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 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924021138619 
 
THE FEDEEAL SYSTEM 
 
 OF THE 
 
 ARGENTINE EEPUBLIC 
 
 BY 
 
 L. S. RowB, Ph.D., LL.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OP POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE TJNIVERSITT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
 Published by the Carnegie Institution of WASHrNGTON 
 Washington, 1921 
 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
 
 OF THE 
 
 AEGENTINE REPUBLIC 
 
 BY 
 
 L. S. RowE, Ph.D., LL.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF POUTICAL SCIENCE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
 Published by the Carnegie Institution of Washington 
 Washington, 1921 _ 
 
 5 ^V 
 
^56^330 
 
 Caknegie Institution of Washington, 
 Publication No. 258 
 
 THETLIMPTON-PEESS 
 NOHWOOO<UA5S>T7*S*A 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Pref^e v 
 
 ^ Past I. Historical Antecedents: Relation of the Federal 
 Government to thb* Provinces, 
 chapter page 
 
 I. Leading Characteristics of the Argentine Political System 3 
 
 n. The Foundations of Argentine Democracy 15 
 
 ni. The Basis of the Argentine Constitutional System 23 
 
 IV. Antecedents of the Argentine Constitution 33 
 
 V. Constitution of 1853 and the Amendments of 1860, 1866, and 1898 41 
 
 VI. Division of Functions between the Federal Government and Provinces. 
 Encroachments of Federal Authority. Constitutional Position of the 
 
 Provinces 55 
 
 VII. Principles and Practice of Federal Intervention 69 
 
 VIII. A Typical Case of Federal ^intervention 83 
 
 Part II. The Organization and Principles of the Federal System. 
 
 IX. The Position of the Executive 91 
 
 X. The Legislative Authority 99 
 
 XI. The Judiciary 107 
 
 XII. Constitutional Guarantees to Person and Property 113 
 
 XIII. Liberty of Speech and of the Press : Religious Liberty 125 
 
 Bibliography 133 
 
 Appendix A. — Documents Illustrative of the Constitutional Development 
 
 of the Argentine Republic 135 
 
 Appendix B. — Constitution of the Argentine Republic 137 
 
 Appendix C. — Summary of Argentine Electoral Law 154 
 
 Appendix D. — Statistics of Illiteracy 156 
 
 Index 157 
 
PREFACE 
 
 " When will it be possible to eliminate party prejudice from 
 the writing of Argentine history? " — Sarmiento, Civilizaci6n y 
 Barbarie. 
 
 Every commentator on the Argentine constitution has emphasized 
 and in many cases exaggerated the influence of the constitution of 
 the United States upon the form and content of the Argentine federal 
 system.^ In an opinion deUvered on August 21, 1887, the supreme 
 court of the Argentine Republic said : 
 
 "The system of govermnent under which we are living was not of our 
 creation. We found it in operation, tested by the experience of many years, 
 and adopted it for our system. As has been well said, one of the great ad- 
 vantages of_this plan has been that we were thus able to avail ourselves of 
 well-established rules of interpretation which serve as a guide in the applica- 
 tion of the fundamental principles of the constitution in all those cases in 
 which we have not altered the wording of the instrument." 
 
 Although the constitution of the United States had exerted a 
 far-reaching influence on Alberdi, whose work on the "Bases of the 
 Argentine Constitution" was used as a constitutional guide by the 
 convention of 1853, the direct influence of the constitution of 
 the United States on the Argentine system is more clearly seen in 
 the constitutional convention of the Province of Buenos Aires, con- 
 vened in 1860 to propose amendments to the federal constitution. 
 It was but natural that Ln this convention the spirit of states' rights 
 should be more pronounced than in the national convention of 1853, 
 and to support this position constant reference was made to the 
 provisions of the constitution of the United States. 
 
 The chairman of the conunittee on constitutional amendments of 
 the Buenos Aires convention, in the report submitted to the conven- 
 tion, said: 
 
 "The federal form of goverimient once accepted, the committee has 
 been guided in its recommendations by the provisions of a similar constitu- 
 tion, recognized as the most perfect, viz., that of the United States. 
 
 "The provisions of this constitution are most readily applicable to 
 Argentine conditions, having served as the basis for the formation of the 
 Argentine Confederation. . , . The democratic government of the United 
 States represents the last word of human logic, for the constitution of the 
 United States is the only one that has been made for and by the people. . . . 
 It would, therefore, be both presumptuous and a proof of ignorance were 
 we to attempt any innovations in constitutional organization, thus ignoring 
 the lessons of experience and the manifest truths accepted by the human 
 
 • See Chapter I. 
 V 
 
vi Preface 
 
 In the convention of 1860, as in the convention of 1853, there was 
 a marked tendency to exaggerate the influence of the form of govern- 
 ment upon the destinies of the country. Thus the chairman of the 
 committee on amendments to the constitution, Dr. Velez Sarsfield, 
 in presenting the report of the committee, said: 
 
 "The constitution of the United States has assured the happiness of a 
 great continent for more than seventy years. The legislators of the Argen- 
 tine adopted this constitution as their model . . . but did not respect its 
 sacred text, and with ignorant hands attempted to improve upon it by sup- 
 pressing certain provisions and by amending others. Your committee has 
 done nothing more than restore to our system those portions of the con- 
 stitutional law of the United States which the convention of 1853 attempted 
 to modify." 
 
 It is also worthy of note that all the early commentators on the 
 Argentine constitution were dominated by the principles formulated 
 in the constitution of the United States.^ 
 
 Sarmiento's work ^ is, in the main, an attempt to prove that the 
 Argentine Republic should profit by the experience of the United 
 States in all constitutional matters. The translation of Story's 
 "Commentaries," by NicoMs Antonio Calvo,' and of a digest of the 
 decisions of the supreme coiu-t, by Orlando Bmnp,* also exerted a 
 marked influence on the poUtical ideas of the leading statesmen and 
 writers of the period. In 1868 Dr. Jos6 Marfa Cantilo pubUshed a 
 translation of the "Federalist," which was widely read. 
 
 Late in the seventies a reaction against this worship of the con- 
 stitution of the United States became noticeable. This tendency 
 first appeared in a commentary by Florentine Gonzalez,^ and became 
 more marked in the subsequent works of Jose Manuel Estrada,* 
 Francisco Ramos Mejla,^ Arist6bulo del Valle,* Manuel A. Montes de 
 Oca,' and especially in the lucid work of Joaquin V. Gonzdlez.^" In 
 all these works (especially in the last two) the necessity of adapting 
 the political system to the traditions, environment, and dominant 
 political ideas of the people is strongly emphasized. The impossi- 
 bility of transplanting a foreign political system and the insta- 
 bility and unrest which necessarily follow such attempts dominate 
 the constitutional discussions in these later writings. This same 
 tendency to test the strength of the political system by the degree of 
 
 ' See Rivarola, Del Regimen Federative al Unitario, Chapter XII, Buenos Aires, 1908. 
 
 * Comentarios de la Constituci6n de la Confederaci6n Argentina, con numerosos documentos 
 
 ilustrativos del texto. 
 ' Comentario sobre la Constitucidn federal de los Estados Unidos, Buenos Aires, 1861. 
 
 * Decisiones Constitucionales de los tribunales de los Estados Unidos. Buenos Aires, 1866. 
 " Lecciones para servir S, la ensenanza en la Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1879. 
 
 * Derecho Conatitucional. 
 
 ' El Federalismo Argentino. Buenos Aires, 1889. 
 ' Nociones de Derecho Constitucional, Vol. I. Buenos Aires, 1897. 
 ° Lecciones de Derecho Constitucional. 2 vols. Buenos Aires, 1902. 
 '" Manual de la Constitucibn Argentina. Buenos Aires, 1897. 
 
Preface vii 
 
 its adaptation to national characteristics is seen in the most recent 
 commentaries, those of Agustin de Vedia/ Perfecto Araya, and Gon- 
 zalez Calderon.'' 
 
 In spite of the many points of similarity in the wording of the 
 constitutions of Argentina and the United States, the constitutional 
 practice of the two countries presents many contrasts of fundamental 
 and far-reaching significance. The opportunity is thus afforded to 
 study the operation of constitutional provisions identical in form 
 under totally different conditions. Although the physical environ- 
 ment and economic conditions of the Argentine Republic present 
 many points of similarity with certain regions of the United States, 
 the political antecedents and traditions of the two countries are 
 fundamentally different. 
 
 The study of the poUtical institutions of the Argentine Republic 
 offers material of great value to the student of political science. An 
 analysis of the successive stages in the constitutional development of 
 that country throws much light on the important problem of the 
 relation between constitutional form and constitutional practice and 
 at the same time enables us to secure a glear idea of the nature of 
 the forces that determine the operation of a written constitution. 
 
 The data for this study were collected dviring a residence of fifteen 
 months ia the Argentine at three different periods, the first of six 
 months in 1906-07; the second of four months in 1908; the third of 
 five months in 1914. 
 
 It is impossible to make ample acknowledgment for aid received 
 and courtesies enjoyed from members of the government, university 
 professors, and individual investigators. The unfaihng readiness to 
 render every possible assistance constitutes one of the most gratifying 
 souvenirs of my stay. While thus acknowledging all these courtesies, 
 I desire to express a special obUgation to Joaquin V. Gonzdlez, ex-presi- 
 dent of the National University of La Plata, and to his lamented 
 associate. Dr. Agustin A. Alvarez, vice-president of the same institu- 
 tion. To their constant counsel and guidance any value which this 
 monograph may possess is primarily due. 
 
 L. S. RowE. 
 
 > Constituci(5n Argentina. Buenos Aires, 1907. 
 
 » Comentario a la Constitucidn de la Naci6n Argentina. Buenos Aires, 1908. 
 
PART I. 
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS. 
 
 RELATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO 
 THE PROVINCES. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 LEADING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ARGENTINE 
 POLITICAL SYSTEM. 
 
 One of the most serious obstacles to the scientific study of the 
 political institutions of the South American countries has been the 
 tendency to group them in one class and to regard their history as a 
 succession of revolutions and dictatorships. Any serious study of 
 the pohtical institutions of these countries must at the outset recognize: 
 
 (1) That it is impossible to study South America en bloc. Funda- 
 mental differences in mode of settlement, in colonial organization, 
 and ui social development subsequent to independence have deter- 
 mined in each the form of goverimient and the content and operation 
 of political institutions. 
 
 (2) That the successive revolutions and dictatorships which have 
 occurred in many of the countries of South America must be studied 
 as integral parts of their constitutional development, possessing a 
 far-reaching institutional significance and in many cases marking the 
 successive stages in the advance of the political system toward a 
 more democratic basis through the recognition of popular rights as 
 against class privilege. 
 
 The contrast, for instance, between the political development of 
 Chile and the Argentine Republic is perhaps greater than is evidenced 
 in the political progress of France and Italy. The three distinct 
 streams of Spanish migration into the Argentine RepubUc, viz., from 
 Cuyo, from the "Alto Peru," and through the River Plate, combined 
 with the inherited Spanish local or regional spirit, laid the foundations 
 of Argentine federalism and thwarted the attempts to establish a 
 unified and centralized government. In Chile, on the other hand, 
 the unity in the conditions of settlement and the pronounced centrali- 
 zation which characterized not only the form but the actual operation 
 of the Spanish colonial administration prevented the development of 
 any "separatist" spirit and led to the growth and maintenance of a 
 imified form of government which no subsequent upheavals have been 
 able to disturb. 
 
 The conflict between the federal and unitary principles constitutes 
 one of the most instructive chapters in the history of many of the 
 South American countries. In every case this struggle represents far 
 more than a mere clash between opposing political ideas. It mirrors 
 a deeply rooted social struggle, the full significance of which is only 
 now beginning to dawn upon the historians of these countries.^ 
 
 • See Dr. Ernesto Quesada's study of the conflict between the federal and unitary principles in 
 the Argentine Republic in a work entitled "La Epooa de Rosas," Buenos Aires, 1898. 
 
 3 
 
The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 In no country has this struggle been as deeply significant as in 
 the Argentine Republic. The constitution of 1853 is, it is true, mod- 
 eled in part after the constitution of the United States, but it is a 
 mistake to suppose that this signifies a bhnd attempt to transplant a 
 political system to unprepared soil. On the contrary, a careful study 
 of the antecedents ^ of the Argentine constitution will show that the 
 attempts made in 1819 and X826 to form a unified state not only failed, 
 but threw the country into a series of convulsions which paved the 
 way for the dictatorship of Rosas. At that time it was quite as im- 
 possible to establish a unified state in Argentina as it would have 
 been to establish a similar system in the United States at the time 
 of the adoption of the constitution in 1787, for such a system would 
 have involved the reduction of the states of our federal union to the 
 position of provinces. 
 
 The strong particularistic or sectional sentiment inherited from 
 the Spanish colonial epoch, together with the loyalty of the people to 
 local leaders and the desire of these leaders to maintain their position, 
 made the establishment of a federal system inevitable. Although 
 there existed nothing approaching an organized public opinion, the 
 traditional and inherited views of the people regarding political organi- 
 zation rebelled against any attempt to destroy the identity of the local 
 subdivisions to which they were attached and about which were 
 clustered their hopes and aspirations. The constitution of the United 
 States, however, represented a convenient and above all a thoroughly 
 tested expression of the fundamental principles of federalism, in 
 harmony with the inherited ideas and political aspirations of the 
 mass of the people. The most cursory study of Argentine history 
 demonstrates that the national sanction given to the federal system 
 in 1853 was quite as inevitable as the adoption of a similar system in 
 the United States in 1787, or in Germany in 1871. 
 
 The establishment of a form of government in harmony with the 
 dominant political ideas of the people does not constitute a guarantee 
 that the subsequent development of the system or its actual opera- 
 tion will conform to the views of the founders of the system. The 
 political ideals of a people may determine the establishment of a 
 particular form of government, but its actual operation is determined 
 by forces beyortd their control. It is this wide discrepancy between 
 the views of the framers of the Argentine constitution and the actual 
 operation of the poUtical system that gives to its study so deep an 
 interest to students of political science. 
 
 While, therefore, the form of government provided for in the 
 Argentine constitution of 1853 was the logical and inevitable out- 
 come of the political training and the poUtical ideas of the people 
 the development of the poUtical system has been quite different from 
 that which the founders had in view. 
 
 ' See Chapter IV. 
 
Leading Characteristics of the Argentine Political System 5 
 
 At the time of the adoption of the present constitution (1853), 
 the Argentine Republic, covering an area of 2,885,620 square kilo- 
 meters, possessed a population of about 1,000,000 inhabitants, i.e., 
 about 1 inhabitant to 3 square kilometers. There were no rail- 
 roads. Taken as a whole, the country was still in the pastoral state. 
 The conditions of life were exceedingly primitive, but the isolation of 
 the provinces served to keep alive a distinctively local spirit which 
 violently opposed any attempts at political consolidation. The 
 growth of population and development of means of communication 
 were very slow during the first two decades after the adoption of the 
 constitution of 1853. In 1860 the total population was about 
 1,210,000 1 with but 1 inhabitant to 2.4 square kilometers. In 1869, 
 the date of the first official census, the total population had increased 
 to 1,830,214, or 1 inhabitant to 1.5 square kilometers. Between 
 1869 and 1895, the date of the second census, the population more 
 than doubled. At the latter date the total population was 4,044,911, 
 viz., 1.4 inhabitants to 1 square kilometer. In 1914, the date of the 
 third census, the population was 7,905,502, or 2.6 inhabitants per square 
 kilometer. During this period the railroad mileage was as follows: 
 6 miles in 1857; 23 miles in 1866; 439 miles m 1870; 1,509 miles 
 in 1880; 5,658 miles in 1890; 8,476 miles in 1896; 12,177 miles in 
 1906; 20,088 miles in 1913; 20,316 miles in 1917. 
 
 With the increase of population, the gradual transition from 
 cattle-raising to agriculture, and the higher standard of life accom- 
 panying this economic advance, the provincial governments were 
 confronted with a group of industrial and social problems, the solution 
 of which required a considerable extension of governmental functions 
 and a corresponding increase in the provincial budgets. These new 
 demands upon the provincial governments emphasized the poverty 
 and lack of resoiu-ces of the less advanced sections of the republic. 
 The growth of the towns made it necessary to improve sanitary 
 conditions through the construction of drainage-works and adequate 
 water-supply. The limited income of most of the provinces would 
 not permit these outlays.^ The widespread ilUteracy * aroused 
 the more enlightened element of the provincial population to the 
 necessity of better school facilities, but it was soon evident that the 
 provincial budgets would be unable to bear the financial burden 
 resulting from such an extension of primary education. 
 
 In this emergency the provinces followed the line of least resistance 
 and appealed to the federal government for assistance. The political 
 effect of the assistance thus rendered we will have occasion to examine 
 
 1 Calculated by Martin de Mowry. 
 
 ' In 1905 the total income of all the provinces exclusive of Buenos Aires (i.e., thirteen provinces) 
 was $10,560,000 — less than the income of the Province of Buenos Aires. The total 
 income of all the provinces was $22,000,000, about one-third the total income of the 
 federal government. 
 
 » In 1904, of a total of 592,000 electors, 285,000 were illiterate. For 1916, see Appendix D. 
 
The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 in Chapter VI. It is sufficient to say that this extra-constitutional 
 extension of federal power into a domain reserved by the constitu- 
 tion to the local governments has been one of the most potent factors 
 in the decUne of the provinces as distinctive poUtical units in the federal 
 system. Not only has it weakened the ties of the people to their 
 respective local governments, but it has also served to increase the 
 hold of the federal authorities upon the provincial governments. The 
 scramble for federal aid has led to the poUtical subordination of the 
 provinces to the federal government. Thus, Uttle by little, the desire 
 of the provinces to partake of the real or supposed federal plenty has 
 done more to undermine the traditional spirit of local exclusiveness 
 than all the years of agitation for a unified government. 
 
 The movement presents many analogies with the decline of local 
 self-government in the larger cities of the United States. The con- 
 stant appeal to the state governments for the solution of problems 
 which should have been met through local effort developed in the 
 state legislatures a tendency to interfere in purely local affairs, so 
 marked that for a time cities lost every vestige of local self-govern- 
 ment. It was only after a long-continued struggle, and after the 
 passage of a series of constitutional amendments restricting the 
 powers of the state legislatures, that the municipalities regained a part 
 of their power to determine purely local questions. 
 
 Another factor of great importance in breaking down the spirit 
 of sectionalism in Argentina has been the rapid development of 
 means of communication during the last twenty-five years. The 
 increase of railroad mileage from 1,560 miles in 1880 to 21,196 miles 
 in 1920 signifies even more than would appear at first glance, for 
 during this period the lines have been extended to the remote prov- 
 inces of the north (Jujuy, Salta, Tucumdn, and Santiago del Estero) 
 and to the provinces and territories of the Andean region (La Rioja, 
 Catamarca, San Juan, Pampa, and Neuquen). 
 
 The federal government, furthermore, has been gradually in- 
 creasing its sources of revenue at the expense of the provinces. Thus, 
 in 1892 the entire internal revenue system was made exclusively 
 federal. These taxes include not merely the imposts on brewed and 
 distilled liquors and tobacco, but also stamp duties on a long list of 
 articles, such as bottled mineral waters, perfumery, etc. 
 
 This financial dependence of the provinces on the federal govern- 
 ment is not limited to subsidies for extraordinary expenditures, such 
 as the construction of pubUc works. For many years the federal 
 government has voted large sums for the purpose of covering deficits 
 in the ordinary expenditures of the provinces. In 1914 La Rioja, 
 Catamarca, Jujuy, and San Luis each received a subsidy of about 
 $40,000 per annum for the purpose of meeting ordinary adminis- 
 trative expenses. 
 
Leading Characteristics of the Argentine Political System 7 
 
 The broad interpretation of certain clauses of the constitution 
 has further contributed toward diminishing the importance of the 
 provinces as political entities. Thus the provision granting to the 
 national government the power to encourage the construction of 
 railroads has been construed to include the right to grant franchises 
 to all lines which extend beyond the limits of one province. As 
 there are practically no infra-provincial lines, railroad franchise 
 grants are dependent exclusively on the federal government. In 
 these grants the national government frequently exempts the railroads 
 from all local taxation, thus depriving the provincial and municipal 
 goverrunents of another important source of revenue. 
 
 The same tendency^ toward the substitution of national for pro- 
 vincial authority is to be found in the development of the educational 
 system. Both secondary and university instruction are under the direct 
 control of the federal govermnent, and through granting subsidies to 
 the provinces for primary schools the national government has ac- 
 quired far-reaching powers over this branch of the educational system. 
 
 This marked tendency toward the extension of the power of the 
 national government has been interpreted by some Argentine com- 
 mentators as an indication of the breaking down of the federal system, 
 involving the gradual disappearance of the provinces as distinct 
 political entities and the estabUshment of a consolidated, unified 
 state in fact if not in law.^ In support of this thesis it is possible to 
 adduce a formidable array of facts, but this interpretation fails to 
 take into account the fundamental basis of every political system, 
 viz., the poUtical ideas of the people. It is true that many of the 
 provinces lack the resources necessary to perform the functions with 
 which they have been intrusted, and it is also true that the assump- 
 tion by the national government of many of the obligations now 
 inadequately performed by the provinces would mean both a more 
 economical as well as a more efficient performance of these functions. 
 Nevertheless, any attempt at a fundamental change in the constitu- 
 tion in this direction is certain to meet with violent opposition and 
 to rekindle passions which, although no longer appearing on the 
 surface, are none the less latent in the political temper of the people. 
 Advocates of new political systems are too apt to forget that the 
 political thought of the mass of the people is determined by inherited 
 formulae rather than by critical analysis, and that the political ideas 
 corresponding to these formulae perpetuate themselves long after 
 the disappearance of the conditions out of which they have arisen. 
 No one who has visited the provinces of the Argentine Republic can 
 escape the conviction that, in spite of their ready acceptance of the 
 financial aid of the federal government, the feeling of provincial 
 separateness is still deeply rooted in the minds of the people. 
 
 1 See Chapter VI. 
 
 2 See Rodolfo Rivarola, "Del Rfegimen Federative al Unitario." Buenoa Aires, 1908. 
 
8 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 The tendency toward concentration of power in the central govern- 
 ment is not peculiar to the Argentine Republic, for it represents a 
 process through which all federal systems pass; but the movement 
 is more pronounced in the Argentine than elsewhere, because lack of 
 adequate financial resources of the provinces prevents the development 
 of counterbalancing forces to offset the extension of the power of the 
 central government. Such a check can come only through the 
 economic advance of the provinces. As they increase in population 
 and wealth, they will be less dependent on the federal government and 
 will be able to perform functions for which at present they rely on the 
 assistance, and consequent control, of the national government. 
 
 Although the provinces are making great industrial progress, 
 the growth of a distinctive and independent local political life is 
 fraught with great difl&culties, largely because during the last fifty 
 years the national executive has gradually acquired a dominant 
 influence in the political affairs of the provinces. To effect any 
 radical modification of this situation will require far-reaching changes 
 in the political habits of the people. In Chapter VII, on Principles 
 and Practice of Federal Intervention, we shall have occasion to ex- 
 amine one of the means employed to establish and maintain this 
 influence. During the period of his term of ojQfice the president of 
 the repubUc has been able in the past to bring most if not all the 
 provinces into harmony with his political views and tendencies. The 
 absence of an organized public opinion, the civic apathy of the mass of 
 the population, and the resultant impossibility of organizing per- 
 manent and well-defined national or local parties made it possible 
 for the president of the republic in conjunction with the governor 
 of each province to influence the selection of candidates for members 
 of the national congress. As there was rarely any well-organized oppo- 
 sition party a nomination was equivalent to an election. If serious 
 opposition did develop, the probabilities of success of the party opposed 
 to the administration were remote. During the last few years a marked 
 change is noticeable by reason of the awakening of public opinion and 
 the more active participation by the masses of the people in public 
 affairs. The political power of the President in the provinces, while 
 still important, is no longer as far reaching as it was ten years ago. 
 
 But, it will be asked, how is the president of the republic able to 
 assure himself of the cooperation of the governors of the provinces. 
 In its general outlines the process is exceedingly simple, but capable 
 of great variation in application. The usual plan was to give a recal- 
 citrant governor the choice between submission to the views of the 
 administration and ejection from office. Article V of the constitution 
 provides: 
 
 "Each province shall adopt its own constitution which shall provide for 
 the administration of justice in its own territory, its municipal system and 
 
Leading Characteristics of the Argentine Political System 9 
 
 primary instruction, such constitution to be framed upon the repubUcan rep- 
 resentative plan, in harmony with the principles, declarations, and guaran- 
 ties of the national constitution. Upon these conditions, the federal gov- 
 ernment shall guarantee to each province the enjoyment and exercise of its 
 institutions." 
 
 The broad interpretation of this article has made it possible, on 
 any one of a series of pretexts, to intervene in the internal affairs of 
 the province, and on the plea that the republican form of government 
 has been undermined, to order the holding of new elections. It is 
 a matter of conunon knowledge that in extreme cases the federal 
 government has encouraged the opposition party to foment a slight 
 local distiu*bance. Such disturbance, which immediately assumes the 
 dignity of a revolution, serves as a justification for federal interven- 
 tion. The federal troops take possession of the situation, a federal 
 commissioner assumes the conduct of provincial affairs, and under his 
 direction a new election for governor is held, which invariably results 
 in the election of the candidate whose views are in harmony with 
 those of the national government. The lessons of repeated experience 
 have taught the provincial governors that their tenure of office is apt 
 to be precarious unless they maintain the closest harmony with the 
 central government. It is for this reason that so many pass through 
 what the Argentines euphemistically call an "evolution of opinion," 
 and thus place themselves in a position of relative security. 
 
 During the administration ^ of President Figueroa Alcorta (1906- 
 1910) the federal government intervened on four different occasions 
 in the internal affairs of the provinces, and each time with an ulterior 
 political motive.^ 
 
 In February 1907 the intervention in the province of San Juan was 
 caused by an uprising against Governor Godoy. The federal com- 
 missioner declared the governorship vacant and ordered the holding 
 of new elections for the unexpired term. As was to be expected, the 
 political views of the new governor were in complete harmony with 
 those of the president of the republic, A few months later a disturb- 
 ance arose in the province of San Luis, the main purpose of which was 
 to prevent the newly elected governor, who had been selected by the 
 president, from taking office. The federal commissioner who was 
 sent to take charge of the situation immediately ordered the installa- 
 tion of the governor-elect. 
 
 In 1908 a local revolution in the province of Corrientes led to 
 another interesting instance of federal intervention. The federal 
 commissioner in the case adopted a novel procedure. The conffict 
 between the legislature and the governor related to the conditions 
 
 » In 1904 Manuel Quintana was elected president and Figueroa Alcorta vice-president. In 
 1906 Dr. Quintana died and was succeeded by the vice-president, who remained in office 
 until 1910. 
 
 2 For further details concerning these "interventions" see Chapter VII. 
 
10 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 under which the elections for the renewal of one-third of the mem- 
 bers of the provincial legislature should be held. Through an entirely 
 extra-constitutional procedure the legislature proposed to the federal 
 commissioner that all the members should resign and thus make a 
 test of popular opinion through the election of the entire legislature. 
 This procedure was agreed to by the governor. The new elections 
 were held under the auspices of the federal commissioner, who was 
 able indirectly to influence the elections and secure an overwhelm- 
 ing majority against the governor. The newly elected legislature 
 immediately proceeded to impeach the governor and removed him. 
 The legislature then appointed a provisional governor and ordered 
 the holding of new elections, which resulted in the selection of a man 
 in complete harmony with the views of the president.^ 
 
 Through his hold on the provincial governors and on the local 
 political machinery the president is usually in a position to influence 
 the selection of candidates for the senate and the chamber of deputies. 
 It is, therefore, only in exceptional instances that there is any real 
 opposition between the federal executive and the local authorities. 
 When such opposition does develop, the president is usually able to 
 maintain his ascendency because of his hold on federal patronage and 
 through pressure on the provincial governors. 
 
 In exceptional cases, resort is had to extraordinary measures. 
 Thus, in the fall of 1907 the president convened the congress in 
 extraordinary session for the purpose of voting the budget for the 
 ensuing fiscal year. In order fully to understand the situation that 
 developed in the course of this extra session, it is important to bear 
 in mind that while congress is in session the executive can not inter- 
 vene in the affairs of the provinces without express authorization. 
 In order to prevent such intervention the congress determined to re- 
 main in session until the opening of the succeeding regular session. 
 Both houses, therefore, refused to vote the budget for 1908, although 
 the leaders of the opposition expressed their wilhngness to vote, from 
 month to month, the sums necessary to meet the ordinary expenses 
 of government. The situation was fiKther comphcated by the presi- 
 dential aspirations of one of the most influential members of the 
 Argentine senate, who attempted to force administration support for 
 his candidacy by a threat to continue the fiUbuster against the budget 
 imtil the opening of the regular session. 
 
 The fiscal year opened with the budget still pending. In view 
 of this situation, on January 25, 1908, the president issued a decree 
 withdrawing from congress the measures submitted to it in extra 
 session and declaring the session adjourned sine die. In order to 
 prevent the assembling of either house, the poUce were placed in 
 
 > In 1909 the federal government intervened in the province of C6rdoba. 
 
Leading Characteristics of the Argentine Political System 11 
 
 charge of the congressional building, with strict orders not to permit 
 members to enter. The action of the president, although distinctly 
 revolutionary in character, was supported by a spontaneous move- 
 ment of opinion which rendered futile the attempted resistance of the 
 legislative branch of the government. 
 
 This incident serves to illustrate the dominant position occupied 
 by the executive in the Argentine system. In law, executive powers 
 are more restricted than in the United States, for under the constitu- 
 tion the concept of executive authority includes both the president 
 and his ministers, and no act of the former is valid without the 
 counter-signature of the respective minister. In fact, however, due 
 in part to the poUtical traditions inherited from Spain, but mainly to 
 the poUtical subordination of the provinces to executive policy, the 
 real power and influence of -the president reach far beyond the formal 
 grant of powers in the constitution. A strong president with a definite 
 program has but little difficulty in seeming support for his poUcies. 
 
 The fundamental weakness of the Argentine political system has 
 made the lack of an organized pubUc opinion. The far-reaching influ- 
 ence of opinion during periods of extraordinary excitement serves to 
 make more prominent the absence of this indispensable element of 
 control in the normal activities of government. Not until the public 
 opinion of the country has been organized will the struggles between 
 poUtical parties truly mirror the Ufe of the nation. Progress towards 
 effective organization of pubUc opinion is now being rapidly accom- 
 pUshed. Din-ing recent years the government and people of the Argen- 
 tine RepubUc have addressed themselves resolutely to encouraging the 
 participation of a larger percentage of voters in local and national 
 elections. A campaign of education has been imdertaken which has 
 produced most gratifying results. 
 
 Legislation designed to improve the system of registration and 
 to safeguard the sacredness of the ballot was passed during the 
 administration of President Roque Saenz Pena. The effect of this 
 legislation was to strengthen the confidence of the voter in the 
 effectiveness of his baUot. The gradual awakening of pubUc opinion 
 to the importance of these measures has placed the political life of 
 the country on a new and distinctly higher plane. Practices which 
 for many years were tolerated are now so severely condemned that 
 they will soon disappear from the political life of the country. 
 
 It is fortunate for the welfare and orderly progress of the Argen- 
 tine that there is a growing conviction throughout the country that 
 the question of federal or consoUdated government is relatively 
 unimportant compared with the basic educational and civic problems 
 confronting the country. The people are beginning to see that the 
 question of greater or less centralization is dependent upon economic 
 forces independent of individual wiU or personal convictions. 
 
12 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 In addition to the pressing need of encouraging immigration, the 
 best thought and energy of the nation and all its available resources 
 must now be directed toward the solution of three fundamental 
 problems, any one of which is far more important to the country's 
 future than the question of the division of power between the central 
 and provincial governments. 
 
 The first of these is the reduction of illiteracy in the smaller towns 
 and rural districts. The registration of voters for 1916 shows that 
 outside of Buenos Aires in a total of 1,018,542 qualified voters, only 
 603,062 (59.21 per cent) were able to read and write. In three 
 provinces, Corrientes, Santiago del Estero, and Tucimidn a majority 
 of the electors was iUiterate. In the city of Buenos Aires the per- 
 centage of illiteracy was only 3.98 per cent.* The quick native intel- 
 ligence of the Argentine "gaucho," while mitigating the unfor- 
 tunate effects of this neglect, does not diminish the grave injustice 
 thus done to the rising generation. 
 
 A second problem, far more delicate in its nature and intimately 
 connected with the inunigration problem, is the improvement in the 
 administration of justice. There has been, it is true, much unjustified 
 criticism of the higher judiciary on the part of foreign observers. 
 With the cumbersome and in many respects antiquated procedure in 
 civil and especially in criminal cases, the wonder is that the delays 
 in the administration of justice are not longer and the miscarriages 
 more frequent. The real problem confronting the country is not 
 so much a change in the personnel of the courts as a simplification 
 of the procedure and the introduction of oral public trial instead of 
 the present written procedure, which is secret in fact, if not in law. 
 But far more important than these changes is the improvement 
 of the minor judiciary, especially the justices of the peace (juzgados 
 de paz). Probably no other factor has contributed so much toward 
 discouraging immigration. 
 
 To a foreign observer the most puzzling element in the Argentine 
 situation is that the country has but 8,000,000 inhabitants, whereas 
 the conditions of soil, climate, and general healthfuhiess are superior 
 to most sections of the United States. Although the number of 
 immigrants has increased within recent years, a considerable propor- 
 tion of this increase is due to the floating foreign population, who go 
 to the Argentine during the harvest and return to their native land 
 as soon as the harvest is completed. From 1895 to 1915 the growth 
 of immigration was as shown in table on page 13. 
 
 There has been considerable discussion as to the causes of this 
 relatively slow increase of immigration. One peculiar circumstance 
 which throws considerable light on the situation is the fact that 
 
 ' See Appendix D. 
 
Leading Characteristics of the Argentine Political System 13 
 
 comparatively few of the foreigners resident in the Argentine RepubUc 
 apply for naturalization. This marked contrast with conditions pre- 
 vailing in the United States is due in part to the fact that no organ- 
 ized campaign encouraging naturalization has been undertaken and in 
 part to the circumstance that the foreigner feels that he may have 
 recourse to the good oflfices of the legation of his country when justice 
 has been denied him by the justices of the peace. The study of local 
 conditions in the provinces shows that this defect, which has con- 
 
 Immigration to and emigration from the Argentine Republic 1896-1917. 
 
 
 
 
 Excess of immi- 
 
 Year. 
 
 Immigration. 
 
 Emigration 
 
 gration over 
 emigration. 
 
 1895 
 
 80,988 
 
 36,820 
 
 44,168 
 
 1896 
 
 135,205 
 
 45,921 
 
 89,284 
 
 1897 
 
 105,148 
 
 57,457 
 
 47,686 
 
 1898 
 
 95,190 
 
 53,536 
 
 41,654 
 
 1899 
 
 111,083 
 
 62,241 
 
 48,842 
 
 1900 
 
 105,902 
 
 65,417 
 
 50,485 
 
 1901 
 
 125,951 
 
 80,251 
 
 46,700 
 
 1902 
 
 96,080 
 
 79,427 
 
 16,653 
 
 1903 
 
 112,671 
 
 74,776 
 
 37,895 
 
 1904 
 
 161,078 
 
 66,597 
 
 94,481 
 
 1905 
 
 221,622 
 
 82,772 
 
 138,850 
 
 1906 
 
 302,249 
 
 103,852 
 
 198,397 
 
 1907 
 
 257,924 
 
 138,063 
 
 119,861 
 
 1908 
 
 303,112 
 
 86,412 
 
 217,700 
 
 1909 
 
 278,148 
 
 94,644 
 
 183,504 
 
 1910 
 
 338,828 
 
 97,854 
 
 240,974 
 
 1911 
 
 281,622 
 
 120,709 
 
 160,913 
 
 1912 
 
 379,117 
 
 120,260 
 
 258,867 
 
 1913 
 
 364,271 
 
 156,829 
 
 207,442 
 
 1914 
 
 182,659 
 
 178,684 
 
 3,975 
 
 Excess of emi- 
 gration over 
 immigration. 
 
 19151 
 
 54,144 
 
 118,636 
 
 66,169 
 
 1916 
 
 40,310 
 
 80,867 
 
 40,358 
 
 1917 
 
 23,530 
 
 56.268 
 
 32,931 
 
 1918 
 
 50,662 
 
 69,908 
 
 9,246 
 
 1919(9 mo3.) 
 
 43,135 
 
 51,383 
 
 9,248 
 
 ' From 1915 on, the Argentine statistics do not take into account 
 any immigration from Europe via Montevideo. 
 
 tributed so much toward retarding the progress of the country is due 
 primarily to two causes: 
 
 (1) The low salaries paid to justices of the peace, a fact which 
 increases the temptation to bribery. 
 
 (2) The absence of traditions of judicial independence. The 
 judiciary has failed to exercise an effective and continuous check on 
 the executive and legislative branches of the government. 
 
 The deeply rooted conviction of the immigrant that there exists 
 a lack of adequate protection to person, but especially to property, 
 
14 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 has aroused a feeling of distrust, which discourages immigration 
 and diminishes the incentive to natiu:alization. Much could be 
 accomphshed through the organization of special associations for the 
 protection of the immigrant, with agencies in every section of the 
 country. The problem is a serious one, requiring the best thought 
 and energy of both the government and citizens. 
 
 At the present time it would be vmfortunate if any attempt were 
 made to compel immigrants to take out naturaUzation papers. It 
 has been seriously proposed by one of the leading statesmen to make 
 the acquisition of Argentine citizenship a condition prerequisite to the 
 proprietorship of land. Any such plan is certain to strengthen the 
 feeling of distrust of the immigrant and thus discourage immigra- 
 tion — to-day one of the coimtry's greatest needs. Argentina has 
 not yet reached a point at which it is advisable to place the slightest 
 obstacle to desirable immigration. Although the national unity of 
 the coimtry suffers by reason of the failure of foreigners to become 
 naturalized, any marked diminution in the current of immigration 
 would mean a far greater loss. 
 
 The discussion of the weaknesses of the Argentine system em- 
 phasizes the one primary, fundamental need abeady referred to, viz., 
 the development of an organized pubUc opinion. The absence of 
 this all-important factor explains most of the shortcomings in the 
 political life of the country. Recent years have witnessed real 
 progress in remedying this defect. It is no longer possible for a few 
 men to dominate the political hfe of the country and to play the 
 game of pohtics as if it were a game of chess. The time is rapidly 
 passing when new parties can be organized simply to satisfy the per- 
 sonal ambition of a few malcontents. PoUtical parties must now 
 have a real program rather than represent a mere personal following. 
 
 It is becoming increasingly evident to students of political institu- 
 tions that the existence of republican government and democratic 
 rule is not so much a question of the selection of officials by popular 
 vote as the control of such officials and of the entire pubhc administra- 
 tion by a well-organized pubhc opinion, with definite standards and 
 with the power to enforce such standards as against the personal 
 interests of selfish pohticians. Until this factor of control is developed 
 a government repubUcan in form is certain to be ohgarchic in fact. 
 Such an organized pubhc opinion is rapidly making impossible govern- 
 ment by small cliques and is creating an atmosphere favorable to 
 the full development of Argentine democracy. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY. 
 
 Peculiarities in the development of political institutions in South 
 America. Five periods in Argentine history: (1) The Colonial Period 
 (prior to 1810). (2) The Revolutionary Period (1810-1816). (3) The 
 so-called "Period of Anarchy" (1816-1829). (4) The Rosas Tyranny 
 (1829-1852). (5) The Period of Constitutional Reorganization (1852). 
 
 Students of political science in the United States have usually 
 taken for granted that the methods of scientific investigation appUc- 
 able to the highly developed political systems of England and con- 
 tinental Europe are inapplicable to the republics of Latin America. 
 In fact, there seems to be a widespread belief that the term "poUtical 
 system" is applied to Latin America by courtesy, but that a more 
 exact designation would be "dictatorships tempered by revolution." 
 It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the repubUcs of Latin- 
 America are usually divided into two classes, the turbulent and the 
 peaceable. The degree of advancement is measured by the length of 
 interval between revolutionary movements. With this simple test 
 the conclusion is reached that the great need of the Latin-American 
 republics is tranquillity under whatever conditions or at whatever 
 price obtained. 
 
 This false approach to the subject has been strengthened by the 
 use of a number of catchwords and phrases by which we attempt to 
 e3q>lain the poUtical situation in the countries of Central and South 
 America. The contrast between "Anglo-Saxon" and "Latin" is con- 
 stantly used to designate the difference between capacity for local self- 
 government and the absence of this quality. We do not stop to think 
 that through the use of these terms we beg the real question rather 
 than solve it. The quaUties which we designate as "Latin" and 
 "Anglo-Saxon" are the result of well-defined social and economic 
 forces which students of pohtical science must undertake to analyze 
 and without which our study of Latin- American institutions must ever 
 remain a play of words rather than a scientific study. 
 
 The first step in the study of the political institutions of Latin 
 America is a clear recognition of the fact that each of these countries 
 has developed its own peculiar economic and political conditions and 
 that it is quite as impossible to treat Latin America, or even South 
 America as a whole, as it is to attempt to explain the development 
 of all the countries of Europe by means of a few simple principles. 
 
 15 
 
16 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 It is furthermore important that we divest ourselves of the tend- 
 ency to judge Latin America by the standards which we have 
 been accustomed to apply to our own poUtical growth. Owing to 
 a peculiar grouping of the social classes during the early development 
 of the English common law, the basis was laid for the harmonious 
 development of order and hberty in our political system, and the 
 degree of stability of government is therefore a fairly accurate 
 measure of progress when applied to our institutions. It is important 
 to bear in mind, however, that the same rule of interpretation 
 can not be applied to the political development of Latin America. 
 Periods of political instability are often indications of profound 
 social changes which are preparing the way for a higher type of 
 institutional growth, whereas there are numerous instances in which 
 political stabiUty is but the cloak for oUgarchical rule and the social 
 degradation of large classes of the population. 
 
 The history of the Argentine Republic illustrates with great clear- 
 ness the principles above formulated. Five distinct periods are readily 
 distinguishable: (1) The colonial period (prior to 1810). (2) The rev- 
 olutionary period (1810-1816). (3) The so-called "period of anarchy" 
 (1816-1829). (4) The Rosas tyranny (1829-1852). (5) The period of 
 constitutional reorganization. These periods represent the successive 
 steps in the development of the institutional Ufe of the country. 
 
 The colonial period in the Argentine differs from that of most 
 of the other South American republics. The Spanish adventurers 
 took little interest in the River Plate territory, owing to the failure 
 to find deposits of gold and silver, and the same cause considerably 
 reduced the incentive of the Spanish crown to maintain close control 
 over this portion of the colonial empire. The powers vested in the 
 viceroy of the River Plate and in the "intendentes" under his 
 control, while far-reaching in law, were exercised in fact in the most 
 haphazard manner. The result was that the towns were given or 
 rather assumed wide powers of self-government, not only within 
 their respective municipal limits, but over districts so large as to 
 become subsequently the basis for the provincial subdivisions. 
 
 The immediate effect of this decentralization in fact was twofold: 
 (1) to develop a strong local spirit, which prepared the way for 
 separation from the mother country; (2) this same sectional feeling 
 which prepared the way for the establishment of a federal system and 
 which has remained a constant and insuperable obstacle to the estab- 
 lishment of a consolidated centraUzed political system. 
 
 It must, furthermore, be borne in mind that the character of the 
 colonial period in the Argentine Republic was largely determined 
 by the pecuUar economic conditions, which differed from those of the 
 other South American republics. During the entire colonial epoch 
 cattle-raising was practically the exclusive pursuit of the inhabi- 
 
Foundations of Argentine Democracy 17 
 
 tants. It was not the peaceful pastoral pursuit of the countries 
 of continental Europe. The care of great herds of wild cattle 
 which, however, ranged over the Argentine pampas required a 
 type of courage and self-reliance wholly incompatible with the kind 
 of serfdom which prevailed in other portions of Spain's colonial 
 empire. 
 
 The concept of personal property was only imperfectly developed. 
 No attempt was made to fence the great estates. At certain 
 seasons of the year a great "round-up" of cattle took place and 
 the representatives of the various ranchmen attempted to identify 
 their property. During the intervals the "gaucho" secured his food 
 by killing such cattle as he found, with but little reference as to 
 whether the animals belonged to his employer or not. It is evident 
 that in a society such as this a real aristocracy of birth was impos- 
 sible. The great landed proprietors lived in the towns, usually in 
 Buenos Aires. The majority were European Spaniards who had 
 received large grants from the home government and who were satis- 
 fied to leave the management of these estates to native agents, pro- 
 vided they secured each year a certain revenue. This "absenteeism" 
 prevented them from securing any hold on the rural population. 
 In the history of the Argentiae Republic we find nothing to compare 
 with the settlement of some of om- southern states, where agriculture 
 was the main piu-suit and where the landed proprietors lived on their 
 estates, took an active part in their management, and exercised a 
 dominant influence in the local government of the colonies. 
 
 Slavery as an institution never took deep root in the rural sections 
 of the Argentine Republic. It is evident that the close control which 
 slavery requires was impossible in a country in which cattle-raising 
 was practically the sole pursuit and was carried on under the peculiar 
 conditions prevailing in the River Plate provinces. Not only was 
 control impossible, but the nomadic life of the great cattle-ranges 
 made the maintenance of slavery as an institution impossible.^ 
 
 In the city of Buenos Aires the conditions were different from 
 those existing in the rural districts. Slavery maintained its vigor 
 as a social institution for a far longer period than in the rural dis- 
 tricts. The use of slaves for menial service and even in a considerable 
 number of the skilled trades placed free labor in a most unfavorable 
 position. In Buenos Aires the antagonism between the European 
 Spaniard and the American Spaniard was pronounced, owing partly 
 to the special privileges enjoyed by the former and the great land 
 grants of which they were the beneficiaries. Not only were all pub- 
 Uc offices in the hands of European Spaniards, but numerous com- 
 
 ' As early as May 25, 1811, i.e., a year after the beginning of the revolution, the first step 
 toward emancipation was taken. By decree of May 15, 1812, the slave trade was pro- 
 hibited. The constituent assembly of 1813 declared that all children born of slave 
 parents should thereafter be deemed free. (Law of February 2, 1813.) 
 
18 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 mercial restrictions and the grant of special monopoly privileges bore 
 heavily on the native population. 
 
 The social and economic conditions above outlined distinguish 
 the development of the Argentine Republic from the other South 
 American countries. Although both Peru and BoUvia belonged at one 
 time to the same viceroy alty and were therefore subjected to the same 
 legal and poUtical system, their development was essentially different. 
 
 These pecuUar economic and social conditions left a deep impress 
 on the growth of pohtical ideas. Throughout the River Plate prov- 
 inces we find the principle of authority seriously undermined in 
 the early years of the colonial regime. To the cowboy the only 
 notion of a government is that of the leader who by superior prowess 
 and skill is able to command respect or inspire fear. In the country 
 districts personal leadership, inspired and maintained by a curious 
 mixture of fear and admiration, was the only form of control to 
 which the population would subject itself. 
 
 Although the country districts in the later history of the Argentine 
 developed a spirit strongly refractory to all centralized authority, 
 the lack of local control which characterized the Spanish colonial 
 regime in the River Plate provinces made the yoke of the mother 
 country rest lightly on the rural sections. It is not surprising, there- 
 fore, that the revolutionary movement of 1810, which marks the 
 beginning of the second period, shovild have been essentially an 
 urban movement. It was the protest of the land-owners residing 
 in the towns ^ and the merchants who were being crushed by the 
 burden of monopoly and special privilege. The innumerable trade 
 restrictions which Spain imposed upon her colonial possessions were 
 keenly felt in Buenos Aires and Montevideo and furnished the basis 
 for the agitation which finally found expression in the assembly of 
 May 22, 1810. The movement, although supported by the people 
 of the city of Buenos Aires, was not primarily democratic either in 
 its purposes or its organization. The leading citizens of Buenos 
 Aires undertook to speak in the name of the people of the viceroyalty 
 of the River Plate, but a comparatively small proportion of the 
 population outside of Buenos Aires took any active interest in the 
 movement. It is far more accurately designated as a "liberal" 
 rather than a "democratic" movement.^ 
 
 The real test came with the gradual acceptance by the country 
 districts of the hberal ideas which had determined the revolutionary 
 movement. With emancipation from the mother country an assured 
 fact, these liberal ideas assumed a form quite different from the 
 revolutionary period (1810-1816). 
 
 1 See the famous Representaci6n de los Hacendados (Petition of the Landowners) of Dr. 
 
 Mariano Moreno, one of the leaders of the revolutionary movement. 
 " The cabildo abierto, which led the movement, was composed of the town council, to which 
 
 a number of leading citizens were added. 
 
Foundations of Argentine Democracy 19 
 
 The declaration of independence, while eliminating the European 
 Spaniard from the management of pubUc affairs, did not materially 
 change the social organization of the rural districts. Its main effect 
 was to make clearly apparent a process which had begun long before 
 the revolutionary movement — the growth of the power of sectional 
 leaders or "caudillos," as they were termed. These "caudillos" 
 were the most characteristic product of the colonial period. Although 
 the country had much to suffer because of their influence, it must 
 always be borne in mind that they represented the only survival of 
 the principle of authority after separation from the mother country. 
 
 The position of the "caudillo" has been the subject of endless 
 unfavorable comment by Argentine historians and sociologists, and 
 his influence has usually been regarded as a national calamity.^ But 
 little attention is given to the fact that these leaders, although at a 
 later period they became an obstacle to an effective national organiza- 
 tion, contributed considerably toward the maintenance of social 
 order at the critical period immediately preceding and following the 
 declaration of independence. Although ruthless in their enmities, 
 intolerant of opposition, and brutal in the repression of disorder, 
 they were for the most part leaders who had risen from the ranks of 
 the people and were ever ready to avail themselves of every move- 
 ment of popular opinion. In a crude, imperfect manner they laid the 
 foundations of Argentine democracy. 
 
