FROM THE TRIPLE TO THE QlfADRlJPLE_ALLIANCE « WHY ITALY WENT TO WAR- -O- D?- E.J. DILLON aiorncU Untttetattg SItbrarg Jltl)ata, New Qartt BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE JACOB H. SCHIFF ENDOWMENT FOR THE PROMOTION OF STUDIES IN HUMAN CIVILIZATION 1918 Cornell University Library D 520.I7D57 From the triple to the quadruple allianc 3 1924 027 830 870 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027830870 FROM THE TRIPLE TO THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE BARON SYDNEY SONNINO. FROM THE TRIPLE TO THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE WHY ITALY WENT TO WAR By DR. E. J. DILLON Published fok "'STlje ^ailp 'Celegrajpi) " by HODDER AND STOUGHTON LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO MCMXV TO KATHLEEN M. DILLON THESE PAGES ARE AFFEOTIONATELY DEDICATED. FOREWORD ITALY'S active participation in the war was the work of the nation, not of the Government. Had the decision been left to the Parhament, to the acknowledged leaders of the people, to the Cabinet or even to all three combined, it must have fallen out differently. Neither Professor Salandra nor Baron Sonnino would have gone back to office after their defeat by Signor Giolitti in May. The Dictator, or else a lieutenant of his choice, would have been entrusted with the reins of power by the King who in this matter had always dis- played a meticulous respect for constitutional forms, and Austria's belated offers would have been accepted by the Consulta. But the nation, wroth with the representatives who had misrepresented it, wrested from them for a moment the powers it had bestowed and reversed their decision. It was the act of a moment. Its effect was to impart direction to policy, not to prescribe ways and means. Wrought to white heat by the strange behaviour of its official spokesmen the Italian people rose up in its millions, disowned them and imposed its own will on the Cabinet. Previous to this, conversations had been carried on between the Consulta and the Ballplatz on the subject of certain claims to which Italy deemed herself entitled in virtue of the Triple AUiance. Baron Sonnino, therefore, relied upon the Triple Alliance for the success of his plea and the con- tinuity of Italy's policy and was minded, he frankly said, to restore fresh vigour to that compact if Italy received the benefits it conferred upon her. That was the ground taken up by the distinguished Foreign Secretary and his colleagues. His chief, the Premier, approving this view launched the phrase " sacred egotism " which was to have consecrated and popularized it. But it failed to catch on. vii viii FOREWORD The Ministers who looked upon themselves as temporary trustees of the community, liable to be called upon to render an account of their stewardship, held that they were not free to substitute generosity for the furtherance of national interests. But the nation took a different stand. It devised a policy which would mark its kinship with the progressive peoples of the world, its sympathy for the victims of Teuton frightfulness and its resolve to link its own immediate interests with those of the Powers which were fighting against the lust of domination. Having thus uttered its fiat the nation abandoned to its official representatives the work of translating it into acts of policy and war. And the Cabinet with a painful sense of responsibility, conscious that it is still but a trustee, has since ^ been carrjdng out the will of the people with the most scrupulous care for national interests. Thus it declared war against Austria-Hungary, whose obstinacy had broken up the Triple Alliance, but not against Germany, who had done her utmost to uphold that alliance. Italy's relations, political and economical, with Germany whom she has for a generation considered and treated as a sort of benevolent guardian, are seemingly only suspended. Money is still freely and openly passing between the two countries via Switzerland. To those Italians who petitioned their Govern- ment to forbid the payment of debts to Germans and Aus- trians during the war, the Premier and the Cabinet turned a deaf ear. The Banca Commerciale has made some changes in its staff but none that connote a change in its policy. And it seems quite possible that whatever developments the war may bring forth Italy's moral support will go with us into Turkey, Asia Minor, and wherever else we are fighting the enemy while her military assistance will probably continue to make itself felt along the Austrian frontier. For the Italian General Staff holds that that is her wisest course. 1 Written on the 6th September, 1915, FOREWORD IX That attitude which, we are officially assured, is approved by the Triple Entente, should serve to remind us that the European States which are now withstanding German aggression, are not members of a homogeneous body joined by close ties and bound by clear stipulations. They are independent entities actuated by motives which are by no mieans identical and eager to achieve aims which are far from convergent. As yet we cannot claim to have found a common denominator for them all. To convince himself of this, if he have any doubt, the reader has but to compare Italy's atti- tude since May 1915 with that say of France or Britain. She did not declare war against Turkey until the bulk of her subjects had returned home. The motives, too, for that decision as propounded in the official proclamation differ characteristically from those alleged by the Entente Powers. And when at last declared the war was not and probably will not be waged against the Turks, with whom Italy has always since the Peace of Ouchy striven to cultivate terms of close friendship, with a view to intimate economic " collab- oration " in the future. It is always on the Austrian fron- tiers that she is fighting for Belgium, France, Serbia and Montenegro, for justice and civilization. Against Germany she has no military quarrel. These efforts are highly appre- ciated by the Entente Powers, but one can hardly consider them identical or co-ordinated with their own. Again, Italy is apparently not bound like the other signa- tories of the London Declaration ^ to refuse all offers of a separate peace. Or if she be so bound she is unwilling publicly to avow the obligation, for I inquired of the Con- sulta and was informed that Baron Sonnino would rather not answer that delicate question. The other signatories had no such scruples. They announced their solidarity to friend and foe. That Italy has cogent reasons for thus differentiating herself from the Triple Entente we cannot, in 1 September 5th, 1914. X FOREWORD fairness to M. Sonnino, doubt. Personally I do not believe that she has signed the compact, were it only because she can hardly undertake not to make a separate peace, say with Germany, seemg that she is not at war with that Empire. She cannot seriously promise to continue to wage war against Turkey until the Entente Powers have also desisted, if she has done no overt act of war against the Sultan's dominions. It is appallingly difficult under such conditions — for which no country or government can be made responsible — for the non-Teutonic group of belligerents fully to utilize their avail- able resources against scentifically organized violence and barbarism. Much — probably most — of their strength is wasted in fitful unsystematic efforts. It was exactly thus in the War of the Succession, when Prussia was in greater danger of disaster than she is to-day. The Allies then arrayed against her who could and should have crushed her out of political existence, frittered away their time, missed their opportunities, talked of co-ordinating efforts that were hardly ever even synchronized and allowed themselves to be beaten piece-meal. At least one of Germany's calculations before embarking on this war has been verified ; and an important one. Italy less than any other belligerent has changed her nature or her disposition by coming into the war. Her national ideals, political aims, chronic likes and dislikes live on, and gather strength under the surface. Peace once concluded, possibly even before it is ratified, they will again suddenly resume sway. For this return to the past, and for the con- sequences it will bring forth, it behoves us all to be prepared. If the following pages contribute to this salutary end they will have achieved their object and rendered a service to the cause of the allied nations. E. J. DILLON. Palace Hotel, Vabese (Como). September 6th, 1915. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I Okigin of Italy's Entry into the Triple Alliance 1 II The Political Intrigues of Bismarck . . 7 III Baron Sonnino and the Alliance ... 18 IV The Ironies of Fate ...... 26 V The Renewal of the Triple Alliance . . . 32 VI Unfair Treatment of Italy by her Teuton Allies 40 VII Austria's Foreign Policy 49 VIII The Albanian Question ..... 56 IX Completeness of Teutonic Organization . . 64 X The Banca Commerciale and its Effect on the History of Italy ...... 73 XI Creating an Army— The " Neutralists " and the " Interventionists " ..... 87 xi xii CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE XII The Policy of the Mabchese di San Giuliano . 108 XIII Impressions of Baron Sonnino .... 120 XIV SaLANDRA and GlOLlTTI . . . . .124 XV The Claims of Italy . . . . . .134 XVI A Turn in European Affairs . . . .153 XVII Pourparlers . . . . . . .166 XVIII An Interview between Bulow and Sonnino — The Italian Government and the Vatican . 174 XIX Further Negociations. ..... 185 XX The Fateful Hour 202 XXI Italy's Decision ....... 223 FROM THE TRIPLE TO THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE CHAPTER I ORIGIN OP ITALY'S ENTRY INTO THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE WHY Italy went to war is a less difficult question to answer than why she ever became a member of the Triple Alliance. For there is something incongruous in the close partnership between a nation whose political ideals, social standards, and pacific strivings so nearly resemble our own and two military empires whose aggressive designs, reactionary conceptions, and military organization are an emphatic negation of those. Many attempts have been made to explain and justify this political synthesis of aims and strivings so conflicting. But as most publicists have studied the subject in the light of fragmentary data and some with the further disqualification of party or national bias, the accounts which they furnish of the chain of cause and effect, although some of these are superficially correct, are incomplete and therefore misleading. They leave the root of the matter untouched. Some writers, for example, hold that the initiative came from the Consulta which struck up the agreement as a matter of expediency, vaguely foreboding the dangers to which it exposed the country abroad and the opposition it would encounter at home. Others affirm that it was public opinion and senti- ment which, suddenly alarmed by the nation's helpless 1 1 2 FROM THE TRIPLE TO plight, forced the Cabinet of the day against its deliberate and better judgment to link the destinies of Italy with those of the world's two greatest military empires. A third set of writers seek the origins of the alliance in the wantonly provocative policy of the French Republic and the grave apprehensions it produced among the governing classes of Italy. But nearly all agree that whatever the motives, they were rooted in a desire to safeguard Italy's interests as modified by tyrannous circumstance and menaced by open and secret enemies, and that the Triple Alliance, at any rate during the first years of its existence, rendered solid services to the country and might have been made to yield greater benefits if the Consulta had felt less self-diffidence in presence of Germany and displayed a higher degree of independence and firmness in its dealings with Austria-Hungary. But since the outbreak of the war and the disclosures embodied in Green Books, Yellow Books and other official announcements, new light has been shed on the unsunned crypts of European diplomacy. And although many of their nethermost recesses still remain unexplored, enough is already known of the doings of the unseen wire-pullers of European politics to enable us to reconstruct their aims, grasp their main motives, and follow the execution of their plans over the tortuous grooves that led to the unavowed goal. The resulting picture, interesting and unedifying, differs from those which hitherto claimed recognition and supplies us with an object-lesson in that most difficult branch of statecraft which consists in moving others to work for ends which, seemingly their own, are at bottom those of their invisible inspirers. And there is now no doubt that that was the task which Bismarck set himself in his dealings with Italy thirty-three years ago ; neither can it be gain- said that Italian statesmen — some unconscious, others sus- picious of the risks they were incurring — played the unen- viable part of executors of his scheme. It is fair to add that THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 3 the dangers with which the nation, whose union was then but twelve years old, was encompassed, called not only for decisive but also for speedy measures and a new political orientation. For careful deliberation, therefore, there was scant leisure. In spite of her hatred of Austria who still held a tight grip on Trentino, Gorizia, Istria and Trieste, and in spite of her pacific strivings which were incompatible with Ger- many's thirst for expansion, Italy made common cause with those two Empires because at that particular conjuncture it appeared to her Government that no safe alternative was open to her. Isolation had obviously entailed impotence and might possibly culminate in dismemberment. An alliance with France, who was busily profiting by that impotence to hinder Italy's natural growth in the Mediterranean, was out of the question. And the only other issue was a pact with Germany, which had to be concluded in a hurry or not at all. But Germany summarily rejected every proposed arrange- ment from which her ally Austria-Hungary was excluded. It was while surveying this embarrassing situation that the Itahan Government was driven to a hasty decision by the trend and force of national opinion voiced by some of the foremost publicists of the day. A piquant circumstance is that among the most insistent and perhaps influential of these was Baron Sidney Sonnino, a man of noble enthusiasms, end- less ambition, high moral character and respectable abilities, who has since reappeared on the scene in the role of destroyer of the Alliance which he then worked so hard and success- fully to create. Those are the outward facts that strike the eye at a glance. But looking beneath the surface we find that the manifestation of public opinion which thus stirred the nation and the calculations made by the nation's leaders, were cunningly provoked, moulded or swayed by the deliberate acts and words of the German Government then presided over by Bismarck, to whom is due the credit not merely of 4 FROM THE TRIPLE TO directing all, but of originating some of the events which were indispensable to the execution of his far-reaching policy. Fate would seem to have taken flesh in the German Chan- cellor and mysteriously moved those nations whose services were essential to the success of his schemes, to toil and moil for their speedy execution. Thus his fiat sufficed to bring about a chassez croisez among the members of the European community. Enemies became friends, friends became allies or infuriated foes, intended victims clamoured for admission to the trap set to ensnare them, while to the admonitions of the few men of political vision and even to the more im- pressive warnings of recent history, many of the responsible statesmen were deaf and blind. By his machinations he created among the nations of Europe scenes of tumult and confusion like that which Mephistopheles produced among the University students in Auerbach's vaults. One of the strangest and most persistent delusions ever harboured — and one which the Italian people have not yet shaken off — ^was that the Germans, and Bismarck in especial, cherished feelings of genuine friendship for their country. In Crispi that belief was deep-rooted. I heard him give expression to it several times. In his successors it was a profound conviction. Giolitti regarded it as an incontro- vertible axiom. Di San Giuliano clung to it with tenacity down to the day of his death. And even Baron Sonnino, who repudiated the alliance and declared war against Austria, eschewed overt acts of hostility against Germany. Nay, he willingly entered into an arrangement with Prince Biilow by which German property in Italy— the machinery and economic fruits of Teutonic interpenetration — is to be religiously respected in case war should break out, and doubt- less when peace is restored the work of weaving Italian and German interests in a solid web will be harmoniously resumed. But the emergency will hardly arise. It requires a powerful effort of the imagination to picture to oneself Baron Sonnino, THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 5 the persistent champion of the Triple Alhance, declaring war on the Empire which alone embodies the might, the intelli- gence and the durability of that formidable league. And Baron Sonnmo's respect for Germany is but a pale reflex of the awe in which Italy stands of that superhuman ethnic machine. Optimists, it is true, hold that Italy will none the less extend the front of her Great War so as to include the Germans among her foes. And they point to coming events in the near East which will, they believe, draw her into the centre of the bloody maelstrom. Well, those things are stUl in the lap of the gods. But even if they came to pass the resourcefulness of Italian diplomacy may surely be trusted to find the means of co-operating with Italy's allies without coming into contact with the Germans carrying on war against these, or evoking any manifestations of discon- tent on the part of France, Britain or Russia, if it were to Italy's interests so to conduct the policy of the State. Bismarck boasted that he knew Italy thoroughly, and many Italians bore witness to the truth of this self-praise, But in reality he flattered -himself. Utter contempt was the unchanging sentiment which at all times he fostered towards the nation, and countless were the forms in which he gave it vent. But the insults and injuries which he inflicted when he had no motive to conceal his real feelings, did not hinder him from flattering the young State and its diplomatists whenever he required their immediate services. Nor did those changing moods arouse the suspicions of his tools. Thus in bj^ast years when maturing his campaign against Austria, he assured Count Nigra of his respect and affection for Italy, adding : "If Italy did not already exist, Europe would have to create her, so indispensable is she to its well- being." By cajolery and threats he contrived to draw her into an alliance with Prussia against the Habsburg Monarchy, and so to word the terms of the covenant that Italy was bound to Prussia while Prussia was free from corresponding obliga- 6 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE tions towards Italy. It was in the spirit of this one-sided arrangement that one month after it had entered into vigour he opened secret negociations with Austria, against whom it was pointed. If those negociations had been brought to a successful issue, Italy would have found herself face to face alone with Austria as an enemy. But the pourparlers, as it chanced, came to naught, and in the struggle that ensued the arms of the Allies triumphed over the Habsburgs. But from the treaty of peace Bismarck excluded the hoped-for clause bestowing the Trentino on his meek and loyal ally. Nay, he concluded the armistice that preceded the peace without Italy's participation or knowledge. The news that it had been arranged reached the Italians not from Berlin but from Paris. And when he was expostulated with on the unseem- liness of this conduct, Bismarck characteristically exclaimed : " Italy ? I don't care a damn for Italy ! " ^ "It is impossible to conceive of more infamous conduct than that which Prussia displayed towards us from the battle of Sadowa down to the conclusion of peace," wrote Bonghi, a statesman of moderate views and sound judgment. None the less, nearly all Italian statesmen since then, includ- ing Salandra and Sonnino, have a lingering regard for German Kultur, which no disillusions, no shocks, nor even the war can be expected to dispel. Prince von Buelow, familiar with this Cult of Kultur, reckoned with it as a helpful instrument in his diplomatic operations before the war. It was in view of the fascination which the Teuton thus exercised over Italy that he so often repeated his conviction : "To keep Italy from making war on the Triple Alliance is to knock at an open door. My real task is to keep her from fighting Austria. Her own instinct of self-preservation will prevent her from challenging Germany." 1 Problemi Italiani, xvi, Pietro Silva, p. 4. CHAPTER II THE POLITICAL INTRIGUES OF BISMARCK DURING the Franco-German campaign of 1870, the march of Garibaldi's legionaries against the Germans and the apprehension that they might be the forerunners of Italy's descent into the arena, on the side of France, stung Bismarck to the quick, and by way of taking preventive measures, as he himself subsequently avowed, he forthwith entered into relations with Italian republicans and conspirators with a view towards aiding and abetting them in an organized plan for the overthrow of the monarchy to be carried out as soon as King Victor Emmanuel should declare war. That kind of strategy, however, was not merely Bismarckian ; it was German. At no period of his career, whether as a private individual or as a statesman, did Bismarck hide for long his contemptuous conception of the Italian people. Talking one day with a French General who put a question to him on the subject, he said : " Italy ? Why, Italy is one of the public women on the streets." ' And oddly enough the man who thought thus meanly and spoke thus brutally of one of the most cultured nations of Europe, had it in his power to draw it to his country's side whenever interest beckoned or danger menaced. United Germany's position after her victory over France, and the nature of the shoals and the rocks of which she had to steer clear, are tolerably understood. The main danger 1 Op. cit., p. 6. 7 8 FROM THE TRIPLE TO she felt moved to guard against was a coalition of unfriendly Powers. Her own history offered her impressive instances of the facility with which such a coalition could be created and of the disasters it might bring down on the nation against which it was directed. Nor were symptoms wanting that the conjuncture was favourable to an anti-German league. France, now a republic, and visibly awakening from her torpor, was not merely thinking and speaking of revenge but actually making ready for it. The wounds inflicted on Austria in 1866 had not yet cicatrized. Certain of the Ger- man monarchs, and in particular the Kings of Wiirtemberg and Bavaria, were impatient of Prussia's supremacy. The Russian Tsar was well enough disposed towards his uncle the first German Kaiser, but his imperial Chancellor Gortschakoff, embittered against Bismarck, was actuated in his policy by one of the deadliest feelings among the mainsprings of political actions — hatred born of wounded vanity. Casting around for ways and means of ensuring to his extended fatherland the enjoyment of the fruits of his labours until they could be consolidated and made permanently secure, Bismarck first hit upon the expedient of a league of the three conservative Empires for the maintenance of reaction- ary principles against the steady incursions of the growing democracy. Prussia, Austria and Russia stood for the divine right of monarchs as opposed to the new-fangled notions of the supremacy of the people's will which had been making headway among Latin people since the French Revolution. This partnership would, it was augured, not only afford Germany the mainstay she craved for, but also raise a barrier between France and those States that might feel disposed to come to her assistance. Such was the origin of the alliance of the three Emperors. Ingenious as a temporary expedient, it offered a basis much too narrow and precarious for the policy of the three commanding Powers of the Continent. Moreover, Bismarck and Gortschakoff hated each other too THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 9 intensely to work in harmony for long, and the incipient irrational jealousies between Russia and Austria, which never ceased to grow since then, thwarted the most insistent efforts to remove the real grounds for their mutual distrust. But by way of striking the iron before it grew cold, Bismarck conceived the plan of provoking another war with France, crippling her this time permanently, and then resuming the process of consolidation under more auspicious conditions. When he had completed the requisite preparations, Russia, in the person of Bismarck's bitter enemy, Gortschakoff, uttered her emphatic veto and the project had to be given up. " I sometimes forgive," the German Chancellor was wont to say, " but I never forget." In the case of Russia he did neither. And opportunity soon served his purpose. Of the fruits of the Russo-Turkish War the Tsardom was deftly dispossessed by means of the most specious formulae current among professional diplomatists. The Russian nation was infuriated. Count Shuvaloff on his return from the Berlin Congress was dubbed a traitor. The central Govern- ment was openly accused of the servility of weakness. A campaign against the Germans was organized in the Press of Moscow, Petersburg, Kieff, and Bismarck made overtures to Austria with a view to a close partnership between the two Empires in face of the common danger. The old Kaiser at first vetoed the scheme. He was unwilling to sever the ties of personal friendship which had so long bound him to his Russian nephew. Friendship with Russia was one of the hallowed traditions of the Hohenzollerns since the days of the Great Frederick. But after many ineffectual attempts to convince Bismarck of the imprudence of the step he pro- posed to take, the aged Emperor finally gave way. There- upon the German Chancellor and the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Andrassy, drew up a defensive alliance stipulating that if Germany were attacked by Russia, she could reckon on the support of Austria, all of whose forces 10 FROM THE TRIPLE TO would be placed at her service ; that Austria under like cir- cumstances would be assisted by Germany to the same extent ; and that if either Empire became the object of aggression on the part of any Power other than Russia, bene- volent neutrality would be the attitude of the ally, unless Russia joined the enemy, in which case both Empires should combine their forces. That treaty represented not what Bismarck desired but the utmost that he could induce Andrassy to agree to. His own proposal had been a covenant which should provide for com- mon defence not merely against Russia but also and especially against France from whom he apprehended attack. But although his scheme was supported by argument, suasion, and even violent outbursts of temper, Andrassy persistently refused to be a party to it. The positive result of these dis- cussions was disappointment. For the arrangement come to promised the Habsburgs greater advantages than any which the Hohenzollerns could expect to reap, seeing that Russia was much more likely to fight Austria than to wage war against Germany. Moreover, France, whose thirst for re- venge was the principal danger to be reckoned with, would, if she came to blows with Germany, be confronted with this Power alone, whereas Austria, should her leanings turn in the old direction, was at liberty to come to an understanding with the Republic. Thus the isolation of France still remained a pious desire, which would have to be effected by other means. ' How earnestly Bismarck set himself to solve this problem may be inferred from the care he bestowed on its every aspect and from the far-fetched expedients to which he had recourse before events favoured the adoption of organized methods. He decided on the one hand to get Russia to agree to a secret treaty of reciprocal guarantees, and on the other to detach Italy from France and bring her within the German orbit. One would have thought that the latter design was wholly THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 11 beyond the range even of Bismarck's efforts. For not only was the chasm between Italy and Austria too great to be permanently bridged over by diplomacy, but Bismarck him- self and the bulk of his fellow-countrymen were known as despisers if not haters of the Italian nation. But between the Chancellor and the every-day Minister there was the same wide difference that prevails between man and the most intelligent of the animals. What he could not do himself he could generally forge instruments to do for him. And that was the course to which he now resorted. At first his path was beset with difficulties. Hatred of the Austrian which had long ago taken root in the breast of the Italian was now intensified by recent events. The unearned increment which the Habsburg Monarchy received at the Congress of Berlin from victories won by Russia over the Turk, impressed upon the Italian mind the hopelessness of a diplomatic campaign against an Empire which was backed by military Germany, favoured by England, and feared by the Tsardom. And from a military point of view Victor Emmanuel's united nation was still less able to make an impression upon the Great Powers among which it was begin- ning to be ranked by a stretch of international courtesy. Italy's army was seldom mentioned without a disparaging epithet or a smile of contempt. As late as the year 1879, when the French Ambassador at Berlin asked Bismarck whether Germany had undertaken to support Austria in the eventuality of Italian aggression, he received the significant answer : "If Italy were a redoubtable military Power, we might perhaps have felt moved to give the matter our atten- tion, but we should be afraid of wounding Austria's feelings by offering her protection against an attack by her neighbour of the Peninsula."^ 1 Cf. Problemi Italiani, xvi, p. 6 (Pietro Silva). This study, to which I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness, is, in spite of its unpretentiousness, the best succinct account I have met with of the origins of the Triple Alliance. 12 FROM THE TRIPLE TO Alone, therefore, Italy could not hope to obtain tolerable strategic frontiers, nor fruitful colonies, nor even to defend her recently acquired unity against the growing movement in favour of the restitution of Rome to the papal see. Yet her isolation was absolute. Owing to Bismarck's illwill her claim to the Trentino had been disallowed and the strategic position which resulted was such that an army twice as power- ful as that which her finances permitted her to maintain would have been inadequate to defend it. In Trentino, Gorizia, Trieste, and other parts of the Austrian Empire, the Italian population was the victim of active persecution or of studied neglect. The Vienna Government, even in its most concili- atory moods, displayed a degree of animosity against Italy which might at the fitting moment embody itself in formal hostilities, while the Emperor and the court made no secret of their sympathies for the dispossessed Sovereign Pontiff or of their desire to have him reinstated in his temporal possessions. Under these circumstances it was natural that Italy should turn to France for comfort and support. Moreover, the moment was judged auspicious. During the first years of the third Republic the official relations between the sister nations had lacked cordiality. For the Conservative party then in power could not forgive Italy's neutrality during the war, nor her haste to seize and incorporate Rome while France was fighting for her national existence. Moreover, a large body of French Conservatives fostered the idea and preached the necessity of restoring the new Italian capital to the Vicar of Christ. But of late a marked change had come over the French Republic. The accession of the republican Left to power had seemingly broken down the barriers between the kindred nations. This party hated the Catholic Church as intensely as Italy hated Austria. Resolved not to sacrifice a soldier on the battlefield nor to waste a word in the council chamber in favour of the temporal power of the Pope, it was THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 13 animated by an all-absorbing desire to make every possible preparation abroad as well as at home for the inevitable struggle with united Germany. And as about the same time the political power in Italy had also passed from the Con- servative to the Liberal party, the essential elements of a Franco-Italian entente were seemingly complete. Bismarck's task, undertaken against such odds, might well be deemed hopeless. That Italy should profess for Austria a friendship which she was incapable of feeling, or that Austria should compose herself to a considerate and neighbourly spirit towards the upstart Power which she regarded as a titled lady might regard her former menial grown rich and insolent, and that both should set aside their natural and dominant feelings of mutual aversion in order to become friends and partners in an enterprise of little or no positive value to either, might have been accounted sheer impossible. But from Bismarck's dictionary, as from that of Mirabeau, the word impossible had been erased. His resourcefulness and the gullibility of his adversaries were equal to all the demands made upon them by his far-reaching designs. And as usual he achieved his aim by means of unconscious tools. One of the most interesting and tragi-comic episodes in Euro- pean history is the spectacle thus unfolded to our gaze of eminent, honourable, and self-conscious national leaders, zealously striving after aims and objects of the greatest moment, as they fancied, to their respective countries, but which were really the elements of a grandiose Bismarckian scheme, to the realization of which they were thus effectively contributing. One might liken them to a hive of bees laboriously making honey which was already destined for their owner and bespoken by his customers. As the most imminent danger was a possible understanding between Italy and France, the first measures to which Bis- marck had recourse were directed to the displacement of that. And the means lay ready to his hands. He had long 14 FROM THE TRIPLE TO had in view an apple of discord wherewith to set his rivals by the ears — supremacy in the Mediterranean. As far back as the year 1868 he had written : " Nature has thrown an apple of discord between France and Italy for which they will never cease to struggle, the Mediterranean. It is out of the question for Italy to allow France to threaten her every moment with the seizure of Tunis."^ And with the foresight that continually characterized him he had laid the foundations of his scheme for the co-operation of Austria and Italy at the Berlin Congress, where he supported Andrassy against Schuva- loff, and like a cunning barrator tempted France to steal a march on Italy while urging Italy to be beforehand with France in their Mediterranean rivalry. To Waddington, the chief plenipotentiary of the Republic at that Congress, he opened his mind respecting the expediency of annexing Tunis and the ease with which this might be achieved now that France was sure of Germany's good-will, England's suffrance, and Italy's impotence. While Bismarck was thus alluring France, he was using the same bait to entice Italy on to the same course where the two rivals were bound to meet and clash with the results he needed- For at the same time the second German plenipotentiary was making seductive suggestions of a like nature to the chief Italian plenipotentiary, Count Corti. " Now that England is at Cyprus," this diplomatist asked, " why should you not annex Tunis with England's consent ? " " You want to make us quarrel with France, do you ? " retorted the Italian. The French plenipotentiary was less emphatic in resisting the tempter. He contented himself with remarking that the only interest which the Republic had in Tunis was of a nega- tive order : that country must not be occupied by any other Power. But despite this partial renunciation, the seed sown by Bismarck took root and flourished. Waddington, assured 1 Op. cit., p. 12. