
 goodness of their accoutrements and equi- 
 page whatsoever. It happened also on the 
 same account that a warm contention was 
 kindled amongst them, under what officers 
 they should be ranged ; and opportunity afford- 
 ed, to the rest of Greece, to construe the whole 
 into a mere ostentation of their power and opu- 
 lence rather than an effective equipment against 
 a foe, For, were a computation to be formed, 
 both of the public disbursements of the state 
 on this occasion, and the private expenses of 
 the whole soldiery ; — of the state, what prodi- 
 gious sums they had already advanced, and what 
 additional sums the generals were to carry 
 along with them ; — of the soldiery, what each 
 had expended on his own equipage, every cap- 
 tain on the decoration of his vessel, and to how 
 much greater charges he was still liable; — 
 
 without taking into the account the vast list of 
 necessaries which, over and above the public 
 allowance, each private person was obHged to 
 lay in for so long a voyage, or the goods which 
 a soldier or trader might take with him on 
 board for the sake of traffic ; — the amount of 
 talents now carried out of Athens would turn 
 out exceeding large. 
 
 Nor was it merely for the strangeness of the 
 enterprise or the splendour of its show, that 
 the armament was noised abroad, but also for 
 the numerous force with which it was provided 
 to attack the foe ; for the remoteness of the 
 voyage, great as ever they had undertaken from 
 their native clime, and that prodigious expecta- 
 tion which was raised of the event ; in order 
 to which the state had now exerted itself quite 
 beyond its strength. 
 
 When the whole force was got on board 
 the fleet, when the stowage of all necessary 
 stores and all baggage whatever was completely 
 adjusted, silence then was proclaimed by sound 
 of trumpet : but the solemn prayers for a suc- 
 cessful expedition were not offered from every 
 vessel apart, but in behalf of all united, by the 
 voice of a herald. The goblets mingled with 
 wine ran the circle of the whole armament and 
 every crew as well as the commanders poured 
 out the libations, and drank success and happi- 
 ness out of gold and silver cups. The whole 
 crowd that stood upon the beach, both of citi- 
 zens and such strangers as were there and 
 wished them prosperity, joined with them in 
 the public prayer. And now, the psean being 
 sung and the libation finished, they put out to 
 sea.^ After moving off at first in a line ahead, 
 
 a Many incidfints are related by Plutarch, in the life of 
 Nicias, in regard to the denunciations of the priests 
 against this expeilition, the coiningand wresting of ora- 
 cles both for and against it, and omens which portended 
 nothing but misfortune. Mere human foresight, and a 
 consciousness, that the means were not equal to the end 
 proposed, gave the wisest apd steadiest part of the 
 Athenian community a sad apprehension, of the event. 
 Socrates constantly declared against it; and assured his 
 friends, it would draw after it the destruction of the 
 state: this his presentiment, soon became the public 
 talk. Meton, the Astronomer, who was named to a 
 post of high rank in the expedition, feigned himself 
 mad and set Ijis house on fire. Others deny that cir- 
 cumstance of his counterfeiting madness; and say, he 
 set his house on tire by night, and appeared next morn. 
 ing on the forum in an abject manner, and begged ol 
 his fellow-citizens, in order to comfort him under so 
 great a misfortune, to excuse bis son, who was to have 
 commanded a trireme, from going the voyage. An 
 incident, farther, at the very time of the departure of 
 
230 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book vr. 
 
 each vessel made afterwaTds the best of her 
 way to ^gina. And this armament made all 
 possible haste to reach Corcyra, where the force 
 of their allies by which they were to be joined 
 was already assembled. 
 
 Though the intelligence of such an in- 
 tended invasion had been brought to Syracuse 
 from several quarters, yet for a long course of 
 time they would yield no credit to its truth. 
 Nay more, when an assembly was convened, 
 such speeches as follow were made by different 
 persons ; some believing the accounts received 
 in relation to this armament of the Athenians ; 
 others pronouncing them absolutely false. On 
 this occasion Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, 
 standing forth in the assembly, and as one con- 
 vinced in his own mind that all such accounts 
 were true, addressed and advised his country- 
 men thus : 
 
 " It will probably be my own fate, as it hath 
 been the fate of others, to be disbelieved, when 
 I epeak of this intended invasion as a matter of 
 truth and certainty. And I also know, by ex- 
 perience, that both those who vent and those 
 who retail such accounts of things as seem in- 
 credible, are so far from effectually persuading, 
 that they generally incur the imputation of 
 madness. Yet no such apprehensions shall in- 
 timidate or strilce me dumb, when such a 
 weight of danger hovers over my country; 
 when in my own heart I am convinced, that I 
 am more clearly enlightened on the point than 
 any other person whatever. 
 
 " For I assert that to be a matter of the 
 highest certainty, which you hear only with a 
 fit of stupid surprise, that the Athenians have 
 already set sail against us with a numerous 
 force both for the service of the sea and the 
 land. The pretext alleged by them is, execu- 
 tion of treaties with the Egesteans and the 
 restoration of the Leontines ; but the true mo- 
 tive is their ambition to enslave Sicily, and 
 above all this our own Syracuse, which if once 
 reduced, they are well assured that nothing will 
 be able afterwards to give a check to their 
 
 the grand fleet, gave many persons vast concern. The 
 women were then celebrating the rites of Adonis, in 
 which many representatfons of deaths and funerals 
 were exhibited all over Athens; and the women, ac- 
 cording to custom, were niDking heavy •moan and 
 lamentation. This struck sad forebodings into people 
 who laid stress on such incidents, that this expensive 
 and mighty armament, though now so vigorous and 
 magnificent would soon moulder into ruin. 
 
 arms. Taking it therefore for granted th\{ 
 they wDl be immediately upon us, deliberate 
 in what manner you may make the most gallant 
 defence in the present posture of your strength ; 
 careful that through contempt )-ou be not taken 
 unprovided, nor through incredulity abandon the 
 means of preservation. Nor, farther, let those 
 who are convinced of their immediate appear- 
 ance, be terrified at the boldness or strength of 
 their undertaking. For they will not be able to 
 hurt us more than we shall be enabled to reta- 
 liate upon them. Nor are they more beyond 
 our reach, because they invade us with so vast 
 an armament ; since this, in regard to the other 
 Sicilians, will plead more abundantly in our 
 cause ; for, terrified at the foe, they will be dis- 
 posed with higher warmth of friendship to co- 
 operate with us. And if thus, in the train of 
 affairs, we are either enabled to defeat their 
 arms, or merely to force their return, their 
 schemes unexecuted and their ambition disap- 
 pointed, (for I am not in the least afraid that 
 their sanguine expectations can be glutted with 
 success,) such events would reflect the highest 
 glory upon you, and complete what I firmly 
 hope. 
 
 " It is a truth evinced by facts, that few con- 
 siderable armaments of either Grecians or Bar- 
 barians, which have been sent out on remote 
 expeditions, have returned successful. Nor, 
 farther, are our present invaders more nu- 
 merous than the Syracusans themselves, or 
 their friends of the neighbouring states, whose 
 strength mere hostile dread will cement and bind 
 fast together. If therefore, though merely for 
 want of needful supplies, they incur miscarria- 
 ges on a foreign shore ; if they prove unsuccess- 
 ful, though chiefly through their own miscon- 
 duct ; the whole honour miist however rest with 
 us, as if we had ruined their projects by art and 
 management. Even these very Athenians were 
 indebted to a parallel coincidence of events for 
 the vast enlargement of their strength and em- 
 pire, when the Mede, who gave out that he 
 aimed the blow at Athens, was, contrary to all 
 human expectation, disconcerted by a series of 
 errors that were purely his own. And some 
 such fortunate coincidence, in our own behalf, 
 we have at present all imaginable reason to ex- 
 pect. 
 
 " Let us therefore with active resolution put 
 our domestic affairs into n posture of defence, 
 and despatch our ambassadors to the Siculi, to 
 keep firm in our friendship such as are already 
 
YEAR XVII.] 
 
 PELOPOiNNESIAN WAR. 
 
 131 
 
 our friends, and to endeavour to procure the 
 friendship and concurrence of the rest. Nay, 
 let our embassies regularly complete the whole 
 circuit of Sicily, where they may represent the 
 common danger which equally threatens them 
 all. Let them, farther, cross over to Italy to 
 procure for us their defensive alliance, or at 
 least to negotiate a denial of reception to the 
 Athenians. I also judge it advisable to send 
 to Carthage: for even the Carthagenians are 
 not exempted from the present dangers, but 
 have been ever under apprehensions of receiving 
 from them a visit at Carthage. It may per- 
 haps effectually occur to their thoughts, that, 
 should they now abandon us, the storm must 
 soon extend itself to them ; by which they may 
 be determined either secretly or openly, by 
 some expedient or other, to vindicate our cause. 
 And, were .their inclination equal to their 
 power, no people on the globe could so easily 
 redress us. For they are possessed of an im- 
 mensity of wealth, which gives an easy and 
 prompt completion to the schemes of war and 
 to every human enterprise. Let us send far- 
 ther, to Lacedffimon and Corinth, requesting 
 the despatch of immediate succours hither, and 
 the renewal of the war against the Athenians. 
 
 " There is one point more, which in my 
 opinion is more critical and important than all 
 the rest: and which, though 'perhaps, inured 
 as you are to domestic indolence, it .may not 
 gain your ready approbation, I shall however 
 boldly recommend. Would all of.us in general 
 who are inhabitants of Sicily, or at least would 
 only we Syracusans, with what other people 
 we can get to assist us, put out instantly to 
 sea with all the ships we have in readiness, 
 and victualled but for the space of two months ; 
 — would wc then give these Athenians the 
 meeting either at Tarentum or cape Japygia, 
 and there convince them, that before they en- 
 ter the lists of war for the conquest of Sicily, 
 they must fight for their passage across the 
 Ionian ; — we should then strike them with the 
 utmost terror, and infinitely perplex them with 
 the thought that from a friendly port we shall 
 sally forth to guard our out-works (for Taren- 
 tum will readily receive us), whilst they have 
 a long tract of sea to pass with all their cum- 
 bersome train, and must find it hard, through 
 so long a voyage, to be always steering in the 
 regular order. As their course must fhuS be 
 slow, and must advance only in exact conform- 
 ity to orders, we should have a thousand op- 
 
 portunities to attack them. If a|ain they clear 
 their ships for action, and in a body bear down 
 expeditiously upon us, they must ply hard at 
 their oars; and, when spent with their toil, 
 we can fall upon them. Or, in case that may 
 not be judged advisable, we have it always in 
 our power to retire into the harbour of Taren- 
 tum. And thus the Athenians, if in con- 
 stant expectation of being fought with at sea, 
 they must make their passage with a small por- 
 tion only of their stores, will be reduced to great 
 distress on coasts which will afford them no 
 supply. Should they chose to continue in 
 their station, they must infallibly be blocked 
 up in it. Should they venture a passage, they 
 must unavoidably leave their tenders and store- 
 ships behind; and as they have no assurance of 
 a hearty reception from the cities on the coasts, 
 must be terribly dismayed. 
 
 " It is my firm opinion, that amidst that 
 great perplexity of thought which must result 
 from these obstructions, they will never pre- 
 sume to sail from Corcyra ; or, at least, whilst 
 they are agitating the forms of proc3duro, and 
 sending out spy-boats to discover our numbers 
 and position, the season of the year must be 
 protracted to winter; or, utterly dispirited at 
 so unexpected a resistance, they will give up 
 the voyage. This I more readily expect, as 
 I am informed that their most experienced com- 
 mander hath been forced into office against his 
 inclination, and would gladly lay hold of the 
 pretext to desist, if such a show of resistance 
 could be made by us as would preserve his 
 honour from suspicion. And I am perfectly 
 convinced that rumour will increase and aggra- 
 vate our strength. Now the sentiments of 
 mankind are constantly adjusted by rumours : 
 parity of danger is supposed, when an enemy 
 declares he is ready to begin the attack ; and 
 such an enemy is always more dreaded than ho 
 who betrays an intention merely to defend 
 himself against an enemy's assaults. Such ex- 
 cess of fear must now fall to the lot of the 
 Athenians. They are invading us, with the 
 fond presumption that we shall not fight. They 
 think they have grounds for such k presump- 
 tion, because we have not concurred with the 
 Lacedemonians in their demolition. But 
 when, to their bitter disappointment, they find 
 we have the courage to act offensively, the 
 suddenness of our efforts will terrify them more 
 than all the reality of our expected strength 
 could have done. 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [hook VI 
 
 -' Determine therefore to execute with bold 
 and ready resolution the plan I have proposed ; 
 or, if this must not prevail, with the utmost 
 expedition to get all things at home in readi- 
 ness for war. And let each Syracusan be 
 firmly convinced, that contempt of an enemy 
 ought never to be shown but in the heat of ac- 
 tion ; that the conduct of those men must 
 tend most highly to .the public preservation, 
 who, alarmed by a decent fear, judge it needful 
 to prepare witli all caution and alacrity, as if 
 the danger was instant at our doors. But 
 these our enemies are actually coming ; they 
 are already (I know it well) upon the voyage ; 
 they are this moment only not in sight." 
 
 In this manner Herraocrates spoke his sen- 
 timents. But the popular assembly of the 
 Syracusans was embroiled with much variance 
 and contention. One party cried out, that " it 
 was all a joke; the Athenians durst not think 
 of invading them." Another, " Hermocrates 
 had truth and reason on his side." A third, 
 " Let them com.3 ; what damage can they do 
 us which we are not able heartily to repay 
 them?" Others betrayed an open contempt 
 at the whole account, and laughed at it as 
 downriglit ridiuculous. The party was but 
 email which gave credit to Hermocrates, and 
 trembled for the future. At length, Athena- 
 goras stood up, who being the first magistrate 
 of the people, and whose credit at this time 
 was highest with them, delivered -himself as 
 followeth : 
 
 "The man who v/ishes the Athenians may 
 not be so mad as to come hither and run them- 
 eelves headlong into our subjection, is either a 
 coward or a traitor to his country. But for 
 those who vent such news, and endeavour to 
 frighten you by the terrible recital, at their 
 audaciousness, truly, I am not in the least 
 surprised ; but I am greatly so at their folly, 
 if they imagine their views can escape detec- 
 tion! Poor abject souls, quite dispirited with- 
 in through their own pusillanimity, are glad to 
 Boread consternation throughout a whole com- 
 munity ; that under the general panic, their 
 own may lie veiled and undistinguished. And 
 Buch is the effect which the present informa- 
 tions may be ready to produce ; not from any 
 grounds of truth and certainty, but the fictions 
 and falsehoods of an iniquitous cabal, vifho arc 
 ever dabbling in the pratices of faction. 
 
 "But you, Syracusans, I exhort, to apply 
 your good sense on this occasion, and search 
 
 after probability ; not by considering such ac- 
 counts as these men have pompously detailed, 
 but such enterprises as a wise and abundantly 
 enlightened people (for such I esteem the 
 Athenians) are likely to undertake. For what 
 probability is there, that, leaving the Pelopon- 
 nesians on their backs, when the war at home 
 is not yet brought to any settled conclusion, 
 they would wilfully embark into another of no 
 less importance? For my part, I am persuad- 
 ed they rest well contented, that, so many and 
 so powerful states as we Sicilians are, we have 
 not yet thought proper to invade them. ^ 
 
 " But, allowing these informations true, and 
 that they are actually coming, — I am firmly 
 persuaded, that Sicily is better able than Pelo- 
 ponnesus to war them ilowii, by how much in 
 all respects, it is better funiiohcd with every 
 resource of war ; and that this Our fSyracustt 
 alone is far superior in strength to that, nay 
 double that armament, whii-h by report now 
 threatens its invasion. For I know, assuredly, 
 that no horse can follow in their train ; that, 
 farther, none can be procured for them in thia 
 country, if we abate an inconsit'erablo party 
 which the Egesteans may furnish. And I 
 know, that a body of heavy-armed, equal in 
 number to our own, can never be transported 
 by them across such a length of sea. The en- 
 terprise is bold indeed, to attempt so long a 
 voyage hither with only light and nimble ships, 
 and to bring all those military stores, the roll 
 of which must be excessively large, in order to 
 attack so great a city. Shall I therefore be 
 terrified at vain reports'! I, who am firmly 
 persuaded, that, if the Athenians were posses- 
 sed of a city on our coasts as considerable in 
 all respects as Syracuse itself, and should dare 
 to provoke us ; if, masters of the neighbouring 
 territoiT they should from thence make war 
 upon us ; — even with such advantages they 
 would with difficulty escape a total destruction. 
 And what therefore, in all human probability, 
 must be their fate, when all Sicily to a man 
 will be combined to oppose them? For now 
 their war must issue from a camp on the beach 
 of the sea, of which their ships must form the 
 ramparts. They will not bo able to luake long 
 excursions from their tents and magazines of 
 needful stores, as our cavalry will bridle and 
 control them. But, in short, it is my firm 
 opinion that they never will be able to accom- 
 plish a descent, so far am I convinced that our 
 force is in all respects superior. 
 
I(EAE XVII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 233 
 
 "I am well persuaded, that all those ob- 
 etacles, which I have hitherto recited, their own 
 wise reflections have suggested to the remem- 
 brance of the Athenians, and deterred them 
 from hazarding their own ruin ; and that our 
 own malcontents amuse us with fictitious ac- 
 counts of things, that neither have nor can have 
 existence. This is by no means the first oc- 
 casion on which I have been able to detect 
 their schemes. I am no stranger to their con- 
 stant attempts of fomenting faction, ever intent 
 as they are, by forgeries like these, or more 
 malicious than these, or even by the open 
 eflforts of sedition, to strike a panic amongst 
 the Syracusan people, and to seize the helm of 
 your government. And I have reason to ap- 
 prehend, that, amongst the many projects they 
 attempt, some one at length may be fatally 
 successful. But this must be charged to our 
 own pusillanimity, who exert no precautions 
 to avert impending miseries, nor bravely oppose 
 the storm, though we perceive it to be, gather- 
 ing around us. And from hence it unavoid- 
 ably results, that our state is seldom blessed 
 with a season of tranquillity, but feels the bitter 
 lot of sedition on sedition, of more numerous 
 struggles against factions within than public 
 hostilities without; nay, sometimes tyranny 
 and despotic rule have been our portion. 
 
 "To guard the present times from such 
 disastrous contingencies, shall be my constant 
 endeavour ; and, if favoured with your concur- 
 rence, my care shall be successful. To this 
 end I must prevail upon you, who are the 
 many, to co-operate with me, whilst I ' inflict 
 upon these artificers of faction the punishment 
 they deserve, not barely for overt commissions, 
 (for in these they are not easily caught,) but 
 for all the treacherous plots which, how desir- 
 ous soever, they are not able to execute. For 
 we ought not only to award our vengeance on 
 the open outrages of an enemy, but to disarm 
 his malice by wise precaution; because the 
 man who will not thus in time disarm it, will 
 feel its blow before he is aware. 
 
 " On the few I have also to bestow, partly 
 some reproofs, partly some cautions, and partly 
 some instructions. For chiefly by these me- 
 thods I judge it feasible to deter them from 
 their factious designs. Let me therefore re- 
 quest from you, ye youths of Syracuse, the 
 solution of a point which hath frequently 
 occurred to my own imagination — What is it 
 91 
 
 you would havel — An immediate possession 
 of the government of your country 1 — Why, 
 the very laws of that country declare you in- 
 capable of it. And these very laws were 
 intended, rather to exclude you, so long as you 
 are unequal, than to give you a disgraceful 
 rejection when you shall be equal, to the trust. 
 But, farther, — are you not piqued at heart at 
 being placed upon the same rank and level with 
 the bulk of your fellow-citizens ? And where 
 would be the justice in awarding distinctions of 
 honour and trust to those who are in no res- 
 pect diflferenced from others t It may perhaps 
 be urged that a democracy is repugnant to the 
 dictates both of wisdom and justice ; that the 
 most opulent'members of a state are entitled 
 to its highest honours, are best able to superin- 
 tend the public welfare. But to this I reply, 
 that, in the first place, by the word people is 
 signified a whole community, including its 
 every individual ; but an oligarchy means only 
 a party ; in the next place, that men of opu- 
 lence 5ire the most suitable guardians of the 
 public treasure; that men of understanding 
 and experience are best qualified to advise ; 
 but the many, after hearing, are the best judges 
 of measutes. And thus, by a democracy, 
 equality of right and of privilege is most fairly 
 preserved, as well to the separate members as 
 to the whole community. An oligarchy in- 
 deed bestows an ample portion of dangers on 
 the many, but in beneficial points it not only 
 assumes the larger share to itself, but by an 
 unbounded rapacity monopoliseth the public 
 harvest. — These are the ends which the men 
 of power, and the raw inexperienced youths 
 amongst you, ambitiously pursue ; ends incom- 
 patible with the welfare of a great and flourish- 
 ing state. The accomplishment of these, I 
 say, you have this very moment in agitation ; 
 though the world cannot furnish such a set of 
 fools, if you perceive not the pernicious tendency 
 of your schemes. Nor can any set of Grecians, 
 within my knowledge, equal either your brutal- 
 ity or your villany, if with open eyes you dare 
 proceed. Lay hold then at once of sound infor- 
 mation, or repent if already informed, and unite 
 in the infallible advancement of the general wel-- 
 fare of the whole community. And let the men. 
 of probity amongst you rest perfectly satisfied',, 
 that thus they shall obtain a proper share, nay. 
 more than a share, in those emoluments which 
 will equally redound to all their country. Bjit, 
 2B 
 
231 
 
 PELOPO.\NESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VI. 
 
 in case you give into different schemes, the 
 hazard is great ; the whole of yonr plan will be 
 baffled and confounded. 
 
 " Trouble us therefore no farther with your 
 informations, as we are privy to and shall cer- 
 '.ainly disconcert the views of their authors. 
 For the Syracusan state, even though the 
 Athenians actually invade us, will repel their 
 efforts with a magnanimity worthy of herself; 
 and we have already a set of brave command- 
 ers, who will effectually manage the point. 
 But, if not one tittle of these intended invasions 
 be true, which is ray firm opinion, the state 
 will not be struck into a panic by your rumours, 
 will never place the command of her forces in 
 your hands, so as to rivet a voluntary servitude 
 upon herself. She, on the contrary, will exert 
 her own vigilance and discretion ; she will 
 interpret the rumours yoti have spread as so 
 many acts against her welfare, and will not give 
 up her liberty to accounts expressly forged to 
 terrify the ear ; but, aware in time, by no means 
 to intrust herself into your management, will 
 leave no possible method of defence untried," 
 
 Thus spoke Athenagoras. But here one 
 of the generals rising up prevented any other 
 person from continuing the debate, and put an 
 end to the present heats by delivering himself 
 thus : — 
 
 " It is contrary to all decorum, both for those 
 who speak to pour forth calumniations against 
 one another, and for those who hear to receive* 
 fben) with attention. At present, we are 
 rather concerned to yield regard to the infor- 
 mations which arc brought us, that every in- 
 dividual and this community may be timely 
 prepared to repel the invaders. And, if this 
 should prove at last to be mere superfluity of 
 care, yet what harm can possibly accrue from 
 such an equipment of the state with horses, 
 and arms, and such other habiliments as are the 
 glory of warl We ourselves shall take all 
 proper care of the provisions of war and the 
 levy of soldiers; and at the same time shall 
 circulate our messengers to the cities around 
 us, and watch the appearance of the foe ; and 
 shall expedite every point judged needful in 
 the present emergence. Some care of these 
 points hath already been taken, and, what 
 more we shall perceive to be expedient, we 
 shall on the proper occasions communicate to 
 you." 
 
 When the general had expressed himself thus. 
 
 the Syracusans broke up the assembly and de- 
 parted. 
 
 The Athenians, with the reinforcements of 
 their allies, were by this time all arrived at 
 Corcyra. And the first thing done by the 
 commanders was, to take a review of the whole 
 equipment, and to settle the order in which 
 they were to anchor and form their naval sta- 
 tion. They also divided it into three squad- 
 rons, and cast lots for the command of each : 
 to the end that, in the course of the voyage, 
 they might be well supplied with water, and 
 harbours, and the proper necessaries, wherever 
 they might chance to put in ; that, in other 
 respects, a better discipline might be kept up, 
 and the men be more inured to a ready obedi- 
 ence, as being under the inspection of an able 
 commander in each several division. These 
 points being settled, they despatched three 
 vesssls to Italy and Sicily, to pick up informa- 
 tions, what cities on those coasts would give 
 them a reception. And their orders were, to 
 come back in time and meet them upon the 
 voyage, that they might be advertised into what 
 ports they might safely enter. 
 
 These previous points being adjusted, the 
 Athenians, with an equipment already swelled 
 to so great a bulk, weighing anchor from Cor- 
 cyra, stood across for Sicily. The total of 
 their triremes was a hundred and thirty-four, 
 to which were added two Rhodian vessels of 
 fifty oars. One hundred of these were Athe- 
 nian, and, of this number, sixty were tight ships 
 fit for service ; the rest were transports for the 
 soldiery. The remainder of the fleet consisted 
 of Chians and the other allies. The total of 
 the heavy-armed on board was five thousand 
 one hundred men. Of these, fifteen hundred 
 were citizens of Athens enrolled ; seven hun- 
 dred were Athenians of the lowest class, 
 (called Thetes,) who served by way of marines. 
 The rest of the force consisted of the quotas of 
 their alliance ; some of their own dependents ; 
 five hundred belonged to the Argives ; the 
 number of Mantineans and mercenaries v/as 
 two hundred and fifty ; the archers in the whole 
 amounted to four hundred and eighty ; and, of 
 these, eighty were Cretans. There were seven 
 hundred Kliodian slingers, and a hundred and 
 twenty light-armed Megarean exiles. And one 
 horse transport attended, which carried thirty 
 horsemen. 
 
 Bo great an equipment sailed out at first to 
 
VEAE XVII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 235 
 
 begin the war. And, in the train of this equip- 
 ment, went thirty storeships laden with corn, 
 and carrying on board the bakers, and masons, 
 and carpenters, and ail things requisite in the 
 works of fortification j and also a hundred sail 
 of small vessels, which necessity demanded to 
 attend the ships that carried the stores. A 
 large number also of small craft and trading 
 vessels, sailed voluntarily in company with the 
 fleet, for the sake of traffic. All which now, 
 in one collected body, stood away from Cdrcyra 
 across the Ionian gulf. * 
 
 The whole armament being got over to cape 
 Japygia, or to Tarentum, as they severally 
 could make the passage, sailed along the coast 
 of Italy, — where not one city would receive 
 them, would grant them a market, or suffer 
 them to land, barely permitting them to anchor 
 and to water, — though at Tarentum and Locri 
 even that was denied them, — till they arrived at 
 Rhegium, a promontory of Italy. At Rhegium 
 the whole fleet was now assembled ; and with- 
 out the city (for an admission into it was re- 
 fused them) they formed an encampment 
 within the verge of Diana's temple, where also 
 they were accommodated by the Ehegians with 
 a market. 
 
 Here, having drawn their vessels on shore, 
 they lay some time for refreshment ; and had a 
 conference with the Rhegians, in which they 
 pressed thera as they were of Chalcidic descent, 
 to succour the Leontines who were also Chal- 
 cideans. Their answer was, that " they should 
 side with neither party, but whatever measures 
 were judged expedient by the other Italians 
 they should conform to those." The Athe- 
 nians' councils were now solely bent on the 
 aifairs of Sicily, in what manner they might 
 most successfully make their approaches. They 
 also waited for the return of the three vessels 
 from Egesta, which had previously been des- 
 patched thither: longing earnestly for a re- 
 port about the state of their treasure, whether 
 it was really such as their envoys at Athens 
 had represented. 
 
 To the Syracusans, in the meantime, un- 
 dcubted advice is brought from several quarters, 
 and by their own spies, that " the fleet of the 
 enemy lies at Rhegium." The truth of this 
 being uncontested, they prepared for their de- 
 fence with the utmost attention, and were no 
 longer duped by incredulity. They also sent 
 about to the Siculi ; to some places, their 
 agents, who were to keep a watchful eye upon 
 
 their conduct : and, to others, ambassadors. 
 And into those towns upon the' coast, which 
 were exposed to a descent, they threw a garri- 
 son. In Syracuse, they examined if the city 
 was provided with the proper means of a de- 
 fence, by a careful inspection of the arms and 
 the horses ; and all other points were properly 
 adjusted, as against a war coming swiftly upon 
 them, and only not already present. 
 
 The three vessels detached beforehand to 
 Egesta, rejoin the Athenians, yet lying at Rhe- 
 gium, with a report that " the great sums which 
 had been promised them were quite annihilated 
 since they saw only thirty talents' in specie." 
 Upon this the commanders were instantly seiz- 
 ed with a' dejection of spirit, because their first 
 hope was thus terribly blasted ; and the Rhe- 
 gians had refused to concur with their attempts, 
 upon whom they had made their first essay of 
 persuasion, and with whom they had the great- 
 est probability of success, as they were by blood 
 allied to the Leontines, and had ever shown 
 themselves well-disposed to the Athenian state. 
 The Egestean aflair had indeed taken no other 
 turn than what Nicias fully expected, but the 
 other two commanders were quite amazed and 
 confounded at it. 
 
 The trick, made use of by the Egesteans, at 
 the time that the first embassy went thither 
 from Athens to take a survey of their treasures, 
 was this ; — Havijig conducted them into the 
 temple of Venice at Eryx, they showed the 
 offerings reposited there, the cups, the flagons, 
 and the censers, and the other furniture of the 
 temple, in quantity by no means small. These, 
 being all of silver, presented to the eye a vast 
 show of wealth, far beyond their intrinsic value. 
 Having also made entertainments in private 
 houses, for those who came in the vessels of 
 the embassy, they amazed together all the gold 
 and silver cups of Egesta : they borrowed others 
 from the adjacent cities, as Well Phoenician as 
 Grecian ; they carried their guests about from 
 one house of feasting to another ; and 'each 
 exhibited them as his own property. Thus, all 
 of them displaying generally the same vessels, 
 and great abundance appeairing at every place, 
 the Athenians who made the voyage were pro- 
 digiously surprised at the splendid shows. 
 Hence it was that, on their return to Athens, 
 they enlarged with a kind of emulation which 
 should magnify it most, on the immensity of 
 
 ■ JESSIS lOs. sterling. 
 
236 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book vr. 
 
 wealth they had seen at Egesta. In this man- 
 ner, being deceived themselves, they obtruded 
 fhe same fallacy upon others ; but now, when 
 the true account was spread amongst them, 
 that " there was no such wealth at Egesta," 
 they were much censured and reproached by 
 the soldiers. 
 
 The generals, however, held a consultation 
 about the methods of proceeding. And here 
 it was the opinion of Nicias, "that with their 
 whole armament they should stand immediately 
 against Selinus, the reduction of which was the 
 principal motive of the expedition; and, in 
 case the Egesteans would furnish the whole 
 armament with the proper supplies of money, 
 their councils might then be regulated accord- 
 ingly ; but, otherwise, they should insist on 
 their maintaining the sixty sail of ships which 
 had been sent expressly at their own request ; 
 then, abiding by them, they should reconcile 
 their differences with the Selinuntians, either 
 by force of arms or negotiation; they after- 
 wards might visit other cities, and display be- 
 fore them the mighty power of the Athenian 
 state ; and, having given such conspicuous 
 proofs of their alacrity to support their friends 
 and allies, might return to Athens ; provided 
 that no sudden and unexpected turn of affairs 
 might give them opportunity to do service to 
 the Leontines, or bring over some other cities 
 to their interest ; ever intent not to bring their 
 own state into danger by a needless profusion 
 of blood and treasure." 
 
 Alcibiades declared " That it could never 
 be justified, if, after putting to sea with so 
 great an armament, they should return with 
 disgrace, and no effectual service done to their 
 country ; that, on the contrary they ought, by 
 heralds despatched expressly, to_ notify their 
 arrival in these parts to all the cities except 
 Selinus and Syracuse ; that, further, they 
 should try what could be done with the Siculi, 
 in order to persuade some of them to revolt 
 from the Syracusans, and to strike up treaties 
 of alliance and friendship with others, that so 
 they might provide a resource of provisions and 
 1 einforcements ; that the first trial of this kind 
 should be made upon the Messenians, who 
 lay m tne finest situation for favouring their 
 passage and descent into Sicily, which must 
 open to them the most convenient harbour 
 and station for their armament : thus,' gaining 
 the concurrence of the cities, and certain from 
 whom they might depend upon assistance, the 
 
 way would then be open fo» them to make 
 attempts upon Syracuse and Selinus, in case 
 the former refused to make up the quarrel with 
 the Egesteans, and the latter to suffer the re- 
 plantation of the Leontines." 
 
 The opinion of Lamachus was diametrically 
 opposite, since he advised it " to be the most 
 judicious measure to stand at once against 
 Syracuse, and to try their fortune before that 
 city with the utmost expedition, whilst they 
 were yet not competently provided for resist- 
 ance, and their consternation was still in its 
 height : because every hostile force is always 
 most terrible on its first approach ; and, in case 
 it protract the time of encountering the eyes of 
 its foes, they must recover their courage through 
 familiarity with danger, and then the sight of 
 an enemy is more apt to inspire contempt : — 
 but, should they assault them on a sudden 
 whilst yet their approach is with terror expected, 
 the victory must infallibly be their own : — in 
 this case, all things would co-operate with 
 them to terrify the foe ; such as, the sight of 
 their numbers, which now only could appear in 
 their greatest enlargement ; the forebodings of 
 their hearts what miseries were like to ensue ; . 
 and, above all, the instant necessity they must 
 lie under of hazarding a battle : that, more- 
 over, it was likely, that numbers of the enemy 
 might be surprised yet roaming abroad in the 
 adjacent country, as still they were incredulous 
 of the approach of the Athenians; or, even 
 though the Syracusans were safely retired with 
 all their effects into the city, the army must 
 needs become masters of prodigious wealth, if 
 they should besiege the city, and awe all around 
 it ; that, by taking this step, the other Sicilians 
 would be more discouraged from succouring 
 the Syracusans, and more easily inclined to 
 concur with the Athenians, and all shifts and 
 delays to keep clear of the contest till one side 
 was manifestly superior, would be precluded." 
 He added farther, that " they should take care 
 to possess themselves of Megara, which was 
 now deserted and not far from Syracuse either 
 by sea or land, as it would afford a fine station 
 for their ships to lie in, would shelter them up- 
 on a retreat, and give expedition to their ap- 
 proaches." 
 
 But, though Lamachus delivered his senti- 
 ments thus, he soon gave up his own opinion and 
 went over to that of Alcibiades. And in pur- 
 suance of this, Alcibiades with his own single 
 ship passed over to Messene ; and, having 
 
YEAH XVII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 237 
 
 gained a conference with the Messenians 
 about an alliance offensive and defensive, when 
 no arguments he brought could persuade, when 
 on the contrary they returned this answer, that 
 " into their city they would not receive them, 
 though they were ready to accommodate them 
 with a market without the walls," he repassed 
 to Khegium. And immediately the generals, 
 having manned out sixty ships with the choicest 
 hands of the whole fleet, and talcen in a re- 
 quisite stock of subsistence, steered away for 
 Naxus, leaving the rest of the armament at 
 Khegium under the care of one of those in the 
 commission. 
 
 After a reception granted them into their 
 city by the Naxians, they stood away from 
 thence to Catana. And, when the Cataneans 
 refused to receive them, (for in that city was 
 a party strongly attached to the Syracusans,) 
 they put into the river Terias. After a night's 
 continuance there, the next day they sailed for 
 Syracuse ; keeping the rest of the fleet ready 
 ranged in the line of battle ahead. But they 
 had attached ten beforehand, who were ordered 
 to enter the great harbour of Syracuse, and to 
 examine what naval force lay there ready launch- 
 ed for service, and to proclaim from their decks 
 as they passed along the shore — that "the 
 Athenians are come into those parts to replace 
 the Leontines in their own territory, as they 
 were bound in point both of alliance and con- 
 sanguinity ; that whatever Leontines therefore 
 were now residing at Syracuse, should without 
 fear come over to the Athenians, as friends 
 and benefactors." 
 
 When the proclamation had been made, and 
 they had taken a view of the city and its har- 
 bours, and of the adjacent ground, what spots 
 were most convenient for a descent and the 
 commencement of the war, they sailed back 
 again to Catana. A council of war had been 
 held in that city, and the Cataneans were come 
 to a resolution, " not to receive the armament ;" 
 but, however, they granted an audience to the 
 generals. At which, whilst Alcibiades har- 
 angued, and the inhabitants of Catana were 
 all in the public assembly, the Athenian 
 soldiers, without giving any alarm, pulled down 
 a little gate of a very sorry structure, and then, 
 entered the city, walked up and down in the 
 market. But such of the Cataneans as were 
 of the Syracusan party no sooner found that 
 the army was got in, than, struck into a sud- 
 den consternation, they stole presently out of 
 
 the city. The number of these was but trifling. 
 The rest of the inhabitants decreed an alliance 
 with the Athenians, and encouraged them to 
 fetch over the remainder of their armament 
 from Rhegium. 
 
 This point being carried, the Athenians 
 having passed to Rhegium, were soon with 
 the whole of their fleet under sail for Catana, 
 and, on their arrival there, they formed a pro- 
 per station for their ships and men. 
 
 But now intelligence was brought them from 
 Camarina that " if they would come to coun- 
 tenance them, that city would declare on their 
 side ;" and that " the Syracusans are busy in 
 manning their fleet." With the whole arma- 
 ment therefore they steered along the coast, 
 touching first at Syracuse. And when they 
 found that no fleet was there in readiness to put 
 to sea, they stood off again for Camarina ; and 
 there, approaching the shore, they notified 
 their arrival by the voice of a herald. Admit- 
 tance was however refused them, the Cama- 
 rineans alleging that " they were bound by 
 solemn oaths to receive only one single ship of 
 the Athenians, unless of their own accord they 
 should require a larger number." Thus disap- 
 pointed they put out again to sea, and, having 
 made a descent on some part of the Syracusan 
 territory, they picked up a booty, til! the Syra- 
 cusan cavalry making ahead against them and 
 cutting off some of their light-armed who were 
 straggled to a distance, they re-embarked, and 
 went again to Catana. 
 
 On their return thither they find the Sala- 
 minian arrived from Athens to fetch back Alci- 
 biades, by public order of the state, to take 
 his trial for the crimes charged against him by 
 his country, and also some others of the soldiery 
 who attended him in the expedition, against 
 whom informations had been given that they 
 were guilty of impiety in the affair of the 
 Mysteries, and against some of them in that of 
 the Mercuries. For the Athenians, after the 
 departure of the fleet, continued to make as 
 strict an inquisition as ever into the crimes 
 committed in regard to the Mysteries, and also in 
 regard to the Mercuries., What sort of persons 
 the informers were, was no part of their concern, 
 but, in the height of jealousy, giving credit in- 
 discriminately to all, through too great a defer- 
 ence to men of profligate and abandoned lives, 
 they apprehended and threw into prison the 
 most worthy citizens of Athens ; esteeming it 
 more prudent by pains and tortures to detect the 
 2b3 
 
238 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VI. 
 
 fact, than that a person of irreproachable cha- 
 racter, whei^once accused through the villany 
 of an informer, should escape without the 
 question. For the people, having learned hy 
 Iradition how grievous the tyranny of Pisistra- 
 tus and his sons became at last ; and, what is 
 more, that it was not overthrown by themselves 
 and Harmodius, but by the industry of the 
 Lacedaemonians ; lived in a constant dread of 
 such another usurpation, and beheld all these 
 incidents now with most suspicious eyes. But, 
 in fact, the bold attempt of Harmodius and 
 Aristogiton took its rise merely from a com- 
 petition in love. The particulars of which I 
 shall here unfold more largely, to convince the 
 world, that no other people, no not even the 
 Athenians themselves, have any certain ac- 
 count, either relating to their own tyrants or 
 the transactions of that period. 
 
 The truth is, that Pisistratus dying pos- 
 sessed of the tyranny in a good old age, not 
 Hipparchus (as is generally thought) but Hip- 
 pias, the eldest of his sons, was his successor 
 in poilper. Harmodius being at this time in 
 the flower of his youth and beauty, Aristogiton 
 a citizen of Athens, nay a citizen of the middle 
 rank, doated upon and had him in his posses- 
 sion. But, some attempts having been made 
 upon Harmodius, by Hipparchus the son of 
 Pisistratus, he rejected his solicitations, and 
 discovers the whole affair to Aristogiton. 
 The latter received the account with all that 
 anguish which a warm aifection feels ; and, 
 alarmed at the great power of Hipparchus, lest 
 by force he might seize the youth, he instantly 
 forms a project, a project as notable as his rank 
 in life would permit, to demolish the tyranny. 
 And, in the meantime, Hipparchus, who, after 
 making a second attempt upon Harmodius, was 
 equally unsuccessful in his suit, could not pre- 
 vail upon himself to make use of force ; but, 
 however, determined, upon some remote oc- 
 casions which might cover his real design from 
 detection, and was actually studying an oppor- 
 tunity to dishonour the youth. — For the power 
 he had was never exerted in such a manner as 
 to draw upon him the popular hatred, and his 
 deportment was neither invidious nor distaste- 
 ful. Nay, for the most part, this set of tyrants 
 were exact observers of the rules of virtue and 
 iliscretion. They exacted from the Atheni- 
 ans only a twentieth of their revenue ; they 
 beautified and adorned the city ; took upon 
 themselves the whole conduct of the wars ; and 
 
 presided over the religious sacrifices. In other 
 respects, the state was governed by the laws 
 already established, except that they always 
 exerted their influence to place their own crea- 
 tures in the first offices of the government. 
 Several of their own famil3' enjoyed the annual 
 oflice of archon at Athens; and, amongst 
 others, Pisistratus, the son of Hlppias the 
 tyrant, who bore the same name with his 
 grandfather, and, in his archonship, dedicated 
 the altar of the twelve gods in the public 
 forum, and that of Apollo in the temple of the 
 Pythian. The people of Athens, having since 
 made additions to it in order to enlarge tlie 
 altar in the forum, by that means efl'aced the 
 inscription : but that in the Pythian is yet 
 legible, though the letters are wearing out 
 apace, and runs thus ; 
 
 Pisistratus, from Hippias born, 
 Of Pytliian Plicbbus, radiant god of day, 
 
 Chose thus the temple to adorn, 
 And thus record his own superior sway. 
 
 But, farther, that Hippias succeeded in the 
 government as the eldest son, I myself can 
 positively aver ; as I know it to be so, and have 
 examined all the accounts of tradition with 
 much greater accuracy than others. But any 
 one may be convinced of the fact by what I 
 am going to subjoin. — Now, we have abundant 
 light to prove, that he was the only one of 
 the legitimate brothers who had any sons. 
 So much the altar attests, and the column 
 erected for a perpetual brand of the injustice 
 of the tyrants in the citadel of Athens. In 
 the latter, the inscription makes no mention 
 of any son, of either Thessalus or Hippar- 
 chus ; but naraeth five sons of Hippias, who 
 were brought him by Myrrhine, the daughter 
 of Callias, the son of Hyperochidas. It is 
 certainly most probable that the eldest son 
 was married first ; nay, he is named the first 
 after his father on the upper part of the 
 column. And there were good reasons for this 
 preference ; because his seniority gave him this 
 rank ; and because he succeeded to the tyranny. 
 Nor can it in any light seem probable to me, 
 that Hippias, on a sudden and with ease, 
 could have seized the tyranny, had Hipparchus 
 died v.hcn invested with it, and he had only 
 one day's time to effect his own establishment. 
 The reverse is the truth ; that, having for a 
 length of time been familiarized to the ex];ccta- 
 tion, having rendered v himself awful to the 
 citizens, and being supported !iy vigilant and 
 
YEAR XVII.J 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 239 
 
 trusty guards, lie received and enjoyed his 
 power with abundant security. He never had 
 cause, as a younger brother must have had, to 
 work his way through perplexities and dangers, 
 as in that case he could not by practice have 
 been made an adept in the affair of government. 
 But was accidental, and owing entirely to 
 subsequent misfortunes,, that Hipparchus got 
 the title, and passed in the opinion of succeed- 
 ing ages for one of the tyrants. 
 
 On Harmpdius, therefore, who was deaf to 
 his solicitations, he executed his resentment in 
 the manner pre-determined. For, a summons 
 having been delivered to a sister of his, a young 
 virgin, to attend and carry the basket in some 
 public procession, they afterwards rejected her j 
 alleging she never had nor could have been sum- 
 moned, because she was unworthy of the honour. 
 Thi.s affront highly provoked Harmodius ; but 
 A.ristogiton, out of zeal for him, was far more 
 exasperated at it. The points needful to their 
 intended revenge were concerted with the party 
 who concurred in the design. But they waited 
 *'or the great Panatheniea, to strike the blow ; 
 on which festival alone, without incurring sus- 
 picion, such of the citizens as assisted in the 
 procession might be armed and gathered to- 
 gether in numbers. It was settled, that they 
 themselves should begin ; and then, the body of 
 their accomplices were to undertake their pro- 
 tection against the guards of the tyrant's family. 
 
 The persons made privy to this design were 
 but few, from a view to n more secure execu- 
 tion of it. For they presumed that even such 
 as were not in the secret, when the attempt 
 was once in whatever manner begun, finding 
 themselves armed, would seize the opportunity, 
 and readily concur to assert their own freedom. 
 When therefore the festival was come, Hippias, 
 repairing without the walls to the place called 
 Ceramicus, and there attended by his guards, 
 was prescribing and adjusting the order of the 
 procession. Harmodius and Aristogiion, each 
 armed with a dagger, advanced to execute their 
 parts. But, when they saw one of their ac- 
 complices in familiar conversation with Hip- 
 pias, (for Hippias was affable and courteous to 
 all men,) they were struck with fear ; they im- 
 agined the whole of their plot had been betray- 
 ed, and that already they were only not appre- 
 hended. Now, therefore, by a. sudden turn 
 of resolution, they determined, if possible, to 
 snatch a timely revenge upon him by whom 
 they were aggrieved, and on whose account 
 
 they had embarked into so dangerous an affair. 
 In this hurry of thought they rushed back into 
 the city, and met with Hipparchus at the place 
 called Leocorium ; where, without any regard to 
 their own safety, they made an instant assault 
 upon him. And thus, in all the fury of pas- 
 sion, one actuated by jealousy, and the other 
 by resentment, they wounded and they kill 
 him. As the people immediately ran together, 
 Aristogiton by favour of the concourse escapes 
 for the present, but, being afterwards seized, 
 was unmercifully treated : but Harmodius is 
 instantly slain on the spot. 
 
 The news of this assassination being carried to 
 Hippias at the Ceramicus, he moved off im- 
 mediately ; not to the scene of action, but to- 
 wards the armed accomplices in the procession, 
 before they could be informed of the fact, as 
 they were stationed at a distance. He art- 
 fully suppressed on his countenance all sense 
 of the calamity ; and, pointing to a certain spot, 
 commanded them aloud to throw down their 
 arms and file off thither. This command they 
 obeyed, expecting he had something to com- 
 municate to them. But Hippias, addressing 
 himself to his guards, orders them to take away 
 those arms. He then picked out, man by man, 
 from amongst them, such as he designed to 
 put to the question, and all upon whom a dag- 
 ger was found : for, by ancient custom, they 
 were to make the procession with a spear and 
 a shield. 
 
 In this manner truly, from the anguish of 
 irritated love,' this conspiracy took its rise, and 
 this desperate attempt was executed by Har- 
 modius and Aristogiton, from the impulse of 
 a sudden consternation. But, after this, the 
 tyranny became more grievous upon the Athe- 
 nians. Hippias, who was now more than ever 
 alarmed, put many of the citizens to death ; 
 and cast his thoughts about towards foreign 
 
 1 And yet so violently were tyrants detested at 
 Athens, that the memory of Harmodius and Aristo-riton 
 was ever after honoured there, as martyrs for liberty 
 and first authors of the ruin of tyrants. Their praises 
 were puhlicly sung at the great Panathenfsa. No slave 
 was ever called by their names. Praxiteles was em- 
 ployed to cast their statues, which were afterwards set 
 up in the forum; Xerxes indeed carried them nway in- 
 to Persia, but Alexander afterwards sent them hack to 
 Athens. Plutarch hath preserved a smart reply of An 
 tipho the orator, who will appear in this history, to the 
 elder Dionysius. tyrant of Syrncuse. The latter had 
 put the question, which \vas the finest kind of hrass • 
 "That," replied Antipho, "of which the statues of 
 Harmodius and Aristogiton were made " 
 
240 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VI. 
 
 powers, to secure himself an asylum abroad in 
 case of a total reverse at home. To ^anti- 
 das therefore, the son of Hippoclus, tyrant of 
 Lampsacus, — to a Lampsacene though he him- 
 self was an Athenian, — he married his daugh- 
 ter Archedice, knowing that family to have a 
 powerful interest with king Darius. And the 
 monument of that lady is now at Lampsacus, 
 and hath this inscription : 
 
 From Hippias sprung, with regal power array'd, 
 
 'Within this earth Archedice is laid ; 
 
 By father, husband, brothers, sons, allied 
 
 To haughty thrones, yet never stain'd with pride. 
 
 For the space of three years after this, 
 Hippias continued in possession of the tyranny 
 at Athens ; but being deposed in the fourth 
 by the LacedaBmonians, and the exiled Alcmseo- 
 nidie, he retired by agreement to SigsDum ; 
 from thence, to jEantidas at Lampsacus ; and 
 from thence, to king Darius : and with a com- 
 mand under him, he marched twenty years 
 after to Marathon ; and, though much ad- 
 vanced in years, served in that war with the 
 Modes. 
 
 The people of Athens reflecting on these 
 past transactions, and recollecting all the dis- 
 mal narratives about them which tradition had 
 handed down, treated with great severity, and 
 deep suspicions, all such as were informed 
 against in relation to the Mysteries : and they 
 construed the whole procedure as the dawning 
 of a plot to erect an oligarchical and tyrannic 
 power. And as their passions were inflamed 
 by such apprehensions, many worthy and 
 valuable citizens were already thrown into 
 prison. Way, it seemed as if their inquisition 
 was to have no end, since from day to day 
 their indignation gave into more increasing 
 severity, and numbers were constantly arrested. 
 Here, one of those' who had been imprisoned 
 on suspicion (and a suspicion too of being 
 most deeply concerned in the crime) is per- 
 suaded, by one of his fellow-prisoners, to turn 
 an evidence, no matter whether of truth or 
 falsehood. Many conjectures have passed on 
 both sides ; but no one, neither at that time 
 nor since, had been able to discover the men 
 "who were really concerned in the affair. The 
 
 » This person, according to Plutarch in Alcibiadcs, 
 was Andocides the orator, a man always reckoned of 
 the oligarchical faction. And one Timieus, his intimate 
 friend,who was a man of small consideration at Athens, 
 but remarkable for a penetrating and enterprising ge- 
 nius, was the person who persuaded him to turn in- 
 former. 
 
 argument which prevailed upon this person 
 was, " the necessity for his taking such a step, 
 even though he had no hand in the commis- 
 sion, since by this he would infallibly procure 
 his own safety, and deliver the city from its 
 present confusion. For he must be much 
 more secure of saving his life by such volun- 
 tary confession on a promise of indemnity, 
 than he could possibly be, should he persist in 
 an avowal of his innocence, and be brought to 
 a trial." In short, this man became an evi- 
 dence, both against himself and against others, 
 in the affair of the Mercuries. 
 
 Great was the joy of the Athenian people 
 at this, as it was thought, undoubted dis- 
 covery. And as they had been highly cha- 
 grined before at their inability to detect the 
 criminals, who had so outrageously insulted 
 the multitude, they immediately discharged 
 this informer, and all other prisoners whom 
 he did not name as accomplices. Upon such 
 as he expressly named, the judicial trials were 
 held. Some of them they put to death, as 
 many as were prevented by timely arrests from 
 flying from justice ;> but they pronounced the 
 sentence of death against the fugitives, and set 
 a price on their heads. Yet all this while, it 
 was by no means clear, that those who suffered 
 were not unjustly condemned. Thus much 
 however is certain, that by such proceedings 
 the public tranquillity was restored. 
 
 In regard to Alcibiades, the Athenians were 
 highly iricensed against him, since the party 
 which were his enemies, and had made their at- 
 tacks upon him before his departure, continued 
 still to inflame them. And now, as they pre- 
 sumed the truth had been detected in relation 
 to the Mercuries, it appeared to them, beyond 
 a scruple, that he must also have been guilty 
 of the crimes charged against him about the 
 Mysteries, upon the same ground of a secret 
 combination against the democracy. 
 
 At this critical period of time, when the 
 public confusion was in all its height, it farther 
 happened, that a Lacedeemonian army, though 
 by no means large, advanced as far as to the 
 isthmus, to execute some scheme along with 
 the Boeotians. This was interpreted to the 
 prejudice of Alcibiades, as if they had now 
 taken the field at his instigation, and not on 
 any account of obliging the Bo30tians ; and 
 that " had they not happily apprehended in 
 time such as had been informed against, Athens 
 had now been infallibly betrayed." Nay, for ' 
 
TEAR XVII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 241 
 
 the space of a niglil, they kept guaril under arms, 
 within the city, in the temple of Theseus. 
 
 About the same time, also, the friends of 
 Alcibiades at Argos were suspected of a design 
 to assault the people. And those hostages of 
 the Argives who were kept in custody among 
 the islands, the Athenians on this occasion, de- 
 livered up to the people of Argos, to be put to 
 death on these suspicions. 
 
 Thus reasons flowed in from every quarter 
 for suspecting Alcibiades. Desirous therefore 
 to bring him to a trial and to execution, they 
 accordingly despatched the Salaminian to Sicily, 
 to order him and such others as they had in- 
 formations against to repair to Athens. But 
 it had been given them in charge to notify to 
 him, that " he should follow them home in 
 order to make his defence," and by no means 
 to put him under arrest. This arrangement 
 was owing to a desire of preventing all stirs in 
 the army or in the enemy ; and, not least of 
 all, to their willingness that the Mantineans 
 and Argives should continue in the service, 
 whose attendance in the expedition they wholly 
 ascribed to the interest Alcibiades had with 
 them. 
 
 In pursuance of this, Alcibiades on board 
 his own ship, and accompanied by all those who 
 were involved in the same accusation, sailed 
 away from Sicily with the Salaminian for 
 Athens. And when they were got to the 
 height of Thuria, they no longer followed ; 
 but quitting their ship were no longer to be 
 seen. Censured as they were, they durst not 
 in fact undergo a trial. The crew of the Sala- 
 minian exerted themselves immediately in the 
 search after Alcibiades and his companions ; but, 
 when they found the search was ineffectual, 
 they gave it up, and steered away for Athens. 
 And Alcibiades, now become a fugitive, passed 
 over in a vessel soon after from Thuria' to 
 Peloponnesus. But the Athenians, upon his 
 thus abandoning his defence, pronounced the 
 sentence of death against him and hij asso- 
 ciates. 
 
 » Somebody at Thuria, who knew Alcibiades, asked 
 him, why he would not stand a trial, and trust his 
 country ? " In other points I would ; but, when my 
 life is concerned, I would nottrust my own mother, lest 
 she should make a mistake, and put in a black l^an 
 insteadof a while one." And, when he whs afterwards 
 told, that his countrymen had pnssed the sentence of 
 death agninsthim. he briskly replied — "Cut I'll make 
 them knowt'iat I am alive.'' Plutarch in Alcibiades, 
 S8 
 
 After these transactions, the Athenian gene- 
 rals who remained in Sicily, having divided 
 their whole armament into two squadrons, and 
 taken the command of each by lot, set sail with 
 all their united force for Selinus and Egesta. 
 They were desirous to know, whether the 
 Egfesteans would pay down the money: to 
 discover also the present posture of the Seli- 
 nuntians ; and to learn the state of their quar- 
 rels with the Egesteans. In their course, 
 keeping on the left that part of Sicily which 
 lies on the Tyrrhene gulf, they arrived at Hi- 
 mera, which is the only Grecian city in this 
 part of Sicily ; and, when denied reception here, 
 they resumed their course. Touching after- 
 wards at Hyccara, a Sicairian fortress, but an 
 annoyance to the Egesteans, they surprise it* 
 for it was situated close upon the sea ; and 
 having doomed the inhabitants to be slaves, 
 they delivered the place into the hands of the 
 Egesteans, whose cavalry was now attending 
 on the Athenian motions. The laud forces 
 marched away from hence through the terri- 
 tories of the Siculi, till they had again reached 
 Catana ; but the vessels on board of which were 
 the slaves, came back along the coasts. 
 
 Nicias had proceeded from Hyccara directly 
 to Egesta, where, after transacting other points 
 and receiving thirty talents,^ he rejoined the 
 grand armament at Catana. And here they 
 set up the slaves to sale,' and raised by the 
 money paid for them'' one hundred and twenty 
 talents. 
 
 They also sailed about to their Sicilian allies, 
 summoning them to send in their reinforce- 
 ments. With a division also of their force they 
 appeared before Hybla,"a hostile city in the 
 district of Gela, but were not able to take it. 
 And here the summer ended. 
 
 Winter now succeeding, the Athenians be- 
 gin immediately to get all things in readiness 
 for an attempt upon Syracuse. The Syracu- 
 sans were equally inter, it on making an attack 
 upon them. For, sina i the Athenians had not 
 thought proper, during iheir first panic and con- 
 sternation, to fall instantly upon them, such a 
 protraction re-inspired them day after day with 
 new reviving courage : since, farther, by cruia 
 
 = £.5812 IOj. sterling. 
 
 a Amoni; the rest, Nicias sold at this sale Lais the f:- 
 
 mous courtezan, at this lime a very young girl, whom 
 
 her purchasers carried lo Corinth, where slie set up and 
 
 drove a prodigious trade indeed. Plutarch in Jtticiaa, 
 
 « X2'.!,250Z. sterling 
 
242 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VI. 
 
 ing on the other side of Sicily, they seemed to 
 affect a remoteness from them ; and, though 
 showing themselves before Hybia, and at- 
 tempting the place, they had not been able to 
 carry it, the Syracusans began now to treat 
 them with an open contempt. They even in- 
 sisted, as might be expected from a populace 
 who are high in spirits, " that their generals 
 should lead out towards Catana, since the ene- 
 my durst not venture to march against them." 
 The Syracusan horsemen also, sent daily out 
 to observe their motions, rode boldly up to the 
 camp of the Athenians, insulting them in 
 other respects, but especially with this sneer- 
 ing demand, " Whether they were not rather 
 come to gain a settlement for themselves on a 
 foreign shore, than to replace the Leontines in 
 their old possessions V 
 
 The Athenian generals, informed of these 
 bravadoes, were desirous to seduce the whole 
 strength of Syracuse to as great a distance as 
 possible from that city, that they might snatch 
 an opportunity of transporting thither their 
 own forces by favour of the night, and seize 
 a proper spot whereon to fix their encamp- 
 ment, without any obstruction from the enemy. 
 They were well convinced, that their point 
 could not be so easily accomplished, should 
 they endeavour to force a descent in the face 
 of the enemy, or by a land-march should give 
 them an early notice of their design. For, in 
 such cases, their own light-armed, and that 
 cumbersome train which must attend, as they 
 had no horse to cover their motions, must suf- 
 fer greatly from the numerous cavalry of the 
 Syracusans ; but, by the other scheme, they 
 might pre-occupy a spot of ground, where the 
 cavalry could not give them any considerable 
 annoyance. Nay, what is more, the Syracu- 
 san exiles vvho followed their camp, had in- 
 formed them of a piece of ground convenient 
 for their purpose near 01ympia3um. 
 
 In order therefore to accomplish the point, 
 the generals have recourse to the following ar- 
 tifice. — They despatch an emissary, of whose 
 fidelity they were well assured, and who might 
 also pass with the generals of Syracuse as well 
 affected to their cause. The person employed 
 was a Catanean. He told them " he was sent 
 by their friends in Catana," with whose names 
 they were acquainted, and knew well to be of 
 that number in Catana which persisted in 
 steadfast attachment to them : he said farther, 
 that, " the Athenians reposed themselves by 
 
 night within the city at a distance from their 
 arms ; and that in case they (the Syracusans) 
 on a day prefixed, would with all the forces of 
 their city appear by early dawn before the 
 Athenian camp, the Cataneans would shut up 
 those within the city and set fire to their ship- 
 ping, by which means they might force the en- 
 trenchments and render themselves masters of 
 the camp ; that, farther, the party of Cataneans, 
 that would co-operate with them in this scheme, 
 was very large, and already prepared to execute 
 these points he was now sent to propose." 
 
 The Syracusan generals, whose ardour other 
 contingencies had already inflamed, and who 
 had formed a resolutioh, even previous to such 
 encouragement, to march their forces towards 
 Ca ana, without the least reserve gave implicit 
 credit to this emissary ; and, having instantly 
 pitched upon a day for execution, dismissed 
 him. They also (for by this time the Seli- 
 nuntian and some other auxiliaries had joined 
 them) issued out their orders for the whole 
 military strength of Syracuse to march out on 
 the day appointed. No sooner therefore were 
 all the needful preparations adjusted, and the 
 time at hand at which they were to make their 
 appearance, than — on the march for Catana, 
 they halted one night upon the banks of the 
 SymsElhus, in the Leontine district. But the 
 Athenians, when assured they had thus taken 
 the field, decamping instantly with the whole 
 of their force, and with all the Sicilian and 
 other auxiliaries who had j oined them, and em- 
 barking themselves on board their ships and 
 transports, steered away by night for Syracuse. 
 And, early the next dawn, they landed on the 
 intended spot near Olympiseum, intent on 
 forming and securing their encarapmaht. The 
 cavalry of the Syracusans, in the meantime, 
 came up first to Catana ; and discovering that 
 the whole Athenian army had put to sea by 
 night, they return with this intelligence to their 
 foot. Upon this, the whole army, soon wheel- 
 ing about, returned with all .speed to the de 
 fence of Syracuse. 
 
 In the meantimCj the Athenians, as the cne 
 my had a long way to march, formed an en 
 campment on an advantageous spot without 
 the least obstruction. On it, they were pos- 
 sessed of the advantage of fighting only at their 
 own discretion, and the Syracusan horse could 
 ndt give them the least annoyance, either during 
 or before an engagement. On one side, they 
 were flanked by walls, and houses, and trees, 
 
YiiA.K xni.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 243 
 
 and a marsh ; and on the other by precipices. 
 They also felled some trees that grew near; 
 and, carrying them down to the shore, they piled 
 them into a barricade for the defence of their 
 ships; and to cover them on the side of Das- 
 con. They also expeditiously threw up a ram- 
 part, on the part which seemed most accessible 
 to the enemy, of stones picked out for the pur- 
 pose, and timber, and broke down the bridge 
 of the Anapus. 
 
 Thus busied as they were on fortifying their 
 camp, not so much as one person ventured out 
 of the city to obstruct their proceedings. The 
 first who appeared to make any resistance, 
 were the Syracusan cavalry ; and, when once 
 they had shown themselves, the whole body of 
 their infantry was soon in sight. They ad- 
 vanced first of all quite up to the Athenian 
 works; but, when they perceived that they 
 would not sally out to fight them, they again 
 retreated : and, having crossed the road to He- 
 lorum, reposed themselves for the night. 
 
 The succeeding day, the Athenians and al- 
 lies prepared for engagement, and their order 
 of battle was formed as follows : — The Ar- 
 gives and Mantineans had the right, the Athe- 
 nians the centre, and the rest of the line was 
 formed by the other confederates. One half 
 of the whole force, which was ranged in the 
 first line, was drawn up by eight in depth. The 
 other half, being posted near the tents, formed 
 a hollow square, in which the men were also 
 drawn up by eight. The latter were ordered, 
 if any part of the lin^ gave way, to keep a good 
 look-out and advance to their support. And 
 within this hollow square they posted all the 
 train who attended the service' of the army. 
 
 But the Syracusans drew up their heavy- 
 armed, which body consisted of the whole mili- 
 tary strength of Syracuse and all the confede- 
 rates who had joined them, in files consisting 
 of sixteen. Those who had joined with auxili- 
 ary quotas, were chiefly the Selinuntians ; and 
 next, the horse of the Geloans, amounting in 
 the whole to about two hundred: the horse 
 also of the Camarineans, about twenty in num- 
 ber, and about fifty archers. But their horse- 
 men they posted to the right, being not fewer 
 in number than twelve hundred ; and next to 
 them, the darters. 
 
 The Athenians being now intent on advan- 
 cing to the charge, Nicias, addressing himself in 
 regular order to the troops of the several states. 
 
 animated them to the fight by the following 
 harangue, repeated in turn to the whole army. 
 " What need, my fellow-soldiers, of a long 
 exhortation, since we are here, determined, and 
 resolute for action 1 for this our present ar- 
 rangement seems to me a stronger confirmation 
 of your courage, than any words could be, how 
 eloquently soever delivered, if we were inferi- 
 or in strength. But when, Argives, and Man- 
 tineans, and Athenians, and the flower of the 
 isles, we are here assembled together, — how is 
 it possible, when such brave and numerous 
 allies are to fight in company, that we should 
 not entertain a steadfast, nay the warmest 
 hope, that the victory will be our ownl nay 
 more, as we have to do with a promiscuous 
 crowd, the mob of a city, not selected for ser- 
 vice, as we have had the honour to be ; and 
 who, it must be added, are but Sicilians ; who, 
 though affecting to despise us, will never sus- 
 tain our charge, because their skill is far be- 
 neath their courage. 
 
