V\- tlie cfitue 'i. juiirder, anil for attcjiijiliiig t.> incite a" porvilc war amojigst a people -wlio bad never barmcj iiinij^nd. wiio livcil under tlio Siune coijstitutjlin and govcrnme^it witb limself., Toijis c^ocutipn/ej^^ . i-igbfetbinkmg- ruan^'iiill sSy A5iek~P -j- TGo 'followiug;.-5<]i'~iiatcb was received, to-nigbt, from tbelelegrapj^fc. operator >at Montgome^.^Mr. C.J, CtTRRiE.-^ - "Wc h:istenfeljat 'tliis kij&orUSit^trirS ■•*■■ A JOHN BROWN EXTRA. GROWTH OF SECESSION SENTIMENT 19 in the South. After the damage was done, Yancey was pressed to take the vice-presidency on the Douglas ticket.* Douglas was known to be in bad health and Yancey was told that he might expect to be President within a few months, if he accepted. But it was too late for further compromise, and Yancey toured the North, speaking for Breckenridge. A State Rights convention in Alabama indorsed the candidates of the seceded convention; a convention of Douglas Democrats in Montgomery declared for Douglas; the "Constitutional Union" party (the old Whigs and "Americans" or "Know-nothings"), for Bell and Everett and old-fashioned con- servative respectability. During the campaign Douglas visited the state and was well received, but aroused no enthusiasm, while Yancey was tumultuously welcomed. As far back as February 24, i860, the legislature had passed almost unanimously a resolution concurring with South Carolina in regard to the right and necessity of secession, and declaring that Alabama would not submit to the domination of a "foul sectional party." In case of the election of a "Black" RepubUcan President a convention was to be called, and $200,000 was appropriated for its use.^ A committee was appointed to reorganize the mihtia system of the state, and so important was the work deemed that the com- mittee was excused from all other duties. The Senate declared that it was expedient to establish an arsenal, a firearms factory, and a powder mill. A bill was passed to encourage the manufacture of firearms in Alabama.' At this session seventy-four military com- panies were incorporated and provision made for military schools.* Elections returns were anxiously awaited.' It was certain that the election of Lincoln and Hamhn would result in secession.^ When 1 Hodgson, Ch. 15. 2 Acts of Alabama (1859-1860), pp. 689-690 ; Smith's "Debates," pp. 10, 11. 8 Acts of Alabama (1859-1860), pp. 681-682; Senate Journal (1859-1860), pp. 147, 176, 293, 302. * Daring this session Judge Sam. Rice, in reply to John Forsyth and others who feared that secession would lead to war, said : " There will be no war. But if there should be, we can whip the Yankees with popguns." After the war, when he had turned " scalawag," he was taken to task for the speech. "You said we could whip the Yankees with popguns." "Yes, — but the damned rascals wouldn't fight that way." 5 The popular vote in Alabama was : for Breckenridge, 48,831 ; for Douglas, 13,621 ; for Bell, 27,875. * Many people believed that Hamlin was a mulatto. 20 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA the news came the old "Union" leaders declared for secession and by noon of the next day the "Union" party had 8-^ to pieces. The leaders who had opposed secession to the last - Watts Clanton, Goldthwaite, Judge, and HiUiard-now took their stand by the side of Yancey and declared that Alabama must withdraw from the Union. Governor Moore, a very moderate man, m a pubhc speech, said that no course was left but for the state to secede, and with the other southern states form a confeder- acy. Pubhc meetings were held in every town and village to declare that Alabama would not submit to the rule of the "Black Repubhcan." A typical meeting held in Mobile, November 15, i860, arraigned the Repubhcan party be- cause: (i) it had de- clared for the abolition of slavery in all terri- tories and Federal dis- tricts and for the abolition of the inter- state slave trade; (2) it had denied the extra- dition of murderers, marauders, and other felons; (3) it had con- cealed and shielded the murderers of masters who had sought to recover fugitive slaves; (4) it advocated negro equahty and made it the basis of legislation hostile to the South; (5) it opposed protection of slave property on the high seas and had justified piracy in the case of the Creole; (6) it had invaded Virginia and shed the blood of her citizens on her own soil; and (7) had announced a policy of KLECTION FOE PKESIDENT, 1880. I Majority or plurality for Breckenridge. ^g •■ " " " Eell. I :,^| " Douglas. For Breckenridge i8,831. " Bell 27,876. " Douglas 13,651. In Lawrence, Coosa, and Mobile Counties tlie vote was nearly evenly divided. , ' ^^ SEPARATION OF THE CHURCHES 21 total abolition/ In December, i860, the Federal grand jury at Montgomery declared the Federal government "worthless, impotent, and a nuisance," as it had failed to protect the interests of the people of Alabama. The presentment was signed by C. C. Gunter, foreman, and nineteen others.^ Had the governor been willing to call a convention at once, seces- sion would have been almost unanimous ; but delay caused the more cautious and timid to reflect and gave the so-called "cooperationists" time to put forth a platform. The leaders of the party of delay representing north Alabama, the stronghold of radical democracy, were WilHam R. Smith, M. J. Bulger, Nicholas Davis, Jere Clemens, and Robert J. Jemison, all strong men, but none of them possessing the ability of the secessionist leaders or of the former "Union" leaders who had joined the secession party. But secession was certain, — it was only a question as to how and when. By law the governor was to call a convention in case the "Black Republican" candidates were elected, and December 24, i860, was fixed as the time for elec- tion of delegates, and January 4, 1861, the time for assembly. Separation of the Churches Before the pohtical division in 1861 the religious division had already occurred in the larger and in several of the smaller denomina- tions. At the close of 1861 every religious body represented in the South, except the Roman Cathohc church,' had been divided into northern and southern branches. The political rather than the moral aspects of slavery had finally led to strife in the churches. The southern churches protested against the action of the northern 1 Horace Greeley, "The American Conflict," Vol. I, p. 355. For a similar meeting in Montgomery, see Hodgson, p. 459 el seq. 2 See Townsend Collection, Columbia University Library, Vol. I, p. 187. One poor white man in Tallapoosa County welcomed the election of Lincoln, for " now the negroes would be freed and white men could get more worlc and better pay." Authori- ties for the political history of Alabama before i860: Hodgson's "Cradle of the Con- federacy"; Garrett's "Reminiscences of Public Men of Alabama"; Brewer's "Alabama"; Brown's " History of Alabama " ; Miller's " History of Alabama " ; Pickett's " History of Alabama " (Owen's edition) ; " Northern Alabama Illustrated " ; " Memorial Record of Alabama" ; DuBose's " Life and Times of William L. Yancey" ; Hilliard's " Politics and Pen Pictures and Speeches " ; Transactions of Ala. Hist. Soc, Vol. IV, papers by Yonge, Cozart, Culver, Scott, and Petrie. 3 O'Gorman, " History of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States," p. 425. 22 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA religious bodies in going into politics on the slavery question and thus causing endless strife between the sections as represented in the churches. The response of the northern societies to such pro- tests resulted in the gradual alienation of the southern members and finally in separation. The first division in Alabama came in 1821, when the Associate Reformed Presbyterian church excluded slave- holders from communion and thereby lost its southern members.^ Next came the separation of the two strongest Protestant denomina- tions, the Baptists and the Methodists. The southern Baptists were, as slaveholders, excluded from appointment as missionaries, agents, or officers of the Board of Foreign Missions, although they contributed their full share to missions. The Alabama Baptist Convention in 1844 led the way to separation with a protest against this discrimination. The Board stated in reply that under no cir- cumstances would a slaveholder be appointed by them to any posi- tion. The Board of the Home Mission Society made a similar declaration. The formal withdrawal of the southern state conventions followed in 1844, and in 1845 the Southern Baptist Convention was formed.^ In the Methodist Episcopal church the conflict over slavery had long been smouldering, and in 1844 it broke out in regard to the ownership of slaves by the wife of Bishop Andrew of Alabama. The hostile sections agreed to separate into a northern and a southerrj church, and a Plan of Separation was adopted. This was disre- garded by the northern body and the question of the division of prop- erty went to the courts. The United States Supreme Court finally decided in favor of the southern church. From these troubles angry feelings on both sides resulted. The southern church took the name of the Methodist Episcopal Church South; the northern church retained the old name.^ In 1858, the northern conferences of the Methodist Protestant nf f^ ^"'f'/'^'^'^r' .^""' °^ '^^ ^"'*''' ^'"''=^'" P' 3°6; Thompson, "History of the Presbyterian Churches in the United States," pp 41 135 in ZT'^t °L?"t"' ^"'"' °' '^^°' P- '46; Ri'ey> "History of the Baptists heBantT T.W " fl' °' ''' Mississippi," p. .05 e^ se,.; Newman, " Histo^ of the Baptists of the United States," pp. 443-454. ,. '/"!/-!""!'' "^'^' °^ J""" ^'^°'"^ Andrew"; Buckley, "History of Metho- wirc?"r:.'TJn"'.''^*°''^""= ^'^^''-'"- ""^^^y °f *e MeVhodist Episcopal Church South" ; Statistics of Churches, p. 581. REPARATION OF THE CHURCHES 23 Church, having failed to change the constitution of the church in regard to slavery, withdrew, and uniting with a number of Wesleyan Methodists, formed the Methodist Church.^ The Southern Aid Society was formed in New York in 1854 for mission work in the South because it was generally beheved that the American Home Mission Society was aUied with the abolitionists, and because the latter society refused to aid any minister or mis- sionary who was a slaveholder. In Alabama the Southern Aid Society worked principally among the Presbyterians of north Alabama.^ The Presb)rterians (N.S.) separated in 1858 "on account of poUtics," and the southern branch formed the United Synod South.' The East Alabama Presbytery (O.S.) in 1861 supported the Presby- tery of Memphis in a protest against the action of the General Assem- bly of the church in entering poHtics. The Presbytery of South Alabama (O.S.) met at Selma in July, 1861, severed its connection with the General Assembly, and recommended a meeting of a Con- federate States Assembly. This Assembly was held at Augusta and formed the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America. A long address was pubhshed, setting forth the causes of the separation, the future policy of the church, and its attitude towards slavery. It declared that the northern section of the church with its radical pohcy was playing into the hands of both slaveholders and aboKtionists and thus weakening its influence with both. "We, " the address stated, "in our ecclesiastical capacity are neither the friends nor foes of slavery." As long as they were connected with the radical northern church the southern Presbyterians felt that they would be excluded from useful work among the slaves by the suspi- cions of the southern people concerning their real intentions.* The Christian church was divided in 1854. During the war the southern synods of the Evangelical Lutherans withdrew and 1 Statistics of Churches, p. 566. 2 Southern Aid Society Reports, 1854-1861. 2 Statistics of Churches, p. 684 ; Carroll, " Religious Forces," pp. 281, 306 ; Thompson, "History of the Presbyterian Churches," p. 135. * Thompson, "History of the Presbyterian Churches," p. 155 ; Johnson, "History of the Southern Presbyterian Church," pp. 333, 339 ; McPherson, " History of the Rebellion," p. 508; "Annual Cyclopaedia" (1862), p. 707; Statistics of Churches, p. 683. 24 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA {ormed the General Synod South. There were few members of these churches in Alabama.' The Cumberland Presbyterians, though separated by the war, seem not to have formally estabhshed an independent organization in the Confederate States. A convention was called to meet at Selma in 1864, but nothing resulted.^ In May, 1861, the Protestant Episcopal Convention of Alabama declared null and void that part of the constitution of the diocese relating to its connection with the church in the United States. In- stead of the President of the United States, the Governor of Alabama, and later, the President of the Confederate States, was prayed for in the formal prayer. Bishop Cobbs, a strong opponent of secession, died one hour before the secession of the state was announced. Rev. R. H. Wilmer, a Confederate sympathizer, was elected to succeed him.^ In July the bishops of the southern states met in Montgomery to draft a new constitution and canons. A resolution was passed stating that the secession of the southern states from the Union and the formation of a new government rendered it expedient that the dioceses within those states should form an indepe;ident organiza- tion. The new constitution was adopted in November, 1861, by a general convention, and the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Confederate States was formed.^ And thus the religious ties were broken. Business had also become sectionalized by 1861. The southern states felt keenly their dependence upon the states of the North for manufactures, water -transportation, etc. For two decades before the war the southern newspapers agitated the question and advocated measures that would tend to secure economic independence of the North. As an instance of the feeling, many of the educators of the state were in favor of using only those text-books written by southern men and printed in the South. Professor A. P. Barnard ^ of the University of Alabama was strenuously in favor of such action. He 1 Carroll, " Religious Forces," pp. 93, 178. ^ Annual Cyclopaedia (1864), p. 683. " Wilmer, " Recent Past," p. 248. ^ Perry, " History of the American Episcopal Church," Vol. II, p. 328 et seq. ; McPherson, " History of the Rebellion," p. 515 ; Whitaker, " Church in Alabama." s President of Columbia College (N.Y.) during and after the war. SPEECH OF SENATOR CLAY 25 declared that nothing ought to be bought from the North. From 1845 to 1861, fifteen "Commercial Conventions" were held in the South, largely attended by the most prominent business men and politicians. The object of these conventions was to discuss means of attaining economic independence. When Alabama withdrew from the Union in 1861, no bonds were broken. Practically the only bond of Union for most of the people had been in the churches; to the Washington government and to the North they had never become attached. The feelings of the great majority of the people of the state are expressed in the last speech of Senator C. C. Clay of north Alabama in the United States Senate. It had been forty-two years, he said, since Alabama had entered the Union amidst scenes of excitement and violence caused by the hostility of the North against the institution of slavery in the South (referring to the conflict over Missouri). In the churches, southern Christians were denied commxmion because of what the North styled the "leprosy of slavery." In violation of Constitution and laws southern people were refused permission to pass through the North with their property. The South was refused a share in the lands acquired mainly by her diplomacy, blood, and treasure. The South was robbed of her property and restoration was refused. Crim- inals who fled North were protected, and southern men who sought to recover their slaves were murdered. Southern homes were burned and southern families murdered. This had been endured for years, and there was no hope of better. The Repubhcan platform was a declaration of war against the South. It was hostile to domestic peace, reproached the South as unchristian and heathenish, and imputed sin and crime to that section. It was a strong incitement to insurrection, arson, and murder among the negroes. The southern whites were denied equahty with northern whites or even with free negroes, and were branded as an inferior race. The man nominated for President disregarded the judgment of courts, the obhgations of the Constitution, and of his oath by declaring his approval of any measure to prohibit slavery in the territories of the United States. The people of the North branded the people of the South as outlaws, insulted them, consigned them to the execration of posterity and to ultimate destruction. "Is it to be expected that we will or can exer- cise that Godhke virtue that beareth all things, beheveth all things, 26 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA hopeth all things, endureth all things ; which tells us to love our ene- mies, and bless them that curse us? Are we expected to be denied the sensibihties, the sentiments, the passions, the reason, the instincts of men?" Have we no pride, no honor, no sense of shame, no rever- ence for ancestors and care for posterity, no love of home, of family, of friends? Are we to confess baseness, discredit the fame of our sires, dishonor ourselves and degrade posterity, abandon our homes and flee the country — all — all — for the sake of the Union ? Shall we live under a government administered by those who deny us justice and brand us as inferiors ? whose avowed principles and pohcy must destroy domestic tranquillity, imperil the lives of our wives and children, and ultimately destroy the state? The freemen of Ala- bama have proclaimed to the world that they will not.^ 1 Smith, pp. 448-450, condensed. CHAPTER II . SECESSION FROM THE UNION On November 12, i860, a committee of prominent citizens, ap- pointed by a convention of the people of several counties, asked the governor whether he intended to call the state convention immedi- ately after the choice of presidential electors or to wait until the elec- tors should have chosen the President. They also asked to be informed of the time he intended to order an election of delegates to the convention.' Governor Moore replied that a candidate for the presidency was not elected until the electors cast their votes, and until that time he would not call a convention. The electors would vote on December 5, and as he had no doubt that Lincoln would be elected, he would then order an election for December 24, and the convention would assemble, in Montgomery on January 7, 1861. The date, he said, was placed far ahead in order that the people might have time to consider the subject. He summed up the situation as follows: Lincoln was the head of a sectional party pledged to the destruction of slavery; the non-slaveholding states had repeatedly resisted the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, even nullifying the statutes of the United States by their laws intended to prevent the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law ; Virginia had been invaded by aboHtionists and her citizens murdered; emissaries had burned towns in Texas; and in some instances poison had been given to slaves with which to destroy the whites. With Lincoln as President the aboUtionists would soon control the Supreme Court and then slavery would be aboKshed in the Federal district and in the territories. There would 1 Smith, " History and Debates of the Convention of Alabama," i86t, p. 12. My account of the convention is condensed almost entirely from Smith's " Debates." Smith was a cooperationist member from Tuscaloosa County. He kept full notes of the pro- ceedings and is impartial in his reports of speeches. Almost the entire edition of the " Debates " was destroyed by fire in 1861. Hodgson, " Cradle of the Confederacy," and DuBose, " Life and Times of William L. Yancey," both give short accounts of the convention. 27 28 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA soon be a majority of free states large enough to alter the Constitution and to destroy slavery in the states. The state of society, with four milhon negroes turned loose, would be too horrible to contemplate, and the only safety for Alabama lay in secession, which was within her right as a sovereign state. The Federal government was estab- hshed for the protection and not the destruction of rights ; it had only the powers delegated by the states and hence had not the power of coercion. Alabama was devoted to the Union, but could not con- sent to become a degraded member of it. The state in seceding ought to consult the other southern states; but first she must decide for herself, and cooperate afterwards. The convention, the governor said, would not be a place for the timid or the rash. Men of wisdom and experience were needed, men who could determine what the honor of the state and the security of the people demanded, and who had the moral courage to carry out the dictates of their honest judgment. The proclamation, ordering an election on Christmas Eve and the assembly of the convention at Montgomery, on January 7, 1861, was issued on December 6, the day after the choice of Lincoln by the electors. On January 7, every one of the one hundred delegates was present. It was a splendid body of men, the -best the people could send. There were the "secessionists," who wanted immediate and sepa- rate secession of the state without regard to the action of the other southern states; the "cooperationists," who were divided among themselves, some wanting the cooperation of the southern states within the Union in order to force their rights from the central gov- ernment, and others wanting the southern states to come to an agree- ment within the Union and then secede and form a confederacy, while a third class wanted a clear understanding among the cotton states before secession. It was said that there were a few "sub- missionists," but the votes and speeches fail to show any. At first both parties claimed a majority, but before the convention opened it was known that the larger number were secessionists. A test vote on the election of a presiding officer showed the relative strength of the parties. WiUiam M. Brooks of Perry was elected over Robert Jemison of Tuscaloosa by a vote of 54 to 46, north Alabama voting for Jemison, central and south Alabama for Brooks. And thus the parties voted throughout the convention. SECESSION FROM THE UNION 29 It is probable that the majority of the delegates were formerly Whigs, and a majority of them was still hostile to Yancey, who was the only prominent agitator elected. His colleague, from Mont- gomery County, was Thomas H. Watts, formerly a Whig. Other prominent secessionists were J. T. Dowdell, John T. Morgan, Thomas H. Herndon, E. S. Dargan, Wilham M. Brooks, and Franklin K. Beck. The opposition leaders were William R. Smith, Robert Jemison, M. J. Bulger, Nicholas Davis, Jeremiah Clem- ens, Thomas J. McClel- lan, and David P. Lewis. Yancey, Morgan, and Watts excepted, the oppo- sition had the more able speakers and debaters and the more poHtical experience. The advan- tage of representation was with the white counties, which sent 70 of the 100 delegates. When the convention settled down to work, the grievances of the South had no important place in the discussions. The Httle that was said on the subject came from the cooperationists and that only incidentally. There was a genuine fear of social revo- lution brought about by the Republican programme, but the seces- sionists had been stating their grievances for twenty years and were now silent.^ All seemed to agree that the present state of affairs was ^ Except Yancey, who declared that the disease preying on the vitals of the Federal Union was not due to any defect in the Constitution, but to the heads, hearts, and con- sciences of the northern people ; that no guarantees, no amendments, could reeducate PARTIES IX SECESSION COSVENTION ] Secession at once. 1 Coopeiution. ■^ Majority of population (1800) Negroes. Contesting delegation from Shelby County. Delegates from Coosa and Talladega, and Clemens from JIadison voted for Secession thougli elected and acted untiLfljlalvote M cooperationists. 30 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA unbearable, and that secession was the only remedy. The only ques- tion was, How to secede ? To decide that question the leaders of each party were placed on the Committee on Secession. A majority of the convention was in favor of immediate, separate secession. They held the logical state sovereignty view that the state, while a member of the Union, should not combine with another against the government or the party controlling it. Such a course would be contrary to the Constitution and would be equivalent to breaking up the Union while planning to save it. As a sovereign ?tate, Alabama could withdraw from the Union, and hence immediate, separate secession was the proper method. Then would follow consultation and cooperation with the other seceded southern states in forming a southern confederacy. From the first it was known that the secessionists were strong enough to pass at once a simple ordinance of withdrawal. They said but little because their position was already well understood. The people were now more united than they would be after long debates and outside influence. Yet, for pohcy's sake, and in deference to the feelings of the minority, the latter were allowed to debate for four days before the question at issue was brought to a vote. In that time they had about argued themselves over to the other side. With the exception of Yancey, the secessionists were silent until the ordi- nance was passed. The first resolution declared that the people of Alabama would not submit to the administration of Lincoln and Hamlin. Both' parties voted unanimously for this resolution.^ The cooperationists were determined to resist Republican rule, but did not consider delay dangerous. Some doubtless thought that in some way Lincoln could be held in check and the Union still be preserved, and a number of them were doubtless wilUng to wait and make another trial. It was known that an ordinance of secession would be passed as soon as the secessionists cared to bring the ques- tion to a vote, but for four days the Committee on Secession con- the northern people on the slavery question, so as to induce a northern majority to with- hold the exercise of its power in aid of abolition. Governor Moore, in the commissions given to the ambassadors to the other states, declared that the peace, honor, and security of the southern states were endangered by the election of Lincoln, the candi- date of a purely sectional party, whose avowed principles demanded the destruction of slavery. 1 It would seem that after this vote no one would say that nearly half of the mem- bers were "Unionists," yet nearly all accounts make this statement. SECESSION FROM THE UNION 31 sidered the matter while the cooperationists made speeches.' On January lo the committees made two reports. The majority report, presented by Yancey, simply provided for the immediate withdrawal of the state from the Union. The minority report, presented by Clemens, was in substance as follows : We are unable to see in separate state se- cession the most effectual mode of guarding our honor and securing our rights. This great object can best be attained by concurrent and concentrated action of all the states interested, and such an effort should be made before deciding finally upon our own policy. All the southern states should be requested to meet in convention at Nashville, February 22, 1861, to consider wrongs and appropriate remedies. As a basis of settlement such a convention should con- sider: (i) the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law and the repeal of all state laws nullifying it; (2) more stringent and explicit provisions for the surrender of criminals escaping into another state ; (3) guarantees that slavery should not be abolished in the Federal district or in any other place under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress; (4) non-interference with the interstate slave trade; (5) protection of slavery in the territories which, when admitted as states, should decide for themselves the question of slavery; (6) right of transit through free states with slave property; (7) the foregoing to be irrepealable amendments to the Constitution. This basis of settlement was not to be regarded as absolute, but simply as the opinion of the Alabama convention, to which its delegates to the proposed convention were expected to conform as nearly as possible. Secession should not be attempted except after the most thorough investigation and discussion.^ The secessionists were of one mind in regard to secession and did not debate the subject; the cooperationists — all from north Ala- bama — were careful to explain their views at length in their speeches of opposition. Bulger (c.) ^ of Tallapoosa thought that separate secession was unwise and impoUtic, but that an effort should be made 1 There were many indications that the opposition was more sectional and personal than political. It is safe to state for north Alabama that had the Black Belt declared for the Union, that section would have voted for secession. 2 This minority report was signed by Clemens of Madison, Lewis of Lawrence, Winston of De Kalb, Kimball of Tallapoosa, Watkins of Franklin, and Jemison of Tusca- loosa, all from north Alabama. 8 c. = cooperationist ; s. = secessionist ; cs. = cooperationist who voted for secession. 32 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA to secure the cooperation of the other southern states before seceding. To this end he proposed a convention of the southern states to con- sider the grievances of the South and to determine the mode of relief for the present and security for the future, and, should its demands not be compUed with, to determine upon a remedy. Clark (c.) of Lawrence denied the right of separate secession, which would not be a remedy for existing evils. The slavery question would not be settled but would still be a vital and ever present issue. Separate secession would revolutionize the government but not the northern feeling,, would not hush the pulpits, nor calm the northern mind, nor purify Black Republicanism. The states would be in a worse condition poHtically than the colonies were before the Con- stitution was adopted. The border states would sell their slaves south and become free states ; separate secession would be the decree of universal emancipation. A large majority of the people were opposed to separate secession, and besides, the state alone would be weak and at the mercy of foreign powers. The proper policy for Ala- bama was to remain in a southern union, at least, with the border states for allies. Would secession repeal "personal hberty" laws, return a single fugitive slave, prevent abolition in the Federal dis- trict and territories, or the suppression of interstate slave trade? By secession Alabama would relinquish her interest in the Union and leave it in the control of Black Repubhcans. It would be almost impossible to unite the southern states after separate secession — as difficult as it was to form the original Union. The only hope for peaceable secession was in a united South, and now was the time for it, for southern sentiment, though opposed to separate - secession, was ripe for southern union. The "United South" would possess all the requirements of a great nation — territory, resources, wealth, population, and community of interests. Separate secession would result in the deplorable disasters of civil war. He hoped that even yet some policy of reconcihation might succeed, but if the contrary happened, there should be no scruples about state sovereignty; the United South would' assert the God-given right of every community to freedom and happiness. Jones (c.) of Lauderdale declared that it was a great mistake to call his constituents submissionists, since time after time they had declared that they would not submit to Black RepubHcan rule. They differed as to the time and man- SECESSION FROM THE UNION 33 ner of secession, believing that hasty secession was not a proper remedy, that it was unwise, impolitic, and discourteous to the border states. Smith of Tuscaloosa, the leader of the cooperationists,' read the platform upon which he was elected to the convention ; which, in substance, was to use aU honorable exertions to secure rights in the Union, and faihng, to maintain them out of the Union. Allegiance, he went on to say, was due first to the state, and support was due her in any course she might adopt. If an ordinance of secession should be passed, it would be the supreme law of the land. Kimball (c.) of Tallapoosa said that his constituents were opposed to secession, but were more opposed to Black Repubhcanism. Before taking action he desired a soHd or united South. He agreed with General Scott that with a certain unanimity of the southern states it would be impohtic and improper to attempt coercion. To secure the cooperation of the southern states and to justify themselves to the world a southern convention should be called. However, rights should be maintained even if Alabama had to withdraw from the Union. Watkins (c.) of FrankUn stated that he would vote against the ordinance of secession in obedience to the will of the people he repre- sented. He believed that separate secession was wrong. Edwards (c.) of Blount said that secession was unwise on the part of Alabama, while Beard (c.) of Marshall thought the best, safest, and wisest course would be to consult and cooperate with the other slave states. He favored resistance to Black Republican rule, and his constituents, though desiring cooperation, would abide by the action of the state. Bulger (c.) of Tallapoosa stated that he had voted against every proposition leading to immediate and separate secession. Yet he would give to the state, when the ordinance was passed, his whole alle- giance; and, if any attempt were made to coerce the state, would join the army.^ Winston (c.) of De Kalb stated that his constituents were opposed to immediate secession, yet they would, no doubt, acquiesce. He had written to his son, a cadet at West Point, to resign and come home. A convention of the slave states should be called to make an attempt to settle difficulties. Davis (c.) of Madison, who had stoutly 1 It was he who compiled the debates of the convention. 2 He was the oldest general officer in the Confederate service. D 34 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA opposed separate secession, now declared that since the meeting of the convention serious changes had occurred. Several states had already seceded and others would follow. Consequently Alabama would not be alone. Clemens (cs.) of Madison said he would vote for secession, but would not do so if the result depended upon his vote. He strongly preferred the plan proposed by the mmonty of the committee on secession. During the debates there was not a single strong appeal for the Union. There was simply no Union feeling, but an intense dislike for the North as represented by the RepubUcan party. The coop- erationists contemplated ultimate secession. They wished to make an attempt at compromise, but they felt sure that it would fail. Their plan of effecting a united South within the Union was clearly uncon- stitutional and could only be regarded as a proposition to break up the old Union and reconstruct a new one.' Political Theories of the Members The secessionists held clear, logical views on the question before them. They clearly distinguished the "state" or "people" from "government." No secessionist ever claimed that the right of se- cession was one derived from or preserved by the Constitution; it was a sovereign right. Granted the sovereignty of the state, the right to secede in any way at any time was, of course, not to be questioned. Consequently, they said but httle on that point. The cooperationists were vague-minded. Most of them were stanch believers in state sovereignty and opposed secession merely on the ground of expediency. A few held a confused theory that while the state was sovereign it had no right to secede unless with the whole South. This view was most strongly advocated by Clark of Lawrence. Separate secession was not a right, he said, though he admitted the sovereignty of the state. To secede alone would be rebellion ; not so, if in company with other southern states. Earnest (c.) of Jefferson said that the state was sovereign, and that after secession any acts of the state or of its citizens to protect their rights would not be treason. But unless the state acted in its sover- eign capacity, it could not withdraw from the Union, and her citizens ^ Constitution, Article I, Section X : "No state shall without the consent of Con- gress enter into any agreement or compact with another state," etc. POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MEMBERS 35 would be subject to the penalties of treason/ Sheffield (c.) of Mar- shall believed in the right of "secession or revolution." Clemens of Madison, elected as a cooperationist, said that in voting for seces- sion he did it with the full knowledge that in secession they were all about to commit treason, and, if not successful, would suffer the pains and penalties pronounced against the highest pohtical crime. Acting "upon the convictions' of a hfetime" he "calmly and deUberately walked into revolution." ^ The cooperationists were generally disposed to deny the sover- eignty of the convention. Most of them were former Whigs, who had never worked out a theory of government. Davis (c.) of Madison repeatedly denied that the convention had sovereign powers; sover- eignty, he said, was held by the people. Clark (c.) of Lawrence complained that the convention was encroaching upon the rights of the people whom it should protect, and asserted it did not possess unlimited power, but that its power was conferred by act of the legis- lature, which created only a general agency for a special purpose; that the convention had no power to do more than pass the ordinance of secession and acts necessary thereto. Smith (c.) said that the con- vention was the creature of the legislature, not of the people, and that the southern Congress was the creature of the convention. Buford (s.) of Barbour ' doubted whether the convention possessed legisla- tive powers. According to his views, pohtical or sovereign power was vested in the people; the convention was not above the consti- tution which created the legislature. Watts (s.) of Montgomery beUeved that the power of the convention to interfere with the con- stitution was confined to such changes as were necessary to the perfect accomphshment of secession. Yelverton (s.) of Coffee summed up the theory of the majority : the convention had full power and control over the legislative, executive, and judiciary ; the people were present in convention in the persons of their representatives and in them was the sovereignty, the power, and the will of the state. This was the theory upon which the convention acted. 1 He was here referring indirectly to the action of the state authorities in seizing the forts at Pensacola and Mobile before secession. 2 Clemens was accused of voting for secession in order to obtain the command of the militia. He had formerly been an army officer, and was now made major-general of militia. It was not long before he deserted and went North. ' Who succeeded Yancey in the convention after the latter was sent to Europe. 36 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA Passage of the Ordinance of Secession On January ii, 1861, Yancey spoke at length, closing the debate on the question of secession. Referring to the spirit of fraternity that prevailed, he stated that irritation and suspicion had, in great degree, subsided. The majority had yielded to the minority all the time wanted for dehberation, and every one had been given an oppor- tunity to record his sentiments. The question had not been pressed to a vote before all were ready. Though preferring a simple ordi- nance of secession, the majority had, for the sake of harmony and fraternal feehng, yielded to amendment by the minority. All, he said, were for resistance to Repubhcan rule, and differed only as to the manner of resistance. Some beheved in secession, others in revolution. The ordinance might mean disunion, secession, or revolution, as the members preferred. The mode was organized cooperation, not of states, but of the people of Alabama, in resistance to wrong. Yet the ordinance provided for cooperation with other states upon the basis of the Federal Constitution. Every effort, he said, had been made to find common ground upon which the advo- cates of resistance might meet, and all parties had been satisfied. This was not a movement of the politicians, but a great popular move- ment, based upon the widespread, deep-seated conviction that the gov- ernment had fallen into the hands of a sectional majority who were determined to use it for the destruction of the rights of the South. All were driven by an irresistible tide ; the minority had been unable to repress the movement, the majority had not been able to add one particle to its momentum; in northern, not in southern, hands was held the rod that smote the rock from which flowed this flood. Some, he said, concluded that by dissolving the Union the rich inheritance bequeathed by the fathers was hazarded. But liberties were one thing, the power of government delegated to secure them was another. Liberties were inalienable, and the state governments were formed to secure them ; the Federal government was the common agent, and its powers should be withdrawn when it abused them to destroy the rights of the people. This movement was not hostile to liberty nor to the Federal Constitution, but was merely a dismissal of an unfaithful agent. The state now resumed the duties formerly delegated to that agent. The ordinance of secession was a declaration Gex]-;ral L. p. VVai.kf.k, First Confederate Secretary of War. Prebident of Convention of 1S75. William R. Smith, Leader of Cooperationists in 1861. i CIVIL WAR LEADERS. il ]ERE CLiaiENS. PASSAGE OF THE ORDINANCE OF SECESSION 37 of this fact and also a proposition to form a new government similar to the old. All were urged to sign the ordinance, not to express approval, but to give notice to their enemies that the people were not divided. "I now ask that the vote may be taken," he said. The ordinance was called up. It was styled "An Ordinance to dissolve the Union between Alabama and other States united under the Compact styled 'The Constitution of the United States of America.' " The preamble stated that the election of Lincoln and Hamlin by a sectional party avowedly hostile to the domestic institutions, peace, and security of Alabama, preceded by many dangerous infractions of the Constitution by the states and people of the North, was a politi- cal wrong of so insulting and menacing a character as to justify the people of Alabama in the adoption of prompt and decided measures for their future peace and security. The ordinance simply stated that Alabama withdrew from the Union and that her people resumed the powers delegated by the Constitution to the Federal government. A cooperationist amendment expressed the desire of the people to form with the other southern states a permanent government, and invited a convention of the states to meet in Montgomery on February 4, 1 86 1, for consultation in regard to the common safety. The ordi- nance was passed by a vote of 69 to 31, every delegate voting. Fif- teen cooperationists voted for secession and 22 signed the ordinance. In the convention opinions varied as to whether peace or war would follow secession. The great majority of the members, and of the people also, beheved that peaceful relations would continue. All truly wished for peace. A number of the cooperationists expressed themselves as fearing war, but this was when opposing secession, and they probably said more than they really beheved. Yet in nearly all the speeches made in the convention there seemed to be distinguishable a feeling of fear and dread lest war should follow. However, had war been a certainty, secession would not have been delayed or checked. There was warm discussion on the question of submitting the ordinance to the people for ratification or rejection. The coopera- tionists, both before and after the passage of the ordinance, favored its reference to the people in the hope that the measure would be delayed or defeated. No one expected that it would be referred to the people, but this was a good question for obstructive purposes. 38 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ABABAMA The minority report on secession declared that, in a matter of such vital importance, involving the lives and liberties of a whole people, the ordinance should be submitted to them for their discussion, and that secession should be attempted only after ratification by a direct vote of the people on that single issue. Posey (c.) of Lauderdale said that his constituents expected the question of secession to be referred to the people, and that they would submit more willingly to a decision made by popular vote; that the ordinance was objectionable to them unless they were allowed to vote on it. He further stated that when the convention had refused to submit the ordinance to the popular vote, the first impulse of some of the cooperationists had been to "bolt the convention." However, not being responsible, they preferred to remain and aid in providing for the emergencies of the future. Kimbal (c.) of Tallapoosa said that the people were the interested parties, that sovereignty was in the people, and that they ought to decide the question. Edwards (c.) of Blount said that his constituents expected the ordinance to be referred to them and had instructed him to use his best exer- tions to secure reference to the people. Bulger (c.) of Tallapoosa voted against all propositions looking toward secession without reference to the people. Davis (c.) of Madison denied the sover- eignty of the convention. He said that the vote of the people might be one way and that of the convention another. He beUeved that the majority in convention represented a minority of the people. In closing the debate on this subject, Yancey (s.) of Montgomery said that, as a measure of poKcy, to submit the ordinance to a vote of the people was wrong. The convention was clothed with all the powers of the people; it was the people acting in their sovereign capacity; the government was not a pure democracy, but a govern- ment of the people, though not by the people. Historically the con- vention was the supreme power in American poHtical theory, and submission to the people was a new doctrine. If the ordinance should be submitted to the people, the friends of secession would triumph, but irritation and prejudice would be aroused. Yancey's views prevailed. ESTABLISHING THE CONFEDERACY 39 Establishing the Confederacy A number of the cooperationists prefessed to believe that secession would result in disintegration and anarchy in the South. The seces- sionists were accused of desiring to tear down, not to build up. These assertions were, in fact, unfounded, since, during the entire debate, those favoring immediate secession stated plainly that they expected to reunite with the other southern states after secession. Wilhamson (s.) of Lowndes said that to declare to the world that they were not ready to unite with the other slave states in a permanent government would be to act in bad faith and subject themselves to contempt and scorn; united action was necessary; financial and commercial affairs were in a deplorable condition; confidence was lost, and in the business world all was gloom and despair — this could be reme- died only by a permanent government. Whatley (s.) of Calhoun was unwilling for it to be said by posterity that they tore down the old government and failed to reconstruct a new; the cotton states should estabhsh a government modelled on the Federal Union. In accordance with these views the ordinance of secession pro- posed a convention of southern states, and a few days later a resolu- tion was passed approving the suggestion of South Carohna to form a provisional government upon the plan of the old Union and to pre- pare for a permanent government. Each state was to send as many delegates to the convention on February 4 as it had had senators and representatives in Congress. The Alabama convention (January 16) elected one deputy from each congressional district and two from the state at large, most of them being cooperationists or moderate seces- sionists. Yancey, on January 16, read a unanimous report from the Com- mittee on Secession in favor of forming a provisional confederate government at once. The report also stated that the people of Ala- bama had never been dissatisfied with the Constitution of the United States; that their dissatisfaction had been with the conduct of the northern people in violating the Constitution and in dangerous mis- interpretation of it, causing the behef that, while acting through the forms of government, they intended to destroy the rights of the South. The Federal Constitution, the report declared, represented a com- plete scheme of government, capable of being put into speedy opera- 40 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA tion, and was so familiar to the people that when properly interpreted they would feel safe under it. A speedy confederation of the seceded states was desirable, and there was no better basis than the United States Constitution. The report recommended the formation, first, of a provisional, and later, of a permanent, government. The seces- sionists warmly advocated the speedy formation of a new confederacy. The cooperationists renewed their poHcy of obstruction. Jemison (c.) of Tuscaloosa proposed to strike out the part of the resolution relating to the formation of a permanent government. Another cooperationist wanted delay in order that the border states might have time to take part in forming the proposed government. Others wanted the people to elect a new convention to act on the question. Yancey replied that delay was dangerous, if coercion was intended by the North ; that the issue had been before the people and that they had invested their delegates with iull power; that the conven- tion then in session had ample authority to settle all questions con- cerning a provisional or a permanent government; that another election would only cause irritation; that delay, waiting for the se- cession of the border states, would be suicidal. The proposition for a new convention was lost by a vote of 53 to 36. The convention decided to continue the work until the end. After choosing delegates (January 16) to the southern convention, which was to meet in Montgomery on February 4, the state conven- tion adjourned until the Confederate provisional government was planned and the permanent constitution written. Then the state convention met again on March 4 to ratify them. The cooperation- ists now proposed that the new plan of government be submitted to the people. It was right and expedient, they said, to let the people decide. Morgan ^ (s.) of Dallas said that the proposition for rati- fication by direct vote of the people was absurd. The people would never ratify, for too many unrelated questions would be brought in. Dargan (s.) of Mobile said that the people had conferred upon the convention full powers to act, and that a new election would harass the candidates with new issues such as the slave trade, reconstruction, etc., introduced by the opponents of secession. Stone (s.) of Pickens thought that a new election would cause angry and bitter discussions, wranghng, distrust, and division among the people ; that the proposed 1 The present (1905) senior U. S. senator from Alabama. ESTABLISHING THE CONFEDERACY 41 constitution was very like the United States Constitution, to which the people were so devoted that they had given up the Union rather than the Constitution; that Lincoln's inaugural address was a dec- laration of war, and a permanent government was necessary to raise money for armies and fleets. Still the cooperationists obstructed, saying that not to refer to the people was unfair and illiberal; that the convention was usurping the powers of the people, who desired to be heard in the matter ; that government by a few was Hke a house built on the sand ; that there was no danger in waiting, for the people would be sure to ratify and then would be better satisfied, etc. Finally most of the cooperationists agreed that it would be better not to refer the question to the people and the permanent Confederate constitu- tion was ratified on March 12 by the vote of 87 to 5.^ For the first time Yancey stood at the head of the people of the state. They were ready to give him any office. But the coopera- tionists and a few secessionist politicians in the convention were jealous of his rising strength and desired to stay his progress. So Earnest (c.) of Jefferson introduced a self-denying resolution making ineUgible to election to Congress the members of the state legislature and of the convention. It was a direct attack by the dissatisfied politicians upon the prominent men in the convention, and especially upon Yancey. The measure was supported by Jemison (c.) who said that it was a practice never to elect a member of a legislative body to an office created by the legislature. Clemens (cs.) thought such a measure unnecessary, as the majority necessary to pass it could defeat any undesirable candidate. Stone (s.) said that such a resolu- tion would cost the state the services of some of her best men when most needed ; that the best men were in the convention ; and that the southern Confederacy should be intrusted to the friends, not to the enemies, of secession. Morgan (s.) of Dallas thought that, as a matter of policy, the congressmen would be chosen from outside of the con- vention. Bragg (s.) of Mobile wanted the best men regardless of place; this was no ordinary work and the best men were needed; the people had already made a choice of the members once and would approve them again. Yancey said that in principle he was opposed to such a measure. He declared that he would not be a candidate. 1 Bulger of Tallapoosa, Jones and Wilson of Fayette, and Sheets of Winston voted in the negative. 