 It is in the third period (1816-1829) that we begin to see clearly 
 outlined the development of the federal idea. The rise of sectional 
 leaders was favored by the local feeling which developed as a result 
 of the large measure of autonomy which the towns of the River Plate 
 provinces were permitted to exercise during the colonial regime. 
 After the declaration of independence this feehng took the form of 
 violent opposition to subjection to any central authority, no matter 
 how democratic such central authority might be. This refractoriness 
 to authority inaugurated the so-called "period of anarchy," diu-ing 
 which the country was divided into a great niunber of local juris- 
 dictions, repubUcan in name but tyrannical in fact. The period 
 between 1820 and 1831 is one long record of bloody conflicts between 
 local leaders, which blocked all attempts at national organization. 
 
 The foiirth period (1829-1852) is marked by the conflict between 
 the centraUzing and federal movements which first resulted in a long 
 period of absolutism under Rosas and the final triumph of the federal 
 principle in the constitutional convention of 1852. It is impossible 
 to draw a definite line between the third and the fom-th periods, 
 inasmuch as this conflict between the centraUzing and federal prin- 
 
 ' See Sarmiento, Civilizaci6n y Barbarie, Buenos Aires, 1889; Lucas Ayarragaray, La Anarqula 
 Argentina y el Caudillismo, Buenos Aires, 1904; Bartolom6 Mitre, Historia del Belgrano, 
 Chaps. 30, 31, 32; Juan Agustin Garcia (Hijo), La Ciudad Indiana, Buenos Aires, 1900. 
 
20 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 ciples runs through the entire third period, as is attested by the 
 unsuccessful attempts to put into effect the constitutions of 1819 
 and 1826. 
 
 The prolonged struggle between the advocates of a federal system 
 and those who favored national organization under the form of a 
 unified centraUzed state can not be understood if interpreted as 
 a mere difference of poUtical opinion as to the most effective form 
 of government.^ Beneath this difference of view there is discernible 
 the great social conflict which was destined to lay the foundations 
 of Argentine democracy. 
 
 The spirit of federaUsm, the origin of which reaches back into the 
 colonial period at a time when local sentiment was being developed 
 by the town authorities, was sustained and developed by the rural 
 districts. The movement for a centraUzed national government, 
 on the other hand, was essentially an lu-ban movement sustained in 
 the main by the city of Buenos Aires. Although at certain stages 
 of Argentine history it represented the attempt of the province of 
 Buenos Aires to dominate the rest of the country, its social significance 
 was far deeper. The propertied classes, who represented a kind of 
 incipient aristocracy of wealth, were convinced that a strong central- 
 ized government was the only means of assuring order, protecting 
 property, and developing a healthy political life. The conflicts be- 
 tween local leaders in the provinces strengthened this belief. The 
 large landed proprietors, who Uved for the most part in Buenos 
 Aires, and who had suffered greatly from this internal strife, joined 
 hands with the commercial element in supporting the movement for 
 a centralized national government. Inasmuch as the estabUshment of 
 a unified poUtical system inevitably meant the predominance of the 
 province of Buenos Aires, the movement also found considerable 
 support in this province among other elements of the population. 
 
 On the other hand, the mass of the people in the provinces, under 
 the guidance of local leaders, supported the federal system not because 
 of their faith in this particular form of government, but because 
 of the widespread feeling that through the wider powers which this 
 system would give to the provincial governments the interests of the 
 common people would be more safely guarded. 
 
 The rural population was convinced that the federal plan was 
 the only one which would give them an opportunity to participate 
 directly in the government. They had constantly before them the 
 pictm-e of local leaders risen from the ranks, with whom they were 
 personally acquainted, and who were ever ready to listen to their 
 complaints. To them a central government in Buenos Aires meant 
 the triumph of an aristocracy and presented the direst possibiUties 
 
 » For the treatment of this period of Argentine history, the author desires to acknowledge his 
 indebtedness to the admirable work of Dr. Ernesto Quesada, La Epoea de Rosas, 1898. 
 
Foundations of Argentine Democracy 21 
 
 of tyranny and oppression. Viewed in this light, the conflict between 
 federalism and centralization assumes quite a different character. 
 It becomes a struggle between the democratic aspirations of the 
 mass of the people of the provinces and the conservative oligarchic 
 tendencies of the well-to-do urban population. With this distinc- 
 tion in mind, it is less difficult to understand the ascendency and 
 almost absolute power exercised by Rosas during the period 1829 
 to 1852. His opposition to the party which favored a strong central- 
 ized government, known as the "Unitarios," was interpreted by the 
 common people of the provinces as an espousal of their cause against 
 a movement which they regarded as a first step toward the establish- 
 . ment of a monarchy. 
 
 Whatever may have been the political ideas of Rosas, he found 
 himself in a position which forced him to rely on the common people 
 for support. The wealthy and the cultured classes of Buenos Aires 
 were not only his sworn enemies, but were actively conducting a cam- 
 paign which, if not checked, meant his downfall. Soon after acquiring 
 power Rosas inaugurated a system of ruthless persecution of his oppo- 
 nents which to most of them meant either death or exile. This 
 exercise of tyrannical power against his enemies has absorbed atten- 
 tion so completely that the profound social changes which took 
 place during the Rosas period have been lost sight of. The twenty 
 years of his ascendency mark the beginnings of pohtical and social 
 self-consciousness of the common people. The contrast between the 
 proceedings of the constitutional conventions of 1826 and 1852 fur- 
 nishes the measure of Argentine social progress during the quarter 
 century. 
 
 With the constitutional convention of 1852, the Argentine Republic 
 entered upon the fifth stage of its development. Although internal 
 strife still made impossible the final step in national organization, 
 the great fimdamental problems were solved. The struggles since 
 the declaration of independence had demonstrated that whatever its 
 disadvantages, the work of national organization would have to pro- 
 ceed on the basis of the federal principle. No matter how weak the 
 individual provinces might be, no matter how great their poverty 
 and inabiUty to perform the function of sovereign units in a federal 
 system, it was evident that the people would not accept any other 
 plan. In 1819 and 1826 the constitutional convention gave but little 
 attention to the wishes of the mass of the people of the provinces; 
 in 1852 it was no longer possible to ignore these demands. However 
 imperfect the mechanism for the expression of the popular will, there 
 is ample evidence that an organic public opinion had begun to 
 develop and that it was unalterably opposed to a highly centralized 
 national government. Although the settlement of this question did 
 not assure national unity, the conflicts which followed the adoption 
 
22 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 of the constitution of 1853 mark successive steps in the political 
 integration of the country. Interpreted in this light the war between 
 Buenos Aires and the provinces in 1861, the numerous revolutions 
 of 1875, 1876, and 1877, and the second war between Buenos Aires 
 and the provinces in 1880 represent stages in a political process 
 which has given to the country a political system which, in spite of 
 its defects, is in harmony with the political ideas of the mass of the 
 people and furnishes the basis for the development of an institutional 
 life and vigor which will in time make real the ideals of the framers 
 of the constitution. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 THE BASIS OF THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM. 
 
 The cabildo and the town. The basis of the constitutional system.^ 
 The Cabildos: Difference of opinion as to part played during colonial 
 period; Wide powers exercised; Assumption of power at critical 
 periods; Conventions of town delegates. The cabildo of Buenos Aires 
 in the revolution of 1810. The towns as the basis of national organiza- 
 tion. The formation of the provinces of the Argentine Republic. The 
 conflict between the "consolidated" and the "federal" principles in 
 national organization. 
 
 THE CABILDOS. 
 
 Among the historians of the Argentme Republic the widest differ- 
 ence of opinion prevails as to the part played by the local govern- 
 ments — the so-called "cabildos" — during the colonial period and 
 during the early years of the repubUc. To some, the cabildo is 
 the nursery of Argentine Uberty, the source of those impulses toward 
 freedom which kept alive the spirit of independence and which finally 
 led to separation from the mother country. To others the cabildo 
 of the colonial period is the servile agent of the viceroy, perpetuating 
 the tjTannical power of the local oligarchies and enabhng the central 
 government to maintain its control over local poUcy.^ 
 
 It has been abimdantly proven that the colonial cabildos were 
 not the democratic institutions which some enthusiastic historians 
 would have us believe, but it is equally true that in spite of their 
 oligarchical character they enjoyed the respect of the people and 
 became the natural heirs to authority, not only during the troubled 
 period immediately following the revolution, but also during the 
 formative years of the republic. In every instance in which the 
 power of the national government was paralyzed by reason of internal 
 strife, we find the cabildos assuming control. The important part 
 they played in the institutional development of the nation is attested 
 by the fact that it was to a great extent due to their influence that 
 the sectional feeling was kept aUve in the Argentine and led ultimately 
 to the adoption of the federal instead of the consolidated form of 
 government. 
 
 In studying the system of local government it must always be 
 remembered that, owing to the failure to find gold in the region which 
 now constitutes the Argentine RepubHc, neither the Spanish crown 
 
 ■ In the preparation of this chapter the author desires to acknowledge his indebtedness to the 
 
 valuable study of Francisco Ramos-Mejia, El Federalismo Argentino. 
 ' Cf. Del Valle, Derecho Constitucional; Ramos-MejJa, Federalismo Argentino. 
 
 23 
 
24 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 nor its direct representative, the viceroy, nor even the district gov- 
 ernors, found it necessary to exercise anything approaching the close 
 control which characterized Spanish rule in Peru.^ While reserving 
 absolute legal power, the towns were, as a matter of fact, permitted 
 considerable freedom of action. This developed a feeUng of local 
 independence which manifested itself in the assumption of wide 
 political powers by the town authorities during the decades immedi- 
 ately following separation from the mother country and in the spirit 
 of territorial independence and separateness which finally blocked all 
 attempts to form a unified state. To these pecuUar local circum- 
 stances must be added the important fact that the majority of the 
 Spanish settlers in the Argentine Republic came from Navarre, Aragon, 
 and the Basque provinces, with the spirit of local independence and 
 the adherence to local privileges strongly developed. 
 
 It is only necessary to read the published archives of Buenos 
 Aires and C6rdoba in order to understand the wide powers enjoyed 
 by the local goverimients.^ Nothing seemed foreign to their sphere 
 of action. In addition to the distinctly local services, they controlled 
 the police service, administered local criminal justice, and in many 
 cases provided for the defense of the surrounding districts against 
 possible invasion by the Indians. In addition to these functions, 
 the local authorities had the power to convene what were known 
 as cabildos abiertos, a kind of town meeting to which all the promi- 
 nent citizens of the locality were invited. When thus assembled 
 the cabildo assumed practically unlimited authority, exercisiag the 
 widest political powers, often acting in the name of the entire 
 district, and in times of crises in the name of the nation itself. The 
 fact that the towns were organized on a plan similar to the English 
 close corporation, with ample power to designate their own members, 
 while tending to develop a strong ohgarchical spirit, also served to 
 increase the spirit of local independence and the aversion to anything 
 like outside interference. 
 
 The important part which the towns were called upon to play 
 during the revolutionary period was foreshadowed in the action of 
 the cabildos during the latter half of the eighteenth century. The 
 towns began to look after the larger interests of the provinces; con- 
 ventions of representatives of the cabildos being called for this purpose. 
 One of the most important of these was that of the province of Salta, 
 held in 1776. This convention dealt with questions of taxation, 
 the condition of the Indians, and various other matters of common 
 
 1 See Report of the Viceroy, Marquis de Montesclaros, made to his successor in 1616, Coleccion 
 
 de DoGumentos Ineditos del Archive de Indias, Vol. VI, p. 191. Also cited by Eamos 
 
 Mejia in El Federalismo Argentino, p. 164. 
 ' Up to the present time these are the only archives published. The vast fund of historical 
 
 material contained in the local archives has as yet been utilized to a very limited extent. 
 
 The two collections above referred to are: (1) Acuerdos del Cabildo de Buenos Aires; 
 
 (2) Archivo Municipal de Cordoba. 
 
Basis of the Argentine Constitutional System 25 
 
 interest. It is significant that these conventions of town delegates 
 were the prototypes of the subsequent national assemblies of the 
 United Provinces of the River Plate. 
 
 The history of the Argentine during the colonial period clearly 
 shows that the towns and their representative authority, the cabildo, 
 mark the first step in the political development of the country. 
 While the provinces, prior to the declaration of independence, 
 represented little more than vast administrative districts with no 
 distinctive Hfe of their own, town institutions acquired such strength 
 and vigor that they were able to tide over the formative period, pre- 
 serving the country, immediately after the destruction of the power 
 of the Spanish crown, from disintegration and anarchy, 
 
 THE CABILDO OF BUENOS AIRES IN THE REVOLUTION OF 1810. 
 
 The circumstances attending the revolution of May 1810 clearly 
 illustrate the important part played by the town governments in the 
 formative period of the national government. It is important not 
 to lose sight of the fact that the revolutionary movement itself was 
 fomented by the town authorities, and so far as there was any unity 
 in the movement it was due to agreements between the cabildos. 
 With the destruction of the power of the viceroy the purely artificial 
 character of the provincial subdivisions became apparent. The town 
 governments were the only political units which had become identified 
 with the Ufe of the people and therefore furnished the only basis for 
 the new poUtical structure which the founders of the republic were 
 called upon to rear. 
 
 The revolution which finally led to the independence of the 
 Argentine was initiated by a large assembly composed of the council 
 of the city of Buenos Aires, to which the more prominent citizens 
 had been invited. The assembly thus called together, composed of 
 about 200 members,^ was known in the Spanish administrative system 
 as the cabildo abierto. Legally it enjoyed no powers beyond the 
 limits of the local administrative district. At the first session of the 
 assembly this lack of authority to speak in the name of the nation 
 was pointed out by one of the leaders, but to this reply was made 
 that in the absence of any constituted authority to protect the inter- 
 ests of the people, the cabildo was justified in assuming this power. 
 On May 22, 1810, this assembly adopted a resolution declaring that 
 the time had arrived to provide a government to take over the powers 
 heretofore exercised by the viceroy and that the cabildo would place 
 the administration of the affairs of the nation in the hands of a board 
 until such time as a convention of delegates from all the provinces 
 should finally determine the form of national government. 
 
 '■ 450 invitations were sent out, but only 220 answered the first roll-call. 
 
26 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 Instead of depriving the viceroy of all authority in accordance 
 with the demands of the people of Buenos Aires, the assembly first 
 attempted to carry into effect a compromise measure which provided 
 that a governing board of five members be organized, of which the 
 viceroy should be president. While still vested with executive 
 authority, his orders and decrees required the countersignature of 
 all the other members. The resolution furthermore provided for 
 the complete separation of the judicial from the executive authority, 
 the necessity of approval of all new taxes by the cabildo, the publicity 
 of accounts, and finally directed the board to notify all the towns 
 within the former territorial jurisdiction of the viceroy of the River 
 Plate to hold open cabildos for the purpose of electing representatives 
 to a national congress which should determine the form of national 
 government. 
 
 Several distinguished historians of the Argentine, notably Fran- 
 cisco Ramos-Mejia,^ have expressed deep disappointment that this 
 plan of organization was not given a fair trial. In their view the 
 form of government thus estabUshed was admirably adapted to 
 tide over the transition period. It stood in organic relation with the 
 form of government to which the people had become accustomed and 
 therefore furnished the basis for the gradual development of poUtical 
 institutions in harmony with the customs, traditions, and political 
 education of the people. It is interesting to note that the constitution 
 of the United States exerted no influence in this first attempt at 
 formulating a written constitution. The debates of the assembly 
 furnish no indication that the American poUtical system in any way 
 influenced the members of the assembly. In fact, the action of the 
 Argentine revolutionary assembly furnishes one of the few instances 
 in which a South American republic attempted to organize a gov- 
 ernment in harmony with local political traditions. The people of 
 Buenos Aires were determined, however, that every vestige of the 
 power of the viceroy should be destroyed, and their opposition made 
 impossible the form of government provided by the revolutionary 
 board. 
 
 Popular agitation rose to a pitch which endangered the authority 
 of the assembly itself, as the people threatened to exercise directly 
 the supreme poUtical authority and to organize a national government, 
 thus destroying the assembly's power. This threat had the desired 
 effect. The resignation of the viceroy was hurriedly demanded and 
 on May 25 the cabildo proceeded to organize a new provisional govern- 
 ment. While preserving the idea of a governing board, the original 
 plan was modified by reducing the authority of the president to that 
 of chairman of the board, with no independent executive powers. 
 
 ' El Federalismo Argentino, op. cit., p. 230 #. 
 
Basis of the Argentine Constitutional System 27 
 
 THE TOWNS AS THE BASIS OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATION. 
 
 The measures adopted by this provisional board to secure a definite 
 organization of the national government further demonstrate the 
 important part played by the towns in the political organization of 
 the nation. The cabildos were intrusted with the election of repre- 
 sentatives to the constitutional convention. It is true that they 
 were directed to add to their number the leading citizens within 
 their respective districts, but the town formed the unit of repre- 
 sentation. The delegates to the provisional assembly of the United 
 Provinces of the River Plate, which assembled on April 4, 1812, were 
 representatives, not of the provinces, but of the towns. The dissolu- 
 tion of this assembly and the convocation of another on October 6, 
 1812, while involving a change of personnel, did not involve any 
 change in the basis of representation. The usurpation of powers by 
 this assembly led to its speedy dissolution. The provisional govern- 
 ment, in making preparation for another assembly, determined to 
 depart from the method of election by the town authorities. This 
 determination was due in large measure to the dissatisfaction, es- 
 pecially in Buenos Aires, at the failure of the first two assemblies to 
 fulfill the expectations of the people. The decree of the provi- 
 sional government of October 24, 1812, provided for the election of 
 delegates to a constitutional convention to assemble in January 1813. 
 The freemen of every town were to choose eight electors, who, 
 together with the members of the town council, were to constitute 
 an electoral college to designate the representatives to the assembly. 
 The system of town representation was retained, Buenos Aires re- 
 ceiving four representatives, the capitals of the various provinces 
 two representatives, and "each of the towns tributary to such capital 
 cities, one representative." 
 
 The constitutional convention which assembled in Tucumdn on 
 March 24, 1816, was based on the same principle of town represent- 
 ation. Not only were the towns made the units of representation, but 
 they were also required to provide for the payment of their delegates. 
 The political development of the Argentine Republic up to and 
 including the congress of Tucumdn clearly shows that during this 
 formative period the poUtical system rested on the town organization. 
 Not only did the cabildo of Buenos Aires assume the leadership in 
 the work of national organization, but every step in the process shows 
 the important part played by the provincial towns. Representation 
 in the constituent assemblies was at first a representation not of the 
 towns, but of the town councils, the "cabildos." With the strengthen- 
 ing oif the democratic spirit the representation acquired a more 
 popular character. Throughout all these changes the towns remained 
 the primary units of the national organization. As we shall have 
 
28 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 occasion to see, this spirit of communal independence proved to be 
 the determining factor in the formation of the provinces and in their 
 development as poUtical entities. It also was at the root of the 
 federal system. The resistance of the towns to anything approach- 
 ing a consolidated national government is the real explanation of 
 the final adoption of the federal principle. 
 
 THE PROVINCES. 
 
 The history of the provinces of the Argentine Republic is so 
 closely bound up with the history of the towns that it is impossible 
 to separate them. In fact, the provinces as political entities are 
 the logical outcome of the spirit of independence and autonomy 
 fostered by the towns. The royal ordinance of Charles III of 1782, 
 which removed the provinces of the River Plate from the jurisdiction 
 of the viceroy of Peru and estabUshed the viceroyalty of Buenos Aires, 
 did not consolidate a homogeneous territory. It is important to bear 
 in mind the fact, already pointed out, that this territory had been 
 settled by three distinct streams of immigration — one from Chile, 
 which established its settlements in the district of Cuyo, another 
 from Peru, which settled the district of Tuctmadn, and a third which 
 entered by way of the River Plate, settling in Paraguay and in the 
 district of Buenos Aires. Although speaking a common language 
 and of essentially the same race, there was little feeling of imity 
 between the peoples inhabiting the new viceroyalty. The great 
 expanse of territory and the consequent impossibiUty of maintain- 
 ing close control over the constituent districts made it practically 
 impossible for the viceroy to consolidate the territory and develop 
 unity of sentiment among the population. The division of the 
 territory into eight intendencias,^ at the head of each of which a 
 governor was placed, was the recognition in law of the impossibility 
 of unified administration. But even if the viceroy of Buenos Aires 
 had been able to exercise adequate control over every portion of the 
 territory under his jurisdiction, it is doubtful whether he would have 
 been able to bring about political consolidation. 
 
 With the revolution and the repudiation of the viceroy of Buenos 
 Aires, the sectional tendencies began to manifest themselves. The 
 towns proclaimed themselves autonomous, but recognizing the neces- 
 sity of some common authority, especially for the maintenance of 
 their independence and for purposes of defense, they were prepared 
 
 i These eight intendencias were designated as follows (Gonzalez, Derecho Constitucional, p. 65): 
 (1) Buenos Aires, which included the territory of the present provinces of Buenos Aires, 
 Santa Fi, Entre Rioa, Corrientes, the republic of Uruguay, and the section of Brazil 
 known as Misiones; (2) C6rdoba del Tucumin, including the present provinces of 
 C6rdoba, Mendoza, San Juan, San Luis, and Rioja; (3) Salta, including the present 
 provinces of Salta, Jujuy, Catamarca, Tucumin, and Santiago del Estero. The others, 
 Paraguay, La Plata, Potosi, La Paz, and Puno, all included territory outside the present 
 limits of the Argentine Republic. 
 
Basis of the Argentine Constitutional System 29 
 
 to maintain a central government, but regarded its establishment 
 as a terminable compact between the territorial units which they 
 represented. 
 
 The formation of the provinces began with the revolutionary 
 movement. The first step was the action taken by the national 
 assembly which, by resolution of November 29, 1813, divided the 
 intendencia of C6rdoba into two parts, designating as the province 
 of C6rdoba the section which comprised the three former provinces 
 of Cuyo. A decree of the supreme director of the confederation, 
 dated March 7, 1814, created the eastern province of the Rio de 
 la Plata, which later on became the Republic of Uruguay. A fur- 
 ther decree of September 10 of the same year created the provinces 
 of Entre Rios, Corrientes, and Misiones. 
 
 The next step in this process of subdivision was made by the 
 executive decree of October 8, 1814, which divided the former 
 intendencia of Salta into two parts. The southern section was 
 designated the province of Tucumdn and included the present 
 provinces of Tuciundn, Santiago del Estero, and Catamarca. The 
 northern section was organized into the province of Salta and in- 
 cluded the present provinces of Salta, Jujuy, and a portion of the 
 present repubUc of Bolivia. Between 1817 and 1820 the town 
 authorities (cabildos) carried the process of subdivision still fm-ther 
 by making provinces of the territory under their jurisdiction. In 
 this way the present provinces of Santa F6, Santiago del Estero, 
 San Luis, San Juan, Catamarca, and Rioja were formed. In 1834 
 Jujuy was declared a province by the cabildo of the city.^ 
 
 In the formation of the provinces the important part played by 
 the town authorities is worthy of note. Immediately after the 
 revolution, the more important towns assumed authority over a 
 large section of surrounding territory. The gradual recognition of 
 this authority led in almost every instance to the formation of a 
 new province, which was given the name of the town whose efforts 
 had brought about its organization. We have here fiurther con- 
 firmation of the fact that the historical foundations of the political 
 institutions of the Argentine Republic are to be found in the activi- 
 ties of the cabildos during the later colonial period and during the 
 early years of independence. 
 
 THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CONSOLIDATED AND FEDERAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 The early development of political institutions in Argentina is of 
 peculiar interest to the student of political science because it illustrates 
 so clearly the futility of attempting to establish a form of government 
 out of harmony with the political ideas and traditions of the people. 
 It may well be that what the country most needed during the forma- 
 
 ■ See Gonzalez, Manual de la Constitucion Argentina, p. 56 ff. 
 
30 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 tive period was a strong central government, and it is also probable 
 that, if the cooperation of the people in the various portions of the 
 repubhc could have been secured, a strong, unified national govern- 
 ment would have been best adapted to carry out the work of national 
 organization. The great leaders, such as San Martin and Rivadavia, 
 were so impressed with the necessity of a strong central authority 
 that they failed to take into consideration the powerful centrifugal 
 forces which made such a government impossible. The spirit of 
 local autonomy which developed in the towns during the colonial 
 period became apparent as soon as the revolution of 1810 had 
 removed the last obstacles to its free expression. As Ramos-Mejia 
 clearly shows,^ the revolution brought before the country two distinct 
 problems — the first, that of securing independence; the second, and 
 no less important, that of effecting a national organization. While the 
 cities of the interior enthusiastically associated themselves with the 
 first of these movements, they were unalterably opposed to any form of 
 national organization which threatened their separate poUtical exist- 
 ence. No amount of reasoning could have convinced them that the ter- 
 ritories which they dominated and which gradually assumed the dignity 
 of provinces did not possess the requisites for a vigorous poUtical life. 
 
 Whatever the defects of the system, it is evident from our 
 present-day perspective that the federal system was the only form 
 of political organization which could hope for even a modicum of 
 success during the formative period. The first fifty years of the 
 existence of the republic represent the struggle between federalism 
 and centralization. During the period between 1810 and 1820 the 
 dangers of foreign invasion enabled the province of Buenos Aires to 
 assume the leadership and to impose its will on the country. None 
 of the other provinces possessed the financial resources to organize the 
 national defense. Temporary cooperation, however, did not signify sub- 
 mission, as is amply demonstrated by the impossibility of making effec- 
 tive the early constitutions. The anarchical conditions which so often 
 prevailed between 1810 and 1820 were in reaUty the expression of the 
 opposition of the provinces, or rather of the towns, to the attempts 
 of the capital to effect the political unification of the nation. 
 
 The attempts of the capital city and of the province of Buenos 
 Aires to force upon the country a consolidated national government,, 
 which began in 1810 and which found final expression in the con- 
 stitutions of 1819 and 1826, were at the outset doomed to failin-e^ 
 as they violated those deeply rooted sectional tendencies which had 
 their origin in the development of local institutions during the co- 
 lonial period. Even the recognized commanding position of Buenos 
 Aires was inadequate to break the force of these traditions. While 
 dominating the constitutional convention of 1819 to the extent of 
 
 » Federab'smo Argentino, p. 338 ff. 
 
Basis of the Argentine Constitutional System 31 
 
 securing the adoption of a consolidated national government, the 
 system was overthrown almost as soon as organized. The subse- 
 quent attempts to effect the same purpose only served to demon- 
 strate more clearly the impossibiUty of securing its acceptance and 
 finally resulted in the anarchy of civil war. The dictatorship of 
 Rosas and the long period of tyrannical power which he inaugm-ated 
 are directly traceable to the difficulty of harmonizing the centraliz- 
 ing tendencies of Buenos Aires and the spirit of local autonomy 
 which dominated the majority of the provinces. The bitter conflict 
 which resulted, sapped the strength of the country to such an extent 
 as to prepare it for the strong arm of the tyrant. 
 
 It may seem idle to speculate as to the probable consequences 
 of an early recognition of the federal principle as the basis of national 
 organization. It is possible that the strong spirit of local inde- 
 pendence would have made it impossible to estabhsh a central 
 government sufficiently strong to maiatain internal order and repel 
 invasion. The history of the country clearly shows that the federal 
 principle furnished the only basis for national organization, however 
 weak such organization might be. If the federal movement, as 
 expressed in the inter-provincial agreement of February 23, 1820, 
 between the provinces of Buenos Aires, Corrientes, Entre Rios, and 
 Santa F6, and the quadrilateral agreement of January 25, 1822, 
 between the same provinces, both of which clearly recognized the 
 federal principle, had been used as the basis for the gradual organi- 
 zation of the nation, it is probable that the work of completing the 
 poUtical organization of the nation would not have required more 
 than half a century. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 ANTECEDENTS OF THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION.' 
 
 The successive steps in the development of national sentiment. The 
 Pirovisions, statutes, and regulations between 1811 and 1816. Constitu- 
 tional convention of Tucumdn (1816). Inter-provincial agreements 
 and treaties. The acuerdo de San Nicolas. The rejection of the acuerdo 
 by the legislative assembly of Buenos Aires. The outbreak of the revo- 
 lution of September 11, 1852. 
 
 The constitutional convention of 1852 is usually referred to by 
 Argentine commentators as marking the beginning of the epoch of 
 national organization. It is important to bear in mind, however, 
 that the form of government adopted by that convention, although 
 profoundly influenced by the constitution of the United States, rep- 
 resents a step in the development of the Argentine political system 
 which stands in direct and organic relation with the system which 
 it replaced. The successive steps in this process are marked by the 
 provisional regulations of October 22, 1811,^ the provisional statute 
 of November 22, 1811,' the statute for the security of the individual 
 of November 23, 1811,* and the regulations for the administration 
 of justice of January 23, 1812.* The mere enumeration of these 
 instruments is sufficient to demonstrate that they represent distinct 
 stages in the development of national sentiment which came to full 
 fruition in the constitution of 1853 and the amendments of 1860, 
 1880, and 1898. The first general constituent assembly of the United 
 Provinces of the River Plate, which met in Buenos Aires on January 
 31, 1813, adopted a series of fundamental laws which, considered jointly, 
 constitute a well-defined constitutional system. These organic laws 
 are as follows: 
 
 1. The statute of February 27, 1813, organizing a national executive 
 
 authority designated as the supreme director. 
 
 2. The statute of February 26, 1814, modifjdng and enlarging the 
 
 powers of the national executive. 
 
 3. llie regulations for the administration of justice (reglamento 
 
 de la administracion de justicia) of September 6, 1813. 
 
 In addition to its powers as a constitutional convention, this 
 assembly assumed legislative powers and adopted a number of im- 
 portant laws, among which should be mentioned the abolition of 
 
 > For the data contained in this chapter the author is indebted to the valuable work of 
 Joaquin V. Gonzalez, "Manual de la Conatitucion Argentina" and of Aristobulo del 
 Valle, "Nooiones de Derecho Conatitucional." 
 
 ' Reglamento Provisorio de 22 de Octubre, 1811. 
 
 = Estatuto Provisional de 22 Noviembre, 1811. 
 
 : Estatuto de Seguridad Individual del 23 de Noviembre, 1811. 
 
 ■ Reglamento de Inatitucion y Administracion de Justicia de 23 de Enero, 1812. 
 
 33 
 
34 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 slavery (February 2, February 4, and March 12, 1813), the abolition 
 of torture in criminal prosecutions (May 21, 1813), the abolition of 
 the tribunal of the inquisition (March 24, 1813), the abolition of 
 monopolies and restrictions upon foreign and domestic trade.^ 
 
 The second constituent assembly convened in Tucumdn in 1816 
 and, after issuing a formal declaration of independence, transferred 
 its labors to the city of Buenos Aires and there adopted a provisional 
 statute ^ for the administration of the affairs of the nation, which 
 was to continue in force until the formulation and adoption of a 
 permanent constitution. This statute provided for a national execu- 
 tive to be known as the director of state (director del estado), elected 
 by the congress. It was further provided that the governors of 
 provinces be appointed by the national executive from lists sub- 
 mitted by the town authorities of the respective provinces. In this 
 fundamental law we find incorporated many of the constitutional 
 guarantees which are contained in the constitution of 1853.^ 
 
 The constitution adopted by the constituent assembly of 1817 
 and finally promulgated on April 22, 1819,* although in operation 
 but a few months, presents considerable historical interest, because 
 it expresses so clearly the conflict between the federal and the con- 
 solidated principles of national organization, which have played a 
 leading part in Argentine history. In this convention of 1817 the 
 consoUdated principle triumphed, but the influence of local leaders 
 was sufficient to thwart the efforts to put it into operation. The 
 national congress, intimidated by local leaders, especially by the 
 famous Artigas, adjourned, placing the direction of national affairs in 
 the hands of the town authorities (cabildo) of Buenos Aires. With 
 the dissolution of this congress the country enters upon a prolonged 
 period of civil war. 
 
 Complete anarchy was avoided only through a series of agree- 
 ments between the governors of several of the provinces. The most 
 notable of these was the treaty of Pilar between the governors of 
 Entre Rios, Santa Fe, and Buenos Aires, signed February 23, 1820, pro- 
 viding for a loose form of federation.^ This was followed by the famous 
 quadrilateral treaty of Janaury 25, 1822,* between the governments 
 of Buenos Aires, Corrientes, Entre Rios, and Santa F6, which was 
 designed to secure freedom of commerce and navigation between 
 these provinces and to secure the benefits of domestic peace. 
 
 The necessities of national defense, especially the danger of invasion 
 by Brazil, gradually brought the provinces closer together. Diu-ing 
 
 ' See Trabajos de las primeras asambleas Argentinas desde la Junta de 1811 hasta la disolucion 
 
 del Congreso en 1822, Vol. I, 1811-1820. 
 ^ Reglamento Provisorio para la direocion y administraciou del Estado del 3 de Deciembre, 1817. 
 ' Registro Nacional, 1817, Vol. I, pp. 441-454. 
 * Ibid., 1819, Vol. I, pp. 502-508. 
 
 ' Vicente Fidel Lopez, Historia Argentina, Vol. XIII, Chap, II, p. 143 ff. 
 ' Registro Nacional, 1822, Vol. II, p. 4. 
 
Antecedents of the Argentine Constitution 35 
 
 the year 1820 a board of representatives of the provmces, known 
 as the Junta de Representantes, was organized. Although wielding 
 comparatively little influence, it was nevertheless the outward ex- 
 pression, during the years of anarchy immediately following 1819, 
 of the social and racial, if not of the political, unity of the provinces 
 of the River Plate.* In 1824 ^ this junta passed a law authorizing the 
 calling of a new constitutional convention. On December 6 of the 
 same year delegates of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, San Luis, Entre 
 Rios, C6rdoba, Tucumdn, Salta, Mendoza, Santiago del Estero, 
 Corrientes, Jujuy, and Misiones met in Buenos Aires for a preliminary 
 conference and on December 22 the convention was formally installed. 
 The constitution adopted by this convention (December 24, 1826) 
 was based on the constitution of 1819, with some modifications in the 
 organization and method of election of the executive and legislative 
 authorities, and provided for a consolidated system of government, 
 the provinces being reduced to mere administrative subdivisions.' In 
 addition to adopting the constitution the convention nationalized the 
 city of Buenos Aires, declaring it the federal capital. 
 
 The submission of this constitution to the provinces was the signal 
 for a general movement of local leaders against its acceptance. To 
 these local leaders of the provinces a consoUdated poUtical system 
 meant the supremacy of the province of Buenos Aires and their 
 consequent subordination. This they were determined to combat 
 at whatever cost. The settlement of the conflict with Brazil through 
 the establishment of the independence of Uruguay removed the last 
 obstacle to the violent assertion of this opposition. 
 
 The anarchical conditions which accompanied the struggle 
 between consolidationists and federalists finally led to the dictator- 
 ship of Juan Manuel Rosas, who, although ostensibly representing 
 the federaUst cause, succeeded in establishing a form of absolutism 
 
 '^ It is a notable fact that these inter-provincial treaties played a most important part in the 
 process of national organization. Amongst the most important of these we may mention: 
 
 1. Treaty of peace and commerce of August 7, 1829, between C6rdoba and Santa F6. 
 
 2. Treaty of peace, friendship, and alliance of October 19, 1829, between Buenos 
 
 Aires and Santa F&. 
 3 Treaty of peace, friendship, and alliance of October 27, 1829, between Buenos 
 
 Aires and C6rdoba. 
 4. Treaty of peace and friendship of April 16, 1830, between San Juan and Cdrdoba. 
 6. Treaty of peace, friendship, and offensive and defensive alliance of July 5, 1830, 
 
 between Cdrdoba, Mendoza, San Luis, and Rioja. 
 
 6. Treaty of union and alliance of August 31, 1830, between C6rdoba, Mendoza, San 
 
 Luis, Rioja, San Juan, Catamarca, Santiago, Salta, and Tucumdn. 
 
 7. Treaty of January 4, 1831, between Buenos Aires, Santa Fd, and Entre Rios, 
 
 which furnished the basis for the agreement of San Nicolas (Registro Nacional, 
 Vol. II, p. 279). 
 
 8. Agreement of San Nicolas of May 31, 1852, upon which the constitution of 1853 
 
 rests (Registro Nacional, Vol. Ill, pp. 13-16). 
 
 9. Treaty of peace between Buenos Aires and the confederation of November 11, 
 
 1859, and under which Buenos Aires was brought into the vmion. 
 
 s Law, February 27, 1824. 
 
 ' Registro Nacional, Vol. II, pp. 1926, 1939, 1940, 1947, 2083, 2098, 2103. 
 
36 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 which continued until 1852. In 1829 he was elected governor and 
 captain-general of the province of Buenos Aires, and at the same time 
 intrusted with the conduct of the foreign relations of the River Plate 
 provinces. In 1836 his power was further increased by a plebiscite 
 which placed supreme poUtical power ia his hands.^ 
 
 This period of more than twenty years (1829-1852) in the history 
 of the Argentine RepubUc is usually ignored by the historians of the 
 country's constitutional development on the ground that a period 
 of dictatorship has nothing to do with the orderly development of 
 free institutions, and that it is, therefore, to be regarded as abnor- 
 mal and "outlawed." So distinguished a publicist as Del Valle* 
 expresses the prevaihng opinion amongst Argentine constitutional 
 lawyers when he says: 
 
 "The bloody dictatorship of Rosas teaches an important lesson, but it 
 furnishes no material for our study. Despotism is not a political institu- 
 tion, but rather the suppression of all rules and principles of social govern- 
 ment. We must, therefore, pass over this sad period and renew our studies 
 with the first attempts at national re-organization which began at the close 
 of this epoch." 
 
 It is only within the last few years that a broader view of this 
 important period is making itself felt. Whatever the verdict as 
 to the means employed by Rosas to carry out his plans, it is evident 
 that his twenty-three years of unquestioned authority not only left 
 a deep impress on the institutions of the country, but, in a sense, 
 prepared the way for the national reorganization of 1853.' Federal 
 institutions in the Argentine were incapable of vigorous growth so 
 long as the tyranny of petty provincial leaders continued. One of 
 the first effects of the dominant power of Rosas was to curb the power 
 of these local tyrants, whose arbitrary measures were an insuperable 
 obstacle to the development of anything approaching local self- 
 government in the provinces. In spite of his brutal and almost 
 savage poUcy in repressing all opposition, the government of Rosas 
 marks a step in the process of national organization, the full effects 
 of which can be seen when we compare the so-called federaUsm of 
 1829 with the federaUsm of 1853. The former was but a cloak for 
 anarchy; the latter gives evidence of the organic unity without 
 which a federal system is impossible. Another fact which deserves 
 consideration in estimating the influence of Rosas is the orderly 
 methods which he introduced into the public administration. It was 
 well known that he would not tolerate inefficiency in the conduct of 
 
 1 Technically designated as "La suma del Poder Publico." Article XXIX, constitution, 1853» 
 specifically prohibits the granting of supreme political power to the executive or legisla- 
 tive authorities of the nation or of the provinces. 
 
 ' Derecho Constitucional, p. 475. See also Alberdi, Organizacion de la Confederacion Argentina, 
 edition 1856, p. 1. 
 
 ' See the important volume of Ernesto Quesada, La Epoca de Rosas, Buenos Aires, 1898 ; also, 
 Adolfo Saldias, Historia de la Confederacion Argentina, 2d ed., 5 volumes. 
 
Antecedents of the Argentine Constitution 37 
 
 public business and punished with ahnost brutal severity the sUghtest 
 laxity in public accounts. 
 
 But by far the most important achievement of this period was 
 its influence on the social organization of the country.^ Although 
 the first steps in the separation from the mother country were sup- 
 ported by a popular movement, the period immediately following the 
 declaration of independence showed distinct signs of the aristocratic 
 trend which the movement soon assumed. In each of the provinces 
 an oligarchy was gradually establishing itself which, if permitted to 
 develop, would smother any attempt toward the development of a 
 real democracy. Although the Rosas government was anything but 
 a free government, its effect upon the Argentine social organization 
 was to prepare the way for a real democratic movement. Although 
 his government was a reign of terror, it was directed in the main 
 against the relatively small groups whose main pmpose was to 
 monopoUze the poUtical life of Buenos Aires and the provinces. 
 When Rosas was compelled to rehnquish the government after the 
 battle of Caseros, the spirit of special political privilege which had 
 characterized the first decades of independence had given way to 
 a spirit of equahty amongst the common people, which gave the 
 nation a reserve civic force which it had never before enjoyed. 
 As Quesada ^ clearly points out, Argentina passed through a social 
 revolution during the government of Rosas, the result of which was to 
 place the country on the road toward a real democratic development. 
 The downfall of Rosas in 1852 and the assembling of a new 
 constitutional convention, while marking therefore an epoch in the 
 history of the country, stand in close and organic relation with the 
 long period of tyranny which preceded. 
 
 General Urquiza, who led the allied forces against Rosas, was 
 anxious to hold a convention with the least possible delay for the 
 purpose of framing a new constitution. He realized that the position 
 of the province of Buenos Aires in the federation presented many 
 and serious difficulties and he was determined to have the funda- 
 mental problems settled before the opposition had opportunity to 
 become thoroughly organized. Although General Urquiza was com- 
 plete master of the situation during the period immediately follow- 
 ing the battle of Caseros, he did not make full use of this power 
 until the province of Buenos Aires began to show hostility to his 
 plans. One of his first acts was to appoint Dr. Vicente Lopez pro- 
 visional governor of Buenos Aires and to intrust the government of 
 the province with the conduct of the foreign relations of the nation. 
 In the formation of his cabinet Dr. Lopez appointed Dr. Valentino 
 Alsina minister of government. General Urquiza was well aware 
 
 » Ernesto Quesada, La Epoca de Rosas, Buenos Aires, 1898. 
 3 Epoca de Rosas, p. 346 et seq. 
 
38 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 that Alsina was unalterably opposed to his policy, and this fact led 
 him to take the first step toward assuming part of the power which 
 he had delegated. On April 5, 1852, the governors of Buenos Aires, 
 Corrientes, and Santa F6 met with General Urquiza on the outskirts 
 of the city of Buenos Aires ^ and adopted a series of resolutions which 
 accomplished two important purposes. The first was the adoption 
 of a protocol which made the interprovincial treaty of 1831, known 
 as the "Pacta de la Liga Litoral," the basis upon which the reorgani- 
 zation of the national government should be effected. The second 
 was to take the conduct of foreign affairs from the government of 
 Buenos Aires and place it in the hands of General Urquiza. On 
 the following day, April 6, 1852, General Urquiza made use of this 
 power by appointing the former minister of foreign affairs special 
 envoy to Brazil and making the then minister of pubUc instruction 
 of the province of Buenos Aires, Dr. Vicente Fidel Lopez, his pro- 
 visional minister of foreign affairs. 
 
 Two days later, April 8, 1852, the invitation was sent to the 
 several governors of the provinces to meet in San Nicolas de los 
 Arroyos to hold a preliminary conference not later than May 20, 
 as General Urquiza was anxious to have the formal conference open 
 on May 25, the aimiversary of the beginning of the movement for 
 national independence. This conference was expected to take the pre- 
 liminary steps toward the framing of a national constitution. It is a 
 matter worthy of note that with the exception of the governor of 
 Buenos Aires, who was elected at a special election ordered by Gen- 
 eral Urquiza, all the provincial governors to whom invitations were 
 sent had supported the dictatorship of Rosas and were in fact his 
 appointees. 
 
 At the conference of San Nicolas, General Urquiza represented 
 the provinces of Entre Rios and Catamarca. The provinces of 
 Corrientes, San Luis, San Juan, Tucumdn, Mendoza, Santiago del 
 Estero, Rioja, Santa F6, and Buenos Aires were represented by their 
 respective governors. But three provinces failed to appear — Salta, 
 Jujuy, and C6rdoba. These three provinces ratified the agreement 
 July 1, 1852. Within less than ten days after assembling, the governors 
 of the provinces represented agreed upon certain fimdamental prin- 
 ciples for the constitutional reorganization of the country.* 
 
 This instrument consists of nineteen articles, which may be sum- 
 marized as follows: 
 
 1. The pact of January 4, 1831, is recognized as the basis for con- 
 stitutional reorganization. 
 
 2. Domestic order having been reestablished the time has arrived 
 to fulfill the provisions of Article XVI of said pact, viz., to call a con- 
 stitutional convention to organize a federal system of government. 
 
 ' Palermo. Now incorporated into the city limits. 
 
 ' Known as the Acuerdo de San Nicolas. See Registro Nacional, Vol. II, p. 279. 
 
Antecedents of the Argentine Constitution 39 
 
 3. All imposts or duties on interprovincial commerce are abolished. 
 
 4. The constitutional convention to convene in August 1852; the 
 delegates being elected in the same manner as members of the pro- 
 vincial legislatures. 
 
 5. Each province is entitled to two delegates. 
 
 6. A majority vote is sufficient for the adoption of the constitution. 
 
 7. The governors of the respective provinces bind themselves to use 
 every lawful influence to secure the election of men imbued with national 
 sentiment, patriotism, and probity. 
 
 8. Establishes the immunity of delegates, but gives to each province 
 the right to withdraw its delegates; requiring, however, the immediate 
 appointment of their substitutes. 
 
 9. Provides for the method of paying the per diem of delegates. 
 
 10. Provides for the method of paying the other expenses of the 
 convention. 
 
 11. Santa F6 is designated as the meeting place of the convention. 
 
 12. The constitution once adopted is to be sent to the provisional 
 executive, who shall proclaim the same, together with such organic 
 laws as may be necessary for its execution. The convention shall then 
 elect the first constitutional president of the repubhc and adjourn. 
 
 13. Pending the adoption of the new constitution the provincial 
 governors shall give special attention to the maintenance of order in 
 their respective provinces. 
 
 14. In case of domestic violence the minister of foreign affairs * is 
 empowered to take such measures as he may deem necessary to restore 
 order. 
 
 15. That, pending the adoption of the new constitution, the land 
 and naval forces of the provinces be placed at the disposal of General 
 Urquiza, who, during this period, is to represent the national sovereignty 
 and act as director of foreign affairs. 
 
 16. That said director of foreign affairs be empowered to regulate 
 the navigation of rivers, the establishment of post-offices, and the 
 improvement of highways. 
 
 17. That the provisional executive be empowered to form a council 
 of state to assist him in the management of public affairs. 
 
 18. That the said director of foreign relations receive the title " pro- 
 visional director of the Argentine Confederation." 
 
 19. That until the estabhshment of a system of national duties, im- 
 posts and excises the respective provinces contribute to the national 
 treasury in proportion to the income from the foreign customs dues 
 which they have estabhshed. 
 
 As soon as the tenns of the agreement became known the hostile 
 movement in the province of Buenos Aires began to take definite 
 shape. The articles w^hich aroused the greatest opposition were 
 those giving to the provisional director^ of the confederation the 
 power to dispose of the land and naval forces and to suppress domestic 
 violence in any of the provinces. The cry was raised that the way 
 was being prepared for a new dictatorship. Although the contents 
 of the famous agreement were known to the members of the pro- 
 vincial legislatvire of Buenos Aires, the instrument was not officially 
 
 ' Technically known as the "Encargado de laa Relaciones Exteriores," who was in reality the 
 provisional executive. General Urquiza occupied this position. 
 
40 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 submitted for their consideration until June 14 (1852). On the 21st 
 the memorable debate ' took place which resulted in the rejection 
 of the agreement and marks the beginning of a new revolutionary- 
 movement which resulted in the separation of Buenos Aires from 
 the confederation. The following day, Dr. Lopez, the governor of 
 Buenos Aires, presented his resignation, which was accepted. The 
 president of the legislative assembly was inamediately intrusted 
 with the executive direction of the affairs of the province. 
 
 As soon as General Urquiza was informed of these proceedings 
 he sent a communication to the acting governor informing him that 
 he regarded the proceedings of the assembly as anarchical and sub- 
 versive of order and that in view of these circumstances he had 
 decided to dissolve the assembly and to assume temporarily the 
 government of the province. Deeming it necessary to assist in the 
 preparations for the national constitutional convention which was 
 soon to meet in Santa Fe, he delegated the power thus assumed to 
 General Galan.^ The departure of General Urquiza for Santa F§ 
 was the signal for the beginning of a series of conspiracies which 
 finally took shape in the revolution of September 11, 1852. After 
 a brief struggle with the forces of the confederation, the conflict 
 resulted in the establishment of Buenos Aires as an independent state, 
 which adopted a new constitution in 1854. 
 
 = In this classic debate the most notable speeches were delivered by Colonel (afterwards Presi- 
 dent) Mitr6, Dr. Velez, and Dr. Vicente Fidel Lopez. 
 ^ Decree of September 11, 1852. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 CONSTITUTION OF 1853 AND AMENDMENTS OF 1860. 1866. AND 1898. 
 
 Situation created by refusal of Buenos Aires to take part in the 
 national constitutional convention. Conflict between Buenos Aires and 
 the other provinces. Difficulties of the situation. Clearly defined work 
 of the convention. Alberdi draft submitted to the committee on 
 constitutional affairs. Report of the "committee on constitutional 
 affairs." Signing of the constitution. Rejection by the province of 
 Buenos Aires. Struggle between Buenos Aires and the confederation. 
 Treaty of November 11, 1859, and pact of union of June 6, 1860. 
 Constitutional convention of the province of Buenos Aires of 1860. 
 Amendments proposed. National constitutional convention of 1860 
 (September 14^25). Conflict between Buenos Aires and the confed- 
 eration. Amendments of 1866. Amendments of 1898. 
 
 The constitutional convention which assembled in the city of 
 Santa Fe on November 20, 1852, met under the most unfavorable 
 circumstances. It is true that every province with the exception of 
 Buenos Aires was represented, but it is important to bear in mind 
 what the absence of this province signified. The prospect of forming 
 a vigorous federation without Buenos Aires was not encouraging. 
 With less than one-third of the population and about one-fourth of 
 the wealth of the country, the thirteen provinces were certain to 
 cut a rather sorry figure in their isolation. The most serious factor 
 in the situation was the fact that the central government of the 
 confederation had always depended upon the customs dues for its 
 support. As the city of Buenos Aires was practically the only port 
 of entry, the central government would be deprived of its most 
 important means of support. The system of provincial taxation 
 was so defective that it yielded but an insignificant revenue. No 
 attempt at direct federal taxation had ever been made. In 1852 
 the revenues from customs dues amounted to $4,000,000 gold, which 
 would have been ample to support the central government, but 
 which was diverted into the treasury of the province of Buenos Aires. 
 
