Oyrrmell €ttt)j^vsiit| ^xhvM^ 
 
Cornell University Library 
 DC 148.S98 1867 
 
 V.I 
 
 Histpry of the French revolution. 
 
 3 1924 022 604 619 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tliis book is in 
 tlie Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924022604619 
 
HISTORY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTIOK 
 
 1789—1795. 
 
 Vol. I. 
 
HISTORY 
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 HEINRICH. VON SYBEL, 
 
 PROFESSOR OF HISTORY^' THE UNFfflESITY OF EC 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD EDITION OF THE ORIGINAL 
 GERMAN WORK, 
 
 WALTER C. XERRY Esq., 
 
 AUTHOR OF "T^ FEAXKS" ie. 
 
 IN FOUR VOLUMES.— VOL. L 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 
 
 1867. 
 
.^CORNELL 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 \ LIBRARY 
 
TRANSLATOE'S PKEFACE. 
 
 The Work of Professor von Sybel on the History of the 
 French Revolution enjoys so high a reputation in Germany that 
 the Translator considers it unnecessary to make any apology 
 for presenting it to the English Public. It has long been con- 
 sidered by the ablest historical critics to contain the most 
 impartial account of that great Historical Drama, which is still 
 unrolling before our eyes, and of which we have not yet seen 
 the catastrophe. If the Author needed any justification for 
 re-opening a subject of such universal interest, it would be 
 found in the long list of documents contained in the follow- 
 ing preface, all of which were first consulted by him, 
 and most of them by him alone. His preliminary remarks 
 are sufficient to show how justly he estimates the magnitude 
 of the task he has undertaken, and with what patience, 
 diligence, and good fortune, he has collected the great amount 
 of fresh materials indispensable to its due performance; but 
 only a perusal of the work itself will enable the reader to 
 appreciate the far higher qualities of the genuine historian — 
 the power of weighing evidence, and the impartiality of the 
 just and fearless judge. 
 
 We have been so long accustomed to see histories of the 
 French Revolution made the theatres of a series of start- 
 ling melodramatic efi'ects, or the vehicles of extreme political 
 opinions and philosophic theories, that we are almost sur- 
 
VI TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 prised to find in the following pages ;i sober statement of 
 facts concerning every portion of the national life of France, 
 during the most fiery trial through which a nation was ever 
 called upon to pas§. Foregoing the comparatively easy 
 and popuhir task of dazzling the reader by a display of all 
 the strange and brilliant meteors which flitted across the 
 wild and bloody waves of revolution, he has endeavoured 
 to open before us the depths from which they rose — to make 
 us acquainted with the great masses of the people, in their 
 errors, sufferings and crimes; and to trace the fearful con- 
 sequences of arbitrary violence, whether exercised in the 
 name of a crowned despot, a privileged aristocracy, or a 
 sovereign mob. 
 
 It canuot but be a source of gratification to the English 
 reader especially, to find in how flivourable a liaht a sao-a- 
 cious and unprejudiced foreign historian views the conduct 
 of the English government and nation, in their lou"- and 
 gigantic struggle against the aggressive tyranny of the French 
 democracy. Full justice is done in the present work to the 
 character of Pitt, who, as it shews, dearly loved peace, 
 though he loved it wisely and not too well— not, like our 
 modern Phocions, "because it is easier for the moment to 
 administer a country under peace than under war, because 
 they either do not, or will not, look forward to the conse- 
 quences of inaction." 
 
 Some objection may possibly be taken to the title of this 
 work, as being too narrow for a history, which, as the Author 
 himself observes, embraces the whole of Europe. But the 
 reader will find, that even when the recital leads him away 
 from French affairs, it is only that he may see them from 
 various sides, and gain a better understanding of the phe- 
 
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. -vii 
 
 nomena of the Revolution; and he will come to the conclusion 
 that a true history of Revolutionary France must of neces- 
 sity be, to a certain extent, a history of all the countries 
 affected by, and mutually affecting, the convulsions by which 
 the French nation was afflicted. 
 
 Bonn-on-the-Rhine, Aug. 1867. 
 
AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 The present work — of which the first edition iippeared in 
 the year 1853, and the third, with important alterations and 
 additions, in 1865 — undertakes to rehite the leading events 
 of European history during the period from 1789 — 1795, 
 and wiU shortly be continued to the beginning of the Con- 
 sulate. Its contents may be arranged under three principal 
 heads: the overthrow of the French Monarchy by the de-^ 
 mocratic revolution : the annihilation of Poland by the two y 
 last partitions: and the dissolution of the German empire / 
 by the war of the First Coalition. How closely these events 
 are connected with one another is to some extent already 
 known, and will be more fully set forth in the following re- 
 cital. They shew, in spite of their external differences, misj 
 essential identity of character: in all we see the fall of me- 
 dijeval feudalism, which in Paris and Warsaw, as well as in 
 the constitution of the Gei-man Empire, turned out to the 
 advantage of the modern niilitai:y--stTrte5^a fact which gives 
 its peculiar character to this epoch, and enables us to measure 
 the capacity of the liberals of that period. At the time when 
 I made up my mind to publish the results of my labours, 
 there existed, as is well known, an almost incalculable num- 
 ber of works on the French Revolution; while on the other \j 
 hand very few writers had undertaken to describe the course 
 of German policy during that important epoch. The Ger- 
 man Governments at that period (1853) had, without ex- 
 
X AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 ception, shrouded in the deepest secrecy their archives relat- 
 ing to the liistory of the Revohitionary war: and in fact our 
 chief knowledge of, it was drawn from a book whose author 
 had heard something'';^ great many things, but the wliole truth 
 about notliiug. I mean the Mcmoircs tires dcs Papiers (Viin 
 llomme d'JStaf, a book belonging entirely to the literature of the 
 French Ein/f/res,— who derived their matter exclusively from 
 hearsay, — and which only through some stupid mistake has 
 been attributed to Prince Hardenberg. In Polish affairs we 
 perceive a jihenomenon, perhaps unique, that the victors in 
 a great and violent catastrophe have left the task of writing 
 its history almost entirely to tlie vanquished. Throughout 
 the whole of Europe, not even excepting Germany, the 
 knowledge of the circumstances attending the Partitions, and 
 the judgments formed concerning them, were based exclu- 
 sively on Polish accounts. 
 
 Under such circumstances it was with the greatest plea- 
 sure that I hailed the opportunity offered to me — only 
 gradually, it is true, and after long and patient efforts — 
 of consulting the greater part at least of the authentic 
 materials hitherto inaccessible to the public. In the first 
 place I gained access to an extremely rich collection of 
 letters and despatches which passed, subsequently to the 
 year 1790, between several of the most prominent statesmen 
 and generals of Prussia- the Duke of Brunswick, Generals 
 Mollendorf and Manstein, and the ministers Ilaugwitz, Har- 
 denberg, and Buchholtz.. I then consulted the correspondence 
 of the Prince of Coburg, preserved at Gotha; the papers of 
 the Austrian go\-ernmcnt in Belgium, at present in the ar- 
 chives of Brussels; the reports of the Dutch ambassadors 
 and the Bavarian charfjes d'affaires, (the former at the Hague 
 
AUTHOR'S PREFACE. XI 
 
 and the latter at Muiiicli) — whieli arc all laid open to the in- 
 quirer with a readiness which merits my warmest thanks. 
 Still more important, of course, was the ciruvimstance, that 
 I succeeded, in the year 1855, in gaining access to the 
 Staats-ArcJiiv in Berlin, and deriving the most trust- 
 worthy information on all leading points from the papers of 
 the actors themselves. 1 cannot speak too highly of the 
 liberal spirit with which the present Prussian ministry, more 
 especially, has placed the treasures of their archives at the 
 disposal of the scientific world. The usual bureaucratic 
 timidity has, in their case, given place to juster views of the 
 real interests of the State. Every earnest and respectable 
 investigator may without difficidty consult the documents 
 down to the year 1840. The same facilities, as is well known, 
 are not afforded in London, where the inquirer has to go 
 through a far greater number of tedious and time-consuming 
 forms, than at Berlin: but in the end — and this is the 
 main point — one does get the desired documents, the im- 
 portance of which need not be dwelt upon, and then receives 
 on all hands the kindest and most efi'cctual aid from the 
 officials of the State Paper Office. And, lastly, I obtained 
 farther additional and extremely important materials for the 
 last portion of my subject — the times of the Diredoirc exe- 
 ciif/f — from the archives of Naples, the opening of which, ^ 
 together with the general support aftbrded to scientific en- 
 deavours, is one of the many benefits conferred on the ci- 
 vilized world by th6 establishment of the kingdom of Italy. 
 I was not able to make use of the archives of the two Eastern 
 monarchies, liussia and Austria. But the Russian government 
 has itself, during the last few years, caused a series of very 
 valuable works on the epoch of the French Revolution to 
 
XII AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 be published, and thereby furnished the public with in- 
 formation on the most important points. I may mention, for 
 example, Ssolowjofi's "Fall of Poland," Smitt's "History of 
 Suwarow," and "The History of the War of 1799," by Miliutin. 
 The Russian government, I may observe by the way, could 
 render no greater service to the historian, than by publishing 
 the vvhole of the correspondence of Catharine II. We may 
 declare with the greatest confidence that they would thereby 
 erect a literary monument, the value and interest of which 
 would not be inferior to that of the correspondence of Fre- 
 derick the Great and Napoleon I. Less has been done in 
 Austria than in Russia towards the elucidation of the Re- 
 volutionary war. Yet even in the former country the se- 
 verity of the old system is beginning to be relaxed. The 
 interesting publications of Ilerr von Arneth and Adam 
 Wolf are well known; and now that the correspondence of 
 the imperial family has been published, wc may hope that 
 Baron Beust will no longer withhold the diplomatic pa- 
 pers of those important years. Biit even Avith regard to 
 these lacunce, we may say that the amount of material 
 already accessible is sufficient to throw light ujjon all but 
 a very few points of European history. Almost all the de- 
 cisive"moments of the great war — the origin of the Austro- 
 Prussian league — the causes of the contest — the enigmas of 
 the campaign in Champagne— the origin of the Polish Par- 
 tition — the breach between England and France — the rupture 
 of the Coalition— the separate peace with Prussia— all these 
 events, which have been the subjects of a thousand contro- 
 versies, now lie in undoubted clearness before the eyes of the 
 historical inquirer. 
 
 With regard, in the next place, to the internal course of 
 
AUTHOK'S PEEFACE. xm 
 
 the French Revolution, I confess that for a considerable 
 time I hesitated to increase the mass of hooks in which it 
 is described. On a nearer review, however, of my task, I 
 found a number of recent publications whose important con- 
 tents seemed to call for a thorough revision of the history 
 of the Revolution — e. g. the correspondence between Mira- 
 beau and Lamarck, the ^lemoirs of Mallet du Pan, of 
 DorJcet de Pontecoulant, and Miot de Melito, and the very 
 numerous Departmental histories, little known abroad, on 
 which the French, to their great credit, continually bestow 
 a vast amount of care and diligence. Furthermore, I had it 
 in my power to consult the most important MSS. in the 
 archives at Paris. The Depot de la Guerre contains the 
 correspondence of the generals in conmiand with the min- 
 isters at war — the secret despatches of the Conventional com- 
 missioners — the minutes of the trials of Custineand Houchard 
 — the documents relating to the national volunteers of 1792 
 and the levee en masse of 1793 — for the most part, as far as 
 I know, hitherto unused, and, as may be supposed, of the 
 highest interest, not only for the military, but also for the 
 political, history of the Revolution. In the ArcJtlves de V Em- 
 pire I obtained an insight into the numerous papers of the 
 Committee of Public Safety, which at that time (1854) had 
 never been consulted by any historical inquirer. This col- 
 lection was, indeed, greatly thinned under the government 
 of the Directory, and many of the papers were handed over 
 to the respective ministries. ]5ut still, what remained was 
 sufficient to furnish the most valuable solutions to many de- 
 bated questions — e. y. the foreign policy of the first Com- 
 mittee of Public Safety — and authentic disclosures respecting 
 the trials of Hebert and Danton and the fall of Robespierre. 
 
XTV AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 They also contained documents relating to the negotiations 
 with Prussia, Sweden, &C.&C.&C.; and further, for the years 
 179(5_1799^ the protocols of the Dlredoire Executif, together 
 with numerous messages to the Corps Ler/islafif, which the 
 latter thought fit to keep secret. Lastly, I endeavoured to 
 gain access to the Archives dcs Affaires Efrmujcrcs, but 
 experienced at first never-ending difficulties; for the regula- 
 tions of this department, which date from an earlier pei'iod, , 
 are hindering to the incpirer, in spite of the personal kind- 
 ness of the directors themselves. Finally, however, during 
 the last year, I had the good fortune to obtain the desired 
 authorisation through the favour of His Majesty the French 
 Emperor himself, and was then enabled, with grateful satis-- 
 faction, to supplement from the French dociuncnts the know- 
 ledge obtained through German sources. 
 
 I feel myself bound in this place publicly to express my 
 sense of the active kindness Avith which the directors and 
 officials of the above mentioned Archives, as well as those 
 of the Imperial Liljrary, complied with all my wishes. 
 It is impossible to facilitate the labours of the stranger in 
 a more kindly spirit than was shown to me l)y all these 
 gentlemen without any exception. To what degree I have 
 turned these numerous sources to account for the advance- 
 ment of historical knowledge, I must leave to the reader to 
 decide. My earnest endeavour has been to place the hitherto 
 less noticed phases of the great lievolution in as clear a 
 light as possible. The dramatic scenes, therefore, of the par- 
 liamentary- contests will be found to occupy but little space, 
 in the following pages; but, on the other hand, I'ar greater 
 attention is paid to the politico-economieal and financial af- 
 fairs of the French Revolutionary period, and to the relations 
 
AUTHOR'S PREFACE. xv 
 
 of France to the rest of Europe, than in the majority of 
 histories of the Revohition. Ilenoe it happens, that I liave 
 heen obliged to forego a great number of splendid eft'eets; 
 but I venture to hope that in many eases the reader will 
 find that facts have been substituted for glittering phrases. 
 Under any circumstances, evcu the most favourable, the 
 composition of a history of the French llevolution must be 
 a hazardous undertaking for a foreignei'. He has, in the 
 first place, to overcome the difficidty of making himself in 
 some degree acquainted with the enormous literary mass 
 of books, journals and pamphlets, which for the most part 
 are not to be met with out of Paris. He has to dive into the 
 opinions and views of a great, and at that period, passion- 
 ately excited nation. He has to poVi^-tray the contests the 
 after-eft'ects of which still agitate the Parisian atmosphere, at 
 one time fanning the tire of party-contest, at another wounding 
 the sensitiveness of national pride. Happily, however, these 
 disadvantages are in some degree self-compensating. If the 
 foreigner finds it more difficult than the Frenchman to under- 
 stand French phenomena, his judgment is less likely to be 
 warped by party feelings. He will perhaps see many points 
 in a less brilliant light than that in which the French national 
 feeling has been accustomed to regard them ; but he is on 
 that account, all the less exposed to the danger of adhering, 
 through attachment to some darling error, to incorrect, and 
 even now sometimes dangerous, views. The Revolution 'of 
 1799 has gained the er/nah'ti/ which it aimed at; but has 
 missed, in spite of its enthusiasm, its second great object — 
 liherly. At its commencement it proclaimed the froferir/i/;, not 
 only of individuals but of nations; but it soon took the di- 
 rection of universal conquest, to end its career of unexampled 
 
 u 
 
XVI AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 successes and triumphs in the disaster of Waterloo. When 
 an author, then, does liis best, without fear or favour, towards 
 opening up the hidden causes of this double failure, may he 
 hope that the French people will see in his efforts, not envy 
 of their jjast glories, but a sincere effort to aid them in their 
 future policy? 
 
 I may be allowed in a preface to express one personal 
 wish. Nothing would afford me greater satisfaction than that 
 my work should find favour in the eyes of two savants, 
 whose labours are indeed confined to special and definitely 
 circumscribed portions of the Eevolutionary history, but 
 who by the excellent treatment of their respective themes 
 have proved themselves thorough masters of the science of 
 history. I do not, it may be, agree in all respects with 
 their view of the -movement of 1789, but I can for that very 
 reasoi^ claim credit for the sincerity with which I offer my 
 warmest thanks for the varied and copious instruction I have- 
 derived from the writings of M. Leonce de Lavergne and 
 M. Mortimer Teruaux. 
 Bonn, Aug. 1867. 
 
 HEINRICH VON SYBEL. 
 
 POSTSGRIPTUM. 
 The present English Version of my work has been pre- 
 pared in Bonn by Dr. Walter C. Perry, and has been through- 
 out revised by me. It is an exact and faithful translation 
 of the third edition of the original; some portions of it have 
 been altered and improved in accordance with fresh in- 
 formation contained in publications which have appeared 
 since the year 18G5. 
 
 H. V. SYBEL. 
 
CONTENTS OF VOL. I. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 BEEAKIXG OCT OF THK KEVOLUTION. 
 CHAPTKR I. 
 
 FKAiSCE BEFORE THE REVOLCTION. 
 
 Kise of the French Monarchy. — The State under Louis XIV. — Decline of 
 the State under Louis XV. — Liberal and radical opposition. — Rural 
 nobility and peasant population. — Condition of towns, trade and manu- 
 factures. — Decline of National Prosperity. — Efforts for Reform under 
 Louis XYL— Resistance of privileged classes. — The Budget. — General 
 ' dissolution of order in the State. — The army . . . Page I 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 OVERTHROW OF FEUDALISM. 
 
 Opening of the States-General. — Contest of the orders respecting their 
 Union in one assembly. — The Tiers etat constitutes itself as national 
 assembly. — The ministry takes the side of the nobles. — Speech from 
 the throne. — First defection of the troops. — Second attempt of the 
 aristocratic party. — Complete defection of the army. — Storming of the 
 Bastille. — Universal anarchy in the kingdom. — Abolition of feudal pri- 
 vileges .......... 54 
 
 CHAPTER IIL 
 
 RIGHTS OF MAN. 
 
 General Lafayette. — His declaration of rights. — Parties in the National 
 Assembly. — The Right.— The Centre. — The Left^Mirabeau. — Consti- 
 tutional (questions. — Suspensive veto ..... 87 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE CAPITAL. 
 
 Continuance of anarchy in the Provinces. — New authorities in Paris. — 
 Their contest with the Democrats. — Social question.— Orleans wisies 
 
in CONTENTS OF VOL. I. 
 
 to driTC away the King. — Lafayette wishes to take him to Paris. — 
 Revolt of Oct. 5th.— October Gth.— "The King to Paris" Page 108 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 .\D MINISTRATION. — ASSIONATS. 
 
 Mirabeau enters into relations with the court. — Ilis plan of a liberal gov- 
 ernment. — Hopeless state of the finances. — Talleyrand demands the 
 Church property for the State. — Mirabeau calls for a parliamentary gov- < 
 ernment. — Consequences of his failure. — New administration. — Enfran- 
 chised citizens. — Communes, departments. — Non-voters, Jacobins.— 
 Reform in the administration of Justice.— First steps towards the sale 
 of church lands. — Interference of the city of Paris. — Confiscation of all 
 the property of the church ....... 136 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 FIRST EFFECTS OF THE KETOLTITION ON EDKOl'E 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 GENERAL CONDITION OF CENTRAL ECROPE. 
 
 Condition of Central Europe. — Epochs of Austrian policy. — Universal do- 
 minion of the house of Hapsburg. — Feudalism in Austria from 1B4S. — 
 Separation from Germany. — Decline of the Polish constitution. — Anta- 
 gonism of Poland and North Germany. — The Prussian state. — Frederick 
 the Great. — The house of Lorraine and State-Union in Austria. — 
 Joseph II.— Resistance of Prussia ..... 175 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 NOOTKA SOUND AND REIOHENBACH. 
 
 Leopold II. — Count Herzberg's plans, — Breach between England and Spain,— 
 Lafayette wishes for a war with England, — The maritime Powers re- 
 nounce Herzberg's plans,— Mirabeau and the Jacobins are in favour of 
 peace — Treaty of Reichenbach. — Progress of Austria . . 202 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 FR.4NCE. FALL OF THE CLERGY AND N0EILIT\. 
 
 Disturbances in consequence of the decrees against the Church.— Civil 
 constitution of the Clergy. — The Jacobins agitate against foreign 
 Powers.— Attempts to excite mutiny among the soldiers.— Constitution ■ 
 of the army. — Military tumults ...... 223 
 
CONTENTS OF VOL. I. xix 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 rOLlTICO-liCONOMIO.^L AFFAIRS. 
 
 Socialist disturbances. — New issues of paper money — New system of taxa- 
 tion.— Belicit.— Growth of the National debt.— Disorder' of afl'airs in 
 the rural districts.— Jacquerie.— Parcelling out of the largo domains.— 
 Administration of Paris. — Ateliers natioiiaux.— Distribution of bread to 
 the People. — Brief prosperity of manufactures. — Unions among the vvorli- 
 men. — Compulsory raising of wages. — Interference of National Assem- 
 bly. — Agitation Page 248 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 COMPLETION OF TUE CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Louis XVI. after the attack on the Church. — Civil oath of the Priests.— 
 The King's plans of flight. — Mirabeau's death. — Lameth malies advances 
 to the Ministry. — Breach between Lameth and Robespierre. — The Queen 
 and the Emperor Leopold. — Flight of the King. — General revolt. — 
 Louis arrested. — Intrigues of the Democrats. — Feebleness of the National 
 Assembly. — Tumult in the Champ de Mars. — Insufficient revision of 
 the Constitution ......... 287 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 FLrCTUATIONS OF PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. 
 
 Leopold defers the conclusion of peace with Turkey. — Prussia and Eng- 
 land support the Porte. — Leopold make advances to Prussia. — Bischofl's- 
 werder in Vienna. — England ofi'evs her alliance to the Emperor. — Prussia 
 follows this example, — Reforms in Poland. — Leopold wishes to strengthen 
 Poland. — Polish constitution of May 3d. — Prussia is contented thereby. — 
 Second mission of Bischoffswerder. — Alarming differences at .Sistowa. — 
 Leopold's sudden change in favour of peace . . , 322 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 ABOLITION OF EOTALTI IN FKAKCE. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIOSABY WAR. 
 
 Weakness of the Right in the National Assembly.— The Girondists aim 
 at the overthrow of the Constitution and at war. — Austria still inclined 
 to peace. — Penal decrees against Priests and Emigres. — Lafayette de- 
 cides in favour of war.— His friend Narbonne becomes Minister-at-war.— 
 Military preparations.— Embassy to Prussia and Englan'l.- Robespierre 
 against war. — Austrian note in favour of peace. — The decree of Jan. 25 
 is decisive in favour of war . . . . . . 37i 
 
sx CONTENTS OF VOL. I. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 FALL OF THE FEUILL.4STS. 
 
 ReTolt of the negroes in St. nomingo. — The pikes in Paris. — Bloody atro- 
 cities in Avignon. — Democracy in Marseilles. — Seqnestration of the 
 estates of the Emigres. — Disturbances in all the Provinces. — The Feuil- 
 lants wish to reform the Constitntion. — Austria wishes to support them. — 
 Talleyrand holds out hopes of friendship with England. — Lafayette and- 
 Narbonne against the l''euillants. — Dismissal of Narbonne. — Lafayette 
 and Brissot overthrow the Ministry. — The Gironde forms a new 
 cabinet .......... 405 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. 
 
 General Diimouriez. — Declaration of war against Austria. — Plans against 
 Sardinia. — Failure of the attack on Belgium. — Lafayette breaks with 
 the ministry. — Crisis in French manufactures. — National bankruptcy. — 
 Fresh attacks of the Gironde on the King. — Indignation of Dumouriez 
 and the Parisian citizens. — Dissolution of the Ministry . . 438 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 LAST EFFORTS OF THE FEUILLANTS. 
 
 Danton and his associates. — Revolt of the 20th of .Tune. — The Minister 
 Monciel. — Lafayette's abortive efforts in Paris. — The Gironde and the 
 danger of the country. — The King's vain dealings with the Centre. — 
 Dissolution of Mouciel's Ministry ..... 471 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE IOtII of AUGUST. 
 
 Robespierre, Billaud-Varennes, Collot d'Herbois. — Embarrassment of the 
 Gironde. — The Gironde advocates a Regency under Louis XVII.— State of 
 the Finances. — Ruin of the peasant proprietors. — Revolutionary plans of 
 the Jacobins.— The National Assembly rejects them.— Revolt of Auo-. 
 10th.— Revolutionary Municipality. — Suspension of the King.- Convd- 
 cation of the National Convention .... igg 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Vol. I page 46 liuo 3 instead of 327 Millious it should be 357. 
 n i> I. „ line 1 instead of 340 it sliould be 193. 
 
HISTOEY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE FEENCH REYOLUTIOK 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. 
 
 Rise of the fbenph monarchy. — The state under louis xiv. — Decline 
 
 of the state under louis xv. — llbekal and radical opposition. 
 
 Rural nobility and peasant population. — Condition of towns, trade 
 
 AND MASUFACTURES. — DECLINE OF NATIONAL PROSPERITY. — EFFORTS FOR 
 reform UNDER LOUIS XVL RESISTANCE OF PRIVILEGED CLASSES. ThE 
 
 BUDGET. — General dissolution op order in the state. — The army. 
 
 In the eighteenth century France afforded an example of 
 a state, the surface of which was covered with modern in- 
 stitutions, but which still rested on a feudal foundation, and 
 preserved within it a thousand feudal elements. 
 
 In the earlier part of the middle ages, there existed in that 
 country, as in the rest of Europe, a community of feudal 
 lords and knights, of prelates and corporations. Above 
 these exclusively privileged classes, there rose a feeble mon- 
 archy and a universally dominant clmrch. The material 
 relations of the people were fettered by the monopoly of 
 labour . in the guilds, and by the inalienability of real pro- 
 perty. Although the privileges of the nobility were broad- 
 
 I. ' A 
 
2 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 cast over the whole soil of France, there existed no aristo- 
 cratic form of government, but only a minute division of 
 political power, and a constant extension of exclusive privi- 
 leges at the cost of political unity and the public weal. 
 The provinces of France, like the German territories, formed 
 almost independent states, whose dukes and counts ruled 
 their own lands as they would or could; and according to 
 their tenures, or the circumstances of the times, led out their 
 vassals to assist or to oppose the king. To their vassals 
 they stood in nearly the same relation as the king to them- 
 selves. Every nobleman was virtually lord and chief of his 
 peasants, and was only bound by a few fixed services to his 
 feudal superior. ^The royal power rose very slowly from 
 amidst this crowd of warlike potentates. Even in the middle 
 ages the kings, by making a skilful use of their alliance 
 with the church and the civic communities, succeeded in 
 getting rid of the great barons of the empire, — the lulers 
 of whole provinces, — and in transferring their authority to 
 the crown. Then the wars with England and the disturb- 
 ances consequent upon them, afforded Charles VII. the op- 
 portunity of gaining the consent of his Estates to the esta- 
 blishment of the first standing army in Europe, and, as a 
 necessary consequence, to the imposition of a fixed and per- 
 manent taxation, to be raised throughout the realm by the 
 king's officers. This made the crown inde23endent of the 
 military services of its vassals, and once more gave the royal 
 administration access to the dominions of the great feudal 
 chiefs. And thus the most solid foundation of absolute 
 monarchy in France was laid amidst the joyful applause of 
 the burghers and peasants, who hoped at last to find pro- 
 tection in the crown from plundering nobles, wanderino- 
 bands of mercenaries, and the miseries of the English wars. 
 Thenceforward the Inonarchy in France was independent 
 and strong enough to act as a counterpoise to the feudal 
 Estates of the realm. From this position it soon rose to one 
 of undoubted predominance ; for when Francis I. had wrested 
 
Ch. I.] RISE OF THE FRENCH MONARCHY. 3 
 
 from the Papacy a decisive influence in the filHng up of 
 ecclesiastical offices, he brought the most important of the 
 ancient orders — the clergy — into a state of complete sub- 
 jection to the throne. At the same time he adorned his 
 court with all the pomp of Burgnndian ceremonial and the 
 choicest products of Italian civilisation; and lastly, he in- 
 spired the whole nation with the liveliest enthusiasm for the 
 terrible contest with the Emperor Charles V. Above all, he 
 sought by these and similar inducements to entice the nobles 
 from the solitary independence of their castles, into the splen- 
 did service of his army and his palace. The revenue was 
 improved under him and his siicccssors, by means of a con- 
 stantly increasing number of indirect taxes. By the help of 
 these the kings were enabled to enlarge their armies; and 
 when once the crisis of the religious wars had been sur- 
 mounted, there existed no corporation in France mighty 
 enough to oppose the material jiower of the monarchy. The 
 nobility, indeed, sometimes called to mind their former in- 
 dependence, whenever a schism in the royal familj-, or in the 
 factions of the covirt, afforded them greater freedom of action. 
 But it is well known how Richelieu and Mazarin defeated 
 these last efforts of armed discontent; and when, subsequently, 
 Louis XIV. assumed the reins of government, both king and 
 people were under the conviction, that there was no limit to 
 the royal power but the royal will. -r 
 
 It is scarcely possible in fact 'to entertain loftier ideas 
 of the royal prerogative than those which filled the mind of 
 this powerful monarch. Yet he did not derive Jiis notions 
 from the legally existing constitution; for this knew of no 
 abolition of the ancient privileges of the nobility, the rights 
 of the imperial parliaments, or the sovereignty of the supreme 
 courts of justice. But he looked to the actual state of things, 
 and saw, that for almost half a century, the king had had the 
 f)0wer to carry out his every wish. He read in the New 
 Testament, and in the Byzantian laws, of the divine origin 
 and unlimited omnipotence of the monarchy, and came to 
 
 a2 
 
4 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 the conclusion, tliat God, who had set kings to rule over the 
 nations, had likewise granted them the absolute disi^osal of 
 their subjects. He regarded himself as the source of eveiy 
 law, which would of itself cease to be in force, the moment 
 he withdrew his sanction to its continuance. He enacted 
 laws, raised taxes, and changed the old statutesof the land, 
 according to his pleasure. The manifestations of his royal 
 pride at times trangressed the limits of European compre- 
 hension. On one occasion, he consulted the jurists as to 
 whether the property of the whole soil of the country were 
 not vested in him, as in the Mahometan rulers of the East. 
 Another time he threatened to punish acts of jDrivate charity, 
 ou the ground that the king, and no one else, was the re- 
 fuge and protector of the poor in France. It always ap- 
 peared unquestionable to him, that the suj^erintendence over 
 air matters of conscience and religion was one of the highest 
 prerogatives of the crown; and we know how he tortured thou- 
 sands of unhapjjy Huguenots, or drove them from his territory. 
 A despotism, apparently so absolute, was for many years 
 still more reverenced than feared by the great mass of the 
 French people. Louis XIV. was as active as he was ambi- 
 tious, and his ambition ^vas directed to the real duties, no 
 less than to the splendours, of his office. In the midst of 
 the profusion and festivity of his court, in the pleasures of 
 the chase and the theatre, of female society and of art, he 
 always found time and Snergy enough to attend to the grand 
 interests of his empire, and to infuse his own leading 
 ideas into the operations of his ministers. He was fortunate 
 enough to be supported in his administration by the inde- 
 fatigable, restless, and comprehensive industry of a Colbert. 
 It is true that he often treated the great minister like a 
 serf; but for a whole generation he constantly supported 
 him in the long series of creative projects, on which Colbert 
 founded modern France. Civil and financial administration, 
 civil and criminal procedure, manufactvu-es, and trade, received 
 a new impulse and a wholesome organisation. The oreat 
 
Ch. I.] THE STATE UNDER LOUIS XIV. 5 
 
 Ordonnances in reference to these matters are not, indeed, 
 faultless performances; but even their defects may pass in 
 the 17th Ceatury for signs of progress; and they everywhere 
 testify to the vast research, practical insight, and patriotism, 
 of their author. Still more forcibly are we struck by 
 the high standard arrived at in these documents, when we 
 bury ourselves in the reports of the current administration 
 in the time of Colbert. ' Grand and imposing is the supe- 
 riority with which the modern system of government, unde- 
 veloped and despotic as it is, rises above the confusion and 
 the narrowness of decaying feudalism. Under Colbert, as 
 under his predecessor Richelieu, the progress of the monarchy 
 constantly took the same general direction, as it had fol- 
 lowed ever since the close of the middle ages. When the 
 territories of the old feudal state were merged in one great 
 political community, the development of society, and the 
 progress of civilization, demanded a corresponding modifi- 
 cation of the political constitution. This all important task 
 was undertaken in France, — not by the nobility, not by the 
 clergy — but by the crown. While the nobles were wasting 
 the blood of their vassals in their private feuds with one 
 another, the crown was establishing a standing army for the 
 protection of the country. While the nobles utterly ne- 
 glected the police arrangements of their territories, the crown 
 collected the forces of the marecliaussee for the protection 
 of internal traffic. While the nobles were only thinking of 
 their privileges and exemptions, the crown was providing for 
 the general welfare, by developing the resources of the 
 country. It was the same in every department of public 
 life; and it is this tendency to keep the general good in 
 view which characterises all the measures of Colbert. Whether 
 it was a question of the great Southern Canal, or of the 
 debts of some petty commune, or of the protection of the 
 highways from vagrants or the defence of the innocent ac- 
 
 ' Correspondance administrat. de Louis XIV. ed. Deppinj 
 
6 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 cused against an arbitrary tribunal, the feeling of .the minister 
 is ahvays on the side of the public weal, the real interests 
 of the country, and the protection of the lower classes; 
 while the conduct of the interested parties displays the un- 
 blushing selfishness of family, rank, or corporation. Severe 
 as were the proceedings of the government against many 
 private interests and rights, we cannot doubt that, in the 
 majority of cases, its operations were highly conducive to 
 the healthy organisation of the state. 
 
 If, moreover, we take into account that France at the 
 same time acquired an almost dominant position in Europe, 
 and that the fullest gratification was afforded to the warlike 
 spirit of the people, we shall cease to be astonished at the 
 long popularity enjoyed by Louis XIV. We should, however, 
 be mistaken in regarding his government as, in the full sense 
 of the the term, absolute. Strong as it was, it was surrounded on 
 all sides by independent powers, by rights and immunities, 
 privileges, and separate jurisdictions. The monarchy, which 
 had only very gradually raised its head above the different 
 strata of feudalism, still found their debris on its path, and 
 often in large and heavy masses. The jDrinciple of rational 
 fitness and expediency, which in modern states pervades and 
 unites every branch of public business, was, at that period, 
 unknown. There was an utter want of a systematic and 
 acknowledged demarcation of contending rights. Their re- 
 spective limits were only found by the actual result of a 
 contest between the government and the privileged orders, 
 in each particular case. Although the king claimed the un- 
 conditional right of raising taxes, and exercised it at his 
 will in the old crown lands, the more lately acquired bor- 
 der provinces watched over their privileges and charters with 
 restless jealousy; and thereby succeeded in obtaining much 
 more favourable treatment than their neighbours, in the mat- 
 ter of taxation. In the departments of police, finance, and 
 home administration, the king could appoint to offices at 
 his pleasure; but it was regarded as a binding rule— which 
 
Ch. I.] THE STATES UNDER LOUIS XIV. 7 
 
 was only to be deviated from on very rare occasions, — that 
 all the higher posts in the church, the army and the court, 
 were to be bestowed exclusively on members of the nobility. 
 While, in most parts of the country, the government was 
 free to administer affiiirs as it thought fit, there still existed 
 some provinces in which the local Estates jDossessed import- 
 ant rights and great authority ; as, for example, Languedoc, y 
 Burgundy, Bretagne, Artois, Beam, and a number of 
 smaller districts. Annual assemblies were held, composed of 
 bishops, nobles, and the magistrates of cities. These bodies 
 had to give their consent to every new tax, to vote an an- 
 nual voluntary grant to the king, and to fix the quota to 
 be paid by the inhabitants of their province. Of the sums 
 thus raised they retained a considerable portion in their own 
 hands, and employed it in the maintenance of the roads and 
 canals, breeding-studs, and hospitals of the land. Their right 
 of granting or refusing these supplies was, according to 
 the law, entirely absolute. Before they voted a fresh grant, 
 they inquired whether the government had fulfilled the pro- 
 mises made in the preceding year. It is true that the king, 
 on his part, maintained an equally unlimited claim to the 
 obedience of all his subjects, in opposition to their votes; 
 and in general he carried his point, as was natural, from his 
 superior power, and as was, in most cases, conducive to the 
 public good. 
 
 But the omnipotence of the state was opposed by the 
 far more powerful corporation of the clergy. The kjng^pos- ^ 
 sessed the right of appointing the bishops and a number of 
 ecclesiastical officers; but when once they were appointed, 
 they administered the affairs of the church in almost entire 
 independence of the king's government. In the few cases in 
 which there was room for secular influence — such as ap- 
 peals against the abuse of ecclesiastical authority — the crea- 
 tion of new endowments— or the acquisition of new estates 
 or legacies — it was not the king alone, but the supreme 
 courts or "parliaments," in common with the crown, who 
 
8 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. 1^°°^ ^■ 
 
 held the decision in their hands. The clergy exercised a 
 most potent influence on the mass of the people; and one 
 may attribute the persecution of the Ilugenots as much to 
 the popular passions worked upon by the church, as to the 
 intolerance of the king. During the whole of the 18th cen- 
 tury, no one in France had a legal right to live out of the 
 pale of the catholic church. The heretic was excluded, as 
 a matter of course, from all political privileges; and as the 
 parish priests had the exclusive care of the registers, the 
 Calvinists had no means of proving the legitimacy of their 
 own birth, or their hereditary rights to property. The whole 
 system of education in all its stages was, like the cure of 
 souls, entirely in the hands of the church. The great ma- 
 jority of the teachers were either clergymen, or persons ap- 
 pointed by ecclesiastical authorities. Some of the scholastic 
 appointments were made by the city communes, or the pro- 
 vincial Estates. But the crown, with the exception of five 
 or six special schools, had no influence at all on the edu- 
 cation of the rising generation. The clergy gave their 
 instructions gratuitously. Their schools were therefore nu- 
 merously attended, and a certain amount of classical know- 
 ledge was widely difl'used among the higher classes. In 
 addition to these means of spiritual influence, the church 
 derived great importance from the possession of immense and 
 well-managed landed property, seignorial authority over many 
 thousand peasants, as well as an income of 130 million 
 francs, derived from tithes and a variety of other dues. Of 
 this enormous wealth the clergy gave the state no more than 
 they thought fit; and long after the imperial Estates had 
 ceased to meet, the assemblies of the clergy continued to be 
 regularly held, and were almost entirely free from royal 
 influence. 
 
 Not only the church and national education, but even the 
 administration of justice, had assiimed in ancient France a 
 peculiar and corporative character. Here, too, unity and 
 suitability of organisation were out of the question. The 
 
Ch. I.] THE STATE UNDER LOUIS XIV. 9 
 
 legal tribunals were a congeries of old remnants and new 
 experiments, existing side by side, amidst continual col- 
 lisions and disagreements. The feudal Seigniors, or the civic 
 authorities everywhere possessed an inferior, and some- 
 times a superior, jurisdiction over their fiefs. The superin- 
 tendence over these fpudal judges, and the decision of the 
 more important causes, were entrusted to the royal hail- 
 lages, or tribunals of the royal domains: a certain number 
 of which — under the name of prsesidial courts — served as courts 
 of appeal. But in none of these courts was the extent of 
 their powers either definitely or unchangeably fixed. They' 
 were continually crossed and disturbed by the privileges of 
 birth, office, and rank; and though the legal procedure was 
 the same through the whole empire, the protection of the 
 law was weakened by a mass of local customs and police 
 regulations. The Parliaments, originally nine, afterwards y 
 fifteen, in number, formed the supreme legal tribunals; of 
 these, the parliament of Paris held the highest rank, from 
 the great extent of its jurisdiction, and the authority of its 
 magistrates; but they were all filled with the consciousness 
 of their real independence and sovereign power, and could 
 agree, neither among themselves, nor with the inferior courts, 
 nor even with the royal council, as to the limits of their 
 functions. They interfered very largely both with the le- 
 gislation and general administration of the country. They 
 maintained that no royal ordonnance had any legal force until ^ 
 it had been entered on the register of the parliament, and 
 that they had the right to protest against such registration, 
 both on legal grounds and in the interest of the public. 
 They issued orders and directions to the police, and pro- 
 nounced judgment on any illegal measures of government 
 officials. Li a state of open rivalry with the church, they 
 prided themselves on protecting the state and the private 
 citizen against the encroachments of the hierarchy. Their ten- 
 dency to oppose the church not unfrequently gained flipm 
 the favour of the crown; but on other occasions their stub- 
 
10 
 
 FRANCE BEFOEE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 born wilfulness proved highly embarrassing to the govern- 
 ment. The king, indeed, generally compelled them to re- 
 gister the laws they had rejected, forljid them to prosecute 
 the accused magistrates, and banished disobedient members. 
 In most cases the parliaments were thus forced to yield ; but 
 they insisted all the more strongly on their rights in prin- 
 ciple, and adhered to them on every fresh occasion -with im- 
 movable tenacity. The relation of the members of these 
 courts to the monarch himself may be easily conjectured 
 from the fact, that their offices, if not attached to some feudal 
 domain, were sold as hereditary possessions; so that the crown 
 had notliing at all to do with filling them when vacant. If 
 the government was of opinion that any tribunal administered 
 justice inefficiently, it had no other legal remedy than to set 
 aside the verdict on the ground of a formal error, or to put 
 a new interpretation on the law, or (in accordance with a 
 hazardous practice of the early middle ages) to summon the 
 parties before their own tribunal, and try the cause de novo. 
 They never thought of removing any of the judges by dis- 
 missal, ti-anslation, or promotion. It was exactly the same in 
 other branches of the public service. Very few of the French 
 monarch's had managed their pecunary affirirs with prudence. 
 On the contrary, most of them, from negligence, ambition, or 
 love of pleasure, were in continual want of money. Ever 
 since the end of the 15th century the deplorable custom pre- 
 vailed of selling public offices; and, from the time of Henry IV., 
 of making them hereditary in the family of the purchaser. 
 Thus arose a numerous and independent aristocracy of 
 state officials. To enhance the value of these offices, the ffov- 
 ernment attached to many of them a patent of nobility; and 
 to all of them, exemption from the most burdensome of the 
 taxes. The number of the places thus sold — many of which 
 were created solely that they might be sold — was immense. 
 -Richelieu, it is said, abolished 100,000 of them; Colbert 
 .reckoned the value of those which existed in his time at 
 500 million francs. They existed in every department of the 
 
t^ii- I-] THE STATE LENDER LOUIS XIV. H 
 
 liublic service; in the court and army, in the customs, in the 
 woods and forests, tlie contmuncs and the guilds. In all these 
 departments the state had renounced, for a small sum of 
 money, the right of controlling and superintending its own 
 organs. Louis XIA'., however, was not of opinion that it 
 was impossible to govern the country with such a consti- 
 tution. The main object in his eyes was, that the possessors 
 of privileges should be brought, as individuals, to obey his 
 command, in each particular case. There was no human pas- 
 sion which he did not appeal to for the accomplishment of 
 his purpose. Irresistibly charming in his youth, dignified and 
 awe-inspiring in his latter years, he was unsurpassed in the 
 art of personal influence. He appealed to the vanity of the 
 nobles — the lust of power of the magistracy, — the con- 
 troversial bitterness of the clergy, — and the avarice of all men. 
 When neither flattery , nor intrigue, nor bribery — employed 
 as they were to the fullest extent, and according to an elab- 
 orate system — were sufficient to carry his point, he did not 
 scruple, in the consciousness of his divine calling, to resort 
 to intimidation and violence. His troops were marched against 
 refractory districts, unmanageable magistrates were crushed 
 by quartering troops upon them, and hundreds of trouble- 
 some opponents were got rid of by arbitrary imprisonment. 
 From insignificant beginnings, a royal administration was gra- 
 dually developed, ^which extended its operations over the 
 whole empire; and being under the sole and absolute con- 
 trol of the minister of finance, soon made its influence felt 
 in every sphere of the national life. Ever since the time of 
 Richelieu, a royal functionary, removable at pleasure, was 
 appointed, under the. name of intencianf, over every pro- 
 vince, who had likewise removable assistants, or suhdelcgucs, 
 under him in each of his districts. His original province was 
 to take care of the financial interests of the state; but he 
 soon extended his influence in all directions — subjected the 
 communes to strict surveillance, threw the noble landovi;ners 
 into the shade, and placed every part of the province un- 
 
12 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 der the siiper%'ision of a strong police. However numerous 
 the privileges, corporations, and exemptions by vi^hich this 
 new authority was surrounded, the King had now in every 
 quarter an energetic and ever ready instrument, if not to 
 rid him of his opponents, at any rate to bend them to his 
 will. The provincial Estates grumbled at times, but they 
 granted all that was demanded of them: the magistrates pro- 
 tested, but in the end resigned themselves to defeat. The 
 nobles hung trembling on every word and look of the 
 monarch, and the clergy overflowed with enthusiastic de- 
 votion. For many years Louis was raised to such a height 
 above the world, that the distant tones of complaint or op- ' 
 position but rarely reached his royal ear. 
 I But could an enduring prosperity be reared on such foun- 
 dations? 
 
 Such a possibility can hardly be disputed. The strength 
 of the monarchy at that period was not in itself injurious 
 to the country; on the contrary, it rej)resented , with splen- 
 dour and success, the vuiity of the nation, the power of the 
 state, and the requisites for the public weal. If, on the other 
 hand, we look for constitutional freedom, — the corporations, 
 Estates, and parliaments, afibrded the living germs of a 
 liberal polity. The task of bringing these germs to full ma- 
 turity was indeed difficult enough. France at that period, 
 as we have already observed, had neither an administration 
 nor a constitution systematically arranged. The various in- 
 stitutions existed side by side, complicated and clumsy in 
 their form, thwarting or supporting one another according 
 to the positions which the accident of their origin had given 
 them. No doubt long and patient toil would have been ne- 
 cessary to reform them to such a degree as to produce an 
 equilibrium between power and freedom, between centra- 
 lisation and self-government, between the prerogatives of the 
 crown and the privileges of feudal orders. The problem 
 was infinitely difficult, but not impossible, to be solved. 
 
 Its solution needed no greater abilities than were possessed 
 
Ch. I.] THE STATE UNDER LOUIS XIV. 13 
 
 by the potentates of the 18th century; but it did require 
 strong and decided political morality, which alns! grew more 
 and more rare from o-eneration to generation. 
 
 As matters stood under Louis XIV., the crown alone 
 could liave initiated such a reformation. It had grown up 
 to its fulness of power, by a vigorous advocacy of the pub- 
 lic interest. If it desired to secure its future prosperity, 
 it must continue to watch over the public good, even at the 
 cost of its own supremacy. It had grown strong through 
 the narrow selfishness of the feudal Estates; to retain its 
 strength, it should have roused those orders from their in- 
 active egoism, and educated them to labour for the public 
 good — in other words, to political liberty. By these means, 
 and these alone, would it have been possible securely to found 
 the state, and with it the throne, on the only firm found- 
 ation — the active patriotism of all the citizens. The deep- 
 est wound from which France was at that time suffering, 
 was the hostile schism between the different classes of the 
 people, for which there was no other remedy than a genuine 
 peace, and a joyful co-operation of all ranks, in which politi- 
 tical privileges would be granted in exact proportion to the 
 degree of public usefulness. The crown, which at that time 
 stood in unassailable grandeur and almost unlimited power, 
 far above the contest, possessed all the requisite means for 
 the attainment of such an object. It only needed to employ 
 them at the cost, if necessary, of the personal and arbitrary 
 will of their possessor. For the great deed of raising the 
 privileged orders of tJie nation from selfishness to freedom, 
 is only possible when the national instructor uses his power, 
 not in the service of his own selfvvill, but of the public good. 
 
 Unfortunately for France and the Bourbons, Louis XIV. 
 was very far from regarding his mission in this light. He 
 had, indeed, done many great things for the welfare of 
 his people. But the innate ambition of his character had 
 been fostered by numerous successes into a colossal egoism. 
 The virtual boundlessness of his power, — which was doubt- 
 
14 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 less for a. wliilo ndvantagcoiis to both state and people, — 
 had inflicted the greatest injury upon himself. It is rarely 
 granted to a liuman being to preserve tlie conseionsness of 
 iiis duty, when there is no outward influenec to remind him 
 of the rights of others. Louis, who regarded his office as a 
 plenary power, mysteriously granted by the grace of God, 
 and -ivho was able to crush all resistance by material force, 
 yielded, as many others have done, to the temptation to de- 
 spise all cartlily laws, and to place his pride, not in active 
 patriotism, but in the omnipotence of his own passions. Un- 
 limited political power had brought him to the same point 
 to which the nobility had been reduced by political inac- 
 tivity; and his high office was changed from an imj^ulse to 
 useful deeds, into a title to personal enjoyment. He ne- 
 glected to meet the great claims which the state, in its gradual 
 progress, continually made upon his attention. In the con- 
 sciousness of his own strength, he neglected to reconcile the 
 unceasing conflict between the royal administration and the 
 rights of the feudal orders. He never thought of rousing 
 the political sense of the people, by urging the higher classes 
 to a well-regulated activity, and granting to the lower a fixir share 
 of political lights. In his ommipotence and self-glorification, 
 he deserted the paths of the public good, for a policy ofmereper- 
 sonal passion and ambition. By a series of plans of concj[uest,each 
 more extravagant than the last, he plunged the country into 
 fatally exhausting wars, and united the whole of Europe in 
 common and successful opposition to French domination. By 
 these means he injured the monarchy in two respects. In 
 the first place he deprived it of the material basis of its power, 
 by an incurable confusion of its finances;— which, on the one 
 , hand, rendered any alleviation of the burdens of the oppressed 
 people impossible, and, on the other, forced the government 
 out of its natural course. In the next place, since the de- 
 ficit was constantly increasing, although the people were taxed 
 to the utmost limit of endurance, even Colbert, and on a 
 larger scale his successors, had recourse to the dangerous 
 
Ch. I.] THE STATE UNDER LOUIS XIY. 15 
 
 expedient of multiplying tlie number of saleable offices to 
 an incredible extent; and thus diffnsing hereditarj- and ex- 
 elusive privileges throiigbont the body politic. The state thus 
 forfeited the right of filling up a new series of offices in the 
 department of customs, and that of the woods and forests. In 
 many towns the trade in timber, wine, and spirits was taken out 
 of private hands; nay even the poor earnings of those who 
 towed boats on the rivers, of porters and funeral mutes, were 
 made a monopoly, and secured to certain families, exclusively, 
 in consideration of a large premium. The worst result was 
 that the moral influence of the throne was lost by these 
 transactions. A nation can for a time put up Avith a judi- 
 cious and farsighted despotism, if piivate prosperity and na- 
 tional power are seen to be promoted. But in this case fa- 
 mine 23revailcd in every- province; the bark of trees was the 
 daily food of hundreds of thousands; the army was demo- 
 ralised.by defeats, and the only result of Louis's quasi di- 
 vinity was the evident ruin of the empire. His successors 
 were destined to feel the effects of his policy. Immediately 
 after his death the j^arliament of Paris set aside his will, 
 without the slightest difficulty; the most important results of 
 his internal policy were lost; and after violent commotions 
 his youthful great-grandson had to enter afresh on the course 
 of modern kingship. 
 
 This was Louis XY. ; and we need only mention his name 
 to bring the events which followed vividly before ovu- eyes. 
 If even Lous XIV. diminished his personal influence by car- 
 rying out his policy to dangerous extremes, his successor 
 afforded an example of moral degradation, to which only the 
 life of the most abandoned of all the Eoman emperors can 
 furnish a counterpart. The hourgeoisie learned to despise 
 a throne which the king had sullied by his debaucheries; 
 and the higher classes were poisoned in every vein by a 
 zealous imitation of the royal vices. Louis XIV. had ne- 
 glected to subject the privileges of the feudal Estates to any 
 searching reform, because he virtually ruled them, and felt 
 
IG FEANCE BEFORE THE EEVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 himself more than a match for their united power. But his 
 successor descended to their level, took part in their feuds, 
 and endeavoured to subdue them, not by his own strength, 
 but by setting them one against another. Thus he first hvun- 
 bled the parliaments to please the clergy and the Jesuits.' 
 He then, at the instigation of the Marchioness of Pompa- 
 dour, allied himself with the judicial nobles, to destroy the 
 predominant influence of the church; and at last, through the 
 influence of the Countess Uubarry, he again fell into depend- 
 ence on the. Jesuit faction, when the power of the jDarlia- 
 ments seemed growing too formidable. Each of these privileged 
 classes employed their term of royal favour in multiplying 
 their own privileges to the injury of the state and the people; 
 and filled the period of their disfavour with democratic 
 accusations against the desjjotism of the king's government. 
 In either case the latter forfeited a portion of its power, or 
 its popularity. Meanwhile the foreign influence of prance 
 met with more and more ruinous defeats. The alliance with 
 Austria, which Madame de Pompadour concluded in 1756, has 
 often been made the object of undeserving censure. It was 
 not the entering into this alliance which injured France, but 
 the wretched conduct of the war — which broke out with 
 England at the same time — by the then ruling faction. 
 When the same party Avas on the point of renewing the 
 contest under Choiseul's ausijices, after very creditable pre- 
 preparations, and with favourable prospects, it had to succumb 
 to its Jesuit opponents, who, from party hatred, condemned 
 the war policy of the fallen ministers, and reduced France 
 to complete insignificance in Europe. The subjection of the 
 monarchy to the influence of the feudal faction was followed 
 by national humiliation. This was the final blow to the credit 
 of the ancient polity. 
 
 Such a condition of affairs must naturally throw an ex- 
 citable nation like the Fi-ench, the upper classes of whom were 
 even at that time highly educated, into a state of the greatest 
 ferment. Year after year, in spite of the censorship and 
 
Ch. I.] THE STATE UNDER LOUIS XV. 17 
 
 the Bastille, the criticism of public opinion became more and 
 more general and impetuous. The current of European thought 
 had long taken a revolutionary direction. After the chief 
 authority of the middle ages— the church— had shown it- 
 self to be neither infollible nor united, there was for a time, 
 no visible rallying point at all. The church had absorbed 
 the state and the law, science and art, into itself," and had 
 declared external nature and the world to be sinful and 
 abandoned things. "When therefore the church itself was 
 divided, not only religious faith, but the whole con- 
 dition and fate of the human race, became uncertain. A 
 determination was everywhere manifested to acknowledge 
 no existing creed or institution, without sufficient evidence 
 of its intrinsic value; and, on the other hand, to trace out 
 and appropriate, without regard to conventional obstacles , 
 whatever contained within it the germs of genuine vitality. 
 The Middle Ages had turned away from the material world; 
 men now began to take triumphant possession of nature, as 
 of some newly discovered treasure. The ancient Church had 
 proclaimed the vanity and worthlessness of all earthly things ; 
 now every effort was directed to the development and im- 
 provement of man's material condition. The religious ages 
 had laid the greatest stress on the sinfulness of man; now 
 the idea of the image of God in man — of the dignity and 
 value of the human mind — was brought prominently for- 
 ward. These new principles struck the very heart of the 
 anden regime, which had never taken any notice of the in- 
 dividual man as such, but had only valued him according 
 to his social or corporative rank. A claim arose — not indeed 
 to overthrow the whole existing order of things — but 
 to open the way to its hitherto exclusive privileges for ever}' 
 active and striving spirit. New political principles Avere work- 
 ing their way to to the surface, simultaneously with a hither- 
 to unknown investigation of nature, and a creative philo- 
 sophy. Everywhere men turned away from the ideal, be- 
 cause it did not seem secure and practical enough to satisfy 
 
 I. B 
 
18 FRANCE BEFOEE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 tlie urgent necessities of the times. The whole social at- 
 mosphere was filled with material and practical impulses, 
 which were ouly gradually purified into civilisation and taste. 
 As the religious middle ages had their anio da fe, so the 
 new order of things was not without its mistakes and 
 crimes; but while we blame the latter, we should not 
 forget that the condition from which Eru-ope was snatched 
 by the Revolution, would appear to all of us, without excep- 
 tion, as the most intolerable barbarism. The enlightenment 
 of the 18th century was for a time- greatly over-estimated, 
 even in its most worthless productions; we are now only too 
 much inclined to overlook its historical services, because it 
 is the common property of all, and has become the very 
 ground on which we stand. But let him who is inclined to 
 shrug his shoulders at its occasionally loose or hypocritical 
 civilization, transplant himself into the utterly uncivilized 
 period which preceded it. Neither classical nor christian antiqu- 
 ity, neither the middle ages nor the Reformation, took any 
 oft'ence at the worst horrors of warfare, or the tortures of a 
 cruel criminal procedure, or the annihilation of political ojjpo- 
 nents; compared with which, all the horrors of our revo- 
 lutions and re-actions are mere child's play. The idea that 
 the life of each individual was of any value to his fellow 
 men, only became a living power in consequence of the events 
 of the last century. 
 
 The negative, destructive, side of this spirit — the repudi- 
 ation of authority — found in France a soil in every respect 
 favourable. For all her existing institutions were miserable 
 in their operations and results; and, what was perhaps still 
 more important, uncertain in their legal titles. The result 
 of Louis XIV.'s mode of government was, that the monarchy 
 possessed all the power, and the feudal orders all the rio-ht, 
 so that the two elements of this double State mutually balanced 
 each other in public opinion. There was scarcely a siuo-le 
 unassailable point in the political law of France; it was quite 
 natural, therefore, that the innovators should make the law 
 
Ch. I.] THE STATE UNDER LOUIS XV. 19 
 
 of nature and of man their starting point. The desire of 
 reforming existing institutions— which in heahhy nations 
 is only exchanged for the impulse of destruction after utter 
 failure,— was in this case hopeless from the very first. 
 Some expressed themselves more mildly, others more rudely; 
 some hoped to succeed by peaceful means, others by violent 
 revolutions ; some studied particular phases, others the whole 
 structure, of political life; — but in whatever direction they 
 carried their investigations, they all brouglit back the firm 
 conviction of the utter M'orthlessness of the ancient system. 
 It does not lie within our scope to examine in detail the 
 multitude of theories which at that time filled the world; it 
 will be enough if we distinguish the two main currents of 
 opinion which assailed the old commonwealth. Both parties 
 deeply felt the luijustifiable and injurious pressure of the 
 privileges of the crown, the church, and the feudal orders; 
 but while the one put forward a claim that the unconditional 
 freedom of the individual should take the place of all these 
 tyrannies, the other demanded that the rule of the hitherto 
 oppressed majority should be setup in their stead. Voltaire 
 and the physiocrates belong to the former, Rousseau and 
 the socialists to the latter. At that period — about the 
 middle of the last century — the important ditference between 
 these two theories was but little felt; they both worked amid 
 endless personal feuds , and constantly changing combinations, 
 under every conceivable form of literature, of social life, of 
 freemasonry and secret orders, towards the common end — 
 the destruction of all that was old. We cannot call these 
 things the cause of the Revolution; we should be the less 
 justified in doing so, because, from the low state of journal- 
 ism,— the severe measures taken against the printing and sale 
 of books,— the very small traffic of the country,— and the deep 
 ignorance of the people,— all intellectual movement was almost 
 entirely confined to high society, and rarely reached even 
 the class of burghers. All that we can say is, that some 
 of the leaders of the Revolution took their first direction 
 
 b2 
 
20 FEANCE BEFOEE THE EEVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 .from this literature; we know, e.g. that Robespierre on all 
 occasions quoted Rousseau. But the practically important 
 part was played on this occasion— as on all others in 
 which the yiolence of the masses is thoroughly let loose- 
 not by a political theory, but by the passions of the people. 
 But the effects of this theory on the privileged classes them- 
 selves, before the Revolution, were exceedingly powerftil. 
 As they were alternately in alliance or at feud with the gov- 
 ernment, they imbibed with ec[ual eagerness the poison of 
 covu-tly immorality, and the doctrines of radical ojiposition. 
 Th^ parJiamenis, which, as true members of the feudal system, 
 still upheld the proscription of Protestantism, and the j)ro- 
 hibition of loans on interest, asumed all the frivolities of 
 the school of Yoltaire in their contest with the Jesuits ; and 
 loudly joined in the cry for the extirpation of superstition. 
 The court nobility learned under Choiseul's administration 
 to pride themselves on freedom of thought; after his fall, 
 they once more rallied round the external forms of religion, 
 with a warmth of devotion which we may easily imagine, 
 since the change took place under the auspices of the most 
 abandoned of all the royal mistresses, the Countess Dubarry. 
 It was just in the immediate vicinity of the throne, that the 
 deepest roots were struck by the most radical opinions ■ — 
 by that j^hilosophy of coarse materialism, according to which 
 nothing is real but selfishness and sensual pleasure, and all 
 besides an emjity phantom of the imagination. 
 
 And thus, at the close of the shameful reign of Louis XV., 
 the fabric of tlie ancient state was undermined in every part. 
 The crown, by the vices of the King and the feebleness of 
 its foreign policy; the feudal orders, by their mutual hostility, 
 and their struggle with the crown; and both, by the rise 
 of radical opinions. But the mass of the people derived uo 
 advantage from the change; the burden of the privileged 
 monopoHes, which were sown broadcast through the length 
 and breadth of civil society, became more intolerable with 
 the progressing decay of the state. The deeper the moral 
 
Cn. I.] THE STATK UNDER LOUIS XV. 21 
 
 degradation of the higher classes, the larger and more selfish 
 were the claims they made upon the commonwealth. This 
 was a melancholy consequence, not of personal passion alone, 
 but, in a great measure, the inevitable result of the con- 
 stitution of the state itself The growing power of the crown 
 deprived the nobihty of all political influence; and the King's 
 officers excluded them more and more from all political ac- 
 tivity. The feudal seignior still appointed the domain judge, 
 but he took little trouble to see that justice was done to 
 his hinds; and he no longer paid any attention to the police, 
 the administration, or the militia, of his district. All that was 
 left to hini of his former position was his honorary privi- 
 leges, and exemption from taxes and other burdens, by 
 which the community had formerly rewarded him for his 
 political labours; and which now raised him, as the unde- 
 serving favourite of fortune, above his paying and serving 
 fellow-citizens. As these privileges were the only things which 
 reminded him of his rank, it was natural that he should re- 
 card the preservation of them, at all hazards, as his highest 
 duty. Nobility, which had once been a public office, was 
 now nothing more than a title to personal enjoyment. The 
 natural state of things, that the most enlarged rights should 
 entail upon their possessor the most onerous duties — and 
 the most splendid privileges should imply the greatest public 
 activity, was, under these circumstances, entirely reversed. 
 The whole system tended richly to endow the higher classes, 
 without demanding of them any services in return; and to 
 exhaust the lower classes by oppressive taxation, without 
 granting them any political rights. 
 
 In order to bring this matter, in its details, more clearly 
 before us, we may pass in review the three great classes 
 into which the French people were divided acording to their 
 occupation.! gy far the most important of these occupations. 
 
 ' In drawing up the following statement we hare chiefly consulted the 
 Statistique Ministerielle de la France, and the admirable works of Moreau de 
 
22 
 
 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 at that period, was agriculture. Nearly 21 out of 25 mil- 
 lions of inhabitants were employed in tilling the soil. Of 
 the 51 million hectares of which the whole kingdom is 
 composed, 35 millions were destined for cultivation, that is, 
 rather less than at the present day, but more than twice as 
 much as is now under cultivation in England. It has often . 
 been imagined that the property of these great masses of land 
 was almost entirely in the hands of the church, the mon- 
 asteries, the nobility, and the financiers; and that before 1789 
 only large estates existed, while the class of small proprietors 
 was created by the Revolution. Some consider this supposed 
 change as the highest glory, and others as the greatest cala- 
 mity, of modern times; but all are agreed as to the fact; 
 and the more so, because it was -continually proclaimed in 
 the debates of the revolutionary assemblies. But, on closer 
 examination, we shall find that the effects of the feudal system 
 upon agriculture are not to be looked for in this direction. 
 We cannot rank the authority of the revolutionary orators 
 very high, both because they had a political interest in break- 
 ing up the large estates for the advantage of the city prole- 
 taries, and because they always shewed themselves fabu- 
 lously ignorant of statistics. If we examine the state of things 
 before 1789, we shall find that — apart from the feudal tenures 
 and the church property — even the old French law of inher- 
 itance by no means favoured the accumulation of estates. The 
 nobility, indeed, were often heard to complain that the ro- 
 turiers were constantly getting possession of land; which is 
 intelligible enough, since the nionied classes were continually 
 gaining ground on the ancient aristocracy. It follows that 
 there was nothing in the circumstances of the age to render 
 the division of land impossible; and one of the most credible 
 witnesses, after three years investigation in all the French pro- 
 vinces, tells us, as the result of his observations, that about 
 
 Yonne; and also Lavergne, Ecouomie rurale. The latter gives much infor- 
 mation respecting the earlier state of things, which now and then, however, 
 req^uires examination and correction. 
 
Cu. I.] THE AGRICULTURAL CLASSES. 23 
 
 a third of the hind was held by small proprietors, who were 
 sufficiently prosperous in Flanders, Alsace, Beam and the 
 north of Brctagne, but in other parts, especially in Lorraine 
 and Champagne, poor and miserable. The division of pro- 
 perty, he observes, is carried to too great an extent ; "I have 
 frequently seen properties of 10 roods with a single fruit- 
 tree; excessive division ought to be forbidden by law." 
 
 This witness is Arthur Yoimg, one of the first agricul- 
 turists of the period in Europe, who gave this testimony 
 after indefatigable inquiry; and his report is confirmed by 
 native authorities. 
 
 "The subdivision of land," says Turgot "is carried to such 
 an extent, that a property, only just sufficient for one fa- 
 mily, is divided among five or six children." "The landed 
 estates," writes an intendant, "are broken up systematically 
 to a very alarming degree; the fields are divided and sub- 
 divided ad mfinittcm." Such was the case among the small 
 proprietors; 1 the other two-thirds of the soil was entirely in 
 the possession of the great landowners — consisting partly of 
 the nobility and clergy, and partly of magistrates and finan- 
 ciers. We shall presently inquire, in what manner they 
 turned their lands to profit; but we may first of all observe, 
 that a middle class of proprietors, substantial enough to derive 
 from their land a sufficient livelihood, and yet humble enough 
 to be bound to constant and diligent labour, was entirely 
 wanting. In the present day the landed proprietors of 
 France may be divided into three sections, each of which 
 possesses about one third of the productive soil of the country. 
 18 milhon hectares belong to 183,000 great landed owners; 
 14 miUions to 700,000 proprietors of the middle class, and 
 14 millions to not quite 4 millions of peasant owners.^ When 
 we compare these figures with those of the pre-revolutionary 
 period, we find the number of poor possessors exactly cor- 
 
 t Quoted by Tocqueville, L'ancien Reyime, 60. — ^ Cochut, Remie de 
 deux Mondes, Sept. 1848. Rossi, Economie FolUkiue, p. 325, et seq. 
 
24 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 responding to one another; and, what is very remarkable, 
 they are almost exactly the same in 1831 as in 1815. The 
 most fearful storms pass over the surface of the land without 
 producing any change in. these relations. But what the 
 movement of 1789,— the emancipation of the soil, and 
 civil equality,— did produce, is this middle class of pro- 
 prietors, which now possesses one-third of the land. It must 
 be confessed that this is a most remarkable result. How 
 often has it been announced by feudalists and socialists, that 
 entire freedom of trade would inevitably lead to the annihi- 
 lation of the middle classes, and leave nothing but; million- 
 naires and proletaries! We here see the very contrary 
 proved by one of the grandest historical facts. Tbe feudal 
 system, by its restrictions, crushed the agricultural middle 
 class ; the rule of freedom created it afresh. Let us, however, 
 consider the position of these lords of the soil and their 
 dependents more closely. 
 
 The first fact which meets us in this investigation is an 
 unhappy one. It was only an excessively small minority of 
 the great landowners, who concerned themselves about their 
 estates and tenants. All who were at all able to do so, hur- 
 ried away to the enjoyments of the court or the capital, and 
 only returned to their jiroperties, to fill the purse which had 
 been emptied by their excesses. There they lived in miserly 
 and shabby retirement; sometimes in wretchedly furnished 
 castles, shunned by the peasants as pitiless creditors; some- 
 times in the midst of forests and wastes, that they might 
 have the pleasures of the chase close at hand. They took 
 as little interest in intellectual subjects, as in agricultural 
 affairs, and cherished little or no intercourse with their 
 neighbours; partly from parsimony, and partly from the 
 entire want of local roads. When the period of fasting was 
 over, they rushed eagerly back to the alluring banquets of 
 Paris and Versailles. The number of exceptions to this 
 melancholy rule was so small as to exercise no influence on 
 the general condition of the country. 
 
Ch. I.] THE SYSTEM OF AGRICULTURE. 25 
 
 While these gentlemen were squandciing the produce of 
 their estates in aristocratic spendour, their fields were let out 
 in parcels of 10 or, at most, 15 hectares, to the so-called 
 metayers, who did not pay a fixed rent, but generally half 
 the gross jjroduce, and received from the owner, in return, 
 their first seed corn, their cattle and agricultural implements. ' 
 This system yielded a wretched existence for the tenants 
 themselves, and reduced the estates to a miserable condition, 
 but it brought the owners a large though uncertain income. 
 The latter, who only saw their estates as travellers, were 
 accustomed to farm out the collection of their dues, generally 
 to a notary or an advocate, who treated the peasants with 
 merciless severity. 
 
 The peasants, in their turn, neglected the cultivation of 
 corn — of which they had to give up a moiety — for any chance 
 occupation, the whole profit of which fell to themselves; 
 they used their oxen rather for purposes of transport than 
 for ploughing, fattened their geese in their own wheat fields, 
 and, above all, introduced the system of alternating crop and 
 fallow, in order to get a greater extent of pasture, and con- 
 sequently a larger number of cattle. This was a jDersonal gain to 
 themselves, but evidently brought no advantage to the estate. 
 A system of tillage, in short, prevailed without industry, without 
 science, and above all, without capital. It has been cal- 
 culated that the average amount of capital employed at that 
 period in the French metairies, was from 40 to 60 francs to 
 the hectare; while in England, at the same time, the average 
 amounted to 240 francs.^ The result was, of course, a wretched 
 one; they only reckoned upon a crop of from 7 to 8 hecto- 
 litres of wheat to the hectare — the increase being from five 
 to sixfold; while the English farmer of that time obtained a 
 twelvefold increase. It was impossible for the peasant under 
 
 ' Quesnay in Daire, Physiocrates, 11.249. The elder Mirabeau reckons, 
 
 p. 219 et seq. — Young's Travels, for the whole of France, 66 francs 
 
 II. 190. — LuUin de Chateauvieux to the arpent. 
 in Mounier, I. 270. — ^ Arthur Yonng, 
 
26 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 such circumstances to gain a livelihood; the produce of 10 
 hectares was scarcely sufficient to support his family, and 
 sale and profit were out of the question. The man who is 
 thus condemned to pass his life in starvation, soon learns to 
 fold his hands in idleness. A constantly increasing extent 
 of country lay uncultivated, which Quesnay, in 1750, es- 
 timated at a quarter of the arable land of France, and 
 Arthur Young, in 1790, at more than 9 million hectares. 
 Millions of rural dwellings had no aperture in them but the 
 door, or at most one window;^ the people had no clothing 
 but a home-made, coarse, and yet not thick, woollen cloth; 
 in many provinces every one went bare-foot, and in others 
 only wooden shoes were known. The food of the people 
 was gruel with a little lard ; in the evening a piece of bread, 
 and on great occasions a little bacon; but, besides this, no 
 meat for months together, and in many districts no wine at 
 all. 2 The mental condition of the people was in accordance 
 with their external circumstances. Books and newspapers 
 were as little known in the villages as reading and writing. 
 The peasants dejocndcd for their instruction on the pastors 
 and parish clerks, proletaries like themselves, who very sel- 
 dom got beyond the horizon of the church steeple. The 
 Church was, after all, the only institution which threw an 
 intellectual spark into their wretched life; but unfortunately 
 their religious impulses were strongly mixed with barbarism 
 and superstition. In many large districts of the South, the 
 peasants had no other idea of a protestaut, than as of a 
 dangerous magician, who ought to be knocked on the head. 
 Their own faith, moreover, was interwoven with a multitude 
 of the strangest images of old Cehic heathenism. Of the 
 world outside they heard nothing, for there was next to no 
 traffic or travelling in the country, There were some royal 
 roads, magnificently made, and sixty feet in breadth— splen- 
 did monuments of monarchical ostentation. On these, however, 
 
 ' This is still the case. — ' Reports of the Prefects to the Ministry, 1803. 
 
Ch. I.] THE PEASANT AND HIS LOED. 27 
 
 lip to 1776, only two small coaches ran, ' throughout the 
 whole of France; and the traveller miglit pass whole clays 
 without gettmg sight of any other vehicle. "■' Only a few vi- 
 lages, in the most favoured provinces, possessed cross-roads to 
 these great highways, or to the nearest market town. And 
 thus the whole existence of these people was passed in toil 
 and privation; without any pleasures, except the sight of 
 the gaudy decorations of a few church festivals ; without any 
 change, save when hunger drove an individual, here and 
 there, to seek day-labour in the towns, or into military 
 service. It was seldom that such a one ever returned to his 
 father's house, so that his fellow-villagers gained no advantage 
 from his wider experience. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the relation between peasant 
 and lord was naturally a deplorable one. What we have 
 already said, sufficiently characterises a conmiunity, in which 
 all the enjoyments fell to the rich, and all the burdens were 
 heaped upon the poor. In aristocratic England at this period, 
 a quarter of the gross proceeds was considered a high rent 
 for a farm, and the owner, moreover, paid large tithes and 
 poor-rates. * In France, half the proceeds was the usual 
 rent; and the owners were exempted by their privileges from 
 many public burdens, which fell with double weight upon 
 the wretched metayers. Thus, the produce of the French 
 land, as compared with the English, was as 9 to 14, while 
 the rents of an English landowner were at the rate of 2'/^ 
 per cent., and those of the French land owner 3^4 per cent.* 
 
 The deficiency in the product of the land, therefore, affected 
 the gains of the little farmer doubly. In addition to this, 
 he was burdened by a number of feudal services, by forced 
 labour on the lands of his lord, by tithes to the church, and 
 by the obligation to make roads for the state. The land- 
 lord who tried to sell his rent in kind as dearly as possible. 
 
 ' E. Daire, Introduction aux Qiuvres de Turgot. — '' Younc/s TravcU. — 
 ' Yvernois, Tableau des Pertes, Sfc. — * Young. 
 
28 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 wished for high prices of corn; the peasant, -who, after paying 
 his dues, did not raise enongh for his own family, longed, 
 like the city proletary, for low prices. In short, these two 
 classes, so intimately connected with one another, had nothing 
 at all in common; in education, in interests and enjoyments, 
 they were as widely separated as the inhabitants of different 
 cpiarters of the globe, and regarded each other respectively with 
 contempt and hatred. "SA'hen the peasant looked upon the towers 
 of his lord's castle, the dearest wish of his heart was to bnrn 
 it down, with all its registers of debt. Here and there a 
 better state of things existed; but we can only bring for- 
 ward two exceptions to the melancholy rule, extending over 
 large tracts of country. In Anjou, the system of metairie 
 prevailed as in Lower Bretagne and Guienne; and yet in the 
 former province, the peasants were jirosperous, and the noble- 
 "^men beloved. Lower Poitou was the only province from 
 which the nobles had not allowed themselves to be enticed 
 into the whirlpool of court life. The nobleman dwelt in his 
 own castle, the real lord of his domains, the cultivator of 
 his fields, the guardian of his peasants. He advanced them 
 money to purchase necessary stock, and instructed them in 
 the management of their cattle; ^ the expulsion of a tenant 
 was a thing unheard of; the labourer was born on the estate, 
 and the landlord was the godfather of all his farmer's children. 
 He was often seen going to market with his peasants, to 
 sell their oxen for them as advantageously as possible. His 
 mental horizon, however, did not extend beyond these hon- 
 ourable cares; he honoured God and the King, laboured in 
 his own fields, was a good sportsman and toper, and knew 
 as little of the world and its civilization as his tenants. 
 
 In the North of the kingdom a more modern state of 
 things had grown up. There, wealthy farmers were to be 
 seen, who held their land on lease at a fixed money rental— 
 which was settled according to the amount of the taxes to 
 
 Sauvegrain, CunsiJaatiuiis sur la Population, lJ-c. Paris 1806. 
 
Ch. 1.] THE SMALL LANDED PROPRIETORS. 29 
 
 which they were liable— and who brought both skill and capital 
 to the management of their land. This was the regnlar prac- 
 tice in Flanders, Artois, Picardy, Normandy, the Isle of^ 
 France, and other smaller districts. In these parts the land- 
 lords had a certain revenue, and their land yielded twice as 
 mnch as that which was in the hands of the metayers. The 
 whole country wore the appearance of a garden, and the 
 poorer neighbours found lucrative employment at the stately 
 farmhouses. These were the same provinces in which Arthur 
 Young met with small proprietors in a tolerable condition. 
 If a peasant in this part of the country possessed a small 
 strip of land near his cottage, large enough to grow some 
 vegetables, food for a goat, or a few vines, he earned suf- 
 ficient to supply the rest of his wants, in day wages 
 from the farmers, or, as a weaver, from the neighbouring 
 manufacturers. 
 
 His was a condition similar to the normal one of the 
 peasant ^proprietors in France at the present day ; who are 
 not reduced farmers, but labourers who have invested their 
 savings in land. ' It was more difficult for these people to 
 make a livelihood at that time than now, because there were 
 fewer manufacturers and wealthy agriculturists. Excef)t in 
 the above-mentioned provinces, these petty proprietors were 
 ecfually wretched and hopeless Avith the metayers, by whom 
 they were surrounded; their only object was to rent a 
 metairie in addition to their own pittance of land. They 
 were in fact entirely lost sight of among the metayers, and 
 this is the reason that French writers, in their descriptions of 
 the so-called petite culture (plot farming), never make any 
 special mention of them, but always confound them with the 
 more numerous class by which they were surrounded. All 
 authorities are agreed in estimating the amount of land culti- 
 vated in small parcels, at 27 million lieetares, while only 
 9 millions were held at a money rent. The former, there- 
 
 1 Rossi 1. c. 
 
30 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book T. 
 
 fore, was nearly equally divided between the small owners, 
 and the metayers, who paid their rent in kind. 
 
 In France, at the present day, nearly 23 million hectares 
 are cultivated by small proprietors and metayers; about 
 8 millions > (the same as in 1780) by tenants paying a money 
 rent, and rather more than 'd% millions, by wealthy land- 
 lords. * Hence we can clearly see what the Revolution has 
 done for French agriculture. Not only did it create the 
 middle class of landowners, but greatly promoted a more 
 rational system of tillage. About 4 million hectares have 
 been rescued from the ])etite enlturc, and an ecjual number 
 redeemed from utter barrenness. The breadth of land stand- 
 ing at a money rent is exactly the same as before the 
 Revolution. The increase is entirely in the properties of 
 rich or substantial landowners, who manage their own es- 
 tates, — which indicates a change to more zealous industry, 
 coupled with the employment of greater capital. The extent 
 occupied by the metayers is still very great, and the con- 
 dition of those who are subject to it but little improved, 
 notwithstanding the abolition of socage and seigniorial rights. 
 It will be one of our most important tasks, to examine the 
 several events and tendencies of the Revolution, in relation 
 to their effects on the rural population. 
 
 If we turn our attention to the towns of ancient France, 
 we find that sinuilar causes produced effects corresponding 
 to those we have just described. The civic offices, to which 
 persons had formerly been elected by the districts, or the 
 guilds, had been frequently filled njj by the crown in the 
 17th century; and in the 18th, the great majority of them 
 were sold in hereditary possession to fill the exchec^uer. ^ 
 The government of the towns, therefore, was in the hands of 
 a close corporation consisting of a few families, who, generally 
 
 ' Qiiesnai, Tiirgot, Young. — ' On ferent, but the general result is tlie 
 
 this point Liillinile Chateanvieux and same. — ^ Depping, Correspondence 
 
 Cochut are in the main agreed, administrative de Louis XIV. Vol. 
 
 Lavergne's figuresare somewhat dif- II., Introduction. 
 
Ch. I.] THE MANIA FOR STOCKJOBBING. 31 
 
 speaking, allowed themselves to be infected with the indolent 
 and self-seeking spirit of the central government. Associated 
 with these were the fiimilies of the monied aristocracy, the 
 members of the great financial companies, the farmers of the 
 indirect, and the collectors of the direct, taxes, the share- 
 holders of the trading monopolies, and the great bankers. These 
 circles, too, were either legally or virtually closed to the general 
 world. The bourse was ruled by an aristocracy, to which 
 only birth, or the permission of government, could give ac- 
 cess. Their activity was of course necessarily centred in 
 Paris. Indeed, they stamped their own character on this 
 city, to a degree which would be imjDossible in our age, noto- 
 rious though it be as the epoch of the rule of paper. Every 
 one knows to what a dizzy and ruinous height stock-jobbing 
 was carried by I41W, in the beginning of the century; and 
 from that time forward, its operations were never suspended, 
 and all who had wealth or credit engaged in it with reckless 
 greediness. King, nobles, ministers, clergy^ and parliaments, 
 one and all took part in these transactions; and the chronic 
 deficit, and increasing debts, of the treasury afforded constant 
 opportunities of involving the state, and making a jjrofit out 
 of its embarrassments. We may confidently assert that, as 
 compared with the present day, the speculative swindling of 
 that age was as prevalent and as shameless as its immorality. 
 Paris was not at that time a manufacturing town, and its 
 wholesale "trade was insignificant; with few exceptions, there- 
 fore, the industry of the city consisted in retail trade and 
 the negotiation of bills of exchange. It is not the least 
 characteristic feature of the indolent and selfish licentious- 
 ness, into which the higher classes of the great nation had 
 fallen, that of all securities, life annuities were most in favour; 
 by means of which the purchaser procured high interest for 
 himself, while he robbed his children of the capital. 
 
 The trade and commerce of the whole empire was fettered 
 by the restrictions of guilds and corporations. The principles 
 on which they were conducted dated from Henry III., who 
 
32 FEANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 was the first to promulgate the proposition, that the King 
 alone can grant the right to labour— a maxim which contains 
 the whole doctrine of the socialists from a monarchical 
 point of view. The masters of every handicraft managed 
 its internal affairs, allowed no one to jjractise it who 
 did not belong to their guild, and admitted no one to their 
 privileges, until lie had passed an examination of his quali- 
 fication before themselves. Originally many trades were free 
 from this organisation, until these too were injuriously af- 
 fected by the financial necessities of the state;. when the ex- 
 clusive rights of a guild were sold to the artizans, as their 
 offices were to the judges. The government soon further 
 proceeded to divide each trade into several guilds, and made 
 an exclusive corporation of the most insignificant occupation. 
 Thus the workers in ebony were distinguished from the 
 carpenters, the sellers of old clothes from the tailors, and 
 the pastrycooks from the bakers. The fruit-women and 
 flower-girls formed separate exclusive associations, regulated 
 by formal and binding statutes. In the guilds of the seam- 
 stresses, embroiderers, and dressmakers, only men were ad- 
 mitted to the privileges- of masters. A number of these sta- 
 tutes, by imposing excessive fees and duties, rendered it doubly 
 difficult for an apprentice, however capable, to obtain the 
 rank of master. Other enactments only admitted the sons 
 of masters, or the second husbands of the widows of masters, 
 to the privileges of the guild. In short, the power of the 
 state was abused in the most glaring manner for the fur- 
 therance of exclusive class interests. Those who did not 
 belong to this aristocracy of trade, could only support them- 
 selves by the labour of their hands, in a state of eternal 
 servitude. Despair and famine drove the peasants from the 
 country into the towns, wliere they found no employment 
 open to them but that of day-labourers. The important in- 
 fluence which this system exercised over the state was 
 clearly understood, both by the privileged and the excluded 
 classes. When Turgot abolished the guilds in 1776, the 
 
Ch. I.] COLBERT'S COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS. 33 
 
 parliament of Paris, the princes, peers and doctors, unan- 
 imously declared that all Frenchmen were divided into close 
 corporations, the links of a mighty chain, extending from 
 the throne to the meanest handicraft; and that this concate- 
 nation was indispensable to the existence of the state, and 
 of social order. It was not long before the guilds were 
 reestablished in accordance with this declaration; we shall 
 see how the journeymen and apprentices replied to this unc- 
 tuous manifesto some fifteen years later. 
 
 The great manufacturing interests of the country were 
 confined by the same narrow restrictions. Since the time of 
 Colbert, who was the real creator of them, manufactures had 
 been the darling child of the government ; and, as is usually 
 the case with darling children, had been petted and tyran- 
 nized over at the same time. When Colbert began his opera- 
 tions, France produced neither the finer kinds of cloth, nor 
 stockings — neither silks nor glass — neither tar nor soap. The 
 previously existing handicraft — which had been for a century 
 in the fetters of the guilds — had done so little to develop^ the 
 native manufacturing talent of the country, that the minister 
 was obliged to introduce German, Swedish and Italian 
 Avorkmen. To secure a sale in foreign countries, he pre- 
 scribed with orreat exactness the sort of fabric which he 
 wished to be produced; and to prevent competition from 
 without, he enacted a munber of prohibitory and protective 
 duties. Here again, the power of the state intruded itself 
 into the sphere of private business, to the advantage of the 
 manufacturer and the injury of the consumer. The same' 
 system was continued by his successors with still worse 
 effects, because it was carried out with all the fickleness and 
 irregularity of Louis XV.'s government. It is true that ma- 
 nufactures made great progress, and increased their annual 
 products six-fold, from the time of Colbert to that of Necker. ' 
 
 This was the proportion in the woollen manufacture. 
 
 C 
 
34 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 But the statutes became more oppressive every year; every 
 new invention and improvement was excluded by them ; and 
 ■ after 1760, no legisLation could keep pace with the progress 
 of machinery. Manufactures, therefore, as is everywhere 
 the case under such circumstances, no longer adapted them- 
 selves to the natural wants and capacities of men, but im- 
 mediately took an artificial and aristocratic direction. During 
 Colbert's ministry, while only 60,400 hands were employed iu 
 the manufacture of wool, no less than 17,300 were engaged 
 in lacemakiug; and a hundred years later, while the 
 manufacture of soap only produced 18 million francs a year, 
 that of hair-powder was estimated at not less than 24 millions. 
 The contrast between the aristocratic luxury of the rich, 
 and the uncleanly indigence of the populace, can hardly be 
 more glaringly displayed. 
 
 Agriculture experienced in every way the disadvantages of 
 a, system, which crippled communication with foreign coun- 
 tries, raised the price of farming implements, and in- 
 juriously aftected the home trade. In their eagerness to 
 protect manufactures, the government had learned to look 
 on the interests of agriculture as of secondary importance. 
 They accustomed themselves, like the modern socialists, to 
 apply the word people exclusively to the manufacturing 
 classes in the towns ; and though they sacrificed the interests 
 of the latter in a thousand Mays to the privileged mono-, 
 polists, yet philanthropy, and love of quiet, cooperated in in- 
 ducing them to supply the necessities of the poorer artizans, 
 at the cost of the agricultural population. As supplements 
 , to the protective and prohibitory duties in favour of manu- 
 ' factures, decrees were issued forbidding the exportation of corn 
 and other raw agricultural products. By these artifices the price 
 of the hcctolHrc of wheat, which on the average is at present 
 19 to 20 francs, was in 1764 forced down to less than 8 francs. ' 
 Choiseul then opened the trade, and the ijrice rose to more 
 
 ' Melier, in lOtli Vol. of tlie Meiiwires de I'Academie royuh cle Mechciiie. 
 
Ch. I.] THE WEALTH OV FRANCK. 35 
 
 than 15 francs. A similar result folloAved the same measure 
 in 1775, during the ministry ofTurgot; but a return to pro- 
 tection reduced the price once more to 12y^ francs, until the 
 Revolution. The city artizans had tolerably cheap bread, 
 but nowhere in the kingdom were the farmers prosperous. 
 In spite of the most violent complaints from all the pro- 
 vinces, the cause of the evil, and consequently the evil itself, 
 remained unchanged. The government adhered to the con- 
 viction that it was their immediate duty to provide for the 
 maintenance of the population of the towns. It seemed to 
 them a matter of course, that the state should use its po- 
 litical power for the advantage of its rulers and their fa- 
 vourites. No one considered the remoter consequences of 
 such a principle; no one asked the question: — "What if 
 this power shoidd fall into democratic hands?" 
 
 Let us endeavour to obtain a general view of the wealth 
 of France at this period. From the imperfection of official 
 information, the task is a difficult one, and its results uncer- 
 tain. Even an approximation to the truth, however, will not 
 be without interest, since, in order not to bring forward un- 
 meaning figures, we shall constantly institute a comparison 
 with the now existing state of things. 
 
 The well-informed Tolosan — the only authority on this 
 subject — estimates the total produce of manufactures at 931 
 million iraucs; that of handicraft at GO millions.'' At the 
 present day* the manufactures of Eastern France alone, — 
 not reckoning handicraft — produce 2282 millions; the sum, 
 total therefore has been at least C[uadrupled. At the former 
 period it amounted to 39 francs per head of the whole po- 
 pulation ; at present we might unhesitatingly place it at more 
 than 100 per head. The emancipation of the internal trade 
 since 1789 has not only raised the amount of property pro- 
 duced, but — what has so often been called in question— has 
 
 ' In 1853. In 18G0 a total of 5 niillLirds was reached. Boitean, Jitat de 
 la France en 17S9, pr, aOC. 
 
 C2 
 
36 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 favorably influenced the manner in which it is distributed. 
 The dail}' wages of the manufacturing labourers in 1788, 
 according to a rather high estimate, were for men 26 sous, 
 V and for women 15.^ They are now, according to the most 
 numerous and trustworthy observation, 42 sous for men, and 
 2(5 for women. The daily wages of the agricultural labourers, 
 too, can certainly not be reckoned at more than 1 5 sous ' for 
 the year 1789, or at less than 25* in the present day. If we 
 fui'ther take into account the very considerable increase in 
 the number of working-days — arising from the abolition of 30 
 holidays, — we shall find the annual wages of the earlier period, 
 to be little more than half what they now are, viz. 351 francs 
 for the manufacturing, and 157 for the agricultural labourer, 
 against 630 and 300 at the present day. To appreciate the 
 significance of these results, we must compare the prices of 
 provisions at these two periods. It appears then, that before 
 1789, bread was considered very cheap at 3 sous per pound, 
 and it was only in Paris that this rate was a common one; 
 in the provinces, the price was generally higher. In our 
 own times, the average price for the whole of France from 
 1820 to 1840, was 17 centimes, while at Paris, in 1851, it 
 was 14 cents, — less therefore than, the old rate of 3 sous. 
 This seems out of proportion to the i^rice of corn ; since the 
 hecfoliire of wheat in 1780 cost from 12 — 13 francs, and in 1840 
 from 19 — 20. This apparent incongruity, however, is accounted 
 for by the improvement in the method of grinding and 
 baking, by which a third, or even a half, more weight of 
 bread is now obtained from the same quantity of corn, than 
 in the former period, i We find therefore that the labourer 
 received for his wages little more than half the quantity of 
 bread, which the modern workman can obtain for what he 
 
 ' Young. AssemWe National, loth ^ Before 1789 the Septier (240 pounds) 
 
 Jan. 1790, 11th Aug. 1791. — of Nvheat yielded only 180 pounds of 
 
 ^ Boiteaii thinks 19 to 20 sous. — bread: Moiiitem; 12 July 1792, sup- 
 
 ' Lavergne says SO sous, p. 07. — plement. 
 
Ch. I.] THE WEALTH OF FRANCE. 
 
 37 
 
 earns. The same proportion holds good in other kinds of 
 food, and in regard to clothing the comparison is still more 
 unfavourable to the ante-revolutionary period. 
 
 We shall discover the determinate cause of these differences, 
 when we come to consider the main wealth of the French 
 empire— the produce of the soil in the widest sense of the 
 word. It would carry us too far, if we were to examine 
 every branch of the subject, and discuss all the difficulties 
 connected with it; it will be sufficient to dwell on a few of 
 the principal points of interest. Of wheat, the great staff of 
 life, the soil of France produced, before the Eevolution, 
 about 40 million hectolitres — or 167 litres per head of the 
 population — and in 1840, 70 millions — or 208 litres per head. 
 At the former period the number of cattle was calculated at 
 33 million head; and at the present day at 49 millions; and 
 there is an equal increase in the number of the other do- 
 mestic animals. The vineyards formerly yielded 27 million 
 hectolitres, and at present 37 millions ; so that the proportion, 
 per head, is at any rate not lower than it was. ' And if we 
 take into consideration that a number of useful agricultural 
 products were at that time unknown, that a violent contro- 
 versy was carried on about the wholesomeness of potatoes, 
 that the forests were allowed to run to waste far more than 
 at the present day, ^ we shall not be astonished that the best 
 statist of modern France estimates the vegetable produce of 
 the French soil, (which now exceeds in value the sum of 
 6,000 millions), at not more than 2,000 millions at the period '' 
 before the Revolution. ' The importance of this fact is suffi- 
 
 1 Mbreau de Yonnes, from con- Agriculure, 366. — ' The calculation, 
 
 temporary sources. I have followed of Yonng agrees with this. Tolosan 
 
 him because space does not allow Dedeley d'Agier, Lavoisier, make the 
 
 me to give my reasons for thinking amounts higher. (Boiteau, Etat de 
 
 a much more unfavourable state of la France en 1789, p. 481, compares 
 
 things in 1770 highly probable. — their statements). But the uncertainty 
 
 2 Memoire remis aux Notables, 1781. of their calculations is very per- 
 
 Young's Travels, IH. 111. Moreau, ceptible. 
 
38 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [BooiO- 
 
 ciently evident; and ^ye may gain an idea of the state of the 
 population before 1789, by remembering, that even now the 
 total consumption of food in France is not greater in pro- 
 portion to the population than in Prussia, and much less 
 than in England. ' 
 
 Respecting commerce, — the third great branch of national 
 wealth — I have but little to say. I am not aware that any 
 statistical data exist of the internal traffic of France before 
 the Revolution; it was, no doubt, smaller than at the present 
 day, in consequence of the multitude of inland duties. And 
 with regard to the foreign commerce of the earlier period, 
 we have no means of dividing the sum totals which lie be- 
 fore us, into the value of the raw materials, and the cost of 
 manufacture, on the one hand, and the clear profits of trade, 
 on the other. It must suffice us to o-ain a general idea of 
 the relation between the two periods, from the summary 
 statement, that in the custom-house registers, immediately 
 before the Revolution, the annual imports are stated at 576 
 millions, and the exports at 540 millions; while as early as 
 1836, the former amounted to 905 millions, and the latter to 
 961 miUions; and in 1857, both imports and exports had 
 risen to a value of more than 1800 millions. Taking all in 
 all, therefore, France under the old monarchy was four times 
 as poor in manufactures, three times as poor in agriculture, 
 and more than three times as poor in commerce, as it 
 is in the present day. AVe must bear this result well in 
 mind when we try to form a judgment respecting the finances 
 / of the anc'ioi regime. A budget of 600 millions weio-hed 
 as heavily upon the resources of the country at that period, 
 as a budget of 1800 millions would now; and, consequently, 
 a deficit of 100 millions was ecjuivalent to one of 300 
 millions in our own times. Such a deficit actually existed 
 when Louis XVI. mounted the throne; it is therefore easy 
 to conceive that his attention should be strongly turned to 
 
 > Communications from the Prussian Statistical Bureaus, 1851. 
 
QE- I] ACCESSION OP LOUIS XVI. 
 
 39 
 
 the restoration of the bahince between income and expend- 
 iture, and that his vain endeavours in this directions hould 
 shake tlie fabric of tlie state to its very foundation. 
 
 A Avhole vohime would be necessary to detail the different 
 schemes of reform, which were brought forward between the 
 accession of Louis XVI., and the outbreali of the Kevo- 
 lution. It will be sufficient for our purpose to notice the 
 chief points, which have an important bearing on the ante- 
 cedents, and the actual events of that mighty movement. 
 
 Louis the XVI. himself— as no one can doubt who has 
 approached the sources of the history of this period -entered 
 on the task of government with a heart fnll of piety, philan- 
 thropy and public spirit. He was earnest, and pure- 
 minded, penetrated by a sense of his own dignity and the 
 responsibilities attached to it; and firmly resolved to close 
 for ever the infamous paths in which his predecessor had 
 walked. 
 
 But, unhappily, his capacity bore no proj^ortion to his good 
 will. He was incapable of forming a decision; his education 
 was deficient; he was awkward both in person and speech, 
 and slow of comprehension. As he had a very limited 
 knowledge both of the people, and the condition, of. his 
 empire, the selection of his ministers was, from the very 
 outset determined by accident — the influence of his aunts, 
 his queen, or the contending court factions ; and as he was 
 immovable wherever morality was concerned, but utterly 
 helpless in the practical execution of his ideas, his was 
 just a case, in which almost every thing depended on 
 the aid of his nearest advisers. He possessed just sufficient 
 sense of justice and benevolence to encourage every eflfort 
 for useful reforms; but lacked entirely that firmness of an 
 enlightened judgment, which knows how to bring about a 
 positive result, in spite of the opposition of existing interests. 
 The inevitable consequences soon showed themselves. Anarchy, 
 which under Louis XV. had reigned in the minds of men, 
 now broke forth into overt acts. The sufferings of the 
 
40 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 people, whioli individuals had hitherto borne in silent apathy, 
 now occupied the attention of the masses. 
 
 That same chance which in his reign directed the man- 
 agement of public business, had given him, as his first 
 minister Turgot, the greatest reformer of the day. 
 
 This great minister's strokes fell heavily on the existing 
 system in every direction. Among his measures we find 
 free trade in corn— abolition of the corvee in the country 
 districts — liberation of tradefrom the trammels of the guilds — 
 the erection of the caisse d'escotnpte^ — a number of im- 
 provements and alleviations in the mode of raising the 
 public taxes — and a prospect held out to all possessors of 
 property, of a gradual increasing share in political rights; 
 and it is under these heads that the restless activity of this 
 liberal statesman may be best arranged. We may easily 
 conceive that there was scarcely one of the jjrivileged classes, 
 which did not consider its previous existence imperilled. 
 
 Opposition arose in every quarter; the courtiers, the par- 
 liaments, the landed aristocracy, and the members of the 
 guilds — all threw themselves into an attitude of defence, with 
 noisy zeal. The contest penetrated into the royal family 
 itself: Louis's younger brother. Count Charles of Artois, 
 abused the minister, who, he said, was undermining the 
 aristocracy, the prop and rampart of the throne; and a 
 cousin of the King, the rich and abandoned Philip, Duke, 
 of Orleans, began, amid the general excitement, to play the 
 demagogue on his own accovuit. Then, for the first time, a 
 spectacle was seen in Paris, which was subsequently repeated 
 in ever darker colours — the spectacle of the police author- 
 ities of the capital, stirring up the mob against the crown, 
 and, on this occasion, in the interest of the privileged 
 classes. 
 
 At first Louis XVI. declared, that he and Turcot were 
 
 ' An institution for lending money for tlie furtherance of manufactures 
 and commerce. 
 
Cii. I.] WAR DECLARED AGAINST ENGLAND. 41 
 
 the only friends of the people, and stood firm against the 
 the parliament of Paris and the street rioters: but he was 
 not proof against the feebleness of his own character, and 
 the wearing influence of those by whom he was daily 
 surrounded. After an administration of nearly a year and 
 a half, Turgot was obliged to yield to the reaction of the 
 amien regime, and almost all his creations collapsed at once. 
 Then followed a long period of experiments and palliatives; 
 the successors of Turgot would gladly have gone on in the 
 broad track of traditional privileges, if their increasing finan- 
 cial difficulties had left them any peace. It was just at this 
 time, that Louis resolved to support the North Americans 
 against England, which he really did against his own will 
 and the views of his ministers, who dreaded the expense of 
 a great war, and clearly saw that the emancipation of the 
 colonies would not weaken England.^ But the undefined 
 longing for freedom, and the liberal political doctrines 
 which had taken root far and wide in the land, prevailed 
 over the scruples of the King and his counsellors. The 
 Marquis of Lafayette, then a tall light-haired youth, full 
 of vanity and ambition, who, on account of his ungraceful 
 manners, had no success at court, fitted out a ship at his 
 own expense, and sailed across the Atlantic. A number of 
 influential persons cried out for vengeance upon England i 
 for the humiliation sustained in the Seven years' war; in a ^ 
 word, the warlike party carried their point, and war was 
 declared against England. The consequence to France was 
 a rapid spread of democratic sentiments on the American 
 pattern. The followers of Rousseau were triumphant; here, ' 
 they said, might be seen the possibility of a democracy on 
 a broad basis — the construction of a state, on the foundation 
 of the natural rights of man. Another consequence of the 
 war was to throw fresh burdens on the public exchequer. 
 The minister of finance at this time was Necker, a native 
 of Geneva. Having come to Paris as a poor clerk, he had 
 risen by his talents, and skill in business, to the position 
 
42 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 of a rich banker; and with great self-complacency, had 
 made his house the rcndcz-vous of the more distinguished 
 members of the liberal party. By his influence Avith the 
 bourse he procured a certain degree of credit for the State; 
 and raised loan after loan to the amount of 500 millions, 
 without any increase of the taxes, or any provision for a 
 licpiidation of the debt incurred. This was evidently sacrificing 
 the future to the present, since the deficit became larger 
 every year, as the interest of the pvdjlic debt increased. 
 Necker had the real merit of bringing some of the depart- 
 ments of finance into better order; he enjoyed, for the time 
 being, unbounded popularity, and basked with delight in the 
 universal acknowledgment, that he was the greatest states- 
 man in Europe. Public confidence was freely given to a 
 minister, who endeavoured to found his administration on 
 credit alone — i. e. on the confidence of mankind. He was 
 looked on as a perfect hero, when he introduced, with good 
 results, provincial assemblies into Berry and Guyenne; and 
 soon afterwards — breaking through all the traditions of the 
 ancient monarchy- — published a detailed, but unfortunately 
 very inexact, and highly coloured report, on the state of the 
 finances. But as he nowhere laid the axe to the root of the 
 evil, he only roused a ninuber of powerful interests by his 
 attempts at innovation, but was utterly unable to close the 
 source of financial confusion. lie, too, soon saw no other 
 means of recovery but limitation of the budget and economy 
 in the expenses of the coi^rt; by avowing which, he 
 made himself hateful to all the grandees of the antechamber, 
 and was deprived of his office in May 1781. After two in- 
 significant and inexperienced ministers had exhausted their 
 strength in the years inunediately following, the intendant 
 of Lille, the gifted but frivolous Calonne, 'was called to the 
 helm. He began with the proposition, that whoever wished for 
 credit must cultivate luxury; and he renewed the prodigality 
 of the court, in the style of Louis XV. After matters had 
 gone on in this jubilant course for some years, and the 
 
<""• I] THE XATIONAL INCOME. 
 
 43 
 
 public debt had been increased by 400 millions, and the 
 taxation by '21 millions, the ruin of the country became 
 palpable at the beginning of the year 1787, and the catas- 
 trophe inevitable. 
 
 Let us here cast a glance at the budget of the anckn 
 riijimc, the disorder of which was to give the signal of con- 
 vulsion to every quarter of the civilised world. After 
 Necker and Calonne, the Notables, and the Kevolution, have 
 quarrelled about its contents with equal mendacity, this 
 budget now lies, in its most secret details, before the eyes 
 of the historical inquirer. ^ 
 
 And first, with regard to the national income, which, as 
 is well known, amounted to about 500 millions before 1789, 
 nearly 800 under Napoleon, and then increased, during the 
 period between 1815 and 1848, to 1500 million francs. 
 However definite these figures may appear, we can by itd 
 means draw a conclusion from them, as to the cheapness of 
 the respective modes of government above mentioned. We 
 have already observed, that in proportion to the national 
 wealth, a taxation of 500 millions before 1789, would be about 
 equivalent to one of 1500 millions at the present day. In 
 the next place we must make several additions to the round 
 sum of 500 millions. 
 
 The income of the state in the year 1785 was calculated 
 at 558 millions, to which were added 41 millions more, for 
 the local administration of the provinces; a sum which was 
 never paid into the treasury, but immediately expended in 
 the difierent places where it was raised. Thus we find that the 
 nation was bearing an annual burden of from 599 to 600 millions. 
 At the same time the Church, whose expenses now figure 
 in the budget of the state, raised 133 millions in tithes, 
 and 16 millions in other dues and offerings.'^ The fees, 
 which served as a complement to the judicial salaries, 
 
 1 Bailly, Hist, finatic. de la France, II. 278. — ^ Louis Blanc, B. III. <:. 3, 
 estimates them, according to otlier authorities, not at 16 but at 30 millions. 
 
 / 
 
44 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 amounted to 29 millions ;i the seigniors raised abovit 2% 
 millions in tolls of various kinds, and at least 37 millions 
 in stamp duties."-^ I pass over the feudal rents and services, 
 the valuation of which is quite impossible. These, from 
 their very nature, cannot be taken into account in speaking 
 of the public burdens, and may very well be set off against 
 the mortgage debts of the modern peasant-proprietors. 
 
 The items already mentioned, however, in addition to some 
 of a similar character, amounted to 280 millions; so that the 
 French people had, at that period, to bear a total annual taxation 
 of 880 millious. If we compare this sum with the national wealth, 
 we may unhesitatingly set it down as equivalent to an amount 
 of 2,400 millions at the present day; it follows, therefore, that 
 from the time of Louis XY. to that of Napoleon III. there 
 existed but one government in France, which appropriated 
 t« itself a still larger proportion of the public income, than 
 the uiicien reyimc, — and that one was the government of 
 the Jacobins during the Reign of Terror. The Empire, the 
 Restoration, and Louis Philippe, contented themselves with 
 far smaller sums ; here too, Kudalism finds its counterpart 
 among the socialists. 
 
 When we inquire into thedistribution of these taxes amongthe 
 different classes of the people, we discover a glaring inequality. 
 The higher ranks were not, indeed, exempt from taxation, 
 but they were in many respects favoured. Of the taxes on 
 consumption — which were valued at 308 millions — they bore, 
 of course, a full share; but of the land and capitation 
 taxes, (171 millions) they ought, as was discovered during 
 the revolution, to have paid, on a fair distribution, 33 millions 
 more than they actually did. In the next place, the main- 
 tenance of the public roads, which were entirely kept up 
 by means of the corrcc, at a cost of 20 millions, — and, 
 
 ' According to other estimates, 42 millions. Boifean, Etat de la France 
 en 1781. Paris 1S61. — - For the sake of brevity I use this term to 
 denote all the fees paid on change of property, e.c/. loch, relods, quints, &o. 
 
Ch. I.] THE FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES. 45 
 
 further, the expenses of the provmcial miUtia, — about G'/^ 
 millions — rested entirely on the shoulders of the lower 
 classes. If we take into consideration the 40 millions quoted 
 above, which the seigniors received from the peasants — 
 the fact that the poorer classes of every town were respons- 
 ible for the taxes of their covtmune,—eyen when their rich 
 fellow-citizens escaped payment by the purchase of privileged 
 offices — and, lastly, the scandalous unfairness in the impo- 
 sition of the taxes on consumption, to which the helpless 
 multitude was subjected by their superiors — we shall easily 
 understand the triumphant fury, with which, in 1789, the 
 peasants, more especially, received the joyful intelligence of 
 the utter destruction of the system above described. 
 
 Great as was the proportion which it exacted of the 
 national income, the government found itself, nevertheless, 
 in a state of ever-increasing need and embarrassment. Dis- 
 order on the one side, and selfishness on the other, scattered 
 its treasures to the wind. The case was the same in the 
 financial administration, as in that of justice; no one had 
 ever tried to organise it on any grand principle of wise 
 adaptation to the end in view; on the contrary, a number 
 of isolated jurisdictions — distinguished from one another 
 according to provinces, or sources of income, or the des- 
 tination of the funds in C]uestion — existed side by side, inter- 
 fering with each other's operations, and destroying all respons- 
 ibility. The amount of arrears due to the treasury — equal 
 perhaps to half the annual budget — not even the Revolution 
 has been able to ascertain; and it could only get hold of 
 the profits of the farmers of the revenue by means of the 
 guillotine. When once familiarised with deficits, the gov- 
 ernment soon fell into the stream of floating debts. The 
 anticipation of the revenue of future years, at a usurious 
 discount paid to the collectors themselves— the putting off 
 the payment of debts which had fallen due— and the omission 
 of expenditure prescribed by law— were the cause of equally 
 enormous losses, when the day for liquidation at last arrived. 
 
4G FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 How widely this confusion spread, may be gathered from 
 the actual cash accounts of the year 1785. By the side of 
 the regular income of the treasury, of not quite SaT millions, 
 there is another account of 340 millions income, and 407 
 millions expenditure, consisting of items which belong either 
 to the earlier or later years of the period between 1781 and 
 1787; so that the sum-total amounts to nearly 850 millions. 
 ^Ye see what a field was opened to speculators and the 
 lovers of jjlnnder, and to what a state such proceedings had 
 reduced the prosperity of an empire, which a hundred years 
 earlier, and twenty years later, dictated its will to Europe 
 as a law. 
 
 The last feature in this state economy which reveals to 
 us its character, is the kind of expenditure in which these 
 treasures, collected with so much difficult}-, were employed. 
 The expenses of the court were stated in the official budget 
 at 33 or 35 millions, but they were in reality 40 millions, 
 which did not include the royal hunting exjjeditions and 
 journeys, the salaries of the great officers of the court, or 
 the maintenance of the royal palaces. The war office — the 
 cost of which Necker states at 99 millions and Calonne at 
 114 millions — received 131 millions, of which rather more 
 than 39 millions went to the administration, 44 millions for 
 the pay and commissariat of the troops, and 4G millions for 
 the salaries of the officers. 
 
 Entirely removed from all ministerial calculation were the 
 money orders of the King himself, "for presents, &c., to 
 courtiers, to the minister of finance and i"agistrates — repayment 
 of foreign loans — interest and-discount to the treasury officials 
 — remission of certain personal taxes, and unforseen expenses of 
 every kind." This class ofcxpenditure, which is well characterised 
 by the above heading, amounted in 1785 to 136 millions; in other 
 years, the sum was rather smaller; but we may MAy assume 
 that tiip annual average was more than 100 millions.! And 
 
 ' Wc> arrive at tliis result from the debates of the Assemblee Consll 
 tuante (in April 1790) on the pensions, the ordoiinaiices a complani, and 
 
Cu. I.] THE FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES. 47 
 
 whilst we thus see nothing but abundance and superfluity 
 among the highest chisses of societ)-, the bridges and roads 
 are only set down at 4 millions, — the public buildings at 
 scarcely 2 millions — and the scientific institutions at rather 
 more than 1 million; for which objects the budget of 
 1832, and the following years, granted 59 millions! The 
 hospitals and foundling institutions received 6 millions 
 from the state, 6 from the church, and had a revenue of 
 24 millions of their own; while the benevolent institutions 
 of modern France (1832) had an annual sum of 119 millions 
 at their disposal. In short, whatever portion of the financial 
 aftairs of this feudal state we investigate, we arrive at the 
 same result, and find the people separated into two great 
 classes, one of which was enriched at the cost of the other. 
 But as every such draining of the wealth of a nation 
 bears within itself the germs of ruin, by drying up, on the 
 one hand, the sources of income, and increasing, on the other, 
 the passion for extravagance, the government found itself 
 at the end of 1786 in the following condition. The regular 
 annual income was 357 iniUions. The annual expenditure, 
 according to the treasury accounts, amounted to 442 millions. 
 In addition to this there were 27 millions for pensions, and 
 72 millions of urgent arrears from former years; and lastly, 
 in the year 1787, there was a loss of 21 millions from the. 
 cessation of a tax, which had only been imposed for a period 
 ending with that year. The deficit therefore amounted to 
 198 millions. Up to this time the government had helped 
 itself by all the artifices, both bad and good, of a credit 
 strained to the very utmost— and now utterly exhausted. 
 An increase of the taxes was not to be thought of, on 
 account of the enormous burdens by which the nation was 
 already crushed. Under these circumstances Calonne, with 
 genial frivolity, recurred to the serious and noble plans of 
 Turgot. 
 
 the livre rouije. Lonis Blanc gives a number of details from these in B. 
 IV. chap. 5. 
 
48 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 He had hitherto lived on the favovir of the privileged classes; 
 he now endeavoured, by sacrificing them, to relieve the 
 commonwealth. He congratulated the state on having within 
 it so many great abuses, by the removal of which new sources 
 of prosperity might be opened! 
 
 The opposition which Turgot had met with was of course 
 directed, with redoubled fury, against Calonne. 
 
 A closely ..ciwvded throng of privileges rose tumultuously 
 agaiusthis plans. ~The' court nobility, the provincial estates, the 
 tax-collectors, the courts of law, the police officers, the council- 
 lors of the commune, and the heads of the guilds, took up the 
 contest against the will of the King and his ministers. But the 
 development of modern ideas had made such progress, that the 
 parties competed with one another for the power of public opinion. 
 The ministry itself emancipated the press, in order to ex- 
 pose the advocates of the old system to the national contempt. 
 The young nobles of the court, and in the provinces, armed 
 the mob of Paris, and the peasants of Auvergne, against the 
 ministers, and instigated them to violent excesses. An assem- 
 bly of aristocratic notables, to whom Calonne submitted his 
 schemes of reform, refused their assent, claimed the right of 
 inspecting and superintending every department of the public 
 service, and ended by declaring, that as they were nominees 
 of the King, and not representatives of the nation, they were 
 not competent to make new grants. Immediately after their 
 dismissal, the parliament of Paris — which, next to the min- 
 istry, was the highest authority in the state — brought forward 
 as a positive demand, what the notables had only negatively 
 suggested. In a formal decree they demanded that an 
 Assembly of the states-general should be called — an Assembly 
 which the monarchy had dispensed with for 200 years. 
 The ministry at first received this proposal- with great 
 disfavour ; but as the want of money grew more and more 
 urgent, the alluring hope arose in their minds of finding in 
 the States-general, Avhich was chiefly comjjosed of burghers, 
 a powerful support against the privileged classes. We shall 
 
C.I. I.] NECKER RESTORED TO OFFICE. 
 
 49 
 
 never understand the extrnordinnry success of tlie first 
 revolutionary inovenients, unless we beiir in mind what a large 
 share in the government of the country was possessed by 
 the higher orders and the corporations; and how they now '^ 
 mutually sought each other's destruction. 
 
 Calonne was not long able to make head against this noisy 
 opposition. The last of the many blows which caused his fall 
 was dealt by the Queen, whom he afterwards persecuted with 
 inextinguishable hatred. Ilis successor, Brienne, after a 
 violent contest with the parliaments, resigned his office, when 
 the convocation of the States-general had already been de- 
 termined on, and the national Ijankruptcy virtually proclaimed. 
 Louis had recourse to Necker again, who really relieved the 
 financial embarrassment for the moment, and, I'ccognizing 
 the necessity of a liberal policy, fixed the meeting of the 
 States-general for the •27th of April 1789. The ferment— 
 which, owing to the preceding disputes, had for the first time 
 since the religious wars penetrated the masses of the people 
 — increased from hour to hour. The agitation was principally 
 caused by the question, whether the States-general should 
 meet, as before, in three separate chambers, or form a single 
 Assembly, in which the tiers ctat should have a double luunber 
 of votes. On this point the hitherto allied opposition parties 
 difi'ered — the aristocrats advocating the separation, the liberals 
 the iniion of the three estates. Necker, with great want of 
 tact, betrayed his own views l)y assigning the double number 
 of votes to the tiers I'tnt while he induced the government 
 to observe an obstinate silence on thcmain point in question. 
 The public debates on this subject were all the more violent 
 in consequence of this reticence ; and in Bretagne it came to 
 an open civil war between the nobility and the burghers. 
 
 The radical elements in France saw that their time for 
 action was come; and the great dearness of provisions which u 
 prevailed during the winter months placed a large number 
 of desperate men at the disposal of every conspirator. In 
 
 I. I) 
 
50 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 Paris the revolutionary demagogues gathered round the agents 
 of the Dulve of Orleans, and at the end of April tried their 
 strength in a sanguinary street riot, which was professedly 
 directed against the usurious avarice of a rich manufacturer, 
 hut really had no other object than to intimidate the mod- 
 erate party, before the impending election of the States-general.^ 
 In other respects external quiet still prevailed in the pro- 
 vinces ; but the feverish agitation of men's minds increased 
 with every day; and in this state of things the elections by 
 almost universal suffrage began to be held. Every electoral 
 college was to entrust its instructions and complaints to its, 
 deputies according to medireval custom. In every district, 
 therefore, a long list of abuses was drawn up and examined; 
 and brought home to the minds of the people at large, by 
 means of discussion. A modern historian has justly observed 
 that these com^jlaints do not leave a single particle of the 
 ancien regime untouched; that every thing was rejected by 
 the restless desire of innovation — and that, unfortunately, 
 neither the possibility, nor the method, of introducing reforms 
 is anywhere pointed out. Revolution — universal and radical 
 revolution, — speaks in every line of these documents. There 
 was but one thought through the whole of France, that, 
 thenceforward, a new era was to commence for the people and 
 the empire, and that the work begun must be completed in 
 
 . spite of every opposition. 
 
 Whilst the millions in every part of the country were thus 
 emancipating themselves from the bonds of traditional law — 
 uncertain about their fntiu-e, but firm in their resolution to 
 
 proceed — the government was daily sinking more and more 
 
 into utter helplessness. It had indeed a presentiment of the 
 dangers which would accompany the breaking out of the new 
 epoch, but its destitution was so complete that it eagerly 
 
 longed for the commencement of the crisis. Money, one of 
 
 1 This has been clearly and concisely sliown by Croker in bis Essays on 
 the Fi-enc/i ftei'oliitioi), p. uO. 
 
Cb. I.] THE ORGANISATION OF THE ARMY. Bl 
 
 the great factors of material power, was not to be found 
 ill its coflfers; and even the other, the army, was already 
 aflfected by the general process of dissolution. This is perhaps 
 the most important circumstance, with respect to the sub- 
 sequent course of the French Eevolution, and its difference 
 from all those which have since taken place in Europe. 
 The reason is simple enough; the French army was, in the 
 main, organised according to the same principles as the other 
 departments of the state; and like them had been thoroughly 
 unhinged by the contests between the crown and the feudal 
 orders, long before the breaking out of the Revolution. 
 The nobility alone were eligible for commissions in the 
 army; and though single exceptions to this rule leally oc- 
 curred, yet the monopoly was actually limited bj- a law of 
 1781 to noblemen of four descents. Twenty-seven regiments 
 belonged to foreio-n or native grandees, and in these the owner 
 of each regiment appointed the colonel, from a list drawn up 
 by the minister at war; and the colonel appointed the other 
 officers. The influence of the King's government, therefore, 
 in the selection of officers, was limited to the composition of 
 the list of candidates for the single office of colonel. In the 
 other divisions of the army, indeed, the highest rank was in 
 the gift of the King alone; but of the other commissions only 
 one half were bestowed by the King, and the other half by 
 the colonel. The officer, moreover, received his commission, 
 after giving proofs of his fitness, on payment of a sum of 
 money; it was a purchase for life, as, in the case of the 
 courts of law, it was a purchase of an hereditary right. The 
 duty of unconditional obedience was not indeed abrogated 
 by this system; but it was inevitable, especially under a weak 
 government, that the ccTrps of officers should feel itself, what 
 it really was, a part of that great aristocracy, which shared 
 with the King the ruling power of France in every depart- 
 ment of public life. The contest between this nobility and 
 the ministry, by which the last years of the anrim rkjinw 
 
 d2 
 
52 FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. [Book I. 
 
 were filled, must, therefore, have had a deep effect upon 
 the army. It frequently occurred that the officers, like the 
 judges, with their colonels at their head, refused obedience.. 
 And as in the rural districts the opposition of the aristo- 
 cracy was followed by excitement among the peasants, and 
 the opposition of the towns by excitement among the arti- 
 sans—so, in the case of the army, the popular movement 
 found its way into the minds of the soldiers, and operated 
 side by side with the class resistance of the officers. The 
 common soldiers had felt the oppression of the aiicien regime 
 ]3erhaps more deeply than the peasants themselves ; for they 
 / were starving on a pay of 10 sous, whilst countless sums 
 were employed in rich endowments for 1171 generals. They 
 suffered all the insolence of the nobility towards the canaille, 
 embittered by the weight of a sevei-e and often brutal disci- 
 pline; and like their fellow-citizens they looked forward to 
 the meeting of the States-general as the signal of liberation 
 from intolerable slavery. The nmnber of regiments on which 
 the government could reckon, was extremely small. The 
 bands of discipline were loosened in every rank; — the officers 
 inveighed against the despotism of the ministers, and the 
 soldiers promised one another to do nothing against the 
 people. 
 
 The ancient polity therefore was destroyed by its own 
 internal discord and dissolution, before a single revolutionary 
 word had been uttered. The government was destitute of 
 money and troops to defend its position; and the feudal 
 seigniors, though they had important individual rights, had 
 no general organisation, which could enable them to replace 
 the government. As soon as public opinion — which, guided 
 by radical theories, emphatically rejected both the government 
 and the aristocracy — obtained an organ of power in the States- 
 general, it only needed to declare its will, nay, only to give 
 expression to the facts before them, and the old system hopc- 
 essly collapsed in its own rottenness. What was to follow 
 no man at that time was able to foresee. As most men were 
 
Ch. I] PROSPECTS OF A STORMY FUTURE. 53 
 
 extremely ill informed respecting the condition of the coun- 
 try, they indulged in hopes which were all the more ardent 
 in proportion as they were undefined. But there were many 
 who knew the poverty and brutality of the masses, the bitter 
 hatred between rich and poor, and the selfish immorality 
 of the upper classes — and looked, some with ambitious pleas- 
 ure, others with patriotic anxiety, towards a stormy future. 
 
64 ■ OVERTHROW OF FEUDALISM. [Book I. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 OVERTHROW OF FEUDALISM. 
 
 OpESISG of the STATES-0ES15RAL. — CoNTEST OF THE ORDERS RESPECTING 
 THEIR USIOK ]N OaH ASSEMBLY. — ThE TIERS ETAT CONSTITUTES ITSELF 
 AS NATIONAL ASSEMBLV. — ThE MINISTRY TAKES THE SIDE OF THE NOBLES. — 
 
 Speech from the throne. — First defection of the troops.— Second 
 attempt of the aristocratic party. — complete defection of the 
 ARMY. — Storming of the bastille. — Universal anarchy in the king- 
 dom. — Abolition of fecdal privileges. 
 
 The opeuiug of the States-general was iixud for the 5th of 
 May 1789, and Versailles was chosen as the place of their 
 meetings. On the 4th, half Paris poured into that town to 
 see the court and the deputies marching in procession to the 
 solemn religious ceremony, which was to inavigurate the im- 
 portant epoch. A countless multitude filled the streets, and 
 the windows and roofs of the houses. When the deputies of 
 the tiera Hat a^Dpeared, the air reverberated with cries of joy. 
 The magnificent procession of the nobility and clergy, on 
 the contrary, was received in the deepest silence; and it was 
 not till the King approaciied that the tumult of thanks and 
 greetings was renewed. On the following day, the States- 
 general, to the number of 1200 persons, assembled in the 
 spacious and richly decorated sallc dcs memis plaisirs. The 
 King appeared, surrounded by his family, with all the magni- 
 ficence of the ancient court, and was greeted by the enthusiastic 
 applause of the deijuties and spectators. On a signal from 
 the grand marshall that the King was about to speak, a death- 
 like stillness succeeded to the tumult of voices; and Louis 
 began his speech from the throne, the periods of which, full of 
 
Ch. II.] OPENING OF THE STATES-GENERAL. 
 
 55 
 
 benevolent feeling, but poor in political ideas, were to open 
 up a new era for France and Europe. 
 
 When the King had concluded, the keeper of the great 
 seal, Barentin, rose, and pointed out to the deputies a wide, 
 but too vaguely defined, sphere of activity. They would, 
 he said, deliberate on the freedom of the press, and the 
 liberty of the person; on public education and on criminal 
 and civil law. They would know how, he added in a tone 
 of warning, to distinguish between these wholesome reforms, 
 and those dangerous innovations, which the enemies of the 
 public weal desired to mingle with them. With regard to 
 the immediate and decisive questions— respecting the functions 
 of the Assembly, and its relation to its component parts, — 
 the privileges of the clergy and the nobility,— and, lastly, 
 the mode of voting, the minister expressed no will, but only 
 hopes and wishes. 
 
 This M'as in itself a sufficient indication of helplessness 
 and want of harmony in the ministry; but Necker, who 
 succeeded Barentin, in a speech of three hours, made the 
 matter still worse. He erred, not only in wearying the Assem- 
 bly ; in neglecting, like Barentin, to reserve for the government 
 the right of decision on the question of the moment, viz. the 
 mode of voting ; ' in contenting himself with expressing mere 
 pious hopes for the harmony of the nobility and clergy; in 
 bringing forward no definite proposal for financial reform, and 
 in not at least secvu'ing for the government the initiative in this 
 department; — all this was bad enough, and might alone have 
 brought danger and ruin on the state; but, what was far more 
 mischievous, he could not prevail upon himself to avow to the 
 Assembly the real state of affairs. 
 
 He announced an annual deficit of 56 million francs, and 
 thereby confused the mind of the public, which, since the 
 
 ' Louis Blanc, B. I. ch. 8. "Sun vrai tort, ce fut de n'amir pas decide, 
 par voie diiiitialii-e, que Its ordres verifieraient leurs pouooirs en commtin, 
 et formeraient des Porit/ine, line weme assemhiee." 
 
E6 OVEKTHROAV OF FEUDALISM. [Book I. 
 
 meeting of the Not;iblcs. liad always been cllsciissiiig a deficit 
 of from 120 to 140 niillioiis. He was quite right in assuming 
 that those 5(5 millions might be covered by economy in the 
 expenditure; but it was both irritating and unti'ue, when he, 
 on this ground, denied the necessity of summoning the States- 
 o-eneral, and called their convocation a free act of royal 
 favour. He did not speak of the veal malady which was 
 eating out the heart of the state, because he himself had been 
 the principal cause of it, and yet did not wish to lose his repu- 
 tation as a financial saviour. The balance of income and 
 expenditure might, indeed, easily be restored in the future, 
 but the deficit of former years had been heedlessly allowed 
 to accumulate, and by uo one more than by Necker himself. 
 ^ A floating debt of 550 millions had to be faced* — in other 
 words, therefore, more than a whole year's income had been 
 expended in advance.- The position was a worse one than if 
 the French budget at the present day had to bear more 
 than two thousand millions, instead of six hundred millions, 
 of floating debt. 
 
 Of this amount 71 millions of anticipated revenue, and 72 
 millions already due to the public creditors, had to he paid, 
 according to contract, in the year 1789.^ The real deficit of 
 the year, therefore, at the lowest calculation, amounted to more 
 than 200 millions, or nearly half the annual income; which 
 was equivalent to a falling-off of 600 millions in the income 
 of the year at the present day. 
 