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 15 of Germany's consent and Italy's helplessness, secretly set himself to ascertain England's sentiments. And he found the Cabinet willing to envisage the realization of French dreams in Tunis as a reasonable compensation for the firmer hold on the Eastern Mediterranean which Britain had obtained by the annexation of Cyprus. And Italy was not merely helpless. For a time her plight seemed almost desperate. The irredentist movement in favour of emancipating the Italians still in Austria from the yoke of the Habsburgs was making itself felt with greater force than ever, embarrassing the Rome Cabinet, and pro- voking journalistic menaces and, worse still, military measures in Austria. For a time, indeed, it looked as though the Vienna Government were seriously contemplating a campaign which would bring back under Franz Josef's sceptre the Italian provinces recently united to Italy, restore the eternal city to the Pope, permanently disable the young kingdom and reduce it to the rank of a second-class Power. On the other hand, those Italians — and they constituted the vast majority — who still turned their eyes towards France, discerned nothing to cheer them in the perspective there. On the contrary they saw much to discourage them. A pro- jected commercial treaty between the two countries which the Minister Decazes had drafted was thrown out by the French Chamber in one of its perverse moods, and the effect on public sentiment in Italy was swift and repellent. A speedy advance towards the Central Empires or the Republic was fast becoming imperative. The Italian Premier Cairoli first took the former road. By way of placating Austria, he put down irredentist manifestations with a heavy hand. The task was eminently unpopular. And in order to pro- vide an outlet for the pent-up forces of patriotic fervour he began to deploy an unusual degree of activity in Tunis, where the number and influence of Italian residents was rapidly increasing. France, whose agreement with England about 16 FROM THE TRIPLE TO Tunis was unknown to the Rome Cabinet, had not yet clearly shown her hand. But as soon as Italy's intentions began to unfold themselves, M. de Freycinet ominously announced that " at present France does not contemplate the occupation of Tunis. As for the future, it is in the hands of God." The Italian press chronicled the utterance, but the Government's colonial ardour was nowise abated. Fortune smiled on Italy's first ventures in that coveted African region. Represented there by a clever and enter- prising agent, she secured from the Bey permission to lay a telegraphic cable between his dominions and Sicily, and, what was of more value, she obtained a concession for a railway line between Goletta and Tunis. This was a triumph of which the hard-pressed Cabinet proceeded to make the most at home. Ministers vaunted it in the Chamber and congratulated themselves in private on enlarging the field of Italian enterprise. They gloried in the thought that they were slowly building up a greater Italy. But what the Italians celebrated as a diplomatic success the French re- sented as a painful humiliation, and the ill-starred Bey who had bestowed favours on one of the rivals was now admon- ished that he must make haste to confer greater boons on the other. The energy of the two Governments was impreg- nated with reciprocal bitterness. Each of them felt that the moment was at hand for a decisive stroke which would bring Tunis under what is euphemistically termed its " pro- tection." Cairoli at once bethought himself of England, still unaware of her secret understanding with France, and at the same time he felt his way cautiously in Vienna and Berlin. The lip-sympathy of the two Central Empires was lavished on Italy, while the behaviour of the French was openly stigmatized by both as infamous. The press of Germany and Austria gave free course to its indignation against the designs of the Republic and piously hoped that the lesson would not be lost on Italy, who could now at last THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 17 discern who her real friends were. And these friends with open arms were waiting for her cordial embrace. But the Italians, for all their impulsiveness, are wont to move slowly in the field of international politics. And now they displayed no unseemly haste to throw themselves into the arms of Germany and Austria. Towards the latter cotmtry in particular their aversion could neither be over- come nor disguised. By way of dislodging it the Central European press kept repeating the saying that the way to Berlin passes through Vienna and wondering why Italy was so long in taking it. The same dictum was dinned into the ears of the Italian diplomatists who in Rome, Bei-lin and Vienna were then groping their way with their German and Austrian colleagues. CHAPTER III BARON SONNINO AND THE ALLIANCE IN this interchange of courtesies, flattery, reproaches and threats the year 1880 passed without bringing any modification of the ground ideas of the negociators or any change in the political situation. It was not until the follow- ing year that the climax was reached. An official mission sent by the Italian colony and the Bey of Tunis to Palermo on the occasion of the visit of the Italian sovereigns to that city spurred the French to frustrate Italy's manoeuvres without incurring her enmity. The means chosen were the creation of an accomplished fact, the sting of which would, it was hoped, be counteracted by the issue of an Italian Loan on the Paris market and by a commercial treaty which was then being negociated. It was further assumed by French statesmen that the danger of an entente between Rome and Berlin was in any event imaginary, seeing that the irredentist strivings of a large body of the Italian people would interpose an impassable bar to partnership with Austria, without whom Germany was resolved not to con- clude an alliance. In Italy an analogous illusion prevailed. The statesmen of Rome imagined that soft words and protestations of friendship for the Republic would ward off the danger to the designs on Tunis which was rapidly growing actual. But amenities brought forth only amenities. Meanwhile a French expedition was rigged out in April, and on May 12th, 1881, the Bey of Tunis was constrained to ratify the Bardo 18 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 19 Treaty which, leaving him his rank and title, transferred his power to the French Republic. On this event the best comment was made by Henri Rochefort, who wrote : " L'ex- pedition est im des coups les mieux reussis de M. de Bis- marck." The anger and disappointment of the Italian people at seeing that wealthy country — ^which they were eager, qualified, and, as they thought, destined to colonize — snatched from their grasp, were intense and universal. The blaze was further fanned by a free fight which broke out in the streets of Marseilles between French soldiers returning from Tunis and Itahans, in the course of which four individuals were killed and seventeen wounded. Forty-eight hours after the ratification of the Bardo Treaty the Cairoli Cabinet fell, and a new administration was formed under the premiership of Depretis who had been Home Secretary under the outgoing Prime Minister. This politician had ever been actuated by friendly feelings towards the Republic. He it was who had hitherto baulked the Austro-German efforts to draw Italy into the Teutonic alliance which Bismarck was toiling to bring about. For he realized the vastness, without comprehending the char- acter, of the change which such an unnatural union would produce in Italy's international status, and he felt that the advantages it promised were dubious. Economically the Italian nation stood to lose enormously. For if France had deprived it of a potential colony, was not France herself— so long as she remained friendly — a colony for Italian emi- grants, over four hundred thousand of whom lived perman- ently in that country, earning wages high enough to enable them to send home considerable savings every year ? On the other hand, it was indispensable that Italy's relations with the two Empires should in the future be marked with greater cordiality than in the past. For public sentiment had been outraged by France, and public opinion as voiced by some of the most respected and most gifted of Italy's 20 FROM THE TRIPLE TO sons now called on the Government to change the course of the ship of State and throw in the country's lot with Germany and Austria. Among these partisans of an alliance with the military Empires were statesmen, officers and publicists of note and influence. Even many, whose antipathies for Austria and Germany were invincible, protested angrily against the greed and unfriendliness of the sister nation. " I am a friend of France," wrote Garibaldi, less than a week after the ratification of the Treaty of Bardo, " and I hold that everything feasible should be done to preserve her friend- ship. But being before everything else an Italian, I would gladly sacrifice the remainder of my life in order that Italy shall not be outraged by any one." And a month later he wrote : " The French treaty with the Bey has demolished the good opinion I had of France, and if her unjust doings in Africa continue, she will force us to recollect that Carthage and Nice are as much French as I am a Tartar." But of all the voices that were uplifted against the Republic and in favour of an alliance with the Teutons, none was as clear, strident and suasive withal as that of Sidney Sonnino, then a wealthy, ambitious and rising young publicist. He had rallied to his standard a small but resolute body of ardent patriots who ventilated their views in the pages of his organ the Rassegna Settimanale. Of this phalanx Baron Blanc was the brain and Baron Sonnino the voice. And the views of these innovators far outstripped the intentions of Depretis and his colleague at the Coiisulta, Mancini. Nothing short of a complete break with the Republic and a formal alliance with the Teutonic Empire would satisfy this self-constituted irresponsible opposition. Isolation, Sonnino declared, would spell annihilation for Italy. The phrase caught on and was repeated with variations throughout the length and breadth of the Peninsula. Mancini, the Foreign Secretary, unable to stem the headstrong current, decided THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 21 to swim with it. As it happened he was personally acquainted with Bismarck who, in one of his gracious moods, had remarked to him ten years before that Italian unity and German unity are not two distinct questions but two aspects of one and the same question, and that it was impossible to sunder them and to oppose the union of the one people without combating the union of the other. Recalling this com- forting assurance, Mancini indited a letter to the Chancellor, opening his mind to him on the expediency of establishing more cordial relations between the two nations whose interests were thus virtually identical. Bismarck replied assuring the Minister of his lively sympathy for Italy. The Italian Ambassador in Berlin reported that the conjuncture was favourable. From Vienna, too, the Ambassador informed his chief that " Austria is only solicitous of living in peace with Italy." But in spite of this encouragement the Cabinet held back. Its press organ ^ and that of the Premier ^ strove to curb the impulse that was driving Young Italy into the arms of the Teutons. Among outsiders the statesman Ruggero Bonghi warned the nation of the dangers involved in this new departure. In short, opinions were hopelessly divided and there was no real guidance anywhere. Thus the Premier was steadily opposed to the idea of a formal alliance ; the Foreign Secretary advocated an alliance with Germany only ; and Baron Blanc, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was pleading the cause of both military Empires with a degree of zeal, a force of suasion, and an unflagging persever- ance that would have done credit to a professional agent of the German Chancellor. Meanwhile Bismarck kept himself in the background lest, by appearing too prominently in this international venture, he should jeopardize an important parliamentary scheme he was then carrying out at home. Qualifying himself for the r61e of ally of the Catholic Centre 1 Jl Diritto. ^ II Popolo Romano. 22 FROM THE TRIPLE TO in Germany, he was making eager advances to the Vatican, the success of which might be marred by friendly relations with the Italian Government. Hence he confided to Austria the task of taking Italy in tow and luring her into the alliance. And Austria accepted the mission with alacrity. For her hope of re-establishing genuine friendship with Russia had vanished and her desire to immobilize Italy had grown correspondingly. The press of Vienna handled the subject skilfully. Sirens' voices filled the air with entrancing sounds, while Bismarck, who put greater faith in brutal threats than in soft-spoken flatteries, sounded a harsher note. His spokesman Treitschke, in a carefully worded diatribe against the Italian Govern- ment, hinted that the question of restoring Rome to the Holy See would be raised if Italy remained isolated and the Vatican struck up an accord with Germany. The warning, repeated in the journals of Vienna, created an impression in Rome which bordered on alarm. The Austrians, in pursu- ance of instructions received from Berlin, had launched a report that the King of Italy contemplated a visit to Franz Josef in Vienna. In this announcement, as in so many others made by German and Austrian Government press agencies, there was not a shred of truth. But Germany's friends in Italy hailed it with delight and lauded to the skies the unknown originator of the genial scheme. The Italian Ambassador in Vienna, a man of sound practical sense, warned his Government against the eagerness for an alliance displayed by the Italian press which tended to put Italy in the position of a mendicant suing for favours. A shocking incident suddenly imparted actuality to Italian apprehensions and reinforced the machinations of the two imperial Governments. One night,^ as the body of Pope Pius IX was being conveyed from the Church of St. Peter to that of St. John Lateran, a number of roughs 1 July 12th, 1881. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 28 assailed the bearers and strove to throw the corpse into the Tiber. The effect of this disgusting onslaught on the remains of a Pope who had once been the civil ruler of Rome was tremendous. Leo XIII called the attention of the Catholic world to the unbearable conditions that pressed upon him in the capital rendering the exercise of his functions impos- sible. Franz Josef took the disgraceful proceedings as much to heart as though the insult were personal and pointed against himself. Bismarck, who had meanwhile attained his end and ingratiated himself with the Vatican and the Catholic Centre, zealously attributed to the Roman problem an international character. Italy's isolation was thus grow- ing more painful and dangerous, and at any moment a collec- tive endeavour might be put forth by the Great Powers for such a solution of the Roman problem as would undo the work of Italian unity. By way of heightening this impression, Bismarck de- spatched his famulus, Dr. Busch, then Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Rome to intimate to the Vatican the desirabiUty of getting the Pope and his court to quit the clerical city and take refuge in Fulda in Germany, where he could reckon on absolute liberty of action " during his exile." Enaanating from any other European statesman, this invitation might be the outcome of a legitimate desire to conciliate the Catholics of the realm he governed, or of an equally legitimate ambition to secure for his country the glamour attaching to the dispensation of hospitality to the Supreme Head of the Catholic Church. But on Bismarck's insidious manoeuvre established facts forbid us to put any such harmless construction. For it was he who, in the year 1875, had expressed in strong terms to the ItaUan Govern- ment his conviction that the Guarantee Laws regulating the status of the Pontiff were much too generous for the Pope and much too dangerous for the other Powers because they rendered the Head of the Church invulnerable. And two 24 FROM THE TRIPLE TO years later he exclaimed to Crispi : " You have wrapped the Pope up in cotton wool so that nobody can deal him a blow." ^ And now when he fancied that his own purposes could best be served by a resentful Vicar of Christ, he had no scruple to condemn the laws which he had thus eulogized and to declare them incompatible with papal liberty, or to exhort the Pope in justice to himself and his spiritual chil- dren to quit the country that had generously enacted and was scrupulously observing them. Bismarck and his Austrian confederates had another motive for the animus which they were manifesting towards Italy now that she was about to enter the net so cunningly spread for her. They feared that Italian diplomacy, with its wonted circumspection, would hedge roxind its adhesion to the alliance with awkward provisoes. What they were playing for was the unconditional surrender of Italy's liberty of action in the sphere of international politics. And they ended by securing it. King Humbert, dismayed by the national peril and dis- satisfied with the indecision of his Cabinet, unexpectedly took the matter into his own hands and arranged a visit to the Austrian Emperor. In this as in one or two other fateful moves he seems to have consulted none of his Ministers. Indeed the Italian Government, when reports of the pro- jected meeting of the monarchs came to its knowledge, denied them with sincerity and emphasis. The Foreign Secretary telegraphed to his Ambassador in Vienna inquiring who had originated the unfounded rumours, and his despatch was crossed by one from that Ambassador asking whether there was any truth in them ! The King's initiative turned the scale, and the journey to Vienna was arranged for October 26th. ^ Even at that late hour the Italian Cabinet ^ Cf. Pietro Silva, Problemi Italiani, xvi. Come Si Formo la Triplice, p. 30. 2 Cf. La Triplice Alleanza, Ricordi, Note, Appunti di un Vecchio Parlamentare. Roma, 1914. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 25 strove hard to whittle down the significance of the visit which it was iinable to countermand, and suggested among other things that the trysting-place should not be Vienna and that the King and his Consort should undertake the journey, unaccompanied by members of the Cabinet. But these limitations were demurred to by Franz Josef, who insisted that the sovereigns should repair to the Austrian capital and should bring with them the chiefs of their respective Governments. The ensuing interview and the solemnity with which the Austrian Government invested it, clinched the political problem. The germanophile press of Rome broke out in pasans of victory ; Germany and Austria were lauded to the skies ; Crispi discoursed eloquently of an alliance of the strong with the strong ; and the joy of Sonnino at seeing his pet programme on the point of realization knew no bounds. " The King's journey," he wrote, " has given us an assurance that the Ministry is at last minded to strike out a new line of foreign policy, and inaugurate a clear-cut system of alliances. In order to reach Berlin it was indispensable to pass through Vienna. Well, we have passed through Vienna. But we must not halt there. We are pushing on to Berlin, abandoning all ideas of an alliance with France." i 1 Op. cit., p. 15. CHAPTER IV THE IRONIES OF FATE IT is interesting as an object lesson in the ironies of fate to compare the fervid enthusiasm of the Sonnino of 1881 for the cultured Germans and Austrians and his exuber- ant hatred of France with the cold logic of the disabused anchoretic Sonnino of 1915 who suddenly acquired wide- spread popularity by undoing the work he had so laboriously helped to achieve a quarter of a century before. European history ever since Germany began to obtain success in moulding it, has been full of these piquant Penelopean activi- ties, some of which are fast losing their humorous points in grim tragedy. One more sensational incident broke the smooth surface of Austro-Italian relations before these were fixed with the relative finality which treaties with Germany and such- like scraps of paper can confer. The chief Vienna press organ came out one day with the announcement that Franz Josef would return King Humbert's visit at the very first opportunity. " It matters little," the journal added, " in what city it will be returned. If we ourselves had any voice in the matter we should suggest Florence. But it is impossible, for comprehensible reasons, that the return visit should be made in Rome." For Leo XIII had refused to receive the Austrian Emperor if he went to the Quirinal, and as head of a Catholic State Franz Josef could not well visit Rome and ignore the head of the Catholic Church. This was a grievous disappointment to the Italian partisans of 26 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 27 Austria and Germany, and it poured water on the mill of the few who were imploring the Italian Government to bethink themselves before it was too late of the chains they were forging for their country. While these contrary currents were clashing and swirhng and embarrassing the Cabinet, Sidney Sonnino, "impatient to see the Triple Alliance become an accomplished fact, ran suddenly to the rescue " of his programme and wrote : " We go further even than the Neue Freie Presse : to us, too, the place of the visit does not matter one jot. In order that the alliance should be concluded we are willing that the return visit should be postponed sine die." i National dignity went for nothing in the honour and glory of an alliance with Germany and Austria. Baron Sonnino had his wish : the alliance was signed on May 20th, 1882, and the visit was postponed sine die. In his own country Baron Sonnino's popularity if not his reputation is founded on the ability and firmness with which he fought his diplomatic duel with Prince Biilow in the year 1915, and on the moral courage with which he dissolved Italy's partnership with Germany and Austria and entered into an alliance with France and Britain. And his cautious temper, exquisite tact, and dialectical skill as displayed during the progress of those conversations, were in truth highly creditable to Italy's official spokesman. So, too, was his rare moral courage. The concrete results constituted tardy but solid amends for the sins of his generous but impetuous youth when, with the noblest intentions, he worked assidu- ously, unwittingly and durably pour le roi de Prusse. But they were attained, like so much else that is precious, with- out having been expressly sought for. Among the many political riddles which have exercised and baffled the ingenuity of students of the history of this period, several turn upon the preliminaries, the form, and 1 Rassegna Settimanale. Cf. La Triplice Alleanza, pp. 19-20. 28 FROM THE TRIPLE TO the wording of the Triple Alliance. The secrecy that envel- oped every official interchange of views and every proposal and modification of the text of the Treaty remained impene- trable until German interests required its partial removal. In addition to the little which then became known, certain momentary glimpses behind the scenes were vouchsafed me in the capitals of the two Central Empires and elsewhere. The few facts which I gleaned are instructive without being sensational and may help to elucidate some of the recent political developments which seem to call for explanation. One of these deals with the pristine texts of the Treaty. I have good grounds for affirming that the first form of the Triple Alliance differed considerably from the second. It consisted really of two distinct treaties : the one between the Habsburg and the Italian Monarchies, and the other between Italy and Germany. In addition to these there was the older treaty between the HohenzoUerns and the Habsburgs. The grounds for the double Italian compact were technical and political. For the Consulta always recognized a noteworthy difference in its views and treat- ment of the two Central Empires, that of the HohenzoUerns being regarded as a powerful friend to be conciliated and humoured, while the other was the masked enemy to be mistrusted, watched, and guarded against. Hence it had been Italy's ardent desire when coming to an accord with Germany to ignore Austria altogether. And more than once proposals in this sense were made to Bismarck. But the Chancellor invariably answered in the words trumpeted abroad by Baron Sonnino and his patriotic friends, that the road to Berlin passed through Vienna and that there was no short cut. And whenever a plea for modifying either this decision or the text of the Treaty was put before him, Bis- marck's stereotyped answer was virtually this : "If you don't like it you may lump it." The only exception which he admitted to this rule — the insertion of the famous Com- THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 29 pensation clause known as Paragraph VII— proceeded from the only error of judgment committed in his dealings with Italy. It would be unfair to imply that Italy without this stipula- tion to fall back upon would now be fighting side by side with her two Allies against Britain and France. Many perfectly legitimate and cogent motives rendered such a consummation impossible. But between military co-opera- tion and hostility there are many intermediate halting places, and Paragraph VII effectually encouraged Italy to abide in none of them. None the less, it was vaguely hoped in Rome that somehow and sometime circumstances might enable her to cultivate Germany's friendship without the paralyzing set-off of Austria's alliance. Into the motives which impelled the Chancellor to acquiesce in a stipulation, of which the destructive effect was manifest to the average mind, it would be idle to inquire. One would do well, however, to remember in this connection that Bismarck, unlike the statesmen of France and Britain, never leaned with much weight on parchment treaties. The struggle for existence among Great Powers, he said, reduced treaty obligations from an absolute to a relative force. Against vital interests, they are unavailing. One of the most telling arguments of the party headed by Sonnino in support of an alliance with the two military Empires had been the necessity of safeguarding Italy's interests in the Mediterranean. Encroachments such as those of which France had just been guilty might, it was argued, recur, and single-handed the nation was powerless to hinder or resent them. But once associated in partner- ship with the two mightiest military States in Europe, Italy would have nothing more to fear from that or any quarter. And this security alone, were there no further advantages to be hoped for, would more than warrant the new orienta- tion of the country's policy. In this plea there was force, 30 FROM THE TRIPLE TO and the Government, recognizing it, sought to provide in the terms of the Treaty for reciprocal guarantees of territorial integrity and also for the protection of Italy's interests in the Mediterranean. But this latter request was curtly negatived by the Teutonic Governments who were minded to bind their would-be ally without binding themselves. In this way Italy was cheated out of the one positive gain for the sake of which she had taken the fateful step that bereft her of the friendship of France, impaired her economic condition, deprived her of the privileges she might have received from the Republic in Tunis, obliged her to suppress her sympathies for her kith and kin in Austria, and degraded her to the role of a satellite. That, too, was one of Fate's cruel ironies, and its effects reach far ; farther than is realized even yet. One of the stipulations agreed to by all contracting parties was the observance of absolute secrecy. And this obliga- tion was not confined to the terms of the alliance but extended to the fact that it had been concluded. But, as usual, the moment the Teutonic Powers thought that their interests would be furthered by a breach of faith, they committed it. And that moment arrived within three weeks after the signa- ture. For one object pursued by Bismarck was the chronic estrangement between Italy and France. And nothing could contribute to this more speedily and efficaciously than the announcement that Italy had turned against the sister-nation in peace and in war and would henceforth be found siding with France's relentless enemies. Accord- ingly in the Reichstag the Chancellor alluded to the Treaty, and a few months later Count Kalnoky mentioned it at the Delegations in Budapest. In this way and through the deliberate indiscretions of the German and Austrian press the fact was trumpeted abroad and Bismarck's object fully attained. An alhance between the Latin nations to Germany's detriment was rendered impossible. France's THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 31 schemes of revenge were become harmless dreams, Russia had no longer to deal with a timorous Austria but with three inseparable allies, and the Teutonic States were free leisurely to conceive and thoroughly to work out the most grandiose scheme of world-conquest and transformation which has ever entered into the mind of man. This was not the Triple Alliance which Crispi had imagined and worked for, and for which he is unjustly made responsible. He neither drafted, signed, nor renewed it. He criticized its terms severely. But finding it as one of the instruments of his country's international policy, he used it to the best of his opportunities and strove in vain to have it modified to Italy's advantage. And when the rivalry between Germany and Great Britain began to assume the form of subdued hostility and Italy's position became tragical, he perceived the appalling consequences it would bring forth and strove hard to insure his country against them. Indeed the un- easiness of almost all Italian statesmen bordered on alarm after the commercial accord was concluded between Austria and France. " What is happening ? " asked Crispi. " Every hand is turned against Italy because of the Triple Alliance. It is we who are supporting all the weight of that concern. . . . We are told that the Triple Alliance was instituted for the sake of peace. But for us it means war. . . . Under these circumstances, it behoves us to reflect whether it is to our interest to remain in it." The Germans pricked their ears and frowned at these ominous tokens of restiveness. The Kaiser called on the Italian Ambassador and informed him that he himself would shortly repair to Rome to talk matters over with Crispi and make an amicable arrangement. The Ambassador telegraphed the good tidings to Rome. But three days later Crispi had fallen and the Kaiser's conces- sions were no longer called for. CHAPTER V THE RENEWAL OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE ITALIAN statesmen bestirred themselves often since the Triple Alliance was first forged to obtain for their country some sensible betterment of the irksome terms on which it had entered the concern. But in vain. Once drawn within the net, the would-be comrade was ranked as a serf. Italy was publicly insulted by Germany for years. Her diplomatic representatives there were treated as menials. For three consecutive years the Italian Ambas- sador in Berlin sued for an audience of the Chancellor, and sued in vain. For three years ! At last one of the few dip- lomatists of clear political vision. Count di Robilant, becom- ing the head of the Consulta, a new leaf was turned. He was the diplomatist who, as Ambassador in Vienna, had continually warned his Government against yielding to the pressure of the unripe youthful patriots headed by Sonnino. Alive to the fact that Bismarck, while feigning to belittle the worth of Italy's adhesion, really prized it as one of his most valuable assets and would have been terribly grieved to forfeit it, di Robilant, when the time came for renewing the pact, simulated unwillingness and indecision. And the stratagem succeeded so well that Bismarck was deeply per- turbed and by way of compromise assented to the insertion in the instrument of the famous Paragraph VII, recognizing the parity of Austrian and Italian interests in the Balkans. Now the admission of this clause, for which the entire credit is due to Robilant, was the one mistake committed by Bismarck 32 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 33 in the course of his negociations with Italy. For it supplied a handle to the Consulta for the claims put forward in 1914- 1915 and an admirable weapon for the diplomatic duel which Baron Sonnino subsequently fought out with dialectical skill and firmness. One may say that it at once imported the germs of dissolution into the newly created international organism, obviously rendering the compact dissoluble at con- junctures when it would be of the utmost consequence to one or other of the parties that its stipulations should be executed. The new clause enacted that if one of the contracting States should acquire power or territory in the Balkan Peninsula the other would be entitled to put in a claim for compensation. And as Austria's designs and activity were concentrated on the Balkan Peninsula, it was not very difficult to foresee that the seed of dissension thus sown would bring forth bitter fruit. In Vienna a few clear-visioned public men realized this danger. The Chief of the General Staff, Konrad von Hoetzendorff, who, to my thinking, is perhaps the ablest statesman in that Empire, told me that he placed not the slightest reliance on Italy's co-operation when the hour for combined action should strike. On the contrary, he looked forward to a series of bickerings which would culminate in a diplomatic quarrel and probably a military struggle. Konrad's forecast, which events have amply confirmed, does more credit to his sagacity than the means by which he would fain have warded off the danger reflected on his political morality. A preventive war, like the stroke of grace by which a compassionate physician might put an agonizing patient out of pain, is one of those desperate and fateful expedients which the conscience of the civilized world rightly refuses to sanction. And in this case the aged Franz Josef, still master in his own house, vetoed it. It is worth noting that during the thirty-three years' duration of the Triple Alliance, the aims pursued by the two Teuton partners were specifically their own, and neither 3 34 FROM THE TRIPLE TO Italy's interests nor those that might be deemed common to the entire concern had any permanent place in their action or designs. It is further interesting to record the fact, which recent disclosures have established, that Austria's policy, always inspired by contempt and distrust of Italy, was since the introduction of Paragraph VII into the treaty uniformly actuated by unfriendliness to that State, and that on one occasion, as we have seen, a preventive war against it advocated by Konrad von Hoetzendorff was elaborately prepared and was on the point of being waged when the firm veto uttered by Count Aehrenthal, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and sustained by the aged Emperor, frustrated the nefarious project. The wording of Paragraph VII, as revealed in recent official communications, was as follows : — Austria-Hungary and Italy, who aim exclusively at the main- tenance of the status quo in the East, bind themselves to employ their influence to hinder every territorial change detrimental to one or other of the contracting Powers. They shall give each other reciprocally all explanations requisite to the elucidation of their respective intentions as well as of those of other Powers. If, however, in the course of events, the maintenance of the status quo in the territory of the Balkans and on the Ottoman coasts and islands of the Adriatic Sea and the ^gean become impossible, and if, either in consequence of the procedure of a third Power or of other causes, Austria and Italy be constrained to change the status quo by a temporary or lasting occupation, this occupation shall take place only after previous agreement between the two Powers on the basis of the principle of a reciprocal arrangement for all the advantages, territorial or other, which one of them may secure outside the status quo and in such a manner as to satisfy all the legitimate claims of both parties. The insertion of this clause in the treaty so insistently demanded by Italy was at once followed by the first renewal of the Alliance. As the Central Empires still declined to protect Italy's THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 35 interests in the Mediterranean, Crispi instinctively turned towards Great Britain for the attainment of those safeguards without which her actual position as Germany's ally and France's prospective enemy would be considerably worse than it had been before the alliance. Such a twofold insur- ance with Germany on land and with Britain on sea had been Crispi' s favourite scheme from the outset. But the British Government, averse to foreign entanglements, fought shy of formal treaties. Had it been otherwise, the German Chancellor would have offered no objection. On the con- trary, he urged Italy to cultivate the friendliest possible relations with Great Britain, " whether Salisbury or Glad- stone happened to be in power," and complimented Crispi on the skill and tact with which he was carrying out this counsel. For at that time Britain felt no mistrust towards the Teuton Empire, and the phrases " blood is thicker than water," " we are both Protestant nations," and " we must live and let our rivals live," were being bandied about by the politicians of both parliamentary parties, as so many magic formulae. The upshot of Italy's efforts and England's good-will was at last announced by Lord Salisbury at the Guildhall,^ when he told his hearers that the traditional fraternity between England and Italy was about to assume more concrete forms and that England would see that the status quo in the Mediterranean was not upset to the prejudice of the Italian nation. The Triple Alliance, at first concluded for a term of five years, was prolonged in March, 1887, under the circumstances and with the addition already mentioned. The Marchese di Rudini renewing it in June, 1891, extended the term from five to twelve years with the proviso that each side reserved to itself the right of seceding from the partnership at the end of the first six years. He also imparted to it a marked economic character which, besides satisfying certain pressing 1 1887. 36 FROM THE TRIPLE TO needs of his country, insensibly blunted the anti-French point of the alliance. The commercial treaties concluded by Italy with Germany and Austria while enriching those Empires had also for a time a distinctly beneficent effect on the material well-being of the Italian partner. To my mind it was this semi-consciously achieved feat of political transubstantiation which, by purging the alliance of its anti-French spirit, rendered possible the secret Franco-Italian agreement con- cluded by MM. Delcasse and Prinetti in February, 1902. After that and the arrangements subsequently come to by Italy, Great Britain and France, one might truly say that the first-named country occupied the anomalous position of being the friend of the Entente and the formal ally of the Central Empires, the potential enemy of Austria and of France and the lasting friend of the two irreconcilable rivals, Germany and Britain. In 1902, the year of the secret alliance with France which Germany did not discover until six years later, the Triple Alliance treaty was adhered to by all three States without modification. Finally and for the last time it was agreed to in 1912, a whole year in advance of the period fixed for its renewal. This anticipatory agreement was intended by Germany to serve as an admonition to the Entente Powers that the Triple Alliance was one, indivisible, vigilant and ready. According to one of those stereotyped phrases with which indolent or interested politicians are wont to delude them- selves that they are solving international difficulties, the object aimed at and the advantage bestowed by the Triple Alliance was the maintenance of the peace of Europe. That was always the thesis of Germany, Austria and Italy. It was also for a time the behef of Britaia and France. And to a certain extent this claim advanced and vaunted by its advocates was warranted. What people never troubled to ascertain was the scope of that peace, whether its advantages THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 37 were equally distributed, and to what use they were being put. And yet the pith of the matter lay there. Peace was indeed preserved, but at the cost of Italy's aspirations, of France's velleities, of Russia's strivings, of Britain's security and of the military preparedness of all these States. And it was preserved mainly in order to give Germany the leisure and the means of stretching forth her tentacles, seizing the economic resources of Europe and laying in the arms, munitions and finances requisite for her part in the world-war which formed the culminating point of her policy. Germany having cemented the alliance against France, proceeded to utilize it for the purpose of rendering herself independent of non-Teutonic allies and of making herself a match for all Europe outside Austria-Hungary. That was the object of the peace which the Kaiser so perseveringly upheld and which the British people so enthusiastically extolled. And once within hail of that goal he launched out upon a policy of aggression which several times endangered the general tranquillity, brought Europe within sight of war, and then by giving way in the nick of time he claimed and received the credit of maintaining international tranquillity. " Wilhelm, the Peace-Emperor," " Germany, the Peace-Power," were some of the clap-trap phrases which masked up the wily expedients of Berlin and bespoke the child-like credulity of the Entente peoples during this insidious game. Italian statesmen were not all blind to this systematic abuse of the ascendency which the Triple Alliance conferred upon the Germans. The indications that some of them clearly discerned the sinister objects of Teutonic policy are many and clear. One instance may suffice ; among the instructions telegraphed by Crispi to the Italian Ambassador in Berlin we find the following passage : — It is needless for me to repeat to you that in reality the diffi- culties with which we now have to cope emanate for the most part from the fetters that bind us to Germany. And if we have 38 FROM THE TRIPLE TO no intention to demand from the letter and the spirit of the Treaty consequences which might in Berhn be accounted exces- sive, it is none the less true that it behoves us to ask, now more than ever, whether, to what extent, and in what way our interests are protected by a treaty which has indeed for its main object to obviate and hinder a European war, but which assuredly ought not to be looked upon as alien from what, in a form more or less disguised, is tantamount to a war waged outside Europe against one or other of the allied Powers. But Crispi, like Mancini, Robilant, and di Rudini, was powerless to do more than watch, report, and wring his hands in impotent grief. The die was cast. Before her adhesion to the Alliance Italy might have accepted France's con- ciliatory offer of an amicable arrangement about her interests in Tunis and President Ferry's suggestion that she should annex Tripoli. But once the treaty was signed Italy's liberty of action was gone. She had concluded a bad bargain and her only course was to make the best of it. This neces- sity was glibly expressed by simplicist politicians in the phrases : " Austria and Italy must be either allies or enemies, there is no middle course. And hostility towards Austria is a luxury which Italy cannot afford." Those formulae give us the clue to the policy of abject submission to the harsh behests of her allies in which Italy steadfastly persisted for thirty-three years. And her secret understand- ing with France reveals the expedients by which she endeavoured to insure herself against some of its most mischievous effects. During this long period, the European situation underwent several far-reaching changes, some of them marked by historic events, but Germany's policy remained the same. For it was the result of a sequence of systematic, single- minded efforts to enforce her own absolute overlordship upon Europe. In diplomacy she compassed this object by en- deavouring to keep the two Latin nations not merely sepa- THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 39 rated but mutually hostile, by strengthening the Slav element in Austria at the expense of the Italian, and by endeavour- ing to drive such a wedge between France and Russia as should split their alhance or immobilize one of the Allies in the supreme hour of the other's need. The story of these last- named manoeuvres has never been written. It has not even been sketched. Yet it abounds in thrilling episodes which lay bare the workings of the strongest and basest of minds and fascinate the feeblest and best intentioned, and a certain chapter of the story which I could reconstruct in every one of its sensational details would throw a painfully intense light on some of the foulest corners of underground politics. It was only when the cunning devices invented for the pur- pose of stirring up dissension or awakening distrust among the Entente Powers had failed of their object that the Kaiser set himself to obtain separately from Russia and from Britain promises of neutrality for the " eventuality " of his wars against any and every Power other than that one to whom he was making the request. This self-denying stipulation, had it been assented to and ratified, would have given Germany a free hand to attack, defeat, cripple, and subject the natural allies of Great Britain and of Russia, while immobilizing all the forces of these two States and reserving each of the latter for subsequent attack under conditions ruinous to them and auspicious for herself. But fortunately there were limits to the simplicity of the two Candides, and at that particular moment they were drawn just here. All that the Cabinets of London and Petersburg could at that time be induced to do was to declare that no political combination to which they actually belonged harboured aggressive designs against Germany and to undertake that they would withhold their support from any alliance or league one of whose objects was inimical to the integrity or peace of that nation. CHAPTER VI UNFAIR TREATMENT OP ITALY BY HER TEUTON ALLIES ITALY was the famulus or fag of her two so-called allies, and she had not even a hireling's reward. During my friend Count Taafte's long tenure of power as Prime Minister of Austria, the Slavs of that Empire were the spoiled children of the Vienna Government, and from that time down to the outbreak of the present war the Italians of the South, whose struggle with the Slav element there was bitter and incessant, were neglected, persecuted, or driven out by a system which was alternately simple and complex, gradual and sudden, legal and arbitrary, but always effectual. The object was destructive. Italian irredentism in Austria was to be plucked up root and branch, and the preliminary ex- pedient resorted to consisted in driving a Slav wedge into the Italian population there. Slavs were encouraged to immigrate into Trieste and other places inhabited by men of Italian race and coveted by the Italian nation. They were favoured socially and politically to an extent which was generally demoralizing. Thus in the year 1910 among the 4,600 civil servants in subordinate positions in Trieste no less than 3,700 were Slavs. In the State railways out of 828 salaried officials 728 were men of Slav origin. In the Lloyd dockyards almost fifty per cent, of the workmen were Slavs. The climax of this coercive policy was reached under Prince Hohenlohe whose Draconian methods strained Austro- Italian relations to the snapping point. Italians were arrested without any more solid reason than their national sympathies expressed or merely assumed. 