 It is no wonder, therefore, that the enthusiasm which marked the 
 first announcement of the calling of a national constitutional conven- 
 tion should have cooled somewhat by the time the delegates met in 
 November 1852. In fact, had the revolution in Buenos Aires broken out 
 a few months earlier it is doubtful whether General Urquiza could have 
 secured the attendance of delegates from all the provinces.^ It was 
 evident that the absence of Buenos Aires meant the beginning of a 
 
 > Mariano A. Pelliza, Historia de la Organizacion Nacional, Buenos Aires, 1897, pp. 73 ff. 
 
 41 
 
42 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 struggle between the provinces and this indispensable portion of the 
 confederation. The delegates all realized that without the province of 
 Buenos Aires a vigorous national organization was impossible. There 
 was general agreement that this province had to come into the confeder- 
 ation, willingly, if possible — by force, if necessary. General Urquiza, 
 in his opening address,^ expressed the opinion of the delegates when 
 he said: 
 
 "The absence of Buenos Aires does not mean permanent separation, 
 it is more in the nature of a passing accident. Geographical conditions, 
 historical traditions, and a series of treaties and agreements bind Buenos 
 Aires to the nation. She can no more continue indefinitely without her 
 sister provinces than her sister provinces without her. In the Argentine 
 flag there is room for more than fourteen stars, but it is not possible to 
 eliminate any one of these." 
 
 It is not surprising, therefore, that in the minds of some of the 
 delegates there was considerable misgiving as to the ultimate success 
 of the undertaking upon which they had embarked. In fact, these 
 misgivings took definite shape in the form of a motion presented by 
 Dr. Facundo Zuvirfa, the presiding officer, on April 19, 1853, to 
 postpone the adoption of a constitution. In a long speech dehvered 
 the following day he maintained that no attempt should be made 
 to adopt a new constitution until the country had been pacified and 
 real unity attained. Although this view received but little support, 
 the somewhat bitter replies made to the president's speech indicate 
 that the delegates were deeply impressed with the unfavorable condi- 
 tions under which the assembly had met. In some respects the 
 work of the convention of 1852 was more clearly defined than that 
 of any previous Argentine constitutional assembly. Most of the 
 previous assemblies met without definite program and without clearly 
 defined powers. The result was that in many instances they assumed 
 extensive legislative powers and at times failed to fulfill the main 
 purpose for which they had been called. For the convention of 
 1852 the program was prescribed by the agreement of San NicoUs. 
 Not only was the convention directed to adhere to the federal prin- 
 ciple in organizing the national government, but it was also required 
 to estabUsh freedom of domestic commerce, to provide adequate 
 national revenues, and to assm-e the payment of the pubUc debt. 
 
 Although the convention met on November 20, 1852, the draft 
 of the constitution was not submitted by the committee on constitu- 
 tional affau-s until April 18, 1853. The material submitted to the 
 committee as a basis for its labors was extremely meager. It is true 
 that the agreement of San NicoMs declared the interprovincial 
 treaty of January 4, 1831, to be the fundamental law of the Republic, 
 
 ' Owing to the revolution in Buenos Aires he was unable to be present personally, but his ad- 
 dress was read to the convention. 
 
Constitution of 1853. Amendments of 1860, 1866, 1898 43 
 
 but this treaty, while recognizing the federal system, did not contain 
 the elements of a national constitution. 
 
 It was reported by one of the delegates that during the preliminary 
 sessions of the convention considerable use was made of the "Fed- 
 eralist," but it is certain that the document which played the most 
 important part in determining the views of the delegates was the 
 draft of a federal constitution submitted by Juan Bautista Alberdi, 
 who had migrated from the Argentine Republic during the dictator- 
 ship of Rosas and who was living in Chile at the time. It is evident, 
 however, that the members of the committee on constitutional affairs 
 were acquainted with the constitution of the United States. A 
 comparison of Alberdi's draft with that submitted by the special 
 committee to the convention shows that the committee made liberal 
 use of the provisions of the constitution of the United States. In 
 fact, the chairman of the committee, in submitting the constitution 
 to the convention, said: "The draft of the committee has been cast 
 in the mold of the constitution of the United States, the only model 
 now existing for a real federation." ^ 
 
 The report of the committee intrusted with the drafting of a 
 constitution ^ was submitted to the convention on April 18, 1853.* 
 The document is brief and contains the merest outline of the system 
 of government proposed. In addition to the project of a constitution 
 the committee submitted drafts of two laws: one for the organization 
 of the financial system of the confederation and the other for the 
 nationaUzation of the city of Buenos Aires and its estabhshment as 
 the national capital, in conformity with article 3 of the constitution. 
 On May 1, 1853, the constitution was signed by the delegates of the 
 provinces represented and on May 25 General Urquiza, provisional 
 director of the Argentine confederation, proclaimed the constitution the 
 supreme law of the land. In August 1853,* General Urquiza ordered the 
 holding of elections for president and vice-president. He was elected 
 president and Dr. del Carril vice-president. The city of Parand (prov- 
 ince of Entre Rfos) was declared the temporary capital of the confeder- 
 ation ^ until the settlement of the pending differences with the province 
 of Buenos Aires. 
 
 The grave question which now presented itself was the relation 
 of the province of Buenos Aires to the federation. Article VII of 
 the law designating Buenos Aires as the national capital provided 
 that a special conmiittee of the convention should submit the con- 
 stitution to the authorities of the province with a view to securing 
 
 • Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Session April 20, 1853. See volume entitled 
 
 "Convencion Nacional," p. 270. 
 » Comision de Negocioa Constitucionales. 
 a See volume on Convencion Nacional de 1898 containing proceedings of convention of 1852-53, 
 
 p. 264. 
 
 * Decree of August 29, 1853. ' Law of December 18, 1853. 
 
44 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 its acceptance. Both the national constitution and the law creating 
 the federal district of Buenos Aires were promptly rejected by the 
 legislature of the province. A long struggle between the federation 
 and the province now follows. General Urquiza, the president of 
 the federation, saw clearly that every effort would have to be directed 
 toward bringing the province of Buenos Aires into the union. Under 
 the then existing conditions, with the city of Buenos Aires the only 
 port of entry, the other provinces were compelled to pay tribute to 
 Buenos Aires. All goods imported from Europe first paid customs 
 dues in Buenos Aires. The independence of this important province 
 was, therefore, a real burden to the other provinces. In order to 
 lighten this burden and at the same time bring pressure to bear on 
 the people and government of Buenos Aires, a system of differential 
 duties was inaugurated in 1856. Under this plan prohibitory duties 
 were placed upon imports which did not come directly from foreign 
 ports. This measure served to increase the enmity between Buenos 
 Aires and the federation. The fact that these differential duties 
 did not bring about the results anticipated strengthened the belief of 
 the leaders of the confederation that if Buenos Aires could not be 
 induced to come into the union willingly she would have to be forced 
 to do so. A mmaber of attempts to bring about a modus vivendi 
 failed. The most notable of these was undertaken by the American 
 charg^ d'affaires. Colonel Yancey, in 1858, but failed because of the 
 conditions attached by the government of the province.^ 
 
 In October 1859 the conflict between the federal and provincial 
 forces culminated in actual warfare. The first action at Cepeda 
 resulted in a victory for the federal forces. General Urquiza fol- 
 lowed up this advantage by a rapid march toward the city of 
 Buenos Aires. Thus invaded and threatened with the capture of 
 the capital, the government of Buenos Aires was prepared to com- 
 promise. On November 10 a treaty of peace was signed, ratified 
 on the following day (November 11), and supplemented by afm-ther 
 agreement of June 6, 1860. This treaty provided: 
 
 First. The province of Buenos Aires to enter the federation. 
 
 Second. A provincial constitutional convention to be called for 
 the purpose of examining the national constitution of 1853. If the 
 convention adopts the constitution without amendment the province 
 of Buenos Aires shall accept the same without delay. 
 
 Third. In case the provincial convention proposes amendments, a 
 national constitutional convention ad hoc shall be called. 
 
 The constitutional convention of the province of Buenos Aires 
 assembled on January 5, 1860. More than a month was lost in the 
 discussion of credentials of delegates. The question of accepting the 
 
 ' These conditions were: (o) That the city of Buenos Aires should not be the federal capital; 
 (6) That General Urquiza should retire and occupy no public office under the confederation. 
 
Constitution of 1853. Amendments of 1860, 1866, 1898 45 
 
 national constitution without amendment was put to vote and 
 negatived. A special committee was then appointed to examine 
 the national constitution and to propose amendments. This com- 
 mittee began its labors on April 6, 1860, and remained in session 
 until May 3, when its report was submitted to the convention.^ In 
 the amendments proposed by the committee the influence of the 
 constitution of the United States is everywhere apparent. The 
 chairman of the comimittee, Dr. Dahnacio Velez-Sarsfield, in present- 
 ing the report, said: 
 
 "The constitution (of the United States of America) has in seventy 
 years assured the progress of an immense continent. The framers of the 
 Argentine constitution adopted it as a model in framing the constitution 
 which we are now examining. They did not, however, respect its sacred 
 text, but in their ignorance and with the idea of improving upon it, sup- 
 pressed certain portions and altered others. Your committee has done 
 nothing more than incorporate into the Argentine system those portions 
 of the constitution of the United States which the framers of the constitution 
 of 1853 had altered to the detriment of their political system." 
 
 The amendments proposed by the committee were made the sub- 
 ject of prolonged discussion, but were finally adopted by the conven- 
 tion on May 12, 1860. 
 
 In accordance with the provisions of the treaty of November 11, 
 1859, and the agreement of June 6, 1860, the amendments proposed 
 by the convention of Buenos Aires were to be submitted to a national 
 constitutional convention called for this piupose. In accordance 
 with this arrangement the national convention met in the city of 
 Santa Fe September 14, 1860. On September 23 the special com- 
 mittee appointed to examine the amendments proposed by the Buenos 
 Aires convention presented its report recommending the acceptance 
 of the proposed amendments with a few verbal but unimportant 
 changes. The convention adjourned September 25, after adopting 
 the amendments as proposed by the conunittee. The amendments 
 incorporated into the constitution may be classified as follows: ^ 
 
 First. Appendix B gives article 3 as follows : 
 
 "The authorities exercising the functions of the federal government 
 shaU reside in the city which shall be declared by special act of Congress 
 to be the capital of the repubhc, a previous cession of the territory which 
 shall become federal being made by one or more of the provincial legisla- 
 tiu-es." 
 
 Second. Article 4 of the constitution gave to the federal government 
 the power to levy export duties. The Buenos Aires convention proposed 
 
 ' Diarlo de Sesiones de la Convencion del Estado de Buenos Aires, encargada del examen de la 
 Constitucion Federal y Anexas, 1860. See especially speech of Dr. Velez-Sarsfield in 
 presenting the report of the commission. 
 
 * Proceedings of National Convention of 1860, in an official publication entitled "Convencion 
 Nacional de 1898," pp. 640-642, in which the proceedings of the conventions of 1860 and 
 1866 are reprinted. Also Del Valle, Derecho Constitucional, p. 507 #. 
 
46 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 that all export duties should cease in 1866.' It is evident that Buenos Aires 
 as the only exporting province felt the burden of this form of taxation and 
 was anxious, therefore, to take this power from the federal government. 
 The acceptance of this amendment made article 4 read as follows: 
 
 " The federal government shall defray the expenses of the nation with 
 the funds of the national treasury, consisting of: receipts from import 
 and export duties; duties to be levied until 1866 on the exports of domestic 
 merchandise as provided in paragraph No. 1 of article 67 of the present 
 constitution;^ proceeds of the sale or lease of national lands; revenues 
 of the postal service; taxes levied by the general congress equitably 
 and in proportion to the population; and moneys obtained through 
 loans and financial operations decreed by said congress for national 
 urgencies, or for works of national utility." 
 
 Third. Article 5 of the constitution, of 1853 provided for free schools 
 up to the grade of high schools.' Owing to the limited resources of many 
 of the provinces, the obligation to establish free schools was eliminated. 
 This article also provided that the constitutions framed by the several prov- 
 inces should be submitted to the national congress for approval before 
 taking effect. The province of Buenos Aires had adopted a constitution 
 in 1854 and, the provincial convention being opposed to the submission of 
 this constitution to the congress, proposed the suppression of this require- 
 ment. Article 5 as amended reads: 
 
 "Each province shall adopt its own constitution, which shall provide 
 for the administration of justice in its own territory, its municipal sys- 
 tem, and primary instruction, such constitution to be framed upon the 
 repubhcan representative plan, in harmony with the principles, declara- 
 tions, and guaranties of the national constitution. Upon these con- 
 ditions, the federal government shall guarantee to each province the 
 enjoyment and exercise of its institutions." 
 
 Fourth. Article 6 of the. constitution of 1853 gave to the federal govern- 
 ment the power to intervene in the government of a province upon the 
 request of the legislature or governor or without such request for the purpose 
 of suppressing domestic violence, of preserving the safety of the nation or 
 repelling foreign invasion. The amendment as proposed and accepted 
 brings the article closer to article IV, section 4, of the constitution of the 
 United States by providing that the federal government shall intervene in 
 the government of the provinces to guarantee a republican form of govern- 
 ment and to repel foreign invasion. When, however, domestic violence 
 or the invasion of another province either threatens the constituted 
 authorities or has deposed them, the federal government may intervene 
 only upon the request of such provincial authorities. In making this distinc- 
 tion it is evident that the province of Buenos Aires wished to guard against 
 the usurpation of provincial authority by the federal government. The 
 article as finally accepted reads as follows : 
 
 " The federal government shall have the right to intervene in the terri- 
 tory of the provinces in order to guarantee the republican form of gov- 
 
 ' V?hen the time arrived for the taking of effect of this amendment the country was at war with 
 Paraguay. As this source of income could not be dispensed with, u constitutional con- 
 vention convened in Santa F6 restored the original wording. 
 
 ' The words printed in italics were ordered to be stricken out by the national convention held 
 at Santa Ffe on September 12, 1866. 
 
 3 "Educacion Primaria," in the Argentine system, includes the graded schools up to the " Colegio 
 Nacional" or high school. 
 
Constitution of 1853. Amendments of 1860, 1866, 1898 47 
 
 ernment, or to repel foreign invasion; and, when requested by the con- 
 stituted authorities to maintain them in power, or to re-estabhsh them 
 if they shall have been deposed by sedition or by invasion from another 
 province." 
 
 Fifth. Article 12 of the constitution of 1853 provided that vessels 
 bound from one province to another should not be compelled to enter, anchor, 
 or pay duties on account of transit. The committee of the Buenos Aires 
 convention, desiring to make forever impossible the system of differential 
 duties which the confederation had inaugurated in 1856, added to this clause 
 a provision similar to that of article I, section 9, paragraph 6, of the constitu- 
 tion of the United States, to wit : 
 
 "No preference shall be given by any law or conamercial regulations 
 to one port over another." 
 
 Article 12 as thus amended reads: 
 
 "Vessels bound from one province to another shall not be compelled 
 to enter, cast anchor, or pay duties on account of transit, and in no case 
 shall any preference be given to one port over another by means of com- 
 mercial laws or regulations." 
 
 Sixth. Article 15 of the constitution of 1853 prohibited slavery. In 
 order to make the prohibition all-inclusive, the Buenos Aires convention 
 proposed the following addition, which was accepted by the national con- 
 vention : 
 
 " Slaves introduced in any way whatsoever into the country shall become 
 free by the mere act of setting foot upon the territory of the republic." 
 
 (a) The article as amended reads: 
 
 "There shall be no slaves in the Argentine nation. Those few now 
 existing therein shall become free as soon as this constitution becomes 
 law. The indemnifications which may have to be paid in consequence 
 of this declaration shall be regulated by a special law. Contracts in- 
 volving the purchase or sale of persons shall be criminal acts, for which 
 the contracting parties, as well as the notary or official before whom 
 they are executed, shall be responsible. Slaves introduced in any way 
 whatever into the coxmtry shall become free by the mere fact of entrance 
 into the territory of the repubhc." 
 
 (6) Also a minor amendment to article 18 abolishing capital punishment 
 by guillotine : 
 
 "No inhabitant of the nation shall be punished except after trial and 
 conviction, under laws anterior to the commission of the offense; nor 
 shaU he be tried by special commissions, or removed from the jurisdic- 
 tion of the courts, which, under the laws in force at the time when the 
 off^se was committed, should take cognizance of his case. No one 
 shall be compelled to testify against himself; nor shall anyone be ar- 
 rested except by virtue of a written order of the proper authority. The 
 defense of persons and of rights before the courts shall be inviolable. 
 Domicile as well as epistolary correspondence and private papers shall 
 be inviolable; but a law shaU determine in what cases and under what 
 circumstances the former may be entered, and the latter seized. The 
 penalty of death for poUtical offenses, torture of all kinds, and whipping 
 are abolished. The national jails shall be healthful and clean, intended 
 for the safe-keeping and not for the punishment of the offenders de- 
 
48 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 tained therein, and any measure which, under color of precaution, tends 
 to inflict upon the prisoners more hardships than those required for 
 their security shall cause the judge authorizing it to be held responsible." 
 
 Seventh. Article 30 of the constitution of 1853 provided that the 
 constitution could only be amended ten years after its acceptance. The 
 convention of Buenos Aires proposed the elimination of this limitation, 
 which was accepted by the national convention. As amended, article 30 
 reads : 
 
 "The constitution may be amended either wholly or in part. The 
 necessity for such amendment shall be declared by Congress, by a 
 vote of at least two-thirds of its members; but the amendment itself 
 shall not be made except by a convention called for that purpose." 
 
 Eighth. Article 31 of the constitution of 1853 established the supremacy 
 of the constitution, the laws made in pursuance thereof, and the treaties 
 with foreign powers in the same form as article VI, paragraph 2, of the con- 
 stitution of the United States. The convention of Buenos Aires, desiring 
 to preserve the proAdsions of the pact of union of June 6, 1860, proposed the 
 following addition, which was accepted by the national convention: 
 
 "This rule is not applicable to the province of Buenos Aires, in so 
 far as the treaties ratified after the compact of the 11th of November 
 1859, are concerned." 
 
 Article 31 as thus amended reads: 
 
 "This constitution, the national laws which may be enacted by con- 
 gress in pursuance thereof, and treaties with foreign powers shall be the 
 supreme law of the nation; and the authorities of each province shall be 
 boimd to abide by them, any provision in their own provincial constitu- 
 tions or laws to the contrary notwithstanding. This rule shall not be 
 applicable to the province of Buenos Aires, in so far as the treaties rati- 
 fied after the compact of the 11th of November, 1859, are concerned." 
 
 Ninth. The convention of Buenos Aires proposed that after article 31 
 of the constitution of 1853 four important additions be made, which con- 
 stitute articles 32, 33, 34, and 35 of the constitution at present in force. 
 These articles are intended (a) to protect the hberty of the press and to 
 prevent the extension of federal jurisdiction over this subject: 
 
 "The federal congress shall not pass any law restricting the liberty 
 of the press, or subjecting it to federal jurisdiction." 
 
 (b) To establish the inviolabiUty of certain rights not enumerated in 
 the constitution, following the example of the ninth amendment to the 
 constitution of the United States: 
 
 "The declarations, rights, and guaranties enumerated in the consti- 
 tution shall not be construed as involving the denial of any other rights 
 and guaranties, not eniunerated, but naturally derived from the prin- 
 ciples of the sovereignty of the people and of the republican form of 
 government." 
 
 (c) Establishing incompatibihty between the exercise of federal and 
 provincial judicial functions : 
 
 "The judges of the federal courts shall not at the same time be judges 
 in the provincial coiuiis. Neither shall a position in the federal service, 
 whether civil or mihtary, confer upon the official who holds it the rights 
 
Constitution of 1853. Amendments of 1860, 1866, 1898 49 
 
 of residence in the province wherein it is held, and which may not he 
 his habitual abode, this provision applying to their being chosen to posi- 
 tions in the province in which they may accidentally happen to be." 
 
 (d) Providing that the term "The Argentine Nation" should be used 
 in the enactive clause of all laws: 
 
 "The names of 'The United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata' 'The 
 Argentine Republic,' 'The Argentine Confederation,' adopted in suc- 
 cession since 1810, may in future be used indiscriminately as the official 
 designation of the government and the territory of the provinces; but 
 the name of 'The Argentine Nation' shall be used in the enactment 
 and approval of the laws." 
 
 Tenth. Article 34 of the constitution of 1853 (present article 38), in 
 providing for the number of representatives in the lower house of the national 
 congress, had given to the prospective capital city — Buenos Aires — six 
 representatives. The convention of the province which was opposed to the 
 federalization of the city proposed and secured the acceptance of an amend- 
 ment eliminating mention of special representation for the city of Buenos 
 Aires and providing for twelve representatives from the province: 
 
 "The deputies to the first congress shall be elected in the following 
 proportion: For the province of Buenos Aires, twelve; for the province 
 of C6rdoba, six; for the province of Catamarca, three; for the province 
 of Corrientes, four; for the province of Entre-Rfos, two; for the prov- 
 ince of Jujuy, two; for the province of Mendoza, three; for the province 
 of La Rioja, two; for the province of Salta, three; for the province of 
 Santiago, four; for the province of San Juan, two; for the province of 
 Santa f4 two; for the province of San Luis, two; for the province of 
 Tucumd,n, three." 
 
 Eleventh. Article 36 of the constitution of 1853 (present article 40), 
 in determining the qualifications for members of the chamber of deputies, 
 simply prescribed an age requirement of twenty-five years and the enjoyment 
 of citizenship for a period of four years. This gave rise to great abuses. The 
 difficulties of travel and the small and imcertaia pay of members of the house 
 made it comparatively easy to institute a system by which the representation 
 of distant provinces was undertaken by residents of or near the city of 
 Parand, the meeting-place of the national congress. The grave defect of this 
 plan was that it enabled a few leaders to name the representatives of the 
 more distant provinces and thus practically to control the congress. To 
 remedy this abuse the provincial convention proposed that, in addition to 
 the qualifications prescribed, members of the chamber of deputies should 
 either be native-born citizens of the provinces they represent or resident 
 therein for the two years preceding their election: 
 
 "No person shall be elected a deputy who has not attained the age 
 of twenty-five, who has not been a citizen for four years, and who is not 
 a native of the province electing him or a resident thereof for the two 
 preceding years." 
 
 Twelfth. Article 41 of the constitution of 1853 (present article 45) 
 provided for the impeachment of the provincial governors as well as the 
 president and federal jtidges; charges to be preferred by the chamber of 
 deputies and to be tried before the national senate. In the provincial con- 
 vention there was a strong feeling that this gave to the federal government 
 too great a power over the provinces, and an amendment was, therefore, 
 
50 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 proposed, excluding provincial governors from impeachment by the federal 
 authorities : 
 
 "The house of deputies alone shall have the right to impeach before 
 the senate, the president, the vice-president, the ministers of the execu- 
 tive power, the justices of the supreme court, and the judges of the other 
 inferior tribunals of the nation for malfeasance or crime in the exercise 
 of their functions, or for ordinary offenses. Impeachment of such per- 
 son shall be made after investigation, and a resolution that a trial is 
 in order passed by a vote of two-thirds of the deputies present." 
 
 Thirteenth. Article 43 of the constitution of 1853 (present article 47) 
 was amended by adding the same requirement for senators as for deputies, 
 viz., they must be either native-born citizens of the province they represent 
 or have resided therein two years prior to their election: 
 
 "The following quahfications shall be necessary for election as sena- 
 tor: the attainment of the age of thirty; citizenship in the nation for 
 six years; the enjoyment of an annual income of two thousand pesos 
 in coin, or an equivalent amount of capital; and nativity in the province 
 which elects him or residence therein for the two years immediately 
 preceding." 
 
 Fourteenth. Article 51 of the constitution of 1853 provided that all 
 amendments to the constitution should originate in the senate. The elim- 
 ination of this provision was proposed by the provincial convention and 
 accepted, thus leaving the procedure of amendments as provided by 
 article 30: 
 
 "The constitution may be amended either wholly or in part. The 
 necessity for such amendment shall be declared by congress, by a vote 
 of at least two-thirds of its members; but the amendment itself shall 
 not be made except by a convention called for that purpose." 
 
 Fifteenth. To article 64 of the constitution of 1853 (present article 67) 
 four amendments were proposed and accepted: 
 
 (a) Reqiming uniformity of customs dues throughout the territory of the 
 republic: 
 
 "To legislate in regard to custom-houses and to establish import 
 duties, which, as weU as the rates of appraisement on which they must 
 be based, shall be uniform throughout the nation; it being thoroughly 
 understood, however, that these duties and all other taxes of a national 
 character are payable in the cvu-rency of the respective provinces in their 
 exact equivalent value. And, likewise to establish export duties up to 
 1866, at which time they shall cease to he either national or provincial taxes." ' 
 
 (b) Prohibiting the federal government from suppressing the custom- 
 houses existing in any province at the time of its incorporation into the union: 
 
 "To regulate the free navigation of the rivers in the interior, to de- 
 clare as ports of entry those which may be deemed fit for that purpose, 
 and to establish or aboHsh custom-houses. But the custom-houses 
 for foreign commerce, existing in each province at the time of its com- 
 ing into the national imion, shall not be aboUshed." 
 
 (c) Reserving to the provinces the enforcement of the national codes 
 and prescribing the determination of citizenship by place of birth: 
 
 ' Words in italics stricken out September 12, 1866. 
 
Constitution of 1853. Amendments of 1860, 1866, 1898 51 
 
 "To. epact civil, commercial, penal, and mining codes without en- 
 croaching upon the local jurisdictions, the provisions of such codes to 
 be enforced either by the federal or provincial courts according as the 
 matters or persons may fall under their respective jurisdictions. And 
 especially to enact general laws on naturalization and citizenship, for 
 the whole nation, based upon the principle of citizenship by nativity, as 
 well as laws on bankruptcy, counterfeiting of money and forging of pubUc 
 documents of the state and on the establishment of trial by jury." 
 
 (d) Taking from the congress the power to examine the provincial con- 
 stitutions and to reject such as are not in harmony with the national 
 constitution. 
 
 Sixteenth. Amendment to article 83 of the constitution of 1853 (article 
 86, clause 22, of the present constitution), Umiting the powers of the presi- 
 dent during recess of congress as follows : 
 
 "The President shall have the power to fill those vacancies which 
 require the consent of the Senate, and which occur during a recess, by 
 means of appointments which shall expire at the close of the next session." 
 
 Seventeenth. Article 86 of the constitution of 1853 (article 89 of the 
 present constitution) gave to the members of the president's cabinet wide 
 powers of promulgating decrees with the approval of the president. The 
 aboUtion of this power was suggested by the convention of Buenos Aires 
 and approved by the national convention: 
 
 "The ministers shall not, in any case, take individual action on any 
 subject, unless it concerns only the internal government of their respective 
 departments." 
 
 Eighteenth. Article 91 of the constitution of 1853 (article 94 of present 
 constitution) was amended in minor particulars by leaving to the congress 
 the determination of the number of justices and the details of judicial 
 organization : 
 
 "The judicial power of the nation shall be vested in a supreme court 
 of justice and in such other inferior courts as congress may estabhsh in 
 the national territory." 
 
 Nineteenth. Article 97 of the constitution of 1853 (present article 100) 
 gave to the federal judiciary the power to settle conflicts between the con- 
 stituted authorities of a province. This power the convention of Buenos 
 Aires proposed to abohsh — an amendment accepted by the national con- 
 vention. With a few additional but unimportant changes this article was 
 made to read as follows: 
 
 "The Supreme Court and the inferior courts of the nation shall try 
 and decide all cases, not enumerated in clause 11 of Art. 67, which arise 
 under the provisions of this constitution, the laws of the nation, or 
 treaties with foreign powers; in cases concerning ambassadors, pubUc 
 ministers, and foreign consuls; in cases of admiralty and maritime 
 jurisdiction; in controversies to which the nation is a party; in cases 
 which arise between two or more provinces, between citizens of dif- 
 ferent provinces, and between a province or its citizens and a foreign 
 state or its citizens." 
 
 Twentieth. In order to bring article 101 of the constitution of 1853 
 (article 104 of present constitution) into harmony with the amendment to 
 article 31, the provincial convention proposed to this article a reservation 
 
52 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 with reference to the existence of special agreements at the time of entering 
 
 the union: 
 
 "The provinces retain all powers not delegated by the present con- 
 stitution to the federal government, and those which they may have 
 expressly reserved by special agreements at the time of their coming 
 into the union." 
 
 Twenty-first. In order to bring article 103 of the constitution of 1853 
 (article 106 of present constitution) into harmony with the amendment to 
 article 5 it was proposed to eliminate from this article the requirement that 
 provincial constitutions be first submitted to the national congress: 
 
 "Each province shall enact its own constitution, in accordance with 
 the provisions of article 5." 
 
 The acceptance by the national constitutional convention of the 
 amendments proposed by the convention of the province of Buenos 
 Aires, while settling the pending constitutional questions, made 
 prominent the precarious position of the federal government and 
 the personal antagonisms between the provincial and federal leaders. 
 The lack of financial resources of the federal government made it 
 apparent that it could not be maintained unless assured of the 
 customs dues collected at the port of Buenos Aires. Although the 
 province of Buenos Aires was willing to accept the constitution as 
 amended, the leaders were determined to control federal policy. It 
 was evident that a conflict between Buenos Aires and the federal 
 government was inevitable. A pretext was not difficult to find and 
 was readily forthcoming in a difference of opinion as to the require- 
 ments of articles 37 and 41 of the constitution. Article 37 provided 
 that for the purpose of electing members of the chamber of deputies, 
 "the provinces and the capital shall be considered as electoral dis- 
 tricts of a unitary state." Article 41 provided that for the first elec- 
 tion the legislatures of the respective provinces should determine the 
 manner of electing deputies. The legislature of Buenos Aires inter- 
 preted this to mean that the provincial election law of July 17, 1860, 
 which had served for the election of the members of the provincial 
 constitutional convention, might remain in force and by act of October 
 31, 1860, so decreed. 
 
 When the twelve deputies thus elected presented themselves 
 they were refused admission and the congress immediately ordered 
 the holding of new elections for deputies. The province of Buenos 
 Aires interpreted this action as an affront and immediately began 
 active preparations for war. The next step taken by the congress 
 was to pass a law (July 5, 1861) declaring that the province of Buenos 
 Aires had violated the compacts of November 11, 1859, and June 6, 
 1860. Her action was declared tantamount to sedition and the 
 national goverimient was authorized to intervene in the affairs of 
 the province, to reestablish order, and to maintain the supremacy of 
 the constitution, Buenos Aires was placed under martial law and 
 
Constitution of 1853. Amendments of 1860, 1866, 1898 53 
 
 communication with the provincial government was prohibited. 
 The federal government lacked the power necessary to give effect 
 to these measures, as the provincial government was not only pre- 
 pared to offer resistance, but was actually preparing to take the 
 offensive. At this juncture France, England, and Peru offered their 
 friendly mediation, but all efforts at adjustment failed. 
 
 The conflict was brief and decisive and resulted in the victory 
 of the provincial forces under General Mitr6 at the battle of Pavon, 
 October 17, 1861. This defeat marks the downfall of the national 
 government. President Derqui fled to Montevideo and on December 
 12, 1861, the congress declared the national executive power sus- 
 pended imtil a new national assembly could be convened. General 
 Mitre, governor of Buenos Aires, was given the power to call such 
 an assembly and also was intrusted with the national executive 
 authority until the contemplated reorganization of the national 
 government was effected. In fulfillment of the duty imposed 
 upon him. General Mitr6, by decree of March 15, 1862, ordered 
 the election of senators and deputies to the national congress. 
 
 The elections were held in April and the new congress solemnly 
 opened on May 25, 1862. The two important questions to be settled 
 were: (1) to place the federal finances on a sound basis, and (2) to 
 determine the seat of government. The provision of the constitution 
 making the customs dues national rather than provincial gave to the 
 national government an assured income. On the other hand, the 
 question of the seat of the national government presented grave 
 difl&culties. Article 3 of the constitution required the assent of 
 the provincial legislature for the federalization of any portion of 
 a province as the national capital. General Mitr6 proposed the 
 federalization of the entire province of Buenos Aires, which was 
 voted by the congress by act of August 20, 1862, but rejected by 
 the provincial legislature. The most that he secured from the local 
 legislature was the residence of the national authorities in and with 
 jurisdiction over the city of Buenos Aires for a period of five years, 
 after which period the matter should be taken up for final settlement. 
 
 The election for president of the republic which took place in 
 October 1862 resulted in the choice of General Mitr^. His personal 
 influence, together with the overshadowing importance of the nation's 
 foreign affairs, especially the war with Paraguay, obscured for a 
 time the feeling of rivalry between Buenos Aires and the provinces. 
 In 1866, owing largely to the heavy expenditures incident to the 
 war with Paraguay, it was found necessary to propose an amendment 
 in order to maintain export taxes as a source of national revenue. 
 Article 4 of the constitution provided that export duties on domestic 
 merchandise could only be levied until 1866. Article 67 provided 
 that in 1866, all export taxes for national purposes should cease, 
 
54 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 and, furthermore, that no such taxes should ever be estabUshed by 
 the provinces. Owing to the pressing financial needs of the national 
 government the congress proposed the aboUtion of this restriction 
 and provided for the calling of a national constitutional convention 
 in the city of Santa F6, which adopted amendments to articles 4 and 
 67, thus enabling the federal government to maintain the export 
 taxes. The act was as follows: 
 
 "The national convention enacts the following: 
 
 "First: That part of article 4 of the national constitution which reads: 
 
 'Until 1866, in conformity with the enactments of article 67, clause I,' 
 
 shall be stricken out, the said article to read as follows: 
 
 "The federal government shall defray the expenses of the nation with 
 fimds of the national treasury, consistiag of receipts from import and 
 export duties; proceeds of the sale or lease of national lands; revenue of 
 the postal service; taxes levied by the general congress equitably and in 
 proportion to the population, and moneys obtained through loans and 
 financial operations decreed by congress for urgent national needs or 
 for works of national utiUty. 
 
 "Second. The last part of clause 1, article 67, which reads: 'Up to 
 1866, at which time they shall cease to be either national or provincial taxes,' 
 shall be stricken out, so as to make said clause read as follows: (1) To legis- 
 late in regard to custom-houses and to establish import duties which, as 
 well as the rates of appraisement on which they are based, shall be uniform 
 throughout the nation; it being thoroughly understood, however, that these 
 duties and all other taxes of a national character are payable in the currency 
 of the respective provinces in their exact equivalent value. And hkewise to 
 establish export duties." 
 
 In 1898 a further revision ^ of the constitution was undertaken, 
 (1) for the purpose of so amending article 37 as to raise the basis of 
 representation for members of the chamber of deputies from 20,000 
 to 33,000 inhabitants; also to require the congress to revise the 
 basis of representation after every census; (2) amending article 87 
 by increasing the number of members of the president's cabinet from 
 five to eight. 
 
 • "The national convention assembled in the capital of the republic, in pursuance of law No. 
 
 3507 of September 3, 1867, sanctions: 
 
 "First. Articles 37 and 87 of the national constitution are hereby amended as follows: 
 
 "Akt. 37. The chamber of deputies shall consist of representatives elected directly 
 and by simple plurality of votes, by the people of the provinces and of the capital, which 
 shall be considered for this purpose as mere electoral districts of a single state. The elec- 
 tion shall be in the proportion of one deputy for each thirty-three thousand inhabitants or 
 fraction thereof of not less than sixteen thousand five hundred. After the taking of each 
 census congress shall fix, according to its results, the rate of representation, which in no case 
 shall be less than that now established. 
 
 "Akt. 87. Eight ministers or secretaries shall have charge of the affairs of the nation, 
 and shaU countersign and attest all acts of the president, which without this requisite shall 
 lack validity. A special law shall determine the business of each department.". 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 DIVISION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
 AND PROVINCES. ENCROACHMENTS OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY. 
 CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE PROVINCES. 
 
 Comparison between Constitution of Argentina and Constitution of 
 the United States. Civil and penal legislation. Public education. 
 Industry and commerce. Historical development of provinces. Con- 
 stitutional Convention of 1852. Struggle between the federation and 
 the province of Buenos Aires. 
 
 In exa mini ng the division of powers between the federal and the 
 provincial governments, it is important to bear in mind that the strictly- 
 constitutional line of division, as contained in the fundamental law, 
 does not give an accurate idea of the actual range of federal functions. 
 As we shall have occasion to see, the limited resoin-ces of the provinces 
 have compelled the central government to adopt a most liberal inter- 
 pretation of federal powers, so hberal in fact as to supplant in some 
 cases not only the provincial governments in their most important 
 functions, but actually to undertake strictly municipal functions, such 
 as the construction of drainage systems in cities, local water supply, 
 and other sanitary works. 
 
 The line of division between federal and provincial powers can 
 best be imderstood after an examination of article 67 of the consti- 
 tution, which contains an enumeration of the powers of congress : 
 
 Aeticle 67. 
 
 1. To legislate in regard to custom-houses and to establish import 
 duties, which, as well as the rates of appraisement on which they must be 
 based, shall be uniform throughout the nation; it being thoroughly under- 
 stood, however, that these duties and all other taxes of a national character, 
 are payable ia the currency of the respective provinces in their exact eqmv- 
 alent value. And likewise to establish export duties wp to 1866, at which 
 time they shall cease to be either national or provincial taxes.^ 
 
 2. To levy direct taxes for a definite period of time and in a maimer 
 proportionately equal throughout the territory of the nation, whenever the 
 defense of the coimtry, the common safety, or the pubUc good may require it. 
 
 3. To borrow money, on the credit of the nation. 
 
 4. To provide for the use and disposition of the national lands. 
 
 5. To estabUsh and organize at the capital a national bank, with 
 branches in the provinces, with power to issue bank notes. 
 
 6. To make arrangements for the payment of the national debt, both 
 foreign and domestic. 
 
 7. To appropriate annually the money necessary to meet the expenses 
 of the national government, and to approve or disapprove the accounts of 
 its disbursement. 
 
 • Worda in italics stricken out September 12, 1866. 
 55 
 
56 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 8. To grant subsidies, to be paid out of the national treasury, to those 
 provinces whose revenues, according to their budgets, are insufficient to 
 meet their ordinary expenses. 
 
 9. To regulate the free navigation of the rivers in the interior, to de- 
 clare as ports of entry those which may be deemed fit for that purpose, and 
 to establish or abolish custom-houses; but the custom-houses for foreign 
 commerce, existing in each province at the time of its coming into the na- 
 tional imion, shall not be abolished. 
 
 10. To coin money, fix the value thereof and that of foreign coins, and 
 to adopt a uniform system of weights and measures for the whole nation. 
 
 11. To enact civil, commercial, penal, and mining codes without en- 
 croaching upon the local jurisdictions, the provisions of such codes to be 
 enforced, either by the federal or provincial courts, according as the matters 
 or persons may fall under their respective jurisdictions; and especially to 
 enact general laws on naturaUzation and citizenship for the whole nation, 
 based upon the principle of citizenship by nativity; as well as laws on bank- 
 ruptcy, coimterfeiting of money, and forging of pubUc documents of the 
 State, and on the estabhshment of trial by jury, 
 
 12. To regulate commerce by land and sea with foreign countries and 
 among the provinces. 
 
 13. To establish and regulate the post-offices and post-roads of the nation. 
 
 14. To settle finally the national boundaries, to fix those of the prov- 
 inces, to create new provinces, and to provide by special laws for the organi- 
 zation, administration, and government of the national territories which 
 may be left outside the limits assigned to the provinces. 
 
 15. To provide for the security of the frontiers and for the preserva- 
 tion of peaceful intercourse with the Indians, and to promote their conversion 
 to CathoUcism. 
 
 16. To provide for all that conduces to the prosperity of the country, 
 to the advancement and welfare of all the provinces, and to the advancement 
 of the enhghtenment of the people, by prescribing plans for general and 
 university instruction, and by promoting industrial enterprise, immigra- 
 tion, the construction of railways and navigable canals, the colonization of 
 the public lands, the introduction and establishment of new industries, the 
 importation of foreign capital, and the exploration of the interior rivers, by 
 protective laws for these purposes, by concessions of privileges for a limited 
 time, and by rewards which shall act as an encouragement. 
 
 17. To estabUsh courts inferior to the supreme court of justice; to 
 create and abolish offices, and to fix the duties of the same; to grant pen- 
 sions, decree honors, and to grant general amnesties. 
 
 18. To accept, or refuse to accept, the reasons assigned for the resig- 
 nation of the president or vice-president of the repubUc; to declare that 
 the time has arrived to proceed to a new election, to count the rettmis thereof, 
 and to ascertain the result. 
 
 19. To approve or reject treaties concluded with other nations and 
 concordats entered into with the Apostolic See, and to make rules for the 
 exercise of ecclesiastical patronage throughout the nation. 
 
 20. To admit into the territory of the nation religious orders in addi- 
 tion to those now existing. 
 
 21. To authorize the executive power to declare war or to make peace. 
 
 22. To grant letters of marque and of reprisal and to make rules con- 
 cerning prizes. 
 
 23. To fix the strength of the land and naval forces in times of peace and 
 of war, and to make rules and ordinances for the government of such forces. 
 
Functions between Federal Government and Provinces 57 
 
 24. To authorize the calling out of the militia of any or all the provinces 
 whenever the execution of the laws of the nation, the suppression of insur- 
 rections, or the repelling of invasions may render it necessary. To provide 
 for the organization, equipment, and discipHne of such militia, and for 
 the administration and government of the part thereof which may be em- 
 ployed in the service of the nation, leaving to the provinces the power to 
 appoint the proper chiefs and officers of their respective mihtias, and to 
 enforce in regard to them the discipHne estabhshed by congress. 
 
 25. To permit the introduction of foreign troops into the territory of 
 the nation, and the departure therefrom of national troops. 
 
 26. To proclaim a state of siege in one or more places in the nation in 
 case of internal disorder, and to approve or suspend the state of siege de- 
 clared during the recess of congress by the executive power. 
 
 27. To exercise exclusive legislative power throughout the territory of 
 the national capital, and in all other places acquired by purchase or cession 
 in any province for the construction of forts, arsenals, magazines, or other 
 establishments of national utihty. 
 
 28. To make all laws and regulations which shall be necessary for carry- 
 ing into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this 
 constitution in the government of the Argentine nation. 
 
 Notwithstanding the many points of similarity between this 
 article and article I, section 8, of the constitution of the United States 
 which is given below, the stronger emphasis of national power in the 
 Argentine constitution is immediately apparent. This is readily 
 explained by the peculiar political conditions upon which the Argen- 
 tine federal system rests. ^ 
 
 The centrahzation of the Spanish colonial system developed a 
 uniformity of institutional type which served as the foundation for 
 the growth of a real miity of national sentiment. The problem con- 
 fronting the founders of the Argentine Repubhc was, therefore, totally 
 different from that with which our constitutional convention had to 
 deal. In the United States, federation meant centrahzation, the 
 attempt to overcome the defects of the loosely jointed confederation. 
 In the Argentine, federation meant the decentralization of the Spanish 
 system. The point of departure of the two systems was, therefore, 
 essentially different, and this difference appears in the relations be- 
 tween the federal government and the provinces.^ 
 
 Article I, section 8, of the United States constitution provides: 
 
 1. The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, 
 imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence 
 and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises 
 shall be imiform throughout the United States. 
 
 2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States. 
 
 3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
 states, and with the Indian tribes. 
 
 4. To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on 
 the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States. 
 
 5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and 
 fix the standard of weights and measures. 
 
 1 See Chapters II and III. ' See pages 64^68. 
 
58 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and 
 current coin of the United States. 
 
 7. To estabhsh post-offices and post-roads. 
 
 8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for 
 limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective 
 writings and discoveries. 
 
 9. To constitute tribimals inferior to the supreme court. 
 
 10. To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high 
 seas, and offences against the law of nations. 
 
 11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules 
 concerning captures on land and water. 
 
 12. To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that 
 use shall be for a longer term than two years. 
 
 13. To provide and maintain a navy. 
 
 14. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and 
 naval forces. 
 
 15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the 
 Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. 
 
 16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and 
 for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the 
 United States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the 
 officers, and the authority of trainiag the militia according to the discipline 
 prescribed by congress. 
 
 17. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such 
 district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular 
 states and the acceptance of congress, become the seat of government of 
 the United States, and to exercise Uke authority over all places purchased 
 by the consent of the legislature of the state, in which the same shall be, for 
 the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dry-docks, and other needful 
 buildings. 
 
 18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
 execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this consti- 
 tution in the government of the United States, or in any department or 
 officer thereof. 
 
 In the division of functions established under the Argentine con- 
 stitution certain matters are placed under the exclusive jurisdiction 
 of the central government. These may be grouped as follows: ^ 
 
 First. The conduct of foreign relations, to declare war, to conclude 
 peace, the formation of land and naval forces, and the issuance of letters of 
 marque and reprisal. It was not tmtil 1862 that the plan now in force was 
 incorporated into the Argentine system. Prior to 1835 the administration 
 of foreign affairs was vested in the governor of one of the provinces, usually 
 Buenos Aires. From 1835 to 1851 this power was vested in Rosas, who had 
 established a dictatorship. After his overthrow and imtil 1861 the conduct 
 of foreign affairs was vested in the governor of the province of Entre-Rlos. 
 With the final organization of national government in 1862, the administra- 
 tion of foreign affairs came within the exclusive authority of the federal 
 government. 
 
 Second. The regulation of commerce with foreign countries, between 
 the provinces, and with the Indian tribes; the coinage of money; the estab- 
 
 • Cf. Jose Manuel Estrada, Curso de Derecho Constitucional Federal y Administrativo, Buenos 
 Aires, 1895. 
 
Functions between Federal Government and Provinces 59 
 
 lishment of a uniform system of weights and standards, uniform bankruptcy- 
 laws, and laws for the pvmishment of piracy on the high seas. 
 
 Third. Legislation relating to naturalization and citizenship. 
 
 Fourth. The determination of the relation between church and state. 
 
 Fifth. The power to determine the territorial limits of the individual 
 provinces and to regulate relations with Indian tribes. 
 
 Sixth. The estabhshment of post-offices and post-roads. 
 
 Seventh. Jurisdiction over the territories of the nation and over such 
 places as may be designated for national institutions, civil or military. 
 
 Concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government is exercised 
 by the provinces in the following cases: 
 
 First. Legislation relating to the settlement of pubUc lands. The 
 federal government legislates with reference to public lands belonging to the 
 nation, whereas the jurisdiction of the provinces extends over the pubhc 
 domain of the proviaces. 
 
 Second. The establishment of banks of issue, although provincial banks, 
 requires the authorization of the national congress. 
 
 Third. The encouragement of industry and the fine arts. 
 
 Fourth. The encouragement of pubhc instruction. 
 
 Fifth. The levying of taxes with the one limitation that the provinces 
 are prohibited from leyjdng taxes on imports or exports. 
 
 Sixth. While the federal government is given power to prescribe the 
 civil, criminal, commercial, and mining codes for the nation, the provinces 
 are given concm-rent power with the federal government to adopt codes of 
 procedure. 
 
 In the division of powers between central and local governments, 
 the most striking contrasts with the constitution of the United States 
 are to be found in the articles relating to: (1) Civil and penal legis- 
 lation (Chap. IV, art. 67, sec. 11); (2) public instruction (Chap. IV, 
 art. 67, sec. 16) ; (3) industry and conmierce (Chap. IV, art. 67, sec. 16). 
 
 CIVIL AND PENAL LEGISLATION. 
 
 Article 67, section 11, of the Argentine constitution reads as 
 follows: 
 
 "To enact civil, commercial, penal, and mining codes without encroach- 
 ing upon the local jurisdictions, the provisions of such codes to be enforced 
 either by the federal or provincial courts, according as the matters or persons 
 may fall under their respective jurisdictions. And especially to enact general 
 laws on naturalization and citizenship, for the whole nation, based upon 
 the principle of citizenship by nativity, as well as laws on bankruptcy, coun- 
 terfeiting of money and forging of public documents of the state, and on the 
 estabhshment of trial by jury." 
 
 This article gives to the federal congress the power to adopt civil, 
 commercial, penal, and mining codes which shall apply throughout 
 the republic. This unity of legislation is restricted to the substantive 
 law, each province having the power to establish its own codes of 
 procedure. The nationalization of the civil and criminal law was 
 the natural result of conditions existing during the colonial period. 
 
60 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 Spain gave to all the provinces of the River Plate a common system 
 of law, and this system remained in force after the declaration of in- 
 dependence. The constitution of 1817 ' specifically provided that 
 the Spanish civil and criminal law should remain in force until the 
 government was able to formulate a new system. 
 
 Pursuant to the powers granted in article 67, the following national 
 codes were adopted by the congress: 
 
 First. The commercial code by act of September 12, 1862, which took 
 effect the same year. In 1890 a revision of this code was completed. 
 Second. The civil code by act of September 29, 1869; effective in 1871. 
 Third. The mining code by act of December 8, 1886; effective in 1887. 
 Fourth. The penal code by act of December 7, 1886; effective in 1892. 
 
 The power thus exercised by the central government has been 
 regarded by some eminent Argentine commentators as in essential 
 contradiction with the spirit of a federal system.^ The more recent 
 commentators, however, agree with Alberdi, who as early as 1852, 
 in formulating the "bases for the Argentine constitution,"^ stated 
 that if each province were to be permitted to formulate its own civil, 
 commercial, and penal codes, the result would be neither a federal nor 
 a consolidated state, but rather a chaos of rules which would be a 
 constant obstacle to the economic and social progress of the country. 
 