42 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA But he believed that the people had a right to a choice from their entire number, and that the convention had no right to violate the equahty of citizenship by disfranchising the 223 members of the con- vention and the legislature. Yelverton (s.) of Coffee at first favored the resolution, but upon discovering that it was aimed at a few leaders and especially at Yancey, he opposed it. He did not wish the leaders of secession to be proscribed. The resolution was lost by a vote of 46 to 50, but the delegates sent to the Provisional Congress were, with one exception, taken from outside the convention. A few politicians among the secessionists united with the cooperationists and, passing by the most experienced and able leaders, chose an inexperienced Whiggish delegation.' The African Slave Trade The Committee on Foreign Relations reported that the power of regulating the slave trade would properly be conferred upon the Con- federate government, but, meanwhile, believing that the slave trade should be prohibited until the Confederacy was formed, the com- mittee reported an ordinance forbidding it. Morgan (s.) of Dallas opposed the ordinance because it was silent as to the cause of the pro- hibition. He was opposed to the slave trade on the ground of public policy. If at liberty to carry out Christian convictions, he would have Africans brought over to be made Christian slaves, the highest con- dition attainable by the negro. In holding slaves, the South was charged with sin and crime, but the southern people were unable to perceive the wrong and unwilling to cease to do what the North con- sidered evil. The present movement rested, in great measure, upon their assertion of the right to hold the African in slavery. The laws of Congress denouncing the slave trade as piracy had been a shelter to those who assailed the South, and had affected the standing of the South among nations. If the slave trade were wrong, then it was much worse to bring Christian and enlightened negroes from Vir- ginia to Alabama than a heathen savage from Africa to Alabama. Slavery was the only force which had ever been able to elevate the negro. He believed that on grounds of pubhc pohcy the traffic should be condemned, but it was a question better left to the Confederate 1 See below, Ch. Ill, sec. 5. THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE 43 government, because the various states would not make uniform laws. There were slaves enough for twenty years and, when needed, more could be had. Reopening of the African slave trade should be for- bidden by the Confederate government expressly for reasons of public pohay. Smith (c.) of Tuscaloosa said that the question of morahty did not arise ; the slave trade was not wrong. The heathen African was greatly benefited by the change to Christian Alabama. But no more negroes were needed ; they were already increasing too fast and there was no territory for extension. Crowded together, the white and black might degenerate like the Spaniards and natives in Mexico. He supported the ordinance as a measure to disarm foes who charged that one of the reasons for secession was a desire to reopen the African slave trade, which should be denied to the world. The slave trade would lead to war, and "If Cotton is King, his throne is peace," war would destroy him. Jones (c.) of Lauderdale did not want another negro on the soil of Alabama. The people of the border states were afraid that the cotton states would reopen the slave trade, but for the sake of uniformity the question should be left to the Con- federate government. Posey (c.) of Lauderdale also thought the border states should be reassured, and said that on the grounds of expediency alone he would vote against the slave trade. There were already too many negroes ; already more land was needed, and that for whites. The slave trade should be prohibited as a great evil to the South. Potter (c.) of Cherokee was astonished that the slave trade and slavery were treated as if identical in point of morality. It was a duty to support and perpetuate slavery ; the slave trade was immoral in its tendency and effects; the question, however, should be settled on the grounds of pohcy alone. Yelverton (s.) of Coffee ' said that the slave trade should not now be reopened nor forever closed, but that the regulation of it should be left to the legislature. It was said that the world was against the South on the slavery question ; then the South should either own all the slaves, or set them all free in deference to unholy prejudice. As the southern people were not ready to surrender the negroes, they should be at liberty to buy them in any market, subject simply to the laws of trade. Slavery was the cause of secession and should not be ' Coffee was a white county and had very few slaves. 44 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA left in doubt. A slave in Alabama cost eight times as much as one imported from Africa. If the border states entered the Confederacy, they could furnish slaves; if they remained in the Union and thus became foreign country, the South should not be forced to buy from them alone. Slavery was a social, moral, and poUtical blessing. The Bible sanctioned it, and had nothing to say in favor of it in one country and against it in another. To restrict the slave market to the United States would be a blow at states rights and free trade, and with slavery stricken, King Cotton would become a petty tyrant. Sla- very had built up the Yankees, socially, poUtically, and commercially. The EngUsh were a calculating people and would not hesitate, on account of slavery, to recognize southern independence, and other nations would do Ukewise. Expansion of territory would come and would cause an increased demand for slaves. The arguments against the slave trade, he said, were that fanaticism might be angered, that there were too many negroes already, and that those who had slaves to sell might suffer from reduced prices. But the larger part of the people would prefer to purchase in a cheaper market, and non-slave- holders, as they grew wealthier, could become slave owners. The argument against the slave trade, he added, was usually the one of dollars and cents. The great moral effect was lost sight of, and it seemed from some arguments that Christianity did not require the Bible to be taught to the poor slave unless profit followed. The time was not far distant when the reopening of the slave trade would be considered essential to the industrial prosperity of the cotton states. Stone (s.) of Pickens said that he would not hesitate, from moral reasons, to purchase a slave anywhere. Slavery was sanctioned by the divine law; it was a blessing to the negro. But on grounds of policy he would insist upon the prohibition of the slave trade. , Too many slaves would make too much cotton; prices would then fall and weaken the institution. Keep the prices high, and the institu- tion would be strengthened; reduce the value of the slaves, and the interest of the owners in the institution would be reduced, and the border states would listen to plans for general emancipation. There was no territory in which slavery could expand. Yancey (s.) explained his course in the Southern Commercial Conventions in preceding years when he had advocated the repeal of the laws against the slave trade. He thought that the laws of Con- THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE 45 gress defining the slave trade as piracy placed a stigma on the insti- tution, condemned it from the point of view of the government, and thus violated the spirit of the Constitution by discriminating against the South. He did not then advocate the reopening of the slave trade, nor would he do so at this time. For two reasons he insisted that the Confederate Congress should prohibit the slave trade: (i) already there were as many slaves as were needed ; (2) to induce the border states to enter the Confederacy. Dowdell (s.) of Chambers proposed an amendment to the ordi- nance of prohibition,, declaring that slavery was a moral, social, and political blessing, and that any attempt to hinder its expansion should be opposed. He opposed reopening the slave trade, though he con- sidered that there was no moral distinction between slavery and the slave trade. The border states, he said, need not be encouraged by declarations of policy; they would join the Confederacy anyway. Slavery might be regulated by Congress, but should not be prohibited by organic law. He expressed a wish that he might never see the day when white immigration would drive out slave labor and take its place, nor did he want social or political inequality among white people whom he believed should be kept free, independent, and equal, recognizing no subordinate except those made as such by God. The legislature, he thought, should be left to deal with the evil of white immigration from the North, so that the southern people might be kept a slaveholding people. But, he asked, can that be done with slaves at $1000 a head? And must the hands of the people be tied because a fantastical outside world says that slavery and the slave trade are morally wrong? Watts (s.) of Montgomery proposed that the Confederacy be given power to prohibit the importation of slaves from any place. Smith (c.) of Tuscaloosa said that the proposal of Watts was a threat against the border states, which would lose their slave market unless they joined the Confederacy ; that the border states must be kept friendly, a bulwark against the North. A resolution was finally passed to the effect that the people of Alabama were opposed, for reasons of pubhc poHcy, to reopening the slave trade, and the state's delegates in Congress were instructed to insist on the prohibition. The debates show clearly the feehng of the delegates that, on the 46 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA slavery question, the rest of the world was against them, and hence, as a measure of expediency, they were in favor of prohibiting the trade. Some wished to have all the whites finally become slaveholders ; others believed that the negroes were the economic and social enemies of the whites, and they wanted no more of them. But all agreed that slavery was a good thing for the negro. Yancey (s.) introduced a resolution favoring the free navigation of the Mississippi. The North, he said, was uncertain as to the policy of the South and must be assured that the South wished no restric- tions upon trade. "Free trade" was its motto. Dowdell (s.) proposed that the navigation should be free only to those states and territories lying on the river and its tributaries, while Smith (c.) thought that all navigation should remain as unrestricted and open to all as before secession. Yancey thought that absolutely unrestricted navi- gation would tend to undermine secession, for it would tend to recon- struct the late pohtical union into a commercial union. Such a poHcy would discriminate against European friends in favor of New England enemies. As passed, the resolution expressed the sense of the con- vention that the navigation of the Mississippi should be free to all the people of those states and territories which were situated on that river or its tributaries. Commissioners to Other States As soon as the governor issued writs of election for a convention, fearing that the legislatures of other states then in session might ad- journ before calhng conventions, he sent a commissioner to each southern state to consult and advise with the governor and legisla- ture in regard to the question of secession and later confederation. These commissioners made frequent reports to the governor and con- vention and did much to secure the prompt organization of a per- manent government.' iThe commissioners sent to the various states were as follows: Virginia, A. F. Hopkins and F. M. Gilmer ; South Carolina, John A. Elmore ; North Carolina, I. W. Garrett and Robert H. Smith ; Maryland, J. L. M. Curry; Delaware, David Clopton ; A-entucky, S. F. Hale; Missouri, William Cooper; Tennessee, L. Pope Walker; Arkansas, David Hubbard; Louisiana, John A. Winston; Texas, J. M. Calhoun- Florida, E. C. Bullock ; Georgia, John G. Shorter ; Mississippi, E. W. Pettus. Only one state, South Carolina, sent a delegate to Alabama. COMMISSIONERS TO OTHER STATES 47 After the ordinance of secession was passed a resolution was adopted to the effect that Alabama, being no longer a member of the Union, was not entitled to representation at Washington and that her representatives there should be instructed to withdraw. A second resolution, authorizing the governor to send two commissioners to Washington to treat with that government, caused some dabate. Clemens (cs.) said that there was no need of sending commission- ers to Washington, because they would not be received. Let Wash- ington send commissioners to Alabama; South Carolina was differently situated; Alabama held her own forts. South Carolina did not. Smith (c.) proposed that only one commissioner be sent. One would do more efficient work and the expense would be less. Watts (s.) said that Alabama as a former member of the Union should inform the old government of her withdrawal and of her policy for the future; that there were many grave and dehcate mat- ters to be settled between the two governments; and that commis- sioners should be sent to propose terms of adjustment and to demand a recognition of the new order. Webb (s.) of Greene said that Alabama stood in the same atti- tude toward the United States as toward France. And the fact that the commissioners of South Carohna had been treated with contempt should not influence Alabama. If one was to be in the wrong, let it be the Washington government. To send commissioners would not detract from the dignity of the state, but would show a desire for ami- cable relations. Whatley (s.) took the same ground, and added that, having seized the forts to prevent their being used against Alabama, the state, as retiring partner, would hold them as assets until a final settlement, especially as its share had not been received. Some members urged that only one commissioner be sent in order to save expenses. All were getting to be very economical. And practically all agreed that it was the duty of the state to show her desire for amicable relations by making advances. Yancey thought the matter should be left to the Provisional Con- gress; the United States had made agreements with South Carohna about the miUtary status of the forts and had violated the agreement ; the other states also had claims of public property, and negotiations should be carried on by the common agent. Separate action by the state would only complicate matters. 48 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA Finally, it was decided to send one commissioner, and the gov- ernor appointed Thomas J. Judge, who proceeded to Washington, with authority to negotiate regarding the forts, arsenals, and custom- houses in the state, the state's share of the United States debt, and the future relations between the United States and Alabama, and through C. C. Clay, late United States senator from Alabama, applied for an interview with the President. Buchanan refused to receive him in his official capacity, but wrote that he would be glad to see him as a private gentleman. Judge declined to be received except in his of&cial capacity, and said that future negotiations must begin at Washington. Foreseeing war, Wa:tts (s.) proposed that the general assembly be given power to confiscate the property of alien enemies, and also to suspend the collection of debts due to alien enemies. Shortridge (s.) thought that the measure was not sufficiently emphatic, since war had practically been declared. He said the courts should be closed against the collection of debts due persons in the northern states which had passed personal Hberty laws. He stated that Alabama owed New York several million dollars, and that to pay this debt would drain from the country the currency, which should be held to relieve the strain. Jones (c.) was opposed to every description of robbery. The course proposed, he said, would be a flagrant outrage upon just cred- itors, as the greater wrong would be done the friends of the South, for nineteen-twentieths of the debt was due to political friends — merchants who had always defended the rights of the South. Those debts should be paid and honor sustained. The legislature, he added, would pass a stay-law, which he regretted, and that would suffice. Smith (c.) said that confiscation was an act of war, and would pro- voke retaliation. Every action should look toward the preservation of peace. Clarke (s.) of Marengo saw nothing wrong in the measure. There was no wish or intention of evading payment of the debt; payment would only be suspended or delayed. It was a peace measure. Lewis (cs.) said that only the war-making power would have author- ity to pass such a measure, and that this power would be lodged in the Confederate Congress. Meanwhile, he proposed to give the power temporarily to the legislature. LEGISLATION BY THE CONVENTION 49 Early in the session the secessionists introduced a resolution pledg- ing the state to resist any attempt by the United States to coerce any of the seceded states. Alabama could not stand aside, they said, and see the seceded states coerced by the United States government, which had no authority to use force. All southern states recognized secession as the essence and test of state sovereignty, and would sup- port each other. Earnest (c.) of Jefferson was of the opinion that this resolution was intended to cover acts of hostility already committed by indi- viduals, such as Governor Moore and other of&cials, before the state seceded, and to vote for the resolution subjected the voter to the pen- alties of treason. When a state acted in its sovereign capacity and withdrew from the Union, then those individuals were relieved. But to vote for such a measure before secession was treason. Morgan (s.) of Dallas said that, whether Alabama were in or out of the Union, she could see no state coerced; the question was not debatable. To attack South Carolina was to attack Alabama. "We are one united people and can never be dissevered." The North was pledging men and money to coerce the southern states, and its action must be answered. Jemison (c.) thought the war alarms were false and that there was no necessity for immediate action, while Smith (c), his colleague, heartily indorsed the measure. Jones (c.) declared that before the state seceded he would not break the laws of the United States ; that he had sworn to support the Constitution, and only the state could absolve him from that oath; that such a measure was not lawful while the state was in the Union. After secession the resolution was again called up, and all speakers agreed that aid should be extended to seceded states in case of coer- cion. Some wanted to promise aid to any one of the United States which might take a stand against the other states in behalf of the South. Events moved so rapidly that the measure did not come to a vote before the organization of the Provisional Congress. Legislation by the Convention Not only was the old political structure to be torn down, but a new one had to be erected. In organizing the new order the conven- tion performed many duties pertaining usually to the legislature. 50 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA This was done in order to save time and to prevent confusion in the administration. Citizenship was defined to include free whites only, except such as were citizens of the United States before January ii, 1861. A per- son bom in a northern state or in a foreign country before January 11, 1 86 1, must take the oath of allegiance to the state of Alabama, and the oath of abjuration, renouncing allegiance to all other sovereign- ties. The state constitution was amended by omitting all references to the United States ; the state officers were absolved from their oath to support the United States Constitution ; jurisdiction of the United States over waste and unappropriated lands and navigable waters was rescinded ; and navigation was opened to all citizens of Alabama and other states that "may unite with Alabama in a Southern Slave- holding Confederacy." A registration of lands was ordered to be made ; the United States land system was adopted, a homestead law was provided for, and a new land office was established at Greenville, in Butler County. The governor was authorized to revoke contracts made under United States laws with commissioners appointed to locate swamps and overflowed lands. The general assembly was authorized to cede to the Confederacy exclusive jurisdiction over a district ten miles square for a seat of government for the Confederate States of America. Provision was m.ade for the mihtary defence of Alabama, and the United States army regulations were adopted almost in their entirety. The militia was reorganized ; all commissions were vacated, and new elections ordered. The governor was placed in charge of all meas- ures for defence. He was authorized to purchase supplies for the use of the state army, to borrow money for the same, and to issue bonds to cover expenses. Later, the convention decreed that all arms and munitions of war taken from the United States should be turned over to the Confederacy; only the small arms belonging to the state were retained. The governor was authorized to transfer to the Confederate States, upon terms to be agreed upon between the governor and the president, all troops raised for state defence. Thus all volunteer companies could be transferred to the Confederate ser- vice if the men were willing, otherwise they were discharged. A number of ordinances were passed organizing the state military sys- tem, and cooperating with the Confederate government. Jurisdic- LEGISLATION BY THE CONVENTION 51 tion over forts, arsenals, and navy yards was conferred upon the Con- federate States. This ordinance could only be revoked by a con- vention of the people. The port of Mobile was resumed by the state. The collector of the port and his assistants were continued in office as state officials who were to act in the name of the state of Alabama. With a view to future settlement the collector was ordered to retain all funds in his hands belonging to the United States, and the state of Alabama guaranteed his safety, as to oath, bond, etc. As far as possible, the United States customs and port regulations were adopted. Vessels built anywhere, provided that one-third was owned by citizens of the southern states and commanded by southern captains, were enti- tled to registry as vessels of Alabama. The collector was authorized to take possession in the name of the state of all government custom- houses, lighthouses, etc., and to reappoint the officers in charge if they would accept office from the state. The weights and measures of the United States were adopted as the standard; discriminating duties imposed by the United States, and regulations on foreign ves- sels and merchandise were abolished; Selma and Mobile were con- tinued as ports of entry, and all ordinances relating to Mobile were extended to Selma. Thaddeus Sanford, the collector of Mobile, reported to the con- vention that the United States Treasury Department had drawn on him for $26,000 on January 7, 1861, and asked for instructions in regard to paying it. The Committee on Imports reported that the draft was dated before secession and before the ordinance directing the collector to retain all United States funds, that it was drawn to pay parties for services rendered while Alabama was a member of the Union. So it was ordered to be paid. After the Confederacy was formed, the convention ordered that the custom-houses, marine hospital, lighthouses, buoys, and the reve- nue cutter, Lewis Cass, be turned over to the Confederate authori- ties; and the collector was directed to transfer all money collected by him to the Confederate authorities, who were to account for all moneys and settle with the United States authorities. The collector was then released from his bond to the state. Postal contracts and regulations in force prior to January 11, 1861, were permitted to remain for the present. The general assem- 52 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA bly was empowered to make postal arrangements until the Confed- erate government should be estabhshed. Meanwhile, the old arrangements with the United States were unchanged/ Other ordi- nances adopted the laws of the United States relating to the value of foreign coins, and directed the division of the state into nine congres- sional districts. The judicial powers were resumed by the state and were hence- forth to be exercised by the state courts. The circuit and chancery courts and the city court of Mobile were given original jurisdiction in cases formerly arising within the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. Jurisdiction over admiralty cases was vested in the circuit courts and the city court of Mobile. The chancery courts had jurisdiction in all cases of equity. The state supreme court was given original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases concerning ambassadors and pubHc ministers. All admiralty cases, except where the United States was plaintiff, pending in the Federal courts in Alabama were transferred with all records to the state circuit courts ; cases in equity in like man- ner to the state chancery courts; the United States laws relating to admiralty and maritime cases, and to the postal service were adopted temporarily ; the forms of proceedings in state courts were to be the same as in former Federal courts ; the clerks of the circuit courts were given the custody of all records transferred from Federal courts and were empowered to issue process running into any part of the state and to be executed by any sheriff ; United States marshals in whose hands processes were running were ordered to execute them and to make returns to the state courts under penalty of being prosecuted as if defaulting sheriffs; the right was asserted to prosecute marshals who were guilty of misconduct before secession. The United States laws of May 26, 1796, and March 27, 1804, prescribing the method of authentication of pubhc acts, records, or judicial proceedings for use in other courts, were adopted for Alabama. In cases appealed to the United States Supreme Court from the Alabama supreme court, the latter was to act as if no appeal had been taken and execute judg- ment ; cases appealed from inferior Federal courts to the United States 1 It was not until the end of June, 1861, that the United States postal service was withdrawn and final reports made to the United States. The Confederate postal service succeeded. At first, the Confederate Postmaster-General directed the postmasters to continue to report to the United States. NORTH ALABAMA IN THE CONVENTION 53 Supreme Court, were to be considered as appealed to the state su- preme court which was to proceed as if the cases had been appealed to it from its own lower courts. The United States were not to be allowed to be a party to any suit in the state courts against a citizen of Alabama unless ordered by the convention or by the general assem- bly. Federal jurisdiction in general was to be resumed by state courts until the Confederate government should act in the matter. No law of Alabama in force January 11, 1861, consistent with the Constitution and not inconsistent with the ordinances of the conven- tion, was to be affected by secession ; no official of the state was to be affected by secession; no offence against the state, and no penalty, no obligation, and no duty to or of state, no process or proceeding in court, no right, title, privilege, or obligation under the state or United States Constitution and laws, was to be affected by the ordinance of secession unless inconsistent with it. No change made by the con- vention in the constitution of Alabama should have the effect to divest of any right, title, or legal trust existing at the time of making the change. All changes were to have a prospective, not a retrospective, effect unless expressly declared in the change itself. The general assembly was to have no power to repeal, alter, or amend any ordinance of the convention incorporated in the revised constitution. Other ordinances were to be considered as ordinary legislation and might be amended or repealed by the legislature.^ North Alabama in the Convention AU the counties of north Alabama sent cooperation delegates to the convention, and these spoke continually of a peculiar state of feel- ing on the part of their constituents which required conciUation by the convention. The people of that section, in regard to their griev- ances, thought as the people of central and south Alabama, but they were not so ready to act in resistance. Moreover, it would seem that they desired all the important measures framed by the convention to be referred to them for approval or disapproval. The cooperation- ists made much of this state of feeling for purposes of obstruction. There was, and had always been, a slight lack of sympathy between the people of the two sections ; but on the present question they were 1 This account of the work of the convention is compiled from the pamphlet ordi- nances in the Supreme Court Library in Montgomery. 54 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA very nearly agreed^ though still opposing from habit. Had the co- operationists been in the majority, secession would have been hardly delayed. Of course, among the mountains and sand-hills of north Alabama was a small element of the population not concerned in any way with the questions before the' people, and who would oppose any measure supported by southern Alabama. Sheets of Winston was probably the only representative of this class in the convention. The members of the convention referred to the fact of the local nature of the dissatisfaction. Yancey, angered at the obstructive tactics of the cooperationists, who had no definite policy and nothing to gain by obstruction, made a speech in which he said it was useless to disguise the fact that in some parts of the state there was dissatisfaction in regard to the action of the convention, and warned the members from north Alabama, whom he probably considered responsible for the dissatisfaction, that as soon as passed the ordinance of secession became the supreme law of the land, and it was the duty of all citi- zens to yield obedience. Those who refused, he said, were traitors and public enemies, and the sovereign state would deal with them as such. Opposition after secession was unlawful and to even speak of it was wrong, and he predicted that the name "tory" would be revived and applied to such people. Jemison of Tuscaloosa, a lead- ing cooperationist, made an angry reply, and said that Yancey would inaugurate a second Reign of Terror and hang people by famiUes, by towns, counties, and districts. Davis (c.) of Madison declared that the people of north Alabama would stand by the expressed will of the people of the state, and inti- mated that the action of the convention did not represent the will of the people. If, he added, resistance to revolution gave the name of "tories," it was possible that the people of north Alabama might yet bear the designation ; that any invasion of their rights or any attempt to force them to obedience would result in armed resistance ; that the invader would be met at the foot of the mountains, and in armed con- flict the question of the sovereignty of the people would be settled. Clark (c.) of Lawrence said that north Alabama was more closely connected with Tennessee, and that many of the citizens were talk- ing of secession from Alabama and annexation to Tennessee. He begged for some concession to north Alabama, but did not seem to know exactly what he wanted. He intimated that there would be JEFFERSON DAVIS. NORTH ALABAMA IN THE CONVENTION 55 civil war in north Alabama. Jones (c.) of Lauderdale said that his people were not " submissionists " and would share every toil and danger in support of the state to which was their supreme allegiance. Edwards (c.) of Blount was not prepared to say whether his people would acquiesce or not. He promised to do nothing to excite them to rebellion! Davis of Madison, who a few days before was ready to rebel, now said that he, and perhaps all north Alabama, would cheerfully stand by the state in the coming conflict. K majority of the cooperationists voted against the ordinance of secession, at the same time stating that they intended to support it when it became law. The ordinance was lithographed, and the delegates were given an opportunity to sign their names to the offi- cial copy. Thirty-three of the delegates from north Alabama, two of whom had voted for the ordinance, refused to sign, because, as they said, it might appear as if they approved all that had been done by the secessionists. Their opposition to the policy of the majority was based on the following principles: (i) the fundamental princi- ple that representative bodies should submit their acts for approval to the people; (2) the interests of all demanded that all the southern states be consulted in regard to a plan for united action. The mem- bers who refused to sign repeatedly acknowledged the binding force of the ordinance and promised a cheerful obedience, but, at the same time, published far and wide an address to the people, justifying their opposition and refusal to sign, causing the impression that they con- sidered the action of the convention illegal. There was no reason whatever why these men should pursue the policy of obstruction to the very last, yet it was done. Nine of the thirty-three finally signed the ordinance, but twenty-four never signed it, though they promised to support it. The majority of the members and of the people contemplated secession as a finality; reconstruction was not to be considered. A few of the cooperationists, however, were in favor of secession as a means of bringing the North to terms. Messrs. Pugh and Clay (members of Congress) in a letter to the convention suggested that the border states considered the secession of the cotton states as an indispensable basis for a reconstruction of the Union. Smith of Tus- caloosa,- the leading cooperationist, stated his belief that the revolu- 56 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA tion would teach the North her dependence upon the South, how much she owed that section, bring her to a sense of her duty, and cause.her to yield to the sensible demands of the South. He looked forward with fondest hopes to the near future when there would be a recon- struction of the Union with redress of grievances, indemnity for the past, complete and unequivocal guarantees for the future. Incidents of the Session The proceedings were dignified, solemn, and at times even sad. During the whole session, good feehng prevailed to a remarkable degree among the individual members, 'and toward the last the ut- most harmony existed between the parties.^ For this the credit is due the secessionists. At times the cooperationists were suspicious, and pursued a policy of obstruction when nothing was to be gained; but they were given every privilege and shown every courtesy. Dur- ing the early part of the session an enthusiastic crowd filled the halls and galleries and manifested approval of the course of the secession- ist leaders by frequent applause. In order to secure perfect freedom of debate to the minority, it was ordered that no applause be per- mitted; and this order failing to keep the spectators silent, the galler- ies were cleared, and thereafter secret sessions were the rule. Affecting and exciting scenes followed the passage of the ordi- nance of secession. One by one the strong members of the minority arose and, for the sake of unity at home, surrendered the opinions of a lifetime and forgot the prejudices of years. This was done with no feehng of humihation. To the last, they were treated with distin- guished consideration by their opponents. There was really no difference in the principles of the two parties; the only differences were on local, personal, sectional, and social questions. On the common ground of resistance to a common enemy they were united. On January ii, 1861, after seven days' debate, it became known that the vote on secession would be taken, and an eager multitude crowded Capitol Hill to hear the announcement of the result. The senate chamber, opposite the convention haU, was crowded with the waiting people, who were addressed by distinguished orators on the topics of the day. As many women as men were present, and, if 1 So Smith, the cooperationist historian, reported. INCIDENTS OF THE SESSION 57 possible, were more eager for secession. Tlieir minds liad long ago been made up. "With them," says the grave historian of the con- vention, "the love songs of yesterday had swelled into the poUtical hosannas of to-day." The momentous vote was taken, the doors were flung open, the result announced, and in a moment the tumultuous crowd filled the galleries, lobbies, and aisles of the convention hall. The ladies of Montgomery had made a large state flag, and when the doors were opened this flag was unfurled in the hall so that its folds extended almost across the chamber. Members jumped on desks, chairs, and tables to shake out the floating folds and display the design. There was a perfect frenzy of enthusiasm. Yancey, the secessionist leader and splendid orator, in behalf of the ladies presented the flag to the convention. Smith, the leader of the cooperationists, replied in a speech of acceptance, paying an affecting tribute to the flag that they were leaving — "the Star-Spangled Banner, sacred to memory, bap- tized in the nation's best blood, consecrated in song and history, and the herald of Hberty's grandest victories on land and on sea." In memory of the illustrious men who brought fame to the flag, he said, "Let him who has tears prepare to shed them now as we lower this glorious ensign of our once vaunted victories." Alpheus Baker of Barbour in glowing words expressed to the ladies the thanks of the convention. Amidst wild enthusiasm in hall and street the convention ad- journed. One hundred and one cannon shots announced the result. The flag of the Republic of Alabama floated from windows, steeples, and towers. Party lines were forgotten, and until late in the night every man who would speak was surrounded by eager listeners. The people were united in common sentiment in the face of common danger. One hour before the signal cannon shot announced that the fate- ful step had been taken and that Alabama was no longer one of the United States, there died, within sight of the capitol. Bishop Cobb of the Episcopal Church, the one man of character and influence who in all Alabama had opposed secession in any way, at any time, or for any reason.' 1 See Smith's "Debates"; Hodgson's "Cradle of the Confederacy"; DuBose's " Yancey " ; Wilmer's " Recent Past." PART II WAR TIMES IN ALABAMA CHAPTER III MILITARY AND POLITICAL EVENTS Sec. I. Military Operations On January 4, 1861, the Alabama troops, ordered by Governor Andrew B. Moore, seized the forts which commanded the entrance to the harbor at Mobile, and also the United States arsenal at Mount Vernon, thirty miles distant. A few days later the governor, in a communication addressed to President Buchanan, explained the reason for this step. He was convinced, he said, that the conven- tion would withdraw the state from the Union, and he deemed it his duty to take every precaution to render the secession peaceable. Information had been received which led him to believe that the United States government would attempt to maintain its authority in Alabama by force, even to bloodshed. The President must surely see, the governor wrote, that coercion could not be effectual until capacity for resistance had been exhausted, and it would have been unwise to have permitted the United States government to make preparations which would be resisted to the uttermost by the people. The purpose in taking possession of the forts and arsenal was to avoid, not to provoke, hostilities. Amicable relations with the United States were ardently desired by Alabama ; and every patriotic man in the state was praying for peaceful secession. He had ordered an inventory to be taken of pubhc property in the forts and arsenal, which were held subject to the control of the convention.^ A month later. Governor Moore, in a communication addressed to the Vir- ginia commissioners for mediation, stated that Alabama, in seceding, had no hostile intentions against the United States; that the sole object was to protect her rights, interests, and honor, without dis- turbing peaceful relations. This would continue to be the pohcy ' Gov. A. B. Moore to President Buchanan, Jan. 4, 1861, in O. R. Ser. I, Vol. I, pp. 327, 328. 61 62 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA of the State unless the Federal government authorized hostile acts. Yet any attempt at coercion would be resisted. In conclusion, he stated that he had no power to appoint delegates to the proposed convention, but promised to refer the matter to the legislature. How- ever, he did not believe that there was the least hope that concessions would be made affording such guarantees as the seceding states could accept.^ The War in North Alabama For a year Alabama soil was free from invasion, though the coast was blockaded in the summer of 1861. In February, 1862, Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, fell, and on the same day Commodore Phelps with four gunboats sailed up the river to Florence. Several steamboats with supphes for Johnston's army were destroyed to prevent capture by the Federals. Phelps destroyed a partly finished gunboat, burned the Confederate supplies in Florence, and then returned to Fort Henry.^ The fall of Fort Donelson (February 16) and the retreat of Johnston to Corinth left the Tennessee valley open to the Federals. A few days after the battle of Shiloh, General O. M. Mitchell entered Huntsville (April 11, 1862) and captured nearly all the rolling stock belonging to the railroads running into Hunts- ville. Decatur, Athens, Tuscumbia, and the other towns of the Tennessee valley were occupied within a few days. To oppose this invasion the Confederates had small bodies of troops widely scattered across north Alabama. The fighting was almost entirely in the nature of skirmishes and was continual. Philip D. Roddy, later known as the "Defender of North Alabama," first appears during this summer as commander of a small body of irregular troops, which served as the nucleus of a regiment and later a brigade. Hos- tilities in north Alabama at an early date assumed the worst aspects of guerilla warfare. The Federals were never opposed by large commands of Confederates, and were disposed to regard the detach- ments who fought them as guerillas and to treat them accordingly. In spite of the strenuous efforts of General Buell to have his subor- dinates wage war in civilized manner,' they were guilty of infamous 1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 89. 2 Miller, "History of Alabama,'' p. 158. 8 See D. C. Buell, " Operations in North Alabama," in " Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. II, pp. 701-708. THE WAR IN NORTH ALABAMA 63 conduct. General Mitchell was charged by "the people with brutal conduct toward non-combatants and with being interested in the stealing of cotton and shipping it North. He was finally removed by Buell.' One of Mitchell's subordinates — John Basil Turchin, the Rus- sian colonel of the Nineteenth Illinois regiment — was too brutal even for Mitchell, and the latter tried to keep him within bounds. His worst offence was at Athens, in Limestone County, in May, 1862. Athens was a wealthy place, intensely southern in feeling, and on that account was most heartily disliked by the Federals. Here, for two hours, Turchin retired to his tent and gave over the town to the soldiers to be sacked after the old European custom. Revolting outrages were committed. Robberies were common where Turchin commanded. His Russian ideas of the rules of war were probably responsible for his conduct. Buell characterized it as "a case of undisputed atrocity." For this Athens affair Turchin was court- martialled and sentenced to be dismissed from the service. The facts were notorious and well known at Washington, but the day before Buell ordered his discharge, Turchin was made a brigadier- general.^ General Mitchell himself reported (May, 1862) that "the most terrible outrages — robberies, rapes, arson, and plundering — are being committed by lawless brigands and vagabonds connected with the army." He asked for authority to hang them and wrote, "I hear the most deplorable accounts of excesses committed by 1 Miller, p. 160 ; Brewer, "Alabama," p. 65 ; Mrs. Clay-Clopton, "A Belle of the Fifties," Chs. 18-22; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, pp. 204, 294, 295, et passim. Buell stated that "habitual lawlessness prevailed in a portion of General Mitchell's command," and that though authority was granted to punish with death there were no punishments. Discipline was lost. The officers were engaged in cotton speculation, and Mitchell's wagon trains were used to haul the cotton for the speculators. Flagrant crimes, Buell stated, were " condoned or neglected " by Mitchell. " Battles and Leaders," Vol. II, pp. 705, 706. North Alabama was not important to the Federals from a strategic point of view, and only the worst disciplined troops were stationed in that section. ^ His real name was Ivan Vasilivitch Turchinoff. Several other officers were court- martialled at the same time for similar conduct. Keifer, " Slavery and' Four Years of War," Vol. I, p. 277; Miller, p. 160; "Battles and Leaders," II, p. 706. A former " Union " man declared after the war that the barbarities of Turchin crushed out the remaining "Union" sentiment in north Alabama. Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Testimony, p. 850 (Richardson) ; O. R., Ser. I, Vols. X and YNl, passim ; Brewer, "Alabama," pp. 319, 348. Accounts of eye-witnesses. 64 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA soldiers."' About fifty of the citizens of Athens, at the suggestion of Mitchell, filed claims for damages. Thereupon Mitchell informed them that they were laboring under a very serious misapprehension if they expected pay from the United States government unless they had proper vouchers.^ Buell condemned his action in this matter also. Mitchell asked the War Department for permission to send prominent Confederate sympathizers at Huntsville to northern prisons. He said that General Clemens and Judge Lane advised such a measure. He reported that he held under arrest a few active rebels "who refused to condemn the guerilla warfare." The War Department seems to have been annoyed by the request, but after Mitchell had repeated it, permission was given to send them to the fort in Boston Harbor.^ Mitchell was charged at Washington with having failed in his duty of repressing plundering and pillaging. He replied that he had no great sympathy with the citizens of Athens who hated the Union soldiers so intensely.^ As the war continued the character of the warfare grew steadily worse. Ex-Governor Chapman's family were turned out of their home to make room for a negro regiment. A four-year-old child of the family wandered back to the house and was cursed and abused by the soldiers. The house was finally burned and the property laid waste. Governor Chapman was imprisoned and at last expelled from the country. Mrs. Robert Patton they threatened to strip in search of money and actually began to do so in the presence of her husband, but she saved herself by giving up the money.^ Such experiences were common. The provost marshal at Huntsville — Colonel Harmer — selected a number of men to answer certain pohtical questions, who, if their answers were not satisfactory, were to be expelled from the country. Among these were, George W. Hustoun, Luke Pryor, and Malone of Athens, Dr. Fearn of Huntsville, and two ministers — Ross and '■ O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, pp. 204, 294, 295. 2 O. R., Ser, I, Vol. X, Pt. II, p. 212. > O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, pp. 167, 168, 174 (May, 1862) ; for Clemens and Lane, see Ch. Ill, sec. 4. * O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, pp. 290-293. 5 Brewer, p. 485, et passim ; Miller, p. 125 ; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, Pt. Ill, pp. 750-751. THE WAR IN NORTH ALABAMA 65 Banister. General Stanley condemned the policy, but General Granger wanted the preachers expelled anyway, although Stanley said they had never taken part in politics.' The harsh treatment of non-combatants and Confederate soldiers by Federal soldiers and by the tories resulted in the retaliation of the former when opportunity occurred. Toward the end of the war prisoners were seldom taken by either side. When a man was caught, he was often strung up to a hmb of the nearest tree, his captors waiting a few minutes for their halters, and then passing on. The Confederate irregular cavalry became a terror even to the loyal southern people. Stealing, robbery, and murder were common in the debatable land of north Alabama.^ Naturally the "tory" element of the population suffered much from the same class of Confederate troops. The Union element, it was said, suffered more from the operation of the impressment law. The Confederate and state governments strictly repressed the tendency of Confederate troops to pillage the "Union" communities in north Alabama.^ General Mifchell and his subordinates were accustomed to hold the people of a community responsible for damages in their vicinity to bridges, trestles, and trains caused by the Confederate forces. In August, 1862, General J. D. Morgan, in command at Tuscumbia, reported that he "sent out fifty wagons this afternoon to the planta- tions near where the track was torn up yesterday, for cotton. I want it to pay damages." * When Turchin had to abandon Athens, on the advance of Bragg into Tennessee, he set fire to and burned much of the town, but his conduct was denounced by his fellow-officers.^ Near Gunterville (1862) a Federal force was fired upon by scouts, and the Federals, in retahation, shelled the town. Thfs was done a second time during the war, and finally the town was burned. In Jackson County four citizens were arrested (1862) because the pickets at Woodville, several miles -away, had been fired upon." In a skirmish in north Alabama, General R. L. McCook was 1 Gen. D. S. Stanley to Gen. William D. Whipple, Feb., 1865 ; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, p. 718. ■■! Clanton's report, March, 1864; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, Pt. Ill, p. 7>8. 3 Miller, " Alabama." * Miller, p. 165. 6 Miller, "Alabama" ; Brewer, pp. 318, 348. « Brewer, pp. 284, 383. F 66 . CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA shot by Captain Gurley of Russell's Fourth Alabama Cavalry. The Federals spread the report among the soldiers that he had been mur- dered, and as the Federal commander reported, "Many of the sol- diers spread themselves over the country and burned all the property of the rebels in the vicinity, and shot a rebel lieutenant who was on furlough." Even the house of the family who had ministered to General McCook in his last moments was burned to the ground. The old men and boys for miles around were arrested. The officer who was shot was at home on furlough and sick. General Dodge's command committed many depredations in retahation for the death of McCook. A year later Captain Gurley was captured and sen- tenced to be hanged. The Confederate authorities threatened re- taliation, and he was then treated as a prisoner of war. After the close of the war he was again arrested and kept in jail and in irons for many months at Nashville and Huntsville. At last he was liberated.^ Later in the war (1864), General M. L. Smith ordered the arrest of "five of the best rebels" in the vicinity of a Confederate attack on one of his companies, and again five were arrested near the place where a Union man had been attacked.^ These are , examples of what often happened. It became a rule to hold a community re- sponsible for all attacks made by the Confederate soldiers. The people suffered fearfully. Many of them had to leave the country in order to live. John E. Moore wrote to the Confederate Secretary of War from Florence, in December, 1862, that the people of north Alabama "have been ground into the dust by the tyrants and thieves." ' The citizens of Florence (January, 1863) petitioned the Secretary of War for protection. They said that they had been greatly oppressed by the Federal army in 1862. Property had been destroyed most wantonly and vindictively, the privacy of the homes invaded, citizens carried off and ill treated, and slaves carried off and refused the liberty of returning when they desired to do so. The harshness of the Federals had made many people submissive for fear of worse things. No men, except the aged and infirm, were left in the country; the population was composed chiefly of women and 1 0. R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Ft. I, pp. 841, 839 ; Wyeth, " Life of Forrest," pp. 1 1 1-113. 2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXII, Ft. I, p. 394. 3 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XX, Ft. II, p. 442. THE STREIGHT RAID 6/ children.' It was in response to this appeal that Roddy's command was raised to a brigade. But the retreat of Bragg left north Alabama to the Federals until the close of the war, except for a short period during Hood's invasion of Tennessee. The Streight Raid April 19, 1863, Colonel A. D. Streight of the Federal army, with 2000 picked troops, disembarked at Eastport and started on a daring raid through the mountain region of north Alabama. The object of the raid was to cut the railroads from Chattanooga to Atlanta and to Knoxville, which supplied Bragg and to destroy the Confeder- ate stores at Rome. To cover Streight's movements General Dodge was making demonstrations in the Tennessee valley and Forrest was sent to meet him. Hearing by accident of Streight's move- ments, Forrest left a small force under Roddy to hold Dodge in check and set out after the raider. The chase began on April 29. Streight had sixteen miles the start with a force reduced to 1500 men, mounted on mules. As his mounts were worn out, he seized fresh horses on the route. The chase led through the counties of Morgan, Blount, St. Clair, De Kalb, and Cherokee — counties in which there was a strong tory element, and the Federals were guided by two companies of Union cavalry raised in north Alabama. Streight had asked for permission to dress some of his men "after the promiscuous southern style," but, fortunately for them, was not allowed to do so.^ On May i occurred the famous crossing of Black Creek, where Miss Emma Sansom guided the Confederates across in the face of a heavy fire. Forrest now had less than 600 men, the others having been left behind exhausted or with broken-down horses. The best men and horses were kept in front, and Streight was not allowed a moment's rest. At last, tired out, the Federals halted on the morn- ing of May 3. Soon the men were asleep on their arms, and when Forrest appeared, some of them could not be awakened. Men were asleep in line of battle, under fire. Forrest placed his small force so as to magnify his numbers, and Streight was persuaded by his officers to surrender — 1466 men to less than 600. The running 1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XX, Pt. II, p. 443. 2 The Andrews raiders in Georgia were hanged as spies for being dressed " in the promiscuous southern style." 