 " Let every soldier farther recall to his re- 
 membrance, that he is now at a vast distance 
 from his native soil, and near no friendly land 
 but what you shall render such by the efforts 
 of your valour. Such things I am bound to 
 suggest to your remembrance, the reverse, I 
 am well convinced of what your enemies utter 
 for their mutual encouragement. They un- 
 doubtedly are roaring aloud — ' It is for your 
 country you are now to fight.' But I tell you, 
 that from your country you are now remote ; 
 and, as such, must either conquer, or not with- 
 out difiiculty ever see it again, since the num- 
 erous cavalry of the enemy will press hard upon 
 our retreat. Call therefore to mind your own 
 dignity and worth ; advance with alacrity to 
 assault your foes ; convinced that your present 
 necessities and wants are far more terrible 
 than the enemy you are to engage," 
 
 When IVicias had finished this exhortation, 
 he led on his army towards the encounter. 
 But the Syracusans were not yet prepared, 
 as by no means expecting to be charged so 
 soon ; and some ef the soldiers, as the city 
 lay so neai-, were straggled thither. These 
 however catoe running with all eagerness and 
 speed to gain their posts ; too late upon the 
 whole; but as each of them met with any 
 number intent on action, he ranged himself in 
 their company. The Syracusans, to do them 
 justice, were not deficient in alacrity or cou- 
 
244 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book \i. 
 
 rage, neither in the present battle nor any of 
 the following. They maintained their ground 
 gallantly so long as their competence of skill 
 enabled them ; but when that failed them, 
 they were forced, though with reluctance, to 
 slacken in their ardour. However, though 
 far from imagining that the Athenians would 
 presume to begin the attack, and though ob- 
 liged in a hurry to stand on their defence, they 
 took up their arms, and advanced immediately 
 to meet their foe. 
 
 In the first place, therefore, the flingers of 
 stones with either the hand or the sling, and 
 the archers, on both sides, began the engage- 
 ment ; and alternately chased one another, as 
 is generally the case among the bodies of the 
 light-armed. In the next place, the sooth- 
 sayers brought forwards and Immolated the 
 solemn victims; and the trumpets summoned 
 the heavy-armed to close firm together, and ad- 
 vance. 
 
 All sides now began to face ; the Syracu- 
 sans to fight for their country ; each soldier 
 amongst them for his native soil, to earn, for 
 the present his preservation, and for the future 
 his liberty. — On their enemies' side, the Athe- 
 nians to gain possession of a foreign country, 
 and not to damage their own by a dastardly 
 behaviour ; the Argives and voluntary part of 
 the confederates, to procure for the Athenians 
 a happy accomplishment of their scheines, and 
 again to visit their own country, to which they 
 were endeared, victorious and triumphant ; and 
 that part of the confederacy which attended in 
 obedience to the orders of their masters, were 
 highly animated by the thought, that they 
 must earn their safety now at once, or, if de- 
 feated now, must for tlie future despair, and 
 then, secretly actuated perhaps by the distant 
 hope, that, were others reduced to the Athe- 
 nian yoke, their own bondage might be render- 
 ed more Ught and easy. 
 
 The business being now come to blows, 
 they for a long time maintained the ground on 
 both sides. It happened, farther, that some claps 
 of thunder were heard, attended with lightning 
 and a heavy rain. This caused a sudden con- 
 sternation in the Syracusans, who now for the 
 first time engaged the Athenians, and had 
 gained very little experience in the affairs of 
 war. But by the more experienced enemy, 
 these accidents were interpreted as the ordi- 
 nary effects of the season ; and their concern 
 was rather employed upon the enemy, whom 
 
 they found no easy conquest. But the Ar 
 gives, having first of all defeated the left wing 
 of the Syracusans, and the Athenians being 
 afterwards successful in their quarter of the 
 battle, the whole Syracusan army was soon 
 thrown into disorder, and began the flight 
 The Athenians however did not continue the 
 pursuit to any great distance ; for the Syracu- 
 san cavalry, as they were numerous and un- 
 broken, put a stop to the chase by assaulting 
 those parties of heavy-armed whom they saw 
 detached for the pursuit, and driving them 
 back into their own line. Having pursued 
 only so far as they could in an orderly and 
 secure manner, they again retreated and erect- 
 ed a trophy. 
 
 But the Syracusans, who had rallied again 
 in the road to Helorum, and were drawn up 
 as well as the present posture of affairs would 
 permit, send a strong detachment from their 
 body for the guard of Olympiseum, apprehen- 
 sive that the Athenians might otherwise seize 
 the treasures that were deposited there. And, 
 this being done, with the remainder of their 
 force they retired within the walls of Syracuse. 
 
 The Athenians in the meantime made no 
 advances against Olympiaeum ; but, after ga- 
 thering together the bodies of their slain, and 
 laying them upon the funeral pyre, they pass- 
 ed the night on the field of battle. 
 
 The next day they delivered up their dead 
 under truce to the Syracusans, of whom and 
 their allies there had perished about two hun- 
 dred and sixty men ; and then gathered up the 
 bones of their own. Of the Athenians and 
 their allies about fifty in all were slain. And 
 now, with all the pillage they had made of the 
 enemy, they sailed back to Catana. 
 
 This was owing to the season of the year, 
 now advanced to winter. It. was no longer 
 judged possible for them to be able to con- 
 tinue the war in their present post before they 
 had procured a supply of horse from Athens, 
 and had assembled others from their confed- 
 erates in Sicily, that they might not be en- 
 tirely exposed to the horse of the enemy. 
 They were also intent on collecting pecuniary 
 aids in those parts, and some were expected 
 from Athens. — " They might also obtain the 
 concurrence of some other cities, which they 
 hoped would prove more tractable, since they 
 had gained a battle : they wanted, farther, to 
 furnish themselves with provisions and all 
 necessary stores, which might enable them 
 
TEAR XVII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 245 
 
 early in the spring to make new attempts on 
 Syiaeuse." Determined by these considera- 
 tions, they sailed back to Naxus and Catana, 
 in order to winter there. 
 
 The Syracusans, after they had performed 
 the obsequies of their slain, called a general 
 assembly of the people. And on this occasion 
 Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, (a man who 
 was inferior to none in all other branches of 
 human prudence, who for military skill was in 
 high reputation, and renowned for bravery,) 
 standing forth among them, endeavoured to 
 encourage them, • and prevent their being too 
 much dispirited by their late defeat. 
 
 He told them, "that in courage they had 
 not been worsted, but their want of discipline 
 had done them harm : and yet the harm suf- 
 ferred by that was not near so great as they 
 might justly have expected ; especially when, 
 no better than a rabble of mechanics, they had 
 been obliged to enter the lists, against the 
 most experienced soldiery of Greece; that 
 what hurt them most was too large a number 
 of generals, and the multiplicity of commands 
 which was thence occasioned, (for the number 
 of those who commanded was fifteeft,) whilst 
 the bulk of their army observed no discipline, 
 and obeyed no orders at all : but were only a 
 few skilful generals selected for the trust, 
 would they only be intent this winter on train- 
 ing their bodies of heavy-armed, and furnish 
 others with arms who had none for themselves, 
 in order to enlarge their number as much as 
 possible and inure them to settled exercise and 
 use, — he assured them, thus, in all probability, 
 they must upon the whole be too hard for 
 their foes, as their natural portion of valour 
 was great, and skill would be attained by 
 practice : that both of these would progres- 
 sively become more perfect; discipline, by 
 being exercised through a series of danger; 
 and inward bravery would merely of itself in- 
 crease in gallant confidence, when assured of 
 the support of skill : as to generals, that few 
 only, and those invested with absolute power, 
 ought to be elected and confirmed by a solemn 
 oath from the people, that they were permitted 
 to lead the army where and how they judged 
 best for the public service. For by this means, 
 what ought to be concealed would be less liable 
 to detection, and all the schemes of war might 
 be directed with order and a certainty of suc- 
 cess." 
 
 The Syracusans, who had listened to this dis- 
 
 course, decreed whatever he proposed. They 
 elected Hermocrates himself to be a general, 
 and Heraclides the son of Lysimachus, and 
 Sicanus the son of Hexecestus ; these three. 
 They also appointed ambassadors to go to 
 Corinth and Lacedaemon, to procure the al- 
 liance of those states, and to persuade the 
 Lacediemonians to make hotter war upon the 
 Athenians, with an open avowal that they 
 acted in behalf of the Syracusans ; that, by 
 this means, they might either be obliged to 
 recall their fleet from Sicily, or might be less 
 able to send any reinforcements to the army 
 already there. 
 
 The Athenian forces, which lay at Catana, 
 soon made an excursion from thence to Mes- 
 sene, expecting to have it betrayed into their 
 power. But all the steps taken previously for 
 the purpose, were totally disconcerted. For 
 Alcibiades, upon his quitting the command 
 when recalled to Athens, being convinced 
 within himself that exile must be his portion, 
 betrayed the whole project (as he had been in 
 the secret) to such persons at Messene as 
 were attached to the Syracusans. The first 
 step this party took was to put to death all the 
 persons against whom he informed. And at 
 the time of this attempt, being quite in a fer- 
 ment and under arms, they carried their point, 
 so that those who wished to give it were ob- 
 liged to refuse admission to the Athenians. 
 The Athenians, therefore, after thirteen days" 
 continuance on that coast, when the weathei 
 began to be tempestuous, when their provisions 
 failed, and no hope of success appeared, re- 
 turned to Naxus**, ' where, having thrown 
 up an entrenchment round their camp, they 
 continued the rest of the winter. They also 
 despatched a trireme to Athens, to forward a 
 supply of money' and horsemen to join them 
 without fail, by the beginning of the spring. 
 
 The Syracusans employed themselves this 
 winter in fortifying their city. They inclosed 
 Temenites within their new works, and carried 
 their wall through all that length of ground 
 which faceth Epipolse, that, in case they should 
 be unable to keep the field, the enemy might 
 have as little room as possible to raise counter- 
 works of annoyance. They also placed a gar- 
 rison at Megara, and another in Olympiffium. 
 
 1 In the original is added x^i Q^avas, But all the 
 editors and note-writera give it up. and own they can 
 make nothing of it. 
 2C 
 
246 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 A.nd all along the sea they drove rows of piles, 
 wherevp-r the ground was convenient for de- 
 scents. Knowing, also, that the Athenians 
 wintered at Naxus, they marched out with all 
 their force against Catana. They ravaged the 
 territory of the Cataneans ; and, after burning 
 the tents and camp of the Athenians, they re- 
 turned home. 
 
 Having also had intelligence, that the Athe- 
 nians had sent an embassy to Camarina, under 
 favour of a treaty made formerly with them by 
 Laches, to try if it were possible to procure 
 their concurrence ; they also despatched an em- 
 bassy thither, to traverse the negotiation. For 
 the Camarineans were suspected by them, as if 
 they had not cordially sent in their quota of 
 assistance for the first battle, and lest for the 
 future they might be totally averse from acting 
 in their support, as in that battle they had seen 
 the Athenians victorious, and so, induced by 
 the former treaty they had made with the lat- 
 ter, might now declare openly on their side. 
 
 When therefore Hermocrates and others 
 were arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and, 
 from the Athenians, Euphemus and his col- 
 leagues in the embassy, an assembly of the 
 Camarineans was held , in which, Hermocrates, 
 desirous to give them a timely distaste against 
 the Athenians, harangued them thus : 
 
 " Our embassy hither, ye men of Camarina, 
 hath not been occasioned by any fears we were 
 under, that you might be too much terrified at 
 the great equipment with which the Athenians 
 have invaded us ; but rather by our knowledge 
 with what kind of arguments they would im- 
 pose on your understanding, by which before 
 we had an opportunity to remonstrate, they 
 might seduce you into a concurrence. Sicily 
 in fact they have invaded, upon such pretext as 
 you have heard them give out ; but with such 
 intentions as we have all abundant reason to 
 suspect. And to me it is clear, that their 
 schemes have no tendency to replant the Leon- 
 tines, but rather to supplant us all. For, how 
 is it reconcilable with common sense, that a 
 people, who have ever been employed in the 
 ruin of the states which are neighbouring to 
 Athens, should be sincere in re-establishing a 
 Sicilian people ; or, by the bonds of consan- 
 guinity, hold themselves obliged to protect the 
 Lcontines, who are of Chalcidic descent, whilst 
 on the Chalcideans of Eubcea, from whom these 
 others are a colony, they hold fast-rivetted the 
 yoke of slavery? No ; it is the same cruel 
 
 policy, that subjugated the Grecians in that 
 part of the world, which now exerts itself to 
 glut their ambition in this. 
 
 " These are those very Athenians, who 
 formerly, having been elected their common 
 leaders by the well-designing lonians and that 
 confederate body which derived from them 
 their descent, on the glorious pretence of 
 avenging themselves on the Persian monarch, 
 abused their trust by enslaving those who 
 placed confidence in them ; charging some 
 with deserting the common cause, others with 
 their mutual embroilments, and all, at length, 
 with diifetent but specious criminations. And, 
 on the whole, these Athenians waged war 
 against the Mede, not in the cause of Grecian 
 liberty, as neither did the other Grecians in 
 the defence of their own : the former fought, 
 not indeed to subject the rest of Greece to 
 the Mede, but to their ownselves; the lat- 
 ter, merely to obtain a change of master ; a 
 master not inferior in policy, but far more 
 abundant in malice. 
 
 " But, though Athens, on manifold accounts, 
 be obnoxious to universal censure and reproach, 
 yet we are not come hither to prove how justly 
 she deserveth it, since your own conviction 
 precludes the long detail. We are much more - 
 concerned at present to censure and reproach 
 ourselves, since, with all the examples before 
 our eyes of what the Grecians in those parts 
 have suffered, who, for want of guarding against 
 their encroachments, have fallen victims to 
 their ambition, — since, with the certain know- 
 ledge that they are now playing the same 
 sophistries upon us, — "the replantation of 
 their kindred Leontines," — " the support of 
 the Egesteans, their allies," — we show no in- 
 clination to unite together in our common de- 
 fence, in order to give them most signal proofs, 
 that in Sicily are neither lonians, nor Helles- 
 pontines, nor islanders, who will be slaves, 
 though ever changing their master, one while 
 to the Mede, and soon after to whoever will 
 please to govern ; — but, on the contrary, that 
 we are Dorians, who from Peloponnesus, that 
 seat of liberty and independence, came to dwell 
 in Sicily. Shall we, therefore, protract our 
 union, till, city after city, we are compelled to 
 a submissionl we, who are convinced that thus 
 only we can be conquered, and when wo even 
 behold that thus our foes have dressed up their 
 plan ; amongst some of our people scattering 
 dissensions, setting others to war down each 
 
TEAE XVII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 247 
 
 otiier for the mighty recompense of their al- 
 liance, cajoling the rest as may best soothe the 
 pride or caprice of each, and avail themselves 
 of these methods to v»ork our ruin'! We even 
 indulge the wild imagination, that though a 
 remote inhabitant of Sicily be destroyed, the 
 danger can never come home to ourselves ; and 
 that he who precedes us in ruin is unhappy 
 only in and for himself. 
 
 " Is there now a man amongst you who 
 imagines, that merely a Syracusan, and not 
 himself, is the object of Athenian enmity, and 
 pronounceth it hard that he must be exposed 
 to dangers in which I only am concerned ^ 
 Let such a one with more solidity reflect that, 
 not merely for what is mine, but equally also 
 for what, is his own, he should associate with 
 me, though within my precincts ; and that this 
 may be done with greater security now, since 
 as yet I am not quite destroyed, since in me 
 he is sure of a steadfast ally, and before he is 
 bereaved of all support may hazard the conten- 
 tion. And let him farther rest assured, that 
 it is not the sole view of the Athenian to 
 bridle enmity in a Syracusan ; but, under the 
 colour of that pretext, to render himself the 
 more secure, by gaining for a time the friend- 
 ship of another. 
 
 " If others, again, entertain any envy or 
 jealousy of Syracuse, for, to each of these, 
 great states are generally obnoxious, and would 
 take delight in seeing us depressed, in order to 
 teach us moderation, though not totally de- 
 stroyed, from a regard to his own preservation, — 
 these are such sanguine wishes, as, in the course 
 of human affairs, can never be accomplished ; 
 because it is quite impossible, that the same 
 person shall build up airy schemes to soothe his 
 own passions and then insure their success. 
 And thus, should some sinister event take 
 place, quite sunk under the weight of his own 
 calamity, he would perhaps be soon wishing 
 again, that I was so replaced as to excite his 
 envy. Impossible this, for one who abandoned 
 my defence, who refused beforehand to parti- 
 cipate my dangers, — dangers, though not in 
 name, yet in reality, his own. For, if names 
 alone be regarded, he acts in the support of 
 my power ; but, if realities, of his own preser- 
 vation. 
 
 " Long since, ye men of Camarina, it was 
 incumbent on you, who are borderers upon us, 
 and must be our seconds in ruin, to have fore- 
 seen these things, and not to have abetted our 
 
 defence with so much remissness as you have 
 hitherto done it. You ought to have repaired 
 to our support with free and voluntary aid ; 
 with such as, in case the Athenians had begun 
 first with Camarina, you would have come with 
 earnest prayers to implore from us : so cordial 
 and so alert you should have appeared in our 
 behalf, to avert us from too precipitate submis- 
 sions. But these things never were ; not even 
 you, nor any other people, have showed such 
 affection or alarcity for us. 
 
 " From timorousness of heart you will study 
 perhaps to manage both with us and the in- 
 vaders, and allege, that there are treaties sub- 
 sisting between yourselves and the Athenians. 
 Yet these treaties you never made to hurt your 
 friends, but to repel the efforts of your foes, 
 should they dare to attack you. By them you 
 are bound to give defensive aid to the Athe- 
 nians when attacked by others, and not when 
 they, as in the present case, injuriously fall 
 upon your neighbours. Kemember that the 
 Rhegians, though even of Chalcidic descent, 
 have refused to concur with them in replatiting 
 the Leontines, who are also Chalcideans. Hard, 
 indeed, is your fate, if they, suspecting some 
 bad design to lie lurking under a fair justifi- 
 cation, have recourse to the wary moderate 
 behaviour which appearances will not warrant ; 
 whilst you, on the pretended ground of a rational 
 conduct, are eager to serve a people who are 
 by nature your foes ; and join with most im- 
 placable enemies to destroy your own kindred, 
 to whom nature hath so closely attached you! 
 
 " In such a conduct there is no justice : the 
 justice lies in abetting our cause, and not 
 dastardly shrinking before the terror of their 
 arms. These arms are not terrible, would 
 we only all combine in our mutual defence ; 
 they are only so, if, on the contrary, we con- 
 tinue disunited, the point which the Athe- 
 nians labour with so much assiduity. For, 
 even when singly against us they entered the 
 lists, and were victorious, yet they were not 
 able to effectuate their designs, but were 
 obliged percipitately to re-embark. If united, 
 therefore, what farther can we have to fearl 
 What hinders us from associating together 
 with instant alacrity and real] especially as 
 we soon shall receive an aid from Peloponne- 
 sus, who in all the business of war are far supe- 
 rior to Athenians. Reject, I say, the vain pre- 
 sumptioi], that either it will be equitable in re- 
 gard to us, or prudential in regard to yourselves. 
 
248 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VI. 
 
 .0 take part with neither side, on pretence that 
 you have treaties subsisting with both, there 
 jS a fallacy in it, which, though veiled under 
 plausible words, the event will soon detect. 
 For if, through your determination to abandon 
 his support, the party already attacked be van- 
 quished, and the assailant be invigorated by 
 success, what can such absenting of yourselves 
 avail, but to help forwards the ruin of the one, 
 and afford free scope to the pernicious schemes 
 of the otherl And how glorious would the 
 reverse of this conduct be, would you exert 
 your efforts to redress the injured, who also by 
 the ties of consanguinity have a right to expect 
 it from you ; to guard the commou welfare of 
 Sicily ; and not suffer your friends, your good 
 friends, the Athenians, to run out into a course 
 of outrage ! 
 
 " In a v/ord, wc Syracusans have noW|Only 
 this to add: that arguments are superfluous, 
 either for the instruction of you or of others, 
 in points whose tendency you know as clearly 
 as ourselves. But we earnestly conjure you, 
 and, if prayers will not avail, we boldly protest 
 against you, that, as the worst designs are 
 formed against us by our eternal foes, the lo- 
 nians, you would act as you ought ; — if not, 
 that by you we are basely betrayed, Dorians by 
 Dorians. If such must be our fate, if by the 
 Athenians we must be destroyed, they will be 
 indebted for their success to your determinations, 
 but the glory of it will be totally assumed by 
 themselves. Nay, the chief reward they will 
 reap from the victory will be this, to enslave the 
 persons who enabled them to gain it. But then, 
 should the victory rest with us, you are the men 
 from whom we shall exact revenge for all the 
 dangers to which we have"been exposed. Exa- 
 mine things, therefore, and declare your resolu- 
 tion, either at once, without embarking into dan- 
 gers, to put on the Athenian chains ; or, with 
 us, to face the storm and earn your preserva- 
 tion ; not basely bending to the yoke of fo- 
 reign tyrants, and preventing an enmity with us 
 which will not quickly be appeased." 
 
 In these words Hermocrates harangued the 
 Camarineans : and, when he had ended, Eu- 
 phemus, ambassador of the Athenians, replied 
 as follows ; 
 
 " Our journey hither was intended for the 
 renewal of a former alliance ; but, as this Sy- 
 racusan hath taken the liberty to be severe upon 
 us, we lie under an obligation to show the jus- 
 tice of our title to that share of dominion which 
 
 we now possess. And the strongest evidence 
 of this he himself hath been pleased to give, 
 by affirming, that lonians have been eternal foes 
 to Dorians. The fact is ineontestably true ; 
 since we, who are lonians, have been necessita- 
 ted to stand ever upon our guard against the en- 
 croaching designs of the Peloponnesians, who 
 are Dorians, who are our superiors in number, 
 and are seated upon our borders. When, there- 
 fore, in the close of the Persian invasion, we 
 saw ourselves masters of a navy, we asserted 
 our own independence from the government 
 and guidance of the Lacedaemonians, since no 
 shadow of reason could be found why we should 
 be obedient to them any more than they to us, 
 save only that in this critical period their 
 strength was greater. We were afterwards 
 appointed, by free election, the leaders of those 
 lonians who had formerly been subject to the 
 monarch. And the preference awarded to us 
 we continue to support ; assured that only thus 
 we shall escape subjection to the Peloponne- 
 sian yoke, by keeping possession of a power 
 which can effectually awe all their encroach- 
 ments. And, farther, (that we may come to 
 particulars,) it was not with injustice that we 
 exacted subjection from those lonians, and in- 
 habitants of the isles, whom the Syracusans say 
 we thought proper to enslave, though connected 
 with us by the ties of blood : for they march- 
 ed, in company with the Mede, against their 
 mother-country, against us, their founders. 
 They had not th& courage to expose their own 
 homes to ruin and devastation, by an honest re- 
 volt, though we with magnanimity abandone(' 
 even Athens itself. They made slavery the .r 
 choice, and in the same miserable fate would 
 have been glad to envelop us. Thus solid are 
 the grounds on which we found our title to that 
 extensive rule we now enjoy. We honestly 
 deserve it : since, in the cause of Greece, we 
 equipped the largest fleet, and exerted the great- 
 est ardour, without the least equivocation ; and 
 since thoseothers acting, with implicit obedience 
 to the Mede, did all they could to distress us. 
 To which let it be added, that we were at the 
 same time desirous to obtain a strength sufficient 
 to give a check to the ambition of Peloponnesi- 
 ans. Submissive, therefore, to their dictates, we 
 are not, will not be ; because, either in return for 
 the repulse of the barbarian by our single efforts, 
 or in requital of the dangers we bravely en- 
 countered in defence of the liberty of those 
 lonians, — greater than all the rest of Greece, 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 249 
 
 YEAR XVII.] 
 
 or even they themselves, durst haiard for their body of our friends, be restored to the full en- 
 own, — we have an undoubted right to empire, j joyment of all their liberty and strength. 
 
 " But, farther, to guard its own liberties and " Now, to a potentate invested with supe- 
 rights is a privilege, which, without either mur- 1 rior power, or to a state possessed of empire, 
 mur or envy, will be allowed to every state : nothing that is profitable can be deemed ab- 
 and now, for the security of these important surd ; nothing secure that cannot be safely 
 
 points to ourselves, have we ventured hither to 
 beg your concurrence ; conscious, at the same 
 time, ye men of Camarina, that your welfare 
 too coincides with our own. This we can 
 clearly demonstrate, even from those crimina- 
 tions which our adversaries here have lavished 
 upon us, and from those so terrible suspicions 
 which you yourselves are inclined to entertain 
 of 'our proceedings. We are not now to learn 
 that men, who with some high degrees of hor- 
 ror suspect latent mischief, may for the pre- 
 sent he soothed by an insinuating flow of 
 words ; but, when summoned to action, will so 
 exert themselves as is expedient for their wel- 
 fare : and, consonant to this, we have already 
 hinted that through fear alone we seized that 
 power which we now possess in Greece ; that 
 through the same motive we have ventured 
 hither, to establish our own security in concert 
 with that of our friends ; so far from the view 
 of enslaving them to ourselves, that we are 
 solely intent on preserving them from being en- 
 slaved by others. 
 
 " Let no man here retort upon us, — that all 
 our solicitude for you is unmerited and super- 
 fluous. Such a one must know, that, so long 
 as you are safe, so long as you are able to em- 
 ploy the Syracusans, the less liable they will 
 be to send reinforcements from hence to the 
 Peloponnesians for our annoyance : and as 
 this is the real state of things, our concern 
 should most largely be bestowed upon you. 
 By parity of reason it also highly concerns us 
 to replant the Leontines ; not in order to ren- 
 der them vassals to ourselves, as their relations 
 of Euboea are, but to make them as strong and 
 powerful as we are able ; that, seated as they 
 then will be on her confines, they may com- 
 pensate our remote situation in affording a di- 
 version to Syracuse. For, if the view be 
 carried back to Greece, we ourselves are there 
 a match for our foes. The Chalcidean there, 
 whom after unjustly enslaving we are taxed 
 with absurdity for pretending to vindicate here, 
 is highly serviceable to us ; because he is dis- 
 armed, and because he furnisheth us with a 
 tribute. But, here in Sicily, our interest de- 
 mandeth, that the Leontines, and the whole 
 39 
 
 managed. Incidents will arise with which we 
 mijst temporize, and determine accordingly our 
 enmity or our friendship. But the latter makes 
 most for our interest here, where we ought by 
 no means to weaken our friends, but through 
 the strength of our friends, to keep down and 
 disable our enemies. Of this you ought not 
 to rest incredulous, as you know, that over our 
 dependents in Greece, we either hold tight or 
 slacken the rein, as squares best with the pub- 
 lic service. We permit to the Chians and 
 Methymneans the free use of their hberties 
 and laws for a quota of shipping ; we do the 
 same to many for an annual tribute, exacted 
 perhaps with somewhat of rigour. Others 
 amongst them, who fight under our oidere, are 
 absolutely free, though seated upon islands aiid 
 easy to be totally reduced, because they are 
 commodiously situated to annoy the Pelopon- 
 nesian coast. And hence, it may be depended 
 upon, that we shall make such dispositions al- 
 so here as are most expedient for our own in- 
 terest, and may best lessen the dread, which, 
 as was said before, we entertain of the Syra- 
 cusans. 
 
 " The point at which they aim is an extent 
 of their rule over you ; and when, by alarming 
 your suspicions of us, they have wrought you 
 to their own purpose, either by open force or 
 taking advantage of your desolate condition, 
 when we are repulsed and obliged to abandon 
 your defence, they imend to subdue all Sicily 
 to their yoke. Such the event will unavoida- 
 bly prove, if at present you adhere to them ; 
 for never again will it be easy for us to as- 
 semble together so large an armament to give- 
 a check to their ambition ; nor, when we- 
 are no longer at hand for your support, willl 
 their strength against you be insuflicient.. It- 
 is vain in any man to indulge an opinion that 
 this may not be the case, since the very train 
 of things evinceth its truth. For, when first 
 you invited us hither, it was not upon the sug- 
 gestion of any other fear than this, that, should 
 we suffer you to be subjected by the Syracusani. 
 the danger then would extend itself to us. 
 And highly unjust it would be now, if the 
 argument you euccessfully enforced with us- 
 2c2 
 
250 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAE 
 
 [book VI. 
 
 should lose all its inifluence upon you, or should 
 you ground suspicions on our present appear- 
 ance against them, with a force superior to 
 theirs, when you ought much more to enter- 
 tain an endless distrust of them. The truth is 
 this, that without your concurrence we are not 
 ahle to continue here. And in case, with per- 
 fidy open and avowed, we make seizure of your 
 cities, yet we are unahle to retain their posses- 
 sion, remote as they lie from Athens ; as 
 cities so large we never could garrison ; and 
 as they are farther provided in all respects as 
 well as any on the continent. But, on the con- 
 trary, the Syracusans will not rush upon you 
 from a camp upon the beach ; but, posted in a 
 city more formidable in strength than the whole 
 of our armament, they are ever meditating your 
 ruin, and, when they have seized a proper op- 
 portunity, will strike the blow. They have af- 
 forded you instances of this already, and a 
 flagrant one indeed in the case of the Leon- 
 tines. And yet they have the eflfrontery now, 
 by words, as if you were so to be deluded, to 
 exasperate you 'against us, who have hitherto 
 controlled their views, and deterred them to 
 this moment from making all Sicily their prey. 
 " Our argum_ents have a tendency directly 
 opposite. We have nothing in view but your 
 certain and assured preservation, when we 
 earnestly conjure you not wilfully to betray 
 the means which at present will result from 
 our union, which we can mutually exert in one 
 another's behalf ; and strongly to represent to 
 your own reflections, that, even without the 
 concurrence of allies, a road to your reduction 
 will at any time be open to these Syracusans 
 through their own superior numbers ; but an 
 opportunity exceedingly-flseldom afforded you 
 to make head against them with so large an 
 auxiliary body. And if, from groundless sus- 
 picions, you suffer now so large a body to de- 
 part either unsuccessful or defeated, yet a 
 ■time will come when you will ardently wish to 
 see them return, though in a much less pro- 
 portion of strength, and they have it no longer 
 in their power to cross the sea for your sup- 
 port. Take care, therefore, Camarineans, that 
 neither yourselves nor others be deceived by a 
 '00 credulous belief of the bold calumniations 
 these Syracusans utter. We have now laid 
 before you the true ground of all those sad 
 suspicions which are fomented against us ; 
 but shall again recall them to your remem- 
 
 brance by a short recapitulation, that they may 
 have the proper influence upon you. 
 
 " We declare, therefore, that we rule in 
 Greece merely to prevent our being enslaved ; 
 but are intent on vindicating liberty in Sicily, 
 to suppress that annoyance which might other- 
 wise be given us from hence ; — that mere ne- 
 cessity obligeth us to embark in many underta- 
 kings, because we have many sinister incidents 
 to guard against ; — that now and formerly we 
 came hither to support those Sicilians who 
 have been unjustly oppressed ; nor uninvited, 
 but solemnly conjured to take such steps. 
 Attempt not, therefore, to divert our pursuits, 
 either by erecting yourselves into censors of 
 our proceedings, or into correctors of our poli- 
 tics, a point too difficult for you to manage. 
 But, so much of our activity or conduct as you 
 can mould into a consistency with your own 
 welfare, lay hold of that, and employ it to your 
 best advantage ; and never imagine that our 
 politics are equally prejudicial to all the world 
 besides, but highly beneficial to the bulk of 
 the Grecians. For, through every quarter, 
 even those which we cannot pretend to con- 
 trol, both such as dread impending mischiefs 
 and such as meditate encroachments, — laying 
 hold on both sides of the ready expectation ; 
 the former, that redress may be obtained by 
 our interposition ; the latter, that, if we think 
 proper to oppose them, their own safety will 
 be greatly endangered ; — both sides, I say, are 
 hence obliged ; the latter, to practice modera- 
 tion, though with regret ; the former, to enjoy 
 tranquillity without previous embroilments of 
 the public peace. The security, therefore, 
 which now offers itself to your acceptance, and 
 is always ready for those who want it, you are 
 conjured by no means to reject ; but relying, 
 like other communities, on that quantity of 
 support we are able to afford you, put the 
 change for once on the Syracusans ; and, in- 
 stead of being ever on the watch against them, 
 force them at length to be watchful and alarmed 
 for themselves." 
 
 Such was the reply of Euphemus. In the 
 meantime the real disposition of the Cama- 
 rineans was this : at bottom they were well- 
 affected to the Athenians, save only for the 
 ambition they showed of enslaving Sicily ; but 
 had ever been embroiled with the Syracusans, 
 through that jealousy, ever to be found in a 
 neighbouring state. But, as the dread of vie- 
 
TEAR XVII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 251 
 
 tory on the side of the Syracusans, who were 
 close upon their borders, if earned without their 
 concurrence, had influenced their measures, 
 they sent a small party of horse to succour 
 them on the former occasion ; and looked upon 
 . themselves as obliged in policy to serve them 
 underhand in future exigencies, but with all 
 possible frugality and reserve; and, at the 
 present juncture, that they might not betray 
 any the least partiality against the Athenians, 
 as they were come off victorious from a battle, 
 to return the same impartial reply to both. 
 Determined, therefore, by these considerations, 
 they answered, — that, " since a war had broke 
 out between two states, each of which was in 
 alliance with themselves, they judged the only 
 method of acting consistently with their baths 
 would be, to observe a strict neutrality." 
 Upon this the ambassadors of both parties took 
 their leaves and departed. And the Syracu- 
 sans, within themselves, exerted their utmost ap- 
 » plications to get all things in readiness for war. 
 The Athenians, who were now encamped at 
 Naxus, opened negotiations with the Siculi, to 
 draw over as many of them as was possible 
 into their adherence. Many of these, who 
 inhabited the plains, and were most awed by 
 the Syracusans, stood resolutely out ; but the 
 generality of those who were seated in the 
 midland parts, as they were now, and had ever 
 kept themselves uncontrolled, sided at once 
 with the Athenians. They furnished them 
 with corn for the service of the army, and there 
 were some who supplied them with money. 
 And then the Athenians, taking the field 
 against such as refused to accede, forced some 
 to a compliance, and prevented others from 
 receiving garrisons and aids from Syracuse. 
 During winter also they removed again from 
 Naxus to Catana ; and having repaired their 
 camp, which had been burned by the Syracu- 
 sans, chose to pass the remainder of the winter 
 there. 
 
 They also despatched a trireme to Carthage, 
 to ask their friendship, and whatever assistance 
 could possibly be obtained. They sent also to 
 Tuscany, as some cities on that coast had 
 made them voluntary offers of assistance. 
 And, farther, they circulated their orders among 
 the Siculi, and despatched in particular one to 
 the Egesteans, " to send them as large a num- 
 ber of horses as they could possibly procure." 
 They busied themselves in collecting materials 
 
 for circumvallation, such as bricks and iron, 
 and all other necessary stores ; being deter- 
 mined to carry on the war with vigour on the 
 first approach of spring. 
 
 The ambassadors, who from Syracuse were 
 sent to Corinth and Lacedaemon, endeavoured 
 in their passage to prevail with the Italians 
 " not to look with unconcern on the Athenian 
 proceedings, since they also were equally in- 
 volved in the danger." But, when arrived at 
 Corinth, they were admitted to an audience, 
 in which they insisted on a speedy supply, 
 upon the plea of consanguinity ; and the Co- 
 rinthians came at once to a resolution, by way 
 of precedent to others, that, " with all possible 
 ardour they would join in their defence." 
 They even appointed an embassy of their own 
 to accompany them to Lacediemon, whose in- 
 structions were, to second them in soliciting 
 the Lacedajmonians " to declare open war at 
 home against the Athenians, and to fit out an 
 aid for the service of Sicily." 
 
 At the time that these joint embassies arriv- 
 ed at Lacedsemon from Corinth, Alcibiadcs 
 was also there. He had no sooner made his 
 escape, attended by his companions in exile, 
 than in a trading-vessel he passed over from 
 Thuria to Cyllene in Elea ; and from thence 
 he repaired to Lacedosmon. But, as the 
 Lacedjemonians had pressed to see him, he 
 went thither under the protection of the public 
 faith ; for he had with reason dreaded his re- 
 ception there, since he had acted so large a part 
 in the affair of Mantinea. 
 
 It happened farther, that, when a public 
 assembly was convened at Sparta, the Corin- 
 thians, and the Syracusans, and Alcibiades, all 
 urged the same request, and were successful. 
 Nay, though the college of ephori, and those 
 who presided at the helm of the state, had 
 dressed up a plan, in pursuance of which they 
 were only to send their ambassadors to Syra- 
 cuse, to hinder all accommodations with the 
 Athenians, and were quite averse to the sup- 
 plying them with real succours. — yet Alcibia- 
 des, standing up, inflamed the Lacedsemonipn 
 fury, and wrought them to his purpose by the 
 following harangue : 
 
 " I lie under a necessity, in the beginning of 
 my discourse, to vindicate myself from the 
 calumny which hath been charged against me, 
 lest a jealousy of me might divert your atten- 
 tion from those points which equally affect the 
 
252 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VI. 
 
 common cause. My ancestors, therefore, hav- 
 ing, upon some reasonable grounds of com- 
 plaint, renounced the privilege of being the 
 public hosts of your embassies at Athens, I 
 am the man vpho again re-established this hos- 
 pitable intercourse ; vrho in many other respects 
 endeavoured with great assiduity to oblige you, 
 and particularly in the calamity which fell to 
 Tour share at Pylus. I cheerfully persevered 
 in these my favourable inclinations towards 
 you, till you yourselves, bent on accommodat- 
 ing your differences with the Athenians, em- 
 ployed my adversaries to negotiate your affairs ; 
 and as thereby you invested them with autho- 
 rity, you of course reflected disgrace on me. 
 With reason, therefore, after such provocations, 
 you were afterwards thwarted by me, when I 
 supported the interest of the Mantineans and 
 the Argives, and introduced new measures into 
 the state, in opposition to you. Let therefore 
 such of your number as, chagrined at what they 
 suffered then, continue unjustly their resent- 
 ments against me, weigh now the force of those 
 reasons on which I acted, and return to better 
 temper. If again I suffer in the opinion of 
 any man, because I have ever manifested an 
 attachment to the interest of the people, let 
 him also learn that his enmity to me on that 
 account is not to be defended. We have borne, 
 from time immemorial, a steadfast unrelenting 
 aversion to tyrants : now the whole of opposi- 
 tion to the despotic power of one is expressed 
 by this word, the people ; and on this principle 
 alone our firm and constant adherence to the 
 multitude hath been hitherto carried on and 
 supported. Besides, as the state of which I 
 was a member was purely democratical, I lay 
 ander a necessity, in many respects, of con- 
 forming my conduct to the established model ; 
 and yet I endeavoured to give the public 
 measures a greater share of moderation than 
 the franctic humour of the Athenians was 
 judged capable of brooking. But incendiaries 
 started up ; such as, not only in earlier times, 
 but even in our own, have driven the people to 
 more furious measures, and have at length 
 etfected — the exile of Alcibiades. But, so 
 long as the state was in my own management, 
 I thought myself justified, could I preserve it 
 in that height of grandeur and freedom, and on 
 the same model of government, in which I 
 found it. Not but that the judicious part of 
 our community are sensible what sort of a 
 
 government a democracy is, — and I myself no 
 less than others, who have such abundant 
 occasion to reproach and curse it : — but, for 
 madness open and avowed, new terms of ab- 
 horrence cannot be invented ; though totally to 
 subvert it we could in no wise deem a measure , 
 of security, whilst you had declared yourselves 
 our foes, and were in the field against us. 
 And all those proceedings of mine, which have 
 proved most offensive to you, are to be charged 
 entirely to such principles as these. 
 
 " And now, in relation to these points on 
 which you are here assembled to deliberate, 
 (and I also with you,) and about which if I 
 am able to give you a greater light, I am bound 
 to do it, — attend to what I am going to declare. 
 Our' principal view in the expedition to Sicily 
 was, if possible, to reduce the Sicilians to our 
 yoke. After them, we intended to do the 
 same by the Italians. We should next have 
 attempted the dominions of the Carthaginians ; 
 nay, Carthage itself. Had these our views 
 been successful, either in the whole or the 
 greater part, we should soon have given the 
 attack to Peloponnesus : assembling for that 
 purpose the whole Grecian force, which the 
 countries thus subdued must have added to 
 our own ; taking also into our pay large 
 bodies of Barbarians and Iberians, and other 
 soldiers of those nations which by general con- 
 sent are famed for the most warlike of all 
 Barbarians. We should have built also great 
 numbers of triremes for the enlargement of our 
 navy, as Italy would plentifully have supplied 
 us with timber ; with which blocking up Pelo- 
 ponnesus on all sides, and with our land-forces 
 at the same time invading it by land, (after carry- 
 ing your cities, some by storm, and some by the 
 regular siege,) we hoped without obstruction to 
 have warred you down, and in pursuance of 
 that, to have seized the empire of universal 
 Greece. With money and all needful stores 
 adequate to this extensive plan, the cities to be 
 conquered in those remoter parts would with 
 all proper expedition have supplied us, without 
 any demands on our own domestic revenues. 
 Such were to be the achievements of that grand 
 armament which is now abroad ; such, you may 
 rest assured upon the evidence of a person who 
 was privy to every step, was its original plan ; 
 and the generals who are left in the command 
 win yet, if they are able, carry it into execu- 
 tion. And I must farther beg leave to tell 
 
■SEAR XVII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 253 
 
 you, that, if with timely succours you do not 
 interpose, nothing in those parts will be able to 
 stand before them. 
 
 " The Sicilians are a people unexperienced 
 in war ; and yet, would they unite and combine 
 together in their mutual defence, they might 
 possibly even now be too hard for the Atheni- 
 ans. But then the Syracusans, abandoned as 
 they are by the rest, and we already have seen 
 their whole force defeated in battle, and who 
 are blocked up in their own harbours by the 
 enemy's fleet, will be unable long to resist the 
 great force of the Athenians which is already 
 there. If, therefore, Syracuse be taken, all 
 Sicily is vanquished at a stroke, and Italy be- 
 cometh instantly their prey ; and then the 
 storm, which, as I intimated before, was to be 
 directed against you from that quarter, will in 
 a short time gather and come pouring down 
 upon you. 
 
 " Let no one therefore imagine that the end 
 of your present deliberation is the safety of 
 Sicily, when Peloponnesus itself will be en- 
 dangered, unless some measures of prevention 
 be executed with speed ; — unless you send out 
 a naval force, for the preservation of Sicily, so 
 dexterously appointed, that the hands who man 
 the ships and ply the oar, may, on the instant 
 of their landing, become a body of heavy- 
 armed ; and, what in my judgment is better 
 than an army, a citizen of Sparta to take upon 
 him the command, that those who are ready he 
 may discipline to service, and for such to join 
 as on choice •, would refuse their concurrence : 
 for, by such a step, those who are already yoiir 
 friends will be animated with higher degrees of 
 resolution, and those who fluctuate at present 
 will join you with a smaller sense of fear. 
 
 " It behoves you also to make war upon the 
 Athenians at home in a more declared and ex- 
 plicit manner ; that the Syracusans, convinced 
 that you have their welfare at heart, may make 
 a more obstinate resistance, and the Athenians 
 be rendered less able to send reinforcements to 
 their troops in Sicily. 
 
 " It behoves you farther to raise fortifica- 
 tions at Decelea in Attica ; a step which the 
 Athenians have ever most terribly apprehend- 
 ed, and think that in that point alone you have 
 not put their resolution to its utmost trial in 
 the present war; and that assuredly must be 
 pronounced the most effectual method of dis- 
 tressing an enemy, to discover what he dreads 
 Host, and then know how to afilict him in his 
 
 most tender part : for it is a reasonable con 
 elusion, that they will tremble most at In- 
 cidents which, should they take place, they 
 are inwardly convinced must most sensibly 
 affect them. As to the benefits which you 
 yourselves sjiall reap by fortifying Decelea, 
 and of what they shall be debarred, I shall pass 
 over many, and only concisely point out the 
 most important. — By this, all the natural com- 
 modities of the country will fall into your 
 hands ; some by way of booty, the rest by vo- 
 luntary contributions. They will instantly be 
 deprived of the profits of the silver mines at 
 Laurium, as well as of the rents of their estates 
 and the fees of their courts. The tributes 
 from their dependents will also be paid with 
 less punctuality ; since the latter shall no soon- 
 er perceive that you are earnestly bent on war, 
 than they will show an open disregard for 
 Athens. 
 
 " That these or any of these points be exe- 
 cuted with despatch and vigour, dependeth, ye 
 LacediBmonians, on yourselves alone. I can 
 confidently aver that all are feasible, and I 
 think I shall not prove mistaken in ray senti- 
 ments. I ought not to suffer in the opinion of 
 any Lacedtemonian, though once accounted the 
 warmest of her patriots, I now strenuously 
 join the most inveterate foes of my country ; 
 nor ought my sincerity to be suspected by any, 
 as if I suited my words to the sharp resent- 
 ments of an exile. I am driven from my coun- 
 try, through the malice of men, who have pre- 
 vailed against me : but not from your service, 
 if you hearken to my counsels. Your enmity 
 is sooner to be forgiven, who have hurt you 
 enemies alone, than theirs, who by cruel treat- 
 ment compel friends to be foes. My patriot- 
 ism is far from thriving under the injustice I 
 have suffered ; it was merely an effect of grati 
 tude for that protection I once enjoyed from 
 my country. Nor have I reason at present to 
 imagine, that against my country I am now go- 
 ing to march, so much as to recover some 
 country to myself, when at present I have none, 
 at all. And I judge the person to be a true 
 lover of his country, — not him who, exiled 
 from it, abandons himself without a struggle to 
 his own iniquitous fate, but— who, from a fond- 
 ness for it, leaves no project unattempted to 
 recover it again. 
 
 " As these are my sentiments, I may fairly, 
 ye Lacedsemonians, insist upon your acceptance 
 of my ser-ice without diffidence or fear, what 
 
254 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VI. 
 
 ever dangers or whatever miseries may here- 
 after result. You well know the maxim, 
 which universal consent will evince to be good, 
 — that if, when an enemy, I hurt you much, 
 when I am now become your friend, I can help 
 you more. Nay, for the latter I am better 
 qualified on this very account, that I am per- 
 fectly acquainted with the state of Athens ; 
 whereas I was only able to conjecture at yours. 
 And, as you are now met together to form re- 
 solutions on points of the highest importance, 
 I conjure you without hesitation to carry your 
 arms at once into Sicily and Attica ; to the 
 end that, in the former, by the presence of a 
 small part of your forces, you may work out 
 signal preservations, and at home pull down 
 the present and even the future growth of the 
 Athenians ; that, for ages to come, yourselves 
 may reap security and peace, and preside at the 
 helm of united Greece, which will cheerfully 
 acquiesce uiider your guidance, and pay you a 
 free, uncompelled obedience." 
 
 To this purpose Alcibiades spoke. And the 
 Lacedaemonians, who had before some sort of 
 intention to take the field against Athens, 
 though hitherto they protracted its execution, 
 were now more than ever animated to it, when 
 Alcibiades had given them such a detail of af- 
 fairs, whom they judged to have the clearest 
 insight in them. Thereupon they turned their 
 attention immediately on fortifying Decelea, 
 and sending out a body of succour for the pre- 
 sent service of Sicily. They also appointed 
 Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, to go and 
 take upon him the command at Syracuse ; with 
 orders, by concerting measures with the Syra- 
 cusans and Corinthians, to draw up a plan for 
 the most effectual and most ready conveyance 
 of succours thither. 
 
 Gylippus accordingly issued out his orders 
 to the Corinthians, to attend him, without loss 
 of time at Asine, with two ships ; and also to 
 expedite the equipment of the fleet which they 
 designed for this service, and to keep them in 
 readiness to sail when opportunity should re- 
 quire. Having so far concerted measures, the 
 ambassadors departed from Lacedsemon. 
 
 The Athenian trireme, also, despatched from 
 Sicily by the generals on that post, to demand 
 Bupplies of money and a body of horse. Was by 
 this time arrived at Athens. And the Athe- 
 nians, on hearing their demands, drew up a de- 
 cree, to send away supplies to that armament, 
 and 1 body of horsemen. 
 
 And here the winter ended ; and the seven- 
 teenth year of this war, of which Thucydides 
 hath compiled the history, came also to an end. 
 
 TEAR XTIII.' 
 
 On the earliest approach of the spring which 
 led on the following summer, the Athenians in 
 Sicily, hoisting from Catana, showed them- 
 selves on the coast of Megara, in Sicily, of 
 which the Syracusans having dispossessed the 
 inhabitants in the time of Gelon the tyrant, 
 (as I have already related,) continued masters 
 of the soil. Having landed here, they ravaged 
 the country ; till, approaching a fortress be- 
 longing to the Syracusans, and attempting it 
 without success, they retired, some by land and 
 the rest on board the fleet, into the river Te- 
 reas ; from whence going again on shore, they 
 ravaged the plains and set fire to the growing 
 corn. They also fell in with a small party of 
 Syracusans, some of whom they slew ; and 
 then, erecting a trophy, went again on board. 
 They next returned to Catana ; and, after vic- 
 tualling there, proceeded from thence, with 
 their whole force, to the attack of Centoripa, 
 a strong fort belonging to the Siculi ; and, hav- 
 ing made themselves masters of it by a capitu- 
 lation, they stood away, burning down in their 
 passage the corn of the Inesseans and Hyble- 
 ans. Upon returning to Catana, they find 
 there two hundred and fifty horsemen arrived 
 from Athens, though without horses, yet with 
 all the proper furniture, as if they could be 
 better supplied with the former in Sicily ; as 
 also thirty archers, mounted, and three hun- 
 dred talents^ in silver. 
 
 In the same spring, the Lacedaemonians also 
 took the field against Argos, and advanced as 
 far as Cleonje ; but the shock of fen earthquake 
 being felt there, they again retired. And after 
 this, the Argives, making an irruption into the 
 Thyreatis, which borders upon themselves, took 
 a vast booty from the Lacedsemonians, which 
 sold for no less than twenty-five talents.' 
 
 And not long after, in the same spring, the 
 popular party at Thespise assaulted those in 
 power, but without success. And, though the 
 Athenians marched away to their succour, some 
 of them wertf apprehended, and others were 
 obliged to take refuge at Athens. 
 
 ■ Before Christ, 414. =58,135/. a 4,S43;. 15.« 
 
YEAR XVIII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 255 
 
 In the same summer, the Syracnsans had no 
 sooner received intelligence of the arrival of a 
 body of horsemen in-.ongst the Athenians, and 
 the design of advancing immediately to assault 
 them, than it occurred to their reflections, that, 
 " in case the Athenians could not possess 
 themselves of Epipolsc, (a spot of ground 
 which is only one continued crag, and lies di- 
 rectly above the city of Syracuse,) it would be 
 difficult to enclose them completely round with 
 works of circumvallation, even though* they 
 should be defeated in open battle." They ap- 
 l)lied themselves therefore to the guard of all 
 (he approaches to Epipolse, that the enemy 
 might not, on a sudden gain the eminence ; 
 for by other methods it was impossible for 
 them to carry that post. Excepting those ap- 
 proaches, the rest of the tract is an impractica- 
 ble steep, inclining gradually quite down to 
 the city, and commanding the view of every 
 thing within it. Hence, therefore, because it 
 riseth with a continual ascent, it was called by 
 the Syracusans Epipolae. 
 
 As Hermocrates and his colleagues had 
 now formally taken upon him the command, 
 ihe whole force of Syracuse marched out, by 
 Dreak of day, into a meadow, on the banks of 
 the Anapus, to pass under review ; where the 
 first thing they did was to select seven hundred 
 of the choicest men amongst the heavy-armed, 
 to be commanded by Diolimus, an exile from 
 Andrus. These were appointed for the guard 
 of Epipolie, and to be ready for service, as 
 they were always to keep in a body, on any 
 sudden emergence. But the Athenians, who 
 had mustered their forces on the preceding day, 
 had stood away from Catana, and were come 
 in the night undiscovered to the spot called 
 Leon, which is distant six or seven stadia' 
 from Epipolae, where they disbarked their land- 
 forces, and then sent their ships to lie in the sta- 
 tion of Thapsus Thapsus is a peninsula, join- 
 ed to the main-land by a narrow isthmus, and jut- 
 ting out into the sea, at no great distance from 
 the city of Syracuse either by land or water. The 
 naval force of the Athenians, having secured 
 their station by a palisade across the isthmus, lay 
 quiet in their posts ; but the land-army, without 
 loss of time, made a running march towards 
 Epipola; ; and mounted by the pass of Euryalus, 
 before the Syracusans, who were yet in the 
 
 1 Above half a mile. 
 
 meadow busied in their review, discovered or 
 were able to advance to prevent them. And 
 now their whole force was in motion to dislodge 
 them ; each man with all possible alacrity, and 
 more particularly the seven hundred command- 
 ed by Diomilus ; but, from the meadow to the 
 nearest spot where they could come up with 
 the enemy, was a march of no less than twenty- 
 five stadia.^ To this it was owing that the 
 Syracusans came to the charge in a disorderly 
 manner ; and, being plainly repulsed in battle 
 at Epipolse, were forced to retire within the 
 city. Diomilus also and about three hundred 
 more lose their lives in this engagement. 
 
 In pursuance of this, the Athenians, having 
 erected a trophy, and given up the bodies of 
 the slain under truce to the Syracusans, march- 
 ed down the next day in order of battle to the 
 very gates of the city ; but as the Syracusans 
 refrained from sallying out against them, they 
 then drew off, and raised a fort at Labdalum, 
 on the very steepest edge of Epipolae, looking 
 towards Megara, which they intended as a re- 
 pository for their baggage and money, whilst 
 themselves might be called off, either to fight 
 or to carry on the works of a siege. 
 
 Soon after, this they were joined by a body 
 of three hundred Egestean horse, and one hun- 
 dred more consisting of Siculi and Naxians, 
 and some others in their alliance. The Athe- 
 nian cavalry was in all two hundred and fifty ; 
 they had procured some horses from the Eges- 
 teans and Cataneans, and had purchased the 
 rest ; so that now they had got together a body 
 of horse amounting in all to six hundred and 
 fifty. 
 
 A garrison was no sooner settled in the fort 
 of Labdalum, than the Athenians approacned 
 to Tyche ; where taking post they built a wall 
 in circle with great expedition, and by the ra- 
 pidity of their work struck consternation into 
 the Syracusans. Upon this they sallied out 
 with the fixed design of hazarding an engage- 
 ment, as they saw the danger of dallying any 
 longer. The armies on both sides were now 
 beginning to face each other; but the Syra- 
 cusan generals, observing that their own army 
 was in disarray, and could not easily be formed 
 in proper order, made them all wheel off 
 again into the city, except a party of their 
 horse : these, keeping the field, prevented the 
 
 '> Two miles and , half. 
 
256 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VI. 
 
 Athenians from carrying stones and straggling 
 to any distance from their posts. But, at 
 length, one Athenian band of heavy-armed, 
 supported by the whole body of their cavalry, 
 attacked and put to flight these Syracusan horse- 
 men. They made some slaughter amongst 
 them, and erected a trophy for this piece of 
 success against the enemy's cavalry. 
 
 On the day following, some of the Athe- 
 nians began to raise a wall along the northen 
 side of the circle ; whilst others were em- 
 ployed in carrying, stones and timber, which 
 they laid down in heaps all along the place 
 called Trogilus, near to the line mairked out 
 for the circumvallation, which was to reach, by 
 the shortest compass, from the great harbour 
 on one side to the sea on the other. But the 
 Syracusans, who were principally guided by 
 the advice of Hermocrates, gave up all thoughts 
 of sallying out for the future, with the whole 
 strength of the city, to give battle to the Athe- 
 nians. It was judged more advisable to run 
 along a wall in length, which would cut the 
 line in which the Athenian works were de- 
 signed to pass, and which, could they effect it 
 in time, must entirely exclude the ertemy from 
 perfecting their circumvallation. Nay farther, 
 in case the enemy should come up in a body to 
 interrupt the work, they might give them full 
 employ with one dividon of their force, whilst 
 another party might raise pallisades to secure 
 the approaches; at least, as the whole of the 
 Athenian force must be drawn out to oppose 
 them, they would be obliged to discontinue 
 their own works. To raise, therefore, the 
 projected work, they issued out of the city; 
 and beginning at the foot of the city-wall from 
 below the Athenian circle, they carried on 
 from thence a transverse wall, cutting down 
 the olive-trees in the sacred grove, of which 
 they built wooden turrets to cover their work. 
 The Athenian shipping was not yet come 
 round from Thapsus into the great harbour, 
 But the Syracusans continued masters of all 
 the posts upon the sea, and consequently the 
 Athenians were obliged to fetch up all neces- 
 sary stores from Thapsus across the land. 
 
 When it appeared to the Syracusans that all 
 their palisades and the transverse wall were 
 Bufiiciently completed,, in which the Athenians 
 had given them no manner of interruption, as 
 they were under apprehensions that, should 
 they divide their force, they might be exposed 
 tc a defeat, and at the same time were ardently 
 
 intent on perfecting their own circumvallation 
 — the Syracusans drew off again into the city, 
 leaving only one band of heavy-armed for the 
 guard of their counter-wall. 
 
 In the next place, the Athenians cut off the 
 pipes, which by subterraneous ducts conveyed 
 the driidcing-water into the city : and having 
 farther observed that the Syracusans kept 
 within their tents during the heat of the day, 
 but that some had straggled into the town, 
 whilst those posted at the paUsades kept but a 
 negligent guard ; they picked out three hun- 
 dred of their heavy-armed, and strengthening 
 them wfth a choice party of their light-armed 
 soldiers, ordered them to march with fill pos- 
 sible speed and attack the counter work. The 
 rest of their force was to march another way, 
 since, headed by one of the generals, it ad- 
 vanced towards the city, to employ the Syra- 
 cusans in case they sallied ; whilst the other 
 detachment, headed by the other general, at- 
 tacked the palisade which covered the sally- 
 port. Accordingly, the three hundred assault 
 and carry the palisade, which those who were 
 posted for its guard abandoned, and fled for 
 shelter behind the works which inclosed Te- 
 menites. The pursuers however entered with 
 them ; but were no sooner got in than they 
 were again forcibly driven out by the Syracu. 
 sans. And here some of the Argives and a 
 small number of Athenians were slain. 
 
 But now the whole army, wheeling about, 
 demolished the counter-work, and pulled up 
 the palisade. The piles, of which it was com- 
 posed, they carried off in tritimph, and erected 
 a trophy. 
 
 The next morning the Athenians resumed 
 their work of circumvallation, and continued it 
 across the crag which is above the marsh, and 
 lies on the quarter of Epipolae that looks to- 
 wards the great harbour. This was the short- 
 est cut for their circumvallation downwards, 
 across the plain and the marsh, till it reached 
 the harbour. Upon this, the Syracusans, issu- 
 ing again, raised another palisade, beginning 
 from the city, and stretching quite across the 
 marsh. They also drew up an entrenchment 
 along the palisade, entirely to prevent the 
 Athenians from continuing their works quite 
 down to the sea. The latter, when they had 
 perfected their work along the crag, are bent 
 on demolishing the new palisade and entrench 
 ment of the Syracusans. For this purpose, 
 they had ordered their shipping to come about 
 
YEAR XVIII.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 257 
 
 from Thapsus into the great harbour of Syra- 
 cuse. They themselves, at the morning's 
 dawn, marched down from Epipote into the 
 plain ; and then, crossing the marsh, where 
 the mud was hardest and best able to bear, by 
 the help of boards and planks which they laid 
 upon the surface, they carry almost the Vv'hole 
 length of the palisade and entrenchment early 
 in the morning, and were soon after masters of 
 the whole. This was not affected without a 
 battle, in which the Athenians were again vic- 
 torious. The routed Syracusans fled different 
 ways ; those who had composed their right, 
 towards the city ; and those who had composed 
 their left, towards the river. But with a view 
 of intercepting the passage of the latter, the 
 three hundred chosen Athenians marched with 
 all speed to seize the bridge. The Sj'racusans, 
 alarmed at this step, as the body consisted of 
 the bulk of their horse, face about on the three 
 hundred, and put them to flight, and then break 
 in upon the right wing of the Athenians. By 
 BO unexpected a shock the first band in that 
 wing was thrown into disorder. Laraachus, 
 observing it, advanced to their support from 
 the left, with a small party of archers that 
 happened to be near him, and the whole body 
 of the Argives. Having crossed a ditch that 
 lay between, seconded only ' by a fevi', whilst 
 the bulk of his party made a full stop, he is 
 instantly slain;' as were also five or six of 
 those by whom he was accompanied. The 
 Syracusans caught up their bodies with all 
 possible expedition, and bore themoflf to a 
 place of security on the other side of the river. 
 They were in great measure obliged to make a 
 precipitate retreat, since the rest of the Athe- 
 nian army was now coming up to attack them. 
 But now, such of the Syracusans as had fled 
 at first towards the city, having gained leisure 
 to observe such turns in their favour, caught 
 fresh courage from the sight ; and, forming 
 again into order, stood their ground against 
 that body of Athenians which faced them. 
 They also send a detachment to attempt the 
 
 » Plutnrch, in tl'e life of Nicins rirrumstantiafes tl-e 
 manner in wliieli llie old general lost liis life in clin- 
 racter. CallicijilCi, a good soldier, but of great im- 
 petuosity, rode at tt:e Ixad of the gyracusan liorse. 
 Being challenged out hy Callicrates, I.amar.lius alone 
 engaged personally with liim. Lamaclius received the 
 first,\voutid : lie thnn returned tl:e blow, and dropped. 
 His antagonist fe'l at the same lime, and tliey both ex- 
 pired together 
 40 
 
 circle on Epipolae, concluding it to be un- 
 manned for the present, and might at once bo 
 taken. This detachment in fact made itself 
 master of the outwork, and demolished it for 
 about ten plethres in length ; but the circle 
 itself was defended by Nicias from all their 
 attempts. Nicias, being much out of order, 
 had been left to repose himself within the cir- 
 cle. He therefore issued orders to his servants 
 to set fire to all the machines and the timber 
 which were lying before the wall ; for he was 
 convinced that thus alone, in such a total want 
 of hands for their defence, any safety could be 
 earned. The event answered his expectation ; 
 for when the flames began to mount, the Syra- 
 cusans durst not any longer come near, but 
 thought proper to desist and march away. 
 
 For now the Athenians, who by this time 
 had chased the enemy from off the plain, were 
 remounting the ascent to defend their circle ; 
 and, at the same instant of time, their fleet, 
 conformable to the orders they had received, 
 was standing into the great harbour. The 
 Syracusans ujion the high ground beheld the 
 sight ; which occasioned them and the whole 
 Syracusan army to retire precipitately into the 
 city ; concluding themselves no longer able, 
 without an augmentation of their present 
 strength, to hinder the completion of the 
 Athenian works quite down to the sea. 
 
 After this, the Athenians erected a trophy, 
 and, in pursuance of a truce, delivered up their 
 slain to the Syracusans, and received in ex- 
 change the body of Lamachus, and of those 
 who fell with him. 
 
 The junction of their whole armament, both 
 of their land and naval force, being now com- 
 pleted, they began again, from Epipolse and 
 the crag, to invest the Syracusans with a 
 double wall, which they were to continue quite 
 down to the sea. The necessary provisions to 
 supply their army were brought in from all the 
 coasts of Italy. Many also of the Siculi, who 
 had hitherto stood aloof, declared now for the 
 Athenians, and came into their alliance, who 
 were farther joined by three vessels iwith fifty 
 oars from Hctruria. 
 
 All other points equally contributed to ele- 
 vate their hopes. For the Syracusans had 
 begun to despair of being able to sustain the 
 siege, as they had no glimpse of any ap- 
 proaching succour from Peloponnesus. They 
 were tossing to and fro amongst themselves 
 some proposals for an accommodation, and had 
 W 
 
25S 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book vr. 
 
 e reii sounded Nicias upon that head, who, by i 
 the death of Lamachus, was left invested with j 
 the sole command. Nothing definitive was 
 however concluded, though (as might reason- 
 ably be expected from men in high perplexity, 
 and more straitly besieged than ever) many 
 proposals were made to him, and many more 
 were agitated within the city. The distresses, 
 a!so, which environed them at present, struck 
 into them mutual suspicions of one another: 
 nay, they even divested of their charge the 
 generals who were in authority when these dis- 
 tresses came upon them, as if all was owing to 
 their misconduct or treachery, and chose in 
 their stead Heraclides, and Eucles, and Tel- 
 lias. 
 
 In the meantime, Gylippus, the Lacedaemo- 
 nian, and the ships from Corinth, were come 
 up to Leucas, designing with the utmost ex- 
 pedition to pass over from thence to Sicily. 
 But terrible accounts came thick upon them 
 here, and all agreed in broaching the same un- 
 truth, that " Syracuse was completely invested 
 on all sides.'' Gylippus upon this gave up all 
 hopes of saving Sicily ; but, having the preser- 
 vation of Italy still at heart, he and Pythen 
 the Corinthian, with the small squadron at 
 hand, consisting only of two Laconic and two 
 Corinthian vessels, crossed over the Ionian 
 gulf with all possible despatch to Tarentum. 
 The Corinthians, besides their own ten now 
 fitting out, were to man two belonging to the 
 Leucadeans, and three more belonging to the 
 Ambraciots, and follow them as soon as pos- 
 sible. 
 
 The first step of Gylippus, now arrived at 
 Tarentum, was to go in quality of ambassador 
 to Thuria, claiming privilege for it, as his 
 father had been a denizen of that state ; but, 
 finding himself unable to gain their concur- 
 rence, he weighed from thence and stood along 
 the coast of Italy. But in the Terinean gnlf 
 he met with a hard gale of wind, which in i his 
 gulf, when in a northerly point, blows generally 
 with great and lasting violence, and now drove 
 
 him from his course, and blew him out into the 
 open sea, where he stood again the rebuiF of 
 another violent storm, but at length reached 
 Tarentum. He there laid his vessels on 
 ground, which had been damaged in the foul 
 weather, and refitted them for service. 
 
 When Nicias found that he was on his pas- 
 sage, he betrayed an open contempt of so 
 trifling a squadron, as the Thurians had al- 
 ready done before him. It appeared to him, 
 that so petty a squadron could only be fitted out 
 for piratical cruizes, and therefore he sent out 
 no detachments to hinder his approach. 
 