40 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 41 In one little district alone 950 Italian labourers were expelled/ postcards with the portrait of Dante or of the Italian Royal Family were confiscated— in a word, the authorities of the Dual Monarchy, whose claim to existence was founded on the protection it afforded to the various nationalities of which it was composed, made a fateful exception to the detriment of its ally who was dealt with as an enemy to whom no compromise was possible. In truth the Triple Alliance existed solely as an agency for executing schemes woven by the Dual Alliance for the exclusive behoof of its two Teutonic members. Only the two Teutonic partners sat at the Council board, whereas all three were working on the executive committee. Italy was made much of when the Kaiser landed at Tangiers, when the Conference was sitting in Algeciras, during the crisis that followed the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- govina, and after the despatch of the Panther to Agadir. Whenever any step was taken which menaced the peace of Europe, Italy at once became the trusty and trusted ally whose views coincided with those of her two comrades and whose resolve was identical with theirs. But once the incident was over she became the needy and brow-beaten client of two wealthy grandees on whose rare generosity she was wholly dependent, and whose behests it was part of her fimctions to carry out. It was in vain that Ministers like Crispi, di Robilant, Guicciardini protested against this gross abuse : Italy was caught in the trap and had to undergo her fate. How cruel this fate was and how helpless she felt against it, is not, cannot be, realized by any but the statesmen who imderwent the ordeal and were subjected to the pressure. An episode — one of several — ^may help the reader to form an idea of how Italy, the ally, was browbeaten by her neigh- bour and co-partner. Towards the close of November, 1893, Giolitti's Cabinet resigned. Zanardelli, then Speaker of the Chamber, was 1 In the year 1911. 42 FROM THE TRIPLE TO sent for and charged with the mission of forming a ministry. He succeeded to his own satisfaction and that of the fair- minded among his fellow countrymen. On December 5 the list was ready. A friend of mine, Fortis, was one of the members and the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs was offered to and accepted by General Baratieri, a man of military capacity, of whom a high opinion was enter- tained in Austria, especially by the Emperor. But as Bara- tieri, like Barzilai, was a native of Trentino in Austria, the Vienna Cabinet took exception to his appointment to be Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. " The nomination of M. Baratieri," Count Kalnoky ^ had said, " inconsequence of his origin, is not consonant to the ties of alliance and amity which link the two States." The Austrian Ambassador at Rome reiterated the objection. But at the same time Vienna and Budapest newspapers, inspired by the Govern- ment, declared that all rumours to the effect that Austria had raised difficulties on account of Baratieri were false and mischievous. Baratieri was thunderstruck. He not only withdrew his acceptance of the portfolio, but he announced his resolve to resign his post in the army and abandon his career alto- gether. But Zanardelli, to his credit, refused to bend to Austria's will and admit her veto as a factor in Italian politics. Therefore he turned to the only alternative and laid the mandate in the King's hand.^ In the true sense of the term Italy was never treated as an ally. When her interests were at stake the utmost she could hope for — and the hope was cruelly belied — was to be left alone to safeguard them to the best of her ability. A very different spirit actuated the conduct of the two German Empires towards each other. At Algeciras, the Kaiser's claims were upheld by Count Goluchowski, the Austrian Minister, with a degree of zeal and vigour which elicited the 1 Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs. - Cf. Nuova Antologia, October 16, 1915. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 43 Kaiser's gratitude and won for Austria the epithet of Germany's "brilliant second." When Aehrenthal incor- porated the two Slav provinces, Germany made the ensuing quarrel her own and despatched to Petersburg the famous conmiunication which was erroneously described as an ultimatum. 1 But when Italy set out to acquire a new colony in Africa, her campaign against the Turks was not only not facilitated by the moral support of her allies, but its success was endangered by their arbitrary limitations, and its pro- gress was systematically impeded by their unfriendly acts. From the beginning of that war, Italy's enterprise called forth scathing condemnations in the German and Austrian press. Counsels of resistance were, it is known, tendered to the Porte by the German Ambassador in Constantinople. And while the German Empire secretly contributed men and money to the Ottoman ally, the Austrian Government frankly forbade Italy to occupy Chios or Mytilene, to bombard Pre- vesa and to adopt the naval and military strategy and tactics which would have brought the struggle to a speedy and successful close. And yet the African provinces for which the Italians were fighting had long been ear-marked by them with the implicit consent of Germany and the express, if secret, acquiescence of France. It was the statesman, Emilio Visconti-Venosta, Italy's chief plenipotentiary at the Algeciras Conference, who had definitively arranged the matter with the French. In reality this agreement was but the application of the principle accepted by Delcasse and Prinetti in February, 1902. Visconti-Venosta had been sent to Algeciras by Sonnino's colleague and friend, Guicciardini, both of them still partisans of the Triple Alliance, and both dissatisfied with the role in ^ This incident will one day be recounted as it really occurred. I know the details which, when compared with the version at present in vogue, will serve to show up the slipshod way in which history is sometimes written, by the very men who made it. 44 FROM THE TRIPLE TO that alliance assigned to Italy by her partners. At Algeciras the steady and helpful support which the Italian delegate gave to France was highly appreciated and suitably requited by that country and Great Britain, whose Governments offered Italy a free hand in Tripoli, whenever she should feel disposed to imitate her French sister and build up a new African colony. And now that the Consulta deemed the auspicious moment come, it was natural to assume that the enterprise would be looked upon more favourably by Italy's allies than by mere friends. For the latter owed incomparably less to her Platonic amity than the former to her implicit obedience, while all of them had assented to what all felt to be a political necessity. On moral grounds no doubt a stand might easily have been taken against the forcible seizure of a Turkish province and its incorporation in the kingdom of Italy. But neither her friends nor her allies being without sin, she had no fear that any of them would cast ethical stones at her. And yet this cheering forecast was quickly belied by incidents which left a sinister and abiding impression. By her own allies Italy was hampered at almost every step. The first prohibition was launched in the name of Germany as well as Austria.^ Count Aehrenthal informed the Duke d'Avarna that operations on the Ottoman coasts of European Turkey and in the islands of the ^gean Sea could be per- mitted neither by Austria nor by Germany because they ran counter to the treaty of the Alliance. And the clause of the Alliance which was pleaded in support of that contention was the famous Paragraph VII which Count di Robilant had expended such ingenuity and pains to have inserted ! The occasion of this prohibition was even more extraordinary than its alleged justification. It had been rumoured that Italian warships had turned their searchlights on the environs of Salonika ! Two days later ^ Count Aehrenthal apprized the 1 On November 5th, 1911. ^ November 7th, 1911. Cf. Italian Green Book Despatch, N. 6. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 45 Italian Ambassador that he looked upon the bombardment of such ports of European Turkey as Salonika, Kavalla, etc., as contrary to Clause 7 of the Treaty, and five months later ' Coimt Berchtold, who had meanwhile succeeded Aehrenthal, complained to the Duke d'Avarna that the Italian squadron replying to the cannon of the Dardanelles forts had damaged them ! Nay, the Austrian Minister went to the extent of menacing the Italian ally : he declared that if the Royal Government was minded to resume its liberty of action, the Austrian Government would do likewise. If any similar operation were attempted in future, it would carry with it " grave consequences." That was the spirit in which the Teuton allies interpreted their friendship and alliance with Italy. And it was in the same spirit of varnished mistrust and masked enmity that the two Central Empires worked for the realization of their own ends during the thirty-three years that the Treaty was in vigour. Austria never ceased to regard Italy as the potential enemy for whose destruction it was incumbent on her to keep her powder dry and prepare favourable conditions. And so offensive were the manifestations of this ill-will that some of the hardiest apostles of the Triple Alliance in Italy were unable to hide their iU-humour or repress their protests. One of these was Fortis, a politician of mark who was for some time Premier. He was so fervid a partisan of the Alliance that he helped to found a Review which was pub- lished in Budapest for the spread of Triplicist doctrines. Yet he complained to the writer of these lines more than once of the shortsighted policy and chronic bitterness of Austria and asked him to direct the attention of the Ministers at Vienna and Budapest to the sinister consequences of a wanton procedure which was estranging the Italian nation and damaging the Austrian Empire. Cavour displayed more 1 AprU, 1912. 46 FROM THE TRIPLE TO sagacity when he declared years before that " Italy can never be tranquil as long as Austria remains a Great Power." During those memorable years of steady preparations for the great European war which they were one day to let loose upon Europe, Austria and Germany were pursuing each their own special aims which were in turn but means for the one common and immutable end. Austria had her own reasons for the aversion she felt for Italy : jealousy of Italian expansion in the Adriatic and contempt for the unwarlike people whom she herself had recently been ruling with an iron rod. This latter sentiment partly explains the systematically harsh treatment which the Italian popu- lation of Austria received at the hands of their rulers, whose dealings with the Slavs were marked by equity or generosity. There was another motive further removed from the surface, but not less cogent than this : Austria, as Germany's fag in the South and East, was being spiirred forward to become mistress of the Adriatic, owner of Salonika, guardian of the Balkans, and therefore to blast Italy's hopes, to encircle her with narrow and impassable barriers and keep her in a state of permanent dependence. And she never lost sight of the first essential condition of success either in her own course or in that which was traced for her as Germany's agent. She continu(pd to plan in secret the downfall of her friend and partner, and made ready to compass her design on the first occasion that might offer. In view of this contingency the Vienna Government spent a milliard krons on the construction of redoubtable strong- holds and strategic railways on Italy's eastern boundaries. Nor were her precautionary measures exhausted by these heroic efforts. Franz Josef's Government did not scruple to approach the Russian rival with an infamous proposal pointed straight against the Italian friend and ally. The Petersburg Foreign Office was solicited by the Vienna Ball- hausplatz to strike up a covenant by which the Tsar's Govern- THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 47 ment should bind itself to preserve an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the Habsburg Monarchy in the probable event of the latter State waging war against Italy. And this arrangement was duly concluded. Thus one Central Empire treacherously and elaborately makes ready to destroy its loyal friend and ally whilst protesting the strength of the brotherly affection that hnks them together, just as the other Empire made a compact with one of its prospective enemies against its own bosom friend and termed the expedient a " back-alliance." It is fair to say that between the Military Empires them- selves ever since the dissolution of the " back-alliance," the honour that prevails among professional thieves was scrupu- lously observed and magniloquently described as " the fidelity of the Nibelimgen." ^ They stood by each other manfully through thick and thin, their vital interests exact- ing this solidarity. It was only towards outsiders that the doctrine of the worthlessness of plighted faith and the sacred- ness of treaties was unofficially preached and officially prac- tised. What community of interests joined together no mere doctrines could sunder. But whenever the time drew near for the renewal of the Triple Alliance which kept Italy's hands tied, the mask of affection was donned, the bugbear of French designs against the sister State was conjured up, and all the contemptible Teutonic devices with which the world is now so familiar were employed to allay the resent- ment and soften the feelings of the nation towards its covert foes. And the moment the diplomatic instrument was signed, the mask was forthwith doffed and Italy once more reduced to the intolerable position of fag and forced to cut and pickle rods for her own back. But she had no alternative. It was thus that after the Austrian and Italian Foreign Secretaries had paraded before Europe in Abbazia as repre- sentatives of two States animated by one mind and one ^ Nibelungentreue. 48 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE heart, Austria opened her purse and laid out vaster sums than her people could afford in fortifying the confines of the Empire on the Italian side. It was after the friendly, nay affectionate meeting in Salzburg that Bosnia and Herze- govina were annexed. It was on the morrow of General Canevo's visit to Vienna, where he deprecated and belittled Italian irredentism as " the folly of a few evil-minded per- sons," that Prince Hohenlohe, the Viceroy, promulgated the four anti-Italian decrees of his coercion law in Trieste. And it was shortly after the last meeting in Abbazia at which the Podesta welcomed the Marchese di San Giuliano that Austria, unknown to her Italian ally, precipitated the war which is still decimating Europe and impoverishing the world.' The history of world-politics affords few such examples of uniform treachery and insincerity on the part of one ally towards another, if we except the doings of the Prussian anti-Machiavel, Frederick the Great, to whom belongs the invidious distinction of having made knavery and foul play the groundwork of his foreign policy. And in the execution as well as the conception of this system of perfidy and base- ness, Germany, who contrived to keep herself out of sight in the dusky background of the scene, effectively aided and abetted her partner. Even during the " friendly conver- sations " between Prince Bulow and Baron Sonnino, in the first half of the year 1915, while the Berlin Government was lavishing gross flattery on Italy and the Italians and inspiring them with high hopes of untold advantages from the gener- osity of the two Elmpires, wagon-loads of " Munich beer " were passing through Italy, on their way to Lybia. One of those happy accidents which occur occasionally on rail- ways smashed one of the beer-barrels, revealing its double bottom and the presence of arms and ammunition for the rebels of Tripoli to be employed against Germany's dear friend and ally. 1 La Triplice Alleanza, pp. 23-2-1. CHAPTER VII AUSTRIA'S FOREIGN POLICY FOR a long while Austria hesitated between the two courses which formed the essence of her own foreign policy, the subjection of Serbia and the crippling of Italy. Both were judged essential to her future prestige and pros- perity as well as to the realization of the general Teutonic programme. And adequate provision was made for tackling either. The decision as to which should be undertaken first was made dependent on opportimity. If the political con- juncture should favour an attack on Italy, the Serbian enter- prise would be adjourned ; but if, on the contrary, circum- stances should render Serbia isolated and friendless, every effort was to be concentrated on severing the ties that linked her with Russia, whittling her territory, destroying her defences and drawing her by force within the Austrian sphere of attraction. On the advantages, necessity and duty of accomplishing these two schemes, there was no divergence of view among the political or military leaders of the Mon- archy. It was only on the question of opportunity that a difference of opinion made itself felt, engendering bitter dissension and giving rise to a campaign of subterranean influences and intrigues. Konrad von Hoetzendorff, Chief of the Austrian General Staff, and one of the most gifted public men in the Habsburg Monarchy, had long been working hard to get the army into trim for either campaign. But for a long time the diffi- culties with which he was confronted were deterrent. Hun- 49 4 50 FROM THE TRIPLE TO gary's move against the use of the German tongue in the army and in favour of a looser union with Austria had exas- perated the German half of the Monarchy and betrayed its leaders into words and acts which stiffened the necks of the Magyars. And the latter refused to respond to the reiterated demands for larger credits for the land forces. Yet these lacked many requisites. It was not until after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina that the danger of a European war forced the adversaries to unite, to close up their ranks, forget their differences, and supply the army not merely with necessaries but also with superfluities. An ultimatum was prepared for Belgrade which Count Aehren- thal authorized me to announce in advance. This unex- pected turn of events gladdened the heart of Konrad, whose ideas were shared and whose projects were approved by the Heir-Apparent, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. But Serbia knuckled down and the crisis subsided. The Slav war spectre being thus laid, it seemed to both those personages a wanton waste to leave the army unutilized. Konrad urged that as an expedition against Serbia had become unnecessary, a war with Italy would remove an ugly obstacle to his country's progress and infuse a new spirit into the peoples of Austria-Hungary. True, Italy had done nothing to deserve such a calamity. On the con- trary, she had repressed her outraged feelings, shut her eyes to the system of coercion which Austria had put in force against Italians of the Monarchy, and loyally discharged all the duties imposed on her by the Alliance, even when the cost was painfully heavy. The Archduke and the Chief of the General Staff, well aware of this, had no intention to punish Italy for the past, but only to hinder her from assum- ing a hostile attitude in the future. In other words, they advocated a preventive war. On political grounds Count Aehrenthal, then Foreign Secretary, dissented from the ideas and opposed the policy THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 51 of Franz Ferdinand. The work of diplomatic reconstruc- tion, he held, was greatly in arrears and might never be completed if Austria were to launch out upon a war which was absolutely unprovoked and against an ally whose con- duct had been exemplary and whose further co-operation might prove helpful. The moment, too, was less propitious than had been assumed. The annexation, although an accomplished fact which the Entente Powers were forced to recognize, had irritated every Government in Europe, excepting that of Germany. Already accusations of bad faith had impaired Austria's credit, and if further and more solid grounds were now purveyed by Austria herself for this indictment, she would forfeit more than a victorious cam- paign against her ally would bring her in. Moreover, Italy had substantially contributed to put an end to the Turkish boycott against Austrian wares. Besides, although engaged in a struggle with Turkey, the Italians were neither resource- less nor wholly friendless, and a campaign which began on the Italian frontier might easily extend until its battlefields covered all Europe. On those grounds Aehrenthal, who had an Austrian programme to carry out, besought the Emperor to veto the scheme. " It can only bring down disaster on all concerned," he said, " and it would be madness to attempt to reahze it, even if it were certain that Italy never means to fulfil her duties as ally." He added that in no case would he remain at his post if it were persisted in. Even then for a brief space of time it looked as though the decision were uncertain. But that period was very brief. Franz Josef, whose deep-rooted aversion to war was not overcome until July, 1914, readily acquiesced in the con- clusions of his Minister and signified his will that all designs against warlike Italy should be relinquished. His remon- strances with the Archduke, whose unwarranted interference had nearly plunged the country into a tremendous conflict, are said to have been barbed with a painful sting. Rumour, 52 FROM THE TRIPLE TO which in Vienna is circumstantial and untrustworthy, affirmed that the monarch upbraided the Heir Apparent with damaging by his thoughtlessness imperial interests which it had taken decades to build up, and with having alarmed the suspicions of an indispensable ally at the very time when it was a matter of supreme moment that her loyalty should not only be, but also appear to be, above suspicion. The Archduke withdrew, disappointed and soured, and he left nothing undone to undermine Aehrenthal's position until that Minister's premature death removed a serious obstacle to his projects. But however sharp the Emperor's strictures may have been, no trustworthy report of them reached the public ear, and so long as no overt act revealed a change in Austria's dispositions, Italy, whose rulers were aware of what had been brewing, made no secret of her ill-humour. Aehrenthal pressed the Emperor to placate the ally by a sacrifice which should leave no doubt that the Government repudiated the machinations of Franz Ferdinand and Konrad von Hoetzendorff. In comphance with this exhortation Franz Josef relieved Konrad of his functions but appointed him to be Inspector-General of the Army. Thereupon the Treaty of Alliance was renewed — one year before the date for extending it fell due — and the world was solemnly informed that the three Allies had never been more intimately united or more unanimous in what they regarded as the groundwork of their policy which was now become the most solid safeguard of European peace and progress. And soon after this demonstration Konrad von Hoetzendorff was reinstated in his position as Chief of the General Staff, Austria's anti-Italian policy was reinforced with unprecedented rigour, and the Austrian Admiral Monte- cuccoli — a renegade Italian — publicly declared that the Austrian navy's function was to drive " the enemy " from the Adriatic. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 53 The sorry figure cut by Italy not only in European affairs but within the narrower limits of the Triple Alliance was now fully realized. The writer of these pages stood in close proximity to the principal actors in that historic episode which is linked by a causal nexus with the vaster drama of the Great War. And among the striking facts he observed was that Italy was neither consulted as to the annexation nor apprized of it in advance nor conciliated subsequently by Austria-Hungary. On the contrary her statesmen were deliberately kept in the dark and encouraged to make solemn declarations about Austria's policy which the lapse of a couple of days showed to be ridiculously erroneous. Another characteristic of international relations was the manner in which the annexation was effected : it constituted a pro- found humiliation for the Italian partner, and the compen- sations which Italy asked for by way of saving her face were promised by the Ballplatz and vaunted by the Consulta but never accorded. Patriotic Italians were stung to the quick. Baron Son- nino and his friend, Francesco Guicciardini, the politician whom he chose for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the two occasions when he formed a Cabinet, were burning with indignation. To their thinking — ^they were now in oppo- sition — ^the annexation and the procedure by which it was accompanied were quite as much of a provocation to Italy as to Russia. And they called on the Cabinet of the day to protest against it. But as the Ministers merely smiled and discoursed sweetly about the concord and amity that characterized Italy's relations with Austria and about the compensations reserved for their own country, Guicciardini demonstratively uttered the protest. He declared that if the Triple Alliance stood for Italy's humiliation, for her submission to the Central Empires, and for her thraldom to Austria, the best course to pursue would be to snap the ties asunder that bound her to that partnership. His anger 54 FROM THE TRIPLE TO was grotinded. Not a word had been whispered to any of Italy's representatives by her ally about the impending annexation. Signor Tittoni, who had specially gone to Salzburg in order to confer with Baron Aehrenthal,^ stated categorically on his return that Austria-Hungary had not the faintest intention of annexing the two provinces and that she was so strongly averse to such a measure that if it were suggested to her by the Powers that signed the Berlin Treaty she would decline to acquiesce in it. And while that statesman was still lavishing these assurances on a sceptical world, the Austrian Count KhevenhuUer-Metsch was on his way to Paris with a letter from Franz Josef announcing the annexation. And by the time Izvolsky'' had reached the French capital, the notification had been made to the President of the French Republic. Count Aehrenthal's act was accounted by the Entente Powers a deliberate infringement of the Treaty of Berlin. What was certain is that it impaired Italy's prestige, lowered her dignity and damaged her interests in the East. The Ministers putting a good face upon their discomfiture boasted that they had demanded and would receive adequate com- pensation. One form of compensation was, they alleged, the evacuation by Austria of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar. As a matter of fact, however, I know that that far-reaching decision was not taken by way of satisfying Italy : it was taken in response to a demand insistently preferred by M. Izvolsky during the Buchlau interview and afterwards observed by Austria because its infringement would have been treated by Russia as an unfriendly act. Italy had to content herself with having her name associated with the suppression of the police functions exercised by Austria in Montenegrin waters. That was the sop thrown to the trusty ally for the shifting of the equilibrium caused by the annexa- 1 Then Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 2 Then Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 55 tion. What the Consulta did ask for was the creation of an Italian University in Trieste. And it was granted by Aehrenthal on his own authority, and trumpeted abroad as a special triumph by Ministers in Rome. But the Austrian statesman who, it is fair to say, made the promise in all sincerity was forced to leave it unredeemed, the reason alleged being the safety of the Austrian Empire ! Thus even a local high school which would have kept at home some of the most intelligent and enterprising of Austria's Italian subjects who would otherwise have finished their education and received an anti-Austrian bias in Italy, was seriously declared to constitute a danger to the Austrian Empire. It must, one would think, have been gall and wormwood to the patriotic Sidney Sonnino and to many of his friends who had had such a large part in forging these chains for his beloved country, to be now condemned to sit still while Italy chafed and fumed helplessly against the implacable enemy whom she was constrained to obey as a master and honour as a friend. Twice during this martyrdom Baron Sonnino came into of3fice as Premier, but neither he nor any other statesman essayed to modify the policy followed. It is characteristic of the curious mental attitude of Italian statesmen towards this alliance that when fortune at last placed in Sonnino's safe keeping the political strait- jacket he had helped to weave for Italy in the days of his generous and unsuspecting youth, people were surprised that he should have dealt with it as Penelope dealt with the web destined for her royal father-in-law. But the reasons appear to have lain principally in the short-sightedness and clumsi- ness of the Vienna Cabinet. CHAPTER VIII THE ALBANIAN QUESTION THE effect of the last anticipatory renewal of the alliance was what Germany had expected and Italy had feared. It embittered France, spoiled her incipient friendly relations with Italy, and confirmed her suspicions that King Victor's Government was more deeply committed to the Central Empires than was commonly assumed. It also grieved Russia who had behaved as Italy's best and indeed only friend during the campaign against Turkey, and it awakened the suspicions of Great Britain. Thus it widened the breach between Italy and the Entente Powers to an extent which gladdened the hearts of German and Austrian statesmen and cleared the way for the execution of their schemes. From that time onward, various subjects of dispute, petty in themselves and capable of being summarily and amicably disposed of, were treated by France and Italy in an uncompromising spirit of rivalry as though they involved vital issues. The protection of religious congregations in the East, for example — a matter which had been regulated by a formal written agreement — gave rise to heated dis- cussion in Rome out of all proportion to its intrinsic impor- tance. The division of Anglo-French naval labour in the Mediterranean, in virtue of which French warships had been substituted for a number of British vessels, produced widespread irritation in Italy where the measure was con- strued as a deliberate provocation and a menace. One day the Marchese di San Giuliano opened his mind 56 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 57 to me on that subject, unfolded the motives that had impelled him to sign the treaty a year in advance, expounded the reasons why Italy's membership of the Triple Alliance ought to be welcomed by the Entente Powers as a guarantee of peace or at any rate an embargo on war, and asked me to put his expose in this light before the Russian Foreign Secretary and the British public and Government, and at the same time to make it clear why Italy felt disappointed and grieved at the arrangement adopted by France and Britain in the Mediterranean. And so bitter did the feeling grow between the two Latin nations that when the declara- tion of war took the world by surprise, it was regarded as probable by some French statesmen that Italy would be found fighting on the side of the Central Empires. In the course of the conversations I had with di San Giuliano in 1913 he entered fully into Italy's attitude towards Albania and the various political interests which were bound up with the progress or failure of that incipient State. Just then the eyes of Europe were turned towards Durazzo, Scutari and the Epirus, and speculation was rife about the outcome of the interwoven tangle of intrigues which char- acterized the activities of Austria and Italy there. The Italian Foreign Secretary sought to impress me with the fact, which seemed fairly well established, that Italy's interest in that country was negative. She would not brook the seizure of the seaboard on that side of the Adriatic by any other Power and least of all by Austria. That was the pith of her policy. Neither could she shake off the conviction that the systematic activity of Austria's agents was directed precisely to the attainment of the one aim which ran directly counter to Italian interests. The Foreign Secretary was careful to add that the Vienna Cabinet re- pudiated any such designs and that both Governments were anxious to reduce friction to a minimum. He concluded his statement with a warm invitation to me to visit Albania and 58 FROM THE TRIPLE TO see with my own eyes what was being done and attempted there. And as I had already been exhorted by Count Berch- told to repair to Durazzo, Scutari and other Albanian towns, I decided to go. The Albanian problem had long had a special fascination for me as a student of Indo-European philology. The antiquity and primitive condition of the people, the unique place occupied by their language among the tongues of the Indo-European race, the absence of written law and the survival of old-world customs and local traditions — intensified my desire to watch the unique experiment which was then being made to weld elements, which for thousands of years had proved incohesive, into a compact and organic State. The experiment was being conducted under conditions of enormous difficulty. The impulse had come from without. In the country itself there was no political tradition, no national enthusiasm, no common aims or ideals. The scheme was born of the mutual jealousy of two allies who were parading before the world as close friends, and its realization would have come to them as even a greater disaster than its sudden abandonment. At the London Conference, where the plan was first mooted and gradually brought into shape, the curious interplay of hollow preten- sions, insincere demands, and obstructive under-plots amused or disquieted disinterested onlookers. Austria's magnilo- quent declaration that, moved by considerations of political idealism, she was resolved to establish the independence of the posterity of Skanderbeg, was taken as a tragi-comic joke, of which the point was revealed by Italy's insistence on rendering all Europe, and not merely the two Adriatic Powers, the guardians of the new political organism. But the fear entertained by these two Powers, lest the experi- ment should succeed, and the efforts they put forward from the outset to hinder this consummation, caused Albania to issue from the Conference a still-bom child of jealousy THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 59 and hate. The one Italian statesman who had the courage to blame the policy of San Giuliano which condemned Italy to take part in this Sisyphean labour, was Barzilai.