p \.: J""NELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 3 1924 074 296 942 All books are subject to recall after two weeks Olin/Kroch Library DATE DUE I'Vw'mt GAYLORD PRINTED IN U.S.A. Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924074296942 NEW-ENGLAND FEDERALISM. Documents RELATING TO New-England Federalism. 1800-1815. EDITED By henry ADAMS. o>»;o BOSTON: LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY. 1877. A. ^3^ Entered according to Act of Congress in tlio year 3877, by HENUY ADAM8, In tlie Onico of the Librarian of Congress, at Wasliington. , cambktdge: press ok john wilsom and son. P H E F A C E. This volume has no controversial purpose. Under the ashes of half a century the fires of personal and party passion still glow in these pages ; but only curi- ous students in history care any longer to stir them. For such as these this volume is printed ; not with a view to controversy, but to place before them historical matter which there is no further reason to withhold. Indeed, so far as controversy is concerned, the recent publication, by Mr. H. Cabot Lodge, of " The Life and Letters of George Cabot " has put at rest for ever the point which was chiefly in dispute fifty years ago. The appearance of that biography, marking as it does the moment when party-spirit begins to yield to the broader spirit of impartial investigation, has removed the last objection to publishing the paper entitled " Re- ply to the Appeal of the Massachusetts Federalists," which makes the larger portion of this volume. Both Mr. Lodge, and Mr. Plumer in preparing his " Life of William Plumer," had the free use of this paper in manuscript. Their books, in each case, need, and al- most assume in their readers, a previous acquaintance VI PEEFACE. with it ; and there is no reason for denying to others, or to the pubhc, what was freely conceded to them. With one class of exceptions, all the papers here printed are given exactly as they are found in the sources from which they are taken. The exception relates only to the " Reply," by J. Q. Adams, in which a few passages of a personal nature, relating to Mr. 11. G. Otis, have been omitted. Readers will bear in mind that the " Reply " was written at a time when its au- thor, after six years of political strain such as has fallen to the lot of few men in American history, had at last been driven, in what he conceived to be disgrace and humiliation, from the Presidency, and was returning to Quincy, smarting not only under the conviction that this was to be the end of a career which he had so earnestly longed to make useful to his country, but smarting, also, under a series of petty and exasperating attacks, the inevitable condition of the position he held, but which seemed to him to have no motive other than his still deeper humiliation. His diary tells how, at this time, the sense of personal abandonment, caused by the rapid desertion of his former friends and follow- ers, had gained so strong a hold upon his mind that scarce a day passed when his ears did not ring with the old refrain : — "O Richard I mon roil " Ij'univera t'abandonne." Under the reaction from this long and depressing struggle, after the excitement of the contest was over, he sat down to write this paper. It would be surprising if PREFACE. Vll a work written under such circumstances, and even in its mildest possible shape involving on every side points of the keenest personal feeling, had shown no trace of bitterness. Such traces are, in fact, abundant, and, as it happened, more particularly addressed against Mr. Harrison Gray Otis, although Mr. Otis had not been by far Mr. Adams's bitterest political enemy, even among those to whom he wrote. But, by the time the paper was completed and the author had taken the advice of friends regarding it, he became satisfied that his own wrongs, if wrongs they were, could not be bettered by revenging them on Mr. Otis ; nor would the public good be furthered by reviving the memory of Northern schemes of resistance to the national authority, at a time when the Union was staggering under the shock of similar projects in South Carolina and Georgia. He suppressed the publication ; and it was not long before the patriotic course of Mr. Otis, at the time of the nulli- fication excitement, led Mr. Adams to rejoice at the suppression, and to look upon Mr. Otis with more kindly eyes. The editor has therefore assumed the responsibility of omitting in this publication such por- tions as were merely personal to Mr. Otis, and could be omitted without mutilating the argument. It is, how- ever, proper to add, that nothing in the omitted portions bears more hardly upon Mr. Otis than much which has been necessarily retained. In order to furnish students in one mass with all the evidence as yet at hand to throw light upon the acts and motives of the characters in this curious scene of VJU PEEFACE. our liistory, tlie editor has attempted to collect in an Appendix a quantity of contemporaneous correspond- ence, mostly taken from the Pickering manuscripts in the library of the Massachusetts Historical Society, — the only considerable collection of Federalist papers of the time which has yet been thrown open to the student. Much of this has already been printed in Mr. Lodge's "Life of George Cabot" and elsewhere; but much is new, or, at least, placed for the first time in its true connection. In collecting these documents, the editor has had no reference to the question which side of the controversy they support. Indeed, some letters are printed which bear only remotely upon the contro- versy in any form. The very limited number of notes he has inserted are intended chiefly to furnish the student with references to other authorities. So far as the editor is concerned, his object has been, not to join in an argument, but to stimulate, if possible, a new generation in our universities and elsewhere, by giving them a new interest in their work and new material to digest, Washington, November 29, 1877. TABLE OP CONTENTS. P/LOB I. Letter of William B. Giles to the " Richmond Enquirer " of 7th September, 1827 1 Enclosure. Extract from the " NationalJournal " . 4 „ "Whig" 5 „ Letter from Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Giles, dated 26th December, 1825 6 n. Letter of Archibald Stuart to Thomas J. Randolph, dated 11th October, 1828, with reply from Mr. Randolph, of same date 10 Enclosure. Letter from Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Giles, dated 25th December, 1825 11 III. Letter of William B. Giles to the " Richmond Enquirer," dated 2l8t October, 1828 14 Enclosure. Letter from Mr. Giles to Mr. Jefferson, dated 15th December, 1825 20 IV. Statement from the "National Intelligencer" of 21st Octo- ber, 1828, by John Quincy Adams 23 V. Letter of William B. Giles to the " Richmond Enquirer," dated 24th October, 1828 27 VI. Letter of Massachusetts Federalists to John Quincy Adams, dated 26th November, 1828 43 VII. Reply of John Quincy Adams to the Letter of Massachusetts Federalists, dated 30th December, 1828 .... 46 VIII. Appeal of the Massachusetts Federalists to the Citizens of the United States, dated 28th January, 1829 . . 63 IX. Letter of James Gould to the " New York Evening Post," enclosing Statements of Connecticut Federalists, dated Uth April, 1829 93 X. Reply to the Appeal of the Massachusetts Federalists, by John Quincy Adams 107 TABLE OP CONTENTS. APPENDIX. Timothy Pickering to C. C. Pirickney .... „ ,, to Kiohard Peters .... „ „ to George Cabot .... Tapping Reeve to Uriah Tracy Timothy Pickering to Theodore Lyman . . . George Cabot to Timothy Pickering .... Theodore Lyman to Timothy Pickering . . . Timotliy Pickering to Rufus King George Cabot to Timothy Pickering . [Received] Rufus King to Timotliy Pickering Roger Giiswold to Oliver Wolcott Timothy Pickering to Theodore Lyman . . . Stephen Higginson to Timothy Pickering . . George Cabot to Rufus King Fisher Ames to Timothy Pickering . . . . Alexander Hamilton to Theodore Sedgwick Timothy Pickering to G. U. Rose G. H. Rose to Timothy Pickering Timothy Pickering to G. H. Rose G. H. Rose to Timothy Pickering George Cabot to Timothy Pickering . . H. G. Otis to Josiah Quincy Christopher Gore to Timothy Pickering . Timothy Pickering to Christopher Gore . Samuel Blanchard to Timothy Pickering . Timothy Pickering to S. P. Gardner . . Richard Peters to Timothy Pickering . A. C. Hanson to Timothy Pickering . . F. J. Jackson „ ,, „ . . Timothy Pickering to G. IL Rose . . . ,, ,, to Edvfard Pennington ,, ,, to George Logan . . ,, „ to Samuel Putnam ,, ,, to Caleb Strong . Caleb Strong to Timothy Pickering John Lowell „ „ ,, . . Timothy Pickering to Gouverneur Morris Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering Timothy I'ickering to John Lowell . . 25 May, 1800, 24 December, 1803, 29 January, 1804, 7 February, 1804, 11 ,. 14 29 „ 4 March, 7 „ 9 „ ■ 11 „ . 14 „ ■ 17 „ • 17 „ . 28 April, . 10 July, . 13 March, 1808, • 18 ,, ,, 0-0 • — »» »» . 23 „ • 8 May, . 4 August, ,, 5 October, ,, . 15 December, 1808, ■ 20 . 8 January, 1809, . 16 ,, ,, 3 February, 1809, 17 January, 1810, 24 April, 1811, 7 April, 1812, 12 July, „ 4 July, 1813, 4 February, 1814, 12 October, 17 „ 19 21 „ 1 November, 7 „ 7 „ 28 „ 331 338 338 342 343 346 350 351 353 353 354 358 3G1 362 365 365 360 307 3G8 370 371 372 373 373 375 376 378 379 380 382 382 387 383 891 391 894 398 400 400 403 404 406 407 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XI John Lowell to Timothy Pickering Timothy Pickering to James Hillhouse Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon James Hillhouse to Timothy Piolcering Gouverneur Morris to Moss Kent Christopher Gore to Caleb Strong Timothy Pickering to John Lowell 8 December, 1814, 410 . 16 „ M 414 . 22 „ M 418 . 25 „ M 419 . 5 January, 1815, 420 . 10 „ 421 . 14 „ 422 . 22 „ 422 • 23 „ 423 • 24 „ 425 Index 427 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO NEW ENGLAND FEDEHALISM. William B. Giles to the " Richmond Enquirer." ^ To the Public. " The great desideratum in political economy is the same as in private pursuits ; that is, what is the best application of the aggregate industry of the nation that can be made hon- estly to produce the largest sum of national wealth. Labor is the source of all wealth ; but it is not natural labor only." ^ Judging from Mr. C.'s prize speech generally, and from the six foregoing lines particularly, indeed, from all his speeches, and it would seem that Mr. Clay knows about as much of the "great desideratum of political economy " as he does about the Delphic oracles, or of the occult art of al- chemy, or of the illusory corruscations of the brilliant prospect of the Panama congress, or of the inexplicable intricacies of the West India trade. It would also seem, from the subjoined letter, that Mr. Jefferson is here directly at points with Mr. C. respecting his great political polar-star, — " the great desideratum in political economy ; " and that his deep- est affliction at the deplorable crisis most unwisely brought upon our country was not produced by his terrific alarms at the " election of a military chieftain " to the presidency, but 1 From (he " Hiclimonrt Enquirer," of 7th September, 1827. ^ Extract from Mr. Clay's speech upon the tariff bill of 1824. 1 Z NEW ENGLAND EEDEKALISM. from much more substantial and fearful considerations, — from tlie unprincipled usurpations of the practical govern- ment ; from converting a limited, federative government into an unlimited consolidated one ; in substance, from the six lines quoted above, and the inevitable consequences from tlie practical operations of their contents in obliterating all our fundamental laws. This letter was not originally in- tended for publication; but I now feel myself impelled to give it publicity from the following considerations, among others : — The extract contains the whole of the political part of the letter ; some parts merely private are omitted. The part respecting the university has been published, as giving Mr. Jefferson's views of the then actual condition and future prospects of this important institution, which may be attended with public utility, and also as a refutation of one falsehood out of many which have been circulated through the press, for the last ten years, in relation to myself ; to wit, that there was an unfriendly feeling existing between Mr. Jefferson and myself. The falsehood is destitute of all pretext whatever. For some time past, some of the administration prints, des- perate in their utmost need, have attempted to avail their bad cause of the just influence of Mr. Jefferson's well-earned political fame, by solemn assurances to the public that Mr. Jefferson, when living, was in favor of the measures of the administration and of the re-election of Mr. Adams. For this purpose, they have lavishly poured forth eulogiums upon Mr. Jefferson for opinions which they have ascribed to him, and which, if living, I verily believe, he would consider his great- est reproach. They have at length gone so far as to put expressions into Mr. Jefferson's mouth, under marks of quo- tation, with intimations that they can be proved by compe- tent evidence, nothing doubting ; whilst they are not only altogether surreptitious, but in direct hostility with the un- deviating tenor and spirit of Mr. Jefferson's whole political life, and with his declarations, both verbally and in writing, often frankly and openly made to his friends, as I am well informed, till within a sliort period before liis immediate NEW" ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 3 death. Under these circumstances, it appears to me to have bocomo tlic dnty of every friend of Mr. Jefferson, and of his country, who may be in possession of any written declara- tions from him, serving to demonstrate his real opinions respecting the perilous crisis of the country, to lay them before the public, and thus at once to put down the surrepti- tious ones. This course alone can serve to rescue Mr. Jeffer- son's unsullied republican fame from the false and unmerited aspersions brought against it, under the guise of affected plaudits the most delusive and deceptive. Besides, I conceive, under these gross attempts at deception, the public has a right to demand a disclosure of all Mr. Jefferson's real opin- ions, in whosesoever hands they may be, as a protection against the mischievous influence of the spurious opinions falsely ascribed to him, and that, too (as I believe), by his now most unnatural, loving friends, not long since his most doadl}"^ foes. Two papers of this description, which have par- ticularly attracted my attention, will be introduced here : the one taken from the " National Journal," the devoted " co- alition " paper, — at least, so characterized; the other, from the " Richmond Whig." This latter is ushered forth by a Avriter under the signature of " A Farmer," who most chari- tably charges bis brother farmers, and everybody else not acting under the same delusive influence with himself, with being " confiding dupes ; " whereas the scribbling farmer Bcems himself to be the most " confiding dupe " that ever undertook to enlighten a people by overcasting them with the thick mist in which he is himself enveloped. So much so, that he seems to be led about by some ignis fatuus, with siren songs, made up in doleful, pathetic strains, which he deals out to others in the same fascinating, heart-rending melody. These characteristics will shine with peculiar lustre in the example here exhibited. Should this " confiding dupe " of a farmer possess only a small portion of the candor of his calling, I think, after reading Mr. J.'s letter, contain- ing his real opinions, and contrasting them with the surrep- titious ones which have served to " dupe " the confiding farmer, he will at once acknowledge that there is no occa- 4 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. sion to ask, " Who is tlie dupe ? " He must stand himself " the dupe confessed." Doubtlessly, he Avill be surprised to be told that he is as much the tmconscious '■'■dupe" in many otlier of his delusive disclosures to the people. Having made tliem, if he means to give the people fair play, it has become his duty to hunt them up himself, and do his best to unde- ceive his own " confiding dupes," should he have been so unfortunate as to have made any. Wm. B. Giles. [Enclosure.] Extract erom the "National Journal." " One venerable authority, however, has been introduced in support of the claims of General Jackson, so imposing as to carry with it, if uncontradicted, gi-eat moral weight. Wo allude to that of the departed and lamented Jefferson, who has been quoted, since tlie grave closed upon his mortal re- mains, on the ground of a volunteer sentiment given by him at a public dinner, as being favorable to the election of Gen- eral Jackson. To suit this purpose, the toast itself was gar- bled ; but, even thus garbled, meant nothing but that General Jackson had earned, what he has justly received as the re- ward of his services, — the thanks of his country. Opposed to such construction as has been put upon Mr. J.'s toast, we have in our possession conclusive testimony that the senti- ments which we have expressed on this subject are those which the illustrious Jefferson expressed, but in stronger terms. We have his dying words, so to speak ; and we will close this article with them. Of late years, that venerable man seldom ventured to say any thing on politics ; but, not many years before his death, he observed to a friend, ' that his faith in the self-government of the people had never been so completely shaken as it had been by the efforts made at the last election to place over their heads one who, in every station he ever filled, either military or civil, made it a point to violate every order and instruction given him, and to take his own arbitrary will as the guide to liis conduct.' NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. " In such terms, strong as they are, and much stronger than we are disposed to use, did Mr. JeiTerson speak, just before his death, of the alarm created in his mind by the effort to place a merely military man at the head of our republic." [Enclosure.] Extract fkom " The Whig." " Tliese were the signs which called forth from that great apostle of freedom, Jefferson, his last but terrible warning : 'My country,' said he, "■ tJiou, too, will experience the fate which has befallen every free government : tht/ liberties will be sacrificed to the glory of some military chieftain. I had fondly hoped to have found in thee an exception ; but thy support of Jackson, — a man who has disregarded every order he has received, who has trampled under foot the laws and Constitution of his country, and who has substituted his own ungovernable will as his own rule of conduct, — thy support of such a man shakes my confidence in tlie capacity of man for self-government, and I fear all is lost.' This is the language of the dying patriot , and if we followed him, with undimin- ished confidence and with unexampled success, in times and seasons when liable to temptation, what deference is not due to his opinion when delivered under such solemn circum- stances, and in a condition little less imposing than if he had just risen from the dead ! Under such high authority, I the more confidently assert that the effort to elect Jackson is the fruitful fountain of the prevailing mischiefs, which every sober man must deprecate as disturbing the repose and threatening the safety of the republic. This infirmity of a blind and idolatrous devotion to military success — the bane of everj' republic that has gone before us — is the prolific soil whose harvest of bitterness we are now reaping. In the frenzy it produces, reason is no longer heard. The grossest falsehoods are propagated and believed ; every object is sacrificed with- out scruple to the success of the idol." b NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. [Enclosure.] Extract. Jefferson to William B. Giles. MoNTiCELLO, Dec. 20, 1825. Dear Sir,^ — I see, as you do, and with the deepest afflic- tion, the rapid strides with which the federal branch of our government is advancing towards the usurpation of all the rights reserved to the States, and the consolidation in itself of all powers, foreign and domestic ; and that, too, by construc- tions which, if legitimate, leave no limits to their power. Take together the decisions of the federal court, the doctrines of the President, and the misconstructions of the constitutional compact acted on by the legislature of the federal branch, and it is but too evident that the three ruling branches of that department are in combination to strip their colleagues, the State authorities, of the powers reserved by them, and to exercise themselves all functions, foreign and domestic. Under the power to regulate commerce, they assume indefi- nitely that also over agriculture and manufactures ; and call it regulation, too, to take the earnings of one of these branches of industry, — and that, too, the most depressed, — and put them into the pockets of the other, — the most flourishing of all. Under the authority to establish post-roads, they claim that of cutting down mountains for the construction of roads, of digging canals, and, aided by a little sophistry on the words, "general welfare," a right to do not only the acts to effect that, — which are sufficiently enumerated and permitted, — but whatsoever they shall think or pretend will be for the general welfare. And what is our resource for the preser- vation of the Constitution? Reason and argument? You might as well reason and argue with the marble columns encircling them. The representatives chosen by ourselves ? They are joined in the combination, — some from incorrect views of government, some from corrupt ones ; sufficient, voting together, to outnumber the sound parts, and, with 1 Tlio opening lines of this letter were omitteil by Governor Giles ; " I wrote you a letter yesterday, of wlticli you will bo free to nuike what use you please. Tliis will contain matters not intended for the public eye." NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 7 majorities of only one, two, or three, bold enough to go for- ward in defiance. Are we, then, to stand at arms? [A few words are here omitted, relating merely to an individual.^] No : that must be the last resource, not to be thought of until much longer and greater sufferings. If every infraction of a compact of so many parties is to be resisted at once as a dissolution of it, none can ever be formed which would last one year. We must have patience and longer endurance, then, with our brethren, while under delusion. Give them time for reflection and experience of consequences ; and keep our- selves in a situation to profit by the chapter of accidents, and separate from our companions only when the sole alternatives left are the dissolution of our union with them, or submission to a government without limitation of powers. Between these two evils, when we must make a choice, there can be no hesitation. But, in the mean while, the States should be watch- ful to note every material usurpation on tlicir rights ; to denounce them as they occur, in the most peremptory terms ; to protest against them as wrongs to which our present sub- mission shall be considered, not as acknowledgments or pre- cedents of right, but as a temporary yielding to the lesser evil, until their accumulation shall overweigh that of separa- tion. I would go still further, and give to the federal mem- ber, by a regular amendment of the Constitution, a right to make roads and canals of intercommunication between the States ; providing sufficiently against corrupt practices in Con- gress (log-rolling, &c.), by declaring that the federal pro- portion of each State of the moneys so employed shall be in works within the State, or elsewhere with its consent, and with a due salvo of jurisdiction. This is the course which I think safest and best as yet. You ask my opinion of the propriety of giving publicity to what is stated in your letter, as having passed between Mr. John Q. Adams and yourself. Of this, no one can judge but 1 The pnssage as printed in Jefferson's Works, tII. 427, runs : " Are we then to stand to our arms with the hot-headed Georgian f " 8 NEW ENGLAND PEDEEALISM. yourself. It is one of tliose questions wliicli belong to the forum of feeling. This alone can decide on the degree of confidence implied in the disclosure ; whether, under no cir- cumstances, it was to be communicated to others. It does not seem to be of that character, or at all to wear that aspect. They are historical facta, which belong to the present as well as future times. I doubt whetlier a single fact known to the world will cany as clear a conviction to it of the correctness of our knowledge of the treasonable views of the Federal party of that day as that disclosed by this the most nefarious and daring attempt to dissever the Union, of which the Hart- ford Convention was a subsequent chapter ; and, both of these having failed, consolidation becomes the fourth chap- ter of the next book of their history. But this opens with a vast accession of strength from their younger recruits, who, liaving nothing in them of tlie feelings or princijiles of 70, now look to a single and splendid government of an aris- tocracy, founded on banking institutions and monej'ed incor- porations, under the guise and cloak of their favored branches of manufactures, commerce, and navigation, riding and rul- ing over the plundered ploughman and beggared yeomanry. This will be to them a next best blessing to the monarchy of their first aim, and, perhaps, the surest stepping-stone to it. [The foregoing includes the whole of the political part of the letter. Then follows some information and remarks, purely private, and it thus concludes : ] Our university has been most fortunate in the five profes- sors procured from England. A finer selection could not have been made. Besides their being of a grade of science which has left little superior behind, the correctness of their moral character, their accommoilating dispositions and zeal for the prosperity of the institution, leave us nothing more to wish. 1 verily believe that as high a degree of edu- cation can now be obtained here as in the country they left ; and a finer set of youths I never saw assembled for instruc- tion. They committed some irregularities at first, until liiey learned the lawful length of their tether ; since which it has never been transgressed in the smallest degree. A great NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 9 proportion of them are severely devoted to study ; and I fear not to say, that, within twelve or fifteen years from this time, a majority of the rulers of our State will have been educated here. Tliey shall carry hence the correct principles of our day ; and you may count assuredly that they will exhibit their country in a degree of sound respectability it has never known, either in our days or those of our forefathers. I can- not live to see it. My joy must only be that 'of anticipation ; but that you may see it in full fruition is the probable conse- quence of the .twenty years I am ahead of you in time, and is the sincere prayer of your affectionate and constant friend, Thomas Jefeekson. The foregoing extract, containing the whole of the political part of the letter, is a true copy from Mr. Jefferson's original letter to me, written in his own handwriting. William B. Giles. 10 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. TI. Aechibald Stctaet to Thomas J. Randolph. Charlottesville, Oct. 11, 1828. Deae Sie, — I am advised that, among the papers in your possession, there is a letter written by your grandfather, vin- dicating Mr. Adams's political course in the support which he gave to his administration, and the reasons which entitled him to so large a share of his confidence. It is important that their connection should be explained, and that the his- tory of this interesting period should be known to the peo- ple; it is important that it should now be known. Your grandfather, if living, would not withhold his testimony in favor of any meritorious public servant, particularly one who has been so distinguished an aid and so bright an ornament to liis administration. Candid men of all parties will bo gratified to receive testimony from so pure a source. May I, then, ask the favor of you to furnish me with a copy of the letter referred to, that it may be laid before the people. I am, dear sir, very affectionately yours, &c., Aechibald Stuaet. Edgeiiill, Oct. 11, 1828. Deae Sie, — In compliance with your request, I send you a copy of the letter, I presume, alluded to in your note of this morning. Conscious that to suffer any of the writings of mj'^ grandfather in my possession to be made subservient to the use of any personal or political purpose, would be an un- worthy and improper abuse of the trust reposed in me, I have, nevertheless, deemed it entirely consistent with its faithful discharge to allow them to bo used as vindicatory testimony of the character or conduct of any individual. NEW ENGLAND FEDEEALISM. 11 wliere they would fairly admit of that construction. This I believe to be one of those cases. The facts contained in this letter have long been familiar to me, having often heard them with great interest from my grandfather, in conversation with others, on different occasions, from tlie date of their oc- currence to his death. I am aware that this piece-meal publi- cation of his correspondence — many of his letters too, seeing tlie light, mutilated and detached from their contexts — would bear the appearance of inconsistent and contradictory opin- ions ; yet the evil has no corrective but in the full publi- cation of his manuscripts, which will before long appear, when the public, being in possession of the whole, will be enabled to form a just judgment. Very affectionately yours, Thomas Jefferson Randolph. [Enclosure.] Thomas Jefferson to William B. Giles. MoNTiCELi.o, Dec. 25, 1825. Dear Sir, — Your favor of the 15th was received four days ago. It found me engaged in what I could not lay aside till this day. Far advanced in my eighty-third year, worn down with in- firmities which have confined me almost entirely to the house for seven or eight months past, it afQicts me much to receive appeals to my memory for transactions so far back as that which is the subject of your letter. My memory is indeed become almost a blank, of which no better proof can prob- ably be given you than by my solemn protestation that I have not the least recollection of your intervention between Mr. John Q. Adams and myself, in what passed on the sub- ject of the embargo. Not the slightest trace of it remains in my mind. Yet I have no doubt of the exactitude of the statement in your letter ; and the less as I recollect the interview with Mr. Adams, to which the previous commu- nications which had passed between him and yourself were 12 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. probably and naturally the preliminary. That interview I remember well ; not, indeed, in the very words which passed between us, but in their substance, which was of a character too awful, too deeply engraved in my mind, and influencing too materially the course I had to pursue, ever to be forgot- ten. Mr. Adams called on me pending the embargo, and while endeavors were making to obtain its repeal. He made some apologies for the call, on the ground of our not being then in the jiabit of confidential communications ; but that that which he had then to make involved too seriously the in- terests of our country not to overrule all other considerations with him, and make it his duty to reveal it to myself particu- larly. I assured him tliere was no occasion for any apology for his visit ; that, on the contrary, his communications would be thankfully received, and would add a confirmation the more to my entire confidence in the rectitude and patriotism of his conduct and principles. He spoke, then, of the dissatis- faction of the Eastern portion of our confederacy with the restraints of the embargo then existing, and their restlessness under it ; that there was nothing which might not be at- tempted to rid themselves of it ; tiiat he had information of the most unquestionable certainty, that certain citizens of the Eastern States (I think he named Massachusetts par- ticularly) were in negotiation with agents of the British government, the object of which was an agreement that the New England States should take no further part in the war then going on ; that, without formally declaring their sep- aration from the Union of the States, they should withdraw from all aid and obedience to them ; that their navigation and commerce should be free from restraint and interruption by the British ; that they should be considered and treated by them as neutrals, and as such might conduct themselves towards both parties, and, at the close of the war, be at liberty to rejoin the confederacy. He assured me that there was eminent danger that the convention would take place ; that the temptations were such as might debauch many from their fidelity to the Union ; and that, to enable its friends to make head against it, the repeal NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 13 of the embargo was absolutely necessary. I expressed a just sense of the merit of this information, and of the importance of the disclosure to the safety and even the salvation of our country. And, however reluctant I was to abandon the measure (a measure which, persevered in a little longer, we had subsequent and satisfactory assurance, would have effected its object completely), from that moment, and influ- enced by that information, ] saw the necessity of abandoning it ; and, instead of effecting our purpose by this peaceful weapon, we must fight it out, or break the Union. I then recommended to my friends to yield to the necessity of a repeal of the embargo, and to endeavor to supply its place by the best substitute in which they could procure a general concurrence. I cannot too often repeat that this statement is not pre- tended to be in the very Avords which passed ; that it only gives faithfully the impression remaining on my mind. The very words of a conversation are too transient and fugitive to be so long retained in remembrance. But the substance was too important to be forgotten, not only from the revolu- tion of measures it obliged me to adopt, but also from the renewals of it in my memory on the frequent occasions I have had of doing justice to Mr. Adams, by repeating this proof of his fidelity to his country, and of his superiority over all ordinary considerations when the safety of that was brought into question. With this best exertion of a waning memory which I can command, accept assurances of my constant and affectionate friendship and respect. Thomas Jefferson. 14 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. III. William B. Giles to the Editoks of the " Richmond Enquirer." i Richmond, Oct. 21, 1828. Gentlemen, — A paper published in the " Staunton Spec- tator," containing some vindictive, ignorant, and deceptive remarks, founded on an extraordinary correspondence be- tween Judge Stuart and T. J. Randolph, Esq., referring to a letter from Mr. Jefferson to myself, is this moment jDut into my hands. Whether Mr. Randolpii has shown himself the friend of his grandfather, Mr. Jefferson, and of his country, by giving up this letter for publication, esjiecially as detached from my letter to Mr. Jefferson to which his is a reply, or whether I have shown myself a friend to both in withhold- ing the publication, will appear from the contents of both letters, connected with the following facts : — Being unwilling to give information, as coming from my- self, of the grounds taken by Mr. Adams for his pretended desertion of the Federal and his affected adhesion to the Republican party, and deeming it highly important that this information should be given to the public, I determined to call on Mr. Jefferson for his recollection of them, and, through them, to urge Mr. Adams himself to publish his own statement of the whole transaction, and his own motives for his own conduct. Accordingly, I addressed a frank com- munication to ]\Ir. Jefferson, fully explaining my views and objects, and requesting him to give me a written statement of his recollection of the transaction. In reply, IMr. Jefferson addressed me a letter, complaining of the extreme pressure of business, — which I understood to have been of the most unpleasant and embarrassing character, for four days before 1 From tlie "Richmond Enquirer" of tlie 23(1 October, 1828. NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 15 ■writing his reply, — and of an extreme want of memory. Upon reading over the reply, I found but too much evidence of the justice of his remark in relation to the aberrations of his memory, on that occasion, arising, doubtlessly, from the press- ing mental distress of that unfortunate moment ; and I in- stantly determined that no consideration should induce me ever to give it publicity in that form ; whilst I felt too much delicacy towards Mr. Jefferson to remind him of the errors of his memory, under the peculiar circumstances of the case. A reference to the reply will, upon the slightest consideration of its contents, exhibit abundantly the propriety of this deter- mination. Mr. Jefferson says that Mr. Adams called on him, pending the embargo, for the purpose of making the communi- cation Avhich forms the subject of his letter, and which was the natural prelude to Mr. Adams's pretended conversion, who, he observes, " made some apologies for the call, on the ground of our not being then in the habit of confidential communications." Mr. Adams's pretended conversion, as is well known, preceded the embargo ; and the first public evi- dences he gave of it were, it will be remembered, his support of that measure, and his extraordinary report in the case of John Smith (in the winter of 1807-8). Yet lie migiit have called on Mr. Jefferson during, as well as before, the embargo. But Mr. Jefferson goes on to state that, in this communica- tion, Mr. Adams informed him that " certain citizens of the Eastern States (I think he named Massachusetts particularly) were in negotiation with agents of the British government ; the object of which was an agreement that the New England States should take no further part in the war then going on." It would here seem that Mr. Jefferson had blended the period of the war and the embargo together, and that he conceived the war to be " going on" "pending the embargo." But he ob- serves further, in another part of the letter : " From that moment, and influenced by that information, I saw the neces- sity of abandoning it" (the embargo) ; " and, instead of effect- ing our purpose by this peaceful weapon, we must fight it out, or break the Union." The embargo was repealed, without any recommendation 16 NKW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. from Mr. Jefferson ; and the war was not begun until 1812, tliree years after. These are some of the obvious errors into which Mr. Jefferson had fallen at the unfortunate moment of writing his reply to my letter ; and surely they not only afford abundant justification for my withholding its publica- tion, but made it imperiously my duty to do so. On the 26th of December, 1825, after being, I presume, relieved from the effects of the pressure of the distressing business which had engaged his attention for several days preceding, Mr. Jefferson addressed me another letter, explain- ing his views of the alarming political condition of the coun- try, under Mr. Adams's administration. This is one of the most clear, lucid, consistent communications, for its objects, of any one of the many he has ever written. It contains no error whatever, either of principle or memory. I had, how- ever, determined not to give publicity to either letter ; but, when I saw Mr. Jefferson's well-known and long-established Republican principles grossly perverted and misrepresented by the administration editors, I felt an irresistible duty to publish his real opinions, as disclosed in that letter. Even then I did not proceed with the publication until I had first addressed a letter to Mr. T. J. Randolph, under cover to a friend in Charlottesville, with a view of getting Mr. Ran- dolph's opinion and advice upon the subject. IMr. Randolph was absent on a visit to the watering-places, and his return uncertain. The letter was requested to be held up until his return, and then delivered to him. Whether it was delivered or not, I cannot tell. In the mean time. Governor Randolpli's publication in relation to Mr. Jefferson's political opinions appeared, which I conceived a sufficient fortification of the opinion formed by myself, and an abundant justification for my taking tlie same course. Tlie loud calls made for the publication of Mr. Jefferson's real opinions related onl}' to liis political ojiinions, not to the grounds disclosed to him by Mr. Adams, for his pretended conversion. His letter of the 25th December had no relation to tliat subject ; and its publication would have been no answer to those calls. His letter of the 26th was full and unequivocal to that point. Of course, I NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 17 published the letter relating to the object of the calls, not the one having no relation thereto. I published the one for the same reason which induced me to refuse to piiblisli the otlier, — to wit, to do justice to Mr. Jefferson's political fame, and to the public information. The one, written after a night's deliberation and repose, and whose contents speak its own merits, was calculated to rescue Mr. Jefferson's political opinions from the attempts to misrepresent them, and to save the public from the delusion of those misrepresentations ; the other I believed to have been written under so undue and unfortunate an impression, producing so many palpable errors as that its publication would do no less injustice to Mr. Jef- ferson than to the public. The contents of the two will be sufficient of themselves to justify my determination in relation to them ; and the consequences attending the unfortunate publication of the letter of the 25th December, 1825, will very shortly, I fear, afford still further justification of it. But it is intimated that I refused the publication of that letter, with a view of depriving Mr. Adams of the benefit of the favorable opinion expressed of him by Mr. Jefferson, in reference to the time when the communication was made to which the letter relates. To this intimation I give a direct and unequivocal denial. Had I been actuated by any undue motives towards Mr. Adams, the publication of this letter would have afforded abundant means for their exercise, not- withstanding the supposed compliment which it contains. Mr. Jefferson speaks most confidently of Mr. Adams ground- ing his conversion upon a treasonable conspiracy then carry- ing on (1807) between the Massacliusetts Federalists and certain British agents, nothing doubting his memory upon this all-important point. Is the refusal to give publicity to tliis information (the only piece of any real importance in relation to Mr. Adams) evidence of a disposition to do injus- tice to him? Is it not utter destruction to Mr. Adams's fame ? And does it not afford the highest evidence, that my inducement to withhold the publication was not to avoid a benefit to Mr. Adams, but to protect Mr. Jefferson's political fame from the malevolent, vindictive attacks now expected 2 18 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. to be levelled at it ? So far from entertaining a wish to con- ceal the fact that Mr. Jefferson once had a good opinion of Mr. Adams, I have stated more than once I believe, publicly, and oftener privately, that there was a time, and a long time, when Mr. Jefferson entertained a high opinion of Mr. Adams's capacity, integrity, and patriotism ; during a portion of which time, I labored myself under a similar delusion. I have maintained this fact in opposition to the opinion of some of Mr. Jefferson's warmest friends ; and have asserted, in evidence of it, that Mr. Jefferson actually nominated Mr. Adams to the Senate as Minister to Russia, according to the best of my recollection, as one of the last acts of his adminis- tration, which nomination was disapproved by the Senate, under an opinion that it was at that time inexpedient to send a minister to Russia. Mv. Madison's subsequent nomination of Mr. Adams to the same office, I always considei-ed as a mere continuation of Mr. Jefferson's previous nomination. I never had a doubt, and never concealed my knowledge of the fact, that I\lr. Jefferson did, at one period, entertain a good opinion of Mr. Adams, and could therefore have no motive nor desire to conceal Mr. Jefferson's own testimony to the same fact. And this is the whole amount of the com- plimentary expression in this letter alluded to by the paper above mentioned, and which I am charged with a desire to conceal. It manifestly, from its context, has reference to time past, — to the period of this communication of which Mr. Jefferson is speaking. This good opinion Mr. Jefferson never entertained of Mr. Adams, perhaps for some time before, and certainly never after, his message to Congress in December, 1825. If any doubts could be entertained upon this subject, fiom the misinterpretation of the letter of the 25th of Decem- ber, they must be abundantly satisfied by that of the 2Gth ; extracts from which I shall now proceed to lay before the public, together with my letter to Mr. Jefferson and his in reply. I repeat the declaration, that the extracts from tiie letter of the 26th contain tiie whole of the political part of that letter. I disdain to prop such a pledge by the testimony of any one ; but the original letters are in my possession, and NEW ENGLAND FEDEEALISM. 19 are offered to the inspection of any gentleman of any party who may please to call and examine them, under an injunc- tion that he shall make no improper use of the parts consid- ered private, the impropriety of divulging which will be manifest to every one. From the view of the whole, the following results will appear : — 1st. My extreme reluctance in giving information respect- ing Mr. Adams's pretended conversion imder any circum- stances, whilst I was extremely desirous that he should do so himself. 2d. That I published Mr. Jefferson's letter of the 26th under the influence of irresistible calls for that purpose. 3d. That the contents of that letter related directly to the objects of the calls. 4th. That the letter of the 25th did not relate to them in any respect whatever, and, of course, the publication of that letter would not have been justified by them. 5th. That the inducement for withholding it was to avoid the exposure of a momentary want of memory on the part of Mr. Jefferson. 6th. That it was not with a view of doing any injustice to Mr. Adams, by withholding Mr. Jefferson's compliments to him ; which, when properly explained, especially by the let- ter of the 26th, and understood as I understand them, fasten on him the greatest reproaches. 7th. That I published the whole of the political part of Mr. Jefferson's letter of the 26 th ; and the private parts omitted will be seen, upon inspection, not intended for pub- lication, being rather of a sportive cast towards certain descriptions of individuals, and are certainly the matter of that letter not intended for the public eye. The foregoing sketch is written on the spur of the occa- sion. If necessary, further explanations and developments will be hereafter given. Wm. B. Giles. 20 NEW ENGLAND PEDEEALISM. [Enclosure.] W. B. Giles to Thomas Jefferson. Wigwam, Dec. 15, 1825. My Dear Sir, — Without hearing directly from you in reLation to the present crisis in our political affairs, I take it for granted that you view it with the same regrets and alarms that I do. Such have been the impressions upon my mind produced by the rapidly progressive usurpations of the gen- eral government, that I have deemed it a duty to make them known to the public, under the caption of political disquisi- tions. Since seeing the President's Message, I have deter- mined to extend the disquisitions into an examination of some of the most prominent principles avowed in it. In the performance of this task, I tiiink mateiial aid might be derived from looking back to the period of Mr. Adams's political conversion, reviewing the inducements then sug- gested by him for his conversion, and tracing the outlines of the policy i^ursiied by him from that time to the present. But I could not permit myself to place that transaction before the public without consulting you, sir, \ipon the pro- priety of the measure : first, as to the suggested inducements themselves ; second, as to the propriety of giving them pub- licity. I presume you will well recollect, sir, that Mr. Adams first intimated to you his intended change of politics, through me. The inducements suggested for this change were, I think, substantially the following : that propositions had been made by certain British agents to many leading Feder- alists in the Eastern States, in the event of war between the United States and Groat Britain, to separate New England from the rest of the States, and to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with Great Britain ; that the proposition Avas approved, by many of them ; that he had been consulted upon its feasibility, and urged to unite with the approving Fed- eralists in giving it the sanction of the whole party ; that his love of country became shocked at the proposition, and he had resolved to abandon a party who could be induced to NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 21 countenance the treasonable project. After urging Mr. Adams to make liis communication in person, and his refusal, at his request and upon his authority I gave you the infor- mation in substance as above stated, according to the best of my recollection. As an inducement to Mr. Adams to call on you in person upon the occasion, I took the liberty of ex- pressing a confident opinion to him that he would be received by you with due respect and attention. I apprised jou of this intimation to Mr. Adams, when you requested me to reassure him upon the same point, wliich I accordingly did; and I understood that, afterwards, he had several personal interviews with you upon the subject. I also informed you, at the same time, that Mr. Adams accompanied his communi- cation witli the strongest assui'ances of his entire disinterest- edness, and that he actually disclaimed all views of official preferment and personal aggrandizement in any form. As to the point of publicity, I have to observe that I have no intention of publishing tliis statement of facts without your consent, probably not without the consent of Mr. A. ; but, in the event of your yielding to its publication, he will be strongly pressed to do so on his part. I propose, however, to refer to so much of that transaction as is already before the public. This will be seen in a speech delivered by myself in the Senate of the United States on the 2d of December, 1808, a copy of which accompanies this note, for your information. This particular subject was introduced for the purpose of defending Mr. Adams against charges brought against him by Mr. Pickering, and will be found in pages 7, 8, 9. You will also find, sir, that one object of that speech was to repel charges made by the same gentleman against yourself and Mr. Madison, as well as Mr. Adams. The statement of that transaction at that time, as far as it went, having been introduced in vindication of Mr. Adams, was quite acceptable to him, as I understood shortly after- wards. It is through his admission, on that occasion, he will now be pressed for a full development of the whole of that transaction, which has subsequently turned out to be the 22 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. most eventful of his whole life. It will occur to you, sir, that, if this transaction should be placed before the public in extenso, your reply to this note will form part of the pub- lication. Be pleased, sir, to accept assurances of my best and most affectionate regard. Wm. B. Giles. NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 23 IV. From the " National Intelligencer " of Oct. 21, 1828. The publication of a letter from Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Giles, dated the 25th of December, 1825, concerning a communica- tion made by Mr. Adams to Mr. Jefferson in relation to the embargo of 1807, renders necessary the following statement, which we are authorized by Mr. Adams to make : — The indistinctness of the recollections of Mr. Jefferson, of which his letter itself feelingly complains, has blended to- gether three distinct periods of time ; and the information which he did receive from Mr. Adams, with events which afterwards occurred, and of which Mr. Adams could not have informed him. It fortunately happens that tliis error is apparent on the face of the letter itself. It saj^s, " Mr. Adams called on me pending the embargo, and while endeavors were making to obtain its repeal." He afterwards says that, at this interview, Mr. Adams, among other things, told him that " he had information, of the most unquestionable cer- tainty, that certain citizens of tlie Eastern States (I think he named Massachusetts particularly) were in negotiation with agents of the British government, the object of which was an agreement that the New England States should take no further part in the war then going on" &c. The embargo was enacted on the 22d of December, 1807, and repealed, by the Non-intercourse Act, on the 1st of March, 1809. The war was declared in June, 1812. In August, 1809, Mr. Adams embarked for Russia, — nearly three j'ears before the declaration of war, — and did not return to the United States till August, 1817, — nearly three years after the conclusion of the peace. Mr. Madison was inaugurated President of the United States on the 4th of March, 1809. It was impossible, therefore, that Mr. Adams could have given any information to Mr. Jefferson of negotiations by 24 NEW ENGLAND PEDEKALISM. citizens of Massachusetts witli Biitisli agents, during the war, or having relation to it. Mr. Adams never had knowledge of any such negotiations. The interview to which Mr. Jefferson alludes took place on the 15th of March, 1808, pending the embargo, but at the session of Congress before the substitution for it of tlie Non-intercourse Act. The information given by Mr. Adams to Mr. Jefferson had only an indirect reference even to the embargo, and none to any endeavors for obtaining its repeal. It was the substance of a letter from the Governor of Nova Scotia to a person in the State of Massachusetts, written in the summer of 1807, and before the existence of the embargo ; which letter Mr. Adams had seen. It had been shown to him without any injunction of secrecy, and he betrayed no confidence in communicating its purport to Mr. Jefferson. Its object was to coinitenance and accredit a calumny, then extensively prevailing, among the enemies of Mr. Jeiferson and tlie op- ponents of his administration, that he and his measures were subservient to France ; and it alleged that the British gov* ernment were informed of a plan, determined upon by France, to effect the conquest of the British Provinces on this con- tinent, and a revolution in the government of the United States ; as means to which, they were first to produce war between the United States and England. From the fact that the Governor of Nova Scotia had written such a letter to an individual in Massachusetts, connected with other facts and with the movements of the party then predominant iu that State, Mr. Adams and Mr. Jefferson drew their infer- ences, which subsequent events doubtless confirmed, but which inferences neither Mr. Jefferson nor Mr. Adams then communicated to eacli other. This was the only confidential interview which, during the administration of Mr. Jefferson, took place between him and Mr. Adams. It took place, first, at the request of Mr. Wilson Gary Nicholas, then a member of the House of Representatives of the United States, a confi- dential friend of My. Jefferson ; next, of Mr. Robinson, then a Senator from Vermont ; and lastly, of Mr. Giles, then a Senator from Virginia ; which request is the only inter- vention of Mr. Giles ever known to Mr. Adams between liim NEW ENGLAND FEDEKALISM. 25 and Mr. Jefferson. It is, tlicrefore, not surprising tlint no sncli intervention occurred to tiie recollection of Mr. Jeffer- son in December, 1825. This interview was in March, 1808. In May of the same year Mr. Adams resigned his seat in the Senate of the United States. At the next session of Congress, which commenced in Novemler, 1808, Mr. Adams was a private citizen, residing at Boston. The embargo was still in force, operating with extreme pressure upon the interests of the people, and was wielded as a most effective instrument, by the party prevailing in the State, against the administration of Mr. Jefferson. The people were constantly instigated to forcible resistance against it; and juries after juries acquitted the violators of it, upon the ground that it was unconstitutional, assumed in the face of a solemn decision of the District Court of the United States. A separation of the Union was openly stimu- lated in the public prints ; and a convention of delegates of the New England States, to meet at New Haven, was intended and proposed. Mr. Giles, and several otiier members of Congress, during this session, wrote to Mr. Adams confidential letters, inform- ing him of the various measures proposed as re-enforcements or substitutes for the embargo, and soliciting his opinions upon the subject. He answered those letters. with frankness, and in confidence. He earnestly reconmiended the substitution of the non-intercourse for the embargo ; and, in giving his reasons for this preference, was necessarily led to enlarge upon the views and purposes of certain leaders of the party, which had the management of the State legislature in their hands. He urged that a continuance of the embargo much longer would certainly be met by forcible resistance, sup- ported by the legislature, and probably by the judiciary, of the State ; that, to quell that resistance, if force should be resorted to by the government, it would produce a civil war ; and that, in that event, he had no doubt the leaders of the party would secure the co-operation with them of Great Britain ; that their object was, and had been for several years, a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of a 26 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. separate confederation, lie knew from unequivocal evidence, although not provable in a court of law ; and that, in the case of a civil war, the aid of Great Britain to effect that purpose would be as surely resorted to, as it would be indis- pensably necessary to the design. That these letters of Mr. Adams to Mr. Giles, and to other members of Congress, were read or shown to Mv. Jefferson, he never was informed. They were written, not for communi- cation to him, but as answers to the letters of his correspon- dents, members of Congress, soliciting his opinion upon measures in deliberation before them, and upon which they were to act. He wrote them as the solicited advice of friend to friend, ■ — both ardent friends to the administration .and to their country. He wrote them to give to the supporters of the administration of Mr. Jefferson in Congress, at that crisis, the best assistance, by his information and opinions, in his power. He had certainly no objection that they should be comnmnicated to Mr. Jefferson ; but this was neither his intention nor desire. In one of the letters to Mr. Giles, he repeated an assurance, which he had verbally given him during the preceding session of Congress, that he had for his support of Mr. Jefferson's administration no personal or inter- ested motive, and no favor to ask of him whatever. That these letters to Mr. Giles were by him communicated to Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Adams believes from the import of this letter from Mr. Jefferson, now first published, and which has elicited this statement. He believes, likewise, that other letters from him to other members of Congress, written dur- ing the same session and upon the same subject, were also communicated to him ; and that their contents, after a lapse of seventeen years, were blended confusedly in his memory, — first, with the information given by Mr. Adams to him at their interview in March, 1808, nine months before ; and, next, with events which occurred during the subsequent war, and of which, however natural as a sequel to the information and opinions of Mr. Adams, communicated to him at those two preceding periods, he could not have received the infor- mation from him. NEW ENGLAND EEDEEALISM. 27 V. William B. Giles to the " Richmond Enquirer." i Oct. 24, 1828. Under the sanction of a correspondence between Judge Stuart and Mr. T. J. Randolph, of the 11th of this month, a letter from Mr. Jefferson to me, of the 25th December, 1825, has been published. The publication did not reach me till the 21st instant. The avowed object of the publication is to counteract the effects of another letter of Mr. Jefferson's to me, of the 26th December, 1825, which I had caused to be published on the 23d September, 1827, — more than twelve months ago. The election of President and Vice-President takes place on the 3d of November next. Is it possible to conceive that Judge Stuart has so far substituted the dark livery of the electioneering spirit for the pure ermine of jus- tice, as to have waited till the eleventh hour to make his explosion for political effect ! On this point the public can judge better than myself. How much is the substitution of the electioneering for the judicial spirit to be deprecated on this as on other occasions ! And with how miich more zeal and solicitude does it seem to inspire its votaries in the dis- charge of the duties of their opposite functions I This new explosion has imposed upon me, most reluctantly, as in the case of the denunciation of the anti-Jackson convention, a new obligation to appear once more before the public in my own vindication ; and I suppose I have to anticipate the same reproaches on this as on that occasion, for condescending to mingle with the newspaper scribblers, as one of the fraternity calls them. This new explosion has brought forth a contemporaneous exposition at Washington, and in this place, — but, it would 1 From tlie " Hiclimond Enquirer " of tlie 25th October, 1828. 28 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. seem, xnuler very different excitements. Tlie one from Wash- ington seems not to be inspired with the delicious joys and triumphant anticipations with that of Richmond ; nor does it teem with the same malevolent spirit, nor malignant com- mentaries towards myself. It does not triumphantly call for the reading of Mr. Jefferson's letter on every election day. It understands its contents and bearings too well. It seems to be drawn with a sombre pencil, indeed ; and well it may, for it must lead to the development of a transaction which will necessarily tend to the utter ruin of its author. The Washington expand well deserves consideration ; the llich- mond one is deemed umvorthy of further notice. The Washington exposS has the authoritative sanction of Mr. Adams himself. It is a paper exhibiting so much human frailty — I fear human depravity — as to excite my astonish- ment, and to admonish me to observe the extremest caution in the review of the transactions to which it relates, so far as they come within my knowledge. Upon casting my eye over this extraordinary paper, last evening, and observing its anoma- lous character, the first reflection presented to my mind, from its perusal, was, whether it had actually been written by Mr. Adams himself or his most subservient editors ; and I came to the conclusion, that it had been penned by Mr. Adams himself. Would it not have been more frank and more respectful to have come before the public upon a subject so vitally interesting to himself, under his proper signature, than under an authority given to his editors ? Be that as it may, the expose can be considered in no other light tlian as an authorized explanation of Mr. Adams's motives for liis pretended political conversion. This statement I have called on Mr. Adams, in impressive terms, to make, at least five times heretofore, but unavailing ; when the disclosure of the boasted contents of Mr. Jefferson's letter seems to have pro- duced it in an instant. new england federalism. 29 The Washington Expose. After the assertion that tlie following statement was au- thorized by Mr. Adams, and after some commentary upon the indistinctness of Mr. Jefferson's recollections on several occasions, the following statement is made : — " It was impossible, therefore, that Mr. Adams could have given any information to Mr. Jefferson of negotiations by citizens of Massachusetts with British agents, during the war, or having relation to it. 3Ir. Adams never had knowledge of any such negotiations." It will be observed that here is a positive declaration: " Mr. Adams never had knowledge of any such negotia- tions." Now, what says Mr. Jefferson on this point? " That interview I remember well ; not, indeed, in the very words which passed between us, but in their substance, which was qf a character too auful, too deeply engraved in my mind, and influencing too materially the course I had to pursue, ever to be forgotten. Mr. Adams called on me pending the embargo, and while endeavors were making to obtain its re- peal. He made some apologies for the call, on the ground of our not being then in the habit of confidential communica- tions, but that which he had then to make involved too seri- ously the interests of our country not to overrule all other considerations with him, and make it his duty to reveal it to mj'self particularly. I assured him there was no occasion for any apology for his visit ; that, on the contrary, his commu- nications would be thankfully received, and would add a con- firmation the more to my entire confidence in the rectitude and patriotism of his conduct and principles. He spoke, then, of the dissatisfaction of the Eastern portion of our con- federacy with the restraints of the embargo then existing, and their restlessness under it ; that there was nothing which might not be attempted to rid themselves of it ; that he had information, of the most unquestionable certainty, that certain citizens of the Eastern States (/ thi^ik he named Mas- sachusetts particularly') were in negotiation with agents of the British government, the object of which was an agreement that 30 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. the New England States should take no further part in the ivar then going on ; that, without foi-mally declaring their separa- tion from the Union of the States, they shoukl withdraw from all aid and ohedience to them ; that their navigation and commerce should be free from restraint or interruption by the British; that they should be considered and treated by them as neutrals, and as such miglit conduct themselves to- wards both parties ; and, at the close of the war, be at liberty to rejoin the confederacy. He assured me that there was eminent danger that the convention would take place ; that the temptations were such as might debauch many from their fidelity to the Union ; and that, to enable its friends to make head against it, the repeal of the embargo was absolutely nec- essary. I expressed a just sense of the merit of the informa- tion, and of the importance of the disclosure to the safety and even salvation of our country ; and, however reluctant I was to abandon the measure," &c. It cannot escape notice .tliat Mr. Jefferson here asserts unequivocally, and pledges himself for the correctness of his memory upon that point, however frail he states it to be on subjects of ordinary interest ; " that he (Mr. Adams) as- sured Mr. Jefferson that he had information of the most unques- tionable certainty, that certain citizens of the Eastern States (2 think he named Massachusetts particularly) were in negotiation ivith agents of the British government, the object of which was that the New England States should take no further part in the war then going on ; that, without formally declaring their separation from the Union of the States, they should withdraw from all aid and obedience to them," &c. Here Mr. Jefferson asserts positively, that Mr. Adams had stated to him that he had information that certain citi- zens were in negotiation with agents of the British govern- ment, &c. Mr. Adams now positively denies that he ever had any knoAvledge of any such negotiation. Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Adams, then, are directly at points upon a most important matter of fact, to the truth of which fact Mr. Jefferson most solemnly pledges his memory. What would Mr. Jefferson now say, if living, upon this positive denial by NEW ENGI.AND FEDERALISM. 31 Mr. Adams of a fact, of the knowledge of which, he had pledged himself to Mr. Jefferson in the most solemn manner, he had the most unquestionable certainty? What does Mr. T. .J. Randolph now think of Mr. Adams's veracity, integrity, and patriotism ? What does the electioneering judge think of Mr. Adams's principles ? What must any man of sound mind think of them ? Upon what ground is this denial made ? Merely upon the ground of the indistinctness of Mr. Jeffer- son's memory, in blending the existence of the war and embargo together. " For " (says Mr. Adams), " it was im- possible for him to give any information to Mr. Jefferson," &c., " during the war," — relying upon this slip in Mr. Jeffer- son's memory ; but he might very well have given him this information pending the embargo, — as, finally, he states he did, during the embargo, give him other information of a dif- ferent character. How does this denial comport with the solemnity with which Mr. Adams opens his communication to Mr. Jefferson ? Here, then, it manifestly appears that Mr. Adams rests the grounds of his denial upon a mere quib- ble, arising from indistinctness of Mr. Jefferson's memory, propped up by a " therefore," and not from his own knowl- edge independently of that aberration of memory, and the " therefore " deducible from it. The exposd proceeds : — " The interview to which Mr. Jefferson alludes took place on the 15th of March, 1808, pending the embargo, but at the session of Congress before the substitution for it of the Non-intercourse Act. The information given by Mr. Adams to Mr. Jefferson had only an indirect reference even to the embargo, and none to any endeavors for obtaining its repeal. It was the substance of a letter from the Governor of Nova Scotia to a person in the State of Massachusetts, written in the summer of 1807, and before the existence of the embargo ; which letter Mr. Adams had seen. It had been shown to him without any injunction of secrecy, and he betrayed no confidence in communicating its purport to Mr. Jefferson. Its object was to countenance and accredit a calumnj'', then extensively prevailing, among the enemies of Mr. J. and the 32 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. opponents of his administration, that he and his measures were subservient to France ; and it alleged that the British government were informed of a plan, determined upon by France, to effect the conquest of the British Provinces on this Continent, and a revolution in the government of the United States, as means to Avhich they were first to produce war between the United States and England. From the fact that the Governor of Nova Scotia had written such a letter to an individual in Massachusetts, connected with other facts and with the movements of the party then predominant in that state, Mr. Adams and Mr. Jefferson drew their infer- ences, which subsequent events doubtless confirmed ; but which inferences neither Mr. Jefferson nor Mr. Adams then communicated to each other. This was the only confidential interview which, during the administration of Mr. Jeiferson, took place between him and Mr. Adams. It took place, first, at the request of Mr. Wilson Gary Nicholas, then a member of the House of Representatives of the United States, — a confidential friend of Mr. Jefferson ; next, of Mr. Kobinson, then a Senator from Vermont ; and, lastly, of Mr. Giles, then a Senator from Virginia, — which request is the only inter- vention of Mr. Giles ever known to Mr. Adams between him and Mr. Jefferson. It is, therefore, not surprising that no such intervention occurred to the recollection of Mr. Jef- ferson in December, 1825." In this quotation, Mr. Adams resorts to the expedient of blending his communication respecting a letter from the Gov- ernor of Nova Scotia, in relation to the origin of the charge of French influence against the administration, with his most solemn assertion of a knowledge of treasonable negotiations then going on (1807-8) between the New England citizens (Federalists) and certain British agents, — two perfectly dis- tinct subjects. He goes so far as to say that neither himself nor Mr. Jefferson communicated to each other any inferences they respectively drew from the facts he had stated; but both drew the same inferences, which were afterwards verified. There is not the most distant intimation in Mr. Jefferson's letter of 25th December, 1825, of any communication what- NEW ENGLAKD FEDEBALISM. 