 About the same time of this summer, the 
 Lacedaemonians, with their own domestic forces 
 augmented by the junction of their allies, made 
 an irruption into Argos, and ravaged great part 
 of that territory, The Athenians put out to 
 sea with thirty sail to succour the Argives, 
 which procedure was, beyond all denial, the 
 clearest violation of the treaties between them 
 and the Lacedaemonians. Hitherto they had 
 only exercised robberies upon them from Py- 
 lus ; and, making descents rather on any other 
 coast of Peloponnesus than Laconia itself, had 
 left it to the Argives and Mantineans to make 
 war against them. Nay, though the Argives 
 had frequently pressed them, that with an 
 armed force they would barely land on the 
 Laconic coast, and, after committing never 
 so small ravage in their company, immediately 
 to retire, they had positively refused. But 
 now, under the command of Pythodorus, and 
 Laespodias, and Demaratus, they made a de- 
 scent at Epidaurus-Limera and Prasia, com- 
 mitted large devastation on the adjacent coun- 
 try, and afforded the Lacedemonians a most 
 specious and justifiable pretext to act offensively 
 against Athens. 
 
 When the Athenian fleet was sailed home- 
 wards from Argos, and the Lacedaemonians 
 also were withdrawn, the Argives broke into 
 Phliasia, where they laid waste part of the La- 
 cedemonian territory, and made some slaughter 
 of the people, and then returned to Argos. 
 
THE 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 BOOK VII. 
 
 The siege of Syracuse is carried on so vigorously by Nicias, that the Syracusans thinlc of a surrender. At thin 
 crisis arrive tjie Peloponnesian succours qnd Gylippus tlie Spartan, which giveth a new turn to the siege. A 
 counterworlc is raised, to stop the Athenian circumvallation ; engagements ensue. Nicias is now in a bad situ- 
 ation. He sendeth home a succinct detail of affairs by letter. A reinforcement is ordered him from Athena, 
 under tlie command of Demosthenes. Tiie Loccdaemonijins resolve to renew the war at home. — Year XIX. At- 
 tica invaded, and Decelea fortified. A naval engagement in the harbour of Syracuse, in which the Athenians 
 aresuperior. In the meantime Athensissadly distressed by theenemy. A massacre at Mycalesus. Asea-fight 
 on the coast of Achaia. A second engagement in the harbour of Syracuse, to the advantage of the Syracusans. 
 The reinforcement arr'reth from Athens. Demosthenes attempts Epipoire without success. Debates about 
 raising the siege, whic/i at length is resolved. The instant tliey are embarking the moon is eclipsed , upon 
 which superstition detaineth tiiem. The Syracusans attack them both by land and water. The Athenians are 
 worsted in every eiigagement ; at length lose all their shipping. They retreat by land, are pursued, sadly dis- 
 tressed, and totally subdued. Nicias and Demosthenes are taken prisoners and put to death. 
 
 Gtiippu?, and Pythen, when they had refitted 
 their sh.ps, stood along the coast from Taren- 
 tum to Locri Epizephyrii. Here they received 
 more, certain information, that Syracuse was 
 not yet completely invested, and that a succour 
 of force might be thrown into the town by the 
 way of EpipoIiE. They went next to consulta- 
 tion, — whether, " keeping Sicily on the right, 
 they should endeavour at all hazards to enter 
 Syracuse by sea ; or, with Sicily on their left, 
 should steer first to Himera ; from whence, 
 attended by the forces of that state and what- 
 ever additional strength they could persuade to 
 join them, they should march thither over- 
 land." It was determined to go first to Hime- 
 ra, especially as the four Athenian vessels' 
 were not yet arrived at Rhegium, which Nicias 
 at last, upon the certain intelligence that they 
 were now at Locri, had detached to observe 
 them. To he beforehand, therefore, with this 
 detachment, they pass through the straits, and, 
 having touched only at Rhegium and Messene, 
 arrive at Himera ; whilst, in the latter place, 
 they prevailed upon the Himereans to concur 
 with them in the war, and not only to intrust 
 
 their troops under their command, but even to 
 supply with arms such of the mariners as had 
 navigated the vessels, and were therefore un- 
 provided ; for their shipping they had drawn 
 ashore, and laid up at Himera. The Selinun- 
 tians also, by a messenger despatched on pur- 
 pose, they had summoned to meet them, with 
 all their united strength, at a determined place 
 upon their route. The Geloans also, and 
 some of the Siculi, promised to attend with a 
 party, though by no means considerable. The 
 latter of these were disposed better than ever 
 to the service, since Archonides was lately 
 dead, (who, reigning over some of the Siculi 
 seated in these parts, and having a great influ- 
 ence over them, had declared for the Atheni 
 ans,) and since Gylippus appeared to them to 
 be sent from Lacedaemon with a full purpose to 
 do them service. 
 
 And now Gylippus, — ^having ass^pibled an 
 army, which consisted of about sever! hundred 
 of those who navigated or came on board his 
 vessels, and for whom he had provided aims; 
 of heavy-armed and light-armed Himereans, 
 amounting together to a thousand men and one 
 
 259 
 
260 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book vn. 
 
 hundred horsemen ; of some light-armed Seli- 
 nuntians ; a small party of Geloan horse ; and 
 a body of Siculi, in all a thousand, — ^began his 
 march for Syracuse. 
 
 The Corinthians in the meantime were send- 
 ing out the other ships, as fast as they could 
 equip them for the service, to follow with all 
 possible expedition from Leucas : and Gongy- 
 p!us, one of the Corinthian commanders, who 
 with a single ship set out last from Leucas, is 
 the first who arrives at Syracuse ; and that 
 but a small space of time before the approach 
 of Gylippus. Finding therefore, upon his ar- 
 rival, that the Syracusans were going forth- 
 with to hold a public assembly, in which the 
 terms of putting an end to the war were de- 
 signed to be adjusted, he dissuaded them from 
 so precipitate a step, and animated their droop- 
 ing resolutions by strong assurances, that 
 " other ships would instantly arrive ;" and that 
 " Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, was sent 
 thither by the Lacedaemonians to take upon 
 him the command." The Syracusans accord- 
 ingly resumed their spirits, and immediately 
 marched out of the town, with the whole of 
 their strength, in order to meet Gylippus ; for 
 by this time they had received intelligence that 
 he was actually approaching. 
 
 Gylippus, upon his route, had made himself 
 master of legas, a fortress belonging to the 
 Siculi ; and now at the head of his army, 
 drawn up in order of battle, he comes up to 
 Epipolse. Having mounted by the pass of 
 Euryalus, as the Athenians had done on their 
 first approach, he marched, in conjunction 
 with the Syracusans, toward the Athenian 
 circumvallation. He happened to arrive at 
 that critical juncture, when the Athenians had 
 completely finished seven or eight stadia' of 
 the double wall extending to the great harbour, 
 when, in consequence, but a very small part 
 remained incomplete ; and on which they were 
 labouring with their highest application. On 
 the other side of their circle, towards Trogil us, 
 the stones for completing their work had been 
 laid ready in heaps almost down to the beach, 
 and some parts of their work on that side stood 
 but half completed, though others had received 
 the finishi^ hand. To such extremity of dan- 
 ger were tne Syracusans now reduced. 
 
 Gyhppus and the Syracusans coming thus 
 
 ' About three-quarters of a mile. 
 
 suddenly upon them, the Athenians at first 
 were struck with consternation : but formed, 
 however, in order of battle, to give them a re- 
 ception. But Gylippus, having ordered his 
 forces to halt, despatcheth a herald to the Athe- 
 nians, proclaiming that, " in case they would 
 evacuate Sicily within the space of five days, 
 with their arms and baggage, he' would readily 
 grant them a truce." Such oflers they received 
 in a contemptuous manner;^ and, disdaining 
 to return an answer, ordered the herald to 
 move off. And now both sides were busy 
 in marshalling and disposing their men for 
 battle. 
 
 But Gylippus, who had made an observation 
 that the Syracusans were in great confusion, 
 and could not easily be formed into proper 
 order, made his army fall back into more open 
 ground. Nicias gave them no disturbance 
 whilst they were making this motion ;, but, 
 without advancing, stood close under his works : 
 and, when Gylippus found that the enemy 
 would not move forwards to attack him, "he 
 made his forces wheel off to the high ground 
 called Temenites, where they reposed them- 
 selves for the night. 
 
 The next morning he drew up the greatest 
 part of his army before the works of the 
 Athenians, to prevent their sending out suc- 
 cours to more distant posts: for he had de- 
 tached a party to attack the fort of Labdalum, 
 which he carried by storm, and put all the gar- 
 rison found within it to the sword. Lab- 
 dalum was so situated, in regard to the Athe- 
 nian posts, that they could have no view of what 
 was transacting there. The same day also an 
 Athenian trireme, as it was entering the har- 
 bour, is taken by the Syracusans. 
 
 After so much success, the Syracusans and 
 allies set about raising a counterwork along 
 Epipolae. Beginning at the city, they carried 
 it upwards towards the single wall which had 
 an oblique inclination ; and intended that, in 
 case the Athenians could not stop its comple- 
 tion, it should entirely exclude them from per- 
 
 'i Nicias (says Plutarch) disdained to return an an- 
 swer. But some of his soldiers laughed outright, and 
 aslied " if, at the arrival of a mantle and staff from 
 Sparta, tiie Syracusans were become so full of spirits as 
 to despise the Athenians; who had lately given up lo 
 the Ijacedsmouians three hundred of their countrymen 
 who had been their prisoners, all of them better soldiers, 
 and who combed their hair, too, much better than Gy- 
 lippus." 
 
VTSAE xvm.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 261 
 
 fecting their circumvallation. The Athenians, 
 having perfected their works to the sea, had 
 now remounted the eminence; and, as some parts 
 of their work were but weak, Gylippus drew 
 out his army by night, and was marching to 
 demolish tliose : but the Athenians, who pass- 
 ed the night without their works, were no 
 sooner aware of it, than they also marched 
 away to defend them. Upon which, Gylip- 
 pus, finding them alarmed, desisted, and made 
 his army retreat to their former posts. This, 
 however, occasioned the Athenians to raise 
 those parts of their wall to a greater height, 
 and to take the guard of it upon themselves, as 
 amongst the body of their confederates they 
 had divided the guard of the rest of their 
 works, allotting a proper charge to each. 
 
 Nicias also judged it expedient to fortify 
 the spot called Plemmyrium. Plemmyrium 
 is a point of land over against Syracuse, which 
 jutting out before the great harbour, renders 
 the mouth of it very narrow. " If this were 
 fortified," he thought, " the importation of ne- 
 cessaries for the army would be better secured ; 
 because then, from a smaller distance, they 
 could at any time command the harbour where 
 the Syracusan shipping lay ; and, should it be 
 their ill fortune to be straitened by sea, might 
 easier fetch in supplies than in the present sta- 
 tion of their fleet at the bottom of the great har- 
 bour." Now also he began, with greater attention 
 than before, to study how to distress them by 
 sea ; convinced, since the arrival of Gylippus, 
 how little room he had to hope for success by 
 land. To this spot therefore he ordered his fleet, 
 and drew his land-forces down, and immediately 
 erected three forts. In these the greatest part 
 of the baggage was laid up ; and the transports 
 and tight ships were immediately stationed 
 there. To this project, however, the havoc 
 that afterwards ensued amongst the seamen is 
 principally to be ascribed ; for, as they suffered 
 in this station under scarcity of water, and the 
 mariners were frequently obliged to fetch both 
 water and wood from a distance, since near at 
 hand they were not to be had, the Syracusan 
 horse, who were masters of the country slaugh- 
 tered them in abundance. The Syracusans had 
 posted a third part of their cavalry at their for- 
 tress of 01ympi£5um, to bridle the marauding 
 expursions of the enemy at Plemmyrium. 
 
 Now also Nicias received intelligence that 
 the other Corinthian ships were in their pass- 
 age. To watch their approach, he therefore 
 
 detached twenty sail, who were appointed tt 
 cruize about Locri, and Khegium, and the 
 capes of Sicily, in order to intercept them. 
 
 Gylippus in the meantime was employed 
 in building the counter-wall along Epipolte, 
 making use of the stones which the Athenians 
 had laid ready in heaps for the continuation of 
 their own work. It was also his daily custom to 
 draw up the Syracusans and allies in order of 
 battle, and lead them out beyond the point of 
 the counter-wall ; which obliged the Athenians 
 to draw up likewise, to observe their motions. 
 And, when Gylippus judged he could attack 
 them with advantage, he instantly advanced ; 
 and, the charge being given and received, a bat- 
 tle ensued in the space between their respec- 
 tive works; but so narrow, that no use could 
 be made of the Syracusan and confederate 
 horse. The Syracusans and allies were ac- 
 cordingly defeated. They fetched off their 
 slain by truce ; and the Athenians erected a 
 trophy. But Gylippus, having assembled the 
 army round him, thought proper to make this 
 declaration in the presence of them all : — that 
 " the defeat was not to be charged on their 
 want of bravery, but on his own indiscretion ; 
 he had deprived* them of the service of their 
 own cavalry and darters, by ranging his battle 
 in too confined a spot between the works ; 
 that he would now again lead them out in a 
 more judicious manner." He exhorted them, 
 therefore " to imprint it strong on their remeni 
 brance, that as in real strength they were not 
 inferior, it would be intolerably disgraceful, if 
 they, who to a man were Peloponnesians and 
 Dorians, should not manifest themselves so re- 
 solutely brave, as to conquer and drive out of 
 their country a parcel of lonians and islanders, 
 and a promiscuous rabble of hungry adven- 
 turers." Having addresed them thus, he lay 
 on the watch to seize a proper opportunity ; 
 and as soon as he had gained it, led them on 
 again to the charge. 
 
 It was the opinion of Nicias, and in gener- 
 al of all the Athenians, that " though it was 
 not their own interest to bring on an engage- 
 ment, yet it highly concerned them to put a stop 
 to the counter-work which the enemy was 
 raising to hinder their progress ;" for, by 
 this time the wall of the Syracusans had 
 only not over-reached the extreme point to 
 which the Athenians had brought their circum- 
 vallation, "and, should it be extended farther it 
 would give the enemy this double advantage ; 
 2d2 
 
262 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VII. 
 
 — a certainty of conquest whenever they thought 
 proper to fight, and a discretionary power not 
 to fight at all." Determined by these consider- 
 ations, they drew out in order to give the Syra- 
 cusans battle. 
 
 Gylippus soon began the engagement. He 
 had now drawn up his heavy-armed without the 
 works, and at a greater distance from them 
 than before. He had posted the cavalry and 
 the darters on a wide, and open spot, yet unoc- 
 cupied by the works on either side, and posted 
 them so that they flanked the Athenians. In 
 the ardour of the engagement, the cavalry broke 
 in upon the left wing of the Athenians, which 
 was ranged against them, and entirely routed 
 them. In consequence of which, the remain- 
 der of the army was soon defeated by the 
 Syracusans, and in the greatest disorder retired 
 for shelter behind their works. And night no 
 sooner came on, than the Syracusans, without 
 loss of time, began to carry forwards their own 
 works, which they soon extended beyond the 
 Atheniar^circumvallation ; by which they gain- 
 ed this great point, that they could no longer 
 be invested on all sides by the Athenians ; and 
 the latter, though masters in the field, were 
 henceforwards effectually stopped from perfect- 
 ing their circumvallation. 
 
 After this, twelve ships of the Corinthians, 
 and Arabraciots, and Leucadians, the remain- 
 der of the squadron designed for this service, 
 having given the Athenian guard-ships the slip, 
 came into the harbour of Syracuse : they were 
 commanded by Herasinides, a Corinthian. By 
 these the Syracusans were now assisted in 
 carrying on their work, till it was completely 
 joined to the traverse wall. 
 
 Gylippus now made a circuit over Sicily in 
 order to promote the common caiise ; and to 
 procure additional forces for the services both 
 of land and sea ; and to solicit the concurrence 
 of such states as hitherto had manifested, either 
 no great inclination, or an open repugnance, to 
 join in the present war. Other ambassadors 
 also were despatched, by the Syracusans and 
 Corinthians, to Lacedaemon and Corinth, in- 
 structed to solicit a speedy reinforcement, to 
 be transported into Sicily either in trading ves- 
 sels, or in boats, or by any other expeditious 
 methods, since the Athenians had also sent for 
 reinforcements from Athens. The Syracusans 
 also assigned complements of men to their 
 shipping, and sedulously trained them to the 
 eervice of the sea, as designing on this element 
 
 also to try their fortune ; nay, they laboured 
 with alacrity and application to increase their 
 strength in all respects. 
 
 Nicias, being sensible of this, and consciouf? 
 that the strength of the enemy and his own 
 inability became daily greater, despatched hi? 
 messengers also to Athens, a custom he -had 
 ever observed, and upon all occasions, to report 
 the particulars of his proceedings. But in his 
 present situation it was more requisite than 
 ever ; since now he was convinced that he was 
 environed with dangers ; and unless, with the 
 utmost expedition, they recalled their troops, oi 
 sent them another, and that a strong, reinforce 
 ment, no hopes of preservation remained. Ap- 
 prehensive, farther, that the persons he should 
 send, either through want of proper address, or 
 through defect of courage, or a passion to soothe 
 the populace, might suppress the truth, he sent 
 a true, account of things in a letter wrote with 
 his own hand. By this method he concluded 
 that his own sentiments of things could not be 
 concealed or invalidated by messengers ,' that 
 the Athenians would be informed of the truth, 
 and might accordingly adjust their resolutions. 
 These messengers therefore departed, instruct- 
 ed to deliver the letter which he intrusted to 
 their care, and what farther they were to add 
 by word of mouth. Nicias in the mean time 
 kept within the limits of his camp, more anxious 
 to guard his shattered forces from annoyance, 
 than to plunge into fresh and spontaneous dan- 
 gers. 
 
 In the close of this summer, Euetion, an 
 Athenian general, marched, in conjunction 
 with Perdiccas and a large body of Thracians, 
 against Amphipolis ; yet could not render him- 
 self master of that city. But then, setting out 
 from Imereum, he brought his triremes abou 
 into the Strymon, and blocked it up on the 
 side of the river. Andhere^is summer ended. 
 
 In the beginning of winter the messengers 
 from Nicias arrived at Athens ; where they 
 gave such accounts of things as he had charged 
 them to give, and resolved such questions as 
 were asked them. They also delivered his let- 
 ter ; which the clerk of the state stood up and 
 read aloud to the Athenians. The contents 
 were these : 
 
 " Athekiaits, 
 
 t 
 
 " The many letters from time to time re- 
 ceived from me have given you all proper in- 
 formation, so far as relates to past transactions ; 
 
TEAK XVm.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 263 
 
 and it is now high time you should be made 
 acquainted with our present situation, that 
 your counsels may be adjusted in a proper 
 manner. 
 
 " After, therefore, we had defeated, in 
 several engagements, the Syracusans, against 
 whom you sent us out, and when we had thrown 
 up those works before their city within which 
 we are at this moment lying, Gylippus the La- 
 cedsemonian came upon us, at the head of an 
 army, brought from Peloponnesus, and aug- 
 mented by the troops of some Sicilian states. 
 In the first battle he is routed by us ; but in 
 the last, pressed hard by their numerous cavalry 
 and darters, we have been forced to retire 
 within our intrenchments. Being therefore 
 obliged, by the superior numbers of the enemy, 
 to discontinue our circumvallation, we are this 
 moment lying upon the defensive. Nor indeed 
 are we able to draw out our whole force for 
 action, as detachments of our heavy-armed are 
 remotely employed in the guard of our works. 
 They have farther run up a single wall to cut 
 our lines ; so that there remains no longer a pos- 
 sibility for us to complete the circumvallation, 
 unless, reinforeed by a numerous body of troops, 
 we are enabled to assault and demolish the 
 counterwork. And, in consequence of this, 
 we, who designed to besiege others, may with 
 much more propriety be said to suffer a siege 
 ourselves, at least by land : for we dare not 
 make any distant excursions into the adjacent 
 country, for fear of the horse. 
 
 " What is more ; they have sent ambassadors 
 to Peloponnesus, to solicit reinforcements. 
 Gylippus also is making the tour of the Sicilian 
 states, with a view to obtain the concurrence of 
 such as are at present neutral, and to prevail with 
 the rest to intrust their additional levies for the 
 service both of land and sea under his com- 
 mand : and, according to my present intelli- 
 gence, they are fully bent to attack, at one and 
 the same time, our intrenchments, with their 
 land-forces by land, and with their ships by 
 sea. And though I say, by sea, let not the 
 sound be too terrible in your ears: for they 
 know very well the present state of our navy ; 
 which, though at first a most complete equip- 
 ment, for the cleanness of the ships and the 
 health and vigour of the seamen, yet at present 
 hath scarce a ship which is not leaky ; so long 
 have they been necessitated to keep the sea, 
 whilst their hands have daily been mouldering 
 away : for in fact, we have no opportunity to 
 
 lay them dry and careen them ; as we are under 
 continual apprehensions of being attacked by 
 the ships of the enemy, equal, nay superior, in 
 number to our own. That they will attempt 
 it, we have most certain ground to believe ; but 
 the seasons of doing it are entirely in their own 
 option ; which also enables them to preserve 
 their vessels ever fit for service, as they are 
 not necessitated to be continually in action to 
 strike awe into others : nay, we should hardly 
 be able to do the like, though the number of 
 our shipping were much larger than it is, or 
 though we were exempted from the necessity 
 we now lie under of keeping guard with them 
 all. For, in case we make the least abatement 
 of our vigilance, we should be distressed for 
 want of necessaries, which even now we fetch 
 in with difficulty in the very teeth of the 
 enemy. To this must be ascribed the great 
 waste of our seamen which hath already been 
 made, and whose number lessens from day to 
 day ; since, obliged to fetch wood, and water, 
 and forage, from remote places, they are in- 
 tercepted by the enemy's horse. Even our 
 servants, who have nothing to dread from our 
 ruinated condition, desert us daily. And such 
 foreigners, as were forced on board our fleet, 
 depart with impunity to their own cities ; whilst 
 others, who were allured to the service by the 
 greatness of our pay, and imagined they were 
 rather come to plunder than to fight, when, 
 contrary to their hopes, they behold the enemy 
 possessed of a numerous fleet, and making a 
 brave resistance in every quarter, some catch 
 at the least pretext to go over to the enemy, 
 and others make shift to skulk away, — never 
 again to be retrieved in so wide a country as 
 Sicily. Nay, some of those, who, having attend- 
 ed us hither from Athens, and since prevailed 
 with the captains of triremes to accept of the 
 service of Hyccarian slaves in redemption of 
 their own, have by this means subverted our 
 naval discipline. 
 
 " I am writing to men well enlightened in 
 naval affairs, and perfectly convinced, that the 
 flower of an equipment is But of short duration, 
 and how few of those on board are skilled at 
 steering the vessel or managing the oar. But 
 what gives me the most acute vexation is this, 
 — that, though commander-in-chief, I am utterly 
 unable to put a stop to these disorders ; since 
 your tempers, Athenians, are hard to be man 
 aged ; and am quite at a loss from whence to 
 repair the waste that hath been made of ou' 
 
264 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VII. 
 
 seamen. The enemy have ahundant resources 
 everywhere at hand, whereas necessity points 
 not only one to us, — that place from whence 
 we had who now remain, and who are for ever 
 lost : for Naxus and Catana, the cities which 
 still persevere in our alliance, are unable to 
 recruit us. And, should the enemy get one 
 circumstance more in their favour, — that the 
 towns of Italy, which at present supply us 
 with food, deterred by the discovery of our 
 low condition and the non-appearance of a re- 
 inforcement from Athens, go over to the Syra- 
 cusans, — the war will be finished to their hands 
 without costing them a blow, and we shall be 
 left to the mercy of the enemy. 
 
 " I could have sent yon much more pleasing 
 accounts of things, but none < so proper to give 
 you a clear idea of the posture of your allairs 
 here, and such as you ought to have before you 
 proceed to deliberate upon them ; and at the 
 same time, — as I am by no means a stranger 
 to Athenian tempers, since I know you to be 
 fond of hearing what will give you pleasure, 
 but are afterwards inflamed with anger if any 
 article in event drops short of your expectation, 
 — I thought it highly concerned my own safety 
 to tell you nothing but the truth. And let me 
 here conjure you, to entertain no resentment 
 either against private soldiers or commanders ; 
 since, in labouring those points which are the 
 principal ends of the expedition, they have 
 fully done their duty. 
 
 " But, since all Sicily is in arms against us, 
 and since our enemies expect a reinforcement 
 from Peloponnesus, resolve, without loss of 
 time, that, as your forces are not sufficient to 
 keep the enemy in play, they must either be 
 recalled, or be reinforced with a body not in- 
 ferior to the first equipment, with both a land 
 and a naval force, and a large pecuniary supply. 
 For myself, I must insist that a successor be 
 sent me ; since I am quite disabled, by a 
 nephritic disorder, from continuing in the com- 
 mand : and I think I have just title to expect 
 my dismission from you ; since, in the vigour 
 of my life, I liave been intrusted by you with 
 several commands, in which I did you some 
 signal services. 
 
 " Whatever you determine, put it in execu- 
 tion on the' first approach of spring ; and, above 
 all things, keep clear of delays : for the ready 
 supplies given the enemy in Sicily, will soon 
 enable them to act ; and those expected from 
 I'eloponnesus, though thev must be longer in 
 
 coming up, yet, depend upon it, that, unless 
 you exert your utmost vigilance, some of them 
 will steal hither, as before, through all your 
 guards, and some will infallibly be here before 
 you." Such were the advices brought them 
 by the letter of Kicias. The Athenians, 
 however, when they had heard it read, would 
 not so far comply with the request of N icias 
 as to give him his dismission ; but that, afflicted 
 as he was in body, the whole burden of affairs 
 might not lie too heavily upon him, they ap- 
 pointed two persons, already in Sicily, Menan- 
 der and Euthydemus, to assist him in the com- 
 mand, till those, who by the public vote should 
 be joined with him in the commission, can 
 arrive. They also decreed him a reinforce- 
 ment, consisting both of a land and naval force, 
 to be levied amongst the Athenians upon the 
 roll and their dependents ; and, for colleagues 
 to share in the command, Demosthenes the 
 son of Alcistenes, and Eurymedon the son of 
 Thucles. Eurymedon, by order, began his 
 passage for Sicily about the winter solstice, at 
 the head of ten sail of ships, and with a supply 
 of twenty talents of silver;' empowered, farther, 
 to assure them, that " a large reinforcement 
 will soon come up, as the state had seriously 
 interested itself in their welfare." Demos- 
 thenes staid behind to forward the equipment, 
 and was intending to set out on the first ap- 
 proach of spring. He was busied in assem- 
 bling together their contingents from the depen- 
 dent states, and in levying amongst them both 
 money, and shipping, and soldiers. 
 
 The Athenians farther sent out twenty sail, 
 to cruize on the coasts of Peloponnesus, and 
 tu take care that no one passed over from 
 Corinth and Peloponnesus into Sicily. For 
 the Corinthians, upon the arrival of the ambas- 
 sadors, and the advice they brought, that " the 
 face of affairs was much altered for the better," 
 (priding themselves in the reflection that their 
 former equipment had arrived in time to con 
 tribute to this turn,) became now more alert 
 than ever, and got transports in readiness to 
 carry over a body of their own heavy-armed 
 into Sicily, whilst the Lacedaemonians were 
 intent on doing the same from other parts of 
 Peloponnesus. The Corinthians, farther man- 
 ned out five and twenty sail ; designing to ha- 
 zard an engagement with the guard-ships sta- 
 tioned at Naupactus, or to disable the Athe 
 
 > 3,875^. sterling. 
 
YEAE XIX.J 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 265 
 
 nians who lay there from giving their transports 
 the least molestation, by keeping their own 
 triremes ready ranged in order of battle in the 
 very face of that squadron. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians also were preparing for 
 on invasion of Attica, in pursuance of a former 
 resolution, and in compliance farther with the 
 pressing instances of both Syracusans and Co- 
 rinthians. They had no sooner heard of the 
 reinforcement intended to be sent by the Athe- 
 nians to Sicily, than, by making a diversion, 
 they designed to stop its execution. Alcibia- 
 des also continued warmly importuning them 
 to execute his plan of fortifying Deeelea, and 
 to proceed briskly with the war. But the 
 motives which at this present juncture ani- 
 mated the Lacedffiraonians most, were, that the 
 Athenians, if engaged in a double war both 
 against themselves and against the Sicilians, 
 must become a much more expeditious con- 
 quest ; and, farther, the Athenians were the 
 first aggressors in violating treaties. In the 
 former war they were well convinced the first 
 offence was chargeable on their own heads, 
 because the Thebans had surprised Plataa 
 whilst treaties were in fact subsisting. Nay, 
 contrary to an express stipulation in a preced- 
 ing treaty, that " arms should never be taken 
 up against the party which was willing to abide 
 by a judicial determination," they themselves 
 had refused to submit to a trial, though claimed 
 by the Athenians. To a conduct so ungene- 
 rous they concluded that their ill success in 
 the war ought fairly to be imputed ; and re- 
 flected, with self-accusations, not only on the 
 calamity they had suffered at Pylus, but on all 
 their other losses in every quarter of the war. 
 But now, since the Athenians, with an equip- 
 ment of thirty sail, had committed devastations 
 at Epidaurus, at Prasiffi, and at other places, 
 and continued to infest their dominions by 
 robberies from Pylus ; nay, as often as dis- 
 putes had intervened about the intent of articles 
 in the last treaty, in which the LacediEmonians 
 appealed to a judicial determination, the others 
 had li;iughtily refused it; concluding hence, 
 that, the Athenians were become as guilty ag- 
 gressors now as themselves had been on the 
 former occasion ; with cheerful presages of 
 success, they determined for war. In order to 
 it, they demanded this winter, from their allies, 
 their contingents of iron, and got all the need- 
 ful materials in readiness to execute their plan 
 of fortification. Kesolvcd at the same time to 
 41 
 
 transport an aid to Sicily in vessels of burden, 
 they began to levy it at home, and exacted the 
 quotas of av.gmentation from their confederates. 
 And thus the winter ended ; and the eighteenth 
 year of this war, of which Thucydides hath 
 compiled the history, came also to an end. 
 
 YEAH XIX.' 
 
 The following spring no sooner approached, 
 than, at an earlier date than on any former oc- 
 casion, the Lacedcemonians and allies invaded 
 Attica ; and Agis, the son of Archidamus, 
 king of the Lacedaemonians, had the command 
 of the army. At first they ravaged the country, 
 particularly the plains; and this being done, 
 having allotted out the work in portions to the 
 several states, they set out about fortifying 
 Deeelea. Now, Deeelea is distant at most 
 but one hundred and twenty stadia'* from the 
 city of Athens, and lies at the same distance, 
 or very little more, from Boeotia : but in the 
 plain, and on the finest spot of ground, from 
 whence effectually to annoy them, was their 
 fortress raised ; and might be seen from the 
 very walls of Athens. 
 
 In this manner the Peloponnesians and 
 allies erected a fortress within Attica itself; 
 whilst, in the same portion of timei their friends 
 in Peloponnesus embarked a body of heavy- 
 armed on board their transports, and sent them 
 off for Sicily. For this service the Lacedos- 
 monians picked out from the very best of the 
 Helots, and of those citizens of Sparta who 
 were newly enfranchised, from both together, 
 six hundred heavy-armed, and appointed Hec- 
 critus, a Spartan, to command them. And 
 the Boeotians sent three hundred heavy-armed, 
 commanded by Xeno and Nicon of Thebes, 
 and Hegesander of Thespiae. These were 
 first embarked at Tsenarus in Laconia, and 
 thence put out to sea. 
 
 Soon after these, the Corinthians sent away 
 five hundred heavy-armed ; some from Corinth 
 itself, others hired from the Arcadians ; and 
 appointed Alcxarchus, a Corinthian, to com- 
 mand them. The Sicyonians also sent two 
 hundred heavy-armed along with the Corinthi- 
 ans, and at their head Sargeus, a Sicvonian. 
 
 But the five and twenty sail of Corinthians, 
 which launched out to sea in the depth of win- 
 ter, lay ranged in an opposite station to the 
 
 ' Before Christ 413. 
 
 ' About twelve miles. 
 
•^66 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [bCOK VII. 
 
 twenty Attic at Naupactus, to give leisure for 
 the embarkation of the heavy-armed on board 
 the transports from Peloponnesus. On this 
 account, principally, they were manned and 
 fitted out to sea, that they might divert the 
 attention of the Athenians from the transport- 
 fleet that was now putting out, and fasten it 
 wholly upon the hostile appearance of these 
 triremes. 
 
 In the meantime, the Athenians, even during 
 the fortifications in hand at Decelea, and at the 
 earliest approach of spring, sent out thirty sail 
 to cruize on the coasts of Peloponnesus, under 
 the command of Charicles, the son of ApoUo- 
 dorus. His instructions were, farther, to touch 
 at Argos, and to summon them, in conformity 
 to the treaty of alliance, to embark a body of 
 heavy-armed on board the fleet. 
 
 Demosthenes, also, according to promise, 
 they sent away for Sicily, with a numerous 
 fleet, consisting of sixty ships of Athens and 
 five of Chios, on board of which were twelve 
 hundred enrolled Athenians, and as large a 
 number of islanders as with the utmost indus- 
 try they had been able to draw together. They 
 had also amassed, from their other confederates 
 subject to Athens, all manner of supplies they 
 were able to furnish for carrying on the War 
 with vigour. But Demosthenes was farther 
 instructed to sail at first in company with 
 Charicles, and assist him in the cruize on the 
 coasts of Laconia. Demostheries, therefore, 
 having stood over to jEgina, continued there 
 till the remainder of his force, which was yet 
 behind, had completely joined him, and Chari- 
 cles had taken on board the Argive auxiliaries. 
 
 About the same time in this spring Gylippus 
 also returned to Syracuse, at the head of as 
 large a force as he had been able to collect 
 from the several states, with whom his persua- 
 sions had been effectual ; and, having convened 
 the Syracusans, he told them that — " they 
 ought to man out as large a number of shipping 
 as they possibly could, and try their fortune in 
 a naval engagement : such a step, he had reason 
 to hope, might be attended with consequences 
 which would amply compensate the danger, and 
 invigorate the war." 
 
 These instances of Gylippus were well se- 
 conded by Hermocratcs, who took uncommon 
 pains to encourage his countrymen to attack 
 the Athenians by sea. — " The latter, he told 
 them, were far from enjoying their naval skill 
 as an hereditary right, or a privilege from time 
 
 immemorial exclusively their own. In fact, 
 they were by nature landmen much more than 
 the Syracusans ; and necessity alone, in the 
 Medish invasion, had forced them to try their 
 fortune at sea : by enterprising men, as the 
 Athenians were, such as were most daring in 
 opposing them must needs be regarded as the 
 most formidable enemies. True — they had 
 been used to intimidate their neighbours, not 
 by a real superiority of strength, but by their 
 daring enterprising genius ; and now, by the 
 same methods, themselves might become forr 
 midable even to Athenians." He assured 
 them, "for his own part, he was perfect!} 
 convinced that the Syracusans, if by an effort 
 of bold resolution they -yvould on a sudden 
 attack the Athenian fleet, might reap more 
 benefit from the terror which such a step would 
 strike upon the foe, than could accrue to the 
 Athenians from their superior skill when com- 
 pared with Syracusan inexperience." He press- 
 ed them therefore " to try their fortune by sea, 
 and bid adieu to fear." 
 
 Thus animated by Gylippus, and by Her- 
 mocratcs, and by others, the Syracusans were 
 eagerly bent on action by sea, and manned out 
 their fleet. And, when the whole was ready 
 for service, Gylippus, by favour of the night, 
 at the head of his land-army, marched down to 
 the forts at Plemmyrium, intending to assault 
 them on the land-side. The triremes of the 
 Syracusans, at the same instant of time, as 
 had been concerted beforehand, to the number 
 of thirty-five, are sai,ling up out of the great 
 harbour, whilst forty-five were going about out 
 of the lesser harbour where their dock lay. 
 The latter went round, designing to complete 
 their junction with the other squadron, and 
 then in a body to stand against Plemmyrium, 
 that the Athenians on both sides might be 
 thrown into confusion. The Athenians lost 
 no time, but instantly manned out sixty vessels. 
 With twenty-five of the number they engaged 
 the thirty-five Syracusan in the great harbour; 
 with the rest they went to meet the other squa- 
 dron, that was coming about from the dock. 
 A smart engagement immediately ensued, in 
 the mouth of the great harbour. The dispute 
 was a long time obstinately maintained ; one 
 side exerting themselves to clear the passage, 
 but the other to obstruct it. 
 
 In the meantime, Gylippus, — as the Athe- 
 nians posted at PlemmyriuBi had flocked down 
 to the sea-side, and with their iitmost atten- 
 
tEAR XTX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 267 
 
 tion were looking at the battle on the water, — 
 Gylippus seizeth the opportunity ; and no 
 sooner had the morning dawned, than, to the 
 great surprise of the enemy, he attacks the 
 forts. He first makes himself master of the 
 largest of the three, and afterwards carries the 
 two lesser, the defendants of which, seeing the 
 largest so easily taken, had abandoned their 
 posts ; nay, on the surprisal of the first, those 
 who had manned it, throwing themselves on 
 board the boats and a transport that lay at 
 hand, found no small difficulty in getting away 
 to the camp ; for, as the Syracusans had now 
 the better of the engagement with their squad- 
 ron in the great harbour, they detached one of 
 their nimblest triremes to pursue the fliers. 
 But, at the time the other two forts were car- 
 ried, the Syracusans were plainly vanquished, 
 which gave them who abandoned the last an 
 opportunity to sail away without obstruction. 
 For that Syracusan squadron, that was engaged 
 before the harbour's mouth, having forced their 
 way through the Athenian fleet, by sailing for- 
 wards in a disorderly manner and continually 
 running foul one upon another, gave the Athe- 
 nians an opportunity to regain the day. For 
 this squadron they soon routed, and afterwards 
 that, within the harbour, by which they had 
 been vanquished. They also sunk eleven ships 
 of the enemy, and made a -slaughter of all their 
 ctews, those of three ships excepted, to whom 
 they granted quarter ; and all this with the loss 
 only of three ships on their own side. Having 
 afterwards drawn ashore the shiitters of the 
 Syracusan fleet, and piled them into a trophy 
 on the little isle before Plemmyrium, they re- 
 tired to their main encampment. 
 
 Thus unsuccessful were the Syracusans in 
 their naval engagement. They had carried, 
 however, the forts at Plemmyrium ; and, to 
 signalize each of their acqusitions, they erected 
 three several trophies. One, also, of the two 
 forts that were taken last they levelled with the 
 ground, but the other two they repaired and 
 garrisoned. 
 
 In this surprisal of the forts, many were 
 slain, and many were made prisoners, and a 
 great stock of wealth reposited there became 
 the prize of the enemy. For, as the Athenians 
 had made use of these forts by way of maga- 
 zine, much wealth belonging to merchants, and 
 corn in abundance, were found within ; much 
 also of the stores belonging to (he captains of 
 the ships of war, inasmuch as forty masts for 
 
 triremes, and other materials of refitment, had 
 been laid up there ; and three triremes were 
 hauled ashore to be careened. Nay, this 
 surprisal of Plemmyrium was one of the chief, 
 if not the greatest source of all the distress 
 which the Athenian army suffered in the 
 sequel ; for no longer was the sea open to them 
 for the secure importation of necessary sup- 
 plies. From this time the Syracusans rushed 
 upon them from thence, and awed all their 
 motions. The convoys could no more get in 
 without fighting their way. Besides that, in 
 all other respects, it struck a great consterna- 
 tion, and even a dejection of mind amongst the 
 troops. 
 
 The next step taken by the Syracusans was 
 tp send out to sea a squadron of twelve ships, 
 under the command of Agatharcus, « Syracu- 
 san. One of these ships was to. proceed to 
 Peloponnesus, and land an embassy there, 
 which had instructions, " to notify a present 
 hopeful posture of affairs, and to press the 
 prosecution of the war in Greece with all pos- 
 sible vigour." The other eleven stood over to 
 the Italian coast, having received intelligence, 
 that a number of small vessels, laden with 
 stores for the Athenians, were coming up. 
 They intercepted and entirely destroyed most 
 of these ; and the timber on board them, which 
 was ready wrought for the Athenians to frame 
 together into ships, they burnt to ashes on the 
 shore of Caulonia. This done, they stood 
 away for Locri ; and, whilst they lay in that 
 road, one of the transports from Peloponnesus, 
 having on board the heavy-armed from Thespios, 
 came in. The Syracusans removed those 
 heavy-armed into their own ships, and returned 
 with them to Syracuse. 
 
 The Athenians with twenty sail were sta- 
 tioned at Megara, in order to intercept their 
 return ; where one ship alone, with all the 
 crew, fell into their hands. They were not 
 able to come up with the rest ; since, eluding 
 all pursuit, they recover with security their own 
 harbours. 
 
 There happened also a skirmish, in the hai- 
 bour of Syracuse, about the piles which the 
 Syracusans had drove down in the sea before 
 their old docks, that their vessels might ride 
 in safety behind them, the Athenians bo un- 
 able to stand in amongst them and do any 
 damage to their shipping. Close up to those 
 piles the Athenians had towed a raft of prodi- 
 gious size, on which turrets and parapets to 
 
258 
 
 PJCLOPONNESIxiN WAR. 
 
 [book VII. 
 
 cover the Jefendants were erected, whilst others 
 in long boats were fastening cables round the 
 piles, and, by the help of a machine convenient 
 for the purpose, craning them up ; and such as 
 they broke, a set of divers sawed off close at the 
 bottom. The Syracusans in the meantime 
 were pouring their missive weapons upon them 
 from the docks, which were plentifully returned 
 by those posted on the raft. In short, the 
 Athenians plucked up most of the pilps, but 
 one part of the staccade was exceeding difficult 
 to be demolished, as it lay out of sight ; for 
 they had driven down some of the piles in such 
 a manner, that their heads emerged not above 
 the surface of the water. This rendered all 
 access exceeding dangerous ; since, ignorant 
 where they lay, a pilot would be apt to bulge 
 his vessel as if it were upon a shelve. But 
 even these, the divers, for a pecuniary reward, 
 searched out and sawed away. And yet, as 
 fast as this was done, the Syracusans drove 
 down a fresh set of piles. The contrivances 
 both of annoyance and prevention were strenu- 
 ously exerted on both sides, as might justly be 
 expected from two hostile bodies posted so 
 near one another ; the skirmishings were often 
 renewed, and every artifice of war was succes- 
 sively practised. 
 
 The Syracusans, farther, had despatched 
 embassies, composed of Corinthians, and Lace- 
 daemonians, and Ambraciots, to the cities of 
 Sicily, " to notify the surprisal of Plemmyri- 
 um, and to give a just representation of the 
 naval engagement in which they had been de- 
 feated, not so much by the strength of the 
 enemy as by their own confusion ; in other 
 respects to assure them, that their hopes of 
 success were high, and that they firmly depend- 
 ed OR receiving soon an aid from them, compo- 
 sed both of a land a(jd naval force : since the 
 Athenians were also in expectation of a rein- 
 forcement from Athens, the approach of which, 
 would their friends anticipate, the Athenians 
 at present there must be totally destroyed, and 
 the war brought at once to an end." Such 
 schemes were now in agitation in Sicily. 
 
 But Demosthenes, when he had assembled 
 the whole of the armament with which he was 
 to pass over to the relief of those in Sicily, 
 weighing from j5Egina, and standing over to 
 Peloponnesus, he completes his junction with 
 Charicles and the squadron of thirty sail of 
 Athenians under his command ; and, as a body 
 of heavy-armed had been taken on board the 
 
 latter from Argos, they steered together for the 
 coast of Laconia. And here first they ravaged 
 in part Epidaurus Limera; and proceeding 
 from thence to that part of Laconia v/hich lies 
 over-against Cythera, and where stands the 
 temple of Apollo, having ravaged part of the 
 adjacent country, they enclosed and fortified a 
 neck of land which might serve as a receptacle 
 to such of the Helots as deserted the Lacedte- 
 monians ; from thence, banditti-like, as was 
 done from Pylus, to infest the country. This 
 convenient spot was no sooner taken in than 
 Demosthenes' stood away for Corcyra, that ha 
 might take on board the auxiliaries there, and 
 make the best of his way to Sicily. But 
 Charicles staid till he had put the place into a 
 state of secure defence, and fixed a garrison in 
 it. This being done, he carried back his 
 squadron of thirty sail to Athens ; and the 
 Argives at the same time received their dismis- 
 sion. 
 
 This summer there arrived at Athens thir- 
 teen hundred Thracian targeteers, of those 
 called Machserophori, and who are originally 
 Dians. This body was intended to have been 
 sent with Demosthenes into Sicily ; but, as 
 they arrived not till after his departure, the 
 Athenians had resolved to send them back 
 again to their own hemes in Thrace. To re- 
 tain them merely for the sake of the war waged 
 against them from Decelea, they thought 
 would plunge them in too large an expense, 
 since the pay of every soldier was a drachma' 
 a day. For now, since Decelea, which 
 had been fortified this spring by the joint 
 labours of the whole united army, continued 
 to be garrisoned by detachments from the 
 several states, which at certain intervals of 
 time relieved one another in a regular suc- 
 cession, it gave terrible annoyance to the 
 Athenians, and caused amongst them such 
 havoc of their effects, and such a destruction 
 of their men as threw them into great dis- 
 tress. All preceding incursions of the enemy, 
 having been only transient, had left them 
 in the peaceable enjoyment of their lands 
 for the rest of the' year; but now, as they 
 awed the country by one continued blockade, 
 and as by intervals they received considerable 
 augmentations to enable them to give greater 
 annoyan(?e, as even the regular garrison was 
 periodically obliged to scour the country and 
 
 «7}(2. 
 
YTIAK XIX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 269 
 
 plunder for their own subsistenee, and as Agis, 
 king of the Lacedsemonians, who witli the ut- 
 most diligence prosecuted the war, in person 
 directed all the operations, — The Athenians 
 were sorely pressed : for they were debarred 
 the whole produce of their own lands ; more 
 than twenty thousand of their slaves had de- 
 serted to the enemy, and a large part of these 
 were mechanics of the city ; their whole stock 
 of sheep and labouring cattle was lost beyond 
 retrieve ; their horses, — as the horsepien were 
 obliged every day to mount, either to ride to- 
 wards Decelea, to awe the excursions of that 
 garrison, or to guard some important posts in 
 the country, — their horses were either lamed by 
 running incessantly over hard or rugged ground, 
 or by wounds were disabled for service ; the con- 
 stant supplies of provisions for the city, which 
 used to be fetched from Eubtea to Oropus, 
 and to be brought in from thence through De- 
 celea as the shortest passage, were now forced 
 to go round the cape of Sunium by sea, which 
 considerably enchanced their price. For want 
 also of foreign commodities the city was equal- 
 ly distressed ; and Athens was now reduced 
 to be merely a place of arms. To keep guard 
 on the battlements by day, the -citizens were 
 obliged successively to relieve one another ; 
 but the whole body of the city, except the 
 horsemen, mounted guard by night. The latter 
 ever under arms without, the rest on the con- 
 stant guard of the city-walls, and this for a 
 summer and winter without any intermission, 
 were reduced to a very low condition. But 
 the point which pressed hardest upon them 
 was, having two wars at once upon their hand : 
 and yet their obstinacy had rose to so high a 
 pitch, as, had it not been visible to all the 
 world, the bare mention of its possibility would 
 have been quite incredible ; for who would 
 have believed, that this people, so closely block- 
 ed up at home by the Peloponnesians, should 
 scorn to give up Sicily 1 nay, should persevere 
 with unabating zeal, to carry on the siege of 
 Syracuse, a city in no respect inferior even to 
 Athens itself 1 that they should exhibit such an 
 astonishing proof of their strength and their 
 courage to the eyes of Greece ; where upon the 
 first breaking out of the war, some people had 
 imagined, that in case the Peloponnesians in- 
 vaded Attica, they could not hold out above 
 one year entire, though others had allowed 
 them two, and others three, but nobody a 
 longer space ? and that, in the seventeenth year 
 
 after the first invasion of this kind, they should 
 attempt the conquest of Sicily; and, when 
 deeply gashed in every part, by one war already 
 upon their hands, should wilfully plunge into 
 another, as formidable in all respects as that 
 waged against them from Pelopcfcinesus ! But 
 now, when, besides what they had suffered al- 
 ready, they were terribly annoyed from Decelea, 
 and other incidents had exacted from them 
 very large disbursements, their finaces were 
 reduced to >i very low ebb. At this period, 
 therefore, instead of the tribute paid them by 
 their dependents, they exacted a twentieth of 
 the value of all commodities imported and ex- 
 ported, which they thought would replenish 
 their coffers faster than the former method ; 
 for their disbursements were not as they had 
 been in preceding times, but had been inflamed 
 in the same proportion as the scenes of war had 
 been enlarged, whilst their annual revenue was 
 constantly decreasing. 
 
 Unwilling, therefore, in the present ebb of 
 their treasures, to defray the charge of this 
 body of Thracians, who came too late for De- 
 mosthenes, they^sent them back to their own 
 country with all possible haste. Diitrephes 
 was the person pitched upon to conduct them 
 home ; and was instructed, that, " In the pass- 
 age (for they were to go through the Euri- 
 pus) he should employ them, if opportunity 
 offered, against the enemy." He landed there- 
 fore near Tanagra, and in a hurrying manner 
 carried off a booty from thence. About tho 
 shut of evening he also crossed the Euripus 
 from Chalcis of Eubcea-; and, having landed his 
 Thracians in Bceotia, led them against Myca- 
 lessus. His design was not discovered tWit 
 night, though he halted at the temple of Mer- 
 cury, which is distant from Mycalessus but 
 sixteen' stadia at most. But early the next 
 morning he assaulted this city, which is of large 
 extent ; he carries it on the first attack, as there 
 was no guard to resist him, and the inhabitants 
 could never have imagined that a maritime body 
 would have marched so far into the country to 
 make attempts upon them. The wall, besides, 
 was weak : in some places it was fallen, and 
 the remaining part of it was low ; and the gates, 
 from too great a confidence of security, had 
 been left open. No sooner were the Thracians 
 broke into Mycalessus, than they gutted both 
 
 2£ 
 
 * More than a mile and a half 
 
270 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VII. 
 
 houses and temples ; they massacred the inha- 
 bitants, showing no regard to cither old age or 
 youth, but venting their fury on all that came 
 in thoir way ; they butchered even the women 
 and the children ; nay, all the labouring cattle, 
 and every creature that had life which came be- 
 fore their eyes ; for the Thracians, when once 
 their fury is inflamed, are as insatiable of blood 
 as any other the greatest savages in the barba- 
 rian world. On this occasion the confusion 
 was terrible, and every ghastly method of 
 destruction was exemplified in act ; they even 
 fell upon the public school, which was a very 
 large one, when the youth of the town were 
 but just got in, and hacked all the children to 
 pieces. And thus this whole city was involved 
 in a calamity, a greater than which no city had 
 ever felt ; nay , a calamity unexpected and dread- 
 ful indeed ! 
 
 The Thebans had no sooner intelligence of it, 
 than they marched to their assistance; but 
 came not up with the Thracians till they were 
 retired to some distance from the town, where 
 they recovered from them their booty, and, 
 having put them to flight,, continued the chase 
 down to the Euripus and the sea, where the 
 vessels which had brought them lay at anchor. 
 Here they make a slaughter of most of those 
 who endeavoured to get on board, but could 
 not swim ; since the persons left in the vessels, 
 when they saw what passed on the shore, 
 put them off beyond their reach. But, in the 
 other parts of the retreat, the Thracians be- 
 haved with some gallantry against the Theban 
 horse, which attacked them first ; since, sally- 
 ing frequently out on the pursuers, and rally- 
 ing;, again after the discipline of their country, 
 they made good their retreat ; and thus few of 
 this body were destroyed. A number, farther, 
 who staid behind in the city to plunder, were 
 found there and put to the sword. The whole 
 number of the slain amongst this body of thir- 
 teen hundred Thracians amounted to two hun- 
 dred and fifty men; though, in return, they killed, 
 of Thebans, and others who accompanied by 
 way of aid, of horse and heavy-armed together, 
 about twenty, and Skirphondas of Thebes, one 
 of the rulers of Boeotia ; the lives of some more 
 Mycalessians were also lost in their company. 
 Such was the calamity which fell to the unhap- 
 by lot of Mycalessus ; and which, for excess of 
 horror, is more to be deplored than any other 
 of the tragical events of this war 
 
 Demosthenes, , who, after marking out the 
 
 fortification, had stood away from Laconia to 
 Corcyra, surprising a transport vessel which 
 rode at anchor in the road of Phia of the Eleans, 
 on board of which a number of heavy-armed 
 Corinthians were to pass over into Sicily, sinks 
 that vessel. But the mariners, having saved 
 themselves by flight, found afterwards another 
 vessel, and proceeded in the voyage. 
 
 From hence Demosthenes came up to Za- 
 cynthus and Cephallene ; where he took their 
 heavy-armed on board, and sent for those of 
 the Messenians from Naupactus. He also 
 crossed over to the opposite continent of Acar- 
 nania, to Alyzia and Anactorium, both belong- 
 ing to the Athenians. Thus employed as he' 
 was in augmenting his force, Eurymedon, re- 
 turning from Sicily, whither he had been sent 
 in the winter to carry a supply of money for 
 the army, meets him ; and, amongst other in- 
 telligence, relates, that " he had heard, since he 
 was upon his return, that Plemmyrium had 
 been taken by the Syracusans." Conon, also, 
 who commanded at Naupactus, came to them 
 with advice, that " the five and twenty sail 
 of Corinthians which lay over-against their 
 squadron had not quitted that station, and even 
 threatened them with an engagement." He 
 exhorted, therefore, these commanders to de- 
 tach some vessels thither, since their squadron 
 at Naupactus, consisting only of eighteen ships, 
 was not a match for the enemy, whose squadron 
 amounted to twenty five. Upon this, Demos- 
 thenes and Eurymedon detach ten of the primi 
 sailers, amongst those under their own com- 
 mand, to follow Conon for the reinforcement 
 of the squadron at Naupactus. 
 
 The two former continued to assemble forces 
 for the grand expedition. Eurymedon, for this 
 purpose, sailed to Corcyra, commanded them 
 to man out fifteen ships, and selected himself 
 the heavy-armed for the service ; for, as he was 
 returned from carrying the stores, he joined 
 himself with Demosthenes in the command, in 
 pursuance of the prior nomination. Demos- 
 thenes was collecting a body of slingers and 
 darters from the towns of Acarnania. 
 
 The ambassadors from Syracuse, who were 
 sent round to the Sicilian cities after the sur- 
 prisal of Plemmyrium, had succeeded in their 
 negotiations ; and having assembled a large 
 body of succours, were intent on bringing thera 
 up. Nicias, who had gained an early intelli- 
 gence of their motion, sends to such of the 
 Siculi, as lay upon their route and were ir 
 
YEAR XIX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR.. 
 
 271 
 
 his alliance, (namely, the Centoripes and Haly- 
 cyicans and others,) " by no means to yield a 
 free passage to the enemy, but to assemble in 
 a body and obstruct their march." It was im- 
 possible for them to reach Syracuse by any 
 other route; for the Agrigentines had refused 
 them a passage through their territories. Now, 
 therefore, the Sicilians being on their march, 
 the Siculi, in compliance with the request of 
 the Athenians, had placed three different am- 
 buscades in their way. From these rushing 
 suddenly upon them, as they were advancing 
 in a careless manner, they destroyed about 
 eight hundred men, and all the ambassadors, 
 excepting one Corinthian. And this Corinthi- 
 an brought up afterwards to Syracuse all those 
 who escaped by flight, the number of whom 
 amounted to fifteen hundred. 
 
 About the same time the Camarineans also 
 send up a body of succours, consisting of five 
 hundred heavy-armed, three hundred darters, 
 and three hundred archers. The Geloans also 
 sent them a squadron of about five sail, beside 
 four hundred darters and two hundred horse- 
 men. 
 
 Now almost all Sicily, except the Agrigen- 
 tines, (for these still adhered to their neutra- 
 lity,) all the rest of the island, I say, who 
 hitherto had stood aloof to observe events, 
 united themselves against the Athenians, in be- 
 half of Syracuse : though the Syracusans, after 
 the blow they had just received from the Siculi, 
 thought it not proper to attack the Athenians 
 again upon a sudden. 
 
 But Demosthenes and Eurymedon, having 
 now completed their embarkations at Corcyra 
 and on the continent, at the head of this united 
 and powerful armament, crossed over the 
 Ionian to cape lapygia ; and, standing awa}' 
 from thence, reach the Chferades, islands of 
 [apygia. Here they take on board their fleet 
 a party of lapygian darters, to the number of 
 fifty, and one hundred more of the Messapian 
 nation ; and, after they had renewed a friend- 
 ship of ancient date with Artas, (who, being 
 lord of these islands, supplied them with the 
 darters,) they proceed to Metapontium in 
 Italy. Upon the plea of an alliance subsisting 
 between them, they prevail upon the Metapon- 
 tians to furnish them out three hundred more, 
 and two triremes, with which augmentation 
 they stood along the coast to Thuria; where, 
 on their arrival, they find that the party, who 
 had acted against the Athenian interest, had in 
 
 a late sedition been driven out of the city. Do. 
 sirous here to take a view of the whole arma/> 
 ment, and to know whether any part had strag- 
 gled and was left behind ; hoping, farther, to 
 prevail upon the Thurians to join them with 
 their forces in the most cordial manner, and, 
 since' their welfare was connected with that of 
 Athens, to declare the friends and foes of the 
 Athenians to be equally their own ; they staid 
 some time at Thuria, and completed their de- 
 signs. 
 
 To return to the Peloponnesians. About 
 the same portion of time, their squadron of 
 five and twenty sail, which, to favour the pass- 
 age of the transports to Sicily, lay ranged in 
 opposition to the fleet at Naupactus, having 
 now made all things ready for an engagement, 
 and equipped out some additional vessels, which 
 had almost equalized their number to that of 
 the Athenian ships, take their station in Rhy- 
 pica, near Erinus of Achaia. As the place in 
 which they rode was bent in the form of a cres- 
 cent, the land force of the Corinthians and the 
 adjacent confederates, who marched to their 
 assistance, was posted upon each wing of the 
 squadron, on the jutting -leeks of land, whilst 
 the ships drawn up close together composed 
 the centre of their arrangement, and Polyan- 
 thes the Corinthit\n commanded the fleet. 
 
 The Athenians, with three and thirty sail, 
 under the command of Diphilus, weighed from 
 Naupactus and stood in against them. At 
 first, the Corinthians lay still without motion ; 
 but, so soon as it was judged necessary for them 
 to act, and the signal flag was accordingly hoist- 
 ed, they advanced to charge the Athenians, and 
 an engagement ensued. The contention was 
 maintained a long time on both sides. Three 
 of the Corinthian vessels are destroyed, whilst 
 not a single ship on the Athenian side was sunk, 
 though seven were disabled for service by blows 
 they had received from the enemies' beaks, by 
 which their forecastles had been shattered by 
 the Corinthian ships, made firm and compact for 
 this very purpose by stays on each side of the 
 beak. The event of the engagement remain- 
 ing doubtful, from whence both sides took 
 occasion to claim the victory, the Athenians 
 however being masters of all the shatters of 
 the enemy's fleet, which the wind drove 
 right into the sea, and which the Corinthi- 
 ans made no eflbrts to recover, they drop- 
 ped aivay from each other. Yet no kind 
 of pursuit was attempted, and no prisoners 
 
272 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAK. 
 
 [book VII. 
 
 were taken by either : for the Corinthians and 
 Peloponnesians, who fought close under the 
 shore, were by that enabled to make an easy 
 escape ; but, on the Athenian side, not even a 
 single ship was sunk. And, yet, when the 
 Athenians were sailed back to Naupactus, the 
 Corinthians immediately set up a trophy, as if 
 the victory was their own, because they had 
 disabled a larger number of the enemy. They 
 farther looked upon themselves as not defeated, 
 because their enemies were not clearly victori- 
 ous : for it is the way with the Corinthians to 
 pronounce themselves victors if they are not 
 sadly beaten ; whereas, the Athenians esteem 
 themselves defeated if they have not made a 
 signal conquest. But, farthcr,'when the Pelo- 
 ponnesians were retired from their station, and 
 the land army was dismissed, the Athenians 
 erected a trophy. The spot they chose, where- 
 on to place this token of their victory, was 
 distant about 'twenty stadia from Erineus, the 
 station in which the Corinthians rode. Such 
 was the event of this naval engagement. 
 
 Demosthenes and Eurymedon, so soon as 
 the Thurians had got in readiness seven hun- 
 dred heavy-armed, with three hundred darters, 
 to attend them in the expedition, ordered the 
 fleet to coast along the shore towards the Cro- 
 toniatis ; whilst themselves, after having taken 
 a review of all their land army upon the banks 
 of the Sybaris, ciarched them overland through 
 the Thuriatis. But when they were advanced 
 to the river Hylias, they were met by a mes- 
 sage from the Crotoniatse, intimating to them, 
 that " their consent should never be given for 
 the passage of this army through their domi- 
 nions ;" upon which they wheeled off down- 
 wards towards the sea and the mouth of the 
 Hylia;, where they halted a night, and were 
 joined by the whole body of the fleet. 
 
 The next morning they re-embarked and 
 proceeded along the coast, touching at every 
 city, except Locri, till they arrived at Petra in 
 the district of Ehegium. 
 
 But during this interval, the Syracusans, 
 who had received advice of the approach of the 
 reinforcement; determined to made another at- 
 tempt with their fleet and the whole augmented 
 body of their land army, which they had assem- 
 bled together for this very design of attacking 
 the Athenians again before the reinforcement 
 arrived. But, like men who in the former 
 
 ' About two miles. 
 
 action had clearly perceived what would give 
 them advantages over the enemy, they had 
 made some alteration in the structure of their 
 vessels : having shortened the heads of their 
 ships, they made them more firm and compact, 
 and fastened very substantial stays to each side 
 of the beak ; they stijingthened these again by 
 rafters of six cubits in length, which were laid 
 a!ong the ribs both within and without, in the 
 same manner as the Corinthians had strength- 
 ened the whole prow of their ships for the 
 last naval engagement against the squadron at 
 JYaupactus. By these means the Syracusans 
 concluded they should gain an advantage over 
 the ships of the Athenians, which were of a 
 different structure, as in the prow they were 
 but weak, because of their usual practice, in an 
 engagement, not to charge a-head, but by tack- 
 ing about to strike upon the sides : — that, far- 
 ther, should the battle be fought in the great 
 harbour, where sea-room would be small and 
 the ships be crowded, this must be also an 
 advantage in their favour ; since, darting them- 
 selves a-head, they must needs shatter the 
 prows of the enemy, when with compact and 
 solid beaks they struck against such as were 
 hollow and weak: — that again, for want of 
 sea-room, the Athenians would be too much 
 straitened to make their tacks, or to run 
 through their lines, which were points of art 
 on which they chiefly relied ; they were deter- 
 mined to the utmost of their power to check 
 all attempts of the latter sort, and the narrow 
 space in which they must engage would of 
 itself prevent the former; and now they in- 
 tended with dexterity to turn to their own 
 advantage the method of striking ahead, which 
 on the former occasion appeared to be an error 
 in the masters ; that hence infallibly the day 
 must be their own ; for the Athenians, if once 
 repulsed, would not have room to go round and 
 return to the charge, since thus they must di- 
 rectly be forced on the shore, which lay but a 
 small distance from their camp, and would 
 sadly cramp them up; that they themselves 
 must be masters of the rest of the harbour, 
 whilst the enemy, crowded together, in case 
 they should be forced to give way, must be 
 driven into narrow compass, and even falling 
 foul on one another, a total confusion and dis- 
 order must certainly follow ; for, what hurt the 
 Athenians most, in all their naval engagements, 
 was their inability to make use of the whole 
 harbour for tacking about or returning to the 
 
YEAR XIX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 273 
 
 charge, in the same manner as the Syracusans : 
 — that, finally, the Athenians could not possi- 
 bly get out into wider sea, as the entrance of 
 the harbour and the space behind the lines of 
 battle were in their own command ; nay, other 
 obstacles would co-operate, such as Plemmy- 
 rium, which would now oppose any attempt of 
 this kind, and the very nature of the harbour's 
 mouth, which was exceeding nartow. 
 
 By such a project the Syracusans had given 
 an increase to their former skill and strength ; 
 and animated more than ever by the thought of 
 having improved from their errors in the for- 
 mer engagement, they Sallied out to encounter 
 the enemy both with their land and naval force. 
 Gylippus showed himself, a small portion of 
 time before the rest, at the head of the infan- 
 try ; whom, sallying out of the city, he drew 
 up near the Athenian entrenchment, in that 
 quarter where it faced the city. Then the 
 garrison of Olympiseum, to a man, as wdl 
 heavy-armed as horsemen, with all the light- 
 armed parties of the Syracusans, came and 
 drew up on the other quarters ; and, immedi- 
 ately after, the ships of the Syracusans and 
 their allies came sailing forwards. 
 
 The Athenians at first imagined that at 
 present they were threatened only with an as- 
 sault by land ; but when, on a sudden, they 
 saw the fleet bearing down against them, they 
 were struck with confusion. Some of them 
 were taking post upon and without the en- 
 trenchments, to make head against the as- 
 sailants ; others were sallied forth to encoun- 
 ter the troops from Olympiaeum, and those 
 from remoter parts coming on with full speed, 
 a numerous body of horsemen and darters. 
 The rest were hurrying on board to man the 
 ships, or to give what assistance they could 
 upon the beach ; and no sooner were the pro- 
 per complements on board, than seventy-five 
 ships stood out to meet the enemy ; but then 
 the number of the enemy's vessels was about 
 eighty. 
 