 The system of national codes is now so firmly established that 
 the so-called "liberty of codes" has even passed out of the realm 
 of academic discussion. In fact, the movement for national codes of 
 procedure is fast gaining ground. 
 
 PUBLIC EDUCATION. 
 
 Chapter IV, article 67, section 16 reads: 
 
 "To provide for all that conduces to the prosperity of the coimtry, to 
 the advancement and welfare of all the provinces, and to the advancement 
 of the enlightenment of the people, by prescribing plans for general and 
 university iastruction and by promoting industrial enterprise, immigration, 
 the construction of railways and navigable canals, the colonization of the 
 public lands, the introduction and establishment of new industries, the im- 
 portation of foreign capital, and the exploration of the interior rivers, by 
 protective laws for these purposes, by concessions of privileges for a limited 
 time, and by rewards which shall act as an encouragement." 
 
 This article is framed in general terms and makes the establish- 
 ment of institutions for "general and university instruction" a 
 function of the federal government. Its meaning is made clearer 
 
 > Art. II, section 2. 
 
 " Cf. Jos§ M. Estrada, Politica Liberal bajo la tirania de Rosas. 
 Bases y Puntos de Partida para la Organizacion Politica de la Republica Argentina, by Juan B. 
 Alberdi, Valparaiso, 1852. 
 
Functions between Federal Oovernment and Provinces 61 
 
 when brought into relation with article V, which makes the pro- 
 vincial governments responsible for the primary grades — i.e., the 
 first six years of the public-school system. This does not, however, 
 exclude the federal government from all participation in primary 
 instruction, but gives it concurrent powers with the provinces. Within 
 the last few years the federal government has been making use of 
 this power by establishing primary schools in the country districts, 
 thus supplementing the work of the provinces. Similarly, the pro- 
 visions of article 67 have been construed to give the provinces powers 
 concurrent with the central government, in the establishment of uni- 
 versities and institutions for secondary instruction. The province 
 of Santa F6 has established a university, and a number of the prov- 
 inces, notably Buenos Aires, Mendoza, Corrientes, and C6rdoba, have 
 established normal and high schools. 
 
 Broadly construing the powers granted by the constitution, the 
 federal government in 1871 ^ passed a law under which the federal 
 treasiu-y contributes toward defraying a portion of the expense of 
 primary education in those provinces whose resources will not permit 
 them to support an adequate system. In 1878 ^ a further step was 
 taken in establishing federal supervision over instruction in private 
 schools. Finally, in 1884,* the federal government established the 
 principle of compulsory education for children between 6 and 14 years. 
 
 INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE. 
 
 Article 67, section 12 reads as follows: 
 
 To regulate commerce by sea and land with foreign countries, and among 
 the several provinces. 
 
 The provision of the Argentine constitution with reference to the 
 regulation of coBomerce is practically the same as article 1, section 8, 
 paragraph 3, of the constitution of the United States. The federal 
 congress is given power "to regulate commerce by sea and land 
 with foreign nations and among the several provinces." In the inter- 
 pretation of this article the jurisprudence of the supreme court of the 
 United States has been followed.* 
 
 In order to supplement this general grant of power, section 16 of 
 article 67 gives to the federal government authority to adopt such 
 measures as may promote the prosperity of the country, the progress 
 
 > Act of September 21, 1871. ' Act of September 30, 1878. ' Act of July 8, 1884. 
 
 ■* See opinion of supreme court, declaring unconstitutional a tax imposed by the legislature of 
 Entre Rfos on cattle passing through the territory of the province. An attempt was 
 made to justify the tax as an "inspection duty," but the supreme court held that it was 
 a tax on inter-provincial commerce and as such unconstitutional. (Opinions Supreme 
 Court, 2d series, Vol. XII, p. 498.) Similarly a tax on introduction of cattle imposed by 
 the legislature of San Juan. (Opinions Supreme Court, 2d series, Vol. VI, pp. 378-383.) 
 
62 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 of the provinces, and the enhghtenment of pubUc opinion, formu- 
 latiag for these purposes programs of secondary and university instruc- 
 tion and adopting measures for the development of immigration, 
 the construction of raih-oads and navigable canals, the settlement of 
 pubUc lands, the establishment of new industries, the introduction 
 of foreign capital, and the exploration of rivers in the interior of the 
 repubhc. Three methods are specified by which the congress may 
 accomplish these purposes: (1) legislation adapted to this purpose; 
 (2) grants for limited periods of special privileges or franchises to 
 private companies; (3) the offering of special premiums or subsidies 
 to stimulate private effort. 
 
 The interpretation and exercise of federal control over the rail- 
 roads of the country represent one of the distinctly nationalizing 
 influences in the political development of the country. The 
 railroad law passed November 24, 1891 (law No. 2873), provides 
 that the railroads of the country shall be divided into two classes — 
 national and provincial. All lines are considered national when 
 constructed or subsidized by the national government, or when con- 
 necting the federal capital with any of the provinces or estabhshing 
 communication between the provinces or with any foreign country. 
 This means that practically all railroads of any importance are 
 classified as national. The granting of franchises for the construction 
 of such roads and the control over them are vested in the national 
 government, so that provincial control over the railroad systems of 
 the country is practically excluded. This unity of control has been 
 the source of real strength in secm-ing a systematic and orderly 
 growth of the means of communication of the republic. It has 
 prevented waste in the duplication of Unes and has also secured the 
 fulfillment of real national purposes in the development of the trans- 
 portation system. 
 
 The Argentine Republic has never been compelled to pass through 
 such anarchical conditions as prevailed in the United States for so 
 long a period in all matters relating to railroad development. Fur- 
 thermore, the narrow and ofttimes selfish views of local authorities 
 have been completely eliminated in the development of the transpor- 
 tation system. It is true that this broad interpretation of national 
 powers also has been instnmiental in further emphasizing the sub- 
 ordination of the provincial governments to the national authorities. 
 
 Furthermore, the powers granted in section 16 are so broad as to 
 give to the federal government complete control over the industrial 
 development of the country. Its action is not limited to the federal 
 territories, but is expressly extended over the provinces for the pur- 
 pose of furthering their industrial progress. The authority of the 
 central government may even extend beyond matters of economic 
 interest, for it is given power to take measures, along the lines above 
 
Functions between Federal Government and Provinces 63 
 
 indicated, to promote the general weKare of the provinces. It will 
 be noted that this clause differs from the "general welfare" clause 
 of the constitution of the United States, which has been interpreted 
 to give no additional powers to the central government, but simply 
 states the general purpose for which the express and imphed powers 
 may be used. 
 
 The powers granted in this section, in conjunction with the 
 authority to give financial aid to those provinces whose resources 
 are insufficient to meet ordinary expenditures, have been used to 
 justify a wide extension of federal authority in matters of purely 
 local concern. In almost all the larger cities of the repubfic, especially 
 in the capitals of the provinces, the federal government is under- 
 taking the construction of drainage systems, water-supply, and other 
 public works intended to improve local sanitary conditions. These 
 public works are financed by the central government, through the 
 issue of special sanitary bonds bearing 5 per cent interest and 1 per 
 cent amortization. The income from these works is pledged to pay 
 this interest and amortization. In effect, therefore, the federal 
 govenxment lends its credit to the provinces, undertakes the construc- 
 tion of the works, and administers them until the bonds have been 
 canceled, when they are to be turned over to the respective provincial 
 governments. Up to December 31, 1906, the federal government had 
 issued sanitary bonds amounting to $5,280,000. Some idea of the im- 
 portance of the service performed in this respect may be obtained 
 by passing rapidly in review the work now in progress in the several 
 provinces: 
 
 (1) In the city of Salta, capital of the province of the same name, the 
 national government has provided a water-supply, drainage system, sewage 
 purification, and the reclaiming of large tracts of swamp-land on the outskirts 
 of the city. The cost of these works will be $704,460.24. 
 
 (2) In the city of San Juan, capital of the province of San Juan, the 
 national government has constructed the water-works, and is now extending 
 the system in order to increase the volume of water supplied and to extend 
 the system throughout the city. The cost of these works was $254,029.60. 
 
 (3) In the city of San Luis the national government constructed during 
 the years 1901 and 1902 a new water-supply, which was enlarged during the 
 years 1903 and 1904. The cost of these works was $122,631. 
 
 (4) In 1900 the national government agreed to provide the city of Jujuy 
 with a public water-supply, and this plan was carried out during the years 
 1902 and 1903. In 1904 the system was considerably extended and improved. 
 The outlay was $158,629.24. 
 
 (5) In 1901 the federal government agreed to furnish the city of Santiago 
 del Estero with a complete system of water-supply, for which the outlay was 
 $282,859.28. 
 
 (6) In the same year (1901) the federal government agreed to provide 
 the city of La Rioja with a water-supply. Up to December 31, 1906, 
 $165,764.72 had been expended on these works, and it will probably require 
 double this amount to complete the system. 
 
 (7) In 1903 the request of the city of Corrientes for a public water 
 
64 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 supply was complied with. Up to December 31, 1906, $462,238.04 had been 
 expended on these works. 
 
 (8) In the city of Mendoza the federal government is executing sanitary 
 works on a large scale, including water-supply and drainage systems. Up 
 to December 31, 1906, the total amount expended was $693,189.20, and it 
 will require at least an equal amount to complete the works. 
 
 (9) In the city of Catamarca the federal government has restricted 
 itself to improving the existing water system at a cost of $83,366.80. In 
 1903 the federal government agreed to further extend the system and estab- 
 lish an electric-Hght and power plant at a cost of $183,081.36. 
 
 (10) In the city of Santa F6 the federal government has constructed 
 a water-supply and drainage system of which the total cost will be about 
 $850,000, of which $736,474.64 had been expended up to December 31, 1906. 
 
 (11) In 1903 the federal government agreed to construct a drainage 
 system for the city of Parang and to expend $484,000 for this purpose. 
 
 (12) In the city of C6rdoba the federal government has recently con- 
 structed a system of drainage and water-supply at a cost of nearly 
 $2,000,000. 
 
 This extension of federal powers is not regarded with alarm by 
 the local authorities. In fact, the central government is constantly 
 besieged with requests to undertake local works. The sanitary con- 
 dition of the provincial capitals is being greatly improved through 
 these efforts of the national government, but it is evident that the 
 local civic life of the provinces suffers by reason of this feeling of 
 dependence on national aid. 
 
 THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE PROVINCES. 
 
 In order to understand the position occupied by the provinces 
 in the political system of Argentina, it is necessary to bear in 
 mind their origin and the part they played, both during the colonial 
 period and during the early years of the republic. The royal ordinances 
 of Charles III of 1782 and the supplementary ordinance of 1803, 
 which divided the vice-royalty into eight intendencias, constitute the 
 basis of the present system.^ Between 1813 and 1820 further sub- 
 divisions occurred, due to three distinct causes: (1) the action of 
 the early national revolutionary assemblies, one of which created the 
 province of C6rdoba; (2) revolutionary movements caused by the 
 desire of sections of existing provinces to set up independent pro- 
 vincial governments, as in the case of the province of La Rioja; 
 (3) the revolutionary initiative of town councils bent on setting up 
 separate provincial governments, as in the case of Santa Fe, Santiago, 
 San Luis, San Juan, and Catamarca. While the formation of new 
 provinces may be traceable to different causes, they could not be 
 definitely constituted as such until recognized by the national gov- 
 ernment. This recognition was extended to Entre Rlos, Santa F6, 
 
 ' Gonzalez, Manual de la Constitucion, p. 55. 
 
Functions between Federal Government and Provinces 65 
 
 and Corrientes in 1814; to Santiago del Estero, San Juan, La Rioja, 
 and San Luis in 1820; to Catamarca in 1821, and to Jujuy in 1831. 
 
 Whatever may be the political principles which the founders of the 
 Argentine system had in view in organizing the government, the his- 
 torical development was totally different from that of the United States. 
 The "Argentine Nation," as the constitution designates the political 
 union, was not formed by the coming together of a group of sovereign 
 states. Social unity and the fundamentals of political unity were 
 established long before the formation of the provinces which now con- 
 stitute the federal union. The provinces were not in their origin 
 sovereign states, and even to-day they resemble more closely adminis- 
 trative subdivisions than separate pohtical entities. In spite of the 
 many internal dissensions which threw the country into a condition 
 of pohtical anarchy prior to the dictatorship of Rosas in 1829, the 
 nation did not lose its sense of social unity. The moral and ethnical 
 bases for a national organization were never destroyed. 
 
 At the time of the adoption of the constitution of 1853 the prov- 
 inces, the vmion of which forms what is now the Argentine Repubhc, 
 were organized imder written constitutions. One of the most im- 
 portant questions that presented itself to the constitutional con- 
 vention of 1852 was the plan that should be adopted in dealing with 
 these existing constitutions. Alberdi, whose "bases" exerted so 
 marked an influence on the deliberations of the convention, pointed 
 out the necessity of subordinating all of these provincial consti- 
 tutions to the principle of national organization. He therefore 
 advocated that the national constitution be first framed and that 
 the provinces be compelled to adopt new instruments, which should 
 be submitted to the national congress for revision. 
 
 This plan was finally adopted, the constitution of 1853 providing 
 as follows: 
 
 (1) The provincial constitutions shall be submitted to the national 
 congress for revision before publication (art. 5). 
 
 (2) The congress shall have power to examine the provincial constitu- 
 tions, and reject such as are not in harmony with the principles of the national 
 constitution (art. 64, par. 28). 
 
 (3) Each province shall frame its own constitution and shall submit it 
 to the congress for examination before putting it into execution. 
 
 In accordance with these provisions, all the provinces then form- 
 ing part of the confederation framed new constitutions, which were 
 submitted to and accepted by the congress. As we have seen, 
 the refusal of the province of Buenos Aires either to attend the 
 convention of 1852 or to enter into the union left pending a question 
 vital to the future of the repubhc, for it was evident that no vigorous 
 political fabric could be built up without the inclusion of this, the 
 
66 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 strategic center of the ancient viceroyalty and its most powerful 
 constituent. 
 
 The struggle which took place for the incorporation of Buenos 
 Aires into the union centered for a time about the acceptance of the 
 clauses of the constitution which we have just considered. Buenos 
 Aires was firmly opposed to any plan which would require the sub- 
 mission of her constitution to a national assembly. The provincial 
 convention which assembled in 1860 for the pmpose of examining 
 the national constitution and of proposing amendments thereto, the 
 acceptance of which would induce Buenos Aires to enter the union, 
 proposed the elimination from the national constitution of all clauses 
 which would require a federal revision of provincial constitutions. 
 This change was accepted by the national convention that assembled 
 in Santa F6. Under the constitution as at present in force, therefore, 
 amendments to provincial constitutions may be made without sub- 
 mitting them to the national congress. This, however, does not 
 constitute any real menace to the unity of the federal system, owing 
 to the clause of the national constitution declaring its provisions to 
 be the supreme law of the land and also the provision requiring the 
 provincial constitutions to conform to the following standards: (a) 
 that the system of government contained therein be representative 
 and repubUcan; (6) that the provincial constitutions be in harmony 
 with the principles, declarations, and guarantees contained in the 
 federal constitution; (c) that the provincial constitutions assure the 
 orderly administration of justice; (d) that they provide for a munici- 
 pal system, in which the principle of local self-government shall be 
 recognized; (e) that they provide for a system of primary education. 
 
 Although the Argentine system is essentially centralized, as 
 compared with that of the United States, the individual provinces 
 are given authority to enter into treaties and agreements with one 
 another for the administration of justice, the furtherance of economic 
 interests, and the execution of public works (art. 107). The consti- 
 tution requires that the national congress be informed of such 
 agreements, but does not state that their validity is dependent upon 
 the approval of the central government. Several Argentine com- 
 mentators ^ have held that the power of the congress to control these 
 agreements is implied, but this question still remains one of the 
 unsettled problems of Argentine constitutional law. 
 
 The provinces have made but little use of the powers thus granted. 
 Instead of joint provincial action in the construction of public works 
 or the performance of other services, the tendency is to appeal to the 
 federal government whenever local resources are insufiicient to carry 
 out a project for local improvement. Even in those cases in which 
 provision for such joint provincial action has been made in the pro- 
 
 1 Joaquin V. Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 732. 
 
Functions between Federal Government and Provinces 67 
 
 vincial constitutions, no action in furtherance of the plan has been 
 taken. The constitution of San Juan,' for instance, gives power to 
 the provincial government to create a supreme court jointly with 
 one or more neighboring provinces, but no steps have ever been 
 taken in this direction. 
 
 Under article 104 of the federal constitution, the provinces enjoy 
 all powers not granted to the federal government. As at first framed 
 by the committee of the constitutional convention of 1852, this clause 
 gave to the provinces all powers not expressly granted to the federal 
 government. In the final draft, however, the word "expressly" was 
 eliminated, thus giving to the federal government the possibility of 
 a far wider exercise of powers. 
 
 It is a fact worthy of note that the constitution of the United 
 States reserves either to the states or to the people all powers not 
 granted to the federal government, whereas the Argentine constitu- 
 tion reserves to the provinces all powers not granted to the central 
 government and makes no mention of those "reserved to the people." 
 
 The constitutional provisions which have exerted the greatest influ- 
 ence on the relation between the federal government and the prov- 
 inces are contained in articles 5 and 6 of the constitution, as follows : 
 
 Art. 5. Each province shall adopt its own constitution, which shall 
 provide for the administration of justice in its own territory, its municipal 
 system, and primary instruction, such constitution to be framed upon the 
 republican representative plan, in harmony with the principles, declarations, 
 and guaranties of the national constitution. Upon these conditions, the 
 federal government shall guarantee to each province the enjojmient and 
 exercise of its institutions. 
 
 Art. 6. The federal government shall have the right to intervene in 
 the territory of the provinces in order to guarantee the repubUcan form of 
 government or to repel foreign invasion; and when requested by the con- 
 stituted authorities, to maintain them in power, or to re-establish them if they 
 shall have been deposed by sedition or by invasion from another province. 
 
 The interpretation given to these articles and the effect of this 
 interpretation on the constitutional position of the provinces will 
 be made the subject of more detailed study in the next chapter. Suf- 
 fice it to say that these provisions have enabled the central govern- 
 ment to place the provinces in a condition of political subordination 
 which has contributed more than any other factor toward retarding 
 the development of a vigorous local political life. 
 
 In considering the position of the provinces in the Argentine 
 system it is important to bear in mind that their subordination to 
 the central government has been further affected by their lack of 
 financial resources and consequent inability fully to meet the require- 
 ments of the public administration. We have had occasion to point 
 out that the Argentine constitution gives to the congress the power 
 
 1 Article 119. 
 
68 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 to grant subsidies to those provinces whose income does not suffice 
 for the ordinary expenditures of the budget. This has opened the 
 door to the widest extension of federal power, owing to the fact that 
 whenever one of the provinces appUes to the federal government for 
 aid in the construction of some public work or for the improvement 
 of the system of pubhc education, the control over such public work 
 is vested, in part at least, in the central government. Thus the 
 federal government has in many cases been able to extend its powers 
 over municipal sanitation and other matters of purely local jurisdiction. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION. 
 
 We now come to the consideration of two constitutional pro- 
 visions which have been not only a source of endless discussion 
 among Argentine commentators, but also have given rise to the 
 widest differences of opinion in the Argentine congress. Article 5 of 
 the constitution recites the standards to which the constitutions 
 framed by the several provinces shall conform, as follows: 
 
 "Each province shall adopt its own constitution, which shall provide for 
 the administration of justice in its own territory, its municipal system, and 
 primary instruction, such constitution to be framed upon the republican 
 representative plan, in harmony with the principles, declarations, and guar- 
 anties of the national constitution. Upon these conditions, the federal gov- 
 ernment shall guarantee to each province the enjoyment and exercise of its 
 institutions." 
 
 Owing to its close relation to article 6 of the federal constitu- 
 tion, these two clauses are usually considered together. That article 
 provides: 
 
 "The federal government shall have the right to intervene in the territory 
 of the provinces in order to guarantee the republican form of government or 
 to repel foreign invasion; and when requested by the constituted authorities, 
 to maintain them in power, or to reestablish them if they shall have been 
 deposed by sedition or by invasion from another province." 
 
 It is apparent at a glance that these provisions of the Argentine 
 constitution are considerably broader than anything contained in 
 the constitution of the United States. The provinces are protected 
 not only against foreign invasion and domestic violence, as well as 
 guaranteed a repubUcan form of government, but they are also 
 protected in the enjoyment and free operation of their local in- 
 stitutions. To understand the full import of article 5 it is important 
 to bear in mind the dangers which the framers of the Argentine 
 constitution endeavored to guard against. The country had emerged 
 from a long period of internal dissensions, during which local leaders, 
 under the cloak of republican forms, had assumed dictatorial powers. 
 It was evident that imless the recurrence of these conditions could be 
 in some way guarded against, the economic and political advance of 
 the whole country would be seriously threatened. The idea ever 
 present to the minds of the framers was that the guarantee of the 
 outward forms of repubhcan government was not sufficient. They 
 therefore inserted a provision which gives to the federal government 
 the power to assure not merely the form but the substance of 
 
70 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 republican rule, by guaranteeing that these institutions should not 
 be undermined or perverted. It is true that subsequent events have 
 shown that this power gives to the federal government far-reaching 
 influence in provincial affairs, and has, in a number of instances, 
 enabled the central authorities to take refuge behind this article, in 
 order to place their political followers in power in those provinces in 
 which the opposing party has secured control. 
 
 In order fully to appreciate the relation existing between the 
 federal government and the provinces, it is important to bear in 
 mind that the present provinces of the republic were closely con- 
 solidated during the colonial period and that the separatist spirit 
 which prevailed from 1820 to 1829 did not leave a deep impress 
 upon the essential unity of political thought and social organization 
 of the country. This fact alone would serve to explain the power 
 of the federal government over the provinces even in the absence of 
 specific constitutional provisions justifying the exercise of such power. 
 
 The history of article 6 reflects with great clearness the dis- 
 crepancy between law and fact in the constitutional development of 
 the republic. In the draft of the constitution prepared by Alberdi, 
 and which the constitutional convention of 1852 used as a basis for 
 its labors, the right of intervention of the federal government was 
 given the widest possible recognition. It read as follows: 
 
 "The federal government may of its own initiative intervene in the 
 territory of the provinces, for the purpose of reestablishing order when 
 menaced by sedition." 
 
 In the convention, the particularistic sentiment of the provinces 
 was sufl&ciently strong to secure a modification which did not in 
 reaUty diminish the powers of the central government. As adopted 
 by the convention, article 6 reads: 
 
 "The federal government shall have the right to intervene ia the territory 
 of the provinces in order to guarantee the republican form of government or 
 to repel foreign invasion; and when requested by the constituted authorities, 
 to maintain them in power, or to reestablish them if they shall have been 
 deposed by sedition or by invasion from another province. 
 
 During the period 1853-1861, this provision gave rise to abuses 
 of authority on the part of the central government. Without the 
 sUghtest justification, and merely for the purpose of securing control 
 of the provinces, provincial governments were overthrown by federal 
 order and new governors and legislatures more in harmony with the 
 poUtical aflfihations of the president were placed in power. During 
 the eight years in which this provision remained in force there were 
 no less than twenty-six interventions, the most notorious of which 
 were those in the provinces of San Juan and La Rioja in 1857. In 
 the decree dated April 6, 1857, authorizing the representative of the 
 national government, Don Nicanor Molinas, to intervene in the affairs 
 
Principles and Practice of Federal Intervention 71 
 
 of these provinces for the purpose of "removing the obstacles which 
 have prevented the organization of the constitutional authorities," he 
 was given unlimited authority to do anything he might deem requisite 
 to fulfill the purposes of his mission.^ In the constitutional conven- 
 tion of 1860, the question of amending article 6 occupied a prominent 
 place. A considerable number of the delegates desired to adopt the 
 exact phraseology of the constitution of the United States on this point, 
 restricting intervention to those cases in which the state authorities 
 request the aid of the federal government when menaced by internal 
 disorder or invasion by another province. 
 
 The committee to which the question was referred rejected the 
 idea of making federal intervention conditional upon the formal 
 request of the state authorities. In proposing the amendment to 
 article 6, the report of the committee states : ^ 
 
 "The intervention of the federal government in the provinces, with or 
 without request on the part of the provincial authorities, may be regarded 
 either as a duty or as a right. In the former case it is an obligation arising 
 out of the guarantee contained in article 5 of the constitution, to wit: 'The 
 federal government guarantees to each province the enjoyment and free 
 exercise of its institutions.' 
 
 "In the latter case it is a power which the federal government exercises 
 as an inherent right; first, whenever one or more provinces violate their 
 obligation toward the union, as, for instance, if they were to attempt to 
 estabUsh a monarchical form of government or perpetuate executive power 
 through internal violence in violation of all democratic principles; or, secondly, 
 when the safety of the nation requires such intervention." 
 
 The committee took the view that while it was necessary to 
 preserve the power of the central government to intervene, even 
 without the request of the proviacial authorities, it was also desir- 
 able to define more clearly the powers of the federal authorities by 
 indicating on the one hand under what conditions intervention may 
 take place without request, viz., to guarantee a republican form of gov- 
 ernment and to repel foreign invasion, and in what cases such interven- 
 tion can take place only upon the request of the provincial authorities, 
 viz., to maintain or reestabUsh their powers, when overthrown by sedi- 
 tion or by invasion from another province.* 
 
 The relation between article 6 as thus amended, and article 4, 
 section 4,* of the constitution of the United States has been the 
 
 1 Cf. Urrutia, Intervenciones del Gobierno Federal, p. 33, Buenos Aires, 1904. 
 
 » Cf. M. A. Montea de Oca, Derecho Constitucional, Vol. I, p. 301, Buenos Aires, 1896. Also 
 see Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1860. 
 
 ' Art. 6. The federal government shall have the right to intervene for the preservation in the 
 territory of the provinces of the republican form of government or for repelling foreign 
 invasion; and when requested by the provincial authorities, for maintaining them in 
 power, or reestablishing them if deposed by sedition or by invasion from another 
 province. 
 
 * Abt. IV, Sec. 4. "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a repub- 
 lican form of govenmient and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on appli- 
 cation of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature can not be convened) 
 against domestic violence." 
 
72 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 subject of considerable discussion by Argentine commentators.^ In 
 spite of striking similarity in formulation, the differences in applica- 
 tion in the American and Argentine systems are fundamental and 
 far-reaching. 
 
 It is evident that the provision of article 4, section 4, of the con- 
 stitution of the United States might well have been made the excuse 
 for as wide an extension of federal power as has taken place in 
 Argentina. This possibiUty did not escape the notice of the supporters 
 of states' rights. In 1867 Reverdy Johnson, in the course of a debate 
 in the United States Senate, said: 
 
 "Does it [this clause] give to the United States authority to interfere 
 with any of the existing rights belonging to the states at the time they 
 adopted the constitution? If it did, then everything was thrown afloat; 
 the United States then, by its congress, is to become a great convention 
 not only to deliberate for the interests and safety of the people of the United 
 States but from what they may from time to time believe to be the true 
 interest and safety of the people of each state in the management of its own 
 concerns." 
 
 The limited use that has been made of the clause guaranteeing 
 to each state a republican form of government has not been due to 
 any restrictions upon federal power imposed by the courts. On the 
 contrary, in the case of Luther vs. Borden (7 Howard, 42), decided in 
 1849, the com-t held that the power to determine which is the legiti- 
 mate government of a state is a political rather than a judicial func- 
 tion, and the decision of the political organs of the government (in 
 this case the congress) is binding on the coiu-ts. So far as the power 
 of the federal government over the states is concerned, this authority 
 to determine which government is legitimate carries with it important 
 consequences, for in order to determine whether a particular govern- 
 ment is republican or not the congress must first decide which is the 
 real government of the state. The guarantee contained in article 4, 
 section 4, is usually invoked when, by reason of violent party conflicts, 
 each party has set up a government which it claims to be the legiti- 
 mate govermnent of the state. In such cases the United States 
 supreme court has held that the decision of the congress as to which 
 government should be recognized is final and not subject to review 
 by the coiu-ts. 
 
 This power is further increased by the fact that the courts have 
 steadily refused to prescribe, with any degree of detail, the standards 
 to which a government must conform in order to be republican in 
 form. The nearest approach to such a definition was made in re 
 Duncan (139 U. S., 449), in which the court said: 
 
 "By the constitution, a republican form of government is guaranteed to 
 every state in the union, and the distinguishing feature of that form is the 
 
 Cf. Barrequero. Estanislao S. Zeballos, in Revista de Hiatoria y Derecho, 1908; Luis V. 
 Varela, Estudios sobre la Constitucion Nacional Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1896. 
 
Principles and Practice of Federal Intervention 73 
 
 right of the people to choose their own officers for governmental administra- 
 tion, and pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in 
 representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be those of the 
 people themselves." 
 
 It will readily be seen that the powers thus vested in congress 
 might well have been used by the dominant party to secure political 
 control of those states in which a majority could not be secured by 
 legitimate means. The reasons for the self-control shown by the 
 congress in the exercise of this power are to be sought, first, in the 
 historical circumstance that the deeply rooted feeling of state autonomy 
 would have aroused a strong movement of public opinion against any 
 such use of power; secondly, the law-abiding sense and spirit of 
 legality of the mass of the people would have condemned any attempts 
 to foment those local disorders which, as a rule, are a necessary pre- 
 liminary to the exercise of federal intervention. 
 
 That portion of section 4 which is intended to protect the states 
 against domestic violence becomes effective in the American, as in 
 the Argentine constitution, only upon the request of the local authori- 
 ties. The only marked differences between the two provisions are: 
 (1) that the constitution of the United States indicates specific- 
 ally the authority from which the request must emanate, viz., "on 
 application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legisla- 
 ture can not be convened)," whereas the Argentine constitution 
 refers in general terms to the "provincial authorities"; and (2) the 
 constitution of the United States provides for such intervention in 
 order to protect the State against any form of domestic violence. 
 The Argentine constitution seems to have solely ia view disturbances 
 of a political character, for it authorizes intervention upon request 
 "for maintaining them [the provincial authorities] in power, or 
 reestablishing them if deposed by sedition or by invasion from another 
 province." 
 
 In spite of the broader formulation of this clause in the constitu- 
 tion of the United States, the use made thereof has been far more 
 limited than in the Argentine system, owing mainly to the fact that 
 imder our system of government the established practice with ref- 
 erence to the militia is quite different from that which obtains in 
 Argentina, although the constitutional provisions relating to this 
 subject are almost identical.^ The congress of the United States is 
 given power "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the 
 laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions," and 
 to "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and 
 for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of 
 the United States; reserving to the states respectively the appointment 
 
 ' Compare chap. 4, art. 67, par. 24, of the Argentine constitution with art. 1, sec. 8, para. 15 
 and 16, of the constitution of the United States. 
 
74 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 of the ofi&cers, and the authority of training the militia according to 
 the discipline prescribed by Congress." 
 
 Although these provisions reserve wide powers to the states, they 
 aroused violent opposition in the constitutional convention. It was 
 feared that the powers vested in the congress would place the states 
 at the mercy of the federal government. These fears have proved 
 totally unfounded, for while congress has prescribed a uniform 
 system for the organization of the miUtia, the states have main- 
 tained the inunediate control over their respective contingents which 
 may at any time be called forth by the state authorities for the 
 purpose of suppressing domestic violence. In actual practice the 
 federal government has shown itself extremely reluctant to respond 
 to the request of the state authorities. The recent formation of a 
 great national army and the incorporation of the nailitia of the sev- 
 eral states into this army has temporarily changed this situation. 
 
 An instance, which occurred in the state of Nevada, clearly 
 illustrates this attitude of the national government. In November 
 1907 the governor of Nevada, fearing that the then existing strike of 
 miners might lead to serious disturbances, called upon the president 
 for federal troops. These were promptly dispatched. Ten days 
 after the arrival of the troops the president sent word to Governor 
 Sparks that inasmuch as no distiu-bance had occurred he had decided 
 to order the recall of the federal troops. In this telegram ^ the presi- 
 dent called the governor's attention to the fact that the poUcing 
 of the territory of the state was the duty of the local authorities. In 
 a subsequent telegram, dated December 19, 1907, the president again 
 emphasized the duties of the state government and called attention 
 to the fact that the national government can not permit a state to 
 avail itself of federal aid in order to escape its manifest obligation 
 to preserve domestic order. 
 
 The use of federal troops for the purpose of restoring order in 
 Chicago at the time of the great railway strike in 1893, in spite of 
 the protests of the then governor of the State, was justified by the 
 president as a means of protecting the national government in the 
 exercise of one of its most important functions, viz., the maintenance 
 of the national postal service. The railway lines passing through 
 Chicago were construed as integral parts of the post-roads of the 
 United States, and to keep these roads open for traffic was considered 
 one of the obligations of the national government. While technically, 
 therefore, this case was not regarded by the president as belonging 
 in the class of "interventions," it was evident to everyone that the 
 maintenance of the postal service and the free transit over the post- 
 roads were the constitutional principles which the federal government 
 invoked in order to justify its determination to put a stop to the 
 destruction of property in the Chicago railway yards. 
 
 ' Cf. telegram dated December 17, 1907, of President Roosevelt to Governor Sparks. 
 
Principles and Practice of Federal Intervention 15 
 
 In the Argentine system the application of the articles relating to 
 the miUtia has been totally different from that which has obtained 
 in the United States. The organization of a standing army and the 
 establishment of the principle of imiversal military service have 
 prevented the development of anything corresponding to the local 
 miUtia in the United States. The entire armed force of the republic, 
 with the exception of the local poUce, is under the immediate direc- 
 tion of the national authorities. The provincial authorities are, 
 therefore, helpless when confronted by any emergency arising out of 
 local disorders. This condition of dependence has been exploited 
 to the utmost by the national govermnent and has contributed more 
 than any other factor in enabUng the national executive to secure 
 political control over the provincial governments. 
 
 It is important to examine in detail some of the typical instances 
 of intervention, for they illustrate more clearly than any other phase 
 of the constitutional practice of the country the relation of the 
 provinces to the central government. 
 
 As has already been pointed out, the constitution of 1853 (art. 6) 
 gave to the national government the power to intervene, upon or 
 without the appUcation of the provincial authorities, for the sole 
 piirpose of establishing order when menaced by sedition or to guar- 
 antee national safety when menaced by a foreign attack or invasion. 
 The most typical case of intervention under this clause was under- 
 taken in 1857 in the province of San Juan. Although the provincial 
 authorities were violently opposed to such intervention and there 
 were no indications of disturbances menacing the public order, the 
 executive by decree appointed a federal commissioner to take charge 
 of the government of the province, and even went so far as to author- 
 ize him to declare martial law.^ 
 
 The use thus made of the power of the central government resulted 
 in placing its political sympathizers in control of the province. The 
 success of the San Juan experiment inmiediately led to interventions 
 in the provinces of Rioja, Jujuy, Mendoza, Santiago del Estero, 
 Entre Rfos, Corrientes, Santa F6, C6rdoba, and San Luis. 
 
 The constitutional amendment of 1860, in limiting the scope of 
 federal intervention, without specific request on the part of the pro- 
 vincial authorities, to the guarantee of a republican form of govern- 
 ment and for the repelling of foreign invasion, was intended to set 
 more definite limits to federal power. The interventions that have 
 taken place since the passage of this amendment indicate that it has- 
 failed of its purpose, for where article 6 can not be invoked to justify 
 federal encroachments, article 5 has served the purposes of thfr 
 national government. Furthermore, as we shall have occasion to- 
 see in examining a number of the more recent instances of inter- 
 
 ^ Umitia, Intervenciones del Gobiemo Federal, p. 33, decrees of April 6 and October 15, 1857.. 
 
76 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 vention, the interpretation, by both legislative and executive branches 
 of the government, of the guarantee of a republican form of govern- 
 ment, has been such as to make intervention jxissible whenever the 
 party in power in the federal government deems it Ukely that thereby 
 their hold on the provincial governments will be strengthened. 
 
 The established practice in the Argentine system is that each 
 intervention must be provided for by special act of congress. When 
 congress is not in session the president may decree such intervention, 
 submitting the same for the approval of congress at its next session. 
 Such approval or disapproval has Uttle or no value, however, inasmuch 
 as the purposes of such intervention are, as a rule, fully accomplished 
 before the convening of congress. When, therefore, there is a lack of 
 political harmony between the president and congress, and the former 
 desires to secure a better hold on the provincial political situation, 
 interventions are decreed during the recess of congress. If, however, 
 such opposition exists, as was the case in 1907, congress is loath to 
 adjourn for fear of the extension of executive influence through the 
 process of federal interventions decreed by the executive. The dead- 
 lock between the president and congress which occmred in January 
 1907, and which was brought to a cUmax by the executive decree 
 of January 25, 1907, declaring the congress adjourned sine die, was 
 caused in part by the desire of congress to remain in session until the 
 opening of the next regular session, in order to prevent the president 
 from undertaking federal interventions in certain provinces, notably 
 Corrientes, and thus strengthening his political influence. 
 
 Of the interventions occurring since the amendment of the federal 
 constitution in 1860 ^ I have selected those which either took place 
 or were contemplated, in San Juan, Salta, Mendoza, San Luis, and 
 Corrientes, owing to the fact that it was my good fortune to be in 
 Argentina in 1906, 1907, and 1908, at the time of these interven- 
 tions and I was therefore able to study the ppUtical as well as the 
 constitutional aspects of the question. The most typical case — 
 the intervention in the province of San Juan — is made the subject 
 of detailed study in the next chapter. 
 
 In the first two instances to which I wish to refer, intervention 
 did not actually take place, but the failure of the president to carry 
 out his plan illustrates an important aspect of poUtical practice in 
 the Argentine RepubUc. 
 
 During the course of the year 1906, the president received from 
 the province of Mendoza three requests for intervention: 
 
 (1) From the provincial chamber of deputies, which requested 
 such intervention "for the purpose of guaranteeing the republican 
 form of govermnent, which is menaced by the undermining of the 
 
 1 See a government publication entitled " Intervenciones del Gobierno Federal en las Provincias," 
 by Manuel Alberto Urrutia, 2 vols., Buenos Aires, 1904. 
 
Principles and Practice of Federal Intervention 111 
 
 electoral system by the violation of the constitutional requirements 
 regulating the formation of the electoral registry, and by the dis- 
 repute into which the judicial branch of the provincial government 
 has fallen." 
 
 (2) From the chief justice of the supreme court of the province, 
 who based his request on the "necessity of guaranteeing the free 
 exercise of the functions intrusted to him." 
 
 (3) From a number of members of the legislature and other 
 citizens, who appealed to the national government to guarantee to 
 them the untrammeled exercise of their local political and civil rights. 
 
 In October 1906 the president sent a federal commissioner to Men- 
 doza to inquire into the local situation and to report to him as to 
 whether the complaints thus filed were well founded. On November 
 12 the commissioner submitted his report. He first undertook an 
 examination of the judicial system of the province. After entering 
 upon a severe criticism of the defects of the judicial organization of 
 the province, he arrived at the conclusion that these defects did not 
 fm-nish a justification for federal intervention. 
 
 The petition of the chief justice of the supreme court was based 
 on the fact that he had been deprived of the presidency of the electoral 
 revision commission. An analysis of the charge led the commissioner 
 to the conclusion that this did not furnish a justification for federal 
 intervention. The examination of the operation of the electoral 
 system showed the existence of certain defects in the formation of 
 the registry rolls, but not of sufficient importance, in the view of the 
 commissioner, to justify intervention. 
 
 After rejecting the specific grounds for intervention upon which 
 the requisitions were based, the commissioner proceeded to point 
 out that in the province of Mendoza the government had been in 
 the habit of giving its support to official candidates and using the 
 influence of the administration to secure the election of these can- 
 didates. He regarded this practice as unrepubUcan and sufficient 
 groiind for intervention for the purpose of guaranteeing the republican 
 form of government. In pursuance of this recommendation, the 
 president sent a special message to congress proposing intervention 
 in the province of Mendoza. In the national chamber of deputies 
 the opposition to the president had assumed formidable proportions 
 and it was feared that federal intervention would enable him to 
 secure the election of one of his personal supporters as governor of 
 the province. The bill submitted was, therefore, rejected. 
 
 If the support of candidates for office by the provincial adminis- 
 tration is to be regarded as undermining the repubUcan form of 
 government and therefore justifying the intervention of the federal 
 government to take charge of the provincial elections, it is evident 
 that the entire responsibility for the integrity of political Ufe in the 
 
78 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 provinces is shifted to the federal government. Independently of 
 the stretching of the constitutional provision involved in this interpreta- 
 tion, and taking for granted that the federal government in every case 
 is actuated by the highest motives, the incalculable harm done to the 
 institutional development of the provinces is at once apparent. 
 
 In November of the same year (1906) the Argentine senate adopted 
 a resolution requesting the president to send a commissioner to the 
 province of Salta for the purpose of "ascertaining the conditions 
 under which the suffrage was there being exercised." 
 
 On December 12 the commissioner submitted his report, in which 
 he recommended that the federal government intervene in the province 
 of Salta on the following grounds: (1) the absence of an election law 
 and the failure to prepare a registry of voters; (2) the failure of the 
 province to put into practice the provision of the provincial con- 
 stitution providing for proportional representation; (3) the violation 
 of the principle of the separation of powers through the usm-pation 
 of judicial powers by the executive, in declaring imconstitutional 
 certain laws relating to local government. 
 
 During the progress of this investigation an agreement was reached 
 between the governor and the president with reference to the candi- 
 date for the governorship at the approaching election. The result 
 was that the report was sent to congress without any recommendation 
 from the executive, and no further attempt was made to carry out 
 the recommendation of the commissioner. 
 
 The federal intervention in the province of San Luis in 1907 was 
 due to an insurrectionary movement which occurred on the eve of 
 the inauguration of a newly elected governor. In fact, this was the 
 main pmrpose of the insurrection. It was thought that federal inter- 
 vention thus secured would lead to new elections and enable the 
 opposition party to place its candidate in power. A federal commis- 
 sioner was immediately appointed to intervene in the affairs of the 
 province "for the purpose of establishing pubUc order, undermined by 
 sedition, and to assure the free operation of local pohtical institutions 
 at present made impossible by acts of violence." After an examina- 
 tion of the local situation, the commissioner issued a decree ordering the 
 installation of the governor-elect. It is interesting to note the word- 
 ing of the closing paragraph of this decree, which reads as follows: 
 
 "In pursuance of the instructions of the federal executive, the federal 
 commissioner hereby convenes the provincial legislature to assemble on 
 Tuesday, September 17, ia order to administer the oath of office to the 
 governor-elect, Dr. Esteban P. Adaro." 
 
 Thus, because of a disturbance which did not assume greater 
 proportions than a local riot, the federal government assumed com- 
 mand of the affairs of the province, and after restoring order formally 
 installed the governor-elect. 
 
Principles and Practice of Federal Intervention 79 
 
 The next instance of federal intervention to which some reference 
 must be made occurred in the province of Corrientes in October 1907. 
 The case presents peculiar interest because of the extraordinary 
 procedure that was followed. Throughout the year 1907 persistent 
 rumors were afloat that a revolution was about to break out in 
 Corrientes in order to depose the then governor, Juan E. Martinez. 
 In September the president sent a confidential agent to the capital 
 of the province, charged with the duty of trying to bring about an 
 agreement between the provincial government and the opposition. 
 His efforts in this direction were unsuccessful. Congress not being 
 in session, the president, on October 11, issued a decree ordering 
 federal intervention in the province of Corrientes "for the sole purpose 
 of organizing the provincial legislature." The federal commissioner, 
 Senator Eugenio Puccio (appointed after the resignation of the 
 commissioner first appointed, Dr. Dimet), immediately assumed full 
 authority in the province, directing the disarming of all local forces, 
 taking command of the police, and supplanting both the legislative 
 and executive authorities of the province. The commissioner then 
 ordered the formation of new registry rolls, the selection of judges of 
 election, and other measures preparatory to the elections for members 
 of the provincial legislature. 
 
 While the execution of these measures was in progress there 
 occurred a most extraordinary proceeding, which indicates the far- 
 reaching powers exercised by the federal government in the provinces 
 during these "interventions." According to the constitution and 
 laws of the province, but one-third of the members of the legislature 
 was to be elected. Under the terms of a special agreement between 
 the commissioner and the members of the legislature, it was arranged 
 that all the members of the legislature should resign, thus enabUng 
 the federal commissioner to order a complete renewal of both houses. 
 Under his supervision this was done. Immediately after the holding 
 of elections and the installation of the new legislature, the federal 
 commissioner decided to reinstall the governor. In pursuance of 
 this purpose a decree was issued on April 22, 1908, by which the 
 following day (April 23) was designated as the date for the installation 
 of the governor. A few hours after the issuance of this decree the 
 commissioner received a communication from the provincial chamber 
 of deputies, informing him that proceedings for the impeachment 
 of the governor had been instituted and that his suspension, pending 
 such proceedings, had been voted. 
 
 In view of this turn of affairs, and owing to the fact that no 
 lieutenant-governor had been elected in the province, the commis- 
 sioner revoked his decree of April 22 and issued a new decree, placing 
 the executive authority in the hands of the presiding officer of 
 the provincial senate. The impeachment proceedings thus instituted 
 
80 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 resulted, as was expected, in the governor's removal from office and 
 in the ordering of new elections. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to add that beneath this appearance of 
 legaUty, definite poUtical purposes were hidden. The case is of 
 special interest because it indicates that the interpretation of the 
 constitutional duty put upon the national authorities to "assiu-e to 
 each province the free exercise and enjoyment of its local poUtical 
 institutions" has given to the central government far-reaching influence 
 over the provinces. 
 
 It is true that if the national government were always actuated 
 by the highest motives, this provision, together with the clause 
 guaranteeing to each province a republican form of government, 
 might serve to give stabiUty to the poUtical system of the repubUc 
 through the prompt suppression of any local disturbances and the 
 discouragement of any attempt on the part of disgruntled minorities 
 to conspire against the constituted authorities. Such disinterested 
 interpretation can not always be expected. The absence of national 
 party organizations, the dependence of the president on the support 
 of the provincial governors and on the possibiUty of securing through 
 their influence the election of senators and deputies in harmony with 
 his poUcy, constitute a real temptation to use "intervention" for the 
 purpose of strengthening the poUtical position of the national executive. 
 
 The absence of an organized pubUc opinion, upon which the 
 president may depend in the execution of his poUcies, makes it 
 essential that he should have the cooperation of the poUtical leaders 
 of the provinces. Without such support he soon finds himself con- 
 fronted, not only by a combination of hostile provincial governors, 
 but also by a hostile congress. Several times in the history of the 
 country the president has been compelled to resign because of such 
 opposition. 
 
 It is evident that where personal poUtical interests of such vital 
 import are involved a disinterested constitutional interpretation is 
 almost if not quite precluded. The history of the long series of 
 interventions, beginning with that in Tucmndn in 1853 and ending 
 with the more recent instance of Corrientes, clearly demonstrates that 
 while, superficially viewed, these interventions seem to be a guarantee 
 of the maintenance of order in the provinces, their real influence is 
 quite the opposite. The possibiUty of securing federal intervention 
 is a constant temptation to the minority party to plan revolutions 
 and to provoke armed disturbances. This fact alone exerts a most 
 unfortunate influence on the political life of the provinces. The 
 line of least resistance for a group of poUtical leaders opposed to the 
 governor is to cultivate friendly relations with the president of the 
 repubUc and secure some assurance of support. This support once 
 secured, it is comparatively easy to secure federal intervention under 
 
Principles and Practice of Federal Intervention 81 
 
 whose patronage the party assured of the president's support is 
 certain to triumph. 
 
 Thus the center of poUtical responsibiUty is shifted from the 
 province, where it properly belongs, to the federal capital, Buenos 
 Aires. Minority parties in the provinces, instead of conducting a 
 systematic campaign in order to increase their following with the 
 people, prefer to treat with the federal authorities for the purpose of 
 securing control of the machinery of government. 
 
 Much has been said and written on the possibility of developing 
 in the provinces a more independent and distinctive local life. With 
 the increase in population and the development of natural resources, 
 they will be assured of a more independent economic existence. The 
 future of their political Ufe is far more difficult to foresee. As careful 
 a student of Argentine affairs as Dr. Rivarola ^ advocates the con- 
 stitutional recognition of what he considers a condition of fact, viz., 
 the suppression of the provinces as independent constitutional units 
 and their reorganization as administrative subdivisions of an unified 
 state. The difficulties involved in any such change we have had 
 occasion to examine.^ 
 
 Viewing the situation in the Ught of the constitutional develop- 
 ment of Argentina during the last fifty years, one is forced to the 
 conclusion that no change can be expected until the civic interest 
 of the masses in the provinces has been aroused. The large foreign 
 element in many of the provinces, the high percentage of illiteracy 
 in others, and the absence in all of traditions and habits of partici- 
 pation in public affairs, have until recently placed the management 
 of provincial poUtical affairs in the hands of a small group of leaders, 
 most of whom are usually resident in the federal capital, either as 
 senators or deputies. Of late years there have been unmistakable 
 indications of a growing determination on the part of the people to 
 manage their own political affairs. The rapid progress made by 
 popular education in Argentina, together with the constantly improv- 
 ing economic condition of the working classes, has developed a 
 desire for more active participation in public affairs. Furthermore, 
 the electoral law, which provides penalties for abstention from voting, 
 has stimulated participation in elections. All these influences have 
 served the further purpose of developing a better organized pubUc 
 opinion, which is making itself felt in establishing more effective 
 control over the administration, both national and provincial. 
 
 1 Del Regimen Federativo al Unitario, Buenos Aires, 1908. ^ See Chapter I. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 A TYPICAL CASE OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION. 
 
 The exercise of the power of "intervention" in the internal affairs 
 ■of the provinces constitutes so important a factor in the proper com- 
 prehension of the Argentine federal system that it is necessary to 
 examine in detail at least one typical instance. I have selected the 
 federal intervention in the province of San Juan, which took place in 
 February 1907, not only because it illustrates so clearly the con- 
 stitutional and political principles involved, but also because I hap- 
 pened to be in that section of Argentina when this intervention was 
 imdertaken and was able, therefore, to make a detailed study of the 
 measures adopted by the federal government. 
 