^ My Professor and friend, Ernest Renan, was wont to assert that if he had funds enough to draw upon, he could foimd a new religion in the Semitic East which would live, spread and flourish. By the same means one might with equal confidence set about establishing a new political com- munity and endow it with vitality. Personally I am dis- posed to think that Albania might have been fashioned into a viable State, as helpful or obstructive as any of the Balkan kingdoms. But abundant financial resources, a coherent scheme, a firm resolve and intelligent methods were indis- pensable conditions. And none of these was available. Indeed the antecedents were superlatively chaotic, and the first deliberate measures intensified the confusion. Every interest was safeguarded, save that of the Albanian people. The ruler was an easy-going German prince, devoid of am- bition, who had to be goaded into accepting the thorny crown. Before he was officially proposed, the writer of these lines exerted himself to dissuade his illustrious backers from carrying out their project. The gendarmerie was Dutch, and its chiefs, feeling impelled to prove that they were as skilful in politics as they were brave in battle, intrigued with a section of raw nationalists against the two nations which had invited them over to maintain order. And so devoted were they to their ideal of Albania that they conspired with the Prince against Albania's two strong men and with Austria 1 The Republican Deputy Barzilai, a native of Trieste, is one of the most gifted orators of the Italian Chamber. He has also ap- proved himself a statesman of clear vision and comprehensive views. His criticism of the policy followed by di San Giuliano, Tittoni and others was sharp, loyal and convincing. Its weak point was the fact, for which Barzilai made no allowance, that the Ministers in question had no alternative but war, for which Italy was unprepared. Signor Barzilai is at present (October) a Minister without portfolio. 60 FROM THE TRIPLE TO against the powerful Moslem party. The Mbret was ham- pered by an Italian and an Austrian counsellor, each of whom proffered advice which was deprecated by the other as nationally ruinous. The Ministers, divided among them- selves, were swayed now by Italy, now by Austria, two only working selfiessly for the regeneration of their country against overwhelming forces of destruction. An international board of financial control, consisting mainly of Commissioners who felt convinced that the whole experiment was foredoomed to failure, intensified the chaos that prevailed, and the lack of money struck the two Ministers' fitful endeavours at consolidation with barrenness. Characteristic of the deep-rooted suspicion with which Italy and Austria watched each other's movements in Albania was the constant alertness with which the so-called stipula- tion of " going halves " was invoked and enforced. It had been settled that if Austria should confer any boon on the Albanians, Italy would be justified in contributing exactly one-half of its value, and vice versa. One day the Arch- bishop of Prizrend expressed the wish to have a carriage. And the Vienna Government supplied it with alacrity. Congruously with the " fifty per cent, arrangement " the horses for the vehicle had to be demanded of the Italian Cabinet. Unhappily the Italians were so long about procuring them that a hint was dropped to the Austrian representative who at once telegraphed to his chief in Vienna. And the horses were duly despatched from Austria. Political Italy, com- moved by this unfair advantage, made haste to repair the omission. At last the Italian steeds arrived and the Church dignitary found himself in the enviable position of having four horses to convey him to his clergy and his flock ! ^ Whether San Giuliano realized the hopelessness of the ostensible task and the danger of the real undertaking in which his country was thus engaged, is immaterial to the 1 Cf. Sulliotti, La Triplice Alleanza, pp. 43-44. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 61 issue. My personal impression is that he did, but that he also felt how futile it would have been to draw the practical consequences which this clear vision seemed to impose. For Italy had no choice in the matter. Her position was the resultant of causes still operative which might have been counteracted before the Alliance was first concluded but were now no longer capable of being removed without a war with Austria. This was the moment when it could be affirmed with truth that the two countries must be either allies or enemies. Consequently it would be unfair to treat di San Giuliano's Albanian policy as a heavy deduction from the high estimate gradually formed of this statesman's sagacity during the earlier phases of his public career. An Italian writer aptly compared the necessarily intimate associa- tion of Italy and Austria in this Albanian venture to that of two convicts in the galleys bound to the same chain and thus forced in their own interests to watch vigilantly over every symptom of each other's acts and intentions.^ To grumblers who urge that Italy might safely have left solici- tude for the integrity of Albania to Europe or at any rate to Russia who would have treated the occupation of Albania by Austria as a hostile act, the Consulta would have been able to retort that this assumption was gratuitous. It was known in Vienna and also no doubt in Rome that the re- occupation by Austria of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar would have been construed by Russia as a casus belli, because its definitive evacuation had been stipulated by Izvolsky ^ and solemnly promised by Aehrenthal as a set-off to the 1 Op. cit., p. 38. * Italian statesmen claim to have made the evacuation of that district a condition sine qua non of the recognition of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And Aehrenthal certainly encouraged them to include it among the " compensations " given to Italy, But in truth the evacuation had been demanded by M. Izvolsky, and Aehrenthal himself told me that it was decided upon at the same time as the annexation and before Italy had hinted at it. 62 FROM THE TRIPLE TO annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But in Albania the Tsar's Government had no direct interests, nor would an Austrian occupation, say of Valona, have of itself sufficed to bring about a diplomatic rupture between the two Empires. And from the knowledge of this fact the Consulta drew the motives which impelled it to place the new State under the guardianship of all Europe. Thus what Italy dreaded most during the last few years of her co-partnership with Austria was to be left to deal single-handed with that ally in any undertaking that involved momentous national interests. To this piteous condition of irremediable impotence and isolation had she been reduced by German wUes devised by Bismarck and abetted by the ingenuousness of her own public men. The Chancellor, could he have witnessed these results of the policy he initi- ated, would have chuckled over the miserable plight of Italy bereft of diplomatic independence, forced to follow her cynical and hostile companion through thick and thin, dissembling her enmity and feigning friendship the while, encircled by dangers which she was powerless to elude or exorcise, deprived of allies and friends, and devoid of grounded hope. But Germany's hold was not confined to the sphere of politics. It cannot be too often repeated that her diplomacy, unlike that of her rivals, has as many eyes as Argus and as many hands as Briareus. Nor should the circumstance be blinked that the personal element of her professional diplo- macy at which French and British critics are so ready to scoff, is often its least important factor. Indeed the broader traits of Germany's policy do not appear even yet to have emerged to the view of European statesmen who are too prone to draw a broad distinction between politics and economics. Not content with making the political aims and strivings of another country dovetail with her own, Germany invariably proceeds to interweave the financial, commercial, industrial, THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 63 and economic interests of both, until a composite web is produced capable of withstanding a much greater strain than any scrap of parchment or paper. To the Teuton statesman economics and politics are but two halves of the same sphere. And both are therefore objects of equal solicitude and en- deavour on his part. He rightly argues that if the root of most of the international jealousies, disputes and wars of to-day is economic, this branch of modern politics deserves to be studied with the same assiduity and applied with the same care as are bestowed by his Government on questions of territorial boundaries, the interpretation of treaties, and the negociation of international conventions. Certainly it cannot with safety be abandoned to the zeal or supineness of the individual citizen. CHAPTER IX COMPLETENESS OF TEUTONIC ORGANIZATION MOST of the amazing results obtained by the Teutonic nations in the so-called political domain, since the close of the Franco-German war, are due to the unceasing exertions of the Central Government to evoke, quicken and reinforce the efforts of private firms and enterprising individuals at home and abroad. If Berlin statesmen had adopted the principle of laissez faire which underlay the action and inaction of every British Cabinet during the historic period of warlike prepara- tion, the astounding radiation which we now witness of all kinds of forces, military, naval, technical, industrial and financial, flashing out from Germany as from some inexhaust- ible centre and smiting any and every Power that ventured to question her right to rule the earth — would have been im- possible. Germany's military and naval strength is rooted in economic conquests scientifically planned and systemati- cally executed by her Government in association with her people and rendered feasible by the obstinate refusal of her rivals to treat economics as an essential element of politics. Italy's experience is charged with instructive ideas on the supreme importance of State initiative in matters connected with foreign trade. And Italy is but one European State and Europe only one of the Continents over which the wake- ful, strenuous, plodding Teuton flung his toils. The problem to which he set himself was how to acquire control of the markets, and also of the industries which supplied the mar- kets, of the country on which he was about to experiment. 64 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 65 And one of the many difficulties he had to surmount was lack of capital. He was spared the much more redoubtable one of serious resistance on the part of native rivals and strenu- ous competition from foreign competitors. It is only fair to say that if he owed much to the shortsightedness .of both, he can fairly claim the credit of deftly adjusting the means he used to the ends he pursued and adopting methods which his antagonists were too purblind or sluggish to imitate. And above all else, the individual Teuton was never left to struggle single-handed. He was vigorously backed by his Consul, his Ambassador and Government who were ready with information, advice, help, concessions, imperial legis- lation, advantageous customs, tariffs and railway freights. In a word, the co-operation among all political parties and social layers of the German nation which astonishes the world to-day was displayed in narrower compass but with the same perseverance and force in the silent pacific struggle for the world's markets which preceded the present struggle for world-sway. Turn to the history of Teutondom during the past thirty years in Turkey, Spain, Roumania, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Persia, Britain, in a word, in any part of the globe, and you find the same essential features of Teutonic interpenetration, modified to suit local conditions. On the one side — the side of the invaders — a vast compact organization, working to realize a coherent and grandiose plan, employing scientific methods, armed with technical skill and aided by a real Government which inspires, heartens, leads, and helps its subjects, identifying their success with its own. And on the other side, classes and masses mutually distrustful, parlia- mentary parties ready to fraternize with foreigners, deputies willing at the suggestion of these to ask awkward questions of the Government, political clubs eager to welcome spying strangers as guests or members and give them facilities for acquainting themselves with State secrets ; commercial 5 66 FROM THE TRIPLE TO institutions and industries longing for foreign capital or brains, and willing to save a few pounds by admitting spies masquerading as hard-working clerks from abroad who serve " without salary " ; public men at the outset of their career, thirsting for foreign recognition and sensible to delicate flattery, and journalists pining for first-hand information and ready to undergo any ordeal for a " scoop." On the invaders' side a body of resolute men toiling and moiling perseveringly, backed by the most powerful Empire on the globe, their gaze rivetted on the goal, their scruples con- sumed by patriotic fire ; and on the side of the invaded, political parties, groups and institutions, each one forming an independent centre, all striving after a variety of conflicting aims, each dependent for success on its own unaided efforts, and glad of help or recognition even from the intelligent foreigner. For the invading phalanx to make headway against the loosely joined crowd — so loosely joined in Britain that it could never have survived so long but for its insular position — all that was needed was tenacity and organized plodding labour. And the Germans exhibited both. They also displayed other qualities which stood them in serviceable stead. They contrived to influence in some countries without corrupting the native press, to suggest and impose the views and con- victions which they wished the nation to cherish and act upon, and in this way they furnished that particular solution to each momentous problem which was requisite to the success of their own schemes. Thus they supplied rising journalists with news from first sources, they sounded the praises of this or that plastic public man at the beginning of his career in their own papers and also in those of his native country. In this way they made many an ephemeral reputa- tion, and it was my privilege to watch this process more than once from the preliminary to the finishing stage and to scrutinize some of the by-products thrown off and utilized. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 67 Their blandishments and threats were not always efficacious. With those stark unbending personalities who are the salt of a nation, they proceeded on opposite lines, undermining their influence by exaggerating their maxims, or secretly spread- ing and then vociferously refuting abominable calumnies against them, and in kindred ways. Li each country the pioneers of the German invasion made the most of whatever institutions they found in vigour there. Religion and atheism, freemasonry and clericalism, Roman Catholic associations, Protestant societies, Jewish sodalities, Mohammedan fraternities and sects. Trades Unionism, socialism, conservative leagues, anarchist bands, industrial trusts and syndicates, journalistic congresses, scientific meet- ings, peace societies, women's guilds — in fine every line of cleavage social, political, religious and other was used as a suitable fissure into which the wedge of destruction was fitted and driven by a force which was that, not of the pioneers, but of the mighty German Empire. Decades must yet elapse before the vastness and perfection of this organization will be realized by its countless victims. The Italian State offered a promising field for this kind of action. Politically united only twelve years previously it was in no sense a first-class Power, had no prospect of becoming one before another great war should give fortune's wheel a vio- lent turn, and yet, having been admitted by courtesy to the highest rank in the hierarchy of nations, felt impelled to live up to the dignity. Hence material and diplomatic help was peremptorily necessary to her growth. For the young nation was still a negligible quantity from a military point of view, because devoid of defensible frontiers and unprovided with an adequate army. It might construct a navy to defend its extensive sea-board, but against Austria who possessed redoubtable sea-frontiers, it was and must remain at a ruinous disadvantage. Under these conditions chronic isolation would have been disastrous, while an alliance which necessi- 68 FROM THE TRIPLE TO tated a large military and naval effective would have saddled the nation with a heavier burden than it could bear. Its revenue was slender and depended to a considerable extent on the savings of Italian workmen who emigrated temporarily to various parts of the world in search of skilled and unskilled labour, and sent home a large percentage of their earnings every year. Taxation was producing as much as could be reasonably expected, and the main hope of cautious econo- mists lay in retrenchment and thrift. France was in some respects qualified to become Italy's natural friend and ally, and the trend of Italian sentiment and opinion was in the direction of close amity with the Republic. The natural conditions on both sides were favour- able to a Franco-Italian alliance, but Bismarck, deftly inserting the German wedge at every line of jointure, suc- ceeded, as we saw, in driving the would-be friends into two reciprocally hostile camps. And his aiders and abettors were the French and Italians themselves. "Were it not that we ourselves supplied you with handles for your hatchets," said the trees to the woodmen, " you would never be able to cut us down." For a time the vagaries of French policy were sometimes fantastic, often disconcerting, and generally anti-Italian. In spite of this discouragement public men of real weight in Italy, less impulsive or more far-sighted than their French confreres, clung to the Franco-Italian ideal. But they were finally out-hectored by a band of fiery patriots who, like Barons Blanc and Sonnino, fancied they could discern the germs of Italy's well-being and greatness in a union with Germany and Austria. When these impulsive agitators had their way and Italy was linked with the two military Em- pires, it became her first duty to organize an army proportion- ate to her population and therefore in excess of her financial capacity. And this, in turn, was considerably diminished by a series of bitterly hostile measures adopted by France, THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 69 whom exasperation against her Italian sister carried to extreme lengths. But French reprisals only riveted all the more firmly the chains that bound Italy to her Teuton masters. To reduce Italy to a state of economic dependence on Germany and Austria was one of the first and main objects of Teutonic solicitude. And its attainment was compassed in different ways simultaneously. Central Government, Ambassadors' private firms, and press associations all had their special schemes, which were judiciously co-ordinated and admirably combined. Now and again a clumsy act or hasty word revealed for a moment the intensity of German greed and the comprehensiveness of German projects, but the Italian nation was too well hypnotized to awaken for long to a sense of the sinister reality. A curious but little known incident which takes us back to the year 1895 is worth record- ing as an illustration of the Teutonic frame of mind. Crisp i having returned to power was desirous of infusing the spirit of reciprocity into the Triple Alliance and proving to the nation that Italy too could hope to reap real benefits from that international concern. Accordingly he wrote a letter in this sense to Berlin, and suggested that some compensation be given to Italy for the terrific commercial onslaught she had had to bear from France, because of her alliance with Germany. The consequences of that campaign were making themselves felt most painfully. The country was passing through an economic crisis, and timely help such as Germany could afford to bestow would enable the nation to emerge from the ordeal quickly and unscathed. Crispi's letter produced a deep impression and had an immediate effect. Soon afterwards it was announced that one of the major gods of German finance ^ would be delegated to Rome with full powers to make any arrangements that might commend themselves to him and the Italian Govern- ment. He duly arrived, was received by the Minister, and 1 It is said that Bleichroeder was the man chosen. ro FROM THE TRIPLE TO passed the usual urbane remarks on the genial Italian sky, the picturesque scenery, the Kultur of the people, and ended by uttering a fervent longing to see Naples and a poignant regret that the time at his disposal was so short. Then coming to the point he said : " Germany is well disposed towards Italy. She is alive to the fact that even in her own interests it is desirable that her Italian ally should be strong economically, and she is prepared to give her a helping hand." The Finance Minister responded fitly : " The realm is new, the nation young, the soil fruitful, and the population industri- ous. Like every other country Italy may be tried by a year of scarcity or a period of depression, but its staying powers are marvellous and its recovery rapid. If help be tendered, the healing process will naturally be swifter still, and if that help were to come from Germany it would be all the more welcome. Naturally, what we should like to know in the first place are the terms on which assistance would be given ? " " I understand," replied the delegate, " that the Italian Government would not object to cede us by way of guarantee, the customs of the realm ? " The Finance Minister, pointing to a clock in the apartment, said : " Your Excellency ex- pressed a desire to see Naples and a regret that you have so little time. In less than an hour from now the fast train, which is the most comfortable of all, will start, and it would be a thousand pities if your Excellency missed it." ^ But this merited rebuff had no slackening effect on the on-pouring legions of Teutondom. With firm purpose and methodic plans they continued to invade the country, quar- tered themselves in the towns, and little by little won a position not merely of preponderance but of control over the staple resources of the kingdom. The principal organs of production and distribution were gradually wrested from the natives and made to serve the interests of the Teuton. 1 Cf. Giornale d'ltalia, June 6th, 1915 ; Corriere della Sera, June 7th, 1915. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 71 For in the end Italy was become an economic colony of Germany. Here a German manufactory arose, or a branch house of some German firm ; there a German institution, after having first struggled with an important firm, rescued it in the nick of time from ruin, summoning it to knuckle down. At the same time a strike of sailors would paralyze independent steamship com- panies while the companies already broken in were paying copious arrears of wages to their sea-folk, who in virtue of solidarity were contributing to the funds of the strikers. And secret accords appeared to ward off from the Austrian marine the danger of serious Italian competition in the Adriatic.^ Psychologically fraught with interest is the attitude of Italians themselves towards this audacious invasion of their country, which would have been a mad freak without the indifference of the many and the assistance of the few. Even the Consulta and its organs were vehemently on the German side during the first and decisive period of Teutonic inter- penetration, and the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bollati,^ was busying himself persuading the editors of Italian periodicals to discourage subscriptions for their journals among Austria's Italian subjects. And all this time Vienna was seconding Berlin in an enterprise the profits of which would be reaped by both. On the one side Germany was exerting herself to drive her tentacles into the organism of Italian life in order to enthral and exhaust it : Italian production, congruously with this new ordering of things, would be no longer possible, except in so far as it did not compete with that of Germany ; commerce would ^ G. A. di Cesaro. Cf. La Germania alia Conquista delV Italia, pp. 6-7. * This gentleman afterwards became Italian Ambassador in Berlin, where he remained until Italy declared war against Austria. Signor BoUati was a great favourite in the German capital, and he employed all his personal influence to hinder the war against Austria and especi- ally against Germany. In the latter task he succeeded. ^2 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE have found an outlet only in places inaccessible to that of Germany ; banking institutions would not work otherwise than as branches of the Teutonic bank ; life, political, social, military, would be adjusted to German life. And on the other side stood Austria, who in this international game was playing the part of Germany's advanced outpost on the Mediterranean : her gaze turned towards the Near East, she was awaiting the opportune moment to assert her claims and enforce them in spite of Italy. Thus the Triple Alliance was reduced to this : Germany was working inside the country with a view to paralyzing Italy's energy and powers of resist- ance. And according as these forces waned, Austria pushed forward the programme of expansion, directly for her own behoof and indirectly for that of Germany. And this combined opera- tion was being executed by means of a perfect organization, of agencies of information, of industrial plant, of missions, and of press propaganda. But the backbone of this organization was the bank.^ ^ Loe. cit., pp. 7-8 CHAPTER X THE BANCA COMMERCIALE AND ITS EFFECT ON THE HISTORY OF ITALY THE political history of Italy during the last ten years would seem to be closely bound up with that of a bank, more closely indeed than is yet realized by the bulk of the Italian nation. A few men of sagacity, acuteness and courage, like Signor G. Preziosi, Professor Maffeo Pantaleoni, and the deputy G. A. Colonna di Cesaro, have endeavoured to shed light upon this interesting by-way of history and to open the eyes of their coimtrymen to its main outlets. That bank is known to the world as La Banca Commerciale Italiana, the headquarters of which are in Milan. The name bestowed on this institution is a misnomer. It is worth noting that whenever the Germans found a bank, a joint stock company, a trust, or other agency abroad for the purpose of exploiting a foreign nation and interpenetrating the country, they invariably give it a name apt to throw off suspicion and foster the belief that it is a national institution. To the bank which has played such a momentous role in sub- jecting the Italian to the German people, not only was this principle applied but various expedients were adopted to give colour to the fiction that the concern was and is essentially Italian and to enable official apologists to come forward at a moment's notice with statistics about the number and nationality of the shareholders and directors and about the 73 74 FROM THE TRIPLE TO sources of the capital subscribed. These details constitute an essential part of every Teuton scheme ; they characterize, so to say, the architectural style of the fabric. The story of the Teutonic invasion of Italy, like that of other countries, its grandiose aims, paltry means and un- promising beginnings ; the formidable hindrances with which it was beset and the dexterity with which they were dislodged ; the calm self-consciousness of the meanest of the invaders, conscious that they embodied the force of a mighty empire ; the crafty scurvy way in which the natives were enlisted in the German cause which was decked for their behoof in Italian colours ; the pathetic enthusiasm of all classes of Italian society, of most parties in Parliament, of rising journal- ists and of experienced statesmen — that story, if narrated with artistic sense, would create an interest in the minds of civilized peoples as intense as that aroused by a first-class novel. Nothing more fantastic yet real, more splendid or squalid, more sublime or base, has been conceived by the most imaginative writer of fiction. It is a gorgeous vision, of which many of the elements are ugly, base, and repulsive, a vision which seizes and fascinates the imagination while it chills the moral sense of the spectator. The central action centres round a bank which, created almost out of nothing, wormed itself into the economic organism of the kingdom, grubbing up capital as it wriggled forward, undermined native industries and institutions, seized and bereft them of their national character, teutonized their direction and activity, but left them their pristine shape and colour ; and in this way caught in its clutches production and distribution, metallurgical works, steamship companies, financial institu- tions, municipalities, electoral constituencies, influential press organs, chiefs of parliamentary parties and Cabinet Ministers, and swayed the nation's policy, negociating peace, ending war, imposing neutrality, and exercising suzerain rights in the guise of the accomplishment of patriotic duty. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 75 No more astounding phenomenon has been revealed to the world's view by any period of human history. This is not the place for the consecutive story of a seemingly useful institution which, in the brief space of twenty years, economically developed and consolidated Italy to the requi- site degree and then swathed and pinioned her and rendered her tributary to Germany. A few master facts will suffice to enable the reader to conceive an idea of its constitution, methods and influence. The Banca Commerciale was founded in the year 1895 with a capital of £800,000 by the fathers of high German finance, and in especial by Herr Schwabach, chief of the firm of Bleichroder. Eight hundred thousand pounds was a relatively small sum for an undertaking which aimed at nothing less than the economic and political con- quest of Italy. But those latter-day Conquistadores had no misgivings. Their audacious plan was as unsuspected as were their methods and their latent power. If 74 per cent, of the shares had been held throughout by Teutons, the suspicions of Italians might have been aroused. But the foreign directors were circumspect. Conversant with the facilities offered by the law on joint stock companies, they took the fullest advantage of these. It is said that the number of those companies in Italy is 793,1 of which only 245 are quoted on 'change, and that the total capital invested amounts to 3,898,174,049 francs, or say £155,926,961. Now whoever controls this capital con- trols Italy. And this enormous power has been acquired by Germany, thanks largely to the bank which began its existence with a capital of less than a million sterling twenty year* ago,^ and partly also to the ease with which joint stock companies may be manipulated by a powerful financial institution. A large capital is unnecessary. A relatively small sum suffices, if concentrated in the hands of a few able 1 According to a publication of the Credito Italiano quoted by G. Preziosi, op. cit., p. 43. ^ Ibidem. 76 FROM THE TRIPLE TO financiers acquainted with the mechanism of joint stock companies and the laws that regulate its action. The shares being scattered all over the country, fictitious majori- ties can be got together without trouble, by means of trans- fers and representation. The bank has been governed by a triumvirate composed of clever men bearing the German- Jewish names of Joel, Weil, and Toepliz, who, having divided the various domains, economic, financial, political, among themselves on the basis of a well defined and thoroughly studied programme, apply it " with the firmness, steadfast- ness and also with the brutality which are Teuton character- istics." ^ It appears that at the general meetings of the Banca Commerciale the majority is formed of a compact group of shares of the value of about twenty-two million francs, possessed by German bankers. These shares, added to those which are deposited with the bank temporarily, give it an artificial majority which carries with it a potent influence on the entire economic and political life of Italy. ^ The Banca Commerciale which began with a capital of £800,000 in 1895 had already increased it by the year 1914 to £6,240,000, and the shares were by this time distributed in a way to calm suspicions and invest the institution with a seemingly Italian character. Only 2j per cent, of the shares were now in Teuton hands, not less than 63 per cent, were owned by Italians and 20 per cent, by Swiss. What more could be expected of an Italian bank ? But these figures, it is alleged, do not convey to the reader the decisive fact that, with this small percentage of shares, the German element still contrives by the means enumerated to control the majority. The directors of the bank were Germans and their representatives were reduced to nine on a board of thirty-three. But even nine is more than the holders of 2j per cent, of the shares are entitled to. Moreover, the nine were what one may call heavy guns of finance as compared 1 Op. cit., p. 41 2 Ibidem. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 77 with the remainder. Besides, the chief Itahan was a fervent and mihtant Germanophile. The real directors, the men who piloted the bank, in good weather and bad, constituted the triumvirate already mentioned, Joel, Weil, and Toepliz. From time to time the Banca Commerciale executes manoeu- vres with Italian securities on the Stock Exchange, sometimes bulling but generally bearing, and earns in this way the funds requisite for the payment of dividends to the German share- holders.^ It is affirmed that these operations, " besides impoverishing thousands of families . . . serve also to dis- credit many of our industries obnoxious to Germanism and to engender in the public distrust of Italian industrial organization." ^ The chief manoeuvres of the financial weavers at the centre of this vast web were well thought out. By an ingenious system the solvency of persons and firms was secretly assessed, and long credit allowed to German importers and vendors of wares who in turn conferred the same facilities on their Italian customers. The result was a sort of Teutonic freemasonry of trade and industry from which all independent Italian merchants were excluded. Regular operations were then begun against those who thus kept aloof outside the pale. At first they were rigorously boycotted. Not only did they not share the benefits of the German credit system, but effective means were resorted to, whereby they were dis- qualified from participating in any system of credit. They became commercial pariahs. This sentence of economic death was usually passed by a secret Vehmgericht, known as the " secret and confidential information bureau." As banks and commercial houses which give credit to merchants often have nothing to base this kind of speculation upon except the data communicated to them thus confidentially, the system may be useful, perhaps even necessary. But its abuse is all the more criminal that it can seldom be brought 1 Op. cit., p. 42. 8 Ibidem. 78 FROM THE TRIPLE TO home to the offender. And the Germans abused it, whenever their interests prompted them, with the same contempt for truth and justice that they exhibited before and during the war. Individuals, institutions, joint stock companies were silently struck down with these §,ches Cf information. And ruin followed as a matter of course. By these and kindred methods Italian industries were besieged and stormed or forced to surrender at discretion. In the latter case they were taken over and dealt with as " tied houses," being allowed to eke out a more or less stagnant existence, on condition that they followed the German lead and contributed to the realization of the German plan. And as every fresh victory added to the power as well as the pres- tige of the Teuton institution, the campaign ended in the subjugation of every enterprise of importance in the kingdom. Metallurgical factories, shipbuilding works, steamship com- panies, great and lesser electrical works, almost all fell under the control of the Banca Commerciale which laid down such rules for their activity as were conducive to the success of the broad scheme of interpenetration. Little by little the main arteries of the economic organism were held and regulated by the German junta which took the saving precaution of having its decrees promulgated by Italian agents. For a whole army of natives was recruited and trained, natives devoted not perhaps to the German cause as such, but to the Banca Commerciale, to Herr Weil or Herr Joel, to this German institution or that. Soon tens of thousands of good Italians were trumpeting abroad the praises of Teutondom in the Peninsula. On the rise and growth of this opinion Germany's hold on the Italian press had a most potent effect. And her grasp was comprehensive and tight. Journalism in Italy is on the whole a poorly paid profession, and some of its higher lights lead a life of extravagance the cost of which cannot be defrayed by the fees or fixed salaries which rule in the journal- THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 79 istic market. To such men temptation comes as a windfall. The money value of their work depends upon their literary style, their prestige, the circulation of the press organs with which they are connected, and kindred considerations. Some of them are subsidized in a more or less permanent fashion by retaining fees, while others are engaged for a special campaign. Occasionally when the competition of two sides waxes keen, and one strives to outbid the other, as happened during the period preceding Italy's declaration of war against Austria, the onlooker is treated to the interesting if unedifying spectacle of a journalist suddenly changing sides and madly smashing the idols he had just been devoutly worshipping. "Levity" of this kind apparently inflicts no abiding mark of disgrace, if one may judge by the friendship subsisting between one of these press condottieri and pillars of the Government who are themselves men of integrity and honour Between the system of " secret commercial information " and that of political and military espionage there is no sharp or solid boundary. They merge into each other insensibly, especially in the German mechanism which needs and inter- changes all three. This was illustrated by the behaviour of the heads of German firms in Antwerp, Brussels and other German cities, and it might be further demonstrated by the secret reports — some of which are no longer secret — de- spatched home by the principals of Teuton firms in Russia. France and Britain. But in Italy the facilities for picking up all kinds of useful information were especially great. A num. ber of representatives of both Houses of the Legislature were enlisted by the Banca Commerciale and its affiliated institu- tions, as figure-heads or agents. Another contingent of the nation's law-givers looked to those Teuton concerns for election to the Chamber. Such a large percentage of the constituents and of the most successful electioneering agents was at the beck and call of the bank or its affiliated steamship 80 FROM THE TRIPLE TO companies, that many a deputy is said to have owed his return to the beneficent Teuton. The funds, too, for the expense of standing were occasionally supplied by the well-disposed foreigner. And the Banca Commerciale not only arranged the appointment of prefects and mayors, whenever the result warranted the effort, but had its own Prime Minister in readiness to supplant Signor Salandra if, as it hoped and intended, the latter were overthrown. Under these circum- stances it may safely be inferred that in the political domain there were no secrets into which the German junta was not initiated. The by-ways as well as the highways of Italian politics, domestic and foreign, were more familiar to the Teuton observer than to the most vigilant Italian politician. It was the enormous power conferred by such knowledge, and the ease with which it could be wielded without risk, that enabled the German invaders to sway Italy's attitude on every question of moment. Hardly had the Lybian campaign begun when the Banca Commerciale, in harmony with the Foreign Offices of Berlin and Vienna, endeavoured to bring it to a speedy termination. The Central Empires, solicitous about the welfare of Turkey, were eager to preserve that country from exhaustion without provoking a popular out- burst in Italy. And they were efficaciously helped by the restrictive action of the Banca Commerciale. When the war seemed likely to go on for an indefinite period, unless some deus ex machina suddenly appeared to stop it, it was an agent of the Banca Commerciale who, without any authoriza- tion from the Government, repaired to Constantinople and opened conversations on the advisability of concluding peace. These pourparlers over, the treaty of Ouchy was negociated by the agents of that same all-powerful bank : MM. Volpi, of the Oriental Commercial Company,^ the Deputy Bertolini ^ The Societa Commerciale d'Oriente has been defined as an agency of the Banca Commerciale in Constantinople which under the Italian flag paralyzed Italian expansion in the Bast, for the benefit of Ger- man expansion there (of. G. Preziosi, op. cit., p. 68). THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 81 predestined, it was said, for the permiership, the son of the ubiquitous triumvir Joel, and Signer Nogara, who after- wards obtained the concession for the so-called Italian railway in Asia Minor. 