 Great part of this day was spent in advanc- 
 ing towards, and retiring from, one another, 
 and in reciprocal endeavours to seize advan- 
 tages: but neither side was able to execute 
 any remarkable piece of service, excepting that 
 the Syracusans sunk one or two of the Atheni- 
 an ships ; upon which they parted, and at the 
 same time the land army drew o6f from the 
 entrenchments. 
 
 The day following the Syracusans lay quiet, 
 43 
 
 affording the enemy no room to guess it theii 
 future designs. 
 
 But Nicias, conscious to himself that hither 
 to no advantages had been gained by sea, and 
 fully expecting that the enemy would repeat 
 their attempt, obliged the captains of the tri- 
 remes to repair their ships if anywise damaged, 
 and stationed the transports before the piles, 
 which they had driven down in the sea, to se- 
 cure the ships, and lock up as it were that 
 space in which they lay. The traiisports he 
 ranged in a line, at the distance of the breadth 
 of two plethra' from one another ; that, in 
 ease a ship was repulsed, it might run in hither 
 as 1 place of security, and might again stand 
 out without any molestation. In perfecting 
 these dispositions the Athenians were all this 
 day employed from morning to night. 
 
 The next day, the Syracusans, earlier in the 
 morning than before, and with the same parade 
 of their land and naval force, came out to at- 
 tack the Athenians. Now again, facing each 
 other in the lines of the engagement, they 
 speiit great part of the day in the same endea- 
 vours as before to over-reach and surprise one 
 another ; till at length Aristo, the son of Pyr- 
 ricus, a Corinthian, and the most expert sea- 
 man in the fleet of Syracuse, persuades the 
 commanders of that fleet to despatch their 
 orders to the magistrates within the city, — 
 " with all expedition to bring the provisions 
 which were for sale down to the beach of the 
 sea, and hold the market there ; nay, farther, 
 to compel all those who had any meat to sell 
 to offer it instantly on the beach, that the ma- 
 riners might come ashore and dine under the 
 sides of their vessels; so that, after a short 
 repast, they might this same day unexpectedly 
 fall upon the Athenians." This counsel being 
 approved, the necessary orders were despatched 
 away, and the market was furnished out. Then 
 suddenly the Syracusan fleet fell back, and 
 stood away towards the city ; where, disem 
 barking with all possible haste, they took their 
 repast. 
 
 But the Athenians, who ascribed this drop- 
 ping off of the enemy to a consciousness of 
 their own inferiority, quitting their own ships 
 as if there was nothing farther to be done, 
 diverted their attention to their own affairs, 
 and especially to prepare a refreshing meal for 
 
 • A plethron is said by eoroe to contain 1,414, by oth 
 ers, 1000 square feet. 
 
274 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book vh. 
 
 themselves, confident there would be no en- 
 gagement on this day. But, on a sudden, the 
 Syracusans, repairing on board, stood out a 
 second time to give them battle. Then the 
 Athenians, in much hurry and confusion, and 
 most of them still fasting, re-embarking with- 
 out any regularity or order, with great difficulty, 
 after a considerable interval, stood out to re- 
 ceive them. For a certain space, each stood 
 upon their guard, and declined the charge. At 
 length it occurred to the Athenians, that it was 
 imprudent to dally so long, and exhaust their 
 spirits by the mere labour of the oar, which 
 ought rather to be exerted on an expeditious 
 attack. Upon which animating one another 
 with a shout, they darted upon the enemy, and 
 the engagement began. 
 
 The Syracusans received the shock without 
 giving way, and, keeping the heads of their 
 vessels right against the enemy, executed their 
 project, and with their strengthened beaks 
 shattered the forecastles of the Athenian ships ; 
 whilst their darters, who were ranged along the 
 decks, galled the Athenians sorely with their 
 missive weapons ; though not near so much as 
 did the crews of some light Syracusan boats, 
 which scoured about the enemy's fleet ; some- 
 times gettingunder their wards and gliding along 
 the sides of their vessels, and from these close 
 positions aiming their darts at the mariners. 
 in fine, the Syracusans, persevering in this 
 n>anner to gall their foes, were masters of the 
 d?y ; whilst the Athenians, being put to flight, 
 were obliged to retire, through the intervals of 
 the line of transports, into their own station. 
 The Syracusaij ships pursued as far as to this 
 line of transports; but were obliged to stop 
 there, for fear of the machines' which hung 
 upon the yards of the transports to bar all ap- 
 proach. Two ships, indeed, of the Syracu- 
 sans, elevated with success, approached too 
 near, and were sunk; and another, with all 
 her crew, was taken by the enemy. And now 
 tile Syracusans, who in the action had sunk 
 seven ships of the enemy, had damaged many, 
 liad taken many prisoners, and made great 
 ^laughter, judged it proper to retire. They 
 then erected trophies as victorious in two 
 eijgagenjents, and plumed themselves in the 
 assuralice, that Vy sea, they had the superi- 
 
 » * Called i/o/pAins, from their form. They were mae- 
 sy, made Qf lead, and hung Ppon the Bail-yards by cords 
 and pu\ieys; and, when thrown into the enemy's ships, 
 Kilher burst or sunk them. 
 
 ority over the enemy ; presuming, at the same 
 time, that they must soon be victorious also by 
 land : upon which they got every thing in 
 readiness to attack them once more on both 
 elements. 
 
 But, at this crisis, Demosthenes and Eury- 
 medon arrive, at the head of the reinforcement 
 from Aihens ; which consisted of seventy- 
 three sail of ships, including foreigners ; of 
 about five thousand heavy-armed of their own 
 and their confe<Jerate troops ; beside a con- 
 siderable number of darters, as well Barbarian 
 as Grecian, and slingers, and archers, and a 
 complete supply of all military stores. The first 
 appearance of this grand reinforcement struck 
 the Syracusans and their allies with no small 
 consternation. It looked as if the war must 
 be endless, and themselves exposed to dangers 
 that knew no bounds. They saw that, in spite 
 of the annoyance which Decelea, now forti- 
 fied, gave them, the Athenians were arrived 
 before Syracuse with another armament as 
 great and as formidable as the former; and 
 that, in every view, the strength of Athens 
 must be quite insurmountable. And now also 
 the Athenians, who remained of the former 
 armament, respired from that dejection of 
 spirit into which a series of misfortunes had 
 plunged them. 
 
 Demosthenes, after taking a view of the 
 present posture of affairs, thought it absolutely 
 necessary to avoid delays, and keep clear of 
 those errors which had done so much prejudice 
 to Nicias : for Nicias, at his first appearance, 
 struck an universal consternation ; and yet, by 
 declining the immediate attack of Syracuse, 
 and loitering a whole winter away at Catana, 
 he became an object of contempt; and Gy lip- 
 pus had time to land a succour from Pelopon- 
 nesus, which disconcerted all his measures. 
 That succour, however, the Syracusans could 
 never have sent for, had Nicias assaulted them 
 on his first approach ; for, deluding themselves 
 with the thought that they were a match for 
 their foes, they would have found, by sad ex- 
 perience, that they had indulged a cruel mis- 
 take, and must the same moment have been 
 invested on all sides : and, in such a state, 
 though they had invited those succours, yet no 
 effectual relief could have been obtained from 
 them. 
 
 Demosthenes, therefore, reflecting on these 
 past mistakes, and sensible that he himself 
 this very moment, on the first day of his ar 
 
YIAR XIX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESlAiN WAR. 
 
 275 
 
 rival appeared most terrible in the eyes of the 
 enemy, resolved without loss of time to im- 
 prove the present consternation which his re- 
 inforcement had struck amongst them. He 
 farther took notice, the counterwork of the Sy- 
 racusans, by which the Athenians had been ex- 
 cluded from perfecting their circumvallation, 
 consisted only of a single wall ; and, in case 
 the heights of Epipolae could again be regained, 
 with the camp which at first had been occupied 
 there, that work might easily be carried, since 
 the defendants could not now be able to with- 
 stand the Athenian strength ; — he determined 
 therefore to put this project in execution ; 
 judging that, in case it succeeded, it would be 
 a means of bringing the war to a speedy con- 
 clusion : for, if the scheme took place, the sur- 
 render of Syracuse must soon follow ; at worst 
 he would draw oif the army, and not waste the 
 lives of those, Athenians who were employed 
 in this service, and the strength of the whole 
 state, to no manner of purpose. 
 
 Now, therefore, the Athenians began to act 
 offensively ; and, in the first place, sallying out 
 from their camp, they ravaged the country along 
 the banks of the Anapus, and were now again, 
 as on the first approach, masters without con- 
 trol both by land and sea; for in neither 
 element durst the Syracusans any longer come 
 out to check their motions, abating what 
 small resistance was made by the cavalry and 
 darters from Olympiaeum. 
 
 In the next place, Demosthenes thought 
 proper to try what could be done against the 
 works of the enemy by the help of machines. 
 But, when, apon applying them, those ma- 
 chines were fired by the Syracusans, who from 
 the top of their works made a gallant defence ; 
 and, though the army attacked in several 
 quarters at once, they were every where re- 
 pulsed ; he determined to waste no longer time 
 upon the trial ; but, having prevailed with 
 Nicias and his other colleagues in command 
 to assent to the scheme he had formed to re- 
 cover Epipola!, he proceeded to put it in exe- 
 cution. Yet, by daylight, it was judged im- 
 possible for them either to march or to mount 
 the ascent without being discovered. Upon 
 this, having issued out his orders, that every 
 man should take with him subsistence for five 
 days, and that all masons and carpenters should 
 attend the march, with proper store of missive 
 weapons, and all needful materials for rais- 
 ing new works in case the attempt was suc- 
 
 cessful, he put himself, about the first sleep, at 
 the head of the whole army, and, assisted by 
 Eurymedon and Menander, marched towards 
 Epipote. But Nicias was l<ift behind in the 
 intrenchments. 
 
 When now they were advanced to the pass 
 of Euryalus, by which the first army gained 
 formerly the ascent, they are yet undiscovered 
 by the Syracusan guards ; and, mounting the 
 heights, surprise the fort which was there man- 
 ned by the Syracusans, and slaughter some of 
 the defendants. But the majority flying amain 
 towards the camps, of which there were three 
 among the advanced intrenchments of Epipolas, 
 (one of Syracusans, a second of other Sicilians, 
 and a third of the confederates,) they spread 
 the alarm, and also notified the enemy's ap- 
 proach to the six hundred Syracusans, who at 
 first were selected for the guard of this quarter 
 of Epipolae. These sallied out instantly to stop 
 their progress ; and Demosthenes, with his 
 Athenians, falling in with them, put them to 
 flight, after they had made a gallant stand. 
 Upon this success, they immediately pushed 
 forwards, that they might improve the present 
 ardour of the soldiers to the immediate comple- 
 tion of those points for which they had made 
 this bold attempt. Another party, which had 
 been advancing all along without a check, sur- 
 prised the counterwork of the Syracusans ; of 
 which, since abandoned by its defendants, they 
 were throwing down the battlements. 
 
 But now the Syracusans, and their confede- 
 rates, and Gylippus with the body under his 
 command, marched out of their intrench- 
 ments : yet, having been attacked in so daring 
 a manner amidst the darkness of the night, 
 they had not recovered their surprise when 
 they fell in with the Athenians ; and thus, not 
 able to stand the first shock, they were obliged 
 to give way for a time. But, as the Athenians 
 pushed forwards with great irregularity, as if 
 the victory was quite their own ; eager, farther, 
 to make themselves masters of all the tract 
 not yet cleared of the enemy, for fear lest, 
 should they slacken in their ardour, the ene- 
 my might have time to rally in a body, 
 — the Boeotians first put a stop to their ca- 
 reer ; and, rushing boldly upon them, rout- 
 ed and put them to flight. By this turn the 
 Athenians were thrown into so much disorder 
 and confusion, that the particulars which fol- 
 lowed cannot easily be gathered, neither from 
 themselves nor their antagonists: for, even 
 
276 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VII. 
 
 ill daylight, when objects are clearest to the 
 sight, men present in a battle are not able to 
 see all that passeth ; each single combatant 
 can barely relate what happened about his own 
 person. When, therefore, armies engage amidst 
 the darkness of the night (though this is the 
 only instance of it between powerful armies 
 in the present war,) how is it possible to come 
 at the knowledge of the several incidents 1 
 The moon indeed shone at this time ; but 
 then they only saw one another as objects ap- 
 pear by moon-light, so as to discern the appear- 
 ance of human bodies, but not to distinguish 
 between friends and enemies. The heavy- 
 armed, farther, numerous on both sides, were 
 too much crowded for want of room. One party 
 of the Athenians was already clearly defeated ; 
 another, unbroken by the first attack upon 
 them, was pushing forwards. Of the remain- 
 der of their army, a great part had already 
 mounted the ascent; yet some were still 
 busied in mounting up ; but none of these, 
 when they were got upon the eminence, knew 
 which way to advance : for, before them (as 
 the rout was begun) there was one grand 
 medley of confusion, and the tumult was so loud 
 that no sounds could be distinctly heard. The 
 Syracusans and their confederates were ani- 
 mating one another with loud exultations (for 
 the season of the night made all signals useless) 
 to complete the blow, and were clearing before 
 them all that came in their way : but the Athe- 
 nians were prying about for one another, and 
 regarded every thing they met, even though 
 they fell in with their own friends, as the flight 
 was now begun, for an assured enemy. Ob- 
 liged, farther, by frequent iterations, to demand 
 the word, as the only method to distinguish 
 one another, (all calling out aloud for it at the 
 same instant of time,) they heightened the 
 general distraction, and clearly discovered their 
 own word to the enemy. But then they had 
 not equal opportunities to discover that of the 
 enemy ; because, as the latter were now the 
 victors and kept more in bodies, it was less 
 liable to detection. Hence it came to pass, 
 that, though a stronger party of the Athenians 
 fell in with a weaker party of their foes, yet 
 they judged it best to fly ; because they were 
 sensible that their own word was divulged ; 
 and, as they could not return the word of the 
 Syracusans, they must unavoidably be cut to 
 pieces. But what had the greatest effect, and 
 did most hurt to the Athenians, was the sing- 
 
 ing the pooan ; since that used on both sides, 
 being nearly the same, raised the utmost con- 
 fusion. And, when the Argives and Corcy- 
 reans, and all others of Doric descent, who were 
 with the Athenians, began from time to time 
 their psean, it struck the same alarm into the ^ 
 Athenians as when the enemy themselves sang 
 it : so that, in short, falling in amongst one 
 another in different quarters of the army, when 
 once the confusion was rose to a height, (friends 
 against friends, and citizens against fellow- 
 citizens,) they not only impress a reciprocal 
 terror, but proceed to blows with so much 
 fury that they could not easily be parted. 
 The pursuit was briskly followed; in which 
 many of them, plunging headlong down the 
 precipices, were dashed in pieces, because the 
 pass downwards from Epipolse was too narrow 
 for their numbers. But, of those who from 
 the heights got down into the plain, many, 
 and all in general who came in the first arma 
 ment, since better experienced in the country, 
 escaped in safety to the camp : whereas, ot 
 the last comers, some, straggling into by-ways, 
 were bewildered in a country to which they 
 were utter strangers, and at break of day were 
 cut to pieces by the Syracusan horse, who 
 scoured the plains. 
 
 On the day following, the Syracusans erected 
 two trophies on Epipolse ; one on the summit 
 of the pass, and the other where the Boeotians 
 first stopped the enemy's progress. The Athe- 
 nians also obtained a truce, to fetch off their 
 dead ; the number of which was large,' both 
 in their own troops and those of their allies ; 
 and yet more arms were taken by the enemy 
 than bore proportion to the slain : for, of the 
 number of light-armed who were pushed to 
 the brink of the precipices, and, throwing 
 away their shields, were obliged to leap down, 
 though some perished by the fall, yet others 
 escaped with life. 
 
 But, after this, the Syracusans, highly ani- 
 mated again with this fresh unexpected turn 
 in their favour, sent out Sicanus, at the head 
 of fifteen sail, to Agrigentum, now embroiled 
 in a sedition, with orders to exert the utmost 
 of his power to reduce it to their obedience, 
 Gylippus also made once more the tour of 
 Sicily, to levy another array ; confident that, 
 with such a reinforcement, he could carry the 
 
 » Plutarch puts it at two tliousand : but Diodorus* Si- 
 cuius says it was two thousand five luuidred. 
 
YEAR XIX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 277 
 
 very intrenchments of the enemy by storm, 
 since affairs had taken such a favourable turn 
 on Epipolffi. 
 
 In the meantime, the Athenian generals 
 were employed in the needful consultations 
 since the last misfortune and the present uni- 
 versal dejection of their troops. They saw 
 that all their attempts were blasted by ill suc- 
 cess and that the soldiers were chagrined at 
 the continuance of so fruitless a service : for a 
 sickness spread amongst their people from a 
 double cause ; from the present season of the 
 year, in which the human body is most subject 
 to disorders, and the marshy unwholesome 
 ground on which they were encamped ; besides 
 that, in every respect, their situation appeared 
 desperate and quite beyond the power of re- 
 dress. 
 
 The opinion of Demosthenes was therefore 
 totally repugnant to a longer continuance be- 
 fore Syracuse. He urged " the immediate 
 execution of the scheme he had formed before 
 he made the late dangerous attempt upon 
 Epipote ; which since it had miscarried' 
 they should no longer protract their departure, 
 whilst yet the season of the year was proper 
 for their voyage homewards, and they had 
 strength enough in the last reinforcement to 
 force their passage in spite of the enemy." 
 He aiErmed, " It would be more conducive 
 to the public welfare to turn their arms 
 against those who were erecting fortifications 
 within Attica itself, than against theSyracusans, 
 whose reduction now was almost impractica- 
 ble ; and that it was madness to persist any 
 longer in a siege which dissipated the wealth 
 of the state in fruitless vain expenses." In 
 this manner Demosthenes declared his senti- 
 ments. 
 
 As for Nicias, though convinced within him- 
 self that their affairs were in a bad situation, yet 
 he was unwilling with his own mouth to confess 
 their low condition, or that a departure should 
 be fixed by the general votes of a public council, 
 where all that passed must be reported to 
 the enemy ; because, should the determina- 
 tion be formed in this manner, the execution 
 could not go forwards without the enemy's 
 privity. Besides, as he knew the state of the 
 enemy somewhat more perfectly than others, 
 he imagined there were grounds to hope that 
 the state of the latter would soon become worse 
 than their own, would they only continue to 
 press the siege. A want of supplies must 
 
 soon reduce them to great straits ; and this the 
 sooner, as, by the accession of the last squa- 
 dron, themselves were now again masters of 
 the sea. And, what is more, in Syracuse itself 
 there was a party which wished to see the city 
 fall into their hands. These had despatched 
 their agents to Nicias, and insisted he should 
 not quit the siege. Yet, thus enlightened as 
 he was, in reality he knew not how to act, as 
 his- mind was balanced between two measures, 
 which equally required mature deliberation 
 But, for the present, he openly declared him 
 self in council against drawing ofT^the army 
 He told them, " he was perfectly well assured 
 that the Athenians would never forgive him, 
 should he carry their troops from Sicily with- 
 out peremptory orders ; that the affair would 
 not then lie under the cognizance of such as 
 here advised it, and with their own eyes were 
 convinced of the necessity of such a step ; but 
 of men who would form their judgments upon 
 the spiteful calumniations of others, and the 
 influence some malicious demagogues would 
 have over their understandings, by which their 
 fate would be determined." He farther repre- 
 sented, that " many, nay, the greater part of 
 the soldiers, who now formed the troops, and 
 make such tragical outcries about the perils that 
 environ them at present, would change their 
 notes so soon as they were landed again at 
 Athens, and ascribe their return to the treach- 
 ery and corruption of their commanders." For 
 such reasons, he declared, " as he was well 
 acquainted with Athenian tempers, he would 
 choose, rather than be undone at Athens by 
 base criminations and an unjust sentence, to 
 hazard the last extremity, and perish, if so it 
 must be, under the violence of the enemy," 
 He maintained, however, that " the state of 
 the Syracusans was worse than their own. 
 The demand upon them for the pay of foreign- 
 ers was large ; their expenses in securing the 
 outworks of Syracuse were high ; they had now 
 supported a large navy for the space of an en 
 tire year ; want therefore must soon como 
 upon them, and they must shortly be totally 
 distressed ; because the sum of two thousand 
 talents' they had already expended of their own 
 stock, and had even contracted a large debt 
 beside. And, in case they abate of their pit- 
 sent punctuality or making good the appoint- 
 ments of the forces they have on foot, their 
 
 S87,50O2. aterlins. 
 
373 
 
 PELOPONiNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book vir. 
 
 strength must moulder away ; since it consisted, 
 not like the Athenians, of troops which must 
 serve, but of such as were only discretionary 
 aids." He concluded with " the necessity they 
 lay under, from the ties of duty, to continue 
 the siege with vigour, and by no means expose 
 a superior strength to ruin, through a false 
 presumption that they were inferior in point of 
 supplies." 
 
 Nicias expressed himself on this occasion 
 with an air of neat confidence, as a person per- 
 fectly well acquainted with the state of Syra- 
 cuse and the failure of money there, and be- 
 cause there was a party within the city which 
 acted in favour of the Athenians, and had 
 advised him, by their agents, " by no means to 
 raise the siege." And, what is more, he placed 
 a stronger dependence now upon the fleet than 
 ever he had done'before the late unsuccessful 
 engagement. 
 
 As to the proposal of continuing the siege, 
 Demosthenes would not yield the least degree 
 of attention to it : " If the army must not eva- 
 cuate Sicily without a peremptory order from 
 Athens, but must persist in this destructive 
 service, he judged it would be better to draw 
 them off to Thapsus or to Catana, where they 
 might find opportunity enough to make incur- 
 sions with the land army upon the territories 
 of the enemy, and, by committing devastations, 
 might highly distress them. Their fleet might 
 then engage in the open sea ; not in u space 
 confined and straitened, which was the greatest 
 advantage to the enemy, but in sufficient sea- 
 room, where all their superior skill might 
 fairly be exerted, where they would be able to 
 make their attacks, and bear down again upon 
 the foe with greater agility, and more violent 
 shocks, than could be done in the limitary space 
 of a close pent-up harbour. Upon the whole, 
 he affirmed, that his consent should never be 
 given to a longer continuance in their present 
 posts, but he was for moving off with all possi- 
 ble expedition, and they had not a moment to 
 lavish upon delay." 
 
 Eurymedon then declared that his sense of 
 things coincided with that of Demosthenes ; 
 and, Nicias persisting in the contrary opinion, 
 a fit of languor and suspense ensued, attended 
 with the secret imagination that the positive- 
 ness of Nicias resulted from some stronger 
 hopes of success he had conceived above his 
 colleagues. And in this manner the Atheni- 
 
 ans fell into dilatory measures, and continued 
 in their camp before Syracuse. 
 
 But in this interval Gylippus and Sicanua 
 returned to Syracuse : Sicanus, truly disap- 
 pointed of Agrigentum, for he was advanced 
 no farther than Gela when the sedition in fa- 
 vour of the Syracusans was brought to an ami- 
 cable period ; but then Gylippus was returned 
 at the head of a numerous body, consistiiig of 
 levies made in Sicily, and the heavy-armed 
 troops from Peloponnesus, who in the spring 
 had put to sea on board the transport, but came 
 over last from Africa to Selinus ; for into 
 Africa they had been driven by contrary winds ■ 
 and, having there been furnished by the Cyre- 
 neans with two triremes and a set of pilots, as 
 they coasted along the African shore, they re- 
 lieved the Evesperitae, then blocked up by the 
 Libyans. The latter they defeated in a set 
 battle ; and, proceeding from thence along the 
 shore, they reached Neapolis, a Carthaginian 
 mart, from whence lies the shortest cut to 
 Sicily, being only a passage of two days and a 
 night. Hence therefore they stood across, and 
 landed at Selinus. 
 
 With this accession of strength, the Syracu- 
 sans instantly prepared to attack the Athe- 
 nians again both by land and sea. But the 
 Athenian generals, — finding they had received 
 so large an augmentation, and that the posture 
 of their own affairs was so far from being 
 changed for the better, that day after day it 
 grew worse in every respect, and, what was 
 worst of all, that their troops were quite ex- 
 hausted with fatigue and sickness, — they re- 
 pented now in earnest that they had not drawn 
 off in time ; and, as Nicias now no longer op- 
 posed that step with the same vehemence as he 
 had done before, but merely endeavoured that 
 it should not be determined in public council, 
 they issued out orders, with the utmost secre- 
 cy, that the whole armament should hold them- 
 selves in readiness to put to sea upon a signal 
 given. But, all things now ready, the very 
 moment they are going to embark, the moon is 
 eclipsed, for it was now the time of the full. 
 The bulk of the army, struck with the awful 
 appearance, call out upon the generals to halt ; 
 and Nicias, always addicted too much to super- 
 stition and such vulgar scruples, positively de- 
 clared, that "it should no more be debated 
 whether they should remove or not, till the 
 three times nine days were past which the 
 
YEAH XIX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 279 
 
 soothsayers prescribe on such occasions." So, 
 for this reason, a. longer stay was forced upon 
 the Athenians who had been too dilatoiy al- 
 ready.' 
 
 The Syracusans, who had soon an intelli- 
 gence of their designs, were now more animated 
 than ever to press briskly on the Athenians, as on 
 men who had given proof of their own inward 
 conviction that they were no longer a match 
 
 » That the bulk of an army or a fleet should be fright- 
 ened at such appearances, is no wonder at all ; they are 
 ever ignorant; and the most daring of them in other 
 respects have been much addicted to superslition. But 
 one cannot help being surprised at the ignorance and 
 superstition of Nicias; one cannot help pitying and de- 
 ploring the foible of a man who had so good a heart. 
 Plutarch expatiates largely on tliis occasion. " Even 
 the vulgar," says he, *' at this time were well apprised 
 that an eclipse of the sun was often occasioned, about 
 the time of the change, by an interposition of the mooh: 
 but, as to the moon, by the interposition of what body, 
 and how on a sudden, at the full, its light fades away or 
 emits variety of colour, was not easy for them to con- 
 ceive. They, thought it a strange occurrence, and sent 
 from God as a prognostic of great calamities. The first 
 person who wrote a clear and bold solution of the en- 
 lightening and obscuration of the moon, was Anaxago- 
 ras, who now had not been long dead ; nor was his ac- 
 count in every body's hands, but concealed, imparted 
 only to a few, and that with caution and assurances of 
 secrecy. The world could not bear that naturalists and 
 meteormongers, as they were then styled, should seem 
 to restrain the divine power by quaint argumentations, 
 invisible operations, and necessary consequences. For 
 such attempts Protagoras was banished ; and Pericles, 
 with much ado, procured the release of Anasagoras 
 when thrown into prison. Nay, Socrates, who never 
 meddled with any of these points, was however put to 
 death upon the charge of philosophizing. It was not 
 till late that the glory of Plato shone abroad ; who, by 
 his irreproachable life, and subjecting natural necessl 
 ties to a divine and sovereign power, cleared away nil 
 had imputations from studies of this kind, and, by a ma- 
 thematical beginning, opened a field to other sciences. 
 And thus his friend Dion, at What time he was setting 
 Rail from Zacynthus against Dionysius, was not at all 
 disheartened by an eclipse of the moon, but landed safe 
 nt Syracuse, and ejected the tyrant. It was the misfor- 
 tune of Nicias, at this juncture, not to have even a skil- 
 ful soothsayer with him; for his intimate, Stilbides, who 
 had cured much of his superstition, had died a little be- 
 fore; since this portent, as Philochorus says, was not 
 o bad one, but an excellent good one, for a flying army ; 
 since acts which are accompanied with fear stand in 
 need of concealment, and light is ever an adversary to 
 them. Besides, after eclipses of the sun or moon, it was 
 the usualcustom, as Autoclidea hath informed us, to 
 hold only a three days' cessation from business. But 
 Nicias persuaded himself that a comlpcte revolution of 
 the moon ought to be waited for ; as if with his own 
 eyes he had not seen her shine bright again, when she 
 had passed the shadow and the earth's interposition. 
 Yet, throwing upall attention to other points, he mind- 
 ed nothing but sacrificing, till his enemies attacked 
 him." — Life of JVicias. 
 
 for their foes either by sea or on land ; since, 
 with other thoughts, they never could have pro* 
 jected a re-embarkation. Apprehensive, at 
 the same time, that, should they remove to any 
 other quarter of Sicily, they would become 
 more difficult of reduction, they saw the ne- 
 cessity of engaging them by sea without a mo- 
 ment's loss, whilst yet they had an advantage 
 in compelliifg them to fight. Upon this, they 
 ordered the complements of men on board 
 their ships, and exercised their crews as many 
 days as was judged sufficient. But, when op- 
 portunity offered of acting with advantage, on 
 the first day they assaulted the Athenian in- 
 trenchments ; and, a party of heavy-armed and 
 horsemen, though not numerous, sallying out 
 at some of the ports to beat them off, they cut 
 off spme of the heavy-armed from the rest of 
 that party, and, having put them to flight, fol- 
 low the pursuit. As the spot, farther, on 
 which the assault is made, was narrow, the 
 Athenians lose seventy horses and a small 
 number of their heavy-armed. Nothing more 
 happened on this day, as the army of the Syra- 
 cusans now made their retreat. 
 
 But, on the day following, they stand out 
 with their fleet,^ to the number of seventy-six 
 ships ; and, at the same time, the land army 
 marched up to the intrenchments. The Athe- 
 nians launched out, with fourscore and six, to 
 give them a reception ; and thus, charging one 
 another, an engagement ensued. Euryraedon 
 commanded the right wing of the Athenian 
 fleet, and endeavoured to over-reach and sur- 
 round the ships of the enemy. For this pur- 
 pose, he opened his line, and stood along too 
 close to the land ; which gave the Syracusans 
 and their allies, who had now defeated the 
 centre of the Athenians, an opportunity to in- 
 tercept him in the bottom and recess of the 
 harbour, where they slay Eurymedon himself, 
 and destroy the ships which had separated in 
 his company : and, this done, they gave chase 
 to the whole Athenian fleet, and drove them 
 ashore. 
 
 a Plutarch adds, that, " on this occasion, the very la da 
 came out in fishing-boats and skiffs, taunting and in- 
 sulting the Athenians. One of these lads, Heraclides, 
 of a noble family, who had advanced too near, was in 
 great danger of being intercepted by an Athenian vessel. 
 But Polliehus, the uncle of the lad, alarmed for his safe- 
 ty, charged instantly with the ten triremes he had un- 
 der his command. The rest of the Syracusan fleet, now- 
 alarmed for Polliehus, ran in at once, and brought on a 
 general engagerhent "—Life of JVicias. 
 
:.o 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VII. 
 
 Gylippus now, perceiving that the ships of 
 the enemy were defeated and drove aground 
 quite wide of the piles and their camp, formed 
 instantly a design to make slaughter of the 
 men as they were leaping on shore, and of giv- 
 ing the Syracusans an opportunity easily to 
 draw off all the ships from land of which they 
 were entire masters. At the head, therefore, 
 of one division of the laud-force, he marched 
 down to the pier to second the fleet. The 
 Tyrrhenes happened to have heen posted near- 
 est by the Athenians ; who, seeing a body of 
 the enemy running down thither in a disorderly 
 manner, advanced eargerly to meet them ; and, 
 charged briskly on the van, put them to flight 
 and drive them into the lake of Lysimelia. 
 But, soon after, a reinforcement of Syracusans 
 and their allies coming up, the Athenians also 
 advanced with speed to succour their friends, 
 and, trembling for their ships, soon came to an 
 engagement with them, and, after routing, pur- 
 sued them amain. They slaughtered now a 
 great number of the heavy-armed ; and, what 
 was more, preserved the far greater part of their 
 fleet, and towed again to their former moorings 
 all their ships, except eighteen, which the Sy- 
 racusans and their allies made prizes, and put 
 all the men on board them to the sword. With 
 a view, farmer, to destroy the rest by setting 
 them on fire, they filled an old transport ship 
 with facines and combustible matter, and, as 
 the wind blew right upon the Athenians, set 
 her on fire, and let her drive in amongst them. 
 The Athenians, trembling for the ships, put 
 all their engines instantly at work to ex- 
 tinguish the flames ; which having at length 
 effectuated, and kept this fire-ship clear of 
 their own vessels, they were delivered from 
 this imminent danger. 
 
 After this the Syracusans erected a trophy 
 for their victorious engagement on the water, 
 and for the interception of the party of the 
 heavy-armed before the intrenchments, where 
 they had taken so many horses. The Athe- 
 nians also did the same, for the repulse given 
 by the Tyrrhenes to the land-forces of the ene- 
 my, and their being chased into the lake, and 
 the larger success they afterwards obtained 
 with the rest of their army. 
 
 But now, when, beyond the reach of doubt, 
 the Syracusans, though at first alarmed at the 
 large reinforcement of shipping brought against 
 them by Demosthenes, had gained a signal 
 victory by sea, the Athenians were plunged 
 
 into a total dejection of spirit: they were 
 thunder-struck by the reverse of misfortunes so 
 little expected; and began to repent, with 
 much more bitterness of thought, that they had 
 ever engaged in so fatal an expedition. They 
 had invaded states, whose polity was already 
 of a piece with their own, whose form of 
 government was popular, like that of Athens, 
 and which flourished in shipping, in horses, 
 and each article of power: and yet, finding 
 themselves unable to give any measure of 
 success to their projects by introducing dissen- 
 sions amongst them through political embroil- 
 ments, nor even by a powerful force, superior 
 to that of their foes, able to ward off the many 
 blows they had received, they had fallen before- 
 hand into great anxieties ; and now, sadly 
 beaten as they were at sea, one thought of 
 which they never could hitherto have conceived, 
 their despondency became more violent than 
 ever. 
 
 From this time the Syracusans scoured the 
 whole harbour without having any thing to fear. 
 They had also formed a scheme of barring up 
 its mouth ; that the Athenians, though never 
 so intent upon it, might for the future not have 
 it in their power to steal away. Their care 
 and diligence were no longer employed on the 
 view alone of their own preservation, but on the 
 larger view of ruining the Athenians. They 
 concluded, and justly too, that the latter turns 
 in their favour had given them the ascendant 
 over these invaders : and, could they but com- 
 pass the total overthrow of this body of A the- 
 nians and their allies, the grand achievement 
 would strike all Greece with admiration. Nay 
 more, all other Grecians must reap the fruits of 
 such success ; of whom some would in an in- 
 stant recover freedom, and others be delivered 
 from the fear of losing it ; for the remaining 
 strength of Athens would never be able to 
 stand against that weight of war with which 
 she must be soon encompassed about. And 
 thus, could they (Syracusans) be the glorious 
 authors of such desirable events, they must 
 infallibly become objects of wonder not only to 
 all the present age, but to latest posterity. 
 And of a truth, considered in such a light, it 
 was great and glorious ambition, to aim at the 
 conquest, not only of the Athenians, but also 
 of their whole extensive and combined alliance ; 
 and this, not merely to earn laurels for them- 
 selves, but for the auxiliaries also who had 
 engaged in their cause, since, exposed in the 
 
YEAR XIX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR 
 
 281 
 
 front of the war with the Lacedemonians 
 and Corinthians, they had subjected their own 
 state to the fury of a storm which threatened 
 them all, and, by their own personal valour in 
 naval engagements, had contributed most to 
 such a height of success. 
 
 The various people, now got together at 
 this one city of Syracuse, were so very numer- 
 ous, as to be exceeded only by the comprehen- 
 sive roll of those who, in the series of the 
 present war, sided either with the states of 
 Athens or Sparta. The catalogue is subjoined 
 of those, who mustered in the offensive and de- 
 fensive armies at Syracuse ; who fought against 
 or in behalf of Sicily ; who joined for the re- 
 duction or preservation of this island, not so 
 much from just and lawful motives, or o. con- 
 currence resulting from the ties of blood, as 
 from policy, or interest, or direct compulsion. 
 
 The Athenians, truly, in quality of lonians, 
 had voluntarily come hither against th» Syra- 
 cusans, who were Dorians ; attended by those 
 vrho spoke the same dialect and used the same 
 institutions with themselves, the Lemnians, 
 and Imbrians, and those .iEginetse who were 
 the present possessors of jEgina. The Hes- 
 tiaaans, farther, now inhabiting Hestisa in 
 Euboea, as an Athenian colony, had joined in 
 the expedition. Of the remaining numbers, 
 some came along with them because they were 
 dependents ; some, though independent, be- 
 cause they were c|»nfederates : and some there 
 were who attended merely for their pay. The 
 dependents and tributaries were the Eretrians, 
 and Chalcideans, and Styrensians, and Carys- 
 tians, from Eubcea ; from the islands, the 
 Ceans, and Andrians, and Teians ; from Ionia, 
 the Milesians, and Samians, and Chians ; of 
 these the Chians, being not subjected to a 
 tribute, but only to furnish a quota of shipping, 
 though independent at home, yet followed their 
 arms. And all these hitherto recited were 
 lonians and Athenian colonies, excepting the 
 Carystians, for these last are Dryopes ; but, as 
 subjected to Athens, not so much from choice 
 as lonians, as by mere compulsion, they now 
 followed their masters against Dorians. To 
 these were added ^olians ; the Methymneans, 
 for instance, who were to furnish shipping, but 
 were exempted from tribute ; the Tenedians, 
 farther, and jEnians, who were tributaries ; 
 but these, being J3olians, were now compelled 
 to fight against other .(Eolians ; namely, their 
 own founders, the Boeotians, who adhered to 
 43 
 
 the Syracusans. The Platseans did the same, 
 and were the only Boeotians that acted against 
 Ba:otians upon the justifiable pretext of lasting 
 enmity. The Rhodians, farther, and Cythe- 
 rians attended, though both of Doric descent: the 
 Cy therians, truly, who are a Lacedsemonian colo- 
 ny, bore arms at this juncture on the Athenian 
 side, against the Lacedsemonians under the 
 command of Gylippus ; and the Rhodians, 
 Argives by descent, were obliged to turn their 
 arms against the Doric Syracusans; nay, against 
 the Geloans, a colony of their owii, now acting 
 in concert with the Syracusans. Of the people 
 of the isles on the coast of Peleponnesus came 
 the Cephallenians and Zacynthians ; indepen- 
 dent, in fact, but through their situation, con- 
 trolled in some measure by the Athenians, who 
 are masters of the sea. The Corcyreans, far- 
 ther, who were not only of Doric, but, what is 
 more, were even of Corinthian original, as 
 being a colony of the latter, and by blood allied 
 to the former, from compulsion, as they gave 
 out for a colour, though in truth from deliberate 
 malice, since opposing the Corinthians, whom 
 they. hated, followed the Athenians with an 
 ardour inferior to none. The Messenians also, 
 now styled Messenians of Naupactus, and those 
 from Pylus, which was still held by the Athe- 
 nians, were brought along to the war ; to whom 
 must be added a small party of Megarean 
 exiles, who by a sad reverse of fortune now 
 took part against the Selinuntians, who were 
 also Megarean. The residue of the qonfede- 
 rates were engaged rather upon free and spon- 
 taneous choice. The Argives, for instance, 
 not more from obligations of subsisting treaties, 
 than the rancour they bore the Lacediemonians, 
 and the gratification of private spleen, though 
 Doric, yet followed the Ionic Athenians against 
 their Doric kindred. But the Mantineans and 
 the rest of the Arcadians, who were mercenaries, 
 and eternally habituated to act against any foe 
 pointed out to them, were now so far influenced 
 by gain as to regard those Arcadians as their 
 enemies, who came over on this occasion in 
 company with the Corinthians. The Cretans 
 also and jUtolians were there, allured by an 
 advantageous pay ; and thus it happened that 
 the Cretans, who, in concert with the Rhodi- 
 ans, had founded Gela, readily took part, for 
 the sake of gain, not with but against a colony 
 which themselves had planted. There was 
 also a body of Acarnanian auxiliaries, partly 
 induced to join by the pay they received, but 
 8F 
 
282 
 
 lELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book 
 
 principally by their personal regard for De- 
 mosthenes and their attachment to the Athe- 
 nians. And thus have we run them over to 
 the utmost boundary of the Ionian gulf. Of 
 the Italic nations, tjie Thurians, and those 
 Metapontians whom intestine feuds had reduced 
 to the necessity of fighting for subsistence, 
 joined their arms; and, of the Sicilian, the 
 Naxians, and Cataneans ; of barbarian, .the 
 jEgesteans, who were the first movers of this 
 grand contention, and the major part of the 
 Siculi ; and, out of Sicily, some of the Tyr- 
 rhenes, from enmity to the Syracusans, and the 
 mercenary lapygians. So many ns^ions were 
 assembled together at present under the com- 
 mand of the Athenians. 
 
 The auxiliaries, on the side of the Syracu- 
 sans, were the Camarineans, who bordered 
 close upon them, and the Geloans, who are 
 situated next the Camarineans. To proceed 
 regularly : as the Agrigentines were neutral, 
 the Selinuntians next occur, who are seated 
 beyond the Agrigentines, since they inhabit 
 that tract of the island which faceth Afric. 
 Then the Himereans, the only Grecian people 
 who inhabit that part of the island which hes 
 off the Tyrrhene sea, and were the only body 
 which came from thence to the aid of Syracuse. 
 The several nations of Greek descent settled 
 in Sicily, being all Doric, and independent, 
 acted together in concert. Of the barbarous 
 people they had those Siculi alone who did not 
 openly revolt to the Athenians ; but, out of 
 Sicily, the Lacedeemonians sent them a citizen 
 of Sparta to command, and a body of Neoda- 
 mades and Helots. By a Neodamas is meant a 
 citizen newly enfranchised. The Corinthians 
 alone aided them both with shipping an^ a 
 land force, in conjunction with the Leucadians 
 and Ambraciots, by blood allied to Syra- 
 cuse. From Arcadia also came a body of 
 mercenaries, sent by the Corinthians ; and the 
 Sicyonians, who acted on compulsion ; and 
 of those who dwell without the Peloponnesus 
 were the Bceotians. But, beside these fo- 
 reign aids, the Sicilians, as possessed of great 
 and powerful cities, furnished out in all re- 
 spects a much greater and well-appointed force ; 
 for by them a numerous body of heavy-armed, 
 of ships, and horses, and other kinds of mili- 
 tary force, in an amazing abundance, were 
 raised and brought to Syracuse. And yet it ( 
 must be said, that the domestic force of the i 
 Syracusans was more to be considered than all I 
 
 the rest, from the greatness of their state and 
 the immediate urgency of those perils with 
 which they were environed. 
 
 These were the aids, the numerous aids, as- 
 sembled together by the contending parties; 
 and at this juncture all these were present on 
 each side of the contest; and from this crisis 
 neither party received any accession. 
 
 The Syracusans therefore and their confe- 
 derates thought, since the signal victory they 
 had gained upon the water, it would be a brave 
 exploit, and highly for their glory, to make the 
 whole extensive camp of the Athenians their 
 prize, and cut off their retreat on both elements, 
 both by land and sea. With this project, they 
 immediately barred up the great harbour, the 
 mouth of which is about eight stadia' over, 
 with a line of triremes placed side by side, and 
 other vessels and boats moored fast together by 
 anchors ; and got every thing besides in readi- 
 ness, ii) case the Athenians should venture on 
 another engagement. Their every view was 
 now become large and aspiring. 
 
 When the Athenians saw the harbour thug 
 barred up, and perceived, farther, the whole of 
 the enemy's designs, it was judged high time 
 to go to consultation. The commanders of 
 the different bodies were called to council, with 
 the generals ; in which, — upon representations 
 made " of the great distress to which they 
 were reduced, and that they had not a stock of 
 provisions ample enough for their immediate 
 subsistence, (for, bent on sailing away, they 
 had sent already to Catana to countermand any 
 fresh convoys,) and, unless they could recover 
 their mastery at sea, it would be impracticable 
 for the future to obtain a supply," — they came 
 to a final resolution, " To quit their intrench- 
 ments on the higher ground, and before the 
 station of their shipping to raise a circular 
 work, of as little compass as possible, but suf- 
 ficient to serve for a magazine and hospital, 
 and to this only to assign a guard ; as for the 
 rest of the land army, they were to oblige every 
 soldier to go on board, that all the ships, which 
 yet were undamaged, or had been laid up for 
 want of hands, might be completely manned ; 
 and thus they must fight their passage out of 
 the harbour ; and, if it succeeded, make di- 
 rectly for Catana ; but, if repulsed, they would 
 burn their shipping, and, moving off in one 
 body by land, would endeavour, by the mosi 
 
YEAR XIX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 283 
 
 expeditious inarches, to reach the nearest place 
 thdt would receive them, whether Barbarian or 
 Grecian." 
 
 Such was the plan resolved on, and which 
 they began immediately to execute ; for now, 
 abandoning their upper intrenchments, they 
 drew down to the beach, and manned the whole 
 of their shipping, on board of which they forced, 
 without exception, all such as had youth and 
 vigour enough to be of service there. The 
 whole number of ships, they were by this means 
 enabled to man, amounted to a hundred and 
 ten. They also placed on board the fleet a 
 large number of archers, the darters of the 
 Acarnanians, and other foreign auxiliaries ; and 
 provided in all other respects for action, as 
 well as their condition would permit or the 
 nature of the project required. 
 
 When things were thus in great forwardness, 
 Nicias, taking notice that the soldiery was 
 much dejected by the great defeats, which, 
 contrary to their wonted custom, they had re- 
 ceived by sea, and yet desirous to hazard an- 
 other engagement as soon as possible, because 
 pinched for want of necessary subsistence; he 
 gathered th^m all round about himself, and en- 
 deavoured to raise their drooping spirits by the 
 following exhortation, the first of the kind he 
 had ever made : 
 
 " My fellow-soldiers, whether of the Athe- 
 nian or the confederate troops ! the bold at- 
 tempt we are now going to make is of equal 
 concern to each individual amongst us ; since, 
 not more for victory over our foes than for the 
 preservation of ourselves and our country, we 
 are now to fight ; and, if our naval efforts be 
 crowned with victory, each of us may again be 
 blessed with the sight of his own native city. 
 Away, therefore, with these faces of despair, 
 this painful dejection, fit only for a raw unex- 
 perienced multitude, who, unsuccessful in their 
 first attempts, for ever after bid adieu to hope, 
 and by unmanly fears anticipate misfortunes ! 
 
 " As for you, Athenians, who form so con- 
 siderable a part of this assembly, experienced 
 as you are in such variety of warfare ! — and 
 you also, our allies, who have ever fought un- 
 der our banners ! — recall to your reflection the 
 unexpected turns of war ; encourage the hope 
 that foitune may at length declare for us, and 
 determine once more to engage the foe with a 
 spirit, worthy of that numerous strength of 
 which by ocular demonstration you see your- 
 selves this momeni possessed. Those points, 
 
 of which we perceive we may avail ourselves 
 against the narrowness of the harbour's mouth, 
 against such a multitude of vessels as will be 
 crowded together, and against that particular 
 disposition of soldiers on their decks, from 
 which on the former occasion we suffered so 
 much, — all these, I must tell you, are as well 
 adjusted as our present condition will permit, 
 by the united care of us your generals and your 
 own masters : for many archers and darters 
 shall now line your decks, and that crowd of 
 soldiers, which, when we engage in the open 
 sea, we never can use, because the vessels 
 would be too heavily laden to allow the proper 
 exertion of our skill ; that crowd, I say, in this 
 pent-up contracted space, shall give to our 
 naval battle the strength and stability of a land 
 engagement. We have also devised the proper 
 means to compensate the inferior structure of 
 our ships ; and, in return for the consolidated 
 beaks of our enemy, have provided the ships 
 with grappling irons, which will hold fast a 
 vessel that hath run against you from getting 
 clear, provided those on board will perform 
 their duty ; because, as necessity enforceth us 
 now to fight a mere land battle from our decks, 
 it highly concerns us neither to be beat off 
 ourselves, nor to suffer them to get clear from 
 our grapple ; especially when all the^ ambient 
 shore, excepting the small tract now occupied 
 by our own army, is hostile in regard to us. 
 Mindful of these things, it behoves you to fight 
 it out so long as strength and vigour shall en- 
 able you, and never suffer yourselves to be 
 driven on such a shore ; but, when once your 
 ship hath grappled with a foe, never once to 
 think of losing your hold, till you have cleared 
 the enemy's decks of all the defendants. But 
 these points I give In charge to the heavy- 
 armed, not less than to the seamen ; since this 
 method of engagement is more particularly 
 your province, and since it still remains within 
 your power to earn a glorious victory, by put- 
 ting your land method into practice. But the 
 seamen I exhort, and with my exhortations 
 mingle my entreaties, not to shrink too much 
 under the sensibility of past defeats, as your 
 decks are now better armed in all respects than 
 they were before, and as the number of the 
 shipping is enlarged. Recall the idea of that 
 heart-delighting privilege, of which you are 
 now to secure the continuance : — to you 1 
 speak, who, though not of Athenian extrac- 
 tion, have hitherto been regarded and honoured 
 
284 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VII. 
 
 as Athenians ; and, for speaking well our lan- 
 guage, and appropriating our manners, have 
 been admired through the whole extent of 
 Greece, have participated the benefits of our 
 large-extended empire, not less than ourselves 
 in point of profit, and much more than our- 
 selves in striking awe into your vassals, and 
 being exempted from the attacks of injustice. 
 Since, therefore, you alone have freely shared 
 our empire with us, you are bound by all the 
 tics of honour, by no means to desert its present 
 vindication. Then, in open despite of those 
 Corinthians whom you have so often conquer- 
 ed, and of those Sicilians not one of whom 
 durst look us in the face so long as the vigour of 
 our fleet was unimpaired, drive your foes before 
 you, and strike into them the plain conviction 
 — that your military skill, though strug- 
 gling with weakness and misfortunes, is yet 
 far superior to all their strength and luck 
 united. 
 
 " But to the native citizens of Athens 
 amongst you, I must once more suggest, that 
 you have now no longer in your docks such 
 another fleet as this, nor have left behind you 
 such another body of heavy-armed. If, there- 
 fore, your immediate fate be any thing less than 
 victory, your enemies will sail and be directly 
 at Athei^ ; and the remainder of our forces 
 there will no longer be able to repulse the 
 united assaults of their domestic foes and such 
 foreign invaders. Nay, the infallible result 
 must be, that you at once put on the chains of 
 Syracusans, against whom you are conscious 
 with what intentions you at first came here, 
 whilst your country must be forced to submit 
 to a Lacediemonian bondage. Now, therefore, 
 summon all your courage, to earn the day in 
 which your own liberty and that of Athens is 
 to be the victor's prize : and let each individual 
 amongst you, invigorate himself with the 
 thought ; nay, let it throw spirit and life into 
 the whole army, — that those who are now to 
 engage on board this present fleet are the whole 
 of the land and naval force of your country ; 
 are the surviving supports of the state, and the 
 great name of Athens. In so momentous a 
 conflict, whoever amongst you excels in mili- 
 tary skill or inward bravery, that person had 
 never so fine an opportunity to give demonstra- 
 tion of his superior worth, or to perform a 
 great service for himself or for the welfare of 
 bis country." 
 
 Nicias, after he had finished this earnest ex- 
 
 hortation, ordered them to repair directly to 
 their posts on board the fleet. 
 
 As all this hurry of preparation lay within 
 their view, Gylippus and the Syracusans could 
 not escape the conviction that the Athenians 
 were bent on another engagement. They had, 
 moreover, received intelligence of the new 
 project of the grappling irons. As, therefore, 
 they had provided against every thing besides, 
 they also made provision to counterwork thai 
 project. For this purpose, they had covered 
 the prows and almost the whole gunnel of their 
 ships with hides ; that, when the grappling 
 iron was thrown, it might slip off and catch no 
 hold. And no sooner were all their preparations 
 completed, than the Syracusan generals, in con- 
 cert with Gylippus, animated their men to en- 
 gage with resolution, by the followingharangue: 
 
 " That your past achievements have been glo- 
 rious indeed, and for the acquisition of greater 
 honour and glory that you are now on the 
 brink of engaging, the generality of you," ye 
 Syracusans and confederates, are well con- 
 vinced, and need not at present to be informed ; 
 for otherwise you could never have persisted 
 so far in this warm career of bravery and suc- 
 cess : but, if there be a man amongst you 
 whose sense of things drops short of their real 
 position, we shall now throw upon it the need- 
 ful illustration. 
 
 " This land, our property, the Athenians have 
 invaded ; aiming, in the first place, at enslav- 
 ing Sicily ; and, had this design succeeded, at 
 inflicting an equal fate on Peloponnesus and 
 the rest of Greece. And yet these very 
 Athenians, who enjoy already the largest tract 
 of empire that any ancient or modern state of 
 Greece hath at any time enjoyed, you are the 
 first who have bravely resisted ; and of that 
 navy, on which they erected their encroaching 
 pile of power, are plainly the victors in several 
 engagements ; as again, in that which now ap- 
 proacheth, you will assuredly beat them. For 
 men who have received such severe checks in 
 a point for which they so highly plumed them- 
 selves, will for the future have a much worse 
 opinion of their own merit than if they had 
 never conceived so high a value of it ; and 
 when all their towering pretensions are so un- 
 expectedly blasted, their subsequent efibrts 
 must of course drop short of their real 
 strength : and this, you may rest assured, is 
 the present state of yonder Atlienians. And 
 by parity, in regard to ourselvea, that proper 
 
YEAR XIX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 285 
 
 lion of strength we enjoyed at first, with 
 which, though far inferior in skill, we boldly 
 and successfQlly presumed to withstand them, 
 must now be suitably enlarged ; and, with the 
 farther accession of this inward assurance, that 
 we are really the best, since we have beat the 
 best seamen in the world, our hopes of success 
 arc in every light redoubled ; and then human 
 experience teacheth us, that, in every competi- 
 tion, the warmest hope is ever accompanied 
 with the greatest resolution. 
 
 " But farther, those late alterations which 
 they have introduced among their shipping, in 
 order to equalize and balance ours, have been 
 a long time familiar to our own practice ; and 
 each of their new preparations we shall dex- 
 terously improve to our own advantage : for 
 when, contrary to the long and inveterate dis- 
 cipline of their fleet, there are crowded together 
 upon their decks a numerous body of heavy- 
 armed, as well as another numerous body of 
 mere terra Jlrma darters, as they may properly 
 be styled, — when thus Acarnanians and other 
 landmen are forced on board, who even sitting 
 would be unable to poise and direct their wea- 
 pons, — how can they avoid endangering their 
 vessels 1 or, jumbled confusedly together, and 
 tottering under motions to which they are not 
 inured, how can they escape a total disorder ? 
 
 " What still makes more against them, the 
 multitude of their shipping will only serve the 
 more to embarrass them ; and let this dispel 
 the fears of those who may be afraid of en- 
 gaging against their superior numbers ; for a 
 multitude of ships in a contracted space will 
 be more slow in executing orders, and are at 
 the same time most easily exposed to the 
 annoyance which our preparations are contrived 
 to give them. And now attend to the true 
 and real situation of the foe, as from good in- 
 telligence we are enabled clearly to declare it to 
 you. 
 
 " Environed on all sides with misfortunes, 
 and distressed in a present want of the neces- 
 saries of life, they are become quite desperate : 
 and hence, though they have resigned all confi- 
 dence in their real strength, yet in the fury of 
 despair they are throwing themselves upon the 
 decision of fortune ; that either, if the passage 
 can be forced, they may launch out to sea ; or, 
 that project failing, may attempt a retreat by 
 land ; — as if to a worse condition than their 
 present it were not in the power of fortune to 
 reduce them. Warned, therefore, with brave 
 
 resentments, let us also try the encounter 
 against such wild confusion, and against the 
 fortune of our inveterate foes now treacher- 
 ously bent to finish their destruction. Let us 
 charge with the full conviction, that on an 
 enemy, who would justify their invasion on 
 the principle of redressing wrongs, it is most 
 fair and equitable to satiate all the fury of re- 
 venge ; nay more, that vengeance on a foe is 
 an appetite of nature, and commonly said to be 
 the sweetest of all human enjoyments. But 
 that those men yonder are our foes, our most 
 bitter unrelenting foes, you need no farther 
 proofs ; since, bent on enslaving this our 
 country, they first made the voyage ; and, had 
 this their odious project been successful, on 
 our citizens they had inflicted the most cruel 
 torments, on our wives and children the most 
 indecent enormities, and on Syracuse the most 
 ignominious appellation. In a work of so just 
 retaliation, to indulge a tenderness of mind, or 
 to think it gain to let them depart without ad- 
 ditional revenge, will be a matter of just re- 
 proach ; for the latter is all they will be able 
 to effect, even though at length they may be 
 victors. But to us, could we execute the fair 
 and equitable wishes of our hearts, by inflicting 
 upon them the punishment they well deserve, 
 and in setting the liberty of all Sicily, as it 
 hath been ever enjoyed by us,,beyond the reach 
 of any future insults, how glorious must such 
 achievements be ! for such critical moments of 
 adventure are most rarely to be met with ; 
 which, if unsuccessful, can do the least disser- 
 vice ; but, if successful, draw after them the 
 most valuable acquisitions." 
 
 When the Syracusan generals, seconded by 
 Gylippus, had finished this their exhortation 
 to their own soldiers, they also, in their turn, 
 repaired immediately on board their fleet, as 
 they found was already done by the Athenians. 
 
 But Nicias, whose mind was surcharged with 
 present cares, sensible how extreme the danger, 
 and how nearly approaching, since, this very 
 moment they were only not in motion ; and once 
 more reflecting, that, as generally happens in 
 aflairs of such prodigious moment, some points 
 might yet be left imperfect, something of en- 
 ergy, and weight, and influence, be yet left un- 
 said; he called out again upon every single 
 captain of the fleet, addressing himself sepa- 
 rately to them, with the honourable mention 
 of their fathers, themselves, and their tribe ; 
 and conjuring each, by his own distinguishing 
 2f2 
 
286 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VII. 
 
 splendour, whatever it was, " not now to be- 
 tray it, nor tarnish those hereditary virtues on 
 which their ancestors had founded their glory ;" 
 -reminding them earnestly of the uninterrupted 
 freedom of their country, and the privilege 
 they had ever enjoyed of living in it quite 
 free and uncontrolled ; asserting other argu- 
 ments, such as with men who had their all so 
 much at stake, might have influence and 
 weight ; no matter now how trite or hackneyed 
 by frequent repetitions, or how equally appli- 
 cable to every case, as fetched from the endear- 
 ments of their wives, and their offspring, and 
 their paternal gods ; such as from every topic, 
 in a plunge of horror and distress, are rung in 
 the ears of men, as likely to animate and per- 
 suade. And thus at last, though fearful that 
 not even yet he had said enough, but all that 
 the time would permit, he parted from them ; 
 and placing himself at the head of the land- 
 army, marched down to the beach ; where he 
 drew them up in as large a line as they could 
 possibly form, that their appearance might 
 have the greater effect in emboldening those on 
 board the fleet. 
 
 And now Demosthenes, and Menander, and 
 Euthydemus, (for these went on board to com- 
 mand the fleet,) getting clear from their moor- 
 ings, stood away directly towards the barricade 
 of the harbour, and that interval of its mouth 
 not yet completely barred, in order to clear the 
 passage. The Syracusans also and their allies 
 had now launched forth against them with their 
 usual number of ships. A detachment of these 
 were so stationed as to guard the passage ; the 
 rest were spread circularly quite round the har 
 bour, that on all sides at once they might at- 
 tack the Athenians, and their land army on the 
 beach might second them on approaches to the 
 shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded 
 by Sicanus and Agatharcus, who were respec- 
 tively stationed in each of the wings, whilst Py- 
 then and the Corinthians composed the centre. 
 
 When the Athenians were come up to the 
 barricade, they ran boldly at it ; and by the 
 violence of the first shock they beat off the 
 vessels ranged about it, and were intent on 
 clearing away the whole barricade. But here, 
 the Syracusans and allies falling in amongst 
 them from every quarter, a general engagement 
 ensued, not only at the barricade, hut in every 
 part of the harbour. Obstinate it really proved, 
 and such a battle as they had never fought 
 before. Great, in truth, was the ardour of the 
 
 seamen on both sides, in running upon the 
 enemy, whenever the word was given ; and 
 great was the art exerted by the officers, in 
 attack, and defence, and reciprocal contention. 
 The soldiers on board exerted all their efforts, 
 that, when ship came close with ship, no 
 stretch of military skill should be omitted on 
 the hatches. Every individual, abiding firmly 
 in his post, strained all his diligence to signalize 
 his own behaviour. But, as numerous ships 
 were falling in together amongst one another 
 in little sea-room, and so large a number never 
 fought before in so small a space, (since the 
 amount of both fleets fell little short of two 
 hundred,) the direct incursions with the beak 
 were few, because room was wanting for tacks 
 and passages ; but boardings were frequent, as 
 the vessels were continually running foul on 
 one another, or in sheering off met with others 
 which were coming on. And, so long as a 
 vessel was in her approach, those on the 
 hatches poured plentifully against her whole 
 showers of javelins, and arrows, and stones"; 
 but, when they were once come to grappling, 
 ^he soldiers, closing in firm battalion, endea- 
 voured by force to board one another. Nay, 
 it most frequently happened, through the strait- 
 ness of sea-room, that, the very moment one 
 party boarded the enemy, the very same mo- 
 ment they were also boarded themselves, as 
 two vessels lay often along side of an enemy ; 
 nay, sometimes more, by necessity mingled and 
 squeezed fast together. In the meantime, the 
 care of the oflScers was not confined to one 
 single point, but distracted on all sides by a 
 whole round of perils : they were here intent 
 on their own defence, and there on the annoy- 
 ance of the enemy. And, farther, the prodi- 
 gious crash that was made by such a number 
 of ships, running at the same instant upon one 
 another, struck such dismay and loss of hear- 
 ing, that the voices of those who issued out 
 orders could no longer be distinguished. Loud, 
 besides, were the exhortations and shouts of 
 the officers on both sides, partly in conformity 
 to rule, though swelled at present by the ardour 
 of contention. Amongst the Athenians it 
 was shouted amain — " to force the passage, 
 and now or never to exert their utmost stretch 
 of bravery to earn a safe return to their native 
 country :"' — amongst the Syracusans and their 
 allies — " how glorious it would be to hinder 
 their escape, and by present victory for every 
 one amongst them to increase the growmg 
 
YEAR XIX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 287 
 
 honours of his country !" The commanders 
 also, on both sides, if they saw a vessel drop- 
 ping olT before it was overpowered by the 
 enemy, called out aloud by name on the captain, 
 demanding on the Athenian side, " did they 
 retire on the wild presumption that yonder 
 most hostile shore would prove more friendly 
 to them than the open sea, which by long pre- 
 scription they had claimed as their own pro- 
 vince 1" — But on the Syracusan — " would they, 
 who were perfectly assured that the Athenians 
 wanted nothing so much as to escape, would 
 they fly first from those who were flying 1" 
 The land-army, farther, of each party upon 
 the beach, whilst yet the battle was alternately 
 fluctuating on the water, felt the utmost anxiety 
 and the most painful conflict of mind ; earnestly 
 bent, as the one domestic party was, " on 
 gaining accumulated honours ;" but fearful, as 
 the other invading party was become, that 
 " their condition might soon become worse 
 than it was already :" for the whole hope of 
 the Athenians centering at present in that fleet, 
 their anguish for the event was more acute 
 than ever they had felt, and was aggravated by 
 their own position on the beach, which gave 
 them a clear uninterrupted prospect of all that 
 passed in the battle upon the water. The 
 scene was but at a trifling distance from their 
 eyes ; and, as the looks of all of them were 
 not at the same instant fastened upon the same 
 spectacle, if any saw their own party prevailing, 
 they grow at once exalted, and immediately 
 began an invocation to the gods, that the eflforts 
 of their friends might be crowned with success ; 
 whilst another party, beholding those who were 
 vanquished, uttered a loud shriek which ended 
 in a groan ; and, by the sight of such affecting 
 turns, weremore subdued in spirit than those who 
 were actually engaged in this medley of horror. 
 Others, farther, who were intent upon a quar- 
 ter of the engagement where the event was yet 
 in suspense, and no judgment amidst such con- 
 fusion could be formed, adjusted the contortions 
 of their bodies to their inward fears, and passed 
 that interval in extremity of anguish ; for, each 
 single moment, they were within a little of 
 escaping or being sunk. And thus, in one and 
 the same army of Athenians, so long as the 
 event was under decision, a whole medley of 
 noises was heard together ; — shrieking — shout- 
 ing — victory ! — undone! — undone! — and all 
 other sounds, of various import, which, in such 
 
 extremity of danger, a numerous body of men 
 may be forced to utter. 
 
 Those, farther, on board, were equally sen- 
 sible of all the quick alternatives of passion ; 
 till at last, after the battle had for a long time 
 been obstinately maintained, the Syracusans 
 and allies put the Athenians to open flight ; 
 and, plying briskly in the chase, with obstre- 
 perous clamour and loud exultations, drove 
 them upon the beach. And here, the land-sol- 
 diers which had served on board, excepting such 
 as had been taken in the deeper water, leap- 
 ing in all parts, as they severally could, on the 
 shore, run in great ponfusion for shelter to the 
 camp. The army on the beach, with passions 
 no longer diversified, but with one and the 
 same uniform vehemence, having expressed 
 their resentment of the horrible conclusion by 
 a loud shriek and a hearty groan, some hurried 
 along the beach to succour the shipping ; others 
 to defend what yet remained of their intrench- 
 ments ; whilst a third party, and the bulk of 
 the army, confined their whole care to them- 
 selves, and were solely intent on their own 
 personal preservation. The horrid consterna- 
 tion, in which this moment they were univer- 
 sally plunged, was greater than Athenians had 
 ever felt before. They suffered now what on 
 a former occasion they had made others 
 suffer at Pylus. There the Lacedemonians, 
 having first lost their fleet, had the farther 
 mortification to see all their gallant Spartans 
 in the island undone. And now the desperate 
 condition of the Athenians offered no glimmer- 
 ing of safety on the land, unless some miracu- 
 lous contingency should take place in their 
 favour. 
 