 These facts then were concealed, and thus the niinisti-y 
 was necessarily placed in a false position towards the States- 
 general; the continuance of the former abuses was perpetuated, 
 or a violent catastrophe made inevitable. It was a t;ital ex- 
 ample by which dishonesty and confusion were established for 
 a whole age in this focus of political life. 
 
 'Anticipations .... 271% mill. - Tliese are tlie remboursemeiis of 
 
 Arrears of interest . . . 160 „ wliich Calonne speaks. 
 
 Arrears of the ministries 120 ,, 
 
 551% mill. 
 
Cii. II.] CONTEST r.KTA\M:EN THE ORDERS. 57 
 
 For the uiouient the matter was not cliseiitised. Every 
 thing yielded to the importance of the constitutional question 
 — whether the three orders shonld deliberate in common or 
 apart — whether there shoiild be one single representative body 
 or independent corporations. This point was mooted at once ^^ 
 in its fnll extent on the question, whether the validity of the 
 elections should be scrutinised by each order separately, or 
 by the whole Assembly. 
 
 We need not here enter into the question of right; but of 
 this there can be no doubt, that the government, which virtually 
 created the States-general afresh, had the formal right to 
 convoke them either in one way or the other, as it thought 
 fit. The government desired reforms, partly in accordance 
 with the political system of the pirincipal minister, and partly 
 because they wanted money, and no money was to be had 
 without reforms. They infinitely lowered their own influence 
 and dignity by leaving a most important constitutional ques- ^ 
 tion to the decision and the wrangling of the three orders ; and 
 they frustrated their own practical objects, by not decidedly 
 declaring for the imion of the orders in one Assembl)'. Every 
 important measure of reform, which had in view the improve- 
 ment of the material and financial condition of the country, 
 would have been mutilated by the clergy and rejected by 
 the nobles. This was sufficiently proved by the caliiers ' of 
 the electors. 
 
 The States themselves had to undertake what the gov- 
 ernment had neglected. That which the government might 
 have freely and legally commanded, now led to violent re- 
 volution. But there was no choice left ; the counnons would 
 not tolerate the continuance of the privileged orders; and 
 the state could not tolerate them if it did not wish to 
 perish. 
 
 The commons, who on this point were unanimous, consid- 
 ered the system of a single Assembly as a matter of course. 
 
 ' The written instructions given by tlie electors to tlie deputies. 
 
58 . OVERTHROAV OF FEUDALISM. [Book I. 
 
 They took care not to constitute themselves as tiers etat, 
 but remained passive, and declared that they would wait 
 until the Assembly should be constituted as a whole. Thus 
 slowly and cautiously did they enter on their career; they 
 felt conscious of the goodness of their cause, but in all other 
 respects their views were vague and unsettled. The deputies 
 were strangers to one another, the scene of meeting was new 
 to the majority, and very few of them were of a character 
 to form any fixed plan of action. They knew the wishes of 
 their constituents, i. c. of nearly all the grown-up men in 
 the kingdom; they were conscious of the ferment in the pub- 
 lic mind, and well aware by what a vast amount of enthusiasm 
 and despair they were backed. Some of the leading men had 
 alread)^ established themselves in the confidence of the alleys 
 and corners of the capital, and had succeeded in some attempts 
 to raise a riot, and thereby satisfied themselves of the pos- 
 sibility of armed resistance. 
 
 But the great mass of the deputies were uncertain as to 
 the scope of their own plans, and grew embarrassed them- 
 selves, when they saw the embarra'ssment of the government. * 
 Should the King, contrary to expiectation change his policy, 
 there were very few who would be able to free themselves 
 from their accustomed reverence for the monarch, and their 
 idea of the overwhelming power of the government.^ It 
 needed many errors on the part of the monarchy to increase 
 their confidence in themselves. Indisputably the most im- 
 portant and influential among them was Count Mirabeau, the 
 
 ' The statements of Bailh', Mira- lonet, and Target; had little con- 
 beau, and Barentin, all agree in this fidence in Mirabeau, and consoled 
 point. — 2 Sieyes expresses a hope, himself with the thought that there 
 at this time, that the Assembly, were 100 patriots in the Assembly 
 might pave the way, and that the ready to die for their country. (Un- 
 next generation might abolish the puhUshed Letters of Robespierre, qaoiai 
 nobility. Beaulieu, Essais, I. 139. by Louis Blano, B. I. ch. 8.) 
 Robespierre suspected Mounier, Ma- 
 
Ch, II.] NECKEK ATTEMPTS TO COMPROMISE. 59 
 
 representative of the town of Aix in Provence, a violent 
 opponent of feudalism, and a restless participator in all the 
 recent popular commotions. He would have been better able 
 than any man to stimulate the Assembly to vigorous action; 
 but even he hesitated, and kept back his associates from 
 taking any violent steps, because he feared that the inconsis- 
 tency and inexperience of the majority would bring ruin on 
 the state. '-If Necker," he wrote at that time, "had a spark 
 of energy and talent, he might impose an additional tax of 
 60 millions, and contract a loan for 150 millions, in eight 
 days, and dissolve us on the ninth; if the King had tact 
 enough to place himself at oiu- head, instead of betraying 
 wishes at variance with ours, the Assembly would be readj- 
 to enact the second part of the Danish revolution of 1660." It 
 was only very gradually that the tiers ctat began to negotiate 
 with the other orders. 
 
 The nobles shewed themselves haughty, dogmatical, and 
 aggressive; and the clergy cautious, unctuous, and tenacious. 
 They tried the efficacy of general conferences; but as no 
 progress was found to have been made after three Aveeks, 
 they gave up their consultations on the 25th of May. The 
 impatience of the public, and the necessities of the treasury, 
 continually increased; the government, therefore, once more 
 intervened, and Necker was called upon to propose a com- 
 promise; according to which, the scrutiny of the election 
 was to be carried on by each order separately, and the result 
 communicated to the other two orders; and, in case of con- 
 troversy, the dispute was to be decided by the council of 
 ministers. But little would have been gained by this plan, 
 because the main question, respecting the mode of voting, 
 would remain unsettled. Tlie clergy, therefore, accepted the 
 proposal without hesitation; but the nobles, rendered more 
 unbending and exactuig by contact with one another, declared 
 that they had long ago finished their scrutiny, and constituted 
 themselves as a separate order. They thus spared the com- 
 mons the dreaded honour of being the first to break with 
 
60 OVERTHROW OF FEUDALISjr. [Book I. 
 
 the crown. The conferences -were again closed on the 9th 
 of June. 
 
 The leaders of the commons now saw that they must 
 either succumb to the nobility, or force the other orders to 
 submission. On the 10th Mirabeau announced that the Abbe 
 Sieyes, the deputy for Paris, had an important motion to bring 
 forward. This was a declaration that the time was come to 
 constitute the Assembly, — to summon the other orders to a 
 common scrutiny of the elections, — to commence proceedings 
 without delay, — and to take no notice of those who remained 
 away. The motion was carried, and rejDorted to the King; 
 the scrutiny was begun on the evening of the 12th and fin- 
 ished on the 14th. The all-important question now approached 
 its solution; the Assembly was in a position to constitute 
 itself, but in what character? Two classes of opinion, which 
 were to come into collision throughout the whole course of 
 ■the Revolution, now stood ofiposed to each other on its very 
 threshhold; each represented by the most powerful organ it 
 jiossesscd in France. 
 
 On the one side rose Sieyes, a theoretical politician of 
 liltle knowledge of real life, who judged the world and 
 mankind solely according to his own system, pursued his 
 course with logical consistency but with one-sided narrowness 
 of mind, and like all such theorists, was filled with secret 
 pride and ambition. His whole speech turned upon these 
 simple propositions: — 
 
 '•"We are, as may be shown by our commissions, repre- 
 sentatives of 96 per cent, of the wdiole nation; the people 
 is sovereign, we, therefore, as its representatives, must regard 
 and constitute ourselves as a National Eepresentation." 
 This was in fact a declaration of open war between arbitrary 
 principles and existing rights. According to these principles, 
 it is agreeable to reason that the majority should rule; but 
 what is not reasonable must no longer exist; if the Kino' 
 and the higher classes remain unreasonable, the sovereign 
 people must pass them by unheeded. 
 
Ch. II.] COUNT MIRABEAU AND NECKER. 61 
 
 Mirabean, on the other hand, wished indeed to introduce, 
 at any cost, a new form of government, and to abolish the 
 old feudal state ; but he was a friend of order, as well as a 
 deadly enemy of the old state of things. He was resolved 
 even upon revolution, if that were unavoidable, but he 
 endeavoured with unceasing anxiety to break the violence of 
 the shock. In his restlessly creative mind was reflected 
 the image of a beneficent activity, which, if order could 
 be maintained, might extend itself without limit in every 
 direction; but he saw, with equal clearness, the fearful ruin, 
 which must accompany the destruction of order. He had 
 recently sought out Necker, who was in his eyes a contempt- 
 ible statesman, and offered him his cooperation, if he would 
 follow the proper course. But Necker, who despised the 
 immorality of Mirabeau's private life, and feared a dangerous 
 rivalry from his brilliant talents, drily rejected his advances. 
 Mirabeau, however, did not allow himself "to be diverted 
 from his course by his indignation at this treatment; and 
 being convinced that a violent step was not to be avoided, 
 he endeavoured at least to prevent the power of the majority 
 from being declared the standard of right. "The people," 
 he cried, "is as yet nothing, but it will become great and 
 majestic; we are still subject to laws sanctioned by the King, 
 and we cannot dispense with his approval of our measures; 
 we nmst, for the present, content ourselves with the rights 
 which we actually possess, but we may set up an irresistible 
 claim on the future. Call yourselves therefore representatives 
 of the people in the National Assembly, jirocure for the 
 people access to its rights, and then march on to power in 
 alliance with the jjeople." 
 
 There were but few jiersons in the Assembly to whom 
 even ^Mirabeau's views seemed to go too far; but even these, 
 while they proposed to adopt the name of representatives 
 of the majoritv, proceeded as if the unity of the Assembly 
 were a necessary and settled thing. On this point there 
 was no doubt, and no divergence of opinion. Outside of 
 
62 OVEBTHROW OF FEUDALISM. [Book I. 
 
 the Assembly the ferment was couthiually on the increase. In 
 Paris the bold orators set up their rostra in the gardens 
 -of the Palais Royal, and kept the crowds which thronged 
 /'to hear them in a state of perpetual excitement. In the 
 provinces the famine grew worse, and led to the formation 
 of numerous bauds of peasant farmers and agricultural la- 
 bourers, who, seeing no prospect of .improvement in any 
 direction, levied black mail, first upon the richer farmers, 
 then upon the castles of the landowners, and lastly upon the 
 small towns. The ti'oops were thereby kejit in perpetual 
 movement, and could after all eft'ect b>Tt little. In Marseilles 
 the city magistrates, by Mirabeau's advice, called upon the 
 citizens to take up arms to keep such bandits from their city. 
 The youth of Bretague, who, over a great extent of country 
 had remained under arms from the time of the election^- 
 to the number, as was said of 40,000 — swore to support 
 the commons, "if the aristocracy should throw obstacles in 
 their way. Intelligence of similar manifestations of feeling 
 were brought to Versailles from every quarter; the opinion 
 prevailed in Paris, that the court Avas guilty of treachery, 
 and the commons of tardiness in their movements. 
 
 Every hour the Assembly was urged more and more 
 irresistibly towards extreme measures, and the court had 
 every reason to feai- that the union of the three orders 
 would raise the National Assemljly to absolute power, even 
 over the crown. In addition to this the ministry found 
 themselves harassed by^ cares of a very substantial nature; 
 six weeks had already passed since the meeting of the 
 Assembly, without any measures having been taken to replen- 
 ish the public cofters, now almost utterly exhausted. The 
 Count d'Artois and his friends were continvuilly harping upon 
 the rapid fulfilment of their gloomy prophecies, and declared 
 that it was higli time to secure the royal power from the 
 hourly increasing daugei'. In the midst of these excited 
 feelings the transactions of the commons were concluded, of 
 which Sieyes gave a short summary on the Ifith of June. 
 
Ch. II.] TRIUMPH OP THE TIERS liTAT. 
 
 63 
 
 The courage of many of the deputies had increased, and 
 others were angry at the increasing leaning of the council 
 of ministers to the side of the nobility. 'SMth a majority 
 little short of unanimity, and amidst the ai^phuise of four 
 thousand spectators, Sieyes carried his point on the 17th, 
 when the commons constituted themselves as the National 
 Assembly. 
 
 This was indeed a resolution which demanded the most 
 serious consideration of the government; for it comprehended, 
 not merely the union of the three orders into one Assembly, 
 but the declaration that the representatives of the majority 
 were raised__a]5ov^_all ,^e^iatijlg__!:ights to the position [of 
 absolute rulers of France. It made a great difterence whether 
 they attained this object in consequence of an understanding 
 between all the parties interested, and with the sanction of 
 the King, or arbitrarily assumed to themselves, and perhaps 
 to themselves alone, the sole legislative power in France. 
 It was, indeed, a usurpatiou if, ever there was one; it was, 
 as one of the deputies for Paris — the great naturalist, Baill)' — 
 himself said, the transference of the royal power to the 
 Assembly; — it was the Revolution! The moderate men in the 
 Assembly could fairly lay the responsibility on the ministers, 
 who had left them no choice between illegality and political 
 death. For the government, which, by its indecision and 
 inactivity, had involuntarily joined the ranks of the higher 
 classes, this event was a crushing blow. 
 
 For many clays past the collision had been generally foreseen. 
 The nobility actively bestirred themselves, and violently 
 urged the King to stand his ground and uphold their rights. 
 A portion of the ministry, not generally favourable to the 
 nobles, now thought themselves obliged to act in concert 
 with thein, in order to protect the i]idepe]idence of the crown. 
 Consultation after consultation was held without much 
 progress being made, for the ministry were by no means 
 imaware of the difficulties of their position, and, worst of 
 all, they were not agreed among themselves. The most zealous 
 
64 OVERTHROW OF FEUDALISM. [Book I. 
 
 opposition came from Necker, who, in concert with a portion 
 of the nobility, and some members of the commons, had long- 
 cherished the wish to introduce a constitution similar to that 
 of England, and to unite the dignified clergj- and the no- 
 Ijility into an upper house. The democratic system of the 
 Abbe Sieves aftorded as little hope of carrying out this idea, 
 as the obstinate spirit of separation in the two liigher orders. 
 In the present state of things, therefore, Necker saw no 
 prospect of success in any direction; but he dreaded most 
 of all the loss of his popularity, which would have entirely 
 destroyed his influence with the connnons — and this loss 
 would certainly befall him, if he took any decided part with 
 the nobility. At last, therefore, he eagerly recommended the 
 measure— which he ought to have carried five months before, 
 as the very foundation of his whole policy, — viz. the in- 
 terference of the King in favor of the right system. The 
 King, he said, in virtue of his prerogative, ought to command 
 the union of the orders, but in other respects to maintain 
 his former sovereignty intact. 
 
 But it was now too late. The attack of the commons 
 touched the possessors of rights and jjrivileges in their 
 tenderest point, and roused them to resistance. The council 
 of ministers resolved to grant every other conceivable reform, 
 but to insist on the separation of the orders. It was not 
 merely the influence of the Queen, as has been said, but 
 zeal ao'ainst the Revolution, which brouaht aliout this deter- 
 mination.' 
 
 The terror and abhorrence of the King's servants must 
 have been blind indeed, which could induce them to take such 
 a step as this. The Assembly had been called together to 
 afford the King's government a po\\'erfnl support against the 
 selfwill of the aristocratic corporations. And now the King 
 was placed in the breach to defend the nobility! By annul- 
 ling the resolution of the commons, the wrath of the nation 
 
 ' Meiiuiirs of tlie iiiiiiit;toi- Biiicntiii. 
 
Ch. II.] THE ASSEMBLY IN THE TENNIS-COURT. 65 
 
 was directed against the King, and to appease this anger 
 an essential part of the royal power was to be sacrificed— 
 an inevitable consequence of every reform, if there were to 
 be any States-general at all. 
 
 Necker's proposal would have done but little to preserve 
 the royal authority, but the ministry had brought this mis- 
 fortune upon themselves, and should have been glad to make 
 a tolerable escape from their embarrassment. The affair was 
 really decided by the fact that the ministers only possessed 
 the power of carrying out their resolution as long as they 
 met with no resistance. The coffers of the state were empty, 
 and the troops in Paris utterly untrustworthy. This was 
 well known to the ministers, yet they went blindly on in 
 the same course. Louis XVI. went hunting, and the 
 courtiers were delighted that the mouths of the talkers and 
 the demagogues were about to be stopped. 
 
 The first step, however, in the new direction joroved to 
 the ministers what a resistance might be expected. When 
 the hall of Assembly was closed on the 20th, to make pre- ' 
 parations for' a royal sitting, the leaders of the tiers etai 
 assembled the majority of their followers in the neighbouring 
 tennis-court. The feelings of the deputies were variously 
 agitated; but the majority were by no means at first in 
 such a state of enthusiasm as has been generally described. ' 
 They did not all know how much the royal power had been 
 undermined, and most of them were by no means at ease 
 during this commencement of the contest against the grand- 
 son of Louis XIV. A few of the more zealous cried out 
 that they ought to remove to Paris, where the peoi^le would 
 welcome them with enthusiastic joy. 
 
 The excitement in the capital had indeed risen to the 
 
 ' Granier de Cassagnac lias brought forward contemporaneous and 
 incontrovertible evidence on this point: Hisloire des Causes, Ifc. III. 63; 
 and Louis Blanc agrees with him, B. I. ch. 8. 
 
 I. E 
 
66 OVERTHKOW OP FEUDALISM. [Book I. 
 
 highest pitch; the great mass of the people was in a state 
 of wild agitation, and the soldiers, who were entertained by 
 hundreds everj" day in the Palais Royal, were completely 
 demoralized.' The moderate party in the Assembly were 
 terrified at the prospect of the catastrophe which their ap- 
 pearance in the streets of Paris wovild precipitate; and 
 Mounier, deputy of Provence, emphatically declared that 
 they ought to remain where they were, and not separate 
 until the constitution of the kingdom, and the new birth 
 of public order, was comioleted. He jjroposed that they 
 should confirm this resolution by a solemn oath. His words 
 ran like wild-fire through the Assembly. They remembered 
 that they should have the aid of a zealous minority among 
 the nobles, an overwhelming number of the clergy, and the 
 silent but active cooperation of the leading minister. 
 
 Mounted on a table, Bailly read out the form of oath, 
 and claimed for himself the honour of being the first to 
 swear. The enthusiasm then became general, and amidst 
 loud and reiterated applauses the deputies repeated the oath, 
 with which the pulsation of a new era was to begin for 
 France — an oath, by which most of them devoted their own 
 heads as a sacrifice for freedom and country. 
 
 Two days afterwards 148 of the clergy — bishops, abbots, 
 and parish p)riests — and the whole of the nobility of Dauphine, 
 came to share the perils of the commons. The ministers 
 did nothing to prevent this stop, nor did it lead them to 
 modify their own intentions. 
 
 On the 2Hrd the King was conducted into the hall, with 
 great state, to make known for the last time his royal pleasure. 
 What he then said would have buried the monarchy in 
 France and transferred the sovereign power to the States- 
 general. The department of finance was put entirely into 
 their hands; and the King declared himself ready to abolish 
 the most oppressive taxes, to reform the army and the courts 
 
 ■'They have all become philosophers," wrote Camille Desmouliiis. 
 
Ch. II.] THE ASSEMBLY REFUSES TO SEPARATE. 
 
 67 
 
 of law, to institute provincial assemblies and to do away 
 with Icftres dc cachet and the censorship of the press. All 
 these matters were to to be decided and regulated by the 
 States-general— and this was in itself a great concession — 
 but it must be done, he said, by the three orders in separate 
 consultation. This prohibition of the National Assembly 
 was the beginning and end of the royal sitting; it was the 
 abdication of the monarchy in favour of the nobility; it was 
 the handing over France to the arbitrary will of the privileged 
 classes. 
 
 In too many histories of this period this all-important 
 point has been overlooked; and yet it is by this alone that 
 we can judge of the value of those promises of the King, 
 which, under the system of three orders, would have been 
 nothing more than promises. 
 
 It was no wonder that the commons resisted. After the 
 King had withdrawn, the master of the ceremonies. Marquis 
 Brcze, called upon the deputies to separate, and was an- 
 swered by Mirabeau with quiet firmness: "If," said he, "you 
 have orders to remove us from this hall, you must also 
 get authority to use force, for we shall yield to nothing but 
 bayonets." 1 The Assembly, on his motion, then decreed 
 the inviolability of the deputies. This was enough to destroy 
 the whole effect of the royal sitting. 
 
 The King was the first to shrink from violence. "They 
 will not leave the hall?" said he, "well then, let them alone." 
 Necker then began to stir again; he had not been present 
 at the sitting biit had given in his resignation. In the 
 evening he received the acclamations of innumerable crowds, 
 who had just before followed the King with murmurs 
 and abuse, and he thereupon allowed himself to be persuaded 
 by Louis to remain in office. The chiefs of the commons 
 were assembled for hours in his house, and on the 24th he 
 
 ' Mirabeau, Lettres a ses Covtmellans. The manifold variations of liis 
 celebrated words are none of them authentic. 
 
 e2 
 
68 OVERTHROW OF FEUDALISM. [Book I. 
 
 thanked the Assembly— which was sitting as if nothing had 
 happened— for the marks of respect he had received. Another 
 section of the clergy, and on the following day the liberal 
 minority of the nobility, friends of Necker, joined the com- 
 mons. By this time the whole of Paris was in an uproar; 
 the excitement was great and universal, and it was now not 
 only the literary hacks and the women of the Palais Koyal, 
 with the fickle crowd who- gathered round them, but the 
 citizen electors of the tiers I'tat, men of property and 
 character, who came forward to jiromise the Assembly their 
 support. The revolt began as early as the 25th, when a 
 mob stormed the palace of the archbishop, and the guards 
 refused to fire upon them. In Versailles a similar crowd 
 of people endeavoured to drive the troojjs from the entrance 
 of the hall of deputies, and the officers could not rely upon 
 their men. The ministers were disheartened by the desertion 
 of Necker, and the King by that of his troops. Louis sent 
 for the Duke of Luxemboxu'g, the president of the nobility, 
 and ordered him to afi'ect a union ^vith the commons. "I have 
 no money," he said, "and the army is full of mutiny; I cannot 
 protect you, for even my own life is in danger." "To do 
 that," cried the duke in astonishment and terror, "is, in the 
 present state of public opinion, to proclaim the omnipotence 
 of the States-general; the nobles are ready to die for their 
 King." "I do not wish," replied Louis, "that any man should 
 lose his life for me." 
 
 Utterly defeated as they were, the feudal party had no 
 intention of falling by their own weakness, or without re- 
 sistance. The union of the three orders was nevertheless 
 effected, and the clergy meritoriously offered to pay taxes 
 for the future, and to give their property as security for the 
 national debt. Then followed all manner of reservations, 
 protests, and consciencious scruples; and the mutual bitterness 
 continued undiminished. Still worse, however, was the contin- 
 uance of the anarchy which had broken out in Paris. 
 
 None of the authorities could command obedience; the 
 
Ch- II-] ANARCHY IN PARIS. 
 
 69 
 
 troops became more and more insubordinate, and vagabonds 
 from all quarters poured into the city, to the number, accord- 
 ing to some reports, of 12,000, and, according to others, of 
 30,000 or even 40,000. The people were starving and the 
 price of bread rose to four sous and upwards; the bakers shops 
 were almost daily attacked, and there was no longer the 
 slightest protection for person or property. ^ In such a state 
 of things, the ministers were quite right in endeavouring to 
 recover their material power by summoning fresh regiments 
 to the capital from the diflferent provinces. But the aris- 
 tocratic party immediately endeavoured to use this force for 
 their ovra purposes. The attempt of the 23rd had failed, 
 they said, because the guards had refused obedience, and 
 Necker had left his colleagues in the lurch. How would it 
 be if they were to form a ministry of new and stronger 
 materials, and place at its disposal an imposing force, which 
 had not yet been tampered with by the demagogues? Such 
 a ministry would have the means of making the braggadocios 
 of the Assembly feel the power of the crown — of securing 
 the fair rights of the nobility, and thereby protecting real 
 liberty from anarchy. 
 
 The course of events remained unchanged. The number 
 of troops in Paris increased every day, and the chief command 
 of them was given to Marshal Broglie, the veteran hero of 
 the seven years' war, who, as the court believed, could not fail 
 to win the favour and obedience of the soldiers. This illusion 
 would soon have been dispelled, had the court party been 
 capable of learning from experience. On the 30th, the colonel 
 of the French guards arrested eleven of his men for combin- 
 ing with the Palais Royal to form a club in their regiment, 
 to seduce the soldiers from their duty. Several clubs of this 
 kind had been formed by Parisian agents in towns and 
 garrisons of the provinces, and they were all connected 
 with the Palais Royal. 
 
 The leaders of the central club in this place resolved to 
 rescue the eleven soldiers, that they might not be themselves 
 
70 OVERTHROW OF FEUDALISM. [Book I. 
 
 involved in the investigation of their offence. A crowd of 
 some thousand persons broke open the prison and liberated 
 the triumphant guardsmen, and a colunm of dragoons which 
 was sent to restore order joined the people. It soon became 
 known in Versailles that the King's body-guard was not at 
 all more trustworthy: a regiment of the line at Bethvme 
 refused to put down a bread riot, and -the grateful citizens 
 awarded an increase of pay to the mutinous troops. 
 
 Broglie knew of no other way of meeting the difficulty 
 than sending for more and more regiments; the only con- 
 sequence of which was that the army became more and more 
 demoralised by contact with the Parisians. "^ In this state 
 of things Mirabeau once more made himself heard in the 
 National Assembly; he was not one of the regvdar leaders 
 of the democracy — who were endeavouring at that time to 
 alienate the soldiers from the throne — but he was always 
 sufficiently mixed up with them, to know the extent of their 
 success, and was firmly resolved to accept even the most 
 terrible evils of Revolution, if these proved absolutely ne- 
 cessary to the overthrow of feudalism; yet the urgent petition 
 which he proposed to present to the King to remove the 
 troops from Paris, did not proceed from a wish to weaken 
 the control over Parisian anarchy, but partly from the desire 
 to free the Assembly from the very appearance of danger, 
 /and still more from the conviction, that any violent step 
 would immediately break up the army and spread anarchy 
 over the whole of France. He coupled with his petition a 
 proposal to form a citizen guard in Paris, by which he hoped 
 
 ' Journal and Correspondence of probability that the wliole army is 
 
 Lord Auckland, II. 326: — "What ready to do the same. The most 
 
 has certainly contributed to this quick serious informations on this head 
 
 and wonderful revolution is the defec- are daily coming to the Ministers 
 
 tiou of those troops who were de- from the provinces." Thus writes 
 
 pendedupon, andappliedto, tosupport on the 5th of July, a diplomatist in 
 
 coercive measures, and a more than daily communication with Necker. 
 
Cii. II.] A CHANGE OF MINISTRY. 71 
 
 to gain at the same time a weapon against the ancicn regime 
 and a guarantee for the new order of things. But neither 
 the King— who had no conception of the disordered state of 
 aflfairs— nor the Assembly— which was territied and exas- 
 perated by the machinations of the nobility— would agree to 
 his proposal. 
 
 On the 11th of July the feudal party executed their cotip 
 d'etat. Necker and three other ministers were dismissed, and 
 Breteuil, Broglie, Foulon and Laporte succeeded them in the 
 royal council. 
 
 These men were not exactly the chiefs of the party, but 
 they were staunch royalists, and the immediate task proposed 
 to them was to overawe the Assembly at Versailles, and the 
 demagogues in Paris. Such was the unnatural complication 
 of things, however, that the fruits of their victory would have 
 been gathered, not by the crown, but by the nobles. This 
 fact was generally understood, and all the old hatred against 
 the privileged classes was directed against the new ministry. 
 
 On the day before, a gigantic banquet had been held in 
 the Palais Royal, where a motley crowd of guardsmen, ca- 
 valry of all arms, artillery men, and troops of the line were 
 entertained by the citizens. 
 
 Late in the night of the 11th the electors of the tiers 
 etat discussed the proposal of Mirabeau, and the formation 
 of a National guard. On the 12th at mid-day the news of 
 Necker's dismissal arrived; a riot immediately broke out in 
 the Palais Royal and Camille Desmoulins incited the people 
 to resistance from the windows of the Cafe Foy. The popu- 
 lace had been so well prepared that the effect of his address 
 was tremendous. 
 
 Many thousands of courageous men of all classes, labourers 
 and students, merchants and apprentices, and, it must be 
 confessed, beggars, vagabonds and thieves, were collected 
 and set in motion. 
 
 The gunsmiths' shops were plundered in all parts of the 
 city; small detachments on guard were dispersed, the custom- 
 
72 OVERTHKOW OF FEUDALISM. [Book I. 
 
 houses at the barrieres set on fire, and the charges of ca- 
 valr)-, which prince Lambesc ordered to be made in the gar- 
 dens of the Tnileries, were repulsed. The defeat of the 
 ministry was decided in the first few minutes; for all the 
 troops, except a few foreign companies, refused to act, so 
 that it became necessary to order them to evacuate the city 
 before dark, and to bivouac on the Champ de Mars. • The 
 13th was an unhappy day, both for the court, vidiich received 
 the news of the defection of the soldiers, ^ and for all who 
 possessed property in Paris. The latter saw themselves 
 threatened, on the one side, by the army on the Champ de 
 Mars, and on the other, by the ever-increasing masses of 
 the revolutionists. The latter danger was the more urgent 
 of the two, for the mob plundered, not only the gunsmiths 
 shops, but the corn magazines and even the bakers shops. 
 They soon proceeded to the wine-cellars, and at last intel- 
 ligence was Ijrought from all quarters of thefts of every kind 
 / committed in the name of freedom. The formation of a 
 V National guard was now hailed with grateful joy, as the 
 only means of safety. ' 
 
 The first patrols made their a2)pearance on the night of 
 the 12th of July; and on the morning of the 13th the electors 
 took possession of the Hotel de Ville, appointed a permanent 
 committee, which undertook the government of the city, 
 armed two hundred men from each of the sixty districts, 
 and passed a resolution to increase this force fourfold. 
 A portion of the hitherto undisciplined gangs immediately 
 
 1 Poisson, L'Armee et la Garde- the foreign regiments Royal-Alie- 
 
 Nationale, I. 32, lias overlooked the mand and Chateau Vieiix renounced 
 
 reports of the contemporaneous press their ohedience. — RevoL de Paris. 
 
 concerning the defection of the troops, ' Louis Blanc attributes this to the 
 
 and attributes their marching out of "suspicion" of the"6o«»-(7eo!S(e" against 
 
 the city to an earlier order of the "the calumniated people." He seems to 
 
 King, which, according to the positive know nothing of the above-mentioned 
 
 statements of Besenval (ilemoire, III. disturbances. 
 300) is quite impossible. — ^ Even 
 
Ch. II.] the demoralisation of the troops. 73 
 
 took service in the National guard, whose principal task was 
 to disarm the bands of a similar kind. The tumult, however, 
 was continually increasing; the whole regiment oi' the French 
 guards went over to the people; and numerous deserters, 
 belonging to other divisions of the army, were continually 
 arriving in Paris,' and proved to be by far the most diffi- 
 cult to control. It was then proposed to plunder all the 
 houses of the aristocracy; the monastery of the Lazarites 
 was devastated, the collection of weapons iu the Crown treas- 
 ury carried off, and a number of prisons for debtors broken 
 open. 
 
 "This was the 13th of July," says Bailly, "the day on which 
 Paris was in constant danger of being plundered, and only 
 saved from the bandits by the National guard. "^ 
 
 The same day decided the fate of the monarchy. General 
 Besenval, who commanded the troops in the Champ de Mars, 
 did not venture to move his demoralized batallions, and after 
 vainly sending messenger after messenger to Versailles, at 
 last decided, on the 14th, to withdraw from the dangerous 
 neighbourhood of the capital. ^ 
 
 The overthrow of the aristocratic party and the ancient 
 monarchy, and the breaking up of the old military system, 
 had now become a certainty. The existing regime had a 
 second time fallen without a blow, in consequence of its own 
 internal disorders, and the defection of its own regiments on 
 
 ' In the Correspondence of Lord 3/ii«(Ye«r also speaks of these hussars), 
 
 Auckland^ II. 330, the correspondent he gives, II. 53, the true standard for 
 
 says tha; a regiment of the Swiss the right estimation of the following; 
 
 guards, a regiment of dragoons, and — "The sudden institution of national 
 
 two regiments of infantry had gone guards was certainly not caused, but 
 
 over to the people. Loustalot speaks at most accelerated, by the reports 
 
 of 3000 men. — 'Mem. I. 113, 115. concerning the bandits; just as the 
 
 (Edit. 1804). — ' When Lafayette, report of the arrival of hussars hur- 
 
 II. 22, says that the arrival of a ried on the emeiile in Paris." Conf. 
 
 squadron of hussars on the 14th Bailly, I. 139. It was a false alarm, 
 
 would have renewed the alarm, and "^ucfT as were spread by thousands 
 
 given I'ise to a Bastille combat (the every day. 
 
71 OVERTHROW OF FEUDALISM. [Book I. 
 
 the 13th of July. The occurrences of the 14th already 
 belonged to a new ei^och and a new struggle. 
 
 The popular movement in Paris continued in its course 
 unchecked. The vast city, from one end to the other, was in the 
 hands of tlie insurgents. Every passion of the human heart, 
 patriotism and love of freedom, hatred and revenge, avarice and 
 ambition, were fermenting in the heaving mass of human 
 beings. The wildest reports were continually spread of the 
 approach of hostile armies, the dispersion of the National 
 Assembly, the bloodthirsty fury of the aristocrats; and these 
 gave rise to threatening and quixotic schemes on the part of 
 the revolutionists — such as putting all the enemies of the 
 people under the ban, marching to Versailles, and liberating 
 the King from his evil counsellors. 
 
 The electors at the Hotel de Villc wished to pause in their 
 course, and in the first place put themselves in communication 
 with the National Assembly; but in the streets the timiult- 
 uous cry was incessantly raised, that the people must not 
 rest till the King had dismissed his ministry, b\it fight to 
 the last drop of blood; and that, above all things, arms must 
 be placed in the hands of the masses. 
 
 One mob, led by the procureur Corny and the priest of 
 the church of St. Stephen, • attacked the Palais des Invalides, 
 where twenty cannon and twenty-eight thousand muskets were 
 captured. Another band of rioters from the Faubourg 
 St. Antoine commenced an attack on the Bastille, where they 
 also expected to find a large supply of ai-ms. This fortress 
 was in ill repute as a receptacle for persons arbitrarily im- 
 prisoned, especially for state prisoners of high rank, who had 
 fallen victims to court cabals or the caprice of the sovereio-n. 
 With its massive walls, ten feet thick, and its eight gloomy 
 towers, it was situated at the very entrance of Paris proper, 
 and commanded with its guns, which peeped from the bat- 
 
 ' A great friend and admirer of Lafayette. (Compare liis doings after 
 the 22nd of July, Lafayette, II.) 
 
Cii. II.] THE STORMING OF THE BASTILLE. 75 
 
 tlements, the habitations of the artisans and day-labourers 
 of the Faubourg St. Antoiue. It was a living monument of 
 the arbitrary despotism of the ancicii rcyiiiic, and a mighty 
 dam in the stream of the Parisian Revolution. The popular 
 love of freedom, and wise calculation on the part of the 
 demagogues, united in the cry of "Down with the Bastille!" 
 which soon resounded through the whole of Paris. In spite 
 of its moats, walls, and guns, the storming of the fortress 
 was no difficult task; its garrison of 138 men, of whom 
 a third were invalides,'' had only two sacks of iloui-, and could 
 not hinder the cutting ofif of their water; and no aid could 
 possibly be given them. Innumerable masses of armed men 
 poured from the Faubourg towards the principal entrance, 
 and several companies of the revolutionary regiments, with 
 the French guards at their head, marched from Paris in the 
 same direction. 
 
 Yet the commandant, De Launay, refused to surrender. The 
 contest began, and after some of the citizens, with desperate 
 boldness, had cut through the chains of the draw -bridge, the 
 first court of the fortress was taken ; but in the attack upon 
 the second court the assailants, to their infinite wrath, 
 met with a bloody repulse. The courage of the garrison 
 however was now exhausted, and the invalides wished to 
 capitulate. 
 
 De Launay, prevented by his officers from blowing himself 
 and the fortress into the air, let down the second bridge on 
 a promise of an undisturbed retreat, and the victorious crowd, 
 some with enthusiastic cries of liberty, and others thirsting 
 for blood and murder, poured into the ancient building. 
 The lives of the garrison were immediately threatened; the 
 common soldiers were with great difficuHy rescued by the 
 French guards, but De Launay and his officers, in spite of 
 the heroic resistance of the popular leaders, who endeavoured 
 to protect them, were cut down, and their heads carried about 
 
 ' According to other accounts, 82 ittvalides, and 32 Swiss, 
 
76 OVERTHROW OF FEUDALISM. [Book I. 
 
 in triumph. Immediately afterwards, another victim fell in 
 the Hotel de Ville, viz. Flesselles, president of the committee 
 of electors, who -was suspected by the people of throwing 
 obstacles in the way of arming the revolutionists, and of 
 promising assistance to De Laimay. ^ 
 
 The only thing which the temporary magistracy of the 
 city could do for the protection of the person, was to issue 
 an order that the houses should be illuminated during the 
 night. In all other respects, they allowed the popular stream 
 to flow unchecked to every quarter of the town. Reports 
 followed one another in quick succession, that the troops 
 were marching from Versailles against Paris — that the liberal 
 deputies had been seized — and orders given to bombard the 
 town. The principal streets were soon covered with barri- 
 cades ; redoubts were thrown up in the squares and furnished 
 with artillery; armed men and women marched through the 
 streets with mingled threats and shouts of joy. On the 
 16th they declared that if the King did not come to Paris, 
 80,000 of the National guard would go to Versailles, and 
 fetch him, and scatter the swarm of aristocrats to the four 
 quarters of the world. 
 
 These violent measures were no longer necessary. As early 
 as the 15th, the King appeared in the National Assembly, 
 accompanied by his brothers, to announce the withdrawal 
 of the troops, and the recall of Neeker; and to beg the 
 Chamber to act as mediators between himself and Paris. On 
 the 16th, a deputation from the Assembly repaired to Paris, 
 and found the streets still full of barricades, and the agents 
 of the Duke of Orleans busily employed in preparing the 
 march upon Versailles; but the intelligence which they brought 
 was received in the Hotel de Ville with unbounded joy. In 
 the midst of this enthusiasm, Bailly, who presided over the 
 commons in the tennis-court, was elected mayor of Paris, 
 
 1 That it was not proved is sliowii by Louis Blanc's close investigation 
 of the subject ,Book I. 11. 
 
Ch. II.] THE KING ARRIVES IN PARIS. 77 
 
 and Lafayette commander-in-chief of the National guard, 
 by general acclamation. Neither of these men would hear 
 of the Duke of Orleans being made King, or even regent; 
 and they resolved that Louis XYI. should make a public 
 appearance in Paris, and by this act of resignation cut off 
 all hopes of a change in the person of the monarch. During 
 the night the ministers, the generals who had conducted the 
 late military operations, the Princes of Artois and Conde, fled 
 from the country, and on the 17th, the King made ready 
 for his dangerous journey to the capital, after making his 
 will, and receiving the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. His 
 progress, however, was a successful one. Under the pro- 
 tection of Bailly, and other popular deputies, the King pro- 
 ceeded in an hour and a half from the harricrcs to the Hotel 
 de Ville, under the windows of which hundreds of thousands 
 filled the Tlace and the streets. The King was not able to 
 address the people himself, but Bailly and Lolly-Tolendal 
 spoke for him, and their words called forth innumerable vi- 
 vats from the crowd. No further mention was made of 
 Philip of Orleans. 
 
 The King had succumbed, and the government had passed 
 into the hands of the National Assembly. But whether the 
 word government, at this period, had any meaning was what 
 no man knew; for like a spark in a train of gunpowder, the 
 revolt in Paris had produced a general explosion through 
 the whole of France, by which in a few days, the old polit- 
 ical system was destroyed for ever. Li all the provinces, with- 
 out one exception, the Estates, the local magistrates, the civic 
 corporations, the peasants and the proletaries rose in arms. 
 In Bretagne, where for months past every jDreparation had 
 been made for the Revolution, the towns appointed new 
 municipalities, and armed a civic guard from the royal 
 magazines. Li Caen the people stormed the citadel, destroyed 
 the offices of the salt-tax, and would have slain the collectors, 
 but for the intervention of the civic guard. In Rouen, Ver- 
 non, and Nevers, several independent municipalities— nay even 
 
78 OVERTHROW OF FEUDALISM. [Book I. 
 
 (lifFerent bodies of civic guards— were formed side by side in 
 the heat of party spirit, and regarded one another with 
 jealous hostility. 
 
 Generally speaking, the civic guards were equipped through- 
 aut the whole of France in the space of eight days, wdth 
 such weapons as lay nearest at hand— guns, pikes, daggers 
 and sabres. These irregularly armed forces were sufficient 
 to keep the more desperate rioters in check, and were not 
 needed for greater enterprises; since not a single regiment 
 in the whole kingdom would have marched ovxt against them. 
 The royal intcndants vi-ere nowhere to be seen; the par- 
 liaments wished to be altogether forgotten, and the old courts 
 of law vanished without leaving a trace. The necessity of 
 rendering life and property secure gave rise to the etablish- 
 V ment of permanent connnittees in all other places, as well 
 as Paris. These were seldom appointed by a regular election, 
 but generally by acclamation, or even by an arbitrary as- 
 sumption of power. These bodies, sujiportcd by the civic 
 guard, maintained a tolerable degree of order in most of the 
 towns; at any rate, they prevented murder and robbery. 
 But there was no hope of jirotcction for anything which 
 belonged to the ancicn reyime. The custom-houses at the 
 gates of the towns, as well as on the frontiers of the kingdom, 
 were almost all demolished; imijopular civil and military of- 
 ficers were hunted down, and jjut to death; and in some 
 places, as St. Denis, Poissy, St. Germain, the so-called corn 
 usurers were Imng. 
 
 An unhappy man of this sort at Poissy, who, as it turned 
 out afterwards, generously supported 40 workmen, was with 
 difficulty saved from the hands of a furious mob by the 
 humblest prayers of a deputation from the National Assembly. 
 The terrible rise in prices brought the question of bread 
 into fearful prominence. The peasants were afraid of taking 
 their corn into the riotous towns, where they ran a chance of 
 being robbed; and the city authorities, fearing for their lives, 
 sent out secret agents to buy corn at any price. These per- 
 
Cii. II.] CONDITION OF THE RURAL DISTRICTS. 79 
 
 sons often bid one against another, and thus raised the prices 
 still higher; and when they excited the attention of the villa- 
 gers, they were stopped, and sometimes put to death as corn 
 usurers. 
 
 In short, cpnfusion, excitement, and ever-increasing tumult 
 prevailed in every quarter. 
 
 But this state of things was mild and tolerable when 
 comjiared with the condition of the rural districts. It was 
 here that feudalism had been most oppressive, and had acted 
 most directly and most injuriously upon individuals; and 
 il was here therefore that, as soon as the weight of the 
 riding power was withdrawn, the outbreak was horrible 
 beyond all description. * 
 
 In the north of France, where the greatest part of the 
 laud was cultivated by wealthy farmers, and well-paid 
 and well-treated labourers, the people contented themselves 
 with suddenly refusing all services, tithes and socage. 
 
 This was bad enough; for first the farmers, and then the 
 land-owners, were thus deprived of all their property. In 
 other parts of the north, the peasants broke into the estates 
 which the land-owners had reserved for their own manage- 
 ment, and settled themselves comfortably down, in full 
 possession. 
 
 Here, however, the lives and dwellings of the owners were 
 respected; but in the centre and south of the kingdom— in ^' 
 the districts where the system of inetairies prevailed, with 
 all its miseries— the exasperation and brutality of the peas- 
 ants were unbounded. 
 
 In Auvergne and Dailphinc, they first banded themselves 
 together in the mountains, and then, with arms in their 
 hands, rushed down like a roaring torrent upon the plains 
 and valleys. The castles were burned to the ground, the 
 monasteries were pillaged and destroyed, and the nobles, 
 whenever they were cavjght, were put to death with horrible 
 
 ' Valuable details in Buchez, IV. 1. 
 
80 OVERTHROW OP FEUDALISM. [Book I. 
 
 tortures. In Franche-Comte a noble castle was burned every 
 day, to the very end of the mouth; and when tlie civic 
 guard ofVesoul endeavoured to check these proceedings, it 
 was defeated by the peasants, and the town itself was 
 stormed. 
 
 In Mafonnais, not far from Vesoul, banditti to the number 
 of six thousand collected together, set fire to the houses 
 of those peasants who would not join them, cut down 
 230 of them, ^ and in a fortnight burned 72 castles. It 
 was not until the 29th that they were defeated, in a regular 
 battle, by the united civic guards of all the neighbouring 
 towns. The waves of an unbridled and bloodthirsty anarchy 
 flowed wildly over the kingdom! 
 
 Such was the result which was brought about in a few 
 j weeks, by the senseless attempt to maintain, by ojien force, 
 la system which had reduced the state to bankruptcy, and 
 Jtlie people to destitution. The sword, which was intended 
 to lop off the natural growth of the nation, had shivered 
 at the first blow. Magistrates and troops had vanished from 
 the surface of the country; there was no law, no author- 
 ity, no court of justice; and society was dissolved into its 
 natural elements. 
 
 The National Assembly has often been reproached with 
 having laid its innovating hands on every thing; — with having 
 paid no respect to existing interests, and made no gradual 
 transition from the old to the new. Where they have 
 deserved this reproach, we shall not palliate their error, 
 but in the majority of cases the reproach belongs rather to 
 those who opposed them in the first few days of their exist- 
 ence. What had the storm which was raised by Breteuil's 
 ministry left of the old system which could be slowly im- 
 proved, and, by improving, permanently maintained? 
 
 Mirabeau was once more right, when, on the 17th of 
 July, he opposed a well-meant motion of Lally-Tollendal— 
 
 ' Report to the Assemblee Nationalo, March 22, 91. 
 
Ch. II.] MUEDER OF FOULON AND BERTHIER. 81 
 
 that the people should be admonished by an energetic procla- 
 mation to return to order and legality, now that they had 
 gained their freedom— by saying, that it was not a question 
 of admonitions, but of new and legally constituted author- ^' 
 ities. The municipalities, he said, ought to be re-established as 
 soon as possible; and with this view, the Assembly ought 
 to lay down a few short rules for their guidance, and leave 
 particulars to the discretion of the different towns them- 
 selves, — only ordering that the election should take place 
 immediately. 
 
 The controversy which arose on this subject prevented 
 anything from being done. Paris, more especially, sank 
 every day more deeply into anarchy. The competence of the 
 electors, who had at first taken the lead in upholding order, 
 was disputed by the local authorities of the city districts, 
 and the rioters were once more free from all control. Five 
 times in live days were victims of popular justice saved with 
 difficulty by the insinuating popularity of Lafayette; and at 
 last, on the 22nd, in spite of all his efforts, Foulon the 
 minister and his sonin-law Berthier were murdered with 
 circumstances of horrible barbarity. 
 
 This crime was not the result of an outbreak of popular 
 fury; it had cost the revolutionary leaders large sums 
 of money, * for which thousands of assassins were to be 
 had. This event had a most powerful efiect on the National 
 Assembly and the party of order in Paris. The electors 
 resigned their office, and 180 representatives chosen by tlie 
 districts formed a new municipality, which forthwith set 
 to work to suppress disorders in every direction. The Na- 
 
 1 In Mirabeau's correspondence 203. Si.K hundreJ men rode to meet 
 
 the following statement occurs; Fou- Berthier, in order to frustrate the 
 
 Ion's death cost hundreds of thoiis- endeavours of his escort to bring 
 
 anfls of francs, the murder of the him straight into the Abbey, Conf. 
 
 baker Francois only a few thousands. Croker's Esumja. p. 70. 
 Bailly also takes the same view, II. 
 
 I. F 
 
82 OVERTHROW OP FEUDALISM. [Book II. 
 
 tional Assembly now issued a proclamation to the provinces, 
 but, as Mirabeau had foretold, without any result whatever. 
 Reports were continually arriving of the burning of castles, 
 of cruel outrages on the nobles, of the desecration of churches 
 in which unpojoular priests had taken refuge, and the plunder 
 of farm-houses in which stores of corn were known to exist. 
 The report of the committee declared, on the 3rd of Aug., that 
 all kinds of projjerty in the i^rovinces were exposed to the 
 most shameful robbery; "the taxes and the seigniorial pri- 
 vileges," it said, "are abolished — the laws are without jJower, 
 and the magistrates without influence, and the administration 
 of justice an empty show." 
 
 The committee again knew no better expedient than an 
 energetic proclamation; but a more extended and practical 
 view of the case began to gain ground. It became evident 
 that nothing could be jjreserved until that which was un- 
 worthy of preservation was completely abolished by law; 
 that no government could exist, until it had gained for 
 itself the free sujiport of the nation. 
 
 At this juncture, the country was in the very focus of 
 the Eevolution. All these horrible scenes did but reveal the 
 deep misery of thousands and thousands, whom the system 
 of feudal rights— not by its abuses, but by its very nature- 
 had condemned to slavery and hunger, through centuries 
 gone by. 
 
 All other evils— the embarrassment of the treasury, the 
 altei'uate weakness and violence of the monarchy, the humil- 
 iation of France abroad— all led up at last to one source, 
 from which the physical and mental impoverishment of the 
 French peojjle flowed. 
 
 Whoever looks beyond the boundaries of the French king- 
 dom and the actual time, will be convinced that the history 
 of this century in Europe tells of little else but the an- 
 nihilation of the feudal system; and tliat the Revolution,', if 
 jit was to liave a history, must pass sentence on the feudal 
 system. Feudalism was indeed virtually scattered to the 
 
Ch. II.] NIGHT OF AUG. 4th 83 
 
 winds, by the folly of tlie Breteuil ministry. What could 
 a man of discernment and conscience desire more ardently 
 than the ratification of its overthrow by a formal law? 
 How could the man who Ijewailed the crimes which ac- 
 companied the outbreak of popular passion, but who loved 
 his country and his people, have recourse to severity and 
 vengeance, until that jaeople was set free, and that country 
 cleared of its abuses? The whole struggle which was carried 
 on respecting the union of the three orders in one Assembly 
 had had no other object than this. The abolition of the 
 feudal system was the leaven of the political life of France, '' 
 from the death of Louis the XIII. to the opening of the 
 States-general. In' this case, it was impossible to hesitate, 
 and impossible to stop. 
 
 The liberal minority of the nobles did themselves hon- 
 our, by taking the initiative on the night of the 4th of , 
 August. Practically speaking, it may be said that no great ( 
 spirit of self-sacrifice was required to give up that which 
 fire and sword had already utterly destroyed; but we ought 
 to recognize the patriotic wisdom of those, who, with the 
 view of promoting the future interests of their country, 
 spontaneously j'^essed the seal of legality on their own 
 losses. After Noailles and Aiguillon had brought forward 
 the first motions, * the other members vied with one another 
 in discussing and condemning every part of the ancient 
 system. No one perhaps in the whole Assembly had bad 
 an idea how long and manifold was the catalogue of bur- 
 dens that was now revealed with terrific clearness. I will 
 not repeat the oft-told tale, how the zeal of the Assembly 
 increased from hour to hour; how they hurried on in breath- 
 less haste— not even leaving themselves time to draw up re- 
 gular decrees, and at last— that nothing might be omitted— 
 
 1 Tlie fact that they had just dined with the Duke of Orleans,— on 
 
 which their opponents lay so much stress, — cannot alter the value of 
 
 * 
 the motion. 
 
 f2 
 
84 OVERTHROW OF FEUDALISM. [Book II. 
 
 voted only principles, hopes, and wishes, and directed their 
 annihilating and liberating blows in every direction. 
 
 Serfdom, fendal jnrisdiction, manorial ground-rents, tithes, 
 game laws, saleable offices, fees, clerical robing dues, munic- 
 ipal and provincial privileges, privileges of rank, exemp- 
 tions from taxes, plurality of offices and livings— were all 
 swept away in breathless haste in one night, by the Assem- 
 bly, who at last with tumultuous enthusiasm, passed a vote 
 of thanks from the nation to Louis the XVI.— the restorer 
 of freedom— and ordered the celebration of the Te Deum. 
 
 This was no act of ordinary legislation, for, if tried by 
 such a standard, it would lie open to numerous objectious. 
 Some of the decrees annihilated fairly earned rights and 
 revenues: and though a clause was added that these might still 
 be enjoyed until some regulation had been made for compen- 
 sation and redemption, it was well known that, in the present 
 state of things even their temporary continuance was impos- 
 sible. Another set of decrees did away with organic in- 
 stitutions, which were just as essential to the state as to 
 the privileged classes— e. g. the seigniorial jurisdiction, the 
 sale of offices, fees in the courts of law, and the game laws. 
 
 The National Assembly has been often blamed, with cheap 
 wisdom, for not having first created the new order of things, 
 since the proviso, that the old system was to continue till 
 the introduction of the new, could have no efi'ect. It is no 
 doulit quite true that after the 4th of August no manorial 
 judge could exercise his functions, no tithe farmer could 
 levy, and no feudal lord obtain his diu^s; that the whole 
 of France was covered with sportsmen, who trampled down 
 the fields, injured the forests, and roasted the game in the 
 forest itself with stolen wood; but it is just as certain that 
 all these illegal acts were perpetrated without hindrance and 
 without shame before that eventful night; that there was 
 no 2'ower which could check these irregularities, and that 
 they would have continued just the same had the decrees 
 of the Assembly never been enacted. The great majority of 
 
Cu. U.] SPREAD OF ANARCHY. 86 
 
 them therefore were absohitely indispensable, and it was of 
 the greatest importance that they should be immediately 
 issued. 
 
 What was blameable, and what made Mirabeau himself 
 characterise the proceedings of the 4tli as nocturnal orgies, 
 was the reeling excitement which took possession of the 
 Assembly; under the influence of which many unnecessary 
 and illegal details were called into existence, many pro- 
 positions, afterwards withdrawn, were thrown like fresh fuel 
 into the flaming passions of the people, and served as a^' 
 dangerous example for subsequent indiscretions. 
 
 Yet the Assembly had, after all, on the 4th of August, 
 the lasting interests of the state, and the great laws of na- 
 tional development, on their side. Their decrees were a 
 great manifesto in which the Assemljly comprehended all the 
 just wishes of the nation, and made itself the mouthpiece 
 of all its real wants and hopes. It is not upon the destruction 
 of the old system— through which the path to a better future 
 led, — that the charges can be founded which may justly be 
 brought against the Assembly. Their weakness was first 
 brought to light by their voluntarily choosing the wrong /^ 
 path, out of the many new ones which lay before them. 
 
 Their new creations have long fallen into decay; but the 
 advantages gained on the 4th of August are eternal; viz. 
 freedom of labour, equality before the law, and the unity y 
 of the state. 
 
 Several days were spent in drawing up the decrees of 
 that single night, some of which, as being too vague, were 
 allowed to drop; others— such as the temporary continuance 
 of abolished institutions— were expressed with greater ac- 
 curacy. The sharpest discussion arose on the subject of tithes, 
 in which, for the first time, a strong dislike of everything ,, 
 ecclesiastical manifested itself in the Assembly. It was in vain 
 that Sieyes called on them, in the name of justice and the 
 public weal, not to make a present, without any redemption, 
 of 130 millions to the land-owners. Buzot replied, that having 
 
86 OVERTHROW OF FEUDALISM. [Book II. 
 
 lost their cause, the clergy should assume the grace of a 
 voluntary renunciation, and remember that all their property 
 belonged of right to the people. From a similar sentiment 
 proceeded the decree which forbade the payment of all 
 ecclesiastical dues to the Pope. In this instance the Assem- 
 bly went beyond the boimds of that historical necessity, which 
 sanctioned the other enactments. This was an arbitrary and 
 illegal act of aggression, in which the most dangerous ten- 
 dencies of the Revolution — hostility to the church, and con- 
 tempt of international law — were manifested in close connexion. 
 
Ch. III.] RIGHTS OF MAN. 87 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 EIGHTS OF MAN. 
 
 GeISERAL LAF.4YETTE. — HiS DECLARATION OF EIGHTS. PARTIES IN THE NATION.AL 
 
 ASSEMBLY. — ThE RIGHT. — ThE CENTRE. — ThE LEFT. — MiRABEAU. — CoM- 
 STITt'TIONAL QUESTIONS. SUSPENSIVE "VETO. 
 
 No one perhaps entered upon the future, which the 5th of 
 May 1789 opened to the French nation, with more restless 
 hopes, than general Lafayette. After having seen the American 
 war of liberation brought to a successful issue, he was busy 
 with the thought of a similar revolution in France. The 
 abuses of the old system were palpable to the eyes of all 
 men, and he too knew them just well enough to be able to 
 regard his inclinations as altogether patriotic. Among the 
 notables and in the Assembly of his own province, he spoke 
 against the dangers of the lettres de cachet, ^nd for the 
 necessity of the right of granting supjilies, and the con- 
 vocation of the States-general. He was able to judge of the 
 illegality of Brienne's violent measures against the parlia- 
 ments, and to attract attention by his opposition to them. 
 He thus extended that liberal reputation which he had 
 acquired by his crusade in America. He formed relations 
 with all the discontented spirits of the time, became an 
 intimate friend of the counsellor Duport, who was the very 
 sold of the parliamentary disturbances of ]788, and soon 
 became one of that small coterie which secretly guided the 
 opposition at that period. As a matter of course, his po- 
 pularity rapidly increased; and the more so because he dis- 
 played a decided talent in the character of prudent de- 
 magogue, and came to be regarded by men of very various 
 
88 RIGHTS OF MAN. [Book II. 
 
 ojjinions as their future leader, without at all exposing himself 
 to the displeasure of the ruling powers. He writes to a 
 friend that he had united himself with every species of op- 
 position, and used tools which must soon be broken — that he 
 liad tried every thing except civil war, and might have proceeded 
 even to that extremity if he had not held it in abhorrence. 
 
 He thus entered into the Assembly of the States-general, 
 not only to give his counsel, but prejDared for revolution. 
 He was not much observed at tirst, because in order to secure 
 his election he had given a promise to an aristocratic constit- 
 uency, only to advocate the union of the three orders in the 
 event of a formal decree to that effect of the nobles them- 
 selves ; and had thus deprived himself of the power of openly 
 takino- the side of the tiers etat. 
 
 Even on the 27tli of June, when the King ordered the 
 union of the three orders, he called on the chamber of 
 nobles to bear witness, how obedient he had been to his 
 instructions. As, however, his cpiality as deputy of the aris- 
 tocratic party appeared to him au incalculable misfortune, he 
 meditated getting himself elected anew as a member of the 
 tiers etat in some supplementary election. These difficulties, 
 however, did, not hinder him from secretly forming demo- 
 cratic connexions. The Breton club — a union of liberal 
 deputies, the majority of whom were representatives of 
 Bretagne— was formed under the leadership of his friend 
 Duport. Duport brought the Parisian democracy, which he 
 gradually organised, into connexion with this club; and 
 Lafayette, ftxvoured by his reputation and his wealth, knew 
 how to derive from it the greatest advantage for the exten- 
 sion of his influence. 
 
 The duke of Orleans, whose opposition to the court served 
 as a rallying point for most of these intrigues, endeavoured 
 to enter into relations with the young general as early as 
 the beginning of July; but Lafayette, who already knew his 
 own strength, and thoroughly despised the duke, coldly and 
 contemptuously rejected his advances. 
 
CH.ni.] FORMATION OF NATIONAL GUARD BY LAFAYETTE. 89 
 
 Mindful of his promise to his constituency Ldfayette did 
 not even yet vote in the Assembly; but he was not to be 
 restrained from bringing forward a favourite and characteristic 
 proposition, which gained for him the enthusiastic applause 
 —not indeed of all the liberals— but at any rate of all the 
 revolutionists. On the 11th of July, he proposed that a 
 declaration of the rigJifs of man sliould be issued on the 
 American model. 
 
 But before this question was put to the vote, the same 
 day decided in a different manner the position which he was 
 to hold. The appointment of the Bretcuil ministry proved 
 to the tiers etat, that other weapons besides those of the 
 rostra must be emj^loyed, and that the issue would depend 
 on the barricades of Paris, and the attitude assumed by the 
 army. In this position of affairs it appeared desirable to place 
 a man at the head of the Assembly who united in his own 
 person both popular and military qualities. 
 
 As the post of president was 'already occupied, the hitherto 
 unknown dignity of vice-f>resident was created, in order to 
 bestow it upon Lafayette, who was at that time the only 
 distinguished general in the liljeral party. 
 
 He accepted the office, and declared that the force of 
 circumstances compelled him to pay no further regard to 
 the instructions of his constituents, but to aid in the salvation 
 of his country. Tliis appointment was only a step to a 
 position of much greater actual power; and on the 15th, he 
 was proclaimed commander-in-chief of the people's army in 
 Paris, by the enthusiastic acclamations of the populace as- 
 sembled on the Place de Greve. This force was called at that 
 time the Civic Guard, Init Lafayette, with a view^ to the 
 union of all the militias in the kingdom, changed its name 
 to that of National Guard. It wore the colours of the cit}-, 
 blue and red; but the new commander-in-chief, in order to 
 distiuffuish it from the colours of the house of Orleans, 
 
 a 
 
 which were the same, added the Bourbon white, and then 
 electrified the hearts of the revolutionists by declaring that 
 
90 ■ RIGHTS OF MAN. [Book II. 
 
 this cockade would travel round the world. This was no 
 empty phrase, for he had already formed connexions in 
 Holland and Ireland, in order, hy raising distiirbances in 
 both these countries, to destroy the influence of England, 
 which lie had learned to hate in the American war. i He 
 was only restrained from a more extensive propaganda hy 
 the entreaties of the ministers, Necker and Montmorin, who 
 by no means wished to add to their difficulties at home by 
 foreign complications. 
 
 We see how little he was adapted for teaching the Revo- 
 lution to respect the rights of nations. 
 
 Still more momentous was the eflect of his proposal to 
 issue a declaration of the rights of man. He was not the 
 originator of the idea of imitating in France the manifesto 
 directed by the Americans against England. The same 
 proposition is found in several electoral caliiers; and in the 
 committee on the constitution, Sieyes, to whose abstract 
 tendencies it was well suited, carried a motion for making it 
 the subject of discussion. 
 
 There seemed indeed to be something in the air which led 
 men to busy themselves with political theories, and to make 
 an immediate application of them to the events of the day. 
 All traditionary law was uncertain, obnoxious to the new 
 ideas of freedom, and continually made the subject of dispute. 
 A deep, ardent, and justifiable conviction prevailed in men's 
 minds, that the future fabric of the state must be erected 
 upon entirely difi'ereut views of the physical and moral world; 
 and nothing was more natural than the wish of the reformers 
 to render the leading principles of those views, clear to 
 themselves, their contemporaries, and their posterity. Con- 
 sidered in this light, the declaration of rights, in spite of all 
 its faults and imperfections, will ever remain a mighty land- 
 mark between two ages of the world, and will for ever in- 
 dicate the source and direction of a new current in the 
 political life of Europe. 
 
 ^ Memoires, IV. 82. 
 
Ch. III.] FATAL MISTAICES OF THE ASSEMBLY. 
 
 91 
 
 It is, ncvertlieless, true that the form and manner in which 
 it was introduced reveal to us, in the clearest light, the 
 deadly sickness of the France of that day, and the terrible 
 nature of the impending crises. Lafiiyettc's motion for a 
 proclamation of the rights of man was a symptom of this 
 disease, and not a step towards its cure. The evil lay in 
 this, that no one in France stood any longer in any living 
 relation to the state— the state as it really and actually 
 existed;— that the lapse of several hundred years had only 
 developed iu one party the desire to make the state an engine 
 for the furtherance of its own interest, and in the other, 
 the ardent longing for equal enjoyments and privileges. 
 Every man thought of himself and his friends alone— no one 
 asked the question to what services he and every other 
 citizen ought to bind themselves, luider existing circum- 
 stances, in order to render the state capable of fulfilling their 
 wishes. Some voices in the Assembly— the abbe Gregoire and 
 the Jansenist Canuis— did, indeed, demand a declaration of 
 duties; but we may easily imagine that they produced but 
 httle effect; since they too took the ground of the universal 
 moral law, and thereby utterly failed in removing the real 
 faidt and danger of the declaration of riglits. Theoretical 
 definitions of universal moral principles brought them no 
 whit nearer to the accomplishment of the task before them; 
 on the contrary, they threatened to cover the land with a 
 flood of pernicious errors, since even the soundest j)hilo- 
 sophical principled cannot be applied to actual human life, 
 with its wants and fi^i-ssions, 'without considerable "modifi- 
 cations. But if the declaration of rights was to be made 
 capable of immediate application — if it was to assign to every 
 Frenchman, according to his position in the state, his rights 
 and duties — then it would be nothing else than the future 
 constitution itself; and nothing was more appropriate than 
 Mirabeau's proposal, that if a declaration of fundamental 
 principles Was wished for at all, it should be made after the 
 work of constructing the constitution had been accomplished. 
 
92 RIGHTS OF MAN. ■: [Book II. 
 
 Lafayette's motion contained three principal propositions; 
 all men are free and equal, and nothing but a regard for 
 the public good can be the source of any difference between 
 them; all men have the right to resist oppression; all 
 sovereignty has its origin in the peojjle; and no individual 
 may exercise any authority unless it be expressly entrusted 
 to him by the people. 
 
 He goes on to deduce from these jjrinciples freedom of 
 religion and the press — security of person and property — 
 submission to the law to which a man has either in person or 
 by representatives agreed — and sejjaration of the legislative, 
 executive, and judicial powers. All this, lastly, was laid 
 down, not as a programme of the future constitution, but as 
 the natural and universal right of all men; the previous 
 denial of which was both illegal and immoral. 
 
 The fundamental principle on which these projjositions 
 ,rested was highly significant. The movement which led^ to 
 the overthrow of the feudal system might be comjjreliended 
 in the words; — every thing for the people. Lafiiyette now 
 laid equal stress upon the second demand; — everything hj 
 the jD^ople. 
 
 In doing this he failed to see the difference between the 
 two propositions in respect to their feasibility. Every wise 
 government can shape the institutions of any state, with a 
 view to the public good, if it has but the will to do so. 
 But a nation creates a successful administration from its 
 own resources, not when it will, but when it can. The 
 mass of mankind cannot be gifted with political wisdom 
 by a mere verdict of the law that they have attained their 
 political majority, but by the diffusion of intellectual, and 
 still more of moral education. At the period of which we 
 speak the French nation was as badly prepared as pos- 
 sible for self-government'i the masses were sunk in the 
 deepest ignorance and the higher orders in an unexampled 
 immorality. 
 
 On the one side, there was a burning desire for revenge 
 
Cn. m.] DECLARATION OP EQUALITY. 93 
 
 and destruction, and, on tlio other, for dominion and wealth; 
 but nowhere an enlightened public spirit; and the majority 
 of the nation had just as much patriotism as is made up of 
 ii bold contempt for the dangers of war, and an instinctive 
 abhorrence of foreign countries. To summon such a people 
 to immediat_dpnd universal sovereignty, was to lead it through 
 the exhausting excesses of anarchy to the arms of protecting 
 despotisvii. 
 
 This mistake was rendered doubly pernicious by the world- 
 embracing form in which the proposition was made. It is 
 true indeed that not only the French, but every nation, ought 
 to be educated for self-government. But whether it will 
 decree by law the immediate exercise of self-government, 
 must be left to the option of each individual state; and the 
 vanity, which led Lafayette to regard himself and his Revo- 
 lution as liberators of the world, was an inflammatory 
 encroachment not only upon the order, but upon the 
 freedom, of all other states. We might perhaps excuse him 
 by remembering that the violent proceedings at Versailles 
 had at any rate the merit of giving an emphatic lesson to 
 pieoples and rulers how to carry on their future political 
 education; but then we nuist all the more deplore, that this 
 ideal public law was not more clearly thought out, and better 
 drawn up in its details. 
 
 Though Lafayette started upon the just principle, that 
 the dignity of man— the image of God— is reflected in every 
 human being, without respect to rank or possessions, yet he 
 falsified this principle in almost every application of it. 
 Instead of merely claiming equality before the law, he 
 demanded actual equality, and thereby annihilated all existing 
 rights. Instead of pointing out to the government the duty 
 of extending political knowledge more and more widely 
 among the pcoi^le, he proclaimed the right of every individual 
 to resist every unpopular law, and to do away with every 
 existing government. He thereby raised to the throne not 
 the will of the whole community, but the caprice of indivi- 
 
94 RIGHTS OF MAN. [Book II. 
 
 duals, not the reason which is common to all men, but the 
 aggregate of individual passions— to which he exposed not 
 only the state but private property, which is the foundation 
 of the most deejjly felt inequality. He in fact destroyed his 
 own nearest and dearest object, viz. the possibility of a 
 parliamentary constitution, and a democratic state. For, 
 according to his propositions, it is just as much slavery to 
 be obliged to obey the behest of elected representatives, as 
 the commands of an hereditary king. On these principles 
 no commonwealth could be founded but one in which the 
 mass of the people had not only the legislative and executive 
 power in their hands, but the right of breaking every self- 
 imposed obligation, and disposing of all kinds of property. 
 
 This is perhaps the idea of the social republic; but it is 
 just the really democratic state which most requires the 
 obedience of the individual to laws when once enacted, and 
 the respect of the state for individual rights when once 
 acquired. The more democratic the constitution of a state, 
 the more reason it has to reject Lafayette's "rights of man." 
 
 Lafiiyette and his friends had no clear idea of the bearings 
 of their own principles. In spite of all his longing for de- 
 mocratic reputation, he always retained the feelings of the 
 aristocratic gentleman; and in the heat of his pojoular zeal 
 had no presentiment of the communistic tendency of his 
 actions. His eyes were not opened by the fact that Marat 
 and Koljespierre — the two men who contributed more than 
 any one else to his subsequent overthrow — characterised 
 the declaration of the [rights of man as the one good deed 
 of the Assembly, and maintained that every other con- 
 stitution was superfluous. It was all the more melancholy 
 that the majority of the Assembly, though by no means 
 followers of Marat, took up the proposal of the general with 
 the greatest zeal, immediately after the storms of July. An 
 immense number of deputies announced their intention of 
 speaking, and scheme after scheme was brought forward in 
 quick succession. It is impossible to read any thing more 
 
Cn. III.] WAENIN6S OF MIRABEAU. 95 
 
 painful, tiresome and Imuuliating, than the discussion in 
 which the meaning of the -words right and freedom was 
 to be ascertained by a numerical majority, and the result 
 laid down as the standard of every citizen's obedience 
 towards the law, in all states and in all ages. An uncontrol- 
 lable zeal prevailed to remove all historical rubbish, and to 
 prepare a site for the erection of a universal state, founded 
 upon pure reason. 
 
 It was to no purpose that Malouet and Clermont-Tonnerre 
 warned them against these self-glorifying metaphysics; and 
 Mounier and Lally-Tollendal reminded them of the existing 
 prerogatives of the King. Mirabeau excited great discontent 
 when he more and more decidedly refused to have anything 
 to do with this abolition of all political order; and there 
 was at last a' most violent outbreak of wrath, when, both 
 from the rostra and through the press, he constantly ad- 
 vocated the expediency of deferring the declaration of rights 
 to more jjeaceful times, when the constitution should have 
 been completed. The Assembly waded indefatigably through 
 the miseries of this long debate. In spite of numberless 
 amendments, tl:^ discussion was at last brought to a close, 
 and on the 22ih of August the declaration of the rights 
 of man was completed. 
 
 It differed in almost every part from the wording of La- 
 fayette's original motion; yet it did not remove a single 
 fault of that motion, while it added to it many seeds 
 of confusion and dissolution. It committed not only the 
 criticism but the] initiation of the most important acts of 
 government, to the passing caprice of individuals and the 
 popular masses. 
 
 "Every citizen" says the sixth article, "has the right, in 
 person, or by his representatives, to take part in the making 
 of the laws." "Every citizen," says the fourteenth, "has the 
 right, either personally, or by bis representatives, to take 
 into consideration the necessity of the taxes;— freely to grant 
 them, to make a proposition as to their application, as well 
 
9G RIGHTS OF MAN. [Book If. 
 
 as to fix the mode "of their assessment; and to make any 
 alteration in them that may seem expedient." The Assem- 
 bly, it is true, meant nothing more by this enactment, than 
 that the representatives of the people should have the right 
 of making laws and granting taxes in their own hands, and 
 that the individual citizen should abide by the decree of the 
 Assembly. But it is evident, that the article itself made 
 the individual citizens competent, under certain circiun- 
 stances, to reverse this relation — to resume their original 
 rights, and then to declai'e any further action on the part 
 of the deputies unnecessary. With regard to the relation 
 between the citizens themselves, they tried to soften dovs'n 
 the general expression of Lafayette, "all men are equal," by 
 adding, "possess equal rights." But though they thus ren- 
 dered a better interpretation possible, they did not make 
 the more pernicious exjilanation of the clause impossible. 
 He who wished to do so might now understand the article 
 to mean, that the state left the road to the attainment of 
 every right equally open to every citizen; but he whose 
 wishes aimed higher found every reason in the wording of 
 this article to insist on the equalisation of the actual con- 
 dition of men, and not to endure anj' inequality whatever. 
 It was at this crisis that the future course of the Revolution 
 was decided; and it was now, also, that the revolutionary 
 parties assumed their distinctive form and colour. There 
 were three great divisions of the Assembly, which hencefor- 
 ward struggled for power, and soon separated from one 
 another by occu])ying different parts of the hall in 
 which they met. On the extreme right, sat most of the 
 nobles and bishops—the uncompromising adherents of the 
 ancien regime; who were ready indeed to make certain 
 reforms, but in principle firmly adhered to the views of the 
 2;3rd of June, according to which the people was to be 
 subordinate to the King, and the King to the ancient orders. 
 Their ninnbers decreased every day, Ijecause the noble- 
 men emigrated more and more frequently; partly from fear 
 
Ch. III.] THE THREE PARTIES IN THE ASSEMBLY. 97 
 
 of disturbances, and partly from hatred to the llevohition; 
 bnt those who were left seemed only to be possessed by a 
 more blind and violent zeal, which increased the exasperation 
 of their opponents. Their best representatives in the As- 
 sembly were, first, the Abbot Maury, a bold and insolent 
 speaker of superabundant talent, a man of abandoned life, 
 and so void of all moral earnestness that he readily changed 
 his colours at a later period. For the present, however, he 
 defended the monarchy, the law, and the church, by the 
 alternate wit and pathos of his oratory. Secondly, Captain 
 Cazales, a chivalrous officer sans joeur ct sans reproclie, a 
 mani of limited but honest judgment, of warm heart and 
 impetuous will, a ready debater, and always prepared to 
 defend his words against every opponent with his sword. 
 
 On the whole, this party displayed all the virtues, and 
 all the fiuilts, of the ancien regime — devoted courage, trifling 
 frivolity, and invincible obstinacy. They were ready to lose 
 their heads for their cause, but not to tise them rationallj^ 
 and seriously; they fought round the banner of discipline 
 and order, but were entirely incapable of sacrificing a single 
 prejudice or feeling to the necessities of their country or 
 party. 
 
 The Centre united the moderate men of the Eight and the 
 Left — the dejjuties, who, being convinced of the rottenness of 
 the old system, had defeated the violent measures of Breteuil 
 by the revolt of July, but regarded the llevohition as an 
 act of self-defence, and not as a permanent right,' and 
 wished, as soon as possible, to found the new political 
 system on the ruins of the old. 
 
 This party comprehended individual politicians of character 
 and talent— the eloquent and enthusiastic Lally-Tollendal — 
 the ever active and ever trustworthy Malouet— the clever 
 and learned Mounier, who had been the first in his province 
 to foretell the fall of feudalism, and who now, in the Assem- 
 bly, prophesied more clearly than the majority of his asso- 
 ciates, the dangers of the new system. 
 
 I. G 
 
98 RIGHTS OF MAN. [Book II. 
 
 His success was unfortunately but small. The great major- 
 ity of those who held the same opinions as he, were hon- 
 ourable men, enthusiastic for freedouj, longing for the re- 
 establishment of order, but without sufficient knowledge of 
 the covmtry; their education too was rather that of lawyers 
 than statesmen, and they M^ere ignorant of the primary 
 requisites of a good administration. They suflfercd, like- 
 wise, from all those disadvantages, which, in stormy times, 
 render the formation of a moderate party difficult; viz., the 
 weakness of critical reason, when opposed to the onset of 
 passion — the want of harmony in their own ranks — and the 
 clogging apjDrehension of the dangers which impended from 
 different quarters. All these difficiiltes, however, might have 
 been overcome; but there existed another, far more import- 
 ant, by which the fate of the party was decided. We need 
 not waste words in proving that the chief, nay the indispens- 
 able condition of success in the prosecution of their ob- 
 jects, was an absolute luiit)' between the Assembly and the 
 government. The ministry of the 15th .Tuly contained some 
 members of this party; and Necker, who had always belonged 
 to it, was at the head of that ministry. Every one would 
 suppose that the most imperative task of such a government 
 would be to extend and organise this party, and that they 
 would make it their especial care to reconcile all personal 
 animosities by their influence, and to silence by their au- 
 thority all differences of opinion. Such a task was quite 
 within the limits of human power, however difficult it might 
 be. Weak as the government at this time was, it possessed, 
 at any rate, the authority derived from official experience, 
 and superior technical skill; and great as was the mistrust 
 which prevailed in the Assembly, there were means of win- 
 ning and guiding all the members without exception. The 
 court, at this period, would have proved no obstacle; 
 the Pohgnac coterie was dispersed through all quarters of 
 the globe; the ciueen was bowed to the ground; and Louis XVI. 
 was without any will or aim of his own. In this direction, 
 
Ch. III.] NECKERS INCAPACITY AND FEEBLENESS. 99 
 
 therefore, Necker had his hands entirel}' free. But again 
 his utter incapacity was fully manifested. He not only did 
 nothing of any moment, either in forming a liberal govern- 
 ment party, or in assuming on the part of the government 
 a -wise initiative of sound reforms; but he did not even 
 attempt to do either the one or the other; nay, incredible 
 as it may seem, he was a real hindrance to any progress 
 in either of these directions. There was ill humour and 
 irritability enough among the deputies, but he was the most 
 irritable and sensitive of them all. The other ministers were 
 by no means men of high, creative talent, but he seemed to 
 make it a principle to prevent the government from shewing 
 any sign of life. He seldom came forward at all, and all 
 that we can report of his operations is, that he continued 
 to manoeuvre with the old financial measures — to irritate 
 the Assembl)- imnecessarily by finding fault with imimportant 
 trifles — timidly to yield to all the important demands of the 
 anarchists — and, lastly, to cling with unreasonable perti- 
 nacity to his office. No wonder then that he lost his in- 
 fluence in a week, his popularity in a month, and forfeited 
 his political existence in a year. No wonder that such a 
 government could jjrepare for the Revolution no other result 
 than anarchy and terrorism. 
 
 It was not the overpowering force of a principle, or the 
 uncontrollable impulse of a natural cause, • which brought 
 about the subsequent mischief, but personal deficiencies and 
 avoidable errors. An active and constructive policy on the 
 part of the Centre in 1789 had become impossible, not, as 
 the liight complained, because it had, on the 14th of July, 
 cast away the principle of authority ; not, as the Left noisily 
 declared, because it had lost its power by inconsistency and 
 treachery to the rause of freedom ; but because the new 
 birth of government was impeded by the government itself 
 
 On the left, lastly, sat the worshippers of the rights of 
 man, and the sovereignty of the people, j)«)- d simple;— . 
 the thorough-going opponents of the church and the aris- 
 
 6 2 
 
100 EIGHTS OF MAN. [Book IL 
 
 tocracy— the entlnisiastic advocates of unchecked agitation in 
 the popular masses. The great majority of these could al- 
 ways be roused to enthusiasm, by the words, "country, free- 
 dom, rights!" It seemed to them impossible to go too far; 
 they did not believe that a state could be injured by be- 
 stowing too extensive privileges ujoon the incapable, or that 
 a people could be ruined by the too umbridled liberty of 
 the unworthy. They still lived in the triumphant storming 
 of the Bastille. 
 
 The evils of the ancien regime were ever before their eyes, 
 and they thought that its destruction and their own victory 
 could never be sufficiently complete. Whatever ^vas in any 
 degree connected with the former state of things — court 
 and clergy, nobility and parliaments — they looked U230n with 
 distrust and dislike; whatever was ojiposed to these was 
 regarded with admiration or treated with palliative indul- 
 gence. Most of them were personally blameless men, but 
 their intelligence and character were inadeciuate for the task 
 before them ; and their excitable natures needed, above all 
 things, the steady guidance of a liberal government. 
 
 Since this, as we have seem, was entirely wanting, the 
 party fell into the hands of the leading demagogues among 
 them, not one of whom deserved, by his talent or his jjoli- 
 tical sentiments, so important a position. Sieyes, who, at 
 an earlier and a later period, succeeded in influencing them, 
 had at that time sulkily abstained from taking part in the 
 debates. lie was succeeded by another churchman, Bishop 
 Talleyrand d'Antuu, a nobleman of high rank, who in con- 
 sequence of a laodily defect had entered the clerical profes- 
 sion, with most profane and worldly sentiments. 
 
 This man was a very paragon of supple intellect and cool 
 calculating knowledge of the world; good-humoured in 
 private intercourse, but unconsciencious and rapacious in the 
 important business of life. 
 
 The leaders of the Breton club made themselves remarkable 
 by their violent radicalism. In close intimacy with the acute 
 
Cn. III.] LEADERS OF THE BRETON CLUB. loi 
 
 and consistent logician Duport were the chevalier Lameth, 
 and Barnave the advocate; the former of these was a shallow 
 empty-headed, but extremely restless and presumptuous man; 
 the latter an enthusiastic and impetuous orator, pure in his 
 morals, and amiable in his character, but carried away for 
 the moment by a boundless fanaticism. Their friends used 
 to characterize these three men by saying, that what Duport 
 thought, Barnave expressed in his orations, and Lameth 
 carried out in his actions. 
 
 StiU farther to the left sat a small group of adherents of 
 the Duke of Orleans;— men, without exception, as abandoned 
 as their patron, who exercised no influence in the Assembly, 
 but were dangerous from their connexion with the worst 
 portion of the Parisian mo!). Beyond these, finally, was a 
 small group on the extreme left, who seldom put themselves 
 forward for the present, but regarded all that had hitherto 
 been done as merely a superficial commencement of the real 
 revolution, and hoped for a democratic future. At their head 
 were the lawyers Petion of Chartres, Buzot of Evreux, and 
 Robespierre of Arras. ' 
 
 The only statesman in the Assembly — the only man who 
 could guide them to the completion of their task—was Mira- 
 beau.2 This extraordinary man was born A. D. 1749, and 
 was therefore in the prime of life. Nature had bestowed 
 her gifts upon him with a most lavish profusion. His father, 
 a clever but self-willed and whimsical man, beheld with aston- 
 ishment the extraordinary endowments of his son, the wealth 
 of his genius, his charming amiability and his wild passions. 
 He thought he must regulate and control a character like 
 this by the severest discipline; and the violent resistance of 
 
 ' Louis Blanc, B I. ch. 8, from etait par sa conviction, les consetjiien- 
 
 Unpubliahed Letters of Robespierre (on ces siipremes." — ' L. Blanc says: 
 
 occasion of the procession of May "II y avait dans I'Assemblee un 
 
 4th 1789): "Un seiil dans ce cortege, c^uatrieme parti — ce parti etait un 
 
 un seul presentait alors, illumine cLu'il hommCj et cet homme etait Mirabeau. 
 
102 RIGHTS OF MAN. [Book II 
 
 his son led him step by ste}-) to the greatest tyranny. The 
 unavoidable consequenues soon followed; the son broke all 
 the ties which bound him to his father, home and family, 
 rushed into the wildest excesses, and forfeited for ever the 
 nobility of moral purity and innocence. 
 
 But his intellect was constructed on so gigantic a scale, 
 that it passed unscathed through the foul debauchery of his 
 life. He had never gone through any regular course of 
 study, but in the midst of his saturnalia he was able to seize 
 with surjiassing genius on all that was presented to his 
 notice — politics and history — administration and finance — 
 legal and constitutional questions. Long before the Eevolu- 
 tion broke out, he had made up his mind as to its necessity, 
 and the course which it woidd take. Though as proud an 
 aristocrat as any of the orthodox cavaliers, he tracked out 
 the rottenness of the feudal state with burning and patriotic 
 hatred; and in a scries of masterly controversial pamphlets, 
 he pourtrayed the picture of the future France, in sharply 
 defined and brilliant features. 
 
 He gave the death-blow to Calonne's unconsciencious finan- 
 cial 2Jolicy, and branded the weakness of Necker, while the 
 rest of the world still reararded him as the infallible god of 
 political economy. Even at that time he occupied the highest 
 place in public attention. Short, thickset, marked with the 
 small-pox, and cynical as he was, he enchanted every one 
 hj his conversation, and shook the hearts of his hearers by 
 his incomparable eloquence. Never, perhaps, did a parlia- 
 mentary statesman excite such ardent admiration or such 
 bitter hatred. Whilst the liberals, as early as 1785, regarded 
 him as the only man worthy of being minister of finance, 
 he was looked upon by the adherents of the ancien 7-egime 
 as the real fire-brand of the Revolution. The ministers, at 
 the very beginning of the elections, wished to transport 
 Mirabeau to the East Indies, as the most dangerous of de-* 
 magogues; but were prevented from doing so by the good- 
 natured intervention of the King. 
 
Cii. III.] RELATION OP THE ASSEMBLY TO THE KING. 
 
 103 
 
 It was a part of the healthy grandeur of his character, 
 that circumstances like these did not make the smallest im- 
 pression upon him ; vast as his ambition was, he was entirely 
 free from personal sensitiveness, and selfish irritability. He 
 wished to rule France, because he thought that he himself 
 possessed — and e.vehish-ehj possessed— the power to do so. 
 He struck aU presumptuous mediocrity with crushing blows, 
 but he had no other thought or wish in his own mind than 
 that his power should contribute' to the welfore of his country. 
 
 Such was the Assembly, which now prepared to follow up 
 the declaration of the Rights of man, by drawing up the 
 constitution. In doing this, will the Assembly develope the 
 principles of that declaration, or prove untrue to them in 
 the very first steps they take ? 
 
 They began with the intention of proceeding very slowly 
 and methodically, from the rights of the citizens to those of 
 the nation — from the nation to its representatives — and from 
 the representatives to the King. But such a mode of 
 proceeding was not suited to this divided, inflammable, and 
 inexperienced Assembly ; and the whole circumstances of the 
 case impelled them to the consideration and settlement of a 
 few great leading points. The debate therefore cpiickly broke 
 through all rules and previous arrangements, and before they 
 were aware of it, the different parties found themselves 
 engaged in a conflict about the most comprehensive of all 
 political questions — the relation of the Assembly to the King. 
 AU the antagonistic principles of difi'erent systems, and all 
 the inflammable materials of practical politics, were here 
 united. 
 
 By degrees the contest came to turn upon the following 
 points; shall the legislative body be divided into difi'erent 
 chambers? shall there be an interval between its sessions? 
 shall the King receive in the new constitution any share in 
 the legislative authority? Ought any part to be awarded to 
 the King in drawing up the future constitution? 
 
 The report of the committee on these questions proceeded 
 
104 RIGHTS OF MAN. [Book II. 
 
 from the coterie to which Necker had formerly considered 
 himself to Ijelong, and of which Mounier was now the 
 head, and several liberal noblemen, Lally-Tollendal and 
 Clermont-Tonnerre, &c., the principal organs. They had 
 all zealonsly contributed to the overthrow of the feudal 
 state, and their aim at present was directed towards 
 a democratic modification of the English constitution. In 
 addition to the representatives of the people, they desired to 
 have a senate composed of members for life; they advocated 
 triennial parliaments, and uninterrupted sessions ; and they 
 held that no law ought to be considered valid, without the 
 consent of both houses, and the sanction of the King. 
 
 Of these motions the one which advocated the permanent 
 session of parliament was sure to be carried; since it was 
 brought forward by the Centre, and was entirely in accord- 
 ance with the principles of the Left. The other, which pro- 
 posed two chambers was fiercely debated. The Left rose in 
 tumultuous opposition to it, and protested against such a 
 violation of the original Rights of man. Mirabeau, who had 
 as much weight as a whole party, was indifferent on this 
 head, but he rather inclined to the system of one chamber, 
 which should carry on its business in two divisions; and, 
 lastly, the Eight grudged their liberal colleagues the satisfac- 
 tion of occupying the new chamber of fieers. It was soon 
 apparent, therefore, that this motion wovild be lost by an 
 overwhelming majority. Consecpiently, all the doubts, the 
 interests, and the passions of the Assembly were directed 
 towards the third question — the right of the King to put his 
 veto on a decree of the chamber. 
 
 On this occasion it was not the Centre, but the Left, which 
 stood alone. It was not merely the Right which zealously 
 fought for the King, but even Mirabeau had maintained the 
 same views with effective energy, in the month of June, 
 when the union of the different orders was discussed. 
 
 If he did this at a time when power and its abuses were 
 all on the side of the crown, he was still less inclined to 
 
Cb. III.] ATTEMl'S AT INSURRECTION. 105 
 
 weaken the royal authority, now that the government was 
 nothing, and the parHament omnipotent. The opinions of 
 the majority were elearly manifested soon afterwards, when 
 a decided royidist was elected to the presidential chair. > 
 The Left foresaw their own defeat, and resorted to every means 
 to gain by intimidation, what was denied them by the free 
 votes of the majority. Their adherents in Paris threatened 
 an armed expedition to "N^crsailles, to turn the traitors out 
 of the Assembly; and a notorious brawler, the Marquis 
 St. Iluruge, tried to set an armed mob in motion for this 
 purpose. But the National guard immediately put an end 
 to this disturbance, and St. Iluruge ran roaring away from 
 their patrols. 
 
 It was well known at Versailles that the real poM'er of 
 the capital was in the hands of the commander of the National 
 guard, general Lafayette. Several of the deputies who were 
 seriously afraid of the agitators, enquired with double anxiety 
 after the views of this sole saviour and protector; and like 
 the deputies, the ministers, too, asked this civic dictator his 
 opinion of the veto. With strong protestations of obedience 
 and loyalty, he replied that he had no objection to the 
 absolute veto per se; but, he said, it was possible that dis- 
 turbances might arise, and therefore advised the expedient 
 of a merely postponing veto, and, lastly, he begged the gov- 
 ernment above all tilings to make the King popular in 
 Paris. ^ 
 
 Hereupon Necker thought it a master-stroke to propose this 
 expedient to the Assembly in the name of the King himself; 
 
 ^LouisBIanc, B.ll. ch. t ; quotesthe explain his views sans crainie de 
 
 words of Desmoulins: '-Nous n'etions murmures. — ^ Tills has been lately 
 
 pas alors plus de dix republicains en confirmed by his correspondence with 
 
 France." When Robespierre wished Ijatonr-Maubourg at the close of 
 
 to discuss the proposition — "The Vol. I. of Mortimer-Ternaux's Hist. 
 
 French constitutionis monarchical" — dc la Tcncur. 
 he begged to be allowed fully to 
 
106 EIGHTS OF MAN. ■ [Book II. 
 
 the King, lie said, would give up his veto, if two following 
 Assemblies adhered to the same resolution. 
 
 The effect of this projjosal was immense. All the wavering 
 spirits forsook the cause which had forsaken itself; the system 
 of two chamljers was rejected on the 10th, and on the 11th 
 the susf)cnsivc veto carried by a large majority. It was in 
 vain that the royalists, in desperation, objected, that the King 
 could have no voice respecting the constitution, which could 
 alone grant him the right of sanction or of veto — and that 
 the Assembly itself was merely constituent. Such a declar- 
 ation, proceeding from such a quarter, might serve to show 
 more plainly the complicated lock in public affairs, but could 
 not avert the defeat of the royal cause : the Left, on the other 
 hand, followed up their advantage with energy, and when 
 the question was brought forward, through how many sit- 
 tings of the chamber the veto was to remain in force, 
 Barnave proposed to defer the settlement of this point, 
 luitil the King had sanctioned the decrees of 4th August. 
 Whereupon Necker, who had already deprived the King of 
 his veto, was shortsighted enough to put into the royal mouth 
 a pedantic criticism of the decrees themselves. Numerous 
 motions were then lirought forward that the chamber should 
 adopt in a formal resolution the opinions lately expressed 
 by Mounier and Mirabeau, in opposition to Necker, viz. 
 that the King had nothing whatever to do with the settlement 
 of the constitution, but had simi^ly to promulgate the decrees 
 of the national will. Such a resolution, when once it had 
 become law, woidd have been equivalent to the deposition 
 of the King; but on this occasion Mirabeau came to the 
 rescue. To have come forward as a defender of the King, 
 would only have injured himself and his cause; and he seized 
 with angry delight the opportunity of humbling Necker. 
 With the thundering force of his eloquence he set up the 
 omnipotence of the Assembly, in opposition to the critical 
 explanations of the minister. He said that if the King 
 refused to obey, they must disregard him altogether; that 
 
Cu. III.] SUSPENSIVE VETO. 107 
 
 the Assembly had hitherto wisely refrained from discussing 
 the royal sanction to the constitution, because they had the 
 greatest confidence in the goodness of the royal intentions; 
 that the King should beware how he tore away the veil with 
 his own hand. The Assembly thus raised to a proud self- 
 consciousness, allowed itself to be appeased without coming 
 to any decision, and Nccker hastened to procure the un- 
 conditional acceptance of the decrees on the part of the King, 
 with the least possible delay. The d\iration of the veto was 
 then extended on 21st September, according to the wish of 
 the minister, to two sessions. The monarchy thus suffered, 
 after all, another defeat, and the principles of the rights of 
 man penetrated more and more deeply into the political 
 life of the nation. 
 
108 THE CAPITAL. [Book If. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 THE CAPITAL. 
 
 CoNIlSUANCE OF ANARCHV IN THE PROVINCES. — NeW AUXnORITIES IN PARIS. 
 
 Their contest with the democrats. — Social question. — Orleans 
 WISHES to drive awav the king.— Lai'avette wishes to take him 
 to PARIS. — Revolt of oct. 5tii. — October 6th. — The king to paris. 
 
 The confusion in the jirovinces continued even after the 
 decrees of August. The Ijenefits of these enactments were 
 not made available to the people by a firm maintenance of 
 order; and, on the other hand, the violations of 2irivate rights, 
 which they rendered necessary, were made more injurious, 
 by the proclamation of the rights of man. The peasants 
 hunted their former lords like wild beasts, iu the name of 
 the sacred duty of insurrection; and they withheld the dues 
 which had been spared by the decree of the 4th, as a pro- 
 perty which was not serviceable to the commonwealth. They 
 paid, moreover, but few taxes to the state itself, on the 
 ground that they had never yet personally granted a tax; 
 in short licence and disorder got the upper hand in all 
 directions. 
 
 The fate of the National Assembly ^\'as the usual one in 
 such cases, when the physician tries a soothing remedy 
 without comprehending the real source of the disease— and 
 just the best-meant measures had in the end the most in- 
 jurious consecxuences. In order that the impotence of the 
 ■provincial authorities might not put a complete stop to 
 business, the Assembly took the government of the provinces 
 into its own hands, by means of committees of administration 
 and of police. The inevitable consequence was the openly 
 
Ch. IV.] POWER OF THE MUNICIPALITY. 109 
 
 declared insignificance of the ministers, whom no one could 
 any longer regard as holding the reins of power. In order 
 to restore the safety of person and property, the Assembly 
 further bestowed on the civic authorities the right of calling 
 out the troops of the line; but as this power was not vested 
 in any other authority, the ministry found itself deP^^dent 
 for its personal preservation on the municipality of the 
 capital. ^Ye shall see hereafter of what enormous consequence 
 this circumstance became. 
 
 In Paris, meanwhile, the new order of things made slow 
 but continual progress. The centre of government was formed 
 by the representatives of the districts, whose numbers were 
 originally 120, but were soon increased to 240 and then to 
 300; they had to deliberate and decide on all questions, 
 where permanent regulations and more serious expenditure 
 were concerned. The care of the current administi'ation, or, 
 as they preferred calling it, the executive power, was in the 
 hands of the mayor and the town council, which was chosen 
 by and from the above-mentioned representatives, and carried 
 on its business by means of committees. The honest BaiUy, 
 who loved to employ himself with political questions in his 
 study, and had presided in the tennis-court with patriotic 
 pride, found himself, all at once, at the head of an admin- 
 istration, with a task of infinite difficulty before him, with 
 a terrible responsibility, and very inadequate means. It was 
 long before any kind of order could be introduced into the 
 transaction of business; everybody, in fact, had to be prepared 
 for every office; and when they had tasked every power 
 from early morning till late in the night, they were thankful 
 if things were in as tolerable a state as before. The last 
 thing they could look for was appreciation of their services; 
 for, since July, all the world possessed both the desire and 
 the ability to rule. The municipality criticized the mayor, 
 and the great committee criticised the municipality; and 
 Bailly was at a loss to understand how his zeal deserved 
 so many votes of want of confidence. 
 
110 THE CAPITAL. [Book II. 
 
 Every district, moreover, had its assembly, and its pre- 
 sident, and these zealously vied with one another in taking 
 charge of the commonwealth, and a dozen times a day, lent 
 their snpport to the Hotel de Ville in the shape of demands 
 and admonitions! To add to the confusion, tlie trade cor- 
 porations began to bestir themselves. The journeymen shoe- 
 makers demanded an increase of wages, and restriction of 
 the cobblers. The hair-dressers demanded a reduction of 
 the apprentice tax; the butchers set up their meat stalls how 
 and where they pleased, declaring that they would suffer no 
 reaction against tlieir sovereign will; and the mimicipality 
 allowed matters to take their own course. 
 
 At first, indeed, the new authorities had every reason to 
 be cautions in their movements; for, since the 14th of July, 
 every man was armed, and, in addition to the muskets of 
 the Hotel des Invalides, there were fifty thousand i^kes in 
 the hands of the proletaries. It was Lafayette's first care 
 to change this condition of things, by bringing the new 
 National guard into a state of completeness, and gradually 
 disarming the rest of the populace. Every district furnished 
 four cojnpanies of a hundred men each; the officers were 
 elected in the district Assembly; and as the men were rather 
 expensively accoutred, the poorest class was necessarily ex- 
 cluded. To these were added one company of paid troops 
 in each district, called the "company of the centre," consist- 
 ing mostly of old French guardsmen, M-hose officers at this 
 time were appointed by Lafayette. ^ The general quickly 
 succeeded in attaching them to his person, and the unpaid 
 guards also rendered him an unconditional obedience. At the 
 head of these :TO,000 men,~the only available force in the 
 kingdom,— Lafayette was the real master of Paris, and con- 
 sequently, without question, the most powerful man in 
 the state. 
 
 "When these military arrangements had been completed 
 
 1 Besides these, there were eight companies of cavalry. Poisson, I, 83. 
 
Ch. IV.] VAGRANT POPULATION OF FRANCE. Ill 
 
 the municipality \yas able to breatlie more freely, and to enter 
 upon a contest, which they had hitherto deferred by making 
 concessions. The meetings in the Palais Royal were still 
 continually held, and those who composed them prided them- 
 selves on having saved the state by the Revolution of July; 
 and had no idea of allowing themselves to be tyrannised 
 over by the civic authorities. 
 
 The habihtes of the Palais Royal, who were at that time 
 roused to enthusiasm bj- Desmoulins, St. Ilnruge, Loustalot, 
 and others, were of an entirely different class from those 
 who are seen under similar circumstances at the present day. 
 Modern revolutions also know those vagabonds, who sud- 
 denly emerge from the ground at the outbreak of disorder, 
 and who far surpass the native population in wildness and 
 audacity. But the numbers of the latter are not to be com- 
 pared with those of the times of which we speak. In the 
 revolutionary convulsions of 1789 to 1795, the importance 
 of the houseless and vagrant population can hardly be rated 
 too highly. The surveillance of the police, and the care of 
 the poor, was much less complete, and the production and 
 distribution of the necessaries of life far less regular and 
 certain, than at present. 
 
 A scarcity of provisions, and consequent famine, were 
 matters of frequent occurrence, and drove immense masses 
 of men from their familiar haunts. The government had 
 continually to struggle with this danger. In the reign of 
 Louis XIV., swarms of beggars, to the number of hundreds 
 and thousands, made their appearance, and proved a real 
 plague to the villages, on which they often levied contri- 
 butions with open violence. The state had no means against 
 the claims of their misery but severe punishments; no wonder 
 then that the evil was transmitted in its full miserable 
 extent from one generation to another, and that riot every 
 where found in these swarms of desperate men a force 
 always ready to proceed to the worst extremities. "There 
 are in Paris," said Loustalot on one occasion, "40,000 strangers, 
 
112 THE CAPITAL. [Book IT. 
 
 who have no settled employment, and live in lodgings; for 
 these the Palais Eoyal serves as the place of meeting."' 
 Another difference between the Paris of those times, and 
 the Paris of to-day, was owing to the circumstance that 
 there were then no factory workmen, united together in 
 disciplined masses by the fact of their being employed on 
 the same machinery. 
 
 The kernel, therefore, of the assembly in the Palais Royal 
 was formed by the journeymen and the poorer master-work- 
 men, whose position was generally far more needy than that 
 of the artisans of the present day. 
 
 It was nuicli easier then than now, under favourable cir- 
 cumstances, to kindle a flame in these loosely connected ma- 
 terials, especially as their political ignorance was far greater; 
 but it was also easier, by the employment of the requisite 
 address, to allay a seemingly terrible excitement. In the 
 jjreseut day it takes longer to put the closely connected 
 masses of workmen into motion; liut when once aroused, they 
 show greater endurance and perseverance; such events as 
 the battles in the streets of Paris in June 1848, wovdd have 
 been simply impossible at the period of the first Revolution. 
 
 The Palais Royal had different methods ot keejjing its 
 adherents in train. As the excitement, at that time, pro- 
 ceeded from the position of the whole state, and all hopes 
 and fears and passions were natiu-ally raised to the highest 
 pitch, it needed laut little art and troiible to keep the popular 
 waves in perpetual motion. The most powerful engine was 
 the press, which covered every house with its placards, filled 
 the streets with its criers, and spread its journals through 
 all classes. People were far more easily satisfied in this 
 respect than at present; most of the newspapers appeared 
 in a small 8vo form — the most inHueutial of them only once 
 a week — and were often adorned with horrible wood-cuts. 
 
 ^ Louis Blanc, B. IV. cli. 2, on the autliority of jMouteil, reckons the 
 number of vaoTant be2;sars in 17S9 at two millions. 
 
Ch. IV.] THE PKESS AND CLUBS OF PARIS. 113 
 
 The writers confined themselves to drastic disquisitions on 
 the most popular questions of the day; and appealed— 
 without any attempt to instruct or systematize— to the favourite 
 passions of the reader; and, consequently, produced a far 
 greater effect than our own great journals. If we except 
 the "French Mercury" of Mallet du Pan, and Mirabeau's 
 "Courrier de la Provence," the press, of which we speak, 
 was similar to the German democratic papers of 1848, whether 
 we look at the education and taste, or the opinions and 
 character, of its editors. 
 
 Its historical importance was rendered greater than that 
 of the modern German newspapers, not by the superiority 
 of its writers, but by the greater excitability of the French 
 nation. The most gifted of these journalists was, indispu- 
 tably, Camille Desmoulins, in whose easy ccmserie, patriotism 
 and licentiousness, love of freedom and venomous scorn, 
 grace and cruelty, were continually mingled. His virritings 
 were like flowers upon a dunghill, and his life like a many- 
 coloured, but scorchingand quickly extinguished firework. By 
 his side marched Loustalot with sedater step, whose clumsy 
 bitterness was redeemed by the earnestness of a genuine 
 conviction, and an excitement which devoured his own heart; 
 while Paul Marat, the "friend of the people," complacently 
 displayed, in every number, his boiling hatred, his restless 
 suspicion, and his half-demented conceit. A singular feature 
 of the times, by the way, was the monopoly possessed by 
 this press for the whole of France. It was only by degrees 
 that newspapers were established here and there in the 
 j)rovinces, and even to these the Parisian papers continued 
 to give the tone ; Loustalot e. g. had for a time 200,000 
 subscribers. 
 
 Side by side with the press, the clubs now began to oper- 
 ate. The Breton club had. some branches in Paris and the 
 neighbouring towns; and another— the club ofMontrouge— 
 made itself conspicuous by a somewhat coarser popularity; 
 but all these were as yet in their cradle, and had but little 
 
 I. H 
 
114 THE CAPITAL. [Book II. 
 
 influence. Far more active were single coteries, united to- 
 gether for transient purjDoses; the foremost of which was 
 composed of the friends of the Duke of Orleans — Bfron, La 
 Clos and Sillery. These men still hoped to raise the Duke 
 to the position of lieutenant-general or regent, and spent large 
 sums on influential demagogues, by which means they stamped 
 all the popular movements with their own impress, and gave 
 to the Orleans party a far greater name than really belonged 
 to it. Their loudest organ in the Palais Royal was St. 
 Huruge ; and beyond the Seine, Danton, the lawyer, agitated 
 the district of the Cordeliers. "Come," said he to a friend, 
 "and howl with us, you will earn much money, and you 
 can still choose your party afterwards." ^ 
 
 The subjects, by the discussion of which these leaders 
 inflamed the p)assions of their crowded audience, were the 
 same as in all other revohitions ; — the same as have done 
 good service in our own times. Among us, men spoke of 
 the threatening "reaction", and the "social question"; while 
 at the time of which we speak, they made use of the simpler 
 terms, "consjDiracy of the aristocrats" and "dear bread". 
 The slightest symptom of these evils led to tumults, rob- 
 beries, homicide, and, as was naturally the case, the final 
 object of all complaints was the nearest magistracy— that 
 of the Hotel de Ville. On one occasion a crowd stopped 
 a boat, in which by command of the commune, gunpowder 
 was being conveyed away; some one read in the permit 
 poudrc de traitrc instead of poudrc de traife, ^ and imme- 
 diately a furious tumult broke out, in which the life of the 
 accused officer was rescued with extreme difficulty. It 
 often occurred that the bakers, whose lives were not safe if 
 their bread was not sufficient in c[uantity, or not agreeable 
 to the taste of the people, plundered the convoys of flour 
 
 ' The name of this man was de traite is bad powder which the 
 
 Lavaux. Extracts from his adven- slave ships carried to exchange for 
 
 tures are given by Villenave, Bio- nen-roes. 
 graphie univ., art. Danton. — ^ Potidre 
 
Cn. IV.] "BOURGEOISIE" AND "PEOPLE." 1]5 
 
 which had been ordered by the city; and then the Palais 
 Eoyal abused the wretched administration, for not putting 
 an end to the scarcity, by hanging the corn usurers. When 
 the uniforms of the National Guard made their appearance, 
 a cry of horror ran through the whole Palais Royal; now, 
 they cried, freedom was for ever lost, and the aristocracy 
 of wealth had succeeded to the aristocracy of birth. In 
 short, the communal authorities were soon convinced that 
 either their power, or that of the Palais Royal, must come 
 to an end. Their first measures were directed against the 
 hole-and-corner Press, and they ordered that nothing 
 should be printed without the name of a responsible editor. 
 When the Palais Royal tlmndered against such a tyrannical 
 and oppressive order, which trampled on the very first prin- 
 ciples of law, the commvme forbad all seditious Assemblies; 
 whereupon the Palais Royal issued a violent protest and 
 openly refused obedience. The National Guard then inter- 
 fered — cleared the garden by their patrols — closed the cafes — 
 and hunted down and arrested a great number of people. 
 The patriots were furious, and now for the first time a new 
 distinction of classes was publicly spoken of, of which we 
 have heard so much in our own day. The people were 
 called upon to rise against the tyranny of the Bourgeoisie. 
 This designation dated from the times of the ancien regime 
 when by "bourgeoisie" was understood the hereditary pos- 
 sessors of municipal offices; and by "people" the great mass 
 of the other citizens. Now, however, 'bourgeoisie signified the 
 freely elected magistrates, who upheld the freely enacted 
 laws; and people, any chance mob, which, in virtue of its 
 sovereign will, chose to transgress the laws. As the latter 
 was chiefly composed of journeymen, we may trace the 
 transition to the present mode of speaking, in which the 
 word "people" me<ans working men, and "bourgeoisie," the 
 rest of the population. 
 
 The social question would have given tlie authorities 
 trouble enough, even without the riots in the Palais Royal. 
 
 h2 
 
116 THE CAPITAL. [Book II. 
 
 Private trade had never sufficed to procure for the capital 
 the necessary quantity of provisions ; and under present cir- 
 cu.mstances the state of things had become much worse, 
 because the disturbances in the city had put a complete Stop 
 to business. A bad harvest, too, had increased the price of 
 corn, 'and every town endeavoured to keep its own supply 
 for its own use. ^ But nothing was more certain, than that ■ 
 an actual interruption of the supplies of corn would bring 
 on a terrible outbreak of popular fury ; and there was no 
 point with res2:)ect to which the new authorities were op- 
 pressed by a heavier responsibility. In order to furnish a 
 pound of bread at the usual price of three sous, the town 
 had to buy up considerable quantities of corn at a high 
 price, in foreign countries, and then to sell it cheaply to 
 the bakers. But it was not enough to j)iit bread into the 
 bakers' shojos at a heavy loss, the city had very soon to give 
 the lower classes money to buy that bread. As many of- 
 the manufacturers had stopped work, a large number of 
 workmen were starving, and streams of vagabonds continued 
 to pour into the city from all quarters. To p)reserve peace, 
 23ublic workshops were erected on the Montmartre, where 
 17,000 people received 20 sous a day as wages. The result 
 was the same as in the national workshops of 1848; the 
 majority of workmen only appeared when the weekly wages 
 were paid ; and at other times looked out for some different 
 employment, or studied politics in the Palais Eoyal. The 
 city treasury was all the less able to meet this expenditure, 
 because its best source of income— the octroi — had been 
 dried up, when the harrieres were destroyed. Eecourse, 
 therefore, was had to the Central Government. The Na- 
 tional Assembly knew no better means of remedying the 
 
 'Loiiis Blanc, who overlooks these thunders against the corn usurers as 
 
 powerful causes, and sees in every authors of the mischief. Conf. infra 
 
 attempt to stop disorder, a culpable B. II. ch. 4 for an opposite view 
 
 oppression of the people by the of the case, 
 bourgeoisie, constantly launches his 
 
Ch. IV.] FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES. 117 
 
 evil than the publication of the decree of the 29th of August, 
 which proclaimed free-trade in corn, and forbade the ex- 
 portation of it under the penalty of high treason. This 
 measure, of course, could bring no immediate help; for 
 Necker was confessedly suiFering under a terrible deficit, and 
 yet BaiUy assured him that if he did not find money a new 
 revolution would break out. The state, therefore, had to 
 undertake the maintenance of the city of Paris. It defrayed 
 the cost of the piu-chase of corn, on condition of receiving 
 back the produce of the sale. But the need increased con- 
 tinually; and as early as September the city not only con- 
 sumed that produce, but demanded additional millions. 
 
 The government paid a premium to the private traders, 
 for every importation of corn ; advanced money to the poorer 
 bakers, and negociated immense supplies in foreign coun- 
 tries. They attained however one object, inasmuch as they 
 were not obliged to live from day to day as in July, but 
 were provided for several months in advance. But money, 
 and again money, was the purport of every despatch which 
 Bailly sent to Necker. 
 
 General Lafayette brought in bills of another kind. He 
 was the hero of the day, the darling of the capital, the 
 centre of Parisian politics, and such a position was not to 
 be maintained without dexterity, or without funds. 
 
 The general possessed the former in a high degree, and 
 managed to procure the latter. The good-humoured Bailly, 
 who was almost overwhelmed by the troublesome details 
 of his office, was constantly at war with the great council of 
 the commune. Lafayette— who, outside his military sphere, 
 only kept up his influence by secret confidants, whom he 
 possessed in every quarter— was courted by the council in 
 the most marked manner. Immediately after his entrance 
 into office, he organized a police of his own under the 
 direction of Semonville and Talon, which first took Paris 
 under its surveillance, and afterwards Versailles, the court, 
 and the National Assembly. Lafayette possessed in Talon 
 
lis THE CAPITAL. [Book II. 
 
 who was civil Lieutenant of the Cour du Chatelet, a devoted 
 instrument in this tribunal, which had just received from 
 the National Assembly a commission to conduct all political 
 causes. When, lastly, the city also appointed a committee 
 of high police, many attacjied adherents of the general formed 
 part of it. By all these means he became the real lord 
 and master of Paris, and so iiifinite was the importance of 
 the capital, that he may be regarded as the third estate of 
 the realm, by the side of the King and the National As- 
 sembly. Money, and again money, was needed for all these 
 things; Lafayette therefore drew on the city, and the city 
 on the state. Amid such various labours, commotions, in- 
 trigues and tumults, the government had to struggle for 
 existence. "What an administi'ation!" said Mirabeau, "What 
 an epoch! We have every thing to fear, and yet must run 
 all risks. We produce a revolt by the very means we take 
 to prevent it. We have to exercise moderation, at a time 
 when all moderation appears dilatory and pusillanimous ; and 
 to show energy, when all energetic action is looked on as 
 tyranny. We are besieged by the advice of thousands, and 
 can only take counsel of ourselves. We have cause to he 
 afraid even of the well-disposed; because restlessness, and 
 excess of zeal, make them almost more dangerous than con- 
 spirators. Prudence often obliges us to yield to wrong, to 
 place ourselves at the head of the disturbers of the peace, 
 in order to control them; and amidst the most horrible 
 embarrassments to show a cheerful face." This description 
 is by no means overdrawn, and the authorities well deserved 
 the eloquent appreciation of the difficulties with which they 
 had to struggle. A few weeks after the storming of the 
 Bastille, life and property were once more safe in Paris. 
 There was, indeed, many an uproar before the bakers' shops, 
 and the commissariat committee was often placed in the 
 most harassing difficulties. But supplies were secured for 
 some months in advance; the National guard could be relied 
 upon, and every department of the administration was in 
 
Cu. IV.] PROPOSALS TO REMOVE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. 119 
 
 full activity. The Palais Royal was kept down by Lafayette's 
 patrols, and the Orleanist intrigues were frustrated by his 
 secret agents. The debate on the veto, it is true, gave a 
 fresh occasion to disquiet and excitement; and the orators 
 of the Palais Royal once more raised their voices. It was 
 even proposed to march to Versailles, but the mass of the 
 popidation remained unmoved, and were of opinion that 
 anarchy was worse than despotism. ' 
 
 As long as their leaders saw no occasion to change the 
 watch-words "quiet and obedience," the rioters did not suc- 
 ceed in getting up any important demonstration. Louis XVI. 
 perfectly understood this state of things ; and when Breteuil, 
 anxious about the personal safety of the King, entreated 
 him, at this juncture, to chang°e his residence to Metz, or 
 some other place, Louis gave a decided refusal; he knew 
 that the noise of the Palais Royal was powerless, and as he 
 entertained no hostile intentions towards the National As- 
 sembly, he could not anticipate any serious danger from 
 Paris. He returned a similar answer to a number of depu- 
 ties of the moderate party, who had heard of threatenning 
 conspiracies in the capital, and therefore advised him to 
 remove the National Assembly to Tours. Louis was right, 
 as far as the present moment was concerned, but as regarded 
 the future it woidd have been well not to trust the vol- 
 cano, and to have listened to Mirabeau as well as Breteuil; 
 for it was just these Parisian intrigues which filled the 
 former with the most harassing anxiety. 
 
 We cannot doubt that the wish of the duke of Orleans 
 was either to frighten away the King, or, if he stood his 
 ground in Versailles, to make away with him, and at all 
 events to ascend the vacant throne. Yet the greatest danger 
 did not arise from this quarter; for though, no doubt, his 
 agents at that time guided the rabble, which afterwards 
 stormed the Tuileries and formed the revolutionary army. 
 
 ' Loustalot, Sept. 13th. 
 
120 THE CAPITAL. [Book II. 
 
 yet the National guard was strong enough to hold them in 
 check, and Lafayette was resolved never to allow the duke 
 to take the reins of government. But what if other dangers, 
 of which Louis had never thought, should arise from the 
 midst of these very protectors! To drive the King away, 
 and, still worse, to murder him, was an abomination to the 
 good citizens of Paris; but the very opposite of this, viz. 
 to bring him to Paris — to protect him and make much of 
 him — to separate him from his reactionary court, and to make 
 him a real citizen-king — this idea, which was equally fatal 
 to the independence of Loius as to the plans of the Duke, 
 began in September to flit through many a brain. When 
 the comnmne had no bread, it was natural to think of the 
 easily accessible civil list; when, on one occasion, the advice 
 of Lafayette was not listened to in the council of ministers, 
 he might flatter himself that the King would hear the wishes 
 of the people more clearly, if he resided in Paris. For a 
 time, however, the temptation was resisted; and when on 
 the 17tli September, the French guards — who, since their 
 defection on the 13tli of July, had been dismissed from the 
 King's service and had entered the paid companies of the 
 National guard— were also eager to march to Versailles, it 
 was Lafayette himself who pacified them, and reported the 
 matter to the ministry. He pointed, in unmistakable lan- 
 guage, to the Duke of Orleans as the centre of all these 
 machinations ; and, in fact, the Duke's ambition was once more 
 roused, and his.money the main source of the disturbances. In 
 consequence of Lafayette's information, the minister St. Priest 
 induced the town-council of Versailles to send for the Flan- 
 ders regiment, 1,000 strong, from Douai, as a protection 
 against any such attempts. The number of troops of the 
 hne about Paris was thereby raised to 3,600 men; a force, 
 which, though far too small for a coup d'etat, gave the Palais 
 Royal an opportunity of spreading alarming reports— that the 
 King was going to Metz, and had secured the help of the 
 Austrians, Prussians, Spaniards and Sardinians. There was 
 
Ch. IV.] MILITARY BANQUET AT VERSAILLES. 121 
 
 not a word of truth in this ; but some of the districts, and 
 mobs of workmen, became excited, and wished to go to 
 Versailles. The National guard, however, stUl remained firm; 
 —the patriots complained of the reactionary bourgeois, and 
 Bailly was indignant at the anarchical intrigues of the 
 Orleauists. 
 
 But the 1st of October brought with it an important change 
 in the position of affairs. In the first place it gave the d"- 
 magogues of the Palais Royal fresh materials for the excitement 
 of the masses. The officers of the Eoyal body-guard gave 
 their fellow officers from Flanders a banquet in the theatre 
 of the Palace at Versailles, at the conclusion of which the 
 Royal family made their appearance, and were greeted by the 
 officers with an outburst of enthusiastic loyalty; and the 
 meeting broke up, at last, in a state of blissful and noisy 
 intoxication. The tidings of this occurrence were greedily 
 seized on by the Palais Royal. "Marat alone," said Des- 
 moulins, "made as much noise as the four trumpets of the 
 day of judgment." The report was industriously spread 
 among the people that the banquet had been a sumptuous 
 orgie,— that the officers had torn the tricolor from their 
 hats— and other lies of the same kind. ^ All the fears of an 
 impending counter-revolution seemed now confirmed; the fer- 
 ment spread among the people, and the life of a man who 
 wore a cockade of one colour was no longer safe. To this 
 was added the want of bread— which was neither greater 
 nor less than it had been in the summer 2— and the lately 
 
 ■ The dinner cost 3fr. 75c. a head, Loustalot's account. The troops which 
 
 Loustalot, Reool. de Paris, N. 15. were not in Paris had not yet adopted 
 
 Louis Blanc, states, without giving the tricolor coclcade. — ' Brissot 
 
 his authority that the price of' the says in the Patriate Frani;ais: "II 
 
 dinner without wine was 26fr. a regnait depuis quelques jours cette 
 
 head; but he then goes on to cite meme disette apparente dont nous 
 
 the statement of a Garde-du-Corps, avons deja parle, mais cette disette 
 
 that each of them had paid 7fr. n'existait point reellement." The 
 
 oOc, which exactly agrees with registers of the Cornmarltet, Poisson, 
 
 L 
 
122 THE CAPITAL, [Book II. 
 
 decreed dissolution of the great workshop at the Montmartre, 
 which had thrown a hirge number of unemployed rabble on 
 the town. 
 
 The people suddenly discovered that the aristocrats were 
 the sole cause of the dearth of provisions, that it was they 
 who hindered threshing and baking, in order that the people, 
 exhausted by hunger, might fall a prey to their myrmidons. 
 The desire of marching to Versailles was once more roused 
 among the French guards, and it was observed, on one or 
 two occasions, that the men showed less zeal in putting 
 down the rioters. The unpaid National guard, 24,000 strong, 
 still remained luiinfected, and their patrols were indefatigable 
 in dispersing the furious mobs. The patriots denounced these 
 troops for blindly placing themselves at the disposal of a 
 municipality which had sold itself to the aristocracy. As 
 late as the evening of the 4th of October, the members of 
 the communal committee repaired to tlieir respective districts 
 to take precautionary measures, that the rioters might not 
 plunder the guard-houses of the National guards and march 
 to VersaOles. ^ The posts and patrols were doubled, and 
 the night passed without disturbance. 
 
 But at this moment the popular leaders were no longer 
 in a mood to make any seiious oj)position to a new outbreak 
 of the Revolution. 
 
 A few days before, the National Assembly had granted 
 the ministry a new tax; on which occasion Duport declared, 
 that as France owed the summoning of the States-general to 
 the deficit, it was not well to do away with it so soon. An 
 otherwise unknown deputy, Broustaret, reminded the Assem- 
 bly that most of the cahicrs wished to hear nothing of 
 new taxes, until after the completion of the constitution. 
 
 I. 122, and the official correspondence, a pound, which remained the market- 
 between Bailly and Necker on the price in Paris for years. i Revo- 
 
 supplies for Paris, Buchez IV., lead lution de Paris, and Gorsas' Courrier 
 
 to the same result. Bread cost 3 sous of the 5th and 6th. 
 
Ch.IV.] LOUIS criticises decrees of national assembly. 123 
 
 AV hereupon Toulongeon, an intimate friend of Lafayette, 
 carried a motion, that pi-evious to the levying of the taxes, 
 the '-rights of man," and the artides of the constitution 
 already approved of by the Assembly, should be laid before 
 the King for his acceptance. 
 
 The particiJars of the discussion on this bill, in the council 
 of ministers, is unknown. But the residt is certain enough, 
 that they ventured on no general opposition to it, though they 
 were little inclined to accept it unconditionally ; and therefore 
 wished to reserve for the Kmg a criticism of the most dan- 
 gerous points. The answer of the King to this effect was 
 drawn up on the 4th, and was communicated to the National 
 Assembly, on the morning of the 5th. Louis approved of 
 the decrees in general, but he made certain objections, and 
 reserved to himself the full exercise of the executive power. 
 The Left attacked the royal answer with violence, and at the 
 same time complained of the court intrigues of the last few 
 days. The Right, on the other hand, dwelt on the absence 
 of all proof to support these accusations, and made a motion 
 for incpiiry, which, uuder the circumstances, was rather rash, 
 but which Mirabeau immediately got rid of, by a rather sharp 
 reference to the general suspicions against the Queen. He 
 then sought to confine the discussion to the articles of the 
 constitution, excluding the "rights of man,"' but met with 
 no better success than in August. The Assembly did not 
 allow its work to be curtailed, and resolved to insist upon 
 the unconditional ratification of all its decrees. 
 
 It was a matter of great importance, at this crisis, that 
 the originator of the "rights of man," general Lafayette, 
 entirely shared these sentiments. He had been informed of 
 the decision of the King, by his friends in the council of 
 ministers, sooner than the National Assembly. He looked 
 on the "rights of man" as the very summit of his reputation, 
 and would not allow one tittle of it to be bartered away. 
 
 1 Avant-muniteur , Courrier de Provence. 
 
124 THE CAPITAL. [Book II, 
 
 If the King, he said, should, notwithstanding, subject it to 
 his criticism, he must take the consequences. The general 
 had no intention of exciting an open revolt himself, but he 
 no longer saw any reason for opposing disturbances that 
 might arise without his agency. The Democrats suddenly 
 saw a free course opened to them, and we may imagine with 
 what zeal they rushed along it. 
 
 At seven ' o'clock on the morning of the 5th, before the 
 National Assembly had commenced its sitting, some hundreds 
 of women, and afterwards some thousands, assembled on the 
 Place de Greve. They forced their way into the Hotel 
 de Ville, cried for bread, and committed every kind of 
 excess; aud wheu at length they sounded the alarm bell, the 
 French guards hastened to join thena, and demanded ven- 
 geance on the insulters of the National cockade. Another 
 armed concourse formed in the Palais Royal, and a third in 
 the Faubourg St. Antoine, the nucleus of which were the 
 soi-disant victors of the Bastille — a p)ortion of the combatants 
 of the 14th of July — who formed a separate volunteer com- 
 pany of chosen patriots by the side of the National guard. ^ 
 
 There is no doubt that its leaders were in the pay of 
 Philip of Orleans, who now hoped to redeem, in the most 
 striking manner, the failure of the I7th of July; and was 
 prepared to pave his way to the throne even by the basest 
 of crimes. The unpaid National guard took no part in the 
 proceedings and gave way on the Place de Greve, when the 
 women threatened violence, and no orders came from the 
 authorities. In the other parts of the city, however, they 
 were on the very point of interfering,^ but their leaders 
 no longer shared the sentiments of the men. Just as the 
 contest was about to commence, envoys from the Hotel 
 de Ville, officers of Lafayette's staff, and popular chiefs, 
 arrived and united in preventing any collision.* Meantime, 
 
 ' Moniteur. — ^ Poisson. I, 111. — ^ Loustalot, Revolution de Paris, N. 13. 
 ^ Moniteur. 
 
Ch. IV.] RIOT IN THE PLACE DE GREVE. 125 
 
 as soon as the tnmiiltnous gathering of the women had begun, 
 \ aiivillers, the vice-president of the municipahty, had hurried 
 off to Versailles. ' By ten o'clock on the same morning, he 
 oonununicated to the mhiisters the intelligence— at that time 
 utterly unfounded, but useful as a means of intimidation^ — 
 not that a mere mob, but the National guard, paid and 
 unpaid, accompanied by artillery and crowds of people were 
 on the march to Versailles. He further stated that they were 
 coming — not to demand bread, or vengeance for the insult 
 offered to the tricolor — but to fetch the King to Paris, of 
 which there had been as yet no talk in the capital. 
 