68 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA fight had lasted four days, over a distance of 150 miles, through rough and broken country filled with unfriendly natives. Forrest could not get fresh mounts, the Federals could; the Federals had been preparing for the raid a month ; Forrest had a few hours to prepare for the pursuit, and his whole force with Roddy's did not equal half of the entire Federal force of 9500/ During the summer and fall there were many small fights between the cavalry scouts of Roddy and Wheeler and the Federal foraging parties. In October General S. D. Lee from Mississippi entered the northwestern part of the state, and for two or three weeks fought the Federals and tore up the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. The First Alabama Union Cavalry started on a raid for Selma, but was routed by the Second Alabama Cavalry. The Tennessee valley was the highway along which passed and repassed the Federal armies during the remainder of the war. During the months of January, February, March, and April, 1864, scouting, skirmishing, and fighting in north Alabama by For- rest, Roddy, Wheeler, Johnson, Patterson, and Mead were almost continuous; and Federal raids were frequent. The Federals called all Confederate soldiers in north Alabama "guerillas," and treated prisoners as such. The Tennessee valley had been stripped of troops to send to Johnston's army. In May, 1864, the Federal Gen- eral Blair marched through northeast Alabama to Rome, Georgia, with 10,500 men. Federal gunboats patrolled the river, landing companies for short raids and shelling the towns. In August there were many raids and skirmishes in the Tennessee valley. On Sep- tember 23, Forrest with 4000 men, on a raid to Pulaski, persuaded the Federal commander at Athens that he had 10,000 men, and the latter surrendered, though in a strong fort with a thousand men. Rousseau's Raid July 10, 1864, General Rousseau started from Decatur, Morgan County, with 2300 men on a raid toward southeast Alabama to destroy the Montgomery and West Point Railway below Opehka, and thus cut off the supphes coming from the Black Belt for John- ston's army. General Clanton, who opposed him with a small force, 1 Wyeth, " Life of Forrest," pp. 185-222 ; Mathes, " General Forrest," pp. 109-127; Miller, Ch. 32. THE WAR IN SOUTH ALABAMA 69 was defeated at the crossing of the Coosa on July 14; the iron works in Calhoun County were burned, and the Confederate stores at Talladega were destroyed. The railroad was reached near Loacha- poka in what is now Lee County, and miles of the track there and above Opehka were destroyed, and the depots at OpcHka, Auburn, Loachapoka, and Notasulga, all with quantities of suppHes, were burned. This was the first time that central Alabama had suffered from invasion.^ In October General Hood marched via Cedartown, Georgia, into Alabama to Gadsden, thence to Somerville and Decatur, cross- ing the river near Tuscumbia on his way to the fatal fields of Frankhn and Nashville. "Most of the fields they passed were covered with briers and weeds, the fences burned or broken down. The chimneys in every direction stood hke quiet sentinels and marked the site of once prosperous and happy homes, long since reduced to heaps of ashes. No cattle, hogs, horses, mules, or domestic fowls were in sight. Only the birds seemed unconscious of the ruin and desola- tion which reigned supreme. No wonder that Hood pointed to the devastation wrought by the invader to nerve his heroes for one more desperate struggle against immense odds for southern independence." ^ A few weeks later the wreck of Hood's army was stragghng back into north Alabama, which now swarmed with Federals. Bush- whackers, guerillas, tories, deserters, "mossbacks," harried the defenceless people of north Alabama until the end of the war and even after. A few scattered bands of Confederates made a weak resistance. The War in South Alabama To return to south Alabama. During the years 1861 and 1862 the defences of Mobile were made almost impregnable. They were commanded in turn by Generals Withers, Bragg, Forney, Buckner, and Maury. The port was blockaded in 1861, but no attacks were made on the defences until August, 1864, when 15,000 men were landed to besiege Fort Gaines. Eighteen war vessels under Farragut passed the forts into the bay and there fought the fiercest naval battle of the war. Admiral Buchanan commanded the Confederate fleet of four vessels — the Morgan, .the Selma, the Gaines, and the Ten- 1 Brewer, p. 339. ^ Miller, p. 213. '•JO CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA nessee> The Tecumseh was sunk by a torpedo in the bay, and Farragut had left 17 vessels, 199 guns, and 700 men against the Confederates' 22 guns and 450 men. The three smaller Confederate vessels, after desperate fighting, were riddled with shot ; one was cap- tured, one beached, and one withdrew to the shelter of the forts. The Tennessee was left, i against 17, 6 guns against 200. After four hours' cannonade from nearly 200 guns, her smoke-stack and steering gear shot away, her commander (Admiral Buchanan) wounded, one hour after her last gun had been disabled, the Tennessee surrendered. The Federals lost 52 killed, and 17 wounded, besides 120 lost on the Tecumseh. The Tennessee lost only 2 killed and 9 wounded, the Selma 8 killed and 17 wounded, the Gaines about the same.^ The fleet now turned its attention to the forts. Fort Gaines surrendered at once; Fort Morgan held out. A siege train of 41 guns was placed in position and on August 22 these and the 200 guns of the fleet opened fire. The fort was unable to return the fire of the fleet, and the sharpshooters of the enemy soon prevented the use of guns against the shore batteries of the Federals. The firing was furious ; every shell seemed to take effect ; fire broke out, and the garrison threw go,ooo pounds of powder into cisterns to prevent explosion; the defending force was deci- mated; the interior of the fort was a mass of smouldering ruins; there was not a place five feet square not struck by shells; many of the guns were dismounted. For twenty-four hours the bombard- ment continued, the garrison not being able to return the fire of the besiegers, yet the enemy reported that the garrison was not "moved by any weak fears." On the morning of August 23, 1864, the fort was surrendered.^ Though the outer defences had fallen, the city could not be taken. The inner defences were strengthened, and were manned with "reserves," — boys and old men, fourteen to sixteen, and forty-five to sixty years of age. 1 After completion at Selma the Tennessee was taken down the river to defend Mobile. It was found, even after removing her armament, that the vessel could not pass the Dog River bar, and timber was cut from the forests up the river and " camels " made with which to buoy up the heavy vessel. By accident these camels were burned and more had to be made. At last the heavy ram was floated over the bar. Of course the newspapers harshly criticised those in charge of the Tennessee. Maclay, " History of the United States Navy," Vol. II, p. 448. 2 Brewer, p. 389 ; Scharf, " Confederate Navy," Ch. 18 ; Miller, pp. 205-206. 8 Brewer, p. 120 ; Miller, p. 207. WILSON'S RAID AND THE END OF THE WAR 71 In March, 1865, General Steele advanced from Pensacola to Pollard with 15,000 men, while General Canby with 32,000 moved up the east side of Mobile Bay and invested Spanish Fort. He sent 12,000 men to Steele, who began the siege of Blakely on April 2. Spanish Fort was defended by 3400 men, later reduced to 2321, against Canby's 20,000. The Confederate Hnes were two miles long. After a twelve days' siege a part of the Confederate works was cap- tured, and during the next night (April 8), the greater part of the garrison escaped in boats or by wading through the marshes. Blakely was defended by 3500 men against Steele's 25,000. After a siege of eight days the Federal works were pushed near the Con- federate lines, and a charge along the whole three miles of line cap- tured the works with the garrison (April 9). Three days later batteries Huger and Tracy, defending the river entrance, were evacuated, and on April 12 the city surrendered.^ The state was then overrun from all sides. ^ Wilson's Raid and the End of the "War During the winter of 1864-1865, General J. H. Wilson gathered a picked force of 13,500 cavalry, at Gravelly Springs in northwestern Alabama, in preparation for a raid through central Alabama, the purpose of which was to destroy the Confederate stores, the factories, mines, and iron Works in that section, and also to create a diversion in favor of Canby at Mobile.^ On March 22 he left for the South. There was not a Confederate soldier within 120 miles; the country was stripped of its defenders. The Federal army under Wilson foraged for provisions in north Alabama when they themselves reported people to be starving.^ To confuse the Confederates, Wilson moved his corps in three divisions along different routes. On March 29, near Elyton, the divisions united, and General Croxton 1 Some of the Confederate gunboats were sunk {Huntsville and Tuscaloosa), and Commander Farrand surrendered twelve gunboats in the Tombigbee. All of these had been built at Mobile, Selma, and in the Tombigbee. ' Miller, pp. 208, 217-221. 3 It was intended that Wilson should raid to and fro all through central Alabama. His men were armed with repeating carbines ; his train of 250 wagons was escorted by 1500 unmounted men who secured mounts as they went farther into the interior. Greeley, Vol. II, p. 716. * N. y. Herald, April 6, 1865. 72 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA was again detached and sent to burn the University and pubHc build- ings at Tuscaloosa. Driving Roddy before him, Wilson, on March 31, burned five iron works near Elyton. Forrest collected a motley force to oppose Wilson. The latter sent a brigade which decoyed one of Forrest's brigades away into the country toward Mississippi,' so that this force was not present to assist in the defence when, on April 2, Wilson arrived before Selma with 9000 men. This place, with works three miles long, was defended by Forrest with 3000 men, half of whom were reserves who had never been under fire. They .made a gallant fight, but the Federals rushed over the thinly defended works. Forrest and two or three hundred men escaped; the re- mainder surrendered. When the Federals entered the city, night had fallen, and the soldiers plundered without restraint until morn- ing. Forrest had ordered that all the government whiskey in the city be destroyed, but after the barrels were rolled into the street the Confederates had no time to knock in the heads before the city was captured. The Federals were soon drunk. All the houses in the city were entered and plundered. A newspaper correspondent who was with Wilson's army said that Selma was the worst-sacked town of the war. One woman saved her house from the plunderers by pulling out all the drawers, tearing up the beds, throwing clothes all over the floor along with dishes and overturned tables, chairs, and other things. When the soldiers came to the house, they concluded that others had been there before them and departed. The out- rages, robberies, and murders committed by Wilson's men, not- withstanding his stringent order against plundering,^ are almost incredible. The half cannot be told. The destruction was fearful. The city was wholly given up to the soldiers, the houses sacked, the women robbed of their watches, earrings, rings, and other jewellery.^ The negroes were pressed into the work of destruction, and when they refused to burn and destroy, they were threatened with death by the soldiers. Every one was robbed who had any- thing worth taking about his person. Even negro men on the streets 1 April 5 Cahaba was captured by a part of Wilson's force and twenty Federal pris- oners released from the military prison at that place. They reported that they had been well treated. — N. Y. Herald, April 29, 1865. 2 W'yeth, " Life of Forrest," pp. 606, 607. ^ Parsons's Cooper Institute Speech in N. Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1865 ; Trowbridge, "The South,'' pp. 435, 440. Accounts of eye-witnesses. WILSON'S RAID AND THE END OF THE WAR 73 and negro women in the houses were searched and their little money and trinkets taken/ The next day the pubhc buildings and storehouses with three- fourths of the business part of the town and 150 residences were burned. Three rolling mills, a large naval foundry, and the navy yard, — where the Tennessee had been built, — the best arsenal in the Confederacy, powder works, magazines, army stores, 35,000 bales of cotton, a large number of cars, and the railroad bridges were destroyed. Before leaving, Wilson sent men about the town to kill all the horses and mules in Selma, and had 800 of his own worn-out horses shot. The carcasses were left lying in the roads, streets, and dooryards where they were shot. In a few days the stench was fearful, and the citizens had to send to all the country around for teams to drag away the dead animals, which were strewn along the roads for miles.^ Nearly every man of Wilson's command had a canteen filled with jewellery gathered on the long raid through the richest section of the state. The valuables of the rich Cane Brake and Black Belt country had been deposited in Selma for safe-keeping, and from Selma the soldiers took everything valuable and profitable. Pianos were made into feeding troughs for horses. The officers were sup- plied with silver plate stolen while on the raid. In Russell County a general officer .stopped at a house for dinner, and had the table set with a splendid service of silver plate taken from Selma. His escort broke open the smoke-house and, taking hams, cut a small piece from each of them and threw the remainder away. Everything that could be was destroyed. Soft soap and syrup were poured together in the cellars. They took everything they could carry and destroyed the rest. On April 10 Wilson's command started for Montgomery. A negro regiment of 800 men' was organized at Selma and accompanied 1 Trowbridge, " The South," p. 435. 2 Hardy, " History of Selma," p. 51 ; Miller, "Alabama," pp. 221-226; Parsons, speeches in N. Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1865, Apr. 20, 1866 ; N. Y. Herald, May 4, and Apr. 6, 1865 ; Montgomery Advertiser, July 14, 1867 ; Wilson's Report, June 29, 1865 ; Selma Times, Feb. 13, 1866; "Our Women in War Times," p. 277; Greeley, Vol. II, p. 719 ; Wyeth, "Life of Forrest," pp. 604-607 ; "Northern Alabama," p. 6i;5.- ' Hardy, " History of Selma," p. 52, says four regiments were organized, and the others were driven away. 74 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA the army, subsisting on the country. Before reaching Georgia there were several such regiments. On April 12 Montgomery was surrendered by the mayor. The Confederates had burned 97,000' bales of cotton to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. The captors burned five steamboats, two rolling mills, a small-arms factory, two magazines of stores, all the rolling stock of the railways, and the nitre works, the fire spreading also to the business part of the town.^ Here, as at Selma, horses, mules, and valuables were taken by the raiders. The force was then divided into two columns, one destined for West Point and the other for Columbus. The last fights on Alabama soil occurred near West Point on April 16, and at Girard, opposite Columbus, on the same day. At the latter place immense quantities of stores, that had been carried across the river from Alabama, were destroyed.^ Croxton's force reached Tuscaloosa April 3, and burned the University buildings, the nitre works, a foundry, a shoe factory, and the Sipsey cotton mills. After burning these he moved eastward across the state, destroying iron works, nitre factories, depots, and cotton factories. Before he reached Georgia, Croxton had destroyed nearly all the iron works and cotton factories that had been missed by Rousseau and Wilson.^ Destruction by the Armies For three years north Alabama was traversed by the contending armies. Each burned and destroyed from military necessity and from malice. General Wilson said that after two years of warfare the valley of the Tennessee was absolutely destitute.^ From the spring of 1862 to the close of the war the Federals marched to and fro in the valley. There were few Confederate troops for its defence, and the Federals held each community responsible for all attacks made within its vicinity. It became the custom to destroy property '■ 125,000 bales, according to Greeley, Vol. II, p. 719. ^ The Advertiser of April 18, 1865. = A'. Y. World, May i and July i8, 1865 ; N. Y. Herald, May 4 and 15, and June 17, 1865 ; Brewer, p. 512 ; Greeley, Vol. II, p. 720. ^ N. Y. Daily News, May 29, 1865; Century Magazine, lio-v., 1889; Transactions Ala. Hist. Soc, Vol. IV, p. 449. ^ Report, June 29, 1865. DESTRUCTION BY THE ARMIES 75 as a punishment of the people. Much of the destruction was unneces- sary from a military point of view.' Athens and smaller towns were sacked and burned, Guntersville was shelled and burned; but the worst destruction was in the country, by raiding parties of Federals and "tories," or "bushwhackers" dressed as Union soldiers. Hunts- ville, Florence, Decatur, Athens, Guntersville, and Courtland, all suffered depredation, robbery, murder, arson, and rapine.^ The tories destroyed the railways, telegraph hues, and bridges, and as long as the Confederates were in north Alabama they had to guard all of these.^ Along the Tennessee River the gunboats landed parties to ravage the country in retaliation for Confederate attacks. In the counties of Lauderdale, Frankhn, Morgan, Lawrence, Limestone, Madison, and Jackson nearly all property was destroyed.* In 1863, a member of Congress from north Alabama tried to get arms from Bragg for the old men to defend the county against Federal raiders, but failed, and wrote to Davis that all civilized usages were being disregarded, women and children turned out and the houses burned, grain and provisions destroyed, women insulted and out- raged, their money, jewellery, and clothing being stolen. In December, 1863, General Sherman ordered that all the forage and provisions in the country around Bridgeport and Bellefont "be collected and stored, and no compensation be allowed rebel owners." In April, 1864, General Clanton wrote to Governor Watts that the "Yankees spared neither age, sex, nor condition." Tories and desert- ers from the hills made frequent raids on the defenceless population. General Dodge reported. May, 1863, that his army had destroyed or carried off in one raid near Town Creek, "fifteen million bushels of com, five hundred thousand pounds of bacon, quantities of wheat, rye, oats, and fodder, one thousand horses and mules, and an equal number of cattle, sheep, and hogs, besides thousands that the army consumed in three weeks; we also brought out fifteen hundred negroes, destroyed five tanyards and six flouring mills, and we left the country in such a devastated condition that no crop can be raised 1 Somers, "The South Since the War," pp. 134, 135. 2 Truman in N. Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1865. 8 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. Ill, pp. 230-233. * See Brewer, " County Notes." f^ CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA during the year;" and nothing was left that would in the least aid the Confederates. On the night of his retreat Dodge lit up the Tennessee valley from Town Creek to Tuscumbia with the flames of burning dwellings, granaries, stables, and fences. In June Colonel Cornyn reports that in a raid from Corinth to Florence he had de- stroyed cotton factories, tanyards, all the corn-cribs in sight, searched every house in Florence, burned several residences, and carried off 200 mules and horses.^ A few days later General Stanley raided from Tennessee to Huntsville and carried off cattle and suppHes, but did not lay waste the country. General Buell did all that he could to restrain his subordinates, but often to no avail. After Sherman took charge affairs grew steadily worse. In a remarkable letter giving his views in the matter he says: "The government of the United States has in north Alabama any and all rights which they choose to enforce in war, to take their lives, their houses, their lands, their everything, because they cannot deny that war exists there, and war is simply power unrestrained by constitution or com- pact. If they want eternal warfare, well and good. We will accept the issue and dispossess them and put our friends in possession. To those who submit to the rightful law and authority all gentleness and forbearance, but to the petulant and persistent secessionists, why, death is mercy and the quicker he or she is disposed of the better. Satan and the rebeUious saint of heaven were allowed a continuance of existence in hell merely to swell their just punishment." He referred to the fact that in Europe, whence the principles of war were derived, wars were between the armies, the people remaining practi- cally neutral, so that their property remained unmolested. However, this present war was, he said, between peoples, and the invading army was entitled to all it could get from the people. He cited as a like instance the dispossessing of the people of north Ireland during the reign of Wilham and Mary.' After this no restraint on the plundering and persecution of Confederate non-combatants was even attempted, and hundreds of famihes from north Alabama "refugeed" to south Alabama. General Sherman wrote to one of his generals, "You may send 1 Brewer, p. 188 et passim ; Miller, p. 179 ; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXIII, Pt. I, pp. 245- 249. 2 Miller, p. 183 ; Garrett, " Public Men." DESTRUCTION BY THE ARMIES "J-J notice to Florence that if Forrest invades Tennessee from that direc- tion, the town will be burned ; and if it occurs, you will remove the inhabitants north of the Ohio River and burn the town and Tuscumbia also/" All through this section fences were gone, fields grew up in bushes, and weeds, residences were destroyed, farm stock had disappeared. People who lived in the Black Belt report that Wilson's raiders ate up all the cooked provisions wherever they went, taking all the meat, meal, and flour to their next camping-place, where they would often throw away wagon loads of provisions. Frequently the meal and flour that could not be taken was strewn along the road. The mills were burned, and some families for three months after the close of the war lived on corn cracked in a mortar. All the horses and mules were taken; and only a few oxen were left to work the crops. Governor Parsons said that Wilson's men were a week in destroy- ing the property around Selma. Three weeks after, as Parsons himself was a witness, it was with difliculty that one could travel from Planterville to Selma on account of the dead horses and mules. The night marches of the enemy in the Black Belt were lighted by the flames of burning houses. Until this raid only the counties of north Alabama had suffered.^ Wilson had destroyed during this raid 2 gunboats; 99,000 small arms and much artillery; 10 iron works; 7 foundries; 8 machine shops ; 5 rolling mills ; the University buildings ; many county court- houses and public buildings; 3 arsenals; a naval foundry and navy yard; 5 steamboats; a powder magazine and mills; 35 loco- motives and 565 cars; 3 large railroad bridges and many smaller ones; 275,000 bales of cotton; much private property along the line of march, many magazines of stores; and had subsisted his army on the country.^ Trowbridge, who passed through Alabama in the fall of 1865, said that Wilson's route could be traced by burnt gin-houses dotting the way.* Three other armies marched through the state in 1865, burning and destroying. 1 Miller, p. 301. 2 Speech at Cooper Institute, Nov. 13, 1865, in N. Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1895. ^ N. Y. Herald, May 4 and 15, 1865; the World, May i, 1865; the Times, April 20, and Nov. 2, 1865 ; Montgomery Advertiser, July 14, 1867 ; Selma Times, Feb. 13, i866 ; Wilson's Report, June 29, 1865 : Hardy, " History of Selma," pp. 46, 51. * "The South," p. 440. 78 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA The Federals took horses and mules, cattle and hogs, corn and meat, gold and silver plate, jewellery, and other valuables. Aged citizens were tortured by "bummers" to force them to tell of hidden treasure. Some were swung up by the neck until nearly dead. Straggling bands of Federals committed depredations over the country. Houses were searched, mattresses were cut to pieces, trunks, bureaus, ward- robes, and chests were broken open and their contents turned out. Much furniture was broken and ruined. Families of women and children were left without a meal, and many homes were burned. Cattle and stock were wantonly killed. What could not be carried away was burned and destroyed.' Though two-thirds of the state was untouched by the enemy two months before the close of hostilities, yet when the surrender came, Alabama was as thoroughly destroyed as Georgia or South Carohna in Sherman's track. Sec. 2. Military Organization Alabama Soldiers : Numbers and Character The exact number of Confederate soldiers enlisted in Alabama cannot be ascertained. The original records were lost or destroyed,' and duplicates were never completed. There were on the rolls infantry regiments numbered from i to 65, but the 52d and 64th were never organized. Of the 14 cavalry regiments, numbered from I to 12, two organizations were numbered 9. There was one battalion of artillery, afterwards transferred to the regular service, and 18 batteries. In Alabama, as in the other southern states, local pride has placed the number of troops furnished at a very high figure. Colonel W. H. Fowler, superintendent of army records, who worked mainly in the Army of Northern Virginia, estimated the total number of men from Alabama at about 120,000. Governor Parsons, in his inaugural proclamation, evidently following Fowler's statistics, placed the number at 122,000,^ while Colonel M. V. Moore placed the number ' Hague, " Blockaded Family," passim ; Riley, "Baptists in Alabama," pp. 304, 305 ; " Our Women in the War," p. 275 et seq. ; Riley, " History of Conecuh County," p. 173. 2 Miller, " History of Alabama," p. 359 ; Brewer, " History of Alabama," pp. 68, 69 ; Transactions Ala. Hist. See, Vol. II, p. 188. ALABAMA SOLDIERS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTER 79 at 60,000 to 65,000.' General Samuel Cooper, adjutant and inspec- tor-general of the Confederate States Army, estimated that not more than 600,000 men in the Confederacy actually bore arms.^ This estimate would make the share of Alabama even less than Colonel Moore estimated. The highest estimates have placed the number at 128,000 and 135,000, but the correct figures are evidently somewhere between these extremes.^ The Superintendent of the Confederate Bureau of Conscription estimated that according to the census of i860 there were in Alabama, from 1861 to 1864, 106,000 men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, and of these, more than 8000 had been regularly exempted during the year 1864, all former exemptions having been revoked by act of Congress, February 17, 1864.^ Livermore's estimate,^ based on the census of i860, was: There were in Alabama (1861) between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, 99,967 men, and in the entire Confederacy there were 265,000 between the ages of thirteen and sixteen. Of the latter, a rough estimate would place Alabama's pro- portion about one-tenth of the whole, that is, about 26,500. Those men over forty-five who later became liable to military duty he esti- mates at 20,000, that is, about 2000 in Alabama. Thus there were in Alabama, in 1861, not allowing for deaths, 127,467 persons who would become subject to military service unless exempted. Livermore places the number of boys from ten to twelve years of age and of men from forty-seven to fifty, in the Confederacy in 1861, at 300,000, or about 30,000 in Alabama. These would become liable to service in the state militia before 1865.° In 1861 the governor stated that by October 7 there had been 27,000 enlistments in the various organiza- tions. Several of these commands were enrolled for short terms of three months, six months, or one year. Before November, 1862, there had been 60,000 enlistments. Included in this number were several thousand reenlistments and transfers. At the end of 1863, when ^ Miller, " History of Alabama," p. 360 ;. Colonel Moore's article in the Louisville Post, May 30, 1900. 2 Miller, p. 359. ^ For other estimates, see Livermore, " Numbers and Losses," and Curry, " Civil History of the Confederate States," pp. 152, 153. *0. R., Ser. IV, Vol. IH, pp. 102, 103. ^Livermore, "Numbers and Losses," pp. 20, 21. ' Alabama did not succeed in organizing the militia. 8o CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA enlistment and reorganization had practically ceased, there had been 90,857 enlistments of all kinds from Alabama/ For two years troops were organized in Alabama much faster than they could be supplied with arms. For months some of the new regiments waited for equipment. Four thousand men at Huntsville were in service several months before arms could be procured, and several infantry regiments were drilled as artillery for a year before muskets were to be had.^ Before the close of 1863, Alabama had placed in the Confederate service about all the men that could be sent. The organization of new regiments by original enlistment practically ceased with the fall of 1862. In 1863, only three regiments were thus organized, and two of these were composed of conscripts and men attracted by the special privileges offered.' The other regiments, formed after the summer of 1862, were made by consolidating smaller commands that were already in service. The few small regiments of reserves called out in 1864 and 1865 and given regular designations saw httle or no service. Those few who were made liable to service by the conscript law and who entered the army at all, as a rule went as volunteers and avoided the conscript camps. The strength of the Alabama regiments came from central and south Alabama, for the full military strength of north Alabama could not be utilized on account of invasion by the enemy. At first there were many small commands — companies and battalions — which were raised in a short time and sent at once to the front before a regimental organiza- tion could be effected. Later these were united to form regiments. Nearly all the higher numbered infantry regiments and more than half of the cavalry regiments were formed in this way. The first regiinents raised and the strongest in numbers were sent to Virginia. To these went also the largest number of the recruits secured by the 1 Miller, "Alabama," Appendix; Report of Col. E. D. Blake, Supt. of Special Registration, in O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. io2, 103 ; Brewer, " Alabama," see " Regi- mental Histories." 2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. Ill, pp.' 440, 445 ; Brewer, "Alabama." Several commands were equipped at the expense of the commanders ; others were equipped by the com- munities in which they were raised ; one old gentleman, Joel E. Matthews of Selma, gave his check for ^(15,000 to the state, besides paying for the outfitting of several com- panies of soldiers. "Northern Alabama Illustrated," p. 661. ' These regiments were the 57th and 6ist Infantry, and 7th Cavalry. ALABAMA SOLDIERS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTER 8 1 recruiting officers sent out by the regiments. On an average, about 350 recruits or transfers were secured by each Alabama regiment in Virginia, though some had almost none. There were numbers of persons who obtained authority to raise new commands for service near their homes, and in order to fill the ranks of their regiments and companies they would offer special inducements of furloughs and home stations. The cavalry and artillery branches of the service were popular and secured many men needed in the infantry regiments.^ Each commander of a separate company or battalion desired to raise his force to a regiment, and it was to the interest of the state to have as many organizations as possible in the field as its quota. A better show was thus made on paper. Such conditions prevented the re- cruitment of old regiments, especially those in the armies that sur- rendered under Johnston and Taylor. Consequently the regiments in the Western Army were, as a rule, much smaller than the ones in the Army of Northern Virginia, to which recruits were sent instead of new regiments. In each infantry and cavalry regiment there were ten companies.^ The original strength of each company was from 64 to 100. Later the number was fixed at 104 to the company for infantry, 72 for cav- alry, and 70 in the artillery. After the formation of new commands had practically ceased, the number for each company of infantry was raised to 125 men, 150 in the artillery, and 80 in the cavalry.^ The original strength of each infantry regiment was, therefore, from 640 to 1000, not including officers ; of cavalry, 600 to 720. A bat- tery of artillery seems to have had any number from 70 to 150, though usually the smaller number. The size of the regiments varied greatly. Colonel Fowler reported that to February i, 1865, 27,022 men had joined the 20 Alabama regiments in Virginia, an average of 135 1 men to the regiment. Brewer gives the total enrolment of 15 regiments in the Army of Northern Virginia as 21,694, an average of 1446 to the regiment.* Four of these regiments had an enrolment of less than 1 General Lee protested against this practice as preventing the proper recruitment of the armies. Livermore, "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War," p. 12. 2 The infantry regiments in Lee's army had 12 companies. 3 See summary of Confederate legislation on the subject. Livermore, p. 30. The purpose of these lavifs vi'as to discourage the formation of new commands. It vfas not effective in Alabama. *These were the infantry regiments numbered 3,4, 5,6, 8, 9, 10, ii, 12, 13, 14, 15, 41, 44, 48. 82 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA 1200;^ SO it is evident that the other 5, not given by Brewer, must have averaged about 1265 to the regiment.^ These numbers in- clude transfers, details, and reenlistments, the exact number of which it is impossible to ascertain. Brewer lists the transfers and discharges from 15 regiments at 4398, an average of 293 each, of which about one-third seem to have been transfers.^ There were also many reenlistments from disbanded organizations.* Both Brewer and Fowler count each enlistment as a different man and arrive at about the same results.'^ The enrolment of 8 Alabama regiments in Johnston's army, as given by Brewer, amounted to 8300, an average to the regiment of 1037." It was the practice, in 1864 and 1865, to unite two or more weaker regiments into one. No Alabama regiments in Virginia were so united, and of the 8 in the Western Army, whose enrolment is given by Brewer, only i was afterward united with another.' It would then seem that the enrolment of the strongest regiments is known.' The total number of enlistments in the Alabama com- mands in Virginia was, according to Fowler, about 30,000, and these were in 20 infantry regiments, and a few smaller commands. In the armies surrendered by Johnston and Taylor there were 38 Alabama infantry regiments, and 13 of these had been consolidated on account of their small numbers. Eight of them which remained separate and which must have been stronger than the ones united had enrolled ^The infantry regiments numbered 9, 11, 44, 48. 2 The infantry regiments numbered 43, 47, 49, 6i. Brewer, "Regimental His- tories." ^These were the infantry regiments numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, II, 12, 13, 14, ij, 41, 44, 48. * When the regiments enlisted for a short time were retained in the service, the men were allowed to change to other regiments if they desired, and many did so. These transfers and reenlistments swelled the total enrolment of popular regiments. * This has since been the method of estimating the number of soldiers furnished by Alabama, — each enlistment counting as one man. ^ The infantry regiments numbered 20, 23, 28, 31, 34, 37, 42, 55. ' The 23d Infantry. 8 The regiments that were united were : 24, 34, and 28 ; 33 and 38 ; 32 and 58 ; 23 and 46 ; 7, 39, 22, and 26-50. All were in Johnston's army except the 32d and 58th, which were in Taylor's command. Some of these regiments were consolidated after only one year's service; the others after less than two years. This indicates a low enrolment. Many companies were never recruited to the minimum. Three infantry regiments were disbanded after short service, — i, 2 and 7, — and the men reenlisted in other organizations. ALABAMA SOLDIERS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTER 83 an average of 1037 (according to Brewer). Thirty-eight regiments of this strength (which is probably too large an estimate) would give a total enrolment of 39,406. This number, added to Fowler's esti- mate of 27,022 in the Army of Northern Virginia, will give 66,428 enlistments of all kinds, for the infantry arm of the service. Add to this 3000 for the 3 regiments of reserves called out in 1864,^ and the total is 69,428 enlistments in the infantry. There were 14 cavalry regiments, 7 of which, and possibly more, were formed by the consolidation of smaller commands already in service. The cavalry regiments did not enter the service as early as the infantry, only i regiment being organized in 1861. The original strength of each regiment, as has been said, was from 600 to 720. All these regiments served in the commands surrendered by Johnston and Taylor, where recruits were scarce, so 1000 to the regi- ment is a. very large estimate of total enrolment. However, this would give 14,000 in the cavalry regiments. Of artillery, there were 19 batteries and i battalion of 6 batteries, making 25 batteries in all, with an enrolment ranging from 70 to 150 in each. A total enrolment of 3750, or 150 to each battery, would be a large estimate. Fowler reported about 3000 enhstments in the various smaller commands from Alabama in the Army of Northern Virginia.^ An additional 2000 would more than account for all similar scattering commands in the other armies.' The total enrolment may then be estimated : — Army of Northern Virginia (Fowler report) .... 27,022 Army of Northern Virginia, scattering (Fowler report) . . 3,000 Armies of the West — infantry (estimate) 39>4°6 Armies of the West — cavalry 14,000 Scattering 2,500 Artillery 3»75° 89,678 This total includes many transfers and reenUstments, which can be only roughly estimated. In the Army of Northern Virginia 464 re- iThe 62d, 63d, 65th. A thousand to the regiment is a very liberal estimate; 500 is probably more nearly correct, I am told by old soldiers. 2 Jeff Davis Artillery, Hadaway's Battery, Jeff Davis Legion, 4th Battalion Infantry, 23d Battalion Infantry. ' The 1st, 3d, 8th, loth.and 15th Confederate regiments of cavalry had some compa- nies from Alabama. 84 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA signed, 245 were retired, 3639 were discharged, 1815 were trans- ferred to other commands, and 1666 deserted or were unaccounted for. Those who resigned — as a rule to accept higher positions — reentered the service. Almost all of those who retired or were dis- charged had to enter the reserves, and many of them again becam2 liable to service. Numbers of soldiers were accustomed to leave one command and go to another without any formahty of transfer. De- serters who were driven back to the army nearly always chose to enter other regiments than their own. There were numbers of transfers from the cavalry to the infantry, for each cavalryman had to furnish his own horse, and, should it be killed or die and the soldier be unable to secure another, he was sent to an infantry regiment. There were also smaller infantry organizations, which were mounted and merged into the cavalry regiments. Half of the enhstments in the artillery came from the infantry. One regiment' at one time lost 100 men in this way, and it has been estimated that one-fifth of the Alabama soldiers served in more than one command.^ Counting each name on the rolls as one man, as Brewer and Fowler do,' it is difficult to see how more than 90,000 enlistments can be counted, and from this total must be deducted several thousand for transfers and reenlistments. Miller's estimate of a deduction of one-fifth for names counted twice would make the total number of different men about 75,000, which is probably about the correct number. Not only were the same names counted twice, and even oftener in different com- mands, but sometimes in the same companies and regiments they were counted more than once. It was to the interest of local and state authorities to have each enlistment counted as a different man, and this was invariably done.* Five of the early regiments were reorganized and reenlisted, and thus 5000 at least were added to the total enrolment without securing a single recruit. The three- year regiments reenlisted in 1864,^ and here again were extra thou- 1 The 6th Infantry. 2 Miller, p. 374. 2 Brewer evidently follows Fowler, as to the Army of Northern Virginia. * Not that this deceived the Confederate admhiistration, but the large estimates sounded well in the governor's messages, and when there was a dispute with Richmond about the quota of the state. ^ In 1861 and 1862 some regiments enlisted for short terms, some for three years, some for the war. I have been unable, in more than two or three cases, to find out the exact term, but there could hardly have been more than one reenlistment of an organization. ALABAMA SOLDIERS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTER 85 sands of enlistments to be added to the former total. There were also 19 infantry regiments' which were formed by the reorganiza- tion of former commands that had already been counted, and upon reenlistment for the war they were again counted. In this same way 7 regiments at least of cavalry were formed.^ In this way it is possible to count up a total enlistment from Alabama of about 120,000.^ There is no method which will even approximate correct- ness by which the total number of enHstments may be reduced to enlistments for a certain term, as three years or four years. The history of every enlistment must first be known. There were three lieutenant-generals who entered the service in command of Alabama troops — John B. Gordon, Joseph Wheeler,^ James Longstreet * ; seven major-generals — H. D. Clayton, Jones M. Withers,' E. M. Law, C. M. Wilcox, John H. Forney,' W. W. Allen, R. E. Rodes ^ ; and thirty-six brigadier generals — Tennent Lomax,' P. D. Bowles,' S. A. M. Wood, E. A. O'Neal, William H. Forney, J. C. C. Sanders,'-^ I. W. Garrott,' Archibald Grade,''' B. D. Fry, James Cantey, J. T. Holtzclaw, E. D. Tracy,' E. W. Pettus, Z. C. Deas, G. D. Johnston, C. M. Shelly, Y. M. Moody, Wm. F. Perry, John T. Morgan, M. H. Hannon, Alpheus Baker, J. H. Clan- ton, James Hagan, P. D. Roddy, John Gregg,' L. P. Walker, D. Leadbetter,'-' J. H.Kelley,''' J. Gorgas, C. A. Battle, John W. Frazer, Alex. W. Campbell, Thomas M. Jones, M. J. Bulger, John C. Reid, James Deshler.' Other Alabamians exercised commands in the troops of other states, and several were staff officers of general rank. The naval commanders were Semmes, Randolph, and Glassell, and a few subordinate officers. ° iThe 1st, 2d, 7th, nth, 21st, 25th, 26th-5oth, 27th, 29th, 42d, 46th, 54th, 55th, 56th, 58th, 59th, 60th, 62d, 65th. 2 The 3d, Russell's 4th, 8th, 9th, loth, nth, 12th. 3 (3) There had been to the end of 1863, 90,857 enlistments in Alabama. Included in these figures were all reenlistments and transfers. (^) In the summer of 1863 the state took a census of all males from sixteen to sixty years of age, a total of 40,500 names. These included 8835, and later 10,000, exempts, and all the cripples and deadheads in the state. Since this was six months previous to the report of the 90,857 enlistments, there must have been in the latter number many that were on the former list. See O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 101-X03, iioi. * West Point graduates, nine. ^ Killed in battle, ten. s Derry, " Story of the Confederate States" ; Southern Hist. Soc. Papers, Vol. VI ; Brewer, "Alabama," "Regimental Histories"; Miller, "History of Alabama," p. 375 ; Brown, " History of Alabama," pp. 238-254. 5 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA During the early months of 1865 a movement was started to iroll negroes as Confederate soldiers, and a number of ofi&cets, mong whom was John T. Morgan, received permission to raise egro troops. The conference of governors at Augusta in 1864 ;commended the arming of slaves, but Governor Watts asked the labama legislature to disapprove such a movement.' An enthusi- ;tic meeting of citizens, held in Mobile, February ig, 1865, declared lat the war must be prosecuted "to victory or death," and that 30,000 negroes should be placed in the field.^ It was too late, how- ler, for success. Wilson, on his raid, picked up the Confederate ;gro troops at Selma, and took them with him.' In 1862, the Creoles" of Mobile apphed for permission to enlist in a body, hey were mulattoes, but were free by the treaties with France in 503 and with Spain in 1819, were property holders, often owning aves, and were an orderly, respectable class, true to the South and ixious to fight for the Confederacy. The Secretary of War was not iendly to the proposal, but in November, 1862, the legislature of labama authorized their enhstment for the defence of Mobile. A ;ar later, at the urgent request of General Maury, they were re- rived into the Confederate service as heavy artillery.'' The Alabama troops in the Confederate service made a notably 3od record. The flower of the Alabama army served with Lee in irginia, but nearly as good were the Alabama troops in the western rmies. Brewer says they moved "high and haughty in the face of ;ath." The regiments of reserves raised late in the war and ationed within the state were not very good. Yet there were LStances of regiments, with bad reputation when stationed near home, taking splendid records when sent to the front. The spirit of the oops at the front was high to the last. In 1864 an Alabama regi- lent reenhsted for the war, with the oath that they would "live on read and go barefoot before they would leave the flag under which ley had fought for three years." ^ On the morning of April 9, 1865, le Sixtieth Alabama (HiUiard's Legion), then about 165 strong, 1 Annual CyclopEedia (1864), p. 7. 2 Annual Cyclopsedia (1865), p. 10. = Riley, " Baptists of Alabama," p. 305 ; O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 1 193. * O. R., Ser. IV, Vol I, p. 1088 ; Vol. II, pp. 94, 197. s N. y. World, March 12, 1864; "The Land We Love," Vol. II, p. 296. UNION TROOPS FROM ALABAMA 8/ captured a Federal battery/ Fowler, in his report in 1865, asserts that Alabama sent more troops into the service than any other state ; also that she sent more troops in proportion to her population than any other state. "I am certain too," he says, "that when General Lee surrendered his army, the representation from Alabama on the field that day was inferior to no other southern state in numbers, and surely not in gallantry."^ Union Troops from Alabama To the Union army Alabama furnished about 3000 regular enhst- ments. Of these 2000 were white men. It is not likely that there were many more, since in 1900 there were in Alabama only 3649 persons, northerners, negroes, and all, drawing pensions, and some of these on account of the Indian and Mexican wars.^ The white Union troops served in the First Alabama Union Cavahr}^, in the First Ala- bama and Tennessee Cavalry (the First Vedette), Kennamer's Scouts (Cavalry), and in northern regiments — principally those from Indiana. The report of the Secretary of War for 1864-1865 says that no white regiments were regularly enhsted in Alabama for the Union army. But this is evidently not correct, since the report for 1866 says that there were 2576 enhstments in Alabama for various periods of service.^ Of negro regiments in the Union army, there were the First Alabama Volunteers, afterward known as the Fifth United States Colored Infantry, the Second Alabama Volunteers (negroes), and the First Alabama Colored Artillery, afterward known as the Sixth United States Heavy Artillery, which served at Fort Pillow. Late in 1864 General Lorenzo Thomas reported that he had recently organized three regiments of colored infantry in Alabama, and Wilson organized several other negro regiments in the state in 1865. Many 'Southern Hist. Soc. Papers, Vol. II, p. 61; Shaver, "History of the Sixtieth Alabama," p. 106; Miller, "History of Alabama," pp. 359, 374; Brewer, "Ala- bama," pp. 586-705; "Confederate Military History'' — Alabama; Longstreet, " Manassas to Appomattox " ; " Memorial Record of Alabama " (Wheeler's " Military History ") ; McMorries, " History of the First Alabama Regiment." 2 Transactions Ala. Hist. Soc, Vol. II, p. 188; also John S. Wise, "End of an Era'-' ; Longstreet, " Manassas to Appomattox." ' Montgomery Advertiser Almanac (1901), p. 220. * Report of 1866, Appendix, Ft. I, p. 166. 58 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA legroes from north Alabama went into various negro organizations, md were credited to the northern states, the official records showing )nly 4969 negro enlistments credited directly to Alabama. A con- ;ervative estimate would be from 2000 to 2500 whites and 10,000 legroes enhsted in Alabama, not counting those who were enrolled n the spring of 1865.^ The white Union soldiers from Alabama vere mostly poor men from the mountain counties of north Alabama. The Union troops from Alabama received no bounty.^ The Militia System The miHtia system of Alabama in 1861 existed only in the statute )ooks, and in the persons of a few brigadiers and a major-general, vhose entire duty had consisted in wearing uniforms at the inaugura- ion of a governor and ever thereafter bearing military titles. A eries of Arabic numbers, something more than a hundred, was issigned to the militia regiments that were unorganized, but which, mder favorable circumstances, might be enrolled and called out. The county was the unit. To each county was assigned one regiment >r more according to the white population. Several counties formed L militia district under a brigadier-general, and over all was a major- ;eneral. Bodies of trained volunteers were not connected with the nilitia system at all, but these went at once, on the outbreak of war, nto the state army, which was soon merged into the Confederate .rmy. In theory the militia consisted of all the male citizens of Alabama if military age. The enlistments for war service soon reduced the naterial from which militia regiments could be formed, and the ystem broke down before it was tried. A few regiments may have )een enrolled in 1861 and 1862, but if so, they at once entered the "onfederate service. The Forty-eighth Alabama MiUtia regiment vas ordered out to defend Mobile in 1861, and $6o©o was appropriated o provide pikes and knives with which to arm them, as it was impos- 1 Report of the Secretary of War, 1866, Appendix, Pt. I, p. 69; Report of the .ecretary of War (1864-1865), p. 28; Moore, "Rebellion Record," Vol. VII, p. 45 ; liller, p. 360; O. R., Ser. Ill, Vol. Ill, pp. 11 15, 1190, and Vol. IV, pp. 16, 921, 925, 269, 1270 ; O. R., Ser. II, Vol. V, pp. 589, 570, 626, 627, 716, 946, 947 ; " Confederate lilitary History" — Alabama. 2 Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., p. 592. THE MILITIA SYSTEM 89 sible to get firearms. On March i, 1862, Governor Shorter appealed to the people to give their shotguns, rifles, bowie-knives, pikes, powder, and lead to state agents, probate judges, sheriffs, and other state officials for the use of the state militia.' A few days later he ordered out, for the defence of Mobile and the coast, the militia from the river counties and the southwestern counties — eighteen counties in all. But the militia failed to appear. It seems that the governor expected a hearty response from the people. He asked for too much, and got nothing. On March 12, 1862, he again ordered out the mihtia, this time specifying the regiments by number.^ But again the mihtia failed to respond. The fact was, there was no longer any militia; the officers and men had gone, or were preparing to go, into the Con- federate service. Many of the militia regiments could not have mustered a dozen men, and it is doubtful if there was a muster-roll of a militia regiment in all Alabama.^ In May, 1862, the governor, recognizing that the militia system was worthless as a means of rais- ing troops for home defence, issued a proclamation asking the people to form volunteer organizations. The response, as he said, "was not prompt." The legislature of that year, not seeing the necessity, refused to reorganize the militia so as to give the governor any effective control. The people seem not to have been worried by any fear of invasion, and many thought that organization into militia com- panies was merely preliminary to entering the Confederate service. Some did not wish to go until they had to do so, others preferred to go at once to the Confederate army. It appears that all persons, for various reasons, disliked militia service. December 22, 1862, the governor issued a proclamation, in which, after mentioning the tardy response to his May proclamation and the failure of the legislature to reorganize the system, he again asked the people to volunteer in companies for home defence.* He begged the people to drive those who were shirking service to their duty by the force of public scorn. He requested that business houses be closed early in order to give time for drill. The response to this 1 Moore, " Rebellion Record," Supplement. 2 The 89th, 94th, 95th, etc. See Moore, " Rebellion Record," Supplement. The highest number of a militia regiment to be found on the records was the I02d, in Sumter County. « See O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. II (Shorter to Johnston). « Moore, " Rebellion Record," Vol. VI ; O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 253-256. 90 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA was the same as to his previous proclamation. There was no longer any material for a militia organization. Early in 1863, and in some sections even before, the need began to be felt for a miUtia force to execute the laws. Under the direction of the governor, small commands were organized here and there of those who were not likely to become subject to service in the Confederate army. These were state and Confederate officials, young boys, and sometimes old men. These organizations were later a source of constant conflict between the state authorities and the Confederate enrolUng officers, who wanted to take such commands bodily into the Confederate service, and who usually did so with the full consent of most of the men and to the great indignation of the governor.