 After an engagement so hardy and well 
 disputed, after the sinking of a large number 
 of ships and the death of numbers on both 
 sides, the Syracusans and their allies, who 
 were masters of the day, took up the shatters 
 and the dead. This being done, they sailed iii 
 triumph to the city, and erected a trophy. 
 
 But the Athenians, quite sunk with the* 
 weight of their present misfortunes, never so 
 much as once entertained the thought of re- 
 covering their shattered vessels or their dead, 
 but were contriving how to decamp by favour 
 of the approaching night. Demosthenes, upon 
 this, repairing to Nicias, declared it as his own 
 opinion, that, " manning at once the whole 
 number of their vessels, they should exert 
 
28S 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book vir. 
 
 their utmost efforts to force their passage out 
 of the harbour early the next dawn ;" affirming 
 that " they had still a larger number of shipping 
 fit for service than the enemy :" for the Athe- 
 nians had yet about sixty left, whereas, those 
 of the enemy were under fifty. Nicias came 
 into the proposal , but when both joined in 
 issuing proper orders for the execution, the 
 seamen flatly refused to go on board. Dispi- 
 rited as they were by the last great blow, they 
 had resigned all hope of ever beating these 
 enemies again. No measure now remained 
 but a retreat by land, on which the universal 
 attention was henceforth employed. 
 
 Hermocrates, the Syracusan, had conceived 
 a suspicion that such a step would be taken by 
 them ; and, foreseeing what difficulties might 
 arise if so large an army should march across 
 the country, and, posting themselves afresh 
 on Sicilian ground, should again resume their 
 spirits and renew the war against Syracuse, he 
 waited upon those in authority, and suggested 
 to them, that, " they ought not, by any rules 
 of policy, to let the enemy steal off by night ; 
 (inserting here his own sentiments of the af- 
 fair ;) but that all the Syracusans and their 
 allies, sallying out in a body, should pre- 
 occupy and secure the roads, and in good time 
 beset and put strong guards in all the passes." 
 The magistrates were sensible, as much as 
 he who gave this advice, how reasonable it 
 was, and declared themselves for its execu- 
 tion : but then, " the men, who now, indulg- 
 ing their joy for the late victory, were intent 
 on recreations, and as besides it was a festi- 
 val-time, for this very day they were per- 
 forming the anniversary sacrifice to Hercules, 
 in all probability would refuse to march ; 
 because, transported as they were with suc- 
 cess, the generality no doubt were celebrating 
 the festival with good cheer and wine ; and 
 any thing might sooner be hoped from them 
 than obedience to an order for taking up their 
 arms and sallying forth at a minute's notice." 
 ' • As the magistrates were convinced that things 
 would so turn out, the scheme was judged im- 
 practicable, and Hermocrates could in no wise 
 prevail. But he thought of an artifice to play 
 off against the foe : afraid lest the Athenians, 
 dislodging quietly by night, might possess them- 
 selves of the most difficult passes before any 
 opposition could reach them, he despatcheth 
 some of his most trusty friends, under an escort 
 of horse, to the Athenian camp so soon as it 
 
 was dark ; who, riding up so near to the in 
 trenchments that their words might be distinct- 
 ly heard, and calling out aloud on some persona 
 to come forth, since they were a party sent 
 from his friends in Syracuse to bring Nicias 
 some intelligence, charged them to carry word 
 immediately to Nicias, " by no means to draw 
 off the army by night, because the Syracusans 
 had beset the roads ; but to defer his march till 
 day-light, when he had leisure to make the 
 proper dispositions." And after delivering this 
 message they rode off, whilst those who re- 
 ceived it went and reported it faithfully to the 
 Athenian generals. 
 
 Wrought upon by this piece of intelligence, 
 in which they were far from suspecting any 
 fraud, they continued all night in their posts ; 
 and then, as they had not dislodged at once in a 
 hurry, they thought it advisable to stay there but 
 one day longer, that the soldiers might pack up 
 and carry away with them as large a part as 
 was possible of their necessary stores. The 
 rest of the baggage it was agreed should be 
 abandoned to the enemy ; they were only to 
 carry off, each person for himself, what was ab- 
 solutely necessary for food and raiment. 
 
 But, in this interval, the Syracusans and 
 Gylippus, by sallying out with the land-forces, 
 had gained a march before them, had blocked up 
 the roads along the country by which it was 
 judged the Athenians would march, and had 
 posted strong guards upon all the fords of brooks 
 and rivers ; nay, their detachments stood ready 
 drawn up in battalia to beat off the enemy from 
 the most convenient passes. Standing out 
 farther into the harbour with their fleet, they 
 dragged from the shore the Athenian shipping. 
 Some few of these they burnt, as the Athe- 
 nians had designed to do ; but the residue at 
 their leisure, from the spot where each lay 
 stranded, they took in tow and carried away to 
 the city. And, this being done, when Nicias 
 and Demosthenes judged that they had com- 
 pleted such preparations for their march as were 
 absolutely needful, the dislodgment of the 
 whole army was put in execution on the third 
 day from the naval engagement. 
 
 Terrible indeed it was, not only when viewed 
 in one particular light, as that they retreated 
 because they had lost the whole of their fleet, 
 and all their mighty hopes had terminated in 
 such personal dartger to themselves, and such 
 as even boded the ruin of Athens ; but the 
 very abandoning of the camp presented to their 
 
YEAH XIX.J 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 289 
 
 sight the most cutting spectacles, and struck 
 each soul amongst them with heart-piercing 
 anguish ; for, as the dead lay uninterred upon 
 the surface of the earth, when the remains of 
 an old acquaintance, thus miserably laid out, 
 arrested the eyes of a soldier, he was instantly 
 seized with regret and horror. But the living, 
 who on account of wounds and sickness were 
 left behind, were causes of much greater afflic- 
 tion to the sound than were even the dead, and 
 in truth were much more to be deplored than 
 those who had no longer a being ; for, bursting 
 out into prayers and lamentations, they occasion- 
 ed a wild irresolution of thought ; earnestly en- 
 treating that they might not be left behind, and 
 screaming out aloud on each by name, as they 
 saw a friend or an acquaintance, or an old 
 comrade, moving off; throwing their arms about 
 their necks, and so dragged along whilst they 
 could keep their hold ; but, when strength and 
 bodily vigour failed and left them destitute of 
 resource, they gave them the last adieu, not with- 
 out a shower of curses and a hideous howl. By 
 such cutting incidents the whole army was 
 filled with tears and a wild irresolution ; so that 
 they could not depart without the highest re- 
 gret, though from a spot so hostile, where they 
 had suffered more than tears could alleviate ; 
 and the dread of more, which yet might be im- 
 pending, was inexpressible. Dejection of the 
 head and self-accusation were general through 
 all the troops ; and they resembled nothing less 
 than a large subjugated city, whose numerous 
 inhabitants were escaping from the fury of a 
 sack ; for the amount of those who were now 
 inarching off together, was not less than forty 
 thousand men. 
 
 Of these,the generality carried off merely what 
 necessary subsistence they had scraped together; 
 but the heavy-armed and horsemen, contrary to 
 custom, were now obliged to carry their own 
 sustenance themielves beneath their armour; 
 some, because they had none, others, because 
 they durst not trust their servants. The de- 
 sertions had for a long time been large, but of 
 late in greater numbers than ever. Neither 
 were they thus provided with sufficient stores ; 
 for there was no longer any corn to be found 
 in the camp. Nay, truly, the general calamity 
 and equability of misfortunes which, in many 
 cases alleviate the pain as numbers are involv- 
 ed, were unable to render the present evils in 
 any degree supportable ; especially when the 
 thought occurred, from what a height of splen- 
 44 
 
 dour and preceding glory, to what a plunge and 
 miserable state they were now reduced ! for a 
 most cruel turn of fortune this really proved to 
 a Grecian army ; who, coming hither to en- 
 slave others, were departing now with the sad 
 alternative of fearing to be made slaves them- 
 selves ; and, instead of the prayers and pajans 
 with which they first began the voyage, were 
 now dislodging with omens that portended no- 
 thing but misery : those, farther, who came 
 hither as lords of the ocean, were now stealing 
 away by land, from henceforth to be saved, not 
 by naval skill, but the perseverance of a land- 
 army. However, all these reflections put their 
 patience nothing on the stretch, in comparison 
 of that weight of misery which this very instant 
 was hovering over their heads. 
 
 Nicias, perceiving the whole army to be 
 overwhelmed in despair,and sunk in this plunge 
 of distress, addressed himself severally to the 
 troops, exhorted, and comforted, by every to- 
 pic which occurred, each single party, whom 
 he visited by turns, elevating his voice far be- 
 yond the ordinary pitch, to suit the earnestness 
 of his heart, in hope that, the louder he spoke, 
 the more extensive effect it might have upon 
 the hearers. 
 
 " Even yet, and in the present low ebb of 
 our fortune, my dear countrymen and confede- 
 rates, we ought to encourage hope. Instances 
 may be given of armies who have been rescued 
 from a deeper plunge of dangers than that which 
 is now our portion. Nor ought you to torture 
 yourselves with too painful regret at what you 
 suffer, or at the unmerited miseries which this 
 moment environ you about. Even I myself, 
 who have much less room to boast of a consti- 
 tution superior to hardships than the meanest 
 soldier in your ranks, (for your own eyes can 
 witness to how low a state my bodily infirmi- 
 ties have reduced me,) who, however, in the 
 continued happiness of my former course of 
 life, or in any other regard, am inferior to none 
 amongst you, — yet am buffeted now, by the 
 storms and outrages of fortune, as cruelly as 
 ever were the vilest and most abject of my fel- 
 low-creatures. It is true, I have ever habitu- 
 ally worshipped the gods, with a consciencious 
 deference to established laws ; and have made 
 justice and beneficence to man the constant 
 practice of my hfe. Upon the strength of this, 
 when I looked forwards to the future, my miml 
 is enlivened with invigorating hope ; though I 
 own these misfortunes, so far undeserved. 
 
290 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VII. 
 
 Btrike no little terror on my thoughts. But 
 better times, perhaps, may be approacliing ; for 
 sure our enemies have been blessed with an 
 ample measure of success ; and, though some 
 deity may have frowned at first on this our ex- 
 pedition, yet by this time his wrath must be 
 fully wreaked upon us. We are not the first 
 instance of a people who have wantonly inva- 
 ded the possessions of another ; many such of- 
 fencop have taken their rise from the impulse 
 of human passions, and have been punished 
 with such a measure of vengeance as human 
 nature was able to endure. Good reason, 
 therefore, have we now to hope for a milder 
 fate from the ofiended deity ; who, depressed 
 as we are, seem objects of compassion more 
 than of resentment. Cast, therefore, your 
 eyes on the fine bodies of heavy-armed, and 
 the goodly numbers, which even now compose 
 your retreat ; and let the sight revive and cheer 
 your drooping spirits. Conclude that, wher- 
 ever you choose to halt, you are of yourselves 
 that instant a mighty community ; such as no 
 other Sicilian people can presume to stand be- 
 fore, should you attack ; nor to dispossess, 
 wherever you tliink proper to settle. But, 
 that your march be orderly and safe, be that 
 the care of each individual amongst your ranks, 
 made warm and earnest by the thought, — that, 
 on whatever spot you may be compelled to 
 fight, on that, if crowned with victory, you re- 
 gain a country and a bulwark of your own. 
 But then, our march must be continued both 
 day and night, with unabating speed, because 
 our stock of provision is but scanty ; and, can 
 we but reach some friendly territory belonging 
 to the Siculi, who, from their excessive dread 
 of the Syracusans, will ever preserve their at- 
 tachment to us, conclude yourselves that mo- 
 ment to be beyond the reach of danger : send, 
 therefore, your messengers beforehand to them, 
 with orders to meet us on our route and bring 
 us the needful supplies of food. On the whole, 
 my fellow-soldiers, rest assured that the last 
 necessity enjoins you to be resolutely brave; 
 since to cowardice now no place of shelter is 
 any longer open ; and only if you stem the ef- 
 forts of your foes — can you again be happy in 
 the enjoyment of those scenes your eyes so 
 fondly regret; and can Athenians re-erect the 
 extensive power of the Athenian state, how 
 low soever it may be fallen at present : for they 
 are men who make a state, not walls nor ships 
 hy men abandoned." 
 
 With these words of encouragement, Nicias 
 ran regularly through all the ranks of the whole 
 army ; careful at the same time, if he saw any 
 parties straggling from the main body, and 
 quitting the order of the march, to fetch them 
 up and replace them. Demosthenes exerted 
 himself as diligently in his own department, 
 encouraging his troops with the same energy 
 and ardour of address. The body under Ni- 
 cias, drawn up in a square, led the van of the 
 march ; that under Demosthenes brought up 
 the rear : whilst the baggage-men, and the nu 
 merous crowd that attended the camp, marched 
 within the centre of the heavy-armed. 
 
 When they were advanced to the place of 
 fording the Anapus, they find a body of Syra- 
 cusans and allies drawn up in battalia there to 
 oppose the passage. But, putting these to 
 flight, they gained the passage of that river, and 
 advanced into the country beyond ; though their 
 march was terribly harassed by the incursions 
 of the Syracusan horse, and by the missive 
 weapons which the light-armed of the enemy 
 poured in from time to time amongst them. 
 And yet in this day's march, the Athenians 
 wrought about forty stadia,' and halted for the 
 night upon an eminence. 
 
 On the ensuing day, by early dawn, they 
 were again in motion, and advanced about 
 twenty stadia ;^ when, descending into a cer- 
 tain plain, they halted and formed an encamp- 
 ment. Their design in this waS to fetch in 
 some provisions, for the adjacent country was 
 inhabited, and to get a proper supply of water 
 to carry along with them ; for in the country 
 beyond, through which their route was fixed, 
 no springs were to be met with for the length 
 of several stadia. But, during this halt, the 
 Syracusans advancing beyond them, throw up 
 a work across their route to stop their farther 
 progress. The spot chosen for this was a 
 strong eminence, flanked on both sides by an 
 inaccessible crag, and known by the name of 
 Acraeum-Lepas. 
 
 On the day foUpwing the Athenians resum- 
 ed their march ; but the horse and numerous 
 darters of the Syracusans and allies stopped 
 their advance, the latter pouring in their wea- 
 pons upon, and the former riding up and dis- 
 ordering their ranks. For a long time, it is 
 true, the Athenians maintained the skirmishes 
 against them ; but at length they retreated 
 
 L About four miles. 
 
 a Two 'tiWes. 
 
YEAR XIX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 291 
 
 again to their last encampment. And now all 
 fartlier supplies of provisions were totally cut 
 off; it being no longer possible. to fetch in any, 
 for fear of the horse. 
 
 But, decamping early in the morning, they 
 continued their march, and forced their pro- 
 gress to the eminence which was fortified by 
 the new work. Here they found the Syracu- 
 san infantry drawn up before them in firm and 
 deep battalia, posted also on the strong emi- 
 nence they had occupied on purpose ; for the 
 pass was very narrow. The Athenians march- 
 ed up and assaulted the work ; but, being pelted 
 by showers of darts from the eminence, which 
 was very steep, and so gave those upon it a 
 great advantage in throwing their weapons 
 home, and finding themselves utiable to force 
 it, they again drew off, and attempted it ho far- 
 ther. It happened, at the same time, that 
 some claps of thunder were heard, accompanied 
 with rain, effects not unusual in this season, as 
 the year was now in autumn; and yet these 
 accidents contributed still more to dispirit the 
 Athenians, who concluded that every thing 
 now acted in combination for their destruction. 
 During this interval of inaction, Gylippus and 
 the Syracusans send off a detachment of their 
 forces to throw up a work in their rear, where 
 the enemy had already passed. But the Athe- 
 nians sent also a detachment of their own body, 
 which prevented its execution ; and, after this, 
 wheeling off with their whole body more into 
 the plains, they halted there for the night. 
 
 The next morning they began to move for- 
 wards again. And now the Syracusans, beset- 
 ting them quite round in a circle, poured volleys 
 of darts and arrows amongst them, and wound- 
 ed numbers. If, indeed, the Athenians sallied 
 out against them, they retreated ; but when 
 the Athenians drew back, they then pressed 
 upon their retreat ; and, falling in chiefly 
 amongst their rear, if at any time they put 
 small parties to flight, they struck a consterna- 
 tion into the whole arn;iy. But, for a long time, 
 in such a train of skirmishings, the Athenians 
 made good their ground ; and advancing after- 
 wards the length of five or six stadia,' they 
 halted in a plain. Here also the Syracusans 
 no longer molested them, but withdrew to their 
 own camp. 
 
 This night it was determined by Nicias and 
 Demosthenes, that, — since the army was re- 
 
 » Atout liolfa mile. 
 
 duced to so low a condition, aijd began already 
 to be pressed with a total failure of provisions ; 
 since, farther, large numbers had been wounded 
 in the many incidental assaults of the enemy ; 
 — they should first kindle a great number of 
 fires, and then march the whole army off, no 
 longer by the route which they had first pro- 
 jected, but by another towards the sea, quite 
 contrary to that which the Syracusans had al- 
 ready pre-occupied and guarded. The residue 
 of the march was no longer pointed towards 
 Catana, but to the other coast of Sicily, to- 
 wards Camarina, and Gela, and the cities in 
 that quarter, both Grecian and Barbarian. In 
 pursuance of this, a large number fires be- 
 ing kindled, they dislodged in the dead of 
 night. 
 
 This part of their retreat (as is the genera, 
 fate of armies, but especially of the greatest, ev- 
 er subject to fears and panics, particularly when 
 moving in the night and on hostile ground, and 
 conscious, farther, that the enemy is close at 
 their heels) was made in a sad and disorderly 
 manner. The column, indeed, under Nicias, 
 which composed the van, kept firm together in 
 a body, and quite out-matched the rest of the 
 army : but that under Demosthenes, beihg one 
 half, at least, if not the major part, of the 
 whole force, was separated from the van, and 
 came on in great confusion and disorder. How- 
 ever, by the dawn of day, they reached the 
 coast; and, gaining the great roa^ which is 
 called the Helorine, took their route along it, 
 that, after they had reached the river Cacyparis 
 they might pierce upwards along the course of 
 that river into the heart of the country ; for 
 thus they hoped to meet with the Siculi, whom 
 they had summoned to be ready on their route. 
 But, when they had gained the sight of that 
 river, they found its banks already occupied by 
 a Syracusan guard, busy in throwing up a ram- 
 part and palisado to defend its passage. This 
 party they soon dispersed, and passed the river, 
 and from thence advanced towards another 
 river, the Erineus ; for thus their guides had 
 planned their route. 
 
 In the meantime the Syracusans and allies, 
 when the day was clearly broke, and they knew 
 the Athenians were stole off, began in general 
 to throw heavy imputations on Gylippus, as if 
 the Athenians had made their escape through, 
 his connivance. Yet, beginning the pursuit 
 with all possible expedition, (and it was easily 
 discoverable what route they had taken,) they 
 
^92 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 FbOOK VII. 
 
 come up with them about the hour of repast : 
 and, as they fell in first with the column under 
 the orders of Demosthenes, which composed 
 the rear, and had moved in a more slow and dis- 
 orderly manner than the van, because the dark- 
 ness of the night had so highly incommoded 
 .ind confounded their march, they immediately 
 charged them and fought. The Syracusan 
 cavalry beset them quite round, (the more 
 easily, indeed, as they were separated from the 
 van,) and drove them into one crowded heap. 
 But the column under Nicias was now fifty 
 stadia' before them ; for Nicias led them for- 
 wards with great celerity, concluding that their 
 safety consisted, not in lingering voluntarily at 
 so critical a period, or exposing themselves to an 
 engagement, but in pushing forwards with their 
 utmost speed, and fighting only when by abso- 
 lute necessity they were compelled to fight. 
 But then Demosthenes was involved in a much 
 more laborious and continued toil ; because, as 
 he filed off last, the enemies were left upon 
 his rear ; and, soon convinced that they had 
 begun the pursuit, he was obliged, npt so much 
 to move forward, as to draw up his troops in 
 the order of battle, till by such necessitated 
 lingering he is environed by them, and himself 
 and the body of Athenians under him are 
 thrown into high tumult and confusion. For 
 now, hemmed in as they were on a certain 
 spot, surrounded quite round by walls, and 
 whence the issues both on one side and the 
 other were full of olive-trees, they were ter- 
 ribly galled on their flanks by the darts of the 
 enemy. This kind of annoyance the Syracdsans 
 wisely chose to' give them, and to decline all 
 close engagement ; because, to hazard the lat- 
 ter against enemies now become quite desper- 
 ate, they judged would make more for the 
 advantage of the Athenians than of them- 
 selves : though, at the same time, a kind of 
 frugality, inspired by the great career of suc- 
 cess they had already obtained, taught them not 
 to exhaust their strength on superfluous en- 
 counters, and persuaded them that thus they 
 might effectually subdue and make this great 
 army their prisoners. When, therefore, for 
 the whole remainder of the day, they had 
 galled them on all sides with missive weapons, 
 and now perceived that the Athenians and 
 their allies were reduced to a miserable "plight, 
 by the wounds which they had received and 
 
 1 About five miles. 
 
 the other calamities which lay hard upon them, 
 Gylippus, in concert with the Syracusans and 
 allies, causeth a herald to proclaim; — first, 
 that " such inhabitants of the isles as would 
 come over to them should rest in the secure 
 enjoyment of their liberty :" — upon which, 
 some cities, though not many, went over to 
 them : — and, in the next place, after some time, 
 a surrender is agreed on of the whole body of 
 troops commanded by Demosthenes, on the 
 terms, that " they should deliver up their arms, 
 and no one should suffer death, either by public 
 execution, or the miseries of a prison, or the 
 want of necessary subsistence." Thus this 
 ■whole body, to the number of six thousand 
 men, surrendered themselves prisoners, and 
 produced all the silver they had about them, 
 which they were commanded to throw into the 
 hollows of shields, four of which in this man- 
 ner were filled full with spoil ; and these 
 prisoners the victors immediately led away to 
 Syracuse. 
 
 But Nicias and the column under his com- 
 mand arrived the same day on the banks of the 
 Erineus ; and having passed that river, halted 
 on an eminence. The day following the Sy- 
 racusans, coming up to his post, notified to 
 Nicias, that " those under Demosthenes had 
 surrendered," and summoned him to follow 
 their example. Incredulous of the fact, he 
 begs leave to send out a horseman to disco vei 
 the truth ; who upon his return affirming that 
 " they had actually surrendered," Nicias sends 
 an intimation to Gylippus and the Syracusans, 
 that he was ready to stipulate, in the name of 
 the Athenians, that " whatever sums the Sy- 
 racusans had expended in this war should be 
 fairly reimbursed, on condition the forces under 
 his command might have free departure ; but, 
 till the money could be paid, he would leave 
 with them a number of Athenians as hostages 
 for performance, a man for a talent." 
 
 Gylippus and the Syracusans refused the 
 offer ; and, resuming offensive measures, ranged 
 their parties quite round the eminence, and 
 poured in their missive weapons upon them till 
 the evening. This body of troops was also 
 sadly distressed for want of bread and necessary 
 subsistence. Watching, however, for the dead 
 and silent hours of the night, they were then 
 determined to continue their march. They 
 accordingly take up their arms ; the Syracu- 
 sans perceive it, and sing the psean of alarm. 
 The Athenians were thus convinced that thev 
 
YEAK XIX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 2P3 
 
 could not dislodge without being discovered, and 
 so grounded their arms again, all but one party 
 of three hundred men ; for these having forced 
 themselves a passage through the guards, 
 made off in the night as fast as it was possible. 
 So soon as the day appeared, Nicias at the 
 head of his troops led them forwards. But 
 the Syracusans and allies pressed upon him on 
 all sides in the usual manner, pouring in volleys 
 of darts and javelins. The Athenians made 
 the best of their way to reach the river Asina- 
 rus ; not only because, annoyed on all sides by 
 the irruption of the numerous cavalry and 
 Bkirmishing parties, they concluded they should 
 ue eased of these could they once pass that 
 river, but also through bodily fatigue and a 
 vehement desire to extinguish their thirst. 
 When, therefore, they are upon the bank, they 
 rush into the river; no longer observant of 
 order, but each single soldier intent on passing 
 the first of the army. And the enemy, who 
 now pressed hard upon them, had rendered the 
 passage already a business of toil : for, obliged 
 as they were to go down in confused heaps, 
 they fell and trampled upon one another; 
 some embarrassed by their spears and^ luggage, 
 met with instant destruction ; others, entang- 
 led in the crowd, were carried away by the 
 current. The hither bank of the river was 
 now filled with Syracusans; and, it being 
 naturally steep, they poured down their darts 
 upon the Athenians, numbers of whom were 
 drinking greedily of the stream, confusedly 
 hampered together in the hollow of the 
 channel. The Peloponnesians, plunging in 
 after them, made a great slaughter of those 
 who were in the river. The water was im- 
 mediately discoloured with blood : but the 
 stream, polluted with mud and gore, deterred 
 them not from drinking it greedily, nor many 
 of them from fighting desperately for a draught 
 of it. But, in short, when the carcases of 
 the dead began to lie heaped one upon another 
 in the river, and the whole army was become 
 B continued carnage ; ' of some in the river ; 
 of those who were making off from the banks, 
 by the horsemen of the foe ; Nicias surrenders 
 himself prisoner to Gylippus, into whose power 
 he chose to fall sooner than into that of the 
 Syracusans. He told him, that " he himself 
 and the Lacedsemonians might decide his fate 
 
 * According to Diodorus Siculiis, the number of the 
 ■lain amounted to eighteen thousand men. 
 
 as best pleased themselves ; but entreated that 
 a stop might be put to the slaughter of his 
 soldiers." Upon this, Gylippus issued o\it 
 orders to give quarter ; and thus they carried 
 off the remnants of this body as prisoners of 
 war, such excepted as were secreted by their 
 captors, the number of which was large. Hav- 
 ing, farther, detached a party in pursuit of the" 
 three hundred, who in the night had broke 
 through the guard, they also made them pri- 
 soners. The whole number now collected 
 together as the public prize was not large ; 
 hut very numerous were they who were clan- 
 destinely secreted. Not a town in Sicily but 
 was crowded with them, since these had not 
 surrendered upon terras like those under De- 
 mosthenes. A considerable number had also 
 perished ; for this was a terrible slaughter ; 
 nay, there was no one greater in the course of 
 the Sicilian war ; and in the preceding skir- 
 mishes, which had happened very frequently 
 during the march, not a few had been slain. 
 Yet, notwithstanding all this, many made their 
 escape ; some from the scenes of action, and 
 others from their prisons, from whence, they 
 afterwards gained an opportunity to run away. 
 These repaired to Catana, as a safe resort. 
 
 And now the Syracusans and allies in one 
 grand collective body, having amassed to- 
 gether as large a number of prisoners as they 
 possibly could, and all the spoils, returned in 
 triumph to Syracuse. The bulk of prisoners, 
 whether of the Athenians or their confede- 
 rates, whom they had taken, they thrust down 
 into the quarries, concluding that from such 
 a confinement they could not possibly make 
 escapes ; hut Nicias and Demosthenes, in spite 
 of all the remonstrances of Gylippus, tjiey 
 butchered : for Gylippus imagined, that the 
 finishing of this war would invest himself with 
 pre-eminent degrees of glory, if, besides the 
 rest of his achievments, he could carry home 
 to the Lacedsmonians the generals of the ene- 
 my. It had, farther, so happened, that one of 
 these, that is Demosthenes, was regarded as 
 their most inveterate enemy, because of his 
 exploits against them in the island Sphacteria 
 and Pylus ; and the other, Nicias, as their 
 most sincere well-wisher, from his behaviour 
 on those very incidents. For Nicias had 
 strenuously exerted hiinself in behalf of those 
 Lacedaemonians who were made prisoners in 
 the island. It was he who prevailed with the 
 Athenians to sign the treaty, in pursuance of 
 2G 
 
294 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [liOOK VII. 
 
 which they were releaseJ. For such services 
 done them, the Laccdiemonians had a kindness 
 for him ; and it had been chiefly owing to his 
 assurance of this that he surrendered himself 
 prisoner to Gyhppus. But a party of the 
 Syracusans, as was generally reported, fearful, 
 because they had kept up a correspondence 
 with him, lest, if put to the torture, he might 
 now, amidst the general prosperity, involve 
 them in trouble ; others also, and, not least of 
 all, the Corinthians, lest, as he was rich he 
 might purchase the connivance of his keepers 
 to get his liberty, and then again might have 
 influence enough to foment fresh stirs to their 
 prejudice ; obtained the concurrence of their 
 allies, and put him to death. For these, or 
 reasons most nearly neighbouring to these, was 
 Nicias doomed to destruction ; though the 
 man, of all the Grecians in the present age, 
 who least deserved so wretched a catastrophe, 
 since his whole life was one uniform series of 
 piety towards the Deity.' 
 
 As for those who were doomed to the quar- 
 ries, the Syracusans treated them at first with 
 outrageous severity. As great numbers were 
 crowded together in this hollow dungeon, 
 the beams of the sun, in the first place, and 
 then the suffocating air, annoyed them in a 
 more terrible manner, because the aperture 
 was left uncovered ; and each succeeding night, 
 the reverse of the preceding day, autumnal 
 and nipping, through such vicissitudes, threw 
 them into strange disorders. Thus straitened 
 as they were for room, they did whatever 
 they had to do on one and the same spot ; 
 and the carcases of those who died lay heaped 
 up promiscuously together, as some expired of 
 their wounds, and others perished through the 
 vicissitudes of air they suffered, or some other 
 such deadly cause. At length the stench be- 
 came intolerably noisome ; and they were far- 
 ther oppressed with hunger and thirst: for, 
 during the space of eight months, the allow- 
 ance to each was only a cotyl " of water and 
 two cotyls^ of bread a-day. Nay, whatever 
 species of misery numbers cooped up in so 
 close a confinement might be liable to suffer, 
 not one of these but pressed cruelly upon them. 
 Tljey were all thus thronged and dieted to- 
 
 > Mr. Hobbes, in his translation, has omitted tbis last 
 comma. 
 
 4 Little more than half a pint. 
 
 > About 32 solid inches. 
 
 gether for seventy days : but, after this term, 
 all but the Athenians, and such of the Sici- 
 lians and Italians as had joined with them in 
 the invasion, were sold out for slaves."* 
 
 What the whole number of prisoners was, it 
 is hard exactly to relate ; but, however, they 
 could not be fewer than seven thousand. And 
 this proved to be the greatest Grecian exploit 
 of all that happened in the course of this war ; 
 and, in my opinion, of all that occur in the 
 whole history of Greece ; since the event to 
 the victors was most glorious, and to the van- 
 quished most calamitous ; for in every respect 
 they were totally overpowered, and their mi- 
 series in no respect had any mitigation ; in 
 short, root and branch, as is commonly said, 
 their land-army and their shipping were now 
 ruined ; nay, nothing belonging to them was 
 exempted from destruction ; and few out of 
 all their numbers, had the good fortune to 
 revisit their native country. 
 
 Such were the transactions in Sicilv.^ 
 
 * " The decent and engaging behaviour of the Athe- 
 nians was of great service lo them : for hy it they 
 either soon obtained their liberty, or were highly 
 esteemed arid caressed by their masters. Some of them 
 were indebted for their freedom to Euripides. The 
 Sicilians, it seems, were fonder of the muse of Euri- 
 pides than were even the people who lived iu Greece 
 itself. If the strangers, who were often resorting to 
 Sicily, brought them any specimens or morsels of hia 
 poetry, they learned them by heart, and with high de- 
 light communicated them to their friends. It is said, 
 that several, who by this means earned their liberty, 
 went afterwards to wait upon Euripides, in token of 
 their gratitude ; assuring him, some of them, that they 
 had been released from slavery for teaching their mas- 
 ters what pieces of his writings they were able to re- 
 peat: and others, that, when vagabonds after the 
 defeat, they had been supplied with meat and drink 
 for singing some of his lines. This is not to be won- 
 dered at : since even a Caunian ve?sel, which, being 
 hard chased by pirates, and endeavouring to get for 
 refuge into a Sicilian harbour, was however kept off 
 by force ; till at length, being asked whether they could 
 repeat any of Euripides*s verses, they answered in the 
 affirmative; upon which they obtained immediate re- 
 ception and refuge." Plutarch in the life of J^icias. 
 
 • Some Iambic verses of an unknown author aro 
 found at the end of this book in the later Greek edi- 
 tions : and I beg the reader to accept the following 
 translation of them : 
 
 The pride of gIoi7, the exalted height, 
 The frequent (rophiee on the land and sea, 
 The long career of wellnleserved succeas, 
 On which their great foretalhers lower'd aloft, 
 Whilst Penia trembled at the Athenian name. 
 Now droop'd at once 1 — A chaos soon succeede, 
 Of ananjly, destructioo, and distress : 
 Low ebb'd die stale, ai high it ent had flowVL 
 
THE 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 BOOK VIII. 
 
 The news of the overthrow in Sicily causeth a great consternation at Athena. All Greece is in combination 
 against tliem ; and their dependents are meditating revolts. — Year XX. Revolt of the Chians. An alliance 
 between Darius Nothus and the LacedEemoniana. The war transferred to Ionia. Battle of Mjlelus. A second 
 alliance between Darius and the Lacedffinionians. Proceedings at Chios. Revolt of Rhodes. The politic con- 
 duct of Alcibiades : his intrigues. A sedition among the Athenians at Samos in favour of an oligarchy. Phry- 
 nichus counterplots Alcibiades. A third alliance between Darius and the Lacedaemonians. — Year XXI. Pro- 
 ceedings at Chios. The democracy overturned in several places of the Athenian j urisdiction ; and at Athens, 
 by the influence of Antipho, Phrynichus, and Theramenes. A council of four hundred take upon them the 
 government. The army at Samos declares for the democracy, recalls Alcibiades, and elects him general. 
 Athens full of factions. Phrynichus stabbed. A tumult; in the midst of which the fleet of the enemy ap- 
 pears in Bight. Battle of Eretria ; and revolt of Euba:a. The four hundred are deposed ; and a new form of 
 government settled at Athens. The banishment of Alcibiades repealed. Battle of Cynoa-Sema. 
 
 teah XIX. 
 
 When the news was reported at Athens, 
 no belief for a long time was given, — even 
 though the most creditable part of the soldiery, 
 who had made their escape from this disastrous 
 business, proved it by a circumstantial, relation, 
 — that so total a destruction was become their 
 lot.' But no sooner were they convinced of 
 its reality, than their resentments bust forth 
 
 » Plutarch, from report, tells an odd story on this oc- 
 casion. — " A stranger, who (it seems) had come ashore 
 dtthe Piraius, and had set him down in a barber's shop, 
 began to talk about the overthrow in Sicily, as a point 
 well known at Athens. The barber, hearing it before 
 any other person had the news, ran with all speed up in- 
 to theciry; and, having first, informed the magistrates 
 of it, spread the report in an instant all over the forum. 
 Consternation and tumult at once ensued. The magis- 
 trates convened an assembly of the people, and produc- 
 ed the barber before them. He was called upon to tell 
 from whom he bad the news; and when he could not 
 name the person, being looked upon as an idle fellow and 
 a disturber of the public peace, he was immediately tied 
 U|)on the wheel, and a long time whirled round upon it, 
 till several persons arrived who gave a minute and cir- 
 cumsliintial account of the whole." Life of jiTlcias. 
 
 against those of the orators who had advised 
 and recommended the expedition, as if their 
 own suffrages had never concurred to its exe- 
 cution. They farther vented their gall against 
 those retailers of oracles and foretellers of fu- 
 ture events, against all in general, who, pretend- 
 ing privity to the will of heaven, had elevated 
 their hopes with the certain conquest of Sicily. 
 On all sides now all manner of disasters envi-. 
 roned them about ; and never had Athens been 
 thrown into so great a consternation and dejeo 
 tion as at the present juncture : for now, be- 
 side what each private family suffered, as the 
 public at the same time had lost the bulk of its 
 heavy-armed and horsemen, and that flower of 
 its youth which they saw it impossible to re- 
 place, they were sorely dejected. Conscious, 
 farther, that they had not shipping sufficient in 
 their docks for a fresh equipment, nor money 
 in the public treasury, nor even hands to man 
 what vessels they had left, they gave up all 
 hope of deliverance in the present plunge. 
 Their enemies from Sicily, they imagined, 
 would soon enter the PirEus with a powerful 
 
 233 
 
29G 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book viii. 
 
 navy, especially as they were flushed with such 
 a career of success ; and their enemies nearer 
 nome, would now, for a certainty, redouble 
 their preparations, and with the utmost re- 
 solution fall upon them at once both by sea and 
 land, and be further strengthened by the 
 revolt of their own temporising confederates. 
 At last, however, they agreed it was their 
 duty to do what might yet be done ; not basely 
 to abandon their own preservation, but to 
 lit out a navy, by collecting from all pos- 
 sible resources both timber and money ; — 
 and timely to secure their own dependent 
 states, above all Eubosa — and to reduce the 
 expenses of the civil administration with all 
 possible economy ; — and to lodge the sove- 
 reignty in the hands of a select body of old ex- 
 perienced statesmen, whose maturer counsels 
 might, if possible, yet extricate the state from 
 its present misfortunes. Such an effect had 
 the general consternation now upon them, an 
 effect not unusual with a people, that they be- 
 came heartily disposed to order their govern- 
 ment aright. And, as to such resolutions they 
 came to, they proceeded, farther, to put them 
 in execution : and the summer ended. 
 
 In the beginning of the ensuing winter, ani- 
 mated by the terrible blow the Athenians had 
 received in Sicily, the whole body of Greece 
 was alert against them. Even such as had 
 hitherto observed a strict neutrality, without so 
 much as waiting for a formal invitation to 
 accede, thought it incumbent upon themselves 
 no longer to be absent from the war, but vo- 
 luntary to enter the lists against the Athenians. 
 Not a state but reasone.d thus, — that " them- 
 selves also these Athenians, had they succeeded 
 in Sicily, would undoubtedly have attacked ;" 
 and then concluded, — that, " as the war for 
 certainty was very nearly finished, it would be 
 glorious for them to have a hand in its com- 
 pletion." But the old confederates of the 
 JiacediEmonians, as their desires were greater, 
 so they exerted themselves now with higher 
 alacrity than ever to procure a speedy relaxa- 
 tion of their heavy burdens. Yet, in a most 
 remarkable manner, such states as were depen- 
 dent upon Athens manifested their readiness 
 to revolt, even beyond the bounds of caution ; 
 since now they formed their judgments in all 
 the warmth of indignation, and could discern no 
 probable method by which the Athenians could 
 retard their ruin for another summer. 
 
 AH these circumstances coinciding, the Lace- 
 
 diemonian state became prodigiously alert ; and, 
 above all, with the expectation, that their con- 
 federates of Sicily, with a powerful reinforce- 
 ment, as their natives must now of necessity 
 act in concert, would be with them, in all pro- 
 bability, very early in the spring. In every 
 view their hopes were gallant and elate. They 
 determined to go on with the war without any 
 delay ; concluding that, if once brought well to 
 a conclusion, they should ever for the future 
 be released from such dangers as had lately 
 threatened from Athens, in case Sicily had 
 been reduced ; and, should they now demolish 
 their competitors, must remain for the future 
 supreme leaclers of Greece, without fear of a 
 reverse. 
 
 Iftstantly, therefore, Agis their king, though 
 in the depth of winter, sallying forth with a 
 body of troops from Decelea, marched round 
 the confederacy, levying sums of money for 
 the service of the marine. Turning his route 
 to the Melian gulf, he took a large booty from 
 the CEtieans, against whom their enmity had 
 been of long duration, which he converted into 
 money. He also compelled those Achseans 
 who were seated in the Pthiotis, and other 
 states in this quarter dependent on Thessaly, 
 spite of all the complaints and murmurs of the 
 Thessalians, to give him some hostages for 
 their good behaviour, and to furnish him with 
 money. He disposed of these hostages into 
 safe custody at Corinth, and spared no pains 
 to get them over into the alUance. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians, farther, circulated an 
 order among the states, for the building of one 
 hundred sail of ships. They taxed themselves 
 and the Boeotians to furnish, respectively, 
 twenty-five ; the Phocians and Locrians fif- 
 teen ; the Corinthians fifteen ; the Arcadians, 
 and Pellenians, and Sicyonians, ten ; the Me- 
 gareans, and Troezenians, and Epidaurians, 
 and Hermionians, ten. They went to work 
 with all other needful preparations, that they 
 might prosecute the war briskly upon the first 
 approach of spring. 
 
 The Athenians, on the other hand, were not 
 remiss in preparing for their own defence ; 
 since, in pursuance of the plan they had form- 
 ed, they were busy during all the winter in 
 building of ships, having collected proper quan- 
 tities of timber ; and in fortifying Sunium; that 
 the navigation of their victuallers round that 
 cape might be preserved from molestation. 
 They also evacuated the fortress in La- 
 
VEAE XIX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 297 
 
 conia which they had raised in the voyage to 
 Sicily ; and in all respects, where they judged 
 themselves involved in any less needful expense, 
 they contracted their disbursements with the 
 utmost frugality. But their principal care was, 
 keeping a close eye upon their dependents, that 
 they might not revolt. 
 
 Amidst these employments of both parties, 
 ■which were nothing less than most earnest pre- 
 parations on all sides, as if war was just in its 
 commencement, the Euboeans took the lead, 
 and sent ambassadors this winter to treat with 
 Agis, about a revolt from the Athenians. 
 Agis accepted what terms they proposed ; and 
 sends for Alcamenes, the son of Sthenelaidas, 
 and Melanthus, from LacedEemon, to pass over 
 as commanders into Eubosa. Accordingly 
 they arrived, with a body of citizens newly en- 
 franchised,' to the number of about three hun- 
 dred ; and Agis was preparing for their trans- 
 portation. But in this interval the Lesbians 
 arrived, with declarations of their readiness to 
 revolt ; and, as they were seconded by the re- 
 commendations of the Boeotians, Agis is per- 
 suaded to put off for a time the affair of 
 Eubcea, and began to expedite the revolt of the 
 Lesbians, having assigned them Alcamenes 
 for their governor, who was to have passed 
 over to Eubcea. The Boeotians promised to 
 Bcnd them ten ships, and Agis ten. These 
 points were transacted without the privity of 
 the Lacedemonian state : for Agis, so long as 
 he continued at Decelea, having under his com- 
 mand the army of the state, was invested with 
 a power of sending detachments whithersoever 
 he thought proper, and to levy men and money 
 at his own discretion : and it may with truth 
 be affirmed, that the confederates, during this 
 period, paid a much greater deference to him 
 than to the state of Lacedaemon ; for, having a 
 powerful force under his own orders, he was 
 formidable in his every motion. And thus 
 he arbitrarily settled the negotiation of the 
 Lesbians. 
 
 But then the Chians and the Erythrseans, 
 who were also desirous to revolt, addressed 
 themselves, not to Agis, but at Lacedajmon. 
 In their company also went thither an ambas- 
 sador from Tissaphernes, who was lieutenant 
 for Darius, the son of Artaxerxes, in the 
 maritime provinces of Asia. Even Tissapher- 
 
 Neodamodes. 
 
 45 
 
 nes concerned himself now to inflame the Pelo- 
 ponnesian ardour, and promise them large 
 supplies. For lately he had been summoned by 
 the king to make returns of the revenue of his 
 government ; which not being able to exact 
 from the Grecian cities, because of the Athe- 
 nian?, he was run into a large arrear. He 
 concluded, therefore, that could he demolish 
 the Athenians, he then with great ease might 
 levy the tributes ; what is more, might make 
 the Lacedsmonians confederates to the king ; 
 and might at length convey to him, either alive 
 or dead, Amorges, the bastard son of Pissuth- 
 nes, who had revolted in Caria, as the king 
 had expressly commanded. The Chians, 
 therefore, and Tissaphernes, were now nego- 
 tiating this point in concert. 
 
 Calligitus, the son of Laophon, a Megarean, 
 and Timagoras, the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzi- 
 cene, both exiles from their native places, and 
 refuged with Pharnabazus, the son of Pharna- 
 bazus, arrive at Lacedajmon about the same 
 point of time, commissioned by Pharnabazus 
 to procure an aid of shipping for the Helles- 
 pont, by which he might be enabled (the very 
 same thing as Tissaphernes desired) to work 
 the revolt of the cities within his district from 
 the Athenian obedience, because of the tributes, 
 and expeditiously to gain for himself the credit 
 of having procured for his master the alliance 
 of the Lacedaemonians. As the agents of 
 Pharnabazus and those also of Tissaphernes 
 were negotiating the same point, though apart 
 from each other, a great debate arose among 
 the statesmen at LacedaEmon ; one party insist- 
 ing, with vehemence, that an aid of shipping 
 and a land force should be sent to Ionia and 
 Chios ; another party, that they should be sent 
 first to Hellespont. The Lacedaemonians, 
 however, complied by far the soonest with the 
 demands of the Chians and Tissaphernes. 
 Alcibiades, indeed, espoused the cause of the 
 latter, from an extraordinary zeal to mark 
 hereditary friendship to Endius, who at this 
 juncture presided in the college of ephori. 
 On this account it was, that the family of Al- 
 cibiades, in compliment to this friendship, had 
 taken a Lacedcemonian name ; for this Endius 
 was the son of an Alcibiades. Yet, previously, 
 the Lacedaemonians despatched Phrynis, a per- 
 son born and educated in those parts, to 
 Chios, to inspect the state of affairs there, 
 and report, whether they had so large a number 
 of shipping as they pretended, and their situa- 
 2a2 
 
298 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VIII, 
 
 tion in otli«r respects equalizec} the fine account 
 they haa given of it. Accordingly, when 
 Phrynis had reported, "that all the accounts 
 they had heard were true," the Chians and 
 Ej-ythraBans were instantly admitted allies. 
 They voted, farther, to send them forty sail of 
 shipping, as there were already assembled at 
 Chios not fewer than sixty from places which 
 the Chians named. Ten of these they design- 
 ed to despatch, as soon as possible, under the 
 command of Melanchridas, who was appointed 
 admiral. But afterwards, the shock of an 
 earthquake being felt, instead of Melanchridas 
 they sent Chalcideus ; and, instead of ten, 
 equipped in Laconia only five ships for their 
 service; 
 
 Here the winter ended ; and the nineteenth 
 year of this war came also to an end, of which 
 Thucydides hath compiled the history. 
 
 Summer now coming on, as the Chians were 
 most earnestly soliciting the despatcli of the 
 ships, and also afraid lest the Athenians should 
 get notice of their transactions, — for the whole 
 of the negotiation had been carried on without 
 the knowledge of the latter, — the Lacedsemo- 
 nians send to Corinth three citizens of Sparta, 
 to prevail with that state for the transportation 
 of their ships with all possible expedition across 
 the isthmus, from the other sea into that which 
 lies towards Athens, that all in a body might 
 stand away for Chios ; as well those which 
 Agis had destined for the service of Lesbos as 
 the rest. The whole number of shipping 
 belonging to the alliance, now assembled to- 
 gether there, amounted to thirty-nine. 
 
 But Calligitus, truly, and Timagoras refused, 
 ill the name of Pharnabazus, to have any par- 
 ticipation in the expedition to Chios ; nor 
 would part with the money they had brought 
 with them, which was five and twenty talents,^ 
 to disburse this equipment. They intended to 
 get another fitted out, which should sail away 
 under their own orders. 
 
 As for Agis, when now he perceived that 
 the Lacedfflmonians were determined to go first 
 to Chios, he no longer suffered his own projects 
 to clash with those of the state ; but the con- 
 federates now assembling at Corinth proceeded 
 (0 draw up a plan of operations. It was ac- 
 
 > Before Christ, 412. 
 
 ■'iBilt. 15s. sterling 
 
 cordingly agreed, that they should go first to 
 Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who 
 fitted out the five ships in Laconia ; from 
 thence to Lesbbs, under the command of Al- 
 camenes, whom Agis had destined for that 
 service ; in the last place they should proceed 
 to Hellespont, and in this service it was agreed 
 beforehand, that Clearchus, the son of Ram- 
 phias, should take upon him the command 
 But the first step should be the transportation 
 of a moiety of their shipping across the isth- 
 mus, which were immediately to stand out to 
 sea, that the attention of the Athenians might 
 be less engaged upon such as were alreadj' in 
 their course than on those which were to fol- 
 low : for now they determined to cross the sea 
 in an open insulting manner, as they contemn- 
 ed the present impotence of the Athenians, be- 
 cause they had no considerable force anywhere 
 at sea. 
 
 When these resolutions were formally com- 
 pleted, they immediately transported one and 
 twenty ships. Expeditious sailing was ear- 
 nestly solicited ; but the Corinthians declared 
 a reluctancy to go the voyage till they had cele- 
 brated the Isthmian games, which were at 
 hand. To remove this obstacle, Agis declared 
 himself ready to have the whole procedure 
 charged to his own account, that they might be 
 cleared from a breach of the Isthmian cessation. 
 The Corinthians not complying with this pro- 
 posal, and delay necessarily resulting from it, 
 the Athenians gained by this an earlier discov 
 ery of the negotiation of the Chians ; and, 
 despatching Aristocrates, one of their generals, 
 charged them openly with the guilt of such a 
 procedure. The Chians as strenuously deny- 
 ing the charge, they commanded them to send 
 away their shipping forthwith to Athens by way 
 of pledge for their safety. 
 
 The Chians accordingly sent seven. But 
 the detachment of these was entirely owing to 
 the popular party of that island, who had been 
 kept in utter ignorance of the late negotiation. 
 The few who were privy to it, had no mind 
 to incur the popular resentment before they 
 were enabled to stem its fury; especially as 
 now they had resigned all hope of the arrival 
 of the Peloponnesians, whose motions were ex- 
 ceeding dilatory. 
 
 In the meantime the Isthmian games were 
 solemnized; and at these the Athenians, who 
 had the regular invitation sent them, assisted 
 in form. The practices of the Chians became 
 
YEAR XX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 299 
 
 here more apparent to them than ever. No I 
 sooner, therefore, were they returned to Athens, 
 than they put all the needfol expedients in 
 readiness, to prevent the squadron which v^as 
 to sail from Cenchrea!, from passing undisco- 
 covered. 
 
 WJien the festival was over, the latter, with 
 one and twenty sail, under the command of 
 Alcamer.es, stood out to sea in order for Chios. 
 And the Athenians, advancing against them, 
 at first with an equal number of ships, stood 
 off again into open sea ; but, when the Pelo- 
 ponnesians would not follow them far, but 
 stood into the land, the Athenians disappeared ; 
 for, having amongst their number the seven 
 ships of the Chians, they thought it not safe 
 to trust them. But, having afterwards manned 
 out others, to the amount of thirty seven, they 
 drive the enemy along the coast into Pirseus of 
 the Corinthians : this is a desert harbour, and 
 the last upon the confines of Epidauria. One 
 ship, indeed, which the enemy came up with at 
 sea, the Peloponnesians lost ; but all the rest 
 they drew together to a station within the har- 
 bour. Here the Athenians attacked them, on 
 the water with their ships, and by land with a 
 party sent purposely on shore. The attack 
 was attended with great confusion, and carried 
 on in a disorderly manner. The party of the 
 Athenians which attacked from the land, dis- 
 able the bulk of the squadron, and kill the 
 commander, Alcamenes ; some also of their 
 own people perished in the action. But when 
 the dispute was ended, they posted a sufficient 
 number of their ships to lie facing those of the 
 enemy ; and with the remainder anchor near a 
 little isle, on which, as it lay at a small distance, 
 they form an encampment, and send away to 
 Athens for a reinforcement. 
 
 In favour of the Peloponnesians came up, 
 on the day following, not only the Corinthians, 
 but soon after a number also of others, from 
 the adjacent country, in aid of the squadron ; 
 who, perceiving that the preservation of it 
 would be a work of laborious toil on so desert 
 a coast, were sadly perplexed. Some argued 
 vehemently for setting the ships on fire ; but 
 at length it was concluded to draw them ashore, 
 and, encamping with their land forces round 
 them, to guard them from the enemy till some 
 convenient opportunity should offer of getting 
 them away. Agis, also, when informed of 
 their situation, sent to them Thermo, a citizen 
 of Sparta. 
 
 To the Lacedsemonians the first advice that 
 had been sent was this,— that " the squadron 
 had set sail from the isthmus ;" for orders had 
 been given Alcamenes by the ephorj, that, 
 when this point was executed, he should des- 
 patch a horseman to them. And immediately 
 then they had determined to despatch away the 
 commander Chalcideus, accompanied by Alci- 
 biades, with the five ships of their own equip- 
 ment ; but, at the instant they were ready to 
 move off, the news arrived, — that " the squad- 
 ron had been drove into Pirieus." Dejected 
 by this unexpected event, because they had 
 stumbled in the very first entrance on an Ionian 
 war, they no longer persisted in the design of 
 sending away their own ships, but even thought 
 of recalling some of those which were already 
 at sea. But, as this was discovered by Alci- 
 biades, he again persuades Endius, and the 
 other ephori, by no means entirely to give up 
 the expedition; assuring them, that "by a 
 timely despatch they yet might make that 
 island, before any information of the disaster 
 which had befallen the squadron could reach 
 the Chians ; and of himself, were he once in 
 Ionia, he pould easily effectuate the revolt of 
 the cities, by opening their eyes in respect to 
 the weakness of the Athenians and the hearty 
 and vigourous interposition of the Lacedffimo- 
 nians, since on these topics he should be heard 
 with greater deference than any other person 
 whatever." He also privately encouraged En- 
 dius with the prospect of " great glory to him 
 self, if through him Ionia could be brought to 
 revolt, and the king be made confederate to 
 Laced^emon, whilst Agis had no hand in thesn 
 masterly strokes of policy ;" for he happened 
 now to be at variance with Agis.' By such 
 
 1 No reasons are here assigned for the variance he 
 twcen Alcihiades and Agis. Numbers of probable one* 
 might occur from the different tempers and manners of 
 the persons ; but we learn, from Plutarch, that Alcihia- 
 des had been intriguing with Timxa, the wife of Agis, 
 and had had a son by her who was called Leolychides. 
 disowned afterwards by Agis and incapacitated f. ora 
 succeeding to the throne. Alcihiades was always dis- 
 solute; and yet this (it seems) was merely to gratify 
 his pride, since he declared his intention in this intrigu'5 
 to have been that his descendants might reign at Sparta 
 This fine gentleman from Athens was exceeding agree- 
 able in the eyes of her S])artan majesty ; even though 
 his deportment at Sparta was such, as if he had been 
 trained from Iiis birth in the severe discipline of Ly- 
 curgus. He wag a thorough Spartan — shaved close, 
 plunged into cold water, could make a meal on dry 
 bread, and feast on black broth. One would think, 
 says Plutarch, he had never kept a cook in his life. 
 
300 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 insinuations Alcibiades prevailed upon the 
 Kphori and Endius, and sailed away with the 
 Ave ships, in company with Chalcideus, the La- 
 cedsemonian ; and the voyage they performed 
 with all possible expedition. 
 
 About the same time, the sixteen ships 
 which had been at the war of Sicily under the 
 orders of Gylippus, regained in safety the Pelo- 
 ponnesian ports. They had been intercepted 
 near Leucadia, and terribly harassed by twenty- 
 seven sail of Athenians, commanded by Hippo- 
 clcs, the son of Menippus, who was stationed 
 there to watch the return of the fleet from Si- 
 cily. Yet only a single ship was lost. The 
 rest, escaping the Athenian chase, arrived safe 
 in the harbour of Corinth. 
 
 But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, who were 
 now upon their voyage, stopped and detained 
 whatever they met, that their course might not 
 be divulged : and, touching first at Corycus on 
 the main,' and there setting at liberty such as 
 they had detained, and gaining a conference 
 with some of the Chians who were privy to 
 their designs, by whom being advised to make 
 directly for the harbour of Chios, without any 
 formal notification, they arrive there, entirely 
 unexpected by the Chians. By this, the many 
 were thrown at once into astonishment and 
 terror ; but the few had so conducted matters, 
 that the council was that moment sitting ; in 
 which Chalcideus and Alcibiades being admit- 
 ted to speech it — that " many other ships are 
 coming up," — but suppressing all mention of 
 the squadron blocked up at PirsBus, the Chians 
 declare a revolt from the Athenians ; and the 
 Erythraeans soon follow their example. 
 
 So far successful, they passed on with 
 three ships to Clazomens, and cause that city 
 also to revolt. Instantly upon this, the Clazo- 
 inenians crossed over into the continent, and 
 fortified Polichne, to be a place of safe resort 
 for themselves, in case obliged to quit the isle 
 they occupied at present All the revolters, 
 in short, were warmly employed in fortifying 
 their towns, and making preparations for war. 
 
 At Athens soon the news arrives of the 
 revolt of Chios. They were now convinced 
 that horrid and apparent dangers already en- 
 vironed them about, and that the rest of their 
 dependents would not long be quiet, when the 
 most powerful state amongst them had thrown 
 
 revcr seen a performer nor ever worn a Milesian robe. 
 I if* 7/ Alcibiidet, 
 
 [book VIII. 
 
 off the yoke. Now, therefore, the thousand 
 talents,' which through all the course of the 
 war they had religiously refrained from touch- 
 ing, the penalties being discharged which the 
 law inflicted upon him who should move, or 
 whoever should vote it, amidst their present 
 consternation, they decreed " should be em- 
 ployed in the public service, and that a large 
 number of ships should , by this means be 
 equipped ; — that, farther, from the squadron 
 which blocked up Piraeus, eight ships should 
 immediately be detached;", which, accordingly, 
 quitting the blockade, pursued the squadron 
 under Chalcideus, but, being unable to come 
 up with them, returned again. This detach- 
 ment was commanded by Strombichides ; the 
 son of Diotimus — that " soon after twelve 
 others, under the orders of Thrasycles, should 
 repair to Chios, there also to be detached from 
 the same blockade." Having, moreover, fetch- 
 ed off the seven vessels belonging to the Chians, 
 which assisted in forming the blockade at Pi- 
 rajus, they set at liberty the slaves who were 
 on board them, and threw all the freemen into 
 prison. But, to replace the whole number 
 detached from the blockade of the Pelopon- 
 nesians, they lost no time in fitting out other 
 vessels and sending them to that post They 
 had also a scheme for the expeditious equip- 
 ment of thirty more. Great, indeed, was their 
 ardour ; and nothing of small importance was 
 taken in hand, as the point in agitation was no 
 less than the recovery of Chios. 
 
 In the mean time, Strombichides, with the 
 eight sail of ships, arrived at Samos ; and 
 taking with him one Samian vessel, stood on- 
 wards to Teos, and required of them " to 
 have no participation in the present com- 
 motions." From Chios, also, Chalcideus was 
 now coming over to Teos, with a fleet of 
 three and twenty sail ; and the land force of 
 the Clazomenians, and also of the Erythraeans, 
 attending his motions, was marcliing thither 
 by land : but Strombichides, having timely no- 
 tice of their approach, put out again before 
 their arrival. Standing out aloof into open sea, 
 he had a view of this numerous fleet in theii 
 course from Chios ; upon which he fled amain 
 to Samos. But the enemy followed in pur- 
 suit 
 
 The Teians, who at first refused admittance 
 to the land forces, when now the Athenians 
 
 < 193^7502. sterling. 
 
YEAR XX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR, 
 
 301 
 
 plainly fled, thought proper to open their gates. 
 Here the hulk of them were inactive for a 
 time, attending the return of Chalcideus from 
 the pursuit. But, when time wore on without 
 his appearing, they demolished of their own 
 accord the wall which the Athenians had huilt 
 on the side of Teos facing the continent. In 
 this they were also assisted hy a small party of 
 Barbarians, who in this interval had joined 
 them, and were commanded by Tages, the dep- 
 uty of Tissaphernes. 
 
 But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they 
 had chased Strombichides into Samos, having 
 furnished the mariners of the Peloponnesian 
 vessels with proper arms, leave them as a gar- 
 rison in Chios. Having manned their vessels 
 afresh at Chios, with an addition of twenty 
 others, they stood away for Miletus, as medi- 
 tating its revolt. This was owing to Alci- 
 biades ; who, having an interest in persons of 
 the first rank among the Milesians, made it a 
 point to effectuate their accession before the 
 fleet should come up from Peloponnesus, and 
 to secure the whole honour to the Chians and 
 himself, and Chalcideus and Endius who had 
 sent him, in pursuance of his engagements to 
 work the revolt of the cities with the sole 
 power of the Chians and with Chalcideus. 
 Having therefore performed the greatest part of 
 their voyage thither without being discovered, 
 and prevented by a small portion of time 
 Strombichides, and also Thrasycles, who was 
 lately come up from Athens with twelve ships, 
 and in junction with the former followed after 
 them, they caused Miletus to revolt. The 
 Athenians, indeed, with nineteen sail, arrived 
 upon their heels ; but, as the Milesians denied 
 them a reception, they took their station at 
 Lade, an adjacent isle. 
 
 The first alliance between the king and the 
 Lacedsemonians was made immediately after 
 the revolt of Miletus, by Tissaphernes and 
 Chalcideus, as foUoweth : 
 
 " On these terms the Lacediemonians and 
 confederates make an alliance with the king and 
 Tissaphernes — 
 
 " Whatever region or cities the king possess- 
 eth and the ancestors of the king possessed, be 
 those the king's. 
 
 " And, out of those cities, whatever sums 
 of money or any other supply went to the 
 Athenians, let the king and the Lacedaemonians 
 and confederates jointly stop, that the Athe- 
 
 nians may no longer receive those sums of 
 money, nor any other such supply. 
 
 "And the war against the Athenians let the 
 king and the Lacedsemonians and confederates 
 jointly carry on. 
 
 " And be it unlawful to put an end to the 
 war against the Athenians without the consent 
 of both the contracting parties ; of the king on 
 one side, of the Lacedsemonians and confede- 
 rates on the other. 
 
 " If, farther, any revolt from the king, be 
 they declared enemies to the Lacedffimonians 
 and confederates. 
 
 " And, if any revolt from the Lacedajmonians 
 and confederates, be they declared enemies, iu 
 the same manner, to the king." 
 
 This alliance was now formally concluded. 
 
 Immediately after this, the Chians, who had 
 manned out ten additional ships, stood away to 
 Ansea, being desirous to pick up some infor- 
 mation of what was doing at Miletus, and at 
 the same time to cause the revolt of the cities. 
 Here, being reached by an order from Chalci- 
 deus to return back to Chios, with an intima- 
 tion that Amorges with a land army would 
 soon be upon them, they sailed away to the 
 temple of Jupiter. From hence they descry 
 sixteen ships, which Diomedon was bringing 
 up from Athens, from whence he had sailed 
 somewhat later than Thrasycles. Upon this 
 discovery they fled amain with a single ship to 
 Ephesus, but with the rest of their fleet to Teos. 
 Four indeed of the number, which their crews 
 had abandoned, the Athenians take ; yet all the 
 hands escaped on shore ; but the remainder 
 reach in safety the city of the Teians. After this, 
 the Athenians stood away into Samos. But 
 the Chians, putting again to sea with the re- 
 sidue of their ships, and attended by a land 
 force, caused Lebedos to revolt, and also Erie. 
 And, these points carried, both the land force 
 and the squadron returned respectively to their 
 own homes. 
 
 About the same time, the twenty sail ol 
 Peloponnesians, which had been chased into 
 Pirseus, and lay blocked up there by an equal 
 number of Athenians, having made an unex- 
 pected sally upon the enemy, and got the 
 better in a naval engagement, take four of the 
 Athenian ships: and sailing away for Cen- 
 chreiE, were again fitting out for the voyage 
 to Chios and Ionia. Astyochus also came 
 down thither from Lacedasmon as admiral, m 
 
302 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VIII. 
 
 whose hands the whole command at sea was 
 now lodged. 
 
 When the land army had quitted Teos, Tis- 
 saphernes in person came thither with a body, 
 and, after completely demolishing those parts 
 of the wall before Teos which were yet left 
 standing, marched away. 
 
 Not long after his departure, Diomedon, ar- 
 riving there with ten sail of Athenians, in order 
 to gain a reception, made a truce with the Te- 
 lans. From thence he coasted along to Erse, 
 and assaulted the place ; but, not being able to 
 take it, he sailed away. 
 
 Coinciding with this in point of time, an in- 
 surrection was made at Samos by the people 
 against the nobility. The Athenians, who 
 with three ships were then lying at Samos, as- 
 sisted the former. On this occasion the Sa- 
 mian people massacred about two hundred per- 
 sons, all of the nobility. Four hundred others 
 they condemned to exile ; and, having divided 
 amongst themselves their lands and houses, and 
 obtained from the Athenians a decree of being 
 governed by their own constitutions, as men 
 whose lidelity was no longer to be suspected, 
 they assumed the whole civil administration, 
 leavin" no share of it in the hands of the landed 
 gentry, and absolutely prohibiting to the people 
 all alliance for the future with them, so as nei- 
 ther to give their daughters to them nor ever to 
 marry theirs. 
 