 The rioters of the Place de Greve, whose leaders entertained 
 exactly opposite wishes, knew nothing of this; but at ten 
 o'clock, the very time that Vauvillers was making his report 
 at Versailles, the women under the guidance of Maillard, a 
 lawyer's clerk, captain of the warriors of the Bastille, resolved 
 to march. It was necessary, they said, to liberate the King 
 from the aristocracy, and to get bread from him for the 
 hungry people; and Orleans probably added in secret, that 
 the King must be removed from France, or from the world. 
 Those fatal words "the King to Paris," therefore, which were 
 destined to have so vast an influence on the Ilevolution, were 
 not first uttered by the riotous women, but by Lafayette's 
 partisans — not by the Palais Royal, or the Orleanists, but by 
 the vice-president of the commune. The ministry was 
 greatly agitated, St. Priest advocated energetic defence — the 
 King wavered — the Queen apjirehended still greater mischief — 
 while Cice, Montmorin and Necker — the three ministers who 
 at that time made common cause with Lafayette — declared 
 that with the well-known attachment of the people to the 
 King's person, his residence in Paris would be rather an 
 advantage than the contrary. And thus they came to no 
 decision. In Paris, meanwhile, the National guard assembled 
 in every district. A few companies went to the Place de 
 
 Lonstalot, 1. c. p. 12. — ' St, Priest, p. CXVIII. — 
 
12G THE CAPITAL. [Book II. 
 
 Greve, and cleared it of the rabble which, in great numbers, 
 had occupied the space left vacant by the women. By the 
 dispersion of this mob, the Orleanist element in the movement 
 was eliminated; and the Cordeliers and warriors of the 
 Bastille had marched off with them. But the crowds in the 
 Place de Greve had as yet no definite object; they were 
 uncertain as to the real position of affairs and did not know 
 by what power the knot was to be cut. It was during these 
 very hours that the National Assembly received the King's 
 answer about the "rights of man." This answer was known 
 at the very same time in the Place de Greve in Paris, * and 
 the tumult thereljy greatly increased. We have here a clear 
 proof of the extensive preparations which had been made for 
 this outbreak, the ramifications of which must have reached, 
 indirectly at least, even to the council of ministers. Towards 
 noon the "Three hundred"^ (or general communal council) 
 assembled, and sent a message to the National Assembly to 
 report that the emcutc was not yet ended, but that no other 
 cause for it was known, than the insult to the cockade, and 
 the want of bread. Immediately afterwards, however, the 
 real ground was strikingly brought to light. 
 
 The French guards suddenly called upon Lafayette to lead 
 them to Versailles. The King, they said, must come to 
 Paris, to put a stop to the machinations of the aristocrats, 
 and to make bread cheap in Paris; should he refiise, he nmst, 
 be deposed, and the general appointed regent for Louis XVII. 
 The Orleanist party had nothing to do with this movement, 
 — by which the report of Vauvillers was realized five hours 
 after it had been made — on the contrary, it ran entirely 
 counter to the wishes of the duke; and the only doubt is, 
 whether it was originated by Lafayette, or produced by the 
 enthusiasm of his soldiers, contrary to the general's will. 
 The former supposition is supported by Vauviller's premature 
 
 ' Gorsas, p. 107. — ' Protocol of tlie Commune. Lafayette says falsely, 
 at 9 o'clock. 
 
Ch. IV.] THE MOB MARCH TO VERSAILLES. 127 
 
 message, wliich was entirely folse as regards the National 
 guard — by the fact that the royal answer respecting the 
 "Rights of Man" was immediately known — by the opinions 
 of Lafayette's friends in the ministry, and lastly by Necker's 
 explicit declaration, 1 that Lafayette had wished for the change 
 of the royal residence, that he might exercise more influence 
 over the government. On the other side we have nothing 
 but the assurance of the general himself, and the resistance 
 which he made for many hoiirs to the eager request of the 
 grenadiers. He sat on horseback in the midst of them, and 
 declared that he must wait for the command of the commune. 
 While the soldiers were raging without, the "Three hun- 
 dred" were engaged for hours in discussing the best means 
 of obtaining bread and corn. Their debate was intimately 
 connected with the great question of the day. Bailly had 
 made, a few days before, very extensive contracts for provi- 
 sions, but just at this time several of the supplies were retarded ; 
 whereupon the National Assembly, on the 2ud of October, 
 had referred a petition for bread to the committees, which, 
 though it was all that they could do, brought no immediate 
 relief to the people of Paris. The minister Necker, since the 
 1st of October, had ceased to give any answer at all. All 
 these cu-cumstanccs favoured the scheme of marching in arms 
 to present a petition to the King and the Assembly. The 
 intelligence soon arrived that the women had passed the 
 bridge over the Seine at Sevres without opposition, and 
 Lafayette now sent off an adjutant, at about four o'clock, to 
 say, that the march to Versailles was inevitable, and that 
 the commune must send him the necessary orders.* 
 
 * Necker, Sur la Revol, II. sec. 2. exercise influence through him." — 
 
 "There were," said he, "two currents ^ He has himself left two reports of 
 
 of opinion in Paris; one party wished this day's proceedings, in neither of 
 
 to driTe the king away in order to which does he make any mention of 
 
 occupy his place, and the other to this circumstance. It is mentioned 
 
 bring him to Paris, in order to in a protocol of the Commune. 
 
]28 THE CAPITAL. [Book II. 
 
 The complete ijrogramme of the day's proceedings was 
 now brought to light; the committee gave orders for the 
 march, according to Lafayette's wishes, and invested the general 
 with full powers to act as he thought fit. They also appointed 
 commissioners from their own number to accompany him, 
 and to lay the following points before the King, as the wishes 
 of the commune; Istly, that Louis should allow the duty in 
 his palace to be performed by the National guards; 2ndly, 
 that he should allow the commune to inspect all the docu- 
 ments relating to the provisioning of Paris; 3rdly, that he 
 should give an unconditional assent to the "Rights of Man;" 
 4thly, that he should choose Paris for his usual residence. ^ 
 
 Everything was included in these few sentences — relief 
 of the Parisians from anxiety about their svistenance — 
 confirmation of Lafayette's constitutional principles — trans- 
 ference of the chief power in the empire to the hands of the 
 National guard, and their leader the general. 
 
 Inspired by such hopes, Lafayette marched out of Paris; 
 but even now the unpaid guards assembled slowly; many of 
 them did not know what was the object in view; and the 
 general had to wait on the way for several divisions for a 
 long time. 2 After he had passed the Seine at Sevres he 
 sent word to Versailles that he was coming under compulsion 
 of the guards, and that he would have turned back if he 
 had found the bridge occupied. ^ Yet he caused his troops 
 to proceed from this point in military order, and issued a 
 command that they shoTild force their way through every 
 obstacle which opposed their march.* 
 
 The women, meantime, had arrived in Versailles at three 
 o'clock, and were throwing every thing into commotion. 
 The)' filled the hall of the National Assembly, where Mirabeau 
 
 ^Protocol oftlie Commune. Lafayette accompany liim. — ^ Gorsas, Courrier^ 
 
 makes no mention of all tljis, and N. 91 p. 108. — ' St.Priest, p. CXXV. 
 
 contents liimself with saying that the — * Lafayette, IV. 117. 
 Commune sent two commissioners to 
 
Cu. IV.] THE MOB AT VERSAILLES. 129 
 
 shortly before had vainly begged the president to adjourn 
 the sitting, and to announce to the King, on his own author- 
 ity, that Paris was marching against him. Maillard delivered 
 a thundering speech to the representatives of the nation, in 
 which he proclaimed the commands of the angry people, and 
 called for vengeance on the corn usvirers and the traitorous 
 nobles; while, outside, the masses were carousing at the 
 expense of the Duke of Orleans, and some of their leaders 
 were secretly planning a night attack upon the palace, and 
 the murder of the Queen.' A deputation of women went to 
 the King,^ to beg for cheap bread and undiminished freedom, 
 and returned enchanted with his kindness. 
 
 Other portions of the mob, however, were brawling with 
 the King's bodyguard; the position of the palace became 
 more and more critical, and the Council of ministers once 
 more assembled. Lafayette's message now arrived, and 
 St. Priest called upon the King to fly forthwith to Rambouillet: 
 "If" said he, "you are taken to Paris to-morrow you will lose 
 your crown." Necker cried out: "That is a piece of advice 
 which may cost you your head." The King determined to 
 fly; but when the National guard of Versailles raised dif- 
 ficulties on this point, the court fell back into a state of 
 inactive expectation. The King's unconditional sanction to 
 the "Rights of Man," however, was now announced to the 
 Assembly. 
 
 Towards eleven o'clock at night Lafayette arrived with 
 20,000 National guards. When they heard his drums the 
 Parisian women were at a loss what to think of it, and sent 
 out a patrol to reconnoitre the approach of a possible enemy. ^ 
 The o-eneral assured the King that he would maintain order 
 
 ' From the minutes of the Court du 5, est reconnu a present pour 
 
 du Ckatelet, quoted hy Louis Blanc, une demoiselle galante, connue et 
 
 B. II. ch. 10. ^ The Prussian freqnentee par des gens connus. Que 
 
 ambassador, Goltz, wrote to Lord d'objets a reflexion!" — ' Gorsas, 
 
 Auckland on the 12th: "La citojenne p. 107. 
 
 qui portait la parole an roi le soir 
 
 I 
 I. 
 
130 THE CAPITAL. [Book IV. 
 
 at the hazard of his life, and the commissioners of the 
 municipality brought forward their four points. The King 
 assented to the first; the two next had already been conceded, 
 and to the fourth— the removal to Paris— he gave an evasive 
 answer. The National guard then occupied some of the 
 posts in the palace; provisions were procured, and several 
 battalions took up their quarters in the churches, while others 
 bivouacked by their watch-fires in the streets. The mob of 
 women and vasrabonds, which had followed the National 
 guard, roamed about among the troops throughout the night. 
 In some streets — especially in the neighbourhood of the palace 
 — these different masses of people collected, and began to 
 talk of storming the barracks of the body-guard, and dispers- 
 ing the suspected regiment. Towards midnight Lafayette 
 left the Palace, spent a quarter of an hour with the minister 
 Montmorin, and then, although the threatend attack on the 
 barracks ' had been reported to him, retired to rest, because, 
 he said, all necessary precautions had been taken. No 
 sooner had he disappeared than the barracks were attacked, 
 taken and plundered;^ at the same time a skirmish took 
 place between the Parisians and a comjDany of the body- 
 guard, in which the latter were driven from the streets, but 
 maintained their posts in the palace. 
 
 At last, about 6 o'clock, a patrol of the insurgents found 
 an entrance into the castle unguarded,' and immediately 
 forced their way in. The first sentinels of the body-guard 
 were cut down, and their heads severed from their bodies. 
 A deluge of men and women, bearing every kind of weapon, 
 swept through the courts, passages and chaml)ers, plundering 
 and raging, and, with the loudest cries of all, threatening 
 destrnction to the Queen. Her antechamber was with dif- 
 ficulty defended by the self-devotion of a few life-o-uards- 
 men, long enough to aUow of her escaping half naked to 
 
 ' La Marck, I. IIG, -who was an eye-witness. Lafayette lias quite a 
 different chronology. — - Gorsas. Toulongeon. — = Gorsas, 110. 
 
CiT. IV.] THE REMOVAL TO PARIS. 131 
 
 the King.i At last Lafayette appeared — having been roused 
 from his peaceful slumbers, by the intelligence of the tumult 
 —and by the energetic action of the National guard, soon 
 put an end to the scenes of robbery and murder in the 
 interior of the Palace. 
 
 But the crowd was raging without and extending itself 
 through all the courts of the building; the cry, "The King 
 to Paris!" was now in every mouth, and the unhappy mon- 
 arch was obliged to show himself upon the balcony, and 
 announce to the roaring mass below, by gestures of assent, 
 his entire subjection to their will. The imprecations and 
 curses against the Queen, however, still continued, until 
 Lafayette led her, too, forward, and kissed her hand before 
 the eyes of the people. Then the joyful cry was immediately 
 raised, "Long live the general! long live the Queen!" "and 
 from that moment," says Lafayette, "peace was concluded." 
 A few hours afterwards the royal family were on their way 
 to Paris, and were followed in 14 days by the National 
 Assembly. 
 
 If we take a general view of the foregoing events, we shall 
 riot find reason to believe that Lafayette either foresaw or 
 originated the operations of these banditti on the 6th, which 
 bad so nearly ended in regicide. But we can hardly clear 
 him from the svTspicion of wishing even at the last moment, 
 to punish the King for his resistance, by subjecting him to 
 a transient terror; and that it was for this reason that he 
 retired to rest, without paying any regard to the rising 
 tumult. He acted in this case as he had done during the 
 whole revolt. He allowed the rioters of the Palais Eoyal 
 to have their way, and was pleased that they gave him a 
 
 1 It speaks badly for Louis Blanc's the qnecn; a calumny, the ground- 
 liistorical conscienciousness, that he lessness and impossibility of which 
 warms up again the unworthy scandal was incnntrnvertibly proved by Cro- 
 of Lord Holland about the presence ker in the Qiiarterli/ Review, 1823. 
 of Count Fersen in the chamber of Coiif. Croker's Essays, 93. 
 
 I2 
 
132 THE CAPITAL. [Book IV. 
 
 suitable opportunity of carrying off all the advantage, and 
 yet appearing as a deliverer and a friend of order. 
 
 He played his cards cautiously enough to preserve himself 
 for a long time from suspicion; and as he and his friends 
 had now the power in their own hands, they were able to 
 direct the investigation against whomsoever they pleased ; 
 and they occupied themselves in this manner during ten 
 whole months. The Duke of Orleans, whose name occurred 
 to every one when evil deeds were spoken of, was especially 
 exposed to suspicion. It was known throughout the city 
 that the mob of vs'omen received his money, if not his instruc- 
 tions; and several persons saw him in the palace, on that 
 bloody night, in the very thickest of the tumult. 
 
 But the clearest proof against him was furnished several 
 years after his death by the discovery of a letter bearing 
 the date of the 6th October, in which he directs his banker, 
 not to pay the sums agreed upon; "the money," he says, 
 has not been earned — the simpleton still lives."' Suspicion 
 was also directed against Mirabeau, whose influence in the 
 Revolution was so mighty, that men considered it impos- 
 ible for any important act to be done without him. But 
 at the time no further evidence appeared against him, than 
 that he had a general knowledge of what was going on, which, 
 with his connexions, was natural enough; and we have now 
 documentary proof that he regarded the movement, from 
 the very conunencement, as a pvdjlic misfortiuie. This was 
 known to Lafayette, if to uo one else, and when the prelim- 
 inary enquiries Avere completed, and the matter was ripe 
 for judgment, the general promised Mirabeau to bear 
 witness to his innocence. But on the appointed day, the 
 general did not show himself in the National Assemblv, 
 
 ' Diicoin, Philippe (TOrlenns, 72. ii'est point gagne, le marmot vit 
 From a communication of the imperial encore." Conf. also the very par- 
 minister of Police, Eeal : "Conrez ticular and positive statements in the 
 vite, mon cher, chez le banqnier, "Correspondence of Lord Auckland,' 
 q^ii'il ne delivre pas la somme ; I'argent II. 365. 
 
Cii. IV.] MIRABEAU AND LAFAYETTE. 133 
 
 and Mirabeau spoke with severity and bitterness of the 
 unbridled ambition of the new dictator. When their common 
 friends blamed this outburst of anger, Mirabeau wrote a letter 
 to his confidant, Count la Marck, which he gave him full 
 permission to show to Lafayette, and in (which he says: 
 "Yesterday, I could have stamped upon Lafayette an indelible 
 stain, which I had hitherto reserved for history. I refrained 
 from doing it ; I drew my sword, but did not deal the blow. 
 Time will do this in my stead, but if he wishes me to hasten 
 the period, he has only to commence the contest by the 
 slightest attack." 
 
 We confess, for our own part, that we have no doubt 
 what the judgment of history ought to be. Neither the 
 disgusting riot of the women, nor the treacherous attack 
 of murderers on the palace, were the important events of 
 the 5th of October. The c^uestion of how far the money 
 of the Duke of Orleans, and the ambition of his friends, 
 were at work in this affair, is one rather of criminal than 
 of historical interest.^ The pregnant occurrence of the day 
 was the subjection of the King to the revolutionary forces 
 of the capital. Lafayette had previously entertained this 
 
 ^ Louis Blane, B. II., ch. 7 and 10, thing to report, except that he visited 
 
 B. III., ch. 8, endeavours to show the Queen in full dress in the morning, 
 
 that the Comte de Provence, (Louis The relation in which the Prince 
 
 XVIII.,) and Mirabeau, as his agent, stood to the Queen, has been much 
 
 got np the conspiracy. The evidence more accurately explained by Count 
 
 he brings forward proves nothing Vieil-Castel, Marie Antoinette et la 
 
 more than that the prince had shewn Revolution Fraiifaise, than by Louis 
 
 hostility to the Queen on several Blanc; and it had been previously 
 
 other occasions, and that in November treated of by Gxienard, Histoire de 
 
 J790 he had plotted against Bailly Madame Elizabeth, and by Goncourt, 
 
 and Lafayette. It is inconceivable Histoire de Marie Antoiiielie. With 
 
 that Louis Blanc should connect a regard to Mirabeau, we may refer 
 
 letter of the latter date with the the reader, in answer to Louis Blanc's 
 
 Favras affair of Nov. 1789. Of the conjectures, to the entirely decisive 
 
 Prince's proceedings on the 6th documents in La Marck's correspond- 
 
 October 1789 he has absolutely no- ence. 
 
134 THE CAPITAL. [Book IV. 
 
 wish, and it was in his immediate circle of friends that 
 the idea of bringing the King to Paris had first found ex- 
 pression, in the message to Versailles, on the morning of 
 the 5th. It was under his influence, too, that the miuiicipal- 
 ity, which was devoted to his interest, passed the above- 
 rpiotcd resolutions at mid-day. His adherents proposed the 
 r'cmoval to the King, and it was not till after his arrival in 
 Versailles that the same cry was taken up by the mass of 
 the people. Lastly, it was he and his friends alone who 
 reaped the advantage of this event, until a new revolution 
 awarded them measure for measure. 
 
 For a brief space, indeed, the men of the Palais Royal 
 thought that such a movement of the popular masses, as 
 had on this occasion crowned their efforts with success, 
 would consolidate for ever the rule of the street orators. 
 But the Commune, which had attained all its objects, and 
 held in its hands the King with his civil list, the ministers, 
 and the National Assembly, suddenly stopped in their career. 
 As early as the 18th of October, they issued a severe in- 
 junction against the abuses of the press, which excited the 
 most venomous bitterness in the Palais Koyal. It w^as rea- 
 sonably asked, by what right the militia, iu their new uni- 
 forms — who were just as much creatures of the Revolution 
 as the pilie-men of the Faiibourgs— began all at once to 
 preach quiet and obedience. No other conclusion could be 
 come to, than that Lafayette's power was founded solely 
 on the Revolution, and that his love of power was his only 
 reason for putting an end to the Revolution. 
 
 They continued therefore to stir the revolutionary fire, 
 got up another jjread riot, and, on the 21st, cut off the head 
 of a liakev. But it was immediately seen which, for thq 
 moment, was the stronger party. The Commune without 
 delay caused the murderers to be arrested, and called upon 
 the National Assembly to proclaim martial law against insurrec- 
 tion. This measure had been already proposed by Mirabeau 
 at Versailles, without effect, but was now passed by a laro-e 
 
Cu. IV.] THE DUKE OF ORLEANS EXILED. 135 
 
 majority. The streets of Paris were now for the first time 
 quiet. 
 
 The Duke of Orleans, who had hojDed to pick up a crown 
 in the emeute, allowed himself to be driven by Lafayette, 
 one may almost say, with blows, into decent exile to London ; 
 so that Mirabeau, judging of the Duke's conduct by his own 
 sentiments, cried out "And this man was to be my King! 
 why, I -would not take him as a servant!" It was all over 
 for a long time to come with the Orleans party. 
 
 But when Mirabeau further proposed to grant to the 
 ministers all the means for the establishment of a strong 
 government which they should point out, the ministers 
 themselves declared, that in the present general uncer- 
 tainty they could not undertake any responsibility. There 
 was no prospect of introducing any thing like order into 
 the affairs of the kingdom, for the very groundwork of law 
 was utterly destroyed. The government continued in its 
 former state of impotence, and the actual rule was exercised 
 by Lafayette, by means of the National guard of Paris. 
 These, for the moment, had the greatest power in the capital,\ 
 and Paris ruled the kingdom; It was a sovereignty of individ- 
 uals, a rule of universal suffrage, a direct popular gov- ; 
 ernment ; it was, in a word, the incarnate theory of the \ 
 rights of man and the universal right of insurrection. The 
 first-fruits of this state of things had fallen to the Parisian 
 Bourgeoisie, as the nearest and strongest party; and they 
 were at liberty to enjoy their victory as long as they 
 possessed the physical power to defend their booty against 
 the next assailants. 
 
136 ADMINISTRATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book V. 
 
 CHAPTEE V. 
 ADMINISTKATION.— ASSIGNATS. 
 
 MiRABEAU ENTERS INTO RELATIONS WITH THE COURT. — HiS PLAN OP A LIBERAL 
 
 GOVERNMENT. HoPELESS STATE OP THE PINANCES. TaLLBVRAND DEMANDS 
 
 THE CHURCH PROPERTY FOR THE ST.\TE. — MiRABEAU CALLS POR A PAR- 
 LIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. — Consequences of his failure. — New admin- 
 istration. — Enfranchised citizens. — Communes, departments. — Nok- 
 voters, jacobins. — Rei>orm, administration op justice. — First steps 
 towards the sale of church lands. — interference of the city of' 
 PARIS. — Confiscation op all the property of the church. 
 
 Only one man among the statesmen of France at this period 
 had a thoroughly clear perception of the position of affairs 
 above described. * Mirabean. understood that the Left — which, 
 from fear of the nobility and military, was always endea- 
 vouring to extend anarchy — was furthering, not the natural 
 development, but the annihilation, of the re2ircsentative system. 
 He saw that the Right — which, from fear of anarchy, was 
 always urgently insisting on the restoration of the ancien 
 rec/imc — was giving the coiq} de grace not to rebellion, but 
 to authority. That a feudal state was now an impossibility, 
 and that every attempt to restore it would be suicide on the 
 part of the government, was a conviction which had been 
 for years the mainspring of all his actions. He had felt 
 the abuses of feudal despotism in his own pi'rson; he had 
 thoroughly tracked out its hectic weakness in every spihere 
 of politics; and it would be difficult to say whether he most 
 hated or despised it. But that which gave animation to his 
 
 1 The main source of the following facts, which have been hitherto 
 very imperfectly known, is the correspondence between Mirabeau and la 
 Marck. 
 
Cii. v.] MIRABEAU'S VIEWS. 137 
 
 wrath, aud a preeminent superiority to his schemes, was 
 the hicid clearness with which the form of the future France, 
 with all the details of administration, appeared before his 
 mind. AV hilst he was rousing the people to an overwhelming 
 attack upon King Louis and his ministers, he never for a 
 moment lost sight of the rights which it was necessary for 
 the monarchy and the government to possess. As early as 
 July he said to Count la Marck, an influential friend of the 
 Queen, "See that they take me for Avhat I am— a friend rather 
 than an opponent." In September, his penetrating insight 
 into men aud things, and his perfect knowledge of the state 
 of Paris, enabled him to foretell the disasters of October. 
 He saw how the government was always helplessly wavering, 
 forfeiting every means of influence, and alternately behaving 
 towards the Assembly with mean servility, or bitter ani- 
 mosity. "Do these people then not see," he cried, "the abyss 
 which is being dug at their feet, and into which they must 
 sink without hope of rescue? The mob of Paris will scourge 
 the corpses of the King and Queen; every thing depends 
 upon their taking a clear view of their own position." It 
 was in these days that he struggled against the "Rights of 
 Man" as the grave of order, and contended, in the name 
 of freedom, for the unlimited veto of the King. These were 
 the days in which he shook Necker's groping and tentative 
 administration by a crushing blow against the caisse cTcs- 
 compte, whilst he wrested from the reluctant Assembly the 
 income tax, proposed by the same minister, as the last and 
 only means of salvation against national bankruptcy. On 
 the 29th of September, he brought forward a motion to allow 
 the King's ministers to take part in the debates of the 
 Assembly. It was immediately supposed that he was think- 
 ing of himself as future minister, and his motion was de- 
 ferred for the time to make way for more urgent questions. 
 Men were so accustomed, at that time, to connect his name 
 with all the successful blows of the Revolution, that Mira- 
 beau was generally regarded as the chief originator of the 
 
138 ADMINISTRATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book V. 
 
 affair of the 6th of October. But, in reality, scarcely any 
 one saw so clearly the ruin which would flow from this 
 source, or the means of remedying it. On the 7th of October 
 he exliorted the Count la Marck to tell the King, that his 
 throne and kingdom were lost, if he did not immediately 
 quit Paris again; and that he himself was prepared, without 
 delay, to point out the means of doing so. When he in- 
 dicated the immediate influence of the popular masses on 
 the government and the legislation as the very heart of the 
 danger, he exactly hit upon the very spring of all the sub- 
 sequent devastation caused by the Revolution. When he 
 drew up a detailed memorial of the measures to be adopted 
 against that danger, he sketched, with a master's hand, the 
 enduring institutions which France owed to the Revolution. 
 
 He wished to remove the King from Paris, because he 
 wished to liberate him from every other influence but that 
 of the National Assembly; with which he thought the King 
 should be indissolubly united. 
 
 He did not wish for any restoration of aristocratic pri- 
 vileges, or of the feudal system, the destruction of which he 
 considered to be irrevocable. He wished that the King 
 himself should anticipate the Assembly, by decreeing the 
 destruction of the Parliaments and the 'judicial Noblesse. 
 He wished that the King should claim for his court exactly 
 what was necessary, and no more; and establish the prin- 
 ciple, that the public revenues were only intended to promote 
 the common weal, and the security of the national credit. 
 
 Mirabeau saw no other possibility of salvation for the 
 King than his entering upon such a course, and identifying 
 himself with the great interests of his people. Above all, 
 he warns him against fleeing to the frontier, and by connect- 
 ing himself with the Emigres, or foreign countries, rousing 
 the whole nation to arms. He calls upon him to exercise 
 prudence and despatch; but roundly declares the .present 
 Ministers utterly incapable of executing his plans. He there- 
 fore demanded that a trustworthy, gifted and liberal man, 
 
Cii- v.] MIRABEAU'S VIEWS. 139 
 
 should be found to carry out the scheme; and that he should 
 be entrusted with full and unlimited powers. 
 
 At the same time he discussed the question of recon- 
 structing the Ministry with men of all parties— with the more 
 influential mentbers of the National Assembly— with the 
 eldest Brother of the King, the pUant, reserved and cautious, 
 yet ambitious Count of Provence • — and lastly, though much 
 against the grain, ^\'ith Lafliyette himself But here lay the 
 difficulty ; for Lafayette considered the present state of things 
 all that could be wished; the King obeyed him from fear, 
 the ministers were entirely subservient to him, and he might 
 well consider himself Regent of France, without the burden 
 of business attached to that office, or the dangers of respon- 
 sibility. He did not yet confess to himself that it was not 
 the Parisian National Guard that obeyed his commands, but 
 he that followed their whims. He was still in the full en- 
 joyment of his new popularity, and above all things he had 
 attained the highest wish of his heart, in not being obliged 
 to bow his head before any superior. Was it likely that 
 he would agree to the formation of a strong ministry? The 
 necessity of it he was, to a certain degree, compelled, during 
 the discussion, to confess; but to invest another with such 
 functions would destroy his sovereign influence; and to 
 undertake the task himself, would, at the same time, put 
 
 ' Conf. observation to Page lOi. character of the Prince rendered it 
 
 The correspondence with la Marck impossible to employ him in any 
 
 exhibits every phase of these nego- vfay. — The passage in the correspond- 
 
 tiations. Mirabeau first came into ence I. 4i8, which Louis Blanc 
 
 connection with the Prince by means supposes to refer to a change of 
 
 of la Marck; for a time he thought sovereign, can certainly only be 
 
 of making the Prince prime Minister, understood of the nomination of the 
 
 then again he wished to appoint Prince as Prime Minister; and there 
 
 Necker to this post, . and he then is not the slightest doubt of the 
 
 makes use of expressions which point spnriousness of the alleged treaty 
 
 to a Stadtholdership of the kingdom, between the King and Mirabeau copied 
 
 But before the end of the year by Louis Blanc, B. III., p. 363, in 
 
 Mirabeau declares that the miserable the Leipsic edition. 
 
140 ADMINISTRATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book V. 
 
 his ability to the test, and endanger his popularity. The 
 same motives operated stiU more strongly on the other 
 leaders, who already Mivicd Lafiiyette liis power, and in 
 other respects lived in a sphere of like capacities and views 
 as the general himself. From the very commencement, the 
 conferences afforded but little hope of success, but were, 
 nevertheless, continued for some weeks. The formation of 
 a government, alike popidar and strong, was the object of 
 all Mirabeau's efforts. It must be strong, he said, to save 
 France from utter ruin ; and it would be strong, as soon as 
 it showed ability and activity, and resolutely turned its back 
 /on the sacrifices of the 4th of- August. 
 
 / In this every thing is comprehended, for Mirabcau did not 
 I confine the popular, modern, or liberal element by any 
 strict definition of principles, or any particular form of gov- 
 ernment; its characteristic mark, in his eyes, was rather the 
 liberation of the national life and the state, from the bonds 
 of individual privileges and monopolies, — i. e. the emancipa- 
 tion of the religious conscience from the dicta of a privileged 
 church — of labour from the trammels of the feudal lords and 
 the guilds — of capital from the monojooly of the bourse and 
 the metropolis— of law and justice from the exclusive posses- 
 sion of seigniors and parliaments — of finance from the privi- 
 leged selfishness of the court nobUity — of the civil admin- 
 
 ^ istration from the hereditary transmission of saleable offices 
 — and lastly, of national unity from the shackles of inland 
 duties and provincial privileges. 
 
 Since these principles render every other rule impossible 
 but that which tends to the public good, they may be said 
 to form the true liberty of the individual, and the true 
 character of a representative state. A change in the form 
 of government is only a consequence of these principles, 
 though indeed a necessary one. The reforms here mentioned 
 render it essential to bestow extensive rights ujDon the 
 representatives of the people; not as an innate original right 
 of every human being, but as absolutely indispensable to the 
 
Ch. v.] mirabeau'S views. 141 
 
 welfare of the state. For, by the abolition of ancient privileges, 
 the crown, especially, obtains such an increase of power, 
 that without the participation of popular representatives in 
 levying taxes, and enacting laws, a complete despotism would 
 arise. Even with this participation, the King— as head and 
 controller of the new administration— would possess a greater 
 power than ever. 
 
 In accordance with these views, Mirabeau was preparing 
 to bring forward a series of laws, not one of which contained 
 a single word on formal constitutional rpiestions, but which 
 would, by the creation of a string government, have sufficed 
 to give consistency and duration to the constitution. The 
 first of these laws had in view the protection of life from 
 the sovereign caprice of individuals. Immediately after 
 the tith of October, therefore, he proposed a martial law 
 which was severer in all its provisions than the one which 
 was afterwards enacted, but more liberal, since it only 
 extended to the precincts of Paris. With his practical in- 
 sight, he saw that the lever which set in motion the whole 
 empire lay in Paris alone ; and while he seized upon this 
 with a vigorous hand, he wished to spare the provinces the 
 unnecessary terrors of a military display. In order to restore 
 an effective government, he needed, in the next place, a large 
 financial measure ; for no government,' under the very best of 
 constitutions, could preserve its equilibrium, when hampered 
 at every step by the fetters of debts and deficits. A violent 
 revolutionary movement here came to his aid; and he 
 ventured to make use of it to promote the ends of good 
 order. j^ 
 
 The state of the finances was of course ahopeless one. 
 If Breteuil's ministry had not let loose the storm of anarchy — 
 if Necker had possessed the energy to take in hand the 
 reform of the finances, immediately after the 23rd of June — 
 sufficient resources might have been discovered. The clergy 
 had at that time determined to offer their estates as a 
 guarantee for the national debt; at that time, too, a redemption 
 
142 ADMINISTRATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book V. 
 
 of the tithes, equally advantageous for all parties, * might 
 have been carried out; according to which the clergy, per- 
 haps, would have been able to take upon themselves the 
 interest of a portion of the national debt; and lastly, it was 
 a matter of course that the nobility and the church would 
 thenceforward contribute to the regular taxes ; and the amount 
 of their contribution — rather more than 30 millions — would 
 at tlmt time have been an eifectual support to the treasury. 
 As the estates of the church represented a capital of nearly 
 2,000 millions, these resources would have been more than 
 sufficient to pay the interest on, and to consolidate, the 
 whole amount of the floating debt, and the sums borrowed 
 for a certain term, as they fell diTC — now about 620 millions 
 — and to place the tottering property of the state upon a 
 sure foundation. 
 
 /^ All this was possible in June, if the government had taken 
 the lead in reforms, and thereby upheld the external peace 
 and order of the state, which are the primary source of all 
 credit. When this opportunity was lost, and the very 
 existence of the state was at stake in July, the financial 
 condition naturally became worse. 
 
 On the one hand, the amount of the floating debt was 
 increased by the extraordinary expenses of the Revolution; 
 103 millions had been spent by the end of the year, and 
 Necker estimated the outlay under this head for 1790 at 
 90 millions more. Again the Government was compelled, 
 by the stagnation in the receii)ts, to defray the current daily 
 expenses with the funds which were intended for consolida- 
 tion and amortisation. All branches of the financial adminis- 
 tration were mixed up together, and order and arrano-ement 
 vanished entirely from the management of the Treasury. 
 
 Necker, moreover, although at that time at the height of 
 
 ' As the collection of the tithes cost more than 30 millions, the tithe- 
 payers would gain 20 millions by the redemiition, which wonkl raise the 
 income of the Church 10 millions of francs. 
 
Ch. v.] the financial difficulties. 143 
 
 his popularity, adhered to the system of palliation and 
 concealment. On the 7th of August, he asked for a loan of 
 30 millions, payable under the future legislature at the will 
 of the lender, and bearing interest at five per cent. This 
 was a reasonable rate of interest, since at the low price of 
 the old State bonds, every purchaser could get from 6 to 
 G'/^ per cent on his investment. But the incompleteness of 
 the information which Necker gave concerning the state of 
 the treasury misled the National Assembly to fix the rate 
 of interest at 4y.2 per cent, whereupon the loan completely 
 failed. Three weeks later, they were obliged to grant 5 per 
 cent for a credit of 80 millions, and, in addition, to burden 
 the state by unfavourable collateral conditions, and in the 
 end to be glad to raise a sum of 33 millions in ready money. 
 They were again obliged to have recourse to the caisse 
 d'csconipte, for new advances, with whigh the treasury was 
 able to make shift tiU the end of September. Then, however, 
 Necker declared that no loan could be raised, even at the 
 most exorbitant interest; and that if bankruptcy was to be 
 avoided, an increase of the taxes was indispensable. He 
 proposed therefore a tax of 25 per cent, on all the income 
 of the country, to be paid within three years, according to 
 the individual tax-payer's own valuation. This was the 
 above-mentioned occasion on which Mirabeavi brought his 
 triumphant elocpence to the aid of the Minister. He had just ap- 
 plied, what he considered an irresistible lever for the over- 
 throw of Necker, he hoped by new remedies to relieve 
 the financial malady of the state, and he did not wish to 
 see it collapse in bankruptcy before the beginning of his 
 treatment. He therefore vehemently and successfully urged 
 the Assembly to grant the tax. 
 
 This was something for the future, but brought no ad- 
 vantage for the moment, except that the caisse d'escompte 
 was thereby induced to make new advances, the greater part 
 of which had to be employed in paying old ones. 
 
 That which Necker had not had the courage to declare 
 
144 ADMINISTRATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book. V. 
 
 on the 5tli of May, came, every day, more clearly, and more 
 threateningly, to light. The burden of the floating debt was 
 the source of all financial embarrassments, and the alleviation 
 of that weight was the great object of all financial operations. 
 
 It was at this juncture that Talleyrand, on the 10th of 
 October, brought forward his all-important motion, to claim 
 the property of the church for the necessities of the state. 
 
 That there was no injustice in the proposition per se, the 
 clergy, as we have seen, themselves confessed. Out of a 
 yearly income of 100 millions from tithes, and 60 to 70 mil- 
 lions ' from the produce of their estates, they had hitherto 
 paid — and that not very regularly — a tax of from 3 to 4 mil- 
 lions. They had, moreover, very insufficiently provided for 
 the poor, and the instruction of the people, the care of which 
 had been entrusted to the church. Both the property and 
 the credit of the clergy were in excellent order, and they 
 had, therefore, the obligation and the means to help the state 
 in its necessitous condition. The only doubt was, as to the 
 manner in which aid should be given; and here the disadvan- 
 tages of the revolutionary condition became again apparent. 
 While in June the clergy might have supported the credit 
 of the state, without any disturbance of their own rights of 
 possession, this wns now impossible, in consequence of the 
 annihilation of that credit; nor would the heated passions of 
 the people have been any longer contented with what the 
 clergy had once freely oflered. All the hatred felt towards 
 the Established Church advanced full sail to the attack, 
 borne upon the roaring tide of triumphant popular opinion. 
 Voltaire's abhorrence of every thing ecclesiastical was widely 
 spread among the educated classes; the Jansenists shouted 
 with grim joy at the prospect of paying off the Romish 
 Church for all the injuries they had suffered; and the sup- 
 jjorters of the rights of man woidd not hear of the existence 
 
 ' According Ui others 80 millions. In the 100 millions of tithes, the 
 cost of collection — above 30 millions — is not included. 
 
Cn. v.] CONFISCATION OF CHURCH PROPERTY. 145 
 
 of so powerful and aristocratic a corporation. Thousands of 
 men were almost glad that the distresses of the Treasury 
 aiforded an incontrovertible argument for putting an end to 
 the class privileges of the Church, by the immediate confis- 
 cation of its goods. The service of religion, they said, had 
 only suffered injury from the princely wealth of the prelates ; 
 while the necessities of the State seemed to them for ever 
 relieved by 2,000 millions' worth of property. Mirabeau 
 did not share in the passionate fury against the Church, 
 which found vent in these demands upon it. lie had no 
 other sentiment towards it than utter indifference; since he 
 considered it outstripped by modern civilization, and therefore 
 regarded its internal dissolution as inevitable. "Pray let the 
 clergy sleep," he said to his noisy colleagues, when they 
 were always seeking new quarrels with the Church. At a 
 later period, he wrote to the Queen, that the Nobility was 
 not to be destroyed, as long as family feeling existed in 
 mankind; bvit that the Church had irrecoverably fallen. But 
 be well knew what deep roots it still had in the land, and 
 was all the less inclined to hazard certain victory over it, 
 by outward deeds of violence. When therefore the Assem- 
 bly had, notwithstanding, recourse to such deeds, he told 
 his friend MauvUlon, that this was the most poisonous of 
 the many wounds the country had received. With these 
 sentiments he could not feel much inclined to appropriate 
 the credit of the material seizure of the Church lands, and 
 stiU less the monstrous proceeding of their actual sale. If 
 he aimed at the improvement of the finances, as a means of 
 restoring order, law and credit, it was evident that such a 
 violent confiscation would only lead him directly away from 
 his object. The storm, however, which threatened the Church, 
 came very opportunely, even for him, because he needed for 
 the execution of his plans the power of disposing of its 
 property. > 
 
 A consolidation of the floating debt having now become 
 impossible, it was necessary to find means to liquidate at 
 
 I. . K 
 
146 i* ADMINISTRATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book I. 
 
 least a portion of it. By the advice of a Gencvcsc emigrant, 
 named Claviere, Mirabeau tried the plan of issuing treasury- 
 notes, with which the pubHc creditors might be paid instead 
 of money. In the ruined condition of its credit the State 
 could not expect to keep so large a quantity of paper money 
 in circulation, without some special guarantee. The Church 
 lands were, therefore, to serve as a mortgage, and in order 
 to keep this security free fBom the previous confusion, it 
 was proposed to entrust the administration of the National 
 debt to a new Board, entirely unconnected with the Ministry 
 of finance. In accordance with these views, Mirabeau brought 
 forward a motion on the 12th of October, that the National 
 Assembly should declare the estates of the Church to be 
 the property of the nation. 
 
 It was not difficult to find objections to this system. 
 Paper money, from its very nature, can only be the fruit of 
 a sound credit, the activity of which it tends to develope; 
 but it is entirely unfitted to restore a shaken confidence, 
 just as it would be a manifest contradiction, if a bankrupt 
 debtor should try to regain the confidence of his creditors 
 by new promissory notes. Many voices, therefore, were 
 immediately raised to prophecy all the subsequent evils 
 caused by the assignats; and Mirabeau was afterwards charged 
 with being the originator of those evils. But to do him 
 justice, we must consider his measures in the connexion in 
 which they were brought forward; and observe, that the 
 creators of the subsequent system of paper money had re- 
 com'se to assignats in order to spare themselves the task of 
 restoring order in the finances, while Ids only object was to 
 gain breathing time for the formation of a strong government. 
 Twice did he take a decided step in the direction of paper 
 money; but, on both occasions, he acted with a conviction 
 that these new resources would be entrusted to a powerful 
 controlling hand. 
 
 No sooner had the National Assembly declared, on the 
 2nd of November, that the property of the Church was at 
 
Cu. v.] MIRABEAU'S PROPOSITIONS. ^ 147 
 
 the disposal of the State, than Mirabeau rose to bring for- 
 ward a motion, on which more than on any other depended 
 the future of France. The Ministerial negociations mentioned 
 above had taken a favourable turn. Lafayette seemed won; 
 his friends Talon and Semonville zealously joined Mirabeau; 
 Cice, the Minister of Justice, declared himself ready to give 
 up Necker; and the King was induced to promise Mirabeau 
 an official position of some kind or other. Under these 
 circumstances, Mirabeau brought the following propositions 
 before the National Assembly ; that the peace of Paris should 
 be secured by large purchases of corn ; that the administration 
 of the National debt should be entrusted to a distinct board 
 — which, he said, would put into circulation paper notes 
 resting on good security, and thereby effect the liquidation 
 of the arrears ; — and lastly, that the King's Ministers should 
 have a deliberative voice in the National Assembly. By 
 these last words, as every one understood, Mirabeau an- 
 nounced himself as a candidate for the Ministry. 
 
 With the powerful connexions which he at that time 
 possessed, he looked for opposition only from the extreme 
 Eight and the extreme Left. The former abhorred him, as 
 the leader in every work of destruction; the latter already 
 regarded him with suspicion as the restorer of order; and 
 both justly looked upon his victory as the grave of their 
 ovra future. Mirabeau gave firmness and consistency to the 
 real blessings of the Revolution, by eliminating its anarchical 
 elements; and this gave him a title to the hostility of both 
 Right and Left. But though Duport and Robespierre united 
 with Maury and EspremenU, they were far from having a 
 majority at their disposal. K the court should influence the 
 more judicious members of the Right, the Minister of justice 
 the ministerial party, and Lafayette the deputies of the left 
 centre, Mirabeau was certain, by his influence and oratory, 
 triumphantly to carry with him the great mass of the house. 
 But on the last night, the aspect of affairs entirely changed. 
 Mirabeau always maintained at a later period, that it was 
 
 k2 
 
148 ADMINISTRATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book I. 
 
 Necker who took tlie decisive step; Lafayette tells us that 
 the Minister of justice was busy on this occasion, but that 
 he himself was a passive spectator. The difference is by no 
 means essential; the main point is, that Necker's influence 
 against Mirabeau was not counteracted, but rather su.pported, 
 by Cice and Lafayette. The relative strength of the opposing 
 parties was hereby entirely changed. On the 6th, the Left 
 carried an adjournment of the division; on the 17th the 
 Assembly, passing over the other propositions, decreed that 
 no deputy could be a member of the Ministry. All the 
 eloquence with which Mirabeau pointed out the general per- 
 versity of tliis decree, and the fact that it was directed 
 solely against himself, was of no avail. He spoke to an 
 audience which had pre-judged the matter; and the monarchy 
 was sacrificed to the maintenance of the insecure and transient 
 power of Necker and Lafayette. 
 
 In saying this, we are not exaggerating ; for the monarchy 
 was at that time helplessly bleeding to death of the wounds 
 received on the 6th of October. 
 
 The doctrine and practice of anarchy had gained such 
 strength in France from that day, that to establish any 
 government at all, was a colossal undertaking, for which the 
 National Assembly alone possessed the necessary strength ; and 
 even this body, only by a right use of the means at its com- 
 mand. No government but a parliamentary one was possible 
 in France, at the time of which we speak; and that such a 
 government is compatible with monarchy and national welfare, 
 is proved above all by the example of England. Parliament 
 influences the government by its leaders becoming the coun- 
 sellors and agents of the king; and being thus secure of 
 its power, the parliament has no interest in hindering, cir- 
 cumscribing, or weakening the government in details. Under 
 this system the king has not indeed, in form, the overruling 
 power to which the monarchs of the Continent are accustomed ; 
 but he has as splendid and influential a position as any 
 potentate in the world; since as a factor of the legislature— 
 
Ch. v.] the crown becomes a nullity. 149 
 
 as the fountain of honour and nobility— and as head of the 
 Ministerial Council— he is called upon to make his influence 
 felt as far as possible in accordance] with his own judgment 
 and capacity— with the laws of the land, and the neces- 
 sities of the times. The limitations of his power are, in fact, 
 such as an absolute monarch — if he is but wise and just — 
 imposes on himself; such as Louis XVI. had long been 
 accustomed to in his deahngs with his Ministers. He who, 
 almost without any will of his own, had hitherto accepted 
 his counsellors at the hands of his Aunt, or his Prioae 
 Minister, the Queen, or a faction of the nobles, might just 
 as well receive them from the Assembly, if he had no reason 
 to suspect that body of enmity to the Crown. At the present 
 moment this enmity was shown, not by forcing unwelcome 
 ministers upon him, Ijut by refusing to give him any ministers 
 at aU. By forbidding the appointment of any Deputy to au 
 office in the ministry as a danger to liberty, they openly 
 branded every minister of the King, and therefore the King 
 himself, as an enemy of the nation. By refusing that indirect 
 influence over the heads of the Government, which forms 
 the focus of the English constitution, the Assembly annoiuiced 
 that perpetual interference in the details of the administration, 
 which must, in the end, be fatal to the existence of the 
 Monarchy. For there is no alternative; where a strong 
 Parliament exists, the Ministry must either proceed from, or 
 be in all respects subject to it. The decree of the 7th of 
 November, therefore, condemned the Crown to absolute nullity 
 in the administration of affaii's ; and as a Parliament cannot 
 carry on the government directly, and the existence even of 
 a dishonoured Throne made the appointment of any other 
 Executive impossible, anarchy was henceforward legally 
 established in France. 
 
 The residts of the decree of the 7th of November became 
 apparent in 'a few days — we might almost say, a few hours— 
 after its promvdgation. At the end of September, Thouret 
 had made his first report on a new division of France, for 
 
150 ADMINISTRATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book I. 
 
 the purposes of election and administration. Debates on this 
 subject were carried on, almost without interruption, during 
 the whole winter; and each act, as soon as it was passed, 
 was sanctioned by the King and brought into operation; 
 and thus at the commencement of the Spring the new state 
 of things was completely inaugurated. France was divided, 
 without any regard to the pro^'inces, into 83 Departments, 
 and these again into 574 Districts, and 4730 Cantons. As far 
 as possible these partitions were made according to natural 
 boundaries, and were generally equal in extent or population. 
 All previously existing connexions or separations were abol- 
 ished, with the exception of the parishes, which could not be 
 destroyed, and the attempt to fuse which into larger com- 
 munities or communes had no result. At any rate their old 
 constitution was done away with, and they were all con- 
 stituted on the same system as Municipalities. Of these 
 parishes there were about 44,000, in which 4 or 5 million 
 enfranchised citizens wielded the Sovereignty of the French 
 people. In order to be admitted to this supreme privilege, 
 the citizen must be of age, must have resided one year in 
 the district, and pay some direct tax. These last conditions 
 caused great discontent at the time, and were, indeed, mani- 
 festly inconsistent with the "Rights of man," which acknow- 
 ledge no political difference between man and man, but that 
 of virtue and talent. There was an evident inconsistency in 
 trying to introduce into this system any privileged class. 
 The democratic journalists again raised a cry against the 
 despotism of the Bourgeoisie, and replied to the exclusive 
 privileges of property, bestowed by this law, by a direct 
 declaration of war against all proprietaires. "If this decree 
 is maintained," cried Loustalot, "it will lead to an agrarian 
 law, and a general division of property." This displeasure 
 had, however, no practical foundation or importance any where 
 but in Paris, where the proper army of the Demagogues 
 forfeited the suffrage for want of a domicile. The number 
 of four million voters shows that in general the law contained 
 
Cn. v.] THE POWER OF THE COilMUNES. 151 
 
 a very insignificant limitation of universal suffrage. It was, 
 moreover, soon afterwards decided that every one should 
 pay the direct tax which constituted a voter, who earned 
 any thing more than the lowest rate of daily wages. On 
 this principle every handicraftsman and operative would be 
 enfranchised, since they all earned higher wages than the 
 lowest class of workmen. Regarded as a whole, it would 
 be impossible to imagine a more perverse system; for while 
 it connected the franchise with a certain income, and there- 
 by necessarily inflamed the wrath of the destitute against 
 property, it virtually placed the chief political power in the 
 hands of the poor and needy. 
 
 The four million voters were forthwith armed as a National 
 guard. Every Commune had its battalion, or its company, 
 in which the citizens chose their officers without any inter- 
 ference from above. The laws for the maintenance of dis- 
 cipline in the National guard were not enacted until later; 
 and were even then of a very insufficient kind; thus far, the 
 guards obeyed their officers as much as they pleased; and 
 according to the law of August 1789, the officers were 
 responsible to no one but the municipal authorities. The 
 municipal offices, again, were fiUed by the direct vote of 
 the citizens, without any higher influence; and the officials 
 thus created had not only the administration of the com- 
 munal affairs, but some highly important functions of ex- 
 ecutive government; e. g. the drawing up -the lists of tax- 
 payers — the rating and collection of the state taxes, to be 
 raised by the commune; and, lastly, they had the uncontrolled 
 disposal of the mUitary power, both of the National guard, 
 and the troops of the line which happened to be present. 
 Properly speaking they were only empowered to issue orders 
 to the latter force when public order was concerned; but, 
 as no superior authority could effect anything in oppo- 
 sition to the Commune^ the latter soon proceeded to give 
 directions respecting the organization and movements of 
 the troops in garrison among them. We see from this, how 
 
152 ADMINISTEATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book I. 
 
 well founded was the saying, current at the time, that France 
 consisted of 44,000 little Republics. The Cantons were 
 nothing more than divisions intended to facilitate the more 
 important electoral operations, and had no administrative 
 significance, or official representatives. We may consider 
 the Districts and Departments together, since they were 
 entrusted with exactly the same functions, and the District 
 authorities were the acting representatives of the Depart- 
 ments in their smaller sphere. At the head of each District 
 were 12, and at the head . of each department, 36 men, 
 some of them acting as a Directory for the transaction of 
 current affairs, and a larger number as a Council for settling 
 the taxes, and enacting administrative regulations. They had 
 to distribute the state imposts, in the Districts and Municipal- 
 ities, to watch over their collection, and to hand over the 
 sums raised to the Exchequer. They had to make and main- 
 tain the roads — to manage the street police — to administer 
 the finances and public institutions of the District, and lastly 
 to give orders to the Gensd'armes. They were appointed, 
 without any interference on the part of the Ministry, for 
 the space of two years, by electoral colleges, whose members 
 were appointed by the voters of the District, according to 
 their respective cantons. They could only be deprived of 
 their office by a judicial sentence; nor could they be trans- 
 lated or promoted. A proposition of Mirabeau's, that no 
 one should take office in a District or Department, who had 
 not served in a subordinate position, was rejected. 
 
 The constitution ordained that they shoidd execute their 
 functions in the name of the King, and carry out all his 
 commands which Avere in accordance with the law. If they ne- 
 glected to do this, or themselves committed illegal actions, 
 the King had the right to annul their orders, and to suspend 
 them from office. But even in such cases, the matter was 
 brought before the National Assembly, which could either 
 cancel or mainlain the suspension, or deprive and impeach 
 the culpable authorities. We need not point out that under 
 
Cu. v.] THE POWER VESTED IN THE MASSES. 153 
 
 such circumstances the authority of the central Government, 
 which neither appointed the Office-bearers, nor exercised any 
 influence on the regular routine of business, nor had any 
 power of awarding either reward or punishment, must have 
 been virtually null. The same relations existed between the 
 Departments and the Municipalities, and even between the 
 Municipal authorities and the individual citizens, when once 
 the former had lost the favour of the National guard. Every 
 where the real power lay in the lower, and the weakness 
 in the upper spheres of this administration. To this was 
 added the excessive number of Magistracies — for from the 
 very beginning no one knew exactly what purpose the District 
 administration was to serve. The great number of members 
 in each, moreover, rendered aU rapidity of execution impos- 
 sible; and notwithstanding the wretched pay given to each 
 member, the whole machine was extremely costly. It was 
 reckoned that one person out of every 34 in the kingdom, 
 was an official. Thus pretty nearly every body was called 
 upon, and well inclined, to command, and no one to obey. 
 At first the masses of the people took part with great zeal 
 in the new arrangements ; but before long the very men who 
 possessed the greatest knowledge of affairs, and were most 
 interested in them, found that in the general tumult and 
 confusion they could effect nothing, and therefore withdrew 
 in terror and disgust. The ambitious, the needy and the 
 factious, remained masters of the position, and the residt 
 was almost the greatest misfortune which can befall a nation, 
 viz. that not only the policy of the general government, but 
 all the daily and local interests of the whole country, were 
 at the mercy of political factions. The great mass of orderly 
 citizens, whose wishes and necessities in ordinary cir- 
 cumstances exercise, by their very existence, an almost irre- 
 sistible influence under every form of government, lost all 
 political power in France. 
 
 On the other hand, the orators, the writers, the meetings, 
 and the clubs, occupied the public attention; and by their 
 
154 ADMINISTRATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book I. 
 
 means the non-voters were enabled to make up for the loss 
 of the suffrage. 
 
 The press was entirely free, and was subject to no kind 
 of legal check. Its power grew with the number of its 
 organs ; with nine-tenths of the Frenchmen of that period, 
 whatever was printed was an authority, and, if it flattered 
 their passions, a power. A journalist, whether a voter or 
 not, had more influence than any elected authority. When- 
 ever an angry article appeared in a popular newspaper. 
 Mayors and Directors, Generals aud Ministers, hastened to 
 send in their apologies and justifications. This floating 
 power in the State had its formal organization in the clubs. 
 The right of association was as unlimited as the freedom . 
 of the press; and the absence of all public authority made 
 the exercise of this right an absolute necessity to the orderly 
 citizens, as a kind of self-defence. The National Guards of 
 neighbouring towns united for defence and offence, and the 
 citizens of whole Departments and Provinces formed alliances 
 against the enemies of order, property and freedom. The 
 system of association attained a greater consistency and a 
 more dangerous activity, when it came to be employed by 
 political parties. The first impetus in this direction came 
 from Paris. The Breton club after its removal from Ver- 
 sailles took up its quarters in the monastery of the Jacobins, 
 and thenceforward began to enrol even those who were not 
 members of the Assembly. Its numbers soon increased to 
 thousands; it founded a journal of its own, and soon esta- 
 blished affiliated clubs in the provinces. All these were con- 
 nected with one another, and with the mother club, by 
 constant correspondence, and an interchange of visits by 
 means of deputations. The chief towns of the Departments 
 formed centres for their Districts; in every club there were 
 a few initiated persons, who had placed themselves at the 
 absolute disposal of the chiefs in Paris, and who took care 
 to recruit equally passive tools in every Section of the Dis- 
 trict. At the end of 1790 the number of Jacobin clubs was 
 
Oa. v.] THE JACOBIN CLUBS. 155 
 
 200, many of which, — hkc the one in Marseilles — contained 
 more than a thousand members. Their organization extended 
 through the whole kingdom, and every impulse given at the 
 centre in Paris, was felt at the extremities. Beneath the 
 official Government, which, notwithstanding the number of 
 its members, displayed nothing but impotence and confusion, 
 there grew up spontaneously a real and living power, full 
 of zeal, discipline, unity and energy. It was far indeed 
 from embracing the majority of adult Frenchmen, but even 
 at that time it had undoubtedly become — by means of its 
 strict unity — the greatest power in the kingdom. It counted 
 members among both voters and non-voters, in the National- 
 Guards, and in the troops of the line. But its own proper 
 and ever ready army was, incontestably, composed of the 
 destitute and restless class, which was neither hu^manized by 
 education, nor checked by prudential motives. Having 
 nothing to lose, they were prepared with light-hearted bra- 
 very for every sacrifice, every danger, and even every crime ; 
 and could only expect from every fresh revolution an im- 
 provement of their lot. It naturally followed that the chief 
 aim of the Jacobins was to satisfy these their troops, and, 
 in the first place, to flatter their passions — their hatred, and 
 their vanity; and then to stUl their hunger and gratify their 
 avarice. The tendency of the most powerful union in the 
 kingdom, therefore, was opposed to the security of property, 
 the recognition of personal rights, and the refined forms of 
 social intercourse. The way was now opened to the establish- 
 ment of the despotic power of the mob. In the year 1790, 
 indeed, this object was far enough from being attained, 
 since the voters had the exclusive possession of all official 
 rights. But even then the conclusion could not be contro- 
 verted, that when the Jacobins had a more powerful or- 
 ganization than the Government, the non-voters would be 
 stronger than the voters, notwithstanding their exclusive 
 suffrage. Here, too, the general principle of the constitution, 
 
156 ADMINISTRATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book I. 
 
 which phxced the real power as low in the social scale as possible, 
 bore its natural fruits. 
 
 The decrees for the regulation of the new Government 
 were completed, as we have already said, in February 1790, 
 and were partly brought into operation in the previons 
 January. It is not to be wondered at, that excitement and 
 disorder continued and extended * in every direction; al- 
 though the National Assembly, on the 16th of February 
 increased the severity of the martial law. The old author- 
 ities disappeared, and the creation of new ones tilled the 
 land with violent election contests. The validity of a large 
 number of the elections was disputed, and not unfrequently 
 two Magistracies were chosen side by side; and several 
 hundred complaints respecting such cases were sent up to 
 the National Assembly. The peasants renewed their quarrels 
 with the nobles, and in Bretagne bands of 1200 men might 
 be seen marching against the chateaux. In Champagne and 
 Lorraine the people refused all feudal services, even those 
 which had not been abolished on the 4th of August. The 
 collection of taxes, which during the winter had begun in 
 some places to proceed more smootUy, came once more to 
 a standstill, to the bitter vexation of Necker, as we shall 
 see here after. Eveij the indirect taxes were no longer paid, 
 and every attempt to collect them proTed dangerous to the 
 tax-gatherers; in Bezieres, for example, the people hung five 
 of them, on one day, before the eyes of the frightened 
 authorities. When the matter was brought before the 
 National Assembly, Lafayette said that the Constitutional 
 Committee ought to propose a law, which would suffice to 
 check disorder, and yet not endanger freedom. The King 
 himself apj)eared to recommend energetic measures; his 
 liberal promises excited enthusiastic applause, and the whole 
 
 ' That the anarchy had never really as an almost incredible fact that 
 
 abated since the summer of 1789 is peace and order had been preserved 
 
 evident e. g. from a notice in the in the small town of Sezanne witli- 
 
 Moniteur of Nov. 27th which reports ont the necessity of appealing to arms. 
 
Cii.V.] THE PARLIAMENTS ABOLISHED. 157 
 
 Assembly took an oath to be faithful to the nation, the law 
 and the King; but the only result was a high-sounding pro- 
 clamation to the people, which had not the least effect. The 
 Eight proposed to authorize the Ministers to call out the 
 troops against the insurgents; the only answer to which 
 was violent indignation at a proposal so fatal to freedom. 
 
 Instead of passing any such measure the Assembly was 
 continually employed in weakening the authoiity of the king, 
 and therefore of the Government, by destroying his in- 
 fluence in the department of Justice, as thoroughly as in the 
 Civil administration. This tendency seems all the more de- 
 plorable in this case, because the legal reforms were in other 
 respects as judicious as they were beneficial. A sufficient 
 number of experienced judges and advocates had seats in 
 the Assembly to prevent such great technical blunders being 
 made, as previoiisly in the civU administrative system. With 
 regard to the starting point of legal reforms, it had long 
 been decided that the provincial Parliaments must be abol- 
 ished. The sale and inheritance of offices had already been 
 proscribed on the 4th of August; the political position of 
 the ParHaments was one which could answer no reasonable 
 object, and their judicial services were not of a nature to 
 inspire respect. On the 3rd of November the National As^ 
 sembly resolved, on the motion of Lameth, that the Par- 
 liaments should make holiday until further notice; and that 
 their business, meanwhile, should be transacted ^by their so 
 called Chambres de Vacance. When the Chambers of Rouen, 
 Metz and Rennes, protested against this measure, they were 
 arraigned before the National Assembly by the Ministers 
 themselves, violently threatened by the people, and imme- 
 diately sought safety in speedy submission; in three short 
 debates the fate of these ancient corporations, which more 
 than once had proved a match for the royal power, was 
 completely decided. 
 
 The compensation money of 350 millions, which was to 
 be paid to the incumbents of offices, was a heavy burden 
 
158 ADMINISTRATION.— ASSI6NATS. [Book I. 
 
 for the moment, and it was easy to see that the new ad- 
 ministration of justice wonld be far more costly to the Govern- 
 ment than the preceding one. It was impossible to offer to 
 the future Magistrates, who were only to pass judgment, 
 and that without any kind of dues, the trifling salary which 
 a parliamentary counsellor had joyfully accepted, because 
 his position was hereditary, and brought him fees and po- 
 litical influence. A people like the French, indeed, would 
 cheaply buy the benefits of good law at an annually in- 
 creased expenditure of 20 mOlions. And we may observe, 
 in general, that the feudal State which paid its officials with 
 privileges, was more cheaply, but worse served, than a Re- 
 presentative Government which pays its servants and retains 
 its prerogatives. 
 
 A full reformation was more urgent in the judicial than 
 in the administrative department, because the latter was at 
 any rate represented by the old municipalities, while the 
 former had no organ at all. The feudal courts, the royal 
 tribunals, and the judicial chambers of the Parliaments, 
 had all been equally proscribed by public opinion; and cer- 
 tain as they were of their impending dissolution, they all 
 wanted the power and authority to manifest any kind of 
 activity. The negociations however were extended to October 
 1790; during the whole Spring and Summer France had 
 virtually no courts of law; and we may easily judge how 
 greatly this circumstance must have contributed to the in- 
 crease of insecurity and lawlessness. 
 
 At the end of April the National Assembly decreed, before 
 any thing else, the introduction of juries in criminal cases. 
 In civil causes they rejected the violent propositions of 
 the democratic party, after listening to the explanations 
 of the practical lawyers Thourct and Tronchet, who with 
 luminous conciseness proved the impossibility of separating 
 the question of law from the question of fact, in civil pro- 
 cedure. The same voices which proclaimed their dislike to 
 the formulrc of scientific jurisprudence, and aimed at a beau 
 
Cii. v.] JURIDICAL REFQEMS. 159 
 
 ideal of free arbitration, in accordance with a natural sense 
 of equity, likewise opposed the principle of appeal, as lead- 
 ing to a useless multiplication of burdensome and costly 
 forms, a purposeless increase of the numbers of the Gov- 
 ernment officials, and all the evils of red-tape. The irre- 
 sponsibility of the judges, which was once an indispensable 
 barrier against the despotism of the Government, was still 
 more violently resisted, because it seemed to threaten the 
 new liberties of the people with a still more dangerous 
 kind of despotism; there was, moreover, a general dislike 
 to place any kind of influence in the hands of the Govern- 
 ment. It was in vain that Cazales exerted himself to defend 
 the appointment of the judges by the King, whose power, 
 he said, theyj were demolishing step by step, and thereby 
 destroying the unity of the empire. In the midst of the 
 greatest excitement, and the triumphant shouts of the people, 
 the Assembly passed a resolution on the 4th of May, that 
 the judges should be chosen by the people from among the 
 professional jurists, for a term of six years. For the civil 
 procedure, an inferior Court was formed in every district, 
 and these were mutually to serve one another as Courts 
 of appeal; and lastly a Court of final appeal was established 
 in Paris. Vin every Department, there existed a Court of 
 criminal jurisdiction, and in Paris a Court of Cassation, from 
 which likewise the members of the National Tribunal were 
 to be appointed by lot to try cases of Lese nation. Cazales 
 called upon them first of all to decide the nature of this 
 crime; but Robespierre was of opinion, that the only requi- 
 site was, that the Court should consist of the friends of the 
 Revolution; inasmuch as its task was to combat the aris- 
 tocrats, the enemies of the people, and punish those who 
 corrupted its moral life. These considerations had so great 
 an effect, that no further notice was taken of Cazales' mo- 
 tion; and the choice of the judges, both of the Court of 
 Cassation and of the National Tribunal, was entrusted to 
 the enfranchised citizens in all the Departments. The King 
 
160 ADMINISTRATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book I. 
 
 was to appoint a Commissioner in each Court, ■who was to 
 watch oyer the interest of the State in the course of the 
 proceedings, and to provide for the execution of the sen- 
 tence; but the office of public accuser was likewise filled 
 up by the votes of the enfranchised citizens. If we examine 
 these arrangements, with regard to the number, the grada- 
 tion, and the competence, of the newly created authorities, 
 and compare them in these points with the old state of 
 things, the superiority of the former is great and striking. 
 To their other advantages were added the publicity of the 
 proceedings, the introduction of counsel for the defendant, 
 the abolition of torture and lettrcs de cacliet, and, finally, 
 the creation otjugcs de paix, tribunals of commerce, and family 
 tribunals. If once the Government succeeded in filling the new 
 offices with suitable persons, the gain would be immense. There 
 is no department in which the favourable side of the Re- 
 volution is so strikingly seen, or so clearly distinguishable 
 from its mistakes and faults. The blessing of the sudden 
 emancipation of the peasants coidd, under the circumstances, 
 hardly be purchased without revolutionary excesses ; but the 
 degradation of the King was so far from being necessary 
 to the attainment of a good administration of the law, that 
 the latter suffered under every blow Avhich was aimed 
 at the royal authority. It is true that the National Assem- 
 bly, by its decrees, had advanced nearer to its object, of 
 creating a monarchy without a king, or a king who might 
 easily be dispensed with. He could neither appoint a village 
 bailifi", nor watch over the operations of a justice of the 
 peace, nor remove a clerk for neglect of duty. The voters, 
 or their representatives, composed the juries and elected the 
 judges; just as they bore arms, and appointed the office- 
 bearers in the general administration. The same party which 
 chose the Director of the District also designated the Dis- 
 trict judge — the former for two, the latter for six years ;^ 
 and both were equally impregnated by party spirit, equally 
 dependent, and equally divested of all dignity and self-re- 
 
Ch. v.] necker's feeble policy. 
 
 161 
 
 liance. This one circumstance threw the whole progress of 
 reform into jeopardy. No doubt the old Parliaments were 
 imperious and selfish, and rotten at the core; but they were, 
 at any rate, independent, and, in the full sense of the word, 
 sovereign Courts. France was soon to discover that her 
 new judges hid their faces before every turbulent mob, and 
 were as impotent as the new administrative authorities. 
 
 Thus the hopes with which the clearsighted friends of 
 freedom — and Mirabeau the warmest of them all— had hailed 
 the downfall of the nncirn rcc/imc were blighted, and suc- 
 ceeded by bitter disappointment. We shall see hereafter 
 how his indefatigable mind sought new methods of repairing 
 the ruins that lay around him. At the moment, perhaps, 
 nothing pained him more deeply than that, in the general 
 destruction of his system, one fragment of it was alone 
 preserved — viz. the decree respecting the estates of the 
 Church — which, in connexion with the rest, might have had 
 a beneficial effect, but by itself was simply destructive. 
 This decree was maintained, and if any one of the numerous 
 enemies of the Clergy had wished to forget it, the linancial 
 distress was more than sufficient to recall it to his memory. 
 
 Necker made no progress; he continued in his old courses, 
 withovTt lifting a finger for the restoration of order, which 
 was the most essential pre-requisite for an improvement of 
 the finances. He contented himself with wearying the As- 
 sembly by exhortations to gentleness and harmony, instead 
 of binding them to himself by creative ideas. His only re- 
 source seemed to be the caisse cTescompte; and when its 
 sources began to dry up, he proposed to restore its credit 
 by a guarantee on the part of the State, and to turn it into 
 a National bank. In this case, he said, it would be in a 
 condition to issue new paper money and make loans to the 
 Government. But as the State had still less credit than the 
 caisse d'escomptc, this scheme was either hopeless or fraudu- 
 lent, and certainly not sound enough to avert, by the linancial 
 prospects it offered, the daily increasing storm which threatened 
 
 I. L 
 
162 ADMINISTRATION.- ASSIGNATS. [Book I. 
 
 the property of the Church. The desire of celebrating a grand 
 triumph of mental enlightenment, "and at the same time 
 acquiring a solid security for the desired paper money, would 
 admit of no delay, and was to be checked by no considera- 
 tion. In accordance with these views, a report on the state 
 of the Exchequer was brought up from the Finance Com- 
 mittee by Montesquieu, a nobleman, like many others in the 
 States-General, of superficial attainments, and splendid exterior, 
 neither a miracle of virtue, nor a great criminal, a revolutionist 
 from ambition, but of aristocratic tastes, and capable of treating 
 all subjects with equal shallowness. His report was a mas- 
 terpiece of self-complacent frivolity. In the same breath it 
 annovmced a debt of 950 — instead 600 millions — as already 
 fallen due, and a surplus of 33 millions in the revenue ; it made 
 no objection to a new loan from the caisse d'escompte, but 
 demanded 400 millions from the Clergy. Necker could only 
 carry a few modifications of little importance, and on the 
 19th December the sale the Church lands to that amount 
 was decreed. From the proceeds of this sale a special fund 
 was to be formed, to which the claims of the caisse d'es- 
 compte were to be referred. The preliminary steps for the 
 execution of this decree were immediately taken. It was 
 necessary to separate from the entire property of the Church 
 an extent of land of the value of 400 millions which was 
 most conveniently situated for immediate sale by auction. 
 The Ecclesiastical Committee of the Assembly undertook 
 this business, while; Necker made a temporary shift with the 
 bills of the caisse d'escompte, and the patriotic contribu- 
 tions — put off the State creditors— deferred the payment of 
 pensions, and renewed the anticipations which had fallen due. 
 Embarrassments of this nature were continually increasing; 
 for the new authorities of the Communes and the Districts 
 were now established, and their debM redoubled the disorder 
 in the Provinces. The Committee, therefore, had good reason 
 to accelerate its operations, and declared, on the 6th of 
 February, that the first step to be taken— "a step not merely 
 
Cu. v.] DISSOLUTION OF THE MONASTERIES. .163 
 
 harmless but advantageous and glorious" — was to break up 
 the monasteries. The other property of the Church, he ad- 
 ded, ought not to be touched, until the religious services 
 which would have to be endowed from this source had been 
 re-modeUed according to some general plan. This statement 
 was not very encouraging to the Clergy, since it held out 
 the prospect not only of a confiscation of their property, 
 but also of a reform in the Church. The very first objection 
 however which they made roused a violent storm. All the 
 dislike entertained against the Church culminated in an an- 
 gry contempt for the monastic system. The popidar masses 
 were excited to the utmost; the secresy of the cloisters 
 appeared to them to conceal nothing but tyranny, suppressed 
 suffering, corrupt debauchery and crime of every kind. 
 "The incarceration of a human being for the whole of life," 
 said the orators, "is imnatural; and svicli a desecration of 
 the dignity of man must no longer be tolerated on the 
 eiuancipated soil of France." The Clergy raised the cry of 
 blasphemy, and the Bishop of Nancy put the question to 
 the Assembly, whether they still considered the Catholic 
 faith as the established religion of France. But he was only 
 answered by derisive murmurs; his motion was rejected as 
 informal, and it was decreed, in accordance with the report 
 of the Committee, that the monasteries should be dissolved 
 and their property sold. It was hoped that an annual pen- 
 sion for the '2,000 persons connected with the monasteries 
 —in all about 16 millions— would be easily gained by the 
 operation. 
 
 This was all very well for the future, and the more secure 
 the final result appeared to be, the less could the public 
 understand why Neckcr would not use these resources for 
 liis present wants and issue bills upon them. But he clearly 
 saw on what dangerous courses they were now entering with 
 thoughtless presumption; he knew that if they had recourse 
 to the convenient system of paper money, without having 
 founded the security of the National credit on a firm basis, 
 
 l2 
 
164 ADMINISTRATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book I. 
 
 the very largest issue of paper must be soon exhausted and 
 the necessity arise of another on a still_ greater scale. It 
 was certain that France would be quickly flooded with a 
 mass of assignats continually decreasing in value, and the 
 whole nation thereby involved in the bankruptcy of the State. 
 It was, moreover, still very doubtful whether the State would 
 in the end gain much by the confiscation of the Church 
 property, since it would have to bear the expenses of the 
 re-modelled Ecclesiastical Establishment. The more zealous 
 calculated that the estates in question had hitherto yielded 
 70 millions per annum ; and that as estates in France usually 
 sold at 33 years' purchase, 2,300 millions might be expected 
 from the sale. If therefore State securities bearing 6 or 
 7 p. cent were bought with this sum, the State would be 
 freed of at least 130 millions of annual interest; so that the 
 gain would be very considerable, even though the Church 
 should be splendidly endowed with, say, 100 million francs 
 per annum. Unhappily, however, there were serious errors 
 in this calculation. In the first place, of the 70 millions 
 yearly income, about twenty belonged, partly to the knights 
 of Malta, and partly to schools and hospitals, which in 
 everybody's opinion ought to keep their property. In the 
 next place, a great part of the remaining 50 millions was 
 not the rent of landed estates, but of plots of ground in 
 towns. State papers, and private claims. The valuation there- 
 fore at 33 years' purchase was certainly too high, and since 
 the immense amount of land thrown upon the market would 
 necessarily depreciate its value, there was every reason to 
 suppose that the produce of the sale would not be more 
 than 25 years' purchase — i. e. 1250 millions. In this way, 
 then, the State would only be freed from 80 millions of 
 yearly interest, and a profit in this colossal operation could 
 only be gained by reducing the expenses of the Church 
 below this amount. It was easy to see that a reduction on 
 so large a scale could hardly be made without endangering 
 the internal organization of the Church, and that thus a 
 
Ch. v.] NECKER'S financial expedients. 165 
 
 religious schism would be added to all the secular disorders. 
 But the Left, far from thinking this an evil, regarded it as 
 another blessing of the Kevolution; and every where pro- 
 claimed their views with impatient eagerness. 
 
 Necker had political and economical experience enough to 
 foresee the consequences of these proposed measures, and 
 made one more attempt to avert the calamity. He informed 
 the Assembly, on the 6th of March, that he should need, in 
 the course of the year, about 250 millions' in addition to 
 the regular revenue; but that he should be able to raise 
 nearly the whole amount by various means — as surplus in- 
 come, fresh anticipations, delay of payments, and, lastly, a 
 final loan from the caisse d'escompte. It is true that several 
 of these items were very questionable ; and he himself, after 
 3 days, was obliged to raise the amount of the loan from 
 30 to 60 millions; moreover, he only spoke of the current 
 expenditure, and the anticipations which were due, without 
 mentioning the unpaid dividends and overdue capital of the 
 National debt. Yet it was not in consequence of these 
 omissions that his plan fell to the ground; we have already 
 learned, that neither the National Assembly nor the Min- 
 ister cared very much about a handful of figures more 
 or less. There were other decisive reasons why he did not, 
 at this time, meet with the same favour as had been shown 
 to his operations with the caisse cl'esconipte in the previous 
 December. The principal reason was that the impatience, 
 both of the Assembly and of Paris itself, to deal the decisive 
 blow against the Church, and to take possession of its pro- 
 perty, had risen to the highest pitch. There was, moreover, 
 an extraordinary impulse in the same direction in the capital, 
 which is too characteristic of the whole state of things to 
 be passed over without notice. 
 
 The city of Paris was suffering vmder the same pecuniary 
 
 ' He says 294, but has on the credit side assets to the amount of 
 38 millions. 
 
166 ADMINISTRATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book I. 
 
 difficulties as the State; its receipts were equally interrupted 
 and irregular, and here too the caissc d'escomjgtc had to 
 advance the entire cost of all branches of the Administration, 
 and, when that was done, to promise 2'/^ millions a month, 
 in ready money. Under these circumstances, it seemed to 
 the Municipality the greatest good fortune that the 6th of 
 October had made them the real possessors of all power 
 and rule in the kingdom. When the proletaries have nothing 
 to eat, they make a revolution; and as the State wishes for 
 no more revolutions, it iliust provide the proletaries with 
 food. By this pithy syllogism they extorted from Necker, 
 in the two first months of the winter, 17 millions for the 
 purchase of corn, and 360,000 livres a month — far more than 
 the entire monthly bu.dget of the city in former times — for 
 the wages of the workmen in the public workshops, which 
 had been in full activity since the 6th of October. The 
 Iloyal Civil list was laid under contribution to an equal 
 extent with the public treasury, and it is no exaggeration 
 to say that the monthly consumption of national projDerty 
 by the people of Paris, amounted to several millions. 
 
 But in this case too, it was impossible to fiU the yawning 
 abyss which anarchy and disorder had opened. It seemed 
 as if every new payment only created fresh wants. The real 
 sovereign of the State, therefore, the Municipality of Paris, 
 could not possibly ahow a question so popular and promising 
 as that of the Church lands to pass without making it 
 contribute towards the progress of the Revolution, and at 
 the same time securing special advantages to themselves from 
 the operation. On the 10th of March, therefore, the Mayor 
 of Paris appeared at the bar of the Assembly to pourtray 
 the perilous state of the national credit, to point out the 
 necessity of a speedy sale of church lands on a large scale, 
 and to promise the ready help of the Municipal authorities. 
 Paris he said, had estimated its own monastic property at 
 150 millions, and was ready to purchase it all, to sell it 
 again, and to be satisfied with a quarter of the proceeds for 
 
Ch. v.] decree for sale of church lands. 167 
 
 the troubles and dangers of the operation. This would have 
 been a commission of nearly 40 millions, for which, added 
 BaiUy, the city would build the Assembly a beautiful palace. 
 But this was too much even for the Assembly, usually so 
 accommodating to the city of Paris; and so much was said 
 that Bailly declared that there had been a mistake, ajid 
 lowered the terms to 16 millions. To this no opposition 
 could be made, and it was decreed, on the 17th of March, 
 that Church property to the value of 400 millions should be 
 made over to the Municipalities of the kingdom, who were 
 to re-sell it in smaller portions, and keep Vigth of the net 
 proceeds for themselves. 
 
 Paris thus gained a very handsome profit, and the way 
 was paved for the actual confiscation of the estates of the 
 Church. Great progress was now made in all directions. 
 First of aU it was proposed, that 400 millions of paper 
 money should be immediately issued by the state. These 
 assignats were to be received as purchase money at the 
 retail sale of the ecclesiastical property, and till then bear 
 their fuU nominal value in all transactions. The Minister of 
 finance would employ the 400 millions in discharging his 
 obligations to the caisse d'escompte (170 millions), in paying 
 the anticipations which fell due in the course of the year 
 (1 58 millions) and lastly half the unpaid dividends (81 millions). 
 Thus far men might console themselves with the thought, 
 that the greater part of these sacrifices were rendered ne- 
 cessary by the ancien regime, and that after the withdrawal 
 of the bills of the caisse d'escompte the ;quantity of paper 
 money could not be considerably increased. But unfor- 
 tunately it was already evident that the 400 millions would 
 only be a starting point. For, after they had been spent, 
 there still remained the old debts of the respective ministries, 
 (120 millions) the second half of the unpaid dividends, and 
 72 millions of over-due capital — in all 273 millions — from 
 former times; and the Committee itself declared, that the 
 liquidation of these items must be seriously taken in hand. 
 
168 ADMINISTRATION.— A SSIGNATS. [Book I. 
 
 Incliicling tlie profit for the cities, it took about a third of 
 the Church hinds to raise the 400 milUons, and it became 
 urgently necessary to provide for the salaries and the debts 
 of the Clergy. The Financial Committee also emphatically 
 dwelt on the necessity of giving a new form to the Ecclesi- 
 astical Hierarchy; and lastly, the Committee explained to 
 the jMinister, that if the assignats set him free from 140 
 millions of anticipations^ he would have 10 millions surplus 
 at the end of the year. But it was not difficult to see that 
 in this calculation, they reckoned upon the raising of 50 
 millions of very uncertain revenue, and an excessive lim- 
 itation of the most necessary expenses. Under these cir- 
 cumstances, it was a matter of course that they could not 
 stop at a sale of lands, and an issue of assignats to the 
 amount of only 400 millions. 
 
 The Ecclesiastical Committee therefore brought forward 
 their own motion, side by side with that of the Committee 
 of Finance; and proposed that the nation should take upon 
 itself the debts of the clergy (149 millions), and defray the 
 costs of the ChiTrch from the taxes. 
 
 For the present the existing dignitaries of the Church were 
 to remain as before, but their revenues were to be so much 
 curtailed that the Church would cost 133 instead of 170 
 millions. But as this sum was still too large, they proposed 
 that in iuture the Church should be arranged on an entirely 
 new system, so that 65 millions (afterwards raised to 77 mil- 
 lions) would suffice for its maintenance. The old Dioceses 
 were to be done away with ; every Department was to form 
 a Bishopric — every half scpiare league a Parish— and the 
 parish priests were to be better paid than before. 
 
 No one could conceal from himself the importance of the 
 crisis into which France was thrown by these propositions. 
 The Clergy strained every nerve; their most influential 
 representatives made urgent appeals to the sense of justice, 
 the interests, the political wisdom and rehgious feelino-, of 
 the National Assemlsly. The Archbishop of Aix, who had 
 
Ch. v.] vehement opposition of the clergy. 169 
 
 formerly been the chief advocate of the union of the Clergy 
 with the tiers ctat, and had subsequently become the highly 
 honoured President of the States-general during the jubilant 
 victory of the 14th July, offered 400 millions as a voluntary 
 offering of the Clergy. This sum was to be raised by a 
 mortgage on their property, the interest of which was to be 
 paid by themselves, and was to be ultimately liquidated by 
 gradual sales. Cazales set before them, in a violent speech, 
 the constant insecurity of assignats based upon lawless 
 plunder — the impotence of the Ministry, which rendered any 
 improvement in the national credit impossible — the fluctu- 
 ations of the ever-growing mass of paper money — by which 
 every individual, rich and poor, would be dragged into the 
 general bankruptcy, and the mass of the people driven by 
 every movement in the money market to insurrections caused 
 by hunger and despair. "How great is the folly of these 
 capitalists," he cried, "who, excited by the hopes of the first 
 specidations in the new pajjer money, urge you on with 
 such reckless haste! — do they not see that all kinds of property 
 receive a fatal blow when any one has been destroyed!"' 
 
 But the majority were unalterably fixed in their resolution, 
 and firmly maintained the advantages they had won. Since 
 the 27th of June — it was urged in reply — a separate order 
 of Clergy no longer • existed ; how, then, could they stQl 
 make an offer of 400 millions? Since the 2nd of November, 
 the property of the Church had been placed at the disposal 
 of the nation; what member of the Assembly, then, had a 
 right to raise a legal protest when the nation was carrying 
 out that decree? The financial difficulty pressed hard upon 
 them; the hope of gain allured many an individual, and the 
 Municipality of Paris had no intention of giving up their 
 booty. The majority thought that the fate of the whole Re- 
 volution was imperilled if an order of men, whom they 
 regarded as the born enemies of all enlightenment, and all 
 reform, were left in possession of their independent wealth. 
 They did not see the possibility of expunging the lay Aristo- 
 
170 ADMINISTRATION.— ASSIGNATS. [Book I. 
 
 cracy from the Constitution, if the ancient Aristocratic Church 
 were allowed to remain in existence; and they hoped, by 
 means of the assignats, to bind the whole French people 
 by material ties to the fate of the Revolution. What objec- 
 tion could be raised on the plea of religion, if the State 
 paid for the services of the altar, better than had been done 
 before, and only removed the princely pomp from a Church 
 whose founders had made the poverty of the Apostles a 
 proverb? At present, they said, the greed of the priests, 
 the self-conceit of the clergy, and the lewdness of the monks, 
 were in every mouth ; and to proceed with the utmost severity 
 against this degraded corporation would be the duty of an 
 emancipated people, even if the improvement cost as many 
 sacrifices, as it really promised blessings. 
 
 The longer the discussion lasted, the more decidedly did 
 these feelings manifest themselves. "I shall speak no more," 
 said an Abbot — "every thing has been already settled in 
 l^rivate cliques;" whereupon a good honest soul, the equally 
 pious and democratic Carthusian, Dom Gerles, rose and 
 declared that this was a calumny which ought to be imme- 
 diately refuted by the Assembly; and he proposed, that a 
 declaration should be made that the Catholic faith was the 
 religion of the French people. A stormy debate ensued; on 
 the Left, they cried that the fact was not called in question, 
 and wherefore should they make it a subject of formal decree, 
 unless they wished to give the signal for a new persecution 
 of heretics? The Clergy asked, in their turn, whether if 
 the fact was acknowledged, the refusal to proclaim it did 
 not betray a bitter hatred against religion? On the side of 
 the Right, Estourmel reminded the Assembly of a vow of 
 Louis XIV., to keep the cities of France in the Catholic 
 faith. Upon this IMirabeau sprang up and said that he too 
 remembered a Catholic King, and could see from that very 
 rostra the window from which the hand of a French Monarch 
 — guided by an abominable faction, which mingled their worldly 
 interests M'ith the sacred interests of religion — fired the shot 
 
Ch. v.] the assembly intimidated by the mob. 171 
 
 which began the massacre of St. Bartholomew! Thus abuse 
 and insult flew from side to side, and the cry resounded 
 from the galleries, "Down with the cowls! down with the 
 priests!" Outside the Assembly the people were collected 
 in crowds, who threatened to drag the nobles and the clergy 
 out of the Assembly; saying, that they were not chosen by 
 the people, but only representatives of abolished orders, and 
 consequently unqualified intruders; and that if they voted 
 wrongly they were not inviolable like the genuine Deputies. 
 At the close of the sitting, the National guard had to protect 
 several Deputies against the attacks of the mob. 
 
 The Assembly decreed, on the 14th and 17th of April, 
 the payment of the Clergy and the expenses of divine worship 
 by the State — the confiscation of all the property of the 
 Church — an immediate sale of it to the extent of 400 millions, 
 — and the fabrication of an equal amount of assignats. 
 
BOOK 11. 
 
 FIBST EFFECTS OF THE EEVOLUTION ON EUROPE. 
 
Cli<?4 POLITICAL STATE OF CENTRAL EUROPE. 175 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 GENERAL CONDITION OF CENTRAL EUROPE. 
 
 cosdition- of central europe. — epociis of acstri.4n policy. — universal 
 dominion of the hoise of hapsbl'ro. — feudalism in austria from 
 1648. — Separation from Germany. — Decline of the polish consti- 
 tution. — Antagonism of Poland and north Germany. — The Prussian 
 STATE. — Frederick the great. — The house of Lorraine and state- 
 union IS AUSTRIA. — Joseph ii. — Resistance of Prussia. 
 
 AVuiLE tlie first year of the Revolution was shaking the 
 French State to its very foundations, the extraordinary spec- 
 tacle it presented attracted, it iS true, the lively attention of 
 foreign countries; yet the anxious regards of European 
 statesmen were only directed in a very inferior degree to- 
 wards Paris. The pohcy of the rest of Europe revolved~ 
 almost exclusively round another Revolution, almost eqvially 
 violent with that which was goinff on at the same time in 
 France, and in many respects analagous to it; but differing 
 from it in this, that it was begun hj a crowned head, the 
 Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Joseph II. of Austria. 
 His efforts had so deep an influence on the history of Europe 
 in the period of which Yve speak, that it is necessary to 
 consider them more closely, and for this purpose to retrace 
 our steps a little. 
 
 The House of Hapsburg attained its European position 
 through the Emperor Charles V. Before his time, the Princes 
 of this Plouse had conducted tliemselves like most other 
 German Sovereigns — attending chiefly to their dynastic in- 
 terests — active, though not self-sacrificing, in promoting the 
 welfare of their dominions, with views confined by the ho- 
 
176 GENERAL CONDITION OF CENTRAL EUROPE. [Book II, 
 
 rizon of the German world, and under no temptation to 
 prefer foreign to domestic connections. In the 15th century, 
 however, this condition of affairs was changed. Inheritance 
 and marriage brought the House of Hapsburg, in rapid suc- 
 cession, the reversion of the Magyar-Slavonian-Hungary, 
 of the half French Burgundy and the Netherlands, and, 
 lastly, of Spain, half Italy, and the immeasurable Indian dis- 
 coveries. Charles V. in possession of so many dominions, 
 scattered over half the globe, and of claims to at least as 
 many more, obtained the Imperial Crown of the Roman Em- 
 pire, and with it the ancient title — acknowledged both by 
 Roman heathen and Mediaeval christian — to rule the world. 
 His position therefore was raised far above that of a mere 
 national chief, and the interests of his person and dynasty 
 were bound up in the task of obtaining universal dominion. 
 As he himself belonged to several nations, and really to 
 none, — being German on his father's, and Spanish on his 
 mother's, side, but Burgundian in education and opinions — 
 their national prosperity was not the object of his life, but 
 only a subordinate means to the great end of spreading the 
 rule of the Hapsburgs over East and AVest. This ambition 
 had several times brought him into conflict with the Pope, 
 whom he had alternately reduced to obedience liy warlike 
 and ecclesiastical measures. This was not done however from 
 any transient sympathy with religions freedom or the inde- 
 pendence of the State, but had merely been a question — as 
 in the struggles of the middle ages— which of the two po- 
 tentates, in the vast theocracy of Christendom, should hold 
 the first place. As soon as the Pope submitted the Church 
 to the will of the Emperor, the Emperor was ready to sub- 
 ject the world to the ChurcTht 
 
 These efforts form one of the most splendid points in the 
 history of our qtiarter of the world, and are indubitable 
 proofs of extraordinary intellect, creative imagination, and 
 an indomitable will. But nature, which has made one nation 
 to differ in character from another, wiO not allow her crea- 
 
Cn. I.] POLICY OF THE EMPEROR CHARLES V. 177 
 
 tures to be used as tools of human ambition. It is the fate 
 of such extravagant projects to destroy tliemselves by cho- 
 king the sources of their own strength. All the nations over 
 which Charles- Y. ruled had to learn by experience that his 
 position, as ruler of the world, was injurious to their pros- 
 perity ; and no nation felt this so early or so deeply as Ger- 
 many. As regards religion, this assertion needs no further 
 proof; but in political matters also its truth was most clearly 
 displayed. The wars with the Turks in the East, waged 
 with German blood, had but little result even for the Em- 
 peror himself, and none at all for the Empire. The Italian 
 conquests in the South brought no advantages to Germany, 
 but to Spain ; and in the West, where Charles exempted the - 
 Netherlands from almost all interference on the part of the 
 Imperial authorities, he confirmed the declaration of the Duke 
 of Lorraine — that he was not under the suzerainty of the 
 Empire, — that the Netherlands might have a friendly neigh- 
 bour. It was in strict accordance with this system that 
 Charles at length subjected the German Protestants by means 
 of Spanish, Italian and Hungarian troops; and their fresh 
 revolt under the Elector Maurice, was caused, not by the 
 desire of religious freedom alone, but, quite as much, by the 
 wrath with which the whole nation, in sj)ite of all Imperial 
 edicts beheld the Frenchman GranveUa, and Alba the Span- 
 iard, lording it in the German Empire. 
 
 The idea of the universal dominion of the Hapsburgs was, 
 of course, considerably weakened when Charles divided his 
 splendid inheritance, and gave Spain, India and Naples, as 
 weU as the old imperial possessions, — Milan and the Nether- 
 lands — to his sou, and the German and Hungarian provinces 
 to his brother Ferdinand, his successor in the imperial dig- 
 nity. The latter, and in a still greater degree his son, Max- 
 imilian, now began to pay greater attention to the interests 
 of Germany; but the common family feeling was still alive 
 in them, and the fatal religious troubles which ensued ren- 
 dered the feudal and dynastic view of things once more 
 
 I. M 
 
178 GENERAL CONDITION OF CENTRAL EUROPE. [Book II. 
 
 triuBiphant. There was, at that time, in Germany, both 
 among Catholics and Protestants, a moderate and a violent 
 party; and whoever retained any attachment to Empire and 
 native land must have wished to see the two moderate fac- 
 tions united, on the ground of a mutual recognition of each 
 other's religious faith; and this was just the object of the 
 above-mentioned Emperor. Now it is certain that faults 
 were committed on both sides, and that the Protestant radi- 
 cals took their full share in the destruction of this prospect 
 of harmony. Equally evident, however, is the inveterate and 
 savagely persecuting spirit of the Catholic zealots; and this 
 party had no more devoted or ardent adherent, than the 
 • future Emperor, Ferdinand II. Here too, as in the case of 
 Charles V., national feelings gave way before the interests 
 of the dynasty and the Catholic world-empire. While he 
 was stiU Archduke he offered his Spanish cousin the Swabian 
 territories of his House, in order to give him a continuous 
 dominion from Milan to Brussels; and as Emperor he began 
 the Thirty years' war, by a comprehensive alliance with 
 Poland, Italy and Spain; which the Protestants answered by 
 invoking the aid of the Danes, Swedes and French. For a 
 whole age the very existence of the German name was im- 
 perilled. 
 
 The issue of the contest was the complete overthrow of 
 the Hapsburg claims. The peace of Westphalia acknow- 
 ledged the equal rights of the Protestant churches, and the 
 sovereignty of the German princes. And thus, on the one 
 side, an end was put to the media3val dominion of the 
 Church, which would have needed exclusive rights for its 
 existence; and on the other side, feudal imperialism lost 
 its rule in the Empire, because its ambition could not be 
 satisfied with guiding the destinies of the German nation. 
 The House of Hapsburg had to seek other channels for its 
 policy. It is true that recollections of former plans repeatedly 
 rose in the Imperial mind; and, as late as the year 1725, 
 an offensive and defensive league was made with Spain 
 
Cn. I.] CONSOLIDATION OF AUSTRIA. 179 
 
 against the Turks and the Protestants, for the furtherance 
 of a fjxmily object. Yet, however zealously catholic the Em- 
 perors remained, — however little they saw things from a 
 German point of view— they were obliged, after all, to yield 
 to circumstances, and to exchange the desire of universal 
 dominion for more limited aspirations. A period of specific 
 Austrian policy now commenced. 
 
 Before the Thirty years' war the territories of the German 
 Hapsburgs were not very considerable. The greatest part 
 of Hungary was in the hands of the Turks; the Tyrol be- 
 longed to a collateral line; and, in the other provinces, the 
 independence of the Nobility was much stronger than the 
 sovereignty of the Archdukes. 
 
 The Nobles were all zealous protestants, so that a mon- 
 archical power could only be created after a victory of the 
 Catholic faith. For the first time since 1621, the crown was 
 seen in these regions to assume a really dominant position. 
 Efforts in this direction had been zealously carried on since 
 1648; the Tyrolese Estates now lost their most important 
 privileges; and, above all, the Emperor succeeded, by the 
 help of Polish and German troops, in driving out the Turks 
 from Hungary, and at the same time crushing the national 
 freedom of the Magyars with frightful bloodshed. By these 
 victories the Monarchy gained, in the first place, a large 
 increase of territory; — which placed it nearly on a level with 
 France. In the second place it acquired at home the power 
 of raising as many taxes and soldiers as were necessary to 
 increase the army to the extent of its wishes; and of dis- 
 tributing its officials and troops — without distinction of na- 
 tion — as imperial servants, throughout its dominions. And 
 thus it secured submission at home and disposable strength 
 for its operations abroad. Here it stopped short. As it had 
 no national, and, consequently, no warm and natural rela- 
 tion to any of its provinces — which were merely used as 
 passive tools to promote the lofty aims of the Hapsburg 
 family— the Government had no intention of using its power 
 
 m2 
 
180 GENERAL CONDITION OF CENTRAL EUROPE. [Book II. 
 
 at home for the furtherance of the public good, or the build- 
 ino- np of a generally useful Administration. The Nobility 
 had no longer the strength to resist the demands of the 
 Crown for men and money, but it still retained exemption 
 from taxes, the jurisdiction and police among its own pea- 
 sants, and a multitude of feudal rights, which, often enough, 
 degraded the peasant to the condition of a serf, and every- 
 where bound down agriculture in the most galling bonds. 
 Of manufactures there were little or none; trade was carried 
 on on the system of guilds. The State officials exercised 
 but little influence over the internal afiairs of the Communes, 
 or Provinces; and the privileged orders had fuU liberty to 
 prosecute their own interests among their inferiors with 
 inconsiderate selfishness. In this aristocracy, the Church, 
 from its wealth and its close internal unity, assumed the first 
 place; and its superior importance was still farther enhanced 
 by the fact of its being the chief bond of unity between the 
 otherwise so loosely compacted portions of the Empire. 
 
 In modern States Provinces are more especially bound 
 together by similarity of language, education and material 
 interests; and these are respectively represented by the or- 
 gans of Law, Instruction, Administration and popular Re- 
 presentation; by means of which the National Unity makes 
 itself felt in every part of the country. The military force 
 only appears in the back-ground, and only acts in case of 
 public disturbances. But of these peaceful and endearing 
 means of influence Austria at that period possessed none; 
 it was only by the army that she could enforce the or- 
 ders of the central Government. It was, therefore, a matter 
 of the most urgent necessity to add to the military force a 
 more peaceful and persuasive agent. This necessary aid was 
 offered, quite spontaneously, by the Church, whose wars under 
 Ferdinand II. had really founded the Monarchy. The Church 
 attached the Nobility to the Government; for we must not 
 forget that a very considerable portion of the estates of the 
 Nobles had passed into the hands of new possessors who 
 
Ch.I.] alliance between HAPSBURGS& catholic church. 181 
 
 had received them as a reward for being good catholies. 
 The Church, too, taught all the youth of the Empire,— in 
 all its different languages,— obedience to the House of Ilaps- 
 burg, and received from the Crown, in return, exclusive 
 control of the national education. It formed, in spite of 
 the resistance of nationalities, a sort of public opinion in 
 ftivour of the unity of the En;pire; and the Crown, in re- 
 turn, excluded all non-catholic opinions from the schools, 
 from literature and religion. Austria, therefore, continued 
 to be catholic, even after 1648; and by this we mean, not 
 only that its Princes were personally devout — or that the 
 Catholic clergy were supported in the performance of their 
 spiritual functions, — or that the institutions of the Church 
 were liberally supported — but also that the State directed 
 its policy according to ecclesiastical views, made use of the 
 Church for political purposes, and crushed every movement 
 hostile to it in all other spheres of the national life. In 
 Austria, therefore, it was not merely a question of theologi- 
 cal differences, but of the deepest and most comprehensive 
 points of distinction between the medieval and the modern 
 ■world. Austria was still, in its whole nature, a Mediaeval 
 State or Confederacy of States. 
 
 The consequences of this condition were most strikingly 
 seen in its relation to Germany. 
 
 In the first place, there was a complete separation, in re- 
 gard to all mental and spiritual matters, between the great 
 body of the Empire, and its powerful Eastern member. This 
 was the period, in which Germany was awaking to a new 
 intellectual life in modern Europe, and laying the foundation 
 of its modern science in every branch — in History and Sta- 
 tistics, Chemistry and Geology, Jurisprudence and Philosophy 
 — and assuming by its Literature, an equal rank with other 
 nations in national refinement and civilization. By the works 
 of genius which this period produced Austria remained 
 entirely uninfluenced; and it has been said, that Werther 
 had only been made known to the Viennese in the form of 
 
182 GENERAL CONDITION OF CENTRAL EUROPE. [Book IT. 
 
 fireworks in the Prater. The hterary police allowed no seed 
 of modern culture to enter the Empire; and the Jesuit 
 schools had rendered the soil unfit for its reception. All the 
 progress of German civilization, at this period, was based 
 on the principle of the independence of the mind in art and 
 science. The education of the Jesuits, on the contrary, 
 though unsurpassed where the oliject is to prepare men for 
 a special purpose, commences by disowning individual pecu- 
 liarities, and the right of a man to choose his own career. 
 There was, at this time, no other characteristic of an Aus- 
 trian than an entire estrangement from the progress of tjie 
 German mind. The case was the same in the department of 
 public law as in those of literature and science. The Imperial 
 dignity, which continued to be maintained by Austria, was 
 nothing more than a means for the furtherance of the 
 dynastic objects of the House of Hapsburg. Under Charles V. 
 the possession of the Imperial crown had extended the ho- 
 rizon of the Monarch far beyond the national soil to the 
 limits of the world itself. But now this crown had shrunk 
 into a mere organ for governing a State, which, looking to 
 its origin, ought only to have been a Province of the Empire. 
 In fact, all that we can say of the constitution of the Em- 
 pire at that time is, that what still remained of it was rather 
 a hindrance, than a channel, to the vigorous impulses of the 
 nation. The progress of the people in science and art, in 
 politics and military strength, was only seen in the larger 
 secular territories, which, after 1G48, enjoyed their own 
 sovereignty; and even these were checked in their movements 
 at every step by the remnants of the Imperial Constitution. The 
 Members of the Empire alone, in whom the decaying remains 
 of Mediaeval existence still lingered on — the Ecclesiastical 
 Princes — the small Counts — the Imperial Knights and the 
 Imperial Towns, — clung to the Emperor and the Imperial 
 Diet. In these, partly from their small extent of territory, 
 partly from the inefficiency of their institutions, neither 
 active industry, nor public spirit, nor national pride, were 
 
Ch. I.] DECAY OF IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION. 183 
 
 to be found. In all which tended to elevate the nation, and 
 raise its hopes for the future, they took, at this period as 
 little part as Austria herself. To her they were led, by 
 similarity of nature, to look up as to their national guardian 
 and protector; and for this reason they placed their votes 
 in the Imperial Diet entirely at her disposal. 
 
 The Imperial constitution, therefore, was inwardly decayed, 
 and stood in no relation to the internal growth of the na- 
 tion. Nothing coidd be more perverse than to judge of the 
 patriotism of single German Estates, according to the degree 
 of devotion which they shewed to this constitution ; it would 
 be still more erroneous than to consider those German States 
 as enemies of the German nation, which did not acknow- 
 ledge the German Diet in 1850 or 1866. "What we ought 
 to look to is this; which of the German territories, in the 
 last century, protected the vital interests of the German 
 Empire at home and abroad with wisdom and energy? — 
 For these are the true representatives of the Empire and of 
 German unity; while the adherents of the dead forms of the 
 Constitution ought only to be regarded as organs of weakness 
 and division. That this constitution had no intrinsic worth, 
 Austria knew best of all; and whenever the interests of the 
 Austrian Dynasty required it, we see her unscrupulously 
 emancipating herself from aU the laws of the Empire. When 
 the House of Hapsburg was in its decline, and Charles VI. 
 wished to give his hereditary lands to his daughter, a suc- 
 cession of females was decreed without hesitation; although 
 electoral Bohemia, according to the very first law of the 
 Empire, could never descend to a woman. When the House 
 of Hapsburg became extinct, Maria Theresa was determined 
 never to acknowledge a non-Austrian-Emperor, although 
 Charles of Bavaria had been legally elected according to aU 
 the Imperial laws. On this side also, therefore, the protec- 
 tion of the Imperial constitution was only a pretence; and 
 the Austrian Government too was well aware, that it could 
 avail nothing in opposition to a real and vital interest. 
 
184 GENERAL CONDITION OF CENTRAL EUROPE. [Book II. 
 
 There was the same divergence between Austria and Ger- 
 many with respect to their foreign interests, as we have 
 observed in their internal reLations. After the Turks had 
 been driven from Hungary, and the Swedes from the half 
 of Pomerania, Germany had only two neighbours whom it 
 was a matter of vital importance to watch, — the Poles and 
 the French. In the South, on the contrary, it had no 
 interests in opposition to Italy, excejot the protection of its 
 frontier by the possession or the neutrality of the Alpine 
 passes. And yet it was just towards Italy that the eyes of 
 the House of Hapsburg had been uninterruptedly directed 
 for centuries past. The favom-ite traditions of the family, 
 and their political and ecclesiastical interest in securing the 
 support of the Pope, and thereby that of the Clergy, con- 
 stantly impelled them to consolidate and extend their do- 
 minion in that country. All other considerations yielded to 
 this; and this is intelligible enough from an Austrian point 
 of view ; but it was not on that account less injurious to the 
 German Empire. How strikingly was this opposition of 
 interests displayed at the end of the glorious war of the 
 Spanish succession, when the Emperor rejected a peace 
 which would have restored Strasburg and Alsace to the 
 Empire, because only Naples, and not Sicily also, was offered 
 to Austria. How sharply defined do the same relations 
 present themselves to our view, in the last years of the 
 Hapsburg dynasty, at the peace of Vienna in 1738! — on 
 which occasion the Emperor — in order at least to gain 
 Tuscany, as a compensation for the loss of Naples,— gave 
 up Lorraine to the French, without even consulting the 
 Empire, which he had dragged into the war. Austria thus 
 maintained a predominant influence in Italy ; but the Empire, 
 during the whole century after the Peace of Westphalia, did 
 not obtain a single noteworthy advantage over France. 
 How much more was this the case with respect to Poland, 
 which during the whole period of the religious wars had 
 been the most zealous ally of Spain and the Hapsburgs, and 
 
Ch. I.] POLISH CONSTITUTION. THE LIBERUM VETO. 185 
 
 which subsequently seemed to threaten no danger to Austrian 
 interests. ■ 
 
 Pohvnd, it is true, had deeply fallen from her former 
 greatness, and was not for the moment too powerful a 
 neighbour even for the Germans. She gave the most striking- 
 example of the insufficiency of the Feudal system; for the 
 feudal development of its Constitution at home, and the 
 feudal direction of its policy abroad, were the sole causes 
 by which this once powerfid people had been reduced to 
 weakness. In the 15th century, when in the rest of Europe 
 all the nations without exception manifested their unity in 
 the form of strong military monarchies; — when the French 
 and Spanish Nobles drew their swords in the service of 
 their respective monarchs ; when the English Lords renounced 
 all the privileges of their Order, and sought for influence 
 over their nation, solely in the Imperial Parliament; — the 
 Polish Nobility began their eflbrts to make the license of 
 individuals the chief law of the State. They successively 
 did away with the hereditary succession to the Crown, the 
 importance of the Royal Council, the distinction of classes 
 among the Noblesse, the political rights of the towns, and 
 the personal freedom of the peasants. The Assembly of 
 Nobles was thus rendered all powerfid against the other Or- 
 ders, biit had no power at all against the freedom of the 
 individual noble; since the deputies were bound by certain 
 instructions, concerning the execution of which they had to 
 give an account to their constituents. Every Nobleman, 
 moreover, had an hereditary right to appear at the diet. 
 We see how short a step remained to the liherum veto, to 
 the right of every individual Deputy to annul a decree by 
 his sole opposition. This was a final result of the mediaeval 
 system — that overthrow of all rational principles of gov- 
 ernment, towards which all the kingdoms of Europe were 
 hurrying headlong, when they were saved from destruction 
 by the renewal of the antique idea of the Commonwealth 
 and the consequences of ecclesiastical reform. 
 
186 GENERAL CONDITION OF CENTRAL EUROPE. [Book IL 
 
 In the 16th century, this aristocratic EepubHc, gallant, 
 haughty and full of religious zeal, undertook the same task 
 in the East of Europe, as Philip of Spain, at the same pe- 
 riod, was prosecuting in the West — the subjugation of the 
 World in the name of the Catholic faith. As the Spanish 
 monarch, the faithful champion of the ancient Church, aimed 
 at the conquest of England, so Sigismund king of Poland 
 endeavoured to subdue Sweden, the country of his birth. As 
 Philip possessed adherents in Fi-ance, for many years main- 
 tained a garrison in Paris, and for a moment had even a 
 prospect of placing his daughter on the French throne ; so 
 Sigismund formed a party in Moscow, kept possession of 
 the Kremlin for several years, and at last obtained the 
 dignity of Czar for his son. But the issue was the same 
 in the East as in the West; the attacks of Sigismund united 
 the natural allies of his country with her hereditary enemies, 
 and it was not with impunity that Poland allowed herself 
 to be driven by Royal ambition and Jesuitical fanaticism 
 into contest after contest, while all the best interests of the 
 nation cried for peace. The Poles were every where beaten. 
 As catholic France rallied at last round Henry IV., so 
 orthodox Russia sujiported Michael Romanow; and as the 
 infant navy of Elizabeth was developed in the struggle with 
 PhiHp, so the most brilliant of Protestant heroes, Gustavus 
 Adolphus, was formed in the Polish wars. Poland emerged 
 from the endless contest in the same exhausted and dying 
 state as Spain; and when, in 1714, the Powers of Europe 
 divided the monarchy of Philip IL— when a French prince 
 received the crown of Spain, Austria took possession of her 
 Italian and Belgian provinces, and England of her commerce 
 — the Eastern Powers talked more than once of either 
 sharing the territories of Poland, or of setting over them a 
 foreign Prince. 
 
 The attitude of Poland in the religious wars, especially, 
 was by no means calculated to mitigate the mutual hatred, 
 which had existed from the beginning of its history, between 
 
Cn.I.] STRUGGLE BETWEEN POLAND AND NORTH GERMANY. 187 
 
 this country and Northern Germany. For centuries the two 
 nations had struggled for the broad plains which lie between 
 the Elbe and the Vistula, which had once been possessed by 
 the Germans, and after their withdrawal, in the 6th century, 
 had been occupied by Sclavonians. In these regions, German 
 colonization had first reconquered the Marches of Bran- 
 denburg and Silesia ; and then the German sword had reduced 
 the Prussian lands, whose heathen love of liberty had proved 
 too strong for their Polish rulers. The rule of the Teutonic 
 Order was first established iu Prussia, in concert with Poland, 
 but when the Knights rejected the Polish suzerainty, a deadly 
 feud arose which, after a hundred years' struggle, ended 
 with the entire subjection of the Order. East Prussia then 
 became a Polish fief, and West-Prussia a Polish province. 
 Now it so happened that those very provinces adopted 
 Protestantism with assiduity and zeal, and that East Prussia 
 thereby became a secular Duchy, which soon afterwards fell 
 to the Electors of Brandenburg. West-Prussia, whose towns 
 and nobles had for the most part become protestant, assumed 
 the same attitude of opposition towards Sigismund as the 
 Netherlands towards Philip II.; and the antagonism of pro- 
 vince to kingdom, of the German to the Polish language, was 
 enhanced by religious enmity; in this case, therefore, the 
 victory of the Catholic reaction would have been destrviction 
 to the German element. But as the very contrary took 
 place, the German cause shared in the victory of Protestantism, 
 and in the last stage of the long wars the Elector of Bran- 
 denburg succeeded in forcing Poland to resign its suzerainty, 
 and in raising East Prussia to the rank of an independent 
 State. Poland yielded to necessity, but did not forget her 
 claims; a few years afterwards she formed an alliance with 
 Louis XIV. for the reconquest of Prussia, and when 
 Frederick I. assumed the Royal crown, there was a shower 
 of protests from the highest of the Polish Magnates. And 
 thus on the Eastern frontier of the Empire, the Prussian 
 State arose in the contest for German nationality, and re- 
 
188 GENERAL CONDITION OF CENTRAL EUROPE. [Book II. 
 
 ligioiis freedom; and in tlie most comjalete internal and external 
 antagonism to Poland. This enmity lay in the, very nature 
 of things; aU must deplore it, but what influence can we 
 allow to sentimental regrets in the relations of one nation 
 to another? As long as Poland existed, it must necessarily 
 strive to make Konigsberg once more Polish, and Dantzic 
 Catholic; as long as Brandenburg remained German and 
 Protestant, its principal object must be to liberate West 
 Prussia, and thereby to vinite the Marches and the Duchy 
 into a single State. The second and more important task 
 was immediately taken up by the founder of the Prussian 
 Sovereignty — the Elector Frederick William. His territories 
 were small and scattered, but united by historical and natu- 
 ral ties, by language, religion and a similar fate; and he 
 conceived the idea of giving internal unity to the State, the 
 external existence and oneness of which he had already 
 secured. As his successors carried out the same object on 
 an ever increasing scale, a government arose which diffused 
 ideas of unity and common weal, and subordinated all private 
 interests, religions differences and class-privileges to the 
 public good. Colbert's plans were here sur^iassed on German 
 soil, while in their native country they came to a stand or 
 perished through the idleness of Louis XV. The modern 
 State in Prussia became strictly monarchical, for the same 
 reason that at the same period it took a parliamentary form 
 '. in England, and somewhat later, a democratic form in America. 
 In all these cases the lead was taken by the class in which 
 i the fertile ideas of national unity, independence and devo- 
 j tion, were generated; and in Prussia this was, almost 
 I exclusively, the Monarch and his servants; while the Estates 
 were either hostile or at least disinclined to innovation, 
 1 and the mass of the people were entirely without political 
 i opinions. 
 
 / An imitation of Colbert, whom we have just mentioned, 
 is clearly discernible in the financial and commercial lei^is- 
 
Ch, I.] PROGRESS OF PRUSSIA. 189 
 
 lation of Prussia, as well as in her efforts for the promotion 
 of manvifiictures. In the long rnn, similar consequences of 
 the well-meant error, of not only emancipating but endeav- 
 ouring to protect industry, showed themselves in this country, 
 as in France; and in course of time Prussia would not have 
 escaped the impoverishment inseparably connected with that 
 error. At first, however, in consequence of the artificial 
 impulse thus given, Prussia enjoyed a brief but remark- 
 able prosperity, which greatly contributed to place at the 
 disposal of this small state, a disproportionately large supply 
 of money; — a supply, indeed, which resembled rather a ■ 
 laboriously filled ' cistern, than the perennial wealth of a 
 running stream. Under these circumstances, it was very 
 fortunate that the German taste for agriculture still pre- 
 vailed among all classes: and though the complete freedom of 
 the soil, or an equality of taxation had not yet been obtained, 
 yet the Noblesse lived among the peasants as protectors of 
 their common interests, and the State was everywhere ready 
 with its active assistance, and beneficent surveillance. The 
 result was unexpectedly favourable; on the whole the peasant 
 of the Brandenburg March was not worse off than the peasant 
 of Picardy, and much better than the Auvergnais. He did 
 not look upon the State as a blood-sucking extortioner, nor 
 on the Nobility as his social enemies — as was deplorably the 
 case in France. The form of the administration and all 
 the official machinery were throughout peculiar and national, 
 having sprung partly from the ancient institutions of the 
 country, and partly from the mind of the Monarch, without 
 any foreign model. 
 
 Thus strong at home and master of all its resources — 
 bound up from its origin with the great interests of the 
 German Nation — the young State immediately began to ad- 
 vocate these interests in the Empire, and to uphold them 
 against the rest of Europe. Frederick William having 
 hberated Eastern Germany from Poland, then undertook, 
 almost single-handed, to support the West of Germany and 
 
190 GENERAL CONDITION OF CENTKAL EUEOPE. [Book IT. 
 
 Holland against the oppressor of Europe — Louis XIV. 
 There is no doubt, that had he lived longer, he would have 
 shared with William III. of Orange the glory of becoming 
 the centre of the finally victorious resistance to the new 
 master of the world. ^His successor followed the same 
 course; and in the mind of Frederick William I. the in- 
 dependence of Prussia and the fulfilment of his duties to 
 the German empire were constantly associated. And lastly 
 Frederick the Great assumed the decisive attitude which 
 shaped for ever the future of his country. He began his task 
 at home, partly by developing the administration of justice 
 to a great degree of independence, and partly, and more 
 especially, by the complete emancipation of his country from 
 the bonds of a dominant church. What the great Prince 
 of Orange had probably wished but had not been able to 
 do in England — viz. to shape his policy on political and not 
 theological principles — Frederick was the first to carry into 
 eifect, and thereby paved the way for the national and 
 spiritual life of modern times. With these operations, his 
 relation to the German Empire was Intimately connected. 
 That confused medley of feudal and ecclesiastical formula3 
 was entirely incompatible with the new life which beat in 
 every vein of the rising Prussian State ; and the breach would 
 have been unavoidable even though the Elector of Branden- 
 bourg had never contended with the Queen of Hungary for 
 the possession of Silesia. The whole relation between the 
 two States had been clear to the keen intellect of the King 
 from the very beginning. His efforts for his own aggrandize- 
 ment were every where connected with his plan for the 
 regeneration of Germany. His alliance with the Emperor 
 Charles VII. was based upon the idea of superseding the 
 old constitution of the Empire by an enduring Confederation 
 of states^ liis war against Francis I. shook the stability of 
 that constitution, by bringing about a military league between 
 the powerful States of North Germany; and his oi3position 
 to Joseph II. ended in the league of German Princes embra- 
 
Cn. I.] POLICY OF PRUSSIAN MONAROHS. 191 
 
 cing all the States of Germany ^^ich had been reconstructed 
 on modern principles. We need hardly say that he was 
 influenced in all these proceedings quite as much by personal 
 and Prussian ambition, as by German patriotism and public 
 spirit. But the fact that these feelings did not run counter 
 to each other in Prussia, as they did in Austria, but. rather 
 coincided in their course, is a proof of the healthy condi- 
 tion of the young State, and secured a powerful national 
 support for the efforts of its monarch. It was felt as a. 
 benefit throughout the whole of Germany, that the military 
 power of the northern part of it once more showed an 
 imposing front. 
 
 This benefit was experienced, even during Frederick's 
 life-time, in one of the most important national afi'airs — the 
 final liberation of West Prussia from Polish dominion. The 
 circumstances of the first partition of Poland — the means by 
 which it was effected, and the legal pretext brought for- 
 ward to justify it — it is not our purpose at present to dis- 
 cuss; we woidd only venture to make two remarks. 
 
 Frederick was first led to give this direction to his plans 
 of conquest, by the wish to compensate Russia for her re- 
 nunciation of Turkish booty which Austria would not allow 
 her to receive. Austria had joined in the partition of Poland 
 with a reluctance, which arose not merely from Maria 
 Theresa's sense of justice, but also from the long-standing 
 and natural connexion between her Empire and the Republic. 
 Her opposition, however, was overcome, partly by the wish 
 that the other two should not alone enrich themselves, and 
 still more by the rise of a new principle of action — side by 
 side with that of the Hapsburgs, — in the Austrian government 
 itself. This was the first important occasion on which Jo- 
 seph II. and the Lorraine policy made their influence felt. 
 With regard to the consequences to Germany of this event, 
 we need only mention that a million Germans were freed 
 from a detested foreign yoke, and that the principal Ger- 
 man State thereby brought its territories into a connected 
 
192 GENERAL CONDITION OP CENTRAL EUROPE. [BookIL 
 
 mass. When the House of Hapsbiirg, at an earlier period, 
 prepared to occupy Burgundy and Bretagnc, France rose 
 like one man, and thanked her Kings for tearing up the 
 treaties they had sworn to; and yet it would be difficult to 
 say, whether that was a more urgent danger to France than 
 the continued rule of Poland over Prussia would have been. 
 The evils, moreover, which threatened the German frontier 
 from the East had assumed an entirely new character from 
 the beginning of the centvu-y. The Polish republic had pre- 
 viously been a formidable neighbour from its superior power ; 
 it was now no less dangerous from its anarchy. Its intestine 
 divisions allowed no rest, even to the surrounding states; 
 each fiiction had recourse to some foreign Power, and Rus- 
 sian influence and Russian arms were continually gaining a 
 firmer footing in the distracted land. During the whole 
 Seven years' war, the professedly neutral soil of the Pohsh 
 republic was really the head c^uarters, the source of supplies, 
 and the base of operations, of the Russian armies against 
 North Germany. Silesia, Brandenburg, East Prussia, all 
 the German land between Nicmen and the Vistula, and on 
 the other side between the Oder and the Elbe, were alike 
 endangered. Under these circumstances, the importance to 
 Germany of the occupation of the lower Vistula is self-evident. 
 In fact the whole position of affairs was intolerable for Ger- 
 many, and to efiect a radical change in a manner agreeable 
 to Poland was not possible. It is customary in the present 
 day, to lament that Germany did not strengthen Poland by 
 a close alliance, and thus oppose a warlike bulwark to the 
 advances of Russia. But as matters then stood, it would 
 not in the first place have been possible to have gained the 
 consent of the Poles themselves, since their King was entirely 
 devoted to the Russians, and their Nobility was filled with 
 a violent hatred against every thing which bore the German 
 name. In the next place, such a step woidd have required 
 the united force of all Germany; and we know that on the 
 Polish, as well as on every other question, the views of 
 
Oil. I.] THE HOUSES OF LOEEAINE AND HAPSBUEG. 193 
 
 Austria and Prussia were utterly opposed, ^\'llnt means 
 then remained of preventing the Eussians iVom pushing 
 forward their outposts close upon the eentres of North Ger- 
 man life! The complication which the adoption of these 
 means were subsequently to give rise to, we shall hereafter 
 see in the course of the revolutionary period. 
 
 Meanwhile a new epoch had conunenced in the history of 
 Austria, the first stage of which has scarcely yet been tra- 
 versed, even at the present day. We liave seen the Haps- 
 burgs first making territorial supremacy in Germany their 
 object — then aiming at universal dominion over a Catholic 
 World — and, finally, pursuing a feudal policy in.Austria. 'But 
 their dynasty came to augend in 1740, and was succeeded by 
 the family of the Dukes of Lorraine, who forthwith directed 
 their efforts towards the centralization and luiity of the 
 Austrian State. 
 
 The Houses of Lorraine and Ilapsburg had long stood in 
 close relation to one another, and had pursued common ob- 
 jects. The former, like the latter, had assumed its modern 
 attitude in the religious wars of the 16th century. It was 
 by a scion of the House of Lorraine that the fiunily of the 
 Guises was founded, which was foremost, in the French 
 civil war, in combating the Huguenots, and at last fought 
 against France herself in close alliance with Philip of Spain. 
 The branch of this house which ruled at home, cut down, 
 about the same time, 20,000 Protestant peasants in Lorraine 
 in a single day. They then formed connexions by marriage 
 with Catharine de Medicis, and afforded powerful aid to the 
 Guises and Spaniards against Henry IV. The Bourbons 
 never foro-ave them this conduct, and it became, thencefor- 
 ward, one of the chief objects of French policy, to deprive 
 this family of Lorraine. On this account the latter sought to 
 connect themselves more closely,— not with Germany, from a 
 union with which they had been released by Charles Y. — 
 but with the Hapsburgs, who, especially in tjie thirty years' 
 war— both against the Elector Frederick, and the Swedes 
 
 I. N 
 
194 GENEEAL CONDITION OF CENTRAL EUROPE. [Book II. 
 
 and French — had no more zealous or fiery champion than 
 Duke Charles IV. of Lorrame. His successor fought the 
 battles of Austria in Hungary, by which Pesth was once 
 more wrested from the Turks ; and he gained in return' the 
 hand of an Austrian Archduchess. The descendant of this 
 marriage was Francis Stephen, the favoured suitor of Maria 
 Theresa, and consequently the successor of the Hapsburgs 
 in the Austrian crown lands. He was personally very in- 
 significant, and left the cares of State to his energetic and 
 ambitious Consort, who was sagacious enough to understand 
 the necessities of the times, and to take important steps to 
 remodel the internal constitution of the Austrian State. The 
 first administrations which deserve the name were created 
 by her; the military system was reformed on the principle of 
 greater .unity and uniformity, and she directed close attention 
 to the condition of the peasants, as the great source of the 
 military strength and revenue of the country. Even in the 
 most unruly lands of the Empire — Belgium and Hungary— 
 tlic Emperor succeeded by tact and gentleness in taking from 
 the hands of the Nobility a number of important pl-ivileges, 
 and thereby strengthening the authority of the central Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 But Maria Theresa was too genuine a Hapsburg to be 
 able to emancipate herself entirely from the principles of 
 government hereditary in this race. It was not until her 
 sou, Joseph II., the first real Emperor of the Lorraine dj-- 
 nasty, came to the throne, that the end of feudal Austria, 
 and the commencement of the modern united and centrahsed 
 State, was proclaimed both in form and fact. His legis- 
 lation is renowned and has often been described and dis- 
 cussed. No one will deny that he was actuated by an active 
 philanthropy, and a ceaseless impulse towards progress. He 
 was earnestly zealous for the welfare of his subjects, and 
 strove, with restless haste, to lead them to a higher stage 
 of free industry, moral dignity, and intellectual culture. It 
 would be almost sinful to doubt the sincerity of his aspira- 
 
CiT. I.] POLICY OF JOSEPH 11. 195 
 
 tions, wliidi manifested themselves in such numberless forms, 
 and found [so touching an expression in the despairing 
 words of his last illness. Yet wc see this "crowned philan- 
 thropist," as his age loved to call him, not only arbitrarily 
 abolishing the pernicious privileges of the Nobility and Clergy, 
 but invading with open violence the sanctuaries of hiunan 
 existence — religion, language and love of home. While he 
 justly placed the pride of his legislation in the emancipation 1 
 of the soil, he distiu'bed the poor peasants of his provinces 
 in the enjoyment of their only form of spiritual life — the 
 devotional services of their Church. While he proclaimed 
 the equality of high and low before the law, he compelled 
 the jNIagyar and the Croat to seek for justice from German 
 officials, whose language they could not understand. And, 
 lastly, the same monarch who would hear of nothing at 
 home but civilization and prosperity, appears abroad in the 
 character of an iinscrupulous conqvieror, engages in quar- 
 rels along the whole line of his extensive frontiers, never 
 allows a weaker neighbour to rest, or knows how to be at 
 peace with a stronger; and at last fills half the world with 
 the tumult of his arms. We should do him injustice, if 
 we were to attrilmte this latter feature of his government 
 to personal ambition alone; we should raise him above his 
 merits, if we were to seek the sole spring of his character 
 in his reforming philanthropy. 
 
 All these inconsistencies become intelligible when we rightly 
 comprehend the leading principle of his policy. Certain as 
 it is that he felt a warm interest in the welfare of his sub- 
 jects, it is no less certain, that the ultimate object of his 
 reforms was, not the progress of his people, but the power 
 of his Empire. He had seen how iU Austria had fared in 
 her contest against Prussia with her modern culture, and he 
 therefore determined, before all things, to carry out the 
 system of modern centralization in the mcdiasval frame- 
 work of his various dominions. As the laws of the P%- 
 siocraics and Rationalists seemed to him adapted for his 
 
 n2 
 
196 GENERAL CONDITION OF CENTRAL EUROPE. [Book II. 
 
 purpose, he became a zealous apostle of enlightenment; and 
 because he would acknowledge no obstacle in the sphere of 
 his power, he showed the same disregard for natural right 
 as for chartered wrong, for religious feeling and national 
 pride, as for ecclesiastical abuses, and aristocratic monopolies. 
 He was resolved that Austria should become a centralized 
 State, like the Prussia of that period, or the France of to- 
 day; that no foreign power, whether of the German Empire, 
 or the Romish Church, should any longer exercise an in- 
 fluence on its internal affairs; that it should gain well 
 rounded, and, if possible, extended frontiers on every side, 
 and thus come forth from the centre of Europe, as the first 
 of European Powers. He was therefore in a state of con- 
 inual aggression against his privileged orders, his peoples, 
 and his neighbours. 
 