 During the early ho\u"s of the morning of February 7, 1907, a group 
 of revolutionists under the command of Carlos Sarmiento, a retired 
 colonel of the regular army, attacked the capitol building, the poUce 
 barracks, and the quarters of the prison guard. After several hours of 
 fighting, during which the revolutionists took possession of the capitol 
 building, and were about to storm the police and prison barracks, a 
 truce was agreed upon which resulted in an agreement between the 
 local authorities and the revolutionists, couched in the following terms : 
 
 "San Juan, February 7, 1907. — After five hours of combat between 
 the revolutionary forces and the government of the province, and with a 
 view to avoiding imnecessary shedding of blood, and, furthermore, in view 
 of the fact that the government finds itself deprived of the means of attend- 
 ing its wounded, the government hereby agrees to surrender to the revolu- 
 tionists the police and prison barracks, with their respective arms and 
 ammunition. The governor, his ministers, the chief of poUce, government 
 employees, and all citizens who participated in the defense of the government 
 are hereby assured of personal protection by the revolutionary junta." ^ 
 
 The president of the republic, Figueroa Alcorta, was at this time 
 absent from Buenos Aires, and the president of the senate, Benito 
 Villanueva, was acting president. He immediately called together 
 the members of the cabinet. Federal intervention was at once deter- 
 mined upon, and the following decree was promulgated : 
 
 "In view of the occurrences in the province of San Juan, and in accord- 
 ance with articles 5 and 6 of the national constitution, the provisional 
 president of the senate, at present invested with the executive power, decrees, 
 with the approval of the cabinet: The province of San Juan is declared in a 
 state of 'intervention.' Lieutenant Colonel Ramon Gonzalez, in conunand 
 
 1 This document was signed by the revolutionary junta on behalf of the revolutionists, and by 
 the minister of government and the representatives of the governor, Victorino Orteza and 
 Ventura Lloveras. 
 
 83 
 
84 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 of the Fourth Infantry Battalion, is hereby appointed provisional chief of 
 police. Until the federal commissioner in charge of the intervention is 
 appointed, the minister of the interior will give instructions to the chief of 
 police, above designated. 
 
 "At its next session the national congress shall be informed of this 
 decree." (See article 6 as given in Appendix B, page 138.) 
 
 Prior to the issuance of this decree, the deposed governor, Manuel 
 J. Godoy, telegraphed to the minister of the interior, requesting the 
 intervention of the national government for the purpose of reestablish- 
 ing his authority in accordance with article 6 of the constitution, 
 which gives to the federal government power to intervene in the 
 provinces, "for the preservation in the territory of the provinces of 
 the republican form of government, or for repelling foreign invasion; 
 and when requested by the provincial authorities, for maintaining them 
 in power or reestablishing them if deposed by sedition or by invasion 
 from another province." 
 
 The federal government decided to ignore the request of the 
 governor, for compliance therewith would have compelled the decree- 
 ing of intervention for the sole purpose of restoring the deposed 
 authorities. The acting president and his ministers took the ground 
 that in the province of San Juan the republican form of government 
 had been overthrown and that the situation therefore called for inter- 
 vention much broader in scope. 
 
 A few hours after the issuance of this decree, a second decree was 
 promulgated in the following terms: 
 
 Art. 1. Dr. Cornelio Moyano Gacitua, justice of the national supreme 
 court, is appointed national commissioner in the province of San Juan. 
 
 Abt. 2. The minister of war will issue orders with reference to the national 
 troops to be placed at the disposal of the national commissioner. 
 
 Art. 3. The minister of the interior will issue instructions to the national 
 commissioner. 
 
 Art. 4. The expenditures incident to the intervention shall be paid 
 out of fimds not otherwise appropriated. 
 
 The constitutional position assumed by the federal executive is 
 clearly set forth in an ojSficial communication of the minister of the 
 interior to the deposed governor in reply to a second request for 
 federal intervention, for the purpose of restoring him to power. The 
 reply read as follows: 
 
 "Buenos Aires, February 12. 
 "Senor Manuel J. Godoy, Governor of San Juan: 
 
 "I have the honor to acknowledge your telegram of yesterday in which 
 your excellency states the causes which, in your opinion, led to the revolution 
 of the 7th instant, and in which you also point out the previous attempts of 
 the same character. In this telegram you also request that the federal 
 intervention be limited to reestablishing the authority of the government. 
 
 "Yoiu: excellency's first requisition arrived some hours after the decree 
 of intervention had been issued, whereas your second requisition is formu- 
 
A Typical Case of Federal Intervention 85 
 
 lated after order has been established in San Juan, as a direct result of this 
 decree and the measures adopted by the federal government in pursuance 
 thereof. 
 
 "The national executive is determined to use all the means at his com- 
 mand in order to assure domestic peace and order, and proceed with the 
 energy and prudence which the circumstances require. In order to accom- 
 pUsh this purpose and, in pursuance of its undisputed authority, the federal 
 government adopted the measures which have been communicated to you, 
 and which it is proposed to carry to successful issue with unfaiUng integrity 
 of piu-pose. 
 
 "Yom- excellency will pardon me if I refrain from entering upon an 
 analysis of the considerations of public law contained in your telegram, 
 especially in view of the fact that this is neither the time nor the place to 
 enter upon such a discussion. The federal commissioner who has been 
 appointed, and whose name is a guarantee of ability and impartiality, will 
 carefully study the conditions of law and fact which will prepare the way 
 for a decision of the question whether the deposed authorities shall be re- 
 established, or whether it is necessary to reorganize the government of the 
 province. 
 
 "I will transmit to the federal commissioner a copy of your excellency's 
 telegram, which will, no doubt, serve as one of the elements upon which his 
 final judgment will be based. 
 
 "Manuel A. Montes de Oca, 
 
 "Minister of the Interior." 
 
 The national commissioner arrived at San Juan, the capital of 
 the province, on February 15. The far-reaching powers vested in 
 him clearly illustrate the power of the central government over the 
 provinces in the Argentine system. 
 
 The formal instructions issued by the minister of the interior 
 directed that "after a careful study of the facts and legal antecedents, 
 the commissioner should decide whether the government overthrown 
 by the revolution of February 7 should be reestablished, or whether 
 a partial or total reorganization of the provincial government should 
 be imdertaken." In the latter case he was authorized to declare 
 such offices vacant as he deemed necessary, and proceed to fill them 
 in accordance with the constitution and laws of the province. 
 
 It is evident at a glance that such an interpretation of article 6 
 of the constitution places the provincial government completely at 
 the mercy of the federal authorities. In order to secure the support 
 of the provincial authorities the federal government possesses this 
 far-reaching power of intervention, which is a constant menace to 
 the tenure of provincial governors. ^ 
 
 It would seem that the governor of San Juan having been duly 
 elected and installed in office, the constitutional obligations of the 
 federal government would have been duly fulfilled by giving effect to 
 that portion of article 6 which makes it the duty of the federal govern- 
 
 » For a more detailed discussion of the dangers involved in this wide extension of the powers 
 of intervention see Chapter VII. 
 
86 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 ment, when requested by the provincial authorities, to intervene for the 
 purpose of maintaining them in power or reestabUshing their authority 
 if deposed by domestic violence or by invasion from another province. 
 
 Instead of adopting this course, the federal commissioner, acting 
 under instructions from the minister of the interior, undertook an 
 investigation, not only of the manner in which the governor had 
 been elected, but also of the honesty and fairness of all elections 
 for members of the provincial legislature held subsequent thereto. 
 This investigation was undertaken, according to the federal com- 
 missioner, in order to ascertain whether a republican form of govern- 
 ment really existed in San Juan, preparatory to determining whether 
 or not the federal government should exercise the power conferred 
 upon it by article 6, to guarantee to the province a republican form 
 of government. As a result of this investigation, the federal com- 
 missioner arrived at the conclusion that although the governor had 
 been duly and legally elected, there had occurred during his adminis- 
 tration fraudulent practices in the elections for members of the 
 provincial legislature. Such practices had, in his view, undermined 
 the republican form of government and made it necessary to proceed 
 to the election of new executive and legislative authorities. 
 
 On March 18 the federal commissioner issued a decree declaring 
 vacant the governorship as well as all seats in both branches of the pro- 
 vincial legislature. The preamble to this decree contains a summary 
 of the reasons upon which the commissioner based his conclusions. 
 He said in part: 
 
 "Proceeding in accordance with my instructions, I made a careful and 
 detailed study of the memoranda submitted by the governor and by the 
 representatives of the opposition party, as well as of the documents and 
 facts which I had collected. The examination of this data leads one to 
 the conclusion that although the present provincial authorities may have 
 been legally elected and organized, subsequent election abuses were so 
 nvmierous that the republican form of government was in reality imdermined 
 when the recent revolutionary movement took place. 
 
 "From the evidence submitted it is evident that the estimable citizen 
 who governed the province was not able or did not know how to prevent 
 the election abuses, which had reached the most deplorable extremes in the 
 preparation of the registry list and in the elections themselves held during 
 the years 1906 and 1907, and especially those held on the 14th of March 
 and the 25th of May, 1906. It is important to note that the authorities of 
 the province, other than the executive, were also involved in these abuses. 
 
 "It is true that armed insurrections should be repudiated and condemned 
 as a means of securing improved political conditions; but it is also true that 
 it is the duty of the federal government, when it intervenes in a province, to 
 protect the political rights of the citizen, and one of these rights is the free 
 exercise of the suffrage, constituting, as it does, the basis of the representative 
 system as provided by the constitution and laws. These are, therefore, the 
 considerations of law and fact which serve as the bases for our decision. 
 A more detailed analysis thereof will be made when our final report is 
 submitted. 
 
A Typical Case of Federal Intervention 87 
 
 "In the province of San Juan it is absolutely necessary to restore the 
 repubhcan form of government in order that the people may as soon as 
 possible elect the legally constituted authorities, who shall govern their 
 destinies in peace and hberty. 
 
 "For these reasons the federal commissioner, in the name of the execu- 
 tive authority of the nation, decrees: 
 
 "Art. 1. That the incvmibents of the executive and legislative offices 
 of the province of San Juan, at the time of the insurrectionary movement of 
 February 7, last, are herewith declared to have forfeited their offices, and 
 new elections are hereby ordered. 
 
 "Art. 2. The manner and date of such elections will hereafter be de- 
 termined, but such elections shall be held in conformity with the constitution 
 and laws of the province. 
 
 "Art. 3. This decree shall be proclaimed and published in the official 
 register." 
 
 (Signed) " C. Moyano Gacitua, Federal Commissioner. 
 "Jos6 A. Frias, Secretary. 
 "H. D. Aguiar, Secretary." 
 
 On the following day (March 19, 1907) the federal commissioner 
 issued another decree, directing the holding of new elections for 
 lieutenant-governor to serve the remainder of the term of the deposed 
 executive, and for senators and representatives of the legislature. 
 On March 20 and 21 further decrees were issued, prescribing details 
 as to the manner of holding elections. 
 
 As was to be foreseen, the candidate of the opposition party was 
 elected to fill the unexpired term. A year later the leader of the 
 revolutionary movement. Colonel Sarmiento, was elected governor. 
 
 Viewed in its purely constitutional aspects, and without reference 
 to the political purposes involved, the case of San Juan presents 
 peculiar interest, because it illustrates so clearly the contrast between 
 the constitutional practice in the Argentine Republic and in the 
 United States. It is true that the Argentine constitution goes one 
 step further than the constitution of the United States, in that it 
 guarantees to each province (article 5) the free exercise and enjoy- 
 ment of its political institutions. (See article 5, page 137.) This 
 article was not invoked in the San Juan intervention, the entire pro- 
 ceeding being based on the provision of article 6, which is identical 
 with article 4, section 4, of the constitution of the United States. In 
 both cases the obligation is placed upon the federal government to 
 guarantee to each constituent part of the federal system (states or 
 provinces) a republican form of government. In the United States 
 this has been construed to mean nothing more than a guarantee that 
 the people shall "choose their own officers for governmental admin- 
 istration, and pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative power 
 reposed in representative bodies, whose legislative acts may be said 
 to be those of the people themselves." ^ 
 
 1 In re Duncan, 139 U. S., 449. 
 
88 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 In the Argentine a totally different view has been taken of the 
 power which this clause confers on the federal government. Instead 
 of drawing the hne, as indicated in this decision, the thesis maintained 
 and successfully enforced by the Argentine government has been that 
 this guarantee involves far more than the right of the people to choose 
 their own officers and to make laws through a representative assembly. 
 It also includes the lawful conduct of elections, strict compliance with 
 preliminary requirements in the formation of the registry rolls, and 
 finally the guarantee of an accurate count of the election results. 
 
 In one sense it may be said that this interpretation of the consti- 
 tutional clause is quite as reasonable as that sustained by the supreme 
 court of the United States; but it is also true that it places in the 
 hands of the federal government the power to reduce the provinces 
 to a condition of poUtical subordination. It is evident that if the 
 national authorities interpret, as a requirement of a "republican 
 form of government," that every elective officer shall hold office 
 through an election entirely free from fraud or intimidation, there is 
 no limit to the federal power of intervention. Judged by the standards 
 applied in the case of San Juan, there is certainly no state of our 
 union which would have escaped the intervention of the federal gov- 
 ernment at some time or other in its history. With such an interpre- 
 tation the national government becomes not merely the guarantor of a 
 repubUcan form of government in the provinces, but also of its smooth 
 operation and to a certain extent of the integrity of its political 
 methods. 
 
 If the national government were able to keep itself aloof from 
 partisan affihations this guarantee would have real value. From 
 the very nature of the situation this is impossible. The fact that the 
 party in power in national affairs requires the political cooperation 
 of the provincial governors makes irresistible the temptation to 
 intervene for partisan purposes. It is for this reason that the federal 
 intervention in the province of San Juan can not be fully understood 
 if studied in its purely constitutional aspects. In order to form an 
 opinion as to its real significance, the accompanjdng poUtical condi- 
 tions must be analyzed. 
 
PART 11. 
 
 THE ORGANIZATION AND PRINCIPLES OF THE 
 FEDERAL SYSTEM. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 THE POSITION OF THE EXECUTIVE. 
 
 No other portion of the Argentine poUtical system has given rise 
 to so much discussion as the position of the executive. This is due 
 in part to the lack of clear and definite formulation of executive powers 
 in the constitution and in part to the influence of deeply rooted politi- 
 cal ideas and tendencies inherited from Spain. 
 
 The memories of arbitrary action by the Spanish viceroys created 
 in the minds of the founders of the repubUc a marked distrust of 
 executive power. It is not surprising, therefore, to find in the early 
 revolutionary assemblies a well-defined reluctance to create a strong 
 executive or even to vest one person with restricted executive power. 
 The early attempts at poUtical organization are all characterized by 
 the formation of executive boards, "trimnvirates," and other forms 
 of multiple executive heads. The inefficiency and lack of definite 
 poUcy resulting from this tjrpe of organization soon forced the reluc- 
 tant acceptance of a single-headed executive. By resolution of January 
 22, 1814, the general constituent assembly decreed that all executive 
 authority should be vested in one person. A few days later it was 
 decided to give to the chief executive the title "supreme director of 
 the united provinces." The immediate cause of the acceptance of a 
 single-headed executive was the impossibility of an effective military 
 organization under the "triimivirate" system. In the national con- 
 stituent congress which assembled in Tucumdn in 1816 and which 
 made the formal declaration of independence of the country, there was 
 no longer any question as to the desirabihty of a siagle executive 
 head; this tendency was dictated in part by a fear of the reappear- 
 ance of the old system of "boards" and "trimnvirates" rather than a 
 real adherence to monarchical principles.^ The congress of Tucumdn 
 having been transferred to Buenos Aires, adopted December 3, 1817, 
 the "provisional regulations for the direction and administration 
 of the state." In these regidations the executive power was vested 
 in a "director of the state," elected by the congress, with ample 
 administrative powers. The history of the executive power between 
 1817 and the constitutional reorganization of 1829 presented a con- 
 stantly increasing emphasis on executive power and finally led to 
 the dictatorship of Juan Manuel Rosas, which lasted from 1829 to 
 1852. With the downfall of Rosas, in December 1852, Argentina 
 entered upon a new period of constitutional development. In spite 
 
 > Letter of General San Martin to Laprida, cited by Del Valle, Derecho Constitucional, p. 327. 
 
 91 
 
92 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 of the long period of dictatorship through which the country had 
 passed, the convention that framed the constitution of 1853 gave 
 evidence of an unexpected willingness to provide for a vigorous execu- 
 tive authority. It would have been natural after a long period of 
 tyranny to find the new constitution filled with provisions intended 
 to guard against possible abuses of power. The members of the 
 convention were sufficiently clear-sighted to avoid the mistakes of 
 the early constitutions of the republic and provided for an executive 
 with far-reaching powers. 
 
 In order to understand the position of the executive in the Argen- 
 tine political system, it is necessary to look beyond the written 
 constitution and carefully observe the operation of the political 
 mechanism. With one notable exception, the powers of the Argentine 
 president as defined in the constitution are strikingly similar to those 
 of the president of the United States. He is chosen for a period of 
 six years under a system of indirect election, by which electors chosen 
 by the people assemble for the purpose of selecting a president. The 
 system has developed in precisely the same manner as in the United 
 States — the people, although voting for electors, in reality select 
 the candidate for whom they desire to cast their vote, the electors 
 being in fact compelled to cast their votes for the candidate designated 
 on the respective tickets. Reelection can only take place after a presi- 
 dential period has elapsed subsequent to the term for which he has 
 been elected. The manner of election is provided for as follows: 
 
 "Art. 81. The election of the president and vice-president of the nation 
 shall be made in the following manner: The capital and each one of the 
 provinces shall appoint, by direct vote, an electoral college, consisting of 
 twice as many members as the number of senators and deputies constituting 
 their respective representation in congress, who shall have the same qualifica- 
 tions, and shall be elected in the same manner, as provided in the present 
 constitution for the election of deputies. 
 
 "Deputies, senators, and ofl&cials receiving pay from the federal govern- 
 ment shall be disqualified from acting as electors. 
 
 "Four months before the expiration of the presidential term, the electors 
 chosen by the capital shall meet in the capital, and those chosen by the 
 provinces in their respective capitals, and shall proceed to elect by signed 
 ballots the president and vice-president of the nation, expressing in one ballot 
 the choice for president and in another distinct ballot the choice for vice- 
 president. 
 
 "Two lists shall be made of all the persons named for president and two 
 others of those named for vice-president, with the mmiber of votes cast in 
 favor of each of them. These Usts shall be signed by the electors and sent by 
 them sealed, two (one of each kind) to the president of the provincial legis- 
 lature, and in the case of the capital to the president of the municipaUty — 
 to be filed and kept, with their seals unbroken, in their respective archives — 
 and the other two to the president of the senate (for the first election, to the 
 president of the constitutional convention). 
 
 "Art. 82. The president of the senate (for the first election, the president 
 of the constitutional convention), having all the lists in his possession, shall 
 
The Position of the Executive 
 
 open them in the presence of the two houses. Four members of congress, 
 selected by lot, shall, together with the secretaries, immediately proceed to 
 count and announce the votes cast for each candidate for president and vice- 
 president of the nation. Those receiving in each case an absolute majority 
 of aU the votes shall be imjnediately proclaimed president and vice-president. 
 
 "Abt. 83. In case the vote is divided and no absolute majority can 
 thus be obtained, congress shall elect one of the two persons who shall have 
 obtained the greatest number of votes. If the highest vote obtained proves to 
 be in favor of more than two persons, congress shall make its choice from 
 among all of them. 
 
 " If the highest vote obtained proves to be in favor of only one person 
 and two or more persons are favored with the next largest vote, the choice 
 of congress shall be made from among all those who obtained the first and 
 second highest votes. 
 
 "Art. 84. This choice shall be made by an absolute majority of votes, 
 the votes to be verbal. If such majority is not obtained on the first ballot, 
 a second vote shall be taken, restricting the vote to the two persons who 
 shall have obtained the greatest number of votes on the first ballot. If the 
 vote is equally divided, the balloting shall be repeated, but if it again results 
 in an equal division, the president of the senate (for the first election the 
 president of the constitutional convention) shall decide by his vote. The 
 counting of the votes and the verifying of these elections shall not be made 
 without the presence of three-fourths of all the members of congress. 
 
 The administrative powers of the president of the Argentine 
 Republic are somewhat more extensive than those of the president 
 of the United States. His powers of appointment are not only far 
 greater, but most appointments are made without the advice and 
 consent of the senate. This power has been the most important 
 factor in giving to the president a dominant position in the Argentine 
 political system and has enabled him to resist successfully all 
 attempted encroachments of the legislative authority upon executive 
 prerogative. 
 
 The one point upon which the framers of the constitution of 
 1853 insisted was that all acts and orders of the president be counter- 
 signed by one of his responsible ministers. Without such counter- 
 signatiu-e the orders of the president are void and without effect. 
 This provision has had a far-reaching effect on the Argentine con- 
 stitutional system, the precise nature of which has been the subject 
 of interminable discussion on the part of jurists and publicists. Is 
 the Argentine system of government presidential or parliamentary? 
 It is no exaggeration to say that volumes have been written on 
 this subject,^ without arriving at any satisfactory conclusion or at 
 least without arriving at any conclusion which has received general 
 assent. 
 
 The question to which an answer should be given is not so much 
 to ascertain the intent of the framers of the constitution of 1853 as 
 
 • See Funcion Constitucional de los Ministros, containing a series of essays by prominent pub- 
 licists. Biblioteca Argentina de Ciencias Politicas, vol. 2, Buenos Aires, 1911. 
 
94 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 to determine the nature of the poUtical mechanism that has actually- 
 developed. The distinguishing characteristic of the position of the 
 Argentine executive as compared with that of the president of the 
 United States is to be found in articles 87, 88, and 89, which read as 
 follows: 
 
 "Art. 87. Eight ministers or secretaries shall have charge of the affairs 
 of the nation, and shall countersign and attest the acts of the president by 
 means of their signatures; these acts shall not be valid without such counter- 
 signature. A special law shall determine the business of each department. 
 
 " Akt. 88. Each minister is individually responsible for the acts signed by 
 himself, and jointly with the other ministers for all acts agreed upon between 
 him and his colleagues. 
 
 "Art. 89. The ministers shall not, in any case, take individual action 
 on any subject, unless it concerns only the internal government of their own 
 respective departments." ' 
 
 From the earliest period " we find the founders of the Argentine 
 political system insistent on the necessity of establishing executive 
 responsibiUty through the countersignature of all presidential orders 
 or decrees by a member of the cabinet, who thereby assumes the 
 responsibility therefor. This plan was taken from the French con- 
 stitution of 1791 (chapter II, section IV, article IV), which provides 
 that no order of the king shall take effect unless countersigned by 
 the minister of the respective department.* 
 
 In the Argentine political system, therefore, the cabinet ministers 
 occupy a distinct constitutional position, whereas, as is well known, 
 the constitution of the United States is silent on this point, the presi- 
 dent alone assmning all responsibility for executive acts; a responsibiUty 
 which, however, can only be enforced by impeachment proceedings. 
 
 Does this constitutional provision for ministerial responsibility 
 mean that the Argentine system departs from the plan of presidential 
 government and establishes either a parliamentary system or some- 
 thing approaching thereto? 
 
 Whatever may have been the intent of the framers of the con- 
 stitution of 1853 — and there is no internal evidence to show that 
 they were bent on establishing a system of parliamentary govern- 
 ment — the fact is that the constitution does not make specific 
 provision for such a system, nor has anything approaching a real 
 parliamentary system developed during the six decades of constitu- 
 tional growth. The causes are due in part to the political ideas 
 inherited from Spain which have, in many cases, proved stronger 
 than constitutional precepts and in part to certain pecuUarities of 
 
 national political life. 
 
 , 1 
 
 1 An amendment of March 15, 1898, increases the number of ministers to eight, designated 
 respectively as follows: interior; foreign affairs and public worship; treasury; justice; 
 agriculture; public instruction ; war; and navy. 
 
 ^ Reglamento Provisorio of December 3, 1817, and article 102 of the constitution of 1826. 
 Matienzo, El Gobierno Representativo, p. 175. 
 
The Position of the Executive Q5 
 
 The essence of the parUamentary system is the dominant position 
 of the legislative authority, the executive being nothing more than 
 a committee of the dominant party va. the most popular branch of 
 the national assembly. The head of the state, whether constitutional 
 monarch or president, is merely the nominal executive who "reigns 
 but does not govern." 
 
 Argentina inherited from Spain the traditions of a vigorous 
 executive accustomed to act without consulting any other authority 
 and dominating the legislative authority whenever brought into con- 
 tact therewith. The idea of an executive subordinated to the legislative 
 authority was completely foreign to Spanish ideas of the eighteenth 
 century. 
 
 Throughout the nineteenth century the supremacy of the execu- 
 tive over the legislative authority has been characteristic of the 
 political development of the country, both in the provincial and the 
 federal governments. This fact alone would have been sufficient to 
 overcome any tendency toward the estabUshment of parliamentary 
 government, even if the constitution were more specific with reference 
 to the relation of the executive to the legislative authority. 
 
 The subordination of the legislative to the executive authority 
 in the actual operation of the political system of Argentina is evident, 
 not only diu-ing the sessions of the national congress, but also in the 
 relation of the president to the candidacy of persons desiring election 
 as representatives. With the exception of the provinces in which 
 the governor is a political opponent of the president, the candidates 
 for members of the lower house are usually selected after consul- 
 tation between the governor and the president or his representative. 
 Thus, the president is assured of far-reaching influence ia the congress. 
 This influence is strengthened by the absence of well-defined national 
 political parties, with definitely formulated principles and platform. 
 The only exception to this rule is the sociaUst party, which, while 
 increasing in strength, is not as yet an important factor in the 
 political life of the nation. The personal character of all the impor- 
 tant political groups makes it comparatively easy for the president, 
 through a judicious distribution of patronage, to make them sub- 
 servient to his wiU. 
 
 With the traditions of executive power reinforced by certain of 
 the salient characteristics of Argentine political life, it is not sm*- 
 prising that the executive has established and maintained its hold 
 over the legislative authority and that in such circumstances the 
 development of parliamentary government has been impossible. 
 The requirement that all executive acts shall be countersigned by a 
 member of the cabinet has in no way diminished the real poUtical 
 power and influence of the president. The resignation of individual 
 ministers takes place, as a rule, not as the result of a vote of lack of 
 
96 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 confidence on the part of the congress, but because of differences of 
 opinion with the president. In a few instances, ministers have re- 
 signed because of difficulties with the congress, such as the rejection 
 of measures which they had fostered or the reduction of appropria- 
 tions in their departments, but such resignations are traceable to 
 personal considerations rather than to an acquiescence in the con- 
 trolUng power of the congress. 
 
 This dominant position of the executive in the Argentine political 
 system is clearly shown when we compare the proceedings of the 
 national congress with the congress of the United States. In the 
 first place, in all matters relating to the budget the presumption is 
 strongly in favor of the estimates submitted by the executive. Dur- 
 ing the extra session of 1914, owing largely to the fact that the 
 country was passing through a severe financial crisis, the budget 
 commission of the congress took greater liberties with the executive 
 estimates than at any time in the recent legislative history of the 
 country, but this was due, in the main, to the necessity of effect- 
 ing a readjustment of expenditures to the diminished income of the 
 public treasury. 
 
 In the ordinary course of legislation the most important measures 
 are usually prepared by the executive and submitted to the congress 
 with a report in which the views of the president are set forth. It is 
 also customary for the minister to whose particular department the 
 legislation in question belongs to appear in both houses in order to 
 explain and defend the measure. 
 
 The constitutional provisions giving to the congress the power 
 to call cabinet ministers for the purpose of securing explanations of 
 measures or of any matters relating to their respective administrative 
 departments have not served to strengthen the hold of the congress 
 on the executive. It has been used at times to annoy the president 
 and his ministers, but has not been a weapon sufficiently powerful to 
 force the resignation of a cabinet. On the other hand, it has served a 
 most useful purpose in keeping the legislative authority in closer 
 touch with the executive than would otherwise have been possible. 
 
 As regards the cabinet itself, the president is entirely free in his 
 choice. He may select the members from the political party to which 
 he owes his election, or he may endeavor, as several presidents have 
 done, to use the cabinet as a means of reconciling or consolidating 
 elements which have not been entirely concordant, with a view to 
 strengthening the political support of his administration. 
 
 Of the eight ministers constituting the cabinet, it has been the cus- 
 tom of successive presidents to select half from the provinces and half 
 from the city of Buenos Aires. In selecting ministers from the prov- 
 inces, however, no attempt has been made at sectional representation,^ 
 
 1 Article of Ruiz Moreno in symposium entitled " Funcion Constitucional de los Miniatros," p. 8. 
 
The Position of the Executive 97 
 
 the purpose being rather to assemble in the cabinet the several polit- 
 ical elements which will assure greatest prestige to the administration. 
 
 It will be seen from the foregoing description that the Argentine 
 system is essentially presidential, both because of the relation of the 
 cabinet to the congress and because of the independent position of 
 the executive. Whatever they may in time become, at the present 
 day the cabinet ministers are nothing more than personal advisers 
 to the president and heads of executive departments. 
 
 Independent of the constitution and in many cases in violation 
 of its spirit, if not of its letter, there have developed certain executive 
 practices in Argentina which further indicate the dominant position 
 of the executive and which have at the same time given to the cabinet 
 an importance which it would not otherwise have attained. I refer 
 to the so-called " Acuerdos de Gabinete," by which is meant a cabinet 
 meeting called by the president at which action is taken on matters 
 submitted by the president. These meetings have undertaken to make 
 appropriations not provided for in the annual budget and thus to 
 remove from the congress the real control of the national finances. 
 Against this practice there has been no lack of protest, but to no 
 avail. The result has been to burden the country with expenditures 
 far in excess of those provided for in the annual budget as voted by 
 the congress. It also is evident that this power, nowhere contem- 
 plated in the constitution, not only places a dangerous weapon in the 
 hands of the executive, but enables him to make serious inroads on 
 the most important power of the national congress, namely, the con- 
 trol over national finances. 
 
 As regards the relations existing between the president and the 
 congress, it may be said that these relations have usually been entirely 
 cordial, due in part to the extra-constitutional influence exerted by 
 the executive, which in most cases has assured a docile congress. 
 When differences have occurred, the president usually has been 
 victorious. In cases of acute conflict, such as occurred in 1908, the 
 executive resorted to the extreme measure of closing the congress 
 peremptorily, enforcing the decree through the use of the military 
 arm and declaring the budget of the preceding year to be in force. 
 
 The possibility of resorting to such extreme measures success- 
 fully is strengthened in Argentina by the fact that the political ideas 
 of the people inherited from Spain lead them instinctively to sup- 
 port the executive as against the legislative authority. It is to the 
 executive that the people look for the great reforms. The influence 
 which he can exert is well illustrated in the recent administration of 
 President Roque Saenz Pena, who went into office with the avowed 
 purpose of eliminating the fraud, intimidation, and bribery which 
 for so many years had characterized both the national and the 
 local elections. He forced through the congress an election law which 
 
98 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 made voting obligatory and at the same time attempted to assure 
 the secrecy of the ballot. The effect was immediately apparent. 
 Political elements hitherto having been denied representation were 
 successful in electing their candidates, thus bringing into the congress 
 new and independent forces which already have shown their influence 
 in giving to the national legislature a degree of freedom from execu- 
 tive control which marks a new epoch in the political development of 
 the republic. 
 
 It is altogether likely that with the growth of a more vigorous 
 political life, with the secrecy of the ballot and freedom of suffrage 
 assured, the confidence of the people in the congress will be strength- 
 ened. This will probably bring about a weakening of the position of 
 the executive or at least a limitation of the extra-constitutional powers 
 which it now exercises. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. 
 
 One of the most difficult tasks of the foreign student of Argentine 
 institutions is to determine with any degree of precision the influence 
 of the national congress in shaping the political destinies of the 
 country. The constitution gives to the legislative authority powers 
 quite as ample as those granted to the congress by the constitution 
 of the United States. Nevertheless, for reasons explained in part in 
 the preceding chapter, the congress has been a relatively subordinate 
 factor in the poUtical mechanism of the Argentine system. The 
 explanation is not to be sought in any failiu-e of the constitution to 
 grant ample powers, but rather in the Spanish tradition of executive 
 supremacy combined with a certain lack of confidence of the people 
 in the earnestness of putrpose of the national legislature. 
 
 Whatever may have been the virtues of the early legislative 
 assemblies, inspired by the patriotic fervor of the revolutionary 
 period, the record of achievement since the adoption of the constitu- 
 tion of 1853 has not been such as to command the confidence of the 
 masses. In the first place the legislative history of the country, 
 until a very recent period, shows a singular indifference on the part 
 of the congress to measures designed to improve the condition of the 
 working classes. Such measures as have been passed have been due 
 to the zeal of cabinet ministers. Until the rise of the socialist party 
 (1901), which, although small in number, is making its influence felt 
 in the lower house, the congress gave but little attention to the wel- 
 fare of the laboring classes. 
 
 Until very recently the voters have shown but little interest in the 
 congressional elections and but a comparatively small percentage has 
 participated therein. That a real and vital interest can be aroused 
 when the people have confidence in the honesty of elections is attested 
 by the extraordinarily active participation in the national elections 
 of 1912, the first to be held under the new election law, which assured 
 secrecy and a fair count. It is true that the law also provided for 
 obUgatory voting, inflicting a penalty of 10 pesos (about $4.40) for a 
 first offense in failing to vote without good cause and 20 pesos ($8.80) 
 for a second offense. There was a general belief, however, that this 
 penalty would not be enforced, as in fact it has not been. It is not 
 likely, therefore, that the obligatory voting clause perceptibly increased 
 the mmiber of votes cast. The guarantees for secrecy and honesty of 
 coimt were sufficient to arouse an extraordinary interest in the elec- 
 tion. Campaigning was carried on with a zeal heretofore unknown 
 
100 
 
 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 in the political history of the country. The results of the election 
 indicate not only an unprecedented participation of the electorate, 
 but also the rejection of many candidates who, in former elections, 
 were assured of success because of the mere fact that they enjoyed 
 the support of the national executive. 
 
 National elections of 1912. 
 
 Registered. 
 
 Vote 
 cast. 
 
 Percentage of 
 
 votes cast to 
 
 voters registered 
 
 Capital, federal 
 
 Provinces 
 
 Buenos Aires 
 
 C6rdoba 
 
 Santa F6 
 
 Tucumdn 
 
 EntreRios 
 
 Corrientes 
 
 Mendoza 
 
 Santiago del Estero . 
 
 Salta 
 
 San Luis 
 
 San Juan 
 
 Catamarca 
 
 La Rioja 
 
 Jujuy 
 
 Total 
 
 126,303 
 
 232,000 
 99,929 
 98,371 
 70,815 
 63,184 
 53,485 
 38,500 
 35,261 
 26,627 
 22,187 
 21,111 
 18,332 
 15,916 
 12.380 
 
 934,401 
 
 106,157 
 
 153,602 
 65,460 
 74,383 
 39,891 
 41,602 
 39,897 
 24,467 
 23,136 
 15,745 
 16,442 
 17,580 
 12,434 
 11,596 
 8,460 
 
 640,852 
 
 84.05 
 
 66.21 
 55.49 
 75.60 
 66.33 
 65.84 
 74.59 
 63.55 
 65.64 
 69.13 
 74.11 
 83.26 
 67.83 
 72.86 
 68.34 
 68.58 
 
 Owing to the fact that neither house of the Argentine congress 
 is renewed at any time in toto, the elections of any one period can not 
 fully reflect the state of pubUc opinion. The elections of 1912 would 
 have had a far deeper influence on the tone and spirit of the chamber 
 of deputies if the renewal of membership had been complete. But 
 even this partial renewal has served to introduce new elements into 
 the lower house which have had a real influence on the character of 
 legislation, but especially on the attitude of the people toward the 
 congress. Since the beginning of the regular session of 1913, the public 
 has evinced a more sustained interest in the debates than at any 
 previous period in the history of the country. Had it not been for 
 the severe financial and commercial crisis through which the country 
 was then passing, it seems quite certain that the many important 
 social problems awaiting legislative solution would have received 
 attention. At all events, it is evident that if the elections continue 
 to be safeguarded with the same care and zeal as was the case in 
 1912, the position of the congress will be considerably strengthened. 
 
 The members of the lower house of the Argentine congress — the 
 chamber of deputies — are elected by direct popular vote, the con- 
 stitution prescribing ^ that there shall be one representative for every 
 
 > Article 37, as amended March 16, 1898. 
 
The Legislative Authority 101 
 
 33,000 inhabitants. The quaUfications for electors are determined by 
 federal law. Every male citizen 18 years of age is entitled to vote 
 except the following: 
 
 (a) Adjudged lunatics living in their respective homes. 
 
 (b) Deaf mutes unable to write. 
 
 (c) Priests hving in religious communities. 
 
 (d) Persons under arrest. 
 
 (e) Inmates of limatic asylmns and poor-houses. 
 
 (/) Persons convicted a second time of offenses against property 
 
 (for a period of five years after such second conviction). 
 (g) Persons convicted of perjury or of violations of the election law 
 
 (for a period of five years after such conviction). 
 (h) All persons declared by judicial decree to be incapacitated to 
 
 hold pubhc office. 
 (i) Fraudulent bankrupts until their discharge in bankruptcy. 
 ( j) Those convicted of misuse of trust fimds until restitution of such 
 
 ftmds has been made. 
 (k) All persons serving a term of imprisonment, during the period 
 
 of the sentence. 
 (Z) All persons who have attempted to evade mihtary service until 
 
 they have submitted to the penalty for the violation of the 
 
 law relating to universal mihtary service. 
 (m) All persons expelled from the army and deserters for a period 
 
 of ten years after conviction for the offenses involved. 
 (n) All persons convicted of misappropriation of pubhc funds, until the 
 
 amounts involved have been returned to the pubhc treasury, 
 (o) Proprietors and managers of houses of prostitution. 
 
 Under the Argentine election law, registry is obligatory. This is 
 due to the fact that such registry is used primarily for the enforce- 
 ment of universal military service. Within three months after having 
 reached the age of 18 years every native-born or naturalized citizen 
 is required to present himself to the municipal authorities, where such 
 exist, or to the justice of the peace in the rural districts, for purposes 
 of em-ollment. Failure to do so involves heavy penalties, ranging from 
 a fine to a year's additional military service. 
 
 In spite of the conscientious effort made to improve the election 
 law, the mechanism of voting, when judged by modern standards, is 
 singularly defective. The official ballot is imknown, each party 
 supplying ballots which the voter takes with him or secures after 
 entering the voting booth. The multiplicity of ballots is exceedingly 
 confusing, especially to the ignorant voter. Furthermore, it tends 
 to facilitate the purchase of votes by enabling election agents to 
 supply the ballots to venal voters. When voters are supplied with 
 ballots by party representatives, rather than compelled to make their 
 selection of candidates from an official ballot, the real freedom of choice 
 is greatly restricted, as was evident in the election for members of 
 congress held under the new election law in May 1914. 
 
 In the selection of members of the lower house the recent election 
 
102 
 
 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 law introduced a system of minority representation under which the 
 voter selects a certain proportion of the candidates listed on a general 
 ticket, in accordance with Table A, colunm 1, which shows the num- 
 ber of deputies to be elected, while column 2 shows the number of can- 
 didates for whom the voter is permitted to cast ballot. 
 
 The total number of members of the lower house is at present 120, 
 distributed as shown in Table B. 
 
 Table A. 
 
 Table B. 
 
 Col. 1. 
 
 Col. 2. 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 7 
 
 6 
 
 8 
 
 6 
 
 9 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 7 
 
 11 
 
 8 
 
 12 
 
 8 
 
 13 
 
 9 
 
 14 
 
 10 
 
 16 
 
 10 
 
 16 
 
 11 
 
 17 
 
 12 
 
 18 
 
 12 
 
 Province or city 
 
 No. 
 
 City of Buenos Aires 
 
 20 
 
 28 
 
 12 
 
 9 
 
 7 
 
 11 
 
 3 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 Province of Buenos Aires 
 
 Santa F6 
 
 Entre Rios 
 
 Corrientes 
 
 C6rdoba 
 
 San Luis 
 
 Santiago del Estero . 
 
 Mendoza 
 
 San Juan 
 
 La Rioja 
 
 Catamarca 
 
 Tucumdn 
 
 Salta 
 
 Jujuy 
 
 The organization of the upper house or senate is governed by 
 article 46 of the constitution, which reads as follows: 
 
 "The senate shall consist of two senators from each province elected by 
 a plurality of votes by the respective legislatures. There shall be also two 
 senators for the capital, who shall be elected in the same way as the presi- 
 dent of the nation. Each senator shall have one vote." 
 
 The qualifications for members of the senate differ from those 
 of the house. For membership in the lower house there are but 
 two requisites, namely, an age requirement of 25 years and the pos- 
 session of Argentine citizenship for a period of at least four years. 
 Senators, on the other hand, must be 30 years of age, have been cit- 
 izens of Argentina for at least six years and have an annual income 
 of not less than 2,000 "pesos fuertes" ($1,941). 
 
 The senate is composed of two members from each province 
 elected by the legislatures thereof and two members from the capital 
 city (Buenos Aires) elected in the same manner as the president, 
 namely, by the election of electors, who, in their turn, select the two 
 senators. The term of office is nine years, the constitution providing 
 for a renewal of one-third of the senate every three years. 
 
 Although the Argentine senate has been honored by the member- 
 
The Legislative Authority 103 
 
 ship of a long line of distinguished men, the body as a whole has 
 never been able to secure for itself an important position in the 
 Argentine political system. We have had occasion several times to 
 refer to the subordinate position of the legislative authority. Not 
 only does the power of the senate suffer because of this fact, but its 
 influence is further reduced by reason of the greater confidence of 
 the masses in the lower house. The fact that the provincial legis- 
 latures are often under the dominion of the provincial governors and 
 that the latter usually enjoy the privilege of selecting the candidates 
 whom the legislature is to elect, has gradually created a deeply rooted 
 conviction that the senate is an oUgarchic body far removed from the 
 currents of public opinion and impervious to its influence. 
 
 The special powers granted to each house separately are compara- 
 tively few. To the chamber of deputies belongs the exclusive power 
 to originate revenue measures and measures relating to military con- 
 scription. To it also belongs the exclusive power to institute impeach- 
 ment proceedings against the president, vice-president, and members 
 of the cabinet, against members of both houses, justices of the supreme 
 court, and provincial governors. The constitution provides (article 45) 
 that such articles of impeachment may be formulated for treason, 
 bribery, misuse of public funds, violation of the constitution, or other 
 offense involving punishment by death or long period of penal servi- 
 tude. The articles of impeachment as formulated must receive the 
 approval of two-thirds of the members present. 
 
 To the senate belongs the exclusive power of trying such impeach- 
 ments. When organized as a tribunal for this purpose, the chief 
 justice of the supreme court presides; a vote of two-thirds of the 
 members present is necessary for conviction. It will be noted that 
 the procedure provided for in impeachment proceedings is identical 
 ■with that prescribed by the constitution of the United States. 
 
 As regards the sessions of the congress, the constitution provides 
 that a regular session shall be held each year, beginning May 1 and 
 ending September 30 (article 55). The president may, however, 
 either extend the regular session or convene the congress in extra 
 session. Whether extending the regular session or convening in extra 
 session, the executive has steadfastly maintained that the congress 
 must limit itself to the pmposes for which convened. As is well 
 pointed out by Matienzo,^ this unusual limitation on the legislative 
 authority when a regular session is extended gives to the president 
 far-reaching powers of control when the congress fails to complete its 
 legislative program at the regular session. As this is of almost con- 
 stant occurrence, the executive is in a position to force upon the 
 attention of the legislative authority the measures which it desires to 
 see enacted. As a rule, what occurs at the sessions of the Argentine 
 
 » El Gobiemo Reprfisentativo. Op. cit., p. 186. 
 
104 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 congress is that the early months are devoted to a general discussion 
 of pending measures exclusive of the appropriation bills and the end 
 of the regular session arrives without final action on the budget. The 
 usual procedure is the extension of the regular session for the sole 
 piupose of considering the budget. Time and again the members of 
 congress have requested the president to include other matters for 
 possible consideration, but he has usually refused or has taken the 
 position that after the voting of the budget he would consider the 
 advisability of including other matters. 
 
 The legislative powers conferred on the congress contained in 
 article 67 of the constitution are as follows: 
 
 "1. To legislate in regard to custom-houses, and to establish import 
 duties, which, as well as the rates of appraisement on which they are based, 
 shall be uniform throughout the nation; it being thoroughly understood, how- 
 ever, that these duties and all other taxes of national character are payable 
 in the currency of the respective provinces in their exact equivalent value. 
 And, to establish likewise export duties wp to 1866, at which time they shall 
 cease to he either national or -provincial taxes.^ 
 
 " 2. To levy direct taxes for a period of time and in a manner propor- 
 tionately equal throughout the territory of the nation, whenever the defense 
 of the country, the common safety, or the public good may require it. 
 
 " 3. To borrow money on the credit of the nation. 
 
 "4. To provide for the use and disposition of the national lands. 
 
 "5. To estabHsh and organize at the capital a national bank, with 
 branches in the provinces, with power to issue bank notes. 
 
 " 6. To make arrangements for the payment of the national debt, both 
 foreign and domestic. 
 
 "7. To appropriate annually the money necessary to meet the expendi- 
 tures of the national government, and to approve or disapprove the accounts 
 of its disbursement. 
 
 "8. To grant subsidies, to be paid out of the national treasury, to those 
 provinces whose revenues, according to their budgets, are insufficient to meet 
 their ordinary expenses. 
 
 " 9. To regulate the free navigation of the rivers in the interior, to declare 
 as ports of entry those which may be deemed fit for that purpose, and to 
 estabUsh or abolish custom-houses. But the custom-houses for foreign com- 
 merce, existing in each province at the time of its coming into the national 
 imion, shall not be abolished. 
 
 " 10. To coin money, fix the value thereof and that of foreign coins, and 
 adopt a tmiform system of weights and measiu-es for the whole nation. 
 
 "11. To enact civil, commercial, penal, and miniag codes without en- 
 croaching upon the local jurisdictions, the provisions of said codes to be 
 enforced either by the federal or provincial courts, according as the matters 
 or persons may fall under their respective jurisdiction, and especially to enact 
 general laws on naturalization and citizenship for the whole nation, based 
 upon the principle of citizenship by nativity, as well as laws on bankruptcy, 
 counterfeiting of money and forging of public documents of the state, and on 
 the establishment of trial by jury. 
 
 " 12. To regulate commerce by land and sea with foreign countries, and 
 among the provinces. 
 
 1 Words in italics stricken out September 12, 1866. 
 
The Legislative Authority 105 
 
 " 13. To establish and regulate the post-offices and post-roads of the nation. 
 " 14. To settle finally the national boundaries, to fix those of the prov- 
 inces, to create new provinces, and to provide by special laws for the 
 organization, administration, and government of the national territories, 
 which may be left outside the limits assigned to the provinces. 
 
 " 15. To provide for the security of the frontiers and for the preservation 
 of peaceful intercourse with the Indians, and to promote their conversion 
 to Catholicism. 
 
 " 16. To provide for all that conduces to the prosperity of the country, 
 to the advancement and welfare of all the provinces, and to the advancement 
 of the enlightemnent of the people, by prescribing plans for general and uni- 
 versity instruction and by promoting iadustrial enterprise, immigration, the 
 construction of railways and navigable canals, the colonization of the public 
 lands, the introduction and establishment of new industries, the importation 
 of foreign capital, and the exploration of the interior rivers, by protective 
 laws for these purposes, by concessions of privileges for a limited time, and 
 by rewards which shall act as an encouragement. 
 
 " 17. To establish courts inferior to the supreme court of justice; to 
 create and abohsh offices and to fix the duties of the same; grant pensions, 
 decree honors, and to grant general amnesties. 
 
 " 18. To accept, or refuse to accept the reasons assigned for the resig- 
 nation of the president or vice-president of the republic, to declare that the 
 time has arrived to proceed to a new election, to count the returns thereof, 
 and to ascertain the result. 
 
 " 19. To approve or reject treaties concluded with other nations, and the 
 concordats entered into with the Apostolic See, and to make rules for the 
 exercise of ecclesiastical patronage throughout the nation. 
 
 " 20. To admit into the territory of the nation reUgious orders in addition 
 to those now existing. 
 
 "21. To authorize the executive power to declare war or make peace. 
 "22. To grant letters of marque and of reprisal and to make rules con- 
 cerning prizes. 
 
 " 23. To fix the strength of the land and naval forces in times of peace and 
 of war, and to make rules and ordinances for the government of such forces. 
 " 24. To authorize the calUng out of the militia of the provinces whenever 
 the execution of the laws of the nation, the suppression of insurrections, or the 
 repelling of invasions may render it necessary. To provide for the organi- 
 zation, equipment, and discipline of such militia, and for the administration 
 and government of the part thereof which may be employed in the service of 
 the nation, leaving to the provinces the power to appoint the proper chiefs 
 and officers of their respective mihtias, and to enforce in regard to them the 
 discipline established by congress. 
 
 " 25. To permit the introduction of foreign troops into the territory of 
 the nation, and the departure therefrom of the national troops. 
 
 " 26. To proclaim a state of siege in one or more places in the nation in 
 case of internal disorder, and to approve or suspend the state of siege 
 declared during the recess of congress by the executive power. 
 
 " 27. To exercise exclusive legislative power throughout the territory of 
 the national capital and in all other places acquired by purchase or cession in 
 any province for the construction of forts, arsenals, magazines, or other useful 
 estabhshments of national utility. 
 
 " 28. To make all laws and regulations which shall be necessary for carry- 
 ing into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this 
 constitution in the government of the Argentine nation." 
 
106 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 An examination of the powers thus conferred shows a striking 
 similarity with section 8, article I, of the constitution of the United 
 States. Comparing the two instruments, it will readily be seen that 
 the Argentine constitution confers wider powers, emphasizing the 
 nationalization of legislation to a greater extent than the constitution 
 of the United States. This is particularly noticeable in the provisions 
 granting to the congress the power to enact national, civil, commercial, 
 mining, and penal codes. 
 