33 ever from Mr. Adams respecting Sir James Craig; whilst it is positive as to the disclosures, made by Mr. Adams, of the treasonable negotiations then going on (1807-1809). Is there a human being of sound mind, upon reading Mr. Adams's and Mr. Jefferson's statements, who could conceive they relate to the same transactions ? This point will be further explained hereafter. In the mean time, it must be considered as a subject entirely distinct from the treasonable negotiations disclosed, and of relatively very little impor- tance. But it is asserted for Mr. Adams, that his interview with Mr. Jefferson of March 16th, 1808, took place, first at the request of the late Colonel W. C. Nicholas, then of Mr. Robinson, and lastly of myself. I was intimate with Colo- nel Nicholas until the close of his life, and never heard a lisp of such a request from his tongue ; although the sub- ject of Mr. Adams's pretended conversion was often men- tioned in conversation, and I think he told me he derived his knowledge of it from Mr. Jefferson. Of Mr. Robinson, I know nothing particularly', except, like Colonel Nicholas, he is not living, as I am told. In relation to myself, I can only say, that, in my letter of the 15th December, 1825, I gave Mr. Jefferson, substantially, my recollections of the interview between Mr. Adams and myself, which, after the best exer- tions of my memory, I now believe to be essentially correct. At the time of making this exposS, Mr. Adams had not the knowledge of the contents of that letter. Messrs. Stuart and Randolph had, from some cause unknown to me, withheld its publication ; and, in doing so, have rendered no service to Mr. Adams, however well intended the concealment might have been. In relation to myself, this language is used for Mr. Adams ; "and, lastly, from Mr. Giles, a Senator from Virginia, which request is the only intervention of Mr.. Giles ever known to Mr. Adams, between him and Mr. Jefferson. It is, therefore, not surprising that no such intervention occurred to Mr. Jefferson in December, 1825." Here is an admission, on the part of Mr. Adams, that one intervention did take place between Mr. Jefferson and myself, but recurs to Mr. Jefferson's want of recollection of it in 1825. It should, 3 34 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. however, be recollected that, whilst Mr. Jefferson positively asserts his want of recollection of any intervention between myself and himself, respecting Mr. Adams, he asserts at the same time : — " Yet, 1 have no doubt of the exactitude of the statement in your letter, — and the less as I recollect the interview with Mr. Adams to which the previous communications which had passed between him and yourself were probably and naturally the preliminary." " J have no doubt of the exactitude of the statement in your letter." Why ? Because I recollect the interview with Mr. Adams, to which the previous communications he had with yourself " were probably and naturally the preliminary." Certainly. IIow was it possible for me to have had a knowl- edge at all of an interview, and the object of it, between Mr. Adams and Mr. Jefferson, without having been apprised of it by one or both of them ? Besides, Mr. Adams is compelled to admit, in another part of his expos/i, a verbal connnunica- tion to me during the preceding session of Congress. For it is said for him, " in one of the letters to Mr. Giles, he repeated the assurance, — which he had verbally given him during the preceding session of Congress, — that he had for his support to Mr. Jefferson's administration no personal or interested motives, and no favor to ask of him whatever." Whilst I am conscientiously compelled to disclaim the honor of receiving any confidential letter from Mr. Adams whatever, for 1808-09, — certainly none, as I verily believe, respecting the repeal of the embargo, nor respecting the opposition to it in Massa- chusetts, — I admit the verbal assurance, given me during tlie preceding session, of his perfect disinterestedness in his con- version, and a positive refusal to accept any office under the Republican administration. But it was in very different terms from his present admission, and formed a part of liis general communications respecting the motives of his pre- tended conversion. Mr. Adams was compelled to make this admission from a recollection of my speech in his defence in December, 1808, which he had subsequently approved. This will be made evident from the following extract, taken from that speech : — NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 35 " I had hoped, Mr. President, that the gentleman would so far have restrained his feelings as to have permitted this gentleman's (Mr. A.'s) retirement to have sliicldcd Iiim from those unmerited reproaches ; but it now seems that no deli- cacy of situation can procure an exemption from the inveter- acy of the gentleman's passions. This cruel attack has imposed upon me an indispensable obligation to defend this absent gentleman ; and it has been principally this circum- stance which has driven me again, most reluctantly, into this debate. Sir, I can attest, and now do attest, with great pleasure, the disinterestedness and purity of the motives which dictated that gentleman's (Mr. Adams's) late political conduct. As to its wisdom, — that is matter of opinion, and now in a course of experiment ; but, as to his exemption from all views of personal promotion or aggrandizement, I here assert that fact, upon my own knowledge and upon my own responsibility, as far as can be warranted by the most explicit and unequivocal assurances from the gentleman him- self, — given, too, under circumstances which render their sincerity unquestionable." Hero is no reference whatever to any communication by letter ; but to the most explicit assurances from the gentleman himself, — given, too, under circumstances which render their sincerity unquestionable : most clearly alluding to the most solemn manner under wliich he made his communication to me, and the magnified importance given by him of the sub- ject of that communication. I have now arrived at a part of this expos6 which, upon the first blush, produced indescribable emotions ; nor have they lost any thing of their original impression from further reflection. Mr. Adams says: — " Mr. Giles, and several other members of Congress, during this session, wrote to Mr. Adams confidential letters, inform- ing him of the various measures proposed as re-enforcements or substitutes for the embargo, and soliciting his opinions upon the subject. He answered those letters with frankness and in confidence. He earnestly recommended the substitu- tion of the non-intercourse for the embargo ; and, in giving 86 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. his reasons for this preference, was necessarily led to enlarge upon the views and purposes of certain leaders of the party which had the management of the State legislature in tlieir hands. He urged that a continuance of the embargo much longer would certainly be met by forcible resistance, sup- ported by the legislature, and probably by the judiciary, of the State ; that, to quell that resistance, if force should be resorted to by the government, it would produce a civil war ; and that, in that event, he had no doubt the leaders of the party would secure the co-operation with them of Great Britain ; that their object was, and had been for several 3'ears, a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of a separate confederation, he knew from unequivocal evidence, altliough not provable in a court of law ; and that, in the case of a civil war, the aid of Great Britain, to effect that purpose, would be as surely resorted to as it would bo indispensably necessary to the design. " That these letters of Mr. Adams to Mr. Giles, and to other members of Congress, were read or shown to Mr. Jef- ferson, he never was informed. They were written, not for communication to him, but as answers to the letters of his correspondents, members of Congress, soliciting his oj)inion3 upon measures in deliberation before them, and upon which they were to act. He weote them as the solicited ADVICE OF FRIEND TO FRIEND, both ARDENT FRIENDS TO THE ADMINISTRATION and TO THEIR COUNTRY. He Wrote them to give to the supporters of the administration of Mr. Jefferson in Congress, at that crisis, the best assistance (by his information and opinions) in his j)0wer. He had certainly no objection that they should be communicated to Mr. Jef- ferson ; but this was neither his intention nor desire. In one of the letters to Mr. Giles, he repeated an assurance which he had verbally given him diuing the preceding session of Con- gress, that he had for his support of Mr. Jefferson's adminis- tration no personal or interested motive, and no favor to ask of iiiin wlialevcr." Mr. Adams liere positively asserts that Mr. Giles, and sev- eral other members of Congress, during this session of 1808-09, NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 87 wrote to him confidential letters, informing him of the various measures proposed as re-enforcements or substitutes for the embargo ; and, soliciting his opinions upon the sub- ject, he answered these letters with frankness and in confi- dence ! When I first saw this unequivocal assertion of Mr. Adams, unattended with any mental reservation Avhatever, and when there was not the slightest trace upon my memory of the recollection of any such correspondence, I was struck with wonder and amazement, as well as with other mingled emotions ; and I put my memory up to its best efforts in trying to trace some such recollection, but found no vestige thereof ; and I now assert that I do not believe that any such correspondence ever took place. If Mr. Adams should be in possession of such confidential letters from me, I now call most earnestly upon him to exhibit them to the public. I am told Mr. Adams is peculiarly methodical in his business, and careful in the preservation of all letters addressed to him. He certainly must have retained mine upon a subject then so interesting to the nation, if he ever received them. I beg him, if in possession of any such confidential letters from me, or of a letter of any kind, to abandon all scruples imposed by the confidence asserted, and forthwith to publish them. If he should do so, it will afford a demonstration tliat one important characteristic transaction of my life has entirely escaped my recollection, leaving not the shadow of a shade behind. I pretend not to any infallibility of memory ; but I deem it next to an impossibility that the impression of any such transaction, if once made, should ever have been completely eradicated from it. As to Mr. Adams's confidential letters to me, written, as he says, " as the solicited advice of friend to friend," I have no more recollection of them than of those said by him to have been written by myself; nor do I believe any such letters were ever written. I am, myself, careful in the preservation of all letters of interest addressed to me, and I have no recol- lection of ever having seen any such letter in my bureau. I have now, I believe, several able and eloquent letters from Mr. Adams's father, written after his retirement fi'om public 38 NEW ENGLAND FEDEEALISM. life ; but none of any description, as I believe, from Mr. Adams himself. What, then, must have been my emotions, when I first beheld these unequivocal declarations on the part of Mr. Adams ! ! Could it be believed that Mr. Adams had intrepidly invented the extraordinary tale to screen him- self from imputations he could not otherwise avoid ! ! ! Could I believe myself to have been an active agent in such an in- teresting scene, and that all traces of it had escaped my memory ! ! ! It really would afford me pleasure now to raise a doubt in my mind, to relieve me from the first conclusion ; and I have put my memory to the severest trial for that pur- pose, but in vain. I find nothing to doubt upon tlie sub- ject. I hope and trust that Mr. Adams's memory has failed him on this occasion ; and that it will not turn out to be a mere invented tale, with a vain hope of extricating himself from a most awful dilemma. But, independently of my own want of memory, I have the recollection of many cir- cumstances (some of tliem on record) to prove that no such correspondence ever did take place. It will be first observed, that there is not the most distant intimation in the corre- spondence between Mr. Jefferson and myself, of any cori-e- spondence whatever between Mr. Adams and any other person. No intimation of the contents of any such letters having been shown Mr. Jefferson by myself, nor any per- son whatever. It cannot escape recollection that, from my extreme reluctance to give the information myself, my letter to Mr. Jefferson Avas intended merely to refresh his memory upon a transaction at a distant day ; tliat my state- ment was not to be laid before the public, but Mr. Jefferson's, in reply to my inquiries, of which he was frankly apprised in my letter to him. I could not, therefore, have had tlie small- est possible inducement to make any other statement to him than that which I believed to be correct. But Mr. Adams alleges that his advice was called for, in these confidential letters, respecting the repeal of the embargo ; and that he was compelled, in reply, to go into tlie statement of the facts respecting the intended separation of the Union, and seems to intend to set up some claim to the credit of that measure. NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 39 Mr. Adams's memory seems to be a perfect blank in regard to the circumstances attending the repeal of the embargo, if, indeed, he ever was informed of them ; the mere recital of which must exclude all ideas of his having any agency in it whatever. The repeal of the embargo never was recom- mended by Mr. Jefferson. It was determined upon by a caucus composed of all the Republican members of both Houses of Congress. The resolution was brought forward by myself ; and, at a second meeting, agreed to, upon condi- tion that it should be brought before the Senate as my own measure, as I had brought it foi-ward to the caucus. To this I readily consented ; and it will be seen from my speech, de- livered in favor of the resolution, that I assumed the whole responsibility of the measure. I will endeavor to have this speech published, or at least its exordium, with as little delay as possible. The debate on the resolution would throw much light on this subject. The resolution made by myself will appear in the journals of the Senate of the 8th of Febru- ary, 1809, and is in the following words : — "Mr. Giles Rubniitted tlie following resolution for consideration; ' Resolved, that the several laws laying an embargo on all ships and ves- sels in the ports and harbors of the United States be repealed on the 4th day of March next, except as to Great Britain and France and their dependencies; and that provision be made, by law, for prohibiting all commercial intercourse with those nations and their dependencies, and the importation of any article into the United States, the growth, prod- uce, or manufacture of either of said nations, or of the dominions of either of them. ' " Mr. Giles also submitted the following motion for consideration : ' Resolved, that provision ought to be made, by law, for interdicting all foreign armed ships from the waters of the United States.' " This resolution was adopted by the Senate on the 14th, as will appear from the following extract of the journals of that day : — " The Senate resumed the consideration of the motion made the 8th instant : ' That the several laws laying an embargo on all ships and ves- sels in the ports and harbors of the United States be repealed on the 4th day of March next, except as to Great Britain and France, and their 40 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. dependencies ; and that provision be made, by law, for prohibiting all com- mercial intercourse with those nations and their dependencies, and the importation of any article into the United States, the growtli, produce, or manufacture of either of the said nations, or of the dominions of either of them.' " On motion by Mr. Bayard, to strike out the following words: ' ex- cept as to Great Britain and France and their dependencies; and that provision ouglit to be made, by law, for prohibiting all commercial intercourse with those nations and their dependencies, and the impor- tation of any article into the United States, the growth, produce, or manufactuie of either of the said nations, or of the dominions of either of them,' — " It was determined in the negative: Yeas, 8; na3's, 23. " The yeas and nays having been required by one-fifth of the Senators present, those who voted in the affirmative are Messrs. Bayard, Oilman, Goodrich, Hillhouse, Lloyd, Parker, Pickering, White. "Those who voted in the negative are, Messrs. Anderson, Condit, Crawford, Franklin, Gaillard, Giles, Gregg, llowland, Kitchel, Leib, MatliewBOn, Milledge, Mitchill, Mooro, Pope, lluod, Smitli of Maryland, Smith of New York, Smith of Tennessee, Sumter, Thruston, Tiffin, Turner. " On motion by Mr. Hillhouse, " To postpone the further consideration of the motion, " It passed in the negative. " On the question to agree to the original motion, " It was determined in the affirmative: Yeas, 22; naj's, 9. " The yeas and nays having been required by one-fifth of the Sena- tors present, those who voted in the affirmative are Messrs. Anderson, Condit, Crawford, Franklin, Gaillard, Giles, Gregg, llowland, Kitchel, Leib, Mathewson, Milledge, Mitchill, Moore, Pope, Reed, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Smith of Tennessee, Sumter, Thruston, Tiffin. " Those who voted in the negative are Messrs. Bayard, Gilman, Goodrich, Ilililwuse, Lloyd, Parker, Pickering, Turner, ^Vhite. " Ordered, that Mr. Giles, Mr. Smith of Maryland, and Mr. Craw- ford be the committee to bring in a bill accordingly." Conformably to the resolutions adopted, and the appoint- ment of a committee, I reported a bill for carrying the prin- ciples of the resolutions into effect : " To interdict the com- mercial intercourse," &c. : containing a pledge, that, in case of one of the belligerents accepting the overture made to both, the other refusing, letters of marque and reprisal should be issued against the refusing nation ; which was taken up NEW ENGLAND PEDEEALISM. 41 on the 20th February, when the following proceedings were held : — " The bill to interdict the commercial intercourse between tlie United States and Great Britain and France and their dependencies, and for other purposes, was read the second time, and considered as in com- mittee of the whole; and the President reported the bill to the House amended. " On motion by Mr. Keed, " To strike out of the fourteenth section, the following words: ' And to cause to be issued, under suitable pledges and precautions, letters of marque and reprisal against the nation thereafter continuing in force its unlawful edicts against the commerce of the United States,' — " It was determined in the negative: Yeas, 11; nays, 14. " The yeas and nays having been required by one-fifth of the Senators present, those who voted in the affirmative are Messrs. Condit, Mathew- son, Franklin, Gilman, Goodrich, Hillhouse, Lloyd, Parker, Pickering, Heed, Sumter. " Those who voted in the negative are Messi-s. Anderson, Crawford, Gaillard, Giles, Gregg, Rowland, Milledge, Moore, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Smith of Tennessee, Tiffin, Turner. " And, the bill having been further amended, " On the question, ' Shall this bill be engrossed and read a third time as amended? ' — " It was determined in the affirmative." Such are some of the most material circumstances attend- ing the repeal of the embargo. It was urged, too, upon my motion at a caucus consisting of at least one hundred and fifty members of Congress. Surely, if such correspondence had taken place, it would have been laid before the caucus ; and surely some one pres- ent would recollect its production and its influence, at that meeting. As for myself, I have no recollection whatever of the introduction of any such correspondence. It was well known at that da}', that, although I supported the embargo, it never was a favorite measure of mine ; and that I always insisted that it should be substituted by some more efficient measure when it had been sufficiently tried, and failed of its objects. I therefore brought that measure from my own views of its propriety and efficiency, substituting a pledge to issue letters of marque and reprisal against the belligerent nation rejecting a just overture to both, the other accepting. 42 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. I have no time now for furtlier remarks. I shall proceed with a further explanation of this most extraordinary exposS, and a further development of other interesting facts connected with it,' — a paper ushered forth to the world, in my judg- ment, in utter disregard of every dictate of common sense, of common discretion, and, I fear, of common respect for truth. William B. Giles. 1 The subsequent papers of Mr. Giles are omitted as immaterial, and as unnecessarily swelling the size of this volume. NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 48 VI. To THE Hon. John Quincy Adams. Boston, Nov. 26, 1828. Sib, — The undersigned, citizens of Massachusetts, residing in Boston and its vicinity, take the liberty of addressing you on the subject of a statement published in the " National In- telligencer " of the 21st of October, and which purports to have been communicated or authorized by you. In that statement, after speaking of those individuals in this State virhom the writer de.signates as " certain leaders ot the party which had the management of the State legislature in their hands " in the year 1808, and saying that, in the event of a civil war, he (Mr. Adams) " had no doubt the leaders of the party would secure the co-operation with them of Great Britain," it is added, " that their object was, and had been for several years, a dissolution of the Union, and the estab- lishment of a separate confederation, ho knew from unecj^uiv- ocal evidence, although not provable in a court of law." This, sir, is not the expression of an opinion as to the nature and tendency of the measures at that time publicly adopted, or proposed, by the party prevailing in the State of Massachusetts. Every citizen was at liberty to form his own opinions on that subject ; and we cheerfully submit the pro- priety of those measures to the judgment of an impartial posterity. But the sentence which we have quoted contains the assertion of a distinct fact, as one within your own knoAvl- edge. We are not permitted to consider it as the unguarded expression of irritated feelings, hastily uttered at a time of great political excitement. Twenty years have elapsed since this charge was first made, in private correspondence with certain members of Congress ; and it is now deliberately repeated, and brought before the public under the sanction of your name, as being founded on unequivocal evidence within your knowledge. 44 NEW ENGLAND FEDEKALTSM. We do not claim for ourselves, nor even for those deceased friends whose representatives join in this address, the title of leaders of any party in Massachusetts ; but we were asso- ciated in politics with the party prevailing here at the period referred to in the statement above mentioned, some of us con- curred in all the measures adopted by that party ; and we all warmly approved and supported those measures. Many of our associates who still survive are dispersed throughout Massachusetts and Maine, and could not easily be convened to join us on the present occasion. We trust, however, that you will not question our right, if not for ourselves alone, at least in behalf of the highly valued friends with whom we acted at that time, and especially of those of them who are now deceased, respectfully to ask from you such a full and precise statement of the facts and evidence relating to this accusation as may enable us fairly to meet and answer it. The object of this letter, therefore, is to request you to state, — First, Who are the persons designated as leaders of the party prevailing in Massachusetts in the year 1808, whose object, you assert, was, and had been for several years, a dis- solution of the Union, and the establishment of a separate confederation ? and, — Secondly, The whole evidence on which that charge is founded. It is admitted in the statement of the charge that it is not provable in a court of law, and, of course, that you are not in possession of any legal evidence by which to maintain it. The evidence, however, must have been such as in your opinion would have been pronounced unequivocal by upright and honorable men of discriminating minds ; and we may certainly expect from your sense of justice and self-respect a full disclosure of all that you possess. A charge of this nature, coming as it does from the first magistrate of the nation, acquires an importance which we cannot affect to disregard ; and it is one which we ought not to leave unanswered. We are, therefore, constrained by a regard to our deceased friends and to our posterity, as well NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 45 as by a sense of what is due to our own honor, most solemnly to declare that we have never known nor suspected that the party which prevailed in Massachusetts in tlie year 1808, or any other party in 'this State, ever entertfiined the design to produce a dissolution of the Union, or the establishment of a separate confederation. It is impossible for us in any other manner to refute, or even to answer, this charge, until we see it fully and particularly stated, and know the evidence by which it is to be maintained. The undersigned think it due to themselves to add that, in making this application to you, they have no design nor wish to produce an effect on any political party or question whatever ; neither is it their purpose to enter into a vindi- cation or discussion of the measures publicly adopted and avowed by the persons against whom the above charge has been made. Our sole object is to draw forth all the evidence on which that charge is founded, in order that the public may judge of its application and its weight. We are, sir, with due respect, Your obedient servants, H. G. Otis. Charles Jackson. Israel Tiiorndike. Warren Button. T. H. Perkins. Benj. Pickman. Wm. Prescott. Henry Cabot, Son of the late George Cabot. Daniel Sargent. C. C. Parsons, " Son of Thcopliilns Parsons, Esq., deceased. John Lowell. Franklin Dexter, Son of the late Samuel Dexter. Wm. Sullivan. 46 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. VII. Washington, Dec. 30, 1828. Messrs. II. G. Otis, Israel Tiiokndike, T. H. Perkins, William Prescott, Daniel Sargent, John Lowell, William Sullivan, Charles Jack- son, Warren Dotton, Benjamin Pickman, Henry Cauot, C. C. Par- sons, and Franklin Dexter. Gentlemen, — I have received your letter of the 2Gth ult., and recognizing among the signatures to it names of persons for whom a long, and on my part uninterrupted, friendship has survived all the bitterness of political dissension, it would have afforded me pleasure to answer with explicitness and candor, not only those persons, hut each and every one of you, upon the only questions in relation to the subject-matter of your letter, which, as men or as citizens, I can acknowledge your right to ask ; namely, whether the interrogator was himself one of the persons intended by me in the extract which you have given from a statement authorized by me, and pub- lished in the " National Intelligencer " of 21st October last. Had you, or either of you, thought proper to ask me tliis question, it would have been more satisfactory to me to receive the inquiry separately from each individual, than arrayed in solid phalanx ; each responsible, not only for him- self, but for all the others. The reasons for this must be so obvious to persons of your intelligence that I trust you will spare me the pain of detailing them. But, gentlemen, this is not all : you undertake your inquisition, not in your own names alone, but as the repre- sentatives of a great and powerful party, dispersed through- out the States of Massachusetts and ]\Iaine, — a party commanding, at the time to which your inquiries refer, a devoted majority in the legislature of the then United Com- monwealth ; and even now, if judged of by the character of its volunteer delegation, of great influence and respectability. I cannot recognize you, on this occasion, as the representa- NEW ENGLAND EEDEEALI8M. 47 tives of that party, for two reasons : first, because you liave neither produced your credentials for presenting yourselves as their champions, nor assigned satisfactory reasons for pre- senting yourselves without them ; but, secondly and chiefly, because your introduction of that party into this question is entirely gratuitous. Your solemn declaration that you do not know that the F'ederal, or any other partj^, at the time to which my statement refers, intended to produce a dissolution of the Union and the formation of a new confederacy, does not take the issue, Avhich your own statement of my charge (as you are pleased to consider it) had tendered. The state- ment authorized by me spoke, not of the Federal party, but of certain leaders of that party. In my own letters to the members of Congress who did me the honor at that agonizing crisis to our national Union of soliciting my confidential opinions upon measures under deliberation, I expressly acquitted the great body of the Federal party, not only of participating in the secret designs of those leaders, but even of being privy to or believing in their existence. I now cheerfully repeat that declaration. I well know that the party were not prepared for that convulsion to which the measures and designs of their leaders were instigating them ; and my extreme anxiety for the substitution of the non- intercourse for the embargo arose from the imminent danger that the continuance and enforcement of this latter measure would promote the views of those leaders, by goading a majority of the people and of the legislature to the pitch of physical resistance, by State authority, against the execution of the laws of the Union, — tlie only effectual means by which the Union could be dissolved. Your modesty has prompted you to disclaim the character of leaders of the Federal party at that time. If I am to consider this as more than a mere disavowal of form, I must say that the charge — which, I lament to see, has excited so much of j'our sensibility — had no reference to any of you. Your avowed object is controversy. You call for a precise statement of facts and evidence, — not affecting, so far as you know, any one of you, but to enable you fairly to meet and to answer it. 48 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM, And you demand, — 1. Who are the persons designated as leaders of the party prevailing in Massachusetts in the year 1808, whose object I assert was, and had been for several years, a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of a separate confederacy ? and, 2. The whole evidence on which that charge is founded. You observe that it is admitted in the statement of the charge that it is not provable in a court of law ; and your inference is, that I am of course not in possession of any legal evidence by which to maintain it. Yet you call upon me to name the persons affected by the charge, — a charge, in your estimate, deeply stigmatizing upon those persons ; and you permit yourselves to remind me that my sense of justice and self-respect oblige me to disclose all that I do possess. My sense of justice to you, gentlemen, induces me to reinark, that I leave your self-respect to the moral influences of your own minds, without presuming to measure it by the dictation of mine. Suppose, then, that, in compliance with your call, I should name one, two, or three persons as intended to be included in the charge. Suppose neither of those persons to be one of you. You, however, have given them notice that I have no evidence against them by which the charge is provable in a court of law ; and you know that I, as well as yourselves, am amenable to the laws of the land. Does your self-respect convince you that the persons so named, if guiltj"-, would furnish the evidence against themselves which they have been notified that I do not possess? Are you sure that the cor- respondence which would prove their guilt may not in the lapse of twenty-five years have been connnitted to tlie flames? In these days of failing and of treacherous memories, may they not have forgotten that any such correspondence ever existed ? And have you any guarantee to offer that I should not be called, by a summons more imperative than yours, to produce in the temple of justice the proof which you say I have not, or be branded for a foul and malignant slanderer of spotless and persecuted virtue ? Is it not, besides, imaginable NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 49 that persons may exist who, tliough twenty-five years since, driven in the desperation of disappointment to the meditation and prej^aration of measures tending to the dissolution of tiie Union, perceived afterwards the error of their ways, and would now gladly wiish out from their own memories their participation in projects upon which the stamp of indelible reprobation has passed ? Is it not possible that some of the conspirators have been called to account before a higher than an earthly tribunal for all the good and evil of their lives, and whose reputations miglit now suffer needlessly by the disclosure of their names? I put these cases to you, gentle- men, as possible, to show you that neither my sense of justice nor my self-respect does require of me to produce the evidence for which you call, or to disclose the names of persons for whom you have and can have no right to speak. These considerations appear, indeed, to me so forcible, that it is not without surprise that I am compelled to believe they had escaped your observation. I cannot believe of any of you that which I am sure never entered the hearts of some of you, — that you should have selected the present moment for the purpose of drawing me into a controversy, not only with yourselves, but with others, you know not whom ; of daring me to the denouncement of names which twenty years since I declined committing to the ear of confidential friend- ship, and to the production of evidence which, though per- fectly satisfactory to my own mind, and perfectly competent for the foundation of honest and patriotic public conduct, was adequate in a court of law neither to the conviction of the guiltj'^ nor to the justification of the accuser, and so explicitly pronounced by myself. You say that you have no design nor wish to produce an effect on any political party or question whatever, nor to enter into a vindication of the measures publicly adopted and avowed by the persons against whom the above charge has been made. But can you believe that this subject could be discussed between you and me, as you propose, when calling upon me for a statement, with the avowed iiitention of refut- ing it, and not produce an effect on any 2'oUtical parti/ or ques- 4 50 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. tion ? With regard to the public measures of those times and the succeeding, — wliicli you declare to have liad your sanction and approbation, — it needs no disclosure now that a radical and irreconcilable difference of opinion between most of yourselves and me existed. And can you suppose that, in disclosing names and stating facts, known, perhaps, only to myself, I could consent to separate them from those public measures which you so cordially approved, and which I so deeply lamented? Must your own defence against these charges for ever rest exclusively upon a solemn protestation against the natural inference from the irresistible tendency of action to the secret intent of the actor ? That a statesman who believes in human virtue should be slow to draw this inference against such solemn asseverations, I readily admit ; but for the regulation of the conduct of human life, the rules of evidence are widely different from those which receive or exclude testimony in a court of law. Even there, you know that violent presumption is e(iuivalcnt, in cases affecting life itself, to positive proof; and in a succession of political measures through a series of years, all tending to the same result, there is an inttrnal oviduuco against wliich mere denial, however solemn, can scarcely claim the credence even of the charity that believeth all things. Let me add, that the statement authorized by me, as pub- lished in the " National Intelligencer," was made, not only without the intention, but without the most distant imagina- tion, of offending you or of injuring anj'- one of you ; but, on the contrary, for the purpose of expressl}' disavowing a charge which was before the public, sanctioned with the name of the late Mr. Jefferson, imputing to certain citizens of Massachu- setts treasonable negotiations with the British government dur- ing the war, and expressly stating tluit he had received infor- mation of this ruoM me. On the publication of this letter, I deemed it indispensabl}^ due to myself, and to all the citizens of Massachusetts, not only to deny having ever given such information, but all knowledge of such a fact ; and tlio more so because that letter had been published, though without my knowledge, yet (I was well assured) from motives of justice NEW ENGLAND FEDEKALISM. 51 and kindness to me. It contained a declaration by Mr. Jef- ferson himself, frank, explicit, and true, of the character of the motives of my conduct, in all the transactions of my in- tercourse with him, during the period of the embargo. This was a point upon which his memory could not deceive him, a point upon which he was the best of witnesses ; and his testimony was the more decisive because given at a moment, as it would seem, of great excitement against me upon different views of public policy even then in conflict and producing great exacerbation in his mind. The letter contained, also, a narrative of a personal interview between himself and me, in March, 1808 ; and stated that I had then given him informa- tion of facts which induced him to consent to the substitu- tion of the non-intercourse for the embargo ; and also that I had apprised him of this treasonable negotiation by citizens of Massachusetts to secede from the Union during the war, and perhaps rejoin after the peace. Now, the substitution of the non-intercourse for the embargo took place twelve months after this interview, and at a succeeding session of Congress, when I was not even a member of that body. The negotia- tion for seceding from the Union with a view to rejoin it afterwards, if it ever existed, must have been during the war. I liad no knowledge of such negotiation, or even of such a design. I could, therefore, have given no such information. But, in giving an unqualified denial to this statement of j\Ir. Jefferson, and in showing that, upon the face of the letter itself, it could not be correct, it was due to him to show that the misstatement on his part was not intentional ; that it arose from an infirmity of memory, which the letter itself candidly acknowledged ; that it blended together, in one indistinct mass, the information which I had given him in March, 1808, with the purport of confidential letters which I had written to his and my friends in Congress a year after, and with events, projects, and perhaps mere suspicions, natural enough as consequences of the preceding times, but which occurred, if at all, from three to six years later, and of which he could not have had information from me. The simple fact of which I apprised Mr. Jefferson was, that, in the summer of 1807, 52 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. about tlie time of what was sometimes called the affair of the " Leopard " and the " Chesapeake," I had seen a letter from the Governor of Nova Scotia to a person in Massachusetts, affirm- ing that the British goverjnnent had certain information of a plan by that of France to conquer the British possessions, and effect a revolution in the United States, by means of a war between them and Great Britain. As the United States and Great Britain were, in 1807, at peace, a correspondence with the Governor of Nova Scotia, held by any citizen of the United States, imported no violation of law ; nor could the correspondent be responsible for any thing which the Gov- ernor might write. But my inferences from this fact were, that there existed between the British government and the party in Massachusetts opposed to Mr. Jefferson a channel of communication through the Governor of Nova Scotia, which he was exercising to inflame their hatred against France and their jealousies against their own government. The letter was not to any leader of the Federal party; but I had no doubt it had been shown to some of them, as it had been to me, without injunction of secrecy, and, as I supposed, with a view to convince me that this conspiracy between Napoleon and Mr. Jefferson really existed. How that channel of communication might be further used was matter of con- jecture ; for the mission of Mr. John Henry was nine months after my interview with Mr. Jefferson, and precisely at the time when I was writing to my friends in Congress the letters urging the substitution of the non-intercourse for the embargo. Of Mr. Henry's mission I knew nothing, till it was disclosed by himself in 1812. • It was in these letters of 1808 and 1809 that I mentioned the design of certain leaders of the li'ederal party to effect a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of a Northern confederacj'. This design had been formed in the winter of 1808-4, immediately after, and as a consequence of, the acquisition of Louisiana. Its justifying causes to those who entertained it were : That the annexation of Louisiana to the Union transcended the constitutional poweis of the govern- ment of the United States ; that it formed, in fact, a new NEW ENGLAND FEDBRALISM. 63 confederacy, to which the States, united by the former com- pact, were not bound to adhere ; that it was oppressive to the interests and destructive to the influence of the Nortliern sec- tion of the confederacy, whose right and duty it therefore was to secede from the new body politic, and to constitute one of their own. This plan was so far matured that the proposal had been made to an individual to permit himself, at the proper time, to be placed at the head of the military movements which, it was foreseen, would be necessary for carrying it into execution. In all this there was no overt act of treason. In the abstract theory of our government, the obedience of the citizen is not due to an unconstitutional law : he may lawfully resist its execution. If a single individual undertakes this resistance, our constitutions, both of the United States and of each separate State, have provided a judiciary power, judges, and juries, to decide between the individual and the legislative act which he has resisted as unconstitutional. But let us suppose the case that legislative acts of one or more States of this Union are passed, conflicting with acts of Congress, and commanding the resistance of their citizens against them, and what else can be the result but war, — civil war? And is not that, de facto, a dissolution of the Union, so far as the resistuig States are concerned ? And what Avould be the condition of every citizen in the resisting States ? Bound by the double duty of allegiance to the Union and to the State, he would be crushed between the upper and the nether millstone, with the performance of every civic duty converted into a crime, and guilty of treason by every act of obedience to the law. That the power of annexing Louisiana to this Union had not been delegated to Congress by the Constitution of the United States was my own opinion, and it is recorded upon the journals of the Senate, of which I was then a member. But, far from thinking the act itself a justifying cause for secession from the Union, I regarded it as one of the happiest events which had occurred since the adoption of the Constitu- tion. I regretted that an accidental illness in my family, which detained me on my way to Washington to take my seat 54 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. in the Senate, deprived me of the power of voting for tlie ratification of tlie treaties by which the cession was secured. I carrived at Washington on tiie fourth day of tlie session of Congress, and, on entering tlie city, passed by the Secretary of the Senate, who was going from the Capitol to the Presi- dent's house, with the advice and consent of that body to the ratification. I took my seat in the Senate the next day. Bills were immediately brought into Congress, making appropriations to the amount of fifteen millions of dollars for carrying the convention into effect, and for enabling the President to take possession of the ceded territory. These measures were op- posed by all the members of the Senate, who had voted against the ratifications of the conventions. Tliey were warmly and cordially supported by me. I had no doubt of the constitutional power to make the treaties. It is ex- pressly delegated in the Constitution. Tlie power of mak- ing the stipulated payment for the cession, and of taking possession of the ceded territory, was equally unquestioned by me : they were constructive powers, but I thought them fairly incidental, and necessarily consequent upon tlie power to make the treaty. But the power of annexing the inhabi- tants of Louisiana to the Union, of conferring upon them, in a mass, all the rights, and requiring of them all the duties, of citizens of the United States, it appeared to me, had not been delegated to Congress by the people of the Union, and could not have been delegated by them, without the consent of the people of Louisiana themselves. I thought they required an amendment to the Constitution, and a vote of the people of Louisiana ; and I offered to the Senate resolutions for cany- ing both those measures into effect, which were rejected. It has been recently ascertained, by a letter from Mr. Jef- ferson to Mr. Dunbar, written in July, 1803, after he had received the treaties, and convened Congress to consider them, that, in his opinion, the treaties could not be carried into effect without an amendment to the Constitution ; and that the proposal for such an amendment would be the first measure adopted by them at their meeting. Yet Mr. JelTer- NEW ENGLAND FEDERAI.TSM. 55 son, President of tlie United States, did approve the acts of Congress, assuming tlie power which he had so recently thoiiglit not delegated to thcin, and, as the Executive of the Union, carried them into execution. Thus Mr. Jefferson, President of the United States, the Fed- eral members of Congress, who opposed and voted against the ratification of the treaties, and myself, all concurred in the opinion, that the Louisiana cession treaties transcended the constitutional powers of the government of the United States. But it was, after all, a question of constructive power. The power of making the treaty was expressly given without limitation. The sweeping clause, by which all pow- ers necessary and proper for carrying into effect those ex- pressly delegated, may be understood as unlimited. It is to be presumed that, when Mr. Jefferson approved and exe- cuted the acts of Congress, assinning the doubtful power, he had brought his mind to acquiesce in this somewhat latitu- dinarian construction. I opposed it as long and as far as my opposition could avail. I acquiesced in it, after it had re- ceived the sanction of all the organized authority of the Union, and the tacit acquiescence of the people of the United States and of Louisiana. Since which time, so far as this precedent goes, and no farther, I have considered the ques- tion as irrevocably settled. But, in reverting to the fundamental principle of all our constitutions, that obedience is not due to an unconstitutional law, and that its execution may be lawfully resisted, you must admit that, had the laws of Congress for annexing Louisiana to the Union been resisted, by the authority of one or more States of the then existing confederacy, as unconsti- tutional^ that resistance might have been carried to the extent of dissolving the Union, and of forming a new con- federacy ; and that, if the consequences of the cession had been so oppressive upon New England and the North, as was apprehended by the Federal leaders, to whose conduct at that time all these observations refer, the project which they did then form of severing the Union, and establishing a Northern confederacy would, in their application of the 56 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. abstract principle to tlie existing state of tilings, have been justifiable. In their views, therefore, I impute to them noth- ing which it could be necessary for tl\em to disavow ; and, accordingly, these principles were distinctly and explicitly avowed, eight years afterwards, by my excellent friend, Mr. Quincy, in his speech upon the admission of Louisiana, as a State, into the Union. Whether he had any knowledge of the practical project of 1803-4, I know not ; but the argu- ment of his speech, in which he referred to my recorded opinions upon the constitutional power, was an eloquent ex- position of the justifying causes of that project, as I had iieard them detailed at the time. That project, I repeat, had gone to the length of fixing upon a military leader for its execu- tion; and, although the circumstances of the times never admitted of its execution, nor even of its full development, I had yet no doubt, in 1808 and 1809, and have no doubt at this time, that it is the key to all the great movements of these leaders of the Federal party in New England, from that time forward, till its final catastrophe in the Hartford Con- vention. Gentlemen, I observe among the signers of your letter the names of two members of that Convention, together with that of the son of its president. You will not understand me as affirming that either of you was privy to this plan of mili- tary execution, in 1801. That may be known to yourselves, and not to me. A letter of your first signer, recently pub- lished, has disclosed the fact, that he, although the putative, was not the real, father of the Hartford Convention. As he, who has hitherto enjoyed, unrivalled, the honors, is now dis- posed to bestow upon others the shame of its paternity, may not the ostensible and the real character of otlier incitlents attending it be alike diversified, so that the main and ulti- mate object of that assembly, though beaming in splendor from its acts, was yet in dim eclipse to the vision of its most distinguished members ? However tliis may be, it was this project of 1803-4, which, from the time when I first took my seat in the Senate of the United States, alienated me from the secret councils of NEW ENGLAND FBDEKALTSM. 67 those leaders of the Federal party. I was never initiated in them. I approved and supported the acquisition of Louisi- ana ; and, from the first moment that the project of separa- tion was made known to me, I opposed to it a determined and inflexible resistance. It is well known to some of you, gentlemen, that the ces- sion of Louisiana Avas not the first occasion upon which my duty to my country prescribed to me a course of conduct dif- ferent from that which would have been dictated to me by the leaders and the spirit of party. More than one of you were present at a meeting of members of the Massachu- setts legislature on the 27th of May, 1802, the day after I first took my seat as a member of that legislature. A pro- posal then made by me, to admit to the council of the Com- monwealth a proportional representation of the minority as it existed in the two Houses, has, I trust, not been forgotten. It was the first act of my legislative life ; and it marked the priiiciplG by wliich my wliolo public career lias been gov- erned, from that day to this. My proposal was unsuccessful, and perhaps it forfeited whatever confidence might have been otherwise bestowed upon me as a party follower. My con- duct in the Senate of the United States, with regard to the Louisiana cession, was not more acceptable to the leaders of the Federal party ; and some of you may perhaps remember that it was not suffered to pass without notice or censure, in the public Federal journals of the time. With regard to the project of a separate Northern con- federacy, formed in the winter of 1803-4, in consequence of the Louisiana cesssion, it is not to me that you must apply for copies of the correspondence in which it was contained. To that and to every other project of disunion, I have been constantly opposed. Mj principles do not admit the right even of the people, still less of the legislature of any one State in the Union, to secede at pleasure from the Union. No provi- sion is made for the exercise of this right, either by the Fed- eral or any of the State constitutions. The act of exercising it presupposes a departure from the principle of compact, and a resort to that of force. 58 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. If, in the exercise of their respective functions, the legisla- tive, executive, and judicial authorities of the Union on one side, and of one or more States on the other, are brought into direct collision with each other, the relations between the parties are no longer those of constitutional right, but of in- dependent force. Each party construes the common compact for itself. The constructions are irreconcilable together. There is no umpire between them, and the appeal is to the sword, — the ultimate arbiter of right between independent States, but not between the members of one body politic!/ I therefore hold it as a principle, without exceptionf^hat, whenever the constituted authorities of a State authorize resistance to any act of Congress, or pronounce it unconsti- tutional, they do therebj'' declare themselves and their State quoad hoc out of the pale of the Union. That there is no sup- posable case in which the people of a State might place them- selves in this attitude, b}^ the primitive right of insurrection against oppression, I will not affirm ; but they have dele- gated no'lSuch power to their legislatures or their judges ; and, if there be such a right, it is the right of an individual to commit suicide, — the right of an inhabitant of a populous city to set fire to his own dwelling-house. These are my views. But to those who think that each State is a sovereign judge, not only of its own rights, but of the extent of powers conferred upon the general government by the people of the whole Union ; and that each State, giving its own construc- tion to the constitutional powers of Congress, may array its separate sovereignty against every act of that body tran- scending this estimate of their powers, — to say of men hold- ing these principles, that, for the ten years from 1804 to 1814, they were intending a dissolution of the Union, and the formation of a new confederacy, is charging them with noth- ing more than with acting up to their principles. To the purposes of party leaders intending to accomplish the dissolution of the Union and a new confederacy, two postulates are necessary : first, an act or acts of Congress, which may be resisted as unconstitutional ; and, secondly, a state of excitement among the people of one or more States NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 59 of the Union, sufficiently inflamed to produce acts of the State legislatures conflicting with the acts of Congress. Kesolutions of the legislatures, denying the powers of Con- gress, are the first steps in this march to disunion ; but they avail nothing without subsequent and corresponding action. The annexation of Louisiana to the Union was believed to be unconstitutional ; but it produced no excitement to resist- ance among the i)eople. Its beneficial consequences to the whole Union were soon felt, and took away all possibility of holding it up as the laharum of a political religion of dis- union. The projected separation met with other disasters, and slumbered till the attack of the " Leopard "on the " Ches- apeake," followed by the Orders in Council of lltli November, 1807, led to the embargo of the 22d December of that year. The first of these events brought the nation to the brink of war with Great Britain ; and there is good reason to believe that the second was intended as a measure, familiar to the policy of that government, to sweep our commerce from the ocean, carrying into British ports every vessel of ours navi- gating upon the seas, and holding them, their cargoes and their crews, in sequestration, to aid in the negotiation of Mr. Rose, and bring us to the terms of the British cabinet. This was precisely the period at which the Governor of Nova Scotia was giving to his correspondent, in Massachusetts, the friendly warning from the British government of the revolutionizing and conquering plan of France, which was communicated to me, and of which I apprised Mr. Jefferson. The embargo, in the mean time, had been laid, and had saved most of our vessels and seamen from the grasp of the British cruisers. It had rendered impotent the British Orders in Council ; but, at the same time, it had choked up the chan- nels of our own commerce. As its operation bore with heavy pressure upon the commerce and navigation of the North, the Federal leaders soon began to clamor against it ; then, to denounce it as unconstitutional ; and then, to call upon the commercial States to concert measures among themselves to resist its execution. The question made of the constitution- ality of the embargo only proved that, in times of violent 60 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. popular excitement, the clearest delegation of a power to Congress will no more shield the exercise of it from a charge of usurpation, than that of a power the most remotely im- plied or constructive. The question of the constitutionality of the embargo was solemnly argued before the District Court of the United States at Salem ; and, although the decision of the judge was in its favor, it continued to be argued to the juries, and, even when silenced before them, was in the dis- temper of the times so infectious that the juries themselves habitually acquitted those charged with the violation of that law. There was little doubt that, if the question of constitu- tionality had been brought before the State judiciary of Mas- sachusetts, the decision of the court would have been against the law. The first postulate for the projectors of disunion, was thus secured. The second still lingered ; for the people, notwithstanding their excitement, still clung to the Union, and the Federal majority in the legislature was very small. Then was brought forward the first project for a Convention of Delegates from the New England States to meet in Con- necticut ; and then was the time at which I urged with so much earnestness, by letters to my friends at Washington, the substitution of the non-intercourse for the embargo. The non-intercourse was substituted. The arrangement with Mr. Erskine soon afterwards ensued ; and in August, 1809, I embarked upon a public mission to Russia. My absence from the United States was of eight years' duration, and I returned to take charge of the Department of State in 1817. Tiie rupture of Mr. Erskine's arrangement, the abortive mission of Mr. Jackson, the disclosures of Mr. John Henry, the war with Great Britain, the opinion of the judges of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts that by the Constitution of the United States no power was given either to the President or to Congress to determine the actual existence of the exi- gencies upon which the militia of the several States may be employed in the service of the United States, and the Hart- ford Convention, all happened during my absence from this country. I forbear to pursue the narrative. The two pos- NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 61 tulates for disunion were nearly consummated. The interpo- sition of a kind Providence restoring peace to our country and to the world, averted the most deplorable of catastrophes, and, turning over to the receptacle of things lost upon earth the adjourned convention from Hartford to Boston, extin- guished (by tlie mercy of Heaven, may it be for ever !) the projected New England confederacy. Gentlemen, I have waived every scruple, perhaps even the proprieties of my situation, to give you this answer, in con- sideration of that long and sincere friendship for some of you which can cease to beat only with the last pulsation of my heart. But I cannot consent to a controversy Avith you. Here, if you please, let our joint correspondence rest. I will answer for the public eye, or for the private ear, at his option, either of you speaking for himself upon any question which he may justly deem necessary for the vindication of his own reputation. But I can recognize among you no repre- sentative characters. Justly ap^jreciating the filial piety of those who have signed your letter in behalf of their deceased sires, I have no reason to believe that either of those parents would have authorized the demand of names, or the call for evidence which you have made. With the father of your last signer I had, in the year 1809, one or more inti- mately confidential conversations on tliis very subject, which I have flattered myself, and still believe, were not without their influence upon the conduct of his last and best days. His son may have found no traces of this among his father's papers. He may believe me that it is, nevertheless, true. It is not improbable that, at some future day, a sense of solemn duty to my country may require of me to disclose the evidence which I do possess, and for which you call. But of that day the selection must be at my own judgment, and it may be delayed till I myself shall have gone to answer for the testimony I may bear before the tribunal of your God and mine. Should a disclosure of names even then be made by me, it will, if jjossible, be made with such reserve as ten- derness to the feelings of the living and to the families and friends of the dead may admonish. 62 NEW ENGLAND EEDEEALISM. But no array of numbers or of power shall draw me to a disclosure which I deem premature, or deter me from making it when my sense of duty shall sound the call. In the mean time, with a sentiment of affectionate and unabated regard for some, and of respect for all of you, permit me to subscribe myself Your friend and fellow-citizen, John Quincy Adams. NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 63 VIII. Appeal to the Citizens op the United States. The following appeal is made to you because the charges which have rendered it necessary were exhibited by your highest public functionary, in a communication designed for the eyes of all, and because the citizens of every State in the Union have a deep interest in the reputation of every other State. It is well known that, during the embargo, and the succeed- ing restrictions on our commerce, and also during the late war with Great Britain, the State of Massachusetts was sometimes charged with entertaining designs dangerous, if not hostile, to the Union of the States. This calumny, having been engen- dered at a period of extreme political excitement, and being considered like the thousand others which at such times are fabricated by party animosity, and which live out their day and expire, has hitherto attracted very little attention in this State. It stood on the same footing with the charge against Hamilton for peculation ; against the late President Adams, as being in favor of a monarchy and nobility ; and against Washington himself, as hostile to France, and devoted to British interests, — calumnies wliich were seldom believed by any respectable members of the party which circulated them. The publication by the President of the United States, in the " National Intelligencer " of October last, has given an entirely new character to these charges against the citizens of Massachusetts. They can no longer be considered as the anonymous slanders of political partisans, but as a solemn and deliberate impeachment by the first magistrate of the United States, and under the responsibility of his name. It appears also that this denunciation, though now for the first time made known to the public, and to the parties implicated. 64 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. (whoever they may be), was contained in private letters of Mr. Adams, written twenty years ago, to members of the general government ; and that he ventnres to state it as founded on unequivocal evidence within his own knowledge. It was impossible for those who had any part in the affairs of Massachusetts during the period in question to suffer such a charge to go forth to the world, and descend to posterity, without notice. The high official rank of the accuser, the silent but baneful influence of the original secret denunciation, and the deliberate and unprovoked ref)etition of it in a public journal, authorized an api^eal to Mr. Adams for a specification of the parties and of the evidence, and rendered such an ajipeal absolutely imperative. No high-minded, honorable man, of anj- partj', or of any State in our confederacy, could expect that the memory of illustrious friends deceased, or the characters of the living, should be left undefended, through the fear of awakening long-extinguished controversies, or of disturbing Mr. Adams's retirement. Men who feel a just respect for their own characters, and for public esteem, and who have a corresponding sense of what is due to the reputa- tion of others, will admit the right of all who might be sup- posed by the j)ublic to be included in Mr. Adams's denunciation, to call iq:)on him to disperse the cloud with which he had enveloped their characters. Such persons had a right to require that the innocent should not suffer with the guilty, if any such there were ; and that the parties against whom the charge was levelled should have an opportunity to repel and disprove it. Mr. Adams had, indeed, admitted that his allegations could not be proved in a court of law, and thereby prudently declined a legal investigation ; but the persons implicated had still a right to know what the evidence was which he professed to consider as " unequivocal," in order to exhibit it to the tribunal of the public before which he had arraigned them. He had spoken of that evidence as entirelv satisfactory to him. They had a right to ascertain whether it would be alike satisfactory to impartial, upright, and hon- orable men. It being determined that this denunciation could not be NEW ENGLAND PEDEUALISM. 65 suffered to pass unanswered, some question arose as to the modc'in which it should be noticed. Should it be b}^ a solemn public denial, in the names of all those who came within the scope of Mr. Adams's accusation; including, as it does, all the leaders of the Federal party from tlie year 1803 to 1814? Such a course, indeed, would serve in Massachusetts, where the characters of the parties are known, most fully to counter- vail the charges of Mr. Adams ; but this impeachment of their character may be heard in distant States and in future times. A convention might have been called of all who liad been members of the Federal party in tlie legislature during those eleven years ; and a respectable host they would be, in num- bers, intelligence, education, talents, and patriotism. Yet it might then have been said, " You mean to overpower your accuser by numbers ; you intend to seize this occasion to revive the old and long extinct Federal party ; your purpose is to oppress by popular clamor a falling chief ; you are aveng- ing yourselves for his ancient defection from your party ; you are conscious of guilt, but you endeavor to diminish the odium of it by increasing the number of j^our accomplices." These reasons had great weight ; and the course adopted, after deliberation, appeared to be free from all objection. The undersigned, comprising so many of the Federal party that Mr. Adams should not be at liberty to treat them as unworthy of attention, and yet so few that he could not charge them with arraying a host against him, addressed to him the above letter of November 26th. They feel no fear that the public will accuse them of presumption in taking upon them- selves tlie task of vindicating the reputation of the Federal party. The share which some of them had in public affairs during the period over which Mr. Adams has extended his charges and insinuations, and the decided, powerful, and well-merited influence enjoyed by their illustrious friends, now deceased, most assuredly gave to the undersigned a right to demand the grounds of the accusation, — a right which, Mr. Adams himself repeatedly admits, might have been justly and properly exercised by each of them severally. Their de- mand was founded on the common principle, recognized alike 6 66 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. in the code of honor and of civil jurisprudence, — that no man slioukl make a charge affecting the rights or character of others, without giving them an opportunity of knowing the grounds on which it was made, and of disproving it if untrue. To tliis plain and simple demand, the undersigned received the answer contained in the ahove letter of Mr. Adams, dated on the 30th of December. It will be seen that Mr. Adams altogether refuses to pro- duce any evidence in support of his allegations. The former part of his letter contains his reasons for that refusal ; and in the other part he repeats the original charges in terms even more offensive than before. When addressing to him our letter, we thought we might reasonably expect from his sense of what was due to himself, as well as to us, that he would fully disclose all the evidence which he professed to consider so satisfactory ; and we felt assured that, in that event, we should be able fully to explain or refute it, or to show that it did not affect any distinguished members of the Federal party. And if, on the other hand, he should refuse to disclose that evidence, we trusted that the public would presume, what we unhesitatingly believe, that it was because he had no evi- dence that would hear to he submitted to an impartial and intel- ligent community. Mr. Adams has adopted the latter course ; and, if the reasons that he lias assigned for it should appear to be unsatisfactory, our fellow-citizens, we doubt not, will join us in drawing the above inference. We therefore proceed to an examination of those reasons. JNIr. Adams first objects to our making a joint application to him ; acknowledging the right of each one alone to inquire whether he was included in this vague and sweeping denun- ciation. It is not easy to see why any one should lose this acknowledged right, by uniting with others in the exercise of it; nor why this mere change of form should authorize Mr. Adams to disregard our claim. But there are two objec- tions to the course which he has condescended to point out, as tiie only one in which he could be approached on this occasion. Any individual who should have applied to him in that mode might have been charged with arrogance ; and NEW ENGLAND FEDERALTSM. 67 to each of them in turn he might have tauntingly replied, " that the applicant was in no danger of suffering as one of the ' leaders ' in Massachusetts, and liad no occasion to excul- pate himself from a charge conveyed in the terms used by Mr. Adams." The other objection is still more decisive. After allowing to this denunciation all the weight that it can be supposed to derive from the personal or official char- acter of tlie accuser, we trust there are few citizens of Mfissachusetts who would be content to owe their political reputation to liis estimation of it, and condescend to solicit his certificate to acquit them of the suspicion of treasonable practices. Mr. Adams next objects, that we make our application as the representatives of a great and powerful party, which, at the time referred to, commanded, as he says, a devoted major- ity in the legislature of the Commonwealth ; and he denies our right to represent that party. We have already stated the objections to a joint application bj'' all who might be included in this denunciation, and to a separate inquiry by each indi- vidual ; and some of the reasons which we thought justified the course Avhich we have pursued. We certainly did not arrogate to ourselves the title of " leaders ; " and Mr. Adams may enjoy, undisturbed, all tlie advantage wliicli tluit cir- cumstance can give him in this controversy. But we freely avowed such a close political connection with all who could probably have been included under that appellation, as to render us responsible for all tlieir political measures that were known to us ; and we, therefore, must have been either their dupes, or the associates in their guilt. In either case, we were interested ; and, aiicli many from tlieir flilelity to tlie Union ; and tliat, to enable its friends to make head against it, the repeal of the em- bargo was absolutely necessary. I expressed a just sense of tlie merit of the information, and of the importance of the disclosure to the safety and even salvation of our country, and however reluctant 1 was to abandon the measure, — a measure wliich, per- severed in a little longer, we had sub- sequent and satisfactory assurance, would have effected its object com- pletely, — from that moment, and influ- enced by that information, I saw the necessity of abandoning it, and, in- stead of effecting our purpose by this peaceful weapon, we must figlit it out, or break tlie Union. I tlion recom- mended to my friends to yield to the necessity of a repeal of the embargo, and to endeavor to supply its place by the substitute in which they could procure a general concurrence." with Mr. Jefferson was in March, 1808. It was impossible that I should have said then what is here stated ; but I wrote, Dec. 21, 1808, tliis to Mr. Ezek- iel Bacon : — " Consider the complication of the case. Two or three file-leaders of dis- appointed ambition, hopeless of conse- quence under the present National Union, and building their castles of personal aggrandizement upon a sep- aration and a British alliance. Under these file-leaders, an organized concert of banks and other moneyed corpora- tions, holding great numbers of sec- ondary characters in a state of de- pendence by the return of discount days, and thus commanding their inaction, it not their assistance ; a leg- islature perfectly under their guid- ance ; a State judiciary, of which you must think what I oannot say ; a mili- tia so commanded as at least not likely to oppose much obstacle to these views; and a plan, long since formed, to seize the first favorable opportunity to divide the States, and set up a New England confederacy. What an en- gine in Iho hands of these people is a system of restriction which turns all the humors of your political body in- ward ! " I have given you the whole of these letters as thej' were written, although I have not felt myself at liberty to publish the letters of my correspondent to which they were the answers. In the rash demand of names other than their own, and of evidence which I had declared not admissible in a court of law, tlie confederates must have been aware that I could not, in all probability, comply with their request, without divulging the secrets of confidential correspondence, — a practice too common, indeed, in our country, but against which I take this occasion to bear my solemn testimony. I give the whole of my letters ; because, to whatever further resentments they may expose me, the occasion calls upon me to meet them; 138 NEW ENGLAND FEDEBALISM. because tliey show the time when, and the manner how, Mr. Jefferson did receive indirectly from me, but without my knowledge or intention, the information upon which he con- sented to substitute the non-intercourse for the embargo, and which, by the blending of times and things in his memory, he represents me in his letter of the 25th of December, 1825, as having given him at our interview in March, 1808. I wrote other letters of similar import to several members of Congress, — to none, however, except in answer to letters from them requesting a confidential communication of my views and opinions at that portentous crisis. Among the rest, several to Mr. W. B. Giles, then a Senator of the United States from Virginia. This person, in December, 1825, — im- mediately after my first message to Congress, expressing from the deepest recesses of my soul the ardent wish for the exer- cise by the government of the United States of all the powers delegated to them by the people of the Union, for the benefit of themselves and of their posterity, and for the improve- ment, physical, moral, and intellectual, of their condition, — seized, with a sagacity peculiar to himself, this golden oppor- tunity to recover the confidence and favor of the people of Virginia, which he had long before enjoyed and forfeited, and which he had recently been struggling, with equal fervor though with less success, to regain by slandering my prede- cessor, Mr. Monroe. " Ut mac/nis inimicitiis clar'esceret " has been the motto of Mr. Giles's life, the greater part of which has been occupied in composing and publishing ribaldry and invective upon his superiors. All the presidents of the United States have been successively the objects of his hos- tility ; and he always reserved his detraction against them precisely to the times and occasions when the duties and the decencies of the station which they occupied precluded them from exercising the privilege of self-defence. If, in the tumult of his patriotic ardor to defeat my purposes of public improvement, he had contented himself with betraying my confidence, — a deposit of twenty years' standing, — it would not have sufficed for his object ; but treachery is the nat- ural ally of falsehood. Mr. Giles's first step in this digni- KEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 139 fied process was to write a letter to Mr. Jefferson, submitting to liim a grave question in political casuistry; namely, whether he (Mr. Giles) would be justified in betraying my confidence and publishing that wliich had secretly passed between him and me. Mr. Jefferson naturally referred the question back to the feelings of the propounder, Avho, reduced thus to his own resources, devised an expedient which would at once absolve him from laws both of confidence and of truth. It Avas to vamp up a tale of his own invention, Avithout a par- ticle of truth in its composition, and give that out as the real confidence which I had reposed in him. By this patent invention of fraudulent disclosure, he pretended that I had selected him to make known to Mr. Jefferson my conversion to the Republican party ; and that, as an earnest of my apos- tasy, I had denounced to Mr. Jefferson, at an interview man- aged by Mr. Giles between us, my old Federal associates as guilty of treason. In all this, as I am to ansAver at the throne of Heaven for what I say, there is not one Avord of truth. I never was con- verted, never pretended to be converted, from the Federal to the Republican party. I changed no opinion ; I de- nounced no associate ; I never authorized Mr. Giles to make to Mr. Jefferson any communication from me Avhatever. He once requested me to call upon Mr. Jefferson, and con- verse with him, as Mr. Wilson Gary Nicholas had done seven days before. Whether Mr. Jefferson had desired him to make this request or not, I never knew. Mr. Jefferson him- self declared that he had not the most distant recollection of any intervention of Mr. Giles between him and me ; nor, other than this, was there any. At a subsequent session of Con- gress, I Avrote confidential letters to Mr. Giles, which he has seen fit totally to forget. He had also forgotten his own let- ters, soliciting confidential communications of opinions from me. His forgetfulness and his invention have equally served his turn. They have made him governor of Virginia for three years, at the close of which he may retire qualified for a new experiment of his favorite occupation of false and inso- lent invective against the President of the United States in 140 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. office. The attack of Mr. Giles upon me in December, 1825, was made in the " Richmond Enquirer," the sink of political faction in the State of Virginia. The ostensible provocation for it was the earnest call upon Congress, in my first message, to give effective energy to the powers delegated by the people for the improvement of the condition of the country. Th e r uling majority of the people of Virginia, under their oligarch- i cal constitution, had, by long and continual party col lisions, b een wrought up into a sort of creed that the liber ties of the people of the Union were in danger inexpressible fro m the exercise of power by the general (g overnment ; and as there was infinite alarm that power dev oted to and re"s"ulting^ n_t^e "improvement ot the~colintfYrwould tak e root in the affec tions -of"'Tlie~peopl e, and become iifesistible, the part y ojTposed~^o the general government seized upon every prejudice and pas- fiipTi nnd| intf res^ wliiah-theyLcn uhll'Oiise into action to^ inTTple JJTft^Xipp.r niinns nf this lip npfinpnf-, p^^wi^ The patriotism of this portion of the people of Virginia was rallied by the cab- alistical watchword of " State rights." T he lurking jealousies n f slavfi i holdnr a w ere e nlisted {i gaip-st the native of aSta te ■v\Jiolly_free. The bone-bred dislikes of tlie cavalier race to the scion from the stock of the Pilgrim Puritans were sum- moned to the array against him ; and the Virginian and Southern and slave-holding mind was thus predisposed to receive falsehood for truth, and sophistry for reason, to ruin the reputation and paralyze the power of a President of the United States elected by one-third of the suffrages of the people, already basely slandered by infamous imputations upon the mode of his election, and placed by his position ujwn a pinnacle to receive the venom of every malignant and every wanton shaft, without shield or spear, or even a sling for his defence. But all these advantages for the assault were not sufficient for the purposes of Mr. Giles. He wanted the assistance of Mr. Jefferson and of Mr. John Randolph ; and he wanted a pretext more plausible, and less revolting to the com- mon sense and feeling of mankind than my ardent zeal for the improvement of the condition of my country, to NEW ENGLAiJD FEDEKALISM. 