 So comprehensive an attack on others, naturally called 
 forth an equally universal resistance. Joseph's policy refused 
 to recognize any of the projJS on which the power of the 
 Austrian government had hitherto rested; no wonder, then, 
 that ferment and dissolution sliowed themselves on every 
 side. The greatest influence on this occasion was exerted 
 by the Church, which the Emperor oj^posed by every means 
 in his power, partly as being foreign, — in so far as it was 
 in the hands of the Pope, Superiors of Ecclesiastical Orders, 
 or Prelates of the German Empire — and partly, as preju- 
 dicial to the financial interests of the State — because it 
 withdrew large tracts of land from taxation and free alien- 
 ation. But he was soon made to feel, what he had not 
 chosen to learn beforehand; in this very disagreement with 
 the Crown, the Church most clearly proved, how indispensable 
 her agency was to the Austrian Government, in controlling 
 the motley elements of the Empire. When the Church was 
 driven into hostility to the Imperial authority, the latter 
 suddenly lost the means of uniting the diS'erent nationalities. 
 AH the distinctive national feelings of Magyars, Belgians, 
 and Sclavonians were awakened; it seemed as if the Austrian 
 
Ch. I.] JOSEPH FORFEITS THE SUPPORT OF THE CHURCH. ,197 
 
 dominion had not been forced upon these peoples centuries 
 ago, but in the last few days; for they all vied with one 
 another in their eiforts to free themselves from the foreign 
 yoke. AVhat a contrast in character and actions, between 
 Joseph and his great model, Frederick the Great! Freder- 
 ick's motives arc throughout deeper and nobler, and, on that 
 account, his modus operandi is calmer, more circumspect, 
 and more fertile of results. Satisfied that no narrow ortho- 
 doxy any longer held dominion over himself, and his own 
 people, he nowhere interferes with the religious conscience 
 of his subjects; well knowing that a nation may be raised 
 to mental freedom by education, but not by force. An 
 opposite course of proceeding was the cause of Joseph's 
 ruin, and his successors, too, seem never to have asked 
 themselves a higher question than this: whether the Church 
 was to be the subservient tool of the State, for the attain- 
 ment of power and conquest, or vice versa. 
 
 Joseph severed all the ties which bound him to the Grer- 
 man Empire, as well his relations to the Church. The trans- 
 formation of Austria into a Central State was in itself suf- 
 ficient to tear the last threads of the rotten fabric, which 
 hitherto bore the name of the Constitution of the German 
 Empire. Joseph broke off his existing relations with the 
 German Diet and Estates, as decidedly as Frederick the 
 Great himself. As he thereby lost the legal influence, which 
 Austria had exercised in the Empire through the Knights 
 and Cities, the Prelates and Counts of the Diet, Joseph 
 endeavoured, all the more earnestly, to compensate for the 
 loss by means of troops and diplomatists. The old claims 
 on Bavaria were now repeatedly brought forward; Suabia 
 was to be gradually subjected from the side of the Austrian 
 possessions on the Black Forest, and Franconia would then 
 be nothing but an Austrian province. As the result of these 
 successes Northern Germany would have been hemmed in, 
 and overpowered on every side. • But unfortunately it be- 
 came apparent, how ill-adapted Austria, from her very 
 
198 GENERAL CONDITION OF CENTRAL EUROPE. [Book II. 
 
 compositiou— her foreign elements, interests, and historical 
 traditions— was, to exercise such a hegemony over Germany. 
 In spite of Joseph's enlightened views, the feelings of all 
 the liberal party in Germany Avere against him; and he, on 
 his part, did not scruple to promise France the possession 
 of the infinitely important territory of Luxemburg, if she 
 would help him to acquire Bavaria. The more moderate 
 statesmen of his own Empire themselves declared, at a later 
 period, that the very nature of things forbids such an ex- 
 tension of Austrian ride, and that Austria's own interests 
 would be better served by a free internal development, than 
 by the forced subjection of Northern and Western Germany. 
 When forced into unnatural union, these two great countries 
 would be in a constant state of internecine war; if left to 
 develope independently, the one would have no closer or 
 svarer ally than the other. But Joseph lived and moved in 
 the idea of adding the other German Lands, as vassal States, 
 to his united empire; the consequence was, the combined 
 opposition of all German Princes, powerfully supported by 
 public opinion. 
 
 But his policy attained a much higher significance, when, 
 after forming a close alliance with Russia in 1788, it con- 
 templated the partition of the Turkish empire. It is un- 
 necessary to explain to readers of the present day the world- 
 wide importance of such a plan; one point in the position 
 of affairs, at that time, deserves particular notice, namely 
 this; that King Stanislaus of Poland had zealously joined 
 this alliance. As one of the numerous lovers of the Em- 
 press Catharine, he had been raised to the throne by her 
 influence, had then consented to cooperate in national re- 
 forms, in consequence of which he had incurred the enmity 
 of Russia, and witnessed the catastrophe of the first Par- 
 tition of Poland. Since that time, he had allowed the Rus- 
 sian Ambassador to rule in Warsaw;— had signed a treaty 
 making Russia the guarantee of the Polish constitution,— 
 or non-constitution, — and had become thoroughly convinced 
 
Cu. I.] ALLIANCE BETWEEN ENGLAND, PRUSSIA & HOLLAND. 199 
 
 that Poland coiild only prosper under the protection of 
 Russia. While, therefore, the powerful families of the Po- 
 tocki and Cznrtoriski sought protection against Russia at 
 the Court of Vienna, Stanislaus was incessantly recommend- 
 ing Russia to change the elective monarchy into a hereditary 
 one. When the two allied Emperors began, in 1788, their 
 grand operations, the Potocki broke off their relations to 
 Austria, but Stanislaus was more eaa;er than ever to cain 
 the friendship of Catharine and Joseph. At a conference 
 at Canieff, therefore, he joyfully assented to a proposal of 
 the two Imperial courts, that he should induce the Polish 
 republic to equip 100,000 men. This force was to be used, 
 in the first place, for the Turkish war, but "likewise for 
 any other contest" — a clause which at the present moment 
 could only have reference to Prussia. The whole Sclavonian 
 East, therefore, supported by all the power of the Austrian 
 monarchy, rose in arms, for an attack in the first place, on 
 Constantinoj)le, but also for ulterior objects which no one 
 could forsee. * 
 
 Such attempts have never been made in Europe, without 
 calling forth the liveliest opposition from every quarter. The 
 King of Prussia, who had just tested the military power of 
 his State, in a rapid suppression of disturbances in Holland, 
 had no intention of retreating, by a single hair's-breadth, 
 from the position of Frederick the Great. England, under 
 the energetic conduct of her great Minister, the younger 
 Pitt, was angry with Russia — which had shortly before 
 granted a favourable treaty to French commerce — and, even 
 at that time, regarded the preservation of Turkey as one 
 of the leading principles of her policy. These two Powers 
 formed an alliance with Holland, which was entirely gviided 
 by them, for the purpose of opposing the Imperial Courts 
 
 ' Herzberg's unpublished memoir.*, precis published in Schmidt'ti Journal, 
 
 "Stir I'AUiance conelue en 1790 entre which have been made use of for the 
 
 la Prnsse et la Pologne." There is following, 
 a series of valuable additions to the 
 
200 GENERAL CONDITION OF CENTRAL EUROPE. [Book II. 
 
 on all points, and especially in the Tnrkisli question, i This 
 treaty produced an effect tln-oughout the whole of Ei\rope, 
 by its mere existence, without any military preparations, or 
 force of arms. Whoever felt his rights or hopes in any 
 degree threatened by the Imperial Courts turned his eyes 
 towards the new alliance. Sweden was already at open war 
 with Russia, and occupied the hitter's best regiments on the 
 Neva; the Turks, with renewed courage, collected their 
 forces for the defence of their frontiers. The Prussian am- 
 bassador in Poland appealed to the patriotic party in the 
 Diet; the possibility of a linssian alliance immediately va- 
 nished, and an increasing number of voices was raised in 
 favour of a close aUiance with Prussia. All the Provinces 
 of Austria herself were in a state of ferment. Himgary, 
 whose constitution Joseph had just been destroying piece- 
 meal, was on the very verge of revolution; Belgium, after 
 long agitation, suddenly rose in rebellion on the 19th De- 
 cember 1780, drove the Austrian garrison from her capital, 
 and the Imperial authorities over her borders. In both 
 these countries, the object was to defend existing rights 
 against the new priiu-iple of centralization; in both the 
 Clergy and Nobility headed the opposition, and were aided 
 by the enthusiastic support of the people. Both imme- 
 diately entered into a close uiulcrstauding with Prussia. The 
 latter had just obtained a firm footing on the Belgian fron- 
 tier, by protecting the constitution of Liege against the en- 
 croachment of the Bishop ; and the two Prussian generals, 
 Schonfeld and Kohler, now entered the Belgian service, to 
 organize the army of the Congress. A deputation from the 
 Hungarian opposition repaired to Berlin, and it was even 
 proposed that the Diet should formally place the rights of 
 the Kingdom of Hungary under the guarantee of Prussia. 
 
 ■ Herzberi;. The King had resolved, subsequently to Sept. 1789 to enter 
 into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Porte, and in the following, 
 Spring to commence a war against the Imperial Courts. 
 
Cii. I.] DEATH OF JOSEPH. 201 
 
 In spite, therefore, of several splendid victories over the 
 Turks, the position of the two Imperial Courts was ex- 
 tremely critical. Hatred and distrust in the German empire — 
 violent ferment in the republic of Poland — tlielr own troops 
 engaged in distant contests, and no ally in Western Europe 
 but France, over whose head the waves of revolution were 
 violently breaking. Devoured by care and sickness, Joseph 
 could come to no resolution. He made some concession to 
 the Hungarians, retained his warlike zeal against the Turks, 
 and took no measures to defend his frontier against the 
 Prussians. The Belgian revolt was the last straw which 
 broke his spirit, and he died two months afterwards, on the 
 10th February 1790. 
 
202 NOOTKA SOUND AND REICHENBACH. [Book II. 
 
 CHAPTER ir. 
 
 NOOTKA SOUND AND liEICHENBACH. 
 
 Leopold ii. — CorsT iiekzoerg's plans. — bp.eacii between England and Spain. 
 — Lafayette wishes for a wab with England. — The maritime powers 
 renol'nce iieiizuekg's plans. mirabeau and the jacobins ake in 
 
 FAVOUR OF PEACE. — TREATY OF REICIIEXBACII. — PkOGRESS OF AUSTRIA. 
 
 Joseph's brother, the Grand-duke Leopold of Tuscany, had 
 formerly often blamed the rash and adventurous policy of 
 the Emperor, and thereby drawn upon himself the deep 
 displeasure of Joseph. As his successor, he was now to 
 withdraw the tottering State from the edge of the abyss. 
 It was no small piece of good fortune for the Plouse of 
 Lorraine, that this brother existed to take the helm of the 
 State in such stormy times. Discreet and calm, gentle, mo- 
 derate and yet immovably firm, he entered on the business 
 of his office, and succeeded at once in spreading confidence 
 around him; and this victory over the minds of men in- 
 cluded within it all future triumphs. lie had intellect enough 
 to appreciate tlie grand views of Joseph, and was just suf- 
 ficiently frivolous to keep himself at a sober distance from 
 all ideal aims. Before all things it was necessary that he 
 should put an end to the present crisis; and 'he was ready 
 to forego his brother's grand plans of conquest, provided 
 that nothing was done to interfere with the future prospects 
 of his Empire, and that his opponents acrpiired no accession 
 of territory. lie was sufficiently imbued with the priucijoles 
 ■ of his family to adhere to these fundamental maxims with 
 immovable firumess. ■ . 
 
Cii. II.] COUNT PIEKZBERG'S PLANS. 203 
 
 As the Anglo-Prussian league had just been formed for 
 the preservation of the staiits qtio, an agreement, it would 
 seem, might have been easily come to. But Leopold had 
 no intention, after all, of ending the war without any com- 
 pensation for expenses incurred; Russia moreover repelled 
 all interference of strangers in her victorious course; and, 
 above all, his enemies, conscious of their strength, were 
 likewise determined to carry off some reward of their exer- 
 tions. At the head of these was the Prussian JMinister, the 
 aged Count Herzberg, whom, a whole age before, Frederick 
 the Great had called his pupil in diplomacy, and who had 
 learned not a little from his great master. Pie possessed 
 great penetration, untiring industry, just so much con- 
 ceit as a diplomatist needs to give him perfect self-con- 
 fidence, and, above all, unbounded devotion to the interests 
 of his government; so that his only pleasure, and his only 
 sense of right, were centred in promoting the interests of 
 Prussia. By these various gifts, he had brought Joseph II. 
 into such a position, that he could be checkmated by the 
 first move of the Prussian army. His whole life was boimd 
 up in the progress of Prussia, and he knew how to set 
 all Europe in motion for the furtherance of his own plans. 
 lie has been unjustly accused of having neglected German 
 affairs — in which the interests of Prussia were more closely 
 and deeply concerned — to busy himself in the disputes con- 
 cerning Sweden and Finland, Turkey and Poland. From 
 Frederick the Great's more comprehensive point of view he 
 had rightly apprehended, that the most important step in 
 the German question was to ward ofl the encroachments of 
 Austria, and that this could only be done on the wide field 
 of European policy. lie therefore kept this main point con- 
 stantly in sight, and followed it up with a rare mixture 
 of cool calculation, and lively energy. He wished to inspire 
 both Poland and the Sublime Porte with confidence in Prussia, 
 and thereby to keep them stedfast in their resistance to the 
 Imperial Courts. For this purpose he met their views with 
 
204 NOOTKA SOUND ANB REICHENBACH. [Book II. 
 
 great zeal, fired tlie martial spirit of the Turks, and favoured 
 certain changes in the Polish constitution, which were so 
 many blows to Russian influence. But he did not wish to 
 proceed further in this direction; for a complete restoration 
 of Poland did not seem to him to lie in the interests of 
 Prussia. He was therefore opposed to the conclusion of a 
 formal treaty wdth either Poland or the Porte,' since these 
 States were already exclusively dependent on Prussian aid; 
 and any compact with them could only have the effect of 
 binding the hands of Prussia. His intention was, to leave 
 a small portion of their booty to the Imperial Courts, vic- 
 torious on the Danube, but to gain in return from both 
 equivalent advantages for Prussia. Russia, namely, was to 
 restore a part of Finland to the Swedes, and Austria a part 
 of Galicia to the Poles; in return for which, Poland was to 
 give the cities of Dantzic and Thorn, and Sweden a portion 
 of Pomerania, to Prussia. The Turks might thank Heaven, 
 that through Prussia's intervention, they had got off with 
 so little loss. Considering the dangerous position of Austria, 
 the impossibility that the Russians could maintain themselves 
 on the soil of the Polish RepuUic against the united will 
 of Prussia and Poland, and the complete readiness for -action 
 of a Prussian army of 160,000 men, such a scheme did not 
 appear quixotical, cither in respect to its object or its 
 means. Sweden was ready to do anything at the price of 
 a few millions;^ Poland would be essentially a gainer — since 
 Thorn and Dantzic as enclaves of Prussia were of little value 
 
 ' Herzberg's report to the King, closely to Prussia, if the latter had 
 of July 6th 1789 — Despatches to not always hesitated, &c. &c. — 
 Lucchesini, of July 11th and Slst; ^ Herzbergto the King, 17. Dec. 1793; 
 Count Golz, too, who was intimately "Ne pomait elk {voire majeste) pas y 
 acquainted with Polish affairs, says, iijouter (a Danzig, ^'c.) encore la Po- 
 rn a memorial addressed to Herzberg meranie suedoise pour tin couple de 
 (May 10th 1701), that Poland, enraged milliuns, tin petit bout de la Finlande, 
 against Russia, was ready for war, en faisant avoir a la Russie la ville 
 and would have attached herself d'Oczakoiv'}" 
 
Cii. II.] LEOPOLD AND FREDERICK WILLIAM. 205 
 
 to the Republic, and the districts of Gaiicia offered to them 
 were of sixfold the extent, with thrice the population. If 
 we look then to the interests of Germany, the acquisition 
 of Dantzic and Pomerania was as favourable, as the partition 
 of Turkey between the Russians and Austrians would have 
 been prejudicial, to them. 
 
 But whatever else we may thiuk of this project, we can 
 not defend it from the charge of being arbitrary and arti- 
 ficial, and so adroit an opponent as the Emperor Leopold 
 did not for a moment neglect to turn its weak points to 
 his purpose. The fact that Herzberg's plan aimed at the 
 aggrandizement of Prussia, was sufficient to determine the 
 Emperor to give it his uncompromising opposition. tie 
 would rather give up all his gains on the Danube, than 
 allow Prussia to grow stronger on the Baltic. He knew 
 his opponent well enough to take the right means of obtaining 
 his object. Passing over the Minister, he appealed to King 
 Frederick ^^illiam himself, in an unreserved and confidential 
 letter. There was in the Prussian King a strong vein of 
 devotedness and docility; the higher his sense of his own 
 dignity, the more easily did he allow himself to be won by 
 the first step which was made towards him in confidence, 
 and he excused many an imprudence in himself, which he 
 would never have pardoned in a Minister. At first many 
 difficult complications presented themselves: the King adhered 
 to Herzberg's plans, and promised, if Leopold consented to 
 them, to leave him free hand in Belgium, and to give him 
 his vote at the election of Emperor. But in other respects 
 he had already swerved from Herzberg's line of policy. After 
 he had been persuaded, in January, to make an alliance 
 with the Turks — so that Herzberg's plan could not well be 
 realized without the consent of the Porte — he allowed him- 
 self at the end of March to be forced into an alliance with 
 Poland, without stipulating beforehand for the cession of 
 Dantzic and Thorn. ^ When therefore Leopold evaded his 
 
 ' Herzberg. 
 
206 NOOTKA SOUND AND REICHENBACH. [Book II. 
 
 engagements, collected troops in Bohemia, and — instead of 
 the desired armistice, — renewed hostilities against the Turks, 
 the right moment had surely come to take vigorous mea- 
 sures. In case of war, Poland would have immediately risen 
 against the Russians ; aud there was not the slightest doubt, 
 that at the first blow Hungary would have been in open 
 rebellion;^ the chances therefore were as favourable as pos- 
 sible. But instead of taking advantage of them, a useless 
 discussion was carried on, by letter, between the two Mou- 
 archs, as to whether the resignation of all her conquests, 
 or Herzberg's plan of exchange, would bo most favourable 
 for Austria. 
 
 While the peace of Europe in the East was thus balanced 
 on points of diplomacy, an insignificant dispute arose on 
 the other side of the Ocean, the reaction of which summoned 
 the South and West of om- quarter of the globe to arras. 
 
 For some time past, England and Spain had been at feud 
 concerning a stripe of land — which in our times has once 
 more become an apple of discord between Anglo-Americans 
 and Spanish Mexicans — viz. Nootka Sound in California. 
 The Spaniards, who still grounded their sovereignty on a 
 Papal grant of the IGth century, would not allow the settle- 
 ments, which bold English merchants had made in that region 
 for the sake of the fur-trade. At last they asserted their 
 claims by force of arms ; whereupon the liveliest indignation 
 was kindled in England, and a warlike spirit took possession 
 of the Cabinet, the Parliament and the whole nation. Spain, 
 in her anxiet)', appealed to the French government for aid, 
 in virtue of the Bourbon family compact of 17()2. In the 
 exti-aordinary state of agitation in whicii the French nation 
 then was, it was natural that such a prospect should excite 
 the liveliest emotion among all parties. 
 
 ' Despatches of the Pnissinn Am- uluiion of peace,— return of the 
 
 bassador Jacoln in Vienna, July 12tli Hungarian regiments, and guarantee 
 
 and 24th, Oct. 10th. The Hungarian of the Hungarian constitution by tbe 
 
 Diet demanded an immediate con- Gorman Princes. 
 
Cii. ir. LAFAYETTE'S HATRED OP ENGLAND. 207 
 
 It had already been a subject of discussion in Paris, during 
 the -winter, whether a foreign war might not be a useful 
 means of diverting the popular passions into a new channel, 
 and placing greater military forces at the disposal of the 
 Government. Montmorin was still at the head of foreign 
 affairs, and had remained firm in that leaning towards 
 Austria, with which Bricnue's Ministry had refreshed men's 
 recollections of 175G. AVhen Austria, therefore, saw herself 
 so hard pressed in the East by the English, her Ambassador 
 in Paris, Count Mercy, found a favourable hearing, when he 
 solicited the interference of France. Lafayette was not dis- 
 inclined to such a step; he hated England from the bottom 
 of his heart; we have already observed his anti-English 
 machinations in Ireland and Holland, and he even now 
 indulged the hope of aiding the Democrats in those countries, 
 overthowiug the Prince of Orange, who had the countenance 
 of England end Prussia, and marching into Amsterdam as 
 liberator, and as triumphator into Paris. "He dreams of 
 nothing," wrote the American Ambassador in January "but 
 driving the Stadtholder of Holland into a swamp." What 
 could Austria have imagined more agreeable to her, than a 
 diversion like this, — which would have entirely withdrawn 
 England from the East? But in this case, as in all others, 
 Lafayette was incapable of forming a decided resolution. 
 If France commenced a war against the maritime powers, 
 she would, indeed, pronjote the interests of Austria, but 
 woidd, at the same time, cut the strongest roots of the 
 Belgian Eevolution. But Laftiyette had democratic friends 
 in Brussels as well as Amsterdam, and several of his envoys 
 were carrying on an active negotiation with the Belgian 
 Estates. One feature of the revolution in Belgiinn was 
 extremely disagreeable to him, vis. that it was still in the 
 hands of the Clergy, the Nobihty and the Guilds, and had 
 nothing of the "Rights of man" about it. But, at all events, 
 it was a revolution,- and its suppression appeared to the 
 hero of the American and French revolutions, an intolerable 
 
208 NOOTKA SOUND AND EEICHENBACH. [Book II. 
 
 tiling. He therefore did his utmost to bring the very small 
 party, ^yllich professed French principles, to the head of 
 aifairs in Brussels. As the reward of compliance with his 
 wishes, he promised the energetic intervention of France in 
 favour of Belgian independence, at the very time that he 
 was meditating the destruction of the Prince of Orange, the 
 most zealous ally of Belgium. lie finally decided on the 
 plan, that Avistria should retain possession of Belgium, on 
 condition of introducing the "Rights of man," and French 
 liberty; a programme' which certainly reconciled the opposing 
 schemes, but on the other hand had all the interested parties 
 — Aiistria, the Belgian Estates, and the Brussels democrats ^ 
 — against it. The difficulty was increased by the unfortunate 
 position of aifairs in the interior of France. The Government 
 had neither money nor serviceable troops, and feared above 
 all things to add new trovdjles to those which already existed. 
 In spite therefore of Lafayette's desire for war, peace re- 
 mained undisturbed during the winter. 
 
 In the spring, however, the above-mentioned news from 
 Spain arrived. The Ministry, although very doubtful about 
 tlie consequences, could no longer maintain peace by their 
 own sole will, and were obliged to think of arming, according 
 to the letter of the treaty. All the projects of Lafayette 
 and his friends once more came to light. To make sure of 
 the National Asscmbl}-, they collected all their most trusty 
 adherents from the party of the Left at a great banquet, at 
 which, after many toasts, and much discussion, a permanent 
 association — the Club of 1789 — and a separate party— the 
 Left centre — was formed. Their cry for the present was, 
 support of the Ministry in a war against England. 
 
 The mere possibility of this war refreshed every nerve of 
 the Austria)! policy. Leo]3old did not hesitate, for a mo- 
 ment, in choosing ratlier to lose all his Turkish booty, than 
 
 ' On this subject no one enlarges more than Lafayette liimself in his 
 memoirs. 
 
Cn.II.] THE MARITIME POWERS ACCEPT LEOPOLD'S OFFERS. 209 
 
 concede a clod of soil to the Prussian. In the beginning of 
 ilay he informed the English Ambassador that he was wil- 
 ling to make peace on the basis of the stnttis r/tto— except 
 that the Turks were to cede Orsova to him, as a rectification 
 of his boundaries — and to restore to Belgium its old con- 
 stitution; by which concessions, he said, he hoped to satisfy 
 every just claim. lie added, that if he were compelled to 
 go to war, by any further demand, he should be obliged to 
 abandon a portion of Belgian territory to France, that she 
 might help him to recover the rest. Joseph II. had already 
 offered a portion of Belgium to the French, on condition of 
 their helping him to conquer Bavaria;' we may easily con- 
 ceive that his threat carried double weight under present 
 circumstances. The maritime Powers came to a decision at 
 once. It was not at all to their commercial interests that 
 Prussia should obtain Dantzic; and tliey were, therefore, 
 from the very first, by no means enthusiastic for Herzberg's 
 plans, and had themselves proposed to Austria an agreement 
 on the status quo. Consequently the danger of seeing Bel- 
 gium fall a prey to the French arms, and Holland threatened, 
 overcame all further scruples, and they declared themselves 
 ready to accept the offers of Leopold. Herzberg's scheme 
 was thus deprived of its foundation, and Leopold could now 
 look forward, with a lighter heart, to the continuance of his 
 negotiation with Prussia. 
 
 Meanwhile affairs in Paris took a very unexpected turn. 
 The foundation of the Club of 1789 alarmed the Jacobins. 
 Their leaders, Barnave, the Lameths and Duport, differed, 
 it is true, but very little from Lafayette in their political 
 tendencies. But they were divided by a no less potent cause; 
 — he was in power, and they ivished to be so. They were, 
 therefore, opposed to him on all occasions, and even in the 
 question of war, the Jacobins determined to throw obstacles 
 in the General's way. 
 
 1 The English Ambassador Keith to his Minister, Vienna, May 11th: 
 Coxe's "Austria." 
 
 I. O 
 
210 NOOTKA SOUND AND .REICHENBACH. [Book II. 
 
 The result was, that each of the parties assumed a singular 
 and unnatural attitude: Montmorin and Lafayette,— the re- 
 presentatives of the Government, — wished for war; the Ja- 
 cobins, — the organs of progressive revolution — contended for 
 peace. Both were of opinion that war would confirm the 
 strength of the crown, and both were working in diametrical 
 oj)position to the interests of their party. In reality there 
 was no greater danger to the King, and no more splendid 
 prospect for the Jacobins, than war. It is true that civil 
 liberty can never be promoted by war, yet war did not run 
 counter to the interests of the Jacobins, because they were 
 aiming to establish— not the freedom of the citizens, but the 
 rule of the demagogues. The latter always gain by war, 
 because it surrounds the country with dangers, and fills it 
 with fiery passions. When allowed to run its full course, it 
 always leads to a Dictatorship, because it needs a Dictator- 
 ship; but it has no motive for placing this absolute power 
 in the hands of legitimate authority, but bestows it on the 
 strongest and the boldest. It brought Charles I. and 
 Louis XVI. to the scaffold, and raised Cromwell, Kobespierre 
 and Bonaparte to despotic power. At that time, however, 
 Robespierre never dreamed of such a possibility; and he and 
 his friends involuntarily exerted themselves to save the 
 Government of Louis XVI. from destruction. 
 
 On the 14th, the National Assembly received a message 
 from the Ministry, who asked for supplies for warlike pre- 
 parations, in consequence of the Cahfornian troubles. La- 
 fayette's influence was strong enough to produce an im- 
 mediate and zealous spirit of compliance with their wishes. 
 In the evening, the rostra and the press of the Jacobin club 
 resounded with angry denunciations and apprehensions. They 
 accused the Government of intending to cause a national 
 bankruptcy by war, and to overthrow the constitution; they 
 had the fear of an Austrian intrigue in the Tuileries before 
 their eyes. They declared, that there was but one means 
 of escaping the danger, and that was a decree to deprive 
 
Cn. II.] THE JACOBINS AVERSE TO WAK. 211 
 
 the King of tlie power of making peace and war, and to 
 bestow it exclusively on the National Assembly. Lameth, 
 consequently, on the following morning, brought forward 
 his motion, which appeared to him, he said, to contain the 
 most direct and natural deduction from acknowledged prin- 
 ciples. The National Assembly expresses the will of the 
 nation, and the Executive carries out that will; the former, 
 therefore, has to declare whether the nation wishes for war, 
 and the latter to carry the declaration of war into execution, 
 like any other law. The ground of contest was well chosen 
 to secure the support of the great mass of the Deputies, who 
 were still honestly enamoured of the "Eights of man," and 
 still believed that they were doing a good deed in weakening 
 the power of the Crown. Ijameth's motion occupied the 
 attention of the Assembly to such a degree, that for several 
 days the Minister's application for money was forgotten. 
 
 On this occasion the Jacobins displayed all their dislike 
 to war. "In times of peace," cried Aiguillon, "freedom is 
 invincible; in war, intrigues are rife^ and a victorious king 
 would be the greatest danger to freedom." Robespierre 
 took up the same position. "War," said he, "is a means of 
 defending arbitrary power against the Peojole; assume to 
 yourselves the right of making war and peace, and war will 
 be impossible; but if you trust the words of the Ministers, 
 you will at once j)i"oclaim war and your own slavery." Then 
 came a perfect flood of historical reminiscences of the frivo- 
 lous wars of crowned heads, and bitter allusions to the 
 alleged intriffues between the Government at home and 
 foreign potentates. "It is very possible," said Lameth, "that 
 there are sufficient grounds for making war; it is possible 
 also that the Courts have concerted a war with one another; 
 for it is now a question of a war of all Kings against their 
 Peoples." 
 
 The effect produced in the Assembly, the galleries, and 
 among the street politicians, was very great. Neither La- 
 fayette,— who feared the hissing of the populace more than 
 
 o2 
 
212 NOOTKA SOUND AND REICHENBACH. [Book IT. 
 
 that of a cannon ball,— nor his friends, ventured to stem the 
 torrent; all thoughts of war were abandoned. Custine alone 
 spoke of England's ambition, against which, he said, the 
 French people must summon all their strength; the others 
 contented themselves with upholding the constitutional point. 
 And here the crown would have fared but ill, if, with the 
 exception of the Right, it had had no supporters but La- 
 fayette. But a very diflferent kind of champion now came 
 forward for its defence, and by a diversion, as powerful as 
 it was unexpected, wrested the prize of victory from the 
 Jacobins on their own ground. 
 
 Since the 7th of November, Mirabeau had remained almost 
 inactive in the Assembly. Without sacrificing a single prin- 
 ciple, he maintained his popularity among the Parisians, by 
 occasionally dealing one of his crushing oratorical blows 
 against the Right. He had no motive for sparing the 
 Ministers, and he now came forward, once more, as the old 
 revolutionist. Secretly he was endeavouring to come to a' 
 fresh understanding, sometimes with the Count of Provence, 
 and sometimes with Lafayette, but without success. In 
 March, however, he met at last with unlooked-for assistance. 
 The Austrian Ambassador, Count Mercy, a man of extensive 
 knowledge and strong character, who had been for a long 
 time past a personal friend of the Queen, and was informed 
 of Mirabeau's real feelings by Count La Marck, persuaded 
 Marie Antoinette no longer to reject such a powerful ally. 
 The Queen had long wished to make the attempt to come 
 to a direct understanding with the most prominent leaders 
 of the National Assembly; but she had always turned away 
 with a shudder at the very mention of Mirabeau, whom she 
 looked on as the instigator of the murderous attack of the 
 6th of October. When La Marck had quieted her mind on 
 this point, a preliminary arrangement was come to after 
 much consideration. The King paid Mirabeau's debts, 
 (200,000 francs) and gave him a monthly j^ension of 1000 
 crowns, in return for which Mirabeau gave the King ad- 
 
 ^ DO 
 
Ch. II.] MIRABEAU SUPPORTS THE THRONE. 213 
 
 vice, and promised to protect the interests of the Crown in 
 the National Assembly. It was fully understood that it was 
 not a qviestion of restoring the ancien regime; the King, 
 with his passive disposition, had no longing for absolute 
 authority, nor any views on any one question of constitutional 
 policy. If he could once gain security for his person, his 
 wishes with respect to the extent of the royal authority 
 hardly went so far as Mirabeau's former convictions of the 
 necessity of a strong government in France. In respect, 
 therefore, to the object to be obtained, there was little diffi- 
 cidty; but where were the means? Every attempt to restore 
 the Monarchy would meet with a hundred-fold more diffi- 
 culties now, in May, than it would have done in November. 
 At all events absolute unity and consistency of action, the 
 fullest powers for Mirabeau as leader, and incessant activity 
 . on all sides, were indispensable prerequisites for success. If 
 Mirabeau could not become Minister himself, the first object 
 should have been to form a Ministry entirely devoted, or, at 
 least, entirely subject, to him. If he himself, in his bound- 
 less activity, often changed his route, and thereby lost much 
 time, it should have been the sole occupation of the King 
 to keep him to the task he had commenced, and to hasten 
 its accompUshment. But the very contrary of all this took 
 place. The Court could not bestow its full confidence; the 
 King was unable either to part with his Ministers, or to 
 bend them to his will. The Queen took counsel with Mira- 
 beau, but also with many very different men; and it was 
 always with inward reluctance that she took any part in 
 State affairs, which only wearied her. Mirabeau, who had no 
 taste for being made use of in so purposeless a manner, 
 occasionally hurled his thunderbolts from the rostra, which 
 had far more effect than all the noisy bluster of the Jaco- 
 bins, but did not improve the position of affairs, and served 
 to irritate and embitter the feeling of the Court. Whether 
 an alliance of this nature could bear good fruit must seem 
 doubtful from the very first. 
 
214 NOOTKA SOUND AND rvEICHENBACH. [Book II. 
 
 At this period, however, when the question as to the right 
 of dedaring war was being discussed, Mirabeavi was still 
 full of the prosi^ects which had been opened to him two 
 days before. He saw that the simple assertion of the King's 
 exclusive right to declare war could no longer be success- 
 fully maintained in the Assembly, nor was he himself inclined 
 to enter the lists in such a cause. The fine phrases about 
 the ambition of Kings, who squandered the blood of the 
 people in dynastic feuds, could not, of course, induce him to 
 transfer the decision to an Assembly, which was just as 
 selfish and fond of rule, and which was possessed of far less 
 practical knowledge than the Executive. But he did wish 
 to secure to the French Chamber as decisive an influence, 
 as that of the English Parliament; and while in England 
 long custom made all enactments on the subject superfluous, 
 it was necessary in France to fix the usage for the future 
 by an express law. The case before him seemed especially 
 calculated to substantiate the evils of a solely Ministerial 
 decision on the question of peace or war. Though Lafayette 
 had been, for the moment, frightened out of all his warlike 
 intentions, yet the future was by no means secure from his 
 ambition. But a foreign war ajjpeared to Mirabeau — and in 
 this he showed his superiority in penetration over Lafayette 
 as well as the Jacobins — the greatest misfortune which could 
 befall the French Government, in its present position. He 
 wished for peace, like the Jacobins, but it was that he might 
 disarm the Jacobins. 
 
 He took his measures accordingly. In the first place he 
 demanded the granting of the subsidies, as defensive pre- 
 parations were under all circumstances indispensable. He 
 then pointed out the impossibility of depriving the King — 
 the Director of foreign alfairs and military measures — of the 
 power of declaring war; dwelling, at the same time, on the 
 efi'ectual control which the popular representatives could 
 exercise through their right of voting supplies, and of calling 
 Ministers to account for their acts. The more forcibly and 
 
Ch. II.] BARNAVE AND MIRABEAU. 215 
 
 loudly he spoke, the louder and more threatening were the 
 angry cries of the Left, and the greater the excitement of 
 the masses. In the streets, they hawked about a pamphlet— 
 "The great treachery of the Count Mirabeau;"— before the 
 door of the Assembly ; the masses of the people were heaving 
 to and fro in breathless suspense, applauding Lameth, cursing 
 Mirabeau, and baited into an agony of fire and fury by a 
 multitude of alarming reports. The Jacobins fixed on the 
 young and gifted Barnave to answer their dreaded opponent; 
 and had the satisfaction of seeing their orator acquit him- 
 self of his task in the most brilliant manner. After pointing 
 out the insufficiency of the guarantees, recommended by 
 Mirabeau, against an irregular lust of war in the monarch, 
 and the terrible importance of every war to the welfare and 
 freedom of the land, he condensed his argument into the 
 one constitutional proposition — that the declaration of such 
 a catastrophe must necessarily be the act of the National 
 will; which could only be expressed and carried into exe- 
 cution by the organ of that will — the legislative Power. 
 His speech produced a tremendous efi'ect in the Chamber, 
 the galleries, and throughout the metropolis. But on the 
 following day, Mirabeau attacked him with overwhelming 
 force in the very centre of his position. He began with 
 the incontrovertible proposition, that though a declaration 
 of war was, like a law, an expression of the national will, 
 the King, in virtue of his sanction which was necessary to 
 the validity of every law, was a joint possessor of the legis- 
 lative power. He then overwhelmed all doubts by a close, 
 and logical line of argument, delivered with aU the passionate 
 fervour of his nature; — met and confuted all objections — ■ 
 and by his superior knowledge of the subject, his practical 
 clearness, and personal influence, carried the great majority 
 of the Assembly with him. A resolution was passed that 
 questions of war and peace were to be settled by the National 
 Assembly, after an express proposition of the king, and 
 under his sanction. 
 
216 NOOTKA SOUND AND REICHENBACH. [Book II. 
 
 Ill the undoubted state of feeling which prevailed in the 
 National Assembly, this was tantamount to a declaration, 
 that France would carry on no war of aggression against 
 Holland and England. This reacted upon Prussia to such 
 a degree, that the King at last resolved on more serious 
 demonstrations against Austria; he therefore stationed one 
 army on the Lithuanian frontier against liussia, and a second 
 in Silesia against Bohemia, and himself repaired to the head 
 charters of the latter. But his zeal was by no means shared 
 by the allied maritime Powers. There was, indeed, no more 
 question of a Spanish war; the Minister Florida Blanca was 
 greatly dispirited, and announced his submission to the 
 English Ambassador, not, he said, because the claims of 
 England were just, but because Spain was compelled to 
 make a sacrifice. "If France," he added, "would sujDportus, 
 I should hold out, but alone we are too weak and must 
 give way."' England, therefore, would have once more had 
 her hands free in the East; l^ut this prospect was far from 
 inducing her to recede from her last engagement with 
 Leopold. The party of peace at any price had by no means 
 obtained a complete ^-ictory in France; the subsidies demanded 
 by ^lontmorin had lieen granted, and a number of warlike 
 symptoms had liegun to sliow themselves. Pitt, therefore, 
 remained in his peaceable mood towards Austria, and was 
 only animated by the desire of maintaining the tranquility 
 of Europe, that no occasion might be given to France to 
 threaten the Netherlands again. 
 
 Leopold, assured of the support of the maritime Powers 
 did his part, with great skill, to further a settlement of the 
 questions, by making up his mind to gratify the pride of 
 Prussia, and apparently allowing himself to be forced to the 
 fulfilment of his most ardent wish. At the end of June, 
 two Austrian diplomatists, Prince Reuss and Baron Spielmanu, 
 made their appearance in the Prussian camp, and opened 
 
 ' Morris to Wasliington. II. 130. 
 
Cu. II.] PRUSSIA DUPED BY LEOPOLD. 217 
 
 negotiations with Herzberg at Reichenbacli, in the most 
 courteous and friendly manner. After Herzberg had exphiined 
 his scheme of an exchange, the Austrians produced, on the 
 13th July, a note of their State Chancellor, in M'hich the 
 latter made a counter-proposal coinciding in principle, and 
 differing only in subordinate points, from that of the Prussian 
 minister. Herzberg now considered that he had attained the 
 realisation of his plans. But on the same day, the Ambas- 
 sadors of the maritime Powers arrived, and protested, in 
 the most emphatic manner, against the execution of any such 
 treaty. They declared that their league had for its sole 
 object the maintenance of the full status quo ante in every 
 quarter, and added that England had already negociated on 
 this understanding at Vienna, and was determined not to 
 engage in any war for any other purpose. At the same 
 time the Prussian Ambassador, Marquis Lucchesini, arrived 
 from Warsaw. He informed them that there was the strongest 
 feeling in Poland against the cession of Dantzic and Thorn ; 
 that in Warsaw, under the present favourable circumstances, 
 the passions of men were highly excited; that the Russian 
 party, in order to injure Prussia, had carried a resolution 
 through the Diet, which declared every cession of territory 
 to be high-treason; and that even the friends of Prussia 
 thought that the King ought to procure for them the whole 
 of Galicia, at least, in return for those two fine cities. 
 These incidents had a most powerful effect on King Frederick 
 William II. His original ardour had passed away ; and much 
 as he liked to form vigorous resolutions in a fit of rash 
 enthusiasm, he was little inclined pertinaciously to adhere 
 to them on merely reasonable grounds. He had lived 40 years 
 apart from all business, sound knowledge, and the discipline 
 of labour. His lively temperament had impelled him to 
 compensate himself for these deficiencies in excitements of 
 every kind; but he soon found himself wearied and hlase; 
 complained of the desolation of his monotonous and fatiguing 
 life; and very soon accustomed himself, even as King, to 
 
218 NOOTKA SOUND AND REICHENBACH. [Book II. 
 
 treat political, as well as all other affairs, as a mere means 
 of intellectual excitement.* Nothing more quickly decided 
 him in favour of a measure than its being of a nature to 
 beget an exalted state of feeling; and nothing wearied him 
 more than the accurate objective calculation which is the 
 soul of all practical policy. As difficulties accumulated in 
 Reichenbach, he was easily convinced that Herzberg had 
 involved him in altogether unnecessary difficulties. He was 
 of opinion that the English view of the matter was, on the 
 whole, highly honourable for Prussia also. The glory of 
 having dictated a peace to three Emperors, as the umpire 
 of Europe, appeared to him still greater if Austria received 
 nothing, than if it made an exchange; and the honour to 
 Prussia of such a treaty, all the more dazzling, the less it 
 was sullied by any selfish grasping at Dantzic and Thorn. 
 The King gave himself up to these feelings with the greatest 
 ardour, without the least suspicion that a rvder is violating 
 his duty, if he indulges an enthusiastic feeling at the cost 
 of the State entrusted to him. Herzberg received express 
 orders to reject the proposals of Prince Kaunitz for an 
 exchange, and to insist on the maintenance of the strict 
 status quo ante. The Austrian Ambassadors affected there- 
 upon to be frightened and indignant, and the King told 
 Herzberg that they must pref)are to fight for the good cause. 
 Herzberg only shook his head mournfully, and hardly eight 
 days had passed before the king himself was surprised by 
 Leopold's ready and zealous assent.^ Austria hereby gave 
 up all her conquests, and promised to Belgium a general 
 amnesty, and a restoration of her ancient legal constitution. 
 Prussia on her side ceased from her efforts to get possession 
 of Dantzic, and promised to guarantee the Austrian rule 
 in Belgium. The only point which Herzberg could carry 
 was a clause, that if Austria should make any small ac- 
 
 ' Letters of Madame Charriere, a friend of the Countess Dohnhof, Rem 
 de Geneve, 1S49, — ^ Herzberg, Precis in "Schmidt's Journal" I. 27. 
 
Ch. II.] LEOPOLD'S SUCCESSES. 219 
 
 quisition on the frontiers of Turkey, she would award a 
 similar advantage to Prussia. 
 
 The American ambassador in Paris, Morris, who was a 
 strict conservative, and if not exactly a trained statesman, 
 was, at any rate, a practical one, wrote on this occasion to 
 his Government as follows: "Prussia, although she has 
 dictated the conditions of the treaty of Reichenbach, has 
 been completely duped." And indeed it soon became apparent 
 how much the disinterestedness of her King had given up.* 
 His influence sank in every quarter, in the same degree as 
 that of Leopold rose. For some weeks, Austria still kept 
 within the limits of the treaty of Reichenbach. She concluded 
 an armistice with the Turks, was willing to open a Peace- 
 Congress, and arranged the recovery of Belgium, at the Hague, 
 in common with Prussia, Holland and England. This was 
 the time which Leopold needed for the consolidation of his 
 position at home. He had to secure his election as Emperor, 
 and since the formation of the League of Princes, Prussia 
 had a majority in the College of Electors. It is true, that 
 Prussia had promised him her vote at Reichenbach, but 
 several of the conditions of his election remained unset- 
 tled. And now the first consequences of the Reichenbach 
 policy were seen, when Saxony refrised any longer to follow 
 the lead of Prussia, and resumed its old cry of perfect 
 neutrality. This once more turned the scale in favour of 
 Austria, and all proposals for the reform of the Capitulation 
 were defeated by the majority, composed of Bohemia, Bavaria, 
 Cologne and Treves, against Brandenburg, Hanover and 
 Mayence. It was a matter of no less moment, that, at the 
 same time, Leopold, in spite of great opposition, secured 
 his recognition in Hungary. In this case too, he acted on 
 the principle which characterised his whole government. 
 While Joseph had endeavoured to destroy all the provincial 
 privileges and Estates, for the advantage of the whole 
 
 ' More fully shown in Haeiisser's Deulsche Geschichte, I. 322 — 339. 
 
220 NOOTKA SOUND AND REICHENBACH. [Book II. 
 
 Empire, Leopold restored the Estates to life, but reserved 
 tlieir most substantial j)rivileges to himself. In Hungary, 
 especially, he found the means most effectual which have 
 been used with such effect in our own times; he rous.ed the 
 Illyrians and Southern Sclavonians against the Magyars, 
 and by their help succeeded in obtaining the crown with 
 all the prerogatives possessed by Maria Theresa. Having 
 succeeded thus far, he pushed forward without hesitation in 
 all directions, even beyond the limits — wherever he could 
 safely do so — drawn at the treaty of Reicheubach. His 
 troops advanced against Belgium, which was ill prepared 
 for resistance, in consequence of its intestine divisions. The 
 Prussian officers, of whom we spoke above, now quitted the 
 service of the Belgian Congress, and the pressure exercised by 
 Austria soon became so strong, as to call forth threats and 
 protests from the maritime Powers in the Conferences at the 
 Hague. But the ojjportunity for serious resistance was past. 
 The Austrian IMinister, Count Mercy, took no notice of 
 any reservations, but pushed forward his troops without 
 delay. Their party divisions had moreover deprived the 
 Belgians of French support, since the Congress of Brussels 
 had, shortly before, proceeded against the democratic leaders, 
 and refused, in spite of Lafayette's representations, to set 
 them free. It was of no avail that the latter sent Dumouriez, 
 expressly on this errand, to Brussels, and offered French 
 assistance against Austria as the price of their liberation. 
 The Congress was immovable, and was therefore on the 
 worst terms with Lafayette, when General Bender with 
 30,000 Austrians begun his operations. Lafayette had no 
 idea of disturbing the peace of Europe for the sake of such 
 hardened sinners; and the Austrian rule was restored in 
 Belgium without a blow. 
 
 The subjection of Liege to the dominion of its Bishop 
 immediately followed. Prussia had hitherto energetically 
 supported the entirely just cause of the inhabitants. In 
 Belgium and Hungary she had only operated in secret, and 
 
Oh. II.] SUBJECTION OF LIEGE. 221 
 
 by means of non-official agents; but in the affairs of Liege 
 she had come forward openly and officially, and was all the 
 more justified in looking for consideration on the part of 
 Austria, when the Liege Estates declared themselves ready 
 to receive their Bishop again, if he would confirm their 
 hereditary privileges. But the Austrian troops now marched 
 into the city, and the opposition was crushed by military 
 force, without any regard to the protests of Prussia. 
 
 The results of the treaty of Reichenbach were still more 
 glaringly displayed in the East of Europe. Sweden, which 
 had commenced a war against Russia, in reliance on Eng- 
 lish and Prussian aid, concluded an unfruitful peace in bitter 
 disappointment. The patriotic party in Poland passed com- 
 pletely out of the sphere of Prussian influence. After their 
 unwise obstinacy in the matter of Dantzic, they had good 
 reason to doubt of the future friendship of Prussia; and 
 after their late experience, they might well consider an 
 alliance with Austria * both safer and more j)i'ofitable. And 
 lastly, even the Turkish Peace-Congress could not be got 
 together; Russia, which was now hard pressed by England 
 and Prussia, made large offers to Austria for a renewal of 
 her alliance; and Kaunitz was of opinion, that if the Prussians 
 attacked Russia, the Emperor of Austria was not prevented from 
 affording assistance to his Russian ally, by the terms of the 
 Reichenbach treaty, which only related to the Turks. Leo- 
 pold indeed refused to listen to this suggestion, as a pro- 
 mise had been made at Reichenbach not to take part, either 
 directly or indirectly, in the Turkish war; but the English 
 and Prussian Ambassadors had to wait in Sistowa^ to the 
 very last day of the year, before their Austrian colleagues 
 arrived. We shall presently see how vnifavonrable was the 
 aspect which affairs then assumed. 
 
 So far were the differences of the European Powers from 
 
 1 "Decline of Prussian influence/' in Ilamhuryer PoUtisch Journul. Sept. 
 1790. _ 2 From Dec. 19tli— 30tli. 
 
222 NOOTKA SOUND AND REICHENBACH. [Book II. 
 
 being brought to a satisfactory conclusion in the year 1790. 
 Russia still filled her neighbours with anxiety and wrath by 
 the din of war, which she still continued to wage against 
 Turkey. Austria, which, with rare good fortune, had es- 
 caped the danger of utter annihilation, and obtained an 
 extraordinary increase of power, endeavoured to make use of 
 her advantages, with ever-increasing eagerness. In spite of 
 her new friendship with Prussia, she had not forgotten 
 how much the Prussian influence had contributed to the 
 disturbances in her unruly provinces. Leopold laid it up 
 in his heart, and did not allow himself to be diverted from 
 his proceedings in this direction, even by the increasing 
 uproar of the French Revolution. ^ And, on the other side, 
 the feelings of the King of Prussia were all the more em- 
 bittered by this conduct of his ally, because he was con- 
 scious of having been actuated by pure motives in the Rei- 
 chenbach treaty. AVhile he heard himself accused of treachery, 
 by Hungary, Brussels and Liege, he was treated with con- 
 tempt by the Poles, and discovered that his confidence in 
 Austria had been utterly misplaced. 
 
 ' Morris to Wasliington, Nov. 22. No doubt from comniunicatioiis made 
 to him by the French ministers. 
 
Ch. II.] GENERAL DISTURBANCES. 223 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 FRANCE. 
 FALL OF THE CLERGY AND NOBILITY. 
 
 DiSTCRBANCES IN CONSEQCEKCE OF THE DECREES AGAINST THE CHURCH.— 
 CiTIL CONSTITUTION OF THE CLERGY. — ThE JACOBINS AGITATE AGAINST 
 
 foreign powers. — attempts to excite mutiny among the soldiers. — 
 Constitution of the army. — Military tumults. 
 
 Whilst tlie seeds of a general war were springing up in 
 many parts of Europe, and Austria was raising lier arm 
 against Prussia, — Prussia against Russia— and England against 
 Spain — the atmosphere, charged with warlike electricity, acted 
 mightily in heating the passions let loose by the Revolution. 
 Of course we do not mean by this, what the Revolutionists 
 have so often affirmed, that the French people, threatened 
 by a league of old Europe, was obliged to have recourse 
 to extremities to preserve its national independence. A 
 simple statement of the facts of German history in 1790 is 
 sufficient to show the impossibility of such a league. But 
 that which did not exist in the external world was engen- 
 dered in the minds of men. When a universal conflagration 
 seemed every moment ready to break out in East and West, 
 in North and South, men considered their own domestic 
 existence imperilled, and, only too readily, drew a conclusion 
 from their own wishes, with regard to the sentiments of 
 their supposed opponents. On occasion of those half diploj- 
 matic, half revolutionary, preparations for war for the pro- 
 tection of Spain, Lameth cried out, "This is a war of all 
 Kings against all Peoples." The whole matter was expressed 
 
224 FALL OP THE CLERGY AND NOBILITY. [Book II. 
 
 by these words ; the French felt so strong an impulse withm 
 themselves to revolutionize the other nations of Europe, that 
 they could not but pre- suppose an equally active hostility 
 towards themselves on the part of the European Govern- 
 ments. 
 
 It so happened, moreover, that, in the same month of 
 May, the opposition to the Revolution in France itself, for 
 the first -time, descended from the Parliament and the Court 
 to the people, and appealed to force of arms. The fiercer 
 anxieties and passions of civil war, were added to the excite- 
 ment against foreign powers; and it was the unhappy 
 Church question which kindled this destructive flame. 
 
 The confiscation of Church property had immediately pro- 
 duced very serious conser|uences. We have seen that, in a 
 financial point of view, it was more than doubtful whether 
 the State, after paying the expenses of the Church from 
 public funds, Avould derive any advantage from the Eccle- 
 siastical booty. Whether in political and religious respects 
 it is to be regarded as an advantage that the Church should 
 be supported b)- the State, rather than by its own property, 
 is a question Avhich a prudent observer will decline to de- 
 cide; since the answer must necessarily dejoend on the pe- 
 culiar nature of the people, the state, and the times. In 
 France, at that period, there was reason enough to change 
 the existing system; for since the Kipg gave away all the 
 livings, the possession of property, instead of investing the 
 Church with natural advantages of dignified independence, 
 only brought with it the evils of wealth, luxury and world- 
 liness. The whole course of the Kevohition, moreover, was 
 once for all directed against exclusive corporations; we may 
 easily conceive, therefore, that it did not spare the already 
 deeply fallen Church, but subjected it entirely, by a system 
 of payment, to the new-born state. It was still a great viola- 
 fion of law, and a bad pecuniary speculation; but strong 
 arguments could be brought forward in its favoiu", and it 
 may even be regarded as unavoidable. 
 
Ch. III.] THE PEASANTS SUPPORT ORTHODOX CLERGY. 225 
 
 But they did not stop here; they began immediately to 
 sell the new State properties singly, and thereby raised a 
 great number of politico-economical difficulties. In the next 
 place, an intention was openly announced of re-modelling 
 the constitution of the Church,— which is itself, to a catholic, 
 an object of faith — an announcement which naturally' stirred 
 the religious conscience of the nation to its very depths. 
 We shall see how fearfully the movement thus begun was 
 embittered by stupid fanaticism and priestly love of power; 
 yet the National Assembly is not thereby acquitted of the 
 charge of either deep ignorance, or grievous disregard, of 
 the condition of their country. It soon appeared that they 
 had left the ground where their authority, supported by the 
 claims of the nation and the age, was unassailable. They 
 might have destroyed the Clergy, as the first Order in the 
 feudal State, without any greater resistance than would serve 
 to show the weakness of the conquered party. But they 
 had no sooner laid hands on the Clergy in their character 
 of representatives of a faith deeply rooted in the hearts of 
 the people, than civil war broke out in a hundred parts 
 of the Kingdom.^ Men had yet to learn that behind the 
 enlightened orators of the clubs, and the godless mobs of 
 the capital, there existed in one half of the country a po- 
 pulation of peasants, who clung with immoveable tenacity 
 and warlike ardour to the Church of their fathers. They 
 were able to judge from past experience whether this re- 
 sistance was to be despised. That the last efforts of the 
 ancieii regime had so utterly failed, and that a new era 
 had been so triumphantly inaugurated, was owing, we have 
 seen — not to the speeches in the Palais Royal, nor even to 
 the storming of the Bastille, but to the general outbreak of 
 the peasants in the country districts, and their universal de- 
 sertion from the regiments. In their rude zeal, they had 
 declared energetically enough what they wanted; they pos- 
 
 ' Louis Blanc, B. IV. ch. 11, takes the same view of the matter. 
 I. P 
 
226 FALL OF THE CLERGY AND NOBILITY. [Book II. 
 
 sessed it now, and felt able to defend it against tlie world. 
 They would have expelled the Ecclesiastical tithe-owner, 
 sword in hand; but they would not allow the Sacrament 
 to be forced upon them by miconsecrated hands. Their 
 private interest, too, which had hitherto led them to look 
 with favour on the measures of the National Assembly, only 
 tended on this occasion to increase their anxiety and dis- 
 pleasure. We have already observed upon the prevalent 
 error that the chief desideratum of agriculture, at that period, 
 was a partition of the large estates, and an increase in the 
 number of proprietors; what was really wanting was the 
 freedom of the soil from feudal trammels, judicious culti- 
 vation and fair arrangements between landowner and tenant. 
 The first of these requisites was already attained; the 
 second could only be slowly learned; and as to the third, 
 the estates of the Clergy had by no means the worst re- 
 putation; — on the contrary, their administration was con- 
 sidered to be sensible and regular, and their leases were 
 eagerly sought after. The report, therefore, that this property 
 had changed hands caused a general panic; the tenants were 
 afraid of being ejected by the new purchaser, or oppressed 
 by speculators. In Alsace alone, a petition against the over- 
 throw of the Catholic religion received 21,000 signatures of 
 farmers in three weeks, among whom Catholics, Lutherans 
 and Jews were found in rare agreement. In Bretagne, the 
 Parish priests had hitherto been at the head of the agitation 
 for freedom; and the peasants, oppressed by pecviliarly griev- 
 ous servile bonds, had risen with fury against the Nobihty. 
 Now, however, both priests and peasants turned round, and 
 the new communal authorities saw the population unani- 
 mously gathering round the recalcitrant Clergy. At first 
 indeed the greatest excitement arose in the South, where 
 the towns also shared in the general indignation; while in 
 a few places the peasants, who had formerly sufl:ered much 
 more from feudalism them their brethren in the North, ad- 
 hered to the paths of revolution. The Clergy themselves 
 
Ch. III.] CIVIL WAR IN THE PROVINCES. 227 
 
 made the fullest use of their deep and wide-spread influence. 
 Threatening addresses were heard from the pulpits ; the con- 
 fessional served to carry the flames of discord into every 
 family; and long processions of penitent believers filled the 
 streets of the towns with lamentations over the detested 
 sacrilege. The first bloody tumult arose in Nismes, where 
 the existence of a numerous Protestant community, influ- 
 ential from its wealth and education, had roused the minds 
 of the Catholic zealots to the highest pitch of fanatical ex- 
 citement, ever since the declaration of the political equality 
 of all religious sects. A man named Froment took the lead 
 in the revolt, with the declaration that the Revolution could 
 never be mastered by arguments addressed to the reason ; 
 that it was necessary to oppose passion to passion, and to 
 crush the revolutionary movement by the powerful weapons 
 of religion. From this time forward, disturbances were of 
 daily occurrence; the life of the Protestants was no longer 
 safe, and at last a more important collision took place, in 
 which a patriotic regiment of the line was severely handled 
 by the orthodox Burgher-guard and the proletaries. There- 
 upon a Catholic society was established, which invited the 
 neighbouring Departments to join in a fraternity of Christian 
 faith. In Alais the mob chased the troops out of the town, 
 and the Burgher-Guard, being divided against itself, was 
 unable to interfere. In Montauban, again, there was a fight 
 between the Burgher-Guard and the people, and here, too, 
 the Cathohcs remained masters of the field, and the Burgher- 
 Guard was dispersed. Amidst these convulsions the Catho- 
 lics gained ground; in Nismes alone the fraternity was joined 
 by 4,000 men, and Uzes, Perpignan, Tarn and the in- 
 fluential city of Toulouse, soon sent in their adhesion. The 
 complaints of tlie patriots resounded day by day, and the 
 National Assembly was overwhelmed with more and more 
 gloomy reports from the authorities. Under the erroneous- 
 idea that they had only to do with artificially got-up dis- 
 turbances, they resolved to cut off all the hopes of the 
 
 p2 
 
228 FALL OF THE CLERGY AND NOBILITY. [Book II. 
 
 partisans of ancient abuses by completing the work of 
 reform. 
 
 On the 29th of May, the new Church constitution — the 
 outlines of which had been published in April, — was laid 
 before the Assembly by the Ecclesiastical Committee. In 
 its fuU development, it went far beyond the principles laid 
 down in the report of April; and made many other encroach- 
 ments on the laws of the Church than the alteration of the 
 bomidaries of dioceses. The sovereignty of the enfranchised 
 citizens was acknowledged in this case, as in the courts of 
 law, and in the general administration. The electors of each 
 District were to name their Priest, and the electors of the 
 Department their Bishop;* the person elected was to swear 
 an oath of allegiance to the Nation, the King and the Con- 
 stitution. There were to be no more Chapters and no Eccle- 
 siastical jurisdiction. The Pope was to forfeit his right 
 of dispensation and canonical investiture. It is true that the 
 dogmatical c[uestions were not immediately touched upon in 
 this scheme, but we need not point out that if it were once 
 carried into execution, there would no longer exist in France 
 for an orthodox Catholic any roligious service free from 
 desecration, or any unpolluted Sacrament. 
 
 Nevertheless the debate was not to be compared in the 
 warmth of feeling displayed with that of April. The Clergy, 
 who had then formally protested against the obnoxious de- 
 crees, now took very little part in the fresh discussion. The 
 contest was almost exclusively carried on by the j)arties 
 of the Centre and the Left, — and related chiefly to the 
 amount of salary, the continuance of the Chapters, and the 
 election of the Bishops by the people or the Clergy. The 
 real hero of this dry and tedious debate was the Jansenist 
 Camus, who, with a mixture of religious and political zeal, 
 endeavoured to prove the exact agreement of the law before 
 
 ' The only condition of the franchise was attendance at one mass. 
 Every non-catholic who fulfilled it might give a vote. 
 
Cn. III.] FORMATION OF CATHOLIC ASSOCIATIONS. 229 
 
 them, with the new Testament and the synodal decrees of 
 the 4th century. Robespierre, for whom the law was not 
 democratic enough, was less fortunate ; and several attempts 
 to introduce the abolition of celiliacy entirely failed. In the 
 midst of these half scholastic and half demagogical discus- 
 sions, the threatening voice of the Catholic South was oc- 
 casionally heard. On June 15th, the National Assembly 
 received an address, couched in dictatorial terms, from the 
 Association at Nismcs, cailling upou them to respect the 
 Church and restore the prerogatives of the King. This was 
 also an act of the sovereign people, as much as the Parisian 
 address of October 5th; but the National Assembly an- 
 swered it in the curtest manner, on the very same day, by 
 a decree for the immediate sale, not of 400 millions' worth 
 only, but of the whole mass of the Church property. 
 The Nismes address, moreover, was declared exciting and 
 seditious, and the ringleaders were cited before the bar 
 of the Assembly, and thus the exasperation on both sides 
 continually increased. This was exactly the juncture at 
 which the new administrative authorities entered upon their 
 functions; no courts of law were as yet in activity, and the 
 army was more and more deeply affected by the general 
 disorders. Every town therefore, was in a state of complete 
 independence; the more important administration of affairs 
 was virtually carried on under the form of voluntary frater- 
 nities, and enthusiasm for the National Assembly was the 
 only bond which still held the loose particles together. Now, 
 however, this enthusiasm was changed, through many a 
 wide region, into hatred and abhorrence. Catholic associa- 
 tions were formed in vehement opposition to the pa- 
 triotic Clubs, and the sovereign towns prepared, as in he 
 times of ancient Gaul, to march into the field. When the 
 struggle in Montauban became known, the freedom-loving 
 Bordeaux rose in fury; the Burgher Guard ran to arms — 
 gathered a small army in the neighbourhood,— and marched 
 out to chastise the rebellious hypocrites. For a long time 
 
230 FALL OF THE CLERGY AND NOBILITY. [Book 1L 
 
 the opposing forces lay regularly encamped in sight of- one 
 another, and the interference of the Ministry and the Na- 
 tional Assembly could Avith difficulty prevent a collision. 
 In Nismes, on the contrary, a dreadful catastrophe took place 
 in the middle of June. The partizans of Froment came to 
 blows with the protestants, and a number of individuals 
 were murdered; then the protestants received reinforcements 
 from the liberal catholics of the town, and fellow-believers 
 of the surrounding villages. The interference of the troops 
 of the line decided the contest in favour of the Liberals, 
 and above eight hundred of the clerical party were cut down 
 with revengeful cruelty. ^ 
 
 In fact while the laws respecting the Civil and Judicial 
 Administration had freed the passions of men from every 
 outward bond, the decrees against the Chiirch placed weapons 
 in their hands for ojien war. In the midst of the RevolxTtion, 
 a civil war rose against the Revolution itself; and the revo- 
 lutionary leaders were nothing loath to enter into this con- 
 test, which afforded them fresh means of rousing the fana- 
 ticism of their adherents. In opposition to the theological 
 zeal of the orthodox Catholics, they invoked the patriotism 
 of all true Frenchmen. The Catholic Priests, who had a 
 year before united themselves by hundreds with the tiers 
 etat, had indeed nothing in common with the Lords and 
 Princes who were begging aid for the feudal system in 
 foreign countries; but the Revolution, after persecuting both 
 parties with equal fury, was delighted to be able to direct 
 the general abhorrence felt towards traitors to their country 
 against the Catholic Church. 
 
 The Jacobins had never allowed the subject of foreign 
 interference, which they had first broached on the 5th Oc- 
 tober, to die away again. If it had been a question of 
 wishes and inclinations alone, they would have had good 
 
 ' Louis Blanc, B. IV. ch. 11, who derives his information from the mi- 
 nutes of the law-suit subsequently carried on in respect to these proceedings. 
 
Ch. III.] EIGHTS OF GERMAN PRINCES IN ALSACE. 231 
 
 reason for all they said; for there was no lack of voices 
 calling vipon the existing Powers of Enrope, to guard and 
 to fight against the Revolution. In the front rank of these, 
 were, of course, the French Emigres, who besought every 
 Court in turn for an armed intervention, and declaimed upon 
 the incompatibility of a revolutionised France with the an- 
 cient order of the world. Their natural chief was the Count 
 d'Artois, the King's brother, who had fled from Paris after 
 the storming of the Bastille. Since that time, he had lived, 
 with his father-in-law, the King of Sardinia; and from that 
 retreat he importiined his friends in France, as well as every 
 foreign Power, with his petitions for help. Complaints from 
 other quarters reached the German Diet on the part of cer- 
 tain German Princes who had posessions in Alsace, and 
 were affected by the decrees of August. In support of their 
 formal right they appealed to an article of the Peace of 
 Westphalia, which guaranted the existing rights of the Im- 
 perial Estates of Alsace. On the other side, France quoted 
 another article from the same treaty, according to which, 
 this guarantee was given without prejudice to the full 
 sovereignty of the King, and Alsace, therefore, was also 
 subjected to French legislation. ' However much the lawyers 
 might differ on this question, it was one which in a political 
 point of view ought evidently to be settled by a peaceable 
 compromise; and Mirabeau carried a decree in the National 
 Assembly, which invited the Alsatian Princes to negociate 
 a compensation. This disagreement, however, tended to in- 
 crease the dissatisfaction with which the higher classes in 
 Germany watched the progress of French disturbances. A 
 sensitiveness of this kind was natural enough among those 
 States of the Empire whose whole existence still rested on 
 a feudal basis. The Prelates and Knights of the Empire, 
 and other little Potentates, found themselves entirely in the 
 position of those Frenchmen against whom the first blows 
 
 ' Instr. pacis Monast. Sec. 73, 74, 87. 
 
232 FALL OF THE CLEEGY AND NOBILITY. [Book XL 
 
 of the Eevolutiou had been struck. The more powerful 
 Princes, however, were in a different position; the majority 
 of them being protestant, they would have been able to look 
 on at the fate of the French Church with greater indifference. 
 Having been for many ages at war with their own Nobility, 
 and following in the main the policy of progress and the 
 public weal, they might even have seen in the decrees of 
 the 4tli of August the victory of their own cause. But the 
 folly of Breteuil, and the weakness of Louis — which in spite 
 of the real nature of the case involved the Monarchy in the 
 defeat of the Feudal Estates — together with the anarchical 
 and world- embracing character of the "Rights of man," 
 entirely changed these sentiments. After the horrors of the 
 6th of October, the Monarchs of Europe naturally considered 
 their own existence endangered by the Revolution, and looked 
 with fixvour on all its victims, almost without distinction. 
 In their case, an internal revolution of thought and feeling 
 took place, analogous to the external revolution in France. 
 The blindness of the Feudal party rendered the rise of an 
 aggressive radicalism possible, by which those natural allies — 
 a national Monarchy, and a liberal policy directed to the 
 public good — -were entirely estranged from one another. 
 
 Yet there was still a wide interval between the alienation 
 of hearts and active hostilities. The Courts of Europe were 
 enraged at the insolence of the Parisian revolutionists, but 
 most of them felt as much contempt as anger, and all were 
 fully occupied by the Austrian troubles. Even at Turin, 
 .though the King of Sardinia expressed his wishes for the 
 /success of his illustrious son-in-law — whose gallantries, by 
 the way, disagreeably disturbed the dignified decorum of his 
 Court — he showed not the slightest inclination to endanger 
 his own interests by a French war. The zeal of the Count 
 d'Artois was always grasping at shadows; and his failure 
 with the other Powers was still more decided. Nay, even 
 in the Tuileries— though they still kept up a communication 
 with the Count in order to learn what he was doing— the 
 
Cii. III.] APATHY OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS. 233 
 
 Queen, without whose knowledge the King undertook nothing 
 of importance, was very far from agreeing to his plans. On 
 the one hand she dreaded the danger which the Royal family 
 must incur in Paris, during an attack of the Emigres, and 
 on the other hand she ^Yas anxious about her own iiitc, in 
 the case of their success ; especially since Calonne had gained 
 favour and influence with the Count d'Artois. The men of 
 deeper insight, who foresaw the final victory of anarchical 
 Democracy from the past career of the Revolution, deplored 
 even at that time the sluggishness of the crowned heads. 
 Not that they wished for a universal war with modern 
 France, or the destruction of reform, but because they had / 
 no doubt that the victorious Democracy would assume the ; 
 aggressive, and render a general war inevitable. They di- j 
 rected attention to the intrigues of Ijafayette in Ireland, 
 Holland and Belgium; to the zeal with which the Emigres 
 of Geneva and Liege thronged round Mirabeau and other 
 party chiefs; to the official tendency of the "Rights of 
 man," which assumed to be the only valid public law, not 
 only of France but of the whole world. The only question '\^ 
 with them was, when the contest should begin, and with \ 
 what resources it should be conducted; and it therefore 
 seemed clear to them that every delay could only increase ) 
 the powers of anarchy. 
 
 But if the Courts, in the midst of their Turkish troubles, 
 did not at all concern themselves, as to whether Marie 
 Antoinette restrained her husband from all participation in 
 the plans of his brother, how many people in Paris, can we 
 suppose, were aware of these domestic and diplomatic in- 
 tricacies, or were inclined to believe in them? Every remark 
 which a democratic newspaper threw out concerning the 
 plans of the foreign tyrants set fire to a thousand inflam- 
 mable hearts. The majority of Frenchmen were so utterly 
 ignorant of foreign affairs, that it was very easy to make 
 them believe the most ridiculous inventions. Sometimes a 
 blow was to be dealt against Lyons, sometimes against Mar- 
 
234 FALL OF THE CLERGY AND NOBILITY. [Book II. 
 
 seilles ; now it was the Emperor, now Catharine II., who were 
 in league with the Emigres; to-day England was repre- 
 sented as conspiring with d'Artois against the Revolution, 
 and to-morrow with Orleans against Louis XVI. — and all 
 to revenue herself for the American war. Thus the whole soil 
 
 o 
 
 seemed undermined with treachery, and the atmosphere poi- 
 soned by conspiracies ; no crime was so clumsy, or so crafty, 
 as not to be imputed to the Reactionists. While these mat- 
 ters were continually painted in the most glaring colours, 
 and the actual intrigues of the Count d'Artois were well 
 known and beyond a doubt, the demagogues succeeded 
 within a few months in filling the mass of the people with 
 painful anxiety and unboimded pride. Strong national feeling, 
 lively imagination, and infinite credulity, combined, and 
 quickly roused far and wide among the people, first, the 
 consciousness of being persecuted by all kings, and, se- 
 condly, the wish to procure freedom for all peoples. A year 
 before they had been proud of being the only free peoplp 
 on the Continent; they now began to extend the horizon 
 of the Revolution far beyond all the boundaries of the 
 Kingdom. 
 
 The state of military affairs presented the readiest means 
 of changing these feelings into action; for against foreign 
 Powers, the army alone could afford protection. But it was 
 feared that the officers, who belonged without exception to 
 the Noblesse, would place themselves at the head of the 
 traitors. The factions in Paris were well aware of what im- 
 portance the opinions of the army were to them; and the 
 Jacobins never for a moment ceased to work upon the minds 
 of the soldiers. Their efforts were only too well backed by 
 the faults of the French military system, which showed 
 themselves more incurable every day. Officers and soldiers 
 stood opposed to one another as members of classes separated 
 by a deep abyss, and were mutually animated by a deadly 
 hostility. Nowhere was the hatred between the Nobility 
 ^nd the Commonalty fiercer than here; and while elsewhere 
 
Ch. III. DEMORALIZATION OF REGULAR ARMY. 235 
 
 the standing army is regarded as the strongest bulwark of 
 order, in France, at that time. Feudalism had in no quarter 
 so greatly facilitated the task of the demagogues as among 
 the soldiers. The non-commissioned officers, almost without 
 exception, held radical opinions; and the officers themselves 
 were divided, some having been convinced by the Revolution 
 of the necessity of reform, and others still more hardened 
 against it. In the course of the winter, the club-system was 
 introduced into the regiments; each had its ovni committee 
 of non-commissioned officers as centre of the movement, 
 and the first subjects discussed were higher pay, security 
 against embezzlement, easier promotion and milder discipline. 
 They sent up deputations to their colonels to discuss these 
 points, or even directly to the National Assembly and the 
 Minister at war; they demanded an account of the military 
 chest from the colonels, and refused to acknowledge superior 
 officers of aristocratic and illiberal opinions. The officers 
 were obliged to look on, and to soothe and flatter their 
 men; whenever they attempted resistance the soldiers re- 
 sorted to open violence, and the Communal authorities con- 
 tinually interfered in matters relating to military discipline. 
 When the confederation began to be formed in the pro- 
 vinces, all these evils were greatly exaggerated; the troops 
 were allured by the festivities and enthusiasm displayed, and 
 the National Assembly, which could not accustom itself to 
 look on the army as anything else than a tool of power, 
 expressly recommended the fraternization of the soldiers and 
 the National Guard, as ecj^ual sons of a common country. 
 By this intercourse of the two sections of the armed force 
 the discipline of the army was completely destroyed. The 
 soldiers saw no reason why they should have less freedom 
 than their free brethren; or more limited rights, than other 
 members of the sovereign people. They found that the Na- 
 tional Guard, without any penal laws, and with the privilege 
 of choosing their officers, did good service to the Common- 
 wealth; and they argued, that as the Declaration of Eighty 
 
236 FALL OF THE CLERGY AND NOBILITY. [Book II. 
 
 allowed of no inequality, but such as the public good de- 
 manded, there was no reason why they should be subject to 
 severer regulations, and not be allowed to select their officers. 
 And thus things soon came to such a pass that the disorders 
 of the new system were worse than the abuses of the old. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the National Assembly began 
 the work of reform, by reserving certain questions, very im- 
 portant to officers and soldiers, for their own sole decision ; 
 and they thereby accustomed the army to look to them more 
 than to the King. "We cannot be sure," said Alexander 
 Lameth, "that a liberally minded king will always rule in 
 France." The Assembly, therefore, resolved that the legislative 
 body had the exclusive right to determine the numbers and 
 regulations of the army — the disposal of it in the Kingdom 
 ■ — the pay of all ranks — the mode of recruiting — the reception 
 of foreign soldiers — and the military code of punishment. 
 Lameth was himself an officer, and beside him were a num- 
 ber of young associates, who looked forward with burning 
 zeal to a grand career in a revolutionary army. Among 
 these were the Duke of Orleans' friend Biron, the hotheaded 
 Menou, Lafayette's associates, Broglie and Montmorency, 
 the aged Ciistine, brave, thoughtless and vain as the youngest 
 of them— and, lastly, the most radical of all, Dubois de 
 Crance, who joined to his^democratic ardour a ferocious 
 spirit of revenge against the old system, under which the 
 Minister of war, St. Germain, had formerly tiitHed him out 
 of the service. All these men were eager to popularize the 
 army; the pay of the common soldiers was raised — access to 
 the rank of officer was opened to all who displayed the 
 necessary talent — and the soldier's civil rights were reserved 
 to him for the time when he was not on active service. 
 
 But as nothing was done simultaneously with these plea- 
 sant concessions for the restoration of discipline, and the 
 charges against the reactionary and treacherous sentiments 
 of the officers were perseveringly repeated, the demoraliza- 
 tion of the army rose, during the Spring, to an alarming 
 
Cn. III.] MILITARY REVOLTS. 237 
 
 height. Both the people and the soldiers were convinced 
 that the officers would desert to the enemy on the very 
 first attack made by the Emigres; and it therefore seemed 
 mere treason to the country not to be beforehand with 
 them, or to leave them in their firesent position, especially 
 in the frontier garrisons. Whoever wished to raise a tumult 
 could not imagine a more fruitful theme. In the besinning 
 
 O DO 
 
 of May — at the same time that the Church disturbances were 
 going on in the interior — the flame of mutiny blazed along 
 the whole Sardinian border. That systematic agitation was 
 at work is evident from the fact that the risings were an- 
 nounced beforehand to the Jacobins of Paris; ^ but there 
 was also something more than conspiracy, vi0. a wide-spread 
 popular feehnff — especially in the rural districts — which 
 eagerly played into the hands of the revolutionary leaders. 
 The people simultaneously stormed the forts ^ at Marseilles, 
 the citadels at Grenoble and Montpelier, and the arsenal at 
 Toulon, in order to arm themselves, and to put to shame the 
 pilans of internal and external traitors. The local authorities 
 were powerless, and the National Assembly for a long time 
 wavered; at last they issued decrees in favour of order, 
 which were, however, too weak to produce any real effect, 
 and, moreover, came too late. 
 
 Such was the position of things at home, when the news 
 of Nootka Sound brought the possibility of a war clearly 
 before the eyes of the National Assembly. The excitement 
 which it caused is now doubly easy to us to understand. 
 The dreadful phantoms which an uncontrolled imagination 
 
 ' Louis Blanc makes' no mention and the Hague. — ^ In Marseilles 
 
 of this; but on the other hand he there had been great dissension since 
 
 speaks of a Royalist plot of Mar- 1789 between the Military and the 
 
 shal Maillebois, which amounted to Civilians; the quarrels in this city 
 
 nothing more than a plan of this gave Mirabeau and C.Lameth occasion 
 
 unsteady and restless officer for con- to abolish the jurisdiction of the 
 
 cocting an armed Counter-revolution G rand- Prevuts Poisson, I. 208. 
 at the Courts of Turin, Madrid 
 
238 FALL OF THE CLERGY AND NOBILITY. [Book II. 
 
 had hitherto created, seemed suddenly to acquire a crushing 
 reality. It was hardly without some personal anxiety that 
 Lameth exclaimed, that it was now a question of a war 
 between kings and peoples. When therefore the supposed 
 danger was past, it was quite in accordance with human 
 nature, that the suspicions against the King, the Noblesse 
 and the Officers should be renewed in an increased degree; 
 for much as the Jacobins feared war, they derived great 
 advantages from warlike rumours. At every repetition of the 
 assertion, that the Kings were forming a league against 
 freedom, a look of distrust fell upon Louis XVI. Every 
 fear of an attack of the Emigres enhanced the irritation 
 against the aristocratic officers. Foreign propiaganda, hatred 
 of nobility, and military insubordination, acted and reacted 
 upon one another. It was just at this time that the city of 
 Lyons gave an example on a large scale of one of those 
 fraternizations, which at that time so frequently took place; 
 more than 50,000 National Guards, amid festive pageantry, 
 swore fidelity to the Constitution, the National Assembly 
 and the King. This occurrence gave rise to the idea in 
 Paris of vmiting all France by a single oath at a sublime 
 festival, to be celebrated on the anniversary of the storming 
 of the Bastille. It was proposed to assemble representatives 
 of all the Deiaartments, National Guards and other forces, 
 on the Champ de Mars, and thereby to give a new impulse 
 to revolutionary enthusiasm and harmony. The proposition 
 had scarcely been made when it was taken up with the 
 greatest enthusiasm. The King and the National Assembly 
 sanctioned it, and all parties endeavoured beforehand to turn 
 it to their own purposes. The most heterogeneous negocia- 
 tions were brought into connection with it, and, as we may 
 easily conceive, the Jacobins were not behindhand. The 
 foregoing remarks will serve to place the following events in 
 their proper light. 
 
 After the union of the three Orders, and the night of the 
 4th of August, had deprived the Church and the Noblesse of 
 
Ch. in.] FESTIVAL OF FRATERNITY. BARON CLOOTS. 239 
 
 their political privileges, the ancient constitution of the former 
 was on the point of being completely abolished. It seemed 
 therefore nothing more than consistent to proceed in the same 
 way against the second of the ancient Orders — the Noblesse. 
 When this idea was first broached is unknown, but the 
 immediate authors of it, as far as we can see, were the nobly- 
 born chiefs of the Jacobins, Lameth, Aiguillon and St. Far- 
 geau. On this occasion, they had no reason to fear any 
 opposition from Lafayette; he remembered how dangerous 
 the contest on the war question had been to his popularity, 
 and on this point be heartily agreed with all the conclusions 
 of the Jacobins. As early as the 4th July, Mirabeau found 
 him and his more intimate friends full of ardour '^ for the 
 abolition of Nobility and Orders, and he made them feel 
 the force of his derision at their enthusiasm on such a sub- 
 ject. A fortnight later, all the world was full of preparations 
 for the Festival of Fraternity; and on the 19th a deputation 
 from a Committee of Foreigners, was sent up to the National 
 Assembly, to beg for admission to the Festival. Hereupon 
 the Prussian Baron Cloots, as spokesman for the human race, 
 brought a number of persons into the Hall,' dressed in all 
 the national costumes of the theatrical wardrobes in Paris— ^ 
 thundered against the powerful of the earth— introduced the 
 representatives of all nations, and called on France to give 
 the signal for the hberation of two worlds! Loud plaudits 
 arose from all sides, and the President granted the desired 
 permission, under the significant condition that they should 
 make known in their own homes what they had witnessed 
 on the free soil of France. This farce was thought to be a 
 worthy prelude to the proper business of the evening. If 
 foreign nations were present, Lameth said, propriety demanded 
 that the fettered images of conquered nations should be re- 
 
 1 "Tres epouffds." Letter to La and Chaldean were learned Orient- 
 
 Marck s. h. d. — ^ To disprove alists -well known at the Royal 
 
 this Louis Blanc cites a public decla- Library and the College, 
 ration of the Baron, that his Turk 
 
240 FALL OF THE CLERGY AND NOBILITY. [Book II. 
 
 moved from the front of Louis XIV.'s statue. It was time, 
 said another, to banish all marks of pride and arrogance, 
 from a land of natural freedom and equality. All titles of 
 nobility, cried the otherwise unknown deputy Lambel, ought 
 to be abolished. The decisive words had been spoken; La- 
 meth and Lafayette rose together and struggled for the 
 rostra in order to express their emphatic assent. The zealous 
 and at last tumultuous opposition of the Eight was fruitless, 
 and the decree was carried by acclamation, amidst the thun- 
 ders of the galleries. 
 
 We have no intention of repeating here all that may be 
 said ou the subject of this debate, in the case of an ideal, 
 or a newly-founded State. Historical exjierience, the final 
 judge, has decided that in France, or any other old nation, 
 an existing nobility cannot be abolished by a law, but only 
 gradually remodelled by a change of social relations. All 
 that was at that period possible in France, in this respect, 
 was fully attained by opening to merit the way to every 
 honour — by establishing perfect equality before the law and 
 by emancipating the soil. The decree of the 19th of June 
 had, and could have, no other consequences than to increase 
 the number and exasjieration of the enemies of the Eevo- 
 lution. It is in every respect a parallel case with the civil 
 constitution of the Clergy; as the latter, without a shadow 
 of formal or actual right, jjroclaimed the omnipotence of the 
 State over the existing religious belief, — the former did the 
 same with respect to the prevailing notions of morality and 
 honour. However desirable the object of one of these laws 
 may seem to men of anti-catholic views, and the tendency 
 of the other, to the partisans of democracy, there can be no 
 doubt that the National Assembly violated the eternal rule, 
 that the provisions of a law must be adapted to the parti- 
 cular people for whom it is intended, or it will never be 
 regarded by them as a sacred authority. The Noblesse and 
 the Clergy had, up to this time, made a sacrifice of their 
 privileges to the Kevolution, and that, too, not merely on 
 
Ch. III.] CIVIL CONSTITUTION OF THE CLERGY. 241 
 
 compulsion. It was just the most pious of the Bishops, the 
 most honoured of the Parish Priests, and the ablest of the 
 Noblesse, who had taken part in the Revolution with disin- 
 terested enthusiasm. Even those who suffered from its ex- 
 cesses a hundred times acknowledged that they had no right 
 to complain, if their Order now suffered the consequences 
 of its errors. But by the late decrees, these Orders obtained 
 the incalculable power of a good conscience in their contest 
 against the Revolution. Every honourable man amongst 
 them felt himself repelled from a cause, the essential ob- 
 jects of which he had cherished in his heart as much as any 
 of the heroes of the day. Count d'Artois' Emigres had in- 
 deed great reason to rejoice at measures which brought a 
 number of elements into their league, nine-tenths of which 
 would have otherwise defended, at the cost of property and 
 life, the advantages gained on the 14th of July. The Ja- 
 cobins, too, might well rejoice, since they wished to render 
 the re-establishment of any kind of order impossible. But 
 nothing can surpass the blindness of the vain and shallow 
 man, who was for ever talking about order while scattering 
 destruction around him with ostentations good humour; — 
 we mean of course General Lafayette. 
 
 In the midst of all these occurrences, the long debate on 
 the civil constitution of the Clergy was indefatigably carried 
 on. The result was easily foreseen; the discussion ended 
 on the 12th of July, ' in the same spirit in which it had 
 begun, and sealed the civil war in France. 
 
 Two days later, the grand Fraternization of the French 
 People was celebrated. Who would venture to doubt of the 
 patriotic sentiments, and the genuine enthusiasm, of the 
 thousands who had here met together from the Pyrenees, 
 the Rhine, and the Ocean; and saw in their own honest 
 hopes a guarantee for the future! But it would require a 
 more innocent world than that in which we live, to rear a 
 
 ' Adopted by the Assembly as a whole on the 24th July. 
 
242 FALL OF THE CLERGY AND NOBILITY. [Book U. 
 
 State, and close a revolution, with enthusiasm and hopes 
 alone. One fact, however, was clearly and indisputably 
 brought to light on that second 14th of July; that while 
 the acquisition of the former summer — the overthrow of 
 feudalism— was the result of the general agreement, and the 
 most active efforts, of the whole of France, the . impending 
 victories of the anarchical party, on the contrary, could only 
 be rendered possible by the general negligence and weakness 
 of the people. The doctrines of the Parisian democracy had 
 no more place among the ^representatives of the Feast of 
 Fraternity, than they had formerly in the caliiers of the 
 electors. Amidst the general joy and triumph, this party 
 found itself alone; their journals, half enraged and half de- 
 pressed, made the discovery that the festival had been in- 
 vented to spread royalism through France. "It was intended," 
 cried Marat, "to amuse the people with childish games, and 
 then to throw them into chains." — "The Federes," said Lousta- 
 lot, "came to Paris as Spartans, and left it as Sybarites and 
 Helots ;" ^ they had, indeed, gathered round Lafiiyette, and 
 were never weary of shouting "Long live Louis XVI.!" 
 But the democracy had soon reason enough to put away its 
 fears; the dazzling and jubilant festival was soon over, while 
 the strife of parties and the destructive principles and regu- 
 lations remained. New reports continually arose of con- 
 spiracies hostile to freedom; the Jacobins spoke more and 
 more definitely of the impending intervention of the Ger- 
 mans; and day after day the hatred of parties broke out in 
 the National Assembly, in the press, and among the masses 
 of people, with ever-increasing fury. In a placard headed 
 "It is aU over with us," Marat announced the approach of 
 the German armies, which, he said, were favoured by the 
 Court. He demanded the imprisonment of the King and 
 Queen, and the execution of five or six hundred enemies of 
 freedom; whereupon the National Assembly, after a stormy 
 
 ' Rev. de Paris 1790, N. 156. Ami du pevple N. 166. 
 
Ch. ni.] MARAT FOSTERS MUTINY IN THE ARMY. 243 
 
 debate, gave orders for the criminal prosecution of Marat. 
 On the other hand, the Government cansed the Court of the 
 Chatelet to bring forward the results of their investigation 
 of the events of the 6th of October; and the passionate ex- 
 citement of the Assembly rose to the highest pitch, when 
 two members of the House, Qrleans ^"'^ "lY^irnKr-gii wovo 
 designated— with what degree of truth we know — as the 
 originators of the outrage. In the debate which followed, 
 the opposing parties almost came to blows; the Cavaliers of 
 the Right began at the same time systematically to force 
 the leaders of the liberal parties into duels, by insults of 
 every kind; and were, on that account, branded by the oppo- 
 sition press as murderous- banditti. Of far more consequence 
 than these private quarrels — which, though they character- 
 ised the heated feelings of the Assembly, had no practical 
 results — was the circumstance, that in one of the most im- 
 portant institutions of the State — the army — the long existing 
 divisions were infinitely widened and envenomed by the law 
 for the abolition of Nobility. Most of the officers had now 
 really become, what they had been hitherto only suspected,^ 
 of being, decided enemies of the Revolution. "That decree," 
 wrote Mirabeau,^has kindled the torch and forged the 
 weapons of civil war." The increasing anger and self-reli ancj / 
 of the soldiers soon carried them beyond all the bounds of 
 discipline. The democratic jjress did its part, and Marat 
 especially was indefatigable in sti rring up the soldiers to 
 open mutiny, and the murder oitheir treacherous officers. 
 Nor did matters stop at a mere war of words. Intelligence 
 of excesses of ever-increasing atrocity continually arrived in 
 Paris; and demoralization spread in every direction. In one 
 place the soldiers arrested their colonel; in another they 
 drove away a lieutenant; in another a whole garrison refused 
 obedience; and in another several regiments fought out their 
 political quarrels in the streets. However unwilling the 
 Assembly might be to adopt severe measures, they could 
 no longer palliate the dissolute brutality of these proceedings 
 
 Q2 
 
244 FALL OP THE CLERGY AND NOBILITY. [Book II. 
 
 by the love of political freedom. On tl ie fitlu August, they 
 prohibited clubs in the regiments, exhorted the men to a 
 strict observance of the rules of discipline, and ordered an 
 investigation into the management of the regimental chest — 
 vi'hich had been an eternal apple of discord between officers 
 and soldiers. To Mira)jeau]s energetic proposal, that the 
 army should be disbanded and thoroughly remodelled, Marat 
 replied in his journal, by saying that the Parisians ought 
 to erect SOOgallows for the supporters of such a scheme, 
 and hang the infamous traitor Mirajisan on the top of it. 
 When the Assembly perceived in what a darling question 
 of the Parisian demagogues they were about to meddle, they 
 timidly drew back, and allowed the question to drop. A fort- 
 night afterwards the storm broke out. vThree^hole regiments 
 mutinied at Nancy, in consequence of a fresh quarrel about 
 the military chest; and being joined by some armed prole- 
 taries made themselves masters of the town, vwth every pro- 
 spect of being joined by the neighbouring garrisons. Anarchy 
 was now seen in its most brutal and degraded form, as the 
 mere desire of licence without any kind of ideal or political 
 aim. The National Assembly hesitated; for what could de- 
 crees or proclamations do in such a position of affairs? In 
 this case, the matter was decided by the rapidity and energy 
 of General Bouille, an able and courageous officer, who had 
 acquired a brillant reputation in the American war by his 
 defence of the French Antilles in 1778. In spite of his strict 
 military habits, he had won the affections even of the ci- 
 tizens in the garrison town of Metz, by his firmness and 
 resolution. ' After the Government and the National Assem- 
 bly had ordered the suppression of the revolt, he collected 
 all the trustworthy troops in the province — composed chiefly 
 of Germans, Swiss, and cavalry regiments — which, with a 
 few hundred National Guards, made up a force of about 
 3000 men. Having intimidated a portion of the rebels by 
 
 ' Poisson, I, 248. 
 
Ch. III.] MILITARY EEORGANIZATION. 245 
 
 his proud and calm superiority, he overthrew the rest with 
 terrible carnage; one of the mutinous regiments was utterly 
 destroyed with the exception of JiO«-«ien. 
 
 The National Assembly, who saw that the popular move- 
 ment had got beyond their control, passed a vote of thanks . 
 to the Ge neral in spite of the opposition of Robespierre. 
 But beforetheir own doors, and under the windflWsof the 
 Tuileries, the mob was raging, demanding with wild cries 
 the dismissal of the blood-stained Ministers, and proclaiming 
 a new and grander Revolution. 
 
 The National Assembly too quickly returned to its old 
 tracks. The above mentioned catastrophe quickened the de- 
 sire for some legal organization, and here, too, the mistrust 
 of every thing which could give power or influence to the 
 Government decided their course. It is true that the code 
 of discipline, which was completed on the 14th . of September, 
 was composed throughout of sensible regulations. But there 
 were two other decrees calculated to undermine afresh the 
 order which had been established under the influence of 
 momentary fear. By one of these the greatest part of the 
 patronage was taken out of the hands of the King, and 
 only the nomination of the Marshals .and ConnngjiiieM-TiP- 
 chief was left to him. In the^ ^er jrrad es. length of ser- 
 vice was to decide in the majority of cases; while the nomi- 
 nation of a new non-commissioned officer was left to the 
 other non-commissioned officers of the company, who pre- 
 sented the ablest man of the ranks to the CaptaJJt-and the J 
 Colonel. They had not yet been quite able to resort to the 
 method of simple election in all grades, from the lowest 
 to the highest, and had, meanwhile, mixed^m^^ll kinds 
 of entirely incompatible systems. The secoif^ decree re- 
 lated to the military courts. According to this, only mili- 
 tary ofi'ences were to be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of 
 the civil judges; every indictment or information was to be 
 signed by the plaintiff; the charge as well as the sentence 
 to be agreed upon by a special jury; the juries to be formed 
 
246 FALL OF THE CLERGY AND NOBILITY. [Book II. 
 
 of members of all grades, down to that of the defen- 
 dant, which was to be doubly represented; and lastly, the 
 jurors were to be takeri from niembers of all grades, in 
 regular succession. It was utterly impossible theryfoi'ii' for 
 tho higher authorities to exercise the slightest influence on 
 the formation of the court. * "' 
 
 We may easily conceive, from what has been said, that 
 though for the present no mutiny occurred like that of 
 Nancy, there was no security for the steadiness and trust- 
 worthiness of the army. No colonel could answer for the 
 loyalty and good order of his troops, with the exception of 
 the German and Swiss mercenaries. Moreover, the material 
 as well as the moral excellence of the army declined. It 
 is true, indeed, that in the course of the autumn and winter 
 a new military organization in all its details was decreed : 
 and the principles on which it was founded have maintained 
 a lasting authority. The privileged corps — the old names of 
 regiments — their merely nominal commanders, — the differences 
 in the regulations for different divisions of the army, and 
 the numerous evils in the form of its previous administra- 
 tion, — were all done away with. But the difficulties of the 
 new state of things were not relieved. It was in vain that 
 the Minister at war, De la Tour, represented to the Assem- 
 bly that the army only numbered 124,000 men, — the anarchy 
 of the last 15 months having caused a deficit of more than 
 30,000; that the 84 million francs, which had been allotted 
 to the military budget, were entirely insufficient, especially 
 since the very reasonable increase of pay for non-commis- 
 sioned officers and privates, which had begun on the 1st of 
 May.' The National Assembly might give their orders re- 
 specting arms and ecpiipments, they might make the necessary 
 grants, and place them at the disposal of the Minister; but 
 
 ^ A very complete compilation from consulted by later French writers 
 
 the minutes in the Tableau de la nearly as much as it deserves. Further 
 
 Guerre de la Revolution, Paris 1803 particulars iu Poisson, I. 304. 
 I. 147 — a book which has not been 
 
Ch. III.] BURKE PROPHESIES A MILITARY DESPOTISM. 247 
 
 what was the use of all their decrees, while the Treasury- 
 was empty, while the Minister was dispirited by the ever- 
 increasing hostility of the Assembly, and checked at every 
 step in all his measures by the insubordination of all the 
 authorities ? 
 
 The army was now irrevocably ^alienats dJErom the King, 
 and from any reaction which might have been attempted 
 through him. To attain this end the demagogues had de- 
 moralized it, rendered it unserviceable against street riots 
 and outbreaks among the peasantry, and even made its 
 fitness for a foreign war very doubtful. If, however, some 
 gifted General should succeed in uniting and re-animating 
 its crumbling an* decaying masses, they would then 
 acknowledge no other authority than that of their favourite 
 leader. By their military measures, the National Assembly\ 
 left the French people no other c hoice , than that between 
 military de.^ncelessness and military dictatorship. It is 
 doubly easy for us, of course, to confirm this judgment from,/ 
 the result, but even then the Assembly was not left with- 
 out a warning. Edmund Burke, the most gifted of the 
 English whigs, who from the beginning of the Revolution 
 had energetically proclaimed the causes of its failure, fore- 
 told in October 1790, that it would end in an unconditional 
 military despotism. 
 
248 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book II. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. 
 
 Socialist disturbances. — New issues of paper money. — New system or 
 TAXATION. — Deficit. — Gkowth of the national debt. — Disordee op 
 affairs in the rural districts. — Jacquerie. — Parcelling out of the 
 
 LARGE domains.— AdMINISTR.ATION OF PARIS. — AtELIERS NATIONAUX. — 
 
 Distribution of bread to the people. — Brieftrosperity of manufac- 
 tures. — Unions among the workmen. — Compulsory raising of wages. — 
 Interference of national assembly. — Agitation. 
 
 A religious war and military riots were not all that the 
 summer of 1790 brovight with it. To complete the picture 
 of the maladies which raged through the wide kingdom of 
 France, we must include risings among the workmen, and 
 the insurrection of the peasants. It is, perhaps, the most 
 important defect of the histories of the Revolution, that they 
 preserve a deep silence with regard to these occurrences, so 
 that for a long time the proposition was universally received, 
 that the last century only aimed at political changes; — that 
 it was not until the present century that a social revolution 
 was attempted, and that the originator of the socialist move- 
 ment in France was Babreuf. In the last few years, however, 
 a clearer insight into these matters has been obtained, and 
 several writers have asserted that at any rate the extreme 
 Communists had their prototypes in the Jacobin period of 
 the great Revolution. But, in the first place, the external 
 history of the Revolution would not be sufficiently cleared 
 up by looking at it from this point of view; and in the 
 second, this assertion is in itself far too limited. All the 
 other phases of modern Socialism had likewise their re- 
 presentatives in the last century ; and beside the Communists 
 
Ch- IV. COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM. 249 
 
 proper— who desired to transfer everykind of property to the 
 State — we find another party of equal importance who, while 
 they recognised the rights of private property, wished to 
 give the State the actual disposal of it by indirect means. 
 We might even assert that there is not a single proposition 
 of the modern Communistic and Socialistic schools, which 
 was overlooked in the year 1790; all that is new in 
 the last ten years consists in the theoretical proofs and 
 philosophical embelhshment of the system. The earlier 
 period of which we are speaking is in every respect 
 instructive to those who would study its efiects; we shall 
 therefore enter somewhat into detail, because, from this time 
 forward, there is no important point of the revolutionary 
 history which is not afiected by the principles of Communism 
 and Sociahsm. 
 
 When, in the Spring of 1790, the Jacobins declared the 
 Revolution still incomplete, and laboured to keep up the 
 disturbances, there were only two pretexts by which they 
 could gain a following in the country favourable to their wishes. 
 
 One of these was the fear of reaction. Many honest men 
 believed that though they were for the moment free enough, 
 they must not allow breathing time to the King, or he would 
 immediately crush their liberties again. The number of these 
 suspicious persons was large, but their activity was not con- 
 siderable, because at the bottom of their hearts they earnestly 
 desired the restoration of order. 
 
 But there were others, and these the most energetic, 
 who understood by the word liberty, the opposite of all 
 government — that is, the power of satisfying every appetite 
 and passion of the heart. In their eyes the Revolution was 
 incomplete as long as any constitution whatever existed in 
 authoritative force; and they regarded every one as reactionary, 
 who endeavoured to establish any constitutional government. 
 These views, the fruits of which we have seen more than 
 enough of in the field of politics, were of course most loudly 
 expressed in regard to politico-economical and social afi'airs ; 
 
250 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS [Book II. 
 
 for it is in these that the most unruly impulses of the heart 
 — vanity, hunger, and love of pleasure, have their proper 
 element. In questions of politics in the narrower sense, in 
 the forms and powers of government, only the higher passion 
 of ambition is concerned, or those ideal aims, which can 
 only rouse the educated man to great excitement. But the 
 great masses of the lower orders, who alone can give to 
 revolutions their volcanic power, require simpler and stronger 
 stimulants to exertion. There has never been a great revolu- 
 tion that was not either social or religious. 
 
 The grand principle of the year 1789 was freedom of labour 
 and of property— equality of State-protection for every work- 
 man and every proprietor. Every thing is concluded in this; 
 for if any one wished to add the fraternal union of the 
 workmen, he would immediately remember that such an 
 association can only be the free act of individuals, if it is 
 to remain fraternal and advantageous. This principle was 
 acted upon in the very first month of the National Assem- 
 bly; — partly in the decrees of the 4th of August, and partly in 
 the permission given to lend out money on interest, by 
 which the operations of the money market received their 
 first legal sanction in France. By these decrees the State 
 renounced the right of interference in matters of production 
 and trade; and the system of free competition, of laisser 
 faire and laisser aller, was established in France for all future 
 time. These principles were the very opposite to those of 
 Feudalism. The latter regarded political power as the private 
 property of each successive possessor; which, consequently, 
 he was at liberty to use, like any other property, for his 
 private purposes ; and by which he could employ the labour 
 of others to his own advantage. The consequence in France 
 had been the exhaustion of the lower classes for the benefit 
 of the higher ; and the final result, destitution on one side and 
 demoralisation on the other. These evils were so glaringly 
 palpable that they induced the National Assembly to overthrow 
 the system at once. Unfortunately however a development 
 
Ch. IV.] COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM. 251 
 
 took place at the same moment, the consequences of which 
 might prove to the modern opponents of free labour the 
 universal validity of the principles they repudiate. France 
 was about to gain the experience, that every deviation from 
 these principles is punished with equal severity, whether 
 it proceeds from a desire to favour the Prince or the 
 Noblesse, the Capitalist or the Proletary. 
 
 No sooner had it been proclaimed, that the possessor of 
 political power must no longer enrich himself at the cost 
 of the people, than the hungry masses remembered that they 
 themselves were now in possession of it. Instead, therefore, 
 of merely denying the principle of Feudalism, they thought 
 of reversing it. If political power had hitherto served to 
 increase the property of the rich, it seemed no more than 
 fair that it should now bring similar advantages to the poor. 
 They therefore claimed not merely freedom of labour, that 
 every man might gain his bread — but equal enjoyments, for 
 which the State must be responsible, even without labour. 
 The State must for the future be strong enough, on the 
 one side, to make itself master of all property with a view 
 of distributing it, and, on the other, to open the access to 
 power widely enough to secure to every proletary the realiza- 
 tion of his particular desires. We have seen that this last 
 demand was fuUy satisfied by the decrees of 1790, since 
 the meanest day labourer possessed greater authority than 
 his Mayor, and the latter far greater power than the Minister 
 of State. But still the enfranchised classes were of some 
 consequence in the country; the laws of meiim and tuum 
 still existed, and many a hard struggle must be gone through 
 before the ideal state of universal enjoyment could be realized. 
 This was the real meaning of the question, whether the 
 Kevolution was to be completed or closed at once. 
 
 The National Assembly assumed a similar attitude towards 
 the social, as they had previously done to the political 
 question. They were fa» from wishing to do what the ex- 
 treme Left required of them, and rejected the community of 
 
252 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book IL 
 
 goods as decidedly as the Republic. But they allowed them- 
 selves to be misled by a false idea of political and politico- 
 economical freedom, to premises, from which the demo- 
 cratic and social Republic — -the arbitrary rule of the proletary, 
 and consequently the destruction of property — were deduced 
 with logical necessity. 
 
 We have seen their first financial operations, and their 
 unsatisfactory results. The first year of the Revolution 
 closed with arrears in the income to the amount of 177 mil- 
 lions; and each of the last months of 1790 left a deficit of 
 more than 30 millions. The assignats, fabricated in April, 
 had already been spent before the end of August, and no 
 new resources could be any where discovered. Mirabeau now 
 played the same game, on a larger scale and with more 
 hazardous audacity, as in the previous November. Necker's 
 Ministry was at its last gasp, despised by almost every 
 party, and bitterly hated by the Parisian mob since the af- 
 fair of Nancy. Mirabeau hoped for a speedy change, and 
 the appointment of his own friends; the Court seemed ready 
 to accept his services, and Lafayette, too, showed himself 
 more accommodating than ever. With a similar prospect in 
 view, Mirabeau had suggested the creation of paper money 
 in November, and now, again, he did not hesitate to resort 
 to the last desperate expedient of a new issue of assignats. 
 He wrote to the Queen, that no one could answer for the 
 result, but that it was the only course possible. A declara- 
 tion of national bankruptcy appeared to him more dangerous 
 than even civil war, which he considered as virtually com- 
 menced. He thought that a domestic war would revive all 
 the strongest and best qualities of mankind at the same time 
 as the more terrible passions, while bankruptcy, which would 
 cause a revolt of all the destitute, could do nothing but in- 
 flame the most brutal appetites and passions. There was, 
 under the circumstances, a fearful truth in these remarks; 
 but it was just as true that any oiifi-sided financial measure, 
 unaccompanied by the re-establishment of order, might, in- 
 
Ch. IV.] FRESH ISSUE OF ASSI6NATS. 253 
 
 deed, defer tlie bankruptcy, but only to make it doubly 
 disastrous in the end. Mirabeau therefore was just as urgent 
 for a change of Ministry, as for an issue of assignats; and 
 Necker did in fact resign his post on the 10th September, 
 unregretted by any party, but not without an energetic 
 warning against the assignats. The partizans of the new issue 
 had great difficulties to contend with in the Assembly, since 
 the great Parisian capitalists seconded with all their influence 
 the protest of the Right and the disinclination of Lafayette. 
 Mirabeau nevertheless succeeded in [carrying his motion by 
 the end of the month. The Jacobins were on his side in 
 this question; but that which outweighed all other considera- 
 tions was the wiU of the Parisian population, who looked 
 upon the new paper money as a fructifying shower from 
 Heaven. The Assembly ordered that 800 millions of new 
 assignats should be fabricated, and employed in the liqui- 
 dation of the national debt — but that more than 1200 millions 
 should never be put into circulation. 
 
 But if Mirabeait supposed that he had secured an Ad- 
 ministration which he could look ujJon as his own, he was 
 quickly undeceived. In the first place Lafayette completely 
 deserted him, and in important legislative questions joined 
 the Jacobins against Mirabeau. Then several tumults oc 
 curred in Paris, by which the Court was rendered once 
 more entirely dependent on Lafayette. The Ministers te- 
 naciously adhered to their posts^ and when at last Mirabeau, 
 without consulting the Court, dispersed them on the 21st of 
 October by a crushing motion of entire want of confidence, ' 
 it was Lafayette who, after much hesitation, was empowered 
 to name their successors. Things went on therefore in the 
 same futile and procrastinating manner; and in a short time 
 it was easy to see that the 800 millions would soon go the 
 
 1 His letters to I* Marck show that removal of the Ministiy. but the 
 
 he was the author of the proposition, debate had so great an effect that 
 
 It is true that the National Assembly in fourteen days the Cabinet was 
 
 rejected the formal motion for the broken up. 
 
254 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. ' [Book II. 
 
 way of their predecessors. Every body felt this and was 
 filled with anxiety. It was repeatedly declared from the rostra 
 that a new financial period must commence with the first of 
 January; and thus at last they arrived at the oft promised 
 reform of the entire system of taxation. 
 
 As a basis for the new system, they endeavoured to 
 ascertain the actual amount required by the State; which 
 after long discussions was fixed at 580 millions for the Cen- 
 tral Government, and 60 millions for the Departments; and 
 besides this, 76 millions for extraordinary expenses for the 
 year 1791; — i. e., at a sum, about 100 millions less than the 
 budget of the ancien regime, including the tithes. But un- 
 fortunately these figures were for the most part fallacious. 
 They reckoned, e. g., for the interest of the National debt and 
 the pensions of the Clergy, only 302 millions, which was 
 probably about 30 millions too little. They reckoned the cost 
 of collecting the taxes at only 8 millions, whereas at the 
 rate of only 6 per cent on the gross receipts, it would have 
 amounted to 31 millions. The vote for the Church was 
 reduced to 67 millions; for the Army from 99 to 89 millions; 
 for the pensions from 29 to 12 millions; — sums, with which 
 the State affairs could not be carried on at all, or only with 
 open injustice and the most injurious consequences. But they 
 wished, at any price, to avoid the confession that the burden 
 of taxation had been increased by the Revolution; they did 
 not choose to give such a triumph to the Right, and they 
 did not think the peopile capable of calculating that the 
 resources of the nation would be increased by the 4th of 
 August 1789 in a still greater degree than its expenditure. 
 They therefore went on building on the false fouudation, and 
 thereby at the same time perpetuated the previous disorder 
 of the finances. 
 
 640 millions must be procured for the regular service of 
 the State. Of this sum the national domains were to con- 
 tribute 60 millions, the State forests 15 millions, the salt 
 pools 5 millions, and an instalment of the American debt 
 
Ch. IV.] PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION. 255 
 
 4 millions. The observation was made that the national 
 domains, under the wretehed management of the Communal 
 authorities, would yield at most only 40 millions; but this 
 seemed a matter of little moment, since the item was only a 
 transient one, and the sale of the domaias would for the 
 future strike off many millions from the burden of debt. 
 They further reckoned as a part of the regular income — and 
 that, too, without hesitation or opposition — 32 millions, the 
 value of half the stock of salt and tobacco which the State still 
 had in its warehouses from a former period; although there 
 
 way, 
 
 was no intention of renewing that stock. In the same 
 
 a 
 
 they set down 34 millions as a part of the patriotic income, 
 tax of September, 1789, although this impost was likewise to 
 end in the following year! By deducting these sums — in all 
 about 148 millions — they were able to afford themselves the 
 pleasure of announcing to the nation a reduction of taxes to 
 less than 500 millions, and of leaving it to their successors 
 to manage with this diminished income as they could. 
 
 The important question still remained in what manner the 
 500 or rather 492 millions should be distributed. 
 
 The old system was one in which the lower classes were 
 drained for the advantage of their privileged rulers. The 
 means employed were, a very complicated Administration, 
 which gave room for the most arbitrary caprice in the col- 
 lection of the taxes; — an unequal distribution of the direct 
 taxes, which consisted mainly in a heavy poll-tax on the 
 poor; — and lastly, a very heavy impost on the most simple 
 and necessary articles of consumption. 
 
 The principles of the 4th of August required that all classes 
 should be called on to contribute, according to a fair estimate, 
 to the necessities of the State. All experience, however, has 
 shown that this can only be done by a judicious union of 
 direct and indirect taxation; for the estimate and collection 
 of each can only be carried out with tolerable completeness 
 in particular classes of the people, and particular departments 
 of business. Directly therefore we seek to supply the ne- 
 
256 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAI.RS. [Book IL 
 
 cessities of the State from the one or the other exclusively, 
 we necessarily deal unequally and unfairly with the different 
 sources of the national income. Direct taxes are naturally 
 best adapted to easily recognised capital, and therefore to 
 landowners, officials and men of independent income. The 
 poor man, on the contrary, cannot escape taxes on consump- 
 tion, and these, therefore, are best suited to the populations 
 of towns, in which surveillance may be most easily and safely 
 exercised. In any political commotion, when a cry is raised 
 for the reduction of taxes on consumption, we may be sure 
 that the working classes of the towns — or the demagogues 
 who make use of them — are at the head of it; just as, on 
 the contrary, the rule of landowners is sure to lead to a 
 system of indirect taxation. Thus England, in the last cen- 
 tury, gradually reduced the land tax to a 36th part of the 
 revenue of the State ; but has subsequently seen herself com- 
 pelled, by the daily increasing influence of her working clas- 
 ses, to give up a large portion of the taxes on consumption, 
 and to substitute an income tax. It is therefore thoroughly 
 consistent when the modern democratic systems — which look 
 exclusively to the mass of city workmen — will hear of nothing 
 else but an income tax, and entirely reject all indirect taxa- 
 tion. They are, indeed, entirely justified in their opposition 
 to certain portions of existing systems of taxation, more 
 especially to protective duties, which are an abuse of the 
 principle of indirect taxation to the injury of the State and 
 the enrichment of a few privileged persons. But the halo 
 of philanthropy which has been thrown around them, is un- 
 real and deceitful. It sounds well to say that the expenses of 
 the State should be defrayed from the superfluities of the rich, 
 and not from the necessaries of the jjoor; but as long as 
 superfluity and necessity are relative notions, the. State must 
 be just before it can compel third persons to be charitable. 
 It is consistent with justice, that the small artisan should 
 pay as much as the peasant owner of land, and that both 
 should be taxed according to their means; as the millionnaire 
 
Ch. IV.] AGITATION AGAINST INDIEECT TAXES. 257 
 
 to his; — but uot that both the rich man and the peasant 
 should be ordered to provide and keep in order the whole 
 State machinery for the workman of the city, who contri- 
 butes nothing to its support. This can never become lawful, 
 until the State denies entirely the right of private property, 
 — assumes the management of every kind of possession — 
 and then bestows upon its darlings as much as their hearts 
 desire. 
 
 In the France of old times, indeed, neither town nor land 
 was in any way favoured ; the mode of collecting all the im- 
 posts was so tyrannical, that the indirect taxes weighed upon 
 the peasant owners as much as the direct taxes on the 
 artisans. Both were therefore abolished by the movement 
 of 1789. But now that a new system was to be created, 
 free from fiscal caprice, the natural interests of different 
 classes were energetically put forward. The more influential 
 the humbler classes throughout the kingdom had been made 
 by the changes of 1790; and, above all, the greater the pres- 
 sure the Parisians could bring to bear on the decrees of the 
 National Assembly; the louder was the cry for the abolition 
 of the indirect taxes. In this agitation the democratic turn 
 which the Revolution was taking miglit be most clearly 
 traced. 
 
 The most hateful of all the taxes was the gabelle, and it 
 fell a sacrifice to the fury of the people in the summer of 
 1789. When the Assembly, in their pecuniary embarrass- 
 ment, expressed the intention of removing this impost, but 
 continued to levy it until some substitute had been found, 
 the province of Anjou declared that it would hinder every 
 attempt at collecting it with a force of 60,000 armed men. 
 The people of Anjou received promises of support from all 
 quarters; the Assembly therefore submitted to what was 
 inevitable, and gave up without further resistance the 60 mil- 
 lions derived from the salt tax. This was soon followed by 
 the aboHtion of three smaller duties on hair-powder, leather and 
 iron — yielding together about 9 millions. As a substitute for 
 
 I. E 
 
258 POLTTICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book II. 
 
 these, an extraordinary direct tax of 50 millions was imposed 
 for 1790, but of which not a single farthing ever entered the 
 Treasury. At that time, however, the coflfers of the State 
 were replenished for the moment by the first assignats; and 
 the Government therefore proceeded in the same direction. 
 The royalty on tobacco — yielding 27 millions,— and the wine 
 and spirit duties— yielding 50 millions— were successively 
 repealed. It was in vain that some of the more prudent 
 deputies raised their warning voices; they were told that 
 tobacco was, after all, smuggled into the country, and the 
 duty on liquors left unpaid. The advocates of abolition tri- 
 umphed and had, moreover, the satisfaction of giving the 
 death-stroke to the detested company of the Fermiers Ge- 
 neraux and Hegisseurs. 
 
 ■ We are informed by writers that the Assembly was guided 
 in these measures by the doctrines of the Physiocrates, 
 according to which all taxes are, in the end, borne by the 
 soil, and every duty and octj'oi is only an expensive and 
 circuitous road to the object in view, and, at the same 
 time, a useless bar to intercourse. In fact these propositions 
 had been frequently and warmly discussed for thirty years. 
 In the present day it is unnecessary to refute them, and all 
 the more so, for our purpose, because the alleged influence 
 of this doctrine upon the events of the Revolution was, in 
 reality, very small. That which decided the National Assem- 
 bly in their decrees was not the opinions of any school of 
 political economists, but the political pressure exercised by 
 the proletaries. The indirect taxes were retained in all cases 
 where the sovereign people of the capital did not raise its 
 mighty voice against them ; e. g. the old duties for registering 
 legal proceedings were not only left untouched, but raised 
 from 40 to 51 in number; and a further stamp tax to the 
 amount of 22 millions was added. We may easily under- 
 stand that the men of the Palais Royal, and the Faubourg 
 St. Antoine, had no direct interest in these imposts. Still 
 more significant is the course which was taken by the 
 
Ch. IV.] THE OCTROI. 259 
 
 question of city octrois. These yielded, chiefly from meal 
 and wine, 70 milUons in the whole of France, of which 
 46 millions went to the State, and 24 to the towns and 
 hospitals; and in Paris alone, 24 millions for the State and 
 13 millions for the city and hospitals. One would have 
 supposed that the physiocrates and democrats, would have 
 been especially zealous for the abolition of this impost, and 
 it is with astonishment that we find it, at the end of 1790, 
 still figuring unopposed in the budget for the following year. 
 The reason of this was, that the proceeds of the octroi 
 formed an indispensable portion of the income of the city, and 
 as long as the Municipality did not propose its abolition, no 
 one in the Assembly ventured to lay hands upon it. It was 
 not until the Commune — no longer able to resist the desires 
 of the lower classes in the troubled months of the Spring 
 of 1791 — itself demanded the removal of this impost, that it 
 was unhesitatingly abolished; and even then the State was 
 obliged to pay an indemnity of 3 millions to the city. To 
 such an extent was the sovereignty of the people of Paris 
 established over France, that the landowners had to sacrifice 
 46 millions to the National Exchequer and 3 millions more 
 to the Parisian Municipality, in order that the artisan of 
 Paris might pay 4 sous less for his bottle of wine. 
 
 Again, the lottery, which produced 10 millions, was, with 
 the most glaring inconsistency, allowed to continue, because 
 it was said the Treasury could not do without it. Of this 
 barren and demoralising tax, too, Paris paid the greatest 
 part; but Paris loved gaming as much as drinking, and there- 
 fore consistently demanded the maintenance of the lottery, 
 and the abolition of the octroi. 
 
 This predominance of the capital had a more beneficial 
 effect, in the then existing state of commerce, on the deci- 
 sion of the important question of duties. There was never 
 any doubt of the propriety of doing away with the customs 
 which separated the different Provinces, and a thorough re- 
 modelling of the scale of frontier duties seemed absolutely 
 
 r2 
 
260 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book n. 
 
 necessary. In the National Assembly, the advocates of free- 
 trade and the upholders of commercial protection, nearly bal- 
 anced each other. This was clearly seen during the debate on the 
 management of the East India trade, in which even Mirabeau 
 could not completely carry out the more liberal principles 
 against the protectors of the national industry. It was for- 
 tunate that Paris was not, at that time, so essentially a 
 manufacturing place as it now is, and that its population, 
 therefore, looked rather to the fiscal than the protectionist 
 side of the system of duties. The people wished for low 
 duties, and therefore the tariff was on the whole moderate. 
 But they were still far from entirely abandoning the mer- 
 cantile system; in general they adhered to the principles 
 which Calonne had formerly expounded to the Notables, and 
 contented themselves with expunging from the old tariff its 
 numerous irregularities and its vuifairness. There were some, 
 but very few, prohibitive duties, and these founded for the 
 most part on political and police considerations. The pro- 
 duce of these taxes to the Exchequer was reckoned as here- 
 tofore at a total of 22 millions. 
 
 Reckoning altogether, we find that the Ministry had given 
 up 170 millions of the former taxes on consumption, and 
 retained 110 millions of indirect taxes, such as registration 
 duties, stamps, posts (12 millions), tolls, lottery and some 
 smaller sources of revenue. As the domains, &c., were ex- 
 pected to yield 148 millions, there still remained .382 millions 
 to be raised by direct taxes, to cover the regular expendi- 
 ture of 640 millions. On this subject difficult and toilsome 
 negociations took place, since it soon became evident that a 
 crushing weight of taxation had been laid upon the land- 
 owners. Meanwhile the guilds had been abolished accord- 
 ing to the decrees of the 4th of August, and freedom of 
 labour proclaimed; but the traders and artisans of every 
 class were now obliged to take out a patent every year, ac- 
 cording to a moderate scale, from which an income of 22 
 millions was expected. In addition to this, there was a poll- 
 
Ch. IV.] EXCESSIVE TAXATION OF LANDOWNERS. 261 
 
 tax, or personal tax, which was partly struck out, but only 
 in the case of salaries, wages, furniture or annual dividends. 
 That it was not considerable, may be seen from the sum 
 total, which was only 60 millions; and it is equally clear 
 that the non-possessors suffered but little from it, since it is 
 universally allowed that in many wealthy departments of 
 the country, there was not a single farmer who was rated 
 as high as 30 livres. There remained then a sum of 300 mil- 
 lions to be levied on the possessors of land — an amount of 
 which it was immediately prophesied that it could not be 
 raised, and whose disproportion to the other parts of the 
 budget need not be pointed out. But in this case, the phy- 
 siocratical theory, and the influence of the Parisian dema- 
 gogues, worked together with irresistible force. It was proved 
 to the possessors of land by arithmetic, that they would 
 have paid more before 1789, and all further objections, were 
 cut short by a reference to the imperative necessities of the 
 State. An order was given for the raising of the 300 mil- 
 lions, of which 60 were to be spent by the different de- 
 partments themselves, and 240 handed over to the Exchequer. 
 This amount was, in itself, sufficient to overburden the tax- 
 payers; but besides this, the distribution and collection of it 
 were arranged in a manner equally inconvenient tot he indi- 
 vidual and the treasury. It was in vain that Cazales urged 
 that each piece of land should be valued once for all, and the 
 tax fixed accordingly. Instead of this, it was arranged that 
 a fifth of the net produce of every year should be paid, and 
 that the ratings should be constantly regulated accordingly. 
 The rating of each individual, therefore, was continually 
 changing, and a wide field remained open to the exertions 
 and the caprice of the controllers of taxes. These were 
 the Directors of Departments and Districts, under whose 
 superintendence the Municipal councils had to prepare, and 
 annually revise, the rolls of tax-payers. But the former 
 lacked connexion and authority, and the latter, time, calm- 
 ness and knowledge of business; the work, therefore, had 
 
262 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book 11. 
 
 scarcely been ordered and begun when it every where came 
 to a stand-still. And thus the political parties soon took 
 possession of the whole affair; the favourites of those in 
 power got off scot-free, while their opponents might be 
 ground to the dust without finding any means of redress. 
 Here too, as in all such cases, disorder went hand in hand 
 with caprice, anarchy with tyranny, and both with poverty. 
 The direct taxes were rendered just as futile by these in- 
 fluences, as the indirect by the Parisian demagogues. 
 
 To recapitulate; the regular expenditure was reckoned at 
 least 50 millions too low, and for the extraordinary expenses — 
 which, by the Avay, were estimated at 76 millions, — not the 
 slightest provision was made. Every thing was struck out 
 of the revenue which did not suit, the wishes of the Parisian 
 proletaries, and one of the best-informed deputies prophe- 
 cied a falling off of at least 100 millions in the proceeds of 
 the direct taxes; in all, a deficit of more than 220 millions 
 on a budget of 640 millions. This was to be the new order 
 of things, by which the people with mutual congratulations 
 and praises hoped to give firmness and solidity to the Na- 
 tional finances, and, thereby, new life and vigour to the State. 
 
 But this was by no means all; for the National debt had 
 grown in the same ratio as the deficit. With regard to the 
 starting point of the whole Kevolution — vis. the floating and 
 over-due debts of the ancien regime — these were far from 
 being liquidated, in spite of all the assignats. Of the over- 
 due capitals as little was now said as in Necker's first bud- 
 get; these amounted, in May 1789, to 52 millions; at the 
 end of 1790 to 107 millions; in September 1791 and at the 
 close of the first National Assembly to 120 millions. No 
 one took any notice of them or of the debts of the different 
 Ministries — amounting to 120 millions. The anticipations — 
 which, as we have seen, had risen in May 1789, to 271 mil- 
 lions, — were discussed with noisy zeal, and their liquidation 
 was ordered more than once; but on the 1st of February 
 1791, 50 millions of them still remained, and these had even 
 
Ch.IV.] increase of the public debt. 263 
 
 increased to 60 on the 1st of October. This was the state 
 of the old debt, to which the Revohition had added another 
 still greater. As, under the ancien regime, all offices and 
 privileges had been at once hereditary and saleable, the price 
 of every office that was abolished, had to be returned to 
 the possessor; and the number of such offices was infinite. 
 Their exact value has never been established, and the dif- 
 ferent estimates vary in an incredible manner. Necker states 
 the price of the judicial offices at 350 millions; the next 
 Minister of Finance, Ramel, at 492 millions; the National 
 Assembly at 800 millions. Besides these there were the 
 offices in the General administration — the caution money of 
 the Fermiers Genercmx and tax-collectors, — a few posts at 
 Court and in the army — and the different guilds and trade pri- 
 vileges. The sum total of these new debts was reckoned at 
 1430 millions^ — bearing an annual interest of about 72 millions. 
 It would be unjust to make this increase of the public bur- 
 dens — as the Royalists at that period did with malicious 
 joy — a ground of accusation against the Revolution. The 
 whole weight of reproach falls entirely on the old Govern- 
 ment, which had raised] money at the cost of its subjects 
 by the sale of offices, and thereby eaten away, to a vast 
 extent, the germs of future prosperity. The Revolution 
 might, perhaps, have spared a third of that sum by greater, 
 moderation and deliberation in its reforms. But, in the ma- 
 jority of cases, an energetic and radical mode of preceding, 
 was both a necessity and a gain; and the only charge which 
 can be fairly brought against the National Assembly — a damn- 
 ing one, certainly — is that such an overburdening of the 
 finances did not give them a stronger impulse towards eco- 
 
 ' Montesquieu's Report of Sept. we get the above-mentioned sum. 
 