^ In August, 1863, the legislature finally passed a law to reorganize the mihtia system, or rather to establish a new system. By the law an official in each county, appointed by the governor, was to enroll as first- class militia all males under seventeen and over forty-five years of age, including all state and Confederate civil officials, and those physically disqualified for service in the Confederate army. The second class was to consist of those not in the first class, that is, of men between seventeen and forty-five years of age. But men of the second class were subject to enrolment by Confederate conscript officers, and consisted of the few thousand who were specially ex- empted by the Confederate authorities. Those of the first class who wished to do so might enroll in the second class. The governor was given the usual power over the mihtia, but it was ordered that the first-class militia was not to go beyond the limits of the county to which it belonged.^ Presumably the second class might be ordered beyond the county limits, but there were so few in their class that they were not organized. The first-class militia in each county was under a commandant of reserves, militia now being called reserves. He had the power to call it out to repel invasion and execute the laws. Jealousy of Confederate authority had caused the legislature to take legal means of making the mihtia worthless to the Confederacy, and useful only for local defence and for executing the state laws in par- 1 O. R., Set. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pts. II and III, pp. 780, 855 ; Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, PP- 175. 323- 2 Act of General Assembly, Aug. 29, 1863, which seems to have followed an act of Congress of similar nature. THE MILITIA SYSTEM gi ticular localities.' Still, the system seems to have been practically useless, and the governor continued to organize small irregular com- mands to execute the laws and to furnish mihtary escorts to civil officials. As has been stated, such commands were highly approved of by the Confederate enroUing officers, who eagerly persuaded them to join the Confederate army, and thus called forth strong remon- strances from Governor Watts. The War Department reasoned that a state could keep troops of war which were not subject to absorption in the Confederate service, but that the militia were subject to the superior claims of the Confederacy.^ February 6, 1864, Governor Watts, in an address to the people, declared that a raid into the state was threatened and called upon young and old to volunteer for the defence of the state.^ The reserve system was now worthless. Few of the regiments had more than fifty men, many had none, and the governor was powerless to use them beyond the limits of their respec- tive counties. The state was at the mercy of any invading force, and Rousseau's Raid, through the heart of the state, showed the woful condition of affairs. On October 7, 1864, the legislature passed an act which prohibited Confederate army officers from com- manding the reserves. It was again ordered that the first-class reserves should not serve beyond the limits of the county to which they belonged. At the same time, permission was granted to the harassed citizens of Dale and Henry counties to organize themselves to protect their homes, provided they did so under the direction of the commandant of the first-class militia. Perhaps the legislature was afraid that, if left to themselves, they might cross the county hne, or choose a Confederate officer to lead them. In December, 1864, when north Alabama was almost entirely overrun by tories, deserters, and Federals, the citizens of Marion County were authorized to organize into squads and protect themselves.* Still the legislature refused to make an effective reorganization of the militia. When the spring campaign in 1865 began. Governor Watts appealed to the people to do what the legislature had failed to do. The first-class militia could not, he said, be ordered beyond the limits of their coun- 1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 1 133. " O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 172-174, 256, 376. The state supreme court held the same view. ' Moore, " Rebellion Record," Vol. VIII, p. 378. * Acts of General Assembly, Dec. 12, 1864. 93 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA ties, and in three congressional districts in north Alabama it had not been and, by law, could not be, organized. He estimated that 30,000 men were enrolled in the first-class militia, of whom 4000 were boys, and to the latter he made the appeal to defend the state. Evidently the remaining 26,000 men were, in his estimation, not worth much as soldiers. However, he called upon all first-class militia to volunteer as second class.' A few hundred responded to this appeal, and all of them who saw active service were with Forrest in front of Wilson. The various organizations mentioned in the War Records, the Junior Reserves, Senior Reserves, Mobile Regiment, Home Guards, Local Defence Corps,^ and others, were, except the reserves, volunteer organizations for local defence, and all that saw active service before 1865, except the Home Guards, were absorbed into the Confederate organization.^ The stupid conduct of the legislature during the last two years of the war in failing to provide for the defence of the state cannot be too strongly condemned. The final result would have been the same, but a strong force of militia would have enabled Governor Watts to execute the laws in all parts of the state, and to protect the families of loyal citizens from outrage by tories and deserters. Sec. 3. Conscription and Exemption Confederate Enrolment Laws In the spring of 1862, the Confederate Congress passed the Enrol- ment Act, by which all white men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five were made Uable to military service at the call of the Presi- dent, and those already in service were retained. The President was authorized to employ state officials to enroll the men made subject to duty, provided the governor of the state gave his consent ; other- wise he was to employ Confederate officials. The conscripts thus secured were to be assigned to the state commands already in the field until these organizations were recruited to their full strength. Substitutes were allowed under such regulations as the Secretary of ^ N. Y. Times, April l6, 1865 ; Annual Cyclopa;dia (1865), p. 10. ^ See O. R., General Index. ^ The 6ist, 62d, and 65th regiments were thus formed, the men becoming subject to duty under the conscript act, or by volunteering. CONFEDERATE ENROLMENT LAWS 93 War might prescribe.^ Five days later, a law was passed exempt- ing certain classes of persons from the operations of the Enrolment Act. These were: Confederate and state officials, mail- carriers, ferrymen on post-office routes, pilots, telegraph operators, miners, printers, ministers, college professors, teachers with twenty pupils or more, teachers of the deaf, dumb, and blind, hospital attendants, one druggist to each drug store, and superintendents and operatives in cotton and wool factories.' In the fall of 1862, the Enrolment law was extended to include all white men from thirty-five to forty- five years of age and all who lacked a few months of being eighteen years of age. They were to be enrolled for three years, the oldest, if not needed, being left until the last.^ At this time was begun the practice, which virtually amounted to exemption, of making special details from the army to perform certain kinds of skilled labor. The first details thus made were to manufacture shoes for the army.^ The list of those who might claim exemption, in addition to those named in the act of April 21, 1862, was extended to include the following : state militia officers, state and Confederate clerks in the civil service, railway employees who were not common laborers, steamboat employees, one editor and the neces- sary printers for each newspaper, those morally opposed to war, pro- vided they furnished a substitute or paid $500 into the treasury, physi- cians, professors, and teachers who had been engaged in the profession for two years or more, government artisans, mechanics, and other employees, contractors and their employees furnishing arms and sup- plies to the state or to the Confederacy, factory owners, shoemakers, tanners, blacksmiths, wagon makers, millers, and engineers. The artisans and manufacturers were granted exemption from military service provided the products of their labor were sold at not more than seventy-five per cent profit above the cost of production. On every plantation where there were twenty or more negroes one white man was entitled to exemption as overseer.' ^ Act, April 16, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., 1st Sess. 2 Act, April 21, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., Ist Cong., 1st Sess. 3 Act, Sept. 27, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., Ist Cong., 2d Sess. * Act, Oct. 9, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., 2d Sess. These details were still carried on the rolls of the company. ° Act, Oct. II, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., 2d Sess. The exemption of one •white for twenty negroes was called the " twenty-nigger law." One peaceable Black Belt 94 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA In the spring of 1863 mail contractors and drivers of post-coaches were exempted ; ^ and it was ordered that those exempted under the so-called "twenty-negro" law should pay $500 into the Confederate treasury ; also, that such state officials as were exempted by the gov- ernor might be also exempted by the Confederate authorities. The law permitting the hiring of substitutes by men liable to service was repealed on December 28, 1863, and a few days later even those who had furnished substitutes were made subject to mihtary duty.^ A law of February 17, 1864,' provided that all soldiers between the ages of eighteen and forty-five should be retained in service dur- ing the war. Those between the ages of seventeen and eighteen, and forty-five and fifty were called into service as a reserve force for the defence of the state. All exemptions were repealed except the following: (i) the members of Congress and of the state legislature, and such Confederate and state officers as the President or the gov- ernors might certify to be necessary for the proper administration of government; (2) ministers regularly employed, superintendents, attendants, and physicians of asylums for the deaf, dumb, and blind, insane, and other public hospitals, one editor for each newspaper, public printers, one druggist for each drug store which had been two years in existence, all physicians who had practised seven years, teachers in colleges of at least two years' standing and in schools which had twenty pupils to each teacher; (3) one overseer or agri- culturist to each farm upon which were fifteen or more negroes, in case there was no other exempt on the plantation. The object was to leave one white man, and no more, on each plantation, and the owner or overseer was preferred. In return for such exemption, the exempt was bound by bond to deliver to the Confederate authori- ties, for each slave on the plantation between the ages of sixteen and iifty, one hundred pounds of bacon or its equivalent in produce, which citizen wished to stay at home, but he possessed only nineteen negroes. His neighbors thought that he ought to go to war, and no one would give, lend, or sell him a slave. Unable to purchase even the smallest negro, he was sadly making preparations to depart, when one morning he was rejoiced by the welcome news that one of the negro women had presented her husband with a fine boy. The tale of twenty negroes was complete, and the master remained at home. 1 Act of April 14, 1863, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., 3d Sess. 2 Acts, Dec. 28, 1863, and Jan. 5, 1864, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., 4th Sess. ^ Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., 4th Sess. POLICY OF THE STATE IN REGARD TO CONSCRIPTION 95 was paid for by the government at prices fixed by the impressment commissioners. In addition, the exempt was to sell his surplus produce at prices fixed by the commissioners. The Secretary of War was authorized to make special details, under the above condi- tions, of overseers, farmers, or planters, if the pubhc good demanded it; also (4) to exempt the higher officials of railroads and not more than one employee for each mile of road; and (5) mail carriers and drivers. The President was authorized to make details of old men for special service.^ By an act passed the same day free negroes from eighteen to fifty years of age were made liable to service with the army as teamsters. These acts of February 17, 1864, were the last Confederate legislation of importance in regard to conscription and exemption. During the year 1864 the Confederate authorities devoted their energies to construing away all exemptions possible, and to absorbing the state reserve forces into the Confederate army. Policy of the State in Regard to Conscription To return to 1861. The state legislature, when providing for the state army, authorized the governor to exempt from militia duty all railway, express, steamboat, and telegraph employees, but even the fire companies had to serve as militia.^ The operation of the enrolment law stripped the land of men of militia age, and on Novem- ber 17, 1862, the legislature ordered to duty on the public roads men from sixteen to eighteen years of age, and forty-five to fifty-five, and later all from sixteen to fifty as well as all male slaves and free negroes from fourteen to sixty years of age.' Militia ofiicers between the ages of eighteen and forty-five were declared subject to the enrolment acts of Congress,' as were also justices of the peace, notaries public, and constables.^ Yet, instead of making an effective organization of the militia, the legislature in 1863 proceeded to frame a law of exemptions pat- terned after that of the Confederacy. It released from militia duty all persons over forty-five years of age, county treasurers, physicians of seven years' practice or who were in the public service, ministers, teachers of three years' standing, one blacksmith in each beat, the 1 Act, Feb. 17, 1864, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., 4th Sess. 2 Acts, Jan. 31, 1861, ist Called Session. 3 Act, Aug. 29, 1863. * Nov. 25, 1862. s Dec. 6, 1862. 96 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA city police and fire companies, penitentiary guards, general adminis- trators who had been in service five years. Confederate agents, millers, railroad employees, steamboat officials, overseers, managers of foun- dries, salt makers who made as much as ten bushels a day and who sold it for not more than $15 per bushel. Besides, the governor could make special exemptions/ In 1864 millers who charged not more than one-eighth for toll were exempted.^ It will be seen that in some respects the state laws go farther in exemption than the Confederate laws, and thus were in conflict with them. But it must be remem- bered that the Confederacy had already stripped the country of nearly all the able-bodied men who did not evade duty. To this time, however, there was no conflict between the state and Confed^ 1 erate authorities in regard to conscription. An act was also passed providing for the reorganization of the penitentiary guards, and only those not subject to conscription were retained.' A joint resolution of August 29, 1863, called upon Congress to decrease the hst of ex- emptions, as many clerks and laborers were doing work that could be done by negroes. At the end of the year 1863 the legislature asked that the conscript law be strictly enforced by Congress.^ On the part of the state rights people, there was much opposition to the enrolment or conscription laws on the ground that they were unc(^nstitutional. Several cases were brought before the state su- pr^pie court, and all were decided in favor of the constitutionality of the laws ; furthermore, it was decided that the courts and judicial officers of the state had no jurisdiction on habeas corpus to discharge from the custody of a Confederate enrolling officer persons who had been conscripted under the law of Congress.^ A test case was car- ried to the state supreme court, which decided that a person who had conscientious ^"^cruples against bearing arms might pay for a substi- tute in the state -militia and claim exemption from state service, but 1 Act, Aug. 29, 1863. 2 Dec. 13, 1864. This was a measure of obstruction, since the Confederate laws did not exempt millers. The legislature elected in 1863 contained many obstructionists. ' 3 Act, Aug. 29, 1863. 4 Resolution, Dec. 4, 1863. * Ex parte Hill, In re Willis et al. vs. Confederate States — 38 Alabama Reports (1863), 429. All over the state at various times men sought to avoid conscription or some certain service under every pretext, sometimes " even resorting to a habeas corpus "'■ before an ignorant justice of the peace, -n\io had no jurisdiction over such cases." See O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. II, p. 139; also Governor Shorter to General Johnston, Aug., 1863. The First Confederate Capitol. The State Capitol, Montgomery. Montgomery Residence of President Davis. Confederate Monument, Montgomery. The Inauguration of Jefferson Daj/is. (From an old negative.) POLICY OF THE STATE IN REGARD TO CONSCRIPTION 97 if conscripted he was not exempted from the Confederate service unless he belonged to the reUgious denominations specially exempted by the act of Congress.' The court also declared constitutional the Confederate law which provided that when a substitute became sub- ject to military duty his principal was thereby rendered liable to service.^ In 1864 the supreme court held that the state had a right to subject to mihtia service persons exempted by the Confederate authorities as bonded agriculturists under the acts of February 17, 1864, and that only those overseers were granted exemption from mihtia service under the act of Congress in 1863 who at the time were not subject to mihtia duty, and not those exempted from Confederate service by the later laws/ and that the clause in the act of Congress "passed February 17, 1864, repeahng and revoking all exemptions, was constitutional/ In other cases the court held that a person regularly enrolled and sworn into the Confederate service could not raise any question, on habeas corpus, of his assignment to any par- ticular command or duty,^ but that the state courts could discharge on habeas corpus from Confederate enrolling officers persons held as conscripts, who were exempted under Confederate laws ; " that the Confederacy might reassert its rights to the military service of a citizen who was enrolled as a conscript and, after producing a dis- charge for physical disability, had enlisted in the state militia service ; ' and finally, that the right of the Confederacy to the military service of a citizen was paramount to the right of the state.' During the year 1864 Governor Watts had much trouble with the Confederate enrolUng officers who insisted upon conscripting his volunteer and militia organizations, whether they were subject to duty under the laws or not. The authorities at Richmond held that while a state might keep "troops of war" over which the Confederacy could have no control, yet the state militia was subject to all the laws of Congress. "Troops of war," as the Secretary of War explained, would be troops in active and permanent service," and hence virtually Confederate troops. A state with troops of that description would be very willing to give them up to the Confederacy to save expense. 1 Dunkards, Quakers, Nazarenes. In re Stringer — 38 Alabama (1863), 457. 2 38 Alabama, 458. ' 39 Alabama, 367. * 39 Alabama, 254. 5 39 Alabama, 457. « 39 Alabama, 440. ' 39 Alabama, 6n. ' 39 Alabama, 609. » O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 256, 463, et passim. 98 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA Thus we find the legislature of Alabama asking the President to re- ceive and pay certain irregular organizations which had been used to support the Conscript Bureau.' The legislature, now somewhat disaffected, showed its interest in the operations of the enrolling officers by an act providing that conscript officials who forced exempts into the Confederate service should be liable to indictment and punish- ment by a fine of $1000 to $6000 and imprisonment of from six months to two years.^ It went a step further and nullified the laws of Congress by declaring that state officials, civil and mihtary, were not subject to conscription by the Confederate authorities.^ Effect of the Enrolment Laws Few good soldiers were obtained by conscription,* and the sys- tem, as it was organized in Alabama,^ did more harm than good to the Confederacy. The passage of the first law, however, had one good effect. During the winter of 1861-1862, there had been a reaction from the enthusiastic war feehng of the previous summer. Those who thought it would be only a matter of weeks to overrun the North now saw their mistake." Many of the people still had no doubt that the North would be glad to make peace and end the war if the government at Richmond were wiUing. Numbers, therefore, saw no need of more fighting, and hence did not volunteer. Thou- sands left the army and went home. A measure Hke the enrolment act was necessary to make the people realize the actual situation.- Upon the passage of the law all the loyal population Hable to ser- vice made preparations to go to the front before being conscripted, which was deemed a disgrace, and the close of the year 1862 saw practically all of them in the army. Those who entered after 1862 were boys and old men.' Many not subject to service 1 Memorial, Oct. 7, 1864. 2 Acts, Dec. 12, 1864. 3 Dec. 13, 1864. * Curry, "Civil History of the Confederate States," p. 151. s The Conscript Bureau had posts at the following places : Decatur, Courtland, Som- erville, Guntersville, Tuscumbia, Fayetteville, Pikeville, Camden, Montgomery,' Selma, Lebanon, Pollard, Troy, Mobile, West Point (Ga.), Marion, Greensborough, BlountsviUe, Livingston, Gadsden, Cedar Bluff, Jacksonville, Ashville, Carrollton, Tuscaloosa, Eutaw, Eufaula, Jasper, Newton, Clarksville, Talladega, Elyton. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 819-821. ^ See De Leon, " Four Years in Rebel Capitals." ' President Davis visited Mobile in October, 1863, and upon reviewing the Alabama troops recently raised, was much moved at seeing the young boys and the old gray-haired EFFECT OF THE ENROLMENT LAWS 99 volunteered, so that when the age limit was extended but few more were secured. Great dissatisfaction was expressed among the people at the enrol- ment law. Some thought that it was an attack upon the rights of the states, and the irritating manner in which it was enforced aroused, in some locahties, intense popular indignation. Conscription being considered disgraceful, many who would have been glad for various good reasons to remain at home a few months longer went at once into service to escape conscription. Yet some loyal and honest citi- zens found it disastrous to leave their homes and business without definite arrangements for the safety and support of their families. Such men suffered much annoyance from the enrolling officers, in spite of the fact that the law was intended for their protection. The conscript officials, often men of bad character, persecuted those who were easy to find, while neglecting the disloyal and refractory who might make trouble for them. In some sections such weak con- duct came near resulting in local insurrections; this was especially the case in Randolph County in 1862.^ The effect of the law was rather to stop volunteering . in the state organizations and reporting to camps of instructions, since all who did either were classed as conscripts. Not wishing to bear the odium of being conscripted, many thousands in 1862 and 1863 went directly into the regular service.^ While the conscript law secured few, if any, good soldiers who would not have joined the army without it, it certainly served as a reminder to the people that all were needed, and as a stimulus to volunteering. Three classes of people suffered from its operations: (i) those rightfully exempted, who were constantly annoyed by the enrolling officers; (2) those soon to become liable to service, who were not allowed to volunteer in organizations of their own choice; and (3) "deadheads" and malcontents who did not intend to fight at all if they could keep from it. It was this last class that made nearly all the complaints about conscription, and it was they whom the enrolling officers left alone because they were so troublesome. men in the ranks before him. See Annual Cyclopaedia (1863), p. 8. The A. and I. General of Alabama reported, July 29, 1862, that not more than 10,000 conscripts could be secured from Alabama unless the enemy could be expelled from the Tennessee valley. In that case, 3000 more men might be secured. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 21. 1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 1 149 ; Vol. II, pp. 87, 207, 208, 790. 2 See Curry, "Civil History," p. 151. 100 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA The defects in the working of conscription are well set forth in ; letter from a correspondent of President Davis in December, 1862 In this letter it was asserted that the conscript law had proven a fail ure in Mississippi and Alabama, since it had stopped the volunteering Governor Shorter was reported to have said that the enforcement o: it had been "a humbug and a farce." The writer declared that thf enrolling officers chosen were frequently of bad character ; that ineffi dent men were making attempts to secure "bomb-proof" offices ir order to avoid service in the army; and that the exemption of slave owners by the "twenty-negro law" had a bad influence upon th( poorer classes. He also declared that the system of substitutes was bad, for many men were on the hunt for substitutes, and others liable to duty were working to secure exemptions in order to serve as sub- stitutes, while large numbers of men connected with the army man- aged in this way to keep away from the fighting. He was sure, he said, that there were too many hangers-on about the officers of high rank, and that it was believed that social position, wealth, and influ- ence served to get young men good staff positions.^ Another evil complained of was that "paroled" men scattered to their homes and never heard of their exchange. To a conscript officer whose duty it was to look after them they said that they were "paroled," and he passed them by. The officers were said to be entirely too lenient with the worthless people aiid too rigorous with the better classes.^ Exemption from Service After the passage of the enrolment laws, every man with excessive regard for the integrity of his person and for his comfort began to secure exemption from service. In north Alabama men of little courage and patriotism lost confidence after the invasions of the Fed- erals, and resorted to every expedient to escape conscription. Strange and terrible diseases were developed, and in all sections of the state health began to break down.^ It was the day of certificates, — for old age, rheumatism, fits, bhndness, and various physical disabili- ties.^ Various other pretexts were given for staying away from the 1 James Phelan to President Davis, O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. II, p. 790. 2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. II, p. 790. 8 C. C. Clay, Jr., to Secretary of War, O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 141, 142. " I know of one man who for two years carried his arm in a sling to deceive the EXEMPTION FROM SERVICE lOI army, while some men hid out in the woods. The governor asked the people to drive such persons to their duty.^ There was never so much skilled labor in the South as now. Harness making, shoe making, charcoal burning, carpentering — all these and numerous other occupations supposed to be in support of the cause secured exemption. Running a tanyard was a favorite way of escaping ser- vice. A pit was dug in the corner of the back yard, a few hides secured, carefully preserved, and never finished, — for more hides might not be available ; then the tanner would be no longer exempt. There were purchasing agents, sub-purchasing agents, and sub-sub- agents, cattle drivers, tithe gatherers, agents of the Nitre Bureau, agents to examine political prisoners,^ and many other Confederate and state agents of various kinds.'' The class left at home for the enrolhng officers to contend with, especially after 1862, was a source of weak- ness, not of strength, to the Confederate cause. The best men had gone to the army, and these people formed the public. Their opin- ion was pubhc opinion, and with few exceptions the home stayers were a sorry lot. From them came the complaint about the favor- itism toward the rich. The talk of a "rich man's war and a poor enrolling officers. It was sound when he put it into the sling. After the war ended he could never regain the use of it. A draft from the Home Guards of Selma was ordered to go to Mobile. The roll was made out, and opposite his name each man was allowed to write his excuse for not wishing to go. One cripple, John Smith, wrote, " One leg too short," and was at once excused by the Board. The next man had no excuse whatever, but he had seen how Smith's excuse worked, so he wrote, " Both legs too short," but he had to go to Mobile. "The Land We Love," Vol. Ill, p. 430. 1 Shorter's Proclamation, Dec. 22, 1862. ^ M. J. Saffold, afterward a prominent " scalawag," escaped service as an " agent to examine political prisoners." O. R., Ser. II, Vol. VI, p. 432. ' The list of pardons given by President Johnson will show a number of the titles assumed by the exempts. The chronic exempts were skilled in all the arts of beating out. If a new way of securing exemption were discovered, the whole fraternity of "deadheads" soon knew of it. In 1864 nearly all the exemptions and details made in order to supply the Quartermaster's Department were revoked, and agents sent through the country to notify the former exempts that they were again subject to duty. Before the enrolling officers reached them nearly all of them had secured a fresh exemption, and from a large district in middle Alabama, I have been informed by the agent who revoked the contracts, not one recruit for the armies was secured. Often the exemption was only a detail, and large numbers of men were carried on the rolls of companies who never saw their commands. Often a man when conscripted would have sufficient influ- ence to be at once detailed, and would never join his company. Little attention was paid to the laws regarding exemption. I02 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA man's fight" originated with them, as well as the criticism of the " twenty- negro law." In the minds of the soldiers at the front there was no doubt that the slaveholder and the rich man were doing their full share.^ Very few of the slaveholders and wealthy men tried to escape service; but when one did, he attracted more attention and called forth sterner denunciation than ten poor men in similar cases would have done. In fact, few able-bodied men tried to secure exemption under the "twenty-negro law." It would have been better for the Confederacy if more planters had stayed at home to direct the pro- duction of supphes, and the fact was recognized in 1864,^ when a "fifteen-negro law" was passed by the Congress, and other exemp- tions of planters and overseers were encouraged.' There is no doubt that those who desired to remain quietly at home — to be neutral, so to speak — found it hard to evade the conscript officers. One of these declared that the enrolling officers "burned the woods and sifted the ashes for conscripts." Another who had been caught in the sifting process deserted to the enemy at Huntsville. He was asked, "Do they conscript close over the river ? " "Hell, stranger, I should think they do; they take every man who has not been dead more than two days." ^ But the "hill-billy" and "sand- mountain" conscripts were of no service when captured; there were not enough soldiers in the state to keep them in their regi- ments. The Third Alabama Regiment of Reserves ran away almost in a body. There were fifteen or twenty old men in each county as a supporting force to the Conscript Bureau, and they had old guns, some of which would not shoot, and ammunition that did not fit.' Thus the best men went into the army, many of them never to return, and a class of people the country could well have spared survived to assist a second time in the ruin of their country in the darker days of Reconstruction. Often the " fire-eating, die-in- the- last-ditch " radical of 1 861 who remained at home "to take care of the ladies" became an exempt, a "bomb-proof" or a conscript ofiicer, and later a "scalawag." ' Curry, "Civil History," pp. 142-148. The wealthy young men volunteered, at first as privates or as officers; the older men of wealth nearly all became officers, chosen by their men. One company from Tuskegee owned property worth over ^2,000,000. Opelika Post, Dec. 4, 1903. 2 Act of Feb. 17, 1864, Pub. Laws, C.S. A. = Curry, " Civil History," pp. 142-148,151. * N. Y. World, March 28, 1864. ^ q. R,, Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 881. EXEMPTION FROM SERVICE I03 Some escaped war service by joining the various small indepen- dent and irregular commands formed for frontier service by those officers who found field duty too irksome. Though these irregular bodies were, as we have seen, gradually absorbed by the regular or- ganizations, yet during their day of strength they were most unpleasant defenders. The men sometimes joined in order to have more oppor- tunity for hcense and plunder, and such were hated ahke by friend and foe. Another kind of irregular organization caused some trouble in another way. Before the extension of the age limits to seventeen and fifty, the governor raised small commands of young boys to assist in the execution of the state laws, no other forces being available. Later, when the Confederate Congress extended its laws to include these, the conscript ofiicers tried to enroll them, but the governor objected. The officers complained that, in order to escape the odium of .conscription, the young boys who were subject by law to duty in the reserves evaded that law by going at once into the army, or by joining some command for special duty. They were of the opinion that these boys should be sent to camps of instruction. The gov- ernor had ten companies of young men under eighteen years of age raised near Talladega, and really mustered into the Confederate service as irregular troops, before the law of February 17, 1864, was passed. After the passage of the law, the enroUing officers wished to disband these companies and send the men to the reserves. Watts was angered and sharply criticised the whole pohcy of conscription. He said that much harm was done by the method of the conscript officers; that it was nonsense to take men from the fields and put them in camps of instruction when there were no arms for them, and no active service was intended; they had better stay at home, drill once a week with volunteer organizations, and work the rest of the time; to assemble the farmers in camps for useless drill while the crops were being destroyed was "most egregious folly." The governor also attacked the pohcy of the Bureau in refusing to allow the enrolment in the same companies of boys under eighteen and men over forty-five.' In regard to the attempts to disband his small 1 The law of Feb. 17, 1864, provided for the separate enrolment of these two classes, and the enrolling officers interpreted it as requiring separate service. Such an interpretation would practically prohibit the formation of volunteer commands and would leave the reserves to the enrolling officers to be organized in camp. I04 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA force of militia in active service, the governor used strong language. To Seddon, the Secretary of War, he wrote in May, 1864: "It must not be forgotten that the states have some rights left, and that the right to troops in the time of war is guaranteed by the Constitution. These rights, on the part of Alabama, I am determined shall be re- spected. Unless you order the Commandant of Conscripts to stop interfering with [certain volunteer companies] there will be a con- flict between the Confederate general [Withers] and the state authori- ties."' Watts carried the day and the' Confederate authorities yielded. The enrolment law provided that state offlcials should be exempt from enrolment upon presenting a certificate from the governor stat- ing that they were necessary to the proper administration of the government. In November, 1864, Governor Watts complained to General Withers, who commanded the Confederate reserve forces in Alabama, that the conscript officers had been enrolhng by force state officials who held certificates from the governor and also from the commandant of conscripts, and, he added: "This state of things cannot long last without a conflict between the Confederate and state authorities. I shall be compelled to protect my state officers with all the forces of the state at my command." The enrolling officers referred him to a decision of the Secretary of War in the case of a state official in Lowndes County, — that by the act of February 17, 1864, all men between the ages of seventeen and fifty were taken at once into the Confederate service, and that state officials elected later could not claim exemption. Governor Watts then wrote to Seddon, "Unless you interfere, there will be a conflict between the Confederate and the state authorities." He denied the right of Con- federate officers to conscript state officials elected after February 17, 1864: "I deny such right, and will resist it with all the forces of the state." ^ The Secretary of War replied by commending the Con- federate officers for the way in which they had done their duty, insist- ing that it was not a political nor a constitutional question, but one involving private rights, and that it should be left to the courts. This was receding from the confident ruling made in the case of the Lowndes County man. There was no more dispute and it is to be 1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 322, 323, 463, 466, 1059, 1060. 2 O. R., Set. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 817, 819, 920. EXEMPTION FROM SERVICE 105 presumed that the governor retained his officials.^ No wonder that Colonel Preston, the chief of the Bureau of Conscription, wrote to the Secretary of War that, "from one end of the Confederacy to the other every constituted authority, every officer, every man, and woman was engaged in opposing the enrolhng officer in the execu- tion of his duties." ^ But these officers had only themselves to blame. They pursued a short-sighted, nagging pohcy, worrying those who were exempt — the state officials and the militia — because they were easy to reach, and neglecting the real conscript material.' The work was known to be useless, and the whole system was irritating to the last degree to all who came in contact with it. It was useless because there was Kttle good material for conscription, except in the frontier country where no authority could be exerted. During 1862 and 1863 prac- tically nothing was done by the Bureau in Alabama, and at the end of the latter year. Colonel E. D. Blake, the Superintendent of Special Registration, reported that there were 13,000 men in the state between the ages of seventeen and forty-five, and of these he estimated 4000 were under eighteen years of age, and hence, at that time, beyond the reach of the enrolling officers. More than 8000 * were exempt 1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 821, 848. At this time there were in the state 1223 officials who had the governor's certificate of exemption. There were 1012 in Georgia, 1422 in Virginia, 14,675 in North Carolina, and much smaller numbers in the other states. See O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 851. 2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 224 (March 18, 1864). ' An ex-Confederate related to me his experiences with the conscript officers. In 1864 he was at home on furlough and was taken by the "buttermilk " cavalry, carried to Camp Watts, at Notasulga, and enrolled as a conscript, no attention being paid to his furlough. To Camp Watts were brought daily squads of conscripts, rounded up by the " buttermilk " cavalry. They were guarded by conscripts. When rested, the new recruits would leave, the guards often going with them. Then another squad would be brought in, who in a day or two would desert. This soldier came home again with a discharge for disability. The conscript officials again took him to Camp Watts. He presented his discharge papers ; the commandant tore them up before his face, and a few days later this soldier with a friend boarded the cowcatcher of a passing train and rode to Chehaw. The commandant sent guards after the fugitives, who captured the guards and then went to Tuskegee, where they swore out, as he said, a habeas corpus before the justice of the peace and started for their homes with their papers. They found the swamps filled with the deserters, who did not molest them after finding that they too were " deserters." * 8835 to January, 1864. See report of Colonel Preston, April, 1864, in O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 355, 363. The estimate was based on the census of i860. I06 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA under laws and orders. This left, he said, looo subject to enrolment. Nowhere, in any of the estimates, are found allowances for those physically and mentally disqualified. The number then exempted in Alabama by medical boards is unknown. In other states this number was sometimes more and sometimes less than the number exempted by law and by order. A year later, after all exemptions had been revoked, the number disquahfied for physical disability by the examining boards amounted to 3933. Besides these there were the lame, the halt, the blind, and the insane, who were so clearly unfit for service that no enrolling officer ever brought them before the medical board. The 4000 between the ages of seventeen and eighteen, and also the 4600 between sixteen and seventeen, came under the enrolment law of February 17, 1864, as also several thousand who were over forty- five. But it is certain that many of these, especially the younger ones, were already in the general service as volunteers. It is also certain that many hundreds of all ages who were liable to service escaped conscription, especially in north Alabama. In a way, their places in the ranks were filled by those who did not become liable to enrolment until 1864, or even not at all, but who volun- teered nevertheless. From April, 1862, to February, 1865, there had been enrolled at the camps in Alabama 14,875 men who had been classed in the re- ports as conscripts. This included all men who volunteered at the camps, all of military age that the officers could find or catch before they went into the volunteer service, details made as soon as enrolled, irregular commands formed before the men were liable to duty, and a few hundred genuine conscripts who had to be guarded to keep them from running a,way. It was reported that for two years not a recruit was sent by the Bureau from Alabama to the army of Ten- nessee or to the Army of Northern Virginia, but that the men were en- rolled in the organizations of the state. This means that much of the enrolment of 14,875 was only nominal, and that this number included the regiments sent to the front from Alabama in 1862, after the pas- sage of the Enrolment Act in April. Eighteen regiments were organ- ized in Alabama after that date, in violation of the Enrolment Act, many of the men evading conscription, as the Bureau reported, by going at once into the general service. The number who left in EXEMPTION FROM SERVICE 10/ these regiments was estimated at more than 10,000.^ There was not a single conscript regiment. It is possible to ascertain the number exempted by law and by order before 1865. A report by Colonel Preston, dated April, 1864, gives the number of exempts in Alabama as 8835 to January, 1864.^ A month later, all exemptions were revoked.^ In February, 1865, a complete report places the total number exempted by law and order in Alabama at 10,218, of whom 3933 were exempted by medical boards. The state officials exempted numbered 1333,* and Confed- erate officials, 21; ministers, 726; editors, 33, and their employees, 155; public printers, 3; druggists, 81; physicians, 796; teachers, 352; overseers and agriculturists, 1447; railway officials and em- ployees, 1090; mail carriers and contractors, 60; foreigners, 167; agriculture details, 38; pilots, telegraphers, shoemakers, tanners, and blacksmiths, 86 ; government contractors, 44 ; details of artisans and mechanics, 570; details for government service (not specified), 218. There were 1046 men incapable of field service who were assigned to duty in the above details, chiefly in the Conscript Bureau, Quartermaster's Department, and Commissariat.' It is certain that many others were exempted by being detailed from service in the army. The hst of those pardoned in 1865 and 1866 by President Johnson shows many occupations not mentioned above. It is interesting to notice the fate of the conscript officers when captured by the Federals. Bradford Hambrick was tried by a mili- tary commission in Nashville, Tennessee, in January, 1864, charged with being a Confederate conscript officer and with forcing "peace- able citizens of the United States" in Madison County, Alabama, to enter the Confederate army. He was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for one year, and to pay a fine of $2000 or serve an additional imprisonment of 1000 days." To sum up: The early enrolment laws served to stimulate en- listment ; the later ones probably had no effect at all .except to give 1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. loi, 103, et passim. 2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 355, 363- ^ Feb. 17, 1864. * There were 1223 to Nov. 30, 1864. ^ O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. I, 103-109. 8 G. 0., No. 144, Dept. of the Cumberland, Atlanta, Ga., Oct. 4, 1864, War Department Archives. There were other similar cases, but I found record of no other conviction. The " tories " were sometimes in league with the conscript officers, and sometimes they shot them at sight. I08 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA the Bureau something to do, and the -law officers something on which to exercise their wits. The conscript service also served as an exemption board. It secured few, if any, enhstments that the state could not have secured, and certainly lost more than it gained by harassing the people. The- laws were constantly violated by the state; this is proved by the enlistment of eighteen new regiments contrary to the law. It finally drove the state authorities into an attitude of nulHfication by its construction of the enrolment laws. Neither the state nor the Confederate government had an efficient machinery for securing enhstments. If there ever were laws regarded only in the breaking, the Enrolment Acts were such laws. The con- scripts and exempts, hke the deserters, tories, and Peace Society men, are important, not only because they so weakened the Confederacy, but also because they formed the party that would have carried out, or at least begun. Reconstruction according to the plans of Lincoln and Johnson as first proclaimed. Many of these people became "scalawags" later, probably influenced to some extent by the scorn of their neighbors. Sec. 4. Tories and Deserters In Alabama opposition to the Confederate government took two forms. One was the rebellious opposition of the . so-called "unionists" or "tories," who later joined with the deserters from the army ; the other was the legal or constitutional opposition of the old cooperation or anti-secession party, which maintained an unfriendly attitude toward the Confederate administration, though the great majority of its members were loyal to the southern cause. From this second class arose a so-called "Peace Party," which desired to end the war on terms favorable to the South ; and from this, in turn, when later it was known that such terms could not be secured, sprang the semi-treasonable secret order — the "Peace Society." In 1864, the "tories" and the Peace Society began to work together. Pecul- iar social and political conditions will in part account for the strength and growth of the opposition in two sections of the state far removed from each other — in north Alabama and in southeast Alabama. CONDITIONS IN NORTH ALABAMA 109 Conditions in North Alabama To the convention of 1861 forty-four members from north Alabama were elected as cooperationists, that is, in favor of a union of the southern states, within the old Union, for the purpose of secur- ing their rights under the Constitution or of securing safe secession. They professed to be afraid of separate state secession as likely to lead to disintegration and war. Thirty-one of these cooperationists voted against the ordinance of secession, and twenty-four of them (mostly members from the northern hill counties) refused to sign the ordinance, though all expressed the intention to submit to the will of the majority, and to give the state their heartiest support. When war came all espoused the Confederate cause.' The coopera- tionist party as a whole supported the Confederacy faithfully, though nearly always in a more or less disapproving spirit toward the ad- ministration, both state and Confederate. North Alabama differed from other portions of the state in many ways. There was no railroad -connecting the country north of the mountains With the southern part of the state, and from the northern counties it was a journey of several days to reach the towns in cen- tral and south Alabama. Hence there was little intercourse between the people of the two sections, though the seat of government was in the central part of the state ; even to-day the intimacy is not close. For years it had been a favorite scheme of Alabama statesmen to build railroads and highways to connect more closely the two sec- tions.^ Geographically, this northern section of the state belonged to Tennessee. The people were felt to be slightly different in char- acter and sympathies from those of central and south Alabama, and whatever one section favored in public matters was usually opposed by the other. Even in the northern section the popula- tion was more or less divided. The people of the valley more closely resembled the west Tennesseeans, the great majority of them being planters, having little in common with the small farmers of the hill and mountain country, who were Hkc the east Tennesseeans. Of ^ D. P. Lewis of Lawrence, Jeremiah (or Jere) Clemens of Madison, and C. C. Sheets of Winston deserted later. 2 T. H. Clark, " Railroads and Highways," in the " Memorial Record of Alabama," Vol. I, pp. 322-323. no CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA the latter the extreme element was the class commonly known as "mountain whites" or "sand-mountain" people. These were the people who gave so much trouble during the war, as "tories," and from whom the loyal southerners of north Alabama suffered greatly when the country was stripped of its men for the armies. Yet it can hardly be said that j,aiLDERDAi:E-=f4gajgJMTOBBN i . _A they exercised much in- fluence on politics before the war. Their only repre- sentative in the conven- tion of 1 86 1 was Charles Christopher Sheets, who did not speak on the floor of the convention during the entire session. On the part of all in the northern counties there was a strong desire for delay in secession, and they were angered at the action of the convention in not submitting the ordi- nance to a popular vote for ratification or rejection. Many thought the course taken indicated a suspicion of them or fear of their action,, and this they re- sented. Their leaders in the convention expressed the belief that the ordinance would have easily obtained a majority if submitted to the popular vote.^ Much of the opposition to the ordinance of secession was due to the vague sectional dislike between the two parts of the state. It was felt that the ordinance was a south Alabama measure, and this was suf&cient reason for opposition by the northern section. Throughout the entire session a local sectional spirit dictated their 1 Smith, Clemens, Jemison, and Bulger, in Smith's " History and Debates of the Convention of 1861 " ; Hodgson, "Cradle of the Confederacy" ; Garrett, " Public Meu of Alabama." Deserters, 1SIS8-18S5. 'Tleconatruction" sentimDilt 186i-5 in same localities. CONDITIONS IN NORTH ALABAMA m course of obstruction.' In January and February of 1861, there was some talk among the discontented people of seceding from secession, of withdrawing the northern counties of Alabama and uniting with the counties of east Tennessee to form a new state, which should be called Nick-a-Jack, an Indian name common in East Tennessee.^ Geographically, this proceeding would have been correct, since these two parts of the country arc closely connected, the people were alike in character and sentiment, and the means of intercourse were better. The people of the valley and many others, however, had no sympathy with this scheme. Lacking the sup- port of the "politicians and no leaders appearing, the plan was aban- doned after the proclamation of Lincoln, April 10, 1861. Had the war been deferred a few months, it is almost certain that the discontented element of the population would have taken positive steps to embarrass the administration ; many beheved that recon- struction would take place. Only after four years of war was there after this any appreciable number of the people willing to listen again to such a proposition. In February, 1861, Jeremiah Clemens wrote that Yancey had been burned in efhgy in Limestone County (some- thing that might have happened at any time between 1845 ^^^ 1861) ; that some discontent still existed among the people, but that this was daily growing weaker, and unless something were done to excite it afresh, it would soon die out.^ Mr. John W. DuBose, a keen observer from the Cotton Belt, travelled on horseback through the northern hill counties during the winter of 1861 and 1862 as a Con- federate recruiting ofhcer. Thus he came into close contact with all classes of people, eating at their tables, sleeping in their beds, and in conversation learning their opinions and sentiments on public ^ See Smith's " History and Debates of the Convention of 1861 " ; Nicolay and Hay, "Lincoln," Vol. Ill, p. 186. ^ A. B. Hendren, mayor of Athens and editor of the Union Banner, wrote in 1861 to Secretary Walker, stating that he had strongly opposed secession, but was now con- vinced that it was right ; as mayor, he was committed to reconstruction, which he no longer favored ; he did not proclaim his new sentiments through his paper for fear of pecuniary loss, but people were becoming suspicious of his lukewarm reconstruction spirit. 0. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, pp. 181, 182. ' "Northern Alabama Illustrated," p. 47; Ku Klux Rept. Ala. Test., pp. 592, 824 ; Saunders, " Early Settlers " ; Brewer, " Alabama," p. 65 ; Garrett, " Public Men " ; Miller, "Alabama " ; Nicolay and Hay, Vol. Ill, p. 186 ; DuBose, "Life of Yancey," pp. 562, 563. 112 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA matters. He saw no man, he says, who was not devoted to the Con- federacy. Several of the first and best vohmteer regiments came from this section of the state, and in these regiments there were whole companies of men none of whom owned a slave. In order to preserve this spirit of loyalty in those who had been opposed to the policy of secession, Yancey and others, after the outbreak of the war, recommended a prompt invasion of the North.' Unionists, Tories, and Mossbacks Before secession, the term "unionist" was apphed to those who were opposed to secession and who wished to give the Union a longer trial. They were mostly the old Whigs, but many Democrats were among them. Then again . the cooperationists, who wanted delay and cooperation among the states before secession, were called "unionists." In short, the term was apphed to any one opposed to immediate secession. This fact deceived the people of the North, who beheved that the opposition party in the South was uncondi- tionally for the Union, and that it would remain in allegiance to the Union if secession were attempted. But after secession this "union" party disappeared. 1 See DuBose, " Life of Yancey," p. 563. The non-slaveholders in the Black Belt appear to have been more dissatisfied than those of the white counties at the outbreak of the vi^ar. May 13, 1861, William M. Brooks, who had presided over the secession convention, wrote from Perry County to President Davis in regard to the bad effect of the refusal to accept short-time volunteers. He said that though there were 20,000 slaves in Perry County, most of the whites were non-slaveholders. Some of the latter had been made to believe that the war was solsly to get more slaves for the rich, and many who had no love for slaveholders were declar- ing that they would " fight for no rich man's slave." The men who had enlisted were largely of the hill class, poor folks who left their work to go to camp and drill. Here, while their crops wasted, they lost their ardor, and when they heard that their one-year enlistment was not to be accepted, they began to murmur. They were made to believe by traitors that a rich man could enter the army for a year and then quit, while they had to enlist for the war. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. VIH, pp. 318-319. Horace Greeley in the Tribune was reported to have said : Large slaveholders were not secessionists, they resisted disunion ; those who had much at stake hesitated a long while ; it was not a " slaveholders' rebellion " ; it was really a rebellion of the non- slaveholders resident in the strongholds of slavery, springing from no love of slavery, but from the antagonism of race and the hatred of the idea of equality with the blacks involved in simple emancipation. — Ku Klux Rept., p. 519. There is a basis of truth in this. UNIONISTS, TORIES, AND MOSSBACKS 113 The "tories" were those who rebelled against the authority of the Confederate States. Some pf them were true "unionists" or "loyahsts," as they were called at the North. Most of them were not. The "mossback," who according to popular belief hid him- self in the woods until moss grew on his back, might or might not be a " tory. " If he were hostile to the Confederacy, he was a " tory " ; if he was simply keeping out of the way of the enrolling ofhcers, he was not a "tory, " but a plain "mossback" or " conscript." When too closely pressed he would either become a "tory" or enter the Confederate army, though he did not usually remain in it. The "deserter" was such from various reasons, and often became a "tory" as well; that is, he became hostile to the Confederacy. Often he was not hostile to the government, but was only hiding from service, and doing no other harm. The true "unionists" always claimed great numbers, even after the end of the war. The North listened to them and believed that old Whigs, Know-nothings, Anti-secessionists, Douglas Democrats, Bell and Everett men, co- operationists — all were at heart "Union" men. It was also claimed that the only real disunion element was the Breckenridge Democ- racy. Such, however, was not the case. Probably fewer of the old Whig party than of any other were disloyal to the Confederacy. So far as the "tory" or "loyalist" had any politics, he was proba- bly a Democrat, and the more prominent of them had been Douglas Democrats. The others were Douglas and Breckenridge Demo- crats from the Democratic stronghold — north Alabama."- Very few, if any. Bell and Everett men were among them. The small lower class had no party affihations worth mentioning. During the war, the terms "unionist" and "tories" were very elastic and covered a multitude of sins against the Union, against the Confeder- ate 'States, and against local communities. With the exception of those who entered the Federal army the "tories" were, in a way, traitors to both sides. North Alabama was not so strongly opposed 1 North Alabama before the war was overwhelmingly Democratic and was called " The Avalanche " from the way it overran the Whiggish counties of the southern and central sections. This was shown in the convention, where representation was based on the white vote. Since the war representation in the conventions is based on population, and the Black Belt has controlled the white counties. " Northern Alabama Illustrated," pp. 251, 756. See also DuBose, "Yancey," p. 562. I 114 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA to secession as was east Tennessee/ nor were the Alabama "unio ists" or "loyalists," as they called themselves, "tories" as oth people called them, of as good character as the "loyalists" of Te nessee. The Alabama tory was, as a rule, of the lowest class of the pop' lation, chiefly the "mountain whites" and the "sand-mountain people, who were shut off from the world, a century behind tl times, and who knew scarcely anything of the Union or of the que tions at issue. There was a certain social antipathy felt by the: toward the lowland and valley people, whether in south or in norl Alabama, and a blind antagonism to the "nigger lord, " as they calle the slaveholder, wherever he was found. In this feeling the wome were more bitter than the men. Secluded and ignorant, they di not feel it their duty to support a cause in which they were not direct concerned, and most of them would have preferred to remain neutr; during the entire war, as there was little for them to gain either wa As long as they did not have to leave their hills, they were quiet, bi when, the enrolling officers went after them, they became dangerou To-day those people are represented by the makers of " moonshine whiskey and those who shoot revenue officers. They were "mooi shiners" then. Colonel S. A. M. Wood, who caught a band ( thirty of these "tories," reported to General Bragg, "They ai the most miserable, ignorant, poor, ragged devils I ever saw.'' Many of the "tories" became bushwhackers, preying impartial on friend and foe, and especially on the people of the rich Tenness( valley.^ Growth of Disaffection The invasion of the Tennessee valley had discouraging effec on the weaker element of the population, and caused many to tal a rather degrading position in order to secure Federal protectic 1 Professor George W. Duncan of Auburn, Ala., and many others have givi me information in regard to the people in that section. See also H. Mis. Doc. No. A 39th Cong., 1st Sess. ; N. Y. Tribune, Nov. 14, 1862. ^ O. R., Ser. I, Vol. Ill, p. 249. For much information concerning the conditio in north Alabama during the vizx, I am indebted to Professor O. D. Smith of t: Alabama Polytechnic Institute, a native of Vermont vi'ho was then a Confedera Bonded Treasury Agent and travelled extensively over that part of the country. 3 Reid, •■ After the War," pp. 348-350 ; Saunders, " Early Settlers," pp. 115, 16 Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. I, pp. 182, 208. GROWTH OF DISAFFECTION "5 for themselves and their property. To call the tones and those who submitted and took the oath "unionists" would be honoring them too highly. Little true "Union" sentiment or true devotion to the United States existed except on the part of those who enhsted in the Federal armies. In October, 1862, C. C. Clay, Jr., wrote to the Secretary of War at Richmond that the Federal invasion had resulted in open defiance of Confederate authority on the part of some who beheved that the Confederacy was too weak to protect or punish. Even loyal southerners were afraid to be active for fear of a return of the Union troops. Some had sold cotton to the Federals during their occupation, bought it for them, acted as agents, spies, and informers; and now these men openly declared for the Union and signed calls for Union meetings. Huntsville, Mr. Clay stated, was the centre of disaffection.^ But in April, 1863, a northern cotton speculator reported that there were but few "true Union men" at Huntsville or in the vicinity.^ Though not fully in sympathy with the secession movement, the majority of the people in the northern counties acquiesced in the action of the state, and many volunteers entered the army. Until late in the war this district sent as many men in proportion to popu- lation as any other section, and the men made good soldiers. But with the opening of the Tennessee and the passage of the conscrip- tion laws the mountaineers aijd the hill people became troublesome. To avoid concription they hid themselves. Their families, with their slender resources, were soon in want of the necessaries of life, which they began to obtain by raids on their more fortunate neigh- bors in the river valleys. A few entered the Federal army. In July, 1862, small parties came to Decatur, in Morgan County, from the mountains and joined the Federal forces under the command of Colonel 'Streight. They told him of others who wished to enlist, so Streight made an expedition to Davis Gap, in the mountains south of Decatur, and secured 150 recruits. These formed the nucleus of the First Alabama Union Cavalry, of which George E. Spencer of Ohio, afterward notorious in Alabama politics, was colonel. At this time C. C. Sheets, who said that he had been in hiding, appeared and made a speech encouraging all to enlist. Streight said that the "unionists" were poor people, 1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 141. 142- '^ O- R-. Ser. I, Vol. X, Ft. II, p. 638. Il6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA often destitute. There were, he reported, about three "unionists" to one "secessionist" in parts of Morgan, Blount, St. Clair, Winston, Walker, Marion, Taylor, and Jefferson counties, and he thought two full regiments could be raised near Decatur. Though so few in numbers, the "secessionists" seem to have made it lively for the "unionists," for Streight reported that the "unionists" were much persecuted by them and often had to hide themselves.' The Con- federate commander at Newberne, in Greene County, reported (Jan- uary, 1862) that in an adjoining county the "Union" men were secretly organizing, that 300 had met, elected officers, and gone into camp.^ A month later, Lieutenant-Commander Phelps of the United States navy, after his river raid to Florence (1862), reported that along the Tennessee the "Union" sentiment was strong, and that men, women, and children in crowds welcomed the boats. How- ever, he adds that they were very guarded in their conversation. It may be that he mistook curiosity for "Union" sentiment. Another naval officer reported that the fall of Fort Donelson was beneficial to the Union cause in north Alabama. Neither of these observers landed, and their observations were limited to the river banks.^ In June, 1862, Governor Shorter said that much dissatisfaction existed in several of the northern counties,* and in December, 1862, that Randolph County was defying the enforcement of the conscript law, and armed forces were releasing deserters from jail. Colonel Hannon was at length sent with a regiment and suppressed for a time the disloyal element.^ September 21, 1862, General Pillow reported to Seddon that there were 8000 to 10,000 deserters and tory con- scripts in the mountains of north Alabama, as "vicious as copper- heads." ° In April, 1863, a civilian of influence and position wrote to General Beauregard that the counties of north Alabama were full of tories. During 1862, he stated, a convention had been held in the corner of Winston, Fayette, and Marion counties, in which the people had resolved to remain neutral. He believed that this meant that when the enemy appeared the so-called neutrals would 1 Moore, "Anecdotes, Poetry, and Incidents of the War,'' p. 215 (Letters from the chaplain of Streight's regiment) ; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, pp. 124, 785 (Streight's Report) ; Miller, " Alabama " ; Jones, " Diary," Vol. I, pp. 182-208. 2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, p. 840. 3 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, pp. 153-156, 424. ■> O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. H49. « O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 258. 6 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 819-821. GROWTH OF DISAFFECTION 117 join them, for they openly carried United States flags.' A simi- lar convention was held in north Alabama (apparently in Winston County) in the spring of 1863. A staff officer reported to General Beauregard (May, 1864) that in the counties of Lawrence, Blount, and Winston, Federal recruiting agents for mounted regiments car- ried on open correspondence with the disaffected citizens,^ appar- ently with httle success, for although disaffection and hostility to the Confederacy among the people of north Alabama had continued for three years, and there was every opportunity for entering the Federal army, yet the official statistics give the total number of enlist- ments and reenlistments (5f whites from Alabama at 2576.' In 1862 deserters from the army began to gather in the more remote districts of the state. Many of them had been enrolled under the conscript law, and had become dissatisfied. As the war went on the number of these deserters increased, until their presence in the state became a menace to government. After the Confederate reverses in the summer of 1863, great numbers of deserters and stragglers from all of the Confederate armies east of the Mississippi River and from the Union armies collected among the hills, moun- tains, and ravines of north Alabama. A large portion of them became outlaws of the worst character. In August, 1863, the general assembly passed a law directing the state officials and the militia officers to assist the Confederate enrolling officers in enforcing the conscript law, and in returning deserters to their commands. The state and county jails were offered as places to confine the deserters until they could be sent back to the army. To give food and shelter to deserters was declared a felony, and civihans were authorized to arrest them.^ The deserters and stragglers of north Alabama were well armed and somewhat organized, and kept the people in terror. General Pillow thought that the temporary suspension of the conscript law had made them bolder. Eleven counties were infested with them. No ma;n was safe in traveUing along the roads, for murders, robberies, and burnings were common, and peaceable citizens were shot while 1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, p. 431. = O, R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. II, p. 57. ' The official statement of the War Department. See also " Confederate Military History," Vol. XII, p. 502. * Act of General Assembly, Aug. 29, 1863. Il8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA at work in the fields. It was estimated that in July, 1863, there were 8000 to 10,000 tories and deserters in the mountains of north Alabama, and these banded themselves together to kill the officers sent to arrest them. It was impossible to keep a certain class of men in the army when they were encamped near their homes.^ Even good soldiers, when so stationed, sometimes deserted. Had these same men been in the Army of Northern Virginia, they would have done their duty well. But here, near their home, many influences led them to desert. There was httle fighting, and they could see no reason why they should be kept away from their suffering families. General Pillow, in the fall of 1863, forced several thousand deserters and stragglers from Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas, who were in hiding in north Alabama, to return to their commands. The legislature commended his work and asked that his jurisdiction be extended over a larger area, even over the whole Confederacy.^ In April, 1864, the Ninth Texas Cavalry was sent against the "union- ists" in Marion County. The colonel reported that the number of tories had been greatly exaggerated, though the woods seemed to be swarming with deserters, and he learned that they had a secret organization.^ The deserters always infested the wildest and most remote parts of the country, and were found wherever disaffection toward the Confederacy had appeared. The Texans, who had no local attachments to interfere with their duty, drove back into the army several thousand "stragglers," as the better class of deserters were called.^ General Polk reported (April, 1864) that in north Alabama formidable bands were being organized for resistance to the government, and that hostility to the Confederacy was openly proclaimed by them. He sent out detachments which forced more than a thousand men to leave the woods and hills and return to the army.^ When Alabama soldiers were captured or deserted to the en- emy, it was the custom of the Federals to send them north of the Ohio River, and to offer to enlist as many as possible in regiments to fight the Indians in the West. Some took advantage of the offer 1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 680. • 2 Joint Resolution, Dec. 4, 1863. 8 0. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXII, Pt. I, p. 671. * O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXII, Pt. I, p. 671, and Vol. XXXIII, Pt. Ill, pp. 570, 683, 856. 5 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, Pt. Ill, pp. 825, 826, 856. OUTRAGES BY TORIES AND DESERTERS 119 and thus avoided prison Kfe. Such men were called "galvanized Yankees" and were hated by the loyal soldiers. Early in 1865, J. J. Giers, a prominent tory, wrote General Grant that if Alabama deserters were permitted to remain near home their numbers would Outrages by Tories and Deserters The tory and the deserter often led squads of Federal sol- diers on expeditions of destruction and pillage. When possible, they would burn the county court-houses, jails, and other pubHc buildings, with the books and records of the counties. Sometimes disguised as Union troops, they committed the worst outrages. On one occasion four men, dressed as soldiers, went to the house of an old man named Wilson, three miles from Florence, and searched it for money supposed to be hidden there. As the old man would tell them nothing, they stripped him to the waist, tied him face downward upon a table, tore leaves from a large Bible, and, piHng them on him, burned him to death. His nephew, unable to tell about the money, was shot and killed. A grandson was shot and wounded, and left for dead. The overseer, coming up, was shot and killed in spite of the appeals of his wife. Senator R. M. Patton had the wounded boy taken to Florence, where the same band came the next night and demanded him. Upon being refused, they fired repeatedly into the house until they were driven away. They then went to the house of a druggist, and, failing to find money, burned him as they had Wilson. Though fearfully burned, he survived. Two of the band, natives of Florence, were captured, court-mar- tialled by the Federal authorities, and hanged.^ Twenty Federals, or disguised tories, led by a tory from Madison County, killed an old man, his son, a nephew and his son, and wounded a fifth person, who was then thrown into the Tennessee River. When he caught the bush on the bank, he was beaten and shot until he turned loose. An enroUing officer was made to wade out into the river, and then was shot from the bank. An overseer who had 1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, p. 659. 2 Somers, "The Southern States since the War," p. 135 ; Montgomery Advertiser, Aug. 17, igo2; N. Y. Tribune, Feb. 10, 1865; Freemantle, "Three Months in the Southern States." 120 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA hidden some stock was hanged. A Confederate officer was robbed of several thousand dollars and driven from the country.^ The tories, who were often deserters from the armies, gathered in the hill country and watched for an opportunity to descend into the valley to rob, burn, and murder. One family had the following experience with Federal troops or "unionists": On the first raid six mules, five horses, a wagon, and fifty-two negroes were taken; on the second, the remainder of the mules, a cart, the milch cows, some meat, and the cooking utensils. On the third the wagons were loaded with the last of the meat, and all of the sugar, coffee, molasses, flour, meal, and potatoes. The mother of the family told the officer in charge that they were taking away their only means of subsist- ence, and that the family would starve. "Starve and be d — d," was the reply. Then the buggy and the carriage harness and cushions were taken, and the carriage cut to pieces. The. house was searched for money. Closets and trunks were broken open, the offer of keys being refused. Clothing and bedding, dishes, knives and forks were taken, and whatever could not be carried was broken. The "Destroying Angels," as they called themselves, then burned the gin-house and cotton press with one hundred and twenty-five bales of cotton, seven cribs of corn, stables, and stacks of fodder, a wagon, four negro cabins, the lumber room, $500 worth of thread, axes, hoes, scythe-blades, and other plantation implements. They started to burn the dwelling house, but the woman pleaded that it was the only shelter for her children and herself. "You may thank your good fortune, madam, that we have left you and your d — d brats with your heads to be sheltered," answered one of the "Destroying Angels." Then an officer galloped up, claimed to be much astonished, and ordered away the men.^ The tories or "unionists" of the mountains, instead of join- ing the Federal army, formed bands of "Destroying Angels," "Prowhng Brigades," etc., to prey upon their lowland neighbors. All the able-bodied loyal men were in the army, and there were no defenders. During the Federal occupation these marauders har- assed the country. When the Confederates temporarily occupied 1 Moore, " Rebellion Record," Vol. VII, p. 45; Freemantle, p. 141. 2 Freemantle, "Three Months in the Southern States," p. 141, quoted from a local newspaper; accounts of eye-witnesses. OUTRAGES BY TORIES AND DESERTERS 12 1 the country, they tried to drive out the brigands, whence arose the "persecution of unionists" that we read about. Thousands of Confederate sympathizers were driven from their homes during the Federal occupation in 1862. When the Union army retreated in 1862, attempts at retaliation were made by those who had suffered, but this was strictly suppressed by the state and Confederate authori- ties. An officer was dismissed for cruelty to "unionists," and the state troops destroyed a band of deserters and guerillas who were preying upon the "union" people in the mountain districts. Marion, Walker, and Winston counties were especially infested with tories.^ In 1864, when there were few Confederate troops in north Alabama, the tories were very troublesome in De Kalb, Marshall, Marion, Winston, Walker, Lawrence, and Fayette counties, and the poor people were largely under their control. Among the hills were deserters from both armies, and these, banded with the tory element, reduced the helpless poor whites to submission. These men were few in comparison with the total population, but most of the able-bodied loyal men were in the army, and the tories and deserters were almost unchecked.^ Sometimes the Confederate soldiers from north Alabama would get furloughs, come home, and clear the country of tories, who had been terrorizing the JDCople. Short work was made of them when the soldiers found them. Some were shot, others were hanged, and the remainder driven out of the country for a time.' After their occupation of north Alabama, the Federal commanders were embarrassed by the violent clamorings of the "unionists" for revenge, and for superior privileges over the non-unionist popula- tion. Material advantage and personal dislikes were too often the basic principles of their unionism. They were extremely vindictive, demanding that all Confederate sympathizers be driven from the country. Thus they made themselves a nuisance to the Federal officers, and especially was this true of the small lowland tory ele- ment. Subjugation, banishment, hanging, confiscation, — was the programme planned by the " loyalists." They wanted the country "pacified" and then turned over to themselves. Though they 1 Miller, passim; Somers, "Southern States," p. 135. 2 Miller, p. 193 ; Moore, " Rebellion Record," Vol. VII, p. 357. ' Saunders, "Early Settlers," pp. 115, 164. 122 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA claimed to be numerous, no instance is found where they proposed to do anything for themselves; they seemed to think that the sole duty of the United States army in Alabama was to look after their interests. The northerners who had deahngs with the " loyalist " did not like him, as he was a most unpleasant person, with a griev- ance which could not be righted to his satisfaction without giving rise to numerous other grievances. Some qualifications of loyalty seem to have been : a certain mild disapproval of secession, a refusal to enlist in the Confederate army or desertion after enlisting, hiding in the woods to avoid conscript officers. These qualifications, or any of them, the "loyalist" thought entitled him to the everlasting gratitude and protection of the United States. But a newspaper correspondent, who was on a sliarp look- out for all signs of weakness in the Confederacy, said: "You can tell the southern loyalists as far as you can see them. They all have black or yellow skins and kinky hair." Sometimes, he added, there was a white "unionist," but this was rare, and the exceptions in any town in north Alabama could be counted on the fingers of one hand.^ As long as the war lasted the lawless element fared well, and when peace should come they hoped for a division of the spoils.^ Disaffection in South Alabama So much for toryism in the northern part of the state. There were also manifestations of a disloyal spirit in the extreme inaccessible corner of .the state next to Florida and Georgia, where the popu- lation of the sparsely settled country was almost entirely non-slave- holding. Though most of the people were Democrats, they were somewhat opposed to secession. Delegates were elected, however, to the convention of 1861, who voted for secession, and after the war began nearly or quite all of those who had opposed secession heartily supported the Confederacy. If there were any "union" men, they 1 This correspondent defined a " unionist " or " loyalist " as one truly devoted to the Union and who had never wavered, thus excluding from consideration those who had gone with the Confederacy and later become disappointed. Boston Journal, Nov. 15, 1864; N. Y. Herald, April 7, 1864; The Tribune, Nov. 14, 1862; N. Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1862; Tharin, "The Alabama Refugee." 2 7/ie World, Feb. 15, 1865. DISAFFECTION IN SOUTH ALABAMA 123 kept very quiet, and for two years there was no trouble.* But during the winter of 1862-1863, numerous outrages were committed by outlaws who were called, indiscriminately, tories and deserters. Much trouble was given by an organization called the First Florida Union Cavalry, which for two years committed various outrages while on bushwhacking expeditions under the leadership of one Joseph Sanders. After being soundly beaten one night by the citizens of Newton, in Dale County, these marauders were less trouble- some.^ The country near the Gulf coast was infested with tories, deserters, and runaway slaves, concealed in caves, "tight-eyes,"^ canebrakes, swamps, and the thick woods of the sparsely settled country. In January, 1863, Governor Shorter wrote to President Davis that nearly all the loyal population of southeast Alabama was in the army, and that the country was suffering from the out- rages of tories and deserters. About the same time. Colonel Price "suppressed unionism and treason in Henry County," though only one prisoner was reported as being taken.^ In August of the same year (1863) conditions had grown worse. General Howell Cobb reported that there was a disloyal feeling in southeast Alabama, but that there was no way to reach the offenders, as they were guilty of no overt act, and therefore the military courts could not try them. To turn them over to the civil authorities in that district would secure only a farcical trial, and the justices of the peace, though assuming the highest jurisdiction, were ignorant, and there was little chance of conviction. At this time. Governor Shorter said that affairs in lower Henry County were in bad condition; that the deserter element was strong and threatened the security of loyal people ; and that the soldiers were afraid to leave their, famihes.' A judge could not hold court unless he had a military escort. During the next year matters grew worse in this section as well as in north Alabama. Some of the best soldiers felt compelled to go home, even without permission, to protect or to support their 1 Information in regard to affairs in southeast Alabama during the war I have ob- tained from relatives (all of whom were " Union " men before the war) and from neigh- bors who were acquainted with the conditions in that section of the country. 2 Miller, " Alabama." Sanders had been a Confederate officer. ^ Thickets which the eye could not penetrate. * O. R., Ser. I, Vol. LII, p. 403. 5 O. R.; Ser. I, Vol. XXVIII, Ft. II, p. 273 ; Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 1043. 124 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA families; and in October, 1864, the legislature recognized this con- dition of affairs, and asked the Alabama soldiers, then absent without leave, to return to their duty under promise of lenient treatment.' The worst depredations were committed during the winter of 1864-1865, in the counties of Dale, Henry, and Coffee. The loyal people in the thinly settled country were terrorized. The legislature, unable to protect them, authorized them to band themselves together in military form for protection against the outlaws. These bands of self-constituted "Home Guards," composed of boys and old men, captured numbers of the outlaws and straightway hanged them. Desertions from the regiments raised in the white counties were often caused by denying to recruits or conscripts the privilege of choosing the command in which they should serve. Others deserted because their families were exposed to tory depredations and Federal raids, or were in want of the necessaries of life. These would have returned to the army after providing for their families had they been permitted to join other organizations and not subjected to punish- ment. Assigned arbitrarily to commands in need of recruits, some became dissatisfied, and deserted. A deserter was an outlaw and found it impossible to remain neutral. Hence many joined the bands of outlaws to pillage, and burn, and steal horses and cattle. Others of better character joined the Federals or became tories, that is, allied themselves with the original tories in order to work against the Confederacy. Numbers of these disaffected people had once been secessionists.^ Prominent Tories and Deserters In view of the fact that the "unionists" were to play an important part in Reconstruction, it will be of interest to examine the records of the most prominent tories and deserters. A few prominent men joined the Federals during the course of the war, though none did so before the Union army occupied the Tennessee valley. Only one of these tried to assume any leadership over the so-called union- 1 Joint Resolution, Oct. 7, 1864. J. J. Seibels proposed to raise a regiment for state defence of men under and over military age. He wanted, also, to get the skulkers who could not otherwise be obtained. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 604. 2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 1042, 1043 (Solicitor James N. Arrington and Attorney- General M. A. Baldwin). PROMINENT TORIES AND DESERTERS 125 ists. This was WilKam H, Smith, who had come within a few votes of being elected to the Confederate Congress, and was later the first Reconstruction governor. He went over to the enemy in 1862, and did much toward securing the enlistment of the 2576 Union soldiers from Alabama. At the same time, a more important character, General Jeremiah Clemens,' who had been in command of the mihtia of Alabama with the rank of major-general, became disgruntled and went over to the enemy. In the secession convention, Clemens had declared that he "walked deliberately into rebeUion" and was prepared for all its consequences.^ He first opposed, then voted for, the ordinance of secession, and afterwards accepted the office of commander of the militia under the "Repubhc of Alabama." For a year Clemens was loyal to the "rebelhon,".but in 1862 he had seen the light and wished to go to Washington as the representative of north Alabama to learn from President Lincoln in what way the controversy might be ended. The Washington administration, by that time, had httle faith in any following he might have, and when Clemens with John Bell started to Washington, Stanton advised them to stay at home and- use their influence for the Union.^ George W. Lane, also of Madison County, was a prominent man who cast his lot with the Federals. Lane never recognized secession, and was an outspoken Unionist from the beginning. He was ap- pointed Federal judge by Lincoln and died in 1864.^ In April, 1861, Clemens wrote to the Confederate Secretary of War that the acceptance of a United States judgeship by Lane was treason, and that the "north Alabama men would gladly hang him." ^ General O. M. Mitchell seemed to think that the negroes were the only "truly loyal," but he recommended in May, 1862, that, when a mihtary government should be established in Alabama, George W. Lane, ^ Qemens was a cousin of " Mark Twain." He was fond of drink, and once when William L. Yancey asked him not to drink so much, he answered that he was obliged to drink his genius down to a level with Yancey's. 2 N. Y. Tribune, May 23, 1865. See Smith, "Debates," Index. ' O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, pp. 167, 168, 174, 178. Qemens had been captain, major, and colonel of the Thirteenth United States Infantry. From 1849 to 1853 he was United States Senator. He died in Philadelphia a few years after the war. Gar- rett, "Public Men of .'\labama," pp. 176-179. * Brewer, "Alabama," p. 364. ' O. R., Ser. I, Vol. LIT, Pt. II, p. 35. 126 CIVIL. WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA the United States district judge appointed by Lincoln, be appointed military governor. Lane's faded United States flag still flew from the staff to which he had nailed it at the beginning of the war, and his appointment as governor, Mitchell thought, would give the greatest satisfaction to Huntsville and to all north Alabama.^ Two members of the convention of 1861, besides Clemens, de- serted to the Federals. These were C. C. Sheets and D. P. Lewis. Like Clemens, they were elected as cooperationists and opposed immediate secession, though all three voted for the resolution declar- ing that Alabama would not submit to the rule of Lincoln. Sheets voted against secession and would not sign the ordinance. For a while he remained quietly at home and refused to enter the Con- federate army. At length he reappeared from his place of hiding and assisted in recruiting soldiers -for. the First Alabama Union Cavalry. He was elected to the state legislature, but in 1862 was expelled for disloyalty. After some time in hiding, he was arrested, and imprisoned for treason. General Thomas retaliated by arrest- ing and holding as a hostage General McDowell. Sheets remained in prison until the end of the war.^ David P. Lewis of Madison County voted against secession but signed the ordinance, and was elected to the Provisional Congress by the convention, and in 1863 was appointed circuit judge by the governor. This position he held for a few months, and then deserted to the Federals. During the remainder of the war he lived quietly at Nashville.^ Another prominent citizen of Madison County, Judge D. C. Humphreys, joined the Federals late in the war. Humphreys had been in the Confederate army and had resigned. He was arrested by General Roddy on the charge of disloyalty. It is not known that he was ever tried or put into prison, but in January, 1865, Hon. C. C. Clay, Sr., and other prominent citizens of Huntsville, of southern sympathies, all old men, were arrested and carried to prison in Nash- ville as hostages for the safety of Humphreys, who had been released 1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, pp. 1 61-163. 2 "Northern Alabama Illustrated," p. 327; Acts of Alabama, 1862, p. 225; Moore, "Anecdotes, Poetry, and Incidents of the War," p. 215. ^ Lewis became the second " Radical " or scalawag governor of Alabama, serving from 1872 to 1874. Miller, "Alabama," pp. 260, 261 ; Brewer, "Alabama," p. 368. NUMBERS OF THE DISAFFECTED 12/ by order of the Confederate War Department as soon as the rumor of his arrest reached Richmond.^ In April, 1864, General Clanton, commanding in north Alabama, sent Governor Watts a Nashville paper in which Jeremiah Clemens, "the arch traitor," and that "crazy man," Humphreys, figured as advisers to their fellow- citizens of Alabama in recommending submission.^ There are indications that several such addresses were issued by Clemens, Humphreys, Lane, and others from the safety of the Federal lines, but the text of none of them has been found except those written and pubhshed when the war was nearly ended. Of the men of position and influence who were, found in the ranks of opposition to the Confederate government after 1861, Judge Lane is the only one whose course can command respect. He was faithful to the Union from first to last, while the others were erratic persons who changed sides because of personal spites and disap- pointments. They had httle or no influence over, and nothing in common with, the dissatisfied mountain people and the tories and deserters. Numbers of the Disaffected At the surrender the deserters came in in large numbers to be paroled. The reports of the Federal generals who received the surrender of the Confederate armies in the southwest show a sur- prisingly large number of Confederates paroled. A large proportion of them were deserters, "mossbacks," and tories, who, hated by the Confederate soldiers and fearing that the latter would seek revenge for their misdeeds during the war, felt that it would be some protec- tion to take the oath, be paroled, and secure the certificate. Then, they thought, the United States government would see to their safety. At the surrender of a Confederate command in their vicinity, they flocked in from their retreats and were paroled as Confederate sol- 1 O. R., Ser. II, Vol. VIII, p. 86. 2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXX, Pt. Ill, pp. 750-75I- 3 It is a notable fact that among the disaffected persons of prominence there were none of the old Whigs, or Bell and Everett men. Nearly all were Douglas Democrats. The Bell and Everett people so conducted themselves during the war that afterwards they were as completely disfranchised and out of politics as were the Breckenridge Democrats. The work of reconstruction under the Johnson plan fell mainly to the former Douglas Democrats and the lesser Whigs. 128 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA diers. To show how large this element in Mississippi and Alabama was, when General Dick Taylor surrendered, May 4, 1865, at Merid- ian, Mississippi, he had not more than 8000 real soldiers, or men under arms. It is possible, though not probable, that many were absent with leave. Yet of the 42,293 soldiers paroled in the artnies of the Southwest ^ about 30,000 of them were at Meridian. Many of these had never been in the army; some had served in both armies; none had been in either for a long time. For weeks they kept coming in at all points where a United States officer was sta- tioned in order to be paroled. The soldiers were furious. The statistics show ^ that strong Confederate armies were surrendered in this section of the country, when, as a matter of fact, the governor of Alabama had for two years been unable to secure sufficient mihtary support to enforce the laws over more than half of the state.^ It is difficult to estimate the number of disaffected persons within the limits of the state. Probably in southeast Alabama there were in all, of tories and deserters, 1000 who at times were actively hostile to the Confederate authorities, and who committed depredations on the loyal people, and 1000 or 1500 more would include the "moss- backs" and obstructionists, who were without the courage to do more than keep out of the army and talk sedition. In addition to the 2576 enlistments in the Federal army credited to Alabama, it is probable that several hundred more were enlisted in northern regiments. Some of these were the Confederate prisoners captured late in "the war and enlisted as "Galvanized Yankees" in the United States regiments sent West to fight the Indians. Of deserters, tories, and "mossbacks" there could not have been less than 8000 or 10,000 in north Alabama. Of these, at least half were in active depredation all over the section. There were several thousand deserters from the Alabama troops, most of them from north Alabama and from commands stationed near their homes. At the beginning of the war there were, probably no more than 2000 1 Report of the Secretary of War, 1865, Vol. I, p. 45 ; "Confederate Military His- tory," Vol. XII, p. 501. 2 Report of the Secretary of War, Vol. I, p. 45 ; " Confederate Military History," Vol. XII, p. 501. ^ I am indebted to old soldiers for descriptions of conditions in north and west Alabama before and following Taylor's surrender. All agree in their accounts of the conditions in Alabama and Mississippi at that time. NUMBERS OF THE DISAFFECTED 129 men who were wholly disaffected/ and these only to the extent of desiring neutrahty for themselves. On November 30, 1864, the Confederate "Deserter Book" showed that since April, 1864, 7994 Alabama soldiers had deserted or been absent without leave from the armies of the West and of Northern Virginia. Of these 4323 were again in the ranks, leaving still to be accounted for 3671 men. There were many deserters in the hills of Alabama from the commands from other states. After the fall of Atlanta, the number of stragglers and deserters greatly in- creased, and late in 1864 it was estimated that 6000 of them were in the state, some in every county; there being no longer a force to drive them back to the army. For a year or more the force for this purpose had been very weak.^ Much of the toryism and of the trouble resulting from it was due to the weak pohcy of the Confederate authorities in deahng with discontent and in protecting the loyal people in exposed dis- tricts. Many a man had to desert in order to protect his family from outlaws, and was then easily driven into toryism. There was a mild annoyance of the more peaceable tories by the Confederate officials in the spasmodic attempts to enforce the conscription laws, but it amounted to very little. The loyal southern people suffered more from the depredations of the disaffected "union" people of north and southeast Alabama than the latter suffered from all causes combined. The state and Confederate authorities were very lenient — too much so — in their treatment of these people. There was no great need of a strong Confederate force in north Alabama, since only raids, not invasions in force, were to be feared ; yet the governments — both state and Confederate — were guilty of neglect in leaving so many of the people at the mercy of the outlaws when, as shown in several instances, two or three thousand good soldiers could march through the country and scatter the bands that infested it. Assuming that the state had a right to demand obedience and support from its citizens, it was weak and ^ These estimates are based on half a hundred other estimates made during the war by state, Confederate, and Federal officials, and by other observers, and from estimates made by persons familiar with conditions at that time. They are rather too small than too large. 0. R., Ser. IV, Vols. I to Vf passim. 2 O. R., Ser. IV, pp. 880, 881. K I30 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA reprehensible conduct on the part of the authorities to allow three or four thousand malcontents and outlaws to demoralize a third of the state. Often the families of tories and "mossbacks" were supphed from the state and county stores for the destitute families of soldiers, while the men of such famihes were in the Federal service or were hiding in the woods, caves, and ravines, or were plundering the families of loyal soldiers. Not enough arrests were made, and too many were released. The majority of the troublesome class was of the kind who preferred to take no stand that incurred the fulfilment of obhgations. In an emergency they would inchne toward the stronger side. Prompt and rigorous measures, similar to the policy of the United States in the Middle West, stringently maintained, would have converted this source of weakness into a source of strength, or at least would have rendered it harmless. The military resources of that section of the state could then have been better developed, the helpless people protected, outlaws crushed, and there would have been peace after the war was ended.' As it was, the animosities then aroused smouldered on until they flamed again in one phase of the Ku Klux movement.^ Sec. 5. Party Politics and the Peace Movement Political Conditions, 1861-1865 When, by the passage of the ordinance of January 11, 1861, the advocates of immediate secession had gained their end, the strong men of the victorious party, for the sake of harmony, stood aside, and intrusted much of the important work of organizing the new government to the defeated cooperationist party, who, to say the least, disapproved of the whole pohcy of the victors. The delegates chosen to the Provisional Congress were : R. H. Walker of Hunts- ville, a Union Whig, who had supported Bell and Everett and opposed secession ; Robert H. Smith, a pronounced Whig, who had supported Bell and Everett and opposed secession ; Colin J. McRae of Mobile, a commission merchant, a Whig; John Gill Shorter of Eufaula, who had held judicial ofi&ce for nine years; William P. Chilton of Montgomery, for several years chief justice and before that an active Whig; Stephen F. Hale of Eutaw, a Whig who supported Bell and 1 See also Pollard, " Lost Cause," p. 563 ; Schwab, p. 190. 2 See below, Ch. XXI. Governor Thomas H. Watts. Governor John Gill Shorter. Governor Andrew B. Moore. Bishop R. H. Wilmer. CIVIL WAR LEADERS. POLITICAL CONDITIONS, 1861-1865 13 1 Everett; David P. Lewis of Lawrence, an "unconditional Unionist" who had opposed secession in the convention of 1861, and who, in 1862, deserted to the Federals; Dr. Thomas Feam of Huntsville, an old man, a Union Whig; and J. L. M. Curry of Talladega, the only consistent Democrat of the delegation, the only one who had voted for Breckenridge, and the only one with practical experience in public affairs. The delegation was strong in character, but weak in political ability and not energetic.^ The delegation elected to the first regular Congress was more representative and more able. In August, 1861, John Gill Shorter, a State Rights Democrat, was elected governor by a vote of 57,849 to 28,127 over Thomas Hill Watts, also a State Rights Democrat, who had voted for secession, but who had formerly been a Whig. Watts was not a regular candidate since he had forbidden the use of his name in the canvass.^ For a time the people enthusiastically supported the administration. Gov- ernor Shorter's message of October 28, 1861, to the legislature closed with the words: "We may well congratulate ourselves and return thanks that a timely action on our part has saved our liberties, pre- served our independence, and given us, it is hoped, a perpetual sepa- ration from such a government. May we in all coming time stand separate from it, as if a wall of fire intervened." ' The legislature in 1 86 1 declared that it was the imperative duty as well as the patri- otic privilege of every citizen, forgetting past differences, to support the policy adopted and to maintain the independence assumed. To this cause the members of the general assembly pledged their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor.^ A year later the same body declared that Mobile, then threatened by the enemy, must never be desecrated by the polluting tread of the abolitionist foe. It must never be surrendered, but must be defended from street to street, from house to house, and at last burned to the ground rather than surrendered.^ The same legislature, elected in 1861 when the war feeling was strong, stated in August, 1863, that the war was unpro- voked and unjust on the part of the United States government, which ^ See DuBose, " Yancey," pp. 566, 567, and Brewer and Garrett under the names of the above. 2 Brewer, p. 126 ; Garrett, p. 723. " O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 709. * Joint Resolution, Acts of 1st Called Sess., 1861, p. 142. * Joint Resolution, Acts of Called Sess. and 2d Regular Sess., 1862, p. 202. 132 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA was conducting it in utter disregard of the principles which should control and regulate civilized warfare. They renewed the pledge never to submit to abolitionist rule. The people were urged not to be discouraged by the late reverses, nor to attribute their defeats to any want of courage or heroic self-sacrifice on the part of the armies. All the resources of the state were pledged to the cause of independence and perpetual separation from the United States. It was the paramount duty, the assembly declared, of every citizen to sustain and make effective the armies by encouraging enhstments, by furnishing supplies at low prices to the families of soldiers, and by upholding the credit of the Confederate government. To enfeeble the springs of action by disheartening the people and the soldiers was to strike the most fatal blow at the very life of the Confederacy.' This resolution was called forth partly by the constant criticism that the "cross-roads" politicians and a few individuals of more im- portance were directing against the civil and military policy of the administration. The doughty warriors of the ofifice and counter were sure that the "Yankees" should have been whipped in ninety days. That the war was still going on was proof to them that those at the head of affairs were incompetent. These people had never before had so good an opportunity to talk and to be listened to. Those to whom the people had been accustomed to look for guid- ance were no longer present to advise. They had marched away with the armies, and there were left at home as voters the old men, the exempts, the lame, the halt, and the blind, teachers, preachers, offi- cials, "bomb-proofs," "feather beds" ^ — all, in short, who were most unlikely to favor a vigorous war policy and who, if subject to service, wanted to keep out of the army. Consequently, among the voting population at home, the war spirit was not as high in 1863 as it had been before so many of the best men enlisted in the army.^ The occu- pation of north Alabama by the enemy, short crops in 1862, and reverses in the field such as Vicksburg and Gettysburg, had a chilling 1 Acts of Called Sess. and 3d Regular Sess., 1863, p. 52. 2 A " bomb-proof" was a person who secured a safe position in order to keep out of service in the field. A " feather bed " was one who stayed at home with good excuse, — a teacher, agriculturist, preacher, etc., who had only recently been called to such profession. 8 By act of the legislature soldiers in the field were to vote, but no instance is found of their having done so. POLITICAL CONDITIONS, 1861-1865 133 effect on the spirit of those who had suffered or were likely to suffer. The conscription law was unpopular among those forced into the service; it was much more disHked by those who succeeded for a time in escaping conscription. These lived in constant fear that the time would come when they would be forced to their duty.^ Further, the official class and the lawmakers were not up to the old standard of force and ability. The men who had the success of the cause most at heart usually felt it to be their duty to fight for it, if possible, leaving lawmaking and administration to others of more peaceable disposition. Some of the latter were able men, but few were filled with the spirit that animated the soldier class. Many of these unwarhke statesmen in the legislature and in Congress thought it to be their especial duty to guard the hberties of the people against the encroachments of the mihtary power. They would talk by the hour about state rights, but would allow a few thousand of the sover- eign state's disloyal citizens to demoralize a dozen counties rather than consent to infringe the liberties of the people by making the miHtia system more effective to repress disorder. They succeeded in weakening the efforts of both state and Confederate governments, and their well-meant arguments drawn from the works of Jefferson were never remembered to their credit. One of the best of these, men — Judge Dargan, a member of Congress from Mobile — seems to have had a very unhappy disposition, and he spent much of his time writing to the governor and to the President in regard to the critical state of the country and suggesting numberless plans for its salvation. Among many things that were visionary he advanced some original schemes. In 1863 he proposed a plan for the gradual emancipation of slaves, later a plan for arming them, and suggested that blockade running be prohibited, as it was ruining the country.