1 This concession really benefited Germany, yet the Italian Government, hypnotized by the influences by which it was encircled, purchased it by foregoing its claim to compensation for the administration of the islands of the Dodecannese. No wonder that clear-visioned Italians bitterly lamented the humiliating fact that " there is not a concern or an industry which has not directly or indirectly its German principal, while the best brains of the nation employed in finances or politics are mere delegates, genuine servants of the powerful employer who is half -concealed in Milan, Zurich, Berlin, Vienna."^ One of the most curious phenomena in all this movement of interpenetration was provided by the electrical industries in Italy. All of German origin, they furnished the most fruitful and trustworthy source of the valuable information about institutions, individuals, fortresses and barracks, everything in a word that interested the politicians of the Wilhelmstrasse and the officers of the General Staff. In order to exploit an electrical enterprise, the sources of energy and the ways of transmitting it have to be studied with care and thoroughness, and this investigation enables the engineers who conduct it to acquaint themselves with the strategic positions of the important places, the resources of the arsenals and fortresses, and everything else which they want to ascertain. The supervision of the plant, the periodic examination of the apparatus, can be conducted only on condition that the employes are privileged and have access to every house and apartment unhindered. The story of the formation of the Swiss-Elektro-Bank and of its various 1 Op. cit., p. 71. ^ Op. cit., pp. 44-45. 82 FROM THE TRIPLE TO " Italian " emanations offers many useful lessons to those who have not yet realized the formidable nature of the German machine of interpenetration. ^ The rise of the Banca Commerciale to this commanding position marked a startling change in the history of Italy. From out of its political laboratory in Milan there flowed a subtle poison into the veins of the nation which paralyzed the independent action and numbed the energies of the people. Italy drew closer to Germany and Austria, in spite of the unfriendly conduct of those Powers during the Lybian campaign ; at the Italian Embassies in Berlin and Vienna representatives were installed whose pro-German leanings were notorious ; at the Consulta officials were appointed on whom the Berlin Foreign Office looked with favour ; at Cairo was an agent whose efforts to discredit British rule in Egypt were persevered in down to the month of May, 1915 ; hastily and a whole year in advance the Treaty with the Central Empires was renewed ; relations with France became tenser than for a long time before ; Italy's official intercourse with Britain growing rapidly colder was marked by mutual distrust ; well-nigh the entire Italian aristocracy bowed down before Teuton idols, and the worship of every- thing German was fast becoming a criterium of good taste. And when at last the European War broke out, all Italy was unanimously resolved that whatever line of policy the Government might adopt towards the Habsburg Monarchy, there must be no conflict with Germany, whose Kultur was highly appreciated and whose international activity was char- acterized as eminently beneficial. Austria's disposition was known to be egotistic and unfriendly, but Germany's growth and strivings were said closely to resemble those of Italy and to encourage the two nations to keep together. Those doctrines were industriously spread and generally accepted. 1 The subject is treated summarily by G. Preziosi in the book already quoted. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 83 From the Consulta in Rome to the rustic hut in Calabria the same Germanophile atmosphere was everywhere diffused. In many influential quarters the Teutonic element was further strengthened. There were politicians, ambassadors, parliamentarians — and among them, it is credibly asserted, a candidate for the premiership — who advocated war against France, Russia and Britain in the name of Kultur and Treaty obligations. And they put forth vigorous exertions in private to have their teachings carried into practice. But it would be an error to imagine that the men in Berlin who were watching over the progress of interpenetration contented themselves with the striking results thus sum- marily described. No lever was too small for their attention, no contingency too remote for their provision, no expedient too audacious for their enterprise. Their activity was limited by no theories, their thoroughness was checked by no scruples. What private initiative, stimulated and assisted by public departments, could not accomplish, the Central Government undertook to carry to a successful issue. By way of obtaining for German wares a permanent advan- tage over those of France and Britain, an ingenious system of commercial treaties was conceived, worked out, and imposed upon other countries with results which, if Germany had only gone on peacefully harvesting them in for another few decades, would have made her the wealthiest nation on the globe. The value of these treaties as an economic asset and a source of German strength has never been realized by the statesmen of Great Britain, nor does it appear that the necessity of counteracting them effectually and for good has yet impressed itself on the minds even of those British Ministers who are credited with a faculty of wide and sweeping forecast. The Berlin Government, alive to the incalculable worth of advantages of this nature, made every exertion to secure them and descended for the purpose in its dealings with Russia to political threats and personal 84 FROM THE TRIPLE TO servility. With Italy it employed methods which were resented by those who experienced their application. But German diplomacy, for all its alleged clumsiness, achieved its end in all European countries and Teuton enterprise was enabled by a sequence of clever expedients to employ a large percentage of the savings of foreign peoples for the purpose of subjecting these. Thus in 1914 ^ a commercial treaty was virtually imposed on Italy by her German ally which secured to Teuton commerce and industry a steady profit of two hxmdred and fifty million francs a year. Everjrthing is fish that comes to the German net. What- ever could further the audacious plan of pacific conquest or seemed calculated to promote it later on, was taken posses- sion of in good time. Thus to the Vatican, which might render valuable services as a broker, a marplot, or an ally, a keenness of attention was devoted which surprised the few and amused the many. The average newspaper reader jeered at the old-fashioned quirks of the Teuton. The picture of a pious priest in the chair of St. Peter endeavour- ing to intervene actively in the political history of the twentieth century tickled the fancy of the humorous paci- ficist. And his appearance as a self-complacent pawn moved hither and thither by the Kaiser in his international chess gambits heightened the whimsicality of the notion. But heedless alike of criticism and ridicule, the German pushed onward unflaggingly, turning everything that came in his way into a tool or a stepping-stone. But the worth laid upon the good will of the Vatican seemed exaggerated even to those who held that a considerable part would yet be played by that ancient institution in the affairs of a world which it repudiated. It was not forgotten that a third of the population in the German Empire owes spiritual allegi- ance to the Pope, that Austria and Hungary are Catholic countries, and that if the religious incentives of which the ^ December 3rd. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 85 Church disposes can no longer unite parties and peoples, its political action is still capable of setting them by the ears. German diplomacy, for all its alleged obtuseness, discerned the blunder committed by the French Republic in breaking off relations with the Vatican and strove methodically to profit by it. In Rome Austrian, German and Italian pre- lates of Teutonophile leanings were set in posts of trust and authority. The identity of certain interests, German and papal, was pointed out and dwelt upon in every tone and every tongue, until children at their catechism were able to show that the Church and the German Empire both stood for the maintenance of the principle of authority against French republicanism and Franco-Italian atheism, free- masonry and anarchism. And whenever siege was laid to a stronghold, religious or profane, commercial or political, a phalanx of supple press- men was ever ready to blow their trumpets till the walls fell. In the same spirit and congruously with the same method, Teutonism had been grafted on other countries in Europe and beyond the seas. In Turkey Mohammed was eulogized, Islam exalted, the Sultan flattered. In Persia the Shiites were made much of and Ali revered. In Italy the Roman Church was the centre of the spiritual world and clericalism the valuable lever to be kept available for use. In France Socialism, Judaism, Free- masonry were the trump cards. In a word, Germany made herself all things to all men, and the majority of nations became her dupes. The exceptions were few. In England the rare individuals who, like the writer of this sketch, ven- tured to keep on warning his fellow-countrymen in plain words, reinforced by cogent evidence, against the redoubtable danger, were shouted down as mischief-makers, by British and Germans in unison. The newspaper press shrank from discussing questions of foreign policy and the Teuton's course ran correspondingly smooth. In Italy, too, now and 86 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE again a sharp-sighted politician of high pubhc spirit saw clearly what was coming and proclaimed what he saw. Few in number they were earnest of purpose and undaunted by the secret decrees of the Vehmgericht and the open campaign of calumny in the newspapers. Happily the centre of this patriotic movement was a really independent and influential press organ, the Corriere della Sera, edited by its proprietor, Signor Luigi Albertini. CHAPTER XI CREATING AN ARMY— THE "NEUTRALISTS" AND THE " INTERVENTIONISTS " ON my arrival in Italy early in February, I sojourned in Milan for the purpose of acquainting myself with the principal political currents, ascertaining their relative strength and gauging the forces which Teutonism could reckon upon when the contest between it and nationalism should reach its culminating phase. From Milan I repaired to Rome, which became my headquarters until the fateful decision was taken and war was declared. Neutrality was the refrain of almost every conversation I had with the chiefs of parliamentary parties and other prominent men. " Italy cannot go to war against Germany with whom she has lived so long in cordial friendship," " Italy cannot afford to fight now, because she possesses neither funds nor an army," " Italy's one aim should be to squeeze what she can out of Austria, without spending a lira or losing a soldier." Those were some of the expressions of opinion which I heard at every hand's turn. The commercial community, especially those sections of it which came into contact with the Banca Commerciale and its emanations, was indignant at the men- tion of a possible rupture between Italy and the Central Empires, The results of my observations appeared in the Daily Telegraph.^ Written without bias, for the purpose of giving a faithful presentation of what was said and done and hoped and believed by the principal sections of Italian society, they 1 Daily Telegraph, March 13th, 22nd and 23rd, 1915- 87 88 FROM THE TRIPLE TO have been deemed worthy of preservation as the records of an eye and ear witness. That is my warrant for reproducing them here. The following reflections were written at the beginning of March : — Creating an Army Italy's position among the neutral Powers is imperfectly understood in France, Russia, and Great Britain. Most writers of those countries, when dealing with what they conceive to be the rights and duties of Italian statesmen at the present con- juncture, treat the problem as eminently simple, because they rivet their gaze on one portion of it, instead of taking a compre- hensive survey of the whole. They see that a favourable oppor- tunity has suddenly offered itself for uniting the unredeemed fragments of Italian territory, for emancipating Italy's enthralled sons, and establishing on a solid basis her claim, hitherto allowed by courtesy, to be treated as a Great Power, and entitled to a voice in moulding the destinies of Europe and the world, and they cannot understand why there should be any hesitation or delay in utilizing a chance that may never return. Indeed, many of them write as though it were a question of deciding between alternative boons and advantages. In truth, it is a choice of dangers and evils. And what is worse, it is seemingly Hobson's choice, so that the utmost that can be done is to stave it off for a time while striving to obviate or deaden some of its worst consequences. Departure from the attitude of neutrality, whatever its ultimate effects — and these would certainly be fateful — must first lead to a long train of privations, hardships, and economic shocks, which would subject the limited staying powers of the nation — accustomed to peace, and only now beginning to thrive — to a searching, painful, and dangerous test. From a Government impressed by this perspective, and conscious of its responsibility, careful deliberation rather than high-pitched views must reason- ably be expected. And the attitude of the Cabinet since the outbreak of war has been marked by the utmost caution and self-containment. Con- templated from a distance by people whose attention was ab- sorbed by the political aspect of the matter, this method of cool THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 89 calculation seemed to smack of indecision or pusillanimity. Why, it was asked, should Italy hold back or weigh the certain losses against the probable gains, seeing that she would have as allies the two most puissant States of Europe, and the enor- mous advantage of sea power on her side ? In any case, as the door to the battlefield must be either open or shut, they could not understand why she took so long to make up her mind as to which it should be. But the critics who thus find fault with the leaders of the Italian people for procrastination lose sight of the decisive fact that the problem is but one of the many facets of a much larger question, and that at best it is a choice of great evils which no Government with a due sense of responsibility would make with- out necessity. And one must add that during the first phase of the war one aU-important condition of intervention was lacking — ^adequate equipment for the task. Intervention in the present struggle is not one of those ordinary enterprises on which Italy might reasonably embark, after hav- ing carefully counted up the cost in men and money, and allowed a reasonable margin for unforeseen demands on both. In this venture the liabilities appear to be unhmited, whereas the re- sources of the nation are bounded, the limits being much nar- rower than in the case of any other Great Power. And this is a hampering circumstance. But serious though it is, it would hardly avail to deter a nation from accepting the risks and offer- ing up the sacrifices requisite, if the motive were at once adequate, peremptory, and pressing. France, Russia and Serbia had no choice. They were chal- lenged. No acceptable alternative to armed resistance was left to them. Great Britain, too, was obliged in honour to redeem her solemn pledge and vindicate Belgium's guaranteed right to live in peace unmolested. But Italy, it may be pleaded, had no such unbearable provocation. Not that she had no griev- ance. She had been badly dealt with by her allies. For nearly a generation she had been a partner of the two militarist States, and she suspended her close connection with them because they deliberately broke their part of the compact. This breach of covenant not only dispensed her from taking arms on their side, but would also, owing to the consequences it involved, have sufficed to warrant her adhesion to the Entente Powers. But for conclusive reasons she drew the line at neutrality. Whether 90 FROM THE TRIPLE TO this moderation was spontaneous, or was the result of necessity, is irrelevant, seeing that the operation of necessity cannot be gainsaid. Italy is essentially a land of peaceful progress. Nowhere in Europe is there a people more averse to war than the subjects of Victor Emmanuel. They keenly appreciate the blessings of peace, and their deep-rooted desire to ward off everything that might lead to war preserved them from the irrational vicissi- tudes which occasionally chequered the career of their .neigh- bours. And it constituted the best justification of their mem- bership of the Triple Alliance. For so long as Italy belonged to that group of States her influence was steadfastly exerted in the cause of diplomatic as opposed to military action, and therefore contributed to the maintenance of peace in Europe. Ever since the Abyssinian chapter of her history was closed her progress in every department of public life derived its motive power from methods which presupposed, and tended to uphold, the continuance of the status quo. In social legislation, sciences and arts the Italian people made much more considerable advance in recent years than the average foreigner is likely to realize. By dint of unceasing moil at home and abroad, of thrift and sobriety, they laid the solid founda- tions on which the material well-being of the State and the com- munity reposed. These tireless efforts might aptly be compared to the laborious toil of the marine polyps which, tiny though each one is, contrive together to build up huge coral islands. The amount of money sent home to Italy every year by hard- working Italian emigrants from South America, the United States, Austria, France and other countries has for long been a source of the nation's solvency. And this stream of gold must cease to flow once the mobilization order has been issued. Having thus adopted a permanent peace policy as the course best suited to the character and pursuits of her people, Italy cannot without a painful wrench make a sudden step back- wards and change the set tendencies of all classes into their opposites. Those are important factors in the case, and the members of the present Cabinet have a complete grasp of them and also of the corollaries that flow from them. They are aware that war has a meaning for Italy, which, although divergent only in degree from that which it bears in Russia, Britain and France, yet connotes a difference which is almost specific in its magnitude. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 91 The three allied Powers now fighting for the liberties of peoples and the civilization of Europe have more than once pointed to their manifest unpreparedness for war as one of the many un- answerable proofs of the contention that the trend of their policy was towards peace. The same argument, and with still greater force, might be adduced by Italy, the orientation of whose entire political and economic life was adjusted to the smooth working of the various international agreements on which the peace of Europe was based. In that country there was so little appre- hension of war that no precautionary measures were adopted to meet the emergency. The complex machinery of the State was kept going in the ordinary way, as though the millennium had been inaugurated. The enormous gaps made in the national defences by the Lybian campaign, which proved far more>costly than had been anticipated, were not filled up. Arms, ammuni- tion, uniforms, boots, in a word the means of equipping an army, were lacking. The expenditure of £80,000,000 sterling during the conflict with Turkey rendered the strictest economy impera- tive, and so intent was the Cabinet on observing it that the first candidate for the post of War Minister declined the honour, because of the disproportion between the sum offered to him for reorganization and the pressing needs of the national defences. The outbreak of the present conflict, therefore, took Italy unawares and found her in a condition of military unprepared- ness which, if her participation in the war had been a necessity, might have had disastrous consequences for the nation. Hap- pily for her, the one State which would gladly have weakened her had its hands tied, and Italy was enabled to make good the wear and tear of the Tripolitan campaign. What has been accomplished during the seven months that have elapsed since then may aptly be described as a rare feat. The Army has been not so much reorganized as created. Italy, although a Great Power and the ex-aUy^ of the two militarist Empires, has had to ^ When those lines were being written, the speculative question whether Italy was still the ally of Germany and Austria was open to doubt. The consensus of opinion in the chancelleries of Europe was that the alliance had been dissolved by her refusal to march against France and Russia. I was aware that that was not the view taken by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Sonnino, and I said so. None the less, I used the expression ex-ally which was then in vogue. 92 FROM THE TRIPLE TO tackle a problem similar to that with which Great Britain was confronted. She has had to raise and equip an enormous army, to lay in provisions and ammunition, to supply her troops with guns, to train the men, and generally to qualify herself to play the part of a Great Power, whether as a neutral or as a belligerent. And so far as one can judge she has at last achieved the feat. From now onward, there "ore, Italy is become the mistress of her own destinies. Heretofore bereft of the means of establishing and enforcing her claim to be heard in the councils of those who will reconstruct the future of Europe, the political inaction to which neutrality imparted a decorous form was the only course which a patriotic and wise Government could have deliberately pursued. To-day provided with a formidable weapon of defence and offence, it is open to Italy to choose whichever line of action may seem best calculated to safeguard her rights and satisfy her aspirations. But King Victor's Government, imable to delay much longer its decision, cannot, without an overpowering sense of responsibility, approach this momentous question of crossing the Rubicon or sitting on its bank like Horace's peasant : Rusticus exspectat dum defluat amnis. For since the beginning of the war many diver- gent and mutually conflicting interests and sentiments have been drawing the nation in different ways. Thus considerations of an economic order point in one direction, while motives of a political character suggest another. Again, national aspirations which cannot be identified with concrete claims or dormant rights create an atmosphere in which strong leanings and impulses are gener- ated, and demands are thrust upon statesmen with a suddenness and pressure which are disconcerting. The Government is com- posed of men who are not only honest, well-meaning, and patriotic, but are known to be so. Consequently they are trusted by the people. They are resolved to do their duty by their country for the welfare of the nation to the best of their lights, and without the slightest regard for party or personal interests and inclinations. But they are alive to the limitations set them by the feeling of the masses, coloured as it undoubtedly is by the desire to avoid as far as may be such changes as would set back the progressive economic movement, which has been steady for several years. That feeling of the masses ^ has to be taken into account were 1 Baron Sonnino frankly admitted, at the outset of negociations, that the leanings of the masses were towards neutrahty. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 93 it only because it also affects one of the essential conditions of Italy's political status in Europe. Her economic resources are relatively slender. The wherewithal to assert the rights and dis- charge the duties of a Great Power are drawn from tiny springs, the sealing up of which would reduce the country to dire straits. Unless, therefore, the motive for departing from her attitude of vigilant neutrality were rendered irresistible by advantages to be secured or disaster to be avoided, it is hard to see how any Government could take upon itself the responsibility of war. Is there any such motive to determine action ? To this question there are two emphatic answers. The " Inter- ventionists " hold that there are conclusive peremptory reasons why Italy should at once throw in her lot with the Allies, seize and annex Trentino, Istria and Triest, and claim to be heard on the subject of the partition of Turkey. The " Neutrahsts," on the other hand, contend that the attitude assumed by the Govern- ment on the outbreak of hostilities is still imperatively imposed by the present conjuncture, and is also the best suited to the pacific temperament, economic conditions, and vital interests of the nation. The ex-Premier, Signor Giolitti, in a letter which provoked lively comment, seemed to veto in advance any change of poUcy on the part of the Cabinet by intimating his belief that those territorial advantages which are indispensable and adequate to the country, and the pursuit of which would alone justify an armed conflict with Austria, may be secured without striking a blow or stopping for a moment the rhythmical movements of the economic machine. This was a serious and singular step for a public man of con- spicuous name like the ex-Premier to make at a moment when every influence thrown into the scale was bound to take effect. Fortunately it was widely known that Signor Giolitti's influence in the Legislature, which is unrivalled, rests upon his complete mastery of Parhamentary tactics and his accessibility to large constructive ideas coming from without, that his acquaintance with the principles of international politics dates only from the Lybian war, and that his knowedge of the decisive elements of the present problem was at best but partial and superficial. Hence to the accents of his voice, which proceeded from chronic elasticity of spirit, and was inspired by his ingrained habit of Parliamentary compromise, the only echo came from a few of his more intimate friends. The bulk of responsible politicians felt 94 FROM THE TRIPLE TO that the pursuit of the central aim of the nation at this fateful moment depended for success less upon Parliamentary strategy and suppleness than upon single-minded patriotism, a sane over- ruling judgment, and a tendency to realize the Dantesque concep- tion of Italian nationalism as the synthesis of politics and morality. And the Ministers at present in power, although some of Signor Giolitti's friends affected to treat them as minor luminaries, were deemed by the bulk of the nation to possess as many of these qualifications as could reasonably be looked for in a humdrum political world. On the burning political question of the day Italy then is divided into two camps, with one of which German influence is undoubtedly, but, one hopes, not fundamentally, associated. The " Neutralists " would fain see the Government persist to the end in the easy policy of aloofness which was hurriedly proclaimed on the outbreak of the war, and which, to their thinking, will bring in, if not everything desired by Italy, at least enough to serve as an acceptable instalment. That Austria, persuaded by Germany, would assent to a rectification at her own expense of Italy's fron- tiers is, they contend, more than probable. Responsible German and Austrian officials in Rome have made their readiness to do so abundantly clear. Signor Giolitti himself manifestly put faith in these offers. And the Neutralists calculate that this extension of Italy's territory, taken together with the value of peace as gauged by the destructiveness of the present war, would more than outweigh the utmost rewards that could be offered at the price of participation in the conflict. The " Interventionists," on the other hand, are strongly im- pressed with the enormous disadvantages which Italy would have to face if, like Dante's neutral angels, they definitively refused to take part, either for God or the Devil, and were only for themselves. The enforcement of the claims of irredentism, ^ and the realization of the higher aspirations of nationalism are integral parts of their programme, but do not exhaust it. They also hold strongly that Italy has not only rights to assert, but duties to perform as a member of the civilized and civilizing community of Europe, 1 The political movement which has for its aim the " redemption " of those parts of Italy which like the province of Trent are still under Austria's sway and therefore " unredeemed," THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 95 that these duties are ethical in character, and that it behoves her to discharge them at whatever sacrifice. Neutrahsm, as it has been called, is a name that covers many shades of opinion, from that which would confine abstention within the bounds of political expediency to that which renounces abso- lutely all velleities to take part in the war. Among the latter, and perhaps among all the partisans of aloofness from the conflict, one may assume the existence in different degrees of vigour of an invisible fibre of pacificism, which some people perhaps rashly as'eribe to the entire nation. It may seem a paradox but it is looked upon by many as a fact, that certain races of to-day, although formerly restless and warlike, have become so modified by the operation of historical forces that their capacity for strug- gles of the fierceness of latter-day campaigns is vastly diminished, and in some cases temporarily atrophied, so that they can hardly be expected to reach the high road of military efficiency. Whether this theory is unconsciously applied to Italy by any of the Neutral- ists is an academical question that does not concern us here, because no Italian has ever yet invoked it. The motives usually relied upon by the Neutralists turn upon the homelier points of profit and loss and the dictates of political expediency. They contend that Italy has no urgent motives, whether in the shape of hopes or fears, to take sides in the great world-struggle, whereas the losses which a war against Germany and Austria must entail upon her would far outweigh the greatest gain that could be anticipated under the most favourable circum- stances. The moment the order for complete mobilization was issued the functions of Italy's economic life would be palsied, and a considerable part of the population, which is even now hard set for cheap bread, would be reduced to the point of starvation. And there would be little hope of the nation being recompensed after the conclusion of peace by a boom in affairs such as that to which the other belligerents confidently look forward. For the sources of much of Italy's revenue are situated in Germany. Many Italians remark with feelings akin to bitterness that the subjects of the Entente Powers when seeking for foreign enter- prises in which to invest their surplus capital uniformly give Italy a wide berth. Great Britain has untold sums buried in concerns of various kinds throughout the globe, but hardly a splash from that golden stream ever sprinkled the Italian Peninsula. France has given enormous loans to the Russian Government, to Russian 96 FROM THE TRIPLE TO corporations and individuals, to Turkey, Austria, Hungary, and Spain, but nothing to Italy except a few paltry millions coming from the Paris fu-m of Dreyfus. Germany, on the contrary, so they say, has been lavish towards Italians with their surplus capital, and has at the same time done good business with them. It is computed that she has invested not less than three milliards of francs, say £120,000,000, in Italy to the advantage, it is alleged, of both borrower and lender. Without this inflow of German capital the material progress which Italy has made during the past fifteen years would have been much less marked. The city of Bari, which is now a flourishing port, has doubled its population in the short span of ten years, and the influx of workers into this growing city from the country districts continues. And the cause of the intenser traffic, as well as the impulse given to shipping there, are both almost exclusively German. In like manner Catania, the second port after Genoa, is now become one of the most thriving towns in the realm, with a population which during the last ten years has doubled in num- ber and considerably raised its standard of life, thanks to German capital and German enterprise. And these are but a few typical instances. The part played by pushing Teutons in supplying Italians with funds or credit for the development of the resources of the country is much more considerable in fact than appears from the official records. The close connection between Berlin financial houses and certain Italian undertakings is often hidden from the profane eye. Cer- tain steamship companies, for example, owe a heavy debt of gratitude to a certain commercial bank which operates with Ger- man money, and in some instances the bonds which thus connect Italian and German interests are so subtle as to be imperceptible to any except the initiated, and yet so powerful withal as to resist every attempt to sever them. Meanwhile the results of this economico-financial relationship are palpable to all. Some of my informants, who had special reason to set a high value on this financial aspect of Italy's foreign relations, went on to affirm, rather illogically it seemed to me, that if France and Britain had co-operated to the same extent as Germany in the economic development of the country, gratitude for the services thus rendered would have embodied itself in military assistance during the war. Gratitude is a plant of capricious growth, about whose freaks one can never be quite positive. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 97 As things now stand, I was further assured, and despite the depressing effect of the war even on neutral Italy, the economic condition of the country may fairly be described as good. Work is abundant and wages are high. The cotton industry, for exam- ple, which was drooping some time ago, is now become brisk and profitable. The iron and steel industries are booming. Agricul- tural and kindred pursuits were never before so lucrative. The class of farmers, gardeners, millers, is, so to say, coining money. Italian shipping, unlike that of Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, has received a fillip from the war the like of which is not remembered by living men. The orange industry is reaping enor- mous profits. In a word, every trade and occupation connected with the land, the sea, and minerals, with the sole exception of the wine export, is doing immeasurably better than at any time for many years past. In this way, not only the economic organization of the country which is running so smoothly, but also its dependence on German support, forbid any step calculated to endanger the existence of either. And both would be upset by the entry of Italy into the arena. If we turn to the most puissant motives that can be set before the Salandra Cabinet as a stimulus to action — it is further contended — ^we look in vain for their adequacy to determine the Government to swerve from the policy of caution and expectancy which has, at any rate, the merit of having kept the nation out of the bloody maelstrom that is fast ruining the greatest peoples of Europe. A great deal has been written about Italy's terri- torial requirements, national aspirations, and prerogatives as a great Power. Far too much, it is urged, has been made of them. In theory they constitute the desiderata of the people. In prac- tice they possess no driving power. Look at the recent past for confirmation of this statement. Ever since the days of Crispi Italy, as a member of the Triple Alliance, has adjusted her con- duct not to the pursuit of those remote aims, but to the further- ance of her immediate interests, hardly any of which were sub- stantially political. Now, if that was sound policy during all the period in question, it is equally sound policy to-day. The deep- rooted conviction of the country's most eminent leaders is that, come what may, the reunion under the Roman sceptre of all Italians, together with the territory on which they are now living, is a foregone conclusion. And every public man in the country holds that the aim of King Victor Emmanuel's Government should 7 98 FROM THE TRIPLE TO be to realize the greatest number of the potentialities of the race at the lowest possible cost. The Trentino and Trieste are national and standing demands. Austria and Germany are aware that they will never be abandoned, just as Italy knows that they cannot be denied always and with finality. The territories would be worth much to Italy, because, apart from the sentimental bearings of the annexation, they would greatly simplify, cheapen, and strengthen the national defences by land and by sea. But, none the less, the possession of these provinces would nowise justify the enormous losses and still more enormous risks which a war against the two greatest military Empires of to-day would entail. For a chance of conquering a lost province Italy could not with safety play va banque. And if this is true in politics, it holds equally good in the military sphere. According to the views expressed in neutralist quarters, Italy, Great Power though she be in name, is not equal to the task, which is always minimized in words, but would be made herculean by circumstance, once it were attempted. The Italian type of to-day is made of the finer kind of clay, superior to that which serves as food for cannon. The people are essentially pacific. For ages they cultivated the arts of peace, and for generations they have been regulating their life in congruity with the belief that war was a contingency which lay outside their orbit. And it does so lie. That explains why no systematic preparations were made for a conflict, and why when General Porro, as incipient War Minister, asked for a large credit to enable him to reorganize the battle-worn army, the present pacific Administration refused the request, whereupon the War Minister elect laid down his portfolio, which was accepted by General Grandi. In the recent past Italy owes more to diplomacy than to feats of arms, and in the immediate future, it is held, she could with profit, and certainly without heavy loss, place her trust in the same means. But if, after all, war were recognized to have become a fatal necessity, it would still be incumbent on the Goverimient to stave it oft as long as possible, to determine with the greatest attainable accuracy the decisive moment, when the inrush of the fresh forces would produce the maximum effect in the shortest span of time, and thus entitle Italy to a voice equal to that of Britain, France and Russia in the moulding of Europe's destinies. If Italy joined the Allies too soon, she would jeopardize her future. For a war of six or eight months would drain her dry. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 99 Present reverses and the prospect of coming tribulations have rendered Austria more compUant than ever before. And Ger- many's efforts, now canalized and directed by Prince Biilow, may succeed in performing the Csesarean operation, which, delivering Austria from a burden, will bestow upon Italy one of her cherished desires. There are already some tokens of this belated conversion of Franz Josef's Government. Prince Btilow, as the spokesman of the active partner, has announced this progressing change to all and sundry in the Italian capital. The Austrian Ambassador Macchio, too, has duly danced to his leader's piping. For Ger- many, isolated by the hatred of the whole world, like Brunhild encircled by fire, is desirous of the friendship of at least one Great Power. And she is all the readier to give the price demanded, that it will be paid at another's cost. Already Italy is in posses- sion of Valona, which as recently as ten months ago Austria was resolved at all costs to hold inviolable. To-day this Empire has unofficially, but adequately, signified its readiness to acquiesce in the retention of this important potential base by Italy, who already wields the rights of legitimate possessor, sanctioning or forbidding the transfer of lands and other transactions.^ Every act which requires State sanction in that comer of Albania has now to be drawn up by Italian lawyers, and approved by the Italian State. Public thought and feehng in Italy, in so far as they busy them- selves with the grounds for the coming great decision of the Gov- ernment, agree, it is contended, in substance with these views. Had it been otherwise a leader of the country so prominent as Signor Giolitti, whose great merit lies in his ability to discover the trend of national sentiment, and to get his Parliamentary adherents to follow that, would never have written the historic letter in which he records his belief that Italy's safest course Ues 1 I had been informed that the Vienna Foreign OflBce had inti- mated its willingness to compensate Italy for the actual and impend- ing changes in the equilibrium of the Balkans, by foregoing all Aus- tria's claims in Albania. The ofHcial Italian Green Book has since confirmed this information. On January 10th, 1915, Baron Sonnino telegraphed to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna that Baron Macchio had alluded to the possibility of compensations in Albania; and in another despatch dated January 15th Baron Sonnino records Mae- chio's return to his suggestion about Albania, 100 FROM THE TRIPLE TO in the exercise of military inaction, diplomatic energy. Christian patience, and tireless vigilance. Such in brief is the case against intervention as put by its most authorized champions. Italian " neutralists " thus put forward a number of proposi- tions which are based exclusively upon expediency and interest. For these politicians assume that the present European struggle differs only in magnitude from past wars, and should consequently be dealt with on the usual lines. On the other hand, a number of eminent publicists whose earnestness and sincerity are universally appreciated plead for immediate intervention. And the leaders of this movement are men endowed with the faculty of concen- trated vision and with a high sense of the responsibilities imposed by supreme issues such as the emergence of wholly new political and social conditions. In the contest which now convulses Europe they discern elements far more dissolvent than those of ordinary pohtics, and they also recognize corresponding obligations of a higher, more sacred, and more peremptory nature, which for the time being absorb into themselves the sum total of the aims and interests which constitute the conjuncture. Quick with glorious memories and noble sentiments, the Italian people, despite its spiritual numbness of recent years, is still full of flexible sympathy for all that is noblest in the civilizing forces of the world. It has a keen sense for far-off issues, an intuitive feeling for the hidden bonds that hold together and bind in kin- ship truly humanized and constructive peoples. ^ And it has been the aim of the neutralist leaders, of whom the most influential is Signer Luigi Albertini, editor of the Corriere della Sera, of Milan, to arouse these dormant instincts, to set the unprecedented task with which the Government and the country are now faced in its true light, not as an occasion for the exercise of vulgar bargaining or studious compromise, but as a splendid opportunity for bring- ing the national life and its potentialities within the vaster circle of the great community of which Italy is a promising member. This view, which nowise excludes care for the more material interests of the nation, possesses commanding attraction for a large class of leading men of thought and action in the country, who, 1 I wrote those lines at the beginning of March, when the belief prevailed throughout Europe that the Italian people were incapable of any but egotistic sentiments. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 101 nerved by faith and impelled by virile force, are eager to see Italy's destinies poured into a vaster and firmer mould, and brought into harmony with those of the great world-Powers with which it is her ambition to keep permanently abreast. Patriotism is con- ceived by them in a wider sense than was hitherto in vogue, for it has come to include, besides Italy's present territorial claims and strivings, all the glorious potentialities which await only a favourable opportunity to be unfolded and realized. The nation, according to Signor Albertini and the Milan group of patriots, is much more than an organism instinct with healthy egotism, eager to get all it can at the cost of any neighbour in distress, while giv- ing as little as possible in return. It is also, and above all else, a loyal member of the European family, conscious of its duties, as well as jealous of its rights, ready for exertions and sacrifices as great in proportion to its resources as those put forth by Great Britain, France and Russia. In this large conception due account is taken of all the elements, duties, interests and aspirations which lie about the roots of the nation's life. The attitude of the friends of intervention towards the profit and loss issues is to the fuU as patriotic as that of their adversaries. One is constantly struck in reading their utterances by the sin- cerity of their desire to get at the best solution of the difficulties in the most dignified way, without waiving the smallest right or evading the least attractive obligation. They argue that the present trial of forces is no mere dynastic struggle, nor one which concerns only the States actually engaged in it. It is a clash of peoples who have sacrificed much and are risking all in a cause which at bottom is Italy's own. The issues are clear-cut. Mili- tarism eager for absolute domination is pitted against pacific peoples intent on developing in legitimate ways each its own characteristic gifts and leading its own national life. Italy's hour, therefore, has struck, as well as theirs, and she can already perceive what awaits her at the end of each of the two roads between which she must speedily make her choice. No mere formula can be substituted for vigorous action. She must rely on her own exertions, which will have to be proportionate to those of the peoples who are nobly risking their all. The partisans of neutrality insist upon the advantages of a diplomatic deal with Austria and Germany which will secure for Italy at least a portion of her demands. The interventionists object that this hope is ill-founded, and that if it were realized the 102 FROM THE TRIPLE TO concessions thus extorted would be of little abiding value while the resulting isolation of Italy would be fraught with greater and more imminent dangers than she has ever yet encountered. Austria's real dispositions towards her are frankly unfriendly. And for years past they have been covertly hostile and obstruc- tive.i For a generation Italy followed the lead of the Habsburgs meekly and supinely in a policy of which the ostensible aim was the prevention of war. Yet far from being prevented, war was deliberately precipitated. What reward did Italy harvest in for her loyal and self-sacrificing co-operation ? None. Nay more, her safety was deliberately sacrificed by hes ally. The Ultimatum to Serbia was framed unknown to her, and she was suddenly faced with the alternatives of embarking on a tremendous struggle, in which she must risk her national existence, or shrinking from the ordeal and being brandmarked as a traitress. And the aim of the war thus secretly and disloyally conjured up was indirectly but efficaciously to upset to Italy's grave detriment the status quo in the Near East. Thus was insult added to injury with a naive directness which would be amusing were it not repulsive. And although now reduced to dire straits Austria is still impeni- tent. The hopes voiced by the Italian partisans of aloofness from the war have been blasted by no less an authority than the Emperor Franz Josef himself. In a conversation which he had a few weeks ago with a person, whose name is not mentioned, he said : " No State territory can be ceded to an enemy who shrinks from fight- ing." ^ But even abstraction made from this utterance, which bears all the marks of authenticity, one has but to ask a few ques- tions in order to make Austria's temper clear. Assuming for a moment her readiness to abandon the Trentino and Trieste to Italy, one would like to know whether this sop would be thrown unconditionally, or only in case she wins a decisive victory. Obviously only in the latter contingency.^ For it is hardly to be supposed that a defeated Austria, compelled to cede Transylvania to Roumania, the Bukovina to Roumania and 1 This assertion, which at the time it was made seemed contrary to fact, has since been fully proven by the documents published in the Green Book. 2 This was also Austria's official attitude, as the Green Book has since demonstrated. 3 This assumption, for which I had good grounds at the time, has been since borne out by official documents. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 108 Russia, her Southern Slav provinces to Serbia, and her Polish possessions to the Tsardom would feel warranted in abandoning over and above the Trentino and Trieste to Italy. But if the cession of the territory in question were conditional upon the defeat of the Allies, and the triumph of the Dual Mon- archy, would this gain to Italy be compensated by the enormous and irreparable loss which Austria's success would inflict upon her elsewhere ? For what that victory would mean is the com- plete control by the Habsburg Monarchy of the Balkan States, the command or possession of Salonika, and the irresistible attrac- tion of Italy herself within the orbit of the two Teutonic Powers. Thenceforward Italy might be tolerated during her good behaviour, but her status as a Great Power, her mission as a civilizing force, and her development as a great Mediterranean State would be definitely gone. Since Prince Biilow, the diplomatist of the golden speech, re- turned to Rome as the Kaiser's Ambassador, he has lent currency to the statement that although Austria may be unwilling to pur- chase Italy's neutrality by the offer of the Trentino and Trieste, she may be persuaded or constrained by her ally to make some reasonable bid for it. And this view is strengthened by the reflection that Germany doubtless perceives already that the costs of the war will have to be paid very largely by her allies, Austria and Turkey, and that she can afford to be generous with the sub- stance of her neighbours. But to this there is a conclusive answer. Austria might possibly make over a portion of the Trentino to Italy, but she would never agree to part with the entire stretch of territory demanded by strategical considerations, which include everything from the Brenner Mountains to the Bocche di Cattaro, and constitute about one-fifteenth part of Austria. Still less is it to be imagined that she would make a present to Italy of Trieste, her great outlet to the sea and the centre of her foreign trade. ^ But even if a promise of these concessions were given, no faith could be put in their binding force. For it should be borne in mind that Austria is, so to say, less closely bound to Germany than is Germany to Austria. In other words, the Entente Powers are well aware that Austria is not the bitter, cruel, relent- less foe that her ally is. Germany's designs on Trieste, Salonika and Asia Minor are integral parts of her scheme of self-develop- 1 These conjectures proved to be correct. Austria refused the demands as exorbitant and humiliating. 104 FROM THE TRIPLE TO ment, so that even if Austria felt constrained to promise Trieste to Italy, no one would be surprised, the Allies once worsted, to see Germany treat this promise as a scrap of paper, and bid Italy be satisfied with a rectification of her frontiers in the Trentino. The claim to the Trentino and Trieste as fragments of unre- deemed Italy, and also as indispensable parts of her strategical frontier, constituted the permanent background to the policy of the Consulta among a sequence of shifting aims and transient interests. And throughout all those years Italian statesmen envisaged the inevitable necessity of having one day to assert that claim by force of arms, with or without allies, and under circumstances which they ardently hoped they might be capable of rendering propitious. To-day this hope is realized beyond their rosiest dreams. The destinies of the nations of Europe are in the crucible, and will soon be cast in new moulds. If after the war, Austria by way of compensating herself for losses suffered in her Slav provinces, were to pick a quarrel with Italy, one can hardly fancy the French RepubUc altruistically rushing in to save her kinsfolk. In their tireless endeavours to win over Italy to their schemes, the Berlin wire-pullers flatter her by exhortations to turn her back to the Adriatic and fix her gaze on the Mediterranean, where her glorious future hes. Well, Italians have done and are doing that. But in the Midland Sea they behold no ships afloat except those of the Allies and the neutrals, and they ask themselves to what phght would their own country, which is now suffering from inadequacy of foodstuffs, be reduced if Italian ports were blocked like the Austrian. But the Adriatic cannot be navigated even by neutral ships on account of the mines, which thus proclaim that the dominion of that sea belongs to the State which owns the opposite shore. And Italy sorely needs that second lung in order to attain normal health, and before she can achieve her mission in the Mediterranean. The Neutralists flatter themselves that as the struggle will be long and the outcome uncertain, Italy stands to gain a good deal if the Allies are beaten, while she will lose nothing if the contrary contingency is realized. Moreover, if Germany can only hold out long enough, she may succeed in breaking up the alliance. Then Italy will have several trump cards to play, and it will be for her statesmen to choose the best. Men of more mature judgment put the case less crudely. If Italy must come into the struggle, they argue, let her wait until the decisive hour has struck and the THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 105 Allied States are literally bled white. Then as she can turn the scales in favour of either, the price of her succour will be left to herself. To these pronouncements writers of the Milan school of politics reply that it is not by sitting at the window until the curtain has fallen on the world-tragedy that any neutral State can qualify for a vote in the councils of the heirs of the departed. Diplo- matic astuteness may go far in ordinary times, but in a world- tussle Uke the present it is worse than useless. When the Allies have sheathed their swords they will have such difficult problems of their own to solve that they will take care not to aggravate them by vindicating the claims of neutrals. It behoves the Italian people, therefore, to take thought of its own aims and claims while there is yet time. From the day on which the Austrian Ultimatum was presented to Serbia, the partisans of Italian intervention gave it as their conviction that Italy must break at once with her two allies. They added that she would be considered by Germany as a trait- ress. And the correctness of this judgment has since been borne out by events. " There shall be no recompense for treason," exclaimed the Emperor Franz Josef to a diplomatist pleading for a sop for Italy. And yet Italians who can entertain no doubt as to how their conduct is condemned in Berlin and Vienna, write and speak and act as though their ex-aUies had forgotten or condoned their so-called " treason " and conceived for them a positive affection. In truth Italy has been severely isolated by her neutrality, and unless she casts about for friends and allies in time she wiU still be isolated when the day dawns for the distribution of parts for the next act of the world's drama. Would she find it easy to acquire friends among any of the Great Powers after having watched their efforts, gauged their dangers, and turned over in her mind how best to make capital out of their diiSculties ? Among the Allies there would be none willing to enter into part- nership with her, and for reasons which lie on the surface. But neither is it likely that her allies of yesterday would become those of to-morrow. Would they pardon what they term her " perfidy " and dismiss all fear of its recurrence ? And would Italy herself accept as adequate the guarantees she received before, and which guaranteed nothing but bitter disappointment ? Those " safe- guards " did not keep Austria and Germany from breaking their compact. Would they prove more effectual a second time ? 106 FROM THE TRIPLE TO The truth is that both those Empires condemn Italy's behaviour as treason, which they would gladly punish at once if they could. If they were victorious would they forgo this " right and duty " ? According to the leaders of the interventionists, who are fol- lowed by many members of all parties. Conservatives, National- ists, RepubUcans, and Socialists, the question of Italy's decision has been placed by the friends of the ex-Premier, Giolitti, and by that statesman himself, on too low a level. It is beneath the dignity of a great nation to lie quiescent while two groups of States are engaged in a life-and-death struggle, one of them for a cause which is largely her own, and to speculate on how much may be extorted from the weakness of whichever of them is vanquished. Italy, we are assured by the foremost of the Milan publicists, might have received in exchange for her co-operation the promise of Corsica, of Nice, of Savoy, of Tunis, of Morocco, and of Egypt. And speaking for myself I can confirm the statement. But the Italian people, he goes on to say, would have risen in wrath against any one who should urge her collaboration in an enterprise of aggression and oppression. This truth, he adds, will prove painful for those who would fain urge the nation to take a hand in Germany's " world-politics," " but it is a fundamental truth which cannot be ignored when the question is asked what the Italian nation can or cannot do. We are now dealing not with colonial policy, but with that world- policy for which a people should be ready to offer up, if necessary, its life-blood, as Germany is doing. . . . Let us therefore acquire for the country a position in the European equilibrium which is congruous with its temperament, its spirit, its instincts. " Happily our aspirations in the Adriatic, our interests in the Midland Sea and in Northern Africa coincide admirably with the policy which it is easiest for us to pursue. Unless we profit with the utmost prudence, with the greatest circumspection, by the present rare opportunity which history offers us to set the finishing strokes to our unification, to render our land and sea frontiers immeasurably more secure and more easily defensible than they are and to harmonize our foreign with our domestic policy, we shall experience after the close of the war the darkest and most difficult days of our existence. The crisis through which we are passing is the gravest we have yet encountered. Let us make it a crisis of growth, not a symptom of irreparable senile decay." ^ 1 Corriere della Sera, Feb. 8th, 1915. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 107 In this way the publicists of Milan have been endeavouring to awaken national emotion and a sense of national dignity, and to set free a current of stimulating force capable of enlightening and strengthening the Government. CHAPTER XII THE POLICY OF THE MARCHESE DI SAN GIULIANO DURING the latent crisis that was imperceptibly drawing Europe into the red maelstrom where it is now madly whirling, the statesman who acted as pilot to the Italian ship of State was the Marchese di San Giuliano. This politi- cian, well known in London where he had represented his country as Ambassador, was a fine specimen of the Sicilian type of nobleman, developed and improved by close inter- course with the West. A skilful diplomatist and brilliant talker he was appreciated by the foreign Ambassadors and Ministers in Rome with whom he would chat vivaciously for hours without committing a political indiscretion. His insinuating manners concealed a firm character marked by unflinching moral courage, and an intellect which was brilliant and quick rather than genial or profound. His policy was less a comprehensive systematized course of action than a single-minded resolve to perpetuate the status quo and the alliance which he accounted its surest mainstay, and failing that, to hold on to Germany as long as possible, even after parting from Austria. This leaning towards and upon Germany had been a tradition at the Consulta ever since the Crimean War. But in San Giuliano's case, it was also a profound personal con- viction. The easy-going brilliant Sicilian was powerfully impressed by German thoroughness, painstaking and perse- verance, and was literally hypnotized by their monumental results, by the numbers and quality of the Kaiser's army, 108 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 109 by the rapid growth of his navy, by the solidity of German finances and by the spread of German trade and Kultur. And to his mind thus constituted and equipped one of the weightiest criteria by which any course of political action under consideration was judged, was its effect upon Italy's relations with Germany. By that central care he was fascinated to the point that he occasionally allowed his predilection and apprehension to pierce through the con- versational mist that was meant to obscure them. Thus a few months before the storm-cloud broke di San Giuliano, at a banquet where several Frenchmen were his table com- panions, gave it as his conviction that the German race was the fine flower of the human kind, inasmuch as it had con- trived to imite in admirable harmony the highest qualities of the British with the highest qualities of the French, It would, however, be unjust to the memory of that gifted states- man not to add that all Europe joined in this appreciation of the race which is now brandmarked with almost equal unanimity as the Cain among the nations of the earth. What is worth remembering in all this is the deep-rooted sentiment inaccessible to argument that Italy's safest course in the vicissitudes of international relations was to cultivate close friendship with Germany. And this feeling has left an abiding mark on the policy of both countries which can be readily traced down to the present moment and bids fair to siurvive the European struggle. Germany is not at war with Italy. After the peace the two may need each other again, and they are preparing for this eventuality. But for all that, San Giuliano was an enlightened patriot who beheld in the Triple Alliance, at the very lowest, a war-obstructing instru- ment of tested force and efficacy, and his efforts were con- centrated on intensifying this aspect of the arrangement. The greater Italy's power and prestige grow (he remarked to me at one of our last meetings), the more potent wiJI our influence 110 FROM THE TRIPLE TO over our allies become. And as our primary interest is peace, that influence will be thrown in the scale against war and against every innovation that tends to produce war. And it is from that angle of vision that Italy's various exertions to increase her specific international weight and also her fidelity to the alliance ought to be contemplated by the Powers of the Entente. You would be rendering a signal service to the cause of humanity by setting forth these considerations in England and Russia. Curiously enough all Europe, with a few noteworthy but unheeded exceptions, assented to the view thus put forward by the Italian Minister. But from this soothing day-dream San Giuliano was rudely awakened in August, 1913, a year before the opening of the world-war. On the 9th of that historic month, the plenipotentiaries of the Balkan States were gathered together at Bucharest for the purpose of liquidating the two sanguinary wars which had upset the political equilibrium of the Peninsula. Take Jonescu, who saw clear and far, had been pleading the cause of equity to no purpose. General Fitcheff, Bulgaria's dignified repre- sentative, had advocated his country's claims in words which also applied with telling force to the interests of Serbia and Greece, but his arguments fell on deaf ears. Bulgaria was despoiled of her conquests and Austria, who had espoused her cause and undertaken to make it prevail, was ready to resort to extreme methods. On Sunday the 10th a treaty was to be signed which would cripple the protegee of the Habsburgs permanently. The day before the signature, San Giuliano received an official communication from Vienna to the effect that the Austrian Government intended to take action against Serbia, and that as this action would be " defensive " in character, Italy would be expected to draw the practical conclusion and behave as an active ally. This astounding definition of a " defensive " war came as a revelation to the Italian Minister, who at once apprized the Premier Giolitti of the fact. The THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 111 Cabinet unhesitatingly displayed a steady determination to use all its influence to keep the Austrian torch from being laid to the mountain of inflammables and to draw clearly the line between legitimate defence and wanton provocation. Austria, if she were minded to wage war, must, Italy said, undertake it alone. She was in no danger of attack. Di San Giuliano boldly appealed to Germany, whose consent to Austria's experiment must be taken as given. But Bethmann-Hollweg naturally vetoed a course which would have broken up the alliance or at least separated the allies. And a more fitting opportunity for paralyzing Serbia was waited for.^ I had the impression that di San Giuliano was more elated by the momentary efficacy of his intervention as peace-maker than by the amazing mentality of his ally and the perspective of recurring dangers which it revealed. In subsequent conversations he assured me that Italy's influence for peace was far-reaching, that it had already been tested and found potent, and that, in the future as in the past, the part she played in the Triple Alliance would entitle her to the gratitude of Europe. When a year later Austria had a relapse which clearly revealed Germany's complicity in the inexpiable crime against humanity, the two conspirators judged that Italy, having forfeited her right of ally, should be deprived of the opportunity to use her good offices as peacemaker. The Ultimatum to Serbia was accordingly drafted without her knowledge and the conflict deliberately precipitated before she could tender advice or even intimate dissent. But emphatic dissent on Italy's part might have been taken for granted. It was not only a coroflary of the whole tenor of Austro-Italian relations during the preceding thirty-two years, but also a necessary consequence of certain unmistak- 1 These revelations were made in the ItaHan Chamber by Signer Giolitti, in the first days of December, 1914. 112 FROM THE TRIPLE TO able incidents of recent date. On the last day of April, 1918, while the Powers were mooting the proposal of an international occupation of Scutari in Albania, the Marchese di San Giuliano, who was never hindered by wont or bias from rising to a great occasion and asserting the rights and dignity of his country, telegraphed to Signor Tittoni : "If the Conference of Ambassadors does not give satisfaction to Austria-Hungary, and, if Austria-Hungary moves against Montenegro without our acquiescence, a delicate situation will arise, and it will be difficult to maintain the Italo- Austrian agreement and the integrity of the Triple Alliance. Italy must not remain inactive, but should, while Austria is operating in the north, manoeuvre in the south by landing troops in a convenient place." Tittoni replied : " If Austria means to occupy all or part of Montenegro we must go to Durazzo or to Valona, even without her consent. The day when Austria attempts to disturb in any measure whatever the equilibrium of the Adriatic, the Triple Alliance will have ceased to exist." And Signor Tittoni, who narrated this incident over two years later, comments on it as follows: "Thus it cannot be said that what Austria lacked was warning from us. What was lacking was her own good will." While granting all this and brandmarking the secret schemes and open juggling of the two Military Empires as a piece of infamy, it would be unfair to leave unsaid on the other side what is evident to the unbiassed and well-informed observer, namely that the efforts made by Italy's official representatives in Rome, Vienna and Berlin to infuse warmth and life into their country's relations with Germany and Austria were not inconsistent with the far-ranging optimistic construc- tion put upon them by Franz Josef's Ministers. And that that interpretation was accepted as fully warranted by the text and tone of the official messages from Rome I, who was in Vienna at the time and possessed of the means of knowing the facts, am able to attest. This view is indirectly borne THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 113 out by the silence of the Italian Green Book on the inter- change of despatches and assurances that took place during this first stage of a discussion which led to a dispute and culminated in war. In Rome unauthorized but reiterated reports emanating from well-informed quarters had it that di San Giuliano was in favour of Italy joining her two allies in August, 1914, but that the dissent of his colleagues and the pessimistic report of the War Minister decided him to content himself with neutrality. Similar rumours were rife about the view at first taken of Italy's obligations by Baron Sonnino. It is alleged that although not yet in office he was requested by the Premier Salandra to state his opinion on the matter ; for the two had for years been friends and comrades. Baron Sonnino, who received the message at his solitude of Romito, repaired to Rome and arrived one day after the Cabinet Council had decided that Italy would not participate in the war. Sonnino is reported to have expressed dissent from this resolution on grounds which were neither technical nor recondite. This narrative, which may be apocryphal or over-coloured, is at any rate interesting, as an indication of public opinion and feeling. From other and trustworthy sources we learn that the first presage of the impending disagreement between Rome and Vienna emerged in a mild shape some time before Austria had presented her ultimatum in Belgrade. Foreseeing Italian tactics, Count Berchtold had taken the precaution to inform the Consulta that even if pacific expedients should prove fruitless to bring Serbia to a sense of her international duty, Austria would in no case wage a war of territorial conquest and annexation.^ This was a gentle admonition that the Compensation Clause would have no application to impending events. But the Consulta paid no heed. Four days later ^ the Italian Ambassador in Vienna announced to Count Berchtold that Italy reserved her right to invoke 1 On July 21st, 1914. 2 juiy 25th, 1914. 8 114 FROM THE TRIPLE TO that clause and meanwhile proposed that the two Govern- ments should come to an agreement on the subject before Serbian territory was actually occupied. But the diplomatist added that in the eventuality of an armed conflict between Austria and Serbia, the Italian Government was minded to assume a friendly attitude towards Austria conformably to the duties of an ally. This was a significant statement and was treated as such in Vienna at that time, and the form in which the tidings were communicated to me was this: " Italy has solemnly promised that she will redeem her plighted word as Austria's ally in case the Dual Monarchy gets involved in a war with Serbia." I had that statement from a sure source and I believed it. The impression it seemingly made in official quarters in Vienna was distinctly favourable and the conclusions eagerly drawn from it were far-reaching. It is undoubted that, as I then pointed out, Italy's official relations with Austria and Germany were good, and that San Giuliano seemed anxious to keep them so, or even better them. The famous Article VII of the Treaty which had been intro- duced by Count di Robilant provides that whichever ally disturbs the equilibrium of the Balkans shall give fitting compensation to the other. Now Austria's contention was that it had no application to the conditions prevailing be- cause these excluded conquest and aimed only at national security. Rome naturally demurred to that thesis and appealed to Berlin for support. Germany, waiving the plea, boldly adopted the Italian view and admitted in principle Italy's right to compensation. Count Berchtold then made the first concession to the Consulta in the following declaration — If we be constrained, contrary to our expectation, to proceed to the occupation of Serbian territory — occupation which would be provisional — we should in this case be ready to inaugurate an interchange of ideas with Italy as to the compensation due to her. On the other hand we expect that Italy should not hinder her THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 115 allies from putting forth the efforts requisite for the attainment of their ends, but should preserve a friendly bearing towards us, in conformity with the alliance. By way of deepening the good impression which this announcement was expected to make, the Austrian Emperor was moved into the foreground and advised to despatch a telegram to King Victor which would, it was confidently assumed, clinch the matter. In accord with Germany (Franz Josef wrote) I am resolved to defend the rights of the Triple AlUance, and I have ordered the mobilization of all the military forces. To the Triple Alliance we owe thirty years of peace and well-being. I note with satisfac- tion the identical interpretation of the Treaty by our (Jovern- ments. At this solemn conjuncture I am happy to be able to reckon on the support of my allies and their powerful armies, and I give utterance to my fervid desire for the success of our arms and for the glorious future of our countries. A curious calculation after all that had gone before ! And yet, as we have seen, it was not wholly destitute of a basis. To that message the King of Italy gave the following answer — I have received your Majesty's telegram. I have no need to assure your Majesty that Italy who has made all possible efforts to ensure the maintenance of peace and who will do everything feasible to restore it as soon as may be, will preserve a cordially friendly attitude towards her allies, congruously with the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, her own sincere sentiments, and the great interests which it behoves her to safeguard. The Austrian and German Governments professed to believe that this royal response was a renewed promise by Italy to discharge the duties of an ally. They maintain that it was confirmed by a statement from a high military author- ity. On August 4th the Austrian Ambassador in Rome communicated to Count Berchtold a curious declaration 116 FROM THE TRIPLE TO alleged to have come from the Chief of the Italian General Staff, Cadorna : "If Austria," he said, "refrains from occupying Lovchen and disturbing the equilibrium of the Adriatic, Italy will never declare war against her." The authenticity of these words has since been called in ques- tion by Cadorna himself. Into this dispute we cannot enter. One cannot, however, deny that there is some logical force in the Italian contention that a political statement coming from a military chief is known by all diplomatists to be worth nothing. Military officers are not the natural or the truest exponents of their country's foreign policy. None the less, if the assurance had been given by General Cadorna, it would have been valuable not only in itself but also as bearing out what was believed to be the view taken by the Court, the King and the Cabinet. In any case the Ballplatz was alive to the possibility of unpleasant surprises. And this prevision was whetted by the venomous comment made on Cadorna's alleged assurance by the Austrian Ambassador in Rome, von Merey, to his Chief in Vienna : " Your Excellency will gather from the data in question that the policy of blackmail is being per- sisted in." " Traitors and blackmailers " were therefore the characteristics of the Italian Government, according to the responsible advisers of the Austrian Emperor. It was in that spirit of mingled bitterness and loathing that these officials entered into conversations with that Government. Rancour and contempt impregnated the words and inspired the whims and deliberate acts of the Austrian negociators, rendering a fair, straight, equitable bargain well-nigh impossible. Aware of that spirit, although not acquainted with all its causes, I felt at the time that an accord between them was hardly to be hoped for, unless indeed a set of new conditions were created. For well- informed Italians were under no illusion as to the feelings with which Austria contemplated them or the standard THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 117 by which she gauged their conduct. The faith which they put in Austria's promises, to be redeemed only if she emerged from the conflict strong enough to repudiate them, was very limited. Even in the course of the official conversations the most telling argument invoked by Vienna was a threat that Italy, if she broke off the negociations, would find the German armies as well as those of Austria-Hungary arrayed against her. On the other hand, it was no secret at the Consulta that the European War ought, and was intended according to Austria's original plan, to be preceded by a crushing defeat of Italy, which fate had unexpectedly caused to be postponed. That in spite of this knowledge and the further conviction that an Austrian campaign against Italy would have found their nation without a single ally to back her, King Victor's Government left the national defences in such a plight that they no longer deserved the name of " defences," throws light upon some of the differences between the temperament of the allied peoples and that of the Teutons. But that Signer Giolitti, who was principally responsible for this neglect, should have afterwards invoked it in conversation with the King as a clinching argument against intervention, betrays the presence of an ethical twist in that statesman's mentality of a kind which was reasonably taken by the nation to disqualify him for the post of its principal trustee. Di San Giuliano had employed the brief period between the presentation of the ultimatum and Austria's order to mobilize, in endeavouring to get the two allies to listen to counsels of self-containment and humanity. But they retorted by dwelling on the enormous odds against the Entente Powers and their own splendid chances of victory. Russia, they urged, is wholly unprepared for a European war and Great Britain would never take the field against the Triple Alliance. But the dissenting Italian Minister was nowise disconcerted. He construed Austria's measures of 1914 as he had inter- 118 FROM THE TRIPLE TO preted her intentions of 1913, and characterized the resulting war as aggressive. In logic the argument was sound and in politics the attitude was at once safe and obligatory. For only on the supposition that Italy's contention was correct could her contemplated refusal to aid her two allies be justi- fied. And her allies implicitly acquiesced in her plea, and congruously with these plastic attitudes, neither of the Military Empires broke off its friendly relations with her. On the contrary, professions of amity were lavished on the Consulta by the Kaiser's Government and re-echoed by the press of Berlin, Vienna and Frankfurt. And one of the outward signs of this tender affection was the despatch of an ex-Chancellor — Germany's most distinguished statesman — ^to Rome, to wipe out old scores, reconcile present differences, and draw closer " the bonds that had so long linked the two peoples together." Meanwhile it was implicitly assumed by all three that the alliance was still in vigour but that the con- ditions which alone could oblige Italy to participate actively in the war had not in the judgment of her statesmen been realized. After this the Italian Government, gazing awe-struck at the perspective that opened out before the nation, the lack of trustworthy and powerful friends, and the absence of adequate means of defence, set to work to organize a new army, to lay in munitions for a severe and long campaign, and to reorganize the navy. Happily for the country, Aus- tria regarded these measures as empty bluff, and in lieu of offering serious concessions, put her hope in hair-splitting arguments. The negociations turned mainly upon the Italian contentions arising out of Article VII, on which Baron Sonnino, after the death of San Giuliano, laid especial stress. The latter statesman, notwithstanding his reserve of moral courage and patriotism, had always displayed in his dis- patches a tender regard for the susceptibilities of his coun- try's allies. His successor seemed more outspoken and his THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 119 utterances were certainly more emphatic. Whether his mind was haunted with bitter recollections of the thirty- three years of humiliation and coercion which the fatal treaty had brought down upon his beloved Italy is very doubtful. If it was he never showed it. On the con- trary the belief of the public and of his personal friends would seem to warrant the view that, like all other Italian statesmen, he recognized the utility while deprecating the one-sidedness of the Alliance. There is no ground for assum- ing that he ever discovered that the object for which he agitated in his youthful days was but one of the baits cun- ningly set before Italians by the past-master of diplomatic legerdemain in Berlin. CHAPTER XIII IMPRESSIONS OF BARON SONNINO WITH the death of di San Giuliano the first phase of the Austro-Itahan dissension came to an end. And for the second act of the drama the cast was consider- ably modified. For Continental nations, unlike the British, never allow themselves to be hypnotized by old saws like that about swapping horses in mid-stream. In Rome, Baron Sonnino, invited by his former partisan, the Premier Salandra, to the vacant post, now discharged the functions of Foreign Secretary. In Vienna Count Berchtold had withdrawn into private life and his place was taken by Baron Burian, Austria's reputed best statesman.