 9. 91. He tliere enumerates them Ramel, Des Finances en Tan /X, p. 49, 
 
 together with the old arrears of the reckons — including the arrears of the* 
 
 Ministries — the rest of the anticipations Ministries (139 millions) — 1304 mil- 
 
 ^and the capital fallen due ; if we lions sommes exigibles, and 12 millions 
 
 take them ont of this long list aommes en rentes. 
 
264 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book II. 
 
 nomy, moderation and order. It was, properly, for the 
 liquidation of these very debts that the assignats were de- 
 signed; and yet the continuance of anarchy constantly ren- 
 dered it necessary to defray the current expenses with this 
 paper money. The issue of September was exhausted in 
 June 1791, and thus a total of 1200 millions had been con- 
 sumed. Of this sum only 108 millions ' had been employed 
 in the liquidation of the debt— 416^ in the payment of anti- 
 cipations and arrears of interest — and 476 millions in the 
 current expenses of Government. ' 
 
 Such a result was calculated to excite the greatest con- 
 sternation. On the supposition that it would redeem the issue 
 of paper money by the sale of the national domains, the 
 State had given away nearly 700 millions, — i. e. a yearly 
 income of about 30 millions, — without obtaining the smallest 
 lasting advantage for itself Whether the sale of public lands 
 would increase the prosperity of individuals, and thereby 
 indirectly the wealth of the whole State, was at that time 
 more than doubtful; at the present day we have clearly as- 
 certained that the advantages and disadvantages of the sale 
 completely balanced one another, and that the true progress 
 of French agriculture was not owing to it, but solely to the 
 night of the 4th of August. But another subject of con- 
 templation presses itself upon our notice. The disorder of 
 the finances, the emptiness of the Exchequer, the democratic 
 and socialistic claims on the public purse, continued; and 
 
 ' Montesquieu's Report, Sec. 5, lions of anticipations (Montesquieu's 
 remboursements. From which it ap- report of Sept. 9), 80 millions arrears 
 pears, that the Bureau of Assignats of Rentes up to Jan. 1. 1791 — and 
 had paid — up to January 1st 1791 — 140 millions in Feb. 1791.— 60 mil- 
 47 millions of terminable loans fallen lions of a«fo'o(/)a<io«s, were left unpaid, 
 due, besides the 221 millions of ' And notwithstanding all this, there 
 an<(cipafa'ons, and 2 8 millions of arrears were 20 vaxWioTis arriere des departe- 
 of ground-rents. Up to the end of moite in the year 1790; and 110 mil- 
 June 61 miOions more were paid — lions advances from the Fermiers et 
 in all 108 millions. — ' /. e. 221 mil- Regisseurs Ge'neraux. 
 
Ch. IV.] FRESH ISSUES OF PAPER MONEY. 265 
 
 the Government had only the choice of immediately declar- 
 ing itself bankrupt, or concealing the real state of things 
 by a new issue of paper money. They unhesitatingly chose 
 the latter. The decree of the 27th of September prescribed 
 that more than 1200 millions should never be brought into 
 circulation; but as about 160 millions had been redeemed by 
 the sale of public lands, it was considered allowable imme- 
 diately to issue 100 millions. This was to be done in the 
 form of five-franc notes, with a view of facilitating small 
 traffic, as complaints of the rarity of specie were raised in 
 every quarter. Trade with foreign countries absorbed sev- 
 eral millions annually; large sums were melted down and 
 disappeared — by which process a net profit of ten per cent, 
 could be made. The chief point however was the uncer- 
 tainty of the law; for a great number of people took their 
 specie with them into foreign countries or deposited it in 
 foreign banks; while others hoarded it, and tried to live on 
 their gradually deteriorating paper money. In April and 
 September, the State had only issued assignats for large 
 amounts, and fixed the lowest value at 50 livres; but in 
 the Spring of 1791 smaller notes were to be seen — first in 
 Lyons and Bordeaux, soon afterwards in Paris and else- 
 where — with which manufacturers and masters paid their 
 workmen, and rich gentlemen their artisans. But the idea 
 that the State was to be answerable for all affairs of national 
 economy had gained such ground, that the Government re- 
 solved, on its own part, to make an issue of five-franc notes. 
 If their value had been fixed, little objection could have been 
 made to this measure; but as all assignats were from 4 to 
 6 per cent lower in value than silver, the poorer classes, as 
 possessors of the small notes, were made to feel all the va- 
 riations of the exchange and the national credit. The moral 
 effect of this was almost more dangerous than the material; 
 the workmen became stock-jobbers. "The peasant," said 
 Burke, in his energetic manner, "does not know whether the 
 money which he has received at market for his corn has 
 
266 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book II. 
 
 still retained its value in the nearest shop; no one in Paris 
 settles in the morning what he will have for dinner without 
 making a speculation." 
 
 But the National Assembly did not go on long with their 
 100 millions, especially since these were not ready for sev- 
 eral months; they therefore determined on the 19th of June 
 to issue 600 millions above the limit of 1200. They calcu- 
 lated that the mortgage of the national domains would easily 
 bear this new burden; though they soon found that the value 
 of the assignats immediately sank from 8 to 10 per cent 
 discount. All the evils of this dej)reciation naturally increased 
 in the same ratio; and we shall consider this point some- 
 what more closely in connexion with particular branches of 
 trade. The worst of the matter was, that every one foresaw 
 the speedy consumption of these 600 millions, and a succes- 
 sion of new issues of paper money. It needed no great acute- 
 ness even at that time to prophecy the final result. 
 
 The greater the quantity of assignats^ the greater their 
 depreciation. The only means of keeping up their value was 
 to increase the security on which they rested — in other words 
 to proceed with the confiscation of estates. The property 
 of the Church was almost exhausted, and the democrats had 
 already often spoken of sequestrating the estates of the 
 Emigres. 
 
 The more assignats, the greater the influence of the Govern- 
 ment over all private property. He who can at any moment 
 create millions without cost or labour, can buy up all the 
 world, and give away what he has bought at his pleasure. 
 A cautious possessor of property, indeed, might mistrust the 
 value of those millions; and an obstinate proprietor might 
 choose to keep his estate though the treasures of the earth 
 were offered in exchange. In such a case the Government 
 must be strong and bold enough to denounce distrust and 
 obstinacy as crimes against the country; and then the State 
 becomes master of all the property in the land, and the 
 pommunity of goods is attained. 
 
Ch. IV.] STATE OP AFFAIRS IN RURAL DISTRICTS. 267 
 
 Such was the direction which the internal affairs of France 
 were beginning to take under the first National Assembly. 
 These years have very often been called the good times of 
 the Revolution; but in truth they differ from the year 1793, 
 exactly in the same way as the seed from the crop. We 
 have made ourselves acquainted with the first germs of the 
 future growth, we must now consider the soil in which they 
 were planted. 
 
 No one, it appears, gathered such immediate and golden 
 fruits from the Revolution, as the most numerous and op- 
 pressed class in France, the peasant-owners. One short warm 
 night in August brought them freedom from feudal tribunals, 
 feudal services, church tithes, inland duties, and the trammels 
 of guilds in the towns. But when the joyful news ran 
 through the country, the people — poor and rude as their late 
 masters had made them — were already in a state of terrible 
 excitement, which threatened to destroy their new advantages 
 by inducing new errors. When they drove away or killed 
 their feudal lords, capital, which had never been very plenti- 
 fully employed in agriculture, entirely disappeared from the 
 rural districts. Again, when the tithes were abolished, the 
 peasants, instead of employing the money thvis saved in the 
 improvement of their cattle — which was their weakest point — 
 remembered that they had turned much arable land into 
 pasture, because the pasture had hitherto paid smaller tithes, 
 and now, under the altered circumstances, they began to change 
 their pasture land into corn fields again, in order to derive 
 immediate profit from the high price of wheat. Then the 
 tax on all kinds of liquors was abolished; a change which 
 was received with great applause — for the French peasant 
 has always had the greatest delight in the cultivation of 
 vines. Now that the tax was removed from this favourite 
 occupation, thousands and thousands of Communes,— without 
 regard to the quality of their soil — were covered with vines, 
 and innumerable small fortunes invested in this precarious 
 occupation, 
 
268 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book II. 
 
 For a time every thing seemed to prosper, but it was the 
 prosperity of the spendthrift who lives on his capital. That 
 which delighted them even more than the abolition of tithes 
 and feudal rights was the cessation of state taxes, which 
 the weakness of the new Government enabled every man 
 to evade at his pleasure. In this first period of the Revolution, 
 170 millions a year, which had formerly been collected by 
 the Intendants, remained in the pockets of the peasants; no 
 wonder therefore, that the villages were proudly conscious 
 of their prosperity, and that the men themselves — in spite 
 of all the quarrels and disorders of the times — began to hold 
 their heads higher in the world. 
 
 But the dangers immediately showed themselves, side by 
 side with the gains. It. was, after all, only that portion of 
 the rural population which possessed property, which derived 
 advantage from the fall of the territorial aristocracy and 
 the feudal rights. He who had no land could feel but 
 little pleasure at the emancipation of the soil. He who 
 dragged on a wretched existence as the tenant of an acre, 
 or half an acre, of land, felt little interest in the cessation 
 of compulsory labour, since he possessed no capital to enable 
 him to turn his leisure time to advantage. The high prices 
 of corn, too, which brought such rich profits to the wealthy 
 tenant farmers of the North, were only a burden to the 
 majority of the small peasant-owners. They produced no 
 more corn — nay, less — than they used; it was their interest, 
 therefore, as well as that of the rural day-labourers and 
 the city operatives, that wages should be high and bread 
 cheap. They were all in so far contented with the late 
 changes as they had freed them from the faille, and the 
 poll-tax; but in other respects they thought that the Revolution 
 had only just commenced its course, and to speak of it as 
 already terminated seemed to them mere treachery. It was 
 no advantage to them that the neighbouring farmer had 
 turned his pastures into cornfields, or planted his arable 
 land with vines, and that, for the moment, he prospered so 
 
Cb. IV.] CONDITION OF RURAL PROLETARIES. 269 
 
 well as to drink wine instead of cider, and to eat meat in- 
 stead of blackbread. It would have been to their advantage, 
 if the new government had endeavoured to substitute money 
 rentals for the metairies — to give an impulse to agricultural 
 operations on a grand scale, and thereby open the way to 
 profitable employment. But the impatience of democracy 
 led to the very opposite results. The people abhorred large 
 estates, because they had good reason to think ill of their 
 former landlords. They regarded it as one of the first 
 conditions of freedom, to increase the number of small pro- 
 prietors, and resolved immediately to turn the poorer pea- 
 sants into landowners, by dividing the estates of the Church 
 into minute plots. 
 
 From the extreme poverty of the great majority of peasants, 
 it could hardly have had any effect if the estates of the 
 Church had been divided into as many lots as there were 
 families, and a quota presented to each. Every one of these 
 poor people would have received, perhaps, a piece of land 
 which had hitherto yielded 100 livres a year;' but he him- 
 self would not have gained nearly so much from it, and 
 would, moreover, have lost his rich neighbour who had 
 thrown many opportunities of earning something extra in 
 his way. What advantage would accnie, if the lands were 
 sold instead of being given away? However low the price 
 had been fixed, the most numerous class, who possessed no- 
 thing at all, would have been unable to pay it ; in their ears, 
 therefore, the high-sounding words, "Sale of the estates of the 
 Church," had no meaning at all. The inevitable result quickly 
 followed; no sooner were the riots against the Feudal Lords 
 at an end, no sooner had the middle class of jjeasant-owuers 
 established themselves in their new acquisitions, than the 
 second — the social Revolution — succeeded to the first, which 
 was political. 
 
 ^ Net revenue of the Church land 70 millions : gross revenue, according 
 to the estimate at that period, about 170; 7 millions of rural proletaries, 
 or I'/j million families. 
 
270 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book II. 
 
 Bread had been dear since the bad harvest of 1788. 
 Necker's mistakes had prolonged the dearth of food, for he 
 purchased many millions' worth of corn, made the deficiency 
 known throughout the whole country, and thereby excited 
 so much alarm that the prices every where rose, and the pos- 
 sessors of corn kept back their supplies. Then the storm of the 
 Revolution broke loose; and every one seized upon what 
 lay nearest to him. Most of the j)rovinces and towns would 
 not allow their corn to be exported; all traffic ceased and 
 the dearth continually increased. The people were furious, 
 for it was known that supplies existed and yet every body 
 was starving. Sometimes it was said that the Aristocracy, 
 and sometimes that the usurers kept their corn concealed, 
 from ill-will or avarice; and before long, every corn-dealer 
 was looked upon as a blood-sucker and went in danger of 
 his life; which of course only increased the evil. We shall 
 see, by-and-by, how they managed to make shift in the 
 towns; but in the open country the people were immediately 
 reduced to extremities. The peasants demanded that the 
 State should control the usurers, and fix the price of corn. 
 They banded themselves together in many hundred places, 
 and the authorities were not always able to resist their 
 demands. Sometimes, therefore, the town made good the 
 damage done to the proprietors by a grant from the Com- 
 mune, but very often the individual was left to bear his 
 loss alone. Matters were at the worst in the summer of 
 1790 in those Departments, which also made the commence- 
 ment of the political movement in 1789, and in the Jacquerie 
 of 1851 — in the old provinces Bourboiuiais, Berry, Nivernais, 
 Charolais, probably the poorest districts in the whole country, 
 in which the system of metairies then, as now, existed 
 with all its miserable consequences. Whilst Nismes and 
 Montauban were roused to rebellion by the Ecclesiastical 
 troubles — whilst patriotic risings were taking place in the 
 border towns — the peasants ran to arms in the centre of 
 the kingdom to lower the price of corn by force. But they 
 
Ch. IV.] STATE COMMUNISM. 271 
 
 did not long remain satisfied with their first demand; after 
 having steeled their courage by the conquest of the town 
 of Decize, they arbitrarily altered the rent and the duration 
 of the farming leases, and openly demanded a number of 
 properties which had come into the hands of their possessors 
 more than a hundred years before. The land resounded; 
 with the dreaded cry for an agrarian law, and Communism 
 showed itself in undisguised brutality. It is true that the 
 National Assembly would not hear of this, nor were the 
 proletaries strong enough to break down the opposition of 
 the middle classes by so direct an assault. Decrees were 
 passed and arms were seized, and every where the National 
 guards of the towns marched out to defend the convoys 
 of corn from the peasants; and for several months the Na- 
 tional Assembly received successive reports of these miser- 
 able expeditions. By the winter the revolt of the peasants 
 had been put down, but no complete security had been 
 obtained. Of what advantage was it that the National 
 Assembly interdicted the cry for a division of land, whilst 
 they made equally dangerous concessions to the proletaries, 
 and were furthering the masked Communism of the State 
 by means of the assignats? It was on this ground that 
 Robespierre, before all others, took up his position. He was 
 inexhaustible in the high-sounding phrases with which he 
 endeavoured to palliate the licentiousness of the people, to 
 pourtray their sufferings, and to urge upon the Assembly 
 a gentle culture of prosperity; when in fact prosperity could 
 only be promoted by a rigorous suppression of disorders. 
 He was very careful not directly to offend the prejudices 
 in favour of property; in this case, as well as on the ques- 
 tion of Republicanism, he exercised the utmost prudence, 
 and was satisfied if he could remove the more immediate 
 hindrance to the prosecution of his aims. By conviction 
 and theory he was as little of a Communist as a Republican ; 
 but a true instinct taught him that by the course he was 
 pursuing, he would most securely attach to himself the 
 
272 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book IL 
 
 enthusiasm of the boldest classes, and gain a position from 
 which he could look with contempt on the random efforts 
 of the other demagogues. The only man who outbid him 
 in his own way was Marat, whose imaginative and ardent 
 nature was unable to understand such cold prudence; and 
 who thought himself man enough at the head of his pro- 
 letaries to seize the reins of power by a coup de main; 
 and therefore, incessantly urged the Government to hang 
 the usurers, to trample on the oppressors, and to give the 
 money to the virtuous People. 
 
 In the meantime the impoi'tant measures of the sale of 
 the national domains, and the issue of the assigiiats, began 
 to take effect in the country districts. As we may easily 
 suppose, many months passed before the movement, com- 
 menced in Paris, reached the rural districts. During the year 
 1790 the retail sale of land went on slowly, and it was not 
 until November that the legal conditions were settled. The 
 Municipalities, who managed the sale, had to value the 
 estates before the auction, and received a sixteenth part of 
 the proceeds— originally a quarter of the surplus above the 
 valuation— for themselves. In other respects every thing 
 was done to entice j^urchasers; the form of proceeding was 
 very simple, the instalments were moderate, long terms were 
 granted for the payment of the residue, and various State 
 securities were received as purchase money, as well as silver 
 and assigiiats. By all these means the Government suc- 
 ceeded in forcing a more and more rapid sale of lands. 
 964 million livres were raised in this way by the close of 
 the Constituent Assembly, and great satisfaction was ex- 
 pressed at the number and patriotism of the new proprietors; 
 every one rejoiced in the improved prospects of the Treasury 
 and the general pacification of the peasants. 
 
 But even here the result was not destined to yield un- 
 alloyed satisfaction. As the Municipalities had a direct 
 interest in obtaining high prices, and as the National Assem- 
 bly from political reasons greeted every large sum with 
 
Ch. IV.] SALE OF CHURCH LANDS. 273 
 
 clapping- of hands, every bidder was made welcome without 
 the smallest inquiry into his character or solvency. In 
 many departments a wild speculation prevailed m the market; 
 penniless men bought at fabulous prices— often at double 
 the valuation — and then handed over the lands to speculators 
 whose tools they were, and who advanced the first instal- 
 ment. Then as much as possible was got out of the estate 
 in the shortest time, the timber was cut down, the fields 
 exhausted, the buildings pulled down and sold for materials; 
 and when the State prosecuted the purchaser for default of 
 payment, the property was found to be greatly depreciated. 
 The confusion reached its greatest height in the Spring of 
 1791, when the value of the assignats began to vary, and 
 the traffic in lands, and gambling at the Bourse^ went on 
 at the same time. How soon had the hope vanished, that 
 from the very commencement of the sale of lands — by which 
 the assignats were to be realized — the value of paper cur- 
 rency would rise? The whole body of purchasers, Avho had 
 made bids to the amount of 900 millions, and were now 
 for a series of years to pay their debt by instalments, had a 
 direct interest in depressing the current value of the assignats, 
 that they might obtain the means of payment for as little 
 money as possible. As the State lived entirely on assignats, 
 a fall in their value of one per cent was a loss of millions, 
 and swallowed up the profit of many sales. But the political 
 and moral mischief was still greater than the financial; the 
 canker of stock-jobbing, which, more than any thing else, 
 had ruined the morals of Paris, was now extended to the 
 rural districts. What a prospect for a country, when its 
 rural population was changed into a great band of gamblers ! 
 
 This process was accelerated by the minute division of 
 land, which the Government continued strongly to recom- 
 mend. The law directed that the sale should always be 
 made in small lots, unless, indeed, a higher bid could be 
 obtained by selling in a more wholesale manner. As a rule 
 there was to be a certain limit to this subdivision, and the 
 
 I. s 
 
274 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book IL 
 
 farms and Mctairies of which the estate had hitherto consisted, 
 were not to be further broken up. But the zeal of the Mu- 
 nicipahties overlooked these regulations, whenever there was 
 a prospect of a higher oifer, and at last sold the land in as 
 minute fragments as any purchaser desired. The demand 
 was, of course, greatly stimulated by this means, and the 
 smaller peasant proprietors, to whom the market was now 
 ojDened, came forward with great zeal. Whoever among 
 them possessed a little money i^urchased a piece of land — 
 generally so much that his little fund was exhausted by the 
 first instalment, and no capital remained with which to culti- 
 vate his new acquisition. The greater part of the estates, 
 moreover, had been terribly neglected and exhausted during 
 the municipal management, under which they had been for 
 the last year; there was, therefore, little doubt that the 
 majority of these fortunate purchasers would go in the very 
 next year to reinforce the army of starving people, who, ten 
 months before, had demanded of the State an agrarian law 
 and a fixed -pvice of corn. 
 
 Thus every thing in the country seemed to threaten new 
 convulsions of paujierism. If we turn to the cities, our first 
 attention is claimed hy the capital, at that time the focus of 
 all events. 
 
 The provisional administration of the "Three hundred," 
 which came to our notice on the 5th of October, had remained 
 in office until the summer of 1790, ere the permanent con- 
 stitution for the city had been completed. The National 
 Assembly, usually accustomed to organize for others without 
 much hesitation, wished to make the Parisians manage their 
 own affairs, and waited for the proposals of the "Three hun- 
 dred." The latter, therefore, drew up a scheme, which, in 
 the main, retained the forms of the previous constitution. 
 There was to be a larger and smaller Council for legislative 
 purposes, and a jNIayor with his subordinates as Executive; 
 and the city Commune was to be divided into 48 sections, 
 and to act as an electoral body. But the zealous adherents 
 
Ch. IV.] INCREASING POWER OF THE ANARCHISTS. 275 
 
 of the "Rights of man" emphatically raised their voice against 
 these institntions. They knew that every hnman being was 
 a part of the sovereign j)eople, and they held the sovereign 
 citizens far too high to allow them to be satisfied with the 
 mere choice of their rulers. They demanded, therefore, that 
 the District Assemblies should sit en permanence ; that the 
 Mayor should every day take their votes on current ques- 
 tions, and act according to the aggregate of theif decrees. 
 The practical working of this system might be foreseen with 
 certainty. The man who had any other sphere of activity 
 would soon absent himself from these eternal sections, and 
 leave the field either to idle rentiers, or the vagabonds of the 
 Palais Royal, who at that time saw a clear opening before 
 them. Among the leaders of the latter Danton with the 
 Districts of the Cordeliers took up this question most 
 zealously; while Brissot — at that time a member of the 
 Municipal council^was the champion of the representative 
 system. This was the first occasion on which the latter 
 embroiled himself with his democratic comrades, and the 
 breach was never entirely healed. Finally, after innumerable 
 debates, placards and quarrels, the National Assembly car- 
 ried their point, and acceded to the views of the "Three 
 hundred" in spite of Robespierre's opposition. 
 
 The administration of the city therefore remained almost 
 unchanged; Bailly was chosen Mayor again, and Lafayette 
 retained the chief command of the National Guards. The 
 attacks of the democrats on both of them increased if jjos- 
 sible in violence. Lafayette's popularity, especially, had 
 greatly sunk, since the King, at the beginning of 1791, by 
 the advice of Mirabeau and Montmorin, had stopped the 
 grants from the civil list, which the General had hitherto 
 extorted for his secret Police by the bugbear of threatening- 
 revolts. The state of the finances occupied more and more 
 attention in the policy both of the city and of the empire, 
 and the democratic press agitated the social question with 
 increasing energy. Marat, as we have seen, demanded with- 
 
 s2 
 
276 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book IL 
 
 out any circumlocution, that the money shou,ld be taken 
 from the rich and given to the poor; and the Abbot — after- 
 wards Bishop— Fauchet came forward as doctrinaire preacher, 
 and founded a "social circle," in which, with the mingled 
 parade of a freemason and an ecclesiastic, he discussed the 
 division of property and the political emancipation of women. 
 The Jacobins at this period entered into no such inves- 
 tigations,* but they co-operated most energetically for the 
 same object by their i^ractice, since their leaders had need 
 of the mob for new undertakings, and were obliged to keep 
 up their good will by solid benefits. The National Assem- 
 bly therefore consented to what they could not prevent; 
 they apjjlauded when an orator, in what was now the 
 stereotyped style, lauded the infallibility of the people, and 
 the virtue which was only to be found among the needy clas- 
 ses. They felt all the enthusiasm of philanthropic conviction, 
 when their Committee on the state of the poor declared that 
 the extirpation of paufierism was a National duty; and 
 although, in the midst of their pecuniary, embarrassment 
 they were terrified at the jjroposal of a yearly outlay of 
 51 millions, yet the galleries had noted the expression, 
 "National duty," and considered it quite natural that the 
 obligation of the nation should give every indiA-idual proletary 
 an undeniable claim to support. 
 
 Thus the opinion took root in Paris far and wide, that 
 the nature of freedom consisted in casting every care upon 
 society, and demanding aid from the State in every trouble. 
 There was no doubt that want and sufiering existed to a 
 very great extent, but it was just as clear that the machina- 
 tions of the democrats were continnallv increasing the suf- 
 ferings of the people. Paris had formerly obtained its prin- 
 cipal livelihood from the rich landowners, and the great 
 speculators, who spent in that city probably a third of all 
 the revenues of France during a large portion of the year. 
 Of these a considerable number had fled from the country; 
 the remaining landowners had suffered enormous losses, and 
 
Cii. IV.] THE PUBLIC WORKSHOPS. 277 
 
 from the insecurity of their future were inclined to be very- 
 sparing of what remained to them. As to tlie specuhitions 
 of the Bourse, it was against these and all that belonged to 
 them that the fury of the people was especially directed. 
 No quarter of a year ever passed, in which the National 
 Guard were not called upon to protect the houses of -the 
 money changers and bankers, or without a proposal being 
 made in the Palais Royal, amidst thunders of applause, to 
 hang up the usurers and bloodsuckers. This was not the 
 way to encourage them to indulge in expense and luxury; 
 and yet there were no other means by Mdiich the trades 
 could obtain work and bread. 
 
 Whilst the opportunities of earning money were thus 
 diminished, the willingness to Avork fell off in an equal 
 degree. AVhile the workmen were* day after day kept in 
 activity and pay by the demagogues, while they were con- 
 tinually hearing that they were the real sovereigns, and tiie 
 State and the Commune their immediate debtors, they had 
 neither time nor inclination for the severe exertions of their 
 trade. It is true that revolutionary work and pay were not 
 always to be had, but, at the worst, they had a refuge in 
 the public workshops, wliere good wages were to be got 
 without trouble. These institutions had grown to an enor- 
 mous extent. In spite of every effort, the number of work- 
 men could not be reduced below 12,000. Every vacancy was 
 immediately filled up from the provinces, since the State 
 paid 20 sous — the highest day wages to be had in France 
 at that time — for useless earthworks. In order, at any rate, 
 to lessen the accumulation of workmen in Paris, 21/2 millions 
 were expended on the 30th of May 1790 in the foundation 
 of new workshops in the Departments, to which the non- 
 Parisians were sent. But the establishment in Paris imme- 
 diately filled again; idleness increased, and a decree of the 
 31st of August for the introduction of piece-work instead 
 of daily wages remained without any effect. The crowd of 
 workmen increased as discipline declined, and it was remarked 
 
L'78 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book II. 
 
 that a quarter of the people, at most, came to their work, 
 while the number of those who received wages amounted in 
 October to 19,000. Tlic Municipality was too weak to make 
 any alteration, and the workmen always had the same answer, 
 that the State was bound to provide for them. 
 
 Similar proceedings occurred in the Departments. In ad- 
 dition to those 272 millions granted by the State, the towns 
 spent untold sums from their own resources, in order to keep 
 their workmen quiet in the public workshops. The amounts 
 thus exjjended were not always stated, nor even the names 
 of the towns; we shall here cite a few examples out of 
 the great mass. Toulouse, as early as March, announced 
 that it had 11,000, Amiens in May, 15,000, the Seine-Oise 
 Department, in November, 41,000 workmen, who were being 
 supported at the cost of these towns by so-called charitable 
 works. It was just the same in Besanpon and Lyons, in 
 Valenciennes and Langres. At first they raised loans, and 
 when their credit was exhausted they levied an extraordinary 
 income tax. As these labours were entirely unproductive, 
 Marat's theory was soon fully realized; those who had no 
 property received — those who had, paid, — on pain of a new 
 Revolution. It was but a vanishing drop in this ocean of 
 necessities, when the Assembly, on the 16th of December, 
 set apart 15 millions for alleged works, and immediately 
 distributed 673 millions of it. The number of people em- 
 ployed in the Parisian workshops rose, in the spring of 1791, 
 to 31,000, and the daily expenses to G0,000 livres; so that 
 Paris alone would have absorbed more than those 15 millions 
 in a single year. Most of these workmen were non-Parisians, 
 and besides these an equal number of necessitous strangers, 
 to whom even the workshops seemed too laborious, were 
 wandering about in the mighty city. 
 
 The second great question, equally important in a political, 
 and still more so in a financial point of view — a question 
 which had occupied the administration of Paris since the 
 beginning of the Revolution— was the mode of supplying the 
 
Cii. IV.] COST OF KEEPING PARIS QUIET. 279 
 
 .city with provisions. At the end of 1790 it appeared that 
 the State had bought corn to the amount of 75 milhons,— 
 had born the cost of transporting and grinding it — and, Lastly, 
 had granted 5 '/a milUons to private dealers as premiums 
 on the importation of corn. The Provinces profited by the 
 last item, but nearly the whole of the first fell to the lot of 
 the capital.! The State paid for their corn at the rate of 
 40 to 50 francs a septier, and consequently received a snpiply 
 sufficient for the consumption of the city during 18 months.''^ 
 The Municipal Council then sold the flour to the bakers at 
 half price; so that bread in Paris was only half as dear as 
 in most of the Departments. This alone was a present of 
 more than 30 millions, which the country made to preserve 
 peace and order in its capital. But this was not enough. 
 The city ought of course to have repaid to the exchequer 
 what it received from the retail sale of the corn. But, as 
 we have seen was the case in October 1789, the repayment 
 at a later period, was omitted; and the State at last re- 
 ceived bacli~ only 2 . millions instead of 30 millions. This 
 was about the cost of grinding and transporting, ^ so that, 
 in fact, these supplies had been altogether gratuitously pre- 
 sented to ihe city of Paris. 
 
 We must further reckon that the State paid the National 
 Guard of Paris 8 millions for pay and equijiment by the 
 end of the year 1790; that it likewise bore the expenses of 
 lighting and paving the streets, to the amount of 2 millions; 
 and that it allowed the expenses of destroying the Bastille 
 to be put down at more than a million, though it had not 
 cost a tenth part of that sum. * We luiist, moreover, re- 
 member that the State spent, as we have seen, more than 
 
 ' Bailly's Memoires, passim. — Cor- lived on the above-mentioned supplies 
 
 respondence between Bailly and about 555 days or 18 months. — 'Ac- 
 
 Necker; Buchez, IV. — Debates of the count of the Minister of France in 
 
 National Convention, Oct. 19. 1793. — Montesquieu's report of Sept.9. 1791. 
 
 2 1 2/3 Million Septiers for 75 millions — 1 Debates of the Commune of 
 
 fiancs. Paris consumed on the average Paris, Jan. 15. 1795. 
 SOOOSeptiersa-day; and consequently 
 
280 POLITICO-KCONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book II. 
 
 17 millions iu giving employment to tlie workmen of Paris; 
 and lastly tliat it. gave tlie town the reversion of about 
 16 millions from the sale of the Church lands. This gives 
 us a total of more than 90 millions, which the kingdom had 
 to raise within 20 months, for a city of about 600,000 
 inhabitants; not to mention the current budget of the city, 
 or the regular expenses of administration, from which Paris 
 derived more advantage than any other part of the Empire. 
 
 The other towns, of course, did not receive an equal de- 
 gree of aid from the Treasury, but the state of things was 
 every Avhere the same, and the towns were obliged, at their 
 own expense, to furnish the bakers with flour at half price, 
 as well as to give money to the p)i'oletaries for half a day's 
 work, that they might purchase bread. To give even an 
 approximation to the total of these expenses for the whole 
 country is simply impossible. In one year (1790), the ad- 
 vances made by the State to the Municipalities of the De- 
 partments, for the purchase of corn, amounted to 1600 mil- 
 lions. 1 But whether the means of payment were furnished 
 Ijy the State or a Municipality, the result was always the 
 same, that those who possessed had to pay and pay again 
 to sui}23ort the needy, whether the latter worked or not. 
 Nor was this any longer regarded as voluntary aid at a 
 time of unavoidable and extraordinary disaster; the source 
 of the people's suffering was no longer to be found in nature 
 itself; on the contrary, the harvests of 1789 and 1790 were 
 abundant, and wherever any extreme want existed at the 
 end of the latter year, its course may be traced to the dis- 
 turbance of public order and the insecurity of property. 
 Every proceeding therefore, which, like those above referred 
 to, was calculated to put a constraint upon the proprietors, 
 might indeed satisfy the hungry for the moment, but in- 
 directly increased their misery a hundred-fold. 
 
 In the year 1791 all these evils continued in full force. 
 
 Johannot's Report to the Convention, July 12. 1795. 
 
Ch. IV.] EFFECT OF THE ASSIGNATS ON COMMERCE. 2.S1 
 
 It is true that at first . the assignats gave the same impulse 
 to business in the city as in the country, but the apparent 
 improvement had no firm foundation even in the towns. 
 Wherever a great quantity of j)aper money is suddenly is- 
 sued, we invariably see a rapid increase of trade. The great 
 quantity of the circulating medium sets in motion all the 
 energies of commerce and manufactures; caj)ital for invest- 
 ment is more easily found than usual, and trade perpetually 
 receives fresh nutriment. If this paper represents real credit, 
 founded upon order and legal secvirity, from which it can 
 derive a firm and lasting value, such a moment may be the 
 starting point of a great and widely extended prosperity; 
 as for instance, the most splendid im^Jrovements in English 
 agriculture were undoubtedly owing to the emancipation of 
 the country banks. If, on the contrary, the new paper is 
 of precarious value, as was clearly seen to be the case with 
 the French assignats as early as February 1791, it can have 
 no lastingly beneficial fruits. For the moment, perhaps, busi- 
 ness receives an impulse all the more violent, because every 
 one endeavours to invest his doubtful paper in buildings, 
 machines and goods — which under all circumstances retain 
 some intrinsic value. Such a movement was witnessed in 
 France in 1791, and from every quarter there came satis- 
 factory reports of the activity of manufactures. The com- 
 mercial excitement, and, in an equal degree, the commercial 
 danger, were enhanced by one particular circumstance. The 
 exchange with foreign countries had been for some years 
 unfavourable to France. Since the year 1783 the coiuitry 
 imported more than it exported; then came Necker's whole- 
 sale purchases of corn, and lastly the utter derangement of 
 commercial relations by the Kevolution, which every where 
 prostrated the home production, and rendered it necessary 
 to give orders in foreign countries. France had, therefore, 
 to make more payments than it received, and consecjuently 
 to bear the expenses of those payments, and to lose in the 
 exchange. The loss in the Spring of 1791 was from 9 to 
 
282 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL, AFFAIRS. [Book IL 
 
 11 per cent. Here too the assignats exercised an influence; 
 for as, at this period, they stood at 4 to 6 per cent dis- 
 count, and the foreign merchant had to be paid in silver, 
 the total loss to the French in the exchange was 15 per 
 cent. Tlie Frenchman, e. g., who owed 30 pounds sterling 
 in London, had to give a bill, not for the nominal value, 
 740 livres, but for 880 livrcs; while on the contrary the Eng- 
 lishman, who wished to pay a debt in Paris of 880 livres, 
 could do so with 30 pounds sterling instead of 34. But for 
 the moment the Frencli manufactui-es derived great advan- 
 tage from this state of things. As their products could be 
 so cheaply paid for, orders poured in from foreign countries 
 to such a degree, that it was often difficult for the manu- 
 facturers to satisfy their customers. But it is easy to see 
 that prosjjerity of this kind nuist very soon find its limit. 
 It was not founded upon any actual and permanent want of 
 those who gave the order, and could only last until the in- 
 creased exports from France had restored the balance of 
 the exchange. This factitious prosperity therefore 'was not 
 calculated to lead to lasting investments of capital and costly 
 extensions of business ; and when a further fall in the asaig- 
 nats took place it would necessarily collapse at ouce, and be 
 succeeded by a crisis all the more destructive, the more 
 deeply men liad engaged in speculation under the influence 
 of the first favourable prospects. 
 
 The new emaneipation of trade had contributed to the 
 activity of business at that time. After its proclamation 
 during the night of the 4th of August, it was immediately 
 carried into operation; and though it produced, of course, 
 some confusion and loss, yet, like the emancipation of the 
 soil, it had, from the very commencement, a highly invigorat- 
 ing effect. But it was not until March 1791 that it Avas 
 formally sanctioned by a law, according to which every 
 Frenchman was allowed to carry on whatever trade he 
 pleased, on the sole condition of paying a licence tax to the 
 State. Every bond therefore was burst, and every kind of 
 
Cii. IV.] ASSOCIATIONS OF WORKMEN. 283 
 
 organization of trade would have laid new fetters on indi- 
 viduals; while the sole object of the National Assembly was 
 to leave to every man the sole use of his own powers. We 
 have heard a great deal in our own day, both from the feudal 
 and the Socialist parties, against this system of isolation — 
 atomism, and egoism. All that has been said on this subject 
 since the Revolution was comjjrehended in the reproach which 
 Marat made against the National Assembly ; when he said, 
 that by granting free competition, they had given the signal 
 for industrial anarchy, knavery and pauperism, y^e. have 
 now however had siafficient experience to enable us to pro- 
 nounce, that entire freedom of labour has been nowhere 
 more decidedly successful than in France; and that in no 
 department has it produced more beneficial results than in 
 that of French manufactures. The effects are so jjalpable, 
 as to render all further discussion unnecessary. 
 
 Though the National Assembly was right in refusing to 
 meddle with the internal mechanism of trade, yet they might 
 have earned the thanks of the nation by cleansing and le- 
 velling the ground for its operations. A judicious legisla- 
 ture does not act inconsistently with the principles of in- 
 dustrial freedom, by rousing its energies, and facilitating its 
 operations by clearing away hindrances. There can be no 
 reasonable objection to industrial schools, statistical accoimts 
 of the condition of manufactures, and associations for mutual 
 assistance. To have paid but little attention to these sub- 
 jects is a reproach, which attaches not only to the first 
 National Assembly, but to the Revolution throughout its 
 whole course. 
 
 If however we enquire into the main reason of this ne- 
 glect, we shall be obliged to transfer the responsibility to 
 other shoulders. 
 
 Even before the law which established industrial freedom 
 existed, several associations of workmen were formed for the 
 improvement of their condition. ^ The first of these arose 
 
 1 Du Celtier, Hist, des classes laborieuses, Paris, 1859, p. 460, observes, 
 
284 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS. [Book II. 
 
 among the carpenters, under the title "Association of duties" — 
 viz. the duties, of the workmen; among the most important 
 of which was that of striking work to force the masters to 
 pay higher wages! Then followed the 23i'inters; ncgociations 
 were carried on with the masters, and the Town Council was 
 prevailed upon to express a kind of semi-approbation. Mean- 
 while the number of members and unions increased; they 
 entered into connexion with one another, established affili- 
 ated societies in the departments, and entered into regular 
 correspondence with them. It is certainly no mark of poli- 
 tical soundness, when a State cannot bear such things as 
 these; and it is no true carrying out of industrial freedom to 
 forbid to the workmen what is allowed to the masters. But 
 it is equally mischievous, when the associations of workmen 
 go too far in a contrary direction, and understand by the 
 word freedom, the right of injuring others. And this is 
 what immediately took place in Paris, as it had done a year 
 l^efore among the peasants. The unions began to compel 
 workmen to strike even when individuals were satisfied 
 with their wages, and to threaten strange workmen, whom 
 the masters had brought from a distance to supply vacancies. 
 In other words, they compelled the masters to pay higher 
 wages by threats of open violence. The proceeding was 
 exactly the same as that of the Commune, which demanded 
 from the State, money to procure bread— abolition of the 
 octroi — and compensation to the city at the cost of the 
 State — under the threat of a new Revolution. It was the 
 same thing in principle as when the jDcasants called for a 
 new division of the land. 
 
 The Municipal Council had not the means, or perhaps not 
 the courage, to resist the unions; so that the matter came 
 before the National Assembly at the end of May. It was 
 at this time that the number of workmen in the public 
 
 that association for keeping up the rate of wages at a point sufficient to 
 afford a livelihood, had existed from time immemorial among the apprentices 
 of the various Guilds. 
 
Cii. IV.] CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC WORKSHOPS. 28.5 
 
 workshops had risen to 31,000, and threatened constantly to 
 increase. The octroi had lately been abolished, and the dis- 
 tribution of corn continued; but instead of the expected 
 amelioration, communistic violence began to intrude into all 
 the relations of private life. Weak and indulgent as the 
 parliamentary chiefs had shewn themselves in ojDposing an- 
 archy, the fear of impending ruin now lent them courage 
 for an energetic resolution. Political circuinstances, to which 
 we shall refer again, contributed to hasten the catastrophe. 
 On the *14tli of June, the Assembly passed a law which 
 forbade all associations of workmen of the same trade, — the 
 drawing up of lists of members — the collection of union 
 funds— and the establishment of union authorities — as a re- 
 vival of the abolished guilds. At the same time they were 
 inconsiderate enough to comfort the destitute workmen by 
 the fatal declaration, that the nation would have to procure 
 work for the unemployed, and support for the sick. ' Two 
 days afterwards another decree was issued which ordered 
 the dissolution of the public workshops on the 1st of July 
 following, and the removal of the strange workmen to their 
 homes; and at the same time, made a grant of a million to 
 the city of Paris, and a million and a half to the Depart- 
 ments, for the relief of the distress, which these measures 
 might in the first instance cause. This was strikino- at the 
 root of the evil; for, on the one hand, the dissolution of the 
 unions saved the property of the masters, and the removal 
 of the strangers secured the prosperity of the city, and, we 
 may even say, the possibility of any government whatever. 
 The strangers formed the audience of the Palais Royal; it 
 was they who had taken the lead in the storming of the 
 Bastille and the riots of the 6th of October; they were in 
 fact the body-guard of the Revolution. The excitement 
 
 ' We must here observe that the trasts favourably with the subsequent 
 
 law applied the same prohibition decrees of 1803 (Germinal XI.) and 
 
 to Masters and employers as to 1804 (Floreal XII.) Conf. Du Cel- 
 
 workmen, and in this respect con- Her, 342. 
 
286 POLITICO-ECONOMICAL AFFAIES. [Book IL 
 
 therefore caused hj these two decrees was very considerable. 
 All who had hitherto existed at the expense of the State — 
 all who had thrust their hands into the pockets of the mas- 
 ters and the land-owners — all to whom the continuance of 
 the Revolution promised a livelihood, saw themselves threat- 
 ened in their material intei-ests, by the reaction of the Na- 
 tional Assembly. 
 
 And just at this very time a political crisis occurred which 
 suddenly opened to them the prospect of ending all their 
 troubles at a blow, and of subjecting France to the domin- 
 ion of the poorest classes by one rapid and violent outbreak. 
 
Ch. v.] 237 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Louis xvi. aftek tde attack on the churcu. — Civil oath of the priests. — 
 The king's PLANS of flight. — Mirabeau's death. — Lametii makes adva>- 
 CES to the ministry. — Breach between lametb and rodespierre. — 
 The queen .\nd the emperor Leopold. — Flight of the kino. — Genicral 
 
 revolt. — LOCIS ARRESTED. — IktRIGCES OF THE DEMOCRATS. — FeeBLUXH> .S 
 
 OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. TuMULT IN THE CHAMP DE MARS. — Ix- 
 
 SCFFICtENT REVISION OF THE CONSTITCTION. 
 
 The greatest injury wliicli the overthrow of the Church in- 
 flicted on the Revolution was the change it produced in 
 the attitude of the King. 
 
 Before that event, the feelings of Louis XVI. towards the 
 Revolution had not been altogether hostile. This good-hii- 
 moured, dvdl man had no 'political opinions at all. While 
 he was young he had seen the Church, the Noblesse and 
 the Parliaments, in strife with one another and with tlie 
 Crown. All the opposition which the Government met with, 
 came from this cj^uarter, and both Turgot and Calonne had 
 taught him, that the abolition of feudal privileges would be 
 alike beneficial to King and People. Under these influences, 
 Louis had called the States-general, to free himself from 
 all kinds of trouble, strife and constraint, and at the same 
 time to further the prosperity of his people. He was there- 
 fore at first extremely astonished that the distress grew worse 
 than ever, and that an vuie.xamplcd discord filled the King- 
 dom. He was then induced to accept the unfortunate Brc- 
 teuil Ministry, in order to put a speedy end to the dis- 
 agreeable scandal. He had so little selfishness, and at the 
 same time so little judgment, that he was on the point of 
 delivering himself and the Kingdom entirely into the hands 
 
288 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 of the ancient privileged Orders. Since that time, the more 
 furiously the storm raged, the more completely did he retire 
 into himself. The personal insults which he received on- the 
 5th and 6th of October, and on innumerable subsequent oc- 
 casions, were not what he felt the most. He was, indeed, 
 fond of popularity, and enjoyed the clapping of hands and 
 vivais of the people, but he would have thought it a sin to 
 to resent a personal injury. On the other hand he perceived 
 with satisfaction, that the Ministers troubled him far less than 
 formerly with the details of business. When, in former 
 times, Turgot opened his portfolio without any regard to 
 his hours of sleep, or his hunting engagements, Louis used 
 often to say with a sigh! "What, another memorial!" Now it 
 was sufficient if he attended the regular sittings of the 
 Council of Ministers, and heard the proposal which best 
 suited his disposition, vh. that he should agree to what the 
 National Assembly demanded. It was not merely the exer- 
 tion of his own thought and will which he shiurned, but 
 the jicrsonal responsibility from which he now thought him- 
 self I'elieved. Whence should his timid and weak nature 
 derive an impulse to take any other course than the one 
 proposed to him? His intellect was very narrow; the few 
 thoughts he had slumbered under a thick covering, and he 
 had not the slightest conception of the causes- and effects 
 of his times. His conscience however was very sensitive;' 
 he thought little of political faults, but much of moral trans- 
 gressions. He was like a blind man who fears at every step 
 to injure some other person, and who is nevertheless jjer- 
 petually called upon to guide others. He was therefore 
 ecjually dependent and hard to lead. He resisted all sudden 
 influences, especially when they couselled decision and acti- 
 vity. "Dip two ivory balls in oil," said his brother, "and 
 hold them together, and then you may keep the King to a 
 steady course of action." Yet those who were about him 
 for any length of time, and transacted regular business with 
 him, were sure in the end to gain an influence over him; 
 
Ch. v.] LOUIS XVI. AND MARIE ANTOINETTE. 289 
 
 and men like Necker or Lafayette, especially, who were so 
 great in all small resources, and so undecided upon all great 
 questions, could always reckon upon Louis's consent. He 
 dealt with them, as formerly with Count Maurepas; he lis- 
 tened to a hundred other counsels besides theirs— had no 
 power of distinguishing between right and wrong— and after 
 some hesitation signed the proposal of the Minister. Where 
 the issue of any such measures was unfortunate, he would 
 quietly remark with undisturbed patience, that he had fore- 
 seen the mischief. 
 
 If any virtue can exist without action, he was, doubtless, 
 the most blameless man among his political contemi^oraries. 
 But even the virtue of a helpless and inactive man often 
 becomes, in human affairs, the source of error and destruc- 
 tion. Perhaps the only strong feeling in the King's heart 
 was his affection for his wife and children; which at first 
 only appeared to him as a christian duty, but had acquired 
 strength and liveliness from habit. Marie Antoinette, how- 
 ever, was worthy of far other feelings. The joyous frivolity 
 with which she had formerly made her debut at the French 
 Court, and awakened wrath and deadly enmity by her easy 
 nonchalance^ had faded and withered amid the storms of 
 the Revolution. The strength of her pure character was no 
 longer concealed beneath a lax exterior; she possessed great 
 sagacity and undaunted courage; and it was not without 
 reason that Mirabeau, on one occasion, declared, that the 
 only man about the King was his wife. But even she 
 lacked the qualities that would have enabled her to keep 
 him in a consistent course of action. She had for many- 
 years taken- part in political affairs, and had promoted and 
 overthrown more than one Minister. But all this was the 
 result of personal liking or disliking, and never of vuipre- 
 judiced reflection, or well-founded consistency. She was 
 wanting both in knowledge and steadiness, because she had 
 no real interest in matters of State and policy. The Re- 
 volution had, indeed, wounded her in her deepest feelings, 
 
 I. T 
 
290 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 and when the King was daily hesitating, whether he could 
 with honouf assume the character of a constitutional mon- 
 arch, Marie Antoinette was firmly resolved, as far as in her 
 lay, to hinder such a degradation. Yet she had no more 
 settled plan of carrying out her opposition than the King 
 himself. In one respect only was she perfectly clear and 
 immovable, and that was in her aversion to those persons to 
 whom she had once taken a dislike. Above all she abhorred 
 the great noblemen who had taken up liberal opinions and 
 joined the Revolution. She could less easily forgive the 
 moderate opposition of the Marqins Lafayette, and the Count 
 Mirabeau, than the coarsest abuse, and the most murderous 
 attacks, of the democratic bourgeois. She shared, in fact, 
 the prevailing sentiment of German Princes, that especial 
 loyalty and devotion to the Com-t are to be expected from 
 the nobility. With such feelings, it was impossible for the 
 Queen to achieve any important success, or even to exer- 
 cise any continuous influence. She was roused for the mo- 
 ment by indignation, sense of duty, and insulted dignity, 
 only to sink again in weariness and exhaustion. She was 
 fully capable of heroism and self-sacrifice, but not of that 
 steady perseverance which alone could enable her to serve 
 the King. All that she did only increased the dread which 
 Louis entertained of every perilous undertaking, and every 
 danger to his fiimily. And in those times there was no 
 other choice than between danger and destruction. 
 
 In this case too, as in all others, the King was guided 
 by his religious feelings ; the ruin which might be in store 
 for him in the future he committed to the hand of the Lord ; 
 bnt voluntarily to expose his family to danger 'appeared to 
 him a transgression of God's commandments. This was the 
 key-note of all his actions, whether in the council of his 
 Alinisters or amidst the roar of the Parisian mob. 
 
 In the narrowness of his mind, be had no other compass 
 amid the sea of troubles, than his moral and religious con- 
 sciousness. When his meditations utterly failed to enable 
 
Ch. v.] LOUIS'S STRONG RELIGIOUS FEELINGS. 291 
 
 him to see his way in political matters, he remembered that 
 we are forbidden to take thought for the morrow; when 
 the rigour of the times afiected him too deeply, he found 
 consolation, support and hope, in the bosom of the Church. 
 In all his difficulties he had but one determination — one 
 guiding principle — never to commit sin. 
 
 After the fall of Feudalism, it would have required no 
 great power, or extraordinary judgment, to reconcile such 
 a Prince to a parliamentary government. We have seen 
 that he put up with a state of things which was the opposite 
 of all government. And when even he could not but perceive 
 the impending ruin, he did not go so far in his reactionary 
 views, as Mirabeau considered indispensably necessary. But 
 the Church question produced an entire change in him. He 
 looked at the matter from the same point of view as the 
 peasants, who had banded themselves together and shed 
 their blood at Nismes. The unlawful election of Parish 
 Priests and Bishops desecrated the Sacraments in his eyes, 
 and the violation of the Papal prerogatives cut him off from 
 union with the Church, and thereby imperilled the salvation 
 of his soul. And all this he was not only to endure, but 
 to ratify by his sanction. In the agony of his heart he 
 made up his mind to the worst step of all — to a disingen- 
 uous act, in the hope that the opposition of the Pope would 
 after all prevent the successful establishment of the new 
 Ecclesiastical system : he gave his Royal assent to the "civil 
 constitution" of the clergy. 
 
 From this time forward an impassable barrier lay between 
 him and the Revolution. There had been moments, perhaps, 
 in which he had been able to comprehend that he ought to 
 place himself at the head of the new movement, — to clear 
 the ground of what was old and obsolete— and to aid in 
 erecting the fabric of the State on a new and more lasting 
 fovindation. JSfoiv the Revolution was in his eyes sullied and 
 poisoned, and he saw no instruments within its limits with 
 which he could conscientiously work. He still, indeed, con- 
 
 t2 
 
292 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 tinued to receive the proposals of Mirabeau, that he should 
 retire to a town in the interior, and summon all loj-al French- 
 men to rally round a counter-constitution. But at the same 
 time his former unlucky friend Breteuil once more obtained 
 influence over him, and urged him to flee to a frontier town, 
 and crush the Revolution by the aid of the foreigner. This 
 was in Oct. 1 790 ; for some months the King wavered between 
 the two systems ; but alas ! the National Assembly took only 
 too good care to impel him to the more fatal course. 
 
 The National Assembly had gone too far to retreat, and 
 the consequences of their own acts perpetually urged them 
 on. After the overthrow of the Church they dared not trust 
 the King, and by continually throwing up barriers against 
 the exercise of the Royal power, they rendered all govern- 
 ment impossible. Mirabeau, the only man who could control 
 them, had been in the highest degree exasjjerated by the 
 issue of the late Ministerial crisis. A second time he liad 
 lived to see his financial measures adopted, and the vital 
 conditions which he had attached to them — the formation 
 of a capable cabinet — disowned. He saw that he had been 
 eagerly made use of, and then constantly thrown aside. He 
 saw his best-contrived plans diverted to the furtherance of 
 destruction — his popularity imperilled without any compen- 
 sation in the shape of power— and, what vs-eighed no less 
 with him, he saw the position which he hoped to occupy 
 in history compromised. It was only too natural, therefore, 
 tliat he should be inspired with the greatest wrath against 
 tlie Court, the Ministers, the Conservative party, the Clergy, 
 and every thing which crossed his wishes. His terrible 
 strokes fell on every side; he was more violent and un- 
 measured than ever in his language from the rostra; and he 
 was at the height of his popularity with the revolutionary 
 mob. He himself was any tiling but satisfied with the course 
 he was now taking; he confessed that he was doing violence 
 to his most secret wishes; but he declared, repeatedly, that 
 he could not act otherwise. What made matters worse, 
 
Ch. v.] civil constitution op the clergy. 293 
 
 the Church question entered into a new phase at this 
 very time. 
 
 After the civil constitution had been sanctioned by the 
 King, it began to be carried into operation throughout the 
 whole kingdom. Two thirds of the Clergy in all the provinces 
 refused obedience to it. ' The schism which agitated the 
 streets of the cities penetrated also into the remotest villages ; 
 the whole of the South of France took lire afresh, and by 
 September 30,000 armed men in the mountains of Jales had 
 sworn to live or to die faithful to the true Church. No 
 actual violence was as yet committed, but this region re- 
 mained from this time the military head-quarters of Southern 
 Catholicism. Hereupon the Ecclesiastical Committee brought 
 a motion before the Assembly to require every Ecclesiastic 
 to take the oath to the civil constitution within eight days,^ 
 and in case of refusal to pronounce his deposition, and to 
 prosecute him as a disturber of the peace, should he continue 
 to exercise his spiritual functions. There were still many 
 Deputies who saw in such a step nothing but an aggravation 
 of existing evils; Mirabeaxi, however, seized the opportunity 
 of displaying his full revolutionary strength. It was perliaj)S 
 the weakest point in his conduct, that though, at certain 
 moments, he justly and clearly recognized the danger of 
 a contest with the Church, he did not allow his convictions 
 on this point a general and steady influence on his measures. 
 His present amendment was indeed somewhat milder than 
 the proposal of the Committee, Init in his speech he brought 
 
 ' The accounts vary according to the nation, the law, tlic Icing, and 
 
 the party from which they proceed, the constitution." When Michelet 
 
 I find exact statements in the Polit. concludes from this that it did not 
 
 Journal of 1790, which is certainly comprehend the constitution cifile 
 
 very conservative, but is not badly dn clerge, his mistake is clear from 
 
 informed in its reports on the state the fact that the decree was ex- 
 
 of Paris. According to it our es- pressly laid before the King as a 
 
 timate is much too low. — ^ The decret constitutionnel. Information on 
 
 words of the oath ai'e, "fidelity to this head in the Moniteur, 25th. Jan. 
 
294 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 forward, witli crushing force, all that could be said against 
 the old Ecclesiastical system.* The effect was irresistible, 
 and he decided the question ; but he decided it against him- 
 self and for the Committee. The Assembly ordered the 
 Ecclesiastics to take the civil oath.^ 
 
 No other measure could have so greatly accelerated the 
 dissolution of the whole state of society ; no other step could 
 have so completely destroyed the understanding which had 
 for a time existed between Mirabeau and the Court. Shortly 
 before, the Emigres had concocted a plan of marching from 
 Turin upon Lyons, but the King had sent them his urgent 
 commands to refrain from carrying it into execution, and 
 had decidedly refused his co-operation. The Queen too, at 
 that time, had come to the conviction that the principles of 
 the new order of things were indestructible, and that the 
 King could only better his condition by sincerely accepting 
 them, and summoning a liberal Ministry to his Council. 
 Now however, not the Emigres, indeed, but Breteuil and his 
 plans again gained favovu' in the eyes of Louis, ^ who no 
 longer hoped to effect any thing by the means at his disposal 
 at home. No fact in history is more certain than this; that 
 the persecution of the Church by the National Assembly, which 
 kindled a civil war in La Vendee, also drove Louis XVI. 
 into an alliance with foreign powers. When the Assembly, 
 by their continual pressure, had forced from the King the 
 sanction of the decree, he exclaimed, "I would rather be a 
 King of a village than King of France on such conditions;" 
 but "patience," he added, "patience, there will soon be an 
 end of this." 
 
 This state of things was all the more to be regretted, be- 
 cause at the very same^time a decided change took place in 
 
 1 Nov. 26th 1790. — = Not. 27th.— at once. — = The fresh powers granted 
 
 And on 27th Jan. a decree that the to Breteuil to treat with foreign 
 
 new elections for the places forfeited governments, bear the date Nov. 20th. 
 by the non-jurors should commence 
 
Ch. v.] raRABEAU TRIES TO SAVE THE MONARCHY. 295 
 
 Mirabeau. The only member of the former Cabinet who had 
 held his ground during the crisis of October, was Count 
 Montmorin, the Minister of foreign affairs. He was an hon- 
 ourable man, well versed in the business of his Department, 
 but utterly devoid of all firmness of character, who had 
 hitherto been Lafayette's obedient friend, and had been pro- 
 tected by him against Mirabeau. He was, however, above 
 all things a faithful adherent of the King; and when he had 
 convinced himself how little he could depend upon the 
 General for the salvation of the Monarchy, he did not he- 
 sitate one moment to place himself, for the King's sake, 
 under the inflvience of Mirabeau. The latter therefore gained 
 what he had long wanted, and once more proceeded with 
 all his power to the work of restoring the monarchy. His 
 projects, notes and propositions, succeeded one another with 
 the greatest rapidity; and before the end of the year, he had 
 developed a grand scheme, i according to which the attack 
 was to commence in all quarters at once. But strong as hs 
 was, he could not undo the past. A whole year of bad! 
 government, and feeble administration of the law, had done 
 their work; — the army was demoralized and the hands ofl 
 the majority in the Assembly bound by anarchical precedents. \ 
 For a whole year, the needy classes had been in a state of 
 agitation, and the patriotic Frenchmen in a state of suspicion ; 
 and lastly, the nation was divided by the Church question, 
 in which JSIirabeau himself had taken the most violent part. 
 His very scheme, therefore, shews the greatness of the danger, 
 and the weakness of the means at his disposal. The begin- 
 ning and end of his memorial was nothing more than a re- 
 commendation to prepare the mind of the public, and we see 
 that he kept back his real plan of operations for the hour 
 of action. It was not till some months later that he brought 
 it forward. He hoped to induce as many as half the De- 
 partments to demand the dissolution of the Assembly; the 
 
 ' Dec. 23U. 
 
296 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 King was to repair to Compiegne, and, under the protection 
 of Bouille's troops, summon a fresh Assembly to revise the 
 Constitution. To this new body certain fixed and unalterable 
 principles were to be offered for acceptance, vis. : two Houses 
 — absolute veto of the King — unconditional subordination of 
 the administrative authorities to the commands of the Ministers 
 — irrevocable abolition of feudal privileges — and confiscation 
 of one-third of the Church property for the use of the State. 
 But he was not even destined to take the preliminary steps; 
 for although the Kiug approved of his proposals, although in 
 accordance with one of these, a secret police was organised 
 in Paris, yet the real wishes of Louis took in the end a 
 different direction. Pie was no longer willing to accept de- 
 liverance from Mirabeau's hand, since the quarrel concerning 
 the Church had placed the barrier of conscience between 
 himself and his dreaded ally. While Montmorin was con- 
 sidting with Mirabeau, the King corresponded with Bouille 
 concerning an escape to the frontier. His only thought was 
 still of deliverance from the trammels of his Parisian abode. 
 And he had indeed only too miicli reason to be impatient, 
 for the licentiousness of the mob was daily increasing. The 
 Royal family itself was several times, in quick succession, 
 insulted; the democratic press out-did itself in coarse and 
 venomous violence. New clubs were continually formed, and 
 grew more and more immoderate in their demands. One 
 speaker advocated the formation of a legion of tyrannicides ; 
 another, the political emancipation of women, and another 
 declared that the Revolution ought to be made permanent, 
 until every body was in the enjoyment of a plentiful income. 
 The Jacobins organized a so-called fraternal society of both 
 men and women from the dregs of the people, whose busi- 
 ness it was to scream and fight when they could not obtain 
 their object by discussion. In the Faubourg St. Antoine, 
 Danton's friend, the brewer Santerre, had completely sup- 
 planted Lafayette in the favour of the National Guard. 
 Street riots, ill-treatment and murder of Royahsts,threatenings 
 
Ch. v.] vacillation of the royal family. 297 
 
 and persecutions of Ecclesiastics, were the order of the day. 
 But the chief object of all the fury and abuse was still the 
 Queen. It was not wonderful that she longed for escape 
 from such a condition as a deliverance from diabolical 
 slavery. 
 
 But what next! It was but gradually that the Queen ar- 
 rived at any clear ideas upon this point. 
 
 She did not wish to conquer by the help of the Emigres, 
 nor to restore the ancicn regime. ' Calm reflexion plainly 
 shewed her that such a restoration was as impossible as for 
 one man to oppose a hundred. She saw that a victory of 
 the Emigres would throw the King into the shade, and 
 deliver her up into the hands of her old adversaries. Above 
 all she was convinced that even the appearance of being in 
 league with the Emigres must irretrievably annihilate the 
 Monarchy in France. If this scheme therefore, as well as 
 Mirabeau's projects, were rejected, two ways still remained 
 open to the Royal family. The one was to fly to La Ven- 
 dee, or the South of France, — to place themselves sword in 
 hand at the head of the catholic insurgents. The other was, 
 to trust to the support of the great Powers, and especially 
 of her brother the Emperor. The Queen had courage enough 
 to take the former course, but the character of the King 
 rendered the adoption of it impossible. Louis regarded civil 
 war, as Mirabeau did bankruptcy, as the very worst of all 
 things, and under no circumstances to be thought of. He 
 revolted at the very thought of wholesale bloodshed, and 
 
 1 On this point,as well as of the published by Hunolstein and Feuillet 
 
 views of the emperor Leopold, the de Conches, may be seen in Histor. 
 
 secretand confidential correspondence Zeitschrift, B. 13, p. 164. In these 
 
 between them (Revue Retrospective collections there are so many spurious 
 
 1835) l^ves not the slightest doubt, passages, that the mere assurance of 
 
 Our reasons for not noticing — in ad- the publishers is not sufficient to 
 
 dition to these letters — the further lend credit to documents which have 
 
 correspondence of the Queen, as no other proofs of authenticity. 
 
298 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 he had not read in vain that Charles I. had lost his head on 
 a charge of commencing a civil vi^ar. If, on the contrary, 
 he fled to the Eastern frontier of his kingdom, a man of 
 Louis' character might for a while conceal from himself that 
 he vs^as just as certainly bringing on a civil war, and a 
 foreign one into the bargain. His idea was to throw himself 
 into a fortress, to surround himself with a few loyal French 
 regiments and some thousands of Austrians, in the first in- 
 stance, as a support. The present state of things was so 
 intolerable that there seemed not the slightest doubt that a 
 great number of Frenchmen would rise at the call of the 
 liberated King. There was no apprehension on the part of 
 the King's advisers of a violent outbreak of National feeling, 
 for they felt themselves quite free from any reproach of 
 treachery to their country, since the foreign troops were 
 only intended to sujsport the good cause of the King, and 
 would certainly have no wish to deprive him of his terri- 
 tory. If by these means they should be victorious, the grand 
 results of the Revolution, — the overthrow of feudalism and 
 the privileges of birth — the unity of the imperial government 
 — equality before the law — emancipation of the soil and of 
 trade — would still be secured. The exact form of the con- 
 stitution would be decided by circumstances. It might be 
 based on the principles of Turgot, or on the more imj^ortant 
 part of the Royal declaration issued on the 23rd of June 1789, 
 according as their present plans turned out; or they might 
 even anticipate the laws of Bonaparte. On these points 
 nothing further was decided than the necessity of securing 
 and strengthening the prerogatives of the King. 
 
 These matters were secretly and restlessly deliberated in 
 the Tuileries, during the winter mouths of the year 1791. 
 No tidings however of what was going on had passed the 
 frontiers of France, except that Marie Antoinette had asked 
 in an indefinite manner at the Court of Vienna and Madrid, 
 whether any help was to be looked for from them. Of their 
 special plan only the first step, the flight to some border 
 
Ch. v.] MIRABEAU defeats the jacobins. 299 
 
 fortress was discussed with Bouille. * Mirabeau's proposals 
 ran parallel with this preliminary act, but were altogether 
 unconnected with it. The old hero of the Revolution had 
 now assumed a decided attitude, and stood openly opposed 
 to the Jacobins in the Assembly on every occasion. This 
 party, after having carried their motion, in January, to com- 
 pel the Ecclesiastics to take the civic oath, made a cor- 
 responding attempt against the Noblesse, by demanding a 
 severe penal law against their continually increasing emigra- 
 tion. Lameth, Barnave, and Duport vied with one another 
 in the violence with which they urged this measure; but 
 they only gave Mirabeau an opportunity of evincing his 
 superiority, not only in the Assembly, but even in the Jaco- 
 bin club, and the law against the Emigres was shelved.'^ 
 
 He succeeded soon afterwards in averting a decree con- 
 ferring on the Assembly the power of choosing a Regent in 
 case of a royal minority. The Court,' who regarded this 
 measure as a strong demonstration on the part of the Or- 
 leanists, seemed especially pleased by this success of the 
 great orator. Montmorin felt confident that the King and 
 
 > It is true that we everywhere (and He took this letter from Bertrand's 
 
 lately again in L. Blanc, V. 164) history, and Bertrand from a contem- 
 
 meet with a letter of Louis to the porary pamphlet. But in the latter, 
 
 King of Prussia, professedly of the as well as in Beaulieu, it bears the 
 
 3d Dec. 1790, in which he calls on date 1791, andthisisevidentlycorrect, 
 
 the latter to summon a congress of and Bertrand's emendation to 1790 
 
 all the Powers with a view of inter- quite impossible, for it mentions the 
 
 vention. This letter is generally taken acceptance of the Constitution, Sept. 
 
 from the Memoires dun homme d'etat, 1791, which Bertrand arbitrarily in- 
 
 and has gained credit through its terprcts as the acceptance of some 
 
 supposed origin from the papers of constitutional decrees. It also men- 
 
 Hardenherg. Beauchamp, the author tions Heymann's sojourn in Berlin, 
 
 of this part of the Memoires has which began in the summer of 1791, 
 
 certainly received a great variety of and a letter which Dumoustier brought 
 
 information, but most of it is in- to Paris, Oct. 1791. — ^ Feb. 28th. 
 complete, or in a wrong connection. 
 
300 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 Queen would trust pi'incipally to Mirabeau's guidance; and 
 the Austrian Ambassador, Mercy, at that time in Brussels, 
 used all his influence in the same direction.* But the King 
 by no means gave up his correspondence with Bouille; and 
 although the latter earnestly warned him against undertaking 
 a secret fliffht from Paris, he received a letter from Louis 
 about the 10th of March, directing him to prepare the for- 
 tress of Montmedy for the reception of the King, towards 
 the end of April. So uncertain and wavering was Louis' 
 confidence in Mirabeau. 
 
 Under these circumstances, we must regard it as fortunate 
 for the great orator that his life came to an end at the mo- 
 ment that the great object of his life became unattainable. 
 Worn out by all that most c[uickly consumes the strength 
 of man — over-exertion, excitement and voluptuous pleasure — 
 he died after a short illness on the 4th of April 1791. The 
 first period of the Revolution closed with his existence. 
 The aims of those who rushed forward to fill up the vacancy 
 occasioned by his death, were not long left doubtful. Mira- 
 beau had directed all his efi'orts to the creation of a parliar 
 mentary government, and of a Ministry formed from the 
 majority of the Keprescntatives of the people; three days 
 after his death, liobespierre called upon the National Assem- 
 bly to prohibit any deputy from undertaking the office of 
 Minister for the next four years. On the principles of 1789 
 it was impossible to rear the fabric of legal order; every- 
 thing tended towards an outbreak. 
 
 The licence of the democrats in Paris no longer knew any 
 bounds. A Papal Breve which rejected the civil constitution 
 of the Clei'gy was the signal for incessant riots. The mob 
 stormed the monasteries and whipped the nuns ; the religious 
 services, which the orthodox catholics celebrated in a private 
 church, were interrupted by repeated acts of violence; the 
 Cordeliers, in a dictatorial manner, called upon the King to 
 
 ' This is clearly proved by his letters to La Marck of April 4th and 10th. 
 
Ch. v.] brutality of the mob. 301 
 
 drive the traitorous priests out of his chapel. Wherever 
 Jacobin elements existed in the provinces, similar scenes 
 occurred. In Bordeaux the Sisters of mercy w^ere plunged 
 into the river and drawn out again half dead; and a great 
 number of the country priests narrowly escaped death at 
 the hands of their democratic parishioners. The King, who 
 had meanwhile j)ostponed his flight on other grounds, en- 
 deavoured at any rate to escape these annoyances; and de- 
 clared his intention of celebrating Easter at St. Cloud, to 
 avoid giving offence in Paris by employing a non-juring 
 priest. But his oppressors had suspected his wishes even 
 longer than he had entertained them. When he was on the 
 point of driving out of Paris, the mob seized the reins 
 of his horses, the National Guard refused to interfere, and 
 even Lafayette was not able to clear the way for him. The 
 King was obliged to return home, and was informed that he 
 would not be allowed to fly from his country to the Emigres; 
 and that it would be the worse for him if he and the Queen 
 did not receive the Holy Sacrament from a priest who had 
 taken the oath. 
 
 This was a little too much even for those who had hitherto 
 been leaders of the Left. Lafayette, who had dviring the 
 last year been violently attacked by the democratic press, 
 beheld with terror the decline of his popularity. Barnave 
 had some months before attempted a reconciliation with 
 Montmorin, and shrank back in terror from the increasinsf 
 coarseness and brutality of the revolutionary movement. ' 
 The Lameths and Duport observed, that the subordinate 
 leaders, whom they had hitherto used as their tools, were 
 independently directing the insurgents, and superseding them 
 on their own ground. They were no longer sure of pre- 
 dominance in the Jacobin club, of which they were them- 
 
 ' Montmorin's Letters. The universally current story that Barnave was 
 suddenly converted in the travelling carriage of the Queen by the emotion 
 caused by her grief, is only a little biographical effect. 
 
302 COMPLETION OP THE CONSTITUTION. [Book IF. 
 
 selves the founders. Since the death of Mirabeaii too, they 
 had reached the most critical point in the life of a demagogue; 
 they were on the point of taking the helm of the State, and 
 therefore began to look with very different eyes on the en- 
 grines of destruction which their hand had formed. Alexander 
 Lameth had several conferences with Montmorin; the war 
 minister, Duportail, hitherto an ally of Lafayette's, began to 
 turn towards the rising sun, and expressed his wish to be 
 guided by Lameth or Duport alone. In short, the prospect 
 of forming a Ministry awakened conservative ideas in these 
 chiefs of the sovereign people. Their general policy re- 
 mained the same, but both they and Lafayette, with his 
 associates, consented to confer with the Ministers as to the 
 best means of calming the jjopular ferment. Lafayette adopted 
 the extreme measure of sending in his resignation in order 
 to test the amount of his influence over the National Guard. 
 As the majority of the battalions assured him of their con- 
 tinued devotion, he once more entered upon his office, and 
 was able to give a certain guarantee for the preservation of 
 j)ublic order. The King however had to submit to very hard 
 conditions; no mention was to be made of the journey to 
 St. Cloud, but on the contrary, Louis was obliged to go to 
 mass in his parish church in Paris, and Montmorin sent a 
 circular note to all the Courts of Europe, in which the King 
 expressed his warm admiration of the constitvition, and as- 
 sured them of his personal freedom. ' We may judge from 
 these fiicts how strong was the suspicion entertained against 
 the plans of the Court, and how correct in the main were 
 the conjectures formed respecting them. The Jacobins were 
 more especially afraid of the long-detested Bouille. The war 
 Minister himself did every thing to weaken that General by 
 taking from him his two most trustworthy regiments, and 
 procuring a decree from the Assembly, tliat the soldiers could 
 
 ' The correspondence between La Marck now sViows the utter ground- 
 lessness of the report reUited by Bertrand de Molleville. 
 
Cn. v.] THE KING MEDITATES FLIGHT. 303 
 
 not be forbidden to frequent the clubs. The desired effect 
 was rapidly produced; and after a few weeks Bouille re- 
 ported to the King, that his troops had lost all discipline, 
 and become thoroughly democratic in their sentiments. 
 
 But the Court was no longer to be diverted from its 
 purpose. Soon after Mirabeau's death, and probably about 
 the beginning of April, Mercy had been requested to hold 
 10,000 men in readiness on the Belgian frontier, to be em- 
 ployed in case of need for the protection of the King. The 
 Emperor Leopold consented to do this, though he watched 
 with great anxiety the development of the plan. He feared 
 the chances of flight, and shuddered at the possible conse- 
 quences of failure. For several months he had been en- 
 deavouring to discover some safe course of action. He rightly 
 judged, that an attack on the part of the Emigres, by reviving 
 the image of the old feudal State, would exasperate the mass 
 of the nation against the King, as the probable accomplice 
 of their detested assailants. In strict accordance with the 
 sentiments of his Sister, therefore, he deterred the Count 
 d'Artois from all military operations, and endeavoured to 
 induce the other neighbours of France to act in concert with 
 himself. This was no easy task, since all the complications 
 and disagreements which we have spoken of in connection 
 with the year 1790 still continued to exist, and in some 
 points with increased bitterness. It was a fortunate cir- 
 cumstance for the Emperor that the person of the greatest 
 weight in this affair — the King of Prussia— took an interest 
 in the fate of Louis and Marie Antoinette from mere feelings 
 of humanity, independently of all political considerations. 
 After he had assured himself of the neutrality of England, 
 Leopold might fairly hope, in spite of all his other difficul- 
 ties, to have his hands free for the execution of his plans 
 in France. 
 
 These were for the present of a very innocent nature. 
 His own habitual tendencies, the insecm-ity of his position 
 in other respects, and his personal views, all contributed to 
 
304 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. Book II. 
 
 render him averse to war. He hoped to attain his object 
 by intimidation alone. In the first place Louis's Bourbon 
 cousins of Spain, Naples and Parma, were to protest against 
 the constraint put upon him. Then, in order to give weight 
 to this protest, troops were to advance from all sides to the 
 French borders. Not only Spain but Sardinia, Switzerland, 
 and several German Princes, had bound themselves to set 
 an army on foot for this jjurpose; and the Emperor, judging 
 from the disinclination to war manifested by the Jacobins 
 in 1790, had no doubt that all the Parisians would call on 
 the King to mediate; — that the Royalists on the borders 
 would rise in arms, and that in this way the King would 
 easily find an opportunity of improving his position. He 
 therefore implored the Queen quietly to await at Paris the 
 results of these events, and not expose herself to the dangers 
 of an attempt at flight.^ 
 
 These views seemed all the more worthy of consideration 
 at that time — the end of May — because the change of jpur- 
 pose, referred to above, in the Jacobin leaders, seemed, in 
 the course of that month to have proceeded very rapidly. 
 Duport, Barnave, and the Lameths, attached themselves more 
 and more closely to the club of 1789, and to Lafayette, 
 whose attitude towards the Parisian Demagogues became 
 daily more hostile. The National Assembly issued severe 
 decrees against the abuse of petitions and placards ; they 
 were even induced by the general excitement to relax their 
 severity towards the non-juring priests, and gave Orders to 
 suspend prosecutions for the present. The schism in the 
 
 ' Correspondence between Leopold d'Artois. He was only instructed to 
 
 and Marie Antoinette. The letter of admonish d'Artois to be quiet. — 
 
 the Emperor, and the answer of The lucubrations of Buchez' (Sd Edit, 
 
 the Queen of June 1st, show that IV. 315) are still farther from the 
 
 Bcrtrand is mistaken when he sup- truth, as are also those of Louis 
 
 poses that the object of Dnrfort's Blanc, V. 32G, who here, as every 
 
 mission was to eflect an under- where, places blind confidence in the 
 
 standing between the Queen and Itunime d'Ktat. 
 
Cir. v.] TRIUMPH OF ROBESPIERRE. 305 
 
 Left thus caused, was fully declared about the middle of 
 the month, when Robespierre brought forward a motion that 
 no member of the present Assembly should be eligible for 
 the next. The chiefs of 1789 and the Lameths opposed 
 the measure, but it was popular with the majority of in- 
 fluential deputies, who thus gained an honourable excuse for 
 not offering themselves for re-election; it was joyfully adopted 
 by the Eight, who saw in it the annihilation of their hated 
 opponents ; and lastly, it was energetically supported by the 
 strangers' gallery, over which Lameth had no longer any 
 power, since he ceased to lead the extreme Left. Robespierre 
 triumphed. This was the first occasion on which he had 
 taken the lead in the Assembly, and from this time forward 
 he continued to be an important personage, and already 
 announced from the rostra that whoever opposed him was 
 guUty of a crime. against liberty. 
 
 But the Queen placed none the greater confidence in 
 Robespierre's new opponents Lafayette and the Lameths. 
 She looked for no aid from them in effecting a radical change 
 in the constitution favourable to Monarchy. Their want of 
 firmness of principle had been too glaringly manifested, and 
 their material power was smaE, as soon as they ceased to 
 control the great mass of the proletaries. She saw no reason 
 therefore to await in Paris, as the Emperor wished, the 
 effect of an armed protest. She moreover remarked that 
 the King was to play a very subordinate part in this scheme ; 
 whereas to bring the crisis to a satisfactory termination, it 
 would be essential that he should outshine all others in strength 
 and enterprising courage. She therefore wrote to the Emperor 
 on the 1st of June, that she intended to abide by her original 
 plan, and hoped to escape, about the 20th, from Paris to 
 Montmedy; and she repeatedly begged him to hold a force 
 of some 10,000 men on the frontier. Leopold replied on 
 the 12th, that he could not get rid of his anxiety, but that 
 every thing should be done according to her wishes. Until 
 she had escaped from Paris therefore, he said, no one would 
 
 I. u 
 
306 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 stir ; but that subsequently to that event, she might reckon on 
 Sardinia, Switzerland, and all the German forces on the 
 Rhine frontier, especially the Prussian troops in Wesel;' he 
 added that Count Mercy had received orders to support, 
 her with the entire Belgian army. But before this letter 
 reached the hands of the Queen, the Eoyal family had begun 
 their flight from Paris in the night of the 20th. 
 
 To luiderstand the issue of this event and the effect which 
 it produced, it is not sufficient to know the intentions of 
 Louis XVI. The Chief point of consideration is the light 
 in which it was regarded throughout the country. During 
 the preceding year, the minds of men in France had been 
 excited by fears of foreign countries and the Emigres. Every 
 one thought, that as soon as the King had reached the 
 frontier he would unite with d'Artois, introduce a hundred 
 thousand foreign soldiers into the kingdom, and re-establish, 
 Feudalism in the midst of blood and ruin. Such a prospect 
 naturally roused not only the men of the clubs — the majority 
 of whom expected to be hung on the restoration of order — 
 and the proletaries, who in a regular state of things would 
 cease to be su^jported at the cost of the State; that these 
 should be hostile to Louis would, under all circumstances, 
 have been a matter of course. Now, however, the real friends 
 of their country feared to see France subjected to foreign 
 influences, and strijjped joerhaps of its frontier provinces. 
 The peasants feared the restoration of tithes, feudal privileges, 
 and grinding taxes; the burghers rememl^ered the insolence 
 of the Noblesse, who would be again sj^itting from the boxes 
 ufjon the heads of the cavaillc in the j)arterre; the soldiers 
 dreamed once more of flogging, a low rate of piay, and ex- 
 clusion from officers' commissions. Their new acquisitions 
 seemed to be slipping from the grasp of the purchasers of 
 Eclesiastioal property, for which about 200 millions had 
 
 1 This was incorrect. The l^ing of Prussia had no intention at this 
 time of interfering in tlie Frencli troubles. 
 
Ch. v.] effects of the KING'S FLIGHT. 307 
 
 already been paid. All the enthusiasm, in fact, and all the 
 public spirit, which still existed in the nation was stirred by 
 the thought of freedom, human rights and patriotism ; a return 
 to the old system, brought about by foreign power, seemed 
 to them both a material and spiritual suicide on the part 
 of the nation. Not that the great majority were any longer 
 blind to the deficiencies and mistakes of the Revolution. 
 The state of things at which Ecclesiastical and Financial 
 affairs had arrived, led the great mass of the citizens eagerly 
 to desire the restoration of order and government; and the 
 feeling in favour of monarchy, which had manifested itself 
 a year before at the Federative festival, still existed un- 
 changed and unimpaired. But they had not experience enough 
 to trace the prevalent disorder, with any certainty or clearness, 
 to its true source — vie. the blunders of the National- Assem- 
 bly ; and they regarded the non-completion of the constitution, 
 and not the principles on which it was founded, as the origin 
 of their misery. And now that the completion of it was 
 close at hand, the King separated himself from the Assembly. 
 Yet the issue would have been doubtful, if Louis could have 
 persuaded peofile that he had no wishes in common with 
 the Emigres. But as all the world believed the very reverse, 
 and the Emigres themselves proclaimed the contrary with 
 noisy zeal, the unhapj)y Monarch, at the very moment of 
 his attempted escape, found himself alone amidst the millions 
 of his subjects, the universal object of suspicion, rage and 
 execration. 
 
 The first intelligence of his flight fell like a thunderbolt 
 on the National Assembly; and it was only gradually that 
 its members resumed the majestic repose of which we read 
 in so many subsequent rejjorts. The greatness of their sins 
 against the King became the clearer to them, tlie more likely 
 it now became that they should have to answer for them. 
 For the first time they spoke in respectful terms of 
 Louis, at the very moment when they had openly to put 
 themselves on their defence against his attack. The distinc- 
 
 U2 
 
308 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 tions of party were once more lost-siglit of; and the universal 
 watchword was the defence of the country against foreigners. 
 So little was known in the Assembly of the intentions of 
 Louis, that even the Eight joined in the same oaths of 
 fidelity to the Nation with their late adversaries. The Left 
 observed silence; the Jacobins assumed an attitude of ex- 
 pectation, and the street clubs disappeared. For the present 
 the National Assembly endeavoured to maintain the forms 
 of government, and instructed the Ministers to continue 
 their functions; a new oath of fidelity was administered to 
 all the officers, and orders were sent in all directions to 
 stop the King. 
 
 On the 24th intelligence was received that Louis had been 
 several times recognised on the road, and at last arrested 
 at Vareniies. This had taken place under the very eyes of 
 Bouille's dragoons, not a man of whom would stir a finger 
 to prevent it. From the, hill above the town, the son of 
 the General saw the Royal carriage returning through the 
 valley, and one of his cavalry regiments was willing to hasten 
 to their rescue. But in all the neiahbourins- Tillages the 
 alarm bells were already ringing, and every by-road brought 
 armed peasants to the scene of action; and in a fevs^ hours 
 there were six thousand of them between the King and his 
 friends. Li two days Bouille himself was no longer safe, 
 the very ground trembled under him; and, threatened by 
 every one as a traitor, he fled a cross the frontier. Wher- 
 ever the news was spread it occasioned a similar convul- 
 sion of feeling. Soldiers and citizens were animated with 
 the same sentiments, and the Nobles and Officers were com- 
 p)elled to join them, or were driven out of the country. The 
 alarm was sounded from the Flemish borders to the Pyre- 
 nees, and in Normandy, the most loyal province, every town 
 and every village called out its Burgher Guard. Li the 
 fortresses, both men and women employed themselves in re- 
 pairing the defences; in the villages the peasants promised 
 to meet the enemy, if necessary, with scythes and axes; and 
 
Ch. v.] arrest of the king. 309 
 
 large numbers of the Burgher guards expressed their readi- 
 ness to march out as national volunteers for the defence of 
 the borders. Whereupon the Austrians remained in their 
 quarters, and the Spaniards, who had shown themselves on 
 the frontier, disappeared behind the mountains. France be- 
 came aware that four millions of men stood under arms for the 
 defence of national independence. The National Assembly 
 seized the opportunity of ordering a uniform organisation 
 of the Burgher Guards throughout the kingdom, and the 
 formation of 169 battalions of national volunteers under of- 
 ficers chosen by themselves; sixty of which were in a few 
 weeks sent into garrison on the northern frontier.' 
 
 No sooner had the King returned to the Tuileries, than 
 it became evident that the excitement and indignation of 
 the people was directed not against him or his throne, but 
 against his supposed alliance with the Emigres: and as this 
 connection seemed dissolved by his arrest, the great mass of 
 citizens and peasants immediately returned to their usual 
 course of daily life. A noisy commotion was still kept up 
 for a time by the political factions, the clubs, and the loose 
 rabble of Paris, which formed the standing army for every 
 revolt. These people thought that the time was now come 
 to break down all resistance. Immediately after the appre- 
 hension of Louis, the boldest bandits among them had en- 
 deavoured to persuade the people to murder the Royal Fa- 
 mily on their entrance into Paris, and thereby cut the Gordian 
 knot. The consecjuence was, that the National Assembly, 
 with the view of disarming the assassins, at first avoided 
 taking any steps for the preservation of the throne.^ The 
 more cautious demagogues, meanwhile, were more zealously 
 at work to efi'ect the abolition of Monarchy and the declara- 
 tion of the Republic. Several different cliques appeared side 
 by side. The club of the Cordeliers, of which Danton was 
 the leader, published a declaration, that every Frenchman 
 
 1 Poisson, I. 332. — ^ Montmorin to La Marck. 
 
310 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 was worthy of death, who was still willing to have a lord 
 and a tyrant over him, and that their club counted as many 
 tyrannicides as members. Some days afterwards, they sent 
 an address to the National Assembly formally proposing the 
 adopition of a Republican Constitution. Brissot's widely cir- 
 culated journal, "The French patriot," zealously supported 
 them. Its editor had been for many years one of those lite- 
 rary adventurers, of whom this age produced so many. He 
 had written abusive articles against the Court in London — 
 studied republicanism in America, — and since 1789 played 
 an important part in the ]\Iunicipality of Paris. He had an 
 easy and jolausible style, great activity in business, kind- 
 heartedness and unselfishness in his personal relations. But 
 in public affairs, he was driven by a restless ambition, and 
 the shallower his character and acquirements, the more nu- 
 merous and extensive were the plans he set on foot. He 
 was one of those men who find pleasure in mere excite- 
 ment, irrespective of results; and though inimoved by any 
 other passion, he recognised no moral restraint which could 
 moderate his ambition. He therefore played the demagogue 
 in earnest; flattered the mob by representing property as 
 a hateful privilege, and the needy as the only true champions 
 of freedom. He declared that he saw no other means of 
 salvation than in a thorough sweej^ing away of obsolete in- 
 stitutions, and a removal of an hereditary throne from the 
 State, as the last remnant of Feudalism. 
 
 Itobespierre jiursued tlie same object with more caution ; and 
 while he almost contemptuously repudiated the word Re- 
 public, he endeavoured to clear the way to it of every hin- 
 drance and danger. Among the Jacobins he made a general 
 accusation against his colleagues in the National Assembly, 
 who were almost all, he said, hostile to the Revolution. 
 When he came to speak of his own merits, and declared 
 that by his liberality and frankness he had sharpened a 
 thousand daggers against his own breast, every member of 
 the Club took an oath to defend the life of Robespierre. 
 
Ch. v.] MARAT'S BLOODY PLANS. 311 
 
 He then called upon the National Assembly to bring the 
 King and Queen to trial;— and to consult the wishes of the 
 country with respect to the future form of government. But 
 of all the plans proposed, that of Marat was the shortest and 
 simplest. He delared that there was but one means of rescue 
 from the wide-spread treason, vis. to appoint a Military 
 Tribune with absolute power, who would forthwith make 
 an end of all traitors and semi-traitors, among whom he* 
 aud his associates more especially reckoned those who were 
 at present in power, — Lafayette, Badly, Barnave, and the 
 Lameths. "The National Guard," cried Desmoulins, "in 
 its present organisation, is a dead-weight ou the breast of 
 the people, — we may gather their sentiments from the hleii- 
 de-Hoi colour of their uniforms, — aud there will be no im- 
 provement until their shakos have been superseded by the 
 woollen caps of the peojjle." We cannot but call to mind, 
 at this point, that BaUly aud the Lameths had four weeks 
 before dispersed the associations of workmen, closed the 
 public workshops, and removed the strange workmen from 
 Paris, by the aid of the National Guard. Exactly the same 
 measure was in 1848 the signal for the most terrible con- 
 tests — the street fights of June. Yet in 1791 the distress 
 of the workmen was greater — their irritation was more re- 
 cent and deeper — and their demands equally extensive. If 
 theu' members and discipline were weaker than in 1848, this 
 disadvantage was fully outweighed by the more complete 
 derangement of all the ordinary relations of life. Whoever 
 was not willing to give up rights and property, law and 
 morals, was obliged to take the side of the King, whether 
 they regarded him as worthy of honour or contempt — as a 
 suffering martyr or an unmasked conspirator. 
 
 Those who had hitherto formed the majority of the Na- 
 tional Assembly were thoroughly convinced of this, and there- 
 fore entered into a still closer union with one another. 
 The Right scai-cely took any part in the deliberations, 
 but the club of 1789 made common cause with Lameth, 
 
 1 
 
312 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 Barnave, and their adherents. The hitter were only pursuing 
 the course which they had entered upon in April: Barnave 
 exactly expressed their sentiments, when he said, on the 15th., 
 that whoever, after the overthrow of every species of aristo- 
 cracy, was desirous of further revolutionary changes, could 
 only be aiming at the ruin of all proprietors. Lafayette 
 also declared, on hearing sentiments of a republican tendency 
 'expressed in his presence: "If you kill the King to day, I 
 will place the Dauphin on the throne to-morrow, with the aid 
 of the National Guard." In the National Assembly the mod- 
 erate party had nearly a tenfold majority over the extreme 
 Left; the National Guard in Paris was at their disposal 
 against every attack of the Democrats; and in the country 
 at large the predominance of the Monarchical party was 
 beyond a doubt. In short, there was no lack either of good 
 win or of external means, but they wanted the most essen- 
 tial things of all — good conscience and firmness of purpose. 
 The Lameth party. had been too long at the head of all the 
 enemies of the King, and had too frequently denounced the 
 Throne as the adversary of every kind of liberty. They had 
 been too long accustomed to regard the humiliation of the 
 Crown as their highest merit, and to listen with greedy ears 
 for the noisy applause of the galleries. They now, there- 
 fore, thought themselves obliged to apologise to the people 
 for every step they took in favour of the Monarchy. In 
 the interests of order they wished to support the King, but 
 in doing so they desired to seem as little royalist as pos- 
 sible. They therefore, in the first place, ' ordered the arrest 
 of the King, and the institution of judicial proceedings against 
 him. Their Committees were about to declare the journey 
 of the King a crime, which only the inviolability of Louis 
 prevented them from punishing; and it was not until they 
 were reminded that the Queen would be thereby exposed 
 to every kind of persecution, that they looked about for 
 some other construction. Meanwhile the democratic ex- 
 citement in Paris continued to increase, and the Jacobin club, 
 
Ch. v.] reaction in favour of monarchy. 313 
 
 which had for a time been reconquered by its old leaders, 
 deserted to Robespierre; every day which the Assembly 
 wasted in irresolntion added strength to the republican party. 
 At the same time, the Emperor Leopold issued a proclama- 
 tion at Padua, in which he earnestly calls on all the Powers 
 to cooperate for the deliverance of Louis. It was known, 
 too, that the King of Sweden and General Bauille were 
 planning an expedition against the Flemish or Norman 
 coast, and the Lameths, with double terror, now saw the war 
 impending, which they had already so greatly feared in 1790. 
 At last the report of the Committees was brought up; it 
 recommended that Louis should, for the present, be sus- 
 pended until he had accepted the Constitution, but that 
 BouUle should be immediately proceeded against for high 
 treason. The future restoration of Louis was hereby indi- 
 rectly implied, but the Committee did not dare to make an 
 express declaration of his innocence. 
 
 Li whatever light we may regard this transaction, we shall 
 find it as unjust as it was unwise. Of its legality we 
 need say nothing; and as to its expediency, it was, as we 
 have seen, even at that time evident, that the proclamation 
 of the Republic under existing circumstances would leave no 
 other choice than a military dictatorship over the citizens, 
 or mob rule over the possessors of property. The existence 
 of liberty and equal rights was bound up with the preser- 
 vation of the hereditary Monarchy. Barnave was perfectly 
 aware of this, and declared his conviction from the rostra 
 in eloquent words. But having once arrived at the con- 
 clusion that the Monarchy ought to be restored, both he 
 and all who entertained similar sentiments were bound by 
 all the rules of policy, honour, and even selfishness, to 
 uphold its cause with energy, openness and dignity. For 
 every one who at that period defended the Monarchy was 
 sure to draw upon himself the deadly emnity of the demo- 
 crats, and a mere regard for self-preservation should have 
 led him to do his utmost to strengthen the foundation of 
 
3U COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 the throne. It was indeed a most melancholy spectacle to 
 see such an assembly, on a question of such vital imjDor- 
 tance, not doubting, indeed, what they ought to do, but 
 either ashamed or afraid of expressing their convictions. At 
 the very moment in which they chose their position^ they 
 were really undermining it; if they wished to j)reserve the 
 Constitution, which entrusted the State to the King and the 
 National Assembly in common, they were no more justified 
 in giving up the King than the Assembly. 
 
 But the majority of the National Assembly considered that 
 by their motion of the 13th of July they had gone to the 
 very extreme of conservative boldness, and they passed it 
 on the 15th after a stormy debate. They immediately be- 
 came aware of what they ought to have foreseen, that their 
 weakness had only facilitated the future success of the de- 
 mocracy, but had by no means aj)peased the present fury 
 of the democrats. Every one knew that a revolt would cer- 
 tainly take place. A pretext for it was afforded by a peti- 
 tion for the deposition of Louis XVI., drawn up by Brissot, 
 accompained by a declaration no longer to acknowledge him 
 as King. This document was to be placed in the Champ 
 de Mars, and after having been covered by the signatures 
 of the sovereign Peojile, was to be laid before the Deputies 
 for their guidance. If this plan succeeded — if the signatures 
 were numerous, and those who brought up the petition were 
 accompanied by large masses of the people, the Assembly 
 would quickly l^ecome aware of the irresistible force of the 
 popular will. Dcsmoulins wrote in those days that the un- 
 faithful Representatives of the people were fair game; and 
 ^larat called upon the people to cut of the thumbs of the 
 prelates and nobles; and as to the Barnaves, the Sieyes and 
 their adherents — to impale them alive! Meanwhile it became 
 evident what the National Assembly might have done at . 
 that time, if it had chosen. The very attack which the King 
 had made upon it by his attempted flight, had raised its 
 authority to the height which it had occupied during the 
 
Ch. v.] energetic action of the national guard. 315 
 
 first days of the Eevolution. When on the 16th it Ccalled 
 upon the Parisian authorities to take energetic measures for 
 the preservation of order, the Municipality, the Bourgeoisie 
 and the National Guard obeyed without hesitation. The ex- 
 pidsion of the strange workmen was immediately carried out 
 to its full extent. The impression thus made was so great, 
 that the Jacobin club — cautious, like its honoured member 
 Robespierre — withdrew from the Republicans. On the follow- 
 ing morning the National Guard occupied the Place de la 
 Bastille, in order to isolate the Faubourg St. Antoine; never- 
 theless about 6000 men assembled on the Champ de Mars 
 in the afternoon for the purpose of signing the petition. 
 Thereuj)on the Municipality proclaimed martial law, the 
 National Guard were despatched to clear the ground; and 
 when the petitioners resisted, by throwing stones and firing 
 a few shots, the National Guard put them to flight by a 
 sharp volley of musketry, by which twelve '^ of the mob were 
 killed. The terror which this occurrence caused spread like 
 an electric shock through the whole democratic party ; Marat 
 hid himself in a cellar; — Desmoulins suspended his journal — 
 Danton went off to his country seat, and Robesjjierre did 
 not dare to sleep at home. They all expected the imme- 
 diate dissolution of the clubs, and the restoration of the 
 Royal power, and not one of them would have dared to 
 resist. 
 
 But they gave their opponents too much credit for energy 
 
 ' Protocol of the Commune. The can be no doubt of the material 
 
 important point in these occurrences importance of the revolt. And Louis 
 
 is not to us the question afterwards Blanc, who has lately renewed the 
 
 debated by the Revolutionary Tribu- complaint that a number of peaceful 
 
 nal, as to how far Lafayette and petitioners were shot down, might 
 
 Bailly were legally entitled to take have learned from the 20th June 
 
 the measures — (proclamation of mar- and the 31st May, that it is not 
 
 tial-law— firing with blanlc cartridges always the least dangerous rebellions 
 
 — firing with ball) — they adopted, which began with peaceful petitions. 
 This is a matter of dispute, but there 
 
316 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 of purpose. Instead of closing the clubs, the Lameths hoped 
 to outdo the Jacobins by a moderate opposition club, which 
 they opened in the Monastery of the Feuillants. Instead 
 of curbing the press during the prevalent excitement, they 
 contented themselves by issuing a feeble warning in legal 
 form. And when the revision of the Constitution came to 
 be discussed, their political incapacity was fully displayed. 
 
 We have noticed the laws M'hich had already been enacted, 
 and have seen that they made every government, whether 
 monarchy or republic, impossible. They gave to every in- 
 dividual whether strong or weak, honest or criminal, ju- 
 dicious or easily led astray, entire and uncontrolled license. 
 Now that the party which had passed these laws had to rule 
 by them, their utter futility was felt at every step. When 
 once they had decided to uphold Louis XVI., they ought 
 certainly not to have hesitated for a single hour as to their 
 course of action. In the state of things in which they found 
 themselves, they should have kept the King under lock and 
 key, that he might not escape, as it were, out of the Con- 
 stitution, or cease to exercise his executive power. They 
 ought to have bound him fast, in order to compel him to 
 rule. The absurdity was palpable; they must either summon 
 another person to the throne or alter the laws. 
 
 Louis, on his side, at a moment when he was perfectly 
 free, in the very protest which he signed before his flight, 
 had left a programme behind him, and had enumerated the 
 series of laws which he was ready to acknowledge. These 
 were the decrees which he had signed before the 6th of Octo- 
 ber — viz. the annihilation of Feudalism, — the "Rights of man" 
 — the popular representation in one Chamber, with the right 
 of granting taxes, of initiating laws and of impeaching min- 
 isters; — and lastly, the suspensive veto. Mirabeau would 
 have objected that this programme was too democratic for 
 a large and demoralized State. But it was, in fact, exactly 
 suited to meet the views of the majority at that time; it 
 embraced the positive principles of the Revolution in their 
 
Cn. v.] PROPOSED REFOKMS IM THE CONSTITUTION. 317 
 
 full extent, and afforded a possibility, at least, of laying the 
 foundation of a more peaceful government. It restored to 
 the King his influence over the law, the army and the in- 
 ternal administration; to the Nobility their legal existence; 
 and to the Church its canonical Constitution. 
 
 The party leaders were well aware of this, and Malouet, 
 on behalf of the Right, endeavoured to come to an under- 
 standing with Barnave and Chapelier, who declared them- 
 selves ready to promote a thorough reform of the Constitu- 
 tion. But on both sides they were left in the lurch by a 
 great body of their respective parties. The chief wish of 
 the members of the Left, at that time, was to disconnect 
 themselves with the reaction of the 17th of July, and to 
 place their character, — as friends of freedom and the people 
 — beyond a doubt. Barnave had forewarned Malouet of this 
 tendency, and had sounded him as to the possibility of a 
 union between the club of 1789 and the Right, and Malouet, 
 who was really desirous of a final settlement, held out hopes. 
 At the first division, however, the latter learned that his own 
 party was in no degree superior to the Left, either in po- 
 litical insight or morality. At the second reading, the Right 
 assumed the same attitude as the Austrians took up in 
 St. Paul's Church at Frankfort in 1848; they refused to co- 
 operate in any kind of reform, in order that the Constitu- 
 tion which they hated might perish as soon as possible by 
 its own worthlessness. It soon became evident that the only 
 impulse that could further the revision was to proceed from 
 the j)olicy of foreign countries. 
 
 The present possessors of power in France feared the 
 outbreak of war, for they saw that it afforded but little hope 
 of success abroad, and would inevitably raise the demagogues 
 to power at home. They watched every step of the Emperor 
 with anxious attention — compelled the King and Queen to 
 exhort him to peace, and therefore mitigated the severity of 
 the durance in which the Royal 'captives were held. They 
 even attempted to negotiate with Count d'Artois, and in spite 
 
318 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 of the growth of the armed Emigratiou, which after the 
 20th of June became ahnost a matter of fashion with the 
 NoVJesse, the Emigrants were only threatened with a higher 
 rate of taxation of their estates. These mild proceedings, 
 however, had not the least effect. A little army gathered 
 round the French Princes in Coblentz to which the Rhenish 
 Sovereigns gave every possible assistance, and Sweden and 
 Russia sent considerable sums of money. At the same time 
 the religious excitement in La Vendee assiuned a more and 
 more threatening aspect. The jieasants shunned the sworn 
 priests as if they had been lepers — withdrew themselves into 
 the woods from the control of the Constitutional authorities, 
 — and refused tlie payment of taxes and military service. 
 _ Most of the border fortresses were in an indefensible condi- 
 tion, since, in spite of all decrees, neither sufficient money 
 nor effectual superintendence could be found to put them 
 into pro'per condition. The regiments on the German fron- 
 tier, especially, had been reduced to the lowest degree of 
 disorder by the shock of the King's flight; most of the of- 
 ficers had emigrated, and the soldiers were badly armed, 
 and without discipline. It is true that a decree' had been 
 issued on the 4th of July to jjlace the army on a complete 
 war-footing, but there was still a deficiency of '30,000 men. 
 On the 28th, the National Guard of the Kingdom was called 
 upon to furnish 100,000 Volunteers for ]iidd service; but 
 they came forward very slowly, and moreover deprived the 
 regiments of their recruiting parties. Under such circum- 
 stances a war with Germany would certainly have been 
 hazardous. 
 
 These clouds however soon dispersed. The Emperor 
 Leopold was informed of the sentiments of the ruling party 
 in Paris, and had other very important reasons (of which 
 we shall speak hereafter) to keep the peace. He feared the 
 internal dangers to France, which would result from a war, 
 quite as nuich as the Lanieths. Brissot, from an opposite 
 point of view, so entirely shared these opinions, that he 
 
Ch.V.] insufficient revision of the constitution. 319 
 
 began to sound the war-trumpet in the Jacobin ch\b as early 
 as the beginning of July. The Emperor contented himself 
 with continviing his diplomatic manifestations, and saw with 
 pleasure their effect on the leaders of the French Assembly ; 
 but he was resolved in no case to use any other weapons 
 than threats. 
 
 Under such circumstances the revision of the Constitution 
 in Paris was summarily carried on. It is not necessary here 
 to recapitulate its contents, since the essential points have 
 been already noticed at the time when they were first brought 
 forward, and those which we have not touched upon made 
 no alteration in its general character. The central authori- 
 ties, like those of the Communes and Departments, were 
 entirely re-constructed subsequently to the month of Axigust 
 1790. In both cases the complicated and clumsy structure 
 of the old State, which had gradually grown up in the course 
 of years, was levelled with the ground. Simplicity, dis- 
 tinctness, and suitability to the object in view, were made 
 the sole guiding principles in the new organization — the 
 framework of which has been partly retained to the j^ie- 
 sent day. Many errors were, however, committed in filling 
 up the details, as we have already observed in connection 
 with the Tribunals and the local Magistracies. -Insubordina- 
 tion of inferior authorities towards their superiors on the 
 one hand, and servile dependence of all Authorities to the 
 capricious humours of the populace, on the other, characterize 
 every portion of the new democracy. The general result was 
 of a nature entirely to justify the saying of the Empress 
 Catharine, that in France there were 1200 legislators, whom 
 no one obeyed but the King. 
 
 In the revision itself no change was made of any import- 
 tance; the little that was done was fiwourable, not to the 
 throne, but to the democracy. A short time before the flight 
 of the King, the nomination of electors for the new legis- 
 lative body had already taken place in most of the Depart- 
 ments. As these elections were carried on according to the 
 
320 COMPLETION OF THE CONSTITUTION. [Book II. 
 
 same law as those of the local Magistracies, — i. e. by the 
 votes of all the enfranchised citizens, — the democrats loudly 
 laniented on principle the exclusion of the non-voters, but 
 had in fiict carried their own candidates in the majority of 
 instances. The only obstacle which still stood in their way 
 was the regulation that no one could be chosen deputy who 
 did not pay 55 livres in taxes. Robespierre made use of 
 the pause which took place in the elections on the news of 
 the King's flight, to remove this difficulty. He succeeded 
 in carrying the abolition of this property qualification, in 
 return for which Lameth's party liargained that the qualifi^ 
 cation of the members of the electoral college should 
 be raised. Theoretically the change was in favour of the 
 possessors of property ; but as on this occasion the college 
 of electors had already been chosen, and their election 
 was held valid, the democratic party obtained the whole 
 advantage for the approaching electors. This was all the 
 more important for the radical leaders in Paris, because they 
 exercised a very powerful influence over the mass of the 
 people, by means of the uncontrolled freedom of the unions 
 and the press. The Constitutional party, on the other hand, 
 suffered a severe loss in the retirement of Lafayette from 
 the chief command of the National Guard; whereupon both 
 royalists and republicans, to both whom this civic-military 
 power was ec[uall3' disagreeable, joined in carrying a decree 
 for the abolition of the influential office of Commander-in- 
 chief. It was agreed that his functions should in future be 
 exercised by the Commanders of the six legions in turn, for 
 the space of a month. This was, in fact, exi)osing the public 
 order of the capital to the freaks of chance; — with its unity 
 and continuity, the chief command lost both its influence and 
 security. * 
 
 No better results were obtained in the department of 
 public economy than in that of poHtics; the regulation of 
 
 ' Mortimer-Ternaux, I. 33. 
 
Ch. v.] financial ruin. 321 
 
 finances, and the i-evlsion of the constitiition were alike 
 neglected. As regards the revenue, the 20 months from the 
 beginning of the. Revolution to the end of 1790 shewed a 
 falling off of 442 millions, in addition to the old deficit; and 
 the first six months of 1791, a further deficit of 145 millions. 
 The Constituent Asseftibly therefore had used 1323 millions 
 out of their 1800 millions of assignats, — 1109 of which were 
 in circulation and 477 remained at the disposal of their suc- 
 cessors. Consequently nothing was more certain than that 
 the new Assembly, willingly or unwillingly, would be obliged 
 to hold on in the downward course of paper money. The' 
 prospect before them, therefore, was general confusion and 
 impoverishment in the rural districts, and a severe commer- 
 cial catastrophe in the towns. The soil of France was in 
 every way prepared for the efforts of the Jacobins and 
 Cordeliers. 
 
 The Constitution, pregnant with such a future, was laid 
 before the King for his acceptance on the 14th of September. 
 Once more infinitely much depended on the will of the cap- 
 tive King; his word was to decide the fate of France and 
 perhaps of Europe. 
 
322 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 FLUCTUATIONS OF PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN 
 POLICY. 1 . 
 
 Leopold defers the conclusion of peace with tukkev. — Prussia a.nd 
 englikd support the porte. — leopold makes advances to prussia 
 eisohopsweeder in vienna. — england offers hek alliance to the 
 
 EMPEROR. PriSSIA FOLLOWS THIS EXAMPLE. — ReFORMS IN P0L.4ND. 
 
 Leopold wishes to strengthen pol.ind. — Polish constitution of 
 MAY 3rd. — Prussia is contented thereby. — Second mission of bi- 
 schoffsweeder. — Allarming differences at sisTOWA. — Leopold's sud- 
 den CHANGE IN FAVOUR OF PEACE. 
 
 I. MAY 3rd 1791. 
 
 The Emperor Leopold awaited in eager suspense the final 
 result of the events which arose out of the King's attempted 
 flight. During these same months his Government too had pas- 
 sed through a crisis, which though it did not fill Europe with 
 the din of revolution, renewed all the dangers with which 
 Austria had been threatened in the previous jear. The points 
 in question have been for the most part unknown or over- 
 looked, but they are important enough to the history of the 
 French Revolution to deserve more particular mention. Let 
 us transplant ourselves to the beginning of that Congress, 
 which, during the last days of September 1790, assembled the 
 representatives of the great Powers of that period in the 
 wooden houses of the Bulgarian town of Sistowa, to conclude 
 a peace between Austria and the Porte. The public imagined 
 that the proceedings would be merely formal, since the single 
 condition of the treaty — the restoration of the exact status 
 quo,i before the signing of the peace — had been agreed to on 
 all sides in Reichenbacli. 
 
 ' The following is derived exclusively from official papers in the Prus- 
 sian Archives. 
 
Ch. VI.] SUSPICIOUS HESITATION OF LEOPOLD. 323 
 
 But Leopold had no intention of letting his adversaries 
 off so quickly and cheaply. Independently even of the con- 
 tents of the treaty, he had serious doubts with respect to 
 the time of its conclusion. In spite of his promises at 
 Reichenbach, he was still the ally of Russia, which continued 
 by means of offers and threats to lure him back to Joseph's 
 system of foreign policy. Wallachia, for example, which was 
 occupied by the Austrians, was to be restored to the Turks ; 
 but Russia claimed it in virtue of an earlier treaty as a 
 common conquest, and threatened forthwith to occupy it 
 with her own troops on the retirement of the Austrians. 
 As far as she was concerned, Catharine would listen to no 
 peace which did not bring her an acqviisition of territory, 
 and rejected all the proposals of the three allied Powers 
 with ostentations arrogance. Her arms obtained brilliant 
 successes both by sea and land. England and Prussia saw 
 the moment approaching, when the Porte could only be saved 
 by foreign arms, even from the Russians alone; and they 
 continually prepared for war. No one could foresee what 
 mighty conflicts were at hand. With such a prospect before 
 him, Leopold was not the least inclined to bring his Turkish 
 negotiations to a premature conclusion. Every prolongation 
 of the uncertainty must render the peace the more ad- 
 vantageous to his interests, the more he had consolidated 
 his power at home, and strengthened his relations in the rest 
 of Europe. 
 
 After the first sitting of the Conference therefore, his Am- 
 bassador, von Herbert, afterwards joined by Prince Esterhazy- 
 Galantha, brought forward a number of demands, which had 
 scancely any other object than to manifest ill-will. The 
 status quo, they said, referred not only to the question of fron- 
 tiers but to other international relations; and they therefore 
 demanded the renewal of the pirevious commercial privileges 
 possessed by Austrian shipping in the Black sea. The me- 
 diation of Prussia and the great Naval Powers, they added, 
 which they had promised at Reichenbach to accept, by no 
 
 x2 
 
324 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICE [Book II. 
 
 means imiDlied an express reference to the Convention itself; 
 on the contrary, such a reference would be inconsistent with 
 the dignity of Austria. But that which made the most un- 
 favourable impression on the Turks was, that the Austrian 
 Envoys on the same grounds interdicted a guarantee of the 
 new treaty by the mediating Powers; for the emptiness of 
 the pretext, and the desire of a fresh breach, were too ob- 
 vious to be overlooked. As the negotiations did not lead 
 to a settlement of these points, the Envoys of the other 
 Powers declared, on the 10th February, that they must con- 
 sult their respective Courts, and the labours of the Congress 
 were suspended for several months. 
 
 The conduct of Austria in respect to the engagements 
 made at Reichenbacli appeared in an equally unfavourable 
 light on the other side of Eurojje, in Belgium. After much 
 discussion. Count Mercy had at last concluded an agree- 
 ment with the three Powers in December at the Hague. 
 As however the Austrian troops were in possession of all 
 the Provinces, and had stamped out the last sparks of re- 
 sistance, the Empieror, while ratifying the other articles of 
 the treaty, announced his intention of substituting for the 
 old constitution which he had acknowledged at Reichenbach, 
 the laws of Maria Theresa — which had in maiiy respects 
 paved the way for those of the Emperor Joseph, and had 
 strengthened the prerogatives of the crown. The three 
 Powers protested without effect, and thereupon withdrew 
 the promised guarantee for the rule of Austria over Belgium. 
 Yet the Government at Brussels continued in the same course, 
 and kept up never ending differences with Holland. At 
 one time, a long promised settlement of boundaries was un- 
 necessarily deferred ; at another the reduction of the Belgian 
 garrisons to the stipulated strength was refused; and at last 
 a violent war of diplomatic notes was begun respecting the 
 residence of Belgian exiles in Holland. In short, both in 
 the East and in the West, the encroaching Lorraine policy 
 developed itself, more slowly and cautiously indeed, but 
 
Cu. VI.] LEOPOLD CAJOLES HIS PROVINCES. 325 
 
 also more completely and systematically, than under the 
 Emperor Joseph II. 
 . There was the less prospect of a check being given to the 
 progress of Austria, because the position of the Govern- 
 ment in Hungary was finally settled in February. We have 
 seen that the Sclavonians had done their best to promote the 
 coronation of Leopold; they now received a reward for their 
 services, which, though it flattered their feelings, had no 
 practical result for any one but the Emperor. Transylvania 
 on the one side, and lUyria on the other, were withdrawn 
 from the jurisdiction of the Hungarian Government, and 
 each of these lands was subjected to a Chancery made up 
 of zealous . royalists. This was done with the same political 
 views, with which Leopold at a subsequent period subdivided 
 first Illyria itself, and then Styi-ia and Carniola, into several 
 smaller governments— the same with which he separated 
 Milan from Mantua, and endeavoured to isolate the several 
 provinces of Belgium. Joseph had forced the old national 
 territorial complexes into his arbitrarily formed administrative 
 districts, and thereby outraged all local interests and feelings 
 of kindred; Leopold split up these nationalities in the most 
 effectual way, by cherishing every little village patriotism; 
 and he thus carried on the work of his brother without losing 
 his own popularity. The Magyars indeed, bitterly complained 
 of the losses they were to sustain ; but Leoj)old managed to 
 delight them also by first burdening the establishment of 
 the Elyrian Chancery with a number of other disagreeable 
 conditions, and finally renouncing them, to the infinite 
 delight of that hot-blooded people. He skilfully suggested • 
 that this very opposition on the part of Hungary had 
 compelled him to those sad sacrifices at Reichenbach; 
 whereas the Turkish booty would otherwise have fallen to 
 the lot of his kingdom of Hungary. The Hungarian Diet, 
 therefore, were possessed by no other feelings than repentance 
 and enthusiasm; they doubled their grants of money, and 
 
826 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 offered him as many recruits as he could desire, with the 
 cry, "Down with the treaty of Reichenbach !" 
 
 In the midst of these events, the Porte, continually threatened . 
 by Austria, and hard-pressed by Russia, no longer hesitated 
 to make use of its Prussian Alliance; and at the beginning 
 of March sent an urgent application to Berlin for help, 
 which was forthwith sent on to the Hague and London. 
 None of these Courts were particularly pleased by the crisis 
 which had arisen; but there was no hesitation on the part 
 of any of them to abide by their treaties, and to protect 
 the Porte by every means, in the first place against the 
 attacks of Russia. Preparations for war were carried on with 
 redoubled energy in the ports of England and in the garrisons 
 of East Prussia. The particular generals and bodies of troops 
 which were to march to the war in Lithuania were im- 
 mediately designated ; and in London it was determined to 
 send one strong fleet into the Baltic, and another into the 
 Black Sea to operate against the Crimea. Should things 
 come to extremities in this cpiarter, there was evidently no 
 more important question than the attitude of Austria, respect- 
 ing which neither Prussia nor England could come to a 
 clear conclusion. The Austrian Emperor had indeed made 
 peace with the Turks by the treaty of Reichenbach, but 
 Kaunitz made a sharj) distinction between an Austro-Turkish 
 and a Prusso-Russian war. And when Leojiold finally 
 promised neutrality for the latter also, Kaunitz continued 
 to affix the condition, that Prussia should seek no advantage 
 for herself. "We demand of Russia," replied the Prussian 
 Ambassador on one occassion, "nothing but the Status quo 
 ante, but if we are once ^compelled to go to war, we must 
 reserve to ourselves a claim of indemnification for our ex- 
 penses." "And we," replied Kaunitz, "must protest against 
 any such reservation." 
 
 During this unsettled state of the relations between all 
 the powers, the Emperor Leopold gradually began to follow 
 a new line of European policy. He was in no hurry, as we 
 
Cn. VI.] NEW POLICY OF AUSTRIA. 327 
 
 have said, to come to a settlement with the Turks, but rather 
 wished to leave matters to take their own course, and perhaps 
 to secure some further advantage to Austria. But in no 
 case did he wish to renew the war. It was just at this 
 time that his Sister, persecuted to the very death, was 
 besieging him with her supplicating letters; and although 
 he repudiated, with all the oljstinacy of his nature, the very 
 thought of an active interference in the affairs of France, 
 he could not altogether shut his heart to the prayers of 
 jNIarie Antoinette, and could not but wish on her account 
 to avoid new contests in the East. Then again, he took quite 
 a different view of his relations to Russia, from that of his 
 predecessor. While Joseph, in his hatred to Prussia, and 
 his ambitions views ujjon Germany, had based his whole 
 policy upon a Russian alliance, and readily opened to 
 Catharine the way to Constantinople — Leopold regarded the 
 extension of the Russian power, even as far as the Danube, 
 as the greatest danger to Austria — to her dominion over the 
 Southern Sclavonian and Magyars, and to the whole future 
 of the Empire. He lamented that his Brother, in his eager- 
 ness for Bavarian and Servian conquests, had first given up 
 the Polish Republic — the old ally of Austria — as a i^rey to 
 the Russians, and then driven it into the arms of Prussia. 
 He bitterly felt the cutting and arrogant tone in which 
 Catharine now Censured his peaceful policy, as if he were 
 not merely withholding the promised help of an ally, but 
 violating the fidelity which he owed to a liege Lord. 
 Cautious, wary, and circumspect, he wished to precipitate 
 nothing, to decide nothing prematurely, and to keep his 
 hands free as long as possible; but on one point he had 
 already made up his mind, namely that he needed gieater 
 independence of his Russian ally ; and that he must there- 
 fore, discover some means of reconciling himself with his 
 present adversaries. 
 
 The first step in the new direction was made immediately 
 after the interruption of the negotiations consequent on the 
 
328 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY, [Book II. 
 
 Conference of Sistova. One of the Reichenbach plenipoten- 
 tiaries, Prince Renss, now Imperial Ambassador at the Court 
 of Berlin, made the first advances by informing the King 
 that Leopold was weary of the long fend between the two 
 States, and earnestly desired a cordial nnion with Prussia. 
 It is probable that Prince Reuss at the same time pointed 
 out a direct personal colloquy between the two INIonarchs, 
 as the most effectual means to the end proposed; and alluded 
 to the difficulties to which the traditional hostilities of the 
 Ministry on either side, wovdd give rise. At all events 
 Frederick William immediately determined to send his con- 
 fidant. Colonel Bischoffswerder, to Vienna, in order to learn 
 more accurately the sentiments of Leopold, without the co- 
 operation of his Ministers. Bischoffswerder, who. had been 
 for many years the constant attendant and councillor of his 
 Sovereign, was a Saxon nobleman, without property, who 
 had tried his fortune in many services, and had finally won 
 the favour of Frederick William by an unlimited subserviency. 
 Though a dull, empty-headed man, he had the tact to impose 
 on the world by a mysterious air of importance; and though 
 his character was of doubtful purity, his unbounded readi- 
 ness to serve made him a convenient tool of the King. His 
 political character therefore was exactly such as the Emperor 
 would desire, since he was neither a match for Leopold in 
 acuteness, nor capable of withstanding the seductions of 
 the Imperial favours with which he was loaded. The 
 Colonel immediately became an enthusiastic admirer of 
 Leopold, and a zealous advocate of a close alliance between 
 the two States. lie deplored the mistaken policy of Fre- 
 derick II., which had separated Prussia from her natural 
 ally; whereupon Leopold declared that it would be easy to 
 bring about a better relation. "I have," said he "my Herz- 
 berg in Vienna, as the King has his Kaunitz in Berlin; if 
 we wish to cultivate a sincere friendship, we must dismiss 
 them both." tie pointed out the dangers with which the 
 French Revolution on the one hand, and the Russian lust 
 
Cii. VI.] CONFERENCE BETWEEN LEOPOLD & FRED. WILLIAM. 329 
 
 of conquest on tlie other, threatened the peace of Europe; 
 he promised to write to Catharine, recommending moderation 
 and disinterestedness, and he hoped that Pnissia in return 
 would aid him, if necessary, against the Jacobins. On his 
 departure he handed to the Colonel an autograph letter to 
 the King, and expressed an earnest wish to settle all existing 
 difficulties with Frederit'k William in a personal conference. 
 
 It is true that BischoflTswerder, when he returned to Berlin 
 with his mind full of what he had seen and heard, did not 
 immediately succeed in imparting his enthusiasm to the men 
 in power. lie found a decided opponent in the immediate 
 neighbourhood of the King, in the person of his adjutant, 
 Colonel Manstein, who manifested an entire distrust in the 
 splendid promises of Leopold; and the King himself was of 
 opinion, that the good intentions of the Emperor should 
 first evince themselves by a speedy settlement at Sist«pva. 
 He was ready, however, for other reasons, to comply with 
 one of the Imperial wishes. The positivcncss and self-suffi- 
 ciency of Count Herzberg had long rendered him disagreeable 
 to his Koyal Master, and the King immediately commanded 
 that no communication should be made to him respecting 
 his new relations with Austria. The aged Finkenstein was the 
 only one of the Ministers who was for the present let into 
 the secret, in order that a confidential message respecting 
 Leopold's offers might be forwarded to London, and a con- 
 sultation had with the King's English allies on the means of 
 turning them to the greatest advantage. 
 
 These unexpected tidings were at this juncture doubly 
 welcome to the British Cabinet. In consequence of the 
 warlike attitude of Russia, a Royal message had been sent 
 down to Parliament, on the 23th of March, respecting the 
 preparations which had been made in favour of the Porte, 
 and had immediately raised a violent storm in public opin- 
 ion. The Baltic trade was at that time a source of im- 
 mense profit to London, and those engaged in it raised a 
 loud protest against risking the loss of it by a Russian war. 
 
330 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTEIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 This populai- movement found an organ in Parliament in 
 the entire Whig party, and by the middle of April the Min- 
 istry, although victorious in every division, had already de- 
 termined to yield to public opinion. Pitt withdrew a threat- 
 ening note which he had already prepared against Russia, 
 and wrote to Berlin, that the King of Prussia must be aware 
 that no British Government could run counter to public 
 opinion. ' The Duke of Leeds, the Minister for foreign af- 
 fairs, retired from office; and his successor, Lord Grenville, 
 undertook the task of coming to a peaceful, and, as far as 
 possible, harmless understanding with Russia. It is clear 
 that under these circumstances, the intelligence that -Austria 
 showed an inclination entirely to break off relations with 
 Russia must have been hailed in England with delight. The 
 English Ministers lost not a moment. The Emperor was 
 then in Florence, where his second son had just assumed 
 the reins of power, and Lord Grenville commissioned the 
 young Earl of Elgin, on the 19th of April, to offer Leopold 
 a defensive'alliance with England and her allies, if he would 
 promise to induce the Russians to make peace on terms 
 agreeable to England. In this case too, a non-official agent 
 was chosen, because Grenville trusted Count Kaunitz just 
 as little as Leopold did Count Plerzberg, and wished to treat 
 with the Emperor himself without the interjjosition of the 
 Austrian Minister. 
 
 This rapid action of the English Ministry at length roused 
 the Prussian Cabinet from the suspicious irresokition with 
 which they had hitherto met the overtures of Ijeopold. On 
 the 1st of May, Count Schulenburg and Coiuit Alvensleben 
 entered the Ministry, and on the 3rd, the former, in concert 
 with Finkenstein, presente(^ a memorial to the King, which 
 was intended to determine the future policy of Prussia. In 
 this dociunent, it was expressly remarked, that there was in 
 general no inducement to enter into a league with Austria ; 
 
 Conf. Stanhope, Life of Pitt, II. 115. 
 
Ch. VI ] ALLIANCE OF THE GERMAN POWERS. 331 
 
 that, on the contrary, the dilatoriness shown by that power 
 in the negociations at Sistova, gave rise to well-f'onnded, 
 doubts of the Emperor's sincerity; but that the prospect of 
 securing Leopold's neutrality in case of a war with Kussia 
 was in itself important enough to justify the acceptance of 
 an Austrian alliance; that, consequently, the mission of Lord 
 Elgin was a matter of rejoicing, since it could not but fur- 
 ther the general objects of negociation commenced by BisehoiFs- 
 werder; that it was especially desirable that Prussia should 
 not enter into new relations w'ith the Emperor, as a mere 
 appendage of England, but should directly come to a settle- 
 ment with Austria, and then open the way to the English 
 of entering into the same treaty. The Ministers then pro- 
 posed to communicate these views of Prussia to Prince Reuss, 
 on condition that he should not report them to the Austrian 
 Ministers, but confidentially to the Emperor himself. The 
 King, whose main object was to inspire the Kussians with 
 respect, and to separate Leopold from Catharine, agreed to 
 the proposal of his Ministers, and ordered that only Count 
 Alvensleben, and not Herzberg, should be taken into the 
 secret. The communication in question was forthwith des- 
 patched to Prince Reuss, who received it gladly, but in his 
 position did not see the possibility of passing over Prince 
 Kaunitz. The Berlin Cabinet therefore, taking into consider- 
 ation that the Emperor would not, after all, take a step of 
 such importance without the knowledge of his Ministers, 
 gave up this last proviso. On the 12th of May the over- 
 tures for a league between the two crowns were forwarded 
 to Vienna in official form. 
 
 Such was the origin of the notorious league between the 
 two great German Powers, which two years later led Europe 
 into the field against the French Revolution — helped to anni- 
 hilate Poland — and filled the whole of Germany with dis- 
 cord. At the time of its conclusion, neither of the parties 
 foresaw the consequences to which it would lead. Frederick 
 William explained the new system to the the Marquis LucchfJ' 
 
332 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 sini, who was his ageut at Sistowa, by saying that he had 
 sanctioned it after convincing himself that the Emperor was 
 only thinking of his own security; that Prussia's sole object 
 in the measiu-e was, as far as possible, to isolate Russia. 
 Leopold on his part meditated no attack upon a neighbour- 
 ing country, but wished to fortify the position of Austria, 
 and above all to free himself from the domineering influ.ence 
 of Russia. He had not however entirely made up his mind ; 
 he was still weighing possibilities against one another, and 
 would perhaps at the very moment of decision choose an 
 jentirely new path. 
 