141 wjirrant him in his onset. Eighteen years before, being a colleague with him in the Senate of the United States, when the outi-ages and intrigues of the British government against our common country had brought us to the verge of war, and when, in the violence of faction against Mr. Jeffer.son's administration, members of the national legislature, to which we both belonged, were shedding each other's blood upon im- putations, in the very sanctuary of legislation, of Mr. Jeffer- son's corrupt subserviency to France, I had apprised Mr. Giles and Mr. Jefferson of a fact within my own knowledge which proved that that same British government, througli the Governor of Nova Scotia, was tampering with that same party, arrayed in deadly hostility to Mr. Jefferson, and using among their most formidable weapons that same imputation, — that he and his administration were sold to Napoleon Bonaparte. I pointed them to the source of the slander, and to the secret and perilous link of connection between the British govern- ment and the internal faction against Mr. Jefferson. Nine months afterwards, at a subsequent session of Con- gress, when I was no longer a member of that body, but a private citizen residing at Boston, Mr. Giles, and other dis- tinguished members of both Houses, wrote me letters inviting a confidential communication of my opinions upon the alter- natives of measures presented for consideration at that session. These alternatives were three : 1, War ; 2, the continuation and re-enforcement of the embargo ; and, 3, the repeal of the embargo, and substitution of a non-intercourse with both the belligerent powers, removable with respect to either upon the revocation by her of her anti-neutral orders and decrees. The party for war was the least numer- ous ; but it was, at the commencement of the session, favored by Mr. Giles. He also, and Mr. Jefferson himself, were strongly inclined to perseverance in the embargo, and the aggravation of it by re-enforcing acts. I believed that this would inevitably produce forcible resistance to the execution of the act in Massachusetts, sanctioned by the State legislature and judiciary ; the next step was civil war. A convention of the commercial States against the embargo Imd first been 142 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. called for by Mr. Pickering, in his letter to Governor Sullivan, published by Mr. George Cabot, and, I believed, had been the great object of that letter. A civil war between the State of Massachusetts and the general government looked something like a dissolution of the Union. A convention of the com- mercial or New England States had an aspect like the forma- tion of a new confederacy; and the prime instigators of these measures were the identical persons whom I knew to have ' entertained a deliberate project for a severance of the Union and the formation of a Northern confederacy, in the spring of 1804, after the acquisition of Louisiana. These were the I reasons assigned by me for urging the substitution of the I non-intercourse for the embargo. My letters, without my/ knowledge or intention, were shown to Mr. Jefferson. It was from them that he received the information which, seventeen years afterwards, under the jackalent light held out to Jiini by Jlr. Giles, he thought he had received from me personally at our interview in March, 1808. In these falsifications and perversions of the transactions between me and j\Ir. Giles, liis purpose was to present me to the public and my country in the odious character of an apos- tate from my party, and an informer against my friends. The transactions, whether public or secret, relating to the embargo and non-intercourse laws of 1808 and 1809, had no earthly connection with my recommendations to Congress in 1825 in favor of internal improvement. But Mr. Giles supposed that my conduct at the period of the embargo and non-intercourse had been the cause of the subsequent public trusts confided to me by Mr. Madison and Mr. Monroe, and, finally, of my elevation to the office of President of the United States. If, then, he could exhibit that conduct, to the purity and disin- terestedness of which he himself had borne signal testimony at and shortly after the time when it occurred ; that conduct which had secured to me the grateful acknowledgment of Jef- ferson, and the profound confidence of Madison and Monroe, manifested by their committing to me the highest and most responsible public trusts, — if be could exhibit that conduct in the light of a base desertion of my party, and a slanderous NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 143 accusation of my friends, — he would succeed not only in rob- bing me of my good name, and in exposing me to the con- tempt and indignation of my country, but would deprive me of all the credit with the nation, and all the blessings of pos- terity, which would be due to the founder of a great system of improvement commensurate with the magnitude of this Republic, and coeval with the lapse of ages. Hut, for tlic attainment of this laudable purpose, ho needed the assistance of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. John Randolph. He therefore wrote to Mr. Jefferson, presenting to him a false and distorted narrative of my relations with him at the time of the embargo, and pretending that he had been selected by me as an agent to make known my conversion and my apos- tasy to Mr. Jefferson. After exhibiting himself in this atti- tude of political pandarism, as my accomplice, he asked Mr. Jefferson's opinion as to the propriety of his exposing to the world, as a tale of turpitude, that which, sixteen years before, he Jiad declared in his senatorial seat, before God and the world, to be an act of honorable and disinterested patriotism. And, knowing at the same time Mr. Jefferson's disapproba- tion of my doctrines of internal improvement, he appealed to his angry feeling for a sanction to this mode of exposing me to the hatred especially of the people of Virginia. Tlie feel- ings of Mr. Jefferson responded to this appeal ; but his moral sense revolted at the infamous falsehoods to which his tempter would have made him accessary. He wrote two letters in answer to that of Mr. Giles; one Avith permission that it should be made public, and the other strictly confidentia]. The letter for the public related to the transactions during the embargo. Still rendering ample justice to the integrity of my motives, it yielded, with regard to the facts, a credence to the fictive memory of Mr. Giles which it denied to the acknowledged decays of his own ; and admitted, as correct, a statement utterly false, because he distrusted his own mem- ory to deny that of which it bore no trace, simply because it had never been there. If this letter had been published during the life of Mr. Jefferson, a simple reference to dates would have enabled 144 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. him to rectify the errors of fact which it contained. But, though intended for publication, Mr. Giles suppressed it, because its testimonial was creditable to me. The other let- ter was an effusion of wounded sensibility, — a passionate invective upon the principles of internal improvement, rec- ommended in my message, the more fully indulged because it was strictly confidential. Of Mr. John Randolph's agency in this honorable consjiir- acy, I shall say nothing for the present. I leave him and his unreproved potations of English porter for a more suitable occasion. It was, then, in confidential letters to members of Congress, written at their desire, and giving them, at a time of extreme difficulty and danger, my advice with regard to measures under deliberation, that I stated my knowledge, though by evi- dence not provable in a court of law, that a plan had been formed by certain leaders of the Federal party, several 3'ears before, for the dissolution of the Union and the formation of a Northern confederacy. Of this fact I have now given to the public evidence, in the letter of Mr. Plumer of the 20th Decembeijast, more conclusive than I had ever asserted that I posses^^fc^ore decisive than the confederates had even ventured wjask. This letter I now submit again, fellow- citizens, to your perusal, and recommend to your profound meditation. Epping, N. H., Dec. 20, 1828. During the long and eventful session of Congress of 1803 and 1804, I was a member of the Senate, and was at the city of Washington every day of that session. In the course of the session, at different times and places, several of the Fed- ei'alists, Senators and Representatives, from the New England States, informed me that they thouglit it necessary to estab- lish a separate government in New England ; and, if it should be found practicable, to extend it so far south as to include Pennsylvania ; but, in all events, to establish one in New England. They complained tliat the slave-holding States had acquired, by means of their slaves, a greater increase of Rep- NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 145 resentatives in the House than was just and equal ; tliat too great a portion of the public revenue was raised in tlio Northern States, and too mucli of it was expended in the Southern and Western States ; and that the acquisition of Louisiana and the new States that were formed, and those to be formed in the West and in the ceded territory, would soon annihilate the weight and influence of the Northern States in ' the government. Their intention, they said, was to establish their new gov- ernment under the authority .and protection of State govern- ments ; that, having secured the election of a Governor, and a majority of a legislature in a State in favor of a separation, the legislature should repeal the law authorizing the people to elect Representatives to Congress, and the legislature decline electing Senators to Congress, and gradually with- draw the State from the Union, establish custom-house officers to grant registei's aiid clearances to vessels, and eventually establish a Federal government in tlie Northern and Eastern States ; and that, if New England united in the measure, it would in due time be effected without resorting to arms. ^^ Just before that session of Congress closed|^^P of the gentlemen, 1 to Avhom I have alluded, inforniSKne that arrangements had been made to have, the n.ext autumn, in Boston, a select meeting of the leading Federalists in New England, to consider and recommend the measures necessary to form a system of government for the Northern States ; and that Alexander Hamilton of New York had consented to attend that meeting. Soon after my return from Washington, I adopted the most effectual means in my power to collect the opinions of well- informed leading Federalists in New Hampshire upon the subject. I found some in favor of the measure, but a great majority of them decidedly opposed to the project ; and, from the partial and limited inquiries I made in Massachusetts, the result appeared to me nearly similar to that in New Hamp- shire. 1 See riumcr's Life of Tlumer, p. 299, and above, p. 100. 10 146 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. The gentleman who, in the winter of 1803 and 1804, in- formed me there was to be a meeting of Federalists in the autumn of 1804, at Boston, at the session of Congress in the winter of 1804 and 1805, observed to me that the death of General Hamilton had prevented that meeting ; but the project was not, and could not be, abandoned. I owe it to you, as well as myself, to state explicitly that, in the session of Congress in the winter of 1803 and 1804, I was myself in favor of forming a separate government in New England ; and wrote several confidential letters, to a few of my friends and corresjioudents, recommending the measure ; but afterwards, upon thoroughly investigating and maturely considering the subject, I was fully convinced that my opin- ion in favor of separation was the most erroneous that I ever formed upon political subjects. The only consolation I had was that my error in opinion had not produced any acts inju- rious to the integrity of the Union. When the same project was revived in 1808 and 1809, during the embargo and non- intercourse and afterwards during the war of 1812, I used every effort in my power, both jirivately and publicly, to defeat the attempt then made to establish a separate and independent government in the Northern States. You are at liberty to make such use of this communication as you shall consider proper. Accept the assurance of my high respect and esteem. William Plumer. To enable you to judge of the force of this testimony of Mr. Plumer, and also of the profound secrecy with which the project of 1804 was formed and pursued, observe, my coun- trymen, that Mr. Plumer and mj^self were both members of the Senate of the United States at the session of Congress of 1803 and 1804 ; that we then formed an intimate friend- ship together, which has continued by correspondence to tliis time ; that when, in October last, the article was published in the " National Intelligencer," upon which the confederates NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 147 SO pertinaciously call for names and evidence, I did not know that Mr. Plumer had been made acquainted with the project of 1804, far less that he had approved and favored it himself. Had I known what he now has disclosed, I should not have said that the evidence upon which I asserted my knowledge of the fact was not provable in a court of law ; that of Mr. Plumer certainly is. Mr. Plumer is venerable in years and extensively known ; a man of fairer character breathes not the vital air. Much of his time has been devoted to histori- cal researches, and his recollections are aided by minutes and copies of letters written at the time. His testimony is entirely independent of mine. The information concerning the project communicated to me at Washington, in the spring of 1804, corresponded in the main Avith tliat detailed by Mr. Plumer. Of some par- ticulars mentioned by him, I was not informed. I heard of others not noticed by him. The author of the written plan was named to me, — a distinguished citizen of Connecticut. I was told it had originated there ; had been communicated to individuals at Boston, at New York, and at Washington. I was not told that General Hamilton approved the plan, but that those by whom it had been formed and was approved looked to him as the military leader in the event tliat for- cible measures should become necessary for effecting its execution.' The session of Congress closed on the 4th of March, 1804, and I shortly afterwards returned to spend the summer at my father's residence at Quincy. On my way thither, I was detained several days at New York, during which I frequently visited Mr. Rufus King, who had then recently returned from his first mission to England. On the 8th day of April, I called and passed great part of the evening with him in his library. I found there, sitting with him, Mr. Timothy Pickering, who, shortly after I went in, took leave and withdrew. As he left 1 " Much of my information at the time was collected from Mr. Tracy, the Senator from Connecticut, who disapproved the project; but was, I believe, made acquainted with it in all its particulars " — ^ J. Q. Adams to W. Plumer, Doc. 31, 1823, published in Life of Plumer, p. 303. 148 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. the house, Mr. King said to me, " Colonel Pickering has been talking to me about a project they liave for a separation of the States and a Northern confederacy ; and he has also been this day talking of it with General Hamilton. Have you heard any thing of it at Washington ? " I said I had, much, but not from Colonel Pickering. " Well," said Mr. King, " I disapprove entirely of the project ; and so, I am happy to tell you, does General Hamilton." I told Mr. King that I rejoiced to hear that this was his opinion, and was equally gratified to learn it was that of General Ham- ilton ; that I was utterly averse to the project myself, and much concerned at the countenance I had heard it was receiving at Connecticut and at Boston. It was the acquisition of Louisiiina which had been the immediate incentive to the plan. I had much conversation with Mr. King on that subject, and found his opinions concerning it concurring with my own ; and, I understood from him, not differing from those of General Hamilton. We agreed, and lamented that one inevitable consequence of the annexation of Louisiana to the Union would be to diminish the relative weight and influence of the Northern section ; that it would aggravate the evil of the slave representation, and endanger the Union itself, by the expansion of its bulk, and the en- feebling extension of its line of defence against foreign inva- sion. But the alternative was, — Louisiana and the mouths of the Mississippi in the possession of France, under Napoleon Bonaparte. The loss of sectional influence, we hoped and believed, would be more than compensated by the extension of national power and security. A fearful cause of Avar with France was removed. From a formidable and ambitious neighbor, she would be turned, by her altered and steadily operating interests, into a natural ally. Should even these anticipations fail, we considered a severance of the Union as a remedy more desperate than any possible disease. But the acquisition of Louisiana, although the immediate occasion of this project of disunion, was not its only, nor even its most operative, cause. The election of Mr. Jefferson t'o the presidency was, upon sectional feelings, the triumph of the NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 149 South over the North, — of the slave representation over the purely free. On party grounds, it was the victory of pro- fessed democracy over Federalism, — of French over British influence. The party overtlirown was the whole Federal party, — the disciples of Washington, the framers and sup- porters of the Constitution of the United States. Their defeat had been caused by their own intestine divisions. Upon the retirement of Washington, Alexander Hamilton, though in private life, aspired to the control of the whole party : but, although bitterly averse to the election of my father as the successor of Washington, he had been deterred by the dread of Jefferson from opposing it. During my father's administration, he had constantly exercised an influ- ence of personal intrigue and management over a large por- tion of the party ; controlled most of the appointments ; and, by the witchcraft of the Mardchale D'Ancre over Anne of Austria,* had acquired an overruling ascendancy over Mr. Pickering, then Secretary of State, over most of the Federal- ists of New York, and over certain influential citizens of Massachusetts known by the name of the " Essex Junto." Mr. Hamilton's system of policy looked to a war with France, and a large army, of which he was to be the head. In this purpose he had so far succeeded, that, by the interposition of General Washington himself, he had attained the chief command, under him, of the army actually raised in 1799. By the death of Washington, he became the commander-in- chief. Precisely at that time, Mr. Hamilton had concerted with his confidential advisers the project of bringing out General Washington himself again as a candidate, against the re- election of my father. This fact has been very recently dis- closed by the publication of a letter from Gouverneur Morris to General Washington, dated the 8th December, 1799,^ and ^ " Le pouvoir qu'a une habile femnie sur une balourde.'' The allusion is properly to Mary of Medici. ^ See Sparks's Life of Gouverneur Morris, vol. iii. p. 123. For Washing- ton's views on tliis subject, see his two letters to Governor Trumbull, dated July 21, and August 30, 1709, printed in the Appendix to Fisher's Life of Benj, Silliman, vol. ii. 381-386. 150 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. which, if received by Wasliington at all, must have been within five days before his death. Disappointed by that event, Mr. Hamilton cast about him for another Federal can- didate against my father ; and finally fixed upon Mr. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, of South Carolina, who had ingratiated himself with him by consenting, though he had been his superior officer during the Revolutionary War, to serve as junior officer under him in the army of 1798. Mr. Pinckney had been appointed hy President Washington Minister Pleni- potentiary to France, upon the recall of Mr. Monroe, and had been treated with indignity by the French directory. He had subsequently been appointed by my father, jointly with Gen- eral Marshall and Mr. Elbridge Gerrj-, on a commission to negotiate with the same directory ; and this mission had failed, under circumstances dishonorable to the French government and highly exasperating to the American people. It was after his return from this mission that Mr. Pinckney gave the celebrated toast of " Millions for defence, but not a cent for tribute," — a sentiment which found an echo in the heart of every patriotic American, and especially in that of Mr. Ham- ilton. In the paroxysm of indignation and resentment against the unworthy treatment of the directory, the project was started of raising an army of fifty thousand men, ten thousand of which were to be cavalry, and of which Hamilton was still to be the commander-in-chief. This sublime project was dis- concerted by the institution of a new mission to France, to which my father, with extreme difficulty, obtained the con- sent of the Senate. War with France, and an army of fifty thousand men with Hamilton at its head, was the political system of Hamilton himself, of Timothy Pickering, then Sec- retary of State, and of a considerable portion of the Federal party, including the whole Essex Junto. This conflict between a French war and a pacific mission was the im- mediate cause of that schism in the Federal party which accomplished their political ruin and the fall of my father's administration. The mission itself was successful. It ter- minated our differences with France ; produced the disband- ment instead of the augmentation of the army ; and prepared NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 151 the way for the subsequent acquisition, under ]\Ir. Jefferson's administration, of Louisiana. But this baffled war with France, and this abortion of the army of fifty tliousand men, was tlie cause of the inextinguishable hatred of Hamilton and Pickering to my father, in which hatred they were cordially joined and seconded by the whole Essex Junto. It was under the influence of tliis hatred that Hamilton published his slanderous pamphlet against my father, — a pamphlet in which, ostensibly disclaiming the intention of opposing his re-election, he used every artifice of electioneering vitupera- tion to procure a larger, or at least an equal, vote for Mr. Charles C. Pinckne3^ The main object of the pamphlet was to procure the vote of the South Carolina electors for Pinck- ney, together with Jefferson. It was hoped that the State sympathies of South Carolina, operating in favor of her own son, would entice the vote of that State thus divided; and, as both the candidates voted for were at that time sujiported for the office of President, if the other Federal States voted for Adams and Pinckney in equal numbers, and South Caro- lina for Jefferson and Pinckney, the result would have given Pinckney a majority both over Adams and Jefferson, and thus made him President; while the vote of South Carolina for Jefferson, with those of the other States for Jefferson and Burr, would have given Jefferson a plurality over Adams, and made him Vice-President. And if this project should fail, and South Carolina vote for Adams and Pinckney, giving them thus the majority of electoral votes, and bringing them into the House by an equal vote, there Mr. Hamilton's pam- phlet was to operate again upon the ballot-boxes of the House by a witchcraft, the experiment of which was actually made, only with a change of the parties, by a series of thirty-five ballots, before the House could make an election between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr. In all these movements of Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Pickering was his devoted and humble coadjutor, and the Essex Junto his ardent supporters. My confederate correspondents have thought proper, in their revived animosity against me, to open afresh this old ulcer, and to trace my feelings towards the 152 NEW ENGLAND EEDERALISM. party of which they are the self-constituted champions to the dissensions of that time. And if this invidious imputation were true, fellow-citizens, what then ? It is not the first time that my filial affection has been made an occasion of taunting reproach to me ; but I must say tliat on this occa- sion it comes with an ill grace from Henry Cabot, Charles C. Parsons, and, above all, Franklin Dexter. Of the thirteen signers of the confederate letter, eleven may be considered as, in their own persons or by representa- tion, Hamiltonian Federalists, or Essex Junto men. Most of them, indeed, would probably not, at that day, have taken a charge against certain leaders of the Federal party as very pointedly aimed at them. They were not then such signally conspicuous persons as they appear to consider themselves now, — authorized to assume the character of inquisitors- general for the whole Federal party. But they knew then, or some of them might have been told by their fathers, that the Federal party consisted of two great divisions, — both bowing at the name of Washington, but divided in their views of policy from one another as widely as war and peace : an army of fifty thousand men, with Hamilton at its head ; and a peace establishment of thousand, with Hamilton an eminent counsellor at the bar of New York. The pacific party prevailed. My father was compelled to dismiss Timothy Pickering from the office of Secretary of State ; and Hamilton's pamphlet and his intrigues terminated in the election of Thomas Jefferson as President, and Aaron Burr as Vice-President, of the United States. The whole Federal party was mortified and humiliated at- the triumph of Jefferson. They were indignant at his treat- " ment of Washington, and particularly at his letter to Mazzei.v They were alarmed for the security of the public faith and ■, the national debt, menaced by the doctrines which his party had maintained in opposing Hamilton's funding sj'stem. They ' were disgusted at his ostentation of deference to Thomas ; \ Paine, the reviler of Washington and of the Bible ; by his I \ formal invitation to Paine to return to the United States in a national vessel. They dreaded the example of his own reli-' NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 153 gions infidelity, strongly suspected as it was of atheism. They attributed to the heartless selfishness of a demagogue his overcharged display of democracy, his partialities to France and the French Revolution, liis _rancor a gainst Great Britain, his jealousies and invidious imputations upon the judiciary. They derided his perpetual courtship of popularity, his rooted aversion to commerce and commercial cities, his fancies that the tobacco-planters of James River were the chosen people of God, his antipathies to a navy and naval power, and his knick-knackeries of literature, tlie fine arts, and philosophical speculation. The morals of his private life, they believed, were not altogether without spot or blemish ; and they deeply resented his political intolerance, his removals from office and proscription of their party, with the unquali- fied avowal that he looked for other qualities than honesty, capacity, and fidelity to the Constitution, in his selections for appointment. The assentations in his correspondence and conversations to opposite and conflicting opinions had drawn down upon him charges of insincerity and duplicity, which Genet had even countenanced in a diplomatic note. Ilia arbitrary detention of the commissions of judicial officers appointed by his predecessor was pronounced by the Supreme Court to be illegal and unconstitutional ; but he paid no regard to that decision. The repeal of the judiciary law enacted just before he came into office, and the persecuting impeachment of judges because they had been Federalists, planted deep in their hearts the stings of political defeat ; and the slanders upon the extravfigance and corruption of the preceding administration, countenanced in his inaugural ad- dress, were contrasted with the appointment to lucrative offices of all the critical votes at his own election in the House, and with the deep defalcations in the treasury, still felt at this day, by the delinquency of one of those rewarded votes. Such were the feelings of the Federalists of both divi- sions of the party towards Mr. Jefferson, at and soon after his political triumph over them. Such were in a great degree my own feelings toward him, aggravated by a 154 NEW ENGLAND FEDEKALISM. deep sense of his injustice and a profound conviction of per- fidy in his personal relations with my father. His address to the Senate in taking the Vice-President's chair ill accorded with his letter to Mazzei, written a year befoie, but not then divulged. Still worse did it accord with his subsequent conduct as a competitor for the presidency against him, and with the purchased slandei's of James Thomson Callender. All personal intercourse between my father and him had ceased, when I took my seat in the Senate of the United States ; and, although my own admiration of him and affectionate reverence for him had once been almost unbounded, a cold and formal intercourse of official station was the only social relation which I thought it then proper to hold with him. His treatment of me was of the same character. In detailing these resentments and prejudices iind bitter animosities of the whole Federal party against ]\Ir. Jeffer- son at that time, it is not my design now to aver that tliey were all well founded ; still less to draw from tlieir dread abode the frailties of a great man now deceased, and I trust purified from all the infirmities and corruptions of his earthly nature. Amidst the boiling and angry passions of political conflict, the precept of Christian charity, " Judge not, that ye be not judged," is perhaps too elevated for the region of human nature. The estimate of each other's motives and designs is not always generous, even between friends. It is scarcely ever candid between competitors and opponents. At the time of which I now speak, Mr. Jefferson's supposed indifference to the interests of commerce, his aversion to the navy, his political, official proscriptions, and, above all, his hostility to the judicial power, festered with inexpressible soreness in the side of Federalism. Mr. Pickering and myself took our seats in the Senate of the United States, in Octobei-, 1803. We had both been elected, the preceding February, by the junction of the two divisions of the Federal party in the Massachusetts legisla- ture against Thomson J. Skinner, the Jefforsonian candidate. One Senator was to be chosen for the full term of six 3ears, and the other for two, — the remnant of the term of Dwight NEW ENGLAND ITEDEEALISM. 155 Foster, who had resigned. At these elections, although the whole Federal party united in the result, its divisions were marked by a struggle for the full term of six years, in which it was my fortune to prevail, — a preference which Mr. Pickering never forgave me. Three, at least, of my present confederate appellants voted at those elections ; and I appeal to their consciences to say whether I was indebted to the vote of either of them for contributing to that preference. The union of the two divisions of the party was indispensable to maintain its ascendancy in the State ; and, on taking my seat in tlie Senate, it was my most earnest desire to act in harmony and concert with my colleague. But the very first measures which came before us for deliberation were for the execution of the Louisiana purchase conventions, and they parted us widely as the poles. Mr. Pickering voted and spoke against them all ; I voted and spoke in their favor. For my conduct on this occasion, I was assailed in the Boston "Centinel"of the 10th December, 1803, by an anonymous writer from Washington. I wrote a private letter to the editor of the " Centinel," requesting the name of the writer of that letter, if he was willing to be known. Major Russell answered me kindly, but declined giving me the name of the writer. Pause with me here, my countrymen, to remark the utter absence of truth with which Mr. Giles has told you that the embargo of December, 1807, was the signal of my conversion from the Federal party to the support of Mr. Jefferson's administration ; and that he was the father confessor whom I selected to negotiate my reconciliation with, and admission to, the true Republican church. At the time of which I speak, October, 1803, four j^ears before the embargo, Mr. Giles was not even a member of Congress. The measures in execution of the Louisiana treaties were the first upon which I was called as a member of the national legislature to act. They Avere of the most important that ever occupied the deliberations of Congress. With vote and voice and heart, I supported them, when every other Federalist in the Senate opposed them ; and, in supporting them, I supported the 156 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. administration of Mr. Jefferson, — supported it upon ground independent and my own, — supported it as far as my duty to the Constitution would admit, and no farther. I believed that the annexation of Louisiana to the Union transcended the constitutional powers of Congress, and that it required also the express assent of the people of Louisiana. They were not a conquered people ; and, upon the first principles of the social compact, the tie of national union between them and the people of the United States required the free and voluntary consent of both. In the speech which I made in Senate in favor of the bill approiniating the fifteen millions for the purchase-money, I marked expressly the distinction between the powers which I thought the Federal government did possess of making the treaty, of acquiring the territory, and of paying for it from the funds of the Union, and those which they did not possess, and which the people of the United States themselves could not give them, — of forming that great and solemn association by which two people are constituted into one. On the 28th October, 1803, I called upon Mr. Madison, then Secretary of State, and inquired of him whether any member of either House of Congress, in the confidence of the Executive, proposed to bring forward a resolution for an amendment of the Constitution to carry into effect the Louis- iana treaty. If this was intended, I told him I should wait for the production of this resolution ; but, if not, I should think it my duty to move for such an amendment. Mr. Madison answered that he did not know that it was univer- sally agreed that it required an amendment to the Constitu- tion : but that, for his own part, had he been on the floor of Congress, he sliould have seen no difficulty in acknowledging that the Constitution had not provided for such a case as this ; that it must be estimated by the magnitude of the object ; and that those who had agreed to it must rely upon the candor of their country for their justification. To all which I assented, but urged the necessity of removing, as speedily as possible, all question upon the subject. Mr. Madison said that he did not know that any arrangement had NEW ENGLAND PEDERALISM. 167 been made for proposing an amendment of the Constitution in Congress ; that, if tliere sliould be, and he should iiave any agency in concerting the measure, he would request the member who might propose it to consult previously with me. On the 25th November, 1803, I laid on the table of the Senate a motion for the appointment of a committee to in- quire into the necessity of further measures to carry into effect the Louisiana treaty. I had, on the same morning, called again upon Mr. Madison, and submitted to him the measures which, if the committee should be raised, I intended to propose. One was an amendment to the Constitution, of the following import : Congress shall have power to admit into the Union the inhabitants of any territory which has been or may be hereafter ceded to or acquired by the United States. The other was a bill for enabling the inhabitants of Louisiana to declare their assent to their admission into the Union of tlie United States. Mr. Madison did not tliiuk tho bill necessary ; tind he thought my proposed amendment to the Constitution too comprehensive, though I informed him it had reference to tlie contingency that it might become applicable either to Florida or to Canada. But he thought it might hazard the ratification by the requisite number of the States, of the amendment, and that it would answer all necessary purposes, if it should be expressed thus : — " Louisiana is hereby admitted into this Union." In submitting my motion to the Senate, I stated, very briefly, my reasons for proposing it. They were, that Congress did not possess by the Constitution the power of annexing the inhabitants of Louisiana to the Union ; that, upon the first principles of the social, compact, they could„not possess the power of governing the people of Louisiana without their consent ; that the object of my proposed measures was to legalize that which both peoples earnestly desii'ed, and for which nothing but the manifestation of that desire was want- ing ; that the legislatures of all the States of tiie Union were, or would be, in session before the proposed amendment could reach them ; that a week would be ample time to carry it 158 NEW ENGLAND FEDEEALISM. through Congress ; that it would remove the only objection, formidable as it was, against the Louisiana cession ; that I believed the proposed amendment would be ratified by the legislatures of every State in the Union ; that there could be no possible doubt it would be ratified by a number sufficient to make it part of the Constitution ; that the assent of the people of Louisiana was equally certain ; and that the whole transaction might be accomplished in time to enable Congress to pass subsequent laws, during that same session, for the government of the Territory of Louisiana. But it had been determined that Congress should assume the power of governing the people of Louisiana, without ask- ing their consent ; and of admitting them to the Union, with- out amendment of the Constitution. No answer was given to the reasons Avhich I assigned for my propositions. No party sustained them. The Senate almost unanimously re- fused me even the benefit of a committee of inquiry ; and, three days afterwards, a motion was made for the appoint- ment of a committee to make a form or forms of government for Louisiana ; Avhich, after all the opposition I could give to it, was adopted on the 5th December, when a committee of five members, of whom I was one, was appointed. The result of the labors of this committee was the act for establishing a government in the Territory of Louisiana, which conferred upon the President of the United States all the powers which had been exercised by the King of Spain in Louisiana while in its colonial state. I opposed the reporting this bill by the committee, without success. It was followed by a bill for raising revenue within the Territory. I opposed the progress and passage of both the bills in the Senate ; and, before they finally passed, I offered to the Senate, on the 10th January, 1801, the following resolutions : — " Resolved, that the people of the United States have never in any manner delegated to this Senate the power of giving its legislative concurrence to any act for imposing taxes upon the inhabitants of Louisiana without their consent. " Resolved, that, by concurring in any act of legislation for imposing taxes upon the inhabitants of Louisiana without NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 159 their consent, this Senate would assume a power unwarranted by the Constitution, and dangerous to the liberties of the people of the United States. " Resolved, that, the power of originating bills for raising revenue being exclusively vested in the House of Represen- tatives, these resolutions be carried to them by the Secretary of the Senate, that, whenever they think proper, they may adopt such measures as to their wisdom may fippear neces- sary and expedient for raising and collecting a revenue from Louisiana." These resolutions were received with temper, rather than opposed by reasoning. Upon taking the 3'eas and nays on the first and second, only three votes besides my own sup- ported them. After they had been rejected, I was not allowed to withdraw the third, Avhich I requested to do ; as, being a deduction from them, it became absurd to vote for it when they were negatived. Mr. Pickering absented himself during the debate ; and then asked to be excused from voting, because he had not heard the discussion. He voted for the Louisiana government and revenue bills ; and my opposition to them, as well as my resolutions, was put down by a triumphant, overwhelming vote. Yet, even then, without the walls of the Capitol, numbers of individuals told me that they had seen my principles voted down, but not refuted. Even then, Abraham Baldwin, Senator from Georgia, came to me in my seat and said, " Your heart is right before God ; your princi- ples and the application of them are unquestionable." Twenty years after all these events, the old journals of the Senate were ransacked to pick out every vote of mine that could be blackened by malevolence ; and I was denounced before my country for these votes against the Louisiana gov- ernment and revenue bills, as proof that I had opposed the purchase of Louisiana, — denounced for denying the powers of Congress to confer upon the President the despotic authority of a king of Spain, — denounced by men who, in the same breath, reviled me as an extravagant latitudinarian of con- structive powers, because I believed that Congress might, without absolute annihilation to the liberties of the country. 100 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. build an observatory, dig a canal, open a road, and institute an university for the education of youth to the pursuits of science and the practice of virtue. Such was my support of the administration of Mr, Jeffer- son in the acquisition of Louisiana, and such my oj^position to it with regard to his first measures for the government of the Territory. The conduct of my colleague, the represen- tative of the Essex Junto Federalism, was in every thing the reverse : he voted against the ratification of the treaties ; he voted against the appropriation bills for carrying them into effect, and for taking possession of the country ; lie excused himself from voting upon my resolutions, denying the right of Congress to govern and tax the people of Louisi- ana M^ithout their consent ; he voted for the bills to govern and tax them ; and he entered into a project for severing the Union and establishing a Northern confederacy. Among the incentives to this desperate measiu-e, on the part of some of the New England Federalists, subsidiary to their dissatisfaction at the Louisiana purchase, I have men- tioned the hostility of Mr. Jefferson to the judiciary. This had been manifested in various "ways, — all offensive to their most cherished principles. At the close of the preceding administration, a new and (as the Federalists thought) a highly imju'oved organization of the judicial courts of the United States had been established. Upon this establish- ment, sixteen judges of circuits had been appointed from among the most eminent lawyers of the Union. One of the earliest acts of Mr. Jefferson's administration was the repeal of this act, — effected, as the Federalists universally believed, only for the prostration of the Constitution in what they deemed one of its most sacred principles, — the independence of the judiciary. At the same session of Congress which sanctioned the Louisiana purchase, a system of impeachment disclosed itself against the remaining judges of the courts of the United States, which was believed by the Federalists to be not only countenanced but stimulated by Mr. Jefferson. It was not then discountenanced by him. It commenced its operations by the impeachment of John Pickering, judge of NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 161 the district court of the United States in New Hampshire, who, from habits of intemperance, had fallen into insanity. Under the repealed Judiciary Act, provision had been made for cases when district judges should be disabled from the performance of their duties, by authorizing them to be per- formed by the judge of the adjoining district. The duties of Judge Pickering, disabled by insanity, had thus been per- formed by the district judge of Massachusetts. By the repeal of the act, the duties of district judge of New Hampshire had again devolved on Judge Pickering ; and upon several occa- sions his conduct upon the bench had been indicative of the state of his mind. He was at this session of Congress im- peached, sentenced, and removed from office, for high crimes and misdemeanors, consisting only of these mental aberra- tions. It was my misfortune to sit as one of his judges, and I thought it one of the most cruel of prosecutions. Upon the trial, I pleaded with intense anxiety the cause of humanity ; and represented, in the warmest coloring I could give it, the extreme severity of convicting, of high crimes and misde- meanors, a person of integrity and intelligence laboring under the heaviest calamity that almighty Power could inflict upon man. But Judge Pickering was a Federalist, and was not in a condition to discharge the duties of a district judge. He was convicted and removed. Upon this trial, the opinions of my colleague, and of all the Federalists in the Senate, entirely concurred with mine ; and I had taken such a leading part in opposition to the proceedings, that Colonel Pickering, in behalf of them all, proposed to me to draw up a paper, to be signed by them all, protesting against the proceedings, and seceding from the final question of " Guilty or not guilty ? " which I declined, as being itself an irregular and disorderly measure. The impeachment of Judge Pickering was merely an entering wedge. On the same day that the Senate passed sentence upon him, the House of Representatives, at the instigation of John Randolph, passed a vote of impeachment of high crimes and misdemeanors against Samuel Cliase, a judge of the Supreme Court of the United Stales, and one of 11 162 NEW ENGLAND FBDERALISM. the signers of the Declaration of Independence. This was generally believed to be a party measure, countenanced by Mr. Jefferson ; and the most ardent of his partisans, in their conversations, scrupled not to avow their readiness to follow up the impeachment of Chase by that of all the other judges of the Supreme Court of the United States but one ; while, at the same time, the judges of the Supreme Court of Penn- sylvania were made to pass through the same ordeal. This persecution of the judiciary power was believed by the Federalists to form a part of Mr. Jefferson's political system. It was believed to be furllior stimulated l)y 2)ersonal aver- sion to the Chief Justice, and by resentment for the decision of the Supreme Court in tlie case of JMarbury and Madi- son. In the political creed of the Federalists, the indepen- dence of the judiciary was the sheet-anchor of Republican freedom. They thought they perceived in Mr. Jefferson's opinions and conduct a deliberate and systematic attempt to break it down ; and they were serioualy alarmed for the only barrier upon which they could rely for protection against proscriptions more terrible than mere removals from ofhce. Tjiese apprehensions were perhaps exaggerated ; but there was too much foundation for them. Mr. Jefferson's radical animosities and prejudices against the judiciary power have had an unwholesome influence upon the public opinions of the American people. They followed him to the last period of his life, and were signally marked by a letter from him to Major Cartwright, published in England shortly before his decease, — a letter which the friends of Mr. Jefferson's memory, of Christianity, and of justice to the venerable names of judges the pride and glory of the British tribunals, have seen with equal pain and mortification. I have enlarged upon this narrative, because the alarm and disgust of the New England Federalists at Mr. Jefferson's anti-judiciary doctrines and measures were then prevailing at their highest pitch, and were one of the efficient causes which led to tlie project of separation and a Northern confederacy. It has been mentioned that, upon my return homo after tlie session of Congress of 1803-4, on the 8th April, at New NEW KNGLANI) FEDEUAMSM. 163 York, Mr. Rufus King informed me that Mr. Timotliy Pick- ering htid been that day with him, and also with General Hamilton, urging them to lake part in. that plan ; which, how- ever, they both disapproved. Three months after that event, on the 11th July, General Hamilton fell by the hand of Colonel Burr. Before going forth to meet him, he wrote a paper, which was published by his executors after his decease, .and which I here transcribe, with a few remarks evincive of its reference to that plan, and to the efforts made to engage him in it : — " On my expected interview with Colonel Burr, I think it proper to make some remarks explanatory of my conduct, motives, and views. " I was certainly desirous of avoiding this interview, for the most cogent reasons : — " 1. My religious and moral principles are strongly opposed to the practice of duelling ; and it would ever give me pain to be obliged to shed the blood of a fellow-creature, in a pri- vate combat forbidden by the laWs. " 2. My wife and children are extremely dear to mc ; \ } p'^ooi]ni] J^jg. George Canning was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. lie declined resuming tlie negotiation of tlie treaty, and the w ar of orders inco iincil and of imperia l decrees was soon waged -to tlif^ annihilatio n of all neutral comm erce. The whole cours_e_ji.nrsnef1 hy__Mrj__Jeffers on throug hout these^ tr ansactions was dissatisfactory to the Feder al party ; and to the commerci al intereg .t.~rTheTregotiation witlTSpain for the purchase of Florida had failed. Serious._guestions as to the extent of Louisiana, as ceded by France to the United States, had" arisen. The^j yre tensions of Sp ain had almost reduced it to the Island of Orleans ; and France had, in no equTvocaTmannerTshownJ^rjEgJp^ the preten- sions ofSpain. A ge neral impres sion was spreading its elf througho ut the Federa l part y, and ^ as now shaj ;edijy_mem- j bers of the party which had sup ported Mr. jefferson ^JJiat F ranc e w as-pi aying a false a nd perfidious gamCjjDfjwJiichJie was flip f|^ip^nr flio insif.rumen^r"~Tho~ power o f_Nai)o]eon - was becoming a sourc e of alarm and terro r to the Federalists in ganeral. They turned their eyes with sympathy to Q reat Britain, threatened bj'- liim with inyasion, and which they considered asTtlie only barrier .i gainst his ambiiion^ ofuniver- . sal "enipiT^; lliey became admi rers of British policy, and devoted to British int erests. The y propor tionallyjiated Nap'o- leon a nd France ; and~ tEey^]conceive d serious ala rmTesT^lr. i, J«££exSQil!s_.pajtiality in his favor should involve the UnitedA StategJjUjv ar with Great Britai n." Ihe reTii sal o f Mr. Jelfe r- son to subni it to the Senate the treaty nego tiated 15y his own ministers highl y aggravated these i n ipi'essions, and was^aJjnost J jirdxer sally censure d. It was not, however, disapproved by. me; for I thought tRe omission of an article to p xotecJLjiur i' seame n from_impr essment, and especially the declarationj \ delivered after the signing of the treaty, ought to be an'. ', insuperable bar to its ratification by us ; and that, if Mr. Jef- ferson thought so, he would be bound to reject it, even if it should receive the advice and consent of the Senate to ratify. It would have been absurd to ask the advice of the Senate, and totally to disregard it when given. 12 178 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. During all these negotiations with Great Britain, the.t fipi- per of the Federal party, especially in New England, hgd contiTmeirto be much exaspeFated~agJrtnsFMi\ Jefferson ; but the whole current of public affairs, and especial ly the pop ular resentments being strongly excited against Great Britain, made th^tiine attDgBther"\inpropiIioui~for aTseparatTQn of the XJnion and the formation of a new contederacy^ There were, however, bosoms in whicTl~the project still brooded ; and in proportion as the difficulties and dangers of Mr. Jefferson's administriition increased were the exertions of these persons to disguise the fact that they were caused by the aggressions of foreign powers, and to impress the public mind with the belief that they were imputable to Mr. Jeffer- son himself. While the commerce of our country was suffer- ing under a succession of vexatious orders of the British council, and under the changeable rules of her admiralty courts, her naval officers were indulged and countenanced in the practice of impressing seamen from the vessels of the United States at sea. This authorized system of kidnapping upon the ocean was practised under the odious pretence of a right in the King of Great Britain to force his own subjects into his naval service in time of war. To the execution of this law no judge, no jury, no writ of habeas corpus, affords to the British seaman the protection of liberty or of life. Its execution is on the desert of the ocean ; its executors armed men, — every lieutenant or midshipman in the navy, under no control but his will, under no responsibility but his discre- tion, interested to seize the man whose service he wants in his own ship, and sure of impunity for the outrage, even if the man shovdd ultimately be discharged and restored to his liberty. The pretence was the right of the king to take liis own subjects only ; the practice was to presume every man a British subject who was wanted. The burden of proof that he was not a British subject was put upon the seaman him- self ; and a native American could not embark upon the ocean, without an authenticated document certifying his name, his age, his stature, and describing his eyes and nose and mouth and chin, the color of his hair and complexion, and the marks NEW ENGLAKD FBDEEALI3M. 179 and scars about liis person, — like the advertisement for a runaway negro. Whenever an American merchant ship met a British armed vessel at sea, she was visited by a midshipman or lieutenant from the man-of-war, at whose command her whole crew was summoned iipon her deck ; and there every man of them passed in review before this often beardless boy, who compared their persons with their protections, and finished by taking or leaving the man, just as his temper or fancy decided liis choice. Fellow-citizens, I describe to you what I have seen with my own eyes ; and I heard a lieutenant in the British navy tlireaten to take a native of Charlestown, Massachusetts, from the ship in which I was, because he thought the person did not accurately correspond with the protection. This practice had been pursued with varying degrees of rigor and of mitigation, according to the temper of friend- liness or of hostility towards the United States prevailing at different periods in the British government. Tiie temper of the naval officers was usually regulated by that of the min- istrj"^ ; and, when the first Lord of the Admiralty was in good humor, the lieutenants remitted their scrutinies, and the mid- shipmen abated of their insolence. During the residence of Mr. King in England, there was much intermission of the practice. A captain in the American navy had been dis- missed by my father from the service, for permitting without resistance, against an overwhelming superiority of force, his men to be mustered, and some of them to be taken, though afterwards restored. At the close of Mr. King's mission, in 1803, he had been on the very point of obtaining a positive stipulation for the abandonment of the practice for ever. At other times, it had been resumed in forms of the most aggra- vating irritBtion. By frigates ranging along our seacoast and impressing men and boys from coasting vessels within our own waters, cases had occurred of vessels shipwrecked, of which the cargoes and crews had perished from the weaken- ing of their hands by impressment of the men. A captain of a coasting vessel had been shot dead upon his own deck by a gun from a British frigate, fired to bring him to, almost in the 180 NKW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. harbor of New York ; and the captain of the frigate had passed through the forms of a trial, only to he acquitted. It is mortifying to be obliged to say that these outrages were not only palliated by a considerable portion of the Federal party, but there were those among them who made no scruple of justifying the British pretensions, and even charging Mr. Jef- ferson and his administration with provoking it by the seduc- tion of British seamen from the service of their king. On the 22d June, 1807, the American frigate "-Chesa- peake " sailed from Norfolk, for service in the Mediterranean. A British squadron was lying at anchor in the same port. The " Leopard," a fifty-gun ship of this squadron, weighed anchor immediately after the " Chesapeake ; " followed her out to sea ; and, within sight of the land and of the squadron, hailed the " Chesapeake," and demanded the delivery of four seamen, three of whom had deserted from the British frigate " Mel- ampus," into which, though native Americans, they had been impressed. The fourth was said to be a deserter from a British merchant vessel. On the refusal of Commodore Bar- ron to deliver up the men, a fire was commenced from the " Leopard " upon the " Chesapeake," wholly unprepared for action as she was, and unsuspicious of attack ; and the flag of which was struck, after the loss of three men killed and six- teen wounded. A lieutenant from the " Leopard " was then sent on board of the American frigate ; her crew was mus- tered upon the deck ; the four men who had been demanded were taken from the ship, carried on board the " Leopard," transported to Halifax, there tried by a naval court-martial, and one of them hanged. One died there in confinement; the two others, five years afterAvards, on the 13th June, 1812, were returned to the " Chesapeake " frigate at Boston. In relating this transaction at the distance of two and twenty years since it happened, will my countrymen forgive the emotion which, upon the recital of it, I cannot suppress 1 It was the last step in a gradation of outrages which it was painful enough to an American to see his country endure from foreign insolence and oppression. Judge, then, 7ioiv — judge upon this cold narrative, twenty-two years after the NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 181 event — of my feelings when I heard this transaction of the British admiral, Berkeley, openly justified at noonday by one of my now confederate correspondents, in a public insurance office upon the exchange at Boston. ^ This, this was the cause, and not (as the inventive Mr. Giles would make you believe) the embargo, or his political pandarism, which alienated me from that day and for ever from the councils of the Federal party. I contested warmly, in the insurance office, the position of this gentleman, — that British naval officers had a right to seize and carry away from an American ship-of-war any deserter from the British navy. The discussion between us assembled a circle of citizens around us, and became so painfully animated that, from that day, there has been little personal interoourse between that citizen and me. Far, very far would it have been from my disposition to revive the memory of this occurrence, had he not thought proper at this time to denounce me before you as an unjust accuser, for charges which nothing but his own assumption had pointed at himself. Mr. Jefferson immediately issued a proclamation convening Congress'to meet on the 26th October, and another interd^pt- ing the admission of British armed vesse ls into the ports ^nd h arbors of the United Stat es. In this last paper, the trnns- action to which I am referring was thus justly related : " A frigate of the United States, trusting to a state of peace, and leaving her harbor on a distant service, has been surprised and attacked by a British vessel of superior force, one of a squadron then lying in our waters, and covering tlie transac- tion ; and has been disabled from service, with the loss of a number of men, killed and wounded. This enormity was not only without provocation or justifiable cause, but was com- mitted with the avowed purpose of taking by force, from a ship-of-war of the United States, a part of her crew ; and, that no circumstances might be wanting to mark its character, it had been previously ascertained that the seamen demanded were native citizens of the United States. Having effected 1 See the Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, vol. i. p. 468, entry for July 9, 1807. 182 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. his purpose, he returned to anchor with his squadron within our jurisdiction." The news of this " affair," as it was afterwards sometimes called, reached Boston, where I then resided, on the 30th June. Wherever it had been known, it had excited a gener.al bursty of indignation ; and numerous meetings had been held of the people, at which resolutions had been adopted expressive of , their abhorrence of the deed, and their determination to sus- tain the government in any measures whicli might be required/ to obtain reparation and atonement. I proposed to a Federal friend of mine that the principal Federalists of the town should take the lead in promoting a strong and clear expres- sion of the sentiments of the people, and, in an open and free- hearted manner, setting aside all party feelings, declare their determination at that crisis to support the government of their country. The principal Federalists, as my friend informed me, did hold a consultation, and declined making application to the selectmen to call a meeting of the inhabitants of tlie town. The government of the town was altogether Federal ; and an application to the selectmen, from the party sujiporting Mr. ^ Jefferson's administration, would have been fiuitless. Mj conversation at the insurance office above noticed was on the 9th July ; and, on the 10th, an informal meeting of the citi- zens of Boston and the neighboring toivns was called, by the friends of Mr. Jefferson, to meet at the new State House. I had so little intercourse with the party, that I was not con- sulted upon the calling of this meeting, and knew not by whom it was convened ; but I determined to attend it, and did so. Mr. Gerry was the moderator of the meeting ; and I heard with delight his declaration that, on such an occasion, if hfijhad but a day more to live, he shoukl feel himself_called uBaH--tQ ,devofe"Tt'ToTTi3""coun tiT. A committee was innne- diately appointed to draw up and report resolutions to be adopted by the meeting. Of this committee I was chosen a member by the citizens there assembled, together with six other persons, — all friends and supporters of Mr. Jefferson's administration. The committee retired to tlie Senate cliam- ber of the State House, and there agreed to four resolutions. NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 183 •which were reported to the meeting, unanimously adopted, and published the next day, signed by all the members of the committee, and of course by me. The fourth of these resolutions was in these words : — " Resolved unanimously, that, though we unite with our government in wishing most ardently for peace on just and honorable terms, yet we are ready cheerfully to co-operate in any measures, however serious, which they may judge necessary for the safety and honor of our country, and will support them with our lives and fortunes." Fellow-citizens, in affixing my name to this resolution, and giving it thus pledged to the world, I did not act without deliberation, nor disburden my conscience with the thought that I was using idle words. And now you have the plain and simple tale of what has been called my apostasy from the Federal party, and what the confederates are pleased before you to term my desertion of my former friends. This was tlie occasion, and this the cause, of my secession from the party. It was done in broad and open day, with the public pledge of my name, and before the face of my country, — done after a fruitless effort by me to prevail upon them to give the same pledge for themselves, and to promote it from the inhabitants of the town. I leave it for you and for pos- terity to judge whether it was I who deserted them, or they who deserted their country. The day after this meeting, a warm Federalist, who had long been my personal friend, said to me that I should have my head taken off by the Federalists for apostasy ; ^ and, from that day, I was given to understand that I should no longer be considered as having any communion with the party ; and, two days afterwards, an article appeared in one of the Boston newspapers formally reasserting the doctrine, that the com- manders of British men-of-war had a right to seize and take away deserters from British ships found on board of the public vessels of the United States. But the honest feelings of the people did not long endure such lessons of national law as that ; and two days more had 1 See Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, vol. i. p. 409. 184 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. not elapsed before a regular town meeting was called by those very leading Federalists who had refused to call it at my suggestion, and for the very purposes which I had recom- mended. This town meeting was held at Faneuil Hall on the 16th July, 1807. I attended this meeting also, though it had been called without consulting me. I was chosen chairman of a committee of nine citizens to report resolutions similar to those which had already been adopted at the meeting on the 10th. Two of my present confederate correspondents — Harrison Gray Otis and Thomas H. Perkins — were mem- bers of that committee. Two-thirds of its members, not including myself, were Federalists. The two following reso- lutions were unanimously reported by this committee, and iinanimously adopted by the town meeting : — " Resolved, that we consider the unprovoked attack made on the United States armed ship ' Chesapeake ' by tlie Brit- ish ship-of-war ' Leopard ' a wanton outrage upon the lives of our fellow-citizens, a direct violation of our national honor, and an infringement of our national rights and sovereignty. " Resolved, that we most sincerely approve the proclama- tion, and the firm and dispassionate course of policy pursued by the President of the United States ; and we will cordially unite with our fellow-citizens in affording effectual support to such measures as our government may further adopt in the present crisis of our affairs." This pledge, it will be perceived, was given in terms not quite so strong as that of the previous meeting on the 10th. But to me it was of equivalent import. This was the pledge of Federalists ; that, of Mr. Jefferson's supporters. I signed them both, as a member of both connnittees. How this last was redeemed by those of the confederates whose names are signed to the resolutions of the town with mine, they, perhaps, can inform you. Leaders of parties who are only driven by the impulse of popular opinion, when they seem themselves to lead, must not be held to a very strict account of connection between promise and performance. I must in justice say, that neither George Cabot, Theophilus Parsons, nor John NEW ENGLAKD FEDERALISM. 185 Lowell attended this meeting. They gave no pledges ; nor were the public journals of Boston, within six months after, without their seasonings of sarcasm upon the compliances to popular delusion of those more flexible leaders who did. Mine was given with a determination faithfully to redeem it ; but it was no adoption or profession of any new principle. It was no conversion. By the resolutions of the town meeting on the 16th July, my friends — if they are so pleased to con- sider themselves — returned to me ; proving thereby that I had not deserted them. It was too much for them to expect that, after twice giving such a pledge within one week, I could ever afterwards learn to justify the impressment of seamen from American vessels by British men-of-war, or charge it to Mr. Jefferson's administration, upon a pretence of their seducing British seamen from the service of their king. It was between this time and the meeting of Congress on the 2Gth October, 1807, that I saw the letter from the Gov- ernor of Nova Scotia, of which I afterwards apprised Mr. Jefferson. It was written just after the arrival at Halifax of Admiral Berkeley with the men taken from the " Chesa- peake." Such was the state of our public affairs with Great Britain, and such were my relations with the Federal party and with Mr. Jefferson's administration, at the commencement of that session, October, 1807. I was discarded from the Federal ranks for having joined the supporters of that administration ' in pledging myself openly to sustain them against this wanton r outrage of Great Britain, — a pledge which they, the Federal- \ ( ists, had refused, at my suggestion, to give; which, within I one week afterwards, by the ovemhelniing . force.^ p.f. the / \ popular feeling, thej were compelled to join me in giving. Congress was convened six weeks earlier than their usual time of meeting, to deliberate upon the measures to be adopted upon the emergency. As a member of the Senate, it was my duty to take part in those deliberations ; and it was the duty of the administration to propose the system of measures which they thought best suited to the occasion. 186 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. The Britis li government disaYO^Yed the a ctof Admiral Berkeley in attacking the frigate " Chesapeake," and taking from her by force the seamen ; but they took exception to tlie defensive measure of the President in inte rdictin g to British armed vessels the admission into tl ie ports and h arbors of the United -StatesTand insisted upon tlie repeal of that interdict as a preliminary to their offer of reparation for that atrocious aggression. The}'' issued, shortly afterwards, a royal procla- mation commanding their naval ofScers to impress all British natural-born subjects from neutral merchant vessels, and to demand tlie release and discliargo of sucli British subjects from all neutral ships of war. And Admiral Berkeley under- went promotion, instead of punishment. After a suitable time passed in quibbling and cavilling upon that reparation, which ought to have been made at tlie instant the knowledge of the deed was received, by Mr. Canning, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with Mr. Monroe, they despatched Mr. Bose as a special envoy to the United States to discuss the matter, through the winter, with Mr. Madison, and to do nothing. Mr. Canning at that time, even more than at the latter period of his life, prided himself upon his satirical talents, which he carried into his official conduct ; and, as a practical sarcasm, almost on the same day, despatclied Mr. Rose on a mission of professed reparation for a wrong, and issued the orders in council of 11th November, 1807. At tlie commencement of the session of Congress, the mes- sage of President Jefferson presented an exposition of our relations with foreign powers as then existing. It mentioned the signature of the treaty of commerce by Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney ; the objections against its ratification by the United States, which had occasioned its being returned to England, with additional instructions to our ministers, pro- posing tlie modifications under wliich it would have been rendered acceptable. It stated that while we were reposing in confidence on this reference to amicable discussion, the attack on tlie "Cliesapeake" frigate, and the subse(juent aggravation of that outrage, till the execution at Halifax of one of the men taken from that ship, had occurred ; that a NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 187 vessel of the United States had been despatched with instruc- tions to our Ministers at London to call on the British gov- ennnent for satisfaction and security ; that the answer might very shortly be received ; and, together with the unratified treaty and proceedings relative to it, should be communicated to Congress. The answer was the mission of Mr. Rose, and the orders in council of 11th November, 1807. The conflict of orders and decrees against neutral commerce had commenced, on the 16th May, 1806, by tlie proclamation blockade by the British government of _tlie_\vlj.olB_£oast of the Eirrppean-Continentj from the Elbe to Brest. To this had been added, in January, 1807, an order inTefdicting all neutral commerce between one enemy's port and another. In retali- ation of the blockade. Napoleon had issued, on the 21st November, 18Q6i_a t Berlin, a decree dec laring tlie—British flliLniiH__La_a_state of blockade ; subjecting to seizure and confiscation all British property found within the territories under his dominion, and forbidding the admission into his ports of any vessel coming directly from England, or having been there after the publication of this decree. The language of tlie decree itself was ambiguous. In declaring the British Islands in a state of blockade, it did not autliorizo the capture and condemnation of vessels and cargoes bound to them. The detail of regulations directing seizures and confiscations was limited to operations within tlie French and Italian territories, and gave no authority to make captures by sea. An explana- tion of its intentions was demanded by General Armstrong, the Minister of the United States in France, who received an equivocal answer. But no condemnation of any American vessel had taken place under it until the 11th November, 1807, — the very day upon which the British order in council was issued. This order in council was jrofgssedljLieialiatorj^jipon the Berlin decree .fif Napoleon. It subjected to cjipture and con- demnation every neutral vessel and cargo bound to anyjDort or colony, of any coun try with which G reat j3r it aiiijvas then at war, and from whichJBritish vessels jvvere excluded. The 188 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. British order and the French decree, operating together, placed the commerce and shipping of the United States, with regard to all Europe and European colonies (Sweden alone ex- cepted), in nearly the same state as it would have been if, on that same 11th of November, England and France had both declared war against the United States. The British order did, indeed, leave permission to the ves- sels of the United States to come to British ports ; and the French decree did not prohibit their admission with cargoes, the produce of the United States, into the ports of France, if they had not been in any British port after tlie publication of the decree. But no American vessel could have dared to go to sea under a hazard less than that of a complete war pre- mium of insurance. The first decision of a French tribunal condemning an American vessel and cargo under the Berlin decree, and an unofficial account of the British order in council of 11th November, 1807, were received by Mr. Jefferson on the 17th December, 1807. The next day he comm unicated to Con- gress the decision, with the British proclamation commanding the impressment of seamen from neutral merchant vessels, and recommended the embargo. Mr. Jefferson had brought himself very reluctantly to the proposal of this measure, which he justly considered at that crisis as the only alternative for war. He proposed it after a consultation of the principal friends of his administration in both Houses of Congress, to whom it was as unwelcome as to himself ; but who, upon a view of the whole state of things, were convinced that without an immedial&-embargo war was unavoidable^ Within three months, under the operation of the order in council, the whole commerce of the Union would have been carried into British ports for adjudication ; Mr. Rose's mission would have terminated, as it did, in a voluntary aljortion ; it would be then too late for an embargo ; and the next and only expedient would have been war. 1'he act for laying^M embargo pas sed throug jij^ts three readings in ^th&- Seiuite_in oiie^ day. It was very feebly oppQBcd.'"'The only struggle made was for delay ; and the NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 189 bill passed by a vote of 22 to 6. In the House of Represen- tatives, it Avas debated earnestly for three days, and then adojjted by a large majority of its members. At tliis distance of time, I remain under the fullest conviction that, had not the embargo been laid, the Avar could not then have been prevented. As the order in council had not been officially received, it coidd not be communicated with the other documents to Con- gress ; but it was the principal cause for laying the embargo. It Avas officially communicated by Mr. Jefferson, by a message on the 4th Februarj^ 1808; and had been folloAved on the 25th November by another order in council, fixing a rate of duties to be paid in England upon all neutral merchandise which should be permitted to be carried by neutral vessels to countries at war Avith Great Britain. It was the tribute to be paid by neutrals, to Great Britain, for permission to trade Avith her enemies. And, in speaking of neutrals, the United States alone were intended : there Avere none in Europe. I was at this time in communion with no party in the United States. The Federalists had renounced me for attending the first meeting at Boston upon the affair of the " Chesapeake," and there pledging myself to support the government in any necessary measures for vindicating the rights and honor of our coiuitry. They had, indeed, Avithin a week afterAvards, given the same pledge ; hut, f,1iR Jp.atf^rs of the dismembermen t, prnjpp.)