^ Even while the tide of war feeling was at the flood there occurred instances of friction between the state and the Confederate govern- ments. In December, 1862, the legislature complained of the con- tinued, use of the railroads by the Confederate government, to the exclusion of private transportation. The railroads were built, it ^See Hannis Taylor, "Political History of Alabama," in "Memorial Record of Alabama," Vol. I, p. 82. 2 Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. I, pp. 250, 335, 391 ; Schwab, "Con- federate States," p. 210; Garrett, p. 385; Brewer, p. 411. 134 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA was stated, for free intercourse between the states, and, since the blockade had become effective, were more important than ever in the transportation of the necessaries of life/ The legislature com- plained about the conduct of the Confederate officers in the state, about impressment, taxation, and redemption of state bonds, the state's quota of troops for the Confederate service, about arms and supplies purchased by the state, and about trade through the hnes. Suits were brought again and again in the state courts by the strict constructionists to test the constitutionaUty of the conscript laws and the law forbidding the hiring of substitutes. But the courts declared both laws constitutional.^ The lawmakers of the state were much more afraid of militarism than of the Federal invasion or domestic disorder, and refused to organize the mihtia effectively.' The military reverses in the summer of 1863 darkened the hopes of the people and chilled their waning enthusiasm, and the effect was shown in the elections of August. Thomas H. Watts, who had been defeated in 1861, was elected governor by a vote of 22,223 to 6342 over John G. Shorter, who had been governor for two years. Watts had a strong personal following, which partly accounted for the large majority; but several thousand, at least, were dissatisfied in some way with the state or the Confederate administration. Jemi- son, a former cooperationist, took Yancey's place in the Confederate Senate. J. L. M. Curry was defeated for Congress because he had strongly supported the administration. The delegation elected to the second Congress was of a decidedly different temper from the delegation to the first Congress. A large number of hitherto un- known men were elected to the legislature.^ At the close of the term of Governor Shorter, the new legislature passed resolutions indorsing his poHcy in regard to the conduct of the war and commending his wise and energetic administration.' Other resolutions were passed which would seem to indicate that the 1 Acts of 2d Regular Sess., 1862, p. 200. 2 Annual Cyclopaedia (1862), p. 9; Schwab, "Confederate States," pp. 195, 196; Brewer, 127; Garrett, pp. 722, 724. See infra, p. 97. ^Shorter's Proclamation, Dec. 22, 1862, in Moore, "Rebellion Record," Vol. IV, and above, p. 88. ^Annual Cyclopaedia (1863), p. 6; O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 126; Brewer, pp. 66, 126, 460; Garrett, p. 722; Hannis Taylor, in "Memorial Record of Alabama," p. 82. ' Acts, 3d Regular Sess., 1864, p. 217. POLITICAL CONDITIONS, 1861-1865 135 war feeling ran as high and strong as ever. In fact, it was only the voice of the majority, not of all, as before. There was a strong minority of malcontents who pursued a policy of obstruction and opposition to the measures of the administration and thereby weak- ened the power of the government. It was believed by many that Watts, who had been a Whig and a Bell and Everett elector, would be more conservative in regard to the prosecution of the war than was his predecessor. There were numbers of people in the state who beheved or professed to beUeve that it was possible to end the war whenever President Davis might choose to make peace with the enemy. Others, who saw that peace with independence was impos- sible, were in favor of reconstruction, that is, of ending the war at once and returning to the old Union, with no questions asked. They believed that the North would be ready to make peace and welcome the southern states back into the Union on the old terms. These constituted only a small part of the population, but they had some influence in an obstructive way and were great talkers. Any one who voted for Watts from the belief that he would try to bring about peace was much mistaken in the man. It was reported that he was in favor of reconstruction. This he emphatically denied in a message to the legislature: "He who is now ... in favor of reconstruction with the states under Lincoln's dominion, is a traitor in his heart to the state . . . and deserves a traitor's doom. . . . Rather than unite with such a people I would see the Confederate states desolated with fire and sword. . . . Let us prefer death to a life of cowardly shame." ^ Though Watts was elected somewhat as a protest against the war party, he was in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war. However, at times, he had trouble with the Confederate government, and we find him writing about "the tyranny of Confederate offi- cials," that "the state had some rights left," that "there will be a con- flict between the Confederate and state authorities unless the conscript officials cease to interfere with state volunteers and state officials."^ 1 Annual Cyclopaedia (1863), p. 7. Francis Wayland, Jr., in a "Letter to a Peace Democrat" in the Atlantic Monthly, Dec, 1863, quotes Governor Watts as saying immediately after he had been elected : " If I had the power I would build up a wall of fire between Yankeedom and the Confederate States, there to burn for ages." See also O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 120; McMorries, " History of the First Alabama Regiment of Infantry." 2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 37, 463. 466, 8i 7, 820. See also above, pp. 97, 103, 104. 136 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA The governor was in favor of supporting the war, and recom- mended the repeal of some of the state laws obstructing Confederate enhstments; he was willing for any state troops that were available to go to the aid of another state, and he desired to aid in returning deserters to the army; but he opposed the manner of execution of laws by the Confederate government. He demanded for the state the right to engage in the blockade trade in order to secure neces- saries. He also protested against the proposed policy of arming the slaves.^ During the year 1864 the legislature protested against the action of Confederate conscript ofhcers who insisted on enrolling certain state officials. It was ordered that the reserves, when called out for service, should not be put under the command of a Confederate officer. The first-class reserves were not to leave their own coun- ties. An act was passed to protect the people from "oppression by the illegal execution of the Confederate impressment laws." ^ Con- federate enrolHng officers who forced exempt men into the army were made liable to punishment by heavy fine.^ An Alabama newspaper, in the fall of 1864, advocated a conven- tion of the states in order to settle the questions at issue, to bring about peace, and to restore the Union. Such a proposition found supporters in the legislature. A resolution was introduced favoring reconstruction on the basis of the recent platform of the Democratic party and McClellan's letter of acceptance.^ The resolution was to this effect: if the Democratic party is successful in 1864, we are will- ing to open negotiations for peace on the basis indicated in the plat- form adopted by the convention; provided that our sister states of the Confederacy are willing. A lengthy and heated discussion fol- lowed. The governor sent in a message asking "who would desire a political union with those who have murdered our sons, outraged our women, with demoniac malice wantonly destroyed our property, and now seek to make slaves of us!" It would cause civil war, he said, if the people at home attempted such a course. After the reading of the message and some further debate, both houses united in a declaration that extermination was preferable to reconstruction according to the Lincoln plan. The proposed resolution, the extended 1 0. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 683, 685, 735, 736. 2 Act, Oct. 7, 1864. 3 Act, Dec. 12, 1864. * See McPherson, "Rebellion," pp. 419-421. THE PEACE SOCIETY 137 debate, the governor's message, all clearly indicate a strong desire on the part of some to end the war and return to the Union/ With the opening of 1865 conditions in Alabama were not favor- able to the war party : the old cooperationists, with other malcontents, were charging the Davis administration with every pohtical crime; the state administration was disorganized in half the counties; de- serters and stragglers were scattered throughout the state; and many of the state and county officials were disaffected. Those who were in favor of war were in the armies. Had the war continued until the August election, there is no doubt that an administration would have been elected which would have refused further support to the Confederacy. Had it not been for fear of the soldier element, the malcontents at home could have controlled affairs in the fall of 1864. For a year there had been indications that the discontented were thinking of a coup d'etat and an immediate close of the war. The formation of secret societies pledged to bring about peace was a sign of formidable discontent. The Peace Society It was after the reverses of 1863 that the enthusiasm of the people for the war very perceptibly declined. For the first time, many felt that perhaps after all their cause would not win, and that the horrors of war might be brought home to them by hostile invasion of their country. PubHc opinion was more or less despondent. There was a searching for scapegoats and a more pronounced hos- tihty to the administration. The "cross-roads" statesmen were sure that a different poHcy under another leader would have been crowned with success, though what this pohcy should have been, perhaps no two would have agreed. This feehng was largely confined to the less well informed, but it was also found in a number of the old-time conservatives who would never believe that extreme measures were justifiable in any event, and who could never get over a feeling 1 The " Confederate Military History " states that in 1864 the people hoped for terms of peace, believing that Democratic successes in the northern elections would result in an armistice, and later reconstruction ; that the people were always ready to go back to the principles of 1787, and it was believed that Davis was willing, but that the unfavor- able elections of 1864 and the military interference by the Federal administration in the border states killed this constitutional peace party. See Vol. I, pp. 505, 537. 138 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA of horror at all that the Democrats might do. If left alone, they thought, time would have brought all things right in the end. It was as painful to them to think that Lincoln was marching armies over the fragments of the United States Constitution, as that the Davis administration was stranghng state' sovereignty in the Con- federate States. Their minds never rose above the narrow legalism of their books. But they were few in numbers as compared with the more ignorant people (who were conscious only of dissatisfaction and suffering) who had willingly plunged into the war "to whip the Yankees in ninety days," and who now thought that all that had to be done to bring peace was to signify to the North a willingness to stop fighting. This course, many thought, need not result in a loss of their independence. Later they were minded to come back into the Union on the old terms, and later still they were ready to make peace without conditions and return to the Union. It seems never to have occurred to them that northern opinion had changed since 1861, and that severe terms of readmission would be exacted. The hardest condition hkely to be imposed, they thought, would be the gradual emancipation of the slaves. As a rule, they owned few slaves, but such a condition would probably have been considered harder by them than by the larger slaveholders who felt that slavery had come to an end, no matter how the struggle might result. This dissatisfaction culminated in the formation of numerous secret or semi-secret political organizations which sprang up over the state, and which together became generally known as the "Peace Society," though there were other designations. Often these organ- izations were formed for purposes bordering on treason; often not so, but only for constitutional opposition to the administration. The extremes grew farther apart as the war progressed, until the constitutional wing withdrew or ceased to exist, and the other became, from the point of view of the government, wholly treasonable in its purposes. These organizations had several thousand members, at least half the active males left in the state. The work of the peace party was first felt in the August elections of 1863. The governor, though a true and loyal man, was elected with the help of a disaffected party, and a disaffected element was elected to the legislature and to Congress. Six members of Congress from Alabama were said to be "unionists," that is, in favor of end- THE PEACE SOCIETY 1 39 ing the war at once and returning to the Union/ A Confederate official who had wide opportunities for observation reported that the district (Talladega) in which he was stationed had been carried by the peace party under circumstances that indicated treasonable influence. Unknown men were elected to the legislature and to other offices by a secret order which, he stated, had for its object the en- couragement of desertion, the protection of deserters, and resistance to the conscription laws. Some men of influence and position be- longed to it, and the leaders were believed to be in communication with the enemy. The entire organization was not disloyal, but he feared that the controUing element was faithless. The election had been determined largely by the votes of stragglers and deserters and of paroled Vicksburg soldiers who, it was found later, had been "contaminated" by contact with the western soldiers of Grant's army.^ By this he evidently meant that the soldiers had been initiated into the "Peace Society." A few months later the "Peace Society" appeared among the soldiers of General Clanton's brigade stationed at Pollard, in Conecuh County. Some of the soldiers had served in the army of Tennessee, and had there been initiated into this secret society. Clanton, who was strongly disliked by General Bragg and not loved by General Polk, had much trouble with them because he asserted that the order appeared first in Bragg's army and spread from thence. Later 1 Williamson R. W. Cobb of Jackson County, a very popular politician, a member of the 35tli Congress, met his first defeat in i85i, when a candidate for the Confederate Congress. In 1863 he was successful over the man who had beaten him in 1861. After the election, if not before, he was in constant communication with the enemy and went into their lines several times. The Congress expelled him by n unanimous vote. It was rumored that President Lincoln intended to appoint him military governor, but he killed himself accidentally in 1864. Cobb was a "down east Yankee" who had come into the state as a clock pedler. He had no education and little real ability, but was a smooth talker and was master of the arts of the demagogue. In political life he was famed for shaking hands with the men, kissing the women, and playing with the babies. At a Hardshell foot-washing he won favor by carrying around the towels, in striking contrast with his Episcopalian rival, who sat on the back bench. Cobb was for the Con- federacy as long as he thought it would win ; when luck changed, he proceeded to make himself safe. After his desertion he lost influence among the people of his district. See Brewer, pp. 286, 287 ; McPherson, pp. 49, 400, 402, 411. ^ 0. R,, Vol. II, p. 726 (W. T. Walthall, commandant of conscripts for Alabama, Talladega, Aug. 6, 1863). In the fall of 1864 a secret peace society was discovered in southwest Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 802- 820. 140 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA developments showed that he was correct.* It was in December, 1863, that the operations of the order among the soldiers were ex- posed. A number of soldiers at Pollard determined to lay down their arms on Christmas Day, as the only means of ending the war. These troops, for the most part, were lately recruited from the poorer classes of southwest Alabama by a popular leader and had never seen active service. They were stationed near their homes and were exposed to home influences. Upon them and their famihes the pressure of the war had been heavy.^ Many of them were exempt from service but had joined because of Clanton's personal popularity, because they feared that later they might become liable to service, and because they were promised special privileges in the way of furloughs and stations near their homes. To this unpromising material had been added conscripts and substitutes in whom the fires of patriotism burned low, and who entered the service very reluctantly. With them were a few veteran soldiers, and in command were veteran officers. A secret society was formed among the discontented, with all the usual accompaniment of signs, passwords, grips, oaths, and obligations. Some bound themselves by solemn oaths never to fight the enemy, to desert, and to encourage desertion — all this in order to break down the Confederacy. General Maury, in com- mand at Mobile, concluded after investigation that the society had originated with the enemy and had entered the southern army at Cumberland Gap.' In regard to the discontent among the soldiers, Colonel Swanson of the Fifty-ninth and Sixty-first Alabama^ regiments (consohdated) stated that there was a general disposition on the part of the poorer classes, substitutes, and foreigners to accept terms and stop the war. They had nothing anyway, so there was nothing to fight for, they said. There was no general matured plan, and no leader, Colonel Swanson thought.^ Major Cunningham of the Fifty-seventh Alabama Regiment " reported that there had been considerable manifestation 1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Ft. 11, pp. 555-557. 2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. II, p. 548. 8 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. II, pp. 551, 552. * The 6ist Alabama Regiment was composed largely of conscripts under veteran officers. It was evidently at first called the 59th. Brewer, p. 673. 5 O. R.. Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. I], p. 550. " The 57th Alabama Regiment was recruited in the counties of Pike, Coffee, Dale, Henry, and Barbour. See Brewer, p. 669. THE PEACE SOCIETY I41 of revolutionary spirit on account of the tax-in-kind law and the im- pressment system, and that there was much reckless talk, even among good men, of protecting their families from the injustice of the government, even if they had to lay down their arms and go home/ General Clanton said that the society had existed in Hilliard's Legion and Grade's brigade, and that few men, he was sure, joined it for treasonable purposes.^ Before the appointed time — Christmas Day — sixty or seventy members of the order mutinied and the whole design was exposed. Seventy members were arrested and sent to Mobile for trial by court-martial.' There is no record of the action of the court. The purged regiments were then ordered to the front and obeyed without a single desertion. Boiling Hall's battalion, which was sent to the Western army for having in it such a society, made a splendid record at Chickamauga and in other battles, and came out of the Chickamauga fight with eighty-two bullet-holes in its colors.* During the summer and fall of 1863 and in 1864 the Confederate officials in north Alabama often reported that they had found certain traces of secret organizations which were hostile to the Confederate government. The Provost-Marshal's Department in 1863 obtained information of the existence of a secret society between the fines in Alabama and Tennessee, the object of which was to encourage desertion. Confederate soldiers at home on furlough joined the organization and made known its object to the Confederate authorities. The members were pledged not to assist the Confederacy in any way, to encourage desertion of the north Alabama soldiers, and to work for a revolution in the state government. Stringent oaths were taken by the members, a code of signals^ and passwords was used, and a well-organized society was formed. The bulk of the membership con- 1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Ft. IT, p. 550. 2 0. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Ft. II, p. 556. The 59th Alabama Regiment was formed from a part of Hilliard's Legion. Brewer, p. 671. 3 O. R., Ser. I, Vol, XXVI, Ft. II, pp. 552, 556. *0. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Ft. II, p. 556; Brewer, "Alabama," p. 671. It may be that the 59th Regiment here spoken of as consolidated was not the 59th under the command of Boiling Hall, but was merely the first number given to the regiment, which later became the 6ist. See Brewer, pp. 671, 673. However, the society existed in Boiling Hall's regiment. 142 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA sisted of tories and deserters, with a few discontented Confederates. Their society gave information to the Federals in north Alabama and Tennessee and had agents far within the Confederate lines, organizing discontent. General Clanton early in 1864 endeavored to break up the organization in north Alabama and made a number of arrests, but failed to crush the order. In middle Alabama, about the same time (the spring of 1864), the workings of a treasonable secret society were brought to light. Colonel JeiJerson Falkner of the Eighth Confederate Infantry over- heard a conversation between two malcontents and began to investi- gate. He found that in the central counties a secret society was working to break down the Confederate government and bring about peace. The plans were not perfected, but some were in favor of returning to the Union on the Arkansas or Sebastian platform,* others wanted to send to Washington and make terms, and still others were in favor of unconditional submission. As to methods, the malcontents meant to secure control of the state administration, either by revolution or by elections in the summer of 1865, then they would negotiate with the United States and end the war. The society had agents in both the Western army and the Army of Northern Vir- ginia, tampering with the soldiers and endeavoring to carry the or- ganization into the Federal army. The leaders in the movement hoped to organize into one party all who were discontented with the administration. If successful in this, they would be strong enough either to overthrow the state government, which was supported only by home guards, or by obstruction to force the state government to make peace. The oaths, passwords, and signals of this society were similar to those of the north Alabama organization, with which it was in communication. Conscript officers, county officials, medi- cal boards, and members of the legislature were members of the order. If a deserter were arrested, some member released him ; the members claimed that the society caused the loss of the battle of Missionary Ridge and the surrender at Vicksburg. The strength of the so-called Peace Society lay in Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, and North CaroKna. The organizers were called Eminents. They gave the "degree" to (that is, initiated) 1 See Nicolay and Hay, "Lincoln," Vol. VIII, pp. 410-415; McPherson, "Rebel- lion," pp. 320-322. RECONSTRUCTION SENTIMENT I43 those whom they considered proper persons. No records were kept; the members did not know one another except by recognition through signals. They received directions from the Eminents, who accom- modated their instructions to the person initiated. An ignorant but loyal person was told that the object of the order was to secure a change of administration; the disloyal were told that the purpose was to encourage desertion and mutiny in the army, to injure loyal citizens, and to overthrow the state and Confederate governments. Owing to the non-intercourse between members there were many in the order who never knew the real objects of the leaders or Eminents, who intended to use the organization to further their designs in 1865. The swift collapse of the Confederacy in the spring of 1865 anticipated the work of the secret societies. The anti- Confederate element was, however, left somewhat organized through the work of the order.* Reconstruction Sentiment Besides the open obstruction of poHticians, officials, and legisla- ture, and the secret opposition of the peace societies, there was a third movement for reconstruction. This movement took place in that part of Alabama held by the Federal armies, and the reconstruction meetings were encouraged by the Union army officers. The leaders were D. C. Humphreys and Jeremiah Clemens, whose defection has been noted before. A more substantial element than the tories and deserters supported this movement — the dissatisfied property 1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, Pt. Ill, pp. 682, 683, and Vol. XXII, Pt. I, p. 671 ; Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 393-397. A fuller account of the Peace Society will be found in the South Atlantic Quarterly, July, 1903. Some of the prominent leaders in the Peace Society were said to be : Lewis E. Parsons, later provisional governor, said to be the head of it ; Col. J. J. Seibels of Montgomery ; R. S. Heflin, state senator from Ran- dolph County ; W. W. Dodson, William Kent, David A. Ferryman, Lieut.-Col. E. B. Smith, W. Armstrong, and A. A. West, of Randolph County ; Capt. W. S. Smith, Demopolis; L. McKee and Lieut. N. B. DeArmon. General James H. Clanton testified in 187 1 that while in the Alabama legislature during the war L. E. Parsons, afterwards governor, introduced resolutions invoking the blessings of heaven on the head of Jefferson Davis and praying that God would spare him to consummate his holy purposes. Jaliez M. Curry charged Parsons with being a " reconstructionist " during the war, that is, with being disloyal to the government. Par- sons had two young sons in the Confederate army, and one of them was so indignant at the charge against his father that he shot and wounded Curry. Dr. Ware of Mont- gomery afterwards made the same charge. Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., p. 234. 144 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA holders who were afraid of confiscation. Several Confederate offi- cers were drawn into the movement later/ Early in 1864, Humphreys ^ issued an elaborate address renounc- ing his errors. There was no hope, he told his fellow-citizens, that foreign powers would intervene. Slavery as a permanent institution must be given up. Law and order must be enforced and constitu- tional authority reestablished. Slavery was the cause of revolution, and as an institution was at an end. With slavery abolished, there was, therefore, no reason why the war should not end. The right to regulate the labor question would be secured to the state by the United States government. At present labor was destroyed, and in order to regulate labor, there must be peace. The address was printed and distributed throughout the state with the assistance of the Federal officials. A number of the packages of these addresses was seized by some women and thrown into the Tennessee River.' Jeremiah Clemens, who had deserted in 1862, issued an address to the people of the South advocating the election of Lincoln as Presi- dent.'' March 5, 1864, a reconstruction meeting, thinly attended, was held in Huntsville under the protection of the Union troops. Clemens presided. Resolutions were passed denying the legahty of secession because the ordinance had not been submitted to the people for their ratification or rejection. Professions of devotion and loyalty to the United States were made by Clemens, the late major- general of Alabama mihtia and secessionist of 1861.'^ A week later the same party met again. No young men were present, for they were in the army. All were men over forty-five, concerned for their prop- erty. Clemens spoke, denouncing the "twenty-negro" law. The Gilchrist story was here originated by Clemens and told for the first time. The story was that J. G. Gilchrist of Montgomery County went to the Secretary of War, Mr. Walker, and urged him to begin hostilities by firing on Fort Sumter, saying, "You must sprinkle blood in the face of the people of Alabama or the state will iSee O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, p. 718. "Confederate Military History," Vol. I, pp. 505, 509, 511, 512, 537. 2 A Douglas Democrat, a Douglas elector, and a strong secessionist, who had de- serted to the enemy. Brewer, p. 364. ^W. y. Times, Feb. 14, 1864; Annual Cyclopaedia (1864), pp. 10, II; N. Y, Daily News, April 16, 1864, from Columbus (Ga.) Sun. < N. Y. Tribune, May 23, 1865. 6 yy; y; World, March 28, 1864. RECONSTRUCTION SENTIMENT I45 be back into the Union within ten days." In closing, Clemens said, "Thank God, there is now no prospect of the Confederacy succeeding." D. C. Humphreys then proposed his plan: slavery was dead, but by submitting to Federal authority gradual emancipation could be secured, and also such guarantees as to the future status of the negro as would reheve the people from social, economic, and poUti- cal dangers. He expressed entire confidence in the conservatism of the northern people, and asserted that if only the ordinance of seces- sion were revoked, the southern people would have as long a time as they pleased to get rid of the institution of slavery. In case of return to the Union the people would have pohtical cooperation to enable them to secure control of negro labor. "There is really no difference, in my opinion," he said, "whether we hold them as slaves or obtain their labor by some other method. Of course, we prefer the old method. But that is not the question." He announced the defection from the Confederacy of Vice-President Stephens, and bitterly denounced Ben Butler, Davis, and Slidell, to whose intrigues he attributed the present troubles. Resolutions were proposed by him and adopted, acknowledging the hopelessness of secession and advising a return to the Union. Longer war, it was declared, would be dangerous to the liberties of the people, and the restoration of civil government was necessary. The governor was asked to call a convention for the purpose of reuniting Alabama to the Union. It was not expected, it was stated, that the governor would do this; but his refusal would be an excuse for the independent action of north Alabama and a movement toward setting up a new state gov- ernment. Busteed could then come down and hold a "bloody assize, trying traitors and bushwhackers." ^ In the early winter of 1864-1865, the northern newspaper cor- respondents in the South ^ began to write of the organization of a strong peace party called the "State Rights party," in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. The leaders were in communication with the Washington authorities. They claimed that each state ijV. K Times, March 24, 1864; N. Y. World, March 28, 1864. Busteed was a newly appointed Federal judge who afterward became notorious in " carpet-bag " days. He succeeded George W. Lane in the judgeship. ^ There were several regular, reliable correspondents in north Alabama, for the New York, Boston, and Chicago papers. Their accounts are corroborated by the re- ports made later by Confederate and Federal officials. L 146 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA had the right to negotiate for itself terms of reconstruction. The plan was to secure control of the state administration and then apply for readmission to the Union. The destruction of Hood's army removed the fear of the soldier element. Several thousand of Hood's suffering and dispirited soldiers took the oath of allegiance to the United States, or dispersed to their homes. Early in 1865 peace meetings were held in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, within the Confederate lines; commissioners were sent to Washington; and the tories and deserters organized. A delegation waited on Governor Watts to ask him to negotiate for the return of the state to the Union, but did not get, nor did they expect, a favorable answer from him. The peace party expected to gain the August elections and elect as governor J. C. Bradley of Huntsville, or M. J. Bulger of Tallapoosa.' The plan, then, was not to wait for the inauguration in November, but to have the newly elected administration take charge at once. It was continually reported that General P. D. Roddy was to head the movement.^ There is no doubt that during the winter of 1864-1865 some kind of negotiation was going on with the Federal authorities. J. J. Giers, who was a brother-in-law of State Senator Patton,^ was in con- stant communication with General Grant. In one of his reports to Grant he stated that Roddy and another Confederate general had sent Major McGaughey, Roddy's brother-in-law, to meet Giers near Moulton, in Lawrence County, to learn what terms could be obtained for the readmission of Alabama. Major McGaughey said that the people considered that affairs were hopeless and wanted peace. If the terms were favorable, steps would be taken to induce Governor Watts to accept them. If Watts should refuse, a civil and military movement would be begun to organize a state govern- ment for Alabama which would include three-fourths of the state. The plan, it was stated, was indorsed by the leading pubUc men. 1 At this time Bulger was in active service. See Brewer, " Alabama," pp. 548, 660; " Confederate Military History " — Alabama, see Index. Bradley was a north Alabama man who had gone over to the enemy to save his property. This was his chief claim to notoriety. He became a prominent " scalawag " later. ^ N. Y. Herald, Nov. 29, 1864; N. V. Times, Feb. 10, 1865; Boston Journal, Nov. 15, 1864; The World, March 28, 1864, Feb. II, 1865; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, pp. 590, 659. ' Later governor, succeeding Parsons. RECONSTRUCTION SENTIMENT 147 The peace leaders wanted Grant, or the Washington administration, to announce at once a pohcy of gradual emancipation in order to reassure those afraid of outright abolition, and to "disintegrate the rebel soldiery" of north Alabama, which they said was never strongly devoted to the Confederacy. It was asserted that all the counties north of the cotton belt and those in the southeast were ready for a movement toward reconstruction. Giers stated that approaches were then being made to Governor Watts. Andrew Johnson, the newly elected Vice-President, vouched for the good character of Giers.' Ten days later Giers wrote Grant that on account of the rumors of the submission of various Confederate generals he had caused to be published a contradiction of the report of the agreement with the Confederate leaders. He further stated that one of Roddy's officers. Lieutenant W. Alexander, had released a number of Federal prisoners without parole or exchange, according to agreement.^ In several instances, in the spring of 1865, subordinate Confederate commanders proposed a truce, and after Lee's surrender and Wilson's raid this was a general practice. During the months of April and May, there was a combined movement of citizens and soldiers in a number of counties in north Alabama to reorganize civil government accord- ing to a plan furnished by General Thomas, Giers being the inter- mediary.^ On May i General Steele of the second army of invasion was informed at Montgomery by J. J. Scibels, L. E. Parsons, and J. C. Bradley — all well-known obstructionists — that two-thirds of the people of Alabama would take up arms to put down the "rebels." * Colonel Seibels alone of that gallant company had ever taken up arms for any cause. The other two and their kind may have been, and doubtless often were, warlike in their conversation, but they never drew steel to support their convictions. It is quite likely that the strength of the disaffection, especially in north and east Alabama, was exaggerated by the reports of both Union and Confederate authorities. There never had been during the war much loyalty, in the proper sense of the word, to the United ' Letter from Giers at Decatur, Jan. 26, 1865 ; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Ft. I, pp.590, 718. See also Report of Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Pt. Ill, pp. 13- 15, 60, 64. 2 Giers, from Nashville, to Grant ; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, p. 659. ' Judging from the correspondence of Giers, the plan had the approval of General Grant. "> O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. II, p. 560. 148 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA States. There was much pure indifference on the part of some people who desired the strongest side to win as soon as possible and leave them in safety. There was much discontent on the part of others who had supported the Confederacy for a while, but who, for various reasons, had fallen away from the cause and now wanted peace and reunion. There was a very large element of outright lawlessness in the opposition to the Confederate government. The lowest class of men on both sides or of no side united to plunder that defenceless land between the two armies. This class wanted no peace, for on disorder they thrived. For years after the war ended they gave trouble to Federal and state authorities. The discontent was actively manifested by civilians, deserters, "mossbacks," "bomb-proofs," and "feather beds." These had never strongly supported the Con- federacy. It was largely a timid, stay-at-home crowd, with a few able but erratic leaders.' The soldiers may have been dissatisfied, — many of them were, — and many of them left the army in the spring of 1865 to go home and plant crops for the relief of their suf- fering famihes. Many of them in the dark days after Nashville and Frankhn took the oath of allegiance and went home, sure that the war was ended and the cause was lost. Yet these were not the ones found in such organizations as the Peace Society. That was largely made up of people whom the true soldier despised as worth- less. There were few soldiers in the peace movement and these only at the last. The peace party, however, was strong in one way. All were voters and, being at home, could vote. The soldiers in the army had no voice in the elections. The malcontents, had they possessed courage and good leaders, could have controlled the state after the summer of 1864. The able men in the movement were not those who inspired confidence in their followers. There were no troops in the state to keep them down, and the only check seems to have been their fear of the soldiers, who were fighting at the front, in the armies of Lee and Johnston, of Wheeler and Hood and Taylor. They were certainly afraid of the vengeance of these soldiers.^ It was much better that the war resulted in the complete destruction of the southern cause, leaving no questions for future controversy, such as would have arisen had the peace party succeeded in' its plans. 1 This fear is expressed in all their correspondence. CHAPTER IV ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS Sec. I. Industrial Development during the War Early in the war the blockade of the southern ports became so effective that the southern states were shut off from their usual sources of supply by sea. Trade through the lines between the United States and the Confederate States was forbidden, and Alabama, owing to its central location, suffered more from the blockade than any other state. For three years the Federal hues touched the northern part of the state only, and, as no railroads connected north and south Alabama, contraband trade was difficult in that direction. Mobile, the only port of the state, was closely blockaded by a strong Federal fleet. The railroad communications with other states were poor, and the Confederate government usually kept the railroads busy in the pubUc service. Consequently, the people of Alabama were forced to develop certain industries in order to secure the necessaries of life. But outside these the industrial development was naturally in the direction of the production of materials of war. Military Industries During the first two years of the war volunteers were much more plentiful than equipment. The arms seized at Mount Vernon and other arsenals in Alabama were old flint-locks altered for the use of percussion caps and were almost worthless, being valued at $2 apiece. These were afterwards transferred to the Confederate States, which returned but few of them to arm the Alabama troops.^ Late in i860 a few thousand old muskets were purchased by the state from the arsenal at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for $2.50 each. A few Mis- sissippi rifles were also secured, and with these the Second Alabama 1 Davis, " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. I, p. 471; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. Ill, p. 440. 149 ISO CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA Infantry was armed. These rifles, however, required a special kind of ammunition, and this made them almost worthless. Other arms were found to be useless for the same reason. Both cavalry and infantry regiments went ~7X to the front armed with rf..w, gjjjgjg ^^^ double bar- relled shot-guns, squirrel rifles, muskets, flint-locks, and old pistols. No ammunition could be sup- plied for such a miscel- laneous collection. Many regiments had to wait for months before arms could be obtained. Be- fore October, 1861, sev- eral thousand men had left Alabama unarmed, and several thousand more, also unarmed, were left waiting in the state camps. In 1 86 1 the Iron ^ Rolling mills 2 fouadrlea 3 ^ Navy Yard - + f^ Nitre Works 6 f§0^ TunnertcB 6 '^c^-^ Cotton Fautorlea 7 Woolen Factories B Halt Works 9 Medical LaboratotloB.l □ Shoe Factories 11 Flour MUIb ,12 Car SbopB .,-_.. IE Shops _ Small Arms Fauturlcai! Harness Facti>riaH... tjulpliur IVorka Nail Factorj- DistUUHes Collieries 20 Iron Works..- 21 Mteel Furnaces 22 Naval Foundrj as ^raonal 24 Foirdflr Mills "" isnusTBiAL DEVELOPMENT 1861-1SG5 state legislature bought v.^ Iron Mines 1 Machine Shops 14 O O a thousand pikes and a hundred bowie-knives to arm the Forty- eighth Militia Regiment, which was defending Mobile. The sum of $250,000 was appropriated to lend to those who would manufacture firearms for the government.^ In 1863 the Confederate Congress authorized the enUstment of companies armed with pikes who should take the places of men armed with firearms when the latter were dead or absent.^ Private arms — muskets, rifles, pistols, shot-guns, carbines — were called for and purchased from the owners 1 Miller, " History of Alabama," p. 158; Davis, "Confederate Government," Vol. I, p. 476 ; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. Ill, p. 440. 2 Acts of 2d Called and ist Regular Sess. (1861), pp. 75, 211. ' April 10, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., 1st .Sess. MILITARY INDUSTRIES 151 when not donated.' An oflFer was made to advance fifty per cent of the amount necessary to set up machinery for the manufacture of small arms.^ Old Spanish flint-lock muskets were brought in from Cuba through the blockade, altered, and placed in the hands of the troops.^ In 1862 a small- arms factory was established at Tallassee which employed 150 men and turned out about 150 carbines a week. At the end of 1864 it had produced only 6000.^ At Montgomery the Alabama Arms Manufacturing Company had the best machinery in the Confederacy for making Enfield rifles. At Selma were the state and Confederate arsenals, a navy-yard, and naval foundry with machinery of English make, of the newest and most complete pattern. It had been brought through the blockade from Europe and set up at Selma because that seemed to be a place safe from invasion and from the raids of the enemy. Here the vessels for the defence of Mobile were built, heavy ordnance was cast, with shot and shell, and plating for men-of-war. The armored ram Tennessee, famous in the fight in Mobile Bay, the gunboats Morgan, Selma, and Gaines were all built at the Selma navy-yard — guns, armor, and everything being manufactured on the spot. When the Tennessee surrendered, after a terrible battle, its armor had not been penetrated by a single shot or shell. The best cannon in America were cast at the works in Selma. The naval foundry employed 3000 men, the other works as many more. Half the cannon and two-thirds of the fixed ammu- nition used during the last two years of the war were made at these foundries and factories. The foundry destroyed by Wilson was pro- nounced by experts to be the best in existence. It could turn out at short notice a fifteen-inch Brooks or a mountain howitzer. Swords, rifles, muskets, pistols, caps, were manufactured in great quantities. There were more than a hundred buildings, which covered fifty acres; and after Wilson's destructive work, Truman, the war correspondent, said that they presented the greatest mass of ruins he had ever seen.^ 1 April 16, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., ist Sess. ; Governor's Proclamation, March i, 1862. 2 April 17, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A,, ist Cong., ist Sess. 8 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. Ill, pp. 870, 875. * 0. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 986, 987 ; Davis, Vol. I, p. 480 ; "Southern Hist. Soc. Papers," Vol. II, p. 61. 5 Miller, " History of Alabama," pp. 180, 181 ; Davis, Vol. I, pp. 480, 481 ; Hardy, "History of Selma," pp. 46, 47; JV. Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1865 (Truman); O. R., 152 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA There was a navy-yard on the Tombigbee, in Clarke County, near the Sunflower Bend. Several small vessels had been completed and several war vessels, probably gunboats, were in process of construc- tion here when the war ended; both vessels and machinery were destroyed by order of the Confederate authorities.' Gunpowder was scarce throughout the war, and nitre or saltpetre, its principal ingredient, was not to be purchased from abroad. A powder mill was estabUshed at Cahaba,^ but the ingredients were lacking. Charcoal for gunpowder was made from willow, dogwood, and similar woods. The nitre on hand was soon exhausted, and it was sought for in the caves of the limestone region of Alabama and Tennessee. In north Alabama there were many of these large caves. The earth in them was dug up and put in hoppers and water poured over it to leach out the nitre. The lye was caught (just as for making soft soap from lye ashes), boiled down, and then dried in the sun- shine.' The earth in cellars and under old houses was scraped up and leached for the nitre in it. In 1862 a corps of officers under the title of the Nitre and Mining Bureau * was organized by the War Department to work the nitre caves of north Alabama which lay in the doubtful region between the Union and the Confederate lines, and which were often raided by the enemy. The men were sub- jected to mihtary discipline and were under the absolute command of the superintendent, who often called them out to repulse Federal raiders. As much as possible in this department, as in the others, exempts and negroes were used for laborers. For clerical work those disabled for active service were appointed, and instructions were Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 986, 987. The arsenal was commanded by Col. J. L. White; the naval foundries and the rolling mills were under the direction of Capt. Catesby ap Roger Jones, the designer of the Virgittia ; Commodore Ebenezer Farrand superin- tended the construction of war vessels at the Selma navy-yard. Captain Jones cast the heavy ordnance for the forts at Mobile, Charleston, and Wilmington. Five gunboats were built at Selma in 1863 and two or three others in 1864-1865. The ram Tennessee, built in 1863-1864, was constructed like the Virginia, but was an improvement except for the weak engines. When the keel of the Tennessee was laid, in the fall of 1863, some of the timbers to be used in her were still standing in the forest, and the iron for her plates was ore in the mines. Scharf, "Confederate Navy," pp. 50, 534, 550, 555; "Northern Alabama Illustrated," p. 654; Maclay, "History of United States Navy," Vol. II, pp. 446, 447; Wilson, " Ironclads in Action," Vol. I, p. 116. 1 Ball, " Clarke County," p. 765. 2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 29, 102. ' Miller, pp. 201, 230 ; Davis, Vol. I, p. 473; Porcher, p. 378. * April II, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., 1st Sess. MILITARY INDUSTRIES 1 53 issued that employment should be given to needy refugee women.' These important nitre works were repeatedly destroyed by the Fed- erals, who killed or captured many of the employees.^ In the dis- trict of upper Alabama, under the command of Captain William Gabbitt, whose headquarters were at Blue Mountain (now Anniston), most of the work was done in the hmestone caves of the mountain region.' Several hundred men — whites and negroes — were em- ployed in extracting the nitre from the cave earth. To the end of September, 1864, this district had produced 222,665 pounds of nitre at a cost of $237,977.17, war prices.^ The supply from the caves proved insufficient, and artificial nitre beds or nitraries were prepared in the cities of south and central Ala- bama. It was necessary to have them near large towns, in order to obtain a plentiful supply of animal matter and potash, and the neces- sary labor. Efforts were also made to induce planters in marl or limestone counties to work plantation earth.' Under the supervision of Professor W. H. C. Price, nitraries were estabhshed at Selma, Mobile, Talladega, Tuscaloosa, and Montgomery. Negro labor was used almost entirely, each negro having charge of one small nitre bed. To October, 1864, the nitraries of south Alabama produced 34,716 pounds at a cost of $26,171.14, which was somewhat cheaper than the" nitre from the caves. From these nitraries better results were ob- tained than from the French, Swedish, and Russian nitraries which served as models. The Confederate nitre beds were from sixteen to twenty-seven months old in October, 1864, and hence not at their best producing stage. Yet, allo\\ing for the difference in age, they gave better results, as they produced from 2.57 to 3.3 ounces of nitre per cubic foot, while the average European nitraries at four years of age gave 4 ounces per cubic foot. Earth from under old houses and from cellars produced from 2 to 4 ounces to the cubic foot. Nitre caves produced from 6 to 12 ounces per cubic foot. Most of the nitre thus obtained was made into powder at the mills in Selma. There were some private manufacturers of nitre, and to encourage 1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 195, 697. 2 0. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 695. ' One of the most valuable of these caves was the " Santa Cave." See O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 29, 102. * O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 695, 698. ^ O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 29, 102. 154 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA these the Confederate Congress authorized the advance to makers of fifty per cent of the cost of the necessary machinery/ The state legislature appropriated $30,000 to encourage the manu- facture and preparation of powder, saltpetre (nitre), sulphur, and lead. Little of the last article was found in Alabama.^ Some of the powder works were in operation as early as 1861, and in that year the War Department gave Dr. UUman of Tallapoosa a contract to supply 1000 to 1 500 pounds of sulphur a day.' The Confederate Nitre and Mining Bureau had charge of the production of iron in Alabama for the use of the Confederacy. The mines were principally in the hilly region south of the Tennessee River, where several furnaces and iron works were- already estab- lished before the war. Two or three new companies, with capital of $1,000,000 each, had bought mineral lands and had commenced operations when the war broke out. The Confederate government bought the property or gave the companies financial assistance. The iron district was often raided by the Federals, who blew up the fur- naces and wrecked the iron works.* The Irondale works, near Ely- ton, were begun in 1862, and made much iron, but they also were destroyed in 1864 by the Federals.^ Other large iron furnaces, with their forges, foundries, and rolling-mills, were destroyed by Rousseau's raid in 1864. The government employed several hundred conscripts and several thousand negroes in the mines and rolling-mills. It also offered fifty per cent of the cost of equipment to encourage the opening of new mines by private owners." There is record of only about 15,000 tons of Alabama iron being mined by the Confederacy, but probably there was much more.' The iron was sent to Selma, Mont- gomery, and other places for manufacture. The ordnance cast in 1 In 1 861 the War Department gave Leonard and Riddle of Montgomery an order for 60,000 pounds of nitre, and a company near Larkinsville in north Alabama was mak- ing 700 pounds a day, which it sold to the government at 22 to 35 cents a pound. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 556. 2 April 17, 1862. Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., ist Sess.; Acts of Ala., Dec. 7, 1861, and Dec. 2, 1862; O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 195, 698, 702, 987; Davis, Vol. I, pp. 316, 473, 477; Miller, pp. 201, 230; Schwab, "Confederate States," p. 270; Annual Cyclopfedia (1862), p. g; Le Conte's "Autobiography," p. 184. 3 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 556. * Somers, " Southern States," p. 162. ^ Somers, p. 175. " April 9, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., ist Sess. ' O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 695, 700, 702, 990. MILITARY INDUSTRIES 155 Selma was of Alabama iron ; and after the war, when the United States sold the ruins of the arsenal, the big guns were cut up and sent to Philadelphia. Here the fine quality of the iron attracted the atten- tion of experts and led to the development by northern capital of the iron industry in north Alabama. The Confederate government encouraged the building and exten- sion of railroads, and paid large sums to them for the transportation of troops, munitions of war, and mihtary supplies.* Several lines of road within the state were made mihtary roads, and the govern- ment extended their hnes, built bridges and cars, and kept the hnes in repair.^ In 1862 $150,000 was advanced to the Alabama and Mississippi Railway Company, to complete the hne between Selma and Meridian,' and the duty on iron needed for the road was remitted.