 In studying the Argentine political system one is impressed with 
 the fact that the most urgent need of the coimtry is the develop- 
 ment of an organic national public opinion. Both houses of congress 
 contaia many able men and the level of debate is probably as high 
 as in any representative assembly of Europe or America. The absence 
 of an organized national public opinion robs the assembly of that 
 cohesion and control which the formation of great national political 
 parties would facilitate. There are abundant signs, however, of a 
 healthful reaction against this state of affairs. Recent years have 
 witnessed several attempts at the formation of national political 
 parties with platforms which include something more than vague 
 expressions of general principles. Concrete problems of national 
 importance are entering into these platforms. 
 
 The primary diflficulty is the indifference of the mass of voters. 
 Outside of Buenos Aires and a few of the larger urban centers, the 
 people are but beginning to take an active, sustained, and consecutive 
 interest in public affairs. Fortunately, the rising generation is giving 
 evidence of an awakening of civic pride which is certain to have a 
 far-reaching influence on the political life of the country, preparing 
 the way for fhe development of national political parties, which will 
 address themselves to the pressing economic and social problems 
 confronting the country. 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 THE JUDICIARY. 
 
 The position of the judiciary in the Argentine political system 
 has received but Uttle attention from commentators and publicists; 
 yet there is probably no other portion of the system which has received 
 so much attention on the part of travelers and foreign commentators. 
 There has been for many years a widespread belief that the minor 
 judiciary (especially the justices of the peace in the several provinces) 
 was subject to political and personal influences. There is no doubt 
 that this belief has been one of the factors discouraging immigration. 
 Accounts of grave injustices done to settlers and of long delays in 
 securing titles to their lands have made a deep impression on foreign 
 opinion. 
 
 Nor is this impression dispelled in speaking with the people of the 
 country. Pervading their comments on the judiciary there runs a note 
 of pessimism, which serves to strengthen the conviction that whatever 
 the merits of the executive and legislative branches of the Argentine 
 system, the judiciary fails to command the complete confidence of 
 the masses. It is only after long-continued acquaintance with the 
 details of judicial organization and procedure that one becomes 
 convinced of the injustice of this estimate. It soon becomes clear 
 that a considerable portion of the present criticism of the judiciary 
 relates to a period which the country has happily outgrown — a 
 period in which the minor judiciary was completely subservient to 
 a despotic eixecutive. One begins, furthermore, to see that these sweep- 
 ing statements overshoot the mark, including within their denuncia- 
 tion both the healthy and the weak portions of the system. 
 
 In any examination of the Argentine judicial system it must 
 always be borne in mind that neither the historical background of 
 Spanish tradition nor the early political development of the coimtry 
 gives evidence of the existence of an independent judicial authority 
 sufficiently strong to assert itself as against the executive. On the 
 contrary, the history of Spain during the eighteenth century is a record 
 of the complete subordination of the judiciary to executive control. 
 The problem confronting the people of Argentina was totally differ- 
 ent, therefore, from that with which the people of the United States 
 had to deal. In the course of the eighteenth century the English 
 courts had succeeded, after a long struggle, in emancipating them- 
 selves from the direct control of the crown and had become the 
 guardians of the liberties of the people as against executive tyranny. 
 
 107 
 
108 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 The United States, therefore, inherited a system in which the founda- 
 tions for the development of an independent judiciary had been laid. 
 In spite of this fact, a long struggle between the executive and the 
 judiciary ensued which for a time placed the prestige of the latter in 
 serious peril. Viewed in this light, it is not siu-prising to find the early 
 history of Argentina replete with instances of judicial subservience, 
 but it is equally true that the last twenty-five years have witnessed 
 marked changes both in the character of the judges and in their at- 
 titude toward executive interference. 
 
 The organization and jurisdiction of the federal judiciary i follow 
 closely the plan outlined in the constitution of the United States. Ar- 
 ticle 94 of the Argentine constitution is similar to section 1, article 3, 
 of the constitution of the United States. It provides that: "The ju- 
 dicial power of the nation shall be vested in a supreme court of justice 
 and in the inferior tribunals which the congress may establish within 
 the national territory." The constitution of 1853 (article 91) provided 
 for a Supreme court of nine justices, but an amendment passed in 
 1860 broadened the discretionary power of congress with reference 
 to the number of justices. Pursuant to the powers thus granted the 
 Argentine congress has established, in addition to the supreme court, 
 district courts and federal courts of appeal. The judges of all these 
 courts hold office during good behavior. The abiUty of the federal 
 judges is, as a rule, of a considerably higher order than that of the 
 provincial judges. This is due to greater care in selection, to the 
 greater professional distinction that attaches to a federal judgeship, 
 to the greater stability of tenure, and to the better salaries paid the 
 federal judiciary. The people also show far greater confidence in the 
 integrity of the federal judiciary. The people of Argentina are accus- 
 tomed to indulge in unsparing criticism of public officials and there are 
 constantly afloat rumors with reference to the approachability of this 
 or that judge. It is exceedingly difficult for a foreigner to judge of 
 the value of such rumors. The impartial inquirer soon reaches the 
 conclusion that most of these rumors have no real foundation in fact 
 and that the federal judiciary, with a few unfortunate exceptions, 
 deserves the confidence which it now enjoys. 
 
 As regards the jiu-isdiction of the federal courts, the constitution 
 of 1853 went far beyond the constitution of the United States. In 
 article 97 it gave to the federal courts cognizance not only of all 
 controversies included within section 2, article 3, of the constitution of 
 the United States, but added thereto four important classes of cases, 
 namely: 
 
 1. Those arising between the authorities of a province. 
 
 2. Those arising between a province and any of its citizens. 
 
 1 Cf. the valuable work recently published by Borchard, " Bibliography and Guide to 
 Argentine law." 
 
The Judiciary 109 
 
 3. Appeals from the ecclesiastical courts which at the time of the 
 
 adoption of the constitution enjoyed jurisdiction over cases 
 involving marriage and separation proceedings. 
 
 4. All cases arising under the national civil, commercial, penal, and 
 
 mining codes. 
 
 It will be remembered that during the first seven years after the 
 adoption of the constitution of 1853 the province of Buenos Aires 
 maintained its independence of the confederation and that the national 
 convention of 1860 was called for the purpose of determining the 
 conditions under which this province should be incorporated into the 
 union. The situation was a critical one and involved nothing less than 
 the political future of the country. 
 
 At this convention the delegates of the province of Buenos Aires 
 made three demands with reference to the jurisdiction of the federal 
 courts as conditions prerequisite to its entry into the union. In the 
 first place they demanded that the procedure with reference to all 
 cases arising under the national codes be determined by the provinces 
 and that the jurisdiction thereunder be assigned to the provincial 
 coiu-ts; secondly, that the federal tribunals should not be permitted 
 to take cognizance of disputes arising between the public authorities of 
 the provinces; and thirdly, that the provision with reference to ap- 
 peal to federal tribunals from the decisions of ecclesiastical courts 
 be eliminated. Not only were all these proposals accepted, but the 
 convention went one step further and removed from the jurisdiction 
 of federal tribunals all cases arising between a province and its 
 citizens. 
 
 The former article 97 of the constitution, now article 100, after 
 the acceptance of these amendments, reads as follows: 
 
 "The supreme court and the inferior courts of the nation shall try and 
 decide all cases, not enumerated in clause 11 of article 67, which arise under 
 the provisions of this constitution, the laws of the nation, or treaties with 
 foreign powers; in cases concerning ambassadors, public ministers, and foreign 
 consuls; in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; in controversies to 
 which the nation is a party; in cases which arise between two or more prov- 
 inces, between one province and citizens of another province, between citizens 
 of different provinces, and between a province or its citizens and a foreign 
 state or its citizens." 
 
 With reference to the jurisdiction over cases arising under the 
 national codes, the amendment provides that the existence of such 
 codes shall not be construed to remove cases arising thereunder from 
 the jurisdiction of the provincial courts, but that all questions of 
 jurisdiction as between federal and provincial courts be determined 
 by the status of the parties to the suit or of the matter in litigation. 
 If, for instance, a case arises under the civil code between citizens of 
 different provinces or between citizens of a province and an alien, 
 recourse may be had to the federal courts, but if the same suit arises 
 
110 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 between citizens of the same province the provincial coxirts alone can 
 take cognizance. 
 
 The amendments adopted in 1860 have been severely criticized 
 by many of the leading pubUcists, who point out that the jurisdiction 
 of the provincial courts over cases arising under the national codes 
 has destroyed the possibility of seciiring uniformity in interpreta- 
 tion and, owing to a widespread lack of confidence in the provincial 
 courts, has served to make these codes less effective than they other- 
 wise would have been. Every student of the Argentine poUtical 
 system must be impressed with the justice of the criticism. Further- 
 more, the removal from federal jurisdiction of cases arising between 
 a province and its citizens has worked serious injustice in a great 
 nimaber of instances because of the difficulty of enforcing claims 
 against a province in the local courts, where a removal to the federal 
 forum would assure impartial consideration of the matter in dispute. 
 
 All the changes above referred to are traceable to the reaction 
 against the nationahzing tendencies of the constitution of 1853, 
 which took place at the time of the incorporation of the province of 
 Buenos Aires into the imion. This tendency was further empha- 
 sized a few years later (act of September 14, 1863) by a successful 
 attempt to remove from federal jurisdiction one of the most 
 important classes of cases deeply affecting the business interests of 
 the country. Profiting by the then prevailing spirit of sectionalism, 
 this law placed bankruptcy proceedings within the jurisdiction of 
 the provincial courts. The legal provisions relating to bankruptcy, 
 instead of being made the subject of a special law as contemplated 
 by the constitution (article 67, section 11) are contained in the com- 
 mercial code.* In the absence of a national bankruptcy act, it was 
 within the power of the congress to place these matters imder the 
 jurisdiction of the provincial com-ts, although the conmiercial interests 
 of the country suffered thereby. In one provision, however, the law 
 goes beyond the constitutional powers of congress, namely, in giving 
 to the provincial courts jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings irre- 
 spective of the nationaUty or domicile of the parties thereto. This is 
 plainly in contradiction with the provision of article 100, which gives 
 to the federal courts jurisdiction in suits arising between citizens of 
 different provinces. It is generally agreed that the only effective 
 remedy for the present unsatisfactory situation is the passage of a 
 national bankruptcy act with exclusive jurisdiction in the federal 
 courts. 
 
 The provincial courts, taken as a whole, represent the most 
 unsatisfactory portion of the Argentine political system. This is 
 particularly true of the minor judiciary — the justices of the peace 
 and the courts of first instance — which concerns most closely the 
 
 1 Matienzo, El Gobiemo Representative, op. cit., p. 319. 
 
The Judiciary 111 
 
 security and weKare of the mass of the people. The poUtical con- 
 siderations which determine the appointments, together with the 
 low salaries attached thereto, make it impossible to secure men of the 
 high standing which the positions require. The situation is fiu"ther 
 compUcated by the attempts in certain of the provinces to exert 
 executive pressure on the courts. The immediate remedy would seem 
 to be the extension of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, but it 
 is hardly likely that the spirit of sectionalism will be sufficiently 
 overcome to make this possible. As conamercial and industrial inter- 
 ests grow in importance, the present anomahes of judicial jm-isdiction 
 are certain to disappear. But even after the improvement of the 
 jurisdictional division between federal and provincial tribimals, there 
 will remain in the provincial covu-ts most of the cases affecting the 
 rights of the masses. 
 
 As regards the procedure both in the federal and provincial courts, 
 one can not help but regard it as exceedingly ciunbersome when com- 
 pared either with American or European practice. There is practically 
 no oral procedure; everything must be reduced to writing, including 
 the testimony of witnesses. Every page of testimony in civil cases 
 must be written on stamped paper, furnished by the government at the 
 rate of 44 cents per page. In civil suits, the bm-den of expense on 
 the poor is so heavy that they are often compelled to suffer injustice 
 rather than hazard the little they have by embarking on a lawsuit. 
 In criminal cases the long and cumbersome procediu-e is the cause of 
 much unnecessary delay. Trial by jmy is unknown and the judge is 
 compelled to reach a decision through the reading of a great mass of 
 depositions. In many cases he has never seen the witnesses whose 
 testimony he is called upon to consider, and is, therefore, unable 
 to weigh properly the personal equation entering into the situa- 
 tion. Testimony in criminal cases, in fact the entire preliminary 
 preparation of a case, rests with a judge of first instance, known as 
 the "juez de instruccion," who prepares what is designated as the 
 "simiario" of the case. Before him the accused is taken unmedi- 
 ately after his arrest, and before he has had the benefit of counsel 
 is submitted to a most searching interrogatory. He is then confronted 
 with such witnesses as the judge is disposed to call. During the 
 period immediately following arrest, ranging from 24 to 72 hours, 
 according to the discretion of the "juez de instruccion," the accused 
 is not permitted either the benefit of counsel or allowed any com- 
 munication whatsoever with the outside world. After this period 
 of "incomunicado" expires his counsel may call witnesses, who are 
 examined by the judge. In all these proceedings the prosecuting 
 attorney, as well as coimsel for the defense, plays a subordinate part, 
 every step in the proceeding being directed by the court. The case 
 having been thus fully prepared, all the papers are forwarded to the 
 
112 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 judge of the criminal court, who may call further witnesses or recall 
 those whose testimony is before him. 
 
 The impression gained in talking with Argentine judges and jurists 
 is that they are unalterably opposed to the introduction of trial 
 by jury, which they beUeve would lead to a complete breakdown in 
 the administration of the criminal law. They point to the unpre- 
 paredness of the people for such a system and are convinced that 
 with a jury it would be impossible to seciu-e convictions. In the rural 
 districts trial by jury would, in their opinion, lead to factional feuds 
 and become a mere mockery of justice. 
 
 In spite of this markedly conservative attitude of both bench 
 and bar, it is clear that the simpUfication of both criminal and civil 
 procedure and the introduction of oral proceedings in criminal prose- 
 cutions would subserve the ends of justice. Probably the greatest 
 immediate need in the administration of justice in Argentina is a 
 simple, rapid, and inexpensive procedure in civil suits when the 
 amount in controversy is relatively small. The great strides made 
 in this respect in Europe and in the United States have had no echo 
 in Argentina. The present cumbersome, expensive system weighs 
 heavily on the small creditor, depriving him of the means of 
 effectively asserting his rights. 
 
 The question of the attitude of the courts toward the constitu- 
 tionaUty of statutes has received but Uttle attention from Argentine 
 commentators. It has been taken for granted that in this respect 
 the courts would follow a course similar to that taken by the judi- 
 ciary in the United States. It is surprising, therefore, to find so 
 few instances in Argentine jurisprudence in which the courts have 
 undertaken to declare unconstitutional either the acts of the congress 
 or those of the provincial legislatures. It is true that the federal 
 supreme court has not hesitated to annoimce its adherence to the 
 jurisprudence of the supreme court of the United States and in a 
 number of notable instances to declare acts of congress unconstitu- 
 tional. One is impressed, however, with the fact that compared with 
 the United States these declarations of unconstitutionality are rare 
 and exceptional. 
 
 The explanation is to be found in the reluctance of the citizen to 
 institute proceedings involving a declaration of unconstitutionality. 
 The respect for authority, inherited from Spain, is so strong that the 
 citizen prefers to abide by the law rather than test its constitution- 
 aUty. It is also true that the provincial courts have shown great 
 reluctance to declare acts of the provincial legislatures null and void. 
 This is due, in part, to the fact that the exercise of such a power is 
 unusual in covmtries of Spanish tradition and in part to the influence 
 which the provincial executive exerts over the judicial department 
 of the government. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES TO PERSON AND PROPERTY. 
 
 It is an interesting fact, throwing considerable light on conditions 
 existing immediately before the movement for emancipation from 
 the mother country, that one of the first measures adopted by 
 the provisional government estabUshed after the first revolutionary 
 movement was to provide protection for the personal rights of 
 the citizen. The regulations of October 22, 1811, promulgated by the 
 revolutionary junta, were aimed at the greatest abuse of the colonial 
 regime, viz., arbitrary imprisomnent. Article 9 of these regulations 
 estabUshed a kind of habeas corpus proceeding through a direct appeal 
 to the junta by any person detained for a period in excess of forty- 
 eight hours. 
 
 The various so-called statutes and provisional regulations which 
 preceded the earliest written constitutions of the republic laid special 
 emphasis on the protection of personal and property rights. As 
 early as 1811 (November 22) a provisional statute was promulgated 
 intended to assm-e the liberty of the press. In fact, this statute simply 
 reproduced the text of a decree of October 26 of the same year. 
 
 On November 23, 1811, the junta issued a decree placing further 
 safeguards about the hberty of the individual. Unfortunately, the 
 estabUshed administrative practice was such that these safeguards 
 proved of Uttle avail when subjected to the stress and strain of 
 those troublous times. The wide gap between precept and practice 
 did not diminish the desire to formulate an increasingly elaborate 
 series of provisions intended to safeguard the rights of the citizen. 
 
 In his work on "Constitutional Guarantees," ^ Alcorta points out 
 that the statute of May 5, 1815, contained a special chapter intended 
 to safeguard individual rights and freedom of the press. The same 
 purpose was manifest in the provisional regulations of December 3, 
 1817, sections 4 and 7 of which contain elaborate provisions, intended 
 to prevent arbitrary action by administrative officials. 
 
 With the first formal constitutional organization of the country 
 in 1819, the question of constitutional guarantees assumes a position 
 even more important than during the preceding period. Under the 
 inspiration of the elaborate declaration of rights contained in the 
 French constitution, the framers of the constitution of 1819 devoted 
 
 1 Las Giiarantias Constitucionales, by Amancio Alcorta. Buenos Aires, 1897. 
 
 113 
 
114 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 an entire chapter to personal rights relating to "life, reputation, 
 liberty, security, and prosperity." In the constitution of 1826 ^ the 
 provisions of the constitution of 1819 relating to personal and 
 property rights were reproduced with a few minor amendments. The 
 constitution of 1853, with the amendments of 1860, preserves the 
 general plan of constitutional guarantees introduced in 1819.* 
 
 In every discussion of constitutional guarantees the question 
 that first presents itself is the nature of the mechanism placed at the 
 disposal of the citizen to prevent arbitrary arrest or detention, and the 
 remedies at his service when such detention does take place. Does 
 the Argentine system provide for a procedure similar or comparable 
 to the habeas corpus of British and American jurisprudence? 
 
 The national constitution makes no mention either of habeas 
 corpus or other procedure to be followed in case of unjustifiable 
 detention, but simply provides, in article 18, that no one shall "be 
 arrested except by an order in writing of the proper authority." The 
 provincial constitutions are more specific with reference to personal 
 rights. Thus the constitution of the province of Buenos Aires con- 
 tains the following provisions: 
 
 " Art. 17. Every person arrested or detained for any reason whatsoever 
 shall have the right to be informed of the reason for such detention within 
 twenty-four hours. 
 
 " Art. 18. Any person arrested or detained may demand, either in person 
 or through a third party, that he be brought before the nearest judge having 
 jiuisdiction over this class of cases. The order of arrest having been issued 
 by such judge, the accused can not be held for a period exceeding twenty- 
 four hours, unless he shall be notified as to the cause of his detention by 
 a coiurt having jurisdiction over the case. Every judge to whom the petition 
 for release is made or to whom recourse is sought for the protection 
 guaranteed vmder- article 17, must take action withm twenty-four hours of 
 presentation of petition; failing to do so, he shall be subject to a fine of a 
 thousand pesos.' In those cases in which the petition is granted by the 
 judge, any official who continues to detain the accused, or fails to comply 
 with the order of the court within the period designated, shall be subject 
 to a fine of five hundred pesos. In all such cases, however, the court shall 
 see to it that the accused is released." 
 
 Both the national and the provincial codes of criminal procedure 
 have endeavored to make effective these constitutional provisions. 
 Article 617 of the national code provides: 
 
 "Every person shall have the right to a writ of protection* against any 
 order or proceeding of a pubhc official, the effect of which is to restrict, without 
 proper authority, the liberty of the individual. 
 
 "The writ of protection shall also issue whenever any provincial authority 
 shall arrest or detain a member of the national congress or any other national 
 official or person commissioned by the national government." 
 
 » Articles 159 #. ' Alcorta, op. cit, p. 18. 
 
 ' The equivalent of the Argentine peso is 44 cents American money in normal times. 
 
 * The term "writ of protection" is used as the equivalent of "writ of habeas corpus." 
 
Constitutional Guarantees to Person and Property 115 
 
 Similar provisions are to be found in the provincial constitutions, 
 regulating even in greater detail the issuance of the writ of protection 
 and providing severe penalties for the failure of the courts to comply 
 with the requirements of the code. 
 
 In spite of the attempt to give to the citizen the fullest protection 
 in the maintenance of his personal rights, the legal history of Argen- 
 tina clearly shows that but little use has been made of the writ. 
 The reasons for this failure to accomplish the purposes for which it 
 was intended are threefold: 
 
 First. The reluctance of the individual citizen to assert his rights as 
 against the public authority. 
 
 Second. The narrow interpretation given to the provisions of the con- 
 stitution and to the articles of the criminal code. 
 
 Third. The failure of public officials fully to comply with the letter and 
 spirit of constitutional and legal requirements, and the reluctance of the 
 courts to insist on their strict enforcement. 
 
 The history of the writ of habeas corpus in Argentina clearly dem- 
 onstrates the difficulties involved in making effective a procediu"e for 
 the protection of individual rights in a country in which any attempt 
 on the part of the individual citizen to resist or even question the 
 acts of the constituted authorities is looked upon as partaking of the 
 nature of insubordination. The inherited ideas, as well as the poUtical 
 traditions of the cotmtry, have served to strengthen the principle of 
 authority and to discourage any attempt on the part of the individual 
 citizen to nullify the acts of public officials. 
 
 The fact that so little use has been made of the writ of protection 
 is to be attributed to these circumstances rather than to any fimda- 
 mental defects in the procedure estabhshed by the code. It is true 
 that in some of the provinces the interpretation given to the writ has 
 been so narrow as to deprive it of much of its value. Thus the su- 
 preme court of the province of Buenos Aires has held that the writ 
 can issue only as against public officials who are without power of arrest 
 or detention. In other words, whenever the power of arrest or deten- 
 tion does exist the writ of protection can not be used to determine 
 whether it has been legally exercised.^ 
 
 It is important, furthermore, to bear in mind that the value of 
 the guarantees against illegal detention has been seriously diminished 
 in the provinces by the failure of the courts to comply strictly with 
 the requirements of the law. Varela,^ in his excellent coimnentary 
 on the constitution of the province of Buenos Aires, refers to the fact 
 that the absence of adequate penal sanctions to assure the observance 
 of the constitutional requirements with reference to the detention of 
 accused persons has led the courts to disregard many of the provisions, 
 particularly the requirement of article 17, which prescribes that within 
 
 » Decision in cases of Aloy and Eohevarria, decided July 15, 1914. 
 
 * Plan de Refonnas a la Constituoion de Buenos Aires, by Luis V. Varela, 2 vols. La Plata, 1907. 
 
116 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 24 hours of his detention the accused shall be informed of the nature 
 of the accusation. 
 
 The further enumeration of personal and property rights in the 
 constitution of Argentina is contained in articles 14 to 20 inclusive, 
 which read as follows: 
 
 "Art. 14. All the inhabitants of the nation shall enjoy, subject to the 
 laws regulating their exercise, the following rights, to wit: to work and engage 
 in any lawful industry; to navigate and engage in commerce; to petition the 
 authorities; to enter, remain in, travel through, or leave the Argentine terri- 
 tory; to publish their own ideas through the press without previous censorship; 
 to use and dispose of their property; to associate together for useful purposes; 
 freely to profess their religion, and to teach and to study. 
 
 "Art. 15. There shall be no slaves in the Argentine nation. Those few 
 now existing therein shall become free as soon as this constitution becomes 
 law. The indemnifications which may have to be paid in consequence of 
 this declaration shall be regulated by special law. Contracts involving the 
 purchase or sale of persons shall be criminal acts, for which the contracting 
 parties, as well as the notary or official before whom they are executed, 
 shall be responsible. Slaves introduced in any way whatever into the coun- 
 try shall become free by the mere fact of entrance into the territory of the 
 repubUc. 
 
 " Art. 16. The Argentine nation does not recognize prerogatives of blood 
 or birth; personal privileges and titles of nobility shall not exist therein. All 
 of its inhabitants are equal before the law, and their eligibility to office shall 
 depend exclusively upon their fitness. Equahty shall be the basis of taxation 
 and of all public burdens. 
 
 " Art. 17. Private property is inviolable, and no inhabitant of the nation 
 shall be deprived of it except by judicial decision founded on law. Con- 
 demnation of property for a pubUc purpose shall be authorized by law, and 
 indemnification previously made. Congress alone shall have power to impose 
 the taxes referred to in article 4. No personal service shall be required of 
 anyone, except when ordered by law or by judicial decision founded on law. 
 Authors and inventors shall be the exclusive owners of their works, inven- 
 tions, or discoveries, for the length of time established by law. Confiscation 
 of property is forever stricken out of the Argentine penal code. No armed 
 body shall make requisitions or demand assistance of any kind. 
 
 "Art. 18. No inhabitant of the nation shall be punished except after 
 trial and conviction, under laws anterior to the commission of the offense; 
 nor shall he be tried by special commissions, or removed from the jurisdic- 
 tion of the courts which, under the laws in force at the time when the 
 offense was committed, should take cognizance of his case. No one shall 
 be compelled to testify against himseK; nor shall anyone be arrested except 
 by virtue of a written order of the proper authority. The defense of person 
 and of rights before the courts shall be inviolable. Domicile, as well as 
 epistolary correspondence and private papers, shall be inviolable, but a law 
 shall determine in what cases and under what circumstances the former may 
 be entered, and the latter seized. The penalty of death for political 
 offenses, torture of all kinds, and whipping are abolished. The national jails 
 shall be healthful and clean, intended for the safe-keeping and not for the 
 punishment of the offenders detained therein, and any measure which, under 
 color of precaution, tends to inflict upon the prisoners more hardships than 
 those required for their security shall cause the judge authorizing it to be 
 held responsible. 
 
Constitutional Guarantees to Person and Property 117 
 
 " Art. 19. Private actions which in no way offend public order or morals, 
 and are not injurious to a third party, shall be reserved to God alone, and are 
 not subject to the authority of the state. No inhabitant of the nation shall 
 be bound to do what is not ordered by law, nor shall he be forbidden to do 
 what it does not prohibit. 
 
 " Art. 20. AUens shall enjoy in the territory of the nation all the civil 
 rights of citizens. They may exercise their trade, business, or profession; 
 own, buy, and transfer real estate; navigate the rivers and coasts; practice 
 freely their religion; make wills, and contract marriage in conformity with 
 the law. They shall not be compelled to become citizens or to pay forced 
 extraordinary taxes. They may obtain naturahzation by residing two con- 
 secutive years in the nation, but the authorities may shorten this period in 
 favor of the applicant who afl&rms and proves that he has rendered services 
 to the repubhc." 
 
 These provisions indicate how fully, and with what wealth of de- 
 tail, the framers of the constitution of 1853 endeavored to secure to 
 every inhabitant of the republic, whether citizen or alien, the widest 
 possible field of individual liberty. Comparison with the constitu- 
 tion of the United States shows that substantive rights are enumerated 
 with far greater detail in the Argentine constitution. On the other 
 hand, the Argentine constitution contains fewer provisions establishing 
 the procedure for the assertion of individual rights. As the enmner- 
 ation of rights is of little value without the assurance of a definite 
 procedure for their maintenance, it is important in this connection to 
 examine the provisions which safeguard the substantive rights assured 
 in articles 14 to 20 iaclusive. In this connection we must first con- 
 sider a provision for which there is no parallel in the constitution of 
 the United States, to wit, article 29, which provides: 
 
 " Congress shall not have power to grant to the national executive, or the 
 provincial legislatures the power to grant to the provincial governors extra- 
 ordinary powers, or the whole of the public authority, or to assent to sub- 
 missions or supremacy through which the lives, the honor, or the property 
 of Argentines may be placed at the mercy of governments, or of any person 
 whatsoever. Acts of this character shall be utterly void, and shall render 
 their authors, or those who consent to them or authorize them with their 
 signatures, hable to be called to account and to be pimished as infamous 
 traitors to their country." 
 
 The unusual character of this provision reflects a long and cruel 
 chapter in the history of Argentine political development. The his- 
 tory of the South American republics contains a number of instances 
 in which the provisions of written constitutions have been set aside 
 and all constitutional guarantees to person and property nullified by 
 the delegation to the national executive of the sum total of all public 
 authority, or, as it is termed in Spanish, "la suma del poder pu- 
 blico." Such delegation of power has usually taken place in moments 
 of grave crises brought about either through domestic insurrection 
 or foreign invasion. These powers, once granted, have rapidly be- 
 come the instruments of tyranny and oppression, sweeping ruthlessly 
 
118 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 aside all guarantees to personal and property rights. The definiteness 
 of the prohibition contained in article 29, and the extreme penalties 
 prescribed for violations thereof, reflect the fears inspired by many 
 years of bitter experience. 
 
 The prominent position given to constitutional guarantees in the 
 Argentine constitution, a position far more significant than in the 
 constitution of the United States, raises a question of fundamental im- 
 portance, namely, under what conditions may constitutional guarantees 
 be suspended? 
 
 The constitution of the United States, it will be recalled, makes no 
 provision for the suspension of constitutional guarantees other than 
 the writ of habeas corpus. Article I, section 9, paragraph 2, provides: 
 
 "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless 
 when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." 
 
 In the famous case of ex parte Milligan,^ the supreme court of the 
 United States laid down the following principles: 
 
 "It is claimed that martial law covers with its broad mantle the pro- 
 ceedings of this military commission. The proposition is this: that in a time 
 of war the commander of an armed force (if, in his opinion, the exigencies 
 of the country demand it, and of which he is to judge) has the power, within 
 the lines of his military district, to suspend all civil rights and their remedies, 
 and subject citizens as well as soldiers to the rule of his will; and in the 
 exercise of his lawful authority can not be restrained, except by his superior 
 officer or the president of the United States. 
 
 "If this position is sound to the extent claimed, then when war exists, 
 foreign or domestic, and the country is subdivided into miUtary depart- 
 ments for mere convenience, the commander of one of them can, if he chooses, 
 within his limits, on the plea of necessity, with the approval of the ex- 
 ecutive, substitute military force for and to the exclusion of the laws, and 
 punish all persons, as he thinks right and proper, without fixed or certain 
 rules. 
 
 "The statement of this proposition shows its importance; for, if true, 
 republican government is a failure, and there is an end of liberty regulated 
 by law. Martial law, estabUshed on such a basis, destroys every guarantee 
 of the constitution, and effectually renders the 'military independent of, and 
 superior to, the civil power,' — the attempt to do which by the king of Great 
 Britain was deemed by our fathers such an offense that they assigned it to 
 the world as one of the causes which impelled them to declare their inde- 
 pendence. Civil liberty and this kind of martial law can not endure together; 
 the antagonism is irreconcilable; and, ia the conflict, one or the other must 
 perish. 
 
 "It follows, from what has been said on this subject, that there are 
 occasions when martial rule can be properly applied. If in foreign invasion 
 or civil war the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer 
 criminal justice according to law, then, on the theatre of active military 
 operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a sub- 
 stitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the 
 army and society; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to 
 govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course. As necessity 
 
 ' 4 Wallace, 2. 
 
Constitutional Guarantees to Person and Property 119 
 
 creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for, if this government is continued 
 after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usiu-pation of power. Martial 
 rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and xrnob- 
 structed exercise of their jurisdiction." 
 
 The suspension of constitutional guarantees in the Argentine 
 system is accompUshed by what is known as the declaration of a 
 " state of siege." The term "estado de sitio" corresponds to the French 
 "etat de si^ge" and the German "Kleine Belagerungszustand," but 
 has no precise equivalent in American jiirisprudence. Four articles of 
 the Argentine Constitution deal directly with the subject, viz. : 
 
 " Akt. 23. In case of domestic disturbance or foreign attack, endangering 
 the observance of this constitution and the safety of the authorities created 
 by it, a state of siege shall be proclaimed in the province or territory wherein 
 pubhc order is disturbed, and the constitutional guaranties shall be suspended 
 within its limits. But during this suspension, the president of the repubUc 
 shall have no power by himself to condemn anyone or inflict punislunent. 
 BUs power shall be limited in such cases, so far as persons are concerned, to 
 arrest or transfer them from one place in the country to another, should 
 they not prefer to leave the Argentine territory. 
 
 "Art. 53. The senate may also authorize the president of the nation to 
 declare a state of siege in one or more places in the repubUc in case of foreign 
 invasion. 
 
 "Abt. 67, Clause 26. Congress shall have power to proclaim a state 
 of siege in one or more places in the nation in case of internal disorder, 
 and to approve or suspend the state of siege declared during the recess of 
 congress by the executive power. 
 
 "Art. 86, Clause 19, should read as follows: 
 
 "With the consent of the senate, and in case of foreign invasion, he may 
 declare one or more places in the nation to be in a state of siege for a limited 
 time. In case of internal troubles, he may exercise such power only during 
 the recess of Congress, for such power belongs to that body. The President 
 shall exercise this power within the limitations estabUshed by Art. 23." 
 
 It will be seen from these provisions that the constitution con- 
 templates the existence of a "state of siege" under at least two 
 different conditions: (1) foreign invasion; (2) domestic insurrection. 
 In addition to these two express delegations of exceptional govern- 
 mental authority, the practice of the country has been to justify 
 the declaration of a state of siege when domestic order is menaced, 
 even when there have been no overt acts of violence. 
 
 The situation which arises with the declaration of a state of siege 
 involves consequences of a far more serious character than the sus- 
 pension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the United 
 States. It means that, for the time being, neither personal nor property 
 rights remain inviolate as against the action of the federal authorities. 
 As tersely stated by an eminent Argentine jurist: ^ 
 
 "The residence, correspondence, and private papers of the citizen may 
 be seized and searched without previous judicial order; the right of public 
 
 ^ Manual de la Constitucion Argentina, p. 268, por Joaquin V. Gonzalez. 
 
120 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 meeting, of association, the right to cany arms, the freedom of speech and 
 of the press, all these liberties may be denied by the public authority to 
 the extent and according to the standards which it may deem necessary for 
 the preservation or the reestablishment of the pubUc peace." * 
 
 It is evident that unless these far-reaching governmental powers 
 were carefully safeguarded through constitutional restrictions they 
 might readily become the instruments of tyranmy and oppression. 
 In order to avoid this danger, the Argentine constitution provides the 
 following safeguards: 
 
 First. The "state of siege" can be declared only by the federal govern- 
 ment, the provincial authorities enjoying no such power. This principle 
 is the result of constitutional interpretation of commentators rather than 
 specific formulation. The question has never been squarely decided by the 
 federal supreme court. That the federal constitution is silent with reference 
 to the exercise of this power by the provincial governments would not, of 
 itself, be conclusive, inasmuch as the power might be reserved to the prov- 
 inces by their respective constitutions. The silence of the provincial 
 constitutions with reference to the declaration of a "state of siege," together 
 with the fact that such exceptional governmental powers can not be presumed 
 to exist independent of specific constitutional delegation, would seem to be 
 conclusive with reference to the absence of provincial authority to suspend 
 the constitutional guarantees. It is furthermore important to note the 
 significant historical fact that when, acting under the provisions of the 
 constitution of 1853, the federal congress examined and revised the provincial 
 constitutions ia order to bring them into harmony with the national constitu- 
 tion, the provisions of the constitutions of Mendoza, La Rioja, San Luis, 
 and Corrientes providing for the declaration of a "state of siege" were 
 eliminated.2 
 
 Second. In the exercise of the power to suspend the guarantees to 
 person and property, the constitution places definite limitations on the 
 federal authorities. 
 
 The constitution (articles 23, 53, 67, and 86) distinguishes between two 
 broad classes of instances in which a "state of siege" may be declared, viz., 
 foreign invasion and domestic disturbance. 
 
 In case of foreign invasion, the senate is given authority (article 53) to 
 authorize the president to suspend the constitutional guarantees. When, 
 however, the danger arises because of domestic disturbance, the suspension 
 must be made by act of congress. If, however, that body is not in session, 
 the president is empowered to declare a "state of siege." Under the pro- 
 visions of article 67, clause 26, congress, upon assembling, is given the power 
 either to approve or suspend the measures adopted by the president. 
 
 The reasons for giving to the president wider powers in case of 
 foreign invasion will be evident at a glance. Need of inomediate 
 action in periods of international conflict makes prompt action 
 indispensable, so much so, in fact, that were the constitution silent 
 on this point, the national executive would probably exercise this 
 authority as part of the general war power. 
 
 There has been considerable discussion amongst Argentine jurists 
 
 ' Decisions of the Supreme Court of the Argentine Republic, 2d series, vol. 3, p. 405. 
 ' National Laws Nos. 36, 37, 39, and 97; also Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 264. 
 
Constitutional Guarantees to Person and Property 121 
 
 as to the precise scope of the congressional powers contained in 
 article 67, clause 26, of the constitution, which reads as follows: 
 
 " To proclaim a state of siege in one or more places in the nation in case 
 of internal disorder, and to approve or suspend the state of siege declared 
 during the recess of congress by the executive power." 
 
 In the main, the discussion has hinged on the question whether 
 the words "approve or suspend" include the right to disapprove, 
 and thus retroactively nullify, as far as such nullification is possible, 
 the acts of the executive performed diu-ing the recess of congress. 
 This question has never been squarely presented to the supreme 
 court, but the overwhelming body of opinion is definitely opposed 
 to so broad an interpretation of congressional powers. ^ 
 
 It will be noted that the provisions of the Argentine constitution 
 with reference to the suspension of constitutional guarantees are 
 more specific and more definite than the provision of the constitution 
 of the United States relating to the suspension of the privilege of the 
 writ of habeas corpus. The relative powers of the national executive 
 and legislative authorities are far more clearly defined and the pos- 
 sibiUty of conflict of authority correspondingly reduced. 
 
 A further limitation on the exercise, or rather on the consequences 
 of the suspension of constitutional guarantees is to be found in the 
 latter part of article 23, which reads as follows: 
 
 "But dining the suspension the president of the republic shall have no 
 power by himself to condemn anyone or inflict punishments. His power 
 shall be limited in such cases, so far as persons are concerned, to arrest or 
 transfer them from one section of the national territory to another shoidd 
 they not prefer to leave the Argentine territory." 
 
 The purpose of these limitations is to diminish the dangers incident 
 to the suspension of constitutional guarantees and particularly to pre- 
 vent, as far as possible, the powers granted to the executive from being 
 made the instruments of political tyranny and personal despotism. 
 An examination of the instances of the suspension of constitutional 
 guarantees in Argentina discloses the dominant position occupied 
 by the national executive as compared with the legislative authority.'' 
 
 The first instance of the suspension of constitutional guarantees 
 after the adoption of the federal constitution of 1853 is to be found 
 in the presidential decree of September 1, 1854, declaring a "state 
 of siege," for a period of thirty days, in the province of Corrientes. 
 The occasion for this decree was the invasion of the province by a 
 revolutionary leader. General Cdceres. The prompt suppression of 
 the internal disturbance led to the restoration of the constitutional 
 guarantees before the expiration of the thirty days, viz., by decree of 
 
 ' Alcorta, Garantias ConBtitucionales, p. 238 ff. 
 
 * The material upon which this list of instances of the suspension of constitutional guarantees 
 
 is based is contained in the work of Alcorta, Garantias Constitucionales, pp. 180 to 186 
 
 inclusive. 
 
122 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 September 11, 1854; upon the assembling of the national congress in 
 December of the same year the action of the president of the republic 
 was approved.! 
 
 A recurrence of domestic disturbance in the same province during 
 the following year (1855) led to a further suspension of constitutional 
 guarantees for a period of thirty days by decree of March 16, 1855. As 
 in the preceding instance, the early termination of the conflict led to the 
 restoration of the constitutional guarantees by decree of April 3, 1855." 
 
 The war of the Argentine confederation against the province of 
 Buenos Aires furnished the next occasion for the declaration of a "state 
 of siege." In this instance a pecuUar situation arose because the 
 national congress delegated to the commander-in-chief of the army, 
 General Urquiza, the power to suspend the constitutional guarantees. 
 AvaiUng himself of this power. General Urquiza, on October 8, 1859, 
 suspended the constitutional guarantees in the city of Rosario for a 
 period of thirty days. Although this suspension was approved by 
 executive decree of October 10, 1859, the constitutionality of the 
 procedure is open to serious doubt.^ 
 
 Again, dviring the civil war of 1861, by law of June 14 and Sep- 
 tember 19, the president was empowered to suspend the constitutional 
 guarantees in the district of Rosario,* and subsequently in such 
 portions of the territory of the republic as he might deem necessary.^ 
 
 With the revision of the constitution by the national convention 
 of 1860, the powers of the president with reference to the suspension 
 of constitutional guarantees were further limited by requiring that 
 in all cases of domestic disturbance the declaration of a state of siege 
 should first receive the approval of the national congress if that body 
 be in session. Under the constitutional provision, as thus amended, 
 the instances of suspension of guarantees have been as follows:^ 
 
 (a) By law of August 12, 1862, the congress authorized the president 
 to suspend the constitutional guarantees in the proAdnce of Corrientes for a 
 period of sixty days.^ 
 
 (6) The Paraguayan war led to a prolonged suspension of constitutional 
 guarantees. During the recess of the congress the president declared the 
 entire territory of the repubUe in a "state of siege." Subsequently, by law 
 of May 19, 1865, the president was authorized to suspend the constitutional 
 guarantees for such period as he might deem necessary,* of which power he 
 availed himself by executive decree of June 9, 1868.° 
 
 (c) A rebellion ui the province of Entre Rfos, led by the famous Lopez 
 Jordan, was the occasion of the next declaration of a "state of siege" in 
 that province by executive decree of May 2, 1870, approved subsequently 
 by the law of August 12, 1870.1" 
 
 1 Registro Nacional, 1854, pp. 483, 491, and 569. ' Alcorta, op. cit., pp. 184 to 187 inclu- 
 
 « Ibid., 1855, pp. 645 and 653. sive. 
 
 » Ibid., 1859, pp. 38, 40, 197, and 198. ' Registro Nacional, 1862, p. 140. 
 
 « Ibid., 1861, p. 715. ' Ibid., 1865, pp. 56 and 122 
 
 6 Ibid., pp. 759 and 760. ' Ibid., 1868, p. 17. 
 
 " Ibid., 1870, pp. 67 and 69. 
 
Constitutional Guarantees to Person and Property 123 
 
 (d) The conflict with the province of Entre Rfos having given rise to 
 fears that the same would involve the adjoining provinces, a law of September 
 24, 1870, authorized the president to suspend the constitutional guarantees 
 in these provinces for a period of sixty days.* 
 
 (e) The continuance of the conflict in Entre Efos again made necessary 
 the suspension of constitutional guarantees in the adjoining provinces of 
 Corrientes and Santa ¥6 by executive decree of May 3, 1873, subsequently 
 approved by the law of May 31.^ 
 
 (/) The same conflict led to a declaration of a "state of siege" in the 
 provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa F6, Entre Eios, and Corrientes for a period 
 of sixty days by the law of September 24, 1874.' 
 
 (g) The continuance of the civil war finally led to the suspension of 
 constitutional guarantees throughout the repubUc for a period of sixty days 
 by the act of September 26, 1874,* subsequently continued for a period of 
 ninety days by decree of November 24.^ 
 
 (h) One of the most curious instances of the declaration of a "state of 
 siege," and one which gave rise to bitter criticism of the government, in- 
 volved the situation created in the city of Buenos Aires by the burning of 
 the Jesuit school known as the Colegio del Salvador. The president, fearing 
 that this disturbance would lead to anti-Jesuit riots throughout the province 
 of Buenos Aires, suspended the constitutional guarantees in the province for 
 a period of thirty days.* The action of the president led to a prolonged 
 discussion in the senate upon the assembling of the congress, but with no 
 definite results. The circumstances indicate that there was not the slightest 
 justification for the declaration of a "state of siege." The attack was a 
 disturbance of local order, readily repressed by the poUce, and which partook 
 of none of the characteristics of a revolutionary movement or a general 
 domestic disturbance.^ 
 
 (i) A revolutionary movement in the province of Corrientes in 1876 led 
 to the suspension of constitutional guarantees in the provinces of Corrientes, 
 Entre Rfos, Santa F6, and Buenos Aires, by executive decree of November 
 27, 1876.' 
 
 (j) During the struggle between the national government and the pro- 
 vincial authorities of Buenos Aires in 1880, the president declared the 
 entire province in a "state of siege," by decree of June 1880, for a period to 
 terminate October 31 of the same year. The action of the president was 
 approved by the act of congress of August 1880.' 
 
 (k) In 1890, 1892, and 1893, the constitutional guarantees were suspended 
 for brief periods owing to internal disturbances. 
 
 (Q The most recent instance of the declaration of a "state of siege" 
 occurred in 1909 as a result of the throwing of a bomb in the Colon theater 
 of Buenos Aires. This outrage was attributed to the anarchist agitation 
 which had been carried on for a number of years. The purpose which the 
 president had in view in suspending the constitutional guarantees was to 
 facilitate the expulsion of undesirable foreigners. It is evident that the 
 circumstances in no way justified so drastic a measure. In fact, the state 
 of siege was raised after a short period and, in order to meet similar situations 
 in the future, the congress passed a law governing the residence of aliens 
 within the repubhc, which gives to the national executive power to expel 
 undesirable foreigners. 
 
 ' Registro Nacional, p. 117. ' Ibid., p. 704. 
 
 ' Ibid., 1873, pp. 199 and 227. ' Decree of March 1, 1875, Registro Nacio- 
 
 ' Ibid., 1874, p. 603. nal, 1875, p. 113. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 608. ' Registro Nacional, 1876, p. 602. 
 
 « Ibid., 1880, pp. 208 and 226. 
 
124 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 In studying the history of the Argentine Republic, one is im- 
 pressed with the frequent use of the power to suspend the constitu- 
 tional guarantees, and especially the numerous instances in which 
 the circumstances in no way justified such extreme measures. During 
 the period immediately following the adoption of the constitution 
 of 1853 this tendency is to be explained by the unsettled poUtical 
 conditions. The absence of real political unity and the constant 
 conflicts between the provinces created an atmosphere of uncer- 
 tainty and suspicion which led to recourse to extreme measures at 
 the slightest indication of domestic unrest. This fact explains why 
 disturbances which in ordinary circumstances would be regarded 
 as simple breaches of the peace were immediately interpreted as 
 partaking of the character of domestic insurrection, requiring the 
 most extreme measures. With the increasing stability of poUtical 
 institutions, the occasion for a declaration of a "state of siege" has 
 been less and less frequent. Furthermore, there is a growing body 
 of pubUc opinion opposed to the use of such measures. The broad 
 interpretation of executive power which characterized the early con- 
 stitutional development of the country will hereafter be subjected to 
 closer control in matters affecting the fundamental personal and 
 property rights of the citizen. 
 
 In concluding this discussion of constitutional guarantees it is 
 important to bear in mind that the establishment of a "state of 
 siege" is not equivalent to the declaration of martial law. Although 
 there exists no definite Argentine jurisprudence on this subject, the 
 commentators, almost without exception, accept the principles laid 
 down in ex parte MilUgan,^ in which the court held that martial law 
 implied the trial of citizens by military commissions, and that such 
 procedure can only be justified in time of war, in the actual theater 
 of military operations, when the courts are closed, and it is impossible, 
 therefore, to administer justice by means of the regularly constituted 
 tribunals. 
 
 « 4 Wallace, 2. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS; RELIGIOUS LIBERTY. 
 
 The Argentine constitution makes no reference to the freedom of 
 speech, but deals with the Uberty of the press in the following terms : 
 
 "Akt. 32. The federal congress shall not pass any law restricting the 
 liberty of the press, or subjecting it to federal jurisdiction." 
 
 The commentators offer no explanation for the failure to include 
 the freedom of speech, particularly in view of the fact that many of 
 the provincial constitutions contain specific provisions deaUng with 
 this subject. The consensus of opinion seems to be that the freedom 
 of speech, while not specifically mentioned, is to be considered as 
 enjoying the same immunities as the freedom of the press.^ 
 
 The prohibitions of article 32 are directed exclusively against the 
 federal government. Not only is the national congress prohibited 
 from limiting the freedom of the press, but it is also prevented from 
 extending the jurisdiction of the federal tribunals to include press 
 offenses. This specific prohibition was deemed necessary because of 
 a possible broad interpretation of the power granted to the national 
 congress (by article 67, clause 11) to enact civil, commercial, penal, 
 a,nd mining codes. In order, therefore, to ascertain the status of 
 freedom of speech and of the press in the Argentine constitutional 
 system, it is necessary to examine the political institutions of the 
 provinces. It will probably suffice for our present purposes to study 
 the situation in the most important of the Argentine provinces, that 
 of Buenos Aires. 
 
 The provincial constitution of Buenos Aires contains the following 
 provision governing freedom of speech and of the press: 
 
 "Art. 11. Freedom of speech and of the press is assined to all the in- 
 habitants of the province. Everyone may publish his views and opinions, 
 being responsible for the abuse of this privilege before a jury which shall 
 take cognizance both of law and fact in accordance with the law governing 
 this subject. Such legislation must not contain provisions calculated to 
 prevent the free expression of opinion or attempting to limit the same. In 
 all prosecutions affecting freedom of speech or of the press, the jiuy shall 
 admit the truth of the charge as justification in cases having to do with the 
 public acts of officials, or with the political capacity of officials or candidates 
 for public office." 
 
 While this constitutional provision would seem to offer ample pro- 
 tection, the important question that presents itself is whether the legis- 
 
 > Gonzalez, Manual de la Constitucion Argentina, p. 166. 
 125 
 
126 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 lation and jurisprudence of the province have given full effect to 
 the intent of the framers of the constitution of Buenos Aires. 
 