 While he was thus treating with Prussia, he was busily 
 engaged in another quarter, in securing a position most 
 important to the influence of Austria, from which he could 
 dictate the terms of his friendship either to his Prussian or 
 Russian rival. This new prospect was opened to him by a 
 most remarkable internal change which was at that time 
 soiniT on in Poland. ^ 
 
 o o 
 
 It had long been evident to every man of common in- 
 telligence, that the soiu-ce of the external helplessness of 
 this unhappy land lay in its own political anarchy. In 
 every age the nation which disarms itself by moral cor- 
 ruption and dissension forfeits its existence; and in the 18th 
 century, that period of conquest and ferment, a State which 
 was not clad in iron was immediately crushed. The right 
 of the stronger was almost recognized as a law; and it is 
 certain that the public opinion even of the peoples them- 
 selves was not offended by it, unless it were influenced by 
 selfish interests. Poland therefore might have foreseen its 
 own fate, and the sole means of avoiding it. Yet 13 years 
 had passed away since the last Russian treaty, without a 
 single step having been taken towards the restoration of in- 
 
 ' For the following. Conf. v, Sybel's Historische Zeitschri/t, Vol. X. p. 387, 
 and Vol. 11. p. 260, where he has examined the objections raised by Ernst 
 Herrmann, and shown their gronndlessness. 
 
Ch. VI.] KING STANISLAUS. 333 
 
 tenial order. We have seen tliat King Stanislaus himself 
 took the side of Russia; but yve must not conclude from this, 
 either that he had no heart for his country and his people, 
 or that he was entirely destitute of political and diplomatic 
 ability. What he did want was thoroughness of understand- 
 ing and character. His sagacity only served to make him 
 waver helplessly between the evils of every scheme which 
 Mas offered to his notice; and he became over-cautious from 
 a want of mental power, and double-tongued from an ab- 
 sence of moral courage. He feared the threatening power 
 of Russia and was therefore averse to oppose its successive 
 advances ; he did every thing in his power to prolong the 
 dangerous friendship of Catharine, and yet was incessantly 
 compelled by circumstances to enrage the mighty Empress 
 by breaking his promises. Thus he had been sincerely re- 
 joiced at the treaty .he had made with Russia in Kanieff, 
 being under the impression that he might collect a strong 
 army at the instigation of Russia, and might then receive 
 the hereditary crown of Poland at the hands of Catharine 
 herself, as the reward for his military services. This calcu- 
 lation was just as foolish as the system pursued by his uncles, 
 in 1762, and it was fortunate for Poland that he met with 
 powerful opposition from another quarter. The estrangement 
 between Prussia and the Imperial Courts might have be- 
 stowed on Poland, not only a brief alliance with her Prussian 
 neighbour, but a permanent amelioration of her internal 
 condition. 
 
 The patriotic party shewed no lack of zeal, but the con- 
 dition of the country was so extremely miserable that the 
 progress made was necessarily small. At an earlier period 
 the Poles had excited the ridicule of Europe, by consulting 
 two French j)hilosophers as to the Polity best suited to 
 their country. And it now became evident that nearly all 
 the requisites for the reestabhshment of a tolerable state of 
 things were absolutely wanting. The peasants were utterly 
 brutaUsed by their condition of serfdom, and hardly any 
 
334 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 civic commniiities existed except in those parts of Great Po- 
 land in which German settlers had established themselves. 
 The Nobility alone was considered to comjDose the Nation,- 
 and the great majority of them had been politically demo- 
 ralized by their long continued and unbridled license. Be- 
 neath the personal gallantry and inflammable enthusiasm, 
 which made so great an imjjression on foreign nations, were 
 concealed a deficient education, self-seeking, and untruthful- 
 ness. All the testimonies, and unfortunately all the facts, 
 of that period concur in this condemnatory judgement. In 
 addition to this, the government was without money, servants, 
 and troops; the nation was divided by religious discord; 
 and the diiferent parties were in alliance with foreign Powers. 
 Nothing was more certain, than that the restoration of Poland 
 could never be eftected by her own unaided efforts. 
 
 Prussia had expressed her approval of the first reforms of 
 1789, but she was far from taking any decided part in pro- 
 moting them. Herself a State at that time of hardly 
 6 millions inhabitants, whose prospects lay exclusively in the 
 direction of Eastern Germany, and which, for four centuries, 
 had carried on an irreconcileable feud with Poland — Prussia 
 was as little inclined as Russia to favour the stability and 
 development of this Kcpuljlic of 9 millions of men. Herzberg 
 himself made no secret of his sentiments, and his Envoy, 
 the Marquis Lucchesini, dissuaded the Polish government 
 from all radical changes, and especially from any large ad- 
 dition to the strength of the army, and the introduction 
 of hereditary monarchy. ' If Poland desired to make use of 
 the friendshijj of Prussia for the furtherance of her own 
 
 ^ Herzberg, Sttr L'AIliance, ^'c, as willi many envoys; in order to 
 
 Report made to thelving on the 6th. — fulfil his mission — of gaining over 
 
 Lucchesini's despatches of the 10th the patriotic party in Poland — as 
 
 and 11th July 1789. Unfortnnately, splendidly as possible, he held out 
 
 it is no less certain that Lucchesini hopes which he was by no means 
 
 did not strictly confine himself to warranted to raise, 
 these instructions. It was with him, 
 
Ch. VI.] MUTUAL BISLIKE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND POLAND. 335 
 
 purposes, she must — since the maxim in polities is "nothing 
 for nothing" — give additional guarantees for the security of 
 Prussian interests. Herzberg at the same time pointed out 
 the way of doing this, by perpetually recurring to the former 
 wish of Frederick II. to possess Dantzic and Thorn. Never, 
 perhaps, was a more glaring political error committed, than 
 that of the Polish Government in obstinately refusing to 
 listen to Herzberg's proposal of an exchange of territory. ' 
 But some thought that they were sure of the aid of Prussia 
 in consequence of her difierences with the Imperial Courts, 
 and others were angry because Herzberg did not offer the 
 whole of Galicia, instead of only six times the amount of 
 the territories of Dantzic and Thorn. And thus, though an 
 alliance between the two States was formed in 1790, there 
 never existed, for a single moment, that cordial harmony of 
 interests and feelings, which can alone give security and 
 permanence to international treaties. When, therefore, a few 
 months afterwards, a peace was concluded at Reichenbach 
 on the basis of the status quo ante, which put entirely out 
 of question the recovery of Galicia by Poland, the Gov- 
 ernment at Warsaw were furious against their ally, whose 
 pilans they had themselves helped to frustrate. They seeilied 
 to think that Prussia had been guilty of treachery against 
 Poland, and no Polish patriot would hear of Prussian friend- 
 ship. These feelings were embittered by the fact, that 
 Prussia, though s!ie had given up her claim to. Dantzic and 
 Thorn in her negotiation with Austria, continued to look 
 about for other means of getting jDossession of those two 
 towns. 
 
 This position of affairs lay clearly before the searching- 
 gaze of Leopold, and he prepared with steady hand, and we 
 must add, with far-reaching ambition, to turn it to his own 
 advantage. During the very same weeks, in which he was 
 entertaining Bischoffswerder with protestations of his eager 
 
 This is the opinion even of Oginski, I. 118. 
 
336 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 longing for the friendship of Prussia, he was employing 
 every means in his power to renew the influence of 
 Austria in Poland, and to form a strong party in that 
 country. Poles of distinction were treated with the greatest 
 consideration in Vienna, and received by the Emperor him- 
 self. The Prussian Ambassador at Warsaw reported that 
 though no Austrian party had as yet been formed in Poland, 
 Leopold was busily engaged in its formation; and the Prus- 
 sian Government it»elf received notice that the Emperor had 
 set on foot a plan for placing one of his Archdukes on the 
 throne of Poland. Kaunitz, though j)ersonally more favour- 
 ably inclined to Russia than Poland, informed the Polish 
 Ambassador at Vienna, Woyna, in the month of March, of 
 the intention of the Prussians and Russians to subject Poland 
 to a new partition; and Woyna lost no time in raising the 
 alarm in Warsaw. The charge was entirely groundless; for 
 Prussia, at this very time, was engaged more actively than 
 ever in preparation for the apparently inevitable war with 
 Russia. But there remained on the minds of the Poles an 
 impression of the most hostile intentions on the part of 
 Prussia, and of the most friendly feelings on that of Leopold. 
 And, in fiict, the Emperor was sincerely desirous to reesta- 
 blish and strengthen Poland. The materials at present in our 
 possession do not enable us to trace the exact means which 
 he employed at different periods for the furtherance of this 
 object; but it lies beyond all doubt, that directly Poland had 
 cooled towards Prussia, the maintenance of the Republic 
 became one of the main objects of the imperial policy. 
 Perhaps in the first, and at any rate not later than the se- 
 cond, half of the year 1791, the Emperor had made up his 
 mind in favour of a system, according to which, the crown 
 of Poland, — which had previously been worn for sixty years 
 by the Saxon Electors— should be transferred for ever to 
 this dynasty; so that each succeeding Elector of Saxony 
 should l.iecome de jure King of Poland. It is not too much 
 to say, that the success of this plan would have changed the 
 
Ch. VI.] COUP D'ETAT IN WARSAW. 337 
 
 fate of Europe. A Mouarchy of more than 11 millions of 
 inhabitants, chiefly of Sclavonian race and Catholic religion, 
 would have been established between Protestant Prussia and 
 the Russian adherents of the Greek Church. The territory 
 of this powerful Kingdom would have run far into Ger- 
 many, and the hereditary feelings of its dynasty, and the 
 necessities of its position, would have bound it to Austria 
 by the closest ties. Prussia — at that time only half as strong 
 as Poland and Saxony when united — would have felt their 
 might equally , strongly, in Konigsberg, in Breslau and 
 Berlin; and would have found itself thrown back in relative 
 power by half a century. Russia would have been separated 
 from the European world by a massive bulwark ; and would 
 have had to direct its views, and seek its development, in 
 Asia and the Eastern world. Austria would have obtained 
 a triumph of fully equal importance to the conquest of Bo- 
 hemia in the Thirty years' war, and the subjection of 
 Hungary in the war with Turkey. • 
 
 Such being the views of the Emperor, the Polish discus- 
 sions on the reform of the constitution were carried on with 
 fresh vigour. The Provincial Assemblies declared themselves 
 in favoiir of an hereditary monarchy in the line of the 
 Elector of Saxony; the King — who in spite of occasional 
 waverings had hitherto remained subservient to Russia — now 
 definitively joined the patriots, and one law was passed 
 respecting the Provincial Estates, and another respecting the 
 political rights of the citizens. Meanwhile, the adherents of 
 Russia and the landatores temporis acti actively bestirred 
 themselves ; the intrigues of one party were crossed by those 
 of another in inextricable confusion, and no one could foresee 
 the issue. The 3rd of May however brought with it a most 
 unexpected occurrence. The approaches to the Diet were 
 occupied by troops; the King appeared with a strong mili- 
 tary retinue, and ordered that instead of proceeding with 
 their usual business, the Assembly should hear a proposal 
 of the Foreign Office respecting the relations of Poland with 
 
 I. Y 
 
338 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 foreign Powers. The Royal command was obeyed, in sj)ite 
 of the violent opposition of the Russian party. The purport 
 of this memorial, which had been compiled from the reports 
 of different Polish Ambassadors, was, that new plans of 
 partition were entertained by Russia and Prussia ; that it was 
 to be feared that the latter meditated the seizure of Dantzic 
 ■ and Thorn; and that the friendly Powers could suggest no 
 other means of avoiding the threatened evils, than the im- 
 mediate introduction of a new and stronger constitution. 
 The King, thereujDon, came forward once more, and in spite 
 of the murmurs of the opjDosition caused the outline of a 
 constitiition, in twelve articles, to be read. The principal 
 provisions of this act, the adoption of which would have 
 changed the whole state of Poland, related to the legal status 
 of the peasants, — the political rights of burghers — formation 
 of two Chambers and an independent Ministry — abolition of 
 the libermn veto — and, lastly, hereditary monarchy in the line 
 of the Saxon Electors; with a special clause that the present 
 Elector should be succeeded by his daughter. Immediately 
 after the reading of these propositions, it became evident 
 how complete had been the preparations for this coup d'etat. 
 A deputy rose and proposed that the constitution should be 
 accepted, carried by acclamation, and immediately sworn to 
 by the Assembly. The King took the oath on the sjDot, 
 and the Deputies poured into the cathedral to do the same 
 on their part. It was afterwards discovered that, on the 
 evening of the 2nd, a majority of the Assembly, under the 
 direction of Ignatius Potocki and Hugo Kollontai, had as- 
 sembled in the Radzivil palace, and arranged beforehand all 
 the particulars of this important act. 
 
 The suddenness of this revolution took every one, both 
 at home and abroad, hj surprise. King Stanislaus wrote to 
 St. Petersburg himself, and declared that the new constitu- 
 tion would not be in any way detrimental to the friendship 
 between Poland and Russia. He further promised, somewhat 
 later, to preserve a complete neutrality in any wars in which 
 
Ch. VI,] FEELING IN POLAND AfiAINST PRUSSIA. 339 
 
 Russia might be engaged with other powers.' The Poles 
 had sounded the Prussian Ambassador, a few days before 
 the coit]} d'etat, as to whether his Government would fiiiall)'^ 
 sanction the most important of the proposed reforms — the 
 hereditary monarchy. He replied, as usual, in the negative; 
 and was all the more bitter in his complaints that this 
 point should have been carried, in spite of his opposition, by 
 means of the coup d'etat. The feeling in Berlin itself was 
 not more favourable. 
 
 It was known that the leaders of the Diet, at that time, 
 had always stood in close relations to Austria ; ^ and though 
 the Government of Berlin was not yet acquainted with the 
 details given above, yet even the official account of the event 
 left no doubt that its tendency was hostile to Prussia. The 
 report of the Foreign Office had grounded the necessity of 
 the coup d'etat on the aggressive spirit manifested by Prus- 
 sia; which, it said, was concocting plans of partition in al- 
 liance with Russia. This charge was made at a time when 
 no more zealous feeling existed in Prussia, than to oppose 
 Russia to the utmost. This feeling could not but be strength- 
 ened by the additional clause, which declared that the Powers 
 friendly to Poland could advise nothing better, than a reform 
 of the constitution. Who were these Powers! No one could 
 suspect France, which was labouring under a terrible in- 
 ternal crisis, nor Holland, nor England, which had made 
 
 ' About the middle of June. Polit. proceeds solely from the Polish 
 
 Journ. 1790, p. 588. Prussiadissuaded Emigrants and the Court of Vienna, 
 
 him on the 21st of June, from making This is well known in Russia, which 
 
 any communication to Russia without wonders that the Austrian government 
 
 some special reason : I. 74. — ^ Des- should patronise the Polish Emigrants, 
 
 patch of the Prussian Charge (VAf- All these Emigrants are of the old 
 
 /aires, Buchholz, from Warsaw, May Austrian party in Poland, against 
 
 8th 1793. "Your Excellency may be which I had to contend under his 
 
 assured of this, that the opposition of late Majesty." — The Emigrants of 
 
 the Walewski and Rzewuski, which 1793 are __just the originators of the 
 
 we have had to put down so forcibly, constitution T)f 1791. 
 
 /'"" ' y2 
 
340 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 common cause with Prussia, and advocated the very cession 
 of territory which was so odious to the Poles. Sweden and 
 Turkey had but little weight in this question ; but the Polish 
 Government was greatly enraged with Denmark, which had 
 almost openly suggested that the difficulties of the Turkish 
 question might perhaps be solved, as in the year 1772, at 
 the cost of Poland. Austria alone remained; and from the 
 very first moment every indication pointed towards her; and 
 every further step in the investigation tended to prove that 
 though there had been no formal rupture of the alhance of 
 1790, the events of the 3rd of May were ecpivalent to a 
 renunciation by Poland of the Prussian alliance in favour of 
 the Austrian. 
 
 But even independently of this temporary concurrence of 
 events, there were general grounds sufficient to dispel all 
 doubts upon the subject from the mind of Herzberg. As 
 early as the 6th of May, the Prussian Cabinet, on his mo- 
 tion, had presented a report to the Kiug respecting the new 
 Polish constitution. This document represented that Prussia 
 would be greatly imperilled, if a concentrated. Polish mon- 
 archy should fall into the hands of an Austrian or Russian 
 Prince — an event which could not always be prevented ; that 
 if a small German Prince should obtain the crown, it was 
 to be feared that he would fall into a state of absolute 
 dependence on Vienna or Petersburg; and, finally, that, as 
 there was no prospect of raising a Prussian Prince to that 
 dignity, there was no security for Prussia unless Poland 
 continued to be a free Elective Monarchy. 
 
 Every lover of Prussia will regret that this report did not 
 receive the royal sanction, and that Prussia did not openly, 
 in the face of all the world, renounce its treaty Avith Po- 
 land. For the time is past for ever, when men, from general 
 philanthropy, overlooked the incompatibility of Polish power 
 and Prussian existence, and good-humouredly called upon 
 Prussia to strengthen a State whose first efforts would have 
 , been directed to the dismemberment of the Prussian Mon- 
 
Ch. VI.] DIFFICULT POSITION OF PRUSSIA. 341 
 
 archy. There was, of course, no idea in Berlin of supporting 
 the act of the 3rd of May ; the only question was, as to the 
 best means of protecting Prussian interests, in opposition to 
 the new policy of Poland. And here, no doubt, the open 
 course which Plerzberg proposed would have been the most 
 dignified. It was beyond all doubt, that no alliance, and 
 not even a lasting peace, was possible between Prussia and 
 a firmly established Polish monarchy; and the longer the 
 open acknowledgment of this fact was delayed, the greater 
 was the danger to Prussia — when the inevitable rupture 
 came — of bringing upon herself the charge of utter perfidy. 
 But such considerations of a perhaps distant future, were, 
 at that time, thro^^ii into the shade, by the urgent neces- 
 sities of the moment. The question which at that period 
 controlled the whole policy of Prussia, was the probability 
 of a war with Russia.. It was stiU qiiite uncertain whether 
 Catharine would be contented with the new ofl^ers which 
 had been made her ; or whether Prussia might not, in a few 
 weeks, be compelled to strain her energies to the utmost. 
 In such a position, it seemed to the Prussian Statesmen 
 highly dangerous to alienate Poland, and perhaps to drive 
 her into an alliance with Russia. The fact that Austria 
 favoured the Polish movement tended to incline the Gov- 
 ernment of Berlin to yield. Reports, indeed, arrived from 
 Vienna, that Kaunitz, friendly as usual to Russia, was highly 
 indignant at the Warsaw coup (Tctat, which he every where 
 represented as a Prussian intrigue; and that he began to 
 speak of the danger that Prussia should place one of her 
 own Princes on the Polish throne, by a marriage with the 
 Saxon Infanta. Meanwhile, Lord Elgin, after repeated con- 
 versations with the Emperor in Italy, reported that Leopold 
 had proposed a guarantee of the integrity and constitution 
 of Poland, as one of the provisions of the proposed alliance. 
 As the Emperor united this proposal with the offer of his 
 friendship, and consequently his neutrality, in a Russian 
 war — could the Prussian Government repel him too, by a 
 
342 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 protest against the Warsaw coup d'etat, and thereby risk the 
 only benefit of the treaty of Reichenbach? In short it was 
 resolved of two evils to choose the least, and for the sake 
 of isolating Russia to raise no objection to the Polish consti- 
 tution. On the 8tli of May, the King expressed to the 
 Polish ambassador, Jablonowsky, his approbation of what 
 had occurred, and caused the same assurances to be repeated 
 in Warsaw and Dresden. With the same object in view, 
 he ordered his agents in Sistova to conform as far as pos- 
 sible to the wishes of Austria— to make no further mention 
 of the old treaty — and no longer to insist upon a guarantee 
 for the new one; and lastly to drop all claims to Dantzic 
 and Thorn. lie had agreed with England to oifer the Rus- 
 sians Oczakov and a district between the Dniester and the 
 Bug. The King hoped that after showing so much mod- 
 eration and readiness to yield on his side, he might reckon 
 on the armed assistance of Poland, and the neutrality at 
 least of Austria, if Russia should drive matters to extrem- 
 ities. For Leopold, before he had seen the Prussian note 
 of the 12th, had given Lord Elgin the most solemn assu- 
 rance — in the conversations I'eferred to above, — that he would 
 settle with the Turks without further delay. Joseph's alliance 
 with Russia, he said, was a mistake; Austria ought not 
 to allow any farther increase of the Russian power. He la- 
 mented that he had not yet received any answer to his 
 friendly overtures from Frederick William; and expressed a 
 wish to see the excellent Colonel BischoiFswerder once more 
 about his person. Lord Elgin did not lose a moment in 
 reporting these promising expressions to Berlin, where they 
 produced a powerful effect upon the mind of the King. On 
 the 25th, Finkenstein and Schulenburg were summoned to a 
 Cabinet council at Charlottenburg. The King declared his 
 belief in Leopold's sincerity, and expressed a wish to send 
 Colonel Bischoffswerder for the second time to Leopold. 
 The Ministers, who still distrusted the Emperor, were not 
 well pleased at this determination, in which however they 
 
Cu.Vl.] BISCHOFFSWEEDER'S SECOND MISSION TO LEOPOLD. 343 
 
 found the King immoveably fixed. "The alliance with 
 Austria," said Finkenstein at last, "will hardly come to pass, 
 and it is better that it shoxdd not; but the mission of Bi- 
 schoffswerder may at any rate have the advantage of in- 
 ducing the Emperor to settle matters more quickly at Sistova." 
 The instructions which were drawn up for the Colonel throw 
 the clearest light upon the Prussian policy at that period. 
 Bischoffswerder was to say, that the King had been prevented 
 from sending an answer to Leopold's offers, solely by the 
 difficulties which Kaunitz had raised in the Turkish negocia- 
 tions; and that as soon as the Emperor had unreservedly 
 concluded peace at Sistova, Prussia was ready to enter into 
 an alliance with Austria. That with regard to the guarantee 
 of Poland in its present extent, and of its free and inde- 
 pendent constitution — in which the Emperor took such strong 
 interest — Prussia had no objections to make, and was ready 
 to sanction them by her signature. That as to the fears of 
 the Austrian ministers respecting the further consequences 
 of the Polish revolution, though Prussia had not taken the 
 least part in originating it, she approved of the fait accom- 
 pli, since the choice of the Saxon Elector could not but be 
 pleasant to her. That a marriage of the Infanta with a 
 Prince of any of the three neighbouring Powers nmst not be 
 thought of; and that the exclusion of such a possibility ought 
 to be emphatically pronounced in a special article of the 
 treaty. That with regard to the alliance itself, the first 
 condition of Prussia was, that llussia should be excluded 
 from it; and that the Emperor should expressly bind him- 
 self to remain neutral in case of a Kusso-Prussian war. 
 Bischoffswerder was further directed not to close with 
 Leopold without referring to Berlin for special instructions. 
 He was moreover to express to the Emperor the King's 
 readiness to meet him in person, and to propose the Saxon 
 Villa of Pillnitz, near Dresden, as the place of rendezvous. 
 "With this view, he was ordered to visit the Elector of 
 Saxony on his way, and to come to an understanding with 
 
3M PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 him on this point; and further to take the opportunity of 
 inviting the Elector to an immediate acceptance of the Pohsh 
 proposals. The King hoped, by these means, to bring mat- 
 ters to a clear and rapid settlement in this quarter also, and 
 to exclude the Russian influence as much as possible. 
 
 Bischoifswerder started from Berlin on the 28th of May, 
 followed by the best wishes and fairest hopes of his King. 
 But he had scarcely passed the Prussian frontier, when in- 
 tellio'ence arrived from Sistova — where the conferences had 
 been reopened on the 19th of May— and from Vienna itself, 
 which formed a striking contrast to the previous assurances 
 of Leopold. In reply to the Prussian note of the 12th, 
 Kaunitz declared that Austria would be very glad to enter 
 into an alliance with Prussia, provided always that Russia 
 was included in it. "AVe cannot," he said, "separate from 
 Russia; Russia is the only Power which does not grudge 
 us an increase of territory." In a second memorial he dis- 
 cussed the claims which Austria had acquired by the j)eace 
 of Belgrade, in 1739, to Orsova and a Croatian district on 
 the Unna; and conchided by saying, that the Emperor, ac- 
 cording to his promise at Reichenbach demanded nothing 
 of the Turks but the status quo ante, by which however he 
 meant the status such as it ought by right to have been 
 before the war. The Court of Berlin was highly astonished 
 at this new check. The'y agreed indeed with the Austrian 
 interpretation of the peace of Belgrade, and were ready to 
 support it, in a special negociation on this f)oint, in Con- 
 stantinople. But they were entirely of opinion that this 
 question had no place at Sistova, and that, according to 
 the treaty of Reichenbach, Austria had simply to restore 
 the actual stattis quo ante. But they were, above all, in- 
 dignant at the proposal to admit Russia to the alliance — 
 the essential and declared object of which was the limiting 
 and curbing of Russia. All the previous distrust of Leopold 
 awoke ■ with double force. "Who is in the right now?" wrote 
 Manstein to the Ministers. "You allowed yourself to he 
 
Ch. VI.] AMBIGUOUS CONDUCT OF LEOPOLD. 345 
 
 deceived by the fair words of the Emperor, and now the 
 most arbitrary demands are brought forward." The Ministers, 
 on their side, sent an urgent warning to Colonel Bischoffs- 
 werder, not to allow himself to be befooled by the am- 
 biguous policy of the Austrians. The more moderate clung for 
 a while to the hope that the new diffieidties were exclusively 
 the work of Kaunitz, and had been raised by him without 
 the knowledge of the Emperor. Eut the symptoms grew 
 worse and worse every day. It was reported from St. Peters- 
 burg, that Catharine was acquainted with the Austrian claims, 
 that she zealously supported them, and had promised the 
 Emperor not to lay down her arms until he was in pos- 
 session of Orsova. In Vienna the Privy Ecfcreiidarius, 
 Spielmann, told the Russian Ambassador, that the Turks had 
 better be reasonaljle, or the two Imperial Courts would most 
 energetically cooperate against them. Lord Elgin wrote from 
 Florence to complain of the cold politeness of the Emperor, 
 who was as eager for the admission of Russia into the 
 impending treaty, as Prince Kaunitz himself. Lastly, the 
 news of an apparently irremediable breach arrived from 
 Sistova. After the Turks had refused the cession of Orsova, 
 Herbert and Esterhazy declared all further negotiation hope- 
 less, and withdrew from the Congress on the 18th June. 
 Recruits and reinforcements hastened from all parts of Hungary 
 to the battalions on the Danube; large bodies of men were 
 drawn together on the Bohemian and Moravian frontiers; 
 in a word, Austria suddenly assumed an attitude as warlike 
 and aggressive, as at any period of Joseph's reign. The 
 Prussian Government were greatly excited and enraged by 
 so sudden a change. They derived some comfort, however, 
 from the receipt of a Russian despatch, which was in the 
 main favourable to the last propositions made by Prussia 
 and England, and dispelled, to a considerable degree, the 
 clouds of war in that direction; and they were all the more 
 resolved to use every means of keeping Austria to her 
 previous engagements. AU the Prussian Provinces were 
 
346 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 still perfectly prepared for war; and orders were now sent 
 to hold 80,000 men ready to march durmg the month of 
 July. This force, under the command of Duke Charles 
 William Ferdinand of Brunswick, was destined to overrun 
 Moravia in three columns, and to besiege Olmiitz. Prussia 
 fovind herself all at once in the midst of warlike excitement ; 
 the Cabinet, the Cajjital and the Provinces resounded with 
 the din of war; the King was surprised and vexed, but de- 
 termined not to yield an inch; when, suddenly, on the 24tli, 
 a few hastily written lines arrived in Berlin, which had been 
 already despatched by Bischoffswerdcr from Milan on the 14th; 
 "God be praised! every thing is cleared up, and all difficulties 
 are at an end; the Emperor's order to come to terms in Sis- 
 tova, without any limitations, has already been despatched, 
 and a meeting at Pillnitz agreed to. 
 
 Since the Polish revolution, in fact, the Emperor's mood 
 was neither so peaceful as Bischoffswerder had once described 
 it, nor so warlike as they now apprehended in Berlin. 
 What he most wished to avoid was the conclusion of a peace 
 with Turkey, as long as nothing was decided concerning 
 the issue of the Russian contest against the Porte. He found 
 himself in a very advantageous position; England had given 
 up all thoughts of war, and Poland, he hoped, had attached 
 herself for a long time to come to the political system of 
 Austria. He was able therefore to await his opportunity, 
 to invent delays, and to make the best use of his advantages ; 
 and though, in his heart, he was desirous of peace, he no 
 longer, as in the former year, dreaded war under any circum- 
 stances. At one moment, indeed, he had almost made up 
 his mind to a new war with Turkey and Prussia. One of 
 his best cards, as we have seen, was the new and aspiring 
 spirit of Poland, whose constitution of the 3rd of May he 
 had immediately taken under his protection. But he sud- 
 denly became apprehensive that these very proceedings in 
 Warsaw might turn out to the advantage, not of Austria, 
 but of his Prussian rival. Both his own and the Russian 
 
Cu. VI.] PROPOSED UNION OF SAXON AND POLISH CROWNS. 347 
 
 Ministers vied with one another in pressing upon him, that 
 Prussia alone had originated and patronized the Polish coup 
 d'etat, and would receive in return from the grateful Poles, 
 first, the long contested city of Dantzio, and, afterwards, 
 the hand of the Infanta for a Prussian Prince. The thought 
 of such a possibility immediately inclined Leopold again 
 towards Russia, and renewed his warlike feelings. lie ordered 
 the claim which we have noticed above, to be made at 
 Sistova, and emphatically proclaimed his friendship for 
 Russia. His eager desire to supplant the Prussian influence 
 in Warsaw led him stUl further. He proposed to the Russian 
 Government a common recognition of the new hereditary 
 monarchy in Poland; nay, it is highly probable that he 
 added to it a further proposition according to which the 
 Saxon Elector should be succeeded on the Polish throne, 
 not by his daughter — whose marriage with a Prussian was 
 apprehended — but by his brother, who was married to an 
 Austrian princess; by which change the connexion between 
 Saxony and Poland would be rendered perpetual. It is 
 true that, according to this plan, the sacrifices to be made 
 by Russia on the Vistida would be, to a certain extent, in- 
 creased, while Austria would be a gainer. But if there ever 
 was a moment when such a proposition could obtain a fa- 
 vourable hearing, it was now, when Prussia was coming 
 forward to protect the Turks against Russia, and when the 
 resumption of the war against Turkey by Leopold, would 
 have enabled the Czarina to indemnify herself in Constan- 
 tinople for the loss of Warsaw. But this whole conjuncture 
 of affairs lasted only for a moment. It became evident at 
 once that Leopold had dreaded the intrigues of Prussia in 
 Poland without reason, and that he had been entirely mistaken 
 as to the sentiments of Russia. Bischoffswerder had mean- 
 time arrived at the Imperial Court, and his first conver- 
 sation with the Emperor was sufficient to dispel all fears 
 of Prussian machinations in Warsaw. In St. Petersburg 
 they chose rather to postpone the conquest of Constantinople, 
 
348 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book n. 
 
 than to forego the re-conquest of Warsaw. It had evidently- 
 been adopted, once for all, as a fundamental principle of 
 Russian policy, not to allow the establishment of an in- 
 dependent Poland. The Austrian overtures were received 
 with ti'iendly composure at the Russian Court, but they only 
 strengthened its determination to conclude a peace with 
 Turkey, on the basis proposed by England ; to content them- 
 selves with the acquisition of Oczakov, and then as soon 
 as possible to invite the Prussian Court to join in meeting 
 the danger which threatened them both from Poland. And 
 thus the condition on which Leopold had made his treaty 
 with Turkey depend was fulfilled, though not^jin the manner 
 he had wished; a Russian negociation with* the Porte was 
 now commenced side by side with the Austrian; and the 
 Emperor immediately sent orders to Vienna and Sistova to 
 come to a settlement without any further reservation. 
 
 The Oriental crisis was hereby ended. The dififerences 
 between ,the two German Powei's, which so lately seemed 
 likely to break out afresh into open war, were settled; and 
 again Leopold took up the idea of making his Prussian rival 
 subservient to the political schemes of Avistria — not by force 
 of arms, but by an alliance. He had the good fortune to 
 make considerable progress towards this object; how well 
 would he have deserved both of Germany and Europe, if 
 he had fairly and openly acknowledged the power of Prussia, 
 and had sought the advancement of Austria in a sincere 
 friendship with his German Confederate! This would have 
 been possible, nay, it would have been easy, in the case of 
 a man like Frederick WiUiam, a Prince who was far inferior 
 to the Emperor in acuteness and penetration of mind, and 
 who, perhaps, took more pleasure in generous devotion to 
 a friend, than is consistent with the duty of a sovereign. 
 But, unfortunately, in his overweening ambition, Leopold 
 could not content himself with such a result. To the pro- 
 posed alliance with Prussia he brought other sentiments than 
 the desire of a sincere and mutual support. With all his 
 
Ch. VI.] LEOPOLD'S GRASPING POLICY. 349 
 
 acviteness, he forgot that every unfair advantage taken of 
 an ally is sure to revenge itself on him who gains it, by 
 disturbing and envenoming the alliance itself We can 
 already point to the very spot, where Leopold introduced the 
 germs of dissolution into the relation in which he placed 
 himself to Prussia. It was the same, at which he had parted 
 company with his former allies — the Russians; the same, 
 where an alliance was already forming at St. Petersburg and 
 Berlin against Vienna; vi:3. the dazzling, but fatal, scheme 
 of a Saxon-Polish hereditary monarch. On this occasion, 
 if ever, le mieux etait Vennemi dii hon. The Prussian king 
 was ready to acknowledge the Polish constitution, under any 
 neutral and harmless dj'nasty; and this addition to the power 
 of Poland might have been maintained against Russia, under 
 the protection of united Germany. But no Prussian Govern- 
 ment coidd lend a hand to the realisation of Leopold's views ; 
 and we shall see, only too soon, how completely the very 
 first declaration of them broke up the proposed alliance. 
 
 II. PILLNITZ. 
 
 No sooner had Bischoffswerder arrived at the Imperial 
 Court, than Leopold found new motives, in the course which 
 French affairs were taking, to congratulate himself on his 
 own peaceful resolutions, and to accelerate his reconciliation 
 with Prussia. During file whole Spring, as we have seen, 
 he had exhorted his Sister to patience and endurance, and 
 endeavoured to restrain her from every rash undertaking. 
 He resolutely kept himself aloof, at the same period, from 
 the exiled Princes, who at that time besieged the German 
 and Italian Courts with their prayers for aid; and who, 
 though they were every where received with the most ela- 
 borate courtesy, and in some quarters obtained grants of 
 money, nowhere found the slightest inclination to interfere 
 in the Revolution by force of arms. Spain and Sardinia 
 were liberal 'in plans, by which other Powers were to save 
 
350 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 the throne of France; and Naples went so far as to grant 
 some pensions. The Kmg of Prussia declared himself ready 
 to render armed assistance, if Louis XVI. would demand it, 
 and promise to repay the expenses. Leopold gave them the 
 fairest words, but induced Louis to send an order to the 
 Count d'Artois to remain entirely inactive. It was natural 
 that as long as the complicated Eastern question remained 
 unsettled, he should wish for no new crisis in the West; 
 and it was with a heavy heart that he saw his Sister ad- 
 hering to her plan of flight, which, whether it succeeded or 
 failed, would inevitably bring him into violent collision with 
 the Revolution. 
 
 It was imder the influence of these feelings that he con- 
 ferred with Bischofl"swerder, at the first audience in Milan. 
 He begged that the Court of Berlin would not be misled 
 by any intelligence of a warlike character from Sistova. He 
 confessed that he had j)nrposely delayed the proceedings 
 there, in order to see whether the parliamentary struggles 
 in England might not throw some small additional advan- 
 tage in his way; but now, he said, all doubts were over, 
 and he had sent the most positive orders to come to a settle- 
 ment. "I know," he added, "that Russia has since that time 
 been hostile to me, but I cannot with decency openly break 
 with her, nor can I accept the offer of an English alliance, 
 until peace has been concluded between Russia and Turkey; 
 when this is done, I think we otight first to treat with 
 Prussia, and then England and Russia can, if they please, 
 join our alliance." He invited the Colonel to accompany 
 him to Vienna. He expressed his approbation of the pro- 
 posal that he should meet the King at Pillnitz, and promised 
 to bring his heir, the Archduke Francis, to the conference, 
 in order to inspire him with friendly feelings towards Prussia. 
 At Pillnitz, he said, they could arrange the Polish question. 
 He likewise expressed his approval of the plan of raising 
 the Elector of Saxony to the Polish throne, and excluding 
 the three neighbouring dynasties from matrimonial alliance 
 
Cn. VI.] THE POWERS DISINCLINED TO WAR. 351 
 
 with the Saxon Princess. "Above all," he added in con- 
 clusion, "we must discuss the French question; I regard it as 
 a subject of the greatest moment, which renders a mutual 
 understanding between us with respect to all future con- 
 tingences absolutely necessary." 
 
 Two days afterwards, on the 13th of June, he had a se- 
 cond conversation with Bischoffswerder, in which he enlarged, 
 for a fuU hour, on the dangers which might arise from the 
 French Revolution. "The Emigres," he said, "are wander- 
 ing from place to place with their foolish fancies, and the 
 Jacobins are stirring up revolts throughout the whole of 
 Italy. It is necessary to root out the evil at once; and we 
 must deliberate on the means of doing this at Pillnitz." On 
 the 18th he gave the Colonel a third audience, went through 
 with him the articles of the treaty between Austria and 
 Prussia, one by one, and at the end of their ^deliberations 
 declared his definitive assent to it. He then recurred to the 
 French question, but this time in a somewhat altered tone. 
 "The danger," he said, "is great; we must proceed with 
 extreme caution, and allow matters to come to such a pass, 
 that the nation itself will feel the necessity of a change in 
 its condition." He then gave the Colonel a letter for the 
 King, together with a declaration written by the Archduke 
 Francis, in which he expressed his readiness to conclude a 
 treaty vsdth BischofiBwerder, — immediately after his arrival 
 in Vienna — regarding the special interests of Austria and 
 Prussia, and in accordance with the articles already agreed 
 upon. These stipulations were then to serve as a basis upon 
 which to invite the adhesion of England and Holland, as 
 soon as the peace between Russia and Turkey should have 
 been signed. Soon afterwards, he showed the Colonel a 
 sketch of a note on French affairs, in which he set forth 
 the right of interference, grounded on the dangers to which 
 the Royal Family were exposed, and the attempts of the 
 French Revolutionists to excite revolt in neighbouring coun- 
 tries. But, he added, that no single State could produce a 
 
352 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 favourable effect; this could only be the result of a general 
 union of all the European Powers. Bischoffswerder entirely- 
 agreed with him, and expressed a hope that the King would 
 in all respects share in the opinions of the Emperor. 
 
 Such was the intelligence, which, at the end of June, in- 
 terrupted the warlike preparations at Berlin. The King, 
 who at the bottom of his heart was very averse to a con- 
 test with Austria, breathed more freely, though he could not 
 as yet place entire confidence in the assurances of Leopold. 
 Bischoffswerder had brought no particulars of the instruc- 
 tions which the Emperor had sent to Sistova, and the Court 
 of Berlin judged it prudent not to lay aside 'their arms, 
 until Leopold had actually signed the peace with Turkey. 
 "They are fine words," wrote Manstein, "but the King says 
 that they are no longer of any avail; that he must see acts." 
 It is true that Count Ilerzberg received on the 5th July 
 his definitive dismissal; but at the same time a messenger 
 was despatched by the Cabinet to the Duke of Brunswick 
 to offer him the command-in-cliief in case of a war with 
 Austria. However, these cares were soon dispelled; the 
 contracting parties at Sistova came to an agreement, that 
 the cession of Orsova should not be mentioned in the treaty 
 of peace, but should be imposed on the Turks by the me- 
 diating Powers in a special negociation. 
 
 By the middle of July, no doubt remained that a general 
 understanding would be come to on the Eastern question. 
 The French Revolution, consequently, was now brought more' 
 prominently into the foreground of all the deliberations at 
 Berlin. In the previous June, a confidant of the Count 
 d'Artois, Baron Roll, had arrived at the Prussian Court, 
 and brought with him an assurance from the Prince (which 
 was by the way untrue) that Louis XVI. had, through the 
 medium of of Count Durfort, asked militai-y aid of Prussia, 
 and had promised an indemnification for all expenses. The 
 King replied evasively, that he could not possibly make any 
 promise before the conclusion ■ of the peace with Turkey. 
 
Ch. VI.] AUSTRIA'S DOUBLE-DEALING. 353 
 
 The Ministers were thoroughly convinced that nothing could 
 be more injurious to Prussia than a war against the French; 
 which could have no other eftect than to strengthen Austria — 
 in whom but little confidence could be placed, — and oiFend 
 England. Alvensleben, who was the most decided of all in 
 his aversion to the Emperor, saw with concern a warmer 
 feeling of compassion in the King's mind for Louis XVI., 
 than was consistent with the interests of Prussia. He was 
 not altogether mistaken in his suspicions, but distrust of 
 the Emperor still divided the heart of Frederick William 
 with pity for the Royal Family. "The French question," 
 wrote the King at this time to Bisohoffswerder, "causes me 
 much anxiety; I wish that you could unravel the mystery, 
 and give me a clue to the policy of the Emjieror, which 
 even now we find it difficult to regard as altogether straight- 
 forward." He feared that the object of Leopold, in speaking 
 of France, was to implicate Prussia in a dangerous under- 
 taking, that he might himself have free scope in Germany 
 and Eastern Europe. 
 
 Meanwhile Leopold, after a false report of Louis's happy 
 escape, had received intelligence of the failure of his. attempted 
 flight, and the desperate condition of his relatives. Deeply 
 concerned as he was, be still adhered to his previous opin- 
 ion, that united Europe alone cauld successfully oppose the 
 Revolution; and he therefore issued a circular from Padua, 
 on the 6th July, to all Sovereigns, inviting them to take 
 up in common the cause of Louis XVI. At the same time, 
 a manifesto was prepared to the French National Assembly. 
 This document, however, only spoke of the personal safety 
 of the Royal Family; and since it appeared that their lives 
 were not immediately threatened, even this was not des- 
 patched. The Emperor then loudly proclaimed his intention 
 of placing his whole army on a war footing, but his real 
 orders were limited to a few battalions. The Prussian Min- 
 isters, therefore, were of opinion, that Leopold would talk 
 big but do Httle, and perhaps make a catspaw of the Ger- 
 
 I z 
 
354 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 man Empire ; and they informed their ambassador at Vienna, 
 that they had determined to hold back and await the pro- 
 posals of the Emjjeror. Leopold, on the other hand, used 
 his utmost endeavours to gain over Colonel Bischoffswerder ; 
 and, owing to the disposition of the Minister, his efforts 
 were speedily crowned with complete success. The Colonel 
 had the proud consciousness of exercising the greatest in- 
 fluence over the Emperor and his confidants, and he became 
 every day more eager to conclude an alliance between Aus- 
 tria and Prussia as quickly as possible — an alliance fraught 
 with svich mighty consequences. He frequently received 
 warnings from Berlin to be on his guard against so wary 
 a calculator as Leopold; to which he replied, that he was 
 well aware of the hostility of Prince Kaunitz, but could 
 depend upon his friends in the Imperial Cabinet. These 
 warnings had at last this effect, that he refused to go into 
 the details of the French question, and declared that he was 
 only empowered to discuss the alliance between Austria and 
 Prussia, which Leopold, on his part was secretly determined 
 not to condude without the introduction of a clause respect- 
 ing France. The Emperor made such good use of his freer in- 
 tercourse with Bischoffswerder, during their journeyto Vienna, 
 that he induced him, on the 25th of July, five days after 
 their arrival in that city, to sign a preliminary treaty, in 
 spite of the express instructions which the Colonel had received, 
 not to affix his signature to any agreement, without a se- 
 cond reference to Berlin, nor before the completion of peace 
 with Turkey. The purport of these preliminaries, as weU 
 as the rapidity of the whole proceeding, testified to the su- 
 periority of the Imperial negociator. The contracting parties 
 commenced by mutually guaranteeing their present posses- 
 sions, which was a decided concession on the jJart of Prussia 
 in regard to Belgium, since the King thereby gave up his 
 protest against the unwarranted limitation of the national 
 privileges of that country. Then came a promise not to 
 enter into any further alliance with a third Power, without 
 
Ch. VI.] THE EMPEROR OUTWITS BISCHOFFSWERDER. 355 
 
 each other's knowledge; a proviso, which, in the existing 
 State of affairs, could only be advantageous to Austria; 
 since it prevented a one-sided, iindcrstanding between Prussia 
 and Riissia. The two Powers further agreed, not to under- 
 take any tiling against the territorial status or constitution 
 of Poland; and not to marry the Saxon Princess to any 
 member of their respective Houses. After what we have 
 observed above, there needs no fui'ther proof that Prussia 
 thereby assented to all the' wishes of Austria, with which 
 it was acquainted, while Leopold kept his hands entirely free 
 to carry out his real plan, and meanwhile took great credit 
 to himself for the disinterestedness with which he decHned 
 the suit of several Polish magnates, who asked the hand of 
 an Archdukef or the Princess of Saxony. It was, again, an 
 advantage to Austria, and a burden to Prussia, that the 
 two Powers promised mutual assistance in the event of any 
 internal disturbance in their respective States. Prussia had 
 nothing to fear, in this respect, from the temper of its pro- 
 vinces; while Hungary and Belgium still trembled beneath 
 the shock which they had received in the reign of Joseph. 
 By the fourth and last article of the treaty, the two Courts 
 engaged to lose no time in promoting a concert of the Eu- 
 ropean Powers, with respect to French affairs — to the con- 
 sideration of which the Emperor had already invited them. 
 Leopold had every reason to be satisfied with the results 
 he had obtained. He had sacrificed nothing to the new al- 
 liance, and had nevertheless secured his own position on 
 every side. As regarded France, he was just as little in- 
 clined as the Prussian Ministers to aggressive proceedings 
 against the Revolution; but the preliminaries, at any rate, 
 prepared the way to procure the co-operation of Prussia in 
 case of need. 
 
 On the 27th of July, Prince Reuss presented a memorial to 
 the Court of Berlin, in which the Emperor explained at 
 length his views of a European Concert. It was drawn up, 
 throughout, in Leopold's usual cautious and circumspect 
 
 z2 
 
356 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 manner. After grounding the right of intervention on the 
 infections nature of the revohitionary malady, it proposed, 
 in the first place, a joint manifesto of the Powers to the 
 French National Assembly, in -vvhich that body should be 
 called upon to pause in its headlong and destructive course. 
 If this step remained fruitless, the Powers were to break 
 off all commerce and intercourse with France, open a con- 
 gress in Aix-la-Chapelle or Spa, and then deliberate on 
 further measures. There too — in case an armed intervention 
 should appear necessary — they would take into consideration 
 the future constitution of France ; but in doing so they were 
 to renounce, in honour of the great cause in which they 
 were engaged, all views of selfish aggrandizement. We see 
 what a small part the desire for war played in the drawing 
 up of this far-seeing plan. The document repeatedly urged 
 that no step ovight to be taken without the concurrence of 
 all the Powers, and esj)ecially of England ; and as England's 
 decided aversion to every kind of interference was well 
 known, this stipulation alone was sufficient to stamp upon 
 the whole scheme, the character of a harmless demonstration. 
 The Prussian Ministers were stiU of ojpinion that in the 
 treatment of so critical a subject, they must observe the 
 greatest prudence and prepare themselves for every contin- 
 gency. Their own minds had long been made up, and they 
 therefore despatched, as early as the 28th, a fuU and cir- 
 cumstantial answer to Vienna. The King, they said, was 
 ready, as soon as the peace with Turkey should be defini- 
 tively concluded, to take an active jiart in the measures which 
 the United Powers might determine upon. The first of these 
 measures, they contimied, would be, of course, the proposed 
 manifesto; but they urged that if this was to produce any 
 effect, it must be supported by adequate warlike prej)arations- 
 and in case of a refusal, the Powers must make up their 
 minds to a war, and agree upon the mode in which it was 
 to be conducted. Nothing, in their opinion, was worse than 
 haughty language, unsupported by deeds. They intimated 
 
Ch. VI.]. THE POWERS DISAVOW SELFISH AIMS. 357 
 
 that their King was not so well satisfied with the joroposal 
 of holding a Congress in Aix-la-Chapelle, and breaking off 
 commercial intercourse with France, from which he an- 
 ticipated no advantage, bnt considerable inconvenience. With 
 respect to a constitution for Prance, it would be difficult to 
 come to an agreement; the King, for his part, would desire 
 to see the Monarchy invested with adequate powers, but- 
 conformed as far as possible to the constitution to which the 
 people themselves had accorded their approbation. The 
 cooperation of England they allowed was undoubtedly neces- 
 sary, but the participation of the German Empire appeared 
 to them open to many objections. Finally, they declared 
 that the King was ready to subscribe to the clause against 
 selfish aggrandizement. 
 
 Thus far the despatch was intended for communication to 
 the Austrian Cabinet; but for the private instruction of the 
 Ambassador, the Ministers went on to say, that this renun- 
 ciation of all prospect of private advantage would hold good, 
 if the Powers succeeded in completely restoring the gov- 
 ernment of Louis XVI. But how would it be, they asked, 
 if the war should terminate otherwise? — if the attempt at 
 restoration faded, but Alsace and Lorraine, for example, were 
 conquered by their arms? What motive would there be for 
 giving them back again? — and if they were not restored, to 
 whom should they fall? — was Austria to keep them? — and what 
 corresponding acqiiisition was Prussia in that case to make? 
 From these questions, they said, an entire rupture of the 
 League might arise; and it was therefore indispensably 
 necessary to elucidate them before the beginning of the war. 
 "We have no wish," they added in conclusion, "to enter 
 into this war at all; we were obliged, however, to give a 
 full answer to the Imperial Note; but we adhere once for 
 all to our system of passive waiting." 
 
 The future was to show, after not many years, how well- 
 founded all these apprehensions were; and Leopold himself 
 fuUy recognized their weight. He regar ed the Prussian 
 
358 . PRUSSIAN AND AUSTPJAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 answer as a virtual refusal, and it confirmed his wish to 
 avoid, if possible, a breach with France. We have seen the 
 course which matters were taking in Paris at this moment, 
 — how the National Assembly began to take the side of the 
 King, and how Lafoyette put down the democrats. Leopold 
 resolved, if any tolerable arrangement could be made in 
 Paris itself, to hinder all foreign intervention, from which 
 he already anticipated no other result than endless complica- 
 tions in Europe, and an infinite exasperation and accelera- 
 tion of the Kevolution. He suddenly began to show extreme 
 coldness to the French Emigres; he exhorted the Royal 
 fiimily, and the political chiefs in Paris, to mutual forbear- 
 ance; and publicly displayed [his own sentiments in acts, 
 by placing his army on a footing of peace, and dismissing 
 nearly half his soldiers from active service. All that he saw 
 arotmd him, at that time, on the political horizon contributed 
 to confirm him in this attitude. While Prussia, in the very 
 act of giving an apparent assent to the Austrian note of the 
 27th, had exposed its practical infeasibility, an extremely 
 concise declaration had arrived from London, to the effect 
 that England would observe the strictest neutrality in case 
 of any breach between Austria and France. It was even 
 believed at Vienna that the Pitt ministry regarded the Na- 
 tional Assembly with decided predilection. It was reported 
 that Louis XVI. had vainly offered to England considerable 
 commercial advantages, if it would join Leopold against the 
 Revolution ; and it was supposed that Pitt, remembering the 
 support which Louis had given to the American Revolution, 
 regarded the helplessness of the Bourbon monarchy with 
 pleasure, and was determined in no case to expose the 
 Netherlands to the danger of a French war. And thus the 
 strongest link in the chain of the European coalition— the 
 firmness and completeness of which Leopold had laid down 
 as the indispensable condition of a successful struggle against 
 the Revolution — broke at the very first touch. 
 
 The mind of the Emperor was stQI more strongly influenced. 
 
Ch. VI.] INDOLENCE & INCAPACITY OF POLISH GOVERNMENT. 359 
 
 at this time, by a fresh change in the policy of the greatest 
 of Continental Powers in regard to another portion of his 
 system. The negociations for peace in the East had just 
 been brought to the long-desired conclusion. A definitive 
 treaty was signed by Austria at Sistova on .the 5th, and 
 the preliminaries of another by Russia at Galacz on the 
 11th of August. These acts no doubt were in so far ad- 
 vantageous to the Austrian Court, that they induced the 
 Berlin Government to ratify, without further delay, the com- 
 pact lately entered into by Bisclioffswerder ; but, on the 
 other hand, another greatly dreaded danger arose from the 
 new state of things ; inasmuch as Catharine, freed from the 
 trammels of the Turkish war, took up the Polish question 
 with the greatest energy. She had now no feeling towards 
 the efforts of Poland but hatred and contempt. She regarded 
 Stanislaus as a perjured traitor, and declared her conviction 
 that the Poles themselves would soon destroy their own 
 work. And in fact the affairs of the Republic presented a 
 most melancholy appearance. As early as July, Stanislaus 
 remarked of Lithuania that it manifested an universal apathy ; 
 the embers of revolt still glowed in the Ukraine, and the 
 Chiefs of the Russian party, Felix Potocki and Branicki, 
 were at that time about to visit Prince Potemkin in Jassy. 
 A phenomenon, stiU more fatal than this opposition, was the 
 idleness and incapacity of the new Government itself For 
 three years aU the Polish patriots had been incessantly de- 
 claiming on the necessity, which was evident to all, of 
 raising the army to 100,000 men. They now had the helm 
 of government in their own hands, and yet, after three 
 months' work, they found themselves in possession of a badly 
 trained, and miserably provided, force of only 20,000 men. 
 In answer to complaints which were made on this subject 
 in the Diet, it was said that the military commission could 
 not work because the necessary qiiorum of seven members 
 could never be brought together at the same time. And 
 what seems almost incredible, the only remedy suggested 
 
360 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 for this evil was to reduce tlie number to five. Under sucli 
 circumstances, Poland nuist inevitably become eitlier the 
 booty or the tool of its most powerful neighbour; and Ca- 
 tharine had no intention of acknowledging a superior. Her 
 Ambassadors every where i^roclaimed her sentiments with 
 the most unreserved frankness. Catharine's Representative 
 at Dresden warned the Elector not to bring down the wrath 
 /of Russia on his head by accepting the crown of Poland, 
 in Vienna, Prince Gallizin told Kaiinitz that each of the 
 Imperial Courts had to carry out a counter-revolution — the 
 one in Paris, the other in Warsaw. Catharine knew how 
 greatly the views of Leopold were at variance with her own ; 
 and her greatest desire was, to implicate the Emperor as 
 inextricably as possibly in the French quarrel, in order to 
 deprive Poland of its most powerful protector; she therefore 
 entered with the greatest zeal into the negociations for the 
 support of Louis XVI. Her old opponent, the brilliant King 
 Gustavus of Sweden, declared his readiness — on receipt of a 
 large subsidy from Russia — to conduct a Swedish army by 
 sea to the coast of Flandei's, and thence, under the guidance 
 of Bouille, against Paris. Catharine, in concert with Gustavus, 
 then entered into a compact with the French Princes, who 
 were regarded as forming the only legitimate government of 
 France, and to whom a Russian Ambassador, Covmt Ro- 
 manzow, was accredited. King Gustavus then importuned the 
 Emperor to set to work in good earnest, and to place himself 
 at the head of the League. But, of course, every word he 
 uttered was only an additional warning to Leopold to keep 
 the peace. He had just obtained from Prussia the recognition 
 of Poland, which country would be inevitably overpowered 
 as soon as Austria was occupied by a war with France. 
 He considered that Russia and Sweden ran very little danger 
 by a French campaign; while he should have to risk the 
 immediate loss of his Belgian Provinces, which he had re- 
 covered with so much difficulty. And, lastly, he sympathized 
 in his sister's fears respecting the Emigres, who were now 
 
Ch. VI.] COUNT D'ARTOIS' SUDDEN VISIT TO LEOPOLD. 361 
 
 basking in the favour of the Courts which were eager for 
 war. In short, he was more than ever convinced of the 
 necessity of peace, and with these views he prepared to 
 malse the best use of his approaching conference with the 
 King of Prussia. 
 
 Under these circumstances, he was most disagreeably 
 surprised on the 20th of August, a few days before his 
 departure for Pillnitz, by the sudden and entirely unan- 
 nounced and unexpected arrival in Vienna of the Count 
 d'Artois. It was not possible to refuse to see him, but Leo- 
 pold made no secret to him of the real position of affairs. 
 D'Artois eagerly reminded him of the prospects which the 
 Emperor, when in Italy, had held out, at the time of Louis' 
 flight; whereupon Leopold pointed out the obstacles arising 
 from the political state of Europe; and finding that he could 
 make no impression on d'Artois, he declared without any 
 kind of reserve, that he formally withdrew his previous 
 promises. The French Prince was violently excited, but 
 produced not the slightest effect on the minds of the Em- 
 peror. He then offered to cede Lorraine, but Leopold re- 
 mained unmoved. He asked permission to accompany the 
 Emperor to Pillnitz, which the latter, with cool politeness, 
 said that he had no scruple in granting, but; that even 
 there no change of policy would take place. A few days 
 afterwards, Kaunitz told the Prussian Ambassador that 
 Naples and Sardinia were certainly ready to go to war with 
 France; that Spain would give fair words but hardly any- 
 thing more, and that, moreover, the neutrality of England 
 was sufficient to settle the whole matter. "For," he added 
 "unless all the Powers of Europe cooperate, no result can 
 be attained in France; I think I know tolerably well the 
 means of restoring order in a State, but the affairs of France 
 are in a condition of vitter and hopeless confusion: I have 
 said this to the Count d'Artois and his friends in the plainest 
 words, and I only hope that the Emperor will not be car- 
 ried away at Pillnitz by his generosity, to take some im- 
 
362 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 prudent step. If Louis XVI. can come to an agreement 
 with the National Assembly about the constitution, there 
 must be no war." 
 
 Filled with such sentiments, the Emperor Leopold set 
 out for the conference with his new ally; and the King of 
 Prussia came to meet him with entirely accordant views. 
 The latter felt, perhaps, a warmer compassion for the suf- 
 ferings of the fallen dynasty of France than Leopold, but 
 the position of his territory, and the experience of the few 
 last years, were such as to give him still less inducement 
 than Austria had, to make war against the Revolution; and 
 he wished with aU his heart to hit upon some expedient 
 compatible with the continuance of peace. The represent- 
 ations of d'Artois, therefore, made just as little impression 
 at Pillnitz, as they had done, a week before, at Vienna. In 
 fact, his propositions were of such a nature as to repel every 
 sensible man, and to fill the friends of Louis XVI. with 
 indignation. He laid a document before the two Monarchs 
 consisting of ten articles, which unfolded a grand scheme 
 of inexorable war. Every thing, it said, must be done to 
 strengthen the confidence of Louis, and to intimidate his 
 oppressors. With this view the Brothers of the King, and 
 all the other Princes of the House of Bourbon, were to issue 
 a manifesto, in which they pointed out the late encroach- 
 ments of the National Assembly, declared all its acts as • 
 nuU and void, and protested against the Royal sanction as 
 obtained by force or fraud. It went on [to say, that as 
 France could no longer be left without a government. Mon- 
 sieur, the Count of Provence, the King's Brother, ought to 
 come forward as Regent, in virtue of his birthright, announce 
 to the nation the cooperation of Austria, Spain, Naples, 
 Prussia, Sardinia, Sweden, Switzerland and, as was to be 
 hoped, Russia, and to make the inhabitants of Paris re- 
 sponsible, on pain of death, for the safety of the Royal 
 family. The EiTiperor was to signify his acknowledgement 
 of the regency of Monsieur, by laying before him the com- 
 
Ch.VI.] GERMAN SOVEREIGNS KEJECTD'AUTOIS' PROPOSALS. 363 
 
 plaiuts of the German Priuces of the Empire, whose interests 
 had been violated in Alsace. He was likewise to march 
 troops, in conjunction with Prussia and Sardinia, to the 
 French frontier — to allow the Emigres to arm themselves 
 in his territory — and to guarantee the payinent of the sum 
 agreed upon to the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, who was 
 willing to lend his troops to the French Princes. Monsieur, 
 it was said, intended, on his part, to negotiate a loan of 
 twelve million francs, immediately after the publication of 
 the manifesto. When the Emperor heard these proposals, 
 he was moved with secret indignation; they appeared to 
 him the offspring of the blindest selfishness and vanity. 
 King Louis — in whose deliverance the Powers were deeply 
 interested, on both personal and political grounds — was, ac- 
 cording to this scheme, completely put aside — stripped of 
 his royal dignity, and irrevocably set at variance with his 
 people. France was condemned to see the ancien regime 
 restored, and Europe to make infinite exertions, that Mon- 
 sieur and the Emigres might regain their former privileges 
 and enjoyments. On this point he very soon came to an 
 understanding with the King; and they both resolved to give 
 a suitable answer to the importunate demands of the Emi- 
 gres, and to assert in opposition to them the general views 
 of European policy. On the 27th, d'Artois received the joint 
 answer of the two Sovereigns, the tone and purport of which 
 clearly testified to the sentiments of its authors. They said 
 that Louis XVI. was weU aware of the plan for a European 
 Coalition in his favour, and that this wovdd suffice to steel 
 his courage; while the elevation of Monsieur to the Regency 
 woidd have a directly opposite effect; that therefore the 
 proposed manifesto of the Bourbon Princes must on no ac- 
 count be made known before the formation of the European 
 League, nor ought any isolated movement of troops to take 
 place. They added, that the rights of the injured Princes 
 of the Empire would be maintained, in accordance with the 
 Imperial Constitution, by the Emperor himself, and that the 
 
364 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 Regency of Monsieur was not necessary for that purpose; 
 that the Elector of Hesse Cassel could only be called upon 
 to fulfil his Constitutional engagments. Lastly, the Emperor 
 and King gave their sanction to the peaceable residence of 
 individual Emigres in their States, but declared that no 
 armed preparations would be allowed before the conclusion 
 of an agreement between the European Powers. To this 
 rejection the two Monarchs added a Proposal of their own 
 — contained in a joint declaration — in which they spoke of 
 the restoration of order and monarchy in France as a question 
 of the greatest importance to the whole of Europe. They 
 signified their intention of inviting the cooperation of all 
 the European Powers, and promised, should their application 
 prove successful, "then and in that case" — alors et dans ce 
 cas — an active intervention on their own part. But as it was" 
 well ascertained that England wovdd take no part, the ex- 
 pressions they chose were really equivalent to a declaration 
 of non-intervention, and were evidently made use of by 
 Leopold solely to intimidate the Parisian democrats. On the 
 very same evening, he wrote to Kaunitz at Vienna, that he 
 might he quite easy in his mind, for that he, Leopold, had 
 only spoken generally, and had avoided all binding engage- 
 ments. '^Alors d dans ce cas," he said, "is with nie the 
 'law and the prophets — if England fails us, the case I have 
 put is non-existent." 
 
 Thus ended the conference of Pillnitz, after the two Mon- 
 archs had agreed to protect the constitution of the Empire, 
 to encourage the Elector of Saxony to accept the crown of 
 Poland, and to afford each other friendly aid in every quarter. 
 The statement, therefore, which has been a thousand times 
 repeated, that the first coalition for an attack on the French 
 Revolution was formed on this occasion, has been shown to 
 be utterly without foundation. As soon as the faintest gleam 
 of a reconciliation between Louis and the National Assem- 
 bly appeared, the cause of the Emigres was abandoned by 
 the German Courts. From the very first, it was nothing 
 
Ch. VI.] AUSTRIA UEGES LOUIS TO ACCEPT CONSTITUTION. 365 
 
 but the personal distresses of the Royal Family which roused 
 Leopold to action. It seemed to him an act of folly to im- 
 peril his own nearer interests on the Danube and the Vis- 
 tula, for the sake of a French constitutional question; but 
 he thought himself bound by duty and affection, not to 
 allow the life and honour of his kindred to perish without help. 
 His aruiies, therefore, would have marched, if Louis had suc- 
 ceeded in escaping, and he would have been obliged to wage 
 war against the Parisian Democrats. But, on the contrary, he 
 resolved on peace, now that war was attended by infinite 
 difficulties, and could only have the effect of increasing the 
 dangers of the French Royal Family. We overlook, in these 
 considerations, the decisive importance to the whole of Eu- 
 rope, of the moment in which the new Constitution of the 
 14th of September was laid before Louis XVI. for his ac- 
 ceptance. The choice officially offered to him was this; by 
 accepting the constitution he would once more enter into 
 his constitutional prerogatives, while his refusal would be 
 considered tantamovmt to an abdication of the throne. If he 
 decided on the latter, it was virtually certain that he would 
 not recover his freedom; and in all probability there would 
 be a wild outbreak of popular fury. In this case, it is not 
 easy to see how the Emperor could have preserved peace. 
 It was in accordance with this state of things, that all the 
 memorials which came from the Austrian party urgently 
 recommended acceptance. The leaders in the National As- 
 sembly worked, of course, in the same direction. The pre- 
 dominant opinion, in fact, was in favour of acquiescence in 
 the popular wish;^and, as far as we know, the emigrant 
 Princes, Burke and Maury alone sent contrary advice to the 
 TuileriesJ What probably decided the question, was that 
 Marie Antoinette without doubt regarded the acceptance of 
 the Constitution as inevitable. It is true that she was as 
 fully convinced as the staunchest Royalists, that the Con- 
 stitution was odious and untenable. But she saw no means 
 of deliverance within the limits of France. She had no more 
 
366 PRUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 liking now than before to foreign war, or the dismember- 
 ment of France by foreign armies. ^ But she hoped that 
 the energetic representations of the Emperor, backed by im- 
 posing preparations for war^ and by the concurrence of the 
 other Powers, would cool down and intimidate the French 
 parties. Everything therefore in her opinion depended on 
 gaining time, on ap)peasing the Revolutionists by accepting 
 the Constitution, and then endeavouring to restore the royal 
 authority. "Let us have no civil war,"^ she wrote to Leo- 
 pold, "no invasion of the Emigres, and, if possible, no 
 foreign war." She recommended, however, that advantage 
 should be taken of the international consequences of the Revo- 
 lution, and that all the Powers should combine in distinctly 
 demanding, that the King should receive back the autho- 
 rity necessary to the government of France, and the safety 
 of Europe ; that France should reduce her force of 4 million 
 National Guards to the standard of other European armies, 
 and conscientiously respect her former treaties with her 
 neighbours. "It is possible," she said, "that if these points, 
 and these alone, are brought forward as the conditions of 
 
 ' Count Merey, it is true, was of 1791, ft-om the Vienna Arcliives in 
 opinion (vid. Letter to tlie Queen, Feuillet I. 449) hopes that Austria, 
 March 7th 1791) "que les grandes Prussia, Spain, Sweden and Den- 
 puissances ne font lien pour rien". mark might be induced to form an 
 Bnt he alwaj-s excepts the principal alliance with Louis XVI. hy the 
 person, the Emperor, from this ge- consideration "qu'il pent etre de 
 neral rule, and regards him as en- I'interet de plusieurs puissances 
 tirely disinterested. He only wished (Prussia, Holland and England) d'a- 
 tliat Louis XVI should endeavour baisser la France et de diminuer 
 to gain over the Spanish and Sar- son influence, mais que sa mine to- 
 dinian Governments by an insigni- tale, ou son demembrement, ne pent 
 fieant rectification of the borders of jamais entrer dans le systeme po- 
 Savoy and Navarre. He does not litique de I'Europe." ^ Memorial 
 reckon England and Prussia to the annexed to the letter of Sept. 8th 1791 
 Coalition to be formed, but regards in the Vienna Archives, published' 
 them as enemies. Marie Antoinette in the lieviie retrospective, 11. 7. 
 herself (Letter to Mercy Eebr. 3rd Ilunolstein 2&7. Feuillet II, 2S9. 
 
Ch. VI.] LOUIS'S LETTER TO HIS BROTHERS. 307 
 
 peace with the rest of Europe, a general reaction may take 
 place in the feeling of the people." 
 
 On the 16th of September, therefore, Louis declared his 
 acceptance of the constitution, -which caused great rejoicing 
 among the population of Paris; and the National Assembly 
 did their part, by proclaiming an unconditional amnesty for 
 all political offences. A few weeks afterwards the King once 
 more explained his motives in a confidential letter to his 
 two Brothers; and at the same time exhorted them to ab- 
 stain from all protests, which would only exasperate the 
 people. He said that violent measures could only lead to 
 horrors of every kind; that a King could never introduce an 
 army of foreigners into his kingdom; that even in the event 
 of their success, they could not always remain in the pro- 
 vinces they had desolated. "It has been said," he continued, 
 "that a King always seeks to recover his lost power ; but 1 
 cannot, on that account, enter on a course which would lead 
 to the ruin of my people, and expose me to the reproaches 
 of my own conscience. I therefore unite with the people 
 in giving the constitution a trial. But the people are changed 
 in all their views; the lower classes long for license, and 
 the higher for erpiality; the former find themselves regarded 
 with respect, and the latter see nothing superior to them- 
 selves. In the pleasure derived from this proud selfcon- 
 sciousness all other considerations are lost sight of. Every 
 man finds fault with some particular jjrovision of the con- 
 stitution, and yet hopes that its completion will produce a 
 state of jjerfect hajipiness. Every attempt to overthrow it 
 would, I am convinced, rouse a storm of which no one could 
 see the end. The people must be allowed to put it to the 
 proof, and then they will soon discover that they have been 
 deceived. T am prepared, therefore, to drag on a wretched 
 existence, and I call on you to sn[)port my plans by entire 
 resignation on your part: you have indeed sufficient reason 
 to be angry, you have suffered much, but have I passed 
 joyous days?" 
 
3GS PRUSSIAN ANT) AUSTRIAN POLICY. [Book II. 
 
 The Emperor Leopold heartily concurred in these views. 
 He approved of the acceptance of the constitution per sc, 
 which at the same time afforded him the prospect of de- 
 liverance from a most painful diplomatic position. No sooner 
 had he received the news from Paris, than he announced to 
 the Powers that the necessity of a European Coalition was 
 for the present obviated. On the 1st of November, he issued 
 a circular to the same effect; that as Louis XVI. had de- 
 clared his willingness to accept his new jDosition, and had 
 thereby recovered his freedom and his power, nothing was 
 left for the rest of Europe but to watch the further develop- 
 ment of affairs in France. The King of Prussia, although 
 at that time more favourably inclined toward the 3iiii- 
 gres than at Pillnitz, would not move without the Em- 
 peror. Spain and the Italian States, in spite of their wrath 
 against the Revolution, thanked heaven for the preservation 
 of peace. As Sweden and Russia were compelled by the 
 lateness of the season to postpone their naval preparations 
 to the following spring, every appearance of a Coalition now 
 vanished away, and the peace of Europe seemed secured for 
 a long while to come. 
 
 The Emigres alone persisted in their previous course, 
 and despatched protests to all the journals; declaring that, 
 Louis, being in a state of captivity, was incapable of 
 issuing any valid decrees. In the interior of France, the 
 religious feud was spreading more and more widely over the 
 laud, and the persecution of the non-juring Priests on the 
 one side, and the fanaticism of the catholic peasants on the 
 other, were constantly increasing in violence and bitterness. 
 The Jacobins observed the growing madness of both parties 
 with equal 2ileasure. They prepared, with ill-concealed joy, 
 to make use of the destructive materials which lay ready 
 to their hands, for the overthrow of the throne, tbc sub- 
 version of society, and the kindling of the Hames of war 
 and revolution, throughout the whole of Europe. 
 
BOOK III. 
 
 ABOLITION OP EOYALTY IN FEANCE. 
 
 2a 
 
Ch. I.] 371. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. 
 
 Weakness of the bioht in the national assembly. — The Girondists aim 
 
 AT THE OVEETHKOW OF THE CONSTITDTION AND AT WAK. AtJSTKTA STILL 
 
 INCLINED TO PEACE. — PeNAL DECKESS AGAINST PRIESTS AND EMIGRES. — 
 
 Lafayette Decides in favour of war. — His friend nakbonne be- 
 comes MINISTER-AT-WAR MILITARY PREPARATIONS. — EMBASSY TO PRUS- 
 SIA AND ENGLAND. — ^RoBESPIERRE AGAINST WAR. — AUSTRIAN NOTE IN FAVOUR 
 
 OF PEACE. — The decree of jan. 25 is decisive In favour of war. 
 
 In the new National Assembly there was only one powerful 
 and active party — that of the Gironde. 
 
 The Assembly had virtually been elected by universal 
 suffrage, and the influence of the Jacobin Club had not been 
 in any degree counteracted by the influence of property. 
 We observe, moreover, a phenomenon, the effect . of which 
 can hardly be rated too highly from this time forward in all 
 the events of the Revolutionary period — viz. a deep and 
 universal feeling of exhaustion and apathy on the part of the 
 middle classes. The out-burst which followed the attempted 
 flight of the King was the last pulsation of the enthusiasm 
 with which the nation had, in the summer of 1789, greeted 
 the dawn of a new era. The great mass of the people 
 were, in spite of all drawbacks, sufficiently contented 
 with what had been already achieved; but they were all 
 the more eager for the final completion of the work; and 
 when this seemed to be offered to them by the acceptance 
 of the Constitution, they hastened to the peaceful enjoyment 
 of their new acquisitions. Every man returned to his private 
 business, and rejoiced to be released, — as he thought, for a 
 
 2a2 
 
372 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. [Book III. 
 
 long time to come— from the heavy burden of politics.^ 
 Nearly all the elections which took place from this time for- 
 ward were made by a minority of the voters, and this was 
 more especially the case in Paris, where it was considered a 
 great thing, if a quarter of the enfranchised citizens came 
 forward to give their votes. 
 
 It is a striking proof, therefore, of the actual weakness' 
 of the democratic party, that even under these circumstances, 
 their candidates were left in a decided minority, at the 
 elections. But their defeat was more than made up to them 
 by the character of the victors. As the men of the ancien 
 regime were excluded by the very position of affairs, the 
 members of the Constituent Assembly by Kobfespierre's law, 
 and the majority of the educated class by their own satiety 
 of politics — the main body of the Assembly was composed 
 of a crowd of people, without any views of their own, 
 without experience, and entirely incapable of the task be- 
 fore them. They had a laudable desire to preserve their 
 newly acquired liberties, but not the slightest power of 
 comprehending the danger by which those liberties were 
 actually threatened. They wished for Monarchy and Order, 
 but they would have regarded every measure which tended 
 towards the preservation of these blessings as reactionary 
 and oppressive. Their cry was "the Constitution, the whole 
 Constitution, and nothing but the Constitution ;" but they had 
 no presentiment that for the preservation of that which they 
 comprehended in these words, a radical reform of the con- 
 stitution itself was indispensably necessary. They were, in 
 short, an inferior edition of Lameth's party in 1790, and met 
 
 ' Mad. Roland speaking of this thing has been done; and are r«- 
 
 period makes the following complaint; turning to their daily labour. All 
 
 "It is incredible how many of the of- the democratic newspapers are en- 
 
 ficials, and merchants are reactionary raged at the cheers with which the 
 
 in their politics; the people are King is received whenever he ap- 
 
 wearied out, and imagine that every pears." 
 
Ch. I.] PROPOSED tJP njER CHAMBER. " 373 
 
 with exactly the same fate. Having begun by lending their 
 aid in every direction to the work of destruction, they saw 
 their error when it was too late, and were obliged at last, un- 
 willingly, to allow the evil work to be carried on, which they 
 themselves, in their thoughtlessness and inexperience, had 
 set on foot. 
 
 "When we use the term parties in reference to this As- 
 sembly, nothing more is meant by it than small groups of 
 from twelve to twenty persons, who bore the sway in the 
 rostra and in the Committees, and who alternately carried 
 with them the aimless crowd of Deputies. It is true, indeed, 
 that at the commencement of their session, one hundred and 
 thirty Deputies entered their names among the Jacobins, and 
 about two hundred among the Feuillants, but this had no lasting 
 influence on the divisions, and the majority wavered under 
 the influence of temporary motives. The party which was 
 regarded as the "Right," had no opportunity for action, but 
 saw themselves, from the very first, obliged to assume an 
 attitude of defence. The old leaders of the Constituent As- 
 sembly, Barnave, Lameth, Duport, were stiU indeed silently 
 at work, partly in the closets of the Ministers, and partly 
 in the Club of Feuillants, and striving to give greater solidity 
 to the existing state of things, by introducing the system of 
 two Chambers. But they could by no means agree iipon the 
 mode in which their common object was to be obtained ; 
 they were at variance as to the respective merits of an 
 hereditary Peerage, and an elective Senate; and all the less 
 on that very account, did they venture to come before the 
 Assembly with any definite proposition. Outside the Cham- 
 ber the heau ideal of this party, — General Lafayette — declared 
 himself in favour of an American Senate, but without any of 
 the energy of real conviction. As he had defended the Mon- 
 archy solely from a sense of duty, while all the feelings of 
 his heart were inclined towards a Republic, so now, though he 
 acknowledged the necessity of an upper Chamber, the existing 
 constitution appeared to him to possess a more ideal beauty 
 
374 ORIGIN OF THE EEVOLDTIONAllY WAR. [Book III. 
 
 He never attained, on this point, either to clear ideas or 
 decided actions; and it was at this period that he resigned 
 his command of the National guard in Paris, and retired for 
 a while to his estate in Auvergne. The system of two cham- 
 bers was thus, from the very first, an empty phantom, and 
 only served the Democrats as a useful pretext for anger and 
 suspicion, which they used with such effect to excite the 
 lower classes, that the Club of the Feuillants was broken up 
 in the course of a few weeks by tlie riotous excesses of the 
 Parisian mob. 
 
 While therefore the one side could with difficulty be roused 
 to a feeble defence of their position, the extreme party, or Left, 
 was animated by the strongest desire to assume the offensive. 
 The Girondist Dejouties, Vergniaud, Ducos, Guadet and Gen- 
 sonne, were distinguished among the new members of the 
 Assembly by personal dignity, regular education, and natural 
 ability; and were, moreover, as ardent in their radicalism 
 as any Parisian demagogue. They consequently soon became 
 the darlings of all those zealous patriots for whom the Cor- 
 deliers were too dirty and the Feuillants too lukewarm. 
 External advantages are not without their weight, even in 
 the most terrible political crises, and the Girondists owe to 
 the magic of their elocpience, and especially to that of Ver- 
 gniaud, an enduring fame, which neither their principles nor 
 their deeds would have earned for them; for in all other 
 respects they had simply run the demagogues' course, with- 
 out any peculiar distinction. In opposition they had assailed 
 the Government with all the weapons of anarchy, and only 
 became conservative when they had themselves to assume 
 the reins of power. In the first half of their career, we look 
 in vain for any essential difference between them and the 
 Cordeliers. In every effort to further the license of indivi- 
 duals, the violence of the masses, the disregard of estabhslied 
 laws and the rights of property, the emancipation of the 
 flesh from moral restraint, and the degradation of religion— 
 the Girondists are seen acting in concert with Kobespierre 
 
Ch. I.] BRISSOT, MAD. EOLAND i\ND SIEY^IS. 375 
 
 and Marat, even after personal ambition had given rise to 
 the bitterest enmity between themselves and those notorious 
 demagogues. And they continued in this course, until the 
 dagger which they had themselves directed against royalty 
 was aimed .at themselves. Then indeed they underwent a 
 sudden metamorphosis; they fought for Order, Law and 
 Property ; and fell, partly because they moved but awkwardly 
 in a sphere so strange to them, and partly, because they had 
 themselves assisted to tear down the dams which checked 
 the tide of anarchy. Their misfortune therefore did not lie, 
 as is often maintained, in their fickle desertion of the cause 
 of mob rule, but in their incapacity to carry out their 
 change of policy to its full extent. They succumbed — not 
 to the logical strength of their opponents — but to the moral 
 consequences of their own wrong-doing, in which they were 
 irrecoverably entangled. 
 
 The representatives of Bordeaux had never occupied a 
 leading position in the Girondist party, to which they had 
 given its name. The real leadership of the Gironde fell 
 singularly enough into the hands of an obscure writer, a 
 political lady, and a priest who carried on his operations 
 behind the scenes. It was their hands that overthrew the 
 throne of the Capets, and spread revolution over Europe. 
 Not one of them was possessed of creative genius or a 
 powerfld character ; ^ but they all had a lively zeal for de- 
 struction, and this was sufficient to throw down the rotten 
 pillars of the new constitution. ^ 
 
 The writer in this trio was Brissot, who on the 16th of 
 July had wished to proclaim the Republic, and who now 
 represented the capital in the National Assembly, as a con- 
 stitutional member. The world lay open to his restless 
 
 • When speaking generally of the c'est Funiversetle mediocrite; elle passe 
 
 capacity of the statesmen of those tout ce que I'imagination pent se pre- 
 
 timeSjMad.Rolandherself says,1.332: senier et cela dans tons les degres." 
 "La chose qui m'ait le plus surprise... 
 
376 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUT/ONARY WAR. [Book III 
 
 ambition, and he contemplated the execution of a work very 
 different from that of the weakhngs of the Constituent As- 
 sembly. These last had, indeed, remodelled France in accord- 
 ance with their principles, but he, for some months past, 
 had learned to look on the Revolution as a preeminently 
 European question, and hoped to exercise his talent and 
 his influence in a world-wide sphere. The precise direction 
 which his efforts were to take was hardly yet determined 
 on, nor was he at all the man obstinately to hamper himself 
 by far-reaching plans; biit in one respect he was always 
 consistent with himself — vi^'. in the desire of spreading dis- 
 turbance and confusion on all sides. He agitated France in 
 fiivour of a Republic, and carried on intrigues in the neigh- 
 bouring countries ; ' and it was he who first uttered the fatal 
 words, that France would need a foreign war to complete 
 her revolution. This war which was to overthrow the throne 
 of Louis XVI., unhinge the whole social system of France, 
 and change the face of Europe, was brought on by no other 
 influence than that of Brissot and his party, and no one 
 therefore has a greater share than he has, in the responsibility 
 for the horrors of 1793. He threw himself into the tide which 
 set towards war with heedless audacity. No doubt he had 
 a certain ideal enthusiasm for the emancipation of the world, . 
 and for republican institutions ; but the chief motive which 
 impelled him was the restlessness of his own character, 
 which delighted in turmoil and fiery excitement, and, careless 
 of figure dangers, trusted to that Fortune which favours the 
 skilful and the bold. While Brissot shaped the foreign 
 policy of the Girondist party, its home aflairs were directed 
 by Marie Jeanne^ Roland, wife of the quondam Inspector 
 of Factories at Lyons, with whom she had come the year 
 
 ' "Both individuals and assooia- neighbouring nations." — ' She calls 
 
 tions," says the report of Moutinorin herself thus in her last trial. Before 
 
 to the Nat. Ass. 31. Oct., "have endeav- hermarriage she called herself Marion, 
 
 oured to excite disturbances among The latest and complete edition of 
 
Ch. I.] CHARACTER OF MADAME ROLAND. 377 
 
 before to Paris, and immediately thrown herself into the 
 ■whirlpool of political life. As early as the year 1789, she 
 had written to a friend, that the National Assembly must 
 demand two illustrious heads, or all would be lost, i And 
 after the flight of the King, she took an active part with 
 Brissot and Robespierre in the agitation which ended so 
 miserably in the emeute of the Champ do Mars. She was 
 at that time 36 years old, not beavitiful but interesting, 
 enthusiastic and indefatigable; with noble aims, but incapable of 
 discerning the narrow line which separates right from wrong. 
 AVith all her talents she coidd not escape the common fate 
 of political women; she too forfeited the feminine sense of 
 the beautiful, and the warmth of hvunan afiectious. She was 
 at this time the enthusiastic advocate of a Republic on the 
 antique model — such as her early studies had presented it 
 to her fancy; — she dreamed of Spartan severity, Roman 
 virtue, and Plutarch's heroes; with aU which the morality 
 of Paris, and the distracted state of France, stood in the 
 most striking contrast. Yet her pure ideality did not pre- 
 vent her from diligently frequenting the clubs, the tone of 
 which was any thing bu.t ideal, or even decent. At a later 
 period she liked to" assemble her friends at her own house, 
 and to listen to their discussions; which for the most part 
 only excited her impatience of men, who never got beyond 
 generaUties, and whose enthusiasm evaporated in words. She 
 then had recourse to private interviews with each individual 
 of the party, roused them one by one from their inertia and 
 lethargy, and scolded down their scruples and consideration for 
 others. When warned by a friend of the unruly nature of the 
 Parisian mob, she replied, that bloodhounds were after aU 
 indispensable for starting the game. When another mani- 
 
 her Mdmoires by Daiiban and Fau- ered letters to Buzot in Dauban, 
 
 geres, only gives unimportant addi- Etude sur Mad. Roland. Paris 1864. — 
 
 tions to the previously known text. Of ' Conf. Crooker, Essai/s on the French 
 
 greater interest are the lately discov- Revolution, p. 176 seij. 
 
378 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. [Book III. 
 
 fested some compassion on seeing the indignities offered to 
 the Queen and the Dauphin, she turned her back on him, 
 and said that greater things were at stake in the Revolution 
 than a woman and a child. He who wishes to take a strong 
 personal interest in her, should be able to overlook this cold 
 fanaticism; and he who examines her policy, as reduced to 
 practice, will find that it consisted exclusively in zealously and 
 incessantly urging on her party to action, but that she was 
 after all too superficial to further their cause by many really 
 original and fructifying ideas. 
 
 A less conspicuous, but not less important part in this 
 association, was played by the Abbe Sieyes. He did what 
 neither Brissot nor Mad. Roland could have done, by fur- 
 nishing his party with a comjDrehensive and prospective plan 
 of operations. After finding himself almost the principal 
 leader of the revolutionary movement in the summer of 1789, 
 he had retired in disgust when the Revolution had not in 
 all respects kept within the limits which he had traced for 
 it; and he now stood perfectly isolated, and angry with a 
 world which neglected alike the excellence of his logical 
 conclusions, and the persistent efforts of his ambition. He 
 was precisely in the humour to unite himself with a party 
 which was preparing to apply the lever for the overthrow 
 of all existing institutions; and however much he inwardly 
 despised these young and immature Republicans, yet he con- 
 descended, in the deejsest secrecy, to play the part of their 
 commander-in-chief The want of practical sense, which so 
 often stands in the way of learned men in political life, was 
 in his case only observable in his more comprehensive theories. 
 In the conduct of current affairs and every-day party strug- 
 gles, and in the management of individuals, he exhibited 
 both calculating astuteness and indomitable coolness. He 
 warned his associates against prematurely terrifying the na- 
 tion by the word Republic, and advised them to prepare the 
 way for its introduction by a change in the person of the 
 Monarch; and, generally, to carry on the contest with con- 
 
Ch. I.] THE 6IR0NDE. 379 
 
 cealed weapons. He had a way of hinting at the vastness 
 of his experience, and the importance and extent of his con- 
 nexions, which produced a greater effect than a more exphcit 
 statement; and he thus contrived to maintain himself in a 
 certain mysterious superiority, and gradually to bring his 
 associates to a result, the full scope of which they had hardly 
 foreseen. ^ 
 
 It may be easily understood from this mingling of hete- 
 rogeneovis elements, that the Gironde could never show the 
 firm and uniform front as a party, which characterised the 
 other Jacobin factions. For the same reason, it will be 
 difficult to state what was the exact nature of the polity 
 which they wished to introduce. Their only clearly defined 
 objects were to possess themselves of the reins of government, 
 to carry on the Revolution, and to destroy the Monarcliy by 
 every weapon within their reach. 
 
 They proceeded at once — not to perform the great and 
 vital task of internal legislation, the reform of the common- 
 law, or the reconstruction of the system of education, which 
 had been crushed beneath the ruins of the Church — but to 
 the vexed and exciting questions of the day — the overthrow 
 of the monarchy, and — as a step towards this — the more 
 active prosecution of the Clergy and the Emigres, even at 
 the risk of a European war. 
 
 Before entering on the history of these complicated affairs, 
 let us once more take a survey of the general position of 
 Europe. Eussia and Sweden wished for war; Spain and 
 Sardinia talked much about it, and Prussia began to take 
 the same direction. It was certain, however, that she could 
 do nothing without the cooperation of Austria, and Leopold 
 was once for all determined to remain at peace ; partly from 
 distrust of Prussia, anxiety about Poland and fears for Bel- 
 
 ' For the character of Siey'es conf. the Me'moires de Mallet du Pan, 
 published by Sayous; and La Marck to Mercy, 30. October. Correspon- 
 dance de Mirabeaa et La March. 
 
380 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. [Book III. 
 
 gium, — and partly out of consideration for the wishes of 
 Louis XVI., and the plans of the Feuillants. These last stiU 
 hoped that the energetic representations of Europe might 
 intimidate the Revolutionists, and wished to see a Congress 
 of all European powers, as the organ of these representa- 
 tions; but they discarded with horror every thought of war, 
 the outbreak of which would endanger their own existence, 
 and in its issue could only serve the interests of the Jaco- 
 bins or the Emigres. 
 
 In this state of affairs it was ridiculous in the Parisian 
 patriots to affect anxiety about the machinations of the Emi- 
 gres. The latter numbered about 4000 men, living partly 
 in Coblentz, partly in Worms and Ettenheim. What could 
 this handful of men undertake, without the help of Austria, 
 against a people which, in spite of their differences, could bring 
 against them, as had been proved in June, no less than 
 4,000,000 armed citizens. In respect to the Church matters 
 the position of affairs was no doubt far more critical, and 
 contests raged in every Department. Whatever view we 
 may take of the aristocratical character of the ancient Church 
 in France, and the confiscation of its property, it can not well 
 be doubted that the next step whicli was taken, viz. the in- 
 troduction of the Constitution Civile du Clcrgc, was a wanton 
 act of aggression on the part of the Revolution, and quite 
 uncalled for by the necessities of the times. Had those who 
 took the lead in this movement been influenced by a genuine 
 regard for the freedom and welfare of the people, they would 
 have begun by moderating their own violence against the 
 Church. 
 
 It is important to bear these undoubted facts in mind, to 
 avoid falling into one of the greatest illusions by which 
 party spirit and national prejudices have obscured a great 
 historical event. It has been said a thousand times, that the 
 war which France began against the Powers of Europe was 
 simply an act of defence against the hostility with which 
 these Powers, in alliance with the Catholic Clergy, had 
 
Ch. I.] PERSECUTION OF THE CLERGY. 381 
 
 threatened the freedom of 1789 and the Constitution of 1791; 
 whereas few facts in history are more indisputable than 
 the very opposite of this proposition. The war was begun 
 by the Gironde to do away with the monarchical consti- 
 tution of 1789; and Louis XVI., the Feuillants and the Em- 
 peror Leopold were attacked by them, because jthey en- 
 deavoured to defend this last bulwark against the Republic. 
 The King wished to bring about a reform of the constitution 
 by peaceable means at a later period; but the Gironde com- 
 menced the war with a view to the immediate and violent 
 overthrow of the Constitution. They stood greatly in 
 need of some powerfiil means of troubling the momentary 
 calm of the popidar mind, and frightening back the great 
 mass of the people into the arms of the Jacobin party. The 
 circumstances of the King's flight showed them what they 
 had to do. They knew that if once the people could be 
 persuaded that King, Priests, Emigres, and Foreign Powers 
 had concerted to restore the ancien regime by the aid of 
 German troops, an overwhelming majority of the people 
 would join the Jacobins. 
 
 They took up a position in accordance with these views. 
 Decrees for the prosecution of Priests and Emigres were 
 brought forward in rapid succession. Couthon commenced 
 operations by a speech against the Priests, on the 7th of 
 October. He was a lame and crippled man of mild and 
 friendly character in private life, but in politics intimately 
 associated with Robespierre. The treatment which the Clergy 
 had in future to expect was clearly indicated by his decla- 
 ration, that the mere presence of the non-juring Priests was 
 an obstacle to the public peace. Claude Fauchet, by his 
 speeches in the Cercle Social, had won the Bishopric of 
 Calvados. Finding the peasants of that Department fiercely 
 attached to the ancient Church, he demanded that the State 
 should at any rate not cherish the vipers in its own bosom, 
 and that therefore the pensions of the refractory Priests should 
 be withdrawn. The Right objected, that these pensions 
 
382 ORIGIN OP THE EEVOLUTIONARY WAR. [Book HI. 
 
 were a compensation for confiscated Clmrcli lands, and had 
 been guaranteed by the Constitution. "Whereupon Isnard, 
 on the other side, so far from yielding to these represen- 
 tations, reverted to Couthon's view of the matter; and amidst 
 the furious applause of the spectators, who in this Assembly 
 played a still greater part than in the preceding one, de- 
 manded the banishment of the Priests from the kingdom. 
 The majority of the Chamber however adhered to the motion 
 of Fauchet — which promised a saving of 30,000,000 francs to 
 the treasury — and empowered the local authorities to remove 
 refractory Priests from their distinct. 
 
 Proceedings were simultaneously taken against the Emi- 
 gres: the Right once more appealed to the Constitution, 
 which confirmed the right of emigration. They referred 
 likewise, to the general amnesty, with which the Constituent 
 Assembly had concluded its labours. Brissot now took the 
 lead in the attack. His great speech on the 20th October 
 with which be inaugurated his leadership in the Chamber, 
 is worthy of remark, because it plainly shows that he was 
 far more concerned about the European Powers than about 
 the Emigres, and that the latter were to him nothing but a 
 pretext for a European war. While he piroposed gentler 
 measures against the Emigres than any of his friends, he 
 roused in glowing terms the national pride of his hearers 
 against the Powers, whom he plainly denounced as the 
 protectors of the Emigration. These Powers, he allowed, 
 were not indeed formidable, because remote, and generally 
 either peaceable or powerless, but he thought it on ' that 
 very account all the more advisable to deprive them, by a 
 vigorous warlike demonstration, of any wish either to inter- 
 fere or to mediate. The Girondists perfectly agreed with 
 him on this point, but it seemed to the majority of them 
 absurd to terrify the Emigres back to their native country 
 by threats, as he proposed. While they wished to banish 
 the Priests, they were particularly anxious not to recall the 
 Emigres, but to perpetuate their exile, and to keep alive 
 
Ch. I.] DECREE OF NOV. 8TH AGAINST EMIGRES. 383 
 
 * 
 the fear of their warhke preparations. There was no simpler 
 mode of effecting this than the introduction of terrorizing 
 measures, which at the same time roused their pride, and 
 alarmed them for their own safety. Thus a decree was made 
 on the 8th November, which appointed the 1st January as the 
 term of their return, and condemned to death, without fur- 
 ther ceremony, all those Princes and Officials who did not 
 make their appearance by that day. The like penalty was 
 also denounced against the rest, if they took part in sedi- 
 tious meetings. The request of the Right for a definition 
 of the term seditious meetings was not complied with; 
 but the Diplomatic Committee was directed to bring up a 
 detailed report on the relations of the country to Foreign 
 Powers. 
 
 The King who, a fortnight before, had in the most urgent 
 terms, as we have seen, exhorted his Brothers to peace, 
 could not make up his mind to have a share in the cruelty of 
 this barbarous decree, and put his veto upon it. This appeared 
 to the Gironde almost a greater gain than the execution of 
 the penal enactment. The Clubs and the Press now vied 
 with one another in complaining of the conspiracy between 
 Louis XVI., the Emigres and the Powers. It was at this 
 time that the Girondists gained a firm footing in the most 
 important office of the capital. The term of office of the 
 Mayor of Paris now came to an end, and thus an oppor- 
 tunity was afforded of appointing a Revolutionist to the 
 most influential post in the Kingdom. The principal can- 
 didate of the Right was General Lafayette, who hoped in 
 this position to regain all his former weight. The Dema- 
 gogues, however, who had hated him ever since the 17th 
 July, used all their efforts to secure the victory for one of 
 themselves, and cast their eyes upon Pethion, who in the 
 Constituent Assembly had formed the small nucleus of the 
 extreme Left with Robespierre, SaUes and Gregoire. They • 
 found on this occasion an unexpected ally in the secret in- 
 fluence of the Court, which since 1790 had suffered from no one 
 
384 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. [Book III. 
 
 greater oppression tliaii from Lafayette, and who looked 
 on Pethion as insignificant and venal. But the result was 
 chiefly owing to the indolence of the great mass of the citi- 
 zens, since nearly 70,000 voters, who were certainly not all 
 in fjivonr of Pethion, remained at home, so that the latter 
 triumphed over Lafayette by a majority of 6,000, out of 
 10,000 votes.' The other elections turned out no better; 
 Roderer, a zealous ally of Erissot was made Syndic of the 
 Department — Manuel, a writer as frivolous as he was fana- 
 tical, Procurcur, — and lastly Danton, the leader of the Cor- 
 deliers, Vice-procureur of Paris. '^ 
 
 On the 22nd November, the report on Foreign affairs was 
 Ijrought up by the Diplomatic Committee. In this body 
 moderate opinions had once more prevailed. It confined 
 itself to simple recommendations that the Government should 
 take the necessary steps to prevent the Rhenish Electors 
 from giving any further encouragement to the Emigres, or 
 aiding them in their preparations. This was quite in accord- 
 ance with the opinions of the Court, the minister Delessach, 
 and the Feuillants by whom he was guided — vi^. the two 
 Lameths, Barnave and Duport — who all shrank from war, 
 but hoped by means of the negotiations proposed by the 
 Committee to bring about the much-desired Congress of the 
 Powers. The majority of the latter had not as yet looked 
 with altogether favourable eyes on the scheme of hol- 
 ding a Congress; some of them because it seemed to them 
 to imperil peace, and others because it would defer the war; 
 so that one of the best-informed of the diplomatists of the 
 period, Count Mercy, wrote on the '28th October:— "In the 
 chapter of hopes the Congress stands first, and three or four 
 months may bring us to this phantasmagoria." 
 
 The Gironde, who feared nothing so much as the effect 
 of such a pressure of the Powers on the middle classes or 
 
 ' Conf. Mortimer-Temaux, I. 44. — ^ Danton was elected by 1162 votes 
 out of 81,000 voters. 
 
Ch. I.-] LAFAYETTE ADVOCATES WAR. 385 
 
 the Jacobins, used every effort to nip the project in the bud 
 by an open breach with Austria. We may doubt, however, 
 whether they would at that time have gained a majority, 
 had they not received decisive support from the Eight itself. 
 Lafayette, for instance, had a general knowledge of the wishes 
 of the Lameths, the Delessarts, and the Emperor, but had not 
 yet made up his mind what attitude he should assume towards 
 them. In one of their objects — the formation of a second Cham- 
 ber — he might perhaps have agreed- with them, though he dif- 
 fered with them in his views of its constitution. But he would 
 never join them, or walk in their ways; partly, no doubt, 
 because his national pride revolted against the influence of 
 the Powers, and partly because his egotism made the thought 
 intolerable, that the hated Lameths should save the King 
 and carry off the prize of political power. If, on the other 
 hand, he joined the Girondists, he was sure of the com- 
 mand of the army and the conduct of the war. He remem- 
 bered his old schemes for the freedom of Belgium, and saw 
 himself once more loaded with honours, and in the enjoy- 
 ment of popular favour; he gave his voice for war. 
 
 The majority of the Right was under his influence, or 
 that of his friends. His first step was to raise a well-ap- 
 pointed army. The few Royalists in the Chamber did not 
 venture to oppose it; Barnave himself had declared that 
 without a strong army it would be impossible to make any 
 progress in internal politics. It was thought that the increase 
 of the military force would necessarily bring on a war, but 
 that it might improve its discipline, and furnish the King with 
 a trustworthy force at home.. As to the Left, Picard ex- 
 pressed its hopes with unreserved impetuosity. "If the French 
 people once draws the sword, it will fling the scabbard 
 far away. Inflamed by the fire of freedom, it can, if roused 
 to action, single-handed change the whole face of the earth, 
 and make the tyrants tremble on their thrones of clay." On 
 the 29th of November, therefore, on the same day on which 
 the decree against the Priests received the finishing touch, 
 
 I. 2 B 
 
386 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. [Book III. 
 
 it was resolved amid the vociferous applause of all parties, ' 
 that the King should call upon the Electors to break up 
 the army of Emigres, — immediately fix the compensation to 
 be given to the German Princes possessed of estates in 
 Alsace — make a liberal change in the Diplomatic Corps— 
 and forthwith draw together the necessary forces on the 
 frontiers, to give emphasis to these demands.^ 
 
 The Court was overwhelmed by this sudden union of 
 parties. It was in vain that Malouet had the King advised 
 to declare, before giving any answer, that he would leave 
 Paris, perhaps for Fontainebleau. In vain did Montmorin 
 throw himself at the feet of the Queen, and conjure her rather 
 to meet the danger at once, than ruin herself by further 
 concessions. The Court feared the consequences of any 
 opposition; — they feared the immediate evil of an insurrec- 
 tion.^ They did not venture, therefore, to offer any open 
 resistance to the first approach of danger, but resorted to 
 the pernicious artifices of the feeble and oppressed — an 
 apparent assent to the demands of the adversary, in the hope 
 of being enabled thereby to prepare in undisturbed secrecy 
 the means of safety. The King returned an answer favour- 
 able in the main to the wishes of the Assembly. It was 
 Marie Antoinette who on this occasion directed the steps of 
 
 ' Even Mortimer-Ternaux, I. 42, preparations. LouisBlanc (VI.219sq.) 
 
 now allows this to have been the is equally wrong in supposing that 
 
 case. — ^ Memoires de Lafayette, VI. Narbonne and Lafayette did not de- 
 
 42, Memoires de Vaublanc, I. 335. sire a real and serious war against 
 
 Vaublanc was himself active in the the Powers, but only insignificant 
 
 Assembly in support of these mea- operations against the Rhenish Electt 
 
 sures and of Lafayette, whom he ors. There was no such option at 
 
 pointed out as Commander of the at. that time; every one knew that 
 
 forces to be set on foot. Buchez falls an attack on Treves or Worms would 
 
 into a great mistake when (VI. 284, be immediately followed by war with 
 
 2nd Edit.) he regards Vaublanc as a the emperor. — = Mallet du Paris 
 
 tool of the Court and the Feuillants, Memoires, I. 248. 
 who were entirely averse to warlike 
 
Ch. I.] THE QUEEN SEEKS AID FROM THE POWERS. 387 
 
 her vacillating husband.* She stiU held fast to the idea of 
 intimidating the Jacobins by a Congress of the foreign 
 Powers, to meet in Aix-la-Chapelle perhaps, and to be sup- 
 ported by military preparations. In this way she hoped 
 that both peace might be preserved, and the Royal authority 
 restored. She had recently and repeatedly written to this 
 effect to Vienna and Brussels, but had found Leopold so 
 little inclined to act with energy, that she learned with pain 
 and indignation to regard her coldly calculating brother, al- 
 most as a traitor to the holiest family duties. It was 
 on this account that now, when the Gironde began their at- 
 tack, she made an essential change in her plans. She de- 
 tested the Emigres, as we have seen, not much less than 
 the Jacobins,, and had consequently hitherto held no com- 
 munication with their patrons at the Courts of St. Peters- 
 burg, Stockholm and Berlin. Now however she made ad- 
 vances towards these Courts. On the 3d of December she 
 wrote to Catharine II., and the Kings of Spain and Sweden, 
 and induced Louis to write in the same spirit to the King 
 of Prussia. She announced to them that in sj)ite of the 
 King's acceptance of the constitution, the throne was se- 
 riously threatened by the factions. She begged Catharine 
 for her cooperation in procuring the only means of safety — 
 the summoning of a congress. She made the twofold request 
 that the Powers should, on the one hand, not encourage the 
 Emigres in their mischievous zeal for war, and on the other, 
 exhort the unwilling and tardy Emperor to an energetic 
 support of his unhappy sister. Louis at the same time gave 
 Baron Breteuil express orders to hold the same language to 
 the Courts. In doing so he did not conceal from himself 
 the fiossibility that the desired measures might fail of the 
 intended effect — that the meeting of the Powers in Congress 
 
 ' The correspondence of the Qneen with Mercy and Fersen (vid. Arneth 
 Marie Antoinette, Joseph II., Leopold II. — and FeuUlet de Conches, Vol. IV 
 September to Dec. 1791) leaves no doubt on this head 
 
 2b2 
 
388 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLDTIONAKY WAR. [Book III. 
 
 might inspire the Jacobins, not with fear, but with fury, 
 and in that case not lead to peace, but accelerate the war. 
 But he saw no alternative, and he hoped that in the latter 
 case, his official acts would not be misinterpreted by the 
 Powers, and would prevent any suspicion from being awak- 
 ened in Prance that he had had a secret understanding with 
 foreign countries. He would then, to all appearance, himself 
 direct the warhke operations against the Powers, but do 
 every thing in secret to bring the crisis as quickly as pos- 
 sible to an issue favourable to the French Monarchy. We 
 see on to what a perilous declivity this first secret step had 
 brought the unhappy Prince. Had the Gironde been aware 
 of the King's deliberations, how justly might they even then 
 have boasted of the correctness of their surmises! And if 
 they succeeded in bringing about the declaration of war, 
 how impossible wovild it become to Louis, whatever were 
 his sentiments, not to be virtually the ally of the enemy, 
 and the foe of his own people! 
 
 The consequences of the decree of the 29th showed them- 
 selves first in Paris with uncontrollable rapidity. Montmorin 
 retired from the Cabinet, and was succeeded the late Min- 
 ister of the Interior, Delessart. The Minister at war, 
 Duportail, a zealous adherent of the peace policy, immedi- 
 ately tendered his resignation, and Loviis not having dared 
 openly to oppose the decree, could not avoid appointing 
 a man of revolutionary opinions to the vacant post. He 
 selected a man, who at any rate by descent and birth belonged 
 to one of the great Aristocratic families, and who manifested 
 a warm attachment to the throne. But in spite of these 
 qualities, Count Louis Narbonne belonged in his views and 
 aims, to that younger generation of the French Nobility 
 which took such an active part in the commencement of the 
 Revolution, and exercised in many quarters so powerful an 
 influence; — to that clique of clever and frivolous men of the 
 world, who engaged in the Revolution, as formerly in a court 
 intrigue, solely as an opening for personal ambition ; and who 
 
Cn. I.] NARBONNE BECOMES MINISTER-AT-WAR. 389 
 
 with all their demagogie always remained men of rank and 
 fashion, rich, magnificent and pleasure-loving. Narbonne had 
 been from early youth on friendly terms with the chief spe- 
 cimens of this class with the Orleanist Biron, and the Fayet- 
 tist Talleyrand, by whom he was brought into close contact 
 with his friend Lafayette. Setting aside his political and 
 moral principles, he was in other respects amiable, brave^ 
 and adroit; one who, with the same audacity, and equal zest, 
 would engage in a questionable love affair, or lead a charge 
 of cavalry, or try a political experiment on which the fate 
 of a nation depended. He was recommended to official 
 circles by Lafayette and Talleyrand. ' He was likewise 
 patronised by Necker's daughter. Mad. de Stael, who had 
 just come to Paris with her husband, the Swedish Ambas- 
 sador; and who, full of the consciousness of being the 
 daughter of an illustrious father, and of her own claims as 
 a talented woman and a zealous patriot, sought with tingling 
 impatience to extend her influence in all directions. Her 
 husband was the representative of a Monarch who wished 
 to undertake at the head of the Emigres, a Crusade against 
 the whole Revolution. Mad. de Stael, however, did not al- 
 low herself to the restrained by such vulgar considerations; 
 and it was in her saloons that Narbonne's nomination as 
 Minister of the Revolutionary war was decided upon; and 
 Narbonne himself perfectly understood the task he was in- 
 tended to perform. He was connected with the Gironde 
 through his friendship with another lady, the wife of Con- 
 dorcet; he had frequent interviews with Brissot, and had 
 no trouble in coming to an understanding with him. He 
 was indeed still farther removed from any participation in 
 Brissot's republican schemes than Lafayette himself; he de- 
 sired not only to uphold the Monarchy, but if possible to 
 increase its power. But, as he said, a man must comprehend 
 the times in which he lives. Li the present day nothing 
 
 Morris's Diary, Feb. 4th. 
 
390 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. [Book III, 
 
 could be done without universal popularity, and bold de- 
 magogic, but he who recognised this fact, and manfiilly, 
 and with a true love of freedom, put his shoulder to the 
 wheel, had no need of a Congress of the foreign Powers. 
 On the contrary, he thought that to look to them for aid 
 would betray a degrading dependence; — that in adopting 
 the proposed preparations for war, they were taking the best 
 means of raising a fine army, and inspiring respect both at 
 home and abroad. In a letter to his friends at this period, 
 he told them that by placing themselves at the head of the 
 movement, they would best preserve peace; and that if war 
 could not, after all, be avoided, they would be able by skill 
 and boldness to rout at once both Europe and the Jacobins. 
 The King, who was at this time quite destitute of influen- 
 tial advisers, — since Barnave never gained a hearing from 
 him, and seldom even from the Queen, and the other Feuil- 
 lants only transacted business with the Minister^ — could make 
 no plausible objection to these views. The other Ministers 
 did not venture to oppose at once their own colleague and 
 the Assembly. Louis therefore on the 14th December an- 
 nounced to the National Assembly, that he had informed 
 the Elector of Treves, that if the army of Emigres was 
 not disbanded within a month, he would consider him as an 
 enemy; that 150,000 men, in three divisions, under Generals 
 Kochambeau, Luckner and Lafayette, were to be stationed 
 on the frontiers ; and that he, the King, would himself pro- 
 pose a declaration of war, should his representations prove 
 of no avail. The Assembly expressed the extreme satisfac- 
 tion they derived from the King's great energy and patriotism, 
 and in this mood they silently allowed Louis five days after- 
 wards to reject the law against the Priests, as he had pre- 
 viously done the decree against the Emigres. ^ 
 
 ' Pellenc to La Marck, 3d Jan. Currespondanve eiitre Miraheau et ha 
 ilurck, Vol. III. — ^ "I yield so often," he said, "that they can give 
 me my way too for once." 1. c. 
 
Cn. I.] VIEWS OF NARBONNE, TALLEYRAND AND BIRON. 391 
 
 The views of Narbonne and his friends, however, were by 
 no means bounded by this preliminary arming. They saw 
 well how insufficient the forces of France at that time were 
 to contend against a coalition of the rest of Europe. They 
 thereffore drew up a plan, by which the whole system of 
 alliances which had prevailed in France would be changed, 
 and the whole of Europe turned upside down. ' The idea 
 originated with Biron. This man, once the fashionable hero 
 of every capital, handsome, rich, and deeply in debt, was 
 renowned for his adventures, love affairs, and midnight brawls, 
 and mixed up with every intrigue. For a time he was in 
 favour with the Queen, and then an associate of the Duke of 
 Orleans ; he had now become a General in the Army of the 
 North, and was filled with the ambition of appearing in the 
 character of a warrior. No sooner did he hear of Nar- 
 bonne's appointment than he wrote to their common friend 
 Talleyrand: "The measure of the 14th is splendid, if you 
 gain over Prussia; otherwise you will play a dangerovis 
 game with bad cards." Talleyrand joyfully acquiesced. 
 "Here lies our salvation," he answered; "if the King of 
 Prussia is with us, we are masters of the situation ; distrust 
 wiU vanish away, and the Constitution will gain ground." 
 They then united their efforts to bring England over to 
 their side, and thought that after her previous alliance with 
 Prussia, she would be easily induced to join them. The re- 
 newal of diplomatic relations which had been solicited by 
 the National Assembly, offered a natural occasion for such 
 negotiations; and Biron, who knew all the dissolute elements 
 of the Berlin Court by heart, busied himself to find a suit- 
 able person for this Embassy. We see in what a flighty 
 way the noble adventurers of that day carried on their State 
 policy. They hoped by means of an intrigue conducted by 
 valets and pimps to mould the policy of great Empires, 
 
 ' The following is from the unpublished correspondence between Nar- 
 bonne, Biron and Talleyrand. Depot de la Guerre, Paris. 
 
392 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. [Book III. 
 
 like SO much clay, into whatever shape they jjleased! If a 
 siiffieieut sum of money were ojBfered to Bischoffswerder, 
 they flattered themselves that they should gain Prussia as 
 an ally of the Revolution against Austria — that very Prussia, 
 which was at the present moment angry with Austria, for 
 showing so little inclination to' make war upon the Revolu- 
 tion. Biron's hopes, of course, were soon dashed, for Bar- 
 nave and Delessart woidd have nothing to do with Prussia 
 on account of her well-known desire for war; though they 
 pretended to consent to Narbonne's wishes, they frustrated 
 the negotiations in the very commencement, by choosing 
 Count Segur for the post of Ambassador, a man who was 
 greatly disliked at the Prussian Court. Biron was furious 
 when informed of Segur's appointment, and immediately 
 gave up all hope, and determined to impeach the treacherous 
 Minister before the National Assembly. Meanwhile exclusive 
 attention was directed to military measures. 
 
 In the disordered state of all the military establishments, 
 a large vote of money was a matter of the most urgent 
 necessity. Narbonne, therefore, asked for an extraordinary 
 grant of 20 million francs in specie, a sum which at the 
 then v;due of gokl v\'as equal to at least 30 millions of «A'- 
 siynats. With ordinarj- Statesmen this one consideration 
 would have sufficed thoroughly to disjicl all warlike thoughts, 
 as the financial difficulties were already enormous. The pro- 
 duce of the direct taxes was almost null. At the close of 
 the present year even the Departments had not settled the 
 amount of the contiiliutions to be levied on each district — 
 and the distribution of these quotas among the Communes and 
 tax-payers was not even liegun. Thus, instead of the 
 prescribed 48 millions, the month of September yielded 
 only 40, October 28, and November 30 million francs; so 
 that on this quarter of a year there was an acknowledged 
 deficit of 46 millions — or nearly 1/3 of the expected income. 
 Now either because the proceeds of the taxes were even 
 below these sums, or that the extraordinary expenses were 
 
Cii. I.] CAMBON'S RECKLESS FINANCIAL MEASURES. 393 
 
 greater than appeared in the official accounts, certain it is, 
 that at the beginning of December, the 600 millions which 
 the Constituent Assembly had voted in June were all ex- 
 pended: — 472 millions towards the liquidation of the Debt, 
 and 128 millions for the administrative expenses of the year. 
 As the Constituent Assembly had expended an additional 
 800 millions, there remained no doubt, that by the end of 
 the year, the Government created by the Revolution would 
 have consumed a milliard of the State capital. 
 
 These figures had very little effect on the National Assem- 
 bly. In all financial affairs they placed implicit confidence 
 in a manufacturer of Montpellier, Peter Joseph Cambon, who 
 impressed his inexperienced colleagues with respect by his 
 knowledge of mercantile book-keeping, and thundered down 
 every objection suggested by the principles of ordinary 
 State-craft with patriotic energy ; declaring the resources of 
 the Revolution to be inexhaustible, as long as men adhered 
 with fidelity to revolutionary paths. In the Constituent 
 Assembly, Montesquieu had at any rate condescended to give 
 explanatory details. Even then indeed the whole truth was 
 never brought to light; but still the Government tried to save 
 appearances, to show vouchers for expenditure, and point out 
 the sources of their income, and so to make up some sort 
 of balance in the accounts. The time was now past for 
 scruples of this nature. Cambon declared, in so many words, 
 that the Treasury was empty, and that consequently new 
 paper must be issued; that the five-franc notes had driven 
 the silver pieces out of circulation, and that therefore the 
 new assignats must be divided into notes of 10 and" 15 sous 
 each. Two speakers thereupon pointed out the mischief 
 that would befall the poorer class from the issue of such 
 worthless paper; but no one attempted to confute them, be- 
 cause the measure, whether good or bad, seemed unavoidable 
 On the 17th Dec. the fabrication of 300 millions of assignats 
 was decreed; so that the whole sum now amounted to 2100 
 millions. The maximum of circulation — hitherto limited to 1400 
 
394 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. [Book III. 
 
 millions — was now fixed at 1600 millions, and the issue grad- 
 ually completed in notes of 50 down to 10 sous. 
 
 Thus were funds obtained, and the Gironde prepared with 
 renewed courage to negotiate the credit demanded by Nar- 
 bonne. "The war," they said, "will be a blessing to the nation — 
 the greatest misfortune would be to have no war. If the 
 Princes wish to attack us, we must be beforehand with 
 them; — if they do not intend to do so, we must put an end 
 to their trifling with the sword." Even Brissot acknow- 
 ledged that the latter was the case, and that the Emperor 
 was by no means eager for war. But he added that they 
 ought to reply to his special pleading about the Alsatian 
 Princes, "that the majesty of the Peoples was not be 
 bound by the treaties of tyrants." Ilerault de Sechelles ex- 
 pressed the real position of affairs in still clearer language. 
 "Do they talk of their empty scheme of a Congress? Should 
 they propose to us the alteration of a single article in the 
 Constitution, we should move the previous question with a 
 laugh at their absurdity." Very significant was his expres- 
 sion of regret that the Minister had not given them more 
 definite intelligence of the hostilities which threatened France. 
 Such a declaration, he said, would have given them power 
 to disregard the two vetos and to do all that the weal of 
 the State required. They would then have been in their 
 right, according to the Roman formula videant Consules, 
 and the moment would have arrived to veil the image of 
 Freedom, and to look solely to the preservation of their 
 existence. 
 
 Finally, Condorcet roused the Assembly to enthusiasm by 
 a manifesto, in which he proposed that the French People 
 should decide on the mode of conducting the war. The chief 
 point in it was, that they— the people of France — desired 
 peace with all nations, and wished to make no conquests; 
 that they should treat even those nations whose Princes began 
 the war, as friends in need of liberty. 
 
 The whole future policy of the Gironde was comprehended 
 
Ch. I.] ROBESPIERRE'S VIEWS ON THE WAR QUESTION. 395 
 
 in this debate. War in all directions, without regard to the 
 law of nations; and by means of war, the establishment of 
 revolutionary rule over France, and the extension of the 
 Revolution though the neighbouring States. 
 
 The 20 millions were unanimously voted on 30th Dec, and 
 on 1st Jan. the decree was published threatening the leaders 
 of the Emigration with the penalties of high treason. 
 
 An unexpected opposition on the part of the Jacobins 
 gave the Girondists an opportunity of bringing their ulti- 
 mate views stiU more unreservedly to light. Robespierre, as 
 we have already remarked in connection with the events of 
 May 1790, had always feared war. The ends which the 
 Gironde hoped to gain by it were indeed altogether iden- 
 tical with his own, as he himself made known in the plainest 
 terms, but he thought the means ill chosen; he feared that 
 as soon as war was declared, a political Dictatorship woidd 
 fall to the lot of the General who directed it. lie regarded 
 all the noise that was being made as an intrigue to place 
 Lafayette and Narbonne at the head of France ; and he took 
 the same view of the probable eifects of a declaration of war 
 as Narbonne himself What could be more glorious, he said, 
 than a sacred war for Freedom, for the extermination of 
 Tyranny, for the liberation of the peoples of the world? 
 "But then such a war," he argued, "must be carried on 
 with unshackled strength, and under trustworthy leaders. 
 And you ask us to go to the shambles amid the applause of 
 the Court, and under the directions of a Narbonne, and the 
 command of a Marquis de Lafayette! Therefore," he said 
 in conclusion, "first overthrow the Court, turn out Narbonne, 
 and annihilate Lafayette, and then, and not till then, can 
 you speak without treachery of a foreign war, and then I will 
 gladly give you my support." 
 
 Louis XVI. might have told him that it was not the war 
 but the Revolution which led to a military Dictatorship. 
 Revolution seems indeed to place Freedom on the throne, 
 but in reality Force, and the greatest force is in the army. 
 
396 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. [Book III. 
 
 The demagogical intrigues of Robespierre, no less than the 
 warlike zeal of Brissot, paved the way for General Buona- 
 parte. The liberty of France was, indeed, rendered hopeless 
 by the declaration of war, but not, as Robespierre had ap- 
 prehended, because it stifled the Revolution, but because, as 
 Brissot rightly foresaw, it necessarily accelerated its fiery 
 course. 
 
 As this last question was the only point of difference 
 between the two leaders of the Revolution, Brissot's su- 
 periority was quite decided. When Robespierre warned 
 them of the treachery of the Court, he i-eplied, with great 
 force, that they were in urgent need of such treachery, as 
 the only means of inflaming the passions of the people, and 
 bringing about the fall of the tyrants; it would raise a storm, 
 he said, by which the herd of intriguers would be swept away, 
 but the povi'er of the Revolution develoiDed in gigantic pro- 
 portions. ^ 
 
 Robespierre had no other means of meeting these unan- 
 swerable deductions than raising suspicions against his op- 
 ponent himself. Brissot, he said, took the same course as 
 Narbonne, and therefore, like Narbonne, he was a betrayer 
 of the People. Brissot was a successful opponent of Robes- 
 pierre in the rostra of the Jacobin Club; and this the latter, 
 suspicious and irritable, and accustomed already to feel him- 
 self in that sphere the Autocrat of the Democracy, could 
 never forgive him. By degrees he succeeded in prejudicing 
 the Jacobins , more and more against Brissot, and nothing 
 contributed to this so much as the increasing power of 
 Brissot himself, which was sufficient to expose him to the 
 dominant love of opposition which characterized the Jacobins. 
 But what availed such an amende to Robespierre's wounded 
 self-love, when the actual results were continually turning out 
 more and more decidedly in accordance with Brissot's wishes? 
 
 ' To the same purport Louvet, in his Memoires; Mallet, I. 247, Roderer 
 in the Jacobin Club. 
 
Ch. I.] INTRIGUES OF THE GIRONDE. 397 
 
 Robespierre had, in fact, no conception of the disposition 
 of his adversary. He could not comprehend tliat any one 
 loved danger for its own sake, and that the rash and in- 
 toxicating game, on which by the declaration of war the 
 future of the State was staked, had a* positive charm for a 
 man of restless energy. He himself, persevering and pe- 
 dantic, moved on step by step in his unvarying course. The 
 European Revolution was, in his eyes, the logical result of 
 the Revolution in France ; and that Brissot, by an audacious 
 inversion, should use the former as a means of promoting the 
 latter was to him incomprehensible and suspicious. He was,' 
 moreover, as ignorant of foreign affairs as Frenchmen gen- 
 erally are, and found himself in all these discussions entirely 
 out of his element. In fact every thing connected with war 
 and armies was repugnant to his mind. He liked to speak 
 but not to strike ; and war appeared to him a vvilgar, and, 
 under some circumstances, a dangerous brawl. That Brissot 
 should labour with such zeal to kindle a war was only in- 
 telligible to him on the supposition of the basest treachery. 
 On the other side, meanwhile, in the camp of the Giron- 
 dists, and in the Ministry at war, the most triumphant joy 
 prevailed at their success in preparing the way for the great 
 catastrophe. Delessart consented at last to send out a se- 
 cond agent after Segur, with abundant means of bribery. 
 In case of failure, they had another scheme, of gaining over 
 the Duke of Brunswick, — whose 'military renown at the head 
 of the Prussians they feared — as leader of the French army. ' 
 Talleyrand himself was to go over to England on a confiden- 
 tial mission, and if Pitt should continue obstinate, he was 
 to aid the Opposition in turning out that Minister. Narbonne 
 made a hasty journey of inspection to the frontiers, for the 
 purpose of seeing in person the generals in command — gain- 
 ing over Rochambeau and Luckner to tlie new system by 
 
 ' Correspondence between Narbonne and the Dnke in Girtanner's Polit. 
 Annul; II. 242. Particulars of the whole scheme in Mallet, I. 259. 
 
398 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. [Book III. 
 
 investing tliem with tlie baton of Marshal,' and concerting 
 some more definite plan with Lafayette. Whether they were 
 really to have war or not, no one knew with any certainty 
 — whether they really desired it, the Girondists had made 
 np their minds, but probably not Narbonne. With cheerful 
 frivolity, and complete self confidence, he approached a crisis, 
 which in its development was to bury himself, his friends 
 and enemies. King and Constitution. 
 
 It was just at this moment that the Emperor's answer 
 to the resolutions of the 14th December arrived. It was 
 dated the 21st December. In this reply he repudiated all 
 hostile intentions, but declared that as chief of the Empire 
 he could not allow a hostile violation of the imperial fron- 
 tiers; and that he had, therefore, given orders to General 
 Bender, in Luxembourg, to protect the Electorate of Treves 
 against any invasion of the French. King Louis, he said, 
 knew how grieved he should be if those -measures were ren- 
 dered necessary, which, in such a case, it would be the bounden 
 duty of the Emperor, the Empire, and the other allied 
 Powers, to take. A second note of January the 5th reiterated 
 that any violation of the imperial territory would neces- 
 sarily bring on a war. At the same time, however, the . 
 Government of Brussels and the Elector of Treves an- 
 nounced to the French Monarch, that the Emperor had de- 
 manded of them the disarming of the Emigres, and had 
 made this a condition of his* protection, and thereby cfi'ected 
 the discontinuance of warlike preparations. 
 
 And in fact, Treves, now seriously alarmed, had ordered 
 the entire dispersion of the Emigres. The Diet of the Elec- 
 torate, which by no means desired an attack of the French, 
 sent up representations to the Elector, which had nothing 
 in them of the usual "obedient unto death" tone, and which 
 
 ' Biron had suggested this, in order Dec. 9.) Narbonne removed the lilies 
 
 to procure for the Generals, who from the Marshal's baton. (Pellenc 
 
 found their assiynals insufficient, an to La Marck, 3. Jan.) 
 increase of pay. (Letter to Narbonne, 
 
Ch. I.] MEASURES AGAINST THE EMIGRES. 399 
 
 filled him with half angry, half alarmed, displeasure. Hitherto 
 Coblentz had presented a noisy and merry scene, in which 
 the French had played the masters in the house of the kind 
 Uncle of their Princes. Court festivals, duels, love intrigues 
 and drilling, followed one another in gay succession. But 
 now the joyful bustle must cease, and it was only in a few 
 viUages, behind the backs of inactive magistrates, that the 
 Emigres could still whet their swords. Calonne, the all- 
 powerful Minister of exiled France, was no Jess angry with 
 the Emperor, than with Louis XVI. Even the latter adhered 
 to his opinion that the operations of the Emigres covdd bring 
 him nothing but destruction ; and through Calonne's old 
 opponent, Breteuil, he sent instructions to the Courts in 
 accordance with the Emperor's views. He most emphatically 
 urged these vie.ws upon the Queen. He repeatedly pictured 
 to her the horrors of the war which would be kindled by a 
 league between the Powers and the Emigres — the difficulty 
 of subduing the nation, which would then stand together 
 as one man — the impossibility, even after a victory, of 
 establishing any enduring order of things upon ruins and 
 corpses. It was impracticable, he said, to take no notice of 
 the temper of the people; and that, therefore, the league of 
 the Powers must not meddle with the essential principles of 
 the Constitution. Their claims, in his opinion, ought to 
 apply only to their previous complaints on the subject of 
 the Alsatian Princes, the spoliation of the Pope, and the 
 late warlike preparations in France; they must, in short, 
 content themselves with what was attainable — the personal 
 safety of the King and the Nobility, and the reestablishment 
 of the Royal authority, — and must leave the rest to better 
 times. ^ 
 
 The more clearly this policy was revealed in official docu- 
 ments, the more plainly did the Gironde recognise the danger 
 
 ' Secret correspondence between Leopold and Marie Antoinette in the 
 Revue retrospective. 
 