-. of 1804 hnd not, uuifedjnaivirig it. They had lost their ascendancy for a moment. The orders in couaml_jQl.I^X)yembcr^_J^8075_juid_U^^ restored it to them, and they immediately resumed tlieir sway. TheTolloAvers, Avho only seem to lead, forgot their pledges of the 16th July, and joi ned in the full cho rus of the pack against the embargo. I had no political connection Avith Mr. JeffersoiTor hls~administration ; I sought none. As a member of the Senate, I took an active and laborious part in all the important measures of the session. On the 28th October, — the day after the delivery of the President's an- nual message, — I offered the two following resolutions : — " That so much of the President's message as relates to the 190 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. recent outrages committed by British armed vessels within the jurisdiction and in the waters of the United States, and to the legislative provisions which may be expedient as result- ing from them, be referred to a select committee, with leave to report by bill or otherwise. " That so much of the said message as relates to the forma- tion of the seamen of tlie United States into a special militia, for the purpose of occasional defence of the harbors against sudden attacks, be referred to a select committee, with leave to report by bill or otherwise." liotli these resolutions were .adopted. I was ch.airman of the committee upon the first, and reported a bill for the more effectual preservation of peace, and maintenance of the authority of the United States in the ports, harbors, and waters under their jiuisdiction, which passed the Senate with only three dissenting voices ; but which, after tlie cliange in the state of affairs by the embargo, was indefinitely postponed by the Plouse of Representatives. I was a member of the committee which reported the embargo bill, and assented to it with reluctance, but with a full conviction that it was indispensably necessary to save the country from war ; but I was of opinion that it ought to be only a temporary measure, and that a system of arming, pub- lic and private, by sea and by land, should have been forth- with commenced, to take as soon as possible its place. On the 11th January, 1808, 1 offered the following resolution : — " That a committee be appointed Avitli leave to report, by bill or otlierwise, and instructed to inquire at what period tlie present embargo can, consistently with the public interest, be removed ; and whether and in wliat manner and to wliat extent, upon its removal, tlie mcrcliant vessels of the United States shall be permitted, in defence of their lawful commerce, to be armed against and to resist foreign aggression." I obtained upon this motion in the Senate, only a vote of 10 to 17. I was a member of a committee who reported a bill to author- ize and require the President of the United States to cause to be prepared for service the frigates and other armed ves- NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 191 sels of tlic Uiiitetl States. Tliis bill passed the Senate by a vote of 21 to 5, but did not pass the House of Representa- tives. The British orders in council of November were soon fol- lowed by a decree of Napoleon, issued at Milan, dated 17th December, 1807, professedly retaliatory upon them; which, declared every sMp; to wh atsoeve r natio Q bel onging, which should have submitted to be searched _ by an English ship, or to a voya ge to En g land7"oF"s^ iJd JiM£--pfti^aiTr-i^cjio^ British— gQ£exnm€n4T--d£iialiQiialized_iUKL_&ubject--t^^ and condemnation. The British Islands Avere declared to be in a state of blockade by land and sea, and every vessel bound to or from British ports was alike subject to capture and con- fiscation. These successive acts of the British and French gov- ernments,---incompatible with the existence of any neutral commerce, were communicated to Congress by successive messages of the President, on the 2d, 25th, and 2Gth February, 17th and 22d March, and on the 2d April. He communi- cated, also, the ineffectual remonstrances of the ministers of the United States in France and England against them. The diplomatic chicanery of Mr. Rose's mission terminated by the rupture of his negotiation, about the 20th February; and, on the 25th March, an act of Parliament gave the sanction of British law to the orders in council of November. Spain had issued decrees of the same purport with those of Napo- leo^^Mr. Jefferson's messages recommended an augmenta- f tioii of the army, and an additional establishment for the \ military academy at West Point ; both of which were author- ized by acts of Congress. ^ The emljiirgo ^vas ^the signa Hoi-thfl-jesilxnBtipn ol t-he pro- j opt. nf IRfl jj^fvr p. sppnTntirfR- of^^h*^ St.n.t.P^_ g,nd the fo rmation of_aiJie5JL,confederacy. The means 3 y -vduch it was to be effecied__:sEas-_by_5rganizing resista2ice_again§.t ^airm£>rity-«£ t-hg-fegislatules ot thf>"Sta-tesjiiost_affected^y it, agd ^ by form ing^ an a a acmb ljmL delegates fro rn_those l,e^isla- tures to act as a constit uent Congress. itTiaS''5een seen, from the foregoing narrative, that, from I 192 - NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. the spring of iSM^when the project had been formed, until this time, every occiiKj;ence in public affairs had been unfa- vorable to its executiorhv The successive altercations with Great Britain, both with regard to the impressment of sea- men and to the aggressions . ^on neutral commerce, had hitherto turned the tide of popular opinion against Great Britain ; and although in her contest with Napoleon all the sym pathies of the Federalists were in her favor , and although a remnant of attachment to her institutions, her laws, lan- guage, literature, ancT manners, had lingered in theTninds'of herjleacfiiidants^^ancl were usedlisTnanageaBTe prejudices by able writers and statesmen, they could not altogether coun- teract the resentments excited by her outrages, nor look to her for a standard auxiliary to that of New England. But the slave_representation of the Sojith ; the rapidly^growing PQ]jul ation, pQw erTaTidiirfluCTice of the West ; the apparent coalition of those t\vo inter ests~againsl the interests of com- merce, and especiall y of New England ; the immense^ accession to their po wer by the acquisitioiT'o f Louisiana, and its conse- qdea££Sj_the hatred_oOIr^effersonandJii§_£rinciples, — still rankled in tlie bosoms wliere tlieyTiad first been planted, and were in no wise assuaged, either by the continued proscription of Federalism which marked all his appointments to office, or by the personal consideration which might have justified a more popular selection of those to whom his favors were ex- tended. With a few exceptions^ the great mass of the talents of New England was Federal. ^The colleges, the clergy, the principal lawyers (including tW judges), the wealthy mer- chants, were almost universally of that denominatioiT>t By the partialities of party feeling, they had persuaded EFiem- selves that they possessed all the talents ; and tlie delinquen- cies of certain individuals of ]\Ir. Jefferson's appointment, as well as of others who had risen to power in the State govern- ment of Massachusetts after its conversion to Democracy, led them far to the conclusion, that all tlig honesty_of_the coointry was also with th^m. ( To tliis was now added a new mania ; [for it scarcely deserves another name. The Federalists, from a very early period, had been shocked and disgusted with the NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 193 progress of the French Revolution, \yhich had been viewed with favor, cheered, and almost recommended to the imitation! jof our own country, by Mr. Jefferson and his partisans. This revolution, commenced under the auspices of liberty, equal- ity, and fraternity, then prosecuted under those of a ferocious and frantic democracy, had now declined into a rank, hered- itary, military despotism, with a soldier of fortune at it-s head, whose fortune had turned his own, — who had conquered already great part of Europe, and was proclaiming to the world his day-dreams of universal empire. \ \\ Mr. .Jefferson had no partialities for Am, or for his impe- rial or his iron crown. But Mr. Jefferson's political system! considered France as then, at least, the natural ally of the! United States ; and he had purchased Louisiana from tlifsj I government of Napoleon. The Federalists had always con-' sidered France with some jealousy and suspicion. They now looked upon the French Revolution as a great imposture, — a calamity to the human species ; and they observed the character and career of Napoleon with terror and abhorrence. > He had conquered Italy, subdued the Netherlands, dismem-' bered Prussia and Germany, humbled Austria, and intimi- dated Russia. Great Britain herself had cowered before him at the peace of Amiens; and he had recommenced the war against her, with threats of invasion at which the stoutest hearts of her statesmen had trembled within them. Partak- ing something of the panic themselves, they infused it (from motives of policy as well as of patriotism) throughout the nation ; and they proclaimed and preached, over the whole civilized world, that they were fighting, not only for their own existence, but for the liberties of mankind, and that Britain was the last and only barrier against the universal conqueror. It was under this pretence, too, that they trampled upon all the rights of neutrality ; and, disguising the fact that the first example of outrage upon them had been set by themselves, affected to justify every step of their own licenses of robbery by the pretext that they were mere retaliations upon the Berlin and Milan decrees. The extent to which the Feder- alists yielded their assent to these mystifications would at' 13 194 NEW ENGLAND PEDEKALISM. this day be incredible. They seem to have been entirely forgotten by my confederate correspondents, when they in- dulge their merriment at my credulity for believing that the letter from the Governor of Nova Scotia could possibly be calculated for effect ; and, if they were not recorded — indeli- bly recorded — in the works of Fisher Ames, I might well be apprehensive of receiving a peremptory call for names and evidence, upon penalty of being branded as an unjust accuser for remembering the toast of " The world's last hope, the Fast-anchored Isle," or the political homily upon the "bul-' wark of our holy religion." With these sentiments prevailing almost universally among the Federalists of New England, the projectors of the North- ern confederacy of 1804 recommenced their operations. The moment selected for them was that when, by the pressure of the orders and decrees of both the belligerent i)o\vcrs, the govern- ment of the United States was placed in the most imminent peril of war. Tlie refusal of the British government to resume the negotiation of the commercial treaty, the proc- lamation commanding the impressment of British seamen from neutral mercliant vessels, and the mission of Mr. Rose, professedly to adjust the affair of the " Leopard and Ches- apeake," were contemporaneous measures. They were an- nounced by Mr. Canning to Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, by notes full of that disingenuous sophistry, overbearing arro- gance, and cutting sarcasm, which, at that period, marked the character of all that statesman's official communications, and to which, even at the last and most brilliant period of his life, he never rose entirely superior. His conduct towards ] the United States at that time was as offensive in form as it ' was unjust and hostile in substance. That of the French government was equally insupportable, and even more openly insulting. Each of the parties reproached the American gov- ernment for submitting to the lawless depredations of the other. The government of the United States needed the pulse of every heart, and the aid of every hand, in support of the interests of the country, when Timothy' Pickering hurled a firebrand upon the stage. The embargo had been two NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 195 /months in operation. It saved the commerce and tlie seamen'^ of the Union from depredation ; bnt it choked up all the chan-/ ncls of trade. It relieved Great Britain from the odinm of . general depredations ; but, by interrupting all commercial I speculations, it performed itself much of that which foreign/ oppression could no longer accomi^lish. The situation of the administration was in the higliest degree perilous and dis- tressing. Mr. Rose, after putting forth an inadmissible pre- liminary condition to any offer of satisfaction for the outrage upon the " Chesapeake," could only refer to his government the proposition made by Mr. Madison. Mr. Pickering waited until it was ascertained that Mr. Rose's negotiation woidd fail, and then wrote a letter to the Governor of Massachu- setts, denouncing the embargo, and calling for a joint resist- ance .against it by the commercial States. This letter was, both in form and substance, an appeal from the government ot the Union to the government of the State of Massachusetts, with the avowed purpose of stimulating the power of the separate State to a resistance of force against a law of the Union ; and it contained the first proposal for a concert of the commercial States for the same purpose. It was the project of 1804, reproduced by the same individual who had then ineffectually urged Alexander Hamilton and Rufus King to take part in the same design. The letter of Mr. Pickering was unexampled, and in prin- ciple unconstitutional. Under the Congress of the confeder- ation, that body was a diplomatic assembly of representatives of separate States. The Senate of the United States is a branch of the legislature ; and each Senator is a representative, not of a single State, but of the whole Union. His vote is not the vote of his State, but his own individually ; and his constit- uents have not even the power of recalling him, nor of con- trolling his constitutional action by their instructions. No instance had in twenty years before — that is, since the exist- ence of the Constitution of the United States — occurred of such an appeal by a Senator of the United States to the gov- ernment of the State by whose legislature he had been chosen. Its principle Avas itself a dissolution of the Union, — a transfer 196 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. of the action of the national government to that of the separate States, upon objects exclusively delegated to the authority of the Union. Mr. Pickering in that letter made no direct personal allu- sion to me ; but it was in substance a rancorous denunciation of me and of my conduct in the Senate, before our common constituents, the legislature of Massachusetts. It was pre- pared precisely in time to operate upon the elections tlien approaching to the legislature of the State ; and that legisla- ture was to elect a Senator for the expiration of my term of service, which would be on the then next 3d of March. In this purpose of the letter, Mr. Pickering was successful. The Governor of Massachusetts declined communicating his letter to the legislature ; upon which Mr. Pickering, through his usual confidential correspondent at Boston, Mr. George Cabot, afterwards president of the Hartford Convention, published it about the 10th March, 1808. I have never doubted that the object of Mr. Pickering was the ultimate substitution of a Northern confederacy, in alli- ance with Great Britain, for that of the United States ; and I had many reasons for believing that Mr. James Hillhouse, then a Senator from the State of Connecticut, concurred with him in these views. In his conversation, indeed, he did not disguise that such were his theoretical opinions ; and I had reason to believe that he was well acquainted with and fully approved the project of 1804. On the 12th April, 1808, this gentleman submitted to the Senate sundry resolutions for the amendment of the Consti- tution of the United States, which, in the journal of that day, it is said, were read for consideration. They were accom- panied by a written dissertation, which Mr. Hillhouse read in his place, and which occupied him nearly two hours in read- ing. The resolutions formed the basis of a constitution totally different from that of the United States. Mr. Hill- house is a man of keen intelligence. It was impossible that he should have imagined there was the remotest possibility that his propositions could obtain a vote of one-fifth of eitlier House of Congress. Yet he was not a man to waste his time NICW KNGLAND IfEUEUALlSM. 197 and talents upon mere unpurposed political speculation. After lie had read his dissertation, in the jocular familiarity with which very serious ojiinions are sometimes conveyed I said to a friend, — I believe to himself, — " it was the constitution for the Northern confederacy." Mr. Ilillhouse never after- wards brought his resolutions before the Senate of the United States ; but some trace of them may be found in the amend- ments to the Constitution proposed by the Hartford Conven- tion, though he was not a member of that body.* I liave said that, in supporting the embargo and the other prominent measures of Mr. Jefferson's administration at this session of Congress, I had been disconnected from all parties. In the month of January, 1808, I received, however, the cir- cular invitation to attend the meeting of Republican members of both Houses of Congress, to fix upon candidates for the office of President and Vice-President at the ensuing election ; and did attend that meeting, and voted at it for George Clinton as President ; and, the majority of votes for that office having been for Mr. Madison, I voted also for Mr. Clinton as Vice-President, that being the office which he then held. I sought no personal intercourse upon public affairs with Mr. Jefferson, or an}' member of his administration. Mr. Giles was generally considered as the most confidential member of the Senate ; and Mr. Wilson Cary Nicholas, of the House of Representatives. I have related the interviews I had with Mr. Nicholas, which were at his own request. With Mr. Giles I was sitting, almost every day throughout the session, upon committees, preparatory to the important measures of the session. I never gave him the most distant idea that I had changed any one political opinion that I had ever enter- tained, or that I had any desire of conciliation with Mr. Jeiferson, or of being admitted to the party consultations of his friends. Mr. Giles himself became very confidential in his communications to me with regard to persons as well as measures ; but I have never betrayed his confidence ; and, to avoid all possible misconstructions of my motives in the cor- dial and earnest support which I gave to the measures of the ' Tliis is an error. Mr. Hillhouse was a member of the Convention. See his letter, p. 420. 198 NEW ENGLAND FEDEKALISM. administration, I assured liim that I had no personal object to ask or desire from that administration whatever. I said the same to others of both parties, and particularly to my friend Mr. Quincy, then a member of the House of Representatives. On the 1st of February, 1808, he requested of me a private interview at his chamber, and there inquired of me the motives of my conduct ; which I exposed to him with the utmost candor. " He said to me that my principles were too pure for those with whom I was acting, and that they would not thank me for them. I told him I did not want their thanks. He said they would not value me the more for them. I told him I cared not whether they valued me for them or not. My character (such as it was) must stand upon its own ground, and not upon the bolstering of any man or party. I fully opened to him my motives for supf)orting the administration at this crisis, and my sense of the danger which a spirit of opposition at this time is bringing upon the Union. I told him where that opposition, in case of war, must in its nature end ; either in a civil war, or in a dissolu- tion of the Union, with the Atlantic States in subserviency to Great Britain ; that to resist this I was ready to risk, if necessary, every thing I have in life, and even life itself. I intimated to him that he would be called perhaps, erelong, to make the election which side he would take, too. He said he did not see the prospect in the same light ; but, if he did, he should also be ready to meet that question when it came. He did not say which side he should take." This passage in inverted commas is a literal copy of a memorandum of the conversation made by me at the time. I said nothing in this conversation to Mr. Quincy of the dis- union project of 1804. It was six weeks before the appear- ance of Mr. Pickering's embargo letter. I spoke of the inevitable tendency of the opposition, in the event of a war. My countrymen, go back with me to that day ; take into view the situation of our country under the British orders in coun- cil of Nuvcnd)cr, 1807 ; tlio impressment proclamation ; the refusal to continue commercial negotiations ; the insulting language of Mv. Canning, and the paltering mission of Mr. Rose ; the Berlin and Milan decrees of Napoleon, and the NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 199 insolence of Champagny, liis mi)iister, outrivalling that of Canning, — and ask my confederate correspondents now to tell you to what other possible result an opposition like that then carried on against Mr. Jefferson's administration could arrive, other than that which I then foretold to Mr. Quincy. Re- member that this was close upon seven years before the Hartford Convention. Remember that this opposition was continued in the same spirit and under the same professions, from the day of this interview till the day of the ratification of tlie peace of Ghent ; and what said the Hartford Convention itself, on the 5th January, 1815, was to be the consequence, if the war with Great Britain should be continued under such circumstances as, they well knew, it must have been if at all ? " This Convention will not trust themselves to express their conviction of the catastrophe to which such a state of things inevitably tends." But that which the Convention would not trust themselves to express is very clearly stated by Mr. James Lloyd, in a letter to my father, dated 8th March, 1815, from which the following is an extract : — " It was not, however, the storm that howled along the lakes or upon the seaboard that created the apprehension of an instant for the fate of the contest ; but it was the hidden fire that was rumbling within our own bosoms, and which, under the continuance of the war, would, I believe, have made our country the theatre of domestic convulsions as well as of foreign warfare, and perhaps, from its effects, would have offered up some parts of it as no very difficult prey to the mercy of the enemy." It was within a month after this interview of mine with Mr. Quincy, and immediately iifter it was ascertiiiiied that /Mr. Rose's mission would come to no satisfactory conclusion, that Mr. Barent Gardinier, a member of the House of RepreA sentatives, charged a majority of that body with a subserviency J ito Napoleon equal to that of the Council of Five Hundred to/ the first consul. The consequence of which was a personal insult to Mr. Gardinier in the House ; which he resented by a challenge ; and a duel followed, which nearly terminated his 200 NEW ENGLAND FEDEKAL[SM. life. Two days after that event (as I have already related), Mr. Wilson Gary Nicholas requested two successive inter- views with me ; at the second of which he desired me to call upon Mr. Jefferson, as well to apprise liim of the fact of the letter which I had seen from the Governor of Nova Scotia,./ as to satisfy me, from the declaration of Mr. Jefferson himself, that the charges against him of his being under sub- serviency to France were utterly without foundation. Mr. Giles, a week afterwards, repeated this request ; and I calledj upon Mr. Jefferson on the 15th March. Mr. Pickering's first embargo letter had not then appeared. I received a printed copy of it the next day from Boston ; and I answered it by a letter addressed to the first of my now confederate correspondents, dated on the 30th of the same month. He had, on the 16th July preceding, joined in giving the solemn pledge of support to Mr. Jefferson's administration in all measures necessary for obtaining reparation to the national honor for the outrageous attack upon the " Chesa- peake." Mr. Pickering had not ; nor had Mr. Cabot. That outrage was not repaired. Others, grievous and heavy, had been lieaped upon it, in quick and melancholy succession. I did hope that a man bearing the name of Otis would shrink from the sorry task of justifying or palliating the impressment of American seamen from an American ship ; would scorn the subterfuge of winking away the orders in council of No- vember, as causes of the embargo, because the embargo was laid without waiting for a diplomatic authentication of them imder the great seal ; would spurn at the petty artifice of holding Mr. Jefferson responsible for the atrocities of Napoleon^ Bonaparte. I did hope he would have eyes to see that oppo- sition, upon tlie plan marked out in Mr. Pickering's letter, could lead to nothing but civil war or disunion ; and that, see- ing it, he would disdain to be blown about by every flaw of momentary and local opinion ; that, true to his pledge of the 10th July, he would listen to nothing but tlie voice of his country, and would take the lead to which his talents called him, give party gibberish to the winds, and speak with the voice of Demosthenes for the rights, for the honoi-, for the interests, of his country against foreign aggression. NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 201 Oh I if the spirit of J.ames Otis had then animated liis soul, he never would have been reduced to the task of disavowing the deeds, and of composing panegyrics upon tlie patriotism, „Qf the Hcartford Convention. It did not so seem good to him. At that trying hour, it was not British impressment, not the burning disgrace of the attack upon the " Chesapeake," not the British orders in council, not the galling insolence of Mr. Canning's correspondence, — against which he felt it his duty to raise his voice and hand. No : it was Mr. Jefferson and the >^mbfirgo. He took his system of politics from Mr. Pickering's embargo letter. He pursued that system till its extinction. It landed him in the Hartford Convention, in formal recom- mendations to the State legislatures to pass laws directly resisting the laws of the Union, and in " not daring to express" what was to follow if the war should be continued. Mr. Otis is not one of those whom I ever heard or believed to have been engaged in the project of 1804. That he h.ad never heard of it, he now so solemnly declares that I caiuiot disbelieve him ; but he must give me leave to say, that, if he did not, he little knew the rudder by which his own sailing courses were regulated from the publication of Mr. Picker- ing's embargo letter till the proclamation of the peace of Ghent. My acquaintance with Mr. Otis is of more than forty 3'ears' standing ; there are ties of private relation between us, which I had hoped he would never tear asunder. They can- not now be severed without a pang to me scarcely less than that which cracks the cordage of the heart. How long it has been since he has seen fit to look at me as an adder in his path is best known to himself, — perhaps not unknown to me. But, for forty years and more, his deportment to me personally has been that of courtesy and kindness, and his professions those of friendship. There was something even of intimacy between us in youth ; and, whatever his jealousies and suspicions may have whispered, never once in my life have I crossed the path of liis ambition, — not even when the numbers of " One of the Convention " were preparing the way for a diplomatic mission to France.^ In his associated letter to me, and in his 1 See Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, vol. ix. 187. 202 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. appeal, fellow-citizens to you, lie has now thrown aside the mask, and indulged his feelings witliout reserve. It would have been more manly in him to have presented himself in this attitude alone, without his twelve compurgators, — with- out the men of two generations, not one of whom has, I believe, ever looked upon me as his rival. He should have felt that the charge of official defender of the Hartford Con- vention had exclusively devolved upon Jam ; that the license of divulging their secrets had been exercised only by him ; that all its other members had faithfully observed that solemn injunction of secrecy, with the renewal of wliich they hud separated ; and he should not have drawn twelve men of spirit and of honor — some of them till then my dear and valued friends — to join him in reproaching me for the slan- ders of Alexander Hamilton upon my father. My embargo letter was not entirely lost upon him. He never answered it, and, for some time, kept his opinions in reserve. The parties in the Commonwealth were so equally divided that the result of the annual elections was, till the meeting of the legislature, a problem. Governor Sullivan, an ardent friend of Mr. Jefferson's administjation, was re-elected. By a representation of forty-three members from the town of Boston, a bare Federal majority was secured in the House of Repi-esentatives. By the representation of the same town as county of Suffolk in the Senate, a bare majoiity was also obtained in that branch ; and one of the first things effected by this majority was to elect a Senator of the United States to take my place after the ensuing 3d of March. The exultation with which this party victory was accomplished still dwells in the memorj' of some of the confederates ; and no one better knows than Mr. Otis by what means it was effected. He was one of the members of the Senate from the county of Suffolk, and president by the same majority which elected a successor to me. But his father, then Secretary of the Senate of the United States, — alw.ays my friend, as I was a warm and faithful friend to him, — told me at the time that his son, like himself, was mortified at the election of another person in my place ; that his son had done every thing in his NKW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 203 power to prevent it, but could not ; that the tide ran too strong; that " the JSbscx Junto were omnipotent." The election of a Senator of the United States to supply my place was made at the first or summer session of the Mas- sachusetts legislature of 1808. Resolutions were about the same time adopted by the same legislature, giving instruc- tions to their Senators in Congress, which I disapproved and could not have carried into execution. I immediatelj' resigned my seat in the Senate. My motives for this step were ex- posed in a letter to Mr. W. B. Giles ; which, with the letter from him to which it was the answer, I now lay before you : — Washington, Nov. 7, 1808. Dear Sir, — Permit me, in the undisguised spirit of friend- ship, to express to you my regrets at not meeting you in the Senate chamber this morning. I regret your absence, not only on account of the pleasure I had some time since anticipated by co-operating with you in pursuing such measures as might be deemed best calculated to promote the general welfare, but on account of the actual loss our country has sustained in being deprived of your im- portant services, — at the moment, too, when it stands most in need of them. I also regret to find that the purity and disinterestedness of the motives which dictated your late public conduct — and which, with great pleasure, I can attest — should not have shielded you from the most unmerited reproaches. But in times like these, when the jjassions are stimulated into action by so many concurring causes, truth and justice seem to be totally disregarded, and private character to be the sport of party sensibility. Indeed, the holy temple itself does not seem too sacred for profanation by the mad ambitions of infuriated demagogues. I confidently hope, however, that our country will not long sustain the loss of your able and unremitted exertions in its favor ; but that, as soon as the public delusion shall have van- ished, you will again appear upon the theatre of public life, 204 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. supported by an increased confidence of the nation, and thus enabled to render it still greater services than j^ou have here- tofore done, — a confidence necessarily resulting from the firm, judicious, and indeijendent conduct you have lately manifested, not only to the American people, but to the world. Be pleased, sir, to accept assurances of my high considera- tion and sincere personal regard, &c. W. B. Giles. Boston, Nov. 15, 1808. My Dear Sir, — Accept my best thanks for your friendly and obliging favors of the 7th and 8th, with the cojjy of the message. The regret which you are good enough to express at not meeting me in the Senate chamber is at once so kind and so llattering, that it will, I hope, furnish me an excuse for explaining fully to you why you did not meet me there. I presume it unnecessary to mention to you that my im- mediate constituents, the legislature of Massachusetts, had already provided that I should meet nobody there after the present session. Had mine been an oidinary case, this cir- cumstance would not have induced me to resign the remainder of the term. But, in the face of every former example, the election of a Senator was precipitated at the summer session of the legislature, instead of waiting for the usual time, which would have been in February next ; and the point of unseat- ing me was carried by such means as, I suppose, are common enough among electioneering partisans, but manifest a much higher estimate of the prize at stake than I have ever accus- tomed myself to bestow upon any thing in the shape of public office. It seemed as if the salvation of the country, or of what was substituted for the country, was thought to depend upon getting me out. But this was not all. The same legis- lature passed resolutions, in the nature of instructions to their Senators, which I utterly disapproved, and which, if I had retained my jjlace, I should have held it my duty, not only to decline supporting, but to resist to the utmost of my power. Placed thus in the dilemma between the respect due to the NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 205 •will SO strongly iiuiiiifcstcd by my special constituents, aixl tlio still more imperious duty to my country, — under a sentence of odicial i)roscription liy the I'ormor, and under tlio ridscst and most odious imputations upon my motives, — my conduct during the session that was approaching would either not have been that of a free agent, or it would have been at the hazard of sacrifices, personal and domestic, which, upon full deliberation, I did not tliink the occasion required me to incur. As to holding my seat in the Senate of the United States, without exercising the most perfect freedom of agency, under the sole and exclusive control of my own sense of right, that was out of the question. But I was aware of the obligation upon a citizen charged with a puVjlic trust to remain at his post, unless duly relieved, and that these were times when the oblig.ation pressed with peculiar force. This con- sideration induced me long to hesitate before I decided upon my resignation ; and the idea which finally turned the balance in my mind was the perfect confidence I had in the firmness and wisdom of the Senate as I knew it would remain com- posed at the present session. I knew the vast majority of that body would neither betray nor surrender the essential rights of the nation. I saw no danger in that quarter which could need any interposition which it would be in my power, as an individual member, to present ; and I could not flatter myself that I should be able to render any public service by my particular exertion which could compensate for that self- degradation to which I must have submitted in continuing to serve principals who had no confidence in their agent, and whose measures were as abhorrent to his sentiments as his conduct had been to theirs. It was a subject upon which I thought myself obligated to take no counsel but that of my own heart and understanding, and my resolution was taken with great reluctance ; for I should have rejoiced in the oppor- tunity to have manifested, to the last moment of my official life, my adherence to the principles upon which I had uni- formly acted, and my zealous co-operation in the measures adopted by Congress, in harmony with the executive, to resist the outrages of both the great warring powers of Europe. 206 NEW ENGLAND PEDERALISKf. With regard to the public reproaches in pamphlets and newspapers with which I have been favored, and which, knowing as you do their falsehood, your friendly concern has led you to see with regret, I shall confess to you that, instead of seeing them (as perhaps a public man ought to do) with cool indifference, I have felt on this occasion a little of the spirit of martyrdom. Knowing that my governing motives have been pure, disinterested, and patriotic, I considered every calumny cast upon me as the tribute of profligate pas- sions to honest principled As the temper of a weapon can be ascertained only by a trial, I have been pleased to undergo that test, which no man of truly honorable purpose can escape. I have enjoyed all along that sort of support which ia beyond the reach of human slander, — the support of my own conscious integrity ; and I had the additional satisfac- tion of reflecting that there existed, even in the knowledge of others, particularly in yours, evidence that my public conduct had not been stimulated by any personal or selfish views. I had no doubt that, if any occasion should require it, you would not withhold that testimony which might be exclusively in your possession ; but I have never seen any reason for be- lieving that it would ever be necessary for my justification. In relation to future time, whether my fellow-citizens in this Commonwealth will ever again think such seiwices as I can render them worth calling for, is for their consideration, not for mine. Our usages do not authorize even those who are candidates for popular election to offer themselves ; and, if they did, there is no station in their gift for which I should feel the slightest inclination to solicit their suffrages. What- ever of profit or of honor there may be in the piping times of peace in the public service, I know that, in the present situa- tion and prospects of this country, public office of any kind would to me be an oppressive burden, — a post of little else than toil and danger ; a thankless task, from which I coidd anticipate nothing better, and might rationally apprehend a' catastrophe infinitely worse, than that which has befallen me. If, then, recovering from that delusion to which you refer, they should hereafter entertain a more favorable opinion of NEW EKGLAND FEDERALISM. 207 my intentions and of my capncity to serve them faithfully, the manifestation of their wishes will always be in their power ; and neither difficulty nor danger shall deter me from any service which they can demand, and which I can render. Let me again apologize to you for saying so much of myself. As the circumstances of the last session led me, in the confi- dence which your character and situation had inspired, to unfold to you, in the most explicit manner, my personal views, or rather the absence of all personal views, in connec- tion with my public conduct, I could not now resist the opportunity of opening to you, with equal frankness, the motives upon which I have acted to the close of my career. And I will only add, that, far from regretting any one of those acts for which I have suffered, I would do them over again, were they now to be done, at the hazard of ten times as much slander, unpopularity, and (if that were possible) displacement. In the removal to a private station, however, under a gov- ernment like ou- 8, a man, though relieved from the burden of responsibility, cannot cease to feel a concern for the aifairs of the public ; and while the independence and union of the nation are at stake upon the perseverance and energy of those who administer its ortcd by the committee of tliree. Certain it is, that, in the body of the report, there is no reference to this third resolution whatever. Setting this, then, aside, and the assertion in the first sen- tence of the report is, that the commission of the Convention was to devise means of defence against dangers, and of relief from oppressions, all proceeding from the act of their own government. The report corresponds entirely with this expo- sition of its first sentence. All the measures which it pro- poses, and upon which it enlarges, are measures against the government of the United States. The remainder of the first paragraph contains general remarks upon the expediency or non-expediency of direct and open resistance, and a determination to change the Con- stitution. The inducements for and against such measures are stated witli sucli a balancing precision, tiiat I know of nothing comparable to it, except Touchstone's parallel be- tween the advantages and disadvantages of a shepherd's life. After reading the paragraph, it renuiins exceedingly doubtful whether the report will recommend an immediate change of the Constitution or not. Jt says, for example, tliat, — " To prescribe patience and firmness to those who are already exhausted by distress, is soinetimes to drive them to despair." That, — NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 281 " When abuses reduced to system, and accumulated through a course of years, have pervaded every department of govern- ment, and spread corruption through every region of the State ; when these are clothed with the forms of law, and enforced by an Executive, whose will is their source, no sum- mary means of relief can be applied without recourse to direct and open resistance." Here the principle of direct and open resistance is asserted to be the onl}' and necessary means of relief to be applied. The next sentence, however, gives some counterpoise to this very bold avowal of resistance ; and the concluding sentence of the paragraph saj's : — " Necessitj' alone can sanction a resort to this measure [direct and open resistance] , and it should never be extended in duration or degree beyond the exigency, until the people, not merely in the fervor of sudden excitement, but after full deliberation, are determined to change the Constitution." These are general remarks, applied to an assumed state of public affairs, which the report intends to be understood as representing that under which the Convention was assem- bled : — 1. They were to provide means of defence and of relief against their own government. 2. They were to authorize a direct and open resistance against laws of the Union. 3. They were to stop there until the people, after full deliberation, should be determined to change the Constitu- tion. In this paragraph, all the principles are laid down. The discussion then commences thus : — "It is a truth not to be concealed, that a sentiment pre- vails to no inconsiderable extent that administration have given such construction to that instrument, and practised so many abuses under color of its authority, that the time for a cliange is at hand. Those who so believe, regard the evils wliicli surround them as intrinsic and incurable defects in the Constitution. They yield to a persuasion that no change at any time, or on any occasion, can aggravate the misery of 282 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. their country. This opinion may ultimately prove to be cor- rect. But as the evidence on which it rests is not yet con- clusive, and as measures adopted on the assumption of its certainty might be irrevocable, some general considerations are submitted, in the hope of reconciling all to a course of moderation and firmness which may save them from the re- gret incident to sudden decisions, probably avert the evil, or at least insure consolation and success in the last resort." This exposition of the object and purposes of the Conven- tion is complete. It is taken, word for word, from the first and second pages of the final report ; nor is there in all the remainder of the report, or in the resolutions appended to it, excepting that anomaly of the third resolution, a word show- ing any different object or purpose. And where in all this do you find a single word about the defence of this part of tlie country against the foreign enemy? Read the whole proem, and ask yourselves whetlier it indicates the existence of a foreign enemy. Ask rather if it was pos- sible that twenty-six men, citizens of the United States, should have put their names to a paper professing such purposes, with a foreign enemy in the heart of their country ; and against the government and authority chai'ged with the de- fence of their country ; and against" the very measures of defence which they were employing. You are told that these twenty-six men represented what- ever of moral, intellectual, or patriotic worth is to be found in the character of the New England community. The moral character of the individuals, so far as it relates to the concerns . of private life, is not here in question ; but a sweeping claim to all the morality, and all the intellect, and all the patriotism, of a large division of the Union is not very demonstrative, either of that benevolence, or even of that justice, which con- stitute essential parts of private morals. " Not like this pub- lican " is read in characters ratlier too legible in the assumption for the humble and sublime standard of Christian morality. But let this pass. The members of the Convention wore men of respectable private chai-acter, and, when claiming no especial privileges of high heroic virtue, may be admitted to NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 283 have been as good as their neighbors. They were almost all lawyers by profession, and in that profession tliere is as much moralmlegn tyas in any other, with the exception perhaps of the clergy. The claim of pre-eminent intellect has perhaps more foundation than that of supererogatory virtue. They were most of them eminent lawyers, and that is a profession in which eminence cannot be obtained but by the exercise of powerful intellect. But the errors of intellect are precisely those which are the most pernicious to the welfare of commu- nities. They are the infectious errors, which catch from man to man, till they walk like a pestilence in the city. With regard to tlie patriotism of the conventionists, their exclusive, ov even their supereminent, claim is far more questionable. I To an American citizen, patriotism is the^ove of the whole Union ; for the whole Union is his country. / There is nothing sectional, nothing of party spirit, nothing Sfelfish, in its com- position. The Hartford Convention represented exclusively a section. It represented exclusively a party, and that an extreme party y and, without imputing more than ordinary selfishness to^ts members, they were not men peculiarly remarkable for the humility of their pretensions or the self- denial of their ambition. Of Mr. Otis, the person in whom all the transactions of the Convention appear from the jour- nal to have been concentrated, I say nothing, inasmuch as ha has excepted himself from the claim of all-absorbing talent and virtue which he puts in for his colleagues. The Convention represented the extreme portion of the Federalism of New England, — the party spirit of the school of Alexander Hamilton combined with the sectional Yankee spirit. I use this somewhat vulgar word, because, though somewhat humble in its original, it has gathered many a laurel in the field of glory, and because — like Brother Jonathan and Uncle Sam — it has an energy of significancy for which no other can be substituted. The Yankee spirit is a social spirit, and carries with it the fire of the flint. It was not well or naturally associated with the Federalism of Alexander Ham- ilton ; and he himself once complained of it as clannish. And so it was, and that was its inherent defect. In itself it 284 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. was good : it was the distillation from the spirit of the Puritan fathers of New England ; but it was not American patriotism ; on the contrary, it was that virtue which, in its excess, turns to vice. " Most d.ingerous la tlint temptation wliicli duth lead us on I To sin in loving virtue." But with this spirit was associated the ultra-Federalism of Hamilton, execrating Mr. Jefferson and all his principles and administration ; hating Mr. Madison and my father, whom they had sacrificed to Hamilton and his policy seventeen years before. This was the composition ; and this was not patriotism. It was the very reverse. This coalition of Hamiltoniau Federalism with the Yankee spirit had produced as incongruous and absurd a system of politics as ever was exhibited in the vagaries of the human mind. It was compounded of the following prejudices : — 1. An utter detestation of the French Revolution and of France, and a corresponding excess of attachment to Great Britain, as the only barrier against the universal, dreaded empire of France. 2. A strong aversion to republics and republican govern- ment, with a profound impression that our experiment of a confederated republic had failed for want of virtue in the people. 3. A deep jealousy of the Southern and Western States, and a strong disgust at the effect of the slave representation in the Constitution of the United States. 4. A belief that Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison were ser- vilely devoted to France, and under French influence. Every one of these sentiments weakened the attachments of those who held them to the Union, and consequently their patriotism. The sentiment itself, in a great measure, changed its object. The feeling against the general administration was so strong that it extended itself to the States and people by which it was supported ; and all the impulses of patriotism became concentrated upon New England ; and the temper of hostility, instead of patriotism, connected itself with every NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 285 tlioiiglit of the general government. All these opinions will be found disclosed in the vivid and forcible language of Fisher Ames, in the volume of his works which was published shortly after his death. I refer you particularly to the essay in it entitled " Dangers of A merican Lib^rtv ," for a full exposition of this sysTera of DpinionsT These were the opinions, aggravated by the pressure of the embargo, and afterwards of the war, represented by the Hartford Convention ; but they were still not entertained by a large portion of the Federal party, — by very few to the degree of those represented in the Convention. They were utterly and totally disapproved by the whole Republican party. It will, therefore, not be surprising that the final report of the Convention begins its calculation of the value of the Union by the explicit declaration, that a sentiment prevailed to no inconsiderable extent that the time for a change was at hand, and that the causes of it were intrinsic and incurable defects in the Constitution. The Convention say that " this opinion may ultimately prove to be correct : " but they think the evidence of it not yet conclusive ; and, to avoid the danger of precipitate and irrevocable measures, they propose a course which may probably avert the evil, or at least insure consola- tion and success in the last resort. But who were those among whom prevailed to no incon- siderable extent the sentiment that the time for a change was at hand, because of intrinsic and incurable defects in the Con- stitution? They were, assuredly, none of the Republican party ; no such sentiment prevailed among them. It was those of the party represented by the Convention itself. Among them, the report says, the sentiment prevailed to no inconsiderable extent. The party were then divided among themselves ; even the party comprising whatever of moral, intellectual, or patriotic worth was to be found in the char- acter of the New England community, were divided among themselves upon no less a question than whether the time for a dissolution of the Union, for intrinsic and incurable defects in the Constitution, was or was not at hand. 286 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. The opinion of the Convention itself is distinctly expressed, — that the time for this change was " not yet " at hand ; and they present an argument containing their reasons for coming to that conclusion, the object of which they declare to be the hope of reconciling all to a course of moderation and firmness, which might save them from the regret incident to sudden decisions, probably avert the evil, or at least insure consola- tion and success in the last resort. A question occurs, who the report means here by the word " all." Certainly not all the people of the Union ; as surely, not all the people of New England, one-half, at least, of whom, far from needing dissuasives from projects of disunion, would, if the Convention had proposed such a measure, have been ready to march with their lives and fortunes in defence of the Union. The all, therefore, whom the Convention hoped to reconcile to their proposed course of moderation and firmness, was no more than tiiat portion of the party represented by themselves who believed that the time for a change was at hand ; that the defects of the Constitution of the United States were intrinsic and incurable, and who expected from the Convention, instead of the half-measures which they did recommend, a declaration of New England independence and a constitution for the new Federal edifice. By that portion of the party, measures to this effect were expected from the Convention. The report says that the sentiment prevailed to no inconsiderable extent. To such an extent did it prevail, that, while the Convention were in ses- sion, anotlier convention was held of inn-holders in the coun- ties of Hampshire, Franklin, and Hampden, at Northampton, — the residence of the Governor of Massachusetts, — who passed and publislied a resolution that tliey would not take out their annual licenses at the new year, and pay the duties upon them, until the decision of the Hartford Convention should be known. The opinion that a secession from the Union and the forma- tion of a new confederation was the main object for which tlie Hartford Convention was convened, was, indeed, far more extensively entertained than by those wlio thought that the NEW ENGLAND FEDEEALISM. 287 time for a change was at hand. It was entertained very extensively b}'^ the enemies of the measnre, — by the true republicans, the friends of the Union and of its administra- tion. It was the opinion, probably, of a great majority of all parties. It was the object which, in 1809, when the Conven- tion was first proposed in the legislature of Massachusetts, John Henry had informed the Governor-General at Quebec, would be its purpose ; and you have seen that John Henry spoke from intimately confidential communications with per- sons then in that legislature. It was the object announced from the pulpit on a day of solemn fast for the war, appointed by the Governor of Massachusetts in July, 1812 ; it was the object urged in a long succession of sermons, newspaper essays, and pamphlets, for a series of years ; and it was the belief and fear that this was its object which constituted the inextinguishable aversion to it of the friends of the Union. So general was this oj)inion, that, if the object of the Conven- tion had been as is now represented to you, — merely the defence of this part of the country against the foreign enemy, — the first and most solemn duty of the Convention would Iiave been to issue a public and explicit declaration to disa- buse both their friends and foes, — to declare that a division of the Union would form no part of their deliberations, but that they unanimously viewed every movement towards that end with sincere and unqualified abhorrence. That this almost universal expectation ; that these formal annunciations and instigations from the sanctuary of the pul- pit ; that this succession of inflammatory publications in the newspapers and pamphlets, for a series of years, — afford no evidence of a design in any leader of a party to produce a dissolution of the Union and a uew confederacy, is the Sisy- phean labor which Mr. Otis has more than once undertaken to perform ; and the charge for which I am brought before you, fellow-citizens, as an unjust accuser, is no other than for having asserted that tliere was in certain leaders of the Fed- eral party such a design. I have shown you that such a design did exist in 1804, and was then attended by action. That the Hartford Convention was the result of the same 288 NEW ENGLAND FEDEEALISM. design, I fully believe ; that all the members of the Conven- tion participated in the design, I do not undertake to say. Mr. Otis may, perhaps, intend to claim some distinction between those who entertained the sentiment tiiat the time for a change was at hand, on account of the intrinsic and incurable defects of the Constitution, and those who designed the change ; but those who, as the report says, to no incon- siderable extent entertained the sentiment, were certainly prepared to give effect to that sentiment by action ; and the Hartford Convention itself was, of all possible measures, that most adapted to the accomplishment of the purpose. The existence of the Convention itself was a violation of the Constitution. The final report does not formally propose a secession from the Union ; but every other proposition contained in it looks to that end. The argument against an immediate dissolution of the Union is an argument, not of ])rineiple, but of ex]iediency. It admits all the premises of those who believed that the time for a change was at hand, except that the defects of the Con- stitution were incurable ; it admits that even this opinion may ultimately prove to be correct ; it urges that a dissolu- tion of the Union should not, unless absolutely necessary, be effected in time of war, and that the proof of this absolute necessity is not yet conclusive ; it presents the danger of precipitate measures (which the state of the negotiation at Ghent, as then known to the Convention, fully accounts for), and expressly saj^s some new form of confederacy should be substituted among those States which shall intend to main- tain a federal relation to each other ; it even says that, if the Union be destined to dissolution by reason of multiplied abuses of bad administration, it should, if possible, be the work of peaceable times and deliberate consent. That "if possible " is happily put in ; for how the multiplied abuses of bad administration could proceed to such an extent as to pro- duce the deliberate consent of the whole Union to its own dissolution, and that in peaceable times, it would have puzzled the representatives of all the intellectual worth of the New NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 289 England character to explain. It sounds to me as if the Convention had said : If the Union be destined to dissolution for good cause, it should, if possible, be the work of times when there shall be no connection between cause and effect, or of times when there shall be no cause for it at all. Tiie argument, however, explicitly admits that a severance of the Union by one or more States, against the will of the the rest, and in time of war, can be justified by absolute necessity ; and the whole argument of the report upon this topic is to show, that the proof of the existence of this absolute necessity was not yet complete. The argument, therefore, is not an argument in favor of the Union, but against an immediate and precipitate dissolution. Not a single consideration is presented to show its transcend- ent importance to every individual, to every family, to every communitj', throughout this nation ; nor even to show its im- portance to the people of New England. Not a glance is cast at the pang which every American patriot must feel at the dissolution of the tie bj' which the inhabitants of Massa- chusetts and Louisiana salute each other as countrymen ; not a hint at the civil and political immunities enjoyed by every individual citizen of a New England State by virtue of that provision of the Constitution which secures to him all tlie rights of a citizen in every other State ; not an allusion to the consequences of a separation, — frequent, inevitable border wars, alliances and counter-alliances of partial confederacies against each other, leagues with rival European powers, and alliances entangling all the parts of separated America with the whole system of European wars ; nothing of the inevi- table consequences to libertjs — of the standing armies which each of the partial confederacies would be compelled to kcej) up figainst each other, of the mutual spirit of encroachment upon each other's territories, and of conquest, which would necessarily follow from their relative situations, of the fire of individual ambition which would be kindled by the same cause, and of the Napoleons, the Bolivars, and the Yturbides, commencing as liberators and ending as dictators, in dun- geons or on the scaffold, — of all this, written upon a disso- 19 290 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. liition of this Union for the future as legibly as upon all human history for the past, not one solitary conception is to be found in the final report of tlie Hartford Convention. The considerations presented by that report for a postpone- ment, momentary or final, of the dissolution of the Union, are three, and no more : — 1. The prosperous administration of the general govern- ment when in Federal hands. 2. The chance, not yet desperate, that the Federalists might recover the reins of power, by the dismission and dis- grace of Mr. Madist)n's administration. 3. The expediency of waiting for peaceable times, and a dissolution of the Union by common consent. It would have been impossible to place the defence of the Union (if this can, even in imagination, be admitted as intended for a defence of the Union) upon weaker grounds. The great and prosperous change which had taken place in the affairs of tlie nation under the Federal administration (and very great it was) was owing, pre-eminently owing, to tlie Constitution itself, to the more perfect union of the people which had been effected by it, and most especially to tlie powers of Congress wliicli the amendments recommended by the Hartford Convention proposed to take away. The administration of President Washington, pure and virtu- ous as it always was, had neither b^en harmonious, nor (as an administration) remarkably prosperous nor satisfactory to more than half the people. Mr. Jefferson had retired from it in disgust ; General Hamilton and General Knox, in disap- pointment ; Mr. Randolph had been extruded from it in humiliation ; and Mr. Monroe recalled from France in dis- pleasure. Of our relations abroad, one of tlie signers to the confederate appeal can tell you how he thought upon the occasion of Mr. Jay's treaty. Of our relations at home, an insurrection in Pennsylvania, half-stifled only by military power, affords significant indication. The succeeding adniin- -ibtration was not more fortunate within itself: it was over- thrown by its intestine divisions. At the moment of his death. General Washington was about to receive a solicitation NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 291 to permit himself to be supported as a candidate against the re-election of the head of tiiat administration ; and a rival candidate was actually supported against him by a pamphlet of General Hamilton. The picture which the report draws of the reverse in the situation and circumstances of the country, under the admin- istrations of iMr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, is still more over- cliarged, though with opposite coloring. With the exception of tile injuries sustained by the nation from the injustice of foreign powers, tlie administration of Mr. Jefferson had been more successful, more prosperous for the country, and more generally satisfactory to the jjeople, tlian that of either of his predecessors. Many of the acts which the Hartford Convention considered as among its aggravated offences were, by a great majority of the people, viewed as its principal merits. The government had passed into tlie hands of Mr. Madison at the moment of its greatest embarrassments from these foreign wrongs. They had kindled into war ; six months after the declaration of which, and two years before the Hartford Con- vention, Mr. Madison had been re-elected by a large majority to the Presidency, against the united exertions of a peace party. Tiic chance that the Federalists should recover their power by the dismission and disgrace of Mr. Madison was so ex- ceedingly remote and desperate, that the assignment of it as a motive for the continuance a little longer of the experiment of tlie Union cannot, witliout some effort of credulity, be believed serious. To render it almost ludicrous, the report dwells with much earnestness upon prospects of a reforma- tion of public opinion favorable to this recovery of Federal ascendancy in the Southern Atlantic States ; and, by way of encouraging these prospects, the Convention propose and insist upon two amendments of the Constitution, — one to take away from them their slave representation, and the other to restrict the power of Congress to admit new States into the Union. Yet these are all the inducements presented for a permanent continuance of the Union ; for the third consideration is a disquisition upon the most favorable time 292 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. for effecting a dissolution of the Union by common consent, — and a remarkable disquisition it is. After saying that it should, if possible, be the work of peaceable times and deliberate consent, and that some new form of confederacy should be substituted among those States which shall intend to maintain a Federal relation to each other, it proceeds thus : " Events may prove that the causes of our calamities are deep and permanent. They may bo found to proceed, not merely from the blindness of prejudice, pride of opinion, violence of party spirit, or the confusion of tlie times ; but they may be traced to implacable combinations of individuals or of States to monopolize power and ofiice, and to trample without remorse upon the rights and interests of commercial sections of the Union." Here is presented, very distinctly, to the people of New England, an eventual common enemy. And what is to bo done with him ? " Whenever it shall appear that these causes are radical and permanent, a separation by equitable arrangement will be preferable to an alliance by constraint among nominal fi-ieiids, but real enemies, inflamed by mutual hatred and jealousies, and inviting, by intestine divisions, contempt and aggression from abroad." The latter end of this Commonwealth forgets its beginning. These implacable combinations Avith their execrable purposes are represented as then existing ; the only inquiry was, whether these causes were radical and permanent. Events might prove them so ; and then — you will make equitable arrangements, in peaceable times, with these implacable and remorseless combinations, for a separation by common consent. You see a highwayman with a pistol at your breast ; and j^ou propose to him an equitable arrangement for departing in peace, by mutual consent. Assuming for a moment the imaginary state of things presented here as real or probable, — deep and per- manent implacable combinations of individuals or of States to monopolize power and office, and to trample without remorse upon the rights and interests of the commercial sections of the Union, — and I ask if it is within tlie possibilities of NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 293 human events that, in such a temper of the parties and such a coiulition of the country, a dissolution of the Union should be effected by equitable arrangements, and by common con- sent? If absurdity of reasoning were the only thing with which this passage of the report is chargeable, it might well be inquired how twenty-six among the most intelligent citizens of New England could sign their names to a paper containing it. But this is a part of the report which its presumed author has presented to you as a defence of the Union, — an earnest defence of the Union, comparable only to that of Washington's Farewell Address ; and, after this passage, — after this array of objections against precipitate measures tending to disunite the States, — the report says that, when examined in connec- tion with the Farewell Address of the Father of his Country, they must, it is believed, be deemed conclusive. The hesitating language of this conclusion is sufficiently characteristic of the whole argument, — an argument not against the dissolution nor in favor of the Union, but against precipitate measures for dissolving it. The transient allusion to the advice in Washington's Farewell Address, at the close, is evidently because it could not be avoided, and to insinuate that there is nothing in their own advice contrary to it. But they carefully avoid quoting the advice itself, which called upon you to frown indignantly upon the first advance towards that of which the Hartford Convention was so near the close. But the strongest objection to this passage is not its absurd- ity. When men of keen intelligence utter absurdities, they cannot expect to escape from the inquiry why they do so ; and here the answer is obvious. The purpose was to inflame that hatred and those jealousies which, they say, must neces- sarily lead to a separation of the States; to stimulate the animosities and ranklings of the people of New England, by the representation that these implacable combinations to monopolize power and office, and to triimple without remorse upon the rights iind interests of commercial sections of the Union, did exist ; that they were the causes of the calamities which they (the people of New England) were then suffering ; 294 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. luid UiiiL Llicir only iiioUve for dinging a liltlo longer to tlio Union would be to ascertain Avlietlier these causes were per- manent, or whether the conventioniats themselves and their confederates might vault into the administration of the general government by the dismission and disgrace of Mr. Madison and his Cabinet. Thus, then, from this complete analysis of all that part of the final report of the Hartford Convention with which it commences, as with the most important object of their deliberations, it resolves itself into a single argument, not in favor of the Union, nor against its dissolution, but merely to reconcile those who were even then prepared for that measure to a little patience, — to wait and see whether, by the dismis- sion and disgrace of Mr. Madison and his administration, the general government might not be restored to Federal hands. That the principal fact upon wliicli they urged this patience was a prospect of a revolution of popular opinion in favor of the Federalists in the South Atlantic Stales, which it was proper to encourage ; and their expedient for giving this encouragement was peremptorily to demand two amendments to the Constitution to annihilate the relative weight in the Union of these same Southern States. Was there ever such an adaptation of means to ends? I ask not what all this has to do with the defence of this part of the country against the foreign enemy : I proceed to the topics next discussed in the report. After settling the point, that the Union was not to be im- mediately dissolved, the report says the Convention proceeded to confer and deliberate upon the alarming state of public affairs. Here, to be sure, you will find something like refer- ence to the defence of tlie country against a foreign enemy ? Not at all, or, at least, no otherwise than as means of action against their own government. Tliey say, • — " They are naturall}^ led to a consideration, in the first place, of the dangers and grievances which menace an immediate or speedy pressure, with a view of suggesting means of present relief ; in the next place, of such as are of a more remote and general description, in the hope of attaining future security." NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 295 Among the subjects of complaint and apprehension which might be comprised under the former of these propositions, tlic attention of the Convention lias been occupied witli the claims and pretensions advanced and the authority exercised over the militia by the executive and legislative depart- ments of the national government ; also, upon the destitution of the means of defence in which the Eastern States are left, while at the same time they are doomed to heavy requisitions of men and money for national objects. Then follows a review of all the measures authorized or contemplated by the general government, Jiot only for the employment of the militia, but even for raising men to serve in the war by sea or land. In this review are included laws of the United States, bills then before Congress, meas- ures of the executive government, reports of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, and even a motion in the House of Representatives of the United States. All these are in- cluded among the dangers and grievances menacing immediate , or speedy pressure, and for which the Convention felt them- selves called to suggest means of present relief ; all these are represented as odious features of a novel system, unconstitu- tional, oppressive, and tyrannical : not a single word about the foreign enemy. The concluding paragraph, after the whole review, is as follows: — " In this whole series of devices and measures for raising men, this Convention discern a total disregard for the Consti- tution, and a disposition to violate its provisions, demanding from the individual States a firm and decided opposition. An iron despotism can imjjose no harder servitude upon the citizen, than to force him from his home and his occupation, to wage offensive wars undertaken to gratify the pride or passions of his master. The example of France has recently shown that a cabal of individuals, assuming to act in the name of the people, may transform the great body of citizens into soldiers, and deliver them over into the hands of a single tyrant. No war, not held in just abhorrence by a people, can require the aid of such stratagems to recruit an army. Had 296 NEW ENGLAND EEDEKALISM. the troops already raised, and in great numbers sacrificed upon the frontiers of Canada, been employed for the defence of the country, and had the millions which have been squan- dered with shameless profusion been appropriated to their payment, to the protection of the coast and to the naval ser- vice, there would have been no occasion for unconstitutional expedients. Even at this late hour, let government leave to New England the remnant of her resources, and she is ready and able to defend her territory, and to resign the glories and advantages of the border war to those who are determined to persist iu its prosecution." At last we have an allusion to the foreign enemy, and it is perfectly characteristic of the spirit of the whole report. The proposition in the last sentence is, that government should leave New England the remnant of her resources. This is of itself a jn-oposition of a separation from the Union, and of a New England confederacy. The only remnant ot her resources which government could leave to New Eng- land was the men and money derived by the general govern- ment from her ; and the proposition is, that, if the general government will leave her these, she. New England, will ask for no defence from the Union. She is ready and able to defend her territory ; and of course this could be done only by a separate confederation. The closing part of the sen- tence, the keen and cutting sarcasm of the readiness of New England to resign the glories and advantages of the border war, you will fully understand when you recollect that it was written almost immediately after the memorable victory of McDonough upon Lake Champlain, and the repulse of Sir George Prevost upon Plattsburg. These were the glories and advantages which the Convention declare that New Eng- land was so ready to resign. And tliis was the representation of the whole patriotic worth of the New England character. I shall not comment on the former part of the paragraph : the iron despotism ; the recent example of France ; the war held in just abhorrenceby a people ; tlie troops sacrificed upon the frontier of Canada ; the shameless profusion ; the pride and passions of a master ; the single tyrant ; and the other NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 297 flowers of vituperative eloquence in this garden of sweets, — I leave, fellow-citizens, to " Come o'er you like tlie sweet South, Tliat brcatlies upon a bank of violets, Stealing and giving odor; " reminding you only that the quintessence from it all is, that the whole series of these measures of the general government for the defence of the country against the foreign enemy demand from the individual States a firm and decided oppo- sition as unconstitutional. Then comes the declaration : " That acts of Congress in violation of the Constitution are absolutely void is an unde- niable position." And from this assertion, coupled with the purport of the preceding paragraph, that all the devices and measures of the general government for raising men were unconstitutional, and demanded from the individual States a firm and decided opposition, you naturally expect an explicit recommendation to the State legislatures to authorize resist- ance against them all. But no : the better part of valor now steps in, and a paragraph ensues, half blunderbuss and thun- der, half meekness and submission. It says, — " It docs not, however, consist with tlie respect and for- bearance due from a confederate State towards the general government to fly to open resistance upon every infraction of the Constitution. The mode and the energy of the opposi- tion should always conform to the nature of the violation, the intention of its authors, the extent of the injury inflicted, the determination manifested to persist in it, and the danger of delay. But in cases of deliberate, dangerous, and palpable infractions of the Constitution, afl'ecting the sovereignty of a State and liberties of the people, it is not only the right but the duty of such a State to interpose its authority for their protection in the manner best calculated to secure that end. When emergencies occur which are either beyond the reach of the judicial tribunals, or too pressing to admit of the delay incident to their forms. States which have no common umpire must be their own judges, and execute their own decisions. 298 NEW ENGLAND FEDEEALISM. It will tlius be proper for the several States to await the ultimate disposal of the obnoxious measures recommended by the Secretary of Wiir or pending before Congress, and so to use their power, according to the character these measures shall finally assume, as effectually to protect their own sover- eignty and the lights and liberties of their citizens." Here it would seem as if the actual recommendation to the State legislatures to pass laws authorizing direct and open resistance against a law of the Union, was only contingent and eventual upon the adoption by Congi'ess of the plan pro- posed by the Secretary of War. But this passage must be read in connection with the first resolution at the close of the report, which is in the following words, — " Resolved, that it be, and hereby is, recommended to the legislatures of the several States represented in this Convention to adopt all such measures as may be necessary effuctuall}'^ to protect tlie citizens of said States from the ojieration and effects of all acts which have been or may be passed by the Congress of the United States which shall contain provisions subjecting the militia or other citizens to forcible drafts, con- sci'iptions, or impressments, not authorized by the Constitu- tion of the United States." This is direct and open resistance to acts of Congress which had passed, as well as to such as might be passed ; and yet, taking the resolution and the passage of the report upon which it is founded together, it would not be surprising if you should now be told by the author of both that no such act of Congress had passed, and that the resolution was nothing more than a menace, — a brutum fulmen pointed at the reported plan of the Secretary of War. The resolution, however, is a direct recommendation to the legislatures represented in the Convention to pass laws authorizing direct and open resistance to laws of Congress which had passed. These laws were the acts of Congress to raise men for the defence of the country against the foreign enemy ; and the only effect such State laws could have had would have been to disorganize and ruin that defence. Let it be farther observed, that there was not the remotest neces- NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 299 sity for the interposition of the State legislatures ; inasmuch aa, if any of the provisions of the acts of CongresrS for raising men had been unconstitutional, the case was susceptible of being brought immediately before the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States upon habeas corpus ; and any man taken by any such unconstitutional process would have been forthwith discharged. The whole argument above cited and the resolution itself are highly unconstitutional. Neither the Constitution of the United States nor that of any of the separate States has given to tiie legislatures of the States any authority to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, That is in its nature a judicial power ; and, if this principle has been contested by others, the Federalists who constituted the Hartford Convention were the last men in the world who should have given coun- tenance to the opposite doctrine. The Constitution of the United States says, — " This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land ; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Art. 6. This article is provided on the express assumption that there may be things in the constitution or laws of a State contrary to laws of the United States, made in pursuance of their Constitution ; and it declares all such things in the State constitutions and laws null and void. It commands and requires the judges in every State, in every such conflict, to decide in favor of the law of Congress, and against the con- stitution or law of the State. Now, if the legislature of the State has the power to decide what law of Congress is or is not made in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, this article is a dead letter. It provides expressly for the case of a conflict between a law of the United States and a law of the State ; and it commands the judges of the State, in every such case, to consider the law of Congress as the supreme law of the land, and the law of the State as null and void. There is, therefore, not only no reservation to the State 300 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. legislatures of a right to pass laws contrary to laws of Congress ; but there is a solemn declaration by the people of the United States that, if tlie legislatui'es do pass such laws, they shall be null and void, and their own judges shall be bound to decide against them. The action of tliis article of the Constitution of the United States is not directly upon their own judiciary, but expressly upon the State judges ; and it binds them totally to disregard any law of the State legis- latures conflicting with a law of Congress. If, tiierefore, the legislatures of the States represented in the Hartford Convention liad passed the laws recommended by the Convention, the judges in eveiy one of the States would have been bound to consider the law of Congress as the supreme law of the land, and the State law as null and void. Tiiis was the only barrier which would have been left between the Union and civil war ; for it is obvious tliat, if you suppose the case which the recommendation of tlie Hart- ford Convention must have produced,-!