^ On June 25 of this year this road was seized by the military authorities in order to finish it,^ and because of the lack of iron D. H. Kenny was directed (July 21, 1863) to impress the iron and roUing stock belong- ing to the Alabama and Florida Railway, the Gainesville Branch of ^ Freight rates in Alabama were as follows in December, 1862 : — 1. Ammunition ^0.60 per 100 lbs., pet 100 miles. 2. (Second class) 0.30 per 100 lbs., per 100 miles. 3. Live stock 30.00 per car, per 100 miles. 4. Hay, fodder, wagons, ambulances, etc. . . 20.00 per car, per 100 miles. Troops were to be carried for 2J to 3^ cents a mile per man. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 276. '' Charles T . Pollard, president of the Montgomery and West Point R.R., who ran his road under direction of the government, reported, April 4, 1862, that he had placed the whole line between Montgomery and Selma under contract, and that it would be com- pleted within the year if iron could be obtained. He thought the road between Selma and Meridian ought to be completed at once. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, pp. 10, 48. On Sept. 14, 1864, it was reported that the grading was finished on the road between Mont- gomery and Union Springs, but that no iron could be obtained. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 576. 3 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 941 ; Pub. Laws, C.S.A., Feb. 15, 1862. * On April 4, 1862, the Secretary of War wrote to A. S. Gaines that the road from Selma to Demopolis had been completed ; from Demopolis to Reagan, a distance of 24 miles, a part of the grading had been done ; while the road from Reagan to Meridian, a distance of 27 miles, had been graded, bridged, and some iron had been laid. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, pp. 1048-1049, 1061. Gaines stated, April 24, 1852, that on the Missis- sippi end of the road the road was completed to within 8 miles of Demopolis, Ala., and was being built at the rate of 3 miles a week. Connection was made by boat to Gainesville, within 2 miles of which a spur of the Mobile and Ohio, 21 miles long, had been com- pleted. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 1089. ^0. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 1171. 156 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA the Mobile and Ohio, the Cahaba, Marion, and Greensborough Rail- road, and the Uniontown and Newberne Railroad. The Alabama and Mississippi road was a very important line, since it tapped the supply districts of Mississippi and the Black Belt of Alabama. There were many difficulties in the way of the builders. In 1862 the loco- motives were wearing out and no iron was to be obtained. In the fall of the same year the planters withdrew their negroes who were working on the road, and left the bridges half finished. But finally, in December, 1862, the road was completed.^ In the fall of 1862 a road between Blue Mountain, Alabama, and Rome, Georgia, was planned, and $1,122,480.92 was appropriated by the Confederate Congress, a mortgage being taken as security.^ This road was graded and some bridges built and iron laid, but was not in running order before the end of the war. Telegraph lines, which had been few before the war, were now placed along each railroad, and several cross-country lines were put up. The first important new hne was along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, from Mobile to Meridian.^ Private Manufacturing Enterprises Both the state and the Confederate government encouraged manu- factures by favorable legislation. The Confederate government was always ready to advance half of the cost of the machinery and to take goods in payment. A law of Alabama in 186 1 secured the rights of inventors and authors. All patents under the United States laws prior to January 11, 1861, were to hold good under the state laws, and the United States patent and copyright laws were adopted for Alabama.* Later, jurisdiction over patents, inventions, and copy- rights was transferred to the Confederate government. A bonus of five and ten cents apiece on all cotton and wool cards made in Ala- bama was offered by the legislature in December, 1861.^ All em- ployees in iron mills, in foundries, and in factories supplying the state 1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, pp. 1089, 1145; Vol. II, pp. 106, 148, 149, 655. 2 0. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 144-145; Vol. Ill, p. 312; Stats.-at -Large, Prov, Cong., C.S.A., Feb. 15, 1862 ; Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., April 7 and Oct. 2, 1862. 3 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 783. < Acts, Feb. 8, i86i. 6 Acts, 2d Called and ist Regular Sess., p. 70. PRIVATE MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES 1 57 or Confederate governments with arms, clothing, cloth, and the like were declared by the state exempt from mihtary duty. Factories were soon in operation all over the state, especially in central Alabama. In all places where there were government facto- ries there also were found factories conducted by private individuals. In 1 86 1 there were factories at Tallassee, Autaugaville, and Pratt- ville, with 23,000 spindles and 800 employees, which could make 5000 yards of good tent cloth a day.^ And other cotton -mills were established in north Alabama as early as 1861 .^ The Federals burned these buildings and destroyed the machinery in 1862 and 1863. There was the most "unsparing hostility displayed by the northern armies to this branch of industry. They destroyed instantly every cotton factory within their reach." ^ At Tuscaloosa were cotton and shoe factories, tanneries, and an iron foundry. A large cotton factory was estabhshed in Bibb County, and at Gainesville there were workshops and machine-shops. In addition to the government works, Selma had machine-shops, car shops, iron mills, and foundries, cotton, wool, and harness factories, conducted by private individuals. There were cotton and woollen factories at Prattville and Autaugaville, and at Montgomery were car shops, harness shops, iron mills, foundries, and machine-shops. The best tent cloth and uniform cloth was made at the factories of Tallassee. The state itself began the manufacture of shoes, salt, clothing, whiskey, alcohol, army supphes, and supplies for the des- titute.^ Extensive manufacturing estabhshments of various kinds in Madison, Lauderdale, Tuscumbia, Bibb, Autauga, Coosa, and Talla- poosa counties were destroyed during the war by the Federals. There were iron works in Bibb, Shelby, Calhoun, and Jefferson coun- ties, and in 1864 there were a dozen large furnaces with rolling-mills and foundries in the state.^ However, in that year the governor com- plained that though Alabama had immense quantities of iron ore, even the planters in the iron country were unable to get sufficient 1 Governor Moore to Sec. L. P. Walker, July 2, 1861, O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 493; Somers, p. 136. 2 Schwab, "Confederate States," p. 271. ^ Somers, p. 136. * Acts, Dec. 13, 1864, Acts of Ala., 2d Called and 1st Regular Sess. passim. ^ Le Conte states that in 1863 he found the only Bessemer furnace in the Confeder- acy at Shelbyville; it was the first that he had ever seen. "Autobiography," pp. 184- 185. It was probably the first in America. 1S8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA iron to make and mend agricultural implements, since all iron that was mined was used for purposes of the Confederacy.^ The best and strongest cast iron used by the Confederacy was made at Selma and at Briariield. The cotton factories and tanneries in the Tennessee valley were destroyed in 1862 by the Federal troops.^ Salt Making Salt was one of the first necessaries of life which became scarce on account of the blockade. The Adjutant and Inspector-General of Alabama stated, March 20, 1862, that the Confederacy needed 6,000,000 bushels of salt, and that only an enormous price would force the people to make it. In Montgomery salt was then very scarce, bringing $20 per sack, and speculators were using every trick and fraud in order to control the supply.' The poor people especially soon felt the want of it, and in November, 1861, the legislature passed an act to encourage the manufacture of salt at the state reservation in Clarke County.* The state government even began to make salt at these salt springs. At the Upper Works, near Old St. Stephens, 600 men and 120 teams were employed at 30 furnaces, which were kept going all the time, the production amounting to 600 bushels a day. These works were in operation from 1862 to 1865. The Lower Works, near Sunflower Bend on the Tombigbee River, for four years employed 400 men with 80 teams at 20 furnaces. The production here was about 400 bushels a day. The Central Works, near Salt Mountain, were under private management, and, it is said, were much more successful than the works under state management.^ The price of salt at the works ranged from $2.50 to $7 a bushel in gold, or from $3 to $40 in currency. From 1861 to 1865, 500,000 bushels of good salt were produced each year. 1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 3. 2 Miller, pp. 179, 180, 181, 193; Davis, Vol. I, p. 481 ; Montgomery Advertiser, July 14, 1867; N. Y. Herald, May 15, 1865. 3 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. loio. * This act authorized the governor to lease the salt springs belonging to the state and to require the lessee to sell salt at 75 cents a bushel at the salt works. The state paid 10 cents a bushel bounty and advanced Jio,ooo to the salt maker. Acts, Nov. II and Nov. 19, 1861. 5 One private maker with one furnace and from 15 to 20 hands made 60 bushels a day. Another, with 15 hands,. burning 5 cords of wood, made 36 bushels a day. There were also many other private salt makers. SALT MAKING 159 To obtain the salt water, wells were bored to depths ranging from 60 to 100 feet, — one well, however, was 600 feet deep, — while in the bottom or swamp lands brine was sometimes found at a depth of 8 feet. The water at first rose to the surface and overflowed about 30 gallons a minute in some wells, but as more wells were sunk the brine ceased to flow out and had to be pumped about 16 feet by steam or horse power. It was boiled in large iron kettles hke those then used in syrup making and which are still seen in remote dis- tricts in the South. Seven or eight kettles of water would make one kettle of salt. This was about the same percentage that was ob- tained at the Onondaga (New York) salt springs. About the same boihng was required as in making syrup from sugar-cane juice. The wells were scattered for miles over the country and thousands of men were employed. For three years more than 6000 men, white and black, were employed at the salt works of Clarke County, from 2000 to 3000 working at the Upper Works alone. All were not at work at the furnaces, but hundreds were engaged in cutting and haul- ing wood for fuel, and in sacking and barrelhng salt. It is said that in the woods the blows of no single axe nor the sound of any single faUing tree could be distinguished; the sound was simply continu- ous. Nine or ten square miles of pine timber were cleared for fuel. The salt was sent down the Tombigbee to Mobile or conveyed in wagons into the interior of Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia. These wagons were so numerous that for miles from the various works it was difficult to cross the road. The whole place had the appearance of a manufacturing city. These works had been in operation to some extent since 1809. The wells were exhausted from 1865 to 1870, when they began flowing again. Besides the smaller works and large private works there were hundreds of smaller establishments. When salt was needed on a plantation in the Black Belt, the overseer would take hands, with pots and kettles, and go to the salt wells, camp out for several weeks, and make enough salt for the year's supply. All private makers had to give a certain amount to the state.^ People from the interior of the state and from southeast Alabama went to the Florida coast and made salt by boiling the sea water. The state had salt works at Saltville, Virginia, but found it difficult to get transportation for" 1 Ball, " Clarke County," pp. 645-649, 765 ; "Our Women in War," p. ^75 et seg. \ ■. .; l6o CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA the product. Salt was given to the poor people by the state, or sold to them at a moderate price. The legislature authorized the governor to take possession of all salt when necessary for public use, paying the owners a just compensation; $150,000 was appropriated for this purpose in 1861, and in 1862 it was made a penal offence to send salt out of the state."- A Salt Commission was appointed to look after the salt works owned by the state in Louisiana. A private salt maker in Clarke County made a contract to deliver two-fifths of his product to the state at the cost of manufacture, and the state pur- chased some salt from the Louisiana saltbeds.^ As salt became scarcer the people took the brine in old pork and beef barrels and boiled it down. The soil under old smoke-houses was dug up, put in hoppers, and bleached like ashes, and the brine boiled down and dried in the sunshine.' At Bon Secour Bay, near Mobile, there were salt works consisting of fifteen houses, capable of making seventy-five bushels per day from the sea- water. In 1864 these were burned by the Federals, who often destroyed the salt works along the Florida coast.* At Saltmarsh, ten miles west of Selma, there were works which furnished much of the salt used in Mississippi, central Alabama, and east Georgia during the years 1862, 1863, and 1864. Wells were dug to the depth of twelve or fifteen feet, when salt water was struck. The wells were then curbed, furnaces of lime rock were built, and upon them large kettles were placed. The water was pumped from the wells and run into the kettles through troughs, then boiled down, and the moisture evaporated by the sun. The fires were kept up day and night. A large number of blacks and whites were employed at these wells, and, as salt makers were exempt from military duty, the work was quite popular.'^ Besides the industries above mentioned there were many minor enterprises. Household manufactures were universal. The more 1 Acts, Nov. 9, 1861, and Dec. 9, 1862. 2 Acts, Dec. 9, 1862, Oct. 11, 1864, and Dec. 13, 1864. 3 Miller, "Alabama," pp. 156, 167, 230; Hague, "Blockaded Family"; "Our Women in War," pp. 267, 268. * N. Y. Herald, Sept. 20, 1864 ; Miller, p. 167. '" American Cyclopadia (1864), p. 10 ; N. Y. Times, April 15, 1864. To show the character of the white laborers employed in the saltworks; in reconstruction days, a prominent negro politician told how, when a slave, he had to keep accounts, and read and write letters for the whites at the salt works, who were very ignorant people. SALT MAKING i6l' important companies were chartered by the legislature. The acts of the war period show that in 1861 there were incorporated six insurance companies and the charters of others were amended to suit the changed conditions; three railroad companies were incor- porated, and aid was granted to others for building purposes. Roads carrying troops and munitions free were exempted from taxation. Two mining and manufacturing companies were incorporated, four iron and coal companies, one ore foundry, an express com* pany,' a salt manufacturing company, a chemical manufacturing company, a coal and leather company, and a wine and fruit company. In 1862 the legislature incorporated four iron and foundry companies, a railroad company, the Southern Express Company, a gas-light company, six coal and iron companies, a rolhng-mill, and an oil company, and amended the charters of four railroad companies and two insurance companies. In 1864 two railroad companies were given permission to manufacture alcohol and lubricating oil, and the Citronelle Wine, Fruit, and Nursery Company was incorporated. Various other manufacturing companies — of drugs, barrels, and pottery — were estabhshed. Besides salt the state made alcohol and whiskey for the poor. Every man who had a more than usual regard for his comfort and wanted to keep out of the army had a tannery in his back yard, and made a few shoes or some harness for the Confederacy, thus securing exemption. Governor Moore, in his message to the legislature on October 28, 1861, said: "Mechanical arts and industrial pursuits, hitherto practically unknown to our people, are already in operation. The chnk of the hammer and the busy hum of the workshop are beginning to be heard throughout our land. Our manufactories are rapidly increasing and the inconvenience which would result from the con- tinuance of the war and the closing of our ports for years would be more than compensated by forcing us to the development of our abundant resources, and the tone and the temper it would give to our national character. Under such circumstances the return of peace would find us a self-rehant and truly independent people." ^ 1 Later the Southern Express Company, which is still in existence. It was the southern division of the Adams Express Company. 2 0. R., Ser. IV, Vol. L p. 71 1- 1 62 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA And had the war ended early in 1864, the state would have been well provided with manufactures. The raids through the state in 1864 and 1865 destroyed most of the manufacturing estabhshments. The rest, whether owned by the government or private persons, were seized by the Federal troops at the surrender and were dismantled.' Sec. 2. Confederate Finance in Alabama Banks and Banking In a circular letter dated December 4, i860, and addressed to the banks, Governor Moore announced that should the state secede from the Union, as seemed probable, $1,000,000 in specie, or its equivalent, would be needed by the administration. The state bonds could not be sold in the North nor in Europe, except at a ruinous discount, and a tax on the people at this time would be inexpedient. Therefore he recommended that the banks hold their specie. Other- wise there would be a run on the banks, and should an extra session of the legislature be called to authorize the banks to suspend specie payments, such action would produce a run and thus defeat the object. He requested the banks to suspend specie payments, trusting to the convention to legalize this action.^ The governor then issued an address to the people stating his reasons for such a step. It was done, he said, at the request and by the advice of many citizens whose opinions were entitled to respect and consideration. Such a course, they thought, would relieve the banks from a run during the cotton season, would enable them to aid the state, would do away with the expense of a special session of the legislature, would prevent the sale of state bonds at a great sacrifice, and would prevent extra taxation of the people in time of financial crisis.' Three banks — the Central, Eastern, and Commercial — sus- pended at the governor's request and made a loan to the state of $200,000 in coin. Their suspension was legahzcd later by an ordi- 1 Miller, pp. 179, 180, 181, 193; Davis, Vol. 11, p. 481 ; Montgomery Advertiser, July 14, 1867 ; N. Y. Herald, May 15, 1865 ; Acts of the General Assembly of Alabama, 1861-1864, /aMw«. The Freedman's Bureau was largely supported by sales of the rem- nants of iron works, etc. 2 Smith, " Debates," pp. 38, 39. a Smith, " Debates," pp. 37, 39. BANKS AND BANKING 163 nance of the convention. The Bank of Mobile, the Northern Bank, and the Southern Bank refused to suspend, though they announced that the state should have their full support. The legislature passed an act in February, 1861, authorizing the suspension on condition that the banks subscribe for ten year state bonds at their par value. The bonds were to stand as capital, and the bills issued by the banks upon these bonds were to be receivable in payment of taxes. The amount which each bank was to pay into the treasury for the bonds was fixed, and no interest was to be paid by the state on these bonds until specie payments were resumed. All the banks suspended under these acts, and thus the government secured most of the coin in the state.^ In October, 1861, before all the banks had suspended, state bonds at par to the amount of $975,066.68 had been sold — • all but $28,500 to the banks. By early acts specie payments were to be resumed in May, 1862, but in December, 1861, the suspension was continued until one year after the conclusion of peace with the United States. By this law the banks were to receive at par the Con- federate treasury notes in payment of debts, their notes being good for public dues. The banks were further required to make a loan to the state of $200,000 to pay its quota of the Confederate war tax of August 16, 1861. So the privilege of suspension was worth paying for.^ The banking law was revised by the convention so that a bank might deposit with the state comptroller stocks of the Confederate States or of Alabama, receiving in return notes countersigned by the comptroller amounting to twice the market value of the bonds de- posited. If a bank had in deposit with the comptroller under the old law any stocks of the United States, they could be withdrawn upon the deposit of an equal amount of Confederate stocks or bonds of the state. The same ordinance provided that none except citizens of Alabama and members of state corporations might engage in the banking business under this law. But no rights under the old law ' In his message of Oct. 25, 1861, Governor Shorter made a report showing that the finances of the state for 1861 were in good condition, and advised against levying a tax on the people to pay the state's quota of the Confederate tax. He stated that the banks had done good service to the state ; that, though in time of peace they were a. necessary evil, now they were a public necessity ; that all the money used to date by the state in carrying on the war had come from the banks. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, pp. 697-700. '^ O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, pp. 697-699 ; Acts of Gen. Assembly, Feb. 2, Nov. 27 and 30, and Dec. 7 and 9, 1861 ; Patton's Message, Jan. 16, 1866. l64 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA were to be affected. It was further provided that subsequent legis- lation might require any "free" bank to reduce its circulation to an amount not exceeding the market value of the bonds deposited with the comptroller. The notes thus retired were to be cancelled by the comptroller.^ The suspension of specie payments was followed by an increase of banking business; note issues were enlarged; eleven new banks were chartered,^ and none wound up affairs. They paid dividends regularly of from 6 to lo per cent in coin, in Confederate notes, or in both. Speculation in government funds was quite profit- able to the banks. Issues of Bonds and Notes The convention authorized the general assembly of the state to issue bonds to such amounts and in such sums as seemed best, thus giving the assembly practically unlimited discretion. But it was provided that money must not be borrowed except for pur- poses of military defence, unless by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house; and the faith and credit of the state was pledged for the punctual payment of the principal and interest.' The legislature hastened to avail itself of this permission. In 1861 a bond issue of $2,000,000 for defence, and not liable to taxation, was authorized at one time; at another, $385,000 for defence, besides an issue of $1,000,000 in treasury notes receivable for taxes. Of the first issue authorized, only $1,759,500 were ever issued. Opposition to taxation caused the state to take up the war tax of $2,000,000 (August 19, 1861), and for this purpose $1,700,000 in bonds was issued, the banks supplying the remaindeir. There was a relaxation in taxation during the war; paper money was easily printed, and the people were opposed to heavy taxes.* In 1862 bonds to the amount of $2,000,000 were issued for the benefit of the indigent. The governor was given unhmited authority to issue bonds and notes, receivable for taxes, to "repair the treasury," and $2,085,000 in bonds were issued under this permit. These bonds 1 Ordinance No. 33, amending sections 1373, 1375, 1393, of the Code, March 16, 1861. 2 In i86i two banks were chartered, two in 1862, five in 1863, and two in 1864. Several of these were savings-banks. ' Ordinance No. 18, Jan. 19, 1861 ; Nos. 35 and 36, March 18, 1861. * Schwab, p. 302 ; Davis, Vol. I, p. 495 ; Journal of the Convention of 1865, p. 61 ; Acts of Ala , Jan. 29, Feb. 6 and 8, Dec. 10, i86l ; Stats.-at- Large, Prov. Cong., C. S. A., Feb. 8, 1861 ; Miller, "Alabama," pp. 152, 157. ISSUES OF BONDS AND NOTES 165 drew interest at 6 per cent, ran for twenty years, and sold at a pre- mium of from 50 per cent to 100 per cent. Bonds were used both for civil and for military purposes, but chiefly for the support of the destitute. Treasury notes to the amount of $3,500,000 were issued, drawing interest at 5 per cent, and receivable for taxes. The Confed- erate Congress came to the aid of Alabama with a grant of $1,200,000 for the defence of Mobile.' In 1863 notes and bonds for $4,000,000 were issued for the benefit of indigent famihes of soldiers, and $1,500,- 000 for defence ; $90,000 in bonds was paid for the steamer Florida, which was later turned over to the Confederate government.^ In 1864 $7,000,000 was appropriated for the support of indigent fami- lies of soldiers, and an unlimited issue of bonds and notes was author- ized.^ In 1862 the Alabama legislature proposed that each state should guarantee the debt of the Confederate States in proportion to its representation in Congress. This measure was opposed by the other states and failed.^ A year later a resolution of the legisla- ture declared that the people of Alabama would cheerfully submit to any tax, not too oppressive in amount or unequal in operation, laid by the Confederate government for the purpose of reducing the volume of currency and appreciating its value. The assembly also signified its disapproval of the scheme put forth at the bankers' meeting at Augusta, Georgia — to issue Confederate bonds with interest payable in coin and to levy a heavy tax of $60,000,000 to be paid in coin or in coupons of the proposed new issue.^ The Alabama treasury had many Confederate notes received for taxes. Before April i, 1864 (when such notes were to be taxed one- third of their face value), these could be exchanged at par for twenty- year, 6 per cent Confederate bonds. After that date the Confederate notes were fundable at 33^ per cent of their face value only." After June 14, 1864, the state treasury could exchange Confederate notes for 4 per cent non-taxable Confederate bonds, or one-half for 6 per cent bonds and one-half for new notes. The Alabama legislature 1 Journal of the Convention, 1865, p. 61 ; Acts of Ala., Nov. 8, Dec. 4, 8, and 9, 1862 ; Miller, p. 168. ^ Jour, of the Convention of 1865, p. 61 ; Acts of Ala., Aug. 29, Dec. 8, 1863 ; Miller, pp. 186, 189. ' Miller, p. 215 ; Acts of Ala., Oct. 7 and Dec. 13, 1864. * Resolutions of Gen. Assembly, Dec. i, 1862 ; Schwab, p. 50. ' Resolutions, Dec. 8, 1863. ^ Confederate Funding Act, Feb. 17, 1864. 1 66 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA of 1864 arranged for funding the notes according to the latter method.' The Alabama legislature of 1861 had made it lawful for debts con- tracted after that year to be payable in Confederate notes.^ Later a meeting of the citizens of Mobile proposed to ostracize those who refused to accept Confederate notes. Cheap money caused a clamor for more, and the heads of the people were filled with fiat money notions. The rise in prices stimulated more issues of notes. On February 9, 1861, $1,000,000 in state treasury notes was issued, and in 1862 there was a similar issue of $2,000,000 more. These state notes were at a premium in Confederate notes, which were dis- credited by the Confederate Funding Act of February 17, 1864. Confederate notes were eagerly offered for state notes, but the state stopped the exchange.^ December 13, 1864, a law was passed pro- viding for an unlimited issue of state notes redeemable in Confederate notes and receivable for taxes. Private individuals often issued notes on their own account, and an enormous number was put into circulation. The legislature, by a law of December 9, 1862, prohibited the issue of " shinplaster " or other private money under penalty of $20 to $500 fine, and any person circulating such money was to be deemed the maker. It was not successful, however, in reducing the flood of private tokens; the credit of individuals was better than the credit of the government. Executors, administrators, guardians, and trustees were author- ized to make loans to the Confederacy and to purchase and receive for debts due them bonds and treasury notes of the Confederacy and of Alabama and the interest coupons of the same. One-tenth of the Confederate $15,000,000 loan of February 28, 1861, was sub- scribed in Alabama.^ In December, 1863, the legislature laid a tax of 37i per cent on bonds of the state and of the Confederacy unless the bonds had been bought directly from the Confederate government or from the state.^ This was to punish speculators. After October 7, 1864, the state treasury was directed to refuse Con- 1 Acts of Ala., Oct. 7, 1864 ; Schwab, pp. 73, 74. 2 ^^ts of Ala., Dec. 10, i86r. ^ Acts of Ala., passim. Notes of the state and of state banks were hoarded, while Confederate notes were distrusted. Pollard, "Lost Cause," p. 421. * Acts of Ala., Nov. 9, 1861 ; Schwab, p. 8. It was considered a matter of patriot- ism to invest funds in Confederate securities. Not many other investments offered ; there was little trade in negroes. Pollard, " Lost Cause," p. 424. 5 Acts of Ala., Dec. 8, 1863. ISSUES OF BONDS AND NOTES 1 67 federate notes issued before February 17, 1864 (the date of the Fund- ing Act) in payment of taxes except at a discount of 33J per cent. Later, Confederate notes were taken for taxes at their full market value.^ Gold was shipped through the blockade at Mobile to pay the interest on the state bonded debt held in London. It has been charged that this money was borrowed from the Central, Commercial, and Eastern banks and was never repaid, recovery being denied on the ground that the state could not be sued.^ But the banks received state and Confederate bonds under the new banking law in return for their coin. The exchange was willingly made, for otherwise the banks would have had to continue specie payments or forfeit their charters. And to continue specie payments meant immediate bankruptcy.' After the war, the state was forbidden to pay any debt incurred in aid of the war, nor could the bonds issued in aid of the war be redeemed. The banks suffered just as all others suffered, and it is difi&cult to see why the state should make good the losses of the banks in Confederate bonds and not make good the losses of private individuals. To do either would be contrary to the Four- teenth Amendment. The last statement of the condition of the Alabama treasury was as follows : — Balance in treasury, September 30, 1864 .... ^3.713.959 Receipts, September 30, 1864, to May 24, 1865 . . . 3,776,188 Total S 7,490,147 Disbursements, September 30, 1864, to May 24, 1865 . . 6,698,853 Balance intreasa;^, September 30, 1864, to May 24, 1865 ^(791,294 The balance was in funds as follows : — Checks on Bank of Mobile, payable in Confederate notes . ^11,440 Certificate of deposit. Bank of Mobile, payable in Confeder- ate notes '.33° Confederate and state notes in treasury .... 517,889 State notes, change bills (legal shinplasters) . . . 250,004 Notes of state banks and branches 3S8 Bank-notes 424 Silver 337 Gold on hand 497 Gold on deposit in northern banks 35 Balance )f 791,294 1 Acts of Ala., Dec. 13, 1864. 2 Clark, "Finance and Banking," in the " Memorial Record of Alabama," Vol. I, p. 341. Statement of J. H. Fitts. ' Patton's Message, Jan. 16, 1866. l68 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA To dispose of nearly $7,000,000 in small notes must have kept the treasury very busy during the last seven months of its existence. It is interesting to note that the treasury kept at work until May 24, 1865, six weeks after the surrender of General Lee. Special Appropriations and Salaries Besides the regular appropriations for the usual expenses of the government, there were many extraordinary appropriations. These, of course, were for the war expenses which were far greater than the ordinary expenses. The chief item of these extraordinary appropria- tions was for the support of the indigent famihes of soldiers, and for this purpose about $11,000,000 was provided. For the miHtary defence of the state several miUion dollars were appropriated, much of this being spent for arms and clothing for the Alabama troops, both in the Confederate and the state service. Money was granted to the University of Alabama and other military schools on condition that they furnish drill- masters for the state troops without charge. Hospitals were furnished in Virginia and in Alabama for the Alabama soldiers. The gunboat Florida was bought for the defence of Mobile, and $150,000 was appropriated for an iron-clad ram for the same purpose. Loans were made to commanders of regiments to buy clothing for their soldiers, and the state began to furnish clothing, $50,000 being appropriated at one time for clothing for the Alabama soldiers in northern prisons. By March 12, 1862, Alabama had con- tributed $317,600 to the support of the Army.of Northern Virginia.' Much was expended in the manufacture of salt in Alabama and in Virginia, which was sold at cost or given away to the poor ; in the pur- chase of salt from Louisiana to be sold at a low price, and in bounties paid to salt makers in the state who sold salt at reasonable prices. The state also paid for medical attendance for the indigent famihes of soldiers. When the records and rolls of the Alabama troops in the Confederate service were lost, money was appropriated to have new ones made. Frequent grants were made to the various benevo- lent societies of the state whose object was to care for the maimed and sick soldiers, the widows and the orphans. Cotton and wool cards and agricultural implements were purchased and distributed ^ Jones, "Diary," Vol. I, p. 114. North Carolina alone had contributed more — ^(325,000. TAXATION 169 among the poor. Slaves and supplies were taken for the public service and the owners compensated. The appropriations for the usual expenses of the government were Ught, seldom more than twice the appropriations in times of peace, notwithstanding the depreciated currency. The salaries of pubHc officers who received stated amounts ranged from $1500 to $4000 a year in state money. In 1862 the salaries of the professors in the State University were doubled on account of the depreciated currency, the president receiving $5000 and each professor $4000.' The members of the general assembly were more fortunate. In 1864 they received $15 a day for the time in session, and the clerks of the legislature, who were disabled soldiers or exempt from service, or were women, were paid the same amount. The salt commissioners drew salaries of $3000 a year in 1864 and 1865, though this amount was not sufficient to pay their board for more than six months. Sala- ries were never increased in proportion to expenses. The compen- sation, in December, 1864, for capturing a runaway slave was $25, worth probably 50 cents in coin. For the inaugural expenses of Governor Watts, $500 in paper was appropriated.^ Many laws were passed, regulating and changing the fees and salaries of public offi- cials. In October, 1884, for example, the salaries of the state offi- cials, tax assessors and collectors, and judges were increased 50 per cent. Besides the general depreciation of the currency, the varia- tions of values in the different sections of the state rendered such changes necessary. In the central part, which was safe for a long time from Federal raids, the currency was to the last worth more, and the prices of the necessaries of life were lower than in the more exposed regions. This fact was taken into consideration by the legislature when fixing the fees of the state and county officers in the various sections of the state. Taxation As a result of the policy adopted at the outset of meeting the extraordinary expenses by bond issues,' the people continued to pay 1 Clark, "Education in Alabama," p. 90. ^ ^ctg of Ala., Dec. 7, 1863. ' The state authorities considered it inexpedient to levy heavier state taxes. The people had always been opposed to heavy state taxes, but paid county taxes more will- I70 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA the light taxes levied before the war, and paid them in paper money. Though falling heavily on the salaried and wage-earning classes, it was never a burden upon the agricultural classes except in the poor- est white counties. The poll tax brought in little revenue. Soldiers were exempt from its payment and from taxation on property to the amount of $500. The widows and orphans of soldiers had similar privileges. A special tax of 25 per cent on the former rate was im- posed on all taxable property in November, 1861, and a year later, by acts of December 9, 1862, a far-reaching scheme of taxation was introduced. Under this poll taxes were levied as follows : — White men, 21 to 60 years Free negro men, 21 to 50 years Free negro women, 21 to 45 years . Slaves (children to laborers in prime) More valuable slaves And other taxes as follows : — ^0.75 5.00 3.00 50 to 2.00 2.00 and up Crop liens 33io/„ Hoarded money . . i % Jewellery, plate, furniture . ..... J % Goods sold at auction ........ 10 % Imports .......... 2% Insurance premiums (companies not chartered by state) . 2 % Playing cards, per pack $1.00 Gold watches, each ........ i.oo Gold chains, silver watches, clocks ..... 0.50 Articles raffled off 10% Legacies, profits and sales, incomes ..... 5 % Profits of Confederate contractors ...... 10% Wages of Confederate officials 10 % Racetracks 10"/ Billiard tables, each jS 1 50.00 Bagatelle 20.00 Tenpin alleys, each ........ 40.00 Readings and lectures, each . 4.00 Pedler 100.00 Spirit rapper, per day 500.00 Saloon-keeper $40.00 to 150.00 Daguerreotypist 10.00 to 100.00 Slave trader, for each slave offered for sale .... 20.00 ingly. So the gift of 1(500,000 to the Confederate government in 1861 and the jS2,ooo,ooo war tax of the same year were assumed by the state, and bonds were issued. Stats.-at-Large, Prov. Cong., C.S.A., Feb. 8, 1861; Acts of Ala., Nov. 27, 1861. TAXATION 171 In 1863 a tax of 37J per cent was laid on Confederate and state bonds not in the hands of the original purchaser ; ' 7^ per cent was levied on profits of banking, railroad companies, and on evidence of debt ; 5 per cent on other profits not included in the act of the year before. The tax on gold and silver was to be paid in gold and silver ; on bank-notes, in notes; on bonds, in coupons.^ In December, 1864, the taxes levied by the laws of 1862 and 1863 were increased by 33J per cent. Taxes on gold and silver were to be paid in kind or in currency at its market value.' This was the last tax levied by the state under Confederate rule. From these taxes the state govern- ment was largely supplied. A number of special laws were passed to enable the county authori- ties to levy taxes-in-kind or to levy a certain amount in addition to the state tax, for the use of the county. The taxes levied by the state did not bear heavily upon the majority of the people, as nearly all, except the well-to-do and especially the slave owners, were exempt. The constant depreciation of the currency acted, of course, as a tax on the wage-earners and salaried classes and on those whose income was derived from government securities. While the state taxes were felt chiefly by the wealthier agricul- tural classes and the slave OAvners, this was not the case with the Confederate taxes. The loans and gifts from the state, the war tax of August 19, 1861, the $15,000,000 loan, the Produce Loan, and the proceeds of sequestration — all had not availed to secure sufficient suppHes. The Produce Loan of 1862 was subscribed to largely in Alabama, the Secretary of the Treasury issuing stocks and bonds in return for supphes,* and $1,500,000 of the $15,000,000 loan was raised in the state. Still the Confederate government was in desperate need. The farmers would not willingly sell their produce for cur- rency which was constantly decreasing in value, and, when selling at all, they were forced to charge exorbitant prices because of the high prices charged them for everything by the speculators.^ The speculator also ran up the prices of supplies beyond the reach of the government purchasing agents who had to buy according to the hst of prices issued by impressment commissioners. So in the spring 1 Another measure aimed at the speculator. ^ ^(.[3 of Ala., Dec. 8, 1863. » Acts of Ala., Dec. 13, 1864. * Pub. Laws, ist Cong., ist Sess., April 21, 1862. ^ Pollard, " Lost Cause," p. 427. 172 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA of 1863 all other expedients were cast aside and the Confederate government levied a genuine "Morton's Fork" tax. No more loans of paper money from the state, no more assumption of war taxes by the state governments because the people were opposed to any form of direct taxation, no more holding back of supplies by pro- ducers and speculators who refused to sell to the Confederate govern- ment except for coin; the new law stopped all that.* First there was a tax of 8 per cent on all agricultural products in hand on July i, 1863, on salt, wine, and Hquors, and i per cent on ajl moneys and credits. Second, an occupation tax ranging from $50 to $200 and from 2J per cent to 20 per cent of their gross sales was levied on bankers, auctioneers, brokers, druggists, butchers, fakirs, liquor dealers, merchants, pawnbrokers, lawyers, physicians, photographers, brewers, and distillers ; hotels paid from $30 to $500, and theatres, $500. Third, there was an income tax of i per cent on salaries from $1000 to $1500 and 2 per cent on all over $1500. Fourth, 10 per cent on all trade in flour, bacon, corn, oats, and dry goods during 1863. Fifth, a tax-in-kind, by which each farmer, after reserving 50 bushels of sweet and 50 bushels of Irish potatoes, 20 bushels of peas or beans, 100 bushels of corn or 50 bushels of wheat out of his crop of 1863, had to deliver (at a depot within 8 miles) out of the remainder of his produce for that year, 10 per cent of all wheat, corn, oats, rye, buckwheat, rice, sweet and Irish potatoes,' hay, fodder, sugar, molasses, cotton, wool, tobacco, peas, beans, and peanuts; 10 per cent of all meat killed between April 24, 1863, and March i, 1863.^ By this act $9,500,000 in currency was raised in Alabama. Ala- bama, with Georgia and North Carolina, furnished two-thirds of the tax-in-kind. Though at first there was some objection to the tax- in-kind because it bore entirely on the agricultural classes, yet it was a just tax so far as the large planters were concerned, since the depre- ciated money had acted as a tax on the wage-earners and salaried classes, who had also some state tax to pay. The tax-in-kind fell heavily upon the families of small farmers in the white counties, who had no negro labor and who produced no more than the barest necessaries of hfe. To collect the tax-in-kind required an army of 1 Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., 3d Sess., April 24, 1863. " See also Curry, " Confederate States," p. 1 10. TAXATION 173 tithe gatherers and afforded fine opportunities of escape from mihtary service. The state was divided into districts for the collection of all Confederate taxes, with a state collector at the head. The col- lection districts were usually counties, following the state division into taxing districts. In 1864 the tobacco tithe was collected by treasury agents and not by the quartermaster's department, which had formerly collected it.' The tax of April 24, 1863, was renewed on February 17, 1864, and some additional taxes laid as follows: — Real estate and personal property ....... 5 % Gold and silver ware, jewellery . . . . . . . .10% Coin 50/^ Credits 5% Profits on liquors, produce, groceries, and dry goods . . . .10% On June lo, 1864, an additional tax of 20 per cent of the tax for 1864 was laid, payable only in Confederate treasury notes of the new issue. Four days later an additional tax ^ was levied as follows : — Real estate and personal property and coin . , . . . . 5 % Gold and silver ware . . . . . . . . . . 10 % Profits on liquors, produce, groceries, and dry goods . . . • 3° % Treasury notes of old issue (after January, 1865) 100% The taxes during the war, state and Confederate, were in all five to ten times those levied before the war. Never were taxes paid inore willingly by most of the people,^ though at first there was oppo- sition to them. It is probable that the authorities did not, in 1861 and 1862, give sufficient consideration to the fact that conditions were much changed, and that in view of the war the people would wilhngly have paid taxes that they would have rebelled against in times of peace. Of the tax-in-kind for 1863, $100,000 was collected in Pickens county alone, one of the poorest counties in the state. The produce was sent in too freely to be taken care of by the government quarter- masters, and, as there was enough on hand for a year or two, much of it was ruined for lack of storage room.* An English traveller in east Alabama, in 1864, reported that there was abundance. The tax-in-kind was working well, and enough provisions had already been collected for the western armies of the Confederacy to last until 1 Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., 4th Sess., Jan. 30, 1864. '' Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 2d Cong., ist Sess., June 10 and 14, 1864. « Miller, "Alabama," p. 190. « JV. Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1864. 174 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA the harvest of 1865.' There were few railroads in the state and the roUing stock on these was scarce and soon worn out. So the suppKes gathered by the tax-in-kind law could not be moved. Hundreds of thousands of pounds of beef and bacon and bushels of corn were piled up in the government warehouses and at the depots, while star- vation threatened the armies and the people also in districts remote from the railroads or rivers. At the supply centres of Alabama and along the railroads in the Black Belt there were immense stores of provisions. When the war ended, notwithstanding the destruc- tion by raids, great quantities of corn and bacon were seized or de- stroyed by the Federal troops.^ Impressment The state quite early began to secure supplies by impressment. Salt was probably the first article to which the state laid claim. Later the of&cials were authorized to impress and pay for supphes necessary for the public service. In 1862 the governor was authorized to im- press shoes, leather, and other shoemakers' materials for the use of the army. The legislature appropriated $250,000 to pay for impress- ments under this law.' In case of a refusal to comply with an order of impressment the sheriff was authorized to summon a posse comi- taius of not less than 20 men and seize double the quantity first im- pressed. In such cases no compensation was given.'' The people resisted the impressment of their property. By a law of October 31, 1862, the governor was empowered to impress slaves, and tools and teams for them to work with, in the pubUc service against the enemy, and $1,000,000 was appropriated to pay the owners.' Slaves were regularly impressed by the Confederate officials acting in cooperation with the state authorities, for work on fortifications and for other pubUc service. Several thousand were at work at Mobile at various times. They were secured usually by requisition on the state gov- ernment, which then impressed them. In December, 1864, Alabama was asked for 2500 negroes for the Confederate service." The people 1 Fitzgerald Ross, " Cities and Camps of the Confederate States," pp. 237, 238. 2 Miller, p. 230. 8 ^^ts of Ala., Nov. 19, 1862. * Acts of Ala., Nov. 17, 1862. ^ Acts of Ala., Oct. 31, 1862. « O. R., Ser. II, Vol. Ill, p. 933; G. O., 86, A. and I. G. Office, Richmond, Dec. 12, 1864; Miller, pp. 198, 199; Beverly, "History of Alabama,"; A. C. Gordon, in Century Magazine, Sept., 1888; David Dodge, in Atlantic Monthly, Aug., 1886. IMPRESSMENT I 75 were morbidly sensitive about their slave property, and there was much discontent at the impressment of slaves, even though they were paid for. As the war drew to a close, the people were less and less wilUng to have their servants impressed. In the spring of 1863, the Confederate Congress authorized the impressment of private property for pubHc use.' The President and the governor each appointed an agent, and these together fixed the prices to be paid for the property taken.' Every two months they pubHshed schedules of prices, which were always below the market prices.^ Evidently impressment had been going on for some time, for, in November, 1862, Judge Dargan, member of Congress from Alabama, wrote to the President that the people from the coun- try were afraid to bring produce to Mobile for fear of seizure by the government. In November, 1863, the Secretary of War issued an order that no supphes should be impressed when held by a person for his own consumption or that of his employees or slaves, or while being carried to market for sale, except in urgent cases and by order of a commanding general. Consequently the land was filled with agents buying a year's supply for railroad companies, individuals, manufactories, and cotporations, relief associations, towns, and counties — all these to be protected from impressment. Most specu- lators always had their goods on the way to market for sale. The great demand caused prices to rise suddenly, and the government, which had to buy by scheduled prices, could not compete with private purchasers ; yet it could not legally impress. There was much abuse of the impressment law, especially by unauthorized persons. It was the source of much lawless conduct on the part of many who claimed to be Confederate officials, with authority to impress.* The legislature frequently protested against the manner of execution of the law. In 1863 a state law was passed which indicates that the people had been suffering from the depredations of thieves who pre- ^ Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., 3d Sess., March 26, 1863. ^ A conference of impressment commissioners met in Augusta, Ga., Oct. 26, 1863. Among those present were Wylie W. Mason, of Tuskegee, Ala., and Robert C. Farris, of Montgomery, Ala. See O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 898-906. ' Schwab, p. 202 ; Saunders, " Early Settlers." Schedules were printed in all the newspapers, and many have been reprinted in the Official Records. * Jones, "Diary," Vol. I, p. 194; Miller, "Alabama," pp. 198, 199; Pollard, "Lost Cause," pp. 487-488. 176 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA tended to be Confederate ofi&cials in order to get supplies. It was made a penal offence in 1862 and again in 1863, with from one to five years' imprisonment and $500 to $5000 fine, to falsely represent one's self as a Confederate agent, contractor, or of&cial.' The merchants of Mobile protested against the impressment of sugar and molasses, as it would cause prices to double, they said.^ There was much com- plaint from sufferers who were never paid by the Confederate authori- ties for the supplies impressed. Quartermasters of an army would sometimes seize the necessary supplies and would leave with the army before setthng accounts with the citizens of the community, the latter often being left without any proof of their claim. In north Alabama, especially, where the armies never tarried long at a place, the com- plaint was greatest. To do away with this abuse resulting from care- lessness, the Secretary of War appointed agents in each congressional district to receive proof of claims for forage and supplies impressed.' The state wanted a Confederate law passed to authorize receipts for supplies to be given as part of the tax-in-kind.* The unequal operation of the impressment system may be seen in the case of Clarke and Monroe counties. In the former, from 16 persons, property amounting to $1700 was impressed. In Monroe, from 37 persons $60,000 worth was taken. The delay in payment was so long that the money was practically worthless when received.' Debts, Stay Laws, Sequestration In the secession convention the question of indebtedness to north- ern creditors came up, and Watts of Montgomery proposed con- fiscation, in case of war, of the property of alien enemies and of debts due northern creditors. The proposal was supported by several members, who declared that the threat of confiscation would do much to promote peace. But the majority of the convention were opposed to any measure looking toward confiscation, and the matter was carried over for the Confederate government to settle." Stay laws were enacted in Alabama on February 8, 1861, and on ^ Acts of Ala., Nov. 25, 1863. 2 Jones, "Diary," Vol. I, p. 301. ^ Pub. Laws, C.S.A., zd Cong., ist Sess., June 14, 1864 ; Saunders, " Early Set- tlers." * Resolutions of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 26, 1864. " Ball, " Clarke County," p. 501. <> Smith, " Debates," pp. 174-183. DEBTS, STAY LAWS, SEQUESTRATION 177 December 10, 1861. The Confederate Provisional Congress enacted a law (May 21, 1861) that debtors to persons in the North (except in Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, and the District of Columbia) be prohibited from paying their debts during the war.^ They should pay the amount of the debt into the Confederate treasury and receive a certificate reUeving them from their debts, transferring it to the Confederate treasury. A Confederate law of November 17, 1862, provided that when payment of the interest on a debt was proffered in Confederate treasury notes and refused, it should be unlawful for the plaintiff to secure more than ^ of i per cent interest. On August 30, 1 86 1, Congress, in retaliation for the confiscation and destruction of the property of Confederate citizens, passed the Se- questration Act, which held all property of alien enemies (except citi- zens of the border states) as indemnity for such destruction and devastation.^ Under the Sequestration Act receivers were appointed in each county to take possession of all property belonging to alien enemies. They were empowered to interrogate all lawyers, bank ofiicials, officials of corporations engaged in foreign trade, and all persons and agents engaged for persons engaged in foreign trade, for the purpose of discovering such property. The proceeds were to be held for the indemnity of loyal citizens suffering under the confiscation laws of the United States.