400 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. [Book III. 
 
 which it threatened to their own plans. If tliey did not 
 forestall that policy, they ran the risk of standing alone in 
 the country. Isnard gave utterance to these sentiments can- 
 didl)' enough on the 5th of January. The contest, he said, no 
 longer turned on the restoration of the ancien regime, or the 
 establishment of a Republic — for even the friends of the former 
 state of things acknowledged the impossibility of returning 
 to it — and the Kepublicans from their small numbers were 
 hardly to be reckoned as a party. But, lie continued, there 
 was the mass of moderate men, who adhered, indeed, to the 
 Constitution, but who loved repose above all things, and 
 stood opposed to the zealous Patriots, — the genuine friends 
 of liberty and equality. "The fear of anarchy frightens tliem 
 away from the truest patriots, and throws them into the 
 arms of the falsely moderate party, the most dangerous of 
 all — the rich, the egotistical, the enemies of equality." The 
 contest, he said, had begun for the salvation or the de- 
 struction of equality. Robespierre and Marat, the bonnets 
 de laine and the pikemen themselves, could not have in- 
 vented a more exact definition of the real state of things. 
 It was not the Constitution in its positive principles which 
 was threatened, l)ut the rule of the mob, and the Dema- 
 gogues who led it. To avoid this most immediate cause of 
 anxiety — the victory of the moderates — the Gironde rushed 
 into war, and far greater though more remote dangers. No 
 reasonable man could conceal from himself, that it was all 
 over with the Revolution, if the Powers should carry on 
 the war' with quick and crusliing blows; but meanwhile, 
 these enemies were far away. Men trusted to the chapter 
 of accidents, and only one thing was certain, that the war 
 would destroy the French Monarchy, if the Powers continued 
 for a few months longer to temporize in their accustomed 
 manner. 
 
 The Gironde, therefore, did not hesitate for a moment. 
 AVith the greatest zeal they sought to cut ofi' every chance, 
 of an understanding. Gensonne, the Baj)porteur of the Di- 
 
Ch. I.] GUADET'S WARLIKE APPEAL. 401 
 
 plomatic Committee, dwelt on the orders given to General 
 Bender, pointed out the concert of the Powers referred to 
 in the Emperor's note, and proposed to put the categorical 
 question^whether the Emperor would renounce all attempts 
 against the Constitution, and, in accordance with their ancient 
 alliance, support France against the other Powers. lie further^ 
 proposed, that if Leopold did not give a binding declara- 
 tion on these points within three weeks, he should be regarded 
 as an enemy. Before the debate on this motion began, Guadet 
 rose from his presidential chair. One point in the motion, 
 he said, had so powerfully excited his feelings, that he 
 begged permission to give them vent in words. And then, 
 mounting the tribune, he denounced the concert of the 
 Powers, whose object was to change the Constitution, as a 
 fact which must fill every honourable and patriotic- heart 
 with annihilating wrath. In a furious torrent of words, he 
 appealed to the pride of the French People — "the only free 
 People of Europe," — the pride which was now to be succeeded 
 by the deepest humiliation, that of receiving laws from de- 
 spised foreigners, — from a hand of crowned despots. "I call 
 iipon you to declare every Frenchman who takes any part 
 in any negotiation whatever respecting our Constitution, as 
 an infamous, traitor to his country." 
 
 Such language suited alike the purposes of the Gironde, 
 the ideas of Lafayette, and the passions of the strangers gal- 
 lery. The whole Assembly was in a blaze of excitement; — 
 without consideration, and without opposition, the motion 
 was carried amidst continual cries of "Liberty or Death!" 
 Delessart was present, and saw the hopes of his friends 
 destroyed. He had not t-he energy to resist, but cried 
 "Freedom or Death!" like the rest, and. demanded of the 
 King his immediate consent to the decree, or all, he said, 
 would be irremediably lost. 
 
 This was the reply to the wish of the Feuillants to work 
 on the minds of the French people by the reasonable re- 
 presentations of the Powers. War was inevitable; for the 
 
 I. '20 
 
402 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. [Book III. 
 
 very programme which the Emperor had adopted and used to 
 restrain the Northern Powers from attacking France, had now 
 been declared by the French to be a casus belli. And with 
 what burning zeal were these sentiments spread abroad among 
 the Parisian Democrats! On the 17th of Jan. Brissot expressed 
 his indignation at that part of the report which proposed 
 that the Emperor was first to be questioned about his 
 fidelity to his alliance with France. His coalition with other 
 Powers, referred to in his note, was of itself a breach of the 
 treaty of 1756, and an overt act of hostility. They ought, he 
 said, to make this declaration to the Emperor at once, and to 
 tell him moreover, that nothing but the immediate dissolu- 
 tion of that coalition could avert the war. "What necessity 
 is there for any declaration," cried Bishop Fauchet — "war 
 between Freedom and Tyranny has long existed. Call upon 
 all nations to take part with you — offer them your help 
 against their despots, and tear up all the treaties by which 
 kings have hitherto enslaved their peoples." "For that," 
 replied a member of the Right, "affairs are not yet ripe." 
 
 During these debates Narbonne had completed his journey 
 to the frontiers; had seen the Generals at Metz, and had 
 summoned them to a Council of war at Paris. He raised 
 the courage of the Assembly by a brilliant description of the 
 fortresses and regiments, and begged for a more effectual 
 recruiting law, since there was a deficit of 50,000 men in 
 the troops of the hne. He would have liked to incorporate 
 the battalions of volunteers with the regiments, and thus to 
 bring then under military discipline; but popidar as he was 
 with the Democrats of the Assembly, he could not succeed 
 in this, since their wish was the very reverse, — vig. that the 
 soldier should merge in the citizen. They contented them- 
 selves, therefore, with raising the bounty money, lowering 
 the standard of height, and instituting public ceremonies of 
 enlistment. It subsequently appeared that the results of 
 these measures were very insignificant; and immediately 
 afterwards. General NoaiUes announced that Cavalry and 
 
Cu. I,] GENERALS EOCHAMBEAU AND LUCKNER. 403 
 
 Artillery were in a state of complete demoralization. But 
 the zeal of the Assembly was not to be checked; on the 
 contrary, they decreed, on the 25th of January, that the King 
 should ask the Emperor whether be would renounce all at- 
 tempts against France; and that war should be declared un- 
 less a satisfactory answer was returned before the 1st of 
 March. No one doiibted of the issue. The Ministry called 
 on the Generals to express their views as to the best method 
 of conducting the war. Rochambeau, a soldier of the old 
 school, accustomed to methodical strategy, and averse to the 
 Revolutionary modes of proceeding, expressed the very un- 
 popular opinion, that in the present bad condition of the 
 troops, nothing more was possible than the defence of the 
 frontier; and that any act of aggression would be injurious. 
 All the more zealously did Luckner meet the wishes of Nar- 
 bonne and the Gironde. He had formerly acquired a re- 
 putation in the Seven-years war, as a partisan against the 
 French ; he had great personal courage, but possessed very little 
 ability as a General, and none as a Statesman. Being with- 
 out personal convictions, he might be won over, especially 
 in his cups, to any opinion whatever. He now declared 
 with great energy, that they ought not to allow themselves 
 to be put upon in any way, but make short work with the 
 Emperor; that, he, Luckner, intended to cross the Rhine, 
 take Mayence, throw the' whole German Empire into a state 
 of ferment, and compel the Emperor to acknowledge the 
 French Constitution in Vienna itself. His associates were 
 almost obliged to moderate his fervid zeal. Brissot and 
 Condorcet considered it more usefid to occupy the attention 
 of the German Empire by exciting its inhabitants, (their 
 agents were already very active in the Breisgau and the 
 Palatinate), but they wished to carry the war into Belgium, 
 where they also hoped to raise a rebellion, and reckoned on 
 the inaction of Prussia. This master-stroke Lafayette in- 
 tended to deal with his own hand. He and the other Party 
 Chiefs were already in active correspondence with the mal- 
 
 2c2 
 
404 ORIGIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY AVAR. [Book III. 
 
 contents in Belgium and Liege, while, count Bethune was 
 arming a number of Belgian exiles in Douai. 
 
 Such was the point at which they had arrived in Paris. 
 The Emperor, on the other hand, had as yet come to no 
 final agreement with any of the Powers. A negotiation with 
 Holland was pending, but hitherto without result; and he 
 had separated himself from Spain, Sweden and Russia, by 
 his resolution to have nothing to do with the Emigres, or 
 with the restoration of the ancien regime. In Belgium 
 30,000 Austrians stood opposed to the 100,000 French, 
 the number which the muster-roll of the armies of the North 
 and Centre contained. To the Breisgau, which was threatened 
 by internal disturbances and the army of Luckner, Leopold 
 determined to send 6,000 men, and to keep 30,000 in Bo- 
 hemia, ready to march. At the same time he carried on his 
 negotiations with Prussia, on the same basis as before. 
 "I will not," he writes to the Queen in February, "oblige the 
 factions who now carry the French people with them, by 
 declaring openly for the Counter-Revolution, and thereby 
 delivering over the moderate jaarty into their hands. I have 
 come to an understanding on this point with Prussia, nor 
 will I, in treating with any Power, swerve from these prin- 
 ciples, — that we are not to assist the Emigres, nor interfere by 
 act with the internal affairs of France, except in case of 
 personal danger to the Royal Family; and that in no case 
 are we to aim at the overthrow of the Constitution, but 
 only to fiivour its improvement by conciliating means. Our 
 measures have no other object than the encouragement of 
 the moderate party, and the furtherance of a just and rea- 
 sonable settlement, which, by reconciling the interests of all 
 parties, shall secure the freedom and happiness of France."' 
 
 ' The Minister Delessart wrote sub- qu'on ne nous voulait pas f aire la guerre, 
 
 sequently from his prison to Necker: par lapreme sansrepiique,quec'estnous 
 
 "Ma defense sera curieuse.. par la mani- qui I'avons provoquee, et mis i' Europe 
 
 festation de ce qui c'est passe dans les contre nous." The daggers of the Sep- 
 
 curos etrangeres, par la demonstration temberassassinsdestroyedthisdefence. 
 
Ch. II] 405 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 FALL OF THE FEUILLANTS. 
 
 Revolt of the negroes in st. domingo. — The pikes in paeis. — Bloody 
 
 ATROCITIES in AVIGNON. DEMOCRACY IN MARSEILLES. — SeQCESTRATION 
 
 OF THE ESTATES OF THE EMIGRES. — DiSTDRBANCES IN ALL THE PRO- 
 VINCES. The FEUILLANTS WISH TO REFORM THE CONSTITUTION. AUSTRIA 
 
 WISHES TO SUPPORT THEM. TaLLEYRAKD HOLDS OUT HOPES OF FRIEND- 
 SHIP WITH ENGLAND. L.iFAYETTE AND NARBONNE AGAINST THE FEUIL- 
 LANTS. — Dismissal of sarbonne. — Lafayette and brissot ovebthkow 
 
 THE ministry. — ThE GIRONDE FORMS A NEW CABINET. 
 
 The Girondists had other reasons also for thinking that 
 their time was Come. "We too," said Mad. Roland, "wanted 
 to make a Revolution — the second and greater Revolution." 
 If their object was by means of foreign war to overwhelm 
 the crown, and by its storms to burst asunder the weak 
 bands of the existing Constitution, it would almost seem, 
 since the beginning of the year, as if there had been no need 
 of this dangerous measure, so fearfully did the internal dis- 
 solution of all social and political relations begin to show 
 itself. 
 
 In November, when Brissot was making his first speeches 
 in favour of war, the tidings, at first vague but soon ter- 
 ribly definite, reached the Assembly, of the ruin and destruc- 
 tion of St. Domingo, the richest colony of France. Im- 
 mediately before the Revolution, this Island had attained a 
 height of prosperity not surpassed in the history of Euro- 
 pean colonies. The greatest part of its soil was covered by 
 plantations on a gigantic scale, which su^iplied half Europe 
 with sugar, coffee and cotton. In 1788 it exported pro- 
 duce to the value of 150 mUlion francs to France,* four-fifths 
 
 ' Arnould, Balance de Commerce. Report of the Minister Joli, Juli 10. 1792. 
 
406 FALL OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 of which was re-exported to the north of Europe by the 
 French dealers, who were always ready to support the 
 Planters, when necessary, with the whole power of their ca- 
 pital. The good fortune of the Island had been still further 
 enhanced, by the passing of a measure in 1786, by which' — 
 contrary to the system of monopoly generally adhered to — 
 the colony was allowed to trade directly with foreign coun- 
 tries. Since that time the Planters had doubled their pro- 
 duce, and a large amount of French capital poured into the 
 Island for investment — a hundred million francs from Bordeaux 
 alone. The returns were already splendid, and still greater 
 were expected. The Planters lived like Princes; all the 
 luxuries of a tropical climate, and of European civilisation, 
 were at their command. On their vast estates they ruled 
 over thousands of negro slaves, without feeling any power 
 above them; and since the emancipation of the American 
 Colonies, they had occasionally asked themselves why they 
 still remained in dependence on the mother country. 
 y- When the States-general were summoned in France, the 
 Planters also wished to share in the new freedom, and the 
 sovereignty of the People. They had, moreover, in the towns of 
 the Island, a dissolute and restless population below them ; for 
 the wealth of the Island had for many years past enticed 
 over a number of ambitious spirits from all parts and classes 
 of the mother country — artisans and soldiers, merchants 
 and sailors, retail traders and publicans. At their political 
 meetings differences arose with the Royal authorities; and dis- 
 cord prevailed among themselves on the question, whether they 
 ^loukl demand rejiresentation in the Assembly, or entire in- 
 dependence of it. Soon however a new element showed itself in 
 the interior of the Island, at the appearance of which aU previous 
 contentions were thrown into the shade. Between the large 
 plantations about 15,000 free people of colour, mulattoes and 
 emancipated negroes, lived on small farms, supporting them- 
 selves by the labour of their hands, knowing nothing of the 
 wealth and the pleasures, the civilization and the luxury. 
 
Ch. II.] REVOLT OF MULATTOES IN ST. DOMINGO. 407 
 
 of the Planters, and entirely excluded by the jealousy of 
 the whites from all participation in their social and political 
 life. Now, however, the doctrine of the rights of humanity 
 was heard in Domingo as well as in France ; the people of 
 colour began to feel that they were men, and demanded 
 political rights in the first place, from the Assembly of Plant- 
 ers, and when scornfully rejected by them, at the bar of the 
 National Assembly at Paris. There Pethion and Robespierre 
 took up their cause, while Barnave pleaded for the Planters 
 as the true pillars of the Revolution in Domingo. The Na- 
 tional Assembly, thrown into a dilemma between the inter- 
 ests of French commerce, and the doctrine of the "Rights of 
 man," wavered and came to no decisive resolution; The 
 mulattoes at length lost all patience, and took up arms under 
 Oge, but their revolt was quickly suppressed by the French 
 regiments under the energetic Colonel Mauduit, and the 
 rebels were punished with horrible cruelty for the exercise of 
 the right of insurrection. 
 
 Unfortunately, however, Mauduit had rendered himself 
 terrible to the white men who longed for liberty, as well as 
 to the unruly Mulattoes. Some months before the rising of 
 the Mulattoes he had dispersed the Assembly of the Whites 
 with an armed force, and had firmly upheld the Royal au- 
 thorities. This the Planters could not forgive; they excited 
 his own troops against him, by a systematic agitation, like 
 that of the Jacobins in Paris; and never rested till Mauduit 
 fell a viction to a mutiny of his soldiers. The day of retri- 
 bution came quickly enough. In May 1791, the extreme Left 
 of the National Assembly succeeded in passing a decree, 
 which admitted the free men of colour to the exercise of 
 the franchise. The news of this event fell like a thunder- 
 bolt amidst the troubles of the Island; the Whites were re- 
 solved rather to throw off the yoke of the mother country 
 than submit to so degrading an association; the Mulattoes 
 determined to realise, at any cost, their now legitimate rights ; 
 and as they could not hope by themselves to subdue their 
 
408 FALL OF THE FEUILLANTS.j [Book III. 
 
 white opponents — who doubled them in number, — they had 
 recourse to the extreme measure of rousing the negro slaves 
 to rebellion. 
 
 Of these there were at that time about 400,000 on the Is- 
 land. Their treatment differed according to the disposition 
 of their owners; but alas! there were never wanting cases 
 in which cruelty, avarice, or lust, had made the lot of the 
 slaves intolerable. And therefore from the very commence- 
 ment of the French dominion, there had never been entire 
 tranquillity, but larger or smaller bands of fugitive negroes, 
 or Maroons, had made the interior of the mountains imsafe. 
 As they were always worsted in every collision with the 
 regular troops, the people of Domingo were quite accustomed 
 to this state of things, and did not apprehend the possibility 
 of danger from that quarter. Now however the Maroons 
 and Mulattoes formed a coalition, and in a moment the re- 
 volt broke out far and wide in every district of the Island. 
 AVithin a month 600 Plantations were reduced to ashes; 
 hundreds of thousands of men ran to arms, the Whites were 
 hunted like wild beasts, prisoners impaled and sawn in 
 pieces, women outraged to death, and the open coimtry 
 ravaged up to the very walls of the towns. The Whites de- 
 fended themselves with the energy of desj^air, bvit now they 
 felt the want of discipline in the troops, and of energetic 
 command. As early as September they saw no other chance 
 of safety than an agreement with the Midattoes, to whom 
 at last they granted equal political rights. But at the very 
 same time Barnave had carried the revocation of the Edict 
 of JMay through the National Assembly, and thereby once 
 more subjected the Midattoes, as far as law could do so, to 
 the arbitrary will of the Whites. This intelligence imme- 
 diately fanned the flame of war afresh; the despatch of troops 
 was prevented by the strife between the Ministry and the 
 Gironde, which, instead of sending aid to the Whites, restored, 
 the political equahty of the Mulattoes. Both courses were 
 equally unavailing, and the conflagration, once kindled, raged 
 
Cm II.] THE PEOPLE ARM THEMSELVES WITH PIKES. 409 
 
 on. Then arose complaints from the whole commercial world ; 
 in the maritime towns bankruptcies followed one another in 
 quick succession. Sugar rose in Paris to nearly double the 
 usual price, and the mob of the Faubourg St. Antoine began 
 to plunder the warehouses, and to demand a fixed price for 
 sugar; and having once commenced proceedings of this kind, 
 for bread also. The calm which had reigned in the city since 
 17th July, was at an end; the mass of the Proletaries was 
 once more set in motion, and the Giroude took care to keep 
 up the agitation. 
 
 They had foreseen the declaration of war, and knew how 
 intimately it was connected with internal commotions, and 
 they therefore determined to have a force ready for the oc- 
 casion. The miseries of St. Domingo were terrible enough 
 to have admonished them to peace and unity, but thgirs was 
 not the kind of patriotism which would have enabled them 
 to make some sacrifice of their system and their ambition 
 to the interests of their country. When Paris had resounded 
 for eight days with the uproar of the suburbs, Brissot and 
 his friends had no other thought, than that the storm would 
 rage still more furiously when the men of the suburbs stood 
 opposed in arms to the National Guard. The electioneering 
 Club in the Episcopal Palace, which had brought Brissot into 
 the Chamber, de'clared that if the musket was the weapon 
 of the enfranchised citizens, the pike must be the arm of 
 the People. The journals of the party took up the cry, and 
 Pethion complained that the Bourgeoisie, whose alliance with 
 the People had brought about the 14th of July; had proved 
 faithless to the sacred popular cause. The fabrication of 
 pikes began, and many thousands were soon in the hands 
 of the non-voters. Two deputations from St. Antoine, which 
 appeared in quick succession at the bar of the National 
 Assembly, declared the object of their arming in the plainest 
 terms. They wished, said they, on the 26th of January, /or a 
 law which secured property, but annihilated accaparement (the 
 buying up of goods) and usury. This was the well-known for- 
 
410 FALL OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book 111. 
 
 miila for an official and compulsory price of goods." Guard well 
 the Tuileries," said the same party on the ]5tli of February — 
 "the Lion will soon awake; we are ready to purge the earth 
 of the friends of the King and to force the King himself to 
 cease from deceiving us. " A short time before Narboune 
 had sent the old French Guards to the frontier, as a regiment 
 of the line, to the great sorrow of the Revolutionists, who, 
 with all their pike enthusiasm, were very sorry to see these 
 gallant chamj)ions march away. The Jacobins were continu- 
 ally discussing the necessity of their return, and the before- 
 mentioned deputation declared that the Pikes and the Guards 
 would save the country. 
 
 They founded still greater hopes on the south of the king- 
 dom. We must say a few words more in this place about 
 Avignon, and a second festival of horror, by which the first 
 days of the legislative Assembly' were desecrated. 
 
 This old residence of the Popes remained until the year 
 1789 under the papal Government, wdiich, from its distance, 
 exercised its authority with great mildness, and left the towns 
 and villages of the country in the enjoyment of a great degree 
 of independence. The general condition of the population 
 was, however, much the same as in the neighbouring dis- 
 tricts of France — agitation in the towns and misery in the 
 country. It is not surjDrising, therefore, that the commotion 
 of Aug. 4th shoidd extend itself among the subjects of the 
 Holy see. Here too castles were burned, black mail levied 
 on the monasteries, tithes and feudal rights abolished. The 
 city of Avignon soon became the centre of a political agita- 
 tion, whose first object was to throw off the papal yoke, and 
 then to imite the country with France. The old constitution 
 of the city was abolished, a Municipality estabhshed after 
 the French pattern, and the chief offices in which were filled 
 exclusively by partisans of France. The middle class of ci- 
 tizens, animated by hatred against the Nobility and Clergy, 
 took the lead in this movement; but they met with great 
 resistance iu the country districts. Carpentras, the second town 
 
Cii. II.] CIVIL WAR IN AVIGNON. 411 
 
 of the country remained true to the Pope, — perhaps out oi" 
 neighbourly opposition to Avignon, — and to this phice resorted 
 a mixed multitude of Nobles, Monks and Peasants. Both 
 towns of course entered into correspondence, respectively, 
 with men of similar sentiments in France. As early as Nov. 
 1789, the Left brought forward the question of the reunion 
 of Avignon with the French Empire in the National Assembly. 
 But in this case, as in the previous one respecting the Co- 
 lonies, the Chamber coidd arrive at no decision; they rather 
 ■feared to resort to open violence, and neverthelesss felt an 
 irresistible longing to appropriate the Papal territory. In 
 June 1790, the people of Avignon tore down the Papal arms, 
 and the Town Council sent a message to Paris that Avignon 
 wished to be united to France. But even then the decision 
 was delayed. In consequence of the representations of the 
 Papal Nuncio himself, Mirabeau obtained a decree for the 
 entrance of some French regiments into Avignon, for the 
 maintenance of order. La Marck wrote to him, at that time, • 
 that he was thereby sending the plague to Avignon; and 
 in fact, no sooner had the French troops arrived in that 
 city than the greater part of them deserted, and marched 
 out with the Democrats of the town to take and sack the 
 little town of Cavaillon, which remained faithful to the Pope. 
 From this time forward civil war raged without intermission. 
 Avignon, immediately after the taking of Cavaillon, summoned 
 a meeting of Electors from all the Communes of the country, 
 and when Carpentras refused to recognise its authority, an 
 armed band, increased by French reinforcements to 6000 
 men, marched against the town to subdue the Papists with fire 
 and sword. The unfortunate inhabitants of the district were 
 unable to protect their lands; — their villages were set on fire, 
 their fields laid waste, and their forests destroyed. But the 
 town itself, filled with exiles and desperate men, held out 
 with unshaken firmness; and when the peasants of the neigh- 
 bouring mountains, a bold and hardy race of men, incensed 
 by the savage brutality of the Bandits of Vaucluse,— for so 
 
412 FALL OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 the Democratic Army called itself^ — rose at last to re- 
 lieve the place, the terrified besiegers were in serious 
 danger. But just at this crisis the Government Commis- 
 sioners arrived from France, and succeeded in bringing about 
 a truce, a preliminary arrangement of diiferences, and the 
 return of the bandits to Avignon. Thereupon the Constituent 
 Assembly, on the 14tli of September, 1791, decreed the reunion 
 of the country with France. Before the new government 
 could assert its authority, fresh and more dreadful atrocities 
 had taken place. The Town-Council of Avignon could no 
 longer control the powers which they had themselves let 
 loose. The Electoral Assembly had promised the bandits two 
 francs daily pay, besides maintenance and arms— a heavy 
 burden for the city, and one which soon made them wish 
 to disband this dangerous gang. But this was not at all 
 that the leaders of the bandits wanted; they therefore took 
 possession of the Papal Castle, which from a lofty rock 
 looks down on the city and the Valley of the Rhone, and 
 at that time served the triple purpose of palace, citadel, and 
 arsenal. From this point they commanded the town at wih; 
 dragged the Members of the Town-Council to their dun- 
 geons, plundered the public treasury, and murdered all who 
 offered any resistance. At length the patience of the people 
 was exhausted. As one of the Members of the Electoral 
 Assembly, Lescnyer, was about to carry off the funds of 
 the public loan-office, an insurrection took place in which he 
 was killed. At the same time intelligence arrived that new 
 Commissioners with French troops were approaching. The 
 bandits saw the end of their rule and the punishment of 
 their crimes at hand, and therefore determined at the last 
 moment to avenge Lescnyer, and rid themselves of the prin- 
 cipal witnesses of their crimes. On the 16th of October they 
 murdered their prisoners to the number of 110, and among 
 them a priest and a woman in a state of pregnancy. A boy 
 of sixteen slew seven of the victims with his own hand ; their 
 bodies were hacked in pieces, and the bleeding limbs thrown 
 
Cn. II.] THE BANDITS OF VAUCLUSE. 413 
 
 into" a dungeon of the Castle, called la Glacivrc that they 
 might be for ever hidden from human eyes. The knowledge 
 of the deed, however, was not to be thus concealed; the 
 whole population came forward as accusers, and the Com- 
 missioaers ordered the immediate apprehension of the ring- 
 leaders. The country rose with one accord against the friends 
 of the murderous crew, and expelled nearly 2000 of these 
 patriots from the city. But these were no times in which 
 justice could obtain a hearing in opposition to party; the 
 banditti of Avignon were as serviceable for a fresh Revo- 
 lution as Parisian pikes and French guards, and in eyery 
 quarter the French Democracy took up their cause. 
 
 The inland towns and nearly the whole province of Pro- 
 vence were actuated by the same sentiments as Avignon it- 
 self. In the summer of 1789 they had joined with enthu- 
 siasm in the Revolution against the ancien regime; but they 
 soon became thoroughly weary of the never-ending disturb- 
 ances, after having seen the real character of the second 
 Revolution displayed in attacks on the Church and the pro- 
 perty and lives of individuals. The sharper the schism in 
 the body of the Church itself — the fiercer the struggle in 
 the neighbouring city of Avignon — the more closely and 
 firmly did the more moderate men hold together. In Mende, 
 Vannes and Jales, associations of armed men were formed 
 to protect the Catliolic Priests from the Jacobins; the ci- 
 tizens of Aries, by long continued efforts, got the mastery 
 over the Democrats; and in consideration of the disturbed 
 condition of the country, took up their residence in some 
 old fortresses from which they could command the Rhone, 
 and, if necessary, block up the river. They were not guilty 
 of any illegal act; on the contrary, the political excitement 
 in Aries was caused by the efibrts of the Jacobins in the 
 Town to put a stop to usury, and to the buying up of 
 goods — by which they always meant maintaining by force 
 the nominal value of paper money, and fixing the price of wares 
 
414 FALL OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book HI. 
 
 at their pleasure. The public authorities of the Department 
 agreed entirely with the citizens. ^ 
 
 These moderate views were violently opposed by the De- 
 mocrats of the South, who were in possession of the crowded 
 and bustling city of Marseilles, the focus of their power. 
 They had elected a Municipality in accordance with their 
 views, and could also reckon on the support of the majority 
 of the 21 batallions of the Burgher Guard. Into this wealthy 
 seat of commerce a crowd of the most excitable of the 
 people daily thronged — French and Catalan mariners, smug- 
 glers and adventurers from all quarters of the world. The 
 extensive works in the harbour employed some thousands 
 of men, and the regular traffic led all the peasants of the 
 neighbourhood to and from the city. "There are 20,000 
 people here," said Barbaroux (at that time secretary of the 
 Town Council), "and just as many characters and views." 
 Opportunities of agitation were never wanting; sometimes 
 reactionar}' attempts were made by Officers, Nobles and 
 Priests; at others, reports were spread of Emigrant conspi- 
 racies, and tumultuous risings of the people, who did not 
 like to lose on their assiynais, and wished to buy cheap 
 bread. In short there was an ever-flowing, ever widening 
 whirlpool, which gradually drew the whole Province into 
 its vortex. The Municipal Government submissively assented 
 to the wishes of the masses — e. g. they caused manifestoes 
 to be printed at an expense (for one year) of 21,000 francs^ — 
 but in other respects they acted with sovereign authority, — 
 formed alliances with neighbouring Communities — opened 
 diplomatic negociations with Corsica — took the direction of 
 the commercial settlements in Africa and the Levant, — and 
 
 ' Charges brought by the Marseil- with similar amounts; e. g. for Or- 
 
 lois against Aries: "TheDirectory has leans 8000 francs; Lottin, I. 304. 
 
 an understanding with the rebels, and If we take the whole kingdom, this 
 
 favours stock-jobbing and the acca- class of unproductive expenditure 
 
 parement. — - This item recurs in must have swallowed millions, 
 all the city budgets of this period 
 
Ch. II.] ORGANISATION OF THE JACOBIN CLUB. 415 
 
 allowed no interference either from the Departmental Author- 
 ities or the Ministry at Paris. As early as the beginning 
 of the year, they began to look with suspicion on Aries and 
 Avignon, and reflected on the consequences which must 
 arise, if these cities were to ally themselves with Sardinia 
 and the Emigres. On the 4th of February therefore they 
 dispatched Barbaroux to Paris, to denounce the alleged ' 
 warlike preparations which Aries was making against Mar- 
 seilles — the counter-revolutionary movements of the Depart- 
 ments, — and the tyranny of the usurers and accapareurs. 
 Barbaroux, a handsome young man, -of great gallantry, ar- 
 dent imagination, and fond of excitement and tumult, im- 
 mediately formed a close intimacy with Brissot, and became 
 an enthusiastic admirer of the equally restless and ambitious 
 Madame Roland. Montpelher and Orange as well as Mar- 
 seilles supported his demands, and as Aries refused to unite 
 with them, they began, on their own authority, to form free 
 companies for its attack, in which they enrolled National 
 guards, armed proletaries, natives and strangers. The same 
 charges were brought against Avignon as against Aries and 
 the whole province, of being in a state of insurrection, and 
 conspiring with the Emigres. 
 
 Similar disturbances were reported to the National As- 
 sembly from every part of France; and now the impotence 
 of the Government, the wretched condition of all civU and 
 religious affairs, and the power of the Jacobins, were clearly 
 brought to light. There was scarcely a town in France in 
 which these last had not a C'lub, affiliated to the great 
 Central Association in Paris. The Jacobins themselves esti- 
 mated their own numbers at 400,000 men, ^ most of them 
 needy men, incapable of an independent opinion, and placed 
 by the Constitution of the Club at the entire disposal of its 
 
 ' General Barbantane, who three weeks later proved his revolutionary- 
 sentiments at Aix, calls the warlike preparations of Aries mere child's play. 
 2 J. M. Chenier, Monit. 1792, p. 711. 
 
41G FALL OF' THE FEUILLANTS. [Book IIL 
 
 Parisian leaders. Not that tlie disorders of wliicli we are 
 about to speak were all planned and ordered beforehand by 
 the club- in Paris. Circumstances made this quite super- 
 fluous; since there were in every village the same occasions 
 for religious disputes — everywhere the same losses by the 
 assignats, — the same desire of cheap bread, — the same con- 
 tempt for magistrates and laws. But the Clubs continually 
 transmitted the general order to rouse or to calm the masses 
 of the people, according to the immediate necessity of the 
 Chiefs of the party. They gave to each separate section of 
 Jacobins the inspiring aonfidence, that similar operations were 
 going on elsewhere, and that they were backed by a countr 
 less number of associates of like opinion with themselves. 
 And in return they enabled their chiefs immediately to turn 
 to account, in the great centre of the kingdom, any local 
 disturbance in the Provinces. On the 11th of February of 
 this year the signal was given, for reasons already stated, to 
 increase the ferment among the people. Brissot and the 
 Gironde were agreed in this particular with Robespierre and 
 Danton, just as in the question of war they had enjoyed 
 the support of Lafayette and Narbonne. That, on the other 
 hand, Robespierre was angry with them on accovuit of the 
 war, and Lafayette on account of the internal commotions, 
 gave them little concern, in the midst of these successful 
 alliances with other parties, by which the latter, for the 
 time at least, seemed only to serve their piirposes. 
 
 The causes of agitation were every where the same. These 
 were no longer, as in 1789, the feudal rights of the Nobles, 
 nor even, as in 1793, the fear of Foreign Powers; and we 
 now see clearly that the alarm respecting the Emigres was 
 got up by the chiefs of parties for their own purposes, and 
 was only really felt in some of the border districts. In the 
 interior it was solely by religious and social questions that 
 men's minds were agitated ; and the abolition of the Church, 
 and the maintenance of the people at the cost of the State, 
 were the objects of almost every disturbance. The assignats, 
 
Cii. II.] DEPRECIATION OF THE ASSIGNATS. 417 
 
 of which at this time 1600 millions, and soon afterwards 
 1800 millions, were in circnlation — after about 400 millions 
 had been burned — had driven the silver coinage entirely 
 out of currency; and even copper, in spite of the melt- 
 ing down of the church bells, was hardly to be met with. 
 The value of paper money had fallen terribly since the be- 
 ginning of the cry for war; and even on the small five- 
 franc notes there was a loss in Paris of 40 per cent, and in 
 other towns of 60 per cent. ; so that the rate of exchange, 
 which usually only troubles men of property, was a source 
 of perpetual torment to the poorest workman. The National 
 Assembly, however, had no other source of income for State 
 purposes than fresh issues of paper money; and they were 
 therefore really very glad that the breach with the Emigres 
 had become irreconcileable, because it afforded them a pre- 
 text for new confiscations, which filled their coffers and fur- 
 nished a fund on the security of which the assignats were 
 issued. On the 9th of February they decreed that all the 
 landed estates of the Emigres should be sequestrated, and 
 administered for the good of the Public. These landed es- 
 tates made up a mass of property already greater than that 
 of the Church, and its confiscation had for a long time been 
 eagerly desired by the Democrats. But as this measure did 
 not raise the value of the assignats a single sou, the people 
 profited but little, in spite of all the jubilation of the ter- 
 rorists. The demand for specie became louder and more 
 threatening every day; it was no longer safe even for the 
 Government to transport specie from one place to another, 
 because the infuriated populace immediately suspected that 
 it was being sent out of the country. Whenever a trades- 
 man refused to receive paper money for his wares, — or, still 
 worse, when a man of business tried to collect a cpantity 
 of coin, — a tumult was the immediate conseciuence, and the 
 cry was raised "a la lanterne''' with the usurers! 
 
 The bread riots were intimately connected with the state 
 of things described above. Prices rose as the value of the 
 
 I. 2d 
 
418 FALL OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 assignats declined ; the people were afraid of being starved, 
 and every where actually suffered much from want, though 
 still more from the fear of it. There was still abundance of 
 employment to be got in the manufactories, as the effect of 
 the low rate of exchange still continued. When there was a 
 deficiency of work, the National Assembly voted more mil- 
 lions for the establishment of public workshops. The re- 
 cruiting of the army, which was very zealously carried on, 
 offered a tolerable livelihood for the moment to more than 
 a 100,000 men. Nor was there a want of corn, and wherever 
 a real deficiency should arise, the State could supply the 
 market, having bought up a stock for 12 million francs 
 in the first 3 months of the year, and subsequently set apart 
 10 million francs for a simOar purpose. But in this case, 
 too, the unruly temper of the people spoiled and ruined every- 
 thing. The recruiting went on very slowly, much as they 
 talked of patriotic enthusiasm. The manufacturer had the 
 greatest trouble in bringing workmen together in sufficient 
 numbers, and the public workshops had lost all credit even 
 in the eyes of the people. They had in fact no taste for 
 work or discipline; they much preferred listening to Marat's 
 imprecations on the hardhearted rich, or to read in the most 
 widely circulated of all the Parisian journals, that the super- 
 fluity of the wealthy is taken from the poor man's portion, 
 and is therefore a theft — a theft worthy of punishment in 
 a society of equals. With these doctrines were interspersed 
 continual exhortations to incarcerate all noblemen, and to 
 divide their goods among the poor; to lodge the Priests in 
 isolated buildings like those who are stricken with the 
 plague; "since, unfortunately, it was impossible to banish 
 them, because no country would receive such vermin;" — 
 and lastly, to compel the King to hear in silence, and the 
 Minister to obey with reverence, the conunands of the sov- 
 ereign People! Such declamations were the very breath of 
 life to the Jacobins, who sent them down into the Provinces 
 and repeated them in every part of the country. And as 
 
Ch. II.] BREAD RIOTS. 419 
 
 their eifect was greatly increased by the want and misery 
 of the great mass of the people, there was no need of any 
 special conspiracies to evoke a similar communistic violence 
 in every part of the kingdom. 
 
 The trade in corn was ' completely ruined. The populace 
 murdered the merchants, whom they regarded us usurers, 
 and stopped all the corn transports. On one of these oc- 
 casions at Noyon, a report arose that troops were on the march 
 to queU the disturbance. The alarm was spread through 
 140 Parishes, and the peasants collected to the number of 
 300,000 to prevent the removal of the bread. The intelligence 
 was brought to the National Assembly, and the Left began 
 at first to make flattering excuses for the rioters. But as 
 soon as it became known that the supply of corn was in- 
 tended for Paris itself, a force was immediately despatched 
 in good earnest, and the mere sight of the troops put an 
 end to the disturbance. In other places the military refused 
 to act, or even joined the insurgents; and in the Depart- 
 ments du Nord and Pas de Calais, there was a revolt on 
 every market day. In Normandy armed bauds of G,000 to 
 8,000 men marched from town to town, put their own value 
 on goods, and obliged the owners to sell them. In Melun, 
 the alarm bells were heard from all the villages round about. 
 The citizens barricaded the gates of the towns, carried stones 
 and boiling water on to the roofs of the houses, and waited 
 for the attack. The Magistrates of different places, having 
 no effectual union with one another, or with the central 
 Government, differed very much in the course which they 
 pursued. The Mayor of Etampes allowed himself to be 
 cut down by a gang of bandits, rather than grant the tarif 
 of prices to which they demanded his assent. In other places 
 the Magistrates of the Communes were at the head of the 
 rioters, while the Governers of the Departments were mostly 
 on the side of law and order. The loose and unpractical 
 nature of the new Government was every where conspicu- 
 ously brought to light. "Our greatest misfortune," says Vau- 
 
 2d2 
 
420 FALL OF THE FEDILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 blanc, "is, tlicat tlie Magistrates of the Communes are in a 
 state of open insubordination to tlie Dejjartmental authorities." 
 The cup of misery was filled to the brim by religious dis- 
 sensions. The Minister of the Interior was Cahier de Ger- 
 ville, once a memlDer of the Town Council of Paris, a friend; 
 of Barnave and Ghapelier, a man of rude and l)lustering man- 
 ners. He was a Kepublican at heart, but after having taken 
 the oaths, he was honestly bent on ujjholding the laws. He 
 held pretty nearly the same views as iNIirabe.au respecting 
 the Church. All Christianity appeared to him superstition, 
 which however, he thought, every man had a right to respect. 
 When the Princess Elisabeth, on one occasion, begged his pro- 
 tection for a perseciited Ecligiciise, he answered cTu-tl)' that a 
 ^Minister had more important things than nuns to care for; 
 and he urgently begged the National Assembly to provide 
 that the words Church and Priests should never again be 
 heard within its walls. This very man reports, on 
 15th February, that the freedom of worship was violated in 
 all the Departments ; that the Authorities had issued vexa- 
 tious ordinances — had caused children to be taken away 
 from their Parents, and ordered the dead to be exhumed, 
 because non-juring Priests had performed the rite of bap- 
 tism or burial; and that several churches had been closed, on 
 the pretext that the Priests were inclined to rebellion. From 
 this official statement, against which the Left had not a word 
 to say, it cannot be doubted which party were the aggres- 
 sors in the church rpiestion, even in the year 1792. This 
 was further shewn" when the Minister earnestly desired that 
 a law shoidd be passed, to transfer the registers to lay au- 
 thorities, that these legal affiiirs might be withdrawn from 
 the influence of religious disputes and scruples of conscience. 
 They allowed him to press this matter on their attention in 
 vain for months, and threw every possible difficulty in the 
 way, and only agreed to it at last on Guadet's remarking 
 that the law was a good one in itself, and that afterwards, 
 if the Constitutional Clergy should gain strength, its enact- 
 
Cu. It] RELIGIOUS FEUDS. 421 
 
 ment might be hindered by them. Just as they rejoiced in 
 the obstinacy of the Emigres, because it enabled them to 
 confiscate their hmds, they now wished for a continuance of 
 the scliism in the Church, that they might obtain the right 
 of banishing the Priests. Some of the Departmental Gov- 
 ernments had already, on their own authority, proceeded to 
 expel them from their customary residence, or to imprison 
 them without previous trial. The Town Council of Lyons — 
 which had alread)- put a fixed price on bread, and arbitrarily 
 ordered houses to be searched to discover false assiynats — 
 placed the ^lonasteries under the special supervision of the 
 Police, and destroyed the coats of arms on the Church doors. 
 We cannot be surprised that persecution of this kind 
 should excite resistance. When the Church was closed the 
 Parish Priest performed the service in the gloom of the 
 forest, far away from all human habitations; the peasants 
 flocked to their ministrations from a distance of many miles, 
 and returned to their villages with anything but enthusiasm 
 for the Revolution. On the River Aisue eighteen parishes 
 drove out their constitutional clergy, and could only be re- 
 duced to submission by the arrival of strong detachm'ents of 
 troops of the line. On the Dordogne, and in the Nantes 
 Pyraiivi:, no candidate could get himself elected who was 
 not supported by the Orthodox Priests. And, lastly, in the 
 Department of the Lozere the deprived iirchbishop Castellane 
 escaped to his castle of Chcnac in the mountains, where the 
 good catholics collected around him, fortified the place, and 
 occupied it with a considerable garrison. This was closely 
 connected with a rising in Mende and Jales, of which we 
 have spoken above; and at no great distance were Aries 
 and Avignon, whose determination , to resist the tyranny of 
 the Democracy grew daily stronger. These were the districts 
 against which Barbaroux was operating in Paris, and the 
 Town Council raising forces in Marseilles. In this latter 
 city the revolutionary leaders were indignant that the Na- 
 tional Assembly had come to no decision, and were preparing 
 
422 FALL OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book IIL 
 
 at last to act independently of its orders. In Aix, on the 
 road to Aries, a Swiss Regiment was stationed, whose trust- 
 worthiness was well known by experience in Marseilles, to 
 whose garrison it had formerly belonged. Fearing that on 
 their way towards Aries they might be exposed to danger 
 from these troops, the Marseillois first marched against Aix on 
 the 28th February, with 4,000 men and six guns. No one in 
 that town was expecting an attack; the Town Council feared 
 for the life of the citizens in case of a collision; and the 
 Colonel of the Swiss regiment, being summoned to surrender 
 by his superior. General Barbantane himself, was not willing 
 to lead his men to fruitless slaughter; and in short, the troops 
 laid down their arms, and retired from the town without 
 a blow. The Marseillois were contented with this first suc- 
 cess, and returned home; but their enterprise produced a 
 powerful impression in Paris; for it opened the eyes of both 
 the Court and the Republicans to the fact, that there was an 
 army in the South ready for action, and only waiting for 
 the signal. 
 
 It was evident enough that such a state of susjjense and 
 ferment could not last much longer. The Ministers had no 
 means of effectual interference; the constitution deprived 
 them of the legal authority, and the insubordination of the 
 troops, of the material power, requisite for the suppression 
 of disturbances. Yet the Gironde did not fail to impute this 
 inaction of the Ministers to a systematic endeavour to dis- 
 gust the people with the Revolution, by prolonging the dis- 
 orders which accompanied it. It would have been easy 
 enough to retort this reproach on the National Assembly 
 itself, since Gerville proved that since the month of October, 
 he had l>rought forward more than 200 bills of importance 
 to the performance of his functions, none of which he had 
 succeeded in passing. The Minister of Marine aiJairs, Ber- 
 trand, was in the same case; and Narbonne himself reminded 
 the Assembly, on the 16th February, that 21 bills were still 
 in arrear, without which it wns simply impossible 'either to 
 
Cu. II.] REACTIONARY SCHEMES OF THE MINISTRY, 423 
 
 equip the army or carry on the war. The Ministers too 
 were divided among themselves, and there were hardly two 
 who held the same opinions.' Bertrand, as an avowed 
 Royalist, kept aloof from the rest. His manner towards the 
 Assembly was abrupt and cool, and he pleased no one but 
 the Court. He was constantly carrying on intrigues in the 
 city, and proved himself a steady, able, but not always trust- 
 worthy man. Tarbe the Minister of Finance, brave and 
 honest, and a thorough man of business, but insignificant as 
 a Statesman, formed a close alliance with Delessart, and like 
 him was chiefly guided by Barnave and the Lameths. They 
 agreed that all further delay was impossible, and they now 
 reverted to the plans of Mirabeau, which their leaders had 
 formerly opposed with such jealous fury. They thought the 
 time was come when the nation, wearied to death, might 
 be induced to send up petitions from all the Departments 
 for the dissolution of the incapable Assembly, — a measure 
 which they thought that a portion of the Assembly itself 
 might be induced to support. They hoped that they should 
 then be able to convey the King to some stronghold in the 
 interioi', where, with the assistance of an Assembly of Notables 
 apjjointed by himself, he could draw up a new constitution 
 on the system of two Chambers.^ Bertrand had no further 
 objection to the plan than its inadequateness for the object 
 in view. Gerville, and Duport, the Minister of Justice, 
 though they set a some what higher value on the existing 
 Constitution, were ready under present circumstances to give 
 their consent to the scheme. The domestic troubles, already 
 endured so long, might perhaps have been borne a little 
 longer, but the complication of the foreign questions would 
 not allow of a moment's delay. The only expedient against 
 war, by which all would be lost, was to break up the ma- 
 jority in the National Assembly; and to effect this was the 
 main difficulty of their scheme. Narbonne indeed was, after 
 
 1 Pellenc to La Marck, 3. Jan. 1792. — ^ Mallet du Pan, I. 295, 432. 
 
424 FALL OF THE FEDILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 all, a member of the Council; might they hope that he, and 
 of course Lafayette, would take an entirely ucw direction? 
 This seemed less impossible just now; for Lafayette was 
 enraged by the internal commotions, which were by no means 
 favourable to warlike preparations, and had always advo- 
 cated the formation of an Elective Senate; and Narbonne 
 was attacked, with ever-increasing fury, by Robespierre's 
 section of the Jacobins; and on several occasion was made 
 painfully aware of the decline of his popularity. At all 
 events there could be no hope of success without the Minister 
 at War, and they said that they must either remove him 
 from his post, which seemed a dangerous step, or admit him 
 to their councils, which, at any rate in the first stages of 
 their scheme, might be done without risk. 
 
 And in fact, about the middle of the month he expressed 
 his readiness to join them. They came to the resolution to 
 enter into relations with a number of weU-disposed Deputies, 
 and to form, what as yet had no existence, a regularly con- 
 stituted Ministerial party. ^ On the 23rd, one of these Deputies, 
 Mouysset, proposed in the name of 300 independent Members, 
 that on the evenings when the Assembly did not sit, their 
 Chamber shovdd be opened to the Deputies for free discussion 
 and explanations. The Gironde immediately saw the scope 
 of this proposition. They feared that a parliamentary vniion 
 might then be formed, which would be independent of, and 
 intimately hostile to, the Clubs, and they, therefore, used 
 all the means in their power of nipping the project in the 
 bud. The debates became stormy; insulting imputations 
 were mingled with loud threats; the galleries stormed above 
 with unchecked shouts and cheers. At last the courage of 
 the moderate party fell, and Muysset withdrew his motion. 
 And thus the first scheme was entirely frustrated. 
 
 ' BeTtrand,— V-oL -^r-uli?^^ ■ His statements, however, concerning time 
 and persons are erroneous. Talleyrand's despatch to Narbonne, Feb. 21: 
 ^^Enjin vous vous unissez tons: voila uiie bonne nouvelle." 
 
Cii. II.] LAFAYETTE PROPOSES TO SAVE THE THRONE. 425 
 
 Lafayette, however, was still so greatly enraged witli the 
 Jacobins, that he deterniinecl, in conjunction witli Narbonne 
 and Madame de Stael, to take the restoration of the throne 
 into his own hands. Madame dc Stael proposed to carry 
 oif the Koyal family in her own carriage ; whereupon the 
 King was to repair to Lafayette's camp, and put himself — 
 (under Ijafayette's guidance, of course) at the head of the 
 army. From what we know of Lafayette we may be sure 
 that nothing satisfactory would have resulted from this plan, 
 the outline of which was as loose and quixotic as Nar- 
 bonne's entire system. The Queen, too, was from the very 
 first averse to the undertaking, and when Bertrand and 
 Delessart heard of it, they had no difficulty in procuring its 
 rejection.^ 
 
 Though the adoption of this plan wovdd probably not have 
 served the royal cause, yet its rejection was fatal alike to 
 Louis XVI. and the Feuillants. The recent wound which 
 had been inflicted on the sensitive pride of Lafayette made 
 him forget his former anger, and his union with the Gironde 
 became closer, and his hatred against the Lameths and their 
 friends more bitter than ever. The catastrophe was acce- 
 lerated by the new turn which foreign affairs had taken. 
 
 Despatches had been received from Vienna and from 
 London; of which the former were calculated to increase 
 the exasperation of the war party in France, and the latter 
 to raise their hopes and courage; and both, therefore, tended 
 to brinar matters to a final decision. 
 
 o 
 
 As to Austria, Leoj)old had clung with his usual tena- 
 city to his former views, notwithstanding the late successes 
 of the Gironde. Himself desirous of peace, he still held 
 to the conviction that the Feuillants must eventually triumph, 
 and, supported by the influence of the Powers, effect a blood- 
 Jess reform of the constitution. In accordance with these 
 views, he repeatedly exhorted the Spiritual Electors to pru- 
 
 1 Mallet, I. 258. 
 
426 FALL OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book IIL 
 
 dence; and even the G,000 men wliom lie destined for the 
 Breisgau received no other instructions than to put an en- 
 ergetic check ou the machinations of the Emigres, i The 
 sharp note of the 25th Jannarj', which peremptorily demanded 
 of him an entire change of system, did, indeed embarrass 
 him for the moment; it seemed, he said, as if the French, 
 who called him '-the Peaceful," must be made to see another 
 side of his character. But he soon fell back on the system 
 of the Feuillants, and resumed his hope that the French 
 would yield as soon as united Europe had sent them an 
 energetic warning. The zeal of the Gu-onde, therefore, only 
 served to quicken his diplomatic efforts to bring about the 
 — as he supposed — decisive Coalition of the Powers, before 
 the Gironde had carried their point, and war had been de- 
 clared. 
 
 He had. just succeeded in inducing Prussia to sign a de- 
 finitive treaty of alliance with himself on the 7th of February. 
 We shall endeavour, farther on, to set before the reader, the 
 course of German politics, in a more connected manner. It 
 is enough for the present to remark, that even in this treaty 
 the Emperor remained true to his former principles — re- 
 garding it as solely one of mutual defence — holding out 
 a prospect of a European concert; — and purposing to aid 
 the Constitutional party in France, as well as Poland. It 
 was altogether in this spirit that the reply of the 17th of 
 Februarj" to the decree of the 25th of January was drawn 
 up. The Austrian Government first expressed its astonish- 
 ment at the displeasure caused by the orders given to Gen- 
 eral Bender, since an official declaration had been sent at 
 the same time both from Brussels and Treves, that Bender 
 was to protect Treves, only on the condition, that the Emi- 
 gres in that Electorate were disarmed and dispersed. With 
 resrard to the Concert of the Powers, he said that since the 
 
 ' Dispatches of the Dutch Minister von Haeften of the 4th, 14th, 16th, 
 25th Jan., 8th Feb., and 10th March. 
 
Cii. II.] DELESSAET'S REPLY TO LEOPOLD 427 
 
 acceptance of the Constitntion, it only had a prospective 
 existence; bnt that it was a matter of dntj to allow it to 
 continue, as long as a republican faction was threatening 
 Leopold's royal ally, and preparing by extensive armaments, 
 and active agitation, to revolntionise the whole of Europe. 
 The note went on to say, that the Emperor wished for 
 peace, and that while France was arming, he had disarmed 
 the Emigres, and exhorted the other Powers to peace; — 
 that it was the Jacobins alone who tried to kindle a war, 
 because they saw in it the only means of rousing the people 
 to a pitch of fanaticism favourable to their views ; — that 
 Austria was thereby forced to take defensive measures but 
 still hoped that the reasonable majority of the French people 
 would not doubt his real sentiments, but liberate themselves 
 from the delusions in which the Jacobins had endeavoured 
 to entangle them. 
 
 Words like these could not but raise the passions of La- 
 fayette and the Gironde to a still higher pitch ; their proud 
 sharp tone was music to the ears of Brissot, who did not 
 fail to turn them to his own purposes. Delessart brought 
 the Austrian despatch before the Assembly on 1st March, 
 and announced that in his reply, after repelling the Em- 
 peror's criticisms on the internal condition, and the party 
 divisions, of France, he had expressed his pleasure at the 
 peaceful assurances contained in the Emperor's note, and 
 called on him, since he denied all hostile feeling towards 
 the Constitution, to dissolve a Coalition which had now no 
 object. The Assembly applauded these happy retorts, and 
 referred the note to the Diplomatic Committee ; but Delessart 
 soon found that there was no longer any place for him, the 
 Minister of peace, upon this burning battle-field. 
 
 At the same time Talleyrand sent home reports of his 
 operations in London: he had, at first, met with rather a 
 cool reception, which did not become warmer when his com- 
 panion Biron was arrested for debt, and he himself had ex- 
 cited the suspicions of the Ministry by his frequent inter- 
 
428 FALL OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 course with Fox, Slieridaii and other members of the oppo- 
 sititiii.' Still there were some points in his favour; the wish 
 of all the leading men in England was for a long conti-. 
 nuance of peace, which Pitt, especially, required to carry 
 out his great financial operations. George III., indeed, hated 
 the Revolution with all the obstinacy of his character, but 
 in the country there were many admirers of young France, 
 and no one could foretell what the decision of the great 
 mass of the Nation would be, slioidd a cusits belli arise. 
 Nor was the Ministry as uuaminous as it appeared to be. 
 The Premier could reckon on his personal friend Dundas 
 and his cousin Grcnville; opposed to these was Thurlow, 
 who was just as self-willed as Pitt was arbitrary, and who 
 had for many years entertained a strong personal enmity 
 against the Prime Minister. It was to these men that Tal- 
 leyrand made his proposal that the two countries, recog- 
 nising the identity of their interests, should mutually gua- 
 rantee each other's possessions both in and out of Europe: — 
 he saw that this agreement was the utmost that could be 
 attained, and that no formal alliance between the two countries 
 could be hoped for. In his opinion, however, such a gua- 
 rantee, exchanged under present circumstances, must virtually 
 break up the Austro-European Concert. There was indeed 
 much in the proposition that was alluring to England. Ire- 
 land was in a state of ferment, and a dangerous war with 
 Tippoo Sahib was in progress:— it woidd therefore be no 
 small gain to England, to secure itself from French hostility 
 in these two quarters. The cjuestion remained undecided in 
 the Cabinet during 14 days. At the end of that, time on 
 the 2nd of March, Grenville announced to the French Envoy, 
 that England was by no means to be counted amongst the 
 
 ' Morris's Jo«)-na/, I. 365 : "Mont- April 4tli: "I have talcen warning 
 
 morin told me on 16. Jan. that Tal- by Talleyrand, and held no inter- 
 
 leyrand was quite sure of being able course with the leaders of the Op- 
 
 to oust Pitt." — Morris to Washington, position." 
 
Cii. n.] TALLEYRAND'S OPERATIONS IN ENGLAND. 420 
 
 enemios of Franco, bvit, on the contrary, wished, for her 
 own sake, that the French people shonld be satisfied. "Pitt 
 and I," said Grenville, "well know that a commercial nation 
 can only gain by the freedom of its neighbours;" "but," he 
 added, "no answer can be returned to Talleyrand's other 
 propositions. The French Envoy thought himself justified 
 by the tenor of this conference in reporting to Narbonnc, 
 that Pitt aimed at a rapprochement to France, but that the 
 Chancellor, and above all the King, were opposed to it: 
 that, therefore, although the English Cabinet had resolved to 
 return an evasive answer, he believed that Pitt would under- 
 take nothing against the French, even should they attack 
 Belgium. It was true, he said, that England had in 1790 
 guaranteed the Belgian sovereignty to the Emperor, but she 
 had not bound herself to protect that country from ti-ansient 
 military occupation, or other accidents of war. ' 
 
 Narbonne considered that he had gained much by this 
 assurance. In the Crisis into which the French Cabinet was 
 thrown by the resolutions of the other Ministers, he had 
 once more summoned the three Generals to Paris, to support 
 himself by their influence and advice. Once more momentous 
 events might be influenced by the decisions of Lafayette, 
 and once more he really decided in favour of destruction. 
 Enraged at Bertrand's opposition to his plans for saving the 
 Royal family, and inspired by new hopes from England, he 
 encouraged Narbonne to continue his present course, to ad- 
 here to his warlike policy, and rigorously to oppose his 
 colleagues. Lafayette undertook to announce to the Council, 
 on the 3rd of March, that Narbonne could no longer serve 
 
 ' All this information is taken remained there — when the Tribunal 
 from Talleyrand's despatches to Nar- was broken up by the September 
 bonne. These papers had also their murders — unnoticed among other do- 
 revolutionary history. At the time cuments, and were discovered a few 
 of Delessart's trial they were sent years ago as waste paper, 
 to the Court of Justice at Orleans; 
 
430 FALL OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 tlie State as colleague of Bertrand, the enemy of the Con- 
 stitution. Expostulations and offers were in vain, because 
 Lafayette and his party hoped to place Narbonne at the 
 head of a Ministry entirely amenable to their will. On the 
 6th of March, Narbonne declared to the Assemlaly, in the 
 name of the Generals, that no one should be allowed to 
 meddle with the Constitution; that though it was a terrible thing 
 to throw the country into a war, it was, on the other hand, 
 a despicable thing to represent war as an impossibility, in 
 order to curtail freedom; that the well-known integrity of 
 the King gave every one a right to expect that he would 
 not only require from his Ministers the upholding of the Con- 
 stitution, but the practical carrying out of its principles, and 
 the removal of all obstructions. It is difficult to say whether 
 the suspicion, thus covertly expressed, attached to the King 
 or to his Ministers; but the Girondists spoke out more 
 clearly the same evening by the mouth of a certain Gon- 
 chon, ' a half crazy citizen of St. Antoine, Avho, in the name 
 of that Faubourg, called on the Assembly to decree the 
 compulsory acceptance of the assignats at their full value, 
 and to annihilate all conspirators— lu-ging that it was more 
 profitable to serve the People than Kings — for that "Cour- 
 tiers, Kings and ^Ministers would pass away," but "the 
 people and the pikes would never pass away." 
 
 Under these circumstances, Delessart and the Lametlis 
 were of opinion ^ that Narbonne could remain Minister no 
 longer; the remainder of the Cabinet thought the same, 
 but proposed, to soften matters, that the royaHst Ber- 
 trand should retu-e likewise. Pending; these deliberations, 
 the Journals published letters from the three Generals to Nar- 
 bonne, in «hich they expressed their regret that he should 
 resign, as he was indispensable to both Army and Country. 
 
 ' That lie was now, and long afterwards, a tool of the Gironde is shown 
 in Gadoul's report. Vid. Buchez, XXVIII. — 2 La Marek to Mercy, 
 March 11th. 
 
Ch. II.] DEATH OF LEOPOLD. 431 
 
 By these means the crisis was made public, and a universal 
 excitement was caused. The King, too, offended by the in- 
 terference of his Army in political questions, hesitated no 
 longer, and announced to Narbonne in a few words that he 
 had appointed Col de Graves as War Minister in his stead, 
 and summoned the Generals to the palace to answer for their 
 letters. Luckner said that Narbonne had been such a con- 
 venient Minister ; and Lafayette affirmed that the letters were 
 published without his knowledge; but, after the audience, he 
 angrily told the Minister of Justice, that "it should soon be 
 seen who had the greatest power in the kingdom — himself 
 or the King." ' 
 
 It was the most unfortunate moment which Delessart could 
 have chosen for a ministerial change, for it seemed as if all 
 the quarters of the globe were conspiring to add weight to 
 the blow impending over his head. On the 8th, news 
 arrived at Paris that the Spanish Minister, Florida Blanca, 
 had fallen into disgrace, and had been succeeded by Aranda, 
 who was believed to hold political opinions similar to those 
 of Lafayette and to entertain a decided hostility to England. 
 Spain therefore was looked upon as entirely lost to the 
 Austrian Concert. — In the next place there was a report 
 that Russia was endeavouring to persuade Prussia to act 
 against the Poles — that Generals and Ministers were at 
 variance on this subject in Berlin — and that the interest felt 
 in Leopold's views respecting France was already on the 
 wane; and lastly, on the 9th, came the astounding intel- 
 ligence of the Emperor Leopold's death, after an illness of 
 only four days — an event which scattered all existing plans 
 to the winds and deprived the European Cloalition of its very 
 soul. Leopold's heir, Francis, a weak young man, 22 years 
 of age, had not yet been declared Emperor; and Austria was 
 supposed to be entirely isolated by the neutrality of Eng- 
 land, which, according to Talleyrand's report, might be safely 
 
 Pellenc to La Marck. 
 
432 FALL OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 relied on. The Parisian public now believed in the contin- 
 uance of peace, and the Funds rose 15 per cent; but 
 Brissot and Lafityette only saw in this turn of affairs, by 
 which Delessart was left friendless and helpless, a more 
 fiivourable opportunity of attacking Austria. They therefore 
 determined to use it to take signal vengeance for the dis- 
 missal of Narbonne from the Cabinet, by seizing for them- 
 selves the reins of power to complete the breach with 
 Austria. 
 
 No speech was ever more malicious, violent, and devoid 
 of argument,' than the one delivered by Brissot, on March 
 10th, in which he discussed the despatches between Austria 
 and Delessart, in order to found ujjon tliem a charge of 
 high treason against that Minister. For, however mvich the 
 latter may, in his heart, have been inclined to the Austrian 
 Coalition, the notes in question contained nothing but what 
 the National Assembly had itself decreed; and that which 
 would generally have been regarded as the duty, and re- 
 dovmded to the credit, of a Minister — viz., making extensive 
 demands in gentle terms, in ord&r not to give unnecessary 
 offence — was now branded as a crime against the honour 
 and safety of the State. No Committee v/as called on to 
 report, nor was the accused allowed to say a word in his 
 own defence; the allied factions of Brissot and Lafayette 
 made up the whole Assembly. But when some members of 
 the Right characterized the criminal impeachment as too 
 strong a measure, and wished to limit the proceedings to 
 the overthrow of the Minister by a direct vote of censure — 
 then the most splendid orator of the Girondc, Vergniaud, 
 rose to place the gentleness of his party in full view, by 
 opening out a vista of future deeds of violence. Mirabeau, 
 
 ' Brissot confessed to Dumont, peachment necessary, in order to re- 
 
 tbat the Minister would certainly be move him from the Ministry ; it would 
 
 acquitted since, there was no evidence not do to let the Jacobins get the start 
 
 against him; but he said that the of them. 'Dnmuwt, Memoires sur Mi- 
 
 position of affairs rendered the im- rabeau, XIX. 378. 
 
Ch. II.] VEEGNIAUD THREATENS THE QUEEN. 433 
 
 in his contest with the Priests, had once reminded his 
 hearers of that St. Bartholomew's night, in whicli fanatics 
 had armed the hand of Charles IX. against his people. On 
 this occasion Vergniand cried, "I too see the window of 
 that Palace in which conspiracy is lajing its snares to lead 
 us through the anarchy of civil war to the chains of slavery. 
 Often in the olden times has Terror issued forth from that 
 Palace in the name of Despotism; let that same Terror now 
 return to it in the name of the Law: let it be clearly known 
 that the King alone in that Palace is inviolable, and that 
 every other head is subject to the sword of Justice!" 
 
 It was thus the Girondists roused the Queen, by threats 
 of the scaffold, from the tears she was shedding over the grave 
 of her Brother, in whom, though so far away, had lain her only 
 hope of safety. They little knew how bvisily they were 
 erecting that same scaffold for themselves as well as their 
 victims! When Vergniaud had finished speaking, every idea 
 of opposition was overwhelmed by thunders of never-ending 
 applause, — the impeachment of Delessart was passed by an 
 immense majority, and his arrest carried into effect that very 
 evening. — The Ministry was overthrown, — where were its 
 successors to be sought for? 
 
 We frequently read two different statements respecting 
 the formation of the new Cabinet. According to one of 
 these, the Gironde dictated the list of Ministers, with the 
 threat that, in case of its non-acceptance, they would im- 
 peach the Queen. ' But when we look closely into the course 
 of events, we shall find no trace of this, except in the speech 
 of Yergniaud. According to the other statement, the King . 
 had made up his mind, that he must keep his friends for 
 better times, and meanwhile choose his Ministers — according 
 to Constitutional usage — from the ranks of the majority. 
 
 * This was Robespierre's version ment, the suspicion arose, that the 
 of the affair at that time; Beaulieu, Gironde, having risen to power, be- 
 lli. 247. As there was no further came accomplices in crimes which 
 mention made of such an impeach- they had once theatened to prosecute. 
 
 I. 2e 
 
434 FALL OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book IIL 
 
 But in such times, the strict forms of the Constitutional 
 tournament can no longer be observed. In a question of 
 life and death, we surround ourselves with defenders — when 
 
 we can 
 
 But Louis could no longer do so, and this was the simjDle 
 reason of the formation of a Democratic Ministry. He was 
 without protectors, without weapons; bis guard was not yet 
 organised, and his troops were as much in the hands of the 
 enemy as the bandits of the Faubourgs. The National Assembly 
 held the supreme power, its leaders ordered the appointment 
 of the Ministers, and needed no longer to employ threats 
 for the attainment of their ends. "The King," writes one of 
 his confidential friends ^ at this period, "lives like a man who 
 is preparing for death." Had the Girondists gained the 
 victory of the 10th unaided, the Government of Louis would 
 have ended at once, and the Gironde would have formed a 
 Regency for Louis XVH. ^ But they had conquered by the 
 help of Lafayette, and the General was still a power with 
 which they must keep on good terms. In Paris he had as 
 many partisans amongst the National Guard, as the Gironde 
 among the Pikemen; and out of the capital he was backed 
 by the army, or, at any rate, both he and the Girondists 
 believed this to be the case. Lafayette, however, in spite 
 of his republican tendencies, had committed himself too 
 thoroughly to the whole constitution, and saw too clearly 
 that any alteration of it under present circumstances would 
 only give the Gironde the victory over himself, to allow 
 of the removal of Louis from the throne. The change of 
 Ministers was all that the Gironde could effect for the pre- 
 sent; but in regard to the members of the new cabinet they 
 carried their point against Lafayette in the case of every 
 office. 
 
 Even the new Minister at War, de Graves, whom Deles- 
 sart had appointed, and who had been recommended to him 
 
 Pellenc. — ' Mallet, I. 2G0. Beauchatup also mentions it. 
 
ch. ii.] the new ministry. 435 
 
 as a friend of NarboniiP, was closely Qonnected with the 
 Gironde by means of Pethion and Gensonne. Of more im- 
 portance was the next nomination to the Ministry of 
 Foreign affairs, for which Lafayette proposed Barthelemy, 
 French ambassador in Switzerland, a man of republican 
 opinions, but of weak and irresolute character. For the 
 Home affairs he wished to introduce his frieud Baron Dietrich, 
 Mayor of Strasburg, who upheld his cause against the 
 Piiestly and Jacobin party in Alsace — and had just presented 
 him with a pocket edition of the "Rights of man" for the 
 seduction of the Austrian soldiers. But the Girondists, at 
 Gensonne's suggestion, had directed their attention to General 
 Dumouriez, whom they considered as one of themselves, aud 
 to whom Lafayette could make no special objection, as he 
 had already himself employed him as his agent in Brussels. 
 By this means one of the most considerable agents of the 
 Revolution was brought on to the great theatre of political 
 life. Dumouriez forthwith decided the nomination to the post 
 of Minister of Marine affairs in favour of Lacoste, a man 
 devoted to himself, but otherwise possessed of small capa- 
 city. The remaining appointments were filled up more 
 slowly, as Dumouriez took no step without having previ- 
 ously consulted with Brissot and Pethion. It was not until 
 the 28th that they agreed in offering the Ministry of Justice 
 to Narbonne's friend Gamier, and as a set-off against this, 
 the Home Ministry and that of Finance were given to two 
 thorough-paced Girondists — Roland and Claviere. But as 
 Garnier declined the post offered to him, it finally fell to 
 the lot of a Boui'deaux lawyer, Duranthon, recommended by 
 Vergniaud and Guadet. ' 
 
 Such was the progress made by the Girondist faction at 
 the seat of Government and the course of events in the 
 provinces corresponded exactly to the crisis of affairs in the 
 
 ' Besides this man, Robert, Louvet and Collot d'Herbois were also 
 talked of. 
 
 2e2 
 
436 FALL OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 Capital. On the 12th of March, a friend of Barbaroux, 
 Rebequi, set out for Marseilles with 4,000 men, and 6 pieces 
 of artillery to quell the counter-revolution in Aries — regard- 
 less of the protestations of the Public authorities, and the 
 prospect of a civil war. It soon, however, became evident 
 that the expected resistance of the citizens of Aries had been 
 greatly over-estimated, and the Marseillois entered the town 
 without opposition, and disarmed the weak force of National 
 Guards. Almost on the same day repeated charges were 
 brought forward in the National Assembly against Avignon, 
 Mende and Jales, and decrees were passed in quick succes- 
 sion to confirm the occupation of Aries by the Marseillois, 
 and to carry out the disarming of the whole department of 
 the Lozere. 
 
 On the other hand they restored the weapons of the Gla- 
 ciere to the Bandits of Vaucluse, by proclaiming a general 
 amnesty for all political offences, and entrusting the Depart- 
 ments of Marseilles and du Gard with the reestablishment 
 of order, instead of the Royal Commission. Marseilles ap- 
 pointed for this office the leaders of the force which had 
 occupied Aries — Rebequi and Bertier, — who immediately 
 desxJatched a troop of their followers to Avignon, liberated 
 Jourdan with a portion of his Bandits and other criminals, 
 and immediately afterwards held a triumphal entry, in their 
 company, into Avignon. From that time forward gloom and 
 terror brooded over the miserable city. "This time," cried 
 Jourdan, "the ice-house shall be filled:" and many thousands, 
 of the inhabitants prepared to leave the place. The republican 
 Revolution reigned throughout the South of the Kingdom, 
 and had a well-equipped and victorious army at its disposal. 
 Lyons, the second city in the land, moreover, was entirely 
 in the hands of the Democrats. The Council of the Com- 
 mune was filled by the friends of Roland. Vitet, the Mayor, 
 kept up a confidential correspondence with him, ruled over 
 the city by means of the Jacobin Club, and had just suc- 
 ceeded in carrying the election of a brave. Sansculotte, the 
 
.\ 
 
 Ch. ir.] UTTERi^NCES OF THE EXTREME DEMOCRATS. 437 
 
 silkweaver Juillard, as Commander-in-Chief of the Civic 
 Guard; while a Gascon Priest, named Laussel, roused the 
 artisans of the great manufacturing town to enthusiasm by 
 a journal, at the head of which was the motto: "The Lord 
 hath filled the hungry with good things and the rich he hath 
 sent empty away." Another ex-priest from Piedmont, Chal- 
 lier, was already declaiming, in imitation of Robespierre, 
 against the lukewarmness of the Girondists, and demanding 
 the annihilation of the moneyed men, who were striving to 
 erect a new aristocracy on the ruins of the old Nobility. 
 It was to no purpose that the Departmental Council sus- 
 pended him for ordering illegal imprisonments and house- 
 searchings, the fury of the Democratic mob firmly upheld 
 him in his office. The Mayor Vitet himself went at this 
 • time to Montpellier, to enter into relations with the leaders 
 of the MarseUlois; and it was commonly reported that the 
 Revolutionary army, strengthened by all the kindred ele- 
 ments of the country, was about to march upon the capital. 
 As the Girondists, however, had fought their way into 
 the Ministry, this extreme measure was for the present de- 
 ferred. Roland even declared the liberation of the Bandits 
 in Avignon illegal; whereupon Robespierre openly accused 
 him to the Jacobins of treason; but Roland was not very 
 much in earnest with his protest, and his friends soon after- 
 wards quashed the complaints of the people of Avignon by 
 moving the order of the day. 
 
438 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. 
 
 General dumouriez. — Declaration of war against austkia. — Plaks 
 
 AGAINST SARDINIA. — FAILURE OF THE ATTACK ON BELfilUM.— LaFAYETTE 
 BREAKS WITH THE MINISTRY. CrISIS IN FRENCH MANUFACTURES. NA- 
 TIONAL BANKRUPTCY.— Fresh attacks of the gironde on the king.— 
 Indignation of dumouriez and the pakisian citizens. — Dissolution 
 of the ministry. 
 
 By far the most important person in the new Ministry was 
 the Minister for Foreign affairs, General Dumouriez. Like 
 Sieyes and Mirabeau, he came from Provence, and belonged 
 to a respectable family of the NoilesSe de Bohc of that coun- 
 try. His Father, however, in consequence of his irritable and 
 iinaccomodating character, rose no higher than the otBce of 
 War Commissary, and his ambitious and pleasure-loving 
 son was thrown at an early age on his own resources. 
 At the age of 18 he served in the army against Frederick 
 the Great, and by his conduct in three campaigns, gained 
 for himself the cross of St. Louis and the rank of Captain. 
 But the peace soon -put an end to his hoi^es of farther ad- 
 vancement; his regiment was broken up, and he himself 
 dismissed with a small pension. His affection for a young 
 kinswoman, with whose parents his own were at variance, 
 caused a quarrel between him and his father. Impelled by 
 the triple force of poverty, passion and ambition, he collected 
 the remnant of his worldly possessions, and with a hundred 
 louisd'or in his pocket, set out to seek his fortune in the 
 world. Ghoiseul, who was at that time at the head of the 
 Ministry, gave him permission to send in a report of his 
 exploits, which established for him a firm footing in the in- 
 
Cii. ni.] GENERAL DUMOURIEZ. 439 
 
 triguing cabal at that time calling itself the French gov- 
 ernment. This was slippery ground for any man, but es- 
 pecially dangerous for one without name or connection like 
 Dumouriez. But he had the genuine spirit of a soldier, 
 to whom danger is a pleasant excitement. He understood 
 the right moment for shewing himself audacious and proud, 
 or supple and submissive, — and above all, adroit and useful. 
 He was not restrained by any of the higher principles of 
 action; his only conviction in pohtics and morality was, that 
 a mistake was worse than a crime, and that in his position 
 any vulgar breach of law would be the worst of mistakes. 
 Thus his life passed away in many-coloured vicissitudes. 
 First employed in a very dubious office in the Corsican troubles 
 of 1 766, he afterwards acted as secret agent of the French Min- 
 ister in Spain and Portugal, and afterwards in Hungary and 
 Poland — where he had made great progress in the organiza- 
 tion of the war on a grand scale against Russia, when the 
 fall of Choiseul put an end to his operations, and called him 
 back to Paris. The new Minister Aiguillon was unfavourable 
 to him, but he considered himself fully recompensed for this, 
 by the favour of Count Broglie, who served the King as 
 private adviser, behind Aiguillon's back. Dumouriez, however, 
 soon learned how little reliance could be placed on the King, 
 who, at the Minister's behest, allowed him to be consigned 
 to a long imprisonment. In 1775 his persecution came at 
 last to an end; he was made Commandant of Cherbourg, 
 with the rank of Major-general, in which post he remained 
 till the breaking out of the Revolution. 
 
 To live away from Paris seemed to Dumouriez a suf- 
 ficiently hard fate; his mind found no rest in the narrowness 
 of provincial hfe, and he was continually besieging the Min- 
 isters with plans, reports and projects. In all his efforts his 
 aspirations were directed, less to the trappings than the 
 realities of power — towards influence, activity, and knowledge. 
 He wished to enjoy life, but would have been also contented 
 with a moderate reward; and would have easily consoled 
 
440 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 himself, even had his name remained unknown. His am- 
 bition was to rule, to influence and to guide men — to make 
 his will felt in the j)olicy of France. In this mood of mind, 
 the Eevolution overtook him. AVithout a moment's hesitation, 
 his path was chosen; his whole life had been a struggle 
 against the privileges of noble birth; the time was now come 
 for personal power and merit, and Dumouriez, threw him- 
 self zealously into the movement. His greatest efforts were 
 spent in revolutionising the soldiers. In the organisation 
 of the Civic Guard at Cherbourg he took a personal part, 
 and quickly acquired a democratic repu.tation throughout the 
 Province. In Paris he was introduced to Mirabeau. and 
 Lafayette, and was entrusted by the latter with a mission 
 to Belgium, where be formed a lasting connection with the 
 Democrats. Backed by a number of old acquaintances he 
 at last obtained infliience with the Ministry itself. Louis XVI. 
 alone could not endure him, and continiially refused to 
 promote him — saying he knew that intriguer well, and that 
 his employers would pay dearly for his support. In 1791 
 he was sent as Commander-in-chief of the Lower Loire to 
 Nantes; distinguished himself by rigid patriotism on the 
 occasion of the King's flight, and became acquainted with 
 Gensonne, when the latter was commissioned in Ausfust to 
 inquire into the religious troubles of La Vendee. Two 
 months afterwards he offered his services to the King as 
 Minister, and promised a complete extermination of the 
 Jacobins.' AVhen rejected by Louis, he kept up his con- 
 nection with the Girondists by means of Gensonne, and was 
 summoned by that faction to Paris in February 1792; and 
 on the fall of Delessart was introduced by them into the 
 Ministry. Dumouriez was at this time 5.3 years old, but 
 had all the liveliness and impetuosity of the youngest man; 
 and he resolved to take his own course and make an epoch 
 in the Revolution. 
 
 ' Morris to Washington, March 2Ist. 
 
Cn. III.] DUMOURIEZ'S MILITARY PLANS. 441 
 
 He entirely sympathised in the war policy of the Gironde, 
 and was really the first to reduce it to system and method, 
 to give it definite objects, and calculate the requisite and 
 possible means of comj^assing its ends. "You will not only 
 have a war," he had previously said to Delessart, "with 
 Austria, but a general European war; it shall, however, only 
 end in bringing us glory, profit and extended dominion." 
 It was he who first uttered the words "natural boundaries" 
 of the Alps and Khine (words fidl of fate to the Revolution), 
 and founded on them his whole system of warlike operations 
 — I'iz. defence where these natural boundaries were already 
 in possession, as in Alsace; and aitack, where they had first 
 to be acquired by conquest. The latter was the case in 
 Belgium, Liege, and the Rhenish Electorate, in the North; 
 and in the South, in the Duchy of Savoy, which was ill ajffected 
 towards its Sardinian Rulers. In the latter country, as well 
 as in Belgium and on the Rhine, numerous connections were 
 kept up with the people; and little doubt was felt that an 
 insurrection would break out as soon as French troops should 
 shew themselves. With this expectation Lafayette was to 
 march by Namur towards Liege and Brussels ; Luckner, 
 starting for Strasburg, was to proceed hy way of Landau 
 to operate against Mayence; and a fourth army would be 
 raised in the South to attack Savoy. Lumouriez, who knew 
 as well as Biron himself, by his former adventures, the weak 
 and evil side of every Court^ had strong hopes of keeping 
 England neutral, and severing Prussia from the Austrian 
 Alliance. It seemed to the whole party impossible that 
 Priissia, against which the Austro-French Alliance of 1756 
 had been formed, should really take part in a war against 
 renovated France — a war which had its origin in the renun- 
 ciation of that very alliance. The death of Leopold seemed 
 to afford fresh chances, and the French Grovernment made new 
 overtures to Prussia, and offered it through the younger 
 Custine, a French-Polish alliance, and, as a recompense, 
 the hegemony of Germany, and perhaps the imperial Crown, 
 
442 GIRONDIST MINISTRY.- [Book III. 
 
 which had just fallen vacant.' But should these expectations 
 fail, (and they were really in every respect inconsistent with 
 the actual state of things), Dumouriez thought that, if the 
 worst came to the worst, he should have conquered Belgium, 
 and organised an armed insurrection in that country, long 
 before the German armies could arrive. Under this im- 
 pression he resumed the interchange of diplomatic notes with 
 Austria, couched in the rudest terms, in order to bring on 
 a declaration of war with the least possible delay. 
 
 Very little was needed to effect this object, since the 
 breach was virtually completed by the decree of January 25th. 
 On the Austrian side, the young King Francis had declared 
 for war as early as 1791; and the already declining in- 
 fluence of Prince Kaunitz (who was the personification in 
 Vienna of the Alliance between Austria and France against 
 Prussia), had now completely sunk below the political horizon. 
 The Avistrian Cabinet being so disposed, there could no 
 longer be any question of further concessions, which the 
 well-known tendencies of the Gironde were of themselves 
 sufficient to render in every respect foolish and unavailing. 
 But Francis was still too new to business, and too distrust- 
 ful of himself and others, to allow of any immediate change 
 in the peaceful policy of Leopold. Accordingly the Vice- 
 chancellor Cobenzl, who retained his former influence, re- 
 peated in his note of March 18th the representations of his 
 previous despatch of the 17th of February, expressed in exactly 
 the same words, for his reply to which Delessart had been 
 first applauded and then impeached. "It is fortunate for 
 you," said the Elector of Mayence, on this occasion, to the 
 Emigres, "that the French themselves declare war, or you 
 would long for it in vain."'^ Dumouriez once more replied 
 with the categorical demand that the Emperor should dis- 
 arm, and likewise break oS his alliance with Prussia. Cobenzl 
 
 ' Condorcet's Revision des travaux de t'Assemblee legislative. Oeuvres X. 442. 
 ' BouilU. 
 
Ch. III.] DISORDERED STATE OP THE ARMY. 443 
 
 replied that this should be done as soon as Fiance had 
 given compensation for her illegal acts against the Alsatian 
 Princes and the Pope; and had established a state of things 
 at home by which the safety of Europe was no longer im- 
 perilled. The means of fulfilling the latter condition, he 
 added, the French themselves should take into consideration.' 
 Austria therefore still maintained the precise position it had 
 taken up in December, without taking a single step towards 
 aggression. Whereupon, Dumouriez, however insufficient 
 might seem the grounds for doing so, resolved to propose 
 to the National Assembly a declaration of war against the 
 King of Hungary and Bohemia. 
 
 By the middle of April he had had time to become in 
 some degree acquainted with the ayrimens which surround 
 the position of a Minister, in a period of Revolution. It 
 is true that the National Assembly applanded all his official 
 Reports, which he knew how to flavour with all the energy 
 of civisine. The majority, even amongst the Jacobins, whom 
 he once visited in the red caj) of liberty, was still favourable 
 to him. But he was soon himself convinced that the existing 
 means of carrying on a serious war were utterly insufficient. 
 Narbonne had taken his measures in the most brilliant, but 
 frivolous and superficial manner. All his reports had been 
 made with a view to the applause of the gallery, rather 
 than in accordance with facts. On every side there was 
 want of men and officers, discipline and materials. The 
 Ministei' at War, de Graves, who placed himself at the 
 disposal of Dumouriez, did his best; but unfortunately the 
 home policy of the Girondists, on whom in other respects 
 he was obliged to lean, rendered all progress impossible. 
 The foremost condition of successful warfiire — the discipline 
 
 ' So runs the note itself. Dumon- (B. IV. ch. 1) how 'far the views 
 
 riez says, that Austria had designated of the Austrian Ministry agreed witli 
 
 the Royal declaration of the 23d of this; at any rate no note to this 
 
 June 1789 as the basis of the future eii'ect has been found, 
 constitution. We shall presently see 
 
444 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 of the army— after Innumerable blows, now received its death 
 stroke from the National Assembly, who, after repeated 
 demands from the Jacobins, ordered the liberation of the 
 Swiss regiment Chateauvieux, which had been condemned to 
 the galleys for the bloody mutiny of Nancy. This gave 
 the Parisian Democrats the opportunity of getting up a 
 tumultuous popular festival in honour of the liberated crim- 
 inals, who were represented as martyrs for liberty. ^ The 
 more active this kind of agitation became, the greater was 
 the number of officers who emigrated, the more unruly 
 did the soldiers become, the fewer the troops that could he 
 spared from home service, and the more completely were 
 all the channels of administration blocked up. It soon ap- 
 peared, moreover, that Dumouriez was too independent to 
 suit the taste of his party. Mad. Roland was angry with 
 his not very refined manners, with his ridicule of her 
 officiousness, and affectation of playing the part of a great 
 man. For the present they were mutually necessary to each 
 other, but there was no real agreement in their views; 
 Dumouriez hardly concealed his opinion that the King was 
 better than any of them. 
 
 Under these circumstances, it was natural he should seek 
 to renew his old connexion with Lafayette, who had returned 
 to his head-quarters in Metz full of wrath at the manner 
 in which the Ministerial appointments had been filled up, 
 and therefore more inclined to wage war with the Jacobins 
 than with Austria. Dumouriez wrote to him three times, 
 confirmed the arrangement made under Narbonne, that the 
 chief blow should be dealt in Belgium by Lafayette, and 
 
 ' The red Phrygian cap, which a red woollen cap, and the fete'd 
 
 had been assumed since the begin- Swiss had also brought it with them 
 
 ning of the Revolution as the symbol from the lagno. Conf, Poisson, 
 
 of freedom, and worn as such by L'arme'e et la garde nationale, I, 370. 
 
 Dumouriez, first gained general and Mortimer-Ternaux, flts«. rfe fe Ten-ear, 
 
 lasting popularity at the festival of Vol. II. c. I. 
 April 15th. The galley-slaves wore 
 
Ch.iii.] dumouriez makes advances TOLAFAYETTE. 445 
 
 strengthened him — in spite of the complaints of the other 
 Generals— by a Division of the Army of the North. ' In 
 reply came a semi-official note from Lafayette, expressing his 
 desire that measures should be taken for the reestablish- 
 ment of order, and for the restoration of civil and religious 
 freedom; and he promised, on these conditions, to support 
 the Ministry. At the same time, in a private letter to 
 Dumouriez, he complained of the exclusive party spirit whicli 
 prevailed, and the unruly eagerness displayed for the com- 
 mencement of war. Dumouriez replied that he was not so 
 inclined; that the date at which war had been decided on, 
 was previous to the formation of the present Ministry. StiU 
 more strongly did he deprecate the imputation of party 
 spirit; and expressed his conviction, that Lafayette and him- 
 self stood in need of mutual assistance. In accordance with 
 these sentiments he defended the General in the debate of 
 the Cabinet against the Girondists, who, feeling themselves 
 now certain of war, and wishing to be reconciled to Robes- 
 pierre, were willing to sacrifice to him his detested opponent 
 Lafayette. Dumouriez opposed their machinations with all 
 his power, yet Lafayette maintained his reserve; and as his 
 feelings were no secret to the Ministers, they were seriously 
 alarmed for the fate of the motion on the question of war 
 in the Assembly, till now so enthusiastic in its favour. As 
 late as the 18th April, when instructions for assuming 
 the offensive had been already sent off to the Generals, 
 Dumouriez wrote to his old friend Biron, that the question 
 of peace and war was before the Assembly, and that should 
 the decision be for peace, nothing would be left for them 
 all but to emigrate to America. But it soon appeared that 
 with Lafayette the thought was not very quickly followed 
 by the deed; and although his own desire for war was cooled, 
 he made, no attempt to influence his party; so that when, 
 on the 20th of April, the King with a heavy heart fulfilled 
 
 * Unpublished correspondence in the military archives at Paris. 
 
446 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 the commands of his Ministry, and brought forward the 
 motion for war with Austria, two or three voices only were 
 raised warning the Assembly to prudence. All the rest were 
 in one tumult of joy and feverish impatience. No delay, not 
 even for the report of a Committee, or for printing the propo- 
 sal, was allowed, and war against Bohemia and Hungary was 
 unanimously decreed. Every thing had been prepared on 
 the frontiers, that the lightning flash might be immediately 
 followed by the thunders of war. 
 
 The Democrats of Marseilles had already begged for 
 Montesquiou as Commander-in-chief for the South, and his 
 having been at variance with Lameth and Lafayette, from 
 the time of the Constituent Assembly, seemed to ojGfer a 
 sufficient guarantee to the Gironde. ' He was now on his 
 way to Lyons in order to place 30,000 men on the very 
 borders of Savoj^^ and to prepare them for a rapid inroad 
 as soon as a pretext ofiered ; and this Avas quickly found. 
 On the 19th of April, the Sardinian Commandant of Alexan- 
 dria refused to receive the newly appointed French Charge 
 d' Affaires, Semonville, on the ground that he had not been 
 officially announced, and that he was known as a dangerous 
 agitator. Both charges were true, for Sardinia belonged to 
 the so-called kindred Courts, at which those ceremonies still 
 obtained. Semonville had once been a tool of Lafayette and 
 afterwards of Mirabeau, in the secret police of Paris : sub- 
 sequently he had cooperated with the Democrats of Liege 
 as Charge d' Affaires in that city; and lastly, when resident 
 in Genoa, had used his utmost efforts to further the same 
 cause in Italy. Notwithstanding these facts, Dumouriez 
 demanded express satisfaction for this insulting violation of 
 international law; and when this was not forthcoming, Mon- 
 tesquiou received instructions to occupy Savoy on the 15th 
 of May. 2 
 
 Rochambeau and Lafayette had received orders, five days 
 
 ' Barbai'oux's Memuires. — ' Coi'respondciice of the Army of the South. 
 
Ch. III.] COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR. 447 
 
 before the declaration of war, to place their men under 
 canvas, that Lafayette, in the very beginning of May, might 
 lead 30,000 men from Dun in forced marches to Givet and 
 Namur; and that as soon as this movement had commenced, 
 Rochambeau might begin his march with 22,000 men by 
 way of Mons towards Brussels. But neither the political 
 nor military views of Rochambeau were agreeable to Du- 
 mouriez or the Gironde; and after an interval of eight days, 
 a second order was issued, that he should himself remain 
 with the rear-guard at Valenciennes, and send General Biron 
 in his stead with 12,000 men against Mons; and that further, 
 for the purpose of misleading the Austrians, he should des- 
 patch two small detachments towards Tournay and Furnes, 
 and begin his attack on the 29th of April at latest. La- 
 fayette was instructed, in like manner, to be at Givet by 
 the 30th, and to March upon Namur by the 1st of May.' 
 Dumouriez, with his own hand, wrote to urge him to lose 
 no time; reminded him of the anger of the Jacobins, which 
 he must disarm by brilliant successes — of the weakness of 
 the Austrians — and of the importance of the results which 
 must ensue if he reached Namur and Liege by forced 
 marches, and called the Belgians to arms. "I shall count the 
 minutes," he said, "till I receive intelligence from you." 
 
 Intelligence arrived only two quickly from all quarters, 
 and more disastrous than any one could have exjDected. 
 
 Rochambeau was bitterly chagrined on receiving the second 
 despatch of the 22nd, and the more so as it was accom- 
 panied by sealed orders for the two Generals under his 
 
 ' The whole difference between the commanders for months, and, as far 
 instructions of the 15th and the 22nd as regarded Namnr, had been drawn 
 consisted therefore in this, that accord- np by themselves, tlie difference ap- 
 ing to the former, the attack was to pears insignificant. When Lafayette 
 be made in the first weelc of May and Rochambeau ascribe their failm'e 
 and according to the latter on the to this discrepancy, it only shows 
 30th of April at latest. As the their wish to throw the blame of it 
 general plan had been known to the on the M-nistry. 
 
448 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 command. But as a man of lionour he did his best, in the 
 eight short daj-s which were left, to furnish Birou with every 
 assistance in his power, although believing him to be the real 
 author and instigator of the whole arrangement. Deficient 
 as was the equipment of the Army, there was sufficient ma- 
 terial to place 12,000 men in the field; and with this force 
 Biron was able to cross the frontier on the 29th, while 
 Theobald Dillon marched with 3,500 from LOle towards 
 Tournay; and Carles with 1,200 men from Dunkirk towards 
 Furnes. Dillon, by marching through the night, arrived on 
 Belgian ground on the morning of the 29th; and halted a 
 league from Tournay, that his men might breakfast. He him- 
 self felt great uncertainty as to his position and chances of 
 success, and told the captain who led the vanguard that he 
 feared a surprise, and should like to beat an immediate re- 
 treat. Nevertheless he remained under cover of some hiUs, 
 without sending forward any outposts to reconnoitre in his 
 front. The Cavalry were just unbridling their horses to feed 
 them, when the enemy appeared in sight, in about equal 
 numbers, on the flank of their 250sition, led by Colonels 
 Pforzheim and Vogelsang, who, with three batallions and six 
 squadrons, were marching against the French. ' Although 
 the Austrians at first only brought a few field pieces, and 
 the Chevaiix-legcrs, into action, the greatest terror seized on 
 Dillon's forces; aud when the Austrian infantry shewed it- 
 self, he instantly sounded a retreat. This was carried out at 
 first in tolerable order — the Austrians pursuing tanibonr hat- 
 taut but without tiring; when suddenly the French Cuiras- 
 siers and the rest of the cavalry broke their lines, riding over 
 the infantry with wild a-ies oi''Saitvc qui pcut!'" and the 
 whole mass rolled in tumultuous confusion towards Lille. 
 The Austrians only pursued to the frontier, and did not 
 lose a man; the French lost four guns, a quantity of bag- 
 gage and two men! The tumult continued to rage in the 
 
 Austrian Military Journal, 1812, I. 16. 
 
Ch. III.] MURD.ee of DILLON BY MUTINOUS TROOPS. 449 
 
 town of Lille itself; the soldiers raised the cry of treachery, 
 in which the mob joined ; the officers were fired on by both 
 soldiers and populace, and Dillon, with two other Generals, 
 were ruthlessly butchered. 
 
 Meanwhile Biron, on the 29th, had occupied Quievrain, 
 the nearest border town of Belgium, without opposition, and 
 marched from that place upon Mons in three columns. A 
 little skirmishing between the outposts took place, but did 
 not cause much delay; and by the afternoon Biron had 
 reached the heights above Mons, where the Austrian general 
 Beaulieu had entrenched himself with only 3,500 men, but 
 in a strong position. Here Biron halted, having no certain 
 knowledge " of the strength of the enemy, and feeling little 
 confidence in his own troops. He was, moreover, surprised to 
 see no signs of a Belgian revolution, and came at last, after 
 a fruitless cannonade against the enemy's light troops, to the 
 prudent determination to wait for news from Toiirnay. When 
 these arrived in the evening, his courage fell; and it was 
 only because the exhaustion of his troops rendered a night 
 march impossible, that he postponed his retreat till the fol- 
 lowincr morninir. It never occurred to him that since the 
 Austrians had only 40,000 men under arms in all Belgium, 
 he could not now be in the neighbourhood of a superior 
 force to his own, and that Dillon's advance was only a feint, 
 while he himself was leading the main attack. He seems 
 to have forgotten, too, that Rochambeau with 6000 men was 
 only a few leagues off, and that he might therefore recon- 
 noitre the enemy's position without any danger. His uneasiness 
 communicated itself to the troops, and disorders broke out 
 in the middle of the night in two regiments of Dragoons, 
 some of whom fled, but the majority remained at their posts.^ 
 Early on the following morning — after a short skirmish near 
 Framerie, — Biron gave orders for a retreat, and his army 
 reached Quievrain without loss.'' Here, however, a sudden 
 
 1 A. N., 17th. May. Reports of the two Colonels. — ^ According to 
 his own report. Monileur, May 8th. 
 
 I. 2 F 
 
4B0 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 attack of the Austrian Hussars put to flight a battalion of 
 National Guards. The disorder spread amongst the other 
 regiments, and on the advance of the Austrian infantry, the 
 whole French army fled back to Valenciennes without stop- 
 ping, amidst cries of treachery. With infinite trouble Biron 
 once more rallied a portion of his troops at Crespin, but 
 no sooner did a patrol of Austrian Lancers shew themselves? 
 than the French again fled in the wildest confusion, and 
 three guns, seven waggons of amunition, and a hundred 
 prisoners fell into the hands of the enemy. The loss of life 
 in this precipitate flight was inconsiderable. ^ 
 
 During these occurrences Lafayette had united 10,000 men 
 by forced marches at Givet between the 25th and 30th; and 
 the rest of his army was in full march for the same place. 
 His vanguard crossed the borders and occupied Bouvines. 
 On the evening of his arrival at this place, he heard from 
 Rochambeau of the retreat of Dillon and Biron. On the 1st of 
 May came a letter from Biron himself, confirming the intel- 
 ligence, and on the 2nd a despatch from the Minister at war 
 expressing his alarm at Dillon's fate, and warning Lafayette 
 to operate with the greatest circumspection, that no further 
 failure might be incurred. Lafayette wished for nothing 
 better than such an intimation, and remained motionless at 
 Givet without attempting to reconnoitre. 
 
 Because, then, 3,000 men under Dillon had fled, Biron, 
 in spite of his three-fold superiority in numbers, retreated. 
 And because Biron had efi^ected nothing, Lafayette with 
 30,000 men did not venture to set one foot into a country 
 which could not possibly have brought a superior force 
 against him. It we examine the course of events more 
 closely, we shall find that the fault was not in the soldiers, 
 who soon afterwards fought gallantly enough, — nor in their 
 
 ' All this is taken from the official papers. In many accounts, the view 
 of the matter is confused by erroneous ideas of what occurred in the 
 Dragoon Regiments. 
 
Ch. in.] WANT OP VIGOUR IN THE FRENCH GENERALS. 451 
 
 bad equipments, which in these first movements did not come 
 into consideration, — but solely in the loaders, who engaged 
 in the war with uncertainty and reluctance, were always 
 calculating the power of the enemy instead of their own, 
 and on all occasions set an example of timidity. The cry 
 of treason, however, raised by the soldiers, and so vio- 
 lently taken up by the Clubs, and the parties in Paris, was 
 by no means justified. No proofs of treachery have ever 
 come to light, and the flight of the soldiers is sufficiently 
 explained by their inexperience, their want of confidence in 
 their officers, and their perception of a want of vigour on 
 the part of their Generals. As to the charge of treason 
 against the Generals themselves, — a want of courage and 
 enterprise is not treachery, and the least consideration of 
 their interests will incontrovertibly convince us that in La- 
 fayette and Rocliambeau, as well as in Biron and Dillon, 
 treachery would have been an act of suicidal madness. On 
 this point even the fanatical blindness of the party hatred 
 of 1792 could hardly deceive itself. Just as futile is the 
 charge brought by Lafayette against Dumouriez, of hav- 
 ing prematurely hurried on the military operations merely 
 to get rid of him, and of wishing that they should be un- 
 successful. Had he not stake his political existence on the 
 success of the attack, retained Lafayette in his command 
 against the wishes of the Gironde, and made his own 
 salvation dependent on the conduct of the General? He, 
 too, was furious at the disgraceful issue, and in a con- 
 fidential letter to his friend Biron gives vent to his feelings, 
 saying, "You marched out like madmen and returned like 
 fools." 
 
 The cup of bitterness was filled to overflowing, when, a 
 few days afterwards, the intelligence arrived from General 
 Montesquiou, that the Ministers were shamefully deceived by 
 those who told them of the existence of an army in the 
 South, that the military force in that part of the Kingdom 
 was as scattered and ill provided, and as unprepared for 
 
 2f2 
 
452 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 military operations, as in December; that no force could be 
 raised in less time than two months, and that, therefore, a 
 breach with Sardinia must at all costs be avoided. 
 
 Thus the hope of advancing to tlie Alps and the Ehine 
 by a cou]} de main vanished into air, the position of the 
 State was in the highest degree critical ; for though Talleyrand 
 had obtained from the English Government an exjDress pro- 
 mise of neutrality — even though Belgium should be occupied — 
 it was stipulated that Holland must be left untouched,' and 
 any assistance from England was no longer to be hoped for. 
 The younger Custine met with no better fortune on his mis- 
 sion to Berlin and Brunswick. On the contrary, there now 
 appeared no doubt that Prussia would join Austria, and that 
 in the course of a few months, a terrible collision might be 
 expected. At this dreary prospect the courage of De Graves 
 deserted him, he did not dare with empty coffers, mutinous 
 soldiers, deserting officers and lukewarm Generals, to face 
 the armies of Germany. On the 5th of May he sent in his 
 resignation. His successor was a Giroixdist, Colonel Servan, 
 a man of steadfast character, and an excellent officer; but 
 as his sole idea was, that the feebleness of the Feuillants, 
 and the treachery of the Court, had caused the present la- 
 mentable state of affairs, he was ready to enter with the greatest 
 zeal into the work of his department and to promote any 
 revolutionary movement at Paris. In the Council, therefore, 
 he held firmly to Roland and Claviere, whilst Dumouriez 
 became daily more and more estranged from them, and di- 
 rected his attention exclusively to foreign affairs. His only 
 thought was to resume the offensive as speedily as possible. 
 Immediately after the disgrace at Mons, Rochambeau had 
 thrown up his command, and Dumouriez had procured the 
 nomination of the' combative Luckner in his place; he also 
 wrote to Lafayette, saying that he entirely agreed with his 
 views on internal politics, entreating him to make a second 
 
 Montmorin to La Marck, May 22d. 
 
Cn. III.] LAFAYETTE'S DISCONTENT. 453 
 
 attack on Belgium within 14 days, and assuring him of every 
 possible support from the Ministers; for in this particular 
 the Gironde, in spite of their suspicions of Lafiiyette, were 
 not slack. Servan raised double and triple the number of 
 recruits, and the Assembly — to thi' great disgust of the Cor- 
 deliers, Robespierre ' and Marat — passed a severe disciplinary 
 law, and large quantities of stores were sent off to the camp. 
 But in this case, as in every other, Lafayette was unable to 
 rise above personal considerations, and the feelings of the 
 moment; he did not trust Dumouriez, and was afraid of get- 
 ting into a position of subordination tp him. He despised 
 the immorality of the man, who had always kept mistresses, 
 always had friends of all parties, and always had money to 
 spend without any visible source of income. In short, he 
 would have nothing to say to such an alliance. In reply 
 he complained more loudly than ever of the utter destitu- 
 tion of his army, which, he said, rendered all decisive action 
 impossible; and he induced the weak Luckner to repeat these 
 complaints in nearly the same words. His dreams of march- 
 ing through Belgium and Holland as a triumjjhant Liberator 
 were again dissipated, and he promised himself no better re- 
 sult of the war, than by a stout defence, to hold the Ger- 
 mans in check, and by a capitulation, to secure at once the 
 "Rights of man" against the Emigres, and the Constitution 
 against the Jacobins.^ The Month of May thus passed 
 without any military movements, except some insignificant 
 skirmishes between the outposts. The French armies re- 
 mained weak and incapable of action, although the first four 
 
 ' Louis Blanc, VI. 384, cites from not mention, however, tliat the theory 
 Robespierre's article the general on this occasion had for its pro- 
 theory, that the soldier should only fessed object, the prolongation of a 
 be subject to military discipline for military insubordination which had 
 transgressions in military service, just exhibited itself in the shape of 
 and lauds it as the best bulwark cowardice, mutiny, and murder. — 
 against military despotism. He does ^ Mallet's Memoires, 14th July, sec. 2. 
 
454 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 weeks of this campaign without battles had cost 52 miUion 
 francs. * 
 
 This was the amount of the additional grant made to the 
 Minister at War, nn excess of the ordinary war budget. 
 That far more was secretly spent was betrayed by Cambon 
 on the 30th, when he mentioned "the 99 miUions" which had 
 been placed at the Minister's disposal. No more precise ac- 
 count has ever been furnished; but still worse than these 
 immediate expenses were the subsequent effects of the war 
 on the finances of the Country, yet the importance of its 
 continuance for the development of the Revolution was eveq 
 at that time apparent. 
 
 In the first place the mere declaration of war put an end 
 to the artificial prosperity of French manufactures, which 
 had formerly existed, and which we have formerly referred 
 to, in describing the state of things in 1791. As early as 
 December 16th a member exclaimed: "We are selling to foreign 
 countries 50 per cent less than last year, and we are iuying 
 just as much more." "All our manufactories have come to 
 a standstill," said another; "and every where foreigners are 
 successfully competing with us." The most important branches 
 — the woollen and cotton manufactories — suffered the most. 
 The former had to procure the greater part, and the latter 
 the whole, of its raw material from other countries. The 
 woollen manufacturers suffered disadvantages in the purchase 
 of their material from the unfavourable state of the exchange, 
 and the cotton manufacturers from the ruined state of their 
 chief source, St. Domingo ; and both witnessed the deteriora- 
 t^ion of the home markets, and saw the consumption of their 
 products daily decreasing. In February this question was 
 brought before the National Assembly — a body already 
 accustomed to interfere with private and commercial affairs, 
 and who soon j)roposed a remedy for the case brought 
 
 ' 20 millions granted in December, 25 on the 22d of April, and then 7 
 for every month from May on. 
 
Ch. III.] EXPORT OF WOOL PROHIBITED. 455 
 
 before them. The chief difficulty was to find the raw ma- 
 terial. "Well then," said they, "let the owner be compelled 
 to bring it into the manufactory." "We have been satisfied 
 hitherto," said Tarbe, "with a moderate export duty on wool 
 and cotton, but now that there is not enough for home con- 
 sumption, the exportation of these materials must be simply 
 forbidden." "The task before us" (such was the light in 
 which Arena placed the matter) "is to maintain 2 million 
 workmen, ' and to annihilate the nefarious speculators who 
 buy up the wool for foreign countries, and by that means 
 bring our manufactories to a standstill." In vain did Vau- 
 blanc and Emmercy raise their warning voices. The growth 
 of wool in France had never been as considerable as the 
 national resources of the soil would have admitted of; and 
 sheep-feeding had up to that time formed the weakest side 
 of French agriculture. It was certain, therefore, that for 
 the sake of affording encouragement of doubtful utility to 
 the manufactories, they would strike a heavy blow at agri- 
 culture, already so greatly depressed, by lessening the pro- 
 duce, and interfering with the markets of the sheep-owners. 
 Nevertheless a decree was passed prohibiting the export of 
 wool. 
 
 At the end of March the Committee on Trade complained 
 that this prohibition had called into existence an infinite 
 amount of smuggling, the continuance of vihich would ex- 
 pose the French to the danger of buying the produce of 
 their own colonies from the English. The Committee, there- 
 fore, proposed in place of the prohibition an ad valorem 
 export duty of 12 per cent. But the adherents of the po- 
 litico-economical omnipotence of the State were not to be 
 so easily satisfied. A zealous Democrat, named Duhem, de- 
 manded instead of the abrogation of the prohibition in ques- 
 tion, the enactment of a new one— 1;«>. of the exportation 
 of wood, because it was too dear for the poor people, 
 
 ' The speaker, like Cambon, is not particular to a cipher more or loss. 
 
45G GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 and "the price," he said, "must be kept down for them." 
 The case was in reality the same as with the wool, and the 
 idtimate cause of the scarcity of both these articles was in- 
 sufficient production, which was certainly not remedied by 
 closing the existing markets against them. The prohibition 
 of the export of wool, therefore, as well as a duty of 50 francs 
 per cwt. on cotton— which was equivalent to a prohibition — 
 remained in full force, and so did all the evils complained, of 
 which were certainly not removed but increased by the 
 prohibitory laws. 
 
 To mitigate the evil it would have been necessary, to re- 
 move the causes from which it proceeded. Nor were these 
 causes hidden from view, but unfortunately they formed an 
 integral part of the revolutionary and warlike policy of the 
 Gironde. As long as this remained the same, France was 
 driven round the dreadful circle— of want increased by vio- 
 lence, and violence increased by want. Matters had gone so 
 far in this direction, that a measure which Mirabeau a year 
 and a half ago had considered worse than civil war, passed 
 almost unobserved in the midst of the tumult and con- 
 fusion. 
 
 Claviere, who had now the direction of the JFiuauces of 
 the State, had already come forward with a proposition to 
 declare the State bankrupt. In earlier periods of the Re- 
 volution, when the property of the Church was confiscated 
 to pay the State creditors with the funds thus raised, there 
 would have been some sense in this proposition. But now 
 the object was to pay the costs of a wantonly provoked 
 war. It was feared, that if they continued to meet their 
 obligations to the public creditor, Belgium could not be 
 invaded, the Itlieuisli Provinces could not be revolutionised, 
 nor the "natural boundaries" of the Empire conquered. In 
 the face of such a danger it seemed impossible to hesitate. 
 It was determined to keep, of course, the proceeds of the 
 confiscated Church lands, but not to pay the creditors to 
 whom those lauds had been offered as security. On the 
 
Cn. III.] THE STATE SUSraNDS PAYMENT. 457 
 
 27th April, therefore, a bill was brought in for creating 
 300 millions of assignats, which, in defiance of previous en- 
 actments, were to be spent for war purposes alone, and not 
 for the liquidation of the public debt. This measure was 
 agreed to without any special debate. Tun days afterwards, 
 it became known that the month of April had consumed 
 60 millions in paying the State debts. "At this rate," cried 
 Jacob Dupont, "the National debt will swallow up all the 
 assignats." Cambon observed that the war alone, by the end 
 of the year, would cost 400 millions more than the whole 
 annual revenue of the State. lie added, moreover, that the 
 suspension of the defrayment of the debt would only affect 
 rich people, old financiers, bankers and speculators. It was 
 therefore decreed, on the 15tli of May, to suspend the payment 
 of public debts for the present, with the exception of small 
 claims under 10,000 francs. 
 
 A financial respite being thus obtained, the Girondists 
 resumed their old revolutionary schemes. After they had 
 established themselves in the Ministry, and Louis XVI. had 
 shown himself compliant to their wishes, their attacks against 
 the monarchy were for a while suspended. This truce might 
 have still continued, perhaps, if the invasion of Belgium had 
 succeeded, and common successes had warmed their hearts, 
 and in some degree reconciled parties. But when the dis- 
 aster of Tournay had given General Lafayette the desired 
 opportunity of venting his wrath against the Gironde, and 
 bringing all warlike operations to a standstill; and when 
 Louis, little as he loved Lafayette, was unwilling to sacrifice 
 him to the revolutionary parties; then it was that Brissot 
 and Roland remembered that they had higher objects than 
 the formation of a Constitutional Ministry. They knew that 
 if Belgium were not occupied before the arrival of the Ger- 
 man armies, the war would assume a very unfavourable as- 
 pect, and they were therefore in hot haste. Meanwhile, 
 however, the Prussians were stlU far away, and aU was quiet 
 upon the German frontier ; and therefore they were animated 
 
458 - GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 by the liveliest audacity. We shall have, hereafter, to discuss 
 the reasons of this dilatoriness on the part of the Germans; 
 but even in this place we may remark that the consequences 
 of their delay were incalculable. The Parisian populace, 
 which in the winter had been greatly excited by innumerable 
 stories of the dangers which threatened them from abroad, 
 almost forgot, in their long continued security, the very exis- 
 tence of the foreign Powers. They talked of the war with 
 the same careless curiosity, as of the battles of the Eng- 
 lish and Tippoo Sahib. Thus ended the hopes entertained 
 by the Feuillants of intimidating the Democrats ; and when, 
 at a later period, the danger came upon the people un- 
 expectedly, their thoughless levity cpickly gave place to 
 frantic terror and brutal fury. 
 
 Roland had been still more consistent than his colleagues 
 in preserving the hostile attitude of his party towards the 
 King. No sooner had he accepted office as Minister of 
 the Interior, than the persecution of the ancient Church was 
 carried on with increased severity. On the 6th April, the 
 National Assembly abolished the corporations of the secular 
 Clergy, and prohibited all ecclesiastic robes of office. When 
 several Departments petitioned for the banishment of the 
 Priests, Roland explained that, in fact, civil war could only 
 be ayerted by severe measures of this kind; in consequence 
 of which statement the "Committee of Public Safety" 
 brought up a report on the 26th, that the Priests, being 
 especially supported by the simplicity of the peasants, ought 
 to be transplanted to the chief towns of the Departments. 
 Dumouriez, to whom all these ecclesiastical scjuabbles were 
 matters of indifference or dislike, checked this zeal for a 
 time, and angrily rejected the suggestion that the King 
 should be compelled to employ a constitutional confessor. 
 But when the Gironde had gained another vote in the coun- 
 cil of Ministers, by the accession of Servan, Roland came, 
 once more into the National Assembly to accelerate its re- 
 solutions respecting the Priests. Whatever view we may 
 
Ch. III.] CHARACTER OF ROLAND. 459 
 
 take of the matter, there can be no doubt of the disloyalty 
 with which Roland, in his capacity of Minister, attacked 
 the most sensitive part of the Royal conscience,— kindled a 
 contest for life and death between the King and the As- 
 sembly,— and remained in office that he might direct his 
 ministerial influence, as long as possible, against his sovereign. 
 He acted with so little reserve in this niatter, as to set up 
 a republican journal with the public money; and was not a 
 little angry with Dumouriez, when the latter refused to 
 sanction such an outlay. Mad. Roland praises the virtue of 
 her husband in every page of her book; but it is evident 
 that, though he may, perhaps, have been an excellent man 
 in private intercourse, he did not scruple, as the chief of 
 a party, to trample on the simplest rules of honour and 
 integrity. 
 
 An entire abolition of the Monarchy, however, did not 
 even now form part of the plan of the Girondist party. 
 SieyeS and Condorcet still considered such a step extremely 
 hazardous. They saw clearly that the greater the compli- 
 cation of present afiairs, the more necessary it was to defer 
 the final decision on the fate of the Monarchy to a later 
 period. Generally speaking, their views werte directed to a 
 fiirther curtailment of the Royal prerogatives, a reduction 
 of the civil list, the appointment of the Ministry by the 
 National Assembly, and lastly, under certain circumstances, 
 a change in the person of the Monarch, or of the dynasty 
 itself. ^ The former heau ideal of the Lameths — a mon- 
 archical constitution from which the monarch might, at plea- 
 sure be omitted — would thus have been completely realized. 
 
 The way towards this object was clearly marked out by 
 circumstances.. The first was the resuscitation of revolution- 
 ary passions; since now, throughout the length and breadth 
 of the country, nothing was to be found but apathy and 
 desire of repose. In Paris, more especially, every one turned 
 
 ' Memoires of Mallet du-Pan, aoc. to communications from Louis XVI. 
 
460 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 his back on politics, and no one but the ever-ready mob of 
 the Chibs, the "Vaiiiquettrs dc la Bastille" — the pikemen and 
 the vagabonds' — at most from 10,000 to 15,000 — were prepared 
 for an vmcute. The war with Germany offered the best 
 means of increasing the number of these unqniet spirits. 
 The chief object of declaring war had been to enable the 
 Gironde to accuse the King of treachery; now was the time 
 to make this charge as loudly and distinctly as possible. 
 
 A second object was to render the King entirely defence- 
 less in a military point of view. By means of Pethion, the 
 Revolutionists already had the National Guard at their disposal, 
 and by means of the Ministry the troops of the line. But 
 the new body-guard of the King had lately entered on its 
 duties. This force, personally bound to the King, and con- 
 sisting, according to its muster roll, of 1800, but in reality 
 of 6000, picked and well-tried men, was considered sufficient, 
 in connection with some Swiss regiments ,in the neighbour- 
 hood, to inspire respect into the heroes of the barricades. 
 The next step therefore was to do away with this constitu- 
 tional Guard. 
 
 But in this way the Gironde could by no means be sure 
 of keeping their booty to themselves. For, easy as it was 
 to rouse the artisans and proletaries to rebellion, they 
 could not reckon on their obedience after the victory. They 
 knew that among such troops, Dantou and Marat, the Corde- 
 liers and Robespierre, were all-powerful ; and from these 
 they had been separated by the deadliest mutual hatred, 
 ever since the agitation of the war question. It seemed 
 therefore to the Gironde a matter of immediate moment to 
 form another force, in addition to Lafayette's soldiers and 
 Danton's pikemen, which should depend immediately on 
 themselves. For the realisation of this object they reckoned 
 principally on the South of the Kingdom, and especially on 
 Provence, which was now completely under the power of 
 the Marsoillois ' and the banditti of Vaucluse. Here, too, 
 
 ' Goisas, Courier of June 13th, contains a Marseilles Correspondence of 
 
Ch. III.] INTRIGUES OF THE GIRONDE. 4G1 
 
 they hoped that, in the hast resort,— if the German armies 
 should arrive more quickly than was expected,— they should 
 find a secure and distant place of refuge, to which they might 
 carry the King with them, and begin a new chapter of the 
 revolutionary struggle under the protection of Jourdan and 
 Barbaroux. 
 
 . All these matters were discussed as early as the middle 
 of May, a fortnight after the disasters of Tournay and Mons, * 
 and put in operation, one after another, during the tedious 
 debate on the subject of the Priests. 
 
 A journalist named Carra, an adherent of the Gironde, 
 who had passed two years in prison (quite undeservedly, 
 he said) for housebreaking, in his journal of the 15th ac- 
 cused an Austrian Committee in the Tuileries of being; the 
 originators of all the mischief. The former Ministers, Ber- 
 trand and Montmorin, were denounced as being members of 
 it; the Qvieen, as an Austrian Princess, was said to be the 
 leader of the conspiracy, which was to deliver France to 
 the Austrian armies; and Count Mercy, who now lived at 
 Brussels, was charged with being the mediator between 
 Vienna and the Tuileries. This blow was intended to strike 
 the Queen, and, through her the position of the King in the 
 tenderest point. All the partisans of the Gironde, both near 
 and distant, , took up the calumny; Brissot and Gensonne 
 brought it before the National Assembly. All the news- 
 papers and Clubs repeated it with odious additions, and 
 Mad. Roland herself had the base idea of composing a Min- 
 isterial rescript to the King himself, in which inuendos of 
 this kind were corroborated by the sanction of the Council 
 of Ministers. The Republican but conscientious Duranthon, 
 Minister of justice, put a stop to this, by declaring that he 
 considered it his duty, as a Minister of the crown, not to 
 
 Jane 5th, in which a letter of the been secured by universal confedera- 
 
 MarseiJIes Jacobinsto Pethion is com- tion. — ' Montmorin to La Marck, 
 
 municated. They wish to come to May and June. Morris to Jefferson, 
 
 Paris and defend liberty, until it has 10th of June. 
 
462 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 throw suspicion on the King, but to support him. * The 
 story of the Austrian Committee, nevertheless, spread from 
 party to party and from province to province, attached it- 
 self irrevocably to every movement of the Queen, and be- 
 came the pretext for all the horrors of the following year. 
 It becomes necessary, therefore, to make a few remarks on 
 the actual truth of the report, although the accusers of the 
 Queen spared themselves the trouble of bringing forward 
 any proof whatever. We have already seen that the cor- 
 respondence between the Queen and her brother Leopold, 
 in the Summer and Autunm of 1791, contained nothing be- 
 yond the wish to avoid a war between France and Germany, 
 and to deter the Jacobins by an imposing coalition of the 
 European Powers, from destroying the constitution and the 
 monarchy. The correspondence between the Queen and Mercy 
 is exactly to the same effect; and there is not a single line 
 in it which aims at the betrayal of French interests to Aus- 
 tria. It is true, indeed, that when the Gironde had attained 
 their object, and commenced the war, with the avowed pur- 
 pose of destroying the monarchical constitution, the Queen 
 did send a note to Mercy, in which she revealed to him 
 the warlike decree of the Ministerial Council, that the Ger- 
 man Powers might take their measures betimes. But how- 
 ever blamable such an act would be in the ordinary and 
 normal condition of a State, no unprejudiced person can in 
 this case deny to the Queen the right of self-defence against 
 the utterly illegal attacks of the Gironde. For the rest, we 
 have not the slightest reason to believe that the Court re- 
 ceived any advice from Bertrand. 
 
 Montmorin only ventured into the Palace for a few stealthy 
 moments, and it was just in May and June that he an- 
 nounced to La March that the Royal family were without any 
 advisers, and that they had no knowledge whatever of the 
 intentions of the German Powers.^ Of the attempts of 
 
 ' Memoires de Roland, pieces justificatives. — ^ May 22., June 19. 
 
Ch. III.] PERSECUTION OF THE PRIESTS. 463 
 
 Louis at this period to recommend to Francis II. his views 
 respecting the attitude of the Powers we shall speak in 
 connection with the events of the war. 
 
 On the 19th of May, the same day on which Roland laid 
 his letter before his colleagues, with the remark that if they 
 refused their concurrence he would present it by himself 
 alone, Lasource called on the National Assembly to rouse the 
 People to its very depth, by a solemn declaration that the 
 country was in danger; and that it was necessary above all 
 things to collect a force near Paris, to protect' the city from 
 external and internal foes. The proposition came too early; 
 the minds of the great majority of the Deputies were not 
 yet prepared for it, and the address of Lasource suflfered 
 shipwreck on some subordinate question of finance. But 
 a few days afterwards, the law respecting the Priests was 
 • completed, the barbarity of which rendered its rejection by 
 the King certain; and the very prospect of that rejection 
 was sufficient to raise a feeling in the majority hostile to 
 Louis. According to this enactment, every Priest was to 
 to take the civic oath. In case of refusal he might, on the 
 motion of twenty citizens of the place where he lived, and 
 the report of the District magistrates, be transported across 
 the frontiers by the Governor of the Department, without 
 further examination. Many a Dej)uty imagined that when 
 once the decree was passed, the King would he obliged to 
 sanction it; and that if it could not be managed in any 
 other way, a little intimidation could do no harm. The 
 Mayor, too, sent instructions to the Assembly to keep a watch- 
 ful eye on any attempts at flight which might be undertaken 
 by the King. The remembrance of Varennes made the blood 
 of many a man boil in his veins, and his head whirl with 
 excitement. Under these circumstances a trifling occurrence 
 sufficed to raise a furious storm. The feelings of the Assem- 
 bly had been powerfully excited by an address of the Minister 
 at War, who demanded the equipment of 83,000 volunteers, 
 in addition to the troops of the line, and for the second 
 
464 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 time uttered in the Assembly the fatal words,— which re- 
 sounded far and wide— that the whole nation must rise as 
 one man. Immediately uj^on this the Committee of Public 
 Safety reported that the Royal Porcelain manufactory at 
 Sevres had burned great bales of paper, — suspicious, very 
 suspicious paper, — in which perhaps the correspondence of 
 the Austrian Committee may have been contained. An in- . 
 vestigation was made, great alarm prevailed in the capital, 
 and the Assembly resolved to sit en permanence. It soon 
 appeared, indeed, that the bales of paper had contained no- 
 thing but a libel on the Queen printed in London, which 
 had been bought up at the expense of the civil list. But 
 the excitement was not allayed, and the Assembly decreed, 
 on the motion of Bazire, that the Royal Guard should be 
 dissolved, on the ground that some legally ineligible per- 
 sons were serving in it, that its numbers had been increased- 
 beyond the prescribed limit, and that it was animated by 
 anti-revolutionary sentiments. The King was of opinion that 
 these charges ought to have been followed up, and the guilty 
 punished, and not made the pretext for depriving him of 
 the Guard assigned to him by the Constitution. Bvit when 
 he was about to reject the decree, his Ministers all refused 
 to put their signatures to his refusal. Threatened on all 
 sides, and destitute of counsel and assistance, the Monarch 
 ratified the order. The Guard was broken up, and their 
 weapons were committed to the custody of the city author- 
 ities. ' He now stood undefended in the midst of enemies, 
 not knowing whether they only desired his crown, or were 
 also thirsting for his blood. 
 
 Servan, the Minister at war, now took the last step. On 
 the 4th of June, without any authority from the King, with- 
 out consulting his colleagues— only Roland and Claviere 
 were in the secret— ho announced to the Assembly that the 
 existing numljer of the armed force, and the means of re- 
 
 ' Gorsas, Courier, June 2nd. 
 
Ch. hi.] the GIRONDE and the FEDEEES. 465 
 
 cruiting it were insufficient, and proposed that every Canton 
 in the Kingdom slioiild send five armed men to a festival 
 of fraternity on the anniversary of the storming of the 
 Bastille; and that after the festivities, this force— which would 
 amount to 20,000 men — should encamp near Paris to protect 
 the capital, and for that purpose should be put in possession 
 of the cannon of the Parisian National Guard. This proposition 
 was agreed to with little alteration, amid the applause of 
 the galleries. In a short time, therefore, the Gironde saw 
 themselves in jjossession of an army, strong enough either 
 to control, or to overthi'ow the throne. The future fate of 
 France seemed entirely in their hands. 
 
 No one could deceive himself with regard to the vast 
 importance of this resolution. Men of all parties saw as 
 clearly as the originator of the scheme himself, that the 
 arms of these 20,000 men were not intended to be turned 
 against an external enemy, but to serve the purposes of 
 internal policy. The Jacobins and Cordeliers were jubilant. 
 Robespierre alone, whose personal feud with Brissot had 
 become more -and more "Venomous, feared the increase of 
 jDower which might accrue to his hated rivals, from the 
 formation of a people's army. The rest regarded this as 
 a remote danger; thought that they should agree very well 
 with the Federes as men of like opinions, and rejoiced at 
 the strengthening of their cause against the Monarchy. 
 Lacroix, the friend of Danton, was already demanding at 
 the club, the isolation of the "Avistrian woman," the sale 
 of the Eanigrants' estates, a general arming of the People, 
 and a progressive income tax. A citizen of the Faubourg 
 St. Antoiue added, amidst tluuiders of applause ; "the people 
 is sovereign, if its representatives fail in their duty, we 
 ourselves wOl see what is to be done." Accordingly the 
 fabrication and distribution of pikes was carried on at an 
 accelerated rate. The second revolution, already announced 
 by the Gironde, was ready to break out. 
 
 The Court and the Bourgeoisie were well aware of this. 
 