 In the first place, it is important to note that the provincial legisla- 
 ture has failed to give effect to the provisions of article 11 of the 
 constitution. Owing to the fact that trial by jury does not form a 
 part of the civil or criminal procedure of the province, a special law 
 for press offenses was necessary. No such law having been passed, 
 the coiu-ts have found themselves compelled to extend to press offenses 
 the provisions of the national civil and penal codes relating to Ubel. 
 The supreme coiurt of the province of Buenos Aires has estabUshed 
 a distinction between offenses in which the press is merely the instru- 
 ment through which a third person utters a libel and press offenses 
 in the strict sense of the word, such as the printing of articles con- 
 trary to public decency and morals.^ The former are eliminated 
 from the class of press offenses and are dealt with in accordance 
 with the provisions of the national penal and civil codes relating to 
 libel. As regards the class of offenses known as distinctively press 
 offenses, the courts, in the absence of a press law to make effective 
 the provisions of article 11 of the provincial constitution, have dealt 
 with such offenses as in the natiu-e of torts, governed by the penal 
 and civil codes. 
 
 The annals of journalism in the province of Buenos Aires, as well 
 as in every other section of the Argentine, indicate that the press 
 enjoys the widest possible liberty of action. Neither the provincial 
 nor the national government has attempted anything in the nature 
 of repressive measures. In fact, the study of the relations existing 
 between the pubUc authorities and the press in all parts of the republic 
 indicates a marked tendency on the part of the government to placate 
 the pubhc press through the distribution of favors. It is a noticeable 
 fact that a considerable number of the reporters of the daily papers 
 occupy minor pubUc offices. 
 
 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY. 
 
 The provisions of the Argentine constitution relating to religious, 
 liberty are as follows: 
 
 "Akt. 2. The federal government supports the Roman Catholic Apos- 
 tolic religion." 
 
 "Art. 14. All the inhabitants of the nation shall enjoy, subject to the laws 
 regulating their exercise, .... the right freely to profess their religion.' 
 
 "Aet. 20. Aliens .... shall be permitted to practice freely their reli- 
 gion." 
 
 "Art. 67, Clause 19. The national congress shall have power to approve 
 or reject treaties concluded with other nations, and the concordats entered 
 into with the Apostolic See, and to make rules for the exercise of ecclesi- 
 astical patronage throughout the nation." 
 
 1 Fallos de la Suprema Corte de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, Serie VII, Tomo IV, pp. 215, 230. 
 
Liberty of Speech and of the Press; Religious Liberty 127 
 
 In addition to the preceding provisions, articles 76 and 80 of the 
 constitution prescribe religious qualifications for the offices of president 
 and vice-president. These provisions are as follows: 
 
 "Aet. 76. To be elected president or vice-president of the nation one 
 must have been born in the Argentine territory, or if born in a foreign country 
 be the son of a native citizen; must belong to the Roman CathoUc Apostolic 
 Chiu-ch; and must have all the other quahfications required to be a senator." 
 
 "Art. 80. On entering upon the discharge of their duties the president 
 and the vice-president shall take an oath, which shall be administered to 
 them by the president of the senate (the first time by the president of 
 the Constitutional Convention), congress being in session, in the following 
 terms: 
 
 'I, , do swear, before God our Lord and these Holy Gospels, 
 
 to discharge loyally and patriotically the office of president (or vice-president) 
 of the nation, and faithfully to observe and to cause others to observe, the 
 constitution of the Argentine nation. Should I fail to do so, may God and 
 the nation require it of me.' " 
 
 Another section of the constitution commits the national govern- 
 ment to the extension of the influence of the Roman Catholic religion 
 in the following terms : 
 
 "Art. 67, Sect. 15. The congress shall have power to provide for the 
 secm-ity of the frontiers and for the preservation of peaceful intercomse 
 with the Indians, and to promote their conversion to Cathohcism." 
 
 These provisions indicate that while the freedom of religious 
 worship is guaranteed to all residents of the republic, the national 
 government occupies an exceptional position toward the Roman 
 Catholic Church. The policy of the government toward the church 
 has its roots in the development of the relation between church and 
 state during the coloiual period, during which the king of Spain and 
 his representative, the viceroy of the river Plate, exercised a certain 
 control over ecclesiastical affairs known as the "patronato." Pope 
 Alexander VI, reahzing the difficulties incident to the exercise of ef- 
 fective control over ecclesiastical affairs in the far-away regions of 
 the viceroyalty of the river Plate, recognized in the papal bull of 
 1508 a condition of fact which had existed since the earliest period 
 of Spanish domination in the southern section of America, namely, 
 the direct control of the king of Spain and of his representatives over 
 the organization of the church.^ This included not only the appoint- 
 ment of bishops and minor ecclesiastical dignitaries, but also the 
 power to settle disputes or conflicts that might arise within the 
 church. Although the Vatican regarded the king of Spain as its 
 personal representative in these matters, the condition of fact which 
 developed in the viceroyalty of the river Plate was the supremacy 
 of the civil over the ecclesiastical authority. 
 
 With the beginning of the movement for emancipation from 
 
 » Cesareo Chalcatano, Patronato Nacional Argentino. Buenos Aires, 1885. 
 
128 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 Spain, the leaders of the revolution show, in no uncertain terms, 
 their determination to enforce the supremacy of the civil over the 
 ecclesiastical authority. The revolutionary junta of 1810 immediately 
 issued a decree, under which it assumed all the powers of the "patro- 
 nato" over the church. ^ In order further to clarify the situation, the 
 general constituent assembly of 1813 issued a declaration to the follow- 
 ing effect: 
 
 "The united provinces of the river Plate are free from all ecclesiastical 
 authority established beyond the confines of the country."^ 
 
 The national congress, which succeeded this constituent assembly, 
 delegated to the chief executive, then known as the supreme director 
 of the United Provinces of the River Plate, authority to make appoint- 
 ments to fill ecclesiastical vacancies. 
 
 It will be noticed that these decrees and declarations were not 
 intended to bring about the separation of church and state. On the 
 contrary, their logical result was to make the support of the Catholic 
 Church one of the functions of the newly founded republic. The 
 constitution of 1819 declared the Catholic religion to be the official 
 state religion, and in various provisions, notably articles 86 and 87, 
 placed all ecclesiastical dignitaries in the category of state officials. 
 
 The same spirit of civil control over ecclesiastical affairs char- 
 acterizes the series of national constitutions which succeeded that of 
 1819. In the constitution of 1826 we find a new element of control 
 in the provision giving to the supreme court the power to examine 
 all papal bulls and encycUcals, and to recommend to the chief execu- 
 tive whether such documents should be admitted or excluded. 
 
 The constitution of 1853 incorporated all the important provisions 
 of the previous constitutions asserting the supremacy of the civil 
 authority and defining the same with even greater definiteness. In 
 the first place, it is to be noted that the constitution no longer speaks 
 of the Catholic religion as the state religion, as was the case in all 
 the previous constitutions, but limits itself to the simple statement: 
 "The federal government supports the Roman Catholic Apostolic 
 Church" (art. 2). This does not mean that the national government 
 has constituted itself an instrmnent of religious propaganda, but 
 simply that, as a logical consequence of the historical control exercised 
 over the Catholic Church, the national treasury defrays the expenses 
 necessary for its maintenance. 
 
 The most important powers which the national government has 
 reserved to itself under the exercise of the patronato are: 
 
 First. — The presentation to the Vatican of a list of names from 
 which the bishop of each diocese must be selected. This list is made 
 by the senate and presented to the Vatican by the president. 
 
 ' See Chalcatano, op. cit., p. 64. ' Declaration of June 4, 1813. 
 
Liberty of Speech and of the Press; Religious Liberty 129 
 
 Second. — The control over papal bulls and encyclicals. This 
 power is exercised in accordance with the provisions of article 86, clause 
 9, which gives to the president the power, with the advice and consent 
 of the supreme court, "to grant or refuse promulgation to decrees of the 
 councils, bulls, briefs, and rescripts of the Supreme Pontiff at Rome; 
 but said grant or refusal shall be made by law, whenever the ecclesi- 
 astical enactments afifected by either action contain provisions of a 
 general or permanent character." The purpose of this reservation 
 is to assert the supremacy of the civil over the reUgious authority 
 and to prevent the promulgation of any ecclesiastical orders not 
 consonant with the federal constitution or laws. 
 
 Third. — Although strictly speaking, not a part of the "patronato," 
 the power of the national government over ecclesiastical affairs is 
 strengthened by the provision of article 67, clause 20, which gives to 
 the congress the power "to admit into the territory of the RepubUc 
 reUgious orders in addition to those now existing." By implication, 
 the congress has the power to exclude such religious orders as it may 
 deem undesirable. This control is fm-ther strengthened by the pro- 
 hibition upon the provinces contained in article 108, which forbids 
 them to admit new religious orders. 
 
 The foregoing analysis of the relation existing between church 
 and state in Argentina, while indicating a relationship totally different 
 from that existing in the United States, does not mean that the 
 freedom of religious worship is limited or in any way menaced. It 
 can not even be said that the material support given to the Catholic 
 Church has strengthened its position. On the contrary, the influence 
 of the church on the life of the people is less in Argentina than in the 
 United States. In fact, one of the pmposes which the framers of the 
 earliest Argentine constitution had in mind in perpetuating the "pa- 
 tronato" system, inherited from colonial times, was to curb the power 
 of the church, and to prevent, as far as possible, the participation or 
 interference of the church in the political affairs of the new-born 
 nation. This determination was strengthened by the realization of the 
 fact that at the time of the first movement for independence most of 
 the higher church dignitaries were Spanish sympathizers, frowning 
 upon the revolutionists and doing everything in their power to main- 
 tain the supremacy of Spain. 
 
 The study of the present situation leads one to the conviction 
 that not only is reUgious Uberty fully guaranteed in every section of 
 Argentina, but also that the problem of the relation between church 
 and state has been solved in a manner which has eliminated the 
 question from the field of pubUc discussion. The question, for the 
 time being at least, is considered as settled. 
 
130 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 OTHER PERSONAL AND PROPERTY RIGHTS. 
 
 As regards other personal and property rights, it is unnecessary 
 to enter into any detailed discussion. The enumeration of these 
 rights is contained in articles 14 to 19 inclusive, which read as follows: 
 
 "Art. 14. All the inhabitants of the nation shall enjoy, subject to the 
 laws regulating their exercise, the following rights, to wit: to work and engage 
 in any lawful industry; to navigate and engage in commerce; to petition 
 the authorities; to enter, remain in, travel through, or leave the Argentine 
 territory; to pubUsh their own ideas through the press without previous 
 censorship; to use and dispose of their own property; to associate together 
 for useful purposes; freely to profess their reUgion, and to teach and to study. 
 
 "Art. 15. There shall be no slaves in the Argentine nation. Those 
 few now existing therein shall become free as soon as this constitution be- 
 comes law. The indemnifications which may have to be paid in consequence 
 of this declaration shall be regulated by special law. Contracts involving 
 the purchase or sale of persons shall be criminal acts, for which the con- 
 tracting parties, as well as the notary or oflacial before whom they are 
 executed, shall be responsible. Slaves introduced in any way whatever into 
 the country shall become free by the mere fact of entrance into the territory 
 of the Repubhc. 
 
 "Art. 16. The Argentine nation does not recognize prerogatives of 
 blood or birth; personal privileges and titles of nobiUty shall not exist therein. 
 All of its inhabitants are equal before the law, and their ehgibihty to office 
 shall depend exclusively upon their fitness. Equality shall be the basis of 
 taxation and of all pubhc burdens. 
 
 "Art. 17. Private property is inviolable, and no inhabitant of the 
 nation shall be deprived of it except by judicial decision founded on law. 
 Condemnation of property for a pubhc purpose shall be authorized by law, 
 and indemnification previously made. Congress alone shall have power to 
 impose the taxes referred to in article 4. No personal service shall be re- 
 quired of anyone, except when ordered by law or by judicial decision founded 
 on law. Authors and inventors shall be the exclusive owners of their works, 
 inventions, or discoveries, for the length of time estabhshed by law. Confisca- 
 tion of property is forever stricken out of the Argentine penal code. No 
 armed body can make requisitions or demand assistance of any kind. 
 
 "Art. 18. No inhabitant of the nation shall be pimished except after 
 trial and conviction, under laws anterior to the commission of the offense; 
 nor shall he be tried by special commissions or removed from the jurisdic- 
 tion of the courts which, under the laws in force at the time when the offense 
 was committed, should take cognizance of his case. No one shall be com- 
 pelled to testify against himself; nor shall anyone be arrested except by 
 virtue of a written order of the proper authority. The defense of person 
 and of rights before the courts shall be inviolable. Domicile, as well as 
 epistolary correspondence and private papers, shall be inviolable, but a law 
 shall determine in what case and under what circumstances the former may 
 be entered and the latter seized. The penalty of death for political 
 offenses, torture of all kinds, and whipping are abohshed. The national 
 jails shall be healthful and clean, intended for the safe-keeping and not for 
 the punishment of the offenders detained therein, and any measure which, 
 under color of precaution, tends to inflict upon the prisoners more hard- 
 ships than those required for their security shall cause the judge authorizing 
 it to be held responsible. 
 
Liberty of Speech and of the Press; Religious Liberty 131 
 
 " Art. 19. Private actions which in no way offend public order or morals, 
 and are not injurious to a third party, shall be reserved to God alone, and are 
 not subject to the authority of the State. No inhabitant of the nation shall 
 be bound to do what is not ordered by law, nor shall he be forbidden to do 
 what it^does not prohibit." 
 
 It is important to note that these guarantees are effective not 
 only as against possible encroachment by the national government, 
 as in the case of the first ten amendments to the constitution of the 
 United States, but are equally effective as against hostile provincial 
 action. In this respect, therefore, the provisions of the Argentine 
 constitution relative to personal and property rights enjoy a broader 
 application than similar provisions in the constitution of the United 
 States. 
 
 The decades immediately succeeding the adoption of the con- 
 stitution of 1853, when the covmtry was still imorganized politically, 
 witnessed repeated violations of these provisions by the federal execu- 
 tive; but during the last twenty-five years they have been constantly 
 and faithfully observed. 
 
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 MoNTBS DE Oca, Manuel Agusto. Questiones Constitucionales (Buenos Aires, 1899). 
 
 . Lecciones de Derecho Constitucional (2 vols., 8vo., Buenos Aires, 1902). 
 
 Ramos-Mejia, Fbancisco. El Federalismo Argentino (1 vol., 8vo., Buenos Aires, 1887). 
 Saldias, Adolfo. Ensayo sobre la EKstoria de la Constitucion Argentine (Buenos Aires, 
 
 1878). 
 Sabmiento, Domingo Fausteno. Comentarios de la Constitucion de la Confederacion 
 
 Argentina (Santiago de Chile, 1853). 
 Ubbutia, Manuel Albebto. Intervenciones del Gobiemo Federal en las Provincias, 
 
 1853-1903 (Buenos Aires, 1904). 
 Vabela, Luis V. Estudios sobre la Constitucion de Buenos Aires (1 vol., 8vo., Buenos 
 
 Aires, 1868). 
 . Estudios sobre la Constitucion Nacional Argentina. Introduccion e Interven- 
 
 cion federal en las Provincias (Buenos Aires, 1896). 
 
 133 
 
134 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 History. 
 
 Calvo, Carlos. Anales Historicos de la revolucion de la America Latina (5 vols., 8vo., 
 
 Paris, 1864-67). 
 Carrillo, Joaquin. Jujiii Provincia Federal Argentina (8vo., Buenos Aires, 1877). 
 Estrada, Jose Mantjbi.. La PoUtica Liberal bajo la tirania de Rosas (8vo., Buenos Aires, 
 
 1873) 
 . Lecciones sobre la Historia de la Republica Argentina (2 vols., 8vo., Buenos 
 
 Aires, 1898). 
 Gonzalez, Joaquin V. La Tradicion Naeional (8vo., Buenos Aires, 1888). 
 Lopez, Vicente Fidel. Historia de la Republica Argentina. Su Origen, su revolucion 
 
 y su desarrollo politico hasta 1852 (10 vols., 8vo., Buenos Aires, 1883-93). 
 MiTRfi, Bartolom:6. Historia de Belgrano (4th ed. 3 vols., 8vo., Buenos Aires, 1887). 
 
 . Historia de San Martin, 2d ed. (2 vols., 8vo., Buenos Aires, 1890). 
 
 Pelliza, Mariano A. La Dictadura de Rosas (1 vol., 8vo., Buenos Aires, 1894). 
 
 . Historia Argentina (5 vols., 8vo., Buenos Aires, 1895). 
 
 . Historia de la Organizacion Naeional 1852-62 (1 vol., 8vo., Buenos Aires, 1897). 
 
 QuESADA, Ernesto. La Epoca de Rosas (1 vol., 8vo., Buenos Aires, 1898). 
 QuESADA, Vicente G. Estudios Historicos (2 vols., 8vo., Buenos Aires, 1863-4). 
 Saldias, Adolfo. Historia de la Confederacion Argentina. Rosas y su Epoca (2d ed., 
 
 5 vols., 8vo., Buenos Aires, 1892) 
 . La Evolucion RepubUcana durante la Revolucion Argentina (1 vol., 8 vo., Buenos 
 
 Aires, 1906). 
 
 FiNANCBS — Economic Condition — Populatign. 
 
 Martinez, Alberto B. Les Finances de la Republique Argentine (1 vol., Buenos Aires, 
 
 1898). 
 
 , and Maurice Lewandowski. Argentine au XX« Siecle (1 vol., Paris, 1906). 
 
 Recensement General de la Republica Argentina, 1895 (1 vol.). 
 
 Recensembnt General de la Villb de Buenos Aires. 1904 (1 vol.). 
 
 Tbrcer Cbnso Nacional. 1914 (4 vols., Buenos Aires, 1916). 
 
 Uribn, Carlos M., and Ezio Colombo. Geografia Argentina. Estudio Historico, Fisico, 
 
 Politico Social y Economico de la Republica Argentina (1 vol., Buenos Aires, 1905). 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
 
 ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 
 
 Constitutional Instkuments Prior to 1853. 
 
 Provisional Regulation of October 22, 1811 (Reglamento Provisorio del 22d de Octubre 
 1811). 
 
 Provisional Statute of November 22, 1811 (Estatuto Provisional del 22d de Noviembre, 
 1811; Registro Nacional, vol. 1, pp. 122, 124, 127, 128). 
 
 Regulations for the Organization and Administration of Justice of January 23, 1812 (Regla- 
 mento de Institucion y Administracion de Justicia del 23 de Enero, 1812; Registro 
 Nacional 1812, vol. 1, pp. 134, 174, 177). 
 
 Regulations for the Administration of Justice of September 6, 1813, and Statute of Febru- 
 ary 27, 1814 (Reglamento de Administracion de Justicia de 6 de Septiembre de 1813 
 y Estatuto de 27 de Febrero, 1814; Trabajos Legislativos de las Primeras Asam- 
 bleas Argentinas, vol. 1). 
 
 Statutes of February 2 and February 4, 1813, abolishing slavery; of March 12, 1813, 
 establishing civil equaUty of the Indians; of May 21, 1813, abolishing torture in 
 criminal procedure. (Trabajos Legislativos de las Primeras Asambleas Argentinas, 
 vol. 1.) 
 
 Declaration of Independence of July 9, 1816 (Declaracion de Independencia de 9 de Julio, 
 1816; Trabajos Legislativos de las Primeras Asambleas Argentinas, vol. 1). 
 
 Provisional Regulations for the Management and Administration of the Affairs of State, 
 December 3, 1817 (Reglamento Provisorio para la direccion y administracion del 
 Estado de 3 de Deciembre, 1817; Trabajos Legislativos de las Primeras Asambleas 
 Argentinas, vol. 2; Registro Nacional 1817, vol. 1, pp. 441-454). 
 
 Constitution of 1819 (Registro Nacional 1819, vol. 1, pp. 502-508). 
 
 Law of November 13, 1824, establishing a Provisional Constitutional System (Registro 
 Nacional, vol. 2, p. 1770). 
 
 Fundamental Law of January 23, 1825 (Ley Fundamental de 23 de Enero, 1825; Registro 
 Nacional, vol. 2, pp. 1780, 1781, 1783, 1816, 1843, 1861). 
 
 Constitution of December 24, 1826 (Registro Nacional, vol. 2, pp. 1926, 1937, 1940, 1947, 
 2083, 2098, 2103). 
 
 iNTER-PROVINCIAIi AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES. 
 
 The Agreement of Pilar of February 23, 1820 (Convenio del Pilar de 23 de Febrero, 1820; 
 
 Lopez, Historia de la RepubUca Argentina, vol. 8, ch. 2, p. 143). 
 Quadrilateral Treaty of January 25, 1822, between Buenos Aires, Corrientes, Entre Rios, 
 
 and Santa Fe (Tratado Cuadrilatero del 25 de Enero, 1822; Registro Nacional 1822, 
 
 vol. 2, p. 14). 
 Treaty of August 7, 1829, between Cordoba and Santa Fe; Treaty of October 19, 1829, 
 
 between Buenos Aires and Santa Fe; Treaty of October 27, 1829, between Buenos 
 
 Aires and Cordoba; Treaty of Apnl 16, 1830, between San Juan and Cordoba; 
 
 Treaty of July 5, 1830, between Cordoba, San Luis, Mendoza, and Rioja; Treaty 
 
 of August 31, 1830, between the above four provinces and San Juan, Catamarca, 
 
 Santiago, Salta, and Tucuman (Registro Nacional, vol. 2, pp. 242, 252, 256, 267, 
 
 270, and 272). 
 Treaty of January 4, 1831, between Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Entre Rios (Registro 
 
 Nacional, vol. 2, p. 279; also volume on Convencion Nacional de 1898, Appendix, 
 
 p. 587). 
 
 135 
 
136 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 Agreement of San Nicolas, of May 31, 1852 (Acuerdo de San Nicolas de 31 de Mayo, 1852; 
 Registro Nacional, vol. 3, pp. 13-16; also volume on Convencion Nacional de 
 1898, Appendix, p. 591). 
 
 Constitution and Amendments in Force. 
 
 Constitution of May 1, 1853 (volume on Convencion Nacional de 1898, pp. 354-367). 
 
 Law Establishing the capital in Buenos Aires (volume on Convencion Nacional de 1898, 
 pp. 378-379). 
 
 Law of Finance and Credit of December 17, 1853 (Registro Nacional). 
 
 Amendments to the National Constitution Proposed by the Constitutional Convention 
 ad hoc of the Province of Buenos Aires, January 5 to May 12, 1860 (Diario de Se- 
 siones de la Convencion del Estado de Buenos Aires encargada del examen de la 
 Constitucion Federal y Anexos 1860). 
 
 Amendments Ratified by the National Constitutional Convention Assembled in Santa Fe 
 September 14, 1860. Amendments adopted September 23, 1860 (volume on Con- 
 vencion Nacional de 1898, pp. 626-628). 
 
 Amendments Ratified by the National Constitutional Convention Assembled in Santa 
 Fe September 10, 1866. Amendments adopted September 12, 1866 (volume on 
 Convencion Nacional de 1898, pp. 789-790). 
 
 Amendments Ratified by the National Constitutional Convention Assembled in Buenos 
 Aires February 24, 1898. Amendments adopted March 15, 1898 (volume on Con- 
 vencion Nacional de 1898, p. 154). 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. 
 (September 25, 1860.) 
 
 PREAMBLE. 
 
 We, the representatives of the people of the Argentine nation, assembled 
 in constitutional convention by the will and election of the provinces of 
 which it is composed, in pursuance of previous agreements, for the purpose 
 of framing a constitution for the national union, to estabhsh justice, insure 
 domestic peace, provide for the conunon defense, promote the general wel- 
 fare, and secure the benefits of liberty to ourselves, our posterity, and to 
 all men in the world who may desire to inhabit the Argentine soil, invoking the 
 protection of God, the source and origin of all reason and justice, do hereby 
 ordain, decree, and establish this constitution for the Argentine nation. 
 
 PART FIRST. SOLE CHAPTER. 
 DECLARATIONS, RIGHTS, AND GUARANTIES. 
 
 Article 1. The Argentine nation adopts for its govermnent the federal 
 repubhcan representative form, as established by this constitution. 
 
 Article 2. The federal government supports the Roman Catholic Apos- 
 tolic religion. 
 
 Article 3. The authorities exercising the functions of the federal govern- 
 ment shall reside in the city which shall be declared by special act of congress 
 to be the capital of the republic, a previous cession of the territory which 
 shall become federal being made by one or more of the provincial legislatures.' 
 
 Article 4. The federal government shall defray the expenses of the 
 nation with funds of the national treasury, consisting of: receipts from 
 import and export duties; duties to be levied until 1866 on the exports of domestic 
 merchandise as provided in paragraph No. 1 of article 67 of the present con- 
 stitviion; ^ proceeds of the sale or lease of national lands; revenue of the 
 postal service; taxes levied by the general congress equitably and in propor- 
 tion to the population; and moneys obtained through loans and financial 
 operations decreed by said congress for national urgencies, or for works of 
 national utihty. 
 
 Article 5. Each province shall adopt its own constitution, which shall 
 provide for the administration of justice in its own territory, its municipal 
 system, and primary instruction, such constitution to be framed upon the 
 republican representative plan, in harmony with the principles, declarations, 
 and guaranties of the national constitution. Upon these conditions, the 
 federal government shall guarantee to each province the enjoyment and 
 exercise of its institutions. 
 
 ' A law promulgated September 21, 1880, established the national capital in the city of Buenos 
 
 Aires, ceded by the legislature of the state of the same name. 
 • The words printed in italics were ordered to be stricken out by the national convention held 
 
 at Santa Fg on September 12, 1866. 
 
 137 
 
138 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 Article 6. The federal government shall have the right to intervene 
 in the territory of the provinces in order to guarantee the republican form of 
 govenmient or to repel foreign invasions; and when requested by the con- 
 stituted authorities, to maintain them in power, or to re-establish them if 
 they shall have been deposed by sedition or by invasion from another province. 
 
 Article 7. Full credit shall be given in each province to the public 
 acts and judicial proceedings of all other provinces; and congress shall have 
 the power to provide by general laws how such acts and proceedings shall 
 be proved, and what legal effect they shall have. 
 
 Article 8. The citizens of each province shall enjoy in all the others 
 the rights, privileges, and immunities belonging to the citizens of such other 
 provinces. The extradition of criminals is reciprocally obligatory on all the 
 provinces. 
 
 Article 9. All custom-houses in the territory of the nation shall be na- 
 tional, and governed by the tariff laws enacted by congress. 
 
 Article 10. The circulation in the territory of the republic of articles 
 of domestic production or manufacture, and of all classes of goods and mer- 
 chandise cleared at the custom-houses, shall be free from taxation. 
 
 Article 11. Articles of national or foreign production or manufacture, 
 and cattle of all kinds, when passing from the territory of one province into 
 that of another, shall be exempt from transit duties. The same freedom 
 shall also be enjoyed by the carriages, vessels, or animals used for their 
 transportation, and no other duty, whatever its name may be, shall hereafter 
 be imposed upon such articles and vehicles during their transit through the 
 territory. 
 
 Article 12. Vessels bound from one province to another shall not be 
 compelled to enter, cast anchor, or pay duties on account of transit, and 
 in no case shall any preference be given to one port over another by means 
 of commercial laws or regulations. 
 
 Article 13. New provinces may be admitted into the nation, but no 
 province shall be erected within the territory of another, nor shall two 
 or more provinces be consolidated into one, without the consent of the 
 legislatures of the interested provinces and of congress. 
 
 Article 14. All the inhabitants of the nation shall enjoy, subject to 
 the laws regulating their exercise, the foUowmg rights, to wit: to work and 
 engage in any lawful industry; to navigate and engage m commerce; to 
 petition the authorities; to enter, remain in, travel through, or leave the 
 Argentine territory; to pubUsh their ideas through the press without previous 
 censorship; to use and dispose of their property; to associate together for 
 useful purposes; freely to profess their religion, and to teach and to study. 
 
 Article 15. There shaU be no slaves in the Argentme nation. Those 
 few now existing therein shall become free as soon as this constitution be- 
 comes law. The indemnifications which may have to be paid m consequence 
 of this declaration shall be regulated by special law. Contracts involvmg 
 the purchase or sale of persons shall be crimmal acts, for which the con- 
 tracting parties, as well as the notary or official before whom they, are 
 executed shall be responsible. Slaves introduced m any way whatever into 
 the country shall become free by the mere fact of entrance mto the territory 
 
 °^ ^Article 16 The Argentine nation does not recognize prerogatives of 
 blood or birth; personal privileges, and titles of nobiUty shall not exist 
 therein AH of its inhabitants are equal before the law and their ehgibility 
 to office shall depend exclusively upon thek fitness. Equahty shaU be the 
 basis of taxation and of all public burdens. 
 
Appendix B 139 
 
 Article 17. Private property is inviolable, and no inhabitant of the 
 nation shall be deprived of it except by judicial decision founded on law. 
 Condemnation of property for a public purpose shall be authorized by law, 
 and indemnification previously made. Congress alone shall have power to 
 impose the taxes referred to in article 4. No personal service shall be re- 
 quired of anyone, except when ordered by law or by judicial decision founded 
 on law. Authors and inventors shall be the exclusive owners of their works, 
 inventions, or discoveries, for the length of time established by law. Con- 
 fiscation of property is forever stricken out of the Argentine penal code. 
 No armed body shall make requisitions or demand assistance of any kind. 
 
 Article 18. No inhabitant of the nation shall be punished except after 
 trial and conviction under laws anterior to the commission of the offense; 
 nor shall he be tried by special commissions, or removed from the jurisdiction 
 of the courts which, under the laws in force at the time when the offense was 
 committed, should take cognizance of his case. No one shall be compelled 
 to testify against himself; nor shall anyone be arrested except by virtue of 
 a written order of the proper authority. The defense of person and rights 
 before the courts shall be inviolable. Domicile as well as epistolary corre- 
 spondence and private papers shall be inviolable; but a law shall determine 
 in what cases and under what circumstances the former may be entered and 
 the latter seized. The penalty of death for political offenses, torture of all 
 kinds, and whipping are abohshed. The national jails shall be healthful and 
 clean, intended for the safe keeping and not for the punishment of the 
 offenders detained therein, and any measure which, under color of precaution, 
 tends to inflict upon the prisoners more hardships than those required for 
 their security shall cause the judge authorizing it to be held responsible. 
 
 Article 19. Private actions which in no way offend pubUc order or 
 morals, and are not injurious to a third party, shall be reserved to God alone, 
 and are not subject to the authority of the state. No inhabitant of the 
 nation shall be boimd to do what is not ordered by law, nor shall he be 
 forbidden to do what it does not prohibit. 
 
 Article 20. Ahens shall enjoy in the territory of the nation all the 
 civil rights of citizens. They may exercise their trade, business, or profession; 
 own, buy, and transfer real estate; navigate the rivers and coasts; practice 
 freely their religion; make wiUs, and contract marriage in conformity with 
 the law. They shall not be compelled to become citizens or to pay forced 
 extraordinary taxes. They may obtain naturaUzation by residing two con- 
 secutive years in the nation, but the authorities may shorten this period in 
 favor of the applicant who affirms and proves that he has rendered services 
 to the republic. 
 
 Article 21. Every Argentine citizen shall be obhged to bear arms in 
 defense of his country and of this constitution, in accordance with the laws 
 enacted by Congress for that purpose, and in accordance with the decrees of 
 the national executive. Naturalized citizens shall be free to render or to 
 refuse mUitary service during the ten years following the day on which they 
 obtain their citizenship papers. 
 
 Article 22. The people shall not deliberate, or exercise the powers of 
 government, except through their representatives and authorities created 
 by this constitution. Any armed force or gathering of persons assuming: 
 to be vested with the representation of the rights of the people and petition- 
 ing in their behalf shall be guilty of sedition. 
 
 Article 23. In case of domestic disturbance, or foreign attack, endanger- 
 ing the observance of this constitution and the safety of the authorities 
 created by it, a state of siege shall be proclaimed in the province or territory 
 
140 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 wherein public order is disturbed and the constitutional guaranties shall be 
 suspended within its limits. But during this suspension the president 
 of the republic shall have no power by himself to condemn anyone or inflict 
 punishments. His power shall be limited in such cases, so far as persons are 
 concerned, to arrest or transfer them from one place in the country to another 
 should they not prefer to leave the Argentine territory. 
 
 Article 24. Congress shall promote the reform of the laws which are now 
 in force in aU branches and the establishment of trial by jury. 
 
 Article 25. The federal government shall encourage European im- 
 migration, and shall not have power to restrict, limit, or obstruct, by taxation 
 of any kind, the entrance into the Argentine territory of foreigners coming 
 to it for the purpose of engaging in the cultivation of the soil, the improve- 
 ment of industrial business, or the introduction and teaching of arts and 
 sciences. 
 
 Article 26. Navigation on the rivers in the interior of the nation is free 
 to all flags and subject to no other regulations than those proclaimed by the 
 national authority. 
 
 Article 27. The federal government shall be bound to strengthen the 
 commercial and peaceful relations of the Argentine nation with foreign 
 countries by means of treaties consistent with the principles of public law 
 estabUshed by this constitution. 
 
 Article 28. No principle, guarantee, or right recognized in the foregoing 
 articles shall be altered by any law which may be enacted to regulate its 
 exercise. 
 
 Article 29. Congress shall not have power to grant to the national ex- 
 ecutive or the provincial legislatures the power to grant to the provincial 
 governors extraordinary powers, or the whole of the public authority, or to 
 assent to submissions or supremacy through which the hves, the honor, or 
 the property of Argentines may be placed at the mercy of governments, or of 
 any person whatsoever. Acts of this character shall be utterly void, and 
 shaU render their authors, or those who consent to them or authorize them 
 with their signatures, Uable to be called to account and to be punished as 
 infamous traitors to their country. , , -., u u • + 
 
 Article 30. The constitution may be amended either wholly or m part. 
 The necessity for such amendment shall be declared by congress, by a vote 
 of at least two-thirds of its members; but the amendment itself shall not 
 be made except by a convention called for that purpose. 
 
 Article 31. This constitution, the national laws which may be enacted 
 by congress in pursuance thereof, and the treaties with foreign powers sha 
 be the lupreme law of the nation; and the authorities of each proymce shall 
 be bound to abide by them, any provision m then- own provmcial constitu- 
 tion or laws to the contrary notwithstanding. This rule shall not be 
 aophcable to the province of Buenos Aires, m so far as the treaties ratified 
 after the compact of November 11, 1859, are concerned. , . ^. xu 
 
 Article 32. The federal congress shall not pass any law restrictmg the 
 liberty of the press, or subjecting it to federal jurisdiction. 
 
 Article 33. The declarations, rights, and guaranties enumerated m the 
 constitution shall not be construed as involving the denial of any other 
 Sts and guaranties not enumerated, but naturally derived from the prmci- 
 pks of thf sovereignty of the people and of the repubhcan form of 
 
 ^°^ A^cLE 34 The judges of the federal courts shall not at the same time 
 V. • ^ir^n the orovincial courts. Neither shall a position in the federal 
 seri?ctXht c?S oTiW, confer upon the official who holds it the 
 
Appendix B 141 
 
 rights of residence in the province wherein it is held, and which may not be 
 his habitual abode, this provision applying to their being chosen to positions 
 in the province in which they may accidentally happen to be. 
 
 Akticle 35. The names of "The United Provinces of the Rio de La Plata" 
 "The Argentine Repubhc," "The Argentine Confederation," adopted in 
 succession since 1810, may in future be used indiscriminately as official 
 designation of the government and the territory of the provinces; but the 
 name of "The Argentine Nation" shall be used in the enactment and ap- 
 proviil of the laws. 
 
 PART SECOND. AUTHORITIES OF THE NATION. 
 
 TITLE FIRST. — THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Section First. — The LEaiSLATrvrB Power. 
 
 Ahticle 36. The legislative power of the nation shall be vested in a con- 
 gress composed of two houses, one called the house of deputies of the nation 
 and the other the house of senators of the provinces and of the capital. 
 
 Chapter I. — The Hoitse of Deputies. 
 
 Article 37. The house of deputies shall consist of representatives elected 
 directly and by simple plurality of votes, by the people of the provinces and 
 of the capital, which shall be considered for this piu-pose as electoral districts 
 of a imitary state. The mmiber of representatives shall be one for every 
 thirty-three thousand inhabitants of fractions thereof of not less than sixteen 
 thousand five hundred. After the taking of each census congress, upon the 
 basis of such census, shall fix the ratio of representation, which may increase 
 but not diminish the number of inhabitants required for each deputy.^ 
 
 Article 38. The deputies for the first congress shall be elected in the fol- 
 lowing proportion: For the province of Buenos Aires, twelve; for the province 
 of Cordoba, six; for the province of Catamarca, three; for the province of 
 Corrientes, four; for the province of Entre Rlos, two; for the province of Jujuy, 
 two; for the province of Mendoza, three; for the province of La Rioja, two; 
 for the province of Salta, three; for the province of Santiago, four; for the prov- 
 ince of San Juan, two; for the province of Sante F6, two; for the province of 
 San Luis, two; for the province of Tucumdn, three. 
 
 Article 39. A general census shall be taken before the meeting of the 
 second congress, and the apportionment of deputies shall then be made iu 
 accordance therewith. The census, however, shall not be taken more than 
 once in every ten years. 
 
 Article 40. No person shaU be elected a deputy who has not attained the 
 age of twenty-five, who has not been a citizen for four years, and who is not 
 a native of the province electing him or a resident thereof for the two pre- 
 ceding years. 
 
 Ajrticle 41. The provincial legislatures shall regulate the manner of 
 holding the first direct election of the deputies of the nation; Congress shall 
 enact a general law for succeeding elections. 
 
 Article 42. The deputies shall serve for four years, and are eligible for 
 re-election. The house, however, shall be renewed by halves every two years, 
 and for this purpose the deputies elected to the first congress shall draw 
 
 1 See article as amended March 16, 1898, p. 163. 
 
142 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 lots as soon as they meet, in order to determine those whose term shall ex- 
 pire at the end of the first two years. 
 
 Article 43. In case of vacancy, the governor of the province or of the 
 capital shall proceed to a legal election of a new member. 
 
 Ahticle 44. The initiative of laws relating to taxes and to the recruiting 
 of troops shall belong exclusively to the house of deputies. 
 
 Article 45. The house of deputies alone shall have the right to impeach 
 before the senate the president, the vice-president, the ministers of the 
 executive power, the justices of the supreme court, and the judges of other 
 inferior tribunals of the nation for malfeasance or crime in the exercise of 
 their functions, or for ordinary offenses. Impeachment of such person shall 
 be made after investigation, and a resolution that a trial is in order passed 
 by a vote of two-thirds of the deputies present. 
 
 Chapter II. — The Senate. 
 
 Article 46. The senate shall consist of two senators for each province 
 elected by a pluraUty of votes of the respective provincial legislatures. 
 There shall also be two senators for the capital, who shall be elected in the 
 manner prescribed for the president of the nation. Each senator shall have 
 one vote. 
 
 Article 47. The following qualifications shall be necessary for election 
 as senator: the attainment of the age of thirty; citizenship in the nation for 
 six years; the enjoyment of an annual income of two thousand pesos in coin, 
 or an equivalent amount of capital; and nativity in the province which elects 
 him or residence therein for the two years immediately preceding. 
 
 Article 48. Senators shall serve for nine years and are ehgible for re- 
 election indefinitely. But the senate shall be renewed by thirds every three 
 years. For this purpose the senators themselves, as soon as they all convene, 
 shall decide by lot those who shall retire at the expiration of the first and 
 second periods of three years. 
 
 Article 49. The vice-president of the nation shall be president of the 
 senate; but he shall have no vote except in the case of a tie. 
 
 Article 50. The senate shall elect a president pro tempore to preside in 
 ca«e of the absence of the vice-president, or when the latter acts as president 
 of the nation. 
 
 Article 51. The senate shall have the power to try in public the persons 
 impeached by the house of deputies, and senators, when sitting for that pur- 
 pose, shall act under oath. When the impeached official is the president 
 of the nation, the president of the supreme court shall preside over the senate. 
 No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the 
 members present. 
 
 Article 52. The sentence of the Senate shall not extend further than 
 removal of the one impeached from office and disqualification to hold any 
 office of honor, trust, or profit under the nation; but the convicted person 
 shall nevertheless be subject to indictment, trial, and punishment, according 
 to law, by the ordinary courts. 
 
 Article 53. The senate may also authorize the president of the nation 
 to declare a state of siege in one or more places in the repubKc, in case of 
 foreign invasion. 
 
 Article 54. When the seat of a senator becomes vacant on account of 
 death, resignation, or for any other cause, the government of the province 
 represented by such senator shall proceed immediately to the election of a 
 new member. 
 
Appendix B 143 
 
 Chapter III. — Provisions Common to Both Hoiises. 
 
 Article 55. Both houses shall meet in regular session on the first day 
 of May of each year and shall continue in session until the thirtieth of 
 September. They may also be convened in extraordinary session or their 
 sessions may be extended by the president of the nation. 
 
 Article 56. Each house shall be the judge of the elections, rights, and 
 titles of its own members, in so far as the questions of their validity is con- 
 cerned. Neither house shall transact business without the presence of a 
 majority of all its members; but a smaller number shall have the power to 
 compel the attendance of absent members by such means and under such 
 penalties as each house may estabhsh. 
 
 Article 57. Both houses shall open and close their sessions simultaneously. 
 Neither shall have the power, during the session of congress, to adjourn, with- 
 out the consent of the other, for more than three days. 
 
 Article 58. Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, and 
 by a two-thirds vote may punish any of its members for disorderly behavior 
 in the discharge of his functions, remove him for physical or moral inability 
 subsequent to his admission, or even expel him from the body. But a 
 majority of one more than half of those present shall be sufficient to act upon 
 the voluntary resignation of a member. 
 
 Article 59. Senators and deputies, on taking their seats, shall take an 
 oath to perform their duties properly and to act in all things in accordance 
 with this constitution. 
 
 Article 60. No member of congress shall be indicted, judicially ques- 
 tioned, or molested for opinions expressed or speeches deUvered by him 
 in the discharge of his duties as a legislator. 
 
 Article 61. Senators and deputies shall be, from the day of their elec- 
 tion to the day of the expiration of their term, exempt from arrest, except 
 when taken in the act of committing a crime that merits the death penalty 
 or any other disgraceful or corporal punishment, in which case the matter 
 shall be reported to the house to which the member belongs, with the record 
 of the preliminary hearing. 
 
 Article 62. Should any charge be made in writing, before the ordinary- 
 tribunals, against a senator or deputy, the house to which he belongs may, 
 by a two-thirds vote, and upon examination in pubUc of the merits of the 
 case, suspend the accused from the exercise of his functions and surrender him 
 to the proper court for trial. 
 
 Article 63. Each house shall have power to summon to its presence the 
 ministers of the executive power in order that they may give orally the ex- 
 planations and information which may be deemed necessary. 
 
 Article 64. No member of Congress shall receive from the executive 
 any appointment or commission without first obtaining the consent of the 
 house to which he belongs; this article shall not be applicable to cases in 
 which the appointment is merely a promotion. 
 
 Article 65. No member of the religious orders shall be elected to con- 
 gress. Nor shall any provincial governor represent his province during his 
 term of office. 
 
 Article 66. The remuneration of the services of senators and deputies 
 shall be fixed by law and paid out of the funds of the national treasury. 
 
144 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 Chapter IV. — Powers of Congress. 
 
 Abticle 67. Congress shall have power: 
 
 1. To legislate in regard to custom-houses, and to establish import duties, 
 which, as well as the rates of appraisement on which they are based, shall be 
 uniform throughout the nation; it being thoroughly understood, however, 
 that these duties and all other taxes of national character are payable in the 
 currency of the respective provinces in their exact equivalent value. And to 
 estabhsh likewise export duties up to 1866, at which time they shall cease to be 
 either national or provincial taxes. ^ 
 
 2. To levy direct taxes for a period of time and in a manner propor- 
 tionately equal throughout the territory of the nation, whenever the defense 
 of the country, the common safety, or the pubUc good may require it. 
 
 3. To borrow money on the credit of the nation. 
 
 4. To provide for the use and disposition of the national lands. 
 
 5. To establish and organize at the capital a national bank, with branches 
 in the provinces, with power to issue bank notes. 
 
 6. To make arrangements for the payment of the national debt, both 
 foreign and domestic. 
 
 7. To appropriate annually the money necessary to meet the expenditm-es 
 of the national government, and to approve or disapprove the accounts of its 
 disbursement. 
 
 8. To grant subsidies, to be paid out of the national treasury, to those 
 provinces whose revenues, according to their budgets, are insufficient to 
 meet their ordinary expenses. 
 
 9. To regulate the free navigation of the rivers in the interior, to declare 
 as ports of entry those which may be deemed fit for that purpose, and to 
 estabhsh or abolish custom-houses. But the custom-houses for foreign com- 
 merce, existing in each province at the time of its coming into the national 
 union, shall not be abohshed. 
 
 10. To coin money, fix the value thereof and that of foreign coins, and 
 adopt a uniform system of weights and measures for the whole nation. 
 
 11. To enact civil, commercial, penal, and mining codes without en- 
 croaching upon the local jurisdictions, the provisions of said codes to be en- 
 forced either by the federal or provincial courts, according as the matters or 
 persons may fall under their respective jurisdiction; and especially to enact 
 general laws on naturaUzation and citizenship for the whole nation based upon 
 the principle of citizenship by nativity, as well as laws on bankruptcy, 
 counterfeiting of money and forging of pubKc docimaents of the state, and on 
 the establishment of trial by jury. 
 
 12. To regulate commerce by land and sea with foreign countries, and 
 among the provinces. 
 
 13. To estabhsh and regulate the post-offices and post-roads of the nation, 
 
 14. To settle finally the national boundaries, to fix those of the provinces, 
 to create new provinces, and to provide by special laws for the organization, 
 administration, and government of the national territories which may be left 
 outside the limits assigned to the provinces. 
 
 15. To provide for the security of the frontiers and for the preservation 
 of peaceful intercourse with the Indians, and to promote their conversion to 
 CathoUcism. 
 
 16. To provide for all that conduces to the prosperity of the country, to 
 the advancement and welfare of all the provinces, and to the advancement of 
 
 1 Words in italics stricken out September 12, 1866. See amendment to art. 67, clause 1, p. 156. 
 
Appendix B 145 
 
 the enlightenment of the people, by prescribing plans for general and 
 university instruction and by promoting industrial enterprise, immigration, 
 the construction of railways and navigable canals, the colonization of the 
 pubUc lands, the introduction and establishment of new industries, the im- 
 portation of foreign capital, and the exploration of the interior rivers, by pro- 
 tective laws for these purposes, by concessions of privileges for a limited 
 time, and by rewards which shall act as an encouragement. 
 
 17. To estabUsh courts inferior to the supreme court of justice; to create 
 and abolish ofl&ces and to fix the duties of the same; grant pensions, decree 
 honors, and to grant general amnesties. 
 
 18. To accept or refuse to accept the reasons assigned for the resignation 
 of the president or vice-president of the republic; to declare that the time has 
 arrived to proceed to a new election, to count the returns thereof, and to 
 ascertain the result. 
 
 19. To approve or reject treaties concluded with other nations, and the 
 concordats entered into with the Apostolic See, and to make rules for the 
 exercise of ecclesiastical patronage throughout the nation. 
 
 20. To admit into the territory of the nation religious orders in addition 
 to those now existing. 
 
 21. To authorize the executive power to declare war or to make peace. 
 
 22. To grant letters of marque and of reprisal and to make rules con- 
 cerning prizes. 
 
 23. To fix the strength of the land and naval forces in times of peace 
 and of war, and to make rules and ordinances for the government of such forces. 
 
 24. To authorize the calUng out of the militia of the provinces, whenever 
 the execution of the laws of the nation, the suppression of insurrections, or the 
 repelling of invasions, may render it necessary. To provide for the organiza- 
 tion, equipment, and discipline of such miUtia, and for the administration 
 and government of the part thereof which may be employed in the service of 
 the nation, leaving to the provinces the power to appoint the proper chiefs 
 and officers of their respective militias, and to enforce in regard to them the 
 discipline established by congress. 
 
 25. To permit the introduction of foreign troops into the territory of 
 the nation, and the departm-e therefrom of the national troops. 
 
 26. To proclaim a state of siege in one or more places in the nation in 
 case of internal disorder, and to approve or suspend the state of siege de- 
 clared during the recess of congress by the executive power. 
 
 27. To exercise exclusive legislative power throughout the territory of the 
 national capital and in all other places acquired by purchase or cession in any 
 province for the construction of forts, arsenals, magazines, or other useful 
 establishments of national utility. 
 
 28. To make all laws and regulations which shall be necessary for carrying 
 into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this con- 
 stitution in the government of the Argentine nation. 
 
 Chapter V. — EnaHrmnt and Approval of Laws. 
 
 Article 68. Laws may originate in either house of congress by means of 
 bills introduced by the members thereof or by the executive; except, however, 
 those relating to the subjects mentioned in article 44. 
 
 Article 69. When a bill has been passed in the house where it originated, 
 it shall be sent to the other house for discussion. Having been passed by 
 both houses, it shall be sent to the executive of the nation for examination, 
 who, if he approve it, shall promulgate it as law. 
 
146 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 Article 70. Bills not returned by the executive within ten working 
 days shall be considered approved. 
 
 Article 71. No bill wholly rejected in one house shall be introduced 
 again during the sessions of the same year. But if it be merely added to or 
 amended by the house to which it was sent for examiaation, it shall be 
 returned to the house in which it originated; and if the additions or amend- 
 ments be adopted there by an absolute majority, it shall be sent to the 
 executive of the nation. If the additions or amendments be rejected, the 
 bill shall be again referred to the house where they were made, and if they 
 be again approved there by a majority of two-thirds of the members thereof, 
 the bill shall be again referred to the other house, where such additions or 
 amendments shall not be deemed rejected unless the rejection is made by a 
 majority of two-thirds of the members present. 
 