^ At the Aus- trian Embassy in Rome Baron Macchio, a native of Friuli, one of the unredeemed Italian provinces, succeeded von Merey, and Germany recalled her Ambassador Flotow, whose wife was a patriotic Russian lady, and delegated in his room the world-famed statesman, the connoisseur of Italian art and history, Prince von Biilow,^ who was ex- pected to evolve harmony out of discord and restore to the Triple Alliance its pristine vigour on a new and more solid basis. Russia recalled her Ambassador at Rome, M. Kru- pensky, and gave him M. Giers as successor. Another figure that now began to flit fitfully across the field of vision casting a dark shadow on the brightest scenes was the ex- Premier Giolitti. Although only a private member of parlia- ment without office or responsibility, this politician was felt throughout to be the sole master of the situation, and 1 January 14th, 1915. " December 3rd, 1914. 120 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 121 at the culminalting moment he boldly realized the theory, usurped the functions without resuming the title of Premier, and turned out the Cabinet by an audacious extra-parlia- mentary master-stroke. Thereupon the nation cried, " Thus far, and no farther ! " With the entry on the scene of these eminent dramatis personcs, public interest in the plot grew keener. But at the same time the means of satisfying this natural curiosity almost completely vanished. For Sonnino, who lives and moves in an atmosphere of solitude and mystery, insisted on the maintenance of absolute secrecy during the conversa- tions. His resolve to conceal their trend from the public gaze was so fixed that he stipulated with Biilow the right to consider a breach of this covenant as tantamount to a rupture of the negociations. The Minister justified this course as a matter of necessity and a peremptory condition of success. To the expectant nation, which had had to acquiesce in tremendous sacrifices for the reorganization of national defences, this was a trying ordeal, especially because the belief was general that peace was certain to be maintained. But it was borne with dignity. Weeks passed and months, during which no news, no hints, not even a vague notion, were allowed to leak out as to how the conversations were proceeding. The Government, heedless alike of its own interest and of that of the nation, failed to prepare the mind of the people for what was coming. Mean- while, the Press exhorted the country to remain calm and patient and hopeful. The Cabinet, it argued, had the con- fidence of the Chamber and the King, its one aim was to further Italy's interests at the least possible sacrifice, and it had already put the country in a position to await with equanimity either of the alternatives before it. As the personal element played a large part in the develop- ment of the crisis thus opened, it may not be amiss to call to mind the salient characteristics of the chief actors. 122 FROM THE TRIPLE TO Baron Sidney Sonnino, whose name, six months before the crisis, was unknown beyond Italian parliamentary circles, had a certain reputation in his own country as a speculative politician and a lonesome parliamentarian, who took a marked interest in finance, political economy, and those moral problems which lie at the root of healthy society. A man of restless ambition, elevation of sentiment, high public spirit, respectable abilities and contempt for that consistency which is so often demanded as a proof of depth and sincerity in public men, Signor Sonnino is half a Briton and half a Jew. He is endowed with some prominent traits of both racial types. British steadiness, tenacity and reserve com- bine with Jewish penetrative observation, subtle analysis, and a marked tendency to scepticism. When the crisis which associated his name with one of the decisive events of the great war was over, I penned the following impres- sions : — From his first masterly speech in Parliament, when he struck the persistent note of his public career, down to the declaration of war against Austria, he has manfully persisted in the discharge of what he deemed public duty, even when individual effort, how- ever strained, seemed unavailing to sway the currents of opinion and sentiment in the only direction where they could become fruitful. From the first, his conception of politics rose high above party arrangements and personal ambition, and included the equitable adjustment of financial burdens, the equal distribution of political rights, the emancipation of the Italian working classes whose lot was sometimes little better than that of serfs, and the duty of the Government to displace the obstacles which hindered the material and intellectual development of the nation. His parliamentary life is replete with splendid undertakings and noble schemes, often left inchoate, seldom completed, and sometimes defaced by men who were less his personal antagon- ists than foes to any kind of progress which might jeopardize their own tenure of power. Sonnino's sjnnpathy has been with the community as a whole rather than with any of its concrete tjrpes ; but despite a steady glow of social feeling, the constitutional shyness, impenetrable THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 123 reserve, and sombre non-conducting atmosphere, which he carries about with him, may account for his failure to organize and keep together a parliamentary party of real influence. With a taste for great undertakings he has a passion for small ones. Tempera- ment has made him firm in applying principles, but neither reflec- tion nor experience has rendered him pliant in dealing with people nor indeed desirous of holding converse with them. His implicit confidence in the nation is coupled with invincible mistrust of individuals ; and he seems unmindful of the fact that a leader is useless to his party if his suspicion is so deep-rooted as to make him unwilling to run the risk of being hoodwinked. He is a recluse rather than a statesman, and for months at a time he retires to his hermitage at Castello Romito by the sea, where he shuts himself out from human society, even from that of his in- timate friends. Indeed his high-pitched seriousness, modesty, and morbid taciturnity have come to resemble some strange malady that benefits others while injuring himself, like that of the oyster — ^the symbol of silence — which produces the pearl. What he sadly lacks is that quasi- magic quality which is vouchsafed to all master-spirits born to lead men — ^the mysterious power of attract- ing, thrilling, and stimulating others to combined action.^ Years of careful observation and varied experience had broadened his horizon, subdued his impulsiveness, matured his judgment ; and when at last poetic justice offered him the welcome opportunity of undoing the greatest and most deplorable work to which he had contributed, he conscien- tiously refrained from utilizing it until compelled by the necessities arising out of the technical problem which the nation had set him to solve. Sonnino, whose personal characteristics i^are apparently incompatible with parlia- mentary leadership, lacks the gift of oratory. He is not only a poor speaker, but he oftentimes has to read his addresses to the Chamber. 1 Cf. E. J. Dillon, Quarterly Review, July, 1915, pp. 260-261. CHAPTER XIV SALANDRA AND GIOLITTI ANTONIO SALANDRA, described by himself as "a modest burgher of Apulia," busied himself a little with journalism, became an average professor of adminis- trative law, and in time an honest, easy-going deputy whose influence made for the removal of public grievances, the efficiency of the public service, the leavening of politics with morality, and the making of life-conditions easier to the masses. Salandra's political life has been a series of local battles during which he had Sonnino as his chief and com- rade, Giolitti as his parliamentary adversary, and the puri- fication of politics as his aim. But unlike Sonnino he has never played the part of a Cato, neither has his name been ever associated with repressive legislation. Modesty, as he himself true-heartedly tells us, has been his predomin- ant characteristic as Journalist, professor and politician. Diu-ing his long life-struggle with its petty vicissitudes, quick-fading laurels and personal chagrins he displayed unflagging good nature as well as public integrity, but no spark of genial fire. After the last elections he gave up the struggle against Giolitti, whose policy he now approved, and he deprived Sonnino, his leader, of his last partisan. He, too, like greater statesmen, laid but moderate stress upon consistency. Before March, 1914, when he received the premiership from the hands of his new leader and political friend Giolitti, having already entered the seventh decade of his existence, Salandra had had no opportunity of 124 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 125 justifying the generous praises of his more enthusiastic friends who credit him with that rare combination of inborn faculties and slowly acquired attainments which is usually known as statesmanship. Journalists, like poets and epitaph composers, are wont to confer titles with a lavish hand. Salandra and Sonnino, in acquitting themselves admirably of an arduous task, have approved themselves noble workers for the public weal. But neither has any claim to the gift of statemanship, of insight or leadership. Their force lies in their sincerity and moral courage. A historic situation of unsurpassed magnitude has lifted them high above the general level. It is a deserving case of dramatic situation predominating over character, Giovanni Giolitti is a political condottiere who by dint of mother- wit, personal luck, and the loose fibre of his environ- ment won for himself a parliamentary army and a kind of arm- chair throne. He has never given evidence of that fine ethical quality which has enabled his two adversaries, and indeed most leaders of the allied nations, to dispense with the more briUiant mental endowments which might seem almost indispensable to chiefs of governments in a world-crisis like the present. But no doubt he, too, has given to his country of his best. For long his judgment was Italy's guidance and his word the law of the land. This unquestioned authority was not, I repeat, the guerdon of any of those rare qualities of statesmanship, diplomacy, or high moral purpose which are occasionally displayed by Italian politicians. Signor Giolitti approached the problem of power and popularity from a wholly different side. Conversant with the working of the administrative machinery in all its branches, he introduced that system into politics, and rendered his par- tisans dependent upon himself for place and influence, as though they were mere subordinates in a State Department. But at the same time he adopted and clung to a single prin- ciple which stood him in good stead ; he never forgot a pro- 126 FROM THE TRIPLE TO mise, nor put off its fulfilment ; he never left a political friend in the lurch. This vaunted fidelity to his partisans was a standing exhortation to all those politicians of other roups who felt aggrieved by the neglect of their chiefs to flock to his standard and share in the good things going. And numbers enlisted in Giolitti's Parliamentary army, receiving either quick promotion — one of them even the leadership of the House — when they possessed qualifications, or other tokens of appreciation when their intellectual equip- ment was lighter. Prefects of provinces, heads of departments, presidents of electoral committees, ambassadors to Great Powers, were among the devoted followers of the " Dictator," and through them he always had a Parlia- ment composed of a great majority of deputies ready to follow him through thick and thin. The Chamber there- fore came to be looked upon as a body representing not so much the nation as Signor Giolitti. Being also a patriot he considered that his own aims were the most conducive to the honour and interests of his country. And in this sense the legislature was national and patriotic as well as Giolittian. By means of his subservient majority, the members of which were at his beck and call, Giolitti felt himself free from the restraints of political principle or common consist- ency. His words had the magical virtue of transmuting things and facts. Thus when a couple of years ago the Premier Luzzatti proposed to give the franchise to a few hundred thousand citizens who lacked the vote, Giolitti's lieutenant, Bertolini, opposed the measure as unnecessary and dangerous, the people being still unfitted to take part in the government of the country. But as the debates were proceeding Giolitti himself suddenly rose up and opposed the bill, not because it would confer too extensive privileges, but because it did not bestow enough ! In the lapse of a few weeks the benighted people had suddenly waxed ripe THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 127 for the responsibility ! He then turned out Luzzatti, assumed the reins of power, enfranchised over three millions, mostly illiterates, and was efficaciously seconded by his lieutenant Bertolini ! In order to save constitutional appearances and to relieve himself of irksome responsibility, Giolitti was wont to retire from office whenever any grave problem became actual and pressing. He would then withdraw voluntarily without provoking a hostile vote which his devoted majority was incapable of giving, and would nominate as his successor a political friend or even a good-natured opponent who had to act as his temporary substitute. But the vicarious Cabinet might not carry any measure obnoxious to the Dictator, and above all else, it was forbidden to remove his prefects, sub-prefects, mayors, and other officials who were indispensable to the success of his electioneering campaigns. For this electoral machinery was one of the main sources of the Tribune's ascendancy. And curiously enough, the monarch, who is constitutionally invested with a prerogative which enables him to have the elections presided over by the Minister of his choice, left them three times running to Giolitti. Thus the Court, Legislature and Administration, as well as the all powerful Banca Commerciale and all its many dependencies, became plastic at the Tribune's touch. The one sacrosanct creation of the Dictator which must on no account be touched by his proxies was the mechan- ism which ensured him his parliamentary majority. And his friends admit that it was partly because the Salandra Cabinet was credited, and correctly credited, with designs on that source of his influence that he conspired against it and implicitly, they add, against his King and country. In the domain of international policy, Giolitti is a novice. Years ago he confessed to me that he abandoned that branch of public affairs to others. And since then he learned nothing on the subject save certain rudimentary notions, which were 128 FROM THE TRIPLE TO borne in upon him by the painful pressure exercised on his Government now by France and now by Austria and Britain during Italy's campaign against Turkey.^ It is ngt sur- prising, therefore, that neither he himself nor his friends made any serious pretence of adjusting their opinions or accommodating their action during the great international crisis to the cardinal elements of the problem. So long as the talisman in which the source of his dictatorship resided was left untouched he was content to let Salandra and Son- nino cope with the task and unravel the tangle, while his partisans resigned themselves to waiting a little longer for admission to the feast of the good things of office. For Salandra had been nominated to the Premiership by his new leader Giolitti on the usual implied conditions : tenure of office during the good pleasure of the Dictator, who could overthrow the Cabinet in a jiffy by means of his obedient Parliamentary majority, and prohibition to meddle with the prefects, sub-prefects, mayors, and other creatures of the Tribune. And, responding to the Dictator's nod, the Chamber passed several votes of confidence in Salandra's Cabinet. Shortly before the crisis had reached its culminating point the Premier, as Minister of the Interior, dismissed or transferred a number of prefects and sub-prefects, not because of their political convictions, but on grounds which would appeal to any honest administrator. And it has been alleged that that act of moral courage did more to provoke the resentment and accelerate the active opposition of the Giolittians than the trend of the negociations which the Government was carrying on with foreign States. They were in dread lest the source of their power and emolument ^ The incident recounted on p. 159 of the conversation between Giolitti and Salandra on the choice of a candidate for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an ilhistration of the former statesman's pecuHar mental attitude. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 129 should be demolished. And their fears were well grounded. The Salandra Administration, despite the Premier's recent expressions of admiration for Giolitti, and especially ever since Baron Sonnino joined the Cabinet intended, if it could remain long enough in power, to destroy root and branch the foul, corrosive thing that in Italy went under the misnomer of Parliamentary Government. This irreconcilable opposition between the Cabinet and the Parliamentary majority, on whose good will its existence depended, was understood, welcomed, and fructified by Prince Billow. His aim was to keep Giolitti's Parliamentary forces in reserve until the crisis should reach its climax, and mean- while to wring from Austria concessions enough to satisfy the demands of the Cabinet as moderated by the Dictator. These tactics, which were pursued from the outset to the finish, depended for success on Billow's possessing unquestioned command of the Italian Chamber and Senate. And it was conferred upon him. He wielded it unhesitatingly when the Triple Alliance was denounced, and sending Gio- litti to the King he had the Salandra Cabinet turned out of office.^ It was the utter rottenness of the parliamentary system in Italy and the subjection of the legislature, the great com- mercial and industrial interests and the Court to one man who looked upon international politics as mere manure for the soil he was cultivating, that inspired Prince Billow with confidence in the success of his mission. For the German plenipotentiary was thoroughly acquainted with land and people and faithfully served by high and low there. Married 1 Cf. E. J. Dillon, Contemporary Review, June, 1915. This esti- mate of Signer Giolitti is an extract from a long message which I despatched from Rome on May 13th. It was, however, held back for reasons of State by the Censor, as were about nine special articles and another series containing 35,000 words, as well as various other tele- grams. Subsequently, however, a portion of one series was released and published in the Daily Telegraph of Aug. 16th and 17th, 1915. 9 130 FROM THE TRIPLE TO to a highly-connected ItaMan lady, his brother-in-law is a member of the Conservative Senate which steadfastly ad- vocated neutrality. Other connections of his occupied positions which enabled them to learn everything that was being done by the State, and they professed political doc- trines which were held to warrant them in comparing notes and making common cause with the foreigner. Under such conditions not only were intrigues to be apprehended, but they were certain be to of a most dangerous character. Giolitti himself had easy access to the King by whom, as a member of the Annunziata order, he might expect to be addressed as " cousin." In posts of high trust in the palace were militant partisans of the Dictator. The army contained some of his warmest supporters and trusty lieutenants. In a word, the only hope that the Cabinet could cherish of conducting the negociations unhampered lay in the severe ordinance it had issued enjoining absolute silence on the negociators. And even that hope was belied. A curious incident which came to light only several months after the conversations were closed and war was declared enables one to divine how insidious were the thrusts to which the Cabinet was exposed from unscrupulous negociators who trafficked in real and spurious State secrets with the Italian opponents of the Government. For the Giolittians were well posted about every movement made by Ministers, the knowledge of which would be helpful to Biilow and his friends ; and the latter by communicating half truths to the Giolittians could indirectly influence the Italian nation. Well, in a telegram dated May 10th the Austrian Ambassador in Rome wrote to Baron Burian — It is an established fact that the King, and indeed most of the members of the Cabinet, have been systematically supplied by Baron Sonnino with merely partial information about our con- cessions and about the^temper of the country. In particular it THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 131 has been ascertained that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who personally jotted down my precise communications, read them over and expressly stated that he would put them as they stood before the Cabinet Council, did it only defectively. For instance he announced the concessions but omitted the mise en effet} Now those statements could only have come to the Am- bassador from those of his Italian friends who were in close touch with the Government and the Court. And by way of reciprocity the Austrian Ambassador and his colleague, Prince Billow, decided to violate their solemn engagement of secrecy and to circulate information about the course of the negoci- ations. It is Baron Macchio himself who reveals this in the same despatch to the Foreign Secretary Burian — In order to enlighten influential circles and those which, in part less favourably disposed towards the Triple Alliance, were seized with the general mistrust, it appeared opportune to cause to be delivered to them a list of Austro-Hungarian concessions, attested by Prince von Billow and myself. In this fashion the game of MM. Salandra, Sonnino and Martini could be thwarted. In this list only certain points had to be enumerated so as to leave open the prospect of further concessions in the sense of Italy's pristine demands. Between this conception of ambassadorial obligations and rights and that which was manifested later on by the Austrian Ambassador at Washington, Dr. Dumba, there is a family trait. Commenting on these confessions of the Austrian diplo- matist Signor Salandra mordantly observed — It is not possible that Baron Macchio, whom I studied atten- tively, should have imagined such a thing by himself. His men, tality is cramped, or say rather Austrian, and therefore incapable of thinking out so subtle a perfidy. I am certain that it was an 1 Cf. the Austrian Red Book. 132 FROM THE TRIPLE TO Italian who put that stupid invention into his head — stupid for an Austrian, infamous for an ItaUan.''^ Those words cut deep. Those incidents have a general as well as a special value, For they throw light upon the free and easy way in which the two Teutonic Ambassadors construed the solemn obli- gation of secrecy which they had contracted towards their Italian colleagues and they also mark the depth of sub- jection into which Italy had fallen. " The Italian Foreign Secretary keeps back our generous offers from the King," soliloquizes Baron Macchio. " We must remedy that, Prince Billow and I. We must send Giolitti to Victor Emanuel who is slumbering in a child's paradise. We must also have our offers published without delay for the enlightenment of the nation." And neither their plighted word nor the limitations which ambassadorial functions set to their inter- ference in internal affairs availed to hold them back. Another inference to be drawn from this curious interlacing of family kinship, political clanship, public service and party obligation — and Biilow drew it — was that to enlist Giolitti on the side of Germany was to win the game. For Giolitti was the legislature, the executive court, the commercial interests, to a great extent the army, and therefore the nation. The chief nationalist organ, characterizing the behaviour of the deputies, put the matter pithily thus : These law-mongers had and have their chief, their symbol, their self -lord, Giolitti, in whose name they load themselves with infamy and treason. They had and have a common denominator ; they bear a hall-mark by which they are recognized, they possess a busi- ness house in which to conceal their cynical trading in morality — the Parliament. The Parliament is Giolitti ; Giolitti is the Par- liament ; the binomial expression of our shame.'' 1 Corriere della Sera, July 17th, 1915. Giornale d'ltalia, July 16th, 1915. 2 Cf. Idea Nazionale, May 15th, 1915. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 133 And the German Ambassador met with Httle difficulty in securing the support of the pariiamentary Condottiere. For Giohtti was under no illusion as to the dependence of his cunningly devised framework of parliamentary govern- ment on the maintenance of peace. A war would necessarily and obviously render the vicarious Cabinet permanent and independent and upset the whole fabric of Giolittism. It would be unfair not to add that the Tribune, whose ideas about international politics were vague and confused, might well have held that his country's interests could best be furthered by persisting in her attitude of neutrality. CHAPTER XV THE CLAIMS OP ITALY PRINCE VON BtJLOW'S name stands for several chapters of European history, and for as many more of the chronicle of frivolous gossip. He is unquestionably the most distinguished statesman in Germany, and also the most resourceful diplomatist. But his statesmanship is over diluted with the spirit of feuilletonism whereas his diplomacy approaches more closely the most approved school of the early nineteenth century than that of any of his countrymen. For the post of Ambassador and plenipotentiary his quali- fications were more than adequate. He was liked in Italy, where he had mostly resided since his retirement from the office of Imperial Chancellor. By his marriage with the Princess Camporeale he is connected with influential Italian Senators and officials. His fortune enabled him to dispense hospitality at the Villa Malta with a lavish hand, and thus to create an Italian party of his own, which he kept together and directed throughout the course of the negociations. This throng of clients was frequently entertained to lunch, dinner, tea, was invited to balls and receptions, was " at- mosphered "at the Villa Malta, and, when the Italian nation, kept in ignorance of the course of negociations by its own conscientious Government, suffered from painful suspense, it was treated from time to time to misleading half-truths about Austria's concessions by these priests of the Teuton oracle. About ways and means the Teutons have never had a scruple. It is fair to say that the German Ambassador 134 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 135 had to cope with a series of extrinsic difficulties which ren- dered his task just arduous enough to yield a stimulus and an attraction. In Germany he had to contend with envious rivals whose faculty for obstruction was extensive, and in Austria he was confronted with obtuseness, ignorance, pride, and obstinacy. To the latter obstacle he himself ascribes the failure of his mission. But speculation on what might have been under circumstances that were never realized, is futile. One of Biilow's first moves, on reaching the Italian capital, was to secure the co-operation of the press. Germany has always paid the highest conceivable tribute to the power of the press and the lowest to the integrity of pressmen. In Italy many of these proved venal and servile. Some influential organs were regularly subsidized, new ones were founded, fostered and sold for little or even gratuitously distributed. Sets of articles were ordered and delivered. Books were compiled. Items of information were presented to the independent organs in the hope that they might be tempted to give them circulation. An excursion of Italian journalists to Germany was organized by German officials, publicly cen- sured by some honest pressmen, and finally investigated by the courts of common law. In Florence the well known journal La Nazione was so completely under the sway of the Teutons that the local German Consul used to take manu- script articles in his pocket direct to the printing office of the paper, correct the proofs there, and alter the headlines of articles written by the permanent staff. ^ Bulow also sought and obtained the backing of the Vatican, which was a most helpful asset. Pope Benedict XV, to whose prematurely renowned statesmanship one looked for light, guidance and practical help during one of the darkest periods of human history, had shown himself to be neutral in public morality, while in politics he was an energetic opponent 1 Messaggero, February 28th, 1915. 136 FROM THE TRIPLE TO of Italy's armed intervention on behalf of the allied Powers. Towards martyred Belgium and suffering France he has been generous in lip-sympathy and alms. But he had found no word of blame for their executioners. Neutrality in matters of public morality on the part of one who claims to be the custodian of the morals of the Christian world is an attitude that was received with disappointment and will long be remembered with regret. It cannot, however, be gainsaid that personally Benedict XV has been careful to keep aloof from Billow and his band, but his apologists would have had a more hopeful case to argue if they could spirit away the celebrated Wiegand interview which revealed the Pontiff's Germanophile leanings and lack of reserve. No denial was or could be given to the message which he entrusted to the American-German champion of militarism at the instigation of his intimate counsellor, Monsignor Gerlach. This ecclesi- astic is one of the most compromising associates and dangerous mentors that any sovereign ever admitted to his privacy. He is described as a man of Austrian nationality, German Christianity, and cosmopolitan suppleness, who, when in Vienna, consorted with ecclesiastics of the type depicted by Poggio and incarnated by French Abbes of the free and easy days of the Regency — when many an ecclesiastic practised the rule of the Monks of the Screw, of which the first ran — My children, be chaste — till you're tempted ; When sober, be wise and discreet ; And humble your bodies with fasting Whenever you've nothing to eat. Years ago, the story rims, Gerlach made the acquaintance of a worldly-minded papal Nimtius in the fashionable salons of gay Vienna, and, being men of similar tastes and proclivities, the two enjoyed life together, eking out the wherewithal for their costly amusements in speculations on the Exchange. When the Nuntius returned to Rome, donned the Cardinal's THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 137 hat, and was appointed to the See of Albano as Cardinal Agliardi, he bestowed a canonry on the boon companion who had followed him to the eternal city. The friendship continued unabated and was further cemented by the identity of their political opinions, which favoured the Triple Alliance. Gerlach became Agliardi's tout and electioneering agent when that Cardinal set up as candidate for the papacy on the death of Leo XIII. But as his chances of election were slender, the pair worked together to defeat Rampolla, who was hated and feared by Germany and Austria. Their bitter opponent was Cardinal Richard, a witty French prelate who laboured might and main for Rampolla. But Rampolla's party was silenced by the Austro-German veto, and Mons. Gerlach is now a personality in the Vatican. During the period of impecuniosity which the falling oft of Peter's Pence inaugurated, Mgr. Gerlach, whose fortune is said to be princely, is having certain works of reconstruction, in which the Pope takes a special interest, carried on at his own expense. That a man of such violent Pan-German sentiments should be the Pope's mentor and guide through the labyrinth of inter- national politics seems a curious anachronism. The Vatican, as distinguished from the Pope, was, and is, systematically hostile to the Allies. Its Press organs, inspired by an astute and influential Italian ecclesiastic named Tedeschini, by Koeppenberg, a rabid German convert, and by the Calabrian Daffina, organized a formidable cam- paign against King Victor's Government and their supposed interventionist leanings. Its agents, including the priest Boncampagni and the German Catholics Erzberger, and others, were wont to meet in the Hotel de Russie to arrange their daily plan of campaign, and when at last the people rose up against Giolitti and his enormities, the Vatican had its mob in readiness to make counter-demonstrations, and was with difficulty prevented from letting it loose by the superhuman efforts of certain legations, of decent Catholics and orderly 138 FROM THE TRIPLE TO citizens. It is a fair thing to add that the attitude of the Roman Catholic clergy throughout Italy was, with some few exceptions, consistently patriotic. Even the bishops and archbishops of the provinces deserved well of their king and country, while the bulk of their flocks left nothing to be desired on the score of loyalty and patriotism. Billow made the most of his allies, and had solid grounds for the hopeful forecasts he sent to Berlin. For all the foretokens were promising, and his own, bearing towards Sonnino, was correspondingly bland and pliant. On the contentious question whether Clause VII of the Treaty entitled Italy to compensation from Austria, he ranged himself on the side of his Italian against his Austrian colleague. But as time went on, Austria's derisory offers and systematic procrastination sapped the hope entertained of a direct understanding. A thorough sifting of fact from legend will leave no doubt that Sonnino's tactics, which can be defended on the highest grounds, were open to misconstruction by the uninitiated. The Minister has a paralyzing fear of publicity. Toiling conscientiously for the weal of the whole people, he is desti- tute of confidence in the good sense of the individual unit. But it was not this distrust — less the result of experience than the projection of his personal instincts — that inspired his resolve to deny to most of his colleagues in the Cabinet, including even the Francophile Minister of the Colonies Martini, information about each day's work done with the Ambassadors of Germany and Austria. That precaution was prompted by the delicate nature of the conversations, the quick temper of the Italian people, the unscrupulousness of Germany's numerous agents and the ease with which the indiscretions even of a well-meaning fellow-worker could be employed to wreck the whole plan of campaign designed by the Government. None the less it betrayed a degree of suspicion which, whether it denoted a morbid peculiarity of THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 139 the Minister or a striking lack of self-control on the part of his colleagues, could not but weaken public confidence in the Cabinet. Surveying the forces on both sides when the diplomatic battle for terms began to grow earnest, we find that the two Teuton Ambassadors disposed of troops comparable to those of Xerxes when he quitted his country to conquer Greece, whereas the Italian Government could rally only a small party of enlightened patriots under the lead of Luigi Albertini and the publicists of the Corriere della Sera and the Idea Nazionale. The two Houses of Parliament, the bulk of the Pre- fects, Sub-Prefects and Mayors, the Socialists, all the important commercial and industrial firms throughout the country, the Banca Commerciale, the peasants, the Pope, the Vatican, the greater part of the clergy, and almost all Italy's diplomatic representatives abroad were arrayed on the side of neutrality. A just recognition of the intensity of this universal tendency and also the weight of positive evidence compel one to admit that whether General Cadorna did or did not promise neutrality, an important section of the army looked upon intervention with marked disfavour. In a word, the Italian nation was disinclined to fall out with Germany and Austria, and ardently hoped for a compromise which would permit it to continue its economic progress without external let or domestic hindrance. This situation was fairly described by Sonnino in his official despatches and conversations, as when he said and wrote : "I remarked to Prince von Biilow that the situation in Italy might be summed up in very few words. The majority of the nation is in favour of maintaining neu- trality and supporting the Government for this purpose, but with the presumption that neutrality shall bring about the realization of some national aspirations."