 I. 2g 
 
466 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 The National Guard of Paris, which, since the 17th of July, 
 knew but too well the bloodthirsty hatred of the proletaries, 
 saw with mingled rage and terror the formation of a de- 
 mocratic army in opposition to""themselves. They felt them- 
 selves dishonoured and imperilled; they did not for a mo- 
 ment doubt that the new camp would be exclusively filled 
 with a Jacobin rabble, which would prepare for the capital 
 the fate of Aries and Avignon. The plan of the Gironde, 
 moreover, if the worst came to the worst, of carrying ofi 
 the King to the South of France, was by no means a secret; 
 and the citizens thought that they should in that case lose 
 their sole protection against the pillage of foreign troops.' 
 The majority of the battalions therefore held a meeting and 
 agreed to make a s'l'and demonstration. The Generals un- 
 dertook the preparation of a memorial to the National Assem- 
 bly against the summoning of the Federes, which quickly 
 received thousands of signatures. The Feuillants entered into 
 this movement with zeal and activity. Lafayette, full of 
 rage against the Ministry, again joined the Feuillants party, 
 and in alliance with them offered the King his aid against 
 the attack of the Gironde. In the field Luckner had just 
 undertaken a second attack on Belgium. "I have," he wrote 
 to Servan, "neither troops or arms enough, but I am ready 
 to take the offensive, if you wish me to do so before the 
 arrival of the Prussians." The Ministry thereujion ordered 
 an attack on Menin and Courtray, in support of which 
 Lafayette was to advance to Maubeuge. When Luckner 
 arrived at Menin he looked eagerly for a revolutionary out- 
 break on the part of the Belgians, but this did not take 
 place; and Lafayette, in consequence of the intelligence he 
 received from Paris, determined not to take any further 
 steps against the Austrians, until he had settled matters 
 with the Jacobins at home. It was in vain that Servan 
 made another attempt at reconciliation, and desjjatched a 
 
 ' Morris. 
 
Ch. III.] DISSENSIONS IN THE GIRONDIST MINISTRY. 4G7 
 
 common frieud into Lafayette's camp. When the latter, on 
 the 15th June, informed the General of Servan's readiness 
 to furnish him with all the means necessary for the con- 
 quest of Belgium, Lafayette's adjutant, with loud mani- 
 festations of joy, brought the news of the fall of the Girondist 
 Ministers. 
 
 Louis XVI. was as fully aware as auy one of the danger 
 of his position. lie had made up his mind for many weeks 
 past to deprive his enemies of their ministerial power; and 
 a split in the Cabinet itself gave him courage to take the 
 decisive step. Dumouriez's relation to his colleagues had 
 grown worse and worse. They blamed the irregularities of 
 his private life, and he was offended at the surveillance 
 exercised over him. They endeavoured to deprive him of 
 his secret service money, since he would no longer spend 
 it on republican newspapers; and he denounced them as 
 perjured forgers, if they laid hands on the money which 
 had once been granted to him. While they were angry 
 with him for mercilessly ridiculing the foibles of the Na- 
 tional Assembly, he, without any circumlocution, declared 
 that it was unconscientious in them, as Ministers of the 
 King, to undermine the throne. To the other causes of dif- 
 ference were added the military disasters, the responsibility for 
 which they mutually, with ever-increasing heat, endeavoured 
 to fasten on each other; and lastly the two decrees respect- 
 ing the Priests and the Federcs made the breach irreparable. 
 Dumouriez did not even agree to the former of these mea- 
 sures, and with respect to the latter, he declared that Servan's 
 mode of proceeding was unjustifiable, and the decree itself 
 a source of certain and immediate destruction both to the 
 King and the Gironde. The discussion in the Council was so 
 warm, that the two Ministers were on the point of challeng- 
 ing each other. After the sitting Eoland proposed to his 
 colleagues to force the King to dismiss the General. But 
 the latter had got the start of them, and in a secret con- 
 ference with the King, undertook to make himself re- 
 
 2g2 
 
468 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 sponsible for the dismissal of the three Girondists, and to 
 form a new Ministry; Louis must however, he said, ratify 
 the two decrees, and he would take care that, in the 
 execution, they shoidd become a dead letter. Dumouriez affirms 
 that the King agreed to these conditions, while the Minister 
 Bertrand maintains the contrary. The opposing statements of 
 these two men are about cc[ually worthy of credit, but we 
 may easily imagine that in these hasty and excited negotiations 
 some vague expression of the King may have inspired a 
 hope in the mind of the General, which Louis, on his 
 side, did not consider himself bound to fulfil. In this po- 
 sition of affairs Hqjiind struck the final blow, by first present- 
 ing to the King the memorial which had been drawn up 
 by his wife, and then laying it before the Council of Ministers. 
 The fundamental proposition of this document — which was 
 drawn up in a defiant tone, and with much circumlocution — 
 was this: that it was, indeed, natural and conceivable for 
 the King, in accordance with the prejudices of his education, 
 to aim at Reaction, but that such attempts were, never- 
 theless, the cause of all the evils of the Revolution. After 
 this personal attack, the King could hesitate no longer, and 
 on the 13th, the three Girondists received their dismissal 
 in a few short words. Dumouriez succeded Servan, and 
 two of his personal friends received the portfeuilles of Ro- 
 land and Claviere. 
 
 It was not difficult to foresee that such a step must have 
 most important consequences. By such a declaration of war, 
 aU the revolutionary powers of France were roused to open 
 enmity against the King. A terrible commotion was im- 
 mediately raised in the National Assembly. Roland's letter 
 was read amid clapping of hands; it was ordered to be 
 printed, and sent into the Departments. The Clubs and 
 journals bestirred themselves, and the Jacobins raised a 
 storm in favour of the patriotic Ministers. Even Robespierre, 
 much as he had grudged the Girondists their posts, could 
 venture no more in the way of opposition than the utterance 
 
Ch. HI] DUMOURIEZ DEFIES HIS OPPONENTS. 469 
 
 of the epigram— that the existence of a treacherous Council 
 of Ministers was perhaps a blessing, because it roused the 
 Patriots to ever fresh distrust. In all other quarters, the 
 revolutionary parties were entirely and zealously united. 
 There was no doubt that a storm was brewing in Paris. 
 
 Dumouriez, whose rude audacity increased with the dan- 
 ger, had no intention of evading i(. On the contrary, 
 he entered the National Assembly in the midst of its ex- 
 citement with cool and unshaken firmness, and read out a 
 long and severe criticism on Servan's official conduct. He 
 increased the exasperation of his opponents, but inspired at 
 the same time no less fear than hatred, by his imperturbable 
 confidence. They all crouched beneath his hand. "He is," 
 cried Brissot, "the basest intriguer who ever lived;" — but 
 they could find no place where to hit him; nay, they 
 scarcely dared to show their hatred, because the former con- 
 fidant of their plans could bring weapons against them 
 which no one else possessed. Who shall decide whether under 
 the circumstances it was possible for Dumouriez to succeed 
 in the contest he had begun? The very first condition of 
 success would have been that all the friends of Monarchy 
 should hold together, as its enemies had done. For though 
 nothing is more certain than that the latter only formed a 
 minority of the nation, yet they had most powerful aids in 
 the demoralization of the troops, the breaking-up of the 
 constituted authorities, and the indiff'erence and cowardice of 
 the wealthier classes. The united forces of the King, the 
 Feuillants, Lafayette and Dumouriez, would, under the circum- 
 stances, have been by no means certain of victory— their 
 disunion ensured their defeat. 
 
 In the first place, the King refused to Dumouriez the ra- 
 tification of the decrees, as he had already done to the Gi- 
 rondists. In vain were Dumouriez's representations, that 
 the veto would have no efi"ect; that the Democrats of the 
 Departments would, in spite of it, maltreat the Priests, 
 and come in armed crowds to Paris ; and that he would only 
 
470 GIRONDIST MINISTRY. [Book III. 
 
 damage his own interests; the King adhered to his resolu- 
 tion, not to sully himself by an act of injustice; and it was 
 no less this conscientious stubbornness of the King, than his 
 consternation at the consequence of the veto, which induced 
 Dumouriez to give in his resignation on the 17th, and to 
 vmdertake a command in the Army of the North. As an 
 enterprising general, he might perhaps have exercised a 
 greater influence on home politics, than at the head of the 
 impotent body of men which bore the name of Ministerial 
 Council; biit here too the blunders of the Conservatives of 
 that period proved an insuperable obstacle. In the appoint- 
 ment of his Ministers the King could only choose from 
 FeuiUants and Fayettists; it depended therefore on Lafayette 
 what services Dumouriez should render to the crown. But 
 Lafayette was inexorable in his hatred. On the sanle day 
 on which Dumouriez resigned his post, a letter from Lafa- 
 yette arrived in Paris, in which he began a furious declara- 
 tion of war against the Jacobins, by saying, that after the 
 fall of the three Girondists, Dumouriez, — the least excusable 
 and most infamous of all — should no longer drag on his 
 scandalous existence. All hopes of reconciliation were thus 
 cut off. Dumouriez, in his rage against the Gironde, would 
 have been ready to stake his all upon the monarchy; but 
 then he wished, in case of victory, to receive his share of 
 the spoil, and had no inclination to sacrifice himself for an 
 idea, the partisans of which had spurned him with contempt. 
 He knew his own power, and saw the crisis approaching; 
 and when he went to the camp, it was in the calm con- 
 viction, that wiser men than Lafayette, in spite of all their 
 repugnance to him, would summon him when they needed 
 his assistance. Lafayette, too, was soon to learn what he 
 •had gained by insulting Dumouriez. 
 
Ch. IV.] 471 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 LAST EFFORTS OF THE FEUILLANTS. 
 
 Danton and his associates. — Revolt oir the 20th ok June.— The minister 
 MONCIEL — Lafayette's abortive efforts in paris. — The gironde and 
 
 THE DANGER OF THE COUNTRY. — ThE KING's VAIN DEALINGS WITH THE 
 
 CENTRE. — Dissolution of mqnciel's ministry. 
 
 The republican parties were in full activity. The Gironde 
 did not choose to have the pow^er torn from them without 
 resistance, but knowing their own unpopularity with the 
 National guard, and the cowardice of the suburban mob, 
 they feared that they could not carry their point with the 
 resources they possessed in Paris itself. They wished, there- 
 fore, to wait until Servan's decree was carried out in the 
 provinces in spite of the royal veto; they called on all the 
 clubs in the. Kingdom to send volunteers to the Festival 
 of Confederation, and, more especially, invoked the aid 
 of the Marseillois, and the army of Vaucluse. Still iViore 
 impatiently did the Cordeliers bestir themselves in all the 
 Metropolitan Sections. Among them there was no talk of 
 delay; they thought it more attractive, and perhaps safer, 
 to bring matters to a conclusion by a rapid coup cle main. 
 While the Gironde were aiming at the favour of the pea- 
 sants, by procuring the abolition, without any compensation, 
 even of those seigniorial rights which were founded on a 
 voluntary compact between the parties, — Danton, by a much 
 shorter route, attained the same object among the proletaries 
 of Paris, by demanding at the Jacobin Club the imposition 
 
472 LAST EFFORTS OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 of fresh taxes on tlie rich, for the advantage of the poor. 
 This was the battle-cry with which he attracted to himself, 
 with irresistible power, the hearts of the Faubourg St. An- 
 toine. 
 
 By his election into the Municipal CouncU, Danton en- 
 tered on a new chapter of his political life. His predecessor, 
 GervLUe, had been called from this post into the Ministry; 
 and henceforward Danton began to feel the ambition to make 
 himself the chief of a party, and to lay the foundation 
 of an independent power. He had already made considerable 
 progress in this direction. The focus of his influence was 
 still the Club of Cordeliers, which was the rendezvous of 
 people from every jiart of Paris who found the proceedings 
 of the Jacobin Club itself too respectable. The Members of 
 this society, caring nothing for wordy discussions, and 
 theoretical investigations, made straight for the only inter- 
 esting part of the Revolution — the hooty. In the National 
 Assembly the Cordeliers had as yet but few votes ; but in 
 the equally important sphere of the capital, their means of 
 influence were very numerous. The Mayor Pethion threw 
 no obstacle in their way, as long as the Gironde was op- 
 posed to the Court. The Procureur Manuel, and of the 
 City authorities the two Police Commissioners Panis and 
 Sergent, were strong adherents of Danton; so that the whole 
 apparatus of the metropolitan Police, with all its connections, 
 pecuniary resources and agents, had passed into the service 
 of the insurrection. It was now, therefore, doubly easy for 
 the Cordeliers to collect about them the restless elements of 
 the mighty city. The workmen of the Fmibourgs acknowledged 
 no supei'ior to Danton's friend, the rich but somewhat re- 
 duced brewer Santerre, and Alexandre, the Captain of the 
 National Guard of St. Marcel. In these quarters the greater 
 part even of the National Guardsmen held democratical opin- 
 ions, and bayonets and pikes were seen united in brotherly 
 harmony. In the other quarters the Democrats were more 
 thinly scattered; but to make up for this the connexions 
 
Ch. IV.] CHARACTER OF DANTON. 473 
 
 of the Cordeliers extended to all the holes and corners of 
 the cite, the lurking-places of the Halles,— to those dens of 
 misery and debauch in which all the criminals of the whole 
 Kingdom met together, and which were now canvassed by the 
 Police themselves for the service of the Revolution. Here 
 were found adventurers of all ranks and nations, — mostly 
 young men practised in CA-ery kind of vice, who for a few 
 dollars were ready for either war or murder, and held the 
 insurrection at the disposal of the highest bidder. The 
 money, which was wanted in large qu^antities for the main- 
 tenance of these banditti, was furnished partly by booty- 
 loving speculators, like the Bankers, Frei Brothers, — who saw 
 a golden harvest ripening for them in the dissolution of all 
 legal bonds; partly by the Duke of Orleans, who, though 
 he had no fixed plan, or clearly defined object, had been 
 thrown into fresh transports of rage by some personal in- 
 sults of the Court; but chiefly, by the Municipality, and, 
 through' its mediation, by the State itself. 
 
 No one would impute to the leader of such an agitation 
 ideal morality or far-seeing patriotism. Danton was not an 
 insignificant man, but coarse and vulgar, endowed with va- 
 rious gifts, which were however only to be set to work by 
 his unbridled sensuality. As long as his thirst for enjoy- 
 ment was unslaked, he was indefatigable, full of activity and 
 energy; ready to undertake the most difficult and disagree- 
 able tasks, — to undergo any exertion, and to commit any 
 crime. But when his appetites were satisfied, he was in a 
 state of complete collapse. At such times, an immovable 
 sluggishness and apathetic good-humour took possession of 
 him; he was comfortable, and did not choose to be disturbed. 
 He performed all that animal energy and passion can do, but 
 there was no vein of a higher intellectual life either in his 
 character or education. He possessed neither moral nor 
 physical courage; for nothing but the consciousness of a good 
 cause can inspire the former, and the latter he had lost in 
 sensual indulgences. It was indeed fortunate for his success 
 
474 LAST EFFORTS OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 in life that the trade of insurrection was not at that time 
 accompanied by any imminent dangers; and he overlooked, 
 with selfish frivolity, the more remote vicissitudes of the 
 career on which be had entered. He had as little real en- 
 thusiasm for any political system as any one of his friends. 
 He was for the moment opposed to the King, although he 
 received very considerable sums from the Civil list, because 
 he clearly saw that the last remnant of government, and all 
 the hopes of the friends of order, were bound u]d in the 
 existence of the Monarch. Like Marat, he rejoiced in the 
 unconditional carrying out of the "rights of man," as the 
 only material part of the constitution, — for the "rights of 
 man" were the all-sufficient weapon to overthrow every con- 
 stitution, in favour of arbitrary violence. The Demagogues, 
 by whom the pikemeu and the ladies of the Halles were 
 roused to enthusiasm, had no other object than the establish- 
 ment of their own omnipotence by the grace of the sovereign 
 mob. Danton despised the schoolmasters and popular ora- 
 tors, who troubled themselves about fjrinciples. Like Du- 
 mouriez, and at a later period, Bonaparte, he was of opinion, 
 that in politics everything depends on being the strongest; 
 and only added, at most, one proposition to this simple prin- 
 ciple, vis. that "he is a fool who, when he is sitting by the 
 fountain, does not draw water for himself." Hitherto, he 
 said, the Patriots had profited but little by, the Revolution; 
 it was necessary to begin again. 
 
 A man of this stamp might cooperate for a time with the 
 Gironde, but it was imjiossible to reckon on any long-con- 
 tinued harmony between them. Brissot's character approached 
 most nearly to that of Danton; for with the former also, the 
 Republic was rather the means than the end, and the plea- 
 sure of ruling others' the principal thing. Yet these two 
 men were irrevocably separated by the difference in their 
 personal and social tastes. Brissot revelled in the conscious- 
 ness of superior personal address; the exercise of which 
 requiring knowledge and education, he naturally lived in good 
 
Ch. IV.] CONTRAST BETWEEN DANTON AND BRISSOT. 475 
 
 society, and in the company of practical statesmen. Dan- 
 ton, on the other hand, wanted, above all things, money, 
 wine and wsmen; and had not the slightest sense of jesthe- 
 tical refinement in his pleasures. The forriier, therefore, in 
 spite of his coquetting with Democracy, was after all a 
 politician of the gducated classes; while the latter, even when 
 Minister and Diplomatist, never ceased to be the party-chief 
 of the Sansculottes. The other Girondists had still fewer 
 points of contact with Danton. Roland, Vergniaud and 
 Guadet were, men of strict morality in private life, and were 
 fully conscious of the respectability of their lives ; and there- 
 fore passed judgment on Danton with the same severity, as 
 the eqvially temperate Lafayette had shown towards the 
 immorality of General Dumouriez. Danton repaid their scorn 
 with interest. He despised the scrupulousness which assumed 
 so respectable a mien at home, and in political life joined 
 in all the machinations of the Cordeliers. Roland was the 
 greatest stumbling-block in his path. For though he also 
 wished to overthrow the monarchy, yet lie desired that it 
 should be succeeded by an orderly arrangement of affairs, under 
 a republic; while the Cordeliers wished for revolution as a 
 means of doing away with all order and all responsibility. 
 
 All the more zealously did they now hurry matters on to 
 make the best of the favourable moment, and to carry off 
 the booty before the eyes of the Gironde. The latter party 
 may have been rather anxious as to the consequences of a 
 premature rising, or one independent of themselves; but 
 among their friends, too, th«re were hotheaded individuals 
 enough, who unreservedly threw themselves into the vortex 
 of agitation, and the Girondist chiefs were well aware, that 
 by openly checking the movement, they risked the loss of 
 all their influence, and the restoration of the Royal author- 
 ity. And thus, for the moment, the distmction between 
 the two parties was lost to view; partizans of the Gironde 
 and adherents of the Cordehers were seen in the meetings 
 
476 I.AST EFFORTS OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 of the Section, working together towards a common ob- 
 ject, i 
 
 On the 16th of June, the Faubourgs resolved to celebrate 
 the 20th of June, the anniversary of the Tennis-Court, by 
 a solemn procession; and those who joined in it were to 
 carry arms as on that eventful day, and express their wishes 
 both to the National Assembly and the King. By collect- 
 ing all the rabble of the city in the Faubourg,^ and joining 
 with them the peasants of the nearest villages, they thought 
 they might perhaps reckon on 20,000 men. ^ The procession 
 itself, they considered, would attract fresh crowds, — an oc- 
 casion for a tumult would easily be fomid, and then the 
 storm might burst on the unprepared Tuileries. Such a 
 coniJ could neither be prepared or carried out without the 
 knowledge of Pethion; but he hated the King bitterly, and 
 did all that he could, short of public sanction, to secure 
 the success of the undertaking. The men of the Faubourgs 
 had no inclination for a contest with the National Guard, 
 and would not have stirred if Pethion had carried out a re- 
 solution of the Council of the Commune, in accordance with 
 the express provision of the law, that no petition should 
 be received from men in arms. Instead of that, he di- 
 rected the Commander of the National Guard not to sup- 
 press the movement, Ijut to guide it. He communicated the 
 order of the Department, — which was contradictory to his 
 own,' — not to the Commander himself, but only to each of 
 the chiefs of Battalions, and thus lamed the efficiency of the 
 
 ' Louis Blanc (Vol. VI. ch. 12) in thing of the Itind without Danton's 
 
 order to throw the whole responsibi- consent? The eTcr-cautious Robes- 
 
 lity of the day's proceedings on the pierre warned them against making 
 
 Gironde, points out tliat no mention a partial insurrection. — ' Beaulieu, 
 
 is made either of Danton or Camille III. 359, — ' Evidence of ;Lareynie, 
 
 Desmoiilins. It is true that Danton in Buchez, XVII. 117. Santerre had 
 
 did not appear openly; but who will sent several affides into the villages, 
 
 believe that Santerre, Alexandre, The peasants of Montreuil threatened 
 
 and Sergent would undertake any- to make an incursion on the 21st. 
 
Ch. IV.] THE 20TH OF JUNE AT THE TUILEEIES. 477 
 
 National Guard, in proportion as he raised the courage of 
 the revohitionary masses. ^ When Santerre, on the morning 
 of the 20th, heard his men considering whether the National 
 Guard would fire on them, he cried, "Pethion is there — don't 
 be afraid— forwards— march!" At first he had only 1,500 ;2 
 but they were soon joined by the battalions of the Fau- 
 bourgs, so that the advancing mass amounted to about 
 8,000.3 Other National Guards then followed by Pethion's 
 orders; a crowd of curious people accompanied them, so 
 that at last 30 — 40,000 armed men, and a crowd in all of, 
 perhaps 100,000 persons, were set in motion.* One division 
 directed its course to the National Assembly, — into which 
 Verguiaud, in spite of all the protests of the Right, pro- 
 cured their admission — and read an address, in which they 
 demanded the blood of the conspirators, and the overthrow 
 of the King, if his wishes should prove different to those 
 of the people. After the procession had defiled through the 
 National Assembly, amid the roll of drums, patriotic speeches 
 and dancing, the whole mass hastened to the Tuileries, 
 where 20 battalions of the National Guard, were drawn up, 
 but left withovit any orders. A rush was made against the 
 great central gate, which was suddenly opened from within ; 
 and the whole swarm, with wild cries of delight, jioured 
 into the palace, as into a fortress carried by storm. 
 
 The King, who had just received from the officials of the 
 Municipality the most satisfactory assurances respecting the 
 sentiments of the people, was completely taken by surprise. 
 
 Nevertheless, he quickly recovered himself, ordered the door 
 of his room to be opened to the rioters, and being driven 
 into a bay-window, he was surrounded for two hours by 
 the rabble, who kept crying out, "Away with the veto, long 
 live the patriotic Ministers! — ratify the decrees!" The King 
 
 ' Vid, minutes of these proceedings in the Revue Retrospective, and also 
 in a more complete form in Mortimer-Ternaux, Vol. I, B. 2. Note 9. — 
 ^ Lareynie. — ^ Beaulieu. — * Peltier. Prudhomme. 
 
478 LAST EFFORTS OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 remained inflexible, a tall young man struck at him several 
 times with a pike — others tried to reach him with the points 
 of their swords ; and four soldiers of the National Guard who 
 were about him had great trouble in protecting him from 
 violence.^ The people then became a little quieter, and the 
 majority had evidently no instructions for the contingency 
 that the King should not be immediately intimidated: they 
 began to drink his health, and compelled him to put on a 
 cap of Freedom; they came to the conclusion that he was 
 not so bad after all, but they could not be induced to 
 leave the room. 
 
 Behind all these brutalities however, there was nothing 
 but insolence, and no real courage. When the nuiskets out- 
 side happened to rattle, the whole swarm rushed hastily to 
 the doors in flight; but the sound was really only the salute 
 with which the National Guard received some Deputies of the 
 National Assembly, and the mob again remained rooted to 
 the spot. Even the representations of the Demagogues, 
 Vergniaiid and Isnard, were fruitless; they too, were an- 
 swered by the cry — "The Ministers — the decrees — away with 
 the Veto!" In the garden below, the cry was several times 
 raised that the people in the room above had made an end 
 of the King. Louis was not to be shaken — he shewed neither 
 fear nor anger, and thereby did the best thing, perhaps, to 
 prolong his own life and that of his family. At last, after 
 a lapse of an hour and a half Pethion arrived. Unfortu- 
 nately, he said, he had not received the intelligence till very 
 late, and had then immediately risen from his dinnei-, but 
 had been delayed at every step. He then made a speech, 
 lauding the wisdom of the people — promising the fulfilment 
 
 ' These details are all confirmed harralessness of this affair, if the 
 
 by the regularly reported evidence King refused to leave the hall, it 
 
 of the National Guards who were was because he did not trust the 
 
 present, as well as the report of the Municipal officer who invited him 
 
 Departmental Commission. Whatever to do so. 
 Louis Blanc may say about the 
 
Cu. IV.] FAILURE OF THE EMEUTE. 479 
 
 of all their wishes, and at last coaxed them out of the 
 apartments; a httle after To'clock, the Palace was cleared. 
 
 The whole course of the proceedings plainly shews what 
 different influences Avere at work amongst the people. The 
 chiefs of the Gironde in the National Assembly were not 
 concerned in getting up this riot. When it broke out, they 
 only rendered it secret, and therefore feeble, assistance, and 
 contented themselves with demanding the recall of Roland. 
 On this condition Pethion smoothed the way for the insur- 
 rection, which he might have prevented by a single order 
 to the National Guard. The Girondists therefore, did not 
 actually plan the death of the King, but it was they alone 
 who opened the gates of the Palace to the murderers; for 
 that there were such in the crowd, cannot be doubted. It 
 was a similar case to that of the Gth of October; when, at 
 Versailles, the bandits, — schooled by Marat and his asso- 
 ciates — marched in the train of the revolutionary demon- 
 stration, and broke with bloodthirsty impetuosity through the 
 crafty plans of the original movers. As on this occasion the 
 murder of Louis had failed, thro' the cowardice of the 
 murderers — the firmness of a few guards — and the calmness 
 of the King, the day had passed without any practical re- 
 sult, and the whole proceedings apj)eared merely in the light 
 of a vulgar and disgusting farce. 
 
 After the 20tli of June, all parties remained in arms — 
 they had gone too far to beHeve in any peaceful measures 
 on the part of their opponents; they had been so near 
 bloodshed, that it was no longer possible that the shedding 
 of blood could be avoided ; and, until the final catastrophe, 
 France showed no other signs of life than preparations for 
 the decisive blow. 
 
 A new Muiistry had just been appointed, and was com- 
 posed of Feuillants, or proteges of Lafayette— at that time 
 synonymous terms. There was a man among them. Terrier 
 de Monciel, Minister of the Interior, who thoroughly under- 
 stood the state of affairs in its origin and results, and 
 
480 LAST EFFORTS OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 was not to be turned from his purpose in this great struggle 
 by any romantic theories. He had previously been Presi- 
 dent of the Department of the Jura, where he had risen into 
 notice as a liberal, and had been made conservative by the 
 scandalous conduct of the Democrats. He had no idea of 
 confining himself, like the Lameths, to intrigues, or, like 
 Lafayette, to protests. It was clear to him, that the Jaco- 
 bins were dangerous, not because they violated the consti- 
 tution, but because the very nature of the constitution 
 itself created Jacobins. He saw that the contest had al- 
 ready passed out of the region of the laws, and had become 
 ■A passage of arms for life and death. His intellect was cool 
 enough, and his heart warm enough, to carry him into the 
 midst of danger, and to enable him when there, to make use 
 of the best means for victory. For the first time since Mi- 
 rabeau's death, the Jacobins — lately the attacking party — 
 saw themselves threatened by a straightforward and deter- 
 mined adversary. 
 
 The riot of the 20th gave strength to its opponents, just 
 because it had been nothing more than a riot. Public 
 opinion was roused among the middle classes at Paris and in 
 the Provinces, and also in the armies. Two attempts made 
 by the Cordeliers on the 21st and 25th to renew the attack 
 on the Tuileries, were frustrated; the former by the inter- 
 ference of the National-Guard, and the latter by a prudent 
 warning from Pethion. ^ Their only result was to increase 
 the wrath of the Bourgeoisie at these dangerous disturb- 
 ances ; and whereas, a month earlier, only eight thousand had 
 signed the petition against Servan's decree, there were now 
 twenty thousand names ^ attached to a very energetic peti- 
 
 ' iJey. de Paris, 13, 672. On se declared at the time that most of 
 
 desista de la nouvelle demarche pro- the.se names were surreptitiously ob- 
 
 jetee. If was not till afterwards that tained. We shall see how eniphati- 
 
 the tale was invented that the dis- cally they withdrew this assertion 
 
 turbances had been fomented by dis- three months afterwards, 
 guised Eovalists. — ^ The Jacobins 
 
Ch. IV.] LAFAYETTE DETERMINES TO CRUSH THE JACOBINS. 481 
 
 tion for the punisliment of tlie rioters. The National Guard 
 only wanted an influential and energetic leader to free it- 
 self from the republican Municipality, and to disperse the 
 Jacobin Club by force of arms. The majority of the Na- 
 tional Assembly would then have followed the ruling power 
 in Paris, towards the Eight, just as willingly as hitherto 
 towards the Left; and a turn of affairs might have taken 
 place of incalculable Importance. No one can assert that 
 success would have been certain, and the revolution at once 
 ended by such a course, but the possibility of such a result 
 was offered. The chances of success would have been greatly 
 increased if a wise reform of the Constitution, according to 
 Mirabeau's principles, had been effected; and at the same 
 time there had been increased activity in military prepara- 
 tions to meet foreign invasion, and straightforward pro- 
 posals of peace had been made to Austria. AJl these ob- 
 jects were attainable, and they were often discussed in the 
 FeuiUants' Club. By such a course, no means of agitation 
 would have been left to the Jacobins which might not have 
 been met with superior force. It was the last oi3portunity 
 of saving France from the horrors of 1793, and Europe from 
 an universal war of twenty years. But alas! the only pos- 
 sible leader in the existing state of affairs was General La- 
 fayette, who had, indeed, the wish to suppress the Jacobins, 
 and to conclude an honourable peace with Austria; but his 
 party was soon to acquire a very sad experience of the 
 extent of his energy in facing danger. 
 
 He received intelligence of the jjroceedings of the 20th of 
 June, two days after the events, in his camp of Teinieres, 
 in the position which he had taken up between Maubeuge 
 and Bavay, in order to support Luckner. Such an answer 
 to his late threatening letter was more than he could bear. 
 He determined to go to Paris and annihilate the Club. With 
 this view he sent his adjutant. Bureau de Puzy, to Luckner 
 with a double commission. In the first place, he informed 
 him of the contents of a letter which he had previously re- 
 
 I. 2h 
 
482 LAST EFFORTS OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book HI. 
 
 ceived from Diimoiiriez, to the effect that the Prussians were 
 advancing, and that consequently he must return to his old 
 position; a change which made it necessary for Lnckner, too, 
 to evacuate his advanced lines, retire behind Valenciennes, 
 and content himself with covering the French frontiers.* 
 Luckner replied that he had already represented to the Min- 
 ister the difficulties of his position; that he had no idea of 
 acting any longer on the offensive, and was only awaiting 
 orders from Paris. In the second place. Bureau was di- 
 rected to inform the Marshal of Lafayette's intention to go 
 to Paris, and in the meantime to try and find out the blunt 
 old warrior's opinion of this enterprise. At first Luckner 
 cried out, "Is he mad! Let him take' care that the Jacobins 
 do not cut off his head." He then contented himself with 
 saying that he understood nothing about politics; — that La- 
 fayette might act in the matter as he thought useful and 
 just. 
 
 Meanwhile Lafayette had withdrawn his army to a position 
 protected by the guns of Maubeuge, and fixed the 26th for 
 the day of his departure for Paris. He can hardly have had 
 any settled plan of operations. He intended to make a speech 
 in the National Assembly, and to rouse the National Guard 
 to enthusiasm. That he had considered beforehand what 
 further stejDS were to be taken is rendered doubtful by the 
 fact, that he had not prepared any one for his arrival in 
 Paris. On the contrary, he wrote as late as the 25th to 
 Lajard, the Minister at War, a man entirely devoted to him, 
 that he did not see how he was to carry on a foreign war, 
 as long as anarchy at home increased tenfold the military 
 weakness of France. This weakness, he said, concerned 
 
 1 Luckner to the Minister at War, better than defence of the borders. 
 
 June 22. On the 20th he had asked These documentary dates are rather 
 
 for reinforcements to continue his fatal to the credit of Bureau's report 
 
 operations; on the 2Gth, after a con- to the National Assembly, and to 
 
 ference with Bureau, he declared to Lafayette's statements, VL 82. 
 the Minister that he knew nothinsc 
 
Ch. IV.] LAFAYETTE'S ARRIVAL IN PARIS. 483 
 
 him most of all, because he was in greater danger from 
 without than Luckiier, who had only the Austriaus on his 
 hands; while he himself had the Prussians, and, what was 
 worse, the Prussian Generals, "^ to deal with. He concluded 
 by saying that he should not be able to make head against 
 them, unless some fortunate crisis previously occurred in 
 Paris; but besides the expression of these desires and fears 
 his letter contained nothing. Lajard, therefore, like all the 
 rest of the world, was greatly astonished, when on the 28th 
 the General arrived in Paris; and not the slightest pre- 
 paration had been made for his reception. 
 
 In the National Assembly, the Left, on hearing of his ar- 
 rival, concluded that he was accompanied by a few regi- 
 ments at least, in order to disperse their party and break 
 up the Jacobin Club. It is certain that in the mood in which 
 the National Guard then was, the Republicans would have 
 had no means of resistance. But when the General appeared 
 at their bar alone, peaceable, and armed only with the wea- 
 pons of speech, their courage was immediately restored. 
 The Galleries murmured, Guadet spoke of a new Cromwell, 
 and the debate ended by referring the question to a Committee : 
 Lafayette then went to the King, to whom he declared that 
 the Jacobins must be morally and physically annihilated ;2 
 and at the same time professed that he 'was still in favour 
 of the American constitution with an hereditary Executive. ^ 
 The King was courteous bvit reserved; and when, after La- 
 fayette had left the room, the Princess EHsabeth exclaimed, 
 that they ought to forget the past, and ally themselves with 
 the only man who could yet save them, the Queen replied: 
 "Better to die, than allow ourselves to be saved by Lafayette 
 and the Constitutionalists." The General summoned a num- 
 ber of intimate friends to a council at his house. The par- 
 
 1 This sentence is wanting in the copy of the letter in Lafayette's Me- 
 moires. — ^ Lally TollendaJ to the King of Prussia. — ^ Morris's Journal, 
 July 29th. 
 
 2h2 
 
484 LAST EFFORTS OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 ticiilars of these tardy deliberations are variously stated in 
 each report of the proceedings; but one essential fact may 
 be found in every one of them, that irresolution and hesitation 
 prevailed among those who were present at the meeting. 
 "When Lafayette brought forward the question of breaking 
 up the Club by force of arms, his friends who belonged to 
 the Directions of the Dej>artment declared that such a step 
 would be illegal, and must therefore be especially avoided 
 by them, as the specifically legal party. ^ Then came a De- 
 putation from some battalions of the Parisian National Guard, 
 who had planted a tree before his door, and set him a guard 
 of honour. They now called on him to lead them, without 
 further hesitation, against the Jacobins, and destroy at one 
 blow the nest of all the mischief. ^The General replied that 
 he would not set an example of a breach of the law, nor 
 would it Be _necessary to do so, since he was sure of the 
 support of two-thirds of the National Assembly, and con- 
 sequently of the legal dissolution of the Club.^ It probably 
 occurred to him afterwards that the majority of the National 
 Assembly would never give a free vote on any subject until 
 the Club and Rostra had lost their power. They agreed 
 therefore to meet in the evening in the Champs Elysees' with 
 all who were of the same mind as themselves. But the first 
 repulse of the National Guards must have had a taming 
 effect; the staunch royalists in the battalions had meanwhile 
 asked for instructions at the Palace, and had been told to 
 take no part in any movement whatever;* so that not a 
 hundred men came to the rendez-vous in the eveuiriff. On 
 the following morning the attempt was renewed with still 
 less success. The Jacobins had from the very beginning 
 been prepared for the worst, but they now began to breathe 
 again, and accompanied the departure of the despairing 
 General with derisive shouts of joy.^ 
 
 ' Lally-Tolleiidal. — ' Beaulieu, Essais. — ^ Toulongeon, Hist, de la 
 Resolution. — < Campari's Me'moires. — « I have not mentioned the anecdote 
 that Lafayette intended to make his coup d'etat on the occasion of a review 
 
Cm. IV.] MONCIEL'S ENERGETIC MEASURES. 485 
 
 All parties now saw that the matter could not be brought 
 to a decision by the forces of the capital. The Conserva- 
 tives could do nothing without the army, nor the revolutionary 
 party without the Fedvres. Everything depended on which 
 of the two parties should be the first to collect its forces, and 
 to deprive its opponents of all means of resistance at the 
 decisive moment. 
 
 The Provinces, which had been canvassed with equal zeal 
 by both parties, began to ferment anew, as they had done 
 in February and March. The mob indulged in corn-riots 
 and persecution of Priests; while all those who possessed 
 property became more impatient every day of the long con- 
 tinuance of anarchy. It was now that the Minister Monciel 
 began to make his energy and influence felt in every quarter. 
 His principal aim was to carry out a plan similar to that 
 which Mirabeau had formed; the main features of which 
 were the removal of the King from Paris, the dissolution 
 of the National Assembly by a great demonstration of the 
 Departments, and a change in the Constitution in connexion 
 with new States-General. Most of the Councils of the De- 
 partments were disposed to consent to these measures. The 
 Jacobins themselves counted from 25 to 32 who were pre- 
 pared to second any step which the Court might take. A 
 number of them had already regular representatives in Paris, 
 with whom the Minister discussed current events of the day. 
 It was important, however, until the moment for decisive 
 action had arrived, to secure the quiet of the capital, and 
 it was with this view that Monciel struck a blow at the 
 
 of the National Guard, but that the Lafayette and his friend; neither 
 
 Queen informed Pethion, who there- Beaulieu nor Lally, neither Campan 
 
 upon countermanded the review, nor Bertrar.d, linow anything about 
 
 From the sentiments of the Queen it; it was, too, an old trick of the 
 
 towards Lafayette this was not in Jacobins to get such stories of court 
 
 itself impossible, but we doubt the intrigues conveyed to the ears of 
 
 truth of the story. The only found- Lafayette, to excite him against the 
 
 ation for it is the statement of Queen. 
 
486 LAST EFFORTS OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 very heart of the Girondist tactics, by ordering, on June 30th, 
 all the Departments to stop the march of the Federes to 
 Paris; since, as he said, all good citizens could celebrate the 
 festival of fraternity at home; and Paris would be imperilled 
 by an accumulation of bandits. 
 
 On the very same day the Gironde laid their plan of 
 operations, without any concealment, before the National 
 Assembly. Immediately after the fall of Roland, this party 
 had procured the nomination of a Committee of 21 members, 
 to deliberate on the state of the country, and the means to 
 be taken to meet the impending dangers. This Committee 
 brought up its first report on the 30th inst. It was a very 
 comprehensive programme, which announced a whole series 
 of new laws, and through these — but without any formal 
 change in the constitution — ^an absolute dictatorship of the 
 National Assembly. This report, accompanied by a solemn 
 declaration that the country was in danger, and a recom- 
 mendation — that all constituted authorities should be declared 
 en permanence, and the National Guards placed under arms, 
 — that the recruiting for the army should be carried on with 
 increased energy — that Commissioners from the Assembly 
 should be sent off to every camp — that the responsibility of 
 the Ministers be made more stringent — and a new law enacted 
 against refractory Priests. The Right listened in apathetic 
 silence, for their courage had fallen greatly since Lafayette's 
 failure. The Centre — in other words the great mass of members 
 of uo settled opinions — fell once more completely under the 
 influence of the galleries, whose uproarious turbulence was 
 constantly on the increase. * The Left eagerly demanded an 
 immediate and thorough discussion of the resolutions of the 
 
 ' From the numerous testimonies on les huail meme avant d'ouvrir la 
 
 to this fact we only select one of a bouche, its etaient juges au premier 
 
 journalist of the extreme Left. It pas qu'ils fuisaient en entrant, et cela 
 
 ■was a disadvantage he says for the chaque jour, les tribunes etaient in- 
 
 Eoyalists that they had fixed seats m exorables. 
 the Right; ils etaient trap en evidence,] 
 
Ch. IV.] DEBATE ON THE DANGER OF THE COUNTRY. 487 
 
 Committee; at the conclusion of which, the final proposition 
 for the suspension of the King was to be brought forward 
 —a measure which had already been proposed in the Com- 
 mittee by Gensonne and had met with the loudly expressed 
 approval of the majority. It was thought that the King 
 woidd then have no longer any means of resisting the decree 
 of suspension, and that the whole power of the govern- 
 ment would pass into the hands of the Assembly without 
 a struggle. Still they were prepared also for more violent 
 occurrences; and with all their dislike to an armed insur- 
 rection, everything was done to facilitate its success. Thus 
 on the 1st of July, a decree was passed, which though it 
 did not directly anuid Terrier's order against the Federes^ 
 rendered it altogether futile, by promising to aU the Civic 
 guards, who should come to Paris to the festival of the 1 4th, 
 free quarters in the capital until the 18th, after which they 
 were ordered to march to a camp near Soissons. On the 
 evening of the '2nd, the National Assembly, in accordance 
 with the wishes of the Faubourg, ordered that the Staff of 
 the National Guard should be dissolved; and on the 3d, it 
 was carried, on the motion of Carnot, that the former French 
 Guards should be recalled to Paris, under the pretext of 
 forming them into a division of Gensd'armes. This was just 
 such a police force as Panis and Sergent needed. With such 
 defenders of the throne, the march of the 'Pecleres to Paris 
 was hardly necessary ; the moment appeared to be approaching, 
 when the overthrow of the monarchy might take place like 
 a harmless scenic spectacle. 
 
 Thus freed from all immediate obstacles, and encouraged 
 by fair prospects in all directions, the Assembly, on the 
 3rd of July, opened the great debate on the danger of the 
 country. Vergniaud led the way in a long and enthusiastic 
 speech, the effect of which was enhanced by a specious 
 moderation in form, but which, in reality, went straight to 
 .the conclusion, that the King, by his secret understanding 
 witht he Austrians, Prussians and the Emigres, had incurred 
 
488 LAST EFFORTS OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 the penalty of deposition, expressly denounced by the Con- 
 stitution for such cases. He ended by proposing that the 
 country should be declared "in danger" — the responsibility 
 of Ministers rendered more stringent — and the King brought 
 back to the right path, by an energetic but conciliatory 
 manifesto. The effect of this speech, which received con- 
 siderable applause even from the opponents of the speaker, 
 was prodigious, and the assent of the majority entirely won. 
 It was in vain that Dumas, in a far less striking but very 
 concise extemporaneous speech, endeavoured to bring back 
 the feeling of the Assembly to some accordance with the 
 real facts of the case. He reminded them that the King had 
 always been averse to the declaration of war, and that the 
 Gironde alone had forced it from him ; that he had always 
 done all in his power to prevent the Emigres from forming 
 any connection with the Powers, and that it was the As- 
 sembly alone which had cavised the fusion of these two par- 
 ties; that the King had destined the main strength of the 
 army for the defence of the Eastern frontier, which the Gi- 
 rondist Ministry alone had left unprotected by an ill-advised 
 attack on Belgium. No one could deny these statements, 
 or conceal the fact that the present complicated state of af- 
 fairs owed its origin, not to the King, but solely to the 
 Gironde. But it was no less true, that under present cir- 
 cumstances the King must regard a victory of the Prussians 
 as a gain to himself, and must therefore appear to the eyes 
 of most men an enemy of the national honour and indepen- 
 dence. Brissot might well look back with pride on the re- 
 volutionary sagacity with which, at the beginning of the 
 year, he had concentrated all his strength in the one master 
 stroke— the kindling of the war. It now became more ap- 
 parent than ever, how greatly the position of the King had 
 been compromised by it. Two-thirds of the Assembly were 
 in favour of monarchy, and yet, on the very first day, it 
 was evident that the issue of the debate would be favourable 
 to the revolutionary party. As early as the 4th of July, a 
 
Ch.IV.] the feudal press, indecision of the court. 489 
 
 decree was passed which ordauaed the permanence of all the 
 constituted authorities, and the levying of all the National 
 guards, in case the country should he declared to be in 
 danger. No one doubted that the declaration itself was 
 close at hand. Bishop Torne declared without reserve that 
 the treachery of the King was manifest, and the Dictator- 
 ship of the National Assembly the only means of saving the 
 country. It was not the political parties alone, but the great 
 mass of the population, which the fiery phantom of treason 
 to the country alienated from the throne, and delivered, even 
 against their own will, into the bondage of the revolutionary 
 faction. The feudal press, with reckless audacit}', did every- 
 thing in its power to extend and deepen the terror and ex- 
 asperation of the people, by boasting of the good under- 
 standing, which, according to them, existed between the 
 officers and regiments of the French army and the enemy. 
 They announced the approaching defection of the troops, 
 and threatened the Parisians with every sort of outrage at 
 the hands of the Croatians. These circumstances may in a 
 great degree account for — though they can by no means 
 justify — the subsequent horrors of revolutionary frenzy and 
 cruelty. 
 
 While the Gironde was thus advancing boldly, methodi- 
 cally, and step by step, towards their object, the Court was 
 full of terror and uncertainty. Hitherto, the influence of 
 Monciel, supported by the American Minister Morris, and 
 the essentially similar propositions of the ex-Ministers Ber- 
 trand and Montmorin, had been in the ascendant. But even 
 among these men there existed no complete harmony; and 
 still less did the King and Queen make up their minds to 
 follow some one course with steadiness and confidence. They 
 received innumerable reports, and the most irreconcileable 
 counsels, to each of which they lent an car in turn, and 
 destroyed one plan by another. This was indeed hardly to 
 be wondered at, for their own personal position became 
 every day more dreadfiil. If the Queen appeared at the 
 
490 LAST EFFORTS OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 ■window, she was frightened away from it by the malicious 
 and obscene abuse of the mob. The rehgious services of the 
 Royal Chapel were interrupted by the noise of the patriots; 
 for weeks the Royal family lived in dread of poison, 
 and could only venture to eat the food which had been 
 specially prepared for them. One night the Chamberlain of 
 the Queen apjDrehended a murderer, who was lying in wait 
 for her in her antechamber. The Queen several times ex- 
 claimed that she would rather be shut up for months in a 
 tower on the seashore, than endure such a condition any 
 longer. ' She listened to all the schemes for her liberation. 
 She allowed the Ministers to negotiate with Ijafayette, and 
 other confidants,. and with the emigrated Princes, and was wil- 
 ling that the Civil list shou.ld be employed in endeavours to 
 bribe Pethion, Danton and other patriots; but at the bot- 
 tom of her heart, she had no serious hopes in anything but 
 the arrival of the German armies. In the middle of May, 
 the Swiss, Mallet du Pan, had been sent off to both the 
 Kings to keep them firm to Leopold's views, and to bar the 
 influence of the Emigres.^ Ho was at this moment in Frank- 
 fort, at the coronation of the Emperor Francis II., and his 
 reports Avere looked for with the most anxious suspense. 
 The Tnileries had no means of aiding the Coalition, as the 
 conduct of the war was entirely in the hands of the Minis- 
 ters and the Generals; who, though at enmity with the Ja- 
 cobins, and bent on the restoration of the monarchy, were 
 not willing to concede any direct influence to foreign Powers. 
 On this point, Monciel and Lafayette were agreed; and in 
 the latter part of June they determined to withdraw Luck- 
 ner's troops from Belgium, and to oppose the entrance of 
 
 ' Memoires de Mud. Campan. In- family brought to the Temple after 
 
 stead of this, Lafayette makes her the 10th of August. — ' Vid. the 
 
 say; „It would be happy for us if now complete minutes of this negotia- 
 
 we were shut up iu a tower," and tion in the Memoires, &c. de Mallet 
 
 then hints that, in accordance with du Pan. 
 this wish, Danton had the Royal 
 
Ch. IV.] PLANS FOR A COUNTER-REVOLUTION. 491 
 
 the Prussians with their combined forces. On the 4th July, 
 moreover, orders were sent off to Montesquiou to despatch 
 20 battahons of the army of the South— nearly half his in- 
 fantry—to strengthen the army of the Rhine. At the same 
 time it was settled that Lafayette and Luckner should change 
 commands, and the former undertake the Flemish army, 
 while the latter took the command on the frontiers of Luxem- 
 bourg and the Rhine. One motive for this was Lafayette's 
 disinclination to measure his strength with the Prussians;^ 
 but a still stronger one was the plan of changing, not only 
 Generals but troops, and of bringing, in the course of their 
 movements, some loyal regiments into the neighbourhood 
 of Paris, and carrying off the King to Compiegne, or some 
 other place, under their protection. The Counter-revo- 
 lution would then commence; and at the same time an 
 honoiu-able peace might be concluded with the Germans 
 through the mediation of the liberated King.^ 
 
 These plans were still in embryo, when the National As- 
 sembly dealt the already mentioned blows. Their effect in 
 the Tuileries was overpowering. An immediate outbreak was 
 apprehended, and the King was without any settled plan — ■ 
 without money or troops under his own control. * He now, 
 therefore, suddenly began to listen to those who recommended 
 an exactly opposite line, — the worst perhaps which could be 
 imagined — and, at the last moment, to seek his safety in 
 gaining over the weak and aimless mass of the National 
 Assembly. The King was now to assume a conciliatory and 
 liberal tone, — to adopt as far as possible the revolutionary 
 measures as his own, — and thus, by means of the Centre, to 
 
 ' Conf. his letter to Lajard (r[uoted removed from place to place. — 
 above) of June 25. It is true that ^ Despatches of Luckner and La- 
 Lafayette in his Memoires represents fayette to Lajard, July 6th, and 
 the matter as if Luckner had oc- Lajard's answer of July 9th. Lally- 
 casioned the change; but the latter, ToUendal to Louis XVL, supplement 
 in a despatch of the 12th of July, to his letter to the King of Prussia, 
 expresses bis astonishment at the — ' Morriji's Journal, July 2d. — 
 manner in which he was constantly 
 
492 LAST EFFORTS OF THS KEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 win back a majority to his side, i Every suggestion of pru- 
 dence and dignity were against such a course ; but the dread 
 of impending dangers, and indifference to the plans proposed 
 by the Ministers, decided the Court in its favour. The 
 King, therefore, now gave his consent to the last decree re- 
 specting the Seigniorial privileges ; aud wrote to the National 
 Assembly on the 4th July, signifying his wish to be present 
 in person at the festival of the Confederation, and to take 
 the oath of fraternity. It was impossible to announce his 
 altered policy in a more striking manner. 
 
 The Left were surprised, but remained suspicious, and did 
 not allow themselves to be diverted from their course. The 
 Gironde and the Jacobins vied with one another in deman- 
 ing the declaration that the coimtry was in danger. Danjou 
 had already argued in the Club, that a legislative body was 
 no longer sufficient; and that for the remodelling of the 
 Constitution a National Convention was absolutely neces- 
 sary. Chepy added that all noblemen should be removed 
 from commands in the army; all emigrant property sold; 
 and new occupants ajopointed to all administrative and ju- 
 dicial offices. With no less vehemence. Bishop Torne, from 
 the midst of the Girondists, demanded -of the National As- 
 sembly that they should no longer look to the laws as their 
 rule of conduct, but the salvation of the country alone. He 
 had already endeavoured to prove among his friends, that 
 it was all over with the Constitution, and that deliverance 
 was only to be sought for in the South of the Empire. The 
 motions brought forward continually increased in extra- 
 vagance. On the 16th, Condorcet proposed that the Ministry 
 of Finance should be suppressed, and the Civil list placed 
 under surveillance ; and gave, at the same time, a sample of 
 the social and moral condition which the Gironde were pre- 
 paring for France, under the name of civil liberty. Abolition 
 of wills— increase of small proprietors — parity of natural and 
 
 .' Lally-ToUendal to Louis XVI. July 19th, Postcript. 
 
Ch. IV.] LAMOURETTE PREACHES UNIV. RECONCILIATION. 493 
 
 legitimate children — freedom of divorce — siicli were tlie re- 
 forms demanded by Condorcet as the surest bulwarks against 
 royal despotism. 
 
 Louis XYI. might have been satisfied with this first ex- 
 perience. But the negotiations with the Centre had already 
 begun, and had excited lively satisfaction in that part of the 
 Assembly which feared alike the victory of the Right and 
 the Left, and dreaded still more the dangers of the contest 
 which must precede that victory. It was a favourite saying 
 among them, that compliance was the greatest of patriotic 
 virtues; that it was by party dissensions alone that the 
 country was endangered, and that the sensible man would 
 be ready to meet his opponent half-way. They had hitherto 
 acted in accordance with these maxims in respect to the 
 Gironde and the Strangers Gallery; and were, of course, en- 
 chanted that the King was willing to assume the same atti- 
 tude towards themselves. On the 7th July there was a per- 
 fect storm of enthusiasm, when Bishop Lamourette gave 
 words to these sentiments — preached universal reconciliation, 
 — called on the Assembly to join him in imprecations on the 
 Republic, and the Chamber of Peers — and on coming down 
 from the rostra, threw himself into the arms of a former op- 
 ponent. The men who had no party were uproarious in their 
 jubilations at the restoration of peace and harmony ; and the 
 two factions of the Right and Left had to make haste to 
 preserve the respect of their fellow citizens by an equally 
 virtuous behaviour. They vied in embracing and kissing 
 each other as brothers, and sons of a common country. 
 The whole Assembly was dissolved in emotion and en- 
 thusiasm, and, forthwith sending word to the King, brought 
 him into the House, in order to turn the freshness of these 
 warm feelings to account for the good cause. He, too, wit- 
 nessed another outburst of patriotism and loyalty, and re- 
 turned to the palace full of good hopes for the future. 
 
 But what availed it, thus for a moment to stir the turbid 
 froth of the National Assembly. It would have needed a 
 
494 LAST EFFORTS OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book III. 
 
 streugth and a courage greater than tliat of all the parties 
 put together, to curb their fierce contention; and how long 
 could a peace endure which had only been brought about 
 by the weakness of the most timid ! Affairs immediately re- 
 sumed their former course. In the very hour in which La- 
 mourette was celebrating his triumph, the Department brought 
 its investigation of the events of the 20th June to a close, 
 and pronounced, as its result, a sentence of suspension from 
 office against Pethion and Manuel. In such cases, accord- 
 ing to the Constitution, the King in the first instance, and 
 then the Assembly, had to decide on the legal validity of 
 the judgment; and the Municipality immediately hastened to 
 evoke the protection of the latter for its virtuous Mayor. 
 The King, endeavoured even now, to carry out the so re- 
 cently inaugurated policy of peace, and begged, as one per- 
 sonally concerned, to be excused from giving a vote in the 
 matter. But the Gironde had no intention of letting such 
 an opportunity of exciting fresh bitterness of feeling pass 
 away, and adhered to the directions of the constitution. On 
 the following day, all the organs of the Left declared that 
 the late reconciliation was either an insidious intrigue, or a 
 disgusting farce. "Between Virtue and Vice," said Prudhomme, 
 "no peace is conceivable." "What we want," said Carra, "is 
 not kisses, but the suspension of the King, and the tocsin 
 ringing through the whole Empire." In the Jacobin Club 
 thousands shouted assent, when Billaud-Varennes cried out 
 that all such sentimental scenes only foreboded mischief; and 
 that "against crowned robbers, and devourers of the people, 
 one must lead, not a whining priest, but Hercules and his 
 club!" In the National Assembly itself, Brissot, on the 3rd, 
 began a great speech on the danger of the country, with 
 the declaration that a single individual was crippling the 
 strength of France; and that Prussia and Austria would 
 be vanquished— as soon as the Tuileries were captured. He 
 concluded by moving the appointment of a Committee of the 
 Assembly for the supreme direction of the police and the 
 
Ch. IV.] LAFAtFTTE WISHES TO REMOVE LOUIS TO COMPIEGNE. 495 
 
 policy of the country — a "Committee," as it was called a 
 year afterwards, "of public safety." 
 
 lu short the policy of concession proved, in the course of 
 twenty-four hours, to be an utter failure. Monciel had never 
 had the slightest doubt on this head; he energetically op- 
 posed the proceedings of Louis in the National Assembly, 
 and finally sent in his resignation.' — After such a complete 
 fiasco, the King was helpless and aimless; the influence of 
 Monciel once more gained ground, and once more it seemed 
 as if Louis woidd give himself up unconditionally to his 
 guidance. A message came from Lafayette, announcing that 
 he and Luckuer would be in Paris on the 14th, and, after 
 the festival, would publicly conduct the King to Compicgne, 
 where, under the protection of loyal regiments, he might 
 commence a new era of freedom. Lafayette was firmly 
 convinced that the mere removal of the King would have 
 such an effect in Paris, that all the good elements in the 
 National Guard wou.ld unite, and the majority in the Na- 
 tional Assembly come to their senses ; and that after a few 
 weeks, the King would return to the Capital as a peaceful 
 Iriumpliator. Lafayette was, however 'in his inmost heart, 
 averse to any change in the constitution. ^ Such a plan 
 would have nullified itself; and therefore Lally-Tollendal 
 undertook to modify it on his own respousibihty, in order 
 to make it agreeable to the King. He represented to Louis 
 that the intentions of Lafayette were these— to restore to 
 the monarchy its necessary privileges — to form a new 
 Chamber from the landed aristocracy — and to reinstate 
 the nobility in their honorary privileges. The Ministry 
 supported these proposals with all their influence; and on 
 the 9th of July, Louis gave his assent. But this resolution 
 was of no long duration. Montmorin thought even the de- 
 parture of the King from Paris too hazardous a step; and 
 
 1 Morris's Journal, July 8th. — ^ Lafayette's Afdmoires, IV. Supplement 
 to Lally's letter to the King of Prussia. 
 
496 LAST EFFORTS OF THE FEUILLANTS. [Book HI. 
 
 Bertrand feared that Lafayette's attacliment to constitutional 
 form would prevent him from acting with vigour and de- 
 cision. The Queen felt the force of both these objections. 
 "All the addresses," she said, "which have been sent up against 
 the proceedings of the 20th, only manifest the attachment 
 of those who signed them to peace and order, but not 
 royalist feeling enough to induce them to tire a single gun 
 in our defence against the Parisians and the Marseillois. 
 Lafayette has lost all power to heljj us, ever since, by his 
 visit to the National Assembly, he cured its members of all 
 fear. And he moreover reverences the source of all evil — 
 the Constitution — as the only thing which deserves to be de- 
 fended." ' In a word, she saw neither help nor deliverance 
 from within, but danger in every quarter, — in the provinces 
 as well as in Paris, — luitil the arrival of the Germans; nay, 
 she thought that their position would be rendered worse, if, 
 by their flight from the capital, they shovdd evacuate the 
 field of decisive action. She was convinced that, for some 
 time to come, nothing but the restoration of vuilimited royal 
 power could save France from incalculable evil. At the 
 same time she was farther than ever removed from all 
 thought of the ancien regime^ with its nobility, its landed 
 proprietors, and its Church; and could therefore, reckon 
 still less on the Emigres than on the Constitutionalists. 
 She had nothing else to propose, than that they should wait 
 in the hope of living to witness the entrance of the Prus- 
 sians into Paris. 
 
 The King did not long resist her influence; and on July 
 10th he signified to his Ministers his intention to remain in 
 Pa]-is. The announcement fell on them like a tluuiderbolt, 
 and they immediately declared that they could no longer 
 maintain their position. The news of this Ministerial crisis 
 caused great and general surprise in the Assembly, where 
 no one was able to account for it, and a long silence pre- 
 
 Beaulieu. 
 
Cu. IV.] ■ ROLAND EXPECTS TO BE RECALLED. 497 
 
 vailed, only broken by the clapping of hands in the galleries. 
 Lamourette then made another attempt in the style of the 
 7th July, by proposing to defer the declaration that the 
 country was in danger, as well as the enquiry into the dis- 
 orders of the 20th of June. He had the mortification of 
 seeing that scarcely any one took any notice of him, but 
 that, on the contrary, the Committee of Twelve was directed 
 to present their final report on the following day. Subse- 
 quent reflection weighed on their minds as to the real signi- 
 ficance of the Ministerial crisis. Roland's interpretation was 
 the most flattering to his party. He was conyinced that 
 Louis XVI., weary of the contest with the Gironde, wished 
 to recall himself and his friends into the Cabinet. This was 
 no reason, however, for stopping the parliamentary measures 
 by which they meant to subdue the King; but they heartily 
 rejoiced that they should no longer need a rising in the streets 
 in leao-ue with the Cordeliers. Roland, therefore, immediately 
 sent for Barbaroux, and directed him to stay the march of 
 the Marseillois, because there was a prospect of a second 
 Girondist Ministry. 
 
 A greater mistake could hardly have been made. The 
 King had dismissed the Feuillants because he looked for de- 
 liverance from foreigners alone. The Cordehers, on the other 
 hand, rejected every kind of regular government, and would 
 have dealt their blows with twofold malice against a 
 Ministry of the Gironde. 
 
 2i 
 
498 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. • [Book III. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. 
 
 Robespierre, billauTjCollotd'herbois. — Embarrassment of the gikonde. — 
 The gironde adyocates a eegenoy under lodis xvii. — State op the 
 FINANCES. — Ruin of the peasant pkoprietoes. — Revolutionary plans 
 of the jacobins. — The national assembly rejects them. — Revolt of 
 AUG. 10th. — Revolutionary municipality. — Suspension of the king. — 
 Convocation of the national convention. 
 
 The very day after the breaking up of the Ministry, the 
 country was declared to be in danger. The National As- 
 sembly made this declaration on the 11th of July, and 
 thereby made the whole National Guard available for general 
 military service, and invoked the vigilance of all the con- 
 stituted Authorities, and the self-sacrificing devotion of the 
 people. Under the j)rescribed and solemn forms, the signal 
 for rising was gradually transmitted through every part of 
 the kingdom, and had a powerful effect. It did not, in- 
 deed, bring any great increase of military strength to the 
 Generals, as I shall explain hereafter in connection with 
 the military history ; but it rendered the intended service to 
 the home policy of the Girondists. The sometimes noisy, 
 sometimes gloomy, but always theatrical, manner, in which 
 the danger of the country was proclaimed — the solemn pro- 
 cessions which moved to the sound of trumpets — considerably 
 increased the excitement, and set the champions of the Re- 
 volution (at any rate before the eyes of the populace) in the 
 light of defenders of the national independence against the 
 hated foreigners. 
 
 In Paris, moreover, the Cordeliers considered that all the 
 existing laws of the country were repealed by the decree; 
 
Ch. v.] PREPAEATIONS FOR FESTIVAL OF CONFEDERATION. 499 
 
 and that the omnipotence of the people was proclaimed at 
 the same time as the danger of the country. The mighty 
 city reverberated with the preparations for the Confederation- 
 festival, during which every one looked for an outbreak. 
 Meanwhile the Fcdcn's— who had already arrived — con- 
 ducted themselves with great turbulence, doubled the noise 
 in the strangers' gallery of the Assembly, and, on the 13th, 
 helped to carry the acquittal of Pethion. The King had 
 upheld the suspension of the Mayor; the reasons for which 
 were unanswerable; but the impartial members of the As- 
 sembly feared infinite mischief from the passions of the- 
 Federes, if the virtuous Mayor were not triumphantly re- 
 stored. He, therefore, was the real hero of the festival, which 
 was celebrated tumultuously enough on the 14th; — in other 
 respects, however, the day did not come up to the expec- 
 tations of the Democrats. On the one hand, Monciel's pro- 
 hibition had its effect, and at any rate delayed the arrival 
 of the Federes, of whom scarcely 3,000 had reached 
 Paris on the 14th, and these were entirely lost in the Na- 
 tional Guard of the Capital. There were, moreover, still 
 some regiments of the line at Paris, against whose array 
 the revolutionists did not dare to rise; and whom the Gi- 
 ronde found occasion to order out of Paris, on the very day 
 after the festival — the 15th. Foi* this, nothing was needed 
 but a simple decree, as the presence of troops in the place 
 where the Assembly held its sittings was made dependent 
 on its approval. From this time, the King only kept a bat- 
 talion of Swiss in the city for the protection of his person. 
 The Cordeliers and Federes consequently were able to 
 pursue their noisy and] reckless course with the less hin- 
 drance. The latter, even before the festival, had promised, ' 
 according to Dauton's proposal, not to leave Paris before 
 tyranny had been overthrown; and on the evening of the 
 14th inst., they appointed a Committee, which subsequently 
 became the leading authority in the insurrection. Their 
 numbers gradually increased to about 5,000, mostly aban- 
 
 2i2 
 
500 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. [Book III. 
 
 doned persons, who knew very little of the Statesmen of the 
 Gironde, but were all the more zealous in the cabarets of 
 the Faubovirgs, in forming hearty friendships with the bands 
 of the Cordeliers ; and who listened with peculiar rapture to 
 Robespierre and Marat, as the champions of the poor. Robes- 
 pierre, whose star had somewhat paled in February before 
 the influence of the Gironde, grew more powerful every day, 
 after the Gironde had deferred the final attack. Externally 
 he kept up a close connection with Danton and Marat, but 
 he had not much trouble in securing for himself a separate 
 and independent position by the side of them. While Marat 
 talked of nothing but blood and murder, treachery and pun- 
 ishment; while Danton collected all his strength for a vio- 
 lent and sudden outbreak; Robespierre sought to work by 
 parliamentary means, which, like the Gironde, he preferred 
 to arms, although for other reasons, and with opposite 
 views. Danton worked for actual anarchy, more from love 
 of pleasure than ambition, and used no other means than 
 his armed banditti. Robespierre had not the word pleasure 
 in his vocabulary, but the impulse was strong in him 
 to rise preeminent and alone, in importance, popularity and 
 power; so that he more easily pardoned an opponent than 
 a rival. He was not willing to trust his life and his power 
 to the hazard of a street ffght, but desired to secure a firm 
 basis for his rule by means of legal organization. Danton 
 well understood how to collect a band of ruffians from all 
 the dens of crime in France; but Robespierre could devise 
 a constitution, in which this band might exercise a lasting 
 and regulated dominion over France. As, in the first period 
 \of the Revolution, he had proclaimed the virtue and the rights 
 'of the oppressed proletaries, so, in the second period, he 
 ■created the legal forms in which their supremacy was to 
 manifest itself, and founded upon these forms his own un- 
 exampled power. In the Jacobin Club, he discussed this 
 (subject in all its parts with indefatigable zeal. Besides 
 urging upon its members the question of the moment— the get- 
 
c°- "V'.] billaud-varennes. 
 
 501 
 
 ting rid of Lafayette and Louis XVI.— he constantly discussed 
 the proposition, that for the future also neither King, Par- 
 ■ liament nor General, should exercise any governing power 
 but the mass of individual, free, and sovereign citizens 
 alone. "When, in this way, the great mass of the people had 
 got the upper hand, the actual power would of itself fall to 
 those proletaries who formed, not indeed the most numerous, 
 but the only organised party. 
 
 The neediest citizens, however, were not only to be the ruling 
 class in the French State; Danton and Eobespierre intended 
 to transfer to them the property of the rich, and Marat's 
 friends aimed at the entire annihilation of existing society. 
 No one among the Jacobins supported these views more 
 energetically than Billaud-Varennes, the son of a poor ad- 
 vocate at La Rochelle, who, wheu a youth, had run 'away 
 from his father's house with a maid-servant; had then for 
 a time gone on to the stage; and had at last been driven 
 out of his native place for writing a scandalous pamphlet. 
 Hunger then drove him into the Congregation de I'Ora- 
 toire at Paris-, where he trained himself as a teacher; and 
 though he did not become a priest, he contracted all the 
 bad qualities of the priestly character. He had as much 
 ambition and self-love as Robespierre himself; his previous 
 life had set him at variance with the law and with society, 
 and, feeling himself an outcast, he looked forward to the 
 time when he could revenge himself on the virtuous and 
 respectable world. In the monastery he had learned to hide 
 his passions behind a serious and unctuous demeanour; he re- 
 cited, with uplifted eyes, bombastic panegyrics on Louis XVI., 
 and inanaged to creep into the favour of his superiors. Yet 
 he was found out at last, and was dismissed the college for 
 composing some indecent verses. Again he fell into want; 
 his malignity assumed a darker hue, his wrath became more 
 venomous, and in this state of mind the Revolution found 
 him. He now threw away all his old sneaking arts of hypo- 
 crisy, and plunged into the political troubles with all 
 
502 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. [Book HI. 
 
 the zeal of long pent-ui^ revenge. He seldom appeared in' 
 the rostra, because his style of speaking was neither clever 
 nor enthusiastic enough to attract the masses; on which ac- 
 count Desmouliiis called him a right-angled politician— a joke 
 which Billaud never forgave. But in the secrecy of the 
 Committee, he was the very man to hatch proposals, the 
 severity of which made even Cordeliers recoil, and to de- 
 duce from Robespierre's hypotheses the most terrible con- 
 clusions. Danton had already advocated a measure of relief 
 for the poor in respect to taxation; but Billaud demanded 
 that the cost of the new revolution should be defrayed from 
 the property of its ofiponents. The modus operandi seemed 
 to him simple enough — vis. dismissing all officers, civil of- 
 ficials, and judges — transporting the enemies of freedom, and 
 confiscating their property. 
 
 We must, however, allow one virtue in this gloomy terrorist. 
 After the year 1 789, he never concealed his desires beneath 
 theoretical and sentimental flowers of oratory; and was never 
 induced by personal interest to desert his colours. He la- 
 boured incessantly to carry extreme measures. Whoever 
 approached him found him at all times heated with passion, 
 and the very clumsiness of his manners seemed only to 
 enhance the weight of his personal influence. It was this, 
 especially, which distinguished him from a colleague of almost 
 identical views, Collot d'Herbois, the Lyonese actor, who, 
 like Billaud, determined to recruit his strength, after all the 
 miseries of his starving life, with the blood of respectable 
 society, but who concealed all his passions behind an im- 
 perturbable and impenetrable reserve. He had first made his 
 name more generally known among the patriots, by writing 
 a new political catechism for the peasants; thousands of 
 copies of which were distributed by the Jacobins, under the 
 title of "Conversations of Father Gerhard." The ministerial 
 crisis of March soon followed, and Collot considered himself 
 already a personage of so much importance, that he offered 
 his services to the Gironde, — first as Minister of the Interior, 
 
Cji. v.] COLLOT D'HERBOIS. 503 
 
 and then as Government Commissioner for the Colonies. 
 Brissot had the bad taet to dismiss the patriotic player with 
 a shrug of the shoulders, whereupon Collot began to per- 
 secute the Giroude with the most furious denunciations. Of 
 all the Jacobins he had decidedly the greatest talent for in- 
 trigue; no one understood so well as he, how to throw a 
 party into confusion, or to form it anew. He possessed in 
 the highest perfection the qualities necessary for his career; 
 insolent selfishness, cool brutality, shameless flattery, and, 
 above all, an vinfathomable reserve. In ordinary circum- 
 stances, even under a democratic government, his character 
 and knowledge would never have raised him above the lowest 
 offices in the commonwealth; but now, when the whole 
 state of things fell daily more and more into the hands of 
 the rude masses, he had a future before him, in which his 
 name was to become the terror of France. 
 
 The more openly and seriously these tendencies manifested 
 themselves among the Jacobins,— the more decidedly these 
 leaders bound the FecUres and the men of St. Antoine to 
 themselves— the more lukewarm, as we may easily suppose, 
 did the Girondists become in the prosecution of their plans 
 of subversion. It is true that they had themselves, on num- 
 berless occasions, lauded every thing which the Jacobins now 
 demanded, and employed the populace zealously enough as 
 a means of carrying on their new revolution; but when once 
 the Robespierre party openly demanded the annihilation of 
 civilised society, they almost without exception felt themselves 
 to be members of the threatened class. Not one of them 
 could make up his mind to go into the pot-houses of the 
 Halles, and drink fraternity there with the Fedires; and 
 yet they knew in their liearts, that this was the only means 
 of keeping the revolution in their own hands, and preventing 
 their deadly enemies from seizing the reins of power. The 
 murky atmosphere of the Jacobin Club, filled with the scent 
 of blood, became every hour more intolerable to them; and 
 they had now arrived at a point at which the Revolution 
 
504 THE lOTII OF AUGUST. [Book III. 
 
 went beyond, not their conscience perhaps, but at any rate 
 their taste. They saw that it was not the King alone whom 
 they had brought into danger; and they were impatient to 
 see whether he would subject himself to them in the interest 
 of their common defence. Vergniaud already began to com- 
 plain of the disturbances of the 20th, and the Committee of 
 of Twelve declared on the 19th, that they could discover no 
 grounds for impeaching Lafayette on account of his late 
 appearance in Paris. But though the Jacobins raged furiously 
 at this treacherous desertion of the Girondists to the King, 
 Louis XVI. himself seemed quite insensible to it, and Koland 
 waited in vain, from day to day, for a summons to the 
 palace. When all chance of such a summons seemed over, 
 the Gironde even resolved to make the first advances. On 
 the 20th, Vergniaud, Guadet and Gensonne, sent up a me- 
 morial to the King through the Court painter, Boze, in which 
 they emphatically recommended the formation of a Girondist 
 Ministry, as the sole means of deliverance. ^ 
 
 How great was their disappointment and rage, when, on 
 the 21st, Louis once more bestowed Koland's former post 
 on a Feuillant, Champion; entrusted the ministry of the 
 Marine to Dubouchage; and lastly, on the 23rd, appointed 
 d'Abancourt Minister at war, promising at the same time to fill 
 up the other appointments with all speed. Roland was beside 
 himself with rage. The first bitterness of feeling found vent 
 in a fresh order to the ]\Iarseillois to accelerate their march 
 to Paris, and a violent attack by Guadet on Lafayette, whom 
 he charged with having (through the mediation of Bureau 
 Puzy) called on Marshall Luckner to march on Paris. Here- 
 upon the National Assembly ordered a new investigation, 
 in which the three officers concerned, in accordance with the 
 actual state of the case, unanimously denied the truth of 
 
 ' Guadet (nephew of the Deputy), Les Girondins, I. 262, states that his 
 uncle was summoned to the King, and listened to in a friendly mannei-. 
 But even his viva voce counsels were not productive of any result. 
 
Ch. v.] increasing power of the sections. 505 
 
 the charge. The Girondists too, after this first ebullition of 
 feeling, began to cool down. General Montesquiou, whom 
 they had themselves promoted to the command of the army 
 of the South, and on whom they had reckoned in all their 
 subversive plans, was now in Paris. He was still their ally, 
 and was just at this time anxious, to retain through their 
 influence, the 20 battalions which Lajard had demanded of 
 him for the Rhenish frontier. With regard to the Republic, 
 his answer to "the Twelve" was dry enough. "You may pro- 
 nounce the deposition of the King in Paris, but be assured 
 that you will then have neither officer nor soldier." This 
 was saying a little too much, as the soldiers had just as 
 little monarchical as republican zeal, but it was quite suf- 
 ficient to quench the ardour of the Girondist party. 
 
 The chiefs of the party now pursued their course accord- 
 ing to circumstances, without any general plan. In some of 
 them anger against the King prevailed over all other con- 
 siderations, and on the 25th Gensonne brought a bill before 
 the National Assembly, which aimed at nothing less than a 
 revolutionary government, to be carried on immediately by a 
 parliamentary majority. By this law the Municipality was 
 to receive the right of apprehending every man who was 
 dangerous to the safety of the State, and to leave him for 
 a year in prison. The office of seeing these measures' carried 
 out was to be entrusted to a Committee of the National As- 
 sembly. If this law passed, the question — which of the parties 
 was to carry off France, as its prize, out of the revolutionary 
 struggles — would be decided by the issue of the contest for 
 the Municipal authority. In respect to Paris, the extreme 
 Left had secured their influence by instituting, after the 17th 
 of July, a so-called "Correspondence Office," of the forty- 
 eight Sections ; whose members were chosen by very irregular 
 elections, and — belonging without exception to the most violent 
 Jacobins, — were ready, during the approaching insurrection, 
 to take the place of the regular Authorities as a revolution'. 
 
506 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. [Book III. 
 
 aiy Municipality.! This party took further steps in the same 
 direction in the National Assembly itself, by declaring, on 
 the 25th, the sittings of all the Sections in the Empire per- 
 manent; and by passing a law, on the 29th, to admit the 
 non-voters to do diity in- the National guard once a month. 
 
 But other Girondists were made still more doubtful as to 
 the course to be pursued, by these extreme measures of their 
 colleagues. A second time Boze received a letter addressed 
 to the King; and Vergniaud spoke from the rostra of those 
 thoughtless people, who by their excesses — i. e. by a pro- 
 position to depose the king — ruined the best cause. Brissot 
 even demanded the punishment of regicides as well as of 
 Emigres; since, he said, the blood of a king had never 
 strengthened liberty but monarchy. When, therefore, Guadet 
 openly proposed an address to Louis XVI. praying for 
 the recall of the Girondist ministry — and both Right and 
 Left had united with equal zeal against it — Brissot rose once 
 more, and denounced the excesses which justified the King 
 in conijilaining, on his side, of a breach of the constitution, 
 and drove the wealthier class throughout the whole of France 
 into the arms of foreigners. He was aj^jilauded by the As- 
 sembly, but the galleries howled, abused the double-tongued 
 traitor, and threw fruit in his face. In the Jacobin club, 
 there was but one unanimous voice of contempt against the 
 miserable party, which. had no other object in view in the 
 Revolution, than to secure for their partisans Ministerial 
 appointments. The Committee of the Federes were in favour 
 of making use of the arrival of a red-hot patriotic battalion 
 from Brest, to deal a decisive blow. But when Pethion heard 
 of it, he hastened to disperse the crowds, and to throw his 
 influence into the scale of order. 
 
 It was the last time; for on the 28th the King declared 
 in positive terms that he would never agree to the proposals 
 of the Gironde.^ About the same time, the manifesto of the 
 
 1 Mortimer-Ternaiix, II. 138. — - Bertrand. 
 
Ch.V.] the GIRONDEONCEMORE turns against the king. 507 
 
 Allied Powers was published,! which .threatened the Giron- 
 dists just as much as the other Jacobins, and breathed to- 
 wards the whole of France nothing but revenge and chastise- 
 ment. Retreat, as the chiefs of the Girondist party declared, 
 was no longer possible. "If we did once wish to pause," said 
 one of them, "we are now compelled to drive the people to 
 break down all the bridges behind them, and to bind the nation 
 to us in indissoluble bonds.*" The Gironde endeavoured to 
 come to some decision as to the most practically feasible 
 and effectual mode of proceeding; but were not even now 
 entirely unanimous. Some members of the party wished to 
 uphold the monarchy, and only to chafSge the person of the 
 monarch. In their opinion, Louis XVI. ought to be removed, 
 and his deposition pronounced. The Dauphin would then 
 succeed, and the Gironde would compose the Council of 
 Regency. The summoning of a National Convention to 
 revise the law seemed indispensable; but they intended to 
 secure a majority beforehand, by declaring two-thii-ds of 
 the present Deputies members of the new Assembly,^ Cou- 
 dorcet was to be the Tutor of the young King, Pethion Presi- 
 dent of the Regency, and Roland, Servan and Claviere, Min- 
 isters. On the other hand, Vergniaud declared that it was 
 a foUy and a crime any longer to reject the heau ideal of 
 freedom — the republican form •f government. He demanded 
 a National Convention for the very purpose of ordaining the 
 abolition of monarchy; and therefore did not advocate a de- 
 position of Louis — which would involve the succession of 
 the Dauphin to the throne — but the suspension of the King, 
 as the first step to the overthrow of monarchy. Important 
 as these differences of opinion were, they did not, for the 
 moment, tend to check the revolutionary progress of the party, 
 as the removal of Louis formed the immediate and common 
 object of the movement; and on this point a definite reso- 
 
 ' Buchez. — ' Beaulieu. — ' Prudhomme {Crimes, &c.), quotes a bill 
 to this effect of Aug. 10th. 
 
508 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. [Book IH. 
 
 liitiou was now come to. In spite of all the difficulties 
 which stood in their way, they found at last as many en- 
 couragements as drawbacks. For whence was the King to 
 derive the means of resistance, after the withdrawal of the 
 troops of the line? Though the armies were not altogether 
 favourably disposed, they would hardly allow themselves 
 to be incited to an act of violence, if a constitutional' 
 decree should pronounce the abdication of the King. 
 Everything depended on preventing a scandalous popular 
 tumult, and thus, on the one hand, deprive the Generals 
 of a pretext for reaction, and the Cordeliers, on the other, 
 of the possibility of creating anarchy. It was just on the 
 29th, that the notorious battalion of Marseillois arrived, which 
 was entirely under the influence of Barbaroux, who intended, 
 on the very first day of his arrival, to extort the decree of 
 deposition from the National Assembly. On this occasion, 
 however, he was left in the lurch by Santerre, and his plan 
 failed; but the Marseillois had still great influence with the 
 democrats, and the Gironde hoped by their means to be able 
 to employ the other Fcderes — 5,300 in number — on the 30th 
 of July, for the execution of their schemes; 'after which, they 
 intended to remove them as quickly as possible out of Paris, 
 and the sphere of the Cordeliers.^ Pethion indulged the 
 brightest hopes; "I see," he *aid, "that I shall not be able 
 to escape being Regent."^ 
 
 There was need, truly, of all the ambition and self-com- 
 placency which characterised Pethion and his friends, to 
 deck the strength of their position with such dreams. Those 
 who had so little confidence in their league with the Cor- 
 deliers that, only eight days before, they had twice allowed 
 themselves to be frightened into humiliating negotiations 
 with Louis XVI., ought, least of all, to have deceived them- 
 
 ' With this view Lasource, on the 29th, demanded in the Jacobin Club 
 that the Federes should be marched off to the frontiers. — ^ Beaulieu— 
 Recording to the statements of ear-witnesses. 
 
Ch. v.] hopeless condition of the finances. 509 
 
 selves so grossly. It became continually more and more 
 evident that the state of the country was one in which only 
 an organised military force could effect anythuig. Such a 
 force the kingdom did, indeed, possess in its army; but it 
 was occupied on the frontiers against the Germans. The 
 revolution, too, had such a force in the proletaries of the 
 Jacobin Club; but in Paris these last were on the side of 
 the Cordeliers ; and even in the provinces they only remained 
 faithful to [the Gironde where they were still imperfectly 
 informed of its disagreement with Danton and Robespierre. 
 Moral and legal powers no longer existed, for the law and 
 the mechanism of the State had lost all influence. The civil 
 Authorities and the National guard were powerless, divided 
 among themselves, or reactionary. In addition to this, the 
 financial prospects became continually gloomier. The finan- 
 cial condition of the Kingdom might, more than anything 
 else, have opened the eyes of the Gironde to the fact, that 
 the authors of the revolutionary war, in turning their backs 
 on the commvmistic democracy, were disowning their own 
 offspring. For in the existing dissolution of all internal 
 relations, it was the war above all things that swallowed up 
 countless sums, which could only be raised by means of 
 assignats. But the increase of assignats naturally led to 
 fresh confiscations, and a universal forced currency, and these 
 again to the transference of all property to the State— in 
 other words, to communism. 
 
 The beginning of the war had occasioned— besides severe 
 prohibitive duties, and insolvency as regards the creditors 
 of the ancien regime — an addition of 600 millions to the 
 assignats. By the end of July these sums were exhausted, 
 and the course of exchange for paper money since February 
 stood at 70 — 60 per cent; the State therefore had used, in 
 the half-year, about :-)30 millions for its current expenses. 
 Paper money to the amount of 2,400 millions had already 
 been issued, and the security of the Church property was 
 far exceeded. According to the last report, presented in 
 
510 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. [Book III. 
 
 May, Clinrcli lands had been sold for 1 800 millions, and the 
 remainder, still unsold, was not worth more than 350 millions;* 
 so that assignats had been issued to an amount of 200 mil- 
 lions more than the entire value of the Church property. 
 Fresh paper money being now required, it was necessary to 
 find new and large security. Fouquet, however, who pre- 
 sented the report on the 31st July, began to show some 
 scruples, and a brief review of the consequences of the j)re- 
 ceding financial administration will prove that his apprehen- 
 sions were not without sufficient grounds. 
 
 The sale of the Church lands had not begun to ijroceed 
 favourably till the spring of 1791, and it went on most raj)idly 
 immediately after the completion of the constitution; when, 
 within four weeks, offers were made to the extent of 
 500 millions.^ But the party feuds of the legislators, and 
 still more, the breaking out of the war, paralyzed the sale 
 at once. The next seven months only produced 360 millions, 
 and it was to be expected that every increase of internal 
 or external complications would render the case more and 
 more unfavourable. The evil was aggravated by the fact 
 that these numbers by no means expressed a corresponding 
 diminution in the paper circulation; for the laws, which of- 
 fered every possible temptation to buyers, fixed a very dis- 
 tant day of payment; and, up to May, only 488 out of the 
 1800 millions had been paid into the Exchequer; — and sub- 
 sequently about 30 millions a month was liquidated. It is 
 only by the hel^) of these facts, that we can explain the large 
 sum of 2,200 millions which were stated to be the proceeds 
 of the sales of Church jjroperty; while under ordinary cir- 
 cumstances it would not have fetched more than 1300 mil- 
 lions. As, after February, the assignats stood about one 
 third below par;^ — the lands had been really disposed of for 
 
 ' Wo have given all these sums 964 millions, .and by the middle of 
 
 in ronnd luimbers. Keports of April October, 1440 millions had been sold 
 
 5tli, April 19th, May 23d. — - Atthe by anction. — ' I. e. in Paris; in 
 
 close of the Constituent Assembly the provinces they were lower. 
 
Ch. v.] EFFECTS OF THE REVOLUTION ON AGRICULTUEE. 611 
 
 1600 millions, and this price was dearly paid for by the ex- 
 cessive subdivision and exhaustion of the lands. What would 
 be the consequence, if they continued to add to the mass of 
 paper money in ever increasing proportions, and, at the same 
 time, kept down the price of land by the constant accumu- 
 lation of new objects of sale. 
 
 There were, moreover, other circumstances to be taken 
 into consideration. The management of the national domains 
 was as bad as it had been two years before. From the 
 Spring of 1790 to May 1792, only a total income of 44 mil- 
 lions had been derived from them; whereas formerly the 
 Clergy had received a yearly revenue of 70 millions, and the 
 Grovernment of 11 — 12 millions. Since February 1792, the 
 estates of the Emigres — the extent of which was originally 
 equal to that of the Church lands, and was daily increasing, 
 — were thrown into the same condition. By virtue of the 
 sequestration they, like the Church lands, were under the 
 superintendence of the Municipalities. During this year, 
 as far as was practicable, the former stewards were allowed 
 to continue their management, for the benefit of the State; 
 while the moveable property was seized and sold by auction. 
 We may easily conjecture how much disorder, embezzlement, 
 and deterioration of the estates must have been the result. 
 In one place the stewards enriched themselves; in another 
 they allowed everything to go to ruin, and sometimes found 
 means to send the revenues into foreign parts to their fugi- 
 tive lords. When the crops were brought in, in the autumn, 
 the fresh tillage of the land was every where neglected. In 
 a land like France, which at that time could scarcely raise 
 corn enough for home consumption, it was no trifle that 
 one-twentieth of its arable land was as good as imculti- 
 vated. 
 
 Such was the case with the lands which the State had 
 kept in its own hands. In the domains which had been sold, 
 the prospects were also far from encouraging. Even at that 
 time, the remarkable fact was brought to light, that the de- 
 
512 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. ^^°'"^ ^^ 
 
 niocratic plan of the Constituent Assembly of creating, b; 
 a division of the land, a number of small proprietors, hai 
 entirely failed. The accumulation of landed estates was no 
 less in 1792 than in 1788. The great properties were dii 
 ferently grouped, and the owners changed, but the mmbe 
 of proprietors was not increased. The small proprietors 
 —the poor people who had been eager to buy land in 1791- 
 had for the most part been ruined. He who had not alread; 
 succumbed in the winter, was made a beggar by the disturb 
 ances which preceded the declaration of war. Speculatioi 
 and stock-jobbing did the rest; in short, the greater jjart o 
 the Church lands was now in the hands of city capitalists 
 the great majority of whom, like the former owners, neve: 
 saw their possessions — allowed the same mode of farming t( 
 continue — and collected their rents by means of hardlieartec 
 agents. 
 
 The result is very remarkable, though it Las been bu 
 little noticed. How often has the Revolution been praised 
 for having thrown the large estates held in mortmain int( 
 the energetic management of small proprietors; or com 
 plained of, by the opposite party, as having commenced tha 
 crumbling of the land which was completed by the Codi 
 Napoleon. We have already had occasion to remark, tha 
 the extent of land occupied by small farms was just as grea 
 before the Revolution, as it is in the present day; and w 
 now see the explanation of such a uniformity even amids 
 the revolutionary storms. The consideration of this fact, a 
 well as of all -the financial convulsions of that period, carrie 
 us back to the general principle, which is even now too fre 
 quently mistaken. The distribution of wealth follows, ii 
 the long run, the same laws as its production. Ever; 
 actual increase of the latter leads at last to its more suitabl 
 distribution; and every attem23t to control this distributio: 
 by human interference, however vfcM intended, is at the bes 
 impotent, and injuriously affects production and circulatior 
 and, consequently, the well-being of all classes. The vicissi 
 
Ch. v.] distress among the peasant-farmers. 513 
 
 tudes of the French soil since 1789 correspond in every 
 respect to this proposition. The 4th of August enriched 
 agriculture in aU its departments, because it emancipated 
 labour, and increased production. Neither the division of 
 the Church lands, nor the subsequent sale of the Emigres' 
 property, increased the number of proprietors; but amid the 
 general anarchy they reduced not only the rich prdate, but, in 
 still more disastrous a manner, the small farmer, to beggary. 
 Similar statements might be maintained respecting the pre- 
 sent state of afiairs and its causes. It is not the divisibility 
 of estates, — the prohibition of which would be a limitation 
 of the rights of property and of freedom, and therefore of 
 prosperity — which is the source of existing evils ; for the al- 
 leged breaking-up of estates is much older than the Cofle 
 Napoleon. But it is the obstacles still thrown in the 
 way of credit, production and sale; the limitation of the 
 powers of testators, the custom of paying rent in kind, the 
 protective duties, and the bank monopoly. To bring about a 
 4th of August for these things is the proper task of the 
 French Economist, and not the invention of new schemes for 
 the division of land, whether in the direction of feudalism 
 or socialism. 
 
 As early as 1792, France bitterly felt the consequences of 
 the attempt on the part of the State to create small pro- 
 prietors. Most alarming reports were received from all 
 quarters respecting the deficiency of the crop, and the worst 
 accounts of all came once more from the Centre and South 
 of the Kingdom. The condition of the tenants at fixed money 
 rents, in the provinces bordering on Belgium and Germany, 
 was somewhat better; but these too could not conceal from 
 themselves, that they would not long be able to struggle 
 against the general ruin. In Alsace, even the memory of 
 the old German Empire began to revive; and its mouldering 
 constitution seemed to the country people like a blessing, 
 in comparison with French disorders. In general, however, it 
 was the threatening vicinity of the enemy's country which 
 
 I. 2k 
 
514 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. [Book III. 
 
 kept up the revolutionary feeling amoug the peasants; they 
 had indeed, if possible, a worse idea of the German barbadians, 
 than the Germans of 1848 of a Russian intervention; and, 
 above all, they gnashed their teeth at the thought of tithes 
 and Seigniorial rights, vs^hich they regarded as inseparable 
 from a victory of the Prussians. They would have had no 
 other objection to make, if Louis XVI. had once more seized 
 the reins of power. 
 
 The disordered state of agriculture necessarily caused an 
 alarming reaction in all directions. It became more and 
 more difficult to provide the towns with bread; for the yield 
 of the land diminished, and the owners themselves abolished 
 the money rents, on account of the fluctuations of the as- 
 signats. They received the rent in corn, which they stored 
 up, in hope of better prices; and often did not even thrash 
 it, to save the cost of labour. Then the prohibition of the 
 export of wool produced its eifect. The breeding of sheep 
 came to an end; and in the Autumn, complaints were sent 
 up from all quarters that there was an utter deficiency of 
 wool. This of, course, produced in turn a still greater de-' 
 terioration of the land under plough; and thus one evil in- 
 creased the other. The most flourishinaf cattle-breedina; in 
 the kingdom was that of La Yendee, where the peasants 
 used their farms for hardly anything but pasture, and very 
 advantageously deposited their gains in the hands of the 
 Seignior. The increase of assignats and the persecution of 
 the nobility deranged this prosperous state of things. The 
 peasants of this province, warmly attached to the Church, 
 and on that account discontented, were furious asrainst the 
 Eevolution; and in July, the first really formidable royahst 
 conspiracy against the new order of things was formed. 
 Paris felt the injurious change, first of all in respect to 
 the means of life; as the supply of meat, which was fur- 
 nished in great part from this province, began to fail. Bread, 
 meat, and clothing, had already become scarce, and now, as 
 the Antumn approached, fuel also began to disappear. It 
 
Cu. v.] RISE IN THE PRICE OF NECESSARIES. 515 
 
 is true that even under the ancien regime the way in which 
 the forests were used was everywhere ruinous and destruct- 
 ive; but the long-existing abuse was rendered infinitely 
 worse by the absence of all legal control. The forests were 
 the last remnant — the sole untouched portion— of the Church 
 property; in these all kinds of vandalic devastations were 
 practised; and the Committee of Finance, in their helplessness, 
 began to cast greedy eyes upon them. 
 
 Under such circumstances, the condition of the wealthier 
 classes was necessarily a very depressed one; while that of 
 the working men was altogether desperate. Every article 
 of consumption had become dearer ; and thotigh wages were 
 also high, they had not risen in proportion. The increase 
 of the circulating medium was, indeed, the chief cause of the 
 alteration in prices, but by no means the only one; for the 
 degree in which the price of each article rose was modified 
 by the demand for it, and the rate of its production. The 
 rise in the value of gold and silver was •wing to the paper- 
 money, and was accelerated by the export of the precious 
 metals to the Emigres, the melting down of coin, and, above 
 all, the operations of the Treasury, which — imder Narbonne, 
 for instance — bought up large sums for the exigencies of 
 the war, whatever might be the cost. The decrease in the 
 rate of production, moreover, combined with the excessive 
 issues of paper, to raise the price of most of the necessaries of 
 life. The course of things was just the reverse in respect to 
 wages. While the increase in the circulating medium tended 
 to raise them, the annihilation of luxury, and the disastrous 
 condition of the manufactories, had an equal effect in keep- 
 ing them down. This was most felt in Paris, where, side 
 by side with greatly enhanced prices of goods, the daily 
 wages were the same in the Autumn of 1792, as they had 
 been four years before — vis. 15 sons a day. 
 
 We have thus traced the results of the revolutionary art 
 of finance in every part of social life. Confiscations, prohi- 
 bitions, and, assignats, combined to blight the fields, to desolate 
 
 2k2 
 
516 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. [Book III. 
 
 the pastures, and to condemn the hand of the artificer to 
 inaction. The State saw the booty it had seized quickly 
 vanish from its grasp. Was it still to go on in its ruinous 
 course, insatiable, and ever condemned to the pangs of 
 hunger? 
 
 But how to find a way of escape? The demands on the 
 public purse were continually accumulating, and of regular 
 sources of income there existed only the faintest traces. 
 How could the peasants — whose stock of cattle was ruined, 
 whose implements had . grown dearer, whose market carts 
 were plundered, and whose gains, at the best, were paid in 
 falling paper money — keep up the full and regular payment 
 of an excessively heavy tax? And when the wages of aU 
 the working classes were diminished, when the wealthy were 
 terrified, and every kind of luxury was proscribed; — when 
 the merchants saw one market closed to them by the war, 
 and another by th% inadmissibility of their mode of pay- 
 ment; — how could it be wondered at, that the customs, at 
 the end of the year, furnished only 12 instead of 22 mil- 
 lions? In the depth of the disorder into which the State had 
 sunk, there was no conceivable means of effecting an im- 
 mediate cure. There was but one way open to the Government, 
 and that was to retrace the steps already taken on the path 
 of Revolution, and, above all, to make peace with Gei-many. 
 This was to be had at any moment, — and with it a saving 
 of 80 millions a month — through a bona fide agreement with 
 the King, on the basis of an adequate revision of the constitu- 
 tion. Lafayette had at last made up his mind to this, and 
 in conjunction with Luckner had proposed this course to 
 the Ministers. Louis replied, that he was thoroughly inclined 
 to peace, if he did but dare to utter the word in Paris. The 
 other alternative was a more resolute progress in the path 
 of piracy, continual fresh issues of paper money, more and 
 more extensive confiscations, and, when there was nothing 
 more to be found in France, an extension of the war, 
 in order to add the treasures of foreign countries to the 
 
Ch. v.] indecision of the GIRONDE. 517 
 
 plunder of France. The Jacobins and the Cordeliers had 
 decided for the latter course, and had therefore every reason 
 to rejoice in the embarrassments of the Treasury as the best 
 means of agitation. 
 
 Between these parties stood the Gironde, as undecided as 
 Lafayette bad been two years before, and in a constant 
 struggle of opposing wishes. They were little inclined to 
 aid in the completion of the vandalism aimed at by the Ja- 
 cobins, but they abhorred every step towards peace as a dis- 
 grace. The financial statement of the 31st of July clearly 
 expresses their undecided state of mind. This report fully 
 explains that a new emission of paper money was in fact 
 impossible, and yet concludes with a demand for the creation 
 of 300 millions of assignats. It further states that the sale 
 of the Emigrants' lands would rather depress than raise the 
 value of paper, and yet does not conceal the wish to see such 
 a rich source of ready money made accessible. It urgently 
 warns them not to lay hands on the most valuable property 
 of the State, namely the forests ; and yet, at last, begs to be 
 allowed to sell a portion of them to the value of 200 mil- 
 lions! One of the Deputies asked why they did not rather 
 confiscate the property of the Knights of Malta. "You may 
 console yourself on that point," replied Cambon, "their turn 
 will come soon enough, when the 300 millions have been 
 spent." And thus the sale of the forests and the fresh issue 
 of paper were resolved upon. 
 
 The democrats derived firom all these measures a fresh im- 
 pulse to hasten towards the final denouement. They made 
 themselves every day more and more certain of the support 
 of the Federes, and continually sketched more precise plans 
 for a violent catastrophe, which should overthrow the hopes 
 of the Gironde, as well as the throne of the King. In the 
 secret sittings which were held for this object in various 
 pot-houses of the Faubourgs, some adherents of the Gironde 
 were present, — vis. Barbaroux and the Journalists Carra and 
 Gorsas; Pethion, likewise, from his official position, was aware 
 
518 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. [Book III. 
 
 of their jjlans. However, none of the disputed points were 
 discussed on this occasion. The leaders, Danton and Robes- 
 pierre, as well as Brissot and Roland, were kept away by care 
 for their personal safety. They did not discuss the use to 
 be made of their victory, but only the attack upon royalty, 
 the day of rising, the formation of the columns, and the di- 
 rection of the march to the Tuileries. The Gironde had 
 thvis far no objection to make, as they, too, considered 
 an armed demonstration necessary to extort the decree of 
 deposition from the majority of the National Assembly. The 
 Court was thoroughly instructed respecting all these machi- 
 nations, but was without means of opposing them ; since the 
 Departmental Authorities had resigned, after the cassation 
 of their judgments, and the other Civil Authorities of the 
 capital were at the head of the conspiracy. The King there- 
 fore, in order to gain time, was induced once more to try the 
 effect of bribery on the chiefs of his eneniies. Danton (and 
 his friends Santerre and Lacroix,) Pethion and Brissot are 
 mentioned among those who were tempted. ^ And, if one 
 
 ' Danton was tempted by Bertrand, paid for by the King with 100,000. 
 
 Lafayette andMirabeau; Fethion by Bougeart states that the value of 
 
 Hue and Beaulieu; Lacroix by Sou- such a post was 60,000 according to 
 
 lavie, according to a communication a memorial sent in to the National 
 
 of the Minister Chambonas; Brissot Assembly by the avocats du Roi, 
 
 and other Girondists byMontmorin; in which they claim this compensa- 
 
 Santerre by Bertrand, according to tion for the abolition of their offices, 
 
 the testimony of Princess Elisabeth But it is evident that this is no proof 
 
 and Gilliers. AH such accounts of the value of the post, nor does it 
 
 ought to be very cautiously received; detract from the credit of Lafayette's 
 
 but it is not worth while to discuss statement, though he may have exa"- 
 
 them singly. In respect to Danton, gerated the insignificance of the value, 
 
 however, we may here remark that Bougeart takes no notice of other 
 
 Bougeart (Danton, 393) rejects La- witnesses, and Louis Blanc has 
 
 fayette's testimony, because, according already remarked that Mirabeau's 
 
 to the latter, the bribery consisted in testimony, especially, decides the 
 
 the purchase of his advocatesliip, question against Danton. 
 which being worth 10,000 francs was 
 
Ch. v.} the sections of PARIS. 519 
 
 may trust the reports of their opponents, some of them took 
 the money, but did not keep their promises ; and the others 
 had too trifling offers made them to bind them to the King. 
 The Jacobins were immediately seized with violent sus- 
 picion; oil the 1st of August, Brissot and Vergniaud were 
 loudly accused of treachery from the rostra of the Ja- 
 cobin club; and Robespierre demanded that no member of 
 the two preceding Assemblies should be allowed to enter 
 the new Convention. Whatever may be the truth respect- 
 ing these attempts at bribery, it is certain that no settle- 
 ment was arrived at. The friends of the King recurred to 
 the idea of a flight into Normandy, but without being able 
 to induce Louis XVI. to agree to it; while the Gironde 
 allowed free course to the intrigues of the Parisian revolu- 
 tionists. 
 
 These machinations were now at their height. The decree 
 of the 25th, by which the sittings of the Sections were de- 
 clared permanent had cleared the way.* Little effort was 
 now needed to carry the most savage decrees. This was 
 generally done by about a tenth of those who had a right 
 to vote, late in the night, when the good citizens remained 
 at home from motives of ease or fear; and, very often, by 
 the aid of the non-voters, whom no one any longer dared 
 to exclude from the Sectional assemblies. On the 28th, Carra 
 announced that 47 of the Sections were in favour of deposing 
 the King. On the 31st, the Section Mauconseil declared, on 
 its own responsibility, that it no longer acknowledged the 
 traitor Louis as King, and that on the 5th, it would lay 
 this resolution (which was passed by about 600 votes) 
 before the National Assembly. On the 3rd, the Faubourgs 
 St. Antoine and St. Marceau signified the same intention; 
 they would appear, they said, at the bar of the Assembly 
 
 ' Practically speaking this decree came into operation immediately, al- 
 thougb it was not ratified till the 28th, and announced by the Mayor on 
 the 6th of August. 
 
520 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. [Book III. 
 
 in arms, and call on the Marseillois to accompany them. 
 About the same time Pethion, as chief of the Sectional Com- 
 missioners, appeared before the Assembly to demand, in the 
 name of the capital, the deposition of Louis. His address 
 was prudently vague in regard to what was to follow; he 
 only demanded the summoning of a Convention, and, until 
 it should meet, the nomination by the Assembly of a pro- 
 visional Ministry; since, he said, it was impossible to know 
 whether the nation would adhere to the present dynasty or 
 not. The way was thus left open to the hopes of all parties 
 — to the friends of a Regency in the name of Louis XVI. — 
 to the partisans of the Duke of Orleans — and the admirers 
 of a Republic. Similar proposals flowed in from all the clubs 
 of the Provinces; and the Jacobins hoped to carry out their 
 designs on the 5th August. On this day, the Marseillois, 
 who had hitherto been quartered in St. Antoine, were to be 
 removed into barracks near the club of the Cordeliers, where 
 they fell completely into Danton's hands; and it was this 
 removal which the Section Mavxconseil and the Faubourgs 
 had in view, when they passed their resolutions. The direct- 
 ing Committee held a meeting on this point during the night 
 of the 4th. It appeared however, on the one hand, that the 
 arming of the Faubourgs was not yet completed, and, on 
 the other, the Gironde expressed a strong desire not to 
 proceed without a decree of the National Assembly, which 
 had fixed the 9th for discussing the question of the deposi- 
 tion. The struggle was therefore deferred, and the Jacobins 
 contented themselves by setting a constant watch over the 
 Tuileries by means of patrols of the FcxUras and the men 
 of the Faubourgs, to hinder any attempt at flight on the 
 part of the King. The Faubourg St. Antoine, moreover, re- 
 solved to wait for the decision of the National Assembly until 
 11 o'clock on the evening of the 9th; and if nothing proper, 
 they said, was done up to that time "the tocsin should be 
 rung at midnight, the general march beat, and a rising en masse 
 take place." The Faubourg St." Monccau and the FecUres 
 
Cn. v.] THE ASSEMBLY REFUSES TO IMPEACH LAFAYETTE. 521 
 
 were forthwith informed of this ; and on the following day- 
 Commissioners were sent off to the other 46 Sections to 
 discuss further measures. Every preparation had been made 
 for action. The police of the Commune had distributed 
 50,000 ball cartridges since the 25th,— y/^. 3,000 to St.Marceau, 
 4,000 to a Section of the Faubourg St. Antoine, 5,000 to 
 the Marsedlois, * &c. On the other hand, the Commander-in- 
 chief of the National Guard had been unable to obtain from 
 the Municipality any ammunition for the use of the battalion 
 which had been called out for the maintenance of order.* 
 
 Meanwhile the National Assembly had come to a resolution 
 on the 7th of August concerning the charges brought against 
 Lafayette. On the 29th of July the Committee of Twelve had 
 been instructed to give a report on the evidence of Bureau 
 Puzy within eight days ; and Jean Debry now moved, in the 
 name of the Committee, that the General slioidd be impeached. 
 During the last few weeks the great mass of the impartial 
 Deputies, through fear of the galleries, had unresistingly 
 voted with the Left; and the Gironde still reckoned on their 
 submissiveness. But the rapid progress which the Demagogues 
 had made of late, and the frankness with which their plans 
 were brought to hght, began to produce a reaction. The 
 majority of these people had formed their political creed on 
 Lafayette's model. They were not indeed prevented thereby 
 from voting, according to circumstances, for democratic or 
 anarchical measures, but to ask them to destroy with their 
 own hands the cherished idol of their hearts was too much, 
 and the impeachment of Lafayette was rejected by 406 to 224. 
 This vote was followed by a decided rupture between the 
 two Sections of the Left. The Gironde justly concluded 
 that the feeling of the majority left no hope of carrying the 
 
 ' Revue Retrvspective. Panis signed the insurrection but dreaded its 
 
 thus; boil ef tres ban a delivrer. — failure. He says that his duty as a 
 
 ^ Roederer, Cinquante Jours. Pethion citizen was to promote freedom, and 
 
 himself confeses {Pieces interessantes as a magistrate to observe the formg 
 
 pour i'histoire, 1793), that he desired of law. 
 
522 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. [Book III. 
 
 deposition of the King immediately; and since they were 
 determined to remain in their present quasi-legal position, 
 they resolved to postpone the catastrophe, and meanwhile 
 caused a number of preliminary questions to be brought for- 
 ward by the twelve for the decision of the Assembly. The 
 Cordeliers and Jacobins, of course, were delighted that no 
 means were now left but to resort to physical force. "The 
 parliamentary majoi'ity fails us — well then, let us march over 
 the heads of the majority! The National Assembly refuses 
 to take the lead in the overthrow of the throne — all the 
 better! — then we wUl create another central Authority, whose 
 democracy shall be of a very diiferent kind." If they suc- 
 ceeded in this, not only would the King, but the Gironde 
 itself, be annihilated, in the very moment of victory. 
 
 Immediately after the conclusion of the sitting, the mob 
 of the galleries fell upon the Deputies of the majority, mal- 
 treated them at the door of the Hall, forced their way into 
 their houses, and threatened to murder them if they ever 
 showed themselves in the rostra again. In the evening, the 
 managing Committee of the Federes held their last meeting 
 in a pot-house of St. Antoine,' and Committees of cor- 
 respondence held sittings in all the Sections.^ The Jacobins 
 were indefatigable in carrying round orders, and holding 
 men of similar views with themselves in readiness. Yet the 
 results of their exertions were at first but small. Hardly 
 ten of the metropolitan Sectional Assemblies were inclined 
 to the revolt; on the contrary, the great majority were dis- 
 posed to peace and quietness.^ Towards 7 clock, however, 
 the leaders declared, that 13 Sections had signified their 
 assent, and they opened the decisive discussion in the Sec- 
 tional Assembly of St. Antoine. First came a message from 
 
 ' Carra. — ^ Beaulieu. Gorsas. — the Quinze-Vingt Section — concern- 
 
 3 Mortimer-Ternaux, II. 228, has pro- ing this agreement of the 13 Sections 
 
 ved from the minutes of all the Sections (Buchez, XVI. 407) — was a lie. 
 that the statement in the protocol of 
 
Ch. v.] preparations for the revolt. 523 
 
 the Federes reminding them of the resohition of the 4th, and 
 warning them to adhere to it steadfastly; then a proposition 
 was made, that every Section should name three Commissioners, 
 who should all unite at the Hotel de Ville, and cooperate 
 in the salvation of the country. A decree was then passed ; 
 to the effect that obedience should be paid to this revolution- 
 ary body alone; the three Commissioners were chosen, and 
 tidings of what had passed despatched to the other Sections. 
 
 It was a mean room in the workmen's quarter of Paris, 
 in which a few hundred people of the lowest class, under the 
 presidency of an old Judges' clerk, Huguenin, carried on 
 these nocturnal discussions. In such secrecy and obscurity 
 arose a Dictatorship, which for two years was to trample 
 all that France contained of life and property, blood and 
 money, beneath its iron heel. 
 
 At midnight the tocsin began to sound, first in the Cor- 
 delier's quarter, then in the Faubourgs, and soon in every 
 part of the city. The timid portion of the commvmity put their 
 heads under the bed-clothes — the men of action in the party 
 of order hastened to their battalions — and the Jacobins were 
 sole masters of the field in the assemblies. The total num- 
 ber of voters is stated at 600 ; * they were not long in choos- 
 ing their Commissioners, who during the night gradually 
 made their appearance at the Hotel de Ville. Here they 
 found the existing Municipality assembled, with the Jacobin- 
 ical Professor Cousin as president, and surrounded by a 
 Jacobin mob in the strangers' gallery. Under these circum- 
 stances, the revolutionary Commissioners found no difficulty 
 in opening their session, (again under the presidency of 
 Huguenin) by the side of the legal Authorities, or in dictat- 
 ing their will to them as long as they were allowed to exist. 
 At first they were not quite at their ease; their numbers 
 
 ' By Bertrand de Moleville. The with this. In the Arsenal Section 
 
 details which Mortimer-Tcrnaux the three Commissioners were elected 
 
 (II. 235) adds from the Sectional by six citizens, 
 protocols are in ^lerfect agreement 
 
524 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. [Book III. 
 
 iUled up slowly, and the morning broke before 27 Sections 
 were represented.* In addition to this, intelligence arrived 
 that the concourse of armed men was smaller than had been 
 expected. At 3 o'clock in the morning they counted only 
 a troop of ],500 men^ in St. Antoine, which only very gra- 
 dually increased. It was not till nearly 5 o'clock that there 
 was any general stir in the city,' and the gathering of the 
 mob became considerable. Then, moreoA^er, differences arose* 
 among them, and timid remembrances of the 20th of June 
 came fresh into their minds; Sauterre himself — ^ whether out 
 of regard to the money of the Civil list, or the safety of 
 his own life^would not begin the march. Danton was in 
 the barracks of the Marseillois, who were* full of zeal; the 
 battalion of the Cordeliers also ran eagerly to arms. A co- 
 lumn from St. Marceau joined them after 6 o'clock, and 
 these united forces began their march towards the Tuileries. 
 They had to pass the Pont Neuf, which the Commander-in- 
 chief, Mandat, had occupied with a battalion of the National 
 Guards and two pieces of cannon. But here, too, the City 
 Authorities had interfered; Manuel had dismissed the troops 
 in the name of the Municipality, and their last outposts retired 
 without resistance before the approaching insurrection. 
 
 This was an important gain for the rebellion, but it was 
 not the last and most decisive step. The way to the Royal 
 palace was now opened; the next step was to render the 
 Tuileries themselves defenceless. At the urgent desire of 
 the Sectional Commissioners, Cousin sent an order to the 
 Commandant immediately to make his appearance at the 
 Hotel de Ville, to give an account to his superiors in com- 
 mand of the measures he had taken. Mandat, formerly a 
 captain in the French guard, a man of liberal and constitu- 
 
 ' Adress of the Commune to the the (old) Municipality to the National 
 
 National Assembly, Aug. 31st. Ter- Assembly. "The burghers of St. An- 
 
 naux (III. 172). — ^ Blondel to toine are not aware what the noise 
 
 Roederer. — ' Pethion in Buchez, and riotous gatherings of the people 
 
 XVI. 445. — ■* Morning report of mean." 
 
C«- v.] MURDER OF MANDAT. 525 
 
 tional principles, a strong sense of duty artd soldier-Jike re- 
 solution, Lad made his preparations as well as circumstances 
 would allow. As long as he commanded, an armed insur- 
 rection was still a dangerous thing ; and the Jacobin leaders 
 were by no means inchned to expose their cause and their 
 persons to any risk. The General received the invitation in 
 the Tuileries ; and as no enemy was as yet to be seen, and 
 he himself knew nothing of the proceedings at the Hotel 
 de Ville, he had no reason for offering resistance to the 
 summons of his superiors. He came with his son and his 
 . adjutant. He appealed to a general command of the Mayor, 
 issued on the 6th, to repel force by force, and was dismissed 
 by the Municipality after a short conference. After this, 
 however, they drew him into the Assembly of the Sectional 
 Commissioners, secured his person, and loaded him with the 
 most violent reproaches; telling him, that he had intended to 
 shed the blood of the patriotic citizens. He immediately 
 saw the fate which was preparing for him, but refused with 
 heroic firmness to save his life by signing an order re- 
 calling the National Guard from the defence of the Tuileries. 
 Orders were then given to apprehend him and lead him 
 away to prison. No sooner, however, did he begin to descend 
 the stairs of the Hotel de Ville, than murderers fell upon 
 him and killed him by a pistol-shot. The Commissioners 
 then proclaimed the chief of the Fauboupg St. Antoine, San- 
 terre, as the new Commandant, and thus threw away the last 
 mask of specious legality. In the name of the sovereign 
 people they suspended the Communal Council, and took 
 their places.' 
 
 The murder of Mandat had more effect than any other 
 
 ' In earlier editions these proceed- the most important parts to serve 
 
 ings were described according to the the interests of the victorious party; 
 
 official minutes of the Commune, and he has given an authentic ac- 
 
 Mortimer-Ternaux has now proved count of the proceedings based on 
 
 from the original documents, that the the original papers, 
 latter were subsequently altered in 
 
526 THE lOTH OF AUGUST. [Book III. 
 
 circumstance on tlie issn.e of the day, inasmuch as it de- 
 prived the defence of the Tviileries of all its unity and firm- 
 ness. Mandat had drawn up rovind the palace sixteen di- 
 visions of the National Gviard, amounting to about 3,000 men. 
 These belonged to different battalions, who were unacquainted 
 with one another, and divided in their political sentiments. 
 The Artillery openly took the side of the insurrection, while 
 the Grenadiers of St. Thomas (the wealthy citizens of the 
 Rue Vivienne, and the Rue Richelieu) were decidedly for 
 the King; the rest had no desire to fight at aU, but would 
 have been carried away by an energetic commander. Man- 
 dat's death crippled this civic force, and there now only re- 
 mained disposable for resistance, 120 noblemen* in the in- 
 terior of the palace, who had gathered round the King from 
 attachment to his person, but were badly armed and entirely 
 without discipline; and besides these a regiment of Swiss 
 guards, to the number of 1,950 (according to the state- 
 ment of Colonel Pfyffer), which was a thoroughly trust- 
 worthy and gallant body of men. They were posted in the 
 haU of the palace, and kept the entrance from the Place du 
 Carrousel closed by their guards. The place gradually filled 
 with people, and soon after Mandat's departure the Marseillois 
 and Cordeliers arrived to the number, at most, of 1,500 
 armed men,^ who were joined by perhaps about double the 
 number of curious spectators. To such minute proportions 
 had the great struggle between the old and new eras 
 been reduced by the apathy and exhaustion of the French 
 State and people. For nearly an hour the hostile forces 
 stood opposed to each other. The Marseillois were expecting 
 the men of , St. Antoine with a most lively impatience; in 
 fact the Swiss guard would have sufficed to have dispersed 
 them, and who knows whether in that case Santerre would 
 
 ' This number is given by Aubier, an eye-witness. Vid. letter to Mal- 
 let, in the British Mercnry. — ' 516 Marsellois and the two battalions of 
 St. Marceau and Theatre Francais. 
 
Ch. v.] COWAKDICE of SANTEBRE, PETHION, MARAT etc. 527 
 
 have made up his mind to move? An adventurer from Al- 
 sace, however, named Westermann, had gone in haste to in- 
 flame the failing courage of the masses ; but he was obliged 
 to put his sword to the breast of their broad-shouldered and 
 pusillanimous commander, before he wovdd give the com- 
 mand to set out towards the Tuileries. And thus at last 
 the march began. The Fcdcres led the way, then came the 
 National Guards and the Pikemen of the Faubourgs, and 
 among them the French Guards, who were awaiting their 
 enrolment as gensd'armes. The column grew on its way. 
 One battalion, which was to have barred their passage at 
 the Hotel de Ville, was disarmed by the death of Mandat, 
 and the procession moved slowly on, without resistance, to 
 the number of 15,000 men, through the narrow streets and 
 along the quays, towards the palace. Santerre preferred 
 to instal himself in his new dignity at the Hotel de Ville, 
 whither Pethion sent him repeated messages to have him 
 (Pethion) arrested according to the agreement. At last Pethion 
 obtained 600 men as a guard of honour, and the leaders 
 were consistent in their cowardly caution up to the very 
 last inoment. Danton and Desmoulins were at any rate to 
 be seen actively engaged in the streets, ^ but Robespierre, 
 who two days before had had himself proposed to the Marseil- 
 lois as Dictator, — and Marat, who on the 9th had begged Bar- 
 baroux for a safe hiding-place in Marseilles, were nowhere 
 to be found. 
 
 To meet this formidable attack the King had only the 
 strength to endure with composure, and this determined the 
 issue of the struggle. Marie Antoinette alone possessed the 
 coui'age of a man. The night had passed at the Tuileries 
 in resultless counsels, and wavering expectations. The King 
 slept for an hour, tried to rouse the spirit of the National 
 Guard by passing them in review, but was himself exhausted 
 and silent, and produced no effect. In the Court-yard of 
 
 Journal of Madame Desmoulins. 
 
528 THE lOTII OF AUGUST. [Book III. 
 
 tlie palace, indeed, he was received with general cheering, in 
 which all joined but the Artillery ;'^ but in the garden, he 
 came upon a Jacobin battalion, and was followed with abuse ; 
 and he returned to the palace heated, biit in a state of mental 
 torpor, to shut himself up with his confessor. This failure 
 was chiefly owing to want of tact on the part of Louis. 
 For though the democratic historians, at a later period, 
 loudly declared that a grand outbreak of all Paris brought 
 about the 10th of August, the contemporary Revolutionists 
 are stiU more unanimous in their opinion, that nothing was 
 wanting but a show of resolution on the part of the King, 
 to make at least half the National Guard do battle in his 
 cause.^ A Girondist named Roderer, a Procureur of the 
 Department, one of the tamest of the party, was destined to 
 carry off the honour of completely disarming him. This 
 man, who came forward as a zealous friend of public order, 
 passed the night in the palace, threw obstacles in the way 
 of all vigorous measures — such as the proclamation of mar- 
 tial law — and urged Mandat to go and obey the invitation 
 of the Commune. Like Santerre, he was in great fear that 
 the King would conquer in the battle, and then j)erhaps 
 lead his troops against the National Assembly. When, there- 
 fore, the Marseillois arrived, he commenced negotiations with 
 them, and proposed to the King that he should prevent 
 bloodshed by placing himself under the protection of the 
 National Assembly. The Queen violently opposed this step, 
 and even Louis remarked that there were but few people in 
 the Place du Carrousel. But when Roderer declared that 
 the Faubourgs were advancing with countless numbers, — that 
 there were not five minutes to be lost, — that he was not 
 merely giving advice, but must humbly hisist on taking the 
 Royal family with him, — Louis' firmness gave way to his 
 
 ' Report of Langlade, Captain of — Prudhomme, Revolutions de Paris. 
 
 Artillery. — 2 Pethion, Buchez, XIX. Sept. 1.— Langlade, Buchez, XVIL 
 
 441. — Barbaroux, Memoires 69. — 304. — Also the English traveller 
 
 Bourdon, Co»i'e»(. iVa<. Dec. 23, 1792. Moore, Journal I. 105, 143. 
 
Ch. v.] repulse of mob by SWISS GUARDS. 529 
 
 fears for his family, and he cried out "Let us go!" Roderer 
 left him no time to give any further orders, and the mournful 
 procession set out for the hall of the National Assembly. 
 On the terrace, which he was obliged to pass, eleven royalists 
 had been cut down an hour before by the mob, which 
 allowed the Royal family to pass amidst a storm of savage 
 imprecations. As the Assembly could not deliberate in the 
 presence of the King, the gallery of the short-hand writers — 
 a low room, ten feet square— was assigned to the fugitives as 
 their abiding place. 
 
 The National Guard, which had wavered ever since it had 
 been reviewed by the King, now entirely dispersed, while 
 masses of people from St. Antoine poured from all c^uarters 
 into the Place du Carrousel. The Marseillois now broke 
 into the Court of the Palace, which was quickly filled with 
 a roaring tide of human beings. The Swiss withdrew to the 
 grand staircase of the palace, and were then summoned to 
 surrender with mingled flattery and abuse. As the people 
 pressed on them with increasing impetuosity, their Colonel 
 at last gave the fatal order to fire. The power of discipline 
 was now most strikingly manifested; the thickly thronging 
 assailants fell in crowds, rushed back, and fled howling from 
 the court. A division of the Swiss by a rapid sally cleared 
 the Place du Carrousel, and thought that the victory was 
 gained, * when a message arrived from the king, ordering 
 them to stop firing and retire to the National Assembly. ^ 
 The besiegers now returned to the attack with fresh zeal, 
 
 1 Letters of Swiss Offices in summary account in the Moniteur. 
 
 Nettement, Etudes stir les Girondins, But that this is a mistake may 
 
 p. 119. — Napoleon, who was then be proved from the Moniteur itself, 
 
 in Paris, was of the same opinion. — since it includes this announcement 
 
 2 Louis gave this order as. soon as in the first speech of Roederer, 
 
 the first volley was heard. Michelet which was delivered at 8 o'clock 
 
 insists upon it that it was not given a. m., hefore a shot had been fired, 
 
 until Roederer had announced the The exact report of the short-hand 
 
 taking of the Tuileries, which is writer shows the actual course of 
 
 indeed in accordance with the very of things. 
 
 I. 2l 
 
530 • THE lOTH OF AUGUST. [Book III. 
 
 and redoubled their firing as that of the Swiss died away. 
 The palace was inundated in a moment, and every male 
 creature, down to the very kitchen-boy, massacred. All the 
 furniture was dashed to pieces, and a great quantity of val- 
 uables stolen, or carried off to the Hotel de Ville. The 
 retreating column of Swiss was fired on from all sides, se- 
 veral detachments dispersed, and the fugitives cut down 
 without mercy. The last remnant of them, in obedience 
 to a fresh order from the King, delivered up their weapons 
 to the National Gviard. ^ 
 
 The Revolution was victorious, and of the former fabric of 
 the State not one stone was left upon on another. Mon- 
 archy lay prostrate in the dust, and the Legislative Assembly 
 only existed in appearance. No member of the majority 
 dared to show himself, and of the 750 Deputies only 284, 
 all belonging to the party of the Left, were present. While 
 booty from the palace was being brought to the bar of the 
 Assembly, — while the new Commune was announcing its 
 entrance upon office, — and fugitive Swiss were being himted 
 through the passages by the pikemen, — Duhem moved the 
 dismissal of the Ministers, and the insurgents announced 
 that the Tuileries were in flames (some neighbouring build- 
 ings had caught fire), and would not be extingnished until 
 the deposition of the King had been proclaimed. Vergniaud 
 then rose in the name of the "Extraordinary Commission," 
 to bring forward the long-prepared measure of the Gironde. 
 It is true that the first point which it touched on was the 
 convocation of a Convention, and that nothing was now said 
 about the jjroviso, that two-thirds of this new body must be 
 members of the present Assembly. But he further proposed, 
 not the deposition, but the suspension of the King. He 
 moved the formation of a new Ministry, but also the nomi- 
 
 ' Mortimer-Ternaux (II. 32b)] by Louis's orders." The people had 
 
 rightly concludes his account with 100 killed and GO wounded, and not 
 
 these words. "The Tuileries were 3,600 (as Lamartine absurdly states). . 
 not taken by storm,- but eyacuated 
 
Ch. v.] oveethrow of the monarchy. 531 
 
 nation of a Tutor for the Heir to the throne; he proposed 
 the suspension of the civil list, but also that the Assembly 
 should assign to the King a residence in the Luxembourg, 
 and a provisional grant of money. The new Ministers, and 
 the Tutor of the Heir to the crown, were to he named by 
 the Assembly, whose decrees were to have the force of law, 
 even without the royal sanction. The Assembly passed all 
 these resolutions without any discussion, but the people were 
 raging out of doors, because the King had not been deposed, 
 and Vergniaud, had great trouble in allaying a storm of 
 petitioners. Under these circumstances it was impossible to 
 refuse the demands of the Jacobins, that the Convention 
 should be elected by universal suffrage, which was now 
 granted as the solemn declaration of the ec[uality of all 
 adult males. But that this equalization of all men might 
 not prove dangerous to the Revolution, and might only be 
 employed in support of the new powers, was provided for 
 by three decrees, M'hich followed close upon the vote for the 
 extension of the suffrage. Firstly, the dismissal of all the 
 paid magistrates (Juges de ]}aix) was simultaneously ordained 
 by the National Assembly and the Hotel de Ville — so 
 troublesome had they hitherto been to the agitators. Se- 
 condly, the Municipalities were empowered to search for 
 arms in the houses of suspected persons ; "For," said Thuriot, 
 "we are at war with a great portion of the citizens, and must 
 conquer at all costs." While they thus disarmed their op- 
 ponents, they strengthened their friends by ordering the 
 formation of a fortified camp under the walls of the capital — 
 a simple method of keeping all the laithful Federes in the 
 neighbourhood. Lastly, the two factions shared the Ministry 
 between them. The Gironde caused the reappointment of 
 Roland, Servan and Claviere, to be carried by acclamation; 
 and of the three others, Danton was chosen Minister of 
 justice; Monge, the zealous Jacobin Mathematician, Minister 
 of the Marine, and the Liege journalist Lebrun, an employe 
 of Dumouriez, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
END OF VOL. I. 
 
 PRINTED HY r. A. BROCKIIAIS, LEIfZlG.