^ Later the property thus seized was sold and the money paid into the Confederate treasury.^ In the last days of the war (February 15, 1865), the Sequestration Act was extended to include the property of disloyal citizens who had gone within the Federal lines to escape mihtary service, or who had entered the Union service to fight against the Confederacy.^ In December, 1861, a law was passed by the legislature which 1 Stats. -at-Large, Prov. Cong., C.S.A. 2 Stat.-at-Large, Prov. Cong., 2d Sess. ; McPherson, " Rebellion," pp. 203, 204. European merchants and capitalists also had a large trade with the South when the war broke out, and thus sustained great losses. They had made large advances to southern planters and merchants, and were also interested in property in the South. Proceeds were remitted to foreign creditors or owners in Confederate or state currency or bonds for there was no other form of remittance. Robertson, "The Confederate Debt and Private Southern Debts" (English pamphlet). 2 McPherson, "Rebellion," pp. 203, 204; Acts of Prov. Cong., Aug. 30, 1861 ; Benjamin's "Instructions to Receivers," Sept. 12, 1861. * Stats. -at- Large, Prov. Cong., 3d Sess., Feb. 15, 1862. 5 McPherson, "Rebellion," p. 613. N 178 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA provided that no suit by or for an alien enemy for debt or money should be prosecuted in any court in Alabama. No execution was to be issued to an alien enemy, and suits already brought could be dismissed on the motion of the defendant.^ In Alabama much of the time of the Confederate district courts was taken up by seques- tration cases. In fact, they did little else. However, but little money was ever turned into the Confederate treasury from this source.^ Just as the state sent nearly all its coin through the blockade to pay the interest of its London debt, so the Mobile, Montgomery, or Selma merchant cancelled his indebtedness and sent money, as he was able, during the early years of the war, to his northern and European creditors. Most debts due to northerners were con- cealed from the government. The stringent laws passed against it were of no avail. As a source of revenue the sequestration of the property of alien enemies hardly paid expenses. After all, however, the northern creditor probably lost nearly all his accounts in the South in the general wreck of property in 1865. Trade, Barter, Prices After the outbreak of war, business was soon almost at a stand- still. The government monopohzed all means of transportation for military purposes. There were few good railroads in the state and few good wagon- roads. In one section there would be plenty, while seventy-five or a hundred miles away there would be great suffering from want. Depreciated currency and the impressment laws made the producer wary of going to market at all. He pre- ferred to keep what he had and hve upon it, effecting changes in the old way of barter. Cows, hogs, chickens, mules, farm implements, cotton, corn, peas — all were exchanged and reexchanged for one another. The farmer tended more and more to become indepen- dent of the merchant and of money. Consequently the townspeople suffered. Confederate money, at first received at par, soon begiijn to depreciate, though the most patriotic people considered it theft duty to accept it at its par value.^ ' Acts of Ala., Dec. 10, 1861. 2 Two years after the passage of the Sequestration Law its entire proceeds in the Confederacy amounted to less than $2,000,000. Pollard, " Lost Cause," p. 220. " Suspension of specie payments had been made in order to prevent a drain on the banks. The Confederate government took possession of some of the coin, while much Ki**k.HT Qr Alabama Money. ri-«flttB:4j»*.'fc#!,'*'n.^\ ;;'rfi|fi|w .> ^f,'\.<*■.^^ •.-■^H t.l -*M.1 . ». St ':./ ' — — - — — ■ ■ — " — '—7 L^ .:;k^ Confederate Postage Stamps. Private Money. Printed in large sheets on one side only and never used. The other side is a state bill similar to the one above. Paper was scarce, and the state money was printed so that when cut apart the private money was destroyed. TRADE, BARTER, PRICES 1 79 At the end of i86i. Confederate money was worth as much* IS Federal, but it had depreciated. Often private credit was better than pubHc, and individuals in need of a more stable circulating medium issued notes or promises to pay which in the immediate neighborhood passed current at their face value. Great quantities 3f this "card money" or shinplasters were issued, and in some communities it almost supplanted the legal money as a more reliable medium of exchange. The Alabama legislature passed severe laws against the practice of issuing "card money," but with httle effect. The effect of depreciation of paper money was the same as a tax so far as the people were concerned. Forced into circulation, it supported the government, but it gradually depreciated and each holder lost a httle. Finally, when almost worthless, it was practically repudiated by the state and by the Confederacy, and funding laws were passed, providing for the redemption of old notes at a low rate in new issues. Depreciation of the currency caused extravagance and other more evil results. A person who handled much money felt that he must at once get rid of all that came into his possession in order to avoid loss by depreciation. Consequently there was speculation, reckless spending, and extravagance. Money would be spent for anything offered for sale. If useful things were not to be had, then luxuries would be bought, such as silks, fancy articles, hquors, etc., from blockade- runners. This was especially the case in Selma, Mobile, and Montgomery, and in northern Ala- bama. Persons formerly of good character frequently drifted into extravagant and dissipated habits, because they tried to spend their money and there were not enough legitimate ways in which to do so. was used in the contraband and blockade trade. All this contributed to discredit Con- federate paper currency. Pollard, " Lost Cause," p. 421. In May, 1862, General Beau- regard seized ^500,000 in coin from a bank in Jackson, Ala. The coin belonged to a New Orleans bank and had been sent out to prevent confiscation by Butler. Confeder- ate money was almost worthless at Mobile in 1864, while in the interior of the state it still had a fair value. ^ Confederate paper held up well in l86i and 1862, though prices were very high. The people were opposed to fixing a depreciated value to Confederate money, but they were forced to do so by speculators. The money was worth more the farther away from Richmond, though comparison with gold should not be made, as gold was scarce, and prices in gold fell. Board, which formerly cost $2 a day, could now be had for fifty cents in gold. Gold was not a standard of value, but an article of commerce with a fictitious value. Pollard, " Lost Cause," p. 425. l80 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA Depreciation, speculation, and scarcity caused prices to rise, especially the prices of the necessaries of life. These varied in the different sections of the state. In Mobile, in 1862, prices were as follows : — $25.00 40.00 Shoes, per pair . Boots, per pair . Overcoats, each . Hats, each Flour, per barrel Corn, per bushel Butter, per pound Bacon, per pound Soap, per pound (cheap) Candles, per pound . Sugar, per pound Coffee, per pound Tea, per pound . Cotton and wool cards, per pair Board per week at the Battle House, in 1862 25.00 15.00 3.00 to 60.00 3-25 I -75 10.00 1. 00 2.50 $ 0.50 to .75 1.75 to 3.25 10.00 to 20.00 2.00 $3.50; in 1863, 8.00 1 In May, 1862, at Huntsville, then in the hands of the Federals, some prices were, in Federal currency : — Green tea (poor quality), per pound ^(4.00 Common rough trousers, per pair ....... 13.00 Boots, per pair ........... 25.00 Shoes, per pair $5.00 to 12.00^^ In 1863, in south Alabama, in Confederate currency: — Meat, per pound .......... ^(4.00 Lard, per pound .......... 6.00 Salt, per sack at the works ...... ^80.00 to 95.00 Wheat, per bushel .......... 10.00 Corn, per bushel .......... 3.00 A cow (worth j!i5 in i860) 127.00' In March, 1864, prices in Selma were as follows: — Salt, per bushel ........... i?30.oo Calico, per yard .......... lo.oo Women's common shoes, per pair ....... 60.00 Men's rough boots, per pair 125.00 Cotton cards (worth $1.75 in Connecticut) 85.00* 1 Clark, " Finance and Banking Memorial Record," Vol. I, p. 341 ; " Two Months in the Confederate States by an English Merchant," pp. Ill, 115; DeBow's Review for 1866. 2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. X, Pt. II, p. 639. 2 Ball, " Clarke County," pp. 294, 295 ; Miller, p. 230 ; oral accounts. * JV. y. Times, April 5, 1864 (from Mobile papers). TRADE, BARTER, PRICES l8l In August, 1864, the prices in Mobile were: — Flour, per barrel ^250.00 to ^300.00 Bacon, per pound 3,00 to 5.00 Cotton thread, per spool 6.00 to 12.00 Calico, per yard 12.50 to 15.00 Common shoes, per pair 150.00 to 175.00 Boots, per pair 250.00 to 300.00 Nails, per pound ^00 Cotton shirts (each worth 50 to 60 c. in Massachusetts) . 50.00 to 60.00 ^ In November, 1864, Colonel Dabney paid the following prices in Montgomery : — Bacon, per pound Beef, per pound Potatoes, per bushel Wood, per cord Board, per day . foSO IS2.00 to 2.50 6.00 50.00 30.00 2 In Russell County and east Alabama the following prices were paid in 1863 -1864: — A calico dress (9 yards) gioS.oo A plain straw hat .......... 100.00 Half a quire of note paper ........ 40.00 Morocco shoes ........... 375.00 Coffee, per pound i? 30.00 to 70.00 Corn, per bushel 12.00 to 13.00 Wax candles, each .......... .10 Wages, per day 30.00 Soldier's pay, per month (which he seldom received) . . . 11.00^ In southwest Alabama, in December, 1864, prices were: — ■ A mule (worth before the war $75.00 to $120.00) . $800.00 to $1200.00 Ahorse (worth before the war $120.00 to $250.00) . 1200.00 to 2500.00 A wagon and team cost ......... 2940.00 Beef cattle, each 930.00* At the close of 1864, in Mobile, Alabama, $1 in gold was worth $25 in state currency, and prices were as follows : — Wheat, per bushel $30.00 to $40.00 Corn, per bushel 10.00 Coffee, per pound .......... 20.00 Fresh beef, per pound 150.00 ^ N. Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1864. ^ Smedes, "A Southern Planter," p. 226. ' Hague, " Blockaded Family," passim ; " Our Women in the War," passim ; Jacobs, "Drug Conditions." * Ball, "Clarke County," p. 501. l82 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA Bacon, per pound .......... ^4.00 Domestics, per yard .......... 5-0° Calico, per yard .......■■.• ■S-°° Ahorse ^1500.0010 2000.00 Salt, per sack 150.00 to 200.00 Quinine, per ounce 150.00 ^ The War Department published, on September 26, 1864, the following prices ^ as agreed upon by the commissioners of February 17, 1864, for the states east of the Mississippi: — Bacon, per pound .......... S2.50 Fresh beef, per pound .......... .70 Flour, per barrel 40.00 Meal, per bushel 4-°° Rice, per pound .3° Peas, per bushel ........... 6.50 Sugar, per pound .......... 3-°° Coffee, per pound .......... 6.00 Candles, per pound 3-75 Soap, per pound ........... I.oo Vinegar, per gallon .......... 2.50 Molasses, per gallon 10.00 Salt, per pound -3° The commissioners' prices were always lower than the prevailing market price. A little property or labor would pay a large debt. Merchants did not want to be paid in money, and were sorry to see a debtor come in with great, rolls of almost worthless currency. Barter was increasingly resorted to. There were so many different series and issues of money and so many regulations concerning it that no one could know them all, and this operated to discredit the currency. Besides, it was known that much of it was counterfeited at the North and quantities sent South. Prices advanced rapidly in 1865; state money was worth more than Confederate money, though it was much depreciated. Board was worth $600 a month; meals, $10 to $25 each ; a boiled egg, $2 ; a cup of imitation coffee, $5. After the news of Lee's surrender, few would accept the paper money, though for ' Miller, p. 232. A negro went to a conscript camp in 1864 with a fifty-cent jug of whiskey. He gave his master a bottleful from the jug, replacing what he had taken out by water. The resulting mixture he sold for $$ a drink, a -drink being a cap-box full. Each drink poured out of the jug was replaced by the same measure of water. In this way he made J300 before the mixture was so diluted that the thirsty soldiers would not buy. Related by the negro's master. 2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 686. BLOCKADE-RUXXIXG 1 83 two or three months longer, in remote districts, state money remained in circulation. When Wilson's army was maxching into Montgomery^ a 3'oung man asked an old negro woman who stood gazing at the soldiers if she could give him a piece of paper to hght his pipe. She fumbled in her pocket and handed him a one-doUar state hill. ""Wliv, aimtie, that is money!" remarked the yoimg man. 'Haw, haw!" the old crone chuckled, "hght it, massa; don't you see de state done gone up?"' Sec. 3. Blockade-running and Trade through the Lines Blockade-niiming For several months after the secession of the state, its one im- portant seaport — Mobile — was open, and export and import trade went on as usual. The proclamation of Lincoln, April 19. 1861, practically declared a blockade of the ports of the southern states. .\ vessel attempting to enter or to leave was to be warned, and if a second attempt was made, the vessel was to be seized as a prize.^ By proclamations of April 27 and August 16, 1861, the blockade was extended and made more stringent. AU vessels and cargoes belong- ing to citizens of the southern states found at sea or in a port of the United States were to be coixfiscated.' As the summer adx'anced, the blockade was made more and more effective, vmtil finally, at the end of 1861, the port of Mobile was closed to all but the professional Mockade-nmners.* The fact that the legislature in the fall of iSoi was fostering various new industries and purchasing certain articles of m mm nn use shows that the effects of the blockade were beginning to be ielt.' ^MoH^mery Daily Advertiser, April iS, 1S65. Bat for another month state money circulated in Montgomery. - See Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. ^^, p. 14. ' Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VI, pp. 15, 37. * In 1S60 the South exported Si 50,000,000 worth of cotton, and Mobile \vas the second cotton port of America. Scharf, " History of the Confederate Xa\-y," pp. 439. %l^ Besides the r^nlar ship channel there were two shallow entrances to Mobile Bay, through which blockade-runners passed. Soley. " The Blockade and the Cruisers," p. 134. Regular water communication with Xew Orleans was kept up until 1S62 through Mississippi Sound. Scharf, p. 535 : Maday, '• A Histor>- of the United States Navy," Vol. II, p. 445. ° Miller, •■.Alabama," p. 167 : Acts of the Called Sess. (1S61), p. 123 ; Acts of 2d Called and ist R^ular Sess. (iS6i>, pp. 151, loS. 214, 278. 1 84 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA At first the general confidence in the power of King Cotton made most southern people desire to let the blockade assist the work of war, and, by creating a scarcity of cotton abroad, cause foreign gov- ernments to recognize the Confederate government and raise the blockade.^ The pinch of want soon made many forget their faith in the power of cotton; there was a general desire to get supphes through the blockade and to send cotton in exchange. The state administration was distinctly in favor of blockade-running and for- eign trade.^ In 1861 the legislature incorporated two "Direct Trad- ing Companies," giving them permission to own and sail ships between the ports of the state and the ports of foreign countries for the purpose of carrying on trade.^ The general regulation of for- eign commerce, however, fell to the Confederate government, which was distinctly opposed to all blockade-running not under its imme- diate control and supervision. The state authorities complained that the course of the Confederate administration was harsh and unnecessary. The state was willing to prohibit blockade-running on private account, but insisted that its pubHc vessels be allowed to import supplies needed by the state. The complaint about restric- tions on trade was general throughout the southern states and, in October, 1864, the southern governors, in a meeting in Augusta, Georgia, Governor Watts of Alabama taking a leading part, declared that each state had the right to export its productions and import such supplies as might be necessary for state use or for the use of ^ The blockading force before Mobile in 1 86 1 often consisted of only one vessel (Soley, p. 134), and the people of Mobile believed that foreign nations would not recognize the blockade as effective. There was an English squadron under Admiral Milne in the Gulf, and on Aug. 4, 1861, the Mobile Register and Advertiser said that a conflict between the English and United States forces was expected ; the English were then to raise the blockade. Scharf, p. 442. 2 This, however, was not the plan favored by Ex-Gov. A. B. Moore, who, on Feb. 3, 1862, wrote to President Davis stating his belief that the permission given by the Federal fleet to export cotton was a " Yankee trick " to get cotton to leave port in order to seize it. He thought that the Confederate government should forbid all exportation of cotton until the close of the war. " This leaky blockade system should be deprecated as one [in which the parties] are either dupes or knaves and [is] not in the least calculated to demonstrate the fact that our cotton crops are a necessity to the commerce of the world." If cotton was not a necessity to Europe, then the sooner the South knew it the better ; if it was a necessity, the sooner Europe knew it the better. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 905. 2 Acts of Feb. 6 and Dec. 10, 1861. BLOCK.ADE-RUXNING 1S5 the staie troops in the army, siaie ve^^ek being used for this purpose. The governors united in a request to Congress to remoMe the restric- tions on such trade.^ But the Confederate achninistration to the last retained control of foreign trade. Agents were seni abroad by the Treasury and War Departments * who were insiracted 10 send on vessels attempting to run the blockade, nrsi. arms a ad ammuniiion : second, clothing, boots, shoes, and hats; third, drags and chemicals that were most needed, such as quinine, chloroform, ether, opium, morphine, and rhubarb. These agents were insimcied to see that all vessels leaving for southern pons were laden with the articles named. Such part of the cargoes as was not taken bv the govern- ment was sold at auction to the highest bidder. These blockade auction sales were attended by merchants from the inland towns. whose shelves were almost bare of goods during three years of the war.' For two years militarj- and na\"al supplies were the most im- portani anicle; brought into the southern jiorts. The .\labama troops were in great need of all kinds of war equipment, and the state administration made everv" effort to obtain miUtary supplies from abroad. Shipments of arms from Europe were made to the West Indies, generaJh' 10 Cuba, and thence smu^led into Mobile and other Giilf ports. The siiipmenrs were always long delayed while wait- ing for a favorable opportunity to attempt a rtm. A large propor- tion of the blockade- runners making for Mobile were captured by the United States vessels.' Dark nights, and rainy. stom:iy weather furnished the opportunit\- to the ruimers to slip into or out of a port. Once at sea, nothing could catch them, since they were built for fast sailing rather than for capacity to cany- freight.* ^ a R, Ser. rV. Vol. HI, p. -j;; ; Ser. I, Vol. XXXIH, It IH, p. S05. ^The Cor.federare War and Treason" r^epartn^ents Feqnired iha: each ?:e-ar.is>:7 craning and sroing should reserre one-half :i5 tonnage for iroTemmei:: u5e, TTie owcers of an outgoing vessel had to make bond 10 rerani 'with one-Ssall the cargo for the goveri!- ment and the other half in aitides the it-.^ponatiou of which was not pn^ibited by She Confedoate gorenanent. Tlie Confedoate gOTerament paid bTe pence steding a pound on oBtgoing freight. ffflTaWe in a British port. On rAim fireigfat x -5 * "^in '^^ paid in cotton at a ConiederaAe port. The expenses of one bloctade-ronner ft«r one tr.r anwonted 10 $80^265: while the gross pro::ts were $17^000, learing a n^ gais of ^i.735 <™ "k* trip- ?^'hari"- pp. 4S1. 4S5. * Joseph Jaoohs. " Drag Conditions.''' * Solev. ^j. 44, 150. • See Taylor, - Ronning the BL.oka 5e."" A typical hlockade-ronner of 1863-1S64. was a long, low, slender, rakish >-.iewher'i steamer, of 400 to 600 tons, abont nine times as long as broad, with poweifigd en^nes, twin screws, and feathering pa3iilas. The 1 86 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA Most of the arms secured by Alabama came by way of Cuba, as did nearly all the supplies that entered the port of Mobile or were smuggled in on boats along the coast. Havanna was 590 miles from Mobile, and between these ports most of the blockade trade of the Gulf Coast was carried on. One shipment, welcomed by the state authorities, was a lot of condemned Spanisti flint-lock muskets, which were remodelled and repaired and placed in the hands of the state troops. Machinery for the naval foundry and arsenal at Selma and for the navy-yard on the Tombigbee was brought through the block- ade from England via the West Indies. The Confederate govern- ment, besides taking its own half of each cargo, had the first choice of all other goods brought through the blockade and usually chose shoes, clothing, and medicine. The state could only make contracts for the importation of supplies; it could not import them on its own vessels. The Confederate government paid high prices for goods, but, on the whole, paid much less than did the private individual for the remainder of the cargo when sold at auction. The mer- chants made large profits on the few articles of merchandise secured by them. Speculators bought up lots of merchandise at Mobile and carried them far inland, to the small towns and villages of the Black Belt ancf farther north, and secured fabulous prices in Confederate money for ordinary caHco, shoes, women's apparel, etc. The cen- tral part of the state was more completely shut from the outside world than any other section of the South. The Federal lines touched the northern part of the state, but the traffic carried on through the lines seldom reached the central counties. Consequently, the arrival of a merchant in the Black Belt village with a small lot of blockade calicoes, shoes, hats, scented soap, etc., was a great event, and people came from far and near to gaze upon the fine things exhibited in the usually empty show windows. Few had sufficient Confederate money to buy the commonest articles, but some one could always be found to purchase the latest useless trifle that came from abroad.^ funnels were short and could be lowered to the deck. It was painted a dull gray or lead color, and the masts being very short, it could not be seen more than two hundred yards away. When possible to obtain it, anthracite coal was burned, and when running into port all lights were turned out and the steam blown off under water. Scharf, p. 480; Soley, p. 156 ; Spears, Vol. TV, p. 55. 1 "Two Months in the Confederate States by English Merchant," p. Ill ; Taylor, " Running the Blockade " ; Hague, '• A Blockaded Family " ; " Our Women in War," passim ; Jacobs, " Drug Conditions." BLOCKADE-RUNNING 1 87 In exchange for goods thus imported, the blockade-runners car- ried out cargoes of cotton. As has been stated, the Confederate ad- ministration was in charge of cotton exportation. The Confederate Treasury Department purchased in Alabama 134,252 bales of cotton for $13,633,621.90 — that is, $101.55 a bale. This cotton was to be sold abroad for the benefit of the Confederate government. Nearly all the cotton purchased by the government was in th£ great produc- ing states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Alabama fur- nished more than any other state. In 1864 3226 bales of cotton were shipped from Mobile by the Treasury Department, and the proceeds applied to the support of the Erlanger Loan. To avoid competition between the departments of the government, it was agreed, June i, 1864, that all stores for shipment should be turned over to the Treas- ury, transported to the vessels by the War Department, and consigned to Treasury agents in the West Indies or in Europe. It was to be sold finall}* by the Treasury agent at Liverpool and the proceeds placed to the credit of the Treasury. The export business was under the direction of the Produce Loan Office, which had charge of all government cotton and tobacco. Contracts were usually made with companies, to whom the government turned over the cotton for ship- ment. In November, 1864, there were 115,450 bales of government cotton in Alabama, 18,802 bales having been sold. It is hardly pos- sible that it was all exported; some of it was sold through the lines.' It was found very difficult to secure bagging and ties sufficient to bale the cotton for shipping. The state lost much as well as gained by trade through the blockade. The risks were great and the exporters had to have a large snare of the profit; but arms, medicine, and blankets were valuable and very necessary. In spite of regulations, the blockade- runners brought in more luxuries than necessaries, causing much extravagance, and there were people who objected to the practice alto- gether. In March, 1863, the Mobile Committee of Safety reported that there were several vessels then in the harbor fitting out to carry cotton to Cuba. They were of the opinion that the government ought not to allow them to depart, since the country could not afford to lose 1 Report of A. Roane, Chief of the Produce Loan Office ; Richmond, to Secretary of Treasury Trenholm, Oct. 30, 1864, in H. Mis. Doc, No. 190, 44th Cong., 1st Sess.; "Two Months in the Confederate States," p. 1 11. 1 88 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA the vessels with their machinery, which could not be replaced. Gov- ernor Shorter agreed with them, and a protest was made to the Rich- mond authorities; but the vessels went out.^ Judge Dargan, whom many things troubled, wrote to the Richmond authorities that the blockade-runners were ruining the country by supplying the enemy with cotton and bringing in return useless gewgaws.^ From March i, 1864, to the end of the war, the Confederate gov- ernment succeeded better in regulating the imports by blockade-run- ners. But after August, when Farragut captured the forts defending the harbor entrance, the port of Mobile received little from the out- side world. Before the stringent regulations of the Confederacy went into force, blockade- running was demoralizing. The import- ers refused to accept paper money for their goods, and thus discredited currency while draining specie from the country. High prices and extortion followed. Cotton, instead of being exchanged for British gold, brought in trinkets, silks, satins, laces, broadcloths, brandy, rum, whiskey, fancy shppers, and ladies' goods generally. Curiously enough, there was great demand for these, in spite of the wants of the necessaries of life, medicine, and munitions of war. Delicate women, old persons, and children suffered most from the effects of the block- ade. As Spears says, there were many tiny graves made in the South because the blockade kept out necessary medicines.'' The blockade reduced* the Confederacy; the Union navy rather than the Union army was the prime factor in crushing the South ; it made possible the victories of the army. As it was, the blockade- runners probably postponed the end for a year or more.^ Though the number of blockade- runners increased in the latter part of 1864 and in 1865, Alabama profited but little; her one good seaport was closed in August, 1864, by Farragut's fleet, and with the fleet came the last regular blockade-runner. As the warships were moving up to engage the forts, a blockade- runner passed in with them unnoticed.' Small boats still brought in supplies. 1 0. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 462. " Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. I, p. 350. 5 Scharf, pp. 484, 486 ; Spears, Vol. IV, p. 56. * Bancroft. " Seward," Vol. II, p. 209 ; Wilson, " Ironclads in Action," Vol. I, pp. 196-197. ^ Scharf, p. 487; Wilson, pp. 187, 192. TRADE THROUGH THE LINES 1 89 Trade through the Lines The early policy of the Confederate administration was to bring the North to terms by shutting off the cotton supply and by ceasing to purchase supplies which had heretofore been a source of great profit to northern merchants, and was, on the whole, consistently adhered to during the war. The state administration held the same theory until one-fourth of its people were destitute ; then it was ready to relax restrictions on trade.^ Individuals who had plenty of cotton and little to eat and wear soon came to the conclusion that traffic with the North would do no harm, but much good. The United States wanted the products of the South, and made stronger efforts to get them than the blockaded South made to get supplies by the exchange. Until the very last, the North was more active in commercial inter- course than the South, notwithstanding the fearful want all over the southern country. The policy of the North was to have all trade in southern products pass through the hands of its own Treasury agents, who were to strip such products of all extraordinary profits for the benefit of the United States Treasury, and to see that the Confederacy profited as little as possible.^ The Confederate States government, when forced to allow some kind of trade through the lines, sought to sell only government cotton or to force ti-aders to traffic under its license. The state administration, at times, worked in its agents under Confederate license in order to get supphes for the destitute in the counties near the lines of the enemy. Few regulations of com- ^ Scharf, p. 446, says that the press and public sentiment were against allowing shipment of cotton to districts or through ports held by the United States. When in danger of capture the cotton was burned. Pollard states that the Richmond authorities were opposed to allowing any extensive cotton trade through the lines or through block- aded ports, because it was believed that the Union finances were in bad condition and would not stand the loss of cotton manufacturing. Moreover, the Confederate authori- ties were afraid of the demoralization caused by contraband trade, and also feared that Europe might consider that licensed trade through ports in possession of the enemy, like New Orleans, was a confession of the weakness of King Cotton, and would refuse to recognize the Confederacy. " Lost Cause," pp. 484-485. ^ The North was determined to show that cotton was not king, and to do this it must get all the cotton possible from the South by allowing a contraband trade in which nearly or quite all the profits on the cotton should be stripped off, leaving only the bare cost to the Confederate government or cotton planter. The North was willing that the South should sell all its cotton, but the North was to be middleman. Scharf, p. 443 ; " Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant," Vol. 1, p. 331. igo CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA mercial intercourse were made by the Confederate States, but many were made by the United States. The Confederate States had the problem almost under control; the United States did not, and had to try to regulate what it could not prohibit. Trade along the Tennessee and Mississippi frontier was subject to the following regulations on the side of the United States : Trade was carried on under the control of the Treasury Department; all trade had to be licensed; there were numerous officials to regulate the trade and the army was directed to assist traders ; no coin, no for- eign money, and no supplies were to be allowed to get to the Confed- erates; the trader must not go within Confederate territory; until 1864 the southern seller, whither Confederate or Union, when he went beyond the lines could get only 25 per cent of the New York value of his produce; from 1864 to 1865 he could get 75 per cent of the value if the cotton were not produced by slave labor ; in all cases the seller had to take the oath of allegiance to the United States. These regulations were gradually repealed during the latter part of 1865 and early in 1866.^ The legislation of the Confederate States was not so full, but the policy was about the same and more consistently enforced. In 1862 the Confederate Congress made it unlawful to sell in any part of the Confederate States in the possession of the enemy any cotton, tobacco, rice, sugar, molasses, or naval stores.^ Licenses, however, for the sale of certain merchandise could be obtained from the Secretary of War. Trade through the lines was not under the supervision of Treasury officials but was looked after by the generals commanding the frontier. In 1864 a law of Congress prohibited the export of 1 The various proclamations, orders, regulations, and laws affecting commercial inter- course between the United States and the Confederate States will be found in acompila-. tion of the United States Treasury Department entitled " Acts of Congress and Rules and Regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, in pursuance thereto, with the approval of the President, concerning Commercial Intercourse with and in States and parts of States declared in insurrection. Captured, Abandoned, and Confiscable Property, the care of freedmen, and the purchase of products of insurrectionary districts on gov- ernment account." The proclamations of the President will be found in the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. See also Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 56, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., and No. 23, 43d Cong., 3d Sess., p. 58 ; Ho. Ex. Doc, No. , 45th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 36; Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 190, 44th Cong., ist Sess., p. 39. A fuller account of the trade regulations is in the South Atlantic Quarterly, July, 1905. ''■ Act, April 19, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., Ist Cong., Ist Sess. TRADE THROUGH THE LINES 191 military and naval stores, and agricultural production, such as cotton and tobacco, except under regulations prescribed by the President/ But the restrictions were not strictly enforced. It was not pos- sible to do so ; commerce would find a way in spite of the war. The people of Alabama were, on the whole, disposed to approve the policy of the Confederate authorities, but, when want and destitution came, the owners of cotton proceeded to find a way to sell a few bales. Early in 1863 north Alabama was occupied by the Federals, and trade began along the fine of the Tennessee River. Later, there were trade lines to the northwest through Mississippi, and to the north- east throiigh Georgia and Tennessee.^ After the capture of New Orleans, cotton was sent through Mississippi to New Orleans, or to the banks of the Mississippi River, and always found purchasers. There was a thriving trade between Mobile and New Orleans during the Butler regime in the latter city. By the trade through the lines, the people of Alabama secured more of the scarcer commodities than by the blockade-running. Much of the trade was carried on by firms in Mobile that had agents or branch houses in New Orleans. Three pounds of cotton were exchanged for one of bacon; army supplies, clothing, blankets, and medical stores were secured in exchange for cotton; salt was also a commodity much in demand. For three years, from 1862 to 1864, trade was quite brisk between the two cities, some of it under license by the Confederate Secretary of War, and some of it purely contra- band. As long as Butler controlled New Orleans there was no trouble.' When General Canby went to New Orleans, he reported that English houses in Mobile were making contracts to export 200,000 bales of 1 Act, Feb. 6, 1864, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., 4th Sess. ^ The state officials in 1862-1863 planned to exchange cotton from Mississippi and Alabama with the cotton speculators in Tennessee for bacon. Davis opposed (Pol- lard, p. 481), but, nevertheless, the change was made. 4'°"S ''•^ Tennessee River there was much trading vrith the enemy. In order to conform with the United States regulations forbidding the payment of coin for Confederate staples, the northern specu- lator bought Confederate and state money, often at a high price (^loo gold for ^225 in Confederate currency or ;?I20 to ^125 in Alabama, Georgia, or South Carolina bank- notes), with which to carry on the cotton trade. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 10. ' Shorter, who was opposed to contraband trade, complained in July, 1862, that the cotton speculators in Mobile had an understanding with Butler and Farragut by which salt was allowed to come in and cotton, in unlimited quantities, allowed to go out. 0. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 21. 192 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA cotton via New Orleans, and expected to realize $10,000,000 net profits. Canby was of the opinion that the cotton trade aided' the Confederates. The character of the Treasury agents in charge of the cotton trade was bad ; they were likely to do anything for gain. He stated on the authority of a New Orleans banker, who was the agent of a cotton speculator, that Confederate agents would come to New Orleans with United States legal tender notes and invest in sterhng with him, drawing against cotton which was ostensibly purchased from "loyal" or foreign citizens.' The speculators would give in- formation to the Confederates with regard to the movements of the Federals, in order that the Confederates might preserve ccJtton that would in an emergency be destroyed. The speculators would buy the cotton later. In 1864 a New York manufacturer testified that he had made contracts with firms in Selma, Montgomery, and Mobile to take pay for debts due him in cotton delivered through the lines at New Orleans. The price was $1.24 to $1.30 a pound in New York. Treasury agents made similar contracts for Alabama cotton to be delivered through New Orleans, Pensacola, or through the lines in Mississippi, Ten- nessee, and Georgia. One agent, H. A. Risley, made contracts with half a dozen persons for more than 350,000 bales of cotton, the bulk of which was to come from Alabama. Most of this, it is needless to say, was not delivered.^ The Confederate officials tried to manage that only government cotton went out under the licenses from the War Department and that only necessary supplies were imported in exchange. But there was much abuse of the privilege and much private smuggling of cotton in 1864, through the Mississippi to New Orleans and the river; and on September 22, 1864, General Dick Taylor (at Selma) annulled all cotton export contracts in the Department of Alabama, Missis- sippi, and East Louisiana. However, he said, the Confederate author- ities would purchase necessaries imported and would pay for them in cotton at 50 cents a pound. This cotton could then be carried beyond the lines. No luxuries were to be imported, under penalty of confiscation.^ 1 Ho. Ex. Doc, No: 16, 38lh Cong., 2d Sess. " Ho. Rept.,No. 24, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 16, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. TRADE THROUGH THE LINES 193 Surgeon Potts, of the Confederate army, stationed at Montgomery, secured medical supplies from the Federal hnes in Louisiana and Mississippi, both by water and by land, sending cotton in exchange. One of the last reports made to President Davis was by Lieutenant- Colonel Brand, of Miles's Louisiana Legion, who stated (April 9, 1865, at Danville, Virginia) that on March 21, 1865, a Mr. McKnight of the Alabama Reserves had presented a permit to General Hodges in Louisiana for indorsement and orders for a grant to escort i,666,666§ pounds of cotton (about 4000 bales) through south- western Mississippi and eastern Louisiana to exchange for medical supplies for Surgeon Potts. Brand was of the opinion that this was merely a scheme to sell cotton and not to get medicines, as he had known of only one wagon-load of medical supplies that had gone through his territory to Dr. Potts. McKnight had no government cotton to carry, for there was none in that section of the country, but he expected to buy it as a speculation. ' This practice, Brand stated, was common. Even government cotton would be sold for coffee, soap, flour, etc., under the name of medical supplies, and these would be sold by the speculators.^ In north Alabama a brisk trade was carried on for three years with the connivance of the Federal officers, many of whom were in- terested in the fleecy staple in spite of orders forbidding such conduct.^ Negroes were given "free papers" in order that they might go in and out of the lines of the armies on contraband trade. The Confederate officials on the border were also often implicated in the traffic or con- nived at it through a desire to see poor people get supplies.' One of the mildest charges against the Federal General O. M. Mitchel was that he had profited by speculation in the contraband 1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 1180, 1181. Davis probably made his last official indorsement on this report, Apr. 10, 1865. He forwarded it to the Adjutant and In- spector-General with instructions to look into the matter. 2 Somers, "The Southern States since the War," p. 134. General Grant, July 21, 1863, stated that this trade through west Tennessee was injurious to the United States forces. " Restriction, if lived up to," he said, "makes trade unprofitable and hence none but dishonest men go into it. I will venture to say, that no honest man has made money in west Tennessee in the last year, while many fortunes have been made there during the time." So vexed was General Grant with the speculators that, early in 1865, he suspended all permits, but within a month he had to remove the suspensions. Scharf, pp. 443, 446, 447. 3 Taylor, " Destruction and Reconstruction," pp. 227, 235. 194 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA trade in cotton while he was in command in north Alabama. It was alleged that he used United States transportation to haul cotton when the transportatioji was needed for other purposes. Mitchel claimed that personally he had received no profit from his trade ; it appeared, however, that he had used his official position to advance the inter- ests of his brother-in-law and his son-in-law. The discussion over his case brought out the fact that the northern cotton speculator or agent would go into the Confederate lines and buy cotton at ten and eleven cents a pound, Confederate currency, and take the cotton North and realize immense profits.^ Mitchel and other Federal offi- cers, it was shown, approved and assisted the trade beyond the lines.^ Individual permits were sometimes given by President Lincoln, authorizing the bearers to go within the Confederacy, without re- striction, and get cotton and other southern produce. Sometimes, after bringing it out, these people lost their cotton to United States Treasury agents, because the permission given by the President was not in accordance with the Treasury regulations. In north Alabama several agents got into trouble in this way. Lincoln, it seems, under- stood that the laws gave him authority to issue permits to trade within the Confederate lines.' In 1864, when cotton was selling at forty to fifty cents a pound in coin, numbers of Federal officers resigned in order to speculate in cotton. A former beef contractor who had grown rich in the cotton trade was said to have controlled almost the whole of Huntsville. Both hotels, the waterworks, and the gas works belonged to him, and there was complaint of his extortions.^ Small packages, especially of quinine, were sent South through the Adams Express Company, which would guarantee to deliver them within the Confederacy.^ This caused speculation, and it was finally stopped. Women passed through the Hues and brought back quinine and other medicines concealed in their clothing. A druggist in middle Alabama determined to carry on a contraband trade in 1 Confederate currency was plentiful in the North, where it was made even more cheaply than in the South, and the southerners did not notice the difference. 2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, pp. 291-293, 638-640. 2 Ho. Rept., No. 83, 4Sth Cong., 3d Sess. ; No. 618, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. * N. Y. Herald, April 7, 1864. * Jacobs, " Drug Conditions," p. 7. The Southern Express Company worked in connection with the Adams, of which it had been a part before 1861. TRADE THROUGH THE LINES I95 cotton and drugs. The South had prohibited private trade in cotton ; the North forbade the sale of medical supplies to the Confederates. But following the example of many others, he went into north Mis- sissippi, loaded a wagon with cotton, and carried it to Memphis, then held by the Federals, and sold it for a high price in United States money. He then exchanged his wagon for an ambulance with a white canvas cover, on which was painted the word "smallpox" in large letters, and over which fluttered a yellow flag. He loaded the ambulance with quinine, ether, morphine, and other valuable drugs, and other articles of merchandise scarce in Alabama. The yellow flag and the magic word "smallpox" kept people away, and, after many adventures, he finally reached home.^ Only by such methods could the beleaguered people obtain the precious medicines. One of the last contracts on record in respect to trade through the lines was- a deal made on January 6, 1865, by Samuel Noble and George W. Quintard, his agent, both of Alabama, to deliver several thousand bales of cotton to an agent of the United States Treasury.^ There is evidence that some of the cotton was deUvered. The illicit trade in cotton by private parties became so flagrant that in the vnnter of 1864-1865, a fresh Confederate regiment, which had not yet been touched by the fever of speculation, was sent from the interior of Georgia to guard part of the frontier in Alabama and Mississippi. One of the first persons captured smuggling a cotton train through the Hnes was the wife of the Confederate commanding general, who, of course, released her.^ Much of the trade was car- ried on by poor people who had a few bales of cotton and who were obhged to sell it or suffer from want. This fact caused the Confed- erate ofiicers to be lax in the enforcement of the regulations.* 1 Jacobs, " Drug Conditions," pp. 7-10. ^ Ho. Repts., 38th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 174. Before this, Samuel Noble of Rome, Georgia, representing himself as a " loyal " man (he was introduced and vouched for by George W. Quintard), made a contract with a United States Treasury agent to deliver 250,000 bales of cotton from Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina. In Alabama at that time he owned 800 bales at Selma, 1256 at Mobile, and had much more contracted for. The cotton was to be delivered at Huntsville, Mobile, and places in the adjoining states. Noble was to get three-fourths of the proceeds, according to the regulations. Ho. Kept., No. 24, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. * Statement of Professor O. D. Smith of Auburn, Ala., who was then a Confederate bonded agent operating in north Alabama. * Taylor, " Destruction and Reconstruction," p. 232. 196 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA The extraordinary prices of cotton in the outside world brought little gain to the blockaded Confederacy. Before the cotton could be brought into the Union hnes or beyond the blockade, all the profits had been absorbed by the Confederate speculator, or, most often, by the Union speculators and Treasury agents. Theoretically, the regu- lations of the United States should have brought much profit to. the Federal government. In fact, as Secretary Chase reported, the United States did not realize a great deal from Confederate staples brought into the Union lines. These frauds and the demoralizing effects of the system were evidenced by many reports from officers from the army and navy.^ But in spite of the demoralizing effects of the contraband trade within the Confederacy and in spite of the extremely low prices ob- tained for Confederate staples, much-needed supphes were sent in in such quantities as to enable the contest to be maintained much longer than otherwise it would have lasted. Owing to its interior location, it is probable that Alabama profited less by this trade than the other states. Sec. 4. Scarcity and Destitution When the men went away to the army, many poor families began to suffer for the necessaries of fife. The suffering was greater in the white counties, where slaves were relatively few, many families feeling the touch of want as soon at the breadwinners left. The Black Belt had plenty, such as it was, until the end of the war. The first legislature, after the secession of the state, levied a special tax of 25 per cent of the regular tax for the next year to provide for the destitute families of absent volunteers.^ A month later a law was passed permitting counties to assume the tax and to pay the amount into the state treasury, and thus secure exemption from the state tax.^ The county commissioners were directed to appropriate money from the county treasury for the support of the 1 Letter of Secretary Chase to Hon. E, B. Washburne, in Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 78, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 Acts of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 11, 1861. As early as Jan. 14, 186 1, Governor Moore reported that the poorest classes were in want and that much suffering,' perhaps starvation, would result unless aid were given. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 51. The soldiers' families were reported to be almost destitute in April, 1861. Idem, p. 220. ^ Acts of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 31, 1861. SCARCITY AND DESTITUTION 197 indigent families of soldiers/ This was to secure immediate relief, which was imperatively necessary, since the special tax for their benefit would not be collected until the next year. Early in 1862 portions of north Alabama were so devastated by the Federals that many people, to escape* starvation, had to "refugee" to other parts of the country, usually to middle Alabama, there to be supported by the state. At this time all crops were short, owing to a drought, and the poorer people suffered greatly.^ Speculators had advanced the prices on food, and wage-earners were unable to buy. Impressment by the government made farmers afraid to bring produce to town.' The county commissioners were authorized in 1862 to levy for the next year a tax equal to the regular state tax and to use it for the benefit of the destitute.* The state also made an appropriation of $2,000,000 for the same purpose. This appropriation was to be distributed by the county commissioners in the form of supplies or money. The families of substitutes were not made beneficiaries of this fund.' The sum of $60,000 was appropriated for cotton and wool spinning cards, which were to be purchased abroad and distributed among the counties in proportion to the white popula- tion. They were sold at cost to those able to buy,° and several dis- tributions were made to the needy families of soldiers.' Salt was the scarcest of all the necessaries of hfe. The state took entire charge of the whole supply that was for sale and sold it at a moderate price, sometimes at cost, and to those in great need it was furnished free.' The county commissioners were authorized to hire and rehire slaves and take in return provisions, which were distributed among the poor families of soldiers." The commissioners of Sumter and Walker counties were permitted to borrow $10,000 in each county for the poor, and tcr levy a tax of 50 per cent of the state tax with which to repay the borrowed money." Judge Dargan, member of Congress, wrote to President Davis 1 Act of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 29, 1861. ^ Annual Cyclopsedia (1862), p. 9. 2 Jones, " Diary," Vol. I, pp. 194, 198. * Act of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 8, 1862. '' Act of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 11, 1862. ^ Act of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 8, 1862. ' Act of Gen. Assembly, Oct. 16, 1864. ' Acts of Gen. Assembly, Oct. 9 and Dec. 9, 1862, and Aug. 29, 1863. Miller, "Alabama," p. 167. ' Acts of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 26, 1862. * i" Act of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 28, 1862. igS CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA in the winter of 1862 that many people of Mobile were destitute.' Mobile was farther away from country supplies, and the people suffered greatly. In the spring of 1863 there was suffering in the southern white counties. A party of women, the wives and daugh- ters of soldiers, raided a provision shop in Mobile, when there were instances of dire distress in the families of soldiers.^ The richer citizens of the city gave $130,000 to support a free market, where for a while 4000 needy persons were furnished daily. Another contri- bution of $70,000 was raised to clothe a thousand destitute families.^ In 1863 the non-combatants of north Alabama suffered more than in the previous year. Houses had been burned, grain and provisions destroyed, and many were homeless and destitute. Num- bers were driven from the country by. the persecutions of the Federals and tories. The Confederate war tax and the state tax were sus- pended in districts invaded by the enemy,^ and in August, 1863, the legislature appropriated $1,000,000 for the support of the destitute families of soldiers during the next three months. Twenty-five pounds of salt were also given to each member of a soldier's family as a year's supply.^ Probate judges impressed provisions and paid for them out of this milhon-dollar fund. In November, 1863, an appropriation of $3,000,000 was made for the support of soldiers' families during the coming year. In counties held by the enemy where there were no commissioners' courts, the probate judges paid to soldiers' families their share of the appropriation. The county commissioners were authorized to impress provisions for the poor if they were unable to buy them.^ Washington County was per- mitted to borrow $10,000 for the relief of soldiers' families.' The pohcy of giving a county permission to raise money for its own poor was much opposed on the ground that the counties which had furnished most soldiers and where the destitution was greatest were the least able to pay. The legislature declared then that the poor soldiers' families should be the charge of the state.* The sum of 1 Jones, " Diary," Vol. I, p. 194. 2 Annual Cyclopsedia (1863), p. 6." 8 N. y. Herald, Dec. 26, 1863.