^ Thus the first move in Italy's independent progress was towards the assertion of her right to compensation. It was also presumably moderate. 1 Italian Green Book, Despatch N. 8, December 20th, 1914. 140 FROM THE TRIPLE TO Planting oneself at the outsiders' point of view — and even most Cabinet Ministers were for a time mere outsiders — and contemplating the formal issues in the light of the nation's pacific leanings, one could not help prognosticating that Italy's claim would be allowed and the Triple Alliance restored to vitality as a consequence of the principle of give and take proclaimed by the German, Austrian and Italian negociators. Every token, every publicly uttered word, every act ascribed to the Cabinet, every motive imputed to the Teutonic Ambassadors pointed to that conclusion, which the writer of these lines rejected only on special grounds. Italy was still the ally of Germany and Austria. And the main motive which had kept her from denouncing that alliance when it was most galling^her military impotence — was still operative, whereas the painful friction had not merely passed away, but was slowly giving place to a sense of ease and enjoyment. Austria would surely give up some of the territory so long and wistfully yearned for by the Italian people in return for a pledge of peace which was what nearly all Italians most ardently desired. The chief difficulty was to move the statesmen of Vienna to admit Austria's liability to compensate her ally for the shifting of the political centre of gravity in the Balkans. But as even Prince Bulow had ranged himself on Sonnino's side in the dis- pute about the construction of Clause VII of the Treaty, the conclusion was foregone. The Italian nation's eagerness for the preservation of peace and Germany's solicitude that Italy should, in Bismarck's words, not exactly fight, but just " place a trumpeter on the Austro-German side accom- panied by four infantry men with their faces turned towards the Alps," would, it might be anticipated, attune them both to compromise and concord. Judging by the frame of mind which Sonnino and Salandra brought to their conferences with Biilow and Macchio, and by the terms in which the issue between them was set forth, THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 141 the matter seemed destined to be arranged with flnahty by the four negociators. The worst that could befall, once the principle of compensation had been adopted as the basis of discussion, was that the extent of the concessions offered might appear too slender to the one side and too generous to the other. It cannot be gainsaid that Baron Sonnino made it tolerably clear that neutrality was the line of policy which he and his colleagues were resolved if possible to persist in, and that its feasibility depended upon Austria's sense of fairness. He told Biilow quite frankly that he considered there was a good deal of truth in the saying that Italy and Austria must be either allies or enemies, and that the alliance could only be fruitful it perfect cordiality prevailed. Thus there were grounds for believing that both parties were animated by a genuiae desire to strike up an agreement. That cordiality would, it was reasoned, be one of the immediate corollaries of Austria's broad conception of her real interest. Moreover for war there was no demand except among as few irresponsible publicists. And those writers were blamed by the country at large for laying undue stress upon claims and aspirations which, if pressed too insistently, would bring the two nations into conflict. In theory, of course, the en- forcement of those claims was the steady aim of the Italian race. But in practice they lacked driving power because they were nowise urgent. The country having waited for them patiently for a long sequence of years, would continue to wait all the more tranquilly that the alternative was a tremendous war, the vicissitudes of which might lead to a catastrophe. Italy could afford to risk something, to risk much in case of real necessity, but she could not venture her all on a gambler's throw. And to embark on a war against the Teutons would be little else, especially at a moment when Germany and Austria spontaneously acknowledged in principle the justice of her claims and were willing that they should be satisfied at least in part, 142 FROM THE TRIPLE TO Thus, in analysing the motives that made for neutrality and in gauging the issues raised by the European struggle, the advocates of quiescence looked to the certain losses which would, they held, be immense and immediate and contrasted them with the hoped-for advantages which seemed far-off and problematical. That was one way of estimating the chances of an agree- ment. But there was another, and to the writer of these pages it commended itself from the outset. It started from the assumption, borne out by a sequence of significant events, that Italy's natural growth had been stimted by Austria's haleness — ^to say nothing of her jealousy and contempt — and that however averse to war either or both nations might be, a conflict was inevitable, a conflict, too, not so much for territory as for national existence. The only debatable aspect of this dire necessity turned upon time and oppor- tunity. Austria had once selected both, fixing upon a moment when war would have connoted irreparable disaster for her rival. And she would have executed her design but for the hindering hand of Fate. Italy had never been able to take the initiative because of her political isolation and military inferiority. And it had always seemed to her futile to endeavour to enlist the support of allies in a quarrel about remote and narrow issues which left their interests untouched. But now the conjuncture had changed. Three Great Powers had joined in battle with the two Empires which, for over thirty years, had held Italy in thrall, exploited her people, numbed her energies, put indignities upon her Government, and threatened her with dismember- ment. It depended on herself to have those States as allies and to make her national defences adequate to her actual needs. Would she strike out that course ? As a mere matter of self-interest neutrality, if maintained to the end, would lead to disillusion. For foremost among the aims which she is impelled by the instinct of self-preser- THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 143 vation to set herself — and which circumstance had now for the first time brought within the field of practical politics — was that of national unity. From the Trentino to Dal- matia Italians live and work away from their brethren of the Kingdom, deprived of political existence, checked at every hand's twcn in their efforts to keep alive the cultural gifts they have inherited from their fathers, and forced to give their substance and their blood to perpetuate Austrian misrule. The utmost that Austria could be expected to dole out without a fight is Trentino and the strip of land as far as the river Isonzo. But these concessions form but a fraction of what is deemed indispensable, not only from the ethnic point of view, but also from the military and naval standpoints. Italy has no defensible frontiers. In a war with Austria she would therefore be in a condition of terrible inferiority. The Alps with their almost inaccessible heights, their dizzy precipices, their yawning abysses, are the natural fortresses of her secular enemy. And Austria, by dint of military science, has rendered these mountain fortresses impregnable. Tonale, Lardaro, Trento, Riva, Rovereto, the fortresses of Malborghetto, the caverns of Carso, the forts of Tolmino and Gorizia, bar the march of an Italian army as effectually as a broad arm of the sea, while allowing the troops of the Habsburgs to advance with ease and withdraw with security Italy compared with Austria, to employ a comparison sug- gested by a Spanish friend of mine, resembled a man who naked and without modern weapons has only a bludgeon with which to defend himself against an adversary provided with formidable arms and cased in mail. Consequently, if the concessions in question were accepted as payment in full, Italy would be waiving definitely rights which were there- tofore held to be indefeasible. Trieste was another of the places to which Italians laid claim on the same grounds and with the same absence of 144 FROM THE TRIPLE TO hope. For Austria would never divest herself of such a valu- able possession — ^the greatest port in the Adriatic, the outlet for Austrian and German trade with the East. Trieste is indispensable to her growth and almost to her very exist- ence. And even if Vienna were moved to cede it, Berlin would veto the intention. Kindred considerations militated against the cession of the seaboard of Istria and of Fiume. These " unredeemed " lands would have to be conquered with the sword, if ever they were to become Italian. And yet they must be secured by hook or by crook, if Italy is not to remain without defensible frontiers on the Austrian side. Her natural boundaries are, as we saw, the fortresses of her enemy. From the Brenner chain southwards the territory now belonging to Austria must change hands if Italy's strategic limits were to become tenable in war time. But even that represented but the land side of the problem. The sea frontier required analogous rectification which was in turn beset with like difiiculties. As a Great Mediter- ranean Power, the command of the Adriatic had been one of the abiding aims of Italy's policy. The pursuit of this object was the mainspring of the friction between her and Austria, which was first eased by the " self-denying ordinance, "^ and has since been partially settled by the Italian occupation of Valona. Heretofore Italy's position in the Adriatic was untenable because that sea is dominated by Pola, by the Dalmatian Archipelago, and by Valona. The possession of Pola is a postulate of Italy's future as a Great Power. The notion that the Dual Monarchy would ever cede that im- portant place is entertained by no sane thinker. War is the only means of obtaining it. Last in order, but first in magnitude, if one contemplates the problems in correct perspective, came the question of 1 An agreement by which Austria and Italy bound themselves to the policy of " hands off " in Albania, and agreed to unite to keep other Powers from acquiring a foothold there. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 145 Italy's status in the Eastern Mediterranean. This problem received actuality from the Allies on the day on which they bombarded the forts at the entry of the Dardanelles. That operation presupposed an understanding among those States respecting the partition of Turkey. The Powers which arrived at this decision were three. Italy, if her army and fleet should contribute to the success of theirs, would be the fourth. But if she kept aloof, the general effect of the arrange- ment would be to divide up Asia Minor — where her potential interests, especially in the economic domain, are much vaster than is commonly realized — without any consideration for her aspirations. And to those who objected that Italy, if she threw in her lot with Germany and Austria to the limited extent of maintaining her neutrality to the end of the war, would establish a claim to a sphere of interest in the Ottoman Empire, the obvious reply was that this is inconceivable were it only because in case the Teutonic States were victorious, the Ottoman Empire would survive as their protfege and vassal. Moreover it requires a puissant effort of the imagination to picture to oneself Italy furthering her interests in Asia Minor with the help of the Teutons, while asserting her rights in the Adriatic against them. Turning from the political to the ethical aspect of the com- plex problem, it might well appear to men of high purpose such as Sonnino and Salandra, that no Great Power that prides itself on its civilizing mission shoidd cower in in- glorious safety while two groups of States — ^members of the same international community — were locked in a life and death tussle for the cause of civilization, which is its own, and speculate on the gains it could extort from the weakness or apprehensions of the losing side. But all these con- siderations belonged to the domain of speculation whereas the Italian Government kept scrupulously to the sphere of pragmatism, 10 146 FROM THE TRIPLE TO I announced this open-mindedness of the Cabinet in a sequence of telegrams. I also set forth the unlikelihood of Austria being able, even if she were wiUing, to render Italy contented and quiescent during an upheaval which would transform the political framework of Europe for a century. The following message from Rome — one of many — was pub- lished in the Daily Telegraph.^ I have to-day had a most interesting conversation with a per- sonage who, without vouchsafing to raise even a corner of the veil behind which the weavers of Italy's destinies are working, threw a welcome light upon the personality of the principal actors, their temperament, the motives to which they are constitutionally susceptible, and the mode in which their mental and moral atti- tude is affected by the present crisis. The information he gave confirmed the accounts I have written of the situation in my messages to the Daily Telegraph. Thus, the authoritative statement recently issued by the Italian Ambassadors abroad to the effect that the policy of the Consulta has undergone no change whatever may be taken as an adequate presentation of the facts, and tallies with my expose. Not only has nothing yet been done or uttered by responsible Ministers which would entitle one to affirm that any definite scheme of policy has crystallized in their thoughts, but circumstantial evidence is overwhelming in support of the belief that their minds are still quite open and their hands absolutely free. And all the signs and tokens point to their desire to keep clear of every entanglement to the end of the chapter. Even the interventionist kites that have occasionally been set flying are devoid of significance as symptoms of Ministerial intentions, and are at most evidence of readiness to confront either of the two alternatives with which the country may be faced.^ 1 CI. Daily Telegraph, March 29th, 1915. ^ It is perhaps worth recording that about that time rumours were circulating in Rome to the effect that Salandra had assured Giohtti that he would as soon commit suicide as lead Italy into war. Deputies alleged that they could attest this. They also pointed to the circumstance that Giolitti could have thrown out Salandra's Cabinet without difficulty or inconvenience just then, and that he certainly would have done so had he apprehended war. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 147 Doubtless Ministers entertain personal opinions respecting the line of action which the nation might advantageously strike out in the present embarrassing and perilous conjuncture, but they are too prudent and scrupulous to allow opinions which have not hardened to conviction to sway their policy or force their hands. And in the delay which results they perceive no inconvenience. From the diplomatic standpoint it will serve to raise the value of Italy's co-operation, while from the military point of view there is no motive why the Government should relinquish its freedom of choice while snow still lies deep on the mountain passes which the army would have to traverse if it took the field against the Habsburg Monarchy. It is safe, therefore, to affirm that no general support will be given by the Cabinet to an academic doctrine of neutrality or intervention as the basis of their policy before the details have fully matured and the pressure of circumstance has outweighed the force of theories, released them from the heavy responsibility of choosing a decision, and constrained them to take the only road left open. Their sense of responsibihty is so developed, their caution so intense, that they are incapable of committing an imprudence, even when it seems prompted by the highest interests. The ex-Premier, Signor Giolitti, on the other hand, owing to his habit of taking a prompt decision in moments of national crisis and to his hold upon the Parliamentary representatives, is invested with a force of moral authority which the modest and scrupulous members of the present Cabinet are loth to flout. Views and tactics of this nature, taken in conjunction with the rigorous secrecy observed by the principal negociators and their intermediaries, render it impossible for outsiders to base their forecasts upon any more sohd foundation than induction and sur- mise. But a survey of the probabilities leads one to the conclusion that Austria does not possess all that Italy requires, and that she could not dispossess herself even of that part of it which she still calls her own without forfeiting her right to her status as a Great Power.i When this assumption has been clearly revealed by the pourparlers, then and only then will an attitude of neutrality have obviously ceased to be compatible with due consideration for Italy's vital interests. 1 The publication of the official Green Book in the following May confirmed these statements in all respects. 148 FROM THE TRIPLE TO Meanwhile, despite the pushing forward of military prepara- tions, the Cabinet still implicitly admits the survival of the Triple Alliance, and explains Italy's neutrality as the necessary conse- quence of the terms of the treaty, which provided for common action under conditions which have not been realized. And it is in the capacity of an ally that Germany has intervened between Austria and Italy. Whether the Italian negociators were swayed in their attitude during the conversations by erroneous notions re- specting Austria's internal plight and her approaching collapse, one cannot now determine with certitude. But that this belief was prevalent among many of the leading politicians in the allied and neutral countries, cannot be gainsaid. On several occasions I endeavoured to convince them that the data for their assumption were fictitious, that the nationalities in Austria, like those in Germany, would, on the whole, behave in the way anticipated by Franz Josef's Government, and that in especial the Austrian Poles would fight with martial ardour against the armies of the Tsar. It may, however, be worth recording that utterances were attributed to Salandra and Sonnino to the effect that Austria was but a sleeping or rather comatose partner of the German Empire. The Kaiser's Ambassador in Vienna, a man whose talent for intrigue is undeniable, communicated to Count Berchtold the gist of Billow's talks with the Italian Ministers, and in the course of his narrative ascribed to Salandra and Sonnino the view that " Austria, in consequence of her internal condition, is unable to sustain a new war and is foredoomed to dissolu- tion." ^ If that was indeed the deliberate judgment of those two statesmen, there was some colour for it in the defeat of the Austrian armies in Galicia, but no solid foundation anywhere. As soon as the Austrian Ambassador in Rome felt able to start from the same principle as Baron Sonnino — and that was not for a long while — he intimated his readiness to ^ Cf. Austrian official Red Book and Vienna journals of July 14th, 1915. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 149 listen to the expectations of the latter, however distasteful, and he hinted at compensation in Albania. But Sonnino informed him that he was not disposed to entertain an offer of territory belonging either to other belligerents or to Albania. Italy's interest in the latter country he described as purely negative. Moreover he laid it down that any arrangement agreed to must be independent of the outcome of the campaign and be promptly realized. ^ One of the principal obstacles that loomed large at the outset of the conversations had to do precisely with this demand for the immediate execution of whatever stipulations might be con- cluded. And it was emphasized by the approving attitude of Germany, who had meanwhile sent Count Wedel to Vienna to induce Franz Josef's Government to cede Trentino. At the same time, however, Biilow dwelt on the awkward con- sequences that would follow from allowing the soldiers born in that province to quit the Austrian army during the war as Italy desired and demanded. He also urged that it would wound the susceptibilities of the Emperor, one of whose titles is Count of Tirol. Throughout the conversations in which these matters were gone into. Prince Biilow assumed that the Transfer of Trentino would be taken by Italy as a full discharge of all her claims and an adequate return for absolute neutrality." By way of realizing this assumption the crafty Ambas- sador preferred the following insidious request in so artless a fashion that one can hardly check a smile at his expectation that a cautious statesman of Sonnino's calibre would fall into the trap. " Prince von Biilow," the Italian Minister narrates, " asked me whether it would not be feasible eventu- ally, as soon as an agreement was come to about Trentino, not indeed to announce the matter to the public nor even to the 1 Italian Green Book, Despatch N. 10. The subtle irony that pervades Sonnino's replies to Macchio renders the Green Book enjoyable reading. " Green Book, Despatch N. 11. 150 FROM THE TRIPLE TO Chamber, but merely that the Government should tell the Chamber that it had grounds for thinking that the greater part of the national aspirations would be realized. I an- swered that that was absolutely impossible." Prince von Billow surpassed himself. Baron Sonnino knew that to acquiesce in this suggestion would be to lose his case ir- remediably. For the aspirations of the Italian people would not be satisfied with Trentino. A solid groundwork of con- cord between Austria and Italy could be formed only after the elimination of the irredentist formula of Trento and Trieste. And the Italian Minister said so. Biilow retorted that Austria would prefer war to the cession of Trieste and that it was of supreme import to Germany as well as to Italy that war should be avoided.^ In any case he could not do more than obtain Trentino. After this the discussion dragged on tediously, Austria inquiring why Italy should decline compensation at the cost of other belligerents, and Sonnino returning short pat replies barbed with ironic suggestion,^ or else reasons being asked for Sonnino's refusal to set forth a list of expectations before Austria had acquiesced in the principle that any concessions to be accorded must be carved out of the Austro- Hungarian Empire. The temporizing tactics of Baron Burian tried the patience of the Italian Ministers, who finally stated that they would formulate no demands until he had consented to recognize the obnoxious principle. The Austrian Foreign Secretary then alleged the necessity of examining carefully its bearings on domestic and foreign policy and of submitting it for a like scrutiny to the various governing personages and bodies of the Dual Monarchy. And so the weary word-duel dragged its slow length along, while the excitable Italian nation was burning with curiosity to learn what was going on behind the walls of the Ministry. After the lapse of ten 1 Green Book, Despatch N. 4. 2 See for example Despatch N. 12. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 151 days, which had brought neither positive result nor even interchange of views, Baron Sonnino uttered his first solemn warning that expedition was essential to the attainment of an accord.^ It passed almost unheeded, the Austrian Minister again alleging that other factors would have to be consulted, and so on after the manner of Spenlow and Jorkins. More to the purpose was Burian's demand that Austria's right to compensation for the occupation of the Dodecannese and Valona should be included in the discussion. Sonnino, however, showed cause why this topic and every other sub- sidiary matter should be ruled out, and then adroitly turning the tables on his Austrian colleague, uttered his second and more solemn warning. Weeks and months have gone by, he telegraphed, and we have not yet elicited an answer even on the question of principle, and the dilatory tactics with which we are confronted have dispelled our illusions about the outcome of the conversations. By way of safeguarding Italy's dignity he thereupon withdrew his former proposal and initiative in the discussion, took his stand on Article VII as construed by Austria during the Lybian campaign, and announced that he would consider further military action by Austria in the Balkans whether against Serbia, Montenegro or any other State (except in the case of a previous accord with Italy), as a violation of that compact, for the serious consequences of which the Royal Government declined responsibility.^ One effect of this declar- ation, which was repeated with emphasis soon afterwards, was the suspension of Austria's military operations against the Serbs and Montenegrins. But it failed to rouse the drowsy Austrian statesmen to wakeful energy. Burian demurred to Sonnino's interpretation of the famous Paragraph VII, and the Italian Ambassador, reporting this decision to his chief, added the comment : " Respecting this last point, it is 1 February 7th, 1915. Green Book, Despatch N. 19. 2 Green Book, Despatch N. 22, February 12th, 1915. 152 TRIPLE TO QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE vainfto cherish illusions. The Imperial and Royal Govern- ment will never consent, under present conditions, to the cession of territory belonging to the Monarchy." ^ That was not my impression, as I stated in several messages to the Daily Telegraph. Nor did it long remain the impression of the Ambassador. But I further held that even if Austria were prevailed on to give way on the subject of Trentino, the remaining points of discord between the two empires would effectually hinder a settlement acceptable to both. Thus I telegraphed : — * My own personal impression, for which I have no official author- ity whatever, is that German diplomacy has put forward certain feelers here in order to ascertain the extent of the sacrifice which Austria would have to make in order to satisfy Italy's claims and aspirations and also the exact nature of the requital which might be anticipated from the grateful Government of King Victor Emmanuel. To this record of my personal impression I can add nothing except my conviction that, even if Germany succeeded in obtaining a promise that Austria would cede the Trentino in return for such considerations as Italy could safely offer, these considera- tions would appear inadequate to both the military empires. Furthermore, I am assured by experts who speak with authority on military matters that the cession of the Trentino, even as Ger- many might understand it, would not solve satisfactorily the problem of the strategic frontier which Italy is so anxious to see settled once and for all. But that Berlin will make the most tempting offers possible now that a new and seemingly decisive factor is being imported into the struggle by the Allies in the Near East may be taken for granted. Meanwhile the Government, with the acquiescence of all the political parties, except the so-called official Socialists, is putting the finishing touches to the military measures which shall enable it to confront all contingencies without misgivings. Already some 1,200,000 men are with the colours, and practically all the other arrangements have been made which this move involves. No parliamentary party except the official Socialists will do anything to hamper the Cabinet, on which alone responsibility for the fate- ful decision rests. 1 February 22nd, 1915. Cf. Green Book, Despatch N. 27. 2 Cf. Daily Telegraph, March 2nd, 1915. CHAPTER XVI A TURN IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS MEANWHILE the Allies' expedition against the Dar- danelles, the success of which was universally believed to be certain and rapid, caused a remarkable stir not only in the Balkan Peninsula but also in Italy. The impressions on this subject which I received in Rome were conveyed in a sequence of messages to the Baily Telegraph.^ Fuel for more intense and widespread excitement than had been witnessed in Italy since the war began is now being supplied by news from the Near East. The fall of the two external forts of the Dardanelles is contributing to dispel the quiescent serenity with which this country has heretofore watched the European conflict, calculating the chances of each group of Powers and endeavouring to adjust Italy's attitude to the resulting expediency. If a national referendum were taken yesterday on the alternative policies of neutrality or war, I am convinced that in Parliament and the country alike a large majority would have been found in favour of remaining inactive. To-day the ranks of the neutralist party are thinner and the convictions of its honest partisans are weaker. At the same time the bulk of the nation is quite willing to aban- don to the Government the initiative and responsibility for the fateful act which would place the now reorganized army in the field against two great military empires. For the Government alone is admittedly in possession of adequate data for a decision, and probably no one, not even Signor Giolitti ^ himself, whose influence in Parliament is still paramount, would venture on a campaign against the Cabinet. But since fate has begun to pursue and seemingly to overtake 1 Cf. Daily Telegraph, March 1st and 2nd, 1915. 2 This belief was founded on statements made to me by Giolitti's trusty lieutenants. He himself was away in Piedmont at the time. 153 154 FROM THE TRIPLE TO Turkey, the foundations of Italian serenity have been considerably shaken, and the curiosity with which this nation heretofore wit- nessed the ups and downs of the conflict has suddenly been trans- formed into earnest preoccupation. It is realized that Italy's interest in the future of the Near East, with which she would fain see her own interwoven, is sufficiently momentous to make it worth her while to pass once more in review the motives which have hitherto justified her attitude of expectancy. Meanwhile, she feels grateful to Britain for eschewing every act and word which might be construed as pressure. It is, perhaps, permissible to remark that, down to the present moment, the military and naval campaign of the Allies looked to many as though it were planned on purely technical grounds, and wholly divorced from politics. Were it otherwise Russia ,might usefully have directed her principal attack against Austria con- tenting herself with a vigorous defensive against Germany. This scheme would have impressed the neutral States profoundly, and might have moved them to independent action. Now, for the first time since August have the Allies adopted a plan of campaign the results of which are bound to be of far-reach- ing political as well as military importance. With the disappear- ance of the Turkish Government and the seizure of Constanti- nople it is reasonably assumed that the Allies will also have traced, at least in broad outline, the basis of that ultimate equilibrium which wiU permanently obtain in the Near East and the Balkan States, and that they will take into account only the claims of those countries which have already contributed to their success. It is no secret that since yesterday reflections of this order are being freely indulged in by all parties here, or that the offer of a recti- fication of Italy's frontier with Austria is shrinking to a mere imaginary point in comparison with her potential interests in Asia Minor, and the fleeting opportunity for realizing them which is fast vanishing. Two days later I wrote on the same theme : — In Italy, too, the necessity of envisaging the international situation, as modified by the Anglo-French offensive in the Near East from the point of view of opportunity, is forcing itself upon the minds of all public men. Some who were heretofore convinced partisans of neutrality pure and simple are, to my knowledge, reconsidering their position, and reluctantly avowing that cir- THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 155 cumstance is stronger than human will. The independent Press also lays due stress on this aspect of the matter, and, with trench- ant dialectic, propounds those motives for intervention which seem most adapted to convince conscientious, scrupulous, and undecided patriots. The Messaggero writes : " Italy cannot remain indifferent to a possible change of government in Constan- tinople and to the liquidation of the empire which would follow at a brief interval after the occupation of the Straits by the Allies. That is why it is absurd to spread a report about her great refusal. Is there to-day any statesman who would dare to repeat the gesture of Mancini towards Egypt ? ... It is manifest, therefore, that Italy's interests cannot be safeguarded without an efficacious and clear accord with the Powers of the Entente." The spirit displayed by Sonnino — calm, dignified and resolute — ^from the first underwent no perceptible change as the result of the Near Eastern venture. Hence the greater trenchancy of his diplomatic action just after the fall of the two outer forts of the Dardanelles may be attributed by those who know of no other motives to the Austrian Minister's unbearable logic-chopping and obvious determination to shirk the issue. " My conversations with him," wrote the Italian Ambassador, " might be prolonged everlastingly without leading to any practical result, seeing that he would go on formulating ever new arguments in support of the contention he is putting forward." ^ Sonnino on his part telegraphed to the Ambassador : " I take it there is nothing to hope from a continuation of the discussion with Baron Burian re- specting territorial compensation in connection with Article VII,"^ whereupon he proceeds to notify Italy's line of conduct. Military action, he says, undertaken by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans without a previous accord with Italy, will be construed as a violation of the Alliance ; no discussion of compensation can lead to a settlement which does not con- template the cession of territory belonging to Austria and ^ Green Book, Despatch N. 34. * Ibidem, Despatch N. 35, March 4th, 1915. 156 FROM THE TRIPLE TO Hungary. Italy demands compensation for the mere fact that mihtary action was begun by Austria, and this set-off shall not exclude ulterior compensation to be determined by results. The concessions thus allotted instead of being kept secret, shall be realized at once and the territories shall be forthwith occupied by Italy, who, on her part, declines to admit discussion of compensation to Austria for the occupa- tion of the Dodecannese and Valona. That spirited declaration and the ferment among the Italian people which was gaining volume and force, produced an immediate effect. Austria bestirred herself. Baron Burian assured the Italian Ambassador that he would shortly deal definitively with the question of principle. On March 8th Prince Biilow told the Italian Minister that Austria's uncom- promising mood was giving way to pliancy, and on the following day he apprized Sonnino that Burian was ready to argue the question of compensation on the basis of ceding Austrian territory, and to collaborate with him in drafting a statement to be read to the Italian Parliament. The notion of the two Teutonic Ambassadors drawing up a declaration for the Italian Chamber" was peculiarly obnoxious to Sonnino. It was Billow's former request for an official declaration from the Italian Government in a new guise. It would have been tantamount to an undertaking by Sonnino to exclude the one alternative to a diplomatic bargain with the Central Empires and therefore to eschew war, which was his most powerful lever. But both the Italian Ambassador in Vienna and the Italian Minister in Rome rejected it with vehemence. In this striving to jockey Italy into a binding declaration of neutrality or some implicit engagement to keep clear of war. Billow expended quite as much energy as in the conduct of the overt negociations. It is the same order of ideas that underlay German efforts before the war to tie in like manner the hands of Great Britain and Russia and induce them to THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 157 forswear their right to have recourse to arms. And to the success of his exertions he attached such importance that he continued perseveringly to put them forward in ever new shapes, employing alternately open methods and unseen manipulations. His line of reasoning was that if the Italian people, which asked only to be left in peace, had any authori- tative statement which it could construe as an assurance that the danger of war was definitely dispelled, it would cherish that as a solid guarantee and adjust its political thought and national sentiment to the tranquillizing perspective. And it would then keep the Government to its supposed engagement. For Germany's purpose, therefore, some such impressive utter- ance must by hook or by crook be procured. From Sonnino and Salandra nothing of the kind could reasonably be ex- pected after their repeated and sharp refusals. But were those Ministers the real heads of the Government ? Were they not merely the proxies of the national Cabinet-maker Giolitti, at whose word they must vanish into obscurity ? Throughout Italy Giolitti was lauded or decried as the Dictator whose power and responsibility were without limit. Whatever else might be thought or said about him, there was no room for doubt as to his absolute command of the legislature and consequent sway over the nation. Government by corrup- tion, if not invented by him had been so perfected, simplified and regulated as to deserve the name of Giolittism by which it was everywhere known. His political adversaries alleged that certain of his antecedents ought to have disqualified him ever to return to public life, much less to be raised to a dignity that conferred upon him the title of " cousin " to the King. But although there was a political purity party, now mainly outside the Chamber, which laboured ceaselessly to cleanse the Augean stables of parliamentary and municipal life, it was numerically small and powerless. It had the right to say what it liked, on condition that Giolitti was free to do what he liked. Accustomed to withdraw from office whenever a thorny pro- 158 FROM THE TRIPLE TO blem or an irksome task had to be faced, he was wont to nominate a temporary successor, and the King never vetoed his choice. On this last occasion he selected a recently con- verted adversary in the person of Professor Salandra. That deputy had long been a courteous political opponent of the Dictator and had worked in harmony with his own chief Sonnino, to check the spread of the political poison of Giolit- tism. But his temperament was more sociable, his manner less stiff, and his opposition less fanatical than that of his leader. " A modest burgher of Apulia," he displayed many of the qualities common to the Southerner, and in particular that popular combination of heart and brain, of likes and dislikes, which is sometimes characterized as an excess of human nature. Thus instead of wasting his energies in sighs and heart-beats after unattainable perfection he was apt to take people and things as they were and to make large allow- ances for human weakness. Endowed by nature with more than average mental powers he seems constitutionally incap- able of that strenuous steady labour with which only a genius can dispense in the struggle for renown. Modesty, as he himself intimated, has been his characteristic trait in life, and it endeared him to many whose jealousy would have been whetted by more brilliant power. He never attempted to excel. As a University professor he made no contribution to science, as a lawyer he won esteem without the vogue of a great jurisconsult, and as a parliamentarian he acquired the friendship of most of his colleagues without gaining a hold on the country or the Chamber, impressing either with a sense of his power, or associating his name with any con- structive system of political thought or definite course of political action. ^.