 After these transactions, during the same 
 summer, the Chians, proceeding with unabat- 
 ing ardour, left nothing Undone to compass the 
 revolt of the cities. Even without Pelopon- 
 nesian aid they made them visits with their own 
 single force ; and, desirous at the same time to 
 involve as large a number as possible in their 
 own dangers, they undertake a voyage with 
 thirteen sail of ships to Lesbos. This squared 
 exactly with the Lacedasmonian plan ; which 
 was, to make the second attempt upon that is- 
 land, and from thence to proceed to Helles- 
 pont. The land force, at the same time, of 
 such of the Peloponnesians as were at hand, 
 and their adjacent allies, attended their mo- 
 tions by the route of ClazomensB and Cyme : 
 these were commanded by Eualas, a Spartan ; 
 but the fleet was under the orders of Deixia- 
 ■3as, a native of those parts. And those ships, 
 iteering first towards and arriving at Methym- 
 ne, cause its revolt.' » • » • 
 
 * From what follows it looks as if some words were 
 
 But Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral 
 in chief, putting to sea from CenchreEC, where 
 he had taken upon him the command, with foui 
 sail of shipping, arrives at Chios. And, the 
 third day after his arrival there, twenty-five 
 sail of Athenians, commanded by Leon and 
 Diomedon, reached the isle of Lesbos ; for 
 Leon had been lately sent from Athens with 
 a reinforcement of ten. On the very evening 
 of that day, Astyochus put out again to sea, 
 with the addition of one Chian ship, and stood 
 away for Lesbos to give them all the assistance 
 in his power. Accordingly he toucheth first at 
 Pyrrha, proceeding from thence the day fol- 
 lowing to Eressus, where information meets 
 him that Mitylene had been taken by the 
 Athenians at a shout; for the latter, as their 
 arrival was entirely unexpected, standing boldly 
 into the harbour, seized at once all the Chian 
 vessels ; and then landing, and gaining a vic- 
 tory over such as made head against them, be- 
 came masters of the city. Astyochus, inform- 
 ed of this event by the Eressians, and the 
 Chian ships under the command of Eubulus 
 from Methymne : — which, having been left in 
 the harbour at that place, had fled at once when 
 Mitylene was taken ; three of them came up 
 safe to Astyochus, but one had fallen into 
 the hands of the Athenians ; — Astyochus now 
 desisted from proceeding to Mitylene. Hav- 
 ing effectuated the revolt of Eressus, and provi- 
 ded the inhabitants with arms, he ordered the sol- 
 diers from on board his own squadron to march 
 by land, under the command of Eteonicus, 
 towards Antissa and Methymne ; whilst him- 
 self, with his own ships and the three Chian, 
 advanced along the shore towards the same 
 places. He hoped the Methymneans, upon 
 the sight of this succour, would resume their 
 spirits and abide by their revolt. But, when 
 every thing in Lesbos seemed tc act in concert 
 against his scheme, he took his landmen again 
 on board, and made the best of h's way back 
 again to Chios. The forces, farther, that had 
 attended the motions of his squadron, and 
 which were to have proceeded with him to 
 Hellespont, were dismissed to their respective 
 cities. After this, they were joined at Chios 
 by six ships, which were sent thither by the 
 
 wanting here. The Latin translators have endeavonr 
 ed to supply it, thus: — " And the Chians, leaving foiu 
 ships here for the defence of the place, stood away wiUi 
 the rest to Mitylene;, and caused it to revolt." 
 
TEAR XX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 303 
 
 confederate fleet of Feloponnesians assembled 
 at Cenchre®. 
 
 The Athenians in "the meantime were em- 
 ployed in resettling the state of affairs in 
 Lesbos. Standing across from thence, and 
 demolishing Polichne, on the continent, lately 
 fortified by the Ckzomenians, they removed 
 all the latter back again to their city in the isle, 
 excepting such as were authors of the revolt ; 
 for these had retired to Daphnus. And thus 
 ClazomeniB once more became subject to the 
 Athenians. 
 
 The same summer, the Athenians, who 
 with twenty ships had stationed themselves at 
 Lade to awe Miletus, having made a descent 
 at Panormus in the Milesian territory, kill 
 Chalcideus the Lacedemonian, who with a 
 handful of men endeavoured to repulse them. 
 The third day after this action, they re-embark- 
 ed ; but first erected a trophy ; which the 
 Milesians thought proper to demolish, as not 
 fixed on a spot which was the property of the 
 victors. 
 
 Leon, also, and Diomedon, at the head of the 
 .Athenian fleet on the station of Lesbos, assem- 
 bling together what force they could from the 
 Oinussfe islands, which lie before Chios, and 
 from Sidusa and Pteleum, fortresses of their 
 own in Erythrsea, stood away from Lesbos in 
 a body, and carried on the war by sea against 
 the Chians. The land soldiers" on board them 
 were some of the heavy-armed of the public 
 roll of Athens, now pressed into this service. 
 At Cardamyle they landed; and at Bolissus, 
 having routed in battle a body of Chians that 
 made head against them, and done great execu- 
 tion upon them, they reduced all the places in 
 that quarter of the island. At Phanse also 
 they fought a second time with great success ; 
 and, a third time, at Leuconium. But as, 
 after these repeated defeats, the Chians no 
 longer showed themselves in the field to oppose 
 them, the victors made cruel ravage on that 
 rich and fertile country ; and which, from the 
 invasion of the Medes to the present period of 
 time, had been totally exempted from the 
 miseries of war. For, next to the Lacedaemo- 
 nians, the Chians are the only people who (as 
 far as I have been able to observe) have en- 
 joyed a series of public prosperity with a steady 
 and uniform moderation, and, in proportion as 
 their state increased in wealth and power, made 
 suitable accessions to its domestic splendour 
 and security. Nay, even their late revolt, if 
 
 this should chance to be ascribed to a want of 
 judicious and cautionary measures, they never 
 ventured to declare, till they had fortified the 
 hazardous step with numerous and gallant con- 
 federates, and saw plainly that the Athenians, 
 (as even the Athenians themselves could not 
 possibly deny,) after the blow received in 
 Sicily, were plunged into the lowest depth of 
 impotence and distress. If, therefore, they 
 proved mistaken, it was one of those cases 
 inseparable from the constant mutability of 
 human affairs, where numbers were involved in 
 the same mistake with themselves, who yet in 
 their jifdgment were perfectly convinced that 
 the entire ruin of Athens was fast approaching. 
 
 Now, therefore, blocked up as they were by 
 sea, whilst their lands all around were ravaged 
 by the enemy, a party amongst them were con- 
 certing the method of delivering up the city 
 into the hands of the Athenians. But those 
 in the administration, getting wind of their 
 design, refrained indeed from making a bustle 
 about it in public ; but, fetching over Astyo- 
 chus, the Lacedsemonian admiral in chief, with 
 his four ships, from Erythrs, they consulted 
 how to prevent the execution of the plot by 
 the mildest and , most gentle methods, eithei 
 by taking hostages for the fidelity of the sus- 
 pected, or some other such cautionary expe 
 dients. In this posture stood affairs at Chios. 
 
 But, from Athens, in the close of the same 
 summer, one thousand five hundred heavy- 
 armed Athenians and a thousand Argives, (foi 
 five hundred Argives, who were but light, 
 armed, the Athenians had equipped in tho 
 manner more complete,) with the addition of a 
 thousand confederates, in eight and forty sail 
 of ships, including the transports of the heavy- 
 armed, and put under the command of Phry- 
 nichus and Onomacles and Skironidas, sailed 
 away to Samos, and, thence stretching over to 
 Miletus, encamped themselves before it. The 
 Milesians marched out into the field, to the 
 amount of eight hundred heavy-armed, assisted 
 by the Peloponncsians who came over with 
 Chalcideus and a body of foreign mercenaries 
 furnished by Tissaphernes. Tissaphernes also 
 assisted them in person with an aid of cavalry ; 
 and thus battle was joined against the Athe- 
 nians and confederates, ^he Argives, of whom 
 a whole wing was composed, advanced before 
 the rest of the line ; and, contemning their 
 enemy too much, as lonians, and unable to 
 stand then- shock, they charged in a disorderlv 
 
304 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VIII. 
 
 manner, are routed by the Milesians, and no 
 less a number thiin three hundred of their body 
 are destroyed. But the Athenians beat first 
 the Peloponnesians, and then cleared the field 
 of the Barbarians and all the rabble of the ene- 
 my, yet came not at all to an engagement with 
 the Milesians : for the latter, returning towards 
 the city from the chase of the Argives, no 
 sooner perceived that their own side was van- 
 quished than they quitted tlie field of battle. 
 The Athenians, therefore, as victors, posted 
 themselves under the very walls of Miletus. 
 It is observable, that, in this battle, the lonians 
 had on both sides the better of the Dorians : 
 for the Athenians beat those Peloponnesians 
 who were ranged against them ; and the Mile- 
 sians did the same by the Argives. But now, 
 after erecting a trophy, as the town was seated 
 on an isthmus, the Athenians were preparing 
 to cut it off by a work of circumvallation ; con- 
 cluding that, " if they once could get possession 
 of Miletus, they should easily complete the re- 
 duction of the other states." 
 
 It was now about the shut of evening, and 
 advice is brought them that " five and fifty 
 sail of ships from Peloponnesus and Sicily are 
 only not at hand." For, from Sicily, where 
 Hermocrates the Syracusan strenuously ad- 
 vised to go on with what yet remained in re- 
 gard to the total demolition of the Athenians, 
 twenty sail of Syracusans and two of Selinum- 
 tians came over. The Peloponnesian fleet, 
 which had been fitting out, was now ready for 
 service ; and both these were sent out in con- 
 junction, under the orders of Theramenes the 
 Lacedemonian, who was to carry them to As- 
 tyochus the admiral in chief. They arrived 
 first at Eleus, an island before Miletus. Being 
 there informed that the Athenians lay before 
 Miletus, they departed thence ; and, steering 
 first into the gulf of lasus, were desirous to 
 pick up information how things went at Miletus. 
 Alcibiades had now rode to Teichiussa in the 
 Milesian ; in which quarter of the gulf the fleets 
 had come to anchor for the night, and receive 
 there a full account of the battlfe. Alcibiades 
 had been present at it, and had given his assist- 
 ance to the Milesians and Tissaphernes. He 
 therefore earnestly pressed them, " unless they 
 were desirous to see all Ionia lost, and all 
 their great expectations blasted at once, to re- 
 pair with all possible expedition to the succour 
 of Miletus, and by no means to suffer it to be 
 'invested by a circumvallation." In pursuance 
 
 of this it was resolved, that at the first dawn of 
 day they would stand away to its succour. 
 
 But Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, 
 when advised from Lerus of the certain arrival 
 of this united fleet, even though his colleagues 
 declared openly for keeping their ground and 
 hazarding an engagement by sea, protested 
 boldly, that " such a step, for his own part, he 
 could not take ; and, were he able to hinder it, 
 that neither they nor any one should force him 
 to it : for, since it would be afterwards in their 
 power, when they had got better intelligence 
 of the numbers of the enemy, and made what 
 possible accessions they could to their own, 
 and when they had prepared for action in an 
 ample and leisurely manner, — since it would 
 be still in their power to fight, the dread of a 
 shameful or reproachful imputation should not 
 bend him to risk an engagement against his 
 judgment. It could be no matter of reproach 
 to the Athenians to retire with their fleet 
 when the exigencies of time required it ; but, 
 in every respect, it would be highly reproach- 
 ful to them should they fight and be vanquished. 
 He would not, therefore, involve the state, 
 not only in reproach, but in the greatest of 
 dangers ; — the state which, but just now re- 
 spiring from the terrible blows it had received, 
 scarce thought it prudential with most ample 
 preparation to choose voluntary hazards, or 
 even, when the last necessity demanded, to 
 strike first at the enemy, — why now, when 
 no neccessity compelled, must it be thrown 
 into wilful spontaneous dangers V He ex- 
 horted them, therefore, " without loss of time 
 to carry the wounded on board, to re-embark 
 their troops, and, securing what baggage they 
 had brought along with them, to leave behind 
 what booty they had got from the enemy, that 
 their ships might not be too deeply laden, and 
 make the best of their way to Samos ; and from 
 thence, after collecting together what additional 
 force they could, to watch for and seize the 
 seasons of advantage to attack their foes." 
 The advice of Phrynichus, thus given, was 
 prevailing, and accordingly wasputinexecution. 
 He was regarded, not only on the present but 
 on future occasions, not only for this, but all 
 the subsequent instances of his conduct, as a 
 man of an excellent understanding, 
 
 In pursuance of this, the Athenians, so soon 
 as the evening was closed, made the best of 
 their way from Miletus, and left the victory 
 imperfect. And the Argives, without n^aking 
 
irr.AR XX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 305 
 
 the least stay, chagrined as they were at their 
 late defeat, departed immediately from Samos 
 to return to Argos. 
 
 The Peloponnesians, early the next dawn, 
 weighing from Teichiussa, stand into Miletus. 
 After one day's stay in that harbour, on the 
 next, having augmented their squadron with 
 the Chian ships which had formerly been 
 chased in company with Chalcideus, they de- 
 termined to go back again to Teichiussa to 
 fetch off what stores they had landed there. 
 Accordingly, when they were thus returned, 
 Tissaphernes, being come up with his land 
 army, persuades them to stand directly against 
 lasus, in which his enemy Amorges at that 
 instant lay. Thus, falling on lasus by surprise, 
 the inhabitants of which expected none but an 
 Athenian squadron, they become masters of it. 
 In this action the ^yracusans were the persons 
 who gained the greatest honour. Amorges, 
 farther, the bastard son of Pissuthnes, who was 
 a revolter from the king, was taken prisoner by 
 the Peloponnesians. They delivered him up 
 to Tissaphernes, that if he pleased he might 
 send him to the king, in obedience to his orders, 
 lasus, farther, they put to the sack ; and the 
 army made on this occasion, a very large booty, 
 for this city had ever been remarkable for its 
 wealth. They gave quarter to the auxiliaries 
 in the service of Amorges : and, without com- 
 mitting the least insult upon them, took them 
 into their own troops, as the bulk of them 
 were Peloponnesians. They delivered up the 
 town into the hands of Tissaphernes, as like- 
 wise all the prisoners, whether slaves or free- 
 men, upon covenant to receive from him a 
 Doric stater' for each. This being done, they 
 again repaired to Miletus ; and from hence 
 they detach Psedaritus, the son of Leon, whom 
 the Lacedaemonians had sent expressly to be 
 governor of Chios, to march over land to Ery- 
 thrsB, having under his command the auxiliaries 
 who had served under Amorges ; and appoint 
 Philippus to commmand at Miletus. And the 
 summer ended. 
 
 The winter now succeeding, after Tissa- 
 phernes had garrisoned and provided for the 
 security of lasus, he repaired to Miletus, and 
 distributed a month's subsistence, in pursuance 
 of his engagements at Lacedaemon, to all the 
 ships, at the rate of an Attic drachma^ to each 
 mariner by the day ; but for the remainder of 
 
 time he declared he would only pay at the rate 
 of three oboli,' till he had consulted the king's 
 pleasure ; and, in case his master's orders were 
 for it, he said, he would make it up a complete 
 drachma. But as Hermocrates, the Syracu- 
 san commander, remonstrated sharply against 
 this usage, (for Theramenes, not regarding 
 himself as admiral, since he was now at the 
 head of the fleet merely to carry it up to Asty- 
 ochus, was very indolent about the article of 
 pay,) it was at length compromised, that except- 
 ing the five supernumerary ships, the crews 
 of the rest should receive more than three 
 oboli a man : for to the five and fifty ships ha 
 paid three talents* a month ; and, for the rest, 
 as many as exceeded that number, pay was to 
 be furnished at the rate of only three oboli a 
 day. 
 
 The same winter, the Athenians now lying 
 at Samos had been reinforced by the arrival of 
 
 II. 12s. 3id. 
 
 » 7id. 
 
 46 
 
 3 Haifa drachma. 
 
 * There is manifestly a fault here ; for r^ioe, three, in 
 the original, should be read r^ixxovTzt^ thirty, talents a 
 month. Mr Hobbes hath taken the pains to compute, 
 and finds that the Peloponnesian ships carried eighteen 
 men a piece. What? only so small a crew as eighteen 
 men for a ship of war with three banks of oars? or, 
 where the complement was perhaps two hundred, did 
 Tissaphernes only pay a tenth part of that number? 
 Xenophon, in the first bqok of his Greek history, ena- 
 bles us to set all to rights. Lysander is negotiating 
 with Cyrus for an increase of pay. Cyrus insists upon 
 the former agreement made by Tissaphernes, that 
 every ship should receive but thirty mins a month. 
 The daily pay of each was of course one mina, or one 
 hundred drachmas; whence it appears, that, at three 
 oboli, or half a drachma, a man, the pay of sixty ships, 
 each carrying two hundred men, would be just thirty 
 talents. Thirty talents, therefore, paid to fifty-five 
 ships for a month, were two talents and a half above 
 three oboli a day. And hence it seems pretty clear, 
 that the complement of a Peloponnesian ship of war 
 was two hundred men. 
 
 I have another proof at hand, which will confirm 
 what hath already been said, and serve at the same 
 time to ascertain the number of men on board a ship 
 of war. In the sixth book Thucydides says, the Eges- 
 leans brought to Athens sixty talents, as a month's pay 
 for sixty ships. He says also, thatin the Sicilian expe- 
 dition the daily pay of the Athenian seamen was raised 
 to a drachma a man. Now a talent a month, reckon- 
 ing thirty days to the month, is two minae a day ; and 
 two miniE are just two hundred drachmas. Hence, it 
 is plain, the complement of an Athenian ship was two 
 hundred men; and, according to the former computa- 
 tion, that of a Peloponnesian ship was, as might rea- 
 sonably be expected, exactly the same. This is a far- 
 ther confirmation that there is a mistake in the printed 
 copies of the original, as was said above; wliere, instead 
 of three talents, which amount but to 58H. 5s. sterling 
 should have been read thirty talents amounting in 
 English money to 5812/. 10s. 
 2H 
 
306 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book viii. 
 
 five and thirty sail from Atliens, under the 
 command of Charminus, and Strombichides, 
 and Euctemon ; and they had farther assem- 
 bled all their ships from Chios, and others. A 
 resolution was therefore taken, after assigning 
 each his peculiar command by lot, to make up 
 against it with a naval force, and awe Miletus ; 
 but to send against Chios both a naval and a 
 land force ; and this accordingly they put in 
 execution. For, in fact, Strombichides, and 
 Onomacles, and Euctemon, with a squadron 
 of thirty sail and a body of transports, which 
 had on board a detachment from the thousand 
 heavy-armed which came against Miletus, stood 
 away for Chios, as this service had fallen to 
 them by lot ; but the rest of the commanders 
 who now remained at Samos, having under 
 them seventy-four ships, were quite lords of 
 the sea, and sailed boldly up to awe Miletus. 
 
 Astyochus, who happened at this juncture 
 to be in Chios, selecting hostages as a preven- 
 tion against treachery, thought proper for the 
 present to desist, when he heard of the arrival 
 of the squadron under Theramenes, and that 
 their engagements with Tissaphernes were 
 much altered for the better. But, taking with 
 him ten sail of Peloponnesians and ten of Chi- 
 ans, he putteth to sea ; and, having made an 
 attempt upon Pteleum, though without suc- 
 cess, he crossed over to Clazomenas. He 
 there summoned such of the inhabitants as 
 were attach jd to the Athenians to remove with 
 their tliects up to Daphnus, and leave him in 
 possession of the place ; Tamus, farther, the 
 subgovernor of Ionia, joined with him in the 
 summons. But, when the inhabitants rejected 
 this offer, he made an assault upon the city, 
 which had no fortifications ; yet, miscarrying 
 in the attempt, he put off again to sea in a hard 
 gale of wind, and reached, with those ships 
 that kept up with him, to Phocea and Cyme : 
 but the rest of the squadron was by stress of 
 weather forced over to the isles which lie near 
 to Clazomenas, — Marathusa, and Pele, and 
 Drimussa ; and, whatever effects belonging to 
 the Clazomenians had by way of security been 
 deposited there, during eight days' continuance, 
 which the stormy weather obliged them to 
 Btay, they partly plundered and partly destroy- 
 ed ; and having secured their booty on board, 
 got away to Phocea and Cyme, and joined 
 Astyochus. But, whilst he was yet in this 
 station, ambassadors reach him from the Les- 
 bians, imparting to him their desires to revolt. 
 
 Him, indeed, they persuade; but, when the 
 Corinthians and the rest of the confederates 
 declared their repugnance, because of the for- 
 mer miscarriage, he weighed from thence and 
 made sail for Chios. And now, a storm dis- 
 persing his squadron, at last they all come in, 
 though from different quarters to which they 
 had been driven, and rejoined him at Chios. 
 
 The next step to this was the junction of 
 Paedaritus ; who, being now at Erythroe, after 
 marching by land from Miletus, passed over in 
 person with the troops under his command to 
 Chios. He had also with him about five hun- 
 dred soldiers, taken out of the five ships under 
 Chalcideus, who had been left behind with 
 their arms. 
 
 But now, the Lesbians notifying again their 
 readiness to revolt, Astyochus, in a conference 
 with Paedaritus and the Chians, " maintains 
 the necessity of going thither with a squadron 
 to support the revolt of Lesbos ; since, in con- 
 sequence of it, they must either enlarge tho 
 number of their confederates, or, even though 
 miscarrying in the design, must hurt the Athe- 
 nians." But they were deaf to this remon- 
 strance ; and Psedaritus positively declared that 
 he should not be attended by the ships of 
 Chios. Upon this, taking with him five sail 
 of Corinthians, a sixth ship belonging to Me- 
 gara, and one more of Hermione, and all the 
 Laconian which he himself brought thither, ho 
 stood away from thence to his station at Mile- 
 tus, uttering grievous threats against the Chi- 
 ans, that, " how low soever they might be re- 
 duced, they should never receive any succour 
 from him." Accordingly, touching first al 
 Corycus of Erythrse, he moored there for the 
 night. The Athenians, who, from Samos, 
 with a considerable strength, were now bourn 
 against Chios, were lying at the same instan 
 of time on the other side of the cape, but so 
 stationed that neither party knew of the near- 
 ness of the other. At this juncture, a letter 
 being delivered from Paedaritus, that " a party 
 of Erythraeans, who had been prisoners at Sa- 
 mos and released from thence, are coming to 
 ErythriE to betray that place," Astyochus puts 
 out again immediately for Erythrae ; and thus 
 narrowly, on this occasion, did he escape fall- 
 ing into the hands of the Athenians. Paedari- 
 tus, farther, had made the passage upon this 
 affair; and both having joined in making all 
 necessary inquiries about those who were ac- 
 cused of this piece of treachery, when they 
 
tEAR XX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR 
 
 307 
 
 found the whole to have been a plot of the 
 prisoners at Samos merely to recover their 
 liberty, they pronounced them innocent, and so 
 departed ; the latter to Chios ; but the other, 
 in pursuance of his first designation, made the 
 best of his way to Miletus. 
 
 In the mean time the armament of the Athe- 
 nians, having sailed round from Corycus to 
 Arginum, falls in with three long vessels of 
 the Chians, and no sooner had descried than 
 they gave them chase. And now a violent 
 storm ariseth, and the vessels of the Chians 
 with great ditSculty escape into harbour : but, 
 o4 the Athenian squadron, three, which had 
 most briskly followed the chace, are disabled 
 and driven ashore at the city of the Chians : the 
 crews of them were partly made prisoners, and 
 partly put to the sword. The rest of the fleet 
 got into a safe harbour which is known by the 
 name of Phcenicus, under the Mimas. From 
 hence they ■ afterwards took their course to 
 Lesbos, and got all in readiness to raise forti- 
 fications. 
 
 From Peloponnesus, the same winter, Hip- 
 pocrates the Lacedemonian, putting out to sea, 
 with ten sail of Thurians commanded by Dori- 
 cus, the son of Diagoras, and two colleagues, 
 with one ship of Laconia, and one of Syracuse, 
 ' arriveth at Cnidus. This place was now in 
 revolt from Tissaphernes. Those of Miletus 
 were no sooner advised of the arrival of this 
 squadron, than they sent them orders, with 
 one moiety of their ships to keep guard upon 
 Cnidus, and with the other to post themselves 
 at the Triopium, in order to take under their 
 convoy the trading vessels, which were in their 
 course from Egypt. The Triopium is a point 
 in the territory of Cnidus, jutting out into the 
 sea, and a temple of Apollo. But the Athe- 
 nians, informed of their designs, and standing 
 away from Samos, take six of the-ships which 
 were stationed at the Triopium : the crews, 
 indeed, quit their ships, and reach the shore. 
 This being done, the victors sailed directly to 
 Cnidus ; and, making an assault upon that city 
 which was quite unfortified, had very nearly 
 taken it. On the next day they renewed 
 the assault. Yet as the inhabitants had taken 
 care to make it more secure by favour of the 
 night, and the men, escaped from the vessels 
 taken at Triopium, had thrown themselves into 
 the place, they did less damage than on the 
 preceding day. After scouring and laying 
 
 waste the territory of Cnidus, they sailed back 
 to Samos. 
 
 About the same time, Astyochus having re- 
 joined the fleet at Miletus, the Peloponnesians 
 were still abounding in all the needful expedi- 
 ents of war. Good pay was regularly advanced 
 them, and the soldiers had store of money yet 
 remaining of the rich booty they made at 
 lasus. The Milesians, farther, sustained with 
 alacrity the burden of the war. It was, how- 
 ever, the opinion of the Peloponnesians, that 
 the first treaty made with Tissaphernes by 
 Chalcideus was in some articles defective and 
 less advantageous to themselves. Upon this 
 they drew up and ratified a second in the pre- 
 sence of Theramenes, The articles of it are 
 these : 
 
 " Stipulated, by the Lacediemonians and 
 confederates, with king Darius and the sons of 
 the king and Tissaphernes, that peace and 
 amity subsist on the following conditions : 
 
 " Whatever province or city soever belong- 
 eth to king Darius, or did belong to his father 
 or ancestors, against them in a hostile manner, 
 not to march, and no injury to do, are bo»nd 
 both Lacedaemonians, and confederates of the 
 Lacedemonians. Not to exact tribute from 
 any such places, are bound both Lacedemoni- 
 ans and confederates of the Lacedcemonians, 
 Neither shall king Darius, nor any subject of 
 the king, march in a hostile manner against, 
 nor do any injury to, the Lacedaemonians and 
 confederates. 
 
 " But, in case the Lacedaemonians or confe- 
 derates need any assistance whatever from the """^ ' 
 king ; or the king from the LacedaBmonians and, 
 confederates ; whatever either party can con- 
 vince the other to be right, let that be done. 
 
 " Be the war against the Athenians and 
 confederates carried on by both parties in strict 
 conjunction. And, in case an accommodation 
 be taken in hand, be it settled by both parties 
 acting in conjunction. 
 
 " But, whatever army be brought into the 
 territories of the king at the request and sum- 
 mons of the king, the king to defray the ex- 
 pense. 
 
 " And, if any of the states, comprehended 
 in this league with the king, invade the terri- 
 tories of the king, the others to oppose and 
 act with all their power in defence of the king. 
 
 " And, if any province belonging to the 
 king, or subject to his dominion, invade the 
 
308 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VIII. 
 
 territory of the Lacedaemonians or confede- 
 rates ; the liing to oppose, and with all his 
 power to defend the party invaded." 
 
 When the finishing hand was put to this 
 treaty, Theramenes, after delivering up the 
 fleet to Astyochus, puts to sea in a fly-boat, 
 and entirely disappears. 
 
 But the Athenians from Lesbos, having now 
 made their passage and landed their forces in 
 Chios, and being masters of the coast and sea, 
 fortified Delphinium ; a place remarkably strong 
 by nature towards the land, abounding, farther, - 
 with harbours, and seated at no considerable 
 distance from the city of the Chians. And 
 now the Chians, dispirited by the many defeats 
 they had already received, and, what is worse, 
 far from being actuated by general unanimity, 
 (but, on the contrary, Tydeus the Ionian and 
 his adherents having been lately put to death 
 by Paedaritus for atticizing, and the rest of the 
 citizens obliged by necessity to submit to the 
 few, each individual amongst them suspectmg 
 his neighbour,) — the Chians now remained 
 quite inactive. Thus, for the reasons above- 
 mentioned; they neither looked upon them- 
 selves, nor the auxiliaries under Psedaritus, as 
 a match for the enemy. Yet, as their last re- 
 source, they send to Miletus, requesting As- 
 tyochus to come over to their succour. But, 
 as he was deaf to their entreaties, Psdaritus 
 sends a letter to Lacedoemon about him, which 
 accused him of injustice. And to this situa- 
 tion were brought the Athenian affairs at 
 Chios. 
 
 Their squadron also at Samos made several 
 visits to the squadron of the enemy at Miletus ; 
 but, as the latter refused to come out to engage 
 them, they returned again to Samos, without 
 committing any hostilities. 
 
 From Peloponnesus, in the same winter, 
 twenty-seven sail of ships, equipped by the 
 Lacedsemonians for Pharnabazus, at the in- 
 stance of his agents, Calligitus the Megarean, 
 and Timagoras the Cyzicene, put out to sea, 
 aud made over to Ionia, about the solstice. 
 Antisthenes the Spartan was on board as ad- 
 miral. With him the Lacedemonians sent also 
 eleven Spartans, to be a council to Astyochus ; 
 in the number of whom was Lichas, the son 
 of Arcesilaus. To these an order was given, 
 that, " when arrived at Miletus, they should 
 in concert act in all respects as might be best 
 for the service ; and this squadron, or one 
 equal in strength, or larger or smaller, at their 
 
 own discretion, should proceed to Hellespont 
 for the service of Pharnabazus, and be sent 
 away under the command of Clearchus the son 
 of Ramphias, who accompanied them in the 
 voyage ; and, in Case it was judged expedient 
 by the council of eleven, to dismiss Astyochus 
 from the chief command, and substitute An- 
 tisthenes." Oi> account of the letters of Pseda- 
 ritus, they began to suspect the former. This 
 squadron, therefore, standing out to sea from 
 Melea, arrived first at Melos ; and, falling in 
 with ten sail of Athenians, they take and burn 
 three of them, which their crews had aban- 
 doned. But, apprehensive that those Athe- 
 nian ships which had escaped might advertise 
 the fleet at Samos of their approach, as was 
 actually the case, they stretched away for Crete ; 
 and, for better security, keeping a good look 
 out, and taking more time, they made land first 
 at Caunus of Asia. From thence, as being 
 now beyond the reach of danger, they despatch 
 a messenger to the fleet at Miletus, to attend 
 and bring them up. 
 
 But, about the same juncture of time, the 
 Chians and Ptedaritus, not bearing to acquiesce 
 under the dilatory answers of Astyochus, press- 
 ed him, by repeated messages, " to come over 
 with the whole of his force, and relieve them 
 from the present blockade ; and by no means 
 to look indolently about him, whilst the most 
 important of the confederate states in Ionia was 
 shut up by sea, and by land exposed to rapines." 
 For, the domestics of the Chians, — being many 
 in number, nay, the largest that any one com- 
 munity except the Lacedaemonians kept, and 
 accustomed, because of their multitude, to be 
 punished with extraordinary severity for their 
 misdemeanors, — no sooner judged that the 
 Athenian forces, by throwing up works, had 
 gained a sure footing in the island, than large 
 numbers of them at once deserted to the ene- 
 my, and were afterwards" the persons who, as 
 perfectly well acquainted with the country, 
 committed the heaviest depredations. The - 
 Chians, therefore, urged, that " the last necesr 
 sity called upon him, whilst yet there was hope 
 or a possibility of success remaining, (the 
 works round Delphinium yet incomplete, and 
 a larger circle even still to be taken in and for- 
 tified for the security of the camp and the 
 fleet,) to undertake their relief." Upon this, 
 Astyochus, who, to verify his threats, had 
 never before thought seriously about it, being 
 now convinced that the whole confederare 
 
TEAR XX.J 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 309 
 
 body was bent on their preservation, deter- 
 mined in person to go to their succour. 
 
 But, just at this crisis, advice is brought 
 him from Caunus, that " twenty-seven sail of 
 ships and the assistant-council of Lacedaemo- 
 nians are arrived." Concluding, upon this, 
 that every other point ought to be postponed 
 to this large reinforcement, that his junction 
 with it might be effected in order to invest 
 them with the sovereignty of the sea, and that 
 the LacedEcmonians who came to inspect his 
 own conduct might securely finish their voy- 
 age ; throwing up immediately all concern for 
 Chios, he sailed away for Caunus. But, 
 having landed in his passage at Cos Meropidis, 
 the inhabitants of which had refuged them- 
 selves in the mountains, he rifled the city, 
 which was quite unfortified, and had lately 
 been tumbled into ruins by an earthquake, the 
 greatest that had been felt there in the memory 
 of us now living. By excursions, also, through 
 all the country, he made prize of all he found, 
 excepting seamen ; for such he dismissed un- 
 hurt. 
 
 From Cos advancing by night to Cnidus, he 
 is dissuaded by the Cnidians from landing his 
 men ; but, on the contrary, without loss of time 
 to get out to sea, and make head against twenty 
 »ail of Athenians, which Charminus, one of 
 the commanders from Samos, had under his 
 orders, and with them was watching the ap- 
 proach of the twenty-seven sail coming up from 
 Peloponnesus, which Astyochus was now go- 
 ing to join. For they at Samos had received 
 from Miletus advice of their coming, and Char- 
 minus was appointed to cruise for them about 
 Cyme, and Chalce, and Rhodes, and the coast 
 of Lycia ; and by this time he knew, for a cer- 
 tainty, that they were laying at Caunus. 
 
 Astyochus, therefore, without loss of time, 
 stood away for Cyme, with a view to surprise 
 the ships of the enemy at sea before they could 
 get any advice of his approach. A heavy rain 
 and thick cloudy weather occasioned the dis- 
 persion of his vessels in the dark, and sadly 
 disordered him. 
 
 When morning broke, the fleet being widely 
 separated and the left wing driven already 
 within the view of the Athenians, the re- 
 mainder yet driving in confusion about the 
 island, Charminus and the Athenians launch 
 out against them with all possible expedition, 
 though with fewer than twenty sail, irnagining 
 this to be the squadron from Caunus whose 
 
 approach they were to observe ; and, proceed- 
 ing instantly to action, they sunk three and 
 disabled others. They had by far the better 
 in the action, till the numerous remainder of 
 hostile ships appeared, to their great conster- 
 nation, and encompassed them round on all 
 sides. Then, taking to open flight, they lost 
 six of their ships ; but with the remainder reach 
 in safety the isle of Teuglussa, and from thence 
 proceed to Halicarnassus. 
 
 This being done, the Peloponnesians, put- 
 ting back to Cnidus, and the twenty-seven sail 
 from Caunus completing here their junction 
 with them, they put out again to sea in one 
 body ; and, after erecting a trophy at Cyme, 
 returned again to their anchorings at Cnidus. 
 
 The Athenians, on the other hand, had no 
 sooner been informed of the engagements of 
 the squadrons, than with the whole of theii 
 fleet they put out from Samos, and made the 
 best of their way to Cyme. And yet against 
 the fleet at Cnidus they made no sallies, as 
 neither did the enemy against them ; but, after 
 taking up the tackling of the vessels left at 
 Cyme, and making an assault upon Lorima on 
 the continent, they returned to Samos. 
 
 The whole united fleet of the Peloponne- 
 sians, now lying at Cnidus, was busy in re- 
 fitting completely for service ; and the Lace- 
 dsemonian council of eleven had a conference 
 with Tissaphernes, who was now come to 
 them, in which they notified to him their dis- 
 like of some things in past transactions ; and, 
 in regard to the future operations of war, de- 
 bated in what manner they might be carried on 
 for their joint benefit and convenience. But 
 Lichas was the person who scrutinized most 
 closely into the past, and expressed a dissatis- 
 faction with both treaties ; aflrrming, that 
 " even the last settled by Theramenes was far 
 from being good ; but that terrible it would be, 
 should the king now claim, upon that pretext, 
 the possession of that tract of country of which 
 either he or his ancestors had formerly been 
 masters : for thus he might be enabled once 
 more to enslave all the islands, and Thessaly, 
 and Locri, quite as far as Bcectia ; whilst the 
 Lacedaemonians, instead of freeing, would be 
 obliged to impose the Median subjection on, 
 the Grecians. He insisted, therefore, that a 
 better treaty should be made, or at least the 
 former should be instantly disannulled ; for on 
 terms like the present they would scorn to take 
 pay from the king." Nettled at this, Tissa- 
 2n2 
 
310 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VIII. 
 
 phernes went from them in a fit of choler, 
 without bringing affairs to any kind of settle- 
 ment. 
 
 The scheme now next in agitation was a 
 voyage to Rhodes, whicli the most powerful 
 persons there had by embassies soUcited them 
 to undertake. They were full of hopes to 
 bring into their subjection an island by no 
 means inconsiderable either for number of 
 mariners or soldiers ; and at the same time 
 judged themselves able, by their present allian- 
 ces, to defray the expense of their fleet without 
 requesting pay from Tissaphernes. Accord- 
 ingly, this winter, with great despatch, they put 
 to sea from Cnidus ; and, arriving first at 
 Camirus, on the Rhodian coast, with ninety- 
 four ships, they struck a consternation into the 
 multitude, who knew nothing of past transac- 
 tions, and were the sooner tempted to abandon 
 their dwellings as the city was not guarded by 
 the least fortification. The, Lacedaemonians, 
 afterwards, summoning to a conference these, 
 and the Khodians also from two other cities, 
 Lindus and lelysus, persuaded them to revolt 
 from the Athenians. Rhodes accordingly 
 went over to the Peloponnesians. 
 
 At the same juncture of time, the Atheni- 
 ans, who had discovered their design, put out 
 with thei* fleet from Samos, earnestly bent on 
 preventing the scheme. They were seen in- 
 deed out at sea by the enemy, but made their 
 appearance a little too late. For the present, 
 therefore, they piit back to Chalce, and from 
 thence to Samos ; and afterwards, making fre- 
 quent trips from Chalce, and Cos, and Samos, 
 they warred against Rhodes. 
 
 The Peloponnesians exacted from the Rho- 
 dians a sum amounting to about two and thirty 
 talents ;' and having laid their skips aground, 
 continued with them eighty days without sub- 
 jecting them to any farther imposition. 
 
 During this interval of time, nay, extended 
 farther back, before they undertook this enter- 
 prise against Rhodes, the following transaction 
 happened : 
 
 Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideus 
 and the battle of Miletus, falling under the 
 suspicion of the Peloponnesians, and through 
 them a letter having been sent from Lacedse- 
 mon to Astyochus to put him to death, — for 
 he was an enemy to Agis, and his treachery in 
 other respects was become notorious, — Alci- 
 
 1 62002. sterliDg. 
 
 blades, I say, fearful of his life, withdraws 
 himself first to Tissaphernes, and in the next 
 place, did all in his power to undermine what 
 ir^terest tlie Peloponnesians had in him. 
 Orown at length his dictator in every affair, he 
 abridged their pay ; that, instead of an Attic 
 drachma," three oboli only should be given 
 them, and that too with no punctuality. He 
 advised Tissaphernes to remonstrate with 
 them, that " the Athenians, who through a 
 long tract of time had gained experience in 
 naval affairs, paid only three oboli to their sea- 
 men, — not so much through a principle of fru- 
 gality, as to prevent their seamen from growing 
 insolent through too much plenty ; some of 
 them would otherwise render their bodies less 
 fit for fatigue, by having wherewithal to pur- 
 chase those pleasures by which weakness is 
 occasioned ; and others would desert, and leave 
 their arrears to balance their desertion." He 
 instructed him farther, how, by seasonable 
 gratuities to the commanders of ships and 
 generals of the states, he might persuade them 
 all to acquiesce in his proceedings, excepting 
 the Syracusans; for, amongst these, Hermo- 
 crates alone made loud remonstrances in be- 
 half of the whole alliance. Nay, Alcibiades 
 himself took upon him to give the denial to 
 such states as petitioned for money ; making 
 answer himself, instead of Tissaphernes, that, 
 for instance, the Chians were void of all 
 shame ; who, though the most wealthy of the 
 Grecians, and hitherto preserved by the 
 auxiliary efforts of others, yet are ever requir- 
 ing strangers to expose their lives and fortunes 
 to keep them free." As for other states, he 
 maintained " they acted basely, if, when 
 subjected to vast expenses before they re- 
 volted from the Athenians, they refused to 
 lay out as much, nay, a great deal more, in 
 their own defence." He was also dextrous at 
 proving, that " Tissaphernes, since now he 
 supported the war at his own private expense, 
 was in the right to be frugal ; but assuredly, 
 when returns were made him from the king, he 
 would make up the present abatement of pay, 
 and do strict justice to every single state." He 
 farther suggested to Tissaphernes, that " he 
 should not be too much in a hurry to bring the 
 war to a conclusion ; or entertain the wish, 
 either by bringing up the Phoenician fleet which 
 he had provided, or by taking into pay a largei 
 
 » Six oboli, or 7}ii. sterling. 
 
YEAR XX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 311 
 
 number of Grecians, to turn the superiority at 
 land and sea infavourof the Lacedaemonians. He 
 ought rather to leave both parties pretty nearly 
 balanced in strength ; and so enable the king, 
 when one of them became troublesome, to let 
 the other party loose against them : whereas, 
 should the dominion in both elements be given 
 exclusively to either, he would then be distressed 
 for want of sufficient power to pull down the 
 triumphant state ; unless at a prodigious ex- 
 l)enso, and through infinity of danger to himself, 
 he should choose to enter the list in person 
 and war them down. The risks incurred by 
 the other method were far more eligible, be- 
 cause attended with a smaller proportion of ex- 
 pense ; and his master might lie by with per- 
 fect security, whilst he was wearing out the 
 Grecians by their own reciprocal embroil- 
 ments." He moreover hinted to him, that 
 " the Athenians were the best suited of the 
 two to share the dominion with him ; because 
 they were less desirous of power on the conti- 
 nent, and by their peculiar turn of politics and 
 militaty conduct were better adapted for this 
 purpose. They would be glad, at the same 
 time, to subdue the maritime parts to their own 
 yoke, and to that of the king all Grecians 
 whatever who live upon the continent. The 
 Lacedasmonians, on the contrary, came thither 
 with the sole passion to set them free ; nor in 
 common prudence could it be judged likely, 
 that men, who were this moment employed to 
 deliver Grecians from the yoke of Grecians, 
 would in that case be stopped by any thing but 
 a superior force from delivering them also from 
 the yoke of barbarians." He advised him, 
 therefore, " in the first place, to wear out the 
 strength of both ; and, after clipping as much 
 as possible the wings of the Athenians, then 
 instantly to drive the Peloponnesians from off 
 his coast." 
 
 The larger part of this advice Tissaphernes 
 determined to follow, so far at least as may 
 be gathered from his actions ; for, satisfied by 
 this means with Alcibiadeg, as a person who 
 on these points gave him sound advice, and re- 
 signing himself up to his guidance, he paid but 
 sorrily their subsistence to the Peloponnesians, 
 and would not suffer them to engage at sea. 
 By the constant pietext that the Phoenician 
 fleet was coming up, and then with so great a 
 superiority of strength the war might be brought 
 to a clear drcision, he ruined all operations of 
 ivar; he suficred the vigour of their fleet, which 
 
 in fact was strong and mighty, insensibly to 
 moulder away, and disconcerted them so open- 
 ly, in other respects, that his motives in doing 
 it were no longer to be concealed. 
 
 Such was the advice which Alcibiades gave 
 to Tissaphernes and the king, when he had 
 opportunities, and which he really thought to 
 be the best in policy ; but at the same time he 
 had deep in his heart and in his study his own 
 return to his country ; assured, within himself, 
 that, if he preserved it from a total destruction, 
 he might find a time to compass his own 
 restoration : and nothing, he judged, could ex- 
 pedite his purpose more, than if it appeared to 
 the world that Tissaphernes was his friend ; 
 which also was verified by fact. 
 
 For, when the Athenian troops at Samos 
 perceived that he had so strong an interest 
 with Tissaphernes, and Alcibiades had already 
 paved the way by sending intimations before- 
 hand to the men of influence and authority 
 amongst them, how desirous he was " they 
 should patronise his return with the consent of 
 the persons of the greatest honour and worth 
 in their company ; since only under an oligar- 
 chy, but not under an iniquitous cabal or that 
 democracy which had formerly banished him, 
 could he even desire it ; — and, thus recalled, 
 he would come and join his cares with theirs 
 for the public welfare, and procure them farther 
 the friendship of Tissaphernes ;" — when, more 
 than this, the officers of those Athenians at 
 Samos, and the men of highest authority 
 amongst them, were voluntarily inclined to put 
 an end to the democracy; — the method of 
 bringing it about began to be agitated first in 
 the army, and from thence soon made a stir in 
 Athens itself. 
 
 Some persons passed over from Samos, to 
 concert matters with Alcibiades ; who gave 
 them room to hope that " he could render first 
 Tissaphernes, and in the next place the king, 
 their friend, if they would dissolve the demo- 
 cracy ; since, on this sole condition, could the 
 king be assured of their sincerity." This con- 
 tributed to enhance their sanguine expectations, 
 that on this their affairs might take a new turn, 
 in which men of first rank in the community, 
 who in the present management were most 
 depressed, might recover the administration, 
 and gain the ascendant over their eneijiies. 
 Returning, therefore, to Samos, they took in 
 the niost proper persons there to be assistants 
 to the scheme ; ahd to the many made public 
 
312 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book viir. 
 
 declarations, that " the king might be made 
 their friend, and supply them with money, 
 were Alcibiades recalled, and the democracy 
 suspended." The effect of these declarations on 
 the many was this, that, though for the present 
 they were chagrined at the scheme in agitation, 
 yet, soothed by the jflattering hope of the royal 
 subsidies, they refrained from all manner of 
 tumult. 
 
 But the set which was caballing in favour of 
 an oligarchy, after such open declarations to 
 the multitude, reconsidered the promises of 
 Alcibiades amongst themselves, and with a 
 larger number of their associates. The scheme 
 was judged by all the rest to be feasible and 
 sure ; but Phrynichus, who was yet in the 
 command, declared a total dislike of it. It ap- 
 peared to him (which was really the case) that 
 " Alcibiades cared as little for an oligarchical 
 as a democratical government; and that no 
 other thought lay seriously at his heart than 
 to throw the present government into some 
 state of confusion, which his friends might so 
 far improve as to carry his recallment. Of 
 consequence, the first point themselves should 
 guard against was, not to be thrown into sedi- 
 tions for the benefit of the king. It was not 
 probable, (he plainly told them,) when the 
 Peloponnesians had gained a power by sea 
 equal to their own, and were masters of cities 
 not the most inconsiderable amidst the king's 
 dominions, that the latter should turn the 
 balance in favour of the Athenians, in whom 
 he hath no confidence at all, whilst he might 
 firmly depend upon the friendship of the Pelo- 
 ponnesians, who had never done him any harm. 
 As for confederate states, to whom they were 
 to give a certain pledge of future oligarchy by 
 setting up that government amongst themselves, 
 he told them he was well assured that on that 
 account neither such as had revolted would the 
 sooner return, nor such as were at present 
 their own would the longer continue in their 
 duty ; since the point on whidh their wishes 
 turned was, not to be enslaved by an oligarchy 
 rather -than a democracy, but to recover their 
 liberty, indifferent equally to either form. As 
 for those of their fellow-citizens to whom was 
 given the appellation of worthy and good, even 
 they would perplex the train of government as 
 much as the people, when, by cajoling that 
 people, and authoritatively leading them into a 
 series of bad measures, they would principally 
 regard their own private emoluments: and, 
 
 should they be subjected to the caprice of such, 
 to die by violence and without a trial must be 
 the general fate ; whereas the people was a 
 sure resource in seasons of extremity, and ever 
 tempered the fury of the great. He was well 
 convinced, the states, enlightened by a long 
 tract of experience, judge of their government 
 in the same light. Upon the whole, therefore, 
 the negotiations of Alcibiades, and all at present 
 upon the carpet, could in no wise be approved 
 by him." 
 
 The party, however, associated together in 
 this design, abiding by their former determina- 
 tions, resolved to proceed to their execution, 
 and were preparing to send Pisander and others 
 by way of deputation to Athens, to set on 
 foot the negotiations concerning the return of 
 Alcibiades, the dissolution of the popular govern- 
 ment there, and the gaining over Tissaphernes 
 to the Athenian friendship. 
 
 Phrynichus, — now convinced that the return 
 of Alcibiades would be brought upon the car- 
 pet, and the Athenians assuredly grant it; 
 apprehensive, farther, that, from the opposition 
 he had given it at their consultations, he should 
 then be exposed to his resentments, as one 
 who had endeavoured to stop it, — hath recourse 
 to the following project : He sends to Asty- 
 ochus, admiral in chief of the Lacedaemonians, 
 who yet continued in the station of Miletus, a 
 secret hint, by letter, that Alcibiades is 
 ruining their affairs, by endeavouring to gain 
 over Tissaphernes to the Athenians;" and, 
 after giving him a clear explanation of other 
 matters, he pleaded "the candour of Astyochus 
 in his own excuse, if he desired in this manner 
 to ruin his mortal foe, though with some pre- 
 judice to the welfare of his country." But 
 Astyochus had given up all thoughts of putting 
 Alcibiades to death, especially as now he never 
 came within his reach ; yet, on this occasion, 
 making a visit to him and Tissaphernes at 
 Magnesia, he communicates to them the advices 
 sent him from Samos, and becomes himself an 
 informer. He is accused by report, not only 
 on this but many other occasions, to have made 
 court to Tissaphernes for his own private 
 lucre ; and, for the same reason, when the pay 
 was not fully rendered before, he suffered it 
 much more pliantly than in duty he ought to 
 have done. Alcibiades sends away immediate 
 notice to the managing party at Samos, that 
 the treachery of Phrynichus was detected by 
 his ovm letter, and insists upon it that he he 
 
YEAE XX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 313 
 
 put to death. Phrynichus, terribly alarmed, 
 and pushed to the very brink of destruction by 
 such a discovery, sends again to Astyochus, 
 niaming his indiscretion on a former occasioij 
 in not keeping his secret, and assuring him 
 that " now he vpas ready to deliver up to his 
 fury the whole force of the Athenians at 
 Samos," (distinctly reciting to him the partic- 
 ulars by which, as Samos was unfortified, the 
 whole scheme might be accomplished,) and 
 that " undoubtedly he ought not to be censured 
 if, when his unrelenting foes had reduced him 
 to sucn extremity of danger, he chose to do 
 this, or even more than this, rather than be 
 destroyed by their rancour." But this proposal 
 also Astyochus communicates to Alcibiades. 
 
 Phrynichus, perceiving in time that Astyo- 
 chus betrayed him, and that notice each mo- 
 ment was only not arrived from Alcibiades 
 about the contents of his last, anticipated the 
 discovery, and becomes himself informer to 
 the army, that " the enemy had resolved, as 
 Samos was unfortified, and the whole of their 
 fleet not securely stationed within the harbour, 
 to endeavour a surprise : of this he had gained 
 the most certain informations ; and therefore 
 Samos ought necessarily to be put into a pos- 
 ture of defence with the utmost expedition, 
 and proper guards in every respect be appoint- 
 ed." He himself commanded, and consequently 
 was empowered to see this put in execution. 
 All hands were instantly at work on the forti- 
 fication ; and Samos, though otherwise intend- 
 ed soon to be, was by this piece of artifice 
 immediately secured. And, no long time 
 after, came letters from Alcibiades, importing 
 that " the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, 
 and in pursuance of it the enemy was coming 
 to surprise them." Their opinion of the good 
 faith of Alcibiades was not in the least estab- 
 lished by this : it was argued, that, as he was 
 privy to the plans of the enemy, from a prin- 
 ciple of enmity he had fastened upon Phryni- 
 chus the charge of being their accomplice. 
 By the last notification, therefore, he was so 
 far from hurting him, that he only confirmed 
 his evidence. 
 
 Yet subsequent to this, Alcibiades continu- 
 ed to make use of all his address and persua- 
 sion with Tissaphernes to gain him over to the 
 Athenians, who in fact stood most in terror of 
 the Peloponnesians, because they had a larger 
 fleet at hand than the Athenians; but was 
 inwardly inclined, were it any how feasible, to 
 47 
 
 comply with his suggestions; especially as, 
 ever since the jar at Cnidus about the treaty 
 of Theramenes, he had been exasperated against 
 the Peloponnesians : for that jar had already 
 happened at the time of their expedition to 
 Rhodes; and the suggestion of Alcibiades, 
 formerly mentioned, that " the views of the 
 Lacedfemonians were to set the cities free, ' 
 was yet more verified by the behaviour of 
 Lichas, who had affirmed, that "it was an 
 article never to be sufi'ered in treaty, that the 
 king should have those cities of which either 
 himself or his ancestors had at any time been 
 possessed. And in truth Alcibiades, as one 
 who had important concerns at stake, continued 
 with much zeal and assiduity to ingratiate 
 himself with Tissaphernes. 
 
 The Athenian deputies, with Pisander at 
 their head, who were sent from Samos, had no 
 sooner reached Athens than they obtained an 
 audience from the people ; where, after touch- 
 ing in a summary manner upon many other 
 advantages, they expatiated chiefly on this, 
 that " by recalling Alcibiades, and making an 
 alteration in the democratical form of govern- 
 ment, they might gain the friendship of the 
 king and a superiority over the Peloponnesians," 
 Large was the number of those who would not 
 hear the proposal against the democracy. The 
 enemies, farther, of Alcibiades were loud in 
 their clamours, that " shameful it would be 
 if so enormous a transgressor of the laws 
 were recalled ; one, to whose crimes, in 
 point of the mysteries, the Eumolpidae and 
 Ceryces' had borne solemn attestation, the 
 consequence of which was his exile ; nay, had 
 farther denounced a curse upon those who 
 should restore him." Pisander, interposing to 
 put a stop to this violent opposition and these 
 tragical outcries, addressed himself apart to each 
 of these opponents, and asked them singly, 
 " Whether any hope they had left of saving 
 
 ' These were sacerdotal families at Athens, descend- 
 ed from Eumolpus and Ceryx. The former of them 
 instituted the Eleusinian mysteries; and it was the 
 grand privilege of his descendants to preside at and 
 regulate those sacred rites. Who (-eryx was, and 
 what the particular privileges of his descendants, any 
 farther than that (according to Suidas) they were 
 " holy and venerable," is not agreed. All of them 
 were commanded to pronounce the solemn cureo on 
 Alcibiades when he was out-lawed. Yet one priestess, 
 (as Plutarch relates,) Theano, the daughter of Menon, 
 refused to obey ; alleging, that '• it was her duty to 
 bless, and not to curse." 
 
314 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VIII. 
 
 their country, now tliat the Peloponnesians 
 had as many ships upon the sea as they had 
 themselves, but a larger number of confe- 
 derate states, besides supplies of money from 
 the king and Tissaphemes, whilst themselves 
 were quite exhausted, unless somebody could 
 persuade the king to declare in their favour V 
 And when those, to whom the demand was 
 put, replied in the negative, he proceeded to 
 make them this plain declaration — " And, yet 
 this turn in your favour can never take place, 
 unless we temper our form of government wjth 
 greater moderation, and intrust the administra- 
 tion in the hands of the few, that the king may 
 have room to place confidence in us : for we 
 are at present to consult about the very being 
 of the state, and not to litigate the forms of its. 
 administration. The sequel may again enable 
 us to return to the primitive form, if we find 
 it expedient ; and we shall recover Alcibiades, 
 the only man alive who is able to accomplish 
 the point." 
 
 The people, in fact, upon the first mention 
 of an oligarchy, were stung to the heart : yet 
 afterwards, convinced by Pisander that no other 
 resource was left, dispirited by fear, and encour- 
 aged at the same time by a distant hope that 
 another change might in the sequel be brought 
 about, they yielded up the point to the neces- 
 sity of the state. Accordingly they passed a 
 decree, that " Pisander and the ten joined with 
 him in she deputation should pass the sea, and 
 negotiate the affair with Tissaphemes and Al- 
 cibiades, in the method judged by them most 
 conducive to the public service." At the 
 same time, as Pisander had preferred a charge 
 of mal-administration against Phrynichus, they 
 discharged him and his colleague Skirondas 
 from their commands, and sent away Diomedon 
 and Leon to take upon them the command of 
 the fleet. The article, with which Pisander 
 charged Phrynichus, was the betraying of las- 
 us and Amorges. The truth is, he thought 
 him by no means a proper person to be let into 
 a share of their intrigues with Alcibiades. 
 
 And thus Pisander — after visiting in order all 
 the several juntos of the accomplices, already 
 formed in the city with the view to thrust them- 
 selves into the seats of judicature and the great 
 offices of state ; and exhorting them severally 
 to act with unanimity, and by general concur- 
 rence to labour the demolition of the popular 
 .ovemment; and, after adjusting- all previous 
 
 measures to guard best against dilatory proceed- 
 ings — repasseth the sea to Tissaphemes, accom- 
 panied by his ten associates in the deputation. 
 
 In the same winter, Leon and Diomedon, 
 being arrived at their post, at the head of the 
 Athenian fleet, made an expedition against 
 Rhodes ; and there they find the sliips of the 
 Peloponnesians hauled ashore. They made a 
 descent upon the coast ; and, after defeating in 
 battle such of the Ehodians as made head 
 against them, they stood away for Chalce, and 
 for the future carried on the war more from 
 thence than from Cos ; for in that station they 
 were better enabled to watch the motions of the 
 Peloponnesian fleet. 
 
 But at Rhodes arrived Xenophantidas, a 
 Lacedaemonian, despatched by Pasdaritus from 
 Chias, with advice that " the works of the 
 Athenians were almost perfected ; and unless, 
 with the whole of their shipping, they come 
 over to relieve them, all is lost at Chios." A 
 resolution accordingly was taken to endeavour 
 their relief ; but, in the mean time, Pasdaritus, 
 at the head of his body of auxiliaries and the 
 Chians, with all the force he could assemble 
 together, sallied out against the rampart which 
 the Athenians had raised around their ships, de- 
 molished a part of it, and made himself master 
 of those vessels which were hauled ashore. 
 The Athenians ran from all quarters to their 
 defence ; and, having first engaged and put to 
 flight the Chians, the rest of the forces under 
 Paedaritus are also defeated. Peedaritus is 
 killed, as were numbers also of the Chians, and 
 many arms were taken. And, after this, the 
 Chians were blocked up by sea and land more 
 closely than ever, and a terrible famine raged 
 amongst them. 
 
 The Athenian deputation, headed by Pi- 
 sander, having reached Tissaphemes, enter into 
 conference about terms of accommodation. 
 Alcibiades now, — as the conduct of Tissapher- 
 nes was still dubious and wavering, since he 
 stood in great awe of the Peloponnesians, and 
 adhered to that rule of policy he had learned 
 from him, " to war both sides out," — Alcibia- 
 des now had resource to another piece of re- 
 finement, causing Tissaphemes to insist upon 
 such exorbitant terms that no accommodations 
 could ensue. Tissaphemes, truly, seems to 
 me to have proceeded in this manner from his 
 own voluntary motives, because fear v/as pre- 
 dominant in him ; but in Alcibiades it was 
 
VEAE XX.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 315 
 
 purely art ; since, as he found the other would 
 not agree upon any terms whatever, he affected 
 to strike the conceit into the Athenians that it 
 really was in his power to manage him at plea- 
 sure, and that he was already wrought to their 
 purpose and willing to come to terms, whereas 
 the Athenians would not offer enough. For 
 Alcibiades himself made such extravagant de- 
 mands, (since, though Tissaphernes assisted at 
 the conference, the other managed it,) that, 
 though the Athenians had yielded to the far 
 greater part, yet the breaking off the treaty 
 would be thrown at their doors. It was in- 
 sisted, beside other demands, that " all Ionia 
 should be given up," and, what is more, " all 
 the islands on the Ionian coast ;" and other 
 points. The Athenians seeming to acquiesce 
 in these, at length upon the third meeting, lest 
 the smallness of his own influence should be 
 plainly detected, he demanded leave « for the 
 the king to build a fleet, and to sail along the 
 Athenian coasts, wherever, and with whatever 
 force he pleased." Here all accommodation 
 was over: the Athenians, concluding these 
 points insuperable, and that they were abused 
 by Alcibiades, broke off in indignation and 
 return to Samos. 
 
 In the same winter, immediately after break- 
 ing off the conference, Tissaphernes repairs to 
 Caunus with intention to bring the Pelopon- 
 nesians again to Miletus, and to form other 
 compacts with them the best he should be able, 
 to supply them farther with pay, and by all 
 means to stave off an open rupture. He was 
 in fact apprehensive, that, should so large a 
 fleet be deprived of subsistence, or, necessitated 
 to engage with the Athenians, should suffer a 
 defeat, or should the mariners quit their ves- 
 sels, the Athenians then would carry their 
 point without thanks to him: but his greatest 
 fear was this, lest for the sake of subsistence 
 they should ravage the continent. Upon all 
 these considerations, and the prudential motives 
 arising from each, co-operating with his princi- 
 pal maxim of balancing the Grecians against 
 one another, he sent for the Peloponnesians, 
 pays them their arrears of subsistence, and 
 makes the following treaty, the third of the 
 kind, with them : 
 
 " In the thirteenth year of the reign of Da- 
 rius, Alexippidas presiding in the college of 
 Ephori at Lacedtemon, articles are signed, in 
 the plain of Mseander, between the Lacedae- 
 monians and confederates on one side ; and 
 
 Tissaphernes, Hioramcnes, and the sons of ' 
 Pharnacus, on the other; concerning the af 
 fairs of the king and those of the Lacedssmoni 
 ans and confederates. 
 
 ' " The whole of the king's dominions situate 
 in Asia belong to the king ; and all his own 
 dominions let the king govern as to him seemeth 
 meet. 
 
 " The Lacedaemonians and confederates are 
 not to enter the dominions of the king to com- 
 mit any act of hostility whatever ; nor he those 
 of the contracting parties for any act of hostility 
 whatever. 
 
 " And in case any of the Lacedaemonians 
 or confederates enter in a hostile manner the 
 dominions of the king, the Laeedasmonians 
 and confederates are bound to restrain them : 
 and, in case any subjects of the king act in a 
 hostile manner against the Lacedaemonians and 
 confederates, be the king also bound to restrain 
 them. 
 
 " Tissaphernes shall pay subsistence to the 
 ships now upon the station, according to the 
 rates agreed oi., till the king's fleet come up. 
 
 " But the Lacedaemonians and confederates, 
 so soon as the king's fleet shall be come up, shall 
 have it in their own option to maintain, if they 
 please, their own fleet ; or, in case they 
 choose to take subsistence from Tissapher- 
 nes, he is bound to supply them. Yet the 
 Lacedaemonians and confederates, at the ex- 
 piration of the war, shall repay to Tissa- 
 phernes whatever sums they may thus receive 
 from him. 
 
 " When the king's fleet cometh up, let the 
 ships of the Laced:£monians, and those of the 
 confederates, and those of the king, carry on 
 the war in concert, by the joint counsels of 
 TissaphernM end of the Lacedaemonians and 
 confederates. 
 
 " And, whenever a peace with the Athenians 
 be thought advisable, it shall be concluded by 
 the joint consent of both parties." 
 
 The treaty was made and ratified in these 
 terms. And, after this, Tissaphernes em- 
 ployed himself with diligence to bring up the 
 Phosnician fleet, as hath been mentioned, and 
 duly to perform all the branches whatever of 
 his engagements. At least he was willing to 
 convince the Peloponnesians, by the measures 
 he took, that he was heartily in earnest. 
 
 In the close of this winter the Boeotians got 
 possession of Oropus by treachery, though an 
 Athenian garrison was in it. The business 
 
316 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAE. 
 
 [book viii. 
 
 • m was effectuated by the management of a party 
 of Eretrians, and those Oropians who were 
 plotting the revolt of Euba3a. For, as this 
 town was situated over-against Eretria, it was 
 impossible but, whilst in Athenian hands, it 
 must terribly annoy both Eretria and the rest of 
 Euboea. Having therefore thus gained Oropus, 
 the Eretrians repaired to Rhodes, inviting the 
 Pcloponnesians to come over to Euboea; but 
 their inclinations were rather to relieve Chios, 
 now sadly distressed. Putting therefore from 
 Rhodes with the whole of their fleet, they 
 stood away to sea ; and having gained the 
 height of Triopium, they descry the Athenian 
 squadron out at sea in a course from Chalce ; 
 yet, neither making any motion to bear down 
 upon the other, one fleet pursued their course 
 "to Samos, the other put into Miletus. They 
 were now convinced, that, without fighting at 
 sea, they could not possibly relieve Chios. 
 
 Here this winter ended : and the twentieth 
 year of this war expired, the history of which 
 Thucydides hath compiled. 
 
 teah XXI.' 
 
 In the ensuing summer, upon the first com- 
 mencement of the spring, Dercylidas a Spartan, 
 at the head of an army not considerable for 
 numbers, was sent over-land to Hellespont to 
 effectuate the revolt of Abydus : they are a co- 
 lony of the Milesians. The Chians also, whilst 
 Astyochus was perplexed about the method of 
 rplieving them, were necessitated, by the intol- 
 erable closeness of the blockade, to hazard an 
 engagement at sea. It happened, whilst As- 
 tyochus was yet in Rhodes, that Leon, a 
 Spartan, who came over with Antisthenes, 
 though merely as a passenger, had arrived at 
 Chios from Miletus, to act as governor after 
 the death of Paedaritus, with twelve sail of 
 shipping draughted from the squadron stationed 
 at Miletus ; of these, five were Thurian, four 
 Syracusan, one belonged to Ansa, another was 
 Milesian, and one was Leon's own. Upon this 
 the Chians having sallied out with all their 
 force and carried a strong post from the enemy, 
 and at the same time their fleet, consisting of 
 six and thirty sail, launching firth against the 
 thirty-two Athenian, an engagement followed ; 
 and, after a battle hotly maintained on both 
 sides, the Chians and allies, who had not the 
 
 I Before Christ 411 . 
 
 worst of the dispute, sheered off again into 
 harbour ; for by this time it began to grow 
 dark. 
 
 Instantly upon this, Dercylidas, having com- 
 pleted his march from Miletus, Abydus in 
 Hellespont revolts to Dercylidas and Pharna- 
 bazus ; and two days after Lampsacus did the 
 same. 
 