- a law of Congress sustained by tlie executive and judiciary^of the Union, and laws of the five New England States sustained by their exec- utive and judiciary authorities, and bearing in direct conflict against each other upon their citizens, — the immediate effect must and would have been civil war ; and this was, to all intents and purposesyjeeommended by this resolution of the Hartford Convention. / • : — I •••••■• Fellow-citizens, if there be on this side of the grave a sub- ject of deep and awful solemnity to you all, it is tliis. Here, in this first resolution appended to the final report of the Hartford Convention, is the last result of tliat project which had been fermenting in New England at least fiom the spring of the year 1804 until January, 1815. Here it is in its naked- ness before you. It is a recommendation to the legislatures of the five New England States to pass laws for the protec- tion of their citizens, in direct and open resistance against existing acts of Congress, — against the supreme law of tlie land. This is wliat I had told my friend, Mr. Quiucy, on the 1st February, 1808, it would come to. Tliis is what, in NEW ENGLANP FEDERALISM. 301 November and December of the same year, I wrote to Ezc- kiel Bacon would be the issue, and wliich Mr. Jefferson's mem- ory mistook for a personal communication to himself. Tiiis is what I wrote to William Plumer, in August, 1809, would be the consequence of that system of measures pursued by the same men who presided over tlie deliberations of the Hartford Convention ; and what, in 1811, I wrote to a friend in a letter, the extract of which was published in the second volume of Mr. Austin's " Life of Elbridge Gerry." i To resist and defeat that system of measures has been the greatest struggle of my life. It was that to which I have made the greatest sacrifices, and for which I have received, in tlie sup- port and confidence of my country, the most ample rewards. That system of measures terminated in the Hartford Conven- tion. The peace of Ghent extinguished it forever, and proved to demonstration, beyond the power of human cavil, that the causes of those calamities which the Hartford Convention alleged as grounds of resistance against the laws of the Union were in the aggression of foreign powers, and not in the administrations of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison. This, then, is the first result of the deliberations of the 'Hartford Convention, — a recommendation to the legislatures of tlic five New England States to pass laws for tlie effective protection of their citizens against existing laws of the Union enacted for the defence of tlie country. Had the war contin- led, and that recomiitendation been carried into execution, I ask what else could have ensued but a dissolution of the Union and civil war ? It is impossible for the people of this nation to fix their eyes too steadily upon this question. Since the existence of the Constitution, this is the only occasion upon which that of our confederacy has been brought into the most imminent danger by that deadly distemper to all ancient confederacies; — the conflict between the members and the head. The disapprobation of yourselves and of your posterity at this attempt will be to you the strongest of all securities against its repetition. 1 The letter was not to Mr. Gerry, nor did I know tliat either lie or Mr. Austin were in possession of tlie extract from it till it appeared published in that work. 802 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. It is after tliis recomincudatioii, if not of direct civil war, of tliiit which is yet to be exphiined, that the report takes up tiie second subject of discussion, — the means of defence against tiie foreign enemy. " Tiiis naturally leads," says the report, " to the inquiries whether any expectations can be reasonably entertained that adequate provision for the defence of the Eastern States will be made by the national government? whether the several States can, from their own resources, provide for self-defence, and fulfil the requisitions which are to be expected for the national treasury ? and generally, what course of conduct ought to be adopted by those States in relation to the great object of defence? " To ascertain the object of the discussion, please to observe the order in which it is presented, and tiie topics of which it consists. It professes to be an in([uiry as to tlie means of defence against the common enemy. It is no such thing. Ifc is a dissertation to prove, first, that the Eastern States will not be adequately defended by the national government; secondly, that they cannot defend themselves, and at the same time furnish the contributions required of them by the general government. And these two positions being estab- lished after their own manner, the conclusion is that the Eastern States must and will ajjpropriate and use their own resources for their own defence. A separation of the Union and a new confederacy are here marked out, if not in open and direct language, at least in terms which it is impossible to misunderstand. The language is as follows : — After stating, in the most decisive manner, that no expec- tation can be entertained of adequate defence by the general government, and that these States (the New England States) have no capacity of defraying the expense requisite for their own protection, and at the same time of discharging the demands of the national treasury, it proceeds thus : — " The last inquiry, what course of conduct ought to be adopted by the aggrieved States, is in a high degree moment- ous. When a great and brave people shall feel themselves NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 803 deserted lij' their government, and reduced to the necessity either of submission to a foreign enemy or of appropriating to their own use tliose means of defence which are indispensable to self-preservation, they cannot consent to wait passive spec- tators of approacliing ruin which it is in their power to avert, and to resign the last remnant of their industrious earnings to be dissipated in support of m.easures destructive of the best intei'ests of the nation. " Tlie Ojnvention will not trust themselves to express their conviction of the catastrophe to which such a state of things inevitably tends." No : the Convention will not trust themselves to express the conclusion from their own premises. And why will they not trust themselves to say that which they intend you shall understand as their meaning? Is it because their meaning is ambiguous or equivocal ? It is this very shrinking back fiom the expression of their intent which renders this one of the most memorable State papers that ever was composed. Read the whole of it attentivelj^ fellow-citizens, and when you come to this passage, remember that it is the result of that inquirijj which the autiior of the report has so often insisted constituted its main burden, — the means of defence against a foreign enemy. Ask yourselves why is it that this Conven- tion of twenty-six persons, delegated from five States in this Union, in the midst of a formidable war, to devise means of defence against the foi-eign enemy, after having first come to the result of recommending explicitly'' to the State legisla- tures to protect their citizens against the execution of laws of Congress for the common defence, and after having settled that no defence is to be expected from the government of the Union, can themselves devise no other means of defence than such as they dare not trust themselves to express. If you ask yourselves this question, it will not be necessary to go to the Searcher of hearts for the answer. It is too plainly written both in the preceding and subsequent pages of the report. The answer is a dissolution of the Union and civil war. A dissolution of the Union by the forcible seizure of the means of defence intrusted by tlie Constitution of the 304 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. United States to tlie general government, and the appropria- tion of them by tlie people of the Eastern States to their own defence. Well might the Convention sin-ink from the expres- sion of their own convictions. But, if they are not here fairly represented, let the author of the report tell you wliat they were. But after thus leading their constituents to the very border of the precipice, and in this manner starting back from it themselves, they propose an expedient f(n' averting this catas- trophe at which they had not dared to look. This exi^edient they usher in with all suitable solemnity. Conscious, they say, of their high responsibility to God and their country, solicitous for the continuance of the Union as well as the sov- ereignty of the States, unwilling to furnish obstacles to ijeace, resolute never to submit to a foreign enemy, and confiding in the divine care and protection, — they will, until the last lioj^e shall be extinguished, endeavor to avert such consequences. With this view they suggest an arrangement which consti- tutes the second resolution at the close of their report ; which, like the first resolution, shall be given in their own words, — " Resolved, tiiat it be, and hereby is, recommended to the said legislatures to authorize an immediate and earnest appli- cation to be made to the government of the United States, requesting their consent to some arrangement whereby the said States may separately or in concert be empowered to assume upon themselves the defence of their territory against the enemy ; and a reasonable portion of the taxes collected within said States may be paid into the respective treasuries thereof, and appropriated to the payment of the balance due said States and to the future defence of the same. The amount so paid into the said treasuries to be credited, and the disbursements made as aforesaid to be charged to the United States." To see in its full eictent the whole system of measures intended by the Convention as inferrible from the report, the co-operative effect of the resolutions at the close of the report, had those resolutions been carried into effect by the State legislatures, is to be considered as that effect would have NEW ENGLAND FEi)EEALISM. 305 received its direction from the atgument of tlie report. Had the laws recommended by the first resolution been enacted by the State legislatures, one of two consequences must have been the immediate result. Either the general government must have ceased to attempt the execution of the resisted laws, — and, as they were the laws for raising men to defend the country, they must in those States have abandoned that defence altogether, — or they must have attempted to carry their own laws into execution by force ; which, with the resistance recommended by the States, would have been civil war; and, in either case, the Union would have been quoad hoc dissolved. The condition of the parties would not have been that of a confederated body governed by the harmonious operation of two concurring authorities, but that of two sepa- rate confederations de facto in a state of war against each other. For this state of things no provision is made in the Constitution of the United States. The provisions against its occurrence existed, but had proved ineffectual. There is no reservation in the constitution of any one State of a power to its legislature to pass such laws or to place the people of the State in such a position towards the rest of the Union. There was, however, yet one authority which would have been exercised by the general government, had the resist- ance of the States been confined to the extent of the recom- mendation in the first resolution of the Convention, — the authority of collecting revenue. The object of the second resolution was to take away that. The means, indeed, by which thb second resolution proposed to accomplish this measure, and the resolution itself, bear indelible marks of that indecision and faltering consciousness of wrong which exhibit in such strong contrast the arguments of the report and the action in which they result. In this case, the argu- ment of the report led, as we have seen, to the conclusion, that the people of the States represented in the Convention would seize by force the revenue raised by authority of the United States, and appropriate the same to their own defence. It had established as premises, first, that the general government had abandoned the defence of the New England States, and 20 306 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. that tliero was no reasonable expectation that tliey would, or even that they could, resume it ; secondly, that the New England States could defend themselves, if left in possession of their own resources, but had not the capacity to defend themselves and also contribute to the revenue of the Union. And then it had h3'pothetically supposed such a state of things as that which they had previously described as really existing, and had inferred that the people would not consent to wait pas- sive spectators of approaching ruin which it was in their power to avert, but would appropriate to their own use those means of defence which were indispensable to self- preservation. This is the opening to that catastrophe to which the Con- vention themselves declare their conviction that the state of things inevitably tended, but which they would not trust themselves to express. Let it not escape 3'our observation that the first of the premises upon which the Convention had brought themselves and their constituents to the edge of this catastrophe — namely, that the general government had abandoned the defence of New England — was totally without foundation. This is not only proved to the completest demonstration in the papers signed " Massachusetts " published in the " National Intelli- gencer " of January and February, 1820, in answer to the numbers of " One of the Convention," but it is proved by " One of the Convention " himself. The following is an ex- tract from his seventh and concluding number. He is reply- ing to objections against the party measures in New England itself to cripple the means of defence employed by the general government ; and, after noticing and endeavoring to refute the charge of combination to defeat the loans and the banking operations of the general government, he says, — " There is more color of truth in the accusation of their withdrawing the militia from the service of the United States ; 3'et it is merely color. The militia were not withheld from the service, but, in some instances, from the command of officers of the United States, — at first through constitutional doubts in the Executive, and latterly, when those doubts NEW ENGLAND FfiDBBALISM. 807 were surmounted or Avaived, through difficulties and collisions among officers and men which the executives of those States could not reconcile or control. But the service never suffered for an instant. The militia was constantly in requisition and on the alert ; and such was the intelligence subsisting and the arrangements made between the executive of Massachu- setts and the principal officers of the navy and army of the United States for acting in concert, Avlien occasion should require, as placed the country in the best possible state of defence with the means at their disposal." Fellow-citizens, is this picture from the same hand which drew up the final report of the Hartford Convention ? Are these constitutional doubts of the Executive, which had been surmounted or waived, the same doubts on which the first resolution of the Convention recommended to the legislatures of the States to pass laws protecting their citizens in effective resistance against the doubted or no longer doubted author- ity ? Is this readiness and alacrity of the militia, this har- monious concurrence for the common defence between the executive of Massachusetts and the principal officers of the navy and army of the United States, — is this best possible state of defence with the means at their disposal, — is this the abandonment by the general government of the defence of New England which would have warranted the people in seizing and appropriating to their own use, and for purposes of self-defence, the revenues of the general government? In this counterfeit presentment of two brothers, whom are you to believe, — the reporter of the Hartford Convention in 1815, or " One of the Convention " in 1820 ? *I trust you will believe that the representation of 1815 was without foundation ; that the general government had not abandoned tlie defence of New England ; and, consequently, that the violent measures which the report presents as conse- quences inevitably resulting from the state of things, were utterly unjustifiable. Still, let us contemplate the measures recommended by the Convention. The defence of New England had not been abandoned by the general government ; but it had been greatly 308 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. weakened, and had been rendered inefficient, by that very refusal of the Governor of Massachusetts to place the militia under the command of the officers of the United States. You are- told that the Governor of Massachusetts had waived or surmounted his objections to this, and that the obstacles afterwards arose from the militia themselves. But the first resolution of the Convention recommended resistance against it, under legislative sanction of the States ; and this recom- mendation extended not only to the State of Massachusetts, — where the objection had first been made, — but to all the other New England States, — where it had yet received no authoritative support. The recommendation of the Conven- tion, therefore, instead of sustaining the Governor of Massa- chusetts in his waiver or subdual of his constitutional doubts, went to turn those doubts into certainties, to counteract his compliances, and to spread over all the New England States the resistance against the general government, which until then had been confined to the State of Massachusetts. The second resolution — recommending the concerted, ear- nest application to the government of the United States to consent to some arrangement whereby the States might separately or in concert assume upon themselves the defence of their territory against the enemy, and a reasonable por- tion of the taxes collected within said States be paid into the respective treasuries thereof — is the expedient which the Convention present, as the only alternative to that of the people's seizing upon these taxes, and appropriating them to their own use for self-defence. The report proposes that, if the State legislatures should make this application, and Con- gress should submit to this arrangement, and should peace upon just terms appear to be unattainable, the people would stand together for the common defence, until a change of administration or of disposition in the enemy should facili- tate the occurrence of that auspicious event. But if the application should fail, — what then ? Why, after having been told that the people would seize upon the taxes levied by the general government, and appropriate them to their own use ; after having been assured that this proposal to NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. S09 Congress, quietly to consent to the separate confederation, and to surrender at once a reasonable portion of the revenues to the State treasuries, was the only alternative to that catas- trophe ; when the Convention came to look in the face the contingency of a rejection of their recommended earnest application, — they conclude again not to trust themselves to express their own convictions : " In a state of things BO solemn and trying as may then arise, the legislatures of the States, or conventions of the whole people, or dele- gates appointed by them for tlie express purpose in another convention, must act as such urgent circumstances may then require." In this passage, the reporter seems to have wrought himseK xip to a degree of perturbation which affects the intelligibility of his discourse. In the dreadful extremity to which he has brought himself, the Convention, and their constituents, he shrinks altogether from sajdng what is to be done, but points to three totally distinct and different authorities, — first, the State legislatures ; secondly, conventions of the whole people ; or, thirdly, delegates appointed by them in another conven- tion, to act as such urgent circumstances may then require. What is meant by conventions of the whole people so to act, is not very clear. It is believed to mean i)opular meetings throughout the New England States ; but how they could have acted otherwise than by the appointment of delegates to another convention, may still be susceptible of elucidation from the author of the report. The obscurity may have been purposely used — " Half to reTeal, half veil the dread intent." The essential character of the earnest application recom- mended in this second resolution is its apparent object to extort from the Congress of the United States their consent to the separate New England confederacy for defence, and the surrender to the State treasuries of the taxes levied within tliose States. For its other ostensible object, — the defence of this part of the country against the foreign enemy, — you have the repeated admissions of the reporter himself tliat it 810 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. was fully provided for by an act of Congress then in the process of enactment, and which had passed the House of Representatives eight days before the Convention met. These, then, are the purposes of the Convention, as dis- closed by their first and second resolutions illustrated by the argument of the report : — 1. Resistance, to be sanctioned and protected by the State legislatures against the laws of the Union for the defence of the country. 2. An earnest application to Congress, under a threat of popular insurrection if it should fail to consent to a, New England confederacy for defence, and to surrender a part of the national revenue to the State treasuries. The third resolution, as has been observed, has no other connection with the rest of the report, forms no part of its system, and is believed to have been reported by another and subsequent committee. It is in the following words : — " Resolved, that it be, and hereby is, recommended to the legislatures of the aforesaid States to pass laws, where it has not already been done, authorizing the Governors, or com- manders-in-chief of the militia, to make detachments from the same or to form voluntary corps, as shall be most convenient and conformable to their constitutions, and to cause the same to be well armed, equipped, and disciplined, and held in readiness for service, and, upon the request of the Governor of either of the other States, to employ the whole of such detachment or corps, as Avell as the regular forces of the State, in assisting the State making such request to repel any invasion thereof which sliall be made or attempted by the public enemy." This resolution looks to the defence of the country, and is the only act of the Convention having that aspect. It recom- mends to the State legislatures to do that which was exclu- sively within the authority of Congress, and which M'as substantially done by the act of 27th January, 1815. The recommendation of the Convention could not liave been car- ried into effect but by agreements between the States prohib- ited by the Constitution of the United States ; and it is NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 311 scarcely reconcilable with the principle admitted in tlie im- mediately preceding resolution, — that the consent of Con- gress was indispensable to such a separate concert of defence between the States. It was not in harmony with the argument of the report ; but its aptitude would have been to facilitate the accomplishment of ulterior measures for the establishment of a New England Confederacy. It was not, however, sufficient for the Convention to rec- ommend resistance by State legislatures against the laws of the Union, — a demand of the consent of Congress to a sepa- rate confederation for defence, and a surrender of national revenue to the State treasuries. The passions of the people of New England were still to be stimulated against the Con- stitution of the United States. And here the Convention return to the considerations with which they had first set out: to those defects in the Constitution wliich they had represented as deemed to be intrinsic and incurable, so as to have caused a sentiment to prevail, to no inconsiderable extent, that the time for a change was at hand, — an opinion which they had then said might ultimately prove to be cor- rect. To these they now return ; and, by one of those most extraordinary modes of logic which invariably bring the con- ditions to conclusions at war with their premises, to support this charge of intrinsic defects in the Constitution, a con- trasted exposition is presented again of the two party adminis- trations of the gdvernment under it. Of these two full-length pictures, it must be repeated that, like the sketches wliich had been given lat the commencement of the report, they have no resemblance to the originals for which they are drawn. The twelve ye4rs of the Federal administration are painted with the colorihg of the poets upon tlie Golden Age. If there were no other Evidence of the condition of the people of this Union at the |;ime to which these statements refer, than their delineation of ithem, the reader would believe that it was the reign of Astrsea renewed upon earth. Little would he imagine that it was the portraiture of a period signalized by as fierce a conflict of parties for power as the history of this country has ever exhibited ; by divisions of opinion among the people 312 NEW ENGLAND FEDEEALISM. as exasperated and intolerant as we have known, — by two successive insurrections among the people, and by tlie final overthrow of the administration itself in consequence of its intestine divisions. It is not thus that history will record the merits of that administration of twelve years. Great and signal those merits were ; but it is not from the pencil of indiscriminate panegyric that they pan be presented with the coloring of truth. I In the final report of the Hartfqrd Convention, it is evi- dently thus drawn for the sake of the contrast, — the reverse of the picture under the succeeding administrations of Jeffer- son and Madison ; but this side of the picture is equally dis- colored, though with excessive shading instead of light. It is painful to perceive men of reputation and intelligence affix- ing their names to two such professedly historical expositions, and giving them out as the foundation of measures recom- mended by them, and aft'ecting the very existence of the Union. After the fatal reverse of a new admipistration established in the hands of a party opposed to the Washington policy, the report says that " a steady perseverance in the new plans of administration at length developed their weakness and deformity ; but not until a majority of the people had been deceived by flattery and inflamed by passion into blindness to their defects. Under, the withering influence of this new system, the declension of the nation has been uniform and rapid. The richest advantages for securing the great objects of the Constitution have been wantonly rejected. While Europe reposes from the convulsions that had shaken down her ancient institutions, she beholds with amazement this remote comitry, once so happy and so envied, involved in a ruinous war, and excluded from intercourse with the rest of the world." I It would be curious to ascertain what proportion of the members of the Convention who signed the paper containing tiiis paragraph would ipw pronounce it worse tiian idle and frothy declamation. The weakness and deformity of the plans of Mr. Jefferson's administration, it seems, had not NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 313 been developed until a majority of the people had been struck by flattery and passion with blindness to their defects. It is always an awkward tiling for a minority, especially for a small minority, to complain) of the blindness of a majority of the people. From all our experience, and from none more than that of the Heartford Convention, we have reason to conclude that minorities are quite as apt to be flattered and inflamed into blindness as majorities. The essence of the complaint here is that the planb of Mr. Jefferson's administration were too popular; so thatjwhen tlieir weakness and deformity were developed, a majority of the peoj^le were blind, and could not perceive their defects. If we admit that a majority of the people may be deceived and inflamed even to momentary blindness, it is too 'much to tell us that this blindness will continue under the withering influence of a system by which the declension of the nation is rapid and uniform. Majorities of the people, like individuals, sometimes fail duly to appre- ciate blessings which they possess, and sometimes may be flattered with the promise of good which they will not obtain ; but the magician has not yet been found who can flatter and inflame a majority of the people into permanent approbation, or even blindness to the defects, of plans under which the declension of the nation is rapid and uniform. Tlie assertion itself of this declension was unfounded. The nation had con- tinued to prosper. The acquisition of Louisiana had brought an immense accession to its territory, to its security from for- eign power, and to its commerce. The injustices and out- rages of foreign European belligerent nations liad checked the commercial prosperity of our country, and had finally involved the nation in a distressing war. All the great inter- ests of the country were suffering under this scourge, and the united patriotism of the whole nation was needed for its defence. But the war had not been provoked by Mr. Jeffer- son or his administration. It was a war forced upon us by that very Europe Avhich is here represented as reposing from her convulsions, and beholding with amazement our condi- tion, as if she herself had not been its primary and only responsible cause.. 314 NEW ENGLAND FEDBEALISM. The report declines the voluminous discussion which would be required to explain the means whereby the fatal reverse had been effected ; but it sets forth nine specifications of charges against the policy which they say has produced this vicissitude. These siaecifications are themselves generalities which bear indefinitely upon the administration and its pol- icy, and upon the acts of seven successive congresses from 1801 to 1815. To show the relative importance in the eyes of the Convention of the heinous sins which they are denounc- ing, it may be proper to remark that five of the nine specifi- cations relate to the distribution of ofBces. The first, and most important of them in their view, is expressed in terms which can, at this day, scarcely be read without exciting a smile : — " First, A deliberate and extensive system for effecting a combination among certain States, by exciting local jealousies and ambition so as to secure to popular leaders in one section of the Union tlie control of public affairs in perpetual succes- sion. To which primary object most other characteristics of the system may be reconciled." This liead and front of the offences of the administration, so comprehensive as to embrace almost all the rest, is so obscurely worded that, even at the time, it must have been somewhat unintelligible to the people iji general. Its appar- ent reference is to the succession of Presidents of the United States, citizens of Virginia. The deliberate and extensive system ; the combination of certain States ; the local jeal- ousies and ambition ; the popular leaders in perpetual succes- sion to whom the control of public affairs was to be secured, — all this appears to be but a mystified manner of saying that Mr. Madison had succeeded Mr. Jefferson, and tliat there was danger that Mr. Monroe would succeed Mr. Madison, as Pres- ident. It is unnecessary to pursue the report through the eight following specifications. One of them points out what I consider as an error of Mr. Jefferson's administration, — the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801. I have already expressed my disapprobation of that repeal, and my conviction tliat tiie whole system of Mr. Jefferson's opinions and feelings with NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 315 regard to the judiciary was erroneous, and has had an unfa- vorable influence upon the public opinion of the country. Its influence, however, was controlled by the result of the im- peachment of Judge Chase. Public opinion has, to a great extent, resisted the influence of Mr. Jefferson upon this point, and Mr. Madison is not chargeable with the same error. The sixth specification may demand a moment's consid- eration : — " The admission of new States into the Union, formed at pleasure in the Western region, has destroyed the balance of power which existed among the original States, and deeply affected their interest." Here we have in a new form, and as a charge against the administration, the old basis of the projected confederacy of 1804, — the acquisition of Louisiana. The State of Louisiana was the only one which had been admitted since that event, — admitted by act of Congress to which the inhabitants of that country, in fulfilment of the stipulations of the treaty, were entitled of right, and which could not, in good faith, have been withheld from them. As a charge against the administration, therefore, this resolves itself into a conii)laint against the acquisition of Louisiana ; and we find it afterwards reappearing in the proposed amendments to the Constitution. For, notwithstanding the contrasted view of the results of the two administrations, and notwithstanding the unbounded prosperity and the transcendent felicity which, according to the report, the people had enjoyed while the Constitution had been in Federal hands, the reporter still brings the Conven- tion to the conclusion, that it is not conceivable that the obliquity of any administration should, in so short a period, have so nearly consummated the work of national ruin, unless favored by defects in the Constitution. The report then proposes and argues seven amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which, if imagination can suppose the possibility that they should have been adopted, would not have left enough of that instrument remaining to call it a ruin. The first of these amendments was to nbolisli the slave representation ; and tlie second, to 316 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. interdict the admission of new States into the Union without the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress. This amendment the report dechires to be highly important, and in fact indispensable ; but, in proposing it, adds the report, it is not intended to recognize the right of Congress to admit new States without the original limits of the United States. How the Convention intended to dispute this right in Congress, and what was to be done if tins in fact indis- pensable amendment should be rejected, the Convention would not trust themselves to express. From the terms of the resolution recommending the amend- ments, it appears indeed that they considered the whole seven as in fact indispensable. The resolution is in this form : — " Resolved, that the following amendments of the Constitu- tion of the United States be recommended to the States rep- resented as aforesaic^ [in the Convention], to be proposed by them for adoption by the State legislatures ; and, in such cases as may be deemed expedient, by a convention chosen by the people of eajCh State. " And it is further recommended that the said States shall persevere in their .efforts to obtain such amendments until the same shall be effected." The Constitution of the United States does not authorize either the State legislatures or conventions chosen by the people of any State to propose amendments to that instru- ment. Two other modes of proposing amendments are pro- vided, — one by the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress ; the other, upon the application of two-thirds of the legislatures of the States, when Congress are required to call a convention for proposing amendments. The Hartford Convention, in their recommendations, not only depart from the modes prescribed by the Constitution, but manifest their distrust even of the legislatures of some of the States repre- sented by themselves. They recommend the proposal of the amendments, first, by the legislatures ; but, secondly, in such cases as might be deemed expedient, by conventions chosen by the people of each State. They do not say by whom it was to be deemed expedient ; but the alternative is evidently NEW ENGLAND FEDEKALTSM 317 substituted for those States the legislatures of wliioh should remain faithful to the Union. It was an ijistigation of the people against itheir own legislatures as Avell as against the general government. Fellow-citizens, if, as you have so often and so earnestly been told, you are to judge of the designs of the Hartford Convention only from their acts, you must then believe that this body of men did recommend the proposal of these seven amendments,- and stubborn perseverance in the pursuit of them, in the sincerity of their hearts, and Avith a firm belief that, by such perseverance, they might and would be effected. Can you so believe ? That twenty-six men of intelligence should have ; imagined if possible that tliose seven amend- ments to the Constitution of the United States should be effected and,> the Union remain entire, requires itself no small effort of th6 imagination. That the amendments themselves would have dissolved the Union, it were, perhaps, too much to say; but that they would have annihilated the Consti- tution, and left the Union weaker than under the confeder- ation Congress, is certain ; and that the slaveholding States should ybluntarily surrender the principle of the slave rej^re- sentation, is of such character in the scale of probability that a man (^an scarcely be credited at once or the intelligence of a statesman, and for sincerity, in believing it. Of the service rendered to their constituents by the Con- vention in the proposal of these amendments, some estimate may be formed by the fortunes which attended them. They were immediately adopted by the legislatures of Massachu- setts and Connecticut, but not by the legislature even of any other of the States represented in the Convention. Tliey were transmitted by the Governors of Massachusetts and Connecficut to the executives of all the other States ; and by the Governor of Massachusetts, to the Senators and Rep- resentatives of the State in Congress, with a request to them to cause them to be proposed in that body. By the legisla- tures of New York and New Jersey they were at once re- jected, apparently without extending to them the courtesy of a discussion. The legislature of Pennsylvania treated them 318 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. with more respect, only to extinguish them after a more humili- ating manner. They were referred in the Senate of that State to a committee, whose report presented a cool, deliber- ate, and candid examination of every one of the amendments, and concluded with two resolutions : one declaring it inex- pedient to concur in the said amendments ; and the other requesting the Governor of the State to transmit a copy of the report and resolution to each of the Senators and Repre- sentatives of the State in Congress, and to the executive of each State in the Union, with a request that the same be laid before the legislature thereof. In Congress, the Jlepresentatives from the State of Massa- chusetts, then in opposition to the general administration, presented the amendments, with the precaution to ask merely that they might lie ^u the Speaker's table ; and they rejiorted to the Governor of JMassachusetts that tliis had been done, and that so tliey (tlhe amendments) had been received by the House. They have never since been heard of tliere but as a spark to kindle indignation, or a point to the sting of derision. Among the ingenious arguments upon which the author of the final report of the Hartford Convention has dwelt, in all his subsequent defences of that assembly, has been the dis- honor which the whole people of New England must suffer by the establishment of the belief that the object of that Con- vention was a dissolution of the Union and the formation of a new confederacy. This argument is again resorted to in the appeal, with a very anxious effort to turn upon me the resent- ment of the people of New England, as if my imputations upon the Convention and upon its measures were the causes of this dishonor to them. That the reputation of the people of New England has suffered, — that their influence in tlie counsels of the nation has been greatly impaired, — that the prejudices against them in the minds of their fellow-citizens throughout the remainder of the Union have been much increased and embittered, can- not be denied ; but all this is owing to the system of policy pui'sued by the party among them in opposition to the gen- NEW eStgland federalism. 319 eral government, and under the guidance of leaders who con- ducted them to tlie catastrophe of the Hartford Convention. Tlie refusal to i)laco the mililia of tlic State of Massacluisctts under the command oi the officer appointed by the President has cost that Commonwealth nearly a million of dollars. No other State, even of New England, sustained Massachusetts in this measure ; and Consequently no other State suffered the pernicious consequences of it. But the recommendations of the Hartford Convention would have involved all New Eng- land in the losses and humiliations which have followed from it. The people of Massachusetts, through every department of their government, have solemnly disavowed the principle of the measure. That the authors and supporters of this disas- trous system should now struggle to throw the whole respon- sibility of it upon the :people themselves, and to divert from their own door the odium and obloquy which they have drawn after them, is perfectly natural. Never was a system of measures devised by man which terminated in a more sig- nal and complete discomfiture. And now you are urged to believe that the proceedings of this Convention — ■ the final act of tlie drama — were the result of all the representative moral, intellectual, and patriotic worth of the New England character. If this position were true, with what shame and confusion of face must a native of New England now read the seven amendments to the Constitution proposed by the Hartford Convention, with the argument of the final report to sustain them, and, immediately afterwards, the report of the commit- tee of the Senate of Pennsylvania upon them ! That report was the work of a Federal hand, and would of itself suffice to rescue the Federal party from the reproach of responsi- bility for those odious proceedings. It was also the work of a statesman. And a New England man now doomed to read the two papers in succession, and to recollect that they were at the same time submitted to the consideration of the legis- lature of every State in the Union, like a bane and antidote administered together, will feel the deep injustice of the pre- tension that the paper from the Hartford Convention should 320 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. be received as the documentary evidence of tlie morals, intel- ligence, and patriotism of New England, in comparison with those of the State the motto to whose armorial bearings is, " Virtue, liberty, and independence." The tendency of the Hartford Convention and of all their measures undoubtedly was, and their effect has been, to degrade New England in the eyes of the rest of the Union, to impair her influence in it, and to sharpen every prejudice against her. They were also eminently calculated to exas- perate and envenom the prejudices of her own j)eople against those of the other portions of the Union. The spirit of dis- union presided at the first conception of calling the assem- bly, — presided at the successive struggles of six years of perseverance before the convocation was effected, — presided at all the deliberations of the assembly, and at all the meas- ures which they proposed. A cold and heartless apology for not immediately recommending a dissolution of the Union, and a repeated involuntary shuddering at the expression of their own intentions, are the only indications which they give of taking any interest in it at all ; and their slight and general allusion to the warning voice of Wasiiington serves but as a stimulus to the inquiry why it was so totally disregarded by them. The closing paragraph of the final report is dictated by the same spirit. It is an apology for not proposing an immediate secession from the Union. It says, " Nothing more could be attempted on this occasion than a digest of general principles, and of recommendations, suited to the present state of public affairs." It refers to the difficulties of the crisis ; to the pending negotiation for peace, and to the duty of abstaining from measures which might unfavorably affect that issue. It then concludes thus : — " It is also devoutly to be wished that an occasion may be afforded to all friends of the country, of all parties and in all places, to pause and consider the awful state to which perni- cious counsels and blind passions have brought this people. The number of those who perceive, and who are ready to retrace, errors, must, it is believed, be yet sufficient to NEW ENGLAND FEDEKALISM. 321 redeem the nation. It is necessary to rally and unite them by the assurance that no hostility to tlie Constitution is medi- tated, and to obtain their aid in placing it under guardians who alone can save it from destruction. Sliould this fortu- nate change be effected, the hope of happiness and honor may once more dispel the surrounding gloom. Our nation may yet be great, our Union durable ; but, should this prospect be utterly hopelessj the time will not have been lost wliich shall liave ripened a general sentiment of the necessity of more mighty efforts to rescue from ruin at least some portion of our beloved country." The same predominating ideas which have pervaded the whole report are hete concentrated in this summary at its close. The expedient for assuring those who might be disposed to retrace ( their errors, that no hostility to the Constitution was meditated, was, to be sure, of singular consistency with the seven proposed amendments to it, beginning with the Abolition of the slave representation ; but it is very apparent ',that the Hartford Convention were pre- pared for a continuance of the Union, and of the Constitution too, if they could ob^tain sufficient aid for placing them under the guardianship of the representative moral, intellectual, and patriotic worth of the New England character. But if that fortunate change could not be effected, and the prospect of it should prove utterly hopeless, then their time would not have been lost in "ripening" the general sentiment of a "neces- sity " of more mighty efforts to rescue from ruin at least " some portion of the country ; " or, in other words, that the time for a change was at hand. It will be no longer necessary to search for the objects of the Hartford Convention. They are apparent from the whole tenor of their report and resolutions, compared with the jour- nal of their proceedings. They are admitted in the first and last paragraphs of the report, and they were, — To wait for the issue of tlie negotiation at Ghent. In the event of the continuance of the war, to take one more chance of getting into their own hands the administra- tion of the general government. 21 822 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. On failure of that, a secession from the Union and a New- England confederacy. To tliese ends, and not to the defence of this part of the country against the foreign enemy, all the measures of the Hartford Convention were adapted ; and, of these ends, that of ripening the sentiment of a necessity for the last of these measures was the greatest object of the solicitude of the Con- vention, and the consummation of all their labors. With this object avowed in the last paragraph of the report, we see throughout the whole an adaptation of means to ends which, if not entitled to the praise of moral or patriotic worth, is at least both intelligent and intelligible. To this end were, with extraordinary address, adapted : — 1. Tlie resolution recommending to the legislatures of the New England States to protect their citizens in resistance I against acts of Congress and of the national Executive for the defence of the country. 2. Tiie resolution recommending a demand, with threats of popular insurrection, for the consent of Congress to a separate concert of defence between the New England States, and that a portion of the national revenue should be paid into the State treasuries. 3. The resolution recommending to the legislatures of New England to pass laws authorizing the Governors of the respec- tive States to employ the forces of the State for the defence of any other of the New England States at the request of its Governor. 4. The resolution recommending the proposal by the State legislatures, or by popular State conventions, of seven amend- ments to the Constitution of the United States, with the further recommendation that the said States should persevere in their efforts to obtain such amendments until the same should be effected. 5. Each and every one of those amendments themselves, — five of them striking at the vitals of tlie Constitution, and the 6th and 7th suited to inflame the jealousies of New Eughuul against Virginia, and the resentments of Virginia against New England. NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 323 6. The resolution that, if the application to the general government for their consent to the separate New England concert of defence and payment of national revenues into the State treasuries should be unsuccessful, peace not be concluded, and the defence of the New England States should be neglected as it had been since the commencement of the war, then recommending the appointment by the New Eng- land legislatures of delegates to another convention, to meet at Boston, on tlie third Tuesday of June then next, with such powers and instructions as the exigency of a crisis so momentous might require. The " ripening " properties of this resolution are exceed- ingly conspicuous. That the application to the general government would fail was certain ; that the defence of the New England States wotdd be as it had been since the com- mencement of the war was equally so. The neglect was assumed without foundation in fact ; and, therefore, the recommenda- tion'to the appointment of another convention rested upon the single contingency that peace should not be concluded. The increased exasperation under which the new convention would have been appointed and assembled appears to have been well premeditated. The application to the general gov- ernment and the proposed amendments to the Constitution were not only inadmissible, but highly irritating and inflam- matory measures. Their discussion in Congress would liave had a distracting tendency upon the national councils. Their certain rejection would have been with many aggravations, mutually offensive. They were firebrands, and, as such, admirably suited to the performance of their office. The contingent convention would have met in the midst of the conflagration they were to kindle. 7. The resolution authorizing the Hon. George Cabot, the Hon. Chauncey Goodrich, and the Hon. Daniel Lyman, or any two of them, to call another meeting of the Convention, to be holden at Boston, at any time before new delegates should be chosen, as recommended in the preceding resolu- tion, if in their judgment the situation of the country should urgently require it. 324 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. This resolution was forgotten by the author of the appeal, when he told jou that the Convention Avas ijjso facto dis- solved when they adjourned after making their report. 8. The same " ripening " properties are manifest in the state- ment preixared and published by order of the Convention, and printed with their final report. These statements consisted of eight schedules and two notes. The schedules are marked with the letters of the alphabet fiom A to H. They are col- lected from public documents, and published to prove the following positions : — a. Tliat the expenses of the war in two years to the 1st July, 1814, amounted to sixty millions of dollars. i. To prove the same fact, with the addition of a note stating that there was but a small British army employed against the United Status, and tliat, in this period, disgrace generally attended the American arms by land. c. That there had been a great increase of the revenues of tlie United States from the adoption of the Constitution till that of the restrictive system, and then an extraordinary diminution of the same revenues. d. That the numbers of the army previous to July 1, 1814, were 31,539 men ; and the recruits enlisted from January to September, 1814, were 13,898. e. That the expenditures of war during two years from its declaration had been greater than those of the years 1780 and 1781 during the Revolution. /. " This schedule brings into one view the great loss of revenue occasioned by the restrictive system, and the enor- mous Avaste of public moneys in the two first years of this war ; the particulars whereof are stated in the preceding schedules." This is the most " ripening" of all the statements. It is a sweeping estimate of two items, — one of twenty-seven, and the other of thirty-three, millions of dollars, footed thus : — " Revenue and public moneys lost by foolish restrictions, and in a profligate management of the war, |GO,000,000." And to give it hot-bed maturity, the radiance of the following note is collected upon it: — NEW ENGLAND FEDEIIALISM. 325 " Note. Had this large sum been saved, as it miglit have been with perfect case by a wise and economical administra- tion, the credit of the United States at tliis moment would have been unimpaired, and the very heavy direct and internal taxes now laid upon the people to supply the place of this sum so lost and wasted might have been avoided." g. Showing the amount of internal duties accrued for the first two quarters of the year 1814, gross total, $2,212,290. h. Tables of exports from 1792 till 1813 : showing the great increase of the commerce of the United States under Federal administration when it was free ; also, its great diminution under embargoes, restrictions, and war. To these eight schedules were added two notes : one being an extract from a report of the Secretary of the Navy of November 15, 1814, proposing a registry of seamen ; and one an extract from a speech of Mr. Madison in the Virginia Con- vention, which adopted the Constitution of the United States ; Avhich speech the Hartford Convention ingeniously represent as " a prophetic view of circumstances which would induce a majority of States to suppokt Virginia against the carrying States." Such is the full exhibition of the proceedings and purposes of the Hartford Convention ; and from this it is apparent that, in the strong disapprobation of them which the public have expressed, no injustice whatever has been done to that assembly. The author of the final report and of the confederate appeal was also the first of the commissioners appointed by the Governor of Massachusetts, under a resolve of the legislature of that State, of the 27th January, 1815, to proceed to the seat of the national government to make the earnest application recommended by the second resolution of the Hartford Convention. It is remarkable that the date of this resolve is precisely the same with that of the act of Con- gress which the author of tlie appeal now tells you " gave to the State governments the very power whicli was souglit by Massachusetts ; viz., that of raising, organizing, and officering State troops, to be employed in the State raising the same, 326 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. or in any adjoining State, and providing for their pay and subsistence." I have shown how very far the Hartford Convention were from considering tliis act in the light in which it is now repre- sented in the appeal. That the act was not more estimated by the legislature of Massachusetts than it had been by the Convention, is evident from the fact that they passed the resolve for the appointment of commissioners on the same day that the President of the United States signed the act of Congress. It had passed both Houses of Congress three weeks before, and must have been published in the Boston newspapers before the commissioners left that place to proceed to Wash- ington, and make earnest .application, in the name of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to the general government to do precisely that which the reporter of the Convention, the first commissioner from Massachusetts, and the composer of the confederate appeal, now tells you that act of Congress had already done. Another and a more fortunate incident, however, soon occurred which superseded the necessity for the commissioners to execute their commission. The messenger with the treaty of peace from Ghent arrived at Washington nearly on the same day with themselves ; and they judged it proper to abstain altogether from requesting an audience in their public capacity, or exhibiting their credentials- to any person. And thus ended the labors, moral, intellectual, and political, of the Hartford Convention ; and thus was extinguislied — I trust, for ever — the design of a Northern or Now England confederacy, entertained originally by a few individuals per- hajDS as early as the administration of Washington, formed into a deliberate and written plan, to which the aid and co-operation of Alexander Hamilton was solicited and refused in the spring of 1804; and pursued, with varying prospects of success, under all the vicissitudes of our national affairs, till it came to its euthanasia in the peace of Ghent. To this design few individuals of the Federal party were originally privy ; the embargo of December, 1807, was the immediate NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 327 occasion of its revival ; and, from that time, all the political measures of the surviving projectors of that plan were devoted to the purpose so well expressed in the last paragraph of the final report of the Hartford Convention, of " ripening the general sentiment of its necessity." It has passed away. Of those named to me as originally concerned in or acquainted with the design, not one in the State of Massachusetts now sui-vives. With them, as I hope and confidently believe, has expired tlie speculative opinion, the fundamental error of their polic^ — that the operation of the national Union waS so- oppressive upon the commercial States, and particularly upon New England, as to justify their resort to a more limited confederation. \ It was this opinion, founded iiponva;' contracted view of things, nourished by sectional prejudices and disappointed ambition, and stimulated by the conflicting prejudices and intolerance of Mr. Jefferson's administration and of his party, which gave rise to the design and prompted all the measures by which it was pursued. Those evils were not all imagin- ary. /The protection of the Union was not, during Mr. Jefferson's administration, extended to its commercial inter- ests as it ought to have been ; and those interests Avere of transcendent importance to New England. Mr. Jefferson had strong, very strong, sectional and party prejudices him- self, and speculative opinions relating to the judiciary power in my estimation little less dangerous than, those of the projectors of the New England confederacy. J/The great error of his administration with reference to Commercial and Ne\^ Eng- land interests was his rooted aversion to a naval power. / The source of this was partly sectional, and partly proceeded from a laudable but miscalculating spirit of national economy. The commercial prosperity of the country until the British orders in council of November, 1807, was, indeed, as great during his administration as it had been during that of his predeces- sors ; but the discontinuance and reduction of the appropria- tions for the navy were among the reforms by which he signalized his administration. The result of them cost the nation ten times more than all his reforms ever saved ; and 328 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. they liarl the still more pernicious effect of infusing a deep and too well-founded discontent into the commercial part of the community, and especially ainong the people of New England. Had Mr. Jefferson partaken the opinions, and pursued the system of policy respecting a navy, of his im- mediate predecessor, he probably never would have been compelled to resort to embargoes and non-intercourses against British orders in council. If he had, they Avoidd, with the assistance of a respectable navy, and with the hearty co-opera- tion of New England, have been far more effective to avert the catastrophe of war. The war itself, if it had come, would have found the nation in a state of preparation better adajjted to meeting it ; would have been more glorious in progress, and more successful in its termination. It is among the attributes of a superintending Providence to bring good out of evil : — " There's a Divinity tliat shapes our ends, Roughhew them liow we will." Under the beneficent guidance of this overruling power, the projected New England confederacy and the war with Great Britain, two of the greatest calamities which have ever befallen this Union, have been turned into two of the most effective instruments for its preservation. The Hartford Convention is a perpetual memento mori to every deliberate projector of disunion throughout this confederate republic. The war has proved to this nation that the ocean is not only the field of their glory, but of the glory upon which is written their defence. Fourteen years have elapsed since the peace with Great Britain was concluded, and since that day no portion of this great confederation lias been more faithfully devoted to tlie Union, none more candid and liberal in sup- port of the administration of the general government, than New England. During the same time, a steady system of gradual increase and impi'ovement of the navy has been in constant operation, and has been adding from year to year to the strength, the dignity, and the security of the nation. And may that Being in whose hands are the destinies of men continue thus to protect and preserve that great bond by NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 329 ■which the iiihahitants of tliis mighty empire are fellow-citizens of one republic, and hail each other by the endearing appella- tion of " Countrymen" ! Tf, in the institutions of the Grecian mytliology, the lyre of Orpheus was transferred to the heavens for its attractive virtues in civilizing and harmonizing the solitary savage of the desert into the social denizen of a com- munity, may its fascination still bind in Union, never to be dissolved, the stars of our confederate hemisphere, till the harmonious movement of the globe shall be involved in the orb of its revolution 1 At lyra deductis per coelum comibua Inter Sidera conspicitur, qua quondam ceperat Orplieus Omne quod attigerat eantu, manesque per ip803 Fecit iter, domuitque infernas carmine leges. Hinc coelestis honos, similisque potentia causse. Tunc silvas et saxa traliens, nunc sidera ducit Et rapit immensum mundi revolubilis orbem. ManiUus, Astronomicon, i. 322, etc. Next in Hie slcy with still congenial charms The lyre of Orpheus spreads abroad its arms ; That lyre whose touch with fascinating spell Tamed the dread lord and tyrant laws of hell ; With soft compulsion won the master's way From death's dire regions to the realms of day. Nor yet, transferred in glory to the skies, Has lost the power to draw by kindred ties. Then rocks and groves obeyed its wondrous force ; Now of the starry orbs it leads the course, Extends its virtues to the welkin's bound. And, rolling, whirls the universe around. John Quincy Adams. APPENDIX. Timothy Pickering to C. C. Pincknet.^ Philadelphia, 25th May, 1800. Dear Sir, — On my return from the country on the 23ct, I found your obliging letter of the 19th^ expressing your astonishment at my removal, asking for what end and how it was done, and for some information relative to the late important events. The story will be long ; but I cannot satisfy your queries without reciting it. Dates will demonstrate that the sentiments 1 shall now express are not the fruits of resentment against Mr. Adams for removing me from office : my feelings are of a very different kind. . . . Indignation and disgust, these arc and long have been my feelings towards Mr. Adams : disgust at his intolerable vanity ; indignation for the disgrace and mischief which his conduct has brought on the cause of Federalism and the country. When I say " long have been," I mean for near two years past, when I began to know him. In ascribing to Mr. Adams " upright views," I refer to public measures in general. If you were to scan his actions minutelj', you would find them influenced b}' selfishness, ambition, and revenge ; that his heart is cankered with envy, and deficient in sincerity ; that he is bUnd, stone bUnd, to his own faults and failings, and incapable of discerning the vices and defects of 1 The frequent allusions to hereditary enmities in the foregoing pages can be thoroughly understood only by reading Hamilton's pamphlet, "John Adams;" the reply of President Adams in his "Letters to the Boston Patriot; " Wol- cott's correspondence in Gibbs'a "Administrations of Washington and Adams ; " Lodge's " Life of George Cabot ; '' as well as Adams's " Cunningham Corre- spondence " and Pickering's " Review " of it. But the letter of Colonel Picker- ing, printed above, from the Pickering MSS., gives so graphic a picture of the first outbreak of these quarrels, and is evidence so contemporaneous, that it has been decided to print it, the more because it was written to his own candidate for the Presidency, and is therefore in a manner offlcial. 332 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. all his family connections. Hence his insatiable desire to provide in pnblic oflices for himself and them, and his injurious treatment of those who have opposed his wishes. Of this number I have the honor to be one. The first act of opposition bj- me was to the appointment of his son-in-law, Colonel Smith, to the offices of brigadier and adjutant- general in 1798. Two or three different times the President said to me, " What shall we do for Colonel Smith?" In the simplicity of my heart I answered each time, according to mj'^ opinion of his capacity, ' ' He can command a regiment." I did not then think of the drift of the President in putting and repeating that question to me ; but the result showed that, however little he valued mj' opinion, he was willing it should sanction his nomination to a higher grade. ^ I endeavored by some general observations to divert the President from nominating at that time auy oflicers below the grade of mnjor- general, because, as not a soldier was then raised, thej' would have nothing to do ; but that the commander-in-chief and the major- generals, besides consulting and forming proper arrangements, living in different parts of the Union, would be able to collect infor- mation of the proper characters for subordinate ofhces. Finding, however, that he was determined to make the oflicers ipimediately (it was just at the close of the session in July, 1 798) , and that Colonel Smith was to be nominated to the offices of brigadier and adjutant-general, I went immediately to the Senate, called out some members of my acquaintance, told them of this intended nomina- tion, expressed my opinion of Colonel Smith's capacity and char- acter (some of the senators were already well acquainted with both), and urged them to put their negative upon him, if they regarded the public interest or the public safety. AVhen the nomi- nation was sent to the Senate, the members manifested their disap- probation. The President's true and honest friends wished to save him from the mortification of a negative ; and three of them, Tracj', 1 In tlie same manner, lie at different times aslied me, " Wliom shall we appoint commander-in-cliief ? " I answered, " Colonel Hamilton.'' The last time he asked this question, when I again answered, " Colonel Hamilton," the President replied, "Oh, no! it is not his turn by a great deal. I wonld sooner appoint Gates or Lineoln or Morgan." Instantly I rejoined, " Morgan is a hrave and meritorious officer, but not competent to a large command ; besides, his constitution is wholly broken down, so that he is incapable of taking the field. As for Gates, he is now an old wonutn ; and lancoln is always asleep." I did not suppose that anybody wotild think of again drawing General Wash- ington from his retreat at Blount Vernon. [T. 1'.] APPENDIX. 333 Goodhue, and Ilillhouse, waited upon liim in the evening, and men- tioned the objections to Colonel Smith, — that he was not only a bankrupt, but a bankrupt ■vvilh dishonor. The President re- pelled the charge, declaring that, although Colonel Smith was a bankrupt, he was an honest man, and had acted honorably towards his creditors. The Senators continued to declare the contrary to be his character, and told the President that thej' wished to save both his feelings and Colonel Smith's, and therefore had waited upon him, that he might have an opportunity to withdraw the nomination and prevent a negative. " I will not withdraw the nomination," Baid the President. The next morning. Colonel Smith was nega- tived, three Senators only voting in his favor. Here, sir, is my original sin. The President was immediatelj- informed of my inter- ference in this matter, and he has never forgiven me : his hatred is implacable. I also took some pains to secure to Mr. Hamilton his rank of major-general, as designated bj- General Washington and intended by the Senate, while the President wanted to raise Gen- eral Knox above you both. I wrote manj' letters on this subject, some to gentlemen in Massachusetts, who, I imagined, might pos- sibly have some weight with the President, he being then at Quincy ; but several to General Washington ; one prior to Mr. McHenry's journey to Mount Vernon, to ask, by the President's direction, information of the candidates most proper for' military commands. This letter is dated the Gth of July, 1798 ; in which, after giving my reasons why Colonel Hamilton should be second in command, I mention the President's disinclination to place him in what I and others conceived to be his proper station, and the necessity of the weight of General Washington's opinion to insure the appointment. I conclude the letter with these words : " The appointment of Col- onel Hamilton in the manner suggested [that is, second to General Washington, void first, if the General declined the chief command] appears to me of such vast importance to the welfare of the coun- try, that I am willing to risk any consequences of my franli and honest endeavors to secure it." The President having manifested his intention to make Knox the first major-general, I again addressed General Washington, reasoning on General Knox's pretensions, and showing them, as I thought, to be unfounded. This letter is dated September 1st, 1798. In it I also mentioned the President's having expressed his opinion that General Knox had a legal right to be first major-gen- eral, and that if General AVashington was of the same opinion, and 834 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. consented io the measure, General Knox was to have the first com- mand. I expressed my full persuasion tliat your patriotism, and vei-y high and sincere respect for GeneralWashington, would deter- mine 30U to acquiesce in his arrangement ; and concluded the letter with this paragraph : — "Thus, sir, I have troubled you with a tedious detail, and have no other apology than my solicitude as a citizen of the United States, devoted to the advancement of their interest and welfare, made sure by the appointment of the fittest charac-rters to the most important stations in the arm3-. I have spoken with a freedom, which, in any other than a confidential letter to one who feels the like solicitude for his country's safetj', might be thought indecorous in relation to the first officer in the Union ; but although I respect the President for many great and excellent qualities, I cannot re- spect his errors, his prejudices, or his passions, and I have been plain and explicit, that you might be fully apprised of the mischiefs which your opinion and influence alone can avert." I now supposed Colonel Hamilton's rank would be secured bej-ond a donbt ; but, to my utter astonishment, without waiting for Gen- eral Washington's opinion and consent, the President, in a second letter to the Secretary of War, decided tliat Knox should be the first major-general. Upon this, on the 13th September, I again wrote to General Washington, and noting this precipitate decision, observed, " One mischief already appears, — Colonel Hamilton will not serve in the place to which the President would now degi'ade him. The fact is, the President has an extreme aversion to Gen- eral Hamilton, — a personal resentment, — and, if he followed his own wishes alone, would scarcelj' have given him the rank of a brigadier." The General, on the Ist October, wrote me that he had made a representation of the subject to the President, which would soon bring matters to a close, so far as they respected himself. In this letter, the President says that, besides the President's intended change in the relative rank of the major-generals, he had departed in almost every other instance from what he (General W.) con- sidered a solemn compact, and the only terms on \vhich he would, by accepting the commission, hazard every thing dear and valuable to him. After this, you must have learnt at the time the President felt himself under the mortifying necessity of treading back his own unadvised steps, and altering the three commissions of the major- APPENDIX. 335 generals, to make them conformable to General Washington's orig- inal arrangement. In tliis affair, also, the President must have believed me to have been not an idle spectator. He wrote to McHenry that there had been too much intrigue about it ; and latel^y, when he upbraided Mr. Goodhue and associates with the negative on Colonel Smith, he added, " And j-ou crammed Hamilton down my throat." But I must return to Colonel Smith. When I had spoken to many Senators, with the view of fixing the negative ui)on him, I told my friends that it was highly probable it would come to the President's ears, and tiiat I should not be surprised if in his resent- ment he removed me from my office ; but that, having done only what I considered to be my duty, I had made up m}^ mind to meet that event. At length it has arrived ; the hatred long laid up and increased has now been disclosed. To this immortal hatred, as the primary and chief cause, I had, with mj' friends, ascribed my dis- mission ; and yesterday, a friend who had chanced to have a long conversation with Mr. Stoddert confirmed it. Mr. Stoddert has enjoyed the President's confidence since the other secretaries lost it i that is, since the latter opposed his an'angements of the mili- tary, and reprobated the last mission to France. Mr. Stoddert told my friend that he early saw the President's resentment for my inter- ference in the case of Mr. Smith, which was undoubtedly the primary and chiefly influential cause of my removal ; and that he thought tliat interference an imprudent act. I grant that Mr. S. has more prudence ., — that prudence which will make him beware not to offend his chief in any case ; but it is a prudence of which I am not ambitious. Mr. Stoddert and Mr. Lee strongly reprobated the mission to France, as well as Wolcott, McHenrj^, and myself ; but when the President, last autumn, resolved that it should proceed, — it had become a proper measure. Another proof of the President's strong and implacable hatred towards all who opposed his will I will give you on the informa- tion of Mr. Goodhue. This gentleman, on Friday, the 9th inst., waited on the President to take leave, intending to set off the next morning for Massachusetts. They were alone ; and the President took the occasion to rake up ever}- subject of dissatisfaction, utter- ing his resentment in a tempest of passion during more than an hour, with some intervals of moderation. Among other things, he reminded Mr. G. of the opposition to the appointment of Colonel Smltli to the offices of brigadier and adjutant-general. " And you 836 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. voted against him," said the President, in a veliemcnt rage. If for nearly two j-ears he has harbored this violent resentment against Mr. Goodhue, for exercising his constitutional riglit and dut}' as a Senator, what must be liis wratli towards me, whose situation he imagines ought to have produced a perfect subserviency to his views? A letter from Mr. Goodhue has just interrupted me. lie begins : " With extreme indignation I have heard of the malignant conduct of the President towards you. Finding, I presume, by every calculation, that there was no chance of his being re-elected, there was nothing to restrain him from the full exercise of his venomous disposition, which otherwise he dared not to manifest. This measure, I have no doubt, will occasion a perfect departure from the plan which they had agreed upon relative to the next election ; ' and he will return to private life, amidst the triumphs of his ancient enemies, and the execrations of his quondam friends, and leave an example to mankind how easil}' they may be deceived into a belief that a man is possessed of superemincnt quahties who is wholly destitute of any that ever ought to have raised him to distinction." I have mentioned my disgust at Mr. Adams's intolerable vanity. But the week before my discharge, in conversation with the Presi- dent about Great Britain and France, and how the former might be aifected by our successful negotiation with the latter, and the Presi- dent having expressed his opinion that Mr. Jefferson would un- doubtedly be the next President, he added, " But IMr. Jefferson will be no more inclined than I to go to war with Great Britain. Indeed, it is well known, and has often been said, that the British were more afraid of John Adams than of any man in the United States." About two weeks before, I was speaking to him of a letter written by Mr. Jefferson, in March, 1798, to Sir John Sin- clair, describing a new-invented mould-board by Mr. J., and of the political notions with which Mr. Jefferson concluded his let- ter. These notions I recited from me.morjr, and then said, "Mr. Jefferson is doubtless a man of ver}^ great learning, but certainl}' a visionary politician." " Why, j-es ! " answered the President ; "he has a certain kind of learning in philosophy and some other things, but very httle of that which is necessary for a statesman." Yet I have understood that he has lately spoken very handsomely of INIr. Jefferson, as the person in the United States most fit to succeed to 1 This was to place Mr. Adams and you on tlie ticket for President and Vice-l'resiaciit. [T. 1'.] APPENDIX. 