 Article 72. A biU rejected, either wholly or in part, by the executive 
 shall be returned with his objections to the house in which it originated, 
 where it shall be discussed a second time, and if passed by a two-thirds 
 majority shall be again referred to the other house for examination. If the 
 bill pass both houses by the aforesaid majority it shall become a law and shall 
 go to the executive for promulgation. The votes in both houses in this case 
 shall be by yeas and nays, and the names of the members who took part in 
 the vote, as well as the grounds upon which they foimded their votes, and 
 the objections of the executive, shall be immediately published by the press. 
 If the houses disagree in regard to the objections, the bill shall not be reconsid- 
 ered in any session of the same year. 
 
 Article 73. The enacting clause of all laws shall be as follows: "The 
 senate and the house of deputies of the Argentine Nation, in congress 
 assembled, etc., decree or sanction as law:" 
 
 Section Second. — The Executive Power. 
 Chapter I. — Its Nature and Duration. 
 
 Article 74. The executive power of the nation shall be vested in a 
 citizen with the title of " President of the Argentine Nation." 
 
 Article 75. In case of illness, absence from the capital, death, resigna- 
 tion, or removal of the president, the executive power shall be exercised by 
 the vice-president of the nation. In case of removal, death, resignation, 
 or incapacity of both the president and vice-president of the nation, congress 
 shall determine what public officer shall act as president imtil the disability 
 is removed or a new president is elected.* 
 
 Article 76. To be elected president or vice-president of the nation one 
 
 1 Law of September 19, 1868: 
 
 The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, etc. 
 
 Article 1. In case of vacancy of both the presidency and vice-presidency of the nation, 
 the executive power shall be vested first in the president pro tempore of the senate, second in 
 the speaker of the chamber of deputies, and third, in the chief justice of the supreme court. 
 
 Article 2. For the purposes of this law each chamber shall appoint its presiding ofiScer 
 thirty days before the closing of the ordinary session. 
 
 Article 3. The official called upon to discharge the duties of the executive, ac- 
 cording to article 1 of this law, shall, if the absence or disability of the president and vice- 
 president be permanent, order a new election of president and vice-president to be held 
 within thirty days after his installation in office. 
 
 Article 4. The functionary who shall exercise the executive power in the cases of 
 article 1 of this law shall, on entering upon the discharge of his duties, take before congress, 
 and in its absence before the supreme court of justice, the oath prescribed by article 80 of 
 the constitution. 
 
Appendix B 147 
 
 must have been born in the Argentine territory, or if born in a foreign 
 country be the son of a native citizen; must belong to the Roman CathoUc 
 Apostohc church; and must have all the other qualifications required to be a 
 senator. 
 
 Article 77. The president and the vice-president shall hold their offices 
 for a term of six years, but neither shall be reelected imtil after an inter- 
 mission of one term. 
 
 Akticle 78. The president of the nation shall cease to exercise his powers 
 on the same day on which his term of six years expires; and no event of any 
 kind which may have interrupted such term may be alleged as a reason for 
 completing it afterward. 
 
 Article 79. The president and vice-president shall receive for their 
 services a compensation, to be paid from the national treasury, the amount of 
 which shall not be changed during their terms of office. During said period 
 they shall not exercise any other office or receive any other emolument, either 
 national or provincial. 
 
 Article 80. On entering upon the discharge of their duties, the president 
 and the vice-president shall take an oath, which shall be administered to them 
 by the president of the senate (the first time by the president of the Con- 
 stitutional Convention), congress being in session, in the following terms: 
 
 " I, , do swear before God our Lord and these Holy Gospels 
 
 to discharge loyally and patriotically the office of president (or vice-presi- 
 dent) of the nation, and faithfully to observe and to cause others to observe, 
 the constitution of the Argentine Nation. Should I fail to do so, may God 
 and the nation require it of me." 
 
 Chapter II. — Manner and Time of Electing the President and Vice-president of the Nation. 
 
 Article 81. The election of the president and vice-president of the 
 nation shall be made in the following manner: The capital and each one of 
 the provinces shall appoint, by direct vote, an electoral college, consisting 
 of twice as many members as the number of senators and deputies con- 
 stituting their respective representation in congress, who shall have the 
 same quaUfications, and shall be elected in the same manner, as is provided 
 for the election of deputies. 
 
 Deputies, senators, and officials receiving pay from the federal govern- 
 ment, shall be disquaUfied from acting as electors. 
 
 Four months before the expiration of the presidential term, the electors 
 chosen by the capital shall meet in the capital, and those chosen by the 
 provinces in their respective capitals, and shall proceed to elect by signed 
 ballots the president and vice-president of the nation, expressing in one ballot 
 the choice for president and in another distinct ballot the choice for vice- 
 president. 
 
 Two Usts shall be made of aU the persons named for president and two 
 others of those named for vice-president, with the number of votes cast in 
 favor of each of them. These lists shall be signed by the electors and sent 
 by them sealed, two (one of each kind) to the president of the provincial 
 legislature, and in the case of the capital to the president of the municipaUty, 
 to be filed and kept, with their seals imbroken, in their respective archives, 
 and the other two to the president of the senate (for the first election to the 
 president of the constitutional convention). 
 
 Article 82. The president of the senate (for the first election the presi- 
 dent of the constitutional convention), having all the fists in his possession, 
 shall open them in the presence of the two houses. Four members of congress, 
 
148 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 selected by lot, shall, together with the secretaries, immediately proceed to 
 count and announce the votes cast for each candidate for president or for 
 vice-president of the nation. Those receiving in each case an absolute 
 majority of all the votes shall be immediately proclaimed president or vice- 
 president. 
 
 Article 83. In case the vote is divided and no absolute majority can 
 be obtained, congress shall elect one of the two persons who shall have ob- 
 tained the greatest number of votes. If the highest vote obtained prove to 
 be in favor of more than two persons, congress shall make its choice from 
 among all of them. 
 
 If the highest vote obtained proves to be in favor of only one person and 
 two or more persons are favored with the next largest vote, the choice of 
 congress shall be made from among all those who obtained the first and 
 second highest votes. 
 
 Article 84. This choice shall be made by an absolute majority of votes, 
 the votes to be verbal. If such majority is not obtained on the first ballot, 
 a second vote shall be taken, restricting the vote to the two persons who 
 shall have obtained the greatest number of votes on the first ballot. If the 
 vote is equally divided, the balloting shall be repeated, but if it again results 
 in an equal division, the president of the senate (for the first election the 
 president of the constitutional convention) shall decide by his vote. The 
 coimting of the votes and the verifying of these elections shall not be made 
 without the presence of three-fourths of all the members of congress. 
 
 Article 85. The election of the president and vice-president of the 
 nation shall be concluded in a single sitting of congress, and the result 
 thereof, as well as the journal of the electoral proceedings, shall be pubKshed 
 immediately through the newspapers. 
 
 Ghafteb III. — Powers of the Executive. 
 
 Article 86. The president of the nation shall have the following powers : 
 
 1. He shall be the chief magistrate of the nation, and shall have in his 
 charge the general administration of the country. 
 
 2. He may issue the instructions and regulations necessary for the execu- 
 tion of the laws of the nation, taking care that the spirit of such laws be not 
 changed by exceptions introduced through the said regulations. 
 
 3. He shall be the chief local authority of the capital of the nation. 
 
 4. He shall assist, in the manner provided by the constitution, in making 
 the laws, shall approve them, and shall cause them to be promulgated. 
 
 5. He shall appoint, with the advice of the senate, the justices of the 
 supreme court and of all other inferior federal courts. 
 
 6. He may grant pardons or commute punishments in cases of offenses 
 subject to federal jurisdiction, upon report of the proper court, except in cases 
 of impeachment by the house of deputies. 
 
 7. He may place officials on the retired list with pay, and grant leaves 
 of absence, and the enjoyment of pensions to widows and orphans, in 
 accordance with the laws of the nation. 
 
 8. He shall exercise the right of national ecclesiastical patronage by pre- 
 senting bishops for the cathedral churches, selected from three names pro- 
 posed to him by the senate. 
 
 9. He shall, with the advice of the supreme court, grant or refuse passage 
 to decrees of the councils, buUs, briefs, and rescripts of the Supreme Pontiff 
 of Rome; but said grant or refusal shall be made by law whenever such eccle- 
 siastical enactments contain provisions of a general or permanent character. 
 
Appendix B 149 
 
 10. He shall appoint and remove, with the advice of the senate, the 
 ministers plenipotentiary and charges d'affaires, and by himself alone, with- 
 out senatorial action, ministers of state, officials of the departments, consular 
 agents, and all the government employees whose appointment is not otherwise 
 provided for by this constitution. 
 
 11. He shall open the annual sessions of congress, both houses assembling 
 for that purpose in the hall of the senate; on this occasion he shall furnish 
 information as to the condition of the nation, of the reforms promised by the 
 constitution, and shall recommend to the consideration of the houses such 
 measures as he may deem necessary and expedient. 
 
 12. He may extend the regular session of congress or convene it in 
 extraordinary session, when some grave interest of order or progress may 
 require it. 
 
 13. He shall cause the revenue of the nation to be collected, and shall 
 decree the disbiu-sement thereof in accordance with the law or budgets of 
 national expenses. 
 
 14. He shall conclude and sign treaties of peace, of conunerce, of navi- 
 gation, of alliance, of boundaries, and of neutrality, as well as concordats and 
 all other negotiations required for the maintenance of friendly relations with 
 foreign powers. He shall receive their ministers and admit their consuls. 
 
 15. He shall be the commander in chief of all the land and naval forces 
 of the nation. 
 
 16. He shall appoint all the military officers of the nation; with the con- 
 sent of the senate when the position to be filled, or the rank to be given, is 
 that of a superior oflBcer in either the army or the navy, and by himself 
 when the appointments are made on the battlefield. 
 
 17. He shall dispose of the land and naval forces of the nation and shall 
 attend to their organization and distribution, according to the necessities of 
 the nation. 
 
 18. With the authority and approval of congress, he may declare war and 
 grant letters of marque and of reprisal. 
 
 19. With the consent of the senate, in case of foreign invasion, he may 
 declare one or more places in the nation to be in a state of siege for a limited 
 time. In case of internal troubles he may exercise such power only during the 
 recess of congress, for such power belongs to that body. The president shall 
 exercise this power within the limitations established by article 23. 
 
 20. He may require whatever information he may desire from the chiefs 
 of all bureaus and departments of the government and through them from 
 other officials, and they shall be obliged to furnish it. 
 
 21. The president shall not leave the national capital without the per- 
 mission of congress. During the recess of the latter he may, however, 
 absent himself from the capital without such permission, if some grave 
 necessity of the public service shall demand it. 
 
 22. The president shall have the power to fill those vacancies which re- 
 quire the consent of the senate, and which occur during a recess, by means 
 of appointments which shall expire at the close of the next session. 
 
 Chapter IV. — The Ministers of the Executive Power, 
 
 Article 87.' Eight ministers or secretaries shall have charge of the affairs 
 of the nation, and shall countersign and attest the acts of the president by 
 means of their signatures; these acts shall not be valid without such counter- 
 signature. A special law shall determine the business of each department. 
 
 > See article as amended March 15, 1898, p. 153. 
 
150 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 Article 88. Each minister is individually responsible for the acts signed 
 by himself, and jointly with the other ministers for all acts agreed upon be- 
 tween him and his colleagues. 
 
 Akticle 89. The ministers shall not, in any case, take individual action 
 on any subject, unless it concerns only the internal government of their own 
 respective departments. 
 
 Article 90. As soon as congress opens its sessions, each minister shall 
 submit to it a detailed report on the state of the nation, in all that relates to 
 the business of his own department. 
 
 Article 91. No minister shall become either senator or deputy without 
 first resigning his position as minister. 
 
 Article 92. Ministers may attend the sessions of congress and take part 
 in the debates, but shall have no vote. 
 
 Article 93. Ministers shall receive for their services a salary established 
 by law; but this salary shall not be increased or diminished in favor of or 
 against the incumbent of the position. 
 
 Section Third. — The Judiclu, Power. 
 Chapter I. — Its Nature and Duration. 
 
 Article 94. The judicial power of the nation shall be vested in a supreme 
 court of justice and in such other inferior courts as congress may establish 
 in the national territory. 
 
 Article 95. The president of the republic shall in no case exercise judi- 
 cial fimctions, assume jurisdiction of any pending case, or reopen cases already 
 decided. 
 
 Article 96. The judges of the supreme court and of the inferior courts of 
 the nation shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall receive for 
 their services a compensation to be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished 
 in any manner while they remain in the exercise of their functions. 
 
 Article 97. No person shall be a member of the supreme court of justice 
 who is not a lawyer, with eight years' practice in the national courts, and has 
 not, furthermore, the qualifications necessary to be a senator. 
 
 Article 98. On the first assembling of the supreme court, the members 
 thereof shall take an oath, which shall be administered to them by the presi- 
 dent of the nation, to fulfill their duties by administering justice well and 
 legally and in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. In the 
 future the oath shall be administered to them by the president of said court. 
 
 Article 99. The supreme court shall make rules for the transaction of 
 its business, and shall appoint all its subordinate employees. 
 
 Chapter II. — Functions of the Judicial Power. 
 
 Article 100. The supreme court and the inferior courts of the nation 
 shall try and decide all cases, not enumerated in clause 11 of article 67, which 
 arise under the provisions of this constitution, the laws of the nation, or 
 treaties with foreign powers; in cases concerning ambassadors, public minis- 
 ters, and foreign consuls; in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; 
 in controversies to which the nation is a party; in cases which arise between 
 two or more provinces, between one province and citizens of another province, 
 between citizens of different provinces, and between a province or its citizens 
 and a foreign state or its citizens. 
 
Appendix B 151 
 
 Article 101. In the above mentioned cases the supreme com't shall have 
 appellate jurisdiction, under such rules and exceptions thereto as congress 
 may establish. But in all cases concerning foreign ambassadors, ministers, 
 and consuls, and in those to which a province may be a party, the jurisdic- 
 tion of the court shall be original and exclusive. 
 
 Article 102. The trial of all ordinary crimes, except in cases of im- 
 peachment, which belong to the house of deputies, shall be by jury, as soon 
 as this institution shall be estabUshed in the repubhc. Such trials shall take 
 place in the province where the offense shall have been committed; but when 
 the offense shall have been committed outside the boundaries of the nation, 
 and in violation of the law of nations, congress shall determine, by a special 
 law, the place in which the trial shall take place. 
 
 Article 103. Treason against the nation shall consist only in taking 
 up arms against it or in joining its enemies and lending them aid and succor. 
 Congress shall by a special law determine the penalty for this crime, but the 
 punishment shall not go beyond the person of the offender, nor shall any 
 infamy resulting therefrom attaint his relatives, whatever the degree of 
 relationship. 
 
 TITLE SECOND.— PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 Article 104. The provinces retain all powers not delegated by the present 
 constitution to the federal government and those which they may have 
 expressly reserved by special agreements at the time of their coming into the 
 union. 
 
 Article 105. The provinces shall have their own local institutions and 
 shall be governed by them. They shall elect their governors, legislators, and 
 other provincial officers without intervention of the federal government. 
 
 Article 106. Each province shall enact its own constitution, in accordance 
 with the provisions of article 5. 
 
 Article 107. With the knowledge of the federal congress, the provinces 
 may enter into partial treaties for the purposes of the administration of justice, 
 the regulation of financial interests, and the execution of public works of 
 common utility; they may promote, by means of protective laws and at their 
 own expense, industry, immigration, the construction of railways and navi- 
 gable canals, the colonization of provincial lands, the introduction and estab- 
 lishment of new industries, the importation of foreign capital, and the 
 exploration of their rivers. 
 
 Article 108. The provinces shall not exercise any power delegated to 
 the nation. They shall not enter into any partial treaties of a poUtical 
 character, pass laws relating to domestic or foreign commerce or navigation; 
 estabUsh provincial custom-houses; coin money; or create banks of issue, 
 without authority from the federal congress; nor shall they enact any civil, 
 commercial, criminal, or mining codes after congress has enacted such codes, 
 or especially pass laws on the subjects of citizenship, naturalization, bank- 
 ruptcy, and counterfeiting of money or forging of government documents; 
 nor shall they establish tonnage dues, arm war vessels, or raise armies, except 
 in case of foreign invasion or of such danger so imminent as to admit of no 
 delay, immediately giving accoimt thereof to the federal government; nor shall 
 they appoint or receive foreign agents, or admit new reUgious orders. 
 
 Article 109. No province shall declare or wage war against another. 
 Their complaints shall be submitted to and settled by the supreme court of 
 justice. Actual hostilities on the part of one province against another shall 
 
152 The Federal System of the Argentine Republic 
 
 be deemed acts of civil war, seditious and riotous, which the federal govern- 
 ment shall put down and repress according to law. 
 
 Article 110. The governors of the provinces shall be the natural agents 
 of the federal government for the enforcement of the constitution and of the 
 laws of the nation. 
 
 Hall of Sessions of the National Convention at the 
 
 City of Santa Fi on the S6th day of September, 1860. 
 
 AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION. 
 Amendments Adopted September 12, 1866. 
 
 The national convention enacts the following: 
 
 First. That part of article 4 of the national constitution which reads: 
 "Until 1866, in conformity with the enactments of article 67, clause 1," 
 shall be stricken out, the said article to read as follows: 
 
 "The federal government shall defray the expenses of the nation with 
 funds of the national treasury, consisting of receipts from import and 
 export duties; proceeds of the sale or lease of national lands; revenue of 
 the postal service; taxes levied by the general congress equitably and in 
 proportion to the population, and moneys obtained through loans and 
 financial operations decreed by congress for urgent national necessities or 
 for works of national utility." 
 
 Second. The last part of clause 1, article 67, which reads: "Up to 1866, 
 at which time they shall cease to be either national or provincial taxes," 
 shall be stricken out, so as to make said clause read as follows: 
 
 "(1) To legislate in regard to custom-houses and foreign commerce and 
 establish import duties which, as well as the rates of appraisement on which 
 they must be based, shall be uniform in the whole nation, it being under- 
 stood, however, that these duties and all other taxes of national character 
 may be paid in the currency of the respective provinces at their just equiva- 
 lent value. And to estabUsh hkewise export duties." 
 
 Amendments Adopted September 19, 1868. 
 
 The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, etc. 
 
 Article 1. In case of vacancy of both the presidency and vice-presidency 
 of the nation, the executive power shall be vested first in the president pro 
 tempore of the senate, second in the speaker of the chamber of deputies, 
 and third in the chief justice of the supreme court. 
 
 Article 2. For the purposes of this law each chamber shall appoint its 
 presiding officer thirty days before the closing of the ordinary session. 
 
 Article 3. The official called upon to discharge the duties of the execu- 
 tive, according to article 1 of this law, shall, if the absence or disabiUty of 
 the president and vice-president be permanent, order a new election of presi- 
 dent and vice-president to be held within thirty days after his installation in 
 office. 
 
 Article 4. The functionary who shall exercise the executive power in 
 the cases of article 1 of this law shall, on entering upon the discharge of his 
 duties, take before congress, and in its absence before the supreme court of 
 justice, the oath prescribed by article 80 of the constitution. 
 
Appendix B 153 
 
 Amendments Adopted March 15, 1898. 
 
 The national convention assembled in the capital of the republic, in 
 pursuance of law No. 3507 of September 3, 1867, sanctions: 
 
 First. Articles 37 and 87 of the national constitution are hereby amended 
 as follows: 
 
 " Article 37. The chamber of deputies shall consist of deputies elected 
 directly and by plurality of votes, by the people of the provinces and 
 of the capital, which shall be considered for this purpose as mere electoral 
 districts of a single state. The election shall be in the proportion of one 
 deputy for each thirty-three thousand inhabitants or fraction thereof of not 
 less than sixteen thousand five hundred. After the taking of each census 
 congress shall fix, according to its results, the rate of representation, which 
 in no case shall be less than that now estabUshed. 
 
 " Abticle 87. Eight secretaries of state shall have charge of the affairs of 
 the nation, and shall countersign and attest all acts of the president, which 
 without this requisite shall lack vaUdity. A special law shall determine the 
 business of each department." 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 SUMMARY OF ARGENTINE ELECTORAL LAW. 
 
 (1) Governed by Law No. 8871 of February 13, 1912. 
 
 All citizens, native or naturalized, of 18 years of age or over, are national 
 electors. 
 
 Exclusions: By reason of incapacity, peculiar status or unworthiness. 
 
 Suffrage is individual and obligatory. Only those persons are exempt who 
 are over 70 years of age, and the judges and assistants who must act as such, 
 during the hours of the election. 
 
 EiiEcnoN OF Deputies. 
 
 Must take place throughout the coimtry in the month of March of all 
 years of even number; extraordinary elections for vacancies must take place 
 during the ordinary periods, on the holiday designated by the Assembly. 
 The deputies remain fom* years in office and may be reelected. They are 
 renewed by one-half every two years. 
 
 Election of Senatoes by the Provinces. 
 
 For the ordinary renovation of the Senate the Legislative Chambers 
 meet and name Senators by plurahty of votes, before the first of March 
 of the year of renovation. They remain nine years in oflice and may be re- 
 elected. The Senate is renewed by thirds every three years. 
 
 In case of extraordinary vacancy notice to be given to the corresponding 
 Government which must immediately instruct the Legislature to celebrate 
 within 15 days the reelection of a new Senator, 
 
 Senators for the Capital. 
 
 (2) The two senators for the Federal Capital are elected by a committee 
 of citizens elected in turn by popular vote. 
 
 Electoral Precincts. 
 
 In the capital of the Republic as well as in the capitals and cities of the 
 Provinces, each police section constitutes an electoral precinct. In each of 
 these precincts are assigned, by numbers, as many tables for receiving votes 
 as there are series composed of 200 registered citizens each, Uving within the 
 precinct. 
 
 If there is a fraction of less than 200 but over lOO^t constitutes a table. 
 If the fraction is less than 100 or disperse, it is incorporated in the nearest 
 serie or series. 
 
 A rural population of over 250 registered citizens constitutes an electoral 
 precinct. For fractions composed of less than 100 the same proceeding is 
 observed as that adopted in the capitals and cities. 
 
 Every group of more than 150 registered citizens, dispersed in small 
 villages or isolated dwellings in the country, constitutes also an electoral 
 precinct, in a single table. 
 
 154 
 
Appendix C 155 
 
 If the group consists of less than 150 it is incorporated in the nearest 
 precinct in its department or district. 
 
 In the elections of national deputies, electors of Senators for the Capital 
 and electors of President and Vice-President, each elector may only vote for 
 the two-thirds part of the number to elect, and in case of a fraction of that 
 niunber, for one candidate more. When the election is for one or two national 
 deputies, each elector may give his vote to an equal number of candidates. 
 
 Examples: 
 
 When 1 is elected 1 is voted for. 
 
 When 2 are elected 2 are voted for. 
 
 When 11 are elected as many as 8 may be voted for. 
 
 When 12 are elected as many as 8 may be voted for. 
 
 That is to say, the majority is shown in the even two-thirds part, and is 
 maintained in the fraction not divisible by three. 
 
 Those persons are proclaimed deputies and electors of Senators and 
 President and Vice-President who receive the greater number of votes, 
 until the number of candidates to be elected is completed, in accordance 
 with the Assembly, whatever list or Usts they may figure in. 
 
 If in completing the representation various candidates receive an equal 
 number of votes, the question is resolved by the Inspection Committee by 
 drawing lots. 
 
 When in the elections of renovation votes are also cast for extraordinary 
 vacancies^ the drawing of lots determines which deputies shall fill such vacan- 
 cies, provided the question is not clearly established by the election. The 
 drawing is verified by the Chamber of Deputies. 
 
 The object of election by incomplete list is to give representation to the 
 minority. The system was adopted in order to avoid the triumph of a single 
 list, that of the majority which was the result of voting by a complete Ust, 
 and also to avoid unfairness in the list by sections (circimscripcion). 
 
 At the present time, it will be observed, the system in use only gives 
 representation to one minority. The suggestion has been made of presenting 
 a modification which would agree to representation by quotient. 
 
 The census of the republic as taken in the year 1914 was approved for 
 
 1919, that is to say, 8,090,084 inhabitants, 7,886,294 inhabitants being fixed 
 as the nominal registered population, it then being necessary to elect 158 
 deputies, or one for every 49,000 inhabitants or fraction not inferior to 16,500. 
 It was also resolved not to divide the representation which at that time 
 corresponded to the electoral districts and the representation was increased 
 by two deputies, it being established that after the biennial renovation of 
 
 1920, there would be 160 deputies. The representation maintained corre- 
 sponded to the Provinces of Salta and Catamarca. The last election was 
 effected in accordance with these resolutions. 
 
APPENDIX D. 
 
 STATISTICS OF ILLITERACY. 
 
 Census: The National Census of 1914, the last taken (Tercer Censo 
 Nacional, Tomo III, p. 321 et seq.), shows that in all the republic of a total 
 of 6,301,961 persons of seven years and over there were 2,213,916 wholly 
 illiterate (i.e., could not read nor write), 172,096 partially illiterate (i.e., could 
 read but not write), and 3,915,949 literate (i.e., could read and write). The 
 figures include both Argentines and foreigners. 
 
 For Argentines the figures are: wholly iUiterate, 1,471,225; partially 
 illiterate, 112,682; literate, 2,420,406. Percentage of (total) illiteracy 36.74 
 per cent. 
 
 For foreigners: wholly illiterate, 742,691; partially ilUterate, 59,414; 
 literate, 1,495,544. Percentage of illiteracy, 32.32 per cent. 
 
 In 12 of the 26 territorial divisions (16 provinces and 10 territories) the 
 number of wholly illiterate exceeded the number who could read and write, 
 viz., Provinces of Corrientes, Santiago del Estero, Tucumd,n, La Rioja, Cata- 
 marca, Salta, Jujuy, and the Territories of Chaco, Formosa, Los Andes, 
 Neuquen, and Rio Negro. 
 
 Electoral: The registration of voters for 1916, to which reference is 
 made in the text, for the 16 electoral districts, shows the following numbers 
 and percentages of ilUteracy (Tercer Censo Nacional, Tomo IV, p. 479 et seq.): 
 
 Electoral district. 
 
 Total 
 registered. 
 
 Literate. 
 
 Per cent. 
 
 Illiterate. 
 
 Per cent. 
 
 Federal Capital 
 
 PROVINCES. 
 
 Buenos Aires (North) 
 " (South). 
 
 Santa Fe 
 
 Entre Rios 
 
 Corrientes 
 
 165,222 
 
 188,118 
 
 104,766 
 
 124,152 
 
 80,018 
 
 69,771 
 
 139,059 
 
 25,869 
 
 56,532 
 
 22,403 
 
 77,249 
 
 18,070 
 
 44,039 
 
 23,247 
 
 30,729 
 
 14,520 
 
 1,183,764 
 
 158,642 
 
 136,992 
 67,247 
 85,788 
 44,640 
 33,674 
 77,409 
 16,070 
 21,668 
 12,513 
 36,011 
 9,278 
 25,336 
 12.645 
 16,167 
 7,624 
 
 761,704 
 
 96.02 
 
 72.82 
 64.19 
 69.10 
 55.80 
 48.26 
 55.67 
 62.12 
 38.33 
 55.85 
 44.62 
 51.54 
 67.53 
 54.39 
 62.61 
 52.50 
 64.35 
 
 6,580 
 
 51,126 
 37,519 
 38,364 
 36,378 
 36,097 
 61,660 
 
 9,799 
 34,864 
 
 9,890 
 41,238 
 
 8,792 
 18,703 
 10,602 
 14,562 
 
 6,896 
 422,060 
 
 3.98 
 
 27.17 
 35.81 
 30.90 
 44.20 
 61.74 
 44.33 
 37.88 
 61.67 
 44.16 
 53.68 
 48.46 
 42.47 
 45.61 
 47.39 
 47.50 
 35.65 
 
 C6rdoba 
 
 San Luis 
 
 Santiago del Estero . . 
 Catamarca 
 
 
 La liioia 
 
 Mendoza 
 
 
 Salta 
 
 Jujuy 
 
 Whole 
 
 
 156 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Acuerdos de Gabinete, 97 
 
 Adaro, Esteban P., 78 
 
 Aguiar, H. D., 87 
 
 Alberdi, Juan Bautista, 36, 43, 60, 65, 70 
 
 Alcorta, Amancio, 113, 121-2 
 
 Alcorta, Figueroa, 9, 83 
 
 Aliens, 117, 126 
 
 Alsina, Valentino, 37-8 
 
 Amendments, constitutional 
 
 Of 1860, 33, 45-54, 66, 71, 75-6, 109- 
 10, 114 
 
 Of 1866, 53-4, 152 
 
 Of 1868, 152 
 
 Of 1880, 33 
 
 Of 1898, 33, 54, 94, 153 
 
 To provincial constitutions, 66 
 Anarchy, 16, 19, 30-1, 34-7, 65 
 Area, 5 
 Artigas, 34 
 Ayarragaray, Lucas, 19 
 
 Ballot, 11, 92-3, 98, 101-2 
 Bankruptcy, 51, 56-7, 59, 110 
 Banks, 59 
 Barrequero, 72 
 Bolivia, 18, 29 
 Bonds, sanitary, 63-4 
 Borchard, Edwin, 108 
 Brazil, 28, 35 
 Budget: 
 
 National, 10, 96-7, 104 
 Provincial, 6, 56, 68 
 Buenos Aires (city), 17-8, 20, 24-7, 30, 
 
 33-5, 38, 41, 43-4, 49, 52-3, 81, 91, 
 
 96, 102, 106, 123 
 Buenos Aires (province), 5, 18, 20-2, 24, 
 
 28, 30-1, 34-49, 52-3, 58, 61, 65, 66, 
 
 100, 102, 109-10, 114^15, 122-6, 
 
 130-1 
 
 Cabildo, 23-31, 34 
 
 Cabildo Abierto, 18, 24-5 
 
 Cabinet, 51, 54, 94, 96-7, 99, 103 
 
 Caceres, 121 
 
 Capital, national, 35, 43-5, 53, 100 
 
 Capital punishment, 47 
 
 del Carril, 43 
 
 Caseros, battle of, 37 
 
 Cases cited: 
 
 Aloy and Echevarria, 115 
 in re Duncan, 72, 87 
 Luther vs. Borden, 72 
 ex parte MilUgan, 118-9, 124 
 Catamarca, city of, 64 
 Catamarca, province of, 6, 12, 28-9, 35, 
 
 38, 49, 64-5, 100, 102 
 Caudillos, 19 
 Central America, 15 
 Cepeda, 44 
 
 Chalcatano, Cesareo, 128 
 Chamber of Deputies, 10, 49-50, 52-4, 77, 
 
 95, 99, 100-3 
 Charles III, 28, 64 
 Chicago, 74 
 Chile, 3, 28 
 Church, 127-9 
 
 Citizenship, 13-4, 50-1, 56, 59, 102 
 Codes : 
 
 Civil, 51, 56, 59, 60, 106, 109, 125-6 
 Commercial, 51, 56, 59, 60, 106, 109- 
 
 10, 125 
 Mining, 51, 56, 59, 60, 106, 109, 125 
 National, 50, 56, 59, 60, 106, 109-10, 
 
 114, 125 
 Penal, 51, 56, 59, 60, 106, 109, 116, 
 
 125-6 
 Provincial, 114-5 
 Colonial period, 3, 4, 16-20, 23, 25, 29, 30, 
 
 57, 59, 64, 70, 127, 129 
 Commerce, 34, 39, 42, 66, 59, 61 
 Congress, 8, 10-1, 34, 46, 49, 50-62, 65-7, 
 72-3, 76, 78-80, 84, 91, 93, 95-100, 
 108, 110, 114, 117, 119-23, 125, 127-9 
 Constitutions: 
 
 Alberdi draft, 43, 70 
 
 Buenos Aires, province of, 66, 115, 
 
 125-6 
 French, 94, 113 
 
 Provincial, 51-2, 65-7, 114^5, 120, 125 
 Of 1817, 34, 60 
 
 Of 1819, 20, 30, 34, 35, 113-4, 128 
 Of 1826, 20, 30, 35, 114, 128 
 Of 1853, 4r-5, 22, 33-5, 42-51, 65, 
 69, 75, 93-4, 99, 108-10, 114, 117, 
 121, 124, 128, 131 
 
 167 
 
158 
 
 Index 
 
 Constitutions — continued. 
 
 Declaration of Independence, 19, 21, 26, 
 
 Federal: 
 
 34, 37, 60, 91 
 
 Amendments, 1866, 1868, 152; 
 
 Derqui, 63 
 
 1898, 153 
 
 Differential duties, 44, 47 
 
 Cabinet, 149-60 
 
 Dimet, 79 
 
 Congress, powers of, 144-6 
 
 Drainage, 6, 66, 63-4 
 
 Declarations, rights, and guaran- 
 
 
 tees, 137-41 
 
 Economic conditions, 6, 8, 16-8, 81 
 
 Deputies, House of, 141-2, 143 
 
 Education: 
 
 Election of President and Vice- 
 
 Compulsory, 61 
 
 President, 147-8 
 
 Primary, 6, 7, 46, 61, 66-7 
 
 Executive power, 146-7, 148-9 
 
 Private, 61 
 
 Judicial power, 150-1 
 
 PubUc, 59, 60-1, 68 
 
 Legislative power, 141 
 
 Secondary, 7, 61-2 
 
 Preamble, 137 
 
 University, 7, 66, 60-2 
 
 Provincial governments, 151-2 
 
 Election law, 52, 78, 81, 98-9, 101-2 
 
 Senate, 142-3 
 
 Elections, 8-11, 27, 62-3, 66, 77-81, 86-8, 
 
 Constitutional development, 36, 91 
 
 92-3, 97, 99-101 
 
 Constitutional guarantees, 34, 48, 113-124, 
 
 Electoral system, Mendoza, 77 
 
 130-1 
 
 Electors, 6, 27, 92, 101-2 
 
 Constitutional reorganization, 16, 20, 38, 91 
 
 England, 16, 63 
 
 Conventions, constitutional: 
 
 English close corporation, 24 
 
 Of 1810, Revolutionary, 18, 25, 26 
 
 Entre Bios, 12, 28-9, 31, 34-5, 38, 43, 49, 
 
 Of 1812-1813, United Provinces of 
 
 68, 61, 64, 76, 100, 102, 122-3 
 
 River Plate, 17, 27, 33-4, 128 
 
 Estrada, Jose Manuel, 68, 60 
 
 Of 1816, Tucuman, 27, 34, 91 
 
 Europe, 15-7, 44, 106, 111-2 
 
 Of 1817, 34 
 
 Executive, 8-11, 26, 33-5, 39, 49, 61, 
 
 Of 1819, 21, 30 
 
 53-4, 66-7, 75-81, 84, 91-9, 100, 
 
 Of 1824, 25 
 
 103-4, 107, 117, 119-24, 127-9, 131 
 
 Of 1824, 35 
 
 Export duties, 45-6, 60, 63-5, 59 
 
 Of 1826, 21 
 
 
 Of 1852, 19, 21, 33, 37-43, 65-7, 70, 92 
 
 Federal commissioner, 9, 10, 75, 77-80, 
 
 Of 1860, Buenos Aires, Province of. 
 
 84^7 
 
 44-52, 66 
 
 Federal intervention, 9-10, 46-7, 69-88 
 
 Of 1860, Santa Fe, 46-52, 66, 71, 109, 
 
 Buenos Aires, 62-3 
 
 122 
 
 Chicago, 74 
 
 Of 1866, Santa Fe, 46, 64 
 
 Cordoba, 10, 76 
 
 Cordoba, city of, 64 
 
 Corrientes, 9, 76, 79, 80 
 
 Cordoba, province of, 10, 12, 24, 28-9, 34- 
 
 Entre Rios, 75 
 
 5, 38, 49, 61, 64, 75, 100, 102 
 
 Jujuy, 75 
 
 Cordoba del Tucumdn, intendencia of, 28 
 
 Mendoza, 75-7 
 
 Corrientes, city of, 63 
 
 Nevada, 74 
 
 Corrientes, province of, 9, 10, 12, 28, 29, 
 
 Rioja, 70, 75 
 
 31, 34, 35, 38, 49, 61, 65, 75-6, 79- 
 
 Salta, 76, 78 
 
 80, 100, 102, 120-3 
 
 San Juan, 9, 70, 75-6, 83-8 
 
 Courts: 
 
 San Luis, 9, 76, 78 
 
 District, 108 
 
 Santa Fe, 76 
 
 Ecclesiastical, 109 
 
 Santiago del Estero, 76 
 
 English, 107 
 
 Tucumdn, 80 
 
 Federal, 48, 56, 59, 108-11, 125 
 
 Federal power, 6, 55-7, 64, 67-8, 71-2, 75 
 
 Inferior, 51, 66, 108 
 
 Federation in Argentine and United States, 
 
 Provincial, 48, 66, 69, 67, 109-12, 115 
 
 57 
 
 Supreme, 51, 66, 61, 108-9, li2, 115, 
 
 France, 3, 53 
 
 120-1, 128-9 
 
 Franchises, raikoad, 7, 62 
 
 Supreme, of Buenos Aires, 115, 126 
 
 Frias, Jose A., 87 
 
 Customs dues, 39, 41, 44, 47, 50, 52-3 
 
 
 Customs houses, 60, 64-6 
 
 Gacitua, Comelio Moyano, 84, 87 
 
 Cuyo, 3, 28, 29 
 
 Galan, 40 
 
Index 
 
 159 
 
 Garcia, Juan Agustin, jr., 19 
 
 Gaucho, 12, 17 
 
 Germany, 4 
 
 Godoy, Manuel J., 9, 84 
 
 Gonzalez, Joaquin V., 28-9, 33, 64, 66, 119, 
 
 125 
 Gonzalez, Ramon, 83 
 Government 
 
 Autonomy, local, 19, 28, 30, 31 
 Centralized, 3, 18-21, 30, 57 
 Consolidated, 7, 11, 16, 23, 28-31, 
 
 3^6, 60 
 Decentralization, 16, 57 
 FederaUsm, 3, 4, 30, 36 
 Federal system, 3, 4, 6-11, 16, 19-21, 
 23, 28, 30-1, 34j 36, 38, 42-3, 52, 
 60, 66, 68, 78, 83, 86, 88, 125 
 Local, 5, 6, 15-18, 23-4, 36, 59, 66, 78 
 National, 7-9, 21, 23-31, 41, 42, 52, 
 63, 55, 58-61, 63-4, 66, 67-8, 75, 85, 
 88, 129 
 National organization, 19-21, 27-8, 
 
 30-1, 33, 34, 36, 42, 65 
 Parliamentary, 94^5 
 Provincial, 5-7, 12, 20, 55, 61-2, 64, 
 
 70, 75-7, 95, 120 
 Republican form, 9, 14, 46, 66-72, 75-7, 
 
 80, 84, 86-8 
 Unitarian system, 21 
 Governors, 8-10, 24, 28, 34, 38, 39, 49, 50, 
 70, 78-80, 83, 85-8, 95, 103, 117 
 
 Habeas corpus, 113-5, 118-9, 121 
 Historical development, 65-8 
 
 Illiteracy, 5, 12, 81 
 
 Immigration, 12-4, 24, 28, 56, 60, 62, 107 
 
 Impeachment, 10, 49, 50, 79, 80, 103 
 
 Indians, 24, 56, 59, 127 
 
 Industry, 59, 61 
 
 Inquisition, 34 
 
 Intendencias, 28, 64 
 
 Intendentes, 16 
 
 Intervention (see Federal.) 
 
 Italy, 3 
 
 Johnson, Reverdy, 72 
 
 Jordan, Lopez, 122 
 
 Judiciary, 12-3, 26, 48, 51, 107-12 
 
 Jujuy, city of, 63 
 
 Jujuy, province of, 6, 12, 28-9, 35, 38, 49, 
 
 65, 76, 100, 102 
 Junta de Representantes, 35 
 Justice, 12-4, 33, 67 
 
 Labor, 17, 99 
 
 Land owners, 17-8, 20 
 
 La Paz, 28 
 
 La Plata, 28 
 
 Laprida, 91 
 
 Latin America, 15-6 
 
 Laws (acts, decrees, resolutions, statutes) : 
 
 English common law, 16 
 
 Royal ordinances of Charles III, 28, 64 
 
 Spanish civil and criminal, 60 
 
 Substantive, 59 
 
 1803, 64 
 
 1811, 33, 17, 113 
 
 1812, 17, 27, 33 
 
 1813, 17, 29, 33-4 
 
 1814, 29, 33, 91 
 
 1815, 113 
 
 1816, 34 
 
 1817, 34, 91, 94, 113 
 1824, 35 
 
 1852, 40 
 
 1853, 43 
 
 1854, 121-2 
 
 1855, 122 
 1857, 70, 75 
 
 1859, 52, 122 
 
 1860, 52 
 
 1861, 52, 122 
 
 1862, 53, 122 
 
 1863, 110 
 1865, 122 
 
 1867, 54 
 
 1868, 122 
 
 1870, 122-3 
 
 1871, 61 
 
 1873, 1874, 123 
 1876, 123 
 1878, 61 
 1880, 123 
 1884, 61 
 1891, 62 
 
 1907, 76, 84, 86-7 
 
 1908, 79 
 Legislation: 
 
 Civil, 69-60 
 
 Penal, 59-60 
 Legislative authority, 35, 95-7, 99-106, 121 
 Legislatures, provincial, 10, 102-3, 112, 117 
 Libel, 126 
 
 Lloveras, Ventura, 83 
 Lopez, Vincents, 37, 40 
 Lopez, Vincente Fidel, 34, 38, 40 
 
 Martial law, 52, 75, 118, 124 
 
 Martinez, Juan E., 79 
 
 Matienzo, 94, 103, 110 
 
 Mendoza, city of, 64 
 
 Mendoza, province of, 28, 35, 38, 49, 61, 
 
 75-7, 100, 102, 120 
 MiUtary, 57-8, 73-5, 101, 103, 105 
 Misiones, 28, 29, 35 
 
160 
 
 Index 
 
 Mitre, 40, 53 
 
 Mitre, Bartholome, 19 
 
 Molinas, Nicanor, 70 
 
 Monopoly privileges, 18, 34 
 
 Montes de Oca, Manuel A., 71, 85 
 
 Montesclaros, Marquis de, 24 
 
 Montevideo, 18 
 
 Moreno, Mariano, 18 
 
 Moreno, Ruiz, 96 
 
 Mowry, Martin de, 5 
 
 Naturalization, 13, 14, 51, 56, 59, 117 
 
 Nequen, 6 
 
 Nevada, miners' strike, 74 
 
 Orteza, Victorino, 83 
 
 Palermo, 38 
 
 Pampa, 6 
 
 Papal buUs, 127-9 
 
 Parana, city of, 64 
 
 Parana, province of, 43, 49 
 
 Paraguay, 28, 46, 53 
 
 Pavno, battle of, 53 
 
 PelKza, Mariano A., 41 
 
 Pena, Roque Saenz, 11, 97 
 
 Personal property, 17 
 
 Personal rights, 113-24, 130-1 
 
 Peru, 3, 18, 24, 28, 53 
 
 Plate River, Provinces, 3, 16-19, 25, 28, 
 
 33, 35-6, 48, 60, 128 
 Political ideas, 7, 18, 22, 94, 97 
 Political parties, 8, 11, 14, 80-1, 95, 98, 106 
 Population, 5, 12 
 Potosi, 28 
 
 President (see Executive.) 
 Press, freedom of, 48, 113, 120, 125-6, 130 
 Property rights, 113-24, 130-1 
 Proportional representation, 49, 54, 78, 100 
 Provinces, 5-13, 18, 20-2, 24^5, 27-31, 34- 
 
 42, 44, 46, 49, 52, 54, 59, 60-71, 75-7, 
 
 80-3, 85-8, 95-6, 10&-12, 115, 119, 
 
 120, 124r-5, 129 
 Public opinion, 4, 8, 11, 14, 21, 62, 73, 80-1, 
 
 100, 103, 106, 124 
 Public works, 5, 6, 63-4, 66, 68 
 Puccio, Eugenio, 79 
 Puno, 28 
 
 Quesada, Ernesto, 3, 20, 36-7 
 Quintana, Manuel, 9 
 
 Raih-oads, 5-7, 56, 60, 62, 74 
 Ramos-Mejia, Francisco, 23-4, 26, 30 
 ReUgious liberty, 56, 126-9 
 Revenue : 
 
 Customs dues, 39, 41, 50, 52 
 
 Revenue — continued 
 
 Federal, 5, 6, 41-2, 46, 50, 53-4, 
 103-4 
 
 Municipal, 7 
 
 Provincial, 5, 7, 56 
 Revolutionary period, 16-9, 24-6, 30-1, 99 
 Revolutionary junta, 26, 35, 83, 113, 128 
 Revolutions, 22-3, 25, 28-30, 40, 83 
 Rio de la Plata, 29 
 Rioja, city of, 63 
 Rioja, Province of, 6, 12, 28-9, 35, 38, 49, 
 
 64-5, 70-1, 75, 100, 102, 120 
 Rivadavia, 30 
 Rivarola, 7, 12, 81 
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 74 
 Rosario, 122 
 
 Rosas, Juan Manuel, 3, 4, 16, 19-21, 
 31, 35-8, 43, 58, 65, 91-2 
 
 Saldias, Adolfo, 36 
 
 Salta, city of, 63 
 
 Salta, Province of, 6, 12, 24, 28-9, 35, 
 
 38, 49, 63, 76, 78, 100, 102 
 Sanitation, Municipal, 68 
 San Juan, city of, 63 
 San Juan, Province of, 6, 9, 28-9, 35, 38, 
 
 49, 61, 63-5, 67, 70-1, 75-6, 83-8, 
 
 100, 102 
 San Luis, city of, 63, 
 San Luis, Province of, 6, 9, 12, 28-9, 35, 
 
 38, 49, &4r-5, 75-6, 78, 100, 102, 120 
 San Martin, 30, 91 
 
 San Nicolas, agreement of, 35, 38-40, 42 
 San Nicolas de los Arroyos, conference of, 38 
 Santa Fe, city of, 39-41, 45-6, 54, 64, 66 
 Santa Fe, Province of, 28-9, 31, 34^-5, 38, 
 
 49, 61, 64, 75, 100, 102, 123 
 Santiago del Estero, city of, 63 
 Santiago del Estero, Province of, 6, 12, 
 
 28-9, 35, 38, 49, 64-5, 76, 100, 102 
 Sarmiento, 19 
 Sarmiento, Carlos, 83, 87 
 Schools (see Education.) 
 Senate, 10, 49-51, 78, 93, 102-3, 119-20, 
 
 123, 128 
 Siege, state of, 57, 119-24 
 Slavery, 17, 34, 47, 116 
 Social conditions, 17-21, 37 
 SociaUst party, 95, 99 
 South America, 3, 13, 15-6, 18, 26, 37, 117 
 Spain, 11, 13, 16-8, 23-5, 60, 91, 94^5, 97, 
 
 107, 112, 127-9 
 Sparks, John, 74 
 Special privileges, 17-8, 37, 62 
 Speech, freedom of, 120, 125-6 
 Strikes: 
 
 Chicago, 74 
 Nevada, 74 
 
Index 
 
 161 
 
 Subsidies, 6, 7, 56, 62, 68 
 Suffrage, 78, 86, 98 
 
 Taxation, 6, 7, 24, 26, 41, 46, 65, 59 
 Towns, 5, 16, 19-20, 23-31, 34, 61, 64 
 Trade, 18, 34 
 Treaties 
 
 Agreement of June 6, 1860, 44^6, 48, 
 
 52 
 Interprovincial 
 1820, 31 
 
 1831, 35, 38-40, 42-3 
 Peace, November 11, 1859, 35, 44-5, 
 
 48,52 
 Peace and commerce, 1829, 34 
 Peace and friendship, 1830, 35 
 Peace, friendship and alliance, Oct. 
 
 19 and Oct. 27, 1829, 35 
 Peace, friendship, and offensive and 
 
 defensive alliance, 1830, 35 
 Pilar, 34 
 
 Quadrilateral, 1822, 31, 34 
 San Nicolas, 1852, 35, 38-9, 42 
 November 11, 1859, 44-5, 48, 52 
 Union and alliance, 1830, 35 
 Trial by jury, 51, 56, 111-12, 126 
 Tucumdn, city of, 27, 34, 91 
 Tucumdn, Province of, 6, 12, 28-9, 35, 38, 
 49, 80, 100, 102 
 
 United States: 
 
 Congress, 72-4, 96 
 
 Constitution, 4, 26, 33, 43, 45-8, 
 57-8, 61, 63, 67, 69, 71-4, 87, 94, 
 99, 103, 106, 108, 117-8, 121, 131 
 Executive, 11, 74, 92-4, 118 
 Federal intervention: 
 
 Miners' strike, Nevada, 74 
 
 United States — continued 
 
 Federal intervention — continued 
 
 Railway strike, Chicago, 74 
 
 Historical development, 65 
 
 Immigration, 13-4 
 
 Judiciary, 111, 112 
 
 Local self-government, 6 
 
 Railroads, 62 
 
 Supreme court, 61, 72, 88, 112, 118 
 Universal military service (see military.) 
 Urquiza, 37-44, 122 
 Urrutia, Manuel Alberto, 71, 75-6 
 Uruguay, 28-9, 35 
 
 VaUe, Aristobulo del, 23, 33, 36, 45, 91 
 
 Varela, Luis V., 72, 115 
 
 Velez, 40 
 
 Velez-Sarsfield, Dalmaeio, 45 
 
 Viceroyalty: 
 
 Buenos Aires, 28 
 
 Peru, 28, 66 
 
 River Plate, 16, 18, 24, 26, 127 
 Villanueva, Benito, 83 
 
 Wallace, 118, 124 
 War: 
 
 Argentine vs. Buenos Aires, 122 
 
 Buenos Aires and provinces, 22 
 
 Civil, 31, 34, 122-3 
 
 Paraguayan, 53, 122 
 Water supply, 5, 55, 63-4 
 Writ of Protection (see Habeas corpus.) 
 
 Yancey, 44 
 
 Zeballos, Estanislao S., 72 
 Zuviria, Facundo, 42