 But intelligence of this having reached 
 Strombichides at Chios, and he, with four and 
 twenty sail of Athenians, including the trans- 
 ports which carried the heavy-armed, stretch- 
 ing thither with all possible expedition, the 
 Lampsacenes sallied out to repulse him. He 
 defeated them in battle ; and, having at a shout 
 made himself master of Lampsacus, which was 
 quite unfortified, he gave up all the effects and 
 slaves for pillage to his men ; and, after re-es- 
 tablishing such as were free in their old hab- 
 itations, proceeded against Abydus. But, 
 finding them deaf to all schemes of accommo- 
 dation, and himself unable to reduce them by 
 force, crossmg over to the spot opposite to 
 Abydus, he garrisons Sestus, a city in the 
 Chersonese, which had formerly belonged to 
 the Modes, and put it in a condition to guard 
 the Hellespont. 
 
 During this interval of time, the Chians had 
 very much enlarged their room at sea : and 
 those stationed at Miletus, and even Astyo- 
 chus, upon receiving the particulars of the late 
 engagement, and advice that Strombichides 
 was drawn off with so many ships, began to be 
 high in spirits. Astyochus, accordingly, arri- 
 ving at Chios with only two ships, carrieth off 
 along with him what shipping was there, and 
 with the whole force is now at sea, in order to 
 make an attempt upon Samos. But when 
 the enemy there, because mutually embroiled 
 in jealousies, came not out against him, he re- 
 turned again to the station of Miletus ; for. 
 about this time, or rather before, the democracy 
 was overturned at Athens. 
 
 The deputation, at the head of which was 
 Pisander, were no sooner returned to Samos 
 from Tissaphemes, than they found their 
 schemes had gained a stronger footing in the 
 army, and that the Samians had been encourag- 
 ing the men of power amongst the Athenians 
 to join their efforts with them for the erection 
 of an oligarchy, though a party was very busy 
 in opposing them, with a view to quash the 
 projected alteration. The Athenians, farther, 
 at Samos, had in private conferences come to r 
 
YEAH XXI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 317 
 
 resolution — " to think no longer of Alcibiades, 
 since he showed himself so averse to join them, 
 and in fact was by no means a proper person 
 to have a share in an oligarichical administra- 
 tion ; but, merely from a principle of self-pre- 
 servation, as now they were environed with 
 dangers, they should take all possible care that 
 the project should not drop in the execution. 
 — That, farther, they should prosecute the war 
 with vigour, and contribute largely towards it 
 from their own private purses, and answer 
 every other exigence of service, since, no long- 
 er for others, but their own sakes, they must 
 continue the struggle." Determined, there- 
 fore, to proceed in this manner, they despatch 
 Pisander and half the former deputation once 
 more to Athens, to manage the execution of 
 the project there : to whom, farther, instruc- 
 tions were given, at whatever places in their 
 dependency they should touch upon the voyage, 
 to set up the oligarchy. The other half they 
 sent severally about to other of the dependent 
 states. Diotrephes also, who was now at Chi- 
 os, but appointed to take upon him the com- 
 mand of the Thracian provinces, they ordered 
 away immediately to his post. 
 
 Diotrephes, upon his arrival at Thasus, dis- 
 solved the popular government. And, in the 
 second month at most after this, the Thasians 
 fortified their city as men who no longer cared 
 for an aristocracy under Athenian influence, 
 but were in daily expectation of receiving lib- 
 erty from the Lacedsemonians : for a number 
 of their countrymen, driven out by the Athe- 
 nians, were now refuged among the Pelopbn- 
 nesians. These were labouring the point with 
 their correspondents in Thasus, to bring off 
 their shipping, and declare a revolt. The pre- 
 sent alteration, therefore, fell out exactly to 
 their own wish ; their state was restored to its 
 ancient form without any trouble ; and the peo- 
 ple, who alone were able to disconcert them, 
 were divested of their power. In Thasus, 
 therefore, the event took an opposite turn to 
 what those Athenians who laboured the oli- 
 garchy had at heart ; and, in my judgment, the 
 case was the same with many other of their 
 dependent states : for, having now their eyes 
 open to their own welfare, and being exempted 
 from the dread of suffering for what others did, 
 they ran into the scheme of a total independ- 
 ence, which they preferred before the precari- 
 ous situation of being well governed by the 
 Athenians. 
 
 Pisander and his colleagues in the course of 
 their voyage observed their instructions, and 
 dissolved the popular governments in the cities 
 where they touched. From some of these 
 they also procured parties of heavy-armed to 
 aid them in the grand project, and so landed 
 at Athens. Here they find affairs in great for- 
 wardness, through the activity of their accom- 
 plices : for, some of the younger sort having 
 combined together in a plot against Androcles, 
 who had the greatest sway amongst the people, 
 and had also been deeply concerned in banish- 
 ing Alcibiades, they secretly despatch him. 
 On him, for a double reason, because of his 
 influence with the people, and with the thought 
 that it might oblige Alcibiades, whose recall- 
 ment was now expected, and through his inter- 
 est the friendship of Tissaphernes, they chose 
 first to wreak their fury. ' Of some others also, 
 whose tractability they doubted, they had rid 
 themselves by the same practices. A specious 
 harangue, had, farther, been dressed up for the 
 purpose, that " none ought to receive the pub- 
 lic money but such as served the state in war 
 with their persons ; that affairs of state ought 
 not to be communicated to more than five 
 thousand, and those to be men who were best 
 qualified, by their estates and personal bravery, 
 to serve the public." 
 
 This with the majority of the city had a fair 
 outside, since such as should concur in the 
 change bid fairest for a share in the adminis- 
 tration. Yet still the assembly of the people 
 and the council of the bean' continued their 
 meetings ; but then they only passed such de- 
 crees as were approved by the cabal. Nay, of 
 this number were all who spoke, and who had 
 previously considered together what should be 
 said upon every occasion. No other person 
 presumed at any time to oppose their motions, 
 through dread of a cabal which they saw was 
 large ; or, did any one venture to open his 
 mouth, by some dextrous contrivance he was 
 certainly put to death. Who were the agents 
 in these murders, no inquiry at all ; and of who 
 were suspected, no kind of justification. The 
 people, on the contrary, looked on with stupid 
 gaze, and such a. fit of consternation as to think 
 it clear gain not yet to have suffered violence, 
 even though they held their tongues ; imagin- 
 ing, besides, that the conspiracy had spread 
 much farther than it really had, they were quite 
 
 The seJl.^te. 
 
 21 
 
318 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VIII. 
 
 dispirited. To discover any certainty of their 
 numbers they were quite unable, because of the 
 great extent of the city and their ignorance how 
 far their neighbours might be concerned. On 
 the same account it was also impossible for 
 him who deeply resented his condition, to be- 
 moan himself in the hearing of another, or to 
 participate counsels for reciprocal defence; he 
 must either have opened his mind to one whom 
 he did not know, or to an acquaintance in whom 
 he dust not confide ; for all the popular party 
 regarded one another with jealous eyes, as in 
 some measure involved in the present machi- 
 nations. Some in fact were concerned who 
 could never have been suspected of oligarchical 
 prrinciples ; and these men gave rise to the great 
 ditEdence which spread amongst the many, and 
 drew after it the highest security to the schemes 
 of the few, as it kept alive that mutual distrust 
 which reigned among the people. 
 
 Pisander , therefore, and his associates, ar- 
 riving at this very juncture, gave the finishing 
 stroke without delay. In the first place, hav- 
 ing called an assembly of the people, they 
 moved for a decree,—" that a committee of ten 
 should be elected with full discretionary power. 
 This committee of ten should draw up the 
 form of a decree, to be reported to the people 
 on a day prefixed, in what manner the state 
 may be best administered." In the next place, 
 when that day came, they summoned an as- 
 sembly of ^he people at Colonus : this is a tem- 
 ple of Neptune without the city, and distant 
 from it about ten stadia.' And here tho com- 
 mittee reported no other proposal than this, — 
 that it be lawful for any Athenian to deliver 
 whatever opinion he himself thought proper. 
 They then enacted heavy penalties against any 
 man who hereafter should accuse the speaker 
 of a breach of law, or should bring him into 
 any trouble whatever. 
 
 This being done, it was now, without the 
 least reserve or ambiguity, moved, — that " no 
 magistrate whatsoever should continue in his 
 post upon the old establishment, nor receive a 
 public salary ; but that five presidents'* be 
 chosen, who should choose one hundred per- 
 sons, and each of these hundred should name 
 three persons for associates : that these persons 
 should enter into the senate, be invested abso- 
 lutely with the administration, and should far- 
 
 One English mile. 
 
 a U^otS^ii 
 
 ther be empowered to convene the five thou 
 sand whenever they should deem it proper." 
 
 Pisander was the person who made this pro- 
 posal, and who also in other respects showed 
 himself openly one of the most zealous to pull 
 down the democracy. But he who contrived 
 the whole of the plan, and by what steps the 
 affair should be thus carried into execution, 
 was Antipho, a man who in personal merit 
 was second to no Athenian then alive, and the 
 greatest genius of his time to devise with 
 sagacity, and ingeniously to express what he 
 had once devised. At the assemblies of the 
 people, or any public debate, he never assisted, 
 if he could possibly decline it, since the multi- 
 tude was jealous of the great reputation he had 
 gained: yet, in the courts of judicature or ap- 
 peals to the people, he was the only person 
 who was able effectually to serve those clients 
 who could get him for their patron. And this 
 same Antipho, when in process of time the 
 government of the four hundred was quite de- 
 molished, and severely prosectited by the peo- 
 ple, is judged to have defended their conduct, 
 and pleaded in a cause where his own life was 
 at stake, the Ijest of any person that down to 
 this time was ever heard to speak. 
 
 Phrynichus, also, was another who singularly 
 distinguished himself in his zeal for the oligar- 
 chy. He dreaded Alcibiades, as conscious 
 that he was privy to the whole of the corres- 
 pondence ^e had carried on with Astyochus. 
 He proceeded thus, on the supposition that 
 Alcibiades would never be restored by an oli- 
 garchical government. And then he was a man 
 in whose capacity and zeal, if once engaged, 
 the greatest confidence might reasonably be 
 placed. 
 
 Theramenes, farther, the son of Agnon, 
 a man vvho both in speaking and acting made 
 no ordinary figure, had- a principal share in the 
 dissolution of the popular government : no won- 
 der, therefore, as the business was managed by 
 so many and so able agents, that, spite of every 
 obstacle, it was brought to effect. Grievous, 
 indeed, it was to the Athenian people to sub- 
 mit to the loss of their liberty, a century after 
 the expulsion of their tyrants, during which 
 period they had not only been independent, but 
 accustomed, for above half that space, to give 
 law to others. 
 
 To return. When, in the assembly of the 
 people not a feoul was heard to oppose the mo- 
 
l-ILfVR XXI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 319 
 
 tion, it passed into a law, and the assembly 
 was adjourned. They afterwards introduced 
 the four hundred into the senate, in the follow- 
 ing manner. 
 
 The whole body of the citizens were daily 
 under arms, either upon the walls or in the 
 field, to bridle the excursions of the enemy 
 from Decelea. Therefore, on the day appoint- 
 ed, they suffered such as were not in the secret 
 to repair to their posts as usual : but, to those 
 in the plot, it had been privately notified, — " by 
 no means to repair to their post, but to lag be- 
 hind at a distance ; and, in case any one should 
 strive to oppose what was now to be agitated, 
 they should take up arms and quell all opposi- 
 tion." Those, to whom these orders . were 
 previously imparted, were the Andrians and 
 Teians, three hundred of the Carysthians, and 
 other persons now established in ^gina, whom 
 the Athenians had sent thither by way of 
 colonyj but were now invited to repair to 
 Athens with their arms to support the scheme. 
 When these dispositions were formed, the four 
 hundred (each carrying a concealed dagger, and 
 guarded by one hundred and twenty youths of 
 Greece, whose hands they had employed when 
 assassination was the point) broke in upon the 
 counsellors of the bean,' who were this mo- 
 ment sitting in the senate-house, and called out 
 to them " to quit the place and take their sala- 
 ries." ^ Accordingly they had ready for them 
 the full arrears due to them, which they paid 
 to each as he went out of the house. In this 
 manner the senate, without giving the least 
 opposition, removed themselves tamely from 
 their office ; and the rest of the citizens made 
 no effort to check such proceedings, and re- 
 frained from any the least tumult. 
 
 The four hundred, having thus gained pos- 
 session of the senate-house, proceeded immedi- 
 ately to ballot for a set of presidents' from 
 amongst their own body ; and made use of all 
 the solemn invocations of the deities and the 
 sacrifices with which the presiding magistrates 
 execute their office. By their subsequent 
 proceedings they introduced considerable al- 
 terations in the popular form of government ; 
 excepting that, on account of Alcibiades, they 
 refrained from recalling exiles; but, in all 
 
 1 Tlie senate of five hundred. 
 5 The stated salary for a senator of Athens was i 
 dinclnna, or sevenpencc three farthings a day. 
 
 other respects, they ruled with all possible 
 sever'ty. Some persons, whose removal was 
 deemed convenient, though few in number, 
 they got assassinated; some they threw into 
 prison, and some they banished. To Agis, 
 also, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was 
 still at Decelea, they despatched a deputa- 
 tion ; notifying " their readiness to accommo- 
 date all disputes ; and that with greater con- 
 fidence he might proceed to make up matters 
 with them than with a democracy which \yas 
 not to be trusted." 
 
 Agis, full of the imagination that the city 
 would not quietly submit to these changes, 
 and that the people wotild not thus tamely 
 part with their ancient liberty ; or, should 
 they now behold his numerous army approach- 
 ing, that public combustions must ensue 
 amongst them ; unable to persuade himself that 
 at the present juncture, they could possibly be 
 kept from tumults, — Agis, I say, returned no 
 proposal of terms to the deputation which 
 came to him from the four hundred. But, 
 having sent for a numerous reinforcement 
 from Peloponnesus, he advanced soon after, 
 with the garrison of Decelea, and the fresh 
 reinforcements, up to the very walls of Athens. 
 He took this step on the presumption that 
 " thus either thrown into utter confusion, they 
 might be mastered whenever he gave the word, 
 or even at the first sight of his approach, through 
 the great confusion which in all probability 
 both must follow within and without ; sincei to 
 make himself master of the long walls, as there 
 could not be hands at leisure for their defence, 
 he could not fail." 
 
 But when, upon his nearer approach, the 
 Athenians within were thrown into no stir or 
 bustle at all ; when even they caused their 
 cavalry, and detachments of their heavy-armed, 
 light-armed and archers, to sally out into the 
 field, who made a slaughter of such as were too 
 far advanced, and became masters of their arms 
 and dead bodies; — finding then he had proceeded 
 upon wrong presumptions, he again drew off 
 his army. After this, he himself, with the 
 former garrison, continued in the post of De- 
 celea ; but the late reinforcement, after some 
 continuance in the country, was sent back to 
 Peloponnesus. 
 
 Yet, subsequent to this, the four hundred 
 persisted in sending deputies to Agis with as 
 much eagerness as ever ; and, he now receiving 
 them in a better manner, with encouragements 
 
320 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VIII. 
 
 to proceed, they even send an embassy to Lace- 
 Jsemon to propose a treaty, being of all things 
 desirous to obtain an accommodation. 
 
 They also send to Samos a deputation of 
 ten, in order to satisfy the army, and give them 
 ample assurance that " the oligarchy vras not 
 set up for the prejudice either of the state or 
 any individuals, but as the only expedient left to 
 preser\e the whole community ; — that the 
 number of those, who now had the manage- 
 ment, was five thousand and not barely four 
 hundred ; and'yet, on no occasion whatever, had 
 the Athenians, partly through employs in their 
 armies abroad or other foreign avocations, ever 
 met together, to consult on affairs of state, in a 
 number so large as five ^thousand." Having 
 instructed them to insert some other alleviating 
 pleas, they sent them away upon the first in- 
 stant of the change they had made ; apprehen- 
 sive of what actually came to pass, that the 
 bulk of their seamen would never quietly sub- 
 mit to an oligarchical government, and an op- 
 position beginning there, might overturn all that 
 had hitherto been done. 
 
 For at Samos some stirs had already arisen 
 about the oligarchy, and that which is now to 
 be recited happened exactly at the time that 
 the four hundred seized the administration at 
 Athens. 
 
 The party which at this juncture was sub- 
 sisting at Samos against the nobility, and were 
 of the popular side, having now altered their 
 schemes, and followed the suggestions of 
 Pisander ever since his return from Athens, 
 and gained the concurrence of Athenians at 
 Samos, combined together by oath, to the 
 number of about three hundred, and resolved 
 to fall upon their antagonists, as factious on 
 the side of the people. Accordingly, they 
 murder one Hyperbolus,^ an Athenian, a 
 
 1 This was the person whom the ostracism made in 
 some measure famous, and who made the ostracism 
 quite infamous. Plutarch hath repeated the story 
 thrice. The following extract is taken from the life 
 of Nicias. 
 
 " When the opposition was very hot at Athens he- 
 1 ween Alcibiades and Niciaa, and the day for ostracizing 
 was drawing on, — which at certain intervals the people 
 of Athens were used to enforce, and send away into a 
 ten years' exile, some one citizen suspected of designs 
 against their liberty, or odious for being too illustrious 
 nr rich, — each of these grand competitors was under 
 grievous apprehens'ons, and with reason too, that it 
 might be his own lot to he exiled on this occasion. 
 Atcibiades was hated for his way of life, and for hia 
 bold and enterprising genius. Nicias was envied on 
 
 scurvy fellow, and banished by the ostracism, 
 not from a dread of his influence or weight, 
 but for the profligacy of his life, and his 
 being a public disgrace to his country. In 
 this they were countenanced by Charminus, 
 one of the commanders and some of the Athe- 
 nians, associated with them, to whom they gave 
 this pledge of their fidelity. Some other acts of 
 the same nature they committed by instructions 
 from them, and had it in agitation to multiply 
 their blows ; but those marked out for destruc- 
 tion, getting wind of their design, communi- 
 cate the whole to Leon and Diomedon, who 
 thought of an oligarchy with high regret, be- 
 cause their credit was high with the people ; to 
 Thrasyjbulus^ also and Thrasylius, the former 
 
 account of his wealth ; his way of living was neither 
 Bociable nor popular ; as he avoided a crowd, and herded 
 with a few intimates, he gave great distaste; besides, 
 as he had often opposed tlie caprices of the people, and 
 constrained them to pursue their real interest, he was 
 deep in their displeasure. In short, the contest ran 
 high between the young and military men on one side, 
 and the old pacific Athenians on the other, whilst each 
 were endeavouring to throw the ostracism upon the 
 hated object. But, 
 
 Faitiea ran higli, and scoandrels got renown. 
 Such dissentions in the community gave scope to 
 knaves and incendiaries. There was one Hyperbolus, 
 of PerithadfE, very assuming, without the least reason 
 to be so; however, by dint of impudence working him- 
 self into power, and tlie disgrace of his country so soon 
 as he had made himself conspicuous in it. On this oc- 
 casion Hyperbolus could have no suspicion of becoming 
 himself the butt of an ostracism ; he had a much better 
 title to the gallows. Presuining, on the contrary, that, 
 when either of these great men were exiled, he himself 
 could easily make head against the other, he manifested 
 great pleasure at the contest, and Irritated the fnry of 
 the people against them both. Nicias and Alcibiades, 
 perceiving his roguish Intent, conferred privately to- 
 gether ; and, getting their several factions to unite, se- 
 cured one another, and threw the votes on Hyperbolas. 
 Such a turn at first gave the Athenians much pleasure 
 and diversion ; yet soon after they were highly chagrin- 
 ed, by reflecting that making such a scoundrel the ob- 
 ject of it was shaming the ostracism for ever. There 
 was dignity even in punishments: the ostracism was 
 of such a nature as to suit a Thucydides, an Aristides, 
 and men of such exalted characters. It was clear 
 honour to Hyperbolus; and gave him room to boast, 
 that, though a scoundrel, he had been distinguished 
 like the greatest and best Athenians ; as Ptato, tlie 
 comic poet, says of him, 
 
 He always acted worthy of himself, 
 
 But quite unworthy of auch high reproof: 
 
 The shell was ne'er desigu'd to honour scoundrels. 
 
 In a word, no person was ever banished by the ostracism 
 after Hyperbolus ; it was he who closed the list." 
 
 3 Thrasybulus, whose name now first occurs, acts a 
 very high-spirited and noble part in the close of this 
 
YEAE XXI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 321 
 
 a captain of a trireme, and the latter of a band 
 of heavy-armed ; and to such others as were 
 judged most likely to stem the fury of the 
 conspirators. These they conjured " not to 
 look calmly on till their destruction should be 
 .completed, and Samos rent away from the 
 Athenians, by which alone till now their em- 
 pire had been preserved and supported." 
 Listening, therefore, to these representations, 
 they privately exhorted eveiy single soldier not 
 to suffer such proceedings, and more earnestly 
 than others the Paralian, since all that sailed 
 in that vessel were, citizens of Athens, all free 
 and enemies determined, from time immemo- 
 rial, to an oligarchy, even when it had no ex- 
 istence. Leon also and Diomedon never went 
 out to sea without leaving them some ships for 
 tlreir guard; insomuch that, when the three 
 hundred made their attempt, as all these united 
 in their obstruction, but most heartily of all 
 the Paralians, the popular party at Samos was 
 rescued from destruction. Thirty of those 
 three hundred they even slaughtered, and three 
 of the most factious amongst the survivors they 
 doomed to banishment. Then, having pub- 
 lished an indemnity for the rest, they continued 
 to support the democracy at Samos. 
 
 But the Samians and soldiery despatch the 
 Paralus with all expedition to Athens, having 
 on board her Chaereas, the son of Achestratus, 
 an Athenian, who had home a considerable share 
 in the last turn of affairs, charged with a noti- 
 fication of these last transactions; for yet it 
 was not known at Samos that the four hundred 
 
 liistory. " If virtue could be weighed merely by itself, 
 without any regard to outward circumstance, I should 
 not hesitate (says Cornelius Nepoa) to prefer him be- 
 fore all the great men in Greece. But I aver, that not 
 one of them ever surpassed him in integrity, in resolu- 
 tion, in grandeur of soul, and true patriotism. — Yet, I 
 know not how it is, though nobody excelled him in real 
 merit, many have outstripped him in point of fame, 
 [n the Peloponnesian war, (the part of it W-hich now 
 remains,) Thrasybulus did many things without Alci- 
 hiades ; Alcibiades did nothing without Thrasybulus ; 
 and yet the other, through a happiness peculiar to 
 himself, reaped the glory and benefit of all." So says 
 this elegant Eoman writer. The reader will soon see 
 some of Thrasybulus's exploits, separately from and in 
 concert with Alcibiades: but the glory of his life was 
 ridding Athens some years after of thirty tyrants at a 
 blow ; for which he was rewarded by a wreath of olive, 
 the most honourable recompense his grateful country- 
 men could bestow upon him. He was ever a firm, in- 
 trepid, disinterested patriot ; and lost his life at last if 
 the service of bis country. ' 
 
 48 
 
 had seized the administration. No sooner, 
 therefore, were they come to their moorings, 
 than the four hundred caused two or three of 
 the crew of the Paralus to be dragged away to 
 prison ; the residue they turned over from that 
 vessel into another ship of war, and ordered 
 them away as a guard-ship for the station of 
 Eubcea. But Chsereas, sensible in what train 
 affairs were going, had the good fortune to 
 make his escape ; and, returning again to Sa- 
 mos, related to the soldiery all that had been 
 done in Athens, exaggerating every point with 
 abundant severity. — That " every citizen was 
 now kept ill awe with whips and scourges, and 
 that even their own wives and children daily 
 felt the insolence of those tyrants ; nay, they 
 have it now in agitation, that if any on duty at 
 Samos shall presume to oppose their pleasure, 
 immediately to arrest and imprison the whole 
 of their kindred ; and in case the former will 
 not submit, to put the latter to death." On 
 many other points he also expatiated, all ag- 
 gravated with falsehoods. 
 
 His audience, in, the first instant of their 
 passion, were fully bent on the destruction of 
 all those who had appeared most active for an 
 oligarchy, and in short of all who had any hand 
 in its promotion ; but, being stopped by the 
 interposition of others more moderate, and lis- 
 tening to the remonstrance, that " they ought 
 not to accelerate the ruin of their country, 
 now that a. fleet of the enemy lay almost rang- 
 ed against them for battle," they desisted. And, 
 afterwards, those who had openly avowed the 
 design of restoring the democratical form at 
 Samos, namely, Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, 
 and Thrasyllus, (for these had the principal 
 agency in this new revolution,) caused every 
 soldier to swear the most solemn oaths, more 
 especially such as were for an oligarchy, that 
 " they would submit to no form but the de- 
 mocracy, and would act in this cause with ge- 
 neral unanimity ; and, farther, would zealously 
 prosecute the war against the Peloponnesians, 
 that eternal enemies they would remain to the 
 four hundred, and would enter into no treaty 
 of accommodation with them." All the Sa- 
 mians, farther, that were old enough to bear 
 arms took the same oaths ; and henceforth the 
 army communicated all their affairs to the 
 Samians, and gave them an insight into all the 
 dangers which might attend the sequel; con- 
 vinced that otherwise no safe resource remained 
 2i2 
 
322 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAJl 
 
 [book VIII. 
 
 for either ; but, if the four hundred or the ene- 
 my at Miletus proved too hard for them, their 
 ruin was unavoidable. 
 
 Terrible were the present embroilments of 
 the times, whilst those at Samos were striving 
 to re-establish the democracy at Athens, and 
 those at Athens to force an oligarchical form 
 upon the army. The soldiers, farther, im- 
 mediately summoned a general assembly, in 
 which they deposed their former commanders, 
 and all such captains of triremes as fell under 
 their suspicions, and then chose others to fill 
 up the vacancies, both captains of triremes and 
 land-commanders, amongst whom were Thra- 
 sybulus and Thrasyllus. The last rose up in 
 the assembly and encouraged them by every 
 topic of persuasion ; particularly, that " they 
 had not the least reason to be dispirited, 
 though Athens herself had revolted from 
 them; for this was merely the secession of 
 a minority from men whose numbers were 
 greater, and who were better furnished for 
 every exigence; because the whole navy of 
 Athens was their own, by which they could 
 compel dependent states to pay in their former 
 contingents of tribute as fully as if they sailed 
 on such an errand from Athens itself. Even 
 yet they were masters of a city at Samos, a 
 city despicable in no respect, but which once in 
 a former war had well nigh wrested the empire 
 of the sea from the Athenians. The seat of 
 war, in regard to their public enemies, would 
 continue the same as it was before; nay, by 
 being masters of the fleet, they were better 
 enabled to procure all the needfjil supplies 
 than their opponents who were now at Athens. 
 It was purely owing to their own peculiar situ- 
 ation at Samos that the others had hitherto 
 been masters of the entrance into the Piraus ; 
 and they soon should be highly distressed if 
 they refused to restore them their ancient 
 polity, since these at Samos could more easily 
 bar them the use of the sea than be barred up 
 by them. What assistances Athens had hither- 
 to given them against the enemy were but 
 trifling, and of no real importance. Nothing 
 could be lost from that quarter ; which was no 
 longer able to supply them with money, since 
 with that they had been supplied by the army ; 
 nor to send them any valuable instructions, for 
 the sake of which alone the troops abroad were 
 submissive to the orders of the state at home. 
 Nay, in some points those at Athens had most 
 egregiously offended since they had overturned 
 
 the laws of their country, which those here had 
 preserved, and were exerting their efforts to 
 compel others to the observance of them; and 
 therefore, in every method of valuation, the 
 men who here provided well for the public 
 welfare, were in no respect worse patriots than 
 the men at Athens. Even Alcibiades, should 
 they grant him an indemnity and a safe return, 
 would readily procure them the king's alliance. 
 And, what had the greatest weigm, should 
 they miscarry in every branch of their present 
 designs, many places of refuge lay always open 
 to men possessed of so considerable a fleet, in 
 which they might find fresh cities and another 
 country." 
 
 After such occurrences in the assembly con- 
 vened by the soldiery, and the conclusion of 
 their mutual exhortations, they continued their 
 preparations for war with unremitting diligence. 
 But the deputation of ten, sent from the four 
 hundred to Samos, being informed of these 
 proceedings when they were advanced in their 
 voyage so far as Delos, thought proper to pro- 
 ceed no farther. 
 
 About this very time, the Peloponnesians on 
 board the fleet stationed at Miletus clamoured 
 loudly amongst themselves, that " they are be- 
 trayed by Astyochus and Tissaphernes ; as 
 the former had already refused to engage, when 
 themselves were hearty and in fine condition, 
 and the fleet of the Athenians was small ; nor 
 would do so even now, when the latter are 
 reported to be embroiled with intestine sedi- 
 tions, and their own ships are daily impairing ; 
 but, under pretext of a Phoenician fleet to bo 
 brought up by Tissaphernes, an aid merely 
 nominal, and which would never join them, he 
 was ruining all by dilatory measures. And as 
 for Tissaphernes, it was never his intention to 
 bring up that fleet ; but he was plainly under- 
 mining the strength of theirs, by not supplying 
 them constantly and fully with their pay. The 
 time, therefore, they insisted, ought no longer 
 to be thus idly wasted, but an engagement 
 hazarded at once." Yet in such clamours 
 those deepest concerned were the Syracusans. 
 
 The confederates and Astyochus himself 
 being affected with these clamours, and having 
 declared in a council of war for engaging the 
 enemy forthwith, as they had received un- 
 doubted intelligence of the confusions at IS.i- 
 mos ; putting out to sea with the whole of 
 their fleet, amounting to a hundred and twelve 
 sail, and having otdeveA the Milesians to march 
 
1-EAR XXI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 323 
 
 thither over-land, they stood away for Mycale. 
 At Glaucffl of Mycale the Athenians were 
 now lying, with eighty-two ships of the Sa- 
 mian department : for in this quarter of My- 
 cale Samos lies, but a small distance' from the 
 continent : but when they saw the fleet of the 
 Peloponnesians approaching, they retired to 
 Samos, judging their own strength insufficient 
 for an engagement with the foe which might 
 prove decisive. Besides, as they had dis- 
 covered the intention of those at Miletus to 
 venture an engagement, they expected Strom- 
 bichides from the Hellespont, who was to 
 bring to their assistance the ships on the station 
 of Chios which had gone up to Abydus ; and 
 a message had already been despatched to 
 hasten him up. For these reasons they plied 
 away to Samos. The Peloponnesians, arriv- 
 ing at Mycale, encamped upon the shore, along 
 with the land forces of the Milesians and those 
 sent in by the bordering people. On the next 
 day, when they were fully bent on standing 
 directly against Samos, advice is brought them 
 that " Strombichides is come up with the ships 
 from the Hellespont;" upon which they made 
 the best of their way back again to Miletus. 
 And now the Athenians, having gained so 
 large an accession of strength, show themselves 
 immediately before Miletus, with a hundred 
 and eight sail, desirous of coming to an en- 
 gagement with the enemy. But, as nothing 
 stirred out against them, they also returned to 
 Samos. 
 
 In the same summer, immediately after the 
 former movements, the Peloponnesians — who 
 had waived coming out to an engagement, since 
 with the whole of their strength they thought 
 themselves by no means a match for their ene- 
 my, and were now reduced to great perplexities 
 about the methods of procuring subsistence for 
 so numerous a fleet, especially as Tissaphernes 
 was so remiss in his payments — send away 
 to Pharnabazus (pursuant to the prior instruc- 
 tions from Peloponnesus) Clearchus the son 
 of Ramphias, with a detachment of forty sail : 
 for Pharnabazus had demanded such a force, 
 and was ready to support the expenses of it ; 
 and it had been farther notified to them in 
 form that Byzantium was ripe for u revolt. 
 And thus this detachment of Peloponnesians, 
 having run out far to sea to get clear of the 
 Athenians during the course, met with very 
 tempestuous weather. The bulk of them, it 
 IS true, witli Olearchus, rode it out to Delos, 
 
 and from thence return again to Miletus. But 
 Clearchus, setting out again, travelled over- 
 land to Hellespont, and took upon him the 
 command. Ten ships, however, of the de- 
 tachment, under Elixus the Megarean, who 
 was joined in the command, reached the Hel- 
 lespont without damage, and effectuate the 
 revolt of Byzantium. The Athenians at Sa- 
 mos, informed of these incidents, send away a 
 detachment to the Hellespont, to support and 
 guard the adjacent cities ; and a small engage- 
 ment happens before Byzantium, between eight 
 ships on a side. 
 
 Those who were in the management at Sa- 
 mos, and above all Thrasybulus, adhering still 
 to the sentiments they had entertained ever 
 since the last turn of affairs there, that Alci- 
 biades must needs be recalled ; the latter at 
 last obtained, in full assembly, the concurrence 
 of the soldiery. Accordingly, when they had 
 voted a return and an indemnity to Alcibiades, 
 Thrasybulus repaired immediately to Tissa- 
 phernes, and brought Alcibiades back with 
 him to Samos ; convinced their last resource 
 depended on his being able to alienate Tissa- 
 phernes from the Peloponnesians. Hereupon 
 an assembly being called Alcibiades at large 
 expatiated upoii and deplored the malignity of 
 his fate, in having been exiled from nis coun- 
 try : and then, having amply run over every 
 topic relating to the present posture of affairs, 
 he raised their expectations high in regard to 
 the future. He magnified, with a mighty 
 parade of words, his own interest in Tissa- 
 phernes ; from the view, not only to intimi- 
 date the patrons of the oligarchical government 
 at Athens, and put a stop to their cabals but 
 also to render himself more respectable to those 
 at Samos, and to raise up their confidence in 
 him as high as possible ; — to give the enemy, 
 farther, as many handles as he was able to 
 calumniate Tissaphernes, and to lower all their 
 present sanguinary expectations. These were 
 the schemes of Alcibiades, when, with all 
 imaginable ostentation, he gave the strongest 
 assurances to his audience, that " Tissapher- 
 nes had pledged his word to him, that, could 
 he once firmly depend upon the Athenians, 
 they never should be distressed for want of sup- 
 plies whilst he had any thing left, nay, though 
 at last he should be forced to turn into ready 
 cash the very bed he lay on ; and the Phoini- 
 cian fleet, already come up to Aspendus, he 
 would join with the Athenians but never with 
 
324 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book viri. 
 
 the Peloponnesians ; the only pledge of fidel- 
 ity he required from the Athenians was, for 
 Alcibiades to be recalled and pass his word for 
 their future conduct. 
 
 The army, delighted with these and many 
 other soothing topics, proceed immediately to 
 associate him with the rest of the commanders, 
 and implicitly trusted every thing to their 
 management. Not a man was any longer to 
 be found amongst them who would have parted 
 with his present confidence of certain security 
 and revenge on the four hundred for all the 
 treasure in the universe. Nay, they were 
 ready this very moment, upon the strength of 
 what Alcibkdes had said, to slight the enemy 
 now at hand, and steer directly for the Piraeus. 
 But, though numbers with vehemence recom- 
 mended the step, he stopped their ardour by 
 remonstrances, that " they ought by no means 
 to think of steering for the Pirsus, and leave 
 their nearer enemies upon their backs ; but, in 
 relation to the operations of war, since he was 
 elected a general, (he said,) he would first go 
 and confer with Tissaphernes, and would then 
 proceed to action." Accordingly, the assem- 
 bly was no sooner dissolved than he immediately 
 departed, that he might appear in all respects to 
 be perfectly united with Tissaphernes ; de- 
 sirous also to raise himself in his esteem, and 
 give him a sensible proof that he was appointed 
 a general ; and, by virtue of this, enabled either 
 to do him service or to do him harm. It was 
 the peculiar fortune of Alcibiades to awe the 
 Athenians by Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes 
 by the Athenians. 
 
 The Peloponnesians at Miletus had no 
 sooner heard of the recall of Alcibiades, than, 
 as before they suspected treachery in Tissa- 
 phernes, they now loudly vented invectives 
 against him. What more inflamed them was, 
 that, ever since the Athenians showed them- 
 selves before Miletus and they had refused to 
 put out to sea and engage them, Tissaphernes 
 had slackened more than ever in his payments ; 
 and thus, hated by them for that reason suffi- 
 ciently before, he now became more odious on 
 account of Alcibiadm. The soldiers again, as 
 on former occasions, ran together in parties, and 
 enumerated their grievances. Nay, some of 
 higher rank, persons of real importance, and 
 not merely the private men, were full of re- 
 monstrances, that " they had at no time re- 
 ceived their full subsistence : his payments had 
 been always scanty, and even those had never 
 
 been regular ; in short, unless they were led 
 directly against the enemy, or carried to some 
 other station where they might be sure of sub- 
 sistence, the crews would abandon their vessels. 
 And the whole blame of all that befell, ought 
 to be charged upon Astyochus, who for private 
 lucre endured patiently the caprices of Tissa- 
 phernes." Employed as they were in thus 
 enumerating grievances, a tumult actually broke 
 out against Astyochus : for the mariners be- 
 longing to the Syracusan and Thurian vessels, 
 by how much they enjoyed the greatest liberty 
 of all others in the fleet, by so much the more 
 heightened confidence did they flock about 
 him and demand their pay. Upon this, As- 
 tyochus returned an answer too full of spirit, 
 threatening hard that Dorian,' who seconded 
 and encouraged the demands of his men, and 
 even lifting his staff and shaking it at him. 
 This was no sooner perceived by the military 
 crowd, than, seamen as they were, with a loud 
 uproar, they mshed at Astyochus to knock him 
 down ; but, aware of their design, he flies for 
 refuge to an altar. He escaped, indeed, with- 
 out any blows, and the fray was ended without 
 any harm committed. 
 
 The Milesians also made themselves masters, 
 by surprise, of a fort erected by Tissaphernes, 
 at Miletus, and obliged the garrison left in it to 
 evacuate the place. These things pleased the 
 rest of the allies, and not least of all the Syra- 
 cusans. Lichas, however, was by no means 
 satisfied with these proceedings. He insisted 
 " the Milesians were obliged in duty to be 
 submissive to Tissaphernes ;' and that all 
 others who lived in the dominions of the king 
 lay under the same obligation, and were bound 
 to pay due regard to his just authority, till 
 such time as the war was handsomely com- 
 pleted." This drew upon him the resentment 
 of the Milesians ; and, because of these ex- 
 pressions and some others of the same na- 
 ture, when he afterwards died of a natural 
 disease, they would not suffer him to be buried 
 in a spot of ground w^ich the Lacedsemonians 
 who were amongst them had chose for his in- 
 terment. 
 
 Whilst affairs were thus sadly embroiled, 
 between the soldiery on one side, and Astyo- 
 chus and Tissaphernes on the other, Mindarus 
 arrived from Lacedaemon, as successor to As- 
 
 1 Hermocratos. 
 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 YEAR XXI.] 
 
 tyochus in the chief command of the fleet. 
 Accordingly he takes the command upon him, 
 and Astyochus sailed away for home. But 
 with him, as ambassador, Tissaphernes sent 
 one of his own creatures, by name Gaulites, a 
 Carian, who spoke both languages, to accuse 
 . the Milesians about the seizure of the fort, and 
 also to make apologies for his conduct. He 
 knew that the Milesians were already set out 
 with an outcry, chiefly against him : and that 
 Hermocrates was gone with them, well armed 
 with proofs that Tissaphernes, in concert with 
 Alcibiades, bafiled all the Peloponnesian 
 schemes, and basely tampered with both the 
 warring parties. But an enmity had always 
 subsisted between these two about the pay- 
 ments of subsistence. And at length, when 
 Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and 
 other Syracusans came to Miletus to take upon 
 them the command of the Syracusan vessels, 
 (namely, Patamis, and Myscon, and Demar- 
 chus,) Tissaphernes vented his choler more 
 bitterly than ever against Hermocrates, now an 
 exile ; and, amongst his other accusations of 
 him, affirmed, that " he had demanded a sum 
 of money, which being refused him, he had 
 ever since declared himself his enemy." As- 
 tyochus, therefore, and the Milesians, and 
 Hermocrates, are now sailed for Lacedtemon. 
 
 By this time also Alcibiades had repassed 
 from Tissaphernes to Samos ; and from Delos 
 the deputation sent from the four hundred on 
 the late revolution to soothe and gain the con- 
 currence of those at Samos, arrive also whilst 
 Alcibiades is there. Upon which, an assem- 
 bly being called, they endeavoured to open the 
 cause. The soldiers at first refused to hear 
 them, and roared aloud for the murder of those 
 who had overturned the popular government. 
 At length, with great difficulty, being quieted, 
 they gave them a hearing. 
 
 The deputies remonstrated, " that not for 
 the ruin of Athens was this new change intro- 
 duced, but purely for its preservation — in no 
 wise to betray it into the hands of the enemy ; 
 because that might have been done effectually 
 upon the late approach of its enemy to her 
 walls, since they were in power. Every single 
 person amongst the five thousand was intended 
 to have a regular share in the administration. 
 Their friends and relations are not treated in 
 an insolent manner, as Chsereas had maliciously 
 RUggested to them ; nay, were not in the least 
 
 325 
 
 molested, but everywhere remained in the un- 
 disturbed possession of their property." 
 
 Though on these topics they amply enlarged, 
 yet they were heard with no manner of com- 
 placence, but with manifest indignation. Dif- 
 ferent methods of proceeding were recommend- 
 ed by different persons ; but the majority de- 
 clared for sailing away at once for the Piraeus. 
 On this occasion Alcibiades first showed him- 
 self a true patriot ; nay, as much a patriot as 
 ever Athenian had been ; for, when the Athen- 
 ians at Samos were hurried furiously along to 
 invade their own selves, the plain consequence 
 of which was giving up at once Ionia and 
 Hellespont to their public foes, he mollified 
 their fury ; and, at a crisis when no other man 
 living could have been able to restrain the mul- 
 titude, he persuaded them to desist from this 
 strange invasion ; and, by reprimanding those 
 whose private resentments burst out most 
 violently against the deputies, prevented mis- 
 chief. At length, he himself dismissed them 
 with the following answer — That " the ad- 
 ministration in the hands of five thousand ho 
 had no intention to oppose : but he ordered 
 them to give an immediate discharge to the 
 four hundred, and to restore the council of 
 fi#e hundred to their prior state. If, farther; 
 from a principle of frugality, they had made 
 retrenchments, in order that those who served 
 in the armies of the state might be better sub- 
 sisted, he praised them altogether. He then 
 recommended to them a steady resistence, and 
 by no means in any shape to give way to ths 
 enemy ; for, could the state once be secured 
 from its public foes, a reconciliation amongst 
 its members might easily be hoped for ; but, 
 should either party be once destroyed, eithei 
 this at Samos, or theirs at Athens, none would 
 soon be left to be reconciled at all." 
 
 There were present at this audience am- 
 bassadors from the Argives, who brought 
 assurances of aid to the people of Athens at 
 Samos. Alcibiades commended them for theii 
 zeal ; and then, exhorting them to hold them- 
 selves in readiness to come upon a summons 
 sent, he civilly dismissed them. These Argivea 
 came to Samos in company with the Para 
 Hans, who had been lately turned over by the 
 four hundred into a vessel of war, to cruize 
 round Euboea, and to carry to Lacedsemon the 
 ambassadors, Lsespodiag, Aristophon, and Me- 
 lesius, sent thither from the four hundred 
 
320 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VIII. 
 
 But, when advanced to the height of Argos, 
 they put the ambassadors under arrest, as chief 
 agents in pulling down the democracy, and de- 
 livei ed them iip to the Argives. They had no 
 business now at Athens, and so came from 
 Argos to Samos, convoying the Argive am- 
 bassadors in the trireme which they had 
 seized. 
 
 The same summer, Tissaphernes, — about 
 that juncture of time in which the Peloponne- 
 sians were most furious against him, for the 
 other reasons, and the recalment of Alcibiades, 
 as having now pulled off the mask and declared 
 for the Athenians, — desirous, as in truth it ap- 
 peared, to efface the bad impressions they had 
 entertained of him, got ready to go to Aspen- 
 dus to the Phoenician fleet, and prevailed with 
 Lichas to bear him company. In regard to 
 the Peloponnesians, he declared that he sub- 
 stituted his own lieutenant, Tamas, to pay 
 them their subsistence, whilst he himself should 
 be absent. Various accounts are vented about 
 this step ; nor can it certainly be known with 
 what view he repaired to Aspendus, or why, 
 when there, he did not bring up the fleet. 
 That a Phoenician fleet, consisting of one hun- 
 dred and forty-seven sail, was now come up to 
 Aspendus, is allowed on all sides ; but, wW 
 they did not come forwards, is variously con- 
 jectured. Some think he went out of sight 
 merely to carry on his old scheme of wearing 
 away the Peloponnesians ; and, in consequence 
 of this, Tamas paid in their subsistence which 
 he was ordered to pay, not better but even 
 worse than Tissaphernes. Others say it was, 
 that, since he had brought the Phoenicians to As- 
 pendus, he might save large sums by dismissing 
 them there, as he never had sincerely designed 
 to make use of their service. Others, again, 
 attribute it to a desire to quiet the clamours 
 against him at Lacedtemon, and to get himself 
 represented there as one abounding in good 
 faith, and who is actually gone to bring up a 
 fleet fairly and honestly fitted out for service. 
 
 But, in my opinion, the true solution of the 
 mystery is this : he would not bring them up, 
 merely to wear out and to balance the strength 
 of the Grecians, that, during his absence and 
 this studied prolongation, the latter might he 
 running into ruins ; and, farther, for the sake of 
 balancing, to join with neither party, for fear 
 of making them too strong ; for, had he once 
 determined to join heartily in the w^r, the con- 
 
 sequence was certainly beyond a doubt. Had 
 he brought them up to join theljacedsemonians, 
 he must in all probabiUty have given them the 
 victory, since already their naval strength was 
 rather equal than inferior to that of their op- 
 ponents. But, that their ruin alone was de- 
 signed by him is plain from the excuse he made 
 for not bringing up that fleet : he pretended 
 they were fewer in number than the Icing had 
 ordered to be assembled : yet, if this were so, 
 he might have ingratiated himself more abun- 
 dantly with the king, if he made a great saving 
 of money for his master, and with less expense 
 had accomplished his service. To Aspendus, 
 however, whatever was his view, Tissaphernes 
 repairs, and joins the Phoenicians ; nay, farther, 
 at his own desire, the Peloponnesians sent 
 Philippus, a noble Lacedaemonian, with two 
 triremes, to take charge of this fleet. 
 
 Alcibiades had no sooiier received intelli- 
 gence that Tissaphernes was at Aspendus, 
 than, taking with him thirteen sail, he hastened 
 thither after him, promising to those at Samos 
 an assured and important piece of service : for 
 " he would either bring the Phoenician fleet to 
 the Athenians, or at least prevent their junc- 
 tion with the Peloponnesians." It is probable 
 that from a long acquaintance, he was privy to 
 the whole intention of Tissaphernes never to 
 bring up this fleet ; and his project was now, 
 to render Tissaphernes still more odious to the 
 Peloponnesians for the regard he showed to 
 himself and the Athenians, that so he -might 
 at last be necessitated to strike in with the lat- 
 ter. He stood away therefore directly by 
 Phaselis and Caunus, and held on his course 
 upwards. 
 
 The deputation, sent from the four hun- 
 dred, being returned from Samos to Athens, 
 reported the answer of Alcibiades; — how "he 
 encouraged them to hold out, and give way in 
 no shape to the enemy : and that his confi- 
 dence was great, he should be able thoroughly 
 to reconcile them with the army, and give 
 them victory over the Peloponnesians." By 
 this report they very much revived the spirits 
 of many of those who had a share in the oli- 
 garchy, and yet would gladly extricate them- 
 selves from the business upon assurances af 
 indemnity. They had already begun to hold 
 separate cabals, and show open discontent at 
 the train of affairs. They were headed by 
 some of principal authority even in the present 
 
PEAK XXI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 327 
 
 oligarchy, and who filled the great offices of 
 state, namely, Theramenes,' the son of Ag- 
 non, and Aristocrates, the son of Sicelius ; and 
 others who were most deeply concerned in 
 late transactions; and from a dread, as they 
 gave out, of the army at Samos, and Alcibia- 
 des had concurred in sending an embassy to 
 LacedjEmon, lest by unseasonable dissents from 
 the majority they might have done mischief to 
 the public. Not that they hastened them- 
 selves even now to put an utter end to the oli- 
 garchical government, but to enforce the neces- 
 sity of making use of the five thousand not 
 merely in name, but in act, and to render the 
 polity more equal. This was, it must be 
 owned, the political scheme which they all pre- 
 tended ; but, through private ambition, the 
 majority had given into that course, by which 
 an oligarchy, founded upon the ruins of a de- 
 mocracy, is ripe for subversion : for it was the 
 daily claim of each single person concerned, 
 not to be equal with the rest, but to be pre- 
 eminently the first ; whereas, when out of a 
 democracy a preference is awarded, the distinc- 
 tion is the more easily brooked, as if it were 
 the real consequence of superior worth. But 
 what of a certainty elevated them most, was 
 the great influence of Alcibiades at Samos, and 
 their own consciousness that this business 
 of an oligarchy carried with it no prospect 
 of firm or lasting continuance. A conten- 
 tion, therefore, ensued among them, which 
 of them should show the greatest zeal for the 
 people. 
 
 But such of the four hundred as made the 
 greatest opposition to this new scheme, and 
 were leaders of their party ; — namely, Phryni- 
 chus, who formerly, during his employment 
 as general at Samos, had embroiled himself 
 
 * Theramenes was very expert at turning about and 
 sliifling his party. Ue got by it the nicliname of 
 Cothurnna, or the Buskin ; because the tragedian's 
 bualtin was made large enough for any foot to go into 
 it. He was however a roan of great abilities, and 
 generally regarded as a lover of his country. His 
 turns wore dextrous, well-timed, and made with a 
 view of public good. Cicsar, when making Cicero a 
 compliment, likened him to Theramenes. He was 
 deeply concerned in all the subsequent revolutions at 
 Athens. He put the finishing hand to the peace with 
 the Lacedaemonians after the taking of Athens t>y 
 Lysander, when they demolished their long walla, 
 opened tlieir harbours, and gave up their shipping. He 
 was afterwards, nominally, one of the thirty tyrants: 
 for he soon began to oppose them ; first with modera- 
 tion, then with vehemence ; wh:ch exasperated them 
 •io, that they put him to death. 
 
 with Alcibiades ; and Aristarchus, one of the 
 most violent and also most inveterate oppo- 
 nents of the people ; and Pisander, and Anti- 
 pho, and others of the greatest influence 
 amopgst them ; who formerly, upon estabUsh- 
 ing themselves first in the government, and 
 ever since the army at Samos had dissented 
 from them in favour of the democracy, had be- 
 stirred themselves, in sending embassies to 
 Lacedaemon, in more firmly establishing the 
 oligarchy, and erecting a new fortification on 
 the spot which is called Eetioneia ; — these, I 
 say, exerted themselves with much greater ar- 
 dour than ever, since the return of the deputies 
 from Samos, as they plainly saw' the inclina- 
 tions of numbers, and some of their own body, 
 on whose perseverance they had highly de- 
 pended, were entirely changed. They even 
 caused Antipho, and Phrynichus, and ten 
 others, to set out with all expedition ; so ap- 
 prehensive were they of fresh opposition both 
 in Athens itself and from Samos ; and charged 
 them with instructions to strike up an accom- 
 modation with the Laeedsemonians upon any 
 tolerable terms they could possibly procure. 
 They also carried on with redoubled diligence 
 the new works at Eetioneia. These works 
 were intended, as was given out by Thera- 
 menes and his party, not so much to keep out 
 of the Pirseus those from Samos, should they 
 endeavour to attempt it, as to enable them- 
 selves, at their own discretion, to receive both 
 the ships and land forces of the enemy ; for 
 Eetioneia is the mole of the Pirseus, and the 
 entrance into it opens at the end of this mole. 
 The new work was therefore joined in such a 
 manner to that which guarded it before on the 
 side of the land, that a small party posted be- 
 hind could command the entrance. For the 
 extremities of it were continued down to the 
 fort in the very mouth of the harbour, which 
 was narrow ; and both the old waU, which was 
 built on the land side, and this new fortifica- 
 tion within, reached down to the sea. They 
 also enlarged and secured the great portico, 
 which adjoined to the new work erected in the 
 PiriEus, and kept it entirely in their own cus- 
 tody. Here they obliged all the citizens to 
 lodge whatcorn they already had, and all that 
 should hereafter be imported, and here only to 
 expose it to sale and to vend it. 
 
 These proceedings had for a long time drjwn 
 sharp insinuations from Theramenes ; and, 
 when the embassy returned from Lacedaemon 
 
328 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VIII. 
 
 without bringing to any manner of issue a gen- 
 eral accommodation for the whole of the state, 
 he averred, that " by this new work the safety 
 of the city was visibly endangered." For from 
 Peloponnesus, at this instant of time, at the 
 request of the Eubceans, no less than forty-two' 
 Bail of ships were on the coast of Laconia ; some 
 of which were Italian, from Tarentum and 
 from Locri, and some Sicilian ; and all were 
 DOW bound for Euboea. At the head of this 
 equipment was Hegesandridas, a Spartan, the 
 son of Hegcsander. Theramenes maintained, 
 that " it was set out less for Euboea than for 
 those who were now fortifying at Eetioneia ; 
 and, unless we stand upon our guard, they will 
 surprise and complete the ruin of Athens." 
 There was really something in the conduct of 
 the men he accused, to countenance this charge, 
 nor was it merely the outcry of slander. Those 
 who now composed the oligarchy were princi- 
 pally desirous to preserve in their hands the 
 whole appendage of the republic ; if this were 
 impracticable, to secure the shipping and walls, 
 and subsist with independence ; but, should 
 they be unable to campass this, rather than fall 
 the first victims to the democracy re-establish- 
 ed, to let in the enemy ; and, resigning their 
 shipping and fortifications, to make any terms 
 whatever for the state, provided they could ob- 
 tain security for their own persons. They 
 accelerated, therefore, this new work; which 
 was so contrived as to have posterns, and sally- 
 ports, and passages enougji to let in the enemy ; 
 and they proceed with all imaginable despatch, 
 in order to outstrip prevention. 
 
 Hitherto, indeed, this charge against them 
 had only been whispered with an air of secrecy 
 amongst a few. But, when Phrynichus, upon 
 his return from the embassy to Lacedaemon, 
 was treacherously stabbed by one of the patrole 
 in the forum, at the hour of public resort, be- 
 ing got but a few steps from the house where 
 the council was sitting, and dropped down 
 dead upon the spot; — when, farther, the as- 
 sassin made his escape ; and a stranger from 
 Argos, who assisted at the fact, being appre- 
 hended and tortured by the four hundred, dis- 
 covered not the name of any one persoh who 
 set them on, nor made any farther confession 
 than that " he knew large numbers met at the 
 house of the officer who commanded the pa- 
 trole, and at other places ;" — then, at length, 
 as nothing could be made of this affair, Thera- 
 menes and Aristocrates, and as many either of 
 
 the four hundred or of others as were combinefl 
 with them, proceeded to act in a more open 
 and resolute manner. For by this time the 
 fleet was come round from Laconia ; and rid- 
 ing before Epidaurus, had made ravages upon 
 .iEgina. Theramenes therefore averred it im- 
 probable, that "were they intended for Eu- 
 boea, they would ever have put into ^gina, 
 and then go again and lie at Epidaurus, unless 
 they had been sent out at the express invita- 
 tion of those whom he had always accused of 
 traitorous designs ; and it was impossible to be 
 passive any longer under such practices." In 
 fine, after many speeches made to excite a tu- 
 mult, and many suspicions disseminated abroad, 
 they fell to work in earnest. For the heavy- 
 armed, posted in the Pirseus to carry on the 
 new works of Eetioneia, amongst whom Aris- 
 tocrates himself was employed at the head of 
 his own band, lay under an arrest Alexicles, 
 who commanded there for the oligarchy, and 
 was a most vehement adversary to the opposite 
 party; and, carrying him into a house, put him 
 under confinement. To this action they were 
 also emboldened by the concurrence of others, 
 as well as by Hermon, who commanded the 
 patrole assigned for Munichia ; and, what was 
 of most importance, it was openly countenanced 
 by the whole body of the heavy-armed. The 
 news of it was immediately carried to the four 
 hundred, who were this moment assembled to- 
 gether in council ; and all, excepting those dis- 
 satisfied with their measures, were ready to 
 run to arms, and vented terrible threats against 
 Theramenes and his associates. 
 
 But he, apologizing for himself, declared his 
 readiness to take up arms along with them, 
 and attend them to the rescue of Alexicles ; and, 
 taking with him one of the generals who was 
 in his secret, he hurried down to the Pirseus. 
 Aristarchus also ran down to assist; as did, 
 farther, the young men belonging to the cavalry 
 of the state. 
 
 Great, in truth, was the tumult, and full of 
 horror : for those who were left in the upper 
 city imagined that the Piraeus was already 
 seized, and that Alexicles was slain ; and they 
 in the Piraaus each moment expected an as- 
 sault from those in the city. Not without 
 difficulty could the men of years and experi- 
 ence stop such as were wildly running up 
 and down the streets, and rushing to arms. 
 And Thucydides, the Pharsalian, public host 
 of the state, who happened then to be at 
 
YEAK XXI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 329 
 
 Athens, threw himself with lively zeal in the 
 way of all who were flocking down ; conjuring 
 them earnestly " not to finish the ruin of their 
 country, when the enemy lay so near to strike 
 the blow." But thus, at length, their fury 
 abated, and the effusion of one another's blood 
 was prevented. 
 
 As for Theramenes, he was no sooner got 
 down to the Firsus, than, assuming authority, 
 (for he himself was at this time a general,) he 
 pretended to rate the heavy-armed for this 
 piece of mutiny, at least so far as mere mak- 
 ing a noisa could do it: whilst Aristarchus 
 and all the opposite faction were angry with 
 them in earnest. But the bulk of the heavy- 
 armed drew together in a body, and betray no 
 sign of regret for what they had done. Nay, 
 they demanded aloud from Theramenes, — " If, 
 in his judgment, these new works were raised 
 with a good design, or would not better be de- 
 molished 1" His reply was this — That, "if 
 they thought it expedient to demolish them, his 
 opinion should concur with theirs." Hereupon, 
 at a signal giveii, the heavy-armed and many 
 others who belonged to the Pirseus rushed on 
 in a moment, and pulled down all the new for- 
 tification. 
 
 The watch-word now published to the mul- 
 titude was this — " Whosoever would have the 
 administration lodged in the five thousand in- 
 stead of the four hundred, let him join in the 
 work." For even still they judged it politic to 
 veil their design under the name of the five 
 thousand, and not to say downright — " Whoso- 
 ever would have the democracy restored," — lest 
 possibly the former might have been actually in 
 force, and a person speaking to any one of them 
 might spoil all by some inadvertent expres- 
 sions. And, on the same account, the four 
 hundred would neither have the five thousand 
 declared, nor yet have it known that they had 
 never been appointed. To admit so large a 
 number into a share of the government, they 
 judged was in fact a mere democracy ; but that 
 leaving the matter in suspense would strike a 
 dread of his neighbour into every Athenian. 
 
 The next morning, the four hundred Jhough 
 highly disordered in their politics, a^tabled 
 however in council. But those in the Pirteus, 
 after enlarging Alexicles, whom they had put 
 under confinement, and completing the demo- 
 lition of the new works, marched to the theatre 
 of Bacchus in Munichia, and there, all armed 
 as they were, held a formal assembly ; and 
 49 
 
 then, in pursuance of what had been resolved, 
 marched directly into the upper city, and posted 
 themselves in the Anaceum. Here they were 
 accosted by a select committee sent from the 
 four hundred, who man to man reasoned calmly 
 with them ; and, perceiving any to be tractable, 
 plied them with persuasions to proceed in a 
 gentle manner, and to restrain the fury of their 
 associates ; giving them assurance, that " the 
 five thousand would be declared ; and from 
 them, by regular succession, at the pleasure of 
 the five thousand, the four hundredshould be 
 appointed ; conjuring them, in the meantime, 
 " not to forward, through impatience, the de- 
 struction of the state, nor give it up for a prey 
 to the public enemy." The whole multitude 
 of the heavy-armed, attentive to these argu- 
 ments, on which many expatiated at large and 
 pressed home upon numbers, became more 
 tractable than they were at first, and were most 
 terribly alarmed at the mention of the total de- 
 struction of their polity. It was at last con- 
 cluded, that, on a set day, an assembly should 
 be held in the temple of Bacchus, to devise an 
 accommodation. 
 
 But, when this assembly, to be held in the 
 temple of Bacchus, came on, and all parties 
 were oiily not completely met, comes in the 
 news that " the two and forty sail and Hege- 
 sandrides are coasting along from Megara to- 
 wards Salamis." Not one of the heavy-armed 
 this moment but pronounced it true, what be- 
 fore was given out by Theramenes and his 
 friends, that " to the new fortifications these 
 ships are now bound ;" and it was judged that 
 in the nick of time they had been levelled 
 with the ground. But Hegesandrides, as 
 perhaps had beforehand been concerted, only 
 hovered about at Epidaurus or the adjacent 
 coast. It is however probable, that, on ac- 
 count of the present sedition amongst the 
 Athenians, he lay for a time in this station, 
 in hope to seize some fair opportunity to strike 
 a blow. 
 
 Be this as it will, the Athenians no sooner 
 heard the news, than; to a man, they flocked 
 dovim amain to the Pirjeus ; less alarmed at 
 their own domestic war, than at invasion from 
 a public enemy, no longer remote, but at their 
 very ports. Some of them threw themselves 
 on board Vfhat shipping was ready ; others 
 launched such as were aground; and others 
 posted themselves upon the walls and at thiv 
 month of the harbour. 
 2K 
 
330 
 
 PELOPONNES-IAN WAR. 
 
 [book viir. 
 
 But the .Feloponnesian fleet, having sailed 
 by and doubled the cape of Sunium, comes to 
 anchor between Thoricus and Phrasise, and 
 proceeds afterwards to Oropus. Hereupon 
 the Athenians, in all imaginable hurry, man- 
 ning out their ships with what hands could be 
 got on this sudden emergency, as in a city dis- 
 tracted with sedition, and yet eager to stave 
 oflF the greatest danger that had ever threatened 
 it, (for, as Attica was occupied by the enemy, 
 Euboea was now their all,) cause Thymocharia, 
 a commander, to stand away with their fleet to 
 Eretria. On their arrival there, and their 
 j unction with such as were already in Euboea, 
 they amounted to six and thirty sail, and were 
 immediately forced to engage : for Hegesan- 
 dridas, after the hour of repast, came out in line 
 of battle from Oropus. 
 
 The distance of Oropus from the city of the 
 Eretrians, across the sea, is about sixty stadia j' 
 and therefore. Upon his approach, the Athenians 
 ordered their men on board, imagining the 
 soldiers to be ready at hand to obey their or- 
 ders ; whereas they happened not yet to be re- 
 turned from the market, whither they had gone 
 to buy provisions. For, through the manage- 
 ment of the Eretrians, nothing could be got by 
 way of sale, except in such houses as lay in the 
 most remote quarters pf the city ; with an iu' 
 tent that the enemy might attack the Athenians 
 before they were all embarked, and oblige 
 them in a hurrying and disorderly manner to be- 
 gin the fight. Nay, a signal had even been 
 held out to the enemy from Eretria towards 
 Oropus, at what time they ought to come for- 
 ward to the attack. 
 
 Upon so short a notice, the Athenians, hav- 
 ing formed their line as well as they were able, 
 and engaging the enemy before the harbour 
 of Eretria, made however a gallant resistance 
 for a time. At length, being compelled to 
 sheer off, they are pursued to land; and as 
 many of them as ran for safety to the city of 
 the Eretrians suffered the most cruel treat- 
 ment, in being murdered by the hands of men 
 whom they supposed their friends. Such, in- 
 deed, as could reach the fort of Eretria, which 
 was garrisoned by Athenians, are safe ; as also 
 the vessels which could make Chalcis. 
 
 But the Peloponnesians, after making prizes 
 of two and twenty Athenian vessels, and either 
 butchering or making prisoners all on board 
 
 * About six English miles. 
 
 them, erected a trophy. And, no long time 
 after, they caused all Eubosa to revolt, except- 
 ing Oreus, which an Athenian garrison secur- 
 ed, and then settled the state of that island at 
 their own discretion. 
 
 When advice of what was done at Euboea 
 reached Athens, the greatest consternation 
 ensued of all that had to this day been known. 
 Not even the dreadful blow received in Sicily, 
 though great concern, in truth, it gfave them, 
 nor any other public disaster, caused so terrible 
 an alarm amongst them. For, at a time 'when 
 their army at Samos was in open revolt, when 
 they had no longer either shipping in store or 
 mariners to go on board, when they were dis- 
 tracted with intestine sedition, and ready each 
 moment to tear one another to pieces ;.^and 
 on the neck of all these this great calamity 
 supervened, in which they lost their fleet, and 
 (what was more of consequence) Euboea, 
 which had better supplied their necessities 
 than Attica itself, — ^had they not ample reason 
 not to fall into utter dejectioni But what 
 alarmed them most was the proximity of ruin, 
 in case the enemy, flushed with their late sue 
 cess, should stand immediately into the Pirxus, 
 now utterly destitute of ships. Not a moment 
 passed but they imagined they were only not 
 in the very harbour ; which, in truth, had they 
 been a little more daring, they might easily 
 have been. Nay, had they made this step and 
 blocked up the city, they must infallibly have 
 increased the seditions within it ; must have 
 necessitated the fleet to come over from louia, 
 though averse to the oligarchy, in order to pre- 
 vent the ruin of their own relations and tha 
 total destruction of their country ; and, in the 
 meantime, Hellespont, Ionia, the isles even 
 up to Euboea, in a word, the whole empire of 
 Athens, must have been their own. Yet, not 
 in this instance only, but many others, the 
 Lacedffimonians showed themselves most com- 
 modious enemies for the Athenians to encoun- 
 ter : for, as nothing difiered more than their 
 respective tempers ; the one being active, the 
 other slow ; enterprising these, but timorous 
 those, especially in naval competitions ; they 
 gave Wem many advantages. The truth of this 
 the Syracusans most plainly showed, who very 
 nearly resembled the Athenians in disposition, 
 and so warred against them with the highest 
 spirit and success. 
 