337 the onflco of Presidont. If I niiatnko not, lin said hh miicli to McIIenry, who, by the way, lias a most charming dialogue of the tke a tke which was the prelude to his resignation. If he has an opportunity, he will certainly show it to you. IJut Mr. Adams is not only pre-eminently \mn of himself: he as egrcgiously errs respecting the talents of his family connections. On the day on which he determined to nominate Colonel Smith to the oflices of brigadier and adjutant-general, he said to me : " When Colonel Smith was with me in Europe, I was informed b}- several military ofTicers who had conversed with him, that he possessed great military talents. Why, sir ! he has seen the grand reviews of the Great Frederic at Potsdam ! " There was no more to be said. The same day, I repeated this anecdote to Colonel North, then in the Senate. "Yes!" said North, "I remember we received the account of Colonel Smith's journe}' to Potsdam when I was at Baron Steuben's, and the Baron expressed his chagrin. ' Colonel Smith,' said the IBaron, ' will appear there in the American uniform : he will be noticed by the king, who will ask him some military questions, which Smith will not be able to answer ; and he will bring disgrace on the American armj\' " When the President appointed his son minister to Berlin, I made a draught of his commission, and, before it was engrossed on parch- ment, waited on the President, to see if it met his approbation. In reciting his son's former offlcial character, I called him late minis- ter to the Hague, and not minister plenipotentiary to Portugal, where he had not been received, and to which place he was only preparing to go. On this trivial occasion, instead of suggesting his opinion, which in this case would have governed me, that it would be more proper to call him late minister plenipotentiarj' to Portugal, he vociferated, "He was minister plenipotentiary to Portugal, appointed by General Washington, not by me ; and by that title he should be designated :" then, lowering his tone, " I am sorry that my son ever went on a mission to Europe : I wish he had stayed at home. There was no man in the United States of whose pen the Jacobins were so much afraid as of my son's." I will not trouble you with more information relating to the President at this time. I have need to make an apology for this long detail, given just as the thoughts occurred to me, and facts were recollected. You will pardon their incoherence, and believe me to be, &c. 22 338 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. Pickering to Richard Peters.* CiTV ot- Wasiiinoton, Dec. 24, 1803. My Dear Friend, -^Although the end of all our Revolutionary labors and expectations is disappointment, and our fond hopes of republican happiness are vanity, and the real patriots of '76 are overwhelmed b}' the modern pretenders to that character, I will not yet despair : I will rather anticipate a new confederacy, exempt from the corrupt and corrupting influence and oppression of the aristocratic Democrats of the South. There wilLiJ4ij=;L.aad^ur children at_Jarthest _ will see it — a separation. The white and black population will mark theTouiicIafy."^^ The British Provinces, even witli the assent of Britain, will become members of the Northern confedcrac}'. A continued tyranny- of the present ruling sect will precipitate that event. The patience of good citizens is now nearly cxlinusted. By oi)eii violations and [iretcnded amend- ments they are shuttering our political bark, which, witli a few more similar repairs, must founder. Etforts, however, and laudable ones, are and will continue to be made to keep the timbers together. The most distinguished you will find in the speech of Mr. Tracy, which I enclose. . . . Pickering to Cabot. ^ City of Washington, Jan. 29, 1804. My Dear Sir, — A friend of mine in Pennsylvania,' in answer- ing a letter, lately asked me, " Is not a great deal of our chagrin founded on personal dislikes, the pride of opinion, and the morti- fication of disappointment?" I replied, or, to speak correctly, I prepared the following reply. But when I had finished, perceiving the sentiments too strong for the latitude of Pennsjdvania, and perha[)s for the nerves of my friend, I changed the form, and now address them to you. To those questions, perhaps to a certain degree, an affirmative answer may be given. I have more than once asked myself. For what are we struggling? Our lands yield their increase, our com- merce flourishes, we are building houses, " are marrying and given 1 Pickering MSS. Printed in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 441. 2 Pickering MSS. Printed in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 337. 8 Judge I'eters. APPENDIX. 339 in marringc," yet we are dissatisfied : not because we envy tlic men in ollice, — to most of us a private life is most desirable. The Fed- eralists are dissatisfied, because they sec the public morals debased by the corrupt and corrupting system of our rulers. Men are tempted to become apostates, not to Federalism merely, but to virtue and to religion- and to good government. Apostasy and original dopravitj'^ are the qualifications for ofTlcial honors and emol- uments, while men of sterling worth are displaced and held up to popular contempt and scorn. r^nd shall we sit still, until this sys- tem shall universally triumph? until even in the Eastern^tates tlio principles of genuine li'cdcralism shall be overwlielmc(l_y Mr. Jefferson's plan of destruction has been gradual)}' advancing. If at once he had removed from office all the Federalists, and given to the people such substitutes as we generally see, even his followers (!• mean the mass) would have been shocked. He is still making progress in the same course ; and he has the credit of being the ,real source of all the innovations which threaten the subversion of the Constitution ,(S,nd the prostration of every barrier erected by it for the protection of the best^ and therefore to him the most obnox- ious, part of the eommunitj-jj His instruments manifest tempers so malignant, so inexorable, as convince observing Federalists that the mild manners and habits of our countrymen are the only security against their extreme vengeance. How long we shall enjoy even this security, God only knows. And must we with folded hands wait the result, or timely think of other protection? This is a delicate subject. The, principle a-of-Qur Reyjalu tion poij it__to^the remedy, — a separation. That this can be accomplished, and with- out spilling one drop of blood, I have little doubt. One thing I know, that the rapid progress of innovation, of corruption, of oiiprcssion, forces the idea upon many a reflecting mind. Indeed, we are not uneasy because " unplaced." But we look with dread on the ultimate issue, — an issue not remote, unless some new and extraordinary obstacle be opposed, and that speedily ; for paper constitutions are become as clay in the hands of the potter. -^ The people of the East cannot reconcile their habits, views, and inter- ests with those of the South and West.. The latter are beginning to rule with a rod of iron. When ndi convenient to violate the Constitution, it must be altered ; and it will be made to assume any shape as an instrument to crush the Federalists. The inde- pendence of the judges is now directly assailed, and the majority are either so bhnd or so well trained that it will most undoubtedly 340 NKW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. be destroj'ed. Independently of specific charges, as gronnd of impeachment, John Randolpli, I am informed, avows this doctrine : that the clause in the 'Constitution granting to the judges their offices during good behavior was intended merely to guard them against Executive removals^ and not at all to restrain the two Houses of Congress, on whose representation the President ought to I'e- move theni ! We should realty be safer without any constitution, for then oppressive acts might excite public attention ; but while the popular tj'rants shelter themselves under the forms or the name of the Constitution, tortured and interpreted to suit their views, the people will not be alarmed. TAy the Philadelphia papers, I see that the Supreme Court judges of Pennsylvania are to be hurled from their seats, on the pretence that, in punishing one Thomas Passmore for a contempt, they acted illegallj' and tyrannically. I presume that Shippen, Yates, and Smith are to be removed by the Governor, on tlie representation of tlie legislature. And when such grounds are taken, in the national and State legislatures, to destroy the rights of tiie judges, whose rights can bo safe? Wh}' destroy Mem, unless as the pre- lude to tlie destruction of every influential Federalist, and of every man of considerable property, who is not of the reigning sect? New judges, of cliaracters and tempers suited to the object, will be the selected ministers of vengeance. I am not willing to be sacri- ficed by such popular tyrants. ISIy life is not worth much ; but, if it must be ofl'ered up, let it rather be in the hope of obtaining a more stable government, under which my children, at least, may enjoy freedom with securitj'. Some Connecticut gentlemen (and thc}^ are all well-informed and discreet) assure me that, if the lead- ing Democrats in that State were to get the upper hand (which would be followed b)' a radical change in their luiwritlen constitu- tion), the}' should not think themselves safe, either in person or property, and would therefore immediately quit the State/'^I do not believe in the practicability of a long-continued union. A Northern confederac}'^ would unite congenial characters, and present a fairer prospect of public happiness ; while the Southern States, having a similarity of habits, might be left " to manage their own aft'airs in their own waj-." / If a separation were to take place, our mutual wants would rencler a friendly and commercial intercourse inevilalile. The Southern States would require tiie naval protec- tion of the Northern Union, and the products of the former would be important to the navigation and commerce of the latter. I be- APPENDIX. 341 lieve, indeed, that, if a Northern confederacy were forming, our Southern brethren would be seriously alarmed, and probably aban- don tlieir virulent measures. But I greatly doubt whether prudence should suffer the connection to continue much longer. They are so devoted to their chief, and he is so necessary- to accomplish their plans of misrule and oppression, that as they have projected an alteration of the Constitution to secure his next election, with a con- tinued preponderance of their party, so it would not surprise me, wore they, soon after his next election, to choose hiui President for life. I am assured that some of his blind worshippers in South (Carolina have started the idea. But when and how is a separation to be effected ? If, as many think. Federalism (by which I mean the solid principles of governr ment applied to a federate republic, — principles which are founded : n justice, in sound morals, and religion, and whose object is the security of li|ja,Jib<»tyv^n£Lproperty, against popular delusion, in- justice, and tj'rannj') , — fif, I saj'. Federalism is crumbling away in New PjHgland, there is no time to be lost, lest it ^ould be over- whelmed, and become unable to attempt its own relieO Its last ref- use is New England ; and immediate exertion, perhaps, its only hope. It must begin in Massactuisetts. The proposition would be welcomed in Connecticut ; and could we doubt of New Hampshire? But New York must be associated ; and how is her concurrence to be obtained? She must be made the centre of the confederacy. Vermont and New Jersey would follow of course, and Rhode Island of necessity. Who can be consulted, and who will take the lead? The legislatures of Massachusetts and Connecticut meet in May, and of New Hampshire in the same month or in June. The sub- ject has engaged the contemplation of manj'. The Connecticut gentlemen have seriously meditated upon it. We 8up[)0Re the British Provinces in Canada and Nova Scotia, at no remote period, perhaps without delay, and with the assent of Great Britain, may become members of the Northern league. Certainl}-, that govern- ment can feel only disgust at our present rulers. She will be pleased to see them crestfallen. She will not regret the proposed division of empire. If with their own consent she relinquishes her provinces, she will be rid of the charge of maintaining them ; while she will derive from them, as she does from us, all the commercial returns which her merchants now receive. A liberal treatj' of amity and commerce will form a bond of union between Great Britain and the Northern confederacj' highly useful to both. 342 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. Are these ideas visionary or impracticable? Do they not merit consideration? If they do, let me know, in such way as j'ou deem expedient, what j'ou think. Tracy has written to several of his most distinguished friends in Connecticut, and may soon receive their answers. R. Griswokl, examining the finances, has found that the States above mentioned, to be embraced by the Northern confederac3', now pay as much (or more) of the jjublic revenues as would disciiarge their share of the public debts due those States and abroad, leaving out the millions given for Louisiana. / Perhaps a crisis may occur to mark the moment for decisive Srieasures. Perhaps the violation of the Constitution in the arbi- trary removal of the judges maj^ hasten such a crisis.^ The signal, a bold but safe step bj' members of Congress. Tappikg Reeve to Uriah Tracy.' [Extract of a letter from u gentleiimn of ilislinutiuii in Coniiccliciit to liis friend in tlie city of Washington, dated Feb. 7, ]804.] '^ " I have omitted answering your lotttir luitil this time, tliat I might learn, if possible, the sentiments of others upon the subject of your letter. I shall continue to pursue the subject with all the industry' I am capable of exercising, and will wiite to j'ou again by the mail next week. The court is now sitting at Litchfield, and I shall have further ojiportunities of learning the sentiments of inllu- ential people. I can now say that there never has been such an alarm excited in the minds of informed people as at the present moment. It seems to be a very general opinion that some method must be fallen upon to preserve ourselves from that ruin with which we are threatened. We are waiting with great anxietj' to learn in what manner the amendment will be treated b}' Massachusetts. I have seen many of our friends ; and all that I have seen, and most that I have heard from, believe that we must separate, and that this is the most favorable moment. The difliculty is, How is this 1 Pickering MS.S. Printed in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 442. [Tliis letter is in- dorsed by Colonel Pickering " T. K. to U. T. ; " and Jlr. Octavius Pickering conjectures, with indubitable correctness, that the initials stand for the names which I have placed at the head of this extract. Tapping Keeve was a dis- tinguished lawyer and judge in Connecticut. His wife was a sister of Aaron Burr, who knew of this Bcheine, and iiroposed, if it seemed jirofitablc, to take part in it. See " Life of Plumor,'' and Hamilton's " History of the Kepublic ; " Davis's " Life of Bnrr." H. C. L.] " This is Colonel Pickering's own head-note to the extract. [H. C. L.] APPENDIX. 343 to be accomplished? I have heard of only three gentlemen, as yet, Tvho appear undecided upon this subject. Among these is . He is sufllcicntly alarmed, but afraid tliat the country is not prepared. I believe that some proper step must be taken before there will be that preparedness that he wishes. Mr. , I believe, retains a great degree of apathj'. The other gentle- man's opinion is, I beUeve, governed in some measure by Mr. . But a settled determination that this must be done has taken fast hold of some minds where you would expect more timiditJ^ It seems to be the opinion of those with whom I have conversed that two things must be done with a view to accompHsh the desired object, — one by j'ou gentlemen of Congress, and the other by the legislatures of the States. We believe, in the present state of alarm and anxiety among Federalists, that if 3'ou gentlemen at Congress will come out with a bold address to your constituents, taking a view of what has been done under the present administra- tion, with glowing comments on the ruinous tendencies of the measures, and if this should be done before the sitting of our legislatin-e, or rather the election of the members thereof, that this will produce all that preparedness that is wanted. I know tliat it will animate the body of the people bejond any other possible method, and give a death-wound to the progress of Democracy in this part of tlie country ; that this ought to be followed up by the legislatures by such declarations as may have the strongest tendency to secure the object aimed at. In what manner this separation is to be accomplished is to me wholly in the dark, unless the amendment is adopted hy three-fourths of the legisla- tures, and rejected by Massacluisetts, New Hampshire, and Connect- icut, upon the last ground taken by Delaware.' In such case, I can see a foundation laid." Pickering to Theodore Ltman.' City of Washington, Feb. 11, 1804. Dear Sir, — The conduct of our rulers reminds me of your early predictions, coeval I believe with Mr. Jefferson's inaugural ' Note by Colonel rickcriiig. " Tlmt tlic nincmlmcnt Imcl not ronstitntion- ally passed the two Houses of Congress ; that is, by two-thirds of the entire number composing the respective Houses." ^ Pickering MSS. Printed in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 444. 844 NKW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. speech. The public debt, indeed, is not annihilated ; but in all other things thej^ have, I suspect, surpassed 3'our apprehensions. The removals from office have been gradual, not to shock the public mind. When the sensations produced b}' the political death of one distinguished Federalist are blunted, another victim is led to the altar ; with the same view, removals and appointments are no longer made public. Tlie changes which take place are but very partially known, — that is, only by the neighbors of the individuals respectively, — while the communitj- at largo is kept in ignorance of the accumulated evil. The violation of the Constitution, though not commenced, yet most remarkable in overthrowing the judi- ciary, is becoming habitual. The judges of the Supreme Court are all Federalists. They stand in the way of the ruling power. Its satellites, also, wish to occupy their places. The judges, therefore, are, if possible, to be removed. Their judicial opinions, if at all questionable, though mere errors of judgment., arc interpreted into crimes, and to be grounds of impeachment. And, if these should fail, theji^ are to be removed by the President, on the representa- tions of the two Houses of Congress. At least, this is the doc- trine of John Randolph, the leader of Democracy in the House of llepresentatives. He sajs that the provision in the Constitution that the judges should hold their offices during good behavior, was intended to guard them against the Executioe cdone, and not by any means to control the power of Congress, on whose representation against the judges the President should remove them. Such a re- moval of some would, or at least ought to, occasion the resignation of all the rest. For, as upright men, feeling for their own dignity and rights, how could the}' consent to hold their oflices at the will and pleasure of such rulers? The removal of good men from office, and the appointment of some of the worst in their places, ha\'e a pernicious elfect on the public morals. Depravity is the surest road to preferment, wliile virtue and integritj' arc objects of virulent persecution. Hence the open apostasy of man}', before of decent character, but without stabilit}' to resist temptation. The removal of the j)resent judges, and the appointment of unprincipled successors, will com- plete the catastrophe. Tlie men of stern, inllexible virtue, who dare expose and resist the public corru|)tion, will be the first \ ic- tims ; and the best portion of the community, alread}' humbled, will be trodden under foot. And must we submit to these evils? Is there no remedy? Is APPENDIX. 345 there not 3'et remaining in New England virtue and spirit enough, if a suitable occasion offer, to resist the toiTcnt ? The most intel- ligent of the Federalists here have been reflecting on this subject ■with the deepest concern. Massachusetts, as the most powerful, the}' say, should take the lead. At the word from her, Connecticut would instantly join. There can be no doubt of New Hampshire. Rhode Island would follow, of neccssit3\ There would probably be no great difficulty in bringing in Vermont. But New York should also concur ; and, as she might be made the centre of the Northern Union, it can hardly be supposed that she would refuse her consent. New Jcrsej' would assuredly become an associate ; and it is to be wished that Pennsylvania, at least east of the Sus- quehannah, might be induced to come into the confederation. At no distant period, the British Provinces on the north and north- east would probably become a part of the Northern Union. I think Great Britain would not object; for she would continue to derive from them, when become States, all the commercial advan- tages they would yield if continued her Provinces, without the expense of governing and defending them. While thus contemplating the only means of maintaining our ancient institutions in morals and religion and our equal rights, we wish no ill to the Southern States and those naturally connected with them. The public debts might be equitably apportioned between the new confederacies, and a separation somewhere about the line above suggested would divide the different characters of the existing Union. The manners of the Eastern portion of the States would be sufficiently congenial to form a union, and their interests are alike intimately connected with agriculture and com- merce. A friendl}' and commercial intercourse would be main- tained with the States in the Southern confederacy, as at i)rescnt. Thus all the advantages which have been for a few ycaxs depend- ing on the general Union would be continued to its respective por- tions, without the jealousies and enmities which now afflict both, and which peculiarlj' embitter the condition of that of the North. It is not unusual for two friends, when disagreeing about the mode of conducting a common concern, to separate, and manage each in his own way his separate interest, and therebj' preserve a useful friend- ship, which without such separation would infalliljlj' be destroyed. If even the New England States alone were agreed in the first instance, would there be any difficulty in making frank and open proposition for a separation, on the principles above suggested? 346 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. The Northern States have nothing to countervail the power and influence arising from the negro representation, nor will thej' ever receive an equivalent. This alone is an adequate ground to de- mand a separation. The only practical equivalent is a direct tax, which will not be resorted to until all other means are exhausted ; and in the mean time we suffer all the mischiefs which flow from an unequal representation. Several distinguished men are turning the attention of their Eastern friends to the consideration of this subject ; and it being of the highest importance, and requiring the most serious reflec- tion, I have thought it riglit to present it to you. Cabot to I'ickeuing.' Feb. 14, 1804. IiIy Dear Sik, — I have read with great interest your letter of the 3d.^ The subject is as important as it is delicate, and has often occupied my thoughts. All the evils you describe and many more are to be apprehended ; but 1 greatly fear that a separation would be no remedy, because the source of t/iein is in the political theories of our country and in ourselves. A separation at some period not very remote may probably take place. The first impression of it is even now favorably received by many ; but I cannot flatter mj'- self with the expectation of essential good to proceed from it, while we retain maxims and principles which all experience, and, I may add, reason too, pronounce to be impracticable and absurd. Even in New England, where there is among the body of the people more wisdom and virtue than in any other part of the United States, we are full of errors, which no reasoning could eradicate, if there were a Lj'eurgus in every village. We are democratic alto- gether ; and I hold democracy i j n its n ntiiml r,^pr!Vihcm^in\^t^^ ernment of the worst. If democracy has not produced among us alTtLe mischiefTo^hich it necessarily' tends, the causes are not difficult to be traced, and I am not without hopes that the same or other causes may still operate to retard and mitigate those evils which cannot be wholly averted ; but it is, in my mind, expecting ' From tlio I'ickcring JfSS. I'rliilcd in Lodge's " Ciibot," p. Oil. ^ " I'robably Jiui. 21), in rough diiitt, wliioli was sent Feb. 3." Tliis is the explanation of llr. Octavius I'ickering, in u manuscript note appended to this letter. [II. C. L.] APPENDIX. 347 too much of mankind to suppose that thej- will cease to act from impulse and habitually act from reflection. It is the ordinar}- duty of every just government to restrain men from doing what their vicious inclinations impel them to do, and coerce them to the per- formance of duties to which they are disinclined. Hence, in popu- lar governments, men are driven from oflice for performing their duty, and others put in their places who violate theirs. The people will not knowinglj' employ men nor voluntarily support a govern- ment whose acts contravene their favorite purposes, whicli are often those of their worst passions ; and it is not unusual to see men of tolerably good characters urgent to choose for iTilers those whom they know to be the worst, because, though thej' do not approve of profligacy and immorality, 3-et they will not on this account sacrifice sinister objects of their own. While I hold tliat a government altogether popular is in effect a government of the populace, I maintain that no government can be relied on that has not a material portion of the democratic mixture in its composition. The great and hitherto insurmountable difflcultj^ has been to estab- lish and maintain the empire of principles against the assaults of popular passions. This can only be done by such an organization as supplies somewhere vital powers which the popular fury cannot extinguish. The independent judiciarj-^ was the best feature in our national sj^stem, but it is abolishing ; and it may be asked who shall prevent the people from destroying their own institutions? You would liope that in New England we should be all alive to guard this sacred principle, but it is not so ; and I doubt whether it is possible by any alarm of this kind to excite a zeal among the people. "VVe look with apathy on things of this sort. At the same time that I do not desire a separation at this mo- ment, I add that it is not practicable without the intervention of some cause which should be very generally felt and distinctly understood as chargeable to the misconduct of our Southern mas- ters : such, for example, as a war with Great Britain, manifestly provoked by our rulers. But they will not hazard a war, though they will wantonly excite much animositj'. AVithout some single event of this kind to rouse us, I am of opinion we must bear the evils which the delusion of democracy is bringing upon us, until men of all i)arties in our countrj' can be brought to acknowledge them and unite in the applicatiou of a remedy. Should this con- viction be general in New England, I think something might be done, in spite of all opposition from the South ; but, until it is gen- 348 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. eral, a great Jacobin party here, supported by the nation and its government, would be likely to triumph. If, as is probable, we do not find ourselves strong enough now to act with success the part proposed, I am sensible of the dangers you point out, and see no wa}^ of escaping them. We shall go the wa}- of all govern- ments wholly popular, — from bad to worse, — until the evils, no longer tolerable, shall generate their own remedies. There was a time when I believed that New England might get along very well with a system of government which had proved in other times and places inadequate to the purposes of social order ; but I can truly say I have despaired of our success these ten jears. The prosperity of these States, and the apparent soundness of their politics, may seem to confute this opinion ; but, like tlie " successful tide of experiment" through the United States, much is to be attributed to the incalculable advantages derived from a neutral station in a world of war. And, in regard to our present politics, let me observe, that there is no energy in the Federal party, and there could be none manifested without great hazard of losing the state government. Some of our best men in high stations are kept in office because they forbear to exert any influ- ence, and not because they possess right principles. They are permitted to have power, if they will not use it. It is happy for us that we have a Governor whose consummate prudence con- ciliates opponents without detaching friends ; but he will cease to be popular the moment he dares to act with vigor. It must be nearly the same in New Hampshire and Connecticut. This latter State has given the best example of a self-governed people that the world has ever seen ; but its system is nearly run out, and I doubt, if everj- honest man in the State were united, whether they could long prevent their opponents from getting the government. Let a solid peace talce place in Europe, and the strength of their government would soon appear too feeble to enforce justice. I shall not bo surprised to see Connecticut as remarkable for disseminating anarchical doctrines as it has been for a contrary character. It is to be feared that the superior information of the Connecticut peo- ple, while it gives them more power to produce political effects, will not give them better dispositions than others. Indeed, their education increases their wants more than their means of supplying them; and sucli people will of necessity become ungovernable when the acquisition of property is dillicult. I doubt not some of our friends from that State view this subject in the light now pre- APPENDIX. 349 sented ; but they arc vory reluctant to admit it. The fcais they dis- cover may, however, be considered as unequivocal evidence of their private opinion. If no man in New England could vote for legis- lators who was not possessed in his own right of two thousand dol- Jbts' value in land, we could do something better ; but neither this nor other material improvement can be made by a fair consent of the people. I incline to the opinion that the essential alterations which may in future be made to amend our form of government will be the consequences only of great suffering, or the immediate effects of violence. If we should be made to feel a very great calamity from the abuse of power bj' the national administration, we might do almost any thing ; but it would be idle to talk to the deaf, — to warn the people of distant evils. By this time, you will suppose I am wilUng to do nothing but submit to fate. I would not be so understood. I am convinced we cannot do what is wished ; but we can do much, if we work with nature (or the course of things) , and not against her. A separation is now impracticable, because we do not feel the necessity or utility of it. The same separation then will be unavoidable, when our loj'alty to the Union is generally perceived to be the instrument of debasement and im- poverishment. If it is prematurely attempted, those few onlj' will promote it who discern what is hidden from the multitude ; and to those may be adressed, — " Triitlifl would you tcacli, or save ft sinltlug Inud, All fear, none aid you, and few understand." I have said that a separation now is not desirable, because we should not remedy the evil, but should bring it home and aggra- vate it by cherishing and giving new sanctions to the causes which produce it. But, if a separation should b}' and bj' be produced b}' suffering, I think it might be accompanied by important amelio- rations of our theories. You have doubtless seen the portraits of some of the New York patriots which are said to be good likenesses. Some observations on the subject which appeared in the " Centinel" may be thought worth reading. You see how unstudied I give you my thoughts. With equal unalTectedness, beUcve me, &c. NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. Theodore Lyman to Pickering.* Boston, Fel). 20, 1804. Dear Sir, — I have earefuUj' and with much solicitude perused the communications received in j'our letter. There are few among my acquaintance with whom I could on that subject freelj' con- verse ; there maj' be more ready than I am aware of, and that are kept back under an impression that they are more singular in their opinion than they really' are. Patient waiting, with prudent man- agement, b}' giving opportunity', when it occurs, of expressing scatimcnts, seems to be the only means to ascertain the opinion of gentlemen whose prudence, discretion, and good judgment are to be relied on. Many judicious and discerning men must see that one encroachment after another on the fundamental principles of the Constitution lessens its solidity. Clearly perceiving the danger, they may yet feel at a loss how to counteract a system of proceed- ing which they are sure will ultimately destroy it, without endan- gering the peace and safety of their country. Tliere is, besides, a large class of valuable men, whose business takes up the principal part of their attention, and who scarcely ever cast their cj-e toward the political horizon of their countiy ; and thej', of course, do not perceive the cloud that is gathering around it. Being themselves honest and true lovers of good government, they are readj' to believe, if not at least to hope, that all are like unto themselves. These good people cannot be made to look up until the cloud shall have so much thickened that their prospects are darkened, and to feel their securit}' is in danger. That such is the state of things, may be to be regretted ; but, if the picture is truly drawn, must not the remedy that is to be applied be in conformitj' thereto ? IIow the project of an adjustment, as has been suggested, would suit the dominant party, is problematical. Men seldom are content to stop at an}' stage of power ; and, possessing it so completely as they now do, is it reasonable to suppose that any proposition founded on reason, and that would in its tendencj' promote the united interest of the whole nation, — is it natural, or can it scared}' be hoped, that it would be well received? You know full well my sentiments, and will believe me ready at all times, in any way tiiat is in my power, to do those things which in their tendency shall promote the interest of my country. 1 I'ickcring MSS. Prhilcd in Lodge's " Cubot," p. 440. APPENDIX. 351 PiCKERINQ TO RUFUS KiNG.'' City op Washington, March 4, 1804. Dear Sir, — I am disgusted with the men who now rule, and with their measures. At some manifestations of their malignancy, 1 am shocked. The cowardly' wretch at their head, while, hke a Parisian revolutionary monster, prating about humanity, would feel an infernal pleasure in the utter destruction of his opponents. We have too long witnessed his general turpitude, his cruel re- movals of faithful ofHcers, and the substitution of corruption and looseness for integrity and worth. We have now before the Senate a nomination of Mcrriweather Jones, of Richmond, editor of the " Examiner," a paper devoted to Jefferson and Jacobinism ; and he is now to be rewarded. Mr. Hopkins, commissioner of loans, a man of property and integrity, is to give room for this Jones. The commissioner may have at once thirty thousand dollars in his hands to pay the public creditors in Virginia. He is required by law to give bonds only in a sum from five to ten thousand dollars ; and Jones's character is so notoriously bad that we have satisfac- tory evidence he could not now got credit at anj^ store in Rich- mond for a suit of clothes ! Yet I am far from thinking, if this evidence should be laid before the Senate, that his nomination will be negatived I I am therefore ready to say, ' ' Come out from among them, and be yc separate." Corruption is tlio object and instrument of the chief, and the tendencj- of his administration, for the purpose of maintaining himself in power and the accomplish- ment of his infldel and visionarj' schemes. The corrupt portion of the people are the agents of his misrule. Corruption is the recom- mendation to office ; and manj* of some pretensions to character, but too feeble to resist temptation, become apostates. Virtue and worth arc his enemies, and therefore he would overwhelm them. The collision of Democrats in your State promises some amendment : the administration of your government cannot well be worse. The FederaUsts here in general anxiously desire the election of Mr. Burr to the chair of New York ; for they despair of a present ascendancy of the Federal party. Mr. Burr alone, we think, can break j"our Democratic phalanx ; and we anticipate much good from his success. "Were New York detached (as under his admin- istration it would be) from the Virginian influence, the whole 1 Pickering MSS. Printed in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 447. 352 NEW ENGLAND EEDEEALISM. Union would be bcncfltecl. Jefferson -would then be forced to observe some caution and forbearance in his measures. And, if a separation should be deemed proper, the five New England States, New York, and New Jersey would naturally be united. Among those seven States, there is a sufficient congeniality of character to authorize the expectation of practicable harmony and a permanent union. New York the centre. Without a separation, can those States ever rid themselves of negro Presidents and negro Con- gresses, and regain their just weight in the poUtical balance? At this moment, the slaves of tlie Middle and Southern States have fifteen representatives in Congress, and they will appoint that number of electors of the next President and Vice-President ; and the number of slaves is continually increasing. You notice this evil. But will the slave States ever renounce the advantage ? As population is in fad no rule of taxation, the negro representation ought to be given up. If refused, it would be a strong ground for separation, though perhaps an earlier occasion maj' present to declare it. IIo\y_many Indian wars, excited by the avidity of the ^Y£§tern_ani_SQilthevn. States for Indian lands, shall we have to e))C0UHtcri.and who will pay the millions to support them ? The Atlantic States. Yet the flfsfmoment we ourselves need assist- ance, and call on the Western States for taxes, they will declare off, or at any rate refuse to obey the call. Kentucky effectually resisted the collection of the excise ; and of the thirt3-seven thou- sand dollars' direct tax assessed upon her so many jears ago, she has paid onlj' four thousand dollars, and probably will never pay the residue. In the mean time, we are maintaining their represen- tatives in Congress for governing us, who surely can much better govern ourselves. Whenever the Western States detach them- selves, they will talcc Louisiana with them. In thirt}' j-ears, the white population on the AYestern waters will equal that of the thirteen States when they declared themselves independent of Great Britain. On the census of 1790, Kentuckj- was entitled to two representatives ; under that of 1800, she sends «i'x.' .... P. S. I do not know one rejlecling Nov- Anglian who is not anx- ious for the GREAT EVENT at which I have glanced. They fear, they dread the effects of the corruption so rapidly extending ; and that, if a decisive stop be long delayed, it will be in vain to attempt it. If there be no improper dela}', we have not anj- doubt but that the great measure may be taken, without the smallest hazard to private APPENDIX. 353 property or the pvhUc funds, the revenues of the Northern States being equal to their portion of the public debt, leaving that for Louisiana on tliosc wlio incurred it. Believe me ever faithfully yours, T. P. The facility with which we have seen an essential change in the Constitution proposed and generally adopted will perhaps remove your scruples about proposing what 3-ou intimate respecting negro representation. But I begin to doubt whether that or any other change we could propose, with a chance of adoption, would be worth the breath, paper, and ink which would be expended in the acquisition. George Cabot to Pickeking.' [Indorsed] Keceived, March 7, 1804. My Dear Sir, — Our friend Ames, whose ill-health has kept him from town through the winter, made an effort to visit my family just as I closed my letter of the 14th. I put it into his hands, having previously enclosed him the one I had received from you. He read yours with pleasure, and a mingled emotion of anger which it was impossible whoUj' to repress. His feelings were such as your sentiments have justly inspired in the few persons to wliom I have communicated them, — say Mr. Parsons and Mr. Iligginson ; but the second thoughts of all of us are such as you would collect from the desultory letter I wrote as mine. RuFns King to Pickering.^ New Yokk, March 9, 1804. Dear Sir, — I have duly recerved, and beg you to accept my acknowledgments for, your letters of the 3rd and 4th instant. The views which they disclose ought to fix the attention of the real friends of liberty in this quarter of the Union, and the more so as things seem to be fast advancing to a crisis. To save the post, I can do little more than acknowledge the receipt of your letters. . . . ' Pickering MSS. 2 Pickering MSS. Printed in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 450. 23 354 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. Roger Griswold to Oliver Wolcott.' AVashington, Marcli 11, 1804. . . . Many of the Democratic members of Congress, from the Northern States have become sensible of the overbearing influence of Virginia. A few of them appear disposed to attempt some union which sliall create a Nortliern interest, and array it in opposition to Virginia ; but tliis disposition is by no means universal. The difli- culty arises from the want of character and talents in those who have been sent to Congress. . . . Many of the others grumble about Virginia, but go every length in their votes. The particular friends of Colonel Burr are more clamorous ; but these are only to be found in the delegation from New York. Some attempts have been made to unite the Northern representation, but have not suc- ceeded. Yet it is certain that much dissatisfaction exists ; and the circumstances attending the nomination of a Vice-President show that there is, in some degree, a division between the Northern and Southern Democrats in Congress. The improbabilitj', however, of forming a Northern interest in Congi'css, by the union of jjarties, ought not to discourage exertions at home. . . . The formation therefore, of a Northern interest must commence at home. The dissatisfaction which has been created here will probabl}' promote the object. I have wished to ascertain, if possible, the views of Colonel Burr in relation to the general government ; but having had no intimacy with him m3self, and finding no one on the spot calcu- lated, or indeed authorized, to require an explanation, I have obtained but little information. He speaks in the most bitter terms of the Virginia faction, and of the necessit}' of an union at the northward to resist it ; but what the ultimate objects are whicli he ^vould propose, I do not know. It is apparent that his election is sui>ported in New York, on the principle of resisting Virginia and uniting the North ; and it may be presumed that the support given to him by Federal men would tend to reconcile the feelings of tliose Democrats who are becoming dissatisfied with their South- ern masters. But it is worthy of great consideration, whether the advantage gained in this manner will not be more than counter- balanced by fixing on the Northern States a man in whom the most eminent of our friends will not repose confidence. If Colonel ' See Hamilton's " History of tlio Republic," vol. vii. p. 781. APPENDIX. 355 Burr is elevated in New York to the ofBce of Governor by tlie votes of Federftlism, will he not be considered, and must he not, in fact, become, tlio head of the Northern interest? His ambition will not suffer him to be second, and his offlce will give him a claim to the first rank. This is a point which, in my judgment, requires great consideration. Although the people of New England have not, on ordinary occasions, a right to give an opinion in regard to New York, jet upon this occasion we are almost as deeply interested as the people of that State can be. If any other project can be fallen on wliich will produce the effect desired of creating a union of the Northern States, I should certainly prefer it. We liave endeavored during this session to rouse our friends in New England to make some bold exertions in that quarter. They generally tell us that they are sensible of the danger, that the Northern States must unite ; but they think the time has not j-et arrived. Prudence is undoubtedly necessary ; but, when it degenerates into procrastina- tion, it becomes fatal. Whilst we are waiting for the time to arrive in New England, it is certain the Democracy is making daily inroads upon us, and our means of resistance arc lessening every day. Yet it appears impossible to induce our friends to make any decisive exertions. Under those circumstances, I have been in- duced to look to New York ; and, as unpleasant as the thing may be, to consider a union in the election of Colonel Burr as the only hope which, at this time, presents itself of rallying in defence of the Northern States. Colonel Burr leaves this place to-morrow, on his return to New York ; and it may, perhaps, be in the power of gentlemen to ascer- tain his views. Those who are directly concerned in the election have certainlj' a right to demand a full explanation ; and I do not see how he can refuse it. The session will probably close before the end of the month ; and I have engaged to call on the Vice-President as I jjass through New York. The manner in which he gave me the invitation appeared to indicate a wish to enter upon some explanation. He said he wished very much to see me, and to converse, but his situation in this place did not admit of it ; and he begged me to call on liim at New York. This took place yesterday in the library. Indeed, I do not see how he can avoid a full explanation witli Fcdoial men. His prospects must depend on the union of the Federalists with his friends ; and it is certain that his views must extend much beyond 356 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. the ofllcc of Governor of New York. He has the spirit of ambi- tion and revenge to gratify, and can do but little with his " little band" alone. In forming the Northern part3'', it is important to consider what the ultimate views of that party onght to be ; and to avoid, as much as possible, embarrassing the partj' with men wlio will oppose the accomplishment of those ultimate objects. I have no hesitation myself in sa3-ing, that there can be no safety to the Northern States without a separation from the confeder- acy/ The balance of power under the present government is decidedly in lavor of the Southern States ; nor can that balance be changed or destro3-ed. The extent and increasing population of those States must for ever secure to them the preponderance which they now possess. Whatever changes, therefore, take place, they cannot pcrmanentl}' restore to the Northern States their influence in the government ; and a temporary relief can be of no importance. The question then is. Can it be safe to remain under a government in whose measures we can have no effective agenc}' ? If the views of the Soufliorn States were in unison with ours, if the system of policy which the}' wish to pursue equallj' affected everj' part of the Union, there would be some security under their management ; and, although we might be excluded from a participation in the power, yet we might expect to find our interests promoted by measures which promoted their own. But, unfortunately, this is not the case. Their enmity to commerce, on which our prosperity depends, is riveted and unyielding. Besides, there is an invetei-ate enmit^^ and jealousy of the Northern States, which pervades everj- part of the Southern and Middle States. This spirit is evidently increas- ing. Since the}- have obtained the power, they have become arro- gant, and appear determined to carry this spirit into all classes of societ}', with a view of riveting the prejudices so strongly as to prevent a union of views between North and South, under all future circumstances. What, then, are we to expect under the management of the most intelhgent of those people? IMust we not continue to _ pay the piincipal part of the expenses of government, without receiving in retiirn either patronage or protection? Without considering, therefore, that dreadful system of Jaco- binism which at this time governs our public counsels, can we hope for prosperity from the present Union and government? But If we add to those considerations the dangers which immediately APPENDIX. 357 threaten us, can there be room for doubt? . . . For one, there- fore, I do not look to a Southern combination for the purpose of correcting the views of the national government. I believe the vices of this government incurable. The thing itself is radically wrong. With these views, I should certainly deem it unfortunate to be compelled to place any man at the head of the Northern interest who would stop short of the object, or would only use his influence and power for the purpose of placing himself at the head of the whole Confederacy as it now stands. If gentlemen in New York should entertain similar opinions, it must be very important to ascertain what the ultimate objects of Colonel Biu-r are. It must occur to every Federal man that objections of a very serious nat- ure oppose the election of Colonel Burr, whether that election is viewed in relation to a general union of the Northern States, or in relation to the power which the office will give a man of Colonel Burr's talents and ability to oppose a more partial union, if it should be attempted. But, my dear sir, what else can we do ? If we remain inactive, our ruin is certain. Our friends will make no attempts alone. By supporting Mr. Burr, we gain some support, although it is of a doubtful nature, and of which, God knows, we have cause enough to be jealous. In short, I see notliing else left for us. The project which we had formed was to induce, if possible, the legislatures of the three New England States who remain Fed- eral to commence measures which should call for a reunion of the Northern States. The extent of those measures, and the rapidity with which they shall be followed up, must be governed by circum- stances. The magnitude and jealousj'' of Massachusetts would render it necessary that the operation should be commenced there. If any hope can be created that New York will ultimately support the plan, it may pei'haps be supported. ... I have examined the interest which the people of the Northern States have in the funds, and I find it considerably less than the proportion of debt which these States ought to pay. This arises from the large purchases made by foreigners in the funded debt ; so that it will be in our power to charge ourselves only with our just proportion of the debt, and still do justice to our own people. And with the superior means whicii we shall possess, it may be casilj^ accomplished. We may also liberate ourselves entirely from the Louisiana stock, and leave that to be paid by those for whose benefit it was created. Our proportion of the funded and Dutch debt, when compared with 358 NEW ENGLAND EEDEEALISM. our means, will be nothing ; and we may manage our affairs in our own way.^ Pickering to Theodore Lyman.' City of Washingtos, March 14, 1804. Dear Sir, — I have received your letter of the 29th ult. Con- sidering 3'OLir connection with a certain cousin of yours, I thought it possible that j'ou might deem it proper to start the idea to him. I had written to G. Cabot on the same subject. He had commu- nicated my letter to Tlieophilus Parsons, S. Iligginson, and Mr. Ames : thoy think the measure premature, while they deplore the existing evils and our future prospects. The idea suggested for your consideration is certainly extending, in Connecticut especially ; and it begins to be entertained in New York. The character and proceedings of the virulent Clintonians in that State, with the de- clining of Chancellor Lansing to be the candidate for Governor, will vastly aid Mr. Burr's pretensions ; and, from the intelligence wo have here, we expect that Mr. Burr will be elected. This will break the Democratic phalanx of that State, and prepare the way for the contemplated event. Jlr. Burr's administration will be more liberal than that of the Clintonian or of the general government. As for the Constitution, 'tis mere paper, to be folded into anj' shape to suit the views of the dominant part}'. Little regard is had, in deciding political questions, to it or to justice ; and a great part of the public measures have a bearing on politics, being cal- culated to depress the Federahsts and to increase the powei- and 1 Tills letter is given as printed in Hamilton's " History of the Republic." The narrative there goes on as follows, but without citing authorities : " In pursuance of the appointment, an interview took pl.ace between this member and Burr at the residence of the hitter in New York, on the 4th April. With the same cautious non-committal he had shown during the Presidential election and recently at Washington, Burr stated that ' he must go on deniocnitically to obtain the government; that, if he succeeded, he should administer it in a man- ner that would be satisfactory to the Eederalists. In respect to the affairs of the nation, Burr said that the Northern Status must be governed by Virgliiia or govern Virginia, and that there was no middle course ; tliat the Democratic members of Congress from the East were in this sentiment, some of those from New York, some of the leaders in Jersey, and likewise in Pennsylvania.' Tlie effect of this conversation was to iniluce the member to wish Burr success, which would, it was supposed, bu much affected by the result of the election in Connecticut, then near at hand." 2 Pickering MSS. Printed in Lodge's " Cubot," p. 4G0. APPENDIX. 359 inflaence of their opponents. "We have this day, upon an ex parte hearing, and against the testimonies of many respectable men of tlie insanity of Judge riclfcring, district judge of New Hampshire, adjudged him guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors, and sen- tenced liim to be removed from oflice. Justice should have presided at this trial, but was not admitted ; nor will she again find a place in the court of impeachment. The demon of party governed the decision. All who condemned were Jeffersonians, and all who pronounced the accused not guilty were Federalists. Some mem- bers retired without giving any vote. I am told that the " Aurora " has i)ublishcd that Mr. Harper was heard in defence of Jndgo Pickering ; but 'tis false. He was permitted to read a petition from Judge Pickering's son, setting forth his father's insanity and utter inability of body to appear in person to read his depositions, to prove the suggestions in the petition, and to enforce the prayer of it that the cause might be postponed. Bat Mr. Harper explicitly stated that he did not appear for Judge Pickering, but merely as • his son's friend, and the friend of the court, to present and support the suggestions in his son's petition. ^ I am this moment informed that the House of Representatives have resolved to impeach Judge Chase. You may conclude he will be condemned. If a considerable majority of the House were to impeach any man in the United States, he would by the Senate be found guilty ; because there could be no doubt that these measures originate with the administration, are made questions of parttj, and therefore at all events to be canied into effect according to the wishes of the prime mover. There will, to be sure, be some stretching of conscience. If several of the Senatoi's were left to decide the questions individually, their consciences would give way ; but, when a nmnber of consciences are joined together, they will bear much rough usage without being rent. Judge Chase will not be brought to his trial this session ; for we hope to adjourn in two weeks. Disgusted and shocked with the proceedings of the ruling sect, I long to get away from such scenes of political profligacj' and injustice. I have just now heard mentioned the means used to obtain the assent of Rhode Island to the alteration of the Constitu- tion relative to the choice of President and Vice-President. The profligate rulers of that profligate State, it is said (and I believe truly) , agreed to adopt the amendment ; provided the Federal ofH- cers in the State, especially the collectors of the customs, were removed, and that Jefferson promised to remove them. This, how- 360 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. ever, will not be done until Congress rises. He is fond of remov- ing and appointing in the recess. The outrage becomes an old story before it is necessary to nominate the same men to the Senate. Under such a man, and with tlie means ho possesses and can command, corruption will continue to make rapid progress, all power will be thrown into the hands of his part}' in all the States, and the Federalists will curse the day which detached them from the milder government of the mother country. Such is the fate which awaits us, and we shall live to see it : j'cs, the next Presidential term will not elapse before what is now antici- pated will be verified. One or two Marats or Robes|)icrres in each branch of the legislature, with half a dozen hardened wretches ready to co-operate, a greater number of half-moderutes, auother portion of gaping expectants of office, another of the ignorant and undiscerning, with the many timid characters, — will constitute a large majority, up to any measure wliich the revenge, the malice, the ambition or rapacity of the leaders shall propose. It will bo enough to render every such measure popular, to declare its object to be to crush aristocracj' and monarchy, and to secure liberty and Republicanism. And are our good citizens so devoted to their private pursuits that tliey will not allow themselves time to look up and see the gathering cloud? Will nothing rouse them but its thunder, or strike their e3-es save the lightning bursting from its bosom ? I am, indeed, sick at heart to see of our Kevolutionar}^ toils, dangers, and sutferings, such a result, and in the short space of twenty jears ! "A inrtuous and enlightened \)(io\AQ\" The ear is wounded by prostitution of those epithets. And is our case really hopeless? I have little to lose, except life, and that, verging to threescore j-ears, is not worth much ; j'ot I would fain die in peace, or, if that be denied, perish in the hope of leaving it an inheri- tance to m}' children, under a free government, established on surer foundations than that which only fifteen years ago we embraced with so much ardor. The experienced errors of the latter miglit, one would hope, be remedied under a Northern confederacy. Are stability, justice, and tranquillity incompatible with Republicanism? You have mistaken, or I did not clearly express m)' meaning with regard to an adjustment. That must be a subsequent measure. If the Slates I mentioned were united, tlie rest would not dare to lift a finger against them. After the confederacy of the former siiould be fixed, the terms of intercourse with the others and the distribution of existing burdens would be agreed on. APPENDIX. 361 Stephen IIigginson to Pickering.' ' Mahoh 17, 1804. Deak Sir, — I have seen your letters to Mr. Cabot and Mr. Lj-man on the question of separation, which is a very dehcate and important one, considered in tlie abstract. We all agree there can be no doubt of its being desirable ; but of the expediencj' of at- tempting it, or discussing it now at this moment, we all very much doubt. It is dangerous to continue under the Virginia system: but how to extricate ourselves at present we see not ; and, if we remain long together, we shall be bound with so many ligatures it will require great efforts to get extricated ; and, in the present state of the public mind, even here no attempt can be excited. It would indeed be very unpopular to suggest the idea of its being either expedient or necessary. It is impossible to alarm, much less to convince, a large portion of the Federal party here of their danger. A small part only of those called Federal, and who in common cases usually go with us, are sound in their opinions, and willing to look into their real situation. Many even of our own party have as much yet to unlearn as to learn. They have yet much of the Democratic taint about them; and, with this nonsense in their brains and the influence of a former great man and his friends, who will seize every occasion to keep up a division in the Federal party here, we should be put into the background, were we to make that question the subject of free conversation. As, in the present state of things, it would be imprudent even to discuss the question, we must wait the effects of still greater outrage and insult from those in power before we prepare for the only measure which can save the New England States from the snares of Virginia. Democracy is rising, and will increase in this StatS. Our elec- tions may this year give us a majority in both Houses, amWSovernor Strong ; but, without some favorable events, the Democrats will succeed another year, and we shall be revolutionized, and the other States will follow. Such is my view of our situation : it is the natural effect of existing causes which will produce the change I contemplate, and I see no means in our power to control their oper- ation. But as we may at times check, perhaps modifj' and often mitigate, by a vigilant and steady opposition, the effects of revolu- 1 Pickering MSS. Printed in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 453. 362 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. tionary measures, and give ourselves the chance of the chapter of accidents for a longer period of time, I am for remaining at our posts, read}' to seize every favorable event and to keep the robin alive as long as we can. J AVishing as much success and happiness as can attend you, I am very truly yours, &c. George Cabot to Rufus King.^ Boston, March 17, 1804. My Dear Sir, — In reply to your inquiry respecting the opinions of our legislature on the subject of Louisiana, I can only specu- late. The session is ended, and no one attempted to discover what was thought or what might be done. We add thousands to our possessions, but have long since discarded the idea of security. The muny do not think at all, and the feio think only to despond. Indeed, most men are compelled to admit that our evils must be home until their intolerahilitij generate their cure. Most of those which we fear must therefore happen before a remedy can be pre- scribed. An experiment has been suggested bj' some of our friends, to which I object that it is impracticable, and, if practicable, would be ineffectual. The thing proposed is obvious and natural, but it would now be thought too bold, and would be fatal to its advocates as public men ; j'ct the time may soon come when it will be demanded by the people of the North and East, and then it will unavoidably take place. I am not satisfied that tlie thing itself is to be desired. Jly habitual opinions have been alwa3's strongl}' against it ; and I do not see in the present mismanagement motives for changing my opinion. It is doubtless true that we are not so perfectly mad in New England as the people in some other States, especially those of the South ; but here we are altogether democratic in our principles, and tliose prineijiles of necessity i)lace power in the worst hands. If tiie favorable aspect of our State politics seems to contradict mj^ opinion, I confess that tliose principles have not yet produced all the mischief to which they tend ; but, at tlie same time, I insist that our appearance is deceptive, being better than tlie realitj', and the reality better tlian can be well maintained. You see good men in high ofllco here, contrary to the natural oper- ' Printed in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 345. APPENDIX. 3G3 ation of democratic election ; but tliose men hold their powers upontlic sole condition that they will not use them, and the moment they shall dare to exercise them with vigor they will cease to bo popular, and of course cease to fill the high ofllces they now hold. There is an unusual apathy among tlie Federalists here. They have lost more of their vivacity than of their numbers. I fear they lose some of these. Our national administration may destroy judiciaries and constitutions, and make new ones, without exciting much sensibility ; but, if they had involved ns by their folly and baseness in a war with Great Britain, I believe New England might be roused to do any thing which her loading men should recommend. Some distinct general cause of evil like this, and fairly imputable to the wickedness or ignorance of those who govern, would be fatal to their power or to the Union of the States. We are loyal to the national government, and can bear every species of public dis- honor ; but, the moment our loyalty appears to be made the instru- ment of our impoverishment, we shall he disposed to act with effect in defence of all that is dear to ns. In tlie moral as in the natural world, we must in all operations consult the tendencj' of general laws. It is vain to attempt sailing against wind and tide : we ought to have the influence of one in our favor to make consider- able progress, and of both to make the greatest. The longer I live, the more I think on the nature of man and of societ}', the more I am convinced of the absurdity of expecting ever to see a self-gov- erned people, as we understand the terms. Men will act from the impulse of their passions. These lead them to seek power, prop- erty, &c., by means incompatible with order and justice. Govern- ment to enforce these is called to counteract and coerce those who (on our principles) have the control of the government. We love virtue and virtuous men ; but we respect power ori\y, and the powerful. If we choose a man to office, we displace him for doing the duties of it when these thwart our sinister views ; and then It happens that good men are often found co-operating in the election of the bad, and to the exclusion of those whom as men they truly esteem. It is folly to expect mankind will act otherwise ; and, therefore, although the people must have a great share in every good government, j-et that share should not be so great as to destroj' it at pleasure, or by the word of their mouth to impede its just offices. Viewing the subject in this light, I contemplate with pleasure the prosperous course of our affairs for many j'cars past, and feel neither surprise nor disappointment at the change which is com- 364 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. menccd. The first part has been better than we had any right to expect ; and without derogating from the transcendent worth of men, who did every thing that time and circumstances would allow, I must attribute the success of their public measures in a great degree to favorable accidents, which, though external, have acted with great force on our internal affairs. We are now going on according to the course of nature, and shall follow those who have gone before us from bad to worse, till suffering, or the fear of suffering, generally and deeply felt ^ stimulates us to do better. Indeed, I expect no essential improvements in our systems but from suffering, from fear, or from force. I think no material change can be made except by those whom we call Jacobins. Good men would not, if they had opportunity, establish any sj'stem of sufficient force to protect itself. The violent and unprincipled are more likelj' to make a government independent of popular consent than their betters. I beg 3'ou, however, not to infer that, because I think we eiinnot do tilings impossible, I would not attempt every possible good, or that I do not think an}' great good can be accom- plished. So far would that be from the truth, that I firmly believe we owe much of what we enjoj', and of what we hope for, to the influence of the Federal party. AVc are a minority, and unable to conquer the vast body which keeps the field ; but we are so power- ful that he is compelled to confine his movements to a narrow com- pass, lest he should give us an advantage over him. "We have, therefore, the most commanding motives to preserve to our party all the weight we can, bj' adhering to the principles on which it is formed, and keep it well combined and well informed, prepared to think and act alike on every important occasion. In this way, we prevent some mischief entirely', and mitigate what we cannot whollj' avert, and shall be able to soften every catastrophe in the political drama which must happen, and turn them to the best account. . . . I should rejoice to sec Burr win the race in your State ; but I cannot approve of aid being given him by any of the leading Federalists. When you next meet Hamilton, Benson, and "Wolcott, give my affectionate regards to each of them. Your faithful and affectionate friend, G. C. APPENDIX. 365 FisiiER Ames to Pickering.' Dedham, April 28, 1804. Mt Dear Sir, — .... ]\Iy health Is good for nothing, but no worse than it has been, and not wliolly to be despaired of. If Jacobinism makes liaste, I maj- yet live to be hanged. Some of our mutual friends say all is lost, — nothing can be done. Nothing is to be done rashly ; but mature counsels and united efforts are necessarj' in the most forlorn case. For, though we may not do much to save ourselves, the vicissitudes of political Fortune may do every thing ; and we ought to be ready when she smiles. The fact is, our people know little of the political dangers ; the best men at least ought to be made to know them, and to digest at least the general outlines of a system. When the Gen- eral Court convenes, this might be matured and extensively impressed. Alexander Hamilton to Theodore Sedov^^ick.^ New York, July ]0, 1804. My Dear Sir, — I have received two letters from you since we last saw each other — that of the latest date being the 24th of May. 1 have had on hand for some time a long letter to j'ou, explaining my view of the course and tendency of our politics, and my inten- tions as to my own future conduct. But my plan embraced so large a range, that, owing to much avocation, some indifferent health, and a growing distaste for poli- tics, the letter is still considerably short of being finished. I write this now to satisfy you that want of regard for you has not been the cause of my silence. "^ I will here express but one sentiment, which is, that dismember- ment of our empire will be a clear sacrifice of great positive advan- tages, without any counterbalancing good ; administering no relief to our real disease, which is Democracy ; the poison of which by a 1 Pickering MSS. 2 Printed in Ilnmilton's Works, vi. 5G7. See also J. C. Hamilton's " History of the Kepublic," vii. 823. Tliis letter was written the day before Hamilton's death, and in view of the possibility of that event. It was the last political letter written by him, and was evidently intended as u. general answer to all argument on the point in question. 366 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. sulHlivision will onl}^ be the more concentred in each part, and consequently the more virulent. [ King is on his way to Boston,' where you may chance to see him, and hear from himself his sentiments. God bless you ! A. H. PiCKEuiNG TO G. II. Rose.' Washington, March 13, 1808. Dear Sik, — You know my solicitude to have peace preserved between the two nations ; and I have therefore taken the libertj' to express to j-ou my opinion of the true point of policy to be observed by5our government towards the United States, in case 3-our mission prove unsuccessful : that is, to let us alone ; to bear patiently the wrongs we do ourselves; in one word, amidst the irritations engen- dered by hatred and folly, to maintain a dignified composure, and to abstain from loar. Eelying on this, that, whatever disi)osition exists to provoke, there is none to connneiice, a war on the part of the United States. ISut not satisfied with the expression of my own opinion, and in a matter of such infinite moment feehng an anxiety tliat, if it were correct, it might be confirmed \>y the opinions of some of our wisest statesmen and best citizens, in whose judgments I confide much more than in my own, I have sought for those opinions with the view of communicating them to you. In a late letter to Mr. King, I recollect the enforcing of my opinion b}^ sentiments of this sort: That a new war between the U. S. and G. B. would revive the memory of former strifes, with all their topics of hatred and ill- will ; would increase existing prejudices, and excite such bitter resentments as hardly any length of time would remove. To that letter I received the enclosed answer, which I communicate with the greater satisfaction because Blr. King is well known to }'our government for his distinguished talents, correct views in political aflTairs, and great respectability of character. At this moment occurs to me the remark made to me b}' the late excellent INIr. Hamilton in 179C, when he expressed to me his desire that INIr. King might be sent to London : "He is the fittest man in the U. S. to represent us at that court.'' In the vastly extended field in which your ministers have to act, this broad corner of it demands and receives their attention. I 1 British Minister at Washington. From tlic Pickering MSS. APPENDIX. 367 also know that, in the present unexampled state of the world, our own best citizens consider the interests of the United States to be interwoven with those of Great Britain, and that our safety de- pends on hers. Men thus enlightened, could they control the measures of their own government, would give them a direction mutually beneficial to the two nations. Of the opinions and reason- ings of such men, I wished j-ou to be possessed. And it was for this purpose chiefly that I have more than once expressed to you my hope tliat you would see them in person, by travelling through the country as far as Boston. Given up as the people arc to strong delusions, to believe lies, it seems impossible that the general deception should continue a great while longer. The embargo will touch their bone and their flesh ; when they must curse its authors. If there should be no urgent cau^e for our coalescing with France, and a war with Great Britain would throw us into the arms of France, the nation will recover its understand- ing, and at length see where its true interest lies. Another consideration : In one year Mr. Jefferson's reign will have an end ; and, if even Mr. Madison should succeed him, — and he will never acquire his ascendancy over the mind of the people, — more serious mischiefs may be prevented. But it is extremely problematical whether Mr. Madison will be the next President; and, with such a change in the head of our government, its policy will change, and in a manner propitious to the continuance of peace. G. II. Rose to Pickering.* "Wasuinoton, Marcli 18, 1808. Dear Sir, — You will, I am sure, recollect the feelings I ex- pressed to j-ou the instant j-ou touched in our late conversation on the subject of jour letter ; j-ou will therefore readilj- conceive the satisfaction I derive from the sanction of j'our confhmed and still further reflected opinion, supported as it is by that of such a man as Mr. King. I have not conflned mj'self to speculative feeling, but have acted in consequence of the conviction which I deeply entertain. I avail myself thankfully of your permission to keep that gentleman's letter, which I am sure will carry high authority where I can use it confidentiallj', and whither it is most important • Pickering MSS. 368 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. that what I conceive to be right impressions should be conveyed. It is not to 3'ou that I need protest that rancorous impressions of jealousy or ill-will have never existed there ; but it is to be feared that at some time or another the extremest point of human forbearance may be reached. Yet at the present moment there is, I thiuk, a peculiarity of circumstances, most strange indeed, which enables the offended party to leave his antagonist to his own sui- cidal devices and self-torment, unless in his contortions under them he may strike some blow which the other might not be able to dissemble. The night of delusion appears to vanish rapidlj' : may no clouds obscure the rising sun ! If the day breaks fairly, it will be daj'- light not only to yourselves, but to dear and important and univer- sal objects, seen more clearlj- through the darkness which blinds so many, by none, or more forcibl}^, than b}' yourself. It is ver}' grievous to me to be obliged to renounce the hope of reaching that part of the Union where for ever}- reason I should feel mj'self the most at home. The state of things here and iu Eng- land, where Parliament is sitting, must, I fear, compel me to take a straight course. It gave me the most cordial satisfaction to see that manful exer- tion of patriotism, your letter, in a New York paper. You indeed lift up the curtain, and let in the daylight where it will not be very welcome, with a strong and masterly hand. You give them " day," as it were, and bid them " Awake, and open their eyes, and see," with a voice of thunder. Pickering to G. H. Rose.' City oi- Wasiiingtox, March 22, 1808. Dear Sir, — Last evening I gave 3-ou a letter from George Cabot, Esq., of Boston, one of my early friends, and one of the best of men, and as enlightened as he is good. Ten or twelve 3'ears ago, he was a Senator in Congress from Massachusetts ; but though eminently well informed in political and commercial sub- jects, yet ahva3's adverse to public life, he retired to resume the quiet enjo3'ment of the pleasures of his domestic circle, and of a select society of friends, and of the studious leisure of a contem- plative mind. You will read his letter again and with fresh interest : 1 rickering MSS. APPENDIX. 369 and I pray yon to eonsiflcr it ns the result on its snbjcct of wlmt- cvcr tlicro is of political wisdom and real patriotism in Massachn- setts ; for the best and most enlightened in that State arc liis friends and associates. On my return to my lodgings, I found another letter from Mr. Cabot, which came by the last evening's mail ; and, as it is on the same subject, I send it to you for the same purpose as the former. Governor Sullivan's letter, of which IMr. Cabot speaks, has been published by his order, evidently as an apology to the people for his not laying my letter before the legislature. My answer had not then reached Boston ; but having a copy, I enclose it, together with the Governor's letter, for your amusement. The latter yon will find in the enclosed ' ' Boston Repertory," with some editorial remarks. I also enclose a newspaper printed in Northampton, an interior town in Massachusetts, in which you will find some inter- esting matter. In the " National Intelligencer" of yesterda}', in the remarks on my letter of February 16th, to Governor Sullivan, you will see mentioned "Essex Junto,'' among whom the editor has honored me with a place. This may need explanation to a stranger. Having then been absent many years from my native State, I think the first time I heard the phrase was from the mouth of the late President Adams, jnst at the moment when lie succeeded George Washington in the Presidency. He had understood that the per- sons comprehended in the term " Essex Junto " had opposed, at least had not favored, his election (thej' all knew his pride, his vanity, and his eccentricities) , and therebj- had committed a deadly sin. Mentioning this to me with some warmth, and in language not very dignified, he pronounced the names of those gentlemen who were confessedly the principals in that soeiet}' of friends, which he called the Essex Junto, jnst as I have Avritten them : " G eorge Cabot, Thoph. Parsons, and Steph. Higginson." These gentlemen now live in Boston, in Suffolk County. Mr. Cabot's character I have already given you ; Mr. Higginson is one of the best-informed and most intelligent of our merchants ; and Mr. Parsons is so emi- nent a lawj'er, and I must add a man of universal science, that in New England he is often designated by the "giant of the law." He is now chief justice of Massachusetts, and would do honor to either bench in Westminster Hall. These three gentlemen hap- pened all to have been born in the county of Essex. I esteem it 24 370 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. fortunate that tlie same county gave me birth, and my highest honor to have those gentlemen for my friends. I commit to your care a letter to my nephew, Mr. Samuel Wil- Uams, merchant in London, and late the Consul of the United States in that city, from which station he had the honor of being removed by Mr. Jefferson. My nephew is a man of worth, of un- sullied integrit}', and, of course, possessed of the entire confidence of numerous merchants in America, who intrust their business to his management. Let him, if j'ou please, be the medium of what- ever epistolary intercourse may take place between j'ou and me. My very worthy friend. Colonel Talmadge, has just handed me a letter addressed to Junius Smith, Esq., to the care of Mr. Rowlet, London ; for I assured him it would give you pleasure to cause it to be delivered. G. II. Rose to Pickeuing.' Alexandria, March 23, 1808. Dear Sir, — The favor of your letter — and let me in the old phrase call it a much-esteemed one, — reached me yesterday even- ing, but just as I was setting off for this place, whence I fall down the Potomac this daj'. It would have especially grieved me to have missed it, as the last mark 1 can receive in America of the good-will of one of her truest patriots and most distinguished citi- zens, to have conciliated whose favorable opinion will be one of the most consoling circumstances of my unavailing expedition. I set a great price upon Mr. Cabot's letter, as containing enlarged and enlightened views, admirably calculated to produce the result we so ardently desire, — the common good of the two nations, the most naturally allied that exist, and whose interests force them at this moment so imperiously together that I much doubt whether the art of man can long keep ttem asunder. You know the vocation I um eager to labor in, and wherefore I hasten my departure, relin- quishing for it, under a paramount sense of duty, my object of seeing that part of the United States the most estimable in the ej-es of an Old Englander, and the most congenial to his feelings and ideas. Your unfortunate correspondent is a mere child in jour hands. It has not been often that I have seen so unequal a conflict ; and the dignified, yet simple gravity, with which as it were, without ' Pickering MSS. APPENDIX. 371 meaning to ridicule him, but by the force of the thing, j'ou bring him into absurd positions, has afforded me extreme satisfaction. The Essex Junto, such as you have the goodness to describe it to me, must be indeed an honorable confraternity, especially if its brethren are all such, or nearly such, as the only one of them I have the advantage of being personally acquainted with. Pray say to General Talmadge, that I shall now, and at all times, take his orders with real pleasure. Your letter to your nephew shall be taken equally good care of; as your relation alone, I should be anxious to know him. Through him I will gladly avail myself of the means you afford me of communicating with j-on. Not having had a moment to write last night, I do it now by a safe conveyance. Farewell, my dear sir : accept the assurances of no common regard and esteem. G. H. Rose to Pickering.^ London, May 8, 1808. Dear Sir, — Your modesty would suffer if you were aware of the sensation produced in this country by the publication of a letter from a Senator of Massachusetts to his constituents. We are less in want of light upon the matter of it than some of those to whom it is addressed ; but so strange a perversion of facts and such sophistry had been exhibited by the opposition here on recent transatlantic matters, that it was highly desirable that a representa- tion so able, authentic, and luminous should be laid before our public. I have the infinite satisfaction of saying that I And every thing here as nearly as possible as I could wish it ; if impressions of the nature most devoutly to be wished for were found, no effort or opportunity have been neglected to strengthen and to render them profound. In this task, — one, too, in which the effort shall not be relaxed, — very great utilit3' has been derived from the communica- tion of two admirable letters furnished by a venerable and most re- spected friend, and addressed to him by a gentleman whose name was not necessarj' to give them the weight they intrinsically carried with them, but whose name alone would have supplied it. . . . Our public spirit is as high as I have ever seen it ; our finances, in a state of unexampled prosperity and receipt, — our I Pickering MSS. 372 NEW ENGLAND EEDERALISM. three-per-cent funds were last week at above 68, and are now within an eighth of 68. Our price of wheat is moderate : the last average of it was 78 shilhngs per quarter, or £17. 10 per load; and the prospect of the crop of this j'ear excellent. Adieu, my dear sir. I cannot too strongly assure you of my cordial esteem and strong regard. Gr. H. Rose to PicKEnmG.' London, Aug. 4, 1808. My Deau Sir, — It is indeed with singular satisfaction that I learn from you the primary eftects of the enibaigo : not as realizing my view of it, but as defeating the mischievous purposes for which it was imposed, and opening the e5-es of the deluded part of 30ur fellow-citizens upon the real interests of the two countries, and thence leading them in a course adapted to these interests, wliich I know not how it could have been effected by any other measure so well or so decisively ; for they never would have been brought to just and moderate views towards tliis countr}', upon whose weal the existence of the civilized world depends, until it was ascerlaiucd that they had not those means of annoyance and control which they alwa3-s imagined they had in reserve in this measure ; and that, moreover, whilst it produces to us little, verj'^ little, present evil, it does us much present and much permanent good. You best know how the account stands on this head with j'ou. It should seem as if Providence willed the defeat of the calculations upon which it was built. Such was our last harvest, and such is that now reaping, that, whilst our usual supply from Europe and Amer- ica has for months been denied us, wheat hardlj' affords our farmers a living profit, although we have had the West Indies to supply in part. Your intimate connections with Massachusetts alone have made me take a livelj' interest in tlie return to sound principles of that most important member of the New England States. In Professor Adams's downfall, at which I cannot but be amused, I see but the forerunner of catastrophes of greater mark. This practical answer of 3'our common constituents to his repty to you was the best possible. Hy his retreat, he admits his conviction that 3'ou were the fitter representative of the State legislature. In tlio conversion of Massachusetts, I see the augury of all that is of good promise with 3'ou. 1 Pickering MSS. APPENDIX. 373 Let mo thank j-ou cordially for j-our answer to Governor Sullivan. It was an unintentional kindness on his part thus to compel you to bring to the public eye the narrative of a life so interesting, so vir- tuous and honorable. Receive the assurance of how anxiously I hope that, though gratitude is not the virtue of republics, the remain- ing years of that life may receive from yours the tribute of honor and confidence it has so many claims to. In so wishing, I wish the prosperity of j'our country. The omission of any mention of the U. S. in the King's speech at the close of the session of Parliament was not meant epigram- matically, tho' it might be so construed. It would be grievous were we to say or do any thing which might by any possibility perturb the operation of things which are producing effects so salutary on your side of the water. Cabot to Pickering.^ Oct. 5, 1808. Mr Dear Sir, — . Since the within writing, I have seen from several quarters let- ters expressing apprehensions that a disunion of the States is med- itated by the Federalists. Some Federalists have been made to believe there was foundation for these insinuations, and the Demo- crats at .tlie Southward are using this story to deter men from acting with the Federalists. I think, therefore, it will be well to pass some very decided resolution on the importance of maintain- ing the Union inviolate under every trial, &c. II. G. Otis to Josiah Quinct.^ Boston, Dec. 15, 1808. Mt Dear Sir, — Your friends are highly flattered and edified by the honorable and zealous exertion of talent which you have displayed in the defence of the interests of j'our country. Your several speeches, in connection with those of our senatorial friends, have left nothing to be said or wished for ; and, though the Federal phalanx is deplorably small, it combines all the variety of force, eloquence, and argument necessary for the contest, and sufflcient to overwhelm all opposition that is not defended by the impene- 1 PickcrinR MSS. Printed in Lodge's "Cnbot," p. SW. Jf «" 2 Reprinted from Edmund Quincy's " Life of Joaiah Quincy," p. 164 874 NEW ENGLAND PEDEEALISM. trable mail of ignorance and impudence. Judging from appear- ances, there seems but little prospect of your preventing by any means a perseverance in the fatal and unheard-of policy on -which the administration seems fully bent, and it becomes of great importance that the New England Federalists should determine whether any aid can be furnished by the legislatures of this session, and, if beneficial effects are to be expected from tlwe quarter, the object should be defined and the means concertecl^ Our general court will soon meet, and I doubt not the majority will require the bridle rather than the spur. If I am not mistaken, there will be found among them a fulness of zeal and indignation which can bo mitigated only by giving them a direction and an object. This temper, 3'ou are sensible, must not be extinguished for want of sympathy, nor permitted to burst forth into imprudent excess. / We must look to our friends in Congress for advice. You are together, and can best decide on such a course as would probably be agreed to by Connecticut, New Hampshire, &c., and no other ought to be adopted. You are sensible how obnoxious Massachusetts, for a thousand reasons, has already become, and perceive more plainly than any of us the efforts which are made to mark and distinguish this State as the hotbed of opposition, and tliis town a^he citadel of a British faction. Perliaps our legislature have said as much as is expedient for them to say, unless they are to be supported by a correspondent spirit in the otlier States. It would be a great misfortune for us to justify the obloquy of wishing to promote a se})aration of the States, and of being solitary in that pursuit. The delusion would spread among our wavering or timid adherents, and furnish great means of anno5'ance to our inveterate adversaries. It would change the next election, and secure the triumph of the dominant party. On the otlier hand, to do nothing will expose us to danger and con- tempt : our resolutions will seem to be a flash in the pan, and our apostate representatives will be justified in the opinions which they have doubtless inculcated of our want of union and nerve. What, then, shall we do? In other words, AVhat can Connecticut do? for we can and will come up to her tone. Is she ready to declare the embargo and its supplementary chains unconstitutional, — to pro- pose to their State tlie appointment of delcgati's, lonieet those fioni the other commercial States in convention at Hartford or elsewhere, ('or the purpose of providing some mode of relief that may not bo nconsisteiU with the union of these States, to which we should adiiero APPENDIX. 375 as long as possible ? Shall New York be invited to join ? And what shall be the proposed objects of such a convention ? It is my opinion, if the session of Congress terminates as we have reason to expect, that recourse ouglit to be had to some such plan as this, and that the only alternative is, in your dialect, sub- mission. But some other State ought to make the proposal, for obvious reasons. Will you, my good sir, talk over this subject with our little Spartan band, and favor me in season with the result of your collected wisdom ? Let me know whether you think any good effect would be produced in Congress by hints of this kind in the public papers. Sometimes I fear that we are so neutral- ized by our accursed adversaries that'all^efforts will be ineflbctual, ancPlEaFwe must sit down quietly""and count the links "of our chains ; but then again their system appears so monstrous, so un- precedented, so ruinous, that I think the time will come that must malce resistance a duty. Remember me with respectful regards to my friend Mr. Lloyd, and believe me very truly, dear sir, your obedient servant and friend. C. Gore to Pickering.^ Boston, Dec. 20, 1808. Mr Dear Sir, — We are much obliged to the FederaUsts in Con- gress who have taken the trouble to expose the weakness and wick- edness of our administration in their late measures, as well as the inefficiency of these measures to do harm to any but themselves. If the motives in which this fatal embargo originated could be doubted, after jour development in the spring, thej"^ have been completely demonstrated in j'our last speech on tliis subject. Our legislature will convene on Jan. 24, and what will be proper for us to do under the circumstances of our times is doubtful. To ascertain the most useful coursq to bo pursued on this occasion fills our minds with deep and anxious solicitude. Notwithstanding the remarks from some of your chaste orators and supple courtiers, the mass 6f the people of this State are much more daring in their means and measures of opposition to the imbecile and profligate men who have disgraced our councils, and degraded our nation, the ■ijast eight j'ears, than the persons whom they are pleased to stj-le their leaders. When the electors met, we had an opportunity of 1 Pickering MSS. 376 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALTSM. learning the sentiments of the people in all parts of the Coramon- wealtb. You may be assured we shall have no eas}' task to tem- per the zeal of our Representatives when the}' assemble. They see nothing but destruction of their property, and slaveixof—thMr per- sons, in the present course^ancrmdeecl he must be a man of strong view who can discern a ray of light wherebj"^ we can extricate our- selves from this lab3'rinth. By conversing with our friends from the other New England States, }-ou might be able to know in what measures and to what extent they would be willing to co-operate with Massachusetts. The opposition, to be effectual of any change in our rulers, should comprehend all' New England. Tliese men, I fear, are too inflated with their own popularity to attend to any call short of this. Unless, therefore, we can unite both as to the man- ner as well as to the end, it may be doubtful whether, if we can, we ought not to prevent the State taking any further steps this winter, in regard to the national government. Though I do not believe it will be in oiu' power to oppose successfully, for any length of time, the display of such hostility as will shake our Union to the centre, and raise such a fever as our Soutliern surgeons cannot speedily allay with all their talent at blood-letting, j^et I give credit to these gentlemen for their dispositions, and for an unyield- ing firmness of nerve that would bear with complacency the deso- lation of our land and the destruction of Yankee life and property, so be that it should remove all distrust as to the perpetuity of their despotism. Pickering to C. Gore.' City op Washington, Jan. 8, 1809. Dear Sir, — I duly received j'our letter of the 20tli last. The period had not arrived when I could suggest any practical ideas on the measures to be taken by our State legislature, and therefore delayed m^' answer ; but, if I were to wait until I could write to my own satisfaction, I should still be silent. It is scarcel}' conceivable that ISIr. Jefferson should so obstinately persevere in the odious measure of the embargo, which he cannot but see has impaired his popularit}' and hazards its destruction, if he were not under secret engagements to the French emi)eror ; unless you can suppose that he would run that hazard and the ruin of his country, rather than that a measure which he explicitly recom- 1 rickering MSS. Appendix. 377 mended should be pronounced unwise. As the emb argo, with all ' jits mischiev ous improvements, is agr eeable to Bon aparte ; and as I Els o&tfagcous captures and confiscations of American property j I have outraged even Armstrong, so that lie has boldly recommended| / 1 what would readily have occurred to an American ruler who pos 1 sessed common sense and common honest}', and one grain of mag- nanimit}' ; or, if not, who would readil}' adopt the measure recom- mended, — I am warranted in supposing that Armstrong is not privj' to the whole of Mr. Jefferson's French negotiations. The Presi- dent who could basely employ, as his confidential messenger, so execrable a villain and so devoted a partisan of France as Haley, must be bad enough ; and, when we advert to the real character of Mr. Jefferson, there is no nefarious act of which we maj' not sup- pose him capable. He would rather the United States should sink than change the present system of measures. This is not opinion, but his- tory .~ 1 repeat it confidentially to you, until I obtain permission to vouch it on evidence, which I trust I can obtain. Yesterday, Mr. Giles's bill for enforcing the embargo was taken up in the Senate, and all the amendments made in the House con- curred in. The President's approbation of his own measure need not be waited for. I recollect but one feature in the bill which is softened b}' tlieso amendments. Oilman of N. H., and Reed of Maryland, joined us in voting against this final passage of the bill. Other Democratic members writhed under the dire necessitj- imposed on them by the force of party to vote for the bill. Henceforward I shall be disposed to consider Oilman and Reed to have quitted the President's ranks. New England must be united in whatever great measure shall be adopted. During the approaching session of our legislature, there may be such farther advances in mischief as may distinctly point out the course proper to be adopted. A convention of delegates from those States, including Vermont, seems obviously proper and necessary-. Massachusetts and Connecticut can appoint their dele- gates with regular authoritj'. In the other States they might be appointed by county conventions. A strong and solemn address, stating as concisely as will consist with perspicuity the evil conduct of our administration as manifested in their measures, ought to be prepared to be laid before our legislature when they meet, to be sent forth by their authority to the people. But the fast, which I ' have repeatedly heard mentioned here, I hope will be postponed till the very crisis of our affairs, if such a ciisis should be suffered to 378 NEW ENGLAND FEDEEALISM. arise : to proclaim a fast sooner would, I fear, have more the appear- ance of management than of religion. I wish you to show this letter to Mr. Cabot, as I have not time to write to him. Pray look into the Constitution, and particularly to the 10th article of the amendments. How are the powers reserved to the States respectivelj', or to the people, to be maintained, ijt< by the respective States judging for themselves and putting their negative on the usurpations of the general government ? ' The unceasing cry of war among the President's pack is a gross artifice, so gross that I wonder men of understanding here are alarmed by it. Its sole object is to make them and the people at large acquiesce in the embargo ; for the administration believe that the alternative of war is not terrible to mothers onlj', but to the men of the United States. P. S. The President's men have moved for a May session. This is another trick to keep the people quiet till then. It proves, by the waj', that instant war, though in their mouths, is not in their thoughts. Samuel Blanch ard to Pickering.^ Wenham, Jan. 10, 1809. Dear Sir, — I duly received 3'our letter of the 28th ult., and should have answered it promptly, but had nothing to communicate worth your attention at a moment when 3'our time is so preciously emploj'ed in endeavoring to arrest the progress of iniquity at the seat of one of the worst administrations that ever disgraced any countr}' pretending to be free. The doings of the present Congress need no comment. The worst is now before the public, and that public will duly appreciate its merits. Yes ! the people have hitherto, and I presume will continue quiet individually, until after the meeting of the legislature ; but that body — I mean the legisla- ture of Massachusetts — must be alive indeed to the distresses of their constituents, and to the wrong-doings of the national legis- lature, to secure a peaceable deportment in the people, either indi- viduallj- or collectivel}^, much longer. I wish you would state to me what will be the probable result of the meeting of the Con- necticut legislature. I believe there can be but little doubt but that we whuU do our duty when we meet on the 'iiUh of the present ' These Italics, like all others in this volume, are in the original draft. 3 I'ickerhig MSS. APPENDIX. 379 month ; but it will be extremely desirable that there should be a coincidence of action in all the New England States. What says your friend Ilillhouse on this subject? It is such kind of informa- tion, my dear sir, that at this moment I wish to hear detailed by 3'ou. You and j'our friends at Washington might give a very har- monious tone to our future proceedings. A few lines under cover to S. P. G. in Boston, where I shall be, will be very gratefully received, and prudent use made thereof. . . . Pickering. TO S. P. Gardner (?)^ [Fragment of a letter among S. P. Gardner's papers.] ... by the first of June, when Coles, his private secretary, who is destined for France, may return with Bonaparte's permission ,'to repeal, as the least of two evils ; the alternative being the total ; demolition of French influence in the United States. Should Mr. Jefferson previously consent to the repeal, Bonaparte may in a pas- ' sion expose the fatal secret. Turreau is perfectly easy. He has said there will be no war between America and France, though he is quite wiUing to have the triangular war, —the U. S. against • France and England at the same time ; because, like the embargo, j '^he sees, and doubtless has been told, that it would be a war against/ England only. After hearing for two months past, now and then, an exphcit reproach of the Frencli government as being as bad as that of Great Britain, I had concluded that this would be perfectly understood as necessary to keep up the popular delusion of a pre- tended impartiality by the U. S. towards the two belligerents : and lately an occurrence made this clear. Turreau said, '■'^ Toumay say what you please, provided you do not act." So pledged is Mr. Jefferson to his system that he said, the last summer, that he would rather the United States shoidd sink than have any alteration take place! Such is my information from a man of reputation, in whose hearing the sentiment was uttered. The advice given by Armstrong, i n a confl dgntja] Cftmmunicn,tinn, of fbe cQurse~of conduct to 15eliH opted by ou r.goverani£nt,_aas_so perfe ctlyc^orrect, at t he same time so adverse to French views, I am constrained t o sup^jose that he is not privy lo all the CoiSmunica^ tions~between" Mr! Jefferson and the French governmentT it is probable"" that "Turreau has been the confidential agent of both. 1 Pickering MSS. 380 NEW ENGLAND PEDERAilSM. And in tho present crisis one still more confidential is destined to go to France, — Mr. Coles, the President's private secretary, wbo has unquestionably imbibed all the love and all the hatred of the President. Some cautious men here of the Federal party discovered an incli- nation to wait patiently, till the first of June, the promised repeal of the embargo ! God forbid that such timid counsels should reach the Massachusetts legislature, or a single member of it ! A million of such men would not save the nation. Defeat the accursed measure now, and you not only restore commerce, agriculture, and all sorts of business to activitj', but you save the country from a British war. The power of the present miserable rulers — I mean their power to do material mischief — will then be annihilated. It fis onl}' for Massachusetts and Connecticut, or even ilassachusetts alone, to will the defeat of the embargo acts, and they become a dead letter. But if tliere be wavering and timidity, our worst ene- mies — the devoted adherents to Franco — will rise with renewed and iuci'eased force, and assuredly plunge the country into a war with , vGreat Britain. Their hatred against that country is inextinguisli^ able, and mounts up to violent rage. The ultimate success of Bonaparte in Spain, they are now waiting for. They triumph in the late defeats of the patriots, which are magnified by their wishes. They cannot conceal their joy. Let the die be cast in our own country by the decisive conduct of New England, before the success of the patriots be despaired of. I j'ct feel a confidence that the event will be propitious to them. The well-informed statesmen and generals who conduct their aflfairs knew the vast militar3' power of Bonaparte, and could well calculate their own. They would not have embarked in a desperate war. Riciiaud PiiXEHs to Pickering.^ Belmont, Feb. 3, 1809. My Dear Sik, — ... No part of }'our letter ^ gave me more satisfaction than that which assures me of the safety of our Union. I confess I have been apprehensive ; yet, on the whole, my confi- dence in the good sense and patriotism of the lilastern people pre- dominated over my fear. Many here were more alarmed on this 1 Pickering MSS. 2 No copy of tliis letter is found in the Pickering MSS. APPENDIX. 381 score than I have been, conscious of the peculiar irritations and oppression produced on those of j'onr section of tlic Union by the embargo and its attendant scourges. Tlie conversation at tallies and public places at Boston held by men not of the mob, and the unjustifiable acts of the latter, as well as of those who would not wish to be thus classified, are and have been very unpleasant to those who wish the Constitution preserved. Our whiskcj' and house-tax business warn us against similar evils, however different may be the causes. Every thing is conjured up to torment when the mind is disposed to be gloomy. The propositions for the pros- tration of the executive and senatorial branches of the government, made by one whose talents are eminent, and whose objects are such as are dictated by a mind well-turned and free from any vicious or impure intention, I confess made me verj- uneasy. I thought that others less considerate and less virtuous than he would be glad to follow such an example. I had rather bear the ills we have, and give time for exertion to cure them, than fly to others which we know not of. Dr. Dwight's century sermon, also, came up in judgment. lie possibly onlj' meant it in a religious view. " Come out therefore from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch not the unclean thing ; and I will receive j-ou, and be a P^ather to you : ye shall be my sons and daughters, saith the Almighty." There are some of his observations on this scriptural call which are not without ambiguity. One of the greatest curses attending the embargo is that of showing to the world our divisions, and driving to resistance and defiance of law the most correct and orderly people among us. We have proved, too, that the idea of our great importance to the European world was a vain and fanciful delusion. . . . Your observation that our administration do not mean to add to the strength of the Northern and Eastern region of our country, is very striking. I cannot persuade myself they seriously intend war, or your people breach of our Union. But may not the first be pro- duced by the measures they take to alarm England, and the latter by the means their opponents pursue to terrify them into an alter- ation of those measures, and this contrary to the real intentions of both sides of our political combatants. Such events happen where no design to produce them originally existed. In disturbed seas, currents and accidents drive the bark out of her course, and far beyond her reckoning. AVhen she will no longer obej' her hehn, she is lost. . . . 382 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. A. C. Hanson to Pickering.' Baltimore, Jan. 17, 1810. Dear Sir, — . . . I am rejoiced to see Quincy making such a noble stand in the House of Representatives. He ought to be supported, and no doubt will. I trust he will not be loss intrepid when Eppes's bill, no doubt fresh from IMonticello, is discussed. If such a bill passes without inchuling France, under circumstances of extreme outrage and insult, — connected, too, with the operations in West Florida, and the creation of so manj' new States, — I shall become heartily sick of the Union. « For my part, I saj' without reserve that the Union was long ago dissolved; and I never thought it criminal to compass a dismemberment of the States, although we have been educated with that belief. But I should prefer produc- ing such an event by quiet means. I should like conventions to be called in the several States so disposed, and to proceed with calm- ness and dignified firmness. Sick as I am, and constitutionally weak-breasted, I expect to outlive the Union. The Democrats spare no pains to hasten the catastrophe. For mj' part, I think, if the question was barel}' stirred in New England, some States would drop off from the Union like fruit, rotten ripe. • Nor do I think the general government would make an effort to recover and preserve them ; which being perceived by other States, they would quickly follow the example which any State might have the courage, f)atri- otism, and love of hbert}', to hold out. Virginia, with the other Southern States, and all Louisiana, and the Floridas in her rear, would then be left to govern her black population as she lists. I have written to you hastilj^ and with the freedom which springs from confidence and friendship. F. J. Jackson to Pickering." London, April 24, 1811. Dear Sir, — I have not, since my return to England, lost sight of the promise which I made of writing to you. On the contrary, I have been waiting for the moment when I could give 3'ou, if not a 1 Pickering MSS. '^ Pickering MSS. Jackson was the British Minister in the U. S., and had just been dismissed. See Ids letters in the " Batli Arcliives," more particularly vol. i. pp. 102-106. APPENDIX. 383 satisfactory, yet a correct statement of the subject ■which I know to be very forward in j'our thought. The policy of your govcrnmont, although constantly moving in the same channel of partiality towards France and French interests, was nevertheless varied by the currents or eddies which ruffled, though it seems they did not obstruct, its course. The policy of our government has been so nearly in a state of stagnation that it was difficult to perceive whether it had any cur- rent at all. This is the character which it now essentiall}'^ pre- serves ; and, although there may be different opinions upon the efficiency of it, yet I find from various letters lately received from the United States that it is the course in which many sensible well- wishers to both countries desire that we should persevere. The discussions that were last year resumed here between our two governments have been for the most part made public at Wash- ington, and you will have seen that they turned upon two distinct topics : — 1. The appointment of a minister to the United States. 2. The revocation of our orders in council, in consequence of the pretended revocation of the French decrees. Enough has of late been disclosed to show that this latter revo- cation has not taken place, even in the sense and to the extent con- tended for by Mr. Pinkney, who has accordingly been not a little dismaj'ed by the appearance of Mr. Russell's correspondence, and taken gieat pains to prove that he was a dupe upon this occasion to his representation, as that gentleman himself appears to have been to those of the French government. Be that as it ma}', there is now no doubt that the French decrees are not repealed as Mr. Eussell and Mr. Pinkney- at one time professed to believe that they were. We, on the other hand, as Englishmen, were bound to maintain that, if they even had been so repealed, such repeal did not satisfy our just expectations. To jou it were needless to enter at large into the grounds of this assertion. They may all be essentially comprised in this brief statement, that a mere nominal repeal, with the substitution of the same injurious measures under another form, was not the condition on which we made our promise. We claim a substantial repeal, such as should place the trade of neutrals upon the footing on which it stood previous to the issuing of the French decrees. We claim a state of things such as would have existed, if those decrees had never been promulgated. The admis- 384 NBW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. sion, as satisfaction, of any tiling slioit of tliis would indeed have proved that we had all along been contending only for a point of honor, for a mere matter of form and etiquette. But Pinknej' pre- tended to be so sure of the correctness of his information, and laid so great a stress as well thereupon as upon the pleas by which we were bound in good faith to do as the French had done, that it was detennined to act upon that view of the subject, to fulfd the expec- tations thus announced, and to throw upon France the odium of a breach of faith, if, as we confidently believed, it should ulti- matelj"^ prove that she did not intend such a revocation of her decrees as we were in right and justice bound to require. In this way the orders in council would, for a time at least, have been removed. What has prevented it? Nothing but the annexation to that demand of another quite inadmissible and not necessarily con- nected with it; viz., that our sj'stem of blockade, and especiallj' the order of the IGth JMay, 180G, should be annulled. This alone, it was declared, would satisfy the just expectations of the President, and would enable him to continue a commercial intercourse with England as well as with France. There is probably no state of things in which we should consent to such a proposal ; and I know of no set of men who would advise that we should. It so happens that the blockade of the 16th May was the act of Mr. Fox. If there could otherwise have been any difference of opinion on the subject, that circumstance alone would have identified the sjstem with his surviving friends. But the President has in fact alienated the most powerful of that number, by pushing his pretensions so much farther than any of them think he has a right to do. His only advocate is to be found in the house of Baring. Accordinglj', every man of every party unites in saying that, whatever may be the merits of the orders in council, our maritime system must be maintained. Probably this is the precise state of things that was foreseen at "Washington, and therefore the demand was made : but, as this cannot be avowed, 3'ou will be at no loss to understand why Mr. Pinkney's whole cor- respondence was not laid before Congress ; though there is, in the tone as well as substance of the suppressed part of it, wherewithal to gratlf}' Joel Barlow himself. The first point of discussion above alluded to, viz., the appoint- ment of a minister to the United States, has afforded some matter of merriment to our wits, who think it quite comical that APPENDIX. 385 our Republican friends ehoiild qnarrcl with us for not sending tliem as minister a man of hereditary rank ; and this is tlie only ground upon which that part of the dispute now stands. Of the intention to appoint a minister, Mr. Pinkney was apprised long before he received his instnictions in the shape of an ultimatum on tliat sub- ject. He himself says he was told of it as early as January and Feb- ruary, 1810. He certainly received repeated assurances to the same effect previous to and about the time of my return, which was that of the beginning of the king's illness ; and the only licsitation was as to the selection to be made. Several persons, and amongst them, I believe, a nobleman, were put in nomination ; but they refused the appointment : and, in consequence of the transactions of the winter of 1809-10, this has become a matter of more diffi- culty than can easily be conceived in 3'our countrj-, where diplo- matic offices are so eagerly souglit after. Foster, being young both in years and in the career, could feel little hesitation to accept. It is a great object to him to get such a step ; and tlie opportunity was not to be neglected. He goes, therefore, as well to satisfy the claim of the United States to a minister of the same rank as tlieir own as to act as a sort of political conductor to attract the light- ning that may issue from the clouds round the Capitol and tlie White House at Washington. I hope that he will convej' the flashes harmless into the Potomac, or, if not, into one of the pow- der magazines that abound in that neighborhood. It lias occa- sioned much surprise here that, exactly at the moment of Pinknc3''8 demand being complied with, he should nevertheless take what he calls an inamicable leave ; placing the questions in dispute, as I before said, upon the non-appointment of a nobleman to the American mission. Whatever of anger or asperity has appeared in his cor- respondence is attributed to the necessitjr of Pinknej's assuring himself a good reception with the party amongst j-ou who last j-ear found fault with him for using too much civility towards this coun- trj'. This error he has since corrected, and due allowance would have been made for his motives ; but it was not expected that he would so far depart from his usual urbanity as to decline the invi- tation that was sent him, in common with the rest of the foreign ministers, to attend the regent's levee. It was not probable after this that the audience of leave which he claimed should answer his expectation. It was very short. Mr. P. was told that tlie regent was desirous of cultivating a good understanding with the U. S ; that he had given a proof of it in the appointment of a minister as 25 386 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. soon as his acceptance of the regency enabled him to appoint one ; that the orders in council would have been repealed ; but that his Royal Highness never could or would surrender the maritime rights of his country. Mr. P. then made some profession of his personal sentiments; to which he was answered, "Sir, I cannot look into men's minds : I can only judge of men's motives by their conduct." And then the audience ended. The result of all this seems to be that, adopting in opposition to the clearest evidence the interpretation put by France upon her acts, tlie United States have adopted also her sj'stcm of commer- cial hostility towards England. Tliis would no doubt authorize corresponding measures on tlie part of the latter ; but as she really has neither wish nor interest to quarrel with the United States, and as she thinks that they are already sufficiently punished by the deprivation which they bring upon themselves, she leaves the rem- edj' of an otherwise incurable evil to the returning sense of good policj' which it is supposed will ere long necessitate in America a change, and possibly an improvement of public measures. These are, whether riglit or wrong, the principles ui)on wliich we are acting. If any amelioration of them can be de\ised that will sooner pro- mote the return of that harmony and of that commerce without restriction which those most desire wlio are most interested in the subject, you will freely suggest it, and I shall as gladly turn your suggestion to good account. This leads me to say, that I shall soon be looking for the report which 3-ou had it in contemplation to make to 3'oiu' constituents at the expiration of j'our period of service. We have no accounts of you later than the 10th March. I would fain hope, but dare not, that the elections of this spring would lead to the renewal of your senatorial career. You will at all events enlighten, if j^ou cannot correct, the public mind. I trust that I shall receive from yourself whatever of j'our sentiments j'ou may think proper to lay before the public, and as much more of them as you will intrust to one very sincerely de- voted to j'Our public and private principles. You cannot doubt of the deep interest I shall take in the perusal of them ; and I hope my friends at Boston will do me the justice to believe that I retain a proper sense of the civilities that I received from, as well as a very pleasurable recollection of the identity of om- political senti- ments. Have the goodness, when occasion offers, to say as much for me to Messrs. Gore, Otis, Cabot, and Tcrkins. I have just been APPENDIX. 387 perusing tlie " Impartial Enquirer " with great satisfaction. I had previoii8l3' heard of it from Mr. Iligginson, who is now at Bath, but whom I had lately the pleasure of seeing here in good health. Pickering to G. H. Rose.^ Weniiam, near Salem, Mabsaciidsetts, April 7, 1812. ' Dear Sir, — The pleasure I enjoyed in your acquaintance during the short time you were in America is not unfrequently recollected. The relations between our two countries were then bad enough ; but now much worse, by the continued operation of the same nefarious causes on the part of the United States government. Its glaring partiality to France is so manifest, and its contrary declarations so obviously unfounded and false, I am astonished to find that it has a single advocate or apologist in the British Parliament.* That member who in his place could express his wish to God that Bona- parte had ships, colonies, and commerce, I can conceive capable of any sort of opposition to the men in power, even to the sacrificing the honor and the clearest interests of his country. His call for peace indeed, if sincere, with the ruler of France in the actual state of his power, indicates Mr. Whitbred's want of judgment. You can have no peace with the tj'rant until j'ou become his slaves. That subject of dispute which j^ou were so anxious to adjust, having served the purposes of our government in a four years' excilement of popular resentment against Great Britain, has been settled ; not for the sake of restoring harmony between us, but because the subject had grown stale, and because there were other topics enough to maintain the irritation. ' They are now framing an embargo, in the expectation of distressing you at home and starving your armies in the Peninsula, by which the subjugation of Spain and Portugal by Bonaparte maj' be facilitated ; and will, if they can, provoke you to make war. Their being unprepared is of little moment in their estimation. If you capture all our vessels, the majority who rule will not directly feer.it raMTEeliuBerings of the people wiii for a time be stifled in their . increased resentments agaiustyou." Would to God that in the end those sufferings might serve to open their eyes ! * — I'commit this to the care of my son Henry Pickering, who, if he has the opportunity, will do himself the honor to present it to you . . . 1 Pickering MSS. 388 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. Pickering to Edward Pennington.' Weniiam, neak Salem, July 12, 1812. Dear Sir, — Your letter of the 6th, lamenting the war declared by our government against Great Britain, has just be(?n brought to me from Salem. You ascribe the war to the arts of Napoleon ; but all his arts would have failed, were not our own rulers corrupt. It is rarelj' that bribery can be detected and exposed upon evi- dence. I cannot therefore undertajce to affirm that French money has been liberally distributed on this occasion, although I entertain no doubt of it. Adet bribed members of Congress in Washing- ton's da}', when the French government was embarrassed to raise money for its laivful uses in the United States. Of this I have sat- isfactory evidence, — the voluntary evidence of the French Consul- General Letomb to an intelligent and worthy friend of mine. But Napoleon has ample funds. The millions he has plundered from our own merchants are sufficient to engage the sui)port and votes of a competent number of many sets of such rulers as for ten or twelve years past have been tlic curse of our country. Your mind is much depressed by the declaration of war : I am sorry for it. This last act of baseness, corruption, treachery, and malignity was necessary to miveil to the peo[)le at large the real character of our rulers. To compare a small matter with this great one, it was the outrageous violation of the Constitution of Massachusetts, and their violent and palpabl}' unjust proceedings b}' Governor Gerr}' and our legislature of last j'ear, which opened the ej'es of the people, and produced a strong majorit)"^ of Federal- ists in our House of Representatives. The corruption of that legislature was so ingeniously exercised as to secure the election of 29 out of 40 Senators, devoted to that system, when there was a decided majority of Federal electors in the State in the original senatorial districts ! Hence the obstruction and defeat of the reformation, which would otherwise have been completed. But tliese senatorial usurpers will be ousted next 5-ear ; by extraordi- nary measures, if milder prove ineffectual. In our State execu- tive, we have nothing to wish. Governor Strong is able, prudent, and at the same time firm as a rock. Unexampled violence having produced these changes in Massa- chusetts, so the excesses of Congress, perfected by the last outrage 1 Pickering MSS. APPENDIX. 389 in declaring war against Great Britain, though deeply to be de- plored in all other respects, has seemed to me necessary to con- vince the people that their rulers must be changed ; that justice, peace, and prosperity can return only by such a change. I am confident of this eflTect in all New England, including VeiTnont ; nor can I doubt of it in New York. The construction of the Senate there, it is true, has at this time secured a Democratic majority in that body ; but all or nearly all concurred in nominat- ing De Witt Clinton for President instead of Madison. I am far enough from desiring CUnton for President of the United States. I would infinitely prefer another Virginian, — if Judge Marshall could be the man. But I would vote for any man in preference to Madison. I am disposed to believe that neither Jefferson nor Madison have dared resist the will of Napoleon ; because I presume they stand committed to him, and dread an expo- sure. Both also, with their adherents, hate England, — the country of our forefathers, and the country to which we are indebted for all the institutions dear to freemen. I would preserve the Union of the States, if possible. I thought the evils of the protracted Revolutionary War of eight years would be compensated for by their necessary intercourse and the intimate knowlodgo and connections and mutual confldenco it would pro-1 duce in these States, and so secure our future harmony and union, i Such were my contemplations at the time. But I would not be' deluded by a word. To my ears there is no magic in the sound of Union. If the great objects of union are utterly abandoned, — much more, if they are wantonlj'^, corruptly, and treacherously sacrificed by the Southern and Western States, — let the Union be severed. Such a severance presents no terrors to me. But the Southern States will tremble, when the idea shall be seriously presented to them. And they will gladly return, and be more firmly than ever united with the Northern States ; for these will be their shield against internal and external enemies. The onl}- permanent sever- ance will be of the Western from the Atlantic States. Yet when the North and the South shall be more closely linked, the Western States will long pause before they break off; and, united or dis- united, they will be cautious how they offend. New Orleans is their only emporium, and the Mississippi their only road to market, for their vast and increasing productions. Now a single frigate, or a few smaller armed vessels, would effectually block up tliis great highway. At any rate, the Western Union can never become a 390 NEW ENGLAND FEDERAUSM. naval power, and for all foreign commerce must lie at the mercy of the Atlantic States. I am for bold and decided measures, but measures perfect^ compatible with the Constitution and Union of the States ; for all temporizing will encourage to persevere the unprincipled men who have betraj-ed us. • And peace with Britain we must have and wiU have. We cannot exist, but in poverty and contempt, without for- eign commerce. And by a war of any continuance with Great Britain, that commerce will be annihilated. Having for years contemplated what are the important interests of Great Britain in relation to the United States, I am without fear of any invasion or of any destruction of our seaports. Instead of sickening at our commercial prosperity, as was said by a frotliy declaimer from Kentucky, Great Britain would not willinglj- see it diminish. With immense regions yet to be peopled and cultivated, she sees an immense demand for ages for her manufactures and colonial jjroductions. And, the more we prosper, the more we shall want and be able to purchase. She cannot without gross blindness destroy our seaports, where are collected the agents and tlie moans of commercial transactions. If indeed the war should be prose- cuted on the part of the United States with bitterness, malignit}', and outrage, and these so long continued as to forbid all hope of reconciliation. Great Britain may give up the rein to her vengeance which she has the power to render terrible, not for conquest but destruction. But all this I hold to be normally impossible. I repeat, we will have peace and commerce. - I am deeply engaged in my farming affairs at this most busj' sea- son ; the more busy because of interruptions by long-continued rain. I have therefore instantly taken up my pen to answer 3'our letter, not knowing wlien, after this day, I shall find a leisure moment. I pray you, as I would beseech all my friends, to rouse from despondency. The men who have brought so many calami- ties on our country are as destitute of wisdom as of integrity ; and the monstrous excesses of this war-session will prove their over- throw. appendix. 391 Pickering to George Logan.' JtjLT 4, 1813. ... If the Southern States should ever open their eyes to see that their real interest is closely connected with that of the other Atlantic States, and, by a union with them in apportioning the public burdens, lay an equitable share of them on the Western States, that moment the latter will declare off, take to them- selves the Western lands, and leave the enormous war debt they have occasioned on the shoulders of the Atlantic States, in addi- tion to the remainder of the debt of the Revolution. You are younger than I, and may live to see it ; and, if I should reach fourscore years, I may survive the present Union. Entertaining this opinion, I cannot think, of course, that a separation at this time would be an evil. On the contrary, I believe an immediate sep- aration would be a real blessing to the " good old thirteen States," as John Randolph once called them. I throw out this idea for the consideration of yourself and our judicious friend Mj^ers Fisher, to whom I request you to mention it. Pickering to Samuel Putnam.'' City of Wasiiinqtok, Feb. 4, 1814. Dear Sir, — The real friends of liberty and our country have long turned their eyes towards Massachusetts, to give the tone in those measures by which the United States shall be rescued from that thraldom in which a pack of petty tyrants, under the auspices of their execrable leader of Monticello, have involved them. The supporters of the administration, partly unprincipled and partly ignorant, now think, and some of them say, that Massachusetts has blustered too long to excite any alarm in the government : we have nothing to fear from her. It is, indeed, time for Massachu- setts to rouse from her slumbers. Her grievances ought no longer to be submissively endured. Had the long catalogue of wanton and cruel oppressions of the last six years been presented at once in their collective force at the time when Jefferson recommended to Congress the adoption of Bonaparte's Continental system, under 1 Pickering MSS. 2 Pickering MSS. See Lodge's " Cabot," p. C30. 392 KEW ENGLAND FEDEEALISM. the deceitful name of embargo, all America would have resisted. But, cheated on flimsy pretences into that single measure, while the flimsy documents oircred as its basis were carefully concealed from the public eye. Congress from its blind confldcnce concur- ring in the concealment, and the other evils having been gradually introduced, the people have learned tamely to bear them all, the majorit}' almost without a murmur. Time once was when the people^ thought and acted otherwise : then ohsta principiis was the principle and rule of action. The non-intercourse was an abominable meas- ure ; but, being an immense relief from the consummate evil of the Continental system of embargo, the people rejoiced at its promul- gation as if they had received a mighty boon. I have heard of the spirited proposition of Mr. Fessenden, and that it was received with acclamation by the people, while the cau- tious counsel [of Mr. Otis] ^ which followed, produced, if not murmurs, certainly no sign of approbation. The time is arrived when ordinai-y opposition will prove futile. God forbid there should be any more supplications or simple remonstrances. These produce here only petulant reproaches from characters as contemptible as you could find by searching in the most obscure corners of New England Democrac}', with impotent defiances and threats from others. On the spot, you can best judge for what the people are ripe and what they will support. But I should suppose j'ou might state in strong language the numerous violations of the Constitution, and various acts of national oppression which crush you to the earth ; that as a member, and a large one, of the Union, for whose benefit, not for whose destruction, the Constitution was framed and by you adopted, j'ou might state the articles in which a change of measures is essential to jour well-being, and as such that you demand immediate relief. If a step of this kind should be adopted, one more should be taken : send forth a solemn and earnest address to your constitu- ents, in plain but forcible language, which all can understand and feel, stating concisely all the great evils wantonly brought on them by the acts of the national government, and for no possible cause but to co-operate with Europe's execrable tyrant, the ruler of France. Recite your demands on Congress for relief; but tell the peoi)lo that while, with a sincere and strong desire to maintain the Union 1 Erased in draft. APPENDIX. 398 of the States, you have made one more application to that body for a redress of grievances, past experience too lamentably shows how small is the hope of relief ; that therefore they must prepare their minds and hold themselves in readiness to " right themselves," and remove from them that accumulated load of oppression which is no longer to be endured. Declarations of this sort by Massachusetts, especially if con- curred in by the other New England States, would settle the busi- ness at once. But, though made now by Massachusetts alone, j'ou surely may rely on the co-operation of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, and, I doubt not, of Vermont and New York. With the executives and legislatures of most and the Repre- sentatives of all of them, you can freely communicate. Ought there not to be a proposal of a convention of delegates from those six States? Recollect the times that are past, when circular letters were first sent from the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, the cradle of American liberty, — whence ensued our organized opposition to meditated oppression, the harbinger of tyranny, but which, as compared with the actual oppression and tjTanny of our own government, would now appear insigniflcarit. In describing in your address to the people (for I presume j-ou will not rise without one) the opi)rcssion8 above referred to, and especially the calamities of tliis profligate war, will there be any impropriety — nay, does not the actual state of tilings loudly call for it ? — after showing conciselj- how the war is unnecessary and unjust, and how impossible bj' its continuance for any length of time whatever to obtain a relinquishment on the part of Great Britain of the right of impressing her own seamen from neutral merchant ships, for whicli absolutely hopeless object alone the war is j'et maintained, — after concisely showing all this, ought you not to caution aU the citizens of Massachusetts not to 3-ield by per- sonal services or bj' monej' any voluntary aid in carrying on the war, which being criminal in its origin aiid continuance and ruin- ous in its consequences, all those who voluntarily contribute to its \ support will be involved in its guilt ; and then solemnlj- denounce all who shall render such voluntary assistance, as enemies of their country ? I have more to say, but must do it in another letter. 894 new england federalism. Pickering to Caleb Strong.' City op AVasiiington, Oct. 12, 1814. Dear Sir, — Yesterday I enclosed to you copies of the letters and papers from our Commissioners at Ghent, stating their com- munications with the British Commissioners on the subject of peace, and intimated my intention to follow them with some remarks. When read in the House (and they were read but once) , con- siderable excitement was produced among some on the right as well as on the wrong side of that body. I thought the few obser- vations then made premature ; and that it had been better to wait until we could deliberatel}' read the documents ourselves. I con- fess, at the same time, that the demands of the British did not sur- prise me or rouse an}' resentment ; for they seemed to be the natural result of the war, waged as it was on such unsuHlcient grounds (if the ostensible had been, what they were not, the real excuses of the war), and under such peculiar circumstances, when not the fate of Britain onl}^, but of the whole civilized world, was at stake. I have uniformly thought that Great Britain might justly demand some indemnity for the injuries actuall}^ done her, and the fatal mischief manifestly intended against her, b}- this base, unjust, and unnatural war. But 3'et she asks not any indemnity : security will satisfjr her, and to that she is entitled. 4 1 . I presume no Federalist has doubted that G reat Britain could insist, as she does, on the right to take bj' force her natural-born subjects from our merchant vessels on the high seas. I also pre- sume that now the President has yielded that point ; although the maintaining of it, when no other pretence for continuing the war existed, has cost many millions of money, and the sacrifice of many thousand lives. 2. To comprehend the Indians, her allies, in the pacification was the indispensable duty of Great Britain ; and to secure for them a permanent boundary was in itself an act of benevolence, though doubtless an interested policy strongly influenced the demand. And how will the United States be affected, should the demand be admitted? Had the just and humane system towards the Indians, formed under the administration of Washington, but which, you will recollect, was vehemently oppugned by the then 1 Pickering MSS. APPENDIX. 395 opposition, been pursued subsequently to tlie year 1800, we should have had no Indian war ; but since that time the North-western Indians have been pressed and constrained to relinquish vast tracts of their hunting-grounds, which are as necessary to them as farms to their white neighbors, by treaty upon treaty, — many of them, I have no doubt, unfairly conducted, — until their resentments were roused, and, by Governor Harrison's incursion and attack at Tippecanoe, a war enkindled. Now, to secure peace and their property to those Indians, and fix their attachment to their powerful ally, Great Britain demands for them a permanent boundary line, over which neither nation shall pass to purchase the Indian lands. These, no doubt, are the lands which fall within the limits of the United States by the treaty of peace of 1783. In effect, then, the demand of Great Britain amounts to this, and to no more : That, as the United States have now the right of pre-emption (and that is all they have) in respect to those lands, they should relinquish it to the Indians, who are the right owners and possessors of the soil ; and the two powers are to guar- antee the same to the Indians, and to stipulate that neither shall pur- chase anjf of them. In conversation, the British Commissioners said the Indians might sell to a third person or power ; but this is omitted in their written note, and ought not to be admitted on our part in a treaty. Let those lands remain (according to the idea suggested by the British Commissioners) a wilderness, and so a perpetual barrier in that quarter between the British territories and ours. And as this proposition, particularly as to boundary, was to be sub- ject to modifications, unquestionably such parts of the Indian territories as had been already purchased and settled would have been excepted and reserved without that boundary. Should any unseated tracts bo then comprehended, they must have been the subjects of speculation, and not improbably the very objects of those irritating treaties and the real causes of the Indian war. To such tracts, no exception need be made. Should the United States have sold and received the consideration for them, the money may be refunded. In a political point of view, this relinquishment of our pre-emption right to the Indians might be really desirable. It is this wild spirit which has scattered our citizens in the wilderness, and exposed them to destruction ; because, so dispersed, they are unequal to their own protection, and by their collisions with the Indians are always endangering our peace. From all that I have heard (and I have 396 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. sought for information) , I entertain no doubt that the Indian war on the Ohio frontiers was produced by the injustice of our own people towards the Indians. You know that the Western lands were early pledged for the redemption of the sacred debt of the Revolution. They have yielded about eight millions of dollars ; while the expenditures in that region in the two j'ears of this war have, I doubt not, risen to double that sum ,— probably to much more. That pledge, then, to the public creditors is goue. It would have been good economy in the United States if they had given away all those lands to the settlers, sololj' on condition that they should defend themselves. That it was not necessary to coerce (I do not mean by military force, but by the irresistible influence of superior power impending, and seen to be always ready to fall upon them and crush them) , — that it was not necessarj' to coerce the Indians to sell their lands in that region to make room for settlers, is perfectly evident from this single fact, that, in the direct tax imposed in 1813, a greater sum was assessed on non-residents' lands in the State of Ohio than on the lands of all the inhabitants of that State, although they send six members to Congress ! In like manner, a large por- tion (I do not remember how much) of the direct tax in Kentucky was imposed on the lands of non-residents. As Indian lands were not wanted to make room for settlers, why have they been so eagerly grasped ? For two reasons : to give opportunity for the speculations of men in office and their friends ; and to furnish occasion to erect more territorial governments, with a train of officers and dependants, to extend executive patronage and gain partisans to the cause of the dominant part}'. 3. The proposition that the United States should have no naval force on the Lakes, nor fortresses on their borders, I was prepared for, and on the very ground taken by the British Commissioners. It is, I believe, more than a year since, in conversation with some of my friends, 1 remarked that it would be happy for both coun- tries if they could agree never to have either armed vessels or military posts on their whole interior frontiers washed by the Great Lakes and their connecting waters. But I added (having contem- plated the subject) , Great Britain cannot agree to this ; for her Canadian Provinces are weak from their small population, and the United States are strong, which in case of future hostilities would enable them to overrun the Canadas before they could prepare for their defence. And can wo think it unreasonable in Great Britain APPENDIX. 397 to ask fbr this securitj- ? Should not wc do it, were our relative situation like hers ? It is to be noted, however, that this proposition is not a «in« qua non ; it is a fair subject of negotiation, and doubtless may be modified in a manner mutually satisfactorj'. For instance, it raaj' be agreed that neither shall have any armed vessels on the Lakes, while each may maintain its fortresses on the land. If there were to be no stipulation of the kind demanded, it would be good policy on the part of the United States to haul up their armed vessels, and never to repair them ; such only of the smaller ones being excepted as, being for ever dismantled of arms, should be useful as tr.ading vessels on those waters. Peace once restored, such a period would probably elapse before another war would arise that three or four or half a dozen sets of armed vessels might be built and rot before they would be wanted for defence or offence. And surely we shall have need enough of economy to save so great an expense as even that of the annual repairs of the vessels now in existence. 4. The only remaining proposition respects the fisheries and the cession of land in the north-east corner of Maine, to enable Great Britain to open a road of its own by which to communicate be- tween Halifax and New Brunswick and Quebec. The declaration relative to the fisheries was precisely what was expected by mj'self and mj' intelligent friends with whom I con- versed on the subject before I left home. We did not believe that Great Britain would attempt to deprive us of the Bank fisheries in the open sea ; while we supposed she would den}' us the fisheries in the baj-s and coasts of her own dominions, of which she would con- ceive herself the sovereign. But the latter she is readj' to j-ield for an equivalent. Now, Great Britain well knows that Massachusetts is almost exclusivelj' interested in the cod-fisheries ; and it is through her territories that she wants a road between Quebec and New Bruns- wick and Nova Scotia, — not a right of passage merely, but the land itself, to have the road in the fullest property. And tiiis, I imagine, is the equivalent she contemplates for yielding a right to the fisheries in question. Not knowing the quality of the lands in Maine of which Great Britain wants a cession, and the proposition being too indefinite to enable me to judge how far down the line between Maine and New Brunswick it may be needful for the road to cross, I should be happ3' to receive information on the subject. A road from Halifax round the head of the Bay of Fundy, and thence directly to Que- 398 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. bee, would appear to take off but a small portion of Maine ; and if the road for New Brunswick were to run northerly until it fell in with the Halifax road, before it crossed the line of Maine, it would seem tliat the contemplated cession would not cover a very large tract of land. These papers having been committed to the Committee for Foreign Affairs, and there being in one portion of that committee at least as much of zeal as of prudence and knowledge, I look for an inflammatory report. Perhaps this may not be acted upon before I receive 3'our sentiments upon the subject ; and I hope your public duties may not be such as to denj' you time to favor me with an answer. For several years past, I have heard the expression from sound and discreet Federalists of the Middle and Southern States, " We look to New England for salvation." I pray God that New Eng- land may not now be wanting to herself and to her brethren, the most valuable members of our great political society. The domi- nant party have brought the United States to the brink of ruin, and treated us, not as equals, but as their fleld-laborers, bound to toil for, as if to compensate them for the trouble of ruling over us with rods of iron. I am weary and indignant at this servitude, and un- willing longer to submit to it. Yet without some extraordinary effort, some act becoming the high spirit of freemen, such as our predecessors would have approved, I see not but our chains are to be riveted for ever ; as, abandoned by the general govern- ment, except for taxing us, we must defend ourselves, so we ought to secure and hold fast the revenues indispensable to maintain the force necessary for our protection against the foreign enemy, and the still greater evil in prospect, — domestic tyrann3% Caleb Strong to Pickering.^ Boston, Oct. 17, 1814. Mt Dear Sir, — I received your note this morning, enclosed with the President's message, for which I thank you. A consider- able sensation has been excited here by a report that, on hearing the message and document read, Mr- Hanson pledged himself and hia party for a vigorous and determined prosecution of the war. I can hardly believe this report ; for I am unable to discover any thing 1 Pickering MSS. APPENDIX. 399 in the claims of tiie British Commissioners that could occasion such a pledge. You observe in your note that j-ou had not anticipated the pro- posal in regard to the Indians. I confess that I have often, since the commencement of the war, expressed a wish that, in a treaty with Great Britain, effectual measures might be taken to protect the Indians in the possession of their lands ; and that I thought G. B. would be bound in honor to effect this object, if possible. Our conduct towards the Indians appeared to me, when I was at Congress, to be extremely unjustifiable and inhuman ; and, if the same conduct is pursued a few j'cars, the wliole race will be extirpated. I can see no other way to prevent tliis but for both nations to guarantee their possessions, to the exclusion of each other. This may hurt the pride of some of our people. But, if justice require it, there is not ground Ibr resenting a demand of this kind, nor will there be any disgrace in complying with it. The proposal to exclude our naval force from the Lakes evidently proceeds from a sense of their inferiority in that neighborhood. We may at any time of peace, if we have a superior force on the Lakes, renew the attempt made bj' General Hull, when the Canadians are wholly ignorant of any hostile views on our part ; and may overrun the country before any aid can be received from England. But there is no danger that Canada will be able to make any serious impression, even on the State of New York. The proposal of a new line between us and New Brunswick may undoubtedly be modified so as to cause no material injury to the State or the Union ; and the same, I suppose, is the case with the fisheries. As to Eastport, I believe it is generally acknowledged by well-informed people that we liave iio just clai m to it under th e treaty of peace, although we might have had it by a treaty madebj' Mr. King which was rejected by President Jefferson. If Great Britain had disco;ered a haughty and grasping temper, it might naturally have excited irritation ; but 1 am persuaded that, in the present ease, there is not a member of Congress who, if he was a member of Parliament, would have thought that more mod- crate terms ought in the first instance to have been offered ; but how they will view this subject now, I can't pretend to say. The pride you mention is an enemy as well to peace as justice. It has been very operative in producing the war, and I am apprehensive will be so in preventing peace. If Mr. King and Mr. Gore had been our negotiators, I think the terms proposed by the British Commis- 400 NEW ENGLAND PEDEKALISM. sioners might have been so modified as to produce a just and equitable accommodation ; but whetlier it would have been accept- able to our government is perhaps questionable. John Loavell to Pickeeing.^ RoxBUBY, Oct. 19, 1814. Dear Sir, — I thank you for your letter and the expression of your opinions. What mine were j-ou will see, before this reaches 3'ou, in tlie " Daily Advertiser." It gives mc great pleasure to find my opinions so fully accord with yours. Be pleased to say as much to my much-respected friend, Mr. Ward, who was so kind as to write me on this subject, and to whom I should have written, but that I am wholly occupied with discussing the question, as well as addressing the Norfolk people on the election. This must be my excuse. I probably go farther than either of you. I think the terms liberal, considering what Great Britain had then a right to expect from her armies here ; and I think them not dishonorable to us, but really such as we ought to desire. It looks like a Avish for a durable peace. AVe ought to meet these offers. A lasting peace can never take place, but on such terms. We shall reject them, because the purposes of the Almightj"- for our humilia- tion and punishment are not fulfilled. Pickering to Gouverneur Morris.'' City of Washington, Oct. 21, 1814. Dear Sir, — To-day I had the pleasure of receiving j-our letter of the 17tli. I was gratified to find my own sentiments correspond- ing with yours. " Union" is the talisman of the dominant partj^ ; and many Federalists, enchanted by the magic sound, are alarmed at every appearance of opposition to the measures of the faction, lest it should endanger the "Union." I have never entertained such fears. On the contraiy, in adverting to the ruinous sj-stem of our government for many j'cars past, I have said, "Let the \ship run aground. The shock will throw the present pilots over- 1 Pickering MSS. 2 Piolteriiig MSS. Printed in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 536. APPENDIX. 401 board, and then competent navigators will get her once more afloat, and conduct her safely into port." I have even gone so far as to say that a separation of the Northern section of States would be ultimately advant ageous ,, because it would be temporary, and be- cause in the intei'val the just rights of the States would be recov- ered and secured ; that the Southern States would earnestly seek a reunion, when the rights of both would be defined and established on a more equal and therefore more durable basis. At a late consultation among Federalists, the great question was agitated, "What part shall we take when the system of taxation shall be brought before us?" In general (I do not know but uni- versally, as to those who spoke) , it seemed to be concluded that, as the nature of the war was now changed from offensive to defen- sive, we could not withhold our assent. At the same time, it was admitted that the present rulers were incompetent to carry on the war, and that the monej^ raised by means of a sj-stem of heavy taxation would, like the millions already obtained, be profusely wasted. But, in assenting to the taxes, all agreed that it would be proper to protest against the administration, and declare it incom- petent to maintain the war or to make peace ! I dissented from this doctrine, and avowed my opinion that our assent to the system of taxation should bo given only on the condition that the admin- istration should be changed, so that Federalists should control the public measures and apply the public funds to support them. I presume I shall not be left alone. I trust a number of Eastern members, at least of my colleagues, will agree with me, unless on better advice we should think it expedient to adopt the plan of our other Federal brethren. This day Eppes called up the resolutions of the Committee of "Ways and Means ; and Mr. Oakley (who is a man of talents) took the ground, above mentioned, of advocating the sj'stem of severe taxation, and protesting against the compe- tency of the men into whose hands the public revenues would be thrown. The reproaches which on this plan are necessarily cast on the administration and its abettors in the two Houses will render these more bitter, and urge them, from pride and resentment, to pursue their course with increased obstinacy. As you suppose, some men " arc on stilts as to British arrogance and audacit}', in proposing terms of peace to which we cannot listen without disgrace." I confess they did not disturb me. For some of them (on which our Commissioners had no instructions) I was in a degree prepared. In conversation with my friends at home, we 402 NEW ENGLAND PEDERAMSM. had concluded that Great Britain would exclude us from those very fisheries which she now says she will not again j-ield to us without an equivalent, but not attempt to deny us the cod-fisheries in the open sea, — that is, on the Banks of Newfoundland. What equiv- alent was contemplated by the Biitish government seemed to me very obvious. They want a direct road from Halifax to Quebec. This will cross the province of IMaine belonging to Massachusetts, to which State those fisheries are almost exclusively interesting. Massachusetts may exchange the north-east corner of IMaiue for the privilege of participating in the British fisheries. As to the lakes, I said more than a j^ear ago that it would be a most desirable thing if Great Britain and the United States could agree to have neither armed vessels on the lakes, nor an)' fortifica- tions on their borders ; but that Great Britain could not so agree, because in Canada she was weak, and we were strong and daily increasing in strength, which would enable us to invade and over- run her dominions there before she could prepare to defend them. But this proposition of hers is not a sine qua non. In its present form, I have an entire repugnance to it. She would doubtless agree either to stipulate that neither power should keep any naval force on the lakes, each fortifying on the land as it pleased, or to say nothing about it, when both would be in the situation existing prior to the war. As to the Indian boundary, I soothed some of mj- friends b}' ask- ing them what Great Britain demanded, answering that she required no cession of territory to herself (in this proposition) , nor to the Indians ; for the latter, being proprietors of the soil. Great Britain demanded in their behalf that we should relinquish our right of pre-emption, which was really all the right we could set up. I added that, the British demand out of the question, good policy should dictate to us the same measure, — to prevent further en- croachments on the Indians (and consequently a renewal of hostil- ities) , the dispersion of our citizens over vast and indefensible regions, when we had yet so many miUions of acres of good lands without inhabitants. To effect a peace, our rulers must be changed, and men less fraud and less haters of Great Britain be employed as negotiators. APPENDIX. 403 GouvERNEUR Morris to Pickering.' MoRRisANiA, Nov. 1, 1814. Dear Sir, — I have received 3"0urs of the 21st of October, and now see that we are to be taxed bej-ond our means, and subjected to military conscription. These measures are devised and pursued bj' the gentle spirits who for more than twenty j'ears have lavished on Britain the bitterest vulgarity of Billingsgate, because she im- pressed her seamen for self-defence, and have shed a torrent of crocodile tears over the poor of that countrj-, crushed, as thej- pre- tend, by oppressive taxes to gratify roj-al ambition. Nevertheless, this waste of men and money, neither of which can be squeezed out of our extenuated States, is proposed for the conquest of Canada. And thus, after swearing and forswearing backward and forward tiU their fondest adherents were grown gidd}-, and after pubUshing their willingness to abandon every former pretext, the administra- tion boldly avow that, although we are so simple as to call this a war of defence, it is still on their part a war of conquest. What will the Federal gentlemen now say, who, to excuse their support of this administration, assumed that their unprovoked, un- wise, unjust war of aggression had, all at once, become defensive. I admire and applaud the proud consistency of our adversaries, who say to these our. quondam friends: "We disdain j-our prof- fered support. You shall not participate in power, neither shall your quibble serve your turn. We wage no defensive war, but mean to conquer Canada. Vote for that, or vote against us, we care not which." And now, my good friend, be, I pray 3'ou, so kind as to tell the pliant patriots who become converts to Mr. Monroe's scheme, frankly communicated to enemies as to friends, of marching into Canada, b}' waj' of inducing the British forces on our coast to meet us there, that, the St. Lawrence being no longer navigable, this sublime diversion cannot take eflFect before the month of IMa}'. But perhaps the Secretary, as facetious as he is sagacious, meant this diversion merely as a pleasantrj' to divert himself and his col- leagues at the eagerness with which Federal gudgeons will, in the lack of bait, swallow a bare hook. Doubts arc, I find, entertained whether Massachusetts is in ear- 1 Pickering MSS. Printed in Lodge's "Cabot," p. 537. See Sparks's " I/ife of Gouverneur Morris " for otiier letters in a similar sense ; especially, vol. iii. pp. 314, 315, 817, 319, 320, 321. 404 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. nest, and whether she will be supported by the New England family. But surely these outrageous measures must rouse their patriot sen- timent to cast off the load of oppression. Pickering to John Lowell. i City of Wasiiington, Nov. 7, 1814. Dear Sra, — You may recollect that, in my letter to Governor Sullivan (April 16, 1808), I said with earnestness "that it was essential to the public safety that the blind confidence in our rulers should cease, that the State legislatures should know the facts and reasons on which important general laws were founded, and es- pecially that those States whose farms were on the ocean, and whose harvests were gathered in every sea, should immediatelj' and seri- ously consider how to preserve them ; " adding that "nothing but the sense of the commercial States, clearly and practicall}' expressed, would save them from ruin." The House of Representatives of Massachusetts was at that time Federal ; (and was not the Senate also Federal?) and, with the spirit which ought to have been exerted, the evils of Jefferson's unlimited embargo might have been shortened, and probably a free connnorce (instead of the mis- erable and mischievous non-intercourse and other restrictions) restored, especially if Connecticut had been invited to co-operate. Ohsta principiis was the motto of the movers and leaders of our Revolution, before — -long before — the obstinac}' and pride of the British government rendered that Revolution unavoidable. The praises of the sages and heroes of that Revolution are in the mouths of all our political coxcombs ; j'et every man who now exhibits one spark of their spirit is denounced as the friend of Britain and the enemy of his own country, while other Federalists, alike sensible of the wanton oppression and tyranny of our rulers, have shrunk from every proposition that contained one particle of boldness. When the war had been declared, the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, again Federal, addressed their constituents, to rouse them to that degree of opposition to our rulers which their interests and safety required, within the pale of the Constitution, recommending meetings of towns and county conventions. TJiero was a convention in Essex, in July, 1812. AVe thought it neces- 1 Pickering MSS. I'rinted in Lodge's " Cabot," p, 539. APPENDIX. 405 sary to have a State Convention, and chose delegates to attend jt. This meastire was defeated at " The Headquarters of Good Princi- ples." ' I did not yet despair of our country ; for, on conversing afterwards with Chief Justice Parsons, he told me the House would take up the business at the ensuing winter session. This arrived, and nothing was done. In 1813, the House of Representatives of Massachusetts addressed a long remonstrance to Congress, with just spirit enough in it to make it the jest of the majority. Massa- chusetts had now become an object of contempt. The majority men, and their partisans abroad, concluded that Massachusetts had neither talents nor fortitude to plan and to execute any efllcient measure to control or to check their destroj-ing projects. Hence I almost dreaded to hear of any movement in Massachusetts, lest, like all former ones, it should end in smoke, and sink the State still deeper in disgrace. My hopes are now revived, and this day strengthened, on seeing the names of the Connecticut delegates. I know them all, save Sherman, — who is the son or nephew of the famous Roger Sherman, and, I am told,, a clever man. For a good while past, when intelligent and spirited Federalists of the Middle States (particularly of Maryland and Virginia) have said to me, " We look to New England, and especially to Massachusetts, for salvation,'' I have been ready to hang my head, I have been morti- fied in the extreme ; because I could say nothing to encourage their hopes and confidence. I am inclined to think there was a time, in the earlj' period of the war, when tlie sentiments of a New England Convention (which might have been strengthened by a delegation from New York, by the authority of their F'ederal House of Representatives) , boldly and firmly expressed, might have put an end to it, while Britain was solicitous to make peace, without the offer of any hard or unpleasant terms. I hope in God that the delegates of Massachusetts (a decided majority, at least) may now prove their readiness to act as well as to speak. I consider the destiny of New England, and, in the result, of the United States, to be placed in the hands of the pro- posed Convention. While an}' symptoms of faint-heartedness will ruin all, the wise sentiments and efficient plans the Convention will be able to express and devise, and the dignified firmness with which they shall be enforced, forbidding every suspicion that they will not 1 See pp. 240, 275. 406 NKW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. be verified in act, -will insure tlie wished-for success. Tlie forlorn condition of tlie general government, and the destitute and helpless situation of the States south of the Potomac, will render your vic- tory easy and complete. That victor}' will be used not to destroy, but to recover and confirm, the Union of the States on more equal, solid, and durable bases. . . . Pickering to Lowell.* (Confidential.') City of WABiiiNOTOir, Nov. 7, 1814. My Deak Sib, — I observe that Mr. Cabot is at the head of the list of the Massachusetts delegates for the Convention at Hartford ; and I am glad to see him there. His information is extensive ; his experience and observation, invaluable. I do not know who has more political sagacity, a sounder judgment, or more dignity of character with unspotted integrity ; and perhaps no man's advice would go furtlier to save a nation that was in his view salvable. But does he not despair of the Commonwealth ? lie consider s the, evil — - th e^ rat^;'e flL-ev4l..cd.Q_be inherent in thegpnerrrment-itself, in democrac y, a nd therefore incurable. Will he, then, think any plan which the wisdom of the Convention may devise wortli an effort of his mind? Yes, it will be answered, or he would not have consented to take a seat in it. But was he not pressed into this situation, reluctantly consenting to take it? Much against his will, and contrary to his own better judgment, he was placed at the head of the committee which, in 1806, subscribed and sent to Wash- ington the remonstrance drawn by Lloj'd against the British doc- trine concerning neutral trade. He signed it (he afterwards told me) officially, as one of the merchants' (or town's) committee. He once said to me (perhaps twelve or eighteen months ago), " Whj' can't you and I let tlie world ruin itself its own way?" These were his words : they sunk deep into my mind, and I confess to you that they never occur to my thoughts unaccompanied with regret. In this wicked world, it is the duty of ever}' good man, though he cannot restore it to innocence, to strive to prevent its growing worse. This has been your course. As I'aul among the Christian apostles, you among the political teachers may say, "I have labored more abundantly than they all." 1 Pickering MSS. rrintcd in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 541. APPENDIX. 407 Pickering to Lowell.' City of Wasiiinoton, Nov. 28, 1814. Deak Sir, — Although I have lately troubled you with several letters, I trust you will excuse one more. As my thoughts cannot fail of being much occupied with the deplorable condition of our country, the cause of its calamities, the means of deliverance, and the practicable guards against their return, — subjects of the greatest importance, but of the greatest difflcultj', and which necessarily turn my eyes toward the Hartford Convention as the best hope of our best men, — so I consider it the duty of reflecting minds to contribute whatever occurs that may ■with any probability merit the attention of that bodj'. While, therefore, I offer my mite, I am highly gratified that this great sub- ject now employs your pen. Like you, I have uniformly disclaimed every idea of a separation of the States, while the liberty and safet3' of the parts can be maintained in a union of the whole. At the same time, I have considered that there may bo evils more to be deprecated than a separation. An intelligent member from Kentucky lately remarked to me that a connection of New England with the States on the Missis- sippi and its waters would be more advantageous to the former than the Southern Atlantic States, because the latter will have con- siderable navigation of their own, while their products will be less abundant than those of the Western States, which must for ever remain destitute of ships and seamen. He mentioned their flour, tobacco, flax, hemp, and cotton, already vast in amount, and rapidly increasing. For some time past, I had contemplated this sub- ject in a like point of view, although formerly I, with many others, felt disposed to let the Western States go off, leaving the " good old thirteen States " (as John Randolph called them) to themselves, and, so left, it is natural to suppose thej' would be more flrmlj' united ; for the Southern States, conscious of their separate impotence, would cling to the strength of the North. After deciding on the means of defence and relief from present calamities, I presume the Convention will consider how we may best guard against their future recurrence, by amending the Con- stitution. It may be necessary, — 1 Pickering MSS. Printed in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 542. 408 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. 1 . To abolish negro representation. 2. To prohibit tlie durable interruption of commerce under any pretence, nor at all without the concurrence of nine of the Atlantic States. 3. To render the President ineligible a second time. 4. To prohibit the election of a second President from the same State in immediate succession to the first. 5. To restore the original mode of electing the President and Vice-President, to prevent the election of a fool for the latter. 6. To make some new provision for appointing to offices, civil and military. Ever since Jefferson came to the chair of state, the public offices have been instruments of briberj-, more extensive and more influential than the treasury of England in the hands of her ministers. This sj'stem of Jefferson and Madison has, more than all other causes, corrupted the morals of the people. 7. To render naturalization more ditBciUt, and absolutely to exclude from office and from the national legislature all who are not natives. 8. To limit the number of Representatives, which, whatever shall be the future population of these States, shall never be exceeded. 9. To require the vote of two-thirds or three-fourths of each House of Congress to a declaration of war. 10. As a further check to the waging of wars of ambition, of pride, of hatred, or of anj' other evil passion, to prohibit the borrow- ing of money bj' means of any discount or bonus, or at any rate of interest higher than the average rate of interest in the three States which, in the year next preceding the declaration, shall have contributed the largest sums to the regular public revenues. If the country at any time is not in a condition to engage in a war without usurious loans, it will amount to a proof that war ought not to be made. If war be commenced against the United States, and for causes so flagrantly unjust as tliat the government cannot pre- vent it, then, as the attack will rouse the whole nation, neither men nor money can be withheld in its defence. 1 1 . What can be done with the country west of the Mississippi ? If, as it becomes peopled, new States are to be founded, the old Atlantic States will become insignificant. To avoid this evil, shall the States west of the Mississippi form a separate confederacy ? 12. It has more than once occurred to me that the first power granted to Congress, in the present Constitution, has not been accurately understood : — APPENDIX. 409 " The Congress shall have power — " To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." I ask, For what purposes ? and answer in the words of the Constitution, "to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and gen- eral welfare of the United States." The words wliich follow prove this to be the correct construction; "but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." As I have often heard this passage quoted, the laying and collecting taxes, &c., has been taken for one power ; and " to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States," as a separate and distinct power : and that of pro- viding for the general welfare, as an independent and universal power, where not expressly limited in other parts of the Constitu- tion ; a power to be exercised in all things affecting the general welfare, without any reference to the expenditure of the "taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." Such are the ideas which have now occurred to mc ; and, as possibly you may think some of them proper to be embraced in your inquir}'', "What the Convention can do, and ouglit to do," &c., I have taken the liberty thus to communicate them for your consideration. A friend of mine from Albany has just put into my hands a letter, which, he says, is written by a worthy and judicious man of that city. It is dated the 23d instant. The writer says, "We . have given up all hope of any better times from any thing in the power or disposition of the general government, and have turned our eyes to the East, from whence we hope to see the sun of lib- erty arise once more, to cheer our hearts and bless our country. Democracj' is sinking here daily, even in their own estimation. And, should the Eastern States move on unitedly in the gkeat vrouK, I believe I may say, without the s^rit of prophecy, this State will wlieel in almost one solid column in support of their measures." ' ' The pressure in tius place for cash is greater than has ever been known. Sta'Ai; Bank .sick — cannot take anv food. J. T. [John Tayler, the lieutenant-governor, a zealous Madisonian] is as pliable as any man, — fears his loan to government is gone. Spencer is much alarmed ; and even B. Knower speaks evil of the administration ; and some of our Demos admit the principle, when alone, ' that the Eastern States have the right of proceeding to protect themselves.' " 410 NEW ENGLAND FEDEBALISM. Multitudes in Vermont are making money by the war. And, considering the small preponderance of Federalists in that State, I have thought it prudent in tliem to suspend a co-operation until the proceedings of the Convention should be known, when Vermont can without difficulty form a junction. LovTELL TO Pickering.^ ( Confidential. ) Boston, Dec. 3, 1814. Dear Sir, — You wrote me on the 7th of November a confi- dential letter on the subject of tlie Convention at Hartford, to which I have failed to reply, owing to my engagements. My feelings on that subject, I perceive, are very similar to yours. How far our projects would agree, I cannot say. I gave great offence during the sitting of our legislature by openly opposing tlie calling a convention. I was attacked with great asperity bj^ some of my best friends, and, among tlie rest, by my friend B. Pickman, Jr., at the Governor's, who threw in a hint or two also against me. But when I explained ni}- reasons, which were that I was con- vinced that the Convention would not go far enough, and that the first measure ought to be to recommend to the States to pass laws to prevent our resources in men and monej' from being withdrawn, they all started, and said I was going farther than anybody. I was always convinced, and am now, that the CouA'cntion will do little ; that they will be ridiculed b}' one part}-, and loudl}' censured by the other. I admit that it is a very responsible situation, and one of great difficulty ; but they ought not to have accepted it, unless they felt, each one for himself, that he was read}' for great and decided measures, although he miglit not have made up his opinion as to what they would be. I say no man should have accepted such an office, if he expected it was to end in mere argument or remonstrance. We have had enough of these from IMr. Gore's admirable report, in 1809, to Air. Otis's excellent preamble to the resolutions ap- pointing this Convention. Words are exhausted. We have said more than was said by all tlie public bodies in the United States prior to the Declaration of ludcpcnilence. I was opposed sincerely and most zealously to the Convention, 1 rickering MSS. Printed in LoJgc'a " Cabot," p. 515. APPENDIX. 411 because I found no one man among its advocates prepared to act. When jou ask anj^ of them what the Convention will do, you will find it is expected they will talk : talk of amendments, talk of militia, talk of defence, talk of being paid out of the national taxes what we advance, but nothing more. I was not anxious for any decisive measures at present. I deprecate, as one of the greatest of evils, a separation of the States. I thought, and think now, that the people en masse will act in six or twelve months more. I think the remedy then will be more effectual, and will produce more lasting good effects. But I was wholly opposed to a premature and feeble effort. Nothing sinks the character of a people, or diminishes the force and influence of a party, so much as suppressed efforts, vain and futile exertions. For measures of wisdom and prudence, to be considered and adopted in common times of tranquillity, perhaps the choice could not have fallen on more suitable persons than those selected from our State. Whatever they propose will be received with great respect by the people ; and the boldest measures would be considered prudent, if suggested by them. But they are not calculated for bold measures. Mr. Cabot is undoubtedly the wisest man in our State, or among the very wisest. He has the best stored mind of any man I ever saw, except Hamil- ton. He is a very practical man, well acquainted with every tiling which concerns the best interests of a nation ; but Mr. Cabot has been alwaj's a desponding man as to our public affairs, and their downward course has confirmed his opinions. He hardly thinks the temporary preservation of the State worth the effort, and ho is most reluctantly dragged in like a conscript to the duty of a delegate. He has no confidence in the possibility of awakening the people. He will not, therefore, be in favor of any measures which will dis- turb our sleep. So at least I fear ; for I cannot find out from him what his opinions are. Mr. Otis is naturally timid, and frequently wavering, — to-day bold, and to-morrow like a hare trembling at every breeze. It would seem by his language that he is prepared for the very bold- est measures ; but he receives anonj-mous letters every day or two threatening him with bodily harm. It seems the other party sus- pect his firmness. He is sincere in wishing thorough measures ; but a thousand fears restrain him. 412 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. Bigelow is reallj'' bold on the present question, has a just confi- dence in the power of Massachusetts, sneers as he ought to do (and as I am sure I do) at all the threats of vengeance of the other States ; and, if he was well supported, I have no doubt that meas- ures of dignity and real relief would be adopted. Prescott is a firm man, but extremely prudent, and so modest that he will too readily yield his own opinions to the counsels of others whom he respects. I think he will give his aid to measures calcu- lated to procure solid redress. Mr. Dane you know. He is a man of great firmness, approach- ing to obstinacy, singular, impracticable ; and, of course, it must be uncertain what course he will take. Honestly, however, inclined. Mr. Wilde, of Kennebec, is a verj^ able man, but one of very great caution and prudence. He lives among a people naturally bad and violent ; and I should fear that his counsels may be influ- enced by that circumstance. Tliese are the men who will have the greatest influence in our delegation. It is to be regretted that we had not chosen two or three such persons as Daniel Sargent, William Sullivan, and Colonel Thorn- dike. I do not know that we have among the delegates a single bold and ardent man. I know it will be said that such men are not the fittest for counsel. That is perhaps true in common times ; but in times of great trouble they are often the most proper, and, indeed, the only ones fit to direct and manage affairs. I should fear that the Connecticut delegation, though extremely respectable, was much of the same character. If it is thought expedient that nothing decisive should be done, then it is to be regretted that so respectable a Convention was called, because it tends to degrade and disgrace the members and the people who sent them. But, if effectual measures were in contemplation, it is in my judgment to be regretted that some few more active and resolute men were not elected. There does not seem to be any difference in opinion as to the extremely hazardous situation in which we are placed, nor as to the incapacity and injustice of our rulers, nor as to their having de- serted us, and in eflfect abdicated the government ; nor does there seem to be any hope of redress in a usual course. It is admitted, also, that pecuniary ruin is inevitable ; and that there is a certainty of national disgrace, and some danger of attempts against our civil APPENDIX. 413 liberties. Yet people seem to have a dread of any effectual meas- ures for relief. They tell you how divided we are, and how strong the party of government in other States. They pretend to fear a civil war, if we assert our rights. My reply is, The state to which j-ou are advancing in consequence of the measures of government will inevitably produce all the evils you dread of civil commotion and separation, besides the others of absolute pecuniary ruin and national disgrace ; and, as to meas- ures of relief, the people are ten times more likely to join you, if the measures you propose are practical, and bring them instant and perfect relief, than if you adopt circuitous poUtical schemes to pro- cure a distant and precarious one. Hence a proposal to relieve them from taxes which go to sup- port distant States, and to cany on a wicked and useless invasion, will be received with delight by men of all parties ; and a truce or separate peace would be the most popular measure which could be devised. If you have, then, settled in your consciences that the govern- ment cannot have a right to tax you, or force you to defend your- selves, when they have wickedly, purposely left you defenceless, what should prevent you from saving yourselves from destruction ? It is answered. The wrath of the Southern States, and the danger of your own minority. As to the first, it is too ludicrous to require an answer. Under the best circumstances, it would be a prett}- arduous undertaking for all the Southern States to attempt the conquest of New ling- land ; but, reduced as they now are to indigence, it would be more than Quixotic. As to our own minoritj', there is nothing which will ever unite them to the majority so readilj- as laws to prevent the collection of the proposed United States taxes, and the lev^' of troops, and the declaration of neutrality. I What a satire it is that the moment the British take possession of anj' part of our country, and relieve it from the yoke of its own government, its inhabitants are happy and grow rich ! Its lands rise in value, every species of property is enhanced in price, and the people deprecate the prospect of being relieved by their own government. Yet such is the fact, in the two lower counties of this State. I Let no man fear the discontents of our own people. They will hail such events as blessings. 414 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. But the permanent advantages of such measures will be greater than their imhiediate effects. It is admitted by all persons that we must have some radical amendment of the Constitution as to slave representation, laws regulating trade, declaring war, &c. Can this ever be effected by Conventions, — bj' General Conventions? No: we shall be out- voted. But if 3-ou once take a stand, and say, " We go no longer on with 30U, unless j'ou agree to these stipulations," you will SUCCEED. You must. I would have it a treaty, not a constitution. The latter is mere paper, violated at pleasure hy interested or ambitious men. But, when a treaty is broken, j'ou know j'our remed}-. I would have the Northern States demand of the Southern States certain stipulations as parts of the compact, which should be duly signed by commissioners and ratified hy the States, respective!}'. These, sir, are my loose ideas on this subject ; but I have little, I may say no, hope that any thing will be done except, — 1. An address to the people of the United States, as a general expose of our grievances ; 2. Proposals for amending the Constitution by general conven- tion ; 3. That Congress should be invited to permit us to pay our own expenses of defence out of the national tax. This I believe is the project. I judge it onlj' from the coldness with which my ideas are received, and some hints occasionally dropped. Pickering to Hillhouse.' City of Washington, Dec. 16, 1814. My Dear Sir, — I am now sitting alone in our old chaml)er in the " Six Buildings," from which we attacked the embargo, while you are in council with the wise men of the East. I do not con- sider the New England Convention as consulting for those States alone, but for the Federalists generall}^ throughout the United States. In other words, I consider the interests of the great body (certainly the most valuable portion) of the people of the United States as resting on the result of your proceedings. I am sure there is no lack of wisdom : it would not be an easy matter to I Pickering MSS. Printed iu Lodge's " Cabot," p. 551. APPENDIX. 415 assemble an equal number of other citizens, where equal wisdom could be found. But a full knowledge of the evils demanding remedies, and a forcible representation of tlicm, will make no im- pression on the hardened sinners upon whose heads those evils must be laid. I deprecate every thing which shall simply be put on paper. We have too long contented ourselves with memorials and remon- strances : they procure for us nought but contempt. And contempt from wretches in power, who are themselves so contemptible, is sufliciently provoking. When I look round me, and see vice and presumptuous ignorance triumphing over wisdom and virtue, — triumphing in cases involving the character and great interests of the country, and putting our liberties in jeopardy, — it is impossible to repress my indignant feelings. If the Convention leave us in this miserable situation, we may despair of the Commonwealth. Strong measures alone will procure relief. Their strength and boldness Vvill render them efficient. From sound Federalists in this portion of the Union, I have for j-ears heard only this declara- tion, " We look to New England for salvation." I wished, my good friend, for an earlier interposition of New England to stay the hands of our destroyers. Ohsta principiis was the governing maxim, when we resisted incipient oppression by the mother country, — an oppression rather in prospect than in action. But for the last seven j'ears we have been submitting to one act of tyranny after another, until the people, familiarized to oppres- sion, have their spirits depressed and humbled to a degree which, if longer borne, will render the cause of our country hopeless. It Is necessary for the Convention to take those firm and decided steps which will rouse the people from the spell which, through an unfounded fear of breaking the Union, the boldness and impu- dence of political mountebanks have imposed upon them. You have nothing to apprehend from the most imbecile of all governments, and certainly nothing from individual States. Those which eagerly approved the war are exhausted. Virginia cannot protect herself. Her militia have been called forth the past summer and autumn, and are thoroughly disgusted. Their rulers seem to have paid less attention to them than to their slaves. I have read a letter, dated at Richmond the 2d of November, from a Senator in their State legislature to his son-in-law in Congress, in which he says, "We have an army of militia, chiefly from twelve to forty miles below, who are generally very sickly, dying, and suffering for almost every military and camp accommodation." A very worthy 416 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. and intelligent Virginian member of Congress, who has had a son (a lieutenant) with the militia at Norfolk, informs me that of the militia of that State, which has been called to the defence of Nor- folk, between three and four thousand have perished. A letter from my friend, the Adjutant-General of Massachusetts, recently received, informs me that of the three thousand six hundred militia called out bj' Governor Strong for the protection of Boston, and who were in service about two months, three only died, and one of the three from an injury received at home. I have read another letter, dated October 31, to the same member of Congress, from a respect- able Virginia gentleman, who had then just been in the lower parts of the northern neck in Virginia, which had been visited by the British. He says, — "You, believe me, can have no idea of the losses, sufferings, and dreadful distresses with which the inhabitants of it are encir- cled. The idea of the war's continuing fills them with complete horror. For they say, and truly, that the lalces, frontiers, fish- eries, &c., are phantoms to them, when brought into competition with their exposed and ruined situation. In short, a more miserable, ill-fated, poor set of men never lived. I am confident, if some prompt and efllcient measures are not adopted bj' Congress (for it seems the Virginia legislature will not do any thing) for their relief, they will take care of themselves by entering into the best terms they can with the enemy." " I admire greatly, indeed, the resolute conduct of Massachusetts and her sister States of the East. The}^ have the firmness and the virtue, I am persuaded, to wield their counsels in such a maTiner as to compel the obdurate President and his execrable followers to abandon their foolish measures of conquest, and to withdraw our armies into the Union for the protection of the countrj'." The writer subjoined to his letter what follows: "Your old acquaintance. Colonel John Taylor, of Caroline, is out of all kind of patience with JNIadison and his party. lie declares that the government is positivelj' mad, and that the British will another summer get this whole lower country : this he said 3'esterday.'' It seems to be the opinion (certainlj' the fearful apprehension) of Western men that New Orleans will be taken b}' the British. If well conducted, the expedition can hardly fail. If it succeeds, it will be with a view to hold it ; and hold it they will, against the whole force of the "Western States, such is the nature of the ground on the Isle of Orleans. For about thirty miles above the APPENDIX. 417 city, the strip of land is but a mile wide, between the Missis- sippi and impassable swamps. This fact has been stated to me by Mr. Brown, one of the Senators from Louisiana. I asked liim the question, whether, if once in possession of Orleans City, the Brit- ish could be expelled? He answered, "It would be extremely difficult to dislodge them." I am confident it will be impracticable. It will be easy to erect an impassable barrier from the river to the swamp. And their armed vessels and boats on the river ivould render the post unassailable by water. On the other side of the city, the creek (Bayou St. John) connected with Lake Pontchar- train approaches within four or five miles. But this also, according to my information, will give no room for an enemy to land, being so easily defended. And it is for this reason concluded that the British will make their attempt by ascending the Mississippi. From the moment the British possess New Orleans, the Union is severed. They will not intermeddle with the governments of the Western States : these will be told to manage their own affairs in their own way. New Orleans will be the market for all their pror ductions, which will be transported in British ships to every coun- try in the world where there is a demand for them. Their tobacco will find a market in Europe, their cotton will all be wanted in the British manufactories, and their hemp for their ships. Tiieir flour, when they sliall have improved their mills, and their beef and pork, when they shall have learned better to cure and pack them, will go wherever men want food. What now constitutes the State of Louisiana will be changed to a province, with a legitimate annexation of West Florida by cession from Spain. The bulk of the inhabitants, bred under monarchies, will not dislike the change ; while the whole population, French, Spaniards, and Americans, finding themselves in the possession of self-government to every useful purpose, under a provincial legislature, with a British gover- nor (who, from the immense importance of the charge, will be one of their ablest men) , will be quite as well satisfied (I am sure they will have reason to be so) as with the creature first imposed on them by Jefferson, and since continued by the votes of the busy electioneering portion of the people, who are not seldom their own worst enemies. The Western people will have no choice ; and, after a little expe- rience, they will not be displeased with their new situation. Their products will probably find more extensive markets than they would as members of our Union. When peace takes place, should the 27 418 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. cottons of Carolina and Georgia interfere with tlieirs in the British markets, a small extra duty may be imposed on the former. The incalculable advantages Great Britain will derive from the acquisi- tion of Orleans will induce her to cherish the good-will of the Western people. This, indeed, will require no more than a reason- able attention to their interests, and this again will best promote those of Great Britain. Thus will Great Britain be virtually possessed of immensely rich provinces, increasing in population more rapidly than ever, without the trouble and expense of governing and defending them. This severance will of course annihilate the war debt. The Western States will also take to themselves all the public lands ; while they will excuse themselves from paying any part of the debt of our llevolution, for which those lands were pledged. Their annual sales will 3'ield a revenue equal to the maintenance of all their State governments. Such are my speculations, arising out of the present state of things. And, should the British succeed at New Orleans, I shall consider the views I have here exhibited as ipso facto realized. In one or two years, if the whole were left to the choice of the AVest- ern people, prompted by the most powerful interests, they would adopt them, while at the instant they must yield to necessity. And, as in their whole intercourse with those who at present are enemies, they will hear and read the English language onlj', thej' will soon forget that they had not always been one nation. One more remark : should the severance above mentioned take place, from that moment the necessity of Union among the Atlantic States will strike every man who thinks, as forcibly as during our Revolution ; and the feebleness of the States south of the Potomac will urge them to cling to those of the North, as the Connecticut vine to the tree which supports it. The terms of a new compact will be adapted to this new state of things. GouvEENEUK Morris to Pickering.^ December 22, 1814. ... I care nothing now about your actings and doings. Your decree of conscriptions and your levy of contributions are alike 1 Pickering MSS. The whole letter is printed in Sparks's " Gouverneur Morris," iii. 322. APPENDIX. 419 indifferent to one whose cj'cs arc fixed on a Star in the East, which he believes to be the dayspring of freedom and glory. The traitors and madmen assembled at Hartford will, I believe, if not too tame and timid, be hailed hereafter as the patriots and sages of their day and generation. May the blessing of God be upon them, to Inspire their counsels and prosper their resolutions ! Pickering to Samuel IIodgdon.' City op ■Washington, Dec. 25, 1814. Dear Sir, — Last evening came to hand j'our two letters of the 20th. I will inquire about John Smith's lands, and let you know the result. As to the Sugar Creek lands, or any other in which I have an interest, although I should "be glad to sell at reasonable prices for monej' in hand or well-secured, I have no occasion to hesitate one moment upon an offer to exchange them for certificates of the war loans. I will have nothing to do with them. The war would have terminated in 1813, but for three foreigners, — An Englishman, Uavid Parish ; a Frenchman, Stci)lien Gerard ; and a Dutchman, John Jacob Astor, — for our native capitalists would not directly lend their money to carry on this iniquitous and destructive war ; but, those foreigners having taken the loan, our native citizens became lenders by purchasing of them the certificates of the war stock, and thus supporters of the war they detested as unnecessary, un- just, and ruinous. But if these considerations did not present to me an insurmount- able bar to any sort of participation in the war loans, another is in prospect. Unquestionably^, the British expedition from the general rendezvous at Jamaica is destined against New Orleans. The latest intelligence, I do not know how it comes, is that it sailed the 20th of November, twelve thousand strong. As there are at New Orleans few regular troops, I cannot doubt that the place will be taken, if the British have a commander of decent abilities. If they take it, they will never restore it. It will become a British province ; for all the power of the United States above cannot dis- possess them, such is the nature of the country. Nor will those States have an interest to induce an attempt to dislodge the British. New Orleans in their hands will be a better market for the tobacco, » Pickering MSS. 420 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. hemp, cotton, flour, and provisions, and soon for lumber, of the whole country watered bj' the Mississippi and its immense branches, than if it remained a part of the United States. Now, New Orleans once in the hands of the British, from that moment the Union of the States is severed, — the Western from the Atlantic States, — and with that severance the war debt will fall to the ground. Our Western brethren after involving us in this war, will abandon it and us. In less than one year, they will be perfectly reconciled to their new friends, with whom an intercourse and civility will be not more in- dispensable than agreeable. Speaking the same language, those who carry down their productions to New Orleans will perceive no change. The Americans will remain there mingled with British merchants, and carrj' on their business with equal harmony and success. The British will not intermeddle with the affairs of the States on the river. These will govern themselves as they do now, forming per- haps a new confederacy. This now confederacy will shake off all the debts of the present Union, and take to themselves all the public lands. The annual sale of these will fiu-nish revenues equal to all the expenses of their united and separate governments, and save the people from what all dread, — taxes. Such, in brief, are my views of the subject : views entertained at the instant that I read Admiral Cochrane's letter to the Lords of the Admiralty, in which he gave an account of the expedition to Baltimore, which was undertaken, he saj-s, only to fill up a short interval of time until the equinoctial new moon should have passed, before which the intended expedition out of the Chesapeake could not be safely commenced. Perhaps few if any persons have contemplated these conse- quences of the expedition to New Orleans : but, its success appear- ing to me highly probable even to moral certainty, I could do no less than communicate my view of them to you ; and, having so done, I have only to request you to consider them, and give them no more weight than they deserve, if they deserve any. HiLLHOusE TO Pickering.' Hartford, Jan. 5, 1815. My Dear Sir, — Enclosed I send you the result of the Hartford Convention, which is the best answer I can make to your invalu- » Pickering MSS. APPENDIX. 421 able letter of Dec. 16th, which I and my associates read with much pleasure. With sentiments of the highest respect and esteem, I subscribe myself your old and esteemed friend. GOUVEENEUR MoRUIS TO MoSS KeNT.' MoRRiSANiA, Jan. 10, 1816. Dear Sir, — Yours of the 4th reached me j^esterday morning. You will have seen that the Hartford Convention have been prudent. Their doings bring to mind one of La Fontaine's fables. A council of rats being convoked to devise measures of defence against feline depredations, a sleek young member was much applauded for proposing to tie a bell round puss's neck, which, giving seasonable notice of her approach, would enable every one to take care of himself. Before the question was put, an old rat (addressing the chair) said, " I too, sir, entirely approve of our j'oung friend's proposal, but wish, before I votd, to know who will fasten on the bell." Your Democratic acquaintance will doubtless make themselves merry at the mildness of Yankee measures. Such humble lan- guage must have a squeaking sound to ears that tingle with the full tone of a gentleman now Governor of South Carolina. You, however, who are somewhat of a Yankee, will see in the modest propositions from Hartford matter more serious than the rattling of words. Yankees like to make what they call a fair bargain, and will, I guess, easily take up the notion of bargaining with the National Government, which, according to my notion, can make no bargain of practical result which will not amount to a severance of the Union. Moreover, in the dearth of ready rhino, the adminis- tration cannot spare a part of New England's contribution ; whereas New England, in adjusting the proportion, will probably guess that the whole is better than any part. I am told that even now there are Federalists who wish for oflSce. This seems strange. They resemble PhiUstines struggling for a seat in the Temple of Dagon while Samson was pulling it about their ears. . . . 1 Printed in Sparks's " Life of Gouverneur Morris," iil. 328. 422 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. Gore to Strong.* ■Washington Ciir, Jan. 14, 1815. My Dear Sra, — The bill for State troops has passed the House, with an amendment to the only section interesting to us, said not to be important. The result of the Hartford Convention is here, and affords satis- faction to most, if not to all, — to some, because they see not the point nor consequence of the recommendation as relates to taxes. The gentlemen had a difficult task, which, according to my poor judgment, they have executed with wisdom and discretion. With great respect, I remain, my dear sir, &c. Gore to Strong.' Georgetown, Jan. 22, 1815. My Dear Sir, — The Congress have passed the bank bill as it last came. There is some question whether the President will sign the act. This arises from its not containing a clause authorizing the issue of notes which the corporation shall be under no obligation to meet with specie. Mr. Dallas has proposed to raise five millions of dollars more for the current year. Three millions of this to be on income. This is a direct tax ; and, if assessed, must be apportioned on the States according to the Constitution. He proposes a tax of one dollar per barrel on flour, in the hands of the miller. He proposes a further stamp duty; viz., on all bonds, mortgages, convej-ances of every kind, policies of insurance, bottomry bonds, &c., on wills and testaments, inventories of the estates of deceased persons, distributions and successions, — that is to say, legacies and devises, property by descent, &c. Mortified with the failure of his scheme of a bank, he may have done this with the view of pressing Con- gress to emit bills of credit, or to pass some bill supplemental to the act instituting a bank, authorizing that institution to issue their notes, and loan to government a large sum in bills, which the cor- poration shall not be obliged to redeem with specie. 1 Printed in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 559, from Gov. Strong's MSS. ^ I'lintcd in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 500, from Gov. Strong's MSS. APPENDIX. 423 These nppear to mc the spasms of a dying government. From New Orleans we have nothing further than what the newspapers afford. Our last accounts from that place are only to the morning of the 24th of December. The bill authorizing the raising of State troops by the States,-, and at the expense of the United States, according to the plan sent j you some time since, has passed both Houses. Thus one part of the ( recommendation of the Hartford Convention seems to be adopted. | The other, that to authorize the States to receive the taxes, will probably be more difficult to be attained. The accession to this seems not to accord with Mr. Monroe's intimation in your letter, or rather in his letter to you. Indeed, if they have fears of the State governments, one can hardly account for this government's author- izing the States to raise and keep in pay, at the expense of the United States, troops which may be used for purposes hostile to or not conformable with the views of the paymaster. I remain, &c. PiCKEKING TO LOVTELL.* CiTT OF WAsmrrOTOif, Jan. 23, 1815. / My Dear Sir, — I have had the pleasure to receive your letter of the 16th inst. I regret that I did not acknowledge the receipt of your very interesting confidential letter of December 3d, and thus have prevented the anxiety which the omission has occasioned. It seemed that I might have communicated some parts of it to partic- ular friends ; but it has so happened that I remain the sole deposi- tary of its contents, and now no motive occurs to me for divulging any of your sentiments. I believe that some of my very cautious friends and acquaintances think me too ardent in whatever pursuits of a public nature my attention becomes engaged ; and hence it may have been supposed that 1 was not quite satisfied with the doings of the Convention. The fact, however, is otherwise ; and, as you have been pleased to ask my opiniort, I will express it with my habitual frankness. I think the report of the Convention bears the high character of wisdom, firmness, and dignit3^ They have explicitly pronounced sentence of condemnation upon a miserable administration, and, 1 Pickering MSS. Printed in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 561. 424 KEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. stamped as it is with the authority of a body of men so eminently distinguished, that judgment cannot fail of making a just impres- sion where it is needed. They have made a declaration of prin- ciples the landmarks by which legislatures and the people may direct their course. And thej- have — in terms that none can mis- take, and which our rulers, whatever for a time they maj' affect, will not venture to disregard — manifested a determination to apply those principles in corresponding measures, when the fu- ture conduct or neglects of the government shall require their application. In their proposed amendments of the Constitution, I have the satisfaction to find that all, save that which regards the admission of new States into the Union, were among those which I took the liberty to intimate to you in my letter of the 28th of November. One which I had deemed of vital importance is omitted, — that respecting the appointment of public officers. I was aware of its intrinsic difficulties ; while the observation of fourteen j'cars had convinced me that it was the great instrument of corruption, and more than all other means had confirmed and extended the power and influence of the executive. Probably the Convention thought that the limitation of the President's power by a single election, both as to the person and the State from which he should be taken, would furnish an adequate check. Or it might be among the num- ber of further amendments alluded to as expedient, but under the circumstances mentioned less urgent than the others, and therefore not explicitly stated. With regard to the admission of new States into the Union, events with which the present moment is teeming may take away the subject itself. If the British succeed in their expedition against New Orleans, — and, if they have tolerable leaders, I see no reason to doubt of their success, — I shall consider the Union as severed. This consequence I deem inevitable. I do not expect to see a single Representative in the next Congress from the Western States. Those States, with the Territories, will be under the necessity of being at peace with the British ; and they will make a virtue of necessity, and this necessit}' they will soon fin-d to have materially promoted their interests. All the public lands west of the Alle- ghany Mountains will go with them. Migrations thither from all the Eastern States have been constant during the war, and its con- tinuance will increase them. But, without entering farther on this subject, permit me to refer you to a late letter from me to Gov- APPENDIX. 425 ernor Strong, In which I have sketched the great and, in my view, certain consequences of the capture of Orleans. Indeed, I wish you to read it. * Pickering to John Lowell.^ Washinoton, Jan. 24, 1815. Dear Sir, — I have just read Mr. Lloyd's letter to Mr. Ran- dolph. Political reasons (I mean those of prudence and policy) probably checked the severity of animadversion which Randolph's letter would have justified. The friendly acquaintance between them, in the two last years of Mr. Llo_yd's senatorial term, doubt- less contributed to his forbearance. The answer does not exactly suit me. The style is too artificial, not a Uttle ostentatious, and somewhat obscure. His suggested amendments of the Constitu- tion are very deficient ; his proposed changes in the administration impracticable ; and his onlj' and exclusive condition of peace un- advised. The status ante bellum Great Britain will not agree to (unless she meets with a disastrous repulse at New Orleans) , nor then, I am inclined to think. Her disappointment there may induce her the more to insist on retaining the country cast of the Penob- scot. Doubtless, her statesmen have looked forward to the period when these States, so rapidly growing in power and extent, and continuing united, may be disposed to dispute with her the empire of the sea. By taking and holding New Orleans, and consequently commanding the whole Western country, she will break the Union, essentially diminish the power of the United States, and thus re- move from us to a distant period, perhaps for ever, the temptation to engage in such a contest. From the whole Western world, although a score of new States should be added, she will have nothing to fear. I have sometimes contemplated, not without horror, the terrible conflicts on the ocean, to be expected between the British and American powers — after I am gone, indeed, but before my children all pass off the stage. The looked-for separa- tion may save the two countries from that mighty evil. The Atlantic States remaining united will in due time acquire a force suflicient to guard tliem from insult and injury, but short of that which would tempt ambition to involve them in destructive wars ' This letter is printed in Lodge's " Cabot," p. 557. 2 I'icltering MSS. 426 NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM. with children of our common ancestors. This view of things presents an additional reason to repress solicitude, where it exists, among any Atlantic citizens to recover New Orleans, should it fall into the hands of the British. Domestic or internal motives have excited in many a willingness, and in some a wish, that the Western States might go off and leave the Atlantic States free from their mischievous control, — a control every day becoming more powerful and dangerous. [On this subject, I do not ask you to communicate your thoughts. A conversation will be better ; and in two months I hope to see you.] * Chief Justice Marshall is an excellent man, and highly distin- guished for Ills mental powers ; but I greatly misjudge if Mr. King will now consent to be second to any man in the United States. Was it not rather assuming for an individual to propose such an arrangement ? Much cause as I have to be displeased with Mr. Adams, I bear him no ill-will ; and I was glad to see Mr. Lloyd's vindication of his character against the virulent, unmanly, and unchristian re- proaches of Mr. Randolph. No part of the letter does Mr. Lloyd more honor, in respect to the sentiments expressed ; and in the manner no part is equal to it. That capital error of Mr. Adams, in instituting the mission to France in 1799, I have long thought originated with Mr. Jefferson, or his agents ; operating on his vanity and ambition, to which he sacrificed his country's dignity and his own, and prostrated the Federal cause. . . . 1 Erased in draft. INDEX. Act of Congress of 27th January 1815, -would have superseded the com- mission of the Hartford Convention, 87, 269-273, 325. Passage of the act, 422, 423. Adams, John. Chai-ged with favoring monarchy, C3. Resentment against Hamilton, 76, 334, 335. Sketch of his administration, 149-151, 312. Described by Timothy Pickering, 331, 426. His conversations with Pickering, Goodhue, &c. , 332, 333, 335-337. His vanity, insincerity, selfishness, ambition, and revenge, 331, 332, 33.5-337, 426. His opinion of Jefferson, 336; of J. Q. Adams, 337. His influence in opposition to a Northern confederacy, 361. Adams, J. Q. Mr. Jefferson's feelings towards him, 2, 10. Mr. Jeffer- son's account of interview with him, 11-13, 29, 31, 236, 240. Mr. Giles's application to Mr. Jefferson for facts regarding him, 1'1-17, 20. Hia charges against certain loaders of the Federalist party, 12, 43, 52, 55, 56, 63, 73, 77, 90, 93-106, 108, 111-114, 122, 126, 127, 129, 133, 191, 209, 210, 212, 221, 228. His statement in the " National Intelligencer," 23, 27-42, 08, 212, 218, 227. His inter- view with Mr. Jefferson, 24, 51, 59, 73, 75, 115, 116, 125, 127, 139, 141, 200, 231. His letters to Mr. Giles and others in 1808-9, 25, 26, 34, 36, 37, 51, 73, 76, 79, 89, 120, 127-139, 142, 204-208, 236, 301. His reply to the letter of H. G. Otis and others calling for proof of his charge against certain leaders, 46, 66. His course in regard to the acquisition of Louisiana, 51, 57, 155-159. His alienation from the councils of the Federal leaders, 56. His proposal in the Massa- chusetts legislature in 1802, 57. His opinion that resistance by a State to an act of Congress places the State quoad hoc out of the Union, 58. His embarkation for Russia, 60. Had no evidence that would bear to be submitted, 66, 217, 227. Reply to his objections to the demand for evidence, 66, 67, 70-72. Few citizens set weight on his estimation of them, 67, 219. An unjust accuser, 73. His tem- per of mind at the time of his interview with Mr. Jefferson, 75, 226. Reproached with voting and not deliberating, 75, 173, 174, 233. His personal views, 76, 94-96. His letter to J. A. Hamilton, 93. His special pleading, 97. His antipathy to Hamilton, 98. His reply to the appeal of H. G. Otis and others, 107. His review of the 428 INDEX. works of Fisher Ames, 115. His letters to Ezekiel Bacon, 127, 131, 137. His doctrines of internal improvement, 140. His relations with Mr. Jefferson, 151, 209, 236. Elected to the Senate, 154. His resolu- tions on the Rule of 1756, 172. His vote on the Non-Importation Act of 1806, 172, 173. His vote on tlie act regarding St. Domingo, 175; on the 12,000,000 appropriation, 175. His course on the affair of the Chesapeake, 181-185. Discarded from the Federal party, 185. His resolutions of 2Sth October, 1807, 189, 190. His bill for the preser- vation of peace, 190. His course in regard to the embargo, 190, 208. His attendance at the Republican caucus in January 1808, 197. His relations with Messrs. Giles and Nicholas, 107. His interview with Josiali Quincy, 108, 240, 300. His answer to Mr. Rickering's em- bargo letter, 200. His relations with Mr. Otis, 201. His defeat in the legislature in 1808, and resignation of his seat in the Senate, 75, 202, 203, 205, 226, 233, 372. Never converted to the Republican party, 209. His obligation to deny Mr. Jefferson's statement, 72, 234. His appointment as Minister to Berlin, 337. Adet, French Minister. Bribed members of Congress, 388. Ames, Fisher, 115, 194. His essay on the " Dangers of American Lib- erty," 285. His opinions in regard to the project of a Northern con- federacy, 353, 358. Letter to Pickering, 365. Appeal of Massachusetts Federalists to the citizens of the United States, 63. Armstrong, John. Minister to France, 187, 377, 379. Astor, John Jacob, 419. Bacon, Ezekiel, 243, 301. Letters to, 127, 131. Baldwin, Abraham, 159. Baldwin, Simon. His denial of belief in the Northern confederacy of 1803-4, 102. Bank Bill, passage of, 422. Bayard, James A., 242. Bigelow, Timothy. Member of the Hartford Convention, 412. Blaachard, Samuel. Letter to Pickering, 378. Bonaparte, Napoleon. His Berlin decree, 187, 188, 883. His Milan decree, 191, 383. His influence on American politics, 193 , 199, 208, 377, 379, 380. Conduct of his government towards America, 194, 198. ^''aVors the embargo, 377. Brown, James. Senator from Louisiana, 417. Burr, Aaron, 151, 163-167, 342, 354, 355, 364. His interviews with Roger Griswold, 355, 358. Cabot, George, 125, 184, 200, 222, 224, 260, 202, 263, 308-371, 378, 386, 400. Letter to Pickeiing on the project of a Northern confederation, 346; to Rufus King on the same, 362. Favors the election of Burr, INDEX. 429 304. Letter to Pickering advising the passage of a resolution de- claring the importance of preserving the Union, 373. Description of, by Pickering, 308, 309, 400; by Lowell, 411. Cabot, Henry, 45, 91, 152, 222. Callender, James Thomson, 1.54. Canning, George, 177, 186, 226. His arrogance and sarcasm, 194, 198. Champagny, 199. Chase, Samuel. Impeachment of, 161, 170, 315, 359. Chesapeake. See Leopard. Clinton, De Witt. His speech in January, 1809, 215, 229, 230, 241. Candidate for the Presidency in 1812, 389. Confederacy. See Northern Confederacy. Convention of inn-holders in the counties of Hampshire, Franklin, and Hampden, 286. Craig, Sir James, 120, 122. His instructions to John Henry, 123, 124, 238. Cashing, William, 244. Dallas, A. J., 422. Dana, Samuel, 106. Dane, Nathan, 412. - — Davenport, John. His denial of belief in the Northern confederacy in 1803-4, 100, 101. Dexter, Franklin, 45, 92, 108, 152, 215. Dexter, Samuel. Mr. Adams's interviews with, 61, 92, 108. Hia opin- ion of the unconstitutionality of the embargo, 91, 215, 223, 243, 244. His speech in Faneuil Hall in 1812, 240, 275, 405. Dutton, Warren, 45, 91. . Dwight, Timothy. His century sermon, 381. Embargo, 59, 79, 115, 128, 129, 133, 134, 141, 191, 195, 228, 247, 367, 372, 377, 379-381, 392, 404. Its constitutionality, 60, 79, 91, 223, 24.3-245. Passage of the act, 188, 247. Its object, 79, 248, 375, 870, 387. Eppes, John W., 208, 401. Erskine, D. M. His mission, 00. Essex Junto, 108, 114, 149, 151, 152, 203. Mr. Pickering's account of, 369, 371. Fox, Charles James, 176. His blockade, 176, 187, 384. Gardinier, Barent, 199. Gardner, S. P., 379. Gates, Horatio, 332. Gerry, Elbridge, 150, 243, 388. 430 INDEX, Ghent, Peace of, 90, 265, 288, 326. Negotiations at, 304. British de- mands, 394-402. Giles, William B. Letters to the "Richmond Inquirer," 1, 14, 27, 140. Letters to, from Mr. Jefferson, C, 11. His application to Mr. Jeffer- son for facts regarding Mr. Adams, 14-19, 143, 144. His letter to Mr. Jefferson, 20. His account of Mr. Adams' pretended conver- sion, 20, 21, 112, 155, 172. Ilia intervention between Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Adams, 20, 21, 24, 117, 139, 181, 231, 232, 234, 235. His remarks on Judge Stuart, 27. His comments on Mr. Adams's state- ment, 28-34. His denial of correspondence with Mr. Adams, in 1808-9, 34, 35, 37, 38, 139, His letter of 7th November, 1808, to Mr. Adams, 203. His account of the repeal of the embargo, 39-41. His character, 138. His opinions in 1809, 141. His objects in 1827, 142. His relations with Mr. Adams in 1808, 197. His en- forcement bill, 377. Girard, Stephen, 419. — Goddard, Calvin. His denial of belief in the Northern confederacy of 1803-4, 104. Goodhue, Benjamin, 333, 335. Letter from, 336. ^Goodrich, Chauncy, 263. Gore, Christopher. Letters to Mr. Pickering, 375, 386; to Gov. Strong, 410, 422. Gould, Jamas, son-in-law of Uriah Tracy. His letter to the editors of the "New York Evening Post," 93. Griswold, Roger. In favor of the project for a Northern confederacy, 106. Examines the finances of the Northern confederacy, 342. His letter to Wolcott on the project of a Northern confederacy, 354. Favors the election of Burr as governor, 354. His interviews with Burr, 855, 358. Hamilton, Alexander. Charged with peculation, 63. His quarrel with John Adams, 76, 98, 108, 151, 202. His consent to attend a meet- ing in Boston in the autumn of 1804, 100, 145. His death, 146, 170. His connection with the project of a Northern confederacy, 147, 167- 169, 242. His disapproval of the project, 148, 169, 326, 365. His course during the administration of John Adams, 149-152, 291. His paper explanatory of his duel with Burr, 163, 166-169. His paper "Lansing or Burr," 167. Complained of the New England spirit as " clannish," 283. His alliance with New England Feder- alism, 284. His retirement from Washington's administration, 291. His appointment as commander-in-chief in 1798 advised by Mr. Pickering, 332. His rank of first major-general intended by the Sen- ate, 333. His nomination as major-general in 1798, 332, 333. Let^ ter to Sedgwick, 305. Hanson, A. C, 398. Letter to Pickering, 382. INDEX. 431 Hartford Convention, 25, 5G, 1D9, 215, 216, 218, 219, 231, 233, 237, 244, 328. Mr. Otis its putative father, 56. First project of, 60, 240, 374, 377, 803, 404. Adjourned to Boston, 01, 87, 263, 823, 324. Its meeting, 80, 81, 415. Discharged the duties of a committee of a legislative body, 81, 251, 252. Its constitutionality derived from the right of petition, 81-83, 254, 253. From the right of providing for the common defence, 83, 84, 255, 258. Its unconstitutionality, 252, 255-257. Its expediency, 84, 85, 258. Its objects, 85, 86, 258, 264, 265, 277^JS2, 286, 287, 310, 321, 322, 407, 408, 410-414. Its ten- dency, 320. Chjuaeter^Jts- jnombcro, 86, S71 >.2I5,_2a24-283^05, 411^^2. ^Jt^-eemposISoa LsO, 81, 253. Its connection with the project of 1804, 245, 287, 288. Its necessity in the project of a North- ern confederacy, 245, 288. No majority in New England prepared for it, 253, 285. Its first proceedings, 266. Report of its committee of measures, 266-269, 271, 274. Its final report, 85, 86, 274-281, 285, 288-299, 302, 304, 309-312, 314-320, 420-422. Appendix to its report, 274, 824. Its recommendation to the States to pass laws re- sisting the operation of acts of Congress, 298-301, 322. Its recom- mendation to appropriate taxes, 269, 304, 305, 308, 309, 322, 422. Its recommendation to adopt a separate system of defence, 268, 310, 311, 322, 326. Its specifications of cliarges against the national policy, ^ljj_315. Its amendments to the Constitution, 315-318, 322, 408, 409, 424. Its recommendation to appoint another convention, 323. Its secrecy, 259, 261. Publication of its journal, 259-262. Contents of its journal, 203, 281. I'ickering's opinions as. to its action, 405, 407-409, 423. John Lowell's opinions as to its composition and action, 410-414. Gouveniour Morris's opinions as to its action, 414, 421. Harrison, William Henry, 395. Henry, John. His secret mission, .52, 117, 120, 122-124, 230, 236, 2-37, 287. His disclosures, GO. Extracts from his despatches, 118, 119, 121, 136, 238, 273. Ilis relations with Federal leaders, 238, 239. Higginson, Stephen, a member of the Essex Junto, 369, 387. His opin- ions on the project of a Northern confederacy, 353, 358, 361. His letter to Pickering on a Northern confederacy, 361. -Hillhouse, James, 379. His denial of all knowledge of or belief in any combination to form a Northern confederacy, 100, 106. His amend- ments to the Constitution, 196, 197, 381. His letter to Pickering, 420. Hodgdon, Samuel. Letter to, 419. Hunt, Samuel. In favor of the project for a Northern confederacy, 106. Jackson, Andrew. Mr. Jefferson's feelings towards him, 4, 5. Jackson, Charles, 45, 01. 432 INDEX. Jackson, F. J., British Minister. Lett.er to Pickering, reviewing the political relations of England and America, 382. Jefferson, Thomas. Letters to W. B. Giles, 6, 11, 136, ld3, 232, 235. His feelings towards Mr. Giles, 2. Towards J. Q. Adams, 2, 7, 8, 13, 17, 18. Towards Andrew Jackson, 4, 5. Towards Napoleon Bonaparte, 193. John Adams's opinion of, 336. His opinions on the rapid advance of the Federal government to consolidation, 6, 7. On making public his letter of 2oth December, 1825, 7, 8. His retirement from Washington's administration, 290. His election to the Presi- dency, 151, ]o2. His letter to Jfazzei, 152, 151. Hit) deference to Thomas Paine, 152. His removals from oflice, 339, 314, 359, 360, 370. His course towards the judiciary, 152, 160, 101, 170, 314, 327, 339, 310, 314. His opiiiions on the constitutional power of accpiiring Louisiana, 55. His course towards the Navy, 327, 328. His rela- tion to the Federal party, 151. His re-election, 171. His course in 1805, 171, 172. In regard to Mr. King's treaty, 309. In regard to Monroe's treaty, 173, 170, 177. In regard to the $2,000,000 appro- priation, 175. His interview with J. Q. Adams pending the embargo, 11, 12, 24, 50, 51, 112, 231, 234, 230, 240. His procla- mation on the Chesapeake affair, 181. His recommendation of an embargo, 188, 189. His alleged sub.serviency to France, 110, 130, 177, 284, 376, 377, 379, 391. His retirement from the Presidency, 367. Success of his administration, 291, 312, 313. His character. 152. His influence over John Adams, 426. Impressment, 178, 179, 393, 394, 403. King, Ilufus. His disapproval of the project for a Noithern confederacy, 148, 103, 227, 230, 242, 366. His negotiation on impressment, 179. Letter to, from Pickering, on the project of a Northern confederacy, 351. His reply, 353. His character and advice, 366, 367, 426. His treaty, 399. Knower, B., 409. Knox, Henry. Retires in disappointment from Washington's adminis- tration, 290. His nomination as major-general, 333, 334. Lansing, John, 167, 358. Lee, Charles. Attorney-general, 335. Leopard and Chesapeake. Affair of, 59, 121, 180, 194, 265. Town- meetings at Boston regarding, 182-184. Disavowed by the British government, 186. Settled in 1812, 387. Ldtomb. French Consul-general, 388. Lewis, Morgan, 167. Lincoln, Levi, 243, 253. Lloyd, James, 400, His letter to John Adams, 199; to John Randolph, 425. INDEX. 433 Louisiana. Its acquisition, 52-55, 77, 78, 148, 155-158, IGO, 171, 315, 302. Its conquest and conversion into a British province, 417-420. Lowell, John, 45, 91, 185. Letters to Piclcering, 400, 410. His opinions as to the composition and acts of the Hartford Convention, 411-414. Lyman, Daniel, 263. Lyman, Theodore. Letters to, from Pickering, 343, 358. His letter to Pickering, 350. Madison, James. Interview with Mr. Adams, 156. Suggests amend- ment to the Constitution, 157. His alleged subserviency to France, 284, 883. His administration, 291, 417. His speech in the Virginia Convention, 325. His succession to Mr. Jefferson, 367. Marshall, John, 150, 389, 426. Massacliusetts. Her situation under the embargo and during the war, 79, 211. Abandoned by the national government, she clung to the Union, 80, 82, 249, 257, 306, .307, 323. Compared with other States, 88, 89. Disavowed the Hartford Convention, 319. " Massachusetts." Writer under the signature of, 249, 300. McHenry, James. Secretary of War, 335. Militia. Opinion of Judges of Supreme Court of Massachusetts that the power to call out the militia did not belong to the President or Con- gress, 60, 244, 245, 319. Objection waived by the Governor, 306-308. Monroe, James. 173, 176, 194, 290, 403, 423. Morgan, Daniel, 332. Morris, Gouverneur. Letters to Pickering, 403, 418. His letter to Moss Kent, 421. New Orleans. British campaign against, 417, 419, 424. Nicholas, W. C, 24, 33, 116, 1-39, 197, 200. Non-Importation Act, 172, 173. Non-Intercourse Act, 128, 130, 141. Nortliern Confederacy. Project of, in 1303-4, 25, 26, 43, 44, 47-49, 52, 53, 55-59, 133, 144, 147, 160, 102, 108, 170, 178, 191, 192, 194, 201, 326, 340-342. Existed only in Mr. Adams's fancy, 73. Disavowal of, by Massachusetts Federalists, 77, 215, 226, 227, 241 ;> by J ames IIillhause-aud_fltker Connecticutj^e^enilists, 100-104. Its existence asserted by W. PlnlMrTUl, 227; by De Witt Clinton, 229, 230. Its reproduction in Mr. Pickering's embargo letter, 195, 228, 326. Not connected with the Federal opposition in 1808, 77, 78, 241, 242. Its connection with the Hartford Convention, 286-288, 327. Known to and disapproved by Mr. Bayard, 242. Described by Timothy Pickering, 341, 342, 345, 351, 352, 360; by Roger Griswold, 357. Discussed by Tapping Reeve, 342, 343; by George Cabot, 346-349, 353, 362-364 ; by Theodore Lyman, 350 ; by Roger Griswold, 354- 356; by Stephen Iligginson, 361; by Alexander Hamilton, 365. 28 434 INDEX. Nova Scotia. Letter from Governor of, 24, 32, 52, 59, 74, 75, 112, 114, 110, 124, 126, 185, 236, 237. « One of the Convention," signature of Mr. H. G. Otis, 249, 260, 277, 306, 307. Orders in Council, of 11th November, 1807, 59, 187-189, 191, 193, 250, 265. Their intended revocation in 1811, 384. Otis, Harrison Gray, 386, 392, 410. Letter from him and others calling on Mr. Adams for proof of his charge against certain Federalist lead- ers, 43. Putative father of the Hartford Convention, 50, 215, 261. Ilis call for Mr. Pickering's embargo letter, 126. Attended town- meeting on affair of Chesapeake, 184, 200, 220, 250, 265. Ilis course in regard to the embargo, 200, 201. Not engaged in the project of 1804, 201 ; or in any design to dissolve the Union, 230, 237. Ilis relation and attitude to Mr. Adams, 201, 202, 216-218. A leader of the Federal party, 218. His course from 1809 to 1815, 220, 229, 230, 238. His eagerness to defend the Hartford Convention, 231, 233, 240. Ilis letter of 14th January, 1812, 250. His arguments on the constitutionality of the Hartford Convention, 81-81, 2.')4, 255, 258. His publication of the journal of the Convention, 260-262. His share in the proceedings of the Convention, 273, 275, 276. Overpersuaded to attend the Convention, 275. First commissioner to tlie national government under the second resolution of the Hartford Convention, 325. His letter to Josiah Quincy suggesting the Hartford Conven- tion, 373. His character described by John Lowell, 411. Parish, David, 419. Parsons, C. C, 45, 91, 15!^, 224. Parsons, Tlieophilus, 45, 91, 184, 223, 224, 243, 245, 369, 405. His opinions on the project of a Northern confederacy, 353, 353. Party leaders. Definition of, 68, 221, 222. Pennsylvania. Its reply to the report of the Hartford Convention, 317- 319. Impeachment of its judges in 1803, 340. Perkins, T. II., 45, 91, 184, 219, 380. Peters, Richard. Letter to, 338. His letter to Pickering, 380. Pickering, John. Jinpcaciiment of, 101, 359. Pickering, Timothy. Anecdote by W. Pliimer, 106. His party, 124, 129. His letters to Governor S\illivan, 125, 142, 194-196, 200, 209, 223, 224, 220, 231, 242,308-371, 373, 404. His interview with Rufus King in 1804, 148, 195. His relation towards Hamilton, 149-151. His dismissal from the Cabinet, 152, 331. Elected to the Senate, 151, 155. Ills course on the Louisiana purchase, 155, 159, 100. His charge against J. Q. Adams of voting under executive influence, 173, 174. One of the leaders in the disunion project of 1804, 148, 195, 200, 228. His letter INDEX. 435 to C. C. Piiickney, 331. His feelings towards John Adama in 1800, 331. Conversations with John Adams, 332, 336, 337. His opinion of John Adams, 331, 420. Ilis course in regard to the nomination of AV. S. Smith, 332; in regard to the nomination of major-generals in 1798, 333, 334. Prophesies a dissolution of the Union, 338, 389, 391, 417, 424. His letter to George Cabot, 338 ; to Rufus King, 351. Favors a dissolution of the Union, and a Northern confederacy, 339, 340, 345, 351, 352, 360, 389, 391, 400, 401. Favors a recovery of the Union on a new basis, 400. Favors the election of Burr as Governor of New York, 351, 358. Has uniformly disclaimed every idea of a separation, 407. Letters to G. H. Rose, 366, 387. His account of the Essex Junto, 309, 371. His advice as to the policy of the British government, 366. Letter to Gore, 276. Recommends a convention of New England States, 377, 393. His intei-pretation of the Tenth Amendment, 378. Believes in the safety of the Union, 380. Letter to Edward Pennington, 388 ; to George Logan, 391 ; to Samuel Putnam, 391 ; to Caleb Strong, on the British demands at Ghent, 394. Advises securing the revenues by New England, 398. Letters to John Lowell, 404, 406, 407, 423, 425 ; to Gouvenieur Morris, 400. Letter to Hillhouse, urging strong measures on the Hartford Convention, 414, 421. Satisfied with the results of the Hartford Con- vention, 423. Pickman, Benjamin, 45, 91, 219, 410. Pincknpy, Charles Cotesworth, 150, 151. Pinkney, William, 173, 170, 101, 383-385. His audience of leave, 885. Pitt, William, 170. Plunier, William. His assertion of the disunion project of 1803-1804, 101, 103. Ilis comments on James Hillhouse and others, 100. Ilis letter to J. Q. Adams, 144, 215, 227. His character, 147. His course, 170. Prescott, 'William, 45, 91, 412. Quincy, Josiah, 382. His opinion on the effects of the acquisition of Louisiana, 56. His report in 1813, 78. His interview with Mr. Adams in February, 1808, 198, 209, 246, 300. Letter to him from II. G. Otis, 373. Randolph, Edmund, 290. Randolph, John, 143, 144, 161, 231, 232, 234, 391, 407. His rupture with Mr. Jefferson, 170, 175. His opinions on the judiciary, 340, 344. Randolph, T. J. Letter to Archibald Stuart, 10. Reeve, Tapping. Letter to Uriah Tracy on the project of a Northern confederation, 342. 436 INDEX. Robinson, Jonathan. Senator from Vermont, 24, 33, 117. Rose, G. H., British Envoy. His mission, 59, 186, 187, 191, 194, 195, 198. Letters to him from Mr. Pickering, 306, 308. His letters to Mr. Picltering, 367, 370-372. Rule of the war of 1756, 171, 172, 176. Sargent, Daniel, 45, 91, 412. Sedgwick, Theodore, 365. -Sherman, R. M., 405. Smith, John Cotton. His denial of belief in the Northern confederacy of 1803-4, 101. Smith, W. S. His appointment as adjutant-general in 1798, 332. His military abilities, 337. Spencer, Ambrose, 409. Stoddert, Benjamin, 335. Story, Joseph, 243. Strong, Governor, 348, 361, 388, 416, 425. His refusal to call out the militia, 80, 249, 319. Letters to Pickering, 398. Stuart, Archibald. Letter to T. J. Randolph, 10, 235. Mr. Giles's re- marks on, 27. Sullivan, William, 45, 91, 412. -Tallmadge, B. His denial of belief in the Northern confederacy of 1803-4, 103. Tayler, John, of New York, 409. Taylor, John, of Caroline, 417. Thorndike, Israel, 45, 91, 412. Tracy, Uriah, 93. llis communications to Mr. Adams, 93, 97. His character, 98, 102. His silence to his friends in regard to the project of a Northern confederacy, 99. James Hillhouse's letter regarding him, 100. John Davenport's letter regarding him, 100. John Cotton Smith's letter regarding him, 101. Simon Baldwin's letter regarding him, 102. B. Tallmadge's statement regarding him, 103. Calvin GodJard's letter regarding him, 104. 'William Plumer's state- ment regarding him, 100. Interview with John Adams, 332, 333. His letters to Connecticut suggesting a Northern confederacy, 342. Trafalgar. Battle of, 75, 114. Turreau. French Minister, 379. Union. Dissolution of, the certain result of a war with England, 347, 363. Discussed by A. C. Hanson, 382 ; by Pickering, 389. Severed by British conquest of Louisiana, 417, 418, 120, 421, 425. By carry- ing out the reconunendations of the Hartford Convention, 421. See Northern Confederacy. INDKX. 437 Waahingtoii, George. Cliaigod willi devotion to IJriti.sli interests, 63. His Farewell Address quoted in Report of the Hartford Convention, 85, 20:i. His relations with Hamilton in 1790, 140. Urged to be a candidate for the rresideuoy in 1700, 140, 201. Dilliculties of his administration, 200, ■'511, 312. His nomination as commander-in- chief in 1708, 332, 333. His course in regard to the major-generals in 1708, 334. Wilde, S. S., 412. Williams, Samuel, 370. Wolcott, Oliver. Seoretai-y of the Treasury, 335. Letter to, 354. Yankee spirit. Its character, 283. Its alliance with Hamilton, 284. Cambridge: PresR of John WilHon & Son. This preservation photocopy was made at BooicLab, Inc. in compliance with copyright law. The paper is Weyerhaeuser Cougar Opaque Natural, which exceeds ANSI Standard Z39.48-I984. 1992