 Terrified, however, at these tidings, the Athe- 
 nians made a shift to man out twenty vessels, 
 
YEAR XXI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 331 
 
 and convened an assembly of the people, on 
 the first report of their loss, in the place which 
 is -called the Pnyx, and where generally that 
 assembly was held. In this they put an end 
 to the administration of the four hundred, and 
 decreed "the supreme power to be vested in 
 the five thousand, which number to consist of 
 all such citizens as were enrolled for the heavy 
 armour; and that no one should receive a 
 salary for any public magistracy ; whoever 
 offended in this point thSy declared a traitor." 
 Other frequent assemblies were afterwards held, 
 in which they appointed Nomothetae,' and filled 
 up the other posts in the government. And 
 now, at least, though for the first time in my 
 opinion, the Athenians seem to have modelled 
 their government aright. A moderation, finely 
 tempered between the few and the many, was 
 now enforced. And, from the low situation 
 in which their affairs were now plunged, this 
 enabled Athens to re-erect her head. 
 
 They decreed, farther, the recalment of Al- 
 cibiades and his adherents ; and, despatching a 
 deputation to him and the army at Samos, ex- 
 horted them to exert their utmost efforts for 
 the public service, 
 
 In the first moments of this new revolution, 
 Pisander and Alexicles, with their partizans, 
 and in general all the great sticklers for the 
 oligarchy, withdraw privately to Decelea. But 
 Aristarchus, who was one of the generals of 
 the state, took a different route from all the 
 rest; and, carrying off a party of archers, though 
 rank Barbarians, went off towards Oenoe: 
 Oenoe was a fortress of the Athenians on the 
 frontiers of Bceotia. But the Corinthians, on 
 a provocation peculiar to themselves, having 
 procured the concurrence of the Boeotians, 
 held it now blocked up, because a party of their 
 countrymen, drawing off from Decelea, had 
 been put to the sword by a sally of the garrison 
 from Oenoe. Aristarchus, therefore, having 
 in a conference settled matters with the be- 
 siegers, deceives the garrison in Oenoe, by 
 assuring them, that, " as their countrymen in 
 Athens had made up all their quarrels with 
 
 • The general course of appointing Nomothetie was 
 by lot. Their number in the whole wna a thousand and 
 one. Their business was not, as the name seems to 
 imply, to make new laws, since that belonged to the 
 supreme power lodged in the people ; but to inspect 
 such as were already made, to reconsider such as were 
 thought to be, or were complained of, as grievous, 
 njid regularly report such as ought to be continued or 
 ought to be repealed. 
 
 the Lacedaemonians, they also were bound to 
 deliver up this place to the Boeotians; and that 
 this was an express provision in the treaty." 
 Giving credit therefore to him as in pub- 
 lic command, and ignorant of all the late 
 transactions, because closely blocked up, they 
 agree with the enemy and evacuate the for- 
 tress. In this manner the Bceotians regained 
 possession Sf abandoned Oenoe : and thus 
 the oligarchy and sedition were suppressed 
 at Athens. 
 
 But, about the same space of time in the 
 current summer, in regard to the Peloponne- 
 sians at Miletus .■—When none of those, who 
 were substituted by Tissaphernes during his 
 absence at Aspendus, made regular payments ; 
 and nothing could be seen either of Tissapher- 
 nes or the Phoenician fleet, and Philippus, who 
 accompanied him, sent advice to Mindarus, the 
 admiral in chief; and Hippocrates, farther, a 
 citizen of Sparta, who was then at Phaselis, 
 advised him also, that, " this fleet would never 
 join him, and in all respects they were shame- 
 fully abused by Tissaphernes ;" — as Pharnaba- 
 zus had made them an invitation, and declared 
 himself ready, if aided by the confederate fleei, 
 to engage as strongly as Tissaphernes for the 
 revolt of what cities yet remained in subjection 
 to the Athenians ; — Mindarus, hoping to find 
 more punctuality in the latter, with notable 
 conduct, and by a sudden signal to the fleet, 
 that his motions might not be discovered at 
 Samos, weighs from Miletus with seventy- 
 three sail, and bent his course to the Helles- 
 pont, But, earlier this summer, sixteen ships 
 had steered their course thither, and ravaged 
 part of the Chersonesus. Mindarus met with 
 tempestuous weather in his passage, which 
 forced him to put into Icarus ; and, after 
 staying there five or six days for want of 
 weather to keep the sea, he arrives at Chios. 
 
 Thrasyllus, so soon as informed of the depar- 
 ture from Miletus, stood after him with five 
 and fifty sail, making the best of his way lest 
 the other should enter the Hellespont before 
 he reached him. ' But, gaining intelligence that 
 he was put into Chios, and concluding he de- 
 signed to remain there, he fixed his scouts at 
 Lesbos and the opposite continent; that, if 
 the Peloponnesian fleet put out, their motions 
 might be descried. He himself, repairing to 
 Methymne, ordered quantities of meal and 
 other necessaries to be prepared, that in case 
 he should be forced to stay in these parts, he 
 
332 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VIII. 
 
 might make frequent cruises from Lesbos 
 against Chios. 
 
 But, as Eressus in Lesbos had revolted, his 
 design was farther to attempt its reduction, in 
 case it were feasible. For some of the Methy- 
 nean exiles, and those not the most inconsider- 
 able of the number, having brought over from 
 Cyme about fifty heavy-armed who were most 
 firmly attached to their cause, and hired others 
 from the continent, which increased their num- 
 ber to about three hundred, Anaxarchus, the 
 Theban, in respect of consanguinity, being 
 chosen their leader, — assaulted first Methymne ; 
 and, being repulsed in the attempt by the 
 Athenian garrison which came up from Mity- 
 lene, and then driven quite ofi" by a battle fought 
 in the field, they retired across the mountain, and 
 make Eressus revolt. Thrasyllus, therefore, 
 steering with his fieet against Eressus, project- 
 ed an assault. But Thrasybulus, with five 
 ships from Samos, arrived there before him, 
 upon information received of the re-passage 
 of the exiles ; yet, coming too late before 
 Eressus to prevent a revolt, he lay at anchor 
 before it. Two other ships, also, bound home- 
 wards from the Hellespont, came in, and the 
 Methymnean. All the ships in the fleet 
 amounted now to sixty-seven, from which they 
 draughted an army for the operations of land, 
 as fully bent, if possible, to take Eressus by 
 a bold assault, with engines and all the arts of 
 attack. 
 
 In the meantime, Mindarus and the Pelo- 
 ponnesian fleet at Chios, after two whole days 
 employment in taking in provisions, and receiv- 
 ing from the Chians every man on board three 
 Chian tesseracosts,' on the third day with 
 urgent despatch launch out from Chios into 
 the wide sea, that they might not be descried 
 by the fleet before Eressus ; and leaving 
 Lebos on the left, stood over to the con- 
 tinent. There, putting into the harbour of 
 Cratersei on the coast of Phocea, and taking 
 their noon repast, they proceeded along the 
 coast of Cyme, and supped at Arginusje 
 of the continent, against Mitylene. From 
 thence, at dead of night, they went forwards 
 along the shore ; and, being arrived at Herma- 
 
 ' This, according to Spaniieim, was a inontli's pay, 
 since lie explains it by forty-three Chian drachmas. 
 But the words will not bear such a construction : a 
 tesseracost was, it is most probable, a coin peculiar to 
 the Chians ; but of what value it is not known, nor is 
 U of any great importance. 
 
 tus which lies facing Methymne, and having 
 eat their dinner there, they passed with the 
 utmost speed by Lectus, and Larissa, and 
 Amaxitus, and other adjacent places, and reach 
 Rhsetium of the Hellespont before midnight. 
 Not but that some ships of the fleet got up no 
 farther than to Sigaeum and some other adja- 
 cent places on that coast. 
 
 The Athenians, who were lying with 
 eighteen sail at Sestus, when the lights were 
 waved by their own friends for signals, and 
 they beheld numerous fires kindled on a sud- 
 den on the hostile coast, were well assured 
 that the Peloponne§ians are approaching. The 
 same night, therefore, under favour of the dark, 
 and with the utmost expedition, they crept 
 along under the Chersonesus, and reached 
 Eleus, desirous to put out to sea, and avoid 
 the enemy ; and, for the sixteen ships at Aby- 
 dus, they stole away unperceived of the Aby- 
 dians, though notice had been sent them from 
 their friends just arrived, to keep a good look- 
 out, and not sufler them to steal ofi". Yet 
 morning no sooner appeared, than, finding 
 themselves in sight of the fleet under Minda- 
 rus, and that they were actually chased, they 
 could not all get off. The greater part, indeed, 
 fled safe to the continent dnd Lemnos ; but 
 four, that got last under sail, are overtaken by 
 the enemy near Eleus; one, also, that ran 
 ashore at the temple of Protesilaus, they seize 
 with all her hands ; and two more, the crews 
 of which escaped. One, farther, but aban- 
 doned, they bum at Imbrus. 
 
 This doije, the ships from Abydus having 
 joined them, and the whole fleet being now 
 increased to fourscore and six sail, they spent 
 the rest of the day in investing Eleus ; but, 
 as it would not surrender, they drew off to 
 Abydus. 
 
 The Athenians, who had been deceived by 
 their scouts, and never imagined that so large a 
 number of hostile ships could pass along un- 
 descried, were very coolly carrying on their siege; 
 but yet were no sooner informed of the ene- 
 my's motions, than, instantly quitting Eressus, 
 they advanced with the utmost expedition to 
 secure the Hellespont. They also pick up two 
 ships of the Peloponnesians ; which, running 
 out too boldly to sea in the late pursuit, fell in 
 amongst them : and, coming up only one day 
 after them, they anchor at Eleus, and re-as- 
 semble from Imbrus the ships which had fled 
 thither. Five whole days they spend here in 
 
YEAR XXI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 333 
 
 getting every thing in readiness for a general 
 engagement : and after this respite they came 
 to an action in the following manner. 
 
 The Athenians, ranged in line of battle 
 a-head, stood along shore towards Sestus. The 
 Peloponneslans, aware of their design, stood 
 out to sea from Abydus, to be ready to receive 
 them. And, as both sides were determined to 
 engage, they unfolded their lines to a greater 
 length ; the Athenians, along the Chersonesus, 
 reaching from Idacus to Arrhiana, in all sixty- 
 eight sail ; and the Peloponnesians over-against 
 them from Abydus to Dardanus, being eighty- 
 six. The line of the Peloponnesians was thus 
 formed : the Syracusans had the right ; and on 
 the left was ranged Mindarus, and the ships most 
 remarkable for being good sailers. Amongst 
 the Athenians, Thracyllus had the left, and 
 Thrasybulus the right: the rest of the com- 
 manders were regularly pasted according to 
 their rank. The Peloponnesians, showing 
 most eagerness to begin the engagement, en- 
 deavoured with their left to over-reach the 
 right of the Athenians, in order to exclude 
 them, if possible, from stretching out into the 
 main sea, and, by keeping them cramped up, to 
 force their centre against the shore, which was 
 not far distant. The Athenians, aware of the 
 enemy's design to shut them up, plying up 
 a-head, forced themselves an opening, and in 
 Velocity beat them all to nothing. 
 
 By these motions, the left of their line be- 
 came extended beyond the cape called Cynos- 
 sema. Tfie consequence of which was expos- 
 ing their centre, composed only of the weakest 
 ships, and those ranged at too great a distance 
 from one another ; especially as in number of 
 vessels they were quite inferior, and as the 
 coast round the Cynos-sema was sharp, and in 
 an acute angle runs out into the water, so that 
 part of the line on one side was out of sight of 
 the other. The Peloponnesians, therefore, 
 charging the the centre, drove at once the ships 
 of the Athenians upon the beach ; and, being 
 so far manifestly victors, leaped boldly on shore 
 to pursue them. But neither those under 
 Thrasybulus could assist the centre from the 
 right, because of the multitude of ships that 
 stood in to awe them ; nor could those 
 under Thrasyllus do it from the left, because 
 the interposition of cape Cynos-sema hid from 
 nim the view of what had passed ; and at the 
 same time the Syracusans and others, who. 
 
 equal in strength, lay hard upon him, prevented 
 his moving. At length, the Peloponnesians, 
 presuming the victory their own, broke their 
 order to give different chase to single ships, 
 and in too heedless a manner threw confusion 
 upon a part of their own line. And now those 
 under Thrasybiilus, finding the squadron op- 
 posed to them began to slacken, stopped all far- 
 ther extension of their line a-head ; and tack- 
 ing upon them, resolutely engaged, and put 
 them to flight. Charging next the dispersed 
 ships of the Peloponnesians, which composed 
 the squadron that presumed itself victorious, 
 they made havoc ; and, by striking them with 
 a panic, routed the greater part without resis- 
 tance. Now also the Syracusans were begin- 
 ning to give way before the squadron under 
 Thrasyllus ; and seeing others in open flight, 
 were more easily tempted to follow their ex- 
 ample. The defeat now being manifestly 
 given, and the Peloponnesians flying away for 
 shelter, first towards the river Pydius, and 
 afterwards to Abydus, the Athenians made 
 prize of only an inconsiderable number of 
 shipping; for the Hellespont, being narrow, 
 afforded short retreats to the enemy. How- 
 ever they gained a victory by sea, most oppor- 
 tune indeed in their present situation ; for 
 hitherto, afraid of the naval strength of the 
 Peloponnesians, because of the rebuffs they 
 had lately received from it, and the calamitous 
 event of the Sicilian expedition, from this 
 moment they stopped all fruitless self-accusa- 
 tions or groundless exaggerations of the ene- 
 my's ability by sea. Some ships of the enemy 
 in fact they take ; for instance, eight Chian, five 
 Corinthian, two Ambraciot, two Boeotian ; but, 
 of Leucadian, and Lacedsemonian, and Syracu- 
 san, and Pellenean, a single one of each : but 
 then they suffered the loss of fifteen ships of 
 their own. 
 
 After erecting a trophy upon the cape of 
 Cynos-sema, and picking up the shatters of 
 the fight, and giving up, under truce, their dead 
 to the enemy, they despatched a trireme to 
 Athens to notify the victory. On the arrival of 
 this vessel, those at home, after hearing the news 
 of this unhoped-for success, greatly resumed 
 their spirits, which had been dejected by the 
 recent misfortunes at Euboea and the sad effects 
 of the sedition, and hoped the state might again 
 resume its power if they cheerfully exerted 
 their efforts in its behalf. 
 2k2 
 
334 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 [book VIII. 
 
 On the fourth day after the battle, the 
 Athenians, having diligently refitted their 
 fleet at Sestus, sailed against Cyzicus, which 
 had revolted ; and, descrying eight ships from 
 Byzantium riding at anchor under Harpagium 
 and Priapus, they crowded sail towards them ; 
 and, having in battle upon the shore defeated 
 their crews, made prizes of them all. Repair- 
 ing thence against Cyzicus, which was quite 
 unfortified, they reduced it once more, and ex- 
 acted large contributions from it. 
 
 But, during this interval, the Peloponnesians 
 made a trip from Abydus to Eleus, and brought 
 oS as many of their own ships which had been 
 taken as were able to sail ; the residue the 
 Eleusians burnt. They also despatched Hip- 
 pocrates and Epicles to Euboea, to fetch up 
 their fleet from thence. 
 
 About the same space of time, Alcibiades 
 also, at the head of his squadron of thirteen sail, 
 returned from Caunus and Phaselis into the 
 harbour of Samos, reporting that "by his 
 management he had diverted the junction of 
 the Phoenician fleet with the Peloponnesians, 
 and made Tissaphernes a faster friend than 
 ever to the Athenians." After enlarging his 
 squadron by the addition of nine more just 
 manned, he levied large contributions upon the 
 Halicarnasseans, and fortified Cos. After 
 these exploits, and putting the government of 
 Cos into proper hands, he returned again, about 
 autumn, to Samos.' 
 
 1 As ihe English reader is here to take his leave of 
 AIcil)iades, he may have the curiosity to know what 
 hecame of him after. — Every thing succeeded so well, 
 under him and his active colleagues, that the Laceds- 
 monians, having received several defeats both by land 
 and sea, and lost two hundred ships, were again neces- 
 sitated to sue for peace. After such great services, 
 Alcibiades returned triumphant to Athens. The whole 
 city flocked down lo the Pirteus to meet him. All 
 strove to get a sight of Alcibiades : Tliey caressed 
 him, crowned him, cursed the authors of his exile, and 
 hurried him away to an assembly of the people. There 
 be harangued them for a time ; then stopped and shed 
 tears in almndance ; then harangued them again. In 
 short, they undid' all they had ever done against him ; 
 and Alcibiades for a time was all in all at Athens. 
 Yet, in subseqiient commands, he happened not to be 
 successful ; a crime which his countrymen very seldom 
 forgave. He became asecond time an exile from Athens. 
 His great abilities made him a continual terror both to 
 foreign and domestic enemies. Yet now he persevered 
 to serve his country, by caballing in their favour, and 
 advising them on critical occasions. Yet all in vain : 
 Lysander was soon master of the PirieuB and of Athens. 
 Alcibiades retired into Phrygia, and was handsomely 
 
 From Aspendus also Tissaphernes rode back 
 post haste into Ionia, so soon as advised of the 
 departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Mil- 
 etus for the Hellespont. 
 
 But, as the Peloponnesians were now in 
 the Hellespont, the Antandrians, (who are 
 of .iXlolic descent) having procured from 
 Abydus a party of heavy-armed who marched 
 across mount Ida, received them into their 
 city, provoked to this step by the injurious 
 conduct of Arsaces, a Persian lieutenant to 
 Tissaphernes. This man, pretending he had 
 enemies to cope with whom yet he never 
 named, prevailed with the Delians settled in 
 Adramittium, because they had been obliged 
 by the Athenians to quit Delos in the affair 
 of the expiation, to attend hun in this secret 
 expedition with the flower of their strength ; 
 and, leading them forwards with all the show 
 of friendship and alliance, watched the oppor- 
 tunity when they were busy at their meal, 
 surrounded them with a body of his own 
 soldiers, and shot them to death with darts. 
 Fearing him, therefore, because of this in- 
 stance of a cruel temper, lest some such 
 act of violence he might execute also upon 
 them, as in other respects he had imposed 
 some burdens upon them which they could 
 not bear, the Antandrians eject his garrison 
 out of their citadel. But Tissaphernes, per- 
 ceiving how deeply the Peloponiiesians were 
 concerned in this aflair, and esteeming him- 
 self sadly injured also at Miletus and Cnidus 
 (since in those places too his garrisons had 
 been ejectad ;) and fearing they would pro- 
 ceed to other commissions of the same na- 
 ture ; chagrined moreover that perhaps Phar- 
 nabazus, in less time and with less expense, 
 having obtained their concurrence, should 
 make a greater progress against the Athenians ; 
 — he determined in person to repair to Helles- 
 pont, in order to expostulate with them about 
 
 supported by the bounty of his friend Pharnabazus; 
 who however was wrought upon at last, by the joint 
 solicitations of his enemies and the plea of its necessity 
 for the service of the king, to undertake his destruC' 
 tion. The agents of Pharnabazus durst not attempt 
 him in an open manner, but set fire to his house by 
 night. By throwing in clothes to damp the flames, 
 he got out safe. The Barbarians soon spied him, 
 shot him to death with arrows and darts, tlien cut 
 off liis head, and carried it to Pliarnatiazus. I shall 
 only add, that he was but forty years old when he was 
 thus destroyed. 
 
YEAR XXI.] 
 
 PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 335 
 
 their late proceedings at Antander, and to wipe 
 off, as handsomely as he could, the aspersions 
 thrown upon his own conduct in regard to the 
 Phoenician fleet and other points. Arriving 
 therefore first at Ephesus, he offered sacrifice 
 to Diana * • • • • • i 
 
 When the winter following this summer 
 shall be ended, the twenty-first year of the war 
 will be also completed. 
 
 " Here breaks off abruptly the history of the Pelopon- 
 nesian war by Thucydidea. The adjuatment of time 
 annexed aeema plainly of another hand* 
 
INDEX. 
 
 MronychuB, 30. 
 
 Acanthus y 187. 
 
 AcarTiajiiajis ; excellent slingerB, 83 — conquer tbe Am- 
 braciots, 129— make peace with them, 131 — enter into 
 an alliance with the Athenians, 77. 
 
 AcharTuans^ 61. 
 
 Admetusy king of the Molossians, 45. 
 
 ^antidas, tyrant of Lampsacus, S40. 
 
 ^ginetm, formerly of great power at sea, € — stir up the 
 war against the Atheniana, 21 — conquered by the 
 Athenians at sea, 34 — how and why expelled ^gina 
 by the Athenians, 63 — are settled by the Lacedrcmo* 
 nians at Thyrea, ib. — how used by the Athenians 
 when they reduced Thyrea, 152. 
 
 Egyptians f which of them most warlike, 35. 
 
 JEneas, 173. ' 
 
 ^nesiasj 53. 
 
 mSEniana, 281. 
 
 ^olians, tributary to Athens, 2S1. 
 
 tMsimideSy 16. 
 
 JEsouy 194. 
 
 .MtheanSf 33. 
 
 ^tolians^ 3— invaded by the Athenians, ISS-HJefeat 
 them, 126. 
 
 Agamemnon^ 4. 
 
 Jlgatharchidas, 83. 
 
 jSgathareuSf 267. 
 
 Mgesander, 47. 
 
 jSgesippidaSj 201. 
 
 Mgis, king of Sparta, 123, 133— he commands against 
 the Argives, 201— lets them gowithoutabaltle,202— 
 is accused for it at Sparta, 203— marches a second 
 lime against them, ib.— gains the victory at Manti- 
 nea, 207— fortifies Decelea in Attica, 265 — makes an 
 unsuccessftil attempt on Athens, 319. 
 
 JlgnoUj 88— the son of Nicias, colleague to Pericles, 38 
 — beeiegeth Potidjea, 72— the founder of Amphipolis, 
 167, 183. 
 
 jSgrwans, 130. 
 
 J3grianians, 89. 
 
 Agrigentineat neutral in the Sicilian war, 282. 
 
 Alcceus, archon at Athens, 188. 
 
 Alcamenes, 297, 299. 
 
 Alcibiades, son of Clinias, 195- his expedition into Pelo- 
 ponnesus, 200— and to Argos, 210— named for one of 
 the commanders in Sicily, 220— his speech on that oc- 
 casion, 223— is accused about the Mercuries, and for 
 profaning the mysteries, 227,237-inaists on a trial,228 
 -^sets out for Sicily ,ib.— his opinion at a council of war, 
 236— is recalled to take his trial, 237— flies and is out- 
 lawed, 241— takes refuge at Sparta, 25 1— his speech at 
 Sparta, ib.— adviseth the Lacedemonians about prose- 
 cuting the war, 297, 299— sent lo Chios with Chalci- 
 50 
 
 deus, 300— his transactions at Miletus, 301— goes to 
 Tissaphernes, and becomes a favourite, 310 — con- 
 trives his own recalment to Athens, 311— his quarrel 
 with Phrynichus, 312— is recalled, 323, 331— his man- 
 agement at Samos, 323, 325— goes to Aspendus, 326. 
 
 Alcidasj the Lacedemonian admiral, sent to Lesbos, 98, 
 101 — he flies, 102— returns to Peloponnesus, 117 — 
 sails to Corcyra, 118— one of the three leaders of the 
 colony to Heraclea, 124. 
 
 Atcinidas, 187, 188. 
 
 Alciphron, 202. 
 
 AlcmiBon, 91, 
 
 AlcmiBonidtBf 240. 
 
 Alexarckus, 265. 
 
 AlexicleSf put under arrest, 328 — flies to Decelea, 331. 
 
 AlexippidaSy 315. 
 
 AmbraeiotSfaid the Corinthians against the Corcyreans, 
 9, 10— make war on the Amphilochians, 77— and the 
 Acarnanians, 82 — make another expedition against 
 both, 127— take OIps, 128— are defeated, 129— make 
 peace, 131— send aid to the Syracusans, 282. 
 
 Ameiniast 177. 
 
 Ameiniades, 77. 
 
 AminocleSy 5. 
 
 AmorgeSf revolts from the king of Persia, 297— is taken 
 prisoner by the Pcloponnesians, and delivered to Tis- 
 saphernes, 305, 
 
 Ampelidas, 187. 
 
 Ampkias, 173, 
 
 Amphilochians, 77, 130. 
 , AmphissensianSt 126. 
 
 Amyntas, 88. 
 
 Amyrtmis, 35. 
 
 Anaxarchus, 332. 
 
 AnaxilaSf 219. 
 
 AndocideSf 16. 
 
 Androcles, 317. 
 
 AndromeneSf 194, 
 
 AndrostheneSj 199, 
 
 Andrians, 281. 
 
 Anthippus, 187, 188, 
 
 Anticles, 38, 
 
 AntimenidaSf 194. 
 
 Antiochus, king of the Orestlans, 82. 
 
 Antiphemus, 218. 
 
 Antipho, 318, 327. 
 
 Antisthenes, 308, 316. 
 
 AntitanianSf 82. 
 
 Apodoti, 124. 
 
 Arcadians, furnished with ships by Agamemnon inthe 
 Trojan expedition, 4— mercenaries, 281. 
 
 Archedice, 240. 
 
 Archelaus, 90. 
 
 337 
 
338 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 ArcJiestratus, 19. 
 
 ArchetimiLS^ 10. 
 
 Archias, of Camarina, 141. 
 
 Arckas, the Corinthian, founder of Syracuse, 218. 
 
 Archidamus, king of Sparta, his speech about the war, 
 26— commands in the invasion of Attica, 56 — his 
 speech, ib. — commands in another invasion, 60 — and 
 against Flateea, 78. 
 
 Arckonides^ 259. 
 
 Argyllians, a colony of Andrians, 167 
 
 Argives, have thirty-years' truces with the Lacedemo- 
 nians, 184 — are irritated by the Corinthians against 
 he Lacedemonians, 189 — aim at bein g a leading state, 
 ib. — make war upon the Epidaurians, 200 — are sur- 
 rounded by the Lacedemonians, but let go, 202 — are 
 defeated at Mantinea,and make peace, 207, 208. 
 
 ArianthidaSf 163. 
 
 Aristagoras, 167, 
 
 Aristarchus, 327,328, 331. 
 
 Aristeus, son of Fellicas, 10. 
 
 Aristeus, son of Adimantus, 19, 21, 77. 
 
 Aristeus^ the Lacedemonian, 177. 
 
 Aristides, son of Lysimachus, 30. 
 
 Aristides, sonof Archippus, 150, 158. 
 
 AHstocles, 185, 206. 
 
 Aristocatesy 187. 
 
 AHstocrates, 188, 327, 328. 
 
 Aristogiton^ 7, 238. 
 
 AristOy 273. 
 
 Aristonous, of Lari^a, 62 . 
 
 Aristophon, 325. 
 
 Aristotle, son of Timocrates, 128. 
 
 ArribtBus, king of the Lyncestians, 160 — warred against 
 by Brasidas and Perdiccas, ib. 174. 
 
 Artabazjis,42. 
 
 Artaphemes, 150. 
 
 Artas, 271. 
 
 Artaxerxes Longimanus , 33 — begins to reign, 46 — dies, 
 —150. 
 
 Asopius, son of Phormio, his exploits and death, 94. 
 
 AstymachuBy 111. 
 
 Astyochus, the Lacedemonian admiral, 301— 306— goes 
 to Chios, 302 — in great danger, 306 — refuses to suc- 
 cour the Chians, ib.— betrays Phrynichus, 312— is 
 mutinied against by his own seamen, aqd returns to 
 Sparta, 324. 
 
 Athenians, gave shelter at first to all who would settle 
 amongst them, 2— had war with the ^Eginetie, 21— 
 how they became a naval power, 7-abandoned Athens 
 and fought at Sa1amis,34 — rebuilt their walls, 29 — 
 made war against the king of Persia, under Pausaoiaa, 
 31-— gain a victory at Eurymedon, 32— reduce the isle 
 of Thasos, ib. — receive the Helots, and settle them at 
 Naupactus, 33 — their war in Egypt, ib. 3S — with the 
 Corinthians, ib.— and Epidaurians, and .£ginets,34 
 — with the Lacedemonians, 35 — Bctotians, 36 — Sicyo- 
 nians, ib. — Cyprians, ib.— recover Chaerona, ib. — de- 
 feated at Coronea, ib — reduce Euboea, 37 — make war 
 upon Samos, 38— make alliance with the Corcyreans, 
 15 — assist them against the Corinthians, 16— their 
 measures with the PotidEeans, 19— make war upon 
 Perdiccas, ib. — fight the Potidseans and Corinthians, 
 20— besiege Potidsa, 21 — deliberate about the Pelo- 
 ponnesian war, 47 — prepare for defence, 55 — send 
 their fleet to cruise upon Peloponnesus, 62 — attack 
 Methone, ib. — invade Locris, 63 — eject the ^ginetae 
 from the isle of ^gina, ib. — make an alliance with 
 Sitalces, ib. — take Solium and Astacua, 64 — invade 
 
 the Megaris, ib. — fortify A talan te, ib.— celebrate the 
 public funeral, ib, — are afflicted with the plague, 69 — 
 send their fleets to cruise on Peloponnesus, 72 — are 
 angry with Pericles, 73 — take Potidcea, 78 — war upon 
 the Chalcideans, 81 — fight the Peloponnesians at sea 
 83 — send a fleet to Lesbos, 93 — besiege Mitylene, 94 — 
 reduce it, 101 — seize the island of Minoa, 110 — send 
 a fleet to Sicily, 122 — their war in Acarnania, 124— 
 are defeated by the .^tolians, 126— their proceedings 
 in Sicily, 133 — they seize and fortify Pylus, 134— 
 fight between them and the Lacedemonians, 336 — 
 fight the Syracusans, 140, 141— invade the Corinth- 
 ians, 147— take Anactorium, 150 — conquer Cythera, 
 151 — takeThyrea, 152— surprise Nisjea, 156 — invade 
 Boeotia, and are defeated at Delium, 163, 165— lose 
 Amphipolis, 167— make a truce with the Lacedemo- 
 nians, 171~take Mende, 176— besiege Scione. 177— 
 eject the Delians, 179— are conquered by Brasidas at 
 Amphipolis, 183 — make a peace, 185 — take Scione, 
 191 — want 10 break the peace, 195 — make an alliance 
 with the Argives, 197— invade and reduce MqIos,210 
 — determine on the Sicilian expedition, 217— their 
 preparations, 227— they sail for Sicily, 228— land at 
 Syracuse, 242— fight, 243 — solicit the alliance of Ca- 
 marina, 246 — take Epipola, 255— besiege Syracuse, 
 256— fight with Gylippus, 261-^send a reinforcement 
 to Syracuse, 265 — fight the Corinthians at Erineus, 
 271 — defeated in the attack of EpipoJjD, 276— are 
 raising the siege, 278— are stopped by an eclipse of the 
 moon, ib. — fight the battle in the harbour, 266— march 
 away, 288 — forced to surrender, 292, 293 — their con- 
 sternation at Athens, 295 — their measures, 296— take 
 Mitylene, 302— subdue the Clazomenians, 303— be- 
 siege the Chians, ib. — defeat the Milesians, 304 — quit 
 Miletus for fear of the Peloponnesians, ib. — fight and 
 are defeated, 309— solicit the friendship of Tissa- 
 phernes, 314— fight with the Chians, 316— lose their 
 democracy, ib. — lose Eubosa, 330 — defeat the Pelo- 
 ponnesians in the battle of Cynos-sema, 333. 
 
 AthentBus, 173. 
 
 Atkenagorasy his speech at Syracme, 232. 
 
 Atreusy 4- 
 
 Autoclest 151, 173, 
 
 B 
 
 Battusy 148. 
 
 BcBotiansy ejected out of Arne, 5 — conquered by the 
 Athenians at Oenophyta, 35— become free, 36— win 
 the battle of Delium, 165 — besiege Delium, 166— take 
 Fanactum, 180 — send aid to the Syracusans, 265. 
 
 Baotian Rulers, eleven in number, 163, 193— four 
 councils, ib, 
 
 Bomiensians, 1525. 
 
 Bottisansy 19,81, 90. 
 
 Braaidasy saves Methone, and receives the public com- 
 mendation at Sparta, 62, 63— is of the council to Alci- 
 das, 118 — his gallant behaviour at Pylus, 136— saves 
 Megara,158 — marches to Thrace, 159— his character, 
 160 — marches eigainst the Lyncestians, ib.— harangues 
 the Acantbians, IHl— gets possession of Amphipolis, 
 168 — is repulsed at Eion, 169 — marches into Acte, 170 
 — takes Torone, ib. — and Lecy thus, 171 — crowned by 
 the Scioneans, 173 — marches a second time againstthe 
 Lyncestians, 174 — his brave retreat, 175 — makes an 
 unsuccessful attempt on Potidffia, 178 — opposes Cleon 
 at Amphipolis, 181 — resolves to attack, 182— ha- 
 rangues, ib. — salUes, 183 — conquers and dies, ib. — hip 
 funeral, ib. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 339 
 
 Sraures, 169. 
 
 Byzantines^ revolt from the Athenians, 37. 
 
 Callias, son of Calliades, 20— killed, 21. 
 
 CallicrateSf 10. 
 
 Calliensians, 125. 
 
 Camarineans^ twice ejected, 219— their conduct in the 
 Sicilian war, 237, 250. 
 
 CambyseSjG, 
 
 Carcinus^ 62. 
 
 CarianSf 2, 3. 
 
 Carthaginians, 6, 231, 252. 
 
 Carystians, 32, 281. 
 
 Cataneans, dwell under mount iEtna, 132 — reduced by 
 the Athenians, 237, 282. 
 
 Cecropsy king of Athens, 59. 
 
 Ceryces, 313. 
 
 Chareas, 321,325. 
 
 Chalcidens^ the Lacedemonian admiral, 299 — bis ex- 
 ploits, 300, 301— killed by the Athenians, 303. 
 
 Chalcideans of Eubcea, make war with the Eretrians, 
 6— subject to the Athenians, 281. 
 
 Chalcideans of Thrace, revolt from the Athenians, 19 
 —defeat them, 81 — enter into league with the Ar- 
 gives, 191. 
 
 Chaonians, 82. 
 
 Charicles, 266', 268. 
 
 Charminus^ an Athenian commander, 306 — defeated by 
 the Peloponnesians, 309 — helps the oligarchial party 
 at Samos, 320. 
 
 Charmadas, son of Euphilitus, 122 — killed, 123. 
 
 Chionis, 187, 188. 
 
 Chiaiis, suspepted, 298 — revolt ftom the Athenians, 300 
 — their war, 303. 
 
 Chrysis, 53, 178. 
 
 Cilicians, 36. 
 
 Cimon, son of Miltiades, takes Eion, 32 — beats the Per- 
 sians at Eurymedon, ib. — dies in the expedition to 
 Cyprus, 36. 
 
 Clearchus, 323. 
 
 Clearidas, commands in Amphipolis, 177, 182 — con- 
 quers Cleon with Brasidas, 183 — endeavours to break 
 the peace, 187. 
 
 Cleippides, 93. 
 
 Cleobulus, 193. 
 
 Clcomedes, 211. 
 
 Cleomenes, 42. 
 
 Cleon, his speech, 103 — command atPylus, 143, 144, 146 
 —his command in Thrace, 179, 181— conquered by 
 Brasidas, and killed, 183. 
 
 Cleopompus, 72. 
 
 Cnemus,the Spartan, commands a squadron against Za- 
 cynthuB, 77— sent into Acarnania, 82 — retires from 
 Stratus, 83, 
 
 Co7ion, 270. 
 
 CopiensiasiSf 164. 
 
 Corcyreans, founders of Epidamnus, 8— were them- 
 selves a Corinthian colony, 9— make war on Epidam- 
 nus, ib.— beat the Corinthians at sea, 10— beg the al- 
 liance of Athens, 11— their speech at Athens, 12— 
 their success, 15— engage the Corinthians at sea, 15— 
 tlieir sedition, 177, 149— aid the Athenians in the war 
 of Sicily, 281. 
 
 Corinthians, first built ships of war, 5— their quarrel 
 with the Corcyreans about Epidamnus, 9— their 
 
 speech-at Athens, Id— continuation of their war with 
 the Corcyreans, 16— send aid to Potidffia, 20— hate 
 the Athenians, 21— their first speech at Lacedemon, 
 ibid. — their second, 39— excite discontent in Pelo- 
 ponnesus, 188, 189— make alliances with the Ele- 
 ans and Argives, 191— aid the Syracusana, 254, 
 264. 
 
 Coroneans, 164. 
 
 Cranians, 64. 
 
 Cranonians,GQ, 
 
 CrattBmenes, 318. 
 
 Crestonians, 170. 
 
 Cretans, 281. 
 
 CrcRsus, 6. 
 
 Cyclops, 217, 
 
 Cylon, the history of him, 41. 
 
 Cynes, 91. 
 
 Cijrus the elder, 6. 
 
 Cyrus the younger, 33. 
 
 Daithus, 187. 
 
 Damagetus, 187, 
 
 Damagon, 124. 
 
 Damotimus, 173. 
 
 Darius, king of Persia, succeeds Cambyses, 6— reduces 
 the isles, ib. 
 
 Darius, son of Artaxerxes, 297 — his leagues with the 
 Lacedemonians, 301, 307, 315. 
 
 Dascon, 219. 
 
 Delians, removed outof Deloa by the Athenians, 179— 
 brought thither again, 191. 
 
 Demaratus, 258. 
 
 Demarchus, 325. 
 
 Demodochus, 158. 
 
 Demosthenes, 123 — his war in ^Stolia, 125 — his seizure 
 of and exploits at Pylus, 134, 135— his harangue, 136 
 — his attempt on Megara, 155 — carries up a reinforce- 
 ment against Syracuse, 265— arrives at Syracuse, 274 
 — repulsed at Epipolie, 275 — is for raising the siege, 
 277 — decamps, 287— surrenders with the troops un- 
 der his command, 292—19 put to death, 293. 
 
 Demoteles, 141. 
 
 Dercylidas, 316. 
 
 Derdas, 19. 
 
 Dersaans, 90. 
 
 Dians, 89. 
 
 Dictideans, takeThyssus, 192 — dwell on mount Athofl, 
 209— revolt from the Athenians, ib. 
 
 Diempoms, 53. 
 
 Diitriphes, 269. 
 
 Diodotus, his speech, 106. 
 
 Diomedon, besieges the Chians, 303— favours the de- 
 mocracy, 320. 
 
 Diomilus, 16. 
 
 Diotrephes, 317 
 
 Diphilus, 271. 
 
 Dolopes, 32. 
 
 DorciSf 31. 
 
 Dorians, in Peloponnesus, 5— founders of Lacedemon, 
 34, 124— bordering on the Carlans, 56— warred upon 
 by the Phociana, 34— perpetual enemies to Ionian!>, 
 248. 
 
 Dorieus the Rhodian, 95. 
 
 DorieuB the Thurian, 307. 
 
 Droans of Thrace, 90. 
 
340 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 E 
 
 Edonians. 33, 90, 170. 
 
 Egesteans^ at war with the Selinuntians, 219— solicit 
 
 aid of Athens, ib. — their trick, 235. 
 Eleanst defeated by the Athenians, 63 — an alliance 
 
 with the Corinthians and Argives, 190 — ^with the 
 
 Athenians, 197. 
 Eleusinians, warred against Erectheus, 59. 
 ElymU2i7. 
 Empediasy 187, 188. 
 Endiusj the Spartan, 297 — ambassador to Athens, 196 
 
 —his enmity with Agis, 299. 
 Entimus, the Cretan, founder of Gela, 218. 
 E-^rdians, 90. 
 Epidamnians, harassed with seditions, 9— beg aid at 
 
 Corey ra, ib. — at Corinth, ib. — besieged by the Corcy- 
 
 reans, ib.— reduced, 10 
 Epitadas, 135, 146. 
 Epitelidasj 177. 
 ErectheuSi 59. 
 Eretrians, at war with the Chalcideans, 6 — subject 
 
 and tributary to Athens, 281. 
 ErythriBanSf 300. 
 Eteonicus, 302. 
 EualaSf 303. 
 Evarchus, tyrant of Astacus, 61 — another of the name, 
 
 218. 
 Eubutus, 302. 
 Eucles the Athenian, 168. 
 Eucles the Syracusan, 258. 
 Euclides, founder of Himera, 219. 
 Euctemon, 306. 
 EvesperittB, 278 
 Eumackus^ 64. 
 EumolpidtBj 313. 
 Eumolpus, 59. 
 Euphamidas, 64, 173. 
 EuphemuSf his speech at Camarina, 248. 
 Enrylochusy the Spartan, 126, 128, 129. 
 Eurymackus, 53,55. 
 Eurymedon, sent to Corcyra, 119 — to Sicily, 134 — is 
 
 fined for returning, 155— sent thither again, 264 — ar- 
 rives at Syracuse, 274 — killed, 279. 
 Eurystheus, king of Micens, 4. 
 Eurytanians, 126. 
 Eustrophus, 194. 
 Eutkydemus, 187, 188 — a commander at Syracuse, 
 
 264— unsuccessful in the last battle, 286. 
 
 G 
 
 OeloUy king of Syracuse, 218, 219. 
 
 Oeloansj build Agrigentum, 218— aid the Syracusans, 
 
 282. 
 OettBt 88. 
 Olauco, 18. 
 Qoaxis, 169. 
 
 OongyluSf the Kretrian, 42. 
 GongyluSfthe Corinthian, 260. 
 OrcsanSj 89. 
 QreHansy account of the old, 2 — ^how they undertook 
 
 the Trojan expedition, 4 — appUed themselves to 
 
 maritime alTairs, 6, 7. 
 Gylippus, sent to command at Syracuse, 254 — arrives 
 
 there, 260 — his battles, 281— lakes Pleminyrium. 266 
 
 — procures succours, 278 — fights the Athenians, 279 
 
 — stops their decampment, 288~takes Nicias prison* 
 er, 293— brings home the fleet from Sicily, 299. 
 Oyrtoniansy 62. 
 
 Raliartians, 164. 
 
 HoTTnodius, history of himj 238. 
 
 HegesandeTf 265. 
 
 Seg-esandridaSf 328, 329. 
 
 Hegesippidaa, 200. 
 
 Heleiij 4. 
 
 HellanicuSf 32. 
 
 Hellen, son of Deucalion, S. 
 
 ifc^off, their revolt from, and war with, the Lacede- 
 monians, 32, 33 — are feared, and 2000 of them made 
 away with, 160. 
 
 HeracleotSt 199. 
 
 HeraclidtB, kill Eurystheus, 4. 
 
 HeraclideSf the Syracusan, 245, 258. 
 
 ffereans, 205. 
 
 HermaondaSy 94. 
 
 Sermocrates, his speech to the Sicilians, 155! — ^to th^ 
 Syracusans, 230— his character, 245 — encourages the 
 Syracusans, ib. — made a commander, ib. — his speech 
 at Camarina, 246 — ^his stratagem, 288— banished, 325. 
 
 Herman, 328. 
 
 Hesiod, 125. 
 
 Sessiana, 126. 
 
 Sestitsansy 37, 281. 
 
 Hestiodoms, 78. 
 
 Hierensians, 124. 
 
 Hierophon, 128. 
 
 Hippagretea, 146. 
 
 Sipparehus^ history of him, 238. 
 
 Hippiasj the eldest son of Fisistratus, history of him, 
 238. 
 
 Hippias the Arcadian, 103. 
 
 Hippoclits, tyrant of Lampsacus, 340. 
 
 Hippoclus, son of Menippus, 299. 
 
 Hippocrates the Athenian, 155 — his attempt on Me- 
 gara, ib. — his harangue, 165 — killed at the battle of 
 Delium, 167— tyrant of Gela, 319. 
 
 Hippolochidas, 159. 
 
 HipponieaSf 133. 
 
 HipponoidaSfZOG. 
 
 Horner^ 2, 4, 127, 
 
 Hyceans^ 127. 
 
 Hijbleans, 254. 
 
 Hyblon, 218. 
 
 SyperboluSf 330- 
 
 I 
 
 Iberianst 217, 252. 
 
 IllyrianSf 9, 175. 
 
 Imbrians, 94, 281. 
 
 Inarusy an African king, revolts from the Persian mon- 
 arch, 33 — crucified, 35. 
 
 lolciusy 187, 188. 
 
 lonians, had a great fleet in the reign of Cyrus, and 
 were masters at sea, 6 — subdued by Cyrus, ib.— re- 
 volt, 31 — enemies to the Dorians, 248 — used to assem- 
 ble at Delos, 127. 
 
 fppensianSf 126. 
 
 Isarchidasj 10. 
 
 IscJiagoras, 177, 187, 188 
 
 laocrates, 83. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 341 
 
 IsoerateSf S3. 
 Isthmtonieus^ 187, 188. 
 Italus, 218. 
 ItamaneSf 103. 
 Itonians, 182. 
 Itys, 03 
 
 Lacedemonians, their power in Peloponnesus, 4 — their 
 dresB, 3 — were the first who stripped in the public 
 games, 3— demolished tyrants, 6 — deluded by The- 
 mistocles, 30 — accuse him, 45 — war, against their 
 Helots, 33 — at war with the Athenians, ib. — and tke 
 Dorians, ib. — beat the Athenians at Tanagra, 35— 
 make a truce for five years, 36 — begin the holy war, 
 ib. — make a thirty years' truce with the Athenians, 
 37 — consult about the Peloponnesian war, 26— deter- 
 mine for it, 38, 29 — send embassies to Athens to spin 
 out time, 41— invade Attica, 56— assign Thyrea to the 
 iEginetae, 63 — invade Attica, 69— make war on Za- 
 cynthus, 77 — march to Plattea, and besiege it, 78 — in- 
 vade Acarnania, 83 — fight at sea, 83 — their project 
 to seize the Piraeus, 87— invade Attica, 97 — resolve 
 to succour the Mityleneans, ib. — become masters of 
 Platffia, 110 — put the Platseans to death, 116— beat the 
 Corcyreans at sea, 119 — send a colony to Heraclea, 
 123 — their expedition against the Ampbilochians, 138 
 — invade Attica, 133 — their endeavours to recover 
 Pylus, 134 — send an embassy to Athens to solicit a 
 peace, 137 — vanquished in Sphacteria, 146 — make 
 away with 2000 Helots, 160— take Amphipolis, 163 
 —make peace with the Athenians, 172 — march into 
 Arcadia, 191 — forbid to assist at the Olympic games, 
 199 — succour the Epidaurians, 201— gain a victory at 
 Mantinea, 206 — determine to succour the Syracusans, 
 254— fortify Decelea, 265— succour the Chians, 299— 
 enter into league with the Persian monarch, 301, 
 307, 315— lake lasus, 305— fight with and beat the 
 Athenians, 308— seize Rhodes, 310— are beat at the 
 sea-fight of Cynos-sema, 333. 
 
 Lacedemonius, son of Cimon, 16. 
 
 Laches^ commander of the Athenian fleet in Sicily, 122, 
 187, 188 — makes war on Myls, 123— defeats the Lo- 
 crians, 127. 
 
 Laco, 111. 
 
 LcBspodias^ 358, 325 
 
 LeBstrigons. 217. 
 
 Lamackus, loseth a squadron, 158 — one of the three 
 commanders in Sicily, 320 — his opinion at a council 
 of war, 236— killed, 257 
 
 Lamis, 218. 
 
 Lamphilus, 187, 188. 
 
 Lampo, 187, 188. 
 
 Letsans, 89. 
 
 LearcIiuSf 77. 
 
 Lemnians^ 94, 182— accompany the Athenians to Sici- 
 ly, 281. 
 
 Leocrates, 34. 
 
 Leon the Lacedemonian, 124. 
 
 Leon the Athenian, 302, 303, 314. 
 
 Leontinea, 141 — at war with the Syracusans, 122— in 
 sedition, 180. 
 
 Leotychides, 29. 
 
 Lesbians, 94. 
 
 Leucadians, aid the Corinthians against the Corcyre- 
 ans, 9— join the Ambraciots, 83. 
 
 Lichas, an Olympic victor, bat scourged, 190— his em 
 bassies, 187, 208 — public host of the Argives, ib. — his 
 dispute with Tissaphernes. 309, 324— his death, ib. 
 
 Loc-rianSf Oiolian^ 3— lose Naupactus, 33 — confede- 
 rate with the Athenians, 125. 
 
 Loerians, Epizephyrian, 259. 
 
 Lycopkron, 84, 148. 
 
 Lyncestians, 90, 160, 174. 
 
 Lysicles, 99. 
 
 Lysistratus, 170. 
 
 M 
 
 Macariua^ 126, 129. 
 
 Machon, 83. 
 
 Mantineans, 129, 130— war with the Tegeata, 178— 
 make alliance with the Argives, 189— at war with 
 the Lacedemonians, 191 — renew the peace with them, 
 209— mercenaries, 381 
 
 Megahetes, 42. 
 
 Megabaius the Persian, 35 — son of Zopyrus, ib. 
 
 Megareans, aid the Corinthians against Corcyra, 10 — 
 prohibited the harbours and markets of Athens, 21, 
 47 — scheme to betray their city to the Athenians, 155 
 — demolish their long walls, 169. 
 
 MeleanSj 181. 
 
 MelanckridaSy 298. 
 
 Melanthus, 297. 
 
 Meleas, 94 
 
 Melesander, 78. 
 
 Melians, their conference with the Athenians, 211 — 
 besieged, 215 — reduced, lb. 
 
 MeliensianSf 124 — fight with the Heracleots, 199. 
 
 Menander, an Athenian commander in Sicily, 264, 
 286. 
 
 Menas, 187, 188. 
 
 Mendeans, 174. 
 
 Menecolus, 219. 
 
 Menecrates, 173. 
 
 MenoUt 62. 
 
 Messenians of Peloponnesus, ejected by the Lacedemo- 
 nians, 33— settled by the Athenians at Naupactus, ib. 
 — take Phia, 63 — replaced at Pylus, 147. 
 
 Messenians of Sicily, at war with the Nazians, 141 
 
 Metagenes, 187, 188. 
 
 Metapontians^ 281. 
 
 MethymneanSf 98, 281. 
 
 Miciades, 16. 
 
 Milesians, their war with the Samians, 37— beat the 
 Argives, 304 — demolish the fort built by Tissapher- 
 nes, 324. ^' 
 
 Mindarus, the Lacedemonian admiral, 324, 331 — dc^ 
 feated, 333. 
 
 Minos, his naval power, 2, 3. 
 
 Mityleneans^ revolt from the Athenians, 93 — their 
 speech at Olympia, 95— reduced, 101 — ordered to bft 
 massacred, 103. 
 
 MolossianSy 83. 
 
 Mycalessians, massacred, 269. 
 
 Myonenaians, 126. 
 
 Myrcinians, 181. 
 
 Mijronides, 34, 35, 165, 
 
 Myrrhine, 238. 
 
 Myrtilus, 187, 188. , ^ 
 
 MyseoTif 325. 
 
 3L 
 
342 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 N 
 
 J^Tauclidea, 53. 
 
 Jfaxiavs, favour the Athenians, 237, 381— vanquish the 
 Mpssenians, 142. 
 
 Tficanor, 82. 
 
 J^icias, son of Niceratus, 110, 142, 147. l5l, 174— his 
 speeches, 220, 225, 243, 283, 289— takes Minoa, 110— 
 attacks Melos, 123 — invades the Corinthians, 147 — 
 takes Cyihera, 151 — and Mende, 175 — ^besieges Sci- 
 one, ib.— author of the peace, 185, 197— named for 
 the command in Sicily, 220— his opinion at a council 
 of war, 236— defeats the Syracusans, 244, 262— his 
 stratagem, 257 — left in the sole command, 258 — his 
 letter to the Athenians, "262 — refuseth to raise the 
 siege of Syracuse, 277 — raiseth the siege, 288 — sur- 
 renders to Gylippiis, 293— put to death, ib. 
 
 JVifias, the Cretan of Gortyna, 84. 
 
 J^icolaus, 77. 
 
 J^icomachuSj 163. 
 
 J^icomedes^ 34. 
 
 jricon^ 265. 
 
 J'^iconidas, 159. 
 
 J^icostratus^ aids the popular faction aS Corcyra, 118 — 
 takes Cythera, 151 — takes Mende, 175— besieges Sci- 
 one, ib.— 203. 
 
 Kymphodorust 63. 
 
 Odomantians^ 90, 181. 
 Odryaians, 89. 
 Oeanthians, 127. 
 
 OeniadiE, 83, 131— invaded by the Athenians, 95— re- 
 ceived into their alliance, 159. 
 Oetisans, 124, 296. 
 Olynthians, 193. 
 Onasimusy 373. 
 OnomcLcles, 306. 
 Ophionians, 125. 
 Opicians, 218. 
 Orestes, 35. 
 Orestians, 82. 
 Oroedus, 82. 
 OropianSj 62. 
 
 Paches, sent by the Athenians to reduce Mitylene, 98 
 — takes it, 101— and Notium, 103— and Pyrrha and 
 Eressus, ib. 
 
 PtBdaritus, or Pedaritus, 305, 306, 308— killed, 314. 
 
 PtBonians, 89. 
 
 pagondas, his harangues to the Bosotians, 163— wins 
 the battle of Delium, 165. 
 
 Palirensians, 64. 
 
 PammiluSy 218. 
 
 Pan^anSf 90. 
 
 Pandion^ 63. 
 
 Paralians, 124. 
 
 Paravmans, ^ 
 
 Parians, ji68. 
 
 pausanias, captain-general of Greece, 31— subdues Cy- 
 prus, ih,— besieges Byzantium, ib. — grows a tyrant, 
 
 ib. — recalled and tried at Sparta, ib. — returns to Hel- 
 lespont, 42 — his letter to Xerxes, ib. — driven from 
 Byzantium, 43 — betrayed, 44 — starved to death, ib. 
 
 Pausanias, son of Pleistionax, 101. 
 
 Pelops^ 4. 
 
 Peloponnesians, their colonies, 5 — their character, 48 
 — originally Dorians, 248 — their war with the Athe- 
 nians: see Athenians and Lacedemonians. 
 
 Petmhiansy 159. 
 
 Perditcas, king of Macedonia, his political turns, 19, 20, 
 63, SB — invaded by Sitalces, 88— in conjunction with 
 Brasidas, invades Arribasus, 160, 177 — quarrels with 
 Brasidas, 177— makes peace with the Athenians, ib. 
 — is again their enemy, 210. 
 
 Pericles, commands the Athenians, 36 — conquers Eu- 
 bosa, ib — and Samos, 37 — his speech for war, 47— 
 makes the funeral oration, 65 — his speech in defence 
 of himself, 73 — his death and character, 75, 76. 
 
 Perierea, 218. 
 
 Persians, at Thermopylie, 146 — their noble custom, 89. 
 
 PhcBUcians, 9 
 
 Phmax, 180 
 
 Phadimus, 195, 
 
 PhminiSf priestess of Juno, 178. 
 
 Phanomachvs, 78. 
 
 Pkarnahazus, 297, 308. 
 
 Phamaces, 77. 
 
 Pharsalians, 62. 
 
 Pkermans, 62. 
 
 Philippus, the Lacedemonian, 305, 331. 
 
 Pkilocharidas, 173, 187,188, 196. 
 
 Philocrates, 215. 
 
 Philoctetes, 4. 
 
 Phliasians, 10. 
 
 Phoceans, built Marseilles, 6 — ^beat the Carthaginians 
 at sea, ib. 
 
 Pkocians, at war with the Dorians, 34^-recover the 
 temple of Delphi, 36. 
 
 Pkcenicians, exercised piracy, 3 — inhabited the isles, ib 
 — had settlements in Sicily, 318. 
 
 Pkarmio, an Athenian commander, 21, 38 — commands 
 their fleet at Naupactus, 78 — beats the Peloponne- 
 sians at sea, 84 — prepares for a second engagement, 
 ib. — his harangue, 85— beats them again, 87. 
 
 Pkotius^ 82. 
 
 Phrynicus,2Q2 — his intrigue against Alcibiades, 312 — 
 deprived of the command, 314 — is of the oligarchical 
 faction, 318, 327— is assassinated, 328. 
 
 Pieriansy 90. 
 
 Pisander, overturns the democracy at Athens, 313, 316, 
 327— flies to DeceJea, 331. 
 
 Fisistratus, the tyrant, 127, 238— purifies Delos, 127— 
 dies an old man, 238. 
 
 PisistratuB, the son of Hippias, 238 — dedicated al- 
 tars, ib. 
 
 Pissuthnes, 37, 103. 
 
 Pitiacus, 169. 
 
 Platmans, confederate with Athens, 54 — ^besieged, 78— a 
 body of them make their escape, 100 — surrender, llO 
 — their speech to the Lacedemonians, ib.— are put to 
 death, 116. 
 
 Pleistionax, VAr\% of Sparta, 34, 37— banished, 61— re- 
 stored, 185, 188, 191. 
 
 Pleistolas, 187, 188. 
 
 Pleistarchus, 43. 
 
 Palis, 77. 
 
 Polles, 181. 
 
 Polyanthe8,fl71 
 
INDEX. 
 
 343 
 
 Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, powerfal at sea, 6— con- 
 secrates Rhenca to the Delian Apollo, ib. 127. 
 
 Patydamidas, 174, 177. 
 
 Polymedea, 62. 
 
 PotidtBans, originally from Corinth, 19— defeated by 
 the Athenians, 21— besieged, ib. 73— surrender, 78. 
 
 ProtodemuSj 77. 
 
 Prodes, 123, 187, 188. 
 
 Procne, 63. 
 
 Proteas, ]6, 62. 
 
 Proxenus, 127. 
 
 PttBodoras, 158 
 
 Pystillus, 219. 
 
 Pytken, 258, 259. 
 
 Pythias. 117 
 
 Pytliodorus, the archon at Athens, 53— the son of Iso- 
 lochus, in the command, 131, 187, 188, 258— banish- 
 ed, 153. 
 
 R 
 
 Ramp Idas, 47, 184. 
 
 Rhegians, 123— attacked by the Locriaca, 133, 140— 
 
 neutral in the Sicilian war, 235. 
 Rhodians, Doric by descent, 281, 
 
 s 
 
 SabylintJius, 82. 
 Sacon, 219. 
 
 Sadocas, son of Sitalces, 64— made a citizen of Ali- 
 ens, ib. 
 Salathus, Bent to Mitylene, 101 — taken prisoner and 
 
 put to death by the Athenians, 103. 
 Salynthius, king of the AgrEans, 131. 
 Samians, conquered by the Athenians, 37 — their insur- 
 rection, 302. 
 Sargens, 267. 
 
 Scioneans, of the Pelene, originally from Peloponnesus, 
 173 — revolt, ib, — crown Brasidas, ib. — reduced and 
 severely treated by the Athenians, 191. 
 Scirondas, 314. 
 Scythians, 89. 
 
 Selinuntians, 281— at war with the Egesteans,219. 
 Sermylians, 186. 
 Seuthes, 89, 167 — succeeds Sitalces in the kingdom of 
 
 OdrysfE, 89 — marries the sister of Perdiccas, 91. 
 Sicanians, 217. 
 Sicilians, 153, 154. 
 Siculi, 218,251,257. 
 Sicyonians, 35, 26, 167. 
 Simonides, 134. 
 Simus, 219. 
 Singeans, 186 
 Sintians, 89. 
 
 Sitalces, king of Thrace, 63, 77— ally tothe Athenians, 
 64_invade3 the Macedonians, 88 — his power, 89— 
 conquered by the Triliallians, 167. 
 Socrates, son of Antigenes, 62. 
 iophocles, son of Sostratides, 131— sent to Sicily, 133 
 
 his acta at Uorcyra, 149 — banished from Athens, 
 
 155. 
 Stesagoras, 38. 
 Sthenelaidas, his speech, 28. 
 Stratonice, 91. 
 
 Stratians, ronqncr the Chaonians, 82. 
 Strombickidea, 300— his exploits, 206, S23. 
 
 Styphon, 146. 
 
 Styrensians, 281. 
 
 Syracusana, at war with the Leontines, 122— are de- 
 feated by the Athenians, 140 — draw up against the 
 Athenians, 243— prepare for battle, ib.— are defeated, 
 244 — fortify their city, 245— send ambassadors to Ca- 
 marina, 246— to Corinth and Sparta,251— engage and 
 are defeated by the Athenians, 255, 257— raise their 
 counter-works, 256 — are about treating with Nicias, 
 257— prepare their fleet, 266— attack the Athenians 
 by land and sea, ib. — erect two trophies, 276— prepare 
 again for an engagement, 279— defeat them again, ib. 
 —prepare for the last battle, 283— engage, 286— arc 
 victorious, 287— stop the Athenians by a stratagem, 
 288— pursue them and take them all prisoners, 290— 
 send aid to the Peloponnesians, 304, 333. 
 
 Tages, 299. 
 
 Tamus, 306. 
 
 Tantalus, a Lacedemonian commander, 152. 
 
 Taurv.3^ 173. 
 
 TegeatcB, fight with the Mantineana, 178. 
 
 Telles, 187, 188. 
 
 Tellias, 258. 
 
 Temenidcpy 90. 
 
 Tenedians, 93, 281. 
 
 Teians, 102, 281, 300. 
 
 Teres, father of Sitalces, 63 — how he got the kingdom 
 of Odrysje, ib. — enlarged it, ib. 
 
 Teutiaplus, 102— his advice to Alcidas and the Pelo- 
 poTinesianB,ib. 
 
 Tharyps, king of the Molossians, 82* 
 
 Thasians, revolt from Athens, 32 — defeated, ib.— beg 
 aid from the Lacedemonians, ib. — surrender, 33. 
 
 Thecenetus, 99. 
 
 TheageneSf 41. 
 
 Thebans, surprize Platjea, 53 — their speech to the La 
 cedemonians against the Platffians, 113 — demolish 
 the walls of Thespiee, 177. 
 
 Themistocles^ 24, 45, 47— by his advice the battle waa 
 fought in the strait of Salamis, 84 — is sent ambassa- 
 dor to Sparta, 29 — deludes the Lacedemonians, ib.— 
 gets the Long-walls and Pirajus secured, 30 — banish- 
 ed Athens by the Ostracism, 45 — resides at Argos, ib, 
 — accused by the Lacedemonians, ib. — flies toCorcy- 
 ra,ib. — to Admetus, ib. — the danger he escaped, ib.— 
 his letter to the king of Persia, 46— his character, ib. 
 
 Theramenes, the Athenian, 318 — one of those who 
 overturned the democracy, ib. — turns to the other 
 side, 327. 
 
 Theramenes, the Lacedemonian, carries the fleet to 
 
 Asia, 304. 
 Thermo, 299. 
 
 ThesBus, 59. 
 
 Thesaalians, drive the Boeotians from Arne, 5 — confe- 
 derate with the Athenians, 33— send them aids, 34, 
 62— their form of government, 159. 
 Tkeucles, founder of Naxua, 218. 
 Thracians, overthrow the Athenians 32, 167— are free, 
 63— their sordid custom,89— fight with the Thebans 
 after the massacre at Mycalessus, 270. 
 Thrasyhulus, 32 1 — supports the democracy, ib — madea 
 commander, 322— brings back Alcibiades, 323— heats 
 
 the Peloponnesians at sea, 333. 
 Thrasycles, 187,188. 
 
344 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Thraeyllus, ihe Argive,202. 
 
 Tkrasyllus^ the Athenian, 320, 322, 331. 
 
 Thrasymelidas, 136. 
 
 Thucles^ see Theucles. 
 
 T/nLcydides, son of Olorus, why he wrote the history 
 of the war, 1, 7, 8, 188— had the plague, 69— his gold 
 mines, and great credit in Thrace, 168— commands in 
 Thrice, ib. — arrives too late to save Amphipolis, lb. 
 — secures Eion, ib. — was an exile for twenty years, 
 389. 
 
 Thucydides, the colleague of Agnon and Phormio, 38. 
 
 ThucydideSf the Pharsallan, 329. 
 
 ThymochatiSt 330. 
 
 TilattBans, 89. 
 
 Timagoras of Cyzicus, 297, 298. 
 
 Timagoras of Tegea, Tt. 
 
 TimanoTy 10 
 
 Timocrates, 84 — kills himself, 87. 
 
 THsamenus, 124. 
 
 Tisander^ 126. 
 
 Tiaiasy 211. 
 
 IHssaphemes^ lieutenant of Darius, 287, 303 — his com- 
 pacts and leagues with the Peloponnesians, 301, 305) 
 307, 309, 314, 315— is conquered at Miletus by the 
 Athenians, 304— fortifies lasus, 305— pays the Lace- 
 demonian ships, ib.— lessens their pay by the advice 
 of Alcibiades, 310— wants to be reconciled to the 
 Lacedemonians, 314^inveigbed against by the mari- 
 ners, 322, 324— why he did not bring up the Phenician 
 fleet, 326. 
 
 Tlepolemus, 38. 
 
 Tolmidasj son of Tolmteus, 35, 36. 
 
 7\>lophov!ian8, 126. 
 
 T^achinians, 124. 
 
 TVerianSf 89- 
 
 Triballianst conquer Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, 
 
 167. 
 TritaensianSt 126 
 Trojans t how enabled to resist the Greeks for ten years, 
 
 5— some of them settled in Sicily af^er the taking of 
 
 Troy, 217. 
 Tydeus^ 308, 
 Tyndarus, 4. 
 Tyrrhenes, 280, 282. 
 
 u 
 
 Ulysses, 140. 
 
 Xenares, Ephorus at Sparta, 192. 
 
 Xenares^ commander of the Heracleots, killed, 199. 
 
 XenoclideSy 16, 131. 
 
 Xeno, 265. 
 
 Xenophantidas, 314. 
 
 Xenophon, son of Euripides, 78, 81. 
 
 Xerxest 12, 38 — his letter to Fausanias, 43. 
 
 Zacynthians, a colony of Achsans, 77 — aid khe Atho* 
 
 nians in the Sicilian war, 281 
 Zeuzidas